Court Opinion

ID: 9704991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:53:54.539666+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:07.188509
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.
(dissenting) — It would be impossible to disagree with the major principles of law announced by the majority. It is too well established to admit of argument that every intendment must be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of all legislative enactments, and that they may be stricken down only if their invalidity appears beyond any reasonable doubt. But, having stated these principles, the majority opinion proceeds to ignore them. I must respectfully dissent.
I. The vital point at which the majority falls into error is in its conclusion that the “single object” required by the constitution must be the cash bonus contemplated by section 4 of chapter 332, Acts of the Thirty-ninth General Assembly. Since by section 4 the method of payment of what may be designated as the “bonus in chief” is to be in cash, it is reasoned the “additional bonus to be administered by the bonus board for the amelioration of the condition” of veterans who are suffering from disability provided by section 8 must likewise be paid only in cash. (Emphasis added.) This must be so, it is said, or the act would transgress the “single object” provision of the constitution.
With this I am unable to agree. Section 1 of the Act provides for a state bond issue, the proceeds of which are “to be expended for the payment of a bonus * * * or for the benefit of such persons, as prescribed by section eight (8) of this act * * *.” (Emphasis added.) This defines the purpose of the Act so far as it concerns us here: that is, the issuance and sale of bonds the proceeds from which shall be expended for the payment of an additional bonus for the benefit of veterans suffering from disability. A “bonus” is defined by the New Century Dictionary as “something given or paid over and above what is due; a premium ; also an extra dividend * * Accepting this definition, there is no sound basis for the conclusion that the “bonus” referred to in section 8 is necessarily to be paid in cash.
*1103In Knorr v. Beardsley, 240 Iowa 828, 38 N.W.2d 236, we had before us for consideration the provisions of the World War II Bonus Act. Items 1 and 2 referred to in the opinion were in substance identical with sections 4 and 8 of the World War I Act now under consideration. Indeed, the second bonus Act seems to have been drawn with the first as a model. We there determined the “single object” of the Act in these terms: “There can be no serious controversy over the singleness of purpose and the unity of object with respect to items (1) and (2). Clearly, they were both solely for the benefit of those who served in World War II. Such was the decision of this very question in Grout v. Kendall, supra, 195 Iowa 467, 192 N.W. 529 * * (Emphasis added.) Knorr v. Beardsley, supra, at page 855 of 240 Iowa, page 251 of 38 N.W.2d. Again, we said: “The movement prompting the bonus statute and the authorization of the $85,000,000 and the sole object of the legislature and the voters was to compensate the service men and women for their services and disability.” (Emphasis supplied.) Knorr v. Beardsley, supra, at page 856 of 240 Iowa, page 251 of 38 N.W.2d.
This holding should dispose of the majority contention that the “sole object” of the World War I Bonus Act was to pay a cash bonus. In addition, significant language is found in section 1 of the Act. It is there provided that the proceeds of the bond issue shall be expended “for the payment of a bonus to the persons defined in section four (4) of this act or for the benefit of such persons, as prescribed by section eight (8) of this act * * *.” (Emphasis added.) The “single object” of the Act, as we held in Knorr v. Beardsley, supra, was “to compensate the service men and women for their services and disability.” This was to be done by the payment of a-cash bonus to those described in section 4, and an “additional bonus” for the benefit of those defined by section 8. The single object of the Act was not to pay -a cash bonus, as the majority holds, but to compensate and benefit the veterans.
An “additional” bonus should be interpreted as anything which comes within the meaning of “something given in addition to what is ordinarily due.” The word “bonus” does not ordinarily or necessarily imply cash. Corporations often give their stockholders, in lieu of additional cash dividends, a stock bonus, or the *1104right to purchase additional stock at a fixed price. Followers of sports are familiar with the current and controversial rule in basketball known as the “bonus” rule, which awards a second or “bonus” free throw when the first one is successful.
But the majority gives weight to what it believes to be a rule of construction that we should assume the word “bonus” is to be given the same meaning at all places where it occurs in the Act. The rule is a most tenuous one, if it exists at all. The cases in which it has been held not to apply are at least as numerous as those in which it has been followed. It appears to be one of those convenient statements which may be, and sometimes are, used to support an otherwise fragile conclusion, and may be readily distinguished or disregarded when the court so chooses. The majority opinion gives it much greater weight than seems warranted, in view of the many authorities which refine it to the point where it has little meaning. Perhaps a further study of the authorities cited by the majority may be helpful. Thus, in 50 Am. Jur., Statutes, section 271, page 260, it is said:
“There is no rule of statutory construction which precludes the courts from giving a word used in various places in a statute the meaning the legislature intended it to have in each instance. It is not a sound proposition that the same word, occurring in different places in the same statute always means the same thing; the same word may have different meanings in different parts of the same statute, or even in the same section.” (Emphasis added.)
In Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U. S. 427; 433, 52 S. Ct. 607, 609, 76 L. Ed. 1204, also cited and relied upon by the majority, the actual holding was that the words did not have the same meaning in the different sections of the Act. The court said: “It is not unusual for the same word to be used with different meanings in the same act, and there is no rule of statutory construction which precludes the courts from giving to the word the meaning which the legislature intended it should have in each instance.”
To the same effect are Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 55 S. Ct. 50, 51, 79 L. Ed. 211, and State v. Knowles, 90 Md. 646, 45 A. 877, 878, 49 L. R. A. 695.
*1105Indeed, the Iowa legislature itself seems to have no idea that section 8, chapter 332, Acts of the Thirty-ninth General Assembly, provided for a bonus to be paid in cash. The Forty-second General Assembly thought it necessary to provide for cash payments. It did this by enacting its chapter 4, which, after providing in section 1 for investment of the “additional bonus and disability fund” created by section 8 of chapter 332, supra, directed in section 4 that “when any award from such additional bonus and disability fund is made by said bonus board, payment shall be made in the manner provided in section seven (7), chapter three hundred thirty-two (332), acts of the thirty-ninth general assembly.” Section 7 of chapter 332 provided plainly for payment of the .original bonus in cash. But, if the legislature were not at least doubtful that the “additional bonus” called for by section 8 was intended to be a “cash” bonus, there would have been no need for the enactment of section 4, chapter 4, Acts of the Forty-second General Assembly. The fact that section 4, chapter 332, Acts of the Thirty-ninth General Assembly, supra, clearly required payment of the major bonus in cash, while there is no reference to cash payments in section 8, is in itself some evidence that such manner of payment was not intended. What the legislature did not say may be as significant as what it said. In United States v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 220 U. S. 37, 44, 31 S. Ct. 362, 363, 55 L. Ed. 361, it is said: “The presence of such a provision in the one part and its absence in the other is an argument against reading it as implied.” See also Wine v. Commonwealth, 301 Mass. 451, 17 N.E.2d 545, 548, 120 A. L. R. 889.
The majority also believes the word “bonus” must be taken in its ordinary meaning. The dictionary definitions cited by the majority do not confine the meaning to “cash”, and I have pointed out instances in which it is used to mean other additional payments or rewards or gifts. Whether all voters who approved the issuance of bonds to pay the bonus thought they were authorizing only cash payments I cannot say; except that as one who voted affirmatively, at this date I have no recollection that I knew section 8 was a part of the Act. Without doubt many of those who voted for passage knew of the “bonus in chief” and as *1106the Act provided, that it .would be paid in cash; to say now that the unconstitutionality of the Act clearly appears because they also thought the “additional bonus” meant cash appears to me to be an assumption we are not warranted in making for the purpose of finding invalidity.
II. While I think the majority opinion rests its case entirely upon the question of whether the “additional bonus” of section 8 appears beyond a reasonable doubt to have been intended to be a cash bonus, there are other matters stated as a basis for the ruling, probably to “shore up” the major holding, to which brief reference should be made. It is said that we should give much weight to the administrative interpretation of the law; and since the “additional bonus” has been paid since March 15, 1928, in cash, there is strong evidence only cash was intended by section 8. I have pointed out that the Forty-second General Assembly, in section 4 of chapter 4 of its Acts, required cash payments. The bonus board, the administrative body, did not begin payments under section 8 until March 1928, at which time section 4 of chapter 4, Acts of the Forty-second General Assembly, was in full force and effect. The administrative body was not construing the Act; it was following the direct order of the legislature. The legislature, being at least in doubt -as to the meaning and method of payment of the “additional bonus” provided by section 8, in 1927, before any payments had been made under it, specified they should be in cash. The administrative body of course followed this direct order. It made no interpretation of the law. No one complained that the Forty-second General Assembly had no right to specify how the “additional bonus” should be paid at that time; it is only now, when the legislature has made a different provision, that it has been challenged. But surely the question of administrative interpretation has no place in this discussion.
