Court Opinion

ID: 9522792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:32:19.917287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:56.115226
License: Public Domain

*67Johnson, J.,
¶20. dissenting. Requiring officers to apprise persons in police custody of their rights acts as a check on the use of coercive interrogation tactics in situations where the balance of power tilts heavily in favor of law enforcement. The Supreme Court in Miranda was particularly concerned with the potential for compelled speech that exists when an individual is “swept from familiar surroundings into police custody, surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to . . . techniques of persuasion.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461 (1966). In its narrow analysis of what amounts to “custody” for purposes of Miranda warnings, the majority loses sight of these fundamental safeguards meant to curb police coercion. Because I believe that the totality of the circumstances indicate that what started out as a consensual, noncustodial encounter between defendant and the police quickly turned into a custodial interrogation, I cannot agree with the majority that just before defendant’s fourth, fifth, and sixth confessions, a reasonable person in defendant’s position would have felt free to terminate the interview and leave. I, therefore, respectfully dissent.
¶21. Determination of custody is a fact-specific inquiry. It is, thus, necessary to preface any analysis with a full recitation of the relevant facts. It is undisputed that defendant was approached by an officer at a convenience store, was asked to accompany that officer to the police station for questioning, and was driven to the police station in a police cruiser. Upon arriving at the police station, defendant was taken to a small, windowless room and assented to police questioning by two uniformed officers. At the outset of the questioning, defendant was told that he was there voluntarily, that the door was unlocked, and that defendant was free to go at any time. Over the next twenty minutes, defendant confessed to setting three fires. The majority’s recitation of facts with regard to the subsequent critical time period of 11:26 p.m. to *6812:15 a.m., however, does not go far enough in giving a clear picture of what happened. The videotape of the police interview was admitted into evidence at defendant’s suppression hearing and indicates that the nature and tone of the interview changed during this period. Review of the videotape reveals the following facts.
¶ 22. At 11:26 p.m., one of the officers offered to make arrangements to pick up defendant’s wife from work. Defendant responded that he was going to pick her up. At that point, the following exchange occurred:
Officer: I’d like to talk to you for a little while longer and here’s the reason why, okay? I haven’t told you everything I know about these fires when I walked in here tonight, alright? One of the other things I’d like to do is start telling you a little bit more about what we know, okay? In fact, we’ve got you coming from the scene of many of these fires.
Defendant: ‘Cause I actually came . . .
Officer: Okay, but let me finish where I’m going with this .... This didn’t just start out of the blue. You did three fires tonight in succession. . . . When I go back to your photograph, people are going to recognize you? . I’m going to ask you a question, and I need you to be 100% honest with this, because this is where we’re going to start going up or down with things. And by that I mean, I’m a patient man to a reason, to a point. Have I been fair with you so far?
Defendant: Yeah
Officer: What we told you is that you can leave any time, correct?
Defendant: Okay.
Officer: You came in here of your own free will, correct?
Defendant: Yeah.
Officer: Did you understand that?
Defendant: Yeah.
*69Officer: Did you understand when [the other officer] and I came in here that I told you when you came in here, if you want to leave, you could leave.
Defendant: I still think I should have a lawyer here.
Officer: That’s going to be up to you. Are you asking for a lawyer or do you want to still talk about this — because to me you’re not sure. If you want to talk some more about this because it’s important we get everything out on the table all at once.
Defendant: I know deep down in my heart I’m not the one who did all these [fires].
At this point, the second officer reentered the room, and the following exchange occurred:
Officer [to second officer]: I have to make you aware of one thing. [Defendant] has brought up the fact that he’s not sure if he should have a lawyer ....
Defendant: But I’m being honest ....
Officer [to second officer]: I asked him if he wanted to continue talking and he said yes.
Second Officer: That door is not locked, [Defendant], you’re free to go. . . . [W]e want these fires to stop. We know there’s a reason why you’re starting these fires.
Defendant: I’m not the one doing them all.
