Court Opinion

ID: 9711821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:40:04.217311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:07.714196
License: Public Domain

SCHWELB, Associate Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
I agree with the majority that when Cow-an told the judge during the sentencing proceedings that “you don’t know me from nowhere,” and the judge responded in part that some women at Mayfair Manor had told him that Cowan “was making their lives miserable,” an impartial observer would have been obliged to conclude that things were not as they should be. A judge is not supposed to have private discussions with third parties about criminal defendants in cases that are before him, nor may he use the fruits of those discussions to negate the defendant’s complaints.
Appearances changed considerably however, after Cowan made an issue of the judge’s remark. The judge’s explanation of the incident, which my colleagues in the majority quite properly accept, was that as *1216soon as the women mentioned the names of Cowan and of his co-defendants, the judge advised them that it would be improper for him to discuss the matter further because the case was still pending before him. He indicated in his written order that he was not influenced, in sentencing Cowan,1 by the brief remarks which were made during his visit to Mayfair Manor.2 My colleagues apparently acknowledge, maj. op at 1211-1213, that if this explanation had been provided contemporaneously with the disclosure of the women’s comments, any appearance of impropriety would have been dissipated, and the judgment could properly be affirmed. Since the judge did not provide his explanation until several months after the fact, however, my colleagues say that the appearance of impropriety persisted and that Cowan’s sentence must be vacated.
Cowan was represented at sentencing by able counsel from the Public Defender Service. When the judge alluded to the remarks which residents of Mayfair Manor had made about Cowan, his attorney could have brought to the judge’s attention the fact that Cowan had no knowledge of these apparently ex parte discussions and that the judge’s invocation of them was inconsistent with Cowan’s rights. Counsel could then have requested any appropriate relief. If this had been done, then the judge could have and presumably would have provided on the spot the explanation of the circumstances which he gave when Cowan raised the issue. The majority evidently agrees that this would have eliminated the need for resentencing.
Under the majority’s rather unconventional approach, then, Cowan’s attorney did his client a favor by not objecting when he could have done so. If a contemporaneous objection had been made and the judge had responded with a contemporaneous disclosure, my colleagues would evidently deny Cowan any relief. Since no objection was made, however, they vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing by another judge. This is an extraordinary signal to send to the defense bar: if you make a timely objection, you lose; if you sit silently by and thus all but preclude the possibility that the trial judge will provide a timely explanation, you win! Objections are ordinarily required “to permit the trial court to fully rule on the issue and thereby to avoid potential error.” Dixon v. United States, 565 A.2d 72, 80 (D.C.1989). In this ease, however, the majority finds it acceptable to defer any objection, prolong the appearance of impropriety, and then prevail on appeal because of the very mischief which counsel might have ended by objecting contemporaneously.3
According to the majority, “it would be expecting too much to hold a defendant accountable for failing, in effect, to accuse a judge of bias[4] at the hearing just before the discretionary, virtually non-reviewable act of sentencing takes place.” Maj. op. at 1212. If this statement was intended to mean what it seems to say, then my colleagues think that a defendant is justified in proceeding on the assumption that the trial judge is a judicial tyrant who will respond to a legitimate objection by sub*1217jecting him (the defendant) to cruel reprisals and prolonged incarceration for exercising his basic rights. I suggest that counsel for Cowan knew, and certainly should have known,5 that thé judge would entertain any motion on its merits6 rather than violating his oath of office by penalizing Cowan for making a legitimate objection.7
In further defense of a doctrine which would reward a defendant’s failure to make a timely objection, my colleagues maintain, maj. op. at 1212, that
a judge should know the ethical restraints on the judicial office; a defendant should not be penalized on appellate review for failure to point out to a judge the ethical rules which the judge should know without coaching.
But surely this proves too much. A judge is also supposed to know, “without coaching,” the rules of evidence and procedure and the law of agency, not to mention the doctrine of worthier title, the Rule in Shelley’s Case, and the intricacies of renvoi. Nevertheless, in the absence of plain error or manifest injustice, a litigant ordinarily waives a point on appeal if he does not press it in the trial court, even where the evidence or ruling to which he failed to object was prejudicial to him. See Dixon, supra, 565 A.2d at 80-81; D.D. v. M.T., 550 A.2d 37, 48 (D.C.1988). Here, the majority agrees that there was no actual prejudice. The present case might perhaps call for a different result from Dixon and D.D. v. M.T. if the judge’s alleged violation had been of some obscure provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct with which counsel might not have been familiar. We can surely expect all competent lawyers, however, to know that judges are not supposed to have ex parte discussions with third parties about a pending case and rely on them in sentencing a defendant. An objection was plainly called for.
My colleagues claim to find support in Scott v. United States, 559 A.2d 745 (D.C.1989) (en banc), and in Turman v. United States, 555 A.2d 1037 (D.C.1989) (per cu-*1218nam), for the proposition that no timely objection is required where reversal is sought on the basis of an appearance of impropriety on the part of the trial judge. Neither case supports their thesis. In Scott, the defendant could not have filed a timely objection to the proceedings, based on the trial judge’s employment negotiations with the Department of Justice, because the judge had not disclosed those negotiations at the time of trial and the defendant was not aware of them. Indeed, the court noted that the defendant had filed a timely motion to vacate after the facts came to his attention. 559 A.2d at 755. A contemporaneous objection not having been possible in Scott, the court was assuredly not holding that a litigant need not make one even if he or she has the opportunity to do so.8
In Turman, this court reversed the defendant’s conviction as a result of the judge’s improper comment that, having presided over prior trials in which the prosecution’s chief witness had testified, he knew that this witness was credible. There was not a word in this court’s opinion, however, as to whether an objection had been or should have been made in the trial court. Accordingly, Turman cannot properly be invoked as authority on the question whether such an objection was necessary. I fear that in purporting to rely on Turman my colleagues have failed to heed the Supreme Court’s admonition, as cogent today as when it was written almost two-thirds of a century ago, that
[t]he most that can be said is that the point was in the case if anyone had seen fit to raise it. Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.
Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511, 45 S.Ct. 148, 149, 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925); see also Thompson v. United States, 546 A.2d 414, 423 n. 14 (D.C.1988).9
My colleagues say that they are “satisfied” that in sentencing Cowan, the judge did not consider the information he had inadvertently received at Mayfair Manor. Maj. op. at 1214. They find no actual prejudice to Cowan. I would hold that, where a defendant seeks reversal of his conviction (or as in this case, vacation of his sentence) solely on the basis of an appearance of impropriety or partiality on the part of the trial judge, but fails to make a timely objection in the trial court which, under the circumstances, he or she reasonably could have made, the conviction or sentence will not be set aside unless the misconduct was so serious that reversal would have been warranted even if the judge had provided a contemporaneous explanation. No such showing has been made here. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court, and I therefore respectfully dissent from the vacation of Cowan’s sentence. In all other respects, I join the judgment and opinion of the court.10

