Court Opinion

ID: 9475958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:43:45.764639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:02.903069
License: Public Domain

HARRY T. EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
For the most part, I am in agreement with the thoughtful and thorough opinion of my colleague, Judge Silberman. I concur in the conclusion that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over this case, and accordingly, should have dismissed the action. I write briefly, however, to underscore my view of the principal issue in this case and of the relevancy of Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson,—U.S.-, 106 S.Ct. 8229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986).
The central issue, as I see it, is whether Congress, when it enacted the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act (“PKPA”), intended to confine all issues involving the application and interpretation of the PKPA to adjudication in the state courts. It is clear from the language and the legislative history of the PKPA that Congress so intended.1 Therefore, whether or not the PKPA creates a cause of action — an issue which is not, and need not be, addressed in this case — the lower federal courts lack jurisdiction to entertain claims arising under the PKPA.2 This is true both as to claims asserting a cause of action under the PKPA as well as claims requiring the interpretation or application of the PKPA as an element of a well-plead state-based cause of action.
Given the posture of this case, I think that the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson touches on this case only peripherally. Merrell Dow merely confirms that if a federal statute raises no federal cause of action anywhere (i.e., either in federal or state court) and only an insubstantial federal question as part of a state-based claim, then a federal court obviously is without jurisdiction to hear the case. In the instant case, because we know that Congress intended to deny the lower federal courts jurisdiction to entertain claims arising under the PKPA, it is irrelevant whether or not Congress intended to provide a federal remedy in state courts for the violation of the PKPA; therefore Merrell Dow sheds no light on the issue of whether there is federal question jurisdiction because “federal law creates the cause of action” or because “ ‘the vindication of a right under state law necessarily turn[s] on some construction of federal law.’ ” Id. 106 S.Ct. at 3233 (quoting *697Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 9, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2846, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983)).
The main point here is that the language and legislative history of the PKPA make it clear that, whatever rights or duties may arise under the statute, the federal district courts have no jurisdiction to enforce them. Thus, whether we find that the PKPA creates a cause of action in state court or conclude that the statute is inconclusive on this point, Merrell Dow is inapposite. In my view, it is unnecessary to offer any interpretations of Merrell Dow, and I am unwilling to speculate as to the effect that Merrell Dow may have on the contours of federal question jurisdiction.
McGOWAN, Senior Circuit Judge:
I join the separate concurring opinion of Circuit Judge Edwards.

. Because I find that Congress intended to withhold whatever jurisdiction the district courts might otherwise have had to entertain claims involving the application and interpretation of the PKPA, I express no view on the extent to which the congressional grant of federal question jurisdiction to the district courts differs from the limits set forth in Article III of the Constitution, or the reasons that might underlie such a difference.

. As noted in the majority opinion, we do not express a view as to the constitutionality of such a restriction on federal court jurisdiction.