Court Opinion

ID: 9648092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:01:58.344577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:56.132784
License: Public Domain

REID, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent because, in my opinion, the Court’s decision denies those persons oppressed by the negligent conduct of public officials an effective means of vindicating the violation of them civil rights; and, also, because the opinion permits a defendant in a criminal case to compromise the prosecution of that case by commencing a civil action for damages against the prosecuting attorney and others prior to the conclusion of the criminal proceedings.
I agree with the holding by the Court that, pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(l)(N), a cause of action for the negligent deprivation of a constitutional right, triable in the claims commission, did exist in Tennessee prior to the date on which that statute was amended.1
I do not agree that the causes of action in this case accrued prior to October 28, 1988, the date on which the State dismissed the criminal actions against the claimants, and were, as held by the majority, barred by the statute of limitations when the claims were filed.
*424I
Claimant Paul Shell was the minister of the Georgian Hills Baptist Church in Memphis, claimant Betty Stimpson was the director of the day care center operated by the church, and claimant Jeff Stimpson was employed by the day care center on a part-time basis. In early 1984, claims were made that children at the center were being sexually abused. The Shelby County District Attorney General’s office, under the direction of Phyllis Gardner, an assistant district attorney, began an investigation of the charges. Gardner headed a “task force” which included personnel from various government agencies.
Based on the results of the investigation, the grand jury, in May 1985, returned indictments charging Shell, Betty Stimpson, and Jeff Stimpson on several counts of sexual abuse. However, despite several trials, none of the claimants were convicted. More than three years later, on October 28, 1988, after Jeff Stimpson had been acquitted on four counts of aggravated rape, the district attorney general dismissed all remaining charges.
On October 17,1989, Betty and Jeff Stimp-son filed claims with the division of claims administration, pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(1)(D) and (N). The claimants alleged that the assistant district attorney general had deprived them of their constitutional rights to due process of law because of her negligence in handling the investigation and prosecution of the cases. The claimants do not contest the State’s claim that as to her prosecutorial functions Gardner had immunity. They insist, however, that she continued to act in an investigative and advisory capacity until the charges had been dismissed. Specifically, the Stimpsons alleged that Gardner disseminated the names of alleged victims to private attorneys, thereby causing the Stimpsons and the day care center to be bombarded with civil lawsuits; used improper interviewing techniques which pressured children into reporting to the investigators and the grand jury that they had been sexually abused; negligently failed to provide exculpatory evidence to the grand jury; negligently destroyed tapes of interviews with the children, which would have been useful by the defense at trial; negligently reported false information to other members of the district attorney general’s office, the trial judge, and the public at large; and thereby violated their rights under the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section 8 of the Tennessee Constitution. The complaint alleges that the acts were committed during the period of time commencing in June of 1984 and ending on October 28, 1988. It further alleges that the acts were committed by the assistant district attorney general in a “negligent and grossly negligent manner.”
Shell filed his complaint which was based on the same grounds, on October 27, 1989. The claims were transferred to the Claims Commission pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8^402(c). The Claims Commission dismissed the claims, holding that the actions accrued prior to October 17, 1988, and were barred by the one-year statute of limitations. T.C.A. § 28-3-104.
II
Since the case is before the Court on the State’s plea of the statute of limitations, the date on which the causes of action accrued is the critical fact. The nature of the cause of action asserted in the complaint and the elements thereof, determine when the causes of action accrued, and, therefore, the date on which the time for initiating the actions expired.
The claimants contend that favorable termination of criminal proceedings is essential to their causes of action, therefore, their claims did not accrue until they had been vindicated by the dismissal of the indictments on October 28, 1988.2
*425The majority finds that “the issue of when this cause of action accrued is to be determined by reference to generally applicable principles of negligence law,” (Majority Opinion, p. 420) and apparently holds that the causes of action accrued on the date the wrongful actions occurred. (Majority Opinion, p. 422).3
For present purposes, the important point in the majority opinion is that the dismissal of the criminal proceedings has no bearing on when the causes of action accrued. The majority treats the dismissal of the indictments as though it were an unrelated event, like the claimants being involved in an automobile accident with the prosecutor.
