Court Opinion

ID: 9930514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 01:00:35.614315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:03.587635
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-10687         Document: 00517057394             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/06/2024

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit
                                       No. 23-10687
                                     Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                     ____________                               February 6, 2024
                                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
   Marcus L. Willis,                                                                   Clerk

                                                                     Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                             versus

   Western Power Sports, Incorporated,

                                                Defendant—Appellee.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                               USDC No. 3:22-CV-1251
                      ______________________________

   Before Jolly, Engelhardt, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Pro se Plaintiff-Appellant Marcus Willis appeals the dismissal of his
   complaint against Western Power Sports, Inc. (“Western Power”) alleging
   claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and
   various Texas laws.          Because Willis failed to state a valid claim, we
   AFFIRM.

         _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 23-10687         Document: 00517057394               Page: 2      Date Filed: 02/06/2024

                                          No. 23-10687

                                                 I.
           Willis, an African American male, was employed by Diversified
   Sourcing Solutions (“DSS”), a temporary staffing agency. 1 In June 2020,
   DSS assigned Willis to Defendant Western Power’s warehouse to work in
   the receiving department. 2 Western Power fired Willis from its receiving
   department but then rehired Willis under a different supervisor. 3 Ultimately,
   in September 2020, Western Power terminated Willis’s employment.
           Willis then filed this suit, pro se, against Western Power alleging
   various claims of race discrimination, retaliation, hostile work environment,
   defamation, wrongful termination, and whistleblowing. Willis contends that
   his supervisor raised his voice, ridiculed him and another African American
   employee, and “was discriminatory towards blacks and favored Spanish
   employees.” Willis further argues that he became depressed when he was
   unable to find new employment after being released from Western Power.
           Western Power responded with a motion to dismiss for failure to state
   a claim under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The matter was referred to the
           _____________________
           1
             The following facts are taken from Willis’s complaint and all well-pleaded
   allegations are accepted as true. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining
   that a complaint must offer more than “unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me
   accusation[s].”) Because Willis is a pro se litigant, his complaint is held to “less stringent
   standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Colman v. United States, 912 F.3d
   824, 828 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internal
   quotations omitted)).
           2
             In the proceedings below, Western Power argued that Willis failed plausibly to
   allege that Western Power was his employer. The district court rejected this argument,
   finding that Western Power exercised a level of control over Willis that allowed the court
   to infer an employment relationship sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Western
   Power does not challenge this finding on appeal. We will therefore refer to Western Power
   as Willis’s employer throughout this opinion.
           3
             It appears that Willis was first fired on August 19, 2020, and then was rehired days
   later, on August 24, to work for a different supervisor.

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                                     No. 23-10687

   magistrate judge. He subsequently issued a Findings, Conclusions, and
   Recommendation (“FCR”). The FCR recommended granting Western
   Power’s motion to dismiss. Willis then filed written objections to the FCR.
   After considering the FCR and Willis’s objections, the district court adopted
   the FCR and dismissed Willis’s complaint. Willis appeals this dismissal.
                                         II.
          We review a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss based on
   failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Bass v. Stryker Corp., 669
   F.3d 501, 506 (5th Cir. 2012). To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss,
   a complaint does not need “detailed factual allegations,” but must provide
   the plaintiff’s grounds for entitlement to relief that “rise above the
   speculative level.” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th Cir. 2007)
   (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal
   quotations omitted)).
          Our review of the record convinces us that Willis failed to allege a
   cause of action against Western Power. As noted earlier, Willis alleged both
   federal and state law claims. His federal claims include racial discrimination,
   hostile work environment, and retaliation. His state law claims include
   defamation, wrongful termination, and termination after being a
   whistleblower. Considering each of his claims, Willis cannot prevail.
          Willis first argues that he was discharged on the basis of his race.
   Willis asserts parallel claims under Title VII, 42. U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(a)(1)
   and the Texas Labor Code, TEX. LAB. CODE § 21.051. Because these
   two statutes have similar language, we often analyze the parallel claims
   together under the Title VII framework. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Dallas County,
   79 F.4th 494, 502–05 (5th Cir. 2023). To meet his burden here, Willis must
   allege: (1) that he is a member of a protected group; (2) he was qualified for
   the position at issue; (3) he was discharged by the employer; and (4) he was

