Court Opinion

ID: 9377729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 17:00:37.666389+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:16.012572
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NO ON E, SAN FRANCISCANS     No. 22-15824
OPPOSING THE AFFORDABLE
HOUSING PRODUCTION ACT;    D.C. No. 3:22-cv-
EDWIN M LEE ASIAN PACIFIC     02785-CRB
DEMOCRATIC CLUB PAC
SPONSORED BY NEIGHBORS FOR
A BETTER SAN FRANCISCO         OPINION
ADVOCACY; TODD DAVID,

             Plaintiffs-Appellants,

 v.

DAVID CHIU, in his official capacity
as San Francisco City Attorney; SAN
FRANCISCO ETHICS
COMMISSION; BROOKE JENKINS,
in his official capacity as San
Francisco District Attorney; CITY
AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO,

             Defendants-Appellees.

      Appeal from the United States District Court
        for the Northern District of California
      Charles R. Breyer, District Judge, Presiding
2                      NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

          Argued and Submitted December 9, 2022
                 San Francisco, California

                       Filed March 8, 2023

    Before: Susan P. Graber, Ronald M. Gould, and Paul J.
                  Watford, Circuit Judges.

                    Opinion by Judge Graber

                          SUMMARY *

                           Civil Rights

    The panel affirmed the district court’s denial of
Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to
enjoin enforcement of a San Francisco ordinance requiring
that “all committees making expenditures which support or
oppose any candidate for City elective office or any City
measure” must comply with the City’s new disclaimer
requirements, in addition to California’s requirements.” S.F.
Campaign & Governmental Conduct Code § 1.161(a).
    Under California law, certain political advertisements
run by a committee must name the committee’s top
contributors. After the passage of Proposition F, referred to
by proponents as the “Sunlight on Dark Money Initiative,”
the City and County of San Francisco added a secondary-

*
  This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                    NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                    3

contributor disclaimer requirement that compels certain
committees, in their political advertisements, also to list the
major donors to those top contributors. Plaintiffs, who
supported the passage of a ballot measure in the June 7, 2022
election, alleged that the secondary-contributor disclaimer
requirement violated the First Amendment, both on its face
and as applied against Plaintiffs.
   The panel first determined that even though the June
2022 election had occurred, this appeal was not moot
because the controversy was capable of repetition yet
evading review.
    The panel held that Plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood
of success on the merits. Applying exacting scrutiny, the
panel held that San Francisco’s requirement was
substantially related to the governmental interest in
informing voters of the source of funding for election-related
communications. As this court previously recognized,
providing information to the electorate may require looking
beyond the named organization that runs an
advertisement. In the context of San Francisco municipal
elections, Defendants showed that donors to local
committees are often committees themselves and that
committees often obscure their actual donors through
misleading and even deceptive committee names. Because
the interest in learning the source of funding for a political
advertisement extends past the entity that is directly
responsible, the challenged ordinance was substantially
related to the governmental interest in informing the
electorate.
    The panel next held that the ordinance did not create an
excessive burden on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights
relative to the government interest and was sufficiently
4                   NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

tailored. Thus, the panel was not persuaded that the
secondary-contributor requirement was an impermissible
burden on speech because the size of the disclaimer was
excessive with respect to larger ads. And given Defendants’
position that it would not enforce the challenged ordinance
with respect to shorter ads, the district court was within its
discretion to conclude that any burden on speech did not
require a preliminary injunction in this instance. Plaintiffs’
argument that the secondary-contributor requirement
violated their right to freedom of association was likewise
insufficient to outweigh the strength of the governmental
interests. The district court was within its discretion to
conclude that the secondary-contributor requirement had a
scope in proportion to the City’s objective.
    Addressing the remaining preliminary injunction factors,
the panel concluded that without an injunction, Plaintiffs
likely would be injured by the loss of some First Amendment
freedoms, but that injury would be modest. Defendants,
however, established that there is a strong public interest in
providing voters with the information of who supports ballot
measures. Thus, the public interest and the balance of
hardships weighed in favor of Defendants.
                        NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                           5

                             COUNSEL

Alan Gura (argued), Institute for Free Speech, Washington,
D.C.; James R. Sutton, The Sutton Law Firm, San Francisco,
California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Tara M. Steeley (argued) and Wayne K. Snodgrass, Deputy
City Attorneys; David Chiu, City Attorney; Office of the San
Francisco City Attorney; San Francisco, California; for
Defendants-Appellees.
Tara Malloy and Megan P. McAllen, Campaign Legal
Center, Washington, D.C., for Amicus Curiae Campaign
Legal Center.

                              OPINION

GRABER, Circuit Judge:

    In response to the growing prevalence of money in
politics, many governments have required groups that run
political advertisements to identify their funding sources
publicly.      Under California law, certain political
advertisements run by a committee must name the
committee’s top contributors. The City and County of San
Francisco adds a secondary-contributor disclaimer
requirement that compels certain committees, in their
political advertisements, also to list the major donors to those
top contributors. 1

1
  The parties in this case distinguish between “disclaimers” (statements
at the time of the advertisement, identifying who is funding the ad) and
“disclosures” (public reports filed with government entities). Although
that distinction is recognized in the case law, see, e.g., Citizens United
6                      NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

