Court Opinion

ID: 2964074
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:20:02.665967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:42:50.202678
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USCA1 Opinion

	

          April 25, 1996
                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1190

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                CHARLES MARTIN EDGAR,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                                     ERRATA SHEET
                                     ERRATA SHEET

            The opinion of this Court issued on April 19, 1996, is amended  as
        follows:

            On page 19, delete footnote 9 in its entirety.

                            United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                 ____________________

        No. 95-1190

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                      Appellee,

                                          v.

                                CHARLES MARTIN EDGAR,

                                Defendant, Appellant.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                   [Hon. Edward F. Harrington, U.S. District Judge]
                                               ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Selya, Stahl, and Lynch,

                                   Circuit Judges.
                                   ______________

                                 ____________________

            Frances L.  Robinson, with  whom Davis,  Robinson &  White was  on
            ____________________             _________________________
        brief, for appellant.
            James  C. Rehnquist, Assistant  United States  Attorney, with whom
            ___________________
        Donald K. Stern, United States Attorney, was on  brief, for the United
        _______________
        States.

                                 ____________________

                                    April 19, 1996
                                 ____________________

                      LYNCH,   Circuit  Judge.    Charles  Martin  Edgar,
                      LYNCH,   Circuit  Judge.
                               ______________

            formerly   a  U.S.  Department   of  Commerce  employee,  was

            convicted of three  counts of making false  statements on his

            federal  workers' compensation  claims, and  of one  count of

            mail fraud arising from a  false automobile accident claim to

            an insurer.   He was  acquitted on  other charges,  including

            bankruptcy fraud.1  Edgar  was sentenced to one year  and one

            day plus two years of supervised release and was fined $5000.

                      His  appeal argues that  joinder of  the bankruptcy

            fraud, workers'  compensation fraud and  insurance fraud  was

            improper, as was the  refusal to sever.  He  strongly asserts

            reversible error in the testimony of his civil-claim attorney

            before  the  grand  jury  which,  he  alleges,  violated  his

            attorney-client privilege.  He also  argues that the issue of

            materiality of the alleged  false statements should have been

            submitted to  the jury  under the  rule established later  in

            United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310 (1995), that denying
            _____________    ______

            him  discovery   was  error,   and  that  the   evidence  was

            insufficient to convict in any event.  We affirm.

                      Two arguments merit close discussion.  Edgar argues

            that it was improper  and harmful for the government  to have

                                
            ____________________

            1.  The court granted Edgar's motions for acquittal on eleven
            counts  of  mail fraud  based  on  the workers'  compensation
            claims,  on one count of using a false social security number
            in connection with  his bankruptcy, and  on eleven counts  of
            bankruptcy  fraud.  The jury returned a verdict of not guilty
            on  one count of making false statements to the Department of
            Labor and could not reach a verdict on nine other counts.

                                         -2-
                                          2

            joined such disparate charges as workers' compensation fraud,

            auto  insurance  fraud and  bankruptcy  fraud  into a  single

            indictment, saying the common allegation of fraud is too weak

            a thread to sew them all together, and that the counts should

            have been severed.  While the argument has some force, he was

            acquitted on the bankruptcy charge and we find no harm to him

            from its joinder with the other charges.

                      Edgar also argues  that the government trampled  on

            his attorney-client  privilege and  that this denied  him due

            process.  The  government subpoenaed  to the  grand jury  the

            lawyer who  had represented Edgar on  the automobile accident

            claim.  The lawyer's initial declinations to answer questions

            about  Edgar's communications  on grounds  of attorney-client

            privilege gave  way in the  face of continued  questioning by

            the  prosecutor.    Edgar  says  he  first  learned   of  his

            attorney's  grand jury  testimony after  he was  indicted and

            before  trial.  While troubled by what happened, we find that

            there  was no prejudice to  Edgar at trial  and therefore his

            remedy, if any, is not the vacating of his conviction.

            Background
            __________

                      Edgar's  checkered  reporting  on   his  employment

            status undergirds all counts  on which he was convicted.   In

            1984 Edgar  filed claims  for compensation  to the  Office of

            Workers' Compensation Programs ("OWCP") of the Department  of

            Labor  based on back injuries suffered in a 1981 plane crash,

                                         -3-
                                          3

            allegedly work-related.   The  claim eventually ripened  to a

            claim  of  total  disability  from  1987  on.    The  federal

            government paid him benefits, after objecting, for injury for

            the period  from 1981 through 1986.   It had balked at paying

            beyond 1986, but Edgar again won on appeal and he was paid to

            1989.   In  May of  1991, in  an effort  to get  payments for

            certain  periods between  1989 and  1991, he  submitted three

            forms CA-8 to the OWCP.  These documents formed the basis for

            the counts of conviction.  On other dates, he submitted other

            forms  CA-8  as well  as forms  EN1032-0389 ("1032").   These

            forms are  important to  the OWCP in  considering claims  for

            continuing compensation.

                      The forms CA-8 required that certain information be

            provided  if   the  claimant  was  working.   The  employment

            information is  used by OWCP  to determine a  claimant's wage

            earning  capacity, and thus the level of his benefits.  Edgar

            was in fact working as a self-employed accountant during this

            period, but he did not provide the information required.  Nor

            did  he mention that he operated and  managed a bar, which he

            also  owned, from  1985 to  1990.2   Instead,  Edgar reported

            that  he was  neither self-employed  nor employed  by others.

            The  forms  include  a  warning that  any  "false  statement,

                                
            ____________________

            2.  During the  time for  which he claimed  disability, Edgar
            also attended law school.   He eventually became  licensed to
            practice law  in Massachusetts,  but was  suspended following
            his conviction in this case.  In the Matter of Edgar, No. 95-
                                          ______________________
            004BD (Bd. of Bar Overseers Jan. 20, 1995).

                                         -4-
                                          4

            misrepresentation,  [or] concealment  of fact"  could subject

            the  submitter to a felony prosecution.  Edgar says the forms

            were not material,  as the department had  already turned him

            down on  this claim.  But,  based in part on  those forms, he

            did receive continuing compensation for the post-1989 period.

            All told, he received more than $250,000 in benefits from the

            government.

                      In January 1987 Edgar was involved in an automobile

            accident and asserted he injured his back and could not work.

