Court Opinion

ID: 9955616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 20:10:46.352831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:08.098636
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Marietta v. Verhovec, 2024-Ohio-1184.]

                                       COURT OF APPEALS
                                  TUSCARAWAS COUNTY, OHIO
                                   FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 CITY OF MARIETTA                                 JUDGES:
                                                  Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, P.J.
         Plaintiff-Appellee                       Hon. William B. Hoffman, J.
                                                  Hon. John W. Wise, J.
 -vs-
                                                  Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 &
                                                            2023 AP 07 0044
 EDWARD VERHOVEC, SR., ET AL.,

         Defendants-Appellants                    OPINION

 CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS:                        Appeal from the Tuscarawas County
                                                  Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2021
                                                  CF 02 0127

 JUDGMENT:                                        Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
                                                  remanded

 DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY:                          March 28, 2024

 APPEARANCES:

 For Defendants-Appellants                        For Defendant-Appellant
 Edward and Dorothy Verhovec                      Cambridge and MacMillan Property Co.

 RICHARD A. NICODEMO                              WILLIAM E. WALKER, JR.
 124 15TH Street, N.W.                            333 Erie Street, South #192
 Canton, Ohio 44703                               Massillon, Ohio 44648

 For Plaintiff-Appellee                           For Defendant-Appellee
 City of Marietta                                 The Huntington National Bank

 DONALD A. MAUSAR                                 ERIC T. DEIGHTON
 ROY J. SCHECHTER                                 Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer &
 965 Keynote Circle                               Ulrich Co., L.P.A.
 Cleveland, Ohio 44131                            24755 Chagrin Blvd., Suite 200
                                                  Cleveland, Ohio 44122
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044   2

For Defendant Tuscarawas
County Treasurer

ROBERT STEPHENSON, II
Tuscarawas County Prosecutor's Office
125 East High Avenue – Room 220
New Philadelphia, Ohio 44663
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                                              3

Hoffman, J.
        {¶1}    Defendants-Appellants Edward and Dorothy Verhovec (hereinafter “the

Verhovecs”) and Cambridge and MacMillan Property Company (hereinafter “Cambridge”)

appeal the judgment of foreclosure entered by the Tuscarawas County Common Pleas

Court. Plaintiff-appellee is the City of Marietta, and Defendant-appellee is the Huntington

National Bank.1

                                STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE

        {¶2}    In 2012, Marietta received two judgment against the Verhovecs for frivolous

conduct related to pursuing claims under Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43.2 One

judgment was against Edward Verhovec only, in the amount of $32,974.51. A second

judgment was rendered against both of the Verhovecs and their attorney, William Walker,

jointly in the amount of $274,033.49 under R.C. 2323.51, and individually against William

Walker under Civ. R. 11.3 Certificates of judgment liens were filed as to both judgments

in Tuscarawas County in 2014, and refiled in 2021.

        {¶3}    On September 8, 2017, Marietta filed a motion for a judgment debtors’

examination of the Verhovecs in Tuscarawas County as to its judgment for $274,033.49.

The Tuscarawas County Common Pleas Court entered an order to appear against the

Verhovecs on April 14, 2020.

        {¶4}    Marietta filed the instant action seeking to foreclose on property owned by

the Verhovecs in Tuscarawas County. In addition to the Verhovecs’ personal residence,

the property includes several rental units. The rent payments from these units are

1 Defendant Tuscarawas County Treasurer has not filed a brief in the instant appeals.
2 The facts underlying the judgments are set forth in State ex rel. Verhovec v. Marietta, 4th Dist. Washington

No. 11CA29, 2013-Ohio-5414.
3Attorney Walker represents Cambridge in the instant appeal.
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                            4

assigned to Cambridge pursuant to a recorded assignment of rents. Huntington and

Cambridge both have recorded mortgages on the property filed for record on May 29,

2015, with Huntington’s mortgage being recorded first on that date.

