Court Opinion

ID: 6739173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 23:20:41.664688+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:01:54.236513
License: Public Domain

Per Curiam.
In this action a rehearing was ordered. On the re-argument defendant contended that the former decision is erroneous:
1. Because it modifies the judgment appealed from, in this, that it finds that the defendant is not entitled to the $900 allowance for damages which was made by the trial court.
2. Because it fails to allow the defendant a credit for $803.29, which it is contended the plaintiff was overpaid by the Linden Investment Company in the action in the United States district court. In other words, it is contended that the judgment of this court should be that proposed in the dissenting opinion.
The majority members have again considered the evidence in the case, and it may not be amiss to make further reference to some of the facts which were not alluded to in the former opinion.
In the fall of 1908, the plaintiff company was engaged in constructing an elevator for the Farmers Elevator Company, at Langdon, in which city the defendant Donovan resides. Donovan, who was secretary of the Linden Investment Company, approached Arthur E. Hon-stain, who represented the plaintiff and was in charge of the construction of the elevator at Langdon, to ascertain if the plaintiff company would build an elevator for the Linden Investment Company at Wales, North Dakota. Donovan stated that he wanted an elevator at Wales exactly like the one which was being constructed at Langdon, except that the Wales elevator was to be of smaller capacity. The Langdon *220elevator was supposed to be of 60,000 bushels capacity, and Donovan stated that he wanted only a 40,000 bushel capacity house. Honstain stated to Donovan that he believed he had some plans in his trunk of an elevator of the kind and size suggested. The plans were produced and a contract was made between the plaintiff company and the Linden Investment Company for the construction of the Wales elevator according to such plans and specifications. A written memorandum of agreement was thereupon entered into. The plans and specifications were attached to and made a part of the agreement. The written agreement, among other things, provided that “it is understood and agreed that Linden Investment Company are to have an authorized representative on the ground, as soon as the building is completed, to inspect and receive the same.” Donovan indorsed upon the back of one of the pages of the specifications the following written statement with an indelible pencil: “It is understood and agreed that these plans and specifications are a duplicate of the elevator that the Honstain Brothers Company are now building in Langdon for the Farmers Elevator Company, except that the Farmers Elevator is to be 60,000 bushels capacity and the elevator for the Linden Investment Company is to be 40,000 capacity.”
While the Wales elevator was being constructed, Donovan arranged with the plaintiff to build an elevator at Mowbray. It was understood that the Mowbray elevator was to be exactly like the Wales elevator, and that the plans and specifications and the contract relative to the Wales elevator should govern as to the Mowbray elevator, with the exception of certain specified additional freight charges which it was understood the plaintiff was to be paid. The elevators Were both constructed and turned over to the possession of their respective owners in October, 1908. Certain payments were made upon both elevators, but substantial amounts remained unpaid. It appears from certain correspondence in evidence that the plaintiff, from time to time, requested payment of the balance claimed due. It is undisputed that in the early part of November, 1908, Donovan, at plaintiff’s office in Minneapolis, Minnesota, paid to it $4,000, and indicated that the balance would be paid soon. Hnder date of December 24, 1909, he wrote in effect promising payment soon. Shortly thereafter the plaintiff company *221served notice of intention to file mechanics’ liens, and later filed such liens.
It appears that the plaintiff supposed that both elevators were built for the Linden Investment Company, and it filed liens against that company. Later plaintiff commenced an action against the Linden Investment Company in the United States district court of this district for the foreclosure of the two liens. The Investment Company, by way of defense, asserted that it had not contracted for and that the Mowbray elevator had not been built for it; that the Wales elevator did not comply with the construction contract for various reasons, among others, that it did not have a 40,000 bushel capacity. Upon the trial in the Federal court, and upon the trial of this action, the defendant Donovan testified that the Mowbray elevator was built under a contract with him as an individual, and not as an officer of the Linden Investment Company. The trial in the Federal court resulted in a judgment in favor of the plaintiff foreclosing both liens, but allowing a deduction upon the two elevators in the sum of $1,270, by way of damages for failure to construct the elevator according to contract. An appeal was taken to the circuit court of appeals. In the decision rendered in the case, the circuit court of appeals said: “This is an appeal from a decree of foreclosure of two mechanics’ liens upon two elevators in North Dakota, situated respectively at Wales and at Mowbray. It is based upon a complaint upon two separate causes of action, — one for the foreclosure of an alleged mechanic’s lien uppn the Wales elevator, and the other for the foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien upon the Mowbray elevator. Each cause of action is entirely separate and independent of the other. It is conceded in this court that there was no error in that part of the decree which establishes and forecloses the alleged mechanic’s lien upon the Wales elevator, but the portion of the decree which adjudges the defendant below, the Linden Investment Company, a corporation, indebted to the plaintiff below, Honstain Brothers Company, a corporation, on account of the Mowbray elevator, establishes a mechanic’s lien upon it, and adjudges a foreclosure thereof, is assigned as error.” 136 C. C. A. 121, 221 Fed. 179.
