Court Opinion

ID: 9411051
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-25 17:26:15.848337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:02.352339
License: Public Domain

J-A14018-23

                               2023 PA Super 132

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 DANA MARIE FADDIS                       :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :    No. 2666 EDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 12, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-15-CR-0002719-2014

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

OPINION BY DUBOW, J.:                                 FILED JULY 25, 2023

      Appellant, Dana Marie Faddis, appeals from the October 12, 2022

judgment of sentence entered in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas

following her violation of probation.   After careful review, we affirm the

judgment of sentence.

      This case has an extensive procedural history involving numerous

violations of probation and parole, the majority of which are not relevant to

the instant appeal. Accordingly, we present an abbreviated recitation of the

factual and procedural history.

      In November 2014, the court sentenced Appellant to 1-11.5 months of

incarceration for Simple Assault and a consecutive 2-year term of probation

for Resisting Arrest.   In August 2020, after several violations of parole,

Appellant completed her sentence for Simple Assault and began her

probationary sentence for Resisting Arrest.
J-A14018-23

       On January 20, 2021, the court revoked Appellant’s probation after

finding that she had violated it and resentenced Appellant to a term of 3-12

months of incarceration (“January 2021 Incarceration Sentence”) followed by

a consecutive term of one year of probation (“January 2021 Probation

Sentence”).

       On December 1, 2021, the court concluded that Appellant violated

parole on her January 2021 Incarceration Sentence and imposed a sentence

of 9 months of incarceration (“December 2021 Incarceration Sentence”).1

While the court acknowledged the January 2021 Probation Sentence during

the hearing, it did not reference the January 2021 Probation Sentence in the

order imposing the December 2021 Incarceration Sentence.2

       On October 12, 2022, following the expiration of the December 2021

Incarceration Sentence, the court concluded that Appellant violated her

January 2021 Probation Sentence.3 It revoked probation and sentenced her

to 3-11.5 months of incarceration (“October 2022 Incarceration Sentence”).

In so doing, the court rejected Appellant’s claim that the silence of the

December 2021 Sentencing Order in regard to the January 2021 Probation

Sentence resulted in termination of the January 2021 Probation Sentence.
____________________________________________

1 The court also stated: “Case can be closed at end of parole period if she
completes treatment successfully as well as all after care.” Tr. Ct. Order,
12/1/21.

2 N.T., 12/1/21, at 8; Tr. Ct. Order, 12/1/21.

3 Appellant’s parole period under the January 2021 Incarceration Sentence

ended on June 6, 2022.

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      Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.       Both the trial court and

Appellant complied with Pa.R.A.P 1925.

      Before this Court, Appellant raises the following question: “Did the trial

court err in revoking probation and imposing sentence when probation term

which was revoked was not contained on the previous written sentencing

order?” Appellant’s Br. at 2.

                                       A.

      Appellant challenges the sentence imposed following the revocation of

her January 2021 Probation Sentence. This Court reviews a sentence imposed

following a revocation of probation for an error of law or an abuse of discretion.

Commonwealth v. Shires, 240 A.3d 974, 977 (Pa. Super. 2020). “[W]e can

review the validity of the revocation proceedings, the legality of the sentence

imposed following revocation, and any challenge to the discretionary aspects

of the sentence imposed.” Id. (citation omitted).

      The instant case involves interactions between the trial court’s

imposition of sanctions for Appellant’s violations of parole and probation. The

sanctions for these violations are distinct. “[A] court faced with a violation of

probation may impose a new sentence so long as it is within the sentencing

alternatives available at the time of the original sentence.” Commonwealth

v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57, 59 n.5 (Pa. 2007) (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(b)). “In

contrast, a court faced with a parole violation must recommit the parolee to

serve the remainder of the original sentence of imprisonment[.]” Id.

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      Moreover, as recently held by this Court in Commonwealth v.

Simmons, 262 A.3d 512, 527-528 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc), and affirmed

by the Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Rosario, 294 A.3d 338 (Pa.

2023), revocation of probation “is permissible solely during the term of the

probation itself.” Id. at 347, see also id. at 349 (holding that “the clear

language   of   [S]ection   9771   explicitly   forbids   anticipatory   probation

revocation”).

