Court Opinion

ID: 9380185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 16:08:49.140469+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:23.252265
License: Public Domain

J-S01017-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: S.R.S, A           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
                                        :
 APPEAL OF: C.M.                        :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :   No. 1070 WDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2022,
              in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
               Civil Division at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000030-2022.

 IN THE INTEREST OF: Z.S., A            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
                                        :
 APPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER                :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :   No. 1071 WDA 2022

            Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2022,
          in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
          Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000029-2022.

 IN THE INTEREST OF: L.S., A MINOR      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                        :
 APPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER                :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :
                                        :   No. 1072 WDA 2022
J-S01017-23

                Appeal from the Order Entered August 22, 2022,
              in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
              Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000031-2022.

BEFORE:      BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                      FILED: March 17, 2023

        In this consolidated matter, C.M. (Mother) appeals the orders entered

by the Allegheny County Orphans’ Court, which involuntarily terminated her

rights to her three daughters, Z.S. (age 5), S.R.S. (age 4), and L.S. (age 22

months), pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5),

(8); (b).1 After careful review, we affirm.

        In its thorough Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court set forth

the following procedural and factual history:

           Z.S. was born [in January] 2017. S.[R.]S. was born [in
           March] 2018. In the summer of 2020, [the Allegheny
           County Office of Children, Youth, and Families (OCYF)] had
           some contact with the family regarding allegations of
           substance abuse by the parents and inadequate medical
           care for the Children. It is unclear to the court whether the
           family was offered services at that time. [In October 2020],
           OCYF received another referral because Mother tested
           positive for opiates and methadone at the time of L.S.’s
           birth. Based upon L.S.’s neonatal exposure to methadone,
           she had to be admitted to the Newborn Intensive Care Unit
           (NICU) at Children’s Hospital of Pittsburgh. On October 4th,
           2020, OCYF caseworkers met with the parents and Mother
           admitted to using heroin throughout her pregnancy. OCYF
           referred Mother to the POWER [(Pennsylvania Organization
           for Women in Early Recovery)] Program to undergo a drug
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1The orphans’ court also terminated the rights of B.S. (Father), who did not
appeal.

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       and alcohol evaluation. Mother completed a drug and
       alcohol assessment on October 5th, 2020 and was
       recommended to attend in-patient treatment.          Shortly
       thereafter, Mother was admitted to UPMC McKeesport
       Hospital’s Inpatient Rehabilitation program for a detox and
       in-patient treatment. On that same day, OCYF obtained an
       Emergency Custody Authorization (ECA) for Z.S. and
       S.[R.]S. and the Children were removed from their parent’s
       care.

       On October 20th, 2020, Z.S. and S.[R.]S. were placed in the
       foster home of [the Foster Family]. On October 21st, 2020,
       L.S. was released from the hospital. OCYF obtained an ECA
       on her that same day and she was also placed in [the same]
       foster home.      On October 26th, 2020, Mother was
       successfully discharged from her inpatient treatment
       program at UPMC McKeesport. Mother was recommended
       to continue her treatment through an intensive outpatient
       program.

       On November 17th, 2020, the court adjudicated the Children
       dependent. The Court ordered them to remain in placement
       with the [Foster Family]. Mother was ordered to engage in
       an appropriate level of drug and alcohol treatment, comply
       with random screens, attend a parenting program, and to
       attend the Children’s medical appointments. Mother’s visits
       were ordered to be supervised.

       A Permanency Hearing was held on February 18th, 2021.
       The court ordered the Children to remain in placement with
       [the Foster Family]. Mother was found to be in minimal
       compliance and to have made minimal progress toward
       alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original
       placement. The court ordered Mother to complete drug and
       alcohol treatment, attend random screens, and to attend a
       coached parenting program. The court found that Mother
       had been attending her methadone maintenance program
       but had not been attending random urine screens. During
       this reporting period, it was discovered that S.[R.]S. had
       twenty-three cavities. S.[R.]S. had dental surgery on March
       30th, 2021, to address the cavities.

       A Permanency Hearing was held on May 13th, 2021. The
       court ordered the Children to remain in their placement with
       the [Foster Family]. The court found that Mother had made

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       minimal compliance. During this reporting period, Mother
       attended most of the Children’s medical and service
       provider appointments but was not engaged in an
       appropriate level of drug and alcohol treatment. The court
       ordered Mother to attend drug and alcohol treatment, to
       sign releases, to submit to random urine screens, and to
       participate in coached visitation.     Mother’s visits were
       ordered to remain supervised with permission to increase
       the frequency at the agreement of all parties. Mother began
       coached visitation in April of 2021.

