Court Opinion

ID: 9795308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:25:41.009758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:24.635064
License: Public Domain

Justice W. JONES,
dissenting.
To the extent that the majority finds that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Dr. Honts’ testimony about photo lineups, video lineups and resulting identifications, I respectfully dissent. The district court’s error in failing to find Dr. Honts *252sufficiently qualified to testify on these matters constitutes reversible error. I have included in this dissent several crucial facts that the majority has omitted from then-opinion.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
The first composite sketches were created immediately following the June 2000 attack while Ms. LeBrane was still in the hospital and the first photo-spread was conducted in December of 2000. The photo-spread was prompted when the Las Vegas police contacted Canyon County with a person matching the description of the composite drawings for the female in the LeBrane attack. The second was conducted in January of 2002, when Jeremy Sanchez’ girlfriend at the time of the attack was considered a person of interest. Ms. LeBrane identified one person from each of the two photo-spreads, neither being Pearce. Repeatedly throughout the process, Ms. LeBrane requested a video lineup because she was concerned about body language and height specifically. On numerous occasions, during the photo-spreads and during her testimony at trial, she expressed concern about identifying a person without seeing their height (in comparison to her height) and without seeing their body language.8 Ms. LeBrane testified that she was adamant about seeing a video lineup after she made the second incorrect identification. Police officers did in fact make a video lineup at that time. However, no persons from the previous photo-spreads were in the video, and it is disputed whether Ms. LeBrane was told that a person of interest was in custody. Ms. LeBrane identified Pearce in her third identification, which was a video lineup, in April of 2002.9
A viewing of the video lineup shows that it consisted of six females. All six of the females are clothed in orange jumpsuits. Three of the six had their hair in a ponytail. Two of the six (including Pearce) had short hair. One of the women (number 6) had hair that was styled (hairspray and/or gel) and was the only one wearing visible make-up. Detective Miles testified that all of the women in the lineup were from the general female inmate population at the Canyon County Jail. The six all stood in a line against a white wall; height was not indicated on the wall. The only reference to height is a comparison amongst other persons in the video lineup. Next, each was individually instructed to say “give me the [expletive deleted] drugs; give me the [expletive deleted] money.” [Emphasis added]. After speaking the instructed phrase, the person was instructed to face each direction, allowing for two profile views and a back view. When Pearce’s individual turn came, the instructed phrase was switched to “give me the [expletive deleted] money; give me the [expletive deleted] drugs” and remained switched throughout the remainder of the lineup. [Emphasis added]. Pearce was the fourth person in the video lineup.
According to the presentence report, Sarah Kathleen Pearce (D.O.B. 11/01/1982) was seventeen years of age on the date of the attack. Pearce, at the time of the presentence report, was 5'6, weighing 130 pounds. She has red hair, brown eyes, and fair complexion. At the time of arrest, Pearce was 5'6, weighing 112 pounds. She is listed as a white female with red hair and brown eyes.
Ms. LeBrane has described the woman attacker as very pretty and attractive with freckles and light Hispanic skin tones. The woman’s height has varied from shorter than 5'1 to around 5'4 and her age varied from mid to late twenties. Other witnesses have described the woman as young with reddish-blond hair, blond hair with ash color, and brown hair. Her height has been described as 5'0-5'6 and she weighs around 110-120 pounds. Her age varies from teens to thirties. Some witnesses describe her as Hispanic specifically. All witnesses agree that *253she has brown eyes. In addition to Ms. LeBrane’s account and eyewitness identification, the State offered the following eyewitness testimony in the ease:
Keith Mower: Mr. Mower witnessed four individuals at a rest stop around 1:15 a.m. on June, 15, 2000. He described the group as strange, consisting of one woman and three men. The woman was unique because she appeared to be too young to be with the men. She was young, looked and dressed nice, wore tight jeans and a simple white shirt. The woman had reddish-blond hair, was around 5'5 and weighed between 110-120 pounds. He only saw her face when she turned and looked back before entering the restroom at the rest stop. Mr. Mower testified that he paid the most attention to the woman out of the four at the rest stop because she did not look like she belonged with the group and she walked really slowly to the bathroom. But on cross-examination he admits that he did not get as good of a look at the woman as the men because he was in the bathroom at the same time as the men. Mr. Mower testified that he did not have problems verbalizing the images in his head to the composite artist because the images were still fresh in his mind.
