Court Opinion

ID: 9566916
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:44:47.045983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:02.207124
License: Public Domain

The opinion of the court was delivered by
Price, J.:
This appeal arises out of a condemnation proceeding wherein the Kansas Gas and Electric Company, a corporation, sought to appropriate a right of way across land owned by A. W. Cline for the purpose of constructing an electric high line.
For convenience, we will refer to the condemner as the company and to the condemnee as the owner.
The commissioners in condemnation awarded the owner a total of $8,935 damages. He appealed to the district court, his notice of appeal setting forth that he
“. . . is dissatisfied with and aggrieved by and intends to and does hereby appeal from the award of damages made by appraisers appointed by the District Court of Montgomery County, Kansas, in the above-entitled matter, to the District Court of said County, . .
*156Following trial in the district court, the jury awarded damages in a total amount of $8,500. In entering judgment for that amount the court allowed the owner interest from the date of taking on a portion of the judgment and assessed the costs equally between the parties.
The owner has appealed, specifying numerous errors, and the company has filed a cross-appeal, specifying error in the allowance of interest on a portion of the judgment and in dividing the costs.
At this point it should be stated that throughout the condemnation proceeding itself, and on appeal to the district court from the award of appraisers, the owner vigorously asserted and contended that the company did not possess the right of eminent domain; that its petition for condemnation did not state a cause of action; that the petition failed to show a public necessity for the condemnation; that the property sought to be condemned was not being condemned for a public use and purpose, and that he, the owner, was being deprived of his property without due process of law in violation of the Federal constitution.
The position of the trial court throughout the proceeding, and in the appeal from the award of appraisers, was that the only matter in issue was the question of damages to be awarded to the owner— that is, how much was he to be allowed for property actually taken and for damage to that remaining.
In thus limiting the issues the trial court was entirely correct.
In State v. Boicourt Hunting Ass’n, 177 Kan. 637, 282 P. 2d 395, it was held that a landowner may not, in a condemnation proceeding, litigate the validity of the proposed condemnation and the right to appropriate property. Later cases dealing with the general subject are Board of Education of the City of Nickerson v. Gum, 178 Kan. 397, 398, 285 P. 2d 780; Ottawa Hunting Ass’n v. State, 178 Kan. 460, 461, 289 P. 2d 754, (cert. denied, 352 U. S. 804, 1 L. ed. 2d 38, 77 S. Ct. 31); Bumm v. Colvin, 181 Kan. 630, 636, 312 P. 2d 827.
Adherence to this rule, however, does not mean that a landowner whose property is sought to be taken in a condemnation proceeding is without remedy. If he desires to litigate questions such as were attempted to be litigated here, he is entitled to file a separate independent action, such as for injunctive relief, and we are aware of no reason why the filing of such independent action would in any way preclude him from also appealing from the award of appraisers in the event he is dissatisfied therewith. In other words, a landowner *157is not deprived of any of his rights with respect to the validity of the condemnation proceeding itself — the only requirement is that in order to enforce such rights he merely is required to raise them in a separate independent action.
In the case before us the owner did not follow that procedure, but attempted to litigate those questions in the condemnation proceeding, and, as stated, the trial court was correct in ruling that on the appeal from the award of appraisers the only issue before it was the question of damages.
It follows, therefore, that the owner’s specifications of error touching questions of the validity of the condemnation proceeding are without merit and cannot be sustained, and we are concerned with only those alleged trial errors relating to the one matter in issue— the amount of damages.
The electric high line in question carries 69,000 volts, and the owner claimed damages for alleged radio and television interference in his home. In attempting to establish this element of damage he offered the testimony of a Mr. Young, a resident of Coffeyville, who was employed in electrical work for the Ozark Electric Company. This witness held a bachelor of science degree, with a major in electrical engineering, from Kansas State College, and had been engaged in electrical work off and on for many years. He was not a licensed electrical engineer, had not worked with television, but had engaged in radio repair work for about ten years. The company objected to the testimony of this witness as an expert relative to radio and television interference resulting from proximity of electric lines and moved that all of his testimony in that connection be stricken and the jury admonished to disregard it. The court expressed the opinion that the witness had not qualified himself as an expert in that phase of the electrical business and sustained the objection.
We believe the ruling was erroneous. The testimony of this witness covers some thirteen pages of the abstract, but no useful purpose would be served by detailing it. We have studied it, and are of the opinion the jury should have been permitted to consider it in connection with the other evidence in the case touching on the subject.
Next it is contended the court erred in refusing to admit evidence offered by the owner and in admitting evidence offered by the company over the objection of the owner.
*158In this connection, it is contended the court erred in permitting three witnesses for the company to testify, over objection, how much damage the owner had sustained by reason of the limitations placed upon his use of his property because of the condemnation of the fifty-foot right of way.
We believe the court erred in permitting such testimony in the form and manner in which it was elicited. The true measure of damage in a case such as this is the value of the property actually taken, together with the diminution in value of that remaining, and is to be based upon the best and most advantageous use to which the property may be put (Mai v. City of Garden City, 177 Kan. 179, 277 P. 2d 636), and we fail to see the competency or materiality of tire theory of limitation of use.
Complaint also is maie that the court unduly and erroneously restricted the owner’s cross-examination of certain witnesses on behalf of the company.
In his opening statement, the owner told the jury that an 81-acre tract immediately south of his property had recently been sold for $111,000 for the purpose of developing it for high-type homes in a highly restricted district. One of the company’s witnesses, a real-estate dealer, gave his opinion as to the amount of damage the owner had sustained by reason of the condemnation, and on cross-examination was asked concerning the sale of the 81-acre tract referred to. Objection was made and sustained. Another witness for the company, who, on direct-examination, had been permitted to testify as to how much damage the owner had sustained because of the limitations placed upon his use of the property by the condemnation, was asked on cross-examination if he had an opinion as to the value of the owner’s property. He replied in the affirmative, but, on objection by the company, was not permitted to state his opinion. We think that both of these rulings were erroneous. While, as a general rule, it is true that the issue of what an owner should receive for land condemned may not be established by some specific or exceptional sale in the neighborhood, yet, in order to test the knowledge of witnesses and the value and weight of opinions given by them as to values, they may be asked on cross-examination concerning other transactions and as to sales of other property. (Railway Co. v. Weidenmann, 77 Kan. 300, 94 Pac. 146.) For a discussion of the general rule relating to the scope and extent of cross-examination in matters such as this, see also Bourgeois v.
*159In our opinion the erroneous rulings heretofore mentioned are of such gravity that it may not be said the owner’s rights were not prejudicially affected thereby, and we therefore believe that he is entitled to a new trial.
In view of this disposition, it follows that discussion of the company’s cross-appeal with respect to the allowance of interest on a portion of the judgment and the division of costs in the trial court between the parties becomes unnecessary. Costs naturally will follow whatever judgment ultimately may be rendered, and with respect to the matter of interest the subject is fully covered in the recent case of Burke v. Board of Education of Common School District No. 110, 181 Kan. 534, 313 P. 2d 272.
The judgment is reversed with directions to grant a new trial.