Court Opinion

ID: 9906082
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 21:03:14.385001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:05.558018
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/30/23
                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                          DIVISION FOUR

 JOHN DOE,
      Plaintiff and
 Respondent,                            A165224

 v.                                     (Alameda County
 GINA LEDOR et al.,                     Super. Ct. No.
                                        RG21097953)
      Defendants and
 Appellants.

       Plaintiff filed a lawsuit alleging that his ex-girlfriend and
her friends, including defendant and appellant Gina Ledor,
embarked upon a “vengeful smear campaign” to harass and
defame him after his senior year of high school.
       Pertinent to this appeal, in the summer of 2020, Gina
Ledor sent emails to school officials at Dartmouth College,
stating essentially that plaintiff had committed voter fraud to
win an election for student body president at Berkeley High
School (BHS) and providing links to what she represented to be
articles and a podcast about the incident. She wrote that she was
sharing the information so that Dartmouth would be “truly aware
of whom you have admitted,” and the BHS election incident was
only one of many instances where plaintiff had shown a lack of
empathy and character, but it “just happened to be the most well-

                                  1
documented.” Sometime after receiving these emails, Dartmouth
revoked plaintiff’s offer of admission. In addition to her emails to
Dartmouth, Gina later sent Instagram messages to two of
plaintiff’s acquaintances, that, among other things, advised them
to “avoid him” because “men like him grow up thinking it’s okay
to disrespect women and be violent.”
      Plaintiff asserted claims against Gina1 for defamation, false
light, invasion of privacy, civil harassment, civil stalking, and
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and he asserted a
claim for vicarious liability against Gina’s parents. The Ledors
filed a special motion to strike the complaint as a strategic
lawsuit against public participation (Code Civ. Proc.2, § 425.16),
and the trial court denied the motion.
      We conclude that the Ledors did not meet their burden of
showing that Gina’s statements in the Dartmouth emails involve
protected activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) or (4),
and we find no established error in the court’s ruling as to the
Instagram messages. We therefore affirm the trial court’s order.
                         BACKGROUND
I.   The Complaint
      The complaint alleges that plaintiff and defendant Nishat
Sheikh began a romantic relationship when plaintiff was a junior

      1 Because the Ledor defendants share a last name, we refer

to Gina individually by her first name.
      2 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure unless otherwise specified.

                                  2
in high school.3 Then, in the summer of 2020, Sheikh and her
friends, Ayumi Namba and Gina, embarked upon a conspiracy to
ruin plaintiff’s life when he sought to end his relationship with
Sheikh. At that time, plaintiff had been accepted to Dartmouth,
and Sheikh and her friends disseminated false and defamatory
information about him to Dartmouth officials and incoming
students, causing Dartmouth to rescind plaintiff’s offer of
admission. The defamatory statements cast plaintiff in a false
light, and defendants went to great lengths to humiliate him,
assassinate his character, and falsely portray him as dangerous,
violent, unethical, and lacking empathy.4
      Plaintiff alleged that he was forced to maintain a
relationship with Sheikh because he feared her consistent
manipulation, threats of acts of defamation, cyberbullying, and
cyberstalking. After the summer of 2020, Sheikh, Gina, and
Namba continued to abuse, blackmail, and slander plaintiff until

      3 Plaintiff filed a separate action seeking a domestic

violence restraining order (DVRO) against Sheikh, but that
action is not at issue here.
      4 Paragraph No. 24 of the complaint pleads that, “among

other things,” the false and misleading correspondence
defendants sent to third parties in the summer of 2020 stated
that plaintiff hit his father and his friend, and his father called
the police; plaintiff’s father was afraid of him; plaintiff’s father
moved out of their home because he feared being assaulted by
plaintiff; plaintiff told his ex-girlfriend to kill herself; the sender
of the communication feared for the safety of plaintiff’s future
classmates and for her physical safety if plaintiff were to know
the sender’s identity; plaintiff’s ex-girlfriend feared for her
physical safety if plaintiff were to know of the communication
being sent; and these were just “a few examples” of plaintiff’s
“incredibly manipulative and abusive” nature.

