Court Opinion

ID: 9565924
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:30:17.247557+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:51.699614
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
concurring specially.
I believe that, with reference to the appropriate standard for reviewing the denial of a motion for directed verdict, this court should follow Conger v. State, 250 Ga. 867 (301 SE2d 878) (1983), rather than Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411 (276 SE2d 590) (1981). The Conger case is a later expression of the Georgia Supreme Court than Lee, and represents a unanimous decision. By contrast, Lee, in addition to being an earlier decision, contains a dissent. Moreover, Conger, at 870, employs the words of the controlling statute: “Nor can we agree with the defendant that the trial court erred in failing to direct a verdict of acquittal. We cannot say that there was ‘no conflict in the evidence and the evidence . . . demand[ed] a verdict of acquittal.’ OCGA § 17-9-1 (formerly Code Ann. § 27-1802).”
The opinion in Conger exemplifies the proper application of two distinct standards in two distinct procedural situations. The statutory standard for granting a motion for directed verdict of acquittal authorizes the trial court to direct the verdict “[w]here there is no conflict in the evidence and the evidence introduced with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom shall demand a verdict of acquittal or ‘not guilty’. . .” (Clearly, the statute refers to competent and probative evidence and not to irrelevant, immaterial, or self-serving statements or documents proffered in a desperate effort to distract the fact-finder or distort his perspective.)
Upon a thoughtful reading of the statute one can see that the phrase “where there is no conflict in the evidence” can be accurately paraphrased as “where all the evidence is in agreement.” The logical corollary is that where there is any piece of evidence which does not agree with — or points to a different conclusion from — the rest of the evidence, then there exists “a conflict in the evidence,” and direction of a verdict of acquittal is inappropriate. This is obviously the rationale underlying the development of the traditional “any evidence” standard of review.
*501In ruling on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, the trial court, under the mandate of the cited statutory provision, is looking for a “conflict in the evidence” which would vitiate the movant’s assertion that “the evidence with all reasonable deductions and inferences therefrom shall demand a verdict of acquittal or ‘not guilty.’ ” In other words, when considering a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal made at the close of the state’s evidence (as in the instant case), the trial court is looking for any competent evidence contrary to, or in conflict with, the defendant’s assertion that the evidence demands acquittal. At this point in the proceedings the trial court is not deciding whether or not, upon presentation of the entire case, the conflicting piece or pieces of evidence would be sufficient to authorize a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Denial of the motion means merely that the court is of the opinion, at that stage in the trial, that the evidence presented does not “demand” a verdict of acquittal. In terms of burden of proof a delicate equilibrium exists at this point: the defendant as defendant is still cloaked in the presumption of innocence that protects him from the very beginning of the criminal proceedings, but nevertheless as movant he must carry the statutorily imposed burden of showing that acquittal is the only verdict the evidence will allow. When seen in this perspective, the “any evidence” standard, although on its face a lesser standard than “beyond a reasonable doubt,” is in reality “lesser” with regard to evidence of innocence rather than of guilt, and therefore effectively reinforces rather than contradicts the “reasonable doubt” standard, which looks at the evidence from an opposite perspective.
In contrast, after the trial has ended and the defendant has been convicted and has filed an appeal, the appellate court is primarily concerned with whether there is sufficient evidence to sustain the conviction. The court is looking at all the evidence adduced at trial (both before and after the motion foj* a directed verdict) to determine if there is any evidence that would authorize a reasonable trier of fact to find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, when denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is enumerated as error, the appellate court considers not only whether the evidence was sufficient at thé time of the trial court’s ruling to sustain the denial of the motion, but also whether the evidence taken as a whole would authorize the rational trier of fact to find the appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus the safeguards afforded by the Jackson v. Virginia standard of review are preserved and implemented. See, e.g., Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371 (219 SE2d 743) (1975).
The foregoing analysis makes it clear that the traditional “any evidence” standard for review of denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal is derived from the statute itself and merely states *502affirmatively (“any”) what is couched in negative terms (“no”) in the statute. The “any evidence” standard, while falling far short of the Jackson v. Virginia (“rational trier of fact/beyond a reasonable doubt”) standard for reviewing a final judgment of “guilty,” is in full accord with the language and, presumably, the intent, of OCGA § 17-9-1, the statute applicable to the review of an interlocutory ruling on a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal. It could be argued the former “any evidence” standard is a lesser included element or part of the latter greater “rational trier” standard. Because the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal (an interlocutory ruling) is procedurally distinct and different from the rendition of a verdict of “guilty” (a final judgment), I believe that the two standards are compatible.
For this reason I agree with the majority rather than with Judge Carley’s concurring opinion as to the necessity vel non of overruling Georgia cases employing the “any evidence” standard which have been decided since Jackson v. Virginia. It should be noted, moreover, that post-Jackson cases utilizing a standard other than that of Jackson for reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal do not number just a few; rather, they are so numerous as to constitute a distinct line of authority. The list below does not purport to be exhaustive but is merely suggestive of the large number of Georgia post-Jackson decisions that have employed non-Jackson standards. Listed separately are Georgia post-Jackson cases that utilize the “any evidence” standard, those that apply the statutory standard (“the evidence . . . shall demand”), those that employ the Jackson v. Virginia (“rational trier/reasonable doubt”) standard, and those employing some combination of standards for review of the denial of a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal.
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT (OCGA § 17-9-1)
A. Cases Using “Reasonable Trier” Standard:
Lee v. State, 247 Ga. 411, 412 (1981)
Cleveland v. State, 155 Ga. App. 267, 268 (1980)
Jackson v. State, 161 Ga. App. 650, 651 (1982)
Hanlon v. State, 162 Ga. App. 46, 47 (1982)
Henderson v. State, 162 Ga. App. 320, 327 (1982)
Williams v. State, 162 Ga. App. 350, 352 (1982)
Adams v. State, 164 Ga. App. 295, 296 (1982)
Lewis v. State, 164 Ga. App. 549, 551 (1982)
B. Cases Using “Any Evidence” Standard:
Baxter v. State, 160 Ga. App. 181 (1981)
Gaither v. State, 160 Ga. App. 705, 706 (1981)
Castillo v. State, 166 Ga. App. 817 (1983)
*503C. Cases Using Statutory “No Conflict . . . and the Evidence Shall Demand” Standard:
Muhammad v. State, 243 Ga. 404, 407 (1979)
Smith v. State, 155 Ga. App. 657, 658 (1980)
Battle v. State, 155 Ga. App. 541 (1980)
James v. State, 162 Ga. App. 490 (1982)
D. Cases Using Some Combinations of Standards:
Bethay v. State, 235 Ga. 371 (1975)
Conger v. State, 250 Ga. 867 (1983)
Causey v. State, 154 Ga. App. 76, 77 (1980)
Walls v. State, 161 Ga. App. 625, 627 (1982)
Walker v. State, 163 Ga. App. 638, 639 (1982)
Jarrard v. State, 163 Ga. App. 99, 100 (1982)
Williams v. State, 165 Ga. App. 69 (1983)