Court Opinion

ID: 9396926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 22:03:37.724739+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:19.379241
License: Public Domain

Filed 5/23/23 In re Samantha M. CA2/3

  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
 Ca l ifornia Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 o p inions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a).
 Thi s opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule
 8. 1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                     DIVISION THREE
 In re SAMANTHA M. et al.,                                    B317547
 Persons Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.

 LOS ANGELES COUNTY                                          Los Angeles County
 DEPARTMENT OF                                               Super. Ct. No.
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY                                         19CCJP05003E–F
 SERVICES,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,

          v.

 TIFFANY J.,

          Defendant and Appellant.

       APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Hernan D. Vera, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with
directions.
       Lelah S. Fisher, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
       Tarkian & Associates and Arezoo Pichvai for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
             _______________________________________
                           INTRODUCTION

       Tiffany J. (mother) appeals from the juvenile court’s orders
terminating dependency jurisdiction over her daughters,
Samantha M. and Savanna J. Mother contends the court erred
when it issued its exit orders by: (1) requiring her visits with
Samantha and Savanna to be supervised by a professional
monitor to be paid for by mother; and (2) failing to specify in its
exit orders how frequently mother is entitled to visit Savanna,
essentially delegating to Savanna’s father the authority to
determine if mother can visit her daughter. We affirm the court’s
orders terminating jurisdiction but remand the matter with
directions for the court to correct the portion of Savanna’s exit
order addressing mother’s visitation rights.

            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY

       Mother has three children, each with different fathers:
Amari M. (born August 2008),1 whose father is Phillip M.;
Samantha (born May 2013), whose father is Anthony J.; and
Savanna (born March 2018), whose father is Dontae J.
       This case arose out of a May 2021 incident in which mother
and her boyfriend, Deandre K., argued and fought each other
while Amari was inside the home, Samantha was outside
playing, and Savanna was visiting Dontae. When the
Department of Children and Family Services (Department)
interviewed Amari following the incident, the child reported that
he and his sisters no longer attended school and that mother
often left them home alone at night while she went to work.

1   Mother does not challenge any of the court’s orders concerning Amari.

                                     2
       On May 12, 2021, the Department filed a dependency
petition on the children’s behalf, alleging that mother’s history of
domestic violence and her practice of leaving the children alone
without adult supervision placed the children at risk of serious
physical harm (Welf. & Inst. Code,2 § 300, subds. (a), (b), & (j)).
The court detained the children from mother and released
Samantha and Savanna to their fathers’ custody. The court
granted mother three monitored visits a week, for three hours
each visit, with the children.
       In late May 2021, mother enrolled in anger management,
domestic violence, and parenting classes. During her first month
in the program, mother completed 5 of 20 required domestic
violence classes, and 5 of 15 required parenting classes.
According to mother’s case manager, mother completed her
homework assignments and “was proactive and very interactive”
during classes.
       Mother’s visits with the children were often problematic,
however. According to Anthony, mother coached Samantha and
yelled, cursed, and argued in front of the child during one visit.
During another visit shortly after the detention hearing, mother
took Savanna from the child’s paternal grandmother’s home
without the grandmother’s or the Department’s permission. After
leaving the grandmother’s home, mother drove Savanna without
putting the child in a safety harness, allowing the child to stand
in the front passenger seat while the car was moving.
       The monitor for several of mother’s visits, Israel L., who
was mother’s friend and pastor, sometimes allowed mother to

