Court Opinion

ID: 9838340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 06:00:21.211066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:18.923032
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     L. GENISE JOSEPH,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                    Appellant,                       PH-0752-21-0216-I-1

                  v.

     UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE,                   DATE: September 5, 2023
                   Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Hartley D. Alley, Esquire, San Antonio, Texas, for the appellant.

           Krista M. Irons, Esquire, New York, New York, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The agency has filed a petition for review, and the appellant has filed a
     cross petition for review of the initial decision, which reversed the appellant’s
     removal on due process grounds. Generally, we grant petitions such as these only
     in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of
     statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the
     case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or
     the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved
     an abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or
     new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the
     petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of
     the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After
     fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that neither party has
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition or cross
     petition for review. Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and the cross
     petition for review.      Except as expressly MODIFIED to VACATE the
     administrative judge’s findings regarding the agency’s use of audio recordings in
     its removal proceedings, we AFFIRM the initial decision, which is now the
     Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was employed as a Postmaster, EAS-18, with the agency in
     Port Reading, New Jersey. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 6 at 4. Following an
     incident in which the appellant allegedly engaged in a physical and verbal
     outburst wherein she threatened other employees and caused physical damage to
     her office space, the agency removed her from Federal service on April 23, 2021,
     based on the charge of unacceptable conduct (two specifications). Id. at 7-10,
     12-16. Thereafter, the appellant filed an appeal with the Board, challenging the
     removal and raising several affirmative defenses.          IAF, Tabs 1, 19, 24.
     Specifically, she argued that the agency violated her due proce ss rights when the
     deciding official considered her to be guilty of violating an agency policy
     regarding workplace violence with which she was not charged and committed
     harmful error by failing to conduct a pre-disciplinary interview with her. IAF,
                                                                                         3

     Tab 1 at 6, Tab 24 at 7-14. She also argued that the agency improperly relied on
     audio recordings of the incident made by her subordinates because such
     recordings are in violation of New Jersey law.             IAF, Tab 24 at 15-16.
     Additionally, during the adjudication of the appeal, the appellant discovered that
     the proposing official had provided the deciding official with an Action Request
     Form without also providing it to the appellant prior to the deciding official’s
     issuance of the decision notice. Id. at 5-6, 12. Thus, the appellant argued that the
     agency also violated her due process rights by engaging                in ex parte
     communications. Id.
¶3         After the appellant withdrew her request for a hearing, IAF, Tab 21, the
     administrative judge issued an initial decision on the written record.          IAF,
     Tab 51, Initial Decision (ID). Regarding the appellant’s claim that the deciding
     official inappropriately considered her guilty of violating a policy with which she
     was not charged, the administrative judge found this argument witho ut merit
     because the decision notice did not include a finding that the appellant violated a
     policy, and the deciding official stated under the penalty of perjury that he did not
     rely on the policy in making his decision. ID at 5. The administrative judg e also
     found that the appellant failed to prove that the agency committed harmful error
     by not conducting a pre-disciplinary interview.       ID at 8-9.   Additionally, the
     administrative judge found that, although the audio recordings of the incident
     appeared to be in violation of New Jersey law, there was no evidence that the
     agency officials involved in the removal action caused or encouraged the secret
     taping. ID at 10. Regarding the appellant’s due process claim concerning the ex
     parte communication, however, the administrative judge found that the agency
     violated the appellant’s due process rights, and, accordingly, she reversed the
     removal action. ID at 7-8, 11.
¶4         The agency has filed a petition for review of the initial decision arguing that
     the administrative judge erred in finding that it engaged in improper ex parte
     communications resulting in a due process violation. Petition for Review (PFR)
                                                                                           4

