Court Opinion

ID: 9652250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:21:14.103133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:49.661294
License: Public Domain

WATKINS, President Judge,
dissenting:
On January 8, 1975, appellee brought an action in assumpsit against both defendants alleging the non-payment of a promissory note signed by both defendants and dated February 14, 1974. The note was for $60,000 and was payable on May 15, 1974. Appellant Triester filed an Answer to plaintiff’s complaint alleging that a second note, dated May 14, 1974, and executed by appellant and Mercer and delivered to plaintiff paid and satisfied the first note. The second note was also for $60,000. Plaintiff took no action to amend its complaint to bring its action on the second note and moved for summary judgment on August 29,1975. Triester’s deposition had been taken on April 30, 1975. On September 25, 1975, the court below granted plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment. Appellant then took this appeal.
During his deposition, appellant testified that the money was borrowed in order to help finance a real estate development in Florida in which he was to have a 22% interest. He testified that he had to contact Mercer many times in order to make sure that Mercer kept up interest payments on the *385note during the 90 day period. Finally, he decided to “get out” of the deal when Mercer informed him that they would need to borrow $250,000 or $300,000. Appellant also testi-' fied that Mercer and plaintiff were negotiating at the time with regards to the payment of the note but that he was not aware of the details of-the negotiations. He testified that he agreed to sign the second note upon the understanding that the second note would discharge the first note. He also entered into a “Hold Harmless and Indemnity Agreement” with Mercer on the second note by which Mercer agreed to indemnify appellant from any liability regarding the second note. Therefore it matters a great deal to appellant whether plaintiff has the right to enforce the provisions of the first note because the second note provides him with much greater protection regarding Mercer. If the second note paid and satisfied the first note then plaintiff can only proceed against the defendants on the second note.
A summary judgment is properly entered only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogations, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure 1035(b). The party who moves for the summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no issue to any material fact and any doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of a material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Schacter v. Albert, 212 Pa.Super. 58, 239 A.2d 841 (1968). The trial court must accept as true all the well-pleaded facts in the appellant’s pleadings and other supporting evidence and give him the benefit of any proper inferences that can be drawn from those sources. Kent v. Miller, 222 Pa.Super. 390, 294 A.2d 821 (1972). Whether a new instrument is to be taken in discharge of one already held is a factual question of interest of the parties. Citizens Bank v. Lipschitz, 296 Pa. 291, 145 A. 831 (1929). Appellant testified that it was his intent that the second note take the place of the first one. Appellee averred in its motion for summary judgment that *386it was its intent that the second note not become effective until an alleged condition precedent was met, the condition being that the defendants were to secure a' written financial commitment from Mellon National Mortgage Company, part of the proceeds of which was to pay the defendants’ obligation to plaintiff. It is apparent therefore that there are certain facts which are material to this issue which remain unresolved. The question as to the alleged condition precedent points up one of these facts. Therefore we would hold that the summary judgment should not have been granted, and would reverse the decision of the court below and remand for a new trial.
JACOBS and VAN der VOORT, JJ., join in this dissenting opinion.