Court Opinion

ID: 9390821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 17:08:39.477174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:37.222481
License: Public Domain

J-S05015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 ABDULLAH HANEEF IBN-SADIIKA             :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 10 WDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 14, 2021
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0010761-1984

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 ABDULLAH HANEEF IBN-SADIIKA             :
                                         :
                   Appellant             :   No. 11 WDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 14, 2021
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0011275-1984

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                  FILED: April 28, 2023

     Appellant, Abdullah Haneef Ibn-Sadiika, appeals pro se from the post-

conviction court’s orders denying his petition for DNA testing under the Post

Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review,

we affirm.
J-S05015-23

         In 1983, Appellant was charged, in two separate cases, with various

offenses, including criminal homicide and robbery, based on the following

facts:

         [A]t about 9:00 p.m. on March 16, 1983, [Appellant] left the
         residence he was sharing with his girlfriend[, Crystal] Sanders[,]
         in Mount Oliver, Pennsylvania. … [Appellant] and Ms. Sanders had
         been experiencing financial difficulties[,] and [Appellant] informed
         [Ms.] Sanders that he was going to get some money and that he
         might have to kill someone to do it. [Appellant] returned home
         at approximately 2:00 a.m. with blood stains on one of his shoes
         and on a pair of black gloves. … [Appellant] was carrying a gym
         bag which contained a jar, a small white pearl box containing a
         set of pearl handled steak knives, two checks[,] each of which
         were the victim’s personal checks made out to the [Appellant,] in
         which one of the checks the [Appellant’s] name was spelled
         incorrectly, various amounts of foreign currency and collector
         coins, various gold necklaces, stickpins, rings and earrings, a few
         of which were engraved with the victim’s initials.

         Testimony given by Ms. Sanders at trial provided that [Appellant]
         explained to her that the items in the gym bag were obtained from
         an elderly woman in the Homewood area of Pittsburgh. He
         informed Ms. Sanders that he forced the victim to write out a
         second check because she misspelled his name on the first. …
         [Appellant] admitted to [Ms.] Sanders that he had stabbed the
         victim and left her to die in her bedroom because she could have
         identified him.

PCRA Court Opinion (PCO), 10/3/22, at 1-2 (citations to the record omitted).

         On June 27, 1985, a jury convicted Appellant of first-degree murder and

robbery. On February 7, 1986, he was sentenced for his murder conviction to

life incarceration, without the possibility of parole, and to a consecutive term

of 6 to 12 years’ incarceration for his robbery conviction. On direct appeal,

we affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court denied

his subsequent petition for allowance of appeal.        See Commonwealth v.

                                        -2-
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Haneef Ibn–Sadiika, 526 A.2d 1233 (Pa. Super. 1987) (unpublished

memorandum), affirmed, 532 A.2d 1137 (Pa. 1987).

     On May 7, 2004, Appellant filed a petition for DNA testing pursuant to

42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1.     Therein, Appellant requested that DNA testing be

performed on cigarette butts found in the victim’s apartment. Ultimately, the

PCRA court denied his petition, and this Court affirmed on appeal.         See

Commonwealth       v.   Ibn-Sadiika,    No.   844   WDA    2005,   unpublished

memorandum at *1 (Pa. Super. filed Oct. 6, 2006). We reasoned:

     The burden lies with the petitioner to make out a prima facie case
     that favorable results from the requested DNA testing would
     establish his innocence. [Commonwealth v. Smith, 889 A.2d
     582,] 584 [(Pa. Super. 2005)]. At [A]ppellant’s trial, Dorothy
     Menges (“Menges”), a criminalist with the Allegheny County Crime
     Laboratory, testified that several cigarette butts were examined
     from the victim’s apartment. They were of two different brands,
     Kool and Carlton, and were removed from the bathroom toilet and
     a bedroom nightstand.

     Appellant’s bald assertion that DNA testing of the cigarette butts,
     unavailable at time of trial and assuming exculpatory results,
     would establish his actual innocence of the crimes is frivolous and
     unsupported by the record. Importantly, [A]ppellant was never
     linked to the cigarette butts; in fact, Menges testified that the
     blood group substances found on most of the cigarettes were
     consistent with the victim and her boyfriend, James Wilber.
     Menges did not even have a sample of [A]ppellant’s blood for
     comparison.

                                     ***

        On its face, the prima facie requirement set forth in [section]
        9543.1(c)(3) and reinforced in [section] 9543.1(d)(2)
        requires an appellant to demonstrate that favorable results
        of the requested DNA testing ‘would establish’ the
        appellant’s actual innocence of the crime of conviction. …
        In DNA as in other areas, an absence of evidence is not
        evidence of absence.

                                     -3-
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                                           ***

        [H]ere, [A]ppellant’s argument that DNA testing of the cigarette
        butts, assuming favorable results, would establish his innocence
        of the victim’s murder is based on a faulty premise. Even if
        [A]ppellant’s DNA were not found on the cigarette butts recovered
        from the victim’s apartment, this in no way would exculpate him
        of her murder.

