Court Opinion

ID: 9893315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 16:12:43.841487+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:50.741706
License: Public Domain

J-A08002-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  J.A.Z.                                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  P.J.J.                                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1052 WDA 2022

               Appeal from the Order Entered September 9, 2022
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
                    Civil Division at No: No. 2010 GN 4413

BEFORE:      STABILE, J., SULLIVAN, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                           FILED: OCTOBER 26, 2023

       Appellant, P.J.J. (“Father”), appeals from an order granting the petition

of Appellee, J.A.Z. (“Mother”), to relocate with the parties’ child, E.J.Z.

(“Child”), who was born in 2008, from Blair County to Allegheny County.

       Mother’s petition for relocation is the most recent dispute in decade-

long divorce and custody proceedings between the parties. The parties were

married, and on November 22, 2010, Mother filed a complaint for divorce

against Father, including a count seeking primary physical custody of Child.

In February 2014, the trial court entered the final divorce decree. Mother and

Father both live in Hollidaysburg, Blair County, Pennsylvania, six blocks apart.

Father, an employee at the retailer REI, is remarried, and he and his current

wife have twin children. Mother is a substitute teacher and freelance writer.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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Child visits Father every Wednesday, and she has a very positive relationship

with both parents.

      In January 2016, Father filed a petition to modify custody. Following an

evidentiary hearing, on December 27, 2016, the trial court directed that the

parties share legal and physical custody of Child and that Child continue to

reside with Mother. In October 2017, Father filed a petition for modification,

requesting a 50/50 physical custody arrangement.        Following evidentiary

hearings, on August 17, 2018, the trial court entered an order awarding

shared legal and physical custody to the parties but granting less than 50

percent custody to Father. Father appealed to this Court, which affirmed on

March 11, 2019 in an unpublished memorandum.

      On November 12, 2019, Mother began the present chapter of this case

by filing a Notice Of Proposed Relocation from Blair County to Allegheny

County. On August 16, 2021, Mother filed an Amended Notice Of Proposed

Relocation.

      The court held several evidentiary hearings on Mother’s request for

relocation.   The essence of Mother’s argument is that she obtained new

employment in Allegheny County with Vision Benefits of America (“VBA”). Her

salary at VBA is $72,000.00, over three times as much as her income in Blair

County ($21,000.00). Mother alleged that Child’s educational opportunities

will substantially improve in Upper St. Clair, the district within Allegheny

County where she intends to move with Child. Mother stated that she and

Child have significant family ties in Allegheny County, and Child will benefit

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from multiple cultural opportunities in Allegheny County that are not available

in Blair County.

      Following several evidentiary hearings, in an opinion and order docketed

on June 14, 2022, the court granted Mother’s request to locate with Child to

Allegheny County. On July 6, 2022, Father filed a petition for reconsideration.

In an order docketed on July 12, 2022, the court timely granted

reconsideration of the June 14, 2022 order. On August 17, 2022, following a

hearing, the court denied Father’s petition for reconsideration. On September

14, 2022, Father filed a timely notice of appeal along with a Pa.R.A.P. 1925

statement of matters complained of on appeal. On September 20, 2022, the

court sent a letter to the prothonotary of this Court advising that it would not

file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925 opinion because it was satisfied with its June 14, 2022

opinion as the decision in this case.

      Father raises the following issues in this appeal:

      I. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND/OR GROSSLY
      ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE PROPOSED
      RELOCATION WHEN THE FACTS OF RECORD DO NOT SUPPORT A
      DETERMINATION THAT MOTHER MET HER BURDEN THAT THE
      PROPOSED RELOCATION IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE
      MINOR CHILD PURSUANT TO 23 PA.C.S.A. § 5337(h)?

      II. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND/OR GROSSLY
      ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE PROPOSED
      RELOCATION WHEN THE FACTS OF RECORD DO NOT SUPPORT
      THE DETERMINATION MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT THAT MOTHER
      ESTABLISHED SIGNIFICANT IMPROVEMENT IN THE QUALITY OF
      LIFE FOR HERSELF AND THE CHILD?

