Court Opinion

ID: 9542506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:35:06.588525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:08.187386
License: Public Domain

*283GERBER, Judge,
concurring and dissenting in part:
¶ 39 I write separately regarding part four of the majority opinion because I see no way an appellate court can apply a clear and convincing test regarding admission of prior bad acts. Admittedly, Terrazas identifies a clear and convincing standard for admission of other act evidence and implicitly authorizes appellate courts to make that determination on review. See State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 582, 944 P.2d 1194, 1196 (1997). In both State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 599, 944 P.2d 1204, 1213 (1997), and Terrazas, our supreme court now has twice made a clear and convincing finding, albeit in cursory fashion.
¶ 40 But in neither Lee nor Terrazas is there any explanation of how an appellate court does such an analysis. Our supreme court has elsewhere defined clear and convincing as evidence that makes the existence of an issue “highly probable.” See State v. King, 158 Ariz. 419, 424, 763 P.2d 239, 244 (1988). Clear and convincing is also defined as “that ... degree of proof that will produce ... a firm belief or conviction.” King, 158 Ariz. 419, 423, 763 P.2d 239, 243 (1988) (citing State v. Turrentine, 152 Ariz. 61, 68, 730 P.2d 238, 245 (App.1986)). Terms like “convincing,” “probable,” “firm belief’ or “conviction” require an assessment of the persuasiveness of the evidence, i.e., its credibility, a function unique to the trial court. Prior Arizona law acknowledges that “convincing” implies an assessment of credibility: “Since [t]he weight to be given to evidence is peculiarly within the province of the trial court, it is the trial court and not the appellate court which draws a distinction between evidence which is clear and convincing and evidence which merely preponderates.” Webber v. Smith, 129 Ariz. 495, 498, 632 P.2d 998, 1001 (App.1981); see also Premier Financial Services v. Citibank, 185 Ariz. 80, 85, 912 P.2d 1309, 1314 (App.1995).
¶ 41 In my view, the clear and convincing standard requires a qualitative as opposed to a quantitative analysis. The latter standard requires a weighing of the quantum of evidence; we do this with regularity in performing sufficiency, substantiality, beyond a reasonable doubt and preponderance measurements. But quality of evidence is a different kind of assessment. When witnesses proffer contradictory testimony, the trier of fact assesses the quality of the testimony by weighing its credibility and assigning greater value to the most credible testimony based on perceptible aspects of witness demeanor. Even in a case where the testimony is uncontradicted, a trier of fact may reject unanimous testimony as unconvincing, which requires distinguishing its credible quality from its quantity. See Leslie C. v. Maricopa County Juvenile Court, 256 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 10 (November 25, 1997).
¶ 42 Here, R.J.’s uncontradicted testimony as to Count VI failed to convince the very jury that observed her demeanor. An appellate court asking whether this evidence satisfies the clear and convincing standard is at a further disadvantage: it must attempt to do so without any observable indicia of credibility. Because of this distance from the witness, appellate courts cannot effectively make this determination from a cold record.
¶ 43 Repeated cases assert that appellate courts do not sit as thirteenth jurors able to substitute their judgment of credibility for that of the jury. See State v. Cid, 181 Ariz. 496, 500, 892 P.2d 216, 220 (App.1995); State v. Salman, 182 Ariz. 359, 361, 897 P.2d 661, 663 (App.1994); State v. Kreps, 146 Ariz. 446, 450, 706 P.2d 1213, 1217 (1985); State v. Childs, 113 Ariz. 318, 321, 553 P.2d 1192, 1195 (1976); see also State v. Brown, 125 Ariz. 160, 162, 608 P.2d 299, 301 (1980) (supreme court will not sit as trier of fact and once again balance the evidence adduced at trial).
¶44 Appellate courts grant such deference to the trier of facts because of the latter’s proximity to the witnesses. In Louis v. Blackburn, 630 F.2d 1105 (5th Cir.1980), the Fifth Circuit observed that “[o]ne of the most important principles in our judicial system is the deference given to the finder of fact who hears the live testimony of witnesses because of his opportunity to judge the credibility of those witnesses.” Unlike trial courts, appellate courts do not observe the face to face demeanor of witnesses. See State v. Gonzales, 140 Ariz. 349, 354, 681 P.2d 1368, 1373 (1984) (an accused’s demean- *284or is a vital piece of evidence). Like any other appellate court, this court cannot see witnesses as they testify, hear the tone of their voices or observe their body language. See Pima County Juvenile Action No. 63212-2, 129 Ariz. 371, 375, 631 P.2d 526, 530 (1981) (“... personal observation of witnesses is crucial to accurate fact-finding when the outcome ... depends on an assessment of the credibility of the witnesses”). When two witnesses give contradictory evidence, appellate courts with only the cold record to review seem unable to determine which evidence is convincing.10
¶ 45 In a libel case involving the clear and convincing standard, the Sixth Circuit divided the facts into subsidiary and ultimate facts and limited its independent judgment to assessing only the latter. Connaughton v. Harte Hanks Communications, Inc., 842 F.2d 825, 841-43 (6th Cir.1988). The court determined that it did not have authority to weigh credibility or choose among inferences already decided by the jury unless they were clearly erroneous. Id. at 843. On review, the Supreme Court agreed with this portion of the analysis, stating “credibility determinations are reviewed under the clearly-erroneous standard because the trier of fact has had the ‘opportunity to observe the demean- or of the witnesses.’” Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688, 109 S.Ct. 2678, 105 L.Ed.2d 562 (1989). Concurring in the judgment, Justice Scalia explained this portion of the'Court’s opinion:
[Our] analysis adopts the most significant element of the Sixth Circuit’s approach, since it accepts the jury’s determination of at least the necessarily controverted facts, rather than making an independent resolution of that conflicting testimony____ [T]he Court does not purport to be exercising its own independent judgment as to whether [the jury’s factual findings are clear and convincing],
id. at 698, 109 S.Ct. 2678; see also Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (When trial court’s findings turn on evaluation of credibility, a reviewing court ordinarily should give those findings great deference); Starkins v. Bateman, 150 Ariz. 537, 543, 724 P.2d 1206, 1212 (App.1986) (appellate court not effectively equipped to determine whether underlying facts supporting the verdict were established by clear and convincing evidence).
¶46 Because the clear and convincing analysis appears to me to be a credibility assessment exclusively within the province of the trial court, I see no way to do this determination on appeal. I thus concur in the result but dissent regarding our court’s ability to do the clear and convincing analysis seemingly employed by the majority.

. "[T]he law has developed three mechanisms to assist the trier in deciding what witnesses to believe. One is to permit the trier to use the demeanor of a witness as an aid in judging both ability to perceive and remember and willingness to tell the truth.... Shifty eyes, sweaty palms, halting answers, and general appearance of marginal competence are perceivable in person, but not capable of being captured in a printed record. This is major reason for the deference given on appeal to the factual determinations made at trial.” Morris K. Udall, Joseph M. Livermore, Patricia G. Escher, Grace McIlvain, Law of Evidence § 41, at 66 (volume one 2d ed.1987).