Court Opinion

ID: 9792173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:24:25.085287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:40.905455
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Justice,
-with whom WILSON, Justice, joins, dissenting in part.
¶ 1 Today’s opinion pronounces that the terms of 68 O.S.1991 § 29401 introduce a mechanism for the collection of preassessed ad valorem taxes (and those that would become due for the year of the property’s acquisition) by authorizing the acquiring public agency to (a) withhold these levies from the purchase price that is to be paid the seller and then (b) remit the withheld amount to the county. Because this procedure was not followed here and no money came to be withheld by the acquiring state agency (Okla*634homa Industrial Finance Authority [OIFA or agency]), the court holds that under the provisions of § 2940 individual liability may now be imposed upon OIFA for the delinquent revenue due the county. The opinion declares that the county may recover this delinquency in a personal action against OIFA. Although I join in some aspects of today’s disposition, I recede from the court’s opinion.
¶2 Firstly, I dissent from the court’s construction of 68 O.S.1991 § 2940. The critical issue to be settled here, which is not one of statutory construction, deals with the State’s constitutional immunity from ad valo-rem levies that burden its newly-acquired land. Secondly, I strongly disagree that there can be found in § 2940 any modicum of textually demonstrable (or otherwise divina-ble) legislative intent to transmute the general land-burdening concept of ad valorem levies into the acquiring public agency’s in-' dividual liability for their payment.2 When an agency invokes the § 2940 procedures, an involuntary trust arises (by operation of law) in favor of the county (with the acquiring agency standing as the involuntary trustee and the county as a cestui que trust ).3 This record conclusively reveals that in the process of acquiring the land in suit the § 2940 mechanism was never set in motion. Without the actual existence of a § 2940 trust res, there can be no agency liability under that section.
¶ 3 The dispositive question here is whether the county’s lien survives the State’s entry into the chain of title. If it does, the land is burdened; if not, there is no tax lien. The answer to be given calls for staking out the permissible reach of Art. 10, § 6, Okl. Const.4 — the constitution-anchored provision that deals with state immunity for its land. Based on an analysis of that section’s outer bounds, my response to the critical question is in the affirmative — that the county’s lien survives.
¶ 4 OIFA a subordinate state-sponsored lending agency, acquired its interest in the property in suit while acting in a commercial capacity. Its demand for a title that is completely freed of all ad valorem assessments for the period before OIFA came into the chain of title clearly lacks any support in Oklahoma’s fundamental law. Where the State’s land is, as it was here, acquired in a nonsovereign capacity, its title comes burdened with all delinquent ad valorem taxes previously assessed against the premises (and those to become due up to the time of acquisition).5
¶ 5 I would hence hold today that (a) the terms of § 2940 were neither invoked nor revocable by the acquiring public agency when title to land passed to OIFA; (b) the county’s tax lien for the full amount of preas-sessed ad valorem levies (and for after assessed tax up to the time of the State’s acquisition) survived OIFA’s entry into the chain of title; (c) the State’s land is not freed from the burdening liability; and (d) because the lien survived the state acquisition of title, the remedies which the county may pursue for collection of delinquent ad valorem levies against private owners also are available against this public agency’s land that came to the State in a nonsovereign capacity.
*635I
¶ 6 THE PROVISIONS OF 68 O.S.1991 § 2940 DO NOT IMPOSE UPON THE ACQUIRING PUBLIC AGENCY INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY FOR THE AD VALOREM TAX DUE. IF ITS PROVISIONS ARE INVOKED AND THE MONEY NEEDED TO SATISFY THE AD VALOREM TAX IS INDEED WITHHELD, THE ACQUIRING PUBLIC AGENCY STANDS VIS-AVIS THE COUNTY AS AN INVOLUNTARY TRUSTEE WHO IS LIABLE FOR THE AMOUNT OF TRUSTEES SETTLED THROUGH COMPLIANCE WITH THE § 2940 PROCEDURES.
¶7 The terms of 68 O.S.1991 § 29406 prescribe a method for the acquiring public agency to withhold from the purchase price the amount that represents preassessed and delinquent ad valorem levies (as well as the
proportionate share of the estimated tax for the current year). When the terms of § 2940 are invoked by the acquiring agency and money is withheld, an involuntary trust stands established by operation of law (with the acquiring agency standing as trustee and the county as cestui que trust).7 On the other hand, if, as here, the record is crystal-clear that the acquiring public agency set no money aside from the purchase price to satisfy the delinquent ad valorem levies, no individual liability may attach to the public owner for payment of the delinquency.
