Court Opinion

ID: 9696338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:45:18.298279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:21.462744
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts:
In dismissing the complaint in the instant case, the court below based its decision on the grounds that the petition for withdrawal was neither timely filed nor properly acknowledged. This Court, in reversing that decision, as well as the decision of the County Board of Elections, holds that even if filed late, the withdrawal should be permitted on the theory that the statutory time period for filing such withdrawals is merely directory.1 In my view such a construction needlessly *407and unwisely opens the electoral process to the possibility of manifold abuses. I, therefore, must dissent from such a construction of the withdrawal provision of the Pennsylvania Election Code.
In support of its interpretation of the statutory language as directory, the majority relies on Altoona Mayor Substitute Nomination Case, 413 Pa. 305, 196 A. 2d 371 (1964), and that line of cases which suggest that, the Election Code be given a liberal construction. See Ross Nomination Petition, 411 Pa. 45, 190 A. 2d 719 (1963), and cases cited therein. In my view, such reliance is misplaced.
In Altoona, supra, this Court was concerned with that section of the Election Code which deals with the substitution of a nominee following the creation of a vacancy. See Act of June 3, 1937, P. L. 1333, §981 (a), 25 P.S. §2941. In the instant case, we are concerned with a separate section dealing with the distinguishable problem of the timeliness of the withdrawal and the creation of the vacancy itself. See id. at §978, 25 P.S. §2938. Not only are the sections applicable to substitution and withdrawal separate and distinct, but a moments reflection reveals that the considerations relevant to their construction are equally inapposite.
Altoona, supra, presented this Court with a situation in which the candidate of one of the major parties had withdrawn from the mayoralty race.2 Thus a va*408caney existed. A mandatory construction of the filing provisions of the Pennsylvania Election Code, under those circumstances, so as to deny substitution, “in reality, would have resolved the election in advance . . . and not at the polls” where such matters were intended to be resolved. Altoona Mayor Substitute Nomination Case, 413 Pa. 305, 313, 196 A. 2d 371, 375 (1964). We concluded, therefore, that the Legislature could not have intended the filing requirements for substitution to have been construed in a fashion so as to deny the voters freedom of choice in the election.3
In the instant case, however, a construction of that section of the election code pertaining to the timeliness of withdrawals as being mandatory would have no such result. Were we to affirm the court below, the names of both candidates regularly nominated in the primary election would appear on the ballot. That freedom of choice which was not present in Altoona and which the election code seeks to preserve would not be denied the voters of Northumberland County by such affirmance. Whether or not the candidate seeking withdrawal will serve if elected is a matter of mere conjecture. Yet the majority, in order to conclude that the instant case is governed by the same considerations which prompted our decision in Altoona, indulges in just such speculation. In so doing, the majority ignores those provisions of the election code more directly suited to meet that *409possible contingency4 and at tbe same time exposes tbe electorate to the possibility of political abuse and undesirable practices.
What the majority fails to realize is that the various time limitations in the election code, extremely numerous, were designed to provide a statutory calendar not only for the orderly administration of the elective process but also, in many instances, to obviate potentially abusive practices. I do not purport at this time to analyze each of the various limitations but I do object, however, to the indiscriminate extension of the reasoning of the Altoona case by the majority without such analysis.
In my view, a careful consideration of the time limitation here involved reveals that the majority needlessly disrupts the legislative election timetable and thereby does a great disservice to the electorate. Were a candidate permitted to withdraw at any time prior to the election, party leaders may be tempted to contrive such belated withdrawals in order to secure the election of those who might otherwise be unable to withstand the exposure and public scrutiny of a more extended campaign. Were both major parties able to secure belated withdrawals from subservient candidates in the same election, then the public would be denied any meaningful choice in light of the possible lack of time for a thorough examination and consideration of the qualifications of the substituted candidates.
A more realistic potential abuse, equally to be condemned, made possible by the decision rendered today, is the opportunity afforded party leaders to test the winds of public sentiment in determining whether the time is propitious to impose an unqualified office-seeker on the public and thereby nullify the primary election. If due to the intervention of some fortuitous *410event, sucli as the death or disability of a strong opponent or a late tide of public attraction to a particular party label, the prospects for victory of one side are significantly improved, great pressure may now be brought to bear on the duly selected nominee to withdraw in favor of a less qualified person whom the party leaders may seek to reward. Unfortunately, these potential abuses are now realistic possibilities under the majority’s reading of the Pennsylvania Election Code.
The majority seeks support from those cases which provide that the Election Code “must be liberally construed so as not to deprive an individual of his right to run for office, or the voters of their right to elect a candidate of their choice.” Ross Nomination Petition, 411 Pa. 45, 48, 190 A. 2d 719, 720 (1963). Neither of these factual circumstances is present in the instant case. Moreover, I fear that the construction which the Court today adopts will promote over the long run neither of these objectives. Rather, it may well promote a complete disregard, under the guise of liberality, for all the time limitations in the code and thereby provide an unfair advantage to those who may seek to subvert the democratic process. By affording the opportunity for such maneuvering, this Court today denies the electorate that protection which the spirit of liberality was designed to afford. What the majority has done in effect is to nullify all the time limitations in the code without a full appreciation of the purposes for which many were provided. The majority justifies its construction of the filing requirement for withdrawal as directory as necessary to avoid an unreasonable result. In my view, such an approach is unfortunate in that no such result would obtain by requiring compliance with the explicit statutory command.
As was pointed out by Justice Cohen in his dissent in Altoona, “it is not too much to ask of a candidate that he not unduly disrupt the election machinery if he *411wishes to withdraw and that he act, if at all, before a certain date. The electorate is not confronted with an unavoidable vacancy as in the case of death, and it rightfully demands that no vacancy be permitted by withdrawal less than sixty-five days before an election [the period then provided for by the Code]; otherwise, candidates could play fast and loose with our election processes and make a mockery of them as was done here.” Altoona Mayor Substitute Nomination Case, 413 Pa. 305, 314-15, 196 A. 2d 371, 375-76 (1964). (Emphasis added.) Although not relevant to the issues presented in Altoona, these observations are particularly pertinent to those raised by the instant case.
Accordingly, since the record supports the finding that the withdrawal was not timely, a finding which the majority does not contest, I would affirm the action of the court below and the County Board of Elections.