The circuit court of appeals sustained the contention of the Investment Company, with the result that the judgment of the district court as to the first cause of action was affirmed, but reversed as to the second *222cause of action. Upon the cause being remanded to the trial court, judgment was entered in conformity with the order of the circuit court of appeals, foreclosing the lien against the Wales elevator, but dismissing the second cause of action, that is, the cause of action for the foreclosure of the mechanic’s lien against the Mowbray elevator. The plaintiffs thereupon brought this action to foreclose the latter lien, in the district court of Cavalier county.
As stated in the former opinion in this case, the plans and specifications under which the elevator was constructed gave the dimensions of the same, and every part thereof, in detail. It gave the number of sizes of the bins. At the time the Mowbray elevator was being constructed, one Powers, Donovan’s partner, was present to inspect the job. No complaint or suggestion was made that the elevator was of insufficient capacity. It was not a difficult matter to determine what the capacity was. This is demonstrated quite graphically by Donovan’s own testimony. He said: “Well, it will hold between 32,000 and 83,000 bushels, as much as you can put into it, or taking all the ways that we had of determining how much it would hold by the three methods which I have named. The plans speak for themselves and it doesn’t require much of a scholar bo compute it.” The defendant received the elevator and operated it through his representative. Under the terms of the memorandum agreement Donovan was supposed to “have an authorized representative on the ground as soon as the building (was) completed, to inspect and receive the same.” He had a representative there. The building was received and put to its intended use. There was no complaint until after the mechanics’ liens had been filed. And, according to Donovan’s own explanation, the provision which he wrote on the back of one of the pages in the specifications was written there primarily to insure that the elevator would be, as far as possible, a duplicate, on a smaller scale, of the elevator at Langdon. He explained as his reason for this that he knew that the plans for that elevator had been carefully considered by a committee selected for that purpose. Hence, he was willing to, and desired to, have a similar but smaller elevator. The reference to the capacity seems to have been incidental, and for descriptive rather than for other purposes. Nowhere does it appear that any particular stress was laid on the capacity, — and of course, as Donovan well said, “The plans *223speak for themselves and it (didn’t) require much of a scholar to compute” the capacity. It would seem that when the building was turned over, and accepted, Donovan got precisely the building he expected to get when he contracted; and that in any event, under all the circumstances, he should be deemed to have waived all objections. We adhere to the conclusion reached in the former opinion on this phase of the case.
But it is asserted that it appears that the judgment rendered by the Federal court for the foreclosure of the lien against the Wales elevator was in fact for more than was actually due on the account, and that when the Linden Investment Company paid that judgment it paid the plaintiff company $803.39 more than was owing for the construction of such elevator. And it is contended that the defendant Donovan should be allowed the benefit of such overpayment in this case. Of course the Linden Investment Company and Donovan are two separate persons. This was asserted to advantage in the action in the Federal court. And it will be noted that the decision of the circuit court of appeals specifically pointed out that that action was “based upon a complaint upon two separate causes of action, — one for the foreclosure of an alleged mechanic’s lien upon the Wales elevator, and the other for the foreclosure of a mechanic’s lien upon the Mowbray elevator. Each cause of action is entirely separate and independent of the otherE The evidence taken in the Federal court was also submitted by stipulation upon the trial of this action, and it appears therefrom that the matter of amounts and application of payments was gone into quite fully.
It seems clear that if the Federal court made a mistake, and rendered judgment against the Linden Investment Company for too large an amount, that fact cannot avail the defendant Donovan in this action. The Linden Investment Company is not a party to this appeal. It was, however, a party to the action in the court below. It appeared and interposed an answer, and upon the trial was represented by the same counsel who appeared for Donovan. The answer contained no averment that there was any mistake in the judgment of the Federal court, or that the Linden Investment Company had in any manner overpaid the plaintiff. The answer did, however, plead with considerable detail the facts relative to the suit in the Federal court, and the judgment rendered *224therein, and averred that, by reason of said judgment the plaintiff “is estopped and foreclosed from further litigating said question (the question of liability of the Linden Investment Company for the construction of Mowbray elevator), or any question in this case.”
We adhere to the conclusions reached in the former decision.
Christianson, Ch. J., and Robinson and Grace, JJ., concur.