Court Opinion

ID: 9837032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:16:04.479967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.935671
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Judge
(concurring in the result):
Appellant was represented by a senior defense counsel and an experienced civilian lawyer. The defense counsel made numerous motions but did not make a multiplicity motion until after the Government rested its ease. The failure to make a motion to combine specifications based on multiplicity before the Government’s case concluded, or to ask for a bill of particulars in order to avoid the implications of having such a motion *246granted, were valid tactical decisions by the defense.
Had the defense made an earlier multiplicity motion or requested a bill of particulars, the Government might have withdrawn the charges, which included only one specification of distribution of marijuana, and instead charged appellant separately for each of the four different transfers he was responsible for as a co-conspirator.
In essence, the majority has allowed appellant to have it both ways. Because these motions were not made before findings, for apparently valid tactical reasons, the majority should not allow appellant a windfall rather than apply waiver. Cf. United States v. Denton, 50 MJ 189 (1998) (“[W]e find that the granted issue [on multiplicity] was neither raised nor litigated at trial and is therefore deemed waived. See paragraph 5(c)(8), Part TV, and RCM 1003(c)(1)(C), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.)”). Waiver should be applied where the record suggests a tactical reason for not making the motion. Cf. United States v. Harwood, 46 MJ 26 (1997); United States v. Lloyd, 46 MJ 19 (1997).
While I appreciate the Government’s concession, we are not bound by it, see, e.g., United States v. Emmons, 31 MJ 108,110-11 (CMA 1990); United States v. Hand, 11 MJ 321 (CMA 1981); United States v. Wille, 9 USCMA 623, 26 CMR 403 (1958), especially since our cases have not been the model of clarity as to multiplicity, flee, e.g., United States v. Britton, 47 MJ 195, 199-201 (1997) (Effron, J., concurring). In United States v. Teters, 37 MJ 370 (CMA 1993), we sought uniformity and clarity, but even today the majority cites pre-Teters cases.
Appellant was convicted of conspiring with Specialist Anthony Collins to wrongfully distribute marijuana. Both paragraph 5c(5), supra, and the Supreme Court in Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 647, 66 S.Ct. 1180, 90 L.Ed. 1489 (1946), recognize the proposition that a conspirator is responsible for the overt acts of each co-conspirator that are in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Under this proposition, appellant committed at least four additional crimes for which he could have been charged: (1) In September 1994, appellant gave Specialist Anthony Collins 11 baggies of marijuana and told him he could sell them for approximately $375.00 and keep the money he collected; (2) After the exchange, Collins sold five or six of the baggies to an undercover agent, Specialist Charles C. Daniels; (3) Collins sold other baggies to Ms. Carol, a civilian working in the dining facility; (4) Later, Collins sold drugs from the stash given to him by appellant to another person, Tilo. Prior to receiving drugs from appellant, Collins had never sold drugs.
Thus, it is clear that there was a tactical advantage to be gained by failing to raise the multiplicity issue earlier. We should respect counsels’ decision.
In any event, I agree with the result reached by the majority.