Court Opinion

ID: 9693244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:32:11.711915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:43.190739
License: Public Domain

BISHOP, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the Dead Man’s Statute is not a bar to the introduction of the decedent’s answers to interrogatories as they relate to Montgomery County; however, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s disposition that, on remand, the case should be tried against Montgomery County, only.
The reasoning of the majority on this issue is, at best, shallow:
PEPCO, of course, is correct, the admission being admissible only against Herlihy, PEPCO would have been entitled to an instruction limiting its effect. And, since we presume jurors follow instructions given by the trial court, we may not speculate that the jury would have reached a verdict, on the basis of that information, finding liability on the part of PEPCO. Accordingly, the jury’s verdict as to PEPCO need not be disturbed, Herlihy not having taken an appeal.
I would remand for a trial against both parties and not speculate that the exact evidence would be submitted to a *518jury who would be clone of the jury who first tried this case.
The substantial injustice that would result from a defendant's verdict in the new trial against Montgomery County, leaving decedent’s estate without recovery, would far outweigh any unfairness in requiring PEPCO to relitigate the issue of its culpability.
In the first trial the jury found that PEPCO was not liable. The jury did not have the benefit of considering the decedent’s answers to interrogatories as admissions which tend to exculpate Montgomery County. What it did have was the choice of two possible tort-feasors. Had it been apprised of the fact that the admissions tended to relieve appellant of liability, the jury may have reviewed the facts in light of the answers and reexamined its conclusions about PEPCO.
I cannot speculate that there will be no new evidence produced in the new trial against PEPCO which may establish its liability. I cannot disregard the possibility that a jury, faced with the possibility of denying decedent’s estate recovery altogether, might strike a compromise or reassess its position with regard to the liability of appellee PEPCO to appellee.
There is no rule or authority cited by the majority that requires that the new trial must be only against Montgomery County. To do substantial justice requires that the new trial be truly a new trial against both defendants.