Court Opinion

ID: 9955256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-27 20:16:16.061312+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:22.406934
License: Public Domain

ENTRY ORDER

                                           2024 VT 18

                           SUPREME COURT CASE NO. 24-AP-070

                                      MARCH TERM, 2024

 In re Eva P. Vekos, Esq.                          }    Original Jurisdiction
 (Office of Disciplinary Counsel)                  }
                                                   }    Professional Responsibility Board
                                                   }
                                                   }    CASE NO. PRB-097-2024

                         In the above-entitled cause, the Clerk will enter:

        ¶ 1.   Respondent Eva P. Vekos is an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of
Vermont. She is currently the State’s Attorney for Addison County. On March 1, 2024,
Disciplinary Counsel filed a petition seeking the immediate interim suspension of respondent’s
license under Administrative Order 9, Rule 22(A). Respondent provided a written response to the
petition and the Court held a hearing on the petition on March 20, 2024, which was attended by
Disciplinary Counsel, respondent, and respondent’s counsel. Having reviewed the materials
submitted by Disciplinary Counsel, we conclude that the requirements of A.O. 9, Rule 22(A), are
satisfied and we immediately suspend respondent’s license to practice law on an interim basis in
accordance with A.O. 9, Rule 22(B). Respondent is directed to comply with the notice
requirements of A.O. 9, Rule 27.

        ¶ 2.   As set forth in the petition for immediate interim suspension, in late January 2024,
Disciplinary Counsel learned of respondent’s arrest for operating or attempting to operate a motor
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (DUI). He obtained a copy of a press release from
the Vermont State Police (VSP) summarizing the alleged circumstances that led to respondent’s
DUI arrest and citation. Disciplinary Counsel determined that respondent’s alleged actions with
respect to her DUI arrest, if true, could constitute attorney misconduct under the Vermont Rules
of Professional Conduct, and he opened an investigation.

        ¶ 3.   Pursuant to this investigation, Disciplinary Counsel emailed respondent on January
26, 2024, and directed her to provide him with a written response by February 15, 2024 “addressing
the allegations against you contained in the attached VSP press release and how they may bear
upon your fitness to practice law.” Attorney David Sleigh later emailed Disciplinary Counsel to
state that he was representing respondent with respect to the disciplinary investigation. After an
exchange of emails, Attorney Sleigh agreed to provide the requested statement by February 15.

        ¶ 4.  On February 1, 2024, Disciplinary Counsel became aware that respondent had
emailed a number of high-ranking Vermont law enforcement officers. The email stated, in part,
that respondent would no longer personally meet with them in the course of her duties as State’s
Attorney “because [she] no longer feel[s] safe around law enforcement.”. Disciplinary Counsel
later obtained and reviewed a copy of respondent’s email correspondence with these law
enforcement officers.

          ¶ 5.   Respondent was thereafter charged and arraigned on the DUI charge; she pled not
guilty.

        ¶ 6.    On February 15th, Disciplinary Counsel learned that Attorney Sleigh had issued a
press release on respondent’s behalf stating that respondent was now on “medical leave” from her
position as Addison County State’s Attorney. Attorney Sleigh was quoted as stating that “[w]e
think it’s a public interest that [respondent] is stepping away for a while.” He indicated that
respondent would return to the job when “fully grounded” and “up to the task.” Disciplinary
Counsel emailed Attorney Sleigh to request that in the submission due on February 15, respondent
also discuss “the reasons/causes, nature and expected duration of [her] medical leave” and further
that counsel provide a copy of the press release referenced above. Attorney Sleigh responded that
he would not have time to do so and would comply by February 23.

        ¶ 7.    On February 15, Attorney Sleigh sent Disciplinary Counsel a copy of the press
release as well as a written response to Disciplinary Counsel’s January 26th request that respondent
“address[] the allegations against you contained in the attached VSP press release and how they
may bear upon your fitness to practice law.” The response did not address respondent’s medical
leave or discuss any facts bearing upon whether she may be currently incapacitated by a physical
or mental condition from practicing law.

       ¶ 8.    On February 16th, Disciplinary Counsel emailed Attorney Sleigh to stress that if
respondent “is physically or mentally incapacitated from practicing law (which is what taking a
medical leave would strongly suggest), [he] need[ed] to know the details of that promptly,” rather
than waiting another week for such information. Disciplinary Counsel also requested an
examination of respondent’s “relevant health records and [to] perhaps speak to her treaters.”
Attorney Sleigh did not respond.

