Court Opinion

ID: 9373126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:54.292732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:47.682328
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     RAJ BATRA,                                       DOCKET NUMBER
                         Appellant,                   SF-1221-15-0674-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                           DATE: January 11, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

               THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Raj Batra, Beverly Hills, California, pro se.

           Maureen Ney, Esquire, Los Angeles, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied his request for corrective action in this individual right of action (IRA)
     appeal.   Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative jud ges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                         2

     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.        Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).            After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. We MODIFY the initial decision to
     clarify the appropriate legal standard by which to evaluate the appellant’s
     communications with the Office of the Inspector General (OIG) and to
     supplement the administrative judge’s contributing factor analysis. We further
     MODIFY the initial decision to supplement the administrative judge’s analysis of
     whether the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
     suspended the appellant in 2013 and 2015 absent his whistleblowing disclosures
     and protected activity.      We find that the administrative judge correctly
     determined that the agency met its burden in this regard and properly denied the
     appellant’s request for corrective action. Except as expressly MODIFIED by this
     Final Order, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2         The relevant background information, as recited in the initial decision, is
     generally undisputed. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 30, Initial Decision (ID).
     The appellant began working for the agency in January 1998 as a staff physician.
     ID at 2. In this capacity, he divided his time performing clinical work (seeing
     patients) and conducting research. Id. The appellant also split his time between
     the agency and the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), whose
                                                                                        3

     receipt of Federal grant funds partially paid his salary. Id. When the appellant
     began working at the agency, he was mentored by Dr. S.D. Id.
¶3         Since approximately 2003-2004, the appellant was no longer identified on
     the Federal grant awarded to UCLA, and he was no longer paid the UCLA portion
     of his original salary. ID at 3. The appellant believed that Dr. S.D. stole his
     research identity by usurping research for which the appellant was responsible
     and receiving millions of dollars of grant funds based on that research. Id. The
     appellant made a hotline call to the agency’s OIG in June 2011 concerning
     improper funding allocation, among other things.      ID at 3 (citing IAF, Tab 1
     at 27).
¶4         The appellant also complained to various agency management officials
     about his concerns.     ID at 5.    For instance, in August 2012, the appellant
     complained to the Associate Chief of Staff-Research Service that Dr. S.D.’s
     UCLA salary is “complemented” with his agency salary.         ID at 5; IAF, Tab 1
     at 23-25.   He also complained to the agency’s Office of Research Oversight
     (ORO) regarding the “usurpation of [his] work” and the corruption of the “peer
     review process,” but ORO indicated that such complaints were against UCLA
     personnel and did not constitute research misconduct. ID at 5; IAF, Tab 1 at 26.
¶5         In May 2013, the Chief of the Medicine Service proposed to suspend the
     appellant   for   14 days   based    on    charges   of   inappropriate    conduct
     (three specifications), disrespectful conduct (two specifications), and failure to
     follow instructions (one specification).   ID at 6; IAF, Tab 4 at 152-54.      The
     individual who heard the appellant’s oral reply, the Assistant Director of the West
     Los Angeles office, recommended to the deciding official that the suspension be
     imposed and that the appellant be required to participate in anger management
     training. ID at 6; IAF, Tab 22 at 10. The Director suspended the appellant for
     14 days, effective July 1, 2013. ID at 6; IAF, Tab 4 at 150-51.
¶6         On November 19, 2013, UCLA issued the appellant a notice of exclusion,
     which barred him from entering or being on campus based on allegations of
                                                                                         4

