Court Opinion

ID: 9960801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-17 13:03:14.863982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:53.914314
License: Public Domain

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                        No. 1D2023-0894
                 _____________________________

ATWOOD OWNER LLC,

    Appellant,

    v.

AQCUINETTA LUMZY,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

On appeal from the County Court for Escambia County.
R. Scott Ritchie, Judge.

                         April 17, 2024

PER CURIAM.

    AFFIRMED.

LEWIS and BILBREY, JJ., concur; LONG, J., concurs with opinion.

                 _____________________________

    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
               _____________________________
LONG, J., concurring.

     I concur in the Court’s decision to affirm but write separately
to discuss the application of section 83.64, Florida Statutes, to a
holdover tenant’s claim of retaliatory eviction.

     Appellee Acquinetta Lumzy was given a notice of non-renewal
of her lease by Appellant Atwood Owner, LLC. Lumzy’s lease then
expired the following month, at which point she refused to leave
and became a holdover tenant. Atwood then filed an eviction
action. Lumzy raised the affirmative defense of retaliatory
conduct under section 83.64, citing her previous report to code
enforcement as the reason for her eviction. A hearing was held.
The trial court ruled that the eviction was retaliatory, and the
complaint was dismissed. This appeal follows.

     Section 83.64, Florida Statutes, provides that it is unlawful
for a landlord “to bring or threaten to bring an action for possession
or other civil action, primarily because the landlord is retaliating
against the tenant.” An example of conduct for which a landlord
may not retaliate includes where “[t]he tenant has complained to
a governmental agency charged with responsibility for
enforcement of a building, housing, or health code of a suspected
violation applicable to the premises.”

     On appeal, Atwood argues that, under section 83.64, there is
a legal distinction between an action for possession brought during
the term of a lease and one brought after the lease’s expiration.
We have never addressed whether a section 83.64 retaliatory
conduct defense is available after the natural expiration of a
tenant’s lease. Nor, if it is available, whether the power of section
83.64 is sufficient to compel landlords to enter into new indefinite
lease agreements against their will. The trial court here permitted
the defense and then, relying on the same, effectively imposed a
new lease on the landlord.

    I nevertheless concur in the Court’s decision to affirm without
addressing these arguments. Appellant failed to provide a
transcript of the proceedings below and there is nothing in the
sparse record to show that these issues were presented to the trial
court. We are therefore limited in our review. Because Appellant

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has failed to demonstrate any preserved reversible error, we must
affirm.

                 _____________________________

Elizabeth Cruikshank of Elizabeth Cruikshank, Atlanta, GA, for
Appellant.

Carrie Vaughn Cromey and Melissa Condon Onacki of Legal
Services of North Florida, Pensacola, for Appellee.

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