Court Opinion

ID: 9912484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 17:00:54.344977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:48.803611
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-1025     Document: 010110973212       Date Filed: 12/22/2023   Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       December 22, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                             Clerk of Court
  PETER GEORGE NOE,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                           No. 23-1025
                                                   (D.C. No. 1:21-CV-01589-CNS-STV)
  UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT;                                     (D. Colo.)
  BERKLEY, Dr.; H. SCHOUWEILER;
  FEDERAL BUREAU OF PRISONS;
  DUNN, R.N.; FELLOWS, R.N.,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before EID, CARSON, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                    _________________________________

       Peter George Noe, pro se, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing

 claims he raised concerning dental care he received from prison staff. Exercising

 jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-1025    Document: 010110973212        Date Filed: 12/22/2023    Page: 2

                                  I. BACKGROUND

       Noe is a federal prisoner housed at the United States Penitentiary

 Administrative Maximum Facility in Florence, Colorado. He filed a pro se action

 against the United States, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), and four individual BOP

 employees in their individual capacities: a dentist (defendant Burkley), a dental

 assistant (defendant Schouweiler), and two nurses (defendants Dunn and Fellows).

 In the operative amended complaint, Noe alleged that at a November 2019 visit with

 Dr. Burkley, he complained of substantial pain in three teeth. 1 Dr. Burkley told Noe

 that the three teeth needed crowns, but because prison policy did not allow crowns

 due to the expense, Dr. Burkley planned to use fillings. Dr. Burkley then put a filling

 in one of those teeth (“tooth #3”) and declined to treat the other two teeth because of

 a one-tooth-per-visit policy. When Noe complained that tooth #3 was worse,

 Dr. Burkley tried another filling. And when that did not work, Dr. Burkley tried a

 pin and a filling. The third procedure, which occurred in June 2020, broke tooth #3,

 which then had to be extracted. Noe received fillings in the other two teeth in

 November 2020 and April 2021. During the eighteen months between Noe’s initial

 visit and the last repair, he was in substantial pain and was denied pain medication.

 The teeth continue to cause him substantial pain.

       Noe asserted three claims: (1) Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference

 against the individual defendants under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of

       1
         Noe also complained about two other teeth, but treatment with respect to
 them is not at issue in this appeal.
                                            2
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 Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); (2) a claim under the Federal Tort

 Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States; and (3) a claim for injunctive relief

 against the BOP based on the no-crowns policy. He sought declarations that

 defendants were liable on each claim, damages on claims one and two, and injunctive

 relief on claim three.

       Noe sought and received multiple extensions of time to file a certificate of

 review for his FTCA claim, but he never filed one. 2 Defendants eventually filed

 motions to dismiss. In December 2022, the magistrate judge recommended:

 (1) dismissing the Bivens claim as not cognizable under applicable precedent,

 because the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program provided an alternative remedy

 Noe could have used to obtain relief; (2) dismissing the FTCA claim because Noe

 failed to obtain a certificate of review; and (3) dismissing the claim for injunctive

 relief because any “no crowns” policy did not violate the Eighth Amendment, but

 with leave to amend the claim to add allegations that might show such a policy

 amounted to an Eighth Amendment violation.

       Noe filed objections, which included factual allegations supporting the claim

 for injunctive relief against the BOP that the magistrate judge had outlined. The

 district court overruled the objections, adopted the recommendation, and granted the

       2
         As we later explain more fully, a certificate of review is required under
 Colorado law to show that a plaintiff has consulted an expert who has concluded that
 the plaintiff’s claims do not lack substantial justification. See Colo. Rev. Stat.
 § 13-20-602(1)(b)(3)(a)(I)–(II).
                                             3
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 motions to dismiss. However, the court allowed Noe fourteen days to file an

 amended complaint limited to the claim for injunctive relief against the BOP.

        Noe never filed an amended complaint. Instead, he filed a notice of appeal on

 January 30, 2023.

