Court Opinion

ID: 9890626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-13 18:04:19.361007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:39.806884
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/13/23 In re S.I. CA2/4
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                       DIVISION FOUR

 In the Matter of S.I. et al.,                                 B323539
 Persons Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.                                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. 20CCJP01832)

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 CYNTHIA A.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gabriela H. Shapiro, Commissioner. Affirmed.
     Lori Seigel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Avedis Koutoujian, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                 ____________________________

       Cynthia A. (mother) appeals from juvenile court orders
from a six-month status review hearing under Welfare and
Institutions Code section 366.21, subdivision (c), denying her
request to have her child, K.W. (born November 2010), returned
to her care.1 Mother challenges both this order and the court’s
findings under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et
seq.) (ICWA) regarding K.W. and mother’s other child, S.I. (born
December 2007).
       We find no error in the juvenile court’s status review
orders. However, we conditionally affirm those orders and
remand the matter with directions for the juvenile court and the
Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS)
to comply with their ongoing duty of inquiry under ICWA.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.    The Removal and Dependency Petition
      DCFS received a referral on behalf of S.I. and K.W. in
September 2021 after S.I. reported suicidal ideation at school.
When interviewed, S.I. reported that mother had told her, “I hope
you die. Go ahead and tell them at school. I don’t want you

1    Unspecified references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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anymore.”2 S.I. also reported that mother had punched and
choked her in February 2021, “beat the hell out of her” on prior
occasions, called her names, and made fun of her hygiene. When
interviewed, K.W. reported that mother traveled out of state and
left K.W. and her siblings D.A. and S.I. in the care of an adult
sibling. D.A. and the adult caregiver got into a physical
altercation requiring police intervention. K.W. also reported that
mother had not taken her to a doctor “in a long time” despite the
child having untreated bedwetting.
       Mother accused S.I. of lying and ordered the children to tell
a social worker they had never reported any issues. Mother also
accused the interviewing social worker of racism and lying and
the school of “triggering” her children.
       S.I. and K.W. were removed from mother and placed in a
foster home. Given her mental health issues, D.A. was placed in
transitional shelter care.
       On September 22, 2021, DCFS filed the operative petition
under section 300 on behalf of D.A., S.I., and K.W. based on
allegations of mother’s emotional and physical abuse of D.A. and
S.I., mother’s failure to obtain appropriate mental health and
medical treatment for the children, and her failure to
appropriately plan for the children’s care and supervision. On

2      S.I. and K.W. are half siblings. The alleged fathers of S.I. and
K.W. are not parties to this appeal.
       Mother has 11 children and an extensive dependency history.
Around 2020, DCFS substantiated allegations of mother’s physical
abuse against the children’s older sibling, D.A., and the case
terminated after a period of family reunification and maintenance
services. In 2007, an investigation revealed mother had physically
abused another older sibling, S.A. In 1995, S.A. and three other
siblings were detained pending an investigation into child abuse and
neglect.

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September 27, 2021, the court detained the children and ordered
mother monitored visitation.

B.     Jurisdiction and Disposition
       Following a medical examination in October 2021, DCFS
reported that K.W. had a two-year history of nocturnal enuresis
(bedwetting) stemming from a fast-food diet and/or witnessing
severe traumatic events. K.W. exhibited symptoms consistent
with post-traumatic stress disorder including self-destructive
behavior, trouble sleeping and concentrating, angry outbursts,
overwhelming shame, and hallucinations. The examining
physician recommended wraparound psychiatric therapy.
       During a child and family team meeting in November 2021,
mother cornered S.I. in a restroom, threatening the child that
“she better tell the Court what she wants her to say or she will
see what happens to her when she comes home.” S.I. refused
further visitation with mother. The same month, K.W. was
placed in a new foster home, the child’s third placement in two
months. It had been reported that K.W. previously ran away
from her foster home after having an unmonitored phone call
with mother. According to the report, mother and an adult
daughter picked up K.W. and drove to a police station to report
abuse by K.W.’s foster mother. A month later, mother posted a
video to her Facebook account accusing the children’s foster
parents of abuse and DCFS of spreading lies. In the video,
mother admitted she had encouraged K.W. to run away from her
placement. The juvenile court suspended mother’s visitation on
December 13, 2021.
       In February 2022, the juvenile court sustained an amended
petition, exercising jurisdiction over S.I. and K.W. under