¶23. Questioning about whether defendant was responsible for certain fires resumed. The questioning took the form of the two officers consulting a list of dates, times, and locations of fires set in the area and asking defendant, incident by incident, if he was responsible. The officers asked questions in quick succession, at times interrupting and talking over both each other and defendant. At 11:32 and 11:33 p.m., defendant confessed to two more fires.
¶24. For the next ten minutes, the officers questioned defendant about a series of fires that occurred over the previous year. The tactics employed by the officers to elicit confessions from defendant included telling defendant that there was no difference between setting one fire or twenty-one fires and that there was *70surveillance tape of defendant at several fire scenes. Just before the third confession, which occurred at 11:48 p.m., one of the officers referenced video and pictures of defendant at the crime scene and began this particular line of questioning by saying, “you wanted to start that little fire and it got out of hand.” Defendant then began to describe that particular fire.
¶ 25. The questioning continued in a similar fashion for approximately ten more minutes, after which the two officers left defendant alone while they conferred. Questioning resumed at approximately 12:10 a.m. At 12:15 a.m., one of the officers asked defendant to wait while the officer prepared a statement for defendant to sign. At that time, defendant indicated that he wanted to leave, to which one of the officers responded “we’re not done yet.”
¶ 26. Defendant moved to suppress his confessions to six fires, arguing that because he was in custody at the time these confessions were made, the officers were required to apprise him of his Miranda rights. After a suppression hearing, the trial court concluded that before 12:15 a.m. defendant was not in custody, finding that: (1) defendant went voluntarily to the police station for questioning; (2) the door to the interview room was closed, but it was not barricaded in any way and defendant had access to it; (3) at 11:29 p.m., defendant inquired about whether he should have counsel and the officer made it clear that if defendant wanted to have a lawyer, he had a right to do so, but defendant never invoked this right; (4) the police could not have made it any clearer to defendant that he was free to leave; and (5) there “was no evidence on the video or from any testimony that [defendant] was deprived of his freedom of action in a significant way.” The court found that at 12:15 a.m. defendant indicated he wished to leave and that the officer stated that they were not done yet. The court found that from that point on defendant “was in a circumstance where he was not free to leave.”
¶ 27. On appeal, defendant contends, in part, that the trial court erred in finding that he was not in custody after 11:26 p.m. Defendant argues that after he had confessed to three fires he was in custody for purposes of Miranda, and in the absence of Miranda warnings, the subsequent three confessions should have been suppressed. Defendant brings his arguments under the Fifth *71and Sixth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution.8
¶ 28. Under the standard of review set forth by the majority, we review the trial court’s legal conclusions de novo and its findings of fact under a clearly erroneous standard of review. State v. Pontbriand, 2005 VT 20, ¶ 12, 178 Vt. 120, 878 A.2d 227. The U.S. Supreme Court has clarified the analysis to be employed on review by articulating a two-part test to determine whether a person is in custody for Miranda purposes — a test this Court has adopted. Id. First, a court must determine the circumstances surrounding the interrogation; and second, the court must determine if, given those circumstances, a reasonable person would have felt he was free to leave. Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). In Thompson, the Court characterized the latter inquiry as to whether a reasonable person would have felt he was free to terminate the questioning as a “mixed question of law and fact qualifying for independent review.” Id. at 112-13 (quotation omitted). It is thus the job of this Court to review the record facts and make the ultimate determination of whether a defendant was or was not in custody.
¶29. The majority accuses me of looking “beyond the trial court’s findings of fact and engaging] in appellate fact-finding.” Ante, ¶ 13 n.6. The majority, however, mischaracterizes the two-part standard set forth in Thompson and my application of that standard here. With regard to the first part of the inquiry — determining the circumstances surrounding the encounter — the trial court’s findings that defendant voluntarily left the convenience store, accompanied an officer to the police station, was not handcuffed, and was in an interview room with a door that was unlocked, are factual findings and should be reviewed under the “clearly erroneous” standard articulated by the majority. Ante, ¶ 13.