        Appellant also asserts that “comparison of the DNA profile
        revealed by the DNA testing to [s]tate and national DNA-
        databases would reveal the identity of the likely killer.”
        Appellant’s argument is based on pure speculation. Even if,
        perchance, forensic testing of the cigarette butts produced a DNA
        profile that matched up with another individual in a state or
        national DNA database, that would not establish [A]ppellant’s
        innocence, let alone reveal the identity of the likely killer. As
        [A]ppellant has failed to present a prima facie case that the
        anticipated evidence would establish his innocence, we will affirm
        the order of the PCRA court dismissing his petition.

Id. at *6-9 (footnote, emphasis, citations, and some quotation marks

omitted).

        On October 8, 2021, Appellant filed another, pro se petition for DNA

testing under section 9543.1. Appellant again sought testing of the cigarette

butts, as well as hairs found in the victim’s apartment.      On December 14,

2021, the court issued an order, listing both underlying docket numbers,

denying Appellant’s petition. He filed timely, pro se notices of appeal at each

of his two trial court docket numbers.1

        On January 20, 2022, the court filed an order directing Appellant to file

a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

However, the court’s order did not notify Appellant that any issue not raised

____________________________________________

1   This Court sua sponte consolidated Appellant’s appeals.

                                           -4-
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in a timely-filed statement would be deemed waived.             See Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b)(3)(iv).   Thus, although Appellant did not comply with the court’s

order to file a concise statement, we will not deem his issue(s) waived. See

Greater Erie Indus. Development Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc.,

88 A.3d 222, 225 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en banc) (holding that, “[i]n determining

whether an appellant has waived his issues on appeal based on non-

compliance with [Rule] 1925, it is the trial court’s order that triggers an

appellant’s obligation[;] … therefore, we look first to the language of that

order”) (citations omitted).

      In Appellant’s pro se brief, he sets forth a “Statement of the Questions

Involved” section, but simply presents a lengthy argument, rather than any

clearly delineated issue(s). See Appellant’s Brief at 3-5. We will overlook this

briefing error, as we can discern that Appellant is asserting that the court

erred by denying his motion for DNA testing of the cigarette butts and hairs

found at the crime scene because he “provided a strong[,] prima facie case of

actual innocence” to warrant that testing. Id. at 3.

      In the Argument section of his brief, Appellant contends that DNA testing

of the cigarette butts and hairs “would prove who smoked the cigarettes and

left behind the hairs and [who] certainly may be the unknown culprit who

killed the [victim] and will vindicate … Appellant[,] who has demonstrated at

the very least a prima facie case for actual innocence.” Id. at 9. Appellant

further argues that he is entitled to DNA testing under the ‘data bank theory,’

as explained in In re Payne, 129 A.3d 546 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en banc). Id.

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at 8.    “The ‘data bank theory’ postulates that any DNA results that are

obtained from DNA testing that prove the presence of an unknown person

could be run through state and federal data banks for a match, which, if

successful would lead to the identification of a separate assailant.” Payne,

129 A.3d at 564 (citation omitted). According to Appellant, here, the DNA

testing of the cigarette butts and hairs would identify another individual who

was present in the victim’s apartment, thereby exonerating Appellant.

        We disagree. Initially, we note that, when examining the propriety of

an order resolving a request for DNA testing, we employ the PCRA standard

of review. See Commonwealth v. Conway, 14 A.3d 101 (Pa. Super. 2011).

“On appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard of review calls for us

to determine whether the ruling of the PCRA court is supported by the record

and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Nero, 58 A.3d 802, 805 (Pa.

Super. 2012) (citation omitted).

        Section 9543.1 states, in pertinent part:

        (a) Motion.--

        (1) An individual convicted of a criminal offense in a court of this
        Commonwealth may apply by making a written motion to the
        sentencing court at any time for the performance of forensic DNA
        testing on specific evidence that is related to the investigation or
        prosecution that resulted in the judgment of conviction.

                                        ***

        (3) A request for DNA testing under this section shall be by written
        petition and shall be filed with the clerk of courts of the judicial
        district where the sentence is imposed.

        (4) DNA testing may be sought at any time if the motion is made
        in a timely manner and for the purpose of demonstrating the

                                       -6-
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         applicant's actual innocence and not to delay the execution of
         sentence or administration of justice.

