Court Opinion

ID: 2965065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:34:47.732138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:03.321689
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USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          No. 97-1398

                                    SHMUEL DAVID,

                                Petitioner, Appellant,

                                          v.

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                                Respondent, Appellee.

                              _________________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                      [Hon. Nancy Gertner, U.S. District Judge]
                                           ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                           Campbell, Senior Circuit Judge,
                                     ____________________

                              and Boudin, Circuit Judge.
                                          _____________

                              _________________________

               Peter Goldberger, with whom Pamela A. Wilk was on brief, for
               ________________            ______________
          appellant.
               Robert L.  Peabody, Assistant  United States  Attorney, with
               __________________
          whom Donald K.  Stern, United States Attorney, was  on brief, for
               ________________
          appellee.

                              _________________________

                                   January 27, 1998

                              _________________________

                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.  Some four years ago, petitioner-
                    SELYA, Circuit Judge.
                           _____________

          appellant  Shmuel David filed a motion for post-conviction relief

          pursuant  to  28 U.S.C.     2255  (1994).1   The  district  court

          eventually  denied  the petition  without holding  an evidentiary

          hearing.  David appeals.  We affirm.

                                          I.
                                          I.
                                          __

                                      Background
                                      Background
                                      __________

                    On direct appeal, we described the petitioner's case as

          "involv[ing]  a spider  web of  drug dealing,  with David  at the

          web's center,"  United States  v. David, 940  F.2d 722,  726 (1st
                          _____________     _____

          Cir. 1991) (David I), and  we proceeded to affirm his convictions
                      _______

          on a myriad of charges.  Inasmuch  as the predicate facts are set

          out at length  in that opinion, we  offer only a pr cis  of those

          events to set the stage for the instant appeal.

                    In David I,  the government charged that,  during 1986,
                       _______

          1987, and 1988,  David, thirteen codefendants, and  various other

          persons  engaged in extensive cocaine trafficking.  Mirroring the

          prosecution's  theory that  a  shift  from  domestic  to  foreign

          suppliers transmogrified the  operation, the indictment described
                              
          ____________________

               1Congress   subsequently  enacted   the  Antiterrorism   and
          Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132,
          110 Stat.  1214 (codified  in scattered  sections of  28 U.S.C.).
          The new law took effect on April 24, 1996.  The Supreme Court has
          determined,  in  general, that  AEDPA  does not  apply  to habeas
          petitions that were pending on AEDPA's effective date.  See Lindh
                                                                  ___ _____
          v. Murphy, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2067-68 (1997) (discussing amendments
             ______
          to habeas  procedures in cases  brought under 28 U.S.C.    2254);
          see also Martin v. Bissonette, 118 F.3d 871,  874 (1st Cir. 1997)
          ___ ____ ______    __________
          (applying  Lindh).   We believe  that  this rationale  applies to
                     _____
          section 2255 motions  (which are, after all, a  species of habeas
          petitions).  Thus, we measure  the petitioner's case against pre-
          AEDPA benchmarks.

                                          2

          two conspiracies:  one beginning  in 1986 and ending in  March of

          1988, and the other taking up where the first left off and ending

          later that  year.  Following a nine-week  trial, a jury found the

          petitioner guilty on  twenty-two counts,  including charges  that

          he:  (a)  engaged in a continuing criminal  enterprise (CCE), see
                                                                        ___

          21 U.S.C.    848; (b)  participated in both conspiracies,  see 21
                                                                     ___

          U.S.C.   846; (c) possessed  cocaine with intent to distribute on

          several occasions, see 21 U.S.C.   841(a)(1); and (d) facilitated
                             ___

          numerous drug transactions by using the telephone, see 21  U.S.C.
                                                             ___

            843(b).

