Court Opinion

ID: 9555673
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-14 19:04:10.147709+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:17.206933
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/14/23
                              CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                               THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                         (Sacramento)
                                               ----

 GRANT PARK NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION                               C095659
 ADVOCATES et al.,
                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 34-2020-
                  Plaintiffs and Appellants,               80003551-CU-WM-GDS)

          v.

 DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH et al.,

                  Defendants and Respondents;

 HARM REDUCTION COALITION OF SANTA
 CRUZ COUNTY,

                  Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

       APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Laurie M.
Earl, Judge. Reversed.

      Brereton, Mohamed & Terrazas, David J. Terrazas, Gabrielle J. Korte and Aaron
J. Mohamed for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

                                                1
       Jason M. Heath, County Counsel (Santa Cruz), John B. Nguyen, Anthony N.
Corso, Assistant County Counsel, and Brad Stephens, County Counsel (Butte), for
Counties as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

       Atchison, Barisone & Condotti and Anthony P. Condotti, City Attorney (Santa
Cruz); Logan & Powell and Kirsten Powell, City Attorney (Scotts Valley); Burke,
Williams & Sorensen and Samantha Zutler, City Attorney (Watsonville); Jones & Mayer
and James R. Touchstone for City of Santa Cruz, City of Scotts Valley, City of
Watsonville, California Police Chiefs Association, California State Sheriffs’ Association,
California Peace Officers’ Association and League of California Cities as Amici Curiae
on behalf of Plaintiffs and Appellants.

       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Cheryl L. Feiner, Assistant Attorney General,
Gregory D. Brown, Kirin K. Gill and Matthew J. Goldman, Deputy Attorneys General,
for Defendants and Respondents.

      Law Office of Babak Naficy and Babak Naficy for Real Party and Interest and
Respondent.

      Under Health and Safety Code section 121349 (section 121349), the State
Department of Public Health (the Department) may authorize an entity to distribute clean
needles and syringes to those who inject drugs intravenously. The statute’s aim is to
prevent the spread of blood-borne viruses, like HIV, from the sharing of used needles.
Before authorizing an entity under this statute, the Department must follow certain
procedures to allow local officials and communities to provide input. These procedures
include consulting with the leaders of local law enforcement with jurisdiction over the
entity’s proposed operating area, providing a period of public comment, and notifying
local law enforcement when the comment period starts.
      In this case, Grant Park Neighborhood Association Advocates and four individuals
(together, Grant Park) challenge the Department’s approval of an entity’s application to
operate a needle and syringe distribution program in Santa Cruz County. Grant Park
argues the Department’s approval was flawed for four reasons. First, it contends the

                                            2
Department failed to consult with local law enforcement before approving the
application. Second, it asserts the Department failed to notify three of the affected local
law enforcement agencies about the comment period. Third, it contends the Department
provided only 45 days for public comment even though its regulations at the time
required 90 days. And fourth, it argues the Department failed to conduct the
environmental review required under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA;
Pub. Resources Code, § 21000 et seq.). Although, after Grant Park filed suit, the
Legislature amended section 121349 to exempt approvals under the statute from CEQA,
Grant Park contends this amendment does not apply retroactively.
       On Grant Park’s appeal from the trial court’s decision in the Department’s favor,
we find the Department failed to engage in the required consultation, failed to provide the
required notice to three local police departments about the comment period, and failed to
provide the required 90 days for comment. We also find these failures to comply with
section 121349 prejudicial. But we find it unnecessary to consider Grant Park’s final
claim premised on CEQA, for the only relief it currently seeks under CEQA is relief we
already agree is appropriate because of the Department’s failures to comply with section
121349. We will direct the trial court to grant Grant Park’s petition.
                                      BACKGROUND
                                               I
                                     Legal Background
       In 2005, the Legislature enacted section 121349 to authorize cities and counties to
operate needle and syringe exchange programs. (Stats. 2005, ch. 692, § 3.) It did so
based on “[s]tudies indicat[ing] that the lack of sterile needles available on the streets,
and the existence of laws restricting needle availability[,] promote needle sharing, and
consequently the spread of HIV among injection drug users.” (Stats. 2005, ch. 692, § 1.)
The Legislature believed better access to clean needles and syringes would “reduce the

