Court Opinion

ID: 9615185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:32:22.646661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:42.665410
License: Public Domain

GRUENDER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I do not agree with the Court’s conclusions that the district court abused its discretion in dismissing this case and that the case should be reassigned on remand, I respectfully dissent.
Initially, I agree with the Court that the Plaintiffs’ motion for recusal was untimely. See Tri-State Fin., LLC v. Lovald, 525 F.3d 649, 653 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 555 U.S. -, 129 S.Ct. 630, 172 L.Ed.2d 610 (2008) (“Motions for recusal under 28 U.S.C. § 455 will not be considered unless timely made. The timeliness doctrine under § 455 requires a party to raise a claim at the earliest possible moment after obtaining knowledge of facts demonstrating the basis for such a claim.” (internal quotations and citation omitted)). In support of their recusal motion, the Plaintiffs cited *906the district court’s language at the December 15, 2006 hearing, along with other acts allegedly reflecting the district court’s partiality that took place between February and December 2006. The latest of these events occurred at the December 15 hearing. However, the Plaintiffs did not file their motion to recuse until June 1, 2007, nearly six months after they learned that the district court would dismiss the case based on the Plaintiffs’ systematic abuse of the discovery process. The Plaintiffs argue that this prolonged delay demonstrates that they did “not file [the][m]otion in haste or without careful consideration.” While a party should fully examine the relevant facts and law before filing a motion to recuse, it still must file a recusal motion in a timely manner, which the Plaintiffs failed to do. Even assuming that the alleged partiality was not manifest until the district court announced its decision to dismiss the case, I would find the recu-sal motion to be untimely and would therefore affirm the district court’s denial of the motion regardless of its merits.
On the merits, I do not agree that either recusal or reassignment is warranted here. As the Court correctly notes, the applicable standard for recusal or reassignment is the existence of an appearance of partiality on the part of the judge. 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). Ante at 904. The Court also correctly finds that “there is no extrajudicial source indicating an appearance of partiality.” Ante at 904. To support its finding of an appearance of partiality here, the Court points to “the proceedings leading up to and including the sanctions hearing, ... and the ultimate order of dismissal” as reflecting “a sufficiently high degree of antagonism to require reassignment of the case on remand.” Id. As the Supreme Court has explained, however, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147. “[OJnly in the rarest circumstances [can judicial rulings] evidence the degree of favoritism or antagonism required.... Almost invariably, they are proper grounds for appeal, not recusal.” Id.
When discussing the proceedings leading up to the recusal motion, the Court cites the district court’s alleged “mischar-acterization” of the discovery orders relating to Walls’s work product as a basis for reassignment. Ante at 905. Even if the district court’s first two orders did not explicitly address the Plaintiffs’ privilege claim, the third and fourth orders did; thus, I am not convinced that the district court mischaracterized the third or the fourth orders. In fact, the Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Eighth Circuit pertaining to the fourth order, which we denied. Despite our denial of the petition for a writ of mandamus, the Plaintiffs still had not complied with the fourth order by the December 15 hearing. Therefore, the district court’s alleged mischaracterization of its own orders, at least with respect to the third and fourth orders, does not support this Court’s decision to order reassignment.
The Court also condemns the district court’s attitude towards the Plaintiffs, finding that the “proceedings leading up to and including the sanctions hearing, ... and the ultimate order of dismissal, reflected] [such] a high degree of antagonism” that the case must be reassigned. Ante at 904. However, according to the Supreme Court,
opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of the current proceedings, or of prior proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible. Thus, judicial remarks during the course of a trial that are critical or disapproving of, *907or even hostile to, counsel, the parties, or their cases, ordinarily do not support a bias or partiality challenge.
