Court Opinion

ID: 9897987
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:27:36.509122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:50.448438
License: Public Domain

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                                                                         FILED
                                                                       MAY 18, 2023
                                                               In the Office of the Clerk of Court
                                                              WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                                    DIVISION THREE

       STATE OF WASHINGTON,                          )         No. 38425-0-III
                                                     )
                            Respondent,              )
                                                     )
          v.                                         )         PUBLISHED OPINION
                                                     )
       LESLIE MELGAR MORENO,                         )
                                                     )
                            Appellant.               )

               PENNELL, J. — Leslie Moreno was charged with first degree premediated murder

       but was convicted at trial of the lesser offense of first degree manslaughter. Ms. Moreno

       asserted a claim of self-defense based on a theory of either excusable or justifiable

       homicide. The jury was instructed on justifiable and excusable homicide as to first degree

       murder and two other lesser offenses. But Ms. Moreno’s attorney failed to request similar

       instructions as to first degree manslaughter. Ms. Moreno’s trial attorney repeatedly

       admitted on the record that they did not make this request based on their belief that the

       defenses of excusable and justifiable homicide did not apply to first degree manslaughter.

               On appeal, Ms. Moreno argues her trial attorney provided constitutionally

       ineffective representation when the attorney failed to seek self-defense instructions
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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

       applicable to first degree manslaughter. We agree. Trial counsel failed to recognize the

       defenses of excusable and justifiable homicide can apply to all forms of illegal homicide.

       As a result, the court’s jury instructions improperly suggested Ms. Moreno’s defenses did

       not apply to the offense of first degree manslaughter, of which she was ultimately

       convicted. Because counsel’s error sufficiently undermines our confidence in the

       outcome, we must reverse Ms. Moreno’s conviction.

                                                FACTS

              On December 28, 2018, Leslie Moreno called 911 and reported she was driving

       her boyfriend, Marcus Allessio, to the hospital because he had been stabbed. Ms. Moreno

       stated she could not remember what happened but she and Mr. Allessio had been fighting

       and struggling for control of a knife. Ms. Moreno said that Mr. Allessio was neither

       conscious nor alert and that her four-year-old daughter was in the back seat of the vehicle.

       Dispatch convinced Ms. Moreno to pull over and wait for help.

              Law enforcement and paramedics met Ms. Moreno at a weigh station just outside

       Walla Walla and discovered Mr. Allessio inside Ms. Moreno’s Toyota Highlander.

       Mr. Allessio had succumbed to a single stab wound to the heart. A kitchen knife was

       found on the floor of the vehicle. Ms. Moreno accompanied law enforcement to the

       sheriff’s office where she agreed to an interview.

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

              In her interview, Ms. Moreno explained that Mr. Allessio had physically attacked

       her while the pair was inside her home and that he had threatened her with a knife.

       Ms. Moreno claimed Mr. Allessio had walked outside with the knife to Ms. Moreno’s

       Highlander. Ms. Moreno stated she followed him, a struggle for the knife ensued and,

       the next thing she knew, Mr. Allessio was covered in blood. Ms. Moreno further stated

       Mr. Allessio had a history of suicidal ideation and she wanted to prevent him from

       hurting himself.

              Multiple law enforcement officers noticed Ms. Moreno had fresh facial injuries,

       including bruising and redness, a swollen lip encrusted with blood, and a developing

       black eye. Law enforcement deemed Ms. Moreno cooperative and released her.

              Meanwhile, officers went to Ms. Moreno’s home for further investigation. The

       interior of the home showed signs of a physical altercation. Contact with a neighbor who

       lived across the street from Ms. Moreno resulted in acquisition of a security surveillance

       video. The video captured the altercation between Ms. Moreno and Mr. Allessio in the

       driveway at the time of the stabbing.

