Court Opinion

ID: 9400210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 18:01:22.213214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:42.991456
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-50642     Document: 00516777776        Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/07/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                                   FILED
                                                                           June 7, 2023
                                 No. 21-50642                            Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                                   Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                      versus

   Victor Manuel Campos-Ayala; Martin Moncada-De La
   Cruz,

                                          Defendants—Appellants.
                  ______________________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 4:21-CR-38-2
                            USDC No. 4:21-CR-38-1
                  ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Elrod and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Priscilla Richman, Chief Judge:
         Victor Campos-Ayala and Martin Moncada-De La Cruz appeal their
   convictions of possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of
   marihuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B). Campos-Ayala
   and Moncada-De La Cruz argue that the evidence was insufficient to support
   their convictions. Because the jury could not reasonably conclude based on
   the available evidence that either Campos-Ayala or Moncada-De La Cruz had
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                                   No. 21-50642

   possession of the marihuana with intent to distribute, we reverse and vacate
   their convictions.
                                        I
          Troopers with the Texas Department of Public Safety pulled over a
   vehicle containing five passengers and five large bundles of marihuana. The
   driver, a juvenile, was immediately removed, handcuffed, and seated away
   from the highway. The passengers, including Campos-Ayala and Moncada-
   De La Cruz, were instructed to remain inside the vehicle, wedged between
   the bundles of marihuana. Agents with the U.S. Border Patrol arrived and
   began questioning Campos-Ayala and Moncada-De La Cruz in Spanish.
   Agent Ramos asked Campos-Ayala and Moncada-De La Cruz, “Do you
   know what you’re on?” One of them responded, “uh” or “no.” Agent
   Ramos asked, “the weed, right” or “that’s marijuana,” to which one of them
   nodded in the affirmative and the other stated, “yes.” Campos-Ayala and
   Moncada-De La Cruz were removed from the vehicle shortly after. While
   frisking Campos-Ayala, Agent Ramos asked, “Why did you help with the
   drugs?” Campos-Ayala responded, “I didn’t.” While escorting Campos-
   Ayala to the transport van, Agent Ramos asked, “Why did you cross with the
   drugs?” Campos-Ayala responded, “I didn’t, I just helped.”
          Campos-Ayala, Moncada-De La Cruz, and another passenger in the
   vehicle were transported to a station with agents from the Drug Enforcement
   Administration (DEA). At the station, all three gave the same basic story.
   The passengers were strangers but crossed the border together and flagged
   down a random car in hopes of travelling further into the United States.
   There were no drugs in the vehicle when they first accepted the ride. After
   they had been on the road for some time, the driver dropped the passengers
   off at a roadside park and told the passengers he would come back for them.
   When the driver returned, the car was loaded with the large bundles of

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                                   No. 21-50642

   marihuana. Agents Kettani and Bustamante testified that Moncada-De La
   Cruz said “he helped rearrange [the bundles of marihuana] so that everybody
   could fit inside the vehicle, because it’s a small vehicle.” Agent Bustamante
   elaborated that the agents believed, in doing so, Moncada-De La Cruz “was
   possessing the marijuana inside the vehicle.” DEA Agent Kettani testified
   that Campos-Ayala “ma[de] a statement that he understood what his charge
   was,” stating, “He understood why he had been arrested. And in Spanish he
   said . . . Well, I guess that’s how it goes. Yes, I was in possession of the
   marijuana.” Agent Bustamante confirmed that Agent Kettani was asking
   Campos-Ayala if he “understood why he was being arrested,” and “what
   charges [were] being pressed against him,” to which Campos-Ayala
   responded in Spanish slang, “That’s just the way things are and I was in
   possession of the marijuana.” Bustamante also testified that Campos-Ayala
   said, “I guess that’s just the way things are, that’s the way things happen,”
   and that “he understood that he was in possession of the marijuana.”
                                        II
          Campos-Ayala and Moncada-De La Cruz argue that the evidence was
   insufficient to support their convictions for possession with intent to
   distribute. They contend that the evidence only shows their presence around
   a person who possessed marihuana and offered them a ride.               The
   Government contends that the defendants’ close proximity to the drugs,
   Campos-Ayala’s statement to Agent Kettani that he understood he was in
   possession of the bundles of marihuana, Campos-Ayala’s statement to Agent
   Ramos that he helped, and Moncada-De La Cruz’s statement that he helped
   rearrange the bundles so that everyone could fit in the car proved their
   possession. Additionally, the Government contends that the jury could
   reasonably conclude the defendants’ reentry into the car with knowledge that
   the driver was transporting marihuana indicated they joined in the crime and

