Court Opinion

ID: 9399496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-05 10:08:28.448778+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:24.202670
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________
          No. 02-22-00363-CV
     ___________________________

        IN THE MATTER OF B.R.

  On Appeal from the 323rd District Court
          Tarrant County, Texas
      Trial Court No. 323-113215-20

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Bassel and Womack, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                   I. Introduction

      Appellant B.R., who was adjudicated delinquent at age sixteen, appeals the sex-

offender registration order that was rendered after he turned eighteen. In two issues,

he argues that the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to render the sex-offender

registration order after he turned eighteen and that the juvenile court abused its

discretion by rendering such order because, among other arguments, the evidence is

factually insufficient. Because the plain language of the statute states that a juvenile

court has jurisdiction to render a sex-offender registration order after a juvenile turns

eighteen and because we hold that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by

rendering the order, we affirm.

                                   II. Background

      In October 2020, the juvenile court found that sixteen-year-old B.R. had

engaged in conduct at the age of thirteen that, if committed by an adult, would have

constituted the felony offenses of aggravated sexual assault of a child (two counts)

and of sexual performance of a child under fourteen years old (one count). The

juvenile court (1) found that B.R. was a child in need of rehabilitation and that it was

in his best interest that he be placed on probation until his eighteenth birthday and

(2) ordered that he successfully complete a licensed sex-offender treatment program.

At that time, the juvenile court deferred sex-offender registration for B.R.

                                           2
      On what was intended to be his last day of sex-offender counseling, B.R. tested

positive for marijuana. Shortly thereafter, in March 2022, B.R. was arrested for

another sexual charge: public lewdness. B.R. was then unsuccessfully discharged

from sex-offender treatment.

      In April 2022, B.R. turned eighteen.

      One week after B.R.’s eighteenth birthday, the State filed a motion to order

sex-offender registration. In response, B.R. filed a “Motion To Retain Exemption

From Sex[-]Offender Registration.” Both B.R. and the State later filed briefs in

support of their motions. The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing and granted

the State’s motion to register. B.R. then perfected this appeal.

          III. Jurisdiction to Render Sex-Offender Registration Order

      In his first issue, B.R. argues that pursuant to Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure Article 62.352(c), the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to render its order

requiring him to register as a sex offender after he turned eighteen.1 B.R. recognizes

that we have previously analyzed this statute and have held that “the juvenile court’s

jurisdiction to reconsider a deferred[-]registration decision does not terminate

following the completion of treatment.” See In re D.K., 589 S.W.3d 861, 865 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2019, pet. denied). He argues that

      1
       B.R. acknowledges that based on his “adjudication for delinquent, sexual
conduct, he was required to register as a sex offender unless the juvenile court chose
to defer a decision on whether to require his registration.”

                                             3
      [t]his [c]ourt should revisit its prior construction of [A]rticle 62.352(c),
      and after applying the appropriate principles of construction as urged
      here by B.R. and giving fair effect to the [Texas] Legislature’s precise
      word choice within the statute as a whole,[2] this [c]ourt should now
      confirm that [A]rticle 62.352(c) does not extend jurisdiction for a
      juvenile court to order sex-offender registration after the juvenile reaches
      the age of majority in the single situation where the juvenile
      unsuccessfully completes [sex-offender] treatment.

Although this case differs from D.K. in that the juvenile in D.K. successfully

completed a sex-offender treatment program, we see no need to reconsider our prior

construction of Article 62.352(c) when the plain language of the statute provides a

juvenile court with jurisdiction to order sex-offender registration after a juvenile’s

eighteenth birthday.

      A.     Standard of Review and Applicable Law

      In D.K., we set forth the standard of review and applicable law:

      Appellant’s argument presents a question of statutory interpretation that
      we review de novo. Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex.
      2019). In construing statutes, our primary objective is to give effect to
      the legislature’s intent. Id. We interpret statutes according to the
      language the legislature used, absent an absurd result or a context
      indicating a different meaning. Id.

             Generally, a juvenile adjudicated delinquent for aggravated sexual
      assault is required to register as a sex offender with law enforcement
      authorities. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 62.001(5)(A), .051(a). But
      on a juvenile’s request, the juvenile court must conduct a hearing to

      2
        Specifically, B.R. contends that in D.K., we failed to read Subsection (c) of
Article 62.352 as a whole to afford proper meaning to each phrase within the context
of the entire subsection, that we used an incorrect definition of “on” in our analysis of
the statute, and that we rationalized our interpretation of the statute by opining that
our interpretation was “sound policy.” See 589 S.W.3d at 865.