He admits that he could not view the woman’s face very well, but during the video line up realized that he could recognize her. Mr. Mower also identified a woman in a photo-spread conducted on November 28, 2000 (hot Pearce). He was told to pick the person that looks most like the woman at the rest stop. He chose a woman from the photos that looked most like the woman from the rest stop, but he “didn’t think that that was her. [It] ... was the one that looked the closest to her.” Mr. Mower identified Pearce at trial as the woman from the rest stop that night. He also identified a younger picture of her as the woman from the rest stop that night. Mr. Mower did note that Pearce was wearing her hair darker and styled differently than the woman at the rest stop. Several times before trial, Mr. Mower admitted to having seen pictures of Pearce on television.
Jeanene Waggoner: Ms. Waggoner testified that she was driving home around midnight on the night of the attack. While she was driving she saw a man standing in the middle of the road waving his arms. Ms. Waggoner spoke with the man and noticed that two other men and a woman were in the car. The woman had narrow shoulders, and was sitting in the front seat. The woman had blond hair with an ash color to it and it might have been a little golden; it was styled messy and spiked up. Ms. Waggoner did not identify Pearce as that woman. She was able to identify John and Kenneth Wurdemann, and Jeremy Sanchez from the video lineup.
Steve Rupert: Steve Rupert testified that he was working at a motel off the Caldwell exit on the night of the attack. A woman and man came in to rent a room around 3:30 am. They paid cash for the room in the amount of $38.55. Steve Rupert made a copy of the woman’s Washington State driver’s license. He described the woman as being in her late teens to early twenties. She was about 5'5 or 5'6 with brown hair. There were two more people waiting in the car. After leaving for the room, the woman and man returned, stating that the room was dirty, and asked for the return of the money and the copy of the driver’s license. Steve Rupert complied. Steve Rupert believes he has seen the woman before the morning of June 15 and that Pearce is the woman that he saw on June 15, 2000. On cross-examination he stated he had not seen the woman before' June 15, but had seen her later, in October or November of the same year. He created a composite sketch of the woman with a composite sketch artist. Steve Rupert also chose Pearce out of the video lineup.
Previously Steve Rupert had stated to the police and sketch artists that the woman was light-colored Hispanic, about five-feet tall and 110 pounds. Her age varied from mid-twenties to twenty-five to thirty. He has also described her hair as brown to red with dark brown eyes.
Joseph Rupert: Joseph works with his dad, Steve Rupert, at the motel in Caldwell. He was nineteen-years-old at the time of trial and was sixteen-years-old at the time of the attack. He saw the woman checking into the motel and described the woman as his age or a little older. He recognized the woman *254from a mutual friend (Susan Davis),10 but did not initially make a police report. Joseph chose Pearce on the video lineup.
He also testified that he and his dad moved to Caldwell in May and that he had seen Pearce before June 15, but doesn’t know when or where. Susan Davis, the alleged friend of Pearce, was hired by the motel in July or August. Joseph definitely believes that he saw Pearce with Susan Davis at some point.
The majority opinion fails to take sufficient note of evidence that Ms. LeBrane’s stolen credit card was used in Jordan Valley 30 minutes after Pearce was allegedly checking into the motel in Caldwell, which is inconsistent with the jury making a finding of guilt. Steve Rupert testified that the woman and man entered the motel around 3:30 a.m. on June 15, and a credit card statement shows that Ms. LeBrane’s credit card was used at 4:01 a.m. in Jordan Valley. Jordan Valley, Oregon is in the same time zone as Caldwell and is 60 miles away by Highway 95.11 A gas station attendant testified that the credit card was used by a Hispanic man in a maroon ear with one or two Hispanic men and a Hispanic woman passenger.
The Court of Appeals unanimously held that the exclusion of Dr. Honts’ testimony about police lineup techniques and resulting identifications was an abuse of discretion and therefore erroneous, but the court held any error was harmless. I agree with the Court of Appeals, that it was error to exclude the testimony, but firmly believe such error constitutes reversible error because of the importance of eyewitness identifications in this particular case.
II.
ANALYSIS
