Court Opinion

ID: 9840156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-15 14:07:02.543615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:10:22.955771
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 8, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                          TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-0960-MR

ETHEL POLLY BRADLEY                                                    APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM FLOYD FAMILY COURT
v.              HONORABLE DWIGHT S. MARSHALL, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 16-CI-00043

CHARLES R. BRADLEY                                                        APPELLEE

                                OPINION
                        REVERSING AND REMANDING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, ECKERLE, AND GOODWINE, JUDGES.

CETRULO, JUDGE: Appellant Ethel Polly Bradley (“Polly”) appeals the Floyd

Family Court’s findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment (“Decree of

Dissolution”) dissolving her marriage to Appellee Charles Randy Bradley

(“Randy”). Polly argues the family court improperly adopted an order tendered by

Randy and committed reversible errors regarding attorney’s fees, maintenance, and

marital distributions. Upon review, we reverse and remand for further findings and

clarification of the distribution of marital assets, to include a possible maintenance

award.
                      I.     FACTS AND BACKGROUND

             Polly and Randy were married in June 1982. Polly petitioned for

dissolution of the marriage in January 2016. Through the next six years, Polly and

Randy litigated the dissolution of their marriage, eventually coming before the

Floyd Family Court for a final hearing over two days – May 12 and November 29,

2021. During the final hearing, the family court heard testimony from two

certified public accountants, Calvin Cranfill (“CPA Cranfill”), and Kim Lockhart

(“CPA Lockhart”); a certified appraiser, Paul David Brown (“Appraiser Brown”);

and a business valuator, Dan Wells (“Valuator Wells”). After the final hearing,

both parties submitted proposed orders, and in July 2022, the family court entered

the Decree of Dissolution.

             During the marriage, Randy worked continuously in the gas and oil

industry, owning (in whole or in part) four companies that operated approximately

572 oil and gas wells: full ownership of Basin Energy Company (“Basin”) and

Troublesome Creek Gas Corporation (“Troublesome Creek”); 49% of Tina Gas

Company (“Tina Gas”); and 50% of R1 Compressor. These oil and gas interests

made up the bulk of marital assets. Polly, with the exception of the first two years

of their marriage, worked as a homemaker. After the price of oil and gas fell in

2014, Randy and Polly’s financial situation took a turn for the worse and Randy

filed for bankruptcy protection. Polly did not file for bankruptcy. In October

                                         -2-
2016, all income, assets, and debts of the marital estate in Randy’s name were part

of the bankruptcy estate; the bankruptcy filing protected the marital estate from

dissolution.

               Polly and Randy lived together in Kentucky from the time of their

marriage until the summer of 2005. That summer, Polly and her youngest child

moved to Los Angeles. Randy remained in Kentucky with the other children and

worked the oil and gas businesses. In 2009, the youngest child moved back to

Kentucky for high school, but Polly remained in Los Angeles alone until 2016. By

the time Polly petitioned for dissolution, Polly and Randy’s five children had all

reached the age of majority, and Polly and Randy had amassed considerable assets

(mostly accrued through the interest in oil and gas ventures) and considerable debt

(including significant tax debt).1

               The Decree of Dissolution allocated a 60/40 division of the marital

estate, in favor of Randy. The Decree of Dissolution denied Polly’s request for

additional attorney’s fees, but Randy did pay partial attorney’s fees to Polly’s legal

counsel through the course of litigation. Polly now appeals the Decree of

Dissolution.2 As an initial matter, Polly argues (A) that the family court’s

1
 The Internal Revenue Service claimed a tax debt of more than $1.5 million, and the Kentucky
Revenue Cabinet claimed a tax debt of more than $330,000.
2
 Polly also challenges the orders entered on May 1, 2019; June 17, 2019; July 10, 2019; and
March 31, 2021. However, those orders are temporary, interlocutory orders (granting temporary
maintenance, appointing experts, and providing partial fees) and are not appealable. See Lebus v.

                                              -3-
“mechanical adoption” of Randy’s tendered findings of fact and conclusions of law

violated Kentucky Rule of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 52.01 and warrants reversal.

