Court Opinion

ID: 9375709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-28 17:08:36.6817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:01.083697
License: Public Domain

J-S42002-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    JENNIFER ORSINI                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ALFRED ORSINI                              :
                                               :
                     Appellant                 :   No. 791 WDA 2022

                  Appeal from the Order Entered June 28, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Civil Division at No(s):
                             No. 3323 of 2019, G.D.

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                            FILED: FEBRUARY 28, 2023

        Alfred Orsini (“Husband”) appeals from the final divorce decree related

to Jennifer Orsini (“Wife”). We affirm.

        Husband and Wife were married on August 21, 2004. The day prior, the

parties entered into a prenuptial agreement wherein Wife relinquished her

rights to, inter alia, alimony and all of Husband’s assets, including property

acquired during the marriage. In 2019, Wife initiated the underlying matter

by filing a complaint for divorce. As part of the divorce proceedings, Wife filed

a motion to set aside the prenuptial agreement. According to Wife, the parties

did not discuss prenuptial agreements during their engagement and her

signature on the agreement was obtained by fraud, misrepresentation,

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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duress, and undue influence. See Motion to Set Aside Prenuptial Agreement,

1/15/20, at unnumbered 2.

      The court held a hearing on the motion. Wife testified on her own behalf.

Husband testified and presented testimony from Kim Brundage, his ex-fiancé

and Wife’s friend, as well as his sister, Coleen Orsini Pongoriero. Much of the

testimony surrounded Wife’s affair during their lengthy engagement and

Husband’s decision to seek a prenuptial agreement as a result. There were

disputes regarding when Wife learned about the prenuptial agreement, but

both parties testified that Wife first saw the actual agreement the day before

the wedding. After taking the matter under advisement, the court granted

Wife’s motion to set aside the prenuptial agreement, finding that she “was not

afforded any opportunity to seek the advice of counsel” because she first saw

the agreement the day before the wedding.        Order, 2/1/22 (emphasis in

original). The court also “credit[ed] Wife’s testimony that she was not advised

to seek counsel by counsel for Husband or by Husband and the agreement

itself prepared by counsel for Husband makes no reference to Wife waiving

counsel or being afforded the opportunity to seek her own counsel.” Id. at

n.1 (capitalization altered).

      Thereafter, the parties proceeded to an equitable distribution hearing

before a court-appointed master.       The master produced a report and

recommendation regarding the division of marital property.      Husband filed

exceptions to the master’s report, which were denied. On June 29, 2022, a

final divorce decree was entered.    This timely filed appeal followed.   Both

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Husband and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.        Husband

raises the following issues for our consideration:

      I.    Whether the Honorable trial court factually and legally erred
            and abused its discretion in finding that the prenuptial
            agreement, dated August 20, 2004, was invalid based on
            “duress” by clear and convincing evidence for each and
            every of the following reasons:

            a. [Wife] failed to sustain her heavy burden of proof
               to establish duress in that she offered not a breath
               of testimony that [Husband] engaged in a
               systematic pattern of emotional, mental, and
               physical abuse perpetuated against her prior to, up
               to, or during the signing of the prenuptial
               agreement.

            b. [Wife] failed to sustain her heavy burden of proof
               to establish duress in that she failed to offer any
               testimony that [Husband] engaged in a web of
               domestic violence, control, manipulation, and
               intimidation against her prior to, up to, or during
               the signing of the prenuptial agreement.

            c. [Wife] failed to sustain her heavy burden of proof
               to establish duress in that she failed to offer
               testimony that she was under any mental defect
               prior to, up to, or during the signing of the
               prenuptial agreement that rendered her incapable
               of understanding the terms and conditions of the
               prenuptial agreement.

            d. [Wife] failed to sustain her heavy burden of proof
               to establish duress in that she failed to offer
               testimony evidencing [Husband] manipulated her
               prior to, up to or during the signing of the
               prenuptial agreement.

            e. [Wife] failed to sustain her heavy burden of proof
               to establish duress in that she failed to offer any
               testimony that there existed any degree of
               restraint or danger, either inflicted or threatened

