Court Opinion

ID: 9443709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 19:28:32.562811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:22.254132
License: Public Domain

HUTCHESON, Chief Judge
(dissenting).
Because I am of the opinion that the examiner correctly found the facts and as correctly drew the legal conclusions from them, I shall content myself with stating so, and briefly pointing out the nature and source of the errors of the board and the majority of this court in departing therefrom, as I see them.
These errors are:' (1) in holding that respondent committed an unfair labor practice in notifying its striking employees that it would like for them to return to their regular jobs and that if they did not return within the time named, the company would consider that they were terminating their employment and a replacement would be hired; (2) In failing to give the proper effect to respondent’s letter, of May 8th, in which, disclaiming any intention to discriminate against the strikers, the company assured the union that while it had secured replacements for some of the men, it could at the present time employ three, and, as far as the other former employees were concerned, they could make application for reemployment and would be reemployed when vacancies occurred; and (3) in holding ¡that the suggestion, of the company, after sixteen sessions of oral negotiations had resulted in an impasse, that written proposals be exchanged, was a refusal to bargain.
It seems as clear to me as it did to the examiner as to the first error, that this being an economic and not an unfair labor practice strike,1 the action of the respondent in sending the telegram of April 6th, could not be characterized as an unfair labor practice. In Kansas Milling Co. v. NLRB, note 1, supra, in a situation almost identical with that presented here, the court took a position exactly the contrary of that taken by board and majority here, and in NLRB v. Bradley, note 1, supra, the court took substantially the same position. These authorities aside, however, it seems to me, on the plainest principles of common sense and justice: that an employer, situated as respondent was, with a plant fully working, with sixty-five employees on the job and wholly unconnected with the strike, had the right, in the interest of keeping its plant going, to call these employees back; and that, though under no legal duty, since the strike was an economic one, to do so, it was under a moral duty to give these employees a chance to return before it replaced them.
*930As to the second error, the failure to give effect to the company’s statement of attitude and to the failure of the employees to apply for reinstatement, I think it plain; that, under the settled principles of law, the employees ordered reinstated with back pay were not entitled to such reinstatement; and that the enforced order in effect mulcts the respondent because of the failure of its employees to apply for reinstatement and not because of the refusal of the company to reinstate them.
As to the third error, while I am in no doubt that the normal procedure requires meeting and face to face bargaining, I am equally in no, doubt that when, after sixteen such meetings, it clearly appeared that no progress was being made, the suggestion by the respondent that the parties try the exchange of written proposals was not a refusal to bargain. Cf. National Labor Relations Board v. American National Ins. Co., 342 U.S. 809, 72 S.Ct. 40, 96 L.Ed. 612, where the court, after pointing out the confusion which has arisen from the notion in some quarters that the bargaining had to result in an agreement and quoting the statute on the point, declared, “Thus it is now apparent from the statute itself that the act does not encourage a party to engage in fruitless marathon discussions at the expense of a. frank statement and support of his- position.” The negotiations had split on wages and seniority. Respondent had made it clear that it could not- and would not pay the wages the union demanded. It' seems clear to me,- as it did to the examiner, that, after sixteen fruitless oral discus■sions, the company was not only not breaking the law but was indeed acting wisely when it suggested that negotiations at least for a while take the form of written proposals.
Summing up, in this controversy with a small unit of its large plant, seven men went out on strike. Of these seven, each was offered an opportunity to return before the respondent began making replacements. Some of them returned very soon after they went out, some a little later, others did not return or offer to return at all. Yet the respondent finds itself in the position of being branded as a law breaker because it offered these persons a right and opportunity to return, and, adjudged liable to back pay, to persons who did not embrace the opportunity offered them to return.
In my opinion, the respondent in its brief correctly states, “The respondent having reinstated two strikers and having offered reinstatement to the others as vacancies occurred, and having replaced the strikers who did not return to work and the others not having requested reinstatement during or after the strike, it was error for the board to order their reinstatement with back pay. * * * In the first place the board had no right to order reinstatement because there has never been before, during, or after the strike, an application for reinstatement, particularly by the four strikers who left the picket line on June 23, 1950. In the absence of a request by the strikers for reinstatement, there was no discriminatory discharge and there was no unfair labor practice. * * * The board has uniformly held that an employer is not required to give back pay to strikers in the absence of an unconditional offer to return to work unless it affirmatively appears that an application for reinstatement by the strikers would be futile.”
That such a situation did not exist here is found by the examiner and conceded by the board and the majority of the court.
It is undisputed that the respondent declared its willingness to reinstate the strikers upon application if and when there were vacancies, and there is no proof that any of them made application for and were refused employment.2
I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the board’s order.

. Cf. Kansas Milling Co. v. N. L. R. B., 10 Cir., 185 F.2d 413; N. L. R. B. v. Bradley, etc., 7 Cir., 192 F.2d 144, at page 153-154.

. N. L. R. B. v. Crosby Chemicals, 5 Cir., 188 F.2d 91.