              As summarized by one of the detectives at trial, the video revealed that:

              [Mr. Allessio] can be seen coming out of the garage . . . . [H]e walks out to
              the [vehicle] and then [Ms. Moreno] is walking out shortly thereafter within
              a few seconds. He gets in the Highlander . . . . [A]nd she comes out with a
              knife in her hand or what appears to be the knife and she’s carrying it in her

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

              right hand and you can see her as he’s standing at the door, they’re yelling
              back and forth. They’re talking about problems with money and she doesn’t
              want him to go waste gas and that it’s her gas and her money and he’s
              saying he doesn’t care. And you know, he’s yelling, you know, [“]have you
              done anything for me,[”] [“]have you filled out any applications for me[”] .
              . . . And she says [“]my fucking gas[”] and [“]my fucking money.[”] And
              while they’re having this exchange, she lifts the knife above her head with
              the blade pointed forward and [Mr. Allessio] kind of steps [or leans] back a
              little bit briefly and there was a little bit more arguing and then he sits in the
              [vehicle] and they argue back and forth a little bit . . . .

       2 Rep. of Proc. (RP) (Feb. 8, 2021) at 637-38 (emphasis added) (some alteration in

       original).

              At the point described above where Mr. Allessio stepped or leaned back,

       Ms. Moreno lowered the knife. Mr. Allessio got into the driver’s seat of the Highlander,

       and with the door open Ms. Moreno leaned her head, arms, and upper torso into the

       vehicle multiple times, entering the driver’s side where Mr. Allessio sat. The first time

       Ms. Moreno leaned back out of the vehicle, the knife was no longer in her right hand but

       her left hand was not visible. Ms. Moreno was the last one seen on the video holding the

       knife, though the footage does not show exactly what happened each time she leaned into

       the vehicle.

              At some point, the Highlander’s horn honked and the reverse lights came on and

       the vehicle backed up slightly, indicating Mr. Allessio had started it. Then, three long

       muffled moans could be heard from Mr. Allessio while Ms. Moreno was leaning inside

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

       the vehicle. Within seconds, Ms. Moreno got out of the vehicle, stood upright and crossed

       her arms, paced for a moment, and then returned her upper body briefly into the vehicle’s

       interior. At that point, there was nothing in her hands. Ms. Moreno can then be seen

       running inside the house and, about 16 seconds later, she emerged with her daughter,

       who she secured in the back seat of the vehicle. Ms. Moreno then drove away seated on

       Mr. Allessio’s lap.

              The video contradicted Ms. Moreno’s statement that Mr. Allessio was the one

       who walked out of the house with the knife. Based on information gleaned from the

       video, Ms. Moreno was arrested. She was eventually charged with first degree murder

       and her case proceeded to a jury trial in February 2021.

              At trial, Ms. Moreno took the stand and testified in her own defense. Ms. Moreno

       described her relationship with Mr. Allessio and explained he suffered from drug

       addiction and suicidal ideation. Ms. Moreno also claimed their relationship repeatedly

       cycled through periods of physical and verbal abuse, manipulation, and reconciliation.

              Ms. Moreno testified that on December 28, 2018, she got home around midday

       from a doctor’s appointment. She could hear Mr. Allessio in the bedroom, and because

       she was exhausted, she put her daughter down for a nap, and fell asleep on the couch

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

       herself. Ms. Moreno testified she woke up to Mr. Allessio screaming at her that he needed

       money for drugs. He was also throwing things at her. Mr. Allessio tore down a rod in the

       coat closet and Ms. Moreno began arguing with him.

              Ms. Moreno alleged Mr. Allessio shoved her onto the couch and then went into

       the kitchen. At this point, Ms. Moreno noticed Mr. Allessio had a knife. She claimed

       he then grabbed her by the neck, pinned her against the wall, and threatened to hurt

       her. Ms. Moreno testified that everything happened “so fast” but “so slow,” that her

       “recollection doesn’t add up,” and that she could not “100 [percent]” distinguish between

       her own memory and what she had read in reports. 3 RP (Feb. 11, 2021) at 1149, 1151.

