Court Opinion

ID: 9376560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 06:05:00.68671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.603849
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    March 2, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 360008
                                                                    Wayne Circuit Court
JAWWAAD SAADIQ REESE,                                               LC No. 18-009807-01-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: K. F. KELLY, P.J., and MURRAY and SWARTZLE, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

         This case returns to this Court after a remand to the trial court to provide a sufficient
justification for imposing consecutive sentencing, or for resentencing. People v Reese,
unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued February 11, 2021 (Docket No.
350618), p 11 (Reese I). Defendant was convicted of eight counts of first-degree criminal sexual
conduct (CSC-I); MCL 750.520b(1)(b), for acts against his then 15-year-old stepdaughter, AM.
MCL 750.520b(3) provides that “[t]he court may order a term of imprisonment imposed under this
section to be served consecutively to any term of imprisonment imposed for any other criminal
offense arising from the same transaction.” Originally, the trial court sentenced defendant to 10
to 20 years imprisonment for each count of CSC-I; the sentences for Counts 1, 2, 4, 6, and 8 were
to run concurrent with each other, and the sentences for Counts 3, 5, and 7 were to run concurrent
with each other, but consecutive to the sentences for Counts 2, 4, and 6.

       When this Court remanded the case, it concluded:

               The trial court’s explanation for imposing three consecutive sentences, in
       essence, was that defendant ‘plied’ AM with marijuana before sexually assaulting
       her, and that the court did not believe the guidelines sufficiently reflected the
       seriousness of these crimes or their effect on the victim. This explanation was only
       slightly more specific than the overly general explanation found to be deficient in
       Norfleet I [People v Norfleet, 317 Mich App 649; 897 NW2d 195 (2016)], and is
       similarly devoid of separate explanations for each of the three consecutive
       sentences. The trial court’s rationale falls short of the level of specificity and

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       substantive content this Court approved to justify only one consecutive sentence in
       Norfleet II [People v Norfleet, 321 Mich App 68; 908 NW2d 316 (2017)].
       Accordingly, we remand this case to the trial court for articulation of sufficient
       justification for each of the three consecutive sentences, or for resentencing should
       the trial court deem it necessary in order to comply with this Court’s guidance in
       Norfleet and in this opinion. [Reese I, unpub op at 11.]

        On remand, the trial court held a hearing on defendant’s motion for resentencing. After
that hearing, the trial court entered an amended judgment of sentence providing that the sentences
for Counts 1 through 6 and Count 8 would run concurrently but that the sentence for Count 7 would
run consecutive to the sentence for Count 6 “for the reasons stated on the record[.]” At the hearing
on defendant’s motion for resentencing, the trial court provided the following justification for
imposing the single, consecutive sentence:

       And there were—he was found guilty of eight counts of CSC–First Degree. And
       this is not even taking into consideration in the—he had separate, you know,
       sentences for each of those. But if they run concurrent, it doesn’t even account for
       that in each of the guidelines.

               [Offense Variable] OV 13 talks about three or more offenses against a
       person. The [Prior Record Variable] [PRV] 7 talks about two or more concurrent
       felonies. These are eight concurrent felonies, eight crimes against a person.

              And I’m not even sure that the eight reflect all of the incidents of CSC that
       occurred between the defendant and the complaining witness. Those are the ones
       that were proven at trial and that were charged.

              But this was a continuing pattern of behavior for at least 2 or 3 months while
       the complaining witness was 15 years old, at the same time her mother is pregnant
       with the defendant’s child.

               This has broken up—this has affected not just the complaining witness, but
       her whole family, her mother and this child that was born right about the same time
       that these things were happening or within close proximity.

              I don’t think that any of those things are accurately reflected within the
       guidelines or are fully reflected in the guidelines.

       Defendant now appeals as of right, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by not
providing an adequate justification for the imposition of the consecutive sentence. We affirm.

        “[W]hen a statute grants a trial court discretion to impose a consecutive sentence, the trial
court’s decision to do so is reviewed for an abuse of discretion, i.e., whether the trial court’s
decision was outside the range of reasonable and principled outcomes.” Norfleet I, 317 Mich App
at 654. When exercising its discretion, the trial court must “articulate on the record the reasons
for each consecutive sentence imposed.” Id.

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        The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it imposed a consecutive sentence on
defendant. MCL 750.520b(3) authorized the trial court to impose a consecutive sentence, and the
trial court adequately explained why it imposed a consecutive sentence. The trial court’s reasoning
for imposing a consecutive sentence was not outside the range of reasonable and principled
outcomes.