Also, substantively, Polly argues the family court abused its discretion when it (B)

failed to equitably divide the marital estate or grant permanent maintenance; and

(C) improperly denied Polly’s request for additional attorney’s fees. Each issue

will be addressed in turn, and additional facts will be supplied as necessary.

                                     II.    ANALYSIS

              A.      Adoption of Tendered Order

              On appeal, Polly argues that the family court erred by adopting

Randy’s proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law contrary to its

responsibilities set forth in CR 52.01 (“[T]he court shall find the facts specifically

and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and render an appropriate

judgment[.]”). Polly argues that nothing in Kentucky precedent “suggests that it is

good practice to permit counsel for one party to author an exhaustive opinion[.]”

We agree. Adopting one party’s tendered order is not good practice, especially in

complex, sensitive, and detailed family matters. See T.R.W. v. Cabinet for Health

Lebus, 382 S.W.2d 873, 874-75 (Ky. 1964); see also Kentucky Revised Statute (“KRS”) 403.160
(trial court may issue temporary maintenance orders, which terminate when the final decree is
entered); see also Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs. v. Jefferson Cnty. Att’y’s Off., 668 S.W.3d
217, 221 (Ky. App. 2023) (discussing the collateral order doctrine and the very limited
circumstances under which an interlocutory order is appealable). Here, the Decree of
Dissolution addressed those issues (maintenance, experts, attorney’s fees) and we shall evaluate
them as they appear in that final and appealable order.

                                              -4-
& Fam. Servs., 599 S.W.3d 455, 459 (Ky. App. 2019) (citing Callahan v.

Callahan, 579 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Ky. App. 1979)) (stating that while permissible

under certain circumstances, such a practice “is frowned upon by the appellate

courts of Kentucky”). This matter was pending for more than six years and

involved complex issues and combined assets of in excess of $5 million, similarly

significant debts, and multiple business entities and arrangements. It is hard to

imagine a more “complex family matter.” Id. at 459.

             We note CR 52.01 does not forbid the family court from adopting

proposed orders from the parties; nor does the Kentucky Supreme Court. See

Prater v. Cabinet for Human Resources, Commonwealth of Kentucky, 954 S.W.2d

954, 956 (Ky. 1997) (citing Bingham v. Bingham, 628 S.W.2d 628, 628-30

(Ky. 1982)) (“It is not error for the trial court to adopt findings of fact which were

merely drafted by someone else.”). As this Court recently pointed out, “[t]he

Supreme Court has not overruled Bingham or Prater.” Keith v. Keith, 556 S.W.3d

10, 14 (Ky. App. 2018). However, such a practice is not without restraints. “An

appellate court will affirm an order supported by substantial evidence” unless a

party shows that “the decision-making process was not under the control of the

judge or that these findings and conclusions were not the product of the

deliberations of the trial judge’s mind.” Keith, 556 S.W.3d at 14 (quoting

Bingham, 628 S.W.2d at 629-30) (internal quotation marks omitted).

                                          -5-
               Here, Polly has not clearly shown that the decision-making process

was not under the control of the trial judge or that the Decree of Dissolution was

not a product of the deliberations of his mind. The parties first appeared before the

family court on March 1, 2016 for a status quo hearing, and that same trial judge

conducted more than 13 hearings3 over the next six years.

               The final hearing took place over two days – May 12, 2021 and

November 19, 2021 – and Randy testified via deposition on December 14, 2021.

Thereafter, the parties both submitted tendered orders, as they had consistently

done through the six years of litigation. On April 19, 2022, the family court held

an additional hearing via teleconference. At that hearing, the judge stated that he

had read a transcript of Randy’s deposition and would “watch the video also.”

Thus, we cannot say that the family court did not personally consider the various

issues and evidence presented. However, as will become apparent, we also cannot

determine that the family court’s adoption of Randy’s tendered order and

calculation of assets and debts were supported by substantial evidence. Rather, an

independent review of the record left us with more questions than answers; in

particular, with the asset and liability breakdown (“distribution breakdown”)

3
  Our independent review of the record found hearings in this matter on March 1, 2016 (in
person); April 5, 2016 (in person); July 5, 2016 (in person); November 2, 2016 (in person); July
18, 2017 (in person); June 4, 2019 (in person); April 16, 2019 (in person); June 18, 2019 (in
person); March 16, 2021 (teleconference); April 6, 2021 (teleconference); May 12, 2021 (in
person); November 19, 2021 (in person); and April 19, 2022 (teleconference). Although the
attorneys varied, the same judge was present for all the hearings.

