Court Opinion

ID: 9556887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-18 22:05:14.528093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:15.596637
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/18/23 P. v. Hernandez CA4/2
Opinion on remand from Supreme Court

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      E077943

 v.                                                                      (Super. Ct. No. FSB053198)

 BENJAMIN HERNANDEZ,                                                     OPINION

          Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Bryan Foster,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Savannah Montanez, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

         No appearance from Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                             1
                                                 I.

                                      INTRODUCTION
                                                                     1
       Defendant and appellant Benjamin Hernandez (Benjamin) appeals the trial court’s

order denying his petition to vacate his second degree murder conviction in which he
                                                                                            2
aided and abetted one or more codefendants and for resentencing under Penal Code
                                             3
section 1172.6 (formerly section 1170.95). He argues the trial court erred in denying his

petition without issuing an order to show cause and holding an evidentiary hearing

because (1) the record of conviction does not conclusively show he is ineligible for relief

as a matter of law; (2) the court engaged in impermissible factfinding; (3) the court

incorrectly denied the petition by recalling the evidence presented at trial, rather than

examining the record of conviction; (4) the court applied the wrong standard in denying

the petition; and (5) the jury instructions given on aiding and abetting were ambiguous

and allowed the jury to find him guilty of second degree murder without finding he

personally harbored malice. Because defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law,

we affirm the trial court’s order denying his section 1172.6 petition.

       1
          To avoid confusion because of shared last names, we will refer to defendant
Benjamin Hernandez, the victim Jerry Ramirez, and some witnesses by their first names.
Because codefendants Edward Vincent Hernandez and Edward Hernandez, Sr., share
both first and last names, we will refer to them as Vinny and Edward, respectively.
Lastly, we will refer to codefendant Alfred Ray Rodriguez by his last name.
       2
           All future statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                                    [footnote continued on next page]

                                                 2
                                             II.
                                                                         4
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       A. Factual Background

       Tina Lopez testified that she had spent the night of November 17, 2005, with Jerry

Ramirez (Jerry), her boyfriend, at a motel. Tina telephoned her father, Benjamin, and

asked for a ride. Edward Vincent Hernandez (Vinny) and Rodriguez, her cousins, picked

her and Jerry up. No one seemed tense or angry.

       The group went to the home of Tina’s aunt, where Jerry’s brother, Eric Ramirez,

lived. Eric testified he had been keeping a .22-caliber semiautomatic and a .22-caliber

revolver, as well as a .25-caliber clip, for Jerry. Eric retrieved the guns and gave them to

Jerry; Jerry unloaded the guns and gave them and the clip to Vinny, who owned one of

the guns. Tina’s aunt testified that about a year earlier, there had been problems between

Vinny and Jerry.

       The group then proceeded to a house on East Pumalo Street (the Pumalo house)

where other extended family members lived. Tina’s mother, Stella Lopez; Tina’s aunt

and uncle, Ruth and Edward Hernandez, Sr. (Edward); and Benjamin were all at the

Pumalo house. Tina bickered with Benjamin while Rodriguez, Vinny, and Jerry were

       3
         Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered section 1170.95 as section
1172.6, with no substantive change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We cite to section
1172.6 for ease of reference unless otherwise indicated.
       4
       The factual background is taken from this court’s prior nonpublished opinion in
Benjamin’s prior direct appeal, case No. E046636. (People v. Rodriguez (Sept. 28, 2010,
E046636) [nonpub. opn.] (Rodriguez).)

                                             3
outside. Tina heard “loudness” in the backyard, and Benjamin went outside. Benjamin

told Tina to stay in the house and told Stella to keep her there.

       Curtis Hawkins, who lived behind the Pumalo house, heard a commotion.

Through his bathroom window, he saw several men, including all four defendants,

surrounding Jerry on the ground near the carport. Jerry was trying to escape but the

others were blocking him. Hawkins heard Benjamin say, “You been fucking with my

family. I’m going to kill you.” Benjamin hit Jerry with a pointed-edge shovel about 20

times in the head and torso while Jerry cried and pleaded for him to stop. Hawkins saw a

pool of blood form around Jerry’s head, and he heard Benjamin say, “Hurry up. Get my

gun.” Hawkins also heard someone say to get blankets. Vinny and Rodriguez rolled

Jerry’s motionless body up in blankets. Vinny backed a car up the driveway into the

carport, and Vinny and Rodriguez loaded Jerry into the trunk and drove off. Hawkins

then saw Edward put some dirt over the blood and hose down the driveway and a car in

the carport. A few minutes later, Hawkins heard Benjamin say to his daughter and

another woman, “The same thing may happen to you.” Hawkins did not contact the

police because he feared for his own safety.

