Court Opinion

ID: 9677138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:44:27.148134+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:54.209244
License: Public Domain

LANSING, Judge
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I agree that the district court properly sentenced D.D.R. by imposing a juvenile sentence and not imposing a stayed adult sentence on the third-degree criminal-sexual-conduct offense. But I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that cumulative error requires that we reverse and remand for a new trial.
I
The majority identifies three errors that combined to deny D.D.R. a fair trial: the prosecutor’s statements in closing argument about the presumption of innocence, the district court’s procedure for D.D.R.’s use of J.B.’s videotaped statement, and the court’s instruction to the jury that the victim’s testimony need not be corroborated. Viewed in their proper context, these three alleged errors did not undermine the *908fairness of the . trial process, and neither the individual nor the cumulative effect of the statements, rulings, or instructions deprived D.D.R. of a fair trial.
First, the record does not support D.D.R.’s claim that the prosecutor’s statements in closing argument “improperly attempted to shift the burden of proof to the defense and misstated the presumption of innocence.” This claim essentially rests on an isolated fragment of one statement by the prosecutor: “[D.D.R.] is no longer presumed innocent.” But this fragment must be evaluated in the context of the full record. In closing argument the prosecutor described the criminal trial process as follows:
There are certain principles of law that the Judge has talked to you about as well. Two of them are the most important. In every criminal case, which this is, there are two overriding principles that govern how a case is handled. First of all, the defendant is presumed innocent and the second is that the State has the burden to prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Now, you must keep these in mind as you evaluate the evidence. Remember that the presumption of innocence stays with the defendant only until the evidence that the State produces prove[s] him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. At that point he is no longer presumed innocent.
(Emphasis added.) The prosecutor recounted the evidence and, in summarizing, stated, “He committed these crimes beyond a reasonable doubt. He’s no longer presumed innocent and justice requires that he — .” At this point, defense counsel objected.
The prosecutor’s argument essentially paralleled the district court’s general instructions at the beginning and the end of the trial that D.D.R. is presumed innocent unless and until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Taken in the full context of the closing argument, the prosecutor’s statement is neither erroneous nor prejudicial. See State v. Walsh, 495 N.W.2d 602, 607 (Minn.1993) (emphasizing that closing arguments should be reviewed for misconduct “as a whole, rather than just selective phrases or remarks that may be taken out of context or given undue prominence”).
D.D.R. assigns further error to the district court’s failure to give a curative instruction on this segment of the prosecutor’s argument. Following the closing statements, the district court reinstructed the jury that it should rely on the evidence and the law as stated by the district court and twice restated the presumption of innocence. The defense attorney, in closing argument, also addressed the presumption of innocence. The defense attorney did not ask for a curative instruction on the presumption of innocence and did not object to the district court’s final instructions. In addition, the district court submitted to the jury extensive written instructions that addressed the respective roles of the judge and the attorneys and restated the presumption of innocence.
D.D.R. similarly alleges that another segment of the state’s closing argument amounted to error and caused cumulative prejudice. These statements were directed to J.B.’s credibility and were not objected to at trial. The prosecutor essentially told the jury that it would have to discount J.B.’s testimony to acquit D.D.R. D.D.R. has not demonstrated that these comments constitute error, let alone plain error. J.B.’s testimony was a significant component of the state’s case, and it is not plain error for the prosecutor to argue the credibility of this evidence. The state is allowed to make reasonable and vigorous arguments on credibility. See State v. *909Jensen, 308 Minn. 377, 380, 242 N.W.2d 109, 111 (1976) (rejecting concept that closing arguments must be colorless); see also State v. Parker, 353 N.W.2d 122, 128 (Minn.1984) (finding no prejudice in prosecutor’s defense of veracity of state’s witnesses by saying, “[I]f you think that these witnesses are lying, you can only come to that conclusion if you come to the conclusion that this whole thing [is] phony ... from top to bottom and stem to stern.”). The prosecutor’s closing argument did not shift the burden of proof, misstate the presumption of innocence, or improperly argue the credibility of the state’s witness.
