Court Opinion

ID: 9409805
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-19 15:08:51.590517+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:53.453490
License: Public Domain

07/18/2023

                                            DA 22-0482
                                                                                          Case Number: DA 22-0482

              IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA
                                         2023 MT 138

FARMERS INSURANCE EXCHANGE
and TRUCK INSURANCE EXCHANGE,

               Petitioners and Appellees,

         v.

DENNIS MINEMYER,

               Respondent and Appellant,

BRAD J. DAVEY, and DALE YATSKO,

               Respondents.

APPEAL FROM:           District Court of the Fourth Judicial District,
                       In and For the County of Missoula, Cause No. DV-20-1463
                       Honorable Shane A. Vannatta, Presiding Judge

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

                For Appellant:

                       Robert J. Phillips, Emma L. Mediak, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, PLLP,
                       Missoula, Montana (for Dennis Minemyer)

                For Appellees:

                       James David Johnson, Nicholas J. Pagnotta, Williams Law Firm, P.C.,
                       Missoula, Montana

                                                    Submitted on Briefs: April 12, 2023

                                                               Decided: July 18, 2023

Filed:
                                 Vrr-6A--.-#f
                       __________________________________________
                                         Clerk
Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1     Respondent and Appellant Dennis Minemyer (Minemyer) appeals from the July 20,

2022 Opinion and Order (Petitioners’ Motion for Summary Judgment & Respondent

Minemyer’s Cross-Motion) and the accompanying July 25, 2022 Final Judgment issued by

the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County. The District Court’s order granted

the summary judgment motion of Petitioners and Appellees Farmers Insurance Exchange

(Farmers) and Truck Insurance Exchange (Truck) (collectively “Insurers”) and denied

Minemyer’s cross-motion for summary judgment, determining the Insurers had no duty to

defend, and therefore no duty to indemnify, Minemyer against claims made against him in

a separate lawsuit.

¶2     We address the following restated issue on appeal:

       Did the District Court err by finding Insurers had no duty to defend Minemyer under
       the terms of the insurance policies?

¶3     We affirm.

                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4     In 2018, Brad J. Davey (Davey) and Dale Yatsko (Yatsko) filed a lawsuit in Cascade

County (Underlying Lawsuit), suing several named and unnamed defendants. The basic

allegation of the Underlying Lawsuit was that the defendants in that case filed a baseless

and unsupported lawsuit against Davey and Yatsko in 2012 (2012 Lawsuit) regarding the

financing and proposed development of a golf course. Davey and Yatsko alleged the

plaintiffs in the 2012 Lawsuit were then able to place a constructive trust and equitable lien

against their property due to the false allegations of that lawsuit. The 2012 Lawsuit was

                                              2
ultimately dismissed in 2017, following Davey and Yatsko’s motion for summary

judgment. The complaint in the Underlying Lawsuit was amended in 2019, adding

Minemyer as a defendant. Minemyer, a certified public accountant, was not a named

plaintiff in the 2012 Lawsuit, but Davey and Yatsko assert he assisted the 2012 Lawsuit

plaintiffs to advance the lawsuit by providing false information and making defamatory

statements about them.

¶5    After the Underlying Lawsuit was amended to add Minemyer as a defendant,

Minemyer tendered the underlying complaint to Farmers, seeking defense and indemnity

under a series of homeowners insurance policies providing coverage from 2010-2020

(Homeowner’s Policy) and a series of commercial general liability (CGL) policies

providing coverage from 2014-2017 (Farmers CGL Policy), and to Truck, seeking defense

and indemnity under a series of CGL policies providing coverage from 2018-2021 (Truck

CGL Policy). The Insurers, while continuing to defend Minemyer in the Underlying

Lawsuit under a reservation of rights, filed a declaratory judgment action against

Minemyer, Davey, and Yatsko in the District Court, seeking a judicial determination that

they were not obligated to defend and indemnify Minemyer against claims made against

him in the Underlying Lawsuit. Meanwhile, in the Underlying Lawsuit, Davey and Yatsko

dismissed all defendants other than Minemyer and one other individual.

¶6    On April 26, 2021, the Insurers filed a motion for summary judgment. Along with

their motion, the Insurers filed an appendix providing copies of the relevant Homeowner’s,

                                            3
Farmers CGL, and Truck CGL Policies. The relevant portions of the Homeowner’s Policy

provided:1

      4. Bodily injury – under Section II – Liability Coverage, means physical
      harm to the body, including physical sickness or disease, to a person other
      than an insured. This includes required care, loss of services and death that
      results.

