Court Opinion

ID: 9890304
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-12 19:00:57.566359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:15.190631
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-14476   Document: 51-1    Date Filed: 10/12/2023   Page: 1 of 41

                                                         [PUBLISH]

                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 21-14476
                         ____________________

        JOHN S. LOWMAN, IV,
        HOLLY LOWMAN,
        RICK BRIAN STEVENS,
        MARYANNE STEVENS,
        JABIN BONNETT,
                                                           Petitioners,
        versus
        FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION,
        FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATOR,

                                                         Respondents,
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        2                    Opinion of the Court               21-14476

        CITY OF LAKELAND, FLORIDA,

                                                 Intervenor-Respondent.
                           ____________________

                    Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                        Federal Aviation Administration
                        Agency No. FAA: FONSI/ROD
                           ____________________

        Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        BRANCH, Circuit Judge:
              The City of Lakeland, Florida, (“City”) owns and operates
        the Lakeland Linder International Airport (“Airport”). To improve
        the Airport’s ﬁnancial performance and boost economic
        development, the City invested in projects—approved by the
        Federal Aviation Administration (“FAA”)—to enhance the Airport.
        The City’s plan worked; it landed a deal to lease the Airport’s
        newly-constructed air cargo area to Amazon.com Services, Inc.
        (“Amazon”).
              Then, to further accommodate Amazon, the City sought
        FAA approval of a second set of expansion projects (“Phase II”).
        The FAA reviewed an Environmental Assessment and issued a
        Finding of No Signiﬁcant Impact/Record of Decision, which
        greenlighted Phase II.
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        21-14476               Opinion of the Court                         3

               Petitioners, a group of ﬁve individuals, ﬁled this petition for
        review, claiming that the FAA violated the National Environmental
        Policy Act (“NEPA”) during its Phase II approval process.
        Petitioners assert that the FAA violated NEPA by (1) segmenting its
        review of a single Airport development project into multiple,
        smaller projects to make the project’s environmental eﬀect appear
        less signiﬁcant, (2) failing to consider the project’s cumulative
        eﬀects, and (3) failing to analyze all air quality impacts. The FAA
        responds that, as an initial matter, Petitioners cannot bring this
        petition for review because they lack standing and did not exhaust
        their administrative remedies. Alternatively, the FAA contends that
        it did not violate NEPA, and the petition for review should be
        denied.
              After careful review, and with the beneﬁt of oral argument,
        we conclude that Petitioners have standing and did not fail to
        exhaust their administrative remedies. Thus, we must consider the
        merits of their petition for review. Petitioners, however, fall short
        on the merits because it is clear that the FAA satisﬁed NEPA’s
        requirements. Accordingly, we deny the petition for review.
                                I.     Background
               A. NEPA Overview
               We start with an overview of NEPA to provide context for
        Petitioners’ arguments.
               NEPA, one of the nation’s ﬁrst large-scale environmental
        statutes, was passed in part to “declare a national policy which will
        encourage productive and enjoyable harmony between man and
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        4                        Opinion of the Court                     21-14476

        his environment,” “prevent or eliminate damage to the
        environment,” and “enrich the understanding of the ecological
        systems and natural resources important to the Nation.” 42 U.S.C.
        § 4321 (quotation omitted). In broad strokes, NEPA requires
        federal agencies to assess the environmental eﬀects of certain
        proposed actions. Id. § 4332. And, to ensure that NEPA was
        implemented properly, the statute created the Council on
        Environmental Quality (“CEQ”). Id. § 4344.
               NEPA is not results-oriented; rather, its procedural
        mechanisms were designed such that agencies must “follow a
        certain [decision-making] process” when evaluating proposed
        actions. Sierra Club v. Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d 1353, 1361 (11th Cir.
        2008). CEQ’s regulations direct federal agencies to evaluate
        diﬀerent proposed actions through diﬀerent processes. 1
               First, for proposed actions “likely to have signiﬁcant eﬀects”
        on the “quality of the human environment,” an agency must
        prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”). 42 U.S.C.
        § 4332(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3(a)(3). EISs “shall provide full and
        fair discussion of signiﬁcant environmental impacts and shall

        1
         While the FAA was reviewing Phase II, CEQ amended its NEPA regulations.
        See Update to the Regulations Implementing the Procedural Provisions of the
        National Environmental Policy Acy, 85 Fed. Reg. 43304-01 (July 16, 2020).
        Under 40 C.F.R. § 1506.13, the amended regulations apply to NEPA processes
        initiated “after September 14, 2020.” For ongoing reviews, agencies have
        discretion to apply the new regulations or those previously in effect. Here,
        the FAA “decided to apply the regulations in effect” in February 2020 when it
        initiated the NEPA process in this case.
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        21-14476                Opinion of the Court                            5

        inform decision makers and the public of reasonable alternatives
        that would avoid or minimize adverse impacts or enhance the
        quality of the human environment.” 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. EISs must
        go through a public comment period. See, e.g., id. § 1506.11(d)
        (“[A]gencies shall allow at least 45 days for comments on draft
        [EISs].”).
                Second, for proposed actions that are “not likely to have
        signiﬁcant eﬀects or [for which] the signiﬁcance of the eﬀects is
        unknown,” an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) should be
        prepared rather than an EIS. Id. § 1501.5. EAs essentially serve an
        intermediary function—requiring that the agency “[b]rieﬂy
        provide suﬃcient evidence and analysis for determining whether
        to prepare an [EIS] or a ﬁnding of no signiﬁcant impact
        [(“FONSI”)] . . . .” Id. § 1501.5(c)(1). In other words, EAs inform
        an agency as to whether a more in-depth analysis is needed because
        the proposed action will have signiﬁcant eﬀects—leading to an
        EIS—or whether no further study is needed because the proposed
        action will not have signiﬁcant eﬀects—leading to a FONSI. 2 Id.;
        see also id. § 1501.6(a)–(c) (“An agency shall prepare a [FONSI] if the
        agency determines, based on the [EA], not to prepare an [EIS]
        because the proposed action will not have signiﬁcant eﬀects.”).
        Irrespective of its role in the NEPA decision tree, each EA must
        “[b]rieﬂy discuss the purpose and need for the proposed action,

        2
          When an agency makes its decision, it is required to “prepare and timely
        publish” a Record of Decision (“ROD”). 40 CFR § 1505.2(a). Here, the Phase
        II FONSI and ROD were published together.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  21-14476

        alternatives [to the proposed action] . . . and the environmental
        impacts of the proposed action and alternatives . . . .” Id.
        § 1501.5(c)(2). EAs are not strictly required to go through public
        comment like EISs. Id. § 1501.5(e) (“Agencies shall involve the
        public . . . to the extent practicable in preparing [EAs].”); see also
        FAA Order 1050.1F § 6-2.2(g) (“Circulation of a draft EA for public
        comment should be considered but is optional at the discretion of
        the responsible FAA oﬃcial.”).
               Third, and ﬁnally, a small subset of proposed actions that
        “normally do not have a signiﬁcant eﬀect” are categorically
        excluded from NEPA review. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.3(a)(1), 1501.4. In
        simpler terms, federal agencies determine “categories of actions”
        that normally do not have signiﬁcant environmental impacts, and
        if a proposed action falls within such a category, then the action is
        allowed to proceed without being analyzed through a more
        onerous environmental review (such as an EIS or EA). Id.
        § 1501.4(a); see also FAA Order 1050.1F § 5-6 (listing actions that the
        FAA has categorically excluded from fuller environmental review).
               With this general NEPA review framework in mind, we turn
        to the relevant procedural history in this case.
               B. The FAA’s Review of Phase I
             There is more groundwork to be laid. Petitioners challenge
        the FAA’s Phase II FONSI/ROD, but the FAA’s previous
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        21-14476                    Opinion of the Court                                  7

        consideration of other Airport enhancements (i.e., the “Phase I”
        developments) is an important part of their larger argument. 3
                In 2015, the City commissioned an Intermodal Feasibility
        Study to assess development opportunities for the Airport. The
        feasibility study indicated that the Airport was “ideally suited to
        undertake air cargo activity” because of its location, runway
        length, and logistics capabilities, among other advantages. The
        study opined that the Airport “could become a secondary
        international air cargo hub for one or more of the air cargo carriers
        serving [Miami International Airport].” But, for the Airport to
        attract this industry, the study indicated that it would have to
        construct air cargo facilities and invest in other improvements.
              Accordingly, the City proposed a new Airport Layout Plan
        (“ALP”) to the FAA. 4 The Phase I EA described the project as

