Court Opinion

ID: 9382068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 19:03:12.781295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:36.886079
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                    )
                                      )
      v.                              )    I.D. No. 1711008021
                                      )
JOHN-TAI D. JOHNSON,                  )
                                      )
     Defendant.                       )

  ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF

                           Submitted: March 13, 2023
                            Decided: March 24, 2023

            Upon Consideration of Motion for Postconviction Relief,
                                  DENIED.

Kevin A. Gardner, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice,
Georgetown, Delaware, Attorney for the State of Delaware.

John-Tai Johnson, Sussex Correctional Institution, Georgetown, Delaware, Pro Se.

CONNER, J.
                               INTRODUCTION
      This is the Court’s decision on a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief

filed pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 (“Rule 61”) by John-Tai

Johnson (“Defendant”). Defendant seeks relief for two ineffective assistance of

counsel claims.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      On October 20, 2021, Defendant entered a plea of guilty to Vehicular

Assault in the First Degree and Driving Under the Influence. This Court conducted

a thorough guilty plea colloquy with Defendant. During the plea colloquy

Defendant confirmed that he understood his constitutional rights listed on the

Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form after conferring with his attorney, James

Murray. Most important to this motion, Defendant confirmed that by pleading

guilty he waived his constitutional rights, including the right to appeal with the

assistance of an attorney.

      Defendant returned to this Court on December 10, 2021, for sentencing.

Defendant was sentenced to three years at Level V. Additionally, the Level V

prison time was to be served without any benefit of early release pursuant to 11

Del. C. § 4204(k).

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         The charges stem from conduct that occurred on September 17, 2017. At

approximately 11:15 a.m. Defendant was driving in the right lane headed

southbound on Coastal Highway. For unknown reasons his vehicle abruptly turned

right, exited the roadway, and struck the victim who was standing on the sidewalk.

The vehicle then continued, hitting a fence and a tree before coming to a stop. The

victim was transported to the hospital and remains paralyzed from the neck down.

         Defendant was taken to Beebe Hospital for a blood draw. At the hospital,

Defendant admitted to the nurse he had consumed PCP the morning of the

incident. Defendant’s blood draw results showed PCP, cocaine, and marijuana in

his system at the time of the incident.

         Defendant filed this instant Motion for Postconviction Relief on December

10, 2022. James Murray, Esquire, filed his affidavit on January 6, 2023. The State

responded on January 10, 2023. Defendant then had until March 13, 2023, to file

his reply. Defendant failed to file a reply leaving the Court to review the Motion

based upon the current record.

                                    PROCEDURAL BARS

         Before addressing the merits of a Rule 61 Motion, the Court must address

the four procedural bars of Rule 61(i).1 If a procedural bar is applicable, the merits

1
    Ayers v. State, 802 A.2d 278, 281 (Del. 2002).
                                                     2
of the claim need not be addressed.2 Pursuant to Rule 61(i), a motion for

postconviction relief can be barred for time limitations, successive motions, failure

to raise procedural claims earlier in the proceedings, or former adjudication.3

       First, a motion for postconviction relief cannot be filed more than one year

after the judgment of conviction is final or more than one year after a retroactively

applicable right is recognized by the Supreme Court.4 Here, Defendant’s

conviction became final after he entered a guilty plea and was sentenced on

December 10, 2021. Defendant mailed the Motion on December 10, 2022.

Therefore, consideration of the Motion is not barred by the one-year limitation of

Rule 61(i)(1).

       Next, subsequent motions for postconviction relief are not allowed unless

certain requirements are met.5 This is Defendant’s first Rule 61 Motion.

       Third, grounds for relief that were not asserted during the proceedings that

led to Defendant’s conviction are barred unless Defendant can show procedural

default or prejudice from a violation of his rights.6 Defendant does not assert new

procedural grounds for relief. Additionally, ineffective assistance of counsel claims

2
  Id.
3
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i).
4
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(1).
5
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(2).
6
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(3).
                                          3
are not subject to this procedural bar because the claims cannot be asserted in

proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction.7 This bar is not applicable.

