Court Opinion

ID: 9404824
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-26 14:00:46.544465+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:17.605437
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11682    Document: 27-1     Date Filed: 06/26/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11682
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       RODNEY BURKE,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 4:18-cr-00017-CDL-MSH-1
                           ____________________
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                       22-11682

       Before WILSON, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Following resentencing, Rodney Eugene Burke, Sr. appeals
       from his sentence of 180 months’ imprisonment for one count of
       being a felon in possession of a firearm. He argues for the first time
       on appeal that the district court violated his Fifth and Sixth
       Amendment rights when it imposed a sentence enhancement
       under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) where the
       indictment failed to allege that the three predicate offenses were
       committed on different occasions from one another and the
       government failed to submit the issue to the jury. Because Burke’s
       claim is foreclosed by binding precedent, we affirm.
                                     I.      Background
              In 2018, following a bifurcated trial, a jury convicted Burke
       of one count of possession of methamphetamine with intent to
       distribute and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted
       felon. United States v. Burke, 823 F. App’x 777, 778 (11th Cir. 2020).
       The district court determined that Burke qualified as an armed
       career criminal because Burke had three prior convictions for a
       violent felony or a serious drug offense. 1 The district court

       1 The ACCA mandates a minimum term of imprisonment of 15 years for “a
       person who violates section 922(g) . . . and has three previous convictions . . .
       for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both, committed on occasions
       different from one another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (emphasis added). At the time
       of Burke’s offense, without the ACCA enhancement, a violation of § 922(g)
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       22-11682                  Opinion of the Court                              3

       sentenced Burke to a total of 240 months’ imprisonment to be
       followed by 8 years’ supervised release, and we affirmed his
       sentence on appeal. Id. Burke did not challenge the ACCA
       enhancement at sentencing or on direct appeal. See id.
               Following his direct appeal, Burke filed a federal habeas
       petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that his convictions should
       be vacated because his counsel provided constitutionally
       ineffective assistance when he failed to challenge the mixture or
       substance that served as the basis for the drug-related count. The
       district court granted Burke relief in part, vacated the drug
       conviction, and ordered resentencing for the firearm count.
              At resentencing, the district court again determined that
       Burke qualified as an armed career criminal. 2 Importantly, at the
       resentencing hearing, Burke did not raise the Fifth and Sixth
       Amendment issue related to the ACCA enhancement that he now
       seeks to raise on appeal. Instead, Burke argued that one of the
       alleged predicate offenses did not qualify as a violent felony for

       carried a statutory maximum of only ten years’ imprisonment. Id. § 924(a)(2)
       (2018). Notably, in 2022, Congress amended § 924 and a violation of § 922(g)
       without the ACCA enhancement now carries a statutory maximum of 15
       years’ imprisonment. Id. § 924(a)(8) (2022).
       2 Burke’srevised PSI listed four qualifying predicate convictions from Georgia
       that served as the basis for the ACCA enhancement: (1) a 1994 burglary
       conviction; (2) a 2008 burglary conviction; (3) 2011 convictions for unlawful
       possession of pseudoephedrine, possession of substances with intent to
       manufacture controlled substances, and criminal attempt to commit a felony;
       and (4) 2014 convictions for possession with intent to distribute
       methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute marijuana.
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                       22-11682

       purposes of the ACCA, but then conceded that the ACCA
       enhancement was proper because Burke had three other qualifying
       convictions.3 Additionally, Burke argued for a below-guidelines
       sentence and asserted that the statutory minimum of 15 years’
       imprisonment was “certainly sufficient to punish [him] for his
       conduct in this case.” The district court sentenced Burke to the
       statutory mandatory minimum of 180 months’ imprisonment,
       (which was below Burke’s advisory guidelines range of 210 to 262
       months’ imprisonment), to be followed by 3 years’ supervised
       release. This appeal followed.
                                      II.     Discussion
              Burke argues for the first time on appeal that the
       government waived application of the ACCA enhancement “by
       not including the different-occasions allegation in [the]
       indictment,” and that the district court violated his Fifth and Sixth
       Amendment rights by imposing the sentencing enhancement
       where the government failed to allege in the indictment that the
       predicate convictions were committed on different occasions from
       one another and failed to submit the issue to the jury.
              We generally review constitutional challenges to a
       defendant’s sentence de novo. United States v. Bowers, 811 F.3d 412,
       430 (11th Cir. 2016). However, where, as here, the defendant fails