I disagree with the majority’s holding that the district court did not err when it failed to qualify Dr. Honts as an expert witness on lineup procedures. The crux of the prosecution’s ease against Pearce consists of eyewitness testimony that identified Pearce as the woman who committed the attack. Pearce’s entire defense rested on the contention that she was not the woman who committed the attack and that the identifications were made in error. Pearce offered testimony in an attempt to rebut the state’s evidence against her, but the trial court refused that testimony. Specifically, the trial court refused to qualify Dr. Honts as an expert to testify on standardized procedures developed to ensure maximum accuracy in conducting lineups. Although the trial court is generally the gatekeeper of admissibility of evidence, this Court should not sit idly by and allow a clear and blatant abuse of that authority. Without this testimony, Pearce was denied the opportunity to present evidence to refute the nucleus of the state’s evidence against her. I find that this denied Pearce the opportunity to a fair trial. I, therefore, respectfully dissent from the Majority’s opinion and find that the trial court abused its discretion. The trial court’s analysis suggests that an expert must be the best or most experienced in a field, which is clearly not required by the Idaho Rules of Evidence. Any shortcomings in Dr. Honts’ training, experience, knowledge or expertise go towards the weight of his testimony, rather than the admissibility. The district court committed reversible error when it failed to find that Dr. Honts surpassed the minimum hurdle required for expert qualification.
A.
The district court abused its discretion by refusing to qualify Dr. Honts as an expert witness to testify as to lineup procedures and any resulting effects on eyewitness identifications.
This Court will not overturn an erroneous lower court decision unless it affects a substantial right of the defendant. See I.C.R. *25552. An error is harmless if the- reviewing court determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result. State v. Gomez, 137 Idaho 671, 673, 52 P.3d 315, 317 (2002). If the error concerns omitted evidence, “the test for harmless error is whether there is a reasonable possibility that the lack of excluded evidence contributed to the verdict.” Gomez, 137 Idaho at 673, 52 P.3d at 317 (citations and internal quotations omitted). It is within the province of the jury to weigh conflicting evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses. State v. Crea, 119 Idaho 352, 353-54, 806 P.2d 445, 446-47 (1991) (citations omitted). A jury verdict will not be overturned on appeal unless clearly erroneous. Crea, 119 Idaho at 353-54, 806 P.2d at 446-47 (citations omitted)., The state bears the burden of proving that a crime has been committed, and that the party charged committed the crime. State v. Avelar, 124 Idaho 317, 320, 859 P.2d 353, 356 (Ct.App.1993) (citations omitted). “The identification of the accused is an issue of fact for the jury, and may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence.” Avelar, 124 Idaho at 320, 859 P.2d at 356.
“[Ajcademic training is not always a prerequisite to be qualified as an expert; practical experience or specialized knowledge may be sufficient.” State v. Eytchison, 136 Idaho 210, 213, 30 P.3d 988, 991 (CtApp.2001) (citing State v. Konechny, 134 Idaho 410, 414, 3 P.3d 535, 539 (Ct.App.2000)). Any weight given to the expert testimony is left to the jury. State v. Hopkins, 113 Idaho 679, 681, 747 P.2d 88, 90 (Ct.App.1987) (citing IHC Hosp., Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, 108 Idaho 136, 697 P.2d 1150 (1985)). A court may allow expert testimony regarding the factors that affect eyewitness memory and the ability of the witness to testify. 31A Am.Jur. 2d Expert and Opinion Evidence § 337 (2008). Most of the jurisdictions which have rejected expert testimony regarding eyewitness memory and identification have done so on the basis that it invades the province of the jury. Id. However, like all testimony, the jury is free to accept or reject and assign weight to the testimony based on the witness’ credibility. Id. Traditionally, this Court has found that the reliability of eyewitness testimony is not outside the understanding of the average juror, and therefore, would not warrant -expert testimony. State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 420, 776 P.2d 424, 429 (1989). In Bingham this Court found that although the reliability of eyewitness testimony is not typically outside the understanding of the average juror, there may be a circumstance where the average juror is not equipped to understand the reliability of eyewitness testimony without the use of an expert. Bingham, 116 Idaho at 420-21, 776 P.2d at 430 (holding that it is not outside the understanding of the average juror to recognize the ability of a mentally retarded twelve-year-nld to correctly perceive and report events).
