Court Opinion

ID: 9622939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:25:24.187173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:49.515284
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
Whatever the rule may be in other states, the law of Georgia “is well settled [that] one who has accepted benefits such as alimony under a divorce decree is estopped from seeking to set aside that decree without first returning the benefits. [Cits.]” White v. White, 274 Ga. 884, 885 (1) (561 SE2d 801) (2002). If the Court had applied this clearly established principle in this case, Wife would have been estopped from attacking the divorce decree, because she has accepted, but not returned, benefits that were awarded to her thereunder. However, the three-Justice plurality opinion, p. 268, finds “persuasive the approach taken by other states that have carved out exceptions to the estoppel rule in recognition of the realities of divorce and the policy considerations involved” and, for that reason, dispenses with the Georgia rule and addresses the merits of Wife’s contentions.
However, the rule in Georgia is not only well-settled, it is also one of long standing. At least as early as Coley v. Coley, 128 Ga. 654, 655-656 (1) (58 SE 205) (1907), this Court unanimously recognized that, in a divorce action, “[i]f a judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff, which she thinks too small, she may except and have the question tested, or she may suppress her dissatisfaction and collect *271the judgment. She can not do both. [Cit.]” As recently as Smith v. Smith, 281 Ga. 204, 207 (2), fn. 11 (636 SE2d 519) (2006), Justice Hines, writing for a unanimous Court, held “that a person who has accepted benefits under a divorce decree is estopped from seeking to set aside that decree without first returning the benefits. [Cit.]” When referring to the decisions which must be overruled to reach the merits of this appeal, the plurality opinion simply mentions on p. 268 “Curtis [v. Curtis, 255 Ga. 288 (336 SE2d 770) (1985)] and other cases____” In fact, over the nearly 100 years that separate the decision in Coley from the decision in Smith, this Court has repeatedly and consistently adhered to the rule that one, such as Wife, who accepts a benefit conferred by a divorce decree, cannot challenge the judgment in any respect unless and until those benefits have been returned. See White v. White, supra; Curtis v. Curtis, supra at 289; Guess v. Guess, 242 Ga. 786 (251 SE2d 528) (1979); Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, 241 Ga. 303, 304 (245 SE2d 278) (1978); Vickery v. Vickery, 237 Ga. 702 (229 SE2d 453) (1976); Sikes v. Sikes, 231 Ga. 105, 108 (200 SE2d 259) (1973); Booker v. Booker, 217 Ga. 342 (122 SE2d 86) (1961); Burnham v. Burnham, 215 Ga. 57, 58 (108 SE2d 706) (1959); Thompson v. Thompson, 203 Ga. 128 (2) (a), (b) (45 SE2d 632) (1947); Davis v. Davis, 191 Ga. 333 (a) (11 SE2d 884) (1940).
Thus, it is undisputed that adherence to the principle of stare decisis in this case would mandate a summary affirmance of the judgment on the ground that Wife, having accepted and retained benefits from the underlying divorce decree, cannot now attack it. See Wilkinson v. Wilkinson, supra.
“The application of the doctrine of stare decisis is essential to the performance of a well-ordered system of jurisprudence. In most instances, it is of more practical utility to have the law settled and to let it remain so, than to open it up to new constructions, as the personnel of the court may change, even though grave doubt may arise as to the correctness of the interpretation originally given to it. (Cits.)” [Cit.]
Etkind v. Suarez, 271 Ga. 352, 357 (5) (519 SE2d 210) (1999). The plurality does not present a convincing rationale to support its assertion that foreign authority is more persuasive than our own established rule. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
The only reason the plurality offers as authority for overruling a century-old line of cases is that divorce should be treated differently because the dissolution of a marriage involves unique and important issues. However, divorce has always been different for that reason, but until today that difference has never been recognized as a basis for permitting a former spouse to retain benefits awarded by a decree, *272while contemporaneously seeking the reversal of another portion of the judgment. “Having accepted the amount awarded by the judgment as alimony, [a former spouse] was estopped, while retaining it, from prosecuting [a] petition to set aside the decree of divorce as contained in the same judgment. [Cits.]” Thompson v. Thompson, supra. Compare Coley v. Coley, supra (no estoppel where accepted and retained award was for child, rather than spousal, support). The plurality does not cite any interest of an ex-spouse which has been compromised by our previous adherence to the principle of estoppel under the circumstances which exist here or any interest which might be advanced by a decision to dispense with it. Estoppel does not necessarily have an adverse financial effect, since, in Georgia, a former spouse can keep receiving any award of temporary alimony, the right to which
“ ‘continues in full force and effect until a final judgment in the case, until the termination of the litigation in all courts, and as long as the case is pending, including litigation in the Supreme Court. [Cits.] The judgment cannot be treated as final so long as either party has the right to have it reviewed by the Supreme Court. [Cit.]’ ”
McDonald v. McDonald, 234 Ga. 37, 39 (3) (214 SE2d 493) (1975). Thus, although any Georgia ex-spouse who appeals only a portion of a divorce decree must decline to accept and retain benefits awarded thereby, he or she can continue to receive any temporary alimony awarded until such time as the rights of both parties are finally resolved.
The plurality’s precipitous attempt at rejection of the well-established principle of estoppel is not only unnecessary to protect the right of a former spouse to pursue an appeal, that sea change in Georgia law would actually have a deleterious effect on the appellate process. Under our century-old rule, an ex-spouse who did not receive all that he or she sought in the divorce proceeding would be required to weigh the likelihood of success on appeal against his or her right to immediately receive the benefits conferred by the award. Under today’s plurality opinion, however, there would be no reason not to seek appellate review, because an ex-spouse could retain benefits and also file an application for discretionary appeal which, even if meritless, would be granted under our pilot project unless frivolous. Thus, the net effect of today’s decision, if it was controlling precedent for future cases, would be to delay the final resolution of divorce proceedings.
In that regard, however, our prior decisions cannot be overruled unless and until “a majority of this [C]ourt determines that stability *273must give way....” Hall v. Hopper, 234 Ga. 625, 632 (3) (216 SE2d 839) (1975). Insofar as today’s decision is concerned, only three Justices have concurred fully in its holding and one Justice has concurred in the judgment only. Under Rule 58 of this Court, a concurrence in judgment only signifies that a Justice does “not agree with all that is said in the opinion.” Accordingly, although today’s opinion purports to overrule the long-standing line of cases, it does not achieve that goal because only a plurality, not a majority, of this Court has determined that those cases must “give way.” Thus, the bench and bar should be apprised that Curtis and all of the other cases which apply estoppel under the circumstances of this case remain controlling authority for the present and that the holdings in those cases should be followed as accurate statements of the applicable law of Georgia.
Decided June 4, 2007
Reconsideration denied July 12, 2007.
Moss & Rothenberg, Robert A. Moss, for appellant.
Davis, Matthews & Quigley, Richard W. Schiffman, Jr., David N. Marple, for appellee.
Therefore, notwithstanding the plurality’s attempt to evade the principle of stare decisis, only the parties to this case will be impacted by today’s decision. However, the limited impact of the plurality’s holding is not justification for failing to apply the Georgia rule of estoppel here, just as it has been applied in similar cases for 100 years. The fact that other states may follow a different rule is not, in my opinion, a valid basis for dispensing with the principle of stare decisis and overruling a well-established and long-standing line of Georgia cases. So, in accordance with the settled law of this state, the judgment in this case should be affirmed based upon the principle of estoppel and, therefore, I dissent to the reversal of the judgment on the merits.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hines and Justice Melton join in this dissent.