Court Opinion

ID: 9676286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:20:12.405085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:47.125754
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I write separately to express my reasons for believing the majority errs in holding points of error twenty-five through forty were not preserved for our review because appellant failed to exhaust his peremptory strikes.
I.
We have long acknowledged that voir dire is an integral part of defense counsel's role in providing adequate legal assistance because it allows counsel to intelligently exercise peremptory strikes during the jury selection process. Dinkins v. State, 894 S.W.2d 330, 344-45 (Tex.Cr.App.1995). We view a trial judge’s decision to limit voir dire under an abuse of discretion standard and a trial judge abuses his discretion when he denies a proper question concerning a proper area of inquiry. Ibid. It is important to remember that harm is not a consideration when dealing with the erroneous limitation of voir dire. Nunfio v. State, 808 S.W.2d 482, 484 (Tex.Cr.App.1991).1 Indeed, notion of harm was specifically rejected in Smith v. State, 513 S.W.2d 823, 826 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), where we stated:
... [W]e reject the State’s argument that these contentions should be denied because the appellant is unable to prove “harm” by showing his peremptory challenges were exhausted or that he had to accept an objectionable juror.... [T]he harm in preventing answers to any proper question is the inability to intelligently make use of the peremptory challenges.
We have repeatedly reaffirmed that the denial of a proper question is reversible error. Maddux v. State, 862 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex.Cr.App.1993); Woolridge v. State, 827 S.W.2d 900, 906, 907 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146, 163 (Tex.Cr. *477App.1988); Cockrum v. State, 758 S.W.2d 577, 584 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); Smith v. State, 703 S.W.2d at 641, 643 (Tex.Cr.App.1985); Powell v. State, 631 S.W.2d 169, 170 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 835, 837 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).
To preserve the issue for appellate review, the defendant must demonstrate only that he sought to ask a proper question which the trial judge denied. Cockrum, 758 S.W.2d at 584; Caldwell v. State, 818 S.W.2d 790, 794 (Tex.Cr.App.1991); Allridge, 762 S.W.2d at 163; Gardner v. State, 730 S.W.2d 675, 689 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Nunfio, 808 S.W.2d at 484; and, Smith, 703 S.W.2d at 643. If the appellate court determines the trial judge denied a proper question, the error is reversible.
II.
In spite of this wealth of authority, the majority holds the denial of a proper question to an individual veniremember is harmless unless appellant exhausted his peremptory strikes. Ante, 937 S.W.2d at 470-471. This holding is reached by blindly following Emanus v. State, 526 S.W.2d 806 (Tex.Cr.App.1975). In Emanus, the defendant contended the trial judge erred by denying a proper question of one of the veniremembers. The Court held that in order to preserve error with respect to the denial of a proper question to an individual veniremember, the defendant must exhaust his peremptory challenges. Id., 526 S.W.2d at 808. This portion of Emanus is the basis for the majority’s disposition of appellant’s points of error twenty-five through forty. However, for the following reasons, I believe Emanus was wrongly decided.
First, the requirement that the defendant exhaust his peremptory strikes ignores the fact that voir dire provides information to peremptorily strike or not strike a venire-member. In other words, while it is important for the parties to identify venire-members who hold views unfavorable to their case, it is equally important for the parties to determine which veniremembers hold favorable views. And without the veniremember’s answer to a proper question, it is impossible for the parties to know the veniremember’s views. Consequently, it is impossible to determine whether the party would have accepted or struck the venire-member. Therefore, Emanus ’ holding that the defendant’s failure to exhaust his peremptory strike mitigates harm is erroneous.2
Second, Emanus did not recognize the right to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. This can be done only if the defendant is able to ask a proper question and receive the veniremember’s response. See n. 2, supra. Instead, Emanus, as the majority notes, requires a defendant to “blindly exercise a peremptory challenge against the veniremember to prevent him from sitting on the jury.” Ante, 937 S.W.2d at 471-474. The Emanus Court provided no basis for this requirement.3 Clearly, a defendant should not be required to exhaust his peremptory strikes when he is deprived of the information necessary to exercise them intelligently.
*478III.
Apparently, the majority relies on Emanus because it dealt with an individual venire-member and in capital cases voir dire is conducted on an individual basis. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 35.17(2). Indeed, my research reveals that even though Emanus was a non-capital case, it has been applied only in capital cases. Gardner v. State, 733 S.W.2d 195, 212 (Tex.Cr.App.1987); Sanne v. State, 609 S.W.2d 762, 770 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); and, Collins v. State, 548 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex.Cr.App.1976). See also, Gardner, 730 S.W.2d at 690. However, Gardner, Sanne and Collins do not provide any authority to support their holdings or any analysis to distinguish our established precedent to the contrary. Finally, notwithstanding the majority assertions otherwise, ante, 937 S.W.2d at 471, n. 9, we do not differentiate between capital and non-capital crimes when considering the denial of a proper question.4 See, Caldwell, 818 S.W.2d at 793-94 (Capital case); Allridge, 762 S.W.2d at 163 (Capital case); Cockrum, 758 S.W.2d at 584 (Capital case); Gardner, 730 S.W.2d at 689 (Capital case); See also, Nunfio, 808 S.W.2d at 484 (Non-capital case); Smith, 703 S.W.2d at 643 (Non-capital case); and, Smith, 513 S.W.2d at 826 (Non-capital case).5
In sum, Emanus directly contradicts our holdings which recognize the constitutionally guaranteed right to question jurors in order to intelligently exercise peremptory challenges. McCarter v. State, 837 S.W.2d 117, 120 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); and, Ex parte McKay, 819 S.W.2d 478, 482 (Tex.Cr.App.1990). Accordingly, Emanus and its progeny should be overruled.
IV.
In points of error thirty, thirty-five, thirty-six and thirty-seven, the record reflects the question and the State’s objection, but does not reflect a ruling by the trial judge. Because the record does not reflect such a ruling, I concur in the majority’s conclusion that these points of error were not preserved for our review. Allridge, 762 S.W.2d at 163; Cockrum, 758 S.W.2d at 584; Gardner, 730 S.W.2d at 689; and, Nunfio, 808 S.W.2d at 484.6 However, as to the remaining points of error, the record reflects the questions appellant sought to ask and the trial judge’s ruling. Thus, the error, if any, was preserved and the majority errs by failing to address the merits of those points of error.

