Court Opinion

ID: 9397822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 16:09:09.185546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.944047
License: Public Domain

J-S04020-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
    RAMON BLANCO                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 2290 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 5, 2022
            In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0004230-2020

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                    FILED MAY 26, 2023

        Appellant, Ramon Blanco, appeals nunc pro tunc from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, following

his bench trial convictions for accidents involving death or personal injury

while not properly licensed (“AIDPI”), aggravated assault by vehicle, reckless

driving, and related offenses.1        We remand this case to the trial court for

specific findings regarding Appellant’s motion for dismissal pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600.

        The relevant facts of this appeal are as follows. At approximately 11:16

p.m. on August 5, 2019, Jamiee Johnstonbaugh (“Victim”) was driving his

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1   75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3742.1(a)(1), 3732.1(a), and 3736(a), respectively.
J-S04020-23

Honda Pilot eastbound on Sumneytown Pike in Lower Gwynedd Township.

Victim stopped for a red light at Sumneytown Pike’s intersection with DeKalb

Pike. When the light changed, Victim proceeded through the intersection. At

the same time, Appellant was approaching the intersection while driving a

Chevrolet Suburban northbound on DeKalb Pike. Despite being controlled by

a red light, Appellant’s vehicle barreled into the intersection and collided with

Victim’s vehicle.      After the crash, Appellant fled the scene on foot.

Eyewitnesses helped Victim out of his vehicle, and an ambulance transported

Victim to a local hospital for treatment. Victim suffered various injuries due

to the crash, including broken bones and a concussion.

      Police subsequently apprehended Appellant, and the Commonwealth

initially filed a criminal complaint on August 7, 2019. Appellant proceeded to

a preliminary hearing, where the magistrate dismissed certain charges. This

prompted the Commonwealth to refile the criminal complaint on February 26,

2020. The trial court opinion set forth the remaining procedural history as

follows:

           The Commonwealth filed a bill of information charging
           [Appellant] with the following offenses: [AIDPI] (count 1);
           accidents involving damage to attended vehicle or property
           (count 2); duty to give information and render aid (count
           3); driving without a license (count 4); reckless driving
           (count 5); failure to stop at red signal (count 6); aggravated
           assault by vehicle (count 7); accidents involving death or
           personal injury (count 8); and recklessly endangering
           another person (count 9).

           On July 29, 2021, [Appellant] filed a motion for dismissal
           pursuant to Rule 600(D)(1) and Commonwealth v.

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       Harth[, ___ Pa. ___, 252 A.3d 600 (2021)]. On September
       10, 2021, the Commonwealth filed a response to this
       motion. The court held a hearing regarding this motion on
       September 13, 2021. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
       court directed the parties to submit memoranda. By order
       dated September 22, 2021, the court denied [Appellant’s]
       motion.

       The court conducted a bench trial on October 13, 2021. At
       the conclusion of the trial, the court found [Appellant] guilty
       on all counts and directed the completion of a pre-sentence
       investigation report.

       On January 5, 2022, the court imposed the following
       sentence: count 7, 11 months and 14 days to 23 months
       and 29 days in the Montgomery County Correctional Facility
       (“MCCF”) to date from August 7, 2019; count 1, 9 to 23
       months’ incarceration in MCCF to run concurrently with
       count 7; count 8, 9 to 23 months’ incarceration in MCCF to
       run concurrently with count 7; and count 9, 4 to 23 months’
       incarceration in MCCF to run concurrently with count 7. The
       court did not impose further penalty with respect to counts
       2-6. Thus, the court imposed an aggregate sentence of 11
       months and 14 days to 23 months and 29 days’
       incarceration in MCCF to date from August 7, 2019.

       The court also directed [Appellant] to pay restitution of
       $1,000 to Aurea Meneses, the owner of the vehicle operated
       by [Appellant] at the time of the accident, and $1,763 to
       GEICO.

       On January 20, 2022, [Appellant] filed a post-sentence
       motion in which he sought: (1) a dismissal of all charges
       pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 and Commonwealth v.
       Harth and (2) judgment of acquittal as to Counts 1, 2, and
       7-9 on the basis that the Commonwealth had failed to prove
       the required mens rea of criminal negligence or recklessness
       for these counts. By order dated May 3, 2022, the court
       denied [Appellant’s] post-sentence motion.

