Court Opinion

ID: 9394948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 17:07:07.789957+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:04.396336
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Elevation Ents., Ltd. v. Anchor Capitol, L.L.C., 2023-Ohio-1646.]

                              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                   TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

Elevation Enterprises Limited d/b/a                     :
Elevation Commercial Realty,
                                                        :                    No. 22AP-365
                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                                    (C.P.C. No. 19CV-9573)
                                                        :
v.                                                                  (REGULAR CALENDAR)
                                                        :
Anchor Capitol L.L.C.
c/o Philip G. Schell,                                   :

                 Defendant-Appellant,                   :

[Whittier Park Limited,                                 :

                 Intervenor-Appellant],                 :

Northwest Title Family of Companies, Inc.               :
c/o James Scott Stevenson,
                                                        :
                 Defendant-Appellee.
                                                        :

                                            D E C I S I O N

                                       Rendered on May 16, 2023

                 On brief: Kemp, Schaeffer & Rowe, Co., L.P.A., Scott N.
                 Schaeffer, and Daniel A. Yarmesch, for appellee, Elevation
                 Enterprises Limited. Argued: Daniel A. Yarmesch.

                 On brief: Kevin R. Nose, for appellant Anchor Capitol,
                 L.L.C.; Kevin E. Humphreys, for intervenor-appellant
                 Whittier Park Limited. Argued: Kevin E. Humphreys and
                 Kevin R. Nose.

                 On brief: Northwest Law LLC, William D. Fergus, Jr., and
                 Charles A. Brigham, III, for appellee, Northwest Title Family
                 of Companies, Inc. Argued: Curtis H. Knapp.

                  APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
No. 22AP-365                                                                                2

LUPER SCHUSTER, J.
       {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Anchor Capitol L.L.C. (“Anchor”), appeals from a
decision and entry of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas denying its Civ.R. 60(B)
motion for relief from judgment, motion for leave to file an answer, and motion to strike
the notice of satisfaction of judgment.      Intervenor-appellant, Whittier Park Limited
(“Whittier”), appeals from the same decision and entry of the trial court denying its motion
for leave to intervene. For the following reasons, we affirm.
I. Facts and Procedural History
       {¶ 2} On November 27, 2019, plaintiff-appellee, Elevation Enterprises Limited
d/b/a Elevation Commercial Realty (“Elevation”), filed a complaint against Anchor and
defendant-appellee, Northwest Title Family of Companies, Inc. (“Northwest Title”), for
declaratory judgment, breach of contract, and quantum meruit. The complaint alleged
Elevation was the exclusive listing agent for real property owned by Anchor and, pursuant
to the listing agreement, Anchor agreed to pay Elevation a 5 percent commission in a
procured purchase of the property. The complaint further alleged Anchor failed to pay
Elevation the commission from the sale of the listed property, and Elevation thus sought
an order instructing Northwest Title to release funds it held in escrow in the amount of
$108,750 and to deliver the funds to Elevation in satisfaction of Elevation’s claims.
       {¶ 3} Northwest Title filed a timely answer on December 9, 2019. Anchor did not
file an answer or otherwise defend any of the allegations against it. The record indicates
service to Anchor was completed by certified mail on December 6, 2019. Elevation then
filed a motion for default judgment against Anchor on January 8, 2020. Neither Anchor
nor Northwest Title opposed the motion for default judgment, and Anchor did not
otherwise appear.
       {¶ 4} On January 28, 2020, the trial court granted Elevation’s motion for default
judgment, awarding Elevation damages in the amount of $108,750 for the unpaid real
estate commission. The trial court ordered Northwest Title to transfer the escrowed funds
to Elevation. Northwest Title then transferred the escrowed funds to Elevation, and
Elevation filed a notice of satisfaction of judgment with the trial court on January 29, 2020.
       {¶ 5} Nearly one-full year later, on January 22, 2021, Anchor and proposed
intervenor Whittier filed a series of motions seeking to overturn the January 28, 2020
No. 22AP-365                                                                                3

