Court Opinion

ID: 9721867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:11:26.516827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:29.015263
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE HARRISON, specially concurring: While I join in the result reached by the majority, I concur separately to emphasize what I believe to be of crucial significance in the disposition of this cause, but only implicit in the majority’s opinion. Possession of a controlled substance is, by statutory definition, a lesser-included offense of the crime of delivery of such a substance. Section 102(i) of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 56%, par. 1102(i)) defines “deliver” or “delivery” as “the actual, constructive or attempted transfer of possession of a controlled substance * ° (Emphasis added.) Therefore, by legislative circumscription, one who commits the statutory offense of delivery under section 401 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 56%, par. 1401) has ipso facto committed the unlawful act of possession (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 56%, par. 1402). Our court has recognized this state of affairs in the past. People v. Dunn (1977), 49 Ill. App. 3d 1002, 365 N.E.2d 164. In determining whether the sentence classification imposed for the crime of possession denies appellant the equal protection of the laws, we must resolve “whether the particular legislative classification is rationally designed to further a legitimate State purpose. (San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), 411 U.S. 1, 17, 36 L. Ed. 2d 16, 33, 93 S. Ct. 1278, 1288; Maher v. Roe (1977), 432 U.S. 464, 470, 53 L. Ed. 2d 484, 492, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 2381.)” (People ex rel. Tucker v. Kotsos (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 88, 96, 368 N.E.2d 903.) Based on a review of the entire Illinois Controlled Substances Act, which the State invites upon us, no legitimate State interest is evident, or has been proposed, nor can I conceive of one, which can justify the sentencing of one convicted of delivery to a shorter term than one convicted of the lesser-included offense of possession. Such differential treatment is the sort of punitive and invidious discrimination the equal protection clause was designed to proscribe. (Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co. (1973), 410 U.S. 356, 359, 35 L. Ed. 2d 351, 354-55, 93 S. Ct. 1001, 1003-04; Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections (1966), 383 U.S. 663, 666, 16 L. Ed. 2d 169, 172, 86 S. Ct. 1079.) This is why the possession statute violates the equal protection clauses of the United States and Illinois constitutions (U.S. Const., amend. XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, §2), and why any conviction thereunder is void.