Court Opinion

ID: 9696383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:46:24.896202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:21.908896
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
I find that I must regrettably dissent from the *261majority in this case. I have no quarrel with the majority’s view that the best interests of the children demand that their legal and physical custody be placed with the State and not with their parents. My quarrel with the majority is in its affirming the county court in terminating the parental rights of the mother in this case. We are not here dealing with children of tender years but, rather, children today who range in age from 10 to 15. Though their needs are no less than children of tender age, experience has taught us that the likelihood of their being adopted either together as a family or individually at this age is virtually impossible. In effect, then, we are not only terminating the relationship between the parents and their children, but may likewise be terminating the relationship of brother and sister as between each child.
I believe the reality of the matter, as was apparently concluded by the District Court, is that these children are unadoptable. And so we have, by our action herein, made these youngsters “children without parents.” I know of no court order which will cause a 15-year-old child to forget his biological parents, nor to forget brothers and sisters of near equal age. It was apparently for that reason that even the county court concluded that the parental rights of the oldest child, Brenda, should not be terminated and, instead, she simply be placed in the custody of the State.
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-209 (Reissue 1978) specifically provides, in part, as follows: “The court may terminate all parental rights between the parents . . . when the court finds such action to be in the best interests of the child . ...” I have difficulty concluding how terminating the parental rights and leaving these children without any parent, or the real prospect of any parent, can be in their own best interests. Courts must address these matters realistically. It is one thing to remove the physical custody of an abused child and place it with the State; it is another thing to attempt to terminate parental rights of children who have reached the *262ages of the children involved in this case, particularly where there is no evidence of any interest by anyone to adopt them. The jurisdiction of the juvenile court is a continuing jurisdiction once a child has been adjudged to be neglected. See State v. Miller, 189 Neb. 383, 203 N.W.2d 97 (1972). The options available to the juvenile court, short of terminating parental rights for the best interests of the child, are many. See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-210 (Reissue 1978). I believe that the action of the District Court was the more appropriate one in this case, in that we would then be granted the option of attempting to find a home or homes for these children before we publicly declared they are without parents. I believe we have, in effect, burned the children’s bridges behind them without knowing that there is any road to the future. I would have affirmed the judgment of the District Court.
Caniglia, District Judge, joins in this dissent.