*72¶ 30. Despite being charged with examining “all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation,” Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994), the trial court made virtually no factual findings on the critical period of time at issue here — 11:26 p.m. to 12:15 a.m. The majority, therefore, errs in describing all of the conclusions drawn by the trial court as “factual findings.” Ante, ¶ 13. Rather, the trial court’s findings that the police could not have made it any clearer to defendant that he was free to leave and that there was no evidence that defendant was deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way are legal conclusions and are subject to independent review from this Court. See Pontbriand, 2005 VT 20, ¶ 12. Given our charge to make an objective inquiry into the totality of the circumstances and determine the ultimate legal question of whether those circumstances amount to a custodial encounter, our only option here is to look to the evidence presented before the trial court.
¶ 31. This type of analysis is not a novel concept in cases reviewing a motion to suppress where an appellate court is asked to look at the totality of the circumstances and determine whether a suspect was in custody for purposes of Miranda. Moreover, though we defer to a trial court’s credibility determinations, where the evidence is a videotape of a police encounter and where officers have testified that the videotape fully and accurately depicts the police interview, there are no issues of credibility. In this situation, it is not only permissible, but indeed necessary, for an appellate court to view this evidence to ascertain what the totality of the circumstances were. See, e.g., Graham v. United States, 950 A.2d 717, 721 (D.C. 2008) (appellate court evaluated videotaped interview to determine whether a confession was admissible); State v. Payne, 149 S.W.3d 20, 25 (Tenn. 2004) (“[DJetermining whether the defendant was in custody is a fact-intensive inquiry which demands a careful, de novo review of the videotaped interview, followed by an application of the governing legal principles.”).
¶ 32. In determining whether a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda, there are few bright-line rules. Determinations are thus fact-specific and based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the police encounter. Though every police encounter will have coercive elements, to rise to the level of a custodial interrogation the totality of the circumstances must be such that a reasonable person would believe he was not free to *73terminate the questioning and leave. See State v. Willis, 145 Vt. 459, 473-75, 494 A.2d 108, 115-17 (1985); see also Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (per curiam) (looking to whether suspect was “no longer free to go”). Federal and state courts grappling with this issue have employed a number of factors to make this determination, including:
(1) the location of the interrogation and whether it was a place where the defendant would normally feel free to leave; (2) whether the contact with the police was initiated by [the police] or by the [defendant], and, if by the police, whether the defendant voluntarily agreed to the interview; (3) whether the defendant was told he or she was free to terminate the interview and leave at any time; (4) whether there were restrictions on the defendant’s freedom of movement during the interrogation; (5) whether neutral parties were present at any time during the interrogation; (6) the duration of the interrogation; (7) whether the police verbally dominated the questioning, were aggressive, were confrontational, were accusatory, threatened the defendant, or used other interrogation techniques to pressure the [defendant]; and (8) whether the police manifested to the defendant a belief that the defendant was culpable and that they had the evidence to prove it.
State v. Rogers, 760 N.W.2d 35, 54 (Neb. 2009). This analysis is a fact-intensive inquiry of the totality of the circumstances, and no one factor is determinative. Id.
¶ 33. Whether a suspect is in police custody is largely determined by whether he is interrogated in a “police-dominated atmosphere.” Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456. A police-dominated atmosphere “results when law enforcement officers take action to fetter the suspect’s freedom of movement during the interrogation,” including isolating the suspect “in an enclosed space.” Pontbriand, 2005 VT 20, ¶ 16. Although the fact that an interview takes place within a police station is not dispositive, it is a factor suggestive of custody. Compare State v. Clark, No. 2003-031, 2003 WL 25745414, at *2 (Vt. June 26, 2003) (unpublished mem.), available at http://www.vermontjudiciary.org/d-upeo/eo03031.aspx (holding that defendant was in custody when questioning occurred in nonpublic area of sheriff’s office), with State v. Peck, No. 2007-080, *742007 WL 5313527, at *2 (Vt. Oct. 18, 2007) (unpublished mem.), available at http://www.vermontjudiciary.org/d-upeo/eo07-080.pdf (holding that defendant was not in custody when questioning occurred in public place during time when public was present).
