Court Opinion

ID: 9880822
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 19:00:52.337395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:57:51.281746
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11935    Document: 19-1     Date Filed: 09/28/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11935
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       JOSEPH RAGUSA,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 9:21-cv-80235-AMC
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11935

       Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Joseph Ragusa appeals the district court’s order aﬃrming
       the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of his application for dis-
       ability insurance beneﬁts (“DIB”) and supplemental security in-
       come (“SSI”). No reversible error has been shown; we aﬃrm.
                                         I.
              When -- as in this case -- an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”)
       denies an application for beneﬁts and the Appeals Council denies
       review, we review the ALJ’s decision as the Commissioner’s ﬁnal
       decision. See Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001).
              Our review of the Commissioner’s decision is limited to
       whether substantial evidence supports the decision and whether
       the correct legal standards were applied. See Buckwalter v. Acting
       Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 5 F.4th 1315, 1320 (11th Cir. 2021). “Substantial
       evidence is more than a scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a
       reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclu-
       sion.” Id. We review de novo the ALJ’s application of the law. See
       id. “We review de novo the district court’s determination as to
       whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence.”
       Id.
             A person who applies for Social Security DIB or for SSI ben-
       eﬁts must ﬁrst prove that he is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§
       404.1512(a), 416.912(a). The Social Security Regulations outline a
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       22-11935               Opinion of the Court                        3

       ﬁve-step sequential evaluation process for determining whether a
       claimant is disabled. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4).
       The ALJ must evaluate (1) whether the claimant engaged in sub-
       stantial gainful work; (2) whether the claimant has a severe impair-
       ment; (3) whether the severe impairment meets or equals an im-
       pairment in the Listings of Impairments; (4) whether the claimant
       has the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform his past rel-
       evant work; and (5) whether, in the light of the claimant’s RFC,
       age, education, and work experience, other jobs exist in the na-
       tional economy the claimant can perform. Id.
              Following two hearings, the ALJ denied Ragusa’s application
       for DIB and for SSI. Applying the ﬁve-step evaluation process, the
       ALJ found that Ragusa suﬀered from three severe impairments: is-
       chemic heart disease/coronary artery disease, asthma, and diabe-
       tes with neuropathy. The ALJ concluded, however, that Ragusa had
       no impairment or combination of impairments that met or medi-
       cally equaled an impairment in the Listing of Impairments.
              The ALJ next determined that Ragusa had the RFC to per-
       form light work with speciﬁed postural and environmental limita-
       tions. Pertinent to this appeal, the ALJ determined that Ragusa
       must “avoid concentrated exposure to extreme cold/heat, humid-
       ity, wetness, fumes, odors, gases, dust and other pulmonary irri-
       tants.” Considering Ragusa’s age, education, work experience, and
       RFC -- together with the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”) -
       - the ALJ determined that Ragusa could perform other work in the
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11935

       national economy. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Ragusa
       was not disabled.
             Ragusa administratively appealed the ALJ’s decision to the
       Appeals Council. The Appeals Council denied Ragusa’s request for
       review. The district court aﬃrmed.
                                         II.
              On appeal, Ragusa focuses on step ﬁve in the sequential eval-
       uation process. According to Ragusa, the ALJ’s determination that
       Ragusa could perform other work in the national economy is un-
       supported by substantial evidence. In particular, Ragusa challenges
       the methodology the VE used to estimate the number of available
       jobs in the national economy. Ragusa also contends that the ALJ
       failed to identify and resolve an “apparent conﬂict” between the
       VE’s testimony and the Dictionary of Titles (“DOT”).
              “[T]he critical inquiry at step ﬁve is whether jobs exist in the
       national economy in signiﬁcant numbers that the claimant could
       perform in spite of his impairments.” Washington v. Comm’r of Soc.
       Sec., 906 F.3d 1353, 1360 (11th Cir. 2018). In making this inquiry,
       the ALJ “does not tally the number of job openings at a given time,
       but rather approximates the number of positions that exist,
       whether vacant or ﬁlled, and without regard to the location of the
       work and a claimant’s likelihood of being hired.” See Goode v.
       Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 966 F.3d 1277, 1281 (11th Cir. 2020). To esti-
       mate the number of available jobs, the ALJ often relies on the tes-
       timony of a VE: a professional with experience in job placement
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       22-11935              Opinion of the Court                        5

