Court Opinion

ID: 9372064
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 18:01:31.276489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:32.561995
License: Public Domain

Rel: February 17, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
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         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                _________________________

                                        1200541
                                _________________________

                               Tarik Yahia Farrag, M.D.

                                                  v.

                           Cynthia Diane Dennis Thomas

                                _________________________

                                        1200542
                                _________________________

                               Tarik Yahia Farrag, M.D.

                                                  v.

                           Cynthia Diane Dennis Thomas
1200541 and 1200542

              Appeals from Covington Circuit Court
                  (CV-18-2 and CV-18-900005)

STEWART, Justice.

     These two consolidated appeals arise from judgments entered by

the Covington Circuit Court ("the trial court") in two identical medical-

malpractice actions commenced by Cynthia Diane Dennis Thomas

against Tarik Yahia Farrag, M.D. In appeal no. 1200541, Dr. Farrag

appeals from the trial court's judgment denying his Rule 60(b), Ala. R.

Civ. P., motion seeking relief from a default judgment entered against

him in case no. CV-18-2. In appeal no. 1200542, Dr. Farrag appeals from

the judgment dismissing case no. CV-18-900005. We affirm the judgment

in appeal no. 1200541, and we dismiss appeal no. 1200542.

                     Facts and Procedural History

     On January 12, 2018, Thomas initiated a medical-malpractice

action ("the malpractice action") under the Alabama Medical Liability

Act, § 6-5-480 et seq. and § 6-5-540 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, against Dr.

Farrag and South Otolaryngology-Head and Neck Surgery, LLC ("South

Otolaryngology"). Thomas intended to commence the action in the trial

court but mistakenly commenced it in the Coosa Circuit Court.        On

January 17, 2018, Thomas initiated a duplicate action in the trial court,
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which was assigned case no. CV-18-900005 ("the duplicate action"). On

January 19, 2018, Thomas filed a motion to transfer the malpractice

action from the Coosa Circuit Court to the trial court. That motion was

granted on January 23, 2018, and the malpractice action was transferred

to trial court and assigned case no. CV-18-2. Thereafter, all pertinent

pleadings and motions were filed in the malpractice action, i.e., case no.

CV-18-2, and Thomas made no further effort to separately prosecute the

duplicate action.

     Thomas made several unsuccessful attempts to serve Dr. Farrag by

certified mail. Thereafter, Thomas retained a process server to attempt

to locate and serve Dr. Farrag. According to Thomas, the process server

spoke with Dr. Farrag, who instructed him to direct service to Patrick

Hays, Dr. Farrag's personal attorney. The summons and complaint in

the malpractice action were personally delivered to Hays's law firm, and,

on September 17, 2019, Hays entered a general appearance on behalf of

Dr. Farrag.

     On October 7, 2019, Hays filed a motion on behalf of Dr. Farrag,

arguing that dismissal of the malpractice action was warranted under

Rule 4(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., on the ground that Dr. Farrag had not been

                                    3
1200541 and 1200542

personally served within 120 days of the filing of the complaint. That

motion stated, in pertinent part:

          "… At some point [Thomas] spoke with [Dr. Farrag], and
     [Dr. Farrag] instructed [Thomas] to send [the] lawsuit to
     [Hays's] firm, [and the summons and complaint delivered to
     Hays's firm] was dated August 13, 2019.

          "… [Dr. Farrag's] counsel is not the proper party of the
     lawsuit. So as of … October 7, 2019, [Dr. Farrag] is yet to be
     properly served."

In response to Dr. Farrag's motion to dismiss, Thomas argued that Hays

was Dr. Farrag's agent authorized to accept service and that Dr. Farrag

had waived his argument as to improper service and lack of personal

jurisdiction when Hays had filed a general appearance in the trial court

on Dr. Farrag's behalf. On March 9, 2020, the trial court entered an order

denying Dr. Farrag's motion to dismiss.

