Court Opinion

ID: 9956919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 14:07:46.217759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:58.880738
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3365-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

NAEEM MILLER,

          Defendant- Respondent.

                   Submitted February 27, 2024 – Decided April 3, 2024

                   Before Judges Natali and Puglisi.

                   On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior
                   Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County,
                   Indictment No. 03-05-1830.

                   Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor,
                   attorney for appellant (Lucille M. Rosano, Assistant
                   Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).

                   Freeman & Patel LLC, attorneys for respondent (Jarred
                   S. Freeman, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      By leave granted, the State appeals from the Law Division's June 1, 2023

order vacating defendant Naeem Miller's May 13, 2005 judgment of conviction

and granting a new trial. Having reviewed the State's contentions and the record

in light of the applicable standard of review, we affirm.

                                        I.

      In March 2003, a grand jury returned an indictment charging defendant

with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a); second-degree aggravated

assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b); third-degree unlawful possession of a weapon,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful

purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a).

      We glean the following salient facts from our decision affirming

defendant's conviction, State v. Miller, No. A-6464-04 (App. Div. Jan. 8, 2007)

(slip op. at 3-5), and our review of the record. In the early morning hours of

December 16, 2001, an individual fired a gun outside a bar in Newark, injuring

Stacy Davis and killing Timothy Phillips. Timothy1 had gone to the bar with his

brother, Kevin. Around 2:00 a.m., Kevin and another individual engaged in a

physical altercation, which left Kevin with a bloody nose and mouth. When

1
  Because Timothy and Kevin share the same last name, we refer to them by
their first names. No disrespect is intended.
                                                                          A-3365-22
                                        2
Timothy saw Kevin's injuries, he exited the bar and began questioning the crowd

outside in an effort to learn who had assaulted his brother in order to fight that

individual.

      Kevin exited the bar around the same time and knelt next to a car parked

on the street, collecting himself. When he looked up, he saw Timothy standing

in front of a car in the street and heard five to seven shots coming from across

the street. Kevin saw a man who "slid on top of [his] brother and shot some

more times." He did not see the shooter's face and could not identify him; he

only saw the man "from the waist down" and described him as having a "small

build, slim . . . silhouette." Kevin did not see anyone else with a gun that night.

      After the shots were fired, Kevin went to Timothy, who was unconscious

on the ground, then left the scene to get his mother and younger brother.

Timothy was taken by ambulance but died on the way to the hospital.

      Davis was friends with Timothy. He did not recall what time he arrived

at the bar but remembered having one beer and hearing a fight break out near

the front of the bar at closing time. He was standing by the back door and did

not see the fight or know who was involved.

      Davis exited the front door onto the street and saw "some dudes in the

street arguing," one of which was Timothy "arguing with this kid." Davis

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walked onto the sidewalk, "got about three steps down and fell on the ground . . .

a couple of feet away from the door." He did not hear any gun shots, only

"people arguing, [and a] bunch of noise" that he considered "regular." Davis

then realized he had been shot and crawled behind a parked car.

      As Davis peered out from behind the car, he saw "a dude shoot" Timothy

three or four times while Timothy stood in the street. Davis was approximately

twenty-seven feet away from the shooter and the streetlights provided enough

light for Davis to see him. The individual who shot Timothy looked at Davis,

who "looked him dead in the face," and then the shooter ran from the scene still

holding the gun. Davis stayed by the car and lost sight of him. Davis had never

seen the shooter before, did not know him, and described him as a "skinny dude

. . . like the rest of them young kids—skinny dude, long dreads," with a "big

black gun."

      In the days after the shooting, detectives visited Davis in the hospital,

where he was recovering from surgery. During the first two interviews, Davis

was unable to identify the shooter from a photo array, one of which contained

defendant.    Five days after the shooting, during the third interview, Davis

provided a signed statement and identified two people out of a six-person photo

array. He identified the individual in photo number three, who was defendant,

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                                        4
as the shooter. He also identified the individual in photo number four as

someone he had seen "out there" that night.

      At trial, when Davis was asked whether he saw the shooter in court, he

answered "no." The testimony continued:

                  Q      Does that picture look different than the
            individual in court today?

            A     That can't be him right there.

                  Q     I'm sorry?

            A     That can't be him right there.

                  Q     And why couldn't it be him?

            A     Look at him.

                  Q     Does it look different?

            A     That can't be him right there.

                  Q     That doesn't look like the same individual?

            A     No, not at all.

                  Q     Is there anything different about him?