       A Permanency Hearing was held on August 25th, 2021. The
       court ordered the Children to remain in placement with the
       [Foster Family]. The court found Mother to be minimally
       compliant and to have made minimal progress. During this
       reporting period, Mother had been compliant with her
       methadone maintenance program, had undergone an intake
       for intensive outpatient program and attended some of the
       Children’s medical appointments.

       Mother completed a POWER interview on November 15th
       2021. She was referred to Pathway to Care and Recovery
       for a full drug and alcohol assessment. A Permanency
       Hearing was held on November 18th, 2021. The court
       ordered the Children to remain in the placement of the
       [Foster Family].     The court found that Mother was
       moderately compliant but had only made minimal progress.
       Mother was compliant with her methadone maintenance
       program but was not participating in intensive outpatient
       treatment. During this reporting period, Mother had not
       attended any of the Children’s medical appointments but
       was participating in coached visitation. The court ordered
       the parents to submit to urine screens and appointed the
       foster parents as secondary medical and educational
       decision-makers.

       A Permanency Hearing was held on March 2nd, 2022. The
       court ordered the Children to remain in their placement with
       the [Foster Family]. The court found Mother to be in
       minimal compliance and to have made minimal progress.
       During this reporting period, Mother was attending her
       methadone maintenance program but was not in intensive
       outpatient treatment. She also had not competed any
       random urine screens and had not attended any medical or
       behavioral appointments for the Children. OCYF filed the

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         termination petitions on March 21, 2022. Mother underwent
         a POWER evaluation on April 12th, 2022 and was
         recommended for outpatient treatment.        Mother also
         submitted a urine screen, the evaluation, and the results
         were indicative of relapse.

         Dr. Patricia Pepe was the court-ordered psychologist
         assigned to evaluate the family for the Dependency and
         Termination matters. As part of the evaluation process,
         Mother was expected to undergo an individual psychological
         evaluation and an interactional evaluation with the Children.
         Mother failed to appear for an individual evaluation on April
         20th, May 19th, and June 8th of 2022. During Mother’s
         interactional evaluation on May 24th, 2022, Dr. Pepe
         reported that Mother positively engaged with the Children
         and had a good understanding of each of the Children’s
         developmental functioning. Dr. Pepe opined that Mother
         exhibited positive and appropriate parenting skills.
         However, Dr. Pepe expressed concerns over Mother’s
         inability to meet her court-ordered goals and what appeared
         to be an “eleventh hour” attempt to gain compliance. Dr.
         Pepe found this troubling as the Children had been in care
         for eighteen months.

         Dr. Pepe also conducted an interactional evaluation with the
         Children and the Foster Parents. Dr. Pepe reported that the
         Children were thriving in their foster home and appeared to
         be receiving excellent care. She further opined that the
         Children exhibited multiple bonding behaviors suggestive of
         positive and primary attachment toward the Foster Parents.
         Dr. Pepe concluded that the Children had developed a
         primary attachment to their Foster Parents and perceived
         them as their primary and psychological parents.

Trial Court Opinion, 10/14/22 (T.C.O.) at 2-6 (citations to the record omitted).

      The orphans’ court granted the termination petitions on August 12,

2022. The court terminated Mother’s rights to each respective Child under

the same grounds – 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). Mother

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timely filed these appeals. She has submitted a consolidated Brief, presenting

the following issues for our review:

            1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
               matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily
               terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23
               Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (a)(2), (5) and (8)?

            2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
               matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of
               proving by clear and convincing evidence that
               termination of Mother’s parental rights would best
               serve the needs and welfare of the Child[ren]
               pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511 (b)?

Mother’s Brief at 10.

      We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

         The standard of review in termination of parental rights
         cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
         and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
         supported by the record. If the factual findings are
         supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
         court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
         decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
         upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
         partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's
         decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
         the record would support a different result. We have
         previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
         often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
         multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted).

      Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases,

deference to the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K.,

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265 A.3d 580, 597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d 1108,

1124 (Pa. 2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive

case involving…the termination of parental rights, the appellate court should

review the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence supports

that trial court’s conclusions; the appellate could should not search the record

for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”).

The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential

standard and, to the extent that record supports the court’s decision, we must

affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary

determination.” In re P.Z., 113 A.3d 840, 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation

omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

         Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
         seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
         evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
         grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only
         if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
         termination of his or her parental rights does the court
         engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section
         2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the
         child[.]

