Court Opinion

ID: 9901574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 05:05:25.399446+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:35.215558
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re SKRZYSINSKI/HUGO/FACUNDO, Minors.                              November 21, 2023

                                                                     No. 365809
                                                                     Bay Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 23-013527-NA

Before: GLEICHER, P.J., and SWARTZLE and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

         Respondent father appeals as of right the trial court’s order after a preliminary hearing
authorizing petitioner’s termination petition and removing his minor children, RS, RH, and IF,
from his care. He challenges the evidentiary support for the removal order and the sufficiency of
the trial court’s factual findings. Because petitioner presented sufficient evidence to warrant the
children’s removal and made the requisite findings justifying its decision, we affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        Petitioner filed a permanent custody petition requesting that the trial court exercise
jurisdiction over the children and terminate respondent’s parental rights to RS, RH, and IF under
MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i) (parent’s act caused physical injury or physical or sexual abuse), MCL
712A.19b(3)(g) (failure to provide care or custody), MCL 712A.19b(3)(j) (reasonable likelihood
of harm if returned to parent), and MCL 712A.19b(3)(k)(ii) (parent abused the child or sibling of
the child via criminal sexual conduct). The petition alleged that during a forensic interview one
of IF’s half-siblings, 15-year-old BF, reported that respondent sexually abused her and had
threatened to “assault” IF if BF disclosed respondent’s conduct. The petition further alleged that
respondent had an extensive criminal history. At the time, IF lived with respondent, and IF and
BF’s mother lived in a substance abuse treatment facility. RS and RH lived with their mothers.
Following a preliminary hearing—at which Mark Schlopert, a Child Protective Services (CPS)
investigator, was the sole witness—the trial court authorized the petition and ordered the minor
children to be removed from respondent’s care and placed with their mothers. This appeal
followed.

        Petitioner’s arguments center on the fact that Schlopert did not actually participate in BF’s
forensic interview. Harley Steele, another CPS worker involved in an investigation of BF and IF’s

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mother regarding substance abuse and domestic violence, personally observed the interview.
Scholpert’s preliminary hearing testimony concerning BF’s forensic interview rested on Steele’s
recounting of what had occurred; he did not independently interview respondent due to the pending
criminal investigation into the sexual conduct allegations. Schlopert recommended placing all the
minor children with their mothers. The trial court questioned whether IF’s mother was an
appropriate placement, and Schlopert responded that CPS and the substance abuse facility did not
harbor any concerns, and would continue to monitor her participation in substance abuse treatment.

                                  II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

       We review a trial court’s findings of fact for clear error. In re Benavides, 334 Mich App
162, 167; 964 NW2d 108 (2020). A finding is only clearly erroneous if an appellate court “is left
with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Diehl, 329 Mich App
671, 687; 944 NW2d 180 (2019), lv den 507 Mich 851 (2021) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). We review de novo the interpretation and application of statutes and court rules. In re
Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, 14; 934 NW2d 610 (2019).

                                          III. ANALYSIS

        Respondent contends that the trial court erred by removing RS, RH, and IF from his care
and custody because petitioner failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence, and the trial
court failed to sufficiently articulate on the record, that (1) the children were at a substantial risk
of harm, (2) the children’s immediate removal was necessary to protect their health and safety, and
(3) the custody conditions away from respondent were adequate to safeguard the children’s health
and welfare.

        At a preliminary hearing, a trial court “must decide whether to authorize the filing of the
petition and, if authorized, whether the child should remain in the home, be returned home, or be
placed in foster care pending trial.” In re McCarrick/Lamoreaux, 307 Mich App 436, 448; 861
NW2d 303 (2014), quoting MCR 3.965(B)(12). If the trial court authorizes the filing of the
petition, it may order the placement of the child in foster care, but only after making required
findings on certain criteria. MCR 3.965(B)(13)(b). Further, “[u]nless the child remains in the
home, the court shall comply with the placement provisions in MCR 3.965(C) and must make a
written determination that the criteria for placement listed in MCR 3.965(C)(2) are satisfied.”
MCR 3.974(B)(2). To remove a child, a trial court “must make explicit findings that ‘it is contrary
to the welfare of the child to remain at home,’ MCR 3.965(C)(3), and ‘reasonable efforts to prevent
the removal of the child have been made or that reasonable efforts to prevent removal are not
required,’ MCR 3.965(C)(4).” Ferranti, 504 Mich at 21. MCL 712A.13a provides, in pertinent
part, as follows:

       (9) The court may order placement of the child in foster care if the court finds all
       of the following conditions:

       (a) Custody of the child with the parent presents a substantial risk of harm to the
       child’s life, physical health, or mental well-being.