2All undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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visit the children unsupervised. For one visit, Israel took
Samantha to mother’s home without the Department’s
knowledge. And, during at least two visits with Samantha, Israel
left mother and the child alone together. Israel also sometimes
picked the children up at their caregivers’ homes, whose
addresses were supposed to remain confidential.
       The Department filed a first amended petition on July 14,
2021, adding allegations that, among other things: (1) mother
failed to provide Amari and Samantha a consistent formal
education; and (2) mother endangered Savanna by abducting the
child and driving without securing her in a safety harness.
       In late July 2021, the Department approved Kamry M.,
another one of mother’s friends, to supervise mother’s visits with
the children. Kamry signed an acknowledgement stating that she
is familiar with the rules for monitoring mother’s visits, including
prohibiting visits at mother’s home and not allowing mother to be
present when the children are picked up and dropped off for their
visits. Mother refused to sign a similar acknowledgement,
claiming she did not agree with the rule prohibiting her from
visiting the children at her home.
       In August 2021, mother followed Kamry to the pick-up and
drop-off locations for Samantha and Amari. According to
Samantha, Kamry was aware that mother followed the monitor
to those locations. Later that month, after Kamry informed the
Department that she could no longer supervise mother’s visits
because of her work schedule, the Department approved Israel to
resume serving as mother’s visitation monitor. The Department
also asked the court to appoint a professional monitor or a
Department staff member to supervise mother’s visits.

                                 4
      Amari’s caregiver reported that Israel was sometimes late
picking up and dropping off the child. According to the caregiver,
Amari would often have emotional outbursts or become
physically aggressive when he returned from visits with mother.
      In September 2021, mother began participating in
individual counseling. Mother’s case manager reported that
mother had completed 8 of 20 required anger management
classes, 4 of 20 required domestic violence classes, and 3 of 15
required parenting classes.3 Due to mother’s inconsistent
attendance in her domestic violence and parenting classes, the
case manager could not “attest to any additional progress[]”
mother had achieved in those programs.
      The court held the jurisdiction hearing in late October 2021
and took the matter under submission. In early November, the
court sustained the allegations that mother’s history of domestic
violence and leaving the children alone without adult supervision
placed the children at risk of serious physical harm. The court
continued the disposition hearing and ordered the Department to
provide a written visitation schedule for mother and updates on
mother’s progress during visits with the children and in her case-
related programs.
      As of early November 2021, some of mother’s visits with
Samantha were successful. Nevertheless, mother continued to
accompany Israel to the pick-up and drop-off locations for visits
with the children. Mother and Samantha’s and Savanna’s fathers
were also having difficulty scheduling visits. Mother provided the

3 The record doesn’t indicate why the case manager reported a
decrease in the total number of domestic violence and parenting
classes that mother had attended since mother’s first progress report
was issued in June 2021.

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Department with a list of days when she was available to visit
the children, but she later changed her availability. Mother
refused to adjust her schedule to accommodate the other parents’
schedules, and Israel was only available to supervise visits
during a three-hour period on Saturdays. Israel also refused to
monitor some of Amari’s visits because he “doesn’t like going to
Palmdale,” where Amari’s caregiver lived.
       By early December 2021, mother completed 16 of 20
required anger management classes, 7 of 20 required domestic
violence classes, and 1 of 15 required parenting classes. Although
mother was progressing well in her anger management program,
her case manager couldn’t provide any meaningful information
about mother’s progress in the domestic violence and parenting
programs because her attendance in those classes was sporadic.
       In one of its final last minute reports filed before the
disposition hearing, the Department asked the court to grant
Savanna’s and Samantha’s fathers sole physical and legal
custody of their daughters. As to mother, the Department
recommended providing her monitored visits with Savanna and
Samantha, with the visits to be supervised by a professional
monitor paid for by mother.
       On December 6, 2021, the court held the disposition
hearing. As to Samantha and Savanna, the court found the
conditions that justified dependency jurisdiction no longer
existed. The court awarded Anthony and Dontae sole physical
custody of Samantha and Savanna, respectively, with mother and
the fathers to share legal custody of the children. The court
granted mother monitored visits with her daughters, with the
court’s “prior orders as to the frequency of [mother’s] visits [to] be

                                  6
respected.” The court terminated jurisdiction over Samantha and
Savanna, pending receipt of custody orders for each child.
      On December 17, 2021, the court signed Samantha’s and
Savanna’s exit orders and terminated dependency jurisdiction
over the children. As to mother’s visits with Samantha, the exit
orders provide: “Monitored visits for mother for a minimum of 9
hours per week. Monitor is to be professional monitor paid for by
mother. Visits to occur in a neutral setting.” As to mother’s visits
with Savanna, the exit orders provide: “[v]isits to occur only with
a professional monitor, where all costs associated with the
monitor are paid by Mother.” The orders don’t specify how
frequently mother is entitled to visit Savanna, however, noting
only that “[m]other shall have monitored visits in a neutral
setting as the parents mutually agree in writing … .”
      Mother appeals.