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

      Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re

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C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of

Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

      Critically, we may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis

exists for the result reached. C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201. We need only agree

with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well

as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.

Super. 2004) (en banc).

      Therefore, we review Mother’s first appellate issue insofar as it concerns

the termination of her rights under Section 2511(a)(2), which provides:

         (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
         child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
         following grounds:

                                      […]

         (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
         or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
         essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
         his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
         causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
         will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2).

      To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party

must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;

(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be

without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes

of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.”

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

                                     -8-
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Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt

assumption of full parental duties. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.

Super. 2010). We note that the grounds for termination are not limited to

affirmative misconduct like abuse but concern parental incapacity that cannot

be remedied. See id.

      Instantly, Mother concedes that OCYF established the first two elements

of the Section 2511(a)(2) inquiry. She recognizes that her substance abuse

rendered her incapable of providing the Children with parental care. However,

Mother maintains OCYF failed to provide the third element – that the cause of

the incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.       She cites her consistent

methadone treatment and her compliance with the other aspects of her family

service plan, including parenting and visitation goals. See Mother’s Brief at

27. She argues that she is in a better place in her life, and that it was an

abuse of discretion for the orphans’ court to find that the conditions that led

to removal have yet to be remedied. Id. at 27-28.

      Mother displayed varying levels of compliance with the reunification

plan. The record of the permanency reviews indicated that Mother was, at

times, fairly consistent when it came to participation in parenting programs,

the Children’s medical care, and visitations. It bears noting, however, that

the orphans’ court concluded that Mother was minimally compliant with her

reunification plan as a whole. In any event, as Mother and the orphans’ court

recognize, this case was first and foremost about Mother’s drug use. On that

point, the orphans’ court found:

                                     -9-
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       Mother’s substance abuse was the most significant concern
       for the family and the reason the Children were removed
       from her care. As such, drug and alcohol treatment has
       been a long-standing goal for Mother. As a part of this goal,
       she was expected to obtain sobriety, to follow through with
       drug and alcohol treatment, to continue medication assisted
       treatment of her methadone program, to submit to random
       screens and to sign releases of information. Mother has
       struggled with nearly every expectation contained within
       this goal except for her methadone maintenance program.

          FN 1: It should be noted that OCYF was unable to
          confirm Mother’s consistent participation in a methadone
          maintenance program. However, the court recognizes
          that many of these programs are not responsive to
          OCYF’s requests for records or compliance reports.

       Mother has not been in [an] appropriate level of drug and
       alcohol treatment outside the roughly two weeks she spent
       at UPMC McKeesport’s inpatient detox program in 2020.
       Upon her release from this program, she was recommended
       for intensive outpatient treatment. Mother has not followed
       through with this recommendation since it was made nearly
       two years ago. Mother reported to OCYF that she has been
       diagnosed with [Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease
       (COPD)] and identified it as a barrier for complying with her
       drug and alcohol treatment goals. Despite several requests
       from the OCYF caseworker, Mother never provided the
       agency with confirmation of this diagnosis. The court did
       not find Mother’s claims of poor health to be a legitimate
       barrier to her participation in drug and alcohol treatment
       goals. Mother chose not to engage in the appropriate level
       of drug and alcohol treatment for nearly two years despite
       it being court ordered after every single Permanency
       Hearing.

       Mother has not submitted to a single urine screen for OCYF
       during the pendency of the case, despite being called in
       thirty-four times. Mother did appear at the Allegheny Health
       Department’s Drug Screening Office five times but was
       unable to provide a urine sample. Mother reported that she
       was physically unable to produce a urine sample while in the
       presence of a female drug screener at the Health
       Department. However, she was able to produce a sample
       at her methadone clinic and at POWER. Mother reported

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         that the method of screening at these locations was different
         than at the Health Department. The Court did not find this
         to be a plausible explanation. Mother has been unable to
         substantiate her claims that she was living a drug free
         lifestyle. As recently as April of 2022, Mother provided a
         urine sample for POWER that was indicative of relapse. For
         these reasons, the court finds that Mother did not
         satisfactorily complete her drug and alcohol treatment goal.

T.C.O. at 9-11 (citations to the record omitted) (footnote original).

      Upon review, we conclude that the record supports the orphans’ court

determination that Mother was unable or unwilling to remedy her substance

abuse. Initially, we observe that a parent’s prolonged use of a prescribed

addiction medication does not necessarily mean the parent is unable or

unwilling to remedy the substance abuse issues that led to the child’s removal.

