Court Opinion

ID: 9367841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 22:03:45.110935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:03.933940
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

    TEAMSTERS LOCAL 677 HEALTH                    )
    SERVICES & INSURANCE PLAN,                    )
    individually and on behalf of all others      )
    similarly situated,                           )
                                                  )
                              Plaintiff,          )
                                                  )
                    v.                            ) C.A. No. 2021-1075-NAC
                                                  )
    FRANK D. MARTELL,                             )
                                                  )
                              Defendant.          )

                             MEMORANDUM OPINION

                           Date Submitted: October 25, 2022
                            Date Decided: January 31, 2023
                           Date Corrected: February 1, 2023 ∗

Stephen E. Jenkins, Tiffany Geyer Lydon, ASHBY & GEDDES, P.A., Wilmington,
Delaware; Donald J. Enright, Elizabeth K. Tripodi, Jordan A. Cafritz, LEVI &
KORSINSKY, LLP, Washington, D.C.; Gregory Nespole, LEVI & KORSINSKY,
LLP, New York, New York; Frank Shirripa, Daniel B. Rehns, HACH ROSE
SHIRRIPA & CHEVERIE LLP, New York, New York; Counsel for Plaintiff.

Robert S. Saunders, Cliff C. Gardner, Matthew P. Majarian, Ryan M. Lindsay,
Trevor T. Nielson, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP,
Wilmington, Delaware; Counsel for Defendant.

COOK, V.C.

∗
 This corrected version of the decision fixes certain formatting and typographical errors.
It does not make any substantive changes.
      Plaintiff is a former stockholder of CoreLogic, Inc. (the “Company”). In late

June 2020, two funds made an unsolicited joint proposal to acquire the Company.

The Company’s board of directors (the “Board”) rejected the proposal as

undervalued. After a proxy contest, the funds succeeded in electing three directors

to the Board.

      The public announcement of the funds’ acquisition proposal stirred significant

interest in the Company. So the Board initiated a months-long strategic alternatives

process. After many months of shopping the Company, the Board narrowed the field

of bidders to a financial buyer and a strategic buyer, CoStar Group, Inc. The

financial buyer proposed an all-cash transaction. CoStar proposed an all-stock

transaction. Both proposals were disclosed to stockholders in the Company’s proxy

statement (the “Proxy Statement”).

      Based on cash, antitrust, and closing considerations, the Board selected the

financial buyer. Then CoStar publicly submitted two post-signing, competing bids.

Both bids were disclosed in the Proxy Statement.

      CoStar’s stock offer was nominally more valuable than the cash offer. But

that nominal value was uncertain. CoStar’s proposals also raised antitrust concerns.

Regulatory scrutiny could have delayed a closing date by up to 15 months. All these

considerations were disclosed in the Proxy Statement.

                                         1
      CoStar’s competing bids were unresponsive to the Board’s regulatory and

closing concerns and did not provide enough cash to address volatility in CoStar’s

stock. Indeed, CoStar’s stock suffered a 19% price decline at the time CoStar

submitted the competing bids. Still, the Board believed that CoStar had the potential

to make a superior proposal. So the Board encouraged CoStar to improve its terms.

But CoStar walked.

      In June 2021, the financial buyer acquired the Company for $6 billion in cash

(the “Merger”). The Merger generated a 51% premium to the Company’s unaffected

stock price. The stockholders voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Merger.

      CoStar’s CEO, Andrew Florance, commented publicly on the Merger. In an

online article, Florance was paraphrased as stating that the Board chose the Merger

over a CoStar deal to entrench the Company’s management. In his own words,

Florance stated generically that, in strategic mergers, “inevitably some of [senior

management’s] jobs go away” and “[t]hat’s a powerful motive to not do a deal.”

      Plaintiff brought a books-and-records action against the Company to

investigate potential wrongdoing.     Plaintiff obtained documents and agreed to

incorporate all of them into its complaint.

      None of the Company’s 11 outside directors is alleged to be conflicted. None

of the Board’s advisors is alleged to be conflicted. None of the stockholders is

alleged to be a conflicted controller. The vote is not alleged to have been coerced.

                                          2
And entire fairness is not alleged to apply to the Merger. As a result, the complaint

is subject to dismissal under Corwin unless the Merger vote was not fully informed.

      To defeat Corwin on disclosure grounds, Plaintiff does not rely on the books

and records it obtained from the Company. The complaint’s version of the facts

obscures documents integral to Plaintiff’s claim. Plaintiff instead relies exclusively

on Florance’s statements to argue that the Board’s meeting minutes and identified

sale considerations must be false. Under this theory, the so-called “real reason”

behind the Merger was Defendant Martell’s undisclosed conflict of interest in

protecting his job. In this way, Plaintiff tries to generate a disclosure claim

concerning otherwise facially appropriate proxy disclosures made by an independent

board with its independent advisors. According to Plaintiff, I must shut my eyes to

everything but a handful of statements on the internet attributed to a senior executive

of an entity that was publicly unsuccessful in making a topping bid.

      One might imagine scenarios where a post-process statement made by a

bidder could support a sale process claim. But this is not one of them. The Proxy

Statement and board materials unambiguously contradict Plaintiff’s theory. And

nothing in the complaint otherwise supports Plaintiff’s extreme inference that the

Company’s books and records and public disclosures are false. To the extent

Plaintiff sought to bring a hidden, management-level conflict to light, its own

inspection demand snuffed the wick.

                                          3
         It is not reasonably conceivable that the Board committed a disclosure

violation. So Plaintiff’s claim fails under Corwin. But even if Corwin did not apply,

the complaint would fail for another reason. Only Martell—the Board’s sole inside

director—is alleged to have been conflicted. But the Proxy Statement disclosed

Martell’s potential pecuniary interest in the Merger. And it is not clear from the

complaint what role Martell played in the Merger anyway. Save for isolated scenes,

he barely appears. In many ways, he is depicted as the Mr. Godot who never arrives.1

         The complaint is devoid of specific facts from which to infer that Martell

steered the Company away from CoStar to entrench himself. Under any standard,

then, Plaintiff has failed to state a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Martell.

Accordingly, I grant Martell’s motion to dismiss.

                         I.      FACTUAL BACKGROUND

         I draw the relevant facts from the Verified Class Action Complaint (the

“Complaint”) and the documents it incorporates by reference.2 At this stage, the

1
    Samuel Beckett, Waiting for Godot: A Tragicomedy in Two Acts (1953).
2
  Citations in the form of “Compl. ¶ —” refer to the Complaint. See Dkt. 1. Citations in
the form of “Ex. —” refer to the exhibits submitted with Martell’s motion. See Dkt. 11–
14. Citations in the form of “Tr. —” refer to the transcript of the oral argument on Martell’s
motion. See Dkt. 30.

                                              4
Complaint’s well-pleaded allegations are assumed to be true and Plaintiff receives

the benefit of all reasonable inferences.

A. The Parties And Relevant Non-Parties

         The Company was a publicly traded Delaware corporation specializing in

property market analytics and technology.3 Plaintiff was a common stockholder of

the Company. 4 Martell was the Company’s CEO and a member of the Board. 5

         The Board comprised 12 directors. The eleven directors not named as parties

to this action were all outside directors.6 Three of those directors were elected

through a proxy contest initiated by Senator Investment Group LP and Cannae

Holdings, Inc. (the “Funds”).7

3
 Ex. 30 at 35 (CoreLogic, Inc., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) (Mar. 30,
2021)) (“Proxy Statement”).
4
    Compl. ¶ 8; Dkt. 17 at 1 (Pl.’s Br. in Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. to Dismiss) (“Opp’n Br.”).
5
    Compl. ¶ 9. Martell has since resigned as the Company’s CEO. See Opp’n Br. at 3 n.1.
6
  CoreLogic, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 110 (Mar. 1, 2021). Plaintiff avers that
it did not sue the outside directors due to a Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision in the
Company’s charter. See Compl. ¶ 22.
7
    Compl. ¶ 44.

                                               5
          Evercore Group L.L.C. served as the Board’s principal financial advisor

during the sale process. 8 Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (“Skadden”)

served as the Board’s legal advisor during the sale process. 9

          CoStar is a publicly traded Delaware corporation that specializes in property

market analytics and technology. 10 CoStar was a strategic bidder. 11

          Stone Point Capital LLC and Insight Partners LLC acquired the Company in

the Merger. Stone Point and Insight were financial bidders.

B. The Sale Process

          According to the Complaint, in June 2020, the Board determined to consider

offers to acquire the Company.12

          On June 26, 2020, the Funds publicly announced an unsolicited joint proposal

to acquire the Company for $65 per share. 13 The Board rejected the proposal,

concluding, among other things, that it “significantly undervalued” the Company.14

8
    Id. ¶ 33.
9
    Id. ¶ 38.
10
     CoStar Gp., Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) at 5 (Feb. 24, 2021).
11
     E.g., Compl. ¶¶ 39, 41.
12
     Id. ¶ 31.
13
     Id. ¶ 32. The Funds increased their bid by $1 a few months later. Id. ¶ 40.
14
     Id. ¶ 34.

                                               6
           The Funds responded with a proxy contest.15 The Funds nominated nine

directors to the Board. 16 The stockholders elected three of the Funds’ candidates. 17

           According to the Complaint, the Funds’ acquisition efforts loomed over the

sale process. 18 The Funds’ offer, however, also galvanized market-wide interest in

acquiring the Company.19 The Board directed management and its advisors to

negotiate with the bidders. 20

           In the fall of 2020, Martell and Florance began discussing a potential strategic

merger between the Company and CoStar. 21 At the time, the Board’s review of the

outstanding bids suggested that the Company was worth at least $80 per share. 22

           On December 15, 2020, CoStar made its first bid.23 The bid contemplated,

among other terms, an all-stock merger at a projected value of $77 to $83 per share.24

15
     Id. ¶¶ 36–37.
16
     Id. ¶ 37.
17
     Id. ¶ 44.
18
     Id. ¶¶ 36, 43, 45.
19
     Id. ¶ 33.
20
     Id. ¶ 35.
21
     Id. ¶¶ 39, 41.
22
     Id. ¶ 42.
23
     Id. ¶ 46.
24
     Id.

                                               7
In reviewing the bid, the Board compared the value certainty of a cash transaction

with the value certainty of an equity transaction.25 The Board also considered

whether closing a CoStar transaction would be delayed by antitrust scrutiny. 26

          On December 28, 2020, the Board ratified an equity-based compensation

package for its senior executives, including Martell.27 The package contained a

$27.5 million “golden parachute” provision payable upon a change of control.28 The

“golden parachute” provision would have been triggered regardless of the buyer.29

The Proxy Statement disclosed Martell’s potential pecuniary interest in the Merger

and explained the nature and operation of management’s compensation package. 30

          At a January 17, 2021, Board meeting, Martell informed the directors that

Florance and he spoke earlier that day about the prospect of post-Merger

employment with CoStar.31

25
     Id. ¶ 93 (citing Proxy Statement at 47).
26
     Id. (citing Proxy Statement at 47).
27
     Id. ¶ 47.
28
     Id. ¶¶ 73–74, 99.
29
     See, e.g., id. ¶ 75; see also Opp’n Br. at 25–27.
30
     Compl. ¶ 99 (copying image from Proxy Statement at 78–83).
31
     Id. ¶ 48.