Ill
Since the claims allowed against the State under Section 9-8-307 include various causes of action in contract and in tort, there is no single limitation of action applicable to all claims made pursuant to that statute. However, the disputed issue in this case is not the applicable statute of limitations, but the date on which the causes of action accrued. Claims pursuant to T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(I)(N) must be brought within one year. T.C.A. § 28-3-104; Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1947, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). The applicable period of limitations commences to run only when the particular cause of action asserted has accrued. In each case, it is necessary that the precise nature of the cause of action alleged be examined in order to determine when the cause of action accrued, and, therefore, when the statutory time within which suit may be filed commenced. This Court has not considered the elements of a cause of action for the negligent deprivation of a constitutional right, nor has it determined when the cause of action accrues. In Swauger v. Haury & Smith Contractors, Inc., 512 S.W.2d 261, 262 (Tenn.1974), this Court stated,
the applicable statute of limitations in a particular cause will be determined according to the gravamen of the complaint.
The gravamen of the complaint, therefore, determines when the action accrues and when the applicable statute starts to run.
The gravamen of the complaint is stated explicitly in the statute, the negligent deprivation of constitutional rights. Since negligence is the breach of a legal duty of care, the breach by a state official or employee of a duty of care imposed upon such person by the state or federal constitution constitutes a cause of action under Section 9-8-307(a)(l)(N). Tennessee courts have recognized such duty, its breach, and the resulting cause of action in only two cases. In Bryson v. State, 793 S.W.2d 252, 255 (Tenn.1990), this Court stated:
The State insists that the claim does not sound either in negligence or in contract. T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(l)(N) (Supp.1988) gives the Commission the authority to hear claims arising from the negligent deprivation of statutory or constitutional rights. The Tennessee Department of Corrections is required by statute to furnish medical care to prisoners in its custody. As an inmate in a state correctional institution, Mr. Bryson had the statutory right to receive medical treatment at the State’s expense. It follows that the Tennessee Claims Commission, under T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(l)(N), has jurisdiction to decide a claim brought by Mr. Bryson for deprivation for that statutory right.
In Computer Shoppe, Inc. v. State, 780 S.W.2d 729 (Tenn.App.1989), the Court of Appeals recognized the possibility of a cause of action under Section 9-8-307(a)(l)(N), based on the State’s negligence in issuing an *426invitation to bid for certain computer equipment. However, neither of these cases is helpful in determining the issue before this Court, when the cause of action accrues.
Since the causes of action which may be brought under Section 9-8-307(a)(1)(N) are those for which immunity was waived by the legislature to provide a substitute for actions in negligence in federal courts pursuant to Section 1983, review of comparable cases under Section 1983 is instructive in determining when the causes of action accrued and the applicable period of one year- began to run.
The United States Supreme Court had no occasion to discuss the determination of the applicable limitation of actions in either Parrratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981) or Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). However, in Albright v. Oliver, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994), in one of three concurring opinions, the issue was discussed. In that case, Albright was arrested on a charge which the trial court later found did not state an offense under state law. According to the facts as alleged in the complaint, it was clear that the defendant police officer knew or^ should have known that he did not have probable cause to arrest Albright. Albright filed a suit under Section 1983, alleging that the police officer deprived him of his right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from criminal prosecution except upon probable cause. The dismissal of the suit was affirmed by the Supreme Court upon a finding that Al-bright’s claimed right to be free from prosecution without probable cause must be judged under the Fourth Amendment rather than the substantive due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, Justice Ginsburg, analyzing the allegations under the Fourth Amendment, which was not pleaded by the plaintiff, stated:
Once it is recognized, however, that Al-bright remained effectively “seized” for trial so long as the prosecution against him remained pending, and that Oliver’s testimony at the preliminary hearing, if deliberately misleading, violated the Fourth Amendment by perpetuating the seizure, then the limitations period should have a different trigger. The time to file the § 1983 action should begin to run not at the start, but at the end of the episode in suit, ie., upon dismissal of the criminal charges against Albright. See McCune v. Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 908 (CA6 1988) (Guy, J., concurring in result) (“Where ... innocence is what makes the state action wrongful, it makes little sense to require a federal suit to be filed until innocence or its equivalent is established by the termination of the state procedures in a manner favorable to the state criminal defendant.”). In sum, Albright’s Fourth Amendment claim, asserted within the requisite period after dismissal of the criminal action, in my judgment was neither substantively deficient nor inevitably time-barred.
Id. - U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 816 (Ginsburg, J. concurring).
Justice Ginsberg’s reasoning is applicable to the case before the Court. The prosecution was dismissed prior to conviction. The basis for the State’s wrongful prosecution of the claimants was the negligent acts of the state officer. The claimants’ innocence is what made the state action, the criminal prosecution based on Gardner’s negligence, wrongful. That innocence, or its equivalent, was not established until the criminal prosecution was terminated, and was, as noted by Justice Ginsberg in Albright, most relevant to the civil action asserted by the claimants.