                                          ***

         (6) The motion shall explain how, after review of the record of the
         applicant’s trial, there is a reasonable possibility if the applicant is
         under State supervision, or there is a reasonable probability if the
         applicant is not under State supervision, or after review of the
         record of the applicant’s guilty plea there is a reasonable
         probability, that the testing would produce exculpatory evidence
         that would establish:

            (i) the applicant’s actual innocence of the offense for which
            the applicant was convicted;

42 Pa.C.S. § 9543.1(a)(1)-(6)(i).

         We first address Appellant’s request for DNA testing of the cigarette

butts.     As discussed supra, this Court has already affirmed the denial of

Appellant’s 2004 request for such DNA testing, concluding that the absence of

Appellant’s DNA on the cigarette butts would not establish his actual

innocence. See Ibn-Sadiika, No. 844 WDA 2005, unpublished memorandum

at *6-9. Aside from citing In re Payne, Appellant provides no discussion of

any intervening circumstances or legal decisions that would permit us to re-

evaluate his request for DNA testing of the cigarette butts. Although he avers

that In re Payne “changed the entire legal thinking concerning the DNA data

base theory,” he provides no elaboration on this bald claim. Appellant’s Brief

at 8.       Furthermore, we previously examined and rejected Appellant’s

speculative argument that a comparison of DNA found on the cigarette butts

to state and national DNA databases would reveal the identity of the true killer

in this case.         See Ibn-Sadiika, No. 844 WDA 2005, unpublished

                                          -7-
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memorandum at *8-9. Therefore, Appellant’s argument concerning the DNA

testing of the cigarette butts has been previously litigated and does not

warrant post-conviction relief. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(3) (stating that, to

be eligible for PCRA relief, the petitioner must prove, inter alia, that the claim

has not been previously litigated).

      In regard to Appellant’s request for DNA testing of the hair, he has failed

to demonstrate that his motion is timely.

      “Section 9543.1(d) requires the petitioner to make a timely
      request for DNA testing.” [Commonwealth v.] Walsh, 125 A.3d
      [1248,] 1254-55 [(Pa. Super. 2015)]. “In analyzing timeliness for
      purposes of Section 9543.1(d)(1)(iii), the court must consider the
      facts of each case to determine whether the applicant’s request
      for post-conviction DNA testing is to demonstrate his actual
      innocence or to delay the execution of sentence or administration
      of justice.” Id. at 1255.

                                      ***

      In [Commonwealth v.] Edmiston[, 65 A.3d 339 (Pa. 2013),
      overruled on different grounds by Commonwealth v. Small, 238
      A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020)], the defendant was sentenced in 1989 to
      death for the murder of a two-year-old girl. Edmiston, 65 A.3d
      at 342-44. After unsuccessfully filing two PCRA petitions, the
      defendant in 2009 — more than 19 years after his conviction —
      filed a petition for post-conviction DNA testing. Id. at 344. In
      deeming the petition untimely, our Supreme Court highlighted
      that the defendant did not seek additional DNA testing at trial; or
      in 2002, when the post-conviction testing provisions were
      enacted; or in his second PCRA petition. Id. at 357-58. The
      Supreme Court concluded:

         [Edmiston’s] guilty status has not changed since his 1989
         conviction; advances in technology allegedly occurring after
         that date do not explain why he, if truly innocent, did not
         seek immediate testing, or, at the very least, testing
         available as technology improved during the intervening

                                      -8-
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         years, rather than languishing on death row, all the while
         being supposedly innocent.

      Id. at 358.

      Similarly, in Walsh, the defendant was convicted of murder. His
      conviction was affirmed on appeal, and he subsequently filed three
      unsuccessful PCRA petitions. Walsh, 125 A.3d at 1251. In 2014,
      more than 10 years after his conviction, he filed a petition for post-
      conviction DNA testing, which the trial court denied. Id. On
      appeal, we affirmed the trial court’s determination that the
      petition was untimely. Id. at 1258. We observed that the
      evidence he sought to test was “discovered and available” before
      trial, when DNA testing was available, and further, he had not
      sought DNA testing in his PCRA petitions. Id. at 1257-58.

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 274 A.3d 1240, 1248-49 (Pa. Super. 2022),

appeal granted, 289 A.3d 889 (Pa. 2022) (finding Hardy’s motion for DNA

testing was untimely where he did not explain why he did not immediately

seek testing in 2002, when the testing provisions were enacted, but instead

waited until 2020 when he filed his motion).

      Here, as in Edmiston and Walsh, the hairs for which Appellant now

requests DNA testing were known to him at the time of trial, as well as in 2002

when the DNA testing provisions were enacted.           Nevertheless, Appellant

waited nearly 20 years to file his present motion for DNA testing of that

evidence. He does not explain why he did not seek DNA testing of the hairs

sooner, or why he did not request testing of that evidence when he filed his

                                      -9-
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motion for DNA testing of the cigarette butts in 2004. Thus, we conclude that

he has not demonstrated that his request for DNA testing is timely.2

       Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 4/28/2023

____________________________________________

2 On February 8, 2023, Appellant filed with this Court a pro se “Application for
Leave to File Original Process in the Supreme Court,” seemingly requesting
that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court take “immediate action” in his case.
See Application, 2/8/23, at 1. We hereby deny Appellant’s motion, without
prejudice to his right to seek relief with our Supreme Court.

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