    Plaintiffs—a political committee that runs ads, the
committee’s treasurer, and a contributor to the committee—
seek to enjoin enforcement of San Francisco’s ordinance.
They allege that the secondary-contributor requirement
violates the First Amendment. The district court held that
Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed on the merits and denied
Plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction. Reviewing
the denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion
and the underlying legal principles de novo, Fyock v.
Sunnyvale, 779 F.3d 991, 995 (9th Cir. 2015), we agree with
the district court. Plaintiffs have not shown a likelihood of
success on the merits. San Francisco’s requirement is
substantially related to the governmental interest in
informing voters of the source of funding for election-related
communications. The ordinance does not create an
excessive burden on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights
relative to that interest, and it is sufficiently tailored to the
governmental interest. Accordingly, we affirm.
         FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    A.       California Political Reform Act
    The California Political Reform Act defines a
“committee” as “any person or combination of persons”
who, in a calendar year, receives contributions totaling
$2,000 or more; makes independent expenditures totaling
$1,000 or more; or makes contributions totaling $10,000 or
more to, or at the behest of, candidates or committees. Cal.
Gov’t Code § 82013. A “primarily formed committee” is

v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67 (2010), some courts use the terms
interchangeably. Where relevant, we clarify whether laws considered by
prior courts required disclosures or disclaimers, consistent with the
foregoing definitions.
                    NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                    7

defined as a committee that receives $2,000 or more in
contributions in a calendar year and is formed or exists
primarily to support or oppose a single candidate, a single
measure, a group of candidates being voted on in the same
election, or two or more measures being voted on in the same
election. Id. § 82047.5. Every committee, whether or not it
is primarily formed, must file a statement of organization
with the California Secretary of State and the relevant local
filing officer, id. § 84101(a), which in this case is the San
Francisco Ethics Commission. See S.F. Campaign &
Governmental Conduct Code (“S.F. Code”) § 1.112(a)(1).
    Committees must file semiannual statements, Cal. Gov’t
Code § 84200(a), and must file two preelection statements,
one at least 40 days before an election and the second at least
12 days before an election, id. §§ 84200.5, 84200.8. Among
other requirements, each of those campaign statements must
include “[t]he total amount of contributions received during
the period covered by the campaign statement and the total
cumulative amount of contributions received.”               Id.
§ 84211(a). If any donor contributes money to the
committee during a reporting period and has given aggregate
contributions of $100 or more, then the report must include
that donor’s name, address, occupation, and employer, plus
the dates and amounts of the donor’s contributions during
the period and the donor’s total aggregate contributions. Id.
§ 84211(f).
    California law also requires specific disclaimers in
political advertisements.   Id. §§ 84501–84511.      An
“advertisement” is defined as “any general or public
communication that is authorized and paid for by a
committee for the purpose of supporting or opposing a
candidate or candidates for elective office or a ballot
measure or ballot measures.”         Id. § 84501(a)(1).
8                   NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

Advertisements must include the words “[a]d paid for by
[the name of the committee].” Id. § 84502(a)(1). They also
must state “committee major funding from,” followed by the
names of the top contributors to the committee. Id.
§ 84503(a). “Top contributors” are defined as “the persons
from whom the committee paying for an advertisement has
received its three highest cumulative contributions of fifty
thousand dollars ($50,000) or more.” Id. § 84501(c)(1).
Depending on the medium, the advertisement must follow
certain formatting requirements. See id. §§ 84504.1 (video);
84504.2 (print); 84504.4 (radio and telephone); 84504.3
(electronic media); 84504.6 (online platforms).
    B.     San Francisco’s Proposition F
    On November 5, 2019, San Francisco voters passed
Proposition F. Referred to by proponents as the “Sunlight
on Dark Money Initiative,” Proposition F changed the
disclaimer requirements for advertisements paid for by
independent political committees, among other provisions.
After the passage of Proposition F, “all committees making
expenditures which support or oppose any candidate for City
elective office or any City measure” must comply with the
City’s new disclaimer requirements, in addition to the state’s
requirements. S.F. Code § 1.161(a).
    Under the new ordinance, ads run by primarily formed
independent expenditure and ballot measure committees
must include a disclaimer listing their top three contributors
of $5,000 or more. Id. § 1.161(a)(1). Additionally, “[i]f any
of the top three major contributors is a committee, the
disclaimer must also disclose both the name of and the dollar
amount contributed by each of the top two major
contributors of $5,000 or more to that committee.” Id. The
ad also must inform voters that “[f]inancial disclosures are
                    NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                    9

available at sfethics.org” or, if an audio ad, provide a
substantially similar statement that specifies the website.
S.F. Code § 1.161(a)(2).
    Printed disclaimers that identify a “major contributor or
secondary major contributor” must list the dollar amount of
relevant contributions made by each named contributor. S.F.
Code § 1.161(a)(1); S.F. Ethics Comm’n Reg. (“S.F. Reg.”)
1.161-3(a)(4). Print ads must include the disclaimers in text
that is “at least 14-point, bold font.”           S.F. Code
§ 1.161(a)(3). Audio and video advertisements must begin
by speaking the required disclaimers of major contributors
and secondary major contributors, but need not disclose the
dollar amounts of those donors’ contributions.              Id.
§§ 1.161(a)(5); 1.162(a)(3). In addition, video ads must
display a text banner that contains similar information to that
required in print ads. Cal. Gov’t Code § 84504.1; S.F. Code
§ 1.161(a)(1).
    Violations of the City’s campaign finance laws are
punishable by civil, criminal, and administrative penalties.
S.F. Code § 1.170. A committee’s treasurer may be held
personally liable for violations by the committee. Id.
§ 1.170(g). Any individual who suspects a possible
violation may file a complaint with the Ethics Commission,
City Attorney, or District Attorney. Id. § 1.168(a); see id.
§ 1.168(b) (providing for enforcement through civil action);
San Francisco Charter, appendix C, § C3.699-13 (Ethics
Commission procedures for investigations and enforcement
proceedings).
   C.      Earlier Litigation Challenging Proposition F
   In 2020, Todd David founded Yes on Prop B, Committee
in Support of the Earthquake Safety and Emergency
10                     NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