       On June 3, 2022, [Appellant] filed an appeal from: (1) the
       sentence imposed on January 5, 2022 and (2) the May 3,
       2022 order denying his post-sentence motion. By order
       filed on July 13, 2022, the Superior Court quashed that

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          appeal as untimely filed because [Appellant] had filed his
          post-sentence motion more than 10 days after the January
          5, 2022 imposition of sentence.

          On August 3, 2022, [Appellant] filed a [Post Conviction
          Relief Act (“PCRA”)2] petition to reinstate appellate rights
          nunc pro tunc on the basis that his trial counsel had filed his
          post-sentence motion late. By order dated August 5, 2022
          the court directed the Commonwealth to file an answer to
          this PCRA petition. On August 26, 2022, the Commonwealth
          filed a reply stating it did not oppose [Appellant’s] request
          for the nunc pro tunc reinstatement of his appeal rights. By
          order dated August 26, 2022, the court granted
          [Appellant’s] PCRA petition and stated [Appellant] may file
          an appeal nunc pro tunc no later than 30 days from the date
          of the filing of the order. Pursuant to this order, [Appellant]
          filed the instant appeal on September 1, 2022[.]

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/24/22, at 1-3) (internal footnotes and some

capitalization omitted).       Also on September 1, 2022, the court ordered

Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained

of on appeal. Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b) statement on September

20, 2022.

        Appellant now raises three issues on appeal, which we have reordered

as follows:

          Was the evidence insufficient to sustain [Appellant’s]
          conviction, in that the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to
          prove that [Appellant] was operating his vehicle in a
          “criminally negligent” manner at the time of the accident
          when it demonstrated only that [Appellant] fell asleep while
          driving?

          Did the [trial] court err in failing to calculate [Appellant’s]
          Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 mechanical run date from the date of filing
____________________________________________

2   42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

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          of the initial criminal complaint against [Appellant] where
          the Commonwealth was not duly diligent in filing a second
          complaint?

          Did the [trial] court err in denying [Appellant’s] motion to
          dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 where the
          Commonwealth failed to establish the requisite due
          diligence in providing discovery that was necessary before
          court delay attributable to COVID-19 emergency orders
          could be considered?

(Appellant’s Brief at 3).

      As a prefatory matter, the trial court suggests that we must quash this

appeal. The court emphasizes the PCRA provision mandating that a petitioner

must be “currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation or parole

for the crime” to be eligible for relief. (Trial Court Opinion at 4) (quoting 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(1)(i)). The court contends that Appellant’s sentence for

the instant offenses expired on August 5, 2021; thus, Appellant had completed

his sentence by the time he filed his PCRA petition on August 3, 2022. The

court concludes that Appellant “was not eligible for PCRA relief,” and it “lacked

jurisdiction” to consider the petition and reinstate Appellant’s direct appeal

rights nunc pro tunc. (Id. at 6) (emphasis added).

      In response, Appellant cites Commonwealth v. Fields, 197 A.3d 1217,

1222 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc) (plurality), appeal denied, 651 Pa. 593, 206

A.3d 1025 (2019), for the proposition that “[t]he plain language of section

9543 does not mention the jurisdiction of the PCRA court[.]” (Appellant’s Brief

at 21).   Appellant maintains that the court possessed jurisdiction to grant

relief, which the Commonwealth did not oppose. Absent some action by the

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Commonwealth, Appellant insists that any challenge to the grant of PCRA relief

is waived, and “the only matter currently before this … Court is [Appellant’s]

direct appeal filed [nunc pro tunc] on September 1, 2022.” (Id.) We agree.

      “[I]n drafting the PCRA, the General Assembly included 42 Pa.C.S. §

9545, a separate provision addressing ‘Jurisdiction and proceedings.’” Fields,

supra at 1222.       “Had the General Assembly intended the eligibility

requirements of section 9543 to be jurisdictional prerequisites, it would have

included that provision within section 9545.” Id. “Accordingly, we hold that

the requirements set forth in section 9543 establish only a petitioner’s

eligibility for post-conviction relief, and do not implicate the PCRA court’s

jurisdiction to act on a petition.” Id. at 1223.

