Court Opinion

ID: 9810035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:38:35.394065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:20.611870
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HOOD,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
T96 I join Parts I and II of the majority opinion. I disagree, however, with the majority's retroactivity analysis. As the majority notes, substantive rules apply retroactively to cases on collateral review. A rule is substantive if it prohibits a category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status. While the Supreme Court did not entirely ban life without parole ("LWOP") sentences for juvenile homicide offenders in Miller v. Alabama, -- U.S. --, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012), it declared unconstitutional a category of punishment-namely, mandatory life imprisonment without the possibility of parole-for Juveniles as a class because of their status as Juveniles. Accordingly, Miller should apply retroactively to Jensen. I therefore respectfully dissent from Part III of the majority opinion.1
T 97 To determine if a new rule should be applied retroactively to post-conviction proceedings, we ask three questions: "(1) whether the defendant's conviction is final; (2) whether the rule in question is in fact new; and (8) if the rule is new, whether it meets either of the two Teague exceptions to the general bar on retroactivity." Edwards v. People, 129 P.3d 977, 983 (Colo.2006) (adopting the Supreme Court's test for retro-activity outlined in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 283, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334 (1989) (plurality opinion)). The majority is correct that Jensen's conviction is final and that Miller announced a new rule. Thus, I need not analyze the first two parts of the Teague test. Our disagreement arises in part three.
T 98 The Supreme Court created two "narrow" exceptions to the maxim that new rules do not apply retroactively to post-conviction proceedings. Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 408, 110 S.Ct. 1212, 108 L.Ed.2d 847 (1990). The first exception is for a watershed rule of criminal procedure. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307-10, 109 S.Ct. 1060. In this context, to qualify as "watershed," the rule must implicate "the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 495, 110 S.Ct. 1257 (1990); see also Teague, 489 U.S. at 311, 109 S.Ct. 1060 (characterizing a new rule as watershed where it involves "new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seriously diminished"). I agree with the majority that Miller is not a watershed rule in that sense.
199 The second exception is for new substantive rules. A substantive rule "alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the law punishes." Schriro v. Summerlin, *981542 U.S. 348, 353, 124 S.Ct. 2519, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004). It either "places a class of private conduct beyond the power of the State to proscribe," Saffie 494 U.S. at 494, 110 S.Ct. 1257 (internal quotation marks omitted), or "prohibit[s] a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because of their status or offense," Perry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 330, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed. 2d 256 (1989) abrogated on other grounds by Atkins v. Virginia, 586 U.S. 304, 321, 122 S.Ct. 2242, 158 L.Ed.2d 885 (2002). Substantive rules apply retroactively because they "necessarily carry a significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of an act that the law does not make criminal," Bousley v. United States, 528 U.S. 614, 620, 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted), or "faces a punishment that the law cannot impose upon him," Schriro, 542 U.S. at 352, 124 S.Ct. 2519. By contrast, a rule is procedural if it "regulates only the manner of determining the defendant's culpability." Edwards, 129 P.3d at 984 (quoting Schriro, 542 U.S. at 353, 124 S.Ct. 2519) (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
T100 Despite having some attributes that are procedural, the rule announced in Miller is ultimately substantive in nature. The majority is correct that the Miller rule requires a new procedure for sentencing juvenile homicide offenders-ceourts must now hold a hearing providing for individualized sentencing in light of considerations of the unique cireumstances of youth. Miller, - U.S. at --, 132 S.Ct. at 2471. But "the procedural rule for a hearing is the result of a substantive change in the law that prohibits mandatory life-without-parole sentencing" for juvenile homicide offenders. State v. Ragland, 836 N.W.2d 107, 115 (Iowa 2018). This substantive change in the law mandates "a sentencing range broader than that provided by statute for minors convicted of first degree murder who could otherwise receive only natural life imprisonment." People v. Davis, 379 Ill.Dec. 381, 6 N.E.3d 709, 722 (11.2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Miller prohibits a certain category of punishment (mandatory LWOP) for a class of defendants (juvenile homicide offenders) because of their status (juveniles). That a court may still sentence a juvenile homicide offender to LWOP after a hearing considering his unique cireumstances and the nature of his crime does not change the Supreme Court's holding that mandatory LWOP is a category of punishment now beyond the reach of the government. °