       {¶5}   Marietta filed a motion for summary judgment.           The Verhovecs and

Cambridge also filed motions for summary judgment. In a series of judgment entries, the

trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Marietta. While the trial court found the

judgment lien against Edward Verhovec in the amount of $32,974.51 was validly

recorded, the trial court found the lien was dormant, and ceased to operate as of June 6,

2019. The trial court found Marietta’s judgment lien in the amount of $274,033.49 was

not dormant due to the 2017 debtors’ examination, and such lien was first in priority over

Huntington and Cambridge. The trial court found as a consensual lien, the payment of

Huntington’s mortgage would come from the Verhovecs’ homestead exemption. In the

judgment of foreclosure, the trial court ordered Cambridge’s interest, claim, or lien

transferred to the proceeds of the sale of the property after the payment of costs of the

action, real estate taxes, the amount due Marietta on its first lien, and the amount due

Huntington on its mortgage. The trial court also held any purchaser at judicial sale will

take title to the property subject to the assignment of rents in favor of Cambridge.

       {¶6}   In the “Order” section of its judgment of foreclosure, the trial court ordered

the proceeds of sale distributed as follows after the payment of costs and taxes: the

Verhovecs’ homestead exemption shall be set aside, after which payment shall be made

to Marietta in the amount $274,033.49 plus interest, and payment shall be made to

Huntington in the amount of $134,835.85 plus interest from the Verhovecs’ homestead

exemption. Any balance was ordered to be held pending further order of the trial court.
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                   5

      {¶7}   It is from the June 30, 2023 judgment of the trial court the Verhovecs

prosecute their appeal (Case No. 2023 AP 07 0043), assigning as error:

             I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT GRANTED THE MOTION

      FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE CITY OF

      MARIETTA AND DENIED THE CROSS-MOTION FOR SUMMARY

      JUDGMENT OF VERHOVECS.

             II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS JUDGMENT ENTRY OF

      JUNE 30, 2023, WHEREBY IT ORDERED THAT THE VERHOVECS’

      EXEMPTION BE SET ASIDE FOR THE PAYMENT OF HUNTINGTON’S

      MORTGAGE.

      {¶8}   It is from the June 30, 2023 judgment of the trial court Cambridge

prosecutes its appeal (Case No. 2023 AP 07 0044), assigning as error:

             I. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE IN THE

      SPECIFIC LANGUAGE GRANTING FORECLOSURE THAT CAMBRIDGE

      AND MACMILLAN COMPANY HAS A RECORDED MORTGAGE ON THE

      PROPERTY.

             II. THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ACKNOWLEDGE IN THE

      SPECIFIC LANGUAGE GRANTING FORECLOSURE THAT CAMBRIDGE

      AND MACMILLAN COMPANY HAS A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTITLING IT

      TO THE RENTAL INCOME WHICH WAS UNCONTESTED AND DECIDED
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                            6

      IN CAMBRIDGE AND MACMILLAN PROPERTIES V. CITY OF

      MARIETTA, CASE NO. 2019 CV 09 0609 (C.P.CT., DATED 11 19 2019)

      (JUDGE O’FARRELL).

             III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY

      JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF MARIETTA BECAUSE MARIETTA WAS

      PRECLUDED FROM SEEKING FORECLOSURE AFTER MARIETTA’S

      COUNSEL PERSONALLY REPRESENTED VERHOVECS DID NOT

      HAVE SUFFICIENT ASSETS TO SATISFY MARIETTA’S JUDGMENT IN

      THE CREDITORS’ BILL ACTION WHICH WAS FILED IN THE COMMON

      PLEAS COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, OHIO.

             IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING JUDGMENT IN

      FAVOR OF MARIETTA WHEN MARIETTA FAILED TO FOLLOW THE

      STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS FOR PERFECTING A LIEN BY FAILING

      TO FILE ITS WASHINGTON COUNTY JUDGMENT LIEN WITH THE

      TUSCARAWAS COUNTY RECORDER’S OFFICE WHERE THE REAL

      PROPERTY WAS LOCATED.

