Court Opinion

ID: 8745415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-11-26 11:05:30.321476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:00:38.660141
License: Public Domain

EVANS, District Judge.
This proceeding is before the court upon a petition for a review of the ruling of the referee expunging the proof of debt filed by the commonwealth of Kentucky. The claim thus proved is for the amount oí a fine imposed by a judgment of a state court in a criminal prosecution upon an indictment for a serious public offense.' At the trial of the indictment the bankrupt was found guilty, and the statutory punishment was inflicted as the result. Subsequently the petition in the case was filed. The referee disallowed the claim upon the exceptions filed by the trustee, and the question is now before the court upon that ruling. It might be admitted that sections 63 and 17 of the bankrupt act, if only the letter of those provisions be looked to, would embrace such judgments as the one referred to; but it is well settled that there may be cases in which such literal construction is not admissible. U. S. v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 487, 19 L. Ed. 278. And especially where it would lead to an absurd result. Lau Ow Bew v. U. S., 144 U. S. 59, 12 Sup. Ct. 517, 36 L. Ed. 240 I shall not go into details in this opinion. It may suffice to say that nothing but a ruling from a higher court would convince me that congress, by any provision of the bankrupt act, intended to permit the discharge, under its operations, of any judgment rendered by a state or federal court imposing a fine in the enforcement of criminal laws, as such, of either jurisdiction. In my opinion, it was never in*150tended in this indirect way, in derogation of the exclusive right of the chief executive to pardon offenders or to remit fines imposed upon them, to relieve criminals from penalties incurred for criminal acts. It seems to me that to rule otherwise would make the bankrupt court the means of frustrating proper efforts to enforce criminal statutes enacted for the public welfare. Congress, in my opinion, never so contemplated or intended. . Judgments such as the one proved in this case may possibly appear to come within the letter of the statute; but nevertheless, as neither state nor national government is mentioned in the act in this connection, I am persuaded that its operations cannot properly be held to-embrace judgments imposed in executing the public criminal laws. End. Interp. St. § 161; Black, Interp. St. pp. 119, 120, and cases cited. While in its broadest interpretation this general principle might be considered as applying only to the sovereignty which enacted the statute, still, in our dual form of government, and in view of the considerations already suggested and of an obvious public policy, I think it is clear that the operation of the principle must be so extended as also to exclude the states of the Union, when congress enacts the legislation, and that it should be held in the case before us that congress did not mean to include within the operations of the bankrupt act fines imposed in executing the criminal laws of a state because it did not expressly legislate to the effect that such fines were dischargeable. I know this is a view different from that taken by the venerable judge of the district court of West Virginia in the case "of In re Alderson, 98 Fed. 588, 3 Am. Bankr. R. 544; but, with all due respect to that learned and most experienced judge, I cannot yield the convictions which I have expressed. The provisions of the bankrupt act have reference alone to civil liabilities, as demands between debtor and creditor, as such, and not to punishments inflicted pro bono publico for crimes committed. The use of the word “debts” in sections 17 and 63 seems to make this construction inevitable. Any other construction would seem to be improper, and might trench, as already indicated, upon the exclusive constitutional right of the chief magistrate, state or national, to remit fines and grant pardons. With the exceptions mentioned in section 17, any “debt” which is provable is made dis-chargeable. As a judgment like the one in question does not come within any one of the exceptions, it will be discharged, if provable. As I do not think it can be discharged) the test upon which its provability depends is not met. If these principles are sound, their operation will control in regard to the judgments of federal court? as well as to the judgments of state courts in criminal cases.
• It may possibly be that the fine in this case has been replevied, in which event,_ if the sureties have paid it, or if they do pay it before the distribution of the assets in this case, a civil liability may, and doubtless would, be thereby created between the sureties and the bankrupt, which would be provable by the sureties alone, and they might be entitled to their pro rata share of the assets. This should be looked into, and, if the fact exist, provision should be made accordingly, but otherwise the ruling of the referee is approved and confirmed.