Response Bond. 2 David and Yes on Prop B challenged San
Francisco’s secondary-contributor requirement in the lead-
up to the March 3, 2020 election. On February 20, 2020, the
district court enjoined the application of that requirement to
the plaintiffs’ smaller and shorter advertisements “because
they [left] effectively no room for pro-earthquake safety
messaging.” Yes on Prop B v. City & County of San
Francisco, 440 F. Supp. 3d 1049, 1051, 1062 (N.D. Cal.
2020). The district court, however, concluded that the
challenged ordinance was “not an unconstitutional burden
on larger or longer advertising” and declined to enjoin the
secondary-contributor disclaimer requirement on its face or
as applied to the plaintiffs’ larger ads. Id. at 1051, 1061–62.
    On October 21, 2020, in an unpublished disposition, we
dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal on the ground of mootness.
Yes on Prop B v. City & County of San Francisco, 826 F.
App’x 648 (9th Cir. 2020). The plaintiffs argued that the
“capable of repetition, yet evading review exception”
applied, but we held that the case was moot because the
plaintiffs had not “shown that ‘there is a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party will be subject
to the same action again.’”           Id. at 649 (quoting
Protectmarriage.com–Yes on 8 v. Bowen, 752 F.3d 827, 836
(9th Cir. 2014)). We stressed that the record was “devoid of
any detail” that plaintiffs would run advertisements in the
future, particularly in the upcoming November 2020
election. Id. Thus, we concluded that, “[a]t best, [the
plaintiffs] have shown only that there is a theoretical

2
  The Prop B at issue in the 2020 litigation concerned an earthquake
safety and emergency response bond and is unrelated to the Prop B that
was originally at issue in this litigation.
                       NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                         11

possibility that the same controversy will recur with respect
to them.” Id.
    D.       Current Litigation
    This action was brought by three plaintiffs: (1) No on E,
San Franciscans Opposing the Affordable Housing
Production Act (“the Committee”), a primarily formed
independent expenditure committee that runs ads subject to
the secondary-contributor requirement; 3 (2) Todd David, the
founder and treasurer of No on E (and the founder of Yes on
Prop B); and (3) Edwin M. Lee Asian Pacific Democratic
Club PAC Sponsored by Neighbors for a Better San
Francisco Advocacy (“Ed Lee Dems”), a committee and a
direct contributor to No on E, whose major donors would be
subject to disclosure in ads under the San Francisco
ordinance. David established the Committee to support the
passage of Prop B in the June 7, 2022 election. The
Committee sought to communicate its message by
publishing mailers, print ads in newspapers, and digital ads
on the internet.
    As of May 10, 2022, the Committee had raised a total of
$15,000 from three donors, each of which contributed
$5,000. Two of those donors were committees that, in turn,
had donors that had made contributions of more than $5,000.
Thus, according to the examples provided by Plaintiffs, San
Francisco’s ordinance would require the following

3
  The lead plaintiff in this suit was known as “San Franciscans
Supporting Prop B” throughout the district court litigation. On appeal,
and after the conclusion of the June 7, 2022 election, the case caption
was updated to reflect the fact that the Committee rededicated itself to
opposing Proposition E and changed its name, as required by California
Government Code section 84107.
12                   NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

disclaimer on       the    Committee’s       print   and   video
advertisements:

          Ad paid for by San Franciscans Supporting
       Prop. B 2022. Committee major funding from:
        1. Concerned Parents Supporting the Recall of
     Collins, Lopez and Moliga ($5,000) – contributors
       include Neighbors for a Better San Francisco
      Advocacy Committee ($468,800), Arthur Rock
                        ($350,000).
           2. BOMA SF Ballot Issues PAC ($5,000).
        3. Edwin M. Lee Asian Pacific Democratic Club
        PAC sponsored by Neighbors for a Better San
     Francisco Advocacy ($5,000) – contributors include
       Neighbors for a Better San Francisco Advocacy
      Committee ($100,000), David Chiu for Assembly
                      2022 ($10,600).
              Financial disclosures are available at
                        sfethics.org.

    On May 11, 2022, Plaintiffs filed this action. Plaintiffs
allege that the secondary-contributor disclaimer requirement
violates the First Amendment, both on its face and as applied
against Plaintiffs. In their prayer for relief, Plaintiffs request
a declaration that the requirement violates the First
Amendment, on its face and as applied to Plaintiffs; an
injunction barring enforcement of the secondary-contributor
requirement, in general and against Plaintiffs specifically;
and nominal damages.
    On May 12, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a motion for a
preliminary injunction. Plaintiffs submitted a proposed
order requesting that the court “preliminarily [enjoin]
                     NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                   13

Defendants and their agents, officers, and representatives
from enforcing against Plaintiffs the on-communication
disclosure requirements for secondary donors at S.F. Code
§ 1.161(a).” In support of the motion for a preliminary
injunction, David submitted a declaration stating that,
“[b]ecause Concerned Parents and Ed Lee Dems are
committees, they have contributed $5,000 to the Committee,
and they both have donors who have given them $5,000 or
more, San Francisco’s law will require that our Committee
report those secondary donors on our communications.”
    On June 1, 2022, the district court denied Plaintiffs’
motion. Plaintiffs timely appeal. We have jurisdiction over
this interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292.
                        DISCUSSION
    To obtain a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must
establish “that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he
is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his
favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter
v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). On appeal,
Plaintiffs argue primarily that they have demonstrated a
likelihood of success on the merits. See Garcia v. Google,
Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“The first
factor under Winter is the most important—likely success on
the merits.”). Below, we address (A) mootness, (B)
Plaintiffs’ likelihood of success on the merits, and (C) the
remaining Winter factors.
   A.      Mootness
    Before turning to the merits, we first must establish that
we have jurisdiction. “[A] federal court loses its jurisdiction
to reach the merits of a claim when the court can no longer
14                   NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

