Court Opinion

ID: 9471221
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:27:08.855309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:18.361906
License: Public Domain

FAIRCHILD, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
This appeal presents a number of issues involving the Federal Labor Relations Authority’s (“FLRA”) interpretation of its enabling legislation, the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Act (“FSLMRA”), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (Supp. III 1979). The majority does not address many of these issues. Judge Bauer holds instead that IRS proposals to accommodate sixty-two workers in space that formerly held fifty workers does not constitute “a material change in conditions of employment” and therefore the FLRA erred in ordering the agency to negotiate over the change. He contends that holding the IRS proposal to be a “material change” would compel cumbersome negotiations whenever an agency proposed “employee transfers or office modifications.” Such a result, he suggests, would be contrary to Congress’ mandate that FLRA interpret its enabling statute “in a manner consistent with the requirements of an effective and efficient Government.” 5 U.S.C. § 7101(b) (Supp. Ill 1979). Judge Flaum concurs in this last suggestion only, arguing that a balancing of IRS costs with “compensating benefits” on the facts before us require our finding FLRA’s bargaining order to be “inconsistent with the requirement of effective and efficient government.”
Because I am unable to hold that FLRA’s order to negotiate was “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976), I respectfully dissent.
The requirement that a proposal cause a “material change in working conditions” be*1179fore a bargaining order will issue was recognized by FLRA in National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1363 and Headquarters, U.S. Army Garrison, Yongsan, Korea, 8 F.L.R.A. 39 (1982). In that case FLRA upheld the denial of a bargaining order over the Army’s announced policy to require its employees to pay for services provided by military installations in United States dollars rather than Korean currency. FLRA agreed with General Counsel that because employees earned their salaries in United States dollars the Army’s “directive affected no material change in conditions of employment,” and no duty arose to bargain over the policy.
There is no indication on this record that IRS argued before the Administrative Law Judge or FLRA that its proposed changes were immaterial; it is unclear then whether the issue is preserved for our consideration on appeal. See Garment Workers v. Quality Mfg. Co., 420 U.S. 276, 281 n. 3, 95 S.Ct. 972, 975 n. 3, 43 L.Ed.2d 189 (1975); Federal Power Com. v. Colorado Interstate Gas Co., 348 U.S. 492, 493-501, 75 S.Ct. 467, 468-472, 99 L.Ed. 583 (1955). Assuming the issue is preserved, the Local 1363 holding is not obviously applicable to the IRS proposals at issue. Neither the facts nor general language of Local 1363 provides guidance. In that case FLRA specifically found the Army’s new policy of accepting only American currency would have no impact on employees who were paid in American dollars. In contrast, there is no question that the IRS proposals to renovate its offices would cause at least some real change in the working conditions of its employees. The Administrative Law Judge found that:
The management proposals ... affected the following four areas of the office:
(1)Office space of four (4) employee work stations along the West perimeter of the office would be displaced to accommodate four conference rooms. The four displaced employees would be squeezed into smaller stations with approximately twelve other employees along the West and North outer perimeters of the office, whose work stations would, likewise, be diminished in size;
(2) The “Horseshoe Area” on the North side of the office, then containing three Appeals Aids stations and four Appeals Officer stations, would be completely gutted and reorganized to accommodate nine Appeals Officer stations and four stations for Legal Research Assistants in the same amount of space;
(3) The “Inner Core” area on the South side of the elevator lobby would be reorganized to accommodate three (3) records clerks in addition to the five already located in that space; and
(4) Three (3) Appeals Aids displaced from the “Horseshoe Area” by changes described in (2) above, would be dispersed to other areas of the office and removed from immediate physical proximity to their supervisors.
Judge Bauer concludes that “the changes initiated by the IRS were minor changes which cannot trigger the duty to negotiate.” But it is FLRA that has been entrusted in the first instance “with the responsibility to define the proper subjects for collective bargaining, drawing upon its expertise and understanding of the special needs of public sector labor relations.” Library of Congress v. FLRA, 699 F.2d 1280 (D.C.Cir.1983). See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7105(a)(2) (E), 7117 (Supp. III 1979).
Judge Bauer finds support for his holding that the IRS proposals involve only minor, non-negotiable changes in the FSLMRA’s “mandate that its provisions be interpreted in a manner consistent with the requirements of an efficient government.” See 5 U.S.C. § 7101(b) (Supp. III 1979). Judge Flaum apparently argues that § 7101(b) required FLRA to interpret the FSLMRA as generally precluding bargaining over theIRS proposals at issue in this case. FLRA has by its order, however, indicated that it interprets the FSLMRA as compelling negotiations of the IRS proposals and finds this result to be consistent with effective and efficient government. On appellate review, this court must show “great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration.” Zenith Radio Corp. v. United States, 437 U.S. 443, 450, 98 S.Ct. 2441,
*11802445, 57 L.Ed.2d 337 (1977) (quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1,16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965)). Accordingly, the Authority’s interpretation of the FSLMRA must be deferred to “unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong.” National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1451 v. FLRA, 652 F.2d 191, 193 (D.C.Cir.1981). See also National Treasury Employees Union v. FLRA, 691 F.2d 553, 557 (D.C.Cir.1982) (“we should adopt [FLRA’s] interpretation if it is reasonably defensible and there is no compelling indication of error”).
There is no question that imposing a duty to negotiate upon a federal agency may create delays in implementing its policies and additional costs may result. The FSLMRA recognizes, however, that labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest. 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a) (Supp. Ill 1979). The Act leaves it to FLRA “to reconcile collective bargaining with the distinctive needs of government employment.” American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, Local 2782 v. FLRA, 702 F.2d 1183, 1185 (D.C.Cir.1983).
The current dispute presented FLRA with the task of reconciling the value of collective bargaining over office alterations having a substantial impact on employees with an agency’s need to effect changes in its operation. I am unable to hold that the resolution reached by FLRA in favor of negotiation of the IRS proposals was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious or otherwise not in accordance with law.
Although the majority did not decide the matter on the IRS contentions, I would also defer to FLRA’s determination that the proposed changes were not “technological” in nature, that the union’s proposals were within the scope of those changes, and that a remand is not required where IRS already received ample opportunity to present evidence. I therefore respectfully dissent.