Court Opinion

ID: 9526685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:22:20.305113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:07.719449
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting in part and concurring in part: I do not agree with that part of the majority opinion which holds that the defendants are not entitled to recover compensation for damages to property not taken. I do not believe that the defendants are barred from such recovery by the deed of dedication executed by them in 1958. For an understanding of the reasons for this dissent it is necessary to amplify the statement of facts contained in the majority opinion. According to Murphy’s uncontroverted testimony, he was advised prior to the 1958 conveyance by Department negotiators that there would be a frontage road constructed on the land taken and that there would be access from the remainder of defendants’ property to the frontage road and from the frontage road to Route 120. Following the acceptance of the dedication, the Department took possession of the property, constructed the frontage road, and constructed and maintained one access point from the frontage road to Route 120 about three blocks west of the intersection. There is another access point from the frontage road to Route 120 across the land that had been dedicated by the defendants. Although the Department contends that this access point near the intersection is illegal and that it was not constructed by the State, there is no evidence to support this contention. The only evidence concerning this point of access to Route 120 was given by Murphy, who testified that the State constructed it when the frontage road was built and that the State erected a stop sign at its entrance to Route 120. In fact there were two stop signs controlling traffic in this area. One was located at the point where eastbound traffic on the frontage road entered the access point, and the other was located at the point where southbound traffic on the access point entered Route 120. Murphy also testified that the State had continuously maintained the access point, had constructed curbs in the area and had provided a break in the lane divider on Route 120 so that eastbound traffic on that highway could enter the access point from the south. All access to Route 43 was eliminated except over the frontage road by going north several blocks to Washington Street and then east to an interchange at the intersection of Washington Street and Route 43. As noted above, prior to the 1958 taking, defendants’ property had direct access to Route 120 on the south and to Route 43 on the east. There were several east-west and north-south streets which ran through the defendants’ property and intersected these highways. A tavern, restaurant, laundry room, outside toilets, about 15 mobile homes and six or seven cabins were located on the property conveyed to the State. The property was in a prime location at a busy intersection, and consequently the rights of access to the highways were valuable. Without the frontage road and access points which Murphy testified the State had agreed to construct and which the State did in fact construct, the remainder of the defendants’ property would have been virtually landlocked and its value drastically reduced. The deed of dedication does not disclose what part, if any, of the payment of $125,000 for this conveyance was allocated for the relinquishment of the access rights. In view of the apparent substantial value of the property taken, a significant part of the consideration must have been compensation for the property taken. Following the 1958 conveyance the State applied the property it had acquired to the accomplishment of a public purpose, the construction of a frontage road and access points to Highway 120. By virtue of this construction by the State the lands abutting the frontage road, the defendants’ land included, acquired certain benefits from and its value was affected by the public purpose project. In 3 Nichols, The Law of Eminent Domain (rev. 3d ed.) sec. 8.6203 [3], at 77, it is stated: “When a street is laid out through a large tract of land, the value of the remaining land may be enhanced by its newly acquired frontage upon a public street and by the increased accessibility.” Also, in 1 L. Orgel, Valuation Under The Law of Eminent Domain (2d ed. 1953), sec. 104, at 443, it is stated: “While the decisions of the courts are not in accord on the question whether an enhancement in value caused by the very improvement for which the land is taken should be considered, they would probably all agree that an increase in value of land resulting from a prior and separate improvement should be allowed. Thus, if there is an anticipated rise in value because of a projected street on which the property will front, and if this land is subsequently taken for park purposes, its enhanced value by reason of the anticipated benefits to result from the projected street improvement will be allowed.” See also McChristy v. Hall County (Tex. Civ. App. 1940), 140 S.W.2d 576; Louisiana Highway Com. v. Merchant (La. App. 1937), 174 So. 696. The relinquishment of access rights by the defendants in 1958 related to the rights their property then possessed. Following the construction of the frontage road and the access points the defendants’ property received certain benefits from that construction and acquired certain rights in relation thereto that it did not have in 1958, namely, access rights in relation to the frontage road. There is no indication in this record that the present highway improvement project is a continuation of or related to the 1958 project. The property rights taken now must therefore be compensated for as their values have been enhanced or diminished by the 1958 project. Also the rights for which the defendants must be compensated are those rights that existed in 1972 after the completion of the 1958 project, including the right of access to the frontage road. The responsibility for an accurate description of the rights of access to be taken rests on the condemnor, not on the property owner or the court. (Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Finks (1956), 10 Ill.2d 20, 25.) Therefore, if the language in the 1958 deed were found to be ambiguous and subject to several constructions, we would be compelled to construe the deed against the State-condemnor. However, I find that the language of the deed is unambiguous and clearly releases only those rights which defendants then had and does not purport to relinquish any rights their property may acquire by virtue of the completion of the project for which the conveyance was made. The State contends that the conversations between Murphy and the State’s negotiators should not have been admitted since the negotiators’ statements could not bind the State. Even if it is assumed, arguendo, that this is correct and that defendants could not have compelled the construction of the frontage road, the fact remains that the frontage road was constructed as a part of the 1958 project. In the subsequent development of their property, the defendants relied for 14 years on the existence and maintenance of this frontage road. The State’s liability is not predicated on the words of its negotiators, but on the overt acts of the Department in constructing and maintaining this public way and its access points. This conclusion does not involve the principle of estoppel. This is only a recognition that following the construction of a public purpose project, affected property assumes its character, value and rights in relation to or as affected by that project. This court has recently stated that a property owner suffers compensable damages if his direct access to an abutting street is completely eliminated, and cases “have consistently indicated that a property owner has a valuable property right of access to streets adjoining his property which cannot be taken away or materially impaired without just compensation.” (Department of Public Works and Buildings v. Wilson and Co., 62 Ill.2d-131, 139.) Therefore, the elimination of the frontage road adjoining defendants’ property and its access to Route 120 substantially affects the value of the remainder of defendants’ property and requires compensation by the State. After access to Route 120 over the frontage road has been extinguished, access to that highway from the defendants’ property will be oyer a proposed extension of an existing east-west street which is about 300 feet north of Route 120. Travel from the defendants’ property will be west over the proposed extension several blocks to Kenilworth Avenue, thence south to an interchange permitting access to Route 120. Defendants’ witnesses testified that this circuitous route will destroy the commercial value of the defendants’ property. We held in Wilson and Co. that the substitution of a frontage road for previously existing direct access does not preclude an award for compensation but instead is a fact to be considered in determining the extent of damage. This rationale likewise applies to the facts in this case. There is no dispute here as to the State’s power to extinguish access rights (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 121, par. 8 — 102), but I cannot ignore the mandate that “[w] hen property is damaged by the closing of any public way, the damage shall be ascertained and paid as provided by law.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 121, par. 8 — 106. In summary, I believe that no rights of access to the frontage road were released by the 1958 deed and that the closing of this public way gives rise to a statutory duty of the State to compensate for damages to the adjoining property of defendants. I concur with the majority that in an eminent domain case it is proper to predicate value on a present capacity for future commercial use, and I also concur that in an eminent domain proceeding the broad scope of discovery set forth in Rule 201(b) should be available to both parties. KLUCZYNSKI and GOLDENHERSH, JJ., join in this partial dissent and partial concurrence.