Court Opinion

ID: 9731750
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:57:18.260598+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:21.343485
License: Public Domain

RAKER, J.,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. Brett Evans’s request for a blood test to determine whether he is the biological father of Kendi should be granted. If the test reveals that he is the biological father, then the court should apply the “best interests of the *643child” test to determine what, if any, legal rights he should be afforded as to Kendi.
The majority holds that when a man claims to be the father of a child born while the mother was married to another man, pursuant to the Estates & Trusts Article, the court may grant his request for a blood test only upon a showing of good cause. Maj. op. at 628. In determining whether good cause exists, the court must consider the best interests of the child. Id.
I disagree for several reasons. First, in my view, “good cause,” under Rule 2-423, should be determined based upon an assessment of whether the request is material to some issue in the case. See Roberts v. Roberts, 198 Md. 299, 82 A.2d 120 (1951). Consideration of the “best interests of the child” has no place at this stage of the proceedings and comes into play only after the blood test has been performed. Second, an action to determine paternity may be brought under either Maryland Code (1984, 1999 RepLVol., 2003 Cum.Supp.) §§ 5-1001 through 5-1048 of the Family Law Article or under Maryland Code (1974, 2001 RepLVol., 2003 Cum.Supp.) §§ 1-206 and 1-208 of the Estates & Trusts Article. The Estates & Trusts Article is not the exclusive means for determining paternity but is merely an alternative means. As pointed out by Judge Eldridge in Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 121, 607 A.2d 935, 943 (1992) (Eldridge, J., dissenting), “the paternity provisions of the Family Law Article were better designed'to resolve disputes over the identity of the natural father.” This is particularly so today, following the addition of § 5-1002(c) to the Family Law Article in 1997 since Turner was decided.
Until Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. 106, 607 A.2d 935 (1992), a person in Maryland could seek a declaration of paternity under the Family Law Article or the Estates & Trusts Article. See Taxiera v. Malkus, 320 Md. 471, 578 A.2d 761 (1990). Turner arbitrarily decided that “when two men each acknowledge paternity of the same child ... an action to establish paternity is more appropriately brought under the Estates & Trusts Article,” on the ground that the Estates & Trusts Article presents the “more satisfactory” and “less traumatic” *644means of establishing paternity.1 327 Md. at 113, 607 A.2d at 939. Under Turner, upon a motion for good cause shown, the court has the discretion to order a blood test pursuant to Rule 2-423, which provides that a court may order an examination “[w]hen the mental or physical condition or characteristic of a party or of a person in the custody or under the legal control of a party is in controversy.” Id. at 113-14, 607 A.2d at 939. The Turner court held that “the determination of good cause allows the court discretion to consider the best interests of the child.” Id. at 115, 607 A.2d at 940 (emphasis added). In reality, however, the Turner court did not simply allow the court to consider the best interests of the child, but instead mandated that the court consider the best interests of the child before a blood test is ordered. Id. at 116, 607 A.2d at 940. “Good cause” simply requires that the request be material to some issue in the case. The request in this case is undeniably material to the issue in the case, that is, the paternity of Kendi.2
*645I cannot subscribe to a view that precludes the discovery of the true facts, undeniably ascertainable and reliable.3 I agree fully with the philosophy repeatedly expressed by Judge Eldridge, and articulated by him in Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 783, 621 A.2d 898, 910 (1993), that “under the majority’s approach, sometimes the most relevant facts will not be ascertained in order to prevent what a court may regard as an unsatisfactory resolution of the dispute.” To reiterate his analysis set forth in Turner:
“The majority has formulated a procedure whereby the trial court must determine the ultimate result, in order to discover whether that result is satisfactory, before it can ascertain the facts. If the court decides that it likes the predicted ultimate result, then the fact finding process continues. If the court decides that it does not like the predicted ultimate result, the process ends. I cannot subscribe to the proposition that relevant, ascertainable evidence should be excluded because it may lead to a result which the court does not like. The trial court’s conjecture over whether the result will be satisfactory should not determine whether facts relevant to that result are concealed. I simply cannot agree with the majority’s view that a government (through its courts) is entitled to determine in a particular case that one will be *646better off by the perpetuation of a falsity and the suppression of relevant, unprivileged facts.”
327 Md. at 123-24, 607 A.2d at 944.
Although the Court may think it “preferable” to bring a paternity action under the Estates & Trusts Article, the Family Law Article remains an alternate avenue to determine paternity, and as I have stated, the preferable statute. Section 5-1002(c) of the Family Law Article, which was added to the Paternity Act in 1997 by the General Assembly, states as follows:
“Establishment of Paternity. — Nothing in this subtitle may be construed to limit the right of a putative father to file a complaint to establish his paternity of a child.”
