Court Opinion

ID: 9948462
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 13:02:47.081734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:42.946066
License: Public Domain

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              O’SULLIVAN v. HAUGHT—DISSENT

   D’AURIA, J., with whom MULLINS, J., joins, dis-
senting. The judgments of the Appellate Court and the
majority of this court take different routes, but both
arrive at the virtually identical destination: the tortious
interference claim brought by the plaintiff, David O’Sul-
livan, in the third count of his complaint is permitted
to go forward. I agree with the outcome. It is a fair
question to ask, then, why I would bother to dissent
from the majority’s holding. My reasons are twofold,
and both, I believe, are important to the proper function-
ing of our appellate system beyond this case. The first
involves the determination (almost always made in the
Appellate Court in the first instance) of whether other-
wise interlocutory appeals qualify as ‘‘final judgments,’’
specifically, whether a prompt decision can be made
that there is or is not a final judgment and, therefore,
whether the appeal must be dismissed for lack of appel-
late jurisdiction or whether the appeal will advance to
merits briefing, oral argument, and a considered opin-
ion. In my view, the Appellate Court properly dismissed
the appeal by the defendant, Alan F. Haught, for failing
to raise a colorable claim of a final judgment for the
same reason the majority rejects the defendant’s collat-
eral estoppel claim on the merits: the Probate Court
decree was not final and binding. I am also concerned
with the majority’s invocation of this court’s supervi-
sory authority over the administration of justice to
address the defendant’s appeal on its merits because
the plaintiff failed to properly present the issue for our
determination, and neither party was given an opportu-
nity to specifically brief that issue.
   To recap, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment on the third count of the plain-
tiff’s complaint, concluding that the doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel did not apply because
the plaintiff did not have an adequate opportunity to
fully litigate his interference with an expected inheri-
tance claim in the prior Probate Court proceeding. The
defendant appealed from that ruling. The plaintiff
moved to dismiss the defendant’s appeal for lack of a
final judgment, and the Appellate Court, without opin-
ion,1 granted the motion and dismissed the appeal.
   Upon our grant of certification, a majority of this
court today reverses the Appellate Court’s judgment of
dismissal because ‘‘a trial court’s denial of a summary
judgment motion based on a colorable claim of collat-
eral estoppel is an immediately appealable final judg-
ment.’’2 Applying this standard, the majority holds that
the defendant’s appeal raises a ‘‘colorable claim’’ that
‘‘the issue of undue influence in the plaintiff’s tortious
interference with an expected inheritance claim was
fully and fairly litigated in the will contest proceeding
before the Probate Court, and that there was an identity
of the issues between the two proceedings,’’ and, there-
fore, there was a final judgment for purposes of appeal.3
See, e.g., Convalescent Center of Bloomfield, Inc. v.
Dept. of Income Maintenance, 208 Conn. 187, 194–95,
544 A.2d 604 (1988); see also Santorso v. Bristol Hospi-
tal, 308 Conn. 338, 346 n.7, 63 A.3d 940 (2013).
   Instead of simply reversing the Appellate Court’s
judgment of dismissal and directing that, on remand,
the appeal proceed to briefing and argument on the
merits in that court, the majority invokes this court’s
supervisory authority and, in the name of ‘‘judicial econ-
omy,’’ cuts to the chase, reaches the merits and disposes
of the defendant’s collateral estoppel defense. Specifi-
cally, the majority holds that, although the defendant’s
appeal raised a ‘‘colorable’’ claim that the Appellate
Court had jurisdiction over his appeal, because, gener-
ally, we have held that rulings denying the application
of res judicata or collateral estoppel are immediately
appealable, the appeal ultimately lacks merit because,
like the federal courts, we have held ‘‘that an appeal that
is conducted as a trial de novo suspends the preclusive
effect of the underlying judgment,’’ and, therefore, a
Probate Court decree ‘‘should not be accorded outcome
determinative, preclusive effect in different litigation
while that appeal is pending.’’ Barash v. Lembo, 348
Conn. 264, 279, 284, 303 A.3d 577 (2023).
