Court Opinion

ID: 9426468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:18:04.944671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:01.121805
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stevens,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins, dissenting.
The city’s reliance on the town meeting process of decisionmaking tends to obfuscate the two critical issues in this case. These issues are (1) whether the procedure which a city employs in deciding to grant or to deny a property owner’s request for a change in the zoning of his property must comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (2) if so, whether the procedure employed by the city of Eastlake is fundamentally fair?
I
We might rule in favor of the city on the theory that the referendum requirement did not deprive respondent of any interest in property and therefore the Due Process Clause is wholly inapplicable.1 After all, when respond*681ent bought this parcel, it was zoned for light industrial use and it still retains that classification. The Court does not adopt any such rationale; nor, indeed, does the city even advance that argument. On the contrary, throughout this litigation everyone has assumed, without discussing the problem, that the Due Process Clause does apply. Both reason and authority support that assumption.2
Subject to limitations imposed by the common law of nuisance and zoning restrictions, the owner of real property has the right to develop his land to his own economic advantage. As land continues to become more scarce, and as land use planning constantly becomes more sophisticated, the needs and the opportunities for unforeseen uses of specific parcels of real estate continually increase. For that reason, no matter how comprehensive a zoning plan may be, it regularly contains some mechanism for granting variances, amendments, or exemptions for specific uses of specific pieces of property.3 No re*682sponsibly prepared plan could wholly deny the need for presently unforeseeable future change.4
A zoning code is unlike other legislation affecting the use of property. The deprivation caused by a zoning code is customarily qualified by recognizing the property owner’s right to apply for an amendment or variance to accommodate his individual needs. The expectancy that particular changes consistent with the basic zoning plan will be allowed frequently and on their merits is a normal incident of property ownership. When the governing body offers the owner the opportunity to seek such a change — whether that opportunity is denominated a privilege or a right — it is affording protection to the owner’s interest in making legitimate use of his property.
The fact that an individual owner (like any other petitioner or plaintiff) may not have a legal right to the relief he seeks does not mean that he has no right to fair procedure in the consideration of the merits of his application. The fact that codes regularly provide a procedure for granting individual exceptions or changes, the fact that such changes are granted in individual cases with great frequency, and the fact that the particular code in the record before us contemplates that changes consistent with the basic plan will be allowed, all sup*683port my opinion that the opportunity to apply for an amendment is an aspect of property ownership protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This conclusion is supported by the few cases in this Court which have decided zoning questions, and by many well-reasoned state-court decisions. In both Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U. S. 137, and Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, the Court invalidated ordinances for procedural reasons. In Eubank the Court held that the method of imposing a building-line restriction on a property owner was defective. In Roberge, which is more analogous to this case, the Court invalidated the requirement that the owners of two-thirds of the property within 400 feet must give their approval to the plaintiff’s proposed use of his property. Implicitly, both cases hold that the process of making decisions affecting the use of particular pieces of property must meet constitutional standards.5
Although this Court has decided only a handful of zoning cases, literally thousands of zoning disputes have been resolved by state courts. Those courts have repeatedly identified the obvious difference between the adoption of a comprehensive citywide plan by legislative action and the decision of particular issues involving specific uses of specific parcels. In the former situation there is generally great deference to the judgment of the *684legislature; in the latter situation state courts have not hesitated to correct manifest injustice.
The distinction was plainly drawn by the Supreme Court of Oregon:
“Ordinances laying down general policies without regard to a specific piece of property are usually an exercise of legislative authority, are subject to limited review, and may only be attacked upon constitutional grounds for an arbitrary abuse of authority. On the other hand, a determination whether the permissible use of a specific piece of property should be changed is usually an exercise of judicial authority and its propriety is subject to an altogether different test.” Fasano v. Board of County Comm’rs, 264 Ore. 574, 580-581, 507 P. 2d 23, 26 (1973).
