Court Opinion

ID: 9704988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:53:50.739964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:07.140721
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting:
With the deepest respect to my colleagues, I must dissent from their determination in this case. I might point out that my reasons for taking the opposite view have been set forth in Hauck, v. Ohio Casualty Group of Insurance Companies, 361 Pa.Super. 370, 522 A.2d 628 (1987), (Dissenting Opinion by Del Sole, J.) and I continue to adhere to that view. Specifically, the Majority once again says “we determine that double recovery, while permitted under the law ... is limited to an amount not exceeding the reasonable charges actually incurred by the victim.” The Majority then, in my view, erroneously, defines reasonable charges actually incurred by the victim as being the amount the victim’s insurer under a Blue Cross/Blue Shield plan pays a health care provider, that amount being totally unrelated to the reasonableness of the charges incurred by the victim but based upon comprehensive business relationship be*391tween the hospital and Blue Shield. It is my view, quite simply, that incurred by the victim does not mean paid by the victim’s health care insurer. For these reasons and those set forth in my Dissenting Opinion in Hauck, I dissent.