Court Opinion

ID: 9377920
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-09 00:02:17.751867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:17.737657
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/8/23 Hepler v. Hagos CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

ERIK HEPLER, Individually and as                                     B316879
Administrator, etc.,
                                                                     (Los Angeles County
         Plaintiff, Cross-defendant and                              Super. Ct. No.
         Respondent,                                                 20STCV45736)

         v.

EYASSU HAGOS et al.,
         Defendants, Cross-
         complainants and Appellants.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Yolanda Orozco, Judge. Affirmed.
         Lyle D. Solomon for Defendants, Cross-complainants and
Appellants.
         Clark Hill, David L. Brandon, Hayden S. Alfano; Mikelson
& Mikelson and Larry D. Mikelson for Defendants, Cross-
defendants and Respondents Eyassu Hagos and HagosHomes.
                                     ___________________
       Erik Hepler agreed to sell a residence owned by the estate
of Ellen Hepler to Evassu Hagos and Hagoshomes, LLC
(collectively Hagos parties). Hepler, individually and as
administrator of the estate of Ellen Hepler, subsequently filed
this lawsuit to invalidate the purchase agreement because it had
been entered before Hepler was authorized by the probate court
to dispose of estate property. The trial court agreed and granted
Hepler’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. On appeal the
Hagos parties contend the court abused its discretion in granting
Hepler’s motion without permitting them to amend their answer.
They also argue the court should have denied the motion because
Hepler failed to meet and confer before filing it, as required by
Code of Civil Procedure section 439.1
       The record designated by the Hagos parties for appeal
omits most of the significant documents, including Hepler’s
complaint; the Hagos parties’ answer; the motion for judgment on
the pleadings; and the Hagos parties’ cross-complaint, which they
assert contained (unspecified) factual allegations that, if included
in an amended answer, would have cured the deficiencies the
court identified in its order granting Hepler’s motion. In
addition, the Hagos parties elected not to provide a reporter’s
transcript or other record of the oral proceedings on Hepler’s
motion. It is impossible for us on this sparse record to evaluate
the issues the Hagos parties present in their opening brief. (They
did not file a reply brief.) Moreover, the Hagos parties, who do
not directly challenge the trial court’s legal ruling based on
pertinent provisions of the Probate Code, fail to articulate how
they could amend their answer to overcome its fatal

1     Statutory references are to this code unless otherwise
stated.

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shortcomings. Making all presumptions in favor of the validity of
the judgment, as we must (see, e.g., Kinney v. Superior Court
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 168, 177 [“‘“[a] judgment or order of a
lower court is presumed to be correct on appeal, and all
intendments and presumptions are indulged in favor of its
correctness”’”]), we affirm.2
      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
      1. The Pleadings and Motion for Judgment on the
         Pleadings
      Hepler initiated this action on November 30, 2020 with a
complaint alleging causes of action for cancellation of instrument
and declaratory relief concerning the purported sale of real
property located in Pasadena that had been owned by Ellen
Hepler and then her estate. Although the complaint is not part of
the record on appeal, the court’s order granting the motion for
judgment on the pleadings stated Hepler sought to invalidate a
March 16, 2019 agreement to sell the residence to the Hagos
parties because he had not yet obtained authority to dispose of
any estate property at the time of the transaction.3

2     Because we affirm the judgment on the merits, we do not
address Hepler’s additional argument that Hagoshomes’s
corporate status has been suspended by the Franchise Tax Board
and it therefore lacks standing to pursue its appeal. (See Bourhis
v. Lord (2013) 56 Cal.4th 320, 324 [as a general matter, a
“‘corporation may not prosecute or defend an action, nor appeal
from an adverse judgment in an action while its corporate rights
are suspended for failure to pay taxes’”].) Hepler’s October 25,
2022 motion for judicial notice is denied as unnecessary.
3   It appears the Hagos parties may have sold the property to
W1 Holdings, LLC sometime thereafter.

                                3
      The Hagos parties filed a cross-complaint on January 20,
2021 with 11 causes of action, including one to quiet title, and
their answer to the complaint on March 4, 2021. Neither
document is included in the record on appeal.
      On May 13, 2021 Hepler filed his motion for judgment on
the pleadings, supported in part by a request for judicial notice
that included a probate order appointing Hepler administrator of
the estate of Ellen Hepler dated December 18, 2019 and letters of
administration signed by the court dated January 8, 2020.4
Neither document is included in the record on appeal. The Hagos
parties filed an opposition to the motion, and Hepler filed a reply
with another request for judicial notice. The Hagos parties’
opposition, together with a declaration by their counsel, is part of
the record on appeal; the Hepler reply and second request for
judicial notice are not.
      2. The Order Granting the Motion and Judgment in Favor
         of Hepler
       The court heard argument on the motion on September 3,
2021. No reporter’s transcript or other record of the oral
proceedings is included in the record on appeal. The court took
the matter under submission and on September 13, 2021 issued
its order granting the motion.
       The court initially found that Hepler failed to meet and
confer before filing his motion for judgment on the pleadings as
required by section 439. Noting (without citing authority) that
this failure was a ground for denial of the motion, the court
admonished counsel to abide by meet-and-confer requirements
while stating it would consider the merits of the motion.

