Court Opinion

ID: 9850845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:03:34.489411+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:44.460861
License: Public Domain

Dolliver, J.
(dissenting) — The majority has written an interesting opinion. It begs a fundamental question, makes selective references to amendment 62, adopts a view of the Legislature not supported by history or law, and overturns better than 60 years of precedent while abandoning the prerogative of this court, and all other American courts, to be the interpreter of our constitution.
The approach of this dissent will be twofold: First, it will respond to the position of the majority and demonstrate why I believe it to be in error. Second, following the analysis in Washington Fed'n of State Employees, Coun. 28 v. State, 101 Wn.2d 536, 682 P.2d 869 (1984), I will propose a solution to this case which will remove the judiciary from *682what is essentially a power struggle between the other two branches of government.
I
Prior to the adoption of amendment 62 by the people on November 5, 1974, those parts of Const. art. 3, § 12 pertinent to this case read as follows: "If any bill presented to the governor contain several sections or items, he may object to one or more sections or items while approving other portions of the bill."
Amendment 62 provides in those parts pertinent to this portion of the dissent:
If any bill presented to the governor contain several sections or appropriation items, he may object to one or more sections or appropriation items while approving other portions of the bill: Provided, That he may not object to less than an entire section, except that if the section contain one or more appropriation items he may object to any such appropriation item or items.
On its face amendment 62 makes two significant changes from the original version of Const. art. 3, § 12: (1) The terms "item" and "items" are modified by the word "appropriation"; (2) while the original constitution simply used the words "section" and "sections" as being subject to veto, amendment 62 provides the veto shall not be exercised on "less than an entire section," except for "appropriation items".
In determining whether the action of the Governor was within the bounds of the constitution, the Court first must determine the meaning of the phrase "less than an entire section," and who is empowered to make that determination. The majority claims there is nothing ambiguous about the term. I disagree.
The court has consistently held the term "section or sections" in the pre-1974 version of article 3, section 12, referred to subject matter rather than to arbitrary divisions. Cascade Tel. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 176 Wash. 616, 30 P.2d 976 (1934); Washington Ass'n of Apartment *683Ass'ns, Inc. v. Evans, 88 Wn.2d 563, 564 P.2d 788 (1977). As we observed:
[T]he words "section or sections" as used in the constitution are not always to be limited by the artificial construction of the legislative measure. By the artful arrangement of the subject matter and an arbitrary division into sections, the governor's power might be unduly limited or enlarged without reason.
Cascade Tel. Co., at 619.
In Fain v. Chapman, 94 Wn.2d 684, 619 P.2d 353 (1980), in considering the language in amendment 62, we stated:
When the legislature enacts legislation, it is presumed to be familiar with judicial decisions of this court construing existing statutes and the state constitution. El Coba Co. Dormitories, Inc. v. Franklin County PUD, 82 Wn.2d 858, 862, 514 P.2d 524 (1973). From this presumption it follows that the legislature knew, both when it passed the joint resolution which became amendment 62 and when it enacted SSB 3207, that this court had construed Const. art. 3, § 12 and determined that what constitutes an item or a section in legislation is a judicial, not a legislative, question. See Cascade Tel. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 176 Wash. 616, 30 P.2d 976 (1934). Section divisions made by the legislature in its legislation are entitled to considerable deference and will normally be upheld, but such a result is not inevitable. Groves v. Meyers, 35 Wn.2d 403, 213 P.2d 483 (1950).
Fain, at 689. Thus, the court has held amendment 62 also is subject to judicial determination as to what constitutes a section in legislation.
The power of the judicial branch of government to be the final authority to interpret, construe, and enforce the constitution is well established. See The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803); Seattle Sch. Dist. 1 v. State, 90 Wn.2d 476, 496, 585 P.2d 71 (1978). Without specific and unambiguous instruction from the people in their constitution, this power will not be impaired. The issue then becomes whether there was specific and unambiguous *684language in amendment 62 removing the power of interpretation of the phrase "less than an entire section" from the court and giving it to the Legislature.