                          DISCUSSION

1.    The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by
      requiring mother to pay for a professional monitor to
      supervise her visits with her daughters.
       Mother contends the court abused its discretion when it
required her to pay for a professional monitor to supervise her
visits with Samantha and Savanna. In mother’s view, the court’s
order unreasonably restricts her right to visit her children and
was unnecessary because Israel or Kamry could have continued
supervising her visits. We disagree.
       After declaring a child a dependent, a juvenile court may
terminate jurisdiction if the child is in parental custody and no
protective issues remain. (In re Destiny D. (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
197, 207.) When a court terminates dependency jurisdiction, “it is

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empowered to make ‘exit orders’ regarding custody and
visitation.” (In re T.H. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1119, 1122 (T.H.).)
The court’s exit orders become part of any family court
proceeding concerning the child and will remain in effect until
they are modified or terminated by the family court. (Id. at p.
1123.)
       A juvenile court has broad discretion to make visitation
orders tailored to the child’s best interests when it terminates
dependency jurisdiction. (§ 362.4; see also In re Nicholas H.
(2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 251, 265, fn. 4.) We review a juvenile
court’s exit orders for an abuse of discretion. (In re Cole Y. (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1456.) Thus, we will not disturb an exit
order unless it constitutes an “ ‘ “arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd determination [citations].” ’ [Citations.]” (In re Stephanie
M. (2004) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318.)
       As a preliminary matter, mother has forfeited any
challenge to the order requiring her to pay for a professional
monitor to supervise her visits with Samantha and Savanna. An
appellate court “ ‘ordinarily will not consider a challenge to a
ruling if an objection could have been but was not made in the
trial court.’ ” (In re Daniel B. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 663, 672
(Daniel B.).) A parent must raise a specific objection stating the
ground or grounds on which the objection is based. (Ibid.) A
general objection is insufficient to preserve an issue for review.
(Ibid.) The purpose of this rule is to encourage parties to bring
issues to the trial court’s attention, so that they may be corrected
before the challenged ruling or order is issued. (Ibid.)
       In one of its final last minute information reports filed
before the disposition hearing, the Department asked the court to
issue an order requiring mother to pay for a professional monitor

                                  8
to supervise her visits. Mother, therefore, was on notice that the
court could order her to pay for a professional monitor should it
award her monitored visits. Although mother’s counsel argued
that the court should award mother joint physical custody of her
daughters should it terminate jurisdiction, mother never objected
to any aspect of the court’s visitation orders, nor did she oppose
the Department’s request that she pay for a professional monitor
to supervise her visits. Thus, mother forfeited any challenge to
the order requiring her to pay for a professional monitor to
supervise her visits with her daughters. (Daniel B., supra, 231
Cal.App.4th at p. 672.)
       In any event, mother’s claim lacks merit for a few reasons.
First, mother’s visits throughout these proceedings were
problematic, and many of the problems were related to the
nonprofessional monitors who mother claims should continue to
supervise her visits. Israel allowed mother to visit Samantha
unsupervised, and Israel and Kamry allowed mother to
accompany them to the children’s pick-up and drop-off locations,
despite the Department’s admonitions not to do so. During some
of the visits that were supposed to be supervised, mother made
inappropriate remarks in front of the children. For instance,
mother coached Samantha about the dependency proceedings and
yelled and cursed in front of that child.
       Second, contrary to mother’s claim that the court should
have allowed Kamry or Israel to continue supervising mother’s
visits, the record does not indicate that either person would be
available to supervise mother’s visits on a regular basis. In
August 2021, Kamry told the Department she could no longer
monitor visits because of her work schedule, and Israel was often
unavailable or unwilling to monitor visits. Indeed, Israel told the

