Court Opinion

ID: 9895551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 18:09:49.079976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:56.606432
License: Public Domain

J-S25041-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  LYDELL JOHNSON                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 129 EDA 2023

           Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 3, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0001127-2012

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                         FILED NOVEMBER 7, 2023

       Lydell Johnson (Appellant) appeals from the order entered in the

Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his Post-Conviction

Relief Act (PCRA)1 petition as untimely. On appeal, he argues the PCRA court

erred when it dismissed his petition without an evidentiary hearing as there

was a genuine issue of material fact regarding the ineffective assistance of

trial counsel. For the following reasons, we affirm.

       The relevant underlying facts are as follows. On September 28, 2011,

around 3:50 p.m., George Jones (George) and some friends, including Phillip

Gillard (Phillip), were at the home of Diane Gillard (Diane) located on the

corner of Ann and Weikel Streets in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. See N.T.,

____________________________________________

1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9545.
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4/15/14, at 172-73, 177-78; N.T., 4/17/14, at 6-7.2 While standing outside

of Diane’s home, one of George’s friends — Shawn Jones (Shawn) — engaged

in a physical altercation nearby.3             N.T., 4/17/14, at 9-10, 16.   George

eventually heard multiple gun shots and began running towards Tulip Street

with Shawn. Id. at 10-11. While on Tulip Street, Shawn was shot in the leg

and George felt “bullets flying past [him, l]ike warm, fast sensations flying

past [his] ear.” Id. at 12-13. Another friend of George took Shawn to the

hospital. Id. at 13-14.

       Meanwhile, responding police officers arrived on the 2900 block of

Weikel Street “within a minute” of shots being fired, and approached Diane’s

home. See N.T., 4/15/14, at 177, 179. While there, they were met by Phillip

and Diane. Diane was lying on the floor after suffering a gunshot wound to

the head. Id. at 177-79.

       That same day, Philadelphia Police Officers Michael Wilson and Prieb4

were on bike patrol when they received a call about gunshots in the area of

____________________________________________

2 The notes of testimony state the following evidence was presented on April

17, 2016. However, this is a typographical error and this portion of trial
occurred on April 17, 2014.

3 George and Shawn are not related. See N.T., 4/17/14, at 7-8 (George
referring to Shawn as a “friend” he has known since he was nine years old).
In the record, Shawn’s name is spelled both “Sean” and “Shawn.” See e.g.
N.T., 4/15/14, at 144; N.T., 4/17/14, at 8-9. George stated in his testimony
Shawn is currently deceased, but the date and cause of his passing are unclear
from the record. See N.T., 4/17/14, at 8.

4 Officer Prieb’s first name is not apparent from the record.

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Ann and Weikel Streets. See N.T., 4/15/14, at 44-45. After speaking with

an eyewitness, the officers located Appellant approximately two blocks away

and arrested him. See id. at 51-53, 58-59, 69-73. At trial, the eyewitness

positively identified Appellant as the shooter. Id. at 71-72. Although the

eyewitness testified that he heard additional gunshots fired “[f]urther away[,]”

he stated he did not see any other shooter. Id.

       Appellant was charged as follows.         At Criminal Docket CP-51-CR-

0001125-2012 (Trial Docket 1125), regarding the Gillard victims, Appellant

was charged with, inter alia, two counts each of attempted murder,

aggravated assault, reckless endangerment of another person (REAP), and

conspiracy, and one count each of carrying a firearm without a license,

persons not to possess a firearm, carrying a firearm on the public streets of

Philadelphia, and possession of an instrument of crime (PIC).5 At Criminal

Docket CP-51-CR-0001127-2012 (Trial Docket 1127), regarding the Jones

victims, Appellant was charged with, inter alia, two counts each of attempted

murder, aggravated assault, and REAP.

       This matter proceeded to a three-day trial on April 15, 2014, where the

Commonwealth presented the evidence as summarized above. On April 23rd,

a jury convicted Appellant at Trial Docket 1125 of two counts each of

aggravated assault and REAP, and one count each of conspiracy, carrying a

____________________________________________

5 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 901(a), 2502(a), 2702(a), 2705, 903, 6106(a)(1), 6105(a)(1),

6108, and 907(a), respectively.

