Court Opinion

ID: 9515311
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:55:40.240396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:27.949695
License: Public Domain

GILBERTSON, Chief Justice
(concurring in result).
[¶ 32.] In Fryer v. Kranz, we adhered to what has been characterized as the “virtual certainty” test for intentional torts. 2000 SD 125, ¶ 24, 616 N.W.2d 102, 108 (citing Harn v. Continental Lumber Co., 506 N.W.2d 91, 95 (S.D.1993); Brazones v. Prothe, 489 N.W.2d 900, 905 (S.D.1992); Jensen v. Sport Bold, Inc., 469 N.W.2d 370, 372 (S.D.1991); VerBouwens v. Hamm Wood Products, 334 N.W.2d 874, 876 (S.D.1983)). In other words, “intent really means intent.” Id. ¶ 27, 616 N.W.2d at 109 (citations omitted).
[¶ 33.] This is not an evolution of a common law doctrine. It is simply the statutory construction of SDCL 62-3-2 to define what constitutes an intentional tort. Since Fryer was decided by this Court, five sessions of the South Dakota Legislature have come and gone. We presume the Legislature acts with knowledge of our judicial decisions. Sanford v. Sanford, 2005 SD 34, ¶ 19, 694 N.W.2d 283, 289 (citations omitted). Were we to have misinterpreted in Fryer what the Legislature intended when it enacted SDCL 62-3-2, it had five chances to so state and adopt some other standard. Yet the statute remains intact, the same as the day we decided Fryer.