Court Opinion

ID: 9378879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-13 21:03:11.022866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:15.003206
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 211643-U
                                                                                FIRST DISTRICT,
                                                                                FIRST DIVISION
                                                                                March 13, 2023

                                              No. 1-21-1643

     NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in
     limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
     _____________________________________________________________________________

                                         IN THE
                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                                FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
     _____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   )      Appeal from the
      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,
                                                   )      Circuit Court of
                                                   )      Cook County, Illinois.
                              Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                                   )
      v.
                                                   )      No. 01 CR 0986401
                                                   )
      CHARLES WASHINGTON,
                                                   )      Honorable
                                                   )      James Michael Obbish,
                              Defendant-Appellant.
                                                   )      Judge Presiding.
     _____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE COGHLAN delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice Lavin concurred in the judgment.
            Justice Pucinski dissented.

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: Circuit court’s second-stage dismissal of defendant’s postconviction petition is
                  affirmed where defendant failed to rebut the presumption that postconviction
                  counsel provided reasonable assistance under Supreme Court Rule 651(c).

¶2          On April 21, 2006, pursuant to a fully negotiated guilty plea, defendant Charles

     Washington was convicted of first degree murder based on a forcible felony of aggravated

     kidnapping and was sentenced to 30 years’ imprisonment. Defendant did not file a motion to

     withdraw guilty plea or a direct appeal. On March 1, 2012, defendant filed a pro se petition for

     postconviction relief under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq.
     No. 1-21-1643

     (West 2012)). Defendant argued, inter alia, that his guilty plea was involuntary because the trial

     court and plea counsel did not inform him that there was a moratorium on executions at the time

     of his plea. He also argued that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to

     “Reduce Charge and Sentence” and “post-guilty plea motions” to preserve his right to challenge

     his plea on appeal. The circuit court dismissed his petition as frivolous and patently without

     merit. On appeal, we reversed and remanded, finding that defendant stated an arguable claim that

     plea counsel was ineffective for failing to preserve his right to challenge his plea on appeal.

     People v. Washington, 2014 IL App (1st) 121295-U, ¶¶ 11, 13.

¶3          On remand, appointed postconviction counsel filed a Rule 651(c) certificate but did not

     amend defendant’s pro se petition. The State moved to dismiss defendant’s petition. The circuit

     court dismissed defendant’s petition at the second stage, finding that it was untimely, failed to

     comply with the pleading requirements of the Act, and that the substantive claims lacked merit.

¶4          On appeal, defendant argues that he received unreasonable assistance of postconviction

     counsel because counsel failed to amend his pro se postconviction petition into proper legal form

     with supporting affidavits. For the following reasons, we affirm.

¶5                                            BACKGROUND

¶6          Defendant was charged with first degree murder, home invasion, aggravated kidnapping,

     criminal drug conspiracy, and aggravated unlawful restraint. The State gave notice of intent to

     seek the death penalty. On April 21, 2006, the parties participated in a conference pursuant to

     Supreme Court Rule 402 (eff. July 1, 1997). Following the conference, defendant entered a fully

     negotiated guilty plea to one count of first degree murder based on the forcible felony of

     aggravated kidnapping. The State dismissed the remaining counts and removed the possibility of

     the death penalty.

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     No. 1-21-1643

¶7           During the negotiated plea hearing, the trial court informed defendant that he faced a

     sentence from 20 to 60 years’ imprisonment and that his sentence would be served consecutively

     to his 30 year sentence in an unrelated case. Defendant indicated that he understood the rights he

     was giving up by pleading guilty. The parties stipulated to the factual basis for the plea, which

     established that defendant participated in the 2001 kidnapping and murder of Wardella

     Winchester. The court found defendant’s plea to be knowing and voluntary and sentenced him to

     the agreed term of 30 years’ imprisonment. The trial court informed defendant that in order to

     appeal, he would have to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea within the next 30 days.

     Defendant did not file a motion to withdraw guilty plea or a direct appeal.