                                   3
he filed a lawsuit, including threatening to contact his employer
and spread lies so he would be fired, monitoring his whereabouts
online, lying to get him banned from dating websites, and
sending defamatory messages about him to his friends and
acquaintances. Sheikh also frequently demanded that plaintiff
account for the time he spent away from her and often demanded
his immediate response to her calls and emails upon threat of
further harmful action. Sheikh, Namba, and Gina acted in
concert as part of a common plan, and acted with malicious intent
and premeditation in seeking to destroy plaintiff’s educational
career, earning potential, and reputation.
      Plaintiff alleged causes of action for defamation per se,
false light, invasion of privacy, civil harassment, civil stalking,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Sheikh,
Namba, and Gina. He sued Casey Ledor and Kobi Ledor on a
theory of vicarious liability for Gina’s willful misconduct as a
minor.
II.   The Special Motion to Strike (Section 425.16)
      The Ledors filed an anti-SLAPP motion (the motion). They
maintained that, although plaintiff alleged broadly that Gina had
conspired to ruin his life through dissemination of false and
misleading communications, he had not identified specific
defamatory statements by Gina or pleaded their substance. The
Ledors contended, however, that plaintiff’s lawsuit was based on
two emails that Gina sent to Dartmouth in the summer of 2020
(the Dartmouth emails) wherein she disclosed that plaintiff had
cheated in an election for student body president at BHS in 2019

                                  4
by hacking into email accounts of hundreds of fellow students
and voting for himself. The Ledors also stated in their motion,
“To extent that plaintiff asserts causes of action against [the]
Ledor defendants based on any other written or oral statements
attributable to Gina Ledor, defendants reserve the right to
demonstrate they too arise from acts in furtherance of First
Amendment rights and are also subject to this Special Motion to
Strike.”
      The Ledors argued that Gina’s statements in the
Dartmouth emails were protected under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(2) (section 425.16(e)(2)) as written statements
“made concerning official proceedings authorized by law — to wit,
the Berkeley Unified School District’s investigation and discipline
[of] plaintiff for engaging in election fraud during his junior year
campaign to become the [BHS] class president.” They also
argued that the statements were protected as statements made
in connection with an issue of public interest (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(4) (section 425.16(e)(4)). They maintained that
plaintiff’s fraudulent conduct in the school election and the
school’s disciplinary proceeding were matters of public interest.
      Gina’s declaration supported the motion. Therein, she
stated that she did not learn of the information that she shared
in the Dartmouth emails through confidential sources, she was
under no obligation of confidentiality, she considered the
information she shared with Dartmouth to be of significant public
interest, and she believed that hundreds of her school mates were
aware of the information about plaintiff. Along with the

                                  5
Dartmouth emails themselves, Gina attached to her declaration
an April 2019 news article on the BHS election incident and a
transcript from a podcast to which she had provided links in the
Dartmouth emails.
      In her June 13, 2020, email to admissions and the
President’s Office at Dartmouth, Gina wrote: “To whom it may
concern, [¶] I’m writing to share with you some crucial
information about an incoming freshman to your school and a
peer of mine, [plaintiff]. I am a senior who just graduated from
Berkeley High, and I trust you will keep the source of your
information anonymous. [¶] In the spring of 2019, [plaintiff] ran
for Student Body President and was found to have cheated in
order to win the election. He hacked into over 500 of his peers’
emails so they appeared to vote for him. I’m assuming that this
is the first you are hearing of this, because my school chose not to
leave it on his disciplinary record. (We are a restorative justice-
based school.) [¶] If you wish to contact others to verify the
credibility of this information, please reach out to John
Villavicencio, the Director of Student Activities . . . or . . . the
Commissioner of Elections . . . . [¶] I am also attaching several
articles that have been written about [plaintiff] with [plaintiff’s]
name omitted. [¶] I am sharing this with you only so that you are
truly aware of whom you have admitted. Because this never
impacted his academic record, he has shown no remorse and has
yet to take accountability for his actions. This incident is not
isolated--it is only one of many instances where [plaintiff] has
shown a lack of empathy and character, but this just happened to

