Court Opinion

ID: 9489368
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:14:08.209191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:29.658287
License: Public Domain

PAUL KELLY, Jr., Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1) provides:
Subject to subsection (b), any court of the United States may authorize the commencement, prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or appeal therein, without prepayment of fees or security therefor, by a person who submits an affidavit that includes a statement of all assets such prisoner possesses that the person is unable to pay such fees or give security therefor. Such affidavit shall state the nature of the action, defense or appeal and affiant’s belief that the person is entitled to redress.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1), as amended by, Pub.L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, § 804(a) (April 26, 1996). The issue we must address is whether the further restrictions concerning prisoners who “bring a civil action or appeal a judgment in a civil action or proceeding,” § 1915(a)(2) & (g), or a prisoner who “brings a civil action or files an appeal in forma pauperis,” § 1915(b)(1), or prisoners “bringing a civil action or appealing a civil ... judgment,” § 1915(b)(4), apply to prisoners who file petitions for a writ of mandamus. These further restrictions are found in sections following the general rule contained in § 1915(a)(1).
Section 1915(a)(1) plainly allows a court of appeals to waive fees associated with a petition for writ of mandamus because such is the “commencement or prosecution” of a “suit, action or proceeding” that is “civil.” The subsequent use of “bringing a civil action” in the remaining sections of § 1915 is merely an abbreviation, rather than an effort to limit the balance of the statute to original proceedings in the district court and appeals in the court of appeals. Moreover, given that a petition for writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) and Fed. R.App. P. 21(a) generally is antecedent to an appeal and in *421aid of our appellate jurisdiction, see FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 603-04, 86 S.Ct. 1738, 1742-43, 16 L.Ed.2d 802 (1966); Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass’n, 319 U.S. 21, 25, 63 S.Ct. 938, 941, 87 L.Ed. 1185 (1943), such a petition is probably within the scope of an “appeal therein,” i.e. an appeal of civil judgment, as used in the statute. Given the extraordinary nature of mandamus relief and the frequency with which it is unsuccessfully requested by prisoners, this interpretation is faithful to the purpose of the statute. I thus concur with the court that Mr. Green is required to comply with the current in forma pauperis requirements because a petition for writ of mandamus comes within the reach of the amended statute. Therefore, I would dismiss this petition without prejudice.
I dissent from that part of the court’s disposition which goes further and resolves the matter under § 1915(g). I see no need to reach the issue at this point. Only if Mr. Green elects to refile his petition (without paying the filing fee) in compliance with the other provisions of § 1915, should the court, with the benefit of an adversarial presentation, consider the important constitutional, legal and factual issues inherent in barring Mr. Green from filing in forma pauperis via § 1915(g). With all due respect to the court, without having heard from Mr. Green (or anyone else) on this issue, I simply do not think that we have enough to go on.