Court Opinion

ID: 9926606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 15:04:59.884131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:46.147075
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-195

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                                COREY D. WEST.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The defendant, Corey D. West, appeals from his conviction

 of rape after a jury trial in the Superior Court.1              The defendant

 argues that an evidentiary ruling by the trial judge was error

 and deprived him of his right to confront witnesses.               We discern

 no abuse of discretion in the judge's ruling and no substantial

 risk of a miscarriage of justice.           We affirm.

       Background.     Before trial, the Commonwealth moved in limine

 to admit testimony of a different victim alleging that the

 defendant had raped her in Boston under circumstances similar to

 those in the present case.        The judge ruled that the bad act

 evidence was not admissible in the Commonwealth's case in chief.

 1 On an indictment charging aggravated rape, the defendant was
 convicted of the lesser included offense of rape. The jury
 acquitted him of armed kidnapping with sexual assault, armed
 robbery, and assault by means of a dangerous weapon (a knife).
The judge warned, "depending on what the evidence is, the door

may be opened at a later time."

    At trial, the jury heard evidence that in September 2016,

the victim was addicted to heroin, worked as a prostitute, and

advertised her services on a Web site called Backpage.       On the

night of September 16 to 17, she, Jeffrey Hopkins, and Mike

Depina drank Hennessy cognac, smoked marijuana, and rode around

in Depina's car.

    In the early morning of September 17, the victim received a

text message from someone seeking one-half hour of sex.       After

she negotiated a price, she received another text message

directing her to a condominium building in Brockton, and Depina

drove her there.   While Hopkins and Depina waited in the car,

the victim went into the building, where the defendant escorted

her to an apartment.    After the defendant asked if she wanted to

use the bathroom, the victim went into the bathroom and closed

the door.   At that point, the victim would have been willing to

have sex with the defendant for money.

    When the victim opened the bathroom door, the defendant was

standing there holding a knife.       The defendant held the knife to

the victim's throat and ordered her to get undressed; she

complied.   Wearing a condom, the defendant raped the victim

orally and vaginally.    Then the defendant flushed the condom

down the toilet.   At knifepoint, he forced the victim to take a

                                  2
shower and brush her teeth.    The victim dressed and ran to

Depina's car.   Crying and upset, the victim told Hopkins and

Depina that the defendant had raped her at knifepoint.

    During a subsequent search of the apartment, police found

the defendant hiding inside a suitcase.    The victim was treated

at a hospital; she had marks on her neck where the defendant had

pressed the knife against her.    At the hospital, she was shown a

photo array and identified the defendant as the man who had

raped her.

    Discussion.   The defendant argues that the judge improperly

restricted his cross-examination of the victim.     Questioned by

defense counsel, the victim testified that before this rape in

Brockton, Depina drove her to Fall River to meet another

Backpage customer for sex, but she never met that man because

"He didn't show up."     At sidebar, defense counsel made an offer

of proof that Hopkins and Depina had testified before the grand

jury that the victim had said that she had been raped and robbed

by the Fall River man.     During a voir dire, the victim admitted

that she did meet the Fall River man but he was "sketchy," so

she returned to Depina's car.    She denied telling Hopkins or

Depina that the Fall River man had raped or robbed her.

    Defense counsel argued that he should be permitted to

impeach the victim with her statement to Hopkins and Depina

because it showed that she had a "pattern of claiming rape."

                                  3
The judge ruled that if Hopkins or Depina testified to the

statement, the defendant could recall the victim to elicit her

denial that she said it, and it would be admitted as a prior

false allegation of rape tending to show fabrication.      Reminded

by the prosecutor of his in limine ruling about the Boston rape

allegation, the judge commented that if the defendant introduced

the victim's prior statement, "then I will explore whether or

not the Commonwealth can put in the prior act in Suffolk,"

telling defense counsel, "You can decide how you're going to

proceed."   On cross-examination of Hopkins, defense counsel

elicited that earlier that evening the victim had met a Backpage

customer in Fall River for sex, but counsel did not ask Hopkins

about the victim's statement.    Depina did not testify.

       On appeal, the defendant argues that he should have been

permitted to cross-examine the victim about her statement to

Hopkins and Depina that the Fall River man had raped and robbed

her.   As set forth above, the trial record shows that the judge

did permit the defendant to introduce the victim's statement

through cross-examination of Hopkins, but the defendant

refrained from doing so.    In those circumstances, the defendant

did not preserve the issue for appellate review, and we consider

it to determine whether a substantial risk of a miscarriage of

justice arose.   See Commonwealth v. Otsuki, 411 Mass. 218, 236

                                  4
(1991).   See also Commonwealth v. Shruhan, 89 Mass. App. Ct.

320, 324 (2016).