judgment entry. The combined filings included: (1) a motion for leave for Whittier to
intervene or be joined as a defendant; (2) a motion to vacate the January 28, 2020
judgment entry and for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B); (3) a motion to
strike the January 29, 2020 notice of satisfaction of judgment; and (4) a motion for leave
for Anchor to file an answer to Elevation’s complaint.
       {¶ 6} In the combined motions, Anchor asserted it failed to respond to the
complaint due to “illness and mistake,” alleging that while Philip G. Schell, the sole member
of Anchor, received service of the complaint, he mistakenly believed the complaint related
to a different lawsuit between the parties and therefore never notified his attorney that he
had received it. (Mot. to Vacate at 13.) Anchor also alleged Schell was in the midst of “an
extended six-week medical recovery” when the complaint arrived and that an employee had
signed for the complaint but not opened it, and Schell did not open the complaint until he
returned from his medical leave. (Mot. to Vacate at 5.) Thus, Anchor sought relief from
judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (3), and (5). Additionally, Anchor alleged Elevation was
not entitled to the claimed commission because Anchor never completed the sale on which
the commission was based and instead sold the property to Whittier. As the ultimate
purchaser of the property, Whittier asserted it should be permitted to intervene or joined
as a defendant because it had an interest in the escrowed funds. More specifically, Whittier
alleged it had advanced the $108,750 to Anchor in order to fund the escrow and Whittier
therefore had an interest in protecting those funds.
       {¶ 7} Elevation filed a memorandum contra to the combined motions on
February 5, 2021. Elevation reiterated, as it had set forth in its complaint, that the same
family owns and/or controls both the original purchaser that Elevation had procured for
the property and the ultimate purchaser, Whittier. When Elevation learned that Anchor,
the original purchaser, and Whittier were working together to complete the sale of the
property without paying Elevation a commission, Elevation recorded a broker’s lien on
November 28, 2018. Despite the lien, Anchor and Whittier continued with the closing of
the sale, and, on September 23, 2019, Northwest Title extinguished the broker’s lien by
placing the $108,750 Elevation claimed was due and owing in escrow. Elevation stated it
filed the complaint after it could not resolve the dispute with Anchor’s counsel to obtain the
escrowed funds.     After obtaining the default judgment and filing the satisfaction of
No. 22AP-365                                                                              4

judgment, counsel for Elevation sent Whittier a copy of a recorded release of the broker’s
lien on May 29, 2020 as well as settlement correspondence in an unrelated case that
referenced the instant matter. Elevation noted that neither Anchor nor Whittier took any
action with respect to this case until January 22, 2021, more than 13 months after Anchor
was served with the complaint and almost one-full year after judgment was rendered and
satisfied.
       {¶ 8} Northwest Title additionally filed a response to the combined motions on
February 8, 2021. Northwest Title noted it did not owe a duty to Whittier regarding the
escrowed funds and its duties to Anchor were limited to those set forth in the escrow
agreement and R.C. 1311.92. Further, Northwest stated it did not owe a duty to Anchor and
Whittier to inform them of the existence of Elevation’s action against Anchor and that it
had no duty or legal grounds to oppose Elevation’s motion for default judgment.
       {¶ 9} In a May 24, 2022 decision and entry, the trial court denied Anchor’s and
Whittier’s motions without a hearing. Specifically, the trial court found Whittier did not
timely move to intervene and noted that Whittier offered no explanation for waiting nearly
one year after judgment was entered to seek to intervene. The trial court further found that
Whittier did not have any interest in the funds that formed the basis of Elevation’s
complaint, rejecting Whittier’s claimed interest by virtue of being the owner of the funds
when they were advanced to Anchor before being deposited into the escrow account. As to
the Civ.R. 60(B) motion, the trial court determined Anchor failed to allege any operative
facts demonstrating it is entitled to relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(3) or (5). Additionally, the
trial court found Anchor failed to demonstrate excusable neglect, pursuant to Civ.R.
60(B)(1), for its failure to appear or defend the action. The trial court also found Anchor
failed to demonstrate excusable neglect such that Anchor should be entitled to leave to file
an answer to Elevation’s complaint. Having rejected Anchor’s and Whittier’s arguments
related to the motion to intervene and to vacate the judgment, the trial court similarly
denied the motion to strike the January 29, 2020 notice of satisfaction of judgment. Anchor
and Whittier timely appeal.
II. Assignments of Error
       {¶ 10} Appellants assign the following five assignments of error for our review:
No. 22AP-365                                                                                 5

              [I.] The trial court erred in failing to grant the motion to vacate
              the January 28, 2020 judgment.