      III. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND/OR GROSSLY
      ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE PROPOSED

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     RELOCATION AND FINDING THAT MOTHER’S WORK REQUIRED
     HER TO BE ABLE TO WORK ON SITE AT HER EMPLOYMENT
     LOCATION IN ALLEGHENY COUNTY, THAT HER EMPLOYER’S
     FLEXIBILITY WOULD TERMINATE AT SOME POINT, AND THAT
     RELOCATION WAS NECESSARY FOR MOTHER TO RETAIN HER
     EMPLOYMENT WHEN THE FACTS OF RECORD DO NOT SUPPORT
     THIS DETERMINATION?

     IV. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND/OR GROSSLY
     ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE PROPOSED
     RELOCATION AND FINDING THAT MOTHER WOULD NEED TO BE
     ON SITE TO PROGRESS WITHIN HER COMPANY AND THAT THE
     CHILD   WOULD   BENEFIT  FROM    MOTHER’S   IMPROVED
     EMPLOYMENT WHEN THE FACTS OF RECORD AS TESTIFIED TO BY
     MOTHER DO NOT SUPPORT THIS DETERMINATION?

     V. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND/OR GROSSLY
     ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE PROPOSED
     RELOCATION AND DETERMINING THAT MOTHER'S PROPOSED
     RELOCATION WOULD ENHANCE THE GENERAL QUALITY OF LIFE
     FOR MOTHER AND THE MINOR CHILD, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
     LIMITED TO, FINANCIAL OR EMOTIONAL BENEFIT OR
     EDUCATIONAL PURSUANT TO 23 PA.C.S.A. § 5337(h) WHEN THE
     RECORD ESTABLISHES:

          A) MOTHER FAILED TO IDENTIFY THE SPECIFIC
          ADDRESS AND TYPE OF RESIDENCE SHE WOULD BE
          MOVING TO UPON RELOCATION.

          B) MOTHER FAILED TO ESTABLISH HER SALARY OR
          EMPLOYMENT WOULD CHANGE IN ANY MANNER
          UPON RELOCATION AND HER COST OF LIVING
          WOULD INCREASE.

     VI. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND/OR GROSSLY
     ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE PROPOSED
     RELOCATION AND FINDING THE PROPOSED RELOCATION IS IN
     THE BEST INTEREST OF THE MINOR CHILD PURSUANT TO 23
     PA.C.S.A. § 5337(h) WHEN THE COURT ALSO FOUND THAT
     RELOCATION WOULD INEVITABLY BE DETRIMENTAL TO FATHER
     AND THAT FATHER’S CURRENT RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MINOR
     CHILD IS ALMOST CERTAIN TO DIMINISH UPON RELOCATION OF
     THE CHILD?

     VII. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND/OR GROSSLY
     ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE PROPOSED

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      RELOCATION AND FINDING THAT MOTHER PERFORMED
      ADEQUATELY IN BEING FLEXIBLE AND GENEROUS IN PROVIDING
      ADDITIONAL PERIODS OF CUSTODY AND DID NOT ESTABLISH A
      PATTERN OF CONDUCT TO PROMOTE OR THWART THE
      RELATIONSHIP OF THE CHILD AND FATHER?

      VIII. WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT AND/OR GROSSLY ABUSED ITS
      DISCRETION IN GRANTING THE PROPOSED RELOCATION AND
      FINDING THAT THE CHILD’S RELATIONSHIP WITH HER SIBLINGS
      COULD BE MAINTAINED WITH THE EFFORT OF BOTH PARTIES
      WHEN THE FACTS OF RECORD AS TESTIFIED TO BY MOTHER DO
      NOT SUPPORT THIS DETERMINATION?

Father’s Brief at 4-7.

      We begin by summarizing the applicable standard of review and

statutory framework. Our standard of review is well-settled:

      [T]he appellate court is not bound by the deductions or inferences
      made by the trial court from its findings of fact, nor must the
      reviewing court accept a finding that has no competent evidence
      to support it.... However, this broad scope of review does not vest
      in the reviewing court the duty or the privilege of making its own
      independent determination.... Thus, an appellate court is
      empowered to determine whether the trial court’s incontrovertible
      factual findings support its factual conclusions, but it may not
      interfere with those conclusions unless they are unreasonable in
      view of the trial court’s factual findings; and thus, represent a
      gross abuse of discretion.