If this sort of prolonged, but prescribed, treatment continues to be essential,

courts should not construe the need for such treatment to be an automatic

bar to reunification. Although the courts may infer that the parent’s fragile

recovery poses safety concerns, the ultimate question is whether ingestion of

such medication renders the parent unable to provide essential parental care.

If a parent can provide proper care, notwithstanding the continued use an

addiction treatment drug, then it would appear that the third element of

Section 2511(a)(2) would be not be established.

      But that is not the case here. First, as the orphans’ court noted, Mother

did not provide confirmation that she was consistent with her methadone

treatment program. We appreciate the candor of orphans’ court Footnote 1,

which articulated the bureaucratic difficulty that OCYF ran into when trying to

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obtain reports from the clinic.            While parents have an obligation to

demonstrate their compliance with their reunification plan, we remind the

Agency that it has the ultimate burden of proving termination. We expect the

Agency to work with parents to overcome these bureaucratic difficulties, given

that a dependency cases typically last for many months. That said, this case

does not turn on whether Mother was consistent in a monitored methadone

treatment program.

       Instead, the orphans’ court determined that Mother’s failure to provide

drug screens was significant. Without such screens, the court could not ensure

that Mother was able to remedy her substance abuse issues and provide

essential care.     Indeed, the one screen Mother did provide, late in the

dependency case, indicated that Mother had relapsed.2          The record also

indicated that Mother had used methadone and opiates around the time of

the L.S.’s birth. Thus, to the extent that Mother maintained a methadone

regiment, it does not mean that Mother was otherwise drug-free.

       Regarding Mother’s missed drug screens, the orphans’ court was not

persuaded by Mother’s excuse that she had COPD.3            But even assuming
____________________________________________

2Confidentiality regulations prohibited the POWER witness from revealing
what drug Mother tested positive for; however, a positive test for methadone
would not constitute a relapse. See N.T., at 9; 18.

3As to whether Mother actually had COPD, our review is impeded by the lack
of documentation. On one hand, if Mother seeks to raise her condition as a
defense, she must provide documentation of the same. On the other hand,
when the goal is reunification, the Agency must make reasonable efforts to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Mother had COPD, such an ailment does not excuse her failure to provide

screens. Perhaps if Mother missed a small number of screens due to COPD

complications, we might find such an excuse reasonable. But Mother did not

provide a single drug screen until the end of the dependency proceedings.

Moreover, parents are required to make diligent efforts toward the reasonably

prompt assumption of full parental duties. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117.         The

Children were in placement for approximately 23 months.         If Mother had

physical difficulty complying with the screens, due to COPD, then special

accommodations could have been made. Evidently, Mother never brought the

matter to the attention of the court. The orphans’ court did not err when it

made a negative inference from Mother’s missed drug screens.

       In sum, the record supports the court’s determination that Mother was

unable or unwilling to remedy her substance abuse issues, because: she did

not provide screens indicating that she was negative for drugs besides her

prescribed methadone; and because she evinced a possible relapse; and to a

lesser degree, because she could not verify her consistent participation in the

methadone program. Thus, the court did not err or abuse its discretion when

____________________________________________

overcome these types of obstacles. Although Mother signed some releases,
the record is unclear whether Mother signed a release enabling OCYF to find
out Mother’s exact medical history.

We emphasis this point, because it exemplifies the problem courts encounter
during dependency and termination proceedings. Ascertaining the best
interests of the child is difficult enough without that decision turning on
whether a party followed through with important paperwork.

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it determined that OCYF established grounds for termination under Section

2511(a)(2).

      Having discerned no error or abuse of discretion as to the first prong of

the bifurcated termination analysis, we next address the orphans’ court’s

findings under Section 2511(b), which Mother challenges in her second

appellate issue.

      The section provides:

         (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
         rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
         developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
         of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
         solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
         inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
         medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
         With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
         (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
         the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
         are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
         filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

      This Court has explained further:

         [S]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
         parental rights would best serve the developmental,
         physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
         In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005),
         this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort,
         security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the
         needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
         that the trial court must also discern the nature and status
         of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect
         on     the     child  of    permanently     severing     that
         bond. Id. However, in cases where there is no evidence of
         a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer

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         that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-63
         (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-
         effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
         the particular case. Id. at 763.

In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).

      Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists,

but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial

relationship. See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted); see also K.Z.S.,

946 A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving where the child

had been in foster care for most of the child’s life, which caused the resulting

bond to be too attenuated). Moreover, the court is not required to use expert

testimony to resolve the bond analysis. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121

(citing In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. Super. 2008)).

