Court Opinion

ID: 9503222
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 19:38:38.899156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:20.052034
License: Public Domain

DE MUNIZ, C. J.,
concurring.
I concur in the court’s opinion. I write separately, however, to emphasize that our holding is a narrow one; it does not, in my view, herald any sort of expansion in the area of criminal law.
In this case, the issue concerns defendant’s mental state. Defendant contends that he was negligent, while plaintiff asserts that defendant was reckless. Those mental states represent two distinct states of mind. Negligence is the least demanding; it requires only that the defendant should have known about a risk.1 Criminal negligence similarly considers *333whether the defendant should have known about the risk, but it also requires that the risk be a “gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.” ORS 161.085(10).2 Recklessness demands proof of a different and more culpable mental state. Although the nature of the risk is the same as for criminal negligence (“a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe”), the standard is no longer what the defendant should have known; instead, a defendant must have been “aware of and consciously disregarded]” that risk. ORS 161.085(9).3
Although the mental state categories are seemingly well defined, they are not so in practice.4 Both negligence and criminal negligence involve what a defendant knew or should *334have known, the only difference being whether the risk involved a “gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation” — a distinction that can be a jury question. Recklessness might seem to have a clearer boundary because it requires a subjective mental state (“aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk”). However, the line between that mental state and criminal negligence can be ephemeral in practice. Only rarely will a defendant admit to having consciously disregarded a risk of which he or she was aware. Absent that admission, a defendant’s conscious disregard can only be determined by inference, in light of the nature of the act and the nature of the risk. When conscious disregard must be determined by inference, the line between what a defendant actually knew and what the defendant should have known can lose its clear boundaries. Again, it can be up to a jury to decide whether to draw that inference.
The absence of a clear dividing line between negligence, criminal negligence, and recklessness can create a danger, however. The absence of a clear dividing line could encourage the following overhasty generalization: If “gross deviation” is a jury question, and if “conscious disregard” is a jury question, then any negligent act automatically creates a jury question as to whether a defendant’s conduct was reckless.
That danger is particularly important in this context, because recklessness and criminal negligence are mental states for the purpose of the Oregon Criminal Code. Both mental states are threaded throughout Oregon’s criminal statutes. See, e.g., ORS 163.005(1) (definition of criminal homicide includes the mental states “recklessly” and “criminal negligence”); ORS 163.118(1)(d) (first-degree manslaughter includes the mental states “recklessly” and “criminal negligence”); ORS 163.145(1) (criminally negligent homicide uses the mental state “criminal negligence”); ORS 163.149(1) (aggravated vehicular homicide uses the mental states “criminal negligence” and “recklessly”); ORS 164.325(1)(a)(B), (C) (first-degree arson includes the mental state “recklessly’).
While juries must decide the mental state question on some fact patterns, that does not mean that only juries *335may decide that question in all cases. Despite the difficulties, courts have an important responsibility to draw the necessary distinctions in appropriate cases. When it appears to a trial court on an appropriate motion that no rational juror could find that a defendant “consciously disregarded] a substantial and unjustifiable risk,” or that the risk constituted “a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation,” then the trial court can and should exercise its authority to grant summary judgment in civil cases or a judgment of acquittal in criminal cases. See ORCP 47 C (in a civil case, the court should grant summary judgment if “no objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for the adverse party”); State v. Mejia, 348 Or 1, 6, 227 P3d 1139 (2010) (on motion for judgment of acquittal in a criminal case, the question is “whether * * * any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
We have concluded that, on these facts, a jury question regarding recklessness has been presented for purposes of this civil case. The bench and bar should be wary of reading this opinion to say anything more than that.
I concur.

 See, e.g., Stoeger v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., 323 Or 569, 579-80, 919 P2d 39 (1996) (trial court should not have granted summary judgment for the defendant on a common-law negligence claim; the evidence created a genuine issue of material fact whether the defendant “knew or should have known” that a railroad switch was defective); Moore v. Willis, 307 Or 254, 258-61, 767 P2d 62 (1988) (to avoid judgment on the pleadings against a negligence claim, a plaintiff who asserts that “a risk was foreseeable, though not necessarily foreseen, * * * must *333allege facts that would allow the factfinder to conclude that the defendant should have known of the risk”).

 ORS 161.085(10) defines “criminal negligence” for purposes of the Oregon Criminal Code. It provides:
“ ‘Criminal negligence’ or ‘criminally negligent,’ when used with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person fails to be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must he of such nature and degree that the failure to he aware of it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”

 ORS 161.085(9) defines “recklessly” for purposes of the Oregon Criminal Code:
“ ‘Recklessly,’ when used with respect to a result or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense, means that a person is aware of and consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation.”

 This court has previously noted this difficulty:
“[T]here is no magic verbal formula which will describe with precision the difference between negligence and reckless conduct. The concept of fault itself is difficult to explain. To draw a line between one type of fault and another and to describe the difference is even more difficult. In fact, it has been asserted that such a distinction cannot be drawn; that the effort to distinguish negligence and reckless conduct is futile because it is an attempt ‘to separate two unknowns, neither of which is capable of being identified.’ Burrell, A New Approach to the Problem of Wilful and Wanton Misconduct, 1949 Ins LJ 716, 717. But certainly there are differences in the gravity of fault and the fact that the difference cannot he precisely stated should not preclude us from administering a scheme of liability which is based upon the seriousness of the actor’s misconduct.”
Williamson v. McKenna, 223 Or 366, 394, 354 P2d 56 (1960).