Court Opinion

ID: 9639959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:53:30.101047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:05.817440
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge SMITH-RIBNER.
I respectfully disagree with the decision of the Majority to reverse the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, which in an exhaustive review of relevant and persuasive case law denied the motion filed by the City of Philadelphia (Appellant) requesting entry of summary judgment in Thomas Jones’ (Appellee) civil action. Appellee avers a cause of action for money damages against the City, and other named defendants, pursuant to Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution 1 arising out of injuries he sustained when police used excessive force to arrest him and thereby violated his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures. Appellant claims governmental immunity under 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8564, commonly known as the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims Act), and it contends that the Court need not create a state constitutional cause of action for money damages when Appellee may seek relief in an action in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Section 1988).
Notwithstanding its extensive research, discussion and analysis of the history of Pennsylvania constitutional case law vis-a-vis the presumed alternative remedies available under Section 1983 to conclude that no state constitutional cause of action exists, the Majority ultimately decides to protect the state and local governments from damage causes of action under Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution based on excessive use of force by police because adverse consequences might inure to governments absent some defined statutory scheme. I reject this “adverse consequences” contention as a basis for refusing to recognize a civil remedy for the violation of an express right guaranteed by the Constitution. As the New York Court of Appeals recognized in Brown v. State of New York, 89 N.Y.2d 172, 652 N.Y.S.2d 223, 674 N.E.2d 1129 (1996), the state constitution is a source of positive law and not merely some set of limitations on government.
Initially, I note that a trial court’s order denying summary judgment should be reversed only when it is clear that no relief may be granted as a matter of law and that the trial court committed an error of law. Cochran v. GAF Corp., 542 Pa. 210, 666 A.2d 245 (1995); Davis v. Brennan, 698 A.2d 1382 (Pa.Cmwlth.1997). That standard is not met here simply because the Majority concludes that an alternative remedy exists under Section 1983 or because no state statute or prior case authority exists that recognizes a cause of action under Article I, Section 8.
The principle is firmly established that when interpreting provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution the Pennsylvania Supreme Court is not bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court in interpreting similar federal constitutional provisions. In Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 526 Pa. 374, 586 A.2d 887 (1991), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court established the principle that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution embodies a strong notion of privacy, despite federal decisions to the contrary under Fourth Amendment analysis, and that the right *1218afforded in Article I, Section 8 to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is connected to the Constitution’s implicit right to privacy in this Commonwealth. The Pennsylvania Constitution thus affords greater protection against unreasonable searches and seizures than does the federal constitution, and as quoted in Edmunds Article I, Section 8 serves “as an independent source of supplemental rights.” Id., 526 Pa. at 398, 586 A.2d at 899 (emphasis added).
In reviewing developments in exclusionary rule jurisprudence since Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Edmunds noted the inception of its divergence from federal precedent in 1973 and explained that the United States Supreme Court had moved toward a view suggesting that the exclusionary rule’s purpose was not to “redress the injury to the privacy of the search victim,” id., 526 Pa. at 396, 586 A.2d at 898, but rather to deter future unlawful police conduct. Thus it is logical to presume that in Edmunds the Supreme Court recognized that Article I, Section 8 represented an added source for redress of injury caused by a violation of the guaranteed right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Indeed, the court had previously endorsed the view that Article I, Section 8 offered an independent source of supplemental rights.
In Edmunds the Supreme Court set forth clear guidelines for courts to follow when interpreting provisions of the Pennsylvania Constitution on questions of first impression. As a general rule, litigants should brief and analyze the following stated factors: (1) text of the constitutional provision; (2) history of the provision, including Pennsylvania case law;2 (3) any *1219related ease law from other states; and (4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state and local concern, and their applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence. The Supreme Court agreed that depending on the issue involved, an examination of federal case precedent may be helpful in the state constitutional analysis. For purposes of this case, the critical factors weighing in the Court’s analysis concern a review of related case law from other states and policy considerations and their applicability within modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence. As noted in Brown, other state courts have allowed state constitutional tort claims based on (1) reasoning contained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 874A (1979) (Restatement); (2) analogy to an action under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971); and (3) common-law antecedents of constitutional provisions under interpretation, or a combination of these.