¶8           On March 1, 2012, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief supported by

     his own verified statement and a transcript of the plea hearing. 1 Defendant argued, inter alia, that

     his “guilty plea [was] unknowing, involuntary, unintelligently, made under duress” because the

     trial court “never informed [him] that there was a moratorium placed on the death penalty.” He

     claimed that “he surely would not have plea [sic] guilty being afforded the correct information,

     but do [sic] only to the misinformation given by trial attorney and that the death penalty would

     be imposed if he did not plea guilty.” Defendant acknowledged that his petition was untimely but

     argued that he “only became aware of the [moratorium] on the death penalty after it had been

     made unconstitutional.”

¶9           Defendant also alleged that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to file a “Motion to

     Reduce Charge and Sentence of Murder, to lesser charge of kidnapping *** as requested by

     defendant” and failing to “notify the [trial] court at pleadings of mitigation evidence, by motion

             1
               Defendant also attached an affidavit of one of his codefendants, Brandon Cordell, however,
     Cordell’s assertions concerned another codefendant and were not relevant to defendant’s claims.
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       No. 1-21-1643

       or orally in open court that defendant wishes to file reconsideration motion.” Under the heading

       “Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel Failing to Preservation of Issues for Appeal,” defendant

       asserted that “[u]pon appeal any issues not raised by the defendant in the motion to reconseder

       [sic] the sentence or withdraw the guilty plea and vacate the judgment shall be deemed waived.”

       And that “the effect of counsel not filing post-trial guilty plea motions caused defendant a severe

       due process violation toward appeal.”

¶ 10          On March 23, 2012, the circuit court dismissed defendant’s petition as frivolous and

       patently without merit, finding that the trial court had no duty to inform defendant of the

       moratorium on executions. Defendant failed to provide any facts or documentation showing that

       trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file any “post-trial motions.”

¶ 11          On appeal, we held that while “inartfully drawn,” defendant’s petition had an arguable

       basis in fact and law. Washington, 2014 IL App (1st) 121295-U, ¶¶ 10-11. Liberally construing

       the petition, we found that defendant asserted that he “sought to attack his plea on several

       grounds” and “requested that his trial counsel file motions relating to those claims to enable him

       to appeal on those grounds; but counsel’s ‘failure to file requested motions violated’ his due

       process rights.” Id. ¶ 10. While defendant never used the term “motion to withdraw guilty plea,”

       “his allegation that he requested counsel to prepare motions to preserve his grounds for appeal”

       was not “fantastic or delusional.” Id. Therefore, defendant’s petition “contained an arguable

       basis in law, namely, that [he] was afforded ineffective representation by his counsel who failed

       to preserve [his] right to challenge his guilty plea on appeal.” Id. ¶ 11. We reversed the dismissal

       of defendant’s petition and remanded for second-stage proceedings. Id. ¶ 13.

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       No. 1-21-1643

¶ 12          Postconviction counsel was appointed on remand.2 On November 12, 2020, counsel filed

       a certificate pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017), certifying that she

       consulted with defendant “in person, by mail, by phone or by electronic means” to ascertain his

       contentions; “examined the report of proceedings at trial, appellate materials, and court files and

       [had] conducted interviews necessary to investigate Defendant/Petitioner’s contentions”; and

       “made any amendments to the motion necessary for the adequate presentation of

       Defendant/Petitioner’s contentions and defects in same.”

¶ 13          On April 15, 2021, the State filed a motion to dismiss defendant’s petition, asserting that

       it was untimely and defendant failed to show that the delay was not due to his culpable

       negligence. The State also asserted that defendant’s verification affidavit was not notarized, and

       the petition was not supported by any affidavits, records, or other evidence as required by

       sections 122-1(b) and 122-2 of the Act. Further, defendant was correctly informed that the

       maximum possible sentence was the death penalty, and he did not allege that he asked plea

       counsel to file a motion to withdraw his plea or the basis for the motion.

¶ 14          Postconviction counsel “asked [defendant] for some information” and sent him a copy of

       the State’s motion, and “asked him if he wished to file any affidavits,” but she did not receive a

       response. She asked the court to continue the case so she could meet with defendant in person.

