Court Opinion

ID: 9955734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 11:16:04.976066+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:18.206739
License: Public Domain

IN THE
                           TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                 No. 10-23-00337-CV

                     IN THE MATTER OF A.S., A JUVENILE

                            From the 474th District Court
                              McLennan County, Texas
                              Trial Court No. 2023-118-J

                            MEMORANDUM OPINION

       A.S. brings this appeal challenging the juvenile court’s order under Family Code

section 54.02 waiving juvenile court jurisdiction and transferring the case for prosecution

in a criminal district court.

                                       Background

       The State filed a petition with the juvenile court seeking discretionary transfer of

this matter to a criminal district court pursuant to section 54.02 of the Family Code. See

generally TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02. The juvenile court conducted a certification

hearing on the State’s petition, and at the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court

approved the State’s petition for waiver of jurisdiction and transfer to a criminal district
court. The juvenile court entered a written order after the hearing, and this appeal

ensued.

                                          Issue One

        In his first issue, A.S. contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support

the juvenile court’s order waiving its jurisdiction and transferring him for prosecution in

a criminal district court.

AUTHORITY

               We review a juvenile court decision to waive its exclusive original
        jurisdiction and transfer a case to criminal district court using two steps.
        First, we review the juvenile court’s findings using the traditional
        evidentiary sufficiency review. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the
        evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the juvenile
        court’s findings and disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact
        finder could not reject it. If there is more than a scintilla of evidence to
        support the findings, then the evidence is legally sufficient. Under a
        factual-sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence presented to
        determine if the juvenile court’s findings conflict with the great weight and
        preponderance of the evidence so as to be clearly wrong or unjust.

                If the juvenile court’s findings are supported by legally and factually
        sufficient evidence, we review the juvenile court’s ultimate waiver decision
        for an abuse of discretion. A juvenile court abuses its discretion if it acts
        without reference to any guiding rules and principles. A juvenile court
        abuses its discretion when its transfer decision is essentially arbitrary, given
        the evidence upon which it was based. By contrast, a waiver decision
        representing a reasonably principled application of the legislative criteria
        generally will pass muster under the abuse-of-discretion standard of
        review. An abuse of discretion does not occur when the juvenile court bases
        its decision on conflicting evidence.

Bell v. State, 649 S.W.3d 867, 887 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d) (internal

citations and quotes omitted).

In the Matter of A.S., a Juvenile                                                          Page 2
DISCUSSION

        Section 54.02(j) of the Family Code permits the juvenile court to waive its exclusive

original jurisdiction and transfer a person to a criminal district court for criminal

proceedings if:

        (1)    the person is 18 years of age or older;

        (2)    the person was:

               (A) 10 years of age or older and under 17 years of age at the time the
               person is alleged to have committed a capital felony or an offense
               under Section 19.02, Penal Code;

               (B) 14 years of age or older and under 17 years of age at the time the
               person is alleged to have committed an aggravated controlled
               substance felony or a felony of the first degree other than an offense
               under Section 19.02, Penal Code; or

               (C) 15 years of age or older and under 17 years of age at the time the
               person is alleged to have committed a felony of the second or third
               degree or a state jail felony;

        (3) no adjudication concerning the alleged offense has been made or no
        adjudication hearing concerning the offense has been conducted;

        (4)    the juvenile court finds from a preponderance of the evidence that:

               (A) for a reason beyond the control of the state it was not practicable
               to proceed in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person; or

               (B) after due diligence of the state it was not practicable to proceed
               in juvenile court before the 18th birthday of the person because:

                     (i) the state did not have probable cause to proceed in juvenile
                     court and new evidence has been found since the 18th birthday
                     of the person;

                     (ii)   the person could not be found; or

In the Matter of A.S., a Juvenile                                                        Page 3
                     (iii) a previous transfer order was reversed by an appellate court
                     or set aside by a district court; and

        (5) the juvenile court determines that there is probable cause to believe
        that the child before the court committed the offense alleged.

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.02(j).

