Court Opinion

ID: 9630841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:22:24.655274+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:44.816995
License: Public Domain

WATANABE, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I disagree with the conclusion of the majority, contained in Part I of the opinion, that “[u]nder rudimentary requirements of due process, Petitioner was entitled to the opportunity to rebut the statement of good cause.” Majority opinion at 136.
The record in this case indicates that Petitioner never requested the issuance of a subpoena, summoning the person who requested the continuance to appear at the hearing. There is also no indication in the transcripts of the administrative revocation hearing that the person who requested the continuance was available to testify at the hearing.
If Petitioner had intended to challenge the “good cause” basis for the continuance, I believe it was incumbent on Petitioner to have the person who requested the continuance present at the hearing. Since Petitioner failed to do so, I cannot agree that the hearing officer abused her discretion in rejecting Petitioner’s challenge to the continuance or that Petitioner’s due process rights were violated.
Moreover, it appears from the record that Petitioner’s primary motivation for wanting to cross-examine the person who requested the continuance was to explore whether Petitioner’s appeal could have been heard on the originally scheduled date by another hearing *370officer or at some other date and time earlier than the rescheduled hearing date. I do not believe that such cross-examination into the nitty-gritty details of the operations of the Administrative Driver’s License Revocation Office (ADLRO) should be allowed.
When a hearing officer notifies the ADL-RO on the morning of a hearing that he or she will be unable to report to work due to sudden illness or a death in the family, quick decisions must be made as to what will happen to the hearing officer’s caseload for that day. Parties whose cases are scheduled to be heard by that hearing officer, as well as their attorneys, must be immediately notified if their cases will be continued, and if so, to what date. It is not always feasible for another hearing officer, who has not prepared for the hearing, to step in as a last-minute substitute for the original hearing officer. It is also not always possible or even practical to rearrange hearings scheduled for subsequent days so as to squeeze additional hearings into existing calendars.
Although a petitioner should be able to challenge whether good cause exists for a continuance, I do not believe that a petitioner should be able to second-guess, in hindsight, whether his or her appeal could have been heard at an earlier date and time.