            Attorney  Robert Koditek  represented him  in his  claims for

            injury and lost income against the other driver's insurer and

            to  his  own  insurance  carrier, Commercial  Union.    Edgar

            submitted a form to his own insurer, purportedly executed  by

            a company bookkeeper but in fact forged by Edgar, stating, as

            to lost income, that his accounting company paid him a yearly

            salary of  $45,600.   Attorney  Koditek, representing  Edgar,

            submitted a demand letter to Commercial Union  on October 12,

            1988,  asserting that  Edgar had  been totally disabled  as a

            result of the auto  accident and demanding the  policy limits

            be  paid him.   In support of  Edgar's claim  for damages for

            lost  income,  the letter  attached  "copies  of Mr.  Edgar's

            federal income  tax returns  for  the years  1985, 1986,  and

            1987."    Those signed  returns  showed  income for  1985  of

            $62,392 and for 1986 of  $61,876.  But Edgar had  never filed

            any tax return  in either  1985 or 1986;  so, the  government

                                         -5-
                                          5

            charged, the representation was false.   On January 16, 1989,

            Commercial  Union settled Edgar's  claim, paying him $75,000.

            Attorney Koditek  testified at trial that  Edgar had supplied

            him  with the copies of  the tax returns  given to Commercial

            Union to support his claim.

            Joinder and Denial of Motion for Severance
            __________________________________________

                      The  37 count  indictment  returned  against  Edgar

            charged  three  fraudulent  schemes.   The  first  24  counts

            charged  Edgar  with  mail  fraud, alleging  that  Edgar  had

            wrongfully  obtained money  through the  mails (specifically,

            the disability checks)  and had made false statements  to the

            Department of Labor.   These counts were  premised on Edgar's

            falsely representing  his employment and earning  capacity in

            connection  with  his disability  claim  from  1989 to  1992.

            Another count  involved Edgar's submission,  through Attorney

            Koditek, of false  documents and a demand letter making false

            statements to his automobile insurer in 1988.   The remaining

            twelve  counts charged Edgar with filing documents containing

            false  statements   in  1991   in  connection  with   Edgar's

            bankruptcy.    The scheme  alleged  was  that  Edgar filed  a

            bankruptcy  petition  in  California,   falsely  representing

            California was his state of domicile, listing a false  social

            security  number and  concealing assets  and income  from his

            former wife and other creditors.

                                         -6-
                                          6

                      Edgar argues that  the counts charging these  three

            schemes  should  not  have  been  joined  because  they  were

            insufficiently  similar.   He argues  that the  single common

            characteristic,  misrepresentation of material facts, was not

            enough  to satisfy the standards for joinder.  He also argues

            that  evidence of  one scheme  would not  be admissible  in a

            trial  on another scheme and  thus the jury  could infer from

            the evidence  of  one fraud  that  Edgar was  predisposed  to

            engage in another fraud.

                      Edgar's argument that there was an improper joinder

            of claims against  him in the indictment, which  the district

            court refused  to undo,  raises two  concerns.   Edgar argues

            first  that there  was  not sufficient  similarity among  the

            counts  of   conviction  to  permit  joinder.     Second,  he

            postulates a harmful spillover effect from all of the counts,

            even those on  which he was  acquitted, which prejudiced  him

            and led to his  conviction.  He also claims that,  apart from

            the initial wrongful joinder,  the district court should have

            allowed his motion for severance.

                      The standard for joinder is set forth in Rule 8(a),

            Fed. R. Crim. P., which provides:

                      Two or more  offenses may  be charged  in
                      the same indictment . . . if the offenses
                      charged . . . are  of the same or similar
                      character . . . .

            "Similar" does not mean "identical," United States v. Werner,
                                                 _____________    ______

            620  F.2d 922,  928 (2d  Cir. 1980),  and similarity  must be

                                         -7-
                                          7

            analyzed  in terms of how the  government saw its case at the

            time  of indictment.  United States v. Natanel, 938 F.2d 302,
                                  _____________    _______

            306 (1st Cir. 1991), cert. denied,  502 U.S. 1079 (1992).  As
                                 ____________

            Judge Friendly commented in Werner, under the mandate of  the
                                        ______

            Speedy Trial Act,  joinder serves the purposes  of economy of

            resources.  620  F.2d at 928.  Denial of  a motion for relief

            from misjoinder  is  reviewed  de novo.    United  States  v.
                                                       ______________

            Chambers,  964  F.2d  1250  (1st  Cir.  1992).    Further,  a
            ________

            misjoinder is  not reversible  if it  was  harmless.   United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 444-50 (1986); United States v.
            ______    ____                               _____________

            Randazzo, __  F.3d __, __,  No. 95-1489,  slip op. at  6 (1st
            ________

            Cir. Apr. 8, 1996).

                      Edgar also argues that  even if joinder was proper,

            his motion  to sever the  different schemes should  have been

            granted.   Under Rule 14, Fed. R.  Crim. P., "[i]f it appears

            that a defendant . . . is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses

            .  . ., the court may order . . . separate trials of counts."

            The denial of a motion for severance is reviewed for abuse of

            discretion, and must  be affirmed unless  there is a  "strong

            showing of  evident prejudice."   United States  v. O'Bryant,
                                              _____________     ________

            998 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1993).

                      In  determining whether counts are properly joined,

            this court considers such factors as "whether the charges are

            laid  under the  same statute,  whether they  involve similar

            victims, locations, or modes of operation, and the time frame

                                         -8-
                                          8

            in which the  charged conduct  occurred."   United States  v.
                                                        _____________

            Taylor,  54 F.3d 967, 973 (1st Cir. 1995) (internal citations
            ______

            omitted).3  The government argues  that the test is satisfied

            because  the workers'  compensation fraud and  the automobile

            accident fraud  involved the  same modus operandi  of claimed
                                               ______________

            total disability following an asserted injury to the back, an

            asserted  loss of  income, the  submission of  false official

            forms, and the misrepresentation of other employment in order

            to   rake  in  large  sums.    As  to  timing,  the  workers'

            compensation  fraud  overlapped  the  auto  insurance  fraud.

            Witnesses and testimony  would also overlap.  Evidence  as to

            the  auto  accident  fraud  would  be  used  on  the  claimed

            disability  from a back injury  from the plane  crash, and to

            establish that Edgar misrepresented  his earnings and earning

            capacity.    We believe  there  were  sufficient similarities

            between the workers' compensation and insurance fraud schemes

            to permit joinder of those counts.