                                                8
           On January 19, 2021, CoStar revised its initial bid.32 The revised bid proposed

an all-stock merger nominally valued at $79 per share.33

           On January 22, 2021, Stone Point itself proposed an all-cash take-private

transaction valued at $77 per share. 34

           On January 23, 2021, the Board countered CoStar’s January 19 offer.35 The

Board proposed (i) an all-stock transaction at an implied value of $85 per share; (ii)

that CoStar accept remedies to obtain required regulatory approvals and agree not to

take action that would delay or increase the risk of obtaining those approvals; (iii) a

closing date of no more than 12 months from signing; and (iv) certain restrictions on

employee retention efforts prior to a closing. 36

           On January 29, 2021, CoStar countered the Board. Among other terms,

CoStar proposed an all-stock transaction with an implied value of $82.53 per share.37

The Board’s discussions of CoStar’s counteroffer centered on cash consideration,

32
     Id. ¶ 49.
33
     Id.
34
     Id. ¶ 50.
35
     Id. ¶ 51.
36
     Id.
37
     Id. ¶ 53.

                                              9
closing speed, and antitrust assurances.38 Based on these considerations, the Board

rejected the counteroffer.

           On February 1, 2021, CoStar returned with what it described as a “best and

final” offer. 39 CoStar again proposed an all-stock transaction.40 This time, CoStar

increased the nominal purchase price to $86.30 per share.41

           On February 3, 2021, Stone Point, now joined by Insight, proposed an all-cash

take-private transaction valued at $80 per share. 42

           On February 3 and 4, 2021, the Board met with its advisors to consider Stone

Point and Insight’s proposal relative to CoStar’s “best and final” offer.43

           On February 4, 2021, the Board unanimously accepted Stone Point and

Insight’s offer. 44 In approving the Stone Point-Insight merger agreement, “[t]he

Board considered that, while the closing of the Merger is subject to certain regulatory

approvals, there are not likely to be significant antitrust or other regulatory

38
     Id. ¶ 54.
39
     Id. ¶ 55.
40
     Id.
41
     Id.
42
     Id.
43
     Id. ¶¶ 56–57.
44
     Id. ¶ 58.

                                             10
impediments to the closing . . . given the respective asset mixes of Stone Point and

Insight [], as well as the Merger[’s] significant protection against any regulatory

impediments that could arise . . . .” 45

           On February 16, 2021, CoStar publicly submitted a competing bid to acquire

the Company (the “Competing Proposal”). The Competing Proposal offered a stock-

for-stock transaction valued at $95.76 per share. 46         CoStar claimed that the

Competing Proposal would not present “meaningful antitrust concerns.” 47

           On February 17 and 21, 2021, the Board met with its advisors to evaluate the

Competing Proposal. 48 The Board indicated interest, noting that the Company was

“prepared to pursue an all-stock transaction” at that time.49         The Board also

determined that the Competing Proposal would reasonably be expected to result in

a “Superior Proposal” under the Stone Point-Insight merger agreement and

authorized Company representatives to negotiate with CoStar.50

45
     Id. ¶ 93 (quoting Proxy Statement at 62).
46
     Id. ¶¶ 61–62 (citing Ex. 25 (Competing Proposal)).
47
     Id. ¶ 61 (quoting Ex. 25 (Competing Proposal)).
48
     Id. ¶ 62.
49
     Id.
50
     Id. ¶ 63.

                                                 11
           On February 21, 2021, Martell communicated a Board-authorized

counteroffer to CoStar. 51 The counteroffer proposed, among other terms, that CoStar

(i) increase the “certainty of value” of the Competing Proposal by adding a cash

component; and (ii) address the Board’s previously stated antitrust concerns.52

           On March 1, 2021, CoStar publicly submitted revisions to the Competing

Proposal (the “Revised Competing Proposal”).53 The Revised Competing Proposal

included a $6.00 cash component, for an implied value of $90 per share.54 CoStar

reiterated its view that a transaction would pose “no meaningful antitrust issues.” 55

           On March 3, 2021, the Board met with its advisors to evaluate the Revised

Competing Proposal. The Board determined that CoStar should “substantially

increase” the cash component and address the Board’s antitrust concerns.56 The

Board continued to believe CoStar had the ability to top the Merger and directed that

the Board’s counter be conveyed to CoStar. 57

51
     Id. ¶ 64.
52
     Id.
53
     Id. ¶ 65 (referencing Ex. 26 (Revised Competing Proposal)).
54
     Id.
55
     Id. (quoting Ex. 26 (Revised Competing Proposal)).
56
     Id. ¶ 66.
57
   Id. (referencing Ex. 18 (Mar. 3, 2021 Bd. Minutes)); id. ¶ 67 (referencing Proxy
Statement at 60).

                                             12
          CoStar did not respond.58 The Complaint alleges that the Board “rejected”

CoStar on March 4, 2021.59

C. The Closing Of The Merger

          The Company’s stockholders voted overwhelmingly in favor of the Merger.

The Merger generated $6 billion or a 51% premium to the Company’s unaffected

stock price as of June 25, 2021. 60        On the closing date, Stone Point and Insight

announced that they would retain Company management.61

D. The Bisnow Article

          On March 16, 2021, Florance was interviewed about the Company’s sale

process by “Bisnow” (the “Bisnow Article”). 62 The Bisnow Article stated that the

Company raised “the threat of antitrust litigation” in its negotiations with CoStar.63

But Florance reportedly was not convinced. Under a heading titled “‘People Just

58
  Id. ¶ 67. As discussed later in this decision, CoStar issued a press release explaining
why it did not respond.
59
     Id. ¶ 4.
60
     Id. ¶ 1 (referencing Proxy Statement at 61).
61
     Id. ¶¶ 103–04.
62
   See, e.g., id. ¶ 67 (citing John Banister, CoStar to Look at New Sectors for Next
Acquisitions After Failed Deals, FTC Scrutiny, Bisnow (Mar. 16, 2021),
https://www.bisnow.com/national/news/technology/costar-to-look-at-new-sectors-for-
next-round-of-acquisitions-after-failed-deals-108133 (“Bisnow Article”)).
63
     Bisnow Article.

                                              13
Don’t Like CoStar’,” the Bisnow Article paraphrased Florance as stating that he

“believe[d] antitrust issues had nothing to do with [the Company’s] decision to turn

down [CoStar’s] offer.” 64 The Bisnow Article also quoted a Morningstar analyst,

who reportedly was “skeptical” of the Company’s antitrust concerns and thought

they were not “substantiated.” 65

           As a reported ulterior motive for the Company’s decision to pursue the

Merger, the Bisnow Article paraphrased Florance as stating that he thought the

Company’s “executives didn’t want to be acquired by CoStar because some of them

would have lost their jobs.” 66 In his own words, Florance said:

           Most of the senior management team there might earn eight digits a year of
           compensation, and in a merger, especially a strategic merger, inevitably
           some of those jobs go away . . . . That’s a powerful motive to not do a deal. 67

E. The 220 Action

           On April 27, 2021, Plaintiff brought a books-and-records action against the

Company under Section 220 of the Delaware General Corporation Law (the “220

Action”). The purpose of the 220 Action was to investigate potential wrongdoing

64
     Id.
65
     Id.
66
     Id.
67
     Id.

                                              14
and, if warranted, to bring a breach of fiduciary duty claim. 68           Through the 220

Action, Plaintiff sought to inspect, among other things, all Board-level materials

surrounding the Merger. Plaintiff obtained those materials and then stipulated to the

dismissal of the 220 Action.69

F. This Litigation

         Having obtained the books and records it sought, Plaintiff filed the Complaint.

         The Complaint does not allege that the Board’s outside directors were

conflicted. It does not allege that the Board’s advisors were conflicted. It does not

allege the presence of a conflicted controller. And it does not allege that the Proxy

Statement failed to disclose the Board’s antitrust concerns or Martell’s potential

pecuniary interests in the Merger. Instead, Plaintiff cites the Bisnow Article to posit

forensically that the Board’s meeting minutes and the Proxy Statement’s disclosures

must be false.70

68
     See Dkt. 1 at 1–2, C.A. No. 2021-0360-JTL (Del. Ch. Apr. 27, 2021).
69
     See Dkt. 13 (Order Granting Joint Stipulation of Dismissal), in id.
70
  See Tr. at 80:6–17 ([Pl.’s Couns.]: “I don’t think I’m shocking anybody here. Absent
those statements by Mr. Florance, we would not have filed this lawsuit. That’s just the
reality. But where you have public statements by a firsthand participant in those
conversations saying one thing versus, you know, these minutes that are thirdhand—Mr.
Martell reporting to the board, and they go to the secretary and they go in the minutes, and
then they are reviewed and edited by however many lawyers—I think it’s reasonable,
certainly at this point, to credit Mr. Florance’s unvarnished public statements.”).

                                               15
          Plaintiff alleges that the Board—at Martell’s behest—caused the Proxy

Statement to make false statements and to omit material information regarding the

Board’s antitrust considerations and Martell’s interest in post-Merger employment.

As to the Board’s antitrust considerations, the Complaint calls them “phony” and

“pure malarkey” because the Board (i) “waited until December 2020” to raise

antitrust concerns; (ii) provided “no explanation” for its antitrust concerns; (iii)

failed to “retain” antitrust counsel; and (iv) failed to inform Company stockholders

that CoStar was not a competitor.71

          As to post-Merger employment, the Complaint alleges the Proxy Statement

omitted that “high level executives” “would have likely lost their positions in a

merger with CoStar.”72 By the same token, the Complaint alleges that the Proxy

Statement omitted that management’s post-Merger employment with Stone Point

and Insight was “assured.” 73 To support this position, the Complaint emphasizes

that Stone Point and Insight retained management after the Merger closed. 74

71
     Id. ¶¶ 81–88, 94.
72
     Id. ¶ 96.
73
     Id. ¶ 102.
74
     Id. ¶ 106.

                                         16
         Overlapping the employment category, the Complaint alleges that Martell had

an undisclosed conflict of interest in entrenchment.75 The Complaint alleges that

Martell “spearheaded” the Company’s sale process, while the “supine” Board

deferred to “management[’s]” interest in pursuing a deal that would guarantee their

continued employment.76 The Complaint alleges that, if the Board rejected CoStar,

then Martell would have “received a change of control payment and kept his job.”77

Plaintiff thus reasons that Martell’s severance pay plus his salary motivated him to

steer the Company away from CoStar. As relief, Plaintiff seeks damages.

         Martell has moved to dismiss the Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure

to state a claim. He argues that the Complaint fails under Corwin and, alternatively,

fails to state a breach of fiduciary duty claim. Plaintiff opposes the motion.

         As discussed below, the Complaint fails under Corwin because Plaintiff has

not alleged a reasonably conceivable disclosure violation.        And even without

Corwin, the Complaint fails to state a claim for breach of the duty of loyalty because

Plaintiff does not allege specific facts from which to reasonably infer that Martell

self-interestedly prevented a CoStar deal. So I will dismiss the Complaint.

