Court Opinion

ID: 9761092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:31:25.589813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:20.088808
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
concurring. I concur in the result, but on different grounds. The critical factor for me is that there was no stop by the officer in this case. It is undisputed that defendant pulled off the road and came to a complete stop before the officer pulled up behind her. Thus, we must distinguish this case from those like State v. Emilo, 144 Vt. 477, 481, 479 A.2d 169, 171 (1984), where a police officer used flashing blue lights in order to stop a vehicle. I think it is clear that the degree of restraint on defendant was significantly less than if there had been a stop. See, e.g., People v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d 382, 390, 560 N.E.2d 309, 313 (1990).
Ordinarily, where there is no stop there is no seizure, and the constitutional protection on which defendant relies does not apply. Three facts present here might change that conclusion: (1) the officer approached defendant’s car “armed and in uniform”; (2) the officer asked for defendant’s license and registration; and (3) when he stopped, the officer activated his flashing blue lights. It is clear that neither of the first two facts amount to a seizure. The United States Supreme Court has held that a uniformed officer approaching a citizen, asking questions of the citizen and asking for identification, is not a seizure, a holding most recently reaffirmed in Florida v. Bostick, — U.S. —, —, 111 S. Ct. 2382, 2386 (1991), in which the Court concluded that the rule was no different on a bus even though the individual involved did not feel free to leave the bus. As a result, courts have uniformly held that “the mere approaching and question- . ing of a person seated in a parked vehicle does not constitute a seizure.” People v. Murray, 137 Ill. 2d at 391-92, 560 N.E.2d at 313; see generally 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(h), at *13409 (2d ed. 1987). Further, they have held that requesting a license and registration does not constitute a seizure unless the officer does not return these documents. See generally 3 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 9.2(h), at 414 n.252.
The only ground to find a seizure in this case is the use of flashing blue lights. In looking at this issue, I accept that the use of these lights is normally viewed as a police “order” to stop. See Moyer v. Dunn County, 691 F. Supp. 164, 169-70 (W.D. Wis. 1988). One commentator has noted, “Certainly it seems an officer seeking to avoid a seizure should not activate the lights of the squad car.” Butterfoss, Bright Line Seizures: The Need for Clarity in Determining When Fourth Amendment Activity Begins, 79 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 437, 456 n.109 (1988). Despite these generalizations, with which I agree, I do not believe the use of the lights in this case resulted in a seizure.
First, our law distinguishes between the use of flashing lights to stop a motorist and the use for other purposes. All of the statutes imposing requirements on a motorist when approached by a law enforcement vehicle using flashing blue lights involve use of the lights to stop the vehicle. See 23 V.S.A. § 1012 (operator “shall promptly and carefully stop when signalled to stop by an enforcement officer wearing insignia which identifies the officer”); § 1013 (person may not “knowingly fail or refuse to comply with any lawful order” of enforcement officer); § 1133 (an operator must “bring his vehicle to a stop when signalled to do so by an enforcement officer . . . operating a law enforcement vehicle . . . displaying a flashing blue . . . signal lamp”). The presence of a stopped law enforcement vehicle with a flashing light more often gives a message that there is a road hazard, and cars should proceed with caution. Indeed, the flashing lights may have been used for this purpose here since the shoulder was narrow.
Second, the primary message that the flashing lights give is the presence of a law enforcement vehicle because only such a vehicle can use this color of flashing light. 23 V.S.A. § 1252(a)(1). In a major sense, the use of the flashing light is similar to the uniform; it identifies the presence of a law enforcement officer. If the visible symbol of law enforcement does not bring about a seizure in one instance, it should not necessarily do so in the *14other instance. While some persons might find the flashing lights to be more intimidating than the uniform, the difference is one of degree, not kind. I see no bright line between these symbols.
Most significant for me is the third reason — we want law enforcement officials to use a visible signal of their presence in a case like this. This incident occurred late at night on a remote and isolated stretch of road. If we prohibit the use of the lights in such circumstances, we are requiring that the officer approach the vehicle with no way of showing that the officer presents no threat to the well-being of the occupant of the vehicle. Even if we view the officer solely as a criminal investigator, it is highly desirable, for both the vehicle occupant and the officer, that the occupant know that the person approaching is an officer. In the context of a DUI roadblock, we have required “a visible display of legitimate police authority” to meet Fourth Amendment requirements. State v. Martin, 145 Vt. 562, 571, 496 A.2d 442, 448 (1985). The need for a visible display is much greater in this case. See Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 452 (1990) (checkpoint stops involve less generation of concern or fear in motorists than stops by roving patrols).
We must also deal with the likely scenario that the officer will be providing assistance to a disabled vehicle and must warn other motorists of a potentially hazardous condition. If the use of flashing blue lights constitutes a seizure, it is because they represent a “show of authority.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). Normally a seizure occurs “only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave.” United States v. Mendenhall; 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980). As the Supreme Court has recently explained, however, the Mendenhall test is incomplete in show-of-authority cases. See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628, 111 S. Ct. 1547, 1551 (1991). In addition to concluding that a reasonable person would not have believed she was free to leave, we must also conclude that there was actually a submission to the assertion of authority. See id. I find it difficult to so conclude in this case. Because the officer may have employed the flashing lights for a number of reasons, it is not clear that a reasonable person would interpret them as *15meaning she is required to remain stopped or that defendant so interpreted them in this case. In this doubtful circumstance, I would not interpret the use of the lights as a command to defendant to remain stopped. I note that in Hodari D. the Court’s interpretation of the Fourth Amendment was influenced by the policy objective of avoiding dangerous street pursuit of criminal suspects. Id. Similarly, in this case, my view of the concept of a seizure is influenced by the desirability of having the officer be identified in some meaningful way.