Court Opinion

ID: 9840035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 23:00:25.83576+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:06:14.460007
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 21-1700

                    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Appellee,

                               v.

                              A.R.,

                      Defendant, Appellant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                 FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

         [Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge]

                             Before

                  Gelpí, Lynch, and Montecalvo,
                         Circuit Judges.

     Joanna E. LeRoy, Assistant Federal Public Defender, with whom
Eric Alexander Vos, Federal Public Defender, Franco L. Pérez-
Redondo, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Supervisor, Appeals
Section,   and   Alejandra  Bird-López,   Research   and   Writing
Specialist, were on brief, for appellant.
     Gregory B. Conner, Assistant United States Attorney, with
whom W. Stephen Muldrow, United States Attorney, and Mariana E.
Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, Appellate
Division, were on brief, for appellee.

                       September 14, 2023
                GELPÍ,    Circuit     Judge.         A.R.,    born   in    2003,   was

adjudicated delinquent in a proceeding under the Federal Juvenile

Delinquency Act ("FJDA"), 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042, pursuant to his

admission of aiding and abetting an attempted robbery of a motor

vehicle (Count One) and five carjackings (Counts Two through Six),

all of which would have been a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119(1)

and (2) had he been an adult.                    The district court ordered A.R.

detained in a juvenile institution until he reaches twenty-one

years      of    age,    followed     by     a    term   of   juvenile     delinquent

supervision.

                A.R. primarily challenges the district court's order of

a detention period rather than a probationary one.                    Specifically,

A.R. posits that the district court erred in:                         (1) making an

incorrect -- but unobjected to -- comment at the admission hearing

that a substantial assistance motion from the government would be

necessary in order to consider A.R.'s cooperation; (2) ordering a

Presentence Report ("PSR"), as requested by his trial counsel,

instead of a "comprehensive study" as provided for in the FJDA,

see   18    U.S.C.       § 5037(e);    and       (3) considering     and   improperly

weighing the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors in its disposition.

Additionally, A.R. claims that the district court erred in failing

to recommend that A.R. be placed in a local detention facility.

Separately, the government and A.R. agree that the district court

                                           - 2 -
erred in imposing a term of detention and supervision that together

exceeded the applicable statutory maximum.

          After careful review, we affirm the district court as to

its imposition of detention rather than a probationary period.

However, we remand to the district court the last two matters.

          I. Background

          Relevant Facts

          The events giving rise to this case date back to late

2019 and early 2020, when A.R. had not yet reached his eighteenth

birthday and he committed a sequence of carjackings alongside

another then-minor ("L.R.") and an adult, Erick De Jesús-Torres

("De Jesús").

          December 20, 2019: The First Carjacking

          On the night of December 20, 2019, L.R. requested an

Uber ride for the trio from the Manuel A. Pérez public housing

project in San Juan to Carolina, two cities in Puerto Rico.      The

Uber driver arrived in a blue Toyota C-HR.    A.R. and L.R. sat in

the back, while De Jesús sat in the passenger seat.   Once at their

destination, De Jesús stopped the Uber car's engine as L.R. exited

the vehicle and, holding a weapon, opened the driver's door and

told him to get out of the car.   The Uber driver complied, and the

trio, after searching his pockets, drove the Toyota C-HR back to

the Manuel A. Pérez public housing project.   Later that night, the

three went for a ride in the stolen vehicle and were involved in

                              - 3 -
an accident.    They fled the scene afoot.

          December 23, 2019: The Second Carjacking

          Three days after the first carjacking, L.R. requested an

Uber ride for the same trio from the Ernesto Ramos Antonini public

housing project in San Juan.    The Uber driver arrived in a white

Hyundai Accent and took them to some location, which from the

record cannot be adduced.      Once there, De Jesús stopped the

vehicle's engine while L.R. took the driver out of the car,

searched the driver, seized from her $350 in cash, and left her

there, with A.R. driving the trio to the Manuel A. Pérez public

housing project in the Hyundai Accent.       L.R. and De Jesús then

went out for a ride in the carjacked vehicle while A.R. remained

at L.R.'s apartment.

          December 31, 2019: The Third Carjacking

          New Year's Eve did not stop the        trio from further

wrongdoing.    Again at the Manuel A. Pérez public housing project,

L.R. requested an Uber ride.    A driver in a red Hyundai Elantra

picked them up and took them to their specified location.      Upon

arrival, De Jesús stopped the vehicle's engine, exited, and walked

around the car.    He opened the driver's door and told the driver

to get out.    The victim reported that the trio gestured as though

they had a weapon, but he did not actually see it.    L.R. searched

the driver and got into his seat.   The three carjackers then drove

back to the housing project, leaving the driver behind.

                                - 4 -
          Night of January 2-3, 2020: Attempted Carjacking and Two
New Successful Carjackings

              At approximately 10:40 p.m. on January 2, 2020, A.R.,

L.R., and De Jesús requested an Uber ride from a location near the

Plaza Escorial Mall in Carolina.          A female driver picked them up

in her blue Kia Soul and drove them to their drop-off location.

Upon arrival, De Jesús stopped the vehicle's engine while L.R.

held   what    appeared   to   be   a   firearm   to   the   driver's   neck.