                           II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION

        Defendants filed a motion to dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction,

 arguing that the district court’s order granting their motions to dismiss was not a

 final, appealable order. However, Noe has since filed a motion in the district court

 stating he did not intend to file an amended complaint and asking for a final

 judgment. On May 9, 2023, the district court entered a final judgment. Noe’s notice

 of appeal, therefore, “is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry” of the final

 judgment, Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2). The notice of appeal is therefore timely and

 confers appellate jurisdiction on this court. Consequently, we deny as moot

 defendants’ motion to dismiss and two related motions Noe filed (“Motion to

 Voluntarily Dismiss Motions” and “Motion for Clarification”).

                                    III. DISCUSSION

        Noe raises five issues on appeal, which we address in the following order:

 (1) his Bivens claim is cognizable; (2) the district court should have allowed him to

 amend his complaint to cite certain statutes; (3) the district court abused its discretion

 in finding an expert was needed for his FTCA claim; (4) the district court should

 have granted him a fourth extension of time to file a certificate of review for his

 FTCA claim; and (5) the district court erred in denying his motion to appoint an

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 expert. Liberally construing Noe’s pro se filings, but without acting as his advocate,

 see Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008), we reject these

 arguments.

                                     A. Bivens claim

        In Bivens, the Supreme Court “authorized a damages action against federal

 officials for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment.” Egbert v. Boule, 596 U.S.

 482, 486 (2022). Since then, the Supreme Court has only twice “fashioned new

 causes of action under the Constitution.” Id. at 490. In Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S.

 228 (1979), the Court recognized a damages action for a former congressional

 staffer’s Fifth Amendment sex-discrimination claim. And in Carlson v. Green,

 446 U.S. 14 (1980), the Court implied a damages action for a federal prisoner’s

 inadequate-care claim under the Eighth Amendment.

        However, the Supreme Court has since “emphasized that recognizing a cause

 of action under Bivens is a disfavored judicial activity.” Egbert, 596 U.S. at 491

 (internal quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, the Court eventually settled on a

 two-step analysis of proposed Bivens claims. At step one, a court has to consider

 “whether the case presents ‘a new Bivens context’—i.e., is it ‘meaningfully’ different

 from the three cases in which the [Supreme] Court has implied a damages action.”

 Id. at 492 (brackets omitted) (quoting Ziglar v. Abbasi, 582 U.S. 120, 139 (2017)).

 And at step two, “if a claim arises in a new context, a Bivens remedy is unavailable if

 there are ‘special factors’ indicating that the Judiciary is at least arguably less

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 equipped than Congress to ‘weigh the costs and benefits of allowing a damages

 action to proceed.’” Id. (quoting Abbasi, 582 U.S. at 136).

          Noe argues that his Bivens claim is cognizable because the factual context of

 his case is like the factual context in Carlson, and factual similarity is sufficient to

 permit a Bivens claims to proceed regardless of whether a plaintiff has a meaningful

 alternative remedy. Noe also argues that the BOP’s Administrative Remedy Program

 (ARP) is not a meaningful alternative to a civil action. Because the district court

 dismissed the Bivens claim with prejudice for failure to state a claim for relief, our

 review is de novo. See Albers v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 771 F.3d 697, 700 (10th Cir.

 2014).

          We need not decide whether Noe’s case is meaningfully different from

 Carlson, because in the wake of Egbert and Silva v. United States, 45 F.4th 1134

 (10th Cir. 2022), the availability of the ARP is sufficient to foreclose a Bivens claim

 despite any factual similarity between the two. In Silva, we observed that Egbert

 “appeared to alter the existing two-step Bivens framework by stating that ‘those steps

 often resolve to a single question: whether there is any reason to think that Congress

 might be better equipped to create a damages remedy.’” 45 F.4th at 1139 (quoting

 Egbert, 596 U.S. at 492). And we viewed “the key takeaway from Egbert” as being

 “that courts may dispose of Bivens claims for ‘two independent reasons: Congress is

 better positioned to create remedies in the [context considered by the court], and the

 Government already has provided alternative remedies that protect plaintiffs.’”