       She explained, “I remember holding [the knife], but I just don’t remember . . . walking

       out of the house with it.” Id. at 1151.

              Ms. Moreno testified that Mr. Allessio screamed at her that he was going to take

       the vehicle and she begged him not to because she did not have gas money. She described

       what happened next as “chaotic” and “it all happened really quickly.” Id. at 1152, 1156.

       She said, “everything was just kind of happening,” and “I remember I was holding the

       knife, [then] he was holding the knife.” Id. at 1152, 1155. She stated that at some point,

       she let go of the knife, and then they were “fighting over it . . . back and forth” while

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

       Mr. Allessio sat in the vehicle. Id. at 1153-54. Ms. Moreno testified repeatedly that she

       never intended to harm Mr. Allessio with the knife. She explained, “I was afraid that he

       was gonna hurt me if I was gonna let go of it. I was scared that he would hurt himself if

       he took it with him. I was just in fear.” Id. at 1154. “At some point,” she stated, she “saw

       just blood everywhere.” Id. at 1157. Then she related her experience of running inside to

       get her daughter, climbing into the vehicle, and driving off. Ms. Moreno reiterated her

       memory of the incident was fuzzy and explained that, when she agreed to go to the

       sheriff’s office, she remained “in shock.” Id. at 1158-60.

              The trial court instructed the jury on first degree murder, along with the lesser

       included offenses of second degree murder, first degree manslaughter, and second degree

       manslaughter. The court instructed the jury, “It is a defense to a charge of murder that the

       homicide was excusable,” and “It is a defense to a charge of murder that the homicide

       was justifiable.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 164-65; 4 RP (Feb. 18, 2021) at 1663-64

       (emphasis added). The instruction on second degree manslaughter also included language

       that the jury may acquit if “the killing [was] excusable or justifiable.” CP at 171; 4 RP

       (Feb. 18, 2021) at 1666. But the instructions on first degree manslaughter did not include

       any such language. The court’s instructions explained the offense of first degree

       manslaughter required the State to prove Ms. Moreno engaged in reckless conduct and

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

       that “Marcus Allessio died as a result of [Leslie Moreno’s] reckless acts.” CP at 169. 1

              In closing argument, the prosecutor reviewed the elements of first and second

       degree murder and then addressed the offense of first degree manslaughter. The

       prosecutor explained, “the standard for manslaughter . . . in the first degree is

       recklessness.” 4 RP (Feb. 18, 2021) at 1714. The prosecutor noted Mr. Allessio was

       irate at the time of the incident. According to the prosecutor, it was “reckless” for

       Ms. Moreno “to follow after him” and “to chase him.” Id. “It’s reckless to chase him

       with a knife and it’s reckless to go in and try to stab him with a knife.” Id.

              In the defense’s closing argument, counsel argued Ms. Moreno acted in fear of

       Mr. Allessio in the moments before he was stabbed. They argued the evidence showed

       Ms. Moreno did not intend to kill Mr. Allessio. Defense counsel addressed the lesser

       included offense of second degree manslaughter and argued Ms. Moreno’s conduct

       was not negligent, as contemplated by the court’s instructions. See id. at 1734.

       Defense counsel never addressed the offense of first degree manslaughter or whether

       Ms. Moreno’s conduct was reckless.

              1
                The instructions defined “recklessness” as follows: “A person is reckless or
       acts recklessly when he or she knows of and disregards a substantial risk that a death
       may occur and this disregard is in gross deviation from conduct that a reasonable person
       would exercise in the same situation.” CP at 170.

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

              After the defense argument, the prosecutor asked to address the court outside

       the jury’s presence. Once the jury was gone, the prosecutor objected to the “excusable

       or justifiable” language, CP at 171, in the court’s instruction on second degree

       manslaughter. 4 RP (Feb. 18, 2021) at 1744-45. The prosecutor argued it was improperly

       inconsistent to so instruct the jury on second degree manslaughter but not on first degree

       manslaughter. The prosecutor summarized their opinion that, “Those two different crimes

       aren’t treated differently under the law.” Id. at 1747.