     File, Tab 1 at 12-26. Specifically, the agency argues that the evidence establishes
     that the deciding official did not recall seeing the Action Request Form and did
     not consider it, and, in any event, the information contained therein was
     cumulative of other information properly provided to the appellant. Id. at 14, 16,
     18-22. The appellant has filed a response to the agency’s petition for review, to
     which the agency has replied. PFR File, Tabs 3-4. The appellant has also filed a
     cross petition for review arguing that the administrative judge erred in her
     findings regarding the agency’s reliance on the improper audio recording of the
     underlying incident.     PFR File, Tab 5.       The agency has responded to the
     appellant’s cross petition for review. 2 PFR File, Tab 6.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     We discern no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findin g that the agency
     violated the appellant’s due process rights, and we deny the agency’s petition for
     review.
¶5         As briefly set forth above, the appellant argued below that the proposing
     official provided the deciding official with an Action Request Form —a form
     apparently used by the agency’s human resources department to initiate
     disciplinary proceedings—prior to the issuance of the removal notice, but that the
     form was not similarly provided to the appellant prior to her removal.             IAF,
     Tab 24 at 5-6. In the form, the proposing official explained that the appellant
     “has shown prior angry outbursts in the presence of her employees as noted by
     their statements,” and that the appellant “should not be allowed back in the
     workforce as she is a danger to [her]self or others and has exhibited workplace
     violence placing her employees in a volatile and dangerous environment for

     2
       Neither party has challenged the administrative judge’s findings that the deciding
     official did not conclude that the appellant violated a workplace policy with which she
     was not charged and that the appellant failed to prove that the agency committed
     harmful error by not conducting a pre-disciplinary interview of the appellant. PFR File,
     Tabs 1, 5. We have reviewed the record, and we discern no reason to disturb the
     administrative judge’s findings.
                                                                                           5

     which there is zero tolerance.”     IAF, Tab 24 at 31-34.       The appellant argued
     below that this information was newly introduced via an ex parte communication
     and that she was not given an opportunity to respond to it . IAF, Tab 47 at 8-10.
¶6         It is well settled that an employee’s due process right to notice extends to
     ex parte information provided to a deciding official if the information not
     previously disclosed to the appellant introduces new and material information. 3
     See Ward v. U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Stone
     v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir.
     1999); Singh v. U.S. Postal Service, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 23. In deciding whether
     new and material information has been introduced by means of ex parte
     communications, the Board should consider the facts and circumstances of each
     particular case. Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377. Among the factors that will be useful
     for the Board to weigh are:      (1) whether the ex parte communication merely
     introduces cumulative information or new information; (2) whether the employee
     knew of the error and had a chance to respond to it; and (3) whether the ex parte
     communications were of the type likely to result in undue pressure upon the
     deciding official to rule in a particular manner. Id.; Singh, 2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 24.
¶7         In the initial decision, the administrative judge considered the deciding
     official’s statements that he did not “recall” the Action Request Form and that he
     did not consider it in making his decision to sustain the charge or uphold the
     proposed penalty of removal. ID at 6-7; IAF, Tab 34 at 10-11. Nonetheless, she
     found that such statements did not conflict with record evidence establishing that
     the deciding official received the form.      ID at 7.    She further found that the

     3
       The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s reasoning rests on the decision of
     the U.S. Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
     538-39, 546-48 (1985), which held that a tenured public employee has a constitutionally
     protected property interest in ongoing public employment and that an agency may not
     deprive such an employee of his property interest without providing him with due
     process of law, including the right to advance notice of the charges against him, an
     explanation of the agency’s evidence, and an opportunity to respond.
                                                                                          6

     form’s suggestion that the appellant is “a repeat, violent offender was a
     significant departure from the rest of the evidence relied upon.” ID at 7 -8. After
     also finding that the Action Request Form was of a type that affected the deciding
     official’s decision to remove the appellant and that the deciding official’s
     “conclusion that the appellant was dangerous” was based on the form, the
     administrative judge concluded that the ex parte communication deprived the
     appellant of due process. Id.
¶8         On review, the agency does not dispute that the deciding official received
     the Action Request Form and that it pertains to the alleged misconduct. PFR File,
     Tab 1 at 12. However, as briefly explained above, the agency challenges the
     administrative judge’s finding that the Action Request Form was not cumulative,
     and that the deciding official considered the form. Id. at 14, 16, 18-22.
¶9         Regarding the question of whether the Action Request Form contains
     information that is merely cumulative, the agency argues that statements from the
     appellant’s subordinates who witnessed the appellant’s alleged misconduct were
     also provided to the deciding official and similarly suggest that the appellant’s
     general workplace behavior created an ongoing hostile work environ ment. 4
     Although the agency is correct that the subordinates’ statements regarding the
     appellant’s workplace conduct show that the appellant was difficult to work with,
     the comments contained in those statements do not rise to the level of the
     information contained in the Action Request Form suggesting that she was an
     ongoing, violent threat. IAF, Tab 6 at 25-28. Specifically, one of the coworker’s
     statements explains that the appellant’s “attitude is completely unpredictable” at
     any moment due to her “mood changes,” and that it makes for a “very [awkward]
     and hostile environment to work in.” Id. at 28. The second coworker explains
     that the incident in question “isn’t the first time I’ve seen or heard [the appellant]

