Court Opinion

ID: 9707109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:02:37.277033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:28.192218
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McDADE, dissenting: The majority has reversed the jury’s award in the present case and has remanded for a new trial. The foundation for this decision is a finding that plaintiff, John Paul Troyan, was deprived of a fair trial because the circuit court of Will County (1) allowed the admission of plaintiffs medical records pursuant to the business records exception to the hearsay rule, but required that certain opinions and conclusions be redacted prior to publication to the jury, and (2) erred in refusing to deem certain facts admitted because of the improper nature of defendant’s responses to four of plaintiffs requests to admit. For the reasons that follow, I dissent from both of these conclusions. Admission of Opinions Through Business Records Exception In making its decision to redact medical opinions and conclusions from plaintiffs medical records before they were circulated to the jury, the circuit court, in a proper exercise of its discretion, acted in full accord with decades of precedent concerning the Illinois Supreme Court’s discovery rules which establish, inter alia, the ground rules for the admission of expert and opinion testimony. In reversing, the majority discounts all of that jurisprudence to render a decision “in accord with a large and growing national trend” of the federal courts and those of 35 other states. 367 Ill. App. 3d at 735. The business records exception to the hearsay rule is set out in Supreme Court Rule 236 as follows: “Any writing or record, whether in the form of any entry in a book or otherwise, made as a memorandum or record of any act, transaction, occurrence, or event, shall be admissible as evidence of the act, transaction, occurrence, or event if made in the regular course of any business, and if it was the regular course of the business to make such a memorandum or record at the time of such an act, transaction, occurrence, or event or within a reasonable time thereafter.” (Emphasis added.) 145 Ill. 2d R. 236(a). The legislative purpose of Rule 236 was to make the production of the original entrant unnecessary because of the routine character of the business entries themselves. Benford v. Chicago Transit Authority, 9 Ill. App. 3d 875, 878, 293 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1973). Application of the rule requires the court to determine whether documents tendered for admission can be properly admitted as business records despite the fact that they are otherwise inadmissible hearsay. The result of a favorable evaluation is that the records are admitted because they document routine matters that are kept in the normal course of business and can be presumed accurate. Under the business records exception, we would accept that the records at issue in the present case, and the statements of opinion included in them, have been adequately and appropriately preserved. It should be noted that the trial judge in the present case admitted all portions of the records that established the fact of the act, transaction, occurrence or event of plaintiffs consultation with and treatment by his medical treaters as set out in Rule 236, and permitted them to be published to the jury. What he did not allow was dissemination of the medical opinions, diagnoses and statements of causation that were included in those records. Although we would accept that the conclusions of Dr. Hiroshi Eguro and physical therapist Marge Taylor are accurately reflected in those records, they do not fit within the policy of Rule 236. They are not routine; they do not simply document an occurrence, but are instead reflections of conclusions distinctively associated with the original entrant. To allow the introduction of such substantive opinion evidence with only the minimal testimony of a custodian would be an unwarranted and illogical extension of the rule and its stated purpose. In addition, it would not only preclude examination of the qualifications of the “experts” to formulate the opinions but also examination of the analysis or procedures resulting in the conclusions noted in the record. Accordingly such opinions and conclusions should — indeed must — be treated differently. Accurate reflection of opinions and conclusions in the business records is not the issue in this case. The fundamental issue is the reliability of the substance of the included medical conclusions which necessarily requires consideration of the opportunity to test that substance through discovery and cross-examination. We have to ask whether the purposes of discovery — to enhance the true function of the trial as a means of ascertaining truth and to provide methods for prompt and just disposition of litigation (Stimpert v. Abdnour, 24 Ill. 2d 26, 179 N.E.2d 602 (1962)); to effectuate the prompt and just disposition of litigation by educating the parties in advance of trial as to the real value of their claims and defenses (People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231, 145 N.E.2d 588 (1957)); to enable attorneys to better prepare and evaluate their cases (Biehler v. White Rolling Metal & Stamping Corp., 30 Ill. App. 3d 435, 333 N.E.2d 716 (1975)) — have been adequately fulfilled. And, if not, whether the “expert” advancing the diagnosis or conclusion will be made available for cross-examination at trial. In the present case, plaintiff has attempted to tender the “expert, opinion testimony” of Dr. Eguro and therapist Taylor