75
     Id. ¶¶ 96–106.
76
     Id. ¶¶ 5, 100.
77
     Id. ¶ 100 (emphasis omitted).

                                          17
                               II.    LEGAL ANALYSIS

         In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court (1) accepts as true all well-

pleaded factual allegations in the complaint; (2) credits vague allegations if they give

the opposing party notice of the claim; (3) draws all reasonable inferences in favor

of the non-moving party; and (4) denies dismissal if recovery on the claim is

“reasonably conceivable.” 78 The Court, however, need not accept “every strained

interpretation of the allegations, credit conclusory allegations . . . [un]supported by

specific facts, or draw unreasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.”79

         Plaintiff agreed to incorporate into the Complaint all the documents Plaintiff

obtained from the 220 Action.80 The parties have debated the extent to which those

documents may be used to evaluate the pleading-stage sufficiency of the

Complaint’s allegations.

         “The complaint generally defines the universe of facts that the trial court may

consider in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion . . . .” 81 Still, the Court may look outside

78
  Cent. Mortg. Co. v. Morgan Stanley Mortg. Cap. Hldgs. LLC, 27 A.3d 531, 535 (Del.
2011).
79
   City of Fort Myers Gen. Emps.’ Pension Fund v. Haley, 235 A.3d 702, 716 (Del. 2020)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
80
  See Ex. 28 ¶ 11 (Confidentiality Agreement); see generally United Techs. Corp. v.
Treppel, 109 A.3d 553, 558–59 (Del. 2014) (permitting such agreements).
81
     In re Gen. Motors (Hughes) S’holder Litig., 897 A.2d 162, 168 (Del. 2006).

                                             18
the complaint to consider “the content of documents that are integral to or

incorporated by reference into the complaint.”82 “The trial court may also take

judicial notice of matters that are not subject to reasonable dispute.”83 “The public

policy behind these exceptions is plain: allegations largely predicated upon

documents not presented to the Court in the pleadings should not escape the Court’s

review under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . .” 84

         Building on these principles, this Court has clarified the framework for

determining whether a document is integral to a disclosure claim:

         Whether a document is integral to a claim and incorporated into a complaint
         is largely a facts-and-circumstances inquiry. This Court has recently
         determined that documents as varied in form as . . . a merger proxy statement,
         an SEC filing, . . . and an internal corporate [document] all can, depending on
         the relevant allegations of the complaint, be deemed integral to the claims and
         therefore be considered by the Court on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion . . . .

         [The] general tendency is that the Court may conclude a document is integral
         to the claim if it is the source for the facts as pled in the complaint . . . .

         In addition, this Court commonly considers extraneous documents, not for the
         truth of their contents, but to test the sufficiency of allegations for disclosure-
         based claims. For example, a stockholder may, in asserting that the directors
         improperly failed to disclose a material fact in advance of a stockholder vote,
         selectively quote or [mis]characterize the relevant proxy statement. In such
         cases, this Court may consider the proxy statement as a whole, rather than

82
     H-M Wexford LLC v. Encorp, Inc., 832 A.2d 129, 139 (Del. Ch. 2003).
83
   Windsor I, LLC v. CWCapital Asset Mgmt. LLC, 238 A.3d 863, 875 (Del. 2020)
(alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
84
  In re Gardner Denver, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2014 WL 715705, at *2 (Del. Ch. Feb. 21,
2014).

                                             19
         merely the portions alleged in the complaint, to determine what information
         was disclosed.85

In short, “a complaint may, despite allegations to the contrary, be dismissed where

the unambiguous language of documents upon which the claims are based

contradict[s] the complaint’s allegations.”86

         To be sure, the incorporation-by-reference doctrine does not heighten the

motion to dismiss standard. The doctrine does not permit a court to accept the truth

of a matter asserted in an incorporated document. 87 Nor does it permit a court to

resolve competing inferences in the movant’s favor.88 To the extent incorporated

documents contradict an allegation, and the allegation is well-pleaded, the allegation

controls. To the extent incorporated documents support competing inferences, and

Plaintiff has made a well-pleaded allegation, Plaintiff is entitled to the inference.

85
     Id. at *3–4 (cleaned up); accord Windsor, 238 A.3d at 873 nn.43, 45.
86
  Encorp, 832 A.2d at 139 (first citing In re Wheelabrator Techs. Inc. S’holders Litig.,
1992 WL 212595, at *3 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 1992); and then citing Malpiede v. Townson,
780 A.2d 1075, 1083 (Del. 2001)).
87
   See In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 70 (Del. 1995) (cautioning,
in the context of securities filings, that proxy statements are hearsay as to matters unrelated
to disclosure). This rule does not apply if the plaintiff concedes the truth of a matter in the
incorporated document. See id. at 69–70.
88
  See In re Dell Techs. Inc. Class V S’holders Litig., 2020 WL 3096748, at *14 (Del. Ch.
June 11, 2020).

                                              20
         Even so, the incorporation-by-reference doctrine allows a court to review an

integral document as a whole “to ensure that the plaintiff has not misrepresented its

contents and that any inference the plaintiff seeks to have drawn is a reasonable

one.” 89 Otherwise, “complaints that quoted only selected and misleading portions

of such documents could not be dismissed . . . even though they would be doomed

to failure.”90 Accordingly, when “a plaintiff chooses to refer to a document in its

complaint, the Court may consider the entire document, even those portions not

specifically referenced in the complaint.”91

         These principles promote efficiency. 92 And that is particularly true in a case

following an inspection demand. Delaware law empowers stockholders to “request

company books and records under Section 220 to attempt to substantiate their

allegations” before pursuing fiduciary litigation. 93 Those documents, if referenced,

89
  Amalgamated Bank v. Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d 752, 797 (Del. Ch. 2016), abrogated in
part on other grounds by Tiger v. Boast Apparel, Inc., 214 A.3d 933 (Del. 2019).
90
     Windsor, 238 A.3d at 875 (internal quotation marks omitted).
91
  Okla. Firefighters Pension & Ret. Sys. v. Corbat, 2017 WL 6452240, at *13 n.233 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 18, 2017) (quoting Donald J. Wolfe, Jr. & Michael A. Pittenger, Corporate and
Commercial Practice in the Delaware Court of Chancery § 4.06[b][2][i] (2016 ed.)). See
Winshall v. Viacom Int’l, Inc., 76 A.3d 808, 818 (Del. 2013) (“A plaintiff may not reference
certain documents outside the complaint and at the same time prevent the court from
considering those documents’ actual terms.” (cleaned up)).
92
  See Yahoo! Inc., 132 A.3d at 797 (“The [incorporation-by-reference] doctrine . . . enables
courts to dispose of meritless complaints at the pleading stage.”).
93
     Cal. State Tchrs.’ Ret. Sys. v. Alvarez, 179 A.3d 824, 839 (Del. 2018).

                                              21
“necessarily shape the range” and “outcomes” of pleading-stage inferences. 94 So do

“public materials” referenced in the complaint, e.g., securities filings.95

         Here, Plaintiff brought a Section 220 action against the Company before filing

this lawsuit. Through that action, Plaintiff obtained internal documents surrounding

the Merger. Those documents are the source of the Complaint’s allegations. So to

the extent the Complaint references those documents, I may consider them “in their

entirety rather than rely on the portions cherry picked” by Plaintiff. 96

         The Complaint is also based on “publicly available documents,” including the

Proxy Statement.97 As a result, I may examine the entire Proxy Statement to

“establish what was disclosed” to voting stockholders 98 and to contextualize

94
     In re GGP, Inc. S’holder Litig., 282 A.3d 37, 55 (Del. 2022).
95
  Id. at 54–55. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. AIG Life Ins. Co., 860 A.2d 312, 320 n.28
(Del. 2004) (“On a motion to dismiss, the court may take judicial notice of the contents of
documents required by law to be filed, and actually filed, with federal or state officials[.]”
(emphasis omitted)); see also D.R.E. 201(b)(2).
96
  Teamsters Loc. 443 Health Servs. & Ins. Plan v. Chou, 2020 WL 5028065, at *2 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 24, 2020) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted).
97
   See, e.g., Compl. ¶¶ 87, 93; Compl. at 1–2 (averring that Plaintiff has drawn its
allegations from “documents filed and/or published by [Martell or the Company], news
reports, press releases, conference call transcripts, and other publicly available documents,
as well as documents produced to Plaintiff in response to” the books-and-records action).
98
  Abbey v. E.W. Scripps Co., 1995 WL 478957, at *1 n.1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 1995) (Allen,
C.); accord Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 69.

                                              22
Plaintiff’s disclosure-based allegations.99 Consistent with the incorporation-by-

reference doctrine, I also may consider the other documents to which Plaintiff refers

to ensure they support the inference Plaintiff seeks.

       Earlier in this decision, I recited the factual narrative as told by the Complaint.

That narrative obscures or elides integral Section 220 documents and public filings

that are referenced in or supplied the facts for the Complaint. This approach runs

contrary to the efficiency-based rationale animating pleading-stage review of

complaints grounded on information obtained under Section 220.100                    Properly

situated, the Complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim.

99
  See In re Rural Metro Corp. S’holders Litig., 2013 WL 6634009, at *7 (Del. Ch. Dec.
17, 2013) (“In dismissing the disclosure claim, the Court of Chancery considered the entire
proxy statement, not just the portions cited in the plaintiffs’ complaint. The Delaware
Supreme Court agreed that the court properly considered the proxy statement for this
purpose . . . .” (citing Santa Fe, 669 A.2d at 69)).
100
    See GGP, 282 A.3d at 54 n.84 (“Delaware’s system affirmatively encourages reliance
on factually specific pleadings as a basis for substantive evaluation of shareholder litigation
at an early stage of the proceedings . . . . [T]he Delaware system provides or depends on
mechanisms that enable and encourage the plaintiff and the defendants as well to supply
relevant information that meaningfully assists the courts in improving the fairness and
utility of that substantive, pleading stage evaluation.” (quoting Lawrence A. Hamermesh
& Michael L. Wachter, The Importance of Being Dismissive: The Efficiency Role of
Pleading Stage Evaluation of Shareholder Litigation, 42 J. Corp. L. 597, 603 (2017))).

                                              23
A. The Complaint Fails To Plead A Disclosure Violation

         “Delaware corporate law grants significant deference to the votes of

disinterested stockholders.” 101 Indeed, “the long-standing policy of our law has been

to avoid the uncertainties and costs of judicial second-guessing when the

disinterested stockholders have had the free and informed chance to decide on the

economic merits of a transaction for themselves.”102 As a result, “there is little utility

in a judicial examination of fiduciary actions ratified by” an uncoerced and fully

informed majority of disinterested stockholders.103 Under those conditions, “there

is no agency problem for a court to review[.]” 104

         Synthesizing these principles, the Delaware Supreme Court in Corwin held

that “when a transaction not subject to the entire fairness standard is approved by a

fully informed, uncoerced vote of disinterested stockholders, the business judgment

rule applies.” 105 “The practical effect of Corwin cleansing is that when the doctrine

applies, a lawsuit that challenges a transaction as a breach of fiduciary duty is subject

101
   Hawkins v. Daniel, 273 A.3d 792, 808 (Del. Ch. 2022), aff’d, --- A.3d ----, 2023 WL
115854 (Del. Jan. 6, 2023).
102
      Corwin v. KKR Fin. Hldgs. LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312–13 (Del. 2015).

  Sciabacucchi v. Liberty Broadband Corp., 2017 WL 2352152, at *2 (Del. Ch. May 31,
103

2017).
104
    In re USG Corp. S’holder Litig., 2020 WL 5126671, at *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 31, 2020),
aff’d sub nom. Anderson v. Leer, 265 A.3d 995 (Del. 2021) (TABLE).
105
      Corwin, 125 A.3d at 309.