                    At  the   disposition  hearing,  the   district  court,

          employing  the January 1988 edition of the sentencing guidelines,

          grouped  related offenses,  see  USSG  3D1.1(a);  used  available
                                      ___

          drug-quantity evidence  to fix  a base offense  level of  36, see
                                                                        ___

          USSG  2D1.1; added two levels  for possession of a firearm during

          the commission of an offense, see USSG  2D1.1(b); added four more
                                        ___

          levels for the petitioner's leadership role, see USSG  3B1.1; and
                                                       ___

          subtracted  two levels for acceptance of responsibility, see USSG
                                                                   ___

           3E1.1.  In the end,  the district court sentenced the petitioner

          within  the  computed  guideline  sentencing  range,  imposing  a

          thirty-year incarcerative term  on the CCE and  various "grouped"

          possession  counts and  shorter  periods  of  immurement  on  the

          remaining charges.  The court designated all the sentences to run

          concurrently.

                    Represented by new counsel, David appealed.  We vacated

          the   conspiracy  convictions  as   violative  of   the  multiple

                                          3

          punishments  prong of  the  Double  Jeopardy  Clause,  given  the

          conviction and sentence on the encompassing CCE count.  See David
                                                                  ___ _____

          I, 940 F.2d at 738  (citing United States v. Rivera-Martinez, 931
          _                           _____________    _______________

          F.2d 148,  152-53 (1st  Cir. 1991)).   In all other  respects, we

          affirmed the convictions and the corresponding sentences.

                    On  January  7,  1994,  while  still  incarcerated, the

          petitioner  retained fresh counsel  and filed a  motion for post-

          conviction relief in  the district court.   Judge Gertner assumed

          responsibility  for  the  motion  in  place  of  the  late  Judge

          McNaught,  who  had  presided  over the  trial  and  had  imposed

          sentence.   She ultimately denied it  on January 2, 1997, but did

          not  deign to  hold an  evidentiary hearing.   Without  missing a

          beat, the  petitioner  changed counsel  again.   His new  lawyers

          filed a  motion for reconsideration  on February 26,  1997, which

          Judge Gertner also  denied.  The  petitioner appeals solely  from

          the original denial of post-conviction relief.

                                         II.
                                         II.
                                         ___

                                       Analysis
                                       Analysis
                                       ________

                    The  petitioner  advanced  three  claims  in the  court

          below.   Two of  these claims  related  to the  propriety of  the

          sentencing calculations; one questioned  the firearms enhancement

          and the second  questioned the upward adjustment for  role in the

          offense.  The  remaining claim posited ineffective  assistance of

          trial counsel, stemming not only from an alleged failure to raise

          this  pair of  sentencing objections,  but  also from  an alleged

          failure promptly to relay a potentially favorable plea bargain to

                                          4

          the petitioner.  On appeal,  David has not continued his campaign

          against  the role-in-the-offense  adjustment,  and  we deem  that

          challenge abandoned.   See, e.g., United  States v. Zannino,  895
                                 ___  ____  ______________    _______

          F.2d 1, 17  (1st Cir. 1990).   He does, however, renew  the other

          two claims.  After a brief introduction, we address each of them.

                                          A.
                                          A.
                                          __

                                     Introduction
                                     Introduction
                                     ____________

                    Section 2255  is not a  surrogate for a  direct appeal.

          Rather, the statute  provides for post-conviction relief  in four

          instances, namely, if  the petitioner's sentence (1)  was imposed

          in  violation of the Constitution, or  (2) was imposed by a court

          that  lacked jurisdiction, or (3) exceeded the statutory maximum,

          or (4) was  otherwise subject to collateral attack.   See Hill v.
                                                                ___ ____

          United  States, 368 U.S. 424, 426-27 (1962) (construing statute).
          ______________

          The  catch-all fourth category includes only assignments of error

          that reveal  "fundamental defect[s]" which, if  uncorrected, will

          "result[]   in   a   complete   miscarriage   of   justice,"   or

          irregularities  that  are  "inconsistent   with  the  rudimentary

          demands of  fair procedure."  Id. at 428.   In other words, apart
                                        ___

          from  claims  of  constitutional  or  jurisdictional  nature,   a

          cognizable   section   2255   claim   must  reveal   "exceptional

          circumstances" that make  the need for redress evident.   See id.
                                                                    ___ ___

          The burden is  on the petitioner to  make out a case  for section

          2255 relief.  See Mack v. United  States, 635 F.2d 20, 26-27 (1st
                        ___ ____    ______________

          Cir. 1980).