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Case: 23-10687      Document: 00517057394           Page: 4   Date Filed: 02/06/2024

                                     No. 23-10687

   replaced by someone outside his protected group or was treated less favorably
   than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group. McCoy
   v. City of Shreveport, 492 F.3d 551, 556 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted).
   Willis falls short of meeting this burden because he fails to show racial animus
   affected his status. His complaint, for example, provides no facts to show
   that a non-African American employee as a comparator, someone who
   “under nearly identical circumstances” was treated more favorably than he
   was treated. Lee v. Kan. City So. Ry. Co., 574 F.3d 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2009)
   (quoting Little v. Republic Ref. Co., 924 F.2d 93, 97 (5th Cir. 1991)) (internal
   quotations omitted). In short, Willis has not stated a claim for discharge
   based on race discrimination.
          Willis next alleges a claim for hostile work environment. To establish
   a claim of hostile work environment, he must show that he (1) belongs to a
   protected group; (2) was subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the
   harassment complained of was based on his membership in the protected
   group; (4) the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or
   privilege of employment; and (5) the employer knew or should have known
   of the harassment in question and failed to take prompt remedial action.
   Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted).
          The hostility Willis suffered must be sufficiently severe or pervasive
   so as effectively to alter the conditions of Willis’s employment. Johnson v.
   PRIDE Indus., Inc., 7 F.4th 392, 400 (5th Cir. 2021). Willis’s non-conclusory
   allegations—that his supervisor raised his voice and that his supervisor
   ridiculed him and another African American employee for being unable to
   push a pallet jack—either alone or in combination are not sufficiently severe
   or pervasive to alter the conditions of Willis’s employment. Moreover, Willis
   has not provided any argument on appeal that our precedent supports his
   claims. Accordingly, Willis has failed to meet his burden to sustain a claim
   for hostile work environment.

                                          4
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                                      No. 23-10687

          Willis next contends that Western Power retaliated against him for
   “whistleblowing”, that is, complaining to HR about the so-called
   discrimination he witnessed. Willis asserts parallel claims for retaliation
   under Title VII and Texas state law. We analyze Title VII retaliation claims
   and parallel claims for “whistleblowing” under the Texas Labor Code
   identically. See Allen v. Radio One of Tex. II, L.L.C., 515 F. App’x 295, 297
   (5th Cir.) (per curiam) (unpublished), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 880 (2013) (citing
   Ysleta Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Monarrez, 177 S.W. 915, 917 (Tex. 2005)). To
   establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, Willis must show that (1)
   he engaged in protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse employment
   action, and (3) a causal link exists between the protected activity and the
   adverse employment action. Wright v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 990 F.3d 428, 433
   (5th Cir. 2021) (citing Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300, 304 (5th Cir.
   1996)). Willis alleges that, on August 20, 2020, he “explained” to Western
   Power’s corporate office that his supervisor “was discriminatory towards
   blacks and favored Spanish employees.” But Willis fails to show that he
   suffered an adverse employment action. Willis’s complaint alleges that he
   complained of the discrimination on August 20 (one day after he was first
   fired) and was almost immediately rehired. Consequently, Willis cannot
   sustain his burden on a retaliation claim. In sum, we affirm the dismissal of
   all of Willis’s federal claims and parallel state law claims.
          With respect to his remaining state law claim, Willis alleges that he
   was defamed. To maintain a valid claim of defamation under Texas law, a
   plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant: (1) published a statement; (2)
   containing assertions of fact that are defamatory, injuring the plaintiff’s
   reputation; (3) while acting with either actual malice, if the plaintiff is
   considered a public official or public figure, or negligence, if the plaintiff is a
   private individual, regarding the truth of the statement. WFAA-TV, Inc. v.
   McLemore, 978 S.W.2d 568, 571 (Tex. 1998) (citation omitted). Willis fails

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                                     No. 23-10687

   on the first requirement: he has not alleged a published statement. Dismissal
   of this claim was therefore proper.
                                           III.
          The dismissal of Willis’s complaint—essentially for the reasons the
   magistrate    judge   explained    in        its   Findings,   Conclusions,   and
   Recommendation issued May 17, 2023—is in all respects
                                                                     AFFIRMED.

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