Court Opinion

ID: 9457719
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:30:36.257439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:28.520099
License: Public Domain

*847BRIGHT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Because I find no indication that the Nebraska courts have ever made a reliable determination of the voluntariness of Erving’s confession as is required by Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964), I respectfully dissent. In denying Erving’s petition, the majority concludes: (1) that the state trial judge’s action in overruling Erving’s objection to the admission of his confession constitutes a reliable finding of voluntariness; and (2) that the state trial judge considered all evidence presented in ruling upon the admissability of the confession. I cannot accept either conclusion.
Under the principles announced in Jackson v. Denno, supra, a defendant “[i]s entitled to a fair hearing in which both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of his confession are actually and reliably determined.” 378 U.S. at 380, 84 S.Ct. at 1783. Jackson’s progeny plainly establish that a trial court’s finding of voluntariness “must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity.” Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544, 87 S.Ct. 639, 643, 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967); see Reizenstein v. Sigler, 428 F.2d 702 (8th Cir. 1970); Parker v. Sigler, 413 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1969), rev’d on other grounds, 396 U.S. 482, 90 S.Ct. 667, 24 L.Ed.2d 672 (1970); Evans v. United States, 375 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1967). The instant record contains no clear finding on the question of voluntariness. In ruling upon the admissability of Erving’s confession, the state trial judge said:
The objections were, I think perhaps by some counsel for the defendants, phrased as motions, but in either event the objections or motions of the defendants and each of them to testimony of the witness Foxall are at this time denied. [Tr. 308]
In my view, this statement falls far short of satisfying the requirement that the trial court’s finding of voluntariness “must appear from the record with unmistakable clarity.” Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 544, 87 S.Ct. 639, 643 (1967).
The majority circumvents this requirement by accepting the Nebraska procedure described in State v. Longmore, 134 N.W.2d 66 (Neb.1965).
Under Nebraska procedure, the admission of the confession in evidence constitutes the court’s independent determination that the confession is voluntary. [Longmore, supra, 134 N.W. 2d at 73.]
In prior decisions, we have reviewed this Nebraska procedure and have found it to be constitutionally inadequate under Jackson v. Denno standards. Reizen-stein v. Sigler, 428 F.2d 702 (8 Cir. 1970); Parker v. Sigler, 413 F.2d 459 (8th Cir. 1969), rev’d on other grounds, 396 U.S. 482, 90 S.Ct. 667 (1970).
Judge Van Oosterhout’s comments in Parker, supra, are apposite here:
The record in the case before us shows that the convicting court made no reliable determination of the volun-tariness issue before admitting the confession in evidence. All that appears in the record is a bald statement overruling defendant’s appropriate objection to the admission of the written signed confession. No finding or basis for such ruling is stated. [413 F.2d at 462.]
In reviewing Parker, the Supreme Court agreed with these comments, saying:
[T]he record of proceedings in the trial court and the opinion of the Nebraska Supreme Court affirming respondent’s conviction do not justify a conclusion that the trial judge made his own determination of voluntariness as required by Jackson v. Denno. [Sigler v. Parker, 396 U.S. 482, 483, 90 S.Ct. 667, 668 (1970).]
The decisions in Reizenstein, supra, and Parker, supra, convince me that the trial court’s action in overruling Erving’s objection to the admission of his confession cannot be accepted as a substitute for a clear finding of voluntariness.
I do not rest my dissent on this ground alone, however. I have exam*848ined and found wanting another aspect of the procedure followed in Nebraska at the time of Erving’s trial.
In Parker v. Sigler, supra, we held that the long-standing Nebraska procedure allowing a trial judge to determine voluntariness on the basis of the affirmative evidence presented by the state does not satisfy the requirements of Jackson v. Denno. In rejecting this procedure as constitutionally inadequate, Judge Van Oosterhout noted:
[T]he trial court under Nebraska standards was going no further than to determine that the State had made a prima facie case on the basis of the affirmative evidence offered by the State. [Id. 413 F.2d at 463.]
The opinion in State v. Longmore, supra, describes this affirmative evidence inquiry as follows:
The question to be determined by the court is that of whether or not the affirmative evidence shows that the confession was voluntarily made and that this evidence excludes any other hypothesis. It is sufficient to establish affirmatively all that occurred immediately prior to and at the time of making the confession, provided such affirmative proof shows it to have been freely and voluntarily made and excludes the hypothesis of improper inducements or threats. [134 N.W.2d at 72-73.]
Not until Erving’s appeal did the Nebraska Supreme Court disapprove this procedure:
The defendant’s specific complaint is that the Nebraska procedure requires only that the trial court consider the affirmative evidence relating to the voluntariness of the confession. The correct rule is that the trial court should consider all of the evidence in determining whether the confession is voluntary and should be admitted in evidence. To the extent that any of our previous decisions may conflict with this statement of the rule they are disapproved. [State v. Erving, 180 Neb. 824, 146 N.W.2d 216, 218-219 (Neb.1966).]
The present record contains no indication that the state trial judge failed to apply the well-entrenched, but constitutionally inadequate, procedure described in Longmore in ruling upon the admissibility of Erving’s confession. On the basis of the trial judge’s statements in overruling Erving’s objection to the admission of his confession, I am unwilling to infer that the trial judge departed from established procedure and applied a rule which had not yet been announced.
For the foregoing reasons, I would reverse and allow the state a reasonable time to grant petitioner a hearing to determine the voluntariness of his confession under Jackson v. Denno standards.