                                               3
spread of HIV infection and blood-borne hepatitis among the intravenous drug user
population within California.” (Stats. 2005, ch. 692, § 3.)
       In 2011, the Legislature amended section 121349 to further expand access to clean
needles and syringes. Under the law as amended in 2011, and still today, the Department
can “authorize entities . . . to provide hypodermic needle and syringe exchange services
. . . in any location where the department determines that the conditions exist for the rapid
spread of HIV, viral hepatitis, or any other potentially deadly or disabling infections that
are spread through the sharing of used hypodermic needles and syringes.” (§ 121349,
subd. (c), as amended by Stats. 2011, ch. 744, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2012.) But before
authorizing a needle and syringe exchange program, the Department must ensure that the
entity meets certain criteria, including that the entity has adequate funding to provide
needle and syringe exchange services, has a plan to evaluate program impact, and can
provide or refer participants to drug abuse treatment services. (§ 121349, subd. (d).)
       The Department also must follow certain procedures before approving a proposed
program. As relevant here, it may authorize a program only “after consultation with the
local health officer and local law enforcement leadership, and after a period of public
comment”—which until 2021, was a period of 90 days under the Department’s
regulations. (§ 121349, subd. (c); former Cal. Code Regs., tit. 17, §§ 7000, subd. (a)(22),
7002, subd. (b).) As part of the comment process, the Department must “[s]end a written
and an email notice to the chief of police, the sheriff, or both, as appropriate, of the
jurisdictions in which the program will operate.” (§ 121349, subd. (e).) Following
consultation and public comment, the Department “shall balance the concerns of law
enforcement with the public health benefits” in deciding whether to approve the program.
(Id., subd. (c).)

                                               4
                                             II
                         Approval of the Coalition’s Application
       In early 2019, the Harm Reduction Coalition of Santa Cruz County (the Coalition)
filed an application to operate a needle and syringe exchange program in Santa Cruz
County. It acknowledged the county already operated its own needle and syringe
exchange program, but it believed an additional program would better serve the
community. The Department afterward found the application provisionally appropriate
and initiated a period for public comment. Five law enforcement agencies in Santa Cruz
County—namely, the Santa Cruz County Sheriff and the police departments for the cities
of Santa Cruz, Scotts Valley, Watsonville, and Capitola—opposed the application. After
the close of public comment, the Coalition e-mailed the Department that it would like to
withdraw and resubmit its application “to out maneuver the hateful mob.”
       In late 2019, the Coalition filed a new application to operate a needle and syringe
exchange program in Santa Cruz County. Under the proposed program, the Coalition
would operate a mobile service location one day per week in Santa Cruz City and deliver
clean needles and syringes to drug users’ homes throughout Santa Cruz County. The
Department again found the Coalition’s application provisionally appropriate and
initiated a period for public comment. In its public notice announcing the comment
period, the Department represented “local law enforcement . . . were notified regarding
the initiation of the public comment period.”
       Five days after purportedly notifying local law enforcement agencies, the
Department notified two local law enforcement heads—the Santa Cruz County Sheriff
and the Santa Cruz City Police Chief—about the Coalition’s application. Both opposed
the application. The city police chief agreed that harm reduction strategies “make[] sense
from a public health, public finance and community safety policy perspective.” But he
expressed concern about syringe litter and said, to have his support, a volunteer syringe
distribution program must have local oversight and accountability, a plan to reduce

                                             5
discarded needles, and a means of ensuring the effectiveness of reducing infection rates
and drug overdoses. The county sheriff expressed similar concerns about the lack of
oversight and increased syringe litter. He also, among other things, found the county’s
existing syringe exchange program “robust” and noted concerns about the Coalition
distributing syringes in local parks.
       The Department never notified the three remaining city police departments in the
county—that is, those for the cities of Scotts Valley, Watsonville, and Capitola. But two
of these departments—the Watsonville and Capitola Police Departments—still submitted
written comments. The Watsonville City Police Chief raised various concerns, including
concerns about syringe litter, the lack of community outreach, and the accuracy of the
facts cited in the Coalition’s application. The Capitola City Police Chief raised additional
concerns, including that the Coalition’s operations would decrease the number of addicts
using the County’s syringe services and consequently deprive these addicts from
receiving medical services and exposure to rehabilitation opportunities.
       The Department ended the period for public comment after just 45 days, rather
than the then-required 90 days. Several months later, in 2020, it approved the Coalition’s
application with certain amendments and a clarification that no services could be
provided in recreational parks in Santa Cruz County. The Department’s amendments,
among other things, required the Coalition to follow the Department’s guidelines, to
provide personal sharps containers to participants, and to conduct syringe litter cleanup at
least once per week. Although the Department appears to have generally considered
local law enforcement’s comments before the approval, it never engaged with them
directly about their concerns. It also found some of their concerns did not even deserve
any mention in its responses to public comments. In internal comments about the Santa
Cruz City Police Chief’s expressed concerns, Department staff wrote: “No need to
respond. [The Coalition’s] procedure will never be ‘thoughtful’ enough for this imbecile.
Don’t give his statement power.”