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                 and impending on the part of [Husband], which
                 was sufficient in severity or apprehension to
                 overcome the mind of a person of ordinary
                 firmness such as herself.

              f. [Wife] failed to sustain her heavy burden of proof
                 to establish duress in that she offered no testimony
                 that she was uncomfortable signing the prenuptial
                 agreement without consulting an independent
                 attorney of her choosing, despite the agreement
                 being signed on the eve of the parties’ wedding.
                 [Wife1] also failed to offer testimony that she was
                 not given the opportunity to obtain independent
                 legal counsel prior to signing the prenuptial
                 agreement.

              g. [Wife]’s testimony was not credible nor believable
                 on the issue of duress and was contradictory to
                 witness testimony. [Wife] testified that she felt
                 pressured to sign the prenuptial agreement.

              h. The special divorce master erred in her report and
                 recommendation by not considering the terms of
                 the prenuptial agreement entered into by the
                 parties.

Husband’s brief at 6-7 (capitalization altered).

       Although framed as several separate issues, Husband raises a single

issue in the argument section of his brief. Specifically, Husband claims that

Wife failed to meet her burden of proof to establish duress and the court

therefore erred in setting aside the prenuptial agreement and preventing the

special master from distributing the marital estate in accordance with the

____________________________________________

1 In his statement of questions, Husband referred to himself at this juncture.
See Husband’s brief at 7 (“The Appellant also failed to offer testimony that
she was not given the opportunity to obtain independent legal counsel prior
to signing the prenuptial agreement.” (emphasis added)). We have corrected
this apparent error within this memorandum.

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prenuptial agreement. See Husband’s brief at 27. We consider this issue

pursuant to the following legal framework.

       Prenuptial agreements are contracts and are therefore governed by

contract principles.    See Stackhouse v. Zaretsky, 900 A.2d 383, 386

(Pa.Super. 2006). “In determining whether the trial court properly applied

contract principles, the reviewing court must decide, based on all the

evidence, whether the trial court committed an error of law or abuse of

discretion.” Lewis v. Lewis, 234 A.3d 706, 711 (Pa.Super. 2020) (cleaned

up).   “An abuse of discretion is not lightly found, as it requires clear and

convincing evidence that the trial court misapplied the law or failed to follow

proper legal procedures.”      Stackhouse, supra at 386 (cleaned up).       In

conducting this review, “we will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding

function.”    Lewis, supra at 711 (cleaned up).    For any questions of law,

however, our standard of review is de novo and our scope plenary. Id.

       In the case sub judice, Wife and Husband had differing accounts

surrounding Wife’s knowledge of the prenuptial agreement before it was

signed.      Wife testified that the parties had never discussed a prenuptial

agreement until the day before their wedding. See N.T., 1/14/21, at 17. To

wit, in the afternoon on the day before the wedding, Husband showed up at

Wife’s home, unannounced, and told her that they were going for a ride. Id.

at 21. When she twice asked where they were going, he responded that she

would see when they got there. Id. at 21-22. Eventually, during the car ride,

Husband told her that they were going to an attorney’s office to sign a

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prenuptial agreement. Id. at 22. When they arrived, Wife was taken to a

conference room that already had papers set on the table.           Id.   After

Husband’s attorney had her sit down, he “flipped through the pages and read

[Husband’s] property off and then he read hers and he said, ‘here, sign.’” Id.

at 23.   We note that Husband had listed twenty-seven items of property

belonging to him, including real estate, vehicles, firearms, financial accounts,

furniture, and electronics, whereas Wife’s property consisted of only two

items: her home and her vehicle.

      Wife further testified that Husband’s attorney did not inquire whether

she had previously spoken with an attorney or suggest that she should. Id.

According to Wife, Husband’s attorney appeared to be under the impression

that Wife was privy to the agreement. Id. Wife testified that she signed the

agreement after Husband signed.       Id. at 26.    She stated that she was

confused, caught off guard, very upset, did not say much, and was crying

because she felt “betrayed” and “a little bit hijacked[.]” Id. at 22-23. After

the agreement was signed, Husband paid his attorney and drove Wife home

in silence. Id. at 28-29. She elucidated that she had been in shock at the

time and felt pressured to sign the prenuptial agreement because the wedding

was the next morning and everything was already planned. Id. at 28-29.