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firearm without a license, persons not to possess a firearm, carrying a firearm

on the public streets of Philadelphia, and PIC. At Trial Docket 1127, Appellant

was convicted of two counts each of aggravated assault and REAP. He was

found not guilty of each of the counts of attempted murder and one count of

conspiracy.     On June 19, 2014, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an

aggregate term of 23 to 46 years’ incarceration. Appellant filed post-sentence

motions only at Trial Docket 1125, alleging, inter alia, his sentence was

excessive and he was provided with after-discovered DNA evidence.         See

Appellant’s    Motion     of Reconsideration of Sentence,   6/27/14, at 1-2

(unpaginated); Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion for a New Trial, 6/27/14, at

1-2 (unpaginated).6        On July 31, 2014, the trial court denied each of

Appellant’s motions. Orders, 7/31/14.7 Appellant did not file a direct appeal

at either trial docket.

       On April 2, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition only at Trial

Docket 1125.       The PCRA court appointed counsel who filed an amended

petition, again only referencing Trial Docket 1125, and requesting that

Appellant’s direct appeal rights be reinstated nunc pro tunc.      Appellant’s

Amended Post-Conviction Relief Act Petition, 3/15/16, at 1-2.      On May 8,
____________________________________________

6As mentioned infra, Trial Docket 1125 was listed in this Court at Appeal
Docket 130 EDA 2023. We take judicial notice of this related record.

7 The order denying Appellant’s post-sentence motion for a new trial, was not

included in the certified record. However, the criminal docket reflects the
court entered an order denying the motion on July 31, 2014. See Criminal
Docket CP-51-CR0001125-2012, at 14.

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2017, the PCRA court granted his petition and on June 7, 2017, Appellant filed

a direct appeal nunc pro tunc at Trial Docket 1125.

       On November 5, 2018, before this Court issued a decision on Appellant’s

direct appeal at Trial Docket 1125, Appellant filed a pro se PCRA petition at

Trial Docket 1127.         See Appellant’s Pro Se PCRA Petition, 11/5/18.   On

November 21st, the PCRA court issued a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its intent

to dismiss the petition due to the pending status of his direct appeal at Trial

Docket 1125.         See Notice Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal

Procedure 907, 11/21/18.            On January 18, 2019, this Court affirmed

Appellant’s judgment of sentence at Docket 1125.          Commonwealth v.

Johnson, 1849 EDA 2017 (unpub. memo. at 1) (Pa. Super. Jan. 18, 2019),

appeal denied, 76 EAL 2019 (Pa. July 31, 2019). Appellant filed a petition for

allowance of appeal, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on July

31, 2019. See id.

       On February 10, 2022, at Trial Docket 1127, the PCRA court appointed

Scott Sigman, Esquire, “for purpose of PCRA.” Order, 2/10/22. On May 6,

2022, Attorney Sigman filed a motion for leave to amend Appellant’s

November 5, 2018, PCRA petition, as well as a proposed amended petition.8

See Appellant’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Petition for Post-Conviction

Collateral Relief Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction Relief Act

____________________________________________

8 The PCRA court did not issue an order granting or denying the motion for

leave to amend.

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(“PCRA”) Filed by [Appellant], 5/6/22; Appellant’s First Amended Petition for

Post-Conviction Collateral Relief Pursuant to the Pennsylvania Post-Conviction

Relief Act (“PCRA”) (Appellant’s PCRA Petition), 5/6/22. Appellant’s sole claim

was that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion

challenging his sentence as unreasonable and excessive.         See Appellant’s

PCRA Petition, 5/6/22, at 4. On both filings, Attorney Sigman referenced both

Trial Dockets 1125 and 1127.

       On November 9, 2022, the PCRA court issued a notice of intent to

dismiss Appellant’s petition without an evidentiary hearing pursuant to

Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907; the court indicated the petition

was untimely filed.      See Notice Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal

Procedure 907, 11/9/22, at 1. Appellant did not file a response and on January

3, 2023, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition.        Appellant filed a

timely notice of appeal at each docket and complied with the PCRA court’s

order to file a concise statement of matters complained of on appeal pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).9 The appeal at Trial Docket 1125 was listed in this Court

at Appeal Docket 130 EDA 2023, and the appeal at Trial Docket 1127 was

listed at Appeal Docket 129 EDA 2023.

       On March 6, 2023, this Court issued a per curiam order at Appeal Docket

130 EDA 2023 directing the parties to, inter alia, address the procedural

history of both Trial Dockets 1125 and 1127, stating:
____________________________________________

9 Appellant’s concise statement listed both Trial Dockets 1125 and 1127.

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             In light of the fact that according to the trial court dockets,
      the November 5, 2018 pro se PCRA petition was filed only at
      [Docket 1127], the May 6, 2022 counseled “PCRA-Amended PCRA
      Petition” was filed at both trial court docket numbers, and there is
      no indication on [Docket 1125] that a PCRA petition was filed prior
      to counsel filing the May 6, 2022 “PCRA-Amended PCRA Petition,”
      both parties are [directed] to address in their briefs the procedural
      history of the PCRA proceedings at [Docket 1125].

