Court Opinion

ID: 9832146
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:40:11.284338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:42.851184
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In overruling the motion for rehearing, in this ease, we concede that some, if not all, of the authorities cited in our former opinion do not go to the full extent of supporting our ruling upon the burden of proof. We also concede, as pointed out in the motion for rehearing, that our decision upon that subject is in conflict with decisions rendered by some other Courts of Civil Appeals and with the Court of Criminal Appeals, when it had jurisdiction of certain civil eases.
In Ry. v. Horne, 69 Tex. 643, 9 S. W. 440, our Supreme 'Court, speaking through that able jurist, Chief Justice Willie, used this language:
“There is a conflict in the decisions of England and America as to whether the escape of sparks from a passing engine is prima facie *704evidence of negligence on the part of the company running the engine. We are aware that numerous authorities can be found in which it is made the duty of the party complaining" of injuries done to his property by reason of fire kindled from such sparks to show negligence on the part of the company, but we think that those decisions which throw the burden upon the company of showing that the sparks did not escape because of any negligence on its part are best supported by reason. They place the burden of proof upon the party having the means of producing the necessary evidence upon the subject. The employees know the condition of the engine and of the appliances used to prevent the escape of fire, and they should be informed as to whether these were sufficient for that purpose. The injured party would not, as a general thing, be possessed of any such information, and he could not ordinarily obtain it. To require him to make the proof would, in most instances, be a denial of justice, and would allow the party doing the wrong to escape by concealing the facts which brought it about. Hence our courts have > adopted the salutary rule of presuming the existence of negligence against - the party who has the means of disproving it and fails to make use of them (Ryan v. Ry. Company, 65 Texas, 20), and have followed that line of decisions, which casts the burden of proof in such cases upon the company, and as we believe our former ‘decisions upon the subject are founded upon good reason we are not inclined to change the rule assumed by them.”
It seems to us that all the reasons which induced the Supreme Court to establish and adhere to the ruling it made upon the burden of- proof in the Horne Case and in similar cases should apply to and control this case. To rule otherwise would be a practical denial of justice to the plaintiff; and therefore we think the salutary rule of presuming, the existence of negligence against the party who has the means of disproving it and fails to make use of them should he applied in this case.
It may be contended that the Horne Case and other grass-burning cases are not analogous to the case at bar involving the liability of a defendant holding property under a contract of bailment. The case of Wardlaw, Walker & Burnsides v. Railroad Co., 11 Rich. Law (S. C.) 337, involved the liability of a bailee; and it having been shown that the loss or injury was caused by fire, it was contended by the railroad company that the plaintiff could not recover unless he produced testimony affirmatively showing that the fire was the result of the defendant’s negligence; and the court, in overruling that contention, said;
“In this case the goods were lost, and defendant having shown the loss to have been occasioned by fire, insists that this fact was sufficient to discharge from liability, unless plaintiff should show by direct proof that the fire was the result of negligence. On the contrary, the presiding judge in his instructions said: ‘It was right to require the company to show how the fire occurred; in the absence of such proof it might be that the jury would think them liable.’ The question of negligence was of course submitted to the jury, the facts were before them, the circumstances were peculiar, the suggestion was appropriate, and the presumption was fair and legitimate. That was a liberal concession to the defendant, which held that the custody as carrier had ceased by turning off the cotton from the car to the platform, and that the skids in the yard of the company alongside the track as a place of deposit, entitled to the character and analogies of a warehouse. * * *
“The omission to prove, what a party should at all times be prepared to establish, may well raise a presumption often against him.
“The place where this loss occurred was in the yard of the company, and surrounded by their employés, who were at all times under their control and within their knowledge. Such witnesses would generally be unknown to the owners or consignees, and but little disposed to implicate themselves in a charge of negligence. In reference to such an inquiry as the one on foot in this case, ordinarily proof by one of the parties, would be easy and proper, by the other impracticable and uncertain. Hence the rules to be found in our books under such circumstances. In this state the rule on the subject of limiting the liability of a carrier has been relaxed though the onus still rests to bring himself within the exceptions and to discharge himself of negligence. Swindler v. Hillard & Brooks, 2 Rich. 303, 45 Am. Dec. 732; Singleton v. Hilliard & Brooks, 1 Strob. 214. So too in case of loss by the killing of cattle, a prima facie case is made by the killing, which devolves on the company the onus of explanation or excuse.
“The standard of diligence in such a case as this would imply the presence of employés acting as watchmen or otherwise, who should be able to speak, and silence of defendant became an element in the inquiry.”
With due respect to the courts which have held otherwise, we still believe that our decision on the burden of proof in this case is correct; and therefore the motion for rehearing is overruled.
Overruled.