R.M.G., Jr. v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2009). Moreover,

      [O]n issues of credibility and weight of the evidence, we defer to
      the findings of the trial [court] who has had the opportunity to
      observe the proceedings and demeanor of the witnesses.

      The parties cannot dictate the amount of weight the trial court
      places on evidence. Rather, the paramount concern of the trial
      court is the best interest of the child. Appellate interference is
      unwarranted if the trial court’s consideration of the best interest
      of the child was careful and thorough, and we are unable to find
      any abuse of discretion.

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Id.   The test is whether the evidence of record supports the trial court’s

conclusions. Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 539 (Pa. Super. 2006).

      The primary concern in custody cases is the best interests of the child.

“The best-interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis, considers all

factors that legitimately have an effect upon the child’s physical, intellectual,

moral, and spiritual well[-]being.” Saintz v. Rinker, 902 A.2d 509, 512 (Pa.

Super. 2006).

      Child custody actions are governed by the Child Custody Act (“Act”), 23

Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5321-5340. With respect to a request for relocation, Section

5337 of the Act provides, “The party proposing the relocation has the burden

of establishing that the relocation will serve the best interest of the child as

shown under the factors set forth in subsection (h).”           23 Pa.C.S.A. §

5337(i)(1). Further, “each party has the burden of establishing the integrity

of that party’s motives in either seeking the relocation or seeking to prevent

the relocation.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(i)(2).

      Section 5337(h) provides as follows:

      (h) Relocation factors.--In determining whether to grant a
      proposed relocation, the court shall consider the following factors,
      giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect the
      safety of the child:

      (1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and duration of the
      child’s relationship with the party proposing to relocate and with
      the nonrelocating party, siblings and other significant persons in
      the child’s life.

      (2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child and the likely
      impact the relocation will have on the child’s physical, educational

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     and emotional development, taking into consideration any special
     needs of the child.

     (3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship between the
     nonrelocating party and the child through suitable custody
     arrangements,     considering   the   logistics  and   financial
     circumstances of the parties.

     (4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration the age and
     maturity of the child.

     (5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct of either
     party to promote or thwart the relationship of the child and the
     other party.

     (6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of life
     for the party seeking the relocation, including, but not limited to,
     financial or emotional benefit or educational opportunity.

     (7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general quality of life
     for the child, including, but not limited to, financial or emotional
     benefit or educational opportunity.

     (8) The reasons and motivation of each party for seeking or
     opposing the relocation.

     (9) The present and past abuse committed by a party or member
     of the party’s household and whether there is a continued risk of
     harm to the child or an abused party.

     (10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the child.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5337(h).

     The trial court also was required to consider the custody factors set forth

in 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328, which are as follows:

     § 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody.

     (a) Factors. – In ordering any form of custody, the court shall
     determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant
     factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which
     affect the safety of the child, including the following:

     (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent
     and continuing contact between the child and another party.

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     (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or member
     of the party’s household, whether there is a continued risk of harm
     to the child or an abused party and which party can better provide
     adequate physical safeguards and supervision of the child.

     (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and (2)
     (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement with
     protective services).

     (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf of the
     child.

     (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s education,
     family life and community life.

     (5) The availability of extended family.

     (6) The child’s sibling relationships.

     (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the child’s
     maturity and judgment.

     (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the other
     parent, except in cases of domestic violence where reasonable
     safety measures are necessary to protect the child from harm.

     (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
     consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate for
     the child’s emotional needs.

     (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily physical,
     emotional, developmental, educational and special needs of the
     child.

     (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

     (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability to make
     appropriate child-care arrangements.

     (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the willingness
     and ability of the parties to cooperate with one another. A party’s
     effort to protect a child from abuse by another party is not
     evidence of unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that party.

