Court Opinion

ID: 9694381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:39:39.899146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:08.828789
License: Public Domain

KING, Associate Judge,
Retired, dissenting:
I disagree with the majority’s decision to give retroactive application to this court’s decision in Carl v. Children’s Hosp., 702 A.2d 159 (D.C.1997) (en banc) (“Carl II”). Because the circumstances of Washington’s firing did not entitle her to relief under the narrow exception established in Adams v. George W. Cochran & Co., 597 A.2d 28 (D.C.1991), because her discharge came three years before Carl II was decided, and because the long-standing caselaw of this jurisdiction would not allow retroactive application of Carl II to Washington’s case, I would affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of Guest Services, Inc. Therefore, I dissent.
The majority correctly states the general rule that legislative enactments operate prospectively while judicial decisions ordinarily are applied retroactively. United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79, 103 S.Ct. 407, 74 L.Ed.2d 235 (1982). Here, the majority would give retroactive effect to Carl II — where the en banc court, wearing its legislative hat, enacted a rule of law establishing new substantive rights and obligations for the public at large — as if it were a garden-variety judicial ruling with a more narrow applicability. See, e.g., Nimetz v. Cappadona, 596 A.2d 603 (D.C.1991) (dealing with retroactive effect of a new rule requiring party to request a special verdict in a civil case in order to preserve certain issues on appeal). This flies in the face of Mendes v. Johnson, 389 A.2d 781 (D.C.1978) (en banc), the leading case in the District of Columbia on the retroactive application of holdings of this court creating new causes of action. In Mendes, we relied heavily on Great Northern Railway Co. v. Sunburst Oil & Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358, 53 S.Ct. 145, 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932) (“Sunburst”), in which the Supreme Court articulated the three general approaches to retroactive application of a new rule of law (total retroactivity, partial retroactivity, or purely prospective application), and the four-factor test for deciding which of these approaches to adopt (extent of reliance on the old rule, alteration of vested contract or property rights, reward for initiating just changes in the law, and burden on the courts from decisions disturbed by the new rule). Mendes, supra, 389 A.2d at 789. The principles set out in Sunburst were further refined by the Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 92 S.Ct. 349, 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (“Chevron"). Under a Sunburst/Chevron/Mendes analysis, this court takes a flexible, case-by-case approach to the question of the retroactive application of a new court-made rule of law.
The majority principally relies upon James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 111 S.Ct. 2439, 115 L.Ed.2d 481 (1991) and Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, *1082509 U.S. 86, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993) (“Beam/Harper”), where the Supreme Court created a new rule of automatic retroactive application in all cases still open on direct review. Harper, supra, 509 U.S. at 97, 113 S.Ct. 2510. In each of those cases the Supreme Court was addressing the retro-activity of one of its prior rulings interpreting federal constitutional law. The Court emphasized, however, that the rule set forth in Beam/Harper was not binding on state courts and that “state courts may ... limit the retroactive application of their own interpretations of state law....” Id. at 100, 113 S.Ct. 2510.1
Neither Beam nor Harper purports to apply to the circumstances here. Therefore, I am satisfied that this division is not obligated to follow the Beam/Harper automatic retro-activity rule in cases involving non-federal law, particularly where the District, through its courts, has created new common law rights as an exercise of its powers as a “state.” When creating such rights, as we did in Carl II, we should be free to determine the degree, if any, of the retroactive application of the new rule. Surely, we are best able to determine the effect a new rule would have upon the parties appearing before this court, weighing the factors considered in Mendes. In short, the more flexible, case-by-case analysis of Sunburst/Chevron is more appropriate for these purposes than the automatic retroactivity rule of Beam/Harper.
I also disagree with the majority’s intimation that our holding in M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 312 (D.C.1971), does not necessarily require it to apply the rule laid down in Mendes. In my view the Mendes rule can be replaced by the non-binding holding of
Beam/Harper only by the en banc court, not a division of the court. I am unpersuaded by the majority’s suggestion that M.AP. may not apply here because the philosophical basis for the prior ruling, i.e., Mendes, has been substantially undermined by subsequent Supreme Court decisions. See Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 379 n. 27 (D.C. 1979). As I have observed above, the Mendes court relied principally upon the Sunburst line of cases, which we have recognized as authoritative in opinions post-dating Beam.2 Moreover, we have applied the Mendes rule on at least four occasions since Beam was decided.3 In Beam/Harper, the Supreme Court rejected the analysis of Sunburst/Chevron in retroactivity determinations for federal constitutional rulings, but the Court did not formally overrule those cases. Nor did the Court suggest that the principles underlying Sunburst/Chevron were unsound for purposes of state court retroactivity analysis. Therefore, I am satisfied that we remain bound by the holding in Mendes.
Finally, I also disagree with the majority’s application of the Mendes factors. First, both parties in this case relied exclusively, and justifiably, on the rule established in Adams.4 Retroactive application of Carl II would undermine the reliance and expectations of the parties. See French, supra note 3, 658 A.2d at 1031-32 (holding that new rule applied purely prospectively, primarily because of reliance factor). Second, because the previous law concerning the right of the employer to fire an at-will employee was clear-cut and generally understood in the workplace, see Nickens v. Labor Agency of Metro. Washington, 600 A.2d 813 (D.C.1991), retroactive application of Carl II would have *1083a significant effect upon vested contract and property rights. Third, Washington did not seek to “initiate just changes in the law,” Mendes, supra, 389 A.2d at 789; that was the course taken by Carl, and Carl’s efforts were rewarded by applying the new rule in her case. Finally, we would expect that the burden on our courts would increase were Carl II given retroactive effect, with the outcome in seemingly resolved cases thrown into question and still-pending cases delayed by amended pleadings, expanded discovery, and new or revised motions being filed. In sum, each of the factors in the Sun burst/Chevron/Mendes retroactivity analysis operates against giving retroactive effect to Carl II except for Carl herself. Therefore, I would not apply the rule set forth in Carl II to the facts of this case.

. As with other state appellate courts, this court does not always follow the holdings of the Supreme Court. For example, we do not apply federal mootness principles. Compare Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 71 L.Ed.2d 353 (1982), with McClain v. United States, 601 A.2d 80, 82 (D.C. 1992).

. See, e.g., Robinson v. Washington Internal Med. Assocs., 647 A.2d 1140, 1146 (D.C. 1994) (opinion by King, J.); First Sav. Bank of Virginia v. Barclays Bank, S.A., 618 A.2d 134, 140 n. 19 (D.C. 1992); Simpson v. District of Columbia Office of Human Rights, 597 A.2d 392 (D.C.1991); Nimetz, supra, 596 A.2d at 608.

. See Chase v. District of Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Bd., 669 A.2d 1264, 1270 (D.C. 1995); Jonathan Woodner Co. v. Breeden, 665 A.2d 929, 934 n. 6 (D.C.1995); French v. District of Columbia Bd. of Zoning Adjustment, 658 A.2d 1023, 1025, 1032 (D.C.1995); Sanders v. Sanders, 602 A.2d 663, 667 (D.C. 1992).

. Indeed, Washington did not argue that the rule of Carl II should apply in her case until we ordered, after the case was submitted, that the parties brief the issue.