4     The trial court granted Hepler’s request for judicial notice
of these documents.

                                 4
       The court then explained under Probate Code section 8400,
subdivision (a), an individual has no authority to act on behalf of
an estate until appointed the personal representative and that
appointment becomes effective through issuance of letters of
administration. Hepler’s appointment was not effective until
January 8, 2020. Accordingly, Hepler lacked legal capacity to
enter into the purchase agreement on March 16, 2019 for real
property that belonged to Ellen Hepler’s estate5 and that
agreement was void.
       In opposition to the motion the Hagos parties argued a
limited power of attorney signed by Hepler on August 11, 2020
after the letters of administration had been issued delegated to
them his authority as administrator, expressly permitting them
to sell the real property and effectively ratifying Hepler’s
previously unauthorized agreement to sell the property.
Although the Hagos parties’ allegations regarding the import of
the limited power of attorney were contained only in their cross-
complaint, not their answer, the court considered the argument
and rejected it, ruling the limited power of attorney could not
lawfully delegate the authority to sell real property. After
pointing to the general prohibition in Probate Code section 16012
against delegating the performance of acts a trustee can
reasonably be required to perform, the court ruled neither
Probate Code section 16052, subdivision (a), which permits
delegation of investment and management functions, nor Probate
Code section 16247, which authorizes the trustee to hire
professionals, including attorneys and investment advisers to

5    Hepler’s motion papers established that the real property
was not included in Ellen Hepler’s trust and, therefore, had to be
probated following her death.

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assist the trustee in the performance of administrative duties,
allowed for delegation of the power to sell real property belonging
to the estate.6 Thus, both the 2019 purchase agreement and the
limited power of attorney’s sale provision were void.7
      The court expressly found that allowing the Hagos parties
to amend their answer to include the facts presented in their
opposition to the motion—that is, the facts alleged in their cross-
complaint—would not cure their answer’s deficiencies.
Accordingly, the motion was granted without leave to amend.
      Judgment in favor of Hepler was entered on October 13,
2021. The Hagos parties filed a timely notice of appeal.
                          DISCUSSION
      1. Governing Law and Standard of Review
      A plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the pleadings may be
granted if “the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a
cause or causes of action against the defendant and the answer
does not state facts sufficient to constitute a defense to the
complaint.” (§ 438, subd. (c)(1)(A); see State Comp. Ins. Fund v.
ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 422, 445.)
      “‘Motions for judgment on the pleadings are usually made
by defendants. In such instances the motion is the equivalent of
a general demurrer, and on appeal from the judgment the

6     The court observed a possible exception existed for a sale of
the property for investment purposes by a professional hired by
the estate to manage its investments. But, the court found, no
facts were alleged that indicated this exception applied.
7     Because both the purchase agreement and the limited
power of attorney’s sale provision were void, the court concluded,
any sale to W1 Holdings was also void, even if W1 Holdings was a
bona fide purchaser.

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appellate court will assume the truth of all facts properly pleaded
in the complaint. [Citation.] Motions by a plaintiff for judgment
on the pleadings, which are less common, are the equivalent of a
demurrer to an answer, and the standard of review is obverse:
the appellate court will assume the truth of all facts properly
pleaded in the answer and will disregard the controverted
allegations of the complaint. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Such a
motion ‘must be denied if the defendant’s pleadings raise a
material issue or set up affirmative matter constituting a
defense.’ [Citation.] Stated differently, ‘[w]here the answer,
fairly construed, suggests that the defendant may have a good
defense, a motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be
granted.’” (Engine Manufacturers Assn. v. State Air
Resources Bd. (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1034.) “The
determination of the sufficiency of the answer requires an
examination of the complaint because its adequacy is with
reference to the complaint it purports to answer.” (South Shore
Land Co. v. Petersen (1964) 226 Cal.App.2d 725, 733.)
       We review de novo an order granting a motion for judgment
on the pleadings, “deriv[ing] the pertinent facts from properly
pleaded allegations in the challenged pleading and judicially
noticeable matters.” (City and County of San Francisco v. All
Persons Interested in Matter of Proposition C (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 703, 713; accord, York v. City of Los Angeles
(2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 1178, 1193 [trial court’s ruling on a motion
for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed de novo]; see Angelucci
v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 166.)