            A     Yes, he don't [sic] look, you know—

                  Q     Well, what's different?

            A     —crazy with the dirty dreads and all that.

                  Q     He doesn't have the dreads? What else is

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                                       5
different?

A     He just—He don't [sic] look the same.

      Q      He don't [sic] look the same?

A     No.

      Q     Did you ever know the name of this
individual?

A     Well, I don't know the kid.

      Q     You never had seen him before. Did he
have a beard, like the individual in court today?

A     No.

      Q      Did he have close-cropped hair, like the
individual in court today?

A     No.

     Q      Take a look at the face in this photograph.
Are you taking a look at the face in the photograph?

A     (No verbal response)

      Q      Take a look at the face of that individual.

A     They don't look the same.

      Q      You don't think they look the same?

A     No.

      Q      Okay. But definitely the hair is different,
the beard is different?

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                            6
            A     Yes.

                  Q      And you did not know the name.

            A     No, I did not know the kid.

                  Q      But this is the individual that you saw
            outside the bar.

            A     Yes.

      Because Davis's identification of defendant was equivocal, the prosecutor

directed Davis to his testimony during the grand jury proceeding:

                  Q    Okay. And during the course of the
            proceeding at the grand jury I had shown you a
            photograph, as a matter of fact, or asked you if you
            would be able to identify the photograph of the person
            you saw outside the bar that evening, correct?

            A     Yes.

                 Q    Were you able to do that for the Essex
            County Grand Jury at that time?

            A     Yes, I was.

                  Q      Yes, and it was the same photograph that I
            showed you before, was it not, with the distinctive
            features of that particular individual at that time.

            A     Right.

                  Q     Same photograph. And you did agree, did
            you not, in front of the grand jury that that was the
            individual?

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                                       7
            A      Right.

                  Q     Once again, the individual in court today
            does not look anything like that picture to you?

            A      Not at all.

                  Q     Okay. Did you see anyone else outside that
            tavern that evening with a handgun? You have to
            answer for the—

            A      No, no.

      The prosecutor concluded Davis's direct testimony by inquiring into his

interactions with the criminal justice system. Davis testified he was currently

serving a four-year sentence for two counts of possession of a controlled

dangerous substance (CDS) in a school zone, which resulted from a plea

agreement that did not require him to testify in this matter. Davis also previously

had been convicted of unlawful possession of a weapon in 1994, for which he

was sentenced to 180 days in jail and five years' probation; robbery in 1995, for

which he was sentenced to fifteen years in prison; and possession of CDS in

1996, for which he was sentenced to three years in prison.

      On cross-examination, Davis said the shooter looked like other

individuals he saw in the area. Davis also conceded he was in pain when he saw

the shooter and was also looking at the gun for fear that it might turn on him.

      Felicia Wright was also at the bar when the shooting occurred. She was

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                                        8
near the front door about to leave when she heard six or seven shots. She exited

the bar and saw "a young man on the ground," she later learned was Timothy,

whom she had known for roughly five years. Wright also saw defendant running

with a "black gun." She had met defendant fifteen years prior and knew him by

name because he was her daughter's father's cousin. Although she regularly saw

defendant in the neighborhood, she did not "know him know him."

      At trial, Wright stated she was "uncomfortable" and did not want to be

there. When asked to elaborate on why she felt uncomfortable, she replied:

            A     I feel like I'm like in the middle.

                  Q      Well, do you—

            A     I know his family, I know his family. I don't—I
            just don't want to be here.

                  Q      But you did receive a subpoena to come
            today, right, ma'am?

            A     Yes. They came and got me this morning.

                  Q     So your discomfort is from the fact that you
            know both families involved, the victim's family and
            the defendant's family?

            A     Yes.

                  Q      Is that making you uncomfortable?

            A     Yes.

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                                        9
                   Q     We've put you in an uncomfortable
            situation, correct?

            A     Yes.

                  Q      Does that affect the testimony that you
            must give today, Ms. Wright? Ma'am, I ask you does it
            affect the truthfulness of the testimony that you must
            give today?

            A     No, no.

                  Q    Are you going to give us the truthful
            testimony?

            A     Yes.

      Despite her discomfort, Wright continued testifying. She did not see

defendant shoot anyone and only saw him running from the shooting. At that

time, she was roughly forty-six feet away from him but she had no difficulty

recognizing him because the streetlights were "pretty bright."

      A detective visited Wright at her home about three weeks after the

shooting, and while she spoke with him from her front porch, she refused to give

a formal statement. The detective also showed her a photo:

                 Q     Now, when he showed you a photograph he
            was talking to you about what had happened on
            December 16[]—

            A     Yes.

