Court Opinion

ID: 9915617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 22:03:03.694462+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:17:32.124933
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2024 IL App (3d) 230087-U

                                  Order filed January 5, 2024
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                      IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                       2024

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                         )     Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                          )     of the 13th Judicial Circuit,
                                                         )     Grundy County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                         )
                                                         )     Appeal No. 3-23-0087
             v.                                          )     Circuit No. 20-CF-315
                                                         )
      GRZEGORZ MICHALIK,                                 )     Honorable
                                                         )     Gary A. Dobbs,
             Defendant-Appellant.                        )     Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Holdridge and Albrecht concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: The evidence presented was sufficient to prove defendant guilty beyond a
                  reasonable doubt.

¶2          Defendant, Grzegorz Michalik, appeals from his conviction for improper passing of an

     emergency vehicle causing injury to another. Defendant contends the State failed to prove him

     guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, arguing there was no evidence presented establishing that the

     collision caused injury to another. We affirm.
¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶4          Defendant was charged by indictment with improper passing of an emergency vehicle

     causing injury to another (625 ILCS 5/11-907(c) (West 2020)). The charges stemmed from a May

     22, 2020, collision where defendant was alleged to have been operating a motor vehicle and

                    “failed to yield the right-of-way, exercise due caution, change lanes, reduce speed,

                    or leave a safe distance to multiple authorized emergency vehicles displaying

                    flashing emergency lights and struck a tow truck operator while he was engaged in

                    his duties and wearing reflective clothing, resulting in the injury of James Harsh,

                    the tow truck operator.”

     A bench trial was held on August 15, 2022.

¶5          Relevant to this appeal, Harsh testified that shortly before midnight on May 22, 2020,

     Illinois State police had called him to the scene of an accident on Interstate 80. Upon arrival, Harsh

     and Scott Mitchell located a disabled vehicle in the center median. After beginning to tow the

     disabled vehicle, they found that it needed to be adjusted to avoid striking “the snatch block.”

     Harsh exited the tow truck to complete the adjustments. As he was climbing back into the cab of

     the tow truck, it was struck. Harsh remembered seeing the trailer come off a semi-truck and slide

     through the median, stopping in the westbound lanes. The semi-truck stopped in the median. Harsh

     heard Mitchell screaming his name. Harsh recounted that he “kept telling [Mitchell] [he] was fine.

     *** And then [he] asked [Mitchell], *** how bad is it? [Mitchell] goes, it’s totaled, meaning the

     tow truck was totaled.”

¶6          Harsh refused medical treatment on the night of the collision. He indicated he believed he

     was fine at the time but began to experience pain the next day and went to the hospital for medical

     attention. The parties entered the following stipulation into the record:

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                    “The stipulation is a *** CAT scan, *** from Morris Hospital. And it is dated 5-

                    24-20. And it reads: Acute fracture to the bilateral lamina at C5 and C6. A tiny

                    fracture fragment is present at the C6 left lamina fracture. This extends three

                    millimeters anterior/medial. May slightly impinge on the central spinal canal/thecal

                    *** sac.”

¶7          Mitchell testified he accompanied Harsh to help with a collision on Interstate 80. He stood

     on the side of the road in reflective gear and waved his arms to get people to move into the right

     lane, further from the tow truck. The tow truck had its amber beacon lights activated. Mitchell

     observed a sedan and a semi-truck approximately one mile away, driving toward them in the left

     lane. After half of a mile, the sedan moved to the right lane and passed safely. Mitchell continued

     to attempt to get the driver of the semi-truck to change lanes, but they did not. Mitchell jumped to

     the center median and observed “the front end of the flatbed get ripped off and the semi continue.”

¶8          Illinois State Trooper Miguel Vega testified defendant was the driver of the semi-truck

     involved in the collision. A video recording from Vega’s dashboard camera was admitted into

     evidence. The video recorded defendant informing Vega he had been cut off by another vehicle.

¶9          Defendant testified he was driving in the right lane of Interstate 80, pulling a trailer with a

     20-ton load. He was traveling at a speed of 67 or 68 miles per hour until he noticed an accident

     approximately two miles ahead. After observing the lights of the accident, defendant remained in

     the right lane and reduced his speed to 62 or 63 miles per hour. Defendant indicated a car passed

     him, moved to the right lane ahead of him, and stopped suddenly. Defendant swerved into the left

     lane to avoid striking the car. He testified that moving to the left lane “was the only way not to kill

     that driver. With that load, if [he] drove into the car, he would have died.” Upon swerving into the

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       left lane, defendant’s trailer was “thrown to the side,” and he entered the median and struck the

       tow truck.

¶ 10          The court found defendant guilty. In its ruling, the court stated: “I do find, by reason of the

       stipulation, that as a result of the impact of the trailer to the tow truck, that Mr. Harsh did sustain

       injuries.” Defendant was sentenced to 24 months of conditional discharge. Defendant appealed.

