Court Opinion

ID: 9428309
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:23:23.95518+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:06.882650
License: Public Domain

Justice Rehnquist,
with whom The Chief Justice, Justice Stewart, and Justice Powell join, concurring in the judgment.
I agree completely with the conclusion of the Court that in these cases “Congress was not concerned with the rights of individuals” and that “[i]t is not surprising, therefore, that there is no ‘indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create ... a [private] remedy or to deny one.’ ” Ante, at 295.
*302I also agree with the Court’s analysis, ante, at 297, where it says:
“As recently emphasized, the focus of the inquiry is on whether Congress intended to create a remedy. Universities Research Assn., Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U. S., at 771-772; Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S., at 23-24; Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, [442 U. S.], at 575-576. The federal judiciary will not engraft a remedy on a statute, no matter how salutary, that Congress did not intend to provide.”
My only difference, and the difference which leads me to write this separate concurrence in the judgment, is that I think the Court’s opinion places somewhat more emphasis on Cort v. Ash, 422 U. S. 66 (1975), than is warranted in light of several more recent “implied right of action” decisions which limit it. These decisions make clear that the so-called Cort factors are merely guides in the central task of ascertaining legislative intent, see Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U. S. 11, 15 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U. S. 560, 575-576 (1979); Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U. S. 677, 739-740 (1979) (Powell, J., dissenting), that they are not of equal weight, Transamerica, supra, at 15, 23-24; Touche Ross, supra, at 575-576; and that in deciding an implied-right-of-action case courts need not mechanically trudge through all four of the factors when the dispositive question of legislative intent has been resolved, Transamerica, supra, at 24; Touche Ross, supra, at 575-576; Kissinger v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, 445 U. S. 136, 148-149 (1980). Surely it cannot be seriously argued that a mechanical application of the Cort analysis lends “predictability” to implied-right-of-action jurisprudence: including today’s decision, five of the last six statutory implied-right-of-action cases in which we have reviewed analysis by the Courts of Appeals after Cort have resulted in reversal of erroneous Court of Appeals deci*303sions. See Universities Research Assn., Inc. v. Coutu, 450 U. S. 754 (1981); Transamerica, supra; Touche Ross, supra; Cannon, supra. Cf. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, ante, p. 77. While this may be predictability of a sort, it is not the sort which the Court in Cort v. Ash, supra, or in any other case seeking to afford guidance to statutory construction intended.
But in these cases, I am happy to agree with the Court that there is no implied right of action because “[t]he language of the statute and its legislative history do not suggest that the Act was intended to create federal rights for the especial benefit of a class of persons,” ante, at 297-298, and because there is no “evidence that Congress anticipated that there would be a private remedy.” Ante, at 298.