        3
         We note from the outset that the parties refer to the construction projects at
        the Airport as Phase I and Phase II. These terms were not used when the FAA
        was making its so-called Phase I determination. That is, when the FAA
        analyzed the City’s initial 2016 proposal that we refer to as Phase I, the FAA
        did not view that project as the first part of a larger build-out. Rather, it viewed
        the proposal as a regular project in the normal course. The FAA was only
        informed of the City’s “need for [Phase II] during construction of the initial
        [Phase I] air cargo facility.” Nevertheless, for ease of reference, we also refer
        to the projects as Phase I and Phase II.
        4
         ALPs are regulatory documents that reflect “the agreement between the FAA
        and the [City] regarding the proposed allocation of airport areas to specific
        operational and support functions.” Airport Compliance Manual, FAA Order
        5190.6B, Change 2, § 7.18 (Dec. 9, 2022); see also 49 U.S.C. § 47107(a)(16). A
        “sponsor,” in this case the City, that is seeking to develop or make changes to
        an airport is required to complete an ALP that “depict[s] the airport’s
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        8                           Opinion of the Court                     21-14476

        “consist[ing] of constructing and operating up to three aircraft
        maintenance, repair and overhaul [] facilities and one air cargo
        facility[.]” The construction of these four buildings was projected
        to “total approximately 223,000 square feet.” Other major project
        elements included constructing “approximately 78,400 yards of
        aircraft parking apron, apron taxilanes, and a connector taxiway”
        as well as “[c]onstruction of on-airport roads.” 5           These

        boundaries, including all facilities, and to identify plans for future
        development on its ALP.” Id. As the FAA indicated in the Phase I EA, its
        unconditional approval of an ALP is a “federal action” subject to NEPA
        review: “The specific federal actions under consideration [in Phase I]
        include . . . [u]nconditional approval of the portion of the [ALP] that depicts
        the components of the Proposed Project and its connected actions pursuant to
        49 U.S.C. Sections 40103(b), 44718, and 47107(a)(16), and Title 14 CFR Parts
        77, 157, and 139.”
        5
            Additionally, the Phase I EA’s “Related Project Elements” section included:
                  •   Site preparation, including demolition of existing
                      pavement, clearing and grubbing, excavation and
                      embankment, and grading.
                  •   Install new taxiway edge lights and airfield directional
                      signs on the new connector taxiway.
                  •   Construction [of] an aircraft staging apron and wash rack
                      (with oil/water separator).
                  •   Install exterior pole-mounted and building-mounted
                      lighting for the new aircraft maintenance hangars, air
                      cargo building, access roads, vehicle parking lots, and
                      portions of aircraft parking aprons.
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        21-14476                  Opinion of the Court                              9

        developments were projected to result in 820 additional “air cargo
        aircraft operations” per year by 2023.
               After a draft EA for Phase I was made available for public
        review and comment, the FAA created a ﬁnal EA and issued the
        Phase I FONSI/ROD approving the proposed Airport
        developments. The FONSI/ROD laid out the project’s component
        parts, purpose, time frame, and potential alternatives to the
        proposed development, including that the proposed projects would
        not be developed at all (also known as the “No Action
        Alternative.”). In pertinent part, the FONSI stated that “[n]o
        signiﬁcant air quality, noise, or traﬃc impacts would occur” as a
        result of the proposed action, that there were no substantial
        cumulative eﬀects associated with the development, and that,
        despite being available for public review and comment, “[n]o public
        comments were received on the Draft EA.” In sum, the FAA
        determined that “the proposed Federal action [was] consistent with
        existing national environmental policies and objectives as set forth

              •    Extend utilities to the development sites, including
                   electric, natural gas, water, sanitary sewer, and
                   communications, and other related infrastructure.
              •    Construct    stormwater       management       system
                   improvements (e.g., inlets, swales, pipes, berms) and
                   modify existing stormwater management system
                   conveyances.
              •    Install security fencing and controlled access vehicle gates
                   and pedestrian gates.
              •    Install landscaping[.]
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                       21-14476

        in section 101 of [NEPA] and other applicable environmental
        requirements and [would] not signiﬁcantly aﬀect the quality of the
        human environment or otherwise include any condition requiring
        consultation pursuant to [NEPA].”
                C. The FAA’s Revalidation of Phase I
               During the pendency of the FAA’s NEPA review of Phase I,
        the City was engaged in preliminary talks with Amazon about
        bringing Amazon’s air cargo operations to the Airport. After Phase
        I was approved but before construction commenced, however,
        Amazon notiﬁed the City that it would require a diﬀerent
        orientation of the air cargo facility and it anticipated a greater
        number of incoming and outgoing ﬂights. The City notiﬁed the
        FAA of these two changes via letter in 2018. As to the site’s
        orientation, the City stated: “Discussions with possible tenants
        ha[ve] determined that it would be more advantageous to their
        operations to orient the cargo building the opposite direction on
        the site.” 6 And it changed its projections for the number of ﬂights
        that would be conducted by 2023—increasing total “air cargo
        aircraft operations” from 820 for the year to 5,840 for the year. In
        the end, the City submitted that even with the revised site
        orientation and increased ﬂight estimate, the Phase I EA remained
        accurate, and no formal reevaluation was necessary.

        6
          The City continued: “This revision to the site plan reduces the project
        footprint slightly and also reduces the building size while allowing the site to
        be used more efficiently by the proposed tenant operator(s).”
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        21-14476              Opinion of the Court                        11

              The FAA agreed. In a letter to the City, the FAA stated:
              The revised development plan would construct and
              operate the same types of facilities within the same
              study area evaluated in the [Phase I] EA and approved
              in the [Phase I] FONSI/ROD. Other than an increase
              in cargo aircraft operations, the revised development
              plan did not identify any impacts that would be
              materially diﬀerent than those identiﬁed and
              disclosed in the [Phase I] EA. . . . [T]here appears to
              be no changes to the action, or new circumstances or
              information, which would trigger the need for a
              Supplemental EA or an [EIS].

