Court Opinion

ID: 9771261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:38:13.737367+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:27.831773
License: Public Domain

SEERDEN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The central question to be decided in this case is whether the information furnished by appellants to the investigators on December 17,1986 and later supplemented at the State’s request, maliciously caused or contributed to the *956indictment of Kenneth Lieck. I would hold that it did not.
It is undisputed that the Texas Rangers and the Cameron County District Attorney’s Office were investigating the Brownsville officials prior to the December 17th meeting. It is also undisputed that the December 17th meeting was initiated at the request of appellants to furnish information regarding the privatization of the Brownsville waste system. There is also no question that this privatization was a long process that unexpectedly did not turn out in appellants’ favor.
The only reference to Lieck in Meszaros’ statement of December 17th is reflected in the second page, where it is stated:
I would like also to mention that while we were negotiating the contract with the City of Brownsville, we worked long hours on the proposals because of the request from the city manager, Kenneth Leick [sic] to meet various deadlines. The contract of B.F.I. was solely to be used by the City of Brownsville for their own use in reaching an agreement on the contract between B.F.I. and the City of Brownsville and nobody else.
The indictment of Lieck charged: on or about April 7, 1986 ... [Lieck] ... unlawfully and knowingly distributed to Robert Torres confidential information in the custody of the City Commission of the City of Brownsville which, if released, would give advantage to competitors and bidders, said information being the content of a Contractor’s Proposal for Solid Waste Collection and Disposal submitted to the City of Brownsville by Browning-Ferris Industries.
Appellees base their claim against appellants on Meszaros’ statement that their proposals were to be used solely by the city in reaching an agreement with B.F.I. and no one else. What appellees did not establish, and what the majority fails to recognize, is that there is no evidence appellants were accusing Lieck of a crime by this statement. The majority concedes that it is not clear which penal statute was violated. Every act of official misconduct, if any, is not necessarily a crime. Appellees never proved which criminal statute appellants accused Lieck of violating. The majority concedes it cannot tell what law appellants accused appellee of violating. At trial, Meszaros’ testimony was to the effect that he did not believe Lieck had committed a crime.
Mosbacker testified that he alone reached the legal opinion that Lieck had violated the law, that he decided to seek the indictment, and that the information that B.F.I. had disseminated the form of the contract did not change his opinion that there' was probable cause that the law had been violated. Many people gave information during the investigation. No one pressured him to seek Lieck’s indictment. He had the minutes of the city meetings, statements of commissioners Lackner and McNair, and information from Hodge, Hodge’s secretary, and Torres. It is their statements that give the facts upon which the indictment is based. McNair’s affidavit states in part:
All during the negotiations, I felt that B.F.I.’s proposals were being given to the representatives of G.M.S. I thought this because when we started the process of receiving the proposals, B.F.I.’s and G.M.S.’s were like night and day — what each company was offering was quite different. But as the process continued, G.M.S.’s proposals were getting more and more similar to those of B.F.I.’s. It seemed to me that every time the City Manager, Ken Lieck, passed out the proposals, a copy of B.F.I.’s ended up in the hands of G.M.S.’s people.
And sinee Ken was the only person dealing with the garbage companies and the only person passing the proposals on to the City Commission, I became suspicious. I believed that if proposals were being unfairly exchanged during the negotiations, the City was not going to receive the best deal because the true process of bettering the competition by adding your own company’s trade secrets (rates, disposal fee, free services, insurances, type of equipment, purchase price, etc.) would not be kept confidential. Since I was new in politics (elected *957in November 1985), I did not know that it was illegal to exchange proposals, but I did know that if you wanted to get the best deal, and do what was best for Brownsville, you don’t hand the competition the proposals of the other companies which are also making proposals. And Ken had told me that proposals were not public information until the actual contract was awarded.
Lackner’s affidavit recounting each stage of the proposal process states at each stage that all information was to remain confidential and not public until accepted. Mosbacker said he presented the matter to the grand jury and recommended the return of the true bill.
District Attorney Ben Euresti testified that Mosbacker was responsible for presenting cases, including this one, to the grand jury. The decision on whether the substance of the allegations was sufficient to present to the grand jury was between the Rangers and Mosbacker. Neither Mes-zaros nor other B.F.I. employees would be involved in that decision. After an investigation, the district attorney’s office had the duty to decide whether to seek an indictment. The district attorney’s office did not rely on B.F.I. or on others to tell it when the law was transgressed.
In a ease of malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant knowingly provided false information, or that he did not actually believe what he told authorities. See Coniglio v. Snyder, 756 S.W.2d 743, 744 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 653, comment (g) (1977), quoted favorably in Thomas v. Cisneros, 596 S.W.2d 313, 317 (Tex.Civ.App.—Austin 1980, writ ref’d n.r.e.) states in relevant part:
In order to charge a private person with responsibility for the initiation of proceedings by a public official, it must therefore appear that his desire to have the proceedings initiated, expressed by direction, request or pressure of any kind, was the determining factor in the official’s decision to commence the prosecution, or that the information furnished by him upon which the official acted was known to be false. (Emphasis added).