                                
            ____________________

            3.  An earlier  case in this circuit applied an arguably more
            stringent standard  for the  government to  join two  or more
            offenses under Rule 8(a).   See United States v.  Yefsky, 994
                                        ___ _____________     ______
            F.2d  885, 895 (1st Cir. 1993)  (finding proper joinder where
            there  was "'substantial identity  of facts or participants'"
            underlying  two charged  schemes,  quoting  United States  v.
                                                        _____________
            Levine, 546 F.2d 658, 662 (5th Cir. 1977)).  Given that Edgar
            ______
            used  the  same  basic  mechanism,   misrepresenting  earning
            capacity in  seeking compensation lost due to  a back injury,
            in both  the workers' compensation and  auto insurance fraud,
            we  believe  that  joinder  of the  counts  underlying  these
            schemes would have been proper even under the test applied in
            Yefsky.  Given  our disposition  of this issue,  we need  not
            ______
            decide  whether Yefsky set a  more rigid test  for joinder of
                            ______
            offenses than the language of Rule 8(a) warrants.

                                         -9-
                                          9

                      However, like the district court,  we are disturbed

            by  the  joinder of  the bankruptcy  fraud.4   We  discern no

            "common scheme  or plan."  See  Randazzo, __ F.3d at  __, No.
                                       ___  ________

            95-1489,  slip op.  at  5.    The bankruptcy  fraud  charges,

            relating  to events  in  1991, were  brought under  different

            statutes  and the  supposed victim  was Edgar's  ex-wife (and

            possibly  other unspecified  creditors).    The location  was

            different.  The bankruptcy filings were all with the court in

            California, while  the other  frauds took place  primarily in

            Massachusetts.  The  modes of operation  were different.   In

            the  workers' compensation  and automobile  insurance frauds,

            Edgar asserted an injury  to his back, which resulted  in the

            loss  of  earnings.   The  alleged bankruptcy  fraud  did not

            involve  an attempt to obtain payment for an injury.  Rather,

            it was allegedly an  attempt to avoid obligations to  his ex-

            wife, with whom  he had an  acrimonious relationship, and  to

            force her to press her claim in an inconvenient forum.

                      Edgar claims he was prejudiced because the evidence

            for  each scheme had a harmful spillover effect, and the jury

            convicted him  not because  of specific evidence  showing his

                                
            ____________________

            4.  The district judge, in  granting the motion for acquittal
            on the bankruptcy charges  after the government had presented
            its case,  noted the potential  problems with the  joinder of
            the bankruptcy  fraud.  He  said, "[T]his type  of indictment
            looks  like you are  piling it on .  . . ."   He also thought
            that "th[e] bankruptcy case was transferred here to  boost up
            the  other  false statement  cases"  and  that  there was  an
            "unusual" number of schemes alleged.

                                         -10-
                                          10

            guilt,  but because of its perception that he was a dishonest

            man.5    Specifically,  Edgar  posits  that  the  jury  heard

            evidence that (1) he collected  $75,000 in settlement for the

            auto  insurance claim;  (2) he  had an  extremely acrimonious

            divorce; (3) he  filed for bankruptcy in  California and made

            false  statements that  he  resided there;  (4) he  has owned

            various properties  and has  established trusts  at different

            times; (5) he filed false information in the bankruptcy court

            regarding his assets and social security number.

                      Even assuming the  bankruptcy count was  improperly

            joined, any error was harmless.  It did not result in "actual

            prejudice"  because  it  did  not  have  a  "substantial  and

            injurious  effect  or  influence in  determining  the  jury's

            verdict."    Lane,  474  U.S.  at  449  (internal  quotations
                         ____

            omitted);  see also O'Neal v.  McAninch, 115 S.  Ct. 992, 995
                       ________ ______     ________

            (1995).  Edgar was  acquitted by the court of  the bankruptcy

            fraud and of  several counts  of mail fraud  in the  workers'

            compensation scheme before the  matter went to the jury.   Of

            the remaining thirteen workers' compensation counts, the jury

            proved itself  capable of making distinctions:   it acquitted

            Edgar of one, could not reach a verdict on nine and convicted

                                
            ____________________

            5.  Edgar also  claims that, had the schemes been severed, he
            may have testified for one, but  not another.  Edgar does not
            expand  upon this  claim of  prejudice, and  an "unexplicated
            assertion" that he would  have testified at one trial  is not
            enough to  establish prejudicial  joinder.  United  States v.
                                                        ______________
            Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 930 (2d Cir. 1980).
            ______

                                         -11-
                                          11

            on three.   The jury  thus showed itself  clearly capable  of

            discriminating  among the evidence  applicable to each count,

            even within  the workers' compensation  fraud, thus  reducing

            the  risk of  any prejudice from  evidence on  the bankruptcy

            count.  See  United States  v. Stackpole, 811  F.2d 689,  694
                    ___  _____________     _________

            (1st Cir.  1987) (jury's acquittal  on one of  several counts

            suggests jury not  confused by joinder).  Moreover, the court

            gave appropriate limiting  instructions.6  See Chambers,  964
                                                       ___ ________

            F.2d at 1251; United  States v. Attanasio, 870 F.2d  809, 815
                          ______________    _________

            (2d Cir. 1989) (misjoinder can be rendered harmless by proper

            limiting instruction);  cf. Lane, 474 U.S.  at 450 (analyzing
                                    ___ ____

            joinder of defendants  under Fed.  R. Crim. P.  8(b)7).   The

            exhibits relating solely to the bankruptcy fraud were struck.

                                
            ____________________

            6.    The court instructed  the jurors that  they should "put
            out  of [their]  minds any  reference or  evidence concerning
            Counts 1 through 11 charging mail fraud and Counts 26 through
            36  charging bankruptcy fraud and  the use of  a false Social
            Security number,  because [the court has] ruled,  as a matter
            of  law, that the  government has failed to  prove all of the
            necessary  elements of  each of  those charges."   The  court
            further instructed, "You must decide the remaining charges as
            if those charges that I have removed from your consideration,
            mail fraud and bankruptcy fraud, were never made and as if no
            evidence was submitted in support of those charges.  You must
            limit your  consideration. . .  .  And you  must determine if
            the  government has sustained  its burden  of proof  beyond a
            reasonable doubt,  excluding all  references  to or  evidence
            concerning Counts 1 through 11 and 26 through 37." 