     (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or member of
     a party’s household.

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       (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or member of a
       party’s household.

       (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a); see also A.M.S. v. M.R.C., 70 A.3d 830, 836 (Pa.

Super. 2013) (when making decision on relocation that also involves a custody

decision, “the trial court must consider all ten relocation factors and all sixteen

custody factors” outlined in the Act).

       The trial court, as the finder of fact, determines “which factors are most

salient and critical in each particular case.” M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331,

339 (Pa. Super. 2013). Further, Section 5323(d) of the Act “requires the trial

court to set forth its mandatory assessment of the [...] factors prior to the

deadline by which a litigant must file a notice of appeal.” A.V. v. S.T., 87

A.3d 818, 823 (Pa. Super. 2014). In expressing the reasons for its decision,

       there is no required amount of detail for the trial court’s
       explanation; all that is required is that the enumerated factors are
       considered and that the custody decision is based on those
       considerations . . . A court’s explanation of reasons for its
       decision, which adequately addresses the relevant factors,
       complies with Section 5323(d).

Id. at 822-23.

       In his first and eighth arguments,1 Father contends that the court

abused its discretion in granting relocation because Mother failed to establish

that relocation is in Child’s best interests. We disagree.

____________________________________________

1 See Father’s brief at 22-24 and 44-48. Father’s eighth argument is
essentially a recapitulation of his first argument, so we review them together.

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      The court carefully balanced all factors under Sections 5337(h) and

5328(a) as follows:

      Section 5337(h)

      (1) Relationship with both parents: The court determined that Child has

a “significantly positive” relationship with both parents, Opinion, 6/14/22, at

8, but Child’s relationship with Mother is closer, because Mother is unmarried

and has no other children, whereas Father has remarried and has two

additional children.   Therefore, the court found that this factor weighed in

favor of relocation.

      (2) Child’s developmental needs: The court determined that Child is

gifted intellectually. Mother established, with documentary evidence, that the

proposed new school district in Allegheny County (Upper St. Clair) has a

“superior” curriculum for Child’s needs that is better than Child’s school in

Blair County. Id. at 9. This factor weighed in favor of relocation. Id.

      (3) Feasibility of preserving relationship with non-relocating parent: The

court determined that this factor weighed against relocation, because Father

would lose his weekly Wednesday contact with Child and would no longer live

six blocks away from Child. The court found it impractical to believe that Child

would be able to travel to Blair County every Wednesday.

      (4) Child’s preference: The court interviewed Child in camera and found

her very intelligent and well-mannered.       Child “did not wish to express a

preference” for either parent. Id. at 7. The court decided not to give any

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weight to this factor, finding, in so many words, that this factor did not weigh

in favor of either parent. Id. at 9.

      (5) Parents’ established pattern of conduct: The court found that both

parents promoted Child’s relationship with the other parent, and therefore this

factor did not favor either parent.

      (6) Effect on relocating parent’s quality of life: The court determined

that relocation “will have a significant improvement on [Mother’s] quality of

life, particular[ly] retaining employment that is significantly superior in terms

of compensation and opportunity for advancement.” Id. at 10. The record

establishes that Mother’s annual salary in her former employment was

$21,000.00, while her annual salary in her new job is $72,000.00.          N.T.,

8/18/21, at 17.

      (7) Effect on child’s quality of life: The court determined that Child will

“certainly benefit from her Mother’s improved employment” and “enjoy

significant benefits if relocation were allowed.” Opinion at 10.

      (8) Mother’s motivation for seeking relocation: The court determined

both that Mother’s reasons for seeking relocation and Father’s reasons for

opposing relocation were in good faith. Therefore, this factor did not favor

either parent.

      (9) Abuse by any parent or member of parent’s household: The court

found that there was no abuse, and therefore this factor did not favor either

parent.

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      (10) Any other factor: The court did not identify any other factor.

      Section 5328(a)

      (1) Parent who is more likely to encourage contact with other parent:

The court found that this factor did not favor either parent, because they are

both cooperative.