And the Supreme Court of Washington made the point in this way:
"Zoning decisions may be either administrative or legislative depending upon the nature of the act. But, whatever their nature or the importance of their categorization for other purposes, zoning decisions which deal with an amendment of the code or reclassification of land thereunder must be arrived at fairly. The process by which they are made, subsequent to the adoption of a comprehensive plan and a zoning code, is basically adjudicatory.
“Generally, when a municipal legislative body enacts a comprehensive plan and zoning code it acts in a policy making capacity. But in amending a zoning code, or reclassifying land thereunder, the same body, in effect, makes an adjudication between the rights sought by the proponents and those claimed by the opponents of the zoning change. The parties whose interests are affected are readily identifiable. Although important questions of pub-*685lie policy may permeate a zoning amendment, the decision has a far greater impact on one group of citizens than on the public generally.” Fleming v. City of Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 298-299, 502 P. 2d 327, 331 (1972) (citations omitted).6
Specialists in the practice of zoning law are unhappily familiar with the potential for abuse which exists when inadequate procedural safeguards apply to the dispensation of special grants. The power to deny arbitrarily may give rise to the power to exact intolerable conditions.7 The insistence on fair procedure in this area *686of the law falls squarely within the purpose of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
II
When we examine a state procedure for the purpose of deciding whether it comports with the constitutional standard of due process, the fact that a State may give it a “legislative” label should not save an otherwise invalid procedure. We should, however, give some deference to the conclusion of the highest court of the State that the procedure represents an arbitrary and unreasonable way of handling a local problem.
In this case, the Ohio courts arrived at the conclusion that Art. VIII, § 3, of the charter of the city of Eastlake, as amended on November 2, 1971, is wholly invalid in three stages.8 At no stage of the case has *687there been any suggestion that respondent's proposed use of its property would be inconsistent with the city's basic zoning plan,9 or would have any impact on the *688municipal budget or.adversely affect the city’s potential economic development.10
First, the requirement that the property owner pay the cost of the special election was invalidated in the trial court and in the Ohio Court of Appeals.11 Second, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the mandatory referendum was "clearly invalid” insofar as it purported to apply to a change in land use approved by the City Council “in an administrative capacity.” Without explaining when the Council’s action is properly characterized as legislative instead of administrative, the court then held that even though its approval in this case was legislative, the entire referendum requirement was invalid. The court reasoned:
“Due process of law requires that procedures for the exercise of municipal power be structured such that fundamental choices among competing municipal policies are resolved by a responsible organ of government. It also requires that a municipality protect individuals against the arbitrary exercise of municipal power, by assuring that fundamental policy choices underlying the exercise of that power are articulated by some responsible organ of municipal *689government. McGautha v. California (1971), 402 U. S. 183, 256, 270. The Eastlake charter provision ignored these concepts and blatantly delegated legislative authority, with no assurance that the result reached thereby would be reasonable or rational. For these reasons, the provision clearly violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 196, 324 N. E. 2d 740, 746 (1975) (footnote omitted).
The concurring opinion expressed additional reasons for regarding the referendum requirement as arbitrary. Speaking for four members of the Ohio Supreme Court, Justice Stern stated:
“There can be little doubt of the true purpose of Eastlake’s charter provision — it is to obstruct change in land use, by rendering such change so burdensome as to be prohibitive. The charter provision was apparently adopted specifically, to prevent multifamily housing, and indeed was adopted while Forest City’s application for rezoning to permit a multifamily housing project was pending before the City Planning Commission and City Council. The restrictive purpose of the provision is crudely apparent on its face. Any zoning change, regardless of how minor, and regardless of its approval by the Planning Commission and the City Council, must be approved by a city-wide referendum. The proposed change must receive, rather than a simple majority, at least a 55 percent affirmative vote. Finally, the owner of the property affected is required to pay the cost of the election, although the provision gives no hint as to exactly which costs would be billed to a property owner.
“There is no subtlety to this; it is simply an attempt to render change difficult and expensive under the guise of popular democracy.
