Court Opinion

ID: 9624237
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:55:08.880633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:41:59.047868
License: Public Domain

Thompson, Justice,
concurring specially.
I must reject the analysis and holding of the majority. Until now, no case has hamstrung the State by requiring it to prove the qualifications of a phlebotomist in only one of two ways. This case does just that, without justification.
In a DUI case, the State has the burden of proving the qualifications of any person who draws blood at the request of a law enforcement officer.3 The State may meet this burden in at least two ways: (1) call the person who drew the blood to testify about his qualifications;4 or (2) pursuant to OCGA § 40-6-392 (e), introduce a “certificate” from the Secretary of State or the DHR showing that the person was licensed or certified.
OCGA § 40-6-392 (e) does not require the state to introduce a certificate from the Secretary of State or the DHR to prove a phlebotomist’s qualifications; it merely provides that such a certificate is admissible.5 Thus, the Court of Appeals has consistently ruled that the qualifications of a person who draws blood may be proved “in at least two ways,” clearly implying — and even stating — that the State can carry its burden in other ways as well.61 see no reason for this Court to now hold that the State may meet its burden in two ways only. More specifically, I see no reason why the State should not be allowed to prove the qualifications of a phlebotomist under OCGA § 24-3-14, the business record exception to the hearsay rule.7
As I see it, the qualifications of a phlebotomist can be proven with a business record upon the laying of a proper foundation without violating a defendant’s right of confrontation. So long as such a record is a mere memorial of the fact that a phlebotomist is qualified *173to draw blood, it may be admitted into evidence.8 Accordingly, I disagree with the holding of the majority.
Decided March 6, 2000.
Monte K. Davis, George A. Stein, for appellant.
Keith C. Martin, Solicitor, Kimberly V. Gross, Assistant Solicitor, for appellee.
I concur specially, however, because the State failed to lay a proper foundation for the admission of the “employee education cumulative report” as a business record. There was no testimony as to “when” the entries on the report were made. Thus, the State failed to establish that the entries on the report were made at the time of the event or within a reasonable time thereafter.9
I am authorized to state that Justice Hines joins in this special concurrence.

 Carr v. State, 222 Ga. App. 776, 777 (476 SE2d 75) (1996).

 See Thurman v. State, 172 Ga. App. 16, 17 (1) (321 SE2d 780) (1984).

 Bazemore v. State, 225 Ga. App. 741, 742 (484 SE2d 673) (1997).

 See, e.g., Dean v. State, 232 Ga. App. 390 (501 SE2d 895) (1998); Brahm v. State, 230 Ga. App. 407 (497 SE2d 240) (1998); Bazemore v. State, supra; Carr v. State, supra; Harden v. State, 210 Ga. App. 673 (436 SE2d 756) (1993).

 See Dean v. State, supra (qualifications of phlebotomist may be proved through hospital business records and testimony of supervisor).

 See Brown v. State, 268 Ga. 76 (485 SE2d 486) (1997) (breath-testing device certificates may be introduced into evidence under the business record exception to the hearsay rule without violating a defendant’s right of confrontation under the Federal and State constitutions).

 Suarez v. Suarez, 257 Ga. 102, 104 (355 SE2d 649) (1987). See Mullinax v. State, 231 Ga. App. 534, 535 (499 SE2d 903) (1998) (certificates for breath-testing machine are inadmissible where trooper does not know if certificates were made contemporaneously with testing).