                                           24
to dismissal at the pleading stage.”106 Absent waste, Corwin’s version of the

business judgment rule has been described as “irrebuttable.”107

         The Complaint does not allege that the Merger is subject to entire fairness

review, 108 that the approving stockholders were not disinterested, or that the vote

was coerced.       So the Complaint must be dismissed under Corwin unless the

Complaint supports a reasonable inference that the vote was not fully informed.

         A stockholder vote is fully informed if the corporation’s disclosures “apprised

stockholders of all material information and did not materially mislead them.” 109 A

fact is material “‘if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable [stock]holder

would consider it important in deciding how to vote.’”110 “The test does not require

a substantial likelihood that the disclosure would have caused the reasonable

106
      Goldstein v. Denner, 2022 WL 1671006, at *19 (Del. Ch. May 26, 2022).
107
    See In re Volcano Corp. S’holder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 737 & n.16 (Del. Ch. 2016),
aff’d, 156 A.3d 697 (Del. 2017) (TABLE); see also Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151,
152 (Del. 2016) (ORDER) (“[T]he vestigial waste exception has long had little real-world
relevance, because . . . stockholders would be unlikely to approve a transaction that is
wasteful.” (citations omitted)).
108
   Although the Complaint calls the Board “supine,” Compl. ¶ 4, that bare allegation is
insufficient to elevate the standard of review to entire fairness, see In re Pattern Energy
Gp. Inc. S’holders Litig., 2021 WL 1812674, at *34 (Del. Ch. May 6, 2021).
109
      Morrison v. Berry, 191 A.3d 268, 282 (Del. 2018).

  Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 944 (Del. 1985) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
110

Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).

                                             25
investor to change his vote . . . .” 111 Instead, “there must be a substantial likelihood

that the disclosure . . . would have been viewed by the reasonable investor as having

significantly altered the ‘total mix’ of information made available.” 112 To plead a

disclosure violation, “a plaintiff must demonstrate a substantial likelihood that,

under all the circumstances, the omitted fact would have assumed actual significance

in the deliberations of the reasonable stockholder.”113

         “Material” does not mean “everything.” Delaware law requires stockholders

to be fully informed, not “infinitely informed.” 114 Determining the materiality of an

alleged omission or misstatement “requires a careful balancing of the potential

benefits of disclosure against . . . the risk of information overload[.]”115 As Vice

Chancellor Zurn recently explained:

         Delaware courts are cautious in balancing the benefits of additional
         disclosures against the risk that insignificant information may dilute
         potentially valuable information. Counterbalancing the mandate for complete
         disclosure . . . is recognition of the risk of inundating the stockholder with
         so much information that the proxy clouds, rather than clarifies, the

111
      Goldstein, 2022 WL 1671006, at *19 (cleaned up).
112
      Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 944 (quoting TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 449).
113
      Loudon v. Archer-Daniels-Midland Co., 700 A.2d 135, 143 (Del. 1997).
114
      In re Merge Healthcare Inc., 2017 WL 395981, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2017).
115
   Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1128 (Del. Ch. 1999) (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted), aff’d, 746 A.2d 277 (Del. 2000) (TABLE).

                                             26
         stockholder’s decision. A complaint does not state a disclosure violation by
         noting picayune lacunae or “tell-me-more” details left out. 116

         Consistent with these principles, “[o]mitted facts are not material simply

because they might be helpful.”117 Nor is an omitted fact material if it would have

“closed a circle” or made a disclosure “somewhat more informative.” 118 “So long

as the proxy statement, viewed in its entirety, sufficiently discloses and explains the

matter to be voted on, the omission or inclusion of a particular fact is generally left

to management’s business judgment.”119

         One disclosure violation is enough to defeat Corwin.120 At the pleading stage,

the operative question is whether the complaint “supports a rational inference that

material facts were not disclosed or that the disclosed information was otherwise

materially misleading.” 121        The plaintiff bears the initial burden to identify a

116
   Teamster Members Ret. Plan v. Dearth, 2022 WL 1744436, at *12 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2022) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), aff’d, 2023 WL 125659 (Del. Jan.
9, 2023) (TABLE). See Zirn v. VLI Corp., 1995 WL 362616, at *4 (Del. Ch. June 12,
1995) (Allan, C.) (“[T]he law ought [to] guard against the fallacy that increasingly detailed
disclosure is always material and beneficial disclosure. In some instances[,] the opposite
will be true.”), aff’d, 681 A.2d 1050 (Del. 1996).
117
      Skeen v. Jo-Ann Stores, Inc., 750 A.2d 1170, 1174 (Del. 2000).
118
      Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., 669 A.2d 79, 89 (Del. 1995) (cleaned up).
119
    In re Match Gp., Inc. Deriv. Litig., 2022 WL 3970159, at *27 (Del. Ch. Sept. 1, 2022)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
120
      See In re Mindbody, Inc., 2020 WL 5870094, at *26 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2, 2020).
121
      Morrison, 191 A.3d at 282.

                                             27
“deficiency in the operative disclosure document[.]”122 Only then does the burden

shift to the defendant to “establish that the alleged deficiency fails as a matter of law

in order to secure the cleansing effect of the vote.”123

            1. The Disclosures Regarding The Board’s Antitrust Considerations

            The Complaint alleges four deficiencies that, in Plaintiff’s view, render the

Proxy Statement’s antitrust disclosures false. None does.

                  a. The Alleged December 2020 Delay

            The Complaint first alleges that the Proxy Statement’s antitrust disclosures

must be false because, according to Plaintiff, the Board did not raise antitrust

concerns until December 2020.            This allegation is contradicted by the Proxy

Statement. Although omitted from the Complaint, the Proxy Statement disclosed

that the Board’s antitrust concerns arose before December 2020. In July 2020, the

Board rejected the Funds’ tender offer, in part, because of “regulatory concerns

raised by” the Funds’ “relationships with competitors.”124 Plaintiff concedes that

122
      In re Solera Hldgs., Inc. S’holder Litig., 2017 WL 57839, at *8 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2017).
123
      Id.
124
   Proxy Statement at 39. The Complaint cites only on the Board’s determination that
the Funds’ proposal “significantly undervalued” the Company. See Compl. ¶¶ 34, 40.

                                              28
“regulatory” and “antitrust” are used interchangeably throughout the Proxy

Statement.125 The nexus to “competitors” dispels lingering doubt.

         Moreover, any purported “delay” in discussing antitrust with CoStar is no

mystery. CoStar did not make its initial bid until December 2020. 126 So the Board

had no reason to raise antitrust concerns with CoStar until then. Similarly, the Board

had no reason in December to use antitrust as a ploy to prefer Stone Point and Insight.

Stone Point and Insight did not make a joint bid until February 2021.

         Neither the Complaint, itself, nor the Proxy Statement supports the delay

allegation. Accordingly, the delay allegation does not support a reasonable inference

that the antitrust disclosures are false.

                b. The Alleged Failure To Explain

         The Complaint next alleges that the Proxy Statement must be false because it

provides “no explanation” for the Board’s antitrust concerns. 127 It does.

         For example, the Proxy Statement disclosed that CoStar proposed to extend

the target closing date to 15 months to account for regulatory scrutiny.128 Similarly,

125
      See Tr. at 69:17–20.

  Proxy Statement at 47. As discussed later in this decision, the Federal Trade
126

Commission commenced proceedings to block a separate CoStar acquisition in late 2020.
127
      Compl. ¶ 88.
128
   E.g., Proxy Statement at 54–59. See also Ex. 14 (Feb. 3, 2021 Bd. Minutes); Ex. 25
(Competing Proposal); Ex. 26 (Revised Competing Proposal).

                                            29
the Proxy Statement disclosed that on December 18, the Board sought “certainty of

closing” from CoStar due to issues with “antitrust approval.”129

         As pleaded, it is not reasonably conceivable that the Company’s disclosures

regarding this concern were false. For one thing, CoStar’s December 15 bid made

“regulatory approval” from the “U.S. antitrust authorities” “in particular” a “material

condition” to closing.130 CoStar reasserted this position in January. 131

         For another, CoStar was facing antitrust-related liability in another deal at the

time. Although styled by the Complaint as an exposé, the Bisnow Article primarily

discussed the impact of domestic antitrust policy on CoStar’s 2020-2021 acquisition

efforts.      Relevant here, the Bisnow Article reported that the Federal Trade

Commission sued CoStar in late 2020 to block a merger between CoStar and another

company.132 The litigation reportedly resulted in a payment of a $59.5 million

reverse termination fee to the target, which CoStar, quite notably, disputed and then

eventually paid in February 2021.133

129
      Proxy Statement at 47.
130
      Ex. 20 at 2 (CoStar Initial Bid).
131
      See Ex. 21 (CoStar Revised Bid).

  Bisnow Article (referencing Compl. for TRO and Prelim. Inj., FTC v. CoStar Gp., Inc.,
132

2020 WL 7137249 (D.D.C. Dec. 3, 2020) (No. 1:20-cv-03518-JDB)).
133
   Id. (citing Dees Stribling, Redfin Pays $608M for RentPath After FTC Foils CoStar’s
Bid, Bisnow (Feb. 19, 2021), https://www.bisnow.com/national/news/multifamily/redfin-
ponies-up-608m-to-buy-rentpath-107812; John Banister, CoStar’s Revenue Grew 19%
                                            30
            The Board knew all this. It discussed the enforcement action and CoStar’s

fee dispute during a February 2, 2021, meeting. 134 Consistent with the Board’s

review, the Proxy Statement disclosed that, on February 2,

            the Board discussed the regulatory-related terms proposed by CoStar, the
            potential risks that regulatory authorities would propose a remedy in order to
            approve a combination with CoStar, the scope of such a remedy, the timing
            of such a process and the risk that CoStar would not take the actions necessary
            to obtain regulatory approval. 135

Having carefully considered the allegations in and materials integral to the

Complaint, it is not reasonably conceivable that, as pleaded, the Board’s antitrust

concerns were pretextual.

            To advance a contrary interpretation of the Proxy Statement, Plaintiff relies

on commentary from a Morningstar analyst. The Bisnow Article reported that the

analyst was “skeptical” that a deal between CoStar and the Company would have

“present[ed] antitrust risk.”136 The analyst acknowledged the Company’s views, but

thought they were not “substantiate[d].”137

Last Year As CRE Shifted Operations Online, Bisnow (Feb. 24, 2021),
https://www.bisnow.com/national/news/technology/costars-revenue-grew-19-last-year-
as-cre-shifted-operations-online-107869).
134
      Ex. 13 at 3 (Feb. 2, 2021 Bd. Minutes).
135
      Proxy Statement at 55.
136
      Bisnow Article.
137
      Id.

                                                31
         Based on these comments, Plaintiff reasons that the Board’s antitrust concerns

were false. But the Proxy Statement disclosed that the Board developed its antitrust

considerations from information received from its advisors. And the Complaint does

not allege that those advisors were conflicted or provided the Board with incomplete

or misleading information. The Proxy Statement was not required to disclose all the

details and underlying assumptions driving Evercore and Skadden’s analyses and

recommendations. 138 The Proxy Statement also was not required to disclose the

opinions of an analyst who did not advise the Board.139 In this case, all that matters

is whether the Board considered the matters the Proxy Statement disclosed. It did.

