Court Opinion

ID: 9704726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:44:18.05467+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:04.712240
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
This replevin action contained allegations of conversion. The relief requested by White was the return of the three items; she sought treble damages only as an alternative remedy.
To be sure, the action could just as easily have sounded in conversion, particularly in light of the knowledge that the items could not have been returned because they had been sold at a garage sale. In the context of a conversion claim, therefore, I agree with the majority's basic assessment that the evidence supports the trial court's findings and that the findings support the judgment. Accordingly, I too coneur in the judgment in favor of the defendant White.
However, I cannot concur in the majority's conclusion that the suit was and is entirely groundless, frivolous, and unreasonable, thereby giving rise to a claim for attorney fees. I therefore dissent from that portion of the majority opinion dealing with attorney fees.
The majority places a degree of significance in its conclusion that MeDonald not only lost at the trial level but has prosecuted "two subsequent appeals." Op. at 525. This categorization is misleading. As noted by the majority in footnote one, this "second" appeal was necessary because the findings made by the trial court were inadequate for appellate review. The remand by Memorandum Decision in March, 1998 was premised solely upon that inadequacy. The current appeal is the first opportunity which Me-Donald has had to challenge the merits of the trial court's determination.
The majority also castigates McDonald for making claim for property having only junk value. This aspect of the determination that the claim was groundless is necessarily premised upon a view that the only evidence of value was the four dollar amount received at the garage sale. It totally ignores the well established principle that an owner of property may give his or her opinion as to the value of that property and such opinion is credible evidence of value entitled to be given some weight. Carpetland U.S.A. v. Payne (1989) Ist Dist., Ind.App., 536 N.E.2d 306; Don Medow Motors, Inc. v. Grauman (1983) 3d Dist., Ind.App., 446 N.E.2d 651. I agree that the trial court was not compelled to accept McDonald's value assessment, but the $645 valuation was appropriately in evidence and belies the majority's view that the suit was totally frivolous.
More importantly, however, the majority decision in this regard presupposes that McDonald had either abandoned the property or by waiver, estoppel, or laches had somehow relinquished her entitlement to the items. The evidence was clear that the items were *526stored in White's attic for safe-keeping as a favor to McDonald. I find no evidence which would lead to the conclusion that MeDonald gave up her right to the property, or that White was, as a matter of law, entitled to the items as against the true owner. It may well have been that White was entitled to believe that her husband, in leaving the items behind when he left the family residence, abandoned any interest he might have had in the property. That belief, however, would not bind McDonald.
A dissolution court may only distribute assets in which the parties to the dissolution have an interest. Property belonging to third parties is not subject to distribution. Schueneman v. Schueneman (1992) 4th Dist., Ind.App., 591 N.E.2d 603. McDonald as a third party was not required to intervene in the dissolution action in order to make claim to property to which she asserted ownership.
For the reasons stated, I would affirm the judgment but would deny White's claim for attorney fees.