Court Opinion

ID: 9854291
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:04:38.359241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:00.344055
License: Public Domain

CARRICO, C.J.,
dissenting.
I. COMMONWEALTH v. EDWARDS
As the majority opinion indicates, the sole question in the Edwards case is whether a person subpoenaed to give non-deposition testimony before an authorized representative of the Attorney General pursuant to Code § 32.1-320(B)(2) is entitled to have retained counsel present during the interrogation. The majority answers the question affirmatively, all the while conceding that neither constitutional mandate nor statutory provision requires the presence of counsel during such interrogation.
Instead, the majority finds a right to the presence of counsel in what it terms a “well-defined public policy” which, the majority says, is derived from the fact that the General Assembly has recognized the right to the presence of counsel “during investigatory proceedings . . . similar to the present activity.” As examples of similar activities, the majority cites proceedings under the Administrative Process Act, hearings before special and multi-jurisdictional grand juries, and investigations authorized by the Virginia Antitrust Act.
I have difficulty equating the investigatory hearings involved in this case with proceedings under the Administrative Process Act and hearings before special and multi-jurisdictional grand juries. Be that as it may, the majority has no apparent difficulty in saying: “Given this well-defined public policy, and considering that the statute in question is wholly silent on a citizen’s privilege to have retained counsel present during the interrogation, we will not read into the enactment authority for the Attorney General to exclude counsel who accompanies the witness to the hearing.”
This reluctance of the majority to read into the statute something not there is certainly commendable. Yet, the majority has done precisely what it abjures. It has read something into the statute clearly not there, viz., the right to have counsel present at a hearing before the Attorney General. The majority simply cannot say the Attorney General lacks authority to exclude counsel from a hearing without also saying the witness has a right to have coun*515sel present, and, of course, the statute contains neither a requirement of the presence of counsel nor a prohibition against exclusion.
The controlling legal principle operative here is that the General Assembly, not this Court, determines public policy. I think the General Assembly made a deliberate policy decision not to require the presence of counsel at investigatory hearings before the Attorney General when it enacted Code § 32.1-320(B) (2). I would afford that decision due respect and order the witness to answer the Attorney General’s questions without the presence of counsel.
II. MEDICAID FRAUD UNIT v. DOE
In the Doe case, the majority upholds the trial court’s enforcement of the attorney-client privilege in six groups of evidentiary material. In each instance, the majority holds the material protected by the privilege because it involves information the client would expect to remain confidential.
But the client’s expectations are irrelevant here. The rule is that when a client communicates information to an attorney knowing the information will be disclosed to others, the disclosure waives the privilege not only with respect to the information communicated but also with respect to underlying details. In other words, in these circumstances, the client waives his expectations of nondisclosure.
In my opinion, the data in all six groups are merely the underlying details of the information voluntarily disclosed. I would require submission of these underlying details.
My views would result in reversal in both cases.