         Plaintiff next faults the Proxy Statement’s background section for using the

word “antitrust” only a handful of times. 140 But again, Plaintiff conceded that the

Board used “antitrust” and “regulatory” interchangeably. And it does not point to

138
   See In re Trulia, Inc. S’holder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 900–01 (Del. Ch. 2016); see also
In re 3Com S’holders Litig., 2009 WL 5173804, at *6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 18, 2009)
(“[Q]uibbles with a financial advisor’s work . . . cannot be the basis of a disclosure claim.”)
139
   See In re Sauer-Danfoss Inc. S’holders Litig., 65 A.3d 1116, 1132 (Del. Ch. 2011); In
re MONY Gp., Inc. S’holder Litig., 853 A.2d 661, 682 (Del. Ch. 2004).
140
      Compl. ¶ 93.

                                              32
any precedent requiring disclosures to use “magic words.” In this context, then,

failure to use the word “antitrust” more frequently makes no difference. 141

         The Proxy Statement’s background section provides a summary and a

“summary” is just that: a summary. It need not disclose everything. 142 Nor should

it. At a certain point, disclosure “becomes an exercise in diminishing returns.”143

Indeed, “[o]ur disclosure jurisprudence is conscious of the risks of overdisclosure”

and so does not require fiduciaries to unleash “an avalanche of trivial information”

on stockholders.144 Antitrust permeated the Proxy Statement, whether in name or

by synonym. There was no need to recite it repeatedly.145

         Labeling the Board’s antitrust concerns as “vague” fares no better.146 In

Cogent,147 for example, target stockholders argued that the board’s antitrust concerns

141
    See Dent v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., 2014 WL 2931180, at *11 (Del. Ch. June 30, 2014)
(“[T]he question of materiality under Delaware law is a context-specific inquiry, and . . .
differs from merger to merger.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
142
      See Trulia, 129 A.3d at 900–01.
143
   Wayne Cnty. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Corti, 954 A.2d 319, 330 (Del. Ch. 2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
144
      Morrison, 191 A.3d at 283 n.65 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145
   See Miami Gen. Emps. v. Comstock, 2016 WL 4464156, at *15 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2016)
(“Delaware law does not require disclosure of a play-by-play of negotiations leading to a
transaction or of potential offers that a board has determined were not worth pursuing.”).
146
      Compl. ¶ 92.
147
      In re Cogent, Inc. S’holder Litig., 7 A.3d 487 (Del. Ch. 2010).

                                               33
were pretextual because the board “merely perceived” antitrust risks. 148 The court,

however, observed that the board disclosed all its considerations, included that the

rejected bidder “had not addressed the regulatory risks of a merger” to the board’s

satisfaction. 149 “Given the number and magnitude of the other reasons cited by [the

board] as to why [the rejected bidder] did not present a favorable option,” the court

found that the board’s antitrust concerns—however small—were legitimate bases

for accepting an offer that would not be complicated by regulatory scrutiny:

            The need for potential regulatory approvals relating to antitrust considerations
            presents a legitimate risk factor for the Board to consider in determining
            whether a proposed transaction would maximize stockholder value. If
            regulatory approval is denied or drawn out in a costly delay, then a higher bid
            price does not necessarily mean a greater return for stockholders. 150

            So too here. The Complaint and Proxy Statement detail the Board’s concern

with antitrust scrutiny and its impact on closing speed. The Board also considered

CoStar’s issues with antitrust litigation and disputes over its obligation to pay a deal-

termination fee. Under these circumstances, it is not reasonably conceivable that the

Board—let alone Martell—fabricated a regulatory basis for choosing the Merger,

which contained strong antitrust assurances, over CoStar’s offers, which did not.

148
      Id. at 511.
149
      Id. at 512.
150
      Id.

                                               34
         In any event, Plaintiff’s objection is beside the point. “Delaware law does not

require that a fiduciary disclose its underlying reasons for acting.”151 As a result,

“asking ‘why’ does not state a meritorious disclosure claim.” 152 And “it is not

enough . . . to pose questions that are not answered in the proxy statement” either.153

Instead, the Complaint “must allege that facts are missing from the proxy statement,

identify those facts, state why they meet the materiality standard and how the

omission caused injury.”154 It does not. The no-explanation allegation fails to

support a reasonable inference that the Board falsified the Proxy Statement.

                c. The Alleged Failure To Retain Antitrust Counsel

         The Complaint next had alleged that the Proxy Statement’s disclosures must

be false because the Board failed to retain antitrust counsel. Martell, who is

represented by Skadden, observed otherwise. 155 Plaintiff commendably abandoned

151
    Sauer-Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1130. See Match Gp., 2022 WL 3970159, at *32
(“Disclosures relating to the Board’s subjective motivation or opinions are not per
se material, as long as the Board fully and accurately discloses the facts material to the
transaction.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)).
152
    In re KKR Fin. Hldgs. LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 1001 (Del. Ch. 2014)
(alteration omitted) (quoting Sauer-Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1131), aff’d sub nom. Corwin, 125
A.3d 304.

  In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 736 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d sub nom.
153

Walker v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000) (TABLE).
154
      Corti, 954 A.2d at 330 (alteration omitted) (quoting Skeen, 750 A.2d at 1173).
155
      Dkt. 11 at 17 n.5 (Def.’s Opening Br. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss) (“Opening Br.”).

                                              35
the allegation.156 Still, during oral argument, Plaintiff contended that “nothing in the

[Proxy Statement] or in the [Board] minutes ever say[s] that the [B]oard was

specifically briefed about antitrust issues by counsel.” 157 But this was not alleged in

the Complaint or raised in Plaintiff’s brief. 158 So Plaintiff’s argument is waived.159

                d. The Allegation That CoStar Is Not A Company Competitor

         Finally, the Complaint alleges that the Proxy Statement must be false because

CoStar was not a Company competitor. To support this allegation, Plaintiff cites the

Company’s 2020 Form 10-K, which did not list CoStar as a competitor.

         Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that antitrust concerns cannot

exist in an M&A setting unless a potential counterparty has been formally

156
      See Tr. at 68:19–22.
157
      Id. at 68:23–69:1.
158
   Compare id., with Compl. ¶ 88 (“[The Company] apparently failed to take any active
steps to retain counsel that specialized in [antitrust] to help analyze whether any such
‘concerns’ had any validity.” (emphasis added)), and Opp’n Br. at 38 (“[T]here was also
no indication that any . . . experts were retained to assess the [antitrust] claim—including
any experts from the antitrust department of [Skadden].” (emphasis added)).
159
    See Roca v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 842 A.2d 1238, 1242–43 (Del. 2004).
Although waiver is dispositive, I note that Plaintiff’s oral allegation would seem to require
the Board to admit it was not fully informed of antitrust issues. Delaware law, though,
does not require the Board to make “self-flagellating” disclosures. See, e.g., Stroud v.
Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 n.1 (Del. 1992); accord Loudon, 700 A.2d at 143. My analysis is
likely further colored by the fact that Kenneth Schwartz, an antitrust partner at Skadden,
attended four Board meetings between January and February 2021. See Opening Br. at 17
n.5; see also Exs. 4, 13–14, 17 (Bd. Minutes). Plaintiff’s counsel was apparently unaware
of this fact until oral argument. See Tr. at 68:20–22. Hence, Plaintiff’s concession.

                                             36
denominated as a competitor in a prior SEC filing. In fact, the opposite seems true.

“It is axiomatic that the antitrust laws were passed for ‘the protection of competition,

not competitors.’”160          In other words, “antitrust laws protect consumers, not

competitors.”161 Consistent with these objectives, the Proxy Statement disclosed

that the Board was concerned with the impact of a CoStar deal on customers and,

most importantly, how regulators would view that impact. 162            And the Proxy

Statement disclosed that CoStar was a strategic bidder, with all that entails. Taken

together, the absence of pre-Merger disclosures formally designating CoStar as a

competitor neither undermines the Board’s “reasonable assumption” that a CoStar

merger could draw regulatory scrutiny, nor gives rise to a disclosure violation. 163

         Even so, the Proxy Statement incorporated the 2020 10-K by reference.164

And stockholders were provided with a hyperlink to it under a heading titled “Where

160
   Brooke Gp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 224 (1993)
(emphasis omitted) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
161
   Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 387 (3d Cir. 2005) (citing
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488–89 (1977)), cert. denied,
547 U.S. 1020 (2006). See Frank H. Easterbrook, Vertical Arrangements and the Rule of
Reason, 53 Antitrust L.J. 135, 138 (1984) (Antitrust law was enacted “to protect consumers
from overcharges and the economy as a whole from harm.”); see also Reiter v. Sonotone
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (“Congress designed the Sherman Act as a ‘consumer
welfare prescription.’” (quoting Robert H. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 66 (1978))).
162
      Proxy Statement at 50.
163
      Match Gp., 2022 WL 3970159, at *27 (internal quotation marks omitted).
164
      See Proxy Statement at 122.

                                             37
You Can Find More Information.” 165 So any absence of CoStar on the 2020 10-K’s

“competitor” list was disclosed, in the place one would expect to look for such

information.

         Nor is it “a per se disclosure violation to disclose information in public filings

incorporated in the proxy instead of the proxy itself.”166 Where, as here, a document

referenced in a proxy statement is “explicitly incorporated” and not “buried” such

that “a reasonable stockholder reading the [proxy statement] could find it without

difficulty,” it is considered “to be a part of the total mix of information available to

stockholders.”167 The Proxy Statement was not required, in this instance, to make a

redundant, affirmative disclosure specifically flagging the absence of a competitor-

designation in the Company’s incorporated and readily available public filings.

         Given all this, it appears that this allegation is really a hair-splitting critique

of the Board’s regulatory analysis. A mere disagreement with the Board’s sale

165
      Id. (embedding link to CoreLogic, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Mar. 1, 2021)).
166
   Match Gp., 2022 WL 3970159, at *28 n.254 (first citing Galindo v. Stover, 2022 WL
226848, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 26, 2022); and then citing Wolf v. Assaf, 1998 WL 326662, at
*3 (Del. Ch. June 16, 1998)).
167
    In re Cyan, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2017 WL 1956955, at *15 & n.72 (Del. Ch. May 11,
2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). See Bren v. Cap. Realty Gp. Senior Hous., Inc.,
2004 WL 370214, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 27, 2004) (explaining, in the context of public
filings, that “all material information that was previously disclosed [need not] be disclosed
again with the specific correspondence requesting action”).

                                             38
considerations “cannot be recast as a disclosure claim.”168 To the extent Plaintiff

suggests that the Board misapprehended antitrust risk posed by a deal with CoStar,

the Proxy Statement was not required to disclose what Plaintiff now says was the

Board’s error.169 To the extent Plaintiff suggests that the Board’s antitrust analysis

was incomplete, the Proxy Statement was not required to disclose what the Board

did not consider.170

         In a last gasp, Plaintiff adopts CoStar’s position that a deal with CoStar would

have presented “no meaningful antitrust concerns.” But “no meaningful antitrust

concerns” does not reasonably mean “no antitrust concerns.”                     Indeed, in its

competing bids, CoStar extended the closing deadline to accommodate antitrust

review. 171 I am not required to accept Plaintiff’s strained interpretations of the facts

alleged. This allegation—and all the others—fail to support a disclosure violation.