              [II.] The trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary
              hearing prior to denying the motion to vacate the January 28,
              2020 judgment.

              [III.] The trial court erred in denying Anchor’s motion seeking
              leave to file an answer.

              [IV.] The trial court erred in denying Anchor’s motion seeking
              to have the January 29, 2020 satisfaction of judgment stricken.

              [V.] The trial court erred in denying [Whittier’s] motion to
              intervene and for joinder.

We note that although appellants filed a joint brief, only Anchor was a party to the
proceedings in the trial court. Thus, we will consider the assignments of error related to
the merits of the trial court’s decision, namely the first, second, third, and fourth
assignments of error, as relating solely to Anchor. Because the fifth assignment of error
relates to the trial court’s decision on the motion to intervene and for joinder, we will
consider the portion of the fifth assignment of error relating to the motion to intervene as
relating solely to Whittier and the portion relating to the motion for joinder as relating
solely to Anchor.
III. First Assignment of Error – Civ.R. 60(B) Motion
       {¶ 11} In its first assignment of error, Anchor argues the trial court abused its
discretion in denying its motion for relief from judgment.
       {¶ 12} To prevail on a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment, the movant
must satisfy a three-prong test. The movant must demonstrate: (1) it has a meritorious
defense or claim to present if relief is granted; (2) it is entitled to relief under one of the
grounds stated in Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5); and (3) the motion is made within a
reasonable time and, when relying on a ground for relief set forth in Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (2), or
(3), it filed the motion not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc. v. ARC Industries, Inc., 47 Ohio St.2d 146
(1976), paragraph two of the syllabus. There will be no relief if the movant fails to satisfy
any one of the prongs of the GTE test. Strack v. Pelton, 70 Ohio St.3d 172, 174 (1994). An
No. 22AP-365                                                                                6

appellate court reviews a trial court’s denial of a Civ.R. 60(B) motion for an abuse of
discretion. Harris v. Anderson, Warden, 109 Ohio St.3d 101, 2006-Ohio-1934, ¶ 7;
Oberkonz v. Gosha, 10th Dist. No. 02AP-237, 2002-Ohio-5572, ¶ 12. An abuse of discretion
connotes a decision that is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v.
Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983).
       {¶ 13} Anchor sought relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (3), and (5).
We address each of its arguments in turn.
   A. Civ.R. 60(B)(1) – Excusable Neglect
       {¶ 14} Pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(1), a court may provide relief from judgment for
“mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect.” In denying Anchor’s motion, the
trial court determined that Anchor had not demonstrated excusable neglect. The Supreme
Court of Ohio has defined “excusable neglect” in the negative, stating “that the inaction of
a defendant is not ‘excusable neglect’ if it can be labeled as a ‘complete disregard for the
judicial system.’ ” Kay v. Marc Glassman, Inc., 76 Ohio St.3d 18, 20 (1996), quoting GTE
at 153. A court must consider all the individual facts and circumstances of a case when
determining whether a moving party’s inaction constitutes excusable neglect. Colley v.
Bazell, 64 Ohio St.2d 243, 249 (1980). “[T]he concept of ‘excusable neglect’ must be
construed in keeping with the proposition that Civ.R. 60(B)(1) is a remedial rule to be
liberally construed, while bearing in mind that Civ.R. 60(B) constitutes an attempt to ‘strike
a proper balance between the conflicting principles that litigation must be brought to an
end and justice should be done.’ ” Id. at 248, quoting Doddridge v. Fitzpatrick, 53 Ohio
St.2d 9, 12 (1978).
       {¶ 15} Here, the facts support the trial court’s determination that Anchor failed to
demonstrate excusable neglect. Anchor acknowledged it was properly served, and further
acknowledged that Schell reviewed the case information after reading the complaint and
did not act quickly because the trial was initially scheduled to be one year away. Though
Anchor would have us find excusable neglect from Schell’s mistaken belief that the
complaint related to some other litigation and his accompanying assumption that counsel
in the other case would respond as necessary, we note that Anchor provides no details about
the alleged other litigation that would explain Anchor’s failure to respond to the complaint.
Instead, Anchor makes only a vague reference to the existence of other litigation.
No. 22AP-365                                                                               7