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                                           No. 21-50642

   possessed the marihuana in furtherance of their own ends of travelling farther
   into the United States.
          While a preserved challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is
   reviewed de novo, an unpreserved challenge is reviewed for a manifest
   miscarriage of justice. 1 Under de novo review, “we will affirm . . . if a
   reasonable trier of fact could conclude . . . the elements of the offense were
   established beyond a reasonable doubt.” 2 Under the “exacting” manifest
   miscarriage of justice standard, “a claim of evidentiary insufficiency will be
   rejected unless the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt or if the
   evidence is so tenuous that a conviction is shocking.” 3                      Under both
   standards, “we consider in the evidence in the light most favorable to the
   government, giving the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences
   and credibility choices.” 4 Furthermore, although the jury is free to choose
   among reasonable constructions of the evidence, 5 and we will not second-
   guess the jury’s reasonable determinations as to evidentiary weight and
   witness credibility, 6 the jury may not “pile inference upon inference to” find
   possession with intent to distribute and it must “limit itself to reasonable
   constructions of the evidence.” 7

           _____________________
          1
              United States v. McDowell, 498 F.3d 308, 312-13 (5th Cir. 2007).
          2
              Id. at 312 (internal quotation marks omitted).
          3
           United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation
   marks omitted).
          4
              McDowell, 498 F.3d at 312 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
          5
              United States v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 422-23 (5th Cir. 2012).
          6
              United States v. Mendoza, 522 F.3d 482, 489 (5th Cir. 2008).
          7
              United States v. Onick, 889 F.2d 1425, 1429 (5th Cir. 1989).

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           Both Campos-Ayala and Moncada-De La Cruz moved for acquittal 8
   at the close of the Government’s evidence and neither renewed their motion
   at the close of all evidence. Campos-Ayala did not introduce any evidence,
   and was therefore not required to renew his motion. 9 His sufficiency of the
   evidence challenge is therefore reviewed de novo. 10 Because Moncada-De
   La Cruz did introduce evidence, calling a witness to testify, the sufficiency of
   the evidence as to Moncada-De La Cruz is reviewed under the manifest
   miscarriage of justice standard. 11
           Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B), to sustain a conviction for
   the crime of possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, the
   Government must prove: “(1) knowledge, (2) possession, and (3) intent to
   distribute the controlled substance.” 12 Possession of a controlled substance
   “may be actual or constructive.” 13 A defendant has actual possession if he

           _____________________
           8
                See Fed. R. Crim. P. 29.
           9
              United States v. Daniels, 723 F.3d 562, 569 (5th Cir. 2013) (“We reject the
   Government’s argument that the . . . defendants’ challenges to the sufficiency of the
   evidence should be reviewed only for manifest miscarriage of justice . . . . [The defendants]
   did not need to renew their Rule 29 motions in order to preserve their challenges because
   they did not present evidence.” (citing United States v. Arias–Diaz, 497 F.2d 165, 168-69
   (5th Cir. 1974)).
           10
                Id.
           11
             See United States v. Salazar, 542 F.3d 139, 142 (5th Cir. 2008) (“[Defendant’s]
   having failed to renew his motion for judgment of acquittal, we review his sufficiency-of-
   the-evidence challenge only for a manifest miscarriage of justice.”); see also United States
   v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 328-31 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (reaffirming that the manifest
   miscarriage of justice standard applies to a forfeited claim of insufficient evidence).
           12
                United States v. Lopez-Monzon, 850 F.3d 202, 206 (5th Cir. 2017).
           13
              United States v. McCowan, 469 F.3d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 2006) (quoting United
   States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 496 (5th Cir. 1999)).

