Court Opinion

ID: 9580666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:07:21.255529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:25.933935
License: Public Domain

*31Wright, C.J.
(dissenting)—I dissent. The majority has ignored many fundamental principles of law to reach their result.
Petitioner sought to recover treble damages for abusive collection practices, as provided by RCW 19.16.440, which designates the practices enumerated in RCW 19.16.250 as being per se violations of the Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86. Specifically, it is RCW 19.86.090 upon which appellant bases her claim to treble damages. That section provides:
Any person who is injured in his business or property by a violation of RCW 19.86.020, 19.86.030, 19.86.040, 19.86.050, or 19.86.060, or any person so injured because he refuses to accede to a proposal for an arrangement which, if consummated, would be in violation of RCW 19.86.030, 19.86.040, 19.86.050, or 19.86.060, may bring a civil action in the superior court to enjoin further violations, to recover the actual damages sustained by him, or both, together with the costs of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, and the court may in its discretion, increase the award of damages to an amount not to exceed three times the actual damages sustained: Provided, That such increased damage award for violation of RCW 19.86.020 may not exceed one thousand dollars. For the purpose of this section "person" shall include the counties, municipalities, and all political subdivisions of this state.
Whenever the state of Washington is injured by reason of a violation of RCW 19.86.030, 19.86.040, 19.86.050, or 19.86.060, it may sue therefor in the superior court to recover the actual damages sustained by it and to recover the costs of the suit including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The district court declined to enforce the treble damages provisions for lack of jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction for superior courts and justice courts both originate from the constitution. Const. art. 4, §§ 6, 10 (amendment 28). The difference between those two courts is that the former is a court of general jurisdiction in which jurisdiction exists unless specifically excluded. Const. art. 4, § 6 (amendment 28) provides in part:
*32The superior court shall have original jurisdiction in all cases in equity and in all cases at law . . . and in all criminal cases amounting to felony, and in all cases of misdemeanor not otherwise provided for by law; . . . and for such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for. The superior court shall also have original jurisdiction in all cases and of all proceedings in which jurisdiction shall not have been by law vested exclusively in some other court; . . .
If a remedy is nonexistent at common law or equity, and that remedy owes its existence to a statute, the superior court, absent exclusive jurisdiction in some other court, automatically has jurisdiction based on the clause in amendment 28 (article 4, section 6) providing jurisdiction "for such special cases and proceedings as are not otherwise provided for."
Justice courts (district courts), on the other hand, are courts of limited jurisdiction. In fact, jurisdiction for that court must be presumed not to exist except by a specific legislative grant. Const. art. 4, § 10 (amendment 28) states: "The legislature shall . . . prescribe by law the powers, duties and jurisdiction of justices of the peace ..." RCW 3.66.010 gives justice courts "all the necessary powers which are possessed by courts of record in this state ..." but only for the purpose of carrying out rights of action arising from RCW 3.30 through 3.74. It is also stated in RCW 3.66.010 that
all laws of a general nature shall apply to such justice court as far as the same may be applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of chapters 3.30 through 3.74 RCW.
For purposes of civil jurisdiction, RCW 3.66.020 lists forms of action over which the district court may have cognizance. A general category of action is contained in RCW 3.66.020(9) which provides:
The justice court shall have jurisdiction and cognizance of the following civil actions and proceedings:
*33(9) Of all other actions and proceedings of which jurisdiction is specially conferred by statute, . . .
(Italics mine.) A further source of limitation of jurisdiction on district or justice courts is contained in article 4, section 10, amendment 28, which dictates that, in no event, shall the legislative grant
trench upon the jurisdiction of superior or other courts of record, except that justices of the peace may be made police justices of incorporated cities and towns.
The foregoing discussion of the jurisdiction of superior courts and of district justice courts is important, primarily in that it furnishes aid to construction of the relevant statutes, because this litigation turns upon the meaning to be given to relevant statutory language.
Another item which is helpful as an aid to construction of RCW 19.86.090, which is in issue here, is that the words "superior court" in that section also appear in the same chapter in RCW 19.86.060, .100, .110, and .140. RCW 19.86.110 also contains reference to "the trial court of general jurisdiction." Nowhere in the chapter is there any mention of "district court," "justice court," or "other court."
The Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86, created a remedy that was nonexistent at common law. Had the legislature made no mention of a forum for the remedy, jurisdiction in the superior court could be presumed because of the absence of exclusive jurisdiction in some other court. The remedy of treble damages for unfair business practices in RCW 19.86.090 would constitute the equivalent of the "special cases and proceedings" in amendment 28 (article 4, section 6). However, the legislature did not remain silent as to forum designation. RCW 19.86.090 provides in part:
Any person who is injured in his business or property . . . may bring a civil action in the superior court to enjoin further violations, to recover the actual damages sustained by him, or both . . .
(Italics mine.) This statutory provision is plain upon its face. Any statute which is clear and unambiguous does not *34admit of construction. State v. Houck, 32 Wn.2d 681, 203 P.2d 693 (1949); Shelton Hotel Co. v. Bates, 4 Wn.2d 498, 104 P.2d 478 (1940); State v. Spino, 61 Wn.2d 246, 377 P.2d 868 (1963). In other words, there is no need to search for the legislature's intent based on rules of statutory construction because the legislature's intent has been clearly spelled out by the use of the words "superior court" in RCW 19.86.090. However, since this issue is the focus of this litigation, I shall discuss several rules of statutory construction which are applicable.
Clearly, the legislature intended to limit any remedy pursued under RCW 19.86 to superior court jurisdiction. Jurisdiction for the justice court must be "specially conferred by statute." RCW 3.66.020(9). The majority argues that the words "may bring" in RCW 19.86.090 is a legislative attempt to leave room for alternate forums. While a majority starts with a series of correct rules, the final result is far from correct. The correct rules start with the statement, "Words in a statute are to be given their usual and ordinary meaning unless a contrary intent appears." With that I agree. I also agree that the word "may" conveys the idea of choice or discretion. But the ordinary rules of grammatical construction would indicate that the word "may" relates to the phrase "bring a civil action." Thus the legislature has indicated that a person may bring a civil action under RCW 19.86, but he is not compelled to do so. It therefore follows that the next phrase, "in the superior court", indicates where the plaintiff brings the action if plaintiff elects to bring an action at all. This is not an oversimplified view of the statute; it is the only commonsense view.
The majority also argues that since RCW 19.86.090 imposes a civil penalty, justice courts have concurrent jurisdiction by virtue of RCW 3.66.020(3). The majority overlooks the fact that treble damages for unfair competition is a purely statutory remedy, which would not exist but for the statute. The statute here created the remedy and provided for the forum wherein the remedy might be *35enforced. The statement in State v. Womack, 82 Wn.2d 382, 386, 510 P.2d 1133 (1973) is applicable here:
In a statutory proceeding, the jurisdiction and authority of the courts are prescribed by legislative enactment, and the court does not have any power that cannot be inferred from a broad interpretation thereof. In re Parsons, 76 Wn.2d 437, 457 P.2d 544 (1969); Passmore v. Passmore, 57 Wn.2d 762, 359 P.2d 811 (1961); Arneson v. Arneson, 38 Wn.2d 99, 227 P.2d 1016 (1951).
Another argument advanced by the majority is that the statute is unwise. Their argument is that most actions by collection agencies are in the district court and that it requires a separate action to enforce rights under RCW 19.86 if such rights can only be enforced in the superior court. Such arguments are not for the courts to consider, but should be directed to the legislature. The wisdom of statutes is not subject to judicial review. It is only the legislature which may properly determine the wisdom of its enactments. State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424, 30 P. 729 (1892); State ex rel. Wolfe v. Parmenter, 50 Wash. 164, 96 P. 1047 (1908); Treffry v. Taylor, 67 Wn.2d 487, 408 P.2d 269 (1965); Petstel, Inc. v. County of King, 77 Wn.2d 144, 459 P.2d 937 (1969).
The treble damage provision is a penalty. The general provisions of the district court act provide that a district court may hear an action to recover a penalty. However, the remedy herein is provided by a special provision. That provision is found in RCW 19.86.090 which is a part of the Consumer Protection Act (RCW 19.86). The rule is well known and generally accepted that if a conflict exists between a special statutory provision and a general statute, the special provision will control. State ex rel. Sherman v. Benson, 111 Wash. 124, 189 P. 1000 (1920); Knowles v. Holly, 82 Wn.2d 694, 513 P.2d 18 (1973). Here the Consumer Protection Act is not only a special statute, it is also the sole source of the remedy sought to be enforced.
*36The judgment of the district court should be affirmed.
Brachtenbach and Horowitz, JJ., concur with Wright, C.J.