Court Opinion

ID: 9352488
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 19:00:22.706875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:37.527769
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30181         Document: 00516600770             Page: 1      Date Filed: 01/06/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                   Fifth Circuit

                                                                                 FILED
                                                                            January 6, 2023
                                         No. 22-30181
                                                                             Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                  Clerk

   Remingtyn A. Williams, on behalf of themselves and all
   other persons similarly situated; Lauren E. Chustz, on
   behalf of themselves and all other persons similarly
   situated; Bilal Ali-Bey, on behalf of themselves and
   all other persons similarly situated,

                                                                     Plaintiffs—Appellees,

                                             versus

   Lamar A. Davis, in his official capacity as
   Superintendent of the Louisiana State Police,

                                                                   Defendant—Appellant.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 2:21-cv-852

   Before Higginbotham, Duncan, and Engelhardt, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          While marching across a bridge, protestors were met with non-lethal
   force exercised by police officers. On behalf of a putative class, three of those

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 22-30181

   protestors now seek to maintain a suit against the superintendent of the
   Louisiana State Police (“LSP”), whose troopers were allegedly
   “bystanders” at the event. As we find that these plaintiffs are unable to
   maintain this suit, we REVERSE and RENDER JUDGMENT in favor
   of the LSP’s superintendent.
                  Factual Background and Procedural History
          In June of 2020, several hundred protestors gathered to cross the
   Crescent City Connection bridge (“CCC”) as part of protests in the wake of
   George Floyd’s death. Among those protestors were the three named
   plaintiffs in this case: Remingtyn Williams, Lauren Chustz, and Bilal Ali-Bey
   (“Plaintiffs”). These protestors approached a police barricade primarily
   consisting of New Orleans Police Department (“NOPD”) officers with
   support from Jefferson Parish Sheriff’s Office deputies and equipment.
   Louisiana State Police troopers were allegedly “bystanders” at the event.
   Protestors requested permission to pass through the barricade but were
   denied. At some point, “a small group of agitated demonstrators passed
   through an opening in the police line.” NOPD officers fired tear gas and
   other non-lethal munitions into the crowd and the crowd dispersed.
          The Plaintiffs asserted various claims relating to alleged violations of
   their constitutional and statutory rights against individual officers and law
   enforcement agencies. Relevant to this appeal are the claims against Colonel
   Lamar Davis (“Davis”), Superintendent of the LSP. In summary, the
   Plaintiffs sued Davis alleging Monell and supervisory liability under 42 U.S.C.
   § 1983 for violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, see
   Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 685 (1978), violations of various
   Louisiana constitutional and statutory provisions, and violations of Title VI
   of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Davis filed a motion to dismiss for failure to
   state a claim, stating in part that he was protected by Eleventh Amendment

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   sovereign immunity and that the Plaintiffs lack standing to proceed against
   him.
          The district court granted the motion as to the Monell claims and the
   Title VI claim but denied it as to the § 1983 claims and the state law claims.
   The court did not address the state law claims in detail as it found it
   unnecessary to do so given its findings on the federal claims. Evaluation of
   the § 1983 claims began with an inquiry into standing, which concluded:
   “[T]he Plaintiffs allege their constitutional rights have been violated, such
   violations are ongoing or may occur again at a later protest, and this Court
   can remedy those risks with prospective relief, namely injunctions curtailing
   LSP’s policies. Therefore, at this time, the Plaintiffs have standing to bring
   this suit.” The court also concluded that the Plaintiffs adequately pleaded §
   1983 claims to fit within the relevant exception to Eleventh Amendment
   immunity as they “sued Col. Davis in his official capacity, ‘allege[] ongoing
   violations of federal law by LSP,’ and seek prospective relief.” Davis
   promptly filed a notice of interlocutory appeal seeking review of the denial of
   Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity.
                                Standard of Review
          “This court reviews denials of Eleventh Amendment immunity de
   novo.” McCarthy ex rel. Travis v. Hawkins, 381 F.3d 407, 412 (5th Cir. 2004)
   (citing Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Par. Council—President Gov’t, 279 F.3d 273, 280
   (5th Cir. 2002)). We likewise review questions concerning standing de novo.
   Tex. All. for Retired Ams. v. Scott, 28 F.4th 669, 671 (5th Cir. 2022).
                                     Discussion
                                   I. Jurisdiction
          “This court has a continuing obligation to assure itself of its own
   jurisdiction, sua sponte if necessary.” United States v. Pedroza-Rocha, 933 F.3d