            7.  Fed.  R. Crim. P.  8(b) allows for the  joinder of two or
            more defendants if "they are alleged to have  participated in
            the same  act or transaction or in the same series of acts or
            transactions constituting an offense or offenses."

                                         -12-
                                          12

                      Some  of  the evidence  as  to  the bankruptcy  and

            insurance   schemes  was  admissible   as  to   the  workers'

            compensation  scheme, thus  resulting in  no prejudice.   See
                                                                      ___

            Stackpole,  811  F.2d  at 694;  cf.  Lane,  474  U.S. at  450
            _________                       ___  ____

            (analyzing  joinder  of defendants  under  Rule  8(b)).   Any

            statements that Edgar filed with the bankruptcy court stating

            his  income  for  the   years  encompassed  by  the  workers'

            compensation fraud  would have been admissible  on the latter

            issue.   The  statements  made to  the  insurance company  in

            connection with  the insurance  fraud were admissible  on the

            workers'  compensation issue, particularly as they related to

            Edgar's back injury and his loss of earnings.  Finally, there

            was  substantial  independent  evidence   on  the  counts  of

            conviction.  The fraud against  the insurance company and the

            three  counts  of  submitting  falsified   documents  to  the

            Department of  Labor were supported by  evidence unrelated to

            the bankruptcy.

                      Thus, Edgar  cannot  meet  his  burden  of  showing

            prejudice on the denial of the motion for severance as to any

            of the counts.  Garden-variety arguments of spillover -- such

            as  if the jury found defendant guilty of A, that alone would

            lead to  the conclusion that  he was  guilty of B  -- without

            more, are insufficient to require severance.  Taylor, 54 F.3d
                                                          ______

            at 973.  Appellants must demonstrate actual prejudice.   That

            is a particularly difficult burden for Edgar to meet, because

                                         -13-
                                          13

            the spillover from his acquittal on  the bankruptcy count and

            certain  of the  workers' compensation  counts could  just as

            easily be posited to have worked  to his benefit.  The law of

            severance  and  joinder is  a  stricter  master than  Edgar's

            claimed error.  See Natanel, 938 F.2d at 307-08.
                            ___ _______

            The Grand Jury Testimony
            ________________________

                      On June  1, 1993, Attorney Koditek  testified under

            subpoena  before the grand jury.  Edgar says that neither the

            government nor  Attorney  Koditek notified  him that  Koditek

            would testify under subpoena.

                      Edgar  complains that he did not learn of the grand

            jury testimony of  his civil-claim lawyer until  after he was

            indicted.  Even then, the prosecution denied Edgar's requests

            for a copy of  Attorney Koditek's testimony.  Ten  days prior

            to   trial,  the   new  prosecutor   assigned  to   the  case

            appropriately provided the transcript to the defendant.  This

            is what the transcript8 showed:

                      AUSA:     Do  you recall  at some point  making, as
                                part  of your  claim to  Commercial Union
                                Insurance   Company  --   submitting  tax
                                returns  to  commercial Union  evidencing
                                Mr. Edgar's income for the years prior to
                                the accident?
                      KODITEK:  I may have.
                      AUSA:     Well, what's your recollection, sir?
                      KODITEK:  I don't recall.
                      AUSA:     Mr. Koditek,  if you'd look at Exhibit 22
                                [the October 12, 1988, demand letter] and

                                
            ____________________

            8.  The  district court  allowed the  government's motion  to
            disclose certain  portions of Attorney  Koditek's grand  jury
            testimony for purposes of responding to this appeal.

                                         -14-
                                          14

                                if  you  could  read  that  carefully  to
                                yourself.
                      KODITEK:  (Witness looking at document)
                      AUSA:     Have   you   looked   at  that   document
                                carefully, sir?
                      KODITEK:  Yes, I have.
                      AUSA:     Does  that  refresh your  recollection at
                                all  as  to  whether  you  submitted  tax
                                returns  to  Commercial  Union  Insurance
                                Company  as evidence of Mr. Edgar's wage-
                                earning ability?
                      KODITEK:  It appears that I did.
                      AUSA:     Do  you recall  any discussions  with Mr.
                                Edgar concerning those tax returns?
                      KODITEK:  Any  discussions would be  subject to the
                                attorney/client privilege.
                      AUSA:     Well, what I'm asking you is not what, in
                                fact,  was said,  but I'm  asking whether
                                the subject of the tax returns ever  came
                                up.
                      KODITEK:  I would presume the subject came up.
                      AUSA:     Did Mr. Edgar  say to you at any time, in
                                connection with your submission  of those
                                tax returns to Commercial Union Insurance
                                Company, that those tax returns were not,
                                in fact, identical to the ones filed with
                                the Internal Revenue Service?
                      KODITEK:  Any  conversation would be subject to the
                                attorney/client privilege.
                      AUSA:     Well, I  think  that in  this  particular
                                instance, sir, they would not.   What I'm
                                asking you is whether Mr. Edgar indicated
                                to you, in substance  or in fact, that he
                                was  submitting or  having you  submit to
                                the  Commercial  Union Insurance  Company
                                tax  returns  which  were  not  the same.
                                That is  to say that they were fraudulent
                                tax  returns that  were not  submitted to
                                the Internal Revenue Service.
                      KODITEK:  No, he never said that to me.
                      AUSA:     Was it your  understanding, sir, that the
                                tax  returns that  he submitted  were, in
                                fact, genuine tax  returns as filed  with
                                the Internal Revenue Service?
                      KODITEK:  That would be my understanding.

                      What  is   clear  is  that   Attorney  Koditek  was

            questioned about the substance  of his conversations with his

                                         -15-
                                          15

            client,  that  he asserted  attorney-client  privilege twice,

            that the prosecutor responded that the matter was not covered

            by  privilege  and that  Koditek  then  answered.   This  was

            apparently done without the client, Edgar, being aware of the

            testimony.   Nor was there any judicial review of whether the

            testimony was indeed privileged.