168
   Dearth, 2022 WL 1744436, at *18 (internal quotation marks omitted). See MONY Gp.,
853 A.2d at 682 (“[P]roxy materials are not required to state . . . legal theories or plaintiff’s
characterization of the facts.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
169
   See Loudon, 700 A.2d at 143 (“[E]ven when material facts must be disclosed, negative
inferences or characterizations of misconduct . . . need not be articulated.”).
170
   See Sauer-Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1132 (“Omitting a statement that the board did not do
something is not material, because ‘requiring disclosure of every material event that
occurred and every decision not to pursue another option would make proxy statements so
voluminous that they would be practically useless.’” (quoting Lukens, 757 A.2d at 736)).
171
      See, e.g., Ex. 26 (Revised Competing Proposal).

                                               39
                e. The Effect of Florance’s Statements

         The Complaint alleged four deficiencies to undermine the Proxy Statement’s

antitrust disclosures. None of them states a disclosure claim. Perhaps recognizing

this, Plaintiff insisted at oral argument that the Complaint, combined with Florance’s

statements, is sufficient to defeat Corwin. 172 It is not.

         In the Bisnow Article, Florance was paraphrased as stating that he “believe[d]

antitrust issues had nothing to do with [the Company’s] decision to turn down

[CoStar’s] offer.”173 Florance’s statement, without more, is a conclusion. I may

“ignore conclusory allegations that lack specific supporting factual allegations.”174

In my view, given the circumstances here, Plaintiff was required to substantiate

Florance’s statement in some fashion with well-pleaded facts. It did not.

         To reiterate, the Proxy Statement disclosed that the Board focused on antitrust

risk before CoStar made an offer. The Proxy Statement also disclosed that CoStar

itself raised antitrust concerns in its first offer. The Proxy Statement further

disclosed that the Board requested antitrust assurances not only from CoStar, but

also from Stone Point and Insight. Contemporaneous Board minutes reflect, and

Plaintiff does not dispute, that the Board actually had antitrust discussions with its

172
      See, e.g., Tr. at 31:14–17, 32:3–5, 62:3–63:3, 79:10–80:1, 80:15–19.
173
      Bisnow Article.
174
      Ramunno v. Cawley, 705 A.2d 1029, 1034 (Del. 1998).

                                              40
unconflicted advisors and took notice of CoStar’s antitrust lawsuit and related fee

dispute. Florance’s statement is unambiguously contradicted and does not save the

Complaint.

            Undeterred, Plaintiff points to Florance’s paraphrased remark that the Board’s

(purportedly fake) antitrust concerns caused the Company to “turn down” CoStar.175

Based on this language, Plaintiff contends that (purportedly fake) antitrust concerns

“prevented” a CoStar deal.176           This position is undermined by CoStar—and

Florance’s—own statements.

            Recall that the Complaint said the Board “rejected” CoStar on March 4.177

But, on March 4, CoStar issued a public press release (the “Press Release”)

announcing that CoStar—not the Board—terminated sale discussions.178                  And

CoStar did not cite antitrust concerns as the deal-breaker either. Instead, the Press

Release explained that “rising interest rates . . . [in] the mortgage refinancing

market” were likely to “negatively impact valuations for residential property

technology companies.”179           This caused CoStar to “change its view of [the

175
      Bisnow Article.
176
      Compl. ¶ 83.
177
      Id. ¶ 4.
178
      CoStar Gp., Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K) (Mar. 4, 2021) (“Press Release”).
179
      Id.

                                              41
Company’s] value.”180 Nevertheless, CoStar praised the Company and its sale

process. In the Press Release, CoStar called the Company “an excellent company

with a talented team.” 181 Even Florance added his own words of congratulations:

            We wish to congratulate [Stone Point and Insight] on [the Merger] . . . . We
            thank [the] Board and management team . . . and congratulate them on
            achieving a strong valuation for [the Company’s] [stock]holders. 182

            Plus, Plaintiff’s theory suggests that antitrust was the sole focus of the CoStar

negotiations. It was not. As the Proxy Statement disclosed, the Board also aimed

for a deal that offered a substantial premium with cash value certainty on a prompt

closing timeline:

               • On December 18, 2020, the Board met with Evercore and Skadden to
                 assess CoStar’s initial bid. The Board compared the value certainty of
                 an equity transaction with the value certainty of a cash transaction.183
                 Based on that analysis, the Board determined that a cash transaction
                 would be preferable to a stock transaction.184

               • On January 19, 2021, the Board met with Evercore and Skadden to
                 assess CoStar’s revised bid. Among other things, the Board considered:
                 (i) the absence of cash consideration or other price protection for
                 volatility in CoStar’s stock price; (ii) that CoStar would have no
                 obligation to accept any structural, behavioral, or other remedies to
                 obtain regulatory approval for the transaction; and (iii) that the bid

180
      Id. (cleaned up).
181
      Id.
182
      Id.
183
      Proxy Statement at 47.
184
      Id. at 47–48; Ex. 1 at 3 (Dec. 18, 2020 Bd. Minutes).

                                               42
                   contemplated an outside date of nine months from signing, plus two 90-
                   day extensions at CoStar’s option.185

              • On February 2, 2021, the Board met with its advisors to assess CoStar’s
                “best and final offer.” 186 The Board considered: (i) the offer’s price
                structure and regulatory terms; (ii) the potential risks and consequences
                of an antitrust challenge; (iii) the timing of a federal review process;
                and (iv) the risk that CoStar would not take actions necessary to obtain
                regulatory approval.187

              • On February 3 and 4, the Board met with its advisors to consider the
                advantages and disadvantages of the competing bids. The agenda
                included: (i) the risks in the valuation of CoStar stock as compared to
                cash; (ii) the risks and opportunities of obtaining synergies in a
                combination with CoStar; (iii) regulatory risk; (iv) the proposed terms
                of each bidder to address regulatory risk; and (v) the timing and
                certainty of closing on each bid. 188 Relative to CoStar, the Board found
                that Stone Point and Insight’s all-cash offer provided “certain value,”
                more “regulatory certainty,” and a shorter closing time.189

              • On February 17 and 21, 2021, the Board met with its advisors to
                evaluate the Competing Proposal. 190 The Board indicated interest,
                noting that the Company was “prepared to pursue an all-stock
                transaction” at that time.191 Still, the Board concluded that a cash
                component was necessary. 192

185
      Proxy Statement at 50.
186
      Id. at 55–56.
187
      Id. at 56.
188
      Id. at 57; Ex. 14 (Feb. 3, 2021 Bd. Minutes).
189
      Proxy Statement at 57.
190
      Id. at 58–59; Exs. 16–17 (Feb. 17 and 21, 2021 Bd. Minutes).
191
      Proxy Statement at 58–59.
192
      Id.; see also Ex. 12 (Graphics on CoStar Historical Stock Performance).

                                              43
             • On March 3, 2021, the Board met with its advisors to evaluate the
               Revised Competing Proposal. The Board determined that, while the
               offer continued to be reasonably expected to result in a Superior
               Proposal, CoStar should include a substantial increase in the cash
               component and shorten its closing deadline to no more than 12
               months.193

         It is not reasonably conceivable that the Board’s concerns were concocted. In

considering CoStar’s February 16 and March 1 bids, the Board assessed the volatility

of CoStar’s stock price. The Board and its advisors observed that, although high,

CoStar’s stock price had been declining steadily. For example, the Proxy Statement

disclosed that, between February 12 and March 2, CoStar’s stock price had declined

from $939.76 to $762.80 per share. 194 The decrease represented a 19% drop or

approximately $177 per share.195 Based on the 19% decline, the Board learned that

the implied value of the Revised Competing Proposal was $83.73 per share,

including the $6 cash component—not the $90 per share that CoStar advertised.196

         Still, the Board recognized that a CoStar deal would come with synergies. So

the Board persisted. It wanted CoStar to “substantially increase” the cash

193
      Proxy Statement at 60; Ex. 18 (Mar. 3, 2021 Bd. Minutes).
194
   Proxy Statement at 59; Ex. 9 (Evercore Presentation on CoStar Stock Volatility); Ex.
12 (Graphics on CoStar Historical Stock Performance).
195
   Proxy Statement at 59; Ex. 9 (Evercore Presentation on CoStar Stock Volatility); Ex.
12 (Graphics on CoStar Historical Stock Performance).
196
      Proxy Statement at 59.

                                             44
consideration to mitigate future volatility.197 It also wanted CoStar to reduce the 15-

month closing date to no more than 12 months.198 Through March, the Board

believed that CoStar had the ability to make a Superior Proposal. 199 Rather than

renegotiate, CoStar walked.

          Given the timing and content of the CoStar negotiations, the Board’s overall

approach, and the Proxy Statement’s disclosures, it is not reasonably conceivable

that the Board’s antitrust considerations “had nothing to do” with the Merger.200

          Finally, it is worth reemphasizing here that Plaintiff brought the 220 Action

before filing this lawsuit. That investigation evidently did not uncover anything to

support Florance’s statements.          A plaintiff cannot then use the Rule 12(b)(6)

pleading standard to distort reality to plead a follow-on breach of fiduciary duty

claim. 201 In the face of the 220 Action, Plaintiff has essentially asked me to infer,

without any books-and-records support, that the Proxy Statement’s disclosures (and,

indeed, the Board’s minutes) were contrived as part of what amounts to a grand

197
      Id. at 60.
198
      Ex. 18 (Mar. 3, 2021 Bd. Minutes); Proxy Statement at 60.
199
      Ex. 18 (Mar. 3, 2021 Bd. Minutes); Proxy Statement at 59–60.
200
      Bisnow Article.
201
   See Morgan v. Cash, 2010 WL 2803746, at *7 (Del. Ch. July 16, 2010) (“Rule 12(b)(6)
analysis does not give this court license to conjure up a reality on behalf of the plaintiff[.]”).

                                               45
conspiracy. To be clear, I am not weighing the evidence. But I am also not required

to “blindly accept” every allegation as true. 202 Plaintiff undertook the difficult task

of claiming the Proxy Statement is false. The Bisnow Article, standing alone or

combined with the Complaint, misses that mark.

      In sum, the antitrust allegations fail to state a reasonably conceivable

disclosure violation.

      2. Martell’s Interests In Post-Merger Employment

      The Complaint alternatively alleges that the Proxy Statement omitted material

information about Martell’s interest in obtaining post-Merger employment. This

theory does not support a claim either.

             a. Martell’s Future Employment At Stone Point And Insight

      The Complaint alleges that the Proxy Statement failed to disclose that Martell

had conversations with Stone Point and Insight about post-Merger employment. The

Complaint does not identify any document supporting this allegation. Instead, the

Complaint speculates that, because Stone Point and Insight retained Martell after the

Merger closed, it would be “preposterous to assume that there were no discussions

with Stone Point [and] Insight concerning continued employment of management”

202
    Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180, 187 (Del. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Brehm
v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); accord White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 549 (Del. 2001).

