Court Opinion

ID: 9449313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:07:54.80132+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:29.202888
License: Public Domain

J-S17023-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  LEROY KENNETH THOMAS JR.                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1081 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 25, 2021
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0002243-2021

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED: August 4, 2023

       Appellant, Leroy Kenneth Thomas, Jr., appeals from the October 25,

2021 judgment of sentence1 entered in the Court of Common Pleas of

Allegheny County that imposed an aggregate sentence of 4 to 8 years’

incarceration to be followed by 3 years’ probation after Appellant pleaded

guilty to indecent assault – complainant is less than 13 years of age (Count

1) and unlawful contact with minor – sexual offenses (Count 3).2 We affirm.

____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s noticeof appeal purports to appeal from the August 16, 2022
order denying his post-sentence motion. “In a criminal action, appeal properly
lies from the judgment of sentence made final by the denial of post-sentence
motions.”    Commonwealth v. Shamberger, 788 A.2d 408, 410 n.2
(Pa. Super. 2001), appeal denied, 800 A.2d 932 (Pa. 2002). The caption has
been corrected accordingly.

2 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3126(a)(7) and 6318(a)(1), respectively.
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       The trial court summarized the procedural history as follows:

       On October 25, 2021, Appellant, [] at CP-02-CR-02243-2021
       [(“CR-2243”)], pled guilty to [the aforementioned criminal
       offenses. That same day, the trial court] sentenced Appellant to
       an aggregate sentence of 4 to 8 years of incarceration, pursuant
       to the plea agreement. Also on October 25, 2021, [the trial] court
       found     Appellant   to   have     violated   his   probation     at
       CP-02-CR[-]09076-2013 [(“CR-9076”).              The trial] court
       resentenced Appellant [at CR-9076] to 7 to 20 years of
       incarceration[, set to run consecutive[ly] to the term of
       incarceration imposed at CR-2243. The trial court also imposed a
       term of 3 years of probation, set to run consecutive[ly] to the term
       of probation imposed at CR-2243. See N.T., 10/25/21, at 42.]
       The post-sentence and appeal periods lapsed. On August 3, 2022,
       [the trial] court granted Appellant's motion to reinstate
       post-sentence and appellate rights [nunc pro tunc. Appellant filed
       a post-sentence motion [nunc pro tunc] on August 12, 2022. The
       trial] court denied Appellant's post-sentence motion[] on August
       16, 2022.

Trial Court Opinion, 1/4/23, at 2 (extraneous capitalization omitted). This

appeal followed.3

____________________________________________

The trial court imposed a sentence of 2 to 4 years’ incarceration, to be followed
by 3 years of probation, on Count 1. Appellant was further ordered to comply
with all Tier III requirements under Pennsylvania’s Sexual Offender
Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.10 to
9799.42, which include lifetime registration with the Pennsylvania State
Police.

The trial court imposed a sentence of 2 to 4 years’ incarceration, to be followed
by 3 years of probation, on Count 3. The term of incarceration on Count 3
was set to run consecutively to the term of incarceration imposed on Count 1.
The term of probation on Count 3 was set to run concurrently to the term of
probation on Count 1.

3 Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.

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       Appellant raises the following issue for our review:

       Is there a substantial question as to the discretionary aspects of
       [Appellant’s] sentence [imposed at CR-2243] due to the trial
       court’s sentence being manifestly unreasonable?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

       Appellant’s issue challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence,

arguing that the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed a manifestly

unreasonable sentence.4 Id. at 8.

       It is well-settled that “the right to appeal [the] discretionary
       aspect[s] of [a] sentence is not absolute.” Commonwealth v.
       Dunphy, 20 A.3d 1215, 1220 (Pa. Super. 2011). Rather, where
       an appellant challenges the discretionary aspects of a sentence,
____________________________________________

4 In its brief, the Commonwealth asserts that Appellant is precluded from
challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence because he entered into
a plea agreement that included “a negotiated sentence.” Commonwealth’s
Brief at 5-6.

