Court Opinion

ID: 9569523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:14:38.032856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:22.852292
License: Public Domain

Benham, Chief Justice,
concurring specially.
At the sentencing hearing following appellant’s conviction for aggravated assault, the trial court ruled that the State had carried its burden of establishing that appellant’s prior guilty plea, proffered by the State to enhance appellant’s punishment for the aggravated assault, was knowing, intelligent and voluntary. The State had presented extrinsic evidence at the sentencing hearing instead of submitting a copy of the transcript of appellant’s guilty plea hearing. That evidence consisted of appellant’s signed guilty plea and the testimony of the assistant district attorney who had signed the guilty plea and had been present at the guilty plea. He testified that, while he could not recall the specific details of appellant’s guilty plea hearing, he had never signed a guilty plea form during his 11 years of practice before the judge who took the plea unless the pleader had been informed of his rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived them, and that it was the judge’s practice of ensuring that the pleading defendant was aware of the possible consequences of a guilty plea and was aware of and waived his constitutional rights. Sworn testimony of a customary procedure may be used to establish compliance with constitutional rights or waiver thereof (Jones v. Wharton, 253 Ga. 82, 83 (316 SE2d 749) (1984); Stargell v. State, 183 Ga. App. 434 (2) (359 SE2d 205) (1987)), and the assistant district attorney’s testimony was sufficient to establish that appellant had been advised of his rights and knowingly and voluntarily waived them and entered a guilty plea. Since the trial court’s ruling and supporting rationale were correct, I would affirm the judgment entered by the trial court.
Neither the Court of Appeals nor the majority has determined that the trial court erred in its finding that the State had carried its burden. Instead, the Court of Appeals took upon itself the task of disregarding the controlling precedents of this State’s jurisprudence in favor of the “controlling authority” it purportedly found in Parke v. Raley, 506 U. S. 20 (113 SC 517, 121 LE2d 391) (1992), a U. S. Supreme Court case involving a constitutional challenge to a differ*287ent allocation of burden of proof established by the Commonwealth of Kentucky. Nash v. State, 233 Ga. App. 75 (503 SE2d 23) (1998). In its opinion, the majority queries whether the U. S. Supreme Court case applies to collateral attacks on final judgments in Georgia and overrules Georgia precedent in order that it might “follow Parke” I disagree with both the implication that Parke v. Raley controls, and the result reached by applying Parke to Georgia cases involving enhanced punishment.
In Kentucky, a “persistent felony offender” who contests the use of a prior conviction based on a guilty plea to increase punishment has the burden of producing evidence that the guilty plea was not valid under Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U. S. 238 (89 SC 1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969). The U. S. Supreme Court ruled in Parke v. Raley, supra, 506 U. S. 20, that the Kentucky scheme did not violate the Due Process Clause of the U. S. Constitution. In contrast to Kentucky, the State of Georgia places on the State the burden of establishing the validity of guilty-plea-based prior convictions proffered by the State to enhance a recidivist defendant’s sentence. Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195 (17) (345 SE2d 831) (1986). Such an allocation of the burden was not ruled unconstitutional, explicitly or implicitly, by the Parke decision. In fact, the Supreme Court expressly stated it was faced with the narrow question of “whether due process permits Kentucky to employ its particular burden-of-proof scheme . . .[,]” and noted its willingness to uphold against due process challenges a variety of state procedures for the implementation of recidivism statutes, emphasizing that tolerance for a spectrum of state procedures dealing with recidivism “is especially appropriate. . . Parke v. Raley, supra, 506 U. S. at 27-28. Thus, it is very clear that we are not facing a situation in which Georgia must change its ways because it has a procedure or statute similar to that of another State whose procedure or statute has been declared unconstitutional by the U. S. Supreme Court. See, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 262 Ga. 625 (422 SE2d 846) (1992), vacated, 509 U. S. 918 (113 SC 3028, 125 LE2d 717), 263 Ga. 602 (437 SE2d 320) (1993); James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. State of Ga., 259 Ga. 363 (382 SE2d 95 (1989), rev’d 501 U. S. 529 (111 SC 2439, 115 LE2d 481) (1991).
While Parke neither controls nor purports to control the manner in which Georgia allocates the burden of proof of the validity of a prior guilty plea used to enhance punishment, issues discussed by the U. S. Supreme Court in its opinion in Parke are worthy of consideration should we be faced with a case in which we must decide whether our allocation of the burden of proof is appropriate. In such a case, we would take into consideration circumstances as they exist in Georgia, much as Parke recognized the practices and procedures in place in Kentucky (see Parke v. Raley, supra, 506 U. S. at 30); *288examine the “presumption of regularity” which Georgia attaches to final judgments; and then balance the competing considerations.
The majority jettisons our burden-of-proof allocation because of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Parke and because our system purportedly fails to give any presumption of regularity to a final conviction used to enhance punishment pursuant to OCGA § 17-10-7 (a). Maj. Op., pp. 283-284. As I have already noted, Parke is in no way controlling precedent in the case before us. Accordingly, I turn my attention to the “presumption of regularity” which should be afforded guilty plea convictions. Both the majority and the Supreme Court recognize that the presumption of regularity plays a role when “there [is] no good reason to suspend the presumption. . . .” Parke v. Raley, supra, 506 U. S. at 30; Maj. Op., p. 282. I believe there are several reasons, some unique to Georgia, which authorize the suspension of the presumption when we are dealing with guilty plea convictions used to enhance punishment.
