Court Opinion

ID: 9749506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:48:02.474148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:50.524437
License: Public Domain

POLLOCK, J.,
dissenting.
The primary issue on this appeal is whether plaintiffs’ action for medical malpractice is barred by the relevant statute of limitations, N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2. That issue can be understood only in the factual context of the case. In a complaint filed on January 30,1976 (Zaccardi I), Anthony Zaccardi alleged that he consulted the defendant doctors on March 17, 1974, at which time the doctors negligently recommended unnecessary treatment and failed to inform him of the possible consequences of that treatment. The complaint alleged further that Mr. Zaccardi was unable to make an informed judgment as to the need for or advisability of the treatment. As required by R. 1:4-8, plaintiffs’ counsel signed the complaint, thereby certifying that there was “good ground” to support the allegations. Plaintiffs’ counsel has since conceded that, at the time he filed the complaint in Zaccardi I, he did not have a medical report and did not know whether there was any basis for the action.
Plaintiffs’ counsel admitted he “deliberately withheld” service of the complaint for several months while trying to determine the basis for the claim. That practice violates the spirit, as well as the letter, of R. 4:4-1, which provides that an action may be dismissed “[i]f a summons is not issued within 10 days after the filing of the complaint. ... ” Plaintiffs’ counsel has acknowledged that he knew from the outset he was obliged to make timely service of the complaint. At oral argument, he stated he finally served the complaint because otherwise he knew he would “be in trouble for not serving it.”
On April 21, 1976, defendants filed and served their answers, together with interrogatories requesting a copy of the reports of any medical experts. In May of 1976, plaintiffs’ counsel obtained from a Dr. Kaplan a report in which, according to plaintiffs’ *265appellate division brief, “[t]here does not appear any specific allegation of act [sic] of negligence or malpractice.” Plaintiffs’ counsel did not provide defense counsel with a copy of Dr. Kaplan’s report, but sought to find another expert. In the meantime, after repeated written demands for answers to interrogatories, defense counsel filed an ex parte motion to dismiss the complaint, and the complaint was dismissed on July 28,1976.
By that time, the two-year period of limitations contained in N.J.S.A. 2A:14-2 had expired. Accepting as true the allegations of the complaint, the statute of limitations would have run in March of 1976, two years after the negligent consultation described in the complaint. Even accepting plaintiffs’ later claim that it was a surgical procedure in April of 1974 that was the relevant act of malpractice, the statute would have expired in April of 1976.
Nevertheless, between July 28, 1976 and December, 1977, due apparently to a computer error, the case was listed for trial on eight occasions. On each of those eight dates, plaintiffs’ counsel appeared and requested an adjournment on the grounds that discovery was not complete. Plaintiffs’ counsel knew there was an outstanding order of dismissal that, under R. 4:23-5(a), could not be vacated after the passage of 30 days, but failed to advise the trial court because he “was happy to see the case coming up on the trial list.” At oral argument, defense counsel advised us he had nothing in his records to indicate that his firm received copies of the trial notices. Further, defense counsel said he never personally consented to the adjournments and he was not aware that any other lawyer from his office consented. Indeed, defense counsel stated that he had informed plaintiffs’ counsel that “[t]he case was over” and that he would not submit the defendant doctors for depositions.
Finally, in December, 1977, plaintiffs’ counsel received a favorable medical report from a Dr. Howard that spoke in terms of negligence and malpractice, as well as lack of informed consent. Armed with this report, plaintiffs’ counsel brought a *266motion to reinstate the complaint, a motion granted reluctantly by the trial court. On appeal, however, the Appellate Division in Zaccardi I found that the actions of plaintiffs’ counsel in circumventing the rules of court had been “deliberate and inexcusable” and, therefore, reversed the trial court and dismissed the complaint. Zaccardi v. Becker, 162 N.J.Super. 329, 333 (1978).
On October 16, 1978, plaintiffs' counsel filed a petition for certification with this Court. In the petition, counsel acknowledged that plaintiffs’ claim “is probably permanently barred by the Statute of Limitations....”1 In November, without advising this Court, plaintiffs filed the complaint in Zaccardi II. On December 19, 1978, this Court denied the petition for certification in Zaccardi I. 79 N.J. 464 (1978).
Thereafter the trial court, on April 29, 1979, dismissed the complaint in Zaccardi II, which was identical to the complaint in Zaccardi I. That court based its decision on the alternative grounds that Zaccardi I had been dismissed with prejudice or that the statute of limitations had run. The Appellate Division affirmed on October 1, 1980 on the single ground that the dismissal in Zaccardi I was with prejudice. The majority of this Court now concludes, however, that the dismissal was without prejudice. In my opinion, whether the dismissal in Zaccardi I was with or without prejudice is irrelevant because the statute of limitations bars the action in Zaccardi II.