                                           4
       determine whether the juvenile’s and the public’s interests require an
       exemption from registration. Id. art. 62.351(a). After the hearing, the
       juvenile court may render an order deferring a decision on whether to
       require registration until the respondent has completed treatment for the
       sexual offense as a condition of probation. Id. art. 62.352(b)(1).

Id. at 864.

       Article 62.352(c) describes when a juvenile court may order sex-offender

registration after initially deferring such registration:

       If the court enters an order described by Subsection (b)(1) [deferring
       sex-offender registration “until the respondent has completed treatment
       for the respondent’s sexual offense as a condition of probation”], the
       court retains discretion and jurisdiction to require, or exempt the respondent
       from, registration under this chapter at any time during the treatment or on the
       successful or unsuccessful completion of treatment, except that during the
       period of deferral, registration may not be required. Following
       successful completion of treatment, the respondent is exempted from
       registration under this chapter unless a hearing under this subchapter is
       held on motion of the prosecuting attorney, regardless of whether the
       respondent is 18 years of age or older, and the court determines the
       interests of the public require registration. Not later than the 10th day
       after the date of the respondent’s successful completion of treatment,
       the treatment provider shall notify the juvenile court and prosecuting
       attorney of the completion.

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.352(c) (emphasis added).

       B.     Analysis

       As noted in the State’s brief,

       [B.R.’s] foundational contention that a juvenile court’s jurisdiction
       expires once the juvenile becomes 18 years old relies heavily on In re
       N.J.A., 997 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1999). That holding, which predated [the]
       enactment of Article 62.352, is no longer good law, as discussed by
       another decision relied upon by [B.R.] See In re R.A., 465 S.W.3d 728,
       735 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) (and cases

                                              5
       cited therein). In . . . R.A., the court held that “the duty to register as a
       sex offender arises from Chapter 62, and R.A.’s duty to register or any
       exemption therefrom is not part of the disposition that terminated on
       R.A.’s eighteenth birthday.” [Id.] at 736.

              ....

              The Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides for ongoing
       jurisdiction for a juvenile court that has deferred decision on whether to
       require [sex-offender] registration. Paragraphs (b)(1) and (c) of Article
       62.352, read together, provide that a juvenile court may defer decision
       on requiring registration until the respondent has had the opportunity to
       complete sex[-]offender treatment without losing jurisdiction thereby.
       Tex. Code Crim. Proc. [Ann.] art. 62.352[(b)(1)], (c). In cases of successful
       completion of treatment, the court may not require registration without
       first holding a hearing and determining that the public interest requires
       registration. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. [Ann.] arts. 62.351, 62.352(c).
       [Record references and footnote omitted.]

As we highlighted above, the wording of Article 62.352(c) specifically states that

juvenile courts retain jurisdiction to order sex-offender registration after initially

deferring such registration, even if a juvenile is unsuccessful in completing sex-

offender treatment: “the court retains discretion and jurisdiction to require, or exempt the

respondent from, registration under this chapter at any time during the treatment or on the

successful or unsuccessful completion of treatment.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

62.352(c) (emphasis added).

       Moreover, the cases that B.R. cites actually cut against his desired holding (i.e.,

that the offender who successfully completes treatment may be required to register as

a sex offender after his eighteenth birthday but that the offender who unsuccessfully

completes treatment is outside the juvenile court’s jurisdiction). For example, In re

                                             6
J.M. dealt with the same scenario presented here: the juvenile court ordered a juvenile

who had unsuccessfully completed a sex-offender treatment program to register after

he turned eighteen, and the juvenile challenged the court’s jurisdiction. No. 12-10-

00159-CV, 2011 WL 6000778, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Nov. 23, 2011, no pet.)

(mem. op.). The Tyler Court of Appeals explained its reasoning for holding that the

juvenile court had jurisdiction:

      As the attorney general has noted, the statute does not specifically
      address the unsuccessful completion of treatment. See Op. Tex. Att’y
      Gen. No. GA–772 (2010).

