Court Opinion

ID: 9758920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:56:08.535292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:01:31.183232
License: Public Domain

HUDSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Relying solely on facts found by the independent hearing examiner, I believe the Board of Trustees of the Houston Independent School District had good cause to terminate the employment of Beverly Goodie.
A teacher may be discharged at any time for good cause as determined by the board of trustees. Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 21.156(a) (Vernon 1996). So long as the board’s decision is not arbitrary, capricious, unlawful, or unsupported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed by the Commissioner of Education. Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 21.303(a) (Vernon 1996). Looking solely at facts found by the hearing examiner, we know that Ms. Goodie was directed to arrive at school by 7:30 a.m. Despite this directive and several warnings, Ms. Goodie was tardy 89 times between August 1994 and May 1996. Ms. Goodie claimed her tardies were attributable to a variety of reasons, including (1) being stopped by parents; (2) having to take items from her car to the classroom; and (3) her own negligence in simply failing to sign in before 7:30 aun.1
After making these findings, the hearing examiner concluded that because Ms. Goodie’s attendance was improving, her conduct was not beyond remediation and did not constitute good cause for her termination. But while the board was obliged to accept the examiner’s fact findings, i.e., Goodie was tardy 89 times, it was not required to accept the examiner’s conclusions, i.e., 89 tardies does not constitute good cause for termination. The board, in fact, was expressly authorized to reject or change the hearing examiner’s conclusions of law and proposal for relief. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.259(b) (Vernon 1996).
The majority contends the board was not authorized to reach different conclusions from those of the hearing examiner because it failed to state in writing the reason and legal basis for changing the conclusions of law as required by Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 21.259(c). However, the board’s letter of August 21, 1996, informed Ms. Goodie that it had adopted different conclusions of law from those put forward by the examiner (the board’s conclusions were attached to the letter). Among the new conclusions was the statement: “Ms. Goodie’s repeated failure to follow directives regarding attendance is good cause for her termination.” In fact, there is little more the board could have said in explanation. Whether specific facts *653constitute “good cause” for termination is a “judicial” decision upon which reasonable minds may differ; advocates of contrary positions can, in the end, do little more than exchange claims of “ ’tis so” and “ ’tis not.” Thus, I would find the board adequately stated its reason for changing the conclusion, namely, repeated tardies constitute good cause for termination.
Moreover, I would affirm the court below even if the board’s letter failed to “state in writing the reason and legal basis for a change or rejection” of the examiner’s conclusion. Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 21.259(d) (Vernon 1996). While the independent hearing examiner decides fact issues, the board “retains the authority to make the ultimate decision of whether the facts demonstrate that board policy was violated.” Montgomery Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 34 S.W.3d 559, 565 (Tex.2000). The ability to reject or change conclusions of law preserves a school board’s authority and responsibility to interpret its policies. Id. Further, the “board has the power to apply those policies to the examiner’s findings and the undisputed evidence by rejecting or changing the examiner’s conclusions of law or proposal for relief.” Id. To preserve the autonomy of the board, the legislature has declared that the commissioner is not authorized to reverse a decision of the board due to a procedural irregularity made by the board unless the irregularity likely led to an erroneous decision by the board. Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 21.303(c) (Vernon 1996). The error alleged here was purely procedural, and because the error occurred after the board’s decision, it could not logically have had any impact on the board’s decision. Accordingly, the error, if any, should have been disregarded.
Because the majority’s decision (1) wrongly finds the board’s letter of August 21, 1996, to be inadequate; (2) infringes upon the board’s authority to apply its own policies to the facts; and (3) fails to disregard a procedural error as mandated by statute, I must respectfully dissent.

. I have no quarrel with the majority's conclusion that under the facts of this case the board was not free to substitute its findings for those of the hearing examiner. The hearing examiner, as the fact-finder, was authorized to make findings of fact. Tex. Educ.Code Ann. § 21.257 (Vernon 1996). Such findings are equivalent to a jury’s verdict. Montgomery Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Davis, 994 S.W.2d 435, 438 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1999), aff'd, 34 S.W.3d 559 (2000). The board was not authorized to reject or change a finding made by the hearing examiner unless it was unsupported by substantial evidence. Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 21.259(c) (Vernon 1996).