¶ 8 Contrary to the court’s conclusion, there is in § 2910 no textually demonstrable (or otherwise divinable) legislative intent to transmute the general land-burdening character of ad valorem levies8 into an acquiring state agency’s individual tax liability. Because no agency liability is imposable by § 2940, the county must resort for collection to the very same procedures as those avail*636able against private landowners9 to enforce its lien upon the OIFA land.10
¶ 9 In the context of this transaction the § 2940 procedure was neither used nor was it invocable.11 The sale was effected by extending a $35,000 credit upon judgments held by the bank and OIFA.12 Since the original acquisition was jointly made by a private entity acting with a public agency, the § 2940 procedures were not at all available to OIFA. Neither did the § 2940 mechanism become available when the bank later transferred to OIFA its interest in the property, but paid no monetary consideration for the transfer of title.13 In sum, no § 2940 trust res was ever in existence. OIFA’s land is burdened but'the agency is free of individual liability for this delinquency.
II
THE RULE PRESSED BY THE STATE TO FREE THE AGENCY’S LAND FROM LIABILITY FOR AD VALO-REM TAX DUE AT THE TIME OF PURCHASE IS NOT INVOCABLE IN THIS CASE
A.
¶ 10 In The Transaction That Is The Subject Of This Litigation The Agency Was Not Acting For The State In A Sovereign Capacity
¶ 11 Acting in a sovereign capacity, states create agencies to perform a wide range of functions at different levels. The subordinate units of government are not themselves sovereign bodies.14 Rather, they serve as instrumentalities of the state acting pursuant to delegated authority,15
¶ 12 OIFA’s stated purpose is to “aid and assist with Oklahoma’s industrial development and provide additional employment and payrolls” (emphasis supplied) within the state.16 To accomplish this goal, the agency may issue and sell bonds, the proceeds of which are placed in an Industrial Development Loan Fund [Fund] that is to be kept in the state treasury. Upon application of an industrial development agency,17 OIFA is au*637thorized to lend money held in the Fund.18 When necessary to protect its loans, OIFA may take title through foreclosure to any industrial development project and then sell, transfer, convey or lease that project to any responsible entity.19
¶ 13 Lending money for the expansion and growth of manufacturing and other industrial enterprises is not a traditional governmental activity. When the State creates a money-lending agency it acts in a commercial capacity. Because OIFA is an inferior agency established primarily to conduct and promote certain business activities, it cannot claim for itself the same status as that due the state when acting in its sovereign capacity.20 When, as here, state ownership of land arises from activities dehors its sovereign role the county cannot be forced to bear the loss of (or relinquish its claim to) ad valo-rem tax revenue.21
B.
¶ 14 In the Transaction That Is the Subject Matter of this Litigation the Agency Was Not Acting for the State as a Constitutional Fiduciary for Any State-owned Property.
¶ 15 This case is uniquely inapposite for conferring upon the State the largesse it may expect under this court’s school land commission jurisprudence. The State errs in relying on that precedent.22 The Commissioners of the Land Office is a constitutionally established managerial fiduciary for school lands.23 In that role the State acts in a sovereign capacity.24 OIFA, on the other hand, is but a legislatively-created money lender.25 In the exercise of the State’s typi*638cally commercial activity, none of its agencies acts in a sovereign capacity.26 While involved in a commercial capacity the State may neither lay claim to sovereign status nor interfere with a county’s constitutionally authorized ad valorem revenue raising.27
¶ 16 In sum, the' State’s exercise of its authority qua constitutional fiduciary for the school lands bears no parallel to a state-sponsored money lending activity. As for the former role, the State acts and takes title to and holds land as a sovereign; in the latter capacity, it functions as commercial enterprise sponsor.
Ill
¶ 17 JUDICIAL EXTINGUISHMENT OF AD VALOREM TAXES DUE OR TO BECOME DUE FOR A PERIOD ANTECEDENT TO STATE ACQUISITION OF LAND IN A NONSOVER-EIGN CAPACITY WOULD OFFEND FUNDAMENTAL STATE LAW
A
¶ 18 The Terms Of Art. 10, § 9, Okl. Const.,28 Prohibit The State From Receiving BeneRts From Ad Valorem Tax Revenue
¶ 19 The State seeks extinguishment of delinquent ad valorem levies against the OIFA-purchased land in order to invest its agency with clear title to the property in contravention of Art. 10, § 9, Okl. Const. The provisions of § 9 operate as an absolute constitutional barrier against appropriation of ad valorem revenue to benefit the State.29 If the court were today to free the land in suit of a validly assessed ad valorem tax, it would enrich the nonsovereign state activity at the expense of the county. The result would clearly offend the § 9 mandate.