                                             6
                                             III
                                     Grant Park’s Suit
       Following the Department’s approval, Grant Park filed a petition for writ of
mandate challenging the approval. It named as parties the Department and two of its
officials (together, the Department) and the Coalition and its founder (together, the
Coalition). Grant Park alleged the approval should be set aside for four reasons relevant
here. First, it argued the Department failed to comply with CEQA. Second, it contended
the Department failed to provide 90 days for public comment, as required in its
regulations. Third, it asserted the Department failed to notify the police chiefs of Scotts
Valley, Watsonville, and Capitola about the Coalition’s application. And fourth, it
contended the Department failed to consult with local law enforcement.
       In a tentative ruling, the trial court largely agreed with Grant Park. It found the
Department wrongly treated its decision as exempt from CEQA, failed to provide the
required 90 days for comment, and failed to notify all local law enforcement about the
Coalition’s application. It rejected, however, Grant Park’s argument that the Department
failed to consult with local law enforcement, noting that the Department considered and
attempted to address and balance at least some of the concerns of law enforcement.
Based on these findings, the court tentatively granted Grant Park’s petition.
       But shortly after, the court asked for supplemental briefing following recent
changes in the law. A few days after the court’s tentative decision, the Governor signed a
bill amending section 121349 to make approvals under the statute exempt from CEQA.
(§ 121349, subd. (h), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 480, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2022.) The
same day, the Department amended its regulations to shorten the required comment
period from 90 days to 45 days.
       Considering these changes in the law, the court changed course in its final ruling.
It found the amendment to section 121349 mooted Grant Park’s CEQA claim. It
similarly found the amendment to the Department’s regulations “arguably” mooted Grant

                                              7
Park’s claim based on the shortened comment period and, alternatively, found requiring
the Department to provide additional time for comment would merely delay the
inevitable. It found the lack of notice to the Scotts Valley, Watsonville, and Capitola
Police Departments was not prejudicial, because all three still had actual notice of the
comment period and Grant Park admitted all three participated in the comment process. 1
And lastly, as in its tentative decision, it found the Department satisfied section 121349’s
requirement for consulting with local law enforcement. The court thus denied Grant
Park’s petition. Grant Park timely appealed.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                               I
                                    Standard of Review
        In this action, we review the actions of the Department. “In ordinary mandamus
actions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, when reviewing the exercise of
discretion, ‘ “[t]he scope of review is limited, out of deference to the agency’s authority
and presumed expertise: ‘The court may not reweigh the evidence or substitute its
judgment for that of the agency. [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.] “In general . . . the inquiry is
limited to whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or entirely lacking in
evidentiary support. . . .” [Citations.]’ Because both the trial court and the appellate
court apply the same standard of review, on appeal we review the agency’s action de
novo.” (Polster v. Sacramento County Office of Education (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 649,
668.)

1 As we explain post, Grant Park incorrectly argued below that all three police
departments submitted comments, but it was the Scotts Valley City Council, not the
Scotts Valley Police Department, that participated in the comment process.

                                              8
                                               II
                                         Consultation
       We start with Grant Park’s contention that the Department violated section
121349’s consultation requirement. It reasons that, under this requirement, the
Department needed to engage in a back-and-forth interactive process with local law
enforcement agencies, not merely solicit and consider comments from these agencies.
Several amici curiae—namely, Santa Cruz County, Santa Cruz City, Scotts Valley City,
Watsonville City, the California Police Chiefs Association, the California State Sheriffs’
Association, the California Peace Officers’ Association, and the League of California
Cities—argue the same. We agree.
       Under section 121349, again, the Department may authorize an entity to provide
needle and syringe exchange services in any location found to have conditions that could
lead to the rapid spread of blood-borne viruses through the sharing of used needles and
syringes. (§ 121349, subd. (c).) But the Department must follow certain procedures
before doing so. As relevant here, it may grant authorization only “after consultation
with the local health officer and local law enforcement leadership, and after a period of
public comment. . . .” (Ibid.) It also, as part of the public comment process on
applications it provisionally deems appropriate, must “[s]end a written and an email
notice to the chief of police, the sheriff, or both, as appropriate, of the jurisdictions in
which the program will operate.” (Id., subd. (e)(3).)
       Both sides in this appeal offer different takes on the meaning of the term
“consultation.” According to the Department, the term simply requires it to give “due
consideration” to local law enforcement’s comments. It cites in support a dictionary
defining the term “consult” to mean, among other things, “to ask the advice or opinion
of.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2023) <https://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/consult> [as of Aug. 14, 2023], archived at:
<https://perma.cc/V58L-YKVV>.) The Coalition construes the term similarly.