Under § 5-1029 of the Family Law Article, a putative father is entitled to a blood or genetic test to determine paternity. The “best interests” analysis plays no role in determining whether the test should be ordered. See Langston v. Riffe, 359 Md. 396, 437, 754 A.2d 389, 411 (2000).
Evans is a “putative father” under the Family Law Article, and arguably, Kendi is a child “born out of wedlock,” notwithstanding the fact that she is “legitimate.”4 Evans points out *647that “putative” fathers have far greater rights today than they enjoyed when Turner was considered because of the addition of § 5-1002(c) to the Family Law Article. Maj. op. at 629-30. Although agreeing with Evans that putative fathers have expanded rights, the majority dismisses Evans’s argument by concluding that “the expanded rights to which he refers do not apply to individuals in his position.” Id.
The majority adopts the reasoning of the court set out in Stubbs v. Colandrea, 154 Md.App. 673, 841 A.2d 361 (2004) in dismissing Evans’ claim. See maj. op. at 632-34. Using Black’s Law Dictionary as the definitive source, bolstered by the stated purpose of the Paternity Act and the legislative history of § 5-1002(c), the Stubbs court construed the term “putative father” in § 5-1002(c) to mean a person who has fathered a child out of wedlock. 154 Md.App. at 684, 841 A.2d at 367. The Stubbs court then interpreted “a child born out of wedlock” to refer only to a child born to an unwed mother and denied that a man who claims to be the father of a child while the mother is married to another man has rights under § 5-1002(c) to bring a paternity suit. Id. at 689, 841 A.2d at 370.
Although the primary impetus for the enactment of § 5-1002(c) of the Family Law Article may have been to implement the federal mandate requiring each state to have in effect laws to increase the effectiveness of child support enforcement, that is not the exclusive purpose of the statute. The Bill Analysis of Senate Bill 636 sets out eleven changes effectuated in State law by the bill.5 Many of the changes are *648obviously designed to improve child support, such as making it mandatory to provide the social security number of each party to a marriage license, requiring court-ordered temporary support orders in certain circumstances, and changing the presumptions in paternity findings by affidavit. But expressly authorizing a putative father to file an action to establish his paternity of a child and mandating blood tests to the putative father upon request is not limited solely to improving the effectiveness of child support enforcement. Paternity proceedings are designed to protect the welfare of the child. E.R.B. v. 496 A.2d 607, 611 (D.C.App.1985). Since the primary purpose is to provide support for the child, and although Kendi at the present moment is receiving support from Wilson’s husband, there may come a time in the future when he will refuse to support the child, perhaps claiming that he is not the natural father. Moreover, there are many other *649reasons that a child may benefit from the knowledge of the identity of the biological father.
The term “putative father” is broader than the definition of the majority and the Stubbs court and includes a person claiming to be the father of a child born in an extant marriage. The United States Supreme Court and Maryland cases have used the term “putative father” to refer to a man who claims to be the father of a child born while the mother is married to another man. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 109 S.Ct. 2333, 105 L.Ed.2d 91 (1989); Sider v. Sider, 334 Md. 512, 639 A.2d 1076 (1994); Monroe v. Monroe, 329 Md. 758, 621 A.2d 898 (1993).
Further, a review of the case law from our sister states reveals that many states use the term “putative father” in this manner. For example, Kelly v. Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d 822, 825 (Minn.App.1992), discusses a paternity action under Minnesota’s Parentage Act. The intermediate appellate court referred to a man as the “putative father” who was seeking parental rights with a child who was conceived and born while the mother was married to another man. Kelly v. Cataldo, 488 N.W.2d at 828; see also Ban v. Quigley, 168 Ariz. 196, 812 P.2d 1014 (1990); R.N. v. J.M., 347 Ark. 203, 61 S.W.3d 149 (2001); In re Jonathan M., 255 Conn. 208, 764 A.2d 739 (2001); Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 234 Conn. 51, 661 A.2d 988 (1995); Preston v. Cummings, 871 So.2d 1055 (Fla.App.2004); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399 (Ind.1996); C.C. v. A.B., 406 Mass. 679, 550 N.E.2d 365 (1990); In re KH, 469 Mich. 621, 677 N.W.2d 800 (2004); Ivy v. Harrington, 644 So.2d 1218 (Miss.1994). The restrictive definition formulated by the majority is unwarranted, unsupported, and result-oriented.