{101 Further, in Miller, the Supreme Court relied on Grakam v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 74, 180 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), which has been applied retroactively because of its substantive ban on LWOP sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. The Court in Miller explained that its decision was based, in part, on "categorical bans on sentencing practices based on mismatches between the culpability of a class of offenders and the severity of a penalty." Miller, -- U.S. at --, 132 S.Ct. at 2463 (citing Graham, 560 U.S. at 60-62, 130 S.Ct. 2011). It then drew on Grakam's "likening of [LWOP] sentences imposed on juveniles to the death penalty itself." Id. at --, 132 S.Ct. at 2466. In a sense then, Graham is Miller's precursor, And that precursor has been applied retroactively on collateral review. Seq, eg., In re Moss, 708 F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir.2013) (holding a juvenile nonhomicide offender "made a prima facie showing that Graham has been made retroactive on collateral review"); In re Sparks, 657 F.3d 258, 261-62 (5th Cir.2011) (holding Grakhom is retroactive on collateral review). "If a substantial portion of the authority used in Miller has been applied retroactively, Miller should logically receive the same treatment." Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 116. Indeed, "the substance of the Miller rule is no different than the rule[ ] established in ... Graham." Songster v. Beard, 35 F.Supp.3d 657, 663 (E.D.Pa.2014).
€{102 In that vein, the Supreme Court itself applied Miller retroactively in its companion case, Jackson v. Hobbs, which was before the Court on collateral review. U.S. at -----, 132 S.Ct. at 2461-62 (outlining factual and procedural history of Jackson's case). Without engaging in a Teague analysis, the Court retroactively applied Miller to vacate the defendant's sentence. Id. at 2468. Admittedly, the absence of any retroactivity analysis is eryptic, but I *982agree with other courts that have observed that "the relief granted to Jackson under Miller tends to indicate that Miller should apply retroactively on collateral review." Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722; see also Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 116; Diatchenko v. Dist. Attorney for Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655, 1 N.E.3d 270, 281-82 (2013).
1103 These other courts are part of a growing majority concluding that the Miller rule is substantive. Of the fifteen state supreme courts that have issued opinions concerning Miller's retroactivity, nine have applied the Miller rule retroactively. See Davis, 6 N.E.3d at 722 (holding Miller created a new substantive rule and applies retroactively); Ragland, 836 N.W.2d at 115-17 (same); Diatchenko, 1 N.E.3d at 278-82 (same); Jones v. State, 122 So.3d 698, 701-02 (Miss.2018) (same); State v. Mantich, 287 Neb. 320, 842 N.W.2d 716, 729-31 (2014) (same); Petition of State, 166 N.H. 659, 108 ASd 227, 233-86 (2014) (same); Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572, 575-76 (2014) (same); State v. Mares, 335 P.3d 487, 504-08 (Wyo.2014) (reaching same conclusion but addressed as a certified question from the trial court); see also Ex Parte Maxwell, 424 SWS3d 66, 75 (Tex.Crim.App.2014) (reaching same conclusion as the court of last resort for criminal matters in Texas). Two others have done so without explicitly analyzing the issue under the retroactivity doctrine. See Jackson v. Norris, 426 S.W.3d 906, 907 (Ark.2018) (remanding for sentencing hearing without explicitly ruling on retroactivity issue); Horsley v. State, 160 So.3d 393, 395, 406 (Fla.2015) (applying legislative amendment to require individualized sentencing for "all juvenile offenders whose sentences are unconstitutional under Miller" because it is "most faithful to the Eighth Amendment principles established by the United States Supreme Court"). Only five states have concluded it is not retroactive. Ex Porte Williams, - So.3d ---, --, No. 1131160, 2015 WL 1388138, at "13 (Ala. Mar. 27, 2015); State v. Tate, 130 So.3d 829, 838 (La.2015); People v. Carp, 496 Mich. 440, 852 N.W.2d 801, 827-28 (2014); Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311, 331 (Minn.2013); Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 622 Pa. 543, 81 A.3d 1, 11 (2013).2
1104 Finally, the Attorney General has conceded that Miller is retroactive. While such a concession is not binding on this court, it is certainly telling. As the First Circuit has explained when relying on the prosecution's concession that Miller applies retroactively,
The government plays a central role in criminal law enforcement. Moreover, it is fair to say that the government is generally resistant to collateral review of criminal convictions and sentences. Accordingly, one might conclude that where the government concedes that a rule favoring prisoners has been made retroactive, that position has at least "possible merit ... warrant{ing] a fuller exploration by the district court."
Evans-Garcia v. United States, 744 F.3d 285, 238 (Ist Cir.2014) (quoting Rodrigues v. Superintendent, 189 F.3d 270, 278 (1st Cir. 998), abrogated on other grounds as stated in Simpson v. Matesanz, 175 F.3d 200, 212-13 (1st Cir.1999)); see also Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720, 720 (8th Cir.2018) (relying on government concession of Miller's retroactivity); Wang v. United States, No. 13-2426 (2d Cir. July 16, 2013) (unpublished) (same).
T105 For all these reasons, the rule announced in Miller is substantive and, as a result, should apply retroactively. I would hold that the Miller rule applies to Jensen, vacate his sentence of mandatory LWOP, and remand the case to the trial court to hold a sentencing hearing in accordance with Parts I and II of the majority opinion. Therefore, I respectfully dissent from Part III of the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that JUSTICE MARQUEZ joins in this concurrence in part and dissent in part.

. Jensen is one of approximately forty-eight juvenile offenders serving a mandatory LWOP sentence in Colorado. These forty-eight offenders are part of a much larger nationwide problem: When the Supreme Court decided Miller, at least 2,100 juvenile homicide offenders across the country were serving mandatory LWOP sentences. See Ashby Jones, Life Sentences' Blurred Line, Wall St. J., Sept. 4, 2013, at A3, available at http://online.wsj.com,/public/resources/ documents/print/WSJ_-A003-20130904.pdf (last visited May 29, 2015).

. The Supreme Court recently granted certiorari to address this issue in Montgomery v. Louisiana, -- U.S, -, 135 S.Ct. 1546, 191 L.Ed.2d 635 (2015).