Court Opinion

ID: 9555977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 18:12:00.601054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:57.326905
License: Public Domain

J-A15042-23

  NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  E.B.                                              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                    :
                v.                                  :
                                                    :
                                                    :
  M.B.                                              :
                                                    :
                       Appellant                    :   No. 3 WDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered December 7, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Family Court at
                         No(s): FD 18-009151-002

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                              FILED: AUGUST 15, 2023

         M.B. (Mother) appeals from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of

Allegheny County (trial court) granting E.B. (Father) shared physical custody

of their son E.B. and daughter A.B. (Children).1 We affirm in part and vacate

and remand in part.

                                               I.

         The parties were married in 2004 and E.B. was born in 2010 and A.B.

was born in 2013. During their marriage, they resided in Ross Township in

the North Hills of Pittsburgh and Mother continues to live in the marital

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 While neither party has requested that they be identified in the caption by

their initials due to the sensitive nature of this custody matter, we will use
their initials in the caption as well other involved individuals.
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residence.   Since April 2021, Father has resided in a home owned by his

paramour, T.C., in Mt. Lebanon, in the South Hills of Pittsburgh. T.C. has a

son approximately one year younger than A.B. who resides in her home.

Father is currently a teacher at a charter high school, while Mother is the

executive director of a non-profit organization working with youth.

      The parties separated in July 2018 and Father filed a complaint in

divorce in October 2018 which was granted on February 6, 2019. Pursuant to

a 2018 marital settlement agreement (MSA), Father had custody of Children

every Wednesday and Thursday evening and every other weekend from Friday

evening until Monday morning. In March 2020, at the onset of the Covid-19

pandemic, the parties shifted to a shared 2-2-3 alternating weekly custody

schedule. In early October 2020, the parties reverted to the MSA custody

schedule at Mother’s insistence.

      On October 28, 2020, Father filed a custody complaint seeking to return

to the shared physical custody arrangement that the parties experimented

with during the pandemic. On February 8, 2021, Mother filed a counterclaim

for primary physical custody and shared legal custody.

      At the hearing, Father, T.C., Mother and Neil Rosenbaum, Ph.D., a

clinical psychologist who was appointed by the court to perform a custody

evaluation, testified. Father testified that his current home with T.C. is 10.9

miles or approximately a 20-minute drive to Mother’s home and to Children’s

school in the North Hills School District. N.T., 5/10/22, at 7, 9, 61. Father

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explained that on Wednesday and Thursday evenings when he currently has

the Children, he ensures that they do their homework, although occasionally

it will not be completed in the three hours when he has them on those

evenings. Id. at 10-11.

      Father described the custody arrangement during the early portion of

the Covid-19 pandemic and stated his request to avoid further disruption of

their relationship. Id. at 23. He stated that the Children were “happy” and

adjusting “[w]onderful[ly]” to the new routine, with “some kinks to work out,”

such as virtual learning issues and scheduled routines.        Id. at 24.   When

hybrid school resumed in the fall of 2020, he attempted to negotiate a new

arrangement with Mother and their co-parenting therapist, but Mother was

resistant to any changes and requested that they revert to the MSA schedule

and that he reluctantly agreed to avoid conflict with Mother. Id. at 15-22.

      Father went on to testify that that he and Mother have a “[f]raught”

relationship because they are in court, but overall they have “done a pretty

fabulous job with co-parenting” Children. Id. at 37. Father said that he has

been working on the anger issue that Mother raised with him during couples

counseling by seeing a therapist and discussing the perception of his intense,

loud personality by various individuals in his life. Id. at 56-59. Father testified

that he went through a brief period during the separation when he was living

with Mother when he was drinking too much alcohol but stated he was not an

alcoholic. Id. at 62-63.

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      Father stated that Children have dealt with the current parenting

situation during litigation well, with minor confusion regarding why they

cannot stay with Father on certain nights or why Mother and Father have a

disagreement. Id. at 38-40. Father explained that he is dealing with A.B.’s

anxiety by preparing a checklist for morning school preparation, and that he

also has attempted to tone down his own interactions with A.B. when in the

past he may have been more voluble. Id. at 43-45, 59-61.