     On July 23, 2020, the trial court set the malpractice action for a

jury trial to be held on October 19, 2020. On July 30, 2020, Hays moved

to withdraw from his representation of Dr. Farrag, and the trial court

granted that motion on August 20, 2020.1 On October 1, 2020, Thomas

     1Hays   had filed an earlier motion to withdraw on November 18,
2019, but that motion had not been ruled upon and Hays had continued
to serve as Dr. Farrag's counsel.
                                   4
1200541 and 1200542

filed in the malpractice action an application for a default judgment

against Dr. Farrag and an entry of default was made by the trial-court

clerk on that date. On October 6, 2020, Dr. Farrag sent a letter to the

trial court asking that the trial scheduled for October 19, 2020, be

postponed for four to five months because he would be out of the State of

Alabama for more than a month and because he needed time to obtain

legal representation. The trial was rescheduled and set for January 25,

2021.

        On October 30, 2020, the trial court entered an order in the

malpractice action, setting a hearing on December 1, 2020, for the

purposes of determining damages and entering a final default judgment

in favor of Thomas against Dr. Farrag. At the hearing, Thomas presented

testimony and evidence to the trial court regarding her damages. Dr.

Farrag did not appear at the hearing. On December 2, 2020, the trial

court entered a default judgment in the malpractice action in the amount

of $500,000 in favor of Thomas and against Dr. Farrag.

        On January 15, 2021, the trial court entered an order resetting the

malpractice action and the duplicate action for trial on February 22,

2021.      On January 21, 2021, Thomas moved to dismiss South

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1200541 and 1200542

Otolaryngology from the malpractice action, without prejudice.2       On

January 28, 2021, the trial court entered an order in the malpractice

action, dismissing the claims against South Otolaryngology and directing

the trial-court clerk to mark the malpractice action as having been

disposed of.

     On February 19, 2021, Dr. Farrag, represented by new counsel,

filed a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., seeking relief

from the default judgment entered in the malpractice action and citing

"excusable neglect" as the sole ground for relief. In that motion, Dr.

Farrag asserted that he had not known that a default judgment had been

entered against him and that he had believed that the malpractice action

was set for trial on February 22, 2021. Dr. Farrag stated that it was only

after he had retained new counsel in early February 2021 that he had

discovered the default judgment against him. Dr. Farrag's Rule 60(b)

motion did not include a challenge to personal jurisdiction or to the

sufficiency of service of process under Rule 60(b)(4).

     2The record indicates that South Otolaryngology had never been
served and had not made an appearance in the malpractice action.
                                  6
1200541 and 1200542

     On April 5, 2021, the trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing

on Dr. Farrag's Rule 60(b) motion, during which Dr. Farrag submitted

testimony and evidence in support of his motion. Dr. Farrag testified

that he had a meritorious defense to Thomas's claims, contending that

Thomas's injuries had been the result of her own conduct in refusing to

return for a critical postoperation appointment. Dr. Farrag claimed that

members of his office staff had made repeated attempts to reach Thomas

after her missed postoperation appointment, and he submitted letters

that he had allegedly sent to Thomas documenting his staff's attempts to

reach Thomas.

     Dr. Farrag also admitted that he had been aware of the malpractice

action against him and that he had retained Hays to represent him. He

noted that, at some point, he had terminated Hays's representation of

him. Dr. Farrag claimed that, at the time of that termination, Hays had

informed him that the malpractice action had been dismissed, and Dr.

Farrag stated that he had relied upon that representation. Dr. Farrag

admitted, however, that he had continued to receive at least some court

filings, including a deposition notice and notices of various trial settings.

Dr. Farrag stated that he had retained his new counsel in early February

                                     7
1200541 and 1200542

2021, for the purpose of representing him at the scheduled February 22,

2021, trial, and he claimed that he had learned of the default judgment

against him only after retaining new counsel. During the hearing on the

Rule 60(b) motion, Dr. Farrag's counsel also noted that the duplicate

action remained pending and made an oral motion to dismiss that action.