                                           46
during the sale process.203 The Complaint also points to a bit of conventional

wisdom that financial buyers often retain target management post-closing. 204

            Precedent rejects Plaintiff’s reasoning here. In English v. Narang,205 target

stockholders alleged that a Recommendation Statement omitted material facts

concerning “post-closing employment opportunities for [target] management.”206

The stockholder-plaintiffs had no evidence that those discussions occurred. Instead,

they theorized that those employment discussions with the acquiror—a financial

buyer—were “likely” because (i) target management “knew” that the acquiror

“routinely retains” existing management; and (ii) the acquiror, on the closing date,

announced that it decided to retain some target managers. 207 The plaintiffs further

reasoned that employment discussions “must have occurred before closing” because

the acquiror’s announcement was filed on the same day that the acquisition closed.208

            The court dismissed the complaint. In doing so, the court first recited the rule

that “if a disclosure document does not say the board or its advisors did something,

203
      Compl. ¶ 105.
204
      Id. ¶ 102.
205
      2019 WL 1300855 (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 2019), aff’d, 222 A.3d 581 (Del. 2019) (TABLE).
206
      Id. at *12.
207
      Id.
208
      Id.

                                               47
then the reader can infer that it did not happen.” 209 That in mind, the court next

observed that the Recommendation Statement’s background section did not discuss

“the timing and extent of any discussions between [the target and acquiror] regarding

post-close employment.” 210         Given that absence, the court explained that the

plaintiffs’ theories would fail “unless plaintiffs allege[d] facts” suggesting that

employment discussions “occurred during the sale process.”211

            They did not. Applying the governing framework, the court concluded that

the plaintiffs’ allegation was entirely speculative and missed the “key point” that

stockholders are entitled to material information about events that happened “during

the sale process,” not “at some point after execution:”

            What is important . . . is whether discussions about post-close employment
            occurred before the Company agreed to do a deal with [the acquiror]. This is
            because the issue that could create a conflict of interest and be material to
            stockholders in deciding whether to tender their shares is whether a fiduciary
            of the Company . . . had a motive to play favorites during the sale process in
            order to secure post-close employment . . . .
            Based on the allegations of the Complaint, it would be speculative—rather
            than reasonable—to infer that such discussions occurred during the sale
            process simply because [the acquiror] has a reputation for retaining
            management. Put differently, the only non-speculative, reasonable inference
            that can be drawn from the Complaint’s allegations is that post-close
            employment discussions occurred at some point after execution of the Merger
            Agreement and before the announcement in the Form 8-K filing issued on the

209
      Id. (alteration omitted) (quoting Sauer-Danfoss, 65 A.3d at 1132).
210
      Id.
211
      Id.

                                              48
         closing date. For the reasons explained above, however, such an omission
         from the Recommendation Statement would not be material . . . . 212

         English is dispositive. Like the stockholder-plaintiffs in English, Plaintiff

bases its theory on a closing-date announcement and the idea that financial buyers

retain management. Plaintiff does not allege facts suggesting that employment

discussions with Stone Point and Insight occurred during the sale process. So

Plaintiff seeks a speculative inference, not a reasonable one. I need not draw it.213

         Moreover, like the Recommendation Statement in English, the Proxy

Statement contains a background section that does not mention employment

discussions with Stone Point and Insight. Consistent with the background, the Proxy

Statement disclosed that, at the time of the stockholder vote, the Company’s

managers had not entered into an employment agreement with Stone Point and

Insight. 214     Given that disclosure, the Proxy Statement was not required to

additionally disclose that the Board or management did not have conversations about

post-Merger employment. 215 If anything, the Complaint supports a reasonable

212
      Id. at *12–13 (first emphasis added) (cleaned up).
213
   See Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, 650 A.2d 1270, 1276 (Del. 1994) (“Delaware law
does not require disclosure of . . . speculative information which would tend to confuse
stockholders or inundate them with an overload of information.”).
214
      Compl. ¶ 102; Proxy Statement at 82.
215
   See Abrons v. Maree, 911 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“Consistent and redundant
facts do not alter the total mix of information . . . .”).

                                              49
inference that Stone Point and Insight decided to retain Martell at some point after

the sale process ended. As in English, any discussion that occurred at that point was

not material.

         To distinguish English, Plaintiff cites two cases: In re Atheros

Communications, Inc. 216 and Maric Capital Master Fund, Ltd. v. Plato Learning,

Inc.217 Both are inapposite.

         In   Atheros,   target   stockholders   alleged   that   a   proxy   statement

mischaracterized employment discussions between the acquiror and one of the

target’s inside directors. The proxy statement disclosed that the director “had not

had any discussions [during the sale process] with [the acquiror] regarding the terms

of his potential employment by” the acquiror.218 But the director had discussed

potential employment with the acquiror via e-mail during the sale process.219 Given

that discrepancy, the court preliminarily enjoined the stockholder vote, finding a

reasonable probability that the plaintiffs stated a meritorious disclosure violation.

216
      2011 WL 864928 (Del. Ch. Mar. 4, 2011).
217
      11 A.3d 1175 (Del. Ch. 2010).
218
      Atheros, 2011 WL 864928, at *11.
219
   Id. The director also admitted in a deposition taken for the preliminary injunction
hearing that he had intra-process employment discussions. See id. at *11 n.84.

                                           50
            The same was true in Maric. There, the proxy statement disclosed that a target

CEO “did not negotiate terms of employment” with the acquiror during the sale

process.220 But the CEO discussed an equity compensation package with the

acquiror during the sale process. 221 The court accordingly held that the proxy

statement “created the materially misleading impression that management was given

no expectations regarding” potential employment.222

            This case is different. In Atheros and Maric, the stockholders had something

more than speculation—communications, testimony—that employment discussions

occurred between management and the acquiror during the sale process. To this

extent, both cases are consistent with English. English dismissed the complaint

because it did not offer the “something more”—communications, testimony—

marshaled in Atheros and Maric. Here, by contrast, Plaintiff only offers Stone Point

and Insight’s announcement at closing. That is not enough.

            The Court cannot infer the existence of undisclosed, intra-process

employment discussions between a target executive and an acquiror from

speculation and innuendo. Again, Plaintiff inspected the Company’s books and

records under Section 220 before filing this action. Plaintiff apparently did not

220
      Maric, 11 A.3d at 1179.
221
      Id.
222
      Id.

                                              51
uncover the “something more” our law requires in this context. Either way, the

Complaint does not support a reasonable inference that the Proxy Statement omitted

discussions about Martell’s future employment. Accordingly, this allegation fails.

                  b. Martell’s Future Employment At CoStar

            The Complaint alternatively alleges the Proxy Statement failed to disclose that

Martell would have been terminated if the Company merged with CoStar. As

support for this allegation, the Complaint relies exclusively on the Bisnow Article.

There, Florance was paraphrased as stating—after CoStar lost its public bid for the

Company—that a CoStar deal would have caused “some” of the Company’s

“executives” to “los[e] their jobs.”223 The Bisnow Article directly quotes Florance

as stating:

            Most of the senior management team there might earn eight digits a year of
            compensation, and in a merger, especially a strategic merger, inevitably
            some of those jobs go away . . . . That’s a powerful motive to not do a deal.224

            One major difficulty with accepting Florance’s statements is that they are

framed generically and seem to express a normative view about the consequences of

strategic mergers that may or may not have been applicable to the factual

223
      Bisnow Article.
224
      Id.

                                               52
circumstances surrounding this case.225 Another major difficulty with accepting

Florance’s statements is that none of the statements references Martell. Yet another

major difficulty with accepting Florance’s statements is that the books and records

that Plaintiff obtained do not support the inference that Florance or CoStar suggested

Martell would be terminated during the sale process—quite the opposite.

         The Complaint alleges that, during a January 17, 2021 Board meeting, Martell

told the Board that “a potential future role for him in the surviving company was a

topic of discussion between himself and [Florance].”226 That is only half the story.

The January 17 meeting minutes report that Martell informed the Board that, during

a call earlier that day, Florance told Martell that he “wanted [Martell] to play a

significant role in the combined entity going forward.”227 Two days later, Florance

and CoStar delivered CoStar’s January 19 bid letter, which stated that CoStar

“envision[ed] ongoing and important roles for [Company] management.” 228 Less

than one month later, Florance and CoStar reasserted, in CoStar’s Competing

225
   At least one decision suggested that this view may be inapt where, as here, the strategic
bidder makes representations about retaining target management. See In re BJ’s Wholesale
Club, Inc. S’holders Litig., 2013 WL 396202, at *10 n.88 (Del. Ch. Jan. 31, 2013).
226
      Compl. ¶ 48 (referencing Ex. 6 (Jan. 17, 2021 Bd. Meeting Minutes)).
227
    Ex. 6 (Jan. 17, 2021 Bd. Minutes). According to the January 17 minutes, Martell
responded that “his potential role in a combined company was not a consideration in
determining whether to enter into any transaction with [CoStar] or any other party[.]” Id.
228
      Ex. 21 (CoStar Revised Bid).

                                             53
Proposal, that CoStar “absolutely want[ed] to retain” the Company’s “talented

management team.”229 CoStar reaffirmed this sentiment in the Press Release.230

Florance echoed it.231

         The Proxy Statement was not required to disclose a fact that “did not exist.”232

And I need not credit an allegation that is unambiguously contradicted by the

documents integral to the Complaint’s allegations.

         My analysis here is perhaps colored by the fact that Plaintiff relies entirely on

statements in an online article that, if anything, smack of post-process sour grapes.

In any event, the Complaint, as pleaded, does not support Plaintiff’s requested

inference that Martell would have lost his job if the Company merged with CoStar.233

So this alleged disclosure violation fails too.

229
      Ex. 25 (Competing Proposal).
230
      Press Release (The Company is an “excellent company with a talented team[.]”).
231
   Id. (“We thank [the] Board and management team . . . and congratulate them on
achieving a strong valuation for [the Company’s] [stock]holders.”).
232
      In re JCC Hldg. Co., 843 A.2d 713, 721 (Del. Ch. 2003).
233
    The Complaint stresses that the Board proposed to CoStar “certain restrictions on
employee retention efforts prior to closing.” Compl. ¶¶ 51, 53. But it is unclear why that
matters. A term that would have limited some operational changes during a transition
period pre-closing does not support a reasonable inference that the Board required or even
wanted CoStar to retain Martell post-closing. Accordingly, this term is irrelevant to my
analysis.

                                             54
         Plaintiff has failed to identify an actionable deficiency in the Proxy Statement.

Corwin therefore requires dismissal of the Complaint.

B. The Complaint Fails To State A Breach Of Fiduciary Duty Claim

         The Complaint fails under Corwin. But even in a pre-Corwin world, I would

find that Plaintiff has failed to state a breach of fiduciary duty claim against Martell.

The Complaint is devoid of specific facts from which to infer that Martell

(improperly or otherwise) steered the Company away from CoStar.

         1. The Applicable Standard

         “The starting point for analyzing fiduciary action is to determine the correct

standard of review.”234         Enhanced scrutiny presumptively applies to cash-out

mergers.235 In that setting, the board’s goal is to “get the best price for the

stockholders at a sale of the company.”236 Revlon, however, does not require that

the board “actually attain[] the best immediate value.”237 After all, “there is no single

blueprint that a board must follow to fulfill its [Revlon] duties.” 238 “[A]t bottom[,]

  Firefighters’ Pension Sys. of City of Kan. City, Mo. Tr. v. Presidio, Inc., 251 A.3d 212,
234

249 (Del. Ch. 2021).

  See, e.g., Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 42–43, 45 (Del.
235

1994); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hldgs., Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
236
   Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243 (Del. 2009) (alteration and internal
quotation marks omitted).
237
      In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 595 (Del. Ch. 2010).
238
      Barkan v. Amsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del. 1989).