Even under the definition of “probable cause” submitted to the jury with Question 1, there was no evidence to show that B.F.I. and Meszaros wanted to have Lieck indicted. I would hold there is no evidence that appellants caused or contributed to the cause of the indictment.
By points twelve through fifteen, appellants complain of the definition of “probable cause” in Question 1 and of the trial court’s failure to properly instruct the jury about “full and fair disclosure” on appellants’ part. The trial court refused appellants’ requested definition, “[pjrobable cause is such facts and circumstances as would excite belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of Mervyn Mosbacker, that Kenneth Lieck was guilty of the misdemeanor for which he was indicted.” It also refused to submit, “You are hereby instructed that a person cooperating or aiding in an investigation does so upon probable cause if that person, in good faith, makes a full and fair statement of the facts to the investigator, and the prosecuting attorney thereafter commences the criminal proceeding.”
The definition of “probable cause” the trial court submitted is essentially the same as that used in Akin v. Dahl, 661 S.W.2d 917, 921 (Tex.1983) and Ramsey v. Arrott, 64 Tex. 320, 323 (1885). Appellants suggest that we distinguish the Akin line of cases because in those cases the parties being sued actually brought the formal complaint, while in this case, appellants did not formally bring a complaint, but furnished information to law enforcement officers, who acted independently and used their own discretion in bringing formal charges.2 They further argue that in this *958situation, the probable cause standard should be different. They contend that when one actually brings a criminal charge, the test of “belief in a reasonable mind, acting on facts within his knowledge, that the person is guilty of the criminal conduct for which he is charged” is appropriate, but that the principles in Thomas govern this case.
In Thomas, 596 S.W.2d at 315, Cisneros was a State Board of Insurance employee and coincidentally, a member of the Travis County Grand Jury. A fellow employee, Thomas,3 said in conversing about Cisne-ros’ grand jury service, “Well, I hope you are not after the chairman, you might not be here the next day.” The comment referred to an investigation of a particular insurance company and its regulation by the Board of Insurance. Cisneros told the grand jury foreman about the remark. Later, the District Attorney asked Cisneros about it. Although Cisneros refused to sign a complaint, Thomas was charged with “retaliation.” After the charge was dismissed, Thomas sued Cisneros for malicious prosecution.
In affirming the summary judgment for Cisneros, the Court stated:
Because we deem the element of causation to be determinative of this ease, we will discuss only this issue. This element of malicious prosecution requires that the criminal prosecution can be caused by the defendant or through the defendant’s aid or cooperation [citations omitted]. It is not necessary for the defendant to have signed the complaint or to have communicated the subject matter to the person who did if the making of the statement proximately caused the prosecution that followed [citations omitted]. However, it is a corollary to this rule that ... if the defendant stated the facts fully and fairly to the District Attorney ... and such officer determines that such facts constitute a crime and proceeds to formulate the necessary papers to set the prosecution in motion, the ... defendant is not liable in an action for malicious prosecution, since, if there is any fault, it is not the defendant’s, (emphasis added).
Thomas, 596 S.W.2d at 316-17.
Thus, when a person charged with malicious prosecution directly brings the formal criminal complaint, a definition of “probable cause” like the one in this case would be proper. See Akin, 661 S.W.2d at 921. However, if the indictment is caused indirectly through the aid or cooperation of the person charged with malicious prosecution, that person is not liable if he has made a full and fair disclosure of the facts to the prosecuting authorities.4 See Thomas, 596 S.W.2d at 317.
In discussing probable cause, this Court observed in Coniglio, 756 S.W.2d at 744:
A prosecuting party who files a criminal complaint does so upon probable cause where, in good faith, he makes a full and fair disclosure of the facts and circumstances known to him at the time. Unless a person fairly discloses informa*959tion to a prosecuting attorney, in good faith, probable cause does not exist. Probable cause has been defined as a state of mind in which the facts are regarded from the point of view of the prosecuting party. The question is not what the actual facts were, but what he honestly believed them to be. [Cites omitted].
The definition of probable cause in this case erroneously required the jury to focus on what Meszaros reasonably believed rather than on what he actually believed, regardless of the truth.
In addition, the charge does not adequately address the principle of full and fair disclosure. Lieck had the burden to show that appellants failed to make a full and fair disclosure of the facts and circumstances known to them. Coniglio, 756 S.W.2d at 747; Terk v. Deaton, 555 S.W.2d 154, 155 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1977, no writ). The definition of probable cause submitted in this case does not include the element of full and fair disclosure. Rather, the explanation of probable cause asks only whether the facts and circumstances would cause belief in a reasonable mind that Lieck was guilty of the conduct for which he was prosecuted, whereas, if a full and fair disclosure was made, probable cause should exist if the facts and circumstances caused actual belief in the person reciting them.
Although the jury found in response to Question 2 that Meszaros failed to make a full and fair disclosure to the investigating officers, this did not amount to a finding that he knowingly provided false information, or that he did not actually believe what he told them.
In light of the facts before the jury, appellants’ objections to the charge and requests for additional instructions, I would hold that the definition of probable cause was insufficient and erroneous. Under the correct law, no evidence supports the result. These errors caused the rendition of an improper judgment within the meaning of Tex.R.App.P. 81(b)(1). I would sustain points one, two, four, five, nine, and twelve through fifteen, reverse the trial court’s judgment, and render judgment that appellees take nothing.
KENNEDY and DORSEY, JJ., join in this dissent.

