Court Opinion

ID: 9847887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:09:15.902341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:42.943813
License: Public Domain

Baker, J.,
dissenting.
Insofar as the opinion of the majority holds that the trial court was empowered to enter an order relating to equitable distribution more than one year after it entered a final decree of divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony between the parties, I respectfully dissent. The decree dissolving the bonds of matrimony was entered on April 3, 1984, and became final and binding twenty-one days thereafter. Rule 1:1. The decree of equitable distribution was entered on April 15, 1985, more than one year after the final decree of divorce. The view expressed and authorities cited in the dissent in Parra v. Parra, 1 Va. App. 118, 336 S.E.2d 152 (1985) are applicable here.
Prior to the 1986 session of the Virginia General Assembly, no section of the Code dealing with awards of equitable distribution modified the express language of Rule 1:1. In 1986, Code § 20-107.3(A) was amended by adding the following language:
The court, on the motion of both parties, may retain jurisdiction in the final decree of divorce to adjudicate the remedy provided by this section when the court determines that such *312action in (sic) clearly necessary because of the complexities of the parties’ property interests, and all decrees heretofore entered retaining such jurisdiction are validated, (emphasis added).
It is clear from this amendment that the legislature never intended that the parties be permitted to bestow equitable distribution jurisdiction on the trial courts beyond the twenty-one days provided in Rule 1:1. Even after the 1986 amendment, the trial court may extend the time in which it must act only after a motion by both parties and a showing that the issues are complex.
The jurisdictional issue is resolved by the majority by reference to the Parra decision. For the reasons expressed in my dissent in that case, I believe that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make the equitable distribution award in this case.
While nothing in the majority opinion suggests that the majority relies on the 1986 amendment to Code § 20-107(A), I also see no reason for the decision to have been delayed “because of the complexities” of the issues. While I do not suggest that it would have been a correct ruling, alternatively, the majority could have held that while the record did not disclose such complexities, the phrase “all decrees heretofore entered retaining such jurisdiction are validated” applies to any decree heretofore entered without regard to the complexity of the issues presented. There is reason to believe that a large number of equitable distribution awards were made at a time when the trial courts were without jurisdiction to enter them. Whether the General Assembly has the power to retroactively “validate” those decisions is a question that must be decided by this court.
I also dissent from that portion of the majority opinion which addresses the constructive desertion issue. If husband had a right to appeal the issue whether wife was guilty of constructive desertion that right arose on April 3, 1984, the day the decree of divorce was entered. To have appealed that issue to this court he was required by our rules to note his appeal within thirty days after the entry of the decree. His failure to note his appeal on that issue until after the entry of the decree awarding equitable distribution was at least one year too late, and yet the majority addresses the issue as it relates to issues of spousal support. While the majority purports to address the constructive desertion issue *313only “to the extent that it relates to the award of spousal support,” it nevertheless proceeds to consider the merits of the trial court’s ruling on the issue. By indirection, the majority allows husband to argue on appeal an issue as to which no timely notice of appeal was filed. While it may be true that the trial judge may delay his opinion as to how much, if any, spousal support wife is entitled to receive, he may not delay beyond the time limit of Rule 1:1 deciding the issue whether she is eligible to receive such support. For this reason, I believe that this court is without jurisdiction to decide the constructive desertion issue.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the opinion expressed by the majority.