¶ 11                                              II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12          On appeal, defendant argues the State failed to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt

       of improper passing of an emergency vehicle causing injury to another where it failed to

       demonstrate the collision caused injury to Harsh. Defendant contends the court erred in finding

       defendant stipulated to causing the injuries recorded in Harsh’s May 24, 2020, CAT scan results

       and that no evidence was presented that Harsh was injured in the collision.

¶ 13          To convict defendant of improper passing of an emergency vehicle causing injury to

       another, the State needed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, (1) defendant drove a vehicle on a

       highway with at least two lanes; (2) while driving, defendant approached a statutorily authorized

       emergency vehicle which displayed alternately flashing amber lights; (3) defendant “failed to

       proceed with due caution, reduce the speed of the vehicle, *** yield the right-of-way by making a

       lane change ***,” or otherwise proceed until he was able to safely pass the authorized emergency

       vehicle; and (4) in doing so, defendant caused injury to another person. Illinois Pattern Jury

       Instructions, Criminal, No. 23.80 (approved Jan. 28, 2022). Defendant’s arguments concern only

       the final factor, whether he caused injury to another person due to his collision with the tow truck.

       Accordingly, defendant has forfeited any additional arguments concerning the remaining factors

       of the offense. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and

       shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.”).

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¶ 14          In a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, the relevant inquiry is “whether, after

       viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could

       have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis in original.)

       Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). It is not the function of the reviewing court to retry

       defendant. People v. Smith, 185 Ill. 2d 532, 541 (1999). All reasonable inferences in favor of the

       State are allowed but unreasonable or speculative inferences are not permissible. People v.

       Cunningham, 212 Ill. 2d 274, 280 (2004). “[I]n weighing evidence, the trier of fact is not required

       to disregard inferences which flow normally from the evidence before it, nor need it search out all

       possible explanations consistent with innocence and raise them to a level of reasonable doubt.”

       People v. Jackson, 232 Ill. 2d 246, 281 (2009). “A conviction will be reversed only where the

       evidence is so unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory that it justifies a reasonable doubt of

       the defendant’s guilt.” People v. Belknap, 2014 IL 117094, ¶ 67.

¶ 15          Relevant to this appeal, the evidence demonstrated that Harsh was climbing into the cab of

       the tow truck when it was struck with great force by defendant’s semi-truck. In the immediate

       aftermath of the crash, Harsh assured Mitchell he was fine but indicated he was in pain the next

       day. Harsh sought medical attention at the hospital shortly after the collision and had a CAT scan

       performed. The results indicated Harsh had suffered vertebral fractures. The evidence that Harsh

       sought medical attention on May 24, 2020, and the extent of his injuries was entered by stipulation.

¶ 16          Initially, defendant argues the court erred in finding he stipulated that Harsh’s injuries were

       the result of the collision. “A finding is against the manifest weight of the evidence only if the

       opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the finding itself is unreasonable, arbitrary, or not based

       on the evidence.” People v. Sanchez, 2021 IL App (3d) 170410, ¶ 25. The court indicated it found

       Harsh was injured because of the collision “by reason of the stipulation” without any further

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       elaboration. The stipulated evidence, that Harsh sought medical attention shortly after the collision

       and sustained spinal fractures, coupled with Harsh’s location at the time of the collision and the

       force with which defendant’s semi-truck struck the tow truck, is sufficient to support a reasonable

       inference that his injuries were caused by the May 22, 2020, collision. Thus, we hold the court’s

       finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 17          Next, defendant argues no evidence was presented to show the collision caused Harsh’s

       injuries. Defendant contends the State’s evidence is incomplete and, if Harsh were injured because

       of the collision, there would be direct testimony to that fact. Defendant contends the court may not

       “fill in the gaps in the evidence to support a conviction.” People v. Harmon, 2012 IL App (3d)

       110297, ¶ 17. It is true the court may not speculate or draw unreasonable inferences; however, it

       is well established that reasonable inferences are permissible and may support a conviction. See

       People v. Newton, 2018 IL 122958, ¶¶ 24-28. Based on the evidence before the court, that (1) the

       collision occurred shortly before midnight, (2) the next day Harsh felt pain, (3) shortly thereafter,

       Harsh sought medical attention, receiving scans which revealed broken vertebrae, we find the

       inference that Harsh’s injuries were caused by the collision to be reasonable and flowed from the

       evidence presented at trial. Accordingly, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable

       to the State, we conclude the evidence presented was sufficient to sustain defendant’s conviction

       for improper passing of an emergency vehicle causing injury to another.

¶ 18                                           III. CONCLUSION

¶ 19          For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Grundy County.

¶ 20          Affirmed.

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