Court Opinion

ID: 9767532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:20:53.397988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:31.642485
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON APPELLANTS’ PETITIONS FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

MANSFIELD, Judge.
Appellants, husband and wife, were charged by separate indictments with the offense of injury to a child. Tex.Penal Code § 22.04. More specifically, they were charged with “intentionally and knowingly, by omission, [causing] disfigurement and deformity, serious bodily injury and serious physical and mental deficiency and impairment to their son, Stephen Hill, a child younger than fifteen years of age, by failure to provide food and medical care_”
The State filed notice of its intent to seek an affirmative finding that a deadly weapon was used in a manner that caused Stephen’s death. The chains, belts and locks that were used to prevent Stephen from obtaining food (Stephen died of starvation) were identified by the State as the deadly weapon(s). Testimony at trial showed Stephen was chained for approximately the eighteen months prior to his death.
The jury found appellants guilty of injury to a child by omission. The jury also found that appellants used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense, and assessed punishment at 99 years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice — Institutional Division. The court of appeals affirmed appellants’ convictions and sentences. Hill v. State, 881 S.W.2d 897 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1994).
Texas Penal Code § 1.07(a)(17) defines a deadly weapon as:
(A) a firearm or anything manifestly designed, made or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury; or
(B) anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.
It is clear that chains, belts and locks are not designed, made or adapted for the purpose of inflicting death or serious bodily injury, so they are not deadly weapons per se as defined under § 1.07(a)(17)(A). However, items that are not deadly weapons per se *583under § 1.07(a)(17)(A) have been found to be deadly weapons by nature of their use or intended use under § 1.07(a)(17)(B). Thomas v. State, 821 S.W.2d 616, 619 (Tex.Cr.App.1991). The use or intended use must be capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.
“Kitchen knives, utility knives, straight razors and eating utensils are manifestly designed and made for other purposes and, consequently, do not qualify as deadly weapons unless actually used or intended to be used in such a way as to cause death or serious bodily injury within the meaning of § 1.07(a)(ll)(B).”
Thomas, at 620. (Note: § 1.07(a)(ll)(B) is now § 1.07(a)(17)(B)).
The State introduced evidence that the restraints used to prevent Stephen from obtaining food were used in a manner so as to cause serious bodily injury or death— namely, his starvation.1 This evidence was constitutionally sufficient to support a rational jury’s finding that appellants used a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense of injury to a child. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).
Appellants assert in their fourth ground for review that an affirmative finding as to use of a deadly weapon may not be made where the predicate offense is an act of omission. Appellants are correct in their assertion that, by definition, an act of omission is a failure to act. In the present case, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellants failed to provide food and medical attention to Stephen in violation of their legal duty to do so. Appellants do not contest the jury’s finding of guilt as to the predicate charge of injury to a child by omission. Appellants are correct in stating that an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon requires the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt appellants used a deadly weapon. See Tex.Penal Code §§ 1.07(a)(ll) and 1.07(a)(34) (1990).
In Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938 (Tex.Cr.App.1989), this Court held, in affirming the judgment of the court of appeals, that “ ‘used [a deadly weapon] during the commission of a felony offense’ refers certainly to the wielding of a firearm with effect, but it extends to any employment of a deadly weapon, even its simple possession, if such possession facilitates the associated felony.” Patterson, at 941.
Appellants used the chains, belts and locks to restrain Stephen to deprive him of food. In so using these objects, appellants committed an affirmative, conscious and intentional act. The conduct here goes far beyond Patterson, where we found that the defendant’s mere possession — no actual employment — of a firearm, along with possession of narcotics, constituted the use of a deadly weapon. Here, we have actual use, without which the predicate offense likely would not have been possible.2
Our opinion is consistent with Patterson in that it requires the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the charged individual employed or used a deadly weapon so as to facilitate the associated felony before an affirmative finding as to use of a deadly weapon may be made. Thus, the State must prove “use.” Additionally, in the present case, as the chains, locks and associated *584items were not deadly weapons per se as defined in Texas Penal Code § 1.07(a)(ll)(A), the State had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they were deadly weapons because, in the manner of their use or intended use, they were capable of causing death or serious bodily injury (as defined in Texas Penal Code § 1.07(a)(34)), per Texas Penal Code § 1.07(a)(ll)(B). Appellants do not demonstrate that the State’s burden of proof on the affirmative finding as to a deadly weapon is in any way affected by whether the associated felony is an act of omission or commission. Appellants’ fourth ground for review is overruled.