effectively remedy a present controversy between the
parties.” Protectmarriage.com—Yes on 8, 752 F.3d at 836.
Defendants maintain that, because the June 2022 election
has occurred, Plaintiffs can no longer receive meaningful
relief and this appeal is moot. Although the June 2022
election has passed, this appeal is not moot because this
controversy is “capable of repetition, yet evading review.”
FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 462 (2007).
    The “capable of repetition, yet evading review”
exception to mootness applies when “(1) the challenged
action is in its duration too short to be fully litigated prior to
cessation or expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party will be subject
to the same action again.” Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs
have satisfied the first prong of that test.                  See
Protectmarriage.com—Yes on 8, 752 F.3d at 836
(describing an election as a controversy of inherently limited
duration).
    “The second prong of the capable of repetition exception
requires a reasonable expectation or a demonstrated
probability that the same controversy will recur involving
the same complaining party.” Wis. Right to Life, 551 U.S.
at 463 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But
that standard does not require Plaintiffs to establish a
certainty that they will be subject to the same enforcement:
“Requiring repetition of every ‘legally relevant’
characteristic of an as-applied challenge—down to the last
detail—would effectively overrule this statement by making
this exception unavailable for virtually all as-applied
challenges.” Id. Plaintiffs bear the burden of showing that
the “capable of repetition” prong is satisfied. Lee v.
Schmidt-Wenzel, 766 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th Cir. 1985).
                        NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                          15

    On this record, Plaintiffs have met that burden with
respect to at least one plaintiff. 4 David has a demonstrated
history of establishing committees that run advertisements
that are subject to the secondary-contributor requirement,
and he has twice engaged in litigation on this same issue. He
also has clearly expressed his intent to continue those
activities, unlike the plaintiffs in the earlier suit. Plaintiffs’
complaint alleges that David “will engage in materially and
substantially similar activity in the future, establishing
committees and using them to speak about San Francisco
candidates and measures.” (Emphasis added). In support of
Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction, David
averred that he “will continue to create primarily formed
committees in future elections, to share ads and
communications substantially and materially similar to those
we wanted to share in 2020 and that we want to share now.”
(Emphasis added).
    Defendants offer no persuasive reason to doubt David’s
affidavit, which is supported by his past practice. See Wis.
Right to Life, 551 U.S. at 463–64 (holding that there was a
reasonable expectation that the same controversy would
recur where plaintiff “credibly claimed that it planned on
running ‘materially similar’ future targeted broadcast ads”
and “sought another preliminary injunction based on an ad it
planned to run” during another blackout period).
Accordingly, this appeal is not moot, because it falls within
the exception for controversies that are “capable of

4
 Although Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction did not include
a facial challenge, the relief sought by Plaintiffs was not limited to the
June 2022 election. Instead, Plaintiffs asked the court to preliminarily
enjoin Defendants from enforcing the secondary-contributor
requirement against Plaintiffs indefinitely.
16                  NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

repetition, yet evading review.” See Hum. Life of Wash.
Inc. v. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d 990, 1001–02 (9th Cir. 2010)
(concluding that there was a reasonable expectation that the
controversy would recur because the plaintiff was a
politically active organization that had been heavily
involved in public debates in the past and intended to
undertake future communications); Porter v. Jones, 319 F.3d
483, 490 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting mootness argument
because plaintiff had expressed intent to create a similar
website in future elections); Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540
F.2d 1360, 1365 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that an issue is
“capable of repetition, yet evading review” where the record
established that plaintiff had continuing interest in and past
practices of participating in local political campaigns by
creating signs).
     B.    Likelihood of Success on the Merits
    Plaintiffs seek a preliminary injunction on the ground
that the secondary-contributor disclaimer requirement
violates the First Amendment. We hold that the district court
acted within its discretion to conclude that Plaintiffs did not
establish a likelihood of success on the merits.
    The district court applied “exacting scrutiny,” which
“requires a ‘substantial relation’ between the disclosure
requirement and a ‘sufficiently important’ governmental
interest.” Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 366–67
(2010) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64 (1976) (per
curiam)). On de novo review, Fyock, 779 F.3d at 995, we
hold that exacting scrutiny is the correct legal standard.
    Regardless of the beliefs sought to be advanced by
association, “compelled disclosure requirements are
reviewed under exacting scrutiny.” Ams. for Prosperity
Found. v. Bonta, 141 S. Ct. 2373, 2383 (2021) (opinion of
                         NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                           17

Roberts, C.J.); see also id. at 2396 (applying exacting
scrutiny to First Amendment challenge to compelled
disclosure) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). In the electoral
context, both the Supreme Court and our court have
consistently applied exacting scrutiny to compelled
disclosure requirements and on-advertisement disclaimer
requirements. See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67
(holding that disclaimer and disclosure requirements are
subject to exacting scrutiny); John Doe No. 1 v. Reed, 561
U.S. 186, 196 (2010) (applying exacting scrutiny to
disclosure requirement); Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64 (requiring
that compelled disclosure requirements survive exacting
scrutiny); Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, 744 (2008)
(evaluating whether disclosure requirements satisfy exacting
scrutiny); Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1005 (applying exacting
scrutiny to Washington law that required disclaimers on
political advertising and disclosure of certain contributions
and expenditures); see also Family PAC v. McKenna, 685
F.3d 800, 805–06 (9th Cir. 2012) (“Disclosure requirements
are subject to exacting scrutiny.”). 5
    Plaintiffs’ argument to the contrary is unavailing.
Plaintiffs take the position that disclaimer and disclosure are
“terms of art,” and argue that the City’s ordinance should be
reviewed under strict scrutiny because it is a “hybrid
disclaimer/disclosure requirement.” But Plaintiffs cite no