We agree, and it is well-established, that a defendant is not permitted to
challenge the discretionary aspects of his or her sentence when the negotiated
plea agreement includes “a sentence of specific duration” because to permit
such a challenge would “make a sham of the negotiated plea process[.]”
Commonwealth v. Dalberto, 648 A.2d 16, 21 (Pa. Super. 1994), appeal
denied, 655 A.2d 983 (Pa. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 818 (1995).

Here, the record demonstrates that prior to entering his guilty plea, the trial
court reviewed the terms of the negotiated plea agreement with Appellant in
open court. N.T., 10/25/21, at 11. When the trial court inquired whether a
3-year term of probation was to be imposed at both Count 1 and Count 3, the
Commonwealth responded, “Your Honor, as to whether it’s [to be imposed at]
one count or two counts, that was not discussed by myself and [Appellant’s
counsel.]” Id. As such, we do not find Appellant’s negotiated plea agreement
included a “sentence of specific duration” thereby precluding Appellant, on this
ground, from raising a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
Dalberto, 648 A.2d at 21.

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      we should regard his[, or her,] appeal as a petition for allowance
      of appeal. Commonwealth v. W.H.M., 932 A.2d 155, 162
      (Pa. Super. 2007). As we stated in Commonwealth v. Moury,
      992 A.2d 162 (Pa. Super. 2010):

         An appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his[,
         or her,] sentence must invoke this Court's jurisdiction by
         satisfying a four-part test:

         We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether
         [the] appellant [] filed a timely notice of appeal, see
         Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
         preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
         modify sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the]
         appellant's brief has a fatal defect, [see] Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f);
         and (4) whether there is a substantial question that the
         sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
         Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

      [Moury, 992 A.2d] at 170. We evaluate on a case-by-case basis
      whether a particular issue constitutes a substantial question about
      the appropriateness of sentence. Commonwealth v. Kenner,
      784 A.2d 808, 811 (Pa. Super. 2001).

Commonwealth v. Hill, 210 A.3d 1104, 1116 (Pa. Super. 2019) (original

brackets omitted), appeal denied, 220 A.3d 1066 (Pa. 2019). If an appellant

fails to challenge the discretionary aspects of a sentence either by presenting

a claim to the trial court at the time of sentencing or in a post-sentence

motion, then the appellant’s challenge is waived.         Commonwealth v.

Lamonda, 52 A.3d 365, 371 (Pa. Super. 2012) (en banc) (citation omitted),

appeal denied, 75 A.3d 1281 (Pa. 2013).

      In determining whether a substantial question exists, this Court “cannot

look beyond the statement of questions presented and the prefatory Rule

2119(f) statement[.]”     Commonwealth v. Christine, 78 A.3d 1, 10

(Pa. Super. 2013), aff’d, 125 A.3d 394 (Pa. 2015).           The Rule 2119(f)

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statement “must explain where the sentence falls in relation to the sentencing

guidelines, identify what specific provision of the [Sentencing] Code [or] what

fundamental norm was violated, and explain how and why the [trial] court

violated that particular provision [or fundamental] norm.” Commonwealth

v. Feucht, 955 A.2d 377, 384 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 963 A.2d

467 (Pa. 2008). While it is not necessary that the Rule 2119(f) statement

“provide elaborate factual and procedural details,” the statement must provide

more than “bald assertions or non-specific claims of error[. The Rule 2119(f)]

statement “must state the way in which the penalty imposed is inappropriate.”

Feucht, 955 A.2d at 384. A substantial question exists when an appellant

presents a colorable argument that the sentence imposed is either (1)

inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code or (2) is “contrary

to   the   fundamental   norms   which   underlie   the   sentencing   process.”

Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 2 A.3d 581, 585 (Pa. Super. 2010),

appeal denied, 14 A.3d 825 (Pa. 2011).

      Here, the record demonstrates that Appellant filed a timely notice of

appeal and properly preserved a challenge to the discretionary aspects of his

sentence in his post-sentence motion requesting that the trial court reconsider

the sentence imposed at CR-2243. In his Rule 2119(f) statement, Appellant

asserts,

      The trial court abused its discretion in sentencing as [Appellant’s]
      sentence was manifestly unreasonable. [Appellant’s] sentence
      was contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the
      sentencing process and not consistent with the gravity of the

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       offense, the need of the public for protection[,] and the
       rehabilitative needs of [Appellant].

