Court Opinion

ID: 9863027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 02:50:27.477659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:46:05.955359
License: Public Domain

*743Dissenting Opinion by
Chief Justice SEERDEN.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion to the extent that it upholds liability and damages against Bradford, Simon and Golden. I would hold that there was no evidence to support any of the findings of liability, including tortious interference with contractual relations, that the award of mental anguish damages is inappropriate in the present case and, even if appropriate, was excessive, and that there was no evidence to support the award for lost profits.

No Evidence to Support Finding of Tortious Interference

The majority concedes that the only act by which Bradford, Simon and Golden could be held liable for tortiously interfering with Vento’s contractual relations is Bradford’s representation to the police that Taylor owned the store at the time of the confrontation between Taylor and Ven-to on October 6,1994. This representation caused the police to eject Vento and restore Taylor to possession of the store. However, I would hold that Bradford’s actions under the circumstances were not tortious, nor did they proximately cause Vento’s injury.
Neither the police, nor Bradford, had the authority to determine right to possession as between Taylor and Vento. The police did, however, have the authority to keep the peace and to arrest anyone that they had probable cause to believe was trespassing on private property. To that end, they looked to Bradford as mall manager and landlord to tell them which of the two rival claimants owned the space in the mall leased to Collector’s Choice.
Had Bradford disclosed that Vento came to him several days before and told him he had purchased the business and paid the rent on that space, but that Taylor still claimed ownership, we do not know what the police officers would have done. The evidence suggests that they were not looking to Bradford for background information, but, as the senior officer testified, for a judgment as to which of the two claimants owned the business.
Bradford was then faced with rival claimants and a written lease that still showed Taylor as the lessee. Whether or not Taylor had sold his business to a third party, the written lease between Taylor and the mall obligated the mall to protect Taylor’s right to that lease until such time as Taylor relinquished it. It was, therefore, entirely reasonable for Bradford, as lessor, to continue to protect the right of this tenant to the peaceful possession of the leasehold until the right of Vento, as third-party purchaser, could be established. Nor is there any indication that a fuller explanation of the background facts by Bradford would have changed the result that day. It is entirely speculative what actions the police might have taken had they had the whole story concerning Bradford’s knowledge of the relationship between Taylor and Vento. I would hold that there was no evidence to show that Bradford acted wrongfully or that his failure to relate the whole story to police proximately caused Vento to be removed from the mall and the resulting interference with Vento’s contractual relations with his customers.

Mental Anguish Damages Inappropriate

I would also hold that Vento is not entitled to damages for mental anguish flowing from his present claims for tortious interference against Bradford, Simon and Golden.
Mental anguish damages are not generally recoverable in a tort action based on rights growing out of the breach of a contract. Rubalcaba v. Pacific/Atlantic Crop Exchange, Inc., 952 S.W.2d 552, 558 (Tex.App. — El Paso 1997, no writ); Delgado v. Methodist Hosp., 936 S.W.2d 479, 486 (Tex.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, no writ); Doe v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 855 S.W.2d 248, 258 (Tex.App. — Austin 1993), affirmed as modified, 903 S.W.2d 347 (Tex.1995). The present action grows out of a breach of contract by which Vento *744purchased a business from Taylor and the associated lease agreement under which that business was to operate in the Valle Vista Mall. Accordingly, I would deny recovery of mental anguish damages.

No Evidence of Lost Profits

Finally, I would hold that the evidence was legally insufficient to support an award of lost profits. The amount of the loss must be shown by competent evidence with reasonable certainty. Szczepanik v. First Southern Trust Co., 883 S.W.2d 648, 649 (Tex.1994); Texas Instruments v. Teletron Energy Management, Inc., 877 S.W.2d 276, 279 (Tex.1994). At a minimum, opinions or estimates of lost profits must be based on objective facts, figures, or data from which the amount of lost profits may be ascertained. Szczepanik, 883 S.W.2d at 649; Holt Atherton Ind., Inc. v. Heine, 835 S.W.2d 80, 84 (Tex.1992).
Profits that are largely speculative, as from an activity dependent on uncertain or changing market conditions, or on chancy business opportunities, or on promotion of untested products or entry into unknown or unviable markets, or on the success of a new and unproven enterprise, cannot be recovered. Texas Instruments, Inc., 877 S.W.2d at 279. Moreover, in determining whether such an enterprise is unproven, the focus is on the experience of the persons involved in the enterprise and the nature of the business activity, and the relevant market. Id. at 280.
In the present case, Vento’s expert, economist Dr. Gilbert De Los Santos, attempted to show lost profits by taking Vento’s estimates of the monthly sales generated by Collector’s Choice in 1994, then taking the amount of his 30% net profits for the first five months of that year, as reflected by the deposits shown in Vento’s checkbook, and extrapolating a profit margin of 15.5%. He then used a 5% growth rate in sales over a ten-year period to project the profits lost over that period.
For two reasons, I do not agree that this was an adequate measure of profits. First, Vento’s estimates of the sales for 1994 were insufficient as a matter of law. Vento has not shown how he “estimated” the monthly sales of Collector’s Choice, nor did Dr. De Los Santos know how these estimates were generated. Vento’s testimony shows that he did not have personal knowledge of the exact amount, nor is there any indication how he arrived at these estimates. They are speculative at best and do not offer a reliable means of calculating profits.
Second, even assuming the accuracy of his calculations for 1994 under the ownership and management of Taylor, there was no indication what profits would have been under Vento’s management and operation of the business.
The record shows this to be a small business dependent upon the direct labor and skill of the proprietor. The loss of that proprietor is, accordingly, a difficult variable to account for in determining the future profitability of the business without Taylor. This obstacle could, perhaps, be overcome with sufficient evidence of the manner of operation and how Vento planned to compensate for the loss of Taylor, together with evidence of Vento’s own ability to manage a small business on his own.
However, the present record is devoid of any such evidence and depends almost entirely on evidence of past profitability under Taylor’s management and control. This is not indicative of the profitability of the business as a sole proprietorship under Vento’s management. We do not know whether Vento has the same abilities as Taylor to successfully operate a business on his own or to retain the customer base that Taylor built up over the years. Accordingly, the business under Vento’s management is an unproven enterprise. See Texas Instruments, Inc., 877 S.W.2d at 279-80. I would hold the evidence speculative and insufficient to support any certain measure of lost profits under Vento’s sole management and control of the business.
*745I would reverse the trial court’s judgment and render a take-nothing judgment in favor of Bradford, Simon and Golden.
Justice DORSEY joins in this dissent.