      (2) Abuse by any parent or member of parent’s household: The court

found that there was no abuse, and therefore this factor did not favor either

parent.

      (3) Performance of parental duties: The court found that this factor

favored Mother, not because Father performed his duties inadequately, but

because Mother has more time with Child.

      (4) Need for stability in Child’s life: The court found that this factor

favored Father, because relocation to Allegheny County would “challenge”

stability, and Child already has a group of friends in Blair County.

      (5) Availability of extended family: The court found that this factor

favored Father because he had his parents, brother and other family in Blair

County, while Mother has a stepmother and aunt near her proposed move.

      (6) Child’s sibling relationships: The court found that Child has a positive

relationship with Father’s other children, and that this relationship could be

maintained through both parents’ efforts.      Therefore, it appears the court

found that this factor did not favor either parent.

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       (7) Child’s preference: The court did not accord any weight to this factor

because Child did not wish to state a preference for either parent.

       (8) Attempt by either parent to turn Child against other parent: The

court found that neither parent attempted to turn Child against the other

parent, so this factor did not favor either parent.

       (9) Parent more likely to maintain loving, stable, consistent and

nurturing relationship with Child:        The court found that this factor favored

Mother, because she is unmarried and makes Child her sole priority, while

Father is remarried and has other children with whom to share his time.

       (10) Parent more likely to attend Child’s daily needs: The court found

that this factor favored Mother, because she is unmarried and makes Child

her sole priority, while Father is remarried and has other children with whom

to share his time. Further, while both parents have full-time jobs, Mother’s

new job allows flexibility to have time with Child.

       (11) Proximity of residences: Without stating whether this factor favored

one parent or another, the court noted that the parties presently live six blocks

apart but will live approximately 100 miles apart due to the proposed

relocation.

       (12) Child care arrangements: The court observed that Child is fourteen2

and can be alone for certain periods of time.

____________________________________________

2 Child has since turned fifteen.

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      (13) Level of conflict between parties: The court stated that the parties’

level of conflict has increased due to this litigation, and the level of conflict

was “present but tolerable” before this litigation. Id. at 14.

      (14) Parents’ history of drug or alcohol abuse: The court found that

neither parent had any history of abuse.

      (15) Mental condition of parents or household members: The court

found no evidence of mental issues.

      Based on this detailed analysis, the court concluded:

      This is a very difficult case as it involves two parties who are both
      performing their parental duties at an exemplary [Child]. Mother
      has seemingly dedicated her life to meeting [Child]’s needs.
      Mother has taken various jobs based on that employment’s
      flexibility to allow her to be present for [Child]. The alignment of
      priorities has compromised Mother’s employment opportunities in
      ways such as advancement. This current position with American
      opens substantial opportunities in ways of compensation and
      advancement.        This current position with Vision Benefits of
      America opens substantial benefits in both of the above areas and
      certainly has great positive potential for both Mother and [Child].

      The only casualty of Mother (and [Child]) moving from Blair
      County to Allegheny County is Father’s relationship with his
      daughter. Despite assurances from Mother, Father’s current
      relationship with [Child] is almost certain to diminish. Mother’s
      proposal that Father’s mid-week visit with [Child] continue is not
      persuasive. The Wednesday visit that now can occur weekly
      between Father and [Child] simply cannot be sustained when the
      distance between their residences is extended from six blocks to
      one hundred miles. Father, who would benefit continuing this
      weekly ritual, has . . . demonstrated his understanding of this
      difficulty for [Child] by eliminating that period.

      In conclusion, . . . the Court finds Mother and [Child] will benefit
      from a substantially improved quality of life if relocation was
      permitted. Mother has demonstrated the educational, cultural,

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      and overall positive benefits of relocation outweigh the concerns
      laid out by Father.

Id. at 14-16.

      The trial court’s decision was a proper exercise of discretion. The court

emphasized that both parents offer strong arguments in support of their

respective positions.   Mother argued that Child has a strong interest in

relocating because of Mother’s increased compensation and opportunity for

career advancement and Child’s better educational opportunities in the Upper

St. Clair School district.   Father vigorously contended Child has a strong

interest in continuing to live within six blocks of Father and seeing him on a

regular weekly basis. The court concluded, after detailed analysis, that Child’s

interest in relocation outweighed her interest in continuing to reside in Blair

County.   Since the court displayed nuanced judgment and attention to all

relevant factors, its decision to grant relocation was proper.

