Court Opinion

ID: 9776807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:45:11.567558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:23.668242
License: Public Domain

CANTU, Justice,
concurring.
Because of the tactical problems experienced by appellant in presenting his evidence in its most favorable posture, I feel compelled to express my separate views regarding the so called “voucher rule”. Given the opportunity to do so, I would encourage the demise of the rule, thus bringing Texas in step with the world of reality.
Requiring that appellant demonstrate hostility or a cognizable injury in order to impeach the deceased’s wife, a clearly hostile witness ab initio, rubs against the grain of the truth gathering process and serves to perpetuate irrationality.
A reading of Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973) would seem to lead to the conclusion that a “voucher rule” has no place in a *135criminal proceeding, whatever the jurisdiction. Surely the argument cannot be made that the Texas rule is significantly different from that of Mississippi.
It is time that Texas abandon trial by compurgation, the Justinian Code and such other archaic concepts still clinging on unnecessarily and hampering the truth-seeking processes.
For too long now Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 1821 has existed without a criminal counterpart. The same argument can be made in the instant case as was made in U.S. v. Bryant, 461 F.2d 912 (6th Cir.1972) when the court, recognizing Rule 43(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C. and the lack of a criminal counterpart,2 stated:
... [TJhere is even more reason for permitting such a practice in criminal cases where every proper means of ascertaining the truth should be placed at the defendant’s disposal.
The voucher rule has been universally criticized as having “no place in a rational system of investigation in modern society ... all attempts to modify or qualify it so as to reach sensible results serves only to demonstrate its irrationality and to increase the uncertainties of litigation.” 1 Morgan, Basic Problems of Evidence, p. 64 (1954 Ed.); See also 3 Wigmore on Evidence, §§ 896-899 (3rd Ed. 1940); Ladd, Impeachment of One’s Own Witness-New Developments, 4 U.Chi.L.Rev. 69 (1936); U.S. v. Norman, 518 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir.1975); U.S. v. Lineberger, 444 F.2d 122 (4th Cir.1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 1060, 92 S.Ct. 746, 30 L.Ed.2d 748 (1972); U.S. v. Stamps, 430 F.2d 33 (dissenting opinion of Circuit Judge Simpson) (5th Cir.1970); U.S. v. Fancher, 319 F.2d 604 (2d Cir.1963); Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial Judge, 64 Va.L.Rev. 1, 67 (1978); 3 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein’s Evidence, 607[01].
I agree with the majority opinion that appellant was, in practical effect, permitted to proceed with a relaxed application of the voucher rule, yet I can find no justification for the application of the rule to any degree, be it relaxed, modified or otherwise.
I urge the legislature to consider the beneficial effects of a rule comparable to Rule 607, Federal Rules of Evidence.

. Source: Acts 1929, 41st Leg. 1st C.S. p. 255, ch. 105, § 1.
In the trial of any civil suit or proceeding in any justice court, county court, or district court any party plaintiff or defendant shall have the right to call as a witness in his behalf any other individual who is a party to such suit or proceedings, either as plaintiff or defendant ... any such witness may be examined by the party calling the witness, and if such witness give testimony adverse to the party calling him, the party so calling such adverse witness shall not be bound to accept the testimony of such adverse witness as true, but shall have the right to impeach such witness and the testimony of such witness, and shall have the right to introduce other evidence upon any issue involved in such suit or proceeding without regard to the testimony of such adverse witness, and in examining such adverse witness leading questions may be asked by counsel for the party calling such witness but opposing counsel shall not be permitted to ask such witness leading questions or in any manner lead such witness.

. Rule 607, Federal Rules of Evidence, Pub.L. 93-595, § 1, Jan. 2, 1975, 88 Stat.1934, “The credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him.”