Court Opinion

ID: 9545563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:15:42.674633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:07.862298
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, P. J.,
dissenting.
In Bates and Bates, 303 Or 40, 733 P2d 1363 (1987), the court said that, if a dependent spouse remarries,
“[s]upport should be terminated when the purposes of the initial award have been met.” 303 Or at 46.
There is nothing in the record to indicate that the initial award was other than to provide wife a means to enjoy a standard of living not overly disproportionate to that enjoyed *489during the marriage. ORS 107.105(1)(d)(M). The amount and duration of the support initially awarded presumptively accomplishes that purpose; if remarriage makes possible the same or greater level of income without spousal support, then support is no longer warranted. This case involves essentially two issues: allocation of the burden of proof and whether the evidence justifies termination of spousal support. I disagree with the majority’s resolution of both and dissent.
Remarriage is obviously a change of circumstances that has an impact on spousal support duties. It does not automatically terminate spousal support, but it can invoke an inquiry whether the initial purpose of support have been met. In Wilson and Wilson, 62 Or App 201, 660 P2d 188 (1983), we discussed the approach to that inquiry:
“Since the decision in Grove [and Grove, 280 Or 341, 571 P2d 477, modified 280 Or 769, 572 P2d 1320 (1977)], neither the Supreme Court nor this court has specifically delineated what the moving party must show in a proceeding to modify spousal support after remarriage of the dependent spouse. We now conclude that if the payor spouse shows that the dependent spouse has remarried, the dependent spouse must then show that despite the remarriage the reasons for the original spousal support still exist. See Carter and Carter, 54 Or App 86, 89, 634 P2d 265, rev den 292 Or 109 (1981).” 62 Or App at 204.
The majority concludes that that analysis is no longer viable, because it was based on a principle in Nelson v. Nelson, 181 Or 494, 182 P2d 416 (1947), that was rejected by the court in Bates. Although we cited Nelson, the concept in Wilson was based on the common sense rationale that, in this situation, the focus is on the financial circumstances of the dependent spouse’s new family and that that spouse is best able to provide the relevant information. Requiring that readily available information be provided places an insignificant burden on the dependent spouse when compared with that of the movant, who must obtain the evidence by the traditional adversarial means such as discovery, deposition and subpoena. In making a principled decision, the court should have as complete and accurate assessment of the parties’ current living situation as possible. In Wilson, decided in 1983, we devised an allocation of proof designed to accomplish that end. There is no basis to discard that principle now.
*490Wife, who was represented by counsel, appeared at the hearing with very little information about her new husband’s finances. Consequently, there was a lack of the type of financial information that the court in Bates used to determine whether support should continue after the wife’s remarriage. In this case, wife’s failure to produce the relevant information frustrated the decisional process of the trial court and frustrates our de novo review. After husband had testified and had examined wife as a witness, the trial court, with no motion from wife or argument, said:
“The motion is denied. There’s been no material unanticipated substantial change of circumstances.”
Wife had intended to put on evidence. I would remand the case and allow wife to establish what Wilson and Bates require.
The majority, after rejecting the analysis in Wilson, analyzes the available information and concludes that husband has not established a basis for reducing or terminating spousal support. Even on the facts established, I would conclude that spousal support should be terminated. Wife was not working at the time of the hearing because of a back problem, but intended to return to work as soon as she was able. The information on her Uniform Support Affidavit shows that she last averaged $1,400 per month gross pay. With the spousal support payment, her gross income was at least $1,700 per month. If we accept her testimony that her new husband’s income is $610 per month from Social Security, the available gross monthly income of the family unit would be $2,000 without any spousal support. The scant information that she provided is to the effect that her new husband owns a home and that she intended to move there perhaps at the end of 1988. Presumably, her son, who is 31 years old and employed in Portland, would not move to Washington with her and would no longer require financial assistance from her. The size of her household will not change.
Husband’s gross income in 1979, when the marriage was dissolved, was approximately $35,000. He retired from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 1986. He presently earns $48,000 per year and receives $1,000 per month from a retirement fund. His new wife is not regularly employed but assists a friend who is a tax. consultant by preparing tax returns. She receives $200 per month support for a child from a former *491marriage. Husband provides a home and additional support, even though he has not adopted the child; consequently, his family consists of himself and two dependents.
The majority utilizes some language from Bates and Bates, supra, and focuses on husband’s income rather than on wife’s current financial situation. It says that “wife’s remarriage did not substantially affect the economic circumstances and, therefore, husband has failed to prove that there has been a substantial change in circumstances justifying a modification of spousal support.” 98 Or App at 488. It is true that the court in Bates analyzed the financial information in terms of both parties’ situations and concluded that the wife’s present available family income after her remarriage would give her more money than the “trial judge originally found to represent an equitable distribution of income.” 303 Or at 48. However, I do not think the court elucidated a new principle but only used those words to describe the original support award as presumptively equitable in terms of allowing the wife to maintain a standard of living not overly disproportionate to that enjoyed during the marriage. The court was purporting to follow the statutory policy embodied in ORS 107.105(1)(d).
The majority’s analysis suggests that the relationship between the incomes of the parties established by the original support award must be maintained. That would mean that, if the payor spouse’s income increases, then the support must be continued, or perhaps increased, in order to maintain the relationship between incomes. Wife’s present family income, without support, is well beyond the amount of available income, including support, that she received before her remarriage. The disparity has increased only because husband’s income has increased by a greater percentage than wife’s. She, as recipient spouse, is not entitled to “an annuity for life or * * * a perpetual lien against her former husband’s future income.” Kitson and Kitson, 17 Or App 648, 656, 523 P2d 575, rev den (1974); see Grove and Grove, 280 Or 341, 571 P2d 477, modified 280 Or 769, 572 P2d 1320 (1977).
I disagree with the majority’s treatment of both issues that I have identified in this case.