        Here, the trial court found: (1) A.S. was eighteen years of age or older; (2) A.S. was

fourteen years of age or older and under seventeen years of age when he allegedly

committed the first-degree-felony offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child; (3) no

adjudication concerning the alleged offense had been made; (4) for reasons beyond the

control of the State, it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before A.S.’s

eighteenth birthday; and (5) there was probable cause to believe that A.S. committed the

offense alleged. A.S.’s legal sufficiency complaint is limited to the juvenile court’s finding

that “for reasons beyond the control of the State, it was not practicable to proceed in

juvenile court before [A.S.’s] eighteenth birthday.”

        It was stipulated by the parties in the juvenile court that A.S.’s birthdate is

December 13, 2001. Therefore, A.S. turned eighteen years old on December 13, 2019. The

forensic interview video that was admitted at the hearing reflects that the interview

occurred on May 20, 2022. When the complainant was asked at that time if she ever told

anyone about the alleged abuse, she said she told her best friend the prior year or the year

before that.      The best friend eventually told a sibling, and the sibling passed the

allegations on to their mother. The best friend’s mother then informed the complainant’s

mother of the allegations. The complainant stated in her interview that her mother was

informed of the allegations against A.S. approximately two weeks before the forensic

In the Matter of A.S., a Juvenile                                                         Page 4
interview. The complainant later specified her mother was informed the day before

Mother’s Day. From the context of the interview, the Mother’s Day referred to by the

complainant was Mother’s Day of 2022. Additionally, during the forensic interview

when she was asked A.S.’s age, the complainant estimated A.S. was twenty years old.

Furthermore, the Waco Police Department case number “22-8296” for the alleged offense

was established in 2022 after A.S. was eighteen years of age. The juvenile victim impact

statement was completed by the complainant and her mother and submitted on January

31, 2023.

        Viewing the evidence before the juvenile court in the light most favorable to the

juvenile court’s finding and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact

finder could not reject it, we conclude there is more than a scintilla of evidence to support

the challenged juvenile court’s finding. See Bell, 649 S.W.3d at 887. The juvenile court’s

transfer decision was not arbitrary but based upon a reasonably principled application of

the legislative criteria; therefore, we conclude the juvenile court’s decision fell within its

sound discretion and did not amount to an abuse of discretion. See id.

        We overrule A.S.’s first issue.

                                          Issue Two

        In his second issue, A.S. contends that the juvenile court’s order should be

modified to accurately reflect the trial judge’s oral pronouncement made on the record in

In the Matter of A.S., a Juvenile                                                       Page 5
the juvenile court. The State agrees the juvenile court’s order should be modified

accordingly.

        The juvenile court’s written order contains the following finding, among others:

“A preponderance of the evidence established that, after due diligence of the State, it was

not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before Respondent’s 18th birthday because

Respondent could not be found.”          [Emphasis added.]       The juvenile court’s oral

pronouncement did not include a finding that A.S. could not be found. The juvenile

court’s oral pronouncement included a finding that for reasons beyond the control of the

State, it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before A.S.’s eighteenth birthday.

        We have the authority to modify a judgment or an order to make the record speak

the truth. See In re J.R., No. 10-12-00201-CV, 2013 WL 135729, at *9 (Tex. App.—Waco Jan.

10, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). We modify the order of the juvenile court by deleting the

finding: “A preponderance of the evidence established that, after due diligence of the

State, it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile court before Respondent’s 18th

birthday because Respondent could not be found.” We replace the deleted finding with:

“For reasons beyond the control of the State, it was not practicable to proceed in juvenile

court before Respondent’s eighteenth birthday.” We sustain A.S.’s second issue.

        We affirm the order of the juvenile court as modified.

                                                  MATT JOHNSON
                                                  Justice

In the Matter of A.S., a Juvenile                                                      Page 6
Before Chief Justice Gray,
       Justice Johnson, and
       Justice Smith
Affirmed as modified
Opinion delivered and filed March 28, 2024
[CV06]

In the Matter of A.S., a Juvenile            Page 7