Court Opinion

ID: 9944979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 19:02:44.851427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:12.004951
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

STATE OF DELAWARE,                   )
                                     )
           Plaintiff,                )
     v.                              )    Case No. 2203013250
                                     )
                                     )
                                     )
ISAIAH BOYKIN,                       )
                                     )
           Defendant.                )

                         Submitted: February 6, 2024
                         Decided: February 26, 2024

                    On Defendant’s Motion for Speedy Trial;

                                   Denied.

                 MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

William H. Leonard, Esq. and Thomas J. Williams, Esq. of the Department of
Justice, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

Raymond D. Armstrong, Esq., Attorney for Defendant.

WINSTON, J.
I.    INTRODUCTION

      Defendant, Isaiah Boykin, moves to dismiss all charges against him for

violation of his right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment to the United

States Constitution and Article 1, Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution. The State

argues that the delay is equally attributable to both the State and Mr. Boykin. For

the following reasons, Mr. Boykin’s Motion for Speedy Trial is DENIED.

II.   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Mr. Boykin was arrested on April 7, 2022, then indicted on August 15, 2022,

on charges of Burglary First Degree, Attempted Robbery First Degree, Conspiracy

Second Degree, Possession of a Firearm During the Commission of a Felony,

Possession of a Firearm by a Person Prohibited, Kidnapping First Degree, Assault

Second Degree, and Terroristic Threatening.1

      The Scheduling Order in this case was issued on October 25, 2022, which

established the following deadlines: First Case Review: November 21, 2022; Final

Case Review: March 6, 2023, and Trial: March 20, 2023.2 On March 9, 2023, the

State filed a joint continuance request due to co-defendant counsel’s conflict with

the March 20, 2023 trial date.3 The parties requested trial be continued to May 22,

1
  See Superior Court Criminal Docket, case 2203013250, Docket Item (“D.I. __”) 4.
2
  D.I. 8.
3
  D.I. 16.
                                        2
2023.4 The Court approved the request, and trial was rescheduled for May 22, 2023.5

      On May 10, 2023, the State proposed Detective Skrobot, the officer who

conducted the search warrant, testify out of turn for medical reasons.6 Subsequently,

on May 22, 2023, the State filed a trial continuance request due to the unavailability

of the State’s witness, Detective Skrobot. Prior to requesting the continuance, the

State suggested to Mr. Boykin’s counsel that Detective Skrobot’s testimony be

admitted through the Chief Investigation Officer.7 Mr. Boykin did not agree to the

State’s proposal but did not oppose the State’s continuance request. Trial was then

rescheduled for September 11, 2023, despite the State informing the Court that

Detective Skrobot would not be available on the proposed trial date.8 Although

Detective Skrobot was unavailable to testify in-person, the State proposed that

Detective Skrobot testify remotely.9 Mr. Boykin opposed.10 The State, then filed

another trial continuance request and requested a specially assigned judge for

scheduling purposes.11 Mr. Boykin did not oppose the State’s requests.12

4
  Id.
5
  D.I. 19.
6
   State’s Response at Ex. A. Detective Skrobot’s wife was expecting a baby the
week of trial. Id.
7
  Id.
8
  D.I. 25 and State’s Response at Ex. C.
9
  See State’s Response at 3.
10
   Id.
11
   D.I. 26.
12
   See State’s Response at 4.
                                         3
       On August 31, 2023, this judge was assigned and on October 19, 2023, an in-

person scheduling conference was held.13 Based on the availability of all parties,

trial was set for March 4, 2024.14 During the scheduling conference, Mr. Boykin’s

counsel stated that he would file a motion for speedy trial.15 The Court asked if Mr.

