Court Opinion

ID: 9670046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:13:07.510657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:16.812533
License: Public Domain

TERNUS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. The majority believes the only consequential issue in this case is whether the statute of limitations for claims against the State, Iowa Code section 669.13, bars the plaintiffs’ claims. They have given little consideration to the State’s argument that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred long before suit was filed in 2003, and that events occurring after these claims were barred cannot serve to resurrect them. I am convinced this court’s long-standing rules of statutory interpretation and well-established legal principles governing the revival of barred claims compel the conclusion that the plaintiffs’ claims are barred as a matter of law.
A. Points of disagreement The majority relies on section 669.13 and the discovery rule to conclude the plaintiffs’ suit is not time barred. I would agree that if one limits one’s consideration to the application of section 669.13, the plaintiffs’ claims are not barred. But the State contends the plaintiffs’ claims were barred long before this action was filed. It asks the court to examine prior law that it says cut off the plaintiffs’ right to bring this suit decades ago. The majority unfairly characterizes the State’s contention as asking the court to go back forty years and reenact a repealed sunrise provision in the original legislation. The majority refuses to do so. They also claim that the repealed provision would not have barred the plaintiffs’ claims anyway, even if the court were to consider it. I will address each aspect of the majority’s analysis separately-
B. Proper analytical framework. I begin with the majority’s description of the State’s request that the court examine pri- or statutes to determine the viability of the plaintiffs’ claims. Contrary to the majority’s statement that the State wants the court to reenact a repealed statute, the State is merely requesting the court to properly analyze the issue presented by the State’s statute-of-limitations defense. That defense requires the court to examine not only the current statute of limitations, but any prior applicable limitations period that may have already expired. See Frideres v. Schiltz, 540 N.W.2d 261, 266 (Iowa 1995).
In Frideres, this court answered certified questions concerning a newly-enacted statute of limitations applicable to claims of sexual abuse. Id. at 263 (referring to Iowa Code section 614.8A (1993)). We stated the following general principles with respect to statutes of limitations:
“ ‘A general rule with respect to statutes of limitations is that the period of limitation in effect at the time suit is brought governs in an action even though it may lengthen or shorten an earlier period of limitation.... However, another general rule ... is that if plaintiffs suit was barred by the running of a statute of limitations prior to the extension of the limitation period, the subsequent statute cannot revive defendant’s liability.’ ”
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“This general rule has been followed and further explained by this court and federal courts applying Iowa law. Previously, we have held that the statute of limitations in effect at the time the cause of action accrues is controlling and that the repeal or amendment of a statute of limitations cannot act retrospectively to revive actions previously barred under *651a prior statute in the absence of express legislative intent.”
Id. at 266 (citations omitted.) (emphasis added). Applying these principles, this court held that the new statute of limitations for sexual abuse contained in Iowa Code section 614.8A did “not apply retroactively to revive claims that have been barred by an applicable statute of limitations in existence prior to the enactment of section 614.8A.” Id. at 267. We noted that “[i]n determining whether a claim has been barred by an applicable statute of limitations, ... application of the discovery rule must be made as a necessary step in that resolution.” Id. We clarified, however, that the discovery rule did not operate retroactively:
Our common law discovery rule thus applies to claims filed prior to the enactment of section 614.8A, and the statutory discovery rule of section 614.8A applies to actions filed thereafter. Claims barred by preexisting staUutes of limitation are not revived by either discovery rule.
Id. (emphasis added).
The majority does not address the principles of law discussed in Frideres, and certainly does not undertake to apply them to this case. I think this law must be applied to fully and fairly analyze the State’s defense. As the following discussion explains, these principles require that the district court’s denial of the State’s motion to dismiss must be reversed.
C. Sovereign immunity and statute of limitations when tort committed. To determine whether the plaintiffs’ claims are barred by a preexisting statute of limitations, we must go back in time. I begin with the state of the law when the alleged torts were committed.
The plaintiffs seek to recover damages for torts allegedly committed by the State in 1939. As the majority acknowledges, at that time the State was immune from suit. See Montandon v. Hargrave Constr. Co., 256 Iowa 1297, 1299-1300, 130 N.W.2d 659, 660 (1964). In addition, even had the plaintiffs been able to sue the State in 1939 or the years immediately following, their claims would have been subject to the two-year statute of limitations for injuries to the person. See Iowa Code § 11007 (1939). Moreover, that two-year limitations period would not have been tolled by the plaintiffs’ failure to discover their claims against the State.7 See McGrath v. Dougherty, 224 Iowa 216, 223, 275 N.W. 466, 470-71 (1937). The only discovery rule recognized by the Iowa courts at that time was the statutory discovery rule for equitable fraud actions found in Iowa Code section 11010 (1939). Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claims here were barred by the statute of limitations in 1941, unless there is some statutory enactment that could validly revive them. Apparently, the majority believes that statutory enactment is the State Tort Claims Act.
