Court Opinion

ID: 86291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:00:21+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:27.140211
License: Public Domain

43 U.S. 457 (____)
2 How. 457
ROBERT BARNWELL RHETT, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
ROBERT F. POE, CASHIER OF THE BANK OF AUGUSTA, DEFENDANT.[(a)]
Supreme Court of United States.

*463 Coxe and Legare, (attorney-general,) for the plaintiff in error. Wilde and Hunt, for the defendant.
*478 Mr. Justice DANIEL delivered the opinion of the court.
The instrument upon which this suit was instituted in the Circuit Court, was, as the aforegoing statement evinces, in form simply a common promissory note, signed by Benjamin R. Smith, made payable to William E. Haskell, endorsed by Haskell to Robert Barnwell Smith alias Robert Barnwell Rhett, and by this last individual to Robert F. Poe, cashier of the Bank of Augusta, the plaintiff in the action. Such being the nature of the instrument, and it appearing that the formalities of demand at its maturity, and notice to the endorsers have been regularly fulfiled by the holder, a question as to the justice of a recovery by the latter could scarcely be suggested, if the rights and obligations of the several parties shall be viewed as dependent upon their relation to the note itself considered as a distinct and separate transaction. Such, however, is not precisely the attitude of the parties to this controversy. It is in proof that there was held by the plaintiff below, beside this note, a draft for $8000 drawn by Timberlake on the 6th of May, 1837, at sixty days, in favour of the plaintiff, on Benjamin R. Smith, and accepted by Smith; and farther, that upon the note was written by the plaintiff's agent, a memorandum in the following words: "This note is collateral security for the payment of the annexed draft of D. Timberlake on B.R. Smith of $8000." Upon the effect of both these instruments, as constituting parts of one transaction, the questions propounded to the Circuit Court and brought hither for review have *479 arisen. The farther proofs contained in this record will be adverted to in the progress of this opinion, as notice of them shall become necessary to explain the instructions prayed for, and those given by the Circuit Court on the trial of this cause. The second series of instructions, embracing a more extended and varied survey of the evidence than is contained in that preceding it, will be first considered. It is to the first, second, third, and fifth instructions of this second series that exceptions are taken. To the first proposition affirmed by the court in this first instruction, it is difficult to imagine any just ground of objection on the part of the defendant below, as that proposition concedes almost in terms the prayer of that defendant. To the second branch of this instruction it is not perceived that any valid objection can be sustained; for, although it might have been true that at the date of acceptance of Timberlake's draft on Smith for $8000, the latter had been in possession of $10,000 placed in his hands by Timberlake, it would not follow under the circumstances proved, or under those assumed in the instruction, that Timberlake as the drawer of that draft was entitled to notice. If, as the instruction supposes, the acceptances for $21,500, which Smith had come under for Timberlake, were drawn for the accommodation of the latter, upon the faith of funds to be furnished by him for their payment; that the $10,000 had been furnished by Timberlake in part for that purpose, but had been withdrawn by him for his own uses prior to the maturity of the draft for $8000  that he should have intercepted before the maturity of the draft all the funds against which he knew the acceptances of Smith were drawn, and that he the drawer, and Smith the acceptor, had, before such maturity, become notoriously insolvent, under such a predicament the law would not impose the requirement of notice to the drawer upon the holder. No useful or reasonable end could be answered by such a requisition. Where a drawer has no right to expect the payment of a bill by the acceptor, he has no claim to notice of non-payment. This is ruled in the following cases: Sharp v. Baily, 9 Barn. and Cress. 44; 4 Mann. and Ryl. 18; Bickerdike v. Bollman, 1 T. Rep. 405; Brown v. Meffey, 15 East, 221; Goodall v. Dolly, 1 T. Rep. 712; Legge v. Thorpe, 12 East, 171. If the $1000 said to have been in the hands of Smith were by the agreement or understanding between Smith and Timberlake to be applied in payment of joint claims against them, and falling due before the draft for $8000, and had been so applied, it had answered the sole object for which it had been raised, and could not in the *480 apprehension of these parties constitute a fund against which the draft of $8000 subsequently to become due was drawn. Those $10,000 were gone, were appropriated by these parties themselves. Then if, after this appropriation, there was, as this instruction assumes, an arrangement between Timberlake and Smith in respect to the bills drawn by Timberlake to the amount of $21,500, that he was to put Smith in funds sufficient to pay $13,500 of the amount just mentioned, which were to become payable before the $8000 draft, and that on Timberlake's supplying those funds Smith was to pay the $8000 draft, and Timberlake failed to put Smith in funds to take up the $13,500, and that the drafts for the same were protested, of which Timberlake had notice, he, Timberlake, could have no claim to notice of non-payment of the draft for $8000. There could be no reason for such a notice from the holder of the draft. Timberlake could have had no right to calculate on the payment of this draft; on the contrary, he was bound to infer its dishonour. He knew that payment of the draft for $8000 was dependent upon a condition to be performed by himself, and he was obliged to know from the notice of the dishonour of all his bills, that he had not performed that condition, and had thereby intercepted the very funds from which the acceptances by Smith were to be met. He therefore quoad this draft had never any funds in the hands of Smith, and consequently, never had any claim to notice of non-payment from the holder.
