Court Opinion

ID: 9884609
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:03:13.444399+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:03.658250
License: Public Domain

Mr. Chief Justice Underwood, dissenting: As I read the majority opinion, it is bottomed upon a finding that the classification of second division motor vehicles as subject to either calendar or fiscal year registration on the basis of whether or not they are under proration is reasonable and thus, the statute authorizing this classification is constitutional. This conclusion is, in my judgment, largely irrelevant since the constitutionality of that provision is not questioned. This case involves two separate statutory provisions, both of which distinguish pro rata vehicles from other vehicles of the second division. The first, enacted in May, 1969, authorized the registration of pro rata vehicles on a calendar rather than a fiscal year basis. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 95 par. 3 — 414.) The announced objective of this provision was to conform the pro rata registration period in Illinois to those in effect in the other States and, in view of the fact that Illinois was previously the only State which did not register vehicles on a calendar year basis for the purpose of proration, this classification was clearly reasonable. The second statute, enacted in July, 1969, increased license fees for all jnotor vehicles and provided that the increases were to become effective six months earlier for pro rata vehicles (January 1, 1970) than for other second division vehicles (July 1, 1970). (See P. A. 76 — 370.) It is the classification created by this “effective date” provision which plaintiffs find objectionable and which was held unconstitutional by the circuit court. As noted by the majority opinion, the legislature has broad discretion in establishing classes for the purposes of taxation and the basis on which classes are determined must only be reasonable. This means of course that the classification must bear some reasonable relationship to the object of the legislation or to public policy. (Fiorito v. Jones, 39 Ill.2d 531; Klein v. Hulman, 34 Ill-2d 343.) Once having determined a reasonable basis of classification for purposes of registration, it does not necessarily follow that a distinction between pro rata and other second division vehicles is valid for all purposes. What then, is the reasonable basis justifying the classification created by the “effective date” provision? The majority opinion concludes that “the provision is clearly designed to enable the defendant Secretary of State to conform the registration period to those in effect in other jurisdictions who are party to the proration agreements.” If the provision referred to is section 3 — 414 (calendar-year registration) then the conclusion as to its constitutionality is irrelevant. If, however, the “conformity rationale” is also thought to justify the differentiation between pro rata and other second division vehicles as to the date when license fee increases become effective (P.A. 76 — 370), I must respectfully disagree since I perceive no reasonable relationship between the six-month difference in effective dates and the objective of conformity. It is to be noted, too, that the discrimination is even more burdensome for the owner of a fleet of trucks, any of which are registered on a calendar year basis, for the statute requires that if any are so registered, all must be. Nor do I agree that the fees paid on a calendar year basis are identical to those paid on a fiscal year basis. The majority contends that although the license fee increases become effective six months earlier for pro rata vehicles than for other second division vehicles, there is no real difference because the length of the registration period is 12 months in either case. This contention implies that at some point, the amount paid by the two classes of second division vehicles will be equalized while, in fact, this is simply not the case. If, following July 1, 1970, the license fees remain the same or, as is more likely, they are increased, the total amount of fees paid by plaintiffs and members of their class will always exceed the amount paid by other vehicles of the second division. The critical fact is that for the first 6 months of 1970 pro rata vehicles paid substantially higher fees than did other second division vehicles of the same weight. Finally, the majority notes that “Plaintiffs are not required to seek proration, and only in the event they do are their vehicles subject to calendar year registration.” Since plaintiffs do not object to the calendar year registration of their vehicles, the relevancy of this observation is not entirely clear. If the suggestion is that, having elected to register on a calendar year basis, plaintiffs must willingly pay the price for this privilege, I cannot agree. Pro rata registration has been in effect in Illinois since 1951 and has never been subject to higher fees. In authorizing calendar year registration the legislature expressly provided that “fees or taxes to be paid on a calendar year basis shall be identical to those specified in the Act for a fiscal year registration.” The legislature clearly did not intend to put a price upon calendar year registration. The majority opinion fails, in my judgment, to identify any real and substantial difference between the classes of second division vehicles created by the “effective date” provision which bears a reasonable relation to the objectives of that statute. In the absence of such differences, the six-month differentiation in license fees is discriminatory and should not be sustained. I would reverse and require the increases to take effect at the same time for all second division vehicles. Mr. Justice Ryan joins in this dissent.