       Fourth, grounds for relief that were already formally adjudicated are barred.8

Again, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are properly raised for the first

time in a postconviction motion for relief, thus this bar is also inapplicable.

       None of the procedural bars under Rule 61(i) apply to this case. The Court

will now consider Defendant’s claims on the merits.

                   INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

       Strickland v. Washington established the well-known standard for ineffective

assistance of counsel claims.9 However, because Defendant pled guilty, he must

show that “but for his counsel’s unprofessional errors, he would not have pleaded

guilty but would have insisted on proceeding to trial.”10

    A. Trial Counsel Failed to Advise Defendant of Appeal Rights

       Defendant’s first ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that his attorney,

James Murray, failed to advise him of his appeal rights. However, in an affidavit

from Mr. Murray, he states he routinely and without exception advises all clients

7
  Green v. State, 238 A.3d 160, 175 (Del. 2020).
8
  Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4).
9
  Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
10
   Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1231 (Del. 2003).
                                                4
regarding the rights they give up when entering a guilty plea.11 Mr. Murray advised

Defendant of the rights he was giving up, including the right to appeal, when

discussing the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form.12 Defendant indicated he

understood the rights he was giving up and that his responses were truthful when

he signed the guilty plea form.13

       Additionally, this Court conducted a detailed plea colloquy with Defendant.

During the colloquy Defendant indicated he understood each and every right he

was giving up by pleading guilty.14 Defendant also confirmed that no one was

forcing him to enter into a plea.15 Defendant then told this Court he had plenty of

time to speak with Mr. Murray about the case and that he was satisfied with the

representation he received.16

       Defendant is bound by the representations he made on the Truth-In-

Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, absent any clear and convincing evidence to the

contrary.17 Here, there is nothing in the record or noted in Defendant’s motion that

leads the Court to believe Mr. Murray failed to advise Defendant of the rights he

was waiving by voluntarily choosing to plead guilty. Defendant has not shown that

11
   Murray Aff. at 1.
12
   Id.
13
   Id. Ex. A.
14
   Tr. of Guilty Plea at 5:4-18.
15
   Id. at 6:18-20.
16
   Id. at 6:12-17.
17
   Collins v. State, 2014 WL 2609107, at *2 (Del. Super. June 9, 2014) (citing Somerville v.
State, 703 A.2d 629, 632 (Del. 1997)).
                                                5
Mr. Murray made unprofessional errors that would have caused Defendant to plead

not guilty and instead proceed to trial. This claim is without merit.

     B. Trial Counsel Filed a Sentence Modification Notwithstanding the Motion’s
        Likely Denial
       Defendant’s next claim appears to be that Mr. Murray was ineffective for

filing a Motion for Sentence Modification when the motion would automatically be

denied due to the sentence being imposed pursuant to 11 Del. C. § 4204(k).18

       The Court is unaware of any statute or case law that would prevent

reconsideration of a sentence imposed under 11 Del. C. § 4204(k). Furthermore,

filing Motions for Sentence Modification appears to be zealous advocacy, not

ineffective assistance of counsel. In no way was Defendant harmed by the filing of

a Sentence Modification Motion. This claim is without merit.

                                        CONCLUSION

       A careful review of the Motion for Postconviction Relief and the record of

prior proceedings makes it plainly apparent that Defendant is not entitled to any

relief. Defendant has failed to show his counsel was ineffective nor has Defendant

shown he would have pled not guilty and instead proceeded to trial absent his

18
  Section 4204(k)(1) reads “Except as provided in this subsection, notwithstanding any statute,
rule, regulation or guideline to the contrary, the court may direct as a condition to a sentence of
imprisonment to be served at Level V or other that all or a specified portion of said sentence
shall be served without benefit of any form of early release, good time, furlough, work release,
supervised custody or any other form of reduction or diminution of sentence.”
                                                 6
counsel’s supposed unprofessional errors. Accordingly, Defendant’s Rule 61

Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.

       IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                          /s/ Mark H. Conner
                                          Mark H. Conner, Judge

cc: Prothonotary

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