Court Opinion

ID: 9618895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:18:51.098617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:33.167833
License: Public Domain

Deen, Judge.
On June 27, 1967, a judge of the Civil Court of Fulton County sustained the general demurrer of each of the defendants and dismissed the case. At the same term of court plaintiff filed a motion to reconsider with rule nisi, which was signed by the judge and by its terms acted as a supersedeas until further order of the court. Thereafter on July 26 the court entered another order sustaining the general demurrers of each defendant and also a special demurrer of each contending that there was a misjoinder of parties defendant. A motion to dismiss the appeal has been filed in this court on the ground that the order of June 27, which is contended to be the final judgment dismissing the case was not appealed from within 30 days. This court is of the opinion that the case of LeCraw v. L. P. D., Inc., 114 Ga. App. 281 (150 SE2d 927) and like cases are not controlling where in analogous situations motions for reconsideration were filed, for the reason that here the grant of the supersedeas tolled time for filing an appeal. Where during the same term a motion to set aside the judgment is entertained, *490the order thereon is the final appealable judgment in the case. Pazol v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Sandy Springs, 112 Ga. App. 161 (144 SE2d 117). The motion is denied.
The Civil Court of Eulton County has no jurisdiction over direct or indirect injuries to the person or reputation. Cantrell v. Davis, 176 Ga. 745 (169 SE 38); Funk v. Baldwin, 80 Ga. App. 177 (55 SE2d 733). The definition of the right of privacy as the term was used in Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. 'Co., 122 Ga. 190 (5) (50 SE 68, 69 LRA 101, 106 ASR 104, 2 AC 561) and as it is generally considered in the cases dealing with the subject, is one that deals with the person as a person, his mental proclivities and emotional reactions. “It is, simply stated, the right to be" let alone; to live one’s life as one chooses, free from assault, intrusion or invasion except as they can be justified by the clear needs of community living under a government of law.” Fortas, J., dissenting in Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 413 (87 SC 534, 17 LE2d 456). So considered, as stated in Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 304 (162 P2d 133): “it is an incident of the person, and not of property. It is a personal action which does not survive the death of the injured party. It does not exist if there has been consent to publication, or where the plaintiff has become a public character, and thereby waived his right to privacy, nor in the ordinary dissemination of news and events, nor in connection with the life of a person in whom the public has a rightful interest, nor where the information would be of public benefit.” It is clear that Count 2 of the petition in this case is based on an invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy in this traditional sense. The general demurrer to this count was correctly sustained both on the theory that the Civil Court of Fulton County has no jurisdiction over injuries to the person, feelings and sensibilities, and •on the ground that as to this phase of the right of privacy the •plaintiff clearly, by acting in the home movie, was seeking exactly the kind of publicity which she obtained, that is, an extension of her public image as Prissie in the movie Gone With the Wind. Once consenting to the use of one’s name in a given situation waives one’s right to privacy in that area. Tanner-Brice Co. v. Sims, 174 Ga. 13 (4), 21 (161 SE 819). The plain*491tiff’s consent was to the use of her name, photograph and image in the very manner in which it was used (a movie identifying her as Prissie) although she did not consent to the making and sale, of the otherwise correct reproductions of this film on postcards, slides, and leaflet illustrations. Pavesich and its offspring afforded no precedent which would shield Count 2 from the demurrers interposed.
As to Count 1 a different principle obtains. Both before and since Pavesich it has been recognized that the appropriation of another’s identity, picture, papers, name or signature without consent and for financial gain might be a tort for which an action would lie on the theory that it constitutes an invasion of a property right. As an early example, it is pointed out in Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 209 (20 S2d 243, 168 ALR 430), that in the case of Prince Albert v. Strange, 64 Eng. Reprint 293, aff. 41 Eng. Rep. 1171 “the English judge instructed the jury that the unauthorized publication of etchings made by the Queen and Prince Consort for their own private amusement amounted to an invasion of their privacy, but the Court saw fit to base its decision upon the nominal right of property.” In 1906 it was observed in Klug v. Sheriffs, 129 Wis. 468, 472 (109 NW 656): “It will be seen, however, upon examination of the cases cited as sustaining the so-called 'right of privacy’ that many of them turn upon property rights or breach of trust, contract or confidence.” In U. S. Life Ins. Co. v. Hamilton (Tex. Civ. App.) 238 SW2d 289, 292, a former employer of the plaintiff continued to send out letters over his signature as manager after his employment had terminated, and the court held: “The use of an individual’s signature for business purposes unquestionably constitutes the exercise of a valuable right of property in the broadest sense of that term. . . In this broad sense, we have no doubt that the unauthorized use of appellee’s name and signature by appellants, regardless of why it was so used, constituted such wrongful conduct on their part as to entitle appellee to the recovery of nominal damages, even though no actual damages were shown.” But when we hold that the unauthorized reproduction and sale of. the plaintiff’s pictures for the financial gain of the defendant is an actionable tort inde*492pendent of elements of injury to the person, we have direct authority in Cabaniss v. Hipsley, 114 Ga. App. 367 (4) .(151 SE2d 496). Both cases deal with a performer whose livelihood depends to some extent on the public image created by her efforts and talent — there, an exotic dancer; here, an actress in a well known movie. Both plaintiffs have packaged their personality within the area of performance as a commodity for sale to the public, and it can no more be tolerated that another take this commodity developed and marketed by the plaintiff for private gain than that her dress or automobile be misappropriated in like manner. “The main distinction between this aspect of privacy and the other three is the distinction between causes of action involving injury to feelings, sensibilities or reputation and those involving an appropriation of rights- in the nature of property rights for commercial exploitation.” (Emphasis supplied.) Cabaniss, supra, at p. 377. This case also points out- that the measure of damages is the advertising value of the use of the material in the manner and for the time it was appropriated, but failure to state a correct measure of damages subjects the petition to special rather than general demurrer. It was error to dismiss the petition without allowing the plaintiff opportunity to amend, since a cause of action for at least nominal damages is set out as against the general demurrer interposed.
The special demurrers on the ground of misjoinder of parties defendant was properly sustained under the old pleading Act in effect when the demurrers' were filed. It appears that the plaintiff’s agreement was with Wilson and Stone Mountain Plantation, Inc. So far as the petition shows, Atlanta News Agency, Inc., knew nothing of the agreement nor did it participate in making the movie. It did make and sell postcards and perhaps the Souvenir Book of Stone Mountain, in which latter pictures of Butterfly McQueen as Prissie of Gone With the' Wind were used. These had to be- obtained from the other two' defendants, who apparently had title to the movie film. No concert of action is alleged. Wilson and Stone Mountain Plantation, Inc., -may or may not be responsible for' any damages accruing to the plaintiff by reason of the sale of - the pictures by Atlanta News Agency, Inc., but it is hard-to see how *493the converse could be true under the skimpy facts alleged. In any event, we are here following the old rule of construction against the pleader.
The trial court did not err in sustaining the special demurrers of the defendants or in sustaining the general demurrers to Count 2 of the petition. It was error to dismiss Count 1 without allowing the plaintiff an opportunity to amend.

Judgment affirmed in part; reversed in part.

Felton, C. J., Bell, P. J., Jordan, P. J., Hall, Eberhardt and Quillian, JJ., concur. Whitman, J., concurs specially. Pannell, J., dissents.