Court Opinion

ID: 9945036
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 21:03:09.407133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:20.328344
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/26/24 P. v. Fallon CA2/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
 opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a).
 This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule
 8.1115(a).

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                 B327318

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                          Los Angeles County
                                                             Super. Ct. No. MA056500
          v.

 JAMES STEVEN FALLON,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lisa M. Strassner, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
      James Koester, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay Boyd,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
           _______________________________________
                         INTRODUCTION
       A jury convicted defendant James Steven Fallon of, among
other crimes, premeditated, deliberate, and willful attempted
murder. The jury also found true allegations that Fallon
personally used a firearm and personally inflicted great bodily
injury during the attempted murder. A different panel of this
division reversed Fallon’s convictions because the trial court did
not properly instruct the jury on reasonable doubt and the jury
was exposed to a prejudicial email between the prosecutor and a
detective that was not admitted as evidence at trial. (People v.
Fallon (Dec. 30, 2014, B251619) [nonpub. opn.] (Fallon).) After
the matter was remanded to the trial court, Fallon pled no
contest to one count of attempted murder, and he admitted that
he personally used a firearm during the commission of that
offense and that he suffered a prior strike conviction. The
remaining charges and allegations, including the premeditation
special circumstance allegation, were dismissed.
       Fallon later filed a petition to vacate his attempted murder
conviction under Penal Code1 section 1172.6. After appointing
counsel for Fallon, the court denied the petition without issuing
an order to show cause, finding he was ineligible for resentencing
relief because the jury at his original trial was never instructed
on a now-invalid theory of attempted murder and the facts from
that trial showed he was a “principal” who acted with actual
malice during the commission of the attempted murder.
       On appeal, Fallon argues, and the People agree, that the
court erred when it denied Fallon’s resentencing petition without
issuing an order to show cause because nothing in the record
establishes Fallon is ineligible for relief as a matter of law under
section 1172.6. We agree with the parties and reverse the order

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                   2
denying Fallon’s petition and remand the matter with
instructions for the court to issue an order to show cause and,
unless waived by the parties, hold an evidentiary hearing under
section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

                         BACKGROUND2
       In June 2012, Fallon and two other men went to the
victim’s house. As one of the other men broke down the front
door, the victim ran to the backyard. Fallon caught the victim in
the backyard and repeatedly hit him on the head with a pistol.
Fallon threatened to kill the victim and dragged him back toward
the house. Fallon and one of his other cohorts continued to beat
the victim as the third cohort approached. Fallon and the second
cohort held the victim while the third cohort drew a knife, held it
to the victim’s face, and threatened to kill the victim. The three
men continued to attack the victim, kicking, hitting, and choking
him before eventually leaving the house. As a result of the attack,
the victim suffered three fractures to his cheek, a fracture near
his eye, a broken nose, swelling around his neck, and memory
loss.
       In 2013, Fallon was tried by a jury for premeditated
attempted murder and first degree burglary, plus several other
crimes that arose out of a separate incident. At trial, the jury was
instructed on direct aiding and abetting principles only; it was
not instructed on the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. The jury found Fallon guilty of attempted murder and
first degree burglary. It also found true allegations that the
attempted murder was committed willfully, deliberately, and
with premeditation and that Fallon personally used a firearm

2 The factual summary is provided for purposes of context and is taken

from Fallon.

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and personally inflicted great bodily injury on the victim during
the commission of the attempted murder.
       In 2014, a different panel of this division reversed Fallon’s
convictions because the court did not properly instruct the jury on
reasonable doubt and the jury received a prejudicial email from
the prosecutor to a detective that was not admitted as evidence at
trial.
       In 2017, after the matter was remanded to the trial court,
Fallon pled no contest to “straight” attempted murder (not
premeditated, willful, and deliberate attempted murder).3 Fallon
also admitted that he personally used a firearm during the
commission of the offense and that he suffered a prior strike
conviction. The parties stipulated to a factual basis based on the
preliminary hearing transcript and the police reports. The
remaining charges and allegations were dismissed as part of the
plea agreement. The court sentenced Fallon to 28 years in prison.
       In March 2022, Fallon filed a resentencing petition under
section 1172.6. Fallon alleged: (1) he was charged with attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine;
(2) he had been convicted of attempted murder in proceedings
where the People could have proceeded under a natural and
probable consequences theory; and (3) he could not be convicted
of attempted murder under current law. Fallon also asked the
court to appoint counsel to represent him.
       In April 2022, the court found Fallon’s petition was facially
sufficient, appointed counsel to represent him, and asked the
parties to submit briefing addressing whether Fallon had made a
prima facie showing of eligibility for relief under section 1172.6.

3 The abstract of judgment issued after Fallon pled no contest to

attempted murder erroneously states that he was convicted of
“Attempted willful/delibera[te]/premeditate[d] murder.”

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       In December 2022, the court denied Fallon’s petition,
finding he failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for
relief. Specifically, the court found Fallon could not have been
convicted of attempted murder under a now-invalid theory
because the jury at his trial was never instructed on the natural
and probable consequences doctrine. The court also found the
evidence from that trial showed Fallon was a principal actor who
acted with actual malice in committing the attempted murder.
       Fallon appeals.