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section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), (c), and (j), based on mother’s
physical abuse of S.I., medical neglect of D.A. and S.I., emotional
abuse of D.A. and S.I., and mother’s failure to appropriately plan
for the children’s care. The court ordered DCFS to initiate
placement of S.I. and K.W. under the interstate compact on the
placement of children (ICPC) with two adult siblings. The court
removed both children from mother’s custody, suitably placed
them in the care of DCFS, and ordered mother monitored
visitation and reunification services.3

C.     Status Review Hearing
       As of March 2022, DCFS was searching for another
placement for K.W. due to mother’s continued harassment of the
child’s caregiver. At a progress hearing on March 29, 2022,
K.W.’s counsel indicated the child wished to live out-of-state with
her adult siblings. The court ordered further efforts at the ICPCs
and admonished mother that her “outlandish behavior” with
DCFS and the children’s caregivers was contrary to the children’s
best interests.
       In June 2022, DCFS reported that K.W. was seen leaving
her school campus by herself. K.W. admitted she left school to go
to mother’s home to retrieve belongings while mother was out of
the home. Later that month, the court held a hearing on the
pending ICPCs. During the hearing, mother requested to
represent herself and accused the court, counsel, and DCFS of
spreading false information.

3      The reunification services included an anger management
program; parenting program for teens with mental health needs;
individual counseling to address case issues, mental health needs of
mother and the children; and a National Alliance on Mental Illness
(NAMI) program.

                                   5
      In status review reports, DCFS reported on mother’s
partial compliance with her reunification services. Mother had
completed parenting and anger management programs and
attended 13 individual counseling sessions that did not address
case issues. Mother continued to report she did not need
individual counseling, and she made untruthful statements about
signing up for NAMI group meetings and attempted to coach
K.W. to recant statements about returning to mother’s care.
      Between February and June 2022, mother consistently
visited with K.W. Though mother was frequently late, the visits
were positive and appropriate. K.W. stated that she loved her
mother and would like to live with her again if reunified. K.W.
followed instructions at school and had no disciplinary issues. In
June 2022, the children were placed in S.A.’s home in Missouri.
Two months later, S.I. was placed on a psychiatric hold for
expressing thoughts of killing herself and S.A. Fearing for her
safety, S.A. asked that both children be placed back in the care of
DCFS.
      As of September 2022, K.W. was placed with a prior
caregiver while S.I. was placed in a transitional shelter. On
August 30, 2022, mother called the police to request a well-child
check at S.I.’s transitional shelter. S.I. did not wish to speak
with mother.
      During a conversation with a social worker, mother’s
therapist stated she was not equipped to provide mother with
appropriate support. The therapist noted that mother was “very
adamant about what information” would be provided in a
progress letter and wanted to review it before the therapist’s
submission to DCFS. In the progress letter, the therapist stated
that mother’s goals were to improve communication, listening,

                                6
and problem-solving skills. Mother believed those skills would
improve parenting. When a social worker called mother to
discuss finding a new therapist, she spoke over the social worker
“and continued to make threats towards the therapist, . . .
claiming that she did not write a good enough letter and that she
would get her fired from her job.” As of September 1, 2022,
mother attended two NAMI group meetings.
       During a phone conversation to discuss a new visitation
schedule with K.W. on September 6, 2022, mother consistently
interrupted a social worker and accused DCFS of lying. Mother
also denied she had discussed case issues with the children and
coached K.W. to say what mother wanted. DCFS believed
mother’s behaviors did not reflect significant progress with case
issues. DCFS recommended continued family reunification
services.
       Based on the children’s discharge from ICPC, the juvenile
court continued the six-month status review hearing. In
addition, the court ordered DCFS to refer mother to another
therapist for case-specific issues and a NAMI support group.
       At the continued status review hearing on September 8,
2022, counsel for K.W. argued the child would be at substantial
risk if returned to mother’s custody. Counsel requested six
months of continued reunification services. Mother summarized
progress she had made in her case plan, informed the court of her
recent employment, and requested the return of S.I. and K.W. to
her care, or alternatively, unmonitored in-home visits. Mother
stated that K.W. had “never been harmed” in her care and did not
have “any concerns.” The court commended mother on her
progress in services but noted ongoing concern with her
individual counseling. The court found that while mother was

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“not at substantial compliance yet, [ ] she [was] working on
substantial compliance” through continued NAMI meetings and
individual counseling. Finding by a preponderance of evidence
that return of S.I. and K.W. would be detrimental to their
physical and emotional wellbeing, the court ordered further
reunification services and visitation. Mother appealed.