5
  In ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979 (9th Cir. 2004), we held
that strict scrutiny applied to statutes that affect the content of election
communications. 378 F.3d at 987. But we have since acknowledged
that intervening Supreme Court decisions clarified that we apply
exacting scrutiny to disclosure and disclaimer requirements. See
Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1005 (citing John Doe No. 1, 561 U.S. at 196,
and Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67).
18                      NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

authority that makes a similar distinction.6 Indeed, they
acknowledge that the Supreme Court has applied exacting
scrutiny to both disclosure rules, John Doe No. 1, 561 U.S.
at 196, and disclaimer requirements, Citizens United, 558
U.S. at 366–67.
    The concerns that Plaintiffs suggest are uniquely
implicated in this case animate the entirety of the exacting
scrutiny standard: “This type of scrutiny is necessary even
if any deterrent effect on the exercise of First Amendment
rights arises, not through direct government action, but
indirectly as an unintended but inevitable result of the
government’s conduct in requiring disclosure.” Buckley,
424 U.S. at 65. Courts have upheld other laws, even where
there was some deterrent effect, because “[d]isclaimer and
disclosure requirements may burden the ability to speak, but
they ‘impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities,’
Buckley, 424 U.S., at 64, and ‘do not prevent anyone from
speaking,’ McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 201 (2003).”
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366 (citations altered). Any
argument that the secondary-contributor requirement
violates the First Amendment because of the length and

6
  Citing Americans for Prosperity Foundation v. Bonta, Plaintiffs further
argue that San Francisco’s “hybrid” requirement should be reviewed
under strict scrutiny because “[t]he Supreme Court recently signaled that
it may be increasing the scrutiny given to any disclosure regime.” This
reading of Americans for Prosperity Foundation clashes with a plain
reading of the case and the manner in which other courts have applied it
to disclaimer laws. See, e.g., Gaspee Project v. Mederos, 13 F.4th 79,
95 (1st Cir. 2021), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2647 (2022); Smith v. Helzer,
No. 3:22-CV-00077-SLG, 2022 WL 2757421, at *10 (D. Alaska July 14,
2022), appeal docketed, No. 22-35612 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 9, 2023).
We hold that Americans for Prosperity Foundation does not alter the
existing exacting scrutiny standard.
                     NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                   19

content of the disclaimer is appropriately addressed as part
of the exacting scrutiny analysis.
    To survive exacting scrutiny, a law must satisfy all three
steps of the inquiry. The threshold question is whether there
is a “substantial relation” between the challenged law and a
“sufficiently important” governmental interest. Citizens
United, 558 U.S. at 366–67 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see Ams. for Prosperity Found., 141 S. Ct.
at 2384 (describing a substantial relation as “necessary but
not sufficient”). Next, “[t]o withstand this scrutiny, the
strength of the governmental interest must reflect the
seriousness of the actual burden on First Amendment
rights.” Ams. for Prosperity Found., 141 S. Ct. at 2383
(quoting John Doe No. 1, 561 U.S. at 196) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Finally, “[w]hile exacting
scrutiny does not require that disclosure regimes be the least
restrictive means of achieving their ends, it does require that
they be narrowly tailored to the government’s asserted
interest.” Id.
    Below, we assess (1) the relation between the secondary-
contributor disclaimer requirement and the governmental
interest; (2) whether the strength of that interest reflects the
seriousness of the burden on Plaintiffs’ First Amendment
rights; and (3) whether San Francisco’s ordinance is
narrowly tailored to that interest.
       1. Relation Between the Secondary-Contributor
          Disclaimer Requirement and Defendants’
          Interest
    Defendants take the position that the secondary-
contributor requirement serves their interest in providing
information to voters about the source of election-related
spending. A committee can circumvent California’s on-
20                  NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

advertisement disclaimer requirement and avoid including
its top donors in a disclaimer by providing funding to another
committee instead of running an advertisement directly.
Defendants contend that the secondary-contributor
requirement satisfies voters’ need for additional information
by making it more difficult to hide the sources of funding for
political advertisements.
    Courts have long recognized the governmental interest
in the disclosure of the sources of campaign funding:

       [D]isclosure provides the electorate with
       information as to where political campaign
       money comes from and how it is spent by the
       candidate in order to aid the voters in
       evaluating those who seek federal office. It
       allows voters to place each candidate in the
       political spectrum more precisely than is
       often possible solely on the basis of party
       labels and campaign speeches. The sources
       of a candidate’s financial support also alert
       the voter to the interests to which a candidate
       is most likely to be responsive and thus
       facilitate predictions of future performance in
       office.

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66–67 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted); see Cal. Pro-Life Council, Inc. v.
Randolph, 507 F.3d 1172, 1179 n.8 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[I]n the
context of disclosure requirements, the government’s
interest in providing the electorate with information related
to election and ballot issues is well-established.”), abrogated
on other grounds as stated in Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1013.
                    NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                 21

    “[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the
responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits
of conflicting arguments.” First Nat’l Bank of Boston v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 (1978). As the role of money in
politics has expanded, the public is faced with a “cacophony
of political communications through which . . . voters must
pick out meaningful and accurate messages.” Cal. Pro-Life
Council, Inc. v. Getman, 328 F.3d 1088, 1105 (9th Cir.
2003).       Understanding what entity is funding a
communication allows citizens to make informed choices in
the political marketplace. Alaska Right to Life Comm. v.
Miles, 441 F.3d 773, 793 (9th Cir. 2006); see Bellotti, 435
U.S. at 791–92 (“[The public] may consider, in making their
judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate.”);
Getman, 328 F.3d at 1105 (“Given the complexity of the
issues and the unwillingness of much of the electorate to
independently study the propriety of individual ballot
measures, we think being able to evaluate who is doing the
talking is of great importance.”).
    We have “repeatedly recognized an important (and even
compelling) informational interest in requiring ballot
measure committees to disclose information about
contributions.” Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 806. Disclosure
of who is speaking “enables the electorate to make informed
decisions and give proper weight to different speakers and
messages.” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 371. “An appeal to
cast one’s vote a particular way might prove persuasive
when made or financed by one source, but the same
argument might fall on deaf ears when made or financed by
another.” Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1008. Thus, we conclude
that, as in other cases, Defendants have a strong
governmental interest in informing voters about who funds
political advertisements.
22                  NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