In Brown the New York Court of Appeals held that a cause of action for damages may be filed against the state for violations of the equal protection and unreasonable searches and seizures clauses under article I, sections 11 and 12 of the New York constitution arising out of claims from unlawful stops, interrogation and searches by New York police and state university security of all Black male university students located in the area of an alleged early-morning attack against a white female. The court considered Section 874A of the Restatement, which provides that a court may imply a civil remedy from legislative or constitutional provisions even when a remedy is not expressly provided for if the court determines that a remedy is appropriate to further the purpose of the provision and to assure its effectiveness, and it reasoned that the analysis in Bivens demonstrates the Restatement principle. In addition, the court was keenly aware of the fact that a Section 1983 action is controlled by federal statutory and case law, which limit liability to actions taken “under color of state law” or as a matter of governmental policy or custom. By contrast, a plaintiff seeking to recover under respondeat superior in a state constitutional claim does not fall within the Section 1983 limits.
In answering questions presented by the court’s recognition of a state constitutional cause of action under the equal protection and unreasonable searches and seizures clauses of the New York constitution, regardless of the absence of statutory or common-law bases, the court reasoned in Brown as follows:
In Bivens, the Supreme Court implied a cause of action for damages against Federal officials who violated the search and seizure provisions of the Fourth Amendment. The underlying rationale for the decision, in simplest terms, is that constitutional guarantees are worthy of protection on their own terms without being linked to some common-law or statutory tort, and that the courts have the obligation to enforce these *1220rights by ensuring that each individual receives an adequate remedy for violation of a constitutional duty. If the remedy is not forthcoming from the political branches of government, then the courts must provide it by recognizing a damage remedy against the violators much the same as the courts earlier recognized and developed equitable remedies to enjoin unconstitutional actions. Implicit in this reasoning is the premise that the Constitution is a source of positive law, not merely a set of limitations on government.
The prohibition against unlawful searches and seizures originated in the Magna Carta and has been a part of our statutory law since 1828.... The civil cause of action was fully developed in England and provided a damage remedy for the victims of unlawful searches at common law....
[Tjhere is historical support for the claimants’ contention that the rights guaranteed by these two provisions have common-law antecedents warranting a tort remedy for invasion of the rights they recognize. Indeed, the availability of a civil suit for damages sustained as the result of a constitutional violation was contemplated by the delegates to the Constitutional Convention of 1938. They did not consider whether one was desirable — they assumed a civil remedy already existed.-...
Moreover, implying a damage remedy here is consistent with the purposes underlying the duties imposed by these provisions and is necessary and appropriate to ensure the full realization of the rights they state.... The analysis is not unlike that which the Supreme Court and this Court have used to find a private right of action based upon certain regulatory statutes and is consistent with the rule formulated by the Restatement. ...
These sections establish a duty sufficient to support causes of action to secure the liberty interests guaranteed to individuals by the State Constitution independent of any common-law tort rule.... The harm they assert was visited on them was well within the contemplation of the framers when these provisions were enacted for fewer matters have caused greater concern throughout history than intrusions on personal liberty arising from the abuse of police power. Manifestly, these sections were designed to prevent such abuses and protect those in claimants’ position. A damage remedy in favor of those harmed by police abuses is appropriate and in furtherance of the purpose underlying the sections.
Nor should claimants’ right to recover damages be dependent upon the availability of a common-law tort cause of action. Common-law tort rules are heavily influenced by overriding concerns of adjusting losses and allocating risks, matters that have little relevance when constitutional rights are at stake. Moreover, the duties imposed upon government officers by these provisions address something far more serious than the private wrongs regulated by the common law....
... By recognizing a narrow remedy for violations of sections 11 and 12 of article I of the State Constitution, we provide appropriate protection against official misconduct at the State level.
Brown, 89 N.Y.2d at 187-92, 652 N.Y.S.2d at 232-35, 674 N.E.2d at 1138-1141. Essentially, to give any meaning to the state constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures the court allowed a *1221cause of action under the state constitution to vindicate a violation of that right.