through the admission of medical records. Because Dr. Eguro is dead and Ms. Taylor is missing, defendant Dana Reyes (1) cannot serve the interrogatories authorized by Rule 213(f) (210 Ill. 2d R. 213(f)) to elicit the exact nature of their conclusions “and the bases therefor”-, (2) cannot take the depositions allowed by Rules 201 (210 Ill. 2d R. 201); 202 (166 Ill. 2d R. 202); and 210 (134 Ill. 2d R. 210) to further flesh out, test and challenge the opinions and the bases for them; (3) cannot, because of the absence of information that could be discerned or firmed up through interrogatories, depositions, and other forms of discovery, adequately select, brief, and utilize an expert of her own; (4) cannot request and secure admissions of fact relevant to the bases for those opinions as allowed by Rule 216 (134 Ill. 2d R. 216); and (5) cannot cross-examine either witness in deposition or at trial to test or challenge their opinions and conclusions. Thus the real question facing the trial court (and this appellate panel) in this case is not whether the business records accurately reflect the challenged opinions and conclusions but rather whether there has been a fair opportunity for the opposing party to discover the exact nature of and bases for the conclusions and to submit them for evaluation by another expert. It is the duty and responsibility of the trial court to ensure the integrity of the litigation. To that end, the trial judge is vested with, among other powers, the discretion to oversee and require compliance with the rules and purposes of discovery, to impose sanctions for noncompliance and to determine, in light of those rules, what evidence can be properly and fairly admitted at trial. See generally (210 Ill. 2d Rs. 201, 213, 219). In making those decisions, the test for the trial courts is reliability, not mere reporting accuracy. In Decker v. Libell, 193 Ill. 2d 250, 737 N.E.2d 623 (2000), the supreme court stated: “Trial courts routinely bar evidence because it is irrelevant or unreliable, and we see no reason to apply a different rule in this context [whether the age of prognosis affects admissibility]. Under this approach, the trial judge serves in a familiar role as ‘gatekeeper,’ barring testimony that is not sufficiently relevant or reliable to be admitted into evidence.” Decker v. Libell, 193 Ill. 2d at 254. In so finding, the court said, “[w]e believe the better view, however, is represented by the cases that first consider whether the testimony or evidence is admissible and, if it is, then permit the trier of fact to determine what weight to assign to it.” Decker v. Libell, 193 Ill. 2d at 253-54. The court then referred with approval to the approach followed in Soto v. Gaytan, 313 Ill. App. 3d 137, 728 N.E.2d 1126 (2000), among others. In Soto the appellate court examined case law concerning the admissibility of an expert’s testimony, particularly that by medical treaters, and noted that “as the gatekeeper of expert opinions disseminated to the jury, the trial court plays a critical role in excluding testimony that does not bear an adequate foundation of reliability.” (Emphasis added.) Soto, 313 Ill. App. 3d at 147. Reliability of an opinion derives not from the fact that it was accurately retained in a business record but rather from whether its substance and foundation have been or can be subjected to the truth-seeking processes of our adversarial system and is thus appropriate for submission to the jury. La Salle National Bank v. Malik, 302 Ill. App. 3d 236, 241, 705 N.E.2d 938, 942 (1999) (holding that only through cross-examination can the reliability or sufficiency of an expert’s opinion be established so that the trier of fact can then determine the weight to accord the expert’s opinion). That, in my opinion, is the difference between admission under the business records exception and admission under the standards of reliability that are implemented by discovery and by cross-examination at trial. The trial judge in the instant case admitted the medical records. However, consistent with his judicial obligations, he also recognized that the medical opinions and conclusions that could not be subjected to the discovery processes or to cross-examination were unreliable and inadmissible and he required them to be redacted from plaintiffs medical records prior to their publication to the jury. It seems abundantly clear to me that he acted properly, responsibly and consistently with long-standing Illinois law in so doing. His decision on this issue was a proper exercise of discretion and should be affirmed. I, therefore, dissent from the majority’s contrary opinion. Responses to Requests to Admit Plaintiff has also challenged the decision of the trial judge not to deem certain facts admitted, claiming that defendant’s responses to four of his Rule 216 Requests to Admit were improper and insufficient. The majority agrees and reverses the trial court on this issue as well. Plaintiffs requests to admit are as follows: “4. That as a result of the collision, Plaintiff suffered $4,052.38 in medical bills that were reasonable and customary charges related to plaintiff’s injuries. 5. That as a result of the collision, Plaintiff suffered a traumatic cervical strain. 6. That the medical records of St. Joseph Medical Center, MedRehab of Illinois, and Hiroshi Eguro, M.D., were kept in the ordinary course of business at each medical facility. 