Court Opinion

ID: 9430909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:30:51.908027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:26.244312
License: Public Domain

Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the judgment.
I, too, conclude, as do Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens, that a creditor’s invocation of a State’s post-judgment collection procedures constitutes action under color of state law within the reach of 42 U. S. C. §1983. See Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U. S. 922 (1982), where I joined the majority opinion. I also agree with them that the District Court was correct in not abstaining under the principles enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U. S. 37 (1971). See ante, at 19-21 and n. (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment); post, at 30, n. 2 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). In my view, to rule otherwise would expand the Younger doctrine to an unprecedented extent and would effectively allow the invocation of Younger abstention whenever any state proceeding is ongoing, no matter how attenuated the State’s interests are in that proceeding and no *28matter what abuses the federal plaintiff might be sustaining. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U. S. 434, 448 (1977) (concurring opinion). In addition, for the reasons given by Justice Brennan, see ante, at 21 (concurring in judgment), I believe that federal collateral review is not barred by the principles announced in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U. S. 462 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U. S. 413 (1923).
I, however, refrain from joining the opinion of either Justice Brennan or Justice Stevens when they would hold, as Justice Stevens does, that no due process violation in this context is possible or, as Justice Brennan does, that room must be left for some constitutional violations in post-judgment procedures, but only when the organization seeking the appeal has “special attributes as an organization” or when the underlying dispute involves “fundamental constitutional rights.” Ante, at 22 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). Those conclusions, I fear, suffer somewhat from contortions due to attempts to show that a due process violation in this case is not possible or is hardly possible.* Thus, I would not disturb the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that Texaco’s due process claim raised a “fair groun[d] for litigation” because “an inflexible requirement for impressment of a lien and denial of a stay of execution unless a supersedeas bond in the full amount of the judgment is posted can in some circumstances be irrational, unnecessary, and self-defeating, *29amounting to a confiscation of the judgment debtor’s property without due process.” 784 F. 2d 1133, 1154 (CA2 1986).
I conclude instead that this case presents an example of the “narrowly limited ‘special circumstances,”’ Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U. S. 241, 248 (1967), quoting Propper v. Clark, 337 U. S. 472, 492 (1949), where the District Court should have abstained under the principles announced in Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496 (1941). Although the Pullman issue was not pressed before us (but see Brief for Appellant 42-43), it was considered by the Court of Appeals and rejected. 784 F. 2d, at 1148-1149. In particular, the court determined that “there [was] nothing unclear or uncertain about the Texas lien and bond provisions” and that abstention was not demanded when there was only a “mere possibility” that the Texas courts would find such provisions unconstitutional. Ibid. I disagree.. If the extensive briefing by the parties on the numerous Texas statutes and constitutional provisions at issue here suggests anything, see Brief for Appellant 23-32 and accompanying notes; Brief for Appellee 32-44 and accompanying notes; Reply Brief for Appellant 3-11 and accompanying notes, it is that on the unique facts of this case “unsettled questions of state law must be resolved before a substantial federal constitutional question can be decided,” Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U. S. 229, 236 (1984), because “the state courts may interpret [the] challenged state statute[s] so as to eliminate, or at least to alter materially, the constitutional question presented.” Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U. S. 471, 477 (1977); see also ante, at 11-12, and n. 11. The possibility of such a state-law resolution of this dispute seems to me still to exist.

In particular, the suggestion that Texaco could enter a Chapter 11 proceeding, pursue its appeal, and then reemerge from this proceeding to continue “business as usual” strikes me as somewhat at odds with the reality of the corporate reorganization that might occur in bankruptcy, especially on the facts of this case. Moreover, while there has been some discussion about a “special law” for multibillion-dollar corporations, I would have thought that our proper concern is with constitutional violations, not with our sympathy, or lack thereof, for a particular litigant. It might also be useful to point out an obvious, but overlooked, fact: Pennzoil, too, is not a corner grocery store.