      {¶9}   We first address the assignments of error raised by the Verhovecs.

                                                I.

      {¶10} In their first assignment of error, the Verhovecs argue the trial court erred in

granting Marietta’s motion for summary judgment, and denying their motion for summary

judgment.
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                                 7

       {¶11} Summary judgment proceedings present the appellate court with the unique

opportunity of reviewing the evidence in the same manner as the trial court. Smiddy v.

The Wedding Party, Inc., 30 Ohio St.3d 35, 36 (1987). As such, we must refer to Civ. R.

56(C) which provides in pertinent part:

              Summary Judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,

       depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,

       transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in

       the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and

       that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence

       or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary

       judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or

       stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds

       can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party

       against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being

       entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the

       party’s favor.

       {¶12} Pursuant to the above rule, a trial court may not enter summary judgment if

it appears a material fact is genuinely disputed. The party moving for summary judgment

bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for its motion and identifying

those portions of the record demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material

fact. The moving party may not make a conclusory assertion the non-moving party has
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                           8

no evidence to prove its case. The moving party must specifically point to some evidence

which demonstrates the moving party cannot support its claim. If the moving party

satisfies this requirement, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to set forth specific

facts demonstrating there is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Vahila v. Hall, 77

Ohio St.3d 421, 429, 1997-Ohio-259, citing Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 1996-

Ohio-107.

                   FAILURE TO ESTABLISH ELEMENTS OF FORECLOSURE

      {¶13} The Verhovecs first argue the trial court erred in granting summary

judgment in favor of Marietta because Marietta failed to present evidentiary-quality

material to establish the elements of foreclosure as set forth by this Court in Wachovia

Bank of Delaware, N.A. v. Jackson, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2010-CA-00291, 2011-Ohio-3203.

In Wachovia, this Court held:

               To sum up, in order to properly support a motion for summary

      judgment in a foreclosure action, a plaintiff must present evidentiary-quality

      materials showing:

               1.) The movant is the holder of the note and mortgage, or is a party

            entitled to enforce the instrument;

               2.) if the movant is not the original mortgagee, the chain of

            assignments and transfers;

               3.) all conditions precedent have been met;

               4.) the mortgagor is in default; and

               5.) the amount of principal and interest due.
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                              9

       {¶14} Id. at ¶¶ 40-45.

       {¶15} Wachovia involved a foreclosure on a debt instrument, while the instant

case involves a judgment lien foreclosure.           We find the above-quoted elements

inapplicable in a foreclosure action such as the instant case, which does not involve a

mortgage and a note.

       {¶16} Marietta filed its certificate of judgment against the Verhovecs in

accordance with R.C. 2329.02, which provides in pertinent part:

              Any judgment or decree rendered by any court of general jurisdiction,

       including district courts of the United States, within this state shall be a lien

       upon lands and tenements of each judgment debtor within any county of

       this state from the time there is filed in the office of the clerk of the court of

       common pleas of such county a certificate of such judgment, setting forth

       the court in which the same was rendered, the title and number of the action,

       the names of the judgment creditors and judgment debtors, the amount of

       the judgment and costs, the rate of interest, if the judgment provides for

       interest, and the date from which such interest accrues, the date of rendition

       of the judgment, and the volume and page of the journal entry thereof.

       {¶17} Pursuant to this statute, “a lien is immediately created upon the lands of the

judgment debtor when a certificate of judgment is filed with the clerk of courts.” E.g., Std.

Hardware & Supply Co. v. Bolen, 115 Ohio App.3d 579, 582, 685 N.E.2d 1264, 1266 (4th

Dist. Hocking 1996).
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                         10

      {¶18} R.C. 2323.07 provides for foreclosure on a judgment lien:

             When a mortgage is foreclosed or a specific lien enforced, a sale of

      the property, or a transfer of property pursuant to sections 323.28, 323.65

      to 323.78, and 5721.19 of the Revised Code, shall be ordered by the court

      having jurisdiction or the county board of revision with jurisdiction pursuant

      to section 323.66 of the Revised Code.

