Court Opinion

ID: 9637007
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 14:52:35.792963+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:52.071732
License: Public Domain

Larry D. Vaught, Judge, dissenting. I dissent from the majority opinion reversing this case because I believe that there is substantial evidence supporting the decision of the Commission. The majority has correctly set forth the standard of review we employ when addressing appeals from the Workers’ Compensation Commission. The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a different finding; even if a preponderance of the evidence might indicate a contrary result, if reasonable minds could reach the Commission’s conclusion, we must affirm its decision. St. Vincent Infirmary Med. Ctr. v. Brown, 53 Ark. App. 30, 917 S.W.2d 550 (1996). The majority maintains that the Commission erred by analyzing this case (through the A LJ’s opinion that it adopted) as an occupational disease; however, appellant neither raised this issue below nor argued it on appeal. Before the evidence was taken at the hearing before the ALJ, appellees’ counsel argued in part that the staph infection was an ordinary disease of life that anyone in the public would be susceptible of contracting. The ALJ asked appel-lees’ counsel whether he was saying that the alleged injury should be considered under the occupational-disease statutes, and counsel responded that it might because Dr. Vowell testified that appellant may have contracted the infection from anywhere, such as a doorknob or out in the air. The ALJ asked for appellant’s counsel’s response, and he only maintained that Dr. Vowell opined that the infection set up in the scratches that appellant contends he received while working for Asplundh. Clearly, appellant did not object to the injury being considered as an occupational disease. In addition, after the ALJ entered his decision finding that appellant failed to prove that he sustained a compensable occupational disease, appellant never argued that the ALJ erred in analyzing the claim as an occupational-disease case, which he could have done either in his notice of appeal to the Commission or in a brief filed with the Commission. In fact, appellant does not argue on appeal that the Commission erred as a matter of law deciding this case under the occupational-disease statutes. Under the occupational-disease analysis, it is clear is that the Commission correctly found that the staph infection contracted by the appellant did not qualify as an occupational disease. Arkansas Code Annotated section ll-9-601(g)(l)(A) (Repl. 2002) provides in part: An employer shall not be liable for any compensation for an occupational disease unless: (A) the disease is due to the nature of an employment in which the hazards of the disease actually exist and are characteristic thereof and peculiar to the trade, occupation, process, or employment and is actually incurred in his employment. The majority concludes that the injuries suffered were the scratches to the arm and that the staph infection was merely a natural consequence of the otherwise compensable injury. I disagree. The appellant testified that he routinely got scratches on his arms and'had never reported them before. The injury he sought compensation for was the staph infection, and the evidence supports the conclusion that it is unrelated to his employment. The two cases cited by the majority to support reversal are both 1944 cases where the supreme court affirmed the Commission, and both were decided under the less strenuous standards in effect prior to Act 796 of 1993. While I agree that the evidence in this case could possibly support a finding of compensability, that is not a basis on which we can reverse. We must construe the Act strictly. See Ark. Code Ann. § ll-9-704(c)(3) (Repl. 2002). This includes the section that declares that findings of fact by the Commission are conclusive unless fraudulent or not supported by substantial evidence. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-9-711 (b)(3) and (4) (Supp. 2003). I would hold that substantial evidence supports the Commission’s decision that appellant failed to prove that he sustained a compensable occupational injury. I am authorized to state that Judge Pittman joins in this dissent.