       On August 11, 2021, postconviction counsel sought leave to “amend” defendant’s pro se

       petition. Counsel explained that she met with defendant in person after he did not respond to her

       multiple letters. Defendant “didn’t think it was necessary to notarize anything” but he eventually

       agreed to have his signature notarized. Counsel indicated that she had “nothing substantive to

              2
                Marsha Watt was initially appointed as defendant’s postconviction counsel. On November 28,
       2018, defendant’s case was reassigned to Camille Calabrese.
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       No. 1-21-1643

       add” to the petition. On August 17, 2021, defendant filed an “amended” pro se postconviction

       petition. The amendments include a notarized signature added to defendant’s verification

       affidavit at the beginning of his petition and a notarized affidavit at the end of his petition,

       stating, “I hereby declare all statements are true and correct.”

¶ 15          Oral arguments were held on the State’s motion. The State raised the same arguments as

       in its motion, but also claimed that the “new amended verification” is still insufficient because it

       cites section 1-109 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/1-109), which is “patently

       wrong.” Postconviction counsel responded that she wrote to defendant “extensively,” had “many

       conversations” with him, and had to go to the prison to “persuade” him to “sign any kind of

       affidavit because he felt his pro se petition was sufficient.” Counsel explained that she went to

       the prison to have defendant “sign a blanket affidavit and attach it so it would cover any errors

       with respect to [him] not citing the exact clause under which he was filing his notarized

       signature.”

¶ 16          Counsel argued that while the death penalty was in effect at the time of his plea,

       defendant claims that “he was psychiatrically coerced into making a plea that perhaps he would

       not have made had he understood better what the term moratorium meant” and “perhaps an

       evidentiary hearing would be merited to explore what he meant when he used the term coercive

       use and the unconstitutional use of the death penalty to induce him to a plea.”

¶ 17          On November 23, 2021, the circuit court granted the State’s motion to dismiss. The court

       found that defendant’s petition was untimely, and he failed to show that the late filing was not

       due to his culpable negligence. Moreover, defendant’s petition failed to comply with the

       pleading requirements of the Act because his “verification affidavit offered as an information

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       No. 1-21-1643

       affidavit for all of the facts alleged within the petition” is not a substitute for the information

       affidavit requirement of section 122-2 of the Act.

¶ 18           The circuit court also rejected the merits of defendant’s claims. The court found that both

       the trial court and plea counsel correctly advised defendant that the maximum possible sentence

       he faced was the death penalty—“the State still sought death penalty sentences and defendants

       still received the death penalty.” The moratorium was imposed at the discretion of the governor

       and could have been lifted by a subsequent governor. Therefore, agreeing with defendant’s

       position would require a defendant entering a plea to “be made aware of all possible, future

       legislation, executive action, and court decisions.” Defendant also “fail[ed] to establish that he

       asked his counsel to file a motion to withdraw his plea or what even would be the grounds of a

       motion to withdraw.”

¶ 19                                                ANALYSIS

¶ 20           Defendant does not challenge the dismissal of his postconviction petition on the merits.

       Rather, he argues that he received unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel where she

       did not amend his pro se petition into proper legal form and did not attach supporting affidavits.

¶ 21                                                 Timeliness

¶ 22           A postconviction petition must be filed no later than three years from the date of

       conviction if the defendant does not file an appeal, unless he alleges facts showing that the delay

       was not due to his culpable negligence. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(c) (West 2020). The State argues that

       we should affirm the dismissal of defendant’s petition because it is untimely, regardless of any

       allegations of unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel.

