Court Opinion

ID: 9544590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:57:30.197722+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:16.074514
License: Public Domain

Reed, C.J.
(concurring in part, dissenting in part)—I must respectfully dissent, insofar as the majority finds it necessary to vacate the special "deadly weapon" finding. My reasoning is as follows:
Query: When the court merges convictions for crimes statutorily defined as elements of another crime charged with them, and thus must strike the merged convictions, must the court also strike special verdicts finding that the constituent crimes were committed with a deadly weapon?
Answer: No.
State v. Johnson, 92 Wn.2d 671, 600 P.2d 1249 (1979), holds that where the evidence justifies a conviction for the incidental crime or crimes making up a central crime as well as for the central crime, the jury may only convict of the central crime. There is nothing in Johnson or in this record, however, that requires us to strike the special verdicts finding that defendant was armed with a deadly weapon while assaulting and kidnapping the victim.
[T]o obtain a conviction under RCW 9.79.170,[5] the prosecutor must prove not only that the defendant committed rape, but that the rape was accompanied by [at least one] . . . act which is defined as a separate crime elsewhere in the criminal statutes.
*688State v. Johnson, supra at 675. In other words, to convict defendant Regan of the "central crime" (first degree rape), the jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he had committed each of the elements of that crime, including, by extension, the elements of the "incidental" or constituent crime or crimes (assault and/or kidnapping). In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 90 S. Ct. 1068 (1970); State v. Roberts, 88 Wn.2d 337, 340, 562 P.2d 1259 (1977). Johnson does not require that we strike this jury's implicit (and unchallenged) findings that Regan committed the elements of the constituent crimes. Under Johnson we only need strike the convictions themselves. In fact, if these underlying findings were to be stricken along with the convictions, then the first degree rape conviction would also fall. Clearly then, because the underlying factual determinations must remain in the case, the deadly weapon special verdicts should survive. The only error in the judgment below lies in the multiple convictions. There is no error in any of the underlying findings of fact, whether found directly through special verdicts or indirectly through the guilty verdicts on each crime.
Nor does the jury's finding Regan was not armed with a deadly weapon when he actually had intercourse with the victim compel us to vacate the deadly weapon findings involving the merged crimes. This jury had no instruction indicating it was to convict of only one crime, not three. Under Johnson, the assault and kidnapping become mere elements of a central crime, no longer crimes in themselves. Therefore, the time span covered by the central crime must extend to include the activities involving these elements, including the use of a deadly weapon. There is nothing in the jury's finding of nonuse of a deadly weapon during the intercourse element of Regan's crime to negate their finding he was armed when he committed the other elements. Just as we do not vacate the factual determination underlying the convictions we here vacate, so also we may not vacate the factual determinations expressed in the special verdicts.
There is another reason the court should not vacate the *689deadly weapon findings. Our legislature has classified crimes involving a deadly weapon as more serious than those where no weapon is used.6 Recognizing the special danger of deadly weapons, the legislature has also passed several "aggravating penalty" statutes.7 These statutes enhance the punishment of a defendant who commits a crime while armed with an instrument which the legislature has determined increases or aggravates that crime's danger to society. State v. Workman, 90 Wn.2d 443, 453, 584 P.2d 382 (1978). It seems unlikely the legislature intends us to frustrate the policy behind its determination by negating a special finding merely because the crimes invoking the findings are incidental to and merge into a central crime. In construing the "aggravating penalty" statutes, our courts have consistently insisted that these special findings must be made when the evidence supports them. State v. Thompson, 88 Wn.2d 60, 63, 558 P.2d 245 (1977); State v. Pierre, 20 Wn. App. 239, 241, 580 P.2d 648 (1978); accord, State v. Workman, supra at 456. The evidence in this case clearly supports the special findings entered by the jury. We therefore may not frustrate the policy which prompted the legislature to require these findings by vacating them.
I would affirm the conviction for first degree rape and *690leave undisturbed the "deadly weapon" finding.
Reconsideration denied May 8, 1981.
Review denied by Supreme Court October 16, 1981.

Recodified as RCW 9A.44.040. Laws of 1979, 1st Ex. Sess., ch. 244, § 1.

Compare RCW 9A.56.210 (second degree robbery) with RCW 9A.56.200 (first degree robbery).

"RCW 9.95.015 Finding of fact or special verdict establishing defendant armed with deadly weapon. In every criminal case wherein conviction would require the board of prison terms and paroles to determine the duration of confinement and wherein there has been an allegation and evidence establishing that the accused was armed with a deadly weapon at the time of the commission of the crime, the court shall make a finding of fact of whether or not the accused was armed with a deadly weapon, as defined by RCW 9.95.040, at the time of the commission of the crime, or if a jury trial is had, the jury shall, if it find the defendant guilty, also find a special verdict as to whether or not the defendant was armed with a deadly weapon, as defined in RCW 9.95.040, at the time of the commission of the crime." (Italics mine.)
See also RCW 9.95.040 (special finding: mandatory minimum prison term); RCW 9.41.025 (special finding for firearms).