Court Opinion

ID: 9732768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:34:17.724629+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:33.040397
License: Public Domain

LIPEZ, Justice,
with whom DANA, Justice, joins, dissenting.
The discussion of the Court regarding the limited value of the proeedural/substantive distinction in deciding whether legislation applies retroactively or prospectively is helpful and important. Regrettably, however, I must dissent because I believe that the Court has ignored a fundamental rule of statutory construction.
In a contract case such as this, the inquiry about the applicability of a statute should be limited to three questions: 1) whether the statute was enacted before or after the contract was executed; 2) if after, whether the Legislature intended that the statute apply retroactively; and 3) if it so intended, whether the statute works an unconstitutional impairment of contract. The substantive/proee-dural (or remedial) analysis should not be used in a contract case to determine whether a statute applies retroactively or prospectively.1
It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction, however, that “all statutes will be considered to have a prospective operation only, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is clearly expressed or necessarily implied in the language used.” Miller v. Fallon, 134 Me. 145, 148, 183 A. 416, 417 (1936). The Legislature must express that intent in “strong, clear and imperative language.” Terry v. St. Regis Paper, 459 A.2d 1106, 1109 (Me.1983) (citation omitted). The court will imply a retroactive intent only if the statute “would be inoperative other than retrospectively.” Id. (citation omitted).
*442Putting the matter colloquially, this rule of construction reflects the reluctance of the law to change the rules in the middle of the game. Putting the matter constitutionally, this rule of construction reflects the constitutional values embodied in the impairment of contract clause, which recognizes the importance of honoring the settled expectations of the parties based upon the law existing at the time of contract formation. The Legislature did not clearly state its intent to apply section 6111 to contracts executed before the effective date of the statute, either on the face of the statute2 or in other sections of the public law or in the legislative history. All are silent as to retroactivity.
Presented with this silence, the Court concludes that the “limitation of section 6111 to private residential mortgages suggests that its purpose is to protect homeowners from noncommercial lenders that are not otherwise subject to regulation, and that “the Legislature must have recognized that a limitation of the section’s application to future mortgages would leave some homeowners unprotected for nearly 30 years.” Suggested purposes and imputed recognitions are not the clear expressions of legislative intent required by the rule of statutory construction that bases retroactive application of a statute on clear expressions of legislative intent. Moreover, section 6111 does not become inoperative if it is only applied prospectively. To the contrary, the statute achieves the protective purpose cited by the Court for future mortgagors without frustrating the expectations of mortgagees who entered into contracts prior to the effective date of the act.3
The Legislature is capable of making clear its intent that a statute be applied retroactively. See, e.g., P.L.1994, ch. 553, § 8 (“Sections 3, 4, and 5 of this Act apply retroactively to January 1, 1994.”); P.L.1994, ch. 580, § 3 (“This Act applies retroactively to June 30, 1993.”); 33 M.R.S.A. § 479-A(2) (1988) (“This subchapter applies to any conservation easement created before the effective date of this subchapter ... unless retroactive application contravenes the Constitution of Maine or the United States Constitution.”); 33 M.R.S.A. § 126(2) (Supp.1993) (“This chapter applies to any affordable housing covenant created before the effective date of this chapter ... unless retroactive application contravenes the Constitution of Maine or the United States Constitution”).
The Maine Legislative Drafting Manual, inter alia, addresses the issue of retroactivity and warns that “[a] bill that has a retroactive application should be drafted with caution. Courts generally will not give a law retroactive application unless the intent of the Legislature to make it retroactive is clear and unambiguous.” Legislative Council, Maine Legislative Drafting Manual, at Pt. II, p. 14 (1st ed. 1990). The manual provides the following example of a clear and- unambiguous statement of intent: “See. 10. Retro-activity. This Act applies retroactively to January 1,1980.” Id. Although the retroactive intent does not always have to be stated so explicitly, it must always be expressed clearly. There is no such clear expression in section 6111.
I would vacate the judgment.

. A number of decisions involving contracts have resolved the question of a statute's temporal application without raising this substantive/procedural dichotomy. See Hubert v. National Casualty Co., 144 A.2d 119, 121 (Me.1958) (determining that a statute controlling the statute of limitations provision in insurance contracts was not retroactive); Atlantic Oceanic Kampgrounds, Inc. v. Camden Nat'l Bank, 473 A.2d 884, 891 (Me.1984) (where statute was enacted after contract was formed, but before cause of action accrued, noting only the general presumption in favor of prospective application of the statutes) (Glassman, J., concurring); see also United States v. Belanger, 598 F.Supp. 598, 604-05 (D.Me.1984) (finding legislative intent to apply statute retroactively when statute was enacted after contract was formed, but before cause of action accrued); N.A. Burkitt, Inc. v. J.I. Case Co., 597 F.Supp. 1086, 1088 (D.Me.1984) (same). But see Langley v. Home Indem. Co., 272 A.2d 740, 744— 47 (Me.1971) (rejecting plaintiff’s assertion that because amendment to uninsured motorist coverage law was remedial in nature, it must be applied retroactively to his policy, on basis that retroactive application in fact would have altered parties contractual rights and obligations, and finding absence of legislative intent to apply statute retroactively). If both the constitutional issue of impairment of contract and the statutory applicability issue involved the same substantive/procedural analysis, the constitutional impairment issue would never be reached when the statute was deemed substantive, given the presumption that statutes affecting substantive rights apply only prospectively. Such prospective application never raises a contract impairment issue. The substantive/procedural (or remedial) distinction, despite its elusiveness, at least remains relevant to the constitutional issue of impairment of contracts. The Court has held that while the Legislature may properly modify remedies available to parties, it may not constitutionally affect the substantive obligations of the parties. Portland Savings Bank v. Landry, 372 A.2d 573, 577-78 (Me.1977).

. The trial court's conclusion that section 6111 applies retroactively because the statute “evinced no exceptions to its application” reverses the applicable rule of statutory construction by basing retroactive application on the absence of language that qualifies temporally language of general applicability. Such language of general applicability, commonplace in statutes, results in prospective application unless the contrary intent is clearly stated.

. "It is well settled that the law in effect at the time of the execution of the contract becomes part of that contract.” Portland Sav. Bank v. Landry, 372 A.2d 573, 575. There does not have to be proof that the party invoking the existing law specifically relied upon it.