Boykin previously raised his speedy trial rights, and his counsel stated he had not.16

III.   STANDARD OF REVIEW

       The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides: “[i]n

all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public

trial….”17 The Constitution of the State of Delaware provides a nearly identical

right.18 A defendant’s speedy trial rights attach upon the date of his arrest or

indictment, whichever occurs first.19 To determine whether a defendant has been

deprived of his right to a speedy trial, four factors must be considered: (i) the length

of delay; (ii) the reason for delay; (iii) the defendant’s assertion of their right; and

(iv) the prejudice to the defendant (the “Barker factors”).20 No individual factor is

13
   D.I. 28.
14
   D.I. 29.
15
   D.I. 28 and 30.
16
   D.I. 28.
17
   U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
18
   DEL. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused hath a right ...
to have ... a speedy and public trial....”).
19
   Brodie v. State, 2009 WL 188855, at *3 (Del. Jan. 26, 2009) (quoting Middlebrook
v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002)).
20
   Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).
                                             4
conclusive.21 Instead, the four factors are related “and must be considered together

with such other circumstances as may be relevant.”22 Thus, in weighing the factors,

courts must engage in a “difficult and sensitive balancing process,”23 weighing “the

conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant.”24 The Court will examine each

factor in turn.

IV.    ANALYSIS

       A.     Length of Delay

       Mr. Boykin contends that the almost two-year delay between his arrest and

scheduled trial violates his constitutional right to a speedy trial; therefore, the only

remedy is to dismiss all charges currently pending.25 Until the length of delay is

determined to be “presumptively prejudicial,” it is unnecessary to consider the

additional Barker factors.26 The Delaware Supreme Court has previously held that

“if the delay between arrest or indictment and trial approaches [or surpasses] one

year, then the Court will generally consider the additional factors.27 Mr. Boykin was

21
   Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at
533).
22
   Id.
23
   Barker, 407 U.S. at 533.
24
   Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 273 (Del. 2002) (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at
530).
25
   D.I. 30.
26
   Rivera v. State, 292 A.3d 111 WL 1978878 (Del. 2023) (citing Barker, 407 U.S.
at 530).
27
   Cooper v. State, 2011 WL 6039613, at *7 (Del. 2011).
                                        5
arrested on April 7, 2022, and due to scheduling conflicts with his co-defendant’s

counsel and the State’s witness, the trial has been continued to March 4, 2024. The

State concedes that the length of delay is presumptively prejudicial. Due to the

almost two-year delay in this matter, this factor weighs in favor of Mr. Boykin and

this Court will consider the remaining Barker factors.

      B.     Reason for the Delay

      The Delaware Supreme Court has stated that “different weights are assigned

to different reasons for the delay.”28 “A deliberate attempt to delay [] trial in order

to hamper the defense should be weighted heavily against the government.”29 More

neutral reasons, however, should be weighted less heavily, but still considered since

the ultimate responsibly for such circumstances must rest with the government. 30 A

valid reason, such as the disappearance or illness of an important witness, or an event

over which the prosecution has no control supports an appropriate rescheduling of

the proceedings.31

      Here, the first delay was the result of a joint continuance request due to a

scheduling conflict with Mr. Boykin’s co-defendant’s counsel. Accordingly, both

sides were responsible for the first delay. Two months lapsed between the first

28
   Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 274 (Del. 2022); See also, Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972).
29
   Barker, 407 U.S. at 531 (citations omitted).
30
   Id. at 531.
31
   Key v. State, 463 A.2d 633, 636 (Del. 1983).
                                          6
scheduled trial date and the second scheduled trial date. Three months lapsed

between the second scheduled trial date and the third scheduled trial date. The

second and third delays were the result of an unavailable State witness. Mr. Boykin

did not oppose either delay. Before the second delay, however, the State attempted

to cure its witness unavailability issue by proposing the Chief Investigating Officer

testify in place of the unavailable witness. Mr. Boykin objected. Before the third

trial continuance request, the State again attempted to cure its witness unavailability

issue by having the witness testify remotely. Mr. Boykin opposed. The true impetus

for the third delay is more attributable to Mr. Boykin rather than the State. The State

was prepared to go forward with trial on September 11, 2023, but Mr. Boykin

opposed, which required the trial to be moved. Mr. Boykin cannot prolong the

matter then claim infringement on his right to a speedy trial.