    It follows that the secondary-contributor requirement is
substantially related to that interest. We have previously
recognized that providing information to the electorate may
require looking beyond the named organization that runs the
advertisement. In ACLU of Nevada v. Heller, 378 F.3d 979
(9th Cir. 2004), for example, the plaintiffs challenged a
Nevada statute that required printed election-related
communications to include the names of the businesses,
social organizations, or legal entities responsible for those
communications. 378 F.3d at 981–83. We recognized that
“individuals and entities interested in funding election-
related speech often join together in ad hoc organizations
with creative but misleading names.” Id. at 994. Thus, we
concluded that, “[w]hile reporting and disclosure
requirements can expose the actual contributors to such
groups and thereby provide useful information concerning
the interests supporting or opposing a ballot proposition or a
candidate, simply supplying the name and address of the
organization on the communication itself does not provide
useful information—and that is all the Nevada Statute
requires.” Id.
    While Heller is an anonymous speech case, we agree
with Heller’s reasoning, and find it relevant to the election
disclaimer context. The interests in “where political
campaign money comes from,” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66
(citation omitted), and “in learning who supports and
opposes ballot measures,” Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 806,
extend beyond just those organizations that support a
measure or candidate directly. Plaintiffs do not challenge
California’s law that requires an on-advertisement
disclaimer listing the top three donors to a committee. But
those donors are often committees in their own right. The
secondary-contributor requirement is designed to go beyond
                    NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                  23

the “ad hoc organizations with creative but misleading
names” and instead “expose the actual contributors to such
groups.” Heller, 378 F.3d at 994; see McConnell v. FEC,
540 U.S. 93, 128 (2003) (noting that “sponsors of [political]
ads often used misleading names to conceal their identity”
and providing examples), overruled on other grounds by
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66. In the context of San
Francisco municipal elections, Defendants show that donors
to local committees are often committees themselves and
that committees often obscure their actual donors through
misleading and even deceptive committee names. Because
the interest in learning the source of funding for a political
advertisement extends past the entity that is directly
responsible, the challenged ordinance is substantially related
to the governmental interest in informing the electorate.
    Notwithstanding that relationship, Plaintiffs contend that
the challenged ordinance actually undermines that interest.
They take the position that the secondary-contributor
requirement could cause confusion because a committee
must list donors who may not have any position on the issue
that the ad is addressing or who may not have known that
their donation would be used to promote those views. But
Plaintiffs provide no factual basis for their assumption that
San Francisco voters are unable to distinguish between
supporting a group that broadcasts a statement and
supporting the statement itself. See Wash. State Grange v.
Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 454–55 (2008)
(requiring more than “sheer speculation” of voter
confusion). Additionally, adopting Plaintiffs’ position could
call into question the logic underlying decisions that uphold
disclosure and disclaimer requirements as applied to primary
donors. Those cases emphasize that the laws at issue further
the governmental interest in revealing the source of
24                  NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

campaign funding, not ensuring that every donor agrees with
every aspect of the message. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at 1005–
08; Getman, 328 F.3d at 1104–07.
    Plaintiffs’ final argument—that any informational
interest furthered by San Francisco’s ordinance is
outweighed by the corresponding limitation on time
available for other speech—is similarly unavailing. It is
well-established that “[d]isclaimer and disclosure
requirements may burden the ability to speak, but they
impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities, and do not
prevent anyone from speaking.” Citizens United, 558 U.S.
at 366 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Even if Plaintiffs are correct that the governmental interest
is somewhat diminished in this instance because the
challenged ordinance requires disclosure of secondary
contributors instead of direct donors, that principle still
applies.
    Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by concluding that the secondary-contributor
disclaimer requirement is substantially related to
Defendants’ informational interest.
       2. Burden On First Amendment Rights
    “To withstand [exacting] scrutiny, ‘the strength of the
governmental interest must reflect the seriousness of the
actual burden on First Amendment rights.’” John Doe No.
1, 561 U.S. at 196 (quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at 744). It is
well-established that there is an important governmental
interest in providing voters with information about the
source of funding for political advertisements. Buckley, 424
U.S. at 66–67; Heller, 378 F.3d at 994; Family PAC, 685
F.3d at 806. Given the strength of that interest, we are not
persuaded by either of Plaintiffs’ arguments that San
                    NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                   25

Francisco’s ordinance impermissibly burdens their First
Amendment rights.
    First, Plaintiffs assert that the required disclaimer
displaces an excessive amount of speech. According to
David, the spoken disclaimer would take up 100% of a 15-
second ad, 100% of a 30-second ad, and 53-55% of a 60-
second ad. David averred that the written disclaimer on
video ads would take up between 35% and 51% of the screen
for either 10 seconds of an ad that is 30 seconds or longer,
or the first 5 seconds of a shorter ad. Finally, David declared
that the required disclaimer would take up 100% of a two-
inch by four-inch ad, 70% of a five-inch by five-inch ad,
35% of a five-inch by ten-inch ad, and 23% of the face of an
8.5-inch by 11-inch mailer. Defendants dispute that
disclaimers required by the ordinance would take up the
majority of the space on most committee’s advertisements.
In any event, Defendants have consistently stated that they
would not enforce the disclaimer requirement where
disclaimers take up most or all of an advertisement’s space.
     In Citizens United, the Supreme Court upheld a law that
required 40% of an advertisement to be devoted to a
disclaimer. 558 U.S. at 320, 366, 367–68. In the earlier
litigation challenging San Francisco’s ordinance, the district
court relied on that precedent and denied the plaintiffs’
request for an injunction with respect to the larger ads. Yes
on Prop B, 440 F. Supp. 3d at 1056–57. Although the court
declined to establish a mathematical formula, it concluded
that the secondary-contributor requirement was not unduly
burdensome for larger ads, in which the disclaimer took up
less than 40% of the ad. Id. The court found that, for larger
ads, the remaining space was sufficient to communicate the
plaintiffs’ political message. Id. We find that reasoning to
be persuasive. Plaintiffs have not shown that they are likely
26                      NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

to succeed on the merits of their argument that the
secondary-contributor requirement is an impermissible
burden on speech because the size of the disclaimer is
excessive with respect to larger ads. 7
     Shorter ads warrant a different analysis. In the earlier
litigation, the district court enjoined San Francisco’s
ordinance with respect to smaller advertisements because the
burden on speech was too great. Yes on Prop B, 440 F. Supp.
3d at 1055–56. But, in this litigation, the district court
denied the entirety of Plaintiffs’ motion for an injunction.
Even if we assume that we agree with the district court’s
conclusion that the secondary-contributor requirement likely
causes constitutional issues with respect to shorter ads, the
district court was within its discretion to conclude that any
burden on speech did not require a preliminary injunction in
this instance.
   In the earlier litigation, the City took the position that it
would not enforce the requirement with respect to shorter