D. State Tort Claims Act and its retro-activity provision. The State Tort Claims Act was enacted in 1965, more than twenty-three years after the plaintiffs’ claims were time barred. See 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 79 (codified at Iowa Code ch. 25A (1966), now Iowa Code ch. 669 (2003)). This act *652partially abrogated the immunity of the State for its torts. See id.; Harden v. State, 434 N.W.2d 881, 883 (Iowa 1989) (“The Iowa Tort Claims Act ... acts as a limited waiver of sovereign immunity”). The abrogation was not without its limits, however. It is clear from an examination of the act that the legislature did not intend to authorize suit against the State for any and all of its torts whenever committed. In defining the “claims” that fell within the scope of the immunity waiver, the legislature expressly stated that “only such claims accruing on or after January 1, 1963” were included. 1965 Iowa Acts ch. 79, § 2 (codified at Iowa Code § 25A.1(5) (1966)). This retroactivity provision was supplemented by a statute of limitations requiring that suit be filed “within two (2) years after such claim accrued or prior to July 1, 1967, whichever is later.” Id. § 13 (codified at Iowa Code § 25A.13 (1966)). Applying proper rules of statutory construction to these provisions, I find the conclusion inescapable that the legislature did not intend to incorporate a discovery rule in the State Tort Claims Act in 1965. Therefore, the act did not purport to revive stale claims based on conduct predating January 1,1963.
1. Principles guiding proper analysis of retroactivity provision. It is helpful at the outset to review pertinent rules of statutory interpretation so a proper focus can be maintained in analyzing the meaning of this statute. The polestar in interpreting the act is the legislature’s intent. State v. Dann, 591 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Iowa 1999). As common sense would suggest, in determining legislative intent, the court “focuses attention on circumstances and events at the time when a bill was enacted.” 2B Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 49:01, at 8 (6th ed.2000 rev.) (emphasis added) [hereinafter “Statutes and Statutory Construction ”]; accord Dann, 591 N.W.2d at 638 (stating “that, in construing a statute, the court must be mindful of the state of the law when it was enacted ” (emphasis added)); Brady v. City of Dubuque, 495 N.W.2d 701, 705 (Iowa 1993) (stating “contemporary circumstances” may be used as an aid to interpretation (emphasis added)); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 117, at 326 (2001) (“Statutes are to be read in the light of attendant conditions at the time of their enactment.”); Iowa Code § 4.6(2) (2003) (instructing court to consider “[t]he circumstances under which the statute was enacted” in determining legislative intent). Accordingly, we “tak[e] into consideration the historical framework” of the statute, 2B Statutes and Statutory Construction § 49:01, at 8-9, and look to the state of the law existing at the time the statute was adopted, Davis v. State, 682 N.W.2d 58, 61 (Iowa 2004).
One aspect of the historical context of a statute is the accepted, contemporaneous meaning of words or phrases used in the statute. Thus, we have long held that “[t]he legislature is presumed to know the usual meaning ascribed by the courts to language and to intend that meaning unless the context shows otherwise.” State v. Shafranek, 576 N.W.2d 115, 118 (Iowa 1998) (citing cases); accord Hagen v. Texaco Ref. & Mkting., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Iowa 1995); 2B Statutes and Statutory Construction § 50:03, at 150 (“The interpretation of well-defined words or phrases in the common law carries over to statutes dealing with the same or similar subject matter.”); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 124, at 334 (stating “words in a statute are assumed to bear their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” (emphasis added)).