Defiantly, the driver refused to exit the car.          L.R. unbuckled the

driver's seatbelt, while De Jesús took her cellphone and ordered

her to unlock it.     The driver told them that they could shoot her

but she was not going to let go of her car.              Right after, L.R.

struck the driver in the face and ordered her not to look at him.

A struggle ensued as she grabbed the steering wheel while both

A.R. and L.R. again struck her several times in an attempt to

remove her from the vehicle.            The driver started honking the

vehicle's horn repeatedly, and the trio eventually fled on foot

towards a nearby bowling alley with $120 in cash taken from the

driver and her cellphone.

              At the bowling alley, a friend of L.R. called them an

Uber ride.      An Uber driver arrived in a white Hyundai Accent and

drove them to their specified location (undisclosed in the record).

When they arrived, De Jesús stopped the car's engine, while L.R.

stepped out, took the driver out of the car, searched him, and

                                    - 5 -
returned to the back seat.          A.R. moved to the driver's seat, drove

to Plaza Carolina Mall, and parked the carjacked vehicle near a

restaurant.

              From there, L.R. requested another Uber ride for the

group.    This time a black Toyota Yaris picked them up.                  At some

point during the trip, L.R. ordered the Uber driver to make a U-

turn.    The driver complied.        Immediately, L.R. told the driver to

get out of the car while pointing a pellet gun at the driver's

head.    The driver exited his vehicle.               After frisking the Uber

driver, L.R. sat in the back seat and A.R. again drove the trio

back to Plaza Carolina Mall.

              The Arrest

              Meanwhile, around midnight on January 3, 2020, the Uber

driver   of    the   blue   Kia   Soul     utilized    the   "Find   my   iPhone"

application, which showed her that her stolen cellphone was located

in the Plaza Carolina Mall parking lot.                At approximately 12:30

a.m., she went to the mall with a friend who was a Carolina

Municipal Police Officer ("CMPO").            Upon their arrival, the driver

spotted A.R., L.R., and De Jesús, who had just dropped off the

stolen   black    Toyota    Yaris    and    were   then   standing    outside   a

restaurant.       The driver      identified them as the subjects             who

attempted to carjack her hours earlier. The CMPO announced himself

as a police officer and issued commands to the trio, which were

not obeyed.      L.R. pointed a pistol at the CMPO, got in one of the

                                      - 6 -
stolen cars, and drove off.       A.R. and De Jesús fled on foot.   The

CMPO chased them, intercepted De Jesús, and attempted to arrest

him.       A struggle ensued, in which De Jesús grabbed the CMPO's

firearm, firing a round that struck De Jesús in the torso.          The

CMPO was also injured in the struggle.        De Jesús and A.R. fled,

and the CMPO pursued them in his vehicle.        Both were ultimately

arrested.1

              Later on January 3, FBI Task Force Agents interviewed

both A.R. -- in the presence of his mother -- and De Jesús.         A.R.

admitted to attempting to carjack the Uber driver of the blue Kia

Soul using a fake firearm.        A.R. also admitted to committing the

three carjackings on December 20, 23, and 31, 2019, and the two

carjackings following the attempted carjacking of the blue Kia

Soul with De Jesús and L.R.

              Legal Proceedings

              That same day, on January 3, 2020, the government filed

a juvenile information2 charging A.R. with attempted carjacking,

       The record does not indicate whether the CMPO himself
       1

arrested De Jesús and A.R., or if other police officers were
involved.
       Although our past precedents have stated that "[f]ederal
       2

intervention in juvenile proceedings [wa]s [at one point] rare,"
United States v. Patrick V., 359 F.3d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 2004), "[t]he
rise in serious juvenile crime, the contraction of state juvenile
court jurisdiction, and the expansion of federal criminal law have
all contributed to the increased prevalence of federal delinquency
proceedings," Charles Doyle, Cong. Rsch. Serv., RL30822, Juvenile

                                   - 7 -
which had he been an adult would have amounted to a violation of

18 U.S.C. §§ 2119(1) and (2). The government filed a certification

to proceed under the FJDA by asserting a "substantial federal

interest in the case . . . due to the violent nature of the crime

affecting interstate commerce."              See 18 U.S.C. § 5032.               The

government simultaneously filed a motion to transfer A.R. for

prosecution as an adult.      See id. After a magistrate judge ordered

A.R. detained,3 he began to cooperate with the government, which

ultimately included, among other acts, testifying before a grand

jury.    Given    A.R.'s   cooperation,        the    government         eventually

declined to press its motion to transfer his case for prosecution

as an adult.4

          On    April 5,   2021,     the     government    filed       a   juvenile

superseding     information    charging        A.R.    with      the       attempted

carjacking (Count One) and five additional carjackings (Counts Two

to Six) that he committed along with De Jesús and L.R.

Delinquents and Federal Criminal Law: The                      Federal     Juvenile
Delinquency Act and Related Matters 1 (2023).
     3 The FJDA permits        the    detention       of   a    juvenile.        See
18 U.S.C. § 5035.
     4 Under the FJDA, certain transfers to adult status for
prosecution are mandatory while others are discretionary. See 18
U.S.C. § 5032.