                                    6
be the most well-documented. For these reasons, I believe that
there are many others who deserve a spot at your prestigious
institution far more than he. [¶] Again, for my own safety, please
preserve my anonymity. [¶] Thank you, [¶] Gina Ledor.” Gina’s
email included links to articles from April 2019 about the BHS
election incident.
      The Director of Admissions at Dartmouth replied to Gina’s
email, stating that Dartmouth took the allegations in the email
and potential violations of Dartmouth’s standards and
expectations seriously, and they would address the matter as
appropriate.
      On July 4, 2020, Gina emailed the Director of Admissions,
“Hi again, [¶] I just wanted to let you know about a new piece
from a reputable podcast about [plaintiff] and his election hack.
The link is below. [¶] Thank you, [¶] Gina Ledor.”
      In opposition to the motion, plaintiff argued that:
(1) Gina’s statements in the Dartmouth emails did not qualify for
protection under section 425.16(e)(2) because any official
proceedings conducted by BHS had long concluded when Gina
sent her emails; (2) Gina’s statements did not further a matter of
public interest; (3) the statements were collateral and incidental
to her larger scheme of misconduct; (4) Gina’s conduct was illegal
as a matter of law; and (5) plaintiff’s claims had minimal merit.
Plaintiff argued that, together, Gina, Sheikh, and Namba had
harassed and defamed him in 2020 with the Dartmouth emails
and messages to incoming Dartmouth freshmen, as well as in

                                 7
2021 through messages sent to third parties on social media
platforms.5
      In support of his opposition, plaintiff submitted his own
declaration stating, among other things, that Gina sent the
Dartmouth emails, and the restorative justice proceeding
stemming from the BHS election concluded in the spring of 2019.
He submitted Sheikh’s verified discovery responses from a
separate DVRO action wherein she admitted that she helped
Gina draft the text that Gina put into her first Dartmouth email.
Plaintiff also submitted declarations from Parmita Das, who
began communicating with plaintiff as a new acquaintance in
2021, and Jen Chen, an elementary school classmate who had not
remained in contact with plaintiff. Both Das and Chen stated
that they received Instagram messages about plaintiff from Gina
in 2021.
      In their reply, the Ledors disputed plaintiff’s legal
arguments, but they also submitted new evidence, including a
new declaration from Gina wherein she conceded that she sent

      5 Plaintiff identified the alleged statements that served as

the basis for his defamation and false light claims in his
memorandum of points and authorities in support of his
opposition to the motion as those that were pleaded in paragraph
No. 24 of the complaint. He also identified the following allegedly
defamatory statements: plaintiff “has never shown any regret or
given a genuine apology” for an incident that occurred his junior
year; “he’s incredibly manipulative and abusive”; “he’s been
harassing people”; “he’s . . . an incredibly manipulative liar”;
“men like [him] grow up thinking it’s ok to disrespect women and
be violent”; and plaintiff “recently got kicked off of Bumble
because many women who know him spoke up and let Bumble
know that someone like him shouldn’t be on there.”

                                 8
Instagram messages to Das and Chen in 2021. The Ledors
argued that these 2021 communications were protected under
section 425.16(e)(4). Plaintiff objected to the court’s consideration
of evidence submitted on reply.
      The trial court heard argument, and, after taking the
matter under submission, denied the motion. The court found
that the Dartmouth emails were not protected under section
425.16(e)(2) because they had not been made in connection with
an issue “under consideration or review,” given that the Ledors
did not show the official BHS disciplinary proceeding was
ongoing when Gina sent her emails.
      Next, the court found that the statements were not
protected under section 425.16(e)(4). Here, the court assumed
that the BHS election “was a matter of public interest in the first
place,” but it found that the Ledors failed to show that it
remained a matter public interest. “Moreover, there has been no
showing that these private communications contributed to any
public debate as required by Film[O]n.com Inc. v. DoubleVerify[ ]
Inc. [(2019)] 7 Cal.5th [133,] 150].” The court reasoned that
Gina’s emails were to the Director of Admissions and their
purpose was to affect plaintiff’s admission at Dartmouth. “While
the private nature of the communications does not categorically
prevent application of [section 425.16](e)(4), it increases the
burden of showing that they contributed to the discussion of a
public issue. [Citation.] Here, aside from the issue of whether
there was a qualifying issue of public interest, the evidence is