     On April 7, 2021, the trial court entered an order in the malpractice

action denying Dr. Farrag's Rule 60(b) motion.       The trial court also

dismissed the duplicate action.    Dr. Farrag filed separate notices of

appeal, challenging the judgment denying his Rule 60(b) motion in the

malpractice action and the judgment dismissing the duplicate action.

The appeal from the malpractice action was assigned appeal no. 1200541;

the appeal from the duplicate action was assigned appeal no. 1200542.

This Court consolidated the appeals.

                                Analysis

                           Appeal No. 1200541

     On appeal, Dr. Farrag first presents an argument that was not

raised in his Rule 60(b) motion -- that Hays was not authorized to accept

service on Dr. Farrag's behalf and that, therefore, the default judgment

is void because of insufficiency of service of process. Generally, " '[t]he

                                    8
1200541 and 1200542

failure to effect proper service under Rule 4, Ala. R. Civ. P., deprives the

trial court of personal jurisdiction over the defendant and renders a

default judgment void.' " Boudreaux v. Kemp, 49 So. 3d 1190, 1194 (Ala.

2010) (quoting Nichols v. Pate, 992 So. 2d 734, 736 (Ala. Civ. App. 2008)).

Rule 60(b)(4) provides that, "[o]n motion," a court may relieve a party

from a judgment on the ground that "the judgment is void."

     However, unlike subject-matter jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction

is subject to waiver.

     "[U]nder certain circumstances the lack of personal
     jurisdiction is subject to waiver, i.e., 'defects in personal
     jurisdiction … can be waived,' which distinguishes personal
     jurisdiction from subject-matter jurisdiction, which ' "may not
     be waived; a court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction may be
     raised at any time by any party and may even be raised by a
     court ex mero motu." ' J.T. v. A.C., 892 So. 2d 928, 931 (Ala.
     Civ. App. 2004) (quoting C.J.L. v. M.W.B., 868 So. 2d 451, 453
     (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)). See also Kingvision Pay-Per-View, Ltd.
     v. Ayers, 885 So. 2d 45 (Ala. 2003) (holding that insufficient
     service of process may be waived); Hall v. Hall, 122 So. 3d 185,
     190 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013) (' "A defense alleging a lack of
     personal jurisdiction because of insufficiency of service of
     process, however, can be waived if the defendant submits
     himself or herself to the jurisdiction of the trial court." '
     (quoting Klaeser v. Milton, 47 So. 3d 817, 820 (Ala. Civ. App.
     2010))); and Rule 12(h)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P. ('A defense of lack of
     jurisdiction over the person … is waived … if it is neither
     made by motion under this rule nor included in a responsive
     pleading or an amendment thereof. …')."

Campbell v. Taylor, 159 So. 3d 4, 11 (Ala. 2014).
                                     9
1200541 and 1200542

     Indeed, under Alabama law, a party seeking to set aside a default

judgment by filing a Rule 60(b) motion forfeits any personal-jurisdiction

challenge to the default judgment if such a challenge is not asserted in

the Rule 60(b) motion or is unsupported by evidence or citation to

authority. See Campbell, 159 So. 3d at 13 (affirming denial of motion

brought under Rule 60(b)(4) when movant failed to present authority

showing that circuit court lacked personal jurisdiction over movant); and

Pruitt v. Palm, 671 So. 2d 105 (Ala. Civ. App. 1995) (affirming denial of

motion brought under Rule 60(b)(4) when material facts supporting

motion were not established in record on appeal). A federal circuit court,

construing analogous federal rules, has explained this forfeiture rule as

follows:

     "This forfeiture rule reflects the functional similarity between
     a personal jurisdictional challenge to a default judgment and
     a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under [Rule
     12(b)(2), Fed. R. Civ. P.]. A defense of lack of jurisdiction is
     forfeited if not asserted in a timely motion to dismiss under
     Rule 12 or a responsive pleading or amendment of such as
     provided by Rule 15[, Fed. R. Civ. P.] Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h);
     Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites
     de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2105, 72 L.Ed.2d
     492 (1982). A motion to vacate under Rule 60(b), [Fed. R. Civ.
     P.,] for lack of jurisdiction is essentially equivalent to a Rule
     12(b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction."