        As such, the FAA approved the changes without going through a
        formal reauthorization process.
               After the FAA’s revalidation of Phase I, the City
        Commission unanimously approved a “Ground Lease Agreement
        with [Amazon]” for air cargo operations. Construction of the air
        cargo facility was completed in July 2020 and Amazon commenced
        its air cargo operations. In January 2020, before Phase I
        construction was completed, Amazon exercised its option to
        expand the air cargo facility, which required the City to seek FAA
        approval for “the expansion of the air cargo facility and related
        improvements” (i.e., “Phase II”).         The so-called Phase II
        developments included the expansion of the existing sort facility
        and office building; construction of a paved truck court, paved
        vehicle lot, concrete aircraft parking apron, pavement for aircraft
        ground support equipment, and a new airport access road;
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        12                        Opinion of the Court                      21-14476

        extension of Taxiway A; installation of security fencing, gates,
        security checkpoints, aboveground fuel storage tanks and a fuel
        farm, and airfield lighting/signage; and modification of the
        Airport’s stormwater management system. 7
               D. The FAA’s Review of Phase II
               The FAA issued a FONSI/ROD approving Phase II after
        analyzing an EA for Phase II prepared by the Airport Sponsor,
        considering public comments made to the draft EA for Phase II, 8
        and determining that Phase II would not have signiﬁcant
        environmental eﬀects. In relevant part, as to the environmental
        eﬀect categories of air quality, noise, and cumulative impacts, 9 the

        7
          Not all of these projects required FAA approval, see, e.g., FAA
        Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3186, § 163
        (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 47101) (limiting the types of airport projects that
        require FAA approval), but even those projects “depend[ed] on the portions
        of the project [that did] requir[e] FAA approval in order to be constructed or
        operated as planned.”
        8
          Petitioners provided public comment to the draft EA. The Lowmans, for
        example, requested in part that “the FAA [] do whatever possible to abate the
        flight noise” from “Amazon flights.” Another set of Petitioners, the Stevenses,
        noted a similar concern: “My appeal to each of you is be certain that this air
        traffic growth is carefully measured and controlled before any further
        expansion of jets flying in and out of [the Airport] is approved.” Finally,
        Petitioner Bonnett expressed a concern that the increased flights and the lower
        altitude at which they were required to fly would increase the risk of a
        “collision between an airplane and a bird.”
        9 “Cumulative impacts are those that result from the incremental impact of

        the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable
        future actions, whether Federal or non-Federal. If the proposed action would
        cause significant incremental additions to cumulative impacts, an EIS is
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        21-14476                 Opinion of the Court                            13

        ﬁnal Phase II EA and FONSI/ROD included the following
        information and analysis.
                To start, after laying out the alternatives to Phase II
        (including the No-Action alternative), the FAA considered the
        environmental eﬀects that Phase II would have across 15 diﬀerent
        categories. 10 One section dealt with cumulative impacts for which
        the FONSI noted that “[t]he impacts associated with [Phase II],
        when considered in addition to other cumulative projects, are not
        expected to exceed thresholds that would indicate a signiﬁcant
        impact.” The associated cumulative eﬀects section of the EA was
        more detailed, as depicted by its table that studied the impact risk
        of 40 diﬀerent sub-projects in Phase II across 14 diﬀerent target
        categories, including air quality, noise, and hazardous materials,
        and its related “cumulative impacts summary” that oﬀered a deeper
        dive on the aggregated eﬀect in each category.
              As to noise, the FAA noted that the increased air traﬃc
        would tangibly aﬀect the sound generated over nearby land parcels.

        required.” Environmental Impacts: Policies & Procedures, FAA Order
        1050.1F § 2-3.2(b)(1) (July 16, 2015).
        10
          Those categories included: Air Quality; Biological Resources; Climate;
        Coastal Resources; DOT Act, Section 4(f) Resources; Farmlands; Hazardous
        Materials, Solid Waste, and Pollution Prevention; Historical, Architectural,
        Archeological, and Cultural Resources; Land Use; Natural Resources and
        Energy Supply; Noise and Noise-Compatible Land Use; Socioeconomics,
        Environmental Justice, and Children’s Environmental Health and Safety
        Risks; Visual Effects Including Light Emissions; Water Resources (including
        Wetlands, Floodplains, Surface Waters, Groundwater, and Wild and Scenic
        Rivers); and Cumulative Impacts.
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                  21-14476

        But, the FAA noted that by 2027 there would only be three
        additional residences within the designated noise sensitive area (the
        FAA focuses its noise analysis on the “DNL 65 contour,” which
        stands for a “Day-Night Average Sound Level” of 65 decibels, which
        is the threshold for signiﬁcant noise). Those three residences
        “would not experience an increase [in sound] of 1.5 dB or greater.”
        In other words, while there would be noise-related eﬀects, those
        eﬀects would not be signiﬁcant.
               Finally, as to air quality, the FAA noted that “[t]he additional
        aircraft operations and vehicle/truck trips associated with [Phase
        II] would increase air emissions at [the Airport]; however, the
        increase in emissions would not constitute a signiﬁcant impact.”
        And, in more technical terms, the Airport was in an attainment
        area for all National Ambient Air Quality Standards (“NAAQS”),
        which meant that there was no State Implementation Plan
        (required for non-attainment areas) that would have presented an
        additional hurdle to navigate. Stated simply, the air quality in the
        Airport’s county was good, and any air quality aﬀects from Phase
        II would not be signiﬁcant enough to alter that status.
               E. Additional Airport Projects
              In addition to the Phase I and Phase II developments, the
        FAA also approved at least two related Airport projects via
        categorical exclusion. The ﬁrst project was to strengthen and
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        21-14476                   Opinion of the Court                      15

        rehabilitate certain runways in late 2016. The second was to
        “upgrade [] the instrument landing system” in early 2021.
                                          * * *
              Petitioners brought this petition for review of the FAA’s
        Phase II FONSI/ROD alleging that the FAA’s decision-making
        process violated NEPA in various ways.
                             II.      Standard of Review
                “We review an agency’s ﬁnal decision to determine whether
        it is arbitrary and capricious.” City of Oxford v. FAA, 428 F.3d 1346,
        1351 (11th Cir. 2005) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706). “In the NEPA context,
        the reviewing court must ensure that the agency took a ‘hard look’
        at the environmental consequences of the project.” Id. (citing
        Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 295 F.3d 1209, 1216 (11th Cir.
        2002)). “The agency need not have reached the same conclusion
        that the reviewing court would reach” because the agency’s
        decision must only have a “rational basis.” Id.; see also Van Antwerp,
        526 F.3d at 1360 (“[A]n agency’s NEPA decisions are only reviewed
        under the [Administrative Procedure Act’s] highly deferential
        standard.”). Accordingly, the reviewing court may only overturn
        the agency’s decision if:
               (1) the decision does not rely on factors that Congress
               intended the agency to consider; (2) the agency failed
               entirely to consider an important aspect of the
               problem; (3) the agency oﬀers an explanation which
               runs counter to the evidence; or (4) the decision is so
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                  21-14476

               implausible that it cannot be the result of diﬀering
               viewpoints or the result of agency expertise.

        U.S. Army Corps, 295 F.3d at 1216 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of
        U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)).
        Finally, “we do not review an agency’s compliance with NEPA by
        asking whether it made optimal choices; NEPA does not require
        perfection.” Citizens for Smart Growth v. Sec’y of Dep’t of Transp., 669
        F.3d 1203, 1215 (11th Cir. 2012) (holding that, because of this
        deferential standard, “[a]ppellees’ compliance with NEPA may not
        have been perfect, but it was suﬃcient”).
                                  III.   Discussion
                In the petition for review, Petitioners argue that the FAA’s
        Phase II review process was fatally ﬂawed. Speciﬁcally, Petitioners
        argue that the FAA violated NEPA in three ways: (1) improperly
        segmenting the larger Airport overhaul into multiple, smaller
        projects so that the overall environmental eﬀect appeared lesser, (2)
        failing to properly consider “cumulative impacts,” and (3) failing to
        analyze all air quality eﬀects from the project. The FAA responds
        that Petitioners’ challenge must be dismissed because they lack
        standing or, alternatively, did not exhaust their administrative
        remedies. As to the merits, the FAA argues that its processes were
        more than adequate to satisfy NEPA’s requirements, and, therefore,
        the petition for review must be denied. We address each argument
        in turn, starting with the procedural arguments (standing and
        administrative exhaustion) before turning to the merits of
        Petitioners’ NEPA challenge.
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        21-14476                 Opinion of the Court                         17

               A.     Procedural Arguments
                            i.   Standing
                The FAA argues that Petitioners do not have Article III
        standing to bring this petition because they cannot show that (1)
        they have suﬀered a concrete and actual or imminent injury, (2) the
        complained-of injury was caused by the FAA’s approval of Phase II,
        or (3) the complained-of injury would be redressed by a favorable
        decision. Petitioners disagree in all respects.
               “We review issues of standing de novo.” See Black Warrior
        Riverkeeper, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 833 F.3d 1274, 1279 (11th
        Cir. 2016).
               [T]o satisfy Article III’s standing requirements, a
               plaintiﬀ must show (1) it has suﬀered an ‘injury in
               fact’ that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
               actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical;
               (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
               action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed
               to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed
               by a favorable decision.

        Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env’t Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S.
        167, 180–81 (2000) (quoting Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
        560–61 (1992)). When, as here, an individual seeks to enforce a
        procedural right, “such as the right to challenge agency action
        unlawfully withheld,” the standing analysis is simpliﬁed, and the
        individual does not have to meet “all the normal standards for
        redressability and immediacy.” Cahaba Riverkeeper v. U.S. Env’t Prot.
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        18                     Opinion of the Court                  21-14476

        Agency, 938 F.3d 1157, 1162 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotations omitted);
        see also Dep’t of Educ. v. Brown, 600 U.S. 551, __ (2023) (“We have
        found . . . that when a statute aﬀords a litigant a procedural right to
        protect his concrete interests, the litigant may establish Article III
        jurisdiction without meeting the usual standards for redressability
        and immediacy.” (quotations omitted)). Rather, in this situation,
        the individual has standing “if there is some possibility that the
        requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider
        the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.” Cahaba Riverkeeper,
        938 F.3d at 1162 (quotations omitted).
               “To show a cognizable injury in fact in a procedural injury
        case, a plaintiﬀ must allege that the agency violated certain
        procedural rules, that these rules protect a plaintiﬀ’s concrete
        interests and that it is reasonably probable that the challenged
        action will threaten these concrete interests.” Ouachita Watch
        League v. Jacobs, 463 F.3d 1163, 1170 (11th Cir. 2006). For example,
        we held that an allegation that the National Forest Service
        “shirked” its duties under NEPA “easily” satisﬁed the injury
        requirement because “[i]t is well settled that, in a NEPA suit, ‘a
        cognizable procedural injury exists when a plaintiﬀ alleges that a
        proper EIS has not been prepared . . . when the plaintiﬀ also alleges
        a concrete interest—such as an aesthetic or recreational interest—
        that is threatened by the proposed actions.’” Id. at 1169–71
        (quoting Sierra Club v. Johnson, 436 F.3d 1269, 1278–79 (11th Cir.
        2006)).
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        21-14476               Opinion of the Court                        19

               “Once . . . a plaintiﬀ has established injury in fact under
        NEPA, the causation and redressability requirements are generally
        more relaxed.” Id. at 1172. Causation is simpliﬁed because
        Petitioners “must demonstrate only that it is reasonably probable
        that the challenged actions will threaten [their] concrete interests.”
        Id. And redressability is simpliﬁed because this Court “has the
        power to order the agency to comply” if we determine that the
        FAA has failed to adhere to NEPA’s requirements. Id. at 1173.
               As discussed previously, “NEPA establishes procedures that
        a federal agency must follow before taking any action.” Van
        Antwerp, 526 F.3d at 1360. Petitioners allege that the FAA failed to
        adhere to NEPA in three distinct ways—i.e., they assert a
        procedural injury. Petitioners also allege a concrete interest that is
        threatened by the FAA’s action. Speciﬁcally, the Lowmans, for
        example, individually declared that they reside and own property
        near the Airport. They further declared that due to the
        implementation of the Phase II project, the area has experienced,
        and will continue to experience, increased air and truck traﬃc,
        resulting in “increased noise impact and environmental harm” that
        has “negatively impacted [their] qualify of life and health,” and
        “damaged the value of [their] home and property.” Petitioner
        Bonnett, who rents a residential home near the Airport, lodged
        similar complaints but focused on increased truck and air traﬃc,
        the noise related to that increased traﬃc, and the eﬀect on
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        20                         Opinion of the Court                         21-14476

        petitioner’s “quality of life and health.” 11 Thus, they have satisﬁed
        the injury in fact requirement. See Ouachita Watch League, 463 F.3d
        at 1170 (“To show a cognizable injury in fact in a procedural injury
        case, a plaintiﬀ must allege that the agency violated certain
        procedural rules, that these rules protect a plaintiﬀ’s concrete
        interests and that it is reasonably probable that the challenged
        action will threaten these concrete interests.”).
               Because it is “reasonably probable” that Phase II will aﬀect
        their “concrete interest” in the air quality, noise, and traﬃc in their
        area and property values, Petitioners have satisﬁed the causation
        and redressability requirements as well. Ouachita Watch, 463 F.3d
        at 1172. And, because we can require the FAA to redo their NEPA
        analysis if we determine that it is incomplete or otherwise
        insuﬃcient, this harm is redressable. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (providing,
        in pertinent part, that reviewing courts shall “compel agency action
        unlawfully withheld . . . .”).
               In sum, Petitioners have satisﬁed the constitutional standing
        requirements for procedural injuries. 12 See Cahaba Riverkeeper, 938

        11 The Stevenses did not provide an individual declaration detailing their

        injuries. Because the Lowmans and petitioner Bonnett have proven standing
        through their declarations and comments, however, we proceed to analyze
        the petition at issue. See generally Town of Chester v. Laroe Ests., Inc., 581 U.S.
        433, 439 (2017) (“At least one plaintiff must have standing to seek each form
        of relief requested in the complaint.”).
        12 The FAA does not challenge whether Petitioners have a valid cause of action

        to bring this petition for review. Accordingly, we simply note that (a) NEPA
        challenges are brought under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), (b)
        the APA requires only a “final agency action” that adversely affects Petitioners
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        21-14476                    Opinion of the Court                                 21

        F.3d at 1162 (“[W]hen a litigant is vested with a procedural right,
        that litigant has standing if there is some possibility that the
        requested relief will prompt the injury-causing party to reconsider
        the decision that allegedly harmed the litigant.” (quotations
        omitted)).
                            ii. Administrative Exhaustion
                The FAA also argues that Petitioners’ challenge must be
        dismissed because they “did not raise any of the issues presented in
        [their] opening brief during the administrative process” (i.e., the
        public comment period). Petitioners counter by pointing to two
        exceptions to the general rule that Petitioners must exhaust their
        administrative remedies by raising relevant objections during the
        agency’s public comment period. According to petitioners, those
        two exceptions are that “commenters need not point out an
        environmental assessment’s ﬂaw if it is obvious” and “a
        commenter does not waive an issue if it is otherwise brought to the
        agency’s attention.”
              As an initial matter, the FAA is correct that the general rule
        is that NEPA petitioners must exhaust their administrative

        to show standing, and (c) “[i]t is well settled that a final [environmental
        analysis] or the record of decision issued thereon constitute[s] final agency
        action.” Ouachita Watch, 463 F.3d at 1173 (quotations omitted); see also Newton
        v. Duke Energy Florida, LLC, 895 F.3d 1270, 1274 n.6 (2018) (“Under [Lexmark
        International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014)], the
        [standing] question is whether [Petitioners] have a valid cause of action . . . .”).
        Petitioners easily satisfy these requirements.
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        22                     Opinion of the Court                21-14476