 45 F.4th at 1141 (quoting Egbert, 596 U.S. at 494) (emphasis and brackets in Silva).

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 We concluded that, in light of Supreme Court precedent, “the [ARP] is an adequate

 ‘means through which allegedly unconstitutional actions can be brought to the

 attention of the BOP and prevented from recurring.’” Id. (ellipsis omitted) (quoting

 Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 74 (2001)). And “‘[b]ecause Bivens is

 concerned solely with deterring the unconstitutional acts of individual officers,’” we

 determined that “the availability of the [ARP] offers an independently sufficient

 ground to foreclose [a] Bivens claim” brought by a federal prisoner. Id. (quoting

 Egbert, 596 U.S. at 498). 3

       Read together, Egbert and Silva direct that where the government has provided

 an alternative remedy, a court generally should not recognize a Bivens claim even if

 the factual context is not meaningfully different from that in Bivens, Davis, or

 Carlson. And here, the ARP, which Silva says is an adequate alternative remedy, is

 available to Noe. Thus, Noe’s Bivens claim is, as the district court concluded, not

 cognizable.

       As Noe points out, at least one district court (outside the Tenth Circuit) has

 said that if the context is not meaningfully different from Bivens, Davis, or Passman,

 the analysis ends there, and the Bivens claims can proceed without the step-two

       3
         In Silva, we noted that Egbert did not overrule Abbasi and that there was
 some tension between Abbasi’s two-step approach and Egbert’s apparent collapsing
 of those two steps into one. See 45 F.4th at 1139 & n.4. But we “decline[d] to
 address or resolve any [such] tension . . . because it [was] not necessary to dispose of
 the appeal before us.” Id. Likewise, here, we may decide this appeal without
 resolving any tension between Abbasi and Egbert given our reliance on Silva’s
 interpretation of Egbert.
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 inquiry into whether an adequate alternative remedy exists. See Kennedy v.

 Massachusetts, 643 F. Supp. 3d 253, 259 (D. Mass. 2022) (“[B]ecause this court is

 not fashioning a new Bivens context, the Court need not consider alternative remedial

 structures.”). 4 But precedential decisions of this court bind later panels unless there

 has been “en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary decision of the U.S.

 Supreme Court.” United States v. Ensminger, 174 F.3d 1143, 1147 (10th Cir. 1999)

 (internal quotation marks omitted). Because neither of those conditions is satisfied,

 we are bound by Silva’s interpretation of Egbert.

                              B. Amendment of complaint

       A day before the district court entered its order adopting the magistrate judge’s

 recommendation and granting the motions to dismiss, Noe filed a motion to amend

 his complaint to add citations to 5 U.S.C. § 702, which is a provision in the

 Administrative Procedures Act (APA), and to 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201 and 2202, which

 concern declaratory judgments. 5 The district court struck Noe’s motion. Noe claims

       4
         Noe relies on another case taking the same approach, Ibuado v. Federal
 Prison Atwater, No. 1:22-cv-00651, 2022 WL 16811880, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 8,
 2022) (unpublished), but that decision—a magistrate judge’s recommendation—was
 vacated by the magistrate judge before the district court ever ruled on it, see
 2023 WL 159568, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 11th, 2023) (unpublished).
       5
         In relevant part, § 702 provides: “A person suffering legal wrong because of
 agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the
 meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” With some
 exceptions not relevant here, § 2201 permits a federal court, “[i]n a case of actual
 controversy within its jurisdiction,” to “declare the rights and other legal relations of
 any interested party seeking such declaration.” And § 2202 allows a court to grant
 “[f]urther necessary or proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree.”
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 that citing these statutes, in conjunction with his reliance on the federal-question

 jurisdictional grant found in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, would have saved his request for

 declaratory relief as to claims one (Bivens) and three (injunctive relief against the

 BOP).

         Noe’s appellate argument fails because §§ 1331, 2201, and 2202 do not create

 any substantive rights, see Hanson v. Wyatt, 552 F.3d 1148, 1157 (10th Cir. 2008),

 and citing them would not have remedied the deficiencies that led to dismissal of

 claims one or three. Noe also has not shown that relief under § 702 is available,

 either by virtue of another statute or because there is no other adequate judicial

 remedy. See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (limiting judicial review under the APA to challenges to

 “[a]gency action made reviewable by statute” and to “final agency action for which

 there is no other adequate remedy in court”).

