Court Opinion

ID: 9476968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:10:21.306953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:36.881069
License: Public Domain

A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
When we first decided this appeal, on April 10, 1987,1 dissented from the majority’s reversal of the district court judgment upholding as constitutional the prison regulation that bars appellant Higgins from hand-carrying his rosary beads into the visiting area. Higgins v. Burroughs, 816 F.2d 119, 124-26 (3d Cir.) (“Higgins I”) (Higginbotham, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, — U.S.—, 108 S.Ct. 54, 98 L.Ed.2d 18 (1987). Given the Supreme Court’s decision and directive remanding the matter to this Court for further consideration in light of O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.—, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), I agree with the majority’s present decision to remand this matter to the district court for application of the Estate of Shabazz standard ab initio. Because the majority has gone further than necessary in deciding this appeal, however, I concur only in its judgment.
Developments since last April have vindicated one concern raised by my earlier dissenting opinion, the untimeliness of our initial decision. At that time, when our decision in Shabazz v. O’Lone, 782 F.2d 416 (3d Cir.1986) (in banc), rev’d, Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S.—, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), was being reviewed by the Supreme Court, I believed we acted precipitously when we decided this matter. Higgins I, 816 F.2d at 124 (Higginbotham, J., dissenting). Had we held this appeal for less than two months, we could have rendered in June the decision we render today.
I am unable to join the majority’s opinion this time around because it does more than remand this matter to the district court for additional factfinding and application of the Estate of Shabazz standard. The majority also offers, in passing, its “view” that “no difference in result w[ill] obtain” under the new legal standard. Maj. typescript at 5. It is just as likely, however, that the district court, once it applies with care the Estate of Shabazz standard, could justifiably differ with the majority’s assessment of the summary judgment record before us. Indeed, especially if the district court were to determine on remand that additional factfinding is required, we can have no basis for predicting now what such additional evidence would demonstrate. If we mean to remand this matter, we should do it without leaving our thumb on the district court’s scale. If we mean to decide the matter here and now, however, we should do so explicitly.
For the foregoing reason, I respectfully concur in the majority’s judgment.