Court Opinion

ID: 9829956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:45:07.014936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:09.361745
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Among contentions urged in the motions is one by the appellee George S. Wright, trustee, that this court erred when it held that he and Mrs. Parmer together were not entitled to recover of appellant the full amount of the policy it issued to her. We think the contention should be sustained.
The error was caused by the failure of this court to give the effect it was entitled to to a stipulation in each of the Collins policies as follows:
“On payment to such mortgagee (or trustee) of any sum for loss or damage hereunder, if this Company shall claim that as to the mortgagor or owner, no liability existed, it shall to the extent of such payment be subrogated to the mortgagee’s (or trustee’s) right of recovery and claim upon the collateral to the mortgage debt, but without impairing the mortgagee’s (or trustee’s) right to sue, or it may pay the mortgage debt and require an assignment thereof and of the mortgage.”
It (the error of this court) was due primarily to the failure of the writer to more carefully examine the record- than he did.
 It appeared in the record that the companies issuing the policies to Collins were not, and claimed they were not, liable to him, and that they paid the mortgage debt and took an assignment thereof and of the mortgage. By such payment and assignment said companies became the owners of the mortgage debt, and, as such, were entitled to look to Mrs. Parmer for payment thereof. Alamo Ins. Co. v. Davis, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 342, 60 S. W. 802; Mosby v. Ins. Co., 285 Mo. 242, 225 S. W. 715; Milwaukee Mechanics’ Ins. Co. v. Ramsey, 76 Or. 570, 149 P. 542, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 1132, L. R. A. 1916A, note page 562. It appeared, further, that, after the fire, Mrs: Parmer transferred to the mortgage company as security for the debt she owed it tire claim she had against appellant on account of the policy it had issued to her; and it appeared, further, that thereafter, in consideration of the amount due upon the mortgage, the mortgage company transferred to appellee Wright, as trustee for the companies issuing the policies to Collins, the indebtedness of Mrs. Parmer to it and the mortgage securing same, “and all claims (quoting) that it might have against the Girard Pire & Marine Insurance Company under its policy.” It appears in the statement of facts that appellant in open court stated it made no claim “that its policy of insurance (quoting) was'void, but that its position was that the companies carrying the policies in the name of Collins were liable to the mortgagee to the extent of the mortgage debt, and that the Girard Pire & Marine Insurance Company was responsible to Mrs. Gladys Parmer only for the difference between the mortgage debt and the amount of loss and damage.” So, it seems, the real question on the appeal was not one as to liability of appellant on the policy it issued, for that was admitted, but was one as to the amount of its liability and as to who was entitled to enforce same. We do not think it appeared that appellant’s liability was “secondary,” or that it was for a sum less than the policy, for any of the reasons urged by it. It appeared the loss by fire amounted to a sum greater than the amount of the policy sued upon. Therefore, we think, the liability of appellant was for the full amount of the policy.
The motion of appellant will be overruled, and the motion of Mrs. Parmer and the trustee will be granted, and the judgment heretofore rendered by this court will be set aside, and the judgment of the court below will be affirmed.