                                               -6-
attached to the end of the Decree of Dissolution. This distribution breakdown

appears as the last page of the Decree of Dissolution, after the family court’s

signature, and confusingly still retains the heading “R’s Exhibit A to FINDINGS

OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.” It was clearly the calculations

prepared by Randy’s counsel and resulted in a payment of only $22,023 by Randy

to Polly.

             B.     Equitable Division of Marital Estate

             When disposing of property in a dissolution of marriage action, KRS

403.190 requires the family court to follow a three-step process: “(1) the trial court

first characterizes each item of property as marital or nonmarital; (2) the trial court

then assigns each party’s nonmarital property to that party; and (3) finally, the trial

court equitably divides the marital property between the parties.” Travis v. Travis,

59 S.W.3d 904, 908-09 (Ky. 2001) (footnotes and citations omitted).

             KRS 403.190(3) creates a “presumption that all property acquired

after the marriage is marital property unless shown to come within one of KRS

403.190(2)’s exceptions.” Sexton v. Sexton, 125 S.W.3d 258, 266 (Ky. 2004)

(citations omitted). When dividing the marital property, KRS 403.190(1) requires

the family court to do so “in just proportions” after “considering all relevant

                                          -7-
factors.”4 “‘Just proportions’ does not mean that the property must be equally

divided, but only that a consideration of the factors in KRS 403.190 has been

made.” Muir v. Muir, 406 S.W.3d 31, 36 (Ky. App. 2013).

               “In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury[,]” including actions

for dissolution of marriage, “[f]indings of fact [] shall not be set aside unless

clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court

to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” CR 52.01. A factual finding is clearly

erroneous if unsupported by substantial evidence. Hunter v. Hunter, 127 S.W.3d

656, 659 (Ky. App. 2003) (citing Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly,

976 S.W.2d 409 (Ky. 1998)). “Substantial evidence is evidence, when taken alone

or in light of all the evidence, which has sufficient probative value to induce

conviction in the mind of a reasonable person.” Id. (citing Golightly, 976 S.W.2d

at 414). However, appellate courts review legal issues de novo. Id.

               The award of maintenance comes within the sound discretion of the

family court. Weldon v. Weldon, 957 S.W.2d 283, 285-86 (Ky. App. 1997)

(citation omitted). The determination of maintenance involves a two-pronged

analysis. KRS 403.200(1). First, the family court must decide whether the

4
  “(a) Contribution of each spouse to acquisition of the marital property, including contribution
of a spouse as homemaker; (b) Value of the property set apart to each spouse; (c) Duration of the
marriage; and (d) Economic circumstances of each spouse when the division of property is to
become effective, including the desirability of awarding the family home or the right to live
therein for reasonable periods to the spouse having custody of any children.” KRS 403.190(1).

                                               -8-
requesting spouse is entitled to maintenance by examining that spouse’s financial

needs and resources. Wattenberger v. Wattenberger, 577 S.W.3d 786, 787 (Ky.

App. 2019) (citing id.). Pursuant to KRS 403.200(1), the family court may award

maintenance if it finds that the spouse seeking maintenance (a) “lacks sufficient

property, including marital property apportioned to [her], to provide for [her]

reasonable needs”; and (b) “is unable to support [her]self through appropriate

employment[.]” McVicker v. McVicker, 461 S.W.3d 404, 420 (Ky. App. 2015)

(quoting KRS 403.200(1)). If, based on those elements, an award of maintenance

is justified, the circuit court moves on to the second prong of the analysis:

deciding the appropriate amount and duration of the award considering the factors

of KRS 403.200(2). McVicker, 461 S.W.3d at 420.