¶ 23           However, in People v. Lander, 215 Ill. 2d 577, 585 (2005), our supreme court held that

       “the untimeliness of defendant’s petition [does] not excuse postconviction counsel from fulfilling

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       No. 1-21-1643

       their duties under Rule 651(c).” The court explained that because untimeliness is an affirmative

       defense that can be raised, waived, or forfeited by the State, “a dutiful prosecutor may waive this

       defense *** if an untimely petition demonstrates the defendant suffered a deprivation of

       constitutional magnitude.” Id. at 584 (relying on People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 101-102

       (2002)). “Therefore, to assure the reasonable assistance of counsel mandated by the Act,

       postconviction counsel must comply with Rule 651(c) and submit defendant’s substantive claims

       to the State to give the prosecutor an opportunity to determine whether they are sufficient to

       merit the State’s waiver of the affirmative defense of untimeliness.” Id. at 585. Because

       postconviction counsel must fully comply with Rule 651(c) despite the untimeliness of a petition,

       we will consider defendant’s argument that he received unreasonable assistance of

       postconviction counsel.

¶ 24                          Unreasonable Assistance of Postconviction Counsel

¶ 25          The Act provides a three-stage procedure for a defendant alleging substantial

       deprivations of his constitutional rights. People v. Allen, 2015 IL 113135, ¶¶ 20-21. At the first

       stage, the circuit court must, within 90 days, independently review the petition and determine

       whether the allegations are “frivolous” or “patently without merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1 (a)(2)

       (West 2020). If a petition advances to the second stage, the circuit court must determine whether

       the petition and any accompanying documentation make a substantial showing of a constitutional

       violation. People v. Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d 239, 246 (2001).

¶ 26          When a petition advances to the second stage, the court may appoint counsel to an

       indigent defendant. People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 42 (2007). The defendant is entitled to a

       “reasonable” level of assistance from postconviction counsel. Id. Because appointment of

       counsel in postconviction proceedings is a matter of “legislative grace,” this “reasonable” level

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       No. 1-21-1643

       of assistance is “significantly lower than the one mandated at trial by our state and federal

       constitutions.” People v. Custer, 2019 IL 123339, ¶ 30.

¶ 27          To ensure this level of assistance is met, Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1,

       2017) imposes three duties on postconviction counsel. Counsel must (1) consult with petitioner

       (by mail, phone, electronic means, or in person) to ascertain his contentions of deprivations of

       constitutional rights; (2) examine the record of the trial proceedings; and (3) make any

       amendments to the pro se petition “necessary for an adequate presentation of [defendant’s]

       contentions.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c); Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 42. However, postconviction counsel “is

       not required to amend a defendant’s pro se postconviction petition.” People v. Malone, 2017 IL

       App (3d) 140165, ¶ 10. “If amendments to a pro se postconviction petition would only further a

       frivolous or patently nonmeritorious claim, they are not ‘necessary’ within the meaning of the

       rule.” People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192, 205 (2004). The purpose of Rule 651(c) is to “ensure that

       counsel shapes the petitioner’s claims into proper legal form and presents those claims to the

       court.” Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 43-44.

¶ 28          The filing of a Rule 651(c) certificate creates a rebuttable presumption that

       postconviction counsel’s assistance was reasonable. People v. Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307,

       ¶ 19. “A defendant has the burden of overcoming that presumption by demonstrating that

       counsel failed to substantially comply with the duties set out in Rule 651(c).” People v. Rivera,

       2016 IL App (1st) 132573, ¶ 36. We review de novo both the dismissal of a postconviction

       petition at the second stage and whether counsel complied with Rule 651(c). Profit, 2012 IL App

       (1st) 101307, ¶ 17 (citing People v. Jones, 2011 IL App (1st) 092529, ¶ 19).

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       No. 1-21-1643

¶ 29          Defendant does not challenge postconviction counsel’s compliance with the first two

       requirements of Rule 651(c); he argues that counsel failed to amend his pro se petition as

       “necessary for an adequate presentation of [his] contentions.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c).

¶ 30                          Failure to Amend Petition with Supporting Affidavits

¶ 31          Defendant asserts that postconviction counsel should have amended his petition with his

       own affidavit alleging facts supporting his claims. Section 122-2 of the Act requires that the

       claims raised in a postconviction petition be supported by “affidavits, records, or other

       evidence.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2 (West 2020).