                                  9
that the focus of [Gina’s] emails was a private concern, not the
public interest.”
      As to any alleged 2020 communications to Dartmouth
incoming students and 2021 communications to plaintiff’s
acquaintances, the court did not strike any such allegations
because it ruled that the Ledors had not attacked that conduct in
their motion. The court did not decide whether plaintiff’s claims
had minimal merit, and it overruled plaintiff’s objections to the
evidence supporting the original motion, noting that the exhibits
were not considered for the truth of the matter. The court also
ruled that it would not consider the Ledors’ reply evidence
because it was “not relevant” to the court’s conclusion that the
Ledors failed to show that plaintiff’s claims arose from protected
activity under section 425.16.
      The Ledors filed a timely notice of appeal. (§§ 425.16,
subd. (i), 904.1, subd. (a)(13).)
                            DISCUSSION
I.   Statutory Context and Standard of Review
      The anti-SLAPP statute states: “A cause of action against
a person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the
person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless
the court determines that the plaintiff has established that there
is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.”
(§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) As relevant here, section 425.16,
subdivision (e) defines an “ ‘act in furtherance of a person’s right

                                    10
of petition or free speech . . . in connection with a public issue’ ”
as: “(2) any written or oral statement or writing made in
connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law . . . (4) or any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition
or the constitutional right of free speech in connection with a
public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16(e)(2), (4).)
      Our review of the trial court’s ruling on an anti-SLAPP
motion, including any issues of statutory interpretation
presented on appeal, is de novo. (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022)
13 Cal.5th 1238, 1250 (Geiser); 1550 Laurel Owner’s Assn., Inc. v.
Appellate Division of Superior Court (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 1146,
1151 (Laurel Owner’s Assn.).) A two-step process is utilized.
(Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 884
(Wilson).) The moving defendant bears the initial burden of
establishing that the allegations or claims “ ‘ “aris[e] from”
protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.
[Citations.] If the defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must
then demonstrate its claims have at least “minimal merit.” ’
[Citation.] If the plaintiff fails to meet that burden, the court will
strike the claim.” (Ibid.)
      More specifically with respect to the first step, the
defendant’s “burden is to identify the activity each challenged
claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is protected by
the anti-SLAPP statute. A ‘claim may be struck only if the
speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of,

                                  11
and not just evidence of liability or a step leading to some
different act for which liability is asserted.’ [Citation.] To
determine whether a claim arises from protected activity, courts
must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what
actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently
form the basis for liability.’ [Citation.] Courts then must
evaluate whether the defendant has shown any of these actions
fall within one or more of the four categories of ‘ “act[s]” ’
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th
at p. 884.)
II.   Protected Activity
      On appeal, the Ledors contend that plaintiff’s claims arise
from two sets of conduct: Gina’s statements in the 2020
Dartmouth emails and her 2021 Instagram messages to Das and
Chen. We first address the Dartmouth emails and then turn to
the 2021 Instagram communications.
         A. The Dartmouth Emails
      The Ledors claim protection for the statements in the
Dartmouth emails under section 425.16(e)(2), (4). We address
both arguments in turn.
      Section 425.16(e)(2)
      The parties do not dispute that the BHS disciplinary
proceeding was an “official proceeding authorized by law”
(§ 425.16(e)(2)), but the Ledors claim the trial court erred in
finding that section 425.16(e)(2) did not apply to Gina’s
statements because there was no pending official proceeding
when she sent the Dartmouth emails in 2020. They assert that

                                  12
section 425.16(e)(2) extends protection to Gina’s 2020 statements.
We disagree.
      The unambiguous language of section 425.16(e)(2) refutes
the Ledors’ position. (See Laurel Owner’s Assn., supra,
28 Cal.App.5th at p. 1151 [plain meaning of statutory text
governs].) The statute provides protection for “any written or
oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.”
(§ 425.16(e)(2), italics added.) “ ‘As used in section 425.16[(e)(2)],
a matter is “under consideration” if it “is one kept ‘before the
mind’, given ‘attentive thought, reflection, meditation.’
[Citation.] A matter under review is one subject to ‘an inspection,
examination.’ ” ’ ” (City of Costa Mesa v. D’Alessio Investments,
LLC (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 358, 373.) The Ledors argue that an
active official proceeding is not required, and that the concluded
BHS official proceeding suffices, because the statute does not use
the words “pending” or “ongoing.” But such language would be
redundant. That the statement must be “made in connection
with an issue under consideration or review” plainly requires
that there be some form of pending consideration of a matter by
one of the authorized bodies when the protected statement is
made.
      Although the Ledors claim there is no authority on this
question, a number of cases support our reading of the statute.
In Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th 610,
the defendant claimed that section 425.16(e)(2) protected