      Father insists that “[e]ven when compared to a potential slightly better

educational opportunity, the relationship of a parent and a child must, as a

matter of law, trump a potential educational opportunity of a child.” Father’s

Brief at 23-24. Father fails to recognize that we defer to the trial court on

how much weight to give any factor. R.M.G., 986 A.2d at 1237. Parties such

as Father cannot dictate the amount of weight that the court must place on a

particular factor. Id. While the child’s relationship with a particular parent is

obviously an important consideration, the court is not required to give this

factor, or any other factor, dispositive weight. See, e.g., M.L. v. S.G., 2020

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WL 7353347 (Pa. Super., Dec. 15, 2020) (where Mother argued that court did

not give proper weight to certain evidence that was in her favor, “she fails to

present case law in which financial, educational, and cultural opportunities are

the deciding factors in granting a relocation request”).3

       Here, the trial court held that the overall weight of the evidence favors

relocation, because Mother’s enhanced compensation and career opportunities

and Child’s enhanced educational opportunities better serve Child’s interests

than other factors, such as Child’s frequency of contact with Father. We defer

to this assessment, because the court had the discretion to determine which

of the Section 5337 and 5328 factors carried the greatest weight, and it made

this determination following careful analysis of all relevant evidence.

       Father’s second through seventh arguments attack the court’s analysis

of individual factors under Sections 5337(h) and 5328(a). We see no abuse

of discretion in the court’s treatment of any individual factor.

       In his second and third arguments, which he presents together, Father

argues that the court erred in determining that Mother’s relocation was

necessary for her to retain her new job and to progress within her new

company. According to Father, Mother conceded in her testimony that she

could continue working in her new job from her present home in Blair County

and did not need to move to Allegheny County to advance her career interests.

____________________________________________

3 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (nonprecedential memorandum decision of Superior

Court filed after May 1, 2019 may be cited for its persuasive value).

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Father’s Brief at 26-28. Mother testified, however, that although she could

work at home temporarily due to COVID, she and new employer agreed that

she would move to Allegheny County because her job responsibilities required

her to be on site. N.T., 8/18/21, at 15-16. In the future, Mother testified,

“we expect that people will be going back into the office.” Id. at 44. Mother

also testified that (1) her salary in her new job ($72,000.00) was considerably

more than her old salary ($21,000.00), id. at 17, (2) her new job offers

medical benefits and 401(k) matching, while she had to pay her own medical

benefits in her old job, id. at 15, and (3) her new job offers significant

opportunities for promotion, id. at 15-16.         The court credited Mother’s

testimony that she had to relocate to keep her job, Opinion at 5, 10, as the

court had the discretion to do. R.M.G., 986 A.2d at 1237. This evidence

supports the court’s conclusions that Mother needed to move to Allegheny

County and that her proposed relocation has great potential for Mother and

Child.

         Father’s fourth argument consists of two subparts. First, Father insists

that the increase in Mother’s salary will be offset by greater living expenses,

and therefore the court erred in determining that the proposed relocation will

enhance Mother’s and Child’s general quality of life. Father points out that (1)

Mother cannot identify the specific address where she will reside in Upper St.

Clair, (2) Mother’s present home in Blair County does not have a mortgage,

and (3) in Upper St. Clair, Mother will be saddled with a costly mortgage or

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expensive apartment rent ($1,700 per month). There is no way to tell whether

Mother will be able to make mortgage payments, Father continues, because

she has not recently applied for a mortgage.