¶ 32          “In the ordinary case, a trial court ruling upon a motion to dismiss a post-conviction

       petition which is not supported by affidavits or other documents may reasonably presume that

       post-conviction counsel made a concerted effort to obtain affidavits in support of the post-

       conviction claims, but was unable to do so.” People v. Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d 227, 241 (1993). The

       record in this case supports this presumption where counsel consulted with defendant multiple

       times, met with him to discuss the State’s motion to dismiss, and indicated that she had “nothing

       substantive to add” to the petition. “A mere failure to amend the pro se petition is not enough to

       establish inadequacy of representation in the absence of showing that the petition could have

       been successfully amended.” People v. Johnson, 232 Ill. App. 3d 674, 678 (1992).

¶ 33          Contrary to defendant’s assertion, we do not find that postconviction counsel’s statement

       regarding a “blanket affidavit” shows that she “misunderstood the law.” In fact, counsel fulfilled

       her duties by ensuring that defendant’s verification affidavit was notarized. See 725 ILCS 5/122-

       1(b) (West 2020) (a postconviction petition must be “verified by affidavit”); see also People v.

       Nitz, 2011 IL App (2d) 100031, ¶ 19 (failure to provide notarized verification affidavit under

       section 122-1(b) of the Act constituted unreasonable assistance of postconviction counsel).

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       No. 1-21-1643

       Counsel indicated that she thought the affidavit would “cover any errors with respect to

       [defendant] not citing the exact clause under which he was filing his notarized signature”

       because the State argued that defendant’s verification improperly cited section 1-109 of the Code

       of Civil Procedure. Defendant has failed to rebut the presumption that counsel made a “concerted

       effort” to obtain affidavits in support of his petition. Compare Johnson, 154 Ill. 2d at 241

       (presumption of reasonable assistance was “flatly contradicted by the record” where counsel

       admitted he made no effort to obtain affidavits) with People v. Kirk, 2012 IL App (1st) 101606, ¶

       25 (“nothing in the record establishes or suggests that counsel did not make an effort to obtain

       affidavits”).

¶ 34                     Failure to Shape Defendant’s Claims into Proper Legal Form

¶ 35           Defendant argues that postconviction counsel failed to amend two of his claims into

       “proper legal form.” These claims are that plea counsel was ineffective in (1) failing “to file a

       motion to withdraw the plea and/or preserve his right to challenge his plea on appeal” and (2)

       failing to inform him of the moratorium on executions.

¶ 36           Defendant assumes that counsel would have been able to amend his petition to allege that

       he asked counsel to file a motion to withdraw guilty plea and the grounds for such a motion. We

       declined to make such an assumption under similar circumstances in People v. Luna, 2022 IL

       App (1st) 200203-U (cited as persuasive authority under Rule 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023)). In

       Luna, defendant entered a guilty plea and did not move to withdraw his plea at any time. Id. ¶¶

       7-8. Defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition, alleging that counsel was ineffective for

       failing to investigate the case and file an appeal “ ‘after being [so] advised by defendant.’ ” Id. ¶

       9. He did not allege that he wished to withdraw his guilty plea. Id. Defendant filed two affidavits

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       No. 1-21-1643

       attesting to the truth of the petition “but made no further assertions of fact.” Id. The circuit court

       docketed the petition and appointed postconviction counsel. Id.

¶ 37          Postconviction counsel did not file an amended petition, but filed two Rule 651(c)

       certificates indicating that he consulted with defendant, reviewed the record, and concluded that

       defendant’s pro se filings “adequately presented his claims, and there was nothing that could be

       added by an additional or supplemental petition.” Id. ¶¶ 10-11. The circuit court dismissed the

       petition. Id. ¶ 12. On appeal, we rejected defendant’s argument that postconviction counsel was

       unreasonable because he “did not amend the pro se petition to state if defendant wanted to

       withdraw the guilty plea [and] had any cognizable bases for withdrawal ***.” Id. ¶ 13. We found

       that “the need for amendments was speculative, in that defendant cannot establish that the

       amendments would have supported his claims,” especially where “counsel repeatedly consulted

       with defendant regarding his claims *** and informed the court that defendant’s pro se filings

       adequately presented his claims.” Id. ¶ 25.

