Court Opinion

ID: 9601386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:42:55.145174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:48:06.404447
License: Public Domain

McFADDEN, Justice
(concurring specially) .
The majority opinion holds that prejudicial error was committed by the trial court in instructing the jury on the “Last Clear Chance Doctrine” for the reason there is no substantial evidence to support the giving of such instruction. With this conclusion I concur. I wish to point out however, that the last clear chance doctrine should be limited in its application to a plaintiff charged with contributory negligence and only in those cases, which disclose proper factual situations justifying its application.
In the early case of Pilmer v. Boise Traction Co., 14 Idaho 327, 344, 94 P. 432, 437, 15 L.R.A.,N.S., 254, this Court stated:
“The origin of the doctrine of the ‘Last Clear Chance’ is generally attributed to the case of Davies v. Mann, 10 Mees. & W. (Eng.) Rep. 546, in which the owner of a donkey, who negligently turned it out on the highway with its feet hobbled, was allowed, notwithstanding his own negligence, to recover from a person driving along the highway who carelessly ran into and killed it. It is stated in the note to the case of Bogan v. Carolina C. R. Co., 129 N.C. 154, 39 S.E. 808, 55 L.R.A. 418, that the doctrine of the donkey case and the ground of its decision have been accurately stated by a writer in the Quarterly Law Review [vol. 2] 507, as follows: ‘The party who last has a clear opportunity of avoiding the accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his opponent, is considered solely responsible for it.’
“The Supreme Court of the United States in Grand Trunk R. Co. [of Canada] v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 12 S.Ct. 679, 36 L.Ed. 485, thus lays down the doctrine of contributory negligence as modified by that of the ‘last clear chance’:
“ ‘Although the defendant’s negligence may have been the primary cause of the injury complained of, yet an action for such injury cannot be maintained, if the proximate and immediate cause of the injury can be traced to the want of ordinary care and caution in the person injured, subject to this qualification, which has grown up in recent years (having been first enunciated in Davies v. Mann, 10 Mees. & W. (Eng.), *138546) that the contributory negligence' of the party injured will not defeat the action if it be shown that the defendant might, by the exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the consequences of the injured party’s negligence.’
“This court is in full accord with the doctrine of the ‘last clear chance’ as above defined. * * * ”
Subsequent decisions of this Court have held that the plaintiff must be in a position of peril from which he can not save himself. Allen v. Idaho Power Co., 84 Idaho 309, 372 P.2d 80; McIntire v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 56 Idaho 392, 55 P.2d 148; Short v. Boise Valley Traction Co., 38 Idaho 593, 225 P. 398; Neil v. Idaho & Washington N. R. R., 22 Idaho 74, 125 P. 331. The defendant must discover the plaintiff’s peril in sufficient time to act so as to avoid the accident. Laidlaw v. Barker, 78 Idaho 67, 297 P.2d 287; Hale v. Gunter, 82 Idaho 534, 356 P.2d 223; Ralph v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 82 Idaho 240, 351 P.2d 464; Graham v. Milsap, 77 Idaho 179, 290 P.2d 744; Ineas v. Union Pacific R. Co., 72 Idaho 390, 241 P.2d 1178; McIntire v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., supra; Short v. Boise Valley Traction Co., supra.
Throughout the application of the rule of. last clear .chance in this state, this court has continually required that there be a last chance to avoid the injury and that it also be a clear chance. In Laidlaw v. Barker, supra, this court stated:
“That doctrine implies thought, appreciation, mental direction and lapse of sufficient time effectually so to act as to save another from injury to which he has negligently exposed himself. It is not applicable where the emergency is so sudden that there is not time to avert the accident.”
Short v. Boise Valley Traction Co., supra; McIntire v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., supra; Stearns v. Graves, 62 Idaho 312, 322, 323, 111 P.2d 882; Ineas v. Union Pacific R. Co., supra; Matheson v. Idaho Hardware & Plumbing Co., 75 Idaho 171, 179, 270 P.2d 841; Graham v. Milsap, supra, Lallatin v. Terry, 81 Idaho 238, 340 P.2d 112; 38 Am.Jur., Negligence § 219, p. 905; 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 137e, p. 774.
