Court Opinion

ID: 9653315
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:43:39.037287+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:57.745808
License: Public Domain

DENMAN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
This circuit court of appeals has rendered a decision on a federal question in conflict with the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court in Adams v. United States, ex rel McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268, 143 A.L.R. 435, and in Whitney v. Dick, 202 U.S. 132, 136, 137, 26 S.Ct. 584, 50 L.Ed. 963, discussed infra. They hold contra to the court’s opinion that in “special circumstances” the circuit court of appeals has the power to require the warden to bring the body of his opposing litigant before that court to have him there present “in the interest of justice.” Cf. Supreme Court Rule 38, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 354.
This dissent is to the denial of the existence of any power in this court to compel a warden to produce the body of his opposing litigant where the warden desires to prevent his opponent from arguing his appeal. We are here discussing the court’s power in the case of such a warden.1 That is to say, that if a skilled member of the bar, sentenced to be hanged, seeks to argue his appeal we have no power to compel a warden to produce him for that purpose in a habeas corpus case in which the balance is between his life and his death — and this though the decision of the appeal may be in a hair’s balance in the minds of the judges composing the court.
What seems the fundamental error in the majority’s approach is the treatment of a habeas corpus appeal, involving life or death to the appellant or the deprivation of his liberty, as an ordinary civil case» This is shown by footnote 4 of the opinion and in the sentence speaking of what one so convicted is deprived of by his imprisonment, as follows: “Of necessity he is disabled for the time being from exercising a myriad of rights, many of them of infinitely greater value than that of personally conducting a civil action to which he is or becomes a party. These deprivations are an inevitable and intended consequence of conviction for crime.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Habeas corpus proceedings are civil in nature but are extraordinarily different from all other civil proceedings. First, as stated, the prisoner litigant is in the custody of his opposing litigant, the warden. Second, it is so concerned with the sentence depriving him of life or of liberty that specific provision is made for it in Article I, Section 9, of the Constitution.
Where, as in the federal criminal procedure, an appeal is provided, it is a denial of due process to the appellant to deny him the right “To be heard * * * according to established modes of procedure” at the appellate hearing. Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326, 35 S.Ct. 582, 586, *23859 L.Ed. 969. Cf. Boykin v. Huff, 73 App.D.C. 378, 121 F.2d 865, 873.
It seems absurd to say that in a habeas corpus proceeding where his life or liberty is equally at stake, we hold that we have no power to bring such an appellant before us to argue his appeal in accordance with our “established method of procedure” because habeas corpus is a civil proceeding.2 In this court the established method of procedure is that appellant “shall be entitled” to open and close an “oral” argument.3 Congress in 28 U.S.C. A. § 394 made it an “established method of procedure” that all litigants “in all courts of the United States * * * may manage tludr own causes personally.” It is not necessary that an appellant shall appear personally to confer jurisdiction on the court. That jurisdiction was obtained for Price had already filed an appeal from the judgment of conviction. Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442, 449, 12 S.Ct. 525, 36 L.Ed. 218. He has prosecuted his appeal in the briefs before us. This dissent is not concerned with the further question whether the Act of Congress instead of constitutional due process confers on the appellant the right in all cases to appear and manage his case. As stated, it is from the court’s denial of the power to bring any appellant here to argue his appeal, even if we deem his argument will aid us in its disposition — an argument we also deem a part of our “established method of procedure” for all other appellants.
That federal appellate courts have power to issue such a writ in all cases “in the interest of justice,” not to secure jurisdiction but to “aid” in its exercise “[In] an appeal over, which the court has jurisdiction” is stated by the Supreme Court in Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268, 143 A.L.R. 435. In that case, in holding at page 275 of 317 U.S., at page 240 of 63 S.Ct. that the writ was “not improvidently entertained” by the circuit court of appeals, the Supreme Court states, at pages 274 and 276, of 317 U.S., at page 240 of 63 S.Ct.:
“But. dry formalism should not sterilize procedural resources which Congress has made available to the federal courts. In exceptional cases where, because of special circumstances, ■ its use as an aid to an appeal over which the court has jurisdiction may fairly be said to be reasonably necessary in the interest of justice, the writ of habeas corpus is available to a circuit court of appeals. * * * [Emphasis supplied.]
“ * * * [The] procedural devices rooted in experience were written into the Bill of Rights not as abstract rubrics in an elegant code but in order to assure fairness and justice before any person could be deprived of ‘life, liberty, or property’”.
The majority in its quotation of the words “Fairly be said to be reasonably necessary” omits the succeeding words “In the interest of justice.” They seem significant.
The Supreme Court had held similarly in Whitney v. Dick, 202 U.S. 132, 26 S.Ct. 584, 586, 50 L.Ed. 963, also cited in the court’s opinion. There, at pages 136 and 137, in discussing the writ of habeas corpus which is to be “agreeable to the usages and principles of law” and which may be “Necessary for the exercise” of an appellate jurisdiction, the Court says the writ is one issuable both “when necessary for and in aid of the exercise of a jurisdiction already otherwise obtained.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant appeal “Jurisdiction [was] already otherwise obtained.” ■ The majority opinion errs when it states that the writ can not issue when “The case is already before us for final disposition, and no impediment of any sort confronts us‘.”
It is thus seen in the above described situation of the condemned lawyer we *239have the power to issue the writ. The Supreme Court so holds. Whether we will exercise the power in any case is dependent upon whether his presence is “in the interest of justice.”
There is nothing contrary to this in the earlier case of Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U.S. 442, 12 S.Ct. 525, 36 L.Ed. 218, cited in this court’s opinion. There, at page 449 of 143 U.S., at page 527 of 12 S.Ct, the Supreme Court states, “ * * * We do not mean to say that the appellate court may not, under some circumstances, require his personal presence; but only that his presence is not essential to its jurisdiction to proceed with the case.”
The majority opinion properly states that no such writ of habeas corpus existed in the appellate court at common law. Yet the Supreme Court holds that, in cases where our jurisdiction is already established, it is a “dry formalism” to deny that Section 14 of the Judiciary Act, now 28 U.S.C.A. § 377, gives us the power to issue the writ whenever it is necessary “in the interest of justice.”
The argument of hardship of the last paragraph of the majority opinion and its statement that “They [the courts] could not in fairness make fish of one applicant and fowl of the other” are a confession of motivation but no avoidance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Adams v. United States, ex rel. McCann, supra. There the power to issue the writ to bring the prisoner before the appellate court is confined to “exceptional cases.” The majority’s opinion denies the power to issue it even in the exceptional case where a skilled lawyer may be of real aid to the court in resolving a doubtful question of law upon which his life depends.
For this Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court’s statement that “[In] special circumstances, its use as an aid to an appeal ■over which the court has jurisdiction may fairly be said to be reasonably necessary in the interest of justice, the writ of habeas corpus is available to a circuit court of appeals” has added to it the words “except where the court thinks the prisoner’s management of his case before the court is in the interest of justice.”
It well may be asked, For what other purpose could an appellate court have the power to bring the body of an appellant before it save to enable him to assist the court in his management of his case while there personally present?
The motion for the order should not have been denied because of an absence of our power to grant it.
ORR, Circuit Judge, concurs.

 The discussion has no application to the able and conscientious Warden Johnston.

 The denial of the right to be represented by counsel is a violation of due process in an ordinary civil suit to quiet title. Roberts v. Anderson, 10 Cir., 66 F.2d 874, 876.

 Rule 22 (1) provides: “1. The appellant in this court shall be entitled to open and conclude the argument of the case. But when there are cross appeals they shall be argued together as one case, and the plaintiff in the court below shall be entitled to open and conclude the argument.”