The effect of the majority opinion is to deprive the defendants of the defense of the statute of limitations because the majority finds, on balance, that the equities weigh more heavily in favor of the plaintiffs. In balancing the equities, however, the majori*267ty emphasizes unduly the mere inaction of defense counsel while deemphasizing the deliberate misconduct of plaintiffs’ counsel.
On one hand, the majority finds that defense counsel somehow “acquiesced” in the “inordinate delay” by plaintiffs’ counsel in moving to vacate the dismissal. Ante at 254. It finds “acquiescence” because defense counsel had notice of the adjournments and “contributed to the delay” by failing to object, ante at 255, and by failing to notify the trial court that the ease was dismissed. Ante at 257. Defense counsel, however, represented at oral argument that he had told plaintiffs’ counsel he would not produce the doctors for depositions because “the case was over,” that he had no record of receiving any trial notices, and that he had not consented to any adjournments.
By contrast, plaintiffs’ counsel conceded at oral argument that he knew the case had been dismissed, that he deliberately failed to inform the trial court of the dismissal and that he was actively misrepresenting the status of the case by asking for adjournments. Furthermore, while he initially asserted that defense counsel had consented to the adjournments, he ended by admitting that, perhaps, counsel simply had not been present. This course of conduct, the majority agrees, is “highly improper.” Ante at 254.
Somehow the majority transmutes this “highly improper” conduct of plaintiffs’ counsel into “[ejquitable considerations” that, when balanced against the inaction of defense counsel, warrant erasure of the defense of the statute of limitations. I am unable to join in that reasoning.
My reservations are underscored, moreover, by the ready distinction of the present case from the cases upon which the majority relies. In those cases, the party equitably estopped from claiming the protection of the statute of limitations had actively contributed to the delay of the opposing party in bringing suit: e.g., State v. United States Steel Corp., 22 N.J. 341 (1956) (defendant, which had breached its duty to report to the State the existence of unpaid wages, was equitably estopped *268from pleading statute of limitations as bar to escheat action); Friedman v. Friendly Ice Cream Co., 133 N.J.Super. 333 (App.Div.1975) (summary judgment for defendant reversed where there was question of fact whether insurer admitted liability, made settlement offer and intentionally protracted negotiations so statute of limitations could run against plaintiffs’ claim). The acts of misrepresentation by defendants in those cases justified estopping them from pleading a time bar. See Carlsen v. Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan Trust, 80 N.J. 334, 339 (1979).
Here, however, defendants did not conceal or misrepresent any material fact. Plaintiffs’ counsel was well aware of the dismissal and knew defense counsel believed “the case was over.” It is doubtful that defense counsel ever received the erroneous trial notices and, in any event, plaintiffs’ counsel did not rely on the silence of defense counsel. This is not a case in which defendants or their counsel deceived or misled plaintiffs or their counsel. Rather, it is a case in which the majority’s misperception of equitable considerations gives rise to an inequitable result.
Two years ago, knowing that the statute of limitations would probably bar a second action, this Court declined to review the dismissal of the complaint in Zaccardi I. In effect, the Court has now reversed itself. This result stems from a belated concern that dismissal of the complaint in Zaccardi II will deprive plaintiffs of their opportunity to prove medical malpractice. On the facts of this case, however, that understandable concern should yield to the underlying purposes of the statute of limitations: to induce litigants to pursue their claims diligently and to spare courts and parties from litigating stale claims. As the Court has recently written, “[Ojnce memories fade, witnesses become unavailable, and evidence is lost, courts no longer possess the capacity to distinguish valid claims from those which are frivolous or vexatious.” Galligan v. Westfield Centre Service, Inc., 82 N.J. 188, 192 (1980).
*269Through no fault of the defendant doctors, they and their witnesses will be called upon to testify in 1982 about events that took place in 1974. The prejudicial effect of the passage of eight years on the recollection of witnesses is apparent. A belief that plaintiffs have a valid medical malpractice claim need not leave them remediless. Where “highly improper” conduct of counsel results in a time bar to an otherwise meritorious claim, plaintiffs’ remedy may sound in an action for legal, not medical, malpractice. The untoward implication of the majority decision is that “deliberate and inexcusable” misconduct of a plaintiff’s counsel becomes a reason for subjecting a defendant to stale claims. In the aggravated facts of this case, the further implication is that parties can no longer rely on the statute of limitations or on the decisions of this Court. Stability in judicial, as well as human, affairs should lead to affirmance of the decision of the Appellate Division.
SCHREIBER, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices PASHMAN, SCHREIBER, HANDLER and O’HERN— 5.
For affirmance — Justice POLLOCK — 1.

The second of two questions involved in the petition for certification in Zaccardi I was “Did the Appellate Division err in failing to consider that plaintiffs’ meritorious claim in this case is probably permanently barred by the Statute of Limitations notwithstanding the fact that there is no evidence of any prejudice to the defendants or the real party in interest, their insurance carrier?”