              Defense counsel immediately retorted, “They actually are.” Id. Defense counsel

       then asserted their belief that the defenses of excusable and justifiable homicide were

       available to second degree manslaughter but not to first degree. The court observed

       that regardless of the prosecutor’s objection, the jury had already been instructed.

       Ms. Moreno’s counsel reiterated their belief that self-defense was not legally available

       as to first degree manslaughter: “You’ll notice that I did not argue under manslaughter

       first the same issues because it’s not available under manslaughter first.” Id. at 1748

       (emphasis added). After the jurors returned, the prosecutor urged them in rebuttal

       to reject Ms. Moreno’s claim of “self-defense.” Id. at 1751.

              The jury acquitted Ms. Moreno of first degree murder and the lesser included

       offense of second degree murder, but returned a guilty verdict as to first degree

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

       manslaughter. During Ms. Moreno’s sentencing hearing, defense counsel twice reiterated

       their belief that self-defense was not available as to the crime of first degree

       manslaughter, but was available as to murder and second degree manslaughter. Defense

       counsel explained:

              [The jury] found that this was not an intentional act on [Ms. Moreno’s] part.
              They found that she was reckless by taking the knife out. . . . Your Honor,
              we did not have available to us the same self-defense argument as we would
              have if the jury found it an intentional act.
              ....
              For a reckless act, Your Honor, there is not the defense of self-defense, we
              saw that with the Jury Instructions. That is something that goes along with
              an intentional act as set out in the Jury Instructions or if the jury would have
              found that it was a negligent act.

       Id. at 1777, 1828 (emphasis added).

              Ms. Moreno received a sentence of 126 months’ imprisonment. She now appeals.

                                               ANALYSIS

              Ms. Moreno’s sole argument on appeal is that she was deprived of the

       constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel when her attorney failed to

       request self-defense instructions as to the offense of first degree manslaughter.

              Both the federal and state constitutions guarantee criminally accused persons

       the right to effective assistance of counsel. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST.

       art. I, § 22. To obtain reversal of a conviction based on ineffective assistance, an

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

       individual “must overcome the presumption that [their] counsel was effective.” In re

       Pers. Restraint of Gomez, 180 Wn.2d 337, 347, 325 P.3d 142 (2014). This entails clearing

       a number of hurdles.

              The initial burden in establishing ineffective assistance is to show trial counsel’s

       performance was objectively deficient. State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899

       P.2d 1251 (1995). When the alleged deficiency is the failure to request a jury instruction,

       this requires showing: (1) the defense was entitled to the instruction, and (2) counsel’s

       failure to request the instruction was not based on trial strategy or tactics. State v. Calvin,

       176 Wn. App. 1, 14, 316 P.3d 496 (2013).

              If the deficient performance hurdle is cleared, there must then be a showing of

       prejudice. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d at 335. This involves demonstrating “a reasonable

       probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

       would have been different.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104 S. Ct.

       2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The defense need not show a different outcome is more

       likely than not. See id. (“The result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and

       hence the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by

       a preponderance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.”). Instead, the

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

       requirement is that the defense show counsel’s errors “undermine confidence in the

       outcome.” Id.

              1. Did defense counsel perform deficiently by failing to request
              self-defense instructions as to first degree manslaughter?

              To assess whether Ms. Moreno’s attorney performed deficiently in failing to

       request self-defense instructions as to first degree manslaughter, we must first examine

       whether Ms. Moreno was entitled to the instructions. This requires us to examine the

       applicable law and how that law applies to Ms. Moreno’s case. To be entitled to a

       particular instruction, the defense must show that a jury instruction accurately states the

       law and that it is justified by evidence in the case. See State v. Edwards, 84 Wn. App. 5,

       14, 924 P.2d 397 (1996).