                                               9
According to Grant Park, however, the consultation requirement obligates the
Department “to actually interact with local law enforcement,” not merely consider law
enforcement’s comments. It then offers its own competing dictionary definition, noting
the term “consultation” has been defined to mean, among other things, “[a] conference in
which the parties consult and deliberate; a meeting for deliberation or discussion.”
(Oxford English Dict. Online (2023)
<https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/39957?redirectedFrom=consultation#eid> [as of
Aug. 14, 2023], archived at: <https://perma.cc/WKV9-YPHZ>.)
       We find Grant Park has the better reading of section 121349. Starting with the
statutory text, we find the Department’s and the Coalition’s reading inconsistent with
basic principles of statutory construction. Section 121349, again, requires both
consultation with local law enforcement and a period of public comment. But under the
Department’s and Coalition’s reading, these two distinct requirements would collapse
into one—public comment. That is because, under their view, the Department satisfies
section 121349 so long as it considers local law enforcement’s comments. But that
interpretation effectively writes the distinct consultation requirement out of the statute.
Adopting their interpretation, then, “would be inconsistent with the well-established
principle that courts should, if possible, give meaning to every word of a statute and
avoid constructions that make any word surplusage.” (B.B. v. County of Los Angeles
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 1, 13.)
       Grant Park’s reading, on the other hand, avoids this problem. It gives life to every
word in the statute and reasonably construes the term “consultation” to mean a
“deliberation of two or more persons on some matter.” (Webster’s Third New Internat.
Dict. (1993) p. 490 [also defining consultation to mean “a council or conference (as
between two or more persons) usu. to consider a special matter”].) This reading,
consistent with the statutory text, treats the consultation language and the public
comment language as establishing two distinct requirements. The latter requires the

                                             10
Department to establish a period for public comment and, beforehand, to notify “the chief
of police, the sheriff, or both, as appropriate, of the jurisdictions in which the program
will operate.” (§ 121349, subds. (c), (e)(3).) The former requires the Department to
consult—that is, to deliberate—“with the local health officer and local law enforcement
leadership.” (Id., subd. (c).) Under this reading, the Department need not ultimately
follow local law enforcement’s recommendations during consultation. (Ibid.) But it at
least must deliberate with local law enforcement about their concerns and take their
concerns into account.
       The legislative history is consistent with our reading. The relevant text of section
121349 was added in a 2011 bill. Under an early version of the bill, the Department
needed, as it does now, to provide for a period of public comment before approving an
application to provide needle and syringe exchange services. (Sen. Amend. to Assem.
Bill No. 604 (2011-2012 Reg. Sess.) Aug. 22, 2011.) But it had no need to consult with
anyone. In the final version of the bill, however, the Department was required to do more
than allow for public comment; it also needed to consult with the local health officer and
local law enforcement leadership. (§ 121349, subd. (c), as amended by Stats. 2011, ch.
744, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2012.) That the Legislature added this consultation requirement after
the public comment requirement was already in place makes plain that it did not perceive
the public comment requirement as already sufficient to safeguard local interests.
       Case law is also consistent with our reading. Consider, for instance, California
Wilderness Coalition v. U.S. Dept. of Energy (9th Cir. 2011) 631 F.3d 1072 (California
Wilderness Coalition)—a case that all parties discuss in detail. The Ninth Circuit there
considered a statute that required a federal agency to conduct a study “ ‘in consultation
with affected States’ ” and then, based on this study, to issue a report after “ ‘an
opportunity for comment from affected States.’ ” (Id. at p. 1085.) Taking an approach
similar to the Department here, the federal agency asserted “it had the discretion to
determine what ‘consultation’ required” and “met its obligation by inviting comments

