Court Opinion

ID: 9885732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:12:55.977101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:56.507511
License: Public Domain

McALLISTEK, J.,
dissenting.
Our ideal is equal justice under the law. 1'n this case the majority seems to have abandoned that goal and created a different rule for used car dealers than it has applied to all other litigants accused of fraud.
The normal rule applied to defendants accused of fraud was epitomized recently in Fahrenwald v. Hemphill, 239 Or 421, 425, 398 P2d 174 (1965), as follows:
“* * * it is a salutary rule of law that requires such an allegation [fraud] to be proven by clear and convincing evidence. The stigma of fraud is not lightly laid upon a defendant. Fraud must be established by clear and satisfactory proof. The party alleging fraud must bring forward the evidence to prove it, and may not rely upon mere suspicious circumstances or equivocal conduct. (Citing prior cases.)”
A more elaborate statement of the rule is found in Conzelmann v. N. W. P. & D. Prod. Co., 190 Or 332, 350, 225 P2d 757 (1950):
“Fraud is never presumed. On the contrary, there is a disputable presumption that a person is innocent of crime or wrong; (% 2-407 (1), O.C.L.A.) and another disputable presmnption that private transactions have been fair and regular (§ 2-407 (19), O.C.L.A.). The person alleging fraud has the burden of proving it, and it must be established by evidence that is clear, satisfactory, and convincing. It is not necessary that it be established by direct evidence, for in many cases that would be impossible, and it may be proved by circumstan*493tial evidence of a clear and satisfactory character. (Citing' prior cases.)”
Plaintiff does not contend that defendant said or did anything to induce him to rely on the accuracy of the speedometer. The defendant’s sales manager testified that the speedometer was replaced in the' normal course of reconditioning the car for resale. There is no evidence to the contrary. At most, the evidence establishes only “equivocal conduct,” which we said in Fahrenwald v. Hemphill is not sufficient to establish fraud.
The majority would let the jury infer fraud, not from any evidence in this case, but from some assumed general knowledge that sharp practices are commonplace in the used car business.
If there was even a scintilla of evidence in this case that defendant replaced the speedometer for the purpose of deceiving a' prospective buyer I would concur in the majority opinion. Since there is no such evidence, I dissent.
Perry, C. J., concurs in this dissent.