Court Opinion

ID: 9696328
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:45:00.208543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:21.334040
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen :
Throughout the great and long history of the writ of habeas corpus no court has ever held, and many have expressly rejected the proposition, that the writ could issue on behalf of one who was lawfully confined. Here, petitioner seeks to attack the validity of a conviction although he is lawfully confined by reason of a different, unassailed, prior conviction. He has not yet begun to serve the sentence imposed upon the conviction which he attacks. In similar circumstances the Supreme Court of the United States has held that the *27petitioner is not entitled to the writ, McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934), Heflin v. United States, 358 U.S.. 415 (1959), and so have we. Commonwealth ex rel. Lewis v. Ashe, 335 Pa. 575, 7 A. 2d 296 (1939). See also Commonwealth ex rel. Padmonsky v. Smith, 127 Pa. Superior Ct. 24, 191 Atl. 684 (1937).
The majority sets forth only one reason for changing the rule — that it will facilitate hearings on petitions and retrials (should they be necessary) because the evidence will be fresher. While there is much said in the majority opinion about the novelty of today’s circumstances compared to the antiquity of the rule regarding when a petition for habeas corpus is appropriate, there is nothing novel about the majority’s reason for change. Staleness of evidence must surely have been as much of a problem when the Hill and. Ashe cases, supra, were decided as it is today.
The only thing that is different today is the increased number of petitions for habeas corpus. While this may increase the number of cases in which staleness of evidence becomes a problem it has another consequence — it greatly increases the case load pressure upon the courts and district attorneys. Why should we now increase that pressure with cases that have heretofore been considered premature? District Attorneys and courts may well find it a mixed blessing to have less time to effectively utilize fresher evidence.
But speculation — and it is only speculation — about the practical effects of throwing out the rule is beside the main point. The majority approaches the issue as though the old rule has no reason. But it does. Courts never should decide issues unless and until they have to — especially constitutional issues. “It is not the habit of the court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the ease.” Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905). This important principle of judicial restraint *28in the area of constitutional litigation was reiterated by Justices Brandeis, Stone, Roberts and Cardozo in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) and applied by us in Beauty Hall, Inc. v. State Board of Cosmetology, 418 Pa. 225, 210 A. 2d 495 (1965). Surely this principle is a good enough reason for the continued vitality of the rule regarding the appropriate time to petition for the writ of habeas corpus. One need only consider the difficult constitutional issues the majority unnecessarily decides.
In my opinion, the majority has perverted the writ of habeas corpus, increased the case load pressure with premature cases, and unnecessarily decided constitutional issues — with no immediate benefit to the lawfully confined petitioner. Nothing said by the majority justifies its action or impels me to abandon our long line of decisions. To do so requires that I ignore Mr. Justice Stone's penetrating discussion in McNally v. Hill, supra. It should suffice to note only the Court’s conclusion in McNally: “Without restraint of liberty the writ will not issue. . . . Equally, without restraint which is unlawful, the writ may not be used. A sentence which the prisoner has not begun to serve cannot be the cause of restraint which the statute [habeas corpus] makes the subject of inquiry.”
I dissent.
Mr. Justice Jones joins in this dissent.