. The judge obviously had the Mayfair Manor conversation in mind when he told Cowan about it, but this does not necessarily mean that he considered it in determining the appropriate sentence.

. Although the judge was not influenced by these remarks, and even though he acted correctly in terminating the discussion and perhaps gave it no further thought, it would have been prudent to disclose the contact to counsel in advance of the sentencing hearing. See Sloan v. United States, 527 A.2d 1277, 1286-88 (D.C.1987) (per curiam).

. The majority’s approach creates intractable problems. When an "error" occurs which could have been corrected or dealt with on the spot, and the defendant's failure to object is countenanced by the appellate court, the consequence is that the defendant has a ground for reversal in his hip pocket. He can use it if he is dissatisfied with the outcome, but forever hold his peace if he is satisfied. I cannot agree that a defendant should have such an option, especially where the problem is an appearance of impropriety from which he suffered no actual prejudice.

.The defense’s point could, incidentally, have been made without the use of the inflammatory term “bias.” See pages 1215-1216, supra.

. See United States v. Felder, 548 A.2d 57, 69 (D.C.1988):
Felder, through [Public Defender Service] counsel, in urging us to use a deferential measure of review referred to Judge Walton as an experienced trial judge. Indeed, Judge Walton's experience in the criminal law is broad, deep, and often insightful. We think the best tribute we can give to Judge Walton, is to hold, as we do, after our de novo review of the question, that his ruling was eminently correct.

. This is not to say that Judge Walton would necessarily have been expected to impose a lenient sentence if the merits, without regard to an objection by counsel, justified severe punishment.

. According to the majority, Judge Walton’s allusion, "without explanation," to his ex parte conversation about Cowan with some women at Mayfair Manor provided justification for a defense perception that terrible consequences would ensure if counsel "questioned the judge’s ethics just before sentence was pronounced.” Maj. op. at 1212 n. 7. I appreciate the fact that Cowan and his counsel must have been astonished by the judge's unusual disclosure, but the ex parte contact would not have remained "without explanation” if defense counsel had requested one. There was no need for counsel to say "Judge Walton, you are biased and unethical,” or to insult the judge in some comparable way.
I cannot agree with my colleagues that either defense counsel or this court may legitimately act on the premise that an objection to the ex parte conversation and a request for an explanation of it, if made politely and respectfully, would have created some appreciable possibility of improper retaliation on the part of the judge. Every "exception, your honor” is generated by some kind of ruling or action by the trial judge adverse to counsel’s client, and we simply cannot presume that a judge will make a defendant pay if his attorney challenges an error on the part of the judge, even where, as here, the error was an undisclosed ex parte contact.
As Judge Newman stated for this court in Johnson v. United States, 398 A.2d 354, 365-66 n. 8 (D.C.1979) (quoting with deletions Magruder, The Trials and Tribulations of an Intermediate Appellate Court, 44 Cornell L.Q. 1, 3 (1958)),
we must always bear in mind that they [trial judges] may be as good lawyers as we are or better. They are under the disadvantage of often having to make rulings off the cuff ... in the press and urgency of a trial.... Hence, we should approach our task of judicial review with a certain genuine humility.
There may be a few “rogue” judges who punish litigants for exercising their rights, but at least in this jurisdiction they would be the rare exception rather than the rule. A legal principle which is based on a contrary assumption is flawed in its logic and unjust in its consequences.

