Court Opinion

ID: 9791800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:18:20.050506+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:38.661437
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice McINTYRE
delivered the opinion of the court.
Marathon Oil Company, formerly The Ohio Oil Company, as appellant challenges action taken by a school district boundary board to change the boundaries of two school districts. The lands involved in the change contain 17 producing oil wells, all of which are owned by Marathon. In fact, that company claims to own approximately 81 percent of the total property evaluation transferred from one district to the other.
It is conceded the interest of Marathon is that of a taxpayer, and the change in boundaries, if valid and permitted to remain in effect, will require such taxpayer to pay substantially more in taxes than it would pay if the boundaries remained as they were.
As a result of a joint petition previously filed by the respective boards of education of School District 28 and School District 1 in Big Horn County, the District Boundary Board of Big Horn County held a special meeting March 29, 1960 to consider-the request of the boards of education of these two districts for a change in boundaries, in order to give to District 28 a part *834of the Byron oil and gas field from District 1. At the meeting, the boundary board adopted the proposal of the petition and the boundaries of the two districts were changed accordingly.
Marathon subsequently brought this action against the county assessor, the county treasurer and the boundary board to enjoin the collection of all taxes arising out of the change in boundaries. The district court upheld the validity of the change, and the taxpayer now seeks a reversal of its judgment.

Appellant’s Claim

Appellant has not claimed the boundary board is without power to make the change which it did make. But it is claimed the board’s action is void because of lack of a formal notice and hearing. In support of this contention, counsel for appellant cites School District No. 9, Fremont County v. District Boundary Board In and For Fremont County, Wyo., 351 P.2d 106; and School Dist. No. 3, El Paso County v. Perry, 126 Colo. 443, 250 P.2d 1010.
We have carefully reviewed these cases and find in them very little, if any, support for counsel’s contention. The District No. 9, Fremont County, case dealt with the need for substantial evidence upon which the decision of the boundary board could reasonably have been based. Nothing was said, however, which would imply that a formal notice and hearing for property owners and taxpayers would be required.
In the Colorado case of Dist. No. 3, a change in boundaries was made by the county superintendent of schools without notice to the school district from which property was being taken and without an opportunity for it to be heard. Although there was an adjudication to the effect that the affected school district had a right to be notified and heard on the question as to whether the best interests of the schools would be promoted by a change in boundaries, nothing was said which would indicate that the notice and hearing for this determination should extend to property owners and taxpayers. Actually, by statute in Colorado, a vote of the electors was required following a determination by the superintendent of schools to propose a change in boundaries.

The Matter of Notice

The powers and duties of a boundary board, insofar as pertinent to the instant case and as they existed on March 29, 1960, were spelled out in § 21-211, W.S.1957, in the following language:
“The county superintendent of schools, the county treasurer, and the board of county commissioners shall constitute a board for laying off their county into convenient school districts, such board to be styled ‘the district boundary board.’ Said board by a majority vote may divide the county into school districts, may alter and change the boundaries of the districts so formed from time to time and may at any time consolidate entire districts or portions of districts, when, in the opinion of such board such changes, alterations or consolidations may be justified by existing circumstances and conditions * * *.»
There is no statutory requirement for a notice of meeting in connection with meetings of a district boundary board, and appellant does not contend the statute under which the boundary board proceeded is unconstitutional. In fact, appellant asserts the statute unquestionably is constitutional. Indeed, the validity of such legislation was recognized by this court in Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Byron School Dist. No. 1, 37 Wyo. 259, 260 P. 537, 539, wherein it was said the establishment of such districts and the change of boundaries is a legislative function which the legislature has delegated to a district boundary board in each county, and it is not questioned this may be done.
In the absence of constitutional restrictions, the question as to whether local boards may exercise their delegated power to change school district boundary lines, without notice and a hearing for property *835owners, is a matter' solely for the determination of the legislature. Anderson v. Peterson, 78 N.D. 949, 54 N.W.2d 542, 551-553; In re Annexation of Common School Dists. Nos. 18 & 21 to Independent School Dist. No. 1, Minidoka County, 52 Idaho 363, 15 P.2d 732, 733; Antelope Valley Union High School Dist. of Los Angeles County v. McClellan, 55 Cal.App. 244, 203 P. 147, 149 ; 47 Am.Jur., Schools, § 18, p. 310.
Generally, statutes authorizing subordinate boards to create and alter school districts are not invalid for failure to require a notice and hearing, and a hearing is not necessary where not required by statute. Perkins v. Lenora Rural High School Joint Dist. No. 1, Norton and Graham Counties, 171 Kan. 727, 237 P.2d 228, 232-233; Prosper Independent School Dist. v.' County School Trustees, Tex.Com.App., 58 S.W.2d 5, 6; 78 C.J.S. Schools and School Districts § 42, p. 731.
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma had occasion to say, in Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City, 185 Okl. 342, 91 P.2d 771, 775, that a school district is a subordinate agency of the state, and the legislature can abolish or change the boundaries of school districts without consulting the inhabitants.
It has been held in this jurisdiction that no person can have a vested right in a particular school district, and the amount of taxes to be paid by taxpayers is not a criterion, or at least a controlling criterion, in determining whether the annexation of territory to a school district is reasonable or not. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Byron School Dist. No. 1, supra, at 260 P. 541. See also Pritchett v. County Board of School Trustees, 5 Ill.2d 356, 125 N.E.2d 476, 478; School Dist. No. 3 of Town of Adams v. Callahan, 237 Wis. 560, 297 N.W. 407, 414, 135 A.L.R. 1081; and Anderson v. Peterson, supra.
The appellants in School Dist. No. 3 of Town of Adams v. Callahan, supra, were school districts and individual property owners and taxpayers. Concerning them the court said:
“■* ■* * no property rights on the part of the districts or any of the appellants are considered involved in the consolidation of such districts. Consequently, neither the absence of a statutory provision requiring notice to be given of a hearing before the superintendent, nor the absence of any such notice to appellants renders the statute unconstitutional or the orders under review invalid on the ground of a want of due process. * * * ”