      Although the trial court did not explicitly address whether Mother will be

able to afford a mortgage or rent in Upper St. Clair, the court clearly implies

in its opinion that Mother will be able to meet this burden. The court wrote

that Mother’s new job is a “substantial benefit to Mother” and that her new

job is “significantly superior in terms of compensation and opportunity for

advancement.” Opinion at 10 (emphasis added).          It is implicit from these

findings that the court viewed Mother’s enhanced prospects as outweighing

Father’s concern that Mother will not meet mortgage or rent requirements in

Upper St. Clair. Since we defer to the trial court on weight issues, R.M.G.,

986 A.2d at 1237, we conclude that this ruling fell within the court’s discretion.

      Second, Father argues that Mother will make as much money in her new

job if she does not relocate than if she moves to Upper St. Clair. Father’s

argument fails because Mother must relocate to Allegheny County to retain

her new job. The court credited Mother’s testimony that her new employer

expects her to move to Allegheny County and to work on-site. Opinion at 5.

As factfinder, the court had the discretion to credit Mother’s testimony, and

we are bound by this evidentiary determination. R.M.G., 986 A.2d at 1237.

By accepting Mother’s testimony that she needs to relocate to Allegheny

County to keep her new job (and higher income), the court implicitly rejected

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Father’s argument that Mother can earn the same income from this job if she

continues to live in Blair County.

      In his fifth argument, Father maintains that               Mother failed to

demonstrate that Child’s quality of life will improve in Allegheny County. We

hold that the trial court acted within its discretion by concluding that Child’s

quality of educational life will improve in Allegheny County. Mother testified

that the Upper St. Clair school district’s rating is superior to the Blair County

school   district   where   Child   attended    school,    and   Mother   submitted

documentary exhibits in support of this point.            N.T., 8/18/21, at 57-60.

Mother also presented detailed testimony, which the court called “compelling,”

about Upper St. Clair’s program for gifted students such as Child and its

extracurricular programs.     Id. at 59-62.     The trial court credited Mother’s

testimony and exhibits and determined that Child’s quality of life will improve

in Allegheny County. As factfinder, the court had the discretion to credit this

testimony and documentary evidence, and we are bound by the court’s

findings. R.M.G., 986 A.2d at 1237.

      In his sixth argument, Father complains that the court determined

erroneously that Mother was not trying to thwart Child’s relationship with

Father. Father states, for example, that (1) when Mother traveled out of Blair

County for work, she would sometimes take Child to a sitter instead of offering

her to Father, and (2) Mother does not allow Father extra time with Child

beyond what the custody order allows. Father’s Brief at 40 (“Father testified

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he almost never is provided extra time beyond what is provided to him in the

custody order”). The trial court ruled that both Mother and Father performed

adequately in allowing contact with the other parent, and there was no

advantage to either party. Opinion at 10. We see no abuse of discretion. The

evidence demonstrates that Child has visited Father on a regular basis in

accordance with the custody order. While Father contends that Mother will

not permit Child to have contact with Father over and above the custody

order, he does not claim that Mother violated the order. We know of no

authority that requires Mother to go beyond the terms of the custody order or

declares that failure to take extra steps is tantamount to thwarting Child’s

relationship with Father.

      In his seventh argument, Father contends that relocation will impair

Child’s relationship with Father’s other two children, whom Father depicts as

having a very harmonious relationship with Child. The court reasoned that

Child’s relationship with the other children “could be maintained with the effort

of both [Mother and Father].” Opinion at 12. This ruling was within the court’s

discretion.   Although relocation will reduce Child’s contact with the other

children (and with Father), the court concluded that the benefits of relocation

outweigh the detriments.      The court was uniquely suited to make this

determination as factfinder, and we see no reason to disturb it.

      The overarching theme of Father’s brief is that the trial court

disregarded factors that Father believes are greatest in importance, e.g.,

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Child’s contact with Father and Father’s children. We reiterate, however, that

it was within the court’s purview as fact-finder to determine which of the many

Section 5337 and 5328 factors are most salient and critical. M.J.M., 63 A.3d

at 339. The fact that the court found other factors more important than the

ones Father wishes to highlight does not provide adequate reason to overturn

the court’s decision.

      For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court acted within its

discretion by deciding that the weight of the evidence favors Child’s relocation

from Blair County to Allegheny County.         We affirm its order granting

relocation.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 10/26/2023

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