                                          B.
                                          B.
                                          __

                                          5

                               The Firearms Enhancement
                               The Firearms Enhancement
                               ________________________

                    The   petitioner  asserts  that,  as  of  the  date  of

          disposition  (August 1, 1989),  the guidelines did  not authorize

          the  two-level sentence enhancement imposed by Judge McNaught for

          the use of a firearm   an enhancement that tacked at least sixty-

          seven  additional months  onto  David's  sentence.    This  claim

          presents a bit  of a moving target.   In his section  2255 motion

          and  in  the court  below,  David  asseverated that  a  two-level

          increase only  could have materialized if it  were authorized for

          the CCE conviction,  and that the two-level  firearms enhancement

          was unavailable because the applicable sentencing guideline, USSG

           2D1.5, did not make reference to it.

                    Having  secured yet a  fourth set  of attorneys  in the

          interim,  the petitioner  recast his  argument in his  motion for

          reconsideration, and now  has come hard about.  In this venue, he

          barely mentions section  2D1.5, but, rather, shapes  his argument

          around USSG  2D1.1.   Paying very little heed to the fact that he

          initially told the  lower court that section 2D1.1  did not apply

          at all, he now maintains that section 2D1.1  is the correct focal

          point, but that it cannot support the enhancement.

                    We  approach  this  moving   target  with  considerable

          caution.   It is well established that a  party may not unveil an

          argument in the court of appeals that he did not seasonably raise

          in the district court.  See United  States v. Slade, 980 F.2d 27,
                                  ___ ______________    _____

          30 (1st Cir. 1992); see also Singleton v. United States,  26 F.3d
                              ___ ____ _________    _____________

          233, 240  (1st Cir. 1994)  (invoking this principle in  a section

                                          6

          2255 case);  United States  v. Mariano, 983  F.2d 1150,  1158 n.9
                       _____________     _______

          (1st Cir. 1993) (invoking this principle in respect to sentencing

          issues).

                    To  apply the  principle  here,  we  must  measure  the

          petitioner's  current argument against that limned in his section

          2255 motion and advanced  before Judge Gertner, not  by reference

          to  the theory  that he  belatedly  surfaced in  his request  for

          reconsideration.2  See  Barrett v. United States,  965 F.2d 1184,
                             ___  _______    _____________

          1187  n.3 (1st  Cir. 1992);  Mackin v. City  of Boston,  969 F.2d
                                       ______    _______________

          1273, 1278-79 (1st Cir. 1992); In re Sun Pipe Line Co.,  831 F.2d
                                         _______________________

          22, 24  (1st Cir. 1987).   Although the petitioner  contends that

          the argument  he  makes  today is  merely  a  more  sophisticated

          statement of a refrain contained in his section 2255 motion, that

          is  plainly  not  the  case.   The  two  arguments  are  markedly

          different.  Consequently, the newer version is by the boards.

                    The petitioner  correctly reminds us that  an appellate

          court has  discretionary power to  override a forfeiture  of this

          type.  To justify deploying this seldom-used power, however,  the

          newly emergent contention must be one that practically guarantees

          the appellant's success.  See Slade,  980 F.2d at 31.  Here,  the
                                    ___ _____

          forfeited argument is  considerably less than robust.  We explain

          briefly.

                    The  firearms enhancement  about  which the  petitioner
                              
          ____________________

               2Even were we disposed to consider the argument  advanced in
          the petitioner's untimely  motion for  reconsideration, we  could
          not do so because the petitioner has not appealed from the denial
          of that  motion.   See Barrett v.  United States, 965  F.2d 1184,
                             ___ _______     _____________
          1188 (1st Cir. 1992).

                                          7

          complains arose out of  a discrete set of facts.  In June 1987, a

          drug courier  by the  name of  Filin, employed  by David  and his

          confederates, tried to purloin a  shipment of cocaine by faking a

          robbery.    The  petitioner  saw through  the  charade  and later

          threatened  Filin  at  gunpoint   in  an  attempt  to  coerce   a

          confession.