                                  13
statements relating to an issue reviewed by the city council two
years after the statements at issue were made. (Id. at pp. 626–
627.) Emphasizing section 425.16(e)(2)’s “ ‘under consideration or
review’ ” language, the high court disagreed. (Id. at p. 627.) “The
subdivision thus appears to contemplate an ongoing — or, at the
very least, immediately pending — official proceeding.
Conversely, if an issue is not presently ‘under consideration or
review’ by such authorized bodies, then no expression — even if
related to that issue — could be ‘made in connection with an
issue under consideration or review.’ ” (Ibid.) While Rand
addressed statements made before the commencement of an
official proceeding, the high court nonetheless recognized that the
statutory language contemplates an “ongoing” or “immediately
pending” official proceeding. (Ibid.) We join courts that have
given effect to the statute’s plain language. (Cole v. Patricia A.
Meyer & Associates, APC (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1120
[where complaint against plaintiff remained posted on
defendant’s website after litigation ended, the posting after the
litigation’s end did not fall within section 425.16(e)(1) or (2)];
Mandel v. Hafermann (N.D. Cal. 2020) 503 F.Supp.3d 946, 971–
972 [attorney’s statements telling client to breach divorce
settlement were not connected to an issue “under review” because
divorce proceeding had concluded when statements were made].)6

      6 The litigation privilege may be used “as an aid” to

interpret section 425.16 (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299,
323), and that privilege has been extended to certain conduct
taken to enforce a judgment. (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006)
37 Cal.4th 1048, 1055, 1062–1065 [where claim was based on

                                  14
      We also reject the Ledors’ suggestion that denying
protection for the statements at issue in this case would violate
the purpose of section 425.16(e)(2). “[T]he purpose of
subdivision (e)(1) and (2) is essentially to protect the activity of
petitioning the government for redress of grievances and petition-
related statements and writings (Briggs [v. Eden Council for
Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1120–1121]).” (Du
Charme v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (2003)
110 Cal.App.4th 107, 114.) The goal of protecting petitioning
activity and participation in official proceedings to seek
government redress is not thwarted by recognizing that the
statute does not extend to the circumstances here, where Gina’s
statements were made more than a year after the termination of
any official BHS disciplinary proceeding.

filing of false proofs of service to obtain default judgment,
application for writ of execution and act of levying on property
were protected under litigation privilege].) Accordingly, courts
have determined that section 425.16, subdivision (e) protects the
acts of obtaining an abstract of judgment and recording it as a
real property lien. (O'Neil-Rosales v. Citibank (South Dakota)
N.A. (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th Supp. 1, 6; see Weeden v. Hoffman
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 269, 285 [parties conceded protected
activity].) But courts have referred to judgment enforcement
proceedings as “an extension of [the] judicial process.” (O’Keefe v.
Kompa (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 130, 134–135 [discussing litigation
privilege]; Brown v. Kennard (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 40, 49
[same].) In contrast, when Gina sent the Dartmouth emails, the
BHS disciplinary proceeding had concluded, and the record
indicates no related extended proceedings.

                                  15
      Section 425.16(e)(4)
      The analysis of whether the challenged conduct falls within
section 425.16(e)(4)’s protection requires two steps. (FilmOn.com
Inc. v. DoubleVerify Inc., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 149–150
(FilmOn).) “First, we ask what ‘public issue or [ ] issue of public
interest’ the speech in question implicates . . . . [Citation.]
Second, we ask what functional relationship exists between the
speech and the public conversation about some matter of public
interest.” (Ibid.)
      With respect to the first step, the statute does not define
the terms “public issue” or “issue of public interest.” However, to
make this determination, “courts look to certain specific
considerations such as whether the subject of the speech or
activity ‘was a person or entity in the public eye’ or ‘could affect
large numbers of people beyond the direct participants’ [citation];
and whether the activity ‘occur[red] in the context of an ongoing
controversy, dispute or discussion’ [citation], or ‘affect[ed] a
community in a manner similar to that of a governmental entity’
[citation].” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 145–146.)
      Geiser recently clarified FilmOn’s first step. As it did in
FilmOn, the high court cautioned that speech is rarely “ ‘about’ ”
any single issue, and it reiterated its critique of cases that had
attempted to discern a single topic of speech. (Geiser, supra,
13 Cal.5th at pp. 1249–1250.) Thus, FilmOn’s first step is
satisfied “so long as the challenged speech or conduct, considered
in light of its context, may reasonably be understood to implicate
a public issue, even if it also implicates a private dispute.”