¶ 34. In addition, the nature of the questioning itself, including the use of leading questions and deceptive police tactics, helps to create a coercive environment. Rogers, 760 N.W.2d at 55 (“[S]urely a reasonable person would conclude he was in custody if the interrogation is close and persistent, involving leading questions and the discounting of the suspect’s denials of involvement.”); see also United States n Axsom, 289 F.3d 496, 500-01 (8th Cir. 2002) (considering “whether strong arm tactics or deceptive strategems were employed during questioning” as a factor which, if present, aggravates the existence of custody (quotation omitted)); People v. Lira, 742 N.E.2d 885, 891 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (treating that “the mood of the interview was that of a serious interrogation” as a factor indicating the defendant was in custody); State v. Bridges, 2003 ME 103, ¶ 30, 829 A.2d 247 (“[The] close and persistent line of interrogation, which involved leading questions and challenged [the suspect’s] denials of involvement, strongly suggests that [the suspect] could not help but believe she was in custody.”).
¶ 35. The majority makes much of the fact that the officers told defendant that he was free to leave. Although the fact that a suspect is told at the outset of an interview that he is free to leave suggests a noncustodial situation, such statements are not determinative of custody. Pontbriand, 2005 VT 20, ¶ 19 (noting that statements by officers that suspect is not under arrest, is not required to talk to them, and is free to go, are “not dispositive” for purposes of determining whether the suspect was in custody); State v. Brunell, 150 Vt. 388, 392, 554 A.2d 242, 244 (1988) (concluding that continued assertions by officers that the defendant was not in custody, “pursuant to their plan to avoid having to give Miranda warnings,” cannot overcome other factors indicating custody); State v. Hassan, 2007 ME 77, ¶ 17, 925 A.2d 625 (concluding that the suspect was in custody despite acknowledging at the outset of the interview that he was there voluntarily when other indicia of custody existed); Bridges, 2003 ME 103, ¶ 28, 829 A.2d 247 (finding that even when officers told suspects they were free to leave, the existence of other factors indicative of custody nonetheless created a custodial situation).
¶ 36. Where the questioning is particularly accusatory or aggressive, statements that the defendant is free to leave become no *75more than rote recitals designed to circumvent a duty to inform a suspect of his Miranda rights. See Brunell, 150 Vt. at 392, 554 A.2d at 244. In Brunell, we concluded that a suspect was in custody despite statements made by police that he was free to refuse to accompany them to the police station for questioning. Id. We held that because the police initiated the encounter, the suspect was driven to the police station in a police cruiser late at night, and the suspect was questioned by two officers in a small room outside the presence of his wife, a reasonable person would not have felt free to actually leave. Id.; see also State v. Jennings, 929 A.2d 982, 987-89 (N.H. 2007) (concluding that suspect was in custody despite officer’s statements otherwise when suspect was “whisked away to the unfamiliar surroundings of the police station” and aggressively questioned behind the closed doors of an interview room); Payne, 149 S.W.3d at 33-35 (concluding that suspect was in custody when aggressive and accusatory questioning took place while the defendant was isolated in an interrogation room within the police station, despite officer’s statement that he could leave). Simply put, there are times when actions speak louder than words.
¶ 37. As the majority correctly states, whether a suspect has confessed to an illegal act and the nature of the illegal act to which he confessed is a widely recognized factor to be considered in determining whether the suspect was in custody. See ante, ¶ 14; see also United States v. Chee, 514 F.3d 1106, 1114 (10th Cir. 2008). This factor, however, is not dispositive. Courts are fairly divided as to the appropriate weight to be given to admissions when determining if custody existed; in addition to the cases cited by the majority where courts have given less weight to the presence of an admission, other courts have decided differently on this question. See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 528 S.E.2d 232, 235 (Ga. 2000) (“A reasonable person in [the defendant’s] position, having just confessed to involvement in a crime in the presence of law enforcement officers would . . . perceive himself to be in custody.”); People v. Carroll, 742 N.E.2d 1247, 1250 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001) (finding that custodial situation began when investigation had become focused exclusively on the defendant and he had inculpated himself in the crime); Ackerman v. State, 774 N.E.2d 970, 978-79 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) (finding that admission of misdemeanor offense of leaving scene of an accident was a factor suggesting that the defendant was in custody); People v. Ripie, *76587 N.Y.S.2d 776, 782 (App. Div. 1992) (finding it “utter sophistry” to suggest that person who had just made an incriminating statement concerning the crime officers were investigating would feel she was free to leave). A consideration of this factor alone does not answer the question before us.
