Court Opinion

ID: 9745246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:43:00.998842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:58.079397
License: Public Domain

*94STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The parties in this case stipulated to the identity of the victim; therefore, the trial court should not have admitted Settie Rowe's testimony identifying a photograph as her brother, the victim.
I agree with the majority that the admission of evidence rests within the sound discretion of the trial court; however, in the exercise of that discretion, the trial court must weigh the probative force of the evidence offered against its tendency to arouse the emotions of the jury. Peaches v. City of Evansville (1979), Ind.App., 389 N.E.2d 322, 326, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1033, 100 S.Ct. 704, 62 L.Ed.2d 669; Smith v. Crouse-Hinds Co. (1978), 175 Ind.App. 679, 373 N.E.2d 923, 926 (trans, denied). The parties stipulated to the identity of the victim. That stipulation is conclusive upon the parties and the court. Reynolds Metals Co. v. Indiana Department of State Revenue (1982), Ind.App., 433 N.E.2d 1, 10. Because the identity of the victim was not at issue, Rowe's testimony that the victim was her brother had no probative value. In allowing the admission of her testimony, the majority attempts to create a distinction that does not exist. Testimony that the victim was Rowe's brother is of no moment in this case. Furthermore, the testimony of the victim's grieving sister was likely to arouse the sympathy of the jurors.
Rowe's testimony not only had no probative force, it also tended to arouse the jury's emotions; therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in allowing her to identify the victim as her brother. I dissent and would reverse Young's conviction and order a new trial.