       {¶ 16} We are also mindful that “ ‘[a] party who is informed of court action against
him and fails to seek legal assistance does so at his risk and such conduct cannot be said to
constitute “excusable neglect” under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) * * * unless a compelling reason is
presented, like a serious illness.’ ” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) Suon v.
Mong, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-879, 2018-Ohio-4187, ¶ 27, quoting Gamble Hartshorn, L.L.C.
v. Lee, 10th Dist. No. 17AP-35, 2018-Ohio-980, ¶ 29. While Anchor asserts Schell was
dealing with a medical issue when the complaint arrived, Anchor does not provide any
details or explanation of how that medical issue prevented Schell from responding to the
complaint. Even if Schell’s medical issue could explain Anchor’s immediate failure to
respond to the complaint within the 28-day timeframe contemplated in Civ.R. 12, Anchor
provides no explanation for its continued delay of nearly one year from the entry and
satisfaction of judgment before taking any action despite its admission that it knew of the
underlying action. Instead, from Anchor’s own motion, Anchor established only that it
received the complaint, read the complaint, and then chose not to take any action until one
year after the trial court entered judgment. From these facts, the trial court reasonably
determined that Anchor’s inaction in response to the lawsuit did not constitute excusable
neglect.
       {¶ 17} Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding no excusable
neglect.
   B. Civ.R. 60(B)(3) – Fraud, Misrepresentation, or Other Misconduct
       {¶ 18} Anchor additionally argues it was entitled to relief from judgment, pursuant
to Civ.R. 60(B)(3), which provides for relief due to fraud, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct of an adverse party. In support of its argument, Anchor asserts Elevation and
Northwest Title fraudulently obtained a judgment for commission of a real estate
transaction when Elevation knew it did not participate in the ultimate sale of the property.
However, “the fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct contemplated by Civ.R.
60(B)(3) refers to deceit or other unconscionable conduct committed by a party to obtain a
judgment and does not refer to conduct that would have been a defense to or claim in the
case itself.” Bank of Am., N.A. v. Kutcha, 141 Ohio St.3d 75, 2014-Ohio-4275, ¶ 13. Though
Anchor attempts to bring its claim of fraud within the purview of Civ.R. 60(B)(3) by
asserting Elevation fraudulently obtained the default judgment, we agree with the trial
No. 22AP-365                                                                                     8

court that the substance of Anchor’s argument under this provision actually represents its
assertion of a meritorious defense: that Elevation was not entitled to the commission.
Anchor does not, in its motion for relief from judgment, allege Elevation or Northwest
engaged in any behavior that would constitute fraud, misrepresentation, or other
misconduct in Elevation’s act of seeking and obtaining the default judgment against
Anchor. See Dublin v. RiverPark Group., L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 21AP-115, 2022-Ohio-1294,
¶ 20 (noting “Civ.R. 60(B)(3) applies when an adverse party’s fraud, misrepresentation, or
misconduct in obtaining a judgment prevents the other party from fully and fairly
presenting its case”). Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Anchor did
not set forth facts constituting fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct under Civ.R.
60(B)(3).
   C. Civ.R. 60(B)(5) – Catch-all
       {¶ 19} Anchor also sought relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(5). Known
as the “catch-all” provision, a court may grant relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)(5)
only in the extraordinary and unusual cases in which the moving party demonstrates
substantial grounds warranting relief from judgment. Luke v. Roubanes, 10th Dist. No.
16AP-766, 2018-Ohio-1065, ¶ 22, citing Caruso-Ciresi, Inc. v. Lohman, 5 Ohio St.3d 64
(1983), paragraph two of the syllabus.          Substantial grounds warranting relief from
judgment exist where the moving party can establish a fraud upon the court. Id., citing
Coulson v. Coulson, 5 Ohio St.3d 12 (1983), paragraph one of the syllabus. “Fraud upon the
court exists if the fraud ‘defile[s] the court itself, or is a fraud perpetuated by the officers of
the court so that the judicial machinery cannot perform in the usual manner its impartial
task of adjudicating cases that are presented for adjudication.’ ” Id., quoting Coulson at 15.
Courts narrowly construe fraud upon the court as contemplated in Civ.R. 60(B)(5) to
prevent it from subsuming fraud upon a party as contemplated in Civ.R. 60(B)(3). Luke at
¶ 23. Thus, Civ.R. 60(B)(3) is the appropriate basis for requesting relief where the alleged
fraud occurred between the parties, while Civ.R. 60(B)(5) is the appropriate basis for
requesting relief where an attorney or other officer of the court perpetuates a fraud on the
court. Id. at ¶ 26.
       {¶ 20} Anchor argues counsel for Elevation acted improperly and perpetuated a
fraud upon the court when it sought judgment for Elevation knowing that Elevation was
No. 22AP-365                                                                                9