      Bodily injury does not include:
      a. psychological injury or effect, including by way of example but not limited
      to fear, depression, humiliation, anxiety, anguish, shock or distress, unless it
      arises from actual physical harm to the body of a person;
      b. any sexually transmitted disease;
      c. Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), AIDS related Complex,
      Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV);
      d. any auto-immune disease;
      e. any viral, bacterial, fungal or parasitic infection; or
      f. any symptom, injury, condition, effect, illness or disease related to
      subsection a. through e. above, or resulting from a noxious substance. A
      symptom, injury, condition, effect, illness or disease includes by way of
      example but not limited to fatigue, insomnia, stomachaches, headaches or
      ulcers.
                                           . . .

      21. Occurrence – under Section II – Liability Coverage, means an accident,
      including exposure to conditions, which occurs during the policy period, and
      which results in bodily injury, property damage, or personal injury during
      the policy period. Repeated or continuous exposure to the same general
      conditions is deemed to be one occurrence.
                                        . . .

      25. Property damage – under Section II – Liability Coverage means direct
      distinct and demonstrable, actual physical injury to or destruction of tangible
      property, including loss of use resulting from the distinct and demonstrable,
      actual physical injury to or destruction of the property.

      Property damage does not mean:

1
 Throughout our following quotations from the Homeowner’s, Farmers GCL, and Truck GCL
Policies, all language, including emphasis, is as provided in the original document.

                                             4
      a. actual, threatened, feared, constructive or alleged diminution of value or
      equity;
      b. functional impairment or loss of use of property unless the property has
      sustained distinct and demonstrable, actual physical injury or destruction; or
      c. non-economic damages.
                                         . . .

      Coverage E (Personal Liability)
      We will pay those damages which an insured becomes legally obligated to
      pay because of:
      1. bodily injury resulting from an occurrence; or
      2. property damage resulting from an occurrence.
      At our expense and with attorneys of our choice, we will defend an insured
      against any suit seeking damages covered under Coverage E (Personal
      Liability). Our obligation to defend a suit seeking damages ends once we
      have paid our applicable stated limit. We may investigate and settle any
      claim or suit seeking damages that we consider appropriate.

      We do not have any duty to defend or settle any suit involving actual, alleged,
      threatened or declared bodily injury or property damage not covered under
      this liability insurance. This applies whether or not the suit is groundless,
      false or fraudulent.

Relevant portions of both the Farmers CGL Policy and the Truck CGL Policy provided:

      3. “Bodily injury” means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a
      person, including death resulting from any of these at any time.

                                         .   .   .

      12. “Occurrence” means an accident, including continuous or repeated
      exposure to substantially the same general conditions.

                                         .   .   .

      15. “Property damage” means:
             a. Physical injury to tangible property, including all resulting loss of
      use of that property. All such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time
      of the physical injury that caused it; or
             b. Loss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured. All
      such loss of use shall be deemed to occur at the time of the “occurrence” that
      caused it.

                                             5
                                        .   .   .

      A. Coverages
            1. Business Liability
                    a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
            obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury”, “property
            damage” or “personal and advertising injury” to which this insurance
            applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against
            any “suit” seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to
            defend the insured against any “suit” seeking damages for “bodily
            injury”, “property damage” or “personal and advertising injury” to
            which this insurance does not apply. We may at our discretion,
            investigate any “occurrence” and settle any claim or “suit” that may
            result. []

                                        .   .   .

                   b. This insurance applies:
                          (1) To “bodily injury” and “property damage” only if:
                                  (a) The “bodily injury” or “property damage” is
      caused by an “occurrence” that takes place in the “coverage territory”; and
                                  (b) The “bodily injury” or “property damage”
      occurs during the policy period.

                           (2) To “personal and advertising injury” caused by an
      offense arising out of your business, but only if the offense was committed
      in the “coverage territory” during the policy period.

As it relates to “personal and advertising injury” coverage, the Farmers CGL and Truck

CGL Policies contained amendatory endorsements with minor differences in language.

The Farmers CGL Policy provided, in relevant part:

      A. Coverages
            1. Item 1. Business Liability is amended as follows:
                    a. The words “personal injury” or “advertising injury” in item
            1.a. are changed to read “personal and advertising injury”.
                    b. Items 1.b. (2)(a) and (b) are deleted and replaced with the
            following:
                           (2) This insurance applies to “personal and advertising
                    injury” caused by an offense arising out of your business, but

                                            6
                    only if the offense was committed in the “coverage territory”
                    during the policy period.

                                         .   .   .

      13. “Personal and advertising injury” means injury, including consequential
      “bodily injury” arising out of one or more of the following offenses:
             a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment;
             b. Malicious prosecution;
             c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion of the
      right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that a person
      occupies, committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord or lessor;
             d. Oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a
      person or organization or disparages a person’s or organization’s goods,
      product [or] services;
             e. Oral or written publication of material that violates a person’s right
      of privacy;
             f. The use of another’s advertising idea in your “advertisement” or
             g. Infringing upon another’s copyright, trade dress or slogan in your
      “advertisement”.

