Court Opinion

ID: 9908835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 21:03:05.949496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:32.179929
License: Public Domain

SUPERIOR COURT
                                     OF THE
                               STATE OF DELAWARE
PAUL R. WALLACE                                                    LEONARD L. WILLIAMS JUSTICE CENTER
     JUDGE                                                             500 N. KING STREET, SUITE 10400
                                                                        WILMINGTON, DELAWARE 19801
                                                                               (302) 255-0660

                         Date Submitted: November 27, 2023
                          Date Decided: December 11, 2023

    Mr. Ramon A. Ruffin                               Mr. Stephen Welch, Jr., Esquire
    SBI No. 322923                                    Deputy Attorney General
    James T. Vaughn Correctional Center               Department of Justice
    1181 Paddock Road                                 102 W. Water Street
    Smyrna, Delaware 19977                            Dover, Delaware 19904

         RE:   State v. Ramon A. Ruffin
               ID. No. 1312005545A
               Application Seeking Reduction or Modification of Sentence

Dear Messrs. Ruffin and Welch:
         The Court is in receipt of Mr. Ruffin’s application which he captions a
“Motion to Nolle Prosequi the Following Indictments and Sentences” (D.I. 80), the
State’s response thereto (D.I. 83), and Mr. Ruffin’s reply (D.I. 85).
                                 PROCEDURAL HISTORY
         After a five-day jury trial in October 2014, Mr. Ruffin was convicted of one
count of Attempted Robbery First Degree, three counts of Possession of a Firearm
During Commission of a Felony (“PFDCF”), one count of Assault Second Degree
(as an included offense of the indicted first-degree assault count), one count of
Aggravated Menacing, one count of Receiving a Stolen Firearm, one count of
Disregarding a Police Officer’s Signal and one count of Resisting Arrest.1

1
   Verdict, State v. Ramon A. Ruffin, ID No. 1312005545A (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 29, 2014) (D.I.
25 & 29). A full recounting of Mr. Ruffin’s brutal pistol-whipping and attempted robbery of
State v. Ramon A. Ruffin
ID. No. 1312005545A
December 11, 2023
Page 2 of 6

       His sentencing occurred on January 15, 2015, after a presentence investigation
had been completed and the State had filed a habitual criminal petition.2 Mr. Ruffin
was sentenced as follows: for Attempted Robbery First Degree (IK13-12-0387)—
25 years at supervision Level V to be served under the then-extant provisions of 11
Del. C. § 4214(a);3 for PFDCF (IK13-12-0389)—25 years at supervision Level V to
be served under the then-extant provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214(a); for Assault
Second Degree (IK13-12-0388)—8 years at supervision Level V to be served under
the then-extant provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214(a); for PFDCF (IK13-12-0368)—25
years at supervision Level V to be served under the then-extant provisions of 11 Del.
C. § 4214(a); for Aggravated Menacing (IK13-12-0391)—5 years at supervision
Level V to be served under the then-extant provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214(a); for
PFDCF (IK13-12-0369)—25 years at supervision Level V to be served under the
then-extant provisions of 11 Del. C. § 4214(a); for Receiving a Stolen Firearm
(IK13-12-0392)—3 years at supervision Level V suspended in whole for 1 year

McDonald’s restaurant owner, Robert Cocozzoli, underlying these convictions and resultant
sentence can be found in earlier decisions resolving Mr. Ruffin’s prior post-verdict attacks on
them. See, e.g., Ruffin v. State, 131 A.3d 295, 297-99 (Del. 2015) (direct appeal) (Ruffin I); State
v. Ruffin, 2018 WL 2202278, at *1-3 (Del. Super. Ct. May 9, 2018) (Commissioner’s report
recommending of denial of first postconviction motion) (Ruffin II).
2
    The State had first filed a petition seeking sentencing under then-extant 11 Del. C. § 4214(b)
(D.I. 27)—which would have required imposition of multiple natural life sentences—but later
substituted a request for application of then-extant 11 Del. C. § 4214(a) (D.I. 31)—which permitted
sentencing to a term of years.
3
    See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4214(a) (2013) (“[A]ny person sentenced pursuant to this
subsection shall receive a minimum sentence which shall not be less than the statutory maximum
penalty provided elsewhere in this Title for the fourth or subsequent felony which forms the basis
of the State’s petition to have the person declared to be an habitual criminal except that this
minimum provision shall apply only when the fourth or subsequent felony is a Title 11 violent
felony, as defined in § 4201(c) of this title.”).
State v. Ramon A. Ruffin
ID. No. 1312005545A
December 11, 2023
Page 3 of 6

