Court Opinion

ID: 9925931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 15:07:00.933745+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:50.450445
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3121-21

ZOE HARRIS-HOHNE,

          Appellant,

v.

BOARD OF REVIEW,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
AND WORKFORCE
DEVELOPMENT, and
INSIGHT GLOBAL, LLC,

     Respondents.
_________________________

                   Submitted September 28, 2023 – Decided January 23, 2024

                   Before Judges Vernoia and Gummer.

                   On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of
                   Labor and Workforce Development, Docket No.
                   253317.

                   Zoe Harris-Hohne, appellant pro se.

                   Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for
                   respondent Board of Review (Donna Sue Arons,
                   Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Gina Marie
                   Labrecque, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      Petitioner Zoe Harris-Hohne appeals from a May 5, 2022 final decision of

the Board of Review. In that decision, the Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's

dismissal of petitioner's appeal from a determination that she was not eligible

for unemployment benefits and a request that she refund benefits already paid

to her. The Appeal Tribunal dismissed her appeal, finding petitioner had not

timely filed it pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1) and had not established good

cause for its untimeliness pursuant to N.J.A.C. 12:20-3.1(i). Having considered

the evidence in the record, the parties' arguments, and the applicable legal

principles, we affirm in part and remand in part for further proceedings

consistent with this decision.

                                       I.

      Petitioner was employed as a recruiter with Insight Global, LLC from July

13, 2019, through February 14, 2020. According to petitioner, she terminated

her employment with Insight Global due to "[t]he pressure and stress of being

pushed to get [her] promoted to a position that [she] was not prepared for . . .

for the sole purpose of [her] management team being awarded additional

compensation for [her] promotion." On April 5, 2020, petitioner submitted a

claim for unemployment benefits, with a weekly benefit rate of $521. She

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received a total of $9,899 in unemployment benefits for the weeks ending April

11, 2020, through August 15, 2020.

      In a notice mailed on December 23, 2020, a deputy of the Director of the

New Jersey Division of Unemployment Insurance advised petitioner she was not

eligible for unemployment benefits as of February 16, 2020, because she had

"left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to [that] work." In a

separate notice also mailed on December 23, 2020, the Director of

Unemployment Insurance requested petitioner return the $9,899 in benefits she

had received. The Director advised petitioner she was not eligible for those

funds because she had "quit [her] job without good cause" and that "[a]ny money

collected improperly must be returned regardless of the reason for the

overpayment in accordance with N.J.S.A. 43:21-16(d)." The Director informed

petitioner that if she disagreed with the determination she had an obligation to

refund and repay those benefits, she had to file a written appeal within seven

calendar days after delivery of the notice or ten calendar days after the mailing

of the notice. The Director also informed petitioner about her right pursuant to

N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2 to request a waiver of her obligation to repay the benefits.

Petitioner received both notices on December 26, 2020.

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      According to petitioner, she mailed an appeal to the Appeal Tribunal on

January 14, 2021. That appeal subsequently could not be located. In April of

2021, petitioner spoke with a Department representative who recommended she

file an appeal by mail and on the appropriate website. On May 11, 2021,

petitioner filed a second appeal online and by mail. In that appeal, petitioner

disputed the finding she had quit her job without good cause, contending she

had "resigned from that job because of specific reasons, all of which created an

untenable environment." Petitioner also requested the Appeal Tribunal "kindly

waive the requirement for [her] to reimburse benefits paid."

      An Appeal Tribunal appeals examiner conducted a telephonic hearing on

December 8, 2021, during which petitioner and her father testified. At the

beginning of the hearing, the appeal examiner stated: "The issues involved in

this case [are] timeliness of filing the appeal, . . . voluntarily leaving, Pandemic

Unemployment Assistance, and non-fraud refund." Petitioner answered, "Yes,"

when the examiner asked her if she "underst[oo]d the issues that [would] be

discussed." When asked why she had not filed the appeal timely, petitioner

responded:

             Given the period . . . it was the holiday season we were
             with family. I then mailed my first appeal on January
             14 which [was] just a couple of weeks later after
             receiving [the notice]. So, we did do it really as soon

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            as possible. It was extremely important specifically.
            So for me during the holiday time and . . . all the
            craziness going [on] that was as soon as I was able to
            . . . draft the appeal and get it sent . . . .

