Court Opinion

ID: 9805046
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 17:30:33.896166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:33:22.693153
License: Public Domain

Tom, J.P., and Andrias, J.,
dissent in a memorandum by Andrias, J., as follows: Holding that the revolver discovered in appellant’s shoe while he was detained in a police station should have been suppressed, the majority would reverse the order which adjudicated appellant a juvenile delinquent upon his admission that he committed an act that, if committed by an adult, would constitute the crime of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. Because I believe that appellant was lawfully taken into custody, and, considering the totality of the circumstances, that the limited search undertaken when appellant was about to be placed in the precinct’s juvenile room, unguarded, was reasonable in scope and manner of execution, I respectfully dissent.
At approximately 10:30 p.m., a police officer observed appellant and another individual riding bicycles against the flow of traffic on a one way street. Because the individuals were swerving in and out of cars and “creating hazardous conditions,” the officer stopped them, intending to issue summonses for disorderly conduct. However, when the officer asked for identification, appellant responded that he was 16 years old, and that he did not have identification with him. Consequently, the officer decided to take appellant back to the precinct to confirm his identity before issuing a summons. Appellant’s companion, an adult, was also taken into custody.
Appellant was patted down, handcuffed, placed in a police vehicle, and taken to the precinct, where he was searched a second time at the desk. No contraband was discovered in either search. Approximately 20 minutes later, appellant told the officer that he was only 15 years old. At that point, the officer, intending to notify appellant’s parent and complete a juvenile report, asked another officer to place appellant in the precinct’s juvenile room.
Appellant told the first officer that he did not know his mother’s phone number because it was in his cell phone, and that the officer would have to charge the phone before calling her. The officer then charged the phone and completed the juvenile report. Meanwhile, the second officer frisked appellant when he first took him to the juvenile room and did not discover any contraband. Although he had no reason to expect that appellant “had anything on him,” the officer then asked appel*433lant, who was not handcuffed, to sit in a chair and to remove his belt and shoelaces, and to take off his shoes one by one and bang them on the ground. When appellant removed his right shoe and slid it towards the officer, the officer saw a black revolver inside it in plain view. Both officers testified that the requests for appellant to remove his belt, shoelaces and shoes were made in accordance with the precinct’s standard lodging procedure to ensure that appellant did not possess anything that he could use to harm himself and was not secreting any weapon or contraband.
Having probable cause to believe that appellant committed in his presence the offense of disorderly conduct, a violation under Penal Law § 240.20 (7), the officer lawfully elected to take appellant into custody, rather than issuing a summons, based on appellant’s inability to produce identification (see People v Soto, 297 AD2d 581 [1st Dept 2002], lv denied 99 NY2d 564 [2002]; see also People v Rodriguez, 84 AD3d 500, 501 [1st Dept 2011], lv denied 17 NY3d 861 [2011]). Although a warrantless arrest of a juvenile is authorized only in cases where an adult could be arrested “for a crime” (Family Ct Act § 305.2 [2]), under the circumstances before us the fact that appellant was under age 16 did not vitiate the arrest. While appellant told the officer at the precinct that he was only 15, he had lied to the officer about his age at the scene of the offense, which gave the officer reasonable justification to believe that appellant was legally an adult (see People v Wilson, 254 AD2d 316 [2d Dept 1998]; Matter of Charles M., 143 AD2d 96 [2d Dept 1998]). Thus, the arrest of appellant for a violation was lawful because it was based on a reasonable belief as to age, and probable cause that an offense had been committed (id.; see also Matter of Carlton F., 25 AD3d 610 [2d Dept 2006]; Matter of Michael W., 295 AD2d 134 [1st Dept 2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 614 [2002]; Matter of James T., 189 AD2d 580 [1st Dept 1993]; compare Matter of Victor M., 9 NY3d 84, 87 [2007] [arrest not authorized where the appellant “was 15 years old at the time of his arrest, and there (was) no evidence in the record that the officer either believed or had reason to believe that he was older”]). Having lawfully arrested defendant, the police were justified in conducting a search incident to that arrest (see People v Lewis, 50 AD3d 595 [1st Dept 2008], lv denied 11 NY3d 790 [2008]; People v Hernandez, 27 AD3d 292 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 6 NY3d 848 [2006]).