      Husband, on the other hand, testified that as a result of Wife’s affair

during their engagement, he told her a few weeks before the wedding that he

would only marry her if she signed a prenuptial agreement. Id. at 59-60. He

claimed that Wife provided the information for the two items appended to the

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agreement that were designated as hers, and that she knew beforehand that

they were going to the attorney’s office to sign the agreement. Id. at 61-63.

He agreed, however, that Wife did not see the prenuptial agreement itself until

the day before the wedding. Id. at 70.

      In granting the motion to set aside the prenuptial agreement, the trial

court found Wife’s testimony credible. Much of Husband’s argument on appeal

challenges this credibility determination, arguing that the court “failed to

conduct a thorough examination of the party’s testimony which would have

exposed to the light of reality no basis for invalidating the prenuptial

agreement on the basis of ‘duress.’” Husband’s brief at 27; see also id. at

21-24 (arguing that Husband’s testimony was corroborated by other witnesses

while Wife’s was not). According to Husband, “[e]ven if one gives the slightest

degree of credit to [Wife]’s testimony that the prenuptial agreement was

signed on the eve of the wedding there was nothing to have prevented her

from signing it, consulting an attorney or simply calling off the wedding. No

restraints,   no   threats   and   certainly   no   abuse   (past   or   present)

perpetuated [sic] by [Husband].” Husband’s brief at 26-27.

      Insofar as Husband asks this Court to reweigh the evidence, that is

outside the purview of this Court. See Lewis, supra at 713 (“The problem

with [appellant’s] argument is that he mistakenly believes it is our role to

reweigh evidence.”). The trial court heard the testimony offered by Husband

and Wife, as well as the parties’ attempts at impeachment and corroboration,

and believed Wife based on the testimony offered and the text of the

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prenuptial agreement. As this Court has explained, it fell to the trial court to

determine the facts by assessing the credibility of multiple witnesses, a task

that not only this Court “does not relish” but, “without having the benefit of

observing the parties firsthand, one we cannot perform.” Id. at 714.

      Upon review, we cannot say that the court’s decision to credit Wife’s

testimony was so unreasonable as to amount to an abuse of discretion.

Therefore, we will not overturn the court’s credibility determinations but are,

instead, bound by them. Our inquiry does not end here, however, as Husband

also challenges the trial court’s deduction from its factual findings that Wife

proved “duress to the degree that necessitated the setting aside of the

prenuptial agreement.” Husband’s brief at 20. This question is squarely within

our purview: “Whether the facts found by the trial court constitute duress as

a matter of law is a purely legal question for which our scope of review is

plenary, and our standard of review is de novo.”        Lewis, supra at 715

(cleaned up).

      We begin with an overview of the relevant legal principles.       “Absent

fraud, misrepresentation, or duress, parties are generally bound by the terms

of their agreements. Mutual assent is necessary to enter into a contract;

mutual assent does not exist however, when one of the contracting parties

elicits the assent of the other contracting party by means of duress.” Lewis,

supra at 714 (cleaned up).      Duress has been defined as “that degree of

restraint or danger, either actually inflicted or threatened and impending,

which is sufficient in severity or apprehension to overcome the mind of a

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person of ordinary firmness.” Id. at 715 (cleaned up). “A party who has

reasonable opportunity to consult with counsel before entering a contract

cannot later invalidate it by claiming duress.” Adams v. Adams, 848 A.2d

991, 994 (Pa.Super. 2004).

      “Because settlement agreements are presumed valid and binding, the

party seeking to avoid or nullify the agreement has the burden of proving the

invalidity of the agreement by clear and convincing evidence.” Lewis, supra

at 714 (cleaned up). This Court has emphasized the heavy burden a movant

bears in this context thusly:

      In our review of the relevant Pennsylvania case law, no spouse
      has ever convinced a court to void a settlement agreement on
      grounds of duress. There have been many instances where the
      party claiming duress suffered unseemly pressures to sign an
      agreement, but in each case, the courts concluded that those
      pressures did not constitute duress in the legal sense. For
      instance, in Simeone v. Simeone, 581 A.2d 162 (Pa. 1990), the
      claimant alleged she was forced to sign a prenuptial agreement
      on the eve of her wedding, “a time when she could not seek
      counsel without the trauma, expense, and embarrassment of
      postponing the wedding.” Id., 581 A.2d at 167. Likewise,
      in Hamilton v. Hamilton, 591 A.2d 720, 722 (Pa.Super. 1991),
      the claimant alleged she was told that without a prenuptial
      agreement, there would be no wedding, notwithstanding the fact
      that “she was pregnant, unemployed, and probably frightened.”
      In Lugg v. Lugg, 64 A.3d 1109, 1113-1114 (Pa.Super. 2013), we
      concluded that “[d]aily badgering and one and one-half hours of
      ‘pressure and negotiations’ does not rise to the level of coercion
      necessary to find duress.”

Lewis, supra at 715 (cleaned up); see also Adams, supra at 993 (“[T]he

mere fact appellant was faced with stress and anxiety resulting from her

divorce proceedings does not establish duress in the legal sense.”).

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Notwithstanding this heavy burden, this Court found duress in Lewis based

on, inter alia, threats of bodily harm and a history of varying forms of abuse.

      In his brief to this Court, Husband distinguishes Lewis’s finding of

duress   because    the   “systematic   pattern   of   physical   and   mental

abuse/manipulation” present in Lewis “was non-existent under the facts of

the instant case.” Husband’s brief at 27. Rather, Husband contends that the

circumstances of the case sub judice are more akin to Simeone, Hamilton,

and Lugg, where no duress was found.

      It is uncontroverted that the evidence adduced did not establish any

abuse surrounding the signing of the prenuptial agreement.         We do not,

however, read the foregoing cases as establishing a rule that duress will only

be found where there is a systematic pattern of abuse in place at the time of

signing the challenged agreement. Critically, the Lewis Court held that even

if the appellant’s actions did not amount to a threat of actual bodily harm, we

would still have concluded that the claimant established the legal definition of

duress “because [she] did not have the opportunity to consult with counsel.”

Lewis, supra at 719.

      In our case law, the duress claimant’s ability to consult with an
      attorney has often proved to be fatal to the claim. No matter how
      reprehensible the negotiation tactics were, if the claimant was
      able to consult with an attorney, the danger or restraint could not
      have been sufficiently severe to constitute legal duress.

Id.

      For example, in Simeone, the claimant contended “that the agreement

was executed under conditions of duress in that it was presented to her at 5

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p.m. on the eve of her wedding, a time when she could not seek counsel

without the trauma, expense, and embarrassment of postponing the

wedding.” Simeone, supra at 167. The master and reviewing courts found

this claim not to be credible because they gave credence to the testimony of

other witnesses that, although the claimant did not see the final version of the

agreement until the eve of the wedding, the parties “engaged in several

discussions . . . regarding the contents of the agreement during the six month

period preceding that date.” Id. Additionally, “legal counsel who prepared

the agreement for appellee testified that, prior to the eve of the wedding,

changes were made in the agreement to increase the sums payable to [the

claimant] in the event of separation or divorce.” Id. Finally, our Supreme

Court “noted, too, that during the months when the agreement was being

discussed [the claimant] had more than sufficient time to consult with

independent legal counsel if she had so desired.” Id.

      In Hamilton, the claimant was told “that without the agreement there

would be no wedding” and, at the time, “she was pregnant, unemployed, and

probably frightened.”    Hamilton, supra, at 722.        However, this Court

emphasized that “she was represented by counsel, who was available to

advise and did, in fact, advise her not to sign the agreement.” Id. That she

chose to ignore this advice and sign the agreement anyway evinced that she

did not sign under duress. See id.

      In Lugg, the claimant argued that the post-nuptial agreement should

be set aside because she signed it under duress. According to claimant, she

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was pressured daily to sign the agreement and there was a conspiracy to get

her to sign the agreement without her counsel being able to first review it.

See Lugg, supra at 1113. This Court rejected the claim of duress, finding

that the record belied her averments as she, in fact, contacted her attorney.

