Court Opinion

ID: 9962017
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 15:03:17.133669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:40.386199
License: Public Domain

FOURTH DIVISION
                                DILLARD, P. J.,
                            BROWN and PADGETT, JJ.

                    NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                    physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                    days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                                https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                       April 22, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A24A0328. THE STATE v. JONES.

      BROWN, Judge.

      Christopher Lee Jones was charged with DUI per se, OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (5),

DUI less safe, OCGA § 40-6-391 (a) (1), reckless driving, OCGA § 40-6-390, and

driving on the wrong side of the road, OCGA § 40-6-40. The State appeals from the

grant of Jones’ motion to suppress evidence. For the reasons discussed below, we

affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand the case with direction.

             When conducting an appellate review of a ruling on a motion to
      suppress evidence, we follow three fundamental principles: First, when
      a motion to suppress is heard by the trial judge, that judge sits as the trier
      of facts. The trial judge hears the evidence, and his findings based upon
      conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict of a jury and should not
      be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence to support
      them. Second, the trial court’s decision with regard to questions of fact
       and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Third, the
       reviewing court must construe the evidence most favorably to the
       upholding of the trial court’s findings and judgment.

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Edwards v. State, 357 Ga. App. 396, 396-397 (850

SE2d 837) (2020). “To properly follow the first principle, we must focus on the facts

found by the trial court in its order, as the trial court sits as the trier of fact.” (Citation

and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) State v. Rouse, 309 Ga. App. 536 (710

SE2d 670) (2011). See also Hughes v. State, 296 Ga. 744, 746 (1) (770 SE2d 636)

(2015) (on appeal from the grant or denial of a motion to suppress, appellate courts

must “focus on the facts found by the trial court in its order”) (citation and

punctuation omitted; emphasis in original). “An appellate court may, however,

consider facts that definitively can be ascertained exclusively by reference to evidence

that is uncontradicted and presents no questions of credibility, such as facts

indisputably discernible from a videotape.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) State

v. Bly, 367 Ga. App. 786, 787 (888 SE2d 593) (2023).

       So viewed, the evidence before the trial court consisted of testimony from the

officer who conducted the traffic stop; a deputy who was called to the scene to

conduct the horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN) test; and video footage of the stop and

                                               2
subsequent investigation. That evidence showed that on September 27, 2022, at

approximately 9:00 p.m., the officer was on his way to assist with an unrelated traffic

stop when he observed Jones turn left into the exit lane of a divided

entrance/roadway. The officer initiated a traffic stop at which point Jones stopped his

vehicle, got out, and approached the officer’s patrol car. Jones told the officer that he

could not see. After asking Jones for his driver’s license, the officer observed that

Jones smelled of alcohol, and that his eyes were bloodshot and “glossed over.” Jones

admitted to drinking “a few” at which point the officer returned to his patrol car to

run a check on Jones’ driver’s license and call for backup. After Jones explained to the

officer that he was out driving because he had an argument with his wife — and

approximately three minutes into the traffic stop — the officer advised Jones that he

needed to run “a couple of evaluations to determine if [Jones was] safe to drive” and

to “hang tight” while he waited for another unit.1

      1
         The officer testified that “another [unit] was called in to do [the HGN
evaluation]” because the officer was not certified to do HGN. The officer was,
however, certified to conduct other field sobriety tests. When asked during the hearing
if he needed backup to perform the HGN, the officer testified that he needed “[j]ust
backup period” and that he “always wait[s] for a backup officer, a secondary officer
before doing any kind of field evaluations. That is for both parties’ safety, if
anything.”
                                            3
      After advising Jones to “hang tight,” the officer got back in his patrol car for

about three minutes and then moved it out of the roadway. Approximately seven

minutes into the traffic stop, he exited his patrol car and waited with Jones for the

other unit to arrive. While waiting, the officer and Jones made small talk, discussing

Jones’ mother’s health, when the officer moved to Georgia, and other topics.

Approximately eleven minutes after the officer called for a second unit, a deputy

showed up and conducted the HGN evaluation.2 After the deputy conducted the

HGN evaluation, the officer conducted other field sobriety tests on Jones, including

walk and turn and one-leg stand. Approximately 23 minutes into the traffic stop, the

officer retrieved a portable breath test (PBT) from his patrol car and performed a

breath test on Jones, which was positive for the presence of alcohol. At this point,

Jones asked the officer, “why did we do all of that, when we could have just done

      2
         Although the officer and deputy both testified that the deputy relayed the
HGN findings to the officer, the video does not reflect any conversation between the
two after the deputy completed the test and before the officer begins his evaluations.
The trial court did not credit this testimony in its order, finding that “the video [did]
not even show the [o]fficer conversing with the [d]eputy about the results of the HGN
before he starts his evaluation. Thus, it appears to the [c]ourt that even the results of
the HGN were not necessary or desired in order for the [o]fficer to conduct his
investigation.”
                                            4
this?” Jones was arrested for DUI. The officer held onto Jones’ driver’s license

during the entire investigation.

