Court Opinion

ID: 9374338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 20:00:53.652776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:50.827772
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FEB 22 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ARMANDO ANDRES ORTIZ,                           No. 21-15496

                Petitioner-Appellant,           D.C. No. 4:17-cv-00623-JGZ

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF ARIZONA; DAVID SHINN, Director,

                Respondents-Appellees,

and

CHARLES RYAN,

                Respondent.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Arizona
                   Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding

                          Submitted February 14, 2023**

Before:      FERNANDEZ, FRIEDLAND, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

      Arizona state prisoner Armando Andres Ortiz appeals pro se from the

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
district court’s judgment denying his habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We

have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253. We review de novo, see Rowland v.

Chappell, 876 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2017), and we affirm.

      Ortiz alleges that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance under

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), by conceding Ortiz’s guilt to the

aggravated assault charges and by failing to research and present a self-defense

theory against those charges. The state courts’ resolution of these claims was

neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable application of, Strickland. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254(d)(1). As the state trial court concluded, the decision to concede a less

serious offense in order to defend against more serious ones can be a reasonable

trial strategy, and it was so here because the evidence against Ortiz as to the assault

charges was strong. See Gallegos v. Ryan, 820 F.3d 1013, 1027 (9th Cir.)

(attorney’s admission of his client’s guilt was not ineffective assistance in light of

the evidence against the client), amended on reh’g, 842 F.3d 1123 (9th Cir. 2016).

Moreover, the state appellate court reasonably concluded that Ortiz failed to show

he was prejudiced by counsel’s alleged failures in researching and presenting a

self-defense theory because there was no reasonable probability that a jury would

find a reasonable person in Ortiz’s position would think it necessary to fire

“several shots from a handgun in front of a convenience store” in response to the

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guards’ use of force.1

      Ortiz also contends that his counsel’s performance regarding his attempted

second-degree murder and burglary charges fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. However, he cannot show prejudice because his convictions for

these charges were vacated and the charges dismissed. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687. Nor does his opening brief “point us to specific instances of [defense

counsel’s] conduct that demonstrate incompetent performance” as to these

convictions. Browning v. Baker, 875 F.3d 444, 471 (9th Cir. 2017).

      We treat Ortiz’s remaining arguments as a motion to expand the certificate

of appealability. So treated, the motion is denied. See 9th Cir. R. 22-1(e); Hiivala

v. Wood, 195 F.3d 1098, 1104-05 (9th Cir. 1999).

      AFFIRMED.

1
 Because Ortiz does not point to persuasive evidence showing that he acted in self-
defense, the state courts’ decisions were not based on unreasonable determinations
of the facts, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), and we presume their factual findings to
be correct, see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).

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