     “disruptive and aggressive behavior.”       ID at 6; IAF, Tab 4 at 144-45.         On
     January 22, 2014, UCLA lifted the notice of exclusion after the appellant
     participated in a threat assessment and met with one of the UCLA deans. ID at 6;
     IAF, Tab 4 at 123.
¶7        On or around July 2014, the agency convened an Administrative Board of
     Investigation (ABI) to investigate allegations that led to the appellant’s exclusion
     from UCLA’s campus. ID at 6; IAF, Tab 4 at 131-34. On July 22, 2014, the ABI
     issued a report, which made the following findings:         (1) the appellant called
     Dr. S.D. a “c---sucker”; (2) he called various UCLA personnel “c---suckers”;
     (3) he made inappropriate physical contact with Dr. H.H.; (4) he verbally
     threatened   Dr. R.R.;   and   (5) he   falsely   accused   Dr. P.F.   without   prior
     clarification. ID at 6; IAF, Tab 4 at 131-34. On July 23, 2014, the appellant sent
     an email to the agency OIG hotline, in which he appeared to be following up on
     his 2011 complaint. ID at 10; IAF, Tab 1 at 31-32.
¶8        On or around October 9, 2014, the Chief of Staff concurred with the ABI’s
     findings and forwarded the report to the Chief of the Medicine Service for
     consideration of possible discipline. ID at 6; IAF, Tab 4 at 130. On November 7,
     2014, the Chief of the Medicine Service proposed to suspend the appellant for
     14 days based on the five specifications of inappropriate conduct that were
     sustained by the ABI. ID at 6; IAF, Tab 4 at 127-29. 2 The Associate Director for
     Administration/Operations concurred with the suspension and recommended that
     the suspension be imposed. ID at 6-7; IAF, Tab 4 at 60-61. The Acting Director
     suspended the appellant for 14 days, effective March 1, 2015. ID at 7; IAF, Tab 4
     at 58-59.
¶9        On March 6, 2015, the appellant filed a complaint with the Office of Special
     Counsel (OSC), alleging that the agency suspended him in 2013 and 2015 in
     retaliation for his complaints to agency management officials and OIG. ID at 7;
     2
      The same Chief of the Medicine Service served as the proposing official on the 2013
     and 2015 suspensions.
                                                                                             5

      IAF, Tab 1 at 14-32. OSC closed its investigation of his complaint, and he timely
      filed a Board appeal. ID at 7; IAF, Tab 1 at 35-36. The administrative judge
      found that the appellant established jurisdiction and held a hearing. IAF, Tab 19;
      Hearing Transcript (HT).
¶10         In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that the appellant’s
      disclosures to OIG in 2011 and 2014 constituted protected activity as defined in
      5 U.S.C. § 2309(b)(9)(C). ID at 7-8, 10-11; IAF, Tab 1 at 27-29, 31-32. She also
      determined that his disclosures to agency management officials, regarding the
      theft of his research identity 3 and Dr. S.D. being paid by the agency for work
      when he was not present and working elsewhere, constituted disclosures of a
      violation of law, but his remaining disclosures to agency managers lacked
      specificity and detail. ID at 11-14. The administrative judge further found that
      the appellant proved that his correspondence with OIG was a contributing factor
      in the 2013 suspension but not the 2015 suspension.            ID at 15-17.    She also
      concluded that the appellant’s whistleblowing disclosures to agency management
      officials were a contributing factor in the 2013 and 2015 suspensions.                ID
      at 17-18. The administrative judge found, however, that the agency proved by
      clear and convincing evidence that it would have suspended the appellant in 2013
      and 2015 even if he “had not engaged in whistleblowing.” ID at 18-24. 4 She
      therefore denied his request for corrective action. ID at 24.
¶11         The appellant has filed a 30-page petition for review with more than
      300 pages of attachments. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 4. The agency
      has not filed a response.     On review, the appellant essentially challenges the
      administrative judge’s findings and conclusions. Id. at 6-35. He also appears to

      3
         The administrative judge reasonably characterized this assertion a s a theft of
      intellectual property. ID at 12.
      4
       For clarity and consistency in this order, we refer to the appellant’s correspondence to
      OIG as protected activity and his disclosures to agency management officials as
      whistleblowing disclosures.
                                                                                                 6

      allege that the agency discriminated against him because of his race.                     Id.
      at 11, 30.
¶12           The appellant also has filed a motion to submit an additional pleading. PFR
      File, Tab 6. He proposes to submit the following materials, among other s, to
      assist the Board:          (1) the UCLA definition of the “In Resident” Joint
      Appointment; (2) a copy of the “cooperative agreement” between the agency and
      UCLA; and (3) “a dialog [sic] that features how the University and [agency]
      research systems are functionally [intertwined] in a manner that creates inherent
      conflicts of interest for the [agency] researchers who are not considered part of
      the University.” Id. at 3. We deny the motion because we are not persuaded that
      such additional documentation will assist us in resolving the legal issues that the
      appellant raised on review. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115.

