Court Opinion

ID: 9532123
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:18:22.497486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:40.949254
License: Public Domain

Wedell, J.
(concurring): Limitations of time preclude an opinion fully expressing my views as to why this particular amended petition states a cause of action on the theory of gross and wanton negligence.
Appellee’s proof at the trial may be wholly inadequate to prove such allegations. Furthermore the record at the trial may disclose such contributory negligence on her part as to bar her recovery entirely. With those matters, however, we are presently entirely unconcerned.
In view of appellant’s emphasis on the intoxication feature of this case I desire to mention only one of our previous decisions stressed by appellant, namely, that of Srajer v. Schwartzman, 164 Kan. 241, 188 P. 2d 971. Appellant is entirely wrong in contending we held in the Srajer case that intoxication is not evidence of gross and wanton negligence. We held nothing of the kind. That decision did not turn on the ruling of a demurrer to a petition but on the evidence. That evidence pertained not only to intoxication but other material facts as disclosed in the opinion. In that case the evidence most favorable to the contention that the driver of the car was intoxicated was the evidence of a witness who first testified he thought the driver of the car was intoxicated but who on cross-*389examination stated he did not know whether he was intoxicated or not. (See p. 251-252 of Srajer opinion.)
Of course, no such weak allegation of intoxication is contained in the instant petition. Moreover there was no direct evidence of the rate of speed in the Srajer case as is contained in the allegations of the petition here. The evidence of speed in the Srajer case was all based on inferences. (See p. 250 of the opinion.)
On demurrer, in the instant case, we must for present purposes accept as true the allegations of speed, intoxication, immediate increase of speed of motor to its maximum capacity after the request of the plaintiff to slow up, failure thereafter to guide the car and all other facts alleged.
It seems to me it is an entirely unwarranted interpretation of our past decisions and of the guest statute to say a driver of a motor vehicle may be intoxicated, may refuse to heed the request of a passenger to slow down and in response to such request immediately open the throttle to the maximum capacity of the motor, fail to guide the car and not to be said to be acting, in legal contemplation, with a realization of the imminence of danger and with a reckless disregard to the safety of his passengers.
Careful consideration leads me to believe if the trial court was wrong in sustaining the sufficiency of the instant amended petition to state a cause of action it would be exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to state a cause of action under the guest statute.
Smith, Price and Wertz, JJ., join in the above concurring opinion.