                          C. Expert required for FTCA claim

         Colorado’s statutes pertaining to a certificate of review are “applicable to

 professional negligence claims brought against the United States under the FTCA.”

 Hill v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1117 (10th Cir. 2004). Colorado

 Revised Statute § 13-20-602(1)(a) provides that a plaintiff has 60 days after service

 of a complaint seeking damages based on professional negligence of a licensed

 professional to file a certificate of review “unless the court determines that a longer

 period is necessary for good cause shown.” The certificate of review certifies that

 the plaintiff’s “attorney has consulted a person who has expertise in the area of the

 alleged negligent conduct” and that the person consulted has concluded that “the

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  claim . . . does not lack substantial justification.” § 13-20-602(1)(b)(3)(a)(I)–(II).

  “[T]he requirements of the certificate of review statute are applicable to civil actions

  alleging negligence of licensed professionals filed by nonattorney pro se plaintiffs,”

  Yadon v. Southward, 64 P.3d 909, 912 (Colo. App. 2002), where “expert testimony

  would be necessary to establish a prima facie case,” Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-20-601.

         In the district court, Noe repeatedly asserted that an expert was required for his

  FTCA claim, and he sought and received three extensions of time to file a certificate

  of review. Not until his response to the United States’ motion to dismiss—and after

  the district court denied his fourth request for an extension of time to file a certificate

  of review—did he argue that an expert was not necessary because the inadequacy of

  the treatment he received was self-evident: Dr. Burkley prescribed a crown for tooth

  #3, he did not provide a crown due to a “no crowns” policy, Noe was left in extreme

  pain for six months, and Noe lost the tooth. The district court rejected this argument

  and concluded that an expert was required. It then premised dismissal of the FTCA

  claim on Noe’s failure to provide a certificate of review.

         On appeal, Noe repeats his argument that expert testimony was unnecessary.

  We review a district court’s determination regarding the need for expert testimony

  for an abuse of discretion. See Shelton v. Penrose/St. Francis Healthcare Sys.,

  984 P.2d 623, 627, 629 (Colo. 1999).

         The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that expert

  testimony was necessary. Under Colorado law, “the standard of care for medical

  malpractice is an objective one.” Day v. Johnson, 255 P.3d 1064, 1069 (Colo. 2011).

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  Thus, Dr. Burkley’s subjective opinion that tooth #3 required a crown, coupled with

  the ultimate failure of alternative treatment, does not, by itself, relieve Noe of the

  requirement to provide a certificate of review. Instead, an expert was required to

  evaluate, as an objective matter, whether Dr. Burkley’s alternative treatment fell

  outside the relevant standard of care. The answer to that question does not “lie[]

  within the ambit of common knowledge or experience of ordinary persons,” and

  therefore Noe had to “establish the controlling standard of care, as well as

  [Dr. Burkley’s] failure to adhere to that standard, by expert opinion testimony.”

  Melville v. Southward, 791 P.2d 383, 387 (Colo. 1990).

        In contrast, to submit a case of professional negligence “to a jury on a theory

  of res ipsa loquitur,” which is the theory implicit in Noe’s argument that an expert is

  unnecessary, “circumstantial evidence must be such that it is more likely than not that

  the event was caused by negligence.” Shelton, 984 P.2d at 627. “The doctrine

  applies where the cause of injury is so apparent that a lay person is as able as an

  expert to conclude that such things do not happen in the absence of negligence.”

  Williams v. Boyle, 72 P.3d 392, 398 (Colo. App. 2003). “It is only in unusual

  circumstances that a medical malpractice claim can be proven without the

  presentation of expert medical opinion to establish the proper standard of care against

  which the professional’s conduct is to be measured.” Shelton, 984 P.2d at 627.

        Noe’s case does not present unusual circumstances, nor would a lay person be

  as able as an expert to conclude that Noe would have lost the tooth but for

  Dr. Burkley’s alleged negligence. The circumstantial evidence only shows

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  Dr. Burkley’s subjective opinion that a crown was necessary and that the extensive,

  alternative treatment he provided ultimately did not work. It is insufficient to show,

  on its own, that the alternative treatment amounted to negligence, and it is difficult to

  see how it could show negligence absent expert testimony regarding the standard of

  care. We therefore conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

  determining that Noe required expert testimony to establish a prima facie case for his

  FTCA claim.