The majority, apparently, would simply abandon the power of this court to interpret the constitution, relying instead on hortatory references such as "[t]he people have now spoken ..." (majority, at 675) rather than any reasoned analysis. I disagree with this approach. Not only is it in error in this case, but it establishes a dangerous precedent for future cases involving constitutional interpretation.
Plaintiffs argue the term "less than an entire section," contained in amendment 62 and debated on the Senate floor, indicates the Legislature intended to limit the power of the Governor’s veto to "structured" sections. (Parenthetically, it should be said this also appears to be the position of the majority, although this is not specifically stated.) In other words, plaintiffs claim the intention of amendment 62 was to give the Legislature authority to determine what is and what is not a section, binding both the Governor and this court. They specifically urge the court to overrule Fain v. Chapman, supra.
In interpreting constitutional amendments, the court must first ask what the people who adopted it understood the meaning to be. The best evidence of voter understanding is the arguments of the proponents contained in the voters' pamphlet which is sent "to each individual place of residence in the state". RCW 29.81.140. Lynch v. Department of Labor & Indus., 19 Wn.2d 802, 812-13, 145 P.2d 265 (1944) ("In determining the meaning of legislation enacted through initiative or referendum, the courts have the right to look to, and may consider, the published arguments made in connection with the submission of such measures to the vote of the electorate. . . . We thus have positive evidence of what the people intended when they voted to adopt the referendum measure."). See also Whitaker v. Spiegel, Inc., 95 Wn.2d 661, 673, 623 P.2d 1147, 637 P.2d 235 (1981).
*685There is nothing in the voters' pamphlet to suggest the viewpoint of the plaintiffs (or the majority) — in fact, quite the contrary. The crucial words in the Official Voters Pamphlet of 1974, at page 6, are:
SJR 140 is a moderate compromise proposal passed with bipartisan support. It will not completely eliminate this unparalleled power [of the Governor to remove portions from laws passed by the Legislature], but limit it to the veto of sections of bills as well as entire bills, and even provides that budget bills would still be subject to the item veto.
The clear meaning conveyed in the voters' pamphlet is that amendment 62 would (1) eliminate the item veto and (2) allow the veto of sections and entire bills. There is nothing which remotely suggests the power to interpret the meaning of the term "section" should be reposed in the Legislature rather than in the courts. Nor is there anything in amendment 62 which indicates the phrase "less than an entire section" somehow overturned our views expressed in Cascade Tel. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, supra, and left to the Legislature the power to structure "sections" in legislation as it chooses.
Plaintiffs point to a colloquy on the Senate floor as evidence of legislative intent to define the phrase "less than an entire section" as only those sections designated and structured by the Legislature. While the colloquy between Senator Gary Grant and Senator Harry Lewis regarding amendment 62 (then Senate Joint Resolution 140) makes it clear that under amendment 62 the Governor could not veto "less than an entire section," at no place in the Senate or House Journals is there any language which indicates the Legislature intended it would be the final authority on what comprises "an entire section". Senate Journal, 43d Legislature, 3d Ex. Sess. (1974), at 116.
While we could speculate that this was the legislative intent, mere speculation is not enough. See Spokane v. Taxpayers, 111 Wn.2d 91, 99, 758 P.2d 480 (1988). If the Legislature had chosen to establish in the constitution the *686portion now asserted by the plaintiffs, it could easily have done so. For example, the words "as designated by the Senate and House of Representatives" could have been added after the phrase "less than an entire section". I observe this is the suggestion made by the author of the note in 10 U. Puget Sound L. Rev. 699, 717 (1987), whose article is relied upon by the majority. For whatever reason, this was not done. The legislative history is no more helpful to plaintiffs than is the voters' pamphlet.
