Court Opinion

ID: 9930728
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 17:03:54.746084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:40:06.083867
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                       Opinion filed February 7, 2024.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-2162
                       Lower Tribunal No. 19-26431
                          ________________

           Arrow Property Insurance Adjusters, Inc.,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

               People's Trust Insurance Company,
                                  Appellee.

    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Valerie R.
Manno Schurr, Judge.

     The Diener Firm, P.A., and Erik D. Diener (Plantation), for appellant.

     Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., and Daniel J. Maher, for appellee.

Before LOGUE, C.J., and EMAS and BOKOR, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
      Affirmed. See EcoVirux, LLC v. BioPledge, LLC, 357 So. 3d 182, 187

(Fla. 3d DCA 2022) (“It is axiomatic that ‘extrinsic evidence . . . should not

be used to introduce [a contractual] ambiguity where none exists.’”)

(quotation omitted); Emergency Assocs. of Tampa, P.A. v. Sassano, 664 So.

2d 1000, 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA1995) (“It is a fundamental tenet of contract law

that a ‘phrase in a contract is “ambiguous” only when it is of uncertain

meaning, and may be fairly understood in more ways than one.’” Friedman

v. Virginia Metal Prods. Corp., 56 So. 2d 515, 517 (Fla.1952)). In the event

of such an ambiguity, a trial court is authorized to admit parol evidence to

explain the words used and how the contracting parties intended them to be

interpreted. Joseph U. Moore, Inc. v. Howard, 534 So. 2d 935 (Fla. 2d DCA

1988). However, before a trial court can consider such extrinsic

evidence in interpreting a contract, the words used must be unclear such

that an ambiguity exists on the face of the contract. Boat Town U.S.A., Inc.

v. Mercury Marine Div. of Brunswick Corp., 364 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 4th DCA

1978).”) (emphasis added); Webster v. Ocean Reef Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 994

So. 2d 367, 370 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008) (“In the case of competing

interpretations of the words used in the articles of incorporation at issue here,

any ambiguity is to be construed against the Association as the drafter.”)

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(quoting Vargas v. Schweitzer–Ramras, 878 So. 2d 415, 417 (Fla. 3d DCA

2004)).

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