                                    10
1200541 and 1200542

Swaim v. Moltan Co., 73 F.3d 711, 718 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that "in

personam jurisdictional challenges to default judgments are forfeited if

not asserted in a Rule 60(b)[, Fed. R. Civ. P.,] motion, if such a motion is

made").3 See also In re Worldwide Web Sys., Inc., 328 F.3d 1291, 1299-

1300 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that movant seeking to set aside default

judgment waived his lack-of-service-of-process argument when that

argument was not asserted in his motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1)

and (b)(6), Fed. R. Civ. P.); and State v. All Real Prop., 95 P.3d 1211,

1215-16 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (holding that party seeking to set aside

default judgment waived his insufficiency-of-service claim by failing to

include that argument in his first Rule 60(b), Utah R. Civ. P., motion).

     Here, Dr. Farrag did not raise his improper-service/lack-of-

personal-jurisdiction argument in his Rule 60(b) motion seeking relief

from the default judgment.       Accordingly, Dr. Farrag forfeited that

challenge to the default judgment. Additionally, Dr. Farrag cannot now

raise this issue for the first time on appeal. Clements v. Clements, 990

     3"It is well settled that federal decisions regarding the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are highly persuasive when this Court is called
upon to construe the Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure because the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure are modeled upon the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure." Allsopp v. Bolding, 86 So. 3d 952, 959 n.4 (Ala. 2011).
                                   11
1200541 and 1200542

So. 2d 383, 396 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007) (holding that lack-of-personal-

jurisdiction argument made for the first time on appeal was waived).

      Similarly, Dr. Farrag raises several other arguments for the first

time on appeal -- specifically, that he did not receive proper notice of

Thomas's filing of her application for a default judgment and that the

damages awarded to Thomas are excessive.            As with his argument

regarding personal jurisdiction, these arguments were not properly

preserved for appellate review. Andrews v. Merritt Oil Co., 612 So. 2d

409, 410 (Ala. 1992) ("[An appellate court] cannot consider arguments

raised for the first time on appeal; rather, [the appellate court's] review

is restricted to the evidence and arguments considered by the trial

court.").

      Next, Dr. Farrag argues that he is entitled to relief from the default

judgment on the basis of "excusable neglect" and that the trial court,

therefore, erred in denying his Rule 60(b) motion. Rule 60(b)(1) provides

that a "court may relieve a party … from a final judgment … for …

mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect."

             "It is well established that the decision to grant or to
      deny relief pursuant to a Rule 60(b)(1) motion is within the
      trial court's discretion. In reviewing the trial court's ruling on
      such a motion, we cannot disturb the trial court's decision
                                     12
1200541 and 1200542

     unless the trial court abused that discretion. DaLee v. Crosby
     Lumber Co., 561 So. 2d 1086, 1089 (Ala. 1990). Additionally,
     under Rule 60(b)(1), a party seeking to set aside a default
     judgment not only must prove excusable neglect but also must
     satisfy the trial court that the other factors enunciated in
     Kirtland[ v. Fort Morgan Authority Sewer Service, Inc., 524
     So. 2d 600 (Ala. 1988),] weigh in favor of setting aside the
     judgment. Marks v. Marks, 181 So. 3d 361, 364 (Ala. Civ.
     App. 2015). See also DaLee, 561 So. 2d at 1091. Those factors
     include a showing that the defaulting party has a meritorious
     defense, that the plaintiff will not be unfairly prejudiced if the
     default judgment is set aside, and that the default judgment
     was not a result of the defaulting party's own culpable
     conduct. Brantley v. Glover, 84 So. 3d 77, 80-81 (Ala. Civ.
     App. 2011) (citing Kirtland, 524 So. 2d at 605)."