       ¶ 9.     On February 26, Disciplinary Counsel warned respondent that he might seek her
immediate interim suspension given her failure to cooperate with his investigation. Attorney
Sleigh responded that day that respondent “plans on returning to work soon” and “[t]here’s no
reason for you to examine her health records or speak to her treaters” because “she has no mental
or physical issues that would impede her ability to practice law.” Disciplinary Counsel noted that
Attorney Sleigh had publicly characterized respondent’s self-imposed hiatus from her law practice
as a “medical leave,” and he therefore required “an explanation and related documentation of the
medical reasons for the leave,” as well as clarification on when exactly respondent planned to
resume her duties, other than “soon.” As of the filing of his petition on March 1, Disciplinary
Counsel had no further communications with Attorney Sleigh.

        ¶ 10. Under A.O. 9, Rule 22(A), an interim suspension order is appropriate where an
attorney has “(1) either committed a violation of the rules of professional responsibility . . . or is
under a disability under [A.O. 9,] Rule 25,” and (2) the attorney “presently poses a substantial
threat of serious harm to the public.” “The purpose of an interim suspension is to quickly protect
the public from harm” and “[i]t is not the equivalent of a suspension imposed as a sanction

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following a determination of misconduct under A.O. 9, Rule 15(A)(2).” In re Carris, 2021 VT 32,
¶ 2, 214 Vt. 648, 254 A.3d 849 (mem.). “[I]t is an interim order put in place until a final disposition
is made pursuant to either disciplinary or disability proceedings. Id.

       ¶ 11. Disciplinary Counsel argues that an immediate interim suspension is warranted
here because respondent violated Vermont Rule of Professional Conduct 8.1(b), and she “presently
poses a substantial threat of serious harm to the public.” A.O. 9, Rule 22(A). We agree.

        ¶ 12. Rule 8.1(b) prohibits a lawyer, “in connection with a disciplinary matter,” from
“knowingly fail[ing] to respond to a lawful demand for information from . . . [a] disciplinary
authority.” V.R.Pr.C. 8.1(b). Rule 8.1(b) is based on a model rule, the annotations to which
recognize that “[l]etters from disciplinary counsel . . . seeking information constitute lawful
demands; subpoenas are not required.” See Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 8.1 annot. (Am. Bar
Ass’n 2023) [hereinafter Model Rules] (citing cases on “Duty to Respond”); see also Att’y
Grievance Comm’n of Md. v. Fezell, 760 A.2d 1108, 1115-16 (Md. 2000) (looking to identical
Model Rule to define “lawful demand,” and explaining that “[u]niversally, the ABA Model Rule
has been interpreted to require an attorney to respond to letters or telephone calls from the
disciplinary authority without the use of a subpoena” and citing cases). As this and other courts
have recognized in suspending attorneys for violations of this rule, the “process of investigating
complaints depends to a great extent upon an individual attorney’s cooperation,” and “[w]ithout
that cooperation, the [disciplinary authority] is deprived of information necessary to determine
whether the lawyer should continue to be certified to the public as fit.” Att’y Grievance Comm’n
of Md. v. Weirs, 102 A.3d 332, 341 (Md. 2014) (quotation omitted).

        ¶ 13. In this case, as set forth above, Disciplinary Counsel opened a disciplinary
investigation following respondent’s DUI arrest. When respondent publicly announced that she
was taking a “medical leave” from her position until she was “fully grounded” and “up to the task,”
Disciplinary Counsel reasonably requested that respondent provide information regarding “the
reasons/causes, nature and expected duration of [her] medical leave,” among other things.
Respondent said she was too busy to respond immediately and she did not provide any information
by February 23 as she stated she would. Respondent did not assert that any of the information
requested by Disciplinary Counsel was privileged; she simply did not respond. When Disciplinary
Counsel reached out to respondent for a third time on February 26, respondent’s attorney
essentially told him that he should not be concerned. When Disciplinary Counsel reiterated his
request, respondent again failed to respond. Her conduct plainly violated Rule 8.1.