             Here, the Decree of Dissolution pointed out the particulars of the

marriage and emphasized Polly’s lack of contributions to the marital estate by

stating:

             Both parties testified that they lived separate and apart
             since the [s]ummer of 2005. From 2005-2009, Polly had
             one child living with her, but 2009-2016, Polly lived in
             California alone. Polly testified that she returned to
             Prestonsburg in 2016. Polly failed to testify as to any
             contribution she made to the marital estate while in
             California. Randy lived at the marital residence while the
             remaining minor children all attended and graduated from
             Prestonsburg High School. The Court finds that Polly
             made little, if any, contribution to the marital estate as a
             “homemaker spouse” from 2005 to the Final Hearing [in
             2021]. Randy testified at length as to his contributions to

                                          -9-
              the marriage. This Court finds the contribution of Randy
              for the final sixteen (16) years of this marriage far exceed
              any contributions from Polly. The majority of the value in
              this marital estate is directly related to Randy’s work and
              talent in finding profitable production of oil and gas[.]

              The family court thus concluded that the marital assets should be

divided, with 60% to Randy and 40% to Polly.

              Further, the Decree of Dissolution awarded Polly and Randy their

current personal bank accounts, homes, furnishings, and vehicles.5 Randy received

nine parcels of land ranging in value from $1,800 to $170,000. Randy received six

business bank accounts, apparently all with a negative balance. Randy was also

allocated the couple’s joint 2014 Kentucky tax debt, 2015 and 2016 overdue

property tax debt, and the 2020 and 2021 federal and state income tax liabilities for

income received from R1 Compressor, Tina Gas, Troublesome Creek, and Basin.

According to the distribution breakdown, Polly received the 2019 and 2020

property taxes on her home. Polly and Randy were each directed to pay their

individual attorney’s fees. Randy received the debt owed to CPA Cranfill. As for

the businesses,6 Randy received 100% of the couple’s interest in R1 Compressor,

5
 Polly received as marital property a Mercedes, a BMW (both previously owned by
Troublesome Creek), and a van, all of which were unencumbered. Randy inherited a truck and
Highlander, and those were awarded to him as non-marital property.
6
 Polly argues the family court abused its discretion by accepting CPA Cranfill’s inaccurate
business valuations that improperly applied “present worth discounts” to the wells and
marketability reductions to the businesses’ overall value. However, the time to challenge the
experts’ valuations, appraisals, and assessments has long since passed. The family court heard

                                             -10-
Tina Gas, and Troublesome Creek (valued at $1.5 million by the family court) (less

the vehicles transferred to Polly). Basin, the couple’s fourth business entity

interest (valued at $4.5 million by the family court), was said to be divided

between Randy and Polly. However, the family court’s ruling then accepts

Randy’s proposal that 38 wells/well interests would be transferred to Polly, while

Randy retained 534 remaining wells/well interests. The family court directed

Randy to execute a “well tending and accounting written agreement” to Polly to

provide services that he “volunteered” to provide but that he valued at $666,900, if

provided over 15 years. However, Randy was relieved of this obligation if Polly

sold the wells. Then, in addressing maintenance, the Decree of Dissolution simply

denied Polly any award of future maintenance.

               Well, quite simply, we have a problem with the wells.

               The body of the Decree of Dissolution states that “Polly will receive

assets from this dissolution of more than $2,000,000.” However, the

testimony from four experts: CPA Cranfill, CPA Lockhart, Appraiser Brown, and Valuator
Wells. CPA Cranfill was appointed by Agreed Order. Polly does not take issue with CPA
Lockhart’s assessments. Appraiser Brown’s appraisals were admitted into evidence without
objection. Valuator Wells was Randy’s witness, but Polly did not challenge his methodology or
qualifications under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786,
125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993), nor did she object to Wells’ report being introduced into evidence.
Polly asserts the family court effectively prevented her from hiring her own experts – to refute
these business valuations – by denying her requests for additional funds prior to the final hearing.
However, we find this argument to be inappropriate (as it pertains to prior, interlocutory orders)
as well as disingenuous; Polly’s legal counsel was awarded $50,000 in legal fees before the final
hearing, and her counsel fronted $11,000 for Polly’s cars and furniture to be returned to
Kentucky.