       3 In light of Burke’s concession, the district court concluded that his objection
       was moot. Nonetheless, the district court stated that, even if the court had
       considered the objection, it would have found that the challenged burglary
       conviction qualified as a violent felony.
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       22-11682               Opinion of the Court                          5

       to make a timely constitutional objection in the district court, we
       review the claim for plain error only. United States v. McKinley, 732
       F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir. 2013). Under this stringent standard,
       “there must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that aﬀects
       substantial rights. If all three conditions are met, we may then
       exercise our discretion to correct the error, but only if (4) the error
       seriously aﬀects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
       judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1296 (quotations and internal citation
       omitted). For an error to be plain, it must be “contrary to explicit
       statutory provisions or to on-point precedent in this Court or the
       Supreme Court.” United States v. Hoﬀman, 710 F.3d 1228, 1232 (11th
       Cir. 2013) (quotations omitted).
               Burke cannot show that any error, much less plain error,
       occurred because his claim is foreclosed by Supreme Court
       precedent as well as precedent from this Court. Speciﬁcally, in
       Almendarez–Torres v. United States, the Supreme Court held that, for
       sentencing enhancement purposes, a judge, rather than a jury, may
       determine “the fact of an earlier conviction.” 523 U.S. 224, 226–27,
       234–35 (1998). In other words, the government does not have to
       charge a prior conviction in the indictment or submit the fact of a
       prior conviction to a jury. See id. Thereafter, in Apprendi v. New
       Jersey, the Supreme Court held that, under the Due Process Clause
       of the Fourteenth Amendment4 and the notice and jury trial
       guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, “[o]ther than the fact of a

       4The language of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
       Amendment are virtually identical.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                22-11682

       prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime
       beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
       jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 530 U.S. 466, 490
       (2000); see also Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999)
       (“[U]nder the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the
       notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth Amendment, any fact
       (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty
       for a crime must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury,
       and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”). As is evident from the
       language of Apprendi’s holding, Apprendi did not alter the pre-
       existing rule from Almendarez–Torres. Subsequently, in Alleyne v.
       United States, the Supreme Court extended Apprendi and held that
       any facts that increase a mandatory-minimum sentence must be
       submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. 570
       U.S. 99, 116 (2013). But in so holding, the Supreme Court expressly
       declined to alter the Almendarez–Torres rule. Id. at 111 n.1
       (“Because the parties do not contest [the] vitality [of Almendarez-
       Torres], we do not revisit it for purposes of our decision today.”).
              Thus, Almendarez–Torres remains a narrow exception to the
       rules set forth in Apprendi and Alleyne. And although there may be
       some tension between Almendarez-Torres and Apprendi and Alleyne,
       “we are bound to follow Almendarez-Torres unless and until the
       Supreme Court itself overrules that decision.” United States v.
       Smith, 775 F.3d 1262, 1266 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted); see
       also United States v. Weeks, 711 F.3d 1255, 1259 (11th Cir. 2013),
       abrogated on other grounds by Descamps v. United States, 570 U.S. 254
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       22-11682                    Opinion of the Court                            7