                           DISCUSSION
A.    Substantial Evidence Supports the Finding of
      Detriment
      Mother challenges the sufficiency of evidence supporting
the juvenile court’s finding that returning K.W. to her custody
posed a risk of detriment to the child. Mother does not challenge
the same finding as to S.I.
      At the six-month review hearing, the juvenile court must
return the child to parental custody “unless the court finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child . . .
would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
(§ 366.21, subd (e)(1).) When making its findings, the juvenile
court must “specify the factual basis for its conclusion that the
return would be detrimental or would not be detrimental.”
(§ 366.21, subd. (e)(2).)
      Whether placement of a child with their parent would be
detrimental is to be examined by looking at the totality of the
circumstances. (See A.H. v. Superior Court (2010) 182
Cal.App.4th 1050, 1059 [“Detriment can be shown many different
ways”].) The failure of the parent “to participate regularly and
make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs
shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental.”

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(§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1); see In re Mary B. (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th
1474, 1483 (Mary B.).) Other circumstances may bear on a
finding of detriment, including: (1) the “effect . . . return [to
parental custody] would have on the child” (In re Joseph B. (1996)
42 Cal.App.4th 890, 894); (2) “the manner in which the parent
has conducted himself or herself in relation to [the] minor in the
past” (Constance K. v. Superior Court (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 689,
705); (3) instability in housing and employment (In re John V.
(1992) 5 Cal.App.4th 1201, 1212); and (4) the parent’s “efforts and
progress . . . towards remedying the causes requiring out-of-home
care as well as their cooperation in availing themselves of the
services provided.” (In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131,
1141–1142.)
       We review the juvenile court’s finding of detriment for
substantial evidence, asking only whether the finding is
supported by evidence that is “‘reasonable, credible[,] and of solid
value . . . .’ [Citation.]” (In re E.D. (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 960,
966.) We construe the record in the light most favorable to the
court’s finding and do not consider whether there is evidence
from which the court could have drawn a different conclusion.
(In re A.C. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 38, 43 (A.C.); In re M.R. (2017) 8
Cal.App.5th 101, 108 (M.R.).)
       Here, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s
finding that returning K.W. to mother’s custody would create a
substantial risk of detriment to the child’s safety, protection, or
well-being. It is undisputed mother was not in substantial
compliance with her case plan. At the time of the status review
hearing, mother had completed parenting and anger
management programs, was enrolled in individual counseling,
and attended several NAMI group meetings. Despite this

                                 9
progress, mother had not addressed case issues with her
therapist and she exhibited controlling behavior over her
therapist, her children, her children’s caregivers, and DCFS.
       In addition, mother continued to deny or minimize her
responsibility for the acts resulting in K.W.’s removal from her
custody. (See In re Gabriel K. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 188, 197
[“One cannot correct a problem one fails to acknowledge”]; In re
Andrea G. (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 547, 553 [“successful treatment
cannot occur until [the parent] accepts responsibility for her
actions”].) Mother’s denial was both direct and continuing.
During the status review hearing, mother averred K.W. had no
“concerns” and had “never been harmed” while in her care.
Mother’s limited awareness of K.W.’s needs and mother’s
emotional coercion over the child is the type of behavior
necessitating dependency jurisdiction in the first place.
       Mother resists our conclusion with various arguments,
none of which we find persuasive.
       First, mother highlights her progress in her case plan and
the skills she learned in parenting. This argument essentially
reweighs the evidence in mother’s favor contrary to the standards
of our review. (See A.C., supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 43; M.R.,
supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 108.)
       Second, mother contends the trial court failed to specify a
factual basis for how her unsubstantial compliance placed K.W.
at risk of detriment. (See § 366.21, subd. (e)(2) [“the court shall
specify the factual basis for its conclusion that the return would
be detrimental”].) Mother misconstrues the record. The juvenile
court did specify a factual basis for its conclusion. The court
stated that mother’s unsubstantial compliance with her case
plan, specifically her need to finish NAMI meetings and

