Court Opinion

ID: 9927988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 17:03:57.371232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:28:23.086197
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/29/24
                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                          DIVISION ONE

 In re                                   B325525

          ANH THE DUONG                  (Los Angeles County
                                         Super. Ct. No. BA240170)
                on Habeas Corpus.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Mark S. Arnold, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
      Habeas Corpus Resource Center, Susan Garvey, Melissa
Burkhart, Christina Sandidge and Anuthara Hegoda for
Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, James William Bilderback II,
Assistant Attorney General, Dana Muhammad Ali and Colleen
M. Tiedemann, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
      A jury convicted Anh The Duong of multiple murders
and imposed a sentence of death. While his automatic appeal
to the Supreme Court was pending, Duong filed a petition for
writ of habeas corpus in that court. The Supreme Court affirmed
his conviction and sentence on appeal (People v. Duong (2020)
10 Cal.5th 36, 42 (Duong)), and thereafter transferred Duong’s
habeas petition to the Los Angeles County Superior Court.
Duong and the Los Angeles County District Attorney stipulated
to granting in part and denying in part Duong’s petition. The
court, accepting that stipulation, vacated Duong’s death sentence
and resentenced him to life without the possibility of parole
(LWOP). Duong appeals the order based on a provision of the
Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act of 2016 (Proposition 66,
as approved by voters, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016)) that permits
an appeal from the denial of a habeas corpus petition “filed by a
person in custody pursuant to a judgment of death.” (Pen. Code,
§§ 1509, subd. (a), 1509.1, subd. (a).)1 We dismiss the appeal
because, no longer being subjected to the death penalty at the
time he filed his appeal, Duong is not eligible for the benefits of
Proposition 66.

         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       In January 2003, a jury convicted Duong of three counts
of first degree murder and one count of second degree murder.
(Duong, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 42.) The jury also found true
a multiple-murder special circumstance allegation and firearm
use allegations. (Ibid.) After a penalty phase trial, the jury

      1 Subsequent unspecified statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

                                 2
sentenced him to death. (Id. at pp. 42, 44–45.) The California
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction and death sentence in
August 2020. (Id. at p. 75.)
       On February 23, 2009, the Supreme Court appointed the
Habeas Corpus Resource Center (HCRC) to represent Duong
“for habeas corpus/executive clemency proceedings related to
[Duong’s] automatic appeal [then] pending in [the Supreme
Court].”2
       On December 14, 2015, Duong filed a petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the Supreme Court, raising 14 claims.3
(In re Duong (case No. S231153).) In what the parties refer
to as claim No. 6, Duong asserted that he received ineffective
assistance of counsel at the penalty phase of his trial.
       While his petition was pending in the Supreme Court,
the electorate approved Proposition 66. (Stats. 2016, Prop. 66,
§ 1, pp. A-149 to A-157.) Among other provisions, Proposition 66
enacted section 1509, which requires generally that a habeas
corpus petition filed by a death penalty inmate be heard in the
court that imposed the sentence. (§ 1509, subd. (a).) If, as in
this case, the habeas petition was pending in another court when

     2 By separate order, we take judicial notice of the
Supreme Court’s order in People v. Duong (case No. S114228),
dated February 23, 2009, the Supreme Court’s order in In re
Duong (case No. S231153), dated November 10, 2020, and the
Los Angeles Superior Court’s minute order in People v. Duong
(case No. BA240170), dated November 17, 2020.
     3 Our record does not include the habeas petition Duong
filed in the Supreme Court. Our references to its contents are
based on a stipulation among the parties filed in the superior
court.

                                3
section 1509 went into effect, the new law authorized the court
to “transfer the petition to the court [that] imposed the sentence.”
(§ 1509, subd. (g).) Pursuant to this provision, the Supreme
Court transferred Duong’s habeas petition to the superior court,
and stated that the Supreme Court “no longer retains jurisdiction
over any aspect of this petition.”4
       On November 23, 2020, the trial court issued an order
to show cause as to claim No. 6—the claim that Duong’s counsel
was ineffective at the penalty phase of his trial. The court denied
relief on his other claims “due to legal and factual insufficiency.”
       On November 17, 2022, the People and Duong submitted
a stipulation to the trial court stating that Duong is entitled
to relief on claim No. 6 and to an LWOP sentence in lieu of a new
penalty phase trial. They further stipulated that neither party
would appeal any order pertaining to claim No. 6.
       On December 7, 2022, the court granted Duong’s habeas
petition as to claim No. 6, vacated Duong’s death sentence, and
resentenced him to LWOP on each of the four murder counts.
The court stated that “the death penalty is no longer being
sought.”
       On January 4, 2023, Duong filed a notice of appeal from
the court’s December 7, 2022 order, stating that the claims he
asserted in his habeas petition “that sought penalty phase relief
are moot” and he is challenging “only those claims (or subclaims)

      4 Under section 1509, subdivision (a), the habeas petition
is to “be assigned to the original trial judge unless that judge is
unavailable or there is other good cause to assign the case to a
different judge.” In this case, the original trial judge had retired
and the matter was assigned to a different judge.