While the Truck GCL Policy provided, in relevant part:

      A. Paragraph 1. Business Liability is amended as follows:
             a. Subparagraph 1.a. is deleted and replaced with the
      following:
                     a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally
             obligated to pay as damages because of “bodily injury”, “property
             damage” or “personal and advertising injury” to which this insurance
             applies. We will have the right and duty to defend the insured against
             any “suit” seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to
             defend the insured against any “suit” seeking damages for “bodily
             injury”, “property damage” or “personal and advertising injury” to
             which this insurance does not apply. We may, at our discretion,
             investigate any “occurrence” or any offense and settle any claim or
             “suit” that may result. But:

             b. Subparagraphs 1.b. (2)(a) and (b) are deleted and replaced with the
      following:
                    (2) To “personal and advertising injury” caused by an offense
             arising out of your business, but only if the offense was committed in
             the “coverage territory” during the policy period.
                                        . . .

                                             7
       F. Definitions 1. “Advertising Injury”, 13. “Personal Injury” and 16. “Suit”
       in Section F. Liability and Medical Expenses Definitions is amended as
       follows:

                                          .   .   .

       2. Subparagraph 13. is deleted and replaced with:

              13. “Personal and advertising injury” means injury, including
       consequential “bodily injury”, arising out of one or more of the following
       offenses:
                      a. False arrest, detention or imprisonment;
                      b. Malicious prosecution;
                      c. The wrongful eviction from, wrongful entry into, or invasion
              of the right of private occupancy of a room, dwelling or premises that
              a person occupies, committed by or on behalf of its owner, landlord
              or lessor;
                      d. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that
              slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person’s or
              organization’s goods, products or services;
                      e. Oral or written publication, in any manner, of material that
              violates a person’s right of privacy;
                      f. The use of another’s advertising idea in your
              “advertisement”; or
                      g. Infringing upon another’s copyright, trade dress or slogan in
              your “advertisement”.

       Damages because of “personal and advertising injury” do not include
       disgorgement, restitution or any other similar monetary amount based, in
       whole or in part, on an insured’s unlawful gain or profit, alleged or otherwise.

The Homeowner’s, Farmers CGL, and Truck CGL Policies also provided numerous

exclusions from coverage.

¶7     On May 13, 2021, Davey and Yatsko filed a brief in opposition to the Insurers’

motion for summary judgment. In addition, they also filed the Affidavit of Brad Davey

and the Affidavit of Dale Yatsko. In Davey’s affidavit, he stated, in relevant part:

       In the underlying action, and as a result of acts and omissions committed by
       Dennis Mineymer [sic] and other individuals. I suffered so much physical

                                              8
       and emotional stress that I had to be admitted to the hospital for significantly
       elevated blood pressure. That is part of the basis of the word “injury” that I
       used in my lawsuit. I did indeed suffer personal injury in this case as a result
       of the acts and omissions committed by Mr. Minemyer and others.

In Yatsko’s affidavit, he stated, in relevant part:

       In the underlying action, and as a result of acts and omissions committed by
       Dennis Mineymer [sic] and other individuals, I suffered such stress that I had
       to go to the hospital for a procedure done on my heart. I know that this is
       part of the stress that I was under as a result of the acts and omissions of
       Defendant Minemyer and others. These acts and omissions are described in
       my complaint and this is a part of the “injury” that [sic] suffered.

¶8     On May 26, 2021, Minemyer filed a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment,

asserting summary judgment should be granted in his favor because “there are no genuine

issues of material fact and Mr. Minemyer is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In

his combined brief in response to the Insurers’ motion and in support of his cross-motion

for summary judgment, Minemyer asserted the Truck CGL Policy was not implicated by

the facts asserted in the Underlying Lawsuit, but coverage was provided under both the

Homeowner’s and Farmers CGL Policies. The Insurers filed a reply brief to Davey and

Yatsko’s response on May 27, 2021, and a combined brief in reply to Minemyer’s response

and response to Minemyer’s cross-motion for summary judgment on June 23, 2021.

Minemyer did not file a reply brief and no party requested oral argument on the competing

motions.

¶9     On January 21, 2022, the Insurers filed the Petitioners’ Notice to the Court,

informing the District Court that Davey and Yatsko had filed a Second Amended

Complaint in the Underlying Lawsuit on December 17, 2021. The Insurers asserted the

Second Amended Complaint did not change the coverage issues before the court, but were

                                               9
willing to submit additional briefing at the court’s request. Minemyer filed a response

asserting the Second Amended Complaint added new claims of oral defamation and the

filing of a lis pendens2 on Davey and Yatsko’s property, which would have “significant

implications on the defenses to coverage” raised by the Insurers and requested the District

Court reopen briefing on the cross-motions for summary judgment. The Insurers filed a

reply brief on February 8, 2022.