                                  16
(Geiser, at p. 1253.) Geiser also made clear that this first step
requires “an objective inquiry, without deference to the movant’s
framing or personal motivations,” although those components
may inform the analysis if objectively reasonable. (Id. at
p. 1254.) “If a reasonable inference can be drawn that the
challenged activity implicates a public issue, then the analysis
proceeds to FilmOn’s second step.” (Geiser, at p. 1254.)
      FilmOn’s second step “moves from a focus on identifying
the relevant matters of public interest to addressing the specific
nature of defendant’s speech and its relationship to the matters
of public interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 152.) Because
“virtually always, defendants succeed in drawing a line —
however tenuous — connecting their speech to an abstract issue
of public interest,” section 425.16(e)(4) “demands ‘some degree of
closeness’ between the challenged statements and the asserted
public interest.” (FilmOn, at p. 150.) “ ‘[I]t is not enough that the
statement refer to a subject of widespread public interest; the
statement must in some manner itself contribute to the public
debate.’ ” (Ibid.)
      “What it means to ‘contribute to the public debate’ [citation]
will perhaps differ based on the state of public discourse at a
given time, and the topic of contention. But ultimately, our
inquiry does not turn on a normative evaluation of the substance
of the speech. We are not concerned with the social utility of the
speech at issue, or the degree to which it propelled the
conversation in any particular direction; rather, we examine
whether a defendant — through public or private speech or

                                 17
conduct — participated in, or furthered, the discourse that makes
an issue one of public interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
pp. 150–151; see also p. 154 [“a court must consider whether a
statement . . . contributes to or furthers the public conversation
on an issue of public interest”].)
      Together, Geiser and FilmOn instruct that context plays an
equally important role as the content of the speech at issue, and
context must be considered at both of FilmOn’s steps. (Geiser,
supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1256; FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
pp. 151–154.) Contextual considerations include “the identity of
the speakers or participants,” the “location and audience,” and its
“purpose and timing.” (Geiser, at p. 1253.) At FilmOn’s first
step, “ ‘Language . . . cannot be interpreted apart from
context’ [citation], and what a particular statement or act is
‘about’ often cannot be discerned from words alone.” (Geiser, at
p. 1252.) And at FilmOn’s second step, “the inquiry of whether a
statement contributes to the public debate is one a court can
hardly undertake without incorporating considerations of context
— including audience, speaker, and purpose.” (FilmOn, at
p. 152.)
      In Geiser, our high court determined that section
425.16(e)(4) protected a sidewalk demonstration “to protest a real
estate company’s business practices after the company evicted
two long-term residents from their home.” (Geiser, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1243.) The genesis of the demonstration was an
individual family’s eviction, but around 25 people protested in
front of the home of the evicting corporation’s chief executive

                                     18
officer in an event sponsored by an advocacy organization
committed to “fight[ing] against the displacement of long[-]term
residents” and “sav[ing] homes from foreclosures.” (Id. at
pp. 1243–1244, 1251.) The appellate court held that the
demonstration “focused on . . . a private matter concerning a
former homeowner and the corporation that purchased her
former home,” and not on “any societal issues of residential
displacement, gentrification, or the root causes of the great
recession.” (Id. at p. 1250.) Our Supreme Court disagreed. “We
do not see why defendants’ expressive activity fits only one
characterization and not both.” (Id. at p. 1250.) The court
reasoned: “It is common knowledge that foreclosures, evictions,
and inadequate housing are major issues in communities
throughout California, and the participation of more than two
dozen members of an advocacy group dedicated to fighting
foreclosures and residential displacement must be considered
against that backdrop.” (Id. at p. 1251.) The high court held that
the speech implicated a public issue even though it could also be
understood to “implicate a private dispute.” (Id. at p. 1253.)
      In FilmOn, in contrast, the allegedly disparaging
statements made in confidential reports that the defendant
disseminated to clients were not protected by section 425.16(e)(4).
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 140.) There, the defendant was
a “for-profit business entity that offers online tracking,
verification and ‘brand safety’ services to Internet advertisers,”
and the plaintiff owned websites that the defendant identified in
its reports as containing “adult content” or “copyright