       Another next-door neighbor, Vivian Jackson, heard screams. Jackson looked
                                           5
through the chain-link fence to see Vinny beat a man on the ground with a shovel at least

five times, while three or four other men beat, stomped, and kicked the victim. She could

       5
          Although Jackson testified that the man with the shovel was Vinny, she had
identified a photograph of Benjamin as the man who had used the shovel.

                                               4
see blood on the ground. She heard the man she identified as Vinny say, “I told you not

to play with me,” and she heard the victim screaming “[N]o.” Jackson then walked away.

Fifteen or 20 minutes later, she saw Edward hosing down what looked like blood from

the carport area.

       Alberta Hechtl, a security guard at a credit union adjacent to the Pumalo house,

heard yelling, and although her view was partially obstructed, she saw an object like a

shovel being driven up and down while a man screamed. She heard a woman yelling

“leave him alone,” and a man reply, “Get in the house.”

       Tina told a detective and testified at the preliminary hearing that Benjamin came

back inside and yelled to Vinny and Rodriguez to “[g]et him out of here” or to “[g]et rid

of him.” She then saw Vinny and Rodriguez push Jerry into the car, and she saw Vinny

driving the car away.

       Deputy Mark Addy of the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department responded

to a report of a domestic disturbance at the Pumalo house. He observed that Benjamin

had what appeared to be fresh blood on his T-shirt and a fresh laceration above his eye.

The deputy also saw someone washing a car in the carport.

       Jerry’s body was discovered in a ravine in Waterman Canyon on November 20,

2005. He had suffered numerous blunt and sharp force injuries, including defensive

wounds on his arms, but the cause of death was seven close-range gunshot wounds to the

head. Some of the blunt-force injuries on his back and buttocks area were consistent with

                                            5
kicking. The seven bullets were all .25-caliber and could only have been fired from a

.25-caliber weapon.

      Neither a gun nor the shovel was ever found.

      B. Procedural Background
                                                                                        6
      The jury found Benjamin guilty of second degree murder as an aider and abettor.

(Rodriguez, supra, E046636; § 187, subd. (a).) The jury also found that Benjamin had

used a deadly weapon, a shovel, in the commission of the crime. (§ 12022, subd. (b)(1).)

The trial court sentenced Benjamin to 15 years to life in prison and imposed a

consecutive one-year enhancement for the weapon use.

      On September 28, 2010, this court rejected Benjamin’s contention that the

evidence was insufficient to show he aided and abetted a codefendant in killing the victim

and affirmed the judgment. (See Rodriguez, supra, E046636.)

      On January 7, 2019, Benjamin in pro. per. filed a petition to vacate his second

degree murder conviction and for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6.

      6
         Codefendant Rodriguez was also found guilty of second degree murder as an
aider and abettor. Benjamin and codefendants Rodriguez, Vinny, and Edward were all
charged with first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder with various weapon
use allegations. Vinny’s trial was severed from that of the others. The jury was unable to
reach a verdict on the murder charge as to Edward and a mistrial was declared as to him.
Vinny and Edward were subsequently tried together. Vinny was found guilty of first
degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 182, subd. (a)(1)),
and the jury found true firearm use allegations as to him under section 12022.53,
subdivisions (b), (c), (d). The jury was again unable to reach a verdict as to the murder
charge against Edward, and another mistrial was declared. Edward thereafter entered a
plea of guilty to acting as an accessory to a felony (§ 32), and the murder charge against
him was dismissed. (Rodriguez, supra, E046636.)

                                            6
       On April 19, 2019, the trial court granted the People’s motion to strike the

petition, finding Senate Bill No. 1437 unconstitutional. We reversed the trial court’s

order in a nonpublished opinion on June 10, 2020, and remanded the matter for further

proceedings under section 1170.95. (See People v. Hernandez (June 10, 2020, E072594)

[nonpub. opn.].)

