Court Opinion

ID: 9529513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:51:38.134841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:49.854291
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, dissenting: Paragraph 10 of the parties’ lease states: “10. The Landlord agrees to maintain in good repair at the Landlord’s cost the roof, 060 during the term of this lease and any extension thereof.” Paragraph 23 of the lease, in pertinent part, reads: “23. In the event the Landlord shall fail to perform the covenants and/or agreements of this lease which are required to be performed by the Landlord and/or there is a breach of any warranty made or implied herein by the Landlord then the Tenant may require the Landlord to remedy said default or defaults by the service of written notice 0 0 0 then the Tenant shall have an election to either terminate and cancel this lease ° 0 * or the Tenant may remedy said breach of covenants, agreements and/or warranties and the cost of such action shall be deducted by the Tenant from the unpaid rents which shall accrue under the unexpired term of this lease or any extension thereof.” (Emphasis added.) Traditionally, under the common law, the landlord is not bound to repair unless he has expressly agreed to do so. (McDaniel v. Silvernail (1976), 37 Ill. App. 3d 884, 346 N.E.2d 382; Yuan Kane Ing. v. Levy (1975), 26 Ill. App. 3d 889, 326 N.E.2d 51.) In this case, as paragraph 10 of the lease shows, landlord has expressly agreed in the lease to maintain the roof in good repair at his own cost. The majority, quoting dictum, states that even if an express covenant to repair has been given, the usual construction is that the covenants of the lessor and the lessee are independent, and therefore the lessee may not treat the lessor’s failure to repair as a basis for stopping rent payments. Yuan Kane Ing, 26 Ill. App. 3d 889, 892, 326 N.E.2d 51, 54. Quite simply, I think the express language of the lease precludes the court from construing the landlord’s covenant to repair as being independent from the defendant’s covenant to pay rent. Paragraph 23 of the lease clearly states that if the landlord breaches his covenant to repair, then the tenant has two options: (1) he can cancel the lease; or (2) “remedy said breach of covenants, agreements and/or warranties and the cost of such action shall be deducted by the Tenant from the unpaid rents # # # ” I think the operative language of the lease clearly allows the tenant to do what he did: withhold rent in order to accumulate money with which to repair the roof. On the other hand, the majority construes paragraph 23 of the lease to require the lessee to make the repairs — which at least would cost over $1,000 — before he may withhold rent. Perhaps the language is ambiguous. But, in the case of an ambiguity, the lease should be construed against the lessor who drafted it. (South Center Department Store, Inc. v. South Parkway Building Corp. (1958), 19 Ill. App. 2d 61, 153 N.E.2d 241.) Therefore, I do not think the tenant breached his covenant to pay rent, and thus I do not think the landlord is entitled to possession. In the seminal Illinois opinion of Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little (1972), 50 Ill. 2d 351, 280 N.E.2d 208, the Illinois Supreme Court held: “[Ijncluded in the contracts, both oral and written, governing the tenancies of the defendants in the multiple unit dwellings occupied by them, is an implied warranty of habitability # 50 Ill. 2d 351, 366, 280 N.E.2d 208, 217. I am aware of the appellate court cases that hold that the holding of Jack Spring, Inc. is limited only to residential leases. (See, e.g., Yuan Kane Ing.) However, neither the language nor logic behind Jack Spring, Inc. dictates this conclusion. Rather, the reasoning and the policy behind Jack Spring, Inc- support the extension of its holding to the present situation. Under Illinois law, a residential landlord cannot collect rent from a tenant if the dwelling is not habitable. (Jack Spring, Inc.; Pole Realty Co. v. Sorrels (1979), 78 Ill. App. 3d 361, 397 N.E.2d 539.) In other words, living quarters must be livable. Quite simply, I think a commercial landlord should not be able to collect rent from a tenant if the leased building is not usable. The leased building should be usable for the purpose for which it was leased. It is truly a medieval law that allows a landlord to collect rent from a tenant for a building that continually leaks. Therefore, analogizing Jack Spring, Inc., I would hold that an implied warranty of usability is included in contracts governing tenancies in commercial realty.. I think that the tenant did not breach his covenant to pay rent because of the express language in the lease, and because the building was not usable for the purposes for which it was leased. Therefore, I dissent.