¶ 38          Likewise, here, postconviction counsel filed a 651(c) certificate and stated on the record

       that she wrote defendant “extensively” and had “many conversations” with him. Counsel sent

       defendant a copy of the State’s motion to dismiss and “asked him if he wished to file any

       affidavits.” After not hearing from defendant, she met with him in person to discuss the State’s

       motion and indicated that she had “nothing substantive to add.” Based on counsel’s Rule 651(c)

       certificate and her statements on the record, “we presume that the answers counsel received from

       defendant were not helpful to defendant’s claims or else they would have been incorporated into

       a supplemental petition.” Id. ¶ 30.

¶ 39          On appeal from the first-stage dismissal of defendant’s petition, we liberally construed

       his petition to find that he stated an arguable claim that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to

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       No. 1-21-1643

       preserve his right to challenge his guilty plea on appeal. Washington, 2014 IL App (1st) 121295-

       U, ¶¶ 10-11. However, at the second stage, defendant is required to show the grounds on which

       he could have moved to withdraw his plea (Edwards, 197 Ill. 2d at 258) and a “reasonable

       probability the motion would be granted on those grounds.” (People v. Beasley, 2017 IL App

       (4th) 150291, ¶ 30). Without showing what available information counsel could have included in

       an amended petition to meet this higher standard, defendant has not rebutted the presumption

       that postconviction counsel’s assistance was reasonable.

¶ 40          People v. Garcia, 2021 IL App (1st) 191820, is distinguishable. There, postconviction

       counsel’s amended petition asserted that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to comply with

       defendant’s request to file a notice of appeal. Id. ¶ 5. We found that postconviction counsel was

       unreasonable for failing to amend the petition to include “ ‘some explanation of the grounds that

       could have been presented in the motion to withdraw the plea.’ ” Id. ¶ 11 (quoting Edwards, 197

       Ill. 2d at 258). Here, postconviction counsel did not insufficiently advance a claim on

       defendant’s behalf. Instead, she stood on the pro se petition, which is permitted. See People v.

       Pace, 386 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 1062 (2008) (counsel can stand on the pro se petition or move to

       withdraw if counsel “investigates the claims but finds them without merit”); Malone, 2017 IL

       App (3d) 140165, ¶ 12 (whether counsel “stood on the pro se petition or withdrew as counsel is a

       distinction without a difference”); People v. Dixon, 2018 IL App (3d) 150630, ¶ 22 (“If counsel

       had found all the claims in the petition to be frivolous, the appropriate procedure would have

       been to stand on the pro se petition or seek to withdraw as counsel”).

¶ 41          Defendant further asserts that postconviction counsel acted unreasonably in “failing to

       state [his] claim into proper legal form by alleging ineffective assistance of plea counsel for

       failing to adequately explain the moratorium.”

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¶ 42          Rule 651(c) “does not require postconviction counsel to amend a petition to advance

       frivolous or spurious claims on a defendant’s behalf.” People v. Gallano, 2019 IL App (1st)

       160570, ¶ 30 (citing Greer, 212 Ill. 2d at 205). “If amendments to a pro se postconviction

       petition would only further a frivolous or patently nonmeritorious claim, they are not ‘necessary’

       within the meaning of the rule.” Greer, 212 Ill. 2d at 205. Therefore, “the question of whether

       the pro se allegations had merit is crucial to determining whether counsel acted unreasonably by

       not filing an amended petition.” Profit, 2012 IL App (1st) 101307, ¶ 23.

¶ 43          To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that counsel’s

       performance was deficient and that he was prejudiced as a result. Strickland v. Washington, 466

       U.S. 668, 687 (1984). In this context, “[a]n attorney’s conduct is deficient if the attorney failed to

       ensure that the defendant’s guilty plea was entered voluntarily and intelligently.” People v. Hall,

       217 Ill. 2d 324, 335 (2005). To establish prejudice, defendant must show that “absent counsel’s

       errors, the defendant would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial.” Id.