                      At trial  Edgar did object on  grounds of attorney-

            client privilege to any testimony from Attorney Koditek.  The

            court  rejected  the  privilege  claim.     Attorney  Koditek

            testified that  he represented  Edgar in connection  with the

            Commercial  Union  claim,  that   he  wrote  two  letters  to

            Commercial Union in  connection with the claim,  and that the

            tax  returns were enclosed with one of the letters.  Attorney

            Koditek authenticated the letters,  but declined to answer on

            grounds  of  privilege  the  question  of  who  gave him  the

            material (including the  tax returns) to be enclosed with the

            demand  letter to the insurer.  The district court ruled that

            because  the  tax returns  were  disclosed  to the  insurance

            company,  the fact that Edgar gave the returns to Koditek was

            not privileged.   Attorney Koditek answered  that he received

            the  tax returns from Mr.  Edgar.  Edgar  chose not to cross-

            examine  on this point and never asserted a defense of advice

            of  counsel   or  that   the  attorney's  actions   were  not

            authorized.   At trial, Attorney Koditek  did not testify, as

            he did to  the grand jury, about whether Edgar  had ever told

                                         -16-
                                          16

            him that the  tax returns submitted  to Commercial Union  had

            not  been submitted  to the IRS.   The government  did put on

            independent evidence that these returns were never filed with

            the IRS.

                      Edgar   filed   several   motions   regarding   his

            attorney's  testimony.   He argued  a fruit-of-the-poisonous-

            tree  theory that  Attorney  Koditek's  testimony before  the

            grand  jury  was  illegal  and so  the  indictment  should be

            dismissed  or  evidence  should  be  suppressed.    There  is

            precedent  for  an  argument  that  a   court  may  quash  an

            indictment  based  upon evidence  directly  obtained from  or

            derived from  breach of  the attorney-client privilege.   See
                                                                      ___

            United States v. Omni International Corp., 634 F. Supp. 1414,
            _____________    ________________________

            1421  (D.  Md. 1986)  (but  doubting  that dismissal  was  an

            appropriate remedy under United  States v. Morrison, 449 U.S.
                                     ______________    ________

            361 (1981));  People v. Fentress, 425  N.Y.S.2d 485 (Dutchess
                          ______    ________

            Co. Ct. 1980); Baltes  v. Doe I, 57 U.S.L.W. 2268  (Fla. Cir.
                           ______     _____

            Ct.  1988).    Some federal  courts  have  held  that if  the

            prosecutor   induces  the  breach,  suppression  of  evidence

            derived  from the  breach is  the appropriate  remedy, unless

            prejudice would remain,  in which case the  indictment may be

            dismissed.   See, e.g.,  United  States v.  Rogers, 751  F.2d
                         _________   ______________     ______

            1074, 1079 (9th  Cir. 1985) (no dismissal  when any prejudice

            to  defendant  could be  neutralized  by  excluding at  trial

            confidential   communications    wrongfully   obtained   from

                                         -17-
                                          17

            defendant's former  attorney).   But "[w]hen a  federal court

            uses  its  supervisory  power  to dismiss  an  indictment  it

            directly encroaches  upon the  fundamental role of  the grand

            jury.   That power is appropriately  reserved, therefore, for

            extremely  limited  circumstances."    Whitehouse  v.  United
                                                   __________      ______

            States  Dist.  Ct.,  53  F.3d  1349,  1359  (1st  Cir.  1995)
            __________________

            (internal citation  omitted).  Indeed, the  Supreme Court has

            said that prejudice is required to dismiss  an indictment for

            prosecutorial  misconduct.   Bank  of Nova  Scotia v.  United
                                         _____________________     ______

            States,  487  U.S.  250,  263  (1988).    Edgar  also  sought
            ______

            discovery as  to whether the proper  procedures were followed

            to  subpoena  Attorney Koditek.    And,  he argued  that  the

            government  had failed  to  follow the  procedures in  United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).  Those motions were all
            ______    _____

            denied.

            Attorney-Client Privilege and Due Process Arguments
            ___________________________________________________

                      Edgar  argues on  appeal  that the  questioning  of

            Attorney Koditek before the grand jury violated his rights to

            due  process and  to  the assistance  of  counsel.   We  will

            assume, arguendo, that  Edgar did not waive his  rights under
                    ________

            the  attorney-client privilege  and  that  those rights  were

            violated  by  Attorney Koditek's  testimony before  the grand

            jury.  But  even with  those assumptions it  does not  follow

            that the appropriate remedy is to vacate his conviction.

                                         -18-
                                          18

                      Contrary to Edgar's  arguments, no Sixth  Amendment

            right to  counsel  is even  implicated  here, as  the  lawyer

            called to  the grand jury  was not criminal  defense counsel.

            See,  e.g., Rogers, 751 F.2d at 1077-78.  Nonetheless, we are
            ___   ____  ______

            troubled  by what  happened  and seek  guidance  in case  law

            discussing the district court's adoption of Rule 3:08  of the

            Rules of the  Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, and in

            the teachings of United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554 (1989).
                             _____________    _____

                      A  long  simmering  dispute in  Massachusetts  over

            prosecutors serving grand jury subpoenas on counsel  resulted

            in  the affirmance by this court, equally divided en banc, of

            a district  court opinion that  approved the Local  Rule that

            adopted the disciplinary rules of the Supreme Judicial Court,

            particularly S.J.C. Rule 3:08, Prosecutorial Function 15 ("PF

            15").   See United States v. Klubock,  832 F.2d 664 (1st Cir.
                    ___ _____________    _______

            1987) (en banc  by an equally  divided court) ("Klubock  II")
                                                            ___________

            (plaintiff prosecutors sought a declaratory  judgment against

            the  Board  of Bar  Overseers that  the  rule was  invalid as

            applied to federal prosecutors),  aff'g 639 F. Supp.  117 (D.
                                              _____

            Mass. 1986).  The  net effect is that federal  prosecutors in

            Massachusetts must comply with PF 15, which provides:

                      It  is  unprofessional   conduct  for   a
                      prosecutor to  subpoena an attorney  to a
                      grand   jury   without   prior   judicial
                      approval   in  circumstances   where  the
                      prosecutor    seeks    to   compel    the
                      attorney/witness   to  provide   evidence
                      concerning a person who is represented by
                      the attorney/witness.

                                         -19-
                                          19

            S.J.C. Rule 3:08, PF 15.

                      The  prosecutor here  argues  that PF  15 does  not

            literally  apply as  Edgar  was represented  in  the past  by
                                        ___

            Attorney  Koditek, but was not represented by him at the time

            of  the  subpoena,  as  the   language  of  PF  15  requires.

