Court Opinion

ID: 9740433
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:35:24.929898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:18.265309
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Schaefer, dissenting: The first question in this case is a simple one of statutory construction and in my opinion the answer to that question disposes of the case. The normal rule is that a statute operates prospectively unless the intention that it should have a retrospective effect is plainly expressed. That rule of construction is crystalized in section 4 of the Statutory Construction Act which provides: “No new law shall be construed to repeal a former law, whether such former law is expressly repealed or not, as to - any offense committed against the former law, or as to any act done, any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred, ■ * * Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap. 131, par. 4. Nothing in the language of the statute before us suggests that it is intended to operate retrospectively, and I see no reason why it should be given such an effect. The argument that “the legislative policy expressed in the proviso would be of no practical effect for 20 years if the proviso were not applied to persons sentenced prior to its effective date” is not convincing to me, for it seems to assume the answer to the question to be decided. If the General Assembly wanted the amendment to apply only prospectively, it would not want it to have any “practical effect for 20 years.” The language used is entirely consistent with such a legislative policy, • ' ■ The same session of the General Assembly that adopted this amendment to the Parole Act also added section 9.1 to that act. The added section authorizes conditional release of prisoners on parole shortly before they have completed their sentences, and the intention that it should operate retrospectively is plainly expressed: “On or after September 1, 1961, any person sentenced to or serving a sentence in the Illinois State Penitentiary * * *.” (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1961, chap. 38, par. 810a.) A similar provision could readily have been included in the amendment before us if retrospective operation had been intended, and in the absence of such a provision I would hold that prospective operation only was intended. Mr. Justice Hershey concurs in this dissent.