III. The majority opinion stresses the thought that if the sum of not to exceed $2,000,000 provided by chapter 256, Acts of the Fifty-fifth General Assembly, is used solely for the construction and equipment of the nursing home, there will be nothing left to maintain and operate it. This, the majority thinks, is in some manner proof of the unconstitutionality of the Act. The majority says: “It is frankly stated: ‘Upon construe-' *1107tion of the new nursing home, the present nursing home and hospital would serve as the dormitory to house persons now in the main building.’ ” "We are not told where this is “frankly stated”; certainly it is not in chapter 256, supra, the statute which we are considering, and to the provisions of which we must look to determine its validity. The majority also says: “It is true the proposed amendment states the new nursing home ‘shall constitute an additional bonus for the amelioration of the condition’ of disabled World War veterans. But this neither alters nor conceals the real purpose.”
The quotation from chapter 256 is not accurate. The nursing home is not to be used for the amelioration of the condition of World War veterans, but of “residents of this state, as defined in section 4 (4) of said chapter [chapter 332, Acts of the 39th G. A.], who are suffering from disability.” The intent of the Fifty-fifth General Assembly to substitute the nursing home to be used for veterans of World War I exclusively, for the cash disability payments before given to them, to the extent of $2,000,-000 of the fund, is clear. What the “real purpose” is that is “neither altered nor concealed” is not stated, and I do not know what ulterior design the majority conceives the legislature may have had. But the statute itself seems clear, and we should determine its constitutionality by its language without looking beyond and outside it to conjure up some hidden intent to pervert the use of the home to be built to purposes other than those expressed in the Act itself. Improper diversion of the funds or illegal use of the property can be dealt with when and if they occur.
It is further said that when the sum of $2,000,000 is used for the building and equipment there will be nothing left to maintain and operate it. This is true of any capital improvement. When land is taken under the power of eminent domain, for the construction of a highway, or for an artificial lake, or for any of the many other public purposes for which it may be requisitioned, usually the taking can be made effective for the stated purpose only if funds are later made available by way of appropriations or otherwise. Roads must be built and maintained after the land is acquired; artificial lakes must be built, improved, and maintained in many ways. Our state is dotted with fine buildings *1108built to house our universities, colleges, mental hospitals, prisons, children’s homes, and many other institutions. All of these depend upon appropriations from the legislature for their utility. But these are matters of policy and wisdom rather than of constitutionality. With the nursing home built and equipped, it is certain that appropriations would be made available by succeeding legislatures: -It is a practice universally followed. Shall we now say the Act is unconstitutional because the lawmaking body has seen fit to use the funds for a nursing home in the well-founded expectation that future legislatures will follow the unvarying practice of appropriating moneys to operate it? The real claim of the appellants and the majority at this point is that they do not think the Fifty-fifth General Assembly acted wisely in deciding that a nursing home is preferable to cash payments as a means of benefiting the veterans, of “ameliorating” their condition.
Here again the majority, saying we are not concerned with the wisdom of the legislation under attack — indeed, we have no right to meddle with the judgment of the legislature — proceeds to ignore the rule it states. It says the statute is “inadequate and improper.” It points out its belief that the new nursing home, if constructed, would not care for all the veterans. For that matter the cash fund itself may well prove inadequate. But these things go to the wisdom of the enactment rather than to its constitutionality. The majority opinion does no more than to demonstrate, if it demonstrates anything; that the legislature acted unwisely in the method it chose to “ameliorate” the condition of the disabled veterans. It may be that the lawmaking body deemed it advisable to provide a nursing home with full care rather than to dole out the funds available so that few if any would get full relief. Whether it chose the best method I do not know, but I am sure, as the- majority says, it is not our concern.
In this connection also, the majority opinion says that one of two situations must result: either the new building will be restricted to World War I veterans, so that general funds appropriated to maintain and operate the nursing home would be used for a special purpose and for a special class, and discrimination would result (I assume illegal discrimination is what is meant); *1109or, if the new nursing home is to be used for all inmates of the Home, then World War I bonus funds will be used for a purpose and for the benefit of parties not contemplated.
Since the statute under attack clearly says the new structure is intended solely for the use of those entitled to the benefits of the bonus authorized by chapter 332, Acts of the Thirty-ninth General Assembly, we need consider only the first of the claimed illegalities above set forth. But in urging the matter of discrimination in the use of funds to maintain the new building if its use is restricted as section 1 of chapter 256 of the Acts of the Fifty-fifth General Assembly provides, the majority is attempting to find support for its holding beyond any point contended for by the appellants herein. __ There is no suggestion in their brief that chapter 256 is illegal because any moneys appropriated to service the nursing home could not legally be used solely for the benefit of World War I veterans. Nor does it seem we should borrow trouble, even though by so doing we bolster what may appear to be a desirable conclusion. As was so aptly said in City of Des Moines v. City of West Des Moines, 239 Iowa 1, 14, 30 N.W.2d 500, 507, “There will be time enough to bid the Devil ‘good morrow’ when we meet him.” I do not know whether, if the new nursing home should be erected and the legislature should appropriáte from the general funds to operate it, such an act would be fairly open to the charge of invalidating discrimination. The point is not suggested or argued, and should not be used to point up a claim of illegality of the Act under consideration.