*690“Even stripped of its harsher provisions the charter provision poses serious problems. A mandatory, city-wide referendum which applies to any zoning change must, of necessity, submit decisions that affect one person’s use of his property to thousands of voters with no interest whatever in that property. We need only imagine the adoption of this same provision in a city such as Cleveland. By such a provision, rezoning for a corner gasoline station would require the approval of hundreds of thousands of voters, most of them living miles away, and few of them with the slightest interest in the matter. This would be government by caprice, and would seriously dilute the right of private ownership of property. The law recognizes that the use a person makes of his property must inevitably affect his neighbors and, in some cases, the surrounding community. These real interests are entitled to be balanced against the rights of a property owner; but a law which requires a property owner, who proposes a wholly benign use of his property, to obtain the assent of thousands of persons with no such interest, goes beyond any reasonable public purpose.” Id., at 199-200, 324 N. E. 2d, at 748-749.
As the Justices of the Ohio Supreme Court recognized, we are concerned with the fairness of a provision for determining the right to make a particular use of a particular parcel of land. In such cases, the state courts have frequently described the capricious character of a decision supported by majority sentiment rather than reference to articulable standards.12 Moreover, they have limited *691statutory referendum procedures to apply only to approvals of comprehensive zoning ordinances as opposed to amendments affecting specific parcels.13 This conclusion has been supported by characterizing particular amendments as “administrative” and revision of an entire plan as “legislative.” 14
*692In this case the Ohio Supreme Court characterized the Council's approval of respondent’s proposal as “legislative.” I think many state courts would have characterized it as “administrative.” The courts thus may well differ in their selection of the label to apply to this action, but I find substantial agreement among state tribunals on the proposition that requiring a citywide referendum for approval of a particular proposal like this is manifestly unreasonable. Surely that is my view.
The essence of fair procedure is that the interested parties be given a reasonable opportunity to have their *693dispute resolved on the merits by reference to articulable rules. If a dispute involves only the conflicting rights of private litigants, it is elementary that the decision-maker must be impartial and qualified to understand and to apply the controlling rules.
I have no doubt about the validity of the initiative or the referendum as an appropriate method of deciding questions of community policy.15 I think it is equally clear that the popular vote is not an acceptable method of adjudicating the rights of individual litigants. The problem presented by this case is unique, because it may involve a three-sided controversy, in which there is at least potential conflict between the rights of the property owner and the rights of his neighbors, and also potential conflict with the public interest in preserving the city’s basic zoning plan. If the latter aspect of the controversy were predominant, the referendum would be an acceptable procedure. On the other hand, when the record indicates without contradiction that there is no threat to the general public interest in preserving the city’s plan — as it does in this case, since respondent’s proposal was approved by both the Planning Commission and the City Council and there has been no allegation that the use of this eight-acre parcel for apartments rather than light industry would adversely affect the community or raise any policy issue of citywide concern — I think the case should be treated as one in which it is essential that the private property owner be given *694a fair opportunity to have his claim determined on its merits.
As Justice Stern points out in his concurring opinion, it would be absurd to use a referendum to decide whether a gasoline station could be operated on a particular corner in the city of Cleveland. The case before us is not that clear because we are told that there are only 20,000 people in the city of Eastlake. Conceivably, an eight-acre development could be sufficiently dramatic to arouse the legitimate interest of the entire community; it is also conceivable that most of the voters would be indifferent and uninformed about the wisdom of building apartments rather than a warehouse or factory on these eight acres. The record is silent on which of these alternatives is the more probable. Since the ordinance places a manifestly unreasonable obstacle in the path of every property owner seeking any zoning change, since it provides no standards or procedures for exempting particular parcels or claims from the referendum requirement, and since the record contains no justification for the Use of the procedure in this case, I am persuaded that we should respect the state judiciary's appraisal of the fundamental fairness of this decisionmaking process in this ease.16
*695I therefore conclude that the Ohio Supreme Court correctly held that Art. VIII, § 3, of the Eastlake charter violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and that its judgment should be affirmed.