In Dunn v. State of Tennessee, 697 F.2d 121 (6th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1086, 103 S.Ct. 1778, 76 L.Ed.2d 349 (1983), a civil action for damages based on the constitutional right against unreasonable searches was found to be analogous in principle to a civil action for malicious prosecution. In that case, which was an action under Section 1983 against two police officers, the plaintiff alleged that he had been deprived of his constitutional rights by being arrested and prosecuted for attempting to exercise the right to be free from unreasonable searches. The court stated the issue:
The narrow issue raised here is whether plaintiffs 1983 action “accrued” under this statute upon the date when Dunn success*427fully defended the criminal charges against him in the Tennessee Court.
Id. at 126 (citations omitted). And the court stated its finding:
this Court finds that favorable termination of the prior criminal proceeding marks the point at which a 1983 claim for malicious prosecution accrues.
Id. at 126-27 (citing to other jurisdictions finding that constitutional claims brought under Section 1983 which are essentially criminal prosecution claims, require that the criminal proceedings be terminated before the civil action is brought).
In Morrison v. Jones, 551 F.2d 939 (4th Cir.1977), an action was brought against a county and several of its police officers to recover damages for the deprivation of constitutional rights on the allegation that the police officers had maliciously conspired to prosecute the plaintiff. The district court dismissed the suit upon finding that, though brought within one year from the date the charges had been dismissed, it was barred because the cause of action had accrued on the date the plaintiff had been arrested. The circuit court reversed, holding that
Since federal law does not define the elements of the claim, we adopt the common law rule that favorable termination of the proceedings is essential. Consequently, the claim does not accrue until the proceedings are terminated.
Id. at 940-41 (citations omitted).
Allowing a defendant in a criminal prosecution to file a Section 1983 action for damages prior to the favorable conclusion of the criminal proceeding, may result in “ ‘the creation of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical transactions.’” Heck v. Humphrey, — U.S. -, -, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 2371, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994) (quoting 8 S. Speiser, C. Krause, & A. Gans, American Law of Torts § 28:5, p. 24 (1991)). In that case, in which the criminal prosecution had proceeded to conviction, the United States Supreme Court held there can be no cause of action for damages based on an alleged unconstitutional conviction until the conviction has been invalidated. In Heck v. Humphrey, the plaintiff claimed that the defendants, acting under color of state law, had engaged in unlawful acts that had led to his arrest and conviction, which conviction was affirmed by the state supreme court. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of a Section 1983 complaint for damages. The Court held that,
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiffs action, even if successful, wall not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit. (Footnotes omitted).
The Court noted that “[j]ust as a cause of action for malicious prosecution does not accrue until the criminal proceedings have terminated in the plaintiffs favor, ... so also a § 1983 cause of action for damages attributable to an unconstitutional conviction or sentence does not accrue until the conviction or sentence has been invalidated.” Id. — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2374. See also McCune v. Grand Rapids, 842 F.2d 903, 908 (6th Cir.1988) (Guy, J., concurring in result) (“[i]f vindication is necessary to your claim, you have no claim until you are vindicated”).
Recently, a judgment of the Second Circuit Couid of Appeals was vacated by the United *428States Supreme Court because, contrary to Heck v. Humphrey, it held that a plaintiffs cause of action for a civil rights violation accrued on the date of his arrest rather than the date his conviction was vacated. Woods v. Candela, 13 F.3d 574 (2nd Cir.1994), vacated, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 44, 130 L.Ed.2d 5 (1994). Under Heck, the plaintiff in a Section 1983 action for damages must show the criminal conviction has been invalidated if a judgment in the plaintiffs favor would necessarily imply that the conviction was invalid. That holding, on principle, is precisely applicable to the case before the Court.
On the motion to dismiss, the Court in this case must assume that the proof would support the allegations that the state officer withheld and destroyed exculpatory evidence and that her negligent conduct “proximately caused claimant to suffer a deprivation of rights and to be subjected to abuse of process by false and recklessly prepared indictments and prosecutions.” That proof necessarily would imply the invalidity of any conviction or sentence which might have been imposed upon the claimants in the criminal proceedings creating the result condemned by Heck — two conflicting judicial resolutions arising out of the same transaction. That the criminal prosecution of the claimants terminated by dismissal of the indictments rather than by post-conviction invalidation of convictions is of no consequence. Cf. Albright v. Oliver, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 810. The significant principle is that the civil action does not accrue unless and until the criminal proceeding has been terminated favorably to the criminal defendant, civil plaintiff.
The cause of action alleged in the case before the Court is similar to those actions brought under Section 1983 in which the federal courts have found the cause of action does not accrue until the claimant has been absolved of any criminal liability. I find these cases persuasive, especially Justice Ginsberg’s analysis in Albright v. Oliver, supra at -, 114 S.Ct. at 812, and the rationale and holding of Heck v. Humphrey, supra — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2371-72.