       and knowledge of working conditions. See Biestek v. Berryhill, 139
       S. Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019).
             At Ragusa’s hearing, a VE identiﬁed three representative oc-
       cupations that a hypothetical person with Ragusa’s limitations
       could perform: (1) housekeeper, DOT 323.687-014, with an esti-
       mated 102,000 jobs available in the national economy; (2) cashier,
       DOT 299.687-014, with an estimated 180,000 jobs available in the
       national economy; and (3) sandwich board carrier, DOT 211.462-
       010, with an estimated 9,000 jobs available in the national economy.
                                       A.
              On appeal, Ragusa contends that the VE relied on a ﬂawed
       methodology in determining the estimated number of available
       jobs for each of the three identiﬁed positions. As a result, Ragusa
       says the VE’s testimony constituted no substantial evidence sup-
       porting the ALJ’s step-ﬁve determination.
               To estimate the types and number of jobs a claimant can
       perform in the national economy, the VE may rely on various pub-
       licly-available sources -- including the DOT -- and on “their own
       experience in job placement or career counseling.” See Biestek, 139
       S. Ct. at 1152-53 (quotations omitted). The DOT is a publication
       produced by the Department of Labor that groups similar jobs into
       “occupations” and assigns each occupation a code number. See
       Goode, 966 F.3d at 1281. The DOT, however, provides no statistical
       information about the number of jobs available in the national
       economy. See id. To estimate the number of available jobs, the VE
       must therefore consult other sources of employment statistics, like
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                22-11935

       the Occupational Employment and Wage Statistics program the
       VE used in this case. See id.
               Instead of using DOT codes, these statistical sources com-
       pile employment data using a job-classiﬁcation system called the
       Standard Occupational Classiﬁcation (“SOC”) system. See Goode,
       966 F.3d at 1281; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, OCCUPATIONAL
       EMPLOYMENT                AND           WAGE              STATISTICS,
       https://www.bls.gov/oes/oes_emp.htm (last visited 17 August
       2023). Because the SOC sorts jobs into broad occupational catego-
       ries, “a single SOC group may contain multiple DOT occupations.”
       See Goode, 966 F.3d at 1281 (noting that, “the use of one system to
       supply the job titles and another system to provide the job numbers
       creates a matching problem: a one-to-one correlation does not ex-
       ist” (brackets omitted)). Thus, after the VE determines the total
       number of available jobs in a given SOC group, the VE “must use
       some method for associating SOC-based employment numbers to
       DOT-based job types.” See id. at 1283.
              Here, the VE testiﬁed that he calculated the estimated num-
       ber of available jobs for each of the representative occupations by
       dividing the number of available jobs within each of the pertinent
       SOC groups by the number of DOT codes within that SOC group.
       This method of calculation is known as the “equal distribution
       method”: a method that “assumes that the total number of jobs
       that exist for a given SOC group are distributed equally among the
       number of DOT occupations within that SOC group.” See id. at
       1284. We have included the “equal distribution method” among
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       22-11935              Opinion of the Court                        7

