Court Opinion

ID: 9567049
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:47:47.403091+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:51:17.496495
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(dissenting) — Prior to the time appellant pleaded guilty to an amended information charging him *462with grand larceny, there had been a dispute between him and his attorney, Mr. Roy A. Holland. On October 15, 1952, appellant’s attorney withdrew from the case as counsel for the defense. On that date, he wrote a letter to appellant, advising that the case was set for trial on October 22, 1952, and that appellant would have to obtain another attorney and should do so at once. Appellant claims that he made an effort to obtain another attorney but was not successful in his attempt to do so. In the meantime, his original attorney agreed to represent him at his arraignment on October 22, 1952, provided he would plead guilty to the reduced charge of grand larceny. That is what happened on October 22, 1952. Sentencing of appellant was deferred until October 31, 1952. On that date, appellant appeared again with his attorney, Mr. Holland, for sentencing. The matter was continued to January 9, 1953, and subsequently was continued to January 16, 1953, when appellant appeared with another attorney, Mr. Doane Brodie, who secured a continuance to January 30,1953. On January 22nd, Mr. Brodie moved that appellant be permitted to change his plea to not guilty. After further continuances, and a hearing on the motion for change of plea, the motion was denied on February 27, 1953. Appellant was sentenced on March 20, 1953. He has appealed from the denial of the motion for change of plea.
At this point, I wish to emphasize that the legislation in ROW 10.40.170 provided:
“Plea of guilty. The plea of guilty can only be put in by the defendant himself in open court. At any time before judgment, the court may permit the plea of guilty to be withdrawn and other plea or pleas substituted.”
I realize we have considered, and apparently construed, RCW 10.40.170 in a number of cases, saying that it is the law of this state that disposition of a motion for a change of plea timely made is within the discretion of the trial judge, and that his action will not be disturbed on appeal except upon a showing of abuse of discretion. State v. Hensley, 20 Wn. (2d) 95, 145 P. (2d) 1014; State v. Rose, 42 Wn. (2d) 509, 256 P. (2d) 493. However, considering the language of *463the statute, it occurs to me that the view expressed in our above-mentioned decisions may be considerably more restrictive of a criminal defendant’s rights than the view taken, and the intent expressed, by the legislature in enacting RCW 10.40.170. In any event, the discretion which is to be exercised in such matters by the trial court is not an absolute one, the exercise of which will not be reviewed. 14 Am. Jur. 960.
Whether or not appellant, who was not satisfied with the advice of his attorney, knew that he could', if he was without funds, have the court appoint another attorney to advise and represent him; and whether or not he knew that he could ask for a continuance on the matter of his making a formal plea to the charges; and despite the fact that subtle distinctions can be spelled out on the basis of these factors or appellant’s knowledge concerning them, it seems to me that, contrary to fundamental due process concepts of fair play, he was under considerable compulsion to plead guilty when he did so on October 22nd.
I do not intend any criticism of Mr. Holland. He had the right to do exactly as he did. However, the choice of plea by an accused is a matter to be determined freely and voluntarily by him and by no one else, not even his attorney. In line with this thought, an admittedly general statement, but certainly a tolerant and enlightening one (citing cases), is found in 14 Am. Jur. 961, § 287, as follows:
“Circumstances Warranting Granting or Refusal of Withdrawal. — As in other cases of discretionary power, no general rule can be laid down as to when a defendant will be permitted to withdraw his plea. The decision in each case must depend to a great extent on the particular attendant circumstances. Generally, however, it may be said that the withdrawal of a plea of guilty should not be denied in any case where it is in the least evident that the ends of justice will be subserved by permitting not guilty to be pleaded in its place. The least surprise or influence causing a defendant to plead guilty when he has any defense at all should be sufficient grounds for permitting a change of plea from guilty to not guilty. Leave should ordinarily be given to withdraw a plea of guilty if it was entered by mistake or *464under a misconception of the nature of the charge, through a misunderstanding as to its effect; through fear, fraud, or official misrepresentation; was made involuntarily for any reason; or even where it was entered inadvisedly, if any reasonable ground is offered for going to the jury. If such a plea has been received by the court without observance of the precautions and solemnities required by law, the court should permit the plea to be withdrawn. On the other hand, if a defendant, with full knowledge of the charge against him and of his rights and the consequences of a plea of guilty, enters such a plea understanding^ and without fear or persuasion, the court may, without abusing its discretion, refuse to permit him to withdraw it.”
Under the circumstances in the instant case, I do not think a free and voluntary choice was open to appellant. At any rate, what harm could have resulted from permitting him to change his plea to not guilty, since he attempted to do so before sentence was imposed and, consequently, before he had an opportunity to take a gamble on whether the sentence imposed by the court would seem to him like a good deal or a bad one? I would reverse and remand, with instructions to vacate the judgment and sentence and to grant the appellant’s motion.
Grady, C. J., concurs with Finley, J.,