130 EDA 2023, Order, 3/6/23, at 2 (unpaginated).

      On March 8, 2023, Appellant filed a praecipe to discontinue his appeal

at Appeal Docket 130 EDA 2023. See 130 EDA 2023, Appellant’s Praecipe to

Discontinue Appeals Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1973, 3/8/23.

      Appellant raises the following claims on appeal at Trial Docket 1127:

      1. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Appellant’s PCRA
         petition] without affording him an evidentiary hearing since
         [Appellant’s] conviction and sentence resulted from the
         ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of
         the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
         process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could
         have taken place?

      2. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Appellant’s PCRA
         petition] without affording him an evidentiary hearing since,
         under the totality of circumstances, there are genuine issues
         concerning material facts and legitimate purposes would be
         served by such hearing?

      3. Whether the [PCRA] court erred in denying [Appellant’s PCRA
         petition] without affording him an evidentiary hearing since
         [Appellant’s] petition makes out a prima facie case warranting
         such hearing where under the totality of circumstances, trial
         counsel provided ineffective assistance that lacked any
         reasonable basis which prejudiced [Appellant]?

Appellant’s Brief at 6-7.

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       Before we may address Appellant’s arguments, we must determine if his

PCRA petition was properly filed.

       The timeliness of a PCRA petition is a jurisdictional requisite.
       [T]he PCRA time limitations implicate our jurisdiction and may not
       be altered or disregarded in order to address the merits of the
       petition. In other words, Pennsylvania law makes clear no court
       has jurisdiction to hear an untimely PCRA petition. The PCRA
       requires a petition, including a second or subsequent petition, to
       be filed within one year of the date the underlying judgment
       becomes final. A judgment of sentence is final at the conclusion
       of direct review, including discretionary review in the Supreme
       Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of
       Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking review.

Commonwealth v. Ballance, 203 A.3d 1027, 1031 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citations, quotation marks, & emphasis omitted); see also 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545(b)(1), (3).

       Here, regarding the present appeal at Trial Docket 1127, Appellant did

not file any post-sentence motions or a direct appeal. Thus, his judgment of

sentence became final at the expiration of time to file a direct appeal —

Monday, July 21, 2014.10 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3) (judgment of sentence

final at the conclusion of time to seek direct review); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (direct

appeal must be filed within 30 days of the imposition of sentence). Generally,

Appellant then had one year from that date — or until July 21, 2015 — to file

____________________________________________

10 The thirtieth day after the trial court imposed Appellant’s sentence fell on

Saturday, July 19, 2014. Accordingly, Appellant had until Monday, July 21st,
in which to file a timely notice of appeal. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1908 (extending
the thirty-day deadline to first non-holiday weekday if the final date falls on a
weekend or holiday).

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a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). He filed the underlying

petition on November 5, 2018 — over three years later — and as such, it is

facially untimely.

      The PCRA, however, allows a defendant to file a petition after this period

where they plead and prove one of the following timeliness exceptions:

      (i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
      interference by government officials with the presentation of the
      claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
      or the Constitution or laws of the United States;

      (ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown to
      the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the exercise
      of due diligence; or

      (iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was recognized
      by the Supreme Court of the United States or the Supreme Court
      of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in this section and
      has been held by that court to apply retroactively.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii).     A petition pleading any of the above

exceptions must be filed within one year of the date the claim could have been

presented. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).

      Appellant does not plead or prove any of the above timeliness

exceptions in either his pro se petition or amended counseled petition. See

Appellant’s Pro Se PCRA Petition, 11/5/18, at 3; see generally Appellant’s

PCRA Petition, 5/6/22. We note that in his, pro se filing, Appellant checked

boxes indicating his petition qualified for the governmental interference and

newly discovered evidence timeliness exceptions, but he provided no

elaboration to support this assertion. See Appellant’s Pro Se PCRA Petition,

11/5/18, at 3. In his amended counseled petition, Appellant simply asserts

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that his petition is timely. See Appellant’s PCRA Petition, 5/6/22, at 2, 4. The

PCRA court opines, and we agree, Appellant’s petition is untimely, he failed to

plead and prove any of the timeliness exceptions, and therefore, neither the

PCRA court, nor this Court, has jurisdiction to review his claims.          See

Balance, 203 A.3d at 1031; PCRA Ct. Op., 2/1/23, at 5-7. As such, we affirm

the court’s order on this basis.