In Hopkins, the court of appeals found that the refusal of the magistrate court to qualify the defendant’s expert “deprived [the defendant] of the opportunity to present testimony challenging the scientific hypothesis and physical theories of [the State’s evidence].” Hopkins, 113 Idaho at 681, 747 P.2d at 90. Additionally, the failure to qualify Hopkins’ expert left him unable to present evidence as to the reliability of the particular procedures used by the State to gather evidence (in this instance, the reliability of the specific breathalyzer machine).12 Id. Ultimately, the court found that without the opportunity to testify as to the reliability of how the State gathered evidence, the court was left with a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same result had the error not occurred. Id. That is, without the ability to challenge the state’s primary evidence against him through expert testimony (the breathalyzer test), the court was left with a reasonable doubt that the jury had *256enough evidence to continue to support the verdict.
In the present case, Pearce offered Dr. Charles Honts as an expert witness to testify on the inherent dangers of eyewitness testimony, standardized procedures for conducting lineups and resulting effects on identifications if such procedures are not followed. The defense laid the following foundation for Dr. Honts’ testimony: (1) Dr. Honts is a full-time professor of psychology at Boise State University; (2) he received a Bachelor of Science in psychology, a Master of Science in experimental psychology, and a Ph.D. in experimental psychology; (3) Dr. Honts’ courses consist of Psychology and Law13, Research Methods, Theory Personality, Introduction to Psychology, Statistics, Industrial Psychology and Physiological Psychology; (4) Dr. Honts supervises student research projects; (5) most of Dr. Honts’ research is conducted on credibility assessments (polygraph tests and ways of determining if people are telling the truth). He has also researched jury behavior, human memory, susceptibility of eyewitnesses to post-event suggestion, creation of false memories, basic statistical issues, statement analysis (methods for looking at a person’s statement) and child witnesses; (6) he regularly attends meetings for American Psychology-Law Society, where a popular and frequent topic is eyewitness behavior and conduct of lineups; (7) Dr. Honts keeps current on lineups and eyewitness behavior as part of his professorial duties; however, Dr. Honts has never personally questioned a witness or conducted a lineup; (8) he has supervised one dissertation on suggestibility of eyewitnesses and one dissertation on the creation of false memory; (9) Dr. Honts testified that he is familiar with the topics of weapons-focus phenomenon,14 the forgetting curve,15 the phenomenon of unconscious transference,16 the tendency to assimilate post-event information,17 and the feedback factor;18 (10) Dr. Honts has read and familiarized himself with two articles at the request of defense counsel, addressing basic principles of lineups and accuracy, addressing controversial areas and widely accepted areas, and lineup procedures and recommended procedures for conducting accurate lineups (based on scientific research); (11) he has read the sections addressing lineups and photo-spreads of the Eyewitness Evidence Guide, a Guide For Law Enforcement, which is published by the United States Department of Justice; and (12) finally, Dr. Honts has viewed the photo-spread and video lineup used in this case and is able to discuss quality in relation to suggested procedures, without addressing any individual lineups.
The district court ruled that Dr. Honts’ testimony would be partially excluded. The court allowed Dr. Honts to testify regarding the characteristics, changes and storage of memory, but suppressed any testimony regarding lineups and eyewitness identification. During the hearing on the motion, defense counsel for Pearce, in arguing for Dr. Honts as a witness, stated that Dr. Honts would be “an expert [to] testify as to the fallacies [in lineups] and the explanation. Now [Dr. Honts is] not going to get into each individual identification and the background. That, the jury can decide.” It is clear from counsel’s statements that the defense clearly understood the line between permissible expert testimony which would aid the average juror’s understanding, and impermissible expert testimony that would invade the province of the jury’s fact-finding ability. Counsel never intended for Dr. *257Honts to testify as to the accuracy of the individual identifications.
The lower court’s decision expressly stated that this Court has traditionally ruled that expert testimony on the reliability of eyewitness testimony is not admissible because it invades the province of the jury in determining the credibility of witnesses. Although that statement may be true if an expert is proffered to vouch for or refute the accuracy of a particular identification, I find that it was an abuse of the district court’s discretion when it excluded Dr. Honts’ testimony as it relates to accepted procedures for eyewitness identification, whether the lineups in this case comport with those procedures, and any scientific data which may affect the result of eyewitness identification when, the procedures are not followed.