                                10
individual counseling on case-specific issues, placed K.W. at
substantial risk of detriment. To the extent mother complains
the juvenile court should have articulated a more detailed
finding, her failure to object below or request the information she
now seeks constitutes a forfeiture on appeal. (See In re S.B.
(2004) 32 Cal.4th 1287, 1293; In re S.C. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th
396, 406.)
      Third, mother contends she was entitled to the
presumption favoring the return of K.W. at the status review
hearing. (Citing §§ 366.21, 366.22.) We agree sections 366.21
and 366.22 provide presumptions favoring “the return of the child
to the physical custody of their parent.” But those presumptions
are conditional—they apply “unless the court finds, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the return of the child . . .
would create a substantial risk of detriment to the safety,
protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.”
(§§ 366.21, subd. (e)(1), italics added, 366.22, subd. (a)(1).) As
discussed, the court’s detriment finding means that mother was
not entitled to the presumptions on which she relies.
      Finally, mother contends the juvenile court should have
considered a family maintenance plan as a reasonable alternative
to continued removal. Mother’s argument ignores the posture of
her case. The “reasonable means” inquiry to which mother refers
occurs at the dispositional phase of the case (see § 361, subd. (c)),
when the court decides whether to remove the child from
parental custody; it does not occur post-removal at a review
hearing. Mother’s reliance on In re Henry V. (2004) 119
Cal.App.4th 522, makes this distinction clear. (See id. at
pp. 530–531 [disposition order “removing a child from a parent’s
custody is ‘a critical firebreak in California’s juvenile dependency

                                 11
system’” in which courts “must recognize the legal restraints
against separating parent and child”].) The juvenile court did not
err when making its finding of detriment over K.W.4

B.     ICWA Compliance
       Mother contends that DCFS and the juvenile court failed to
inquire of extended family members as to whether S.I. and K.W.
are or may be Indian children under ICWA. We agree.
       Under state law, the juvenile court and DCFS have “an
affirmative and continuing duty to inquire whether a child for
whom a petition under Section 300 . . . may be or has been filed,
is or may be an Indian child.”5 (§ 224.2, subd. (a); see In re Isaiah
W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 9, 11–12.) “The continuing duty to inquire
whether a child is or may be an Indian child ‘can be divided into
three phases: the initial duty to inquire, the duty of further
inquiry, and the duty to provide formal ICWA notice.’” (In re
Y.W. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 542, 552.) The duty of initial inquiry
includes, but is not limited to, “asking the child, parents, legal

4      For the very same reasons, we find no abuse of the juvenile
court’s discretion denying mother’s request for liberalized visitation
with K.W. (See In re Natasha A. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 28, 34–35; In
re Robert L. (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 1057, 1067 [“evaluating the factual
basis for an exercise of discretion [in custody and visitation orders] is
similar to analyzing the sufficiency of the evidence for the ruling”].)

5      An “Indian child” is a child who is either a member of an Indian
tribe or is eligible for membership in an Indian tribe and is the
biological child of a member of an Indian tribe. (§ 224.1, subds. (a), (b);
25 U.S.C. § 1903(4).)

                                    12
guardian, Indian custodian, extended family members,[6] others
who have an interest in the child, and the party reporting child
abuse or neglect, whether the child is, or may be, an Indian
child.” (§ 224.2, subds. (a), (b).)
       Here, DCFS does not dispute mother’s contention that it
failed to fully discharge its duty of initial inquiry, nor does it
argue that its failure was non-prejudicial. Instead, DCFS
disagrees with mother on the appropriate remedy for its failure to
comply.
       We conclude that because the juvenile court retains
jurisdiction over S.I. and K.W. and continues to have an ongoing
duty to ensure ICWA compliance, the failure by DCFS to
adequately discharge its duty of initial inquiry can be addressed
by a conditional affirmance of the status review orders with
directions to the juvenile court to require that DCFS fulfill its
duty. (E.g., In re Baby Girl M. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 635, 639,
fn. 2 [“We see no need to order any ICWA findings vacated
because ICWA-related obligations are continuing duties; that
means earlier ICWA-related findings are subject to change and
no order vacating an earlier finding is necessary here”]; In re A.C.
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1018 [same].) The parties identify
several extended family members who, despite having contact
with DCFS, have not been asked about possible Indian heritage.
On remand, DCFS shall attempt to inquire of these known family
members (including maternal grandmother, C.C., and adult

6       “Extended family members” include persons defined by law or
custom of the Indian child’s tribe, or in the absence of law or custom,
adults who are the child’s “grandparent, aunt or uncle, brother or
sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or nephew, first or second
cousin, or stepparent.” (§ 224.1, subd. (c); 25 U.S.C. § 1903(2).)

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siblings, S.A. and Mariah A.), as well as any other extended
family member known to DCFS.

                          DISPOSITION
       The six-month status review orders are conditionally
affirmed. The matter is remanded with instructions to the
juvenile court to conduct any necessary ICWA inquiry as to
available relatives as soon as practicable. If that inquiry reveals
evidence of Native American heritage, DCFS and the court shall
comply with additional ICWA requirements, including, if
applicable, the notice requirements of section 224.3. If it does
not, the orders shall stand.

                                           MORI, J.
      We concur:

            CURREY, P. J.

            ZUKIN, J.

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