                                 19
infringement” material. (Id. at pp. 140–142.) With respect to
FilmOn’s step one, the defendant argued that the presence of
adult content on the internet, generally, and the presence of
copyright infringing content on the plaintiff’s website,
specifically, were matters of public concern. (Id. at p. 150.) It
submitted evidence that the plaintiff had been subject to media
reports of infringing content on its websites and copyright
litigation over its streaming model to support its latter argument.
(Id. at pp. 150, 152.) The high court acknowledged that the
reports in the abstract could implicate issues of public interest
(id. at p. 152), but ultimately it determined that the reports did
not contribute to the public debate on such issues. (Id. at
pp. 152–153.) The reports were made “privately, to a coterie of
paying clients,” who used them “for their business purposes
alone. The information never entered the public sphere, and the
parties never intended it to.” (Id. at p. 153.) Accordingly, the
reports were “too remotely connected to the public conversation
about [the implicated public] issues” to come within the
protection of the anti-SLAPP statute. (Id. at p. 140.)
      The Ledors argue that the Dartmouth emails implicate
issues of public interest — the BHS election incident, including
plaintiff’s role therein, as evidenced by the 2019 media coverage
and the podcast, and the issue of restorative justice. In applying
the above-outlined body of law to the present case, we need not
decide whether Gina’s speech “implicate[s] issues of public
interest” (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1252) — because even
assuming that it does, the Ledors have not satisfied the second

                                 20
part of the test. They have not shown that Gina’s speech
“contribute[d] to or further[ed] the public conversation on an
issue of public interest.” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 154.)
      First, the speech at issue occurred in private. Gina sent
two emails to school officials at their Dartmouth email addresses.
Although our Supreme Court stresses that “no single element is
dispositive” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 153) in determining
whether a defendant’s speech is entitled to protection, the private
context “makes heavier” the defendant’s “burden of showing that,
notwithstanding the private context, the alleged statements
nevertheless contributed to discussion or resolution of a public
issue for purposes of [section 425.16](e)(4).” (Wilson, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 903.)
      Second, nothing in the record indicates that Dartmouth, a
college, used Gina’s statements for anything other than its
private purposes.
      Third, there is no evidence that Gina intended the
Dartmouth emails to reach the public sphere. Gina sent the
emails more than a year after the BHS election incident and the
conclusion of the restorative justice proceeding, and the evidence
before the court showed that defendant Sheikh assisted in
drafting the content of Gina’s first email at a time when plaintiff
attempted to end his relationship with Sheikh. In her own
words, Gina shared the information “only so that” Dartmouth
was “truly aware of whom [it had] admitted.” Gina also wrote
that the BHS election incident “just happened to be the most
well-documented” of many instances where plaintiff had shown a

                                 21
“lack of empathy and character,” and she opined that many
others deserved a spot at Dartmouth “far more than [plaintiff].”
The content of Gina’s speech objectively suggests that she shared
the information not to “further[] public discussion” of the BHS
incident or of restorative justice (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 1256), but instead merely to provide an example for Dartmouth
of plaintiff’s lack of good character for Dartmouth’s private
purposes only. Thus, both the content and context of the emails
at issue show they were not intended for a wide public audience.
      Finally, there is no evidence that the Dartmouth emails
ever reached a wider public audience.
      In sum, then, with her private emails intended only for
Dartmouth’s private use, Gina’s emails to Dartmouth officials did
not further or contribute to a larger public conversation (even
assuming such a conversation existed at the time7). (FilmOn,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 154.)

      7 The news article in the record about the BHS election and

the links Gina sent to Dartmouth, which is the only evidence we
consider (though not for the truth of the matters alleged therein
given the court’s unchallenged ruling below), are from April 2019.
The Ledors claim that the existence of the July 2, 2020, podcast
shows that the public discussion of the BHS election incident was
“ongoing and nationwide” when Gina sent the Dartmouth emails.
The Ledors make many representations in their briefing about
this alleged “popular podcast,” its alleged influence, and the
alleged “award-winning podcast company” that produced it.
Those representations are not evidence, and they are entirely
unsupported. The only evidence in the record regarding the
podcast is from Gina’s declaration and its attached transcript.
Gina states therein that there was a podcast covering the BHS
election incident, and “[a]ttached hereto as Exhibit C is a true
and accurate copy of a transcript of a recording to which I linked

