Court Opinion

ID: 9480528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:50:39.2375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:44.726637
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Sept. 10, 1990.
Plaintiff-Appellee, Calvin Berthelsen, has petitioned this court for a rehearing. The petition for rehearing is really a request for a clarification of this court’s earlier opinion. Specifically, Berthelsen seeks to determine whether it was the intention of this court to order that the costs incurred by defendant-appellant, Maurice Kane, in securing a supersedeas bond are now taxable against the plaintiff-appellee.
Rule 39(a) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure provides as follows:
Costs
(a) To Whom Allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise agreed by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against the appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs shall be allowed only as ordered by the court.
Since the default judgment previously entered in the district court was vacated by this court pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39(a) costs are allowed only as ordered by. the court. The logic behind this rule is obvious. Although the defendant-appellant prevailed in this court in the sense that the default judgment previously granted against him was vacated, he has not as yet prevailed on the merits. In the *623event that he should fail to prevail on the merits, then the appeal merely would have resulted in a further delay of the judgment to which the plaintiff was rightfully entitled. For that reason, Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 39(e) provides:
(e) Costs on Appeal Taxable in the District Courts. Costs incurred in the preparation and transmission of the record, the cost of the reporter’s transcript, if necessary for the determination of the appeal, the premiums paid for cost of supersedeas bonds or other bonds to preserve rights pending appeal, and the fee for filing the notice of appeal shall be taxed in the district court as costs of the appeal in favor of the party entitled to costs under this rule.
Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 39(e), the district court is free to determine whether the premium paid on the superse-deas bond should be taxed as costs after there has been a determination on the merits of this case.
The petition for rehearing is DENIED, and this order shall serve as a clarification of this court’s earlier opinion which vacated the default judgment granted against the defendant.