      {¶19} This Court has explained the procedure employed for foreclosure on a

judgment lien:

             R.C. 2329.02 is intended to create a specific lien upon the lands and

      tenements of the judgment debtor which lie within the county at the time

      there is filed in the office of the clerk of the court of common pleas of such

      county a certificate of judgment. The lien applies specifically to all such

      property identified as belonging to the judgment debtor at the time of the

      filing of the certificate and may be enforced as a specific lien pursuant to

      R.C. 2323.07 by a foreclosure action.

      {¶20} Sheely v. Gindlesberger, 5th Dist. Holmes No. 16CA008, 2017-Ohio-200, ¶

21.

      {¶21} R.C. 2323.07 recognizes the enforcement of a specific lien, as in the instant

case, as a separate procedure from a mortgage foreclosure. The elements set forth by
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                             11

this Court for a mortgage foreclosure in Wachovia Bank, supra, do not make sense in the

context of a judgment lien foreclosure, where the debtor has not defaulted on a debt

instrument. We find the trial court did not err in failing to overrule Marietta’s motion for

summary judgment for failure to establish the elements of a mortgage foreclosure.

                                     DORMANT JUDGMENT

       {¶22} The Verhovecs next argue Marietta’s judgment in the amount of $32,974.51

was dormant pursuant to R.C. 2329.07(C):

              (C) If, in any county other than that in which a judgment was

       rendered, the judgment has become a lien by reason of the filing, in the

       office of the clerk of the court of common pleas of that county, of a certificate

       of the judgment as provided in sections 2329.02 and 2329.04 of the Revised

       Code, or there has been a renewal of the judgment, except as otherwise

       provided under division (D) of this section, the judgment shall cease to

       operate as a lien upon lands and tenements of the judgment debtor within

       that county, unless one of the following occurs within five years or, if the

       judgment is in favor of the state, within fifteen years:

              (1) An execution on a judgment is issued.

              (2) A certificate of the judgment is filed in that county.

              (3) An order of garnishment is issued or is continuing, or until the last

       garnishment payment is received by the clerk of courts or the final report

       and answer is filed by the garnishee, whichever is later.

              (4) A proceeding in aid of execution is commenced or is continuing.
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                        12

      {¶23} The Verhovecs argue Marietta’s motion for summary judgment should have

been denied and the entire action dismissed because Marietta took no steps to prevent

the dormancy of its judgment lien in Case No 2014 CJ 06 0607, the judgment lien against

Edward Verhovec in the amount of $32,974.51. However, the trial court found the

judgment against Edward Verhovec to be dormant:

             Upon review of the Court file, the Court FINDS that there is no

      indication that Plaintiff took any steps before January 28, 2021 to renew the

      judgment lien filed on June 6, 2014.

             The Court FINDS, therefore, that the judgment issued by the Court

      of Common Pleas of Washington County against Edward Verhovec in Case

      No. 11 OT 197 in the amount of $32,974.51 ceased to operate as a lien

      upon the subject property on June 6, 2019.

             The Court FINDS, therefore, that Plaintiff’s judgment lien on the

      Second Judgment does not have priority over the liens of The Huntington

      National Bank and Cambridge and MacMillan Company.

             The Court FINDS, therefore, that only Plaintiff’s judgment lien on the

      First Judgment has priority over the liens of The Huntington National Bank

      and Cambridge and MacMillan Company.

      {¶24} Judgment Entry, August 31, 2022, page 15.

      {¶25} We find no error in the trial court’s judgment. The judgment against Edward

Verhovec only in the amount of $32,974.51, was not a part of the 2017 debtors’
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                           13

examination, which Marietta filed only as to the $274,033.49 judgment. Because Marietta

took no action to prevent the judgment against Edward Verhovec only from going

dormant, it ceased to operate as a lien against the property as of June 6, 2019.