¶ 20 The judiciary is bound to give the words of the constitution that meaning which accords with popularly accepted notions of their significance.30 The commonly understood meaning of the pertinent § 9 text31 impels the conclusion that judicial nullification of an ad valorem levy, valid when assessed, which burdens state land acquired in *639a nonsovereign status, violates the constitution’s interdiction of that revenue source’s use for the support of state activities.
B.
¶21 The Provisions of Art. 5, § 53, Okl. Const.,32 Bar Public Officials From Releasing, Extinguishing Or Settling Obligations Due Any Of The There Enumerated Government Units
¶22 The terms of Art. 5, § 53, Okl. Const., provide that the legislature shall have no power to release anyone’s indebtedness to the State, to the county, or to its municipalities.33 Section 53 targets any special act that would extinguish one’s liability for a public debt.34 Extinguishment of an obligation imposed by the county against land acquired by OIFA in furtherance of its commercial enterprise would plainly contravene the cited interdiction in the fundamental law. This court’s jurisprudence, no less than the legislature’s enactments, must faithfully obey the fundamental law’s interdiction against official release of public debts owed to the county and against the use of ad valorem revenue to benefit the State.35 The judiciary is powerless to order county revenue’s seizure and to confer its benefit upon a subordinate state-sponsored lending agency that acquired land in the course of its commercial activity.
IV
¶ 23 A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO CREATING EXEMPTIONS FROM AD VALOREM TAX ASSESSMENTS
¶24 A governmental official’s immunity from civil liability is now allocated on a “functional analysis”.36 In applying this approach *640the court must look to the “nature of the functions” performed at the critical time, and not to the status of the defendant.37 I would adopt today afunctional analysis to determine for this case if the state was acting in a sovereign capacity when acquiring the land against which the unpaid ad valorem assessment is now sought to be canceled.38 Measured by the gauge I propose, the State’s quest for cancellation of the validly assessed tax cannot pass constitutional muster. Its land purchase bears no connection to any exercise of sovereign power. In short, viewed through the prism of a functional analysis, the State’s land in contest here was not acquired in sovereign capacity.
SUMMARY
¶ 25 Ad valorem assessments are a burden on the land as an in rem obligation rather than as the individual (in personam) liability of a landowner. When the procedures of 68 O.S.1991 § 2940 are invoked by the acquiring public agency (and money is withheld from the purchase price to he
paid), an involuntary trust relationship stands created. In the absence of an involuntary trust, there is nothing in § 2940 to show legislative intent for transmuting the land’s delinquent burdens into the acquiring agency’s individual liability. For payment of ad valorem levies no liability may be imposed on the acquiring public agency dehors the parameters of a § 2940 involuntary trust. Because the county’s ad valorem lien survived OIFA’s entry into the chain of title, the land itself cannot be freed of its ad valorem delinquency. The lien of that levy is enforceable against OIFA — qua public titleholder — by the same remedies as those available against private landowners.
¶ 26 Because the State did not take title as a sovereign but rather acquired it in a commercial capacity, the interdictions in Art. 10, § 9, Okl. Const.39 and in Art. 5, § 53, Okl. Const.40 would stand offended by a judicial decree (a) freeing the land acquired by a state-sponsored public money lender from a hen that secures delinquent ad valorem levies and (b) conferring a benefit on the State by *641canceling the county’s legitimate claim to an ad valorem revenue source.
¶ 27 The State’s interest in the land initially acquired jointly with a private entity (through its nonsovereign money-lending agency) is inferior and subject to the county’s lien claim for all preassessed ad valorem' levies (and for afterassessed portion up to the time of the State’s acquisition). The county’s lien survives the State’s entry into the chain of title. OIFA’s demand that its title to the land in suit be recognized as an asset acquired in the State’s sovereign capacity must fail. The nisi prius court should on remand declare the delinquent ad valorem levies validly impressed as a lien but it should pronounce the State’s land free from that burden which may be due for the period beginning with OIFA’s entry into the chain of title as the property’s sole owner.41