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   490, 493 (5th Cir. 2019) (citing Bass v. Denney, 171 F.3d 1016, 1021 (5th Cir.
   1999)). Orders denying Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity are
   reviewable under the “collateral order doctrine.” P.R. Aqueduct & Sewer
   Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993).
          Less clear, however, is whether we have jurisdiction to review the
   district court’s finding of standing. The Supreme Court has held that
   reviewable issues under the collateral order doctrine are those which “‘[1]
   conclusively determine the disputed question, [2] resolve an important issue
   completely separate from the merits of the action, and [3] [are] effectively
   unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.’” P.R. Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at
   144 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)). The
   Eleventh Circuit has explicitly considered whether standing is one such issue:
   “In contrast to the question of Eleventh Amendment immunity, however,
   we have held that a district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss on
   justiciability grounds is not immediately appealable under the collateral order
   doctrine.” Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1334 (11th Cir.
   1999) (citation omitted) (emphasis in original). Under Eleventh Circuit
   precedent, then, the “only” way the court can review a district court’s
   finding of standing on interlocutory appeal is via the “pendent appellate
   jurisdiction doctrine.” Summit Med. Assocs., 180 F.3d at 1335 (emphasis in
   original).
          This comports nicely with the nature of the collateral order doctrine.
   Eleventh Amendment immunity cannot effectively be reviewed “on appeal
   from a final judgment,” P.R. Aqueduct, 506 U.S. at 144 (quoting Coopers &
   Lybrand, 437 U.S. at 468), because as immunity is “an immunity from suit
   rather than a mere defense to liability … it is effectively lost if a case is
   erroneously permitted to go to trial.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231
   (2009) (ellipses in original, internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
   Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, (1985)). Standing, however, can and

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   often is reviewed on appeal without such loss, in part because the question of
   standing is often “intertwined” with that of the merits. See Barrett Comput.
   Servs., Inc. v. PDA, Inc., 884 F.2d 214, 219 (5th Cir. 1989). This makes
   questions of standing inappropriate for collateral review. If we are to address
   standing on the merits, therefore, it must be by the exercise of pendent
   appellate jurisdiction.
            II. Whether to Exercise Pendent Appellate Jurisdiction
          Pendent appellate jurisdiction may only be exercised in one of two
   “carefully circumscribed” circumstances: “(1) If the pendent decision is
   ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the decision over which the appellate court
   otherwise has jurisdiction, pendent appellate jurisdiction may lie, or (2) if
   ‘review of the former decision [is] necessary to ensure meaningful review of
   the latter.’” Escobar v. Montee, 895 F.3d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting
   Swint v. Chambers Cty. Comm’n, 514 U.S. 35, 51 (1995)).
          This court has previously exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction to
   address justiciability issues such as standing. In Hospitality House, Inc. v.
   Gilbert, it was held: “where … we have interlocutory appellate jurisdiction
   to review a district court’s denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity, we may
   first determine whether there is federal subject matter jurisdiction over the
   underlying case.” 298 F.3d 424, 429 (5th Cir. 2002). As standing
   indisputably goes to whether or not a court has subject matter jurisdiction,
   see, e.g., Abraugh v. Altimus, 26 F.4th 298, 301 (5th Cir. 2022), this panel can
   exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to address standing issues. In fact,
   while reviewing a denial of Eleventh Amendment immunity, the panel in
   Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson determined that through the exercise of
   pendent appellate jurisdiction it had jurisdiction over justiciability issues
   such as standing. 13 F.4th 434, 446 (5th Cir. 2021).