      Though Appellant withdrew his appeal at Trial Docket 1125, we note

that the November 5, 2018, PCRA petition would have been untimely filed at

that docket as well. At Trial Docket 1125, Appellant filed a nunc pro tunc

direct appeal, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence on January 18,

2019, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on

July 31, 2019. As such, his judgment of sentence became final on October

29, 2019 — 90 days after the Supreme Court denied review. See 42 Pa.C.S.

§ 9545(b)(3); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13(1) (requiring the filing of a petition for writ of

certiorari within 90 days of entry of judgment).      He then would have had

generally one year — or until October 29, 2020 — to file a timely PCRA

petition.

      While Appellant asserts he filed a timely PCRA petition on November 5,

2018, his argument fails for two reasons.      See Appellant’s PCRA Petition,

5/6/22, at 2, 4. First, his prior nunc pro tunc direct appeal at Trial Docket

1125 was still under review when he filed the November 5th pro se petition.

Thus, the PCRA court had no jurisdiction to contemplate a petition filed at that

docket.     See Commonwealth v. Smith, 244 A.3d 13, 16-17 (Pa. Super.

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2020) (“If a [PCRA] petition is filed while a direct appeal is pending, the PCRA

court should dismiss it without prejudice towards the petitioner’s right to file

a petition once his direct appeal rights have been exhausted.”) (citation

omitted).   Second, his November 5th pro se petition only referenced Trial

Docket 1127. See Appellant’s Pro Se PCRA Petition, 11/5/18, at 1. It was

not until Appellant filed the counseled “amended” petition on May 6, 2022 —

approximately two and a half years after his judgment of sentence became

final — that he referenced Trial Docket 1125. See Appellant’s PCRA Petition,

5/6/22, at 1. Thus, the “amended” petition was actually the first petition he

filed at this docket, and it was untimely. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). As

such, the PCRA court correctly determined it was also without jurisdiction to

review his petition at this docket. See Ballance, 203 A.3d at 1031; PCRA Ct.

Op., 2/1/23, at 5-7.

      Moreover, we note that even if Appellant had filed a timely PCRA at

either docket, he would not be entitled to relief. Each of his claims asserts

the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing.

See Appellant’s Brief at 18, 26. The decision to hold an evidentiary hearing

is within the discretion of the PCRA court and will not be reversed absent an

abuse of that discretion. See Commonwealth v. Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617

(Pa. 2015).

      It is well settled that “[t]here is no absolute right to an evidentiary
      hearing on a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine
      from the record that no genuine issues of material fact exist, then
      a hearing is not necessary.” [T]o obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s
      decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an appellant must

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       show that he raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in
       his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court
       otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing.”

Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations

omitted).

       Though he purports to present three claims on appeal, all three issues

merely assert the PCRA court erred in dismissing his petition without an

evidentiary hearing.        See Appellant’s Brief at 18-26.        He argues his

ineffectiveness claim established issues of material fact and had merit because

counsel failed to file a post-sentence motion challenging his sentence, there

was no reasonable basis to do so, and as a result, he was prejudiced. See id.

at 25-26.

       The PCRA court concluded, and we agree, that Appellant did not present

meritorious claims. See PCRA Ct. Op. at 5. While trial counsel did not file a

post-sentence motion at Docket 1127,11 Appellant failed to demonstrate “he

raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor, would have

entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise abused its discretion in

denying a hearing.” See Maddrey, 205 A.3d at 328 (citations omitted). The

basis of his purported post-sentence motion would have been that the court

failed to place “sufficient” reasons on the record before imposing his sentence,

which was above the aggravated range.              See Appellant’s Brief at 25-26.
____________________________________________

11 As we explained supra, trial counsel did file a post-sentence motion seeking

reconsideration of Appellant’s sentence at Trial Docket 1125. See Appellant’s
Motion of Reconsideration of Sentence, 6/27/14, at 1-2 (unpaginated). This
does not impact our review.

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However, our review reveals the trial court did explicitly state the

“aggravating factors” it found on the record at the sentencing hearing. See

N.T., 6/19/14, at 35 (trial court stating “[t]he aggravating factors are as

follows: The shooting. . . was an open-fire shooting in a residential

neighborhood with people on the street. There is testimony that there were

children outside. There is further testimony . . . that there is a school nearby.

There were people on the street, a residential neighborhood. [Also,] bullets

did make contact. People were injured from this shooting.”). Thus, Appellant

did not establish the court abused its discretion in denying Appellant a hearing

before dismissing his petition.

      In conclusion, because Appellant’s petition is facially untimely and he

did not plead and prove any exception to the PCRA’s time-bar, no relief is due.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 11/7/2023

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