Board’s Discretion

In Pritchett v. County Board of School Trustees, supra, the Supreme Court of Illinois said the sufficiency of notice, or lack of it, is purely a matter of legislative determination; however, it may be a subject for judicial review as regard to whether the county board has sufficiently apprised itself of the situation at hand before carrying out its legislative directive.
This statement, we believe, affords the answer to our decision in the case before us. The matter of requiring or not requiring notice is purely a matter of legislative determination. But it is indeed a subject for judicial review as regard to whether the county board has sufficiently apprised itself of the situation at hand before carrying out its legislative directive.
Thus it was, in the District No. 9, Fremont County, case 'that Justice Parker, at 351 P.2d 111, said a district boundary board must have before it sufficient information upon which it may properly find that it is to the best interests of the people in both the annexed and annexing areas. He also pointed out that information from which the welfare and interests of all of the people concerned may be determined is a prerequisite to action of any administrative board. The decision in that case was predicated squarely upon a lack of sufficient information from which it could *836reasonably be determined that a change should be made.
This brings us then, in the case at bar, to a review of the record in order to determine whether the boundary board of Big Horn County had sufficient information upon which to base its decision for a change. However, before reviewing the specific information upon which the board appears to have acted, we think it will be helpful to examine briefly the extent of the board's discretion.
We have repeatedly said the courts are warranted in setting aside action of a,n administrative agency only where its action is arbitrary or fraudulent or where there is an illegal exercise of discretion; and the burden of proving arbitrary, illegal or fraudulent action is on the complainant. Thompson v. Conwell, Wyo., 363 P.2d 927, 928; Rayburne v. Queen, 78 Wyo. 359, 326 P.2d 1108, 1111; Mahoney v. L. L. Sheep Company, 79 Wyo. 293, 333 P.2d 712, 716; Whitesides v. Council of City of Cheyenne, 78 Wyo. 80, 319 P.2d 520, 526; Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Byron School Dist. No. 1, supra, at 260 P. 539.
Otherwise stated, if the board’s discretion is properly exercised, its decision is final and.not subject to interference by the courts. 47 Am.Jur., Schools, § 19, p. 311. See also Annotation 135 A.L.R. 1096, 1102.