                                     - 8 -
            Juvenile Proceedings Terminology

            In juvenile delinquency proceedings the precise legal

terminology used differs from that of adult criminal proceedings.

Because we shall employ that same terminology, it is important to

briefly explain the terms used in this opinion.               Juveniles do not

"plead guilty" to "crimes," but rather "admit" to conduct.                   The

analogy to a change of plea hearing is called an admission hearing.

Likewise,    juveniles      are   not   sentenced,     but   rather    undergo   a

disposition.5       See 18 U.S.C. § 5037.       Moreover, juveniles are not

found     "guilty"    but   rather      "adjudicated    delinquent."        And,

following release from a detention disposition, they may be placed

in   "juvenile      delinquent    supervision"    rather     than     "supervised

release."     Id.     Notwithstanding, the terms "plea agreement" and

"probation" are used just as in adult proceedings.

            The Admission Hearing

            On May 18, 2021, A.R. admitted to the conduct described

in all six counts pursuant to a plea agreement.                        Under the

agreement, the district court could use the Sentencing Guidelines

to determine the upper limit in setting the term for which A.R.

could be committed to juvenile detention.              See 18 U.S.C. § 5037.

      5We note, however, that even the Congressional Research
Service used "sentencing" and "disposition" interchangeably when
discussing the FJDA in a 2023 report. See generally Doyle, supra
n.2; see also United States v. M.R.M., 513 F.3d 866 (8th Cir. 2008)
(using terms interchangeably).

                                        - 9 -
The plea agreement set forth maximum penalties under 18 U.S.C.

§ 5037(c)(1).        By the time the parties entered into the plea

agreement, A.R. had turned eighteen, thus his maximum penalties

were to be determined pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(2).             Neither

party contests this conclusion.         Although both parties requested

that the district court impose a probationary term, the agreement

provided     that    the    district   court   was   not   bound    by    that

recommendation and had discretion to sentence him otherwise.                As

a supplement to the plea agreement, A.R. also entered into a

cooperation agreement with the government.

           During the colloquy that took place at the admission

hearing    the      district   court   made    two   statements    that    are

inapplicable to juvenile proceedings under the FJDA.               First, the

district court stated that A.R.'s admission "may deprive [A.R.] of

some rights," and specifically that he would not be "able to hold

public office; . . . serve on a jury; . . . possess any kind of

firearm; . . . [and] may even lose [his] right to vote."                 A.R.'s

counsel immediately corrected the district court, noting that

because "this is a juvenile delinquency case, [A.R.] will not be

adjudged as a felon, and those deprivation of rights will not and

should not apply to him."        The district court struck that portion

of the colloquy.           No party disputes that this statement was

incorrect, and A.R. does not argue that this statement in isolation

was error.

                                   - 10 -
            Second, the district court stated that it could consider

A.R.'s cooperation with the government in determining his sentence

"only" if the government filed a substantial assistance motion.

No party corrected the district court during the admission hearing

or at any point after.            No party disputes that this statement was

incorrect.

            Following A.R.'s admission to the six counts of the

juvenile superseding information, the district court ordered the

Probation Office to prepare a PSR.                  A.R.'s counsel did not object

to the directive that a PSR be prepared.

            The PSR recounted the string of carjackings that led to

A.R.'s detention.      It further explained that pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 5037(c)(2), a term of official detention may not extend "beyond

the lesser of: (A) 5 years; or (B) the maximum of the guideline

range, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994, applicable to an otherwise

similarly situated adult defendant unless the court finds an

aggravating       factor     to    warrant     an    upward    departure     from   the

otherwise       applicable    guideline      range."          Accordingly,    the   PSR

included    a    guideline        sentencing    range    ("GSR")    calculation      to

determine the maximum detention applicable.                      The PSR concluded

that the applicable GSR was 97 to 121 months.

            Prior to the disposition hearing, A.R. filed what was

titled   his     "sentencing        memorandum."        As    explained    supra,    in

juvenile proceedings, the correct terminology is "disposition

                                        - 11 -
memorandum."      A.R.'s      memorandum    emphasized   his   cooperation -

- which   contributed    to    a    juvenile   adjudication    and   sentence,

respectively,   of    L.R.    and    De   Jesús -- and   his   potential   for

rehabilitation.      He also emphasized that, given his cooperation,

the government agreed to recommend a disposition of probation.

           The Disposition Hearing

           On August 17, 2021, the district court conducted A.R.'s

disposition hearing.       The district court acknowledged and thanked

A.R.'s counsel for the disposition memorandum.                  Counsel then

expressed that A.R. had shown "exceptional progress" since being

detained at a Commonwealth operated facility in Villalba, Puerto

Rico, where counsel stated that he had availed himself of every

educational and counseling opportunity that was offered.                   The

district court clarified that, although A.R. was now eighteen and

could be adjudicated as an adult, it was treating him as a minor

given the delays in proceedings due to the COVID-19 pandemic.6

     6 We note that the district court stated -- incorrectly, in
the absence of proceedings to try A.R. as an adult -- that A.R.
was "now an adult and can be sentenced as an adult." Even if a
juvenile turns eighteen (and has not reached twenty-one) by the
time the disposition hearing takes place, proceedings are covered
by the FJDA given that the statute governs law violations
"committed by a person prior to [their] eighteenth birthday." 18
U.S.C. § 5031(emphasis added). In other words, turning eighteen
does not otherwise turn the juvenile into an adult for purposes of
the FJDA. But see United States v. Soto-Beníquez, 356 F.3d 1, 23-
24 (1st Cir. 2003) (holding adult could be tried for conspiracy
crimes that began before his eighteenth birthday where defendant
joined conspiracy as a minor but "ratified his participation after
he had turned eighteen").