                                               -11-
aforementioned “distribution breakdown” not referenced at all in the Decree of

Dissolution contains multiple “deductions” from that total, ultimately resulting in a

payment by Randy to Polly of only $22,023 and a “credit” to Randy for his well-

tending services over 15 years. The Decree of Dissolution noted that Polly’s 38

wells and well interests had generated an income of approximately $130,552.47 in

2019. However, there was nothing to indicate the expected income production

duration of the wells, nor was there any accommodation in the Decree of

Dissolution if those wells stop producing next year, or the year after. Also, there is

no language in the Decree of Dissolution that addresses the possibility of another

fall in gas prices, possibly resulting in significantly less income. Moreover, in the

distribution breakdown, the “well tending and accounting” fee was deducted from

Polly’s marital asset allocation, despite the fact that in Randy’s deposition he

offered to tend the wells free of charge.7 Then, Polly’s marital estate was reduced

by the full amount of 15 years of Randy’s tending the wells, but there is no

language about reimbursing Polly for these fees if (a) Polly sells the wells or (b)

the wells dry up prior to 15 years. Finally, the Decree of Dissolution does not state

7
  Randy testified that he would tend these wells for no additional charge to Polly because he’s
“already there, already doing it” and “already got all these [wells] in [their] system.” Further on
in his deposition, Randy’s legal counsel asked, “Why do you believe that you should not be
required to pay Polly maintenance?” Randy answered, “Well with the wells that she’ll be getting
and us taking care of all of them for free for her, she should not have to have any more money.”
And yet, the distribution breakdown deducts $666,900 for “well tending and accounting by
Randy for Polly for next 15 years[.]”

                                               -12-
who will be responsible for the “plugging fees” when the wells are no longer

income producing; therefore, we assume that obligation would fall to Polly.

However, Randy himself testified that plugging fees range between $10,000 and

$20,000 for each well depending on the depth of the well.8 It appears, from our

review, that when the wells “dry up” Polly will have to pay between $190,000 and

$380,000 to plug them (assuming she only has to plug the wholly owned wells and

not the wells in which she has an interest).

               And so, it appears that Polly’s purported “40%” of the marital estate

said to be valued at $1,995,187 was reduced to an in-need-of-repair home, past due

property taxes, two used cars, her private bank accounts (totaling less than $7,000),

some sort of monthly installment payment by Randy, possibly income-producing

wells, a check from Randy for $22,023.16, and possibly owed plugging fees of up

to $380,000. Randy received ownership of all the businesses and most of the

couple’s debt, and his 60% of the marital estate totaled $3,418,988.19, after he had

made all of the payments to result in the “equitable transfer” to Polly. We seek

clarity on this distribution.

8
  In his deposition, Randy disagreed with Valuator Wells’ business evaluation of Basin because
the valuator did not adequately account for the “plugging fees” for each well. Valuator Wells
allowed for a $10,000 plugging fee for each well, but Randy stated that $10,000 was “too low.”
Randy stated, “The biggest problem with the [Basin] valuation, and it’s a common problem with
everybody that’s in the oil and gas business, is the plugging liabilities associated with the wells.
Most of the time nobody wants to acknowledge the fact that somebody has to plug these wells
eventually.” Despite that, the Decree of Dissolution does not acknowledge the fact that
somebody has to eventually plug these wells.

                                                -13-
              The lack of any explanation or even reference in the Decree of

Dissolution to Randy’s attached exhibit that was utilized by the family court, and

was presumably the basis of the rulings, is troubling. Likewise, we have concerns

regarding the creation of an “installment contract” as part of the property division.

That contract is not part of the record on appeal; not part of the Decree of

Dissolution; and it apparently is an obligation upon Randy that would end if Polly

was forced to sell the wells. Numerous questions come to mind as to tax liabilities,

income attributed to Polly, Randy’s possible death during the 15 years; and none of

these questions can be answered from the family court’s fully adopted findings,

conclusions, and decree, prepared by Randy’s counsel.9 While there were often

failings on Polly’s part to present evidence to counter Randy’s, those do not

eliminate the family court’s obligation to equitably assign and divide the marital

and non-marital property under KRS 403.190. With so many questions, we cannot

find sufficient evidence to support the assignment and division herein.

              Secondly, we accept that the award of maintenance comes within the

sound discretion of the family court. Weldon, 957 S.W.2d at 285. Again, we note

the Decree of Dissolution aptly pointed out the weaknesses of Polly’s proof and the

inconsistencies in Polly’s legal argument: she requested permanent maintenance,

9
 The family court did change two dates from June to August on page 35. Otherwise, it and the
exhibit referenced herein appear to be exactly as submitted by counsel.

