Court Opinion

ID: 9752964
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:47:44.257003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:06.088376
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Watkins, J.:
I would reverse and award a new trial. This is another effort by the Pennsylvania Courts to avoid the plain implication of the law as to illegal search and seizure as laid down in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U. S. 643, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081. True, the trial in this case was held two weeks before the announcement of this decision but the proper constitutional objections were raised to the introduction of the evidence alleged to be illegally obtained and the court below discussed the Mapp case in disposing of the defendant’s post trial motions.
Much has been made of the contention that a different standard of reasonableness applies in the search of an automobile on the ground that it can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction. But as the defendant contends “It cannot be seriously argued that the facts of this case are analogous to those cases where the requirements of ‘reasonableness’ in arrest or warrant were relaxed. The rule of Flores v. U. S., supra (234 F. 2d 604), and Carroll v. U. S., supra (267 U. S. 153), is one of practicality to be applied in situations where the vehicle might be moved out of the jurisdiction Avliile a warrant was being procured. Is the instant case such a case? There was no fleeing felon•—no police in hot pursuit. On the contrary, the police knew the identity of the appellant twenty-four (24) hours before they went to his home and placed him in a cell, before they carried on their search of his car. Under the circumstances, the possibility of the appellant’s spiriting *518the car away before the police could procure a search warrant was remote and a search warrant should have been obtained.”
Most certainly the niceties of procedure should not be used to deprive a citizen of the United States of the protection afforded him by the Constitution of the United States. “. . . rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment are indispensable to the full enjoyment of personal security, personal liberty and private property. They are to be regarded as the, ‘. . . very essence of Constitutional liberty . . .’. It has been repeatedly decided that those Amendments should receive liberal construction, so as to prevent stealthy encroachment upon or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by them, by the imperceptible practice of courts or by well intentioned but mistakenly overzealous officers.” Gouled v. U. S., 255 U. S. 298, 65 L. Ed. 647, 41 S. Ct. 261.
The Supreme Court, in the Gouled case further said, “We think rather that it is a rule to be used to secure the ends of justice under the circumstances presented by each case, ... A rule of practice must not be allowed for any technical reason to prevail over a constitutional right.”
I find it difficult to follow the reasoning of the court that would require the defendant to remain incarcerated and bring a petition of habeas corpus to raise the question or seek by other means prior to trial to secure the return of the questioned evidence, when such determination at best would constitute interlocutory, unappealable orders and would entail interminable and unconscionable delay. While the objections or motions made during the trial, at the time of the presentation of the evidence, which in many cases will be the first knowledge the defendant has of its possession by the Commonwealth, is simple and direct and the issue can be promptly determined.
Flood, J., joins in this dissent.