      After the instant case was specially assigned, the parties agreed on the current

trial date. The five-month delay between the third trial date and the current trial date

is attributable to the Court and parties’ availability for trial. As there was no attempt

by the State to hamper Mr. Boykin’s defense, this factor will not be heavily

weighted. Nonetheless, this factor weighs in favor of Mr. Boykin.

      C.     Assertion of the Right to a Speedy Trial

      The Delaware Supreme Court has explained that “the defendant’s assertion of

his speedy trial right … is entitled to strong evidentiary weight in determining

                                           7
whether the defendant is being deprived of the right.”32 “If and when a defendant

asserts his rights are factors of considerable significance in determining whether

there has been a speedy trial violation.”33

      Mr. Boykin did not assert his right to a speedy trial, either directly or

inferentially, until the scheduling conference with the Court on October 19, 2023.34

At the scheduling conference, Mr. Boykin’s counsel advised the Court that he

intended to file a motion for speedy trial.

      Mr. Boykin’s initial assertion came more than eighteen months from the date

of his arrest. During those eighteen months, Mr. Boykin could have asserted his

right at any time during the pendency of the case. This does not mean that Mr.

Flowers has forfeited his right to a speedy trial. Instead, his failure to assert that

right at an earlier time and acquiesce to the continuance requests weigh against him.

Therefore, this factor weighs in favor of the State.

      D.     Prejudice Resulting to the Defendant from the Delay

      The fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. “This factor should be

assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the speedy trial right was

designed to protect.”35     Those interests as: (i) preventing oppressive pretrial

32
   Id.
33
   Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d at 275 (citing Bailey v. State, 521 A.2d 1075 (Del.
1987).
34
   D.I. 28.
35
   Barker, 407 U.S. at 532.
                                          8
incarceration; (ii) minimizing anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) limiting

the possibility that the defense will be impaired.36 The most serious of these interests

being the last, “because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case

skews the fairness of the entire system.”37

      Mr. Boykin contends that due to his pretrial incarceration, he has lost

employment and housing, is experiencing stress and anxiety stemming from the

charges, and the delays may impair his defense.38 Mr. Boykin has been incarcerated

for almost two years. Except for the last few months, this time can be attributed to

continuance requests sought by the State, one of which Mr. Boykin joined and the

other two he did not oppose. Mr. Boykin’s own silence suggests that he did not

suffer oppressive pretrial incarceration, or any undue anxiety related to the delay.

Additionally, the Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that all defendants face

some degree of anxiety while awaiting trial, whether incarcerated or not.39 This does

not constitute prejudice unless the defendant shows excessive concern or anxiety.40

Mr. Boykin has presented no evidence that he has suffered an unusual amount of

anxiety or prejudice due of the delay. Finally, Mr. Boykin’s statement that his

36
   Id.
37
   Id.
38
   D.I. 30.
39
   Fensterer v. State, 493 A.2d at 966-67; Stovall, 1998 WL 138931, at *4.
40
   Id.; Rodriguez, 2021 WL 1221461, at *6; see also Cooper, 2011 WL 6039613
(“The second interest does not weigh in Cooper’s favor, as Cooper has not alleged
excessive concern or anxiety”).
                                          9
defense may be impaired by the delays does not satisfy the fourth Barker factor.

Indeed, due to the unopposed continuances, Mr. Boykin has had additional time to

prepare for his upcoming trial. Mr. Boykin has not shown that the delays caused or

will cause any impairment to his defense. Therefore, this last factor weighs in favor

of the State.

V.    CONCLUSION

      After carefully analyzing and balancing the Barker factors, the Court finds

Mr. Boykin’s right to a speedy trial has not been violated. The third and fourth

factors outweigh the first two factors. Importantly, the State has not attempted to

hamper Mr. Boykin’s defense, and Mr. Boykin did not assert any objections to the

three continuance requests. Mr. Boykin’s Motion for Speedy Trial is therefore

DENIED.

      IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                    /s/ Patricia A. Winston
                                                   Judge Patricia A. Winston

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