            Nonetheless,  the  prosecution  represented to  the  district

            court that it had complied with PF 15 and had obtained  prior

            judicial approval  to  serve the  subpoena.   But,  as  Edgar

            points out, the record is devoid of proof on this point.

                      The  subpoena  here  did  not go  to  the  target's

            criminal  defense counsel and so does not raise the issues of

            potential abuse specific to  that situation.  See Whitehouse,
                                                          ___ __________

            53 F.3d  at 1354.   But  Edgar and Attorney  Koditek were  at

            least  potentially  placed  in  the   hypothetical  situation

            described in the panel opinion vacated by Klubock II9:
                                                      __________

                      The  serving of  a  subpoena  under  such
                      circumstances  will  immediately drive  a
                      chilling      wedge      between      the
                      attorney/witness  and  his client.   This
                      wedge  is  the  natural   consequence  of
                      several  underlying  factors  created  by
                      this anomalous situation.   Most  obvious
                      is the fact that the client  is uncertain
                      at  best, and  suspicious at  worst, that
                      his  legitimate trust in his attorney may

                                
            ____________________

            9.  The  court in  Klubock  II produced  for publication  the
                               ___________
            vacated panel opinion, United States v. Klubock, 832 F.2d 649
                                   _____________    _______
            (1st  Cir. 1987) ("Klubock I"), because the members of the en
                               _________
            banc  court referred to the  panel opinion.   Klubock II, 832
                                                          __________
            F.2d  at  665.   The  opinion  in  Klubock  II affirming  the
                                               ___________
            district  court did refer to the portions of Klubock I quoted
                                                         _________
            here, id. at 667,  although neither Klubock I nor  Klubock II
                  ___                           _________      __________
            is controlling precedent, Whitehouse, 53 F.3d at 1354.
                                      __________

                                         -20-
                                          20

                      be subject to betrayal.   And because the
                      subpoenaed  attorney/witness may  himself
                      feel  intimidated, this may  in fact take
                      place   if  there  is  not  even  minimal
                      ethical     control    regulating     the
                      subpoenaing  of  an  attorney/witness  to
                      seek evidence against his client.

                           More   subtle,   but  perhaps   more
                      important in terms of the ethical setting
                      within  which PF  15  is  framed, is  the
                      immediate  conflict of  interests created
                      between  the   attorney/witness  and  his
                      client  by the  serving of a  subpoena in
                      the context of what is contemplated by PF
                      15.  As  a witness, the  attorney/witness
                      has   separate    legal   and   practical
                      interests apart from those of his client.
                      These interests may  or may not  coincide
                      with  those  of the  attorney/witness and
                      his client.  The mere possibility of such
                      a  conflict is  sufficient  to  create  a
                      problem.    A   minimal  overview  by  an
                      impartial observer, as is provided  by PF
                      15, can go far in preventing the creation
                      of  these  ethical conflicts  between the
                      attorney/witness and his client.

            United  States v.  Klubock,  832 F.2d  649, 652-53  (1st Cir.
            ______________     _______

            1987)  (footnote omitted)  ("Klubock I").   We  believe these
                                         _________

            considerations apply to the relationships with former counsel

            as well as with present counsel.

                      There  may be  an implicit  threat to  the attorney

            called to testify about a  client to the grand jury that  the

            attorney   will  become   a  target   himself10  should   the

            prosecutor  think  he knowingly  participated  in  the fraud.

                                
            ____________________

            10.  Indeed, at trial Attorney Koditek indicated an intent to
            assert the right under the Fifth Amendment not to incriminate
            himself  if called  to  testify.   By  the time  of  Attorney
            Koditek's trial  testimony, he  had been granted  immunity by
            the prosecution.

                                         -21-
                                          21

            This is  particularly so  where the prosecution  asserts that

            the  privilege must  give way  to the  crime-fraud exception.

            The lawyer may be  tempted to reveal privileged conversations

            in order  to avoid  becoming  a target  himself.11   Ideally,

            counsel receiving a subpoena will give notice to a client and

            consistently  assert the  privilege  on behalf  of a  client.

            Ideally, a prosecutor faced with an assertion of privilege by

            an  attorney witness  will seek  a judicial  determination of

            whether the  privilege is valid.   But we  do not live  in an

            ideal  world.  See Jerome  Frank, If Men  Were Angels (1942).
                           ___                ___________________

            We  are loath  to say  the prosecutor  here crossed  over the

            line.   But we are  equally loath to  say, as  the government

            urges, that there is no line and there is never a remedy.12

                                
            ____________________

            11.  While an attorney  may, under the  self-defense doctrine
            set forth  in S.J.C. Rule  3:07, Code of  Prof. Resp.,  DR 4-
            101(C)(4),  reveal information  without prior  notice  to the
            client,  the  doctrine does  not  apply  unless there  is  an
            "accusation"  of  wrongful  conduct.   We  do  not  think the
            prosecutor  here made  an  "accusation" against  counsel that
            would have triggered this provision.

            12.  Indeed,  other  courts  have  concluded that  there  are
            limits  to  how  far   government  investigators  may  go  in
            attempting   to  induce  a   breach  of  the  attorney-client
            privilege.    In  Omni,  the  district  court  chastised  the
                              ____
            government for interviewing an  attorney's secretary.  634 F.
            Supp. at 1431, 1439.  See also United States v. Valencia, 541
                                  ________ _____________    ________
            F.2d 618  (6th Cir.  1976)  (improper for  government to  pay
            attorney's  secretary for  information  about the  attorney's
            clients).    But,  attorneys are  themselves  responsible for
            protecting  the client  by  asserting the  privilege when  it
            applies.   See, e.g., United States v. Rasheed, 663 F.2d 843,
                       _________  _____________    _______
            854  (9th Cir.  1981), cert.  denied,  454 U.S.  1157 (1982);
                                   _____________
            Omni, 634 F. Supp. at 1422-23, 1431.
            ____

                                         -22-
                                          22

                      The  first  line  of  defense  to  protect  Edgar's

            privilege lay  in the hands of  his lawyer.  A  lawyer has an

            obligation  not to  reveal client  confidences.   S.J.C. Rule

            3:07, Code  of Prof. Resp., DR  4-101.  A lawyer  also has an

            obligation to assert privilege  on behalf of a client.   Id.;
                                                                     ___

            see also In re Impounded Case (Law Firm), 879 F.2d 1211, 1213
            ________ _______________________________

            (3d  Cir. 1989).  Generally, an attorney has an obligation to

            assert  the  privilege on  behalf of  the  client and  not to

            disclose  confidential information until  there is a judicial

            determination that  there is  no privilege.   ABA/BNA Lawyers
                                                          _______________

            Manual on  Professional Conduct  55:1307-08 (1989).   Even if
            _______________________________

            there  is an assertion that there is no privilege because the

            crime-fraud exception  applies, the  attorney is  required to

            give notice to  the client.  S.J.C. Rule 3:07,  Code of Prof.