      Petitioner's father testified that from their perspective they had done

"everything [they] could to be timely and to continue following [up] with the

State for a response to [the] appeal." Petitioner's father gave no specific reason

for the untimeliness of the appeal. At the end of the hearing, the appeals

examiner asked petitioner if she would "like to give a closing remark before

[she] close[d] out the hearing." Petitioner responded that she had nothing else

to say and that everything she had wanted to cover during the hearing had been

covered.

      In its December 8, 2021 decision, the Appeal Tribunal accepted

petitioner's representations that she had received the notices on December 26,

2020, and had filed an appeal on January 14, 2021, but found that appeal was

not timely under N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1).       It also found petitioner had not

demonstrated good cause for the untimeliness of the appeal because the delay

"was not for a circumstance beyond the control of [petitioner], nor for a

circumstance which could [not] have been reasonably foreseen or prevented ,"

citing N.J.A.C. 12:20-3.1(i). Concluding it had no jurisdiction to rule on the

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                                        5
merits of the appeal given its untimeliness, the Appeal Tribunal dismissed the

appeal.

      On December 15, 2021, petitioner appealed from the decision of the

Appeal Tribunal. In that appeal, she asserted for the first time that her father

had been "in a severe car accident on December 19, 2020 . . . . and he [had been]

badly injured." According to petitioner, she "began staying near [her] father and

taking care of him" after the accident and when he collapsed on December 23,

2020, she brought him to a hospital "where he underwent several medical tests

and procedures." Petitioner submitted with her appeal medical records that

reflect petitioner's father received treatment in the hospital emergency room on

December 23, 2020, but do not reflect treatments on any other day. Petitioner

represented that from December 19, 2020, and "through most of the month of

January, 2021, [her] focus was on taking care of [her] father and supporting his

recovery." Petitioner contended that based on those circumstances, she had

demonstrated good cause for the delay in the filing of her appeal.

      Petitioner claimed she had not "anticipate[d] the Appeal Tribunal would

evaluate [her] appeal based on 'timeliness of appeal filing'" but "anticipated

rather that the Appeal Tribunal would evaluate [her] appeal based on the more

substantive fact of, 'I did not voluntarily leave my previous employment.'"

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Consequently, she "did not feel that, during the telephone hearing, there was any

need for [her] to go deeper into [her] explanation as to why [her] appeal was not

filed in a timely manner."

      On May 5, 2022, the Board affirmed the decision of the Appeal Tribunal

dismissing petitioner's appeal. The Board found petitioner had not established

good cause under N.J.A.C. 12:20-3.1(i) for her delay in filing the appeal because

"the delay was caused by the holiday season according to [her] testimony taken

under oath." The Board held that because petitioner had not established good

cause for the delay in filing her appeal, the Appeal Tribunal "properly

dismissed" her appeal as untimely pursuant to N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1).

      Petitioner appeals from the Board's decision, arguing it erred in finding

she had not provided good cause for the late filing of her initial appeal and in

not considering the substantive merits of that appeal.

                                       II.

      "We review a decision made by an administrative agency entrusted to

apply and enforce a statutory scheme under an enhanced deferential standard."

E. Bay Drywall, LLC v. Dep't of Lab. & Workforce Dev., 251 N.J. 477, 493

(2022). Accordingly, "we will disturb an agency's adjudicatory decision only

upon a finding that the decision is 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable,' or is

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unsupported 'by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'"

Sullivan v. Bd. of Rev., Dep't of Lab., 471 N.J. Super. 147, 155-56 (App. Div.

2022) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)). In

making that determination, we "must examine:           '(1) whether the agency's

decision conforms with relevant law; (2) whether the decision is supported by

substantial credible evidence in the record; and (3) whether, in applying the law

to the facts, the administrative agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion.'"

In re Y.L., 437 N.J. Super 409, 412 (App. Div. 2014) (quoting Twp. Pharmacy

v. Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 432 N.J. Super. 273, 283-84 (App.

Div. 2013)).    "The burden of proving that an agency action is arbitrary,

capricious, or unreasonable is on the challenger." Parsells v. Bd. of Educ., 472

N.J. Super. 369, 376 (App. Div. 2022). Petitioner has not met that burden.