In an annotation, 32 A.L.R.2d 543, at 549, dealing with the subject of whether the doctrine of last clear chance is available to a defendant, the following statement appears which I consider most appropriate and commensurate with the consideration given by this court in the early case of Pilmer v. Boise Traction Co., 14 Idaho 327, 94 P. 432, 15 L.R.A.,N.S., 254:
*139“ * * * the doctrine * * * involves four elements, the existence of all of which are essential to its application: (1) plaintiff’s inability to escape from, or obliviousness to, danger resulting from his own negligence, (2) defendant’s awareness of the danger, 13) defendant’s opportunity to avert the injury, and (4) defendant’s failure to avert it. As the name of the doctrine indicates, the defendant’s chance to avert the injury must be the ‘last’ chance and must also be a ‘clear’ chance. Consequently, such holdings are not to be taken as meaning that the defendant may not rely upon the fact that the plaintiff actually had opportunity to avoid the injury, as late as, or later than, that of the defendant, for where it appears that the plaintiff was able to escape the danger, or was not oblivious to it, or had as late a chance to avoid it as had the defendant, one of the essential elements of the doctrine is missing, precluding the plaintiff from relying upon it, since his negligence in failing to take advantage of his own ability to avert the injury remains the proximate cause thereof.”
See also: Restatement Torts, Negligence § 479. Prosser on Torts 2d ed. § 52, p. 290; Annots. 92 A.L.R. 47; 119 A.L.R. 1041; 171 A.L.R. 365.
Possible confusion has arisen as to its application on behalf of a defendant by reason of language employed by this court in discussing the rule in abstract terms, as was done in Short v. Boise Valley Traction Co., supra, wherein the Court quoted from Locke v. Puget Sound International R. & Power Co., 100 Wash. 432, 171 P. 242, L.R.A.1918D, 1119:
“If the one party knows of the peril of the other, although brought about by that other’s negligence, in time to avoid injuring him, he is at once put to a degree of care commensurate with the present situation of the parties.”
Such statement was reiterated in the case of McIntire v. Oregon Short Line R. R. Co., 56 Idaho 392, 397, 55 P.2d 148.
In an annotation entitled “Availability of Last Clear Chance Doctrine to Defendant”, appearing at 32 A.L.R.2d 543, the annotator has allied Idaho with the jurisdictions supposedly recognizing that the doctrine is available to a defendant. The annotator cites, at 32 A.L.R.2d 556, for this proposition the case of McKinley v. Wagner, 67 Idaho 104, 170 P.2d 796, and states:
“The Idaho court apparently recognizes the right of a defendant to invoke the last clear chance doctrine, for in McKinley v. Wagner (1946) 67 Idaho 104, 170 P.2d 796, it re*140affirmed its prior holding that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his opponent, is considered in law solely responsible for such accident. Furthermore, while rejecting the defendant’s contention that the trial court had given an erroneous instruction on the doctrine because it did not make clear to the jury that any party, either plaintiff or defendant, who has the last clear chance or opportunity to avoid an accident, notwithstanding the negligence of his opponent, is considered solely responsible for it, on the grounds that the instruction closely followed and was in harmony with its previously announced rule and that the plaintiffs had a right to an instruction which instructed the jury on their theory of the case, based upon the evidence, as the challenged instruction was, the court further stated that if the defendant desired an instruction on his theory of the case, he should have requested it.”
To dispel the misconception that a defendant is entitled to such an instruction, it must be pointed out that in McKinley v. Wagner, supra, the plaintiff had instituted the action alleging the negligence of the defendant; defendant answered, and cross-complained for damages he suffered in the accident. In such a situation, the defendant was seeking affirmative relief, and thus was relegated to' the relative position of a plaintiff. The same situation prevailed in Durrington v. Crooker, 78 Idaho 539, 307 P.2d 227, wherein the plaintiff sought recovery for his damages, and the defendant cross-complained charging the plaintiff with negligence.
The 1960 and 1962 issues of A.L.R.2d Supplemental service again allies Idaho with those jurisdictions holding that the doctrine is available to a defendant, citing the cases of Laidlaw v. Barker, supra; Lallatin v. Terry, supra; and Hale v. Gunter, 82 Idaho 534, 356 P.2d 223.
The case of Laidlaw v. Barker, supra, was an action for wrongful death of a minor with judgment for plaintiffs, from which the defendants appealed; this court held that the minor’s contributory negligence appeared as a matter of law, thus requiring a reversal of a judgment for the respondent. The court then held that, the last clear chance doctrine was inapplicable to the facts of the case, as the appellants (defendants) did not have an opportunity to avoid the accident; and further held, that the giving of such an instruction on the doctrine was not reversible error, since the appellants had invited *141the error by requesting such an instruction on their own behalf.
In Lallatin v. Terry, supra, also a wrongful death action, wherein the plaintiff appealed, the trial court gave an instruction on last clear chance applicable to both the plaintiff and defendant. This court, without discussion of the applicability to a defendant of such instruction held that such doctrine had no application under the facts, but held that the giving of such instruction on the doctrine was not reversible error as the instruction was favorable to the appellant (plaintiff).