                                              11
from the public (including the affected States) while it was preparing the [study].” (Id. at
p. 1086.) But the Ninth Circuit disagreed. It found Congress’s use of the distinct terms
“consultation” and “comment” showed “that Congress intended consultation to be more
than responding to comments”—namely, it intended “an exchange of information and
opinions.” (Id. at pp. 1087, 1093.) The court added that a contrary reading would render
part of the statute superfluous, be inconsistent with the statute’s purpose of allowing
states to participate in preparing the study, and be inconsistent with case law construing
the term “consult.” (Id. at pp. 1087-1088.)
       The court in United States Steel Corp. v. U.S. (Ct.Internat.Trade 2005) 362
F.Supp.2d 1336—one of the cases the California Wilderness Coalition court discussed—
found similarly. The court there considered a statute that restricted a federal agency’s
ability to suspend certain types of investigations, requiring the agency, before suspending
an investigation, to consult with the parties that petitioned for the investigation and to
allow interested parties to submit comments. (Id. at p. 1342.) In the federal agency’s
telling, this statute simply required the agency to solicit and receive comments from those
that petitioned for the investigation. (Id. at p. 1343.) But the court disagreed. It wrote:
“Throughout this action, the Government has persisted in conflating [the agency’s]
notice-and-comment obligations with its consultation obligations. . . . However, the
statute is clear: [The agency’s] consultation obligations are separate and distinct from
(albeit related to) its notice-and-comment obligations.” (Ibid., fn. 14; see also HIAS, Inc.
v. Trump (4th Cir. 2021) 985 F.3d 309, 320-321 [after noting the “ordinary meaning of
the term ‘consult’ is to seek an opinion or advice, or to deliberate,” the court indicated it
favored the latter meaning because the statutory structure “strongly suggests that
Congress intended for the consultation requirement to involve a dialogue facilitating an
exchange of opinions among the affected parties”].)

                                              12
       Considering section 121349’s text and structure, the statute’s legislative history,
and case law construing similar statutes, we interpret section 121349’s consultation
requirement to require a period of back-and-forth deliberation with local law
enforcement. Under this requirement, then, the Department needed to deliberate with all
local law enforcement agencies in Santa Cruz County, including the Santa Cruz County
Sheriff and the police departments for the cities of Santa Cruz, Scotts Valley,
Watsonville, and Capitola. But the Department never contacted three of these agencies.
And although it sought comments from two—the Santa Cruz County Sheriff and the
Santa Cruz Police Department—it engaged with neither. It also found some of their
concerns did not even deserve any mention in its responses to public comments, with its
staff writing, in internal comments, that there was “[n]o need to respond” to part of the
Santa Cruz City Police Chief’s expressed concerns and that the Coalition’s “procedure
will never be ‘thoughtful’ enough for this imbecile.” That is not the consultation required
under section 121349. Whatever discretion the Department may have in determining
when the consultation requirement is satisfied under section 121349, subdivision (c), it
cannot skip this step altogether and simply relegate law enforcement leaders to
participating in the public comment period.
       The Department’s violation of section 121349’s consultation requirement,
moreover, was prejudicial. Its failure to engage with any of the local law enforcement
agencies, and even to contact three of these agencies, prevented the interactive process
that the Legislature intended in section 121349. That failure makes it impossible to know
what effect this interactive process would have had on the Department’s balancing of law
enforcement concerns with public health benefits under the statute. Under these
circumstances, we cannot say the Department’s violation of section 121349 was
harmless, particularly since, were we to do so, we would render the statute’s consultation
requirement a nullity. (See California Wilderness Coalition, supra, 631 F.3d at p. 1093
[finding prejudicial a federal agency’s failure to consult and noting “the nature of