        ¶ 14. We note that this case is not about whether respondent’s medical records should be
provided to Disciplinary Counsel. Should a question arise about whether certain records are
privileged, the rules provide a process by which such issues may be pursued. See A.O. 9, Rule 19.
The issue here is solely about whether respondent responded to a lawful demand for information
under Rule 8.1. She did not. The information in respondent’s press release was sufficient to cause
Disciplinary Counsel to inquire into the situation and it was a lawful demand. As set forth above,

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respondent gave no information to Disciplinary Counsel in response to his request, aside from a
copy of the press release announcing respondent’s “medical leave.”*

        ¶ 15. Respondent’s behavior presents a substantial threat of harm to the public. Because
she did not cooperate with Disciplinary Counsel, he “cannot determine if a disability investigation
should be opened,” and he “cannot assess how to protect the public.” In re Legus, 2020 VT 40,
¶ 5, 212 Vt. 653, 235 A.3d 517 (mem.). As in Legus, “[r]espondent’s behavior has significantly
impaired Disciplinary Counsel’s ability to fulfill [his] obligation to protect the public and it
warrants the immediate interim suspension of respondent’s license to practice law.” Id.; see also
In re Tao, 2022 VT 7, ¶ 6, 216 Vt. 596, 273 A.3d 652 (mem.) (reaching similar conclusion where
attorney failed to cooperate with Disciplinary Counsel).

        ¶ 16. Numerous courts have reached similar conclusions. See Model Rules, r. 8.1 annot.
(regarding “Discipline as a Lawyer for Lack of Candor to Admissions Authorities” recognizing
that “Rule 8.1(b) imposes what is usually described as a duty of cooperation,” and explaining that
“lawyer who ignores or falsely responses to a disciplinary authority’s request for information can
be disciplined for violating Rule 8.1 even if the disciplinary authority does not bring, or dismisses,
any other charges of misconduct”) (citing cases); see also In re Liviz, 144 N.E.3d 284, 285-86
(Mass. 2020) (affirming suspension of respondent from practice of law for failing to respond to
bar counsel’s requests for information during disciplinary investigation, and explaining that
respondent was suspended, not for conduct under investigation, but instead for failing to cooperate,
which itself constituted misconduct subject to discipline under rules).

        ¶ 17. In Weirs, 102 A.3d at 341, for example, the court held that a respondent’s “failure
to cooperate readily and fully with Bar Counsel” violated Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct
8.1, which, like Vermont, is based on the ABA Model Rule. The respondent there took the position
that Bar Counsel “was somehow acting in ‘bad faith’ by making, according to [the] respondent,
baseless and unlawful demands during the investigation,” and that he therefore did not violate Rule
8.1 by refusing to readily cooperate. Id. The court “cautioned [the] respondent against future
conduct of this nature and reaffirm[ed] the importance of Bar Counsel’s role in regulating the legal
profession.” Id. at 342. It emphasized “Bar Counsel’s duty to investigate potential instances of
misconduct” and noted that the “authority to make lawful demands for information carries with it
the authority to demand that attorneys furnish Bar Counsel with the requested information timely
and within a reasonable period of time.” Id.; see also Model Rules, r. 8.1 (regarding “Response
Must Be Timely” recognizing that “response to a demand for information must be timely,” and
that “lawyer’s eventual response does not cure the initial delay” (citing cases)).

       ¶ 18. We reach a similar conclusion. Both practicing attorneys and those seeking
admission to the Vermont Bar have a responsibility to comply with the Rules of Professional
Conduct, including Rule 8.1. The requirement is not a hypertechnical one. As set forth above, it

       *
          We note that the Bar Assistance Program remains an available resource for attorneys,
including respondent. See A.O. 9, Rules 4-7. We encourage attorneys to take time away from
practicing law when needed. In this case, however, respondent provided Disciplinary Counsel
with no information about any issues that she might be experiencing. Absent cooperation from
respondent, Disciplinary Counsel cannot assess the full scope of the circumstances involved,
including whether a referral to a Bar Assistance Program might be appropriate.

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plays a critical role in allowing Disciplinary Counsel to fulfill his duties and in ensuring that those
who practice law are fit to do so. We conclude that the evidence here warrants the immediate
interim suspension of respondent’s license to practice law.

      Respondent’s license to practice law is immediately suspended on an interim basis.
Respondent is directed to comply with the notice requirements of A.O. 9, Rule 27.

                                                  BY THE COURT:

                                                  Paul L. Reiber, Chief Justice

                                                  Harold E. Eaton, Jr., Associate Justice

                                                  Karen R. Carroll, Associate Justice

                                                  William D. Cohen, Associate Justice

                                                  Nancy J. Waples, Associate Justice

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