¶10     On February 9, 2022, the District Court issued its Order (Request for Supplemental

Summary Judgment Briefing). The court ordered the parties to file supplemental briefing

regarding the Second Amended Complaint in the Underlying Lawsuit. Davey and Yatsko

filed their supplemental brief on February 17, 2022, while both Minemyer and the Insurers

filed their supplemental briefs on February 25, 2022. Though Minemyer had previously

asserted the Truck CGL Policy was not implicated, Minemyer now asserted the Insurers

had a duty to defend him “against the Second Amended Complaint under both CGL

Policies” and that the Insurers had a “duty to defend under all three policies.” Minemeyer

and the Insurers thereafter each filed a supplemental response brief on March 11, 2022. No

party requested oral argument on the cross-motions after the supplemental briefing.

¶11     On July 20, 2022, the District Court issued its Opinion and Order (Petitioners’

Motion for Summary Judgment & Respondent Minemyer’s Cross-Motion). The District

2
  A lis pendens, as alleged here, is a “notice, recorded in the chain of title to real property, required
or permitted in some jurisdictions to warn all persons that certain property is the subject matter of
litigation, and that any interests acquired during the pendency of the suit are subject to its
outcome.” Lis pendens, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

                                                   10
Court found the Insurers had no duty to defend Minemyer under the Homeowner’s,

Farmers CGL, or Truck CGL Policies.3 The court found Minemyer failed to meet his initial

burden to demonstrate the claims fell under the coverage grant and did not address any

exclusions to the Policies. The District Court’s order found the claims, as alleged in the

Underlying Lawsuit, did not constitute “bodily injury” or “property damage” under the

language of any of the Policies, failed to show the offense of malicious prosecution was

committed within the Farmers CGL policy period, and failed to show the offense of slander

was committed within the CGL policy periods.

¶12    Minemyer appeals. Additional facts will be discussed as necessary below.

                                 STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶13    We review a district court’s grant or denial of summary judgment de novo, applying

the same criteria as M. R. Civ. P. 56. Fire Ins. Exch. v. Weitzel, 2016 MT 113, ¶ 10, 383

Mont. 364, 371 P.3d 457. Summary judgment is only appropriate if there is no genuine

dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of

law. Lorang v. Fortis Ins. Co., 2008 MT 252, ¶ 37, 345 Mont. 12, 192 P.3d 186.

3
 Relying on Minemyer’s previous assertion from his cross-motion for summary judgment that the
Truck CGL Policy was not implicated in the Underlying Lawsuit, the District Court did not
specifically address coverage under the Truck CGL Policy other than in relation to the slander
claim. In his supplemental briefing, Minemyer appeared to walk this back by asserting the Insurers
had a duty to defend him “under both CGL Policies” and “under all three policies.” Regardless,
under the coverage analysis done by the District Court in this case, the result—finding no duty to
defend under the Truck CGL Policy—would be the same.

                                               11
¶14    The interpretation of an insurance policy presents a question of law, which we

review for correctness. Town of Geraldine v. Montana Mun. Ins. Auth., 2008 MT 411, ¶ 8,

347 Mont. 267, 198 P.3d 796 (citations omitted).

                                      DISCUSSION

¶15    Did the District Court err by finding Insurers had no duty to defend Minemyer under
       the terms of the insurance policies?

¶16    This matter comes to us following cross-motions for summary judgment where the

parties each asserted there are no material facts in dispute. On appeal, we are simply tasked

with interpreting the insurance policies at issue and determining whether the Insurers had

a duty to defend Minemyer based on the language of the policies and the factual allegations

of the Underlying Lawsuit.

¶17    “An insurer has a duty to defend when a complaint against an insured alleges facts

which, if proved, would result in coverage.” Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Wessel, 2020 MT 319,

¶ 14, 402 Mont. 348, 477 P.3d 1101 (citing Weitzel, ¶ 12). “The insured bears the initial

burden to establish that the claim falls within the basic scope of coverage.” Weitzel, ¶ 13

(citing Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Ribi Immunochem Research, 2005 MT 50, ¶ 29, 326

Mont. 174, 108 P.3d 469). “If there is no coverage under the terms of the policy based on

the facts contained in the complaint, there is no duty to defend.” Wessel, ¶ 14 (citing

Weitzel, ¶ 12). If the insured meets the initial burden of showing that the claim falls within

the basic scope of coverage, then the burden shifts to the insurer to show that the claim is

unequivocally excluded under an exception within the coverage. Wessel, ¶ 14 (citing

Weitzel, ¶ 13).