The case of Claridge v. Dalton, in 4 Maule and Selw., is strongly illustrative of the principle here laid down. That was a case in which the drawer had supplied the drawee with goods which were still not paid for. To this extent, then, the former unquestionably had funds in the hands of the latter; but on the day of payment of the bill the credit upon which the goods were sold had not expired, and the court thereupon unanimously ruled that quoad the obligations of the parties arising upon these transactions, the drawer must be understood as having no effects in the hands of the drawee, and therefore, not entitled to notice. The second instruction affirms in the first place, what must be admitted by all, and what is not understood to be matter of contest here, viz.: that whenever a party to a bill or note is entitled to notice, such notice, if not given him in person, must be by a timely effort to convey it through the regular or usual and recognised channels of communication with the party or his agent, or with his known residence or place of business. It is to so much of this instruction as is applicable to what may amount to *481 a dispensation from the regular or ordinary modes of affecting parties with notice, that objection is made; to that portion in which the court charged the jury, that if they believed from the evidence that although Timberlake may have resided in New York, that he had since the autumn of 1834 or 1835 made Augusta his residence, and that he had removed from Augusta, and out of the state of Georgia after the bill for $8000 was drawn and before its maturity, that then due diligence had been used to give him notice of the dishonour of the bill. It is not considered by this court that this charge in any correct acceptation of it trenches upon the legitimate province of the jury, or transcends the just limits of the authority of the court, or contravenes any established doctrine of the law. 'Tis a doctrine generally received, one which is recognised by this court in the case of the Bank of Columbia v. Lawrence, 1 Peters, 578, that whenever the facts upon which the question of due diligence arises are ascertained and undisputed, due diligence becomes a question of law; see also the Bank of Utica v. Bender, 21 Wendell, 643. In the case before us every fact and circumstance in the evidence which was to determine the residence of the drawer in Augusta, or his abandonment of that residence, or his removal from the state of Georgia; the unsettled and vagrant character of his after-life, the fruitless inquiries by the notary to find out his residence, the notoriety of his having neither domicil nor place of business in Georgia, the effort to follow him with notice of dishonour of his draft, were all submitted to the jury to be weighed by them. The charge of the court should be interpreted with reference to the testimony which is shown to have preceded it, upon which, in truth, it was prayed; with reference, also, to the reasonable conclusions which that testimony tended obviously to establish. Interpreted by this rule, it amounts to this, and this only, a declaration to the jury that if the evidence satisfied them of the residence of Timberlake in Augusta at the time of drawing the draft, of the certainty and notoriety of his having abandoned that residence and the entire state before its maturity, leaving behind him no knowledge of any place, either of his residence or for the transaction of his business, satisfied them also of the real but unavailing effort of the notary who protested the draft to discover his whereabout, they ought to infer that due diligence had been practised by the holder of the draft. In the case of an endorser, with respect to whom greatest strictness is always exacted, it has been ruled that the holder of a bill is excused for not giving regular notice of dishonour *482 to the endorser, of whose place of residence he is ignorant, if he use reasonable diligence to discover where the endorser may be found. Thus, Lord Ellenborough in Bateman v. Joseph, 2 Campb. 462, remarks, "When the holder of a bill of exchange does not know where the endorser is to be found, it would be very hard if he lost his remedy by not communicating immediate notice of the dishonour of the bill; and I think the law lays down no such rigid rule. The holder must not allow himself to remain in a state of passive ignorance, but if he uses reasonable diligence to discover the residence of the endorser, I conceive that notice given as soon as this is discovered is due notice within the custom of merchants." See to the same effect 12 East, 433; Baldwin v. Richardson et al., 1 Barn. and Cress. 245; Beveridge v. Burgis, 3 Campb. 262. It has been held in Massachusetts, that where the maker of a promissory note had absconded before the day of payment, presentment and demand could not be required of the holder in order to charge the endorser: opinion of Parsons, Chief Justice, in Putnam v. Sullivan, 4 Mass. Rep. 53. In Duncan v. McCullough, 4 Serg. and Rawle, 480, it was ruled that if the maker of a promissory note is not to be found when the note becomes due, demand on him for payment is not necessary to charge the endorser, if due diligence is shown in endeavouring to make a demand. Hartford Bank v. Stedman, 3 Conn. Rep. 487, where the holder of a bill who was ignorant of the endorser's residence, sent the notice to A. who was acquainted with it, requesting him to add to the direction the endorser's residence, it was held that reasonable diligence had been used. The measures adopted in this case by the holder of Timberlake's draft, when viewed in connection with the condition and conduct of the drawer himself, appear to come fully up to the requirement of the authorities above cited; and, therefore, in the judgment of this court, affect him with all the consequences of notice, supposing this now to be a substantial proceeding upon the draft itself.
