Court Opinion

ID: 9890687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 23:03:11.847119+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:34.781630
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/13/23 P. v. Monroy CA2/3

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This
 opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B318709

        Plaintiff and Respondent,                            Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. BA189665
        v.

 EDUARDO LALO MONROY,

        Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Norman J. Shapiro, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.
      Johanna Pirko, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Heidi Salerno, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                         INTRODUCTION

       In 2000, defendant and appellant Eduardo Lalo Monroy
(defendant) was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, first
degree murder with special circumstances, and second degree
murder, with arming, firearm use, and gang enhancements. In
2019, defendant petitioned for resentencing on the second degree
murder count under former Penal Code1 section 1170.95.2 The
court found that defendant failed to state a prima facie case for
relief under the statute and denied the petition without
conducting an evidentiary hearing. Defendant appeals.
       We agree with defendant that he sufficiently stated a prima
facie case for relief with respect to his second degree murder
conviction. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for further
proceedings.

        FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

1.    Underlying Crime and Charges
      On the afternoon of February 9, 1999, Lovell Ferguson
purportedly stole some marijuana from a member of the Barrio
Mojados gang. Two other members of the gang, Richard George
Moreno and defendant, searched for and found Ferguson. When
Ferguson ran from the men, Moreno chased after him. After
Ferguson scrambled into the passenger side of a car that was
stopped at a traffic light, Moreno approached the car. Moreno

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 Effective June 30, 2022, former section 1170.95 was renumbered to

section 1172.6 with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) At
times we refer to the law formerly codified at section 1170.95 as section
1172.6.

                                   2
fired a handgun multiple times into the passenger compartment
and killed Ferguson as well as the driver, Silvia Servin. Two
officers from the Los Angeles Police Department, who were
passing in a marked patrol car, witnessed the shooting.3
       Moreno and defendant were charged by indictment with
conspiracy to murder Ferguson (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 1). The
indictment alleged that Moreno and defendant took the following
overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy: they agreed to kill
Ferguson due to his theft of drugs, Moreno asked defendant for a
handgun, Moreno and defendant searched for Ferguson while
armed, they chased Ferguson after they found him, and after
Ferguson shattered the window of and entered Servin’s car,
Moreno fired a nine-millimeter pistol into the car. The indictment
also charged both defendants with the murders of Ferguson
(§ 187, subd. (a); count 2), and Servin (count 3). The indictment
included allegations on all counts regarding the possession and
use of firearms. (§§ 12022.53, subds. (a), (b)(1), (c)(1), (d)(1) &
(e)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). Counts 2 and 3 included multiple
murder special circumstance allegations (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)),
and counts 1 and 2 included allegations that the crimes were
committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)).

3 We provide these facts for background purposes because they were

recited by both parties in their briefing and were included in the
opinion in the direct appeal. However, we do not rely on these facts in
resolving the issues presented in this appeal. (See § 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).)

                                   3
2.    Verdict, Sentence, and Direct Appeal
        Moreno and defendant were tried together before a jury. As
relevant here, the jury was instructed regarding direct liability as
an aider and abettor (CALJIC No. 3.01), aider and abettor
liability for murder as a natural and probable consequence of
conspiracy to murder (CALJIC No. 3.02), conspiracy to commit
murder and overt acts, as well as liability for the natural and
probable consequences of acts in furtherance of conspiracy to
murder (CALJIC Nos. 6.10, 6.11, & 6.23), premeditation and
deliberation (CALJIC No. 8.20), and multiple murder special
circumstance (CALJIC No. 8.80.1).
        The jury found defendant guilty of conspiracy to murder
Ferguson (§ 182, subd. (a)(1); count 1), willful, deliberate, and
premeditated murder of Ferguson (§ 187, subd. (a); count 2), and
second degree murder of Servin (§ 187, subd. (a); count 3). The
jury found true the gang allegation (§ 186.22, subd. (b)) as to
counts 1 and 2, but not true as to count 3. On all counts, the jury
found true the armed principal (§ 12022.53, subd. (a)) allegations
and found not true the allegations that defendant personally used
and personally discharged a firearm (§§ 12022.53, subds. (b)(1),
(c)(1), (d)(1) & (e)(1), 12022.5, subd. (a)(1)). Finally, the jury found
true the multiple murder special circumstance allegation
(§ 190.2, subd. (a)(3)).4

