Court Opinion

ID: 9659727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:53:38.581782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:11.146179
License: Public Domain

Spencer, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion herein. The main issue presented by the appeal is the sufficiency of the evidence, under the applicable law, to sustain the judgment of the trial court.
Plaintiff’s father testified that he purchased the south half of Section 9 in 1938, and has owned it since that time. He has been familiar with the road in question since 1934, and has always considered it a public or open road. He used it as such whenever he had occasion to do so. On occasions, the county tractor had on request dragged it in the winter. His testimony placed the road between Sections 8 and 9, going north to Highway No. 12. In addition to his own use, he gave the names of others who had used the road since the early 1930’s.
Plaintiff testified to his use of the road for 50 to 150 trips annually. He gave the names of several others who have used the road since 1934. There was a gate at the highway. This action resulted when the defendant padlocked the gate after a dispute with the plaintiff and the plaintiff cut the padlock.
Martin G. Grooms testified that he was familiar with the road because he had traveled it years ago. His use of the road covered the period from 1932 into the 1950’s. He knows from observation the road was used by the public for that period. He has not been in the area since the 1950’s. In 1932, through 1934, he cut wood *105in the canyon below this property and built a cabin there. The road at that time was well-traveled and was the only way in and out. He had never asked permission of anyone to use it, and knows of his own knowledge that it was used by the public for more than 10 years continuously as a public road. In 1933, he built a road below this one through the canyon south of Sections 8 and 9. This road then was open all the way from present Highway No. 12 to the river.
The testimony of defendant at one place on direct examination appears to corroborate plaintiff’s evidence. It is as follows: “Q All right. Now, was there, at that time, when you acquired this, a road going straight south from the northeast corner of Section Eight down clear across the section, or down towards the north half of the section? A Yeh. Q There was a road there? A Yes.” Defendant’s testimony otherwise would seem to indicate that Highway No. 12 was an old concrete trail, rough and hilly, previous to 1961; that it had very little use; and, while there were a few trails across his land, there was no road. It was his testimony the Connots had a road across the south half of Sections 9 and 10 which they used. Except for a few occasions when he saw the plaintiff hauling hay on the area in question, he did not see the Connots using the alleged road. None of the Connots asked his permission to use the road, and he doesn’t know of anyone who was prohibited from using it in the 1930’s.
Defendant’s brother-in-law testified there was a road but he could not give the date nor the exact location. He placed it across this area to the highway. His testimony was to the effect this road was extensively used back in the early years.
Fred R. Grooms testified he traveled the road as early as 1914. He placed the road along the section line on the west side. The road went clear down into the canyon, and it was used by folks in the canyon going north. Most of them came out over this road.
*106There are two aerial photographs of the area in evidence, one taken in 1939, the other taken October 17, 1955. Both indicate the presence of a road between Sections 8 and 9, as well as a trail on Section 8. Exhibit 4 is a general highway and transportation map of Cherry County as of January 1, 1937. It clearly shows a road between the section lines at the exact spot where the trial court found a public road to exist.
The plaintiff has shown open, visible, continuous, and unmolested use of the road for a period of time sufficient to acquire an ¡easement by adverse user. In such instance, the use would be presumed to be under a claim of right. See Hopkins v. Hill (1955), 160 Neb. 29, 68 N. W. 2d 678. In that case we said: “If the use of an easement has been open, adverse, notorious, peaceable, and uninterrupted, the owner of the servient tenement is charged with knowledge of such use, and acquiescence in it is implied.” Plaintiff’s use and that of his father started before defendant acquired the north half of Sections 8 and 9.
In Pierce v. Rabe (1964), 177 Neb. 745, 131 N. W. 2d 183, we said: “The use and enjoyment which will create title by prescription to an easement are substantially the same in quality and characteristics as the adverse possession which will give title to real estate. The use and enjoyment must be adverse, under claim of right, continuous, notorious, exclusive, with the knowledge and acquiescence of the owner of the servient tenement, must continue for the full prescriptive period, and must be substantially identical.”
In Pierce v. Rabe, supra, we further said: “If the owner of land encloses it with a fence and installs gates therein at the entrance and exit where the right-of-way is claimed across the tract, it is evidence that he recognizes the right of those who use the road to continue to use it.”
Passing for the moment the finding of a public road, *107the evidence herein is ample to establish a prescriptive right to an easement.
While plaintiff’s action was for an easement, the trial court found a public road to exist, and that the plaintiff had the right to use the same without interference by the defendant. From exhibit 4, there can be little question a public road did exist at the point involved on January 1, 1937. This was before defendant acquired his property. While the county has not maintained the road, plaintiff’s evidence would indicate it has been used since that time by the plaintiff, his family, and other members of the general public.
To establish a highway by prescription, it must be shown there was use by the general public under a claim of right, adverse to the owner of the land on some particular or (defined line of travel, uninterruptedly without substantial change for a period of time necessary to bar an action to recover the land. However, in this respect, it is not indispensable to the establishment of a highway by prescription that there has been no deviation in the line of travel. If the course of travel has remained substantially unchanged for the full period, it is sufficient, even though at times to avoid encroachments, obstructions, or the like upon the road there have been slight changes in the line of travel. See State ex rel. Game, Forestation & Parks Commission v. Hull (1959), 168 Neb. 805, 97 N. W. 2d 535.
The evidence was sufficient to show the establishment of a road previous to the time the defendant acquired his property. In the Hull case, supra, we held that the change in the course of a road after the right of the public is established by use for the statutory period does not defeat the public right to the use of the road as previously established.
While the evidence is not as clear as I would like to have it as to the exact location of the road in question, I feel it is sufficient to sustain the finding of the trial court. The Cherry County highway transportation map *108definitely indicates the road was well established at least by January 1, 1937.
I have determined the evidence was sufficient to permit the trial court to find that a public road existed along the section line dividing the northeast quarter of Section 8 and the northwest quarter of Section 9. The evidence is fairly conclusive that there had been a road in the area which was used as a thoroughfare by the public for many years previous to the acquisition of the property of the parties herein.
The trial court inspected the area in question. He had an opportunity to personally observe the manner and conduct of the witnesses in testifying; and the exhibits in evidence tend to support his finding.
The following rule enunciated in Satterfield v. Dunne (1966), 180 Neb. 274, 142 N. W. 2d 345, is particularly pertinent herein: “When an action in equity is appealed, it is the duty of this court to try the issues de novo and to reach an independent conclusion without reference to the findings of the district court. Where in such a case the trial court has made a personal examination of the physical facts, and where, in the same case, the oral evidence in respect of material issues is so conflicting that it cannot be reconciled, this court will consider the fact that such examination was made and that such court observed the witnesses and their manner of testifying, and must have accepted one version of the facts rather than the opposite.”
From the above, it is apparent to me that the judgment entered by the district court is correct and should be affirmed.
Smith, J., concurs with the dissenting opinion by Spencer, J.