      Father stated that Children get along excellently with his partner, T.C.,

as well as her son, who they refer to as their brother. Id. at 61-62. T.C.

generally drives Children to school on the mornings he has them as she has a

more flexible schedule. Id. at 46-47. Father intends to take E.B. to school

when he starts middle school in the 2022-2023 school year as that school has

an earlier start time, while T.C. will continue to take A.B. to school. Id. at 48.

School pick-up would be shared between Father and T.C. Id. at 47, 61.

      T.C. testified that she and Father had been in a committed relationship

for over two years and planned to marry at some point, even though they

were not engaged.     Id. at 77.    She described the morning and afternoon

school drop-offs and pick-ups and explained that her work schedule is flexible

such that it allows her to accommodate flexible pick-up times. Id. at 78, 80-

81. T.C. said that Children and her son “get along incredibly well” and that

her son and A.B. are “extremely close.”       Id. at 79.    T.C. stated that the

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blended family functions very well together and that Children and her son

have been very happy together. Id. at 81.

      Mother testified that she works at a fully remote organization, allowing

her flexibility to set her schedule, volunteer at school, be available for drop-

offs and pick-ups and taking Children to their doctor’s appointments. Id. at

96-97.   In August 2020, she agreed during the Covid-19 pandemic to try

allowing Father to have overnights with Children during the school week after

discussion with the co-parenting therapist.     Id. at 100-02.    There was a

disagreement in October 2020 regarding whether to continue, and Mother

requested that they return to the MSA schedule; she stated that she had

noticed that Children were reverting to earlier anxious behaviors after

overnights with Father, including not sleeping through the night, having bad

dreams and becoming emotional very easily.       Id. at 102-04. Rather than

tapering off, Mother noted that the behavior was becoming more frequent as

the trial period continued. Id. at 105. Furthermore, Children were regularly

unprepared for school during the period when Father would drop them off at

school such that they could not participate in certain activities. Id. at 157-

60.

      Mother described Father’s anger issues as “abuse,” explaining that

Children had “witnessed him yelling at me, berating me, cursing at me, and

throwing things across the home or towards me.” Id. at 107. Father also

threatened to hurt him or her on one occasion during the marriage, forcing

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Mother to remove Children from the house for a night. Id. Mother stated

that Father’s alcohol use played a role in his rage outbursts, with Father

sometimes flying off the handle with her or Children over minor issues during

periods when he was drinking. Id. at 110-11.

      Mother stated that a shared physical custody schedule was a “lose, lose,

lose” situation for Children because all of their activities were in the North

Hills, Children’s school and activities schedules often did not line up, and

Father/T.C., as well as the Children, would have to often make three trips

from Mt. Lebanon and back during the day (school drop-off, school pick-up

and evening activities). Id. at 115-19. Mother denied that the trip would

take 20 minutes as Father said, insisting that she tracked E.B.’s phone location

showing the trip taking as much as 54 minutes. Id. at 120-21, 183.

      Mother contrasted her house, which she described as Children’s “home

base,” as contrasted with Father’s living situation where he lived in an

apartment, his aunt’s house, stayed with a prior girlfriend on occasions and

now has moved in with T.C. Id. at 123-25. She also contrasted her organized

parenting style with Father’s more “sporadic, impulsive, and playful” style.

Id. at 125-27. As an example, Mother described Father as being inconsistent

in tracking Children’s completion of homework assignments, requiring

Mother’s follow-up to have Children either verify completion or finish the

assignments which were not done several times a month on Father’s watch.

Id. at 134-38, 140-48, 160-63.       Mother said that Father was often late

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arriving for drop-off and pick-up and did not always pick Children up at the

designated locations. Id. at 149-56. According to Mother, Father also has

not taken the lead on any of Children’s medical appointments and needs. Id.

at 179.