The first significant effect of the Court’s decision in this case is that it allows, actually compels, the defendant in a criminal case to commence and prosecute a civil action for damages while defending the criminal prosecution. These simultaneous criminal and civil proceedings will present conflicting and disruptive issues and even inconsistent results.
Another effect of the Court’s decision is that requiring a criminal defendant to file a claim for damages before the conviction has been invalidated, as a practical matter, will defeat the civil cause of action. Since most criminal prosecutions are not completed within one year, the time within which a civil action for damages must be filed, a person being prosecuted would have the Hobson’s choice of energizing the prosecution by filing a suit for damages against the state official or employee acting under color of state law, or allowing the time to pass without filing suit and thereby lose the cause of action for damages. Few will assert the right to damages at the risk of their freedom. Consequently, the remedy for the negligent deprivation of constitutional and statutory rights is, under the majority decision, illusory. The statute was designed to protect the rights of those who are oppressed by official neglect of duty. Justice Souter noted the history of Section 1983, for which T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(l)(N) was enacted as an alternative proceeding, as the Ku Klux Act,
enacted in part out of concern that many state courts were “in league with those who were bent upon abrogation of federally protected rights.”
Heck v. Humphrey, — U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 2380 (Souter, J., concurring). The Court’s decision in this case will impede rather than facilitate the protection of those rights.
IV
In summary, I dissent because the majority opinion will allow the integrity of a criminal proceeding to be compromised by a simultaneous civil action and because, effectively, it will deny any remedy for the deprivation of the rights that the statute was enacted to protect.
*429I would hold that the cause of action in this case accrued upon dismissal of the charges and remand the case to the trial court.

. T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(l)(N) (1992), as amended in 1989 (Acts of 1989, Chapter 491, Section 1) still permits claims against the State for "negligent deprivation of statutory rights.” Consequently, the Court’s opinion in this case is not limited to constitutional claims under that statute which arose prior to the 1989 amendment. Further, I would express no opinion as to the validity of the rationale which the state contends prompted the repeal of that portion of T.C.A. § 9-8-307(a)(l)(N) which referred to constitutional rights. Relief was denied in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 68 L.Ed.2d 420 (1981), because “the state of Nebraska has provided respondent with the means by which he can receive redress for the deprivation. The
State provides a remedy to persons who believe they have suffered a tortious loss at the hands of the State.” Parratt, 451 U.S. 527, 101 S.Ct. at 1917. In Daniels v. Williams, the Court noted:
Accordingly, we need not decide whether, as petitioner contends, the possibility of a sovereign immunity defense in a Virginia tort suit would render that remedy “inadequate" under Parratt and Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984).
474 U.S. 327, 332, n. 1, 106 S.Ct. 662, 666, n. 1 (1986). The Court also stated,
this case affords us no occasion to consider whether something less than intentional conduct, such as recklessness or "gross negligence,” is enough to trigger the protections of the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 334, n. 3, 106 S.Ct. at 667, n. 3. In Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tennessee, 814 F.2d 277, 282-283 (6th Cir.1987), the Sixth Circuit held that "gross negligence” or "reckless indifference” may establish a violation of the Due Process Clause. But see Lewellen v. Metro Gov’t of Nashville, 34 F.3d 345, 350-51 (6th Cir.1994).

. The claimants also allege that the negligent conduct continued through the year preceding the filing of the complaint. However, neither the dates on which the civil actions against them were filed nor the dates on which false information was disseminated are stated specifically in the complaint. The complaint does state that the allegations cover negligent acts which spanned a period of time up to the dismissal of the criminal charges on October 28, 1988, thereby occurring within the limitations period. Under Rule 12 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, applica*425ble to proceedings before the Tennessee Claims Commission pursuant to Rule 03101 — 1—.01 of the Rules of the Tennessee Claims Commission, allegations of negligent acts within the limitations period are sufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss grounded on the statute of limitations. Cook v. Spinnaker's of Rivergate, Inc., 878 S.W.2d 934, 938 (Tenn.1994). Nevertheless, the claimants' position on appeal is that the causes of action accrued upon the dismissal of the indict-merits, rather than any later date. Consequently, that is the only issue before the Court.

. However, this is not consistent with the Court’s subsequent caveat, "we do not hold that any possible cause of action for prosecutorial misconduct — such as a § 1983 action invariably accrues upon the return of an indictment.” (Majority opinion, p. 422; see also pp. 417, 420.)