J.N.M.-R. v. M.D.L.-C., [Ms. 2210294, Oct. 21, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___

(Ala. Civ. App. 2022). Furthermore, "where there are disputed issues of

fact to be resolved and the trial court has received ore tenus evidence, the

ore tenus rule is applicable to our review of a ruling on a Rule 60(b)[]

motion." Ex parte A & B Transp., Inc., 8 So. 3d 924, 932 (Ala. 2007).

     In describing what constitutes "excusable neglect" warranting the

setting aside of a default judgment under Rule 60(b)(1), this Court has

explained:

           " 'It is the duty of every party desiring to resist an action
     or to participate in a judicial proceeding to take timely and
     adequate steps to retain counsel or to act in his own person to
     avoid an undesirable judgment. Unless in arranging for his
     defense he shows that he has exercised such reasonable
     diligence as a man of ordinary prudence usually bestows upon
                                     13
1200541 and 1200542

     important business, his motion to set aside a judgment for
     default should be denied. Little v. Peevy, [238 Ala. 106, 189
     So. 720 (1939)].

           " 'Courts cannot act as guardian for parties who are
     grossly careless of their own affairs. All must be governed by
     the laws in force, universally applied, according to the
     showing made.

           " 'If judgment be entered against a party in his absence,
     before he can be relieved of the judgment he must show that
     it was the result of a mistake or inadvertence which
     reasonable care could not have avoided, a surprise which
     reasonable precaution could not have prevented, or a
     negligence which reasonable prudence could not have
     anticipated.' "

DaLee v. Crosby Lumber Co., 561 So. 2d 1086, 1091 (Ala. 1990) (quoting

McDavid v. United Mercantile Agencies, Inc., 248 Ala. 297, 301, 27 So.

2d 499, 503 (1946)).

     In the malpractice action, Dr. Farrag was initially represented by

Hays, who filed a motion to dismiss the action on Dr. Farrag's behalf.

The motion to dismiss was denied on March 9, 2020, and Dr. Farrag did

not thereafter file an answer. Dr. Farrag claimed that at some point he

terminated Hays's representation of him. Indeed, on July 30, 2020, Hays

moved to withdraw as counsel for Dr. Farrag, claiming that he and Dr.

Farrag were at an impasse on how to defend the case. The trial court

granted that motion on August 20, 2020. Dr. Farrag testified that, at the
                                   14
1200541 and 1200542

time he terminated Hays's representation of him, Hays had told him that

the malpractice action had been dismissed. Dr. Farrag argues on appeal

that his reliance on that purported representation by Hays constitutes

excusable neglect warranting relief from the default judgment.

     The trial court, however, was not obligated to believe Dr. Farrag's

testimony that he had relied on a purported representation by Hays that

the malpractice action had been dismissed.       Indeed, there was an

abundance of evidence indicating that Dr. Farrag knew that the case

remained active and was progressing toward trial. Hays's motion to

withdraw -- which, according to the certificate of service, was mailed to

Dr. Farrag -- indicated that the case was continuing and had not been

dismissed. Furthermore, numerous other court filings bear a certificate

of service indicating that they were mailed to Dr. Farrag between the

time of Hays's withdrawal and the entry of the default judgment, each of

which also would have alerted Dr. Farrag that the case was ongoing. For

example, Dr. Farrag testified that he had received a notice of deposition

filed by Thomas on August 28, 2020, for a witness deposition scheduled

for September 22, 2020. Dr. Farrag was also aware that the case had

been set for trial on October 19, 2020, and he wrote the trial court on

                                   15
1200541 and 1200542

October 6, 2020, to obtain a postponement, citing, among other reasons,

his need to retain legal representation. On October 30, 2020, the trial

court entered an order setting a December 1, 2020, hearing on Thomas's

application for a default judgment. The trial court verified that that

order was mailed to Dr. Farrag. Dr. Farrag, however, did not appear for

the hearing, and the trial court entered the default judgment in the

malpractice action on December 2, 2020. Dr. Farrag did not seek to

defend the malpractice action until after he had retained new counsel in

early February 2021.