Appellants argue, in their first and second grounds for review, that the wording of the special issue paragraph is fatally defective because it does not contain the phrase “during the commission of the charged offense.” Appellants assert this phrase is mandated by Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, article 42.12, section 3(g)(a)(2). Alternatively, appellants claim the charge is erroneous and constituted egregious error under Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 167 (Tex.Crim.App.1984).
In Polk v. State, 693 S.W.2d 391 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), we described the methods by which an affirmative finding may be made. “If the indictment by allegation places the issue before the trier of fact (i.e. “... by stabbing him with a knife, a deadly weapon ... ”) then an affirmative finding is de facto made when the defendant is found guilty ‘as charged in the indictment.’ ” Polk, at 394. See also Ruben v. State, 645 S.W.2d 794 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). In the present case, the indictment is silent on the deadly weapon issue and the State gave proper notice of its intent to seek an affirmative finding.
An affirmative finding may also be made if the trier of fact responds to a special issue submitted during the punishment phase of the trial. We do note, however, that article 37.07, section 1(a) does not mandate that the issue be submitted at the punishment phase of the trial and could be submitted during the guilt-innocence phase. Polk, at 394, fn. 3. For the purposes of article 42.12, section 3(g)(a)(2), an affirmative finding may be made if, during the punishment phase, the jury is presented with and responds in the affirmative to a special issue regarding the defendant’s use or exhibition of a deadly weapon during the commission of the charged offense.
Polk, however, does not give any guidance as to what, if any, specific language must be contained in a special issue regarding a deadly weapon affirmative finding. Indeed, a special issue does not even have to be submitted for an affirmative finding to be entered if the issue is properly presented in the indictment. As the indictment in the present case does not allege use of a deadly weapon, a special issue charge was required. Polk does not, however, support appellants’ assertion that omission of the phrase “during commission of the charged offense” means “the jury’s affirmative answer to the special issue in the present case has no legal effect whatsoever.”
This Court held in Nickerson v. State, 782 S.W.2d 887 (Tex.Crim.App.1990), that “a charge must be treated in its entirety with regard to the connection and interdependence of its several parts.” Nickerson, at 891. In the present case, the jury instructions on the special issue contain an application paragraph. The application paragraph describes acts which actually occurred during commission of the offense and constitute the res gestae of the offense. The jury had to find beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed these acts using the items alleged by the State to be deadly weapons in order to answer the special issue charge in the affirmative. In effect, the specific language of the application paragraph increased the State’s burden of proof beyond what would have been created under the generic phrase “during the commission of the charged offense.” Increasing the State’s burden of proof only inured to appellants’ benefit and cannot be said to be error, much less reversible error. See State v. Kinsey, 861 S.W.2d 383 (Tex.Crim.App.1993) and State v. Garcia, 861 S.W.2d 386 (Tex.Crim.App.1993).
Assuming, arguendo, that omission of the phrase “during commission of the *585charged offense” is error, it is charge error. Appellants did not object to omission of this phrase at the time of the proceedings when the court, pursuant to Article 36.14, provided appellants with a written copy of its proposed charge on the deadly weapons special issue. Errors alleged to have been made in a jury charge are subject to review under the standards established by this Court in Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 160 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (opinion on rehearing) controls.
“If the error in the charge was the subject of a timely objection in the trial court, then reversal is required if the error is ‘calculated to injure the rights of defendant,’ which means no more than there must be some harm to the accused from the error. In other words, an error which has been properly preserved by objection will call for reversal as long as the error is not harmless. On the other hand, if no proper objection was made at trial and the accused must claim that the error was ‘fundamental,’ he will obtain a reversal only if the error is so egregious and created such harm that he ‘has not had a fair and impartial trial’ — in short, ‘egregious harm.’
In both situations the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Almanza, at 171.
Appellants concede they did not object to omission of the phrase “during the commission of the charged offense” from the special issue instruction submitted on use of a deadly weapon.3 Therefore, we must determine if the court of appeals correctly concluded under Almanza that appellants did not suffer egregious harm as a result of the omission of the phrase “during the commission of the charged offense” from the charge on the special issue. We find that the court of appeals correctly found no egregious harm resulted.
The record shows that the only time appellants used the items alleged by the State to be deadly weapons was during the commission of the underlying offense of injury to a child by omission. There was no evidence that the items were used to hit Stephen or were used for any other purpose. The only logical conclusion one could draw from the jury’s answer to the special issue, as submitted, is that appellants used the items during the commission of the offense. Furthermore, appellants do not contest the court of appeals’ affirmance as to their conviction of the underlying offense. The appellants suffered no egregious harm as a result of the omitted phrase from the language submitted on the special issue. We overrule appellants’ grounds for review numbers one and two.
