Court Opinion

ID: 9674453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:28:59.778101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:27.724298
License: Public Domain

Elsijane T. Roy, Justice, dissenting. I cannot agree with the majority opinion in its determination that the appellee’s income tax returns were pending on January 1, 1975. In construing statutes courts must give words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in the common language. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Heath, 254 Ark. 847, 497 S.W. 2d 30 (1973), and Hicks v. Ark. State Medical Board, 260 Ark. 31, 537 S.W. 2d 794 (1976). The ordinary meaning of the word “pending” is “in the period before the decision or conclusion of; remaining undecided; awaiting decision or settlement; unfinished.” Random House Dictionary of the English Language, 1967. Another definition is “begun, but not yet completed; during; before the conclusion of; prior to the completion of; unsettled; undetermined; in the process of settlement or adjustment.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition. These same definitions have been accepted by the courts. U.S. v. 2049.85 Acres of Land, 49 F. Supp. 20 (1943); State v. Faircloth, 34 N.M. 61, 277 P. 30 (1929); Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 161 Ga. 559, 131 S.E. 359 (1926). In Davis v. Britt, 243 Ark. 556, 420 S.W. 2d 863 (1967), we stated: “It would appear evident that if the case is ‘pending’ there would have been no final judgment.” “An action is pending so long as it is still open to modification, appeal, or rehearing,” i.e., until final judgment is rendered. (Italics supplied.) 1 C.J.S. Action, § 142, p. 1421. None of the above avenues of relief remained open to appellee, so this cause could not have remained pending. The judgment was final in every sense of the word when the petition for rehearing was denied on October 14, 1972. The majority bases its opinion on the unsound premise that even though the cause has been finally adjudicated the income tax returns were pending. The issues involved and all substantive matters in connection with the income tax returns had long since been resolved. They had been finally and completely adjudicated. The only thing pending was payment of the tax due by appellee for the years 1969 and 1970. Not having met the criterion of “pending tax returns” appellee is not entitled to the benefit of the net loss carry-over provision on its 1969 and 1970 returns. Furthermore, to view the matter in any other light involves the more serious issue of illegal classification. While the legislature has considerable discretion in establishing classifications for the purpose of taxation, this discretion does not extend to setting up a classification which relieves from the tax burden here involved all who have not paid the tax and placing in another category the taxpayers who long ago paid the amounts due on their 1969 and 1970 income tax returns under the loss carry-over provision in effect at that time. The United States Supreme Court has held many times that states in the exercise of their taxing powers, are subject to the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 79 S. Ct. 437, 3 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1958)1, the Court stated: But there is a point beyond which the State cannot go without violating the Equal Protection Clause. The State must proceed upon a rational basis and may not resort to a classification that is palpably arbitrary. The rule often has been stated to be that the classification “must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.” Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415; Louisville Gas & Electric Co. v. Coleman, 277 U.S. 32, 37; Airway Electric Appliance Corp. v. Day, 266 U.S. 71, 85; Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U.S. 230, 240; Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 281 U.S. 146, 160. The classification established in this case is arbitrary, discriminatory and has no reasonable relation to an impartial administration of the Arkansas income tax laws. The majority opinion also states appellant’s citations involve “only the rights of private individuals” and that “the general rule applicable to individuals does not apply to retroactive legislation impairing a state’s own rights.” The opinion also declares that “a state has no vested rights which are immune from legislative control.” However, citizens and taxpayers of this state do have rights involved in this case. One is the right to demand that tax burdens be imposed fairly and impartially and that taxes owed be collected in a nondiscriminatory manner. To waive collection from appellee on the sole basis of refusal to pay the assessment while collecting from other taxpayers under the old loss carry-over provision of the statute is to place a stamp of approval on the most obvious kind of special legislation and put a premium on delay in payment of taxes instead of a penalty. For the foregoing reasons I respectfully dissent. Justice George Rose Smith and Justice Fogleman join in this dissent.  Cited with approval in Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351, 94 S. Ct. 1734, 40 L. Ed. 2d 189 (1974).