       Following remand, the People filed a written informal response and opposition to

Benjamin’s petition. In support, the People attached our nonpublished opinion from

Benjamin’s direct appeal, case No. E046636, and the information. The People also

requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the decision and files and records in

the underlying trial, including the abstract of judgment and the jury instructions and
              7
verdict forms. Benjamin did not file a brief in response to the People’s informal

response and opposition.

       On September 3, 2021, the trial court (the same court that heard the underlying

trial) held a prima facie hearing on the petition. Benjamin was not present, but

represented by appointed counsel (the same counsel that had represented Benjamin at

trial) and waived Benjamin’s presence. After recalling the facts of the case, the trial

court denied the petition because Benjamin “made an insufficient prima facie showing”

he is entitled to relief pursuant to section 1172.6 and issued a written order on September

30, 2021. In its written order, after reciting the factual background, in pertinent part, the

       7
         There is no indication in the record the trial court granted the People’s motion to
take judicial notice of the record of conviction.

                                              7
court explained: “This Court finds substantial evidence was presented at trial that

Benjamin Hernandez instigated the assault, was a major participant in the assault and

acted with reckless indifference to human life, and aided and abetted in the murder of

Jerry Ramirez.” Benjamin timely appealed.

       On January 18, 2022, Benjamin’s prior appellate counsel filed a brief raising no

arguable issues pursuant to Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738 and People v.

Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. Benjamin did not file a supplemental brief. As Benjamin

had failed to file a supplemental brief raising any issues for our review, we dismissed the

appeal as abandoned without independently reviewing the record in a nonpublished

opinion filed on March 15, 2022.

       Benjamin’s current appellate counsel was appointed on March 24, 2022. Current

counsel thereafter filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court. The

Supreme Court granted Benjamin’s petition for review and transferred the case back to us

with directions to vacate our prior decision and reconsider the matter in light of People v.

Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216. We vacated our decision and provided the parties an

opportunity to file a supplemental brief. We granted Benjamin’s current appellate

counsel’s unopposed motion to file a supplemental brief and to take judicial notice of the

jury instruction from Benjamin’s trial. Because current appointed counsel had

determined appealable issues existed and had filed a supplemental brief arguing those

issues, we vacated our order filed April 5, 2023, granting Benjamin permission to file a

personal supplemental brief. The People did not file a brief in response.

                                             8
                                              III.

                                        DISCUSSION

       Benjamin contends the trial court erred in denying his petition at the prima facie

stage by “recalling the evidence presented at trial and deciding substantial evidence

supported [his] murder conviction,” rather than examining the record of conviction to

determine whether he was ineligible for relief. He further asserts that the court applied

the wrong standard, i.e., substantial evidence, in denying his petition and inappropriately

engaged in factfinding at the prima facie stage. Benjamin also argues (1) Senate Bill No.

775 applies retroactively; (2) even though the jury was not instructed on the felony

murder or natural and probable consequences doctrines, he may nonetheless have been

convicted on a theory under which malice was imputed to him based solely on his

participation in a crime because the instructions given on aiding and abetting were

ambiguous and allowed the jury to find him guilty of second degree murder without

finding he personally harbored malice; and (3) he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing

because the record of conviction does not conclusively show he is ineligible for relief as a

matter of law.

       A. Legal Background

       Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill No. 1437 “‘to amend

the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to

murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual

killer, did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying

                                               9
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’” (People v. Gentile (2020) 10

Cal.5th 830, 846-847 (Gentile); see Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) The Legislature

accomplished this by amending sections 188 and 189.

       Section 188, which defines malice, now provides in part: “Except as stated in

subdivision (e) of [s]ection 189, in order to be convicted of murder, a principal in a crime

shall act with malice aforethought. Malice shall not be imputed to a person based solely

on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 2.)

       Section 189, subdivision (e), now limits the circumstances under which a person

may be convicted of felony murder: “A participant in the perpetration or attempted

perpetration of a felony listed in subdivision (a) [defining first degree murder] in which a

death occurs is liable for murder only if one of the following is proven: [¶] (1) The

person was the actual killer. [¶] (2) The person was not the actual killer, but, with the

intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or

assisted the actual killer in the commission of murder in the first degree. [¶] (3) The

person was a major participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless

indifference to human life, as described in subdivision (d) of [s]ection 190.2.” (Stats.

