Court Opinion

ID: 9571918
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:36:14.877091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:10.262243
License: Public Domain

Justice - ERICKSON
dissenting:
The trial court found that the purpose and scope of the search of the defendant’s automobile was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances.1 Based on these findings, the trial court suppressed the evidence seized from the defendant’s vehicle.
The majority, based on its interpretation of the record, holds that the search of the defendant’s ear was justified and that the scope of the search was reasonably related to the purpose of ensuring the safety of the police officer who stopped the defendant’s vehicle. As a result of this holding, the majority overrules the trial court and reverses the trial court’s order suppressing the evidence and statements that resulted from the search. In my opinion, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the search was unreasonable. Accordingly, I dissent.
I
On September 18, 1992, at approximately 10:45 p.m., Officer Shannon Lucy (Officer Lucy) of the Aurora Police Department was on routine patrol when she received a radio communication from fellow officers who were investigating a stabbing. The radio communication advised police officers patrolling in the area of the stabbing to be on the lookout for an older model Datsun automobile, dark in color, possibly brown, with license plates containing the letters “B,” “C,” or “J.” The radio report stated that the police officers investigating the stabbing believed that the three black men in the Datsun were involved in the stabbing that occurred at the 1600 block of Beeler Street. The Datsun was seen proceeding north on Beeler and then east on 17th Avenue immediately after the *1301stabbing. The three black men in the Dat-sun were not described in the report.
Approximately one hour and fifteen minutes after the information was broadcast, Officer Lucy saw a 1984 Nissan 200SX automobile occupied by three black males. The car was traveling west on Colfax Avenue near Florence Street. The location of the Nissan was south of where the reported stabbing occurred and it was traveling toward, rather than away from, the scene of the attack. Officer Lucy followed the Nissan for approximately four blocks. She later testified that she did not remember if the name “Datsun” was printed anywhere on the Nissan but did recall that the neither the letter “B,” “C,” nor “J” was on the license plates. Officer Lucy testified that the driver of the Nissan had not violated any traffic laws. Although no traffic infractions were committed, and despite the discrepancies between the information in the radio alert and her observations, Officer Lucy stopped the Nissan.
Two backup officers were called to assist Officer Lucy. Officer Lucy requested identification from all three individuals in the Nissan. The driver of the automobile, Darin Weston (Weston), produced personal identification and registration documents for the automobile. The two passengers also produced identification. The automobile registration and the identification provided by each of the three individuals was in order. Nevertheless, Officer Lucy ordered Weston and the passengers to exit the vehicle and then conducted a pat-down weapons search on each of the individuals. No weapons were found. Officer Lucy later testified that none of the men appeared to have been involved in a stabbing or any other kind of fight. She saw no signs of blood and the men’s clothing was not disheveled or torn.
After completing the weapons search, Officer Lucy searched Weston’s automobile. While searching the inside of the automobile, she reached inside a map pocket on the driver’s side door. She described the pocket as six to eight inches deep and less than three inches wide at the top. The search of the pocket resulted in the discovery of two small glassine bags, one of which Officer Lucy believed contained cocaine and the other marijuana.
No weapons were found during the search of the car and neither Weston nor his passengers were ever identified as having any involvement in the alleged stabbing. Weston was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance, cocaine,2 and unlawful possession of less than one ounce of marijuana.3 Weston filed a motion to suppress the evidence and statements which were obtained as a result of the stop. The trial court heard testimony from the arresting officer and, at the conclusion of the hearing on Weston’s motion, found that the search of the Nissan was unconstitutional. Based on this finding, the court ordered the suppression of the cocaine, the marijuana, and the statements made by the defendant.
II
I agree that a police officer may conduct an investigatory stop and a limited search of a person for weapons providing that three requirements are met: (1) there must be an articulable and specific basis in fact for suspecting that criminal activity has occurred, is taking place, or is about to take place; (2) the purpose of the intrusion must be reasonable; and (3) the scope and character of the intrusion must be reasonably related to its purpose. People v. Martinez, 801 P.2d 542, 544 (Colo.1990). During an investigatory stop, a police officer may search the areas of the passenger compartment of an automobile where a weapon could be placed. People v. Melgosa, 753 P.2d 221, 225 (Colo.1988). In deciding whether an officer possessed reasonable suspicion, or whether a particular intrusion is reasonable, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances. People v. Bell, 698 P.2d 269, 272 (Colo.1985).
Officer Lucy testified that three factors led her to search the vehicle: (1) Weston’s vehicle was in a high-crime area; (2) one of the passengers was dressed “gang-style”; and (3) her belief that the suspect vehicle was involved in the stabbing.