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                                          No. 21-50642

   “knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a given time.” 14 A
   defendant has constructive possession if he “had (1) ownership, dominion or
   control over the item itself or (2) dominion or control over the premises in
   which the item is found.” 15 In other words, “the government must establish
   [an] adequate nexus between the accused and the prohibited substance.” 16
   “Mere presence in the area where drugs are found is insufficient to support
   a finding of possession,” 17 and “we have not hesitated to reverse a conviction
   when the evidence has shown only that the defendant ran with bad
   company.” 18       “Ultimately, the determination of whether constructive
   possession exists is not a scientific inquiry, and the court must employ a
   common sense, fact-specific approach.” 19
           Based on the available evidence, 20 the jury could not reasonably
   conclude Campos-Ayala or Moncada-De La Cruz possessed the marihuana
   with the intent to distribute it. Moncada-De La Cruz’s statement that he
   rearranged the bundles, while showing more than mere presence, does not
   establish an adequate nexus sufficient to enable a reasonable jury to find
           _____________________
           14
            United States v. Meza, 701 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v.
   Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 416 (5th Cir. 1998)).
           15
                Id.
           16
              United States v. Benbrook, 40 F.3d 88, 94 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing United States v.
   Rojas, 537 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1061 (1977)).
           17
              United States v. Cordova–Larios, 907 F.2d 40, 42 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing United
   States v. Ferg, 504 F.2d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1974)).
           18
             United States v. Sandoval, 847 F.2d 179, 185 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing United States
   v. Gardea Carrasco, 830 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1987)).
           19
             Meza, 701 F.3d at 419 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted) (quoting
   United States v. Wright, 24 F.3d 732, 735 (5th Cir. 1994)).
           20
             Greer v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 2090, 2098 (2021) (“This Court has repeatedly
   stated that an appellate court conducting plain-error review may consider the entire
   record—not just the record from the particular proceeding where the error occurred.”).

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                                          No. 21-50642

   possession.      Campos-Ayala’s statements that he “just helped” and
   “understood” he was in possession after Agent Kettani explained the
   charges to him are similarly insufficient for a reasonable jury to find he
   possessed the marihuana.
                                                A
           We first address the sufficiency of the evidence as to Moncada-De La
   Cruz. We conclude that the jury could not reasonably find Moncada-De La
   Cruz’s act of rearranging the bundles of marihuana so that he could fit inside
   the vehicle for the sole purpose of traveling further into the United States
   imputed to him ownership, dominion, or control over the marihuana.
           Under this court’s decisions, a defendant’s mere presence in a vehicle
   in which drugs are found is insufficient to support a finding of constructive
   possession. 21 We have found this to be the case even when the defendant
   may have known the vehicle was illegally transporting marihuana but was a
   passenger in the vehicle for the sole purpose of travelling further into the
   United States. 22

           _____________________
           21
               United States v. Gordon, 700 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1983) (reversing defendant’s
   conviction for possession of marihuana with intent to distribute where the defendant was
   only present in the vehicle with the drugs with no other evidence connecting him to drugs);
   see also Cordova–Larios, 907 F.2d at 42 (“Mere presence in the area where drugs are found
   is insufficient to support a finding of possession.”); Ferg, 504 F.2d at 917 (“The facts of
   this case illustrate the logic of this ‘mere presence’ rule. The government presents only
   two pieces of circumstantial evidence in an attempt to link Ferg with the seized marijuana.
   Ferg was traveling with Shaw, the person who admitted having purchased the marijuana,
   and Ferg was a passenger in the car in which the marijuana was concealed. Beyond the
   admission by Ferg that he was a traveling companion of one guilty of illegal possession of
   marijuana, the government failed to establish that Ferg in any way violated 21 U.S.C.
   § 841(a)(1).”).
           22
              See United States v. Moreno-Hinojosa, 804 F.2d 845, 847 (5th Cir. 1986) (“Even
   if [the passenger] knew that [the driver] was making an illegal marihuana run, this fact
   would not be sufficient evidence to establish his possession without an additional showing

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                                            No. 21-50642

           Here, arguably, there is more than mere presence because Moncada-
   De La Cruz rearranged the bundles so he could fit in the vehicle. However,
   common sense dictates that such an act, by itself, does not establish
   ownership, dominion, or control over another’s item. In United States v.
   Martinez, 23 this court stated that “constructive possession is the ability to
   reduce an object to actual possession.” 24 We concluded that the district
   court properly instructed the jury by providing the following example of
   constructive possession: “I have pencils on my desk in my chambers. My
   law clerk will go get them for me if I want them. . . . That’s constructive
   possession.” 25
           When this court has affirmed a finding of constructive possession
   under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), it has only been when there was substantially
   more circumstantial evidence connecting the defendant to the controlled
   substance. For example, in United States v. Brito, 26 this court concluded that
   the defendant had constructive possession based on “his ownership of the
   vehicle [transporting marihuana], his proximity to the vehicle on the day in
   question, and his failure to ever provide any explanation as to the purpose of
   his trip to the Big Bend area.” 27 In United States v. Rogers, 28 this court