2018, ch. 1015, § 3.)

       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 expanded eligibility for relief to

include individuals convicted of “attempted murder under the natural and probable

consequences doctrine” or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based

solely on that person’s participation in a crime. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a), as amended by

                                             10
Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2; Legis. Counsel’s Dig., Sen. Bill No. 775 (2020-2021 Reg.

Sess.).) Appellate courts have held the new amendments in Senate Bill No. 775 apply

retroactively to appeals from the denial of petitions not yet final as of January 1, 2022.

(People v. Porter (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 644, 652 [“[T]he trial court’s order denying the

petition is not yet final and Senate Bill No. 775 has already taken effect. Therefore, the

revisions set forth in Senate Bill No. 775 apply to the instant petition.”]; People v. Montes

(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 1001, 1006 [“New legislation generally applies to all judgments

which are not final as of the effective date of the new statute.”].) The amendments in

Senate Bill No. 775 thus apply to Benjamin’s appeal. (People v. Maldonado (2023) 87

Cal.App.5th 1257, 1261.)

       However, Senate Bill Nos. 1437 and 775 did not expand eligibility for relief

pursuant to section 1172.6 to one who directly aids and abets another who commits

murder or attempted murder. (People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588, 595-596.)

Such persons who by act or advice aid, promote, encourage or instigate the commission

of murder, with knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s criminal purpose and with intent to

commit, encourage, or facilitate the commission of murder, remain criminally liable for

murder. (Ibid.)

       Senate Bill No. 1437 also created a procedure for offenders previously convicted

of felony murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine to seek

retroactive relief if they could no longer be convicted of murder under the new law.

(§ 1172.6, subd. (a); Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843; People v. Lewis (2021) 11

                                             11
Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis); People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708 (Strong).) “[T]he

process begins with the filing of a petition containing a declaration that all requirements

for eligibility are met [citation], including that ‘[t]he petitioner could not presently be

convicted of murder or attempted murder because of changes to . . . [s]ection 188 or 189

made effective January 1, 2019 . . . .’” (Strong, supra, at p. 708, fn. omitted.) “When the

trial court receives a petition containing the necessary declaration and other required

information, the court must evaluate the petition ‘to determine whether the petitioner has

made a prima facie case for relief.’ [Citations.] If the petition and record in the case

establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief, the trial court may

dismiss the petition.” (Ibid.)

       Petitioners who request counsel “are entitled to the appointment of counsel upon

the filing of a facially sufficient petition . . . .” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.)

“[O]nly after the appointment of counsel and the opportunity for briefing may the

superior court consider the record of conviction to determine whether ‘the petitioner

makes a prima facie showing that he or she is entitled to relief.’” (Ibid., italics omitted;

see id. at p. 966.) The court’s “prima facie inquiry . . . is limited. . . . ‘“[T]he court takes

petitioner’s factual allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment regarding

whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his or her factual allegations were

proved. If so, the court must issue an order to show cause.”’ [Citations.] ‘[A] court

should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on credibility grounds without first

conducting an evidentiary hearing.’” (Id. at p. 971.) A trial court’s failure to follow the

                                               12
procedures enacted in section 1172.6 is analyzed for prejudice under the state law

standard of People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836. (Lewis, supra, at pp. 973-974.)

Under this standard, we ask whether it is reasonably probable defendant would have

obtained a more favorable outcome if proper procedures had been followed. (Id. at p.

974.)

        If a petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, “‘the court

shall issue an order to show cause.’” (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) Once the

court determines that a defendant has made a prima facie showing, it “must [then] hold an

evidentiary hearing at which the prosecution bears the burden of proving, ‘beyond a

reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder or attempted murder’ under state

law as amended by Senate Bill [No.] 1437. [Citation.] ‘A finding that there is substantial

evidence to support a conviction for murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter is

insufficient to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for

resentencing.’ [Citation.] ‘If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior

conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be

vacated and the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.’” (Strong,

supra, at p. 709; accord, Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 960; § 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)

        In Senate Bill No. 775, the Legislature amended the language of section 1172.6,

codifying Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th 952, expanding the scope of the petitioning process,

and clarifying some of the procedural requirements. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) Section

1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) now provides the admission of evidence at the hearing “shall

                                              13
be governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence

previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law,

including witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed.” The

statute continues, “The court may also consider the procedural history of the case recited

in any prior appellate opinion.” Further, “The prosecutor and the petitioner also may

offer new or additional evidence to meet their respective burdens. A finding that there is

substantial evidence to support a conviction for murder . . . is insufficient to prove,

beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.” (§ 1172.6,

subd. (d)(3).)

