Court Opinion

ID: 9776363
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:31:40.486123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:37.879852
License: Public Domain

DON WITTIG, Justice,
concurring.
The majority correctly sets out the facts and standard of review. My concurrence is by way of amplification only and to note needless prosecutorial misconduct.
In his first point, appellant correctly avers the trial court erred by limiting his voir dire examination. The gist of appellant’s question was whether the jury believed that based on the mere idea appellant was from Columbia, he probably did it. Proper grounds for voir dire examination virtually always include bias or preju*254dice for or against a party.1 The trial court erroneously sustained the State’s objection. However, as found by the majority, the error was waived by appellant’s trial counsel because he refused the opportunity to rephrase the question.2
In appellant’s second point complaining of ineffective assistance of counsel, the prosecutorial misconduct is lost in the backwash of his constitutional complaint. The State’s objection to appellant’s voir dire Columbian connection included relevance. Though irrelevant, the prosecutor twice asked Officer Gomez whether the subject kilos were packaged consistent with a person growing and making it in Columbia. And again the prosecutor queried whether the pressed brick form was done in Columbia. The record does not support these apparently unscrupulous inquiries by the prosecution. After effectively keeping out voir dire questioning on nationality prejudice, the prosecution injects and infects the record with the same self-proclaimed irrelevant prejudice. In final argument, the prosecution inflicted the coup de grace. Once again, without evidence, the prosecution argued it takes lots of people to turn cocaine in Columbia into money here in the United States. The race or nationality of appellant should play no role in the fair administration of justice.3
In Duggan v. State, the Court of Criminal appeals clearly mandated:
It shall be the primary duty of all prosecutors... not to convict, but to see that justice is done. This overriding duty falls upon the prosecutor in his capacity as the State’s representative in criminal matters. As a trustee of the State’ interest in providing fair trials, the prosecutor is obliged to illuminate the court with the truth of the cause, so that the judge and jury may properly render justice. Thus the prosecutor is more than a mere advocate, but a fiduciary to fundamental principles and fairness.4
Other applicable standards are too numerous to name but minimally include: rule 3.04 of the Fairness in Adjudicatory Proceedings,5 rule 3.09 of the Special Responsibilities of a Prosecutor,6 and article 2.01 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.7
Because the accused was facially ineffectively represented, this prosecutorial misconduct went unchallenged.8 Yet as the majority recites, the silent record explaining why defense counsel was asleep at the switch, gives us insufficient justification to overcome the presumption of competence.9

. See Edwards v. State, 882 S.W.2d 493, 494 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no pet.).

. See Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102, 108 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

. See Riascos v. State, 792 S.W.2d 754, 758 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, pet. ref’d).

. 778 S.W.2d 465, 468 (1989) (citations omitted) (citing Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88, 55 S.Ct. 629, 79 L.Ed. 1314 (1935)).

. Tex. State Bar R. art. X, § 3.04, reprinted in Tex.Gov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 1998).

. Tex State Bar R. art. X, § 3.09, reprinted in TexG'ov’t Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A (Vernon 1998).

. TexCode Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 2.01 (Vernon Supp. 199).

. Nor does it appear that the trial judge exercised her mandated duty, under rule 611 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, to exercised control over the mode and order of interrogation of witnesses and presentation of evidence to make the presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth. TexR.Evid. 611.

. See Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).