                    D. Extension of time to file certificate of review

        Noe sought counsel to help him obtain a certificate of review. The magistrate

  judge granted that request, but warned Noe that there was no guarantee that any

  attorney on the court’s pro-bono panel would represent him. Noe never found

  counsel willing to represent him. And as noted, Noe sought and obtained three

  extensions of time to file the certificate of review, variously relying on the prison’s

  mail/communications policy and defendants’ failure to provide him with copies of his

  dental x-rays or other medical records. As set out in a memorandum from the warden

  that Noe repeatedly submitted to the court, the communications policy permitted Noe

  to communicate only with people on his approved contact list, warned that approved

  contacts could not circumvent that limitation by forwarding communications or

  funds, and prohibited contacting anyone through a third party. However, defendants

  presented an affidavit from a staff lieutenant stating that Noe could communicate

  with members of the public, including medical professionals, provided the

  communications did not otherwise violate BOP policies.

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        The three extensions moved the deadline from approximately December 2021

  to September 26, 2022. In granting the third extension, the magistrate judge warned

  that no further extensions would be granted. As the September deadline approached,

  Noe sought another extension, asserting that defendants still would not provide him

  with film of his x-rays (they provided only a paper copy that, according to Noe, did

  not show the pin that had been put into tooth #3) and that prison policy precluded

  him from contacting an expert on his own. The district court summarily denied the

  motion, directing Noe to its previous order upholding the magistrate judge’s denial of

  Noe’s motion for an indefinite stay but granting the final extension. In the previous

  order, the court determined that an indefinite stay would not advance the purpose of

  the certificate-of-review requirement (to weed out frivolous claims by pro se

  litigants); Noe had not explained why a paper copy of his x-rays was unsatisfactory;

  and because Noe’s prior requests for extensions of time “were based on the same

  communication restrictions,” the magistrate judge did not err in denying “any further

  extension due to the same alleged issue.” Suppl. R. at 105. The court also concluded

  more generally that despite any restrictions on third-party communications, Noe had

  had enough time to obtain a certificate of review.

        On appeal, Noe’s argument, although verbose, is that it was unfair to dismiss

  the FTCA claim on the ground that he failed to obtain a certificate of review when

  the causes of that failure were the prison’s communications policies and defendants’

  refusal to provide the required medical records. He says that instead, the district

  court should have granted his fourth motion for an extension of time. Reviewing for

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  an abuse of discretion, see Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390, 394 (10th Cir. 2016), we

  see none.

        Our resolution of this issue turns on evidence in the record that, despite the

  alleged limitation in the Warden’s memo that Noe can only communicate with those

  on his approved contact list, he was able to ask for representation from the University

  of Denver Sturm College of Law’s Civil Rights Clinic, see Suppl. R. at 20–21

  (rejection letter dated October 27, 2021), and at least four law firms, see id. at 22

  (undated rejection letter from Covington & Burling); id. at 83 (rejection letter from

  Law Offices of Dianne Sawaya dated June 30, 2022); id. at 84 (rejection letter from

  Killmer, Lane & Newman dated June 17, 2022); id. at 85 (rejection letter from

  Wahlberg, Woodruff, Nimmo & Sloane dated May 2, 2022). Noe has not claimed

  that the DU law clinic or any of the firms were on his approved contact list, or that he

  was disciplined for contacting them. Thus, the evidence supports that Noe could

  communicate directly with members of the public.

        But even if, for example, Noe had to get a medical professional on his

  approved contact list and doing so took as long as he now says it does (four to six

  months), he had almost eleven months to do so—from October 29, 2021, when he

  first served defendants, to September 26, 2022, the final deadline the court set to

  submit the certificate. Moreover, in another case he filed, which the district court

  discussed (the same magistrate judge was assigned to that case), he was able to get a

  certificate of review from his aunt, who is a nurse and, apparently, on his approved

  contact list. He fails to explain why she could not have helped him identify a dentist

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  who could have reviewed his treatment and whom Noe could have tried to put on his

  approved contact list. 6 And without any showing that he had an expert who could

  review his medical records, it is irrelevant whether prison officials refused to give

  him film of his x-rays or any other medical records. In sum, the district court gave

  Noe a generous amount of time to find an expert and submit the certificate of review.