 A directory provision is one the observance of which is not necessary to the validity of the proceedings. American Labor Party Case, 352 Pa. 576, 579, 44 A. 2d 48, 49 (1945). It should be noted that although the court below dismissed the complaint on two grounds, the majority ignores the lack of acknowledgement on the withdrawal petition. Despite a complete lack of discussion on this *407issue, the result which the majority reaches can only be explained by assuming that the Court decided sub silentio that the lack of acknowledgement is without significance. As I view the merits of the instant case, it is not necessary to reach this issue, and accordingly I offer no opinion on the matter.

 No objections were interposed to either of the withdrawals in Altoona, and the County Board of Elections permitted them. Altoona Mayor Substitute Nomination Case, 413 Pa. 305, 307 n.1, 196 A. 2d 371, 372 n.1 (1964). Its action in permitting such withdrawals was not contested and the issue of their timeliness was not before this Court in Altoona.

 It should be noted that Altoona presented no novel question. This Court previous to that decision had permitted late substitution in order to secure to the voters that choice which the election code was intended to provide. See County Commissioner Substitute Nomination Case, 383 Pa. 372, 118 A. 2d 750 (1955). My disagreement with the majority’s disposition of the instant ease should not be taken as indicating any belated doubts as to the propriety of the Altoona and County Commissioner Substitute Nomination Case decisions.

 See Act of August 9, 1955, P. L. 323, §409, 16 P.S. §409; see also Act of July 28, 1953, P. L. 723, §409, 16 P.S. §3409.