¶ 44           “A criminal defendant has the constitutional right to be reasonably informed with

       respect to the direct consequences of accepting or rejecting a plea offer.” (Emphasis in original.)

       People v. Curry, 178 Ill. 2d 509, 528 (1997), abrogated on other grounds by People v. Hale,

       2013 IL 113140, ¶ 20. Counsel “has the obligation to inform his or her client about the maximum

       and minimum sentences that can be imposed for the offenses which the defendant is charged.”

       Id. The record shows that defendant was informed of the minimum and maximum possible

       sentences, including the death penalty. As the circuit court aptly noted, defendant could have still

       received the death penalty and the moratorium could have been lifted at any time. Because

       defendant was “reasonably informed with respect to the direct consequences of accepting” the

       plea (see id. at 528), he cannot show that plea counsel’s conduct was deficient. Postconviction

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       No. 1-21-1643

       counsel had no duty to amend the pro se petition to advance this meritless claim. See, e.g.,

       Gallano, 2019 IL App (1st) 160570, ¶ 31 (“counsel did not provide unreasonable assistance

       when she did not support this meritless claim” with a notarized affidavit).

¶ 45          Finally, we disagree with defendant’s assertion that postconviction counsel’s statement

       that “perhaps an evidentiary hearing would be merited” to “more fully explore [defendant’s

       claims” shows that she “erroneously thought there would be an opportunity, at an evidentiary

       hearing, to support [his] claims and therefore, did not make an effort to support them at the

       second stage.” The record shows that counsel fulfilled her duties under Rule 651(c) and stood on

       defendant’s pro se petition. Defendant argues that if postconviction counsel was unable to

       support his claims, she was required to withdraw. However, “postconviction counsel has the

       option of standing on the allegations in the pro se petition” or withdrawing. Malone, 2017 IL

       App (3d) 140165, ¶ 10; Pace, 386 Ill. App. 3d at 1062.

¶ 46          For all of these reasons, we find that defendant has failed to rebut the presumption that he

       received reasonable assistance of postconviction counsel.

¶ 47                                             CONCLUSION

¶ 48          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

¶ 49          Affirmed.

¶ 50          JUSTICE PUCINSKI, dissenting:

¶ 51          I would reverse and remand for new second stage proceedings with new postconviction

       counsel.

¶ 52          Defendant stated in his pro se Petition for Postconviction relief that neither his trial

       attorney nor the court explained that his sentence range included a moratorium on the death

       penalty he was facing. Even though the moratorium might have ended sometime during his

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       incarceration, he still had to make a choice about a negotiated plea without that information. In

       my opinion, that cannot be a knowing decision. For a knowing decision about a guilty plea the

       defendant has to know all the potential outcomes, not just some of them. His postconviction

       attorney did not amend his Petition to properly add an affidavit from him about this matter. This

       was sufficient to rebut the presumption of counsel’s 651(c) certificate.

¶ 53          Defendant also stated in his pro se Petition that his plea counsel did not preserve his right

       to appeal, but the postconviction counsel did not amend his petition to get that allegation into its

       proper form.

¶ 54          To make matters worse, postconviction counsel, ignored the language of the order this

       court entered in 2014, remanding for second stage, finding that while the pro se Petition was

       “inartfully drawn” it had an arguable basis in fact and law. People v. Washington, 2014 IL App

       (1st) 121295-U, ¶¶ 10-11. This court provided a blueprint which postconviction counsel simply

       ignored. Instead, counsel made the slightest possible amendment to the Petition by adding a

       verification to the pro se Petition, while arguing in the hearing on the Petition that it still needed

       some evidence and was, therefore, entitled to a third stage hearing.

¶ 55          I just do not see how we can find, on the one hand, that a pro se Petition needs work, and

       then, on the other hand, let the postconviction attorney get away with failure to amend it.

¶ 56           Because I believe that postconviction counsel provided unreasonable representation, I

       would reverse and remand for new second stage proceedings with new postconviction counsel.

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