         FAILURE TO PERFECT LIEN WITH TUSCARAWAS COUNTY RECORDER

       {¶26} The Verhovecs argue the instant foreclosure action should have been

dismissed because Marietta failed to file the lien with the county recorder, as required by

R.C. 2329.02, which provides in pertinent part:

              No such judgment or decree shall be a lien upon any lands, whether

       or not situated within the county in which such judgment is rendered,

       registered under sections 5309.02 to 5309.98, inclusive, and 5310.01 to

       5310.21, inclusive, of the Revised Code, until a certificate under the hand

       and official seal of the clerk of the court in which the same is entered or of

       record, stating the date and purport of the judgment, giving the number of

       the case, the full names of the parties, plaintiff and defendant, and the

       volume and page of the journal or record in which it is entered, or a certified

       copy of such judgment, stating such facts, is filed and noted in the office of

       the county recorder of the county in which the land is situated, and a

       memorial of the same is entered upon the register of the last certificate of

       title to the land to be affected (Emphasis added).

       {¶27} When quoting the statute in their brief in support of their argument, the

Verhovecs omitted the portion in italics above, which requires filing the judgment with the
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                              14

county recorder only when the land is registered under sections R.C. 5309.02 to 5309.98,

and 5310.01 to 5310.21. The trial court found the parties presented no evidence to

suggest the land is registered under these sections, and therefore the Verhovecs’

argument Marietta was required to file the lien with the Tuscarawas County Recorder’s

Office was not well taken. Judgment entry, May 19, 2022, page 14. We find no error in

the trial court’s judgment.

                                        LACHES, WAIVER

       {¶28} The Verhovecs argue the trial court erred in overruling their motion for

summary judgment based on their defense of waiver and laches.

       {¶29} Waiver is a voluntary relinquishment of a known right, and is generally

applicable to all personal rights and privileges, whether contractual, statutory, or

constitutional. Glidden Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 112 Ohio St.3d 470, 2006-

Ohio-6553, 861 N.E.2d 109, ¶49. We find no evidence in the record Marietta waived its

right to pursue foreclosure simply by waiting to pursue foreclosure as a remedy of last

resort when it was unable to collect the judgment by other measures.

       {¶30} “The elements of laches are (1) unreasonable delay or lapse of time in

asserting a right, (2) absence of an excuse for the delay, (3) knowledge, actual or

constructive, of the injury or wrong, and (4) prejudice to the other party.” State ex rel. Polo

v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Elections, 74 Ohio St.3d 143, 145, 656 N.E.2d 1277 (1995). For

purposes of the doctrine of laches, prejudice exists when the plaintiff's delay causes the

loss of evidence helpful to the defendant's case, or when the person against whom the

claim is asserted has changed his position in reasonable reliance on the words or conduct
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                            15

of the party who would enforce the claim. E.g., U.S. Bank, Natl. Assn. v. Mitchell, 2nd

Dist. Montgomery No. 27984, 2018-Ohio-4887, ¶ 20.

       {¶31} The trial court found the Verhovecs presented no evidence in support of

their summary judgment motion suggesting Marietta’s delay in bringing the foreclosure

action caused the loss of evidence or caused them to change their position in reasonable

reliance on the words or conduct of Marietta. We agree. The affidavit of Dorothy

Verhovec, attached to the motion for summary judgment, averred she was the co-owner

of the property, she was 78 years old, and the property serves as the sole residence of

herself and her husband. Likewise, the affidavit of Edward Verhovec attached to the

motion stated he was 77 years old, co-owned the property with Dorothy, and the property

was the sole residence of himself and Dorothy.          Nothing in the affidavits provided

evidence of prejudice by the delay in pursuing foreclosure as a remedy, as opposed to

prejudice from the foreclosure action itself. As such, we find the trial court did not err in

finding the Verhovecs failed to present evidence in support of their defense of laches.