      Here, this Court’s interpretation of the relevant provisions of the PCRA

refutes the trial court’s conclusion that it “lacked jurisdiction” to act on

Appellant’s petition. See id. To the extent that the PCRA court might have

erred in granting relief where Appellant was ineligible, the Commonwealth

waived any challenge to the PCRA court’s ruling by failing to appeal from the

order granting nunc pro tunc relief. See Commonwealth v. Bryant, 566 Pa.

307, 780 A.2d 646 (2001) (reiterating that PCRA court’s order granting relief

in part was final order that petitioner or Commonwealth could have appealed,

and failure to file notice of appeal would have waived review of PCRA court’s

decision).   Consequently, we proceed to address the issues Appellant now

raises in this nunc pro tunc appeal from his judgment of sentence.

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       In his first issue, Appellant claims that the offense of AIDPI requires a

mens rea of “criminal negligence,” and the offenses of aggravated assault by

vehicle and reckless driving “share an equivalent mens rea of recklessness

and gross negligence.” (Appellant’s Brief at 35, 37). Appellant insists that

the Commonwealth failed to prove these mental states where “the only

evidence presented … was [Appellant’s] statement that he had fallen asleep

while driving.”3 (Id. at 39). Appellant also argues that “the fact that [he]

was speeding shortly before the crash” does not establish the requisite

recklessness.     (Id. at 40).      Appellant concludes that the Commonwealth

presented insufficient evidence to support these convictions, and he is entitled

to an arrest of judgment for these offenses. We disagree.

       Our standard of review for sufficiency claims is as follows:

          The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the
          evidence is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at
          trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, there
          is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
          element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In
          applying [the above] test, we may not weigh the evidence
          and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition,
          we note that the facts and circumstances established by the
          Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of
          innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may
          be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
          and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
          fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. The
          Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every
____________________________________________

3 At trial, a detective from the Lower Gwynedd Township Police Department
testified that he interviewed Appellant about the collision on August 6, 2019.
(See N.T. Trial, 10/13/21, 105). During the interview, Appellant said he “fell
asleep at the wheel, at which point the accident happened.” (Id. at 115).

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        element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means
        of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the
        above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
        evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the
        [trier] of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses
        and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe
        all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Tucker, 143 A.3d 955, 964 (Pa.Super. 2016), appeal

denied, 641 Pa. 63, 165 A.3d 895 (2017) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Hansley, 24 A.3d 410, 416 (Pa.Super. 2011)).

     The Motor Vehicle Code (“MVC”) defines the offense of AIDPI as follows:

        § 3742.1. Accidents involving death or personal
        injury while not properly licensed

           (a) Offense defined.—A person whose operating
        privilege was disqualified, canceled, recalled, revoked or
        suspended and not restored or who does not hold a valid
        driver’s license and applicable endorsements for the type
        and class of vehicle being operated commits an offense
        under this section if the person was the driver of any vehicle
        and:

                (1) caused an accident resulting in injury or
           death of a person

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3742.1(a).

        By its express terms, the statutory offense contains no
        scienter requirement. In [Commonwealth v. Hurst, 889
        A.2d 624 (Pa.Super. 2005)], this Court examined what level
        of culpability was required for a conviction under the
        statute.    There, the appellant entered an intersection
        against a red light and struck a police vehicle that was
        proceeding on a green light. We determined that AIDPI was
        not an absolute liability crime, and that criminal negligence
        was the minimum mens rea the Commonwealth must
        establish to prove AIDPI beyond a reasonable doubt.

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Commonwealth v. Kutzel, 64 A.3d 1114, 1117-18 (Pa.Super. 2013).4

       “A person acts negligently with respect to a material element of an

offense when he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that

the material element exists or will result from his conduct.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

302(b)(4). “The risk must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s

failure to perceive it, considering the nature and intent of his conduct and the

circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from the standard of

care that a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.” Id.

          In determining whether a person’s actions constitute
          criminal negligence one must obviously consider the entire
          situation; and we hold that the determination whether those
          actions qualify as a “gross deviation” within the meaning of
          the statute, can depend upon the nature of the standard
          applicable to a given situation.

Kutzel, supra at 1119 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lobiondo, 501 Pa. 599,

606, 462 A.2d 662, 666 (1983)).

