Court Opinion

ID: 9600055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:24:03.024348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:49.892452
License: Public Domain

LANE, Justice,
concurring in result.
I write to address my views as to the majority’s treatment of Appellant’s Proposition II, the restrictions on cross examination of witness Rinker. I fail to see how the evidence of his arrest between the time of the murder and the trial would be admissible for impeachment in the second stage of trial and not in the first. The majority finds that the evidence .is admissible in the second stage to show bias or motivation to testify. I find that it is admissible in the first stage for the same reason.
The majority relied upon statements referring to 12 O.S.1981, §§ 2401-2403 contained in Beck v. State, 824 P.2d 385 (Okl.Cr.1991) which I do not believe apply to the current case. In Beck, the defendant had asked questions as to whether or not a witness had received favorable treatment on charges in exchange for his testimony. Favorable treatment was denied. The defendant then attempted to introduce evidence that in spite of the testimony certain charges were either not filed or were subsequently dropped against the witness. It is the introduction of this extrinsic evidence to which the quoted language relates. We do not have that situation here. Here, the trial court prohibited Appellant from asking about favorable treatment on arrests. The identified language from Beck would only apply if the questions had been asked, there was a denial of favorable treatment being offered and Appellant then tried to introduce evidence of favorable treatment.
However, Beck does stand for the proposition that sometimes evidence that would not be admissible under the evidence code may be admissible for the purpose of showing the witness is biased or had motivation to testify in a certain manner. This concept was reinforced in Carolina v. State, 839 P.2d 663 (Okl.Cr.1992) where we held that the State could cross examine on prior arrests and pending charges to show bias of defense witnesses.
Once we establish that the denied questioning may be permitted we must then look to see if the trial court abused its discretion in prohibiting the appellant from inquiring into the arrests. I would find that it was an abuse of discretion. I would then make a determination as to whether the error was verdict determinative or fit in the area of harmless error. When examined in the light of the entire case I find that the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
I concur in results.