       Whether a petitioner has made the requisite prima facie showing is a

predominantly legal question. We thus review de novo whether the trial court properly

denied Benjamin’s petition without issuing an order to show cause. (People v. Coley

(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 545.)

       B. Analysis

       Benjamin contends we must reverse the order denying his petition because the

court did not examine the record of conviction but relied on its recollection of the facts,

applied the wrong standard in denying his petition, and inappropriately engaged in

factfinding at the prima facie stage. We reject these contentions. The specific evidence

presented at trial regarding the facts and circumstances of the killing is immaterial to the

analysis of whether Benjamin made a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6.

The jury instructions and verdict demonstrate Benjamin is ineligible for relief under

                                              14
section 1172.6 as a matter of law because he was prosecuted as a direct aider and abettor

to murder, and the jury found he intended to aid and abet a second degree murder. The

jury was instructed on direct aiding and abetting via CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401.

Senate Bill No. 1437 did not eliminate direct aiding and abetting liability for murder or

attempted murder. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 848; People v. Cortes (2022) 75

Cal.App.5th 198, 204-205 [petitioner convicted of murder and attempted murder either as

perpetrator or direct aider and abettor ineligible for § 1172.6 relief].)

       “[T]o be liable for an implied malice murder, the direct aider and abettor must, by

words or conduct, aid the commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that

act. The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct aider and abettor, is

knowledge that the perpetrator intended to commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in

the commission of the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and acting

in conscious disregard for human life.” (People v. Powell (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 689,

713; see also People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991.) Aiding and abetting implied

malice murder is a theory of murder based on the aider and abettor’s own mental state; it

does not rely on imputed malice. (People v. Silva (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 632, 639;

People v. Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 443-444; People v. Vizcarra (2022) 84

Cal.App.5th 377, 390-391.)

       As given to Benjamin’s jury, CALCRIM Nos. 400 and 401 stated that an aider and

abettor’s guilt is based on the direct perpetrator’s acts and the aider and abettor’s own

acts and own mental state. (See generally People v. McCoy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 1111,

                                              15
1117.) CALCRIM No. 401 told the jury that to prove a defendant was guilty of a crime

as an aider and abettor, the People had to prove (1) the perpetrator committed the crime;

(2) the defendant knew that the perpetrator intended to commit the crime; (3) before or

during the crime’s commission, the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator in

committing the crime; and (4) the defendant’s words or conduct in fact aided and abetted

the perpetrator’s commission of the crime. The instruction further stated that the aider

and abettor must know “of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose” and specifically intend to

“aid, facilitate, promote, encourage, or instigate the perpetrator’s commission of that

crime.” (CALCRIM No. 401; see generally People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219,

1225.)

         The jury therefore did not convict Benjamin under the natural and probable and

consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice was merely imputed to him.

(Compare People v. Whitson (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 22, 27, 33 [jury was instructed on

natural and probable consequences theory of liability].) He was instead convicted as a

direct aider and abettor who had malice aforethought. As such, he was ineligible for

section 1172.6 relief.

         Relying on People v. Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972 (Langi), Benjamin

acknowledges the jury was not instructed on the felony murder rule or the natural and

probable consequences doctrine, but claims the aiding and abetting instructions were

ambiguous and allowed the jury to find him guilty of second degree murder without

finding he personally harbored malice, i.e., by imputing malice to him. He thus believes,

                                             16
as in Langi, an evidentiary hearing is required here.

       In Langi, the petitioner was convicted of second degree murder as one of four men

who had beaten the victim to death. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 975.) The trial

court summarily denied Langi’s petition for resentencing under former section 1170.95 at

the prima facie stage. (Langi, supra, at p. 976.) The record did not conclusively

establish, without factfinding, that Langi had thrown the fatal punch, and the jury

instructions failed to explain that “to be guilty as a direct aider and abettor of second

degree murder, an accomplice must have acted with the mental state of implied malice.”