In the Senate colloquy Senator Grant, one of the sponsors of amendment 62 (Senate Joint Resolution 140), stated: "Frankly, what we are trying to accomplish is to restore the veto power to the governor as it was understood up until 1959." Senate Journal, at 89. As we have previously stated, in 1959 it was established law under Cascade Tel. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, supra, that it was up to the courts to determine what constituted a section and that this determination was not dependent on the legislative segregation of a bill into sections. When it enacts legislation, the Legislature is presumed to be familiar with judicial decisions of this court construing existing statutes and the state constitution. Fain v. Chapman, supra at 689. Add to this presumption the fact that the Senate was acting on advice of counsel (see comments of Senator Grant, Senate Journal, at 116), and that presumption becomes even stronger.
Further examination of the Senate debate makes it apparent the real purpose of amendment 62 (Senate Joint Resolution 140) was to eliminate the item veto, not to give the Legislature sole authority to define sections in a bill. In a colloquy with Senator William Day, Senator Grant stated:
Up until 1959 it was understood that he [the Governor] could veto appropriations items, but the Constitution does not say 'appropriations item.' All the Constitution says is 'items,' and so Governor Rosellini at the time interpreted that and it was upheld, in the Ruoff case [State ex rel. Ruoff v. Rosellini, 55 Wn.2d 554, 348 P.2d 971 (1960)] I believe it was, that 'items' meant a comma, a word, anything.
*687Senate Journal, at 89. In State ex rel. Ruoff v. Rosellini, 55 Wn.2d 554, 348 P.2d 971 (1960), which involved the item veto of the salary of the Governor, the court refused to limit the item veto to appropriations. ("We find no merit in the contention that only an item in an appropriation bill is within the purview of the constitutional provision." Ruoff, at 556.) Therefore, it would seem the real thrust of amendment 62 — which was accomplished — was to limit the item veto to appropriations.
The majority points to and emphasizes the previously cited language in the voters' pamphlet as supporting its position. Again, I disagree. The analysis the majority puts to this paragraph is stated as follows:
All of the arguments supporting the Governor's vetoes of less than full sections of the bill in question in this case boil down to a single conclusion — that when the people wrote into the constitution the limitation that the governor "may not object to less than an entire section" of a nonappropriation bill, what they really meant was that the governor may object to less than an entire section of such a bill! To adopt this reasoning would skew the state constitution off the course set by the people and violate the basic constitutional precepts that the constitution means what it says, and when it is not ambiguous there is nothing for the courts to construe.
Majority, at 674.
While all of this is an excellent rhetorical flourish to show the devotion of the majority to the will of the people, it, of course, completely begs the question. The question is: What is a section? As I have demonstrated, this issue was not faced by the Legislature. It is hornbook law that this court presumes the lawmaking body to be "familiar not only with its own prior legislation relating to that subject, but also with the court decisions construing such former legislation." Graffell v. Honeysuckle, 30 Wn.2d 390, 399, 191 P.2d 858 (1948). The debate on the floor of the Legislature illustrates that, in fact, the Legislature was aware of this rule. The Legislature, and the people, were attempting to rid the constitution of the power of a governor to exercise an item *688veto on other than appropriations. Amendment 62 successfully does this. Nowhere in the legislative debates or in the voters' pamphlet, however, is there the slightest indication the words "item" and "section" are somehow synonymous. Yet, this is exactly what the majority would have us believe. The issue is not the elimination of the item veto — that has been done. The issue is who should define a section. That was not done by amendment 62. Thus, it should be up to this court to make that determination.
In a strange passage the majority states:
Even were we to consider the 62nd Amendment ambiguous, which it is not, it was directly enacted by the voters and must therefore be read "as the average informed lay voter would read it." There is no reasonable way that "entire section" in the 62nd Amendment could have been read by an informed lay voter as meaning "part of a section".
(Footnote omitted.) Majority, at 674. Implicit in the argument of the majority is the patronizing belief that voters cannot possibly be well enough educated to understand or be aware of the issue involving "section" or be aware of or understand the opinions of this court or the debate in the Legislature. Adopting such a gloomy, unwarranted view of the electorate as a basis for our decisions was rejected in the recent case of Spokane v. Taxpayers, supra.