                                 22
      The Ledors rely heavily on Geiser, but Geiser is
distinguishable. There, the defendants participated in a sidewalk
demonstration with 25 to 30 strangers organized by an advocacy
group that fought against the displacement of long-term
residents. (Geiser, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1244–1245, 1251.)
Multiple police officers and an observer from the National
Lawyers Guild were present as well, and the protest received
media attention. (Id. at pp. 1245, 1255.) Our high court found
the protest had dual purposes to facilitate repurchase of the
defendants’ foreclosed home and to draw attention to the alleged
unfairness of the business practices by which the defendants
were foreclosed upon and evicted. (Id. at p. 1255.) In light of the
latter purpose and the context, the public sidewalk protest
furthered the public discussion of public issues. (Ibid.)
No similar facts exist here.
      This case is instead, albeit without the for-profit corporate
speaker, more analogous to FilmOn, wherein the plaintiff’s
copyright infringement was presumed to be a public issue, the
defendant identified the plaintiff’s websites as providing
improper access to copyrighted materials8 in its reports to clients,

in my email to Dartmouth: a July 2, 2020 podcast on “Reply-All”
by PJ Vogt under “gimletmedia” entitled “#163 Candidate One.”
The 44-minute recording can be accessed at:
https://gimletmedia.com/shows/reply-all/76h63r.”
      8 The FilmOn defendant’s tag for “ ‘Copyright

Infringement: Streaming or File Sharing’ ” meant “ ‘ “ ‘Sites,
presently or historically, associated with access to or distribution
of copyrighted material without appropriate controls, licensing,
or permission; including but not limited to, sites electronically

                                 23
but the high court nonetheless held that the reports, which were
not intended to, and did not, enter the public sphere, did not
contribute to the public discussion on a matter of public interest
in a manner sufficient to warrant protection under section
425.16(e)(4). (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 153.)
         B. 2021 Instagram Communications to Das and
             Chen
      On appeal, the Ledors assert that Gina’s 2021 Instagram
communications to Das and Chen are protected under section
425.16(e)(4). But because they fail to demonstrate error in the
trial court’s ruling that their motion to strike did not address any
allegations regarding Gina’s 2021 communications to plaintiff’s
acquaintances, the Ledors have not established a basis for
reversal of the trial court’s order.
      To prevail on appeal, the Ledors “ ‘must establish both
error and prejudice from that error. [Citation.] In order to
demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewing court
with some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and
citation to the record. Rather than scour the record unguided, we
may decide that the appellant has forfeited a point urged on
appeal when . . . [appellant makes] conclusory arguments that
are not supported by pertinent legal authority.’ ” (Champir, LLC
v. Fairbanks Ranch Assn. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 583, 597; United
Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th
142, 146 [“ ‘In order to demonstrate error, an appellant must

streaming or allowing user file sharing of such material.’ ” ’ ”
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 141.)

                                  24
supply the reviewing court with some cogent argument supported
by legal analysis and citation to the record.’ ”].)
      The Ledors have not properly presented this issue on
appeal. They do not cite the standard by which we should review
the trial court’s determination that their motion did not seek to
strike allegations regarding Gina’s 2021 Instagram
communications. They do not cite any law establishing error in
the court’s ruling, and, with the exception of a few cursory
sentences (one of which is in a confusing footnote), they do not
even attempt to show error. Given that the Ledors failed to make
a cogent argument that would justify a reversal of the court’s
finding that they did not properly move to strike the allegations
regarding Gina’s 2021 Instagram messages to Das and Chen,
they have not established that the court erred by failing to strike
those allegations.
      Because the Ledors have failed to show that plaintiff’s
allegations arise from activity protected under section 425.16, we
need not consider the parties’ additional arguments, including
those regarding whether plaintiff demonstrated a probability of
prevailing on the merits of his claims.

                                  25
                          DISPOSITION
      The order denying the anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed.
Plaintiff shall recover his costs on appeal.

                                               BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.
HIRAMOTO, J.                             Doe v. Ledor et al. (A165224)

      
        Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of
Contra Costa, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                 26
Trial Court:   Alameda County Superior Court

Trial Judge:   Hon. Stephen Kaus

Counsel:       Law Office of Jeremy Friedman, Jeremy Friedman
               Defendants and Appellants.

               Moya Law Firm, Mario A. Moya, Rebecca M. Hoberg for
               Plaintiff and Respondent.