                  Q      —was he not?

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                                      10
            A     Yes.

                  Q     Did you tell him who you saw that evening
            with a gun?

            A     Uh-huh, I think.

                  Q      I'm sorry. Please –

            A    I think—I don't—I'm not quite sure. I told
            him nothing about no gun that night.

                  Q    Okay. Did he show you a picture?
            A     Yes.

                  Q      All right. Whose picture is that?

            A     It's Naeem.

                  Q      Naeem Miller?

            A     Yes.

      At trial, Wright said defendant looked different because he had cut his

hair and grown a beard after the shooting.

      On cross-examination, Wright added that she left the bar fifteen seconds

after the shooting and that the street had two lanes on both sides. From across

the four-lane street, she saw defendant running with an "automatic weapon."

Her view was mainly of his side and back, and she could not see his clothing or

whether he wore a jacket, but saw his dreadlocks. When asked if anyone else at

the bar had dreadlocks, she answered "[e]verybody . . . around there" had

                                                                         A-3365-22
                                      11
dreadlocks.

      On re-direct examination, Wright testified that when she saw the shooter,

she "thought deeply" that it was defendant, whom she had seen "plenty of times"

prior to the shooting. She did not wear glasses and never needed them, and she

could see clearly at the time of the crime. Wright reiterated she did not want to

be in court and that seeing defendant's family members made her feel "[b]ad,

wrong."

      On re-cross-examination, Wright said when she looked up and saw the

shooter, she "said it was" defendant but had some doubt. After hearing other

people name defendant as the shooter, she felt "stronger" it was him.         On

additional direct examination, Wright said she was "certain it was him," but then

said, "I don't know. I don't—I don't know."

      Twice during deliberations, the jury advised the judge it could not reach

a unanimous decision and the judge instructed the jury to continue deliberating.

After three days, the jury found defendant guilty on all counts. On count one,

he was sentenced to thirty years with a thirty-year mandatory minimum term,

subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2; on count two,

seven years consecutive to count one, subject to NERA; on count three, four

years concurrent to count one; and count four was merged into counts one and

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                                      12
two.

       After we affirmed the conviction and sentence, our Supreme Court denied

defendant's petition for certification. State v. Miller, 190 N.J. 397 (2007). In

May 2007, defendant filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief (PCR)

claiming various trial errors, prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective

assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The PCR judge denied the petition and

we affirmed that order. State v. Miller, No. A-5571-07 (App. Div. Nov. 4,

2009).

       In April 2010, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, again claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. Miller v.

Ricci, Civil No. 10-2492 (D.N.J. Mar. 12, 2014). The District Court denied his

petition because his arguments lacked merit or were procedurally barred.

Defendant then filed a second petition for PCR, which was denied as time-

barred, followed by a motion to correct an illegal sentence, which was also

denied.

       In late 2022, defendant filed a Rule 3:20-1 petition to vacate the judgment

of conviction and dismiss the indictment or, in the alternative, to release him on

bail and order a new trial based on newly discovered evidence that constituted a

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                                       13
Brady2 violation. The petition was based on the State's failure to disclose that,

one month before Wright testified at trial, she was indicted in Morris County for

fourth-degree impersonation, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-17; third-degree forgery, N.J.S.A.

2C:21-1(a)(2); third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution, N.J.S.A.

2C:29-3(b)(4); and fourth-degree theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a).         Wright had

previously been admitted into the pretrial intervention (PTI) program in August

2004, but was terminated from PTI two weeks before her trial testimony.

       During argument on the petition, the State conceded that it had a duty to

disclose Wright's indictment and PTI discharge pursuant to Brady because the

information served as favorable impeachment material that the State possessed

prior to trial. The State argued defendant was not entitled to a new trial because

Wright's pending charges were not material to the overall criminal case . The

State pointed out Davis had also identified a photo of defendant as the shooter

and Wright did not witness the shooting, but only saw defendant running with a

gun afterwards.

       The court reserved decision to obtain the testimony of defendant's trial

attorney, who subsequently testified he never received any information on

2
    Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
                                                                            A-3365-22
                                       14
Wright's pending charges and PTI discharge and that if he had, he would have

used the information to impeach her credibility.