In Lallatin v. Terry, supra, reference is made to the case of Graham v. Milsap, 77 Idaho 179, 290 P.2d 744. In the Graham case, also a wrongful death action, the plaintiff recovered, and the defendant appealed ; this court held that reversible error had been committed in the giving of an instruction on last clear chance in favor of the plaintiff, for the facts did not warrant the giving of such instruction. Unlike the case of Lallatin v. Terry, however, the defendant (appellant) did not invite the error.
The cases of Laidlaw v. Barker and Lallatin v. Terry (supra) are decisions which must be confined to the respective factual situations presented in those cases, and not expanded to encompass a factual situation as presented in the instant cause.
The last case referred to by the annotator as authority for applying the doctrine in favor of defendant is Hale v. Gunter, supra. There the owner of an automobile brought action against the owner of a truck for damages to the automobile as a result of a collision between the two vehicles. The driver of the plaintiff’s automobile was attempting to pass defendant’s truck, while the defendant attempted to make a left turn into a private roadway. The trial court found that the driver of plaintiff’s car was acting in a reasonably prudent manner. Counsel for the defendant contended on appeal that the driver of the plaintiff's car had the last clear chance to avoid the accident. This Court concluded that this was an emergency situation to which the doctrine of the last clear chance had no application.
The Supreme Court of Arizona, in dealing with the problem of whether the last clear chance doctrine was available to a defendant, in Rollman v. Morgan, 73 Ariz. 305, 240 P.2d 1196, 32 A.L.R.2d 540, held that the doctrine of last clear chance was not applicable to a defendant. Arizona had earlier adopted the last clear chance doctrine in the case of Casey v. Marshall, 64 Ariz. 232, 168 P.2d 240, and relied upon the statement of the rule as appears in Grand Trunk R. Co. of Canada v. Ives, 144 U.S. 408, 12 S.Ct. 679, 687, 36 L.Ed. 485, 493, which is the identical authority *142relied upon by this Court in the case of Pilmer v. Boise Traction Company, supra.
The Supreme Court of Arizona in Rollman v. Morgan, supra, stated:
“The Casey case, supra, also cited with approval the Restatement of the Law, Torts, § 479, Contributory Negligence, which treats the doctrine as applicable only for the benefit of a plaintiff who is met with a defense of contributory negligence.
“The majority of states also follow this same construction of the application of the doctrine, 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 137b, page 762. For an excellent analysis of minority rule see the leading case of Island Express v. Frederick, 5 W.W.Harr. 569, 35 Del. 569, 171 A. 181, 185.
“We adopt the majority rule. To invoke the doctrine on defendant’s behalf would only tend to confuse the jury. Such a use of the rule would simply be another method of charging the plaintiff with contributory negligence. We concur with a statement made by the Supreme Court of South Dakota in Wolff v. Stenger, 59 S.D. 231, 239 N.W. 181, 184: ‘* * * Contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff seeking recovery being essential to the application of the doctrine of “last clear chance,” the doctrine is not in any proper sense susceptible of being invoked by the defendant from whom recovery is sought against the plaintiff because, before that stage can be reached, plaintiff’s recovery is barred by his own contributory negligence.’ ”
For other jurisdictions that have followed the rule that the last clear chance doctrine is not available to a defendant; See Annot: 32 A.L.R.2d 543, § 3 at 548.
The doctrine of last clear chance is an anomaly of the law, which under very limited circumstances authorizes a relaxation of the rule of contributory negligence. It should not be expanded into a rule that would excuse a defendant found to have been negligent, from the responsibility for his own neglig'ence.
In the instant action the plaintiff was proceeding in his vehicle on 5th Street and had the right of way over the defendant approaching such street from Warner Avenue. Defendant Bates was required to stop at the stop sign at 5th Street, and Warner Avenue, and had the duty imposed by statute to protect travellers on 5th Avenue from danger of his prematurely entering the intersection. The defendant is in no position to seek any “last clear chance” instructions, and the giving of such an instruction could do nothing except authorize the members of the jury to speculate *143on. a defendant’s duties which are defined by-statute. The sole function of the doctrine of last clear chance is to relax the harsh rule of a plaintiff’s (or a counter claiming defendant’s) contributory negligence which would otherwise bar recovery. The giving of an instruction as was done in this case, for the benefit of the defendant, in my opinion is clearly prejudicial error, as it distracts the attention of the members of the jury from their primary obligation of determining the issue of negligence of the parties and the issue of proximate cause.
McQUADE, TAYLOR and SMITH, JJ., concur in the foregoing special concurring opinion.