There is no doubt but that the approach of this court to the question of defining a section presents difficulties when the court is called upon to settle a dispute between the Legislature and the Governor involving a veto. But it is the role of this court to make difficult decisions involving the interests of contending parties. To turn and run simply because a problem is difficult is unseemly. I would uphold the long-standing position of this court, as most recently expressed in Fain v. Chapman, supra. The court then should analyze the vetoes of the Governor and determine whether they are in accord with the rules developed by this court over the past 50 years and which have not been cast aside by amendment 62.
*689II
While the approach to this case properly should proceed along the lines I suggest, there is another approach which I also believe to be valid. A significant amount of comment is directed by the majority to the now discredited affirmative-negative veto test. The majority spells out the history of the doctrine and indicates its demise in the case of Washington Fed'n of State Employees, Coun. 28 v. State, 101 Wn.2d 536, 682 P.2d 869 (1984). The majority then urges the court to abandon the "separate subject" test for determining sections just as it has abandoned the affirmative-negative test.

I agree.

While I do not believe the separate subject test to be as subjective as the affirmative-negative rule, it does lead to involvement by the judiciary in what is essentially a battle between the Legislature and the Governor. I welcome the abandonment of this burden to those branches of government involved in the controversy if it can be done without unduly harming the authority of the judiciary to interpret the constitution. I believe the approach I propose, which was foreshadowed in Washington Fed'n of State Employees, Coun. 28 v. State, supra, will accomplish this goal.
If the separate subject test is to be abandoned, however, the court should leave the parties as equal contenders and not tip the scales in favor of one side or the other. Certainly the allocation and exercise of political power is the purpose of constitutions. The power is allocated by the people through their constitution to be exercised by the government which derives its power from the people. In the case of amendment 62 the people adopted a scheme whereby the two contending branches of government can settle the veto dispute in an orderly manner, without the intervention of the judiciary or without the judiciary, as the majority does here, giving an advantage to one side or the other.
Amendment 62 provides that:
[Wjithin forty-five days next after the adjournment, Sundays excepted, the legislature may, upon petition by *690a two-thirds majority or more of the membership of each house, reconvene in extraordinary session, not to exceed five days duration, solely to reconsider any bills vetoed.
Thus, if the Legislature disagrees with the Governor's vetoes, it may call itself back into special session to correct the perceived defect. If the Governor feels the Legislature has improperly designated a section, see Cascade Tel. Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, supra, that subject which the Governor believes to be a separate section may be vetoed. If the Legislature disagrees, it may call itself back into session to rectify the perceived error. That is the constitutional structure, adopted by the people of this state. As we observed in Washington Fed'n of State Employees, Coun. 28 v. State, supra at 547:
While it may be argued it is difficult for the Legislature to obtain the two-thirds concurrence to call itself into a special veto session or override a veto, these constitutional arrangements are for the people to determine, not this court. If these arrangements become unsatisfactory or subjected to abuse, the people are capable of making desired changes.
This stands in marked contrast to the situation prior to amendment 62 when only the Governor could call the Legislature into any kind of special session. Const. art. 3, § 7.
Essentially, the difference between the majority and the dissent is that while the majority would give the Legislature the power to make the final determination as to what was a "section" thereby overturning over 50 years of judicial interpretation and finding legislative intent where none can be shown, I would recognize the meaning of the term "section" is one of continuing dispute, both on this court and in the other two branches of government. Rather than tilt the scales in favor of one branch over the other, I would allow them to follow the constitutional scheme, passed by the Legislature and adopted by the people. Since, in this case, *691the Legislature failed to exercise its constitutional prerogative and call itself back in session to deal with the Govern- or's vetoes, I would reverse in part the holding of the trial court and affirm all of the Governor's vetoes.
Utter, J., concurs with Dolliver, J.