       The MVC defines the offense of aggravated assault by vehicle as follows:

          § 3732.1. Aggravated assault by vehicle

            (a) Offense.—Any person who recklessly or with gross
          negligence causes serious bodily injury to another person
          while engaged in the violation of any law of this
____________________________________________

4Our Legislature amended Section 3742.1 in 2018. See Act of Oct. 24, 2018,
P.L. 925, No. 153, § 3, effective in 60 days. The version of the statute in
effect at the time of Kutzel defined the offense of AIDPI as follows: “A person
whose operating privilege was disqualified, canceled, recalled, revoked or
suspended and not restored or who does not hold a valid driver’s license and
applicable endorsements for the type and class of vehicle being operated
commits an offense under this section if the person was the driver of any
vehicle and caused an accident resulting in injury or death of any person.”

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         Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the
         operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic,
         except section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of
         alcohol or controlled substance), is guilty of aggravated
         assault by vehicle, a felony of the third degree when the
         violation is the cause of the injury.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3732.1(a).

      “A person acts recklessly with respect to a material element of an

offense when he consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk

that the material element exists or will result from his conduct.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 302(b)(3). “The risk must be of such a nature and degree that, considering

the nature and intent of the actor’s conduct and the circumstances known to

him, its disregard involves a gross deviation from the standard of conduct that

a reasonable person would observe in the actor’s situation.” Id.

      The MVC defines the offense of reckless driving as follows:

         § 3736. Reckless driving

         (a) General rule.—Any person who drives any vehicle in
         willful or wanton disregard for the safety of persons or
         property is guilty of reckless driving.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3736(a).

         [T]he mens rea necessary to support the offense of reckless
         driving is a requirement that [the defendant] drove in such
         a manner that there existed a substantial risk that injury
         would result from his driving, i.e., a high probability that a
         motor vehicle accident would result from driving in that
         manner, that he was aware of that risk and yet continued to
         drive in such a manner, in essence, callously disregarding
         the risk he was creating by his own reckless driving.

Commonwealth v. Bullick, 830 A.2d 998, 1003 (Pa.Super. 2003).

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      Instantly, the Commonwealth presented witnesses who described

Appellant’s driving on the night of the crash. Tyler Mitchell testified that he

was driving northbound on DeKalb Pike shortly before the collision. (See N.T.

Trial at 84). While traveling in the center lane, Mr. Mitchell saw “a person

from behind me, from a high rate of speed, basically flying, and basically

swerved towards and around me” on the right.          (Id. at 85).   Mr. Mitchell

specified that the vehicle that passed him was “definitely a Suburban.” (Id.

at 87). Mr. Mitchell described the aggressive maneuvers performed by the

Suburban: “Like I say, it cut us off, and it kind of like veered me off to the

side a little bit[.]” (Id. at 87). Mr. Mitchell also explained that he was driving

“about the speed limit,” so he knew the Suburban was moving at a higher rate

of speed to pass him. (Id. at 88).

      Mr. Mitchell did not actually see the collision between Appellant and

Victim’s vehicles.   Seconds after the crash, Mr. Mitchell saw the accident

scene. (Id. at 89). Upon arriving at the intersection, the light controlling Mr.

Mitchell’s lane of travel was red. (Id.) Thereafter, Mr. Mitchell stopped to

render aid to Victim. (Id. at 90). While assisting Victim, Mr. Mitchell saw the

driver of the Suburban flee the scene. (Id. at 91).

      The Commonwealth also presented testimony from Thaddeus Brown,

who was driving home from work on the night of the collision. Mr. Brown was

driving eastbound on Sumneytown Pike when he stopped for a red light at the

intersection with DeKalb Pike. (Id. at 64-65). Mr. Brown “was the second car

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at the traffic light,” with Victim’s vehicle in front of him. (Id. at 65). When

the light turned green, Victim and Mr. Brown’s vehicles proceeded to the

intersection. Mr. Brown unequivocally testified that Victim had a green light

to proceed.5 (Id. at 69). At that point, Mr. Brown saw the Suburban “go

around the [northbound] traffic” that was stopped for a red light on DeKalb

Pike. (Id. at 67). The Suburban entered “the shoulder area” of the road to

execute this maneuver. (Id.) Thereafter, the Suburban collided with Victim’s

vehicle. The Suburban did not attempt to brake before the collision. (Id. at

73).