        remedies before petitioning this Court. Under 49 U.S.C. § 46110(d),
        we have jurisdiction to “consider an objection to an order of
        the . . . Administrator of the [FAA] only if the objection was made
        in the proceeding conducted by the . . . [FAA].” Further, “[u]nder
        ordinary principles of administrative law, a reviewing court will not
        consider arguments that a party failed to raise in timely fashion
        before the administrative agency.” Vidiksis v. EPA, 612 F.3d 1150,
        1158 (11th Cir. 2010); see also Zukas v. Hinson, 124 F.3d 1407, 1410
        n.6 (11th Cir. 1997) (noting that “[b]ecause [petitioner] failed to
        raise [two speciﬁc] objections before the [administrative law judge]
        or [National Transportation Safety Board], we need not address
        them”); Bradshaw v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 8 F.4th 1215, 1222 (11th
        Cir. 2021) (“Because Bradshaw failed to raise [his argument that the
        FAA followed improper procedures in terminating his designation]
        before the FAA appeal panel, we cannot consider it.”). But there is
        an exception if “there was a reasonable ground for not making the
        objection in the proceeding.” 49 U.S.C. § 46110(d). “[T]he agency
        bears the primary responsibility to ensure that it complies with
        NEPA, and an EA’s or an EIS’[s] ﬂaws might be so obvious that
        there is no need for a commentator to point them out speciﬁcally
        in order to preserve its ability to challenge a proposed action.”
        Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 765 (2004) (dicta)
        (internal citation omitted).
               During the public comment period for the Phase II draft EA,
        Petitioners participated in the administrative process by providing
        comments expressing general concern over the additional Airport
        expansion. The Lowmans primarily expressed concern about the
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        21-14476               Opinion of the Court                       23

        increase in ﬂight noise and Bonnett focused on the risk that the
        increase in ﬂights posed to the bird population. These comments,
        however, touched on generalized issues that are not the subject of
        this petition. Thus, we must analyze the discrepancy between
        Petitioners’ generalized comments during the public review period
        and their more speciﬁc arguments as part of this petition to
        determine whether there was a “reasonable ground” for Petitioners
        not to raise the arguments they currently make because the FAA
        committed an “obvious” mistake in its NEPA review. 49 U.S.C. §
        46110(d); Public Citizen, 541 U.S. at 765.
               Under NEPA, the FAA is required to conduct certain
        reviews, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C), and it has regulations mandating
        that it consider the issues that Petitioners raise in this petition.
        Speciﬁcally, on segmentation, the FAA’s regulations provide that
        “[a] proposed action cannot be segmented by breaking it down into
        small component parts to attempt to reduce impacts.” FAA Order
        1050.1F § 2-3.2(b)(1). Similar requirements exist for analyzing
        cumulative impacts, id. § 2-3.2(b)(2) (providing that “[c]umulative
        actions [that] when viewed with other proposed actions, have
        cumulatively signiﬁcant impacts” “should be discussed in the same
        EIS [as one another]”), and the eﬀect on air quality, id. § 4-3.3
        (exhibit 4-1) (describing the signiﬁcant threshold for air quality as
        when an “action would cause pollutant concentrations to exceed
        one or more of the National Ambient Air Quality Standards”).
        Thus, because the FAA—according to its own regulations—was
        supposed to have analyzed Phase II’s cumulative impacts and eﬀect
        on air quality as well as refrain from segmenting the Airport
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        24                          Opinion of the Court                        21-14476

        projects, the Petitioners were not obligated to point out obvious
        ﬂaws in the FAA’s NEPA analysis on these issues. Accordingly, we
        conclude that Petitioners had “reasonable grounds” for not raising
        their instant arguments previously. 13 49 U.S.C. § 46110.
                B.      Merits Arguments
               Having concluded that Petitioners have standing and having
        addressed the exhaustion issue, we now consider Petitioners’ main
        argument that the FAA failed to adhere to NEPA’s requirements in
        issuing its FONSI/ROD which greenlighted Phase II. Petitioners
        look back in time to argue that the FAA improperly segmented the
        various Airport projects and conducted an inadequate cumulative
        impacts analysis. They also argue that the FAA failed to properly
        analyze Phase II’s potential eﬀect on air quality. We address each
        argument in turn.
                               i.     Segmentation
              In simple terms, Petitioners argue that the Airport
        renovations were improperly considered as separate projects rather

        13
          We note as well that this conclusion is consistent with the general purpose
        of administrative exhaustion—notice. See, e.g., Chandler v. Crosby, 379 F.3d
        1278, 1287 (11th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he purpose of administrative exhaustion, . . .
        is ‘to put the [administrative authority] on notice of all issues in contention
        and to allow the [authority] an opportunity to investigate those issues.’”
        (alterations in original) (quoting Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516, 1531 (11th Cir.
        1985)). Here, the FAA was required to consider segmentation, cumulative
        impacts, and air quality and, therefore, was on notice of those predominant
        issues even if Petitioners never raised those arguments during the public
        comment period.
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        21-14476                 Opinion of the Court                            25

        than one larger Airport build-out (i.e., Phase I, Phase II, and the
        other projects in-between were really just subcomponents of one
        larger Airport project that the FAA should have analyzed together
        to determine the true environmental impact). But Petitioners’
        argument lacks evidence and boils down to an untimely challenge
        against the FAA’s previous decisions.
                The FAA directs its oﬃcials to consider “connected actions
        and other proposed actions or parts of proposed actions that are
        related to each other closely enough to be, in eﬀect, a single course
        of action” in “the same EA or EIS.” FAA Order 10501.F § 2-3.2(b)(1)
        (citing 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.4(a), 1508.25(a)(1)); see also Kleppe v. Sierra
        Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 (1976) (explaining that “[a] comprehensive
        impact statement may be necessary” in some cases,
        including “when several [proposed actions] that will have
        cumulative or synergistic environmental impact upon a region are
        pending concurrently before an agency”). Relatedly, “[a] proposed
        action cannot be segmented by breaking it down into small
        component parts to attempt to reduce [environmental] impacts.”
        FAA Order 10501.F § 2-3.2(b)(1) (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27(b)(7));
        see also Pres. Endangered Areas of Cobb’s History, Inc. v. U.S. Army Corps
        of Eng’rs., 87 F.3d 1242, 1247 (11th Cir. 1996) (noting that “the
        [Army Corps of Engineers] cannot ‘evade [its] responsibilities’
        under [NEPA] by ‘artiﬁcially dividing a major federal action into
        smaller components, each without a “signiﬁcant” impact’” (citing
        Coal. on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 826 F.2d 60, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1987)));
        see also Taxpayers Watchdog, Inc. v. Stanley, 819 F.2d 294, 298 (D.C.
        Cir. 1987) (“The rule against segmentation was developed to
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        26                      Opinion of the Court                  21-14476

