Court Opinion

ID: 9465189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:38:26.954107+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:01.468241
License: Public Domain

COLEMAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
With great deference to the views of my distinguished Brethren, I must respectfully dissent to the affirmance of this conviction.
I agree that Gresham’s confession was voluntary, but this fell far short of the necessary.
In this Circuit, in prosecutions for a violation of 18 U.S.C., § 2312, interstate transportation of a stolen motor vehicle, the evidence for the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) the vehicle was stolen, (2) the defendant transported it in interstate commerce, and (3) the defendant had the requisite guilty knowledge concerning the theft of the car, Moody v. United States, 5 Cir., 1967, 377 F.2d 175; United States v. King, 5 Cir., 1970, 425 F.2d 1163; United States v. Casey, 5 Cir., 1970, 428 F.2d 229, cert. denied, 400 U.S. 839, 91 S.Ct. 78, 27 L.Ed.2d 73.
In Casey we said that upon each of these elements, the government must present substantial evidence from which a jury might find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, 428 F.2d at 231.
The majority opinion states, quite correctly, that the government did not 'put the alleged owner of the vehicle on the witness stand, offered no other proof of ownership, and offered no direct independent proof from any source that the vehicle had, in fact, been stolen. The majority says that this was “strange”, as indeed it was, but nevertheless affirms on the basis of the confessions.
I think the prosecutor fell into a monumental failure of proof — one that cannot be cured on appeal. My conclusion on this score is easily reached: (1) the government had the obligation of proving that the vehicle belonged to Suskind and (2) it could not prove that fact by Gresham’s confession because, quite obviously, Gresham did not know, and could not have known, who owned the vehicle.
Thus, the Court is affirming this conviction solely on the defendant’s confession, with no independent evidence to establish the trustworthiness of Gresham’s confession that he stole an automobile belonging to Suskind.
I do not believe that defendants can be so exploited by such slipshod prosecutorial tactics.
See, e. g., United States v. Frazier, 5 Cir., 1970, 434 F.2d 994; United States v. Abi-gando, 5 Cir., 1971, 439 F.2d 827, 832; United States v. Kitzman, 8 Cir., 1975, 520 F.2d 1400; and United States v. Shiver, 5 Cir., 1969, 414 F.2d 461.
I respectfully dissent.