Similarly, the legislature has specifically provided that a court, in interpreting ambiguous statutory provisions, should consider “[t]he common law or former statutory provisions, including laws upon the *653same or similar subjects.” Iowa Code § 4.1(4) (2003). These resources are pertinent because “[i]t is assumed that whenever the legislature enacts a provision it has in mind previous statutes relating to the same subject matter.” 2B Statutes and Statutory Construction § 51:02, at 176; accord State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996) (in interpreting statutory language court may consider similar statutes); 73 Am.Jur.2d Statutes § 150, at 353 (“[I]f a special meaning is attached to certain words in a prior act, there is a presumption of some force that the legislature intended that they should have the same signification when used in a subsequent act in relation to the same subject matter.”). In addition, “the interpretation of a doubtful statute may be influenced by language of other statutes which are not specifically related, but which apply to similar persons, things, or relationships.” 2B Statutes and Statutory Construction § 53:03, at 327-38; accord Hagen, 526 N.W.2d at 536 (applying case law interpretation of same language used in other, unrelated statutes). Having established that the state of the law, including court decisions interpreting similar language in related and unrelated statutes, is a useful aid in interpreting a statute, I now examine whether these resources reveal a meaning for the word “accruing,” as used by the legislature in 1965.
2. Contemporaneous context of retro-activity provision. The majority states, “Precedent clearly holds a claim does not ‘accrue’ until the plaintiff ‘discovers the injury or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered it.’ ” (Citation omitted). While this statement may be true in 2005, in 1965 precedent clearly held that a claim accrued at the time of injury. See, e.g., Eppling v. Seuntjens, 254 Iowa 396, 117 N.W.2d 820, 825 (Iowa 1962); Beerman v. Beerman, 225 Iowa 48, 51-52, 279 N.W. 449, 451-52 (1938); Ogg v. Robb, 181 Iowa 145,156,162 N.W. 217, 221 (1917); Gustin v. County of Jefferson, 15 Iowa 158, 160 (1863). Moreover, prior to 1965, this court had expressly and consistently stated that “ignorance of the existence of a cause of action at law does not prevent the statute from running unless there has been an intentional fraudulent concealment.” McGrath, 224 Iowa at 223, 275 N.W. at 471; accord Lougee v. Reed, 133 Iowa 48, 50-51, 110 N.W. 165, 166 (1907); see Chrischilles v. Griswold, 260 Iowa 453, 461, 150 N.W.2d 94, 100 (1967) (noting rule up to that point in time— 1967 — was that “ignorance of a right does not prevent the running of the statute of limitations”), superseded by statute as stated in Langner v. Simpson, 533 N.W.2d 511, 516 (Iowa 1995).
Prior to 1965, this court had never applied the discovery rule outside the legislatively authorized area of equitable fraud, mistake, and trespass, see Iowa Code § 614.4 (1962), and the statutory discovery rule had been strictly limited to the types of claims expressly listed in the statute. See, e.g., Cole v. Hartford Accident & Indent. Co., 242 Iowa 416, 426, 46 N.W.2d 811, 817 (1951). It was not until this court’s 1967 decision in Chrischilles that the discovery rule was applied outside statutory parameters. Clearly, this case, which changed the law and which was decided after legislative enactment of the retroactivity or sunrise provision, is not authoritative on the issue of the legislature’s intent two years earlier. See Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. Ry., 22 Ill.2d 305,175 N.E.2d 785, 792 (1961) (refusing to ascribe intent to legislature that was contrary to legal principles followed at time statute was enacted).
This court’s refusal to apply the discovery rule outside section 614.4 prior to 1967 is even more significant when one examines the statutes of limitation that were being interpreted by our decisions. From *654its initial adoption, the general statute of limitations found at Iowa Code section 614.1 has focused on the accrual of the cause of action: “Actions may be brought within the times herein limited, respectively after their causes accrue, and not after-wards, except when otherwise specially declared .... ” Iowa Code § 614.1 (emphasis added). Prior to our 1967 Chrischilles decision, this court had always interpreted the word “accrue,” as used in the limitations statute, to refer to the time of injury, regardless of when the injury or claim was discovered by the injured party. See, e.g., Cole, 242 Iowa at 426, 46 N.W.2d at 817; McGrath, 224 Iowa at 223, 275 N.W. at 470-71; Lougee, 133 Iowa at 50-51, 110 N.W. at 166.
When one focuses on the proper time-frame, it is readily discernible that the word “accruing” had a well-defined meaning in 1965: it meant when the injury occurred. Consequently, if we remain true to our longstanding principles of statutory interpretation, we must conclude that when the legislature stated that only “claims accruing on or after January 1, 1963” were included in the waiver of immunity, the legislature did not intend to revive claims for torts committed prior to January 1,1963.