     4
      There is no dispute that these statements were also provided to the appellant prior to
     her removal.
                                                                                        7

      upset,” and that the work environment gives her “anxiety and stress.” Id. at 26.
      In contrast, as set forth above, the Action Request Form suggests that that the
      appellant has a pattern of engaging in workplace violence and is generally a
      danger to herself and others. IAF, Tab 24 at 31-34. In other words, the general
      tone of the appellant’s subordinates’ statements suggests that the appellant was
      difficult to work with because of an unpredictable attitude or mood, whereas the
      Action Request Form suggests that she is difficult to work with b ecause she is
      regularly violent and poses a violent threat to those in the workplace with her.
      Although both can reasonably be considered difficult environments in which to
      work, they are, nonetheless, different in nature and in degree. Accordingly, we
      discern no error in the administrative judge’s finding that the Action Request
      Form represented a “significant departure” from other evidence in the record, and
      thus, that the form contained new and material information.         See Mathis v.
      Department of State, 122 M.S.P.R. 507, ¶ 11 (2015), (explaining that information
      may be considered new and material if it constitutes a significant depar ture from
      evidence already in the record).     The agency’s arguments on review to the
      contrary do not persuade us otherwise.
¶10        As noted, the agency also argues on review that there is no evidence that the
      deciding official considered the Action Request Form in deciding to sustain the
      charge and uphold the penalty of removal and that the administrative judge erred
      in finding otherwise. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16, 18-22. The agency again points to
      the deciding official’s declaration, wherein he stated that he did “not recall” the
      form, and that he “did not consider it in making [ his] decision” to remove the
      appellant. IAF, Tab 34 at 10-11. Like the administrative judge, we acknowledge
      the deciding official’s statements. However, the record also contains statements
      from the deciding official that he considered all the information that was sent to
      him prior to making his decision. IAF, Tab 27 at 25. Additionally, he stated in
      the decision notice that he “based [his] decision solely on the evidence of record
      to which [he has] given full consideration.” IAF, Tab 6 at 7. Thus, th e record
                                                                                         8

      contains conflicting statements from the deciding official on this material point.
      Given that the agency does not dispute that the deciding official received the form
      and the deciding official’s own statement that he considered all the record
      evidence and information provided to him, we find his assertion that he did not
      consider the form to be internally inconsistent with other prior statements
      included in the record and otherwise implausible. See Hillen v. Department of the
      Army, 35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987); Borninkhof v. Department of Justice,
      5 M.S.P.R. 77, 87 (1981). As such, the agency’s arguments on review do not
      provide a basis to disturb the initial decision.
¶11         Based on the foregoing, we agree with the administrative judge’s
      conclusion that the Action Request Form introduced new and material
      information regarding the appellant’s workplace behavior that was not merely
      cumulative, that the appellant did not have a chance to respond to the information
      contained in the form, and that the information was of the type likely to result in
      undue pressure upon the deciding official. See Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377; Singh,
      2022 MSPB 15, ¶ 24. As such, we agree with the administrative judge that the
      agency violated the appellant’s due process rights, and that such a finding
      requires reversal of the appellant’s removal. ID at 6-8. The appellant is entitled
      to a new constitutionally correct removal procedure. See Amar v. Department of
      the Treasury, 89 M.S.P.R. 505, ¶¶ 11-25 (2001).          The agency’s petition for
      review is denied.

      We decline to consider the appellant’s arguments regarding the agency’s use of
      the audio recordings, vacate the administrative judge’s findings in that regard,
      and deny the appellant’s cross petition for review.
¶12         As briefly set forth above, the appellant has filed a cross petition for review
      challenging the administrative judge’s findings regarding the agency’s use of the
      audio recordings of the alleged incident that gave rise to the appellant’s removal.
      PFR File, Tab 5 at 5-14. By way of brief background, it appears that at least one
      of the appellant’s subordinates recorded audio of the appellant’s conduct during
                                                                                        9