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          Exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction is not mandatory – as
   appellees point out, the Supreme Court carefully noted that “no one
   contest[ed] th[e] decision” to review standing on appeal in Whole Woman’s
   Health. Whole Woman’s Health v. Jackson, 142 S. Ct. 522, 537 (2021). Though
   that is not the case here, this court’s jurisprudence nonetheless permits this
   panel to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction. For one, “our Article III
   standing analysis and Ex parte Young analysis ‘significant[ly] overlap.’” City
   of Austin v. Paxton, 943 F.3d 993, 1002 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Air Evac
   EMS, Inc. v. Tex., 851 F.3d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 2017)). In fact, “our caselaw
   shows that a finding of standing tends toward a finding that the Young
   exception applies to the state official(s) in question.” Id. Additionally, “[w]e
   … address standing … when there exists a significant question about it.” K.P.
   v. LeBlanc, 627 F.3d 115, 122 (5th Cir. 2010). The K.P. court even addressed
   standing before proceeding to an Ex parte Young analysis even though
   “neither party … raised the issue of standing.” Id.
          Appellees    recommend      against   exercising    pendent    appellate
   jurisdiction in this case for two main reasons. First, they note that as not all
   defendants are participating in this appeal, ruling on standing will
   “prematurely instruct the district court on how to decide this case for all of
   the defendants who are not participating in this appeal.” But while the
   Plaintiffs stress this point, they submit no caselaw or other reasoning for why
   this would be problematic in itself. More persuasive are Plaintiffs’ cites to
   Swint for the proposition that “a rule loosely allowing pendent appellate
   jurisdiction would encourage parties to parlay … collateral orders into multi-
   issue interlocutory appeal tickets.” Swint, 514 U.S. at 49–50. We are
   conscious of the risk of encouraging parties with potential Eleventh
   Amendment immunity claims (or other claims which are appealable on an
   interlocutory basis) to file “meritless immunity appeals just so they could
   seek premature interlocutory review of standing, allowing them to short-

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   circuit the normal appeals process when other defendants do not enjoy that
   same privilege.” See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 663 (1977) (“Any
   other rule would encourage criminal defendants to seek review of, or assert,
   frivolous double jeopardy claims in order to bring more serious, but otherwise
   nonappealable questions to the attention of the courts of appeals prior to
   conviction and sentence.”). However, this immunity appeal is not meritless;
   further, we find that review of the Ex parte Young factors in this particular
   case is inextricably bound up with the issue of standing.
          In sum, an exercise of pendent appellate jurisdiction “‘is only proper
   in rare and unique circumstances.’” Byrum v. Landreth, 566 F.3d 442, 449
   (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting Thornton v. Gen. Motors Corp., 136 F.3d 450, 453 (5th
   Cir. 1998)). But our jurisprudence suggests that review of standing challenges
   in evaluating Eleventh Amendment immunity claims is often relevant as the
   issues may be both “‘inextricably intertwined’” and “‘necessary to ensure
   meaningful review.’” Escobar, 895 F.3d at 391 (quoting Swint, 514 U.S. at 51).
   While panels should review each case to determine whether or not it is an
   appropriate case for such an exercise, Fifth Circuit precedent suggests that
   cases such as this are “rare circumstances” in which pendent appellate
   jurisdiction may be exercised to review standing. As “our Article III standing
   analysis and Ex parte Young analysis ‘significant[ly] overlap,’” City of Austin,
   943 F.3d at 1002 (citation omitted), this case presents an appropriate
   opportunity to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction to review standing,
   and we thus do so.
                            III. Standing on the Merits
          “[T]he irreducible constitutional minimum of standing contains three
   elements:” (1) “an ‘injury in fact’—an invasion of a legally protected interest
   which is (a) concrete and particularized, … and (b) ‘actual or imminent,’ not
   conjectural or hypothetical;” (2) “a causal connection between the injury