       the possible methods that are “on the table” for VEs to consider in
       calculating job availability. See id. (stressing that “we express no
       view on the merits of any particular approach”).
              Beyond relying on the “equal distribution method,” the VE
       in this case also testiﬁed that he relied on the software programs
       JobBrowser and SkillTRAN to assess the job-incidence data. We
       have identiﬁed the use of these programs as another potential cal-
       culation method “on the table” for VEs. See id. The VE testiﬁed
       further that he had professional experience placing applicants in
       cashier and housekeeping positions and had observed those two
       positions being performed: testimony that demonstrates that the
       VE applied the calculation methods “in conjunction with his [own]
       knowledge and expertise.” See id.
              Ragusa has failed to demonstrate that the VE’s methodol-
       ogy for estimating the number of available jobs was impermissibly
       inconsistent or unreliable. Nor has Ragusa presented evidence or
       data contradicting the VE’s job estimates. On this record, we con-
       clude that the VE’s testimony about the availability of jobs in the
       national economy was suﬃciently reliable to constitute substantial
       evidence supporting the ALJ’s determination at step ﬁve.
                                       B.
              Ragusa next contends that the ALJ failed to resolve an “ap-
       parent conﬂict” between the VE’s testimony and the DOT’s job de-
       scription for the “sandwich board carrier” job. Given the purported
       unresolved conﬂict, Ragusa says a remand is necessary to allow for
       additional factﬁnding.
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       8                          Opinion of the Court                        22-11935

               An ALJ has “an aﬃrmative duty” to identify and to resolve
       “apparent conﬂicts” between a VE’s testimony and the DOT. See
       Washington, 906 F.3d at 1365. An “apparent conﬂict” is “a conﬂict
       that is reasonably ascertainable or evident from a review of the
       DOT and the VE’s testimony.” Id. (“At a minimum, a conﬂict is
       apparent if a reasonable comparison of the DOT with the VE’s tes-
       timony suggests that there is a discrepancy, even if, after further
       investigation, that turns out not to be the case.”). When an ALJ
       fails to discharge this duty, “the ALJ’s decision, when based on the
       contradicted VE testimony, is not supported by substantial evi-
       dence.” Id. at 1362.
               According to the DOT, the position of “sandwich board car-
       rier” involves constant “exposure to weather” but no exposure to
       extreme cold, to extreme heat, to atmospheric conditions, or to wet
       and/or humid conditions.1 See DOT 299.687-014.

       1 The Selected Characteristics of Occupations (“SCO”) -- a companion publi-

       cation to the DOT -- clarifies that exposure to “extreme cold,” “extreme heat,”
       and “wet and/or humid” conditions means exposure to “nonweather-related”
       cold or hot temperatures and humidity. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, SELECTED
       CHARACTERISTICS OF OCCUPATIONS DEFINED IN THE REVISED DICTIONARY OF
       OCCUPATIONAL TITLES App. D., at D-1 (rev. ed. 1993) (emphasis added). The
       SCO also provides that exposure to “atmospheric conditions” means “[e]xpo-
       sure to such conditions as fumes, noxious odors, dusts, mists, gases, and poor
       ventilation, that affect the respiratory system, eyes, or the skin.” See id. at D-
       2. “[E]xposure to weather,” on the other hand, means “[e]xposure to outside
       atmospheric conditions.” See id. at D-1.
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       22-11935                 Opinion of the Court                           9

               Meanwhile, Ragusa’s RFC contains no weather-related limi-
       tation. 2 Instead, Ragusa’s RFC provides that he should “avoid con-
       centrated exposure to extreme cold/heat, humidity, wetness,
       fumes, odors, gases, dust and other pulmonary irritants”: condi-
       tions the DOT provides expressly are “Not Present” in the job of
       “sandwich board carrier.” See id.
              The DOT’s job description for “sandwich board carrier” is
       consistent with the VE’s testimony that a claimant with Ragusa’s
       limitations could perform that position. In other words, no “rea-
       sonably ascertainable or evident” conﬂict exists between the DOT
       and the VE’s testimony. The ALJ thus committed no error in rely-
       ing on the VE’s testimony at step ﬁve.
             Substantial evidence supports the Commissioner’s denial of
       SSI and DBI; we aﬃrm.
              AFFIRMED.

       2 Never has Ragusa challenged the ALJ’s RFC determination or asserted that

       his RFC should include a weather-related limitation.