                                     - 12 -
Both   parties   asked   the   district   court   to   follow   the   plea

agreement's recommendation of probation until A.R. turned twenty-

one, in approximately three years.

           The district court first explained that the Sentencing

Guidelines do not apply to juvenile proceedings save that Section

1B1.12 of the Sentencing Guidelines and, in accord with that

section, stated that "[t]he sentence imposed upon a juvenile

delinquent may not exceed the maximum of the guideline range

applicable to an otherwise similarly situated adult defendant."

Here, the GSR for an adult similarly situated would be from 97 to

121 months.

           The district court next recounted both A.R.'s personal

characteristics   and    the   modus   operandi   of   the   carjackings,

acknowledging that A.R. had timely accepted responsibility, and

recognized that both parties had recommended a term of probation

until A.R. turned twenty-one.      The district court disagreed with

said recommendation, stating it fell short of reflecting the

seriousness of the offense, promoting respect for the law, and

protecting the public from further crimes.        It further found that

the recommendation failed to address the issues of deterrence and

punishment:

           After evaluating the specific circumstances of
           this case, [A.R.'s] participation in the
           carjackings, the impact that those carjackings
           had on the victims, who could have easily

                                 - 13 -
            perceived that they were being threatened to
            death with a firearm, even though the weapon
            used was a pellet gun, as their vehicles,
            which they used to work and generate income,
            were stolen from them by [A.R.] and his co-
            defendants, and the increase of the offenses
            involving carjackings to Uber drivers in
            Puerto Rico, the [district court] finds that
            a sentence of juvenile detention is necessary
            to achieve the sentencing goals set forth in
            [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)].
    The     district   court   ultimately   adjudicated   that   A.R.   be

detained until he reached 21 years of age -- a term of detention

the court calculated in its written judgement as forty-two months

and three days -- followed by seventeen months and twenty-seven

days of juvenile delinquent supervision, as indicated in the

judgment.    No fine was imposed.

            Finally, the district court inquired of A.R.'s counsel

if he had in mind any juvenile institution so as to permit the

court to issue a recommendation for A.R.'s placement.            Counsel

replied that he would like the Bureau of Prisons ("BOP") to keep

A.R. in Villalba, Puerto Rico.      The district court explained that

Villalba was not under a BOP contract and, therefore, it would

recommend A.R. to be designated to a BOP contracted facility.

            At the end of the disposition hearing, A.R.'s counsel

objected to both the procedural and substantive unreasonableness

of the disposition, emphasizing his view that the district court

                                 - 14 -
had disregarded mitigating factors and failed to credit A.R.'s

cooperation.    This timely appealed followed.

            II. Discussion

            An early case in this circuit on juvenile delinquency

proceedings under the FJDA is United States v. Patrick V., 359

F.3d 3, 5 (1st Cir. 2004).         Generally, juveniles apprehended and

processed by federal authorities for armed robbery or carjacking

are subject to proceedings for transfer to adult status pursuant

to 18 U.S.C. § 5032.      See United States v. Smith, 178 F.3d 22, 26

(1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 910 (1999).            Here, the

government -- to A.R.'s benefit -- did not seek to transfer A.R.

to adult status, and so we briefly describe the governing statute

for juvenile delinquency proceedings, the FJDA, before discussing

the merits of A.R.'s arguments.

            The FJDA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042, governs the treatment

of juveniles who are charged in federal court with violating

federal criminal laws.       See 18 U.S.C. § 5032.      The FJDA defines

"juvenile" to be a "person who has not attained [their] eighteenth

birthday,      or   for      the     purpose     of    proceedings   and

disposition . . . a person who has not attained [their] twenty-

first birthday."     18 U.S.C. § 5031.         The FJDA is designed with

leniency and rehabilitation in mind but the goal of rehabilitation

"has increasingly shared the stage with [the other] goals of the

criminal process."     Patrick V., 359 F.3d at 10; see also United

                                   - 15 -
States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291, 298 n.2 (1992) ("We do not think

a broader congressional purpose points clearly in either party's

direction" -- that is, neither toward nor away from rehabilitation

as a goal).

            FJDA     proceedings      are     "marked       by    a        duality    of

objectives -- that       of    rehabilitation       and    that       of    protecting

society."        Patrick V., 359 F.3d at 9.          The FJDA provides for a

district court to consider a juvenile's "personal traits, his

capabilities, his background, any previous delinquency or criminal

experience, any mental or physical defect, and any other relevant

factors."    18 U.S.C. § 5037(e).         This information can be gathered

from what the FJDA labels a complete study.                       See 18 U.S.C.