7
  Plaintiffs rely heavily on American Beverage Association v. City &
County of San Francisco, 916 F.3d 749 (9th Cir. 2019) (en banc), to
support their assertion that the size of the disclaimer is excessive here.
But American Beverage is inapposite. The court in American Beverage
was applying the Zauderer test, a separate inquiry that requires the
defendant to prove that compelled commercial speech was neither
unjustified nor unduly burdensome. Am. Bev., 916 F.3d at 756 (citing
Zauderer v. Off. of Disciplinary Couns., 471 U.S. 626, 651 (1985), and
Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocs. v. Becerra (NIFLA), 138 S. Ct.
2361, 2372, 2377 (2018)). That test differs from exacting scrutiny
review, which applies to disclaimer and disclosure requirements in the
electoral context. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 366–67; see id., 558 U.S.
at 422 (“The election context is distinctive in many ways[.]” (Stevens,
J., concurring)); Gaspee Project, 13 F.4th at 95 (“The election-related
context implicated here is alone sufficient to distinguish NIFLA”).
                     NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                    27

ads, and the district court granted an injunction to that effect.
Yes on Prop B, 440 F. Supp. 3d at 1055. When Plaintiffs
moved for an injunction in this action, Defendants offered to
agree not to enforce San Francisco’s ordinance with respect
to print ads that were five-inches by five-inches or smaller,
or to spoken disclaimers on digital and audio advertisements
of 60 seconds or less. After Plaintiffs refused that offer,
Defendants again took the position that they would not
enforce the challenged ordinance with respect to shorter ads
in which the “required disclaimer would consume the
majority of Plaintiffs’ advertisement.” In light of that
commitment, San Francisco’s ordinance does not burden
Plaintiffs such that “the intervention of a court of equity is
essential in order effectually to protect . . . rights against
injuries otherwise irremediable.” Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
    The second burden identified by Plaintiffs—that the
secondary-contributor requirement violates their right to
freedom of association and drives away potential donors—
is likewise insufficient to outweigh the strength of the
governmental interests. “It is undoubtedly true that public
disclosure of contributions to candidates and political parties
will deter some individuals who might otherwise
contribute.” Buckley, 424 U.S. at 68. But to support an
exemption from a compelled disclosure requirement,
Plaintiffs must show more than a “modest burden.” Family
PAC, 685 F.3d at 808; see Ams. for Prosperity Found., 141
S. Ct. at 2388–89 (concluding that petitioners had shown a
“widespread burden on donors’ associational rights” where
there was evidence that petitioners and their supporters had
been subjected to “bomb threats, protests, stalking, and
28                  NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

physical violence,” and hundreds of organizations expressed
that they shared the petitioners’ concerns).
    Plaintiffs provided only two declarations in support of
their contention that San Francisco’s ordinance burdens their
right to freedom of association. David asserts that
“[p]otential donors have expressed concern to me about the
secondary disclosure rules and are more reluctant to
contribute to committees where their donors need to be
disclosed.” Ed Lee Dems asserts that it would have to
withdraw its donations from the Committee and would have
its own fundraising challenges if donors thought that their
names might become public through the secondary-
contributor requirement.
    The district court was within its discretion to conclude
that Plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the secondary-
contributor requirement “actually and meaningfully deter[s]
contributors.” Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 807. Plaintiffs have
not provided evidence of any specific deterrence beyond
some donors’ alleged desire not to have their names listed in
an on-advertisement disclaimer. See Family PAC, 685 F.3d
at 806–08 (concluding that disclosure requirements
presented only a modest burden without a showing of a
significant risk of harassment or retaliation). That level of
hesitation on the part of donors is insufficient to establish
that the “deterrent effect feared by [Plaintiffs] is real and
pervasive.” Ams. for Prosperity Found., 141 S. Ct. at 2388.
    Adopting Plaintiffs’ view that a modest burden on their
right to associate anonymously outweighs the informational
interest would “ignore[] the competing First Amendment
interests of individual citizens seeking to make informed
choices in the political marketplace.” McConnell, 540 U.S.
at 197 (quoting McConnell v. FEC, 251 F. Supp. 2d 176, 237
                    NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                   29

(D.D.C. 2003)), overruled in part on other grounds by
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66. The modest burden
imposed on the Plaintiffs is permissible when contrasted
with the alternative: “Plaintiffs never satisfactorily answer
the question of how uninhibited, robust, and wide-open
speech can occur when organizations hide themselves from
the scrutiny of the voting public.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
       3. Narrow Tailoring
    Under exacting scrutiny, “the challenged requirement
must be narrowly tailored to the interest it promotes.” Ams.
for Prosperity Found., 141 S. Ct. at 2384. But this standard
does not require “the least restrictive means of achieving that
end.” Id. Despite the close fit between San Francisco’s
ordinance and the government’s informational interest,
Plaintiffs present two different arguments as to why the
secondary-contributor requirement is insufficiently tailored.
Neither argument is persuasive.
    First, Plaintiffs argue that the requirement fails narrow
tailoring because there are other available alternatives, such
as making the same information available in an online
database. That suggestion misunderstands the relevant
standard. The secondary-contributor requirement must have
a scope “in proportion to the interest served,” but it need not
represent the “single best disposition.” McCutcheon v. FEC,
572 U.S. 185, 218 (2014) (plurality opinion) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Case law and scholarly research
support the proposition that, because of its instant
accessibility, an on-advertisement disclaimer is a more
effective method of informing voters than a disclosure that
voters must seek out. See Gaspee Project, 13 F.4th at 91
(holding that an on-ad donor disclaimer is “not entirely
30                   NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