             J.M. unsuccessfully completed treatment on or about September
      15, 2009. The Texas Youth Commission discharged him on September
      22, 2009. It is reasonable, at least in some scenarios, that a child would
      work on treatment until the end of his commitment to the youth
      commission or until the end of his community supervision. Therefore,
      whether the child can be said to have completed treatment or not
      completed treatment would not be known until the end of the child’s
      commitment, which in at least some cases would be when the child
      reached the age of eighteen or nineteen. In such a situation, under J.M.’s
      reading of the statute, a juvenile court would be empowered to address
      the issue of registration only until the last day of the child’s commitment.
      Or as applied to this case, because J.M. was not determined to have been
      unsuccessful with his treatment until approximately a week before the
      youth commission released him, the court would have been able to
      address the registration issue only within the very narrow window
      between the determination that he had failed to complete treatment and
      his nineteenth birthday.

             The legislature could have written the statute to require that result.
      However, the legislature would not have expanded or provided
      jurisdiction for the juvenile court to act if it intended the court to act
      only during a time when it already had jurisdiction. Instead, with Article
      62.352, the legislature provided that the juvenile court’s jurisdiction
      extended for the duration of treatment or to the end, successful or
      unsuccessful, of treatment. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

                                           7
      62.352(c). In this case, this additional grant of jurisdiction was sufficient
      to allow the juvenile court to address the State’s motion following J.M.’s
      unsuccessful completion of treatment.

Id. (footnote omitted). Similarly, R.A., which the State touched on in the portion of

its brief that is set forth above, cites J.M. and reaches the same conclusion:

      Under the unambiguous language of [A]rticle 62.352(c), the [j]uvenile
      [c]ourt had discretion and jurisdiction to require, or exempt R.A. from
      registration under Chapter 62 “on the successful or unsuccessful
      completion of treatment.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.352. The
      statute provides that, following successful completion of treatment, the
      respondent is exempted from registration as a sex offender unless a
      hearing under subchapter H of Chapter 62 is held on the motion of the
      prosecuting attorney. See id. Though [A]rticle 62.352(c) provides
      jurisdiction to the juvenile court to require registration or exempt from
      registration on the successful or unsuccessful completion of treatment,
      the statute does not mention a presumed outcome or motion by the
      State if the respondent unsuccessfully completes treatment. See id.
      Nonetheless, a sister court has held that, even if the respondent
      unsuccessfully completes treatment, the State still may move for a
      hearing under [A]rticle 62.352(c)[,] and the juvenile court still may
      require registration under this statute. . . . J.M., 2011 WL 6000778, at
      *1–3. We agree that, even if R.A. unsuccessfully completed treatment,
      the State still may move for a hearing under [A]rticle 62.352(c) and [that]
      the juvenile court still may require registration under this statute. See
      Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.352(c); . . . J.M., 2011 WL 6000778,
      at *1–3.

465 S.W.3d at 737–38. The R.A. court upheld a sex-offender registration order that

was issued when R.A. was eighteen. Id. at 732, 738, 745.

      Based on the plain language of the statute, we see no reason to reach a different

conclusion than that reached in J.M. and R.A. Accordingly, we hold that the juvenile

court had jurisdiction to render the order requiring B.R. to register as a sex offender

after he turned eighteen. We therefore overrule B.R.’s first issue.

                                            8
  IV. No Abuse of Discretion in Rendering Sex-Offender Registration Order

      In his second issue, B.R. contends that the juvenile court abused its discretion

by ordering him to register as a sex offender. B.R. makes a variety of arguments

within his second issue; we reject each for the reasons set forth below.

      A.     Burden of Proof and Standard of Review

      To avoid sex-offender registration, the juvenile bears the burden to show by a

preponderance of the evidence (1) that protection of the public is not increased by

registration or (2) that any potential increase in protection of the public is clearly

outweighed by the anticipated substantial harm to the juvenile and the juvenile’s

family that would result from registration. In re Z.P.H., No. 02-13-00188-CV, 2014

WL 670203, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 20, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); see also

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.352(a) (setting forth the two factors).