      the incident that formed the basis of the appellant’s removal. IAF, Tab 29 at 17,
      38. The appellant asserted below that the recordings violate New Jersey law.
      IAF, Tab 24 at 15-16. Additionally, it is undisputed that the agency relied, in
      part, on these recordings when it proposed her removal. IAF, Tab 37 at 5, 10. As
      briefly set forth above, in the initial decision, the administrative judge concluded
      that it was “clear that the employees’ violated New Jersey law ” in making the
      recordings, and that the recordings “constituted misconduct by those employees.”
      ID at 10. However, the administrative judge observed that the appellant failed to
      proffer arguments that the agency’s use of the recordings under the circumstances
      similarly violated the law. Id. Ultimately, the administrative judge found that
      there was no evidence that the agency “caused or encouraged the secret taping.”
      Id. As such, she rejected the appellant’s affirmative defense.      On review, the
      appellant reiterates the argument that the recordings violated the law and internal
      agency regulations. PFR File, Tab 5 at 8.
¶13        We decline to consider the appellant’s argument here. Because we agree
      with the administrative judge that the agency violated the appellant’s due process
      rights, the removal decision is a nullity. See Sullivan v. Department of the Navy,
      720 F.2d 1266, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (explaining that an improper ex parte
      communication that rises to the level of a due process violation voids the entire
      proceeding and renders the adverse action a nullity); Blake v. Department of
      Justice, 81 M.S.P.R. 394, ¶ 35 (1999) (same). Because the removal action is
      void, we need not address the appellant’s argument regarding the agency’s use of
      the audio recordings. See 5 U.S.C. § 1201(h) (prohibiting the Board from issuing
      advisory opinions); Solis v. Department of Justice, 117 M.S.P.R. 458, ¶ 10 (2012)
      (declining to consider an appellant’s arguments unrelated to a due process claim
      when the Board disposes of an appeal by finding a due process violation).
      Accordingly, we deny the appellant’s cross petition for review. For these same
      reasons, we vacate the administrative judge’s findings regarding the agency’s use
      of the audio recordings.
                                                                                          10

                                             ORDER
¶14         We ORDER the agency to cancel the removal and to retroactively restore
      the appellant effective April 23, 2021. See Kerr v. National Endowment for the
      Arts, 726 F.2d 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The agency must complete this action no
      later than 20 days after the date of this decision.
¶15         We also ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the correct amount of back
      pay, interest on back pay, and other benefits under the Back Pay Act and/or Postal
      Service regulations, as appropriate, no later than 60 calendar days after the date
      of this decision.   We ORDER the appellant to cooperate in good faith in the
      agency’s efforts to calculate the amount of back pay, interest, and benefits due,
      and to provide all necessary information the agency requests to help it carry out
      the Board’s Order. If there is a dispute about the amount of back pay, interest
      due, and/or other benefits, we ORDER the agency to pay the appellant the
      undisputed amount no later than 60 calendar days after the date of this decision.
¶16         We further ORDER the agency to tell the appellant promptly in writing
      when it believes it has fully carried out the Board’s Order and of the actions it has
      taken to carry out the Board’s Order. The appellant, if not notified, should ask
      the agency about its progress. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.181(b).
¶17         No later than 30 days after the agency tells the appellant that it has fully
      carried out the Board’s Order, the appellant may file a petition for enforcement
      with the office that issued the initial decision on this appeal if the appellant
      believes that the agency did not fully carry out the Board’s Order. The petition
      should contain specific reasons why the appellant believes that the agency has not
      fully carried out the Board’s Order, and should include the dates and results of
      any communications with the agency. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.182(a).
¶18         For agencies whose payroll is administered by either the National Finance
      Center of the Department of Agriculture (NFC) or the Defense Finance and
      Accounting Service (DFAS), two lists of the information and documentation
      necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from a Board decision
                                                                                     11

are attached. The agency is ORDERED to timely provide DFAS or NFC with all
documentation necessary to process payments and adjustments resulting from the
Board’s decision in accordance with the attached lists so that payment can be
made within the 60-day period set forth above.

                 NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                       YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                      ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
      You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set forth at title 5 of
the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
and costs WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.
You must file your motion for attorney fees and costs with the office that issued
the initial decision on your appeal.