                   INSUFFICIENT PROPERTY VALUE TO PAY JUDGMENT

       {¶32} The Verhovecs argue because of the value of the property and the

homestead exemptions to which they are entitled under R.C. 2329.66, Marietta will

receive no proceeds from the sale, and thus foreclosure is inequitable.

       {¶33} This Court has previously rejected a similar argument:

              Appellants do not seem to take issue with the procedure in this

       matter, but rather that the property is not of sufficient value to pay the

       exemption in full.
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                             16

              Upon review and in light of the fact that Appellants provide no law to

       support their assertion that a party obtaining a judgment under R.C. §

       2329.02 cannot levy execution upon property under R.C. § 2323.07, we find

       Appellants' assignment not well-taken.

       {¶34} Sheely v. Gindlesberger, supra, at ¶¶ 24-25.

       {¶35} The Verhovecs cite no legal authority for its proposition Marietta cannot

foreclose on the property pursuant to R.C. 2923.07 simply because they believe the value

of the property will be of insufficient value to pay Marietta. We find the trial court did not

err in failing to grant summary judgment for the Verhovecs on this basis.

       {¶36} In summary, we find the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment

in favor of Marietta and denying the Verhovecs’ motion for summary judgment. The first

assignment of error is overruled.

                                                 II.

       {¶37} In their second assignment of error, the Verhovecs argue the trial court

erred in finding Huntington’s mortgage should be paid from their homestead exemption.

In support of their argument, they cite two cases, a 1918 appellate case from the Third

District, and a 1910 Common Pleas Court decision. We find the cases relied upon by

Appellant do not reflect the current state of Ohio law regarding the payment of a

consensual mortgage.

       {¶38} As this Court has previously recognized, the homestead exemption takes

priority over a nonconsensual lien, such as Marietta’s judgment lien in the instant case,

but does not take priority over a consensual mortgage, such as Huntington’s mortgage:
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                        17

            Appellant contends that he is entitled to a $5,000.00 homestead

     exemption pursuant to R.C. 2329.66(A)(1)(b) as priority over appellee's

     mortgage. Such section provides, in relevant part, as follows:

            “Every person who is domiciled in this state may hold property

     exempt from execution, garnishment, attachment, or sale to satisfy a

     judgment or order, as follows:

            (b) ... the person's interest, not to exceed five thousand dollars, in

     one parcel or item of real or personal property that the person or a

     dependent of the person uses as a residence.”

            However, pursuant to R.C. 2329.661, certain claims are not

     exempted by R.C. 2329.66(A)(1) from execution, garnishment, attachment

     or sale. R.C. 2329.661 states in relevant part, that 2329.66(A)(1) does not:

            “(1) Extend to a judgment rendered on a mortgage executed, or

     security interest given on real or personal property by a debtor or to a claim

     for less than four hundred dollars for manual work or labor;

            (2) Impair the lien, by mortgage or otherwise, of the vendor for the

     purchase money of real or personal property that the debtor or a dependent

     of the debtor uses as a residence, the lien of a mechanic or other person,

     under a statute of this state, for materials furnished or labor performed in

     the erection of a dwelling house on real property, or a lien for the payment

     of taxes due on real property;

            (3) Affect or invalidate any mortgage on any real property, or any lien

     created by such a mortgage.
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                            18

             (B) No promise, agreement, or contract shall be made or entered into

      that would waive the exemption laws of this state, and every promise,

      agreement, or contract insofar as it seeks to waive the exemption laws of

      this state is void.”

             It is clear from the plain language of R.C. 2329.661(A)(3) that the

      $5,000.00 statutory homestead exemption does not affect or invalidate the

      validity of appellant's mortgage. See The Metropolitan Bank of Lima, Ohio

      v. Steven E. Turner, et al (April 28, 1987), Auglaize App. No. 2-85-26,

      unreported and The State Savings and Loan Co. v. Sam Parker, III, et al.