                                 7
      2. Hepler’s Failure To Meet and Confer Did Not Obligate
         the Court To Deny the Motion
       Section 439, subdivision (a), provides that, before filing a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party must
meet and confer with the party who filed the challenged pleading.
Section 439, subdivision (a), also contains details concerning the
necessary timing and content of the required meeting. As
discussed, the trial court found Hepler had failed to comply with
those requirements. It also stated, without citation to authority,
that it could deny the motion because of that failure. On appeal
the Hagos parties similarly assert, also without citation to
authority, a failure to meet and confer may serve as the basis for
denying a motion for judgment on the pleadings.8 (Cf. Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [each point in the brief should be
supported, if possible, by citation of authority].)
       Section 439, subdivision (a)(4), however, expressly provides,
“A determination by the court that the meet and confer process
was insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the motion
for judgment on the pleadings.” Pursuant to this provision, the
trial court acted well within its authority in admonishing Hepler
to comply with meet-and-confer requirements in the future and
deciding the motion on its merits.

8     Even if the premise for the argument were correct, a highly
doubtful proposition, the Hagos parties do not contend dismissal
is mandatory. Nor do they address why it was an abuse of
discretion for the trial court to elect to proceed to the merits of
the motion under the circumstances here.

                                 8
       3. The Record on Appeal Is Inadequate To Allow Us To
          Evaluate the Argument the Trial Court Considered
          Improper Material in Deciding the Motion
       It was the Hagos parties’ burden as appellants to provide
an adequate record demonstrating reversible error. (Maria P. v.
Riles (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1281, 1295-1296 [to overcome presumption
an appealed judgment or order is correct, the appellant must
provide an adequate record demonstrating reversible error];
Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 574 [“[i]t is well settled, of
course, that a party challenging a judgment has the burden of
proving reversible error by an adequate record”].) The Hagos
parties contend the trial court improperly considered matters
beyond the allegations of Hepler’s complaint and their answer to
the complaint when ruling on the motion. However, they elected
not to provide either document in the record they designated for
their appeal. It is impossible for us to determine what has been
alleged in the missing documents and, therefore, to assess
whether the trial court committed error by considering matters
not included in them. (See generally Jameson v. Desta (2018)
5 Cal.5th 594, 609 [“‘“if the record is inadequate for meaningful
review, the appellant defaults and the decision of the trial court
should be affirmed”’”]; Randall v. Mousseau (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th
929, 935 [“[f]ailure to provide an adequate record on an issue
requires that the issue be resolved against appellant”].)
       The Hagos parties make no other substantive challenge to
the trial court’s ruling. In particular, they do not contend the
court misconstrued the provisions of the Probate Code it cited or
misapplied those provisions when ruling the March 16, 2019
purchase agreement and the August 11, 2020 limited power of
attorney were void.

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      4. The Hagos Parties Failed To Identify Amendments That
         Would Cure the Defects in Their Answer
       The Hagos parties’ final argument is that the trial court
abused its discretion in granting Hepler’s motion without
allowing them to file an amended answer, as authorized by
section 438, subdivision (h)(1).9 As the Hagos parties
acknowledge, it is their burden on appeal to demonstrate a
reasonable possibility an amendment would cure the defects in
their answer identified by the trial court. (See King v.
CompPartners, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 1039, 1050; Goodman v.
Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349; Akhlaghpour v. Orantes
(2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 232, 242.) To carry that burden, they must
“‘show in what manner [they] can amend [their answer] and how
that amendment will change the legal effect of [their] pleading.’”
(Salazar v. Target Corp. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 571, 577; accord,
Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594,
618 [“‘“The burden of proving such reasonable possibility is
squarely on the plaintiff.”’ [Citation.] To satisfy this burden, “‘a
plaintiff ‘must show in what manner he can amend his complaint
and how that amendment will change the legal effect of his
pleading’”’ by clearly stating not only the legal basis for the
amendment, but also the factual allegations to sufficiently state a
cause of action”].)
       Arguing it was an abuse of discretion to deny leave to
amend, the Hagos parties assert the trial court implied the facts
alleged in their cross-complaint, if included in the answer, would
have changed the ruling on the motion. That analysis, they

9       Section 438, subdivision (h)(1), provides, “The motion
provided for in this section may be granted with or without leave
to file an amended complaint or answer, as the case may be.”

                                 10
contend, establishes a reasonable possibility the defects in their
answer could be cured through amendment.
      This argument—the sole ground advanced for seeking leave
to amend—is predicated on a misrepresentation of the trial
court’s order. As discussed, after noting the allegations contained
in the Hagos parties’ opposition papers regarding the effect of the
limited power of attorney had been included in their cross-
complaint, but not their answer, the court nonetheless
considered—and rejected—the argument that, by signing that
document after issuance of the letters of administration, Hepler
properly authorized the sale of the Pasadena property.
      The Hagos parties identify no other factual allegations they
could include in any amended pleading, let alone explain how
additional allegations would change the legal effect of their
answer. There was no abuse of discretion in denying leave to
amend.
                         DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Hepler is to recover his costs on
appeal.

                                     PERLUSS, P. J.

      We concur.

            SEGAL, J.

            FEUER, J.

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