§ 5037(e).       With this in mind, we turn to the case at hand.

            At his disposition hearing, A.R. objected to both the

procedural and substantive reasonableness of his disposition.                         On

appeal, however, he does not specify whether his arguments are

directed to procedural and/or substantive reasonableness.                         Whether

labeled   procedural      or    substantive,    the       first   set       of    A.R.'s

challenges       fail.        The   corresponding         safeguards         in     adult

proceedings provide that "[w]here challenges are to the procedural

and substantive reasonableness of a [disposition], our review

process     is     bifurcated:       we     first    determine         whether       the

[disposition] . . . is procedurally reasonable and then determine

                                     - 16 -
whether it is substantively reasonable."   United States v. Flores-

Quiñones, 985 F.3d 128, 133 (1st Cir. 2021) (cleaned up).

          1. Detention and Supervised Release Calculation

          We agree with A.R. and the government that the district

court erred in calculating the term of juvenile detention and

subsequent supervision because it exceeds the FJDA's statutory

maximum of five years pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 5037.    Accordingly,

the case must be remanded for the district court to correct the

miscalculations.

          The relevant FJDA provision explains that:

          (d)(1) The court, in ordering a term of
          official   detention,    may   include    the
          requirement that the juvenile be placed on a
          term of juvenile delinquent supervision after
          official detention.

          (2) The   term    of    juvenile    delinquent
          supervision that may be ordered for a juvenile
          found to be a juvenile delinquent may not
          extend--

               (A) in the case of a juvenile who is less
               than 18 years old, a term that extends
               beyond the date when the juvenile becomes
               21 years old; or

               (B) in the case of a juvenile who is
               between 18 and 21 years old, a term that
               extends beyond the maximum term of
               official detention set forth in section
               5037(c)(2)(A) and (B), less the term of
               official detention ordered.
18 U.S.C. § 5037(d)(1), (2) (emphasis added).         Likewise, the

statute explains that the official term of detention for a juvenile

                              - 17 -
who, like A.R., is between eighteen and twenty-one years old, may

not exceed the lesser of five years or the maximum of the guideline

range applicable to a "similarly situated adult defendant unless

the   court    finds   an   aggravating    factor   to   warrant   an   upward

departure."     18 U.S.C. § 5037(c)(2).       Here, the maximum period of

detention is five years.

              In its written judgment, the district court ordered a

term of detention "until [A.R.] reaches 21 years of age (that is,

for a term of 42 months and 3 days)" and from then, a term of

juvenile delinquent supervision of "17 months and 27 days, pursuant

to [18 U.S.C. § 5037(d)(2)(B)]."          The district court miscalculated

the total amount of time that will transpire from A.R.'s detention

until he turns twenty-one.         The total amount of time is not 42

months and 3 days, but rather, 49 months and 17 days.                     This

inadvertent miscalculation thereby tainted the accuracy of the

juvenile delinquent supervision term.           If allowed to stand, A.R.

would essentially be "sentenced" to around 67 months and 14 days

(49 months and 17 days plus 17 months and 27 days), which exceeds

the maximum five-year period authorized by the FJDA.                    Such a

miscalculation simply cannot stand.              We thus remand for the

district court to enter an amended judgment with the correct

calculations      as   to   the   juvenile     detention    and    delinquent

                                   - 18 -
supervision terms.7    See United States v. Procell, 31 F.4th 32, 39

(1st Cir. 2022).

           2. Challenges to Detention

           a. The Court's Statements About Substantial Assistance
Motion

           A.R. first contends that the district court, not at the

disposition hearing, but at the admission hearing, incorrectly

stated as part of the admission colloquy             that a substantial

assistance motion from the government was necessary for it to

consider   A.R.'s    cooperation    as   a   mitigating   factor    in    its

disposition.   From this statement, he makes the further argument

that the district court incorrectly disregarded the "critical and

significant assistance" provided to the government.                As noted

supra, neither party objected to that statement or corrected the

district court judge during the admission hearing or after.              Three

months   separated    the   admission    hearing   from   the   disposition

hearing, and neither party argues that the district court said or

did anything at the disposition hearing to suggest that it still

     7  A.R. asserts that "there is at least a reasonable
probability that a district judge would have opted for a shorter
detention period in order to maintain a robust period of [juvenile
delinquent supervision] to transition [A.R.] back into a
law-abiding life" and that error requires reconsidering the
disposition in its entirety. We are unpersuaded by this argument.
In its oral pronouncement, the district court was clear in its
intention of placing A.R. in juvenile detention until his 21st
birthday.

                                   - 19 -
believed a substantial assistance motion was necessary for it to

consider A.R.'s cooperation.

          He further maintains that the district court should have

articulated how it considered his cooperation and acknowledged the

same in its disposition.    While the government agrees that the

district court incorrectly stated at the admission hearing that a

substantial assistance motion was necessary,8 it points out that

the district court did in fact consider A.R.'s cooperation in its

disposition.   Moreover, the government points out that there is no

indication in the record that the district court felt constrained

by the lack of a substantial assistance motion in considering

A.R.'s cooperation. Rather, the record evidences that the district

court indeed did articulate its awareness of his cooperation and

assistance in determining its disposition.

