Court Opinion

ID: 9541493
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:25:58.530262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:59.283236
License: Public Domain

Hale, J.
(dissenting) — The majority expects too much of police officers. It gives their legal craftsmanship in this case as exhaustive a study, I think, as the bar examiners do to *201bar examinations. But regardless of the standards of practice required of police officers in giving legal counsel to persons under arrest, the evidence, I would say, shows that the police performed their duty well. The record establishes that the officers advised the defendant in such abundant detail as to meet all standards, constitutional as well as judicial. I would require no more of them.
In assessing the adequacy of legal advice rendered by police officers to persons under arrest, the courts are obliged to look for some discernible connection between the standards fixed by the courts and the constitutions of the United States and the State of Washington. The United States Constitution says that no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. Const, amend. 5. The Constitution of the State of Washington says much the same. Const, art. 1, § 9. If I could find anywhere in the record that the defendant had been compelled to be a witness gainst himself, or even that his confession was otherwise the product of some kind of coercion, I would agree that the conviction should be reversed. My search of the record, however, reveals nothing compulsory or coercive but on the contrary shows affirmatively a voluntary disposition by the defendant to speak out when confronted with damning evidence and admit his guilt.
From what appears to me as abundant evidence, the trial court found not only that defendant confessed voluntarily but did so after receiving a detailed explanation of his rights and privileges relating to self-incrimination. Before asking the questions that elicited the confession, the police officers told the defendant that (1) he had a right to remain silent; (2) any statements he made could be used against him in court; (3) he had the right to the advice of an attorney before making any statement; and (4) looking to his future course, added explicitly, “if you do not have the funds to hire an attorney the court will appoint an attorney for you free of charge to you.”
This advice was read to the defendant before he made a confession, but that was not the end of it. He was advised *202in even greater detail. At a preliminary hearing held under CrR 101.20W to determine the voluntariness of the confession, Stanley May, sergeant of detectives, after saying that he recited to the defendant a list of the defendant’s constitutional rights, testified that he “asked him if he knew his constitutional rights, and he stated that he knew most of them.”
The officer then testified:
Q. Did you advise him that he had the right to have an attorney at that time? A. I advised him in order that he had the right to remain silent, that he had the right to call an attorney, that if he did not have any funds that the court would appoint one, that he had a right to remain silent, and that anything that he told me would be used later in court, and that he had a right to waive these rights and that he had the right to talk to me without the benefit of an attorney, and that anything that he would or did tell me would be voluntary on his part.
He said he declined all these and he would tell me what I wanted to know.
Detective May said that he was present 2 days later when Detective Rutz questioned the defendant. Describing Officer Rutz’s conduct of the interrogation, Detective May said:
A. The first thing that Detective Rutz did he informed the defendant of his constitutional rights, which took about ten or fifteen minutes. Mr. Rutz was very thorough and went through the whole thing, exactly the same thing as I did two days before. We all have the same form that we use. He was questioning about signing or passing the check at the NBC here in Yakima.
Detective May testified on cross-examination:
Q. Did you ever tell Mr. Creach what the word “waive” means? A. He understood. He knew what the word meant. I believe he said he would set aside — he declined the use of a mouthpiece or attorney. Q. He said what? A. He said he knew what that meant to set aside, and that’s when I went into it and I said, “You don’t want to call an attorney?” And he said, “That’s right.” He said, “I’ll tell you about it.” Q. Did you at any time inform him that this waiver was not permanent? A. I beg your pardon? Q. Well, did you at any time tell him that *203by waiving Ms rights he didn’t really waive Ms rights and that at anytime he wished to go back he could go back and rely on Ms attorney. A. He was told that, yes, that at any time he wanted to call an attorney he could. Q. Well, did you tell him that or did you read tMs statement to Mm? A. Well, I told Mm that. Q. Outside of the statement? A. Yes. Q. You told him that outside of the statement? A. I told him several things. Q. You told Mm sometMng outside of the statement? A. I told him several tMngs outside of the statement. Q. What else did you tell him other than reading the statement to Mm? A. Well, I told him that — as I recall, I told Mm all the tMngs that are on there, plus that the phone was on the desk, and that he could call an attorney, anyone of his choosing. I told him it was voluntary. I told him that everytMng was voluntary and anything he said was voluntary, and I believe that’s about it. Q. In other words, outside of the statement, you told him that the phone was on the desk and he could call an attorney. A. And the telephone directory was right there, and a list of local attorneys was in the book. And he informed me that he didn’t know anyone in Yakima. Well, he didn’t know an attorney, that’s what he said. Q. Did you tell Mm that you would assist him in getting an attorney? A. No, I did not. Q. At any time during the interrogations or taking a statement did you inform him again of these rights? A. The only time — I informed him of his rights prior to the interrogation and he was informed later by Detective Rutz.