redundant to the donor information revealed by public
disclosures” because it “provides an instantaneous heuristic
by which to evaluate generic or uninformative speaker
names”), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2647 (2022); Majors v.
Abell, 361 F.3d 349, 353 (7th Cir. 2004) (reasoning that
because fewer people are likely to see reports to government
agencies than notice in the ad itself, “reporting [is] a less
effective method of conveying information”); Michael
Kang, Campaign Disclosure in Direct Democracy, 97 Minn.
L. Rev. 1700, 1718 (2013) (“Research from psychology and
political science finds that people are skilled at crediting and
discrediting the truth of a communication when they have
knowledge about the source, but particularly when they have
knowledge about the source at the time of the
communication as opposed to subsequent acquisition.”).
Given the realities of voters’ decision-making processes
amidst a “cacophony” of electoral communications,
Getman, 328 F.3d at 1105–06, the district court was within
its discretion to conclude that the secondary-contributor
requirement has a scope in proportion to the City’s objective.
    Plaintiffs’ second argument—that the requirement is not
limited to donations that are earmarked for electioneering—
does not change that conclusion. Plaintiffs cite two out-of-
circuit cases in which courts concluded that disclosure laws
were narrowly tailored, in part because the laws applied only
to donations that were earmarked for electioneering. See
Indep. Inst. v. Williams, 812 F.3d 787, 797 (10th Cir. 2016)
(upholding Colorado constitutional provision that only
required disclosure of donors who have specifically
earmarked their contributions for electioneering purposes);
Indep. Inst. v. FEC, 216 F. Supp. 3d 176, 190–92 (D.D.C.
2016) (three-judge panel holding that a large-donor
disclosure requirement limited to donors who contribute
                        NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                          31

$1,000 or more for the specific purpose of supporting the
advertisement is tailored to advance the government’s
interest in informing the electorate of the source of the
advertisement). 8 Those courts upheld laws that required
only disclosure of earmarked contributions. But neither
court suggested that, or had occasion to consider whether, a
law fails narrow tailoring unless it is limited to the disclosure
of earmarked contributions.
    And even though San Francisco’s ordinance goes
beyond donations that are earmarked for electioneering, it
does not have an unconstrained reach. The challenged
ordinance requires an on-advertisement disclaimer listing
only the top donors to a committee that is, in turn, a top donor
to a primarily formed committee. S.F. Code § 1.161(a)(1).
Under California law, a primarily formed committee is
formed or exists primarily to support candidates or ballot
measures. Cal. Gov’t Code § 82047.5. By donating to a
primarily formed committee, a secondary committee
necessarily is making an affirmative choice to engage in
election-related activity.
   If a secondary committee were to purchase and run an
advertisement opposing a ballot measure directly, its top

8
  Plaintiffs also cite Van Hollen, Jr. v. FEC, 811 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir.
2016), in which the D.C. Circuit considered a challenge to an FEC rule
requiring corporations and labor organizations to disclose only donations
“made for the purpose of furthering electioneering communications”
instead of all donations. 811 F.3d at 488 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). But because the court in Van Hollen did not consider
whether a campaign finance law violated the First Amendment, we do
not find its analysis to be persuasive. See id. at 495, 501 (holding that
the FEC’s rule is consistent with the text, history, and purposes of the
authorizing statute and is not an arbitrary and capricious exercise of the
FEC’s regulatory authority).
32                   NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU

donors could be subject to California’s disclaimer
requirements, which Plaintiffs do not challenge. The
application of that law does not depend on whether the top
donors earmarked their contributions for electioneering, or
on whether they support the content of the advertisement.
The City’s ordinance does not violate narrow tailoring just
because the secondary committee funneled its donations
through a separate committee instead of running its own
advertisements.
     Additionally, even if Plaintiffs’ challenge to the City’s
requirement were to succeed, the secondary donors still
would be subject to disclosure and publicly visible on
government websites. Plaintiffs do not challenge those
public disclosures of secondary donors, which occur whether
or not the donors earmarked their contributions. Assuming
that those disclosures are permissible, as Plaintiffs do by
failing to challenge their validity, we are not persuaded that
a law requiring those same donors to be named in an on-
advertisement disclaimer is insufficiently tailored.
    Thus, we hold that the district court was within its
discretion to conclude that Plaintiffs did not establish a
likelihood of success on the merits.
     C.    Remaining Preliminary Injunction Factors
    The district court concluded that none of the remaining
Winter factors weighed in favor of an injunction, in part
because Plaintiffs’ argument as to those factors largely relied
on their position that they had demonstrated a likelihood of
success on the merits. The same is true on appeal. We hold
that the district court did not abuse its discretion by reaching
that conclusion.
                     NO ON E V. DAVID CHIU                   33

    Without an injunction, Plaintiffs likely would be injured
by the loss of some First Amendment freedoms, Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976) (plurality opinion), but that
injury would be modest, Family PAC, 685 F.3d at 806.
Defendants, however, have established that there is a strong
public interest in providing voters with the information of
who supports ballot measures. Brumsickle, 624 F.3d at
1008. Thus, the public interest and the balance of hardships
weigh in favor of Defendants. See FTC v. Affordable
Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Under
this Circuit’s precedents, ‘when a district court balances the
hardships of the public interest against a private interest, the
public interest should receive greater weight.’” (quoting
FTC v. World Wide Factors, Ltd., 882 F.2d 344, 347 (9th
Cir. 1989))).
   AFFIRMED.