Comment from the decision in Newell v. City of Elgin, 34 Ill.App.3d 719, 340 N.E.2d 344 (1976), lends added support for the trial court’s decision in the case sub judice. The Appellate Court of Illinois recognized a cause of action for damages under the state constitution against the city based solely on the rationale in Bivens. Police drove squad cars across the center line and forced Newell, who was on a motorcycle, off the road and into a curb resulting in his injury. Police then ordered Newell to ride his motorcycle to the police station and threatened to shoot him if he changed direction. He filed a complaint against the city of Elgin, the villages of Bartlett and Hanover Park and several police officers seeking exemplary damages for violation of his rights under, inter alia, the unreasonable searches and seizures provision of the Illinois constitution. The court below dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action for damages, but the appellate court reversed because the municipalities could be held liable for actual damages and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court explained: “ ‘The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.’ ” Id., 34 Ill.App.3d at 724, 340 N.E.2d at 349 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163, 2 L.Ed. 60, 69 (1803)).
In connection with the Majority’s stated policy considerations, I note its failure to recognize the overriding need and public demand for the state and local governments to enforce rights guaranteed in the state’s Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures by eradicating excessive use of force by police in the performance of their duties. The Louisiana Supreme Court said it best in Moresi v. Louisiana, 567 So.2d 1081, 1093 (La.1990), in allowing a private damages cause of action for violation of rights guaranteed by the state constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures:
Indeed, the limitations on remedies under ordinary state law for violations of rights by other private citizens argue in favor of a state constitutional remedy. The injuries inflicted by officials acting under color of law are substantially different in kind than those inflicted by private parties. Recovery of damages is the only realistic remedy for a person deprived of his right to be free from unreasonable searches or seizures. Rarely will he be able to obviate the harm by securing injunctive relief from any court. Assuming his innocence of the crime charged, the exclusionary rule is simply irrelevant.
The foregoing reasoning applies with equal force here for there is no doubt that an individual in this Commonwealth should be allowed to pursue a cause of action under Article I, Section 8 the Pennsylvania Constitution to redress violations of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Moreover, it does not stretch the imagination to conclude that an unreasonable seizure under Article I, Section 8 is one that entails excessive use of force that is unnecessary in performing the officer’s duties by any objective standard under the circumstances. For guidance see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (defining “seizure” as when government actors restrain a citizen’s liberty by means of physical force or show of authority and holding that law enforcement excessive use of force claims are to be analyzed under Fourth Amendment “objective” reasonableness standard that provides explicit textual source of constitutional protection against physically intrusive governmental conduct).
*1222In regard to the contention that potential financial consequences might- befall state and local governments if this Court were to allow a state constitutional cause of action for excessive use of force, I would point out that the Supreme Court in Renk v. City of Pittsburgh, 537 Pa. 68, 641 A.2d 289 (1994), required the City to indemnify a police officer found liable to the plaintiff under various state tort claims arising out of the officer’s use of unnecessary or excessive force in arresting the plaintiff. The court imposed liability on the City under the Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8548(a), for the judgment against the officer because he acted within the scope of his duties. See also Wiehagen v. Borough of North Braddock, 527 Pa. 517, 594 A.2d 303 (1991) (holding borough hable in state court to indemnify police officer for compensatory damages judgment against him and holding borough liable for plaintiffs reasonable attorney fees, costs and expenses incurred in a Section 1983 action, plus interest). Hence, the Majority’s concerns over potential financial consequences that might befall state and local governments if a state constitutional cause of action were allowed is simply unsupportable even on policy consideration grounds when the governments may be made to pay damages in any event where judgments are entered against police in civil actions arising out of excessive use of force in making arrests.