      Finally, Mother called Dr. Rosenbaum, the court-appointed custody

evaluator, to testify. Dr. Rosenbaum completed a psychological evaluation in

this case on July 31, 2021, after interviewing each member of the family over

the preceding few months and speaking to Children’s therapist and the parties’

co-parenting therapist. N.T., 5/11/22, at 205-06, 216-18. He testified that

both Mother and Father were excellent parents but had different parenting

styles. Id. at 227.

      Dr. Rosenbaum described Father as having a more fluid history that may

not lend itself to the stability Children need, citing the numerous colleges, jobs

and residences after the divorce. Id. at 210-13. On psychological testing,

Father scored high on anger control, acting out, impulse control and mania,

but these scores were not statistically significant. Id. at 220-24. (Mother had

elevated scores for defensiveness, inhibition of aggression and denial of social

anxiety.   Id. at 255-59.)    On the other hand, Dr. Rosenbaum described

Father’s strengths as being upbeat, validating Children and being affectionate

and loving towards them. Id. at 219-20.

      Dr. Rosenbaum related Mother’s complaints regarding Father’s anger

issues and specifically how it would affect A.B., who “is more sensitive and

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cautious.” Id. at 206-09. He opined that A.B. is “a little more scattered and

forgets things,” and she gets more support from Mother in that respect,

whereas Father is more upbeat and playful but lacks focus on the details of

the tasks necessary for the day-in and day-out preparation for school. Id. at

209-10, 220.     Dr. Rosenbaum explained that the 2020 shared custody

experiment “was very difficult and stressful for” A.B. with episodes of Father

yelling and A.B. crying, often related to the process of getting ready for school.

Id. at 215-18.

      Regarding the proposed custody change, Dr. Rosenbaum did not believe

that shared physical custody during the school year would be beneficial to

Children “at this time,” although it would potentially work when Children were

older and more mature. Id. at 225-26. He noted that Father’s estimate of

drive time from his residence to school was 15 to 20 minutes, while Mother

thinks that in rush hour, it is more like 30 to 45 minutes, which he stated he

believed was more realistic. Id. at. 210. During the summer, Dr. Rosenbaum

believed that a shared custody schedule would be beneficial. Id. at 227-28.

In addition to the factors discussed above, Dr. Rosenbaum also noted Father’s

issue of not being available for the Children in the morning as he started work

early himself and Children’s ability to finish homework in the evening because

of the extra driving time. Id. at 234-38. He also stated that if Father lived

closer to Mother, the proposed shared custody arrangement would not be so

much of an issue. He also stated that it was the Children that wanted the

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overnights to not continue because Father was giving them a “pep talk about

that” but not “pressuring them or brainwashing them” to say so but because

they have so much fun at Father’s residence sometimes to the detriment of

their responsibilities. Id. at 243.

       At the conclusion of the custody trial on May 11, 2022, the trial court

placed on the record its assessment of the Section 5328(a) custody factors2

____________________________________________

2 The Child Custody Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 5321-5340, requires a trial court to

consider all the Section 5328(a) 16 best interest factors when “ordering any
form of custody.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a). Those factors are: (1) Which party
is more likely to encourage and permit frequent and continuing contact
between the child and another party; (2) The present and past abuse
committed by a party or member of the party’s household, whether there is a
continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and which party can
better provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision of the
child.(2.1). The information set forth in Section 5329.1(a) (relating to
consideration of child abuse and involvement with protective services); (3)
The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of the child; (4) The
need for stability and continuity in the child’s education, family life and
community life; (5) The availability of extended family; (6) The child’s sibling
relationships; (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
child’s maturity and judgment; (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child
against the other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the child from harm; (9)
Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable, consistent and
nurturing relationship with the child adequate for the child’s emotional needs;
(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical, emotional,
developmental, educational and special needs of the child; (11) The proximity
of the residences of the parties; (12) Each party’s availability to care for the
child or ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements; (13) The level
of conflict between the parties and the willingness and ability of the parties to
cooperate with one another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by
another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with
that party; (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member of
a party’s household; (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
member of a party’s household; (16) Any other relevant factor.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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but did not rule on the custody claims. In making those assessments, the trial