                                             12
¶18    When a court compares allegations of liability advanced in a complaint with policy

language to determine whether the insurer’s obligation to defend was triggered, the court

must liberally construe allegations in a complaint in favor of finding that the obligation to

defend was activated unless there is an unequivocal demonstration that the claim against

an insured does not fall within the insurance policy’s coverage. Christian v. United Fire

& Cas. Co., 2023 MT 100, ¶ 14, 412 Mont. 340, 530 P.3d 456 (citing Farmers Union Mut.

Ins. Co. v. Staples, 2004 MT 108, ¶ 22, 321 Mont. 99, 90 P.3d 381). “Factual disputes

between the parties relevant to coverage ‘must be resolved in favor of coverage.’” Weitzel,

¶ 12 (quoting Staples, ¶ 24).

¶19    Minemyer asserts the District Court erred because the Insurers owed him a duty to

defend on four separate claims in the Underlying Lawsuit: slander, malicious prosecution,

loss of tangible property, and bodily injury. It is Minemyer’s burden as the insured to

establish the claims of this case fall “within the basic scope of coverage” before the duty

to defend would be triggered. Weitzel, ¶ 13. “If a complaint states multiple claims, some

of which are covered by the insurance policy and some of which are not, it is a mixed

action. In these cases, Montana follows what is known as the mixed-action rule, which

requires an insurer to defend all counts in a complaint so long as one count triggers

coverage, even if the remaining counts do not trigger coverage.” Weitzel, ¶ 14 (citing State

Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Schwan, 2013 MT 216, ¶ 16, 371 Mont. 192, 308 P.3d 48).

Accordingly, if the District Court did err on any of these four claims, the Insurers would

be required to defend Minemyer against all claims. We address each in turn.

                                             13
a. Slander

¶20    Minemyer asserts the Insurers owe a duty to defend him under the terms of the

Farmers and Truck CGL Policies because the Second Amended Complaint in the

Underlying Lawsuit contains an undated allegation of slander, therefore creating a factual

dispute that must be resolved in favor of coverage. The District Court rejected this

argument because the parties agreed the Underlying Complaint did not specify when the

alleged defamatory statements were made or what the statements were and inserting the

allegation the statements were made during the policy periods to the undated claim of the

Underlying Complaint would be “based entirely on speculation.” The Insurers contend

Minemyer is asking this Court to “insert facts into the pleadings to support his argument

that the claim falls within coverage.”

¶21    “An insurer’s duty to defend its insured arises when an insured sets forth facts that

present a risk that possibly would be covered by the terms of an insurance policy.” Horace

Mann Ins. Co. v. Hanke, 2013 MT 320, ¶ 24, 372 Mont. 350, 312 P.3d 429 (citing Staples,

¶ 22). We liberally construe allegations in a complaint in favor of finding that a duty to

defend exists. Staples, ¶ 22. The insured bears the initial burden of establishing that the

claim falls within the basic scope of coverage, however. Weitzel, ¶ 13. In addition,

“[s]ummary judgment cannot be defeated by unsupported speculation.” Knucklehead Land

Co. v. Accutitle, Inc., 2007 MT 301, ¶ 26, 340 Mont. 62, 172 P.3d 116.

¶22    Together, the Farmers CGL and Truck CGL Policies at issue provided Minemyer

coverage from 2014-2021. Each policy provides that Minemyer is entitled to a defense

against a claim for personal or advertising injury, which, as defined in the Policies, includes

                                              14
the oral or written publication of material that slanders or libels a person. The Second

Amended Complaint in the Underlying Lawsuit contained the following allegations

relevant to the offense of slander:

       [The 2012 Lawsuit plaintiffs]4 accused [Davey and Yatsko] of having
       committed fraud, published those statements to others and these allegations
       were likewise false and constitutes defamation per se. . . . The assertions
       against [Davey and Yatsko] by [the 2012 Lawsuit plaintiffs] had a natural
       tendency to injure [Davey and Yatsko] and [Davey and Yatsko] were indeed
       injured by the defamatory written and oral allegations and statements
       advanced by the Defendants against them.

                                          .   .    .

       The allegations leveled against [Davey and Yatsko] by [the 2012 Lawsuit
       plaintiffs] were also grossly negligently advanced as there was really no basis
       for making the statements against [Davey and Yatsko] which were made.

                                          .   .    .

       Dennis Minemyer, a CPA, negligently and recklessly provided much of the
       factual information which was false and erroneous and then used the same to
       develop the complaint allegations against [Davey and Yatsko]. . . .
       Minemyer knew or should have known that [his] input into the lawsuit lacked
       sufficient due diligence such that the allegations themselves were erroneous
       and should not have been made.

                                          .   .    .