In ground for review number three appellants aver it was improper for the trial court, during the punishment phase of the trial, to give the jury two charges on parole. One charge described the law governing parole if the jury answered “no” to the special issue as to an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon; the other charge described the parole law which would apply to appellants if the jury answered the deadly weapons special issue in the negative. In effect, the jury was informed as to the effect of a “yes” answer or a “no” answer to the special issue on the amount of time appellants would have to serve before appellants would be eligible for parole.
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, article 37.07, section 4, then in effect (1992), provided for two different parole instructions. Section 4(a), applicable to a defendant convicted of an offense described in article 42.12, section 3(g)(a)(l) or if the judgment contained a deadly weapon affirmative finding under section 3(g)(a)(2), read in relevant part:
Under the law applicable in this case, if the defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment, he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served equals one-fourth of the sentence imposed or 15 years, whichever is less, without consider*586ation of any good conduct time he may earn. If the defendant is sentenced to a term of less that six years, he must serve at least two years before he is eligible for parole. Eligibility for parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted.
Section 4(b), then in effect (1992), which was applicable to a defendant convicted of an offense not described in article 42.12, section 3(g)(a)(l) or where there was no deadly weapon affirmative finding under section 3(g)(a)(2), read in relevant part:
Under the law applicable in this ease, if the defendant is sentenced to a term, of imprisonment he will not become eligible for parole until the actual time served plus any good conduct time earned equals one-fourth of the sentence imposed or 15 years, whichever is less. Eligibility of parole does not guarantee that parole will be granted.
Appellants objected to the State’s proposed submission of the deadly weapons special issue at the guilt-innocence phase of the trial. The trial court agreed with appellants and submitted the special issue at the punishment phase, even though this Court has never held that it is improper to submit the deadly weapons special issue at the guilt-innocence phase. Luken v. State, 780 S.W.2d 264, 268 (Tex.Crim.App.1989). See also McIntosh v. State, 855 S.W.2d 753, 771 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1993, pet. ref' d.) As the court of appeals below states, the wording of sections 4(a) and 4(b) of article 37.07 “implicitly requires the deadly weapon issue to be submitted at the guilt-innocence stage so that the trial court will know which parole law instruction to give the jury during the punishment phase.” Hill, 881 S.W.2d at 907. We agree that the better practice is to submit the deadly weapons special issue charge at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial.
There was no submission on the deadly weapons special issue during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial as a result of appellant’s objection. The trial court was given no alternative but to give the jury two parole instructions at the punishment phase — one applicable in the event the jury answered the special issue in the affirmative and the other applicable in the event the jury answered the special issue in the negative when the special issue was submitted. Appellants do not cite any authority in support of their contention the trial court erred in submitting two parole law instructions. Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that it was error, appellants invited it and cannot complain of it on appeal. Tucker v. State, 771 S.W.2d 523, 534 (Tex.Crim.App.1988); cert. denied 492 U.S. 912, 109 S.Ct. 3230, 106 L.Ed.2d 578 (1989).
The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed.
OVERSTREET and MALONEY, JJ., concur in the result.
CLINTON, J., dissents.

. The jury instruction stated:
"Deadly weapon” means anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury.
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant(s) used a chain, rod, belts or locks, either individually or in combination, and you further find that the chain, rod, belts or locks, either individually or in combination was a deadly weapon as previously defined; or if you find that the defendant(s) was a party to the offense and knew that the chain, rod, belts or locks, either individually or in combination, would be used, and you further find that the chain rod, belts or locks, either individually or in combination, was a deadly weapon, then you will answer the Special Issue "Yes.” If you do not so believe, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof, you will answer the Special Issue "No.”
Special Issue
Do you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendants) used a deadly weapon? Answer "Yes” or "No."

. Appellants do not cite any authority to support their proposition that Patterson's "facilitation of an associated felony” language applies only to cases involving deadly weapons per se as defined in § 1.07(a)(17)(A).

. Appellants did object to the legal propriety of submission of a deadly weapon special issue where the charged offense is one of omission, but we decided this matter in a manner adverse to appellant in our disposition of ground for review four. Appellants did not object to the wording of the special issue charge, however.