(Id. at p. 983.)

       The appellate court reversed the trial court’s denial of Langi’s petition, finding

that the pattern instructions on aiding and abetting (CALJIC Nos. 8.31 & 3.01) “create[d]

an ambiguity under which the jury may find the defendant guilty of aiding and abetting

second degree murder without finding that he personally acted with malice.” (Langi,

supra, at 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.) The appellate court agreed with Langi, that the

instructions permitted the jury to find him guilty of murder based on his codefendant’s

act regardless of his personal knowledge or disregard of danger to human life. (Id. at p.

981.) The court explained that “under the instructions that were given, the jury was

entitled to conclude that, to be guilty as an aider and abettor of second degree murder,

[Langi] need only have intended to encourage the perpetrator’s intentional act—in this

case, punching [the victim]—whether or not [Langi] intended to aid or encourage [the

victim’s] killing, and whether or not he personally knew of and disregarded the risk of

                                              17
such a killing.” (Id. at p. 983.) In other words, the jury could have convicted Langi of

murder as an aider and abettor without finding that he had personally acted with express

or implied malice. The court emphasized that the instructions “should have explained

that, to be guilty as a direct aider and abettor of second degree murder, an accomplice

must have acted with the mental state of implied malice.” (Ibid.) Because they did not,

the record of conviction did not “conclusively negate” the possibility that Langi was

convicted on an invalid theory, and an evidentiary hearing was required under section

1172.6. (Id. at p. 984.)

       Langi is distinguishable from the present matter. In Langi, the victim fell and

struck his head after someone in a group that included the defendant punched him, and

the trial court concluded he was the actual killer based on language in the direct appellate

opinion suggesting that the defendant threw the fatal punch. (Langi, supra, 73

Cal.App.5th at p. 975.) Here, Benjamin struck the victim up to 20 times in the head and

torso with a metal shovel, verbalized his intent to kill the victim, and commanded others

to get his gun and get rid of the victim. Benjamin was convicted of murder based on

directly aiding and abetting his cohorts and not based solely on his participation in the

crime. In other words, the jury could not have convicted Benjamin of murder as an aider

and abettor without finding that he had personally acted with express or implied malice.

       Langi is analogous only to the extent that Benjamin, like the defendant there, may

have been convicted either as the actual killer or as an aider and abettor. That fact alone

does not entitle him to relief, however, as “Senate Bill 1437 does not eliminate direct

                                             18
aiding and abetting liability for murder.” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 848.) The jury

here was instructed with CALCRIM No. 520, which explained express and implied

malice aforethought, and CALCRIM No. 401, which, in part, instructed the jury that an

aider and abettor had to know the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator and intended to aid

and abet the perpetrator in committing the crime. The jury here could not have convicted

Benjamin under an imputed aiding and abetting theory.

       As to the aiding and abetting instructions, Benjamin apparently relies on the

phrase “equally guilty” that was used in CALCRIM No. 400, as implicating imputed

malice. The inclusion of this phrase, however, did not result in Benjamin being

convicted based on imputed malice because the jury was also instructed with CALCRIM

No. 401, that an aider and abettor had to know the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator,

that the defendant intended to aid and abet the perpetrator, intended to encourage or

facilitate the commission of the crime, and by act or advice, aided or encouraged the

commission of the crime. By giving CALCRIM No. 401, the instructional language

would have cleared up any ambiguity arguably presented by former CALCRIM No.

400’s reference to principals being equally guilty. (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th

600, 641.)

       Benjamin could be prosecuted for murder under the same direct aiding and

abetting theory today. “Senate Bill 1437 does not eliminate direct aiding and abetting

liability for murder because a direct aider and abettor to murder must possess malice

aforethought.” (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 848.) The amendments to sections 188

                                            19
and 189 are not relevant to Benjamin’s case. Thus, he cannot show he “could not

presently be convicted of murder . . . because of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made

effective January 1, 2019,” a statutorily mandated prerequisite for a section 1172.6

petition. (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) He is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter

of law.

                                             IV.

                                       DISPOSITION

          The order denying Benjamin’s section 1172.6 petition is affirmed.

          NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                                CODRINGTON
                                                                          Acting P. J.

We concur:

FIELDS
                            J.

RAPHAEL
                            J.

                                              20