Court Opinion

ID: 9634412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:10:51.288456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:02.119996
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Cohen:
I dissent from the majority opinion on the ground that there was insufficient evidence presented to the jury on the likelihood of a change in zoning. I agree with the statement by the majority that in order for evidence of a possible zoning change to be admissible, the prospect of repeal or amendment of the zoning ordinance must be reasonably probable and not speculative or remote. However, I disagree with the majority’s application of this principle to the facts — or more accurately, the lack of facts — of this case.
Appellee’s evidence on the likelihood of change can be summarized as follows: No commercial enterprises are located along Route 22 in Churchill Borough, the area involved in this case. The only nonresidential use in the relevant area was the Westinghouse Research property which had been changed from residential to institutional. However, no other zoning changes had been made along Route 22 in Churchill Borough. Aside from the change secured by Westinghouse, the Churchill Borough authorities refused to rezone the property of an adjoining owner from residential to commercial in 1957.
It is undisputed that Route 22 is zoned commercial in bordering municipalities, but such zoning classifica*25tions are promulgated by different governmental bodies than Churchill Borough and hence have little bearing on the instant case. From this meager evidence, appellee’s expert witness on value — who was admittedly not an expert on zoning — was permitted to conclude that it was reasonably likely the area in question would be zoned commercial in the near future. It should also be noted that the evidence discloses that appellant had not made application for a zoning change.
The burden of proving the likelihood of a change in zoning is upon the party asserting such probability and, because of the uncertainties inherent in such change, that burden is not easily satisfied. Thus, in the absence of a well-defined trend of zoning changes in a particular area, it would be pure surmise for a judge or jury to attempt to predict how the members of a borough council or zoning board will vote. It is common knowledge that the various factors which affect the votes of individual zoning board members, compounded by the vagaries which affect the vote of the collective body, defy any type of prediction based upon reasonable probability.
Keeping in mind the high standard of proof mentioned above, I find that the evidence presented by appellee did not permit more than a remote speculation on the possibility of a future zoning change, and this is especially true, where, as in this case, appellant had not taken any steps to secure such change. Cf. Redondo Beach School District of Los Angeles County v. Flodine, 153 Cal. App. 2d 437, 314 P. 2d 581 (1957).
I dissent.
Mr. Chief Justice Bell and Mr. Justice Eagen join in this dissenting opinion.