¶ 38. When I consider all of the factors that contribute to the totality of circumstances surrounding defendant’s interrogation, not just defendant’s confession to three apparent misdemeanors, the conclusion is overwhelming that defendant was in custody at 11:26 p.m. Defendant was approached by police. He was driven to the police station in a police cruiser late at night. Upon arriving at the police station, defendant was taken to a small, windowless room where he was questioned by two officers behind a closed door. Questioning that takes place behind the closed doors of a police station, rather than a public area, is precisely the “police-dominated” situation that we have found warrants heightened attention to the presence of possible police coercion. See Clark, 2003 WL 25745414, at *2.
¶ 39. The questioning consisted of two officers consulting a list of dates, times, and details of forty-six fires started in the area over the past year. The officers then used this list to question defendant, incident by incident. During this pressured questioning, the officers spoke over and interrupted both each other and defendant. The officers conducting the interview testified at the suppression hearing that they used fabricated statements such as “we have surveillance videotape of you setting those fires” and “admitting to one fire is no different than admitting to one hundred fires” to elicit more confessions from defendant. The officers also used leading questions to elicit confessions such as, “you wanted to start that little fire, and it got out of hand,” most notably to prompt the sixth confession from defendant.
¶ 40. Under this kind of accusatory and aggressive questioning, a reasonable person in defendant’s position would not have felt able to interrupt the questioning and leave the interview. Instead, the use of such tactics compounded the coercive nature of the encounter such that defendant’s only apparent recourse was to attempt to defend himself by denying wrongdoing. This technique kept him in the interview and forced him to participate in the questioning. This is a police tactic we have seen before; indeed, the use of leading questions and subterfuge to ascertain a confession is not, in and of itself, dispositive of the existence of *77custody. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 495-96 (holding that custody not established despite use of incriminating and fabricated evidence). In conjunction with other indicia of custody, however, the use of such tactics is an important factor in assessing whether the encounter was coercive.
¶ 41. Nor does the fact that defendant was unequivocally told at the outset of the interview that he was free to leave negate any unconstitutional conduct that followed. In this interview, it is obvious that the nature and tenor of the questioning changed dramatically over the course of the interview, effectively negating the assurances that defendant was, in fact, free to walk out the door. See, e.g., State v. Dedrick, 564 A.2d 423, 427 (N.H. 1989) (finding that “sea change” in police demeanor and tenor of interview converted what started as noncustodial encounter to custodial one), abrogated in part on other grounds by State v. Spencer, 826 A.2d 546, 550-51 (N.H. 2003).
¶ 42. Moreover, when the officers reiterated statements made at the outset of the interview that defendant could leave, these “assurances” were followed immediately by such statements as, “we’ve got you coming from the scene of many of these fires”; “it’s important we get everything out on the table all at once”; or “I just want to talk to you a little while longer.” In other words, there was no pause to see whether defendant would take the opportunity to leave because the questioning immediately resumed. For instance, when one officer pointed to the door and asserted “[t]hat door is not locked, [defendant] — you’re free to go,” before defendant could respond, the officer immediately directed the conversation back to the subject matter stating, we “want these fires to stop. We know there’s a reason why you’re starting these fires.” Similarly, during the exchange in which defendant indicated he may want a lawyer present, the officers effectively ignored defendant’s concerns. In fact, defendant was never given an opportunity to actually assert his right to speak with counsel.
