Court Opinion

ID: 9722520
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:37:53.2414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:07:00.637969
License: Public Domain

POCHÉ, J.
I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority opinion finding harmless the trial court’s errors under People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301 [211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111]. I agree with the majority, however, that two errors were committed: (1) determining that defendant’s prior conviction of possession of a controlled substance was admissible for impeachment purposes; and (2) failing to exercise its discretion under Evidence Code section 352 with respect to the only prior conviction which was admissible for that purpose: possession of a controlled substance for sale. I view the effect of those errors quite differently from that of my colleagues.
I cannot agree with their presumption of what defendant’s testimony would have been “i.e., that appellant [would have] denied the allegations against him.” (Maj. opn. ante, p. 850.) How do they know that? Because the arresting officer testified to his conversations with defendant. Thus the law now is, once you talk to the police, you are limited to testifying in court to what you told them. And you need not bother testifying for if you do, it will be merely “corroborative and cumulative” of the arresting officer’s recitation of what you said.
My point is merely this: appellate courts are treading on thin ice when they attempt to second-guess from a silent record what a defendant’s testimony might have been. Treading does not come any easier by looking to his postarrest statements to the police.
The next step of the majority’s analysis is to guess the effect that nonexistent testimony would have had on the triers of fact. (Maj. opn., ante, p. 850.) I submit that in so doing, my colleagues have fallen through the ice into the pond. Whether or not the jury would have believed in whole or in part or totally disbelieved the defendant depends on a multitude of factors beyond the knowledge of this court. For instance, would defendant have been a believable witness? Would the prosecuting victim have become less believable in the face of another version of events? I submit that neither of these questions can be answered by the reading of a cold record. What can be said with some certainty on this record is that the jury did not believe *853everything the prosecuting victim said, for they found defendant not guilty of assault with intent to commit rape, but guilty of the lesser included offense of simple assault.
In short, I cannot join my colleagues’ analysis of harmless error in the instant case. The question thus becomes what methodology of assessing the effect of the errors is the correct one?
Were the only error before this court the error in failing to exercise discretion with respect to the good impeaching prior conviction, I would vote for a remand for limited hearing in accordance with People v. Reardon (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 110, 121 [215 Cal.Rptr. 88], and People v. Brazil (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 889, 895-896 [215 Cal.Rptr. 499].)1 That procedure will not work here, however, because one prior conviction was absolutely inadmissible for impeachment purposes. I have no way of knowing whether defendant’s decision to testify would be altered by the fact that he could be impeached with only one rather than two prior convictions. It might well have. Reluctantly, therefore, I conclude that the errors before this court require a reversal of the judgment of conviction.

 Petitions for review are presently pending in the California Supreme Court in both cases.