              We first address whether it was legally accurate for trial counsel to assert that

       self-defense instructions are inapplicable to the offense of first degree manslaughter.

       The legislature has identified four types of homicide: “(1) murder, (2) homicide by

       abuse, (3) manslaughter, (4) excusable homicide, [and] (5) justifiable homicide.”

       RCW 9A.32.010. Only the first three types of homicide are crimes. See State v. Burt,

       94 Wn.2d 108, 110, 614 P.2d 654 (1980). An accidental or intentional killing in the

       course of self-defense falls under the fourth or fifth type: excusable homicide or

       justifiable homicide. See State v. Brightman, 155 Wn.2d 506, 525, 122 P.3d 150 (2005).

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

       Because neither excusable nor justifiable homicide is a criminal act, they are both

       available defenses to a charge of illegal homicide, including a charge of manslaughter.

       See State v. Hanton, 94 Wn.2d 129, 133, 614 P.2d 1280 (1980). Thus, contrary to what

       Ms. Moreno’s attorney asserted during trial, the defenses falling under the rubric of

       self-defense were legally available in Ms. Moreno’s case as to first degree manslaughter.

              Given the defenses of excusable and justifiable homicide are legally available

       to a charge of first degree manslaughter, Ms. Moreno would have been entitled to the

       instructions so long as the evidence at trial was sufficient to raise a possible claim to

       the two defenses. See State v. Adams, 31 Wn. App. 393, 395, 641 P.2d 1207 (1982).

       As the trial court determined, there was plausible evidence of both excusable homicide

       and justifiable homicide, sufficient to allow for instructions to the jury.

              As relevant to Ms. Moreno’s case, excusable homicide happens when, in the

       course of defending oneself, a defendant causes the victim’s death “by accident or

       misfortune.” RCW 9A.16.030; see RCW 9A.16.020(3). And as relevant to Ms. Moreno’s

       case, when a person’s intentional act of self-defense kills a person, the killing is justified

       if there was a “reasonable ground” to believe the person slain posed an imminent danger

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

       to the defendant or another person. RCW 9A.16.050(1); see State v. Baker, 58 Wn. App.

       222, 228, 792 P.2d 542 (1990). 2

              There were facts at trial to support plausible claims of excusable and justifiable

       homicide. Ms. Moreno testified that, just prior to the stabbing, Mr. Allessio obtained

       possession of the knife. At that point, Ms. Moreno stated she worried Mr. Allessio was

       going to either hurt himself or her. Given the danger allegedly posed by Mr. Allessio,

       Ms. Moreno would have been legally entitled to disarm Mr. Allessio. If, during her

       purported attempt to engage in this lawful conduct, Ms. Moreno accidentally stabbed

       Mr. Allessio, then her unintentional act of killing would have met the criteria for

       excusable homicide. Alternatively, if during the purported struggle over the knife,

       Ms. Moreno found herself in imminent peril, she may have also been justified in

       intentionally stabbing Mr. Allessio in order to save herself. We note Ms. Moreno’s

       testimony, that she feared Mr. Allessio, was bolstered by her testimony regarding their

              2
                Some cases have imprecisely used the phrases “justifiable homicide” and
       “self-defense” interchangeably. See, e.g., State v. Hendrickson, 81 Wn. App. 397,
       399, 914 P.2d 1194 (1996). But the two terms are not synonymous, and a claim of
       self-defense might implicate either a theory of justifiable homicide, excusable homicide,
       or both. See State v. Espinosa, 8 Wn. App. 2d 353, 362, 438 P.3d 582 (2019) (noting
       that a claim of self-defense might “justify or excuse the homicide” (emphasis added));
       Brightman, 155 Wn.2d at 521 (“Justifiable homicide, and indeed all self-defense, is
       unmistakably rooted in the principle of necessity.” (Emphasis added)).