      On June 1, 2023, the court issued its oral decision on the record,

concluding

             the combined testimony of . . . Wright and . . . Davis
             arguably bolstered one another. . . . Wright had personal
             knowledge of the defendant, testified to seeing him . . .
             running from the scene with a gun. Davis saw the man
             who shot [Timothy], and presumably him, as well, and
             identified him after being shown a second photo array.
             Although the defendant, as presented at trial, did not
             look like that same man, . . . Davis was given two photo
             arrays before he identified the defendant, it's not clear
             that . . . Davis's testimony alon[e] would not cause any
             doubt in the mind of the jury. Even . . . Wright's
             testimony does not include seeing the defendant with
             [Timothy] or pulling a trigger next to him. Without
             reason the State suggests that . . . Wright's testimony
             was not that strong. It is likely that the testimonials in
             concert allowed the jury to determine that the State had
             met its burden in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the
             defendant's [g]uilt.

      The court found the State's violation of Brady deprived defendant of his

right to procedural and substantive due process, and entered an order vacating

the judgment of conviction, granting a new trial, and ordering defendant's

detention in the interim.

      We granted the State's motion for leave to appeal, in which it raises the

following issues for our consideration:

                                                                          A-3365-22
                                        15
              POINT I

              Wright’s Morris County Indictment was Cumulative
              Impeachment Evidence which had no Reasonable
              Probability to Affect the Outcome Given the State’s
              Compelling Proofs. The Trial Court Erred when it
              Concluded this Evidence was Material for Purposes of
              Establishing a Brady Violation and Meeting Carter's[3]
              Newly Discovered Evidence Test.

                    A.   The Trial Court Applied the Wrong Legal
              Standard for Materiality when Assessing the Brady
              Violation.

                    B.   The Trial Judge made Factual Findings that
              were not Supported by Credible Evidence in the Record
              and Misapplied the Law to the Facts.

                    C.   There was no Reasonable Probability that
              had Wright’s Morris County Charges Been Disclosed
              to the Defense, the Result of the Proceeding Would
              have been Different.

                   D.    The Trial Judge Incorrectly Concluded that
              Defendant met the Materiality Standard for Newly
              Discovered Evidence under Carter.

        Our review of a motion court's decision on a request for a new trial based

on a Brady violation presents a "mixed question of law and fact." State v. Russo,

333 N.J. Super. 119, 135 (App. Div. 2000) (citing State v. Landano, 271 N.J.

Super. 1, 36 n.13 (App. Div. 1994)). Accord State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 185

3
    State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300, 311-12 (1981).
                                                                            A-3365-22
                                        16
(1997) (Marshall II). We afford deference to the motion court's factual findings,

but its "conclusion regarding whether defendant sustained [the] burden of proof

is not entitled to the same deference as [the] factual findings." Russo, 333 N.J.

Super. at 135. If the motion court applied the correct legal standard, we affirm

unless the motion court's conclusion was "clearly erroneous." Marshall II, 148

N.J. at 185.

      Brady instructs that "the suppression by the prosecution of evidence

favorable to an accused . . . violates due process where the evidence is material

either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the

prosecution." Brady, 373 U.S. at 87. Accord United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S.

667, 674 (1985) (summarizing ibid.). The Brady rule's purpose

               is not to displace the adversary system as the primary
               means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a
               miscarriage of justice does not occur. Thus, the
               prosecutor is not required to deliver his entire file to
               defense counsel, but only to disclose evidence
               favorable to the accused that, if suppressed, would
               deprive the defendant of a fair trial.

               [Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675.]

      "Impeachment evidence, . . . as well as exculpatory evidence, falls within

the Brady rule." Id. at 676 (referencing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150,

154 (1972)). A defendant is entitled to a new trial based on a Brady violation if

                                                                              A-3365-22
                                         17
the defendant can show that the undisclosed information was not only favorable

to the defense but material to the case. Carter, 85 N.J. at 311-12. "Materiality"

refers to the evidence's probability of affecting the verdict, and this standard has

evolved over time. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 681-82.

      Initially, the test for materiality of a Brady violation hinged on the

circumstances in which the violation occurred. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S.

97, 111-13 (1976); see also Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678-81; Carter, 85 N.J. at 312.

Agurs described three situations with different accompanying materiality tests:

where the prosecutor used knowingly perjured testimony, Agurs, 427 U.S. at

103; where the defendant made a request for specific information and the

prosecutor failed to disclose it, id. at 104; and the situation here: where the

defendant made a general request for material or no request at all, id. at 106-07.

In this third instance, where the defendant alleged a Brady violation, a request

for a new trial turned on whether "the suppressed evidence might have affected

the outcome of the trial." Id. at 104. In considering the character of the evidence

in relation to the entire trial record, if the record established no reasonable doubt

of guilt and the undisclosed Brady material did not change that, a new trial was

not warranted. Id. at 112-13.