¶ 43. Though the officers may have uttered the words “you are free to leave” to defendant, this situation is more akin to the circumstances in Brunell, in which the actions of the officers, including accusatory, late-night questioning at the police station, refuted any verbal assertion that the suspect could leave. 150 Vt. at 392, 554 A.2d at 244.
*78¶ 44. As I noted earlier, the majority directs much attention to the fact that defendant’s first three admissions involved apparent misdemeanors, instead of more serious crimes, in concluding that defendant was not in custody before 12:15 a.m. Ante, ¶¶ 14-15. Although it is likely that an admission to any criminal act — whether a misdemeanor or not — would cause a reasonable person to believe he was unable to terminate police questioning, it is still but one factor to consider. The majority’s focus on this factor to the exclusion of the other factors discussed above results in a narrow analysis that fails to address the totality of the circumstances surrounding the encounter.
¶ 45. Finally, the trial court and the majority create an artificial distinction between the circumstances that existed at 11:26 p.m., when the court found the encounter to be noncustodial, and those that existed at 12:15 a.m., when the trial court found defendant to be in custody. At 11:26 p.m., an officer asked defendant whether he needed someone to pick up his wife from work, indicating to defendant that the questioning was far from over. The officer responded that “I just want to talk to you a little while longer,” followed immediately by “I’m going to ask you a question, and I need you to be 100% honest with this because this is where we’re going to start going up or down with things. And by that I mean, I’m a patient man to a reason, to a point.” The statement that “I just want to talk to you a little while longer” and the context in which it was made is no different from the officer’s statement at 12:15 a.m. — “we’re not done yet” — that the trial court found to mark the beginning of custody. In both of these situations, the officer made it apparent that questioning would continue regardless of defendant’s prior commitments, obligations, or desire to leave.
¶ 46. By attempting to distinguish the dynamics present at 11:26 p.m. from those that existed at 12:15 a.m., the trial court and the majority seem to imply that a suspect is “in custody” only when he explicitly asks to leave and is told in no uncertain terms that he cannot. This narrow definition of custody is contrary to Vermont and federal case law as well as the fundamental notions of justice on which Miranda is premised. To determine whether a suspect is in custody, a trial court is tasked with looking at the totality of the circumstances, upon which, the court must make a determination of whether or not a reasonable person would have felt free to terminate the questioning and leave. Willis, 145 Vt. at *79473-75, 494 A.2d at 115-17. This determination is based on an objective assessment and should not turn on a suspect’s or officer’s subjective view of the situation. Id.; see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (concluding that undisclosed, subjective intent of officer has no bearing on whether suspect is in custody; instead, “the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect’s position would have understood his situation”). That objective assessment does not depend on whether the suspect has attempted to leave and been prevented from doing so. If that were true, there would be no need to consider the' numerous factors that make up the totality of circumstances that we and other courts have historically considered in determining whether a suspect is in custody.
¶47. The totality of the circumstances indicate that defendant was in custody just before his fourth, fifth, and sixth confessions. As a result, defendant should have been advised of his right to remain silent. Because he was not, I would reverse the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to suppress and suppress the three admissions made after 11:26 p.m.9

 The majority has analyzed defendant’s claim under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, see ante, ¶ 8 n.l, and I have responded to that analysis here. Although defendant also raised the issue under Chapter I, Article 10 of the Vermont Constitution, this is not an area of constitutional jurisprudence where we have substantially departed from federal decisions or where there is a choice to be made between different lines of analysis. See In re C.C., 2009 VT 108, ¶ 17, 186 Vt. 474, 987 A.2d 1000 (Johnson, J., concurring). Therefore, I do not separately analyze the Vermont constitutional issue because my dissent and the resulting outcome would be the same.

 On appeal, defendant also argues that his requests for counsel were denied in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. I concur with the majority’s treatment of defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim. Ante, ¶¶ 18-19. Because I would find that defendant was in custody before his fourth, fifth, and sixth confessions and would suppress those confessions on this basis, it is unnecessary to address defendant’s claim that his request for counsel should have caused the officers to immediately cease all questioning.