Court Opinion

ID: 9570980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:28:03.999158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:25.757258
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
On January 8, 1976, appellant was convicted of the crime of aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony1 and sentenced to an indeterminate term at the Utah State Prison of not less than five years. He now appeals the conviction, claiming the following errors:
(1) The trial court erred in admitting evidence not named or described in the Information or the Bill of Particulars.
*1356(2) The trial court erred in refusing cross-examination of a witness regarding her use of heroin on the date of the robbery.
(3) The trial court erred in permitting the prosecutor to question appellant concerning his arrest in Arizona for which there was no conviction.
(4) The trial court erred in refusing to allow testimony that would indicate the witness had committed perjury.
The first claimed error has been well settled in this State for many years. Our statute2 requires only that the particulars of the crime charged need be given in the Bill of Particulars. It is not necessary that the evidence to be used in the prosecutor’s case be set out in detail.3 As to the Information, the statute4 provides that it is sufficient if it informs the defendant of the nature and cause of the charge against him. This is supported by our casé law,5 a most recent case in point being State v. Moraine.6 It was there stated:
If the information under which a defendant is to be tried is sufficiently clear as to what the crime is, then the prosecuting attorney need not furnish any bill of particulars at all. . . . Where the court orders the prosecuting attorney to give matters not required . the court may excuse the failure to furnish such material by permitting the evidence to be introduced, .

In the instant case, the Information charged the defendant with aggravated robbery of Brenda Bradley and Barbara Harris on June 30, 1975, with the use of a revolver. In addition, the Bill of Particulars listed all the witnesses who were at the scene of the robbery, including witnesses the State did not intend to call. This was entirely sufficient to put appellant on notice that evidence relating to the other people present would be brought forth at trial. In U. S. v. Mackey,7 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held:
the exercise of this (the court’s) discretion cannot be reversed on appeal unless the court concludes that the ‘defendant was actually surprised at the trial and thus that substantial rights of his were prejudiced by the denial’
Appellant can hardly claim surprise since he did not deny having been at the Harris home when the crime occurred. He was in a position to know who was there at the time and what he should be prepared to defend against. It is not necessary that each person robbed and each item taken be listed in the Information. Such facts are not elements of separate crimes but are surrounding circumstances that explain and prove the offense charged. The evidence was properly admitted, and no error was committed.
Appellant, during the course of cross-examination, asked the witness, Brenda Bradley, if she were using heroin on the day of the robbery. The trial court refused to permit this evidence and appellant claims it was pertinent to her credibility under Rule 20, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). However, Rule 20 is subject to the qualification of Rule 45 which provides that even if credibility may be affected, the trial court has the discretion to deny admission of the information when the prejudicial effect far outweighs the probative value of the testimony.
This Court has stated that it is permissible to inquire about the use of drugs that would affect the physical or mental condition of the witness, in order to test the *1357memory of the witness or his capacity to adequately relate knowledge of the facts.8 While it may have been proper to admit the disputed testimony, the qualification of Rule 45 gives the trial court the discretion to refuse it. And that discretion should not be tampered with by this Court unless the appellant shows that his rights were substantially prejudiced because of the trial court’s actions. In the instant case, appellant has failed to meet this test.
The witness was only one of se\«pral witnesses, and the factual accounts given by the other witnesses were substantially the same as the witness whose testimony is questioned here. Drug use by the witness has no direct bearing on the elements of the crime with which appellant was charged and, therefore, was a collateral matter that the trial court could have properly determined did not have enough probative value to justify taking the risk that the entire testimony of Ms. Bradley might be discounted merely because she admitted to the use of heroin. Heroin users can be robbed as easily as anyone else, but such evidence (the use of heroin) can also have the effect of prejudicing a jury to the point where nothing the witness says will be believed because of the stigma that is attached to drug users. Rule 45 is intended to protect against the possibility of this kind of harm, and the trial court made no error by invoking the rule here.
Even if it be admitted that it was error to sustain the objection (which I do not do), the appellant cannot validly claim on this appeal that it was prejudicial error. He made no tender of what the answer would be. For all we know, the answer would have been a flat “no.” The specific question was, “On June 30, 1975, when this incident occurred, had you used any heroin?” There was no tender of proof that the witness had used any drug that would have affected her faculties to know and understand the things which there occurred. It was merely a red herring drawn across the testimony in the hope that the jurors might get the idea that the witness herself was a law violator. I think it lay within the discretion of the trial court to refuse to permit the inquiry into the collateral matter and was, therefore, not error; and I think beyond any shadow of a doubt that, as revealed by the record, it was not prejudicial.
Evidence was admitted during testimony that appellant had been arrested for crimes in the State of Arizona for which he had not been convicted. Appellant claims this admission amounted to prejudicial error.
It is the rule in this State that the scope of cross-examination by the prosecutor is within the trial court’s discretion, and such discretion will not be overturned on appeal, absent a showing of abuse.9 Rule 55, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) provides that evidence of other crimes or wrongs is admissible when relevant to prove some other material fact. The only fact sought to be proved by the prosecutor’s questions was that a gun identical to that alleged to have been stolen and used in the robbery was found in appellant’s possession during a search by the/Arizona police when he was arrested. This was material to the case because appellant had consistently denied having a gun at any time and denied using any weapon to commit the robbery. The gun was a vital element to prove the charge of aggravated robbery, and admission of the evidence of the Arizona arrest was proper under these circumstances.
Other jurisdictions have adopted this view as well. In Holland v. Briggs,10 the defense tried to prevent questions alluding to previous assaults. It was held proper to *1358admit the testimony to show the sequence of events and general state of mind. The court there distinguished the general rule by saying that evidence of other crimes is admissible if their omission would impair the jury’s understanding.11 In the instant case, the jury would have had a difficult time sorting the testimony of the witnesses that appellant used a gun from the testimony of appellant that he never had a gun unless the prosecutor had been permitted to show the sequence of events that led to appellant’s arrest in Arizona where the gun in question was found in his possession.
This Court established its rule many years ago in the case of State v. Nemier.12 There, at p. 312 in the Utah Reports, at p. 329 in the Pacific Reports, this Court stated:
It is universally recognized that the state may not prove other similar offenses committed by accused merely to show his bad character and propensity to commit similar crimes, ... It is, however, recognized that if the facts which constitute the collateral offense are relevant, that is they inherently tend to establish any of the necessary elements of the crime charged, . . . proof of such facts is admissible, . . . [Emphasis added.].
Appellant sought to bring in the testimony of an undercover narcotics agent who would have testified that three months after the robbery, Barbara Harris sold him heroin. In this way, appellant tried to impeach Ms. Harris’ testimony for she had stated that she never sold heroin. This testimony would have been relevant for impeachment purposes if Ms. Harris were being tried for selling narcotics, but in a trial for armed robbery, such evidence, at the most, would be only collateral and have no direct bearing on the issue of the case.
In Banta v. Superior Court of Maricopa County13 it was held that “A witness cannot be impeached by producing extrinsic evidence to contradict the testimony concerning a collateral issue.” And, again, in State v. Superior Court14 the Arizona Supreme Court stated:
. the use of character evidence to impeach a witness may not extend to the showing of a specific prior bad act for which the person was not convicted of a felony.
The reason for this conclusion is that the matter on which the witness was impeached was merely a collateral matter, not a material one, and the prejudicial effect resulting therefrom far outweighed the benefits of such impeachment. Again, at page 949, the Arizona court continued:
The substantive use of specific bad acts of a witness is also barred because as a general proposition they have little relevance to the merits of the present action and may be extremely prejudicial.
This Court has.never dealt squarely with this particular point, but the Arizona cases appear to state the better rule. Other jurisdictions also support the view that a witness cannot be impeached concerning facts collateral to the issue. In State v. Johnson 15 it was stated that whether a matter is collateral or not depends on whether or not the party cross-examining the witness is entitled to prove it in support of his case.
In the instant matter, the appellant was not entitled to prove that the witness was a heroin user or distributor, because such was not material to his defense. Whether the witness used or sold drugs and, subsequently, lied about it in a case such as this one does not prove that the witness lied about the armed robbery for which appellant was being tried. To permit a witness to be impeached by showing prior bad acts for which the witness has not been charged and *1359which may force an admission of illegal conduct, would deter such witnesses from coming forward to testify. This undesirable result can be avoided by adopting the rule that a witness cannot be impeached on facts that are merely collateral to the issue.
The appellant has failed to prove that his fundamental rights have been prejudiced. The judgment should be affirmed.
CROCKETT, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of ELLETT, C. J.