      (Nov. 21, 1986), Lake App. No. 11-162, unreported. Thus, appellee's

      mortgage claim has priority over appellant's homestead exemption claim.

      Moreover, while appellant cites numerous cases in support of his contention

      that his homestead exemption under R.C. 2329.66 is not impaired by

      judicial liens, such cases are not applicable since a mortgage lien is not a

      judicial lien. A judicial lien, unlike a mortgage lien, is obtained involuntarily

      by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or

      proceeding as provided for in Bankruptcy Code Section 101. A mortgage

      lien is a consensual lien. Appellee's mortgage is not a judicial lien and,

      therefore, has priority over appellant's homestead exemption claim.

      {¶39} Markle v. Wayne Savings & Loan Co., 5th Dist. Ashland No. 98-COA-

01274, 1999 WL 547443, *3.
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                          19

         {¶40} The trial court’s finding Marietta’s lien has priority over Huntington’s

mortgage has not been assigned as error on appeal. Pursuant to Ohio law, Huntington’s

and Cambridge’s mortgage liens have priority over the Verhovecs’ homestead exemption,

but Marietta’s judgment lien does not have priority over the Verhovecs’ homestead

exemption. Marietta’s judgment lien takes priority over Huntington’s and Cambridge’s

mortgage liens and the claims of the Verhovecs only to the extent the proceeds of the

sale exceed the homestead exemption. Because Marietta’s judgment has priority over

Huntington’s mortgage and Cambridge’s mortgage, Marietta is entitled to the first

proceeds of sale after satisfaction of the costs, taxes, and the payment of the homestead

exemption from the set-aside. However, Huntington’s and Cambridge’s mortgage liens

are consensual, and therefore have priority over the Verhovecs’ claim to the homestead

exemption set-aside. We find the trial court did not err in ordering the homestead

exemption to be set aside before the payment of Marietta’s judgment over which the

homestead exemption has priority, but then using the set-aside to pay the Huntington and

Cambridge mortgage liens before any potential payment to the Verhovecs from the set-

aside.

         {¶41} The second assignment of error is overruled.

         {¶42} We next turn to the assignments of error raised by Cambridge on appeal.

                                             I.

         {¶43} In its first assignment of error, Cambridge argues the trial court erred in

failing to recognize its mortgage in the order directing the payment of the proceeds of the

foreclosure sale.
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                              20

      {¶44} In the judgment of foreclosure, the trial court made the following finding as

to Cambridge’s mortgage:

             Defendants, Cambridge and McMillan Company asserted interests

      in said premises, as set forth in its answer herein. The Court makes no

      finding as to the right, title, interest, claim or lien of said Defendant as set

      forth in their answer except that such right, title, interest claim or lien of said

      Defendant is hereby ordered transferred to the proceeds of the sale of said

      premises after the payment of the costs of this action, real estate taxes due

      and payable, and the amount due to the Plaintiff on its first lien and the

      amount due to the Defendant, The Huntington National Bank on its

      mortgage.

      {¶45} However, in the order directing the payment of the proceeds, Cambridge

was not included. We find the record established Cambridge possessed a mortgage over

the property, although the exact amount currently due on said mortgage was not

established. Marietta’s complaint in the instant case alleged Cambridge may have an

interest in the property due to a recorded mortgage in the amount of $150,000. In its

answer, Cambridge admitted this allegation. The amended preliminary judicial report,

filed January 13, 2022, noted a mortgage from the Verhovecs to Cambridge in the amount

of $150,000, recorded May 29, 2015. Because the record affirmatively establishes the

existence of a mortgage from the Verhovecs to Cambridge, albeit not the exact amount

due on said mortgage, we find the trial court erred in not including the Cambridge
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                           21

mortgage in its order directing payment of the proceeds of the foreclosure sale. We find

the mortgage held by Cambridge should be paid as a consensual mortgage from the

homestead exemption, second in priority to Huntington.

