Court Opinion

ID: 9544453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:55:41.686082+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:00.931550
License: Public Domain

DENECKE, J.,
specially concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion.
The reason for the problem is historical. Courts extended the basis for liability in products liability eases beyond negligence. In making the extension they borrowed the concept and terminology of “implied warranty” from the law of sales in order to keep within known legal remedies. Stonebrink v. Highland Motors, 171 Or 415, 423-426, 137 P2d 986 (1943). This, however, created new problems because implied warranty in the law of sales had some impedimenta which were regarded as ill-suited to a remedy for personal injuries. The requirement of privity and the necessity of notice of breach were two such impedimenta. The courts eventually freed the remedy of these contractual incidents by evolving the tort of strict liability. Wights v. Staff Jennings, 241 Or 301, 405 P2d 624 (1965); Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or 467, 435 P2d 806 (1967).
At the same time that the tort of strict liability was evolving from the contractual remedy of implied warranty, the drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code were slightly enlarging the implied warranty remedy for personal injuries.
In Markle v. Mulholland’s, Inc., 265 Or 259, 509 P2d 529 (1973), the majority of this court recognized the existence of two separate remedies, one, strict liability in tort, and the other, implied warranty, provided by the Uniform Commercial Code. When the Uniform Commercial Code remedy is sought it logic*286ally should he accompanied by both the benefits and the detriments expressly provided by the statute.