        [e]nsure that interrelated projects the overall eﬀect of which is
        environmentally signiﬁcant, not be fractionalized into smaller, less
        signiﬁcant actions.”).
                We have also recognized, however, that “just because [a]
        project at issue connects existing highways does not mean that it
        must be considered as part of a larger highway project; all roads
        must begin and end somewhere.” Pres. Endangered Areas of Cobb’s
        History, Inc., 87 F.3d at 1247. In other words, the simple fact that
        two projects are related does not mean that those projects must
        necessarily be considered as part of one larger project. Similarly,
        proving that a project was segmented requires more than merely
        showing that a series of related projects were approved
        sequentially—after all, EA’s and EIS’s are “forward-looking
        instrument[s]” designed “to assist in evaluating proposals for major
        federal action,” and we must remain mindful that we, of course,
        are reviewing them with the added beneﬁt of hindsight. See Aertsen
        v. Landrieu, 637 F.2d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1980) (quotation omitted); see
        generally Churchill Cnty. v. Norton, 276 F.3d 1060, 1082 (9th Cir. 2001)
        (rejecting a segmentation claim because “[p]laintiﬀs [did] not show
        that the [agency] acted arbitrarily or capriciously”). Indeed, for an
        agency to segment a larger project into component parts, the
        agency would necessarily have to know about the entire proposal
        on the front end. See City of Oxford, 428 F.3d at 1356 (recognizing
        this timing disparity in a similar context and determining that
        because there was “no concrete plan to consider” and little
        indication that the sponsor planned to construct a new building,
        “investigators and researchers would be forced to analyze the
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        21-14476                 Opinion of the Court                           27

        environmental impact of a project, the parameters and speciﬁcs of
        which would be a mere guess”).
                To review, a simpliﬁed timeline of the project approvals at
        issue in this case is as follows. Phase I was approved in 2016. After
        two years of inaction, Phase I—including the changes to the
        orientation of the air cargo facility and increase in ﬂight traﬃc—
        was revalidated in 2018. The FAA also approved a runway
        rehabilitation project via categorical exclusion in 2019. The
        projects approved in Phase I, such as the air cargo facility, became
        operational in 2020. The FAA approved another project—the
        upgrade of the instrument landing system—via categorical
        exclusion in early 2021. Finally, Phase II was approved in late
        2021. 14
               We note that Petitioners’ challenge, in many ways, boils
        down to an untimely objection to the FAA’s approval of Phase I
        (and/or the other Airport projects that were previously approved
        via categorical exclusion). That is, Petitioners’ arguments are
        focused on the past, not the actual processes of Phase II, which is
        the only action we are empowered to review. See 49 U.S.C.
        § 46110(a) (limiting the time period for ﬁling a petition for review
        of the FAA’s orders to “no[] later than 60 days after the order is
        issued”). Thus, to the extent that Petitioners are actually
        challenging Phase I or other previous approvals, such challenges
        are untimely and inappropriate. See, e.g., Clayton Cnty. v. FAA, 887

        14
          Petitioners also reference the construction of a fuel farm. That project,
        however, is already included as part of Phase II’s ALP and the EA.
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        28                     Opinion of the Court                21-14476

        F.3d 1262, 1267 n.3 (2018) (“Petitioners do not challenge the FAA’s
        [two-year old] policy clariﬁcation, likely because such a challenge
        would be untimely.” (citing 49 U.S.C. § 46110(a)).
               Turning to Phase II itself, the ultimate analysis of the
        segmentation claim proves simple. Petitioners’ claim fails because
        they oﬀer no evidence that the FAA broke Phase I, Phase II, and the
        other Airport-related projects apart to avoid a more onerous
        environmental review. To start, Petitioners’ argument that the
        Airport projects are connected actions that lack independent utility
        (and thus should have been considered together rather than as
        separate projects) is entirely conclusory. While the projects were
        proposed and approved sequentially, that fact alone is not enough
        for us to conclude that the FAA improperly segmented these
        projects. Rather, looking to the record, it is clear Phase II was not
        pending before the FAA (or seriously contemplated) when it
        approved Phase I. See Kleppe, 427 U.S. at 410 (focusing on the need
        for a “comprehensive impact statement” when multiple related
        actions are “pending concurrently before an agency”). Indeed, the
        only reference to future Airport projects at the time was the
        observation in the Phase I EA that future projects could be
        undertaken “as demand dictate[d].” For obvious reasons, this one-
        oﬀ observation about an entirely speculative, not-yet-proposed
        future development is insuﬃcient to prove that the FAA arbitrarily
        and capriciously violated NEPA’s mandate against segmentation.
        See City of Oxford, 428 F.3d at 1356 (guarding against holdings that
        would require “investigators and researchers” to “analyze the
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        21-14476                  Opinion of the Court                             29

        environmental impact of a project, the parameters and speciﬁcs of
        which would be a mere guess” (emphasis added)).
              The deﬁciencies of Petitioners’ challenge are even clearer
        when compared to the facts of a case they cite repeatedly—
        Delaware Riverkeeper Network v. Federal Energy Regulatory
        Commission, 753 F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2014). In Delaware Riverkeeper,
        Tennessee Gas Pipeline Company, L.L.C., submitted four separate
        project proposals to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
        (“FERC”) for upgrade work on one section of pipeline. Id. at 1308.
        FERC’s approval of one project (the “third upgrade project,” to use
        the D.C. Circuit’s terminology) was challenged on segmentation
        grounds. Id. The D.C. Circuit held, in part, that FERC improperly
        segmented the proposed actions in part because “the ﬁrst upgrade
        project was under construction” and “the applications for the
        second and fourth upgrade projects were pending before FERC”
        when it approved the project at issue. Id. at 1308, 1318.
               Whereas FERC considered the pipeline projects separately
        despite the fact that they were pending at the same time, there is
        no evidence in the instant case that the FAA manipulated its
        processes in a similar way. Phase I was approved in 2016 and Phase
        II was not even proposed until 2020 when the construction of
        Phase I was well underway. 15 While Delaware Riverkeeper may be a

        15
          And while there were other projects that were approved via categorial
        exclusion, the consideration of those projects did not temporally overlap with
        the FAA’s consideration of Phase II (or were otherwise properly treated as
        categorical exclusions) and did not need to be considered as part of Phase II.
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        30                     Opinion of the Court                 21-14476

        prime example of segmentation, it is clear that the FAA’s actions in
        the instant case in no way resemble FERC’s violative processes in
        that case.
                Further, to the extent that Petitioners’ segmentation
        arguments capitalize on hindsight (i.e., looking back at the Airport
        developments since 2016 to make it appear like the FAA pushed the
        Airport projects through in piecemeal fashion), we ﬁrst
        reemphasize that NEPA’s environmental assessments are forward-
        looking and created to provide agency actors with up-to-date
        information to aid their decision-making. Landrieu, 637 F.2d at 19;
        see also Nat’l Wildlife Fed. v. Appalachian Reg. Comm’n, 677 F.2d 883,
        890 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“Where, for instance, substantial construction
        of a project has already been realized, the ‘forward-looking’
        criterion suggest that where new construction is necessary to ﬁnish
        oﬀ work already done, the new work does not trigger an obligatory
        EIS evaluating program-wide eﬀects.”). And second, to reiterate,
        the fact that a series of projects have been approved over a set
        period of time is not enough—without other evidence—to prove
        that an agency was improperly segmenting its review process in
        contravention of NEPA. Here, Petitioners have presented no such
        evidence.
               Petitioners oﬀer two additional arguments on segmentation.
              First, Petitioners rely on Western North Carolina Alliance v.
        North Carolina Department of Transportation, 312 F. Supp. 2d 765
        (E.D.N.C. 2003), to argue that the Phase I and Phase II projects
        were impermissibly segmented because “[t]he lease agreement
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        21-14476               Opinion of the Court                        31

        between Amazon and the City made the expansion of the facility
        inevitable,” thereby eﬀectively eliminating all viable alternatives to
        the project. Petitioners essentially argue that—if (a) the approval
        of Action 1 would (b) also require Action 2 to be undertaken, then
        (c) there is no true “alternative” to Action 2, so that (d) Action 1
        and Action 2 should be considered together and not segmented
        from one another. In other words, because the lease to the air
        cargo facilities gave Amazon a right of expansion, and if Amazon
        exercised that right, the City could not refuse the expansion, the
        FAA was required to analyze Phase I and Phase II together.
                Petitioners’ argument fails. The only legal support they cite
        is an out-of-circuit, district court case that carries no precedential
        value. See W. N.C. Alliance, 312 F. Supp. 2d 765. Regardless, that
        case is distinguishable. In Western North Carolina Alliance, the North
        Carolina Department of Transportation addressed interconnected
        road projects such that “[i]f I-4400 [was] expanded to six lanes
        [Action 1], then I-4700 . . . [would] have to be expanded as well
        [Action 2].” Id. In other words, there was no real alternative to
        Action 2 because the outcome was predetermined. In the instant
        case, however, the City’s contract with Amazon in no way required
        the FAA to approve Phase II. That is, while the City may have been
        contractually obligated to go along with the expansion, the FAA
        was free to fully consider each alternative and, ultimately, deny
        Phase II if it determined that the project’s environmental eﬀects
        were too signiﬁcant.
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        32                      Opinion of the Court                21-14476