Officer Rutz testified:
A. I referred to Mr. Creach, I advised Mm about Ms constitutional rights. Q. And what rights did you advise Mm of? A. I advised Mr. Creach that he did not have to talk to me if he felt that he did not want to, that he did not have to talk to me without the advice of counsel or without counsel present, and if he wanted counsel, the telephone was sitting on my desk, the telephone book was on the desk. He could utilize that. He could call an attorney if he so desired. Q. Did you then have a conversation with him? A. Yes, I did. Q. What did he say about your advising Mm of these things? A. Mr. Creach stated to me and informed me that he was well aware of his constitutional rights. Q. Did you promise Mm anytMng or threaten him with anything to talk to you, to get him to talk to you? A. No, sir, I did not. Q. Did you offer to *204work any deals for him if he told you what took place? A. No, sir, I did not. Q. And what did Mr. Creach tell you specifically at this time? A. I beg pardon? Q. What did Mr. Creach tell you at this time? A. Mr. Creach stated to me that he would talk to me.
Officer Rutz then said that he showed Creach the check, and Creach told him he had endorsed and cashed that particular check at the National Bank of Commerce in Yakima. This was the check that the state proved to everyone’s satisfaction that it was a forgery.
Further, concerning advice given to the defendant by the Yakima police, Officer May testified:
A. Well, I went down a list of rights that is always or that I always inform a person that he has, and I informed the defendant that he had a right to an attorney prior to making any statement to me and that anything he made to me — or that any statement he made to me could be used against him in court at a later date. I informed him that he had a right to counsel. Also, that if he didn’t have any funds the court would appoint an attorney for him. I informed him that anything he told me would be voluntary and the — Mr. Velikanje: Excuse me, did you say he said that or you said that? A. I told him that anything that he told me would be voluntary on his part. Mr. Velikanje: I see. All right. A. And he had a — I believe I repeated or stated he had a right to remain silent, and I also told him he had a right to waive all of these rights and that he could talk to me of his own free will. I believe that was about it.
But again this was not the end of the legal advice as shown by the record. Officer May said that he was present and heard Officer Rutz expounding the law of constitutional and judicial immunities to the defendant as follows:
A. Detective Rutz introduced himself first and told him that anything he told us could be used in court at a later date. He told him he had a right to counsel or an attorney, and directed his attention to his telephone and telephone directory on his desk, and told the defendant that he could get any attorney of his choosing and he pointed out that if the subject would be taken to court that the court would appoint one for him at a later date if he could not afford one, and I believe he — basically the *205same thing that I told him. It took him about — he has his own style of talking to these people and it took him about fifteen minutes to go through this.
After the court had ruled that the admission and confession were admissible, Officer Rutz testified, again on direct examination:
A. I advised Mr. Creach that he didn’t have to talk to me if he did not care to, if he did not want to discuss this matter. If he wanted to consult with an attorney, the telephone directory was on my desk and it was available for his use, and he could consult an attorney, and he could have an attorney present at the office while I was talking to him, and if he didn’t have the funds to hire an attorney and in the event should this matter come to court, the court would appoint an attorney for him without any cost to him. Q. Did you advise him of anything else at this time, that you recall? A. No, not offhand not right now, no, sir. Q. Did you threaten him at any time? A. No, sir. Q. Did you promise him anything? A. No, sir.
Detective May in his testimony described how, after the defendant had been advised in detail several times, he at first denied cashing the forged check and then admitted cashing it at the bank:
A. Well, with the black vest-type billfold opened there was numerous credit cards with the name James Black, and I also had this other billfold with the name of Mr. Creach, and I also questioned Mr. Creach how he got hold of this billfold and he first started by telling me that he was employed in Idaho, and he explained the type of employment, and he stated where he was working was near a resort area or was a resort area and that he and another person which he would not name or describe to me were near some parked cars near a resort area, and this one particular car was broken into and immediately after this car was broken into he received the identifications of Mr. Black. . . . A. In the course of the interrogation, the first part, Mr. Creach denied being in the bank and denied cashing it. In about fifteen minutes or twenty minutes after — now, this is a guess, I’d say within fifteen or twenty minutes after Detective Rutz questioned him he produced the check and affidavit of forgery, and he Mr. Creach told Rutz and myself that he *206went into the NBC and he passed the check using Mr. Black’s Washington State Driver’s license.
