Court Opinion

ID: 9464589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:37:59.611783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:43.507641
License: Public Domain

MANSFIELD, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
While F.R.Evid. 404(b) prohibits the use of “similar act” evidence to prove a defendant’s bad character, i. e., that he has a propensity or disposition to commit the crime alleged, it does permit the introduction of such evidence as proof of the “identity” of the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime charged. However, a mere showing of general similarity between the defendant’s prior similar act and the act charged is insufficient to render the evidence admissible to prove identity. There must be some unique and specific characteristic common to both the uncharged act and the alleged criminal conduct, such as a similarity in the modus operandi, before the earlier act may be admitted on the issue of identity. See, e. g., United States v. Cavallino, 498 F.2d 1200, 1207 (5th Cir. 1974); United States v. v. McCray, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 67, 433 F.2d 1173, 1175 (1970); United States v. Bussey, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 268, 432 F.2d 1330, 1333 (1970); Parker v. United States, 400 F.2d 248, 252 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1097, 89 S.Ct. 892, 21 L.Ed.2d 789 (1968). Indeed, as the majority in United States v. Benedetto, 571 F.2d 1246 (2d Cir. Feb. 24, 1978), Dkt. No. 77-1306, Slip Opin. 1735 stated:
“Similarly, we would be hard pressed to hold that Benedetto’s alleged similar acts shared ‘unusual characteristics’ with the acts charged, thereby evidencing a unique scheme or pattern. McCormick states that such evidence is admissible:
To prove other like crimes by the accused so nearly identical in method as to earmark them as the handiwork of the accused. Here much more is demanded than the mere repeated commission of crimes of the same class, such as repeated burglaries or thefts. The device used must be so unusual and distinctive as to be like a signature. (Footnotes omitted, emphasis added by Benedetto opinion).
“We are told there was such a ‘signature’ here because Benedetto used ‘a similar technique for receiving the cash: the passing of folded bills by way of a handshake.’- But that method of bribery is about as unique as using glassine envelopes to package heroin. If the evidence were that the money had always been passed to Benedetto in an unusual way, e. g., a requirement that the money be placed in a peculiar place, we would have a different view.” (Footnotes omitted).
See also Weinstein’s Evidence 1404(09) at 404-61.
The reasoning behind the requirement that there be some showing of uniqueness in the defendant’s conduct to render his prior similar acts probative on the issue of identity is readily apparent. Without such a showing, the evidence would “identify” the defendant as the perpetrator of the act charged only because it would provide the basis for an inference that since the defendant had engaged in similar conduct on other occasions he was more likely than not to have committed the act on the occasion alleged in the indictment. But this is precisely the inference prohibited by F.R.Evid. *1257404(b), which provides that “Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.”
Applying these principles here, in the absence of proof of some peculiarity or uniqueness about Gubelman’s conduct, the fact that he took bribes on other occasions, at other places, from other meat processors, does not serve to identify him as the same person who took the bribes alleged in the indictment. All it tends to prove is that he had a propensity for bribe-taking. For this purpose its admission is barred by Rule 404(b) which, if paraphrased, would read as follows: “Evidence of other [bribes] is not admissible to prove [Gubelman’s propensity to take bribes] in order to show that he [took bribes at the places charged].”
For these reasons I must respectfully dissent.