Court Opinion

ID: 9381205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 14:00:41.301384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:30.740718
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10482     Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 03/22/2023       Page: 1 of 8

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                     In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                  No. 22-10482
                            Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       JAMES D. STEFFENS,
                                                           Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       CHRISTOPHER NOCCO,
       in his Official Capacity as Pasco County Sheriff,

                                                      Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 8:19-cv-01940-KKM-AAS
USCA11 Case: 22-10482        Document: 37-1       Date Filed: 03/22/2023        Page: 2 of 8

       2                         Opinion of the Court                    22-10482

                              ____________________

       Before LUCK, BRASHER, and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               James Steffens appeals the grant of summary judgment to
       his former employer Sheriff Christopher Nocco, in his official ca-
       pacity as Pasco County Sheriff. Steffens is biracial and worked as a
       Captain in the Pasco County Sheriff’s Office. Steffens asserts the
       district court erred by applying a single-intent analysis, rather than
       a mixed-motive analysis, to his race discrimination case, and that
       his claim would have survived summary judgment under a mixed-
       motive analysis. Additionally, Steffens asserts the district court
       erred by failing to find he had presented a “convincing mosaic” of
       evidence of discrimination. After review, 1 we affirm the district
       court’s grant of summary judgment.
                                 I. MIXED-MOTIVE
              Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer “to discriminate
       against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
       conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individ-
       ual’s race . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Discrimination claims
       brought under Title VII are categorized as either mixed-motive or

       1 We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo,
       “viewing all the evidence, and drawing all reasonable inferences, in favor of
       the non-moving party.” Vessels v. Atlanta Indep. Sch. Sys., 408 F.3d 763, 767
       (11th Cir. 2005).
USCA11 Case: 22-10482         Document: 37-1        Date Filed: 03/22/2023         Page: 3 of 8

       22-10482                   Opinion of the Court                               3

       single-motive claims. Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d
       1227, 1235 (11th Cir. 2016); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (m).
       The district court analyzed Steffens’ claim under the McDonnell
       Douglas analysis as Steffens pled and litigated his case under a sin-
       gle-intent theory. E.E.O.C. v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d
       1265, 1272 (11th Cir. 2002) (explaining a plaintiff can prove a single-
       motive employment discrimination claim through circumstantial
       evidence, which we generally analyze using a three-step, burden-
       shifting framework identified in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
       Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)).
               Steffens failed to argue a mixed-motive discrimination case
       before the district court and we do not consider it. 2 See Access
       Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331-32 (11th Cir.
       2004) (stating an issue not raised in the district court and raised for
       the first time on appeal in a civil case will not be considered absent
       extraordinary circumstances). Steffens’ amended complaint failed
       to allege the actions taken against him resulted from mixed mo-
       tives or that his interracial relationship was only a motivating factor
       for these actions. In his response to Nocco’s motion for summary

       2 Even if we considered Steffens’ mixed-motive claim, it would fail as Steffens
       failed to show an adverse employment action, as discussed in Part II of this
       opinion. See Quigg, 814 F.3d at 1239 (stating for a Title VII claim presented
       under a mixed-motive theory to survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must
       introduce evidence sufficient to support a jury finding that: “(1) the defendant
       took an adverse employment action against the plaintiff; and (2) a protected
       characteristic was a motivating factor for the defendant’s adverse employment
       action” (quotation marks, alterations, and emphasis omitted)).
USCA11 Case: 22-10482      Document: 37-1     Date Filed: 03/22/2023     Page: 4 of 8

       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10482

       judgment, Steffens failed to make any arguments that a mixed-mo-
       tive analysis applied to his claim. Rather, he chose to argue his case
       under the McDonnell Douglas framework. Steffens asserted “there
       were zero grounds for [his] termination, all of the ‘Mercado’ re-
       lated issues having been resolved properly, and the only remaining
       reason being racially motivated.” Also, while Steffens alleged both
       race discrimination and retaliation, these claims were separated
       into distinct counts. To the extent Steffens argues his claims were
       inherently mixed-motive, as he alleged both racial discrimination
       and retaliation, this argument fails as a party may allege multiple
       separate single-intent claims under Title VII. A claim does not be-
       come a mixed-motive claim merely because multiple unlawful
       causes for an action are alleged. See e.g. Johnson v. Miami-Dade
       Cnty., 948 F.3d 1318, 1324-26 (11th Cir. 2020) (evaluating a retalia-
       tion claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework despite the
       plaintiff alleging both race discrimination and retaliation).
              As Steffens never pled or litigated his case under a mixed-
       motive theory before the district court, the district court did not
       err in evaluating the case under the single-intent framework in
       McDonnell Douglas. Additionally, in his initial brief, Steffens fails
       to challenge the district court’s finding that he did not establish a
       prima facie case of race discrimination under McDonnell Douglas
       because he failed to identify a similarly situated comparator treated
       more favorably than him, thus abandoning any challenge on this
       basis. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 873 (11th Cir.) (en
       banc), petition for cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022) (stating issues
USCA11 Case: 22-10482      Document: 37-1       Date Filed: 03/22/2023     Page: 5 of 8