. We distinguish Davis v. City of San Antonio, 752 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Tex.1988), factually and legally. The majority claims Davis authorizes the jury charge language "caused, aided, or contributed to the criminal prosecution” as the correct standard; however, in Davis, the causation standard given the jury was not at issue. Moreover, the facts in the opinion do not show that any person or entity other than the City (by and through its parks director) initiated any investí-*958gation or proceedings against Davis. See Davis, 752 S.W.2d at 522. Davis is not a case in which the City volunteered information in an ongoing investigation which encompassed employee Davis.

. The majority (at 938) refers to Thomas as "the office jokester.” My reading of the case does not indicate whether the comment was made in jest or whether Thomas made humorous remarks on other occasions.

. Public policy requires citizens to feel free to furnish information about possible illegal activities to law enforcement authorities. See Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Ortiz, 753 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, writ denied). The testimony of Cantu, Euresti, and Mosbacker illustrate the policy grounds for making it difficult to prosecute a witness for his testimony to a grand jury, and illustrate different approaches to the role of the grand jury.
Reynaldo Cantu, former Brownsville City Attorney, former District Attorney, and former special prosecutor, testified that it is malpractice for an attorney to allow his client to testify before a grand jury. He said this is because the client is questioned without his attorney and can be prosecuted for aggravated perjury if he misstates or forgets something. When asked if he ever asked a grand jury to indict someone without a thorough investigation, he replied that "the norm in these counties is that you don't have a particularly thorough investigation. You have enough to meet the elements of the offense, and then you proceed from there.”