not entitled to the commission. Through this argument, Anchor attempts to repackage the
argument it made under Civ.R. 60(B)(3). However, as we explained above, Anchor’s
arguments about the propriety of the underlying judgment relate to its possible meritorious
defense of the action and do not, despite Anchor’s attempts to utilize careful language, bring
the allegations under the catch-all provision of Civ.R. 60(B)(5). Accordingly, the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in determining Anchor did not allege operative facts
demonstrating relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(5).
       {¶ 21} We agree with the trial court that Anchor did not allege operative facts
demonstrating it was entitled to relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)(1), (3), or (5).
Because Anchor could not satisfy the second prong of the GTE test, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Anchor’s motion for relief from judgment. Strack at 174.
Therefore, we overrule Anchor’s first assignment of error.
IV. Second Assignment of Error – Failure to Conduct a Hearing
       {¶ 22} In its second assignment of error, Anchor argues the trial court erred when it
denied its Civ.R. 60(B) motion without first conducting an evidentiary hearing.
       {¶ 23} A party filing a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B) is
not automatically entitled to a hearing on the motion. Canel v. Holland, 10th Dist. No.
19AP-570, 2020-Ohio-4797, ¶ 13, citing Davis v. Davis, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-1078, 2016-
Ohio-7790, ¶ 13. As this court has stated, “if the Civ.R. 60(B) motion contains allegations
of operative facts that would warrant relief from judgment, the trial court should grant a
hearing to take evidence to verify those facts before it rules on the motion.” Mattingly v.
Deveaux, 10th Dist. No. 03AP-793, 2004-Ohio-2506, ¶ 7. “Conversely, ‘[i]f the material
submitted by the movant in support of a motion for relief from judgment under [Civ.R.
60(B)] contains no operative facts or meager and limited facts and conclusions of law, it
will not be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to overrule the motion and refuse to
grant a hearing.’ ” U.S. Bank Natl. Assn. v. Lewis, 10th Dist. No. 18AP-550, 2019-Ohio-
3014, ¶ 28, quoting Adomeit v. Baltimore, 39 Ohio App.2d 97 (8th Dist.1974), paragraph
four of the syllabus.
       {¶ 24} As we explained in our resolution of Anchor’s first assignment of error,
Anchor did not allege any operative facts that would warrant relief under Civ.R. 60(B)(3)
or (5). With respect to its allegations under Civ.R. 60(B)(1), Anchor asserts it should have,
No. 22AP-365                                                                               10

at minimum, been granted a hearing to more fully explain its failure to respond to the
complaint. However, as the moving party, it was Anchor’s burden to set forth sufficient
operative facts in its motion demonstrating excusable neglect. Though Anchor set forth
facts that its conduct was neglectful, it did not allege any facts to establish its conduct
constituted excusable neglect within the meaning of Civ.R. 60(B)(1). A party cannot set
forth limited allegations and legal conclusions in a motion for Civ.R. 60(B)(1) with the
promise of more details to come at an evidentiary hearing; instead, to warrant an
evidentiary hearing, the moving party must allege sufficient operative facts in the motion,
itself. Abram v. Eldermen Properties, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 19AP-791, 2021-Ohio-523, ¶ 12
(“where a movant who seeks relief pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B)(1) fails to set forth operative
facts demonstrating excusable neglect, a trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying
the Civ.R. 60(B) motion without holding an evidentiary hearing”).
       {¶ 25} Because Anchor did not set forth sufficient operative facts demonstrating
excusable neglect, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to conduct an
evidentiary hearing before denying Anchor’s motion for relief from judgment. Therefore,
we overrule Anchor’s second assignment of error.
V. Third Assignment of Error – Denial of Motion Seeking Leave to File Answer
       {¶ 26} In its third assignment of error, Anchor argues the trial court erred in denying
its motion for leave to file an answer.
       {¶ 27} Pursuant to Civ.R. 6(B)(2), a trial court may extend the time to file an
untimely pleading “upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period * * *
where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect.” To determine whether the
neglect at issue qualifies as excusable neglect, a court must consider all the surrounding
facts and circumstances. Asamoah v. SYGMA Network, Inc., 10th Dist. No. 21AP-405,
2022-Ohio-1868, ¶ 16, citing Davis, Admr. v. Immediate Med. Servs., Inc., 80 Ohio St.3d
10, 14 (1997). A party’s conduct is inexcusable neglect where the conduct falls substantially
below what is reasonable under the circumstances or reflects a complete disregard for the
judicial system. Id., citing Dietrich v. Dobos, 10th Dist. No. 15AP-2, 2015-Ohio-4866, ¶ 13.
An appellate court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a motion for an extension of time under
Civ.R. 6(B)(2) for an abuse of discretion.        Asamoah at ¶ 17, citing State ex rel.
No. 22AP-365                                                                                11

