Court Opinion

ID: 9515224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:54:42.763032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:26.390862
License: Public Domain

*855KONENKAMP, Justice
(concurring).
[¶ 21.] Goodwin should be permitted to withdraw his plea of guilty to aggravated assault because the record does not affirmatively shoiv at the time he pleaded guilty that he did so understandingly and voluntarily. Roseland v. State, 334 N.W.2d 43, 45 (S.D.1983); State v. Holmes, 270 N.W.2d 51, 53 (S.D.1978). “Before accepting” guilty pleas, judges are required to personally address defendants in open court, informing them that if they plead guilty they waive their right to a trial, their right to confront and cross-examine witnesses against them, and their right not to be compelled to incriminate themselves. SDCL 23A-7-4 (Rule 11(c)). No prudent reading of our statutes can lead to the conclusion that this requirement can be fulfilled anytime before a guilty plea, no matter how long before.
[¶ 22.] It is true that this Court has upheld guilty pleas when judges have failed to readvise defendants of their rights immediately before pleading guilty if the record shows that they had knowledge of their rights and the consequences when entering their guilty pleas. Clark, 294 N.W.2d at 919. We have found no abuse of discretion where the time span between advice and plea was five hours, twenty-six days, and thirty days. See Garritsen, 376 N.W.2d at 577-78 (citing cases). But let us be clear and emphatic on this point: those cases did not establish a model performance standard. They measured the limits of judicial discretion in determining whether readvisement and explicit waiver were required. Those cases can be summed up by saying that we will not insist on a ritualistic recitation of rights each time a defendant pleads guilty, regardless of how fresh those rights remain in the mind of the defendant. We look to the totality of circumstances. Nonetheless, we have never condoned a plea of guilty where the lapse between advice and plea spanned some three months.
[¶ 23.] Here the judge never asked Goodwin whether he recalled the rights recited to him eighty-nine days earlier and never asked him if he understood that he was then waiving those rights by pleading guilty. The purpose for the procedure in SDCL 23A-7-4 (Rule 11(c)) is to ensure that defendants are fully aware of the consequences of a guilty plea before they enter that plea. Thus, the record must affirmatively show that the plea was voluntary, that the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty, and that the defendant explicitly waived' the constitutional right against compulsory self incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers. See Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-44, 89 S.Ct. at 1712, 23 L.Ed.2d at 279-80; Nachtigall, 178 N.W.2d at 201. The record in this case fails to satisfy the foregoing requirements. Goodwin’s plea was therefore defective. South' Dakota law provides for withdrawal of a plea if that withdrawal is necessary “to correct a manifest injustice.” SDCL 23A-27-11 (Rule 32(d)). Cf. State v. Gunwall, 522 N.W.2d 183, 185 (N.D.1994) (interpreting identical statute).