                    Under  the sentencing regime imposed by the guidelines,

          the law in effect on the date of the disposition hearing governs,

          absent ex post facto concerns.   See United States v. Harotunian,
                 __ ____ _____             ___ _____________    __________

          920 F.2d 1040, 1041-42 (1st Cir. 1990).  Hewing to this line, the

          government defends the enhancement by pointing to the  version of

          USSG  2D1.1(b)(1)  that took  effect on January  15, 1988.   That

          guideline provided for a two-level upward adjustment if a firearm

          "was  possessed  during   commission  of  the  offense."     USSG

           2D1.1(b)(1).  The government concedes that "the offense" must be

          an offense to which the guidelines attached, thus restricting the

          enhancement in this case to the two drug distribution counts that

          transpired in  1988, namely, counts 15 and  16.3  Notwithstanding

          this  concession, the government  posits that the  phrase "during

          commission  of the offense"  requires reference to  the "relevant

          conduct" guideline, which  in its 1988 iteration  indicated (with

          certain  exceptions not germane here) that an "offense" generally

                              
          ____________________

               3These  counts,  each of  which  charged a  violation  of 21
          U.S.C.    841(a)(1),  are  the  only  post-guidelines  counts  of
          conviction  that are legally  capable of supporting  the firearms
          enhancement.   The CCE  sentencing paradigm  did not provide  for
          such an enhancement, and the two conspiracy convictions have been
          vacated.

                                          8

          is deemed  to include  "all acts  . .  . committed  or aided  and

          abetted  by  the  defendant  .  .  .  that  occurred  during  the

          commission  of the offense of conviction," USSG  1B1.3(a)(1), and

          that, with respect to "grouped" offenses, see  USSG  3D1.2(d), an
                                                    ___

          "offense" generally  is deemed to include all "acts and omissions

          that were part of the same course  of conduct or common scheme or

          plan as the offense of conviction," USSG  1B1.3(a)(2).  Since the

          Filin  episode was part  of the same course  of conduct or common

          scheme or plan  as the vignettes on  which counts 15 and  16 were

          premised, the government's thesis  runs, the petitioner possessed

          the gun "during commission of the offense."

                    The  petitioner's  counter-argument  is  somewhat  more

          convoluted.    As  a  general  matter,  he   maintains  that  the

          government  defines  "the  offense"  too  broadly  and  that  the

          phrase's  scope is  restricted  to  the  specific  offense(s)  of

          conviction  and does  not include  "relevant  conduct."   On this

          basis, he argues,  his proven use of a  firearm could not support

          the  enhancement because that use did not  occur in the course of

          an  offense of  conviction  to  which  the  guidelines  attached.

          Indeed,  he  adds,  since  the  gun use  took  place  before  the

          effective  date of  the guidelines,  it could  not  possibly have

          occurred as part of such an offense.

                    After studying  the guideline provision, we  reject the

          petitioner's hypothesis.   We  conclude instead  that the  phrase

          "the  offense,"  fairly read,  bears  the  broader interpretation

          ascribed to  it by  the government and  the district court.   Our

                                          9

          conclusion is grounded in the  language, structure, and theory of

          the  sentencing guidelines, and it is  reinforced by an amendment

          that the Sentencing  Commission adopted subsequent to  the events

          at issue here.   See USSG App. C,  Amend. 394 (Nov. 1991).   That
                           ___

          amendment deleted the "during commission of the offense" language

          from  section 2D1.1(b)(1)  and  thus confirmed  the  government's

          interpretation of the guideline as extending to relevant conduct.

                    We  do  not  embrace the  petitioner's  suggestion that

          Amendment  394   is  inapposite.    The  general   rule  is  that

          revisionary  amendments to the  guidelines   that  is, amendments

          which change  the law in  a substantive way    cannot  be applied

          retroactively   by   a   sentencing   court   to  a   defendant's

          disadvantage.   See United  States v. Rostoff,  53 F.3d  398, 406
                          ___ ______________    _______

          (1st Cir. 1995).   By contrast, clarifying amendments    that is,

          amendments  which  do  not  change  the  law,  but  which  merely

          elucidate its intended meaning   can be freely used by sentencing

          (or    sentence-reviewing)   courts    as   interpretive    aids,

          prospectively or retrospectively.   See Isabel v.  United States,
                                              ___ ______     _____________