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

       turbulent history, her expert’s opinion regarding the relationship between Ms. Moreno

       and Mr. Allessio, 3 as well as the evidence of fresh injuries that were visible on

       Ms. Moreno’s face.

              The evidence supported instructions on both excusable and justifiable homicide,

       despite the fact that these two defenses contemplate inconsistent mental states. Justifiable

       homicide requires an intentional fatal blow; it is “not available” when a fatal blow is

       accidental. State v. Hendrickson, 81 Wn. App. 397, 400, 914 P.2d 1194 (1996). In

       contrast, excusable homicide requires accidental conduct. Had Ms. Moreno been able to

       clearly and consistently describe her mental state at the time of the stabbing, she may

       have been entitled to an instruction only on the type of self-defense that coincided with

       her testimony. See, e.g., Baker, 58 Wn. App. at 228. But the law of self-defense “does

       not require an explicit statement of intent.” Hendrickson, 81 Wn. App. at 401. When a

       defendant’s memory as to their mental state at the time of the fatal blow is unclear or

       imprecise, instructions on both defenses are appropriate so long as circumstantial

       evidence supports either mental state. See id. at 400-01.

              3
               During her case-in-chief, Ms. Moreno presented testimony from Dr. April
       Gerlock, who opined Ms. Moreno suffered from battered person’s syndrome and
       posttraumatic stress disorder.

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

              Because the record supports plausible defense theories of excusable and justifiable

       homicide, it would have been an abuse of discretion for the trial court to refuse to extend

       these instructions to manslaughter in the first degree. Thus, had defense counsel requested

       the instructions, the court would have been bound to give them.

              The fact that Ms. Moreno was entitled to instructions on excusable and justifiable

       homicide does not necessarily mean her attorney performed deficiently in failing to

       ask for them. As previously noted, an attorney’s performance is not ineffective if it can

       be explained by “legitimate trial strategy or tactics.” State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856,

       863, 215 P.3d 177 (2009). But here, no conceivable strategy explains counsel’s error.

       Ms. Moreno’s trial attorney repeatedly explained they did not seek excusable and

       justifiable homicide instructions as to first degree manslaughter because of the mistaken

       belief that the defenses were not available. An attorney does not act strategically when

       they make a mistake of law. See id. at 868-69; see also In re Pers. Restraint of Mockovak,

       194 Wn. App. 310, 322, 377 P.3d 231 (2016).

              Despite defense counsel’s legal error, the State argues we should decline to find

       deficient performance because instructions on self-defense would have contradicted

       Ms. Moreno’s theory that Mr. Allessio was killed accidentally. We disagree. For one

       thing, the defense theory of accidental killing is completely consistent with the defense

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

       of excusable homicide. In addition, as set forth above, because Ms. Moreno’s testimony

       regarding her mental state was imprecise, justifiable homicide was also available. See

       State v. Dyson, 90 Wn. App. 433, 439-40, 952 P.2d 1097 (1997) (“[T]he fact that a

       defendant does not recall the particular blow does not preclude the inference that [she]

       intended to defend herself.”). Defense counsel could have comfortably argued their theory

       of the case by asserting that, at the moment of the killing, Ms. Moreno was engaged in

       lawful defensive conduct and that the stabbing occurred either because Ms. Moreno

       intentionally sought to repel an imminent attack or because she was reasonably acting to

       disarm Mr. Allessio and accidentally stabbed him in the process. Defense counsel’s

       failure to request instructions on justifiable and excusable homicide as to all of the

       homicide offenses at issue in this case was constitutionally deficient.

              2. Did defense counsel’s deficient performance result in prejudice?

              As previously explained, a claim of constitutionally deficient performance by trial

       counsel will result in reversal of a conviction only if the defense can show prejudice.

       Proving prejudice involves more than showing a “‘conceivable effect on the outcome.’”

