Court Opinion

ID: 9710546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:11:42.974372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:57.675878
License: Public Domain

NIGRO, Justice,
dissenting:
I cannot conclude the trial court erred in suppressing the statement given by Appellee Nester. I must, therefore, respectfully dissent.
*169The Majority indicates the Superior Court applied the wrong standard in analyzing whether a non-custodial confession is voluntary. The Superior Court, the Majority writes, did not examine the “totality of the circumstances,” but rather focused only on the narrow concept of threat or inducement. Although the Superior Court did not specifically label the standard on review as “totality of the circumstances,” both the suppression court and the Superior Court, in fact, employed a totality analysis and extensively reviewed all circumstances surrounding the entire interview.
As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has noted:
A “totality of the circumstances” inquiry defies strictly analytic treatment. A conclusion cannot be reached simply by scrutinizing each circumstance separately, for the concept underlying the phrase ‘totality of the circumstances’ is that the whole is somehow distinct from the sum of the parts. See United States v. Wertz, supra, 625 F.2d [1128] at 1134 [4th Cir.1980]. Nevertheless, we can understand the totality only after reviewing the constituent elements of the situation.
Miller v. Fenton, 796 F.2d 598, 605 (1986).
Each relevant circumstance of the interrogation is thus reviewed independently before the question of whether all the circumstances together indicate whether a confession is voluntary. While some psychological tactics may be used in eliciting a statement from a criminal suspect, the statement elicited must be the product of the suspect’s own balancing of competing considerations. The offer eliciting the statement must not be so manipulative or coercive as to deprive a criminal defendant of his ability to make an unconstrained, autonomous decision to make a statement. Id.
The suppression court applied the “totality of the circumstances test.” It specifically articulates that upon review of the “totality of the circumstances,” “[D]efendant’s confession resulted from an agitated state of mind, inadequate notice of his rights and the consequences of his statements, and a combination of inducements and threats from the B.C.C.Y.S. *170caseworker.” Trial Court Opinion, p. 4. While not using the phrase “totality of the circumstances,” the Superior Court reviewed the circumstances of the interview and held that the record supports the suppression court’s conclusion that the confession was involuntary.
Our scope of appellate review is limited primarily to questions of law. We are bound by the suppression court’s findings of fact if those findings are supported by the record. Commonwealth v. Webb, 491 Pa. 329, 421 A.2d 161, 162 (1980). There is ample factual support in the record for the foregoing conclusions. Child Protective Services organizations are government agencies with a statutory duty to report complaints to police who investigate for criminal prosecution. During the course of the interview with Appellee, the Child Protective Services caseworker failed to inform Appellee of her statutory duty to report to the police, or the criminal consequences of any incriminating statements made by Appellee. The “Rights” Letter provided to Appellee by the caseworker, likewise, did not advise Appellee that the contents of the interview would be reported to police, and any statements made by Appellee would ultimately be utilized against him in criminal prosecution. The caseworker failed to convey to him the seriousness of the allegations, or that the allegations could mandate a minimum prison sentence. Appellee testified during the suppression hearing that the caseworker told him if he did not talk to her, he would have to talk to the police and it would be harder talking to the police than it would be to her.1 As noted by the trial court, the caseworker’s statements regarding a police interview are misleading. (Trial Court Opinion, p. 5). The scenario is presented to Appellee as an alternative to criminal prosecution, when, in fact, the caseworker knows or should know she is statutorily obligated to report her findings to police. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6311.
*171The Majority exceeds the proper scope of review by reweighing the findings of fact by the suppression court. I am unpersuaded by the Majority’s reasoning, as the suppression court reviewed the constituent elements (i.e. the duration of the waiting and interview time, the mental state of the Appellee, the promises of treatment, the threat of an interview with the police, the consequences of Appellee’s statement and the inadequate notice of appellee’s rights), evaluated the totality of the circumstances, and correctly concluded that Appellee’s statement was involuntary. Accordingly, I see no error by the suppression court and would affirm.
ZAPPALA and CAPPY, JJ., join.

. Because Nester ultimately prevailed on the motion to suppress, we must accept Nester’s testimony as accurate. See Commonwealth v. James, 506 Pa. 526, 486 A.2d 376 (1985) (where Commonwealth is appealing the decision of the suppression court, appellate court must consider only the evidence of the defendant’s witnesses and so much of the evidence for the prosecution as read in the context of the record as a whole remains uncontradicted).