Court Opinion

ID: 9915646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-06 00:02:07.738713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:39.437077
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/5/24 In re M.W. CA4/2

                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
     publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
                               publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re M.W., a Person Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.

 SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                            E081918

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super.Ct.No. J291700)

 v.                                                                       OPINION

 J.B.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Cara D. Hutson,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Melissa A. Chaitin, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant.

         Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Svetlana Kauper, Deputy County Counsel for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                                              1
       The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of J.B. (Mother) to her son,

M.W. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26, subd. (b)(1).)1 Mother contends the juvenile court

erred by (1) not expressly stating, on the record, its analysis of the evidence pertaining

to the parent-child benefit exception to terminating parental rights (§ 366.26, subd.

(c)(1)(B)(i); In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 632 (Caden C.)); and (2) not finding

in favor of Mother on the parent-child benefit exception (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)).

We affirm.

                                       DISCUSSION

       A.     LACK OF AN EXPRESS ANALYSIS

       The parent-child benefit exception to terminating parental rights applies when

“[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child

would benefit from continuing the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) In

Caden C., our Supreme Court wrote, “As to the second element, courts assess whether

‘the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.’ (§ 366.26, subd.

(c)(1)(B)(i).) Again here, the focus is the child. And the relationship may be shaped by

a slew of factors, such as ‘[t]he age of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent in

the parent’s custody, the “positive” or “negative” effect of interaction between parent

and child, and the child’s particular needs.’ ” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)

       At the hearing to terminate parental rights, Mother’s attorney urged the juvenile

court to apply the parent-child benefit exception to termination. When describing the

       1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

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second element—whether M.W. would benefit from continuing the relationship with

Mother—Mother’s attorney explained some of the factors within that element: “the age

of the child, the portion of the child’s life spent with the parent in her custody, and the

child’s particular needs.” Mother’s attorney asserted that M.W. spent the majority of

his life with Mother—four out of six years.

       In response, M.W.’s attorney argued in favor of terminating parental rights.

M.W.’s attorney said, “The parents have both cited Caden C.” M.W.’s attorney

contended Mother’s visits were detrimental to M.W. in that M.W. engaged in negative

behaviors for several days after visits with Mother.

       San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (the Department) argued

that Mother “met the first prong of Caden C.” by regularly visiting M.W. but “that’s the

only prong that she meets.” The Department continued, “[I]n regards to the second

prong of Caden C. it states that the children have [a] substantial, positive emotional

attachment to [the] parents. The kind implying that he would benefit from continuing

that relationship.” The Department argued that M.W.’s poor behavior at school for

several days after visits with Mother “can negatively affect him in his future so . . . that

prong is not met.”

       The Department explained that the third step in the parent-child benefit analysis

is balancing the detriment to M.W. of terminating parental rights against the benefit to

M.W. of adoption. The Department contended that M.W. is young, at six years old, and

he would greatly benefit from 12 years in a stable adoptive home.

                                              3
       After the attorneys finished their arguments, the juvenile court said, “The Court

finds termination of parental rights would not be detrimental to [M.W.] and there’s no

exception to .2[6](c)(1) so the Court will grant the order of terminating parental rights.”

The juvenile court did not state its reasons for finding that the parent-child benefit

exception did not apply. However, given that the attorneys’ arguments were focused on

Caden C., it is reasonable to infer that the juvenile court found Mother did not satisfy

the Caden C. factors.

       Mother contends, “because the juvenile court failed to (1) address the elements

and factors articulated in Caden C., (2) explain the factual basis for its findings,

(3) engage in any subtle analysis of [M.W.’s] emotional attachment to his mother, it is

impossible for this reviewing Court to affirm the findings and order terminating parental

rights.”

       In her appellant’s reply brief, Mother concedes that there is no authority

requiring the juvenile court to state its analysis on the record. However, Mother

contends that without an expressly stated analysis, “it is difficult, if not impossible, to

ascertain whether the [juvenile] court relied on impermissible factors.” Mother’s

argument would be better presented to the Legislature. Mother is correct that one can

better review the process when the trial court “shows its work,” i.e., expressly states its

reasoning. However, as Mother concedes, the law does not require the juvenile court to

state on the record its reasons for rejecting a parent’s argument for an exception to

termination. Therefore, while a statement of reasons would be the best practice, it is not

reversible error to omit a statement of reasons.

                                              4
       B.     FINDING THAT THE EXCEPTION DOES NOT APPLY

       Mother asserts that she should have prevailed under a Caden C. analysis, i.e.,

Mother asserts substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s finding.

Mother urges this court to follow In re E.T. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 68, 77, in which the

appellate court wrote, “The standard is whether the children benefit from Mother’s

presence in their lives, not whether they could eventually be happy without her.” For

the sake of addressing Mother’s argument, we will apply the foregoing benefit standard.

“ ‘We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to the factual issue of the

existence of a beneficial parental relationship.” (Id. at p. 76.)

       M.W. was removed from Mother’s custody in December 2021 due to Mother’s

boyfriend physically abusing M.W.; Mother and M.W.’s father having engaged in

domestic violence in the presence of M.W.; Mother’s drug abuse negatively impacting

her child care; and M.W.’s half sibling “sustaining an orbital fracture, a skull fracture to

the left of his forehead, and black and blue bruising to the face.”

       In February 2023, the Department reported that M.W. was “receiving mental

health services . . . to address outburst[s], verbal aggression and nightmares. The [foster

parent] shares that the child has decreased these behaviors and that therapy treatments

have further decreased [them].” In June 2023, the Department wrote in its report,

“[M.W.’s foster mother] reported that [M.W.] will have a different attitude, he will not

listen, and he tends to get into trouble at school for two to three days after the visits

[with Mother].” Mother’s parental rights to M.W. were terminated in August 2023.

                                              5
       The foregoing is substantial evidence supporting the finding that Mother’s

relationship with M.W. had a negative effect on M.W. because he suffered nightmares

and had aggressive behaviors following his time with her, which improved during his

time in foster care. M.W. regressed after visiting Mother. The evidence reflects that

Mother was not a beneficial presence in M.W.’s life. Accordingly, substantial evidence

supports the juvenile court’s determination that the parent-child benefit exception does

not apply in this case.

                                         DISPOSITION

       The order is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                       MILLER
                                                                                           J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
                          Acting P. J.

FIELDS
                                    J.

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