Court Opinion

ID: 9370696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 17:00:24.48823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:23.214140
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 21-3213
                         ___________________________

                             United States of America

                                       Plaintiff - Appellee

                                          v.

                               Tyler Joseph Berglund

                                     Defendant - Appellant
                                   ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                     for the District of North Dakota - Eastern
                                   ____________

                          Submitted: December 13, 2022
                            Filed: February 14, 2023
                                 [Unpublished]
                                 ____________

Before LOKEN, MELLOY, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                           ____________

PER CURIAM.

      Tyler Berglund appeals the district court’s1 denial of his motion for a sentence
reduction. We affirm.

      1
       The Honorable Peter D. Welte, Chief Judge, United States District Court for
the District of North Dakota.
       Berglund pleaded guilty to two counts of possessing a firearm during a drug
trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). Section 924(c)’s “stacking provision”
means that a second § 924(c) conviction carries a 25-year mandatory minimum
sentence. In 2006, when Berglund was sentenced, we applied the stacking provision
even if the first and second § 924(c) convictions were in the same case. The First
Step Act changed this in 2018, imposing the stacking provision only if the first
§ 924(c) conviction was in a separate case. See First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No.
115-391, 132 Stat. 5192. The change was not retroactive, so it did not apply to
Berglund.

       Berglund moved to reduce his sentence, arguing that even though the § 924(c)
change was not retroactive, it qualified as an “extraordinary and compelling
reason[]” for a sentence reduction. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The district
court disagreed. It noted the circuit split on the issue and held that a non-retroactive
change made by the First Step Act is not an extraordinary and compelling reason.2
We review de novo. United States v. Rodd, 966 F.3d 740, 746 (8th Cir. 2020).

       Berglund’s appeal was stayed pending United States v. Crandall, 25 F.4th 582
(8th Cir. 2022). There, we considered the same question and held “that a non-
retroactive change in law, whether offered alone or in combination with other
factors, cannot contribute to a finding of extraordinary and compelling reasons for a
reduction in sentence under § 3582(c)(1)(A).” Id. at 586 (citation omitted); see also
United States v. Taylor, 28 F.4th 929, 930 (8th Cir. 2022). Because Crandall
controls, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
                        ______________________________

      2
        The court also held that Berglund’s release would be inconsistent with the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. See id. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) (allowing a district
court to reduce a prisoner’s sentence if, after considering the § 3553(a) factors, “it
finds that [] extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction”).
Because Crandall is dispositive, see discussion infra, we do not need to address
whether the district court abused its discretion.
                                          -2-