          We agree that the district court's observation at the

admission hearing noting that it required a substantial assistance

motion from the government to consider A.R.'s cooperation was

indeed incorrect.   United States v. Landron-Class, 696 F.3d 62, 77

(1st Cir. 2012). But the district court soon, in effect, corrected

the error and A.R. suffered no harm.

     8 At oral argument, the government admitted that it did not
correct the district court when it indicated that the government
must file a substantial assistance motion.

                               - 20 -
           Careful examination of the record demonstrates that the

district court did take A.R.'s cooperation into account. At A.R.'s

disposition    hearing,    the   district   court      acknowledged    reading

A.R.'s    disposition     memorandum,   which     painstakingly      recounted

A.R.'s immediate admission of responsibility and cooperation with

the   government    (which    ultimately    led   to    the   indictment     and

information, followed by a guilty plea and admission from his

aiders and abettors, De Jesús and L.R., respectively).               Likewise,

the district court was well aware that the government and A.R. had

jointly recommended probation instead of detention, given his

cooperation.     The district court also acknowledged that "[A.R.]

timely accepted responsibility for his offense" and noted that

this led to his offense level being reduced.             Moreover, it noted

that it had "evaluat[ed] the specific circumstances of this case"

(the victims involved, the impact on them, that they were at the

time working) when explaining its disposition.

           b. PSR Versus Comprehensive Study

           A.R. on appeal asks us to disregard his position in the

district court and find that the district court plainly erred in

ordering a PSR instead of a comprehensive study pursuant to 18

U.S.C. § 5037(e), which pertinently provides that "[i]f the court

desires   more     detailed   information    concerning       an   alleged   or

adjudicated delinquent, it may commit him . . . for observation

                                   - 21 -
and study by an appropriate agency."9              At the outset, this claim

was not preserved in the district court.                   "Even more fatal to

[A.R.'s] contention is . . . that he not only did not object: he

affirmatively agreed."        United States v. Chen, 998 F.3d 1, 9 (1st

Cir. 2021); see also United States v. Ruiz-Valle, 68 F.4th 741,

745-46 (1st Cir. 2023).        A.R.'s trial counsel indeed supported the

preparation of a PSR:       "I know the Court wants a [PSR], and I think

that that would be very helpful for everyone."               Hence, A.R. cannot

now   claim    that   the    district    court     erred    in    doing    what     he

affirmatively agreed to.             See Ruiz-Valle, 68 F.4th at 745-46;

United States v. Serrano-Delgado, 29 F.4th 16, 29 (1st Cir. 2022).

Accordingly, we find that this argument has been waived.                      Chen,

998 F.3d at 9.

              c. Section 3553(a) Factors

              A.R.   next   posits    that   the   district       court    erred    in

"mak[ing]     [the    § 3553(a)      factors]    the    primary    focus    of     its

[disposition]."       A.R. contends that the district court should have

emphasized his rehabilitation over the seriousness of his offense,

just punishment, respect for the law, and deterrence so as to stay

aligned with the purpose of the FJDA.                  The government maintains

that A.R.'s position is waived because he advocated below for

      9There is no meaningful difference between a PSR and a
predisposition report (comprehensive study). See Patrick V., 359
F.3d at 6.

                                      - 22 -
consideration of the § 3553(a) factors, which he now challenges.

We,    however,      construe     A.R.'s          claim   differently       from    the

government.      A.R. is not arguing that the district court should

not have considered the § 3553(a) factors, but instead that they

were afforded excessive weight.               Because A.R.'s counsel objected

to the "excessive weight" given to the factors "already taken into

account in the sentencing guidelines" (the § 3553(a) factors) at

the disposition hearing, we find this statement sufficient to give

notice to the district court of A.R.'s objection.                  See Ruiz-Valle,

68 F.4th at 746.        We thus review for abuse of discretion, see

United States v. Melendez-Rosado, 57 F.4th 32, 37-38 (1st Cir.

2023), and find none.

             "The legal atmosphere of the [FJDA] is marked by a

duality     of   objectives -- that          of    rehabilitation     and    that    of

protecting society."         Patrick V., 359 F.3d at 9.            In keeping with

that duality of objective, Patrick V. rejected the argument,

embraced by other circuits, that the district court must select

the     least     restrictive         disposition         that     would      achieve

rehabilitation.       Id. at 11-12; see also United States v. M.R.M.,

513 F.3d 866, 869 (8th Cir. 2008) (joining our circuit in rejecting

a least-restrictive disposition requirement).                 Careful examination

of    the   record    indicates       that    the     district    court     precisely

emphasized these very objectives in its disposition.                          At the

disposition       hearing,      the    district       court      stated     that    the

                                       - 23 -
recommended     action      by    the    parties -- probation -- "d[id]      not

reflect the seriousness of the offense, does not promote respect

for    the    law,   does        not    protect   the   public   from    further

crimes . . . , and does not address the issues of deterrence and

punishment."     These, along with rehabilitation, are factors under

§ 3553(a).     See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).