      As we have explained the standard of review,

      In an appeal from an order requiring sex-offender registration, our
      standard of review “is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion in
      requiring registration.” In our abuse-of-discretion review, we ask
      whether the juvenile court (1) had sufficient information upon which to
      exercise its discretion and (2) erred in its application of discretion. We
      answer the first question under the well-trod principles of a sufficiency-
      of-the-evidence review . . . .[3]

             If sufficient evidence exists, we then determine under the second
      inquiry whether the juvenile court made a reasonable decision or an

      3
       In reviewing a factual-sufficiency challenge, we consider all of the evidence
and uphold the judgment unless it is so against the overwhelming weight of the
evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex.
1986).

                                           9
         arbitrary one, i.e., a decision made without reference to guiding rules or
         principles. If the juvenile court did not enter specific findings, . . . we
         examine the implied findings supporting the court’s decision to require
         registration.

Z.P.H., 2014 WL 670203, at *2 (quoting In re J.T.W., No. 02-12-00430-CV, 2013 WL

3488153, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 11, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.)); see In re

C.J.H., 79 S.W.3d 698, 702 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.) (holding that legal

and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant factors in assessing whether the

juvenile court abused its discretion in a juvenile delinquency case). The mere fact that

a trial judge may decide a matter within his discretionary authority in a different

manner than an appellate judge in a similar circumstance does not demonstrate an

abuse of discretion. D.K., 589 S.W.3d at 866 (citing Quixtar Inc. v. Signature Mgmt.

Team, LLC, 315 S.W.3d 28, 31 (Tex. 2010)).

         B.    What the Order States

         The juvenile court rendered a nine-page order setting forth the law, the

evidence, and its findings. We set forth the evidence and the findings as stated in the

order:

         Evidence

               [B.R.’s] juvenile probation officer, Sara Saucedo, testified [that
         B.R.] tested positive for THC at his final sex[-]offender treatment
         counseling session. [B.R.] also admitted to Saucedo that he had used
         marihuana, but “only on a couple of occasions” during his probation.

                Saucedo also testified about a “lapse” in the family’s “safety plan.”
         That incident involved [B.R.’s] grandparent[’s] leaving [B.R.] alone with
         his younger siblings, a circumstance that was an unequivocal violation of

                                             10
      [B.R.’s] conditions of probation requiring adult supervision any time
      [B.R.] was around children younger than a certain age. Saucedo and
      [B.R.’s] sex[-]offender counselor addressed the “lapse” with [B.R.] and
      his family.

             Shortly after what was to have been his last sex[-]offender
      counseling session, [B.R.] was arrested for having sexual intercourse with
      his adult girlfriend in the backseat of a vehicle at a public park. This
      incident, combined with his positive drug test, resulted in [B.R.’s]
      unsuccessful discharge from sex[-]offender treatment.

             [B.R.’s] sex[-]offender counselor, Christina Zamaniego, testified
      [that B.R.’s] arrest for a new sex-related offense demonstrate[d] [that] he
      continues to lack impulse control. Zamaniego criticized [B.R.] and his
      family for allowing him to be alone, unsupervised, with his girlfriend.
      Zamaniego believed [that B.R.’s] lack of impulse control might increase
      his potential to engage [in] dangerous behavior in the future.

             Zamaniego also testified about [B.R.’s] lack of complete
      truthfulness and honesty during his counseling sessions. Zamaniego and
      [B.R.] eventually worked through that problem.

             [B.R.] testified [that] he believed [that] he should not have to
      register as a sex offender. He believed registration would hurt him and
      his parents.

              In addressing his arrest for public lewdness,[4] [B.R.] characterized
      his girlfriend as being the sexually aggressive partner. He claimed [that]
      he merely lost control and was persuaded by his girlfriend to engage in
      sexual intercourse once they “became unsupervised” at the park.
      Intercourse was not his idea; he merely followed his girlfriend’s lead—
      according to his testimony[.]

             Elsewhere in his testimony [B.R.] similarly minimized his
      culpability for the events that [had] led to his unsuccessful discharge
      from sex[-]offender counseling. He portrayed himself as a victim of a
      fellow student’s prank when he unknowingly accepted a marijuana-laced
      brownie from a fellow student on the date of his last sex[-]offender

      B.R. testified that the case was dismissed after he completed twenty-four hours
      4

of community service. A copy of the dismissal order is included in the record.

                                           11
counseling session. He told the court, “I was offered a brownie and
didn’t know it was laced.” He asserted [that] he [had] only accepted the
brownie from the student—whom [B.R.] could not fully name—because
he had not [eaten] breakfast that morning and was very hungry.