           _____________________
   that he was riding in the truck to participate in the possession and distribution. The
   government did not make this additional showing even circumstantially beyond a
   reasonable doubt.”).
           23
              588 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1979), abrogation on other grounds recognized by United
   States v. Sandoval, 615 F. App’x 242, 243 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (unpublished).
           24
                Id. at 498.
           25
                Id. at 498 & n.3.
           26
                136 F.3d 397 (5th Cir. 1998).
           27
                Id. at 411.
           28
                719 F.2d 767 (5th Cir. 1983).

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                                           No. 21-50642

   concluded there was “far more than mere presence” connecting the
   defendant to the marihuana because the defendant’s “presence near the drug
   pick-up was . . . the effect of great effort and considerable expense on his part
   in promoting a long journey all but inexplicable for any other purpose, made
   chiefly in his own automobile, and ending with the capture of his associate in
   a load car over which he had dominion and had rented for no apparent
   purpose on the last leg of the journey.” 29 In United States v. Cardenas, 30 this
   court found constructive possession because the defendant “flew to Dallas
   from Miami for a brief visit[,] [h]e engaged in suspicious activities prior to his
   apprehension, [] he, along with the person seen driving him the previous day,
   was present in a room for over three-and-one-half hours where drugs and
   other incriminating evidence were in plain view[,] and [o]ther individuals
   arrived at this room, apparently for a meeting and a drug-related
   transaction.” 31 There is no equivalent evidence connecting Moncada-De La
   Cruz to the marihuana as in those cases.
          The Government argues that the jury could reasonably conclude
   Moncada-De La Cruz’s and Campos-Ayala’s reentry into the car with
   knowledge that the driver was transporting marihuana indicated they had
   joined in the crime and possessed the marihuana in furtherance of their own
   ends of travelling further into the United States. However, in United States
   v. Moreno-Hinojosa, 32 this court expressly rejected that same argument,
   reversing the defendant’s § 841(a)(1) conviction on the basis of constructive

          _____________________
          29
               Id. at 770-71 (internal quotation marks omitted).
          30
               748 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1984).
          31
               Id. at 1022.
          32
               804 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1986).

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                                          No. 21-50642

   possession. 33        In Moreno-Hinojosa, the defendant was a passenger in a
   “tractor-trailer rig” which he may have known was illegally transporting
   marihuana. 34 He caught a ride in the vehicle with a co-worker in order to find
   work elsewhere, and there was no evidence he asked to travel in the truck to
   participate in the possession and distribution of marihuana. 35 Likewise, even
   if Campos-Ayala and Moncada-De La Cruz knew the car was illegally
   transporting marihuana, that would be insufficient to support a finding they
   possessed the marihuana with the intent to distribute it by virtue of re-
   entering the vehicle after it had been loaded elsewhere with the contraband
   when there is no evidence they had any prior knowledge of the drug-
   trafficking scheme. 36 The Government’s argument falls short.
                                                B
           We next address the sufficiency of the evidence as to Campos-Ayala.
   We conclude that it would be unreasonable for the jury to conclude Campos-
   Ayala was in possession based solely on Campos-Ayala’s statements that he
   “just helped” and “understood” he was in possession after Agent Kettani
   explained the charges to him.
           First, it would be unreasonable for the jury to infer Campos-Ayala had
   possession with intent to distribute based on his statement to Agent Ramos
   that he “just helped.” Agent Ramos asked Campos-Ayala, “Why did you
   help with the drugs?” to which Campos-Ayala responded, “I didn’t.” Agent
           _____________________
           33
                Id. at 847.
           34
                Id. at 846.
           35
                Id. at 847.
           36
              Id. (“Even if [the passenger] knew that [the driver] was making an illegal
   marihuana run, this fact would not be sufficient evidence to establish his possession without
   an additional showing that he was riding in the truck to participate in the possession and
   distribution.”).