court found that neither party was favored with respect to factors 1

(encouraging child’s contact with other party), 3 (performance of parental

duties), 6 (sibling relationships), 7 (preference of children), 8 (attempts by

parent to turn child against other parent), 9 (loving, stable, consistent,

nurturing relationship with children), 11 (proximity of parents’ residences), 12

(care and making child-care arrangements), 13 (conflict between parties and

cooperation), 14 (drug or alcohol abuse) and 15 (mental and physical

condition of parents or members of household).

       The court found that factors 2 (present and past abuse), 4 (need for

stability for children) and 10 (attending to daily physical, emotional,

developmental, educational and special needs) slightly favor Mother.        The

court found that factor 5 (availability of extended family) slightly favors

Father. With respect to factor 16 (any other relevant factor), the court noted

that Dr. Rosenbaum relied on the input of Children’s therapist and the co-

parenting therapist and determined that shared physical custody was

____________________________________________

A trial court must “delineate the reasons for its decision when making an
award of custody either on the record or in a written opinion.” S.W.D. v.
S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 401 (Pa. Super. 2014). See also 23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(a),
(d). However, “there is no required amount of detail for the trial court’s
explanation; all that is required is that the enumerated factors are considered
and that the custody decision is based on those considerations.” M.J.M. v.
M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 336 (Pa. Super. 2013).

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appropriate in the summers, and that there were only minor roadblocks to it

being appropriate during the school year, such as the distance between

Father’s home and the school and his schedule. N.T., 5/11/22, at 293-319;

Trial Court Opinion, 12/7/22, at 2-8 (unnumbered).       The trial court also

determined that the drive from Father’s residence to the school was

approximately 18 minutes. Id. at 390.

       While it addressed the factors at the end of the May 11, 2022 hearing,

in the trial court’s December 7, 2022 order, it granted Mother and Father

shared legal and physical custody. Mother was to have custody from Monday

afternoon to Wednesday morning, Father was to have custody from

Wednesday afternoon until Friday morning, and the parents would alternate

weekends. Also relevant here, without analysis, the trial court also adopted

Father’s proposed custody order with respect to custody exchanges and the

holiday schedule, thus deviating from the previous arrangement set forth in

the MSA. Order, 12/7/22, at 1-4 (unnumbered). In accompanying opinion,

it reiterated the assessment of the factors it made on May 12, 2022.

       Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and a contemporaneous concise

statement of errors complained of on appeal as required by Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court filed an opinion on February 3, 2023.3

____________________________________________

3 Our standard of review is as follows:

(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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                                               II.

       Mother first contends that the trial court committed an abuse of

discretion because its December 7, 2022 order imposing a new custody

arrangement violated Pa.R.Civ.P. 1915.4(d) requirement that a decision be

issued within 15 days, but that “[i]n no event” shall it be delayed more than

45 days4 having been issued on December 7, 2022, approximately six months

____________________________________________

       In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type
       and our standard is an abuse of discretion. We must accept
       findings of the trial court that are supported by competent
       evidence of record, as our role does not include making
       independent factual determinations. In addition, with regard to
       issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we must defer to
       the presiding trial judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses
       first-hand. However, we are not bound by the trial court’s
       deductions or inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the
       test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as
       shown by the evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions
       of the trial court only if they involve an error of law, or are
       unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.

Graves v. Graves, 265 A.3d 688, 693 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation omitted).
The paramount concern in any child custody case is the best interests of the
child. D.K. v. S.P.K., 102 A.3d 467, 474 (Pa. Super. 2014). “The best-
interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis, considers all factors
which legitimately have an effect upon the child’s physical, intellectual, moral,
and spiritual well-being.” D.K.D. v. A.L.C., 141 A.3d 566, 572 (Pa. Super.
2016) (citation omitted). “In a dispute between parents, each parent shares
the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that an award of
custody to him or her would serve the best interests of the child.” Graves,
265 A.3d at 698 (citation omitted).

