Court Opinion

ID: 9603155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:03:46.437896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:08.999946
License: Public Domain

SUTIN, Judge (concurring in result). I concur in the result. A special concurring opinion is not read or relied upon by lawyers and district judges. It is a waste of space in New Mexico Reports and should not be written. If the Supreme Court grants certiorari, it will not be published. Generally, I write one to point out the idiosyncratic performance of trial lawyers and district judges, together with the tortuosities of appellate opinions. First, the district judge adopted the findings and conclusions requested by defendants. The Supreme Court and this Court have heretofore remanded such a cause to the district court to make its own findings. Heretofore, I disagreed and still disagree. But when a district judge adopts the requested findings without reading and studying them, the trial lawyer often leads the judge astray. It was done in this case. In Correspondence Opinions written in response to Memorandum Opinions submitted by my brethren, I have suggested a solution to this problem: (1) submit requested findings and (2) submit proper findings for the court to use with a change in verbiage. A district judge, long after a trial, generally accepts any findings submitted by the successful party even without carefully reading them. It occurred in this case. Under these circumstances, a remand is necessary but impractical. The district judge no longer sits in office. A new trial granted would be a useless appendage. Plaintiff can seek an increase in the percentage of scheduled disability. Second, there was no evidence of partial permanent disability. No such finding appears in the court’s findings nor in the judgment. At the close of the case, comments were made, and for these comments, I applaud the district judge. He stated that he leaned toward plaintiff to give him some relief. He awarded plaintiff “partial permanent disability of five percent,” and “if the Court’s arithmetic is correct . $1,010.88.” Partial disability is defined in Section 52-1-25, N.M.S.A.1978 as follows: “[PJartial disability” means a condition whereby a workman * * * is unable to some percentage-extent to perform the usual tasks in the work he was performing at the time of his injury and is unable to some percentage-extent to perform any work for which he is fitted by age, education, training, general physical and mental capacity and previous work experience. [Emphasis added.] The question put to Dr. Allan Wilson by plaintiff, reads: Q. Doctor, do you have an opinion — I will talk about impairment of function and not legal disability, — Do you have an opinion as to the percentage extent that Bert suffers, percentage extent of functional impairment that Bert suffers as a result of the condition in his right elbow . . . ? A. It is my opinion that Bert has a five percent permanent impairment of his right upper extremity. [Emphasis added.] The testimony of Dr. Wilson does not establish permanent partial disability. Seldom, if ever, is an expert witness asked the following questions: In your opinion, is the workman wholly (or to some percentage-extent partially) unable to perform the usual tasks in the work he was performing at the time of the injury? In your opinion, based upon the age, education, training, general physical and mental capacity and previous work experience, is the workman wholly (or to some percentage-extent partially) unable to perform any work for which he is fitted? On cross-examination, plaintiff was asked these questions to which he made these answers: Q. You are still working at this job with Bill Jay Construction Company [same type of work]? A. Yes. Q. And that, as with all the other previous job[s], involves essentially the same type of work that you have been doing all of your adult life, doesn’t it? A. Yes. Plaintiff agreed that he was wholly able to perform the usual tasks in the work he was performing at the time of his injury, and wholly able to perform all work for which he was fitted by age, education, training, general physical and mental capacity and previous work experience. Dr. Wilson was asked these questions to which he made these answers: Q. Now Doctor, did you have an opinion, based upon reasonable medical probability on May 4, 1977, as to whether Bert Gearhart was able to return to work? A. I did not feel that he could return to work at this point, no. Q. Did you subsequently okay his return to work? A. Yes I did. Basically we treated Bert on 5/4/77 and he returned to work on 5/18/77, and was at that point, essentially asymptomatic and was discharged. [Emphasis added.] The trial court found that on May 18, 1977, plaintiff was released by Dr. Wilson as being fully recovered. Dr. Jacob Bronitsky was asked this question to which he made this answer: Q. Would you be able to express an opinion for us as to whether or not in your opinion Bert Gearhart is disabled to any extent? A. I don’t think he is disabled to any extent. He is able to do the heavy kind of work that he has been doing. I mean if he is having some discomfort, I would say, if I had to give a percentage, I would say about five percent. [Emphasis added.] Furthermore, the court concluded: 4. The undisputed medical evidence was that the Plaintiff suffered from a 5% impairment of the right arm at the elbow. ****** 6. The Plaintiff is entitled to $1,010.88 as compensation benefits. 7. The Plaintiff is completely able to perform the type and amount of work which he was performing on February 10, 1977. 8. The Plaintiff is completely able to perform all work for which he is fitted by age, education and work experience. 9. The Plaintiff has suffered a schedule injury which has produced a 5% impairment of the right arm at the elbow, but such injury has not created any disability. [Emphasis by Court.] If defendants had cross-appealed, we would have been compelled to deny plaintiff any compensation benefits. Defendants put in their requested conclusions that plaintiff was entitled to compensation benefits and yet was not disabled. This contradiction is explained by the comments made by the district judge at the close of the evidence, and defendants’ desire to seek judgment. This mishmash, hodgepodge and hogwash method of trying cases on the part of both parties does find favor with most appellate judges, but not with me. However, I want to make my position clear. Merely because a workman is wholly able to perform his usual tasks does not per se mean that he is totally or partially disabled. In my Correspondence Opinion in Lopez v. Phelps Dodge Corporation, No. 3505, filed September 19, 1978, cert. granted, November 11, 1978, I said: Plaintiff drove a muck truck having a capacity of 85 to 100 tons of ore. He was divorced but he had custody of the children, three of whom had reached the age of 18, and three who had not. He wore a back brace during his employment. He was not paid compensation benefits and had to borrow money from a bank. He worked a midnight shift to 8:00 a. m. Many workmen will do slave labor to support a family notwithstanding disability as defined by law. The mere fact that he is employed full time does not bear on the percentage of his disability, if any. ****** In the trial of a workmen’s compensation case, “Plaintiff must establish that he was totally or partially unable to perform the work he was doing at the time of the injury.” Medina v. Zia Company, 88 N.M. 615, 544 P.2d 1180 (Ct.App.1975). This does not mean that plaintiff must suffer the pangs of misery while doing the work. Plaintiff was able to perform his job on a full time basis with a back brace, pain and discomfort. . “Slave labor” and “pangs of misery” suffered while performing work puts a workman in the category of disability under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. This includes pain suffered which, in the opinion of a workman or an expert, falls within the definition of disability. Third, in my opinion, this appeal was taken to provide for future medical expense, costs and attorneys fees. I concur with Judge Hendley. The considerations that enter into the matter of fixing attorney fees was stated in Elsea v. Broone Furniture Co., 47 N.M. 356, 143 P.2d 572 (1943) and followed in Michelson v. Michelson, 89 N.M. 282, 551 P.2d 638 (1976). See Marez v. Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation, No. 3487, filed December 19, 1978, Sutin, J., specially concurring.