      Finally, “[i]t is well-settled that due process protections apply both to

individuals who are on probation[] and to individuals who are on parole[.]”

Commonwealth v. Hoover, 231 A.3d 785, 793 (Pa. 2020) (internal citations

omitted). “[D]ue process[, inter alia,] requires that individuals be given fair

warning of the acts which may lead to revocation of parole or probation.” Id.

                                       B.

      Appellant challenges the trial court’s jurisdiction to impose a sentence

for a violation of her January 2021 Probation Sentence. She contends that

the January 2021 Probation Sentence ceased to exist when the court did not

reference it in the December 2021 Order imposing a sentence for her violation

of the January 2021 Incarceration Sentence. While she recognizes that the

court acknowledged the January 2021 Probation Sentence during the

December 2021 hearing, Appellant emphasizes that “[o]ral statements made

by the judge in passing sentence, but not incorporated in the written sentence

signed by [the sentencing judge], are not part of the judgment of sentence.”

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Appellant’s Br. at 6 (quoting Commonwealth v. Quinlan, 639 A.2d 1235,

1239 (Pa. Super. 1994)).

       Moreover, Appellant claims that the due process protections of the

United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions required the court to provide

her with notice of her full sentence, including any outstanding probationary

sentences. She asserts that “[t]he practice of not including sentences on the

last sentencing sheet is very confusing to attorneys, probation officers, and

the court, but most importantly to defendants who have a right to know their

sentence and may face multiple consecutive probationary terms.” Id. at 13.

       After careful consideration, we agree with the trial court that Appellant’s

January 2021 Probation Sentence remained intact, regardless of whether the

court referenced that sentence in the December 2021 Sentencing Order.

Indeed, the court correctly recognized that the January 2021 Probation

Sentence was not before the court in December 2021, given that under

Simmons, Appellant could not have violated the consecutive probationary

sentence that she had yet to begin serving.         Tr. Ct. Op., 12/9/22, at 3.

Appellant fails to cite any other indication in the record of the court’s intent to

terminate the January 2021 Probation Sentence. Accordingly, we agree that

the January 2021 Probation Sentence continued to bind Appellant and that the

court had jurisdiction to adjudicate her violation of it.4

____________________________________________

4 Although the trial court opined that a court “is not permitted to address the

anticipatory probationary period,” Tr. Ct. Op. at 8, as noted in Rosario, a trial
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -5-
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       Additionally, we reject Appellant’s complaint that the failure to restate

the January 2021 Probation Sentence in the December 2021 Sentencing Order

violated her constitutional due process protections by failing to provide notice

of the remaining sentence. To the contrary, Appellant received the requisite

notice of the probation sentence in the January 2021 Sentencing Order.5

       In sum, we conclude that the court had jurisdiction to impose a sentence

for Appellant’s violation of her January 2021 Probation Sentence.

       Judgment of Sentence affirmed.

____________________________________________

court may address a probationary sentence “at any time” in three limited
instances under the plain language of Section 9771(a), specifically it may
“terminate continued supervision, lessen the conditions of probation, and
increase the conditions of probation upon a finding of an identifiable threat to
public safety.” Rosario, 294 A.3d at 347 (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9771(a)).

Thus, the court could have terminated the January 2021 Probation Sentence
before it began. Indeed, the December 2021 Sentencing Order implied that
the January 2021 Probation Sentence could be terminated early, as it stated
that the “[c]ase can be closed at the end of parole period if [Appellant]
completes treatment[.]” Tr. Ct. Order, 12/1/21. There is no indication,
however, that Appellant completed treatment to trigger this provision.

5  Nevertheless, we acknowledge Appellant’s valid concerns regarding
defendants’ and other stakeholders’ potential confusion when faced with
multiple sentencing orders on the same docket. Indeed, the sentencing court
raised similar questions in observing that “Simmons, supra, and its progeny,
do not address what should be reflected on the VOP sentencing sheet in light
of the fact that the courts are not to consider anticipatory sentences.” Tr. Ct.
Op. at 7. To alleviate any confusion, we recommend that courts restate all
sentences outstanding on the docket in all violation of parole or probation
sentencing orders, absent further guidance from the Supreme Court.

                                           -6-
J-A14018-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 7/25/2023

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