       “In Michigan, ‘concurrent sentencing is the norm,’ and a ‘consecutive sentence may be
imposed only if specifically authorized by statute.’ ” People v Ryan, 295 Mich App 388, 401; 819
NW2d 55 (2012), citing People v Brown, 220 Mich App 680, 682; 560 NW2d 80 (1996). This
Court has previously emphasized that the Michigan Supreme Court “has a ‘clear preference for
concurrent sentencing’ and that the ‘[i]mposition of a consecutive sentence is strong medicine.’ ”
Norfleet I, 317 Mich App at 665, citing People v Chambers, 430 Mich 217, 229, 231; 421 NW2d
903 (1988).

        Defendant was convicted of eight counts of CSC-I pursuant to MCL 750.520b(1)(b). MCL
750.520b(3) states that “[t]he court may order a term of imprisonment imposed under this section
to be served consecutively to any term of imprisonment imposed for any other criminal offense
arising from the same transaction.” This Court has held that “any other criminal offense” includes
additional CSC-I offenses. Ryan, 295 Mich App at 406. Two or more offenses arise from the
“same transaction” when they arise from a “continuous time sequence.” Id. at 402. As this Court
concluded, Counts 6 and 7 arose from a continuous time sequence. Reese I, unpub op at 10 n 6.
Therefore, those sentences may be served consecutively in accordance with MCL 750.520b(3).

        When exercising its discretion, the trial court must “articulate on the record the reasons for
each consecutive sentence imposed” Norfleet I, 317 Mich App at 654. If multiple consecutive
sentences are given, the trial court must explain the rationale for each consecutive sentence
separately. Id. at 665. As noted, the trial court provided three reasons for its imposition of a
consecutive sentence: (1) the number of convictions defendant received was not adequately
reflected in the sentencing guidelines, (2) the circumstances of defendant’s convictions were not
adequately reflected in the sentencing guidelines, and (3) defendant’s actions affected more than
just AM, which was not adequately reflected in the sentencing guidelines.

        Specifically, the trial court explained on remand that it was imposing a consecutive
sentence on defendant because the sentencing guidelines did not fully account for defendant’s high
number of CSC-I convictions. OV 13 was assessed at 25 points for all the counts, reflecting that
the “offense was part of a pattern of felonious criminal activity involving 3 or more crimes against
a person.” MCL 777.43(1)(c). PRV 7 was assessed at 20 points for all the counts, reflecting that
defendant “ha[d] 2 or more subsequent or concurrent convictions[.]” OV 11 was assessed at 25
points for Counts 2 through 7 to reflect that there were “two incidents of penetration happening at
the same time” during those counts. The trial court’s conclusion that the sentencing guidelines did
not adequately take into account the number of convictions defendant received was not outside the
range of reasonable and principled outcomes. Eight crimes against a person are significantly more
than three crimes against a person, and eight concurrent convictions are significantly more than
two concurrent convictions. None of the variables specifically took into account all eight counts
at once. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the guidelines did
not adequately reflect the high number of CSC-I convictions defendant received in this case.

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        The trial court also justified its imposition of a consecutive sentence by explaining that the
circumstances of defendant’s convictions, as well as the wide-reaching effect of his actions, were
not adequately reflected in the sentencing guidelines. Defendant is correct in pointing out that OV
10 was assessed at 15 points (the maximum possible points) for all the counts because the trial
court concluded that defendant engaged in “predatory conduct[.]” However, the trial court’s
conclusion that OV 10 (and the scoring guidelines as a whole) did not adequately take into account
the extent of defendant’s predatory conduct, the aggravating circumstances surrounding the
convictions, and the wide-reaching effect of defendant’s actions, was not outside the range of
reasonable and principled outcomes. The trial court listed several specific circumstances
surrounding defendant’s convictions that could warrant a consecutive sentence: the criminal sexual
conduct occurred over a period of two to three months; AM was only 15 years old at the time of
the conduct; AM’s mother was pregnant with defendant’s child at the time of the conduct; and his
actions broke up a family. These circumstances go beyond predatory conduct, showing a pattern
of behavior and aggravating circumstances.

        The trial court’s reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence are at least as specific as the
trial court’s reasons for imposing a consecutive sentence in Norfleet II. Norfleet II, 321 Mich App
at 72. Therefore, the reasoning provided by the trial court is likewise “sufficient to depart from
the heavy presumption in favor of concurrent sentences and to order one of the sentences to be
served consecutively to another.” Id. at 73. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it
imposed a consecutive sentence on defendant; it adequately explained its justification for doing
so.

       Affirmed.

                                                              /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly
                                                              /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                                                              /s/ Brock A. Swartzle

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