*1302The fact that a suspect is in a high-crime area, without more, is not sufficient to justify a reasonable suspicion. Brown v. Texas, 448 U.S. 47, 52, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 2641, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979). In People v. Rahming, 795 P.2d 1338, 1340 (Colo.1990), a police officer detained three young males on the basis that one of the juveniles was dressed like a member of a gang called the “crips,” i.e., he was wearing a jacket with the Los Angeles Raiders emblem on the back, a blue hat, black jeans, and British Knight tennis 'shoes. Even though the three youths were seen near an apartment where rival gang leaders lived, and the officer who stopped the three juveniles had recently arrested individuals who lived in the apartment for a drive-by shooting and assault on a crip gang member, we found that the circumstances did not create a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was about to occur. Id. at 1341-43.
Officer Lucy stated that one of the reasons she searched the car was the fact that a passenger in the car was dressed “gang-style.” She did not elaborate regarding the type of clothing that fits this description. Officer Lucy also stated that the stop occurred in an area of gang and drug activity. The passenger’s clothing and the fact that the Nissan was stopped in an area of gang and drug activity are insufficient to warrant a reasonable suspicion that Weston’s vehicle contained a weapon. See United States v. Daniel, 804 F.Supp. 1330, 1335 n. 10 (D.Nev. 1992) (recognizing that Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), and its progeny, require some degree of particularized suspicion beyond gang membership).
The information regarding the vehicle does not provide the missing quantum of evidence sufficient to justify a reasonable belief that a weapon would be found in the Nissan. The investigating officers described the automobile that fled from the scene of the stabbing as an older model, dark, possibly brown, Datsun with the letters “B,” “C,” and “J” on the license plates. Weston’s car did not match the description. His car was a recent model Nissan and not one of the letters on Weston’s license plates matched those of the suspect vehicle. Although Weston’s vehicle was spotted within six to eight blocks of the crime scene, an hour and fifteen minutes had elapsed and Weston was proceeding toward the scene of the crime, not in the probable direction of flight which was broadcast by the dispatcher. Given the substantial time lapse and the Nissan’s direction of travel, the suspicious effect of being near the crime scene is negligible.
In addition to the lack of evidence supporting the officer’s three reasons for searching the automobile, there is other evidence which supports the trial court’s suppression order. The three men in the car provided personal identification and Weston produced registration documents for the Nissan. All three men were frisked and nothing was discovered on their persons. Officer Lucy testified that she observed no blood stains or any physical evidence that would indicate that any of the men were involved in a stabbing. Officer Lucy did not indicate that the men acted nervously or suspiciously or that the men gave unsatisfactory answers to any of her question or failed to comply with all of her requests.
When Officer Lucy was asked on direct examination why she searched the interior of the vehicle she testified: “Normally I will do that and it just basically comes down to courtesy to people I’ve stopped. We did not have phones in our car at that time and it takes awhile to clear people via the radio.” On cross-examination Lucy reiterated that she searched the automobile as a courtesy to Weston and the two passengers stating that “it keeps them from having to stand out on the sidewalk for however long this thing takes to get through.” The majority notes that the district court found “the purpose of the search was not the officer’s safety, but the convenience of the occupants ‘so that they would not have to remain out in the cold’ while the officer obtained clearances.” Maj. op. at 1297-1298.
Despite the evidence which supports the trial court’s findings, the majority relies on Officer Lucy’s testimony about her concerns for her safety and overrules the trial court’s findings. The majority correctly states that the examination of the objective circumstances surrounding a search results in fac*1303tual findings. Maj. op. at 1298. In reviewing a trial court’s factual findings, our inquiry is not to determine if the record supports a different interpretation of the facts; our inquiry is whether the record contains sufficient evidence to support the trial court’s findings.4 Rahming, 795 P.2d at 1341.
Based on the totality of the circumstances surrounding the stop of the vehicle, the subsequent actions of the three men in the vehicle, the lack of evidence uncovered prior to the search of the automobile, and the testimony of Officer Lucy, there was competent evidence in the record to support the trial court’s finding that the purpose and scope of the search was unreasonable.
III
In my view, the record contains evidence supporting the trial court’s finding that the search of Weston’s automobile was unreasonable. Accordingly, I would affirm the trial court’s findings and suppression order.
SCOTT, J., joins in this dissent.

. The trial court specifically stated:
[T]he Court would find that the reason for the search was based upon a convenience of the witnesses, if you will, so that they would not have to remain out in the cold.
That was the officer’s testimony, and this Court would find that the scope of the search, without either a lawful arrest or further establishment of probable cause, was unreasonable under the totality of the circumstances; and that there's been no showing of the necessity to come about or enter the motor vehicle of Mr. Weston.
The Court will find that the stop was appropriate; that the scope of the intrusion, vis-a-vis the search, was not reasonable under the totality of the circumstances test....
Although the court found that there was a reasonable and articulable suspicion which justified the investigatory stop of Weston's car, I agree with the majority that this issue is not reviewable under C.A.R. 4.1. Maj. op. at 1297; see also People v. Weeams, 665 P.2d 619, 623 (Colo.1983).

. § 18-18-405, 8B C.R.S. (1993 Supp.).

. § 18-18-106(1), 8B C.R.S. (1986).

. The majority indicates its willingness to review the trial court's findings de novo in its conclusion, "we disagree with the district court and hold that Officer Lucy was justified in conducting a limited search of Weston’s car for weapons.” Maj. op. at 1299.