          980 F.2d 60,  62 (1st Cir. 1992); United  States v. Ruiz-Batista,
                                            ______________    ____________

          956 F.2d 351, 353-54 (1st Cir. 1992).  When determining whether a

          guideline amendment is  revisionary as opposed to  clarifying, an

          inquiring court must accord substantial respect to the Sentencing

          Commission's view  on the subject.   See Isabel, 980  F.2d at 62.
                                               ___ ______

          In effecting Amendment 394, the Sentencing Commission stated that

          "[t]his  amendment clarifies that the provisions of   1B1.3(a)(2)

          [incorporating as  relevant conduct all  acts which were  part of

                                          10

          the same course of conduct as the offense of conviction] apply to

          the   adjustments   in      2D1.1(b)(1)."      The   Commission's

          characterization of Amendment 394 appears apt:  it is designed to

          disambiguate  the  guideline provision  and thereby  mitigate any

          confusion caused by the original wording.

                    That is game,  set, and match.   Because Amendment  394

          worked  no substantive change in preexistent law, a sentencing or

          reviewing court may apply it retroactively.  See United States v.
                                                       ___ _____________

          LaCroix, 28 F.3d 223,  227 n.4 (1st Cir. 1994);  United States v.
          _______                                          _____________

          Valencia-Lucena, 988 F.2d 228, 234  n.4 (1st Cir. 1993); see also
          _______________                                          ___ ____

          USSG  1B1.11(b)(2) (Nov. 1993).  We do so here.

                    The   Commission's   language   could   not   be   more

          straightforward.  Amendment 394 makes it plain that the "relevant

          conduct"  provisions (such as  section 1B1.3(a)(2)) apply  to the

          adjustments  in  section  2D1.1(b)(1)   (such  as  the   firearms

          enhancement).   Accordingly,  Amendment 394  fully validates  the

          district  court's use  of a  "relevant conduct"  approach to  the

          firearms enhancement.

                    The   petitioner's  fallback   position   is  no   more

          persuasive.  He contends that, even if the  sentencing guidelines

          permit the  enhancement  when  a firearm  was  used  during  pre-

          guidelines  conduct "relevant"  to a  post-guidelines  offense of

          conviction, his  gun use  does not so  qualify because  the Filin

          incident (which  took place  in 1987)  was not  part of  the same

          course of conduct,  common scheme, or plan that  underlays counts

          15 and 16 (both of which  focus on events that occurred in  April

                                          11

          of 1988).

                    This contention  depends on an  artificial distinction.

          The petitioner  notes that his  use of a firearm  occurred within

          the  time frame of  the so-called  first conspiracy,  whereas the

          conduct underlying  the  two  post-guidelines  drug  distribution

          counts occurred within  the time  frame of  the so-called  second

          conspiracy.   Based  on this  chronology,  he theorizes  that the

          enhancing  conduct   the  gun use    cannot be  "relevant" to the

          offenses of conviction.

                    The fallacy in this theory is that "a course of conduct

          or common  scheme  or  plan,"  as that  phrase  is  used  in  the

          sentencing  guidelines, is broader  than, rather than coterminous

          with, the  definition of a  "conspiracy" as  that term of  art is

          used in the overall criminal law.  See United States v. Wood, 924
                                             ___ _____________    ____

          F.2d 399, 403  (1st Cir. 1991); see also United States v. Spence,
                                          ___ ____ _____________    ______

          125 F.3d 1192, 1195 (8th Cir. 1997);  United States v. Boney, 977
                                                _____________    _____

          F.2d 624, 635  (D.C. Cir. 1992).  Thus,  whether or not enveloped

          within the  same conspiracy,  offenses may  qualify as  occurring

          within  the same course  of conduct as  long as  they are related

          sufficiently  to allow  a rational  factfinder  to conclude  that

          "they are part of . .  . [an] ongoing series of offenses."   USSG

           1B1.3(a), comment.  (n.9(B)).  In  the same vein, "[f]or  two or

          more offenses  to constitute  part of a  common scheme  or plan,"

          they only need to "be substantially connected to each other by at

          least one  common factor, such as .  . . accomplices, [or] common

          purpose. . . ."  USSG  1B1.3(a), comment. (n. 9(A)).