                          DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶13           The appellant may establish a prima facie case of retaliation for
      whistleblowing disclosures and/or protected activity by proving by preponderant
      evidence 5 that: (1) he made a disclosure described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
      engaged in protected activity described under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B),
      (C), or (D), 6 and (2) the whistleblowing disclosure or protected activity was a
      contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take a personnel action against
      him. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1); Webb v. Department of the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R.
      248, ¶ 6 (2015). If the appellant establishes a prima facie case, then the agency is
      given an opportunity to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, 7 that it would
      have taken the same personnel actions in the absence of the whistleblowing

      5
        Preponderant evidence is the degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person,
      considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a contested
      fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q).
      6
          Section 2302(b)(9)(A), (B), and (D) are not implicated by the facts of this appeal.
      7
       Clear and convincing evidence “is that measure or degree of proof that produces in the
      mind of the trier of fact a firm belief as to the allegations sought to be established.”
      5 C.F.R. § 1209.4(e).
                                                                                              7

      disclosure or protected activity. 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)-(2); Webb, 122 M.S.P.R.
      248, ¶ 16.

      We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant made whistleblowing
      disclosures and engaged in protected activity.
¶14         The appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s conclusion that
      he engaged in protected activity when he communicated with OIG and he made
      whistleblowing disclosures to agency management officials regarding the theft of
      his research identity and Dr. S.D. being paid by the agency for work when he
      was not present and working elsewhere. We affirm those conclusions herein.
¶15         The appellant challenges on review the administrative judge’s conclusion
      that the following three disclosures to agency management officials lacked
      specificity and detail and were not protected under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8):
      (1) that agency funds and benefits were being diverted to UCLA; (2) that Dr. S.D.
      was diverting agency resources to UCLA; and (3) that Dr. S.D. was taking credit
      at UCLA for work performed at the agency.              PFR File, Tab 4 at 14-19; ID
      at 11-13.    In reaching this conclusion, the administrative judge noted, among
      other things, that the appellant failed to provide sufficient factual context for
      these allegations, the agency and UCLA have an arrangement to share resources,
      and the appellant did not identify any law, rule, or regulation that the agency
      violated, nor did these allegations clearly implicate an identifiable violation of
      law, rule, or regulation. ID at 12-13. She further found that these allegations
      did not constitute preponderant evidence of an abuse of authority, gross
      mismanagement, or a gross waste of funds by agency officials. ID at 13. 8

      8
        In the initial decision, the administrative judge made two references to the appellant’s
      burden to make nonfrivolous allegations. ID at 8-9, 13-14. We assume that these
      references were misstatements because she previously determined that the appellant
      satisfied his burden to make nonfrivolous allegations of Board jurisdiction and a
      hearing was held, IAF, Tab 19, and she correctly noted the proper burden of proof at the
      merits stage, ID at 9; see, e.g., Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281,
      282 (1984) (explaining that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to the
      appellant’s substantive rights provides no basis for reversal of the initial decision).
                                                                                         8

