Court Opinion

ID: 9576135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:21:10.34712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:54.917411
License: Public Domain

Hall, Justice,
dissenting.
I do not find this statute unconstitutional for either of the reasons for which the majority opinion invalidates it. Accordingly, I dissent for the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Coursin v. Harper, 236 Ga. 729, 734 (225 SE2d 428) (1976). The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit very recently upheld the constitutionality of Florida’s post-judgment garnishment statute on the same principles enunciated in my Coursin dissent. Brown v. Liberty Loan Corp. of Duval, 539 F2d 1355, 1362-1369 (5th Cir. 1976). In fact, this court is the only appellate tribunal in the country that equates pre-judgment and post-judgment due process requirements. All other courts that have addressed the issue have without exception held that the requirements of the due process clause are significantly different once a judgment has been entered.
*14Clearly the due process rights of a defendant are protected in Georgia’s post-judgment procedure by the defendant’s right to a speedy post-garnishment hearing and by the fact that a judgment has already been entered against the defendant. Judicial supervision of the issuance of a summons of post-judgment garnishment would serve no purpose and would be disruptive of the trial judge’s daily schedule which is already overburdened by routine procedures. They do not need any additional make-work duties.
The majority opinion in Coursin endured some very heavy seas during this appeal. The first holding here which followed Coursin came down on October 19, 1976. Amicus briefs appeared on motion for rehearing attacking the decision. The majority opinion in this appeal was then altered so that while it struck down the 1976 garnishment statute, it revived the 1975 garnishment statute. More motions were filed. On November 24th the court struck that part of the opinion reviving the 1975 statute. In the meantime, one of the strongest defenders of the Coursin opinion (see 236 Ga. 874), now dissents and the majority view has one fewer vote. Nevertheless, Coursin sails on into even rougher seas ahead with its constitutional buoyancy dependent solely upon the determined bailing of the five Justices of this court who continue to equate pre-judgment and post-judgment due process requirements.