IV. A special concurring opinion now filed urges that chapter 256, Acts of the Fifty-fifth General Assembly, does not restrict the use of the proposed nursing home to veterans of World War I, because of the provision that none of the funds appropriated shall be expended until it shall be determined by the state board of control, with the approval of the legislative budget and financial control committee, “that the expenditure shall be for the best interests of the state.” It is said “the governing factor is ‘tire best interests of the state.’ ”
Here again those of the majority who join in the special concurrence are finding unconstitutionality of the statute upon a ground not argued or so much as suggested by the appellants.
*1110It is beyond our rules and forbidden by many decisions that we reverse upon a point not raised in the trial court or argued here; it is especially wrong when by SO' doing we invalidate a statutory enactment of tbe legislature. Nor is the logic of the special concurrence evident. The nursing home to be built is specifically said to be for the amelioration of the condition of veterans of World War I, as defined by section 4 of chapter 832 of the Acts of the Thirty-ninth General Assembly; but the structure is not to be built until the board of control, with the approval of the legislative budget and financial control committee, has decided it is in the best interests of the state. That is, the building is to be built when it is determined by the board of control and the legislative committee that the best interests of the state require that it be constructed; but such construction, when made, is to be for the amelioration of the condition of the specified veterans. The Act gives the board of control and the legislative committee no power to act upon the broad general principle of whatever may be for the best interests of the state; it is only when they decide it is for the best interests of the state that the structure intended for and limited to the use and benefit of veterans of World War I should be built that they are to proceed. Whatever may be conceived to be the right of the legislature to give the power to withhold appropriations at the discretion of an interim committee is not for our consideration at this time. It is not argued by appellants and so the same rule applies which has long been in force by rule and by our numerous decisions, and which I have referred to above. We should not consider errors or propositions not argued; we should not consider claims of unconstitutionality not pleaded and urged in the trial court. These principles are so well established that they should not require supporting citation, nor should it be necessary to call attention to them. But see Rule 344(a) (4) (Third), Iowa Rules of Civil Procedure; Jacobs v. City of Chariton, 245 Iowa 1378, 65 N.W.2d 561, and State v. Walters, 244 Iowa 1253, 58 N.W.2d 4.
V. The majority also places weight upon the thought that chapter 256, supra, transgresses section 6 of Article VII of the Constitution of Iowa. This, it says, is because the Act under *1111consideration “would offend the spirit of this provision [section 6, Article VII] by placing the effective continuance of the ‘additional bonus’ at the mercy of future legislatures.”
The plaintiffs’ petition does not allege any violation of section 6, Article VII. We have several times held we will not consider claims of unconstitutionality not pleaded and urged in the lower court. State v. Walters, supra, 244 Iowa 1253, 1260, 1261, 58 N.W.2d 4, 8. See also Jacobs v. City of Chariton, supra, 245 Iowa 1378, 1394, 65 N.W.2d 561, 569, and cases cited.
VI. The conclusion seems to me to be inescapable that the statute under attack here is not so clearly unconstitutional beyond any reasonable doubt that we have the right to strike it down. To uphold the position of the majority, it must be clear beyond such doubt that the words “additional bonus” in section 8 of the original Act mean a “cash” bonus and only that. The authorities point definitely in the opposite direction. Considerations of efficiency, expediency, advisability or wisdom are not for us; we have no duty to say whether the legislature was well advised, whether it chose the wisest method, in determining how the disabilities of the veterans would be best ameliorated. As I read the majority opinion it finds unconstitutionality first, and chiefly, because the “additional bonus” can be only a cash bonus; and second, because the method of using the fund provided by the Fifty-fifth General Assembly, in the opinion of the majority, will not work out well, is ill advised and will not give the veterans as good protection as they will secure by cash payments under the present system. Neither of these reasons is so free from reasonable doubt that we are warranted in interfering with the law as enacted by a co-ordinate branch of Government. The judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Bliss and Garfield, JJ., join in this dissent.