¶16          To remedy these deficiencies, the appellant discusses on review his research
      expertise, the nature of the cooperative research agreement between the agency
      and UCLA, and the impact of the agency’s decision to exclude him from various
      funding applications (including the disparity of salary support between him and
      Dr. S.D. and the professional opportunities that he was denied). PFR File, Tab 4
      at 14-18.    We have considered this information as well as his assertion that
      because Dr. S.D. was on various “regulatory panels with falsified credentials (that
      belonged to [the appellant]),” he was able to steer “many additional hundreds of
      millions of dollars . . . towards dead-end medical research projects, and/or killed
      others (like [the appellant’s]) that . . . had significant promise,” which in turn
      “harmed the American public.” Id. at 18. However, we are not persuaded that
      this additional information provides sufficient detail to constitute a disclosure of
      a violation of law, rule, or regulation or any other category protected by 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8).    Therefore, we affirm the administrative judge’s conclusion th at
      these disclosures are not protected.
¶17          Although not raised by the appellant on review, we modify the initial
      decision to clarify the proper analytical standard by which to evaluate the
      appellant’s communications with OIG. The administrative judge acknowledged
      that   the   appellant’s   communications   to   OIG   are    covered   by   5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(C), which makes it a prohibited personnel practice to take or fail to
      take a personnel action against an employee because of “disclosing information to
      the Inspector General of an agency.”        ID at 10-11.     However, in the initial
      decision, she also referenced the standard for general retaliation claims.        ID
      at 7-8, 10-11 (citing Murry v. General Services Administration, 93 M.S.P.R. 560,
      ¶ 6 (2003), for the proposition that the appellant must show that he engaged in
      protected activity, the accused official knew of the protected activity, the adverse
      employment action could have been retaliation under the circumstances, and there
      was a genuine nexus between the alleged retaliation and the adverse employment
      action). In Alarid v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 15 (2015), the
                                                                                            9

      Board clarified that the standard for general retaliation claims is inapplicable to
      claims that are subject to the burden-shifting framework set forth in 5 U.S.C.
      § 1221(e). As noted above, the appellant’s communications to OIG are covered
      by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(C), and they are subject to the burden-shifting
      framework set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e). See 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1)-(2). We
      therefore modify the administrative judge’s analysis, and we find that the
      appellant’s communications with OIG in 2011 and 2014 constitute protected
      activity under section 2302(b)(9)(C). 9

      We modify the administrative judge’s contributing factor analysis , but we agree
      with her conclusion that the appellant proved by preponderant evidence that his
      whistleblowing disclosures and/or protected activity was a contributing factor in
      the agency’s decision to suspend him in 2013 and 2015.
¶18         One way of proving that the appellant’s whistleblowing disclosure s and/or
      protected activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action is the
      “knowledge/timing test.”      Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 13 (citing Shibuya v.
      Department     of   Agriculture,    119 M.S.P.R.      537,   ¶ 22    (2013)).       The
      knowledge/timing test allows an employee to demonstrate that the whistleblowing
      disclosure and/or protected activity was a contributing factor in a personnel
      action through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the official taking

      9
        On review, the appellant indicates that he “reach[ed] out to [a] Congressional
      representative,” and he includes correspondence to various Congressional
      representatives. PFR File, Tab 4 at 22, 159-60, 169-70. He also provides evidence that
      he filed with OSC a whistleblowing disclosure in late 2013 or early 2014, PFR File,
      Tab 4 at 150-152, as well as an earlier prohibited personnel practice complaint in 2013,
      for which he received a preliminary closure letter on September 6, 2013, PFR File,
      Tab 4 at 146-49. He did not provide this information below, and the Board generally
      will not consider evidence submitted for the first time with the petition for review
      absent a showing that it was unavailable before the r ecord was closed despite the
      party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980).
      The appellant has not made such a showing here. Moreover, this additional information
      would not change our analysis based on our finding that, although the appellant made
      whistleblowing disclosures and engaged in protected activity, as the administrative
      judge found, the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have
      suspended the appellant in 2013 and 2015 absent his whistleblowing disclosures and
      protected activity.
                                                                                               10

