Court Opinion

ID: 8039301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 03:24:37.679213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:37:16.065392
License: Public Domain

Carter, J.,
dissenting.
I am not in accord with the majority opinion. It is the law of this state that the elements necessary to be established to warrant the rejection of- a will on the ground of undue influence are: That the testator was subject to such influence, that the opportunity to exercise it existed, that there was a disposition to exercise it, and that the result appears to be the effect of such influence.
It is my contention that the facts shown in the majority opinion fail to show by sufficient evidence that there was a disposition on the part of the devisee, Stickney, to exercise undue influence. Every statement in the majority opinion on this point is as consistent with Stickney’s relationship to the testator as tenant, or neighbor as it is with that of substituting his will for that of *165Bainbridge in the testamentary disposal of the latter’s property.
I submit that there must appear in the record somewhere, if undue influence is to be submitted to the jury, some evidence which can be accounted for only on the basis of a disposition on the part of Stickney to exercise undue influence. No such evidence is set forth in the majority opinion.
We have repeatedly held that every sane person is entitled to will his property as he sees fit, except where he has been limited by statute. He has a right to give it to relatives, to strangers, or to charity. If the conclusion reached by the majority is correct, the jury is entitled to pass upon the question of undue influence where the relationship of the parties is put before them, even if there is not a syllable of evidence which can be accounted for only on the basis of a disposition of the one charged, to influence the making of the testator’s will. The practical effect of such a holding is to make the execution of any will subject to the approval of a jury where undue influence is charged.
The right of a person to dispose of his property by will rests on a much more secure foundation than this. Isaac v. Halderman, 76 Neb. 823, 107 N. W. 1016; In re Estate of Bose, 136 Neb. 156, 285 N. W. 319; In re Estate of Scoville, 149 Neb. 415, 31 N. W. 2d 284. This case is very important to those who desire to make a testamentary disposal of their property. One who desires to make an unnatural disposition of his property, for reasons best known to himself, is seriously restricted by the .majority opinion. Juries are inclined to sustain charges of undue influence in the drafting of wills which they deem to be unfair to the natural objects of testator’s bounty. But the maker of a will has a right to be unfair in disposing of his property without revealing his reasons therefor. I submit that if evidence is not required, which can be accounted for solely on the basis of a disposition to "influence the testator, there is no *166question of undue influence, as a matter of law, to be submitted to a jury. Undue influence cannot be inferred alone from motive or opportunity, and mere suspicion of undue influence on the testator is insufficient to require submission of the question to the jury or to sustain a verdict and judgment. In re Estate of Inda, 146 Neb. 179, 19 N. W. 2d 37; In re Estate of Woodward, 147 Neb. 270, 23 N. W. 2d 75. See, also, In re Estate of Heineman, 144 Neb. 442, 13 N. W. 2d 569.
In my judgment, the trial court correctly analyzed the evidence and properly directed a verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
The judgment should be affirmed.
I am authorized to state that Judge Chappell concurs, in this dissent.