Sufficiency of Information

Regarding the question as to whether in the case at bar there was sufficient information to justify the board’s decision to make the proposed change, we think consideration can be given to the fact that both of the school districts affected were petitioners and helped to bring about the decision. Thus, the problem involved in the Colorado case of School Dist. No. 3, El Paso County v. Perry, 126 Colo. 443, 250 P.2d 1010, upon which appellant relies, is not involved in this case. As indicated above, the Colorado case had to do with the lack of an opportunity for the adversely affected school district to be heard.
Evidence introduced in the trial of the instant case reveals that minutes of the meeting in question were before the court. These minutes indicate that a written petition had been filed with the county boundary board by the two school districts, and that a map was presented by the county assessor showing the area to be transferred from District 1 to District 28 and showing the location of oil wells in the area concerned. The minutes state there was a short discussion and an examination of the map, after which a motion was unanimously carried for the requested change.
Ample testimony was presented to the trial court to indicate members of the board were familiar with the situation of each district and with the problems involved. According to the testimony, there was mention of the fact that school children were not adversely affected by the change; there was evidence as to the needs of the schools; there was evidence as to the assessed valuations involved; and there was evidence as to the relative size of the districts and relative number of pupils in each district.
It appears rather strongly from all of the evidence that the main purpose of the change was to equalize to some extent the valuations of the two districts, both of which had approximately the same number of children to educate. The testimony as a whole indicated these various pertinent matters had been previously discussed and were further discussed at the March 29, 1960 meeting. Also, some adjustment and alteration in the actual boundaries of the proposed change were worked out at the meeting itself, in order to better accomplish the result which was being sought.
As further proof that the change in boundaries was not made thoughtlessly or arbitrarily, testimony was introduced indicating the voters of School District No. 1 had voted on the proposition as to whether its district should give approximately two million dollars in assessed valuation to District 28. This referendum question was submitted at the time of a *837regular bond-issue election, and approval for the change was given by a vote of 207 to 4.
Adopting some of the logic and language employed in the Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. case, we can say the school district .trustees and the district boundary board were confronted with a stern necessity, which could be met in no other way as far as the record discloses. The real question is as to whether the rights of appellant as a taxpayer so overshadow the necessities involved as to require us to say the district boundary board acted arbitrarily and oppressively, and that it should have considered the interests of the school children of secondary importance.
The evidence disclosed by the record before us is amply sufficient, under the circumstances of this case, to justify the conclusions of the trial court to the effect that plaintiff failed to sustain the burden of proof upon it and failed to establish that the action of the boundary board was arbitrary, an abuse of discretion or fraudulent.

Overlapping of Districts

Appellant complains of an overlapping in territorial boundaries between School District No. 28 and the Byron High School District. Since District 28 maintains grades one through 12 at Cowley, Wyoming, and the Byron High School District maintains grades 9 through 12 at Byron, Wyoming, it is argued the same taxable property would be subject to levy for the purpose of supporting a district operating grades one through 12 and also a high school district operating grades 9 through 12.
It is admitted the levy board and county assessor have limited District 28’s taxing ability, on the property transferred, to 13[4 mills — the limit for elementary school purposes. See Ch. 217, § 2, S.L. of Wyoming, 1961. Also, the Byron High School District has actually levied under the mill-levy limit for high school purposes. See Ch. 217, § 1, S.L. of Wyoming, 1961. Thus, the levy to which Marathon’s property has been subjected is under the statutory limitation for both elementary school and high school purposes.
Counsel argues, however, that there is no authority for the action of the taxing officials and at some time in the future Marathon’s property could be subjected to double taxation for high school purposes and to a total levy in excess of the statutory limits. This argument overlooks' the fact that Art. IS, § 13, Wyoming Coi» stitution, prohibits the - levying of am tax, except in pursuance of law. And hence, taxing officials would be debarred in any case from levying or collecting, taxes in excess of the statutory .limitations.
As stated in 43 C.J.S. Injunctions § 21, p. 436, an injunction will not lie to restrain one from doing what he is not attempting and does not intend to do, and a fortiori an injunction will not issue where it is shown defendants are without power to accomplish the thing sought to be enjoined. See Cantou v. Walker, 61 Wyo. 56, 154 P.2d 530, 534; Aerated Products Co. of Philadelphia, Pa. v. Department of Health of New Jersey, 3 Cir., 159 F.2d 851, 854; and Davis v. Upshur County, Tex.Civ.App., 191 S.W.2d 524, 525.
It is not uncommon in Wyoming for a high school district to be superimposed over an ordinary school district. This was recognized in Ericksen v. School Dist. No. 2 of Natrona County, 67 Wyo. 216, 217 P.2d 887, 891. The court in that case said the governing authorities of the high school district and the. governing authorities of the ordinary school district must cooperate to see that the limit in question was not exceeded.

Decision .

Although there was some evidence indicating employees of Marathon knew of the meeting of the district boundary board on March 29, 1960, and that the company could have been heard if it had chosen to be, the district court found no formal *838notice of meeting was . given to the applicant for injunctive relief. Its judgment was based upon the legal conclusion that notice to and a hearing for the individual taxpayer was not required. We agree with this conclusion and we find no other basis for granting the relief sought. We therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.