Court Opinion

ID: 9700739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 21:47:40.125574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:24.542072
License: Public Domain

White, J.,
dissenting in part.
Neb. Const. art. VII, §1, states that the Legislature shall provide for the free instruction in the common schools of the state of all persons between the ages of 5 and 21. The constitutional provision is not self-executing. State ex rel. Shineman v. Board of Education, 152 Neb. 644, 42 N.W.2d 168 (1950). To carry out the commands of the Constitution, the Legislature has specified the duties of the State Board of *170Education, the Commissioner of Education, and the State Department of Education. Neb. Const. art. VII, §§ 2 to 4. See Neb. Rev. Stat. ch. 79 (Reissue 1987 & Cum. Supp. 1992).
From an analysis of article VII of our Constitution, certain conclusions are readily apparent. Among them: (1) The Constitution does not define what constitutes “instruction,” leaving that to be defined by the Legislature; (2) the right to “free instruction” is a right that may be asserted and protected by resorting to the courts, Neb. Const, art. I, §§ 3 and 13; (3) in determining whether “free instruction” has been denied, the courts may review the action of the Legislature and decide whether the instruction provided comports with the constitutional command; and (4) the Constitution does not require that the financial burden of free instruction be borne uniformly.
Less certain, and subject to determination in an appropriate case, is whether the right to free instruction is a fundamental right, rendering any legislation affecting free instruction subject to strict scrutiny.
I agree with the majority that an unequal method of financing of a school district’s instruction budget is not a per se violation of the Nebraska Constitution. However, I strongly disagree with any implication that unequal financing may not be considered in the overall determination of whether the district is supplying at least a minimum quality of instruction to its students. I, therefore, agree with that portion of the opinion which states that the trial court should have sustained the demurrers. I submit that the petition may easily be amended to state a cause of action, and, therefore, I dissent from the portion of the opinion dismissing the action.
This court has consistently held that after a demurrer is sustained, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity to amend the petition unless it is clear that there is no reasonable possibility that the plaintiff will be able to remedy the deficiency. LaPan v. Myers, 241 Neb. 790, 491 N.W.2d 46 (1992); Pappas v. Sommer, 240 Neb. 609, 483 N.W.2d 146 (1992); Barelmann v. Fox, 239 Neb. 771, 478 N.W.2d 548 (1992); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Touche Ross & Co., 234 Neb. 789, 452 N.W.2d 746 (1990); Fowler v. Nat. Bank of *171Commerce, 209 Neb. 861, 312 N.W.2d 269 (1981).
The pleadings do not indicate that it would be impossible for the appellants to amend the petition to include facts that demonstrate that the education being provided by the appellees is constitutionally inadequate. I therefore submit that the appellants should be granted an opportunity to amend their petition.
Shanahan, J., joins in this dissent.