. For the text of 68 O.S.1991 § 2940 see infra note 6.

. For the (ad valorem) tax liability of land, see cases cited infra note 8.

. See discussion in Part I infra.

. The pertinent text of Art. 10, § 6, Okl. Const. (1992), is:
"(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b) of this section, ... all property of this state, and of counties and of municipalities of this state ... shall be exempt from taxation. ...” (Emphasis supplied.)

.This conclusion is drawn from consistent Oklahoma jurisprudence which, since statehood, has placed a restrictive construction on the § 6 (supra note 4) immunity for nonsovereign acquisition; but land passing to the State in its sovereign capacity is entirely freed from the lien of any ad valorem tax assessments validly made before its acquisition by the State. State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v. Galyon, 154 Okl. 204, 7 P.2d 484, 485 syl. 1 (1932); see also cases cited in Galyon, supra; Foster v. City of Duluth, 120 Minn. 484, 140 N.W. 129, 131 (1913); State v. Locke, 29 N.M. 148, 219 P. 790, 794 (1923).

.The terms of 68 O.S.1991 § 2940 are:
“Whenever the United States, the state, or a city, town, county, school district, or any other political subdivision, including, but not limited to, a turnpike authority, municipal trust, water or conservation district, flood control district, levee or waterway improvement district, urban renewal authority, public housing authority, or any other authority authorized by law, state or federal, acquires title to any real property for a governmental purpose between January 1 and October 1 of the tax year, such property shall be relieved of ad valorem tax for the remaining months of the year beginning with the first of the month next succeeding the date its acquisition for public purposes becomes a matter of public record, if the deed thereto was recorded prior to October 1; provided, however, that all taxes assessed against such property prior to its acquisition shall be paid in full and there be paid a sum equal to one-twelfth (⅛) times the number of months that the property remained in private ownership of an amount estimated by the county treasurer of the county wherein the real property lies to be substantially equal to the amount of tax which would have been or will become due and payable for the year had the real property not been acquired for public purposes. In estimating the amount of taxes which would have been or will become due and payable for the tax year had the real property not been acquired for public purposes the county treasurer shall use as a basis the current assessment and the tax rate for the preceding year, unless the tax for the current year shall be by then determined and set, in which event he shall use as basis the new assessment and rate. The.public agency acquiring the property shall deduct the amount of such taxes from the purchase price payable to the private owner and remit the same to the county treasurer in satisfaction of such taxes. The county treasurer of any county is hereby authorized upon order of the board of tax roll corrections to cancel of record all taxes assessed against such property for the year of its acquisition when the deed thereto was recorded prior to October 1 and the aforesaid estimated amount of the tax for the months that the property was in private ownership is paid, which order shall be issued upon application of the acquiring authority.” (Emphasis added.)

. One who, though not a consensual trustee, stands nonetheless liable qua trustee for misapplied fiduciary funds is known in equity jurisprudence as involuntary or de son tort trustee. Sandpiper North Apts., Ltd. v. American Nat’l Bank, 1984 OK 13, 680 P.2d 983, 988. The terms — de son tort, ex maleficio, constructive, involuntary, implied-in-law trustee or one by operation of law — are all synonyms. Id. at 988 n. 10; Davis v. National Bank of Tulsa, 1960 OK 151, 353 P.2d 482, 488.

. Ad valorem assessments are obligations in rem and not in personam. No personal liability is cast upon the properly owner to pay the assessments levied against the land. U.S. v. Home Fed. S. & L. of Tulsa, 1966 OK 135, 418 P.2d 319, 325; Allen v. Henshaw, 197 Okl. 123, 168 P.2d 625, 629 (1946); McDonald v. Duckworth, 197 Okl. 576, 173 P.2d 436, 438 (1946) (the ad valo-rem tax code provides a comprehensive system by which delinquent taxes on real estate may be collected by the sale of the property). Although no personal liability for ad valorem taxes is chargeable against the owner, the unpaid levies *636constitute a continuing lien upon the realty. Home Fed S. & L., supra at 325.

. 68 O.S.1991 § 3105; Dealing v. State ex rel. Com'rs of Land Off., 1982 OK 5, 642 P.2d 226, 228-29 (when tax is overdue, unpaid ad valorem levies against realty attach as a lien against the entire fee and, unless redeemed, make the property subject to sale in satisfaction of the delinquency).

. OIFA may sue and be sued in all courts. 74 O.S.1991 § 855(h).

