Court Opinion

ID: 9731837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:59:37.198211+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:21.548750
License: Public Domain

TODD, Justice.
The defendants City of Minneapolis, et al., appeal from the order of the Hennepin County District Court directing that the liquor license of the plaintiff Flame Bar, Inc., be reinstated and imposing conditions precedent to the reopening of the facility. We reverse.
The plaintiff was the licensee of an on-sale liquor license issued by the defendant on February 1,1978, effective April 1, 1978. Upon its receipt of an investigatory report concerning the plaintiff, the Consumer Services Committee of the City Council issued a notice to the plaintiff’s owner, directing him to appear before it on July 12, 1978. The stated purpose of the meeting was the committee’s consideration of the revocation of the license due to the conduct and operation of the business. Thereafter, the committee issued its written report to the city council recommending the revocation of the plaintiff’s license.
By its action of July 14, 1978, the city council adopted the report and revoked the license, effective September 1, 1978. The decision of the council was served by mail upon the plaintiff’s owner on July 25, 1978. *587The instant action was commenced by the plaintiff on August 29, 1978, seeking a permanent injunction against the city, restraining it from either revoking or enforcing the revocation of its license.
Minn. Stat. § 340.135 (1978) pertaining to the suspension of revocation of a liquor license incorporates by reference certain provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act, Minn. Stat. ch. 15, the procedure to be employed in contested cases. Specifically Minn. Stat. § 15.0424, subd. 2 (1978), directs that proceedings for the review of a decision be instituted within 30 days after service by mail of such a decision upon all record parties. While the plaintiff apparently chose to institute separate proceedings to obtain injunctive relief, the proceedings are more properly categorized as an appeal and must be viewed within the context of § 15.0424 and R. 6.01 and 6.05, R. Civ. P.
There is no question that this proceeding was instituted beyond the 33-day period for review as authorized by operation of statute and rule and that the district court was without jurisdiction to consider the merits of the decision of the city council. Therefore, its order authorizing the plaintiff to proceed and its decision relating to the reinstatement of the plaintiff’s license are accordingly reversed as beyond its jurisdiction. See, e.g., Kenzie v. Dalco Corp., 309 Minn. 495, 245 N.W.2d 207 (1976).
Reversed upon jurisdictional grounds.