Court Opinion

ID: 9646598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:04:16.242786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:39.363556
License: Public Domain

SEILER, Judge
(concurring in result).
I concur in the result reached in this case because I must agree that under the decisions of this court, the claim that the sentence of fifty years is excessive is futile, simply because the sentence imposed is within the statutory limits. Perhaps the sentence is not excessive in this particular case because this was defendant’s second armed robbery, and, in addition to that, he had been convicted of auto theft, assault, transportation of a stolen automobile in interstate commerce, and statutory rape.
However, I wish to add that in view of the inordinate disparity in sentences which we see in cases on appeal, I doubt the soundness of the rule which gives the trial judge absolute discretion in these matters with no review whatever as to the length of sentence so long as it is within the statutory range. It has been said “that in no other area of our law does one man exercise such unrestricted power. No other country in the free world permits this condition to exist.” 1
*442The subject is discussed in President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, Task Force Report : The Courts 23-24 (1967):
“The problem of disparity arises from the imposition of unequal sentences for the same offense, or offenses of comparable seriousness, without any reasonable basis. The existence of unjustified disparity has been amply demonstrated by many studies. It is a pervasive problem in almost all jurisdictions. In the Federal system, for example, the average length of prison sentences for narcotics violations in 1965 was 83 months in the 10th Circuit, but only 44 months in the 3rd Circuit. During 1962 the average sentence for forgery ranged from a high of 68 months in the Northern District of Mississippi to a low of 7 months in the Southern District of Mississippi ; the highest average sentence for auto theft was 47 months in the Southern District of Iowa, and the lowest was 14 months in the Northern District of New York.
“Disparity among judges sitting in the same court is illustrated by the findings of a recent study in the Detroit Recorder’s Court. Over a 20-month period in which the sample cases were about equally distributed among the 10 judges, 1 judge imposed prison terms upon 75 to 90 percent of the defendants whom he sentenced while another judge imposed prison sentences in about 35 percent of the cases. One judge consistently imposed prison sentences twice as long as those of the most lenient judge. The study also showed that judges who imposed the most severe sentences for certain crimes also exhibited the most liberal sentencing policy for other offenses.

“Unwarranted sentencing disparity is contrary to the principle of even-handed administration of the criminal law. As Attorney General Robert H. Jackson stated: ‘It is obviously repugnant to one’s sense of justice that the judgment meted out to an offender should be dependent in large part on a purely fortuitous circumstances; namely, the personality of the particular judge before whom the case happens to come for disposition.’ Unjustified disparity adversely affects correctional administration. Prisoners compare the sentences, and a prisoner who is given cause to believe that he is the victim of a judge’s prejudices often is a hostile inmate, resistant to correctional treatment as well as discipline.”
In the Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences, adopted by the American Bar Association, judicial review of sentences is held to be sound, desirable and practical. The Standards provide, in part, as follows:
“PART I. GENERAL PRINCIPLES
“1.1 Principle of review.
(a) In principle, judicial review should be available for all sentences imposed in cases where provision is made for review of the conviction. This is specifically meant to include
(i) review of a sentence imposed after a guilty plea equivalent, if the case is one which review of a conviction would be available had the case gone to trial;
(ii) review of a sentence imposed by a trial judge, a trial jury, or the two in combination; . . .

*443

“1.2 Purposes of review.
The general objectives of sentence review are:
(i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest;
(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording him an opportunity to assert grievances he may have regarding his sentence;
(iii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the sentencing power and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing process; and
(iv) to promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing which are both rational and just.
“PART II. AVAILABILITY OF REVIEW
“2.1 Reviewing court.
In general, each court which is empowered to review the conviction should also be empowered to review the disposition following conviction...”
The Missouri rule that we will not review sentences is judge made law and as such is subject to revision by the court. It seems to me that in a proper case, we should exercise the power which I believe we have to reduce a sentence, and we should not consider ourselves powerless to act merely because the sentence imposed is within the statutory range.2

. The Missouri law does not provide that all sentences shall be assessed by the trial judge. However, when we consider the large number of guilty pleas, the large *442number of cases tried under the second offender act, and the procedure approved in State v. Brown, (Mo.Sup. banc) 443 S.W.2d 805, by which the jury is permitted to turn the sentencing responsibility over to the trial judge, we see in actual practice that most sentences are fixed by the trial judge and very few are set by the jury.

. In tlie case before us, the trial judge gave 50 years for first degree robbery. At the same handdown this opinion is being released, I note there are nine other first degree robbery eases. The sentences imposed range from six to 99 years. In the last bound volume of Southwestern Second Series, Missouri cases only, 477-479 S.AV.2d, the sentences in first degree robbery cases vary from five years to life. Time does not permit further research into Missouri sentences, but there can be no doubt that sentencing policies at the trial level vary widely.