. The § 2940 procedure is ideally available in situations in which there is a cash purchase and money is due from the acquiring public agency to the owner.

. The property in contest was acquired at sheriff's sale on January 7, 1992 by OIFA (87.5%) and the plaintiff (bank) (12.5%) taking title jointly in their proportional undivided interests.

. OIFA acquired 100% fee ownership of the property in contest on August 9, 1995 when the plaintiff bank quitclaimed to OIFA its entire interest in the property.

. Sovereign power resides either in the federal government or in the several states. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 50, 102 S.Ct. 835, 842, 70 L.Ed.2d 810 (1982); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 379-81, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 1111-12, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886).

. Government 'bodies with limited legislative functions" are “derived from, or exist in, subordination to” state sovereign bodies. Kagama, supra note 14, 118 U.S. at 379, 6 S.Ct. at 111 1—12; see also Benson & Gold Chevrolet, Inc. v. Louisiana Motor Vehicle Com'n, 403 So.2d 13, 20 (La.1981) ("the principle is well established that an administrative agency must act in conformity with its statutory authority, which it cannot exceed"). See in this context Shenefield, The Parker v. Brown State Action Doctrine and the New Federalism of Antitrust, 51 Antitrust L.J. 337, 341 (1982) ("[sjubordinate [state] agencies operate under delegations of state sovereign power, and can only follow state policy”).

. 74 O.S.1991 § 852.

. An "industrial development agency” is statutorily defined as "any Oklahoma incorporated organization, foundation, association or agency, regardless of the particular name, whether organized for profit or nonprofit, which shall have as its primary function the promotion, encouragement and development of industrial, recreation*637al, agricultural processing and manufacturing enterprises, livestock processing and conditioning enterprises and enterprises which process mined resources in Oklahoma.” 74 O.S.1991 § 853(d).

. 74 O.S.1991 § 855(g).

. 74 O.S.1991 § 855(o).

. A helpful analogy may be found in the rule of common law that, absent explicit legislation to the contrary, exemption from the impact of statutory limitations on personal actions stands confined to the state qua sovereign. State ex rel. Schones v. Town of Canute, 1993 OK 90, 858 P.2d 436, 440 (Opala, J., dissenting); Okl. City Mun. Imp. Auth. v. H.T.B., Inc., 1988 OK 149, 769 P.2d 131, 137 (Opala, J., dissenting). When acting in sovereign capacity no state agency is subject to statutory limitations unless it is expressly included by the terms of the pertinent enactment. Time bars do and will govern the State when it is acting in a proprietary or commercial capacity. See People v. Hale, 320 Ill.App. 645, 52 N.E.2d 308, 310-311 (1943); Great Western Ins. Co. v. Saunders, 223 Iowa 926, 274 N.W. 28, 31-32 (1937); City of Reidsville v. Burton, 269 N.C. 206, 152 S.E.2d 147, 151-152 (1967); Trustees of Bergen Community College v. J.P. Pyfe, Inc., 188 N.J.Super. 288, 457 A.2d 83, 86-88 (Law Div.1982), aff'd, 192 N.J.Super. 433, 471 A.2d 38, 40 (App.Div.1983), certification denied, 96 N.J. 308, 475 A.2d 598 (1984).

. See Part 111(A) and (B), infra.

. For the notion that upon a state agency's acquisition of title to land the county’s tax lien must be extinguished, the State relies on Galyon, supra note 5 at 485 syl. 1 (real estate acquired by the state in its sovereign capacity is absolved of further liability for ad valorem taxes); State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v. Passmore, 189 Okl. 232, 115 P.2d 120 (1941).

. Art. 6, § 32, Okl. Const.; Art. 11, §§ 1, 2 and 5, Okl. Const. See Oklahoma Ed. Assn. Inc. v. Nigh, 1982 OK 22, 642 P.2d 230, 235-36; State ex rel. Commissioners of Land Office v. Armstrong, 199 Okl. 474, 188 P.2d 347, 349 (1947). The Commissioners of the Land Office is a constitutional body that has control of the sale, rental, disposal and management of school land and of other public lands of the state. Nigh, supra at 235-237; Haskell v. Haydon, 33 Okl. 518, 126 P. 232, 233 (1912).