Lindenschmidt v. Bd. of Commrs. of Butler Cty., 72 Ohio St.3d 464, 465 (1995), and Davis
at 14.
         {¶ 28} Through this assignment of error, Anchor reiterates the arguments made
under its first assignment of error, asserting the trial court abused its discretion in failing
to find Anchor’s failure to timely respond to the complaint was a result of excusable neglect.
For the reasons articulated above, we agree with the trial court that Anchor did not allege
sufficient facts demonstrating its conduct amounted to excusable neglect. Accordingly, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Anchor’s motion for an extension of time
to file an answer. Therefore, we overrule Anchor’s third assignment of error.
VI. Fourth Assignment of Error – Notice of Satisfaction of Judgment
         {¶ 29} In its fourth assignment of error, Anchor argues the trial court erred in
denying its motion to strike the notice of satisfaction of judgment.
         {¶ 30} “The Supreme Court of Ohio has held ‘ “[w]here the court rendering
judgment has jurisdiction of the subject matter of the action and of the parties, and fraud
has not intervened, and the judgment is voluntarily paid and satisfied, such payment puts
an end to the controversy, and takes away from the defendant the right to appeal or
prosecute error or even to move for vacation of judgment.” ’ ” Thompson v. Lester, 10th
Dist. No. 17AP-898, 2018-Ohi0-4298, ¶ 13, quoting In re Appropriation for Hwy.
Purposes: Rauch v. Noble, Dir. of Hwys., 169 Ohio St. 314, 216 (1959), quoting Lynch v.
Bd. of Edn. of City School Dist. of Lakewood, 116 Ohio St. 361 (1927), paragraph three of
the syllabus; Blodgett v. Blodgett, 49 Ohio St.3d 243, 245 (1990). Relying on the same
arguments in support of its motion for relief from judgment, Anchor asserts the trial court
should have granted its motion to strike the notice of satisfaction of judgment because,
Anchor maintains, the judgment was not voluntarily paid.
         {¶ 31} Anchor concedes this court should sustain its fourth assignment of error as a
means of providing Anchor complete relief only if we have determined it is entitled to relief
on either the first or second assignments of error related to the Civ.R. 60(B) motion and the
lack of a hearing. Having already determined the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Anchor’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment without a hearing, Anchor’s
argument related to the notice of satisfaction of judgment lacks merit. Therefore, we
overrule Anchor’s fourth assignment of error.
No. 22AP-365                                                                                  12