Level IV-Work Release; for Disregarding a Police Officer’s Signal (IK13-12-
0393)—2 years at supervision Level V suspended in whole for 1 year Level III; and
for Resisting Arrest (IK13-12-0394)—1 year at supervision Level V suspended in
whole for 1 year Level III.4
       Mr. Ruffin’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal.5 And
he has been unsuccessful in his attempts to obtain collateral relief therefrom.6
         MR. RUFFIN’S CURRENT ATTEMPT TO REDUCE HIS PRISON TERM
       Mr. Ruffin filed his latest challenge to his convictions and sentence asking
“the court in connection with Senate Resolution No. #32 Nolle Prosequi two counts
of the weapons offenses and § 3901(d) along with § 4214 administration Directive
No. 2017-5 in relations the Multiple sentences modified into one concurrent
sentence.”7
       As Mr. Ruffin recently clarified in his reply, he “is seeking nolle prosequis on
the imposition of the three state sought PFCDF charges, because their stacked

4
    Corr. Sentencing Order, State v. Ramon A. Ruffin, ID No. 1312005545A (Del. Super. Ct. Jan.
15, 2015) (D.I. 28); id. (D.I. 51, and 84).
5
    Ruffin I, 131 A.3d at 308.
6
  See, e.g., Ruffin II, 2018 WL 2202278, aff’d, 2019 WL 719038 (Del. Feb. 19, 2019); Ruffin v.
May, 2023 WL 2810063 (D. Del. Apr. 6, 2023) (denial of federal habeas relief).
7
    Def. Sent. Red. Mot. at 3 (D.I. 80). Throughout Mr. Ruffin’s pleading, he invokes as support:
Del. S.C.R. 32, 152nd Gen. Assem. (2023) (State Senate Resolution—“Proclaiming April 2023 as
‘Second Chance Month’ in the State of Delaware”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 3901(d) (2023)
(which, in its amended version effective as of June 25, 2019, now allows a judge imposing
sentences for the violent felonies of which Mr. Ruffin was convicted the discretion to order those
sentences be served concurrently); Del. Super. Ct. Spec. R. 2017-1 (procedural rules for
consideration of sentence modification petitions filed under 11 Del. C. § 4214(f)); and a Delaware
Department of Justice Internal Policy Memorandum authored by the Attorney General on February
15, 2019 and entitled Fairness and Equality in the Criminal Justice System: Internal Policies
(https://news.delaware.gov/files/2019/02/Memo-Internal-Policy-Changes-2.15.pdf last accessed
Dec. 10, 2023).
State v. Ramon A. Ruffin
ID. No. 1312005545A
December 11, 2023
Page 4 of 6

charges and sentences, or the court run the sentences concurrent to each other,
Eliminating the death behind bars sentences given to Mr. Ruffin.”8 So at bottom,
Mr. Ruffin suggests the Court engage certain means—dismissal of counts and
concurrent sentencing—to reduce his sentence.
                THE RELIEF MR. RUFFIN SEEKS IS EITHER INCOGNIZABLE
                       OR OTHERWISE UNAVAILABLE TO HIM

        “When addressing any species of sentencing reduction or modification
request, the Court first identifies the specific procedural mechanism the inmate
attempts to invoke; it must then determine whether that mechanism is available
under the circumstances.”9
        There are few instances where this Court is empowered to dismiss or vacate a
conviction obtained by verdict of a jury or upon plea of guilt.10 And Mr. Ruffin cites
no statute, case, or rule that would allow the Court to now simply strike certain
convictions and their sentences to effect sentence reduction.11                           Indeed, any

