Court Opinion

ID: 9632214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:07:01.920927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:49.796427
License: Public Domain

Allegrucci, J.,
dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s interpretation of K.S.A. 21-4303(b) and K.S.A. 21-4302(5). I agree with the principles of statutory construction stated in Syllabus
*221§§ 1 and 2, but not with the majority’s application of them in the present case. I agree with the Court of Appeals that, since the State failed to establish that the residence was a gambling place within the meaning of K.S.A. 21-4302(5), the defendants’ convictions must be reversed.
The majority’s interpretation of K.S.A. 21-4303(b), that proof the residence had previously been used for gambling or that gambling is “one of its principal uses” is not required, converts a home, school, church, monastery, or nursing home into a “gambling place” if on one occasion bets or offers to bet are made therein. Since gambling is making a bet under 21-4303(a), such an interpretation renders the definition of a “gambling place” in K.S.A. 21-4302(5) superfluous.
I do not find the statute to be clear and unambiguous; however, the majority’s finding that, since the statute is clear and unambiguous, the court “must give effect to the legislative intent therein expressed rather than make a determination of what the law should or should not be [and that] no room is left for statutory construction” is misleading. (Emphasis added.) In Todd v. Kelly, 251 Kan. 512, 513, 837 P.2d 381 (1992), the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit certified a question concerning the interpretation of K.S.A. 40-3422. The pertinent part of that statute to be interpreted was “the proceedings shall be stayed on appeal by the filing of a supersedeas bond in the full amount of the judgment against the health care provider signed by the commissioner of insurance as administrator of the health care stabilization fund without surety or other security.” Federal District Judge Patrick F. Kelly held the statutory provision was clear, unambiguous, and mandatory, notwithstanding K.S.A. 1991 Supp. 40-3403(e), which set a maximum liability of the fund of $3,000,000. We responded: *222Notwithstanding that the statute is clear and unambiguous, we did not give effect to the legislative intent as expressed therein but, rather, looked to the entire Act and the legislative history of the original Act and its numerous amendments. We concluded that K.S.A. 40-3422 cannot be construed to require the Fund to post an appeal bond in excess of its maximum liability under 40-3403(e). 251 Kan. at 519-20. We noted, in reaching this conclusion, that courts are given exceptional leeway in interpreting statutes requiring appeal bonds. 251 Kan. at 525.
*221“We now turn to the issue raised by the certified question. We agree with the trial judge that K.S.A. 40-3422, when read in isolation, is clear and unambiguous and appears to require a supersedeas bond in the full amount of the judgment. However, as the foregoing rules and authorities clearly demonstrate, such a simplistic and narrow reading of the statute is not available to us. K.S.A. 40-3422 may not be read in isolation but may only be considered in connection with the other provision of the ■ Health Care Provider Insurance Availability Act, K.S.A. 40-3401 et seq. (the Act).” 251 Kan. at 516.
*222Here, we are interpreting a criminal statute, which we must strictly construe in favor of the defendants. Interpreting K.S.A. 21-4303(b) in that manner supports the Court of Appeals’ interpretation. I do not find that interpretation to be unreasonable and insensible in effectuating the legislative design and true intent. This is made evident by the Judicial Council notes following K.S.A. 21-4303. In my opinion, the majority’s interpretation does not express the true intent of the legislature.
I must therefore dissent, and I would affirm the Court of Appeals and reverse the district court.