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       (b) No provision of service or other arrangement except removal of the child is
       reasonably available to adequately safeguard the child from risk as described in
       subdivision (a).

       (c) Continuing the child’s residence in the home is contrary to the child’s welfare.

       (d) Consistent with the circumstances, reasonable efforts were made to prevent or
       eliminate the need for removal of the child.

       (e) Conditions of child custody away from the parent are adequate to safeguard the
       child’s health and welfare. [Benavides, 334 Mich App at 168, quoting MCL
       712A.13a(9) (quotation marks omitted)].

        MCR 3.965(C)(2) is materially identical to MCL 712A.13a(9), including the same
subdivisions (a) through (e) as in the statute. Respondent challenges the trial court’s findings with
respect to the factors in subdivisions (a), (b), and (e) of the statute and Court Rule. He argues that
the evidence insufficiently supported removal, pointing to the court’s reliance on hearsay
testimony from a single witness who “lacked personal knowledge,” and that the trial court failed
to make the statutorily-required factual findings.

        Relying on In re Williams, 333 Mich App 172; 958 NW2d 629 (2020), respondent
incorrectly asserts that a preponderance of the evidence standard applied to the removal decision
made at the preliminary hearing. In Williams, this Court, addressing the grounds for pretrial
removal under MCL 712A.13a(9) and MCR 3.965(C)(2), stating, “The ‘preponderance of the
evidence’ standard ‘applies to cases where the court is merely assuming jurisdiction over the child
and not terminating the parent’s rights in that child.’ ” Id. at 183 (quoting In re Martin, 167 Mich
App 715, 725; 423 NW2d 327 (1988)). Notably, the court did not assume jurisdiction over the
children at the preliminary hearing here. Further, Martin—on which Williams relied—did not
involve a challenge to a child’s pretrial removal, and the language at issue in Martin was specific
to the standards of proof applicable during adjudication, not at a preliminary hearing or any other
pretrial proceedings. See In re Martin, 167 Mich App at 725 (“[T]he preponderance of the
evidence standard applies to adjudicative hearings while the clear and convincing standard applies
to termination proceedings.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis added).

        Nevertheless, to the extent that Williams applied a preponderance of the evidence standard
to any proceeding involving the pretrial removal of a child, including a preliminary hearing, this
language is nonbinding dictum. See Estate of Pearce v Eaton County Rd Comm, 507 Mich 183,
197; 968 NW2d 323 (2021) (“Unlike holdings, [o]biter dicta are not binding precedent. Instead,
they are statements that are unnecessary to determine the case at hand and, thus, lack the force of
an adjudication.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted; alteration in original). Specifically,
Williams did not hold that the evidence in that case was insufficient under any particular standard
of proof; instead, it reversed because the lower court made no findings whatsoever on factors (b)
and (d) and made “ambiguous and incomplete” findings regarding factor (e) contrary to the
requirements of MCL 712A.13a(9) and MCR 3.965(C)(2). Williams, 333 Mich App at 183-185.

        Our Supreme Court in Ferranti, 504 Mich 1, has articulated the procedure applicable in
child protective proceedings, in relevant part, as follows:

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       After receiving the petition, the trial court must hold a preliminary hearing and may
       authorize the filing of the petition upon a finding of probable cause that one or more
       of the allegations are true and could support the trial court’s exercise of jurisdiction
       under MCL 712A.2(b). [Id. at 15, citing MCR 3.965(B).]

See also MCR 3.965(B)(12) (“[At a preliminary hearing], the court must decide whether to
authorize the filing of the petition and, if authorized, whether the child should remain in the home,
be returned home, or be placed in foster care pending trial. The court may authorize the filing of
the petition upon a showing of probable cause, unless waived, that one or more of the allegations
in the petition are true and fall within MCL 712A.2(b).”) (emphasis added). Following Ferranti
and the underlying court rule governing preliminary hearings in child protective proceedings, the
trial court did not err by applying the probable cause standard at the preliminary hearing here.