                                              13
consultation makes it difficult to determine the precise consequences of its absence”]; cf.
Rural Landowners Assn. v. City Council (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 1013, 1019, 1021
[finding prejudicial a city’s conduct that prevented state agencies from submitting timely
comments on a CEQA project; although the city received similar comments from others,
“it was impossible . . . to know what effect these expert criticisms would have had on
public comments, presentations and official reaction”]; Fall River Wild Trout Foundation
v. County of Shasta (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 482, 493 [finding similarly when a county
failed to reach out to an agency with subject matter expertise].)
       Although both the Department and the Coalition favor a different reading of
section 121349, we find none of their arguments persuasive. Both, to start, try to
distinguish California Wilderness Coalition. They argue the case is distinguishable
because the statute there used somewhat different language than that here. But while true
these two statutes are not identical, respondents miss the Ninth Circuit’s point in
California Wilderness Coalition. The court there, again, focused on the statute’s distinct
language for “consultation” and “comment” in its holding, reasoning that this
“juxtaposition . . . indicates that Congress intended consultation to be more than
responding to comments.” (California Wilderness Coalition, supra, 631 F.3d at p. 1087.)
That same juxtaposition is present here. And so while section 121349 may be phrased
somewhat differently than the statute in California Wilderness Coalition, it is similar in
the way that matters—it has distinct language for consultation and comment, evidencing
distinct requirements for consultation and comment.
       The Coalition also cites a case it believes more on point—California Native Plant
Society v. City of Rancho Cordova (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 603 (California Native Plant
Society). In that case, our court considered a provision in a city’s general plan that
required it to consult with a state agency when making certain decisions about plant and
animal habitats. (Id. at p. 635.) Starting with the principle that a city enjoys a high
degree of deference in interpreting its own general plan, we found the city reasonably

                                             14
concluded that soliciting and considering comments from the state agency was good
enough. (Id. at pp. 638-639.) After all, we explained, one of the meanings of the word
“ ‘consult’ ” is simply “ ‘to ask the advice or opinion of.’ ” (Id. at p. 639.) In the
Coalition’s telling, this “analysis and holding is directly on point here and controlling,”
including the discussion of deference.
       The Coalition, however, fails to appreciate several important differences in that
case. First, while a city has “ ‘ “unique competence to interpret [its] policies” ’ ” when
approving a project and is entitled to a high degree of deference (Orange Citizens for
Parks & Recreation v. Superior Court (2016) 2 Cal.5th 141, 155), a state agency
interpreting a statute is not entitled to the same amount of deference (see Center for
Biological Diversity v. Department of Fish & Wildlife (2015) 62 Cal.4th 204, 236
[“[e]ven in substantive areas of the agency’s expertise, . . . our deference to an agency’s
statutory interpretation is limited”]). Second, and more importantly, the text of section
121349—which includes both a consultation requirement and a public comment
requirement—is not comparable to the text of the general plan in California Native Plant
Society—which included no comment requirement at all. (California Native Plant
Society, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 635.) Again, the structure of section 121349
matters, and it shows that consultation must mean something more than merely providing
an opportunity to comment.
       To the extent California Native Plant Society is comparable, moreover, it tends to
favor Grant Park. The general plan there, as covered, required the city to consult with a
state agency on certain matters. It also required the city to coordinate with the state
agency on related matters. (California Native Plant Society, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at
p. 635.) In part because the general plan used these distinct words, the court concluded
that “the City intended ‘coordination’ to have a different meaning than ‘consultation’ ”—
otherwise it could have just used the word “consultation.” (Id. at p. 641.) Even the
Coalition’s preferred case, then, favors Grant Park’s position and shows a provision’s

                                              15
terms must be construed in the context of the provision as a whole, not in isolation.
(See Brennon B. v. Superior Court (2022) 13 Cal.5th 662, 673 [courts must “ ‘ “
‘consider portions of a statute in the context of the entire statute and the statutory scheme
of which it is a part, giving significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an
act in pursuance of the legislative purpose’ ” ’ ” ].)
       The Department also raises the topic of deference, though, unlike the Coalition, it
does not claim it is entitled to the same degree of deference as a city interpreting its own
policies. It instead simply contends it has “broad discretion” to construe the term
“consultation” and suggests we should defer to its preferred reading. But like the
Coalition, the Department overstates the deference it is due. “An agency interpretation of
the meaning and legal effect of a statute is entitled to consideration and respect by the
courts.” (Yamaha Corp. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization (1998) 19 Cal.4th 1, 7.)
But in the end, courts still must “independently judge the text of the statute,” even when
“taking into account and respecting the agency’s interpretation of its meaning.” (Ibid.)
“Depending on the context, [the agency’s interpretation] may be helpful, enlightening,
even convincing. It may sometimes be of little worth.” (Id. at pp. 7-8.) Here, we find
the last of these descriptions best describes the Department’s interpretation here. For the
reasons already covered, its interpretation is inconsistent with the statutory text and
structure, inconsistent with the legislative history, and inconsistent with existing case law.
       Lastly, in an argument directed toward all Grant Park’s claims, the Coalition
asserts Grant Park’s claims are moot because the Department’s 2020 approval of the
Coalition’s program expired on August 7, 2022. It reasons that in these circumstances no
court could provide Grant Park effective relief. We find differently. As the Coalition
concedes, the Department, relying on the initial 2020 approval, has since reauthorized the
Coalition’s program for another two years until August 7, 2024. It did so under section
121349, subdivision (c), which allows the Department to authorize a program for up to
two years and then “reauthorize the program in consultation with the local health officer