The second alleged error is the district court’s ruling on D.D.R.’s use of J.B.’s videotaped statement. Although the argument on this issue is confusing, the transcript is not. Both the defense attorney and the prosecutor agreed to the court’s suggested procedure to accommodate D.D.R.’s cross-examination of J.B. on parts of the videotape that had not been transcribed. The record discloses neither an objection nor an error. See Minn. R. Evid. 611(a) (allowing district court to exercise reasonable control over mode and order of interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence), 613(b) (providing that witness must be afforded prior opportunity to explain or deny allegedly prior inconsistent statement). As agreed before the trial began, the court allowed D.D.R. to show J.B. the videotape, outside the presence of the jury, to refresh her recollection. J.B. watched the videotape after direct examination, and D.D.R. was able to cross-examine her in front of the jury about the content of the tape.
The final alleged’ error is the district court’s instruction to the jury that, in a prosecution for criminal sexual conduct, the testimony of the victim need not be corroborated. We have previously stated that the lack of corroboration in a sexual assault ease is an evidentiary matter that is generally not appropriate as a substantive jury instruction. State v. Williams, 363 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Minn.App.1985), review denied (Minn. May 1, 1985). But additional considerations are important to determine whether this instruction constituted prejudicial error in D.D.R.’s trial. In her opening statement, the defense attorney told the jury, “You will not hear that there’s any physical evidence to corroborate — corroborate is kind of a big technical legal term — but there’s no physical evidence to confirm what she told her, the police, and what she told her mother.” The issue of corroboration was thus raised by D.D.R. in the first instance, and D.D.R. implied that the absence of corroboration was legally significant. In this context the district court’s instruction was a correct statement of the law that offset an incorrect implication. See Minn.Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1 (2004) (stating that corroboration is not required in criminal-sexual-conduct .prosecutions); see also State v. Ani, 257 N.W.2d 699, 700 (Minn.1977) (confirming that Minn.Stat. § 609.347, subd. 1, correctly states evidentiary rule). The no-corroboration instruction did not result in an unfair trial.
This record simply does not support a determination that cumulative error requires that the jury’s verdict be reversed and that the case be remanded for a new trial. Therefore, I would affirm the jury’s verdict.
II
Although I concur with the decision to affirm the district court’s imposition of a juvenile disposition and not a stayed adult conviction, I do not agree with the rationale argued by D.D.R. and accepted by the majority. D.D.R. and the majority assert that, although a literal reading of subdivision 4(a) of the extended-juvenile-jurisdiction (EJJ) statute would require a stayed *910adult sentence, ' imposing the sentence would be improper because D.D.R. was found guilty of an offense that only a juvenile may commit. See Minn.Stat. § 260B.130, subd. 4(a) (2004) (stating that, upon finding of guilt in EJJ prosecution, court shall impose juvenile disposition and stayed adult sentence). To support its determination, the majority cites our decision in which we addressed the constitutionality of Minn.Stat. § 260B.130, subd. 4(b) (2002). In re T.C.J., 689 N.W.2d 787, 793-96 (Minn.App.2004), review dismissed (Minn. Jan. 26, 2005). But this reliance misstates our holding in T.C.J. In T.C.J. we held that subdivision 4(b) is unconstitutional insofar as it treats more harshly a juvenile who arrives at an EJJ disposition following designation by the court than a juvenile designated an EJJ juvenile through' adult certification by the prosecution. Id. at 796. This distinction arises because subdivision 4(b), as written, does not apply to a judicial designation of EJJ and only comes into operation following EJJ designation by the prosecutor in a delinquency petition; we held that this distinction lacks a rational basis. Id. D.D.R. was designated an EJJ juvenile by the prosecutor, and the statute therefore does not manifest an unconstitutional result in this case.
The district court’s decision not to impose a stayed adult sentence on D.D.R. was proper because he was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct under Minn.Stat. § 609.344, subd. 1(a) (2004), an offense for which commitment to prison is not presumptive under the Sentencing Guidelines and applicable statutes. See Minn.Stat. § 260B.130, subd. 1(2) (2004) (stating offenses that result in EJJ designation). As we stated in T.C.J., subdivision 4(b) is “sensible and fair” when it ensures that an absence of guilt for the offense that triggered an EJJ prosecution “permit[s] the punishment for the nontrig-gering offenses to revert to the juvenile system.” T.C.J., 689 N.W.2d at 795. The same circumstances form the basis for D.D.R.’s sentencing, and I therefore join the majority’s decision to affirm the sentence. But the reasoning underlying D.D.R.’s argument is unsound and will result in further confusion in a complex area.