Court Opinion

ID: 9718774
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:33:32.086244+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:16.197750
License: Public Domain

HANSON (P. D.), Acting P. J.
I concur in the affirmance as to all counts, but do not join in the majority’s broad statement that the principles underlying People v. Arbuckle (1978) 22 Cal.3d 749 [150 Cal.Rptr. 778, 587 P.2d 220, 3 A.L.R.3d 1171] have no application except in unusual circumstances to guilty pleas taken by a magistrate under Penal Code section 859a.
I agree that under the statutory scheme a defendant has no right to be sentenced by a magistrate merely because the plea is taken before that officer. However, the Arbuckle rule recognizes the exercise of sentencing discretion may differ significantly among judges and protects a defendant’s reasonable expectations based upon approval of his bargain by a particular judge. Although a magistrate will not generally have a demonstrated propensity in felony sentencing, in considering the validity of a guilty plea, we must be concerned with the perceptions of the defendant. Under section *826859a and related statutes concerning the taking of guilty pleas, prior to certification the magistrate may approve pleas of guilty or nolo contendere specifying the degree of the crime or the punishment. (See Pen. Code, §§ 1192.2, 1192.4, 1192.5.) A lay person cannot be presumed to know, without being told, that by pleading guilty before a magistrate who has approved the plea bargain, he is electing to be sentenced by an unspecified superior court judge.
Accordingly, it would be a much better practice and no great burden for the magistrate taking a defendant’s plea under section 859a clearly to inform the defendant he will be sentenced by a different judge. Such an admonition (in addition to those required by section 1192.5, if applicable) would provide to a defendant who pleads guilty at an earlier stage of the proceedings the same degree of protection to ensure the plea is knowing and intelligent as is afforded a defendant who pleads in superior court. Furthermore, such a record admonition would avert an unascertainable, but potentially significant1 number of motions to set aside guilty pleas under Penal Code section 1018.
Flere, appellant did not move to set aside the guilty plea and made no showing he was unaware his sentencing would be conducted by a superior court judge. Appellant does not claim he relied on any supposed discretion of the magistrate in entering his plea. Under these circumstances, I concur in the affirmance.
Appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied October 19, 1984. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

 In light of the addition in 1982 of Penal Code section 1192.7 (prohibiting, except in specified circumstances, plea bargaining where “the indictment or information charges any serious felony or any offense of driving while under the influence . . . .”), it is apparent the number of pleas taken by magistrates under section 859a will increase.