Court Opinion

ID: 9575995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:19:28.542055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:05.825623
License: Public Domain

*415SPENCE, J.
I dissent.
The majority concludes that the offense should be reduced from second degree murder to manslaughter upon the authority of People v. Kelley, 208 Cal. 387 [281 P. 609].) The cited case is clearly distinguishable. Prom the summary of the testimony in the majority opinion, it appears that there was ample evidence here from which the jury could infer that defendant had a definite motive for killing his victim, that he had deliberately made preparation for such killing, and that the killing was thereafter accomplished with “malice aforethought” and at the first opportunity. (Pen. Code, § 187.) There was no comparable evidence in the Kelley case to support any one of the above-mentioned inferences. I am therefore of the view that the Kelley case is not controlling, and that the evidence in this case is sufficient to sustain the conviction of second degree murder. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 189.) In fact, said evidence appears to be sufficient to sustain an inference that defendant’s act constituted a “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing,” but these elements are only required in sustaining a conviction of first degree as distinguished from second degree murder. (Pen. Code, § 189.)
With respect to the alleged error in the failure of the trial court to give an instruction, I find no evidence to support the theory that defendant was unconscious at the time of the killing. Defendant was asked: “You believe that in your condition, as you were that Sunday morning, that you were capable of thinking correctly and rationally?” He testified in reply: “I thought so at the time. I rather doubt it now.” While defendant professed at the trial to be somewhat hazy in his recollection concerning the events of the morning of the killing, he did not testify at any time that he was unconscious at the time of the killing. If, however, there could be found any basis for the majority’s conclusion that the evidence was such as to require an instruction on the subject of unconsciousness, then the majority should reverse rather than reduce the crime to manslaughter, as a person who does an act “without being conscious thereof” does not commit voluntary manslaughter or any other crime by the doing of such act. (Pen. Code, § 26, subd. 5.)
I would affirm the judgment and the order denying a new trial.
Shenk, J., and McComb, J., concurred.