Court Opinion

ID: 9802859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 14:59:30.010223+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:02:20.717321
License: Public Domain

Skoglund, J.,
¶ 25. dissenting. The majority rules, as a matter of law, that if one is present in the courtroom when a judge considers his plea, a full colloquy must still ensue if the defendant, by his presence, has failed to actually waive his appearance in court pursuant to Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 43(c)(2).4 The logic of this decision eludes me. Pursuant to Rule 43, the trial courts have a longstanding practice of accepting pleas by waiver in certain misdemeanor cases. If the waiver form is valid when a defendant is not present before the court, how can it be invalid if the defendant is present in the courtroom and the judge supplements the information on the form by asking the defendant if he understood the forms he signed and if he has any questions? This is not “a practical and functional application” of the requirements of Rule 11, State v. Ploof, 162 Vt. 560, 563, 649 A.2d 774, 776-77 (1994), and strikes me as a mechanical approach to application of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and the court processes they satisfy. I dissent.
*435¶ 26. In his request for post-conviction relief (PCR), petitioner moved to strike his 1992 conviction for driving under the influence, first offense, claiming his plea and sentence were obtained in an unconstitutional manner that did not comply with the applicable portions of Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. V.R.Cr.P. 11(c), (d). While the PCR court found a failure to meet the Rule 11 requirements and struck the 1992 conviction, its decision failed to mention or consider the fact that petitioner signed a “Waiver of Arraignment and Request to Enter Plea” form. The decision was based solely on the transcript of the 1992 hearing wherein the sentencing court accepted petitioner’s no contest plea. There is no analysis of whether the form satisfied the requirements of Rule 11.
¶ 27. Most notably, the decision failed to mention this Court’s decision in State v. Morrissette, 170 Vt. 569, 743 A.2d 1091 (1999) (mem.), which, I suggest, is a first cousin to this case. Of course, to reach its conclusion that a waiver is invalidated by a defendant’s presence, the majority overrules our decision in Morrissette, declaring the decision to be simply wrong. Ante, ¶ 23. I suggest that if Morrissette is wrong, then State v. Delisle, 171 Vt. 128, 758 A.2d 790 (2000), is probably terminal as well.
¶ 28. While the majority uses a footnote to dismiss the confusion over what the PCR court below was actually deciding, I find it an important element of the analysis. Ante, ¶ 8 n.l. There was no “stipulated record submitted by the parties” that could substitute for a merits hearing. And, if the PCR court was deciding a summary judgment motion, the affidavit of petitioner submitted in response to the State’s motion for summary judgment can surely be considered self-serving at best, and is contested by the State.5 So, however the trial court’s decision came about, it contains various facts that were never admitted into evidence, such as “[t]he public defender did not advise Petitioner of potential problems with his arrest including the use of a processing form later deemed unconstitutional6 and the police’s failure to provide *436Petitioner access to an attorney before he submitted to an evidentiary test.” The genesis and basis of the court’s decision remains a mystery and should preclude appeal.
¶ 29. But, to continue, in a post-conviction relief challenge, it is the petitioner’s burden to come forward with objective evidence that his waiver was not knowing and intelligent. Delisle, 171 Vt. at 132-33, 758 A.2d at 793-94. Pretending for the moment that the court decided this matter as a summary judgment, there are facts in dispute. Petitioner relies on statements contained in his affidavit, made more than twenty years after his waiver. This cannot be sufficient to meet his burden. In In re Stevens, 144 Vt. 250, 255, 487 A.2d 212, 215 (1984), we held that the petitioner’s ad hoc claim that he misunderstood the rights surrendered by his plea of guilty was insufficient to meet his burden to produce “objective proof reasonably justifying his mistaken impression.” We called his suggestion to accord his persistent claim of mistaken belief “objective” weight the “most specious of arguments.” Id. at 256, 487 A.2d at 215. We continued, “[njothing could be more subjective than petitioner’s own testimony about what he thought, unsupported by reference to specific circumstances or persons. We will accord no objective weight to such testimony.” Id. The same should hold true here.