       State v. Estes, 188 Wn.2d 450, 458, 395 P.3d 1045 (2017) (quoting State v. Crawford,

       159 Wn.2d 86, 99, 147 P.3d 1288 (2006)). But at the same time, the defense need not

       show counsel’s errors more than likely swayed the outcome. Id. Instead, the required

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

       showing is a reasonable probability of a different result, “sufficient to undermine

       confidence in the outcome.” Id.

              Here, the record as a whole shows prejudice. The court’s instructions stated the

       defenses of excusable and justifiable homicide applied to first and second degree murder

       as well as second degree manslaughter. But first degree manslaughter was treated

       differently. The instructions did not identify excusable or justifiable homicide as defenses

       to first degree manslaughter. This different treatment created a serious risk the jury would

       interpret first degree manslaughter as an offense that was legally different from the

       others. As worded, the jury instructions improperly suggested Ms. Moreno could be

       convicted of first degree manslaughter even if her conduct would otherwise be

       understood as either excusable or justifiable.

              The State argues that because the jury found Ms. Moreno behaved recklessly, as

       required for first degree manslaughter, it could not have found she engaged in excusable

       homicide or justifiable homicide. It is true that a reckless killing cannot constitute either

       an excusable homicide or a justifiable homicide. See Hanton, 94 Wn.2d at 133; State v.

       Norman, 61 Wn. App. 16, 28-29, 808 P.2d 1159 (1991). This is because excusable

       homicide requires the absence of a culpable mental state and recklessness is a culpable

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

       mental state. And justifiable homicide requires intentional conduct, not a reckless

       disregard for harm to others.

              Despite the difference between reckless conduct and the type of mental states

       contemplated by excusable and justifiable homicide, the record in this case presented a

       real possibility for confusion. The prosecutor argued to the jury Ms. Moreno’s “reckless”

       conduct began by following Mr. Allessio out to the vehicle. 4 RP (Feb. 18, 2021) at 1714.

       Given the implication from the court’s instructions that excusable and justifiable

       homicide did not apply to the offense of first degree manslaughter (which requires proof

       of recklessness), there is a risk the jury believed that once it found Ms. Moreno engaged

       in reckless conduct by following Mr. Allessio out of the house, she was no longer entitled

       to act in self-defense, even if a renewed need to defend herself subsequently arose.

              “[S]elf-defense instructions are subject to heightened appellate scrutiny.” State v.

       Woods, 138 Wn. App. 191, 196, 156 P.3d 309 (2007). The instructions “‘must more than

       adequately convey the law.’” Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 864 (quoting State v. Walden, 131

       Wn.2d 469, 473, 932 P.2d 1237 (1997)). The “instructions, read as a whole, ‘must make

       the relevant legal standard manifestly apparent to the average juror.’” Id. (quoting

       Walden, 131 Wn.2d at 473).

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       No. 38425-0-III
       State v. Moreno

              Had the jury been properly instructed, it may well have been satisfied that,

       regardless of Ms. Moreno’s initial reckless conduct in following Mr. Allessio out of the

       house, she was nonetheless legally entitled to defend herself when, according to her

       testimony, Mr. Allessio wrested the knife away from her and appeared ready to harm

       himself or her. Given this possibility, it was crucial Ms. Moreno’s jury receive accurate

       instructions regarding the applicability of excusable and justifiable homicide.

              Counsel’s deficient failure to request instructions on excusable and justifiable

       homicide as to first degree manslaughter prejudiced the outcome in this case and deprived

       Ms. Moreno of a fair trial. Ms. Moreno’s conviction for first degree manslaughter must be

       reversed.

                                            CONCLUSION

              The judgment of conviction is reversed. This matter is remanded for further

       proceedings.

                                                 _________________________________
                                                 Pennell, J.

       WE CONCUR:

       ______________________________            _________________________________
       Fearing, C.J.                             Siddoway, J.

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