                                          12

                    This dichotomy makes  a world of difference.   Although

          the  petitioner's  drug  trafficking  resulted  in  two  separate

          charged conspiracies, the  framing of the charges  cannot obscure

          the  fact that, throughout  the cocaine trafficking  described in

          the indictment,  the  petitioner and  his  principal  accomplices

          remained  at the  center of  an ongoing  enterprise devoted  to a

          single purpose.4  The shift in the source of supply permitted the

          prosecutor  to divide  the enterprise  into two  segments and  to

          charge  some defendants  accordingly,  but  the petitioner  never

          deviated  from his main business:  the acquisition, distribution,

          and  sale  of  cocaine  in   a  specific  region.    Because  the

          petitioner's  activities during 1986,  1987, and 1988 constituted

          an ongoing series of offenses, the  district court did not err in

          imposing the firearms enhancement.

                                          C.
                                          C.
                                          __

                          Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
                          Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
                          _________________________________

                    Insofar as  the petitioner's ineffective  assistance of

          counsel claim relates to the sentencing phase, it is  impuissant.

          The petitioner received  an appropriate sentence, see  supra Part
                                                            ___  _____

          II(B), and, absent any prejudice, an ineffective assistance claim

          cannot prosper.  See  Scarpa v. Dubois, 38 F.3d 1,  8-9 (1st Cir.
                           ___  ______    ______

          1994).   We turn, then, to  a consideration of the remaining tine

          of   the  petitioner's  claim:    that  he  received  substandard

          assistance  because   his  trial   counsel  failed   promptly  to
                              
          ____________________

               4The  David I  record discloses  that at  least  three other
                     _______
          ringleaders  (Yehuda Yarden,  Joseph  Zalmanovich, and  Mordechai
          Mizrahi) were involved with the petitioner in both conspiracies.

                                          13

          communicate a favorable plea bargain to him.

                    The genesis of this claim is as follows.  In his motion

          (or,  more  accurately,  in a  memorandum  accompanying  it), the

          petitioner averred that he learned at some  indeterminate time of

          a  favorable plea  offer  extended  by  the  government  but  not

          communicated to  him until after  its withdrawal.  Had  the offer

          been made  known to  him, the petitioner  ruminates, he  "likely"

          would  have accepted  it.   The averment  contains no  specifics,

          e.g.,  who  made  the  proposal,  when  it  was  tendered,   what

          conditions were attached to it, why  it was withdrawn, or how the

          petitioner came to hear of it.5

                    Judge Gertner dismissed the  unsupported allegation out

          of hand.   On appeal, the  petitioner argues only that  the judge

          erred in  brushing aside  the allegation without  a hearing.   We

          review the district court's denial of  an evidentiary hearing for

          abuse of discretion.   See United States v. Garcia, 954  F.2d 12,
                                 ___ _____________    ______

          19 (1st Cir. 1992).

                    A prisoner who invokes section 2255 is not entitled  to

          an evidentiary hearing as a  matter of right.  See United  States
                                                         ___ ______________

          v. McGill,  11 F.3d 223, 225 (1st Cir. 1993).   Even if a hearing
             ______

          is requested, a district court properly may forgo it when (1) the

          motion   is  inadequate  on   its  face,  or   (2)  the  movant's

                              
          ____________________

               5In  his  papers,  the petitioner  merely  asserted  that he
          "later learned that during pre-trial period the Government made a
          plea offer .  . .  in return  for a sentence  of 19  years and  6
          months.  Counsel failed to  adequately communicate this offer . .
          . until the offer had been withdrawn.   [I]n all likelihood . . .
          [he] would have accepted said plea offer."

                                          14

          allegations, even if true, do  not entitle him to relief,  or (3)

          the movant's  allegations "need not  be accepted as  true because

          they state conclusions  instead of facts, contradict  the record,

          or  are  `inherently  incredible.'"    Id.  at  225-26  (citation
                                                 ___

          omitted);  see also  Rule  4(b),  Rules  Governing  Section  2255
                     ___ ____

          Proceedings.

