Court Opinion

ID: 989412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:06:38.127051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:12:14.377802
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

WILLIE C. CLEMONTS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.                                                                    No. 95-7769

SCOTT WEST,
Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh.
Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge.
(CA-95-879-5-CT-BO)

Submitted: December 29, 1995

Decided: May 29, 1996

Before WILKINSON, Chief Judge, and MURNAGHAN and
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judges.

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Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.

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COUNSEL

Willie C. Clemonts, Appellant Pro Se.

_________________________________________________________________

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________
OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Willie Clemonts appeals the district court's dismissal, pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988), of his lawsuit alleging racial discrimina-
tion in job assignments at the Tillery Correctional Facility. Clemonts
alleged that the farm supervisor, Scott West, gave more favorable job
assignments to white inmates than to blacks. Further, Clemonts stated
that West gave pay raises to white inmates but not to blacks who mer-
ited raises. The district court dismissed the action, observing that Cle-
monts had not identified West's race and concluding that Clemonts
had not made a prima facie showing of a constitutional tort. We
vacate and remand.

Under § 1915(d), a district court may "permit suits that are argu-
ably meritorious and . . . exclude suits that have no arguable basis in
law or in fact." Nasim v. Warden, 64 F.3d 951, 954 (4th Cir. 1995)
(in banc). We review § 1915(d) dismissals for an abuse of discretion.
Id.

Absent a compelling state interest, racial discrimination in prison
job assignments states a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment and of the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974);
Black v. Lane, 824 F.2d 561, 562 (7th Cir. 1987). To establish an
equal protection violation based on racial discrimination in the dele-
gation of job assignments to inmates, a plaintiff must show a discrimi-
natory purpose as the motivating factor; showing that employment
practices have a discriminatory impact on a certain race is not enough.
See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 493 (1977); Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp. , 429 U.S. 252,
265-66 (1977); Foster v. Wyrick, 823 F.2d 218, 221 (8th Cir. 1987).

Clemonts' allegations were sufficient to survive a§ 1915(d) dis-
missal. We think it is obvious from the complaint that Clemonts and
West are of different races. Further, even if they were of the same
race, that would not end the inquiry, for it is entirely possible that an
individual of one race could discriminate against members of his own
race. The focus is on whether the defendant was motivated by a dis-

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criminatory purpose, not on the race of the defendant. See St. Francis
College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 609-10 (1987).

Clemonts claimed that West gave whites more desirable job assign-
ments than blacks. He also claimed discrimination in giving pay
raises. Further, Clemonts claimed that West had made derogatory
slurs against blacks. The lawsuit has an arguable basis in law and in
fact. Accordingly, we conclude that the district court abused its dis-
cretion in dismissing the Complaint pursuant to§ 1915(d).

We therefore vacate the judgment of the district court and remand
for further proceedings. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
The motion for appointment of counsel is denied.

VACATED AND REMANDED

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