Next and last in the order of exception, is the fifth instruction. The first position in this is given almost literally in the terms of the prayer. The court proceeds further to charge, that if the insolvency of the drawer and acceptor were known to each other, and that this bill was drawn to pay for purchases on joint account, or a transaction in which they were partners, and the property so purchased had been diverted by the drawer to his own use, and that the payment of the bills had been the subject of private arrangement between the acceptor and drawer, that then the holder was excused from giving notice of the *483 non-payment of the bill for $8000. With respect to the exception taken to this instruction, all that seems requisite to dispose of it, is the remark, that if the drawer of the bill was in truth the partner of the acceptor, either generally, or in the single adventure in which the bill made a part, in that event notice of dishonour of the bill by the holder to the drawer need not have been given. The knowledge of the one partner was the knowledge of the other, and notice to the one notice to the other. Authorities upon this point need not be accumulated; we cite upon it Porthouse v. Parker, 1 Campb. 82, where Lord Ellenborough remarks, speaking of the dishonour of the bill in that case. "as this must necessarily have been known to one of them, the knowledge of one was the knowledge of all;" also, Bignold v. Waterhouse, 1 Maule and Selw. 259; Whitney v. Sterling, 14 Johns. Rep. 215; Gowan v. Jackson, 20 Johns. 176. Recurring now to the first series of instructions prayed for, we will consider how far the two propositions presented by them were warranted by the correct principles upon which the opinion of the courts may be invoked; and how far the court was justifiable in rejecting the propositions in question, upon the ground either of want of connection with any particular state or progress of the evidence  or of support and justification as derived from the entire testimony in the cause. It is a settled rule of judicial procedure that the courts will never lay down as instructions to a jury, general or abstract positions, such as are not immediately connected with and applicable to the facts of a cause, but require that every prayer for an instruction should be preceded by and based upon a statement of facts upon which the questions of law naturally and properly arise. It is equally certain that the courts will not, upon a view of the testimony which is partial or imperfect, give an instruction which the entire evidence in a cause when developed would forbid. Tested by these rules, the two instructions prayed for in the first series are deemed to be improper, they are accompanied with no statement of the testimony as their proper and immediate foundation; they are bottomed exclusively upon assumption, and such assumption too as the testimony taken altogether is believed to contradict. The court, therefore, properly refused these instructions; for this refusal it was by no means necessary that the causes should be assigned, by the court, in extenso  these are to be seen in the character of the instructions themselves, and in the testimony upon the record. This court has thus considered and disposed of the several prayers for instruction in this cause, and of the rulings of the Circuit Court thereupon. *484 Whilst this procedure has been proper with the view of ascertaining how far the rights of the parties have been affected by the several questions presented and adjudged in the Circuit Court; it is our opinion that the true merits of this controversy are to be found within a much more limited and obvious range of inquiry than that which has been opened by these questions. The note on which the action below was instituted, was given as a guarantee for the solvency of the parties to the bill for $8000, drawn in favour of the plaintiff, and for its punctual payment at maturity. Such being the character and purposes of the note, was it necessary, in order to authorize a recovery upon it, that every formality, all that strictness should have been observed in reference to the bill intended to be guarantied, which it is conceded are indispensable to maintain an action upon a mercantile paper against a party upon that paper? It is contended that a guarantee is an insurance of the punctual payment of the paper guarantied; is a condition and a material consideration on which this paper is received, and therefore that a failure in punctual payment at maturity is a forfeiture of such insurance on condition, rendering the obligation of the guarantor absolute from the period of the failure. Whether this proposition can or cannot be maintained to the extent here stated, the authorities concur in making a distinction between actions upon a bill or note, and actions against a party who has guarantied such bill or note by a separate contract. In the former instances notice in order to charge the drawer or endorser is with very few established exceptions uniformly required; in the latter the obligation to give notice is much more relaxed, and its