                                              55
Revlon is a test of reasonableness; directors are generally free to select the path to

value maximization, so long as they choose a reasonable route to get there.” 239

         Although enhanced scrutiny provides the standard of review, it does not

govern the standard of conduct. “A court does not apply enhanced scrutiny when

determining whether a fiduciary should be held liable” for damages.240 Indeed, there

is no “freestanding ‘Revlon claim’” for damages.241 So a viable claim for damages

“requires more [than] an allegation implying that [a fiduciary] failed to satisfy

Revlon[.]" 242 It must also state a breach of an underlying fiduciary duty.243

         The Company’s charter contains a Section 102(b)(7) exculpatory provision

applicable to directors. 244 As a result, the Complaint must be dismissed, “regardless

of the standard of review[,]” unless it pleads a non-exculpated fiduciary duty

239
      Dollar Thrifty, 14 A.3d at 595–96.
240
      Presidio, 251 A.3d at 252.
241
      USG, 2020 WL 5126671, at *28.
242
      Presidio, 251 A.3d at 254 (internal quotation marks omitted).

  See Malpiede, 780 A.2d at 1083–84; McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 502
243

(Del. Ch. 2000).
244
   Compl. ¶ 22. It is not clear whether Plaintiff has sued Martell in his director or officer
capacity. Because the Complaint fails under any title or theory, I disregard the distinction.

                                              56
claim. 245 Duty of loyalty claims cannot be exculpated. 246 To plead a loyalty-based

damages claim in the Revlon context, “the plaintiff must plead facts supporting a

reasonable inference that the defendant failed to act reasonably to obtain the best

transaction reasonably available, either due to interestedness, because of a lack of

independence, or in bad faith.”247

         “[T]he paradigmatic Revlon claim involves a conflicted fiduciary who is

insufficiently checked by the board and who tilts the sale process toward his own

personal interests in ways inconsistent with maximizing stockholder value.”248

Martell does not fit this mold.

         2. The Allegations Challenging the Sale Process

         Plaintiff alleges that “Martell spearheaded the sale process,” “personally

convinced the [‘supine’] Board to proceed” with the Merger, and “was motivated”

245
      In re Cornerstone Therapeutics Inc. S’holder Litig., 115 A.3d 1173, 1175 (Del. 2015).
246
   Plaintiff also has attempted to allege a breach of the duty of good faith. See Compl. ¶¶
110–14. I summarily reject this claim, however, because the Complaint does not allege
any “extreme set of facts” suggesting Martell “knowingly and completely failed” to obtain
the best price for the stockholders. Frank v. Elgamal, 2014 WL 957550, at *22 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 10, 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted).
247
      Presidio, 251 A.3d at 254.
248
      Mindbody, 2020 WL 5870084, at *13.

                                             57
to do so by an undisclosed “self-interest” in his continued employment and executive

pay. 249 These allegations fail to state a claim for breach of fiduciary duty.

         None of the Board’s 11 outside directors is alleged to be conflicted. None of

those directors is alleged to have been beholden to Martell. Three of them, in fact,

were nominated by entities in connection with a proxy contest. Plaintiff’s allegation

that three directors recently elected during a proxy fight were “supine” is not only

conclusory, but, frankly, strains belief.250

249
      Compl. ¶¶ 4–5, 100; Opp’n Br. at 1–2.
250
     See, e.g., Gregory H. Shill, The Independent Board As Shield, 77 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
1811, 1861–62 (2020) (“Managers often have the capability and incentive to filter and
shape the presentation of information for director consumption . . . . Directors nominated
by activist shareholders are less vulnerable . . . . Such directors—known as designated
or activist directors—usually qualify as independent . . . but are less information-poor than
other outside directors because they can call upon the assistance of staff at the fund that
facilitated their appointment.” (citations omitted)). See also In re Zale Corp. S’holders
Litig., 2015 WL 5853693, at *13 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2015) (noting “skepticism” of claim that
directors nominated by a large target stockholder, even if “beholden” to the stockholder,
would be incented to select a sale proposal less valuable than the one chosen); Air Prods.
& Chems., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 122 (Del. Ch. 2011) (finding reasonableness of
takeover response was “bolstered” by the fact that activist directors on the target board
agreed that the takeover response was appropriate); Venhill Ltd. P’Ship v. Hillman, 2008
WL 2270488, at *25 (Del. Ch. June 3, 2008) (Strine, V.C.) (observing that “outside advisors
. . . help check the potential that [a] conflicted party’s personal motivations will cause the
consummation of a transaction that should have been avoided or, at the very least, been priced
much differently”); see generally In re Williams Cos. S’holder Litig., 2021 WL 754593, at
*29–30 (Del. Ch. Feb. 26, 2021) (“Activists may pressure a corporation to make
management changes, implement operational improvements, or pursue a sale transaction .
. . . Many forms of stockholder activism can be beneficial to a corporation . . . .”), aff’d sub
nom. Williams Cos. v. Wolosky, 264 A.3d 641 (Del. 2021) (TABLE).

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         Nor does the Complaint challenge the Board’s advisors. None of those

advisors is alleged to be conflicted. None of those advisors is alleged to have been

beholden to Martell. None of those advisors is alleged to have provided inaccurate

or irrelevant information. Together with its unconflicted advisors, the concededly

independent Board sought to minimize the regulatory and closing risks inherent to

antitrust scrutiny. It concluded that cash consideration was generally preferable to

stock. And it preferred to close a deal promptly rather than be subject to an extended,

uncertain closing process. All these considerations were disclosed. And these

considerations were applied to all bidders.251

         In all this, Martell is nowhere to be found. He is not alleged to have introduced

the Board’s antitrust concerns. He is not alleged to have recommended cash. And

he is not alleged to have pushed for a quick closing. The Complaint’s conclusory

allegations concerning Martell’s involvement do not support a reasonable inference

that Martell improperly tilted the playing field in favor of Stone Point and Insight or

otherwise wrote the script for the Board’s negotiations or choreographed CoStar’s

decision to walk.

251
      See Proxy Statement at 57; see also Ex. 23 at 3.

                                              59
          True, Martell communicated with Florance and updated the Board. But the

Complaint portrays Martell—who is often group-pleaded with “management”252—

as another member of the negotiation team. There is no well-pleaded allegation that

Martell “personally convinced” the concededly independent Board to do anything.

By the same token, there is no well-pleaded allegation that he “spearheaded” the sale

process. The Board did.

          To make something out of nothing, the Complaint presses Martell’s

compensation package.         It says that salary incentives, coupled with a golden

parachute, caused Martell to “control the Company’s strategy.” 253                   But the

Complaint acknowledges that those benefits would have been realized in a CoStar

deal too.254 So they could not have motivated Martell one way or the other.255

252
      Compl. ¶¶ 5–7.
253
      Id. ¶ 100.
254
   Id. ¶ 75. See also Tr. at 37:12–18 ([Pl.’s Couns.]: “[Martell] stood to receive roughly
the same under a Stone Point[-Insight] transaction or a CoStar transaction in terms of the
mechanics of the golden parachute . . . . I think we calculated that he might get a few million
dollars more in a CoStar deal than . . . the [M]erger.”).
255
   See Lukens, 757 A.2d at 730 (“More importantly, the Complaint does not challenge the
validity or enforceability of the ‘golden parachute’ contracts and acknowledges that
Allegheny was prepared to enter into a merger agreement substantially identical to the
Bethlehem merger agreement. I infer from this that Allegheny was also willing to honor
the golden parachute payments. In the circumstances, there is simply no basis for inferring
that directorial approval of a transaction providing for their payment was the product of
disloyalty or bad faith.” (emphasis in original) (cleaned up)), aff’d sub nom. Walker, 757
A.2d 1278; see also Golden Cycle, LLC v. Allan, 1998 WL 892631, at *12 (Del. Ch. Dec.
10, 1998).

                                              60
         Moreover, the Proxy Statement disclosed Martell’s potential pecuniary

interests in the Merger.256       The stockholders approved the Merger anyway.257

Assuming the (contradicted) allegation that CoStar would have fired Martell is true,

the extra salary he would obtain at Stone Point and Insight is not well-pleaded to be

the wheel that steered the Company away from CoStar.

         The Complaint last highlights the implied-value differential between the

Merger price and the Revised Competing Proposal. The Complaint insists the Board

would have taken the latter had Martell not been pulling the strings. And the Board’s

failure to do so, Plaintiff says, appropriately states a claim under our Revlon-

precedent against Martell. It does not.

         “Delaware law empowers directors to consider whether, under the

circumstances, ‘stock or other non-cash consideration’ is preferable to cash when

evaluating a proposal.”258 Here, the Board countered the Revised Competing

Proposal for at least two reasons. First, rather than resolving the Board’s antitrust

256
      Proxy Statement at 78–83.
257
    Cf. Goldstein, 2022 WL 1671006, at *19 (“[T]he version of the business judgment rule
that applies post-Corwin cannot be rebutted based on director-level conflicts that were
disclosed to stockholders.”); USG, 2020 WL 5126671, at *2 (“[A] bribe, if fully disclosed
to the stockholders in way of a non-coercive vote, . . . theoretically would result in dismissal
under Corwin despite adequate pleading of a clear breach of loyalty on the part of the
directors.”), aff’d sub nom. Anderson, 265 A.3d 995.
258
   In re Essendant, Inc. S’holder Litig., 2019 WL 7290944, at *10 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 2019)
(quoting Paramount, 637 A.2d at 44).

                                              61
concerns, CoStar extended its proposed closing deadline precisely because of its own

apparent regulatory concerns. Second, the Board sought more cash consideration

because CoStar’s stock price was volatile and thus CoStar’s revised bid did not

reflect the nominal value that CoStar advanced, particularly given the lengthening

closing timeline reflected in that bid. Notably, the Board based its view on financial

analyses provided by Evercore, not Martell. Cash provided the value certainty that

defined the Board’s decision-making.

      Having reviewed the Complaint’s allegations and the documents integrated

therein, I conclude that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim. The Board’s choice to

accept the relative certainty of an all-cash, high-premium transaction that

contemplated a prompt closing over a nominally higher-value all-stock transaction

that posed valuation and closing risks does not, as pleaded, support a reasonable

inference of disloyalty. 259 To be clear, the Complaint’s conclusory allegations also

do not support a reasonably conceivable claim that Martell violated his fiduciary

duties in connection with the Board’s decision to counter the Revised Competing

Proposal instead of declaring it a Superior Proposal. If anything, the Complaint

259
   See Citrin v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 68 (Del. 1989) (In
assessing a bid, the board may consider “the proposed or actual financing for the offer,”
“the consequences of that financing,” and “the risk of nonconsummation.” (cleaned up)).

                                           62
supports a reasonable inference that the Board desired a deal with CoStar, but on

terms CoStar was unwilling to accept.

      In the end, the Board conducted a sale process that generated a substantial

premium for the Company’s stockholders. The Complaint does not support a

reasonable inference that the sale process was infected by a conflict of interest. The

Complaint does not support the extreme inference that the Board’s minutes and the

Company’s disclosures are false. And the Complaint does not allege any reasonably

conceivable facts implicating Martell personally in wrongdoing.              Properly

understood, then, the Complaint evinces a mere disagreement with the Merger. That

does not state a claim under Delaware law. Accordingly, I dismiss the Complaint.

                                  CONCLUSION

      For the foregoing reasons, Martell’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

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