Moreover, in scheduling a meeting to sign the agreement, the claimant’s

husband included a note that contemplated the claimant showing the

proposed agreement to her attorney. See id. at 1114. Accordingly, this Court

found that there was no duress.

     Finally, in concluding that the appellant in Adams had failed to prove

duress, we highlighted the fact that “[t]he parties engaged in extensive

negotiations regarding the terms of the agreement” and the claimant

“consulted with her counsel on multiple occasions prior to entering the

agreement.” Adams, supra at 994.

     This Court concluded in Lewis that the claimant did not have the ability

to consult with an attorney. “When coupled with our analysis . . . regarding

[the claimant’s] inability to overcome the degree of restraint and danger, we

ultimately conclude[d the claimant] met the legal definition of duress.   As

such, the settlement agreement lacked mutual assent, rendering it voidable.”

Lewis, supra at 721.

     At first glance, the matter sub judice may seem more akin to Simeone

or Hamilton and not Lewis because of the underlying wedding pressures and

lack of abuse. However, we find one dispositive difference between this case

and Simeone and Hamilton: the lack of an opportunity to consult with an

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attorney. It was on this absence of opportunity that the trial court based its

finding of duress:

      The agreement consists of seven paragraphs, none of which states
      that Wife had an opportunity to review the agreement with
      counsel nor is there a provision where the parties acknowledge
      and affirm that each has made a true, correct, and complete
      representation of their financial status and all of the debts and/or
      obligations for which he or she presently is responsible. We note
      that the attachments to the agreement list approximately twenty-
      seven items for [Husband] and only a house and car for [Wife].
      Not only do we find this is not a full and fair disclosure, it was clear
      to the court that this supported the claim of [Wife] that she was
      blindsided by the prenuptial agreement the day before the
      wedding. The fact that neither a checking account or clothing,
      furniture, or any other personal items are listed lends a great deal
      of credibility to [Wife]’s claims and violate the full and fair
      disclosure requirement consistent with traditional principles of
      contract law.

Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/22, at 6-7 (cleaned up).

      The appellate courts did not reject the claims of duress in Simeone and

Hamilton because pressures attendant to weddings are per se insufficient to

establish duress. As discussed, our courts rejected those claims of duress

because the facts, as found by the finder of fact, established that the claimant

either had months to consult an attorney or in fact did consult an attorney.

As in Lewis, “[w]hether Wife had the opportunity to seek counsel turns on

the credibility of the witnesses.” Lewis, supra at 720.

      Instantly, the trial court credited Wife’s testimony that she was unaware

that Husband wanted a prenuptial agreement until she was brought to the

office of Husband’s attorney the day before her scheduled wedding and

presented with the agreement and a pen to sign it. While Husband focuses

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on his proffered evidence that he had discussed a prenuptial agreement in the

abstract with Wife a few weeks before the wedding, the trial court found that

testimony not credible.   Instead, it credited Wife’s testimony that she had

been caught wholly unaware by the agreement. She further testified that she

was in shock, confused, and felt pressured to sign the agreement so that

Husband would not cancel their planned wedding. See N.T., 1/14/21, at 28

(“[M]y wedding was the next morning. Everything was already done. I didn’t

want to start some huge argument and have him cancel everything and throw

it all away.”). Critically, Husband’s attorney did not ask her whether she had

spoken with an attorney nor provided the opportunity for her to do so.

      Based on the trial court’s credibility determinations, by which we are

bound, Wife did not see the prenuptial agreement until less than twenty-four

hours before her scheduled wedding. Since Wife did not know beforehand

that a prenuptial agreement was even being contemplated, she did not have

the opportunity to contact an attorney or negotiate the terms in any

meaningful way before seeing the finalized prenuptial agreement. In short,

Husband obtained Wife’s assent by way of an ultimatum “sufficient in severity

or apprehension to overcome the mind of a person of ordinary firmness.”

Lewis, supra at 715 (cleaned up).

      Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in concluding that Wife

signed the prenuptial agreement under duress and granting her motion to set

it aside. Accordingly, Husband was not wrongfully deprived of the benefit of

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the agreement in the master’s recommended distribution of the marital estate.

Thus, we affirm the order of the trial court.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/28/2023

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