[Juvenile] Court’s Findings

        The [c]ourt’s jurisdiction to rule upon the State’s [m]otion [t]o
[r]egister did not expire when [B.R.] turned eighteen. See . . . R.A., 465
S.W.3d at 736.

       [B.R.’s] repeated efforts at minimizing his culpability for the
events that led to his unsuccessful discharge from treatment leads the
court to believe [that B.R.] is not a credible witness. Despite years of
counseling, [B.R.] still lacks impulse control. He continues to engage in
sexually risky behavior. His therapist provided compelling testimony
suggesting [that] she believes he may reoffend.

       [B.R.] admitted to having continued unsupervised access to the
internet through online gaming consoles, a fact [that] only came to light
during the court’s questioning of [B.R.] His testimony suggested such
unfettered, unsupervised access [had] occurred before he turned
eighteen, in violation of his conditions of probation.

       The evidence showed [that B.R.] did not successfully complete
sex[-]offender treatment. He was unsuccessfully discharged from
multiple treatment programs[] and fully completed none.

       Accordingly, the court finds [that] the evidence does not support
a ruling favorable to [B.R.] The protection of the public would be
increased by requiring [B.R.] to register under Chapter 62. Any potential
increase in protection of the public resulting from registration is not
clearly outweighed by any anticipated substantial harm to [B.R.] and/or
his family that would result from registration under Chapter 62. [B.R.]
did not successfully complete the required sex-offender[ ]treatment
program. And the interests of the public require ordering [B.R.] to
register as a sex offender under Chapter 62. Cf. . . . D.K., 589 S.W.3d at
868 (citing . . . Z.P.H., . . . 2014 WL 670203, at *[4] . . . (respondent did
not meet his burden of proof)); In re [M.C.H.], No. 11-14-00330-CV, . . .
2016 WL 4131642, at *4 (Tex. App.—Eastland [July 28,] 2016, no pet.)

                                     12
      (mem. op.) (failure to complete counseling, moderate risk to reoffend
      supported registration order).

             The court hereby orders the respondent to submit to Chapter 62’s
      sex[-]offender registration requirements.

      C.     Analysis

      The juvenile court’s detailed findings, which are supported by the evidence,

reveal that the juvenile court had sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its

discretion and made a reasonable decision based on that evidence. As set forth above,

the juvenile court granted B.R.’s motion to defer sex-offender registration, which

requested that registration be deferred until he had an opportunity to participate in

and successfully complete a sex-offender treatment program. But after spending his

“entire time of probation in treatment,” when it came to what was supposed to be his

last sex-offender counseling session, B.R. tested positive for drugs. Not long after

that incident, he was arrested for public lewdness for having sex with his girlfriend in

the backseat of a vehicle in a park (near a playground) in the middle of the day. Based

on the positive drug test and his arrest for the new sex-related offense, B.R. was

unsuccessfully discharged from sex-offender treatment.           Because B.R. did not

successfully complete treatment, he did not fall within Article 62.352(c)’s presumption

of exemption from sex-offender registration.        Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art.

62.352(c) (“Following successful completion of treatment, the respondent is exempted

from registration . . . unless a hearing under this subchapter is held . . . and the court

determines the interests of the public require registration.” (emphasis added)).

                                           13
       Though the statute does not clearly state whether a hearing is required when

the respondent is unsuccessfully discharged from treatment, the juvenile court

concluded that a hearing was required. At that hearing, B.R. had the burden to show

by a preponderance of the evidence that protection of the public is not increased by

registration or that any potential increase in protection of the public is clearly

outweighed by the anticipated substantial harm to the juvenile and the juvenile’s

family that would result from registration. See Z.P.H., 2014 WL 670203, at *2. B.R.

initially acknowledges this burden in his brief but then argues what the State failed to

prove. The burden, however, did not shift to the State; it was B.R.’s burden, and he

did not carry it.

       Although there was testimony that B.R.’s treatment had gone “very well until

the end,” the latter part of that statement points to why sex-offender registration was

necessary. B.R.’s own testimony revealed that despite having participated in both

group and individual counseling throughout his probation and having been given the

tools that he needed to succeed, he did not use them when he was at the park with his

girlfriend; instead, at the point when they “became unsupervised,” he “lost complete

control of the situation” and “didn’t think the situation thoroughly [sic].” B.R.

reoffended by committing another sex offense at the end of his sex-offender

treatment—treatment that he was required to successfully complete as a condition of

his probation for having been adjudicated delinquent for three prior sex offenses.