      “Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they

have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.     Finally, we

emphasize that “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with her and/or her child

is a major aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is

nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when

determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d

95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).

      The orphans’ court issued the following findings as part of the Section

2511(b) analysis:

         Moving to the best interests analysis, the court considered
         several factors including the safety needs of the Children,

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       the nature of the bond between the Children and Mother,
       and the relationship between the Children and their Foster
       Parents.    Mother has struggled to provide safety and
       stability during periods of supervised visitation. Multiple
       service providers have reported that Mother was unable to
       properly supervise all three Children together, even with
       Father’s help. Despite a lengthy tenure with a coached
       parenting program, Mother’s parenting abilities have not
       improved. Additionally, the court is not confident that
       Mother has been living a substance free lifestyle. She has
       never been in an appropriate level of treatment and has
       shown signs of relapse as recent as the Spring of 2022.
       Substance abuse by one or both parents significantly
       increase safety concerns for the Children living in the home.
       Based upon Mother’s inability to address her substance
       abuse concerns and her parenting deficits, the court does
       not believe that she could adequately provide a safe and
       stable environment for the Children.

       With respect to the bond between Mother and the Children,
       the court has little evidence to support the notion that one
       even exists, particularly with [the 22-month-old] L.S. as she
       does not generally seek Mother out for comfort or support.
       Dr. Pepe opined that L.S. appears largely indifferent to
       Mother. The older girls do have a level of comfortability with
       Mother and do appear to enjoy their visits with her.
       However, they do not view her as their psychological parent
       and do not have a primary attachment to her. To the
       contrary, the Children appear to have a very strong bond
       with their Foster Parents. Dr. Pepe reported that the
       Children exhibited multiple bonding behaviors suggestive of
       primary attachment to the Foster Parents and appeared
       genuinely happy in their presence. She further opined that
       the Children would seek them out for assistance and viewed
       them as psychological parents. The former and current case
       managers [for a service provider] reported that the Children
       appeared happy in their foster home. OCYF caseworker,
       Rick Ogden, reported that the Children were doing “really
       well” and were bonded with their foster parents. The foster
       parents have been a great source of support for the Children
       and have been involved in all their services and activities.
       The Children have been in their care since October of 2020
       and Dr. Pepe opined that [the Children] would be at

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         significant risk for psychological problems if they were
         removed from the foster home.

         In any termination case, the court must consider the effects
         of severing the bond between parent and child and whether
         it is in the child’s best interests. In this case, the court finds
         that the bond between the Children and Mother is not
         beneficial or necessary and that the Children would not
         suffer irreparable harm if their relationship with Mother
         ceased. The court recognizes that there would be likely
         some [discord] but believes that the Foster Parents could
         provide the support needed to overcome any negative
         impact from termination.           Dr. Pepe shared a similar
         sentiment, opining that the Foster Parents’ strong bond and
         commitment to the Children would help to mitigate any
         issues resulting from the termination of Mother’s parental
         rights. For these reasons, the court found that terminating
         Mother’s parental rights would best suit the developmental,
         physical and emotional needs and welfare of the Children.

T.C.O. at 13-15 (citations to the record omitted).

      On appeal, Mother argues that termination under Section 2511(b) was

unfounded. She cites the fact that the Children were excited and happy to

see her. Mother also notes that she is appropriate with the Children during

the visits. Mother states that she loves the Children, and her involvement

adds value to their lives. See Mother’s Brief at 32-33.

      Upon review, we first note that a parent’s own feelings of love and

affection, alone, do not prevent the termination of parental rights. Z.P., 994

A.2d at 1121. Although the Children are affable during the visits, the same

should not be confused with a beneficial or necessary parental bond. Mother’s

inability to make progress in her reunification plan meant that the Children

did not have substantive visits with Mother throughout the dependency

proceedings; Mother’s visits always remained supervised. That the Children

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have done well during the visits is a testament to the Foster Parents’ attention

to the Children’s healthy development. Thus, it comes as no surprise that the

Children consider their Foster Parents to be their primary attachments. It was

not manifestly unreasonable for the orphans’ court to find that relationship

between Mother and the Children were too attenuated. For these reasons, we

discern no error or abuse of discretion when the orphans’ court found that

termination would best serve the Children’s needs and welfare under Section

2511(b).

        In sum, the orphans’ court properly concluded that OCYF met its burden

by clear and convincing evidence that termination was warranted under

Section 2511(a)(2) and (b).

        Orders affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date:    3/17/2023

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