Court Opinion

ID: 9636985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:51:35.974974+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:11.897850
License: Public Domain

RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
Section 443.130.2 provides for statutory penalty and must be strictly construed. A strict construction requires that courts “not engraft upon the statute provisions which do not appear in explicit words or by implication from other language in the statute.” State ex rel. Rogers v. Bd. of Police Commissioners of Kansas City, 995 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo.App.1999). Section 443.130.2 requires only that a mortgagor send a demand letter to the mortgagee by certified mail, return receipt requested. *461The only statutory requirements for the content of the demand letter are that it “include good and sufficient evidence that the debt secured by the deed of trust was satisfied with good funds” and that the mortgagor advance funds for “the expense of filing and recording the release.... ” Section 443.130.2. There are no other express or necessarily implied statutory requirements for the contents of the demand letter. “[N]o particular form of words is necessary for the demand; it is sufficient if it informs the mortgagee with reasonable certainty that an entry of satisfaction of the particular mortgage is requested.” Martin v. STM Mortgage Co., 903 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Mo.App.1995); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages, Section 474c (1949).
In this case, the Garrs’ demand letter complied with all statutory requirements for a valid demand letter and reasonably informed Countrywide that the plaintiffs were requesting a deed of release under section 443.130. The Garrs sent the demand letter via certified mail, return receipt requested. In the letter, the Garrs requested a deed of release because the debt was satisfied. As expressly required by the statute and referenced in the demand letter, they enclosed funds for the expense of filing and recording the deed of release. Nonetheless, the majority concludes that Countrywide, a large, sophisticated mortgage lender, had no notice that the Garrs were invoking the Missouri statute that enforces a mortgagee’s right to a deed of release upon satisfaction of the mortgage.
In support of its conclusion, the majority identifies three aspects of the demand letter that prevented Countrywide from being put on notice that the Garrs were invoking section 443.130. First, the majority argues that the demand letter is deficient because the plaintiffs requested an “immediate release” of the deed of trust rather than allowing Countrywide fifteen business days to respond. That the Garrs requested an “immediate release” is irrelevant. The only relevant factor is that they demanded a deed of release because the debt was satisfied. The fifteen-day time period in section 443.130.1 is nothing more than the time in which a mortgagee has to provide a deed of release pursuant to a demand letter. It does not constitute a necessary citation requirement for a valid demand letter. The statute does not, either explicitly or implicitly, require citation to the fifteen-day time limit in order for a demand letter to be effective.
Second, the majority argues that the plaintiffs demanded that Countrywide record the deed of release and, therefore, demanded an action not required by the statute. Even if this characterization of the demand letter is correct, requesting an action not required by the statute does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that Countrywide was unaware that the Garrs were requesting a release under section 443.130. The Garrs also advised Countrywide, as required by the section 443.130.2, that they had enclosed money for the expense of filing and recording the deed of release. I would not conclude that Countrywide was confused by the Garrs’ decision to enclose, as required by the statute, money for the filing and recording of the release.
Finally, the majority argues that the Garrs’ letter did not cite, reprint or otherwise reference section 443.110. No case has ever held that a section 443.130 demand letter is effective only if the statute is cited, reprinted or referenced. The statute itself imposes no such requirement. All that is required is that the mortgagee be put on notice, via a demand letter, that the mortgagor is requesting a deed of release. As explained above, the Garrs’ demand letter satisfied every statutory re*462quirement for a demand letter. Furthermore, banking corporations, as are other parties, are presumed to know the law. Round Prairie Bank of Fillmore v. Downey, 64 S.W.2d 701, 704 (Mo.App.1933); Deal v. Bank of Smithville, 52 S.W.2d 201, 205 (Mo.App.1932). Concluding that a sophisticated mortgage company is not on notice because a customer’s demand letter fails to cite or reprint a copy of the statute being invoked indulges an unreasonable assumption that institutional lenders are utterly unaware of their statutory obligations unless advised by their customers.
The demand letter is valid. It is undisputed that Countrywide failed to provide a deed of release within fifteen days. As stated in section 443.130.1 and found by the trial court, the Garrs are entitled absolutely to ten percent upon the amount of the security instrument. I would affirm.