      At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court granted the motion to suppress

all evidence obtained after the officer began waiting for the second unit to arrive,

ruling that the officer failed to diligently pursue a means of investigation likely to

confirm or dispel his suspicions that Jones was driving under the influence, and that

the detention was prolonged more than necessary. The court ruled, however, that the

State can use any evidence gained before that time and found that the question of

“whether [Jones’] arrest lacked probable cause is moot since the [c]ourt has

suppressed all post-arrest evidence.” In so ruling, the trial court found that the while

the DUI investigation was initially valid, the officer pursued no investigation until the

deputy arrived even though he was trained in conducting other field sobriety tests and

had a PBT readily available in his patrol car, and that his standard procedure of

waiting for backup was not a reasonable explanation for not undertaking some

investigation. Indeed, the trial court found that it was the officer’s “personal

preference” to wait for backup, implicitly rejecting his safety claim. This appeal

followed.

                                            5
      1. The State contends that the trial court erred in suppressing all evidence

obtained after the officer began waiting for the second unit to arrive because Jones’

detention was reasonable under the circumstances and supported by reasonable

articulable suspicion. We disagree.

      The United States Supreme Court has held that “an investigative detention

must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the

stop. Similarly, the investigative methods employed should be the least intrusive

means reasonably available to verify or dispel the officer’s suspicion in a short period

of time.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U. S. 491, 500 (II) (103 SCt 1319, 75 LE2d 229) (1983).

See also Mullins v. State, 355 Ga. App. 452, 455 (1) (844 SE2d 519) (2020).

      Claims that such a detention was unreasonably prolonged are of two
      sorts. In [the first sort], a detention is prolonged beyond the conclusion
      of the investigation that warranted the detention in the first place, and in
      those cases, the courts generally have concluded that such a prolongation
      — even a short one — is unreasonable, unless, of course, good cause has
      appeared in the meantime to justify a continuation of the detention to
      pursue a different investigation. In [the second sort], the detention is not
      prolonged beyond the conclusion of the investigation that originally
      warranted the detention, but it is claimed that the investigation took too
      long, perhaps because the officer spent too much time inquiring about
      matters unrelated to the investigation. In these cases, the courts examine

                                           6
      whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was
      likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it
      was necessary to detain the defendant.

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rodriguez v. State, 295 Ga. 362, 369 (2) (b) (761

SE2d 19) (2014). The central question is “whether the detention was appreciably

prolonged, considering the detention as a whole, and keeping in mind that the

touchstone of our inquiry is reasonableness.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Id.

at 370 (2) (b). It is the State’s burden of proving that the duration of the detention was

reasonable. See Royer, 460 U. S. at 500 (II). See also Mullins, 355 Ga. App. at 456 (1).

“A trial court’s conclusion that a traffic stop was unreasonably prolonged may often

be a fact-intensive determination, but it is ultimately a holding of constitutional law

that we review de novo.” State v. Allen, 298 Ga. 1, 4 (2) (779 SE2d 248) (2015). See

also Weaver v. State, 357 Ga. App. 488 (851 SE2d 125) (2020). Moreover, as our

Supreme Court has recognized, while a police officer is “not constitutionally required

to move at top speed or as fast as possible, . . . [the] officer [must] pursue[ the]

investigation with reasonable diligence” so as not to offend the Fourth Amendment.

Rodriguez, 295 Ga. at 371 (2) (b).

                                            7
      Jones alleged that this case presents the second sort of claim, arguing in his

motion to suppress that the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop because he

could have conducted other field sobriety tests while waiting for the second unit to

arrive to perform the HGN evaluation. The trial court agreed and we agree with the

trial court that Jones’ detention was unreasonably prolonged. In particular, the State

failed to establish why it was reasonable for the officer to detain Jones while waiting

for a second unit without performing any field sobriety tests when the evidence

showed that (1) the officer was certified to perform two of the field sobriety tests he

eventually performed; (2) he had a PBT in his patrol car which he eventually used on

Jones; and (3) the deputy never disclosed to the officer the results of the HGN test.

Moreover, although the officer testified that it was his routine practice to wait for

backup before conducting a DUI investigation “for both parties’ safety, if anything,”

the trial court seemingly rejected this rationale as unreasonable given that the officer

spent the time waiting outside his patrol car engaging in small talk with Jones. We,

therefore, conclude that the trial court did not err in granting the motion to suppress

on the ground that the detention was unreasonably prolonged. See Mullins, 355 Ga.