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                                        No. 21-50642

   Ramos then asked, “Why did you cross with the drugs? to which Campos-
   Ayala responded, “I didn’t, I just helped.” While it is unclear from this
   exchange what Campos-Ayala was referring to when he said he “helped,”
   the Government invited the jury to infer that Campos-Ayala was saying he
   helped rearrange the bundles as did Moncada. Because, as previously
   explained, such an act would not impute ownership, dominion, or control of
   the marihuana with intent to distribute, there was insufficient evidence for a
   reasonable jury to infer there was an adequate nexus connecting Campos-
   Ayala to the marihuana. 37
           Second, Campos-Ayala’s statement made to DEA Agents after Agent
   Kettani explained the charges against him was not a confession. Agents
   Kettani and Bustamante testified that Campos-Ayala said in Spanish slang
   that he was in possession of the marihuana, but it is clear from the testimony
   that both agents Kettani and Bustamante believed Campos-Ayala was
   “mak[ing] a statement that he understood what his charge was” after Agent
   Kettani explained the charges against him. The statement, therefore, can
   most readily be taken to mean he comprehended that the officers were telling
   him his actions constituted possession.             In this context, it would be
   unreasonable for the jury to infer Campos-Ayala, in making the statement,
   was confessing to being caught in possession of the marihuana, particularly
   given the paucity of other evidence connecting Campos-Ayala to the
   marihuana.
           Ultimately, the Government failed to offer evidence of anything more
   than Campos-Ayala and Moncada-De La Cruz being “just along for the

           _____________________
           37
             See United States v. Onick, 889 F.2d 1425, 1429 (5th Cir. 1989) (explaining the
   jury may not “pile inference upon inference to” find possession and must “limit itself to
   reasonable constructions of the evidence”).

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                                              No. 21-50642

   ride.” 38 The evidence connecting Moncada-De La Cruz and Campos-Ayala
   to the marihuana is insufficient to support a finding that Campos-Ayala and
   Moncada-De La Cruz had possession with intent to distribute. Because to
   otherwise affirm the convictions on the basis of such tenuous evidence would
   be shocking, 39 and would amount to essentially “countenanc[ing] a
   conviction based on guilt by association,” 40 we are compelled to reverse the
   judgment of the district court and vacate the defendants’ convictions.
                                          *        *         *
           For the foregoing reasons we REVERSE and VACATE Campos-
   Ayala and Moncada-De La Cruz’s convictions.

           _____________________
           38
              See United States v. Brito, 136 F.3d 397, 411 (5th Cir. 1998); see also Moreno-
   Hinojosa, 804 F.2d at 847.
           39
              See United States v. Phillips, 477 F.3d 215, 219 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting United
   States v. Avants, 367 F.3d 433, 449 (5th Cir. 2004)).
           40
                United States v. Gordon, 700 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1983).

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                                    No. 21-50642

   Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
          With all due respect to my esteemed and learned colleagues, sitting
   on, hugging, and otherwise being sandwiched between and under 283 pounds
   of marijuana constitutes “possession” of it:

   The defendants had “direct physical control” over the drugs they were
   literally holding, sitting on, and lying under. Henderson v. United States, 575
   U.S. 622, 626 (2015). That, coupled with the extremely deferential standard
   of review, makes this a straightforward case. I respectfully dissent.

          A jury found Campos-Ayala and Moncada-De La Cruz guilty of
   possession with intent to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana in
   violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B). Such possession may be actual
   or constructive. See United States v. Meyer, 63 F.4th 1024, 1038 (5th Cir.
   2023); Nat’l Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 67 (1914); 2A
   O’Malley, Grenig & Lee, Federal Jury Practice and
   Instructions, Criminal § 39.12 (6th ed. 2023 update). Possession
   may also be joint among multiple parties. See United States v. Ramos-

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                                    No. 21-50642