                         DISCUSSION

       Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 1437)
eliminated the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a
basis for finding a defendant guilty of murder and limited the
scope of the felony murder rule to ensure a “person’s culpability
for murder [is] premised upon that person’s own actions and
subjective mens rea.” (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (g); see
also People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 707–708.) Senate Bill
No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (S.B. 775) later expanded the
scope of S.B. 1437 by, among other things, eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of attempted murder.
       In addition to changing the law of murder and attempted
murder prospectively, S.B. 1437 and S.B. 775 provide defendants
who have been convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter under the former law the opportunity to petition
for resentencing under section 1172.6. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 957 (Lewis).) Now, a defendant convicted of
attempted murder may petition the court that sentenced him to
have his conviction vacated and to be resentenced if (1) the
complaint or information “allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of … attempted murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine”; (2) the defendant was convicted

                                5
of attempted murder “following a trial or accepted a plea offer in
lieu of a trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted”
of attempted murder; and (3) the defendant “could not presently
be convicted of … attempted murder because of changes to
Section 188 or 189.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       If the petitioner files a facially sufficient petition, the court
must appoint counsel. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).) After allowing the
parties to file briefs, the court must hold a hearing to “determine
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing that [he]
is entitled to relief.” (Id., subd. (c).)
       In Lewis, the California Supreme Court clarified the scope
of the trial court’s inquiry at the prima facie stage under section
1172.6, subdivision (c). As the court explained, the inquiry “is
limited. Like the analogous prima facie inquiry in habeas corpus
proceedings, ‘ “the court takes [the] petitioner’s factual
allegations as true and makes a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if his
or her factual allegations were proved. If so, the court must issue
an order to show cause.” ’ [Citations.]” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th
at p. 971.) While the court may review the record of conviction, it
“should not engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of
evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.] … [T]he ‘prima
facie bar was intentionally and correctly set very low.’ ” (Id. at p.
972.) In other words, a denial at this stage “ ‘is appropriate only if
the record of conviction demonstrates that “the petitioner is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law.” ’ ” (People v. Ervin (2021)
72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.)
       If the petitioner makes a prima facie showing for relief, the
court must “issue an order to show cause” and “hold a hearing to
determine whether to vacate the murder … conviction and to
recall the sentence.” (§ 1172.6, subds. (c) & (d)(1).) At that
hearing, the prosecution bears the burden to prove beyond a

                                   6
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of attempted
murder under a now-valid theory. (Id., subd. (d)(3).) “If the
prosecution fails to sustain its burden of proof, the prior
conviction, and any allegations and enhancements attached to
the conviction, shall be vacated and the petitioner shall be
resentenced on the remaining charges.” (Ibid.) “The petitioner’s
conviction shall be redesignated as the target offense or
underlying felony for resentencing purposes if the petitioner is
entitled to relief … , murder or attempted murder was charged
generically, and the target offense was not charged.” (Id., subd.
(e).)
       The parties agree, and so do we, that Fallon made a prima
facie showing that he is eligible for relief under section 1172.6.
The conviction at issue here stems from a plea bargain, in which
Fallon pled no contest to generic attempted murder. When he
entered his plea, Fallon did not admit that he acted with
premeditation and deliberation or with an intent to kill during
the attempted murder. Nor did he admit or stipulate to any
particular theory of attempted murder. Where, as here, a crime is
charged in a “generic manner”—i.e., without specifying the
degree or manner in which the crime was committed or
identifying the theory on which the prosecution relies—the
prosecution may “proceed on any theory.” (See People v. Rivera
(2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 233; People v. Eynon (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 967, 977–978.) Thus, when Fallon pled no contest to
attempted murder, the People could have prosecuted him under a
natural and probable consequences theory. (See Rivera, at p.
233.)
       To be sure, when Fallon was originally tried for attempted
murder, before he entered the underlying no contest plea, the
court did not instruct the jury on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine; it instructed on direct aiding and abetting

                                7
principles only. Additionally, the jury in that trial convicted
Fallon of premeditated, deliberate, and willful attempted murder.
But Fallon’s convictions from that trial were reversed, and when
he later pled no contest to generic attempted murder, the People
dismissed the premeditation special circumstance allegation.
Accordingly, the record does not establish the People proceeded
under a theory other than the natural and probable consequences
doctrine when Fallon pled no contest to attempted murder.
       In sum, the record of conviction does not establish, as a
matter of law, that Fallon was convicted of attempted murder
under a now-valid theory. Accordingly, we reverse the order
denying his resentencing petition. On remand, the court shall
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing
under section 1172.6, subdivision (d), at which the People will
bear the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Fallon
is ineligible for resentencing. (Id., subd. (d)(3).)

                                8
                        DISPOSITION
      The order denying Fallon’s resentencing petition is
reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court with
directions to issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6.

  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                LAVIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

      EDMON, P. J.

      ADAMS, J.

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