. As Professors Dix and Dawson noted: "The harm is the infringement upon counsel's ability to use whatever answers there might have been in the calculus involved in deciding whom on the panel to strike.” 42 G. Dix & R. Dawson, TEXAS PRACTICE: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 35.33 (1995).

. Legal commentators agree:
The suggestion has been made that perhaps denial of a proper question to a particular venireman might be rendered harmless by the granting of an additional strike. However, this ignores the fact that the particular venireman’s answer to the precluded question might have caused counsel not to strike him as easily as it could to strike him. We do not know what the answer to the question would have been. If the particular venireman is struck, we have no way of knowing whether the granting of an extra strike cures anything. It certainly does not return the struck venireman to the jury panel.
42 G. Dix & R. Dawson, TEXAS PRACTICE: Criminal Practice and Procedure § 35.33 (1995) (emphasis in original)(intemal quotations and citations omitted).

. Providing no authority for their actions, the Emanus Court held:
... Our research has revealed no cases resulting in reversal where the limitation of the Voir dire examination complained of pertained to only one juror. In the cases we have found which were reversed for this reason, the trial court has refused the asking of certain questions or otherwise acted with reference to the jury panel as a whole_ The fact ... that appellant did not exercise all his peremptory challenges, is relevant in this situation and mitigates the harmfulness of any error.
Id., 526 S.W.2d at 808.

. Indeed, if we did differentiate between capital and noncapital cases as the majority suggests, the majority’s reliance on Emanus is entirely misplaced because Emanus was a non-capital case.

. The majority recognizes these capital cases stand for the proposition that the denial of a proper question is reversible enror. However, the majority states that holding was mere dicta. Ante, 937 S.W.2d at 471 n. 9. However, the same can be true of this Court’s reliance on Emanus in Gardner, 733 S.W.2d at 212 ("[T]rial judge did not limit appellant's voir dire in proper areas of questioning.”), and Sanne, 609 S.W.2d at 770 ("The proposed questions were cumulative of those already asked and answered.”).

. In Nunfio, we stated:
Once appellant posed the specific question he sought to ask the venire and the judge refused to allow the question, the ruling by the trial court amounted to a direct order not to ask the question. Appellant obtained a specific ruling as to a specific question and properly preserved the issue for review.
Id., 808 S.W.2d at 484.