       When the [2012 Lawsuit plaintiffs] orchestrated the filing of the [2012
       Lawsuit] Complaint against [Davey and Yatsko], made defamatory
       statements about [Davey and Yatsko] and wrongfully filing a lis pendens
       against [Davey and Yatsko’s] property, without even telling them, the [2012
       Lawsuit plaintiffs] tortiously damaged [Davey and Yatsko].

4
 While Minemyer was not a named plaintiff in the 2012 Lawsuit, the allegations of Davey and
Yatsko’s Underlying Lawsuit, with some exceptions not relevant here, tend to refer to both the
actual plaintiffs and Minemyer interchangeably. When used in this Opinion, the term “2012
Lawsuit plaintiffs” is inclusive of both the actual plaintiffs and Minemyer.

                                              15
Reviewing these allegations, the District Court found Minemyer’s claim the alleged slander

was committed during the policy periods was “based entirely on speculation,” because

Davey and Yatsko did not allege any time periods to correspond with allegations of any

new oral defamatory statements other than the filing of the 2012 Lawsuit and the

defamatory written allegations.

¶23    We agree with the District Court. Even liberally construing the allegations in favor

of Minemyer, Christian, ¶ 14, does not lead to a determination he has met his burden of

demonstrating coverage. Liberal construction of a complaint in favor of the insured does

not require a court to insert facts that have not been alleged in order to find coverage. See

generally Weitzel, ¶¶ 21-24. The undated allegation of slander makes no claim the slander

was made during either the Farmers or the Truck CGL Policy periods. Minemyer admits

as much, noting that the “reality is that the Underlying Complaint is silent as to what

Minemyer allegedly said and when he allegedly said it,” but then asks this Court to make

the assumption the slander did occur during the policy periods. We decline to do so. The

allegations of the Second Amended Complaint in the Underlying Lawsuit, if proven, do

not allege that the slander was committed during the policy periods. As such, Minemyer’s

“argument is based entirely on speculation without a basis in the facts actually pled in the

complaint.” Weitzel, ¶ 24. While Minemyer complains that the District Court somehow

shifted the burden to him to demonstrate the slander did occur during the policy period, we

are not convinced by this argument because the initial burden to establish the claim falls

within the basic scope of coverage lies with him. Weitzel, ¶ 13. The undated slander claim

here, added to the Underlying Lawsuit by Davey and Yatsko after the parties had already

                                             16
moved for summary judgment in the present case, does not present a claim which falls

within the basic scope of coverage because it is not alleged in the Underlying Complaint

to have happened during the CGL policy periods. The District Court therefore correctly

determined the Insurers did not have a duty to defend Minemyer from the slander claim

under either the Farmers CGL or the Truck CGL Policies.

b. Malicious Prosecution

¶24   Minemyer next claims he is entitled to a defense from Davey and Yatsko’s

malicious prosecution claim under the Farmers CGL Policy, correctly noting he was not a

named plaintiff in the 2012 Lawsuit.      The Insurers assert the offense of malicious

prosecution occurred on the date of the filing of the 2012 Lawsuit. Minemyer, meanwhile,

argues the malicious prosecution offense occurred later, because Davey and Yatsko were

not actually served and did not voluntarily answer that complaint under November 2015.

The District Court concluded Davey and Yatsko’s alleged damages arose from the filing

of the 2012 Lawsuit in 2012, which did not occur during the Farmers CGL Policy period,

which did not begin until 2014.

¶25   A claim for malicious prosecution is established upon a showing of six elements:

      (1) a judicial proceeding was commenced and prosecuted against the
      plaintiff;

      (2) the defendant was responsible for instigating, prosecuting or continuing
      such proceeding;

      (3) there was a lack of probable cause for the defendant’s acts;

      (4) the defendant was actuated by malice;

      (5) the judicial proceeding terminated favorably for plaintiff; and

                                           17
       (6) the plaintiff suffered damage.

McAtee v. Morrison & Frampton, PLLP, 2021 MT 227, ¶ 17, 405 Mont. 269, 512 P.3d 235

(quoting Plouffe v. Mont. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Human Servs., 2002 MT 64, ¶ 16, 309

Mont. 184, 45 P.3d 10).

¶26    The Farmers CGL Policy provided Minemyer with “personal and advertising

injury” coverage caused by an “offense” committed during the policy period. This question

has not been squarely addressed in Montana. To determine when the offense of malicious

prosecution occurred, the District Court relied on out-of-state cases for the proposition that

the tort of malicious prosecution occurs upon the filing of the complaint. The California

Court of Appeal, in addressing an insurance dispute where the policy required the offense

of malicious prosecution to be committed within the policy period noted that in California,

like Montana, the “favorable termination of the offending action is a prerequisite to the

filing of the malicious prosecution action[.]” Zurich Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 188 Cal. App.