   I appreciate the salutary efforts of the majority, hav-
ing decided that the Appellate Court indeed had jurisdic-
tion over the appeal, to resolve this appeal with a modicum
of dispatch because, while the defendant has pursued
this appeal, the plaintiff’s case on the merits of his third
count awaits trial. Nonetheless, my disagreement with
the way the majority has resolved this certified appeal
is twofold.
   First, I would credit the Appellate Court with know-
ing full well that, in general, a trial court’s denial of a
summary judgment motion based on a colorable claim
of collateral estoppel is an immediately appealable final
judgment. See footnote 2 of this opinion; see also Light-
house Landings, Inc. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co.,
300 Conn. 325, 328 n.3, 15 A.3d 601 (2011); Convalescent
Center of Bloomfield, Inc. v. Dept. of Income Mainte-
nance, supra, 208 Conn. 194. I assume that the Appellate
Court was drawing a different conclusion about the
defendant’s appeal, something other than the proposi-
tion from Convalescent Center of Bloomfield, Inc. Spe-
cifically, I would also credit the Appellate Court with
knowing full well that black letter law requires that the
preclusive effect of the doctrine of collateral estoppel
applies only to final, valid judgments. See, e.g., Indepen-
dent Party of CT—State Central v. Merrill, 330 Conn.
681, 714–15, 200 A.3d 1118 (2019). Although the majority
in the present case relies heavily on our recent decision
in Barash for its conclusion, the principle we applied
in that case (that, because the Probate Court ruling was
subject to a de novo appeal, there was no finality of
judgment) is not a concept so new or extraordinary
that the Appellate Court could not have easily relied
on it for its determination to dismiss the appeal. There-
fore, for the same reasons that the majority holds that
the defendant’s appeal in this case fails on the merits,
I would conclude that the defendant’s appeal fails to
raise a colorable claim of a final judgment. I am rather
confident that is the reason the Appellate Court dis-
missed the defendant’s appeal. If I am mistaken about
that having been the court’s basis for dismissing the
appeal, I would nonetheless affirm the judgment of dis-
missal. See Alves v. Giegler, 348 Conn. 364, 394, 306
A.3d 455 (2024); Connecticut Dermatology Group, P.C.
v. Twin City Fire Ins. Co., 346 Conn. 33, 40–41, 288
A.3d 187 (2023).
   Second, even if I agreed that the Appellate Court
erroneously dismissed the defendant’s appeal, I would
resist the temptation to invoke our supervisory author-
ity to resolve the merits of that appeal, as the majority
does in the present case, even though the rationale for
doing so appears obvious to us. ‘‘ ‘The exercise of our
supervisory powers is an extraordinary remedy’ ’’; In
re Ivory W., 342 Conn. 692, 734, 271 A.3d 633 (2022);
that we invoke ‘‘only in the rare circumstance [in which]
. . . traditional protections are inadequate to ensure
the fair and just administration of the courts.’’ (Internal
quotation marks omitted.) In re Aisjaha N., 343 Conn.
709, 724, 275 A.3d 1181 (2022). Several reasons convince
me that this is not a case in which I would use our
sparingly employed supervisory authority to reach an
issue not otherwise before the court.
   Primarily, upon our grant of certification, the plaintiff
could have put the merits issue before us properly by
filing a statement of alternative grounds for affirmance
under Practice Book § 84-11 (b) and then have briefed
the merits (i.e., the nonjurisdictional question). More-
over, because the plaintiff did not present the question
as he should have, I am not as confident as the majority,
which cites Finan v. Finan, 287 Conn. 491, 949 A.2d
468 (2008), and indicates that the defendant will not be
prejudiced by the majority’s resolution of the appeal
‘‘[b]ecause both parties have briefed the issue and it
was addressed at oral argument before this court
. . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 498. In
fact, the defendant’s counsel mentioned several times
at oral argument that, if we were inclined to reverse
the Appellate Court’s judgment of dismissal and reach
the merits, he would be eager to submit a brief on the
merits. Only under circumstances in which no party is
prejudiced should we invoke our supervisory authority
in such a way. See id. (court can exercise discretion to
consider question outside scope of certified question
only if both sides have had opportunity to brief issue);
see also Blumberg Associates Worldwide, Inc. v.