      The Board did not err in finding untimely petitioner's initial appeal. The

version of N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1) in effect when petitioner submitted her appeal

provided that a decision "shall be final" unless the claimant files an appeal

"within seven calendar days after delivery of notification of an initial

determination or within [ten] calendar days after such notification was mailed."

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See N.J.S.A. 43:21-6(b)(1) (2017) (amended July 2023). 1 The notices were

mailed on December 23, 2020, and petitioner admittedly received them on

December 26, 2020. The Appeals Tribunal and the Board accepted petitioner's

representation that she had filed an appeal on January 14, 2021.         But that

purported submission was more than seven days after petitioner had received

the notices and more than ten days after they were mailed. Thus, petitioner's

appeal was untimely.

      Pursuant to N.J.A.C. 12:20-3.1(i), a late appeal may be considered on its

merits if "the appeal was delayed for good cause," with good cause existing

when "[t]he delay in filing the appeal was due to circumstances beyond the

control of the appellant" or "[t]he appellant delayed filing the appeal for

circumstances which could not have been reasonably foreseen or prevented."

1
  N.J.S.A. 43:21-6 and -16 were amended after the Board issued its decision.
See L. 2022, c. 120. Among other things, N.J.S.A. 43:21-6 was amended to
increase the time for filing an appeal. However, nothing in the amendment
indicates the Legislature intended retroactive application of the amendment. See
In re J.D-F., 248 N.J. 11, 22 (2021) ("[C]ourts generally will enforce newly
enacted substantive statutes prospectively, unless [the Legislature] clearly
expresses a contrary intent." (quoting Maeker v. Ross, 219 N.J. 565, 578
(2014))). In fact, the Legislature expressly provided the act amending the statute
would "take effect on the 270th day following enactment, . . . [,]" which was
July 31, 2023. See State v. Lane, 251 N.J. 84, 96 (2022) (recognizing the Court
has "repeatedly construed language stating that a provision is to be effective
immediately, or effective immediately on a given date, to signal prospective
application").
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                                        9
We agree with the Appeal Tribunal and the Board that petitioner's testimony that

the appeal was delayed because "it was the holiday season" does not demonstrate

good cause under N.J.A.C. 12:20-3.1(i).

      In relying on petitioner's sworn testimony to determine the cause of the

delay and not her belated, unsworn submissions attributing the delay to her

father's accident, the Board did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably.

The Board's finding that the delay was caused by "the holiday season" was

supported by evidence in the record, specifically petitioner's testimony.

Petitioner's subsequent assertion that her failure to file the appeal timely was

caused by her father's accident was not supported by any affidavit or

certification. Her contention that she believed she did not need to testify about

her father's accident during the telephonic hearing because she did not know the

Appeal Tribunal would evaluate her appeal based on its timeliness is belied by

the record. At the beginning of the hearing, the appeal examiner expressly stated

the "issues involved in this case," including the "timeliness of filing the appeal."

When asked if she understood the issues that would be discussed, petitioner

answered, "Yes." When the examiner asked petitioner directly why she had not

filed the appeal timely, petitioner testified about only the holiday period; she

said nothing about her father's accident. When her father testified, he asserted

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                                        10
they had done "everything" they could to be timely; he said nothing about his

accident.

      Because the Appellate Tribunal and the Board correctly applied the law

in place when they rendered their decisions and because substantial credible

evidence in the record supports their conclusion that petitioner did not file the

appeal timely and did not establish good cause for the delay in filing her appeal,

we see no basis to disturb the Board's decision and, accordingly, affirm it.

      The Board in its decision, however, did not address petitioner's request for

a waiver pursuant to N.J.A.C. 12:17-14.2 of the obligation to repay the

unemployment benefits she had received. Petitioner made the request for a

waiver in her May 11, 2021 letter to the Appeal Tribunal. Neither the Appeal

Tribunal nor the Board addressed that request in their decisions. The question

of a refund waiver "should be decided in the first instance, by the Division,

applying its expertise." Mullarney v. Bd. of Rev., 343 N.J. Super. 401, 410

(App. Div. 2001). We, therefore, remand this matter to the Director of the

Division for consideration of petitioner's waiver request, with an enhanced

record, if necessary.

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                                       11
      Affirmed in part and remanded in part to the Division for consideration of

petitioner's request that the demand for reimbursement of benefits be waived.

We do not retain jurisdiction.

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