Nevertheless, in a Section 1983 action for monetary relief a plaintiff must demonstrate that the conduct complained of was committed under color of state law and that it operated to deny the plaintiff a right or rights secured by the Constitution and the laws of the United States. Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978). The plaintiff must prove a governmental policy, custom or practice that was responsible for the deprivation of a guaranteed right. Id. However, no such limitation is imposed under the explicit and self-executing provisions of Article I, Section 8, see n2 above, to prove a violation of one’s right against unreasonable searches and seizures. I disagree that legislation is required to make the provision operative but more fundamentally discern no basis to foreclose a state constitutional cause of action in this case. After applying the factors in Edmunds, including review of relevant Pennsylvania cases, review of related cases from other states and review of policy considerations and their applicability to modern Pennsylvania jurisprudence, I conclude that the the trial court should be affirmed. It is evident that the absence of a right to relief is not clear and free from doubt and that the trial court therefore did not err.
In conclusion, the state and local governments ultimately must be held accountable for the excessive use of force by their police in violation of the unreasonable searches and seizures provision of Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution. They alone have the power and the authority to avoid state constitutional claims by preventing excessive use of force by police through proper training and supervision and/or discharge and discipline in the face of repeated abuses of police power. The Constitution commands no less. I dissent.
Judge FRIEDMAN joins in this dissent.

. Article I, Section 8 provides as follows:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the affiant.

. In Coffman v. Wilson Police Department, 739 F.Supp. 257 (E.D.Pa.1990), the federal district court held that claims arising from violations of the Pennsylvania Constitution may be raised against local governments and that the plaintiffs claims arising under Article I, Sections 8 and 26 were not barred by the Tort Claims Act. Cf. Warren v. Cheltenham Township, No. Civ. A. 94-4999, 1995 WL 732804, at *6 (E.D.Pa. November 13, 1995) (“[S]ection 8541 does not render local governments immune to actions under the constitution of Pennsylvania.”); In re PVI Assocs., 181 B.R. 210, 215 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1995) ("[I]t remains true that neither the concept of sovereign nor governmental immunity is designed to insulate government agencies from claims arising under the State Constitution.”). The court in Coffman cited Pennsylvania cases decided after enactment of the Tort Claims Act in 1980, and while recognizing that later federal court decisions have disagreed with Coffman Appellee notes that the Tort Claims Act only immunizes torts arising under common law or a statute. See also Article I, Section 26 ("Neither the Commonwealth nor any political subdivision thereof shall deny to any person the enjoyment of any civil right, nor discriminate against any person in the exercise of any civil right.”); Erd-man v. Mitchell, 207 Pa. 79, 56 A. 327 (1903) (holding that Article I, Section 26 needs no affirmative legislation for its enforcement in civil courts as the right of liberty and right to acquire property must be recognized and protected under common-law judicial power of courts, and it needs no statutory authority to enforce against the violators of constitutional rights).
In determining whether an implied cause of action exists under Article I, Section 8, this Court may find direction in Article I, Section 11, which provides that "every man for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have remedy by due course of law[.]” Guidance may be found in other Pennsylvania court decisions allowing claims against municipalities for violation of the Declaration of Rights in the Pennsylvania Constitution. See, e.g., Thelin v. Borough of Warren, 118 Pa.Cmwlth. 336, 544 A.2d 1135 (1988) (allowing suit for violation of contract rights under Article I, Section 17); Williams v. City of Pittsburgh, 109 Pa.Cmwlth. 168, 531 A.2d 42 (1987) (recognizing suit for violation of equal protection and due process clauses); Hunter v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 277 Pa.Super. 4, 12 n. 6, 419 A.2d 631, 636 n. 6 (1980) (recognizing cause of action under Article I, Section 1 for remedies relating to *1219denial of employment wherein the court stated that "no affirmative legislation is needed for the vindication" of rights in this section); and Harley v. Schuylkill County, 476 F.Supp. 191 (E.D.Pa.1979) (stating that Article 1, Section 1 is self-executing, like other sections of the constitution, and needs no affirmative legislation, civil or criminal, for its enforcement in civil courts). See O’Neill v. White, 343 Pa. 96, 22 A.2d 25 (1941) (reiterating principle that when a constitutional provision is complete in itself it needs no further legislation to put it in force; in other words it is self-executing if it is susceptible of execution and does not require specific legislation to become operative).