A lower court does not abuse its discretion if (1) the court recognizes the issue as one of discretion, (2) the court acts within the bounds of that discretion and applies the appropriate legal standards, and (3) the court exercises reason in reaching the decision. State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 819, 965 P.2d 174, 179 (1998) (citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991)). Here, the district court recognized the decision as one of discretion. However, the court did not apply the appropriate legal standards within the bounds of that discretion. The lower court’s decision found that Dr. Honts was not qualified to testify on standardized procedures for lineups and eyewitness identifications because (1) Dr. Honts had never participated in a lineup; (2) Dr. Honts had not spoken with the witnesses who participated in the photo-spreads and lineups; (3) Dr. Honts had not viewed all of the composite sketches; (4) Dr. Honts had only viewed the video lineups three days ago; and (5) Dr. Honts had never testified as an expert on standardized lineup procedures. I believe that the failure to qualify Dr. Honts on the preceding grounds was an abuse of the district court’s discretion.
The entire decision of the lower court, although citing the rules of evidence, relied heavily on previous decisions of this Court, most of which found that the particular trial court had not abused its discretion. The bounds of discretion authorize a lower court to reach a decision based on the merits of the individual ease presently in front of the court. Specific academic training in a particular field has never been required to qualify an expert. “Idaho has interpreted the five qualification areas as disjunctive, holding that academic training is not always necessary and that practical experience or special knowledge or training in a related field ... might suffice.” Hopkins, 113 Idaho at 681, 747 P.2d at 90(emphasis added) (citing IHC Hosp., Inc. v. Board of Commissioners, 108 Idaho 136, 697 P.2d 1150 (1985); IDAHO EVIDENCE COMMITTEE REPORT TO THE IDAHO STATE BAR, C 702 at 2-3 (1984)). Dr. Honts may not have been the best expert to testify on this matter, but the rules do not require an expert to be the best witness in that particular field. The rales of evidence establish a floor of who qualifies as an expert, not a ceiling. They require the expert to have “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” and that the expert is qualified to testify by “knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education.” I.R.E. 702 (emphasis added).
Here, it is clear that Dr. Honts has attended numerous seminars relating to eyewitness identification and is well-read on the subject. The majority states that “[t]he record reveals sufficient evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that Dr. Honts lacked academic or practical experience specific to the area of lineup procedures.” However, the rules of evidence do not limit an expert’s “scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge” to persons with “academic or practical experience.” Dr. Honts’ training and research in the area, especially in light of his educational background and experience, sufficiently qualify him to testify on lineup procedures and resulting identifications. The district court’s emphasis on Dr. Honts failure to interview all eyewitnesses and to view all composite sketches is also analytically flawed. Dr. Honts’ lack of ease-specific knowledge is largely irrelevant. Expert testimony on general lineup procedures does not require case-specific knowledge. For example, in Hopkins, it was held that direct expe*258rience with a particular breathalyzer machine goes to the weight of the testimony, rather than the admissibility. Hopkins, 113 Idaho at 681, 747 P.2d at 90. However, Dr. Honts had gathered the information necessary to determine whether the correct lineup procedures were used during the video lineup. Therefore, requiring Dr. Honts to view .the composite sketches prior to testifying on the video lineup seems unnecessary due to their unrelated nature. As stated in Hopkins, any lack of case specific knowledge would go towards the weight the jury assigns the testimony, rather than the admissibility. Id.
I find that Dr. Honts is qualified, through his research, training and experience, to testify on (1) standardized and accepted modes of lineups; (2) whether, in Dr. Honts’ opinion, the procedures employed in this case conformed with the standardized procedures and accepted modes of lineups, and if not, why not; (3) any studies which show that the accuracy in eyewitness identification is decreased when the accepted lineup procedures are not used; and (4) the aspects of memory and how different environmental stimulus may affect the retention of memory and perception.19
