Court Opinion

ID: 9616419
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:46:42.346543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:04.251898
License: Public Domain

GUTHRIE, Chief Justice,
with whom THOMAS, Justice, joins, concurring and dissenting in part.
I concur in the result and affirmance of the trial court’s judgment and join in the majority opinion except as to those portions thereof which are hereinafter set out.
I must most strongly dissent from that portion of the opinion which affirms the holding of the trial court “that it was a denial of the appellee’s right to a fair and impartial hearing for him to have been denied inquiry as on voir dire.” I cannot approve any opinion which would result in the addition of such a requirement to the proceedings of administrative bodies within this state. Contrary to the assumption of the trial court, administrative bodies in their performance of these functions must be compared with judges, not juries.
The parties herein have cited no authority, nor has the writer found any, which has given judicial recognition to the propriety of attaching a voir dire proceeding to an administrative hearing, nor any authority where its denial before an administrative body was deemed error. Thus, I will presume counsel found no such authorities, Nation v. State ex rel. Fire Fighters Local 279, I.A.F.F., Wyo., 518 P.2d 931, 933, and authorities cited. The case of Duffield v. Charleston Area Medical Center, Inc., 4 Cir., 503 F.2d 512, is in no manner applicable or helpful for the reason that in that case the board allowed the request for voir dire, so that this question could never have become the basis of decision. I would term such a procedure unduly burdensome and essentially ineffective; and without knowledgeable and able control, such as a judge might supply, it could become an instrument of interminable delay and confusion. Its probable effect might be to eliminate the rule of necessity mentioned in Justice Rose’s opinion, and which is a necessary part of administrative proceedings. Some body or group must be able to dispose of such matters, and in this instance the only possibility is the school board, Federal Trade Commission v. Cement Institutes, 333 U.S. 683, 68 S.Ct. 793, 803, 92 L.Ed. 1010, rehearing denied 334 U.S. 839, 68 S.Ct. 1492, 92 L.Ed. 1764.
Nor do I believe that an aggrieved party could be a victim of a decision by a biased, prejudiced board without relief, particularly if he at the time of hearing requested that the members of said body who might be prejudiced should recuse themselves; and that in event of their failure to do so, if the party asserting prejudice could produce such evidence or did thereafter discover evidence that there was bias and prejudice on the part of the board which deprived him of a fair hearing and affected the decision, it might be received under Rule 72.1(h), W.R.C.P. This statement must not be construed as in any manner suggesting that the members of such administrative bodies are any less men of probity or integrity, or insensible to their duties, than are judges. I do not deem it improper to suggest 'that such bodies have *1181the power, and that it may be desirable, to adopt a rule covering the disqualifications of its members. However, this is a mere suggestion inasmuch as there is no due process question in this case involving Spiegel because a disposal hereof favorable to him has been made on other grounds.