                                              16
and local law enforcement leadership.” Under these circumstances, our finding that the
Department’s initial approval was inappropriate, which would undermine the basis for the
later reauthorization, could still provide Grant Park with effective relief. (Harris v.
Stampolis (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 484, 495 [party could challenge restraining order that
expired but has since been renewed].)
                                              III
                                       Public Comment
       We consider next Grant Park’s contention that the Department violated section
121349’s requirements for public comment. Grant Park raises two points on this topic.
First, it argues the Department failed to notify three local police departments about the
comment period. Second, it contends the Department wrongly ended the comment period
at 45 days, even though its regulations at the time guaranteed a comment period of 90
days. We agree with both contentions.
       We begin with the Department’s failure to notify three local police departments
about the comment period. Section 121349, subdivision (e) describes the process for
public comment. It states: “If the application is provisionally deemed appropriate by the
department, the department shall, at least 45 days prior to approval of the application,
provide for a period of public comment as follows: [¶] (1) Post on the department’s
internet website the name of the applicant, the nature of the services, and the location
where the applying entity will provide the services. [¶] (2) Send a written and an email
notice to the local health officer of the affected jurisdiction. [¶] (3) Send a written and
an email notice to the chief of police, the sheriff, or both, as appropriate, of the
jurisdictions in which the program will operate.” (§ 121349, subd. (e).) Our focus here is
on the last of these requirements. Before approving the Coalition’s application, the
Department contacted two law enforcement agencies in Santa Cruz County—the Santa
Cruz County Sheriff and the Santa Cruz Police Department. But it only contacted these
agencies five days after it started the comment period and after it told the public that local

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law enforcement had already been contacted. It also, more relevant to Grant Park’s
argument, never contacted the remaining three city police departments in the county—
namely, the Scotts Valley, Watsonville, and Capitola Police Departments. None of these
police departments thus received the required notice under section 121349.
       We turn next to the Department’s failure to provide a 90-day comment period. At
the time the Department considered the Coalition’s application, and still today, section
121349 required the Department to provide for a period of public comment “at least 45
days prior to approval of the application.” (§ 121349, subd. (e), italics added, as
amended by Stats. 2018, ch. 34, § 13, eff. June 27, 2018.) But the Department’s
regulations at the time of the application required more than the minimum period
required in the statute. They required a 90-day period for public comment. (Former Cal.
Code Regs., tit. 17, §§ 7000, subd. (a)(22) [“ ‘Public Comment Period’ means a 90-day
period”], 7002, subd. (b) [“The public may comment online about an application during
the 90-day public comment period”].) And so, as required under these then-governing
regulations, the Department should have provided the public 90 days to comment on the
Coalition’s application. Instead, it allowed only half this time—45 days.
       Because the Department both ended the comment period 45 days early and failed
to notify three city police departments about the comment period, we find it violated
section 121349’s requirements for public comment—something that neither the
Department nor the Coalition dispute on appeal. We also find these violations
collectively prejudicial. The record suggests that the Department’s conduct prevented at
least one law enforcement agency, the Scotts Valley Police Department, from
commenting on the Coalition’s application here. That department’s police chief
commented on the Coalition’s first application, voicing his “strong opposition to the
application” and noting the reasons for his opposition. But the Department never notified
him about the Coalition’s second application, and, lacking fair notice of the application,
he never submitted a comment on this application. The general public too—which had