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                                        18
      But "if the omitted evidence create[d] a reasonable doubt that did not

otherwise exist, constitutional error ha[d] been committed." Id. at 112. Accord

Carter, 85 N.J. at 312. And "if the verdict [was] already of questionable validity,

additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient to create

a reasonable doubt." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 113.

      Nine years later, the United States Supreme Court "abandoned the [Agurs]

distinction between" information specifically requested by defendant and

information generally requested, or not requested at all, in favor of a materiality

test that mirrored the one set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984). Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433 (1995) (discussing Bagley, 473

U.S. at 682). As the Court subsequently explained in Kyles, regardless of the

situation in which the Brady violation arose, the Bagley test instructs that

"favorable evidence is material, and constitutional error results from its

suppression . . . 'if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been

disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.'" Id. at 433-34 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682). "A 'reasonable

probability' is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."

Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682.

                                                                             A-3365-22
                                       19
      Kyles emphasized the "[f]our aspects of materiality" discussed in Bagley.

514 U.S. at 434. First, "a showing of materiality does not require demonstration

by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would have

resulted ultimately in the defendant's acquittal." Ibid. (citing Bagley, 473 U.S.

at 682). Rather,

            Bagley's touchstone of materiality is a "reasonable
            probability" of a different result, and the adjective is
            important. The question is not whether the defendant
            would more likely than not have received a different
            verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he
            received a fair trial, understood as a trial resulting in a
            verdict worthy of confidence.             A "reasonable
            probability" of a different result is accordingly shown
            when the government's evidentiary suppression
            "undermines confidence in the outcome of the trial."

            [Ibid. (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 678).]

      Second, the materiality standard "is not a sufficiency of evidence test":

            A defendant need not demonstrate that after
            discounting the inculpatory evidence in light of the
            undisclosed evidence, there would not have been
            enough left to convict. The possibility of an acquittal
            on a criminal charge does not imply an insufficient
            evidentiary basis to convict. One does not show a
            Brady violation by demonstrating that some of the
            inculpatory evidence should have been excluded, but by
            showing that the favorable evidence could reasonably
            be taken to put the whole case in such a different light
            as to undermine confidence in the verdict.

            [Id. at 435.]

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                                       20
      Third, if the reviewing court finds constitutional error under Bagley,

"there is no need for further harmless-error review." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 435.

And fourth, undisclosed evidence must be "considered collectively, not item by

item." Id. at 436.

      Our Supreme Court has applied the Bagley "unitary standard" to all

motions for a new trial based on a Brady violation regardless of whether the

defendant made any request for the material. Marshall II, 148 N.J. at 155-56;

State v. Knight, 145 N.J. 233, 247 (1996). The Court found no significant

difference in the Agurs tests, as the ultimate question in any context was whether

the suppressed evidence had a reasonable probability of affecting the verdict.

Ibid. "In all instances, evidence is material for Brady purposes 'if there is a

reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the

result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Marshall II, 148 N.J. at

156 (quoting Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682).

      With this backdrop in mind, we address the State's contentions. The State

argues the motion court applied the "abandoned Agurs materiality standard for

general requests for evidence," which required the court to find that the Brady

material "create[d] a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist." We find

this argument unavailing for two reasons.

                                                                            A-3365-22
                                       21
      First, the State's contention misreads Agurs and Bagley. Bagley accepted

the Agurs materiality test applicable when a defendant either made a general

request or no request for the material, as the controlling test for a Brady

violation. This standard requires a showing that the suppressed evidence had a

reasonable probability of affecting the verdict and, as articulated in Agurs,

another way of conveying this requirement is that the suppressed evidence

created a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist. 427 U.S. at 112.

      Second, the motion court did not apply the incorrect standard in

considering defendant's motion. After discussing the standard for a new trial

based on newly discovered evidence where a defendant does not allege a Brady

violation, the court turned to the standard where a defendant alleges a Brady

violation and analyzed defendant's motion under the latter. In so doing, the court

explained this case turned on whether the undisclosed information of Wright's

pending charges and PTI discharge "create[d] a reasonable doubt . . . that did

not otherwise exist" because the State conceded that the first two prongs of

Brady were met. Although the court cited Agurs, it applied the correct standard

as set forth in Bagley.