                    To   progress  to  an  evidentiary  hearing,  a  habeas

          petitioner must do  more than proffer gauzy  generalities or drop

          self-serving hints that  a constitutional violation lurks  in the

          wings.  A representative case is Machibroda v. United States, 368
                                           __________    _____________

          U.S. 487  (1962), in which  the petitioner's section  2255 motion

          alleged   that  his   guilty  plea   resulted   from  an   unkept

          prosecutorial  promise.    After the  trial  court  dismissed the

          motion without  an evidentiary hearing  and the court  of appeals

          affirmed,  the  Supreme  Court   reversed,  noting  that   "[t]he

          petitioner's  motion  and  affidavit contain  charges  which  are

          detailed and  specific."  Id.  at 495.   In a pithy  passage that
                                    ___

          possesses particular pertinence  for present purposes, the  Court

          cautioned  that a habeas petitioner is not automatically entitled

          to  a  hearing  and  normally  should  not  receive  one  if  his

          allegations are "vague, conclusory, or palpably incredible."  Id.
                                                                        ___

          This  is true,  the  Court wrote,  even "if  the record  does not

          conclusively and expressly belie [the] claim."  Id.
                                                          ___

                    Inferior courts routinely  have applied the  Machibroda
                                                                 __________

          standard  in determining  the need  for  evidentiary hearings  on

          section  2255 motions.   Allegations  that are  so evanescent  or

                                          15

          bereft  of detail  that they  cannot  reasonably be  investigated

          (and,   thus,  corroborated  or  disproved)  do  not  warrant  an

          evidentiary hearing.   See Dalli v. United States,  491 F.2d 758,
                                 ___ _____    _____________

          761 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding  that the district court  supportably

          refused to convene  an evidentiary hearing when  the petitioner's

          allegations were  "vague, indefinite and  conclusory"); see  also
                                                                  ___  ____

          Amos v. Minnesota, 849 F.2d 1070, 1072 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding
          ____    _________

          the  denial of  an evidentiary  hearing  in a  section 2254  case

          inasmuch as petitioner "offered only general allegations").

                    In this instance, the district court was not obliged to

          credit  the petitioner's threadbare  allusions to a  phantom plea

          bargain.   Who,  what, when,  where, and  how details  might have

          placed matters  of  ascertainable fact  at  issue and  thus  have

          bolstered the  case for  an evidentiary  hearing,  but none  were

          forthcoming.    To  the  contrary,  the  petitioner  offered  the

          district  court no names,  dates, places, or  other details, even

          though  such details  presumably were  within  his ken.   In  the

          absence of any  particulars, the lower court  justifiably treated

          the petitioner's conclusory averments as mere buzznacking.

                    The  petitioner points  to  United States  v. Rodriguez
                                                _____________     _________

          Rodriguez, 929 F.2d 747 (1st  Cir. 1991) (per curiam), as support
          _________

          for his contention that, when  a section 2255 motion alleges that

          defense counsel failed  to inform the defendant of  a plea offer,

          the district court  must hold an evidentiary hearing.   That case

          provides David with cold comfort,  for the court there took pains

          to admonish petitioners  that, in order to  secure an evidentiary

                                          16

          hearing on  such a claim,  they must tender more  than conclusory

          allegations.  See id. at 752.  Rodriguez, unlike David, "provided
                        ___ ___

          adequate  factual  specifications beyond  bald  speculation," and

          therefore merited an evidentiary hearing.  Id.
                                                     ___

                    To sum up,  the petitioner has put forth  less than the

          bare minimum that is necessary to warrant an evidentiary hearing.

          On this  gossamer showing, the  district court did not  abuse its

          discretion in refusing to license a fishing expedition.

                                         III.
                                         III.
                                         ____

                                      Conclusion
                                      Conclusion
                                      __________

                    We need  go no  further.   The petitioner's  sentencing

          arguments are  procedurally defective  and substantively  infirm.

          By  like token, his  unparticularized claim  that a  phantom plea

          bargain lapsed for want of timely communication is much too vague

          to demand an evidentiary hearing.  Hence, the court below did not

          err in rejecting David's section 2255 motion.

          Affirmed.
          Affirmed.
          ________

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