   Cardenas, 524 F.3d 600, 605 (5th Cir. 2008). Actual possession “occurs
   when a ‘defendant knowingly has direct physical control over a thing at a
   given time.’” United States v. Fields, 977 F.3d 358, 365 (5th Cir. 2020)
   (quoting United States v. Munoz, 150 F.3d 401, 416 (5th Cir. 1998)); see also
   Henderson, 575 U.S. at 626. “Constructive possession is established when a
   person, though lacking such physical custody, still has the power and intent
   to exercise control over the object.” Henderson, 575 U.S. at 626. It requires
   “some evidence supporting at least a plausible inference that the defendant
   had knowledge of and access to the weapon or contraband.” United States v.
   McCowan, 469 F.3d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 2006) (quotation omitted). “In other
   words, constructive possession is the ability to reduce an object to actual
   possession.” United States v. Pigrum, 922 F.2d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 1991)
   (quotation omitted). Thus, actual possession is “a more restrictive
   standard” than constructive. United States v. Gaines, 295 F.3d 293, 301 (2d
   Cir. 2002). Neither type of possession requires proof of legal ownership. See
   Henderson, 575 U.S. at 626.
          Possession is easily established here. These defendants “knowingly
   ha[d] direct physical control over [the marijuana] at a given time” to show
   actual possession. Fields, 977 F.3d at 365 (quotation omitted). Just look at the
   picture. The defendants were literally sitting on, under, and beside the
   marijuana. And the evidence supported “at least a plausible inference that
   the defendant[s] had knowledge of and access to the . . . contraband” to show
   constructive possession. McCowan, 469 F.3d at 390 (quotation omitted).
          The majority relays some of the evidence put on by the Government:
   “the defendants’ close proximity to the drugs, Campos-Ayala’s statement to
   Agent Kettani that he understood he was in possession of the bundles of
   marijuana, Campos-Ayala’s statement to Agent Ramos that he helped, and
   Moncada-De La Cruz’s statement that he helped rearrange the bundles so
   that everyone could fit in the car.” Ante, at 3. But the majority omits the most

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                                    No. 21-50642

   important piece of evidence: the fact that the officers discovered the
   defendants actually holding the contraband.
          And let’s be clear about how many cases we need to push aside to
   reach the majority’s holding.
          We have repeatedly held that physical control is sufficient to show
   possession. See, e.g., United States v. Ortiz, 927 F.3d 868, 874 (5th Cir. 2019)
   (holding that a felon possessed a firearm when he held it briefly); United
   States v. Hagman, 740 F.3d 1044, 1049 (5th Cir. 2014) (surveying cases and
   finding that a defendant’s mere fingerprint on a firearm or eyewitness
   testimony of a defendant holding it were sufficient to show actual
   possession); United States v. De Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 497 (5th Cir. 1999)
   (finding that a defendant’s “thumbprint on the box of ammunition would
   also lead a jury to reasonably infer” that the defendant possessed it); Munoz,
   150 F.3d at 416 (finding actual possession where an eyewitness saw the
   defendant “handle the sawed-off shotgun”); United States v. Steen, 55 F.3d
   1022, 1032 (5th Cir. 1995) (finding possession of cocaine when the officer
   observed a white powder on the defendant’s arms); United States v. Ivy, 973
   F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that defendant actually possessed
   illegal narcotics when he took a package containing them and began to open
   it), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 1022 (1993); United States v. Parker, 566 F.2d 1304,
   1306 (5th Cir. 1978) (holding a defendant possessed a gun when he held it for
   thirty minutes); United States v. Tyler, 474 F.2d 1079, 1081 (5th Cir. 1973)
   (per curiam) (holding that the jury could “draw an inference of actual
   possession from the presence of the [defendant’s] fingerprint”); see also
   United States v. Johnson, 46 F.4th 1183, 1188–89 (10th Cir. 2022) (holding
   that a defendant actually possessed a firearm when he knowingly sat on it);
   Gaines, 295 F.3d at 301 (holding that where the evidence showed the
   defendant “actually holding the weapons in his hand,” that “fact alone was
   sufficient to allow a jury to find actual possession, however briefly it

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   occurred”); cf. United States v. Crain, 33 F.3d 480, 486 (5th Cir. 1994)
   (finding no actual possession because the defendant “never touched” the
   item in the car); United States v. Onick, 889 F.2d 1425, 1429 (5th Cir. 1989)
   (similar).
          Today the majority breaks with those cases.
          This court has repeatedly held that passengers can be just as guilty of
   possession of contraband in a vehicle as owners. See, e.g., Crain, 33 F.3d at
   486 (“[W]hen two or more people are occupying a place, a defendant’s
   control over the place is not by itself enough to establish constructive
   possession of contraband found there. We are especially reluctant to infer
   constructive possession of contraband by one occupant when there is
   evidence in the record explicitly linking the contraband to another
   occupant.”); United States v. Wright, 24 F.3d 732, 735 (5th Cir. 1994)
   (similar); United States v. Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 441–42 (5th Cir. 1993)
   (holding that both driver and passenger-owner possessed drugs found in a
   hidden compartment); United States v. Phillips, 496 F.2d 1395, 1397–98 (5th
   Cir. 1974) (holding that passenger possessed marijuana in a vehicle he didn’t
   own or rent even when marijuana was found in the trunk); United States v.
   Canada, 459 F.2d 687, 689 (5th Cir. 1972) (finding sufficient evidence of
   possession where passenger knew of the presence of contraband in the
   vehicle). For example, this court held in United States v. Niver, 689 F.2d 520
   (5th Cir. 1982), that a passenger was not merely “hitching a free ride” and
   was instead guilty of possession with intent to distribute when the marijuana
   was in plain view and the passenger recognized it as marijuana. Id. at 530; see
   also United States v. Whitmire, 595 F.2d 1303, 1316 (5th Cir. 1979) (similar).
          Today the majority breaks with those cases, too.
          This court has repeatedly held that a mere admission of possession—
   like Campos-Ayala’s admission here—is sufficient to establish possession.