       After the collision, Mr. Brown stayed at the scene because “[i]t was a

horrific crash, from what I witnessed, so I just wanted to make sure everyone

was okay.” (Id. at 71). Mr. Brown explained that the impact of the crash

caused the Suburban to ricochet off Victim’s vehicle and hit a telephone poll.

When the Suburban came to a stop, Mr. Brown watched the driver climb out

through the window and run away from the scene.

       Here, the record belies Appellant’s assertion that he simply fell asleep

at the wheel. Mr. Mitchell’s testimony established that Appellant conducted a

high-speed, passing maneuver on the right side of Sumneytown Pike before

its intersection with DeKalb Pike. After passing Mr. Mitchell, Appellant entered

the shoulder of the road to pass other cars that had stopped at the intersection

____________________________________________

5 Victim also testified that he proceeded through the intersection on a green
light. (See N.T. Trial at 54).

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for a red light. Without braking, Appellant then ploughed into Victim’s vehicle,

which had the right-of-way to proceed through the intersection. Under these

circumstances, Appellant demonstrated the criminal negligence necessary to

support his conviction for AIDPI.         See Kutzel, supra; 18 Pa.C.S.A. §

302(b)(4). Likewise, the facts adduced at trial are proof of the recklessness

necessary to support the convictions for aggravated assault by vehicle and

reckless driving. See Bullick, supra; 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 302(b)(3). Therefore,

Appellant is not entitled to relief on his first claim.

      Appellant’s second and third issues are related, and we address them

together.    Appellant notes that the Commonwealth first filed a criminal

complaint on August 7, 2019, and the Rule 600 mechanical run date was

August 6, 2020.      Appellant claims that the Commonwealth’s subsequent

inaction resulted in the dismissal of certain charges after the preliminary

hearing, which delayed the prosecution.              Appellant insists that the

Commonwealth created additional delay by failing to refile the criminal

complaint in a timely manner. Because the Commonwealth did not proceed

with due diligence, Appellant contends that the adjusted Rule 600 run date

should not be calculated by utilizing the filing date of the second criminal

complaint.

      Appellant also observes that additional delays plagued this case after

the refiling of the complaint. Appellant acknowledges that some delay was

attributable to the declaration of a judicial emergency in the wake of COVID-

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19, and he concedes that the period from March 12, 2020 through June 1,

2020 is excludable under Rule 600. Nevertheless, Appellant argues that “none

of the ensuing 500 days between June 1, 2020 and the commencement of

[Appellant’s] trial can be attributed to the judicial emergency.” (Appellant’s

Brief at 32-33). Rather, Appellant asserts that “the Commonwealth was never

ready to proceed to trial throughout this period, since photographs remained

outstanding in discovery[.]” (Id. at 33). Mindful of these delays, Appellant

calculates an adjusted run date of October 25, 2020. Appellant concludes that

trial commenced after this date, and the court should have granted his Rule

600 motion.    Based upon our review of the record, additional action is

required.

      The following principles apply to our review of a speedy trial claim:

         Our standard of review in a Rule 600 issue is whether the
         trial court abused its discretion. Our scope of review when
         determining the propriety of the trial court is limited to the
         evidence in the record, the trial court’s Rule 600 evidentiary
         hearing, and the trial court’s findings. We must also
         view the facts in the light most favorable to the prevailing
         party[.]

Commonwealth v. Risoldi, 238 A.3d 434, 449 n.14 (Pa.Super. 2020),

appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 244 A.3d 1230 (2021) (emphasis added).

         Additionally, when considering the trial court’s ruling, this
         Court is not permitted to ignore the dual purpose behind
         Rule 600. Rule 600 serves two equally important functions:
         (1) the protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and
         (2) the protection of society. In determining whether an
         accused’s right to a speedy trial has been violated,
         consideration must be given to society’s right to effective
         prosecution of criminal cases, both to restrain those guilty

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         of crime and to deter those contemplating it. However, the
         administrative mandate of Rule 600 was not designed to
         insulate the criminally accused from good faith prosecution
         delayed through no fault of the Commonwealth.

         So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the
         Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental
         speedy trial rights of an accused, Rule 600 must be
         construed in a manner consistent with society’s right to
         punish and deter crime. In considering these matters …,
         courts must carefully factor into the ultimate equation not
         only the prerogatives of the individual accused, but the
         collective right of the community to vigorous law
         enforcement as well.

