Court Opinion

ID: 9582983
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:33:30.685176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:53.879446
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(specially concurring).
Code pleading was honored here. Four separate offenses were charged in four separate counts. This was not done in State v. Likness, 386 N.W.2d 42 (S.D.1986). SDCL 23A-8-2(4) provides for the dismissal of an information when more than one offense is charged in a single count. State v. Myott, 246 N.W.2d 786, 789 (S.D.1976). See my dissent in State v. Likness, 386 N.W.2d at 44, upholding that precedent. Here, the code pleader set forth four specific offenses in four specific counts, albeit by an amended information which was handwritten, in part, but the original of which was duly dated, signed, filed, and read in open court in the presence of the defendant.
*41There is no doubt that a statutory right was violated, namely, the right to have a true copy of the information, all as required by SDCL 23A-7-1. This is for the purpose of apprising the defendant of that which he is specifically accused. As defendant heard, in open court, that of which he was accused and entered pleas thereon, surely he knew that of which he was charged. Although a statutory right has been violated, the question is whether it has an overture of constitutional infringement. And is this eri®*-, indeed, harmless error or is it prejudicial error? As recent as April 2, 1986, this Court adopted the writing of Acting Justice E.W. Hertz in State v. Dokken, 385 N.W.2d 493 (S.D.1986), which contained, inter alia, a dissertation on harmless error, vis-á-vis prejudicial error. This author believes that the Dokken dissertation on harmless/prejudicial error, by way of struggling with these concepts, has entered a rebirth in South Dakota. Harmless error/prejudicial error is not as simple as some followers of the law would believe. See a scholarly work of former Chief Justice Roger Tray-nor of the California Supreme Court, as stated in “The Riddle on Harmless Error,” Law Forum Series of the College of Law of the Ohio State University, no. 7 (Ohio State University Press 1970). As one can see by the decision in Dokken, this Court has quoted Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). The Chapman holding has apparently met this Court’s approval1 and it is the considered opinion of this author that when the prosecutorial authorities have failed to accord federal constitutional rights, then it is federal law, not state law, which is applicable in fashioning a rule as to what constitutes harmless error. Also, the Chapman case teaches us that the application of a state harmless error rule “is a state question where it involves only errors of state procedure or state law.” Dokken, 385 N.W.2d at 499. Thus, under our most recent pronouncement in Dokken, I can comfortably join the majority opinion’s stance of nonprejudicial error pertaining to a statutory right of a true and complete copy not having been furnished to the defendant under the facts of this case.
This then turns us to the second error, committed in this trial, with the above principles and holdings in mind. It is noted that the majority opinion reflects that the hearsay evidence entered in this case was inadmissible under any exception, yet, it was harmless error. I can only join this opinion because of the fact that this testimony was applicable to the counts pertaining to the defendant driving the vehicle. Defendant was acquitted of the two driving counts; therefore, the inadmissible hearsay evidence could not be prejudicial error. However, defendant’s confrontation rights do reach constitutional dimension and had the hearsay evidence convicted him under the driving counts, my vote, under Dokken and Chapman, would surely be different. One of Chapman’s basic tenets is “that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828, 17 L.Ed.2d at 710-11. We must then, in my opinion, apply such review if a case arises in South Dakota establishing federal constitutional error. Regarding same, we cannot go back to State v. Reddington, 80 S.D. 390, 125 N.W.2d 58 (1963).2 If a defendant’s constitutional rights are infringed, the harmless error rule as announced in Reddington and its progeny is inapplicable. Given federal constitutional transgression, the appellate scope of review is the requirement that this State Supreme Court must “declare a belief beyond a reasonable doubt that it was harmless and did not contribute to the verdict obtained.” State v. Heumiller, 317 *42N.W.2d 126, 130 (S.D.1982). Given a federal constitutional error, and given overwhelming evidence of guilt in the record, consider, however, the holdings in Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1570-71, 36 L.Ed.2d 208, 215 (1973), and Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 254, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 1728, 23 L.Ed.2d 284, 288 (1969). See also, Harmless Constitutional Error: A Reappraisal, 83 Harv.L.Rev. 814, 820 (1970).
Lastly, we should. remember that the polestar, in criminal cases, should always be that the defendant receive a fair trial. You cannot use the harmless error rule— ever — to justify unfairness at the trial. State v. Webb, 251 N.W.2d 687 (S.D.1977).

. See this author’s recitation of same as authority in his dissent in State v. Chief Eagle, 377 N.W.2d 141, 144 (S.D.1985).

. The Reddington principle of review on determining harmless or prejudicial error is this: Prejudicial error is that which in all probability must have produced some effect upon the final result and affected rights of the party assigning it.