     Considering the record before us, the trial court was free to

conclude, as it did, that Dr. Farrag had not sufficiently established that

he "was prevented from appearing and defending the suit by 'mistake,

inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect' that ordinary prudence

could not have guarded against." DaLee, 561 So. 2d at 1091. There was

evidence before the trial court indicating that Dr. Farrag had known that

the case was ongoing but, nevertheless, had waited months to defend

against the action, thus demonstrating that Dr. Farrag was not

prevented from appearing and defending the action due to excusable

neglect. Accordingly, Dr. Farrag has not demonstrated that the trial

                                   16
1200541 and 1200542

court exceeded its discretion in denying Dr. Farrag's Rule 60(b) motion.

See J.N.M.-R., ___ So. 3d at ___ (affirming circuit court's denial of motion

brought under Rule 60(b)(1) because the trial court could have found that

defendant's testimony supporting motion was not credible, when other

testimony indicated that defendant had been grossly careless of his own

affairs and had history of ignoring the other orders of the circuit court);

and Taylor v. Williams, 455 So. 2d 893, 894 (Ala. Civ. App. 1984) (holding

that trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying motion brought

under Rule 60(b)(1) when there was conflicting evidence regarding

whether moving party had received notice of hearing).

     Furthermore, Dr. Farrag argues that the trial court erred in failing

to specifically address the three factors identified in Kirtland v. Fort

Morgan Authority Sewer Service, Inc., 524 So. 2d 600 (Ala. 1988). To

obtain relief from the default judgment under Rule 60(b), a movant is

required to show not only that that the Kirtland factors weighed in his or

her favor, but also that one of the grounds for relief under Rule 60(b)

exists -- in this case, Dr. Farrag was required to show that his failure to

defend was the result of "excusable neglect" under Rule 60(b)(1). See

DaLee, 561 So. 2d at 1091 (noting that to set aside default judgment

                                    17
1200541 and 1200542

under Rule 60(b) the defaulting party not only must establish that the

Kirtland factors weigh in favor of setting aside the judgment "but must

also demonstrate the ground under Rule 60(b) justifying relief from the

final judgment"), and Fountain v. Permatile Concrete Prods. Co., 582 So.

2d 1069, 1072 (Ala. 1991) (holding that to obtain relief under Rule

60(b)(1) the movant must have established not only that the Kirtland

factors weighed in his favor, but also that the requirements of Rule

60(b)(1) were satisfied). Here, because the trial court concluded that Dr.

Farrag had not demonstrated that his failure to defend the malpractice

action was due to excusable neglect under Rule 60(b)(1), it was not

necessary for the trial court to also weigh the Kirtland factors. See

J.N.M.-R., ___ So. 3d at ___ (holding that, because the trial court

concluded that defendant had failed to establish excusable neglect under

Rule 60(b)(1), there was no need to discuss Kirtland factors).

                          Appeal No. 1200542

     Regarding the appeal from the judgment dismissing the duplicate

action, we note that the judgment in that action was wholly in Dr.

Farrag's favor. Furthermore, Dr. Farrag has made no arguments on

appeal directed toward that judgment. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal.

                                   18
1200541 and 1200542

See Ex parte Jefferson Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 13 So. 3d 993, 996 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2009) (quoting Personnel Bd. of Jefferson Cnty. v. Bailey, 475 So.

2d 863, 865-66 (Ala. Civ. App. 1985)) (" '[W]here a judgment is wholly in

a party's favor and there is nothing prejudicial in the judgment no appeal

lies to the prevailing party.' "); Rule 2(a)(2)(C), Ala. R. App. P. (providing

that this Court may dismiss an appeal when it determines that there is

an obvious failure to prosecute an appeal).

                                 Conclusion

     In appeal no. 1200541, the judgment denying Dr. Farrag's Rule

60(b) motion is affirmed. Appeal no. 1200542 is dismissed.

     1200541 -- AFFIRMED.

     1200542 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.

     Parker, C.J., and Wise, Sellers, and Cook, JJ., concur.

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