VII. Fifth Assignment of Error – Motion to Intervene and for Joinder
       {¶ 32} In their fifth and final assignment of error, appellants argue the trial court
erred in denying the motion to intervene and for joinder. We clarify, as we noted above,
the portion of this assignment of error related to the motion to intervene relates to Whittier,
while the portion of this assignment of error related to the motion for joinder relates to
Anchor.
       {¶ 33} Civ.R. 24 allows a non-party to an action to file a motion to intervene. Where
a non-party to an action claims an interest relating to the property or transaction that is the
subject of the action, and the non-party is situated such that disposition of the action may
impair or impede the ability to protect that interest, the non-party may file a motion to
intervene pursuant to Civ.R. 24(A). Nigh Law Group, L.L.C. v. Pond Family Med. Ctr.,
Inc., 10th Dist. No. 21AP-558, 2022-Ohio-2036, ¶ 14, citing Eaton Natl. Bank & Trust Co.
v. LNG Resources, L.L.C., 10th Dist. No. 08AP-829, 2009-Ohio-1186, ¶ 5. We review a trial
court’s denial of a motion to intervene for an abuse of discretion. Id. at ¶ 15, citing Whitehall
v. Olander, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-6, 2014-Ohio-4066, ¶ 27.
       {¶ 34} Whittier argues the trial court should have permitted it to intervene as a
matter of right because it had a separate agreement with Anchor to advance the funds that
were placed in the escrow account in order to obtain the release of Elevation’s broker’s lien.
Thus, Whittier asserts it has an interest in the escrowed funds forming the basis of
Elevations’ complaint and should be permitted to intervene. As the trial court noted,
however, Whittier is not a party to the escrow agreement. Instead, the escrow agreement
is between Anchor and Northwest Title. The escrow agreement provides that Anchor is the
owner of the subject property and that Anchor entered into a contract for sale requiring
conveyance of the property free and clear of any liens. Anchor and Northwest Title agreed,
pursuant to R.C. 1311.92, that Anchor would deposit the $108,750 with Northwest Title.
Additionally, R.C. 1311.92(A) provides that “to enable a transfer of lien property to close
when a broker’s * * * lien may otherwise prevent the closing, a separate escrow account
shall be established by the owner into which moneys from the proceeds of the closing shall
be deposited in an amount sufficient to release the broker’s lien.” (Emphasis added.) Thus,
R.C. 1311.92(A) requires the owner of the property to deposit the proceeds of the closing
No. 22AP-365                                                                                    13

into the escrow account. It is undisputed that Whittier was the buyer of the property in the
real estate transaction, not the owner.
       {¶ 35} We agree with the trial court that although Whittier may have advanced the
funds, it advanced the funds to Anchor. At closing, once the funds had been advanced to
Anchor, Anchor was in possession of the funds and Anchor then deposited the funds into
the escrow account. Even though Anchor and Whittier had a separate agreement relating
to the advancement of funds, the separate agreement does not override the escrow
agreement or the requirements of R.C. 1311.92(A).               As a result, Whittier cannot
demonstrate an interest in the escrowed funds that are the subject of Elevation’s complaint,
that it is so situated that the disposition of the action may impair or impede its ability to
protect it, or that its interest is not adequately represented by the existing parties. Thus,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Whittier’s motion to intervene under
Civ.R. 24(A).
       {¶ 36} Additionally, Anchor argues the trial court erred in denying the motion for
joinder under Civ.R. 21, which permits the addition of parties on the motion of a party or
on the trial court’s own initiative “ ‘at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.’ ”
Whitehall at ¶ 29, quoting Civ.R. 21. This court has explained that “Civ.R. 21 only permits
addition of parties on the motion of a party or on the trial court’s own initiative; the rule
does not permit the addition of parties on the motion of a non-party.” Whitehall at ¶ 29.
Thus, we construe the arguments related to the motion for joinder pursuant to Civ.R. 21 as
relating solely to Anchor, a party to the action, and not to Whittier, a proposed intervenor
and non-party.
       {¶ 37} Utilizing the same arguments Whittier advanced pursuant to Whittier’s
motion to intervene, Anchor argues that Anchor should have been permitted to join
Whittier as a party “in the interest of justice.” (Appellants’ Brief at 54.) Having found the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Whittier’s motion to intervene pursuant
to Civ.R. 24, we similarly conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Anchor’s motion for joinder under Civ.R. 21.           Therefore, we overrule Anchor’s and
Whittier’s fifth assignment of error.
No. 22AP-365                                                                              14

VIII. Disposition
       {¶ 38} Based on the foregoing reasons, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
denying Anchor’s Civ.R. 60(B) motion for relief from judgment without a hearing, denying
Anchor’s motion for leave to file an answer, denying Anchor’s motion to strike the notice of
satisfaction of judgment, and denying Whittier’s motion to intervene and Anchor’s motion
for joinder. Having overruled appellants’ five assignments of error, we affirm the judgment
of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas.
                                                                       Judgment affirmed.

                          BOGGS and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.