Litelcy, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147.4
Although I do not condone the district court’s language, its statements did not express such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism to make fair judgment impossible. At most, the district court vented its frustration over the Plaintiffs’ failure to abide by its discovery orders. The Supreme Court has held that a party does not establish bias or partiality by reciting “expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges, sometimes display.” Id. at 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147. “A judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration— even a stern and short-tempered judge’s ordinary efforts at courtroom administration — remain immune.” Id. at 556, 114 S.Ct. 1147. While the district court may have failed to maintain ideal decorum, I cannot say that its statements were more than “expressions of impatience, dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger” that were “within the bounds of what imperfect men and women ... sometimes display.” Id. at 555-56, 114 S.Ct. 1147; see also United States v. Wilkerson, 208 F.3d 794, 797-98 (9th Cir.2000) (finding that recusal was not necessary where the district court referred to the Government’s actions as “absurd” and “asinine”); Air-Sea Forwarders, Inc. v. Air Asia Co., 880 F.2d 176, 191 (9th Cir.1989) (finding that recusal was not necessary where the district court stated that counsel had “ ‘misled’ the jury by blowing ‘cloak and dagger smoke’ at it”); In re Beard, 811 F.2d 818, 830 (4th Cir.1987) (finding that recusal was not necessary where the district court called a party’s attorney a “son-of-a-bitch” and a “wise-ass lawyer”).
The Court justifies the Plaintiffs’ failure to obey the orders “because Plaintiffs presented a non-frivolous argument regarding privilege, and Defendants admit the district court did not address the privilege argument until the third order.” Ante at 902. Whether or not the Plaintiffs presented a non-frivolous argument regarding privilege, the district court had already clearly rejected their privilege claim. The third order required the Plaintiffs to produce Walls’ work product that was “currently being withheld on grounds of privilege.” The fourth order stated that the Plaintiffs must
produce any and all document[s] or analysis developed by Chris Walls relating to this litigation, regardless of whether the document is claimed as privileged or if Chris Walls relied upon said document. The documents must be produced by noon on Monday, September 11, [2006], If these documents are not produced, Plaintiffs will not be permitted to present the testimony of Mr. Walls at trial.
The Plaintiffs filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Eighth Circuit regarding this discovery order, which we denied. Thus, at that point, the Plaintiffs could not have been justified in delaying or withholding production of the documents after their privilege claim had been rejected by both the district court and the Eighth Circuit. Despite this fact, the Plaintiffs still had not *908produced the fifty-eight documents as of the December 15 hearing. Instead, the Plaintiffs made a belated attempt to submit the documents to the district court for in camera review, which I conclude was a willful violation of the discovery order.
After learning on December 15, 2006, that the Plaintiffs had continued to disobey its discovery orders by not producing the fifty-eight documents in question when they were indisputably required to do so, the district court was understandably perturbed. The district court’s language was regrettable, but its comments do not create an appearance of such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism to make fair judgment impossible.
I also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing with prejudice the Plaintiffs’ lawsuit as a sanction for their willful discovery violations. I recognize that dismissal is an “extreme sanction.” See Smith v. Gold Dust Casino, 526 F.3d 402, 405 (8th Cir.2008). However, it is appropriate here because the Plaintiffs continually and willfully disobeyed the district court’s discovery orders by refusing to produce the fifty-eight documents, failing to produce Anton for the July 6 hearing, and misrepresenting Anton’s employment status, all of which prejudiced the Defendants. See id. (“Dismissal with prejudice is an extreme sanction and should be used only in cases of willful disobedience of a court order -” (quotation and alteration omitted)).5
As explained above, even if the district court did not address the Plaintiffs’ privilege argument until the third order, that order was issued on August 16, 2006, four months before the December 15 hearing. The fourth order was issued on September 8, 2006, more than three months before the December 15 hearing. And we denied the Plaintiffs’ petition for a writ of mandamus on September 26, more than two and a half months before the December 15 hearing. The third and fourth orders clearly rejected the Plaintiffs’ privilege claim. This court refused to intervene. Rather than comply with the orders by producing the fifty-eight documents to the Defendants, the Plaintiffs once again sought to inhibit and delay discovery by belatedly submitting the documents to the district court for in camera review. The Plaintiffs’ “particularly evasive” tactics do not strike me as mere “technical violation[s] of the discovery order.” Ante at 903.