             Here, as in         Patrick V., "the court felt that real

acceptance of responsibility entailed some detention."                  359 F.3d

at 11.       The district court explicitly considered the need to

"protect society" when it described the specific circumstances

that   influenced     its        disposition:      A.R.'s   participation     in

carjackings at gunpoint, including the fact that the trio pointed

a pellet gun at a female victim's head, who also sustained bodily

injuries during the offense; the economical and emotional impact

on the victims, whose stolen property -- their cars -- were their

means of working and generating income; the fact that the victims

could easily have perceived they were being threatened with death;

and the danger to public safety from an increased number of

carjackings of rideshare drivers in Puerto Rico.             M.R.M., 513 F.3d

at 869 ("Nothing in the statute precludes the district courts from

giving due consideration . . . to protection of the public or

deterrence.").

             As discussed supra, the district court was well aware of

A.R.'s cooperation and his acceptance of responsibility.                     The

                                        - 24 -
district court further considered and prioritized rehabilitation

by recommending that A.R. participate in a job placement program,

vocational training, GED courses, and mental health treatment, if

necessary   while    detained.       Indeed,    "rehabilitation,     with    the

growth of youth violence, has increasingly shared the stage with

the goals of the criminal process."            Patrick V., 359 F.3d at 10.

Thus, after analyzing and evaluating all that was before it, the

district    court   felt    that   "real   acceptance    of   responsibility

entailed some detention."      Id. at 11.      All this cuts against A.R.'s

argument    that    the   district   court     placed   improper    weight   on

§ 3553(a) factors.        We thus conclude that the district court did

not commit procedural error.

            For the same reasons, A.R.'s argument that the term of

juvenile detention was substantively unreasonable lacks merit.               We

review for abuse of discretion.        Flores-Quiñones, 985 F.3d at 133.

Here, the totality of the record supports a finding that a period

of juvenile detention followed by a term of juvenile delinquent

supervision was warranted given the circumstances of the case and

the need to both rehabilitate and protect society.                 See Patrick

V., 359 F.3d at 11-12; United States v. A.S., 939 F.3d 1063, 1085

(10th Cir. 2019).         A judge adjudicating a juvenile disposition

"should set forth enough to satisfy the appellate court that [they

have] considered the parties' arguments and has a reasoned basis

                                     - 25 -
for exercising [their] own legal decision[-]making authority."

Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).

          As discussed supra, the totality of the record is clear

as to the district court's examination of A.R.'s cooperation.        Cf.

United States v. Muñoz-Fontanez, 61 F.4th 212, 214-15 (1st Cir.

2023).   "There is not the slightest reason to think that the

district court overlooked [A.R.'s cooperation]."       United States v.

Cortés-Medina, 819 F.3d 566, 571 (1st Cir. 2016).            In the end,

however, the district court understood A.R.'s conduct necessitated

detention rather than probation.      Thus, we discern no abuse of

discretion   in   the   district   court's   failure    to    explicitly

acknowledge mitigation.     See Patrick V., 359 F.3d at 8.       ("[T]he

task of reconciling the various considerations involved in the

disposition of a juvenile . . . is one that demands a wide range

of discretion[.]").     We thus find no abuse of discretion.

          3. Concerns About A.R.'s Juvenile Facility Placement
2,000 Miles From His Family

          A.R. next challenges the district court's failure to

recommend Villalba -- a state juvenile facility where A.R. had

been detained pending his disposition -- as the local juvenile

institution for his post-disposition detention.

          The FJDA provides for special rules for juveniles.        That

is, pursuant to an adjudication of delinquency, a juvenile shall

                                - 26 -
be committed under the custody of the Attorney General,10 who shall

place the juvenile in an appropriate facility.                  See 18 U.S.C.

§ 5039.     Such a "facility must provide the juvenile not only the

necessities of life, but 'counseling, education, training, and

medical care . . . or other care and treatment.'"           Patrick V., 359

F.3d at 12 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 5039).                 Further, "[w]henever

possible,    the   Attorney    General   shall    commit    a    juvenile   to

a . . . facility located in or near his home community." 18 U.S.C.

§ 5039.

            Here, the exchange between the district court and A.R.'s

counsel on the location of his detention post-conviction was brief.

The district court asked his counsel if there was any juvenile

institution    that   counsel    would   like    the    district    court   to

recommend.     In reply, counsel requested placement at the Puerto

Rican facility Villalba, stating earlier that "[A.R.] has made

exceptional     progress      since   being      at    Villalba     for     the

past . . . year and a half [a]nd . . . has availed himself to

every opportunity, be it educational, counseling, opportunities to

work closely with a social worker."

     10Here, the district court committed A.R. to the custody of
the Bureau of Prisons.    A.R. argues that it was error for the
district court to commit him to that agency's custody rather than
the custody of the Attorney General directly, as named in the
statute.   Because the Bureau of Prisons is housed within the
Department of Justice, however, A.R. was in fact committed to the
Attorney General's custody when he was committed to the Bureau of
Prisons.

