Court Opinion

ID: 9383388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 16:00:35.486314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:45.215877
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 30 2023
                                                                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARMAN AKOPOVICH KHALULYAN,                      No.   21-70909
AKA Armen Khalulyan,
                                                Agency No. A071-083-833
                Petitioner,

 v.                                             MEMORANDUM*

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                     Argued and Submitted January 27, 2023
                           San Francisco, California

Before: GOULD, RAWLINSON, and BRESS, Circuit Judges.

      Arman Khalulyan petitions for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals

(BIA) decision dismissing his appeal of an Immigration Judge (IJ) order finding him

removable and denying his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and

protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). He also claims that the

BIA erred in affirming the IJ’s denial of his motion for continuance and his related

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
motion for reconsideration.

      In a published opinion issued concurrently with this memorandum

disposition, we hold that Khalulyan’s conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1029(b)(2)

qualifies as an “aggravated felony.” Under the criminal alien review bar, we

therefore lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s “final order of removal.” 8 U.S.C.

§ 1252(a)(2)(C). The denial of an application for statutory withholding is part of a

“final order of removal,” so § 1252(a)(2)(C) strips our jurisdiction to review the

agency’s denial of withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A) absent a

colorable legal or constitutional challenge. See Pechenkov v. Holder, 705 F.3d 444,

448 (9th Cir. 2012). We retain jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 to review the

agency’s other determinations, including the denial of CAT protection.          See

Nasrallah v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1683, 1691 (2020) (“[T]he Board’s ruling on a CAT

claim . . . does not merge into the final order of removal.”).

      1. The BIA did not abuse its discretion in adopting the IJ’s finding that

Khalulyan committed a particularly serious crime, which made Khalulyan ineligible

for statutory withholding of removal and withholding of removal under the CAT.

See Bare v. Barr, 975 F.3d 952, 961 (9th Cir. 2020) (standard of review). When, as

here, the petitioner was not convicted of a per se particularly serious crime (which

requires a 5-year sentence), see 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B), whether a particular

offense is a “particularly serious crime” depends on the facts and circumstances.

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Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2014). Our review of the

agency’s decision “is limited to ensuring that the agency relied on the appropriate

factors and proper evidence to reach this conclusion.” Avendano-Hernandez v.

Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1077 (9th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted). “We may not

reweigh the evidence and reach our own determination about the crime’s

seriousness.” Id.

      Here, the agency properly considered “the nature of the conviction, the

circumstances and underlying facts of the conviction, and the type of sentence

imposed.”    Konou, 750 F.3d at 1127.         The agency could properly consider

Khalulyan’s sentencing enhancement in its particularly serious crime determination.

See id. at 1128. The agency balanced the nature of the credit card scheme, the time

and planning that it took to carry out the scheme, and Khalulyan’s role in it. The

agency’s analysis was not “arbitrar[y], irrational[], or contrary to law,” and thus was

not an abuse of discretion. Arbid v. Holder, 700 F.3d 379, 385 (9th Cir. 2012)

(quotation omitted).     Nor does Khalulyan raise any colorable constitutional

challenge or question of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).

      2. The IJ did not violate due process or abuse her discretion by denying the

motion to continue. We review due process claims de novo, see Rodriguez Diaz v.

Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2022), and challenges to the denial of a

motion to continue for abuse of discretion, see Garcia v. Lynch, 798 F.3d 876, 881

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(9th Cir. 2015). “The decision to grant or deny the continuance is within the sound

discretion of the judge and will not be overturned except on a showing of clear

abuse.” Id. (quotations omitted).

      Here, the IJ held a hearing on the motion to continue and considered the

relevant factors. See Matter of Hashmi, 24 I. & N. Dec. 785, 790 (B.I.A. 2009)

(identifying factors to consider for a motion to continue). Most prominently, the IJ

found that a visa was not scheduled to be available for another seven years, rendering

speculative Khalulyan’s likelihood of obtaining adjustment of status during the

requested three-month continuance.       In denying reconsideration, the IJ also

reasonably concluded that Khalulyan, based on his criminal history, was unlikely to

receive adjustment of status even if his visa petition was approved during the period

of any continuance. The denial of the motion to continue was not a due process

violation or a “clear abuse” of discretion. Garcia, 798 F.3d at 881. Nor was there

any abuse of discretion in denying Khalulyan’s motion to reconsider the denial of

the motion for continuance. See Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1229 (9th Cir. 2020)

(standard of review).

      3. Khalulyan failed to exhaust his remaining claims. He did not argue before

the agency that any deficiency in his notice to appear deprived the agency of

jurisdiction over his removal proceedings. Regardless, this claim is foreclosed by

precedent. See United States v. Bastide-Hernandez, 39 F.4th 1187, 1193 (9th Cir.

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2022) (en banc); Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 895 (9th Cir. 2020);

Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1161 (9th Cir. 2019). Khalulyan similarly

failed to raise before the BIA any challenge to the IJ’s finding that he had not shown

a well-founded fear of persecution based on a protected ground or a likelihood of

torture, and that he therefore was ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or

CAT protection. Because these claims are unexhausted, we lack jurisdiction to

review them. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1); Abebe v. Mukasey, 554 F.3d 1203, 1208

(9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).

      For these reasons, and the reasons set forth in our accompanying opinion, the

petition for review is

      DISMISSED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART.

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