                                            -14-
but did not request a specified amount nor duration; and, she acknowledged there

were multiple inaccuracies in the living expenses she submitted. However, the

Decree of Dissolution does not adequately consider Polly’s age and medical issues,

her unlikely employability, her minimal social security, the testimony about the

poor condition of her home, and her inability to provide for her reasonable needs.

Additionally, the Decree of Dissolution, in denying maintenance, relied on Polly

being able to support her reasonable needs with income received from the wells,

but that well income expectation was not supported by substantial evidence. As

such, the denial of maintenance requires further clarity – within and as a result of –

a re-examination of the division of the marital estate.

             Also, clarity is necessary on a non-marital debt attributed to Randy

from his father’s estate. The Decree of Dissolution states that Randy received a

non-marital check for $242,159.52 from his father’s estate, and Randy invested

$217,158.52 of that inheritance into Basin. However, the distribution breakdown

shows a debt to his father’s estate for $468,000 that was included in toto in the

distribution breakdown as a marital debt. Although inheritance is typically a non-

marital asset, KRS 403.190(2)(a), it is unclear from the Decree of Dissolution if,

under these circumstances, the debt was affected by the inheritance. Stated another

way, because Randy is one of the beneficiaries to his father’s estate, does the non-

marital inheritance affect the marital debt owed by Basin?

                                         -15-
             Additionally, clarity is necessary as to the 2019 and 2020 property

taxes on the home awarded to Polly. According to the distribution breakdown,

Polly is responsible for the 2019 and 2020 Floyd County property taxes. However,

the body of the Decree of Dissolution stated that there was a debt owed to

Community Trust Bank in the amount of $30,070 that was traced to the payment in

full of a property tax lien that was being foreclosed upon while this action was

pending. That loan is solely in Randy’s name. Does that loan include the cost of

the property taxes or only the fees and interests associated with the foreclosure

action? Did Randy create the possibility of the foreclosure action by not paying

the taxes as directed, or did he assist Polly by paying the taxes despite the taxes

being her responsibility during the litigation?

             Therefore, the Decree of Dissolution was not supported by substantial

evidence, and we must remand for a more complete and detailed allocation of

marital assets with consideration of the factors in KRS 403.190 and thereafter

application of KRS 403.200 to the maintenance determination.

             C. Attorney’s Fees

             KRS 403.220 governs attorney’s fees and under this statute:

             a trial court may order one party to a divorce action to pay
             a reasonable amount for the attorney’s fees of the other
             party, but only if there exists a disparity in the relative
             financial resources of the parties in favor of the payor. But
             even if a disparity exists, whether to make such an
             assignment and, if so, the amount to be assigned is within

                                         -16-
             the discretion of the trial judge. There is nothing
             mandatory about it. Thus, a trial court’s ruling on attorney
             fees is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion.

Sexton, 125 S.W.3d at 272 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

             On appeal, Polly claims the family court erred by denying, in the

Decree of Dissolution, her request for additional attorney’s fees. She received

$40,000 in attorney’s fees from Randy through the course of litigation, but her

appellate brief states that “by the end of trial, Polly owed her attorney

approximately $151,000.” Polly argues that her temporary maintenance and her

allocation of marital assets are not sufficient to cover her legal fees. However, the

family court determined that Randy was not responsible for her remaining legal

debt.

             Because we are remanding for the clarification of the division of the

marital estate as directed herein, the family court shall reconsider Polly’s request

for attorney’s fees based on the factors listed in KRS 403.220. Still, we recognize

that “[the trial court] is in the best position to observe conduct and tactics which

waste the court’s and attorneys’ time and must be given wide latitude to sanction

or discourage such conduct.” Gentry v. Gentry, 798 S.W.2d 928, 938 (Ky. 1990).

                               III.   CONCLUSION

             Therefore, we REVERSE and REMAND the Decree of Dissolution of

the Floyd Family Court for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

                                         -17-
           ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Louis P. Winner            Suzanne Baumgardner
Sidney M. Vieck            Kami C. Brumley
Louisville, Kentucky       Lexington, Kentucky

                         -18-