The failure of the trial court to qualify Dr. Honts as a witness was a clear abuse of discretion. The district court misconstrued previous decisions of this Court and incorrectly applied the standard of law. Direct and in-depth research of the immediate case is not required to testify on general procedures and whether they were employed in this specific instance. Further, the fact that Dr. Honts has never testified as an expert on this particular matter is of virtually no significance. At most this means that Dr. Honts has not made a career out of providing expert testimony; in other words, he is not a professional witness for hire. Additionally, few cases warrant expert testimony on lineup procedures, and as stated previously, courts typically find that expert testimony on witness perception invades the province of the jury. Unless a case falls into extraordinarily narrow circumstances, such as this case, it would seem that very few experts may have the opportunity to testify on lineup procedures.
However, I do not disagree with the district court’s exclusion of expert testimony regarding whether Pearce was or was not the woman involved in the attack on Ms. LeBrane. Any testimony by an expert which states whether any particular eyewitness identification is in fact correct or incorrect invades the province of the jury. The district court correctly found that any statements regarding the witness’ credibility would invade the province of the jury. If Dr. Honts, in his testimony, stated whether a person was, in his opinion, speaking truthfully, then the province of the jury would be invaded. However, testimony that relates to the proper procedures to conduct an accurate lineup, whether or not those procedures were employed in this instance and the potential effects of non-compliance does not invade the province of the jury.
The present issue is whether Pearce was afforded a fair opportunity to present a defense in this case. Without the ability to present expert testimony which may help a jury assign weight towards the state’s case against her, she was deprived of the opportunity to present her case fully and fairly. A fair trial requires a fair lineup, and in instances such as the present case where “fair” would be a far stretch from reality, a defendant should be afforded the chance to present' to the jury, through expert testimony, how and why eyewitness identifications may be flawed. However, it remains within the province of the jury to assign weight to that evidence and under no circumstance should expert testimony be allowed to express a direct opinion on whether a particular witness is credible. Additionally, expert testimony on eyewitness identification should only be available in the most extreme cases. Regardless if a witness is qualified as an expert, a trial court is free to limit testimony in an instance where the information will not help the jury understand or determine a fact *259in issue. See generally Bingham, 116 Idaho at 421, 776 P.2d at 430.
I further find that any such error was reversible error. In this case the issue of eyewitness identification was crucial because there was very little other evidence connecting Pearce to the crime. In fact, there appears to be direct evidence inconsistent with a finding of guilt.20 The state bore the burden of proving every fact beyond a reasonable doubt, including that a crime was committed and that the defendant committed that crime. Avelar, 124 Idaho at 320, 859 P.2d at 356. The Court of Appeals found that the exclusion of Dr. Honts’ testimony was harmless error because “[f]rom a scientific standpoint, the generic concerns in regard to lineups and subsequent identifications were sufficiently covered by other testimony offered by Dr. Honts and other witnesses.” Although I fully support the Court of Appeals conclusion that the exclusion of Dr. Honts’ testimony was error, I cannot support a finding that the error was harmless. Under the unique circumstances of the present case, in which there is a paucity of incriminating evidence other than the eyewitness identifications, and substantial exculpatory evidence, some of which the jury never heard, it is simply impossible for me to find that it was harmless error to exclude the testimony of Dr. Honts.
Several of the witnesses addressed memory and how people perceive, how people forget, and any external factors that would have an effect on perception. The investigating officers also testified to the lineup and photo-spread procedures they specifically used, and that there were no instructions or standardized program for conducting procedures which were available to them. However, no witness testified regarding the correct procedures, whether correct procedures were used in this instance and how incorrect procedures may affect the ultimate outcome of the eyewitness identification. An offer of proof was made of Dr. Honts’ excluded testimony on temporary remand from the Court of Appeals. Dr. Honts testified that the Department of Justice has released a publication on eyewitness procedures which contains four standards for conducting eyewitness identification through photo-spreads and lineups. Those principles specify that, (1) the lineup should be double-blind;21 (2) the witness should not have knowledge of whether a person of interest is in the lineup; (3) persons in the lineup should match the description given by the witness; and (4) a statement of confidence should be made and recorded. Dr. Honts then walked through different identifications and confirmed that the four principles were not followed, and further, how the failure to follow the principles may have influenced the witness in his or her choice.