. The portion of the Scott opinion to the effect that it “hardly would be appropriate to place on a criminal defendant the burden to attack a judge’s integrity,” 559 A.2d at 755, is cited by my colleagues, maj. op. at 1212, somewhat out of context. It is part of a discussion of the interplay between harmless error and appearance of partiality, and does not deal at all with the question whether a timely objection is necessary. In any event, ”[i]t is well to remember that significance is given to broad and general statements of law only by comparing the facts from which they arise with those facts to which they supposedly apply.” Kraft v. Kraft, 155 A.2d 910, 913 (D.C.1959); see also Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126, 132-33, 65 S.Ct. 165, 168, 89 L.Ed. 118 (1944) (words of opinions are to be read in light of facts under discussion; transposition to other facts is often misleading).

. With due respect to my colleagues, I do not think a principle becomes established as a precedent because "neither the government nor this court perceived” something that was neither raised nor decided. See maj. op. at 1212.

. Four other points which the majority describes as “clearly indicated,” maj. op. at 1215, also merit response.
First, my colleagues say, id., that the risk of injustice to the government is virtually nil, be*1219cause only resentencing, not retrial, is involved. I agree that the cost in Scott — a new trial — was substantially greater. But aside from time, money, and effort which must be expended if Cowan’s sentence is vacated, he will have to be sentenced by a judge who did not preside over the trial, and who will have far less familiarity with him than Judge Walton had. See Super.Ct. Crim.R. 25(b); Gaffney v. United States, 421 A.2d 924, 930-31 (D.C.1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 941, 101 S.Ct. 2026, 68 L.Ed.2d 330 (1981). (Ironically, Cowan implied that he wanted to be sentenced by a judge who knew him, and it was his complaint that Judge Walton did not know him that precipitated the problem in this case.) A real benefit — sentencing by the judge who knows the most about the defendant — will thus be sacrificed solely for the sake of appearances.
Second, according to the majority, "Cowan will never be as sure as we are that the impression conveyed at sentencing was not prejudicial to him.” Maj. op. at 1215. The propriety of vacating Cowan’s sentence is not dependent, however, on my colleagues’ speculation as to what he may or may not believe. Rather, it turns on how an “objective, disinterested observer fully informed of the facts” would view the situation. Pepsico, Inc. v. McMillen, 764 F.2d 458, 460 (7th Cir.1985); accord, Scott, supra, 559 A.2d at 750.
Third, according to my colleagues, there is a risk that "unless failure to disclose such ex parte communications has consequences, judges may relax their guards against appearances of impropriety.” Maj. op. at 1215. But the publication of an opinion in which the court holds that the judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, albeit inadvertently, surely provides adequate deterrence; I do not see how the vacation of the sentence will contribute any additional inhibition. Moreover, I question whether a deterrence rationale is productively invoked where, as here, there was concededly no intentional wrongdoing by the judge.
Finally, my colleagues apprehend that public confidence in the judicial system will be undermined if we do not vacate Cowan’s sentence, because some hypothetical person or persons who may have been present when Cowan was sentenced, and who never learned of the judge’s explanation of the Mayfair Manor conversation, might continue to believe that judges sentence people on the basis of ex parte information. Id. This theory founders on its own logic. If a hypothetical spectator at the trial does not read our opinions, then in most cases he or she will not find out, however we decide the case, that the judgment has been reversed. Accordingly, reversal will not redeem the reputation of the judiciary in that spectator’s eyes. If a spectator does follow the case and does read our opinion, then he or she will learn from the opinion of Judge Walton’s explanation of the ex parte contact and of our resolution of the problem, and that should restore his or her respect for the judicial system whether we affirm or reverse. I suppose that it is theoretically conceivable that someone who does not read this court’s opinion will learn independently that Cowan was resen-tenced, and that this person will conclude that resentencing must have occurred because the ex parte conversation was found to be improper, and therefore develop renewed confidence in the judiciary. I suggest, though, that this eventuality is far too remote to warrant vacating the sentence. I really do not think that we should be remanding cases on the basis of such speculative and illusory possibilities.