       22-10482                Opinion of the Court                          5

       not raised in an appellant’s initial brief are deemed abandoned and
       will not be addressed absent extraordinary circumstances);
       Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 680 (11th Cir.
       2014) (stating an appellant must clearly and specifically identify in
       his brief any issue he wants the appellate court to address).
                           II. CONVINCING MOSAIC
               A plaintiff will “survive summary judgment if he presents
       circumstantial evidence that creates a triable issue concerning the
       employer’s discriminatory intent.” Smith v. Lockheed-Martin
       Corp., 644 F.3d 1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). “A triable issue of fact
       exists if the record, viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff,
       presents a convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence that
       would allow a jury to infer intentional discrimination by the deci-
       sionmaker.” Id. (quotation and footnote omitted). A plaintiff may
       establish a “convincing mosaic” by pointing to evidence that
       demonstrates (1) suspicious timing, ambiguous statements, or
       other information from which discriminatory intent may be in-
       ferred, (2) systematically better treatment of similarly situated em-
       ployees, and (3) pretext. Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d
       1169, 1185 (11th Cir. 2019).
              As to a “convincing mosaic” argument, Steffens failed to
       provide sufficient evidence from which a jury could infer discrimi-
       natory intent on the part of the decisionmaker. Steffens has not
       identified an adverse employment action onto which a jury could
       infer discriminatory intent. Steffens argues he suffered multiple ad-
       verse employment actions, including multiple failures to promote.
USCA11 Case: 22-10482      Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 03/22/2023     Page: 6 of 8

       6                       Opinion of the Court                 22-10482

       However, the district court did not err in finding Steffens only al-
       leged a single adverse employment action within his EEOC charge,
       namely that he was “coerced into resigning . . . because he main-
       tained a relationship with [his] fianc[eé].” Further, these alleged
       actions, which occurred well before his resignation, are not actions
       which could reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of
       discrimination. Gregory v. Ga. Dep’t of Human Res., 355 F.3d
       1277, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2004) (explaining a plaintiff’s judicial com-
       plaint is limited by the scope of the EEOC investigation which can
       reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge of discrimina-
       tion). Therefore, the district court did not err in determining the
       only potential adverse employment action was Steffens’ resigna-
       tion.
              Additionally, the district court did not err in finding Steffens
       voluntarily chose to resign rather than “stand pat and fight” an in-
       vestigation. See Hargray v. City of Hallandale, 57 F.3d 1560, 1568
       (11th Cir. 1995) (stating we presume that resignations are volun-
       tary, unless an employer forces the employee to resign by coercion,
       duress, deceit, or misrepresentation of a material fact). First, Stef-
       fens was aware he was being investigated and Major Ken Gregory
       had informed him that it “did not look good.” Later that day, Stef-
       fens was told Nocco had lost faith in him, and he was asked if he
       would resign effective immediately. Steffens testified he knew he
       could choose to resign, leaving the agency in good standing, or to
       face the investigation, under which “all options,” including the po-
       tential for no disciplinary action to be taken, were available.
USCA11 Case: 22-10482      Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 03/22/2023     Page: 7 of 8

       22-10482                Opinion of the Court                         7

       Steffens requested to speak with Nocco, but when that request was
       denied, he did not seek additional time to consider or consult coun-
       sel. Rather he stated “[y]ou know what my answer is” and pre-
       pared a written resignation. Given this, Steffens knew his options
       and, rather than choosing to “stand pat and fight,” facing the inves-
       tigation, he chose to voluntarily resign. Thus, considering the to-
       tality of the circumstances, the district court did not err in finding,
       as a matter of law, that Steffens’ resignation was a voluntary choice
       to take what he viewed as the best of two bad options, not a result
       of coercion, duress, deceit, or misrepresentation of a material fact.
       Id.
              As such, no reasonable jury could infer that a decisionmaker
       acted with discriminatory intent, as the only relevant decision, Stef-
       fens’ resignation, was made voluntarily by Steffens. Lockheed-
       Martin Corp., 644 F.3d at 1328. Even if we apply the “convincing
       mosaic” analysis to Nocco’s decision to request Steffens’ resigna-
       tion, Steffens has failed to provide evidence from which a jury
       could infer that the decisionmaker, Nocco, acted with discrimina-
       tory intent. Steffens has not pointed to any piece of evidence show-
       ing Gregory provided inaccurate or biased information to Nocco
       which could bias his decision. Rather, the record shows the order
       to request Steffens’ resignation came from Nocco through Colonel
       Jeffrey Harrington. Steffens has not asserted Nocco made any am-
       biguous statements or otherwise showed discriminatory intent to-
       ward Steffens. Rather, the record shows Nocco hired Steffens
       knowing he was in a interracial relationship, promoted him while
USCA11 Case: 22-10482       Document: 37-1      Date Filed: 03/22/2023      Page: 8 of 8

       8                       Opinion of the Court                   22-10482

       he was in a interracial relationship, and filled Steffens’ position after
       his resignation with another individual in a interracial relationship.
       Given this evidence, no reasonable jury could infer discriminatory
       intent. See id.
              AFFIRMED.