Creach did not testify on his own behalf before the jury, but at the hearing under CrR 101.20W, RCW vol. 0, ¿to test the admissibility of his confession, he said:
Let me see, then Detective May he come back in and asked me what my name was, and he had the billfold. He said, “You don’t have to talk to me.” He said, “You can call an attorney.” He said, “We have reports from — I believe he said — “from Idaho that these credit cards were stolen, and also that you was wanted in Idaho for burglary.”
Further, said the defendant:
A. I believe it was Rutz’s office. And Mr. Rutz told me that I didn’t have to talk to him and that I could call an attorney, that the telephone was on the desk, and I said, “Well, I don’t think I need an attorney.” And somewhere along the line they asked me about a burglary that was committed here I think on the 7th of August, and I told them that I did not know anything about a burglary in Yakima because I just arrived in town, and at some place they brought that check out. He said, “Did you ever see this?” And I said, “I don’t know.” And they said, “Did you sign it?” And I said, “If I signed the check I would never admit it.”
and went on, still in direct examination:
Q. Tell me exactly what he said when you were in his office on August 9th? A. He told me that I didn’t have to talk but I could call an attorney. Q. Did he tell you that anything that you might say could be used against you in court? A. No. Q. Did he say if you couldn’t afford to hire an attorney he would get one for you? A. No, he did not. Q. Did he read anything to you from a sheet of paper? A. No, I couldn’t say positively. Q. You mean you don’t remember? A. No, I don’t remember. Q. Can you tell me exactly what Mr. Rutz said to you? A. He said — he introduced himself and he said, “I’m in charge of the forgery detail,” and he said, “You don’t have to talk to me. You can remain silent.” He said, “You can call an attorney. The phone is on the desk.” Q. Did he say anything that you might say would be used against you in court? A. Yes.
*207The defendant thus admitted that he knew of his right to remain silent and that anything he said could be used against him in court, but denied that he was told the court would appoint a lawyer for him if he was without funds. However, when interrogated by the court, he answered as follows:
The Court: Did they threaten you to do you bodily harm if you did not talk to them? A. No. The Court: Did they hold you for a long time or have any strong lights on you, or anything like that? A. Well, no, no strong lights. They put me in a cell by myself. The Court: I know, but was your will so that you couldn’t refuse to talk to them? When they told you, “You can remain silent, if you want to” — They told you that, didn’t they? A. Yes. The Court: Did you feel that you could then remain silent if you wanted to? A. Yes. The Court: Did they in any way say that you must make a statement? A. No. The Court: Either in words or action? A. No. The Court: In other words, whatever you told them — you dispute what you told them — but whatever you told them was purely voluntary on your part, is that right? A. Well, the questions they asked me was purely partially — The Court: Well, I know but did you talk voluntarily? A. Yes. The Court: Nobody forced you to talk? A. No.
On cross-examination at the pretrial hearing, Creach admitted that he had been convicted and sentenced to 5 years’ imprisonment for grand larceny in 1943; sentenced in 1947 to 5 years’ imprisonment for burglary; and, in 1949, convicted of another felony and sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment; and, in either 1958 or 1959 — he could not be certain of the year — sentenced to the Michigan State Penitentiary at Lansing for 5 to 10 years for second-degree burglary and forgery.
The court was well within its discretionary power, I think, in not according to Mr. Creach the highest degree of credibility, and it is not for a reviewing court to believe Mr. Creach’s testimony and disbelieve the other witnesses. In my opinion, the court had no choice but to admit the defendant’s confession and admissions against interest as voluntary, competent, and material under every conceivable constitutional theory or rule of evidence and even under *208the most expanded and ethereal interpretation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966).
In a record about one half of which appears to be devoted to a palaver among court, counsel and witnesses concerning advice to the accused to remain silent or to consult an attorney or to speak up if he wished and the remainder devoted to substantive proof of the crime charged, the evidence is overwhelming that the defendant’s confession was voluntary and that he knowingly waived his right to remain silent. The incriminating statements and confessions were admissible, I think, both under the Miranda decision and the state and federal constitutions and under what I deem the time-tested, long-held rule of the American common law now codified for the federal judiciary under Witnesses and Evidence 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1969), as follows:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistanee .of counsel; and (5) whether-or not such defendant *209was without the' assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession..
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
I would, therefore, affirm.
Hunter, C. J., Finley and Hamilton, JJ., concur in the result of the dissent.