Court Opinion

ID: 9686921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:11:21.860866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:22.958039
License: Public Domain

Allen, J.
(dissenting). While I agree that the prosecutor’s failure to give the notice required by statute is not excused under the exception set forth in People v Gillman, 66 Mich App 419, 428; 239 NW2d 396 (1976), I disagree that reversal is required by People v Terry Alexander, 82 Mich App 621; 267 NW2d 466 (1978). In two significant respects the instant case differs from Alexander. First, in the instant case the trial court made a specific finding that Pritchett’s testimony would not surprise the defendant.1 No such finding was made in Alexander. Second, Alexander did not discuss that part of the statute reading "at such *322other time as the court may direct”. MCL 768.20(2); MSA 28.1043(2) provides:
"Within 10 days after the receipt of the defendant’s notice but not later than 5 days before the trial of the case, or at such other time as the court may direct, the prosecuting attorney shall file and serve upon the defendant a notice of rebuttal which shall contain, as particularly as is known to the prosecuting attorney, the names of the witnesses whom the prosecuting attorney proposes to call in rebuttal to controvert the defendant’s defense at the trial of the case.” (Emphasis added.)
In a sense, what took place here was that the notice of rebuttal was served on defendant "at such other time as the court may direct”, that time being when the court overruled defendant’s objection to Pritchett’s testimony.
The rationale behind the notice of alibi statute is to prevent surprise at trial. As was stated in Wardius v Oregon, 412 US 470, 473; 93 S Ct 2208, 2211; 37 L Ed 2d 82, 87 (1973):
"[T]he ends of justice will best be served by a system of liberal discovery which gives both parties the maximum possible amount of information with which to prepare their cases and thereby reduce the possibility of . surprise at trial.”
To reverse where, as here, there is no prejudice nor surprise is to stretch the statute beyond its legitimate purpose of affording the defendant a fair trial. If Alexander stands for the proposition that, under the statute as amended, the trial court has lost all its former discretion to permit or exclude testimony of rebuttal to an alibi defense if the requisite notice of rebuttal is not timely given, then I disagree with Alexander.
*323Under prior law the trial court had such discretion. People v Merritt, 396 Mich 67, 83; 238 NW2d 31 (1976). Under the statute, as amended, the prosecutor must file notice of the people’s rebuttal witnesses "not later than 5 days before trial of the case, or at such other time as the court may direct”. In my opinion the underscored language grants the trial court some discretion in allowing the filing of notice even less than five days before trial. The majority opinion shuts out all discretion and totally ignores the language underscored. I disagree.

 After defense counsel objected to Pritchett testifying, the court heard arguments by counsel out of the presence of the jury and then found: "I want to look at this total case. In this total case, no one but no one, was surprised or will be surprised by the proposed witness”. During the arguments it was revealed that Pritchett had testified as early as May, 1976, before a grand jury.