                                          14
      B.R.’s lack of impulse control, as demonstrated by the sexual offense at the

park, concerned his probation officer and his counselor. B.R.’s probation officer

believed that someone who has had sexual relations with a child and who

demonstrates poor sexual impulse control is a potential danger to the community.

When asked what sort of danger a person’s lack of impulse control brings to the

community, B.R.’s counselor stated, “Well, when someone with sexual behavior

problems acts on their impulses rather than thinking things through, they tend to put

themselves at a higher risk for being out in the community than somebody who stops

and thinks . . . about the consequences and how it affects other people.” This

constitutes some evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that “[t]he

protection of the public would be increased by requiring [B.R.] to register under

Chapter 62.”

      B.R.’s only attempts to counter this evidence—and thereby show that any

potential increase in protection of the public would be clearly outweighed by the

anticipated substantial harm to him and his family that would result from

registration—were his responses to the following two questions:

      Q. Do you think [sex-offender registration] would hurt you?

               A. Yes.

               Q. Do you think it would hurt your parents as well?

               A. Yes, sir.

                                          15
B.R. did not elaborate on how he would be hurt, nor did he provide testimony that

there would be “substantial harm” to him and his family from the registration. B.R.

thus did not carry his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that any

potential increase in protection of the public is clearly outweighed by the anticipated

substantial harm to the juvenile and the juvenile’s family that would result from

registration. Cf. R.A., 465 S.W.3d at 743–44 (rejecting claim that public safety need

was outweighed by testimony from juvenile’s mother, grandmother, and therapist as

to the mental and emotional harm that registration would cause, as well as impacts on

juvenile’s educational and career prospects).

      B.R. further argues within his second issue that even assuming that

      the evidence was not factually insufficient, the [trial] court erred in its
      application of discretion by failing to properly consider the lack of any
      need for public protection, the presumed harm to B.R. due to the State’s
      late-filed motion to register him as a sex offender, and the “significant
      gaps” and developmental differences identified by the United States
      Supreme Court between juveniles and adults.

B.R. then fleshes out his three arguments, beginning with his argument that “the

evidence did not establish a firm showing that [he] was ‘at risk to relapse’ or ‘at an

increased risk to reoffend’” and that “the juvenile court’s legal conclusion that the

protection of the public would be increased by registration was an abuse of

discretion.” B.R. ignores that this court previously pointed out in D.K. that some

courts have “relied almost exclusively on nonsexual risk factors to justify registration”

and that this court has previously upheld a decision to require registration based in

                                           16
part on an appellant’s repeated failures to “maintain . . . self-control,” his general

downward “spiral[],” and his inability to “safely function in the community.” See 589

S.W.3d at 868 (first citing In re C.G.M., No. 11-12-00031-CV, 2012 WL 2988818, at *3

(Tex. App.—Eastland July 19, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.); and then citing Z.P.H., 2014

WL 670203, at *3). Here, the juvenile court had evidence of both nonsexual risk

factors (B.R.’s probation violations, which included a positive drug test, unsupervised

time with children in the household, and unsupervised time on electronic devices) and

sexual risk factors (his failure to successfully complete treatment and his arrest for

another sexual offense). Additionally, although B.R.’s counselor did not use the exact

terminology of “at risk to relapse” or “at an increased risk to reoffend,” she did state

that someone who has had sexual relations with a child and who demonstrates poor

sexual impulse control is a potential danger to the community.

      B.R. next argues that the juvenile court “entirely failed to account for the

presumed harm that falls to both a juvenile and his family when there is unnecessary,

unexplained delay in the State[’s] filing a motion to require the juvenile’s sex-offender

registration after the juvenile’s 18th birthday.” B.R. cites and quotes R.A. for the

proposition that “as to the delay by the State in moving for a hearing under [A]rticle

62.352(c), ‘the interests of [the juvenile] and of the public are best served by a motion

by the State either during treatment or promptly thereafter.’” 465 S.W.3d at 738. Yet

B.R.’s argument does not make sense in light of the timing of the events here. We are

hard pressed to see how a one-month delay from the time that B.R. committed the

                                           17
new offense (and was thereafter unsuccessfully discharged from treatment) until the

State filed its motion to order registration (which was filed only one week after B.R.’s

eighteenth birthday) constitutes presumed harm to him and to his family.