     The defendant contends that the victim's statement was

admissible during her cross-examination on any of three grounds:

as a prior false allegation of rape, as her prior inconsistent

statement, or to explain her physical injuries.   We are not

persuaded.   First, the defendant argues that because the victim

testified on voir dire that her only interaction with the Fall

River man was a brief conversation, her statement to Hopkins and

Depina that the man had raped her was admissible as a prior

false allegation of rape.   See Commonwealth v. Bohannon, 376

Mass. 90, 92-94 (1978).   In contrast, trial defense counsel

repeatedly told the judge that he was not seeking to introduce

the victim's statement as a prior false allegation of rape.2    In

any event, the judge permitted the defendant to introduce the

victim's statement as a prior false allegation, but required him

first to prove by extrinsic evidence -- the testimony of Hopkins

or Depina -- that the victim had made the statement.   After the

voir dire in which the victim denied making the statement, it

2 The defendant has not argued, in the trial court or on appeal,
that the victim "confabulated" her interactions with the
defendant and the Fall River man. Contrast Commonwealth v.
Polk, 462 Mass. 23, 38 (2012) (expert testimony of psychologist
supported claim that rape victim had "confabulated" allegations
against defendant with prior sexual assaults by uncles). Thus
we do not consider that issue.

                                 5
was within the judge's discretion to require the defendant to

elicit the statement through Hopkins or Depina before recalling

the victim to question her about it.   See Commonwealth v.

Parent, 465 Mass. 395, 399-400 (2013) (after sexual assault

victim denied having made inconsistent statements to detective,

defendant should have been permitted to elicit inconsistencies

from detective).   That the defendant chose not to do so did not

give rise to a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

    Second, the defendant contends that because the victim had

testified before the jury that the Fall River man "didn't show

up," her statement that that man raped her was admissible as her

prior inconsistent statement.   See Commonwealth v. McGowan, 400

Mass. 385, 390 (1987) (no discretion to exclude prior

inconsistent statement "directly related" to "central issue in

the case").   The jury heard the victim's testimony that she was

working as a prostitute, was addicted to heroin, and would have

been willing to have sex with the defendant for money.   On

cross-examination, the defendant elicited that the victim had

lied both to police and under oath before the grand jury.     In

that context, evidence of whether the victim met the Fall River

man or had sex with him -- consensually or

nonconsensually -- would have gone to a collateral matter.     Cf.

Commonwealth v. Dabney, 478 Mass. 839, 857-860 (2018) (judge

properly precluded impeachment of sex trafficking victim with

                                 6
Backpage invoices).     Even assuming that the victim had made

inconsistent statements about her interaction with the Fall

River man, their omission did not create a substantial risk of a

miscarriage of justice.

    Finally, the defendant argues, for the first time on

appeal, that the victim's statement that the Fall River man had

raped her would have been admissible to explain her physical

injuries.    The defendant did not file a written motion in limine

or make an offer of proof that the evidence was admissible for

that purpose, as required by the rape-shield statute, G. L.

c. 233, § 21B.    See Commonwealth v. Cortez, 438 Mass. 123, 129

(2002).     Thus the defendant made no showing that whatever

happened in Fall River would have explained the marks on the

victim's neck.    See id. at 129-130 (consensual intercourse two

days before murder would not have explained injuries including

bloody fingermarks on victim's thighs).

    The judge's evidentiary ruling did not create a substantial

risk of a miscarriage of justice by violating the defendant's

right to confront witnesses under the Sixth Amendment to the

United States Constitution or art. 12 of the Massachusetts

Declaration of Rights.    That right "is 'not absolute,' . . . and

'the scope of cross-examination rests largely in the sound

discretion of the trial judge.'"       Commonwealth v. Gallett, 481

Mass. 662, 682 (2019), quoting Commonwealth v. Miles, 420 Mass.

                                   7
67, 71 (1995).    As explained above, the judge did not preclude

the defendant from introducing the statement as a prior false

allegation of rape, or otherwise abuse his discretion by

excluding the statement.    See Commonwealth v. Sealy, 467 Mass.

617, 624 (2014) (in judge's discretion to preclude cross-

examination of rape victim about motive to fabricate arising

from immigration benefits she received after reporting prior

rape).    Nor did any violation of the defendant's confrontation

rights arise from the judge's comment that, if the defendant

introduced the victim's statement to show her motive to

fabricate this rape, that might "open the door" to admission of

evidence of the Boston rape allegation against the defendant.

The judge's ruling was not a definitive one.     See Commonwealth

v. Pierre, 486 Mass. 418, 431 (2020).

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Massing,
                                        Grant & Brennan, JJ.3),

                                      Assistant Clerk

Entered:    January 25, 2024.

3   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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