Appellant’s Brief at 8. In so arguing, we find that Appellant failed to raise a

substantial question. Appellant makes nothing more than a bald assertion

that his sentence was manifestly unreasonable and parrots the general

standards to be applied by a trial court in fashioning a sentence, as outlined

in Section 9721(b) of the Sentencing Code, to explain why his sentence is

manifestly unreasonable. Id.; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) (stating, “the

court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed should call

for total confinement that is consistent with section 9725 (relating to total

confinement) and the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the

rehabilitative needs of the defendant”). Appellant failed to explain where his

sentence falls in relation to the sentencing guidelines, to identify what

fundamental norm, or Sentencing Code provision, was violated, and to explain

how and why the trial court violated that particular fundamental norm, or

provision.5 See Feucht, 955 A.2d at 384. Because Appellant failed to present
____________________________________________

5 To the extent that Appellant asserts his sentence was manifestly
unreasonable because the trial court failed to consider his rehabilitative needs
(see Appellant’s Brief at 12 (Argument Section)), this Court in
Commonwealth v. Grifflin, 65 A.3d 932, 936-937 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal
denied, 76 A.3d 538 (Pa. 2013) set forth ample precedent to support a
determination that Appellant’s assertion fails to raise a substantial question.
See Grifflin, 65 A.3d at 936-937. We rely on Grifflin, supra, and the
precedent set forth therein, to find that Appellant failed to raise a substantial
question.

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____________________________________________

Moreover, insomuch as Appellant asserts his sentence was manifestly
unreasonable because the trial court failed to run the sentence imposed at
CR-2243 concurrently with the sentence imposed for his probation violation at
CR-9076, we find this assertion does not raise a substantial question.
“Pennsylvania law affords the [trial] court discretion to impose its sentence
concurrently or consecutively to other sentences being imposed at the same
time or to sentences already imposed.” Commonwealth v. Austin, 66 A.3d
798, 808 (Pa. Super. 2013), appeal denied, 77 A.3d 1258 (Pa. 2013); see
also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(a) (stating that, a trial court may order sentences
to run consecutively or concurrently). “Any challenge to the exercise of this
discretion ordinarily does not raise a substantial question.” Austin, 66 A.3d
at 808 (original quotation marks omitted). As this Court has long-held, an
appellant is not entitled to a “‘volume discount’ for his crimes by having all
sentences run concurrently.” Commonwealth v. Hoag, 665 A.2d 1212,
1214 (Pa. Super. 1995). “[T]he imposition of consecutive, rather than
concurrent, sentences may raise a substantial question in only the most
extreme circumstances, such as where the aggregate sentence is unduly
harsh, considering the nature of the crimes and the length of imprisonment.”
Lamonda, 52 A.3d at 372. The “key to resolving the preliminary substantial
question inquiry is whether the decision to sentence consecutively raises the
aggregate sentence to, what appears upon its face to be, an excessive level
in light of the criminal conduct at issue in the case.” Austin, 66 A.3d at 808
(citation omitted).

Here, the trial court, at CR-2243, sentenced Appellant to an aggregate
sentence of 4 to 8 years’ incarceration to be followed by 3 years’ probation for
the aforementioned convictions. The aforementioned convictions are similar
to the crimes Appellant pled guilty to at CR-9076. See N.T., 10/25/21, at 7
(explaining that, Appellant pled guilty at CR-9076 to involuntary deviate
sexual intercourse with a child, indecent assault, and sexual assault). As a
result of Appellant’s probation violation at CR-9076, the trial court sentenced
Appellant to an aggregate sentence of 7 to 20 years’ incarceration to be
followed by 3 years’ probation. The term of incarceration at CR-9076 was set
to run consecutively to the term of incarceration at CR-2243. As such,
Appellant’s overall aggregate sentence was 11 to 28 years’ incarceration to be
followed by 6 years of probation.