4 Because the verdict forms could not be located during the preparation

of the record on appeal, the Attorney General has requested that we
take judicial notice of the entire record from the direct appeal. We take
judicial notice of the verdict forms (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459)
but otherwise deny the request.

                                    4
      On direct appeal, a different panel of this Division affirmed
defendant’s convictions but concluded the court made several
sentencing errors. (People v. Moreno et al. (Sept. 13, 2002,
B144016 [nonpub. opn.].) On remand, the trial court resentenced
defendant on count 2 to life without the possibility of parole and
to 15 years to life on count 3, to run consecutively. The court
stayed the previously imposed sentence on count 1 under
section 654 and struck the arming and gang enhancements under
section 1385.
3.    Petition for Resentencing
      In January 2019, defendant filed a petition seeking
resentencing under section 1172.6 and alleging: (1) he had been
convicted of first and second degree murder under a felony
murder or natural and probable consequences theory; (2) he was
not the actual killer; (3) he did not, with the intent to kill, aid and
abet the actual killer; (4) he was not a major participant in the
underlying felony or did not act with reckless indifference to
human life; and (5) he could not be convicted of murder under a
currently valid theory. The trial court appointed counsel to
represent defendant.
      The People opposed the petition. As to counts 1 (conspiracy
to murder Ferguson) and 2 (first degree murder of Ferguson), the
jury necessarily found that defendant acted with the specific
intent to kill Ferguson. Because those convictions were based on
express malice, they were unaffected by the recent changes to the
murder statutes. As to count 3, the People argued the evidence
demonstrated that, at a minimum, defendant acted with
conscious disregard for human life. In addition, the People
asserted defendant acted with express malice as to Ferguson’s

                                  5
murder and the doctrine of transferred intent extended that
express malice to Servin’s murder.
       In response to the opposition, defendant conceded there
was some evidence that he conspired with Moreno to kill
Ferguson. As to victim Servin, however, defendant maintained
that he could have been convicted under the natural and probable
consequences theory and that an evidentiary hearing was
necessary to determine whether he was eligible for resentencing.
       Both sides submitted supplemental briefs. Defendant
emphasized that he made out a prima facie case for relief with
respect to his second degree murder conviction. Specifically, he
was not the actual killer of Servin and the jury had been
instructed that it could convict him of her murder under the now-
invalid natural and probable consequences theory. The People
argued, again, that the jury’s express malice finding on counts 1
and 2 meant that no malice was “imputed” to defendant on
count 3, rendering him ineligible for relief under section 1172.6
as a matter of law.
       The trial court denied defendant’s petition. The court did
not explain the basis of its ruling from the bench, nor did it issue
a statement of decision.5 (See former section 1170.95, subd. (c), as
amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551 (S.B. 775), § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 2022
[“If the court declines to make an order to show cause, it shall
provide a statement fully setting forth its reasons for doing so.”].)
       This timely appeal followed.

5 The complete transcript of the hearing reads as follows: The Court:

“Calling BA189665-02 Eduardo Monroy. This is an 1170.95(a) request.
Counsel, I have reviewed all of the material submitted by both sides
and after extensive review I have to deny this request. [¶] Thank you
both.”