4 The full text reads:  “(d) Prompt Decisions. The judge’s decision shall be
entered and filed within 15 days of the date upon which the trial is concluded
unless, within that time, the court extends the date for such decision by order
entered of record showing good cause for the extension. In no event shall an
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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after the May 11-12, 2022 custody hearing. Mother contends that the trial

court’s reasoning in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion that the court “announced

its decision on the record at the conclusion of trial,” TCO at 3, was erroneous

because the trial court only reviewed the custody factors but did not give any

indication of the final outcome, and because only one of the factors was in

favor of Father made it impossible to predict at the end of the hearing that

the court would rule for Father.

       We decline to vacate the order because of a violation of Pa.R.Civ.P.

1915.4(d)’s time requirement because it does not provide a remedy or any

other sanction if the trial court does not comply with its time limits. Rather,

the Rule serves an instruction to the trial court to issue a decision in a custody

matter within the prescribed time, and if a timely decision is not issued, it

allows either party to petition the trial court, reminding it that its decision is

overdue, and if an opinion is not then issued, to petition our Supreme Court

for relief. In this case, Mother did not seek relief from the trial court once the

decision became due or take any other action to seek a timely order. If we

were to hold that a party had to take no action if the time periods were not

followed, a party could wait until a decision is issued and, if adverse, appeal

____________________________________________

extension delay the entry of the court’s decision more than 45 days after the
conclusion of trial.” Pa.R.Civ.P. 1915.4(d); see also Pa.R.Civ.P. 1915.4,
Comment (noting that “the interests of children who are the subjects of
custody litigation would best be served by a requirement that the litigation be
concluded within specific time frames”).

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seeking the order be vacated based solely because the Rule’s time limits were

not followed.

                                      III.

      Mother next contends that the trial court did not appropriately address

the best interests of Children in its decision to award Father shared physical

custody and urges us to reverse for several reasons.

      First, Mother contends that the trial court’s decision is at variance with

its Section 5328(a) finding in that it only found one factor (No. 5 – availability

of extended family) favoring Father while three were found in her favor (No.

2 – present and past abuse, No. 4 – need for stability for children, and No. 10

– attending to daily physical, emotional, developmental, educational and

special needs of Children). Mother highlights Factor 11 (the proximity of the

parties’ residences) which the trial court found to be neutral despite the court’s

discussion in its discussion of Factor 16 (other relevant factors) of Dr.

Rosenbaum’s serious reservations about whether a 50/50 split of custody

during the school year would be in Children’s interests. N.T., 5/11/22, at 316-

18. In summary, Mother contends that the trial court abused its discretion by

issuing a shared custody order requiring longer school commutes to school,

less stability in their homes and educational lives, as well as more time spent

with Father who the court found slightly less able to meet their daily needs.

      However, a custody factor analysis is not a mere tallying of points as to

how many factors favored each parent. We review a custody determination

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for an abuse of discretion and will not find an abuse of discretion “merely

because a reviewing court would have reached a different conclusion.” In re

K.D., 144 A.3d 145, 151 (Pa. Super. 2016); Id. (citation omitted). Rather,

“[a]ppellate courts will find a trial court abuses its discretion if, in reaching a

conclusion, it overrides or misapplies the law, or the record shows that the

trial court’s judgment was either manifestly unreasonable or the product of

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.” Id. In this case, the custody factors

assessments only slightly favored Mother making them not compelling in the

custody determination.     While Dr Rosenbaum found that during the school

year there should not be shared custody, he opined that Mother and Father

were each an excellent parent. Nothing in those assessments alone would

make it an abuse of discretion for the trial court to award shared physical

custody.

      Second, Mother asserts that the court’s analysis focuses on the parties’

burden in making the drive from the South Hills to the North Hills and back,

without not accounting for how the time spent traveling and shared overnight

custody on school nights will serve the best interests of Children. This is the

central issue in this case because even Dr. Rosenbaum testified that if Father

lived closer to Mother, shared physical custody during the school year would

not be an issue. Despite being the central issue, neither Child testified at the

hearing how they were affected by the commute.