In fact, that was exactly the interpretation this court gave to the statute one year after its enactment. In Graham, v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 146 N.W.2d 626 (Iowa 1966), we considered the validity of a constitutional challenge to the State Tort Claims Act. One ground addressed by the court was directed to the provision stating that “ ‘claim’ includes only such claims accruing on or after January 1, 1963.” Graham, 259 Iowa at 855, 146 N.W.2d at 634. The challenger claimed this provision violated a constitutional prohibition against the payment of public money for a purpose not provided for by pre-existing law. Id. at 855-56, 146 N.W.2d at 634. We stated:
By its terms the Iowa Tort Claims Act became effective March 30, 1965. This then means claims which may have accrued anytime within two years and three months before its effective date are embraced within the terms of the enactment.
The question now presented is whether disbursement of funds for torts committed prior to the effective date of the Act would constitute payment of money, the subject matter of which was not provided for by any previously enacted law.
Id. at 855-56,146 N.W.2d at 634 (emphasis added). Clearly this court equated accrual of the claim with the date the tort was committed.
Later in the same opinion, we considered “whether chapter 25A operates equally upon all within the same class and with uniformity.” Id. at 863, 146 N.W.2d at 638. We said:
[The law] accords to all damaged or injured by the tort of an officer, agent or employee of the state subsequent to January 1, 1963, a prescribed method and means by which to secure a judicial or quasi-judicial determination of their grievances, denying this right to no person within that designated general field or classification.
Id. at 864, 146 N.W.2d at 639. Again, this court was undoubtedly interpreting the language “accruing on or after January 1, 1963,” to refer to damage or injury occurring subsequent to January 1, 1963. Moreover, this interpretation of the statute was not mere dicta. To the contrary, our court was required to identify the legislative classifications in order to assess the validity of the plaintiffs constitutional challenge under the Iowa Constitution’s Equality Clause. See Grovijohn v. Virjon, Inc., 643 N.W.2d 200, 204 (Iowa 2002) (“The first step of an equal protection *655claim is to identify the classes of similarly situated plaintiffs singled out for differential treatment.”).
It is significant that this interpretation of the language at issue was made only one year after the statute was adopted. Certainly this court’s understanding of the well-defined meaning of the statutory term “accruing” would have been much clearer in 1966, than it is now after having been muddied by the intervening years of applying the discovery rule in ever-growing contexts. See generally Wiltgen v. United States, 813 F.Supp. 1387, 1392, (N.D.Iowa 1992) (stating “it often happens that those cases closer in time to the enactment of a statute or the handing down of a precedent are in a better position to assess its true character”); accord State ex rel. McElhinney v. All-Iowa Agri. Ass’n, 242 Iowa 860, 868, 48 N.W.2d 281, 285 (1951) (presuming “meaning given [the statute] by contemporary usage” to be the true meaning).
In summary, when the legislature abrogated sovereign immunity in 1965, it did so only for torts that were committed on or after January 1, 1963. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claims, based on torts committed in 1939, remained barred notwithstanding the enactment of the Iowa Tort Claims Act. That brings me to the 1969 repeal of the retroactivity provision.
E. Repeal of retroactivity provision. Four years after the State Tort Claims Act was adopted, the legislature amended the statute in two relevant particulars. First, the general assembly deleted the words “or prior to July 1, 1967, whichever is later” in the statute of limitations, with the explanation that this amendment “deletes unnecessary and confusing language.” S.F. 376, 63rd G.A., 1st Sess. Explanation (Iowa 1969); see also 1969 Iowa Acts ch. 81, § 4(2). At the same time, the legislature deleted the sentence in the definition of “claim” that stated “ ‘claim’ includes only such claims accruing on or after January 1, 1963.” 1969 Iowa Acts ch. 81, § 2. The senate bill approved by the general assembly explained that the deleted sentence “is no longer necessary in view of the statute of limitations set forth in section 25A.13.” S.F. 376, 63rd G.A., 1st Sess. Explanation (Iowa 1969).
These legislative explanations' — -that the amendments were mere housekeeping to rid the statute of unnecessary provisions— are entirely consistent with my interpretation of the statute. By 1969 when these provisions were deleted, all claims accruing/occurring after January 1963 that had not already been pursued in court were barred. That conclusion is required by the statutory provision stating that “[e]very claim against the state permitted under this Act shall be forever barred, unless [filed within two years or prior to July 1, 1967].” Thus, there was no reason for the legislature to continue to address claims within this transition period: these claims had either been pursued in court or they were “forever barred.”