The definition ascribed to “born out of wedlock” is also important. The majority and the Stubbs court simply assume that “out of wedlock” has only one meaning — a child born to an unwed mother. Courts around the country have considered the meaning of this language and have interpreted the phrase to mean either a child born to an unmarried mother or a child born to a married woman but fathered by a man other *650than the mother’s husband. See, e.g., In re Legitimation of Locklear, 314 N.C. 412, 334 S.E.2d 46, 50-51 (1985). In Locklear, the North Carolina Supreme Court considered the meaning of the phrase and concluded as follows:
“Our research indicates that the phrase, ‘born out of wedlock,’ should refer ‘of the status of the parents of the child in relation to each other.’ Pursley v. Hisch, 119 Ind.App. 232, 235, 85 N.E.2d 270, 271 (1949). A child born to a married woman, but begotten by one other than her husband, is a child ‘born out of wedlock’... Id. citing State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546 (1945). This same interpretation of the phrase is also consistent with the position taken by the Uniform Act on Paternity, § 1, 9A U.L.A. 626 (1979) (act withdrawn 1973), which states, ‘A child born out of wedlock includes a child born to a married woman by a man other than her husband.’ Finally, the Uniform Illegitimacy Act of 1922, § 1, 9 U.L.A. 391 (1942) (act withdrawn 1960) interprets the term ‘wedlock’ as referring ‘to the status of the parents of the child in relation to one another.’ S. Schatkin, I. Disputed Paternity Proceedings § 1.01, at 1-2 (rev. ed.1984). The alleged parents of Stanley Locklear, Petitioner herein and Stanley’s mother, in their relation to one another, did not acquire the status of wedlock. Thus, the minor child was ‘born out of wedlock, although his mother was married to another man, not his natural father.’ ”
Id.
Many other courts have adopted the definition of “out of wedlock” to mean a child born to an unmarried woman and one born to a married woman but having a father other than the mother’s husband. See, e.g., County of Lake v. Palla, 94 Cal.App.4th 418, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 277 (2001); Lewis v. Schneider, 890 P.2d 148 (Colo.App.1994); Estey v. Mawdsley, 3 Conn.Cir.Ct. 491, 217 A.2d 493 (1966); Wilkins v. Georgia Department of Human Resources, 255 Ga. 230, 337 S.E.2d 20 (1985); Johnson v. Studley-Preston, 119 Idaho 1055, 812 P.2d 1216 (1991); Pursley v. Hisch, 119 Ind.App. 232, 85 N.E.2d 270 (1949); Girard v. Wagenmaker, 173 Mich.App. 735, 434 *651N.W.2d 227 (1988); Martin v. Lane, 57 Misc.2d 4, 291 N.Y.S.2d 135 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1968), rev’d sub nom. on other grounds; State v. Coliton, 73 N.D. 582, 17 N.W.2d 546 (1945); Baker v. Munro, 71 Or.App. 164, 692 P.2d 126 (1984). The Idaho Supreme Court considered the meaning of the phrase, noted the common definition, and adopted the broader one. Johnson v. Studley-Preston, 119 Idaho 1055, 812 P.2d 1216 (1991). The court stated as follows:
“[The Idaho statute] 7-1103 defines ‘child born out of wedlock’ as ‘a child who is begotten and born outside of lawful matrimony.’ While this phrase has commonly been construed to mean only a child born to an unmarried mother, it is susceptible to another interpretation. Many jurisdictions have interpreted the phrase ‘child born out of wedlock’ to mean either a child born to an unmarried mother or a child born to a married woman but fathered by a man other than the mother’s husband.... We agree with the above authorities and hold that § 7-1103, which defines ‘child born out of wedlock’ as ‘a child who is begotten and born outside of lawful matrimony,’ refers to either a child born to an unmarried woman or a child born to a married woman but who was conceived by a man other than the mother’s husband. This interpretation is consistent with the remaining sections contained in the Idaho Paternity Act.”
Id. at 1219.
The term “putative father” in the Family Law Article includes a man who claims to be the biological father of a child where the mother is either unmarried or where the child was conceived by a man other than the woman’s husband. This construction is mandated not only because it is fair and makes sense, but also because it is required under the Equal Rights Amendment of the Maryland Constitution. Article 46 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, known as the Equal Rights Amendment (E.R.A.), was adopted in Maryland in 1972 and provides as follows:
“Equality of rights under the law shall not be abridged or denied because of sex.”