Appellant’s assertion that his sentence was manifestly unreasonable because
the sentences imposed at CR-9076 and CR-2243 were set to run consecutively
and not concurrently is merely a request by Appellant to receive a “volume

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a substantial question, we are without jurisdiction to address the merits of his

underlying claim that his sentence was manifestly unreasonable.

       In the argument section of his appellate brief, Appellant asserts that the

trial court failed to give him “credit for time served prior to the probation

revocation.” Appellant’s Brief at 13. This assertion, raising a challenge to the

trial court’s failure to award credit for time served, presents a legality of

sentence claim that cannot be waived and may be raised sua sponte by this

Court. Commonwealth v. Gibbs, 181 A.3d 1165, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2018);

see also Commonwealth v. Hills, 238 A.3d 399, 407 (Pa. 2020). Issues

relating to the legality of a sentence are questions of law for which our

standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. Gibbs, 181

A.3d at 1166.

       Section 9760 of the Sentencing Code, governing how a trial court applies

credit for time served, states, in pertinent part,

       Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term shall be
       given to the defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of
       the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as
       a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based. Credit
       shall include credit for time spent in custody prior to trial, during
       trial, pending sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.

____________________________________________

discount” on the two cases both of which involved Appellant committing
heinous sexual offenses against child-victims. Thus, in light of the criminal
conduct at issue in both cases, and the length of incarceration, we conclude
that the trial court’s imposition of a sentence at CR-2243 set to run
consecutively to the sentence at CR-9076 does not raise a substantial
question.

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42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1).

      Our Supreme Court in Gaito v. Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and

Parole, 412 A.2d 568 (Pa. 1980) set forth rules governing the award of credit

for time served when a defendant has been detained both for a parole or

probation violation and prior to trial on new criminal charges. In relevant part,

Gaito states:

      if a defendant is being held in custody solely because of a detainer
      lodged by the [Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole] and
      has otherwise met the requirements for bail on the new criminal
      charges, the time which he spent in custody shall be credited
      against his original sentence. If a defendant, however, remains
      incarcerated prior to trial because he [] failed to satisfy bail
      requirements on the new criminal charges, then the time spent in
      custody shall be credited to his new sentence.

Gaito, 412 A.2d at 571 (emphasis in original). While the nuances of awarding

credit for time served can be daunting, the hallmark principles in awarding

such credit remain as follows: (1) that pursuant to Section 9760, a defendant

must be awarded credit for time served, and (2) that credit for time served

may only be awarded once.          See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1); see also

Commonwealth v. Hollawell, 604 A.2d 723 (Pa. Super. 1992) (stating that,

Pennsylvania courts do not deal in “volume discounts” and a defendant may

not receive a “windfall” on sentencing by having credit for time served

awarded more than once).

      Here, the record demonstrates that, at CR-2243, Appellant was arrested

on the aforementioned criminal charges, and bail was set on March 16, 2021.

Because Appellant failed to post bail, he remained incarcerated as a result of

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these new charges from March 17, 2021, until October 25, 2021, a total of

223 days.   On October 25, 2021, the trial court sentenced Appellant at

CR-2243 as discussed supra.     That same day, the trial court found that

Appellant violated his probation and resentenced him at CR-9076 as discussed

supra.   The term of incarceration imposed at CR-9076 (7 to 20 years’

incarceration) was set to run consecutively to the term of incarceration

imposed at CR-2243 (4 to 8 years’ incarceration). In other words, Appellant

was ordered to serve 4 to 8 years’ incarceration to be followed by 7 to 20

years’ incarceration for an aggregate of 11 to 28 years’ incarceration. The

trial court credited Appellant with 223 days for time served towards the

sentence imposed at CR-2243. Thus, the trial court correctly awarded credit

for the 223 days of time served towards Appellant’s sentence imposed on the

aforementioned criminal convictions in the case sub judice because he was

incarcerated pending trial on these new charges and was unable to post bail.

Gaito, 412 A.2d at 571.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/4/2023

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