 The Fourteenth Amendment provides: “No State shall . . . deprive any person of . . . property, without due process of law . . . .” U. S. Const., Arndt. 14, § 1.

 The Ohio Supreme Court opinion is reported at 41 Ohio St. 2d 187, 324 N. E. 2d 740 (1976).

 “Zoning maps are constantly being changed, for various reasons; and the question is, under what circumstances are such changes justified? . . . The problem is then to develop criteria for distinguishing valid from invalid zoning changes . . . IN. Williams, American Land Planning Law 6 (1974).
“Legally, all zoning enabling acts contemplate the possibility of dezoning, the power to amend zoning ordinances serving that purpose. The provisions do not show on their face whether they are intended to remedy particular errors or hardships, or whether they contemplate readjustments called for by the changing character of neighborhoods; undoubtedly, however, they may be made available for either purpose.” Freund, Some Inadequately Discussed Problems of the Law of City Planning and Zoning, 24 Ill. L. Rev. 135, 145 (1929).
“For most communities, zoning as long range planning based on generalized legislative facts without regard to the individual facts has proved to be a theoretician’s dream, soon dissolved in a *682series of zoning map amendments, exceptions and variances — reflecting, generally, decisions made on individual grounds — brought about by unanticipated and often unforeseeable events: social and political changes, ecological necessity, location and availability of roads and utilities, economic facts (especially costs of construction and financing), governmental needs, and, as important as any, market and consumer choice.” Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights, 391 Mich. 139, 168, 215 N. W. 2d 179, 191-192 (1974).

 “Zoning is a means by which a governmental body can plan for the future — it may not be used as a means to deny the future.” National Land & Investment Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment, 419 Pa. 504, 528, 215 A. 2d 597, 610 (1965).

 The majority distinguished these cases on the ground that “the standardless delegation of power to a limited group of property owners ... is not to be equated with decisionmaking by the people through the referendum process.” Ante, at 678. Whether or not that is a sufficient distinction of those cases insofar as they deal with the adequacy of the city’s procedure, the distinction does not undermine their support for the proposition that the city’s procedure must afford the property owner due process.

 Fleming was followed by the Supreme Court of Colorado:
“Although our early decisions viewed the enactment of rezoning ordinances as a legislative function, the more recent decisions have held such activity to be a quasi-judicial function and reviewable under Rule 106 (a) (4). In so doing, we have distinguished between the adjudicative process involved in enacting a rezoning ordinance and the legislative process involved in passing the general zoning ordinance. This distinction was concisely drawn by the Supreme Court of Washington in Fleming v. Tacoma, 81 Wash. 2d 292, 502 P. 2d 327 (1972).” Snyder v. City of Lakewood, - Colo. -, 542 P. 2d 371, 373-374 (1975) (footnotes omitted).

 One expert on zoning matters has made the following comment:
“The freedom from accountability of the municipal governing body may be tolerable in those cases where the legislature is engaged in legislating but it makes no sense where the legislature is dispensing or refusing to dispense special grants. When the local legislature acts to pass general laws applicable generally it is performing its traditional role and it is entitled to be free from those strictures we place upon an agency that is charged with granting or denying special privileges to particular persons. When the municipal legislature crosses over into the role of hearing and passing on individual petitions in adversary proceedings it should be required to meet the same procedural standards we expect from a traditional administrative agency.” R. Babcock, The Zoning Game 158 (1966). Compare this comment with the practice of another “zoning man.” See United States v. Staszcuk, 517 F. 2d 53, 56 (CA7 1975).