                                  4
which seek guilt phase relief.” Duong requested the appointment
of counsel in the notice of appeal.
       On February 9, 2023, we issued an order to show cause
(OSC) directing Duong and the Attorney General to address
the following questions: (1) whether this appeal should be
dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction; (2) if the appeal
is not dismissed, whether rule 8.395 of the California Rules
of Court applies to the appeal; and (3) whether, in light of the
court’s resentencing of Duong to LWOP, Duong is entitled to
the appointment of counsel in this matter. We stayed further
proceedings pending resolution of the OSC or further order of
the court.
                         DISCUSSION
      Under section 1509, “the exclusive procedure for collateral
attack on a judgment of death” is a petition for “writ of habeas
corpus pursuant to [that] section.” (§ 1509, subd. (a).) The
parties do not dispute that Duong’s petition, originally filed in
the Supreme Court prior to the enactment of section 1509 and
then transferred to the superior court pursuant to section 1509,
subdivision (g), is a “writ of habeas corpus pursuant to [that]
section.”
      Under section 1509.1, “[e]ither party may appeal
the decision of a superior court on an initial petition under
Section 1509 to the Court of Appeal.” (§ 1509.1, subd. (a),
capitalization added.)
      Duong contends that we have jurisdiction to hear his
appeal according to the plain language of section 1509.1. The
Attorney General disagrees, arguing that sections 1509 and
1509.1 apply to persons subject to a judgment of death, and
Duong is not such a person; he is serving an LWOP sentence

                                5
and must therefore seek relief, if at all, in the same manner
as other LWOP inmates: By filing a new habeas petition in
the Court of Appeal. We agree with the Attorney General.
        “When we interpret an initiative, we apply the same
principles governing statutory construction.” (People v. Superior
Court (Pearson) (2010) 48 Cal.4th 564, 571.) Our goal is to
“adopt a construction ‘that will effectuate the voters’ intent,
giv[ing] meaning to each word and phrase, and avoid absurd
results. [Citations.]’ ” (Santos v. Brown (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th
398, 409.)
        As Duong argues, “[o]ur first step is to scrutinize the actual
words of the statute, giving them a plain and common[-]sense
meaning.” (People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 597.)
Applying the text of the statute here, Duong contends that he
“appeal[ed] the decision of a superior court on an initial petition
under Section 1509 to the Court of Appeal.” (Capitalization
added.) This court, he concludes, therefore has jurisdiction over
his appeal. We disagree.
        The “ ‘plain meaning’ rule does not prohibit a court from
determining whether the literal meaning of a statute comports
with its purpose or whether such a construction of one provision
is consistent with other provisions of the statute. . . . [Citation.]
Literal construction should not prevail if it is contrary to the
legislative intent apparent in the statute. The intent prevails
over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to
conform to the spirit of the act.” (Lungren v. Deukmejian (1988)
45 Cal.3d 727, 735; see also Palmer v. City of Anaheim (2023) 90
Cal.App.5th 718, 725 [“[l]iteral construction should not prevail
if it is contrary to the voters’ intent apparent in the provision”].)

                                  6
       As its title—the Death Penalty Reform and Savings Act—
indicates, Proposition 66 was directed at “California’s death
penalty system,” which the electorate found and declared
to be “inefficient, wasteful, and subject to protracted delay,
denying murder victims and their families justice and due
process.” (Briggs v. Brown (2017) 3 Cal.5th 808, 823, citing
Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) § 2, p. 212.)
Among the express findings the electorate made in enacting
Proposition 66 is that California’s “death penalty system is
broken, but it can and should be fixed.” (Prop. 66, § 2.) To
fix the broken death penalty system, the electorate sought to
“[r]eform[ ] the existing inefficient appeals process for death
penalty cases” (Prop. 66, § 2) and “expedite habeas corpus
proceedings in capital cases” (In re Friend (2021) 11 Cal.5th 720,
739).
       Proposition 66 implements the goal of expediting death
penalty cases in various ways, including directing the Judicial
Council to adopt rules “designed to expedite the processing of
capital appeals and state habeas corpus review” (Prop. 66, § 3,
amending § 190.6, subd. (d)), directing the Supreme Court “in
a capital case to expedite the review of the case” and appoint
counsel “as soon as possible” (Prop. 66, § 5, adding § 1239.1,
subd. (a)), requiring that a habeas corpus petition “filed by a
person in custody pursuant to a judgment of death” (Prop. 66,
§ 6, adding § 1509, subd. (a)) “shall be conducted as expeditiously
as possible, consistent with a fair adjudication,” and that
the petition generally be resolved “within one year of filing”
(Prop. 66, § 6, adding § 1509, subd. (f)).
       These and other Proposition 66 reforms are directed
exclusively at “death penalty cases” and intended to address

