Court Opinion

ID: 9771009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:28:44.819094+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:52.660947
License: Public Domain

BURGESS, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. It is always difficult to conclude a trial judge has “abused his discretion”.1 Yet, as pointed out in State v. Gonzalez, 855 S.W.2d 692, 696 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), this has been the standard of review for more than forty years.
At the risk of being redundant, it is uncon-troverted that:
(1) the offense was alleged to have been committed on September 29, 1992;
(2) appellant was brought to trial on October 7, 1992, and was given eight days credit on his prison sentence, thus he had been incarcerated the entire time;
(3) on October 7, 1992,2 (a) the complaint was filed in the District Court, (b) the information was filed in District Court, (c) counsel was appointed, (d) indictment was waived, (e) ten days to prepare for trial was waived, (f) the plea was taken, (g) ten days for sentenc*219ing was waived, and (h) right to appeal was waived;
(4) on October 13, 1992, the judgment was signed;
(5) on November 5, 1992, the motion for new trial was filed;
(6) on November 23, 1992, a judgment nunc pro tunc was signed;3
(7) on November 30, 1992, the motion for new trial was heard;
(8) on December 1,1992, an order denying the motion for new trial was signed;
(9) on December 22, 1992, permission to appeal was granted;
(10) on January 4, 1992, notice of appeal was filed.
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, appellant testified:
(1) he saw his lawyer for the first time on October 7, 1992;
(2) about 15 minutes elapsed between the first time he met his lawyer and the time he entered his guilty plea;
(3) he “really wasn’t understanding ... what [his lawyer] was telling” him;
(4) he was confused, was pressured and “really didn’t have enough time to consider [his] options”; and
(5) while he may have appeared to understand, he really didn’t;
Appellant’s attorney testified he “had no idea if [appellant] was, in fact, confused about what was going on_” The attorney went on to state appellant did seem confused or “[t]hat something was going on.” When asked if he had brought this to the Court’s attention, the attorney stated: “No. And the reason I was going to tell you that was because of his lack of communication with me. I mean, it was — he was listening. He appeared, you know, to hear what I was saying and he signed it, but there was very little talk between he and I about the case.”
The question raised on appeal is one of voluntariness, not competence. Appellant alleges his plea was not voluntary because of the time constraints.4 Yet the majority frames the discussion in terms of competency. The majority finds quite probative, and describes as “almost identical”, the fact that appellant admitted he had pleaded to an offense four years before. However, the state failed to produce any evidence that plea was similar, much less identical, in a time context, to the plea we now consider. Furthermore, the statement of facts regarding the plea is only 5 pages and could not have lasted more than five minutes.
The attitude of the state can best be summed up in their own words to the trial judge: “The man has pled. He only gets one bite at the apple. He has already had his day in court, and he had a right back then to go to trial. However, after the plea of guilty, there was no reason for it. And to this day there is not absolutely any evidence that he is not guilty. And because of that, Your Honor, we would ask that the plea stand as it is.” (Emphasis mine.)
I do not believe this attitude, in this ease, is compatible with Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 2.01 (Vernon Supp.1993) wherein it states, in pertinent part,: “It shall be the primary duty of all prosecuting attorneys, ..., not to convict, but to see that justice is done.” Justice is, arguably, a vague concept, which only has a definite meaning within the mind and heart of each individual. Therefore, what is justice to me, may not be justice to the prosecutor. We do, however, allude to “the criminal justice system.” This system has a “being” of its own. It has an integrity of its own; far more important than that of any single component of the system.
When viewed in this context, I believe the trial judge abused his discretion in denying the motion for new trial. In relative terms, *220there had been precious little prosecution or court time allotted to this case. There are no allegations nor any evidence that affording appellant a trial would unduly burden the system. The statement of facts from the guilty plea shows only the standard, superficial inquiry into each facet of the plea. Same day, same hour pleas, by their very nature, should be “red flags” and dictate an extended, meaningful examination of a defendant. More often than not, these “hurry up and move the case” pleas result in claims of involuntary pleas, ineffective assistance of counsel and other claims which, in turn, undermine the system. Not only should the guiltiest of the guilty be secure in the penitentiary, if appropriate, but they should also be secure in the knowledge they were put there by a system which has integrity. This case has afforded Claude Hafford the former, but not the latter. I dissent.

. In Cantu v. State, 842 S.W.2d 667, 682 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 3046, 125 L.Ed.2d 731 (1993), the abuse of discretion standard was discussed and the court held it would reverse "only when the trial judge’s decision was so clearly wrong as to lie outside that zone within which reasonable persons might disagree.”

. While all of the instruments are "date” stamped, none of them are “time" stamped. They are, however, placed in an appropriate chronological order in the transcript.

. The judgment nunc pro tunc corrected the date of the offense from September 19, 1992, to September 29, 1992.

. It is interesting to note that this plea was a dual one. That is, there were two defendants entering pleas at the same time. Throughout the statement of facts, there is only reference to "Defendants” with a single answer in each instance. Were the two defendants speaking in exact unison? Did each defendant answer each question? "The record speaketh not.”