App. at 455-456 (1). Compare State v. Holt, 334 Ga. App. 610, 611-612 (780 SE2d 44)

                                           8
(2015) (reversing grant of motion to suppress where trooper who had been sent to

investigate a vehicle incident observed signs of alcohol consumption in defendant,

conducted breath test which tested positive for alcohol six minutes after stopping

defendant, and then radioed for another trooper).

       2. The State contends that the trial court erred in granting Jones’ motion to

suppress because there was probable cause for his arrest regardless of the field-

sobriety evaluations and the prolonged delay. In its order, the trial court noted that it

had “suppressed all evidence obtained after the [o]fficer began waiting on the

[d]eputy to arrive to assist him [and that] [a] ruling on lack of probable cause to arrest

is deemed moot.” After concluding that Jones’ detention was unreasonably

prolonged, the trial court then ruled as follows:

       As such, any evidence gained after this point is excluded — both pre-
       arrest and post-arrest evidence. [The] State can use any evidence in its
       case in chief that was gained BEFORE that point. The issue of whether
       [Jones’] arrest lacked probable cause is moot since the [c]ourt has
       suppressed all post-arrest evidence.

       As this Court has explained,

       [p]robable cause exists for an arrest where the objective facts known to
       the officer establish a probability that the suspect has been engaged in

                                              9
       illegal activity. A probability is less than a certainty but more than a mere
       suspicion or possibility. Thus, to arrest a suspect for DUI less safe to
       drive, an officer must have knowledge or reasonably trustworthy
       information that a suspect was actually in physical control of a moving
       vehicle, while under the influence of alcohol to a degree which renders him
       incapable of driving safely. Mere presence of alcohol is not the issue.

(Citations and punctuation omitted; emphasis in original.) Bostic v. State, 332 Ga.

App. 604, 606-607 (774 SE2d 175) (2015). See also State v. Culler, 351 Ga. App. 19,

23 (1) (830 SE2d 434) (2019). When engaging in a probable cause analysis, “a court

must consider the facts and circumstances altogether, for it is the totality of those facts

and circumstances that matters, not any one fact or circumstance standing alone.”

(Citation and punctuation omitted.) Culler, 351 Ga. App. at 23. However, where “the

trial court has made express findings of fact, but not with sufficient detail to permit

meaningful appellate review, an appellate court may remand for further findings.”

Hughes, 296 Ga. at 746 (1), n.6.

       In this case, the trial court deemed the issue of probable cause moot, without

engaging in any analysis as to whether Jones was under the influence of alcohol to a

                                              10
degree which rendered him incapable of driving safely.3 See Bostic, 332 Ga. App. at

607. While the trial court’s order acknowledged certain testimony by the officer

necessary for establishing probable cause to arrest for DUI less safe, it offered no

guidance as to whether it found that testimony credible and made no specific factual

findings related to a probable cause analysis. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 301 Ga. 60,

62 (799 SE2d 779) (2017) (vacating this Court’s decision reversing grant of motion to

suppress and remanding to the trial court “for further clarification on the specific

findings that form the basis for its legal conclusions” including whether it credited the

officer’s testimony). Because the trial court’s order lacks sufficient detail to enable

meaningful appellate review on the issue of probable cause to arrest for DUI less safe,

we vacate that portion of the order and remand the case for further proceedings

      3
         We recognize that the trial court’s statement in its order that “[the] State can
use any evidence in its case in chief that was gained BEFORE” the officer began
waiting on the deputy, could be interpreted as a finding that the officer had probable
cause to arrest for DUI less safe based on the fact that the officer smelled alcohol on
Jones’ breath, that Jones’ eyes were “glossed over,” and that he admitted to having
“a few.” However, given the standard on a motion to suppress and the requirement
that we focus on the facts found by the trial court in its order, we will not assume such
a conclusion without an express statement by the trial court. See, e.g., Williams v.
State, 301 Ga. 60, 62 (799 SE2d 779) (2017) (vacating and remanding grant of motion
to suppress “for further clarification on the specific findings that form the basis for
[the trial court’s] legal conclusions”).
                                           11
consistent with this opinion. See id. See also Culler, 351 Ga. App. at 27 (2) (a)

(vacating and remanding for trial court to consider further questions regarding

administration of the HGN test); Martinez v. State, 347 Ga. App. 675, 685 (C) (ii)

(820 SE2d 507) (2018).

       Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part, and case remanded with direction.

Dillard, P. J., and Padgett, J. concur.

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