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reason to expect an additional 45 days to comment—also lacked a fair opportunity to
comment on the Coalition’s second application. And considering the high public interest
in the Coalition’s application—with nearly 700 comments submitted—it is not plausible
that the Department’s failure to provide these 45 days of public comment was harmless.
(Cf. Joy Road Area Forest & Watershed Assn. v. California Dept. of Forestry & Fire
Protection (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 656, 673 [“the significant public interest in this case
is a strong indication that the failure to comply with CEQA’s notice and recirculation
requirements was prejudicial”].)
       Although the Department and the Coalition contend the Department’s violations
are either moot or not prejudicial, we find differently. Starting with prejudice, they argue
the Department’s failure to notify the Scotts Valley, Watsonville, and Capitola Police
Departments was not prejudicial, because all three police departments still had actual
notice of the comment period and even submitted comment letters. But while we accept
these police departments eventually had notice of the comment period after several
members of the public shared courtesy copies of their comments, they only received this
notice well after the comment period had already begun. And while two of the three
police departments—the Watsonville and Capitola Police Departments—ultimately
submitted comments, the Scotts Valley Police Department submitted nothing on the
application here. In claiming otherwise, the Department and the Coalition appear to have
confused the Scotts Valley City Council—which did submit a comment letter—with the
Scotts Valley Police Department—which did not. Grant Park appears to have made the
same mistake at the trial court level, alleging that all three police departments submitted
comments, though it has corrected its factual error on appeal.
       Turning to mootness, the Department and the Coalition argue the Department’s
failure to provide the required 90 days for comment is moot because, after Grant Park
filed suit, the Department amended its regulations to require a comment period of only 45
days. (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 17, §§ 7000, subd. (a)(22), 7002, subd. (b).) They reason that

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Grant Park and others already received the full 45-day comment period required in the
current regulations. They add that remanding the matter to require an additional 45-day
comment period would only delay the inevitable.
       We find neither argument persuasive. Telling the public they have 90 days to
comment but then, at day 45, saying the rules have changed and the comment period is
over, is not the same as telling the public up front they have only 45 days to comment. In
the former scenario, members of the public may be excluded from the administrative
process simply because they took the government at its word. Not so in the latter
scenario. That distinction is important. And to the extent members of the public were
excluded from participating here because they reasonably anticipated having more time
to comment based on the Department’s regulations, remanding this matter to the
Department to provide a new comment period would provide effective relief. Remanding
in these circumstances, moreover, cannot be said to merely delay the inevitable, for we
cannot simply presume the Department has already made up its mind and will not be
moved by any further comments.
                                            IV
                                          CEQA
       Lastly, we consider Grant Park’s assertion that the Department violated CEQA.
       CEQA serves “to ensure that public agencies will consider the environmental
consequences of discretionary projects they propose to carry out or approve.” (Stockton
Citizens for Sensible Planning v. City of Stockton (2010) 48 Cal.4th 481, 488.) To that
end, absent an exemption, an agency proposing to carry out or approve a project
generally must conduct an initial study to determine “if the project may have a significant
effect on the environment.” (Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 14, § 15063, subd. (a).) Depending on
the initial study’s findings, the agency must then prepare either an environmental impact
report, a mitigated negative declaration, or a negative declaration. (Pub. Resources Code,

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§§ 21100, 21151; Cal. Code. Regs., tit. 14, §§ 15063, subd. (b)(2), 15070, subd. (b),
15371.)
       In this case, Grant Park contends the Department—which treated its approval as
exempt from CEQA—violated CEQA requirements in place at the time it approved the
Coalition’s application in 2020. Although Grant Park acknowledges the Legislature later
amended the law in 2021 to make authorizations under section 121349 exempt from
CEQA (§ 121349, subd. (h), as amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 480, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2022), it
contends this amendment was not in effect at the time of the trial court’s ruling and, in
any event, it does not apply retroactively. It then asserts it is “still entitled to the remedy
[it] seek[s], which is the rescission of the authorization, with a new public comment
period and actual local law enforcement consultation, and declaratory and injunctive
relief” requiring full compliance “with the Health and Safety Code and its implementing
regulations.” Respondents, in response, assert that the 2021 amendment renders the issue
moot and that adopting Grant Park’s approach would only waste resources.
       We need not resolve the merits of the parties’ dispute. Although Grant Park seeks
various remedies in this case, the remedies it currently seeks are remedies it is already
entitled to receive because of the Department’s violations of section 121349. We need
not, and will not, address whether CEQA provides a separate ground for providing some
of this same relief.
                                       DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed. On remand, the trial court is directed to vacate its
judgment denying the petition for writ of mandate and to enter a new judgment granting

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the petition. Grant Park is entitled to recover its costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.278(a).)

                                                      /s/
                                                  BOULWARE EURIE, J.

We concur:

    /s/
HULL, Acting P. J.

    /s/
KRAUSE, J.

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