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   and the conduct complained of;” and (3) “it must be likely … that the injury
   will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
   555, 560–61 (1992) (cleaned up). Davis contends that the Plaintiffs have no
   standing because their alleged future injuries are speculative.
          The parties suggest that the standing debate largely turns on whether
   this case is more akin to City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) or
   Hernandez v. Cremer, 913 F.2d 230 (5th Cir. 1990). In Lyons, a plaintiff sued
   the City of Los Angeles and several of its police officers after he was placed
   in a chokehold. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 97. The Supreme Court found that while
   he had standing to pursue his claim of being subjected to a chokehold, he was
   without standing to seek injunctive relief to enjoin the Los Angeles police
   force from the use of chokeholds because he had demonstrated neither that
   he was likely to have another encounter with the police nor “(1) that all police
   officers in Los Angeles always choke any citizen with whom they happen to
   have an encounter, whether for the purpose of arrest, issuing a citation or for
   questioning or, (2) that the City ordered or authorized police officers to act
   in such manner.” Id. at 106 (emphasis in original). Hernandez involved an
   American citizen born in Puerto Rico who presented a birth certificate
   indicating his place of birth while attempting to re-enter the United States
   from Mexico. Hernandez, 913 F.2d at 232. He was initially denied entry by an
   INS official who doubted the authenticity of the birth certificate; after several
   attempts, Hernandez was granted entry by another INS official. Id. at 232-33.
   Both Lyons and Hernandez sought to change an allegedly unconstitutional
   government policy. The Hernandez panel distinguished the case from Lyons
   by noting that “Hernandez (unlike Lyons) was engaged in an activity
   protected by the Constitution.” Id. at 234.
          The Plaintiffs here submit that they were engaged in activity protected
   by the First Amendment, that they would engage in such activity again in the
   future if not for the officers’ actions, and that the LSP “employs policies,

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   practices, and customs that violate the plaintiffs’ First, Fourth, and
   Fourteenth Amendment rights.” They contrast the behavior of police
   officials at the CCC protest to police behavior at “protests attended by
   largely White attendees,” noting that pro-confederate protests and anti-
   Covid-restriction protests were not met with tear gas or the like despite
   violations of state law. The Plaintiffs state that the LSP’s actions have had “a
   chilling effect upon the rights of African American citizens (and those who
   directly and actively support them) to freely and lawfully protest without fear
   of police interference, harassment, intimidation or abuse.” They contend,
   therefore, that they have adequately pleaded both that the policies in question
   are authorized by the superintendent and that the policies have chilled their
   speech. See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 11, (1972) (“[C]onstitutional
   violations may arise from the deterrent, or ‘chilling,’ effect of governmental
   regulations that fall short of a direct prohibition against the exercise of First
   Amendment rights.”).
          Unlike the plaintiff in Hernandez, these Plaintiffs were not engaged in
   constitutionally protected activity. Certainly, the right to peacefully protest
   is protected by the First Amendment. But “[e]xpression, whether oral or
   written or symbolized by conduct, is subject to reasonable time, place, or
   manner restrictions.” Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288,
   293 (1984). One such reasonable restriction is a restriction on protesting on
   public highways, as the Louisiana Supreme Court has recognized. See Doe v.
   McKesson, 2021-00929 (La. 3/25/22), 339 So. 3d 524, 533. In their briefing,
   the Plaintiffs retort that they had been protesting in the same way the five
   days preceding the events on the CCC and that they had even protested on
   another “elevated roadway” the night before. It is unclear why prior
   misconduct should justify further misconduct. More compellingly, the
   Plaintiffs suggest that they would “‘lawfully’ protest racial injustice and
   police misconduct in the future but for the discriminatory policies, practices,