            Resp.,  DR  7-102(B)(1).    If the  attorney  violates  these

            duties,  he is at risk at least  of a malpractice suit and of

            professional discipline.

                      Concomitantly, a prosecutor has certain obligations

            beyond  zealous  representation  of the  government  when the

            prosecutor interrogates witnesses before the grand jury.  For

            example,  if a  witness invokes  the privilege  against self-

            incrimination, the prosecutor should cease  questioning as to

            the particular subject to  which the privilege was addressed.

            United  States v. Mandujano, 425  U.S. 564, 581  (1976).  But
            ______________    _________                               ___

            see  United States v. Benjamin,  852 F.2d 413,  420 (9th Cir.
            ___  _____________    ________

                                         -23-
                                          23

            1988)  (testing  validity   of  reliance  on  privilege   not

            prosecutorial misconduct unless prosecutor  harangued witness

            or improperly  commented on assertion  of privilege), vacated
                                                                  _______

            on other grounds,  490 U.S.  1043 (1989).   Thus, the  second
            ________________

            line  of defense is that  the prosecutor will  not harangue a

            witness, but will promptly bring the issue to a court.  

                      The  third  line  of  defense is  that  there  will

            ultimately be a  disinterested judicial determination of  the

            issue.13  In  United   States   v.  Zolin,   491   U.S.   554
                          _______________       _____

            (1989),  the  Supreme  Court  set  forth  the  procedure  for

            obtaining judicial review when the  attorney-client privilege

            is  consistently asserted  and  the  government  opposes  the

            privilege.   Id. at 572.  The government may obtain in camera
                         ___

            review of  the information alleged  to be privileged,  at the

            discretion  of the court, upon a "'showing of a factual basis

            adequate  to  support a  good  faith belief  by  a reasonable

            person' . .  . that  in camera  review of  the materials  may

            reveal evidence  to establish the claim  that the crime-fraud

            exception applies."  Id. (quoting Caldwell v. District Court,
                                 ___          ________    ______________

            664 P.2d 26, 33  (Colo. 1982)).  Apparently, no  such showing

            was made  in this  case because  Attorney Koditek  so quickly

                                
            ____________________

            13.  The judicial protection of rights inherent in PF 15 does
            not  resolve this  situation.   That  a  judge has  ex  parte
                                                                _________
            authorized issuance of  a subpoena to  counsel does not  mean
            that  a determination  has  been made  that any  assertion of
            privilege before  the  grand jury  has  been decided  in  the
            prosecution's favor.

                                         -24-
                                          24

            succumbed to  the prosecutor's  questioning.  Under  Zolin, a
                                                                 _____

            prosecutor  may  not  obtain  disclosure,  or  even  judicial

            review, of the privileged information upon a simple assertion

            that  the crime-fraud  exception applies, as  happened before

            the grand jury here.  See id. at 571.
                                  ___ ___

                      Nevertheless, Edgar  ultimately had the  benefit of

            that third line of defense.  On the facts of this case we see

            no  prejudice,   and  therefore   no  basis  to   vacate  the

            conviction.   See Fed.  R. Crim. P. 52;  Bank of Nova Scotia,
                          ___                        ___________________

            487 U.S. at 254-55 (requiring prejudice).  Edgar does not now

            assert  that  the  trial  testimony by  Koditek  invaded  his

            privilege.   The district court instructed  the prosecutor to

            limit his questions  to what was  disclosed to the  insurance

            company  and to  avoid the  communications between  Edgar and

            Attorney Koditek.   On the  significant point  as to  whether

            Edgar had or had not confided to Koditek that the tax returns

            to  be provided to Commercial  Union had not  been filed with

            the IRS, Attorney Koditek did not so testify at trial, as  he

            had to the  grand jury.   Indeed, the  evidence that the  tax

            returns  had  not  been filed  was  introduced  independently

            through a Certification of Lack  of Record from the custodian

            of federal tax returns.  On the point that Edgar provided the

            tax  returns to  Attorney Koditek,  Edgar does  not claim  on

            appeal that the trial court erred in holding that information

            was not privileged.

                                         -25-
                                          25

                      Edgar  argues there  was prejudice  in that  he was

            deprived of the choice as  to whether to assert an  advice of

            counsel  defense.  Edgar chose  not to assert  that the false

            tax returns were prepared and submitted on advice of counsel.

            He was free to have made  such an argument, if supported,  at

            trial, whatever Koditek's grand jury testimony.  Had  he made

            such an argument, of  course, he would have waived  any claim

            that   the   attorney-client   privilege    protected   those

            discussions.   See  Glenmede Trust  Co. v. Thompson,  56 F.3d
                           ___  ___________________    ________

            476,  486-87 (3d  Cir.  1995); Saint-Gobain/Norton  Indus. v.
                                           ___________________________

            General  Elec.  Co., 884  F. Supp.  31,  33 (D.  Mass. 1995).
            ___________________

            Moreover, there  was no  argument or evidence  that Koditek's

            actions  in  connection  with  the  demand  letter  were  not

            authorized.   The choice as to whether to make such arguments

            was not foreclosed to him and was a strategy choice  by trial

            counsel.

                      Nor is this a fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree situation

            that would  require suppression  of evidence or  quashing the

            indictment.  Cf. Rogers,  751 F.2d at 1078-79.  Edgar has not
                         ___ ______

            convinced us that he would not have been indicted but for his

            attorney's testimony.  Edgar argues  that the only reason the

            government  knew  that  Attorney  Koditek  obtained  the  tax

            returns  from  Edgar  was  because of  Koditek's  grand  jury

            testimony.     However,  that  inference   was  self-evident.