      the personnel action knew of the whistleblowing disclosure and/or protected
      activity and that the personnel action occurred within a period of time such that a
      reasonable person could conclude that the whistleblowing disclosure and/or
      protected activity was a contributing factor in the personnel action.               Alarid,
      122 M.S.P.R. 600, ¶ 13; Carey v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 93 M.S.P.R.
      676, ¶ 11 (2003); see 5 U.S.C. § 1221(e)(1).
¶19          The administrative judge found that the appellant proved that his
      whistleblowing disclosures and protected activity were contributing factors in the
      agency’s decision to suspend him in 2013 and 2015.                   ID at 15-18.      The
      administrative judge found that the concurring official was the only individual
      involved in the 2013 suspension that had knowledge of his communications with
      OIG, but he only knew about the appellant’s general complaints regarding
      Dr. S.D. and research transgressions.           ID at 15-18.       Regarding the 2015
      suspension, the administrative judge found that the proposing official and the
      Chief of Staff who concurred in the ABI’s recommendation had some knowledge
      that the appellant disclosed to agency management officials that Dr. S.D. stole his
      research identity and/or was improperly paid for time worked at the agency . ID
      at 17. 10

      10
         The administrative judge’s contributing factor analysis is confusing due, in part, to
      the lack of clarity in the record regarding to whom, and when, the appellant made
      whistleblowing disclosures and when the various agency officials involved in the 2013
      and 2015 suspensions had knowledge of such disclosures. E.g., ID at 17 (noting that it
      was “not entirely clear” when the proposing official had knowledge of the appellant’s
      disclosures to agency management officials). The administrative judge’s confusion is
      somewhat understandable because the appellant’s submissions do not clearly articulate
      such information.       For instance, he included with his OSC complaint his
      correspondence with the Associate Chief of Staff-Research Service and the agency’s
      Office of Research Oversight as discussed supra ¶ 4. However, it appears that the
      appellant informed other agency management officials of his concerns regarding theft
      of intellectual property and improper payments to Dr. S.D. E.g., IAF, Tab 17 at 30-31
      (the Chief of the Medicine Service acknowledged in his deposition that he knew of the
      appellant’s allegation that Dr. S.D. stole his intellectual property and received credit for
      his work), Tab 22 at 64 (stating in a February 1, 2012 email to the Chief of Staff that
      his “contributions have been usurped and misappropriated” and his “research identity
                                                                                          11

¶20         We modify the initial decision to find that additional agency officials
      involved in the 2013 and 2015 suspension actions had knowledge of the
      appellant’s whistleblowing disclosures and/or protected activity, but we agree
      with the administrative judge’s overall conclusion that the appellant proved
      contributing factor for each suspension. For instance, we have considered the
      appellant’s assertion that the proposing official knew about his complaints to OIG
      and agency managers.      PFR File, Tab 4 at 12, 19.       On review, the appellant
      includes a May 24, 2013 email, which he sent to the proposing official and the
      Chief of Staff, who concurred with the ABI recommendation, among others. Id.
      at 60. Included with this email was his response to the 2013 notice of proposed
      suspension, which was already in the record below. Id. at 61-66; IAF, Tab 22
      at 36-41. In his response to the notice of proposed suspension, he stated that he
      “began raising concerns with Federal Agencies (see 2011 VA-[Tech Transfer
      Office (TTO)] and VA-OIG communications).” 11             IAF, Tab 22 at 38.       The
      proposing official testified that he did not know that the appellant went to OIG
      until June or July 2015. HT at 79-80, 89 (testimony of G.B.). However, as one
      of the recipients of the appellant’s May 24, 2013 email, we find that he had
      knowledge of the appellant’s communication with OIG on or around this date.
      We also conclude that the Chief of Staff, as a recipient of the May 24, 2013
      email, had knowledge of the appellant’s communications with OIG. We modify
      the initial decision accordingly. The record also reflects that the Chief of Staff

      stolen”); HT at 142 (testimony of the Chief of Staff acknowledging that the appellant
      raised the issue of whether Dr. S.D. was committing fraud by getting paid by the agency
      when he was not working at the agency).            We cannot discern whether such
      communications are intended to constitute additional whistleblowing disclosures in this
      IRA appeal. The lack of clarity in the record regarding to whom and when the appellant
      made whistleblowing disclosures does not require further development of the record
      because the existing voluminous record is sufficient to address the numerous arguments
      raised by the appellant on review.
      11
        According to the appellant, the TTO is the agency’s Office of Intellectual Property.
      HT at 21 (testimony of the appellant).
                                                                                     12