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   and customs of the [LSP.]” Had the Plaintiffs been “lawfully” protesting at
   the time of their confrontation with law enforcement, perhaps there would
   have been a different outcome. The allegation that they were undisturbed in
   the five days prior to the CCC encounter only further suggests that a lawful
   protest may have been addressed differently.
          In fact, the only other evidence of the LSP’s attitude towards
   protesting comes in a discussion about how the LSP “did not intervene at
   all” while monitoring an anti-Covid-restrictions protest outside the
   Governor’s mansion. It is alleged that the LSP officers likewise declined to
   intervene during the protest on the CCC. Both protests were allegedly
   unlawful and the LSP responded passively to both. This comparison, far from
   bolstering Plaintiffs’ case, helps demonstrate why their injury is at best
   speculative. Their own complaint seems to allege that the LSP responds
   more or less identically to unlawful protests involving “overwhelmingly
   white” attendees as it did to this protest on the CCC. Plaintiffs attempt to
   place this incident in the context of the LSP’s allegedly “well-documented
   history of racism against Black people” and “discriminatory use of excessive
   force against [Black people]” by pointing to various instances involving LSP
   officers’ use of excessive force against minorities. The LSP is not here,
   however, on excessive use of force grounds, and none of these Plaintiffs were
   subjected to any discriminatory conduct by the LSP. None of the incidents
   the Plaintiffs bring to the court’s attention which are alleged to show
   unconstitutional conduct by the LSP demonstrate an “actual or imminent”
   risk of “concrete and particularized” harm to these Plaintiffs by the LSP.
   Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (cleaned up).
          The Hernandez panel comfortably distinguished Lyons by noting that
   “[t]he injury alleged to have been inflicted did not result from an individual’s
   disobedience of official instructions and Hernandez was not engaged in any
   form of misconduct; on the contrary, he was exercising a fundamental

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   Constitutional right.” Hernandez, 913 F.2d at 234–35 (footnote omitted).
   Here, neither of those factors is present. Some individuals did indeed disobey
   official instruction and attempted to pass through the barricade and the
   Plaintiffs were certainly engaged in misconduct by protesting atop the CCC
   at all. A section of Lyons is particularly illustrative:
          Although Count V alleged that the City authorized the use of the
          control holds in situations where deadly force was not threatened, it
          did not indicate why Lyons might be realistically threatened by police
          officers who acted within the strictures of the City’s policy. If, for
          example, chokeholds were authorized to be used only to counter
          resistance to an arrest by a suspect, or to thwart an effort to escape,
          any future threat to Lyons from the City’s policy or from the conduct
          of police officers would be no more real than the possibility that he
          would again have an encounter with the police and that either he
          would illegally resist arrest or detention or the officers would disobey
          their instructions and again render him unconscious without any
          provocation.
   Lyons, 461 U.S. at 106. Likewise, though the complaint alleges that the LSP
   authorizes unlawful passivity in the face of unlawful usage of force by other
   police officers, the future threat from the LSP for the Plaintiffs is “no more
   real than the possibility that [they] would again have an encounter with the
   police and that either [they] would illegally [protest] … or the officers would
   disobey their instructions.” Id. This conclusion is especially strong given that
   the LSP officers are not alleged to have used excessive force themselves.
          “[P]ast wrongs do not in themselves amount to that real and
   immediate threat of injury necessary to make out a case or controversy.” Id.
   at 103. Plaintiffs may or may not have a stronger case against the officers and
   offices who were responsible for direct action, but against the LSP the
   Plaintiffs have not demonstrated more than a speculative future injury with
   little to no basis in past practice.

