Court Opinion

ID: 9855436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:24:46.692104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:34:42.316594
License: Public Domain

Hood, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in *302part). I do not agree that the improper introduction of Parham’s identification testimony constitutes error requiring reversal, and therefore I must dissent from that portion of the majority opinion.
At the trial of this cause, no one, with the exception of the defendant himself, was aware that a prior information had been dismissed because of the failure of a prosecution witness to appear for trial before a different judge and with different trial counsel on both sides. Also unknown to anyone, again with the exception of the defendant, was that the judge in the previous trial had suppressed Parham’s eyewitness testimony identifying defendant as the perpetrator.
The issue of the propriety of Parham’s identification did not emerge until the remand proceedings under People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973) which, inter alia, addressed defense counsel’s failure to challenge the Parham testimony. Again, however, neither the lawyers nor the judge knew at the time of the hearing that the judge who presided over the prior, dismissed action had resolved the same Parham identification question in defendant’s favor and ruled that the evidence had to be suppressed. Defendant finally spoke up during the Ginther testimony and told his attorney, at which time the judge adjourned the proceedings.
The proceedings after adjournment took on the character of a motion for a new trial. The prosecutor conceded that admission of the Parham identification testimony was, in his view, unwittingly erroneous. The judge then reviewed the identification evidence, excising Parham’s identification, and determined that there was identification testimony that was otherwise sufficient to sustain a verdict of guilty.
*303This was a bench trial, and the experienced and learned trial judge noted that, in determining the verdict, he in fact had not placed much weight on Parham’s testimony. He stated that his reasons for this were, first, because a police officer who had been present at the scene testified that Parham was "hysterical” and, further, that she had shown some indecision at subsequent showups. Accordingly, the judge stated, he would rely on Parham’s testimony solely for the purpose of establishing that the robbery had been perpetrated by one (unidentified) man and no other.
The judge then stated that he affirmed the verdict. He found that Odell Inge’s testimony, coupled with the judge’s own finding that there was only one perpetrator and thus no possibility of confusion, was decisive. The judge stated that he placed significant weight on Inge’s identification for several reasons. First, Inge had prior knowledge of defendant (Inge testified that he had "grown up” with defendant, whom he knew as "Bulldog”). Second, Inge had seen defendant earlier on the day in question. Finally and most decisively, the judge noted, Inge had testified that defendant had shown him a .32 caliber revolver at that time, which was the same caliber as the weapon with which the decedent had been shot later that day.
Unlike the majority, I am not prepared to attribute to the parties involved in the error a knowledge which they steadfastly deny, and of which there is no contrary evidence, except our 20/20 hindsight with regard to what we believe should have been obvious to everyone involved. Even more importantly, I see no basis for questioning the trial court’s determination that the improperly admitted evidence did not unduly influence his determination of guilt. This was a bench trial and we have repeatedly, and correctly, held that, un*304like a jury, a trial judge possesses an understanding of the law which allows errors to be ignored and a case to be decided solely on the basis of properly admitted evidence. People v Farmer, 30 Mich App 707, 710-711; 186 NW2d 779 (1971); People v Jones, 168 Mich App 191, 194; 423 NW2d 614 (1988). The trial court stated that it decided the case on the basis of the properly admitted evidence. In my opinion, we do violence to settled law by questioning that determination.
I do agree, however, that defendant is entitled to a new trial on the basis of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that counsel’s assistance was ineffective under the standards articulated either in People v Garcia, 398 Mich 250; 247 NW2d 547 (1976), or Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 674 (1984). See People v Dalessandro, 165 Mich App 569; 419 NW2d 609 (1988).
Therefore, I concur in the reversal of the convictions and the remand for a new trial, although I see no reason to assign the case to a different judge.