Commonwealth v. Martz, 232 A.3d 801, 809-10 (Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Peterson, 19 A.3d 1131, 1134-35 (Pa.Super. 2011)).

      Rule 600 sets forth the speedy trial requirements and provides in

pertinent part:

         Rule 600. Prompt Trial

            (A)   Commencement of Trial; Time for Trial

                                 *     *      *

            (2) Trial shall commence within the following time
         periods.

                   (a) Trial in a court case in which a written
            complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence
            within 365 days from the date on which the complaint is
            filed.

                                 *     *      *

            (C)   Computation of Time

           (1) For purposes of paragraph (A), periods of delay at
         any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth
         when the Commonwealth has failed to exercise due

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         diligence shall be included in the computation of the time
         within which trial must commence. Any other periods of
         delay shall be excluded from the computation.

                                  *     *      *

         In cases in which the Commonwealth files a criminal
         complaint, withdraws that complaint, and files a second
         complaint, the Commonwealth will be afforded the benefit
         of the date of the filing of the second complaint for purposes
         of calculating the time for trial when the withdrawal and re-
         filing of charges are necessitated by factors beyond its
         control, the Commonwealth has exercised due diligence,
         and the refiling is not an attempt to circumvent the time
         limitation of Rule 600. See Commonwealth v. Meadius,
         582 Pa. 174, 870 A.2d 802 (2005).

Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a), (C)(1), and Comment.

         Due diligence is a fact-specific concept that must be
         determined on a case-by-case basis. Due diligence does not
         require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but rather a
         showing by the Commonwealth that a reasonable effort has
         been put forth. Due diligence includes, inter alia, listing a
         case for trial prior to the run date, preparedness for trial
         within the run date, and keeping adequate records to ensure
         compliance with Rule 600. Periods of delay caused by the
         Commonwealth’s failure to exercise due diligence must be
         included in the computation of time within which trial must
         commence.

Martz, supra at 810-11 (quoting Commonwealth v. Moore, 214 A.3d 244,

248-49 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 224 A.3d 360 (2020))

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Recently, this Court addressed the concepts of “mechanical” and

“adjusted” Rule 600 run dates, as well as the impact of local emergency orders

on the calculation of these dates:

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       In a Rule 600 analysis, the “mechanical run date” is 365
       days after the complaint was filed. The “adjusted run date”
       is then calculated by adding any time that is “excluded from
       the computation” under Rule 600(C)(1). If a defendant is
       not brought to trial by the adjusted run date, the case is
       dismissed. Two key cases guide our analysis here.

       First, in Harth, our Supreme Court held that “before a trial
       court excludes time from its Rule 600 time computation on
       the basis of ‘judicial delay,’” the Commonwealth must
       “demonstrate that it acted with due diligence.” That is:

          [I]n ruling on a defendant’s Rule 600 motion to
          dismiss, a trial court must first determine whether the
          Commonwealth has met its obligation to act with due
          diligence throughout the life of the case; if the
          Commonwealth meets its burden of proving due
          diligence, only then may the trial court rely upon its
          own congested calendar or other scheduling problems
          as justification for denying the defendant's motion.

       Second, this Court considered the effect of local emergency
       orders in Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743
       (Pa.Super. 2022). The issue in Carl was whether a period
       of a local judicial emergency would be excluded from the
       Rule 600 computation, i.e., whether to add the days of the
       judicial emergency to the run date. The relevant order
       contained two provisions: “Suspend statewide rules
       pertaining to the rule-based right of criminal defendants to
       a prompt trial,” and: “Any postponement caused by the
       judicial emergency shall be considered a court
       postponement and shall constitute excludable time for
       purposes of the application of Rule 600.” This Court read
       the first provision as an absolute, unqualified suspension
       and the second provision as a supplemental rule for
       additional postponements. The second provision set a local
       policy to address ongoing delays.         Because the first
       provision unambiguously suspended Rule 600, the days of
       that suspension should have been added to the run date
       regardless of the Commonwealth’s diligence.

       Harth and Carl frame the inquiry for the effect of
       emergency orders on Rule 600. If an order unambiguously
       suspends Rule 600 without qualification, then the period of

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         the suspension is added to the run date without considering
         the Commonwealth’s diligence. Alternatively, if an order
         characterizes a delay as a court postponement, then that
         period is only excluded if the trial court determines after a
         hearing that the Commonwealth exercised due diligence
         through the life of the case.