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                       IV. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
          Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity generally “bars private
   suits against nonconsenting states in federal court.” City of Austin, 943 F.3d
   at 997 (citing Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc. v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 253 (2011)).
   Although this suit was brought against Davis rather than the state, “a suit
   against a state official in his or her official capacity … is no different from a
   suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S.
   58, 71 (1989) (citations omitted). In order to maintain a suit against a state, a
   litigant must generally take advantage of a state waiver or a Congressionally
   created exception to state sovereign immunity. See Va. Off. for Prot. & Advoc.,
   563 U.S. at 253–54. It is undisputed here that Louisiana has not waived
   sovereign immunity in this case and that no Congressional loophole applies.
          The Supreme Court has provided one alternative means by which
   litigants may sue a non-consenting state: the Ex parte Young exception, so
   named for the seminal Supreme Court case which codified it. See Ex parte
   Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (1908). “[I]n order to fall within the Ex parte
   Young exception, a suit must: (1) be brought against state officers who are
   acting in their official capacities; (2) seek prospective relief to redress
   ongoing conduct; and (3) allege a violation of federal, not state, law.” Freedom
   from Religion Found. v. Abbott, 955 F.3d 417, 424 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing NiGen
   Biotech, L.L.C. v. Paxton, 804 F.3d 389, 394–95 (5th Cir. 2015)). It is through
   this exception that the Plaintiffs seek to maintain this suit.
          The suit is brought against Davis in his official capacity, so the first
   Young prong is satisfied. Although Davis contends that he cannot be sued
   under § 1983 because he is not a “person” under § 1983, the very case he
   cites for that proposition rejects that contention: “Of course a state official
   in his or her official capacity, when sued for injunctive relief, would be a
   person under § 1983 because ‘official-capacity actions for prospective relief

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   are not treated as actions against the State.’” Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n.10
   (quoting Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 167 n.14 (1985)).
          As is made clear in our analysis of standing, however, the Plaintiffs
   have not demonstrated that they “seek prospective relief to redress ongoing
   conduct.” Freedom from Religion Found, 955 F.3d at 424 (citation omitted).
   The Plaintiffs have not pleaded any “ongoing conduct” on behalf of the LSP
   that can be redressed prospectively. At oral argument, counsel made clear
   that the theory of standing underlying Plaintiffs’ claims is that of chilled
   speech – namely, that the LSP’s failure to act to restrain or otherwise inhibit
   the NOPD’s use of force on the CCC that night is part of “decades-long
   policies and patterns of conduct” wherein LSP officers fail to intervene to aid
   (or prevent harm from coming to) protestors who are either minorities or
   speaking out in favor of minorities. As we have already mentioned, this claim
   is unsupported by the complaint and is far too vague to support a
   continuation of the action under the Ex parte Young standard. The LSP
   allegedly failed to intervene at this protest. Plaintiffs do not and cannot
   adequately demonstrate the relation between this failure to act in a case in
   which they were engaged in misconduct and the chilling of their lawful First
   Amendment rights. As there is no “ongoing conduct” in the pleadings in this
   case, they have failed to satisfy the Ex parte Young standard and these claims
   are barred by sovereign immunity.
          Several of the Plaintiffs’ claims independently fail the third prong as
   they assert violations of state law rather than federal law. The district court
   indisputably erred in not dismissing the state law claims asserted against
   Davis. “[S]ince state law claims do not implicate federal rights or federal
   supremacy concerns, the Young exception does not apply to state law claims
   brought against the state.” McKinley v. Abbott, 643 F.3d 403, 406 (5th Cir.
   2011) (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). Appellees do not contest that

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   this was error. To the extent that the Plaintiffs’ claims are for violations of
   state law they are barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
                                    Conclusion
          The Plaintiffs have failed to demonstrate that they have standing to
   bring this suit and have relatedly not met their burden to proceed with their
   federal law claims under the Ex parte Young standard. Accordingly, we
   REVERSE the district court’s order and reasons and RENDER
   JUDGMENT in favor of Davis.

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