       {¶46} The first assignment of error is sustained.

                                             II.

       {¶47} In its second assignment of error, Cambridge argues the trial court erred in

not mentioning the right of Cambridge to the rental income in the listed items in the last

pages of the foreclosure decree.

       {¶48} In the foreclosure decree, the trial court stated:

              Any purchaser at a judicial sale in this matter will take title to the

       property in this matter subject to an assignment of rents in favor of

       Cambridge and MacMillan, referred to in Tuscarawas County Common

       Pleas Court case no. 2019 CV 09 0608.

       {¶49} In the “order” section of the judgment entry, just prior to the listing of the

order in which the proceeds were to be paid, the trial court stated:

              The Plaintiff may file a praecipe, at which time the Clerk of Courts

       shall issue an Order of Sale to the Sheriff of this County ordering the Sheriff

       to sell the same at public sale, as upon execution and according to law, free

       and clear of all interests of all parties to this action, except subject to an

       assignment of rents in favor of Cambridge and MacMillan, referred to in
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                           22

       Tuscarawas County Common Pleas Court case no. 2019 CV 09 0608, after

       having the same properly appraised and advertised according to law.

       {¶50} The listed items, in which Cambridge argues its rent assignment should

have been referenced a third time, follow the directive, “The Sheriff, upon confirmation of

sale, pay from the proceeds the following [.]” The rent assignment is not a part of the

proceeds of the sale. We find the trial court’s reference of the rent assignment twice in

its judgment entry sufficient to protect Cambridge’s interest and put any purchaser on

notice of the rent assignment.

       {¶51} The second assignment of error is overruled.

                                            III.

       {¶52} In its third assignment of error, Cambridge argues the trial court erred in

denying its motion for summary judgment based on judicial estoppel. Cambridge argues

by filing the foreclosure action, Marietta took a position inconsistent with the position it

asserted in a creditor’s bill action in Washington County. Cambridge argues in the

creditor’s bill action, Marietta asserted the Verhovecs had no assets to satisfy the

judgment, and therefore cannot now argue the Verhovecs have real property subject to

foreclosure available to satisfy the judgment.

       {¶53} In order to apply the doctrine of judicial estoppel, the proponent must show

his opponent “(1) took a contrary position; (2) under oath in a prior proceeding; and (3)

the prior position was accepted by the court.” Chrysler Group, L.L.C. v. Dixon, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 104628, 2017-Ohio-1161, ¶ 16.
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044                            23

       {¶54} The position taken by Marietta in the creditor’s bill action, as required by

R.C. 2333.01, was the judgment debtor does not have sufficient personal or real property

to satisfy the judgment. We find the position taken by Marietta in the creditor’s bill action

related to the sufficiency of the Verhovecs’ assets to satisfy the judgments against them

to be different than its position in the instant case, which is the Verhovecs possessed real

property subject to foreclosure to be paid toward satisfaction of the judgment.

       {¶55} In addition, there was no final judgment in the creditor’s bill action, and

therefore Cambridge has not established the prior position of Marietta was accepted by

the court.

       {¶56} We find the trial court did not err in overruling Cambridge’s motion for

summary judgment.

       {¶57} The third assignment of error is overruled.

                                                IV.

       {¶58} In its fourth assignment of error, Cambridge argues the trial court erred in

granting Marietta’s motion for summary judgment because Marietta failed to record the

judgment lien with the county recorder as required by R.C. 2329.02. For the reasons

stated earlier in this Opinion in our discussion of the Verhovecs’ first assignment of error,

Marietta was not required to record its lien with the county recorder.
Tuscarawas County, Case Nos. 2023 AP 07 0043 & 2023 AP 07 0044   24

      {¶59} The fourth assignment of error is overruled.

By: Hoffman, J.
Delaney, P.J. and
Wise, J. concur