 This exceptional bit of legislation is worth reading in its entirety:
“Section 3. Mandatory Referral
“That any change to the existing land uses or any change whatsoever to any ordinance, or the enactment of any ordinance referring to other regulations controlling the development of land and the selling or leasing or rental of parkways, playgrounds, or other city lands or real property, or for the widening, narrowing, re-locating, vacating, or changing the use of any public street, avenue, boulevard, or alley cannot be approved unless and until it shall have been submitted to the Planning Commission, for approval or disapproval. That in the event the city council should approve any of the preceding changes, or enactments, whether . . . approved or disapproved by the Planning Commission it shall not be approved or passed by the declaration of an emergency, and it shall not be effective, but it shall be mandatory that the same be approved by a 55% favorable vote of all votes cast of the qualified electors of the City of Eastlake at the next regular municipal election, if one shall occur not less than sixty (60) or more than one hundred and twenty (120) days after its passage, otherwise at a special election falling on the generally established day of the primary election. Said issue shall be submitted to the electors of the City only after approval of a *687change of an existing land use by the Council for an applicant, and the applicant agrees to assume all costs of the election and post bond with the city Auditor in an amount estimated by the County Auditor or the Board of Elections proportionate with any other issues that may be on the ballot at the same time. The applicant shall further agree to authorize the City Auditor to advertise, and assume the obligations to pay, for a notice of the posted bond and the requested land use change in a newspaper of general circulation, whose circulation is either the largest, or second to the largest within the limits of the City for two consecutive times, with at least two weeks between notices and a third notice one week prior to the election. Should the land use request not be affirmed by a 55% favorable vote it cannot be presented again for one full year and a new request must be made at that time.
“It shall be the duty of any applicant for a land use change to obtain zoning codes, maps, thoroughfare and sewer plans or advice of the city council and officials and approving bodies for interpretation of this section as they are always available. If this section is violated and a building is under construction or completely constructed it shall be mandatory for the Mayor, Safety Director, Service Director and Building Inspector equally to have the building or structure removed completely within 60 days at the owner[’]s expense as these officials are charged with the enforcement of this section. It shall be mandatory that the City Council charge and fund the Planning Commission to have on display at all times in the council chambers and available to the public a zone map, showing a legend and summary of zoning regulations by district, [m]ajor use, [m]inimum and maximum lot width and that each district, city park, playground, and city lands be accurately located and identified with the date of adoption and the date of revisions to date. Any and all revisions will be posted to the zone map within 90 days of their occurrence. Maps shall be available to each land owner of the city for a nominal cost not to exceed $2.50 each on demand. Maps shall be available within six months of this charter change.”

 Both the City Planning Commission and the City Council expressly approved the proposal.

 There is no support in the record for the speculation in the Court’s opinion, ante, at 673 n. 7, that the land use change “would likely entail the provision of additional city services, such as schools and police and fire protection.” It seems equally likely that the residents of Eastlake who might move into the new development would also receive such services if they lived elsewhere. Nor is there any support for the speculation that the “change would also diminish the land area available for industrial purposes, thereby affecting Eastlake’s potential economic development.” If that speculation were accurate, it is surprising that the Planning Commission and the Council approved the change.

 Indeed, the city never even tried to enforce that requirement; for when respondent refused to post the bond to cover the cost, the city went ahead and held the election anyway.

 “But in restricting individual rights by exercise of the police power neither a municipal corporation nor the state legislature itself can deprive an individual of property rights by a plebiscite of *691neighbors or for their benefit. . . .” Benner v. Tribbitt, 190 Md. 6, 20, 57 A. 2d 346, 353 (1948).
“The determination of a petition for a variance cannot be determined by a poll of the sentiment of the neighborhood.” Town of Homecroft v. Macbeth, 238 Ind. 57, 62-63, 148 N. E. 2d 563, 566 (1958).
“It is also not a proper exercise of such authority to base their decision [on a rezoning] merely on ‘strenuous objections of residents of the Town’ as [the Board] does in reason (3). Such remonstrances may be heard and taken into consideration but they may not be permitted to control the board’s decision. Heffernan v. Zoning Board, 50 R. I. 26, 144 A. 674. A poll of the neighborhood to weigh the conflicting wishes of the residents or landowners in the vicinity is not the purpose of the hearing.” Kent v. Zoning Board of Town of Barrington, 74 R. I. 89, 92, 58 A. 2d 623, 624 (1948).
“Rather, the comprehensive plan is the essence of zoning. Without it, there can be no rational allocation of land use, It is the insurance that the public welfare is being served and that zoning does not become nothing more than just a Gallup poll.” (Emphasis added.) Udell v. Haas, 21 N. Y. 2d 463, 469, 235 N. E. 2d 897, 900-901 (1968).

