Court Opinion

ID: 9568711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:06:50.347585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:56:57.309538
License: Public Domain

Opinion
BAKER, J.
Norman Jeffrey Helms (appellant) appeals his bench trial conviction by the Circuit Court of Prince William County (trial court) for possession of phencyclidine (PCP). He asserts that the trial court erred by failing to suppress (1) the evidence of PCP discovered in a film canister found in his possession during a lawful pat-down search of his person, and (2) the laboratory analysis of the residue found in a pipe taken from him during the course of the pat-down.
A confidential informant told the Prince William County police that PCP was being sold from the premises known as 8633 Newton Place in that county. Thereafter, a controlled purchase was made at that address. A search warrant for the purpose of seizing PCP was then obtained for the premises. A county police investigator, Kelmartin, assisted in the execution of the warrant and the search. Upon entering the house, Kelmartin encountered appellant only a few feet from the front door. Appellant was not named in the warrant nor was he initially suspected of possessing, selling or distributing PCP.1 He did not act suspicious and was cooperative when confronted, ordered to lie down and submit to a personal search. The search of appellant revealed that he had on his person a film canister, a small pipe and some keys, which were taken into custodial control by Kelmartin, who then opened the canister and found that it contained PCP. Appellant concedes that safety reasons justified the warrantless search of his person; however, he denies that probable cause for an arrest existed prior to the search of the canister, and asserts that Kelmartin had no right to examine the canister’s contents without a search warrant.
At the suppression hearing, Kelmartin testified that he was aware that sales of PCP had taken place on the premises for which a search warrant had been procured; that when he saw the *370film canister it went through his mind that it contained PCP or some other type of narcotic; and that he opened the canister because he believed that a felony was being committed in his presence. He further stated that he could not see the contents prior to opening the canister but that by holding it he could tell that it held “some type of loose material,” not film. He knew that the canister did not contain a weapon. Upon opening the canister, based on his training and experience, he concluded that it contained parsley treated with PCP. He then placed appellant under arrest for possessing PCP.
The Commonwealth argues that the record shows that Kelmartin stated that, based on his prior experience and knowledge, he was aware that film canisters are used to distribute illegal drugs. In making its finding, the trial court noted that the officer’s knowledge, experience and education disclosed that film canisters are often used for the sale of PCP. The record, however, fails to support those arguments or the conclusion of the trial court. Kelmartin did not testify that from his knowledge and experience film canisters are used to transport drugs. It was the contents found after opening the canister that Kelmartin identified from his knowledge and experience, not the purpose for which film canisters are commonly used.
The Commonwealth heavily relies on People v. Hughes, 767 P.2d 1201 (Colo. 1989) to support Kelmartin’s right to open the canister without a warrant. In Hughes, the Court held that the officer had the right to open a film canister found on a defendant who was on the premises for which a search warrant had been issued because (1) the defendant was “connected to the premises” by a description the police had of him as “a drug supplier” and (2) because that record contained evidence from the police that “a film canister is an item frequently used to carry cocaine.” Neither of these reasons were established on this record.
The Commonwealth further argues that the actions of Kelmartin are supported by Wright v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 188, 278 S.E.2d 849 (1981). The Wright case involved “exigent circumstances” not disclosed by the record before us.
When a person with standing (i.e., legitimate expectation of privacy) objects to a warrantless search of his person or property, the burden is on the prosecution to show a need for such a *371warrantless search. United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951). The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their person and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. The Supreme Court of the United States has interpreted that amendment to require that, absent exigent circumstances, searches of private property be performed pursuant to search warrants issued in compliance with the amendment’s warrant clause. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 758 (1979).
In the ordinary case, therefore, a search of private property must be both reasonable and pursuant to a properly issued search warrant. The mere reasonableness of a search, assessed in the light of the surrounding circumstances, is not a substitute for the judicial warrant required by the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 758 (emphasis added). The exigent circumstances that will justify a warrantless search include danger to the officer, search incident to a lawful arrest, or the risk of loss or destruction of evidence. None of the exceptions are apposite here. See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
We are aware that another panel of this Court has decided that under the facts of that case the police had probable cause to make a warrantless search of a film canister found in the defendant’s pocket. See Harris v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 355, 388 S.E.2d 280 (1990). We concur in the holding of that panel; however, we note key differences in the facts. In Harris, the defendant was seated in a moving vehicle whose driver had been reported to the police as “a fugitive from justice” and probably would be carrying narcotics and possibly, weapons. The record in Harris further disclosed that when the vehicle was stopped there was “a lot of movement in the automobile;” that the officer who made the stop was warned to be careful; and that when defendant was asked to get out of the vehicle, he twice refused, complying only when the officer told him that if he did not comply he would be removed by force. In Harris, as here, the officers found a film canister in the defendant’s possession; however, in Harris the officer specifically articulated in clear language that during “his experience as a police officer he had, on numerous occasions, seen film canisters used to transport controlled substances.” (emphasis added). In *372Harris, the panel held that this experience and knowledge of the officer combined with the information possessed by the officer that the driver was in possession of narcotics, the officer’s observation of the “movement in the vehicle which gave an opportunity for the occupants to exchange possession of the contraband,” and the defendant’s refusal to cooperate, constituted probable cause to search the canister sufficient to overcome the per se presumption of invalidity created by a warrantless search.
In the case before us, however, there was no vehicle which could be used to flee; appellant cooperated totally, offering no resistance. Except for being on the premises, there is no showing of appellant’s association with any person who was the object of the police investigation, nor was any person named or described in the search warrant. The trial judge may have heard officers in other cases articulate (as in the Harris case) that from their knowledge and personal experience film canisters are frequently used to illegally transport narcotics; however, in the case before us, the record does not support the trial court’s conclusion that Kelmartin possessed such knowledge and experience or that such knowledge and experience was the reason the officer made the warrantless search of the canister.
The record before us discloses no legally cognizable reason for the warrantless search of the film canister; therefore, we find that the trial court erred when it failed to sustain appellant’s motion to suppress the evidence found therein. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 (1977); see also Matthews v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 1, 235 S.E.2d 306 (1977).
Appellant further argues that the trial court erred in failing to suppress the laboratory analysis of the content of the pipe found during the search. This argument was not stated to the trial court with the specificity required by Rule 5A:18 and will not be considered by us in this appeal. See Hogan v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 36, 45, 360 S.E.2d 371, 376 (1987).
Because the evidence obtained from the film canister should have been suppressed, appellant’s conviction will be reversed, and the case will be remanded for such further proceedings as the Commonwealth may be advised.

*373
Reversed and remanded.

Keenan, J., concurred.

 No individual was named or described in the affidavit made to obtain the warrant.