8. That as a result of the collision, plaintiff suffered a permanent injury to his cervical spine.” (Emphasis added.) Defendant’s response to plaintiffs request to admit are as follows: “4. Objection. Request to admit number 4 requests that the defendant, Dana C. Reyes admit to an opinion. Also, request to admit number 4 requests that the defendant admit or deny information to which the defendant, Dana C. Reyes has no personal knowledge or information. Further, this request pertains to matters protected by the physician/patient privilege. Therefore, the defendant Dana C. Reyes, is unable upon reasonable inquiry to admit or deny the facts set forth in request to admit or deny number 4. 5. Objection. Request to admit number 5 requests that the defendant, Dana C. Reyes admit to an opinion. Also, request to admit number 5 requests that the defendant admit or deny information to which the defendant, Dana C. Reyes has no personal knowledge or information. Further, this request pertains to matters protected by the physician/patient privilege. Therefore, the defendant Dana C. Reyes, is unable upon reasonable inquiry to admit or deny the facts set forth in request to admit or deny number 5. 6. Objection. Request to admit number 6 requests that the defendant, Dana C. Reyes admit to an opinion. Also, request to admit number 6 requests that the defendant admit or deny information to which the defendant, Dana C. Reyes has no personal knowledge or information. Further, this request pertains to matters protected by the physician/patient privilege. Therefore, the defendant Dana C. Reyes, is unable upon reasonable inquiry to admit or deny the facts set forth in request to admit or deny number 6. 8. Objection. Request to admit number 8 requests that the defendant, Dana C. Reyes admit to an opinion. Also, request to admit number 8 requests that the defendant admit or deny information to which the defendant, Dana C. Reyes has no personal knowledge or information. Further, this request pertains to matters protected by the physician/patient privilege. Therefore, the defendant Dana C. Reyes, is unable upon reasonable inquiry to admit or deny the facts set forth in request to admit or deny number 8.” The holding in Szczeblewski v. Gossett, 342 Ill. App. 3d 344, 349 (2003), on which both plaintiff and the majority rely, involves the examination of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 216, in light of a plaintiffs requests to admit. Szczeblewski questioned on appeal whether a Rule 216 request to admit could be used to establish the causal connection between a defendant’s conduct and a plaintiffs injuries, the necessity and reasonableness of the medical services received by plaintiff, and the reasonableness of the cost of the medical services received by plaintiff. The court found that all three requests dealt with facts that were proper subjects for a Rule 216 request to admit. Szczeblewski, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 348. The court also noted that “ ‘[a]n answering party may not give lack of information or knowledge as a reason for failure to admit or deny unless the party states that the party has made reasonable inquiry and that information known or readily obtainable by the party is insufficient to enable the party to admit or deny.’ ” Szczeblewski, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 349, quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a). Plaintiffs claim in the instant case that defendant should have been required to respond to his requests is misleading because defendant did, in fact, answer the requests. Indeed, defendant’s response closely parallels the language laid out by the Szczeblewski court. Her final answer to each of the requests is: “Therefore, the defendant Dana C. Reyes, is unable upon reasonable inquiry to admit or deny the facts set forth in request to admit or deny number 4[, 5, 6, 8].” The mere fact that defendant’s answers contained the word “objection” does not negate the fact that she provided sufficient answers to plaintiffs requests. In fact, under Szczeblewski, defendant could not have answered plaintiffs requests more thoroughly. She said that plaintiff was seeking an opinion, that she had no personal knowledge that would permit her to render the opinion, that the requests pertained to matters covered by the doctor/patient privilege, and that she could not answer upon reasonable inquiry. The majority cites section 8 — 802 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/8 — 802(4) (West 2002)), which provides in pertinent part: “No physician or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any information he or she may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character, necessary to enable him or her professionally to serve the patient, except only *** (4) in all actions brought by or against the patient *** wherein the patient’s physical or mental condition is an issue ***.” All that section does is remove the legal barrier against any disclosure and allow the physician to give information under certain circumstances. It does not give a party to a lawsuit the right to simply call up the doctor (or therapist) and demand medical information about the opposing party. The disclosure of such information is gird with complex rules and regulations overseen and enforced by the courts pursuant to the rules of discovery. As the court observed in Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. App. 3d 581, 499 N.E.2d 952 (1986): “The patient’s implicit consent, however, is obviously and necessarily limited; he consents only to the release of his medical information (relative to the lawsuit) pursuant to the methods of discovery authorized by Supreme Court Rule 201(a) [citation], A patient certainly does not, by simply filing suit, consent to his physician discussing the patient’s medical confidences with third parties outside court-authorized discovery methods, nor does he consent to his physician discussing the patient’s confidences in an ex parte conference with the patient’s legal adversary.” (Emphasis omitted.) Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 591, 499 N.E.2d at 959. “Thus, when a patient files suit, the physician should be prepared to release those records relevant to the condition placed at issue, be available to give depositions, and be prepared to testify should he be called upon to do so. However, we also believe that the patient, because of the fiduciary relationship existing between him and his physician, should have the right to expect that his physician will provide the medical information sought by the patient’s adversary pursuant only to court authorized methods of discovery.” (Emphasis omitted.) Petrillo, 148 Ill. App. 3d at 595, 499 N.E.2d at 961. In order to provide more specific information or more definitive answers to the requests to admit — which must be filed in 28 days— defendant would have to engage in fairly extensive and time-sensitive discovery of plaintiff’s doctor and the administrative personnel of two — possibly three — medical facilities. She would probably also have to retain her own expert to examine the plaintiff, review the testimony of Dr. Eguro and the therapist before she could render the opinions sought in numbers 4, 5, and 8. It is highly unlikely that defendant could accomplish such a task within 28 days in light of the fact that Dr. Eguro was dead and the therapist was missing. The majority also seems to suggest that, since defendant had plaintiffs medical records, she was in a position to draw medical conclusions from them. It is not the nature of our justice system to require one party to accept the untested, unsubstantiated conclusions from an opponent and adopt them without question as his or her own. See Tsoukas v. Lapid, 315 Ill. App. 3d 372, 380, 733 N.E.2d 823, 830 (2000) (holding cross-examination is a matter of right which allows a defendant to discover what potentially relevant information plaintiffs expert may have failed to consider in reaching an opinion). The trial court has wide discretion concerning requests to admit. Turner Investors v. Pirkl, 338 Ill. App. 3d 676, 685 (2003). In its discretion, the trial court denied plaintiffs requests numbers 4, 5, 6 and 8. We should find the court did not abuse its discretion because defendant properly stated that she did not have the personal knowledge necessary to answer such requests, that the information she needs to answer further is subject to the physician/patient privilege, that she made reasonable inquiry to obtain such knowledge, and that she is unable to admit or deny. Implicit within her answers is “ ‘that the information known or readily obtainable by the party is insufficient to enable the party to admit or deny.’ ” Szczeblewski, 342 Ill. App. 3d at 349, quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a). This response conforms with legal requirements. Accordingly, I believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to deem plaintiffs requests 4, 5, 6 and 8 admitted and I dissent from the majority’s contrary determination on this issue. The Jury’s Verdict Was Not Against the Manifest Weight of the Evidence Because I believe the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring certain medical opinions be redacted prior to publication to the jury and in refusing to deem plaintiffs requests admitted, I now turn my attention to plaintiffs assertion that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. In the verdict returned by the jury, the plaintiff was awarded a total amount of $1,681.76. $359.92 of that award was for medical expenses. This represented the expenses for the plaintiffs visit to the emergency room on the day of the accident. Plaintiff claims that since the medical expenses introduced totaled $4,052.30 the amount awarded by the jury is against the manifest weight of the evidence. To be against the manifest weight of the evidence the verdict, when viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, must so overwhelmingly favor the movant that no contrary verdict would stand. State Farm Mutual Insurance Co. v. Ellison, 354 Ill. App. 3d 387, 389 (2004). After a review of the record, it is clear that the verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. At trial, the plaintiff testified that since the accident he continues to experience pain in his neck and headaches. Then upon cross-examination, plaintiff testified that the injury was resolved by April 1994, six months after the accident. Evidence was also brought in showing that plaintiff told the police officer who arrived at the scene of the accident that he was not injured and did not need an ambulance. Only later, did plaintiff drive to the hospital on his own. Based on this testimony, the jury had to decide whether the plaintiff was injured and whether the treatment received was causally related to the accident. It is plausible that after deliberating, the jury determined that the plaintiff was not injured to the extent claimed and that other than the emergency room visit the treatment received was not causally related to the accident. Thus, I would hold that the jury’s verdict was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and would therefore affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Will County. For all of the foregoing reasons, I cannot agree with any of the conclusions reached by the majority and, therefore, dissent from them.