Court Opinion

ID: 9639383
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:15:12.011403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:17.169068
License: Public Domain

Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
dissenting.
On June 9, 2003, defendant Angelo A. Grenci appeared at a pretrial conference concerning a then pending indictment in which he was charged with one count of second-degree burglary, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2. During a later motion for a new trial, the trial court found as a fact that, at the June 9, 2003 pretrial conference,
[i]t’s not disputed by [defendant] and the Defense that [defendant] knew that the superseding indictment was coming____
[T]he assistant prosecutor ... gave notice to defense counsel that [the State] would be seeking a superseding indictment which would be returned on June 11th, two days hence ... and that the superseding indictment would charge an additional count of burglary, which is the same as the existing count of burglary, second-degree, and additional counts of aggravated assault with regard to the use of a deadly weapon.
*624It was on that June 9th date, after this information was disclosed to the defendant through his counsel, that new Hudson warnings were given, the Court set a preemptory trial date of July 28th, 2003. So we’re talking about actual notice.
The Hudson warnings to which the trial court referred were: that trial would proceed on July 28, 2008 or any rescheduled trial date; that if defendant failed to appear, the trial would proceed in his absence; and that defendant would be bound by the jury’s verdict. See State v. Hudson, 119 N.J. 165, 183, 574 A.2d 434 (1990).
As the assistant prosecutor represented to the trial court and to defendant and his counsel, on June 11, 2003, the State again appeared before the Hudson County grand jury, and the grand jury returned a superseding indictment, recharging defendant with one count of second-degree burglary, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2, and also charging defendant with three counts of second-degree aggravated assault, in violation of N.J.SA, 2C:12-l(b)(l), and three counts of third-degree aggravated assault, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:12-l(b)(2). Two days later, on June 13, 2003, defendant’s counsel mailed a copy of that superseding indictment to defendant; defendant made no showing that he did not receive that mailing. Thirteen days later, on June 26, 2003, the prosecutor mailed to defendant’s counsel another copy of the superseding indictment, accompanied by additional discovery materials; on July 2, 2003, defendant’s counsel mailed that package to defendant and, again, no showing has been made that defendant did not receive that package. Defendant then fled to Mexico and failed to appear at the July 28, 2003 trial date. It is against that factual backdrop that defendant’s claims attacking his trial in absentia must be gauged.
In evaluating defendant’s claim that his right to be present at trial was abridged, the Appellate Division acknowledged that “[t]he defendant’s right to be present at trial is guaranteed to him under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 10 of the New Jersey Constitution.” It further noted that, “[hjowever, a trial may proceed in absentia following the finding of a waiver, which is *625grounded in the principles set forth in Hudson, supra, 119 N.J. at 182, 574 A.2d 484 and Rule 3:16(b).” It explained that
a defendant cannot be tried in absentia if the trial date is accelerated to a date prior to the original trial date and that “a defendant cannot be tried in absentia because he does not respond on short notice to a call from his attorney’s office to report prior to the date he was told to do so by the judge.”
[ (quoting State v. Mahone, 297 N.J.Super. 524, 528, 688 A.2d 658 (App.Div.), aff'd, 152 N.J. 44, 702 A.2d 1286 (1997)).]
Noting that “[t]here is no reported case applying this body of law to the return of a superseding indictment, charging several more serious offenses, returned after a defendant was last given Hudson warnings by the judge[,]” the panel reviewed defendant’s interactions with the Court and his counsel and reasoned that “although defendant was not formally arraigned on the superseding indictment, he was provided with adequate notice of the superseding indictment such that his decision not to appear for trial constituted a knowing waiver.” It therefore concluded that “defendant had adequate knowledge of the pending charges and his failure to appear was knowing, voluntary and unjustified” (citing R. 3:16(b)). It also rejected defendant’s constitutional claims, stating that “[bjecause we are convinced that defendant was informed of the charges against him, we are satisfied he was provided with the constitutional guarantee of due process” and that “defendant was not subjected to ‘oppression, harassment, or egregious deprivation’ by not having been informed of the details of the indictment in a formal arraignment” (quoting State v. Reldan, 373 N.J.Super. 396, 406-07, 861 A.2d 860 (App.Div.2004), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 628, 868 A.2d 1031 (2005)).
Summing up, the Appellate Division’s logic stripped bare defendant’s protestations:
To permit defendant to receive a new trial in light of his knowing, voluntary, and unjustified absence would frustrate the ends of justice. Defendant’s voluntary absence placed him in the position to claim that he had not been informed of the superseding indictment and the subsequent charges that followed, resulting in a waiver that was not “knowing." “A defendant may not 'take advantage of his own wrong and turn the proceedings into a ‘solemn farce’ by absenting himself from his own trial and thereby frustrate the legal process of justice.” State v. Givens, 353 N.J.Super. 280, 285, 802 A.2d 563 (App.Div.2002) (quoting Diaz v. United States, *626223 U.S. 442, 4581,] 32 S.Ct. 250, 255[,] 56 L.Ed. 500, 506 (1912)). Granting defendant’s motion for a new trial would conflict with the public interest in the orderly administration of justice. We are convinced defendant’s motion for a new trial on the basis of the lack of a knowing waiver of the right to be present at trial was properly denied by the trial court.
Finally, the panel succinctly rejected defendant’s attack on one isolated sentence in the trial court’s instructions to the jury in respect of the second-degree burglary charge. It noted that, in the aggregate, “the court made clear to the jury that in order for the jury to find defendant guilty of burglary it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant entered the structure ... without permission and without being privileged or licensed to do so.” It correctly acknowledged its limited role, explaining that a “court must review the single unobjected to sentence in the court’s jury instruction based on the ‘plain error’ standard of review” (citing B. 2:10-2), and announced itself “satisfied after reviewing the court’s jury instruction as a whole that the charge was not clearly capable of producing an unjust result and thus did not constitute plain error” (emphasis supplied).
I cannot improve on the Appellate Division’s logic, reasoning or conclusions in respect of the two issues raised in defendant’s petition for certification. Therefore, I would affirm in all respects the judgment of the Appellate Division, substantially for the reasons it set forth. Because the majority reaches a contrary result, I respectfully dissent.
For reversal and remandment — Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA, ALBIN, WALLACE AND HOENS — 6.
For affirmance — Justice RIVERA-SOTO — 1.