            Further, the  Koditek letter  and attached returns  came from

                                         -26-
                                          26

            Commercial  Union's  claim  file  and there  was  independent

            evidence identifying the signature on the unfiled tax returns

            as  Edgar's.    There  being   no  prejudice,  there  was  no

            reversible error.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 52.

            Sufficiency of Evidence of Materiality
            ______________________________________

                      In  his reply  brief14  in this  court Edgar  makes
                              _____

            the  argument  for  the first  time  that  the  jury was  not

            permitted to decide the issue of materiality of his allegedly

            false statements, in violation of the principles announced by

            the Supreme Court in United States v. Gaudin, 115 S. Ct. 2310
                                 _____________    ______

            (1995).   Gaudin was decided  after his trial  but before his
                      ______

            appeal.  The issue,  not having been raised in  his principal

            brief  to  this  court, is  waived.    See  United States  v.
                                                   ___  _____________

            Gabriele, 63 F.3d 61,  67 n.9 (1st Cir. 1995);  United States
            ________                                        _____________

            v. DeMasi,   40 F.3d 1306,  1318 n.12 (1st Cir.  1994), cert.
               ______                                               _____

            denied,  115 S. Ct. 947 (1995); United States v. Brennan, 994
            ______                          _____________    _______

            F.2d 918, 922  n.7 (1st  Cir. 1993).   Had  Edgar raised  the

            Gaudin issue initially on appeal, this court would review the
            ______

            failure to submit  materiality to  the jury  under the  plain

            error  test because Edgar also  failed to raise  the issue in

            the district  court.  See  Randazzo, __ F.3d  at __, No.  95-
                                  ___  ________

                                
            ____________________

            14.  Edgar  filed  a  motion with  this  court  for  leave to
            present a claim  under United  States v. Gaudin,  115 S.  Ct.
                                   ______________    ______
            2310 (1995), in  his reply  brief.  The  motion was  granted,
            "without  prejudice, however,  to the  government's right  to
            argue, or the court's right to conclude, that the issue ha[d]
            been waived."

                                         -27-
                                          27

            1489,  slip op. at 17; see  also United States v. Collins, 60
                                   _________ _____________    _______

            F.3d  4, 8  (1st Cir.  1995).   Edgar  argues that  we should

            nonetheless review the district court's failure to submit the

            element  of materiality to the jury for "plain error" just as

            though  the  issue were  raised in  his  initial brief.   See
                                                                      ___

            Randazzo,  __  F.3d  at __,  No.  95-1489,  slip  op. at  17.
            ________

            However,  we  think a  higher standard  must  be met,  and as

            review for "plain error" lies "within the sound discretion of

            the Court of Appeals,"  we decline to apply that  standard in

            the  circumstances  of this  case.15   See  United  States v.
                                                   ___  ______________

            Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1779  (1993); Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b);
            _____

            Taylor,  54  F.3d  at  972  ("appellate  courts  will  notice
            ______

            unpreserved    errors    only   in    the    most   egregious

            circumstances").

                      Edgar  did  properly preserve  an objection  to the

            sufficiency of the  evidence on materiality, but that we also

            reject.  Edgar argues that  the evidence was insufficient  to

            establish that his omissions from the forms CA-8 for which he

            was convicted were material.   A statement is material  if it

            has  a  natural  tendency  to  influence  or  is  capable  of

            affecting  or  influencing  a government  function.    United
                                                                   ______

            States v. Arcadipane, 41 F.3d 1,  7-8 (1st Cir. 1994).  Edgar
            ______    __________

                                
            ____________________

            15.  Even if we were to apply  the plain error test, we would
            find  Edgar had  not met his  burden.   In light  of the very
            strong  evidence  of  guilt, we  do  not  think  there was  a
            "miscarriage of justice" that would warrant correction of any
            error.  United States v. Olano, 113 S. Ct. 1770, 1779 (1993).
                    _____________    _____

                                         -28-
                                          28

            argues that because  the decision not  to grant him  benefits

            had  already been made and because the forms were filed late,

            his  failure  to  set   forth  his  self-employment  was  not

            material.   However,  the standard is  not whether  there was

            actual influence,  but whether  it would  have a  tendency to

            influence.  The district director for the OWCP testified that

            on a claim for disability, whether one may work or has worked

            has  considerable  influence   on  the  amount  of   benefits

            warranted.  Thus, the  district court did not err  in finding

            Edgar's false statements to be material.   See id. (affirming
                                                       ___ ___

            a finding  of materiality for false  statements of employment

            on a Form 1032).

            Fair Credit Reporting Act
            _________________________

                      Edgar's last  claim of error  is that there  was an

            abuse of discretion in the denial of his motion for discovery

            of the government's compliance with the Fair Credit Reporting

            Act, 15 U.S.C.     1681-1681t.  Edgar claimed to  have needed

            this information  in order to  determine whether a  motion to

            dismiss the indictment or  a motion to suppress  evidence was

            warranted.   Even assuming  that the government  violated the

            FCRA   by  improperly   acquiring  data   concerning  Edgar's

            finances, Edgar has  not shown  how any use  of the  acquired

            information could  have prejudiced him  in the grand  jury to

            support dismissal of the indictment.  See, e.g., Bank of Nova
                                                  ___  ____  ____________

            Scotia  v. United  States, 487  U.S. 250  (1988).   Nor would
            ______     ______________

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                                          29

            suppression  be  required  for   a  violation  of  the  FCRA.

            Suppression of the  evidence is not a mentioned  remedy under

            the FCRA, nor is discovery of whether the government complied

            with  the Act.  See 15 U.S.C.    1681n; cf. United States  v.
                            ___                     ___ _____________

            Kington,  801 F.2d  733,  737 (5th  Cir.  1986) (refusing  to
            _______

            suppress  records  obtained  in  violation of  the  Right  to

            Financial Privacy Act  when Congress did not provide for that

            remedy in statute), cert. denied,  481 U.S. 1014 (1987);  cf.
                                ____________                          ___

            also  United  States  v. Payner,  447  U.S.  727,  735 (1980)
            ____  ______________     ______

            (evidence otherwise  admissible may not be  suppressed on the

            ground that  it was  seized unlawfully from  a third  party);

            United  States  v. Caceres,  440  U.S.  741 (1979)  (evidence
            ______________     _______

            obtained  in   violation  of  IRS  regulation   need  not  be

            suppressed).   There was thus  no abuse of  discretion in the

            denial of the motion.

                      Affirmed.
                      _________

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