Court Opinion

ID: 9632484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:16:36.925965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:52.155503
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON REHEARING
JOSH R. MORRISS, III, Chief Justice.
After we issued our original opinion18 in this case, we received motions for rehearing from both sides. Most of the issues raised in the dueling motions for rehearing are not meritorious and need not be addressed. One issue does merit comment, in that it was not explicitly addressed in our original opinion.
Charles Bishop complains that we did not directly address his conditional complaint that the trial court erred by reducing his fraud-based damage award by the percentage of his negligence. The reduction was based on the application of Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code on proportionate responsibility. Bishop was found thirty percent responsible for his own damages due to his negligence, so the fraud damages were reduced by that percentage. He raises several arguments attacking that damage reduction.
Bishop first argues that Section 33.002 does not apply at all, based on longstanding caselaw consistently holding that negligence is not a defense to fraud. Traditionally, negligence has never been a defense to fraud. See Davis v. Estridge, 85 S.W.3d 308, 311 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2001, pet. denied); McCrary v. Taylor, 579 S.W.2d 347, 349 (Tex.Civ.App.-Eastland 1979, writ refd n.r.e.); S. States Life Ins. Co. v. Newlon, 398 S.W.2d 622, 626 (Tex.Civ. App.-Eastland 1966, writ refd n.r.e.); see also Isenhower v. Bell, 365 S.W.2d 354 (Tex.1963). While the cases do say that negligence is not a complete defense to fraud, they do not address the issue of *117proportional responsibility, a statutory matter.
Further, although McCrary stated explicitly that Article 2212a of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes — the statute which was ultimately recodified as part of Section 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code — applied only to actions based on negligence and declined to apply the statute because the recovery in that lawsuit was based on fraud, the language in that early version of the statute referenced in McCrary explicitly stated that it did not apply to a claim based on an intentional tort. McCrary, 579 S.W.2d at 350. The current statute has no such restriction. See generally Harris v. Archer, 134 S.W.3d 411 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2004, pet. denied) (intentional tort restriction no longer in proportional responsibility statute).
Bishop also argues that an exception that exists in the relevant version of Section 33.002 has the effect of taking this case entirely out of the application of the section, thus allowing his recovery for fraud without reduction for his own negligence. The version of Section 33.002(b)(ll) applicable to this case stated that, notwithstanding subsection (a), a defendant with specific intent to harm others, acting in concert with another person in a manner described in specified Penal Code sections is “jointly and severally hable with such other person for the damages legally recoverable by the claimant that were proximately caused by such conduct.” Subsection (11) refers to the crime of securing execution of document by deception.19 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 32.46 (Vernon Supp.2007).
Bishop argues that, as the fraud findings (and others made by the jury) cover the elements of the crime mentioned above, the exception should apply and exclude the application of proportional responsibility in his situation.
In determining the amount of recovery, Section 33.012 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code provides that the trial court shall reduce the amount of damages to be recovered by a claimant by a percentage equal to the claimant’s percentage of responsibility. Tex. Crv. PRAC. & Rem. Code Ann. § 33.012 (Vernon Supp.2007). In this instance, Bishop’s percentage of responsibility was thirty percent. Section 33.002, which applies to defendants, settling persons, or responsible third parties, provides that a defendant may, in limited situations (specific intent plus acting in concert with another to engage in prohibited conduct), may be jointly and severally liable for the damages legally recoverable. In this instance, the damages legally recoverable are those found by the jury, reduced by thirty percent in accordance with Section 33.012. According to the plain language of Section 33.002 applied to the facts of this case, those reduced damages would still be recoverable by Bishop, but might be damages for which Isaacs would be jointly and severally liable with another. Assuming, without deciding, that the findings of the jury mandate a determination that Isaacs is jointly and severally liable, he would still be liable for the “damages legally recoverable” as determined by the trial court.
We need not determine whether the civil findings made in the trial court are equivalent to formal findings that the stated *118crime occurred, because, even if Section 33.002(b)(ll) applies, it does not eliminate the application of proportional responsibility; it merely provides that co-conspirators will be jointly and severally liable “for the damages legally recoverable.” Because that does not create an exception to proportional responsibility, we conclude that the argument is without merit. This contention on rehearing is overruled.
We overrule the motions for rehearing.

.Isaacs v. Bishop, No. 06-05-00092-CV, 2008 WL 680795, 2008 Tex.App. LEXIS 114, 249 S.W.3d 100 (Tex.App.-Texarkana Jan. 10, 2008, no pet. h.).

. The prior version of the statute applies in this case, as suit was filed before July 1, 2003. Act of May 8, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 136, § 1, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 971, repealed, by Act of June 2, 2003, 78th Leg., R.S., ch. 204, § 4.10(1), 2003 Tex. Gen. Laws 847, 859.