Court Opinion

ID: 9505405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 20:04:23.272272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:26.249020
License: Public Domain

BOEHM, Justice,
dissenting.
It is important to understand the sequence of events in this case. The significant ones may be easily summarized. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment supported by the panel's opinion, admissible in evidence by statute, that there was no causal relationship between the defendant's acts and the plaintiff's injury. The plaintiff responded with an affidavit from a physician that there was causation. The motion was denied on the ground that there was a genuine issue of material fact, namely, whether the defendant caused the plaintiff's injury. So far, so good. The plaintiff's affiant then died. The majority holds, and I agree, that this did not entitle the defendant to summary judgment. As the majority points out, the unavailability of the particular affiant to testify at trial does not establish that there is no genuine issue of fact.
But the majority goes too far, in my view, and suggests that an affidavit may *1245"raise a material issue of fact on summary judgment if that evidence can be rendered admissible at trial." The majority explains that because somebody else could express the same opinion, the affidavit from the now deceased physician is sufficient. That is not correct in my view and is not supported by most of the cases cited for that proposition.
Trial Rule 56(E) requires that the moving party and the party opposing summary judgment support their factual claims with affidavits that (1) are based on personal knowledge, (2) set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and (8) "show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."
I agree that the death of an affiant opposing summary judgment does not render the affidavit a nullity so that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment. As the majority notes, there may be many witnesses who can establish the same fact on personal knowledge, and the accident that fate struck down the one chosen to file an affidavit should not, in itself, entitle the opposing party to prevail. The death of the affiant is not insignificant, however. The affidavit no longer meets the requirements of Rule 56(E) because a dead person is not a competent witness. Faced with this situation, the moving party should be required to do exactly what the defendant did in this case-renew the motion, supplemented by proof that the erstwhile affiant is no longer with us. That requires the opposing party to file a new affidavit or concede that the motion no longer can be opposed by competent testimony at trial. Because the plaintiff here failed to oppose the defendant's renewed summary judgment with an affidavit from a competent witness controverting the panel's opinion that there was no causation, the defendant was entitled to summary judgment on the renewed motion.
The authorities cited by the majority, with a single exception, do not support the broad proposition that the majority advances. Judge Posner's opinion in Winskunas v. Birnbaum, 23 F.3d 1264, 1268 (7th Cir.1994), merely points out that the affidavit itself is not required to be admis-gible in evidence. That is of course true, but it is not a remarkable proposition. Indeed, almost no affidavits offered in support of or opposing summary judgment motions are themselves admissible. Rather, they are, standing alone, classic hearsay. Although the affidavit need not be itself admissible, it must establish that there is admissible evidence. The passage from Winskunas that the majority quotes does not mean that it is sufficient if some other unspecified witness might be able to fill the gap. The court said it is sufficient that the evidence be admissible in some form. This means only that there is no requirement that the affidavit itself be admissible. Indeed, Winskunas expressly requires that the "content" of the affidavit, which includes proof that the affiant is a competent witness, must be admissible. The omitted portion of the majority's quotation from Winskunas makes this clear. Judge Posner describes as an example of a change of the "form" but not the "content" of an affidavit "substitution of oral testimony for a summary of that testimony in an affidavit...." Id. This surely means the testimony of the affiant, not just anyone.
Similarly, the cases cited by Judge Pos-ner support only this narrow point, not the claim that an affidavit from an incompetent witness, or an affidavit reciting what somebody told the affiant, is sufficient because an affidavit from somebody else might be adequate. Rather, it is up to the party seeking to establish the fact to find the "somebody else" and present his or her affidavit. That is precisely what McMillian v. Johnson, 88 F.3d 1573, 1584-85 (11th *1246Cir.1996), and Treff v. Galetka, 74 F.3d 191, 196 (10th Cir.1996), cited by the majority, hold. They each reject as inadmissible hearsay affidavits that recite statements told to the affiant.
In Oto v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 224 F.3d 601 (7th Cir.2000), the affiant died but had been deposed and cross examined as to the affidavit. The court held the affidavit and deposition were properly considered on summary judgment. Only the deposition was needed to establish the facts, and it was clearly admissible under Evidence Rule 804(b). The affidavit was a proper exhibit to the deposition. To the extent the court's language suggests the affidavit was properly considered as a freestanding item in opposition to summary judgment, it is dicta and is simply incorrect in my view. Only Petruszi's IGA Supermarkets, Inc. v. Darling-Delaware Co., Inc., 998 F.2d 1224, 1234-35 n. 9 Bd Cir.1993), suggests, in a footnote, that the Third Cireuit would allow hearsay in an affidavit because another affiant could be produced. The Third Cireuit is out of step with the weight of authority on this point, as far as I can tell, and should remain so.
The requirement that an affidavit establish evidence admissible at trial applies equally to parties seeking summary judgment and those who oppose it. Just as it would be improper to seek summary judgment based on an affidavit that says "I wasn't there but Sally told me the light was red," so also is it insufficient to oppose an affidavit from a competent witness with such a filing. An affidavit from the person who told the affiant the reported fact would presumably do the job because that person could testify at trial. But Rule 56 requires an affidavit from that person, who can testify to the fact, not the affiant who cannot. The same problem exists with affidavits from a person who cannot testify at all. An affidavit reciting hearsay told to the affiant is insufficient because, although the reported facts may be true, Rule 56 requires an affidavit setting forth admissible evidence to establish those facts. Similarly, an affidavit from a witness who cannot testify does not do the job because that person cannot establish the same at trial. That is true whether the witness has no personal knowledge, is dead, or cannot testify for any other reason.
In sum, the requirement of the Rule is that the affidavit establish that there is admissible evidence supporting the fact advanced by the party offering the affidavit. Before the affiant died, assuming his expertise was sufficiently shown, his affidavit was not itself admissible, but it established that there was evidence-his opinion to be given in live testimony-that would be admissible at trial. After the death of Dr. Alpern was established by uncontroverted evidence, his affidavit no longer served that purpose because all it proved was that a now incompetent witness would, if still with us, have presented admissible evidence. It failed to establish that there remained admissible evidence establishing causation. The undisputed facts thus established that the defense would prevail at trial on the issue of causation. Under these circumstances summary judgment should be granted.
I believe all of the foregoing is not only consistent with but demanded by the purpose of summary judgment, which is to avoid unnecessary trials, Rosi v. Bus. Furniture Corp., 615 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ind. 1993) (noting that the revisions to Trial Rule 56(C) "promote the expeditious resolution of lawsuits and conserve judicial resources. ..."). If the only evidence on the causation issue at trial will be the panel's opinion, there will be literally no evidence to support a verdiet for the plaintiff and a directed verdict will be required. There is no reason for the parties or the taxpayers *1247to go through the expense and effort of a trial whose result is foreordained. Indeed, the whole purpose of Trial Rule 56 is to flush out claims and defenses that cannot be substantiated at trial by admissible evidence.
I would grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants on their renewed motion for summary judgment.
SHEPARD, C.J., concurs with separate opinion.