       (2013) (“[W]e have consistently held that Almendarez–Torres
       remains good law . . . .”).
              The ACCA refers to three previous qualifying predicate
       convictions that were “committed on occasions diﬀerent from one
       another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). To qualify as oﬀenses committed
       on diﬀerent occasions from one another under the ACCA, the
       oﬀenses must be “temporally distinct” and arise from “separate
       and distinct criminal episode[s].” United States v. Sneed, 600 F.3d
       1326, 1329 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotations omitted). The government
       bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence
       that the prior convictions “more likely than not arose out of
       separate and distinct criminal episode[s].” United States v. McCloud,
       818 F.3d 591, 596 (11th Cir. 2016) (alteration in original) (quotations
       omitted). “As long as a court limits itself to Shepard[ 5]-approved
       sources, the court may determine both the existence of prior
       convictions and the factual nature of those convictions, including
       whether they were committed on diﬀerent occasions, based on its
       own factual ﬁndings.” United States v. Dudley, 5 F.4th 1249, 1259–60
       (11th Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 1376 (2022) (quotations
       omitted). Thus, “we have repeatedly rejected the argument that
       judicially determining whether prior convictions were committed

       5 Shepard v. United States, 544
                                    U.S. 13, 26 (2005) (holding that when conducting
       certain inquires related to prior convictions courts are limited to certain
       judicial record evidence—charging instruments, terms of a plea agreement, or
       “transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in which the factual basis
       for the plea was confirmed by the defendant, or to some comparable judicial
       record”).
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       8                          Opinion of the Court                        22-11682

       on diﬀerent occasions from one another for purposes of the ACCA
       violates a defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights.” Id. at
       1260; United States v. Longoria, 874 F.3d 1278, 1283 (11th Cir. 2017);
       Weeks, 711 F.3d at 1258–60. And recently, in Wooden v. United States,
       the Supreme Court expressly declined to address “whether the
       Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, rather than a judge, resolve
       whether prior crimes occurred on a single occasion.” 142 S. Ct.
       1063, 1068 n.3 (2022). Accordingly, Burke’s claim is foreclosed by
       Almendarez-Torres, as well as numerous decisions from this Circuit. 6
       Consequently, we aﬃrm his sentence.

       6 Even if not foreclosed, Burke’s claim fails because he invited any error by
       conceding at the resentencing hearing that the ACCA enhancement was
       proper. Under the doctrine of invited error, we will not reverse, even for plain
       error, an error that the appellant induced the district court to make. United
       States v. Love, 449 F.3d 1154, 1157 (11th Cir. 2006). A defendant invites the
       district court to err when he “expressly acknowledge[s]” that the court may
       take the action of which the defendant complains on appeal. Id.; United States
       v. Carpenter, 803 F.3d 1224, 1236 (11th Cir. 2015).
               Notwithstanding the above, even assuming there was error, Burke’s
       claim fails on the merits because he cannot show that any error affected his
       substantial rights for purposes of plain error review. See Greer v. United States,
       141 S. Ct. 2090, 2099 (2021) (explaining that “the general rule is that a
       constitutional error does not automatically require reversal of a conviction”
       (quotations omitted)); see also United States v. King, 751 F.3d 1268, 1279 (11th
       Cir. 2014) (holding that Apprendi and Alleyne errors are subject to harmless
       error analysis). “[A]n appellate court conducting plain-error review may
       consider the entire record,” “including information contained in a pre-
       sentence report.” Greer, 141 S. Ct. at 2098 (emphasis omitted); United States v.
       Reed, 941 F.3d 1018, 1021 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining that we “may consult the
       whole record when considering the effect of any error on [the defendant’s]
       substantial rights” (quotations omitted)). Here, the record, including the
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       22-11682                  Opinion of the Court                               9

              AFFIRMED.

       undisputed in statements in the PSI, establishes that each of the ACCA
       predicate offenses were committed years apart—i.e., on different occasions
       from one another. Thus, based on this record, Burke cannot “show a
       reasonable probability that, but for the error, the outcome of the proceeding
       would have been different.” Molina-Martinez v. United States, 578 U.S. 189, 194
       (2016) (quotations omitted).