ORDER DENYING RECONSIDERATION OF OPINION FILED NOVEMBER SO, 1995

Petitioner-Appellant Robert C. Miller (Petitioner) filed a Motion for Reconsideration on December 4, 1995 following our decision in Miller v. Tanaka, 80 Hawai'i 358, 910 P.2d 129 (Haw.App.1995). We granted Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on December 5, 1995 and further ordered Respondent-Appellee Administrative Director of the Courts, State of Hawaii (Respondent) to file an answer to the aforementioned motion for reconsideration. Respondent timely filed its answer on December 18, 1995. We deny Petitioner’s request to amend our opinion.
Petitioner argues that Hawaii District Court Rules of Civil Procedure (DCRCP) Rule 72(i) restricts our disposition of Miller to affirmance or reversal because the district court from which the appeal was taken is restricted to affirming or reversing the administrative ruling. Petitioner relies on DCRCP Rule 72(i), which provides in pertinent part, “[u]pon determination of the petition, the [district] court having jurisdiction shall enter judgment to reverse or affirm the administrative ruling. Such judgment shall be reviewable, or final, as may be provided by law.” (Emphasis added.) DCRCP Rule 72(i) has not been previously construed by an appellate court of our jurisdiction. However, DCRCP Rule 72(i) does provide that the “judgment shall be reviewable, or final, as may be provided by law.” Hence, to determine the reviewability of the district court’s judgment concerning an “administrative ruling,” we examine the statute involved. Cf. County of Hawai'i, v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 77 Hawai'i 396, 885 P.2d 1137 (App.1994).
In Miller, the district court affirmed Petitioner’s driver’s license revocation. Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) chapter 286, Part XIV (1993), which governs the administrative revocation of driver’s licenses by the Administrative Driver’s License Revocation Office (ADLRO), does not specify whether the district court’s judgment is reviewable or final.
The Hawaii Supreme Court confronted the scope of appellate jurisdiction over appeals under HRS chapter 286, Part XIV ADLRO proceedings as one of the issues in Kernan v. Tanaka, 75 Haw. 1, 856 P.2d 1207 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1070, 127 L.Ed.2d 389 (1994). The question in Keman pertinent here was “whether the lack of a statutory provision providing for a further appeal [beyond the district court] is evidence that the legislature did not authorize an appeal beyond the district court level or whether the omission of statutory authority supports a conclusion that the legislature intended the general statutes governing appeals to be applicable.” Id. at 15-16, 856 P.2d at 1215 (citations omitted). Noting that HRS § 641-l(a) provides in part that “ ‘[a]ppeals shall be allowed ... from all final judgments, orders, or decrees of circuit and district courts ... except as otherwise provided by law[,]’ ” the supreme court reasoned that “any district court final judgment, *371order, or decree may be appealed to the supreme court, unless a specific statute provides otherwise.” Id. at 16, 856 P.2d at 1216. The Keman court concluded that “the omission of language specifically providing further appeal to this court does not signal finality at the district court level” because “HRS § 286-260 makes no attempt, by its own terms, to limit the general right of appeal from all final district court judgments as set out in HRS § 641-l(a).” Id. at 17, 856 P.2d at 1216. Consequently, under “HRS §§ 602-5(1) and 641-l(a), jurisdiction properly lies in the [appellate] court to hear and determine appeals from district court judgments after an administrative hearing.” Id.
Thus, in Miller, we vacated and remanded the case, noting that petitioner appealed “under the general jurisdiction statutes[,]” and cited Keman and HRS § 641-l(a) (1993). Miller, 80 Hawai'i at 369, 910 P.2d at 140.
Under the general jurisdiction statutes, appellate courts are empowered, inter alia,
To make or award such judgments, decrees, orders and mandates, issue such executions and other processes, and do such other acts and take such other steps as may be necessary to carry into full effect the powers which are or shall be given to it by law or for the promotion of justice in matters pending before it.
HRS § 602-5(7) (1993). Within this power is the power to remand to the district court. See State v. Arlt, 9 Haw.App. 263, 277, 833 P.2d 902, 910 (1992) (“[s]ince there is no statute or constitutional provision in Hawai'i which specifically vests in the appellate courts the express authority to affirm, reverse, remand, vacate, or set aside any judgment, decree, or order of a court brought before them, such authority presumably derives from [HRS § 602-5(7) ].”). Accordingly, it is evident that under the general jurisdiction statutes, we have the power to remand the district court’s judgment to the district court.
With respect to whether the district court may remand the case to the ADLRO, we note that HRS § 286-260 authorizes judicial review of ADLRO proceedings by the “district court in the district in which the offense occurred[.]” HRS § 286-260(a). The statute does not limit the district court’s dispositions on judicial review to affirmance or reversal other than the following provision in HRS § 286-260(b), that “the court shall affirm the administrative revocation” if a petitioner fails to appear without just cause.
As Respondent argues, our ‘“vacate and remand for further proceedings’ instruction [in Miller, — Hawai'i at -, 910 P.2d at 140] squarely falls within the ... provision of the general statute outlining the district courts’ powers” in HRS § 604-7(e) (1993). HRS § 604-7(e), like HRS § 602-5(7), grants the district court such powers as we have held to encompass the power to remand in Arlt. HRS § 604-7(e) provides as follows:
The several district courts shall have the power to make and award judgments, decrees, orders, and mandates, issue such executions and other processes, and do such other acts ... as may be necessary to carry into full effect the powers which are or shall be given them by law or for the promotion of justice in matters pending before them.
In the absence of a specific provision in HRS chapter 286, Part XIV limiting the manner of the district courts’ dispositions, we conclude that there was no legislative intent to limit these dispositions, such as by remand, ordinarily available to the reviewing courts. Cf. Keman. We hold, therefore, that the district court is vested with jurisdiction under HRS § 604-7(e) to remand the case to the ADLRO for proceedings consistent with our opinion.