omission does not imply injury as a matter of course. In Warrington v. Furbor, 8 East, 242, where the guarantee was not by endorsement of the paper sued upon, and the action was upon the contract, Lord Ellenborough said, "that the same strictness of proof is not necessary to charge the guarantees as would have been necessary to support an action on the bill itself, where by the law-merchant a demand and a refusal by the acceptor ought to be proved to charge any other party on the bill, and this notwithstanding his bankruptcy. But this is not necessary to charge guarantees who insure as it were the solvency of the principal, and if he becomes bankrupt and notoriously insolvent, it is the same thing as if he were dead, and it is nugatory to go through the ceremony of making a demand upon him." Le Blanc, Justice, says in the same case, "there is no need of the same proof to charge a guarantee as there is a party whose name is on a bill of exchange; for *485 it is sufficient as against the former to show that the holder could not have obtained the money by making demand of it." The same doctrine may be found in Philips v. Astling et al., 2 Taunt. 205. So too, Lord Eldon in the case of Wright v. Simpson, 6 Ves. 732, expresses himself in terms which show his clear understanding of the position of a collateral guarantee or surety, his language is "as to the case of principal and surety, in general cases, I never understood that as between the obligee and the surety there was an obligation to active diligence against the principal, but the surety is a guarantee, and it is his business to see whether the principal pays and not that of the creditor." The case of Gibbs v. Cannon, 9 Serg. and Rawle, 198, was an action against a guarantor who was not a party on the note, upon his separate contract. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania decided in this case, that provided the drawer and endorser of the note were solvent at the maturity of the note, notice of non-payment should be given to the guarantor, and that the latter under such circumstances may avail himself of the want of notice of non-payment, but it places the burden of proving solvency, and of injury flowing from want of notice upon the guarantor. The last case mentioned on this point, and one which seems to be conclusive upon it, is that of Reynolds v. Douglass et al., 12 Peters, 497, in which the court establish these propositions.
1st. That the guarantor of a promissory note, whose name does not appear upon the note, is bound without notice, where the maker of the note was insolvent at its maturity, unless he can show that he has sustained some prejudice by want of notice of a demand on the maker, and of notice of non-payment.
2d. If the guarantor can prove he has suffered damage by the neglect to make the demand on the maker, and to give notice, he can be discharged only to the extent of the damage sustained. Tried by the principles ruled in the authorities above cited, and especially by that from this court, in 12 Peters, it would seem that this case should admit of neither doubt nor hesitancy. The note on which the action was brought was given as a guarantee for the payment of the bill for $8000, as is proved and indeed admitted on all hands. It is the distinct and substantive agreement by which the guarantee of the bill was undertaken. It is established by various and uncontradicted facts and circumstances in the cause, and finally by the solemn admissions of Timberlake the drawer and Smith the acceptor of the bill, both of whom have testified in the cause, that at the maturity of the *486 bill they were both utterly insolvent; that Timberlake was probably so before the commencement of these transactions, and that Smith before the maturity of the bill had made an assignment of every thing he had claim to, for the benefit of others, and, amongst the creditors named in that assignment, providing for the plaintiff in error as ranking high amongst the preferred class.
Under such circumstances to have required notice of the dishonour of the bill would have been a vain and unreasonable act, such as the law cannot be presumed to exact of any person. Upon a review of the whole case, we think that the judgment of the Circuit Court should be affirmed.

ORDER.
This cause came on to be heard on the transcript of the record from the Circuit Court of the United States for the district of South Carolina, and was argued by counsel. On consideration whereof, It is now here ordered and adjudged by this court, that the judgment of the said Circuit Court in this cause be, and the same is hereby affirmed with costs and damages at the rate of six per centum per annum.
NOTES
[(a)]  This case, although subsequent in this volume to that of Lawrence v. McCalmont, was in fact decided before it; having been argued at the preceding term and held under a curia advisare vult; and the manuscript opinion in the present case was sent for and referred to, during the progress of the argument in that of Lawrence v. McCalmont. The reason for stating this may be easily seen by referring to the report of that case.