Court Opinion

ID: 9728005
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:55:08.012641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:44.955711
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
0concurring). I concur in the result and much of the majority opinion. I disagree, however, with the majority's discussion on pages 683-685 relating to the trial court's authority to impose forfeitures or various work and living arrangements on juveniles under section 48.34, Stats. In my view, these dispositional options are related to offenses that underlie a finding of delinquency and reflect the legislature’s recognition that certain life-style controls may be necessary to *689accomplish the dual aim of The Children's Code: protection of the public and rehabilitation of the juvenile delinquent, see sec. 48.01(l)(c), Stats. These alternatives are as much related to an underlying offense as is transfer to a secure facility, see sec. 48.34(4m), Stats., or placement on probation, see sec. 48.34(2), Stats. The issue here is thus not whether the blood-test condition is related to the underlying offense but, rather, whether, as a probationer, the juvenile may complain about the infringement on his Fourth Amendment interest.1 For the reasons expressed in the main body of the text on page 687 of the majority opinion, I conclude that he may not.2

A compelled blood test is "a Fourth Amendment search." Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-617 (1989).

 I specifically join in the following from the majority opinion:
In Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), the United States Supreme Court upheld a warrantless search of a probationer's home, premised on "reasonable grounds," as opposed to "probable cause," to believe that there was contraband in the home. The court reasoned that a probationer's status can constitute one of many "special needs” that justify departure from strict adherence to the Fourth Amendment's probable-cause and warrant requirements. Id., 483 U.S. at 873-80. Griffin's rationale applies here; the special needs in the context of this case articulated by the trial court fully support the condition of probation we uphold today. See also Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) ("[T]he permissibility of a particular practice 'is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests.'") (citation omitted).