3d 438, 444 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). Nevertheless, after surveying the issue across the

decisions of several states, the California court held that “for purposes of an insurance

policy which measures coverage by the period within which the ‘offense is committed,’

the tort of malicious prosecution occurs upon the filing of the complaint.” Zurich Ins. Co.,

188 Cal. App. 3d at 448. This continues to be the majority position across the nation, as

the “majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue have concluded that the

‘occurrence’ causing personal injury under an insurance policy is the filing of the

                                             18
underlying malicious suit[.]” Billings v. Commerce Ins. Co., 936 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Mass.

2010) (collecting cases).

¶27    The tort of malicious prosecution includes not just the commencement of a judicial

proceeding, but the prosecution of the proceeding as well. It also requires that “the

defendant was responsible for instigating, prosecuting or continuing such proceeding[.]”

McAtee, ¶ 17. So while the ongoing tort of malicious prosecution may span months or

even years, for purposes of determining whether or not it falls within a particular insurance

coverage period, clarity requires that we determine a specific date constituting the

occurrence of the offense. Consistent with the reasoning of the majority of jurisdictions

that have considered this issue, we hold that solely “for purposes of an insurance policy

which measures coverage by the period within which the ‘offense is committed,’” the tort

of malicious prosecution occurs upon the commencement of the judicial proceeding on

which the malicious prosecution claim is based. To hold otherwise would allow a party

who did not have an insurance policy covering malicious prosecution when the underlying

lawsuit was filed to later purchase coverage and force the insurer to defend and indemnify

against a claim of malicious prosecution arising out of the previously filed suit. Such a

result has been consistently rejected by the majority of the states who have addressed the

issue, see Zurich Ins. Co., 188 Cal. App. 3d at 448 and Billings, 936 N.E.2d at 413, and we

join them in rejecting such a theory. Because the Farmers CGL Policy did not exist until

2014, and the judicial proceeding on which the malicious prosecution claim is based was

commenced prior to the effective policy period, the District Court correctly held that the

Insurers had no duty to defend against this claim.

                                             19
c. Loss of Tangible Property

¶28    Minemyer next asserts Farmers owed him a duty to defend against Davey and

Yatsko’s claim of property damage under the Farmers CGL Policy. The Underlying

Complaint alleged Davey and Yatsko had a lis pendens filed against their property, had

their property “tied up for a significant period of time,” and were “unable to sell or use the

property” due to the 2012 Lawsuit. Minemyer argues the loss of use allegations of Davey

and Yatsko’s complaint, when liberally construed in his favor, sufficiently allege “property

damage” so as to be covered under the Farmers CGL Policy. The Insurers contend Davey

and Yatsko alleged only pecuniary damages and the District Court correctly concluded

none of the claims in the Underlying Lawsuit qualified as “property damage.”

¶29    Under the relevant portion of the Farmers CGL Policy, “property damage” is

defined as the “[l]oss of use of tangible property that is not physically injured.” The

Farmers CGL Policy does not define “loss of use of tangible property[.]” “Tangible

property is property that is capable of being handled, touched[,] or physically possessed.”

Graber v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 244 Mont. 265, 269, 797 P.2d 214, 216 (1990)

(collecting cases). The Underlying Complaint alleged Davey and Yatsko suffered damages

because “their property was tied up for a significant period of time,” and “were unable to

sell or use the property in the interim.” As recognized by the District Court, the allegations

of the Underlying Complaint did not allege Davey and Yatsko were somehow “prohibited

from physically accessing, physically interacting with, or otherwise physically using the

property,” but were in fact an allegation of economic loss because they were unable to sell

the land or otherwise use it for business opportunities.

                                             20
¶30    Minemyer contends the allegations of the Underlying Complaint, when liberally

construed in his favor, do allege the loss of use of tangible property because Davey and

Yatsko alleged they “were unable to . . . use” the property. Such a reading is divorced from

the actual context of the Underlying Complaint, where all allegations of damage to Davey

and Yatsko’s property were economic in nature, such as the lis pendens and not being able

to sell the property. Such claims do “not constitute property damage, or loss of use of

tangible property.” Graber, 244 Mont. at 269, 797 P.2d at 217. The District Court

correctly read the entire paragraph, and the complete sentence, at issue here and came away

with the interpretation Davey and Yatsko made no allegation they were somehow

physically prevented from accessing or using the property at issue in the 2012 Lawsuit. A

conveniently placed ellipsis to remove context does not change this basic fact. “Montana

courts have consistently held that in order for economic loss to be covered by insurance a

direct physical injury to tangible property must occur.” Graber, 244 Mont. at 269, 797