Commonwealth v. Lear, 290 A.3d 709, 718-19 (Pa.Super. 2023) (internal

citations and footnote omitted).

      Utilizing this framework, Lear analyzed the specific orders related to the

2020 judicial emergency in Montgomery County.

         On March 16, 2020, Montgomery County declared a judicial
         emergency and ordered that the operation of Rule 600
         would be suspended “during the period of the local judicial
         emergency.” On March 31, 2020, Montgomery County
         extended the judicial emergency to April 30, 2020, again
         ordering Rule 600 to be suspended. On April 14, 2020,
         Montgomery County extended the judicial emergency to
         May 31, 2020.

         On May 5, 2020, Montgomery County entered an order
         rescinding its previous orders effective May 31, 2020. It
         listed virus-related protocols that would be effective June 1,
         2020.

         On May 28, 2020, Montgomery County declared that the
         local judicial emergency would be extended “until further
         Order of Court.” It ordered that its declaration included the
         provisions of the order from May 5, 2020.

         On June 3, 2020, Montgomery County ordered “that any
         postponement of criminal case scheduling caused by the
         declaration of this judicial emergency, from March 12, 2020
         through the expiration of the judicial emergency, shall be
         considered a court postponement and shall constitute
         excludable time for purposes of the application of Rule of
         Criminal Procedure 600.”

                                   *     *      *

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          [T]he plain language of the orders reflects that Montgomery
          County did not continue its unqualified suspension of Rule
          600 beyond May 31, 2020. On May 5, 2020, Montgomery
          County ordered that its previous orders would be rescinded
          effective May 31, 2020.       There were no later orders
          suspending Rule 600. Instead, Montgomery County opted
          to order on June 3, 2020, that any emergency-related delay
          “shall be considered a court postponement and shall
          constitute excludable time” under Rule 600(C).

          As in Carl, the plain meaning of the “court postponement”
          provision was to establish a framework for applying Rule
          600 to any postponement caused by the local judicial
          emergency. Unlike in Carl, however, the Montgomery
          County orders did not separately provide that Rule 600
          would be suspended after May 31, 2020.

Id. at 719-20 (internal citations omitted).

       Instantly, the trial court denied Appellant’s Rule 600 motion on

September 22, 2021.         The order stated that the court had considered the

arguments raised at the Rule 600 hearing, Appellant’s dismissal motion, the

Commonwealth’s response, and the memoranda of law submitted by the

parties.6 The order, however, contained no additional findings regarding the

Commonwealth’s due diligence or any periods of excludable delay. Likewise,

the current Rule 1925(a) opinion offers no further insight into the reasoning

behind the denial of Appellant’s Rule 600 motion. On this record, we do not

have an adequate basis for evaluating whether the court erred in issuing its

ruling. See Risoldi, supra. Thus, remand is required.

____________________________________________

6The certified record does not include the memoranda of law, and there are
no docket entries memorializing the filing of the memoranda.

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      We also note that the parties have yet to evaluate the Lear decision.

This is significant because the parties grappled with issues addressed in Lear.

For example, the court ordered the parties to file their memoranda of law

immediately after the Rule 600 hearing. In this order, the court directed the

parties to address “whether Commonwealth v. Harth is applicable to periods

of judicial delay occasioned by the emergency orders issued as a result of the

COVID-19 pandemic.”       (Order, filed 9/13/21, at 1).     Now that there is

guidance from this Court, questions concerning the applicability of Harth need

not hover over the resolution of this matter.

      Because we cannot say whether consideration of Lear might impact the

court’s prior determination, the most prudent course of action is to remand

the matter for a supplemental Rule 600 hearing. At that time, the parties can

evaluate the impact of Lear.         After additional argument, the court must

identify each period of delay and determine whether it is excludable under

Rule 600, as well as whether the Commonwealth acted with due diligence.

See Commonwealth v. Thompson, 93 A.3d 478 (Pa.Super. 2014)

(remanding for trial court to determine whether certain period of delay was

attributable to Commonwealth for Rule 600 purposes). The court should make

specific due diligence findings for the periods of delay that came before and

after the refiling of the charges.

      Case remanded. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/26/2023

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