1130. At the 1992 hearing, the sentencing court’s inquiries to petitioner were strikingly similar to those we embraced in Morrissette. 170 Vt. at 570, 743 A.2d at 1092. There, the defendant had also signed a “Waiver of Rights and Request to Enter a Plea” form and a “Notice of Plea Agreement” form. And, the defendant appeared before the court, as did petitioner here. The Morrissette court asked the defendant if he had examined the waiver-of-rights form and if he understood it. The defendant replied affirmatively. The court asked if the defendant had any questions regarding his plea and he said he did not. We found that the court had substantially complied with Rule 11. Id. at 571, 743 A.2d at 1093. We did not discount there the executed waiver forms and written plea agreement and the court’s questions to the defendant regarding his understanding of the same. We held the defendant’s plea to be valid. Id.
*437¶ 31. In Delisle, a case decided in 2000, the defendant argued that the State could not prove that his 1983 plea was knowing and voluntary. 171 Vt. at 129, 758 A.2d at 791. In 1983, the defendant was convicted of misdemeanor DUI in absentia and without counsel, based upon his signature to a notice-of-plea-agreement form. The case record included a letter to the defendant from the court indicating enclosure of “the approved Plea Agreement and Waiver,” but the file contained no signed waiver-of-rights form apropos of Rule 43(c)(2). Id. We noted, because the defendant did not appear in court, “there was no oral Rule 11 colloquy.” Id. Yet we affirmed his conviction based in large part on the presumption of regularity that attaches to final judgments, “‘even when the question is waiver of constitutional rights.’ ” Id. at 131, 758 A.2d at 792 (quoting Parke v. Raley, 506 U.S. 20, 29 (1992)). We held that the defendant had to “do more than point to an ambiguous or incomplete record. He must produce evidence that his prior plea was invalid.” Id. at 132, 758 A.2d at 794.
¶ 32. The purpose of Rule ll(c)-(d) is to assure that a plea is knowingly and voluntarily made. “Toward this end, we have required a practical application of the rule ensuring fairness, rather than a technical formula to be followed.” Morrissette, 170 Vt. at 571, 743 A.2d at 1092. All we require is “substantial compliance” with the requirements of the rule. Id. at 571, 743 A.2d at 1093. As we said in Morrissette, “matters of reality, and not mere ritual, should be controlling.” Id. (quotation omitted). The reality here is that petitioner, represented by competent counsel, signed a waiver form designed to take the place of a full colloquy with the judge — a form that specifically informed him of the charges against him, the maximum sentences allowed for those charges, and his rights, including all those rights he would give up by pleading no contest. Then, the judge asked him if he understood what he had signed and if he had any questions. The judge read each charge to petitioner and asked for his plea. And, the judge offered him his right to allocution, which petitioner declined. How can this not be substantial compliance with the requirements of Rule 11? The waiver-of-arraignment form covered all the rights required in a Rule 11(c) colloquy. It also specifically addressed the requirements of Rule 11(d) concerning the voluntariness of his plea and a stipulation that there was a factual basis for same.
¶ 33. This case does not equate to the “wholesale failure” of Rule 11 compliance we discussed in In re Parks, 2008 VT 65, ¶ 10, *438184 Vt. 110, 956 A.2d 545. In Parks there was absolutely no record demonstrating that the defendant’s plea and consequent waiver of constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary; no discussion with the defendant about the constitutional rights he was waiving in entering into a plea agreement. In Parks the court never addressed the defendant at the change-of-plea hearing, except to ask for the plea. That does not resemble in any way the process afforded petitioner in this case.
¶ 34. With this decision, the waiver form contemplated by Rule 43(c)(2) is worthless and fails to substitute for a full Rule 11 colloquy if the defendant enters the courtroom. Only if he stays away from the courtroom can the waiver form fulfill its function and be relied upon by the court.
¶ 35. I dissent.

 Citing to the Reporter’s Notes for Rule 43(c)(2), which in turn cite to 3 C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 721 (1969), the majority holds that the court’s discretion to accept a waiver under Rule 43(c)(2) is limited to those circumstances where to be present would cause hardships that would outweigh any advantages. Ante, ¶ 12. That concept is absent from Rule 43. All Rule 43 requires before the court may give consent to the defendant’s absence is that the waiver be in writing and have the consent of the defendant and the state’s attorney.

Even on appeal the State is confused by the process: “Although the procedural basis for this determination is not plainly stated in the court’s written decision, it appears the court relied on Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f)(3), which permits summary judgment independent of the motion of either party.”

The form was found unconstitutional because it failed to inform individuals of a twenty-four hour attorney hotline established to ensure that a person could exercise his or her right to speak with an attorney before deciding whether or not *436to submit to an evidentiary test, regardless of income. State v. Madonna, 169 Vt. 98, 103, 726 A.2d 498, 501 (1999). This shortcoming is unrelated to the issues presented in this case.