Court Opinion

ID: 9479116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:08:53.95593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:50.393209
License: Public Domain

GEE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority holds that the time limit for civil appeals should apply to appeals from a denial of a writ of error coram nobis and that we must, therefore, remand this case to determine whether the defendant’s rehearing motions were timely Rule 59(e) motions, depriving us of jurisdiction of this appeal. Because I believe that the proper time limit for an appeal from denial of such a writ is the time limit for criminal appeals, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority notes, there is currently a split of authority among the circuits on the issue of whether the time limit for appeals from a denial of a writ of error coram nobis is the same as the time limit governing civil appeals or the time limit governing criminal appeals. The Second Circuit has held that such appeals are subject to the rules governing civil appeals while the Eighth and Ninth Circuits have held that they are subject to the rules governing criminal appeals. See United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138 (2nd Cir.1968); United States v. Mills, 430 F.2d 526 (8th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1023, 91 S.Ct. 589, 27 L.Ed.2d 636 (1971) and Yasui v. United States, 772 F.2d 1496 (9th Cir.1985).
The majority notes that the Supreme Court has stated that a coram nobis proceeding is of “the same general character” as a § 2255 motion. Therefore, according to the majority, the time limit applicable to § 2255 proceedings — the civil time limit, should apply to coram nobis proceedings. Additionally, the majority cites with approval from Keogh in which the Second Circuit stated that “[t]he policy considerations supporting prescription of a very short time for appeal in a criminal case are notably absent in coram nobis.” Id. at 140. I am unpersuaded by these arguments.
First, in addition to stating that a coram nobis proceeding is of “the same general character” as a § 2255 motion, the Supreme Court has also stated that “[sjuch a motion is a step in a criminal case.” United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 505-06, 74 S.Ct. 247, 249, 98 L.Ed. 248 n. 4, citations omitted. Consequently, it is impossi*1197ble to determine from the Supreme Court’s statement whether the civil or criminal time limits should apply.
Second, as the Ninth Circuit noted in Yasui
We decline to apply the civil time limit by analogy to cases under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. That section establishes a special, statutory remedy with its own particular procedural requirements and limitations, and explicitly authorizes the taking of appeals as in habeas corpus cases. No such structure surrounds the coram no-bis writ. The petitioner had no reason to rely on the time limit applicable to section 2255 proceedings.
Id. at 1499.
Further, neither the Second Circuit nor the majority states what policy considerations supporting a short appeal in criminal cases are absent in coram nobis proceedings and I am unable to conceive of any. On the contrary, I believe that the same policy considerations that support application of a short appeal time in criminal cases are equally present in coram nobis proceedings.