Court Opinion

ID: 9499739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:56:30.546352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:41.923774
License: Public Domain

SHEDD, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in parts I, II.A, and II.B.2 of Judge Traxler’s opinion, remanding Lin-Jian’s asylum and withholding of removal claims for further credibility determinations with respect to past persecution. However, I believe that Lin-Jian is also entitled to a new hearing with respect to his claims of future persecution. Thus, I dissent from parts II.B.1 and III of the opinion.1 Accordingly, I would remand for *194a more thorough examination of Lin-Jian’s claims of both past persecution and future persecution as they relate to his requests for asylum, withholding of removal, and the Convention Against Torture.
In my view, the IJ’s determination that Lin-Jian “[went] in and out of hiding” while residing at his uncle’s house fails to address Lin-Jian’s- explanation for his actions. JA 48. Lin-Jian’s testimony reveals that he considered himself in hiding throughout the entire period he and his wife resided with his uncle, even though he continued to report to work. In addressing Lin-Jian’s behavior during this period, the IJ stated, “This makes no sense to this Court. If [Lin-Jian] were in fear of being sterilized, as he so claims, then he would not go in and out of hiding.” JA 48. Without more explanation, the conclusory assertion that testimony “makes no sense” is not a specific, cogent reason for discrediting it, as required by Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 78 (4th Cir.1989). Further, hiding does not necessarily require that a person never leave his home. The only evidence in the record indicates that government officials did not have accurate information regarding Lin-Jian’s true place of employment.2 The IJ offered no clear rationale for rejecting this evidence, merely characterizing it as “not of great assistance in this case.” JA 49. Therefore, in my view, the IJ provided no reason, much less a specific and cogent one, for the conclusion that Lin-Jian’s continued employment as a construction worker constituted “go[ing] in and out of hiding.” JA 48.
Further, the IJ found it inconsistent that Lin-Jian claimed to continue to work to support his family yet was able to borrow $10,000 to come to the United States. The uncontested testimony reveals that Lin-Jian was a debtor who borrowed money to flee to a country that offered vast economic opportunities. Lin-Jian testified that he was “trying to earn some money so [he could] have enough money to pay back [sic].” JA 110. As Judge Traxler correctly notes, our case law allows immigration judges to exercise common sense in evaluating the credibility of an asylum applicant. Tewabe v. Gonzales, 446 F.3d 533, 540 (4th Cir.2006). However, a common sense determination — like any other credibility determination — must be based on more than mere speculation. Id. at 538. In my view, it is totally speculative to assert that Lin-Jian could have obtained $10,000 to avoid reporting to work and earning a wage. Indeed, common sense dictates that a person may be able to borrow $10,000 from individuals who expect to be repaid, even when those same individuals would not give $10,000 to anyone. Accordingly, I believe that this determination made by the IJ is not supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, is due no deference.
Thus, in light of “the ordinary ‘remand’ rule” announced in INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 18, 123 S.Ct. 353, 154 L.Ed.2d 272 (2002), I would grant Lin-Jian’s petition for review in its entirety and remand for clarification on Lin-Jian’s credibility re*195garding both his past persecution and his well-founded fear of future persecution.

. Section II.B.l of Judge Traxler’s opinion asserts that two out of four credibility determinations made by the IJ with respect to future persecution are supported by substantial evidence. I believe that none of the four credibility determinations made by the IJ with *194respect to future persecution are supported by substantial evidence. I address herein only the two credibility determinations upon which Judge Traxler and I differ in opinion.

. Lin-Jian’s official household registry card stated that he worked as a farmer in Chun Lau City, but he testified that he actually worked in construction in Fuzhou City. Though the IJ expressed doubts about the helpfulness of the household registry card, she never expressly discredited it. Thus, the only conclusion to be drawn from the record is that the government-issued card was authentic but inaccurate, which serves to corroborate Lin-Jian’s claim that he was able to hide from government officials despite his continued employment.