                                 7
the perceived “waste, delays, and inefficiencies” of “California’s
death penalty system.” (Prop. 66, § 2.) Neither the text of
Proposition 66 nor the related Voter Information Guide express
or imply any intent to alter the existing law concerning appeals
and the review of habeas corpus petitions in cases other
than capital cases. The analysis by the Legislative Analyst
published in the Voter Information Guide, for example, states
that Proposition 66 “seeks to shorten the time that the legal
challenges to death sentences take”; and there is no mention of
legal challenges in noncapital cases. (Voter Information Guide,
Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) p. 105.) The argument in favor of
Proposition 66 presented in the Voter Information Guide states
that the initiative measure “was written to speed up the death
penalty appeals system,” and neither it nor the argument against
the proposition suggest that the law will impact appeals or
habeas corpus petitions filed by criminal defendants who are not
sentenced to death. (Voter Information Guide, Gen. Elec. (Nov. 8,
2016) pp. 108–109.)
       The electorate’s intent in enacting Proposition 66 was to
fix a “death penalty system” that it perceived to be “broken” in
part because of lengthy delays in obtaining appellate review of
death penalty cases. A person such as Duong, who is no longer
subject to the death penalty, is no longer involved in the
“broken” “death penalty system” that the electorate intended
Proposition 66 to fix. Therefore, reading section 1509.1 in light
of the explicit purposes the law is intended to serve, we construe
the statute as permitting an appeal from the denial of a habeas
petition in death penalty cases (Prop. 66, § 2); that is, an appeal
by a person who, at the time the appeal is filed, is “in custody
pursuant to a judgment of death.” (§ 1509, subd. (a).) Because

                                8
Duong was not in custody pursuant to a judgment of death when
he filed the instant appeal, the appellate process Proposition 66
enacted is not available to him.
       Duong argues that we should not construe section 1509.1
“to deprive him of his right to appeal—and therefore his
entitlement to counsel—solely because penalty relief was
subsequently granted on claim [No. 6].” (Capitalization
omitted.) He asserts that the “appellate mechanism” provided
by section 1509.1 “was designed in part to ensure adequate,
efficient, and effective state court process for future federal
review,” and that our construction of the statute would
“undermine [his] ability to timely and efficiently exhaust his
state remedies.” But these arguments assume his conclusion:
that he has the “right to appeal” and the right to the particular
“appellate mechanism” provided by Proposition 66. He does not,
however, have any right to appeal or to use that mechanism
unless section 1509.1 is first construed in the manner he seeks.
Because we reject his construction of the statute, his circular
arguments fail.
       Duong next argues that his construction of section 1509.1
“comports with the practice in federal court where both parties
appeal and cross-appeal various portions of an opinion with
frequency.” (See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(a) [“[i]n a habeas corpus
proceeding . . . , the final order shall be subject to review,
on appeal, by the court of appeals for the circuit in which the
proceeding is held”]; Gonzalez v. Thaler (2012) 565 U.S. 134,
140 [federal statute provides “a general grant of jurisdiction” for
review of “district courts’ final orders in habeas proceedings”].)
Nothing in Proposition 66 or the supporting materials suggests
that the electorate intended to incorporate federal habeas law

                                 9
into our state habeas and appellate procedures. Indeed, the
explicit and broad grant of appellate jurisdiction in federal
habeas proceedings contrasts with the grant of appellate
jurisdiction under Proposition 66, which is limited to cases in
which the habeas petition was “filed by a person in custody
pursuant to a judgment of death.” (§ 1509, subd. (a).)
       Duong further contends that subdivision (c) of
section 1509.1 “underscores the conclusion that each party
is permitted to appeal grants and denials on initial petitions.”
But subdivision (c), as is relevant here, merely requires the
petitioner to obtain “a certificate of appealability” before
appealing from an order “denying relief on a successive petition.”
(§ 1509.1, subd. (c).) Duong fails to explain how this restriction
on the right to appeal a ruling on a successive petition compels
the construction he seeks as to the right to appeal generally.
       For the foregoing reasons, we hold that a person who files a
petition for writ of habeas corpus while the person was in custody
pursuant to a judgment of death and who, at the time of filing
an appeal from a ruling on the petition, is no longer in custody
pursuant to a judgment of death, is not entitled to appeal under
section 1509.1.5 We therefore dismiss Duong’s appeal.6
       In light of our disposition, the additional questions we
posed—whether rule 8.395 of the California Rules of Court

      5 This case does not require us to consider the separate
issue of whether an appeal taken under section 1509.1 when the
appellant is in custody under a judgment of death is thereafter
rendered moot if the death sentence is vacated while the appeal
is pending.
      6 We decline Duong’s request to deem his appeal as an
original petition for writ of habeas corpus.

                                 10
applies to the appeal, and whether Duong is entitled to the
appointment of counsel as requested in his notice of appeal—
are moot.
                        DISPOSITION
     The order to show cause is discharged.
     The appeal is dismissed.
     CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION.

                                         ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                 CHANEY, J.

                 BENDIX, J.

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