For example, the video lineup was conducted by Sergeant Miles, who knew that Pearce was the person of interest and that she was in custody, so it violated the first principle because it was not double-blind. If the lineup is not double-blind, the interviewer may subconsciously guide a witness to the “correct” choice. That is, through body language or subtle clues, the witness may choose the answer that the interviewer seeks.22 Additionally, the second principle was violated when Ms. LeBrane was not given a warning *260that the person of interest may not be in the video lineup and it is disputed whether she was told to choose the person who looks most like her attacker. When a witness is told to make a relative judgment, the witness no longer recalls the memory of the attacker, but makes a comparative judgment of which person in the lineup most closely matches the attacker, rather than choosing the correct person from their memory. Dr. Honts further stated that the third principle was violated because of the discrepancy in hair length23 and that there was no reference to height. Because Ms. LeBrane’s initial descriptions of the female attacker focused on the hair and height, all the lineups should have been conducted based on that description and included a reference to height. Dr. Honts further testified that by making the reference to height only relative to other persons in the lineup, none of whom had an expressed height, it might lead the witness to believe that all the persons are 5'1 or shorter. Therefore, any reference to comparative height in the lineup is actually flawed, if all the suspects are actually around 5'6.24 Ms. LeBrane, without a reference to height, could have been led to believe that she was viewing women 5'1 or shorter, and among that group, Pearce stood about 5'1 or shorter, when in reality Pearce is 5'6. And finally, Dr. Honts stated that the fourth principle was violated because no statement was made or recorded of Ms. LeBrane’s confidence in her choice. This principle is important because a person has a tendency to become more confident in their choice as time progresses. Therefore, any resulting identifications at trial will be overly confident in comparison to the initial identification. Taking into account the testimony by Dr. Honts during his offer of proof, I can definitively say that I am left with more than a reasonable doubt that the exclusion of Dr. Honts’ testimony contributed to the jury’s verdict.
The overwhelming majority of the state’s evidence consisted of eyewitness testimony as to whether Pearce was the woman involved in the attack. Although the jury had the benefit of Dr. Honts’ testimony in regard to memory and perception, there is no bridge to mend the proverbial gap of how a flawed memory will effect a resulting identification. This jump is deceptive because it is seemingly logical. Although it is intuitive that a flawed memory may create a flawed identification, it is not intuitive that a flawed lineup will consistently produce flawed results. As stated by Pearce’s counsel in oral arguments, the repetition factor weighs heavily in this case. The jury hears from four people that Pearce is the alleged perpetrator, but most of the memories created were likely flawed.25 Therefore, the jury hears that a flawed memory is created, but also hears that four people have identified Pearce. What the jury doesn’t hear is that a flawed lineup will consistently produce flawed results, regardless if the identifier has any knowledge of the crime. To the jury the repetition factor may reduce the significance of any flawed memories. However, if the flaw is in the underlying process for identification, the flaw is superimposed on any subsequent identification. A flawed lineup will cause a person with no memory or knowledge of the underlying crime to be able to correctly identify the person of interest. It is that information of which the jury was deprived. Without such information, I am left with a substantial doubt that the jury would have reached the same conclusion.
I am unable to say beyond a reasonable doubt that the exclusion of Dr. Honts’ testimony did not affect the verdict. In fact, I strongly believe that it did affect the verdict. This error was not harmless. Without such testimony, Pearce was denied the ability to present scientific evidence which rebutted the majority of the state’s evidence against her, constituting reversible error.
*261hi.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse Pearce’s conviction and remand to the district court for a new trial.