                                   6
                          DISCUSSION

       Defendant argues the court erred in denying his section
1172.6 resentencing petition at the prima facie stage with respect
to his second degree murder conviction. We agree.
1.    Senate Bill No. 1437 and Section 1172.6
       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill
1437) eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine
as a basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and limited
the scope of the felony murder rule. (People v. Reyes (2023) 14
Cal.5th 981, 984; People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708
(Strong); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis);
People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).) The
bill amended section 188 by adding the requirement that, except
as stated in section 189, subdivision (e), “in order to be convicted
of murder, a principal in a crime shall act with malice
aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based
solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3).)
       Senate Bill 1437 also created a procedure, now codified at
section 1172.6, for a person convicted of murder under the former
law to be resentenced if he or she could no longer be convicted of
murder under amended section 188. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 959; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 847.) A defendant begins
by filing a petition containing a declaration that, among other
things, he or she could not presently be convicted of murder
under the current law. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) If a
petition fails to contain the required information and the
information cannot be “readily ascertained” by the court, the
petition may be denied without prejudice to the filing of another
petition. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(2).) Otherwise, counsel must be

                                  7
appointed, if requested. (Id., subd. (b)(3).) The prosecutor must
file a response and the petitioner may file a reply. The trial court
must then hold a hearing to determine if the petitioner has made
a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief. (Id.,
subd. (c); accord, Lewis, at pp. 961–963, 967.)
       In making the prima facie determination, the court may
rely on the record of conviction. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 970–971.) However, the prima facie inquiry is limited and, at
this stage of the proceedings, the court “should not engage in
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 972; see also People v. Romero (2022) 80
Cal.App.5th 145, 151.) Nevertheless, the court may appropriately
deny a petition at the prima facie stage if the petitioner is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law. “ ‘[I]f the record, including
the court’s own documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the
allegations made in the petition,” then “the court is justified in
making a credibility determination adverse to the petitioner,” ’ ”
thereby deeming the petitioner ineligible. (Lewis, at p. 971.) For
example, if the record shows that the jury was not instructed on
either the natural and probable consequences or felony-murder
doctrines, then the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of
law. (People v. Daniel (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 666, 677.)
       We independently review a trial court’s determination on
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie showing. (People v.
Harden (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 45, 52.)
2.    Defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing under
      section 1172.6.
      Defendant contends that his second degree murder
conviction was premised on the now-invalid natural and probable
consequences theory. The trial court instructed the jury on two

                                   8
possible theories relating to Servin’s murder: aiding and abetting
(CALJIC Nos. 3.00 and 3.01) as well as the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Specifically, CALJIC No. 3.02 told the
jury that a person who aids and abets the commission of a crime
is not only guilty of that crime, but any crimes committed by a
principal that is a natural and probable consequence of the crime
originally aided and abetted. (CALJIC No. 3.02.) The verdict form
does not indicate, one way or the other, which theory the jury
relied on in convicting defendant of Servin’s murder. And during
closing argument, the prosecutor relied in part on the natural
and probable consequences theory with respect to defendant’s
liability for Servin’s murder. It is therefore possible that the jury
relied on the natural and probable consequences doctrine to
convict defendant of Servin’s murder.
       The Attorney General argues defendant is ineligible for
resentencing under section 1172.6 as a matter of law because
“[t]he jury’s verdicts in this case establish that the jury found
[defendant] guilty under a theory that he directly aided and
abetted the murders. The jury’s true findings on the multiple-
murder special circumstances indicate it found that [defendant],
who was not alleged to be the actual killer, necessarily acted
‘with the intent to kill, aided or assisted in any act in the
commission of murder in the first degree.’ ”
       We agree that the jury found defendant acted with the
intent to kill Ferguson. Indeed, the jury made a special finding
that the killing was willful, premeditated, and deliberate. But
neither the instructions nor the verdict form regarding the
multiple murder special circumstance definitively establish, as a
matter of law, that the jury convicted defendant of Servin’s