Georgia requires the making and preservation of a verbatim record of the proceeding at which a defendant pleads guilty (Uniform Superior Court Rule 33.11; King v. State, 270 Ga. 367 (509 SE2d 32) (1998)); expressly sets out what information must be given a defendant before a guilty plea is entered (USCR 33.8); requires an on-the-record presentation of a factual basis for the plea (USCR 33.9); and a judicial determination that the plea is voluntary (USCR 33.7). Yet, despite all these mandatory precautions, we do not have a system which ensures that all guilty pleas are knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. See, e.g., Knight v. Sikes, 269 Ga. 814 (504 SE2d 686) (1998); Wharton v. Henry, 266 Ga. 557 (469 SE2d 27) (1996); State v. Evans, 265 Ga. 332 (454 SE2d 468) (1995); Green v. State, 265 Ga. 263 (454 SE2d 466) (1995); Woody v. State, 229 Ga. App. 823 (494 SE2d 685) (1997); Johnson v. State, 227 Ga. App. 390 (489 SE2d 138) (1997); Parks v. State, 223 Ga. App. 694 (479 SE2d 3) (1996). In light of the appellate case law evidencing that we have not been entirely successful in our efforts to ensure that a defendant pleading guilty is informed of all rights and executes a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver thereof, I question whether it “ ‘defies logic’ to presume that a defendant was not advised of his rights from the mere unavailability of a transcript.” Maj. Op., p. 284. Second, the statutory presumption in favor of an unreversed judgment, found in OCGA § 24-4-24 (b) (1), is an estoppel and “[e]stoppels are not generally favored” in Georgia. OCGA § 24-4-24 (a). We do not employ a presumption of regularity in habeas corpus petitions involving guilty plea convictions (Knight v. Sikes, supra, 269 Ga. 814) and in enhanced punishment hearings where the defendant contends he was without counsel and did not waive that right when he pled guilty (Maj. Op., p. 285). Lastly, it is my belief that the finality of a judg*289ment entered on a guilty plea is not at risk when a sentencing court determines that it will not consider that judgment for sentencing enhancement because it has not been established that the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. The sentencing court’s determination in no way interferes with the finality of the judgment entered therein — it does not reverse or vacate the judgment of conviction based on the guilty plea; rather it is merely an evidentiary ruling that causes the court so finding to refrain from using that conviction on that particular occasion.
From a practical point, it is appropriate that the State shoulder the burden of establishing the validity of the guilty plea conviction proffered by the State to support the State’s request that the defendant be punished as a recidivist. Since the State is the party which decides to pursue recidivist punishment and selects which of the defendant’s prior convictions it is going to rely upon to have the defendant’s sentence enhanced (OCGA §§ 17-10-7; 17-10-2 (a)), it is rational and logical to have the State, as the proponent of the evidence, verify that its evidence may be used legitimately for this purpose. A conscientious prosecuting attorney who selects a guilty-plea-based prior conviction as the means of supporting enhancement of a defendant’s punishment will ensure that proof is at hand to establish that the plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily entered. In fact, even under Kentucky’s burden-of-proof allocation, the State must initially present a certified copy of a judgment of conviction and be prepared “affirmatively to show that the underlying judgment was entered in a manner that did, in fact, protect the defendant’s rights.” Parke v. Raley, supra, 506 U. S. at 24. Putting the burden on the defendant to also make a showing results in a duplication of the effort the prosecutor has already expended and results in an unnecessary stretching of precious judicial resources. Furthermore, in the 13 years since this Court placed the burden of establishing the validity of a prior guilty plea used to enhance punishment on the State, the State has shouldered the burden well. I see no need to exercise judicial fiat to embark on an experiment to see if criminal defendants, most of whom are indigent, are equally capable of carrying the burden.
I question the practical application in Georgia of the Kentucky procedure endorsed by the majority. The majority requires a defendant to produce affirmative evidence by means of a transcript of the guilty plea, testimony regarding the taking of the plea, or other affirmative evidence, but warns that the “ ‘mere naked assertion by an accused that his prior counseled plea was not made knowingly and intelligently is insufficient.’ ” Maj. Op., p. 285. In Georgia, it has long been appropriate to grant habeas relief, despite the presumption of regularity, based on the testimony, corroborated or not, of the con*290victed defendant. Balkcom, v. Williams, 220 Ga. 359 (1) (138 SE2d 873) (1964); Balkcom v. Vickers, 220 Ga. 345 (1) (138 SE2d 868) (1964); Balkcom v. Turner, 217 Ga. 610 (123 SE2d 918) (1962). In light of these Georgia precedents, the testimony of a defendant who challenges the use of a prior guilty plea should also be sufficient to serve as a basis for rebutting the presumption of regularity.
Decided July 6, 1999.
Pete & Associates, Anthony T. Pete, for appellant.
Lastly, I question the practicality of setting out a new procedure for our trial courts without discussing the ramifications that state constitutional guarantees might have. The majority’s failure to address state constitutional grounds in the case at bar is understandable given that the issue was raised only by the State’s argument on appeal that, though it met its burden of proof regarding the prior guilty plea, it should not have had to shoulder that burden.2 As the protections afforded a defendant under the Georgia Constitution have not been articulated or explored in this case, “tinkering” with the majority’s new procedure may be required in the future.
In conclusion, I endorse only that portion of the majority opinion which affirms the trial court’s determination that appellant’s prior guilty plea conviction could be used to enhance his sentence. For the reasons stated herein, I cannot embrace either the Court of Appeals’ or the majority’s decision to abandon Georgia precedent in favor of a U. S. Supreme Court ruling that dealt with a different attack on another state’s different procedure. Accordingly, I would order the Court of Appeals to vacate that portion of its opinion which extends beyond affirming the trial court’s ruling appealed by appellant.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Fletcher joins this special concurrence.

 Query whether the State’s complaint is, in reality, a contention that the trial court erred in requiring it to carry the burden of proof. If it is, I question whether this Court is authorized to address the issue in the absence of a cross-appeal.