Court Opinion

ID: 9669626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:02:00.432693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:58.776299
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, P.J.
(concurring). I concur. I write separately because of my partially concurring and dissenting opinion in Veeneman v Michigan, 143 Mich App 694, 702-703; 373 NW2d 193 (1985), lv gtd 424 Mich 876 (1986), which has no precedential value given the Supreme Court’s order granting leave to appeal. See People v Phillips, 416 Mich 63, 74-75; 330 NW2d 366 (1982).
In Veeneman, I reserved judgment on whether the recreational use act applies to state-owned lands. I now agree that it does. McNeal v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 140 Mich App 625; 364 NW2d 768 (1985), Veeneman v Michigan, supra, and Schiller v Muskegon State Park, 153 Mich App 472; 395 NW2d 75 (1986).
In Veeneman, I also joined with the majority in concluding that the recreational use statute does not provide immunity from ordinary negligence where a state park charges annual and daily *503motor vehicle fees. We were off the mark. Following the decision in Veeneman, however, another panel of this Court considered the same question and arrived at a different conclusion. See Schiller v Muskegon State Park, supra. 1 now agree with the position taken in Schiller and by the majority in the instant case and conclude that payment of the state park motor vehicle entry fee does not constitute sufficient consideration under the recreational use statute to deprive state parks of the immunity otherwise guaranteed under that act.