Court Opinion

ID: 6421908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-06-25 12:00:35.236299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:51:48.831438
License: Public Domain

Holmes, J.
The plaintiffs’ evidence warranted the conclusion that they refused to sell to Clementson, the broker, but delivered the wool to him on the understanding that it was sold to an undisclosed manufacturer in good credit with the plaintiffs. This evidence was not objected to, and was admissible, notwithstanding the fact that the sale was entered on the plaintiffs’ books as a sale to Clementson, and that a bill was made to him. Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 7 Allen, 548, 564. It was admitted that Clementson, in fact, was not acting for such an undisclosed principal; and it follows that, if the plaintiffs’ evidence was believed, there was no sale. There could not be one to this supposed principal, because there was no such person, and there was not one to Clementson, because none purported to be made to him, but, on the contrary, such a sale was expressly refused and excluded. Edmunds v. Merchants' Despatch Transportation Co. 135 Mass. 283.
It was suggested that this case differed from the one cited, be- ■ cause there the principal was disclosed, whereas here he was not, and that credit could not be supposed to have been given to an unknown person. We have nothing to say as to the weight which this argument ought to have with a jury, beyond observing, that the plaintiffs had reason in Clementson’s representations for giving credit to the supposed manufacturer. But there is no rule of law that makes it impossible to contract with or sell to an unknown but existing party. And if the jury find that such a sale was the only one that purported to be made, the fact that it failed does not turn it into a sale to the party conducting the transaction. Schmaltz v. Avery, 16 Q. B. 655, only decides that a man’s describing himself in a charter-party as “ agent of the freighter ” is not sufficient to preclude him from alleging that he is the freighter. It does not hint that the agent could not be excluded by express terms, or by the description of the principal, although insufficient to identify the individual dealt with, as happened here; still less, that in favor of third persons the agent would be presumed without evidence to be the undisclosed principal, although expressly excluded.
*6The invalidity of the transaction in the case at bar does not depend upon fraud, but upon the fact that one of the supposed parties is wanting, it does not matter how. Fraud only becomes important, as such, when a sale or contract is complete in its formal elements, and therefore valid unless repudiated, but the right is claimed to rescind it. It goes to the motives for making the contract, not to its existence; as when a vendee expressly or impliedly represents that he is solvent and intends to pay for goods, when in fact he is insolvent, and has no reasonable expectation of paying for them; or, being identified by the senses and dealt with as the person so identified, says that he is A., when in fact he is B. But when one of the formal constituents of a legal transaction is wanting, there is no question of rescission ; the transaction is void ab initia, and fraud does not impart to it, against the will of the defrauded party, a validity that it would not have if the want were due to innocent mistake.
The sale being void, and not merely voidable, or, in simpler words, there having been no sale, the delivery .to Clement-son gave him no power fo convey a good title to a bona fide purchaser. He had not even a defective title, and his mere possession did not enable him to pledge or mortgage. The considerations in favor of protecting bona fide dealers with persons in possession, in cases like the present, were much urged in Thacher v. Moors, 134 Mass. 156, but did not prevail. Much less can they be allowed to prevail against a legal title, without the intervention of statute.

Exceptions overruled.