                 Second, Petitioners argue that the FAA should have prepared
        a “supplemental [EA for Phase I], not a separate [EA for Phase II].”
        Supplemental environmental assessments for a project are required
        if: “(1) there are substantial changes to the proposed action that are
        relevant to environmental concerns, or (2) there are signiﬁcant new
        circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns
        and bearing on the proposed action or its impacts.” See FAA Order
        1050.1F, § 9-3; Van Antwerp, 526 F.3d at 1360 (“In some cases, after
        an agency publishes a FONSI or an EIS, but before any action is
        taken, the proposed action changes . . . [so] the agency must make
        an additional NEPA determination” and may have to prepare a
        supplemental environmental analysis). The instant case, however,
        was never a candidate for a supplemental analysis because the
        Phase II project was not an addition to a pending proposed action
        but rather an all-new proposal—indeed the Phase I project had
        already been implemented. Thus, a supplemental EA to Phase I
        was not required. And, to the extent that Petitioners take issue
        with Phase I, we have explained that such a challenge is untimely.
                 For all these reasons, Petitioners’ segmentation argument
        fails.
                          ii. Cumulative Impacts
               Next, Petitioners argue that the FAA failed to “take into
        consideration the cumulative impact of its past actions.” They
        argue that the FAA failed to follow NEPA because the FAA’s Phase
        II analysis did not adequately account for the cumulative impacts
        of (a) Phase I, (b) the other Airport development projects it
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        21-14476                  Opinion of the Court                             33

        approved via categorical exclusion, and (c) Phase II. Within their
        larger cumulative impacts argument, Petitioners advance four sub-
        arguments: (1) the FAA’s cumulative impact analysis is inadequate,
        (2) the FAA did not consider the cumulative impact of its past
        actions, (3) the FAA’s use of the DNL 65 dB corridor is unduly
        restrictive, and (4) the FAA’s use of the “no action” alternative is the
        wrong noise baseline. We address each argument in turn.
               The FAA’s regulations provide: “Cumulative impacts are
        those that result from the incremental impact of the action when
        added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future
        actions, whether Federal or non-Federal. If the proposed action
        would cause signiﬁcant incremental additions to cumulative
        impacts, an EIS is required.” FAA Order 1050.1F § 4-2(d)(3). 16
        While the regulations clearly require a cumulative impacts analysis,
        they do not detail the required form of such analysis. Id.
        Nevertheless, we have identiﬁed certain considerations that “[a]
        cumulative impact analysis must identify,” including:
               (i) the area in which the eﬀects of the proposed
               project will be felt, (ii) the impact expected in that
               area, (iii) those other actions—past, present, and
               proposed, and reasonably foreseeable that have had or

        16
          This definition of cumulative impacts is consistent with CEQ’s definition of
        “cumulative impacts” that was in effect at the time of the FAA’s decision in
        2020. See 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2020). We note that, in 2022, CEQ’s regulations
        were amended, and the term “cumulative impacts” was changed to
        “cumulative effects,” and the definition (which remained the same except for
        the change in terminology) was recodified in § 1508.1(g)(3) (2022).
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        34                     Opinion of the Court                   21-14476

              will have impact in the same area; (iv) the eﬀects of those
              other impacts; and (v) the overall impact that can be
              expected if the individual impacts are allowed to
              accumulate.

        City of N. Miami v. Fed. Aviation Admin., 47 F.4th 1257, 1270 (11th
        Cir. 2022) (quoting Sierra Club v. FERC, 827 F.3d 36, 49 (D.C. Cir.
        2016) (emphasis in original)). While the analysis must identify
        certain considerations, the “determination of the extent and eﬀect
        of [the cumulative impact] factors, . . . is a task assigned to the
        special competency of the appropriate agencies.” Kleppe, 427 U.S.
        at 414. Finally, the cumulative eﬀects must be directly correlated
        with the project at issue—otherwise they are not properly
        considered as part of that project’s environmental analysis. See
        C.A.R.E. Now, Inc. v. FAA, 844 F.2d 1569, 1575 (11th Cir. 1988)
        (“[C]umulative impacts include only the indirect and direct eﬀects
        caused by a project” and do not include “speculation” (emphasis
        omitted)).
                Petitioners’ ﬁrst two sub-arguments—that the FAA’s
        cumulative impact analysis was inadequate and the FAA did not
        consider the cumulative impact of its past actions—are so closely
        related that they are properly considered together. Turning to the
        cumulative impacts section of the Phase II EA, it is clear that the
        FAA’s analysis was rigorous and detailed, and covered all of the
        factors that we have identiﬁed as necessary to include. Speciﬁcally,
        in its ﬁnal Phase II EA, the FAA assessed the cumulative impacts of
        40 diﬀerent actions—past, present, and future—across 14 diﬀerent
        ﬁelds (air quality; biological resources; climate; coastal resources;
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        21-14476               Opinion of the Court                         35

        hazardous materials; cultural resources; land use; natural
        resources/energy; noise; socio-economics/environmental justice;
        light emissions/visual; wetlands; ﬂoodplains; and water resources)
        and determined the extent of the environmental eﬀect on each of
        these ﬁelds. Then, after conducting this analysis, the FAA
        aggregated the eﬀects to complete the cumulative eﬀects analysis.
        Accordingly, we conclude that Petitioners’ contentions that the
        cumulative impacts analysis was inadequate is without merit.
               Resisting this conclusion, Petitioners argue that the Phase II
        EA was “unduly restrictive” because the FAA, in its analysis of noise
        impacts, limited its study to the 65 DNL contour although it “knew
        that the Phase II expansion would have impacts on noise levels far
        beyond the boundaries of the 65 DNL contours.” Critically,
        however, the FAA’s regulations provide that “[a]n airport environs
        study area must be large enough to include the area within the
        DNL 65 decibels (dB) contour, and may be larger.” FAA Order
        1050.1F, App’x B., § B-1.3 (emphasis added). Thus, while
        Petitioners may have hoped the study would span a larger area, the
        FAA did exactly what it was required to do in its EA (study the area
        within the DNL 65 contour).
               Finally, Petitioners argue that “[the] FAA’s use of ‘no action’
        conditions for its noise baseline fails to capture the impacts of noise
        from [the] FAA’s actions prior to the project.” Essentially, their
        argument is that the “no action” baseline (i.e., if Phase II were not
        undertaken) is an insuﬃcient comparator because it does not take
        into consideration the cumulative impacts that will result from the
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        36                         Opinion of the Court                        21-14476

        previous airport projects. But, as we recognized in City of North
        Miami, the FAA’s Desk Reference on Cumulative Impact Analysis
        provides that “[the] FAA has discretion to determine whether, and
        to what extent, information about the speciﬁc nature, design, or
        present impacts of a past action are useful for the analysis of the
        impacts of the proposed action and alternative(s).” City of N.
        Miami, 47 F.4th at 1271. 17 Here, as we have described, the FAA’s
        cumulative eﬀects analysis was robust, and it clears this low bar. 18