. Nigh, supra note 23 at 235-236 (the primary purpose of the school land trust is the protection of income for the support and maintenance of the common schools of the state); Sears v. Fair, 1964 OK 239, 397 P.2d 134, 138; Goodin v. Commissioners of Land Office, 174 Okl. 364, 50 P.2d 189, 191 (1935).

. The pertinent terms of Art. 10, § 33A, Okl. Const., are:
"The Legislature of the State of Oklahoma is hereby authorized to enact legislation creating a State Industrial Finance Authority ... [which] shall be, and is hereby, authorized to issue and sell State Industrial Finance Bonds ... the proceeds [of which] ... to be loaned, and reloaned, by said Authority only to Oklahoma incorporated industrial development agencies (whether profit or non-profit) in Oklahoma communities, which agencies shall first have been approved and qualified by said Authority, such loans to be secured either by first *638or second mortgage on the land, buildings and facilities of such industrial properties ...”
Oklahoma Industrial Finance Authority was created by enabling legislation (74 O.S.1991 §§ 851 et seq.) defining it as "a body corporate and politic, constituting a public corporation and governmental instrumentality” of the state. 74 O.S.1991 § 854.

. State Insurance Fund v. Taron, 1958 OK 282, 333 P.2d 508, 513 (when the government acts in a proprietary capacity, it does not enjoy sovereign status); State v. Graham, 12 Kan.App.2d 803, 758 P.2d 247, 251 (1988) (governmental functions are those which are performed for the "general public with respect to the general welfare”); State ex rel. Schneider v. McAfee, 2 Kan.App.2d 274, 578 P.2d 281, 283 (1978); State ex rel. Stephan v. Brotherhood Bank and Trust Co., 8 Kan.App.2d 57, 649 P.2d 419, 422-23 (1982); People ex rel. Nelson v. Waukegan State Bank, 351 Ill. 158, 184 N.E. 237, 238 (1932) (while the state itself is sovereign, its agencies are not so universally).

. Tax cancellation by judicial fiat would imper-missibly invest an inferior agency — acting for the State in a purely commercial capacity — with a license to extinguish legitimate ad valorem revenue sources of a county.

. The pertinent terms of Art. 10, § 9, Okl. Const., are:
"(a) * * * No ad valorem tax shall be levied for State purposes, nor shall any part of the proceeds of any ad valorem tax levy upon any kind of property in this State be used for State purposes. * * *”

. Board of County Com’rs of Muskogee County v. City of Muskogee, 1991 OK 115, 820 P.2d 797, 805.

. Recognized constitutional hermeneutics dictates that fundamental-law provisions be interpreted in conformity with their ordinary significance in the English language, i.e., that they be given their commonly accepted nontechnical meaning. Fundamental-law provisions must be construed in a practical manner in order to hon- or the plainly manifested intent of their drafters. In re Initiative Petition No. 363, State Question No. 672, 1996 OK 122, 927 P.2d 558, 570; Ogden v. Hunt, 1955 OK 125, 286 P.2d 1088 syl. 1, 2; Sharpe v. State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Association, 1968 OK 1, 448 P.2d 301, 306; Wade v. Brown, 1973 OK 137, 516 P.2d 526, 528; Campbell v. White, 1993 OK 89, 856 P.2d 255, 262.

. For the pertinent text of Art. 10, § 9, Okl. Const., see supra note 28.

. The terms of Art. 5, § 53, Okl. Const., are:
"Except as to tax and assessment charges against real property remaining delinquent and unpaid for a period of time as long or longer than that provided by law to authorize the taking title to real property by prescription, the Legislature shall have no power to release or extinguish, or to authorize the releasing or extinguishing, in whole or in part, the indebtedness, liabilities, or obligations of any corporation or individual, to this State, or any county or other municipal corporation thereof."
Delinquent taxes are “liabilities”, and any law directly or indirectly releasing or extinguishing liabilities for taxes, in whole or part, is unconstitutional. Thompson v. Smith, 189 Okl. 217, 114 P.2d 922 (1941). A statute providing for refunding of penalties accrued on ad valorem taxes was not violative of this section. City of McAlester v. Jones, Okla., 181 Okl. 77, 72 P.2d 371 (1937). Laws 1915, Ch. 8, which extended the time for payment of certain taxes, did not remit or release penalties which had already accrued on delinquent taxes in violation of this section. Rogers v. Mann, Okla., 53 Okl. 648, 157 P. 331 (1916).