                                 9
murder as a direct aider and abettor, i.e., that he acted with the
intent to kill Servin.
       The court instructed the jury using CALJIC Nos. 8.80.1
and 8.81.3, which stated as pertinent here:
       “If you find a defendant in this case guilty of murder of the
first degree, you must then determine if the following special
circumstance is true or not true: MULTIPLE MURDER.
       “The People have the burden of proving the truth of a
special circumstance. If you have a reasonable doubt as to
whether a special circumstance is true, you must find it to be not
true.
       “If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant actually killed a human being, you need not find that
the defendant intended to kill in order to find the special
circumstance to be true.
       “If you find [the] defendant was not the actual killer of a
human being, or if you are unable to decide whether the
defendant was the actual killer or an aider and abettor or co-
conspirator, you cannot find the special circumstance to be true
as to that defendant unless you are satisfied beyond a reasonable
doubt that such defendant with the intent to kill aided, abetted,
counseled, or assisted any actor in the commission of the murder
in the first degree.
       “A defendant acts with reckless indifference to human life
when that defendant knows or is aware that his acts involve a
grave risk of death to an innocent human being.”

                                 10
      “To find the special circumstance, referred to in these
instructions as multiple murder convictions, is true, it must be
proved:
      “A defendant has in this case been convicted of at least one
crime of murder of the first degree and one or more crimes of
murder of the first or second degree.”
      Under these instructions, in order to find the special
circumstance allegation true in this case, the jury was only
required to find that defendant acted with the intent to kill
Ferguson, i.e., the victim of the first degree murder conviction.
Nothing in the instructions advised the jury that it was required
to make a similar finding with respect to Servin’s murder, as
would be required to convict defendant as a direct aider and
abettor.
      The verdict form also contains no reference to the theory
underlying the murder conviction relating to Servin nor did it
require the jury to make a specific finding on that point. The
special circumstance verdict form states: “We the jury having
found the defendant EDUARDO LALO MONROY guilty of the
crime of MURDER in count 2 and MURDER in count 3 further
find the Special Circumstance of Multiple Murder pursuant to
Penal Code section 190.2(a)(3), that the defendant has been
convicted of at least one crime of MURDER in the first degree
and one crime of MURDER in either the first degree or second
degree to be _[TRUE]__.” This special circumstance finding does
not indicate, one way or the other, whether the jury convicted
defendant of Servin’s murder based on direct aiding and abetting
or under the natural and probable consequences doctrine.
      The Attorney General also argues that the doctrine of
transferred intent precludes relief under section 1172.6 as a

                                11
matter of law. But the jury was not instructed regarding
transferred intent and therefore it is not clear defendant was
convicted under that theory. (Cf. People v. Cortes (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 198, 205 [the defendant failed to make a prima facie
showing of entitlement to section 1172.6 relief because “the jury
was not instructed on any theory of liability for murder or
attempted murder that required that malice be imputed to him”];
People v. Estrada (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 941, 945–949 [the
defendant was ineligible for section 1172.6 relief because the jury
instructions showed that he was convicted as a direct aider and
abettor to first degree murder]; People v. Daniel (2020) 57
Cal.App.5th 666, 677 [the defendant was ineligible for section
1172.6 relief as a matter of law because the jury was not
instructed on felony murder or the natural and probable
consequences doctrine].) To find defendant ineligible for
resentencing based on a theory that was not pursued at trial
would require judicial factfinding, which is impermissible at the
prima facie stage. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 971–972.)
       In sum, defendant adequately alleged a prima facie claim
for relief and the record does not rebut his allegations as a matter
of law. The court was required to issue an order to show cause
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c)), and to hold a hearing at which the
prosecution bears the burden of proving defendant’s ineligibility
for resentencing as to count 3 beyond a reasonable doubt unless
such hearing is waived. (Id., subd. (d).) In failing to do so, the
court erred. Accordingly, we must reverse and remand for further
proceedings. We express no opinion on the merits of the petition.

                                12
                        DISPOSITION

      The order denying the petition for resentencing as to
count 3 is reversed. On remand, the court shall issue an order to
show cause and conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine
whether defendant Eduardo Lalo Monroy should be resentenced
on the second degree murder conviction under section 1172.6.

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                     LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

      EDMON, P. J.

      EGERTON, J.

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