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       We note, though, that Dr. Rosenbaum used Mother’s estimate of travel

time of 35 to 45 minutes while the trial court found the travel time to be 18

minutes.    Dr. Rosenbaum testified that the commute for A.B. was difficult

because of the distance between Father’s residence and the school and she

became anxious. It was noted that Father now employed a checklist that was

to be followed before A.B. left for school which would hopefully lessen her

anxiety. However, as previously noted, Children, when visiting Father on a

school night, indicated that they did not want to stay overnight. Accordingly,

the trial court’s finding that travel time from Father’s residence to Children’s

school was not a sufficient reason to deny joint custody is not an abuse of

discretion.5

____________________________________________

5 Mother also contends that the trial court mischaracterized and disregarded

Dr. Rosenbaum’s expert opinions and otherwise is not based upon competent
evidence. M.A.T. v. G.S.T., 989 A.2d 11, 20 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)
(“while a trial court is not required to accept the conclusions of an expert
witness in a child custody case, it must consider them, and if the trial court
chooses not to follow the expert’s recommendations, its independent decision
must be supported by competent evidence of record.”). However, the trial
court did address Dr. Rosenbaum’s opinion and provided a basis for its
reasoning in disagreeing with his recommendation. As mentioned, Dr.
Rosenbaum’s position against Father’s shared physical custody during the
school year was based primarily upon the time Children would spend traveling
from Father’s house to the school and activities. The trial court discounted
that position by finding that the actual travel time was more in line with Father
and his paramour’s testimony.          In addition, Dr. Rosenbaum’s cross-
examination showed that Father was not deficient in addressing A.B.’s anxiety,
as two incidents in which she reported stomach distress to her school nurse
after overnight visits with Father early in the 2021-2022 school year did not
continue through the remainder of his custodial school mornings.

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      Accordingly, because the trial court’s decision is based upon a full

analysis of the custody factors and is supported by competent evidence, the

trial court did not abuse its discretion by awarding joint custody.

                                      IV.

      Finally, Mother contends that the trial court erred as a matter of law and

abused its discretion by deviating from the status-quo for custody exchanges

and holiday custody without any comment, analysis or reasoning as to why

these changes would be in the best interests of the Children. Mother contends

that the parties established a carefully agreed-upon custody agreement in the

MSA, including a detailed holiday and summer vacation schedule and a

custody exchange protocol, and yet the court completely disregarded the

status quo arrangement and adopted Father’s proposed order as to these

issues without a scintilla of explanation as to why the established practice

should be disregarded or how the new provisions better serve Children’s best

interest. As Mother notes, there was no testimony from Father or otherwise

as to why his new proposed custody exchange and holiday schedule would be

better for Children. Mother highlights changes such as the parties now having

to be responsible equally for transportation costs, which Father was uniquely

responsible for before, and each party being able to block out 20 vacation

days during the summer, which could effectively allow one party to monopolize

Children’s whole summer. Order, 12/7/22, at 2, 4. Mother notes that she

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submitted her own proposed order, which would have preserved the status

quo of the MSA.

      While the court did not need to run through an analysis of the Section

5328(a) factors in determining custody exchanges, holiday custody and

vacation custody, it still must provide due process by providing an explanation

before changing previously agreed-upon schedules to see if those schedules

are in the Children’s best interest as well as the parents’ best interest because

often those interests coincide. In this case, the court just adopted Father’s

proposed order wholesale without explanation and did not explain why it found

those arrangements were necessary to change the existing MSA custody

schedules. Accordingly, we remand to the trial court to make findings as to

why the vacation and summer schedule set forth in the MSA should not be

followed and, if so found, to enter a new schedule.

      Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded. Jurisdiction

relinquished.

      Judge Murray joins the memorandum.

      Judge McLaughlin files a concurring/dissenting memorandum.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/2023

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