. "I judge the height by how tall people were standing by me.” Ms. LeBrane is 5'1 or shorter.

. Two video lineups of female suspects were created. However, only one was ever shown to the witnesses because the detectives had begun to focus the investigation on Pearce (rather than an earlier suspect).

. It is unclear from Joseph’s testimony whether he recognized Pearce on the night of the attack as a person he knew, or whether he recognized the woman from the night of the attack and later made the connection to Pearce as that same woman.

. Highway 95 is mostly a two lane road through mountainous terrain.

. I do not cite Hopkins because the reliability of eyewitness identification is as far outside the understanding of the average juror as the workings of a breathalyzer machine, but because I find Hopkins helpful on two relevant points. First, the court expressly states that hands-on experience with the specific breathalyzer machine is not necessary to be qualified as an expert on breathalyzers, and second because the court notes that the expert testimony was the defendant's only means to challenge the gravamen of the state’s evidence.

. This course examines the legal profession and forensics in general, insanity and how insanity and competency to stand trial are assessed, how lineups, interviews, and polygraph tests are' conducted, assessment of child witnesses and jury behavior.

. Where a weapon interferes with a person's ability to observe

. Period of time between observance and identification

. Condition where information from one situation will be attributed to another

. Interactions that may create new information into the memory

. Where two or more witnesses discuss observations

. Dr. Honts' was previously qualified and allowed by the trial court to testify on the aspects of memory. I do not mean to limit Dr. Honts’ testimony from the previous trial, but to state that the trial court correctly found that Dr. Honts was qualified to testify on those matters.

.For as much time as I have spent on this case, I have yet to find a reconcilable answer to Steve and Joseph Rupert's identification of Pearce and the use of Ms. LeBrane's credit card in Jordan Valley, Oregon less than 30 minutes later. Further, on a post trial Motion for New Trial, facts were presented to the trial court (but not to the jury) regarding one of the previous suspects who had been identified through a photo-spread by Ms. LeBrane as the female attacker. The other suspect had been identified by a third party as visiting his home with Jeremy Sanchez and the Wurdenmann brothers in the early morning hours on the night of the attack. The third party filed a statement with Pearce's lawyer that Mr. Sanchez and the female suspect used a hose to wash blood off of them and they stated that they were going to California that night, which would take them through Jordan Valley, Oregon.

. That is, the person conducting the lineup does not know who the suspect is in the lineup or whether any of the persons in the lineup are suspects.

. Recall that the statement switched’ during the video lineup at Pearce's turn from drugs/money to money/drugs. It is absolutely undeterminable whether this switch was a subconscious subtle clue resulting from the violation of principle one, but it is a prime example of the importance of the principles.

. Recall that four of the six women had long hair in ponytails, and Pearce was one of two women with short hair.

. It is assumed that because in the video lineup Pearce was of average height comparatively, that all the other people were about the same height as Pearce, which is 5'6.

.During the trial, Dr. Honts was qualified and permitted to testify on the process of memory creation and depletion, and how different factors will contribute to the creation of a false memory.