*652In Rand v. Rand, 280 Md. 508, 515-16, 374 A.2d 900, 904-905 (1977), this Court established that the Equal Rights Amendment forbade gender based discrimination and that the people of Maryland were fully committed to equal rights for men and women. We reiterated in Burning Tree Club, Inc. v. Bainum, 305 Md. 53, 64, 501 A.2d 817, 823 (1985), that “the E.R.A. flatly prohibits gender-based classifications, either under legislative enactments, governmental policies, or by application of common law rules, in the allocation of benefits, burdens, rights and responsibilities as between men and women.”
It is a violation of the Equal Rights Amendment if a greater burden is placed on the male biological parent to rebut the presumption of legitimacy than on the female biological parent. See R.McG. v. J.W., 200 Colo. 345, 615 P.2d 666 (1980). State statutes that employ gender-based classifications such as:
“[e]xclusive statutes, which allow the mother, husband and child to rebut the marital presumption, but deny this ability to all putative fathers do not withstand this scrutiny. First, while not immediately obvious, such statutes employ a gender-based classification____Exclusive statutes employ three classifications of persons: biological parents, presumed fathers and children. Within the biological parent classification, exclusive statutes discriminate on the basis of gender: only women may rebut the presumption.”
Traci Dallas, Rebutting the Marital Presumption: A Developed Relationship Test, 88 Columbia L.Rev. 369, 379-80 (1988). Applying the majority’s reasoning in the instant case causes the “Paternity Proceedings” subtitle of the Family Law Article to fall within the classification of an exclusive statute because it permits the biological mother to bring a suit to rebut the presumption of legitimacy, whereas it does not allow this same right to a man claiming to be the biological father. Currently, a woman can bring a paternity action under the Family Law Article to rebut the presumption that her husband is the father of her child. See Toft v. State of Nev. ex rel. Pimentel, 108 Md.App. 206, 223-224, 671 A.2d 99, 107-108 (1996). But a man claiming to be the biological father is *653required to bring a paternity action under the Estates & Trusts Article to rebut the presumption that the mother’s husband is the father of the child. See Turner, 327 Md. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938.
A man claiming to be the biological father of a child is more significantly burdened than the biological mother if he wishes to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. Section 5-1027(c) of the Family Law Article in effect permits the natural mother to seek a declaration of paternity in a man who is not her husband, and thereby undo the state’s interest in preserving family stability. Moreover, the Toft, court ruled that a mother could receive blood tests to rebut the presumption of legitimacy contained in § 5-1027(c) of the Family Law Article. 108 Md.App. at 225, 671 A.2d at 108. The Toft, court did not condition the natural mother’s right to seek a declaration of paternity and to receive blood tests on consideration of the child’s best interests. Yet, a non-spouse claiming to be the biological father is required to bring suit under the Estates & Trusts Article to establish paternity and to rebut the presumption that the mother’s husband is the father. See Turner, 327 Md. at 113, 607 A.2d at 938. Moreover, under the Estates & Trusts Article, the court will not allow the man’s request for a blood test unless and until it finds that it is in the best interests of the child to conduct the test. This leads to the biological mother securing blood tests without any qualifications, whereas the man claiming to be the biological father cannot receive the same unless the court finds that it is in the best interests of the child to grant the request for the test. This result is really no different than that found by the Colorado Supreme Court in R.McG. v. J.W., 200 Colo. 345, 615 P.2d 666, 671 (1980):
“that Section 19-6-107(1) [of Colorado’s Uniform Parentage Act] exemplifies a gender-based classification predicated on an overbroad generalization that a mother has a legitimate interest in establishing a determination of paternity in a non-spousal father, while such father has no interest in establishing a determination of paternity in himself.”
*654The ramifications of today’s decision may lead to some unfortunate results. Assume that sometime in the future, Harris, Wilson’s husband, asserts that he is not the father of Kendi and refuses to support her. Neither Kendi nor Harris were parties to this action.6 Would Wilson be permitted to bring an action against Evans? If so, why should Evans not be permitted to bring the action today? Also, if Kendi should need a bone marrow transplant or needs to ascertain genetic information for medical treatment in the future, she will have been denied the benefit of the critical genetic information that Evans is seeking to make available at this time. What happens if these scenarios arise and Evans is no longer alive? Policy and logic require that the court order the blood tests requested by Evans.