                                  - 27 -
             The district judge responded:              "I don't know if [BOP]

can do that.      It's got to be one that is under [BOP's] contract,

and I don't think Villalba is, so I will recommend that [A.R.] be

designated to a juvenile institution under contract with the

[BOP]." Counsel did not disagree. Indeed, it appears the district

court was correct.

             At the outset, we note that A.R. has not cited, nor have

we identified, any statute that requires a federal juvenile court

to recommend a detention facility when committing a juvenile

delinquent to the custody of the Attorney General for a term of

official detention.        In fact, the provision of federal criminal

law which authorizes the BOP to consider a sentencing court's

recommendation as to placement in the adult context, 18 U.S.C.

§ 3621, is not incorporated into the FJDA despite the fact that

the   FJDA   explicitly     incorporates        other   provisions   of   federal

criminal law.       See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 5037(c) (incorporating 18

U.S.C. § 3624).         For that reason, we believe a court imposing a

term of official detention on a juvenile delinquent may, in its

discretion, but is not required to, issue a recommendation as to

facility placement.

             Our decision in Patrick V. noted the tension between a

potential recommendation from the court and the commitment of the

juvenile     to   the   custody   of    the     Attorney   General   given   "our

recognition that placement is ultimately the responsibility of the

                                       - 28 -
Attorney General."     359 F.3d at 13 n.5.         Patrick V. involved a

juvenile who was also ordered detained pursuant to the FJDA after

a finding that he committed arson causing extensive property

damage.    As such, he was to be placed in juvenile detention for

thirty months, followed by juvenile delinquent supervision for

twenty-seven months.    Id. at 7.    Like the facts before us today,

Patrick V.'s disposition hearing was "bereft of any information

concerning    the   facility   chosen     for     [his]   detention -- its

location, policies, and programs available to juveniles in [his]

situation."    Id. at 12.   While at his disposition hearing, Patrick

V.'s counsel inquired about the appropriateness of the detention

facility where Patrick V. might be sent, speculating that he might

be sent somewhere far where he would not receive rehabilitation,

there appeared to be no further discussion on the subject.             Id.

At oral argument on his appeal, we learned that Patrick V. was

ultimately sent to a state facility in Pennsylvania, 550 miles

from Patrick V.'s home in Maine.        See id.

            Ultimately, we found ourselves "uncomfortable with [the]

state of the record," noting that "[o]ur task is to try to strike

a balance between the responsibilities of a court arriving at the

disposition of a juvenile matter and the exclusive authority of

the Attorney General to determine the facility of detention in any

case."    Patrick V., 359 F.3d at 13.     As such, we held that because

"[a] district judge has wide discretion in determining whether any

                                 - 29 -
or how much detention . . .     should be imposed on a juvenile[,]

[a] rational exercise of that decision requires at the minimum a

realistic understanding of the location and nature of probable

detention facilities available to the government." Id. The record

being bereft of these details, this Court remanded the case to the

district court after concluding that neither we nor the district

court had sufficient information about where Patrick V. would serve

his juvenile detention, and the nature of the services such

facility offered -- facts which we thought were relevant to the

district court's disposition.    See id. at 12-14.

          Here, we are troubled by the fact of Puerto Rico's island

status and location in the Atlantic Ocean, approximately 1,000

miles from the nearest point in the U.S. mainland, that being the

state of Florida.   Hence, A.R.'s detention, unlike that of Patrick

V., poses additional challenges insofar as proximity to his home

community, which is a matter for the Attorney General to consider.

At oral argument A.R.'s counsel stated that A.R., who does not

speak English, is currently being housed at a juvenile detention

facility in Texas, which we note is approximately 2,000 miles from

Puerto Rico.11 We think it appropriate on remand for the government

     11 We take judicial notice that in 1994 Puerto Rico's
institutionalized juvenile population -- subject to a federal
consent decree -- was approximately 2,000. Over the years, it has
dwindled and, as of March 2023, was 62. See Fed. Monitor's First
Q. Rep. for 2023 at 25-26, United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto
Rico, (No. 94-2080), ECF No. 1938.

                                - 30 -
to provide more information as to the options available for his

detention, to permit the district court to make a recommendation.

We do not understand the government to argue that, on remand, the

court lacks discretion in this area.

             III. Conclusion

             A.R.'s   disposition     is   both    procedurally   and

substantively reasonable.      For the foregoing reasons, the district

court's disposition is AFFIRMED.      We REMAND to the district court

to correct the term of juvenile detention and subsequent delinquent

supervision, to hear from the government as to A.R.'s placement,

and to make a recommendation as to that placement if the district

court so chooses.12

So ordered.13

     12 Wedeny A.R.'s request that the case be reassigned on remand
to a new judge. See United States v. Castillo-Torres, 8 F.4th 68,
73 (1st Cir. 2021).
     13We caution district courts and attorneys to be mindful of
the terminology they use in federal juvenile delinquency
proceedings, as they each must adhere to the language set forth in
the FJDA, the purpose of which is "to enhance the juvenile system
by removing juveniles from the ordinary criminal justice system
and by providing a separate system of 'treatment' for them."
United States v. Juvenile, 347 F.3d 778, 785 (9th Cir.
2003)(internal citations omitted).

                                 - 31 -