Court Opinion

ID: 9846049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:33:25.545058+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:31.777776
License: Public Domain

MlKELL, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent because I believe that the garnishment action is the proper vehicle for deciding whether the insurance company is indebted to the bankrupt judgment debtor, which is another way of saying that the garnishment action is where the coverage issue should be decided. Footnote 2 suggests that the injured plaintiff might establish the liability of the insurance company by “receipt of an assignment of claims.” But creditors cannot depend on the cooperation in good faith by the debtor in executing voluntarily such an assignment. The footnote also suggests a declaratory judgment action. Although controlling Supreme Court precedent does allow suits for a declaratory judgment by an insured, declaratory judgments were traditionally reserved for situations in which a party *80was uncertain of his rights. Those precedents do not make declaratory judgments the exclusive remedy. Garnishment is a clean, efficient method for deciding coverage, especially when, as here, the issue is one of law: does the assault and battery exclusion apply?
Decided February 20, 2004
Reconsideration denied March 4, 2004
Goetz, Allen & Zahler, Charles M. Goetz, Jr., David A. Webster, for appellant.
Willace D. MaGee, for appellees.
Because I believe the Rosses do have standing, the other issues in the appeal would not be moot.
I am authorized to state that Judge Ellington joins in this dissent.