Further, on June 30, 2006, the district court ordered the Plaintiffs to produce Anton for a July 6, 2006 hearing. The Plaintiffs failed to produce him, claiming at the July 6 hearing that they could not reach him because he was simply a hired outside accountant and not an employee of the Plaintiffs. However, on June 22, 2006, Anton signed an application for a liquor license renewal stating that he was the managing agent for Sentís, and on June 29, 2006, Barazi signed an application to sell liquor, which indicated that Anton was the managing officer for Sentís. From this evidence, I cannot find fault with the *909district court’s conclusion that Anton was, in fact, more than a hired outside accountant such that the Plaintiffs misled the district court at the July 6 hearing when they claimed that they could not produce him because he was not their employee.
Based on these circumstances, I do not find an abuse of discretion in the district court’s determination that the Plaintiffs willfully violated the discovery orders by failing to produce the fifty-eight documents to the Defendants and failing to produce Anton for the July 6 hearing. See Hutchins v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 116 F.3d 1256, 1260 (8th Cir.1997) (“Plaintiffs’ persistent failure to cooperate and their disregard of the district court’s orders make it clear that their conduct throughout these proceedings was deliberate rather than accidental. Plaintiffs’ pattern of intentional delay is the type of conduct for which the extreme sanction of dismissal with prejudice is appropriate.”).
Finally, I conclude that the Plaintiffs’ willful delay in producing the fifty-eight documents and willful failure to produce Anton prejudiced the Defendants. Prejudice “includes deprivation of information through non-cooperation with discovery, and costs expended obtaining court orders to force compliance with discovery.” Adams v. Trustees of the N.J. Brewery Employees’ Pension Trust Fund, 29 F.3d 863, 874 (3d Cir.1994). While the Court argues that there is no prejudice because “[i]t appears from the record on appeal ... that everything that might be produced has been produced to the court or to Defendants,” ante at 903, “[prejudice need not be [an] ‘irremediable harm,’ ” Adams, 29 F.3d at 874 (quoting Curtis T. Bedwell & Sons, Inc. v. International Fidelity Insurance Co., 843 F.2d 683, 693 (3d Cir.1988)). The Plaintiffs’ willful delay in producing the fifty-eight documents required Defendants to spend their time and resources attempting to enforce the district court’s orders rather than completing discovery and preparing for trial. See Schoff-stall, 223 F.3d at 824 (finding prejudice when plaintiffs failure to produce medical records “required [the defendant] to spend its time hounding her for releases the court had already ordered her to provide”). The district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that the Plaintiffs’ delay in producing the fifty-eight documents and their failure to produce Anton for the July 6 hearing constituted willful violations of the discovery orders that prejudiced the Defendants and thereby justified the dismissal of the Plaintiffs’ lawsuit under Rule 37.
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the district court.

. As an example of a judicial remark that revealed such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism that fair judgment was impossible, the Supreme Court cited this remark made by a district court in “a World War I espionage case against German-American defendants: 'One must have a very judicial mind, indeed, not [to be] prejudiced against the German Americans’ because their 'hearts are reeking with disloyalty.' ” Liteky, 510 U.S. at 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147 (quoting Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 28, 41 S.Ct. 230, 65 L.Ed. 481 (1921) (alteration in original)).

. The Court explains that when analyzing a dismissal sanction, "a Rule 37 analysis normally should stand alone and not blend together with a less-structured, inherent authority analysis.” Ante at 899. Because I agree with this proposition and because I think that Rule 37 supports the dismissal here, I find it unnecessary to discuss the e-mail production, the recorded-conversation production, Bara-zi’s purported lies, and the purported attempt to bribe Anton. See id. at 900 (stating that the district court relied on these issues only with respect to its inherent authority analysis, not its Rule 37 analysis). Therefore, I limit my analysis to whether the Plaintiffs' willful refusal to produce the fifty-eight documents despite the district court’s orders and their willful failure to produce Anton for the July 6 hearing provided sufficient justification for the dismissal under Rule 37.