More importantly, the repeal of the ret-roactivity provision did not affect claims based on torts committed before January 1, 1963, such as those of the plaintiffs. First, the 1969 housekeeping amendments evidence no intent to effect a substantive change in the law, namely, to revive previously barred claims. Cf Frideres, 540 N.W.2d at 266 (stating extended statute of limitations will not “ ‘revive actions previously barred under a prior statute in the absence of express legislative intent’ ” (emphasis added) (citation omitted)). Consequently, the mere repeal of the retroactivity provision did not revive the plaintiffs’ claims. As I have already explained, the retroactivity provision did not revive claims based on pre-1963 torts, and so its repeal did not affect such claims either.
In addition, at the time the retroactivity provision was repealed, the State had a *656right to assert the statute of limitations as a defense because the applicable limitations period had expired and the plaintiffs’ barred claims had not been revived by the act. There is nothing in the bill deleting the retroactivity provision to indicate that the legislature intended to alter accrued rights by its action, and therefore, the State’s right to its statute-of-limitations defense was not affected by the repeal of the retroactivity provision. See D.M. ex rel. C.H. v. Nat’l Sch. Bus Serv., Inc., 305 Ill.App.3d 735, 238 Ill.Dec. 950, 713 N.E.2d 196, 203 (1999) (refusing to “ ‘breathe life into [a] previously barred claim’ ” brought against a governmental subdivision, stating “ ‘ “[a] vested ground of defense is as fully protected from being cut off or destroyed by an act of the legislature as is a vested cause of action” ’ ” (citations omitted)). See generally 2 Statutes and Statutory Construction § 41:9, at 455 (6th ed.2001 rev.) (“[A] statute may not apply retroactively to revive a cause of action already barred by the statute of limitations”).
In conclusion, the contemporaneous law and our rules of statutory interpretation unequivocally establish that the legislature intended that claims based on events occurring before January 1, 1963 were excluded from the act and forever barred. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ claims were not revived by the State Tort Claims Act. In addition, contrary to the majority’s characterization of the State’s position, it is not necessary to resurrect the repealed retro-activity provision in order to conclude the State has a viable statute-of-limitations defense. The retroactivity provision did not breathe life into the plaintiffs’ time-barred claims when it was enacted, and the plaintiffs’ claims remained just as dead after the retroactivity provision was repealed as they were before.
F. Application of Frideres principles to present case. I now return to the real issue in this case. That issue rests on the following principle: notwithstanding the general rule that the statute of limitations in effect when suit is filed governs, “ ‘ “if plaintiffs suit was barred by the running of a statute of limitations prior to the extension of the limitation period, the subsequent statute cannot revive defendant’s liability.” ’ ” Frideres, 540 N.W.2d at 266 (citations omitted). I am convinced the plaintiffs’ claims were barred decades ago; they were not revived by the provisions of the original State Tort Claims Act or amendments to that act; and they cannot be revived by this court’s application of the current statute of limitations and its discovery rule. See Frideres, 540 N.W.2d at 267 (“Claims barred by preexisting statutes of limitation are not revived by either [the common law or the statutory] discovery rule.”); cf. Leasojf, 428 A.2d at 784 (stating retroactive application of prior decision abolishing sovereign immunity did not revive claims already barred by statute of limitations).
G. Conclusion. When I apply the governing legal principles to this case, I can reach only one conclusion: the plaintiffs’ claims are time barred. I cannot understand why the majority believes these well-established principles regarding statutory interpretation and the revival of barred actions have no application to the suit before us. I suspect it is because they believe the debate in this case concerns “the king’s liability for his past indiscretions,” which they claim “still simmers within our court today.” I, for one, have no quarrel with the legislature’s decision to waive the State’s immunity. My quarrel is with the majority’s refusal to apply the law just because they disagree with the policy decisions made by prior legislatures and prior justices on this court. Under those prior statutes and prior decisions, the plaintiffs’ claims were barred. I dissent from the majority’s unprincipled revival of those claims. I would reverse the district *657court’s ruling and dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims on statute-of-limitations grounds.
CARTER, J., joins this dissent.

. Additionally, the existence of sovereign immunity did not toll the statutory limitations period. See Monroe v. Trustees of the Cal. State Colls., 6 Cal.3d 399, 99 Cal.Rptr. 129, 491 P.2d 1105, 1110 (1971) (stating "litigants who suffered injury at the hands of the government prior to [the abolition of sovereign immunity] would be barred from recovery unless their suits had been 'filed within the ordinary limitations periods provided for tort actions’ "); Leasoff v. Commonwealth, 59 Pa. Cmwlth. 45, 428 A.2d 783, 784 (1981) (rejecting argument that "Commonwealth's prior immunity ... toll[ed] the statute of limitations”). The plaintiffs make no argument to the contrary.