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   See, e.g., Hagman, 740 F.3d at 1049; United States v. Tovar, 719 F.3d 376, 389
   (5th Cir. 2013); United States v. Cartwright, 6 F.3d 294, 299 (5th Cir. 1993).
          Again, today’s majority breaks with those cases.
          This court has repeatedly held that we must be extremely deferential to
   the jury when reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence challenge. See, e.g.,
   United States v. Yusuf, 57 F.4th 440, 444 (5th Cir. 2023); United States v.
   Cabello, 33 F.4th 281, 288 (5th Cir. 2022); United States v. McNealy, 625 F.3d
   858, 870 (5th Cir. 2010). We cannot reweigh evidence, and we must defer to
   the jury’s choice “among reasonable constructions of the evidence.” Ramos-
   Cardenas, 524 F.3d at 605 (citing United States v. Ibarra, 286 F.3d 795, 797
   (5th Cir. 2002)). We must “view[] the evidence in the light most favorable
   to the verdict and draw[] all reasonable inferences from the evidence to
   support the verdict.” United States v. Jimenez-Elvirez, 862 F.3d 527, 533 (5th
   Cir. 2017) (quotation omitted); see also United States v. Resio-Trejo, 45 F.3d
   907, 911 (5th Cir. 1995). “We do not consider whether the jury correctly
   determined innocence or guilt, but whether the jury made a rational
   decision.” United States v. Nolasco-Rosas, 286 F.3d 762, 765 (5th Cir. 2002).
   And we must uphold the verdict even if the evidence does not “exclude every
   reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” United States v. Bell, 678 F.2d 547, 549
   (5th Cir. 1982) (en banc).
          Yet again, today’s majority breaks with those cases too.
          Finally, this court has repeatedly held that we must be doubly
   deferential to the jury verdict on plain error review of a sufficiency of the
   evidence challenge. See Yusuf, 57 F.4th at 445; Cabello, 33 F.4th at 288;
   United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 330–31 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The
   defendant must show “the record is devoid of evidence pointing to guilt or
   [that] the evidence is so tenuous that a conviction is shocking.” Delgado, 672
   F.3d at 331 (quotation omitted). We reverse “only if there is a manifest

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   miscarriage of justice.” Ibid. (quotation omitted). This is “tantamount to the
   eye of a virtually impassable needle.” Yusuf, 57 F.4th at 445. And even for
   Campos-Ayala’s preserved challenge, we still must place “a heavy thumb on
   the scale in favor of the verdict.” Cabello, 33 F.4th at 288.
          You guessed it: Today’s majority breaks with these cases too.
          This is not a case of “mere presence.” Ante, at 6–7. This is not a case
   where the defendants had mere knowledge that the driver possessed
   marijuana with intent to distribute. Ante, at 9–10 (citing United States v.
   Moreno-Hinojosa, 804 F.2d 845, 847 (5th Cir. 1986)). This is not a case where
   some marijuana was found in the trunk or a hidden compartment of the car.
   Ante, at 7 (citing United States v. Gordon, 700 F.2d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1983);
   United States v. Ferg, 504 F.2d 914, 917 (5th Cir. 1974)).
          This is a case where the defendants unloaded and re-loaded five bales
   stuffed with 283 pounds of marijuana into a vehicle, climbed into that very
   transport car, held that marijuana in their immediate physical control as they
   drove, and admitted to officers that they knew they were holding marijuana.
   A rational jury could easily infer from this evidence that the defendants
   exercised “direct physical control” over the contraband so we must defer to
   its verdict. Fields, 977 F.3d at 365 (quotation omitted). In fact, only an
   irrational jury could look at the picture on the first page of this dissent and
   conclude that holding marijuana is not possession of it.
          I respectfully dissent.

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