      The State also claims the motion court erred by finding Wright's pending

charges and PTI discharge were material to the case because these facts had no

                                                                            A-3365-22
                                       22
reasonable probability of creating a doubt that did not otherwise exist. In

concluding otherwise, the State argues, the court improperly acted as a thirteenth

juror, disregarded the significance of Davis's testimony, failed to consider that

Davis's inability to identify defendant in court was based on defendant's changed

appearance, and gave undue weight to Wright's testimony.

      We find this argument unavailing because the record reflects the motion

court applied the Bagley standard and reached the correct outcome.                 In

considering the trial record in its entirety, the court noted the State's case relied

heavily on identification testimony provided by two eyewitnesses. Because

neither witness provided clear, consistent, unequivocal testimony identifying

defendant as the shooter, the jury likely considered the witnesses' testimony

together in finding defendant guilty.

      The court acknowledged the State's argument that Davis's testimony alone

could have supported the verdict and his inability to confirm his prior

identification in court could have been based on defendant's changed

appearance. But the ultimate question was not whether the verdict would have

been the same even with the suppressed evidence, but rather, whether the

undisclosed evidence had a reasonable probability to change the verdict or,

stated another way, whether the undisclosed evidence "create[d] a reasonable

                                                                              A-3365-22
                                        23
doubt that did not otherwise exist." See ibid. We agree with the court's finding

that it did.

       Wright's charges and discharge from PTI amounted to more than "mere"

impeachment information or cumulative information. While the nature of the

pending charges may not have been admissible under the Rules of Evidence, the

fact that Wright had a pending indictment was highly material to any potential

bias. See State v. Bass, 224 N.J. 285, 303 (2016) ("A defendant's claim that

there is an inference of bias is particularly compelling when the witness is under

investigation, or charges are pending against the witness, at the time that he or

she testifies."). The suppressed information directly related to her credibility

and honesty, particularly given her express reluctance to testify. 4

       As it was, Wright's testimony did not overwhelmingly implicate

defendant. While she testified that she was familiar with defendant's appearance

4
   Defendant points out Wright's December 4, 2009 judgment of conviction
indicated mitigating factor twelve (the willingness of defendant to cooperate
with law enforcement authorities), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b). It is unclear from the
record before us whether this factor referred to her testimony in this matter or
some other cooperation. Nevertheless, defendant should have been afforded the
opportunity to cross-examine her on this issue. See Bass, 224 N.J. at 303
("Indeed, '[i]n an unbroken line of decisions, our courts have held that the
pendency of charges or an investigation relating to a prosecution witness is an
appropriate topic for cross-examination.'") (citing Landano, 271 N.J. Super. at
40).
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because she had known him for years, the circumstances in which she observed

him at the scene were less than ideal. In addition, while she initially thought

defendant was the shooter, she only became more certain of that after she heard

other people talking and naming him.

      Davis's identification was likewise assailable, especially given his in-

court testimony defendant was not the shooter. Because the jury had many

grounds on which to find Davis's testimony unreliable, we agree with the motion

court's finding that Wright's testimony likely served to bolster his and

conversely, his testimony bolstered hers.     Indeed, the suppressed evidence

"would have resulted in a markedly weaker case for the prosecution and a

markedly stronger one for the defense." Kyles, 514 U.S. at 441.

      Lastly, the State argues defendant also failed to show entitlement to a new

trial under the newly-discovered evidence standard where no Brady violation is

alleged. According to the State, the court concluded defendant established

materiality under the non-Brady violation standard by establishing materiality

under Bagley, without conducting a separate analysis. The State contends this

was error because the non-Brady violation standard is more stringent than the

Brady violation standard, and since defendant did not establish materiality under

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the less stringent standard, he cannot establish it under the more demanding

standard.

      We reject this contention because the motion court found a new trial was

warranted for the Brady violation, therefore there was no need for it to further

address an inapplicable standard. And while the standard on a motion for a new

trial based on a non-Brady violation has been described as more stringent, this

descriptor refers to the additional requirement a defendant must demonstrate—

that the new evidence could not have been discovered prior to trial through due

diligence—which is not required in a Brady violation case. State v. Henries,

306 N.J. Super. 512, 534-35 (App. Div. 1997). However, the materiality element

of both standards is effectively the same. Ibid.

      In sum, none of the State's arguments establishes that the court's order

granting defendant's motion for a new trial was "clearly erroneous." Marshall

II, 148 N.J. at 185. The motion court's finding that the suppressed impeachment

evidence had the capacity to change the verdict is premised on the application

of the correct standard and is amply supported by the record.

      Affirmed.

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