Brown & Brown of Connecticut, Inc., 311 Conn. 123,
162, 84 A.3d 840 (2014); State v. Benjamin, 299 Conn.
223, 232, 9 A.3d 338 (2010). Finally, even if I were not
concerned about whether it is appropriate to exercise
our supervisory authority to reach the merits in the
present case, I am concerned about arguably similar
cases in which we do not exercise our supervisory
authority to reach alternative issues that we have not
certified or that a party has not briefed. See, e.g., Smith
v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928, 930, 293 A.3d 851 (2023)
(‘‘[b]ecause the defendants’ appeal presents such a col-
orable claim, we transfer the appeal back to the Appel-
late Court for further proceedings according to law’’);
Diaz v. Commissioner of Correction, 335 Conn. 53,
60–61, 225 A.3d 953 (2020) (remanding case to Appellate
Court so that it may decide, following briefing by par-
ties, how best to proceed). Although it is not apparent
whether we have an established standard for when we
should be reaching and resolving issues instead of
remanding the case to the Appellate Court for resolu-
tion, it is obvious to me that the Appellate Court is the
best venue for the resolution of the merits of this appeal.
  Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would affirm
the Appellate Court’s judgment.
  1
     The Appellate Court’s order simply provided: ‘‘Granted.’’ It is worth
noting that the plaintiff based his motion to dismiss on a different ground
(identity of issues) than both I and the majority address here (final and
binding judgment). It is to me very doubtful that the Appellate Court dis-
missed the appeal on the identity of issues ground because, as the majority
correctly concludes, it is clear that there was an identity of issues between
the two proceedings. Rather, as I will discuss, my confidence is high that
the Appellate Court dismissed the appeal for lack of a final judgment based
on a correct application of our law that the Probate Court decree lacked
sufficient finality to make it preclusive for purposes of collateral estoppel.
Understanding fully that the Appellate Court, as the ‘‘ ‘workhorse’ ’’ of our
appellate system; Georges v. OB-GYN Services, P.C., 335 Conn. 669, 701,
240 A.3d 249 (2020) (D’Auria, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
disposes of hundreds upon hundreds of motions each year, while this court
rules on only a fraction of that number, providing a brief explanation of the
Appellate Court’s rationale—even a sentence or two, or even simply a case
citation—can go a long way toward dispelling any uncertainty about the
basis for the Appellate Court’s action, perhaps obviating the need for any
appeal to or review by this court.
   2
     Although we require a ground of appeal to be ‘‘colorable’’ for appellate
jurisdiction to attach in other types of interlocutory appeals; see, e.g., Smith
v. Supple, 346 Conn. 928, 929–30, 293 A.3d 851 (2023) (special motion to
dismiss pursuant General Statutes § 52-196a); Markatos v. Zoning Board of
Appeals, 346 Conn. 277, 283 and n.6, 288 A.3d 1024 (2023) (denial of motion
to intervene); Dorfman v. Smith, 342 Conn. 582, 594, 271 A.3d 53 (2022)
(immunity); State v. Bornstein, 196 Conn. App. 420, 426, 229 A.3d 1097
(2020) (double jeopardy); I am not aware of any cases applying this standard
in the collateral estoppel context, but I accept the majority’s determination
to apply it in the present case.
   3
     Although it is indeed well established law in this court, it is not well
established in the federal courts that a ruling denying the application of
res judicata or collateral estoppel is immediately appealable. See Strazza
Building & Construction, Inc. v. Harris, 346 Conn. 205, 211 n.2, 288 A.3d
1017 (2023).