8
    Def. Reply at 3 (errors in original) (D.I. 85). While Mr. Ruffin earlier cited the procedural rule
for § 4214(f) application, he now acknowledges that he “is not petitioning for 11 Del. C. § 4214(f)
review . . . [he] is not time-served eligible to seek relief pursuant to that Statue and is not petitioning
for review.” Id. In this reply, Mr. Ruffin also asks that the Court “hold any decisions in this matter
until the Court decides the Constitutionally of Delaware’s life behind bars ‘Death by incarceration’
sentencing scheme.” Id. (errors in original). But Mr. Ruffin does not tell the Court where or how
such a challenge is presently posed. The Court must, therefore, decide the motion Mr. Ruffin has
filed.
9
   State v. Brown, 2022 WL 14781911, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Oct. 26, 2022), aff’d, 2023 WL
1808446 (Del. Feb. 7, 2023) (internal quotations omitted).
10
    See, e.g., Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61 (allowing for vacatur of a conviction only upon a finding by
the Court that “the court lacked jurisdiction” or “that [there] is a sufficient factual and legal basis
for a collateral attack upon” that conviction).
11
    Mr. Ruffin’s rumination that he might not be subjected to the same prosecutorial
decisionmaking were he to be tried and sentenced now is of little moment. The State is defending
the sentence Mr. Ruffin is actually serving and opposes his request to reduce it. See D.I. 83.
State v. Ramon A. Ruffin
ID. No. 1312005545A
December 11, 2023
Page 5 of 6

recognizable sentence reduction mechanism, “presupposes a valid conviction and
sentence.”12 Thus, Mr. Ruffin’s prayer for the Court to “nolle prosequi” counts as a
means of sentence reduction is incognizable.
        While again, he cites no rules-based, statutory, or caselaw authority in his
meager pleading, the relief Mr. Ruffin wants—cutting time from his
imprisonment—is no doubt governed by this Court’s Criminal Rule 35(b). 13
        “Rule 35(b) requires that an application to reduce imprisonment be filed
promptly – i.e. within 90 days of the sentence’s imposition – ‘otherwise, the Court
loses jurisdiction’ to act thereon.”14 To overcome the 90-day time limitation, an
inmate seeking to reduce a sentence of imprisonment on his or her own motion must
demonstrate “extraordinary circumstances.”15
        “Rule 35(b) is not now, nor ever has been, an instrument for reexamination of
previously imposed sentences in light of subsequent statutory changes.”16 And so,
such subsequent statutory, prosecutorial, or sentencing policy changes simply do not

12
    Brown, 2022 WL 14781911, at *1 (quoting State v. Henry, 2022 WL 4112850, at *3 (Del.
Super. Ct. Sept. 9, 2022)). See, e.g., State v. Walsh, 2016 WL 7191539, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Dec.
12, 2016) (“[A] motion to reduce a sentence under Rule 35(b) presupposes a valid conviction and
sentence proceedings. It is not a vehicle to attack the validity of the conviction or related
proceedings.” (citations omitted)); State v. Rivera, 2014 WL 3894274, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug.
11, 2014) (citing cases).
13
    Super. Ct. Crim. R. 35(b) (providing that, if certain requirements are met, the Court may reduce
a sentence of imprisonment on an inmate’s motion); Jones v. State, 2003 WL 21210348, at *1
(Del. May 22, 2003) (“There is no separate procedure, other than that which is provided under
Superior Court Criminal Rule 35, to reduce or modify a sentence.”).
14
     State v. Redden, 111 A.3d 602, 607 (Del. Super. Ct. 2015) (internal citations omitted).
15
    Sample v. State, 2012 WL 193761, at *1 (Del. Jan. 23, 2012) (“Under Rule 35(b), the Superior
Court only has discretion to reduce a sentence upon motion made within 90 days of the imposition
of sentence, unless ‘extraordinary circumstances’ are shown.”) (emphasis added).
16
     State v. Thomas, 220 A.3d 257, 261 (Del. Super. Ct. 2019).
State v. Ramon A. Ruffin
ID. No. 1312005545A
December 11, 2023
Page 6 of 6

meet Rule 35’s “extraordinary circumstance” criterion.17                 More to the point,
“application of the 2019 Amended Sentencing Act to modify the terms of
Mr. [Ruffin]’s pre-existing sentence and to order each separate period of his
confinement to run (or deem those periods to have been running) concurrently is
prohibited.”18
                                         CONCLUSION
        For the above reasons, Mr. Ruffin’s request for a reduction of his prison term
is DENIED.
        IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                                    Paul R. Wallace, Judge

Original to Prothonotary-Kent County

17
     Id. at 262-63.
18
     State v. Caulk, 2021 WL 2911768, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. July 12, 2021).