                                 9
Department he was only available to monitor visits for a three-
hour period on Saturdays.
      And finally, mother never presented any evidence below
demonstrating she couldn’t afford to pay for a professional
monitor. Indeed, as we just explained, mother never opposed the
Department’s request that she pay for one.
      In sum, the court did not abuse its discretion when it
required mother to pay for a professional monitor to supervise
her visits with Samantha and Savanna.
2.    Savanna’s exit order must be corrected to reflect the
      court’s oral order regarding mother’s visitation with
      her daughter.
       Mother next contends Savanna’s exit order does not define
the extent of mother’s visitation with Savanna and improperly
delegates to the child’s father the authority to determine if
mother gets to visit her daughter. While we agree that the
written exit order fails to specify the extent of mother’s visitation
with Savanna, the court’s oral ruling at the disposition hearing
makes clear that the court intended to incorporate mother’s
existing visitation schedule into its exit orders.
       The authority to determine the extent of a parent’s
visitation resides solely with the court and may not be delegated
to the other parent, children, social workers, or other third
parties. (T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.) While a court
may delegate to third parties the responsibility for managing the
details of visits, such as their time, place, or manner, a court may
not delegate to third parties the discretion to determine the
frequency or length of visits. (In re Rebecca S. (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 1310, 1314.) A court, therefore, abuses its discretion
when it allows a third party to determine whether any visitation

                                 10
will occur. (In re S.H. (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 310, 317.) This rule
applies to exit orders issued when the court terminates
dependency jurisdiction. (T.H., at p. 1123.)
       Here, Savanna’s exit order does not define the extent of
mother’s visitation with Savanna. As noted above, the order
provides only that “[m]other shall have monitored visits [with
Savanna] in a neutral setting as the parents mutually agree in
writing.” (Italics added.) As courts have recognized, such a vague
order can render a noncustodial parent’s visitation rights illusory
since the custodial parent can limit or even veto the noncustodial
parent’s visits with her child. (See T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1123 [order providing for visits “upon the ‘agreement of the
parents’ ” effectively delegated to the custodial parent the power
to determine whether visitation will occur at all because she
“could conceivably agree to only one visit a year or less without
violating the letter of the court’s order”].)
       But, as the Department points out, the court stated at the
disposition hearing that “[a]s to mother, prior orders as to
frequency of visits shall be respected.” Following the detention
hearing, the court issued a visitation order allowing mother to
visit Savanna three times per week, for three hours each visit.
That order remained in place throughout Savanna’s proceedings.
Thus, it’s clear that the court intended to incorporate into
Savanna’s exit order mother’s visitation schedule established at
the detention hearing. (See In re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796,
799–800 (A.C.) [where there are conflicts between the court’s
statements in the reporter’s transcript and the recitals in the
clerk’s transcript, we presume the reporter’s transcript is more
accurate].)

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       In light of the foregoing, we conclude the court did not
unlawfully delegate to Savanna’s father the authority to
determine the extent of mother’s visitation with her daughter.
Nevertheless, the court must correct Savanna’s exit order to
reflect mother is entitled to visit Savanna three times per week,
for three hours each visit. (A.C., supra, 197 Cal.App.4th at p. 800
[remanding matter to the juvenile court to correct exit order so it
is consistent with the court’s oral order regarding visitation].)

                            DISPOSITION

       The orders terminating dependency jurisdiction are
affirmed. The matter is remanded with directions for the juvenile
court to correct Savanna’s exit order to reflect mother is entitled
to visit Savanna three times per week, for three hours each visit.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                     LAVIN, J.
WE CONCUR:

      EDMON, P. J.

      BENKE, J.*

*Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate
District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6
of the California Constitution.

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