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation and
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of

5
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      12

this final decision, you should immediately review th e law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
                                                                                   13

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court (not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other secur ity.          See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
                                                                                     14

with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6   The court of appeals must receive your petition for

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
                                                                                 15

review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.           5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       16

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.
                                 DEFENSE FINANCE AND ACCOUNTING SERVICE
                                           Civilian Pay Operations

                          DFAS BACK PAY CHECKLIST
The following documentation is required by DFAS Civilian Pay to compute and pay back pay
pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805. Human resources/local payroll offices should use the following
checklist to ensure a request for payment of back pay is complete. Missing documentation may
substantially delay the processing of a back pay award. More information may be found at:
https://wss.apan.org/public/DFASPayroll/Back%20Pay%20Process/Forms/AllItems.aspx.

NOTE: Attorneys’ fees or other non-wage payments (such as damages) are paid by
vendor pay, not DFAS Civilian Pay.

☐ 1) Submit a “SETTLEMENT INQUIRY - Submission” Remedy Ticket. Please identify the
       specific dates of the back pay period within the ticket comments.

Attach the following documentation to the Remedy Ticket, or provide a statement in the ticket
comments as to why the documentation is not applicable:

☐ 2) Settlement agreement, administrative determination, arbitrator award, or order.

☐ 3) Signed and completed “Employee Statement Relative to Back Pay”.

☐ 4) All required SF50s (new, corrected, or canceled). ***Do not process online SF50s
       until notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 5) Certified timecards/corrected timecards. ***Do not process online timecards until
       notified to do so by DFAS Civilian Pay.***

☐ 6) All relevant benefit election forms (e.g. TSP, FEHB, etc.).

☐ 7) Outside earnings documentation. Include record of all amounts earned by the employee
       in a job undertaken during the back pay period to replace federal employment.
       Documentation includes W-2 or 1099 statements, payroll documents/records, etc. Also,
       include record of any unemployment earning statements, workers’ compensation,
       CSRS/FERS retirement annuity payments, refunds of CSRS/FERS employee premiums,
       or severance pay received by the employee upon separation.

Lump Sum Leave Payment Debts: When a separation is later reversed, there is no authority
under 5 U.S.C. § 5551 for the reinstated employee to keep the lump sum annual leave payment
they may have received. The payroll office must collect the debt from the back pay award. The
annual leave will be restored to the employee. Annual leave that exceeds the annual leave
ceiling will be restored to a separate leave account pursuant to 5 CFR § 550.805(g).
NATIONAL FINANCE CENTER CHECKLIST FOR BACK PAY CASES
Below is the information/documentation required by National Finance Center to process
payments/adjustments agreed on in Back Pay Cases (settlements, restorations) or as ordered by
the Merit Systems Protection Board, EEOC, and courts.
1. Initiate and submit AD-343 (Payroll/Action Request) with clear and concise information
   describing what to do in accordance with decision.
2. The following information must be included on AD-343 for Restoration:
       a.   Employee name and social security number.
       b.   Detailed explanation of request.
       c.   Valid agency accounting.
       d.   Authorized signature (Table 63).
       e.   If interest is to be included.
       f.   Check mailing address.
       g.   Indicate if case is prior to conversion. Computations must be attached.
       h.   Indicate the amount of Severance and Lump Sum Annual Leave Payment to be
            collected (if applicable).
Attachments to AD-343
1. Provide pay entitlement to include Overtime, Night Differential, Shift Premium, Sunday
   Premium, etc. with number of hours and dates for each entitlement (if applicable).
2. Copies of SF-50s (Personnel Actions) or list of salary adjustments/changes and amounts.
3. Outside earnings documentation statement from agency.
4. If employee received retirement annuity or unemployment, provide amount and address to
   return monies.
5. Provide forms for FEGLI, FEHBA, or TSP deductions (if applicable).
6. If employee was unable to work during any or part of the period involved, certification of the
   type of leave to be charged and number of hours.
7. If employee retires at end of Restoration Period, provide hours of Lump Sum Annual Leave
   to be paid.
NOTE: If prior to conversion, agency must attach Computation Worksheet by Pay Period and
required data in 1-7 above.
The following information must be included on AD-343 for Settlement Cases: (Lump Sum
Payment, Correction to Promotion, Wage Grade Increase, FLSA, etc.)
       a. Must provide same data as in 2, a-g above.
       b. Prior to conversion computation must be provided.
       c. Lump Sum amount of Settlement, and if taxable or non-taxable.
If you have any questions or require clarification on the above, please contact NFC’s
Payroll/Personnel Operations at 504-255-4630.