        17 Petitioners rely on Grand Canyon Trust v. Federal Aviation Administration, 290

        F.3d 339 (D.C. Cir. 2002). In addition to being out-of-circuit precedent, it is
        distinguishable from the instant case. In Grand Canyon Trust, the FAA
        conducted an EA concerning how a proposal to move an airport would affect
        noise levels at a nearby park. Id. at 340. The EA concluded that the
        incremental difference in air traffic noise between the two locations was
        insignificant. Id. The D.C. Circuit held that the EA was arbitrary and
        capricious because the EA considered only the change in noise related to flight
        traffic at the different locations, without considering how the increased air
        traffic noise tied in with other existing noises at the park. Id. at 345–47. But
        unlike the EA in Grand Canyon Trust, the EA here accurately considered the
        existing soundscape and aggregated the total noise.
        18
          Petitioners also invoke NEPA’s purpose to argue that the FAA’s analysis did
        not provide useful information to the public. For one, the public information
        component is only part of NEPA’s purpose. See Black Warrior Riverkeeper, 833
        F.3d at 1278–79 (“NEPA serves the dual purpose of informing agency
        decisionmakers of the environmental effects of proposed federal actions and
        ensuring that relevant information is made available to the public . . . .”). And,
        for two, the tables as well as the FAA’s written descriptions of the cumulative
        effects do, in fact, provide extensive information to the public.
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        21-14476               Opinion of the Court                        37

                        iii. Air Quality
               Petitioners’ last argument is that the “FAA violated NEPA by
        failing to analyze all air quality impacts,” meaning that the FAA
        should have conducted additional air quality analyses. Once again,
        Petitioners’ argument is multi-faceted. We address each part of
        their argument in turn.
               Starting with their broadest argument, Petitioners argue
        that the FAA’s air quality analysis was too limited because it did not
        extend to “all air quality impacts.” Petitioners, however, lose sight
        of the role of the environmental analyses under NEPA.
        Speciﬁcally, an EA is intended to gauge whether there are
        “signiﬁcant” impacts so that (a) if there are “signiﬁcant” impacts an
        EIS can be created, and (b) if there are not “signiﬁcant” impacts a
        FONSI can be issued so that the project can proceed. See Sierra
        Club, 295 F.3d at 1215 (“The EA should provide enough evidence
        and analysis to guide the agency to one of two conclusions: (1) a
        ﬁnding that the project will have a signiﬁcant eﬀect [which would
        require the preparation of an EIS], or (2) a ﬁnding of signiﬁcant
        impact (‘FONSI’).”).
               To bring this broader point into focus, we look to the FAA’s
        regulations. For air quality, the FAA describes the “signiﬁcance”
        threshold in the following way: “The action would cause pollutant
        concentrations to exceed one or more of the National Ambient Air
        Quality Standards (NAAQS) . . . [or] increase the frequency or
        severity of any such existing violations.” The FAA studied exactly
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        38                    Opinion of the Court                 21-14476

        this standard by focusing on the signiﬁcance threshold to
        determine if it would be surpassed:
              Air Quality – Polk County is located in an attainment
              area for all National Ambient Air Quality Standards
              (NAAQS) for criteria air pollutants and is not subject
              to the requirements of a State Implementation Plan.
              Construction activities would generate temporary air
              emissions at [the Airport] from equipment and
              vehicle exhaust, as well as, fugitive dust during
              excavation and grading activities. The EA notes
              typical measures that can be taken by contractors to
              reduce air emissions during construction.
              Operational emissions associated with the No-Action
              Alternative and the Proposed Development Project
              were computed for study years 2022 and 2027 using
              FAA’s Aviation Environmental Design Tool (AEDT).
              The emissions inventories in Section 5.2.1.2 of the EA
              compares emissions from the No-Action Alternative
              and Proposed Development Project. The additional
              aircraft operations and vehicle/truck trips associated
              with the Proposed Development Project would
              increase area emissions at [the Airport]; however, the
              increase in emissions would not constitute a
              signiﬁcant impact.
              The Proposed Development Project occurs in an area
              classiﬁed as Attainment for all criteria air pollutants,
              and there is no State Implementation Plan or numeric
              signiﬁcance threshold applicable to the Proposed
              Development Project.           However, the EA
              demonstrated that even if stringent de minimis
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        21-14476                   Opinion of the Court                                39

                thresholds were in place for Polk County, the
                anticipated air emissions would not exceed thresholds
                indicating a signiﬁcant impact.
        The FAA, after studying the issue determined that a FONSI/ROD
        was proper because Phase II would not have a signiﬁcant impact.
        Thus, the FAA did what it was required to do under NEPA and its
        regulations interpreting NEPA. Petitioners’ contention that the
        FAA should have done more is merely the expression of a policy
        preference.
               Petitioners do not stop there. They also cite to a passage in
        FAA Order 1050.1F that provides that additional air quality analyses
        are required in “extraordinary circumstances.” FAA Order 1050.1F
        § 5-2(b)(8). 19 The problem for Petitioners is that this excerpt comes
        from Chapter 5, which is about Categorial Exclusions—and the
        Phase II project was not a categorical exclusion. Indeed, even if this
        section applied, if there was an “extraordinary circumstance,” the
        proper response would be for the FAA to conduct “further analysis
        in an EA or an EIS.” Thus, even if Petitioners were correct, they
        would not gain anything as the FAA already prepared an EA that
        did not reveal any signiﬁcant air quality impacts.

        19  This section of FAA Order 1050.1F provides that “[e]xtraordinary
        circumstances are factors or circumstances in which a normally categorially
        excluded action may have a significant environmental impact that then
        requires further analysis in an EA or an EIS.” FAA Order 1050.1F § 5-2(a). It
        continues to list circumstances that qualify as “extraordinary,” including: “[a]n
        impact on air quality or violation of Federal, state, tribal, or local air quality
        standards under the Clean Air Act . . . .” Id. § 5-2(b)(8).
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        40                        Opinion of the Court                       21-14476

               Finally, Petitioners also argue that the FAA acted arbitrarily
        or capriciously in failing to discuss hazardous air pollutants
        (“HAPs”) in the Phase II EA, when there were several potential
        sources for HAPs in the Phase II project. Simply put, such an
        analysis is outside of the FAA’s air quality requirements and was
        not required for this project. 20
               Accordingly, Petitioners’ arguments fail because the FAA
        properly analyzed air quality according to its regulations
        interpreting NEPA. 21
                                    IV.     Conclusion
              Petitioners are unhappy that the FAA greenlighted Phase II
        (as well as the Airport developments preceding Phase II). But we
        do not vacate agency decisions over mere policy disagreements.
        Upon close inspection, we deny Petitioners’ petition for review
        because the record is clear that the FAA followed its regulations

        20
          Petitioners point us to a 2009 guidance document (Guidance for Quantifying
        Speciated Organic Emissions from Airport Sources) that is not in the record.
        FAA, Office of Env’t & Energy, Guidance for Quantifying Speciated Organic
        Gas Emissions from Airport Sources (Sept. 2009), at 14–15. Even if we were
        to consider the guidance document, we would conclude that the FAA was not
        required to conduct a HAPs analysis for Phase II. The guidance provides types
        of “major” projects (requiring a HAPs analysis) that are dissimilar to Phase II.
        Additionally, Phase II is not located in the type of area where the guidance
        document indicates that such analyses would be required (e.g., nonattainment
        areas).
        21
          Because we agree with the FAA that Petitioners’ arguments lack merit, we
        do not reach the FAA’s final argument that we “should deny [Petitioners’]
        requested relief because [they] have not established that vacatur is warranted.”
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        21-14476              Opinion of the Court                       41

        interpreting NEPA and did not improperly segment the Airport
        development projects, fail to consider cumulative impacts
        adequately, or neglect its air quality analysis. In other words, the
        FAA did what it was supposed to do, and its review processes were
        not arbitrary and capricious.
              Petition DENIED.