P.2d at 216 (collecting cases). No physical injury to Davey and Yatsko’s property occurred

and their alleged economic loss does not qualify as “property damage” under the Farmers

CGL Policy.

d. Bodily Injury

¶31    Finally, Minemyer asserts the Insurers owed him a duty to defend under terms of all

three policies because Davey and Yatsko filed affidavits asserting they suffered “bodily

injury” in response to the Insurers’ summary judgment motion. The Insurers contend

Davey and Yatsko’s self-serving affidavits fail to cure the deficiency that the Underlying

Complaint contains no allegation of bodily injury. The District Court found Davey and

                                            21
Yatsko did not allege bodily injury in the Underlying Complaint and that their affidavits

were “not sufficient documented evidence to support the allegations of physical

manifestations of injury to trigger coverage.” Again, we agree with the District Court.

¶32    “Bodily injury” is defined in all three policies at issue here.             Under the

Homeowner’s Policy, bodily injury “means physical harm to the body, including physical

sickness or disease,” to a person other than an insured. The Homeowner’s Policy further

provides that bodily injury does not include “psychological injury or effect, including by

way of example but not limited to fear, depression, humiliation, anxiety, anguish, shock or

distress, unless it arises from actual physical harm to the body of a person.” Under the

CGL Policies, bodily injury “means bodily injury, sickness or disease sustained by a

person, including death resulting from any of these at any time.”

¶33    Nowhere in the Second Amended Complaint filed in the Underlying Lawsuit is

there any specific reference to bodily injury suffered by either Davey or Yatsko. Davey’s

affidavit, filed in response to the Insurers’ motion for summary judgment, asserted he “had

to be admitted to the hospital for significantly elevated blood pressure” due to stress.

Yatsko’s affidavit, meanwhile, asserted he “had to go to the hospital for a procedure done

on my heart” due to stress.

¶34    “Each case must necessarily be judged by its own facts to determine whether the

alleged injuries are sufficiently akin to physical injuries to fall within coverage for ‘bodily

injury.’ Such conditions include those which are susceptible to medical diagnosis and

treatment in a manner which distinguishes them from mental injuries.”              Allstate v.

Wagner-Ellsworth, 2008 MT 240, ¶ 42, 344 Mont. 445, 188 P.3d 1042. Judging this case

                                              22
by its own facts, the District Court found Davey and Yatsko did not allege bodily injury in

the Underlying Lawsuit and their self-serving affidavits filed in response to the Insurers’

motion for summary judgment were “not sufficient evidence to support the allegations of

physical manifestations of injury to trigger coverage.” See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.

Basham, 520 N.W.2d 713, 715 (Mich. Ct. App. 1994) (“At a minimum, there must be

allegations of physical manifestations supported by sufficient documented evidence in

order for insurance coverage to be triggered.”).

¶35    We agree with the District Court that the Underlying Complaint failed to set forth a

claim of bodily injury which would be covered by any of the Policies. The initial complaint

in the Underlying Lawsuit was filed in March of 2018. It was not until over three years

later, in May of 2021, where Davey and Yatsko first made any allegation which could even

possibly be construed as “bodily injury” through their self-serving affidavits alleging each

had to go to the hospital due to “stress.” The District Court properly took these self-serving

affidavits for what they were, merely weak evidence to be received with caution and not

conclusive of the facts stated therein. Neither Davey nor Yatsko provided any evidence,

beyond their affidavits filed in response to the summary judgment motion, let alone

“sufficient documented evidence,” to support their newly-discovered claim—over three

years into litigation—of a physical manifestation of injury. There was certainly no

allegation of hospital visits in the Underlying Complaint. Because there was no sufficient

documented evidence to support Davey and Yatsko’s newfound allegations of physical

manifestations of injury, Minemyer’s insurance coverage was not triggered in this case.

See Wagner-Ellsworth, ¶ 42 (citing Basham, 520 N.W.2d at 715).

                                             23
¶36    Because Minemyer failed to meet his burden of demonstrating the claims fell within

the scope of coverage of any of the policies at issue, it is unnecessary to address whether

the claims would also be excluded by any exceptions to the coverage under the terms of

the policies. As such, the District Court correctly granted the Insurers’ motion for summary

judgment and denied Minemyer’s cross-motion for summary judgment.

                                     CONCLUSION

¶37    The District Court correctly granted the Insurers’ motion for summary judgment

and found the Insurers had no duty to defend Minemyer for claims of slander, malicious

prosecution, loss of tangible property, and bodily injury under the terms of the policies at

issue and the facts of this case.

¶38    Affirmed.

                                                 /S/ INGRID GUSTAFSON

We concur:

/S/ JAMES JEREMIAH SHEA
/S/ BETH BAKER
/S/ LAURIE McKINNON
/S/ DIRK M. SANDEFUR

                                            24