. U.C.A.1953, 76-6-302 (1977 pamphlet).

. U.C.A.1953, 77-21-9(1); see also State v. Solomon, 93 Utah 70, 71 P.2d 104 (1937) holding that the same strict rules do not apply to the Bill of Particulars as apply to indictments and informations.

. Wong Tai v. U. S., 273 U.S. 77, 47 S.Ct. 300, 71 L.Ed. 545 (1927).

.U.C.A.1953, 77-21-8.

. State v. Winters, 16 Utah 2d 139, 396 P.2d 872 (1964); State v. Lack, 118 Utah 128, 221 P.2d 852 (1950).

. 25 Utah 2d 51, 475 P.2d 831 (1970).

. 551 F.2d 967, 970 (5th Cir. 1977).

. State v. Mason, Utah, 530 P.2d 795 (1975). While this case dealt specifically with drug influence while on the stand, it is our opinion that it is also proper to permit examination as to the influence of drugs on the day the crime was committed to assure that the witness’ memory was not impaired, if the trial court deems it relevant.

. State v. Anderson, 27 Utah 2d 276, 495 P.2d 804 (1972); State v. Belwood, 27 Utah 2d 214, 494 P.2d 519 (1972).

. 166 Mont. 278, 532 P.2d 411, 413 (1975).

. Id.; see also 66 A.L.R.2d 806, 826.

. 106 Utah 307, 148 P.2d 327 (1944).

. 112 Ariz. 544, 544 P.2d 653, 654 (1976).

. 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946, 948 (1976).

.192 Wash. 467, 73 P.2d 1342 (1937), see also Dewey v. Funk, 211 Kan. 54, 505 P.2d 722 (1973) where it was held that the sexual morality of a witness testifying in a rape case had nothing to do with the veracity of the witness.