Appellant argues that since the alleged disorderly conduct involved the unlawful operation of a bicycle, it was essentially a minor traffic offense, for which an arrest and incidental search would not be proper (see People v Marsh, 20 NY2d 98 [1967]). *434However, the conduct observed by the police satisfied the elements of the nontraffic offense of disorderly conduct, including the element of, at least recklessly, creating a risk of public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm (see Penal Law § 240.20 [7]). In any event, even treating appellant’s conduct as a traffic infraction, his failure to produce identification, thus rendering it impracticable to issue a summons, justified the police conduct (see People v Ellis, 62 NY2d 393, 396 [1984]; People v Copeland, 39 NY2d 986 [1976]).
The majority believes that the search that revealed the revolver was nevertheless unreasonable because it took place after appellant had told the officer that he was 15 years old. However, appellant’s continued detention, at midnight, pending the arrival of his mother, was reasonable. Although appellant now claimed that he was only 15, he still did not have any identification, which would have enabled the officer to confirm that he was in fact a juvenile, and not 16 as he had originally claimed. As appellant’s actual age was still in question, the officer appropriately determined that the proper course was to contact appellant’s mother, and have her come to the precinct to pick him up. Once it was determined that appellant would be further detained, it was reasonable and prudent for the police to conduct a protective patdown search and, in accordance with standard lodging procedure, to request that appellant, for his own safety and the safety of others, remove his belt, shoelaces and shoes before leaving him by himself in the juvenile room to await his mother (see e.g. Matter of Shamel C., 254 AD2d 87 [1st Dept 1998] [check for weapons in shoe was a permissible minimum intrusion, incidental to patdown search, where officer reasonably believed juvenile was a runaway within meaning of Family Ct Act § 718 (a)]).
In this regard, it is worthy to note that a police direction to a detainee to remove footwear does not transform that search, without more, into a strip search (see People v Vega, 56 AD3d 578 [2d Dept 2008], lv denied 12 NY3d 763 [2009]). Only unreasonable searches are prohibited, “and the individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy is a significant factor in determining reasonableness” (People v Perel, 34 NY2d 462, 466 [1974]). Even assuming that the police knew that appellant was in fact a minor when they took him to the juvenile room, the majority fails to explain why procedures undertaken for the juvenile’s own protection are unreasonable or violate his legitimate expectation of privacy. Unlike the juvenile in Matter of Victor M. (9 NY3d 84 [2007], supra), cited by the majority, appellant was properly brought to the precinct house, largely as a result of his own misrepresentation.
*435Indeed, the majority concedes that in an appropriate case law enforcement officers are authorized to employ reasonable measures to guard against a detainee’s self infliction of harm. Nevertheless, the majority finds that the removal of appellant’s shoes cannot be justified as a protective measure because he had twice been searched by police officers who had no reason to expect that he had “anything on him,” or otherwise posed a danger. However, in United States v Edwards (415 US 800 [1974]), the Supreme Court held that a search incident to arrest may take place after the arrestee has been transported to a place of detention, even where officers may have conducted a brief patdown search at the original time and place of arrest. Furthermore, the State has a significant interest in preserving life and preventing suicidal acts of its detainees (see generally Matter of Bezio v Dorsey, 21 NY3d 93, 104-105 [2013]), and the legitimate ends of a detainee safety search are broader than a search incident to a lawful arrest (see Fate v Charles, 24 F Supp 3d 337 [SD NY 2014]). Thus, while the majority assigns great significance to the fact that no contraband was discovered in the prior patdowns, it remains that appellant was subject to the actual supervision and control of police officers, who were responsible for his safety until such time as he could be released to his mother’s custody. Significantly, while the majority notes that the purpose of asking appellant to remove his belt, shoelaces and shoes was unjustified as a safety measure for the protection of police officers, two patdown searches having been conducted previously, it fails to acknowledge its reasonableness a safety measure for the protection of the juvenile himself.
In sum, considering the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable, both in scope and manner of execution, for the second officer, who had not participated in appellant’s arrest or the prior patdown searches, to ask appellant to remove his shoes as a protective measure before appellant was left by himself in the juvenile room. As a practical matter, neither the interest of the juvenile detainee nor the interest of law enforcement, including the safety of police officers and juvenile detainees, will be promoted by the establishment of a rule that prohibits the search of a juvenile’s shoes in a police station. Such a holding would unduly restrict police searches of detainees in police precincts and may facilitate the secretion of weapons in shoes by detainees to avoid detection. Indeed, had the police failed to properly search appellant before placing him in the juvenile room, one can only imagine the public outcry had appellant shot himself or harmed an officer with the gun secreted in his shoe.