 “While the referendum provision of the statute has not heretofore been construed by this court, we believe that the reasonable and proper construction of the statute supports the position of the plaintiff to the effect that the referendum-election provision applies only to a comprehensive type of zoning ordinance and does not apply to an altering or amending ordinance.” Minneapolis-Honeywell Regulator Co. v. Nadasdy, 247 Minn. 159, 165, 76 N. W. 2d 670, 675 (1956).

 “The issue is whether an amendment to a city zoning ordinance changing the zoning of particular property is subject to a referen-dary vote of the electors of the city.
“We hold that such a change in zoning is not subject to referen*692dum. The right of referendum extends only to legislative acts. A change in the zoning of particular property, although in form (amendment of a zoning ordinance) and in traditional analysis thought to be legislative action, is in substance an administrative, not legislative, act.” West v. City of Portage, 392 Mich. 458, 460-461, 221 N. W. 2d 303, 304 (1974).
“An ordinance changing the classification of property from residential to business use after the adoption of a comprehensive zoning plan is an administrative or executive matter, and not subject to referendum laws applicable to municipalities.” Kelley v. John, 162 Neb. 319, 75 N. W. 2d 713, 714 (1956) (syllabus by the court).
“The City of Washington Terrace has in effect a master zoning plan ordinance. Subsequent to its adoption, the City Council passed an ordinance changing the classification of certain property from residential to commercial use. . . .
“The ordinance in question was passed after the requested change had been studied and recommended by the planning commission and after a public hearing had been held. The determinative question is whether or not the action of the City Council was administrative or legislative. If the former, it is not subject to referendum. We so hold, based upon logic and prior decisions of this court. If each change in a zoning classification were to be submitted to a vote of the city electors, any master plan would be rendered inoperative. Such changes are administrative acts implementing the comprehensive plan and adjusting it to current conditions.” (Emphasis added.) Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1-2, 394 P. 2d 808 (1964).

 James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S. 137, sustained the “use of referendums to give citizens a voice on questions of public policy.” Id., at 141. The approval of a publicly financed housing project, which might “lead to large expenditures of local governmental funds for increased public services and to lower tax revenues,” id., at 143, raises policy questions not involved in a zoning change for a private property owner. That case presented no due process or other procedural issue.

 The final footnote in the Court’s opinion identifies two reasons why the referendum procedure is not fundamentally unfair. Both reasons are consistent with my assumption that there is virtually no possibility that an individual property owner could be expected to have his application for a proposed land use change decided on the merits.
The first of the Court’s reasons is that if “hardship” is shown, “administrative relief is potentially available”; that “potential” relief, however, applies only to some undefined class of claims that does not include this respondent’s. A procedure in one case does not become constitutionally sufficient because some other procedure might be available in some other case.
The second of the Court’s reasons is that there is a judicial *695remedy available if the zoning ordinance is so arbitrary that it is invalid on substantive due process grounds. This reason is also inapplicable to this case. There is no claim that the city’s zoning plan is arbitrary or unconstitutional, even as applied to respondent’s parcel. But if there is a constitutional right to fundamental fairness in the procedure applicable to an ordinary request for an amendment to the zoning applicable to an individual parcel, that right is not vindicated by the opportunity to make a substantive due process attack on the ordinance itself.