. The provisions of Art. 5, § 53, Okl. Const., supra note 32, were intended to stamp out rampant and pernicious practice by some lawmakers of sponsoring bills to exonerate their political cronies of liability for a public debt. See Covington Bridge v. Davidson, 102 S.W. 339, 340 (Ky.1907); In re Stanford's Estate, 126 Cal. 112, 58 P. 462, 464 (1899), identified in R.L. Williams, The Constitution and Enabling Act of the State of Oklahoma Annotated (1912), as a material source for the Constitutional Convention’s text of Art. 5, § 53. See also State ex rel. Schones v. Town of Canute, 1993 OK 90, 858 P.2d 436, 440 (Opala, J., dissenting).

. Liability for taxes is treated as fixed only when their assessment has become final. Love v. Silverthorn, 187 Okl. 114, 101 P.2d 254, 257 (1940).

. See, in the connection, Art. 5, § 46, Okl. Const., jurisprudence: Reynolds v. Porter, 1988 OK 88, 760 P.2d 816, 822. Although directed to the legislature, the terms of Art. 5, § 53, Okl. Const., supra note 32, and Art. 10, § 9, Okl. Const., supra note 28, are no less binding on the courts.

. See, e.g., Richardson v. McKnight, - U.S. -,-, 117 S.Ct. 2100, 2109-2110, 138 L.Ed.2d 540 (1997) (private prison guards, unlike those who work directly for the government, do not enjoy immunity from suit in a § 1983 case); Clinton v. Jones, —— U.S. -, -, 117 S.Ct. 1636, 1644, 137 L.Ed.2d 945 (1997) (in a § 1983 action there is no absolute immunity for damages arising from "unofficial conduct”); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 113 S.Ct. 2606, 125 L.Ed.2d 209 (1993) (there is no absolute immunity for a prosecutor's conspiracy to manufacture false evidence that was later introduced at grand jury proceedings and at trial, or for a prosecutor's out-of-court statements to the press); Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 484-486, 111 S.Ct. 1934, 1938-1939, 114 L.Ed.2d 547 (1991) (prosecutors have absolute immunity for their actions in participating in a probable-cause hearing but not in giving advice to the police); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224, 108 S.Ct. 538, 542, 98 *640L.Ed.2d 555 (1988) (a judge is not entitled to absolute immunity for the "administrative” act of dismissing an employee); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 342-343, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096-1097, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986) (a police officer is not entitled to absolute immunity for false statements made in a warrant application); Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 201, 106 S.Ct. 496, 500, 88 L.Ed.2d 507 (1985) (there is no absolute immunity for prison disciplinary board members who adjudicate free from various procedural safeguards, including, the right to counsel, cross-examination, a transcript, and direct judicial review); Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 342, 103 S.Ct. 1108, 1119, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (all witnesses, including those who give perjured testimony, are absolutely immune from civil suit under § 1983); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 810, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2734, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982) (government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known); Butt v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 511-513, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2913-2914, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978) (federal officials are not liable for mere mistakes in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law); Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 420-425, 96 S.Ct. 984, 990-993, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976) (state prosecutors have absolute immunity for the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution, including presentation of the state’s case at trial).

. Briscoe, supra note 36, 460 U.S. at 342, 103 S.Ct. at 1119; Forrester, supra note 36, 484 U.S. at 229, 108 S.Ct. at 545 ("it [is] the nature of the function performed, not the identity of the actor who performed it, that informfs] our immunity analysis") (emphasis added); Cleavinger, supra note 36, 474 U.S. at 201, 106 S.Ct. at 496 ([absolute immunity "flows not from rank or title or ‘location within the Government;' ... but from the nature of the responsibilities of the individual official”), quoting Butz, supra note 36, 438 U.S. at 511, 98 S.Ct. at 2913.

. Functional approach is thus far limited to governmental employees carrying out the various functions for their employer. The analysis has not yet been extended to private individuals who undertake for profit government tasks to be performed under a contract. See, e.g., Richardson, supra note 36, — U.S. at -, 117 S.Ct. at 2107-08 (the Court refused to extend the functional-analysis approach to employees of a private enterprise performing governmental functions).

. For the pertinent terms of Art. 10, § 9, Okl. Const., see supra note 28.

. For the pertinent terms of Art. 5, § 53, Okl. Const., see supra note 23.

. Once the property had passed to the State in any capacity, the county's power further to burden it with ad valorem levies came to an end by force of Art. 10, § 6, Okl. Const., supra note 4; Galyon, supra note 5 at 485.