       Next, to the extent respondent faults the trial court for relying on inadmissible hearsay
testimony from Schlopert, his argument is unavailing. A trial court’s findings at a preliminary
hearing “may be made on the basis of hearsay evidence that possesses adequate indicia of
trustworthiness.” MCR 3.965(C)(3). See also MCR 3.965(B)(12) (“[At a preliminary hearing,
t]he Michigan Rules of Evidence do not apply . . . .”). Respondent’s additional argument, that
Schlopert did not have personal knowledge of the events at issue, is similarly unpersuasive. The
probable cause determination includes a finding that it is “contrary to the welfare of the child to
remain at home,” and this finding “may be made on the basis of hearsay evidence that possesses
adequate indicia of trustworthiness.” MCR 3.965.

        The trial court made sufficient findings on the record to satisfy its obligations under MCL
712A.13a(9) and MCR 3.965(C)(2). A trial court is generally not obligated to articulate extensive
findings regarding every conceivable detail. Rittershaus v Rittershaus, 273 Mich App 462, 475;
730 NW2d 262 (2007), citing MCR 2.517(A)(2). However, when a statute or court rule requires
factual findings as to an enumerated list of factors, the trial court must make a record of its findings
as to each and every factor sufficient for this Court to conduct a meaningful review. Id.

         The trial court made specific factual findings on the record and recommended the children
be removed from respondent. In its oral declarations at the preliminary hearing and in its signed
order on April 13, 2023, the trial court explicitly found that: (1) the children’s custody with
respondent would place them at substantial risk of harm; (2) no reasonably available service would
adequately safeguard the children from the risk of harm; (3) permitting the children’s residence
with respondent would be contrary to their welfare; (4) consistent with the circumstances,
reasonable efforts to prevent removal were previously made and no longer necessary pursuant to
MCL 722.638; and (5) conditions of custody away from respondent were adequate to safeguard
the children. While the trial court did not provide any particular reasoning to justify these findings,
it still made explicit findings on each factor (a) through (e) as required under MCL 712A.13a(9)
and MCR 3.965(C)(2) sufficient for this Court to conduct a meaningful review on appeal.

        Lastly, the court’s findings regarding factors (a), (b), and (e) were all adequately supported
by the record. With respect to factor (a), the trial court found that the children were at a substantial
risk of harm under respondent’s care due to the underlying sexual abuse allegations. Respondent
argues there was no indication that RS, RH, and IF were at risk of harm under his care because he
only allegedly threatened to harm IF if BF revealed the alleged sexual assault, and never harmed

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IF despite the disclosure. However, how a parent treats one child is probative of how that parent
may treat other children. In re AH, 245 Mich App 77, 84; 627 NW2d 33 (2001). BF disclosed in
a forensic interview that respondent sexually abused her and threatened IF. Allegations of the
sexual abuse of the one child may support a trial court’s finding of a substantial risk of harm to
other children who are in a respondent’s care. Consequently, the trial court appropriately evaluated
respondent’s potential risk to RS, RH, and IF by analyzing how respondent treated IF’s half-
sibling, BF.

        Regarding factor (b), because this case is based on accusations of sexual abuse, separation
from respondent was the only approach reasonably available to alleviate the risk of harm to the
children. Concerning factor (e), RS and RH were placed with their mothers before these child
protective proceedings, and there were no allegations asserted against either mother. Thus, the
conditions of placement were adequate to safeguard RS and RH. The trial court further determined
it was appropriate to place IF with his mother after Schlopert confirmed that CPS and the mother’s
substance abuse facility had no concerns with that arrangement. Furthermore, Schlopert
maintained that DHHS would continue to monitor the situation regarding IF in case the mother
attempted to leave the facility before completing her treatment program.

        Respondent additionally argues that Schlopert was unprepared and had limited knowledge
of the allegations in the petition. However, when reviewing for clear error, this Court gives “due
regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the witnesses.” In re BZ, 264 Mich App
286, 296; 690 NW2d 505 (2005). We afford deference to the trial court’s credibility
determinations and its weighing of evidence. In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 33; 817 NW2d 111
(2011). Nothing in the record leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was
made, especially since Schlopert provided details regarding the underlying DHHS and law
enforcement investigations concerning BF’s sexual abuse allegations. Respondent has failed to
establish any error during the removal proceedings warranting reversal.

       We affirm.

                                                             /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
                                                             /s/ Brock A. Swartzle
                                                             /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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