  Under the circumstances, it was not an abuse of discretion for the court to refuse to

  give him more time.

                          E. Denial of motion to appoint expert

        In August 2022, Noe filed a motion asking the district court to appoint an

  expert under Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a) to complete the certificate of review. 7

  The magistrate judge held a hearing on the motion and denied it in a minute order for

  reasons given at the hearing (there is no transcript of the hearing). Noe filed

  objections, which the district court overruled. The court gave two alternative reasons

  for upholding the magistrate judge’s ruling. First, the court found that Noe’s

        6
           As mentioned in the next subpart of our decision, the magistrate judge
  determined at a hearing on Noe’s motion to appoint an expert that he could have
  asked family and friends on his approved contact list to solicit experts to complete
  the certificate.
        7
            Rule 706(a) provides:

        On a party’s motion or on its own, the court may order the parties to show
        cause why expert witnesses should not be appointed and may ask the
        parties to submit nominations. The court may appoint any expert that the
        parties agree on and any of its own choosing. But the court may only
        appoint someone who consents to act.

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  argument that prison policy prevents him from communicating with anyone not on

  his approved contact list was inconsistent with evidence that he was able to

  correspond with various law firms in 2022 and with the lieutenant’s declaration. The

  court also observed that at the hearing on the motion, the magistrate judge noted that

  Noe could contact family and friends on his approved contact list and ask them to

  solicit experts for the certificate of review. Second, the court determined

  that Rule 706(a)’s purpose is to appoint an expert to assist the court, not the parties.

         We review the denial of a motion to appoint an expert under Rule 706(a) for

  an abuse of discretion. Rachel, 820 F.3d at 397.

         Noe argues that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to appoint

  an expert on the ground that BOP policy does not prevent him from contacting third

  parties. He argues he presented evidence that prison officials reject mail sent to him

  by third parties “all the time.” Aplt. Br. at 19.

         Noe’s argument completely overlooks the district court’s alternative reason for

  denying his motion—that Rule 706(a) allows the court to appoint an expert to assist

  the court, not the parties. 8 Noe’s failure to challenge this alternative reason for

         8
           In support of that rationale, the district court relied on McCleland v.
  Raemisch, No. 20-1390, 2021 WL 4469947 (10th Cir. Sept. 30, 2021) (unpublished).
  In McCleland, a panel of this court determined that “[t]he details of Rule 706 make
  clear that an appointed expert’s role is to assist the court, not the parties.” Id. at *4.
  The panel pointed out that “‘[t]he court [i.e., not a party] must inform the expert of
  the expert’s duties.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 706(b)) (second set of brackets in
  McCleland). The panel also observed that under Rule 706, “‘[t]he expert must advise
  the parties of any findings the expert makes’” and “‘may be deposed by any party.’”
  Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 706(b)(1)–(2)) (ellipsis omitted). And the panel
  recognized that Rule 706 “‘does not limit a party in calling its own experts.’”
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  denying his motion is fatal to his success on this issue: “[W]here a district court’s

  disposition rests on alternative and adequate grounds, a party who, in challenging that

  disposition, only argues that one alternative is erroneous necessarily loses because

  the second alternative stands as an independent and adequate basis, regardless of the

  correctness of the first alternative.” Shook v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 543 F.3d 597,

  613 n.7 (10th Cir. 2008).

                                    IV. CONCLUSION

        We affirm the district court’s judgment. We grant Noe’s motion to proceed on

  appeal without prepayment of costs and fees. We deny Noe’s motion to appoint

  counsel. We deny as moot Appellees’ Motion to Dismiss For Lack of Appellate

  Jurisdiction, Noe’s Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss Motions, and Noe’s Motion for

  Clarification.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Allison H. Eid
                                              Circuit Judge

  Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 706(e)). Thus, the panel concluded that “Rule 706 was not
  designed to fill in the gaps for a party who cannot find or afford an expert.” Id. at *5.
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