      B.R.’s third argument, which is included throughout his brief and his reply

brief, contends that the juvenile court was under an obligation to take into account

“significant gaps” between juveniles and adults as identified by the United States

Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 471, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2464 (2012).

Due to such “significant gaps,” B.R. contends that the juvenile court “should have

properly found that [he] was entitled to exemption from sex-offender registration.”

The State responds with a variety of arguments, including the following:

      [B.R.’s] arguments that the juvenile court failed to take [his] juvenile
      status sufficiently into account are inapposite. Had [B.R.] been an adult
      when he committed his sex offenses, he would have been subject to the
      registration requirements of Chapter 62 without exemption. . . .

             ....

             . . . Miller concerned the proper role of the defendant’s age when
      considering punishment. The concerns of Miller were honored in [B.R.’s]
      sexual[-]assault case when he received a juvenile adjudication and
      probation rather than a criminal conviction and prison sentence. In
      contrast, the sex[-]offender registration scheme of Chapter 62 is civil and
      remedial, not criminal or punitive.

In addition, we note that B.R. does not make any argument showing how Miller

helped him meet his burden of proof; instead, he implies that his status as a

juvenile—and the inherent mental and emotional deficiencies that lie therein—should

exempt him from sex-offender registration. This conclusion belies the language of

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Article 62.352 and would make such statute a nullity. B.R., however, raises no

arguments attacking the statute.

      B.R. raises two additional arguments in his reply brief. B.R. states that his

delinquent conduct could only have been based on his having had consensual sex with

a female who, like him, was also younger than fourteen years of age. B.R. attempts to

couch the underlying sexual offenses as “the scenario where two children engaged in

consensual sexual conduct.” A child under fourteen, however, may not consent to

sex. See May v. State, 919 S.W.2d 422, 424 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (stating that a child

under fourteen cannot legally consent to sex and that alleged consent of a victim who

is under fourteen is therefore not an available defense); see also State v. R.R.S., 597

S.W.3d 835, 842–43 (Tex. 2020) (explaining that juvenile’s legal inability to consent to

sex does not render him illegally incapable of committing the offense of aggravated

sexual assault). Moreover, B.R. may not collaterally attack the underlying probation

order here; the only order on appeal is the sex-offender registration order.

      Finally, in his reply brief, B.R. responds to the argument in the State’s brief that

this court should assign no weight to his testimony (regarding the reoffense of public

lewdness in the public park with an adult girlfriend who initiated the sex act) because

B.R. provided the sole testimony regarding the details of the act and because the

juvenile court found that his testimony lacked credibility. The State’s argument was

limited to a portion of B.R.’s testimony—regarding the new sex offense that led to his

unsuccessful discharge from treatment—that the juvenile court found lacked

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credibility. B.R. urges this court to “construe any possible credibility determination as

relating only to [his] testimony ‘minimizing his culpability’ for acts prior to his

discharge from treatment and should not apply any such determination to [his]

testimony more broadly than that narrow subset of subject matter.” He contends that

his testimony that he and his family would be harmed by an order requiring him to

register as a sex offender should still be afforded weight by this court. Even affording

weight to B.R.’s testimony about harm, such testimony, as discussed above, did not

overcome his burden to show by a preponderance of the evidence that any potential

increase in protection of the public is clearly outweighed by the anticipated substantial

harm to him and his family that would result from registration.

       In light of the evidence and the juvenile court’s findings based on that

evidence, we hold that the juvenile court had sufficient information upon which to

exercise its discretion and that the court acted in careful observance of guiding rules

and principles. See M.C.H., 2016 WL 4131642, at *4; Z.P.H., 2014 WL 670203, at *4.

Accordingly, we overrule B.R.’s second issue.

                                     V. Conclusion

       Having overruled B.R.’s two issues, we affirm the juvenile court’s order

requiring B.R. to register as a sex offender.

                                                      /s/ Dabney Bassel
                                                      Dabney Bassel
                                                      Justice

Delivered: June 1, 2023

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