Court Opinion

ID: 9725273
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:38:15.119554+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:13.065682
License: Public Domain

Carr, C. J.
(concurring). While in the employ of the defendant corporation plaintiff’s husband sus*544tained a physical injury causing disability for which he received compensation under the provisions of the workmen’s compensation law of the State.* Plaintiff brought the present suit for damages for alleged loss of consortium, basing her claim on the case of Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich 33, affirmatively asserting in reply to defendant’s motion to dismiss that she had been granted a right of action for damages by said decision, and that the provisions of the workmen’s compensation act of the State did not operate to bar her suit. The circuit judge before whom the motion to dismiss was heard entered an order denying it, and on leave granted defendant has appealed.
Prior to Montgomery v. Stephan, which was a 4-to-3 decision, an action for damages for loss of consortium on behalf of either spouse had not been recognized in Michigan as existing by virtue of statute law, common law, or judicial decision. Such right was denied in Blair v. Seitner Dry Goods Co., 184 Mich 304 (LRA 1915D, 524, Ann Cas 1916C, 882); Harker v. Bushouse, 254 Mich 187; and Bugbee v. Fowle, 277 Mich 485. That the weight of authority throughout the country is in accord with the previous holdings of this Court is not open to question. Under the common law a married woman could not maintain such an action in the English courts. That causes of action may be created by legislative authority, and may likewise be abolished, is not open to question, but such measure of authority is not within the proper scope of the functions of the judiciary.
In the dissenting opinion in Montgomery v. Stephan we set forth at some length our reasons for disagreeing with creating by Court action the cause for suit here involved. It is unnecessary to repeat *545what was there said. The question at issue should be given careful reconsideration. For the reasons there advanced plaintiff in the instant case was not entitled to maintain the action instituted by her in circuit court, and the circuit judge to whom the motion to dismiss was submitted should have so held.
We are in accord with the holding of Mr. Justice O’Hara that the rights granted by the workmen’s compensation act to an employee who sustained an injury arising out of and in the course of his employment are exclusive. The provision of the title restricting the right to compensation or damages in such cases to such as are provided by the act is significant. Part 1, § 4 (CL 1948, §411.4 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.144]), is in accord with the intent indicated by the title. Said section reads as follows:
“Where the conditions of liability under this act exist, the right to the recovery of compensation benefits, as herein provided, shall be the exclusive remedy against the employer.”
Permitting the maintenance of actions for damages in instances where the injured employee is entitled to, and has received, compensation under the statute would clearly be at variance with the express language as enacted by the legislature. Such an interpretation would mean that a dependent or other person claiming injury because of disability sustained by the employee might maintain suit to recover. No issue of such character was involved in Mackin v. Detroit-Timkin Axle Co., 187 Mich 8, as was pointed out by the Court in somewhat ambiguous language. The question was, however, squarely presented in Wall v. Studebaker Corporation, 219 Mich 434, in which the parent of a minor employee who received compensation for injuries sustained in his employment brought suit for loss of the son’s wages to which the parent claimed he was entitled. *546The Court quoted with approval part 1, § 4, of the statute as it then read, and stated (p 436):
“We think that the plain language of this statute clearly indicates that it was the intention of the legislature to abrogate the parent’s right of action for loss of services of his minor child while employed under the compensation act.”
The case was cited and followed in Varga v. Detroit Edison Co., 240 Mich 593. In accord is the language of the court of appeals of the sixth circuit in Fernandez v. Flint Board of Education, 283 F2d 906. Of interest also are the opinions of the Illinois supreme court in Wangler Boiler Co. v. Industrial Commission, 287 Ill 118 (122 NE 366), and Faber v. Industrial Commission, 352 Ill 115 (185 NE 255), it appearing that the provisions of the Illinois statute are analogous to those of the Michigan act.
For the reasons indicated, we concur in the reversal of'the order from which the appeal has been taken.
Dethmers and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Carr, C. J.

 PA 1912 (1st Ex Sess), No 10, as amended (CL 1948, §411.1 et seq., as amended TStat Ann 1960 Rev and Stat Ann 1961 Cum Supp § 17.141 et seq.]).