Court Opinion

ID: 9577804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:38:18.010806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:17.113152
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice.
This is an appeal from a summary judgment dismissing plaintiff’s action for breach of employment contract on the basis that the cause of action is preempted by federal statute. We affirm.
Idaho First National Bank, is a national banking association with its principal place of business in Boise, and has 72 branch locations in Idaho. Alegría worked for the bank for 17 years in various positions, and in 1974 the board of directors of the bank *315appointed him assistant manager of the Homedale branch. In 1978 the board of directors appointed Alegría assistant manager of the Eagle branch. Brown was the manager of the Eagle branch. During 1979, managerial performance at the Eagle branch came into question since profitability had apparently declined and customer dissatisfaction had surfaced. Ultimately, in May 1982 both Brown and Alegría were fired.
Both Brown and Alegría brought actions against the bank alleging breach of their employment contracts, and their cases were consolidated for discovery and trial. Upon motion therefor, summary judgment was granted in favor of the bank, and against both plaintiffs, wherein the court found as a matter of law that 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982) precluded plaintiffs’ claims. That statute provides in pertinent part that a national bank has the power:
“FIFTH. To elect or appoint directors, and by its board of directors to appoint a president, vice president, cashier, and other officers, define their duties, require bonds of them and fix the penalty thereof, dismiss such officers or any of them at pleasure, and appoint others to fill their places.” (Emphasis added.)
The district court held as a matter of law that the term “other officers” includes managers and assistant managers of national bank branches. Brown did not appeal from that summary judgment, but Alegría appeals, asserting as a matter of law that an assistant branch manager does not fall within the term “other officers” and argues alternatively that such is a factual question to be determined at trial. We disagree.
In 1983 two decisions of federal courts addressed the same issue presented here under circumstances similar to the case at bar. Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat. Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.1983); Mahoney v. Crocker National Bank, 571 F.Supp. 287 (N.D.Cal.1983). In Wiskotoni it was conceded that the manager of a national banking association fell within the term “other officers” of 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982). But since he was neither appointed nor dismissed by the bank’s board of directors, but rather hired and fired by the bank president, the statutory requirement was not met and the federal legislation did not bar that plaintiff's claim for breach of implied contract and wrongful discharge.
Similarly, in Mahoney, a manager and assistant manager of a branch of a national banking association brought state law claims against the bank for alleged acts of discrimination, and the bank interposed 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982) as a defense to the state law claims. There plaintiffs argued, as does plaintiff in the instant case, that the phrase “other officers,” as used in the federal legislation, applies only to senior officers and not to lower echelon officers such as branch managers and assistant branch managers. The court, however, based its ruling on the assumption that branch managers and assistant branch managers were included in the phrase “other officers” but that nevertheless while the plaintiffs were hired by the board of directors in accordance with the federal legislation, they were not dismissed by said board of directors, and hence there was no Congressional authorization for the dismissals at pleasure. See also McWhorter v. First Interstate Bank, 67 Or.App. 435, 678 P.2d 766 (1984), wherein that court relied on Wiskotoni, supra, and stated, “Although we are not bound by lower federal court decisions, we give due regard to federal courts of appeal decisions on matters of federal law.” (Citations omitted.)
In the instant case, clearly Alegría was appointed assistant branch manager at the Eagle branch by resolution of the bank board of directors. Alegría argues that he was not terminated by the board of directors, but rather by the then branch supervisor late in the day, Friday, May 21, 1982. Alegría asserts that he and Brown were offered the option of resigning or being terminated, but that neither of them signed resignation letters. The record indicates that on the previous day, May 20, 1982, the bank’s board of directors took *316action regarding Alegria’s separation from employment, stating:
“BE IT RESOLVED, That the resignation of Raymond A. Alegria, Assistant Branch Manager II of the Eagle Valley Office, be accepted and his authority to transact business for the bank be revoked effective May 21, 1982.” (Emphasis added.)
The record further indicates that the board of directors was aware that both Brown and Alegria would be given the option to resign or be fired. We deem the distinction between a “dismissal” and the face-saving device of a “resignation which if not immediately tendered will be followed by dismissal,” is a distinction without a difference. Clearly, the board of directors intended to dismiss and terminate Alegria and revoke his authority to transact business for the bank, effective on the following day:
Alegria asserts that the words “other officers” contained in 12 U.S.C. § 24,(1982), under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, must be construed to include only those “other officers” as perform duties similar to the offices of president, vice president, and cashier, as are specifically enumerated in the statute. See Case v. First National Bank of City of Brooklyn, 59 Misc. 269, 109 N.Y.S. 1119 (N.Y.Sup.Ct.1908). We disagree. Rather, we hold that the determination of this issue must be made by consideration of the purpose behind the National Banking Act, i.e., the power to dismiss a bank officer at will reflects the Congressional mandate to establish an independent national system in order to maintain the stability of, and promote the welfare of, national banks. See Easton v. Iowa, 188 U.S. 220, 23 S.Ct. 288, 47 L.Ed. 452 (1903); Westervelt v. Mohrenstecher, 76 F. 118 (8th Cir.1896); see also Lane v. Chowning, 610 F.2d 1385 (8th Cir.1979); Kozlowsky v. Westminister National Bank, 6 Cal.App.3d 593, 86 Cal.Rptr. 52 (1970); Kemper v. First National Bank in Newton, 94 Ill.App.3d 169, 49 Ill.Dec. 799, 418 N.E.2d 819 (1981); Van Slyke v. Andrews, 146 Minn. 316, 178 N.W. 959 (1920); McGeehan v. Bank of New Hampshire, 123 N.H. 83, 455 A.2d 1054 (1983); Copeland v. Melrose National Bank, 229 App.Div. 311, 241 N.Y.S. 429, aff'd, 254 N.Y. 632, 173 N.E. 898 (1930).
As stated in Westervelt, supra, “active officers, to whose integrity and discretion the monies and property of the bank and its customers are entrusted, should be subject to immediate removal whenever the suspicion of faithlessness or negligence attaches to them.”
Alegria had the bank’s authority to make unsecured loans of up to $15,000.00 and secured loans of up to $25,000.00, and was responsible for loan documentation. Alegria was responsible for day-to-day operations within the Eagle branch of the bank, and upon the absence of Brown, Alegria assumed the full managerial duties of the Eagle branch.
Hence, we hold that the district court was correct in its order of summary judgment and its ruling that as a matter of law Alegria fell within the strictures of 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1982) as an “other officer” of a national banking association, whom the board of directors was empowered to dismiss at will regardless of the provisions of an explicit or implicit contract of employment otherwise enforceable under the provisions of state law. We need not agree with the philosophy of, nor the power delegated by, the Congressional enactment, but are nevertheless bound thereby.
The record before us, and before the district court, contains voluminous documentations of the duties and responsibilities of Brown and Alegria and other officers and employees of the bank. Hence, no factual question remains for resolution at trial regarding the duties, responsibilities and authorities of Alegria.
The orders of the district court are affirmed; costs to respondent.
DONALDSON, C.J., and WALTERS and McFADDEN, JJ. Pro. Tern., concur.