. Judge Eldridge, joined by Judge McAuliffe, concurred and dissented, on two grounds. First, Judge Eldridge disagreed with the majority's view that the Estates & Trusts Article was the better statute for resolving paternity issues. Second, on the merits, Judges Eldridge and McAuliffe held the view that the putative father was entitled to blood tests and that he did not have to establish that a declaration of paternity was in the child's best interests before blood tests should be ordered. Turner v. Whisted, 327 Md. at 118, 607 A.2d at 941 (Eldridge, J., concurring and dissenting). The dissent pointed out that:
"[t]he fact of biological parentage does not automatically entitle the natural father to visitation with his child. A determination of paternity would entitle the natural father to the presumption that the child's interests will be served by allowing the father visitation. Yet, this presumption can be rebutted when some exceptional circumstances render such custody [or visitation] detrimental to the best interests of the child."
Id. I agree with the dissent completely.

. This is not a case where a third party blithely asserts that he is the father of a child born to a married woman. Evans and Wilson had a sexual relationship, beginning in March 2001. Evans regularly spent nights at Wilson’s home, and attended a baby shower in November 2001. Evans received mail from Wilson, and his parents visited Kendi at the hospital on the day that she was born. Wilson prepared a birth announcement indicating that Evans was the father, and on Valentine’s Day, when Kendi was one month old, Wilson sent Evans a card *645identifying him as "Daddy.” Evans visited with Kendi and bought her clothes, diapers and toys.

. As pointed out by the Supreme Court of Nebraska, in B.H. v. K.D., 506 N.W.2d 368 (N.D.1993):
“The result of the test is universally accepted by distinguished scientific and medical authority. There is in fact, no living authority of repute, medical or legal, who may be cited adversely ... There is now ... practically universal and unanimous judicial willingness to give decisive and controlling evidentiary weight to a blood test exclusion of paternity.”
Id. at 382 (quoting S. Schatkin, Disputed Paternity Proceedings § 5.03 (1975)).

. First, all children are legitimate. Second, under the statutory presumption, Kendi is "legitimate,” even though there may arise competing presumptions, i.e., the statutory presumption of "legitimacy” versus the presumption that might arise if Evans is proven to be the biological father.
The Court of Appeal of Florida for the second district made a cogent distinction between legitimacy and paternity. See Daniel v. Daniel, 681 So.2d 849 (Fla.App. 1996). The court reasoned as follows:
"We believe confusion has arisen in the law because of a failure to distinguish between paternity and legitimacy. The presumption of legitimacy is one of the strongest rebuttable presumptions known in the law ... The American Heritage College Dictionary 1001 (3d ed.1993), defines paternity as 'the state of being a father; fatherhood ... a woman attempting to establish that a particular man is the father of her child ... 'Only one person can be the biological father of a child. The American Heritage College Dictionary 775 (3d ed.1993), defines legitimate as ‘being in compliance with the law; lawful ... Born to legally married parents.' Paternity and legitimacy are related concepts, but nonetheless separate and distinct concepts.”
Id. at 851-852.

. The Bill Analysis of Senate Bill 636 sets out the changes to State law that are included in the bill as follows:
"Making it mandatory, rather than voluntary, for an applicant for a marriage license to give the social security number of each party;
• Expressly authorizing a putative father to file an action to establish his paternity of a child;
• Eliminating an alleged father’s right to a jury trial in a paternity action;
• Establishing that an affidavit of parentage constitutes a legal finding of paternity, rather than a rebuttable presumption;
• Allowing a legal finding of paternity established by affidavit to be set aside only if it is rescinded within 60 days or, after the expiration of *648the 60-day period, the party challenging it proves that the affidavit was executed because of fraud, duress, or a material mistake of fact;
• Authorizing the Child Support Enforcement Administration (CSEA) to require any individual to submit to blood or genetic tests to determine paternity;
• Making written statements concerning the cost of a blood or genetic test and records relating to the cost of the mother’s medical and hospital expenses and the child’s neonatal expenses admissible in evidence in a paternity action without the presence of the custodian of the records and establishing that the statement or record constitutes prima facie evidence of the amount of expenses incurred (subject to a party’s right to subpoena the custodian at least 10 days before trial);
• Requiring the court in a paternity action to pass a temporary child support order if the laboratory report of a blood or genetic test establishes a statistical probability of paternity of at least 99% and the putative father has the ability to pay;
• Amending the State new hire reporting law to require reporting of additional employment information required for the National New Hire Registry;
• Providing immunity for employers, public service companies energy providers, financial institutions, and labor unions that comply with requests for information from the CSEA; and
• Requiring the CSEA to establish a State disbursement unit for collection and disbursement of support payments in specified cases effective October 1, 1998, and requiring the Executive Director to report to the General Assembly on or before December 1, 1997 on the implementation of the State disbursement unit.”

. Although no one has raised the issue, I believe that the action should have been dismissed for failure to join Kendi and Harris as necessary parties.