Court Opinion

ID: 9776394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:33:55.798222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:38.414748
License: Public Domain

*748OPINION
ROBERTS, Judge.
This is an appeal from a conviction for assault with intent to rape. Trial was before a jury, which assessed punishment at confinement for 45 years.
Appellant raises five grounds of error. In his first ground of error, he contends that the trial court improperly permitted the State to ask a defense witness, Dr. Bublis, a psychiatrist, several “have you heard” questions at the punishment stage of the trial. The record reflects that the State asked the witness if she had heard of thirteen separate acts of misconduct. The witness answered that appellant had told her of certain of the acts, but in answer to most of the questions she answered, “No.”
Prior to this series of questions, Dr. Bublis had testified, in summary, that she had examined appellant and that, based upon her examination, she was of the opinion that he was suffering from alcoholism and the effects of drugs. In response to a hypothetical question based on the evidence previously adduced in the case, she testified that, in her opinion, appellant did not know the nature and quality of his acts at the time of the commission of the offense. At no time was she asked, nor did she state her opinion in regard to appellant’s reputation.
Prior to the “have you heard” questions, the trial court conducted an examination of the witness out of the presence of the jury, at which the State asked the “have you heard” questions. The court held that the questions were permissible as a test of the witness’ opinion. The court ruled that the State could ask the witness if she had heard of the offenses, and if she had not, whether she would have changed her opinion had she known of them. Appellant was granted a continuing objection. Thereafter, the jury returned and the State proceeded to ask the questions. The witness did not testify that she had formed her opinion based upon her knowledge of appellant’s prior criminal record. The witness was not asked whether she would have changed her opinion if she had known or heard of the acts. She was merely asked if she had heard of certain acts of misconduct.
We feel that the questions, as asked, were improper. “Have you heard” questions are proper only when propounded to a witness who has testified as to the reputation of the person in question. The questions are permitted only for the purpose of testing the witness’ knowledge of the person’s reputation. Also, the questions may not be phrased so as to imply that the offense has been committed. A detailed discussion of the rationale of “have you heard” questions appears in the recent case of Brown v. State, 477 S.W.2d 617 (Tex.Cr.App., delivered February 16, 1972). Any further discussion in this opinion would be superfluous.
We now turn to the question of whether the error in permitting this line of questions was of such magnitude as to compel a reversal of this case. After a careful examination of the record, we are of the opinion that the error was harmful to appellant.
The record reflects that defendant testified in his own behalf. On voir dire examination, out of the presence of the jury, appellant testified that he had been previously convicted of crimes on four occasions, and that his probation which had been granted in one prior case had been revoked. The trial court ruled that the State could introduce evidence of three convictions, but that a 1953 conviction and subsequent probation revocation were too remote to be admissible. Thereafter, appellant testified in the presence of the jury that he had been convicted on three occasions, twice in 1961 and once in 1969.
In our opinion, the net effect of the questions propounded to Dr. Bublis was to convey to the jury the impression that appellant had a long criminal record. The *749tone of the questioning was such that the “have you heard” questions were taken as established fact by the questioner. For example, immediately following the questions, the following transpired between counsel for the State and the witness:
“Q Now, Doctor, I will ask you if in your experience as a psychiatrist, you have had occasion to observe people who consistently run afoul of the laws and the mores and the standards of society ?
“A Yes.
“Q I’ll ask you also, Doctor, if this record which I have just asked you about here is consistent with a person who has difficulty reforming and who has difficulty complying with the mores and the standards and the laws of society ?
“A Certainly sounds consistent with that. Might I add that if he were drinking, this would fit in even more so with the history of alcoholism as we know it.
“Q But irrespective of whether he was drinking or whether he was taking drugs, or whatever it might be, it does show a person who has had difficulty reforming and difficulty of complying with the laws and standards of our society ?
“A Yes.” (Emphasis supplied)
This line of questions certainly infers that the questions were intended to he considered as established fact by the witness and likewise, by the jury.
Three of the “have you heard” questions were based upon the convictions which appellant had testified that he had received in the past. Two of the questions were based upon 1953 and 1954 conviction and revocation of probation, respectively, which appellant acknowledged on voir dire, but which the trial court had excluded as being too remote. “The law places no limitation by reason of remoteness on prior convictions offered to show the prior criminal record of the defendant.” Ingram v. State, 426 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex.Cr.App.1968); accord, Rose v. State, 470 S.W.2d 198 (Tex.Cr.App.1971); see Art. 37.07, Sec. 2(b), Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P. Therefore, had the state chosen to offer evidence of the 1953 and 1954 conviction and revocation at the punishment stage of the trial, it would have been admissible. Thus, the net effect of the questions was to place eight additional acts of misconduct before the jury.
In this case it is difficult to state with certainty that the error was either harmful or harmless, nevertheless, considering the number of acts and the general tone of the questioning, we feel that the probability of undue prejudice being formed in the minds of the jury was great enough to warrant a reversal of this conviction.
We do note that appellant, on re-direct examination, asked the following question:
“Q Dr. Bublis, now, after having in your storehouse of information these questions that the District Attorney asked you about what you had heard about the defendant, Hubert Hurt, does this change the opinion that you gave earlier when you told this jury that you had an opinion as to his state of mind at the time of the offense in question, and that your opinion was that he did not know, based upon reasonable medical probability that he did not know the nature and quality of his act, and that he did not know the difference between right and wrong?
“A This information does not change my opinion about his mental status at the time of the act.”
This Court stated in Patterson v. State, 458 S.W.2d 658, 660 (Tex.Cr.App.1970):
“There would appear to be a conflict in cases as to whether an accused may complain of admission of testimony *750where his own counsel adduces the same testimony upon cross-examination. Cf. Ervin v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 367 S.W.2d 680, with Willoughby v. State, 87 Tex. Cr.R. 40, 219 S.W. 468, where this Court said, ‘We know of no decision of this Court nor rule of criminal law which compels an accused when evidence has been admitted over his objection to refrain from the right of cross-examination as to such evidence, or else be penalized by the loss of his objection and bills of exceptions.’
“The Willoughby case seems to represent the correct rule - except in cases where the cross-examination extends so far beyond the scope of the; direct examination so that it can be said the cross examiner has legitimately made the witness his own witness.”
We do not feel that the above question met this test. Therefore, the objection was not waived.
In light of our disposition of this ground, we need not consider appellant’s remaining grounds of error.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.