      concurred with the ABI’s findings on or around October 9, 2014, and the Chief of
      the Medicine Service proposed the second suspension on November 17, 2014.
      IAF, Tab 4 at 127.     The Board has held that a personnel action taken within
      approximately 1-2 years of the whistleblowing disclosure(s) or protected activity
      satisfies the knowledge/timing test.          Mastrullo v. Department of Labor,
      123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶ 21 (2015). We further modify the initial decision to find that
      the appellant’s communication with OIG was a contributing factor in the decision
      to propose the 2015 suspension. 12
¶21         The appellant further contends that the concurring officials on the 2013 and
      2015 suspensions did not appreciate the magnitude of the issues that he was
      raising in his responses to the proposed agency actions. PFR File, Tab 4 at 21.
      We understand this argument to mean that he informed these officials through his
      oral and written replies that he had made disclosures to agency management
      officials, but they failed to recognize the context of his assertions.
¶22         The concurring official on the 2013 suspension testified that he had no
      knowledge of any complaints that the appellant made to agency management
      officials. HT at 120 (testimony of C.S.). However, he acknowledged that he read
      the appellant’s response to the notice of proposed suspension, which stated the
      appellant’s belief that Dr. S.D. intended “to steal [his] intellectual property by
      claiming it as his own,” that funds were “absconded” from his accounts and
      redistributed elsewhere to Dr. S.D.’s benefit, and that he began raising concerns
      with “Federal Agencies (see [agency]-TTO and [agency]-OIG communications).”
      Id. at 120-24; IAF, Tab 22 at 37-38. The appellant’s response further indicated
      that he had raised with the proposing official and other agency management
      officials issues concerning his research environment and laboratory privileges,
      and he stated that the proposing official’s actions were retaliatory. IAF, Tab 22

      12
         We are not persuaded that the proposing official had any knowledge of the
      appellant’s communications with OIG prior to his decision to propose the
      2013 suspension.
                                                                                          13

      at 40. Viewing the appellant’s response as a whole, we find that the concurring
      official had some knowledge of the appellant’s substantive whistleblowing
      disclosures to agency management officials.          We modify the initial decision
      accordingly.       Here, too, the 1-month span of time between the appellant’s
      May 24, 2013 response to the notice of proposed suspension and the June 20,
      2013 recommendation that the proposal should be sustained, IAF, Tab 22 at 10,
      was sufficiently short to satisfy the timing component of the knowledge/timing
      test.      See    DeLeonardo v.   Equal   Employment      Opportunity   Commission,
      103 M.S.P.R. 301, ¶ 10 (2006) (finding that a performance evaluation issued
      1 month after a disclosure was made satisfied the knowledge/timing test).
¶23           By contrast, we are not persuaded that the concurring official on the 2015
      suspension had any knowledge of the appellant’s whistleblowing disclosures or
      protected activity. Indeed, the concurring official on the 2015 suspension denied
      having any such knowledge, and the documentary evidence supports her
      testimony.       HT at 162-63 (testimony of S.S.).    Importantly, in the appellant’s
      written response to the proposed suspension, he discussed his personal conflicts
      with Dr. S.D. and the proposing official and his feeling that he was “betrayed” by
      Dr. S.D., but he does not at any time discuss the substance of his whistleblowing
      disclosures or his complaints to OIG. IAF, Tab 4 at 62-126.
¶24           Because we conclude that the appellant satisfied his prima facie burden to
      show that his whistleblowing disclosures and/or protected activity was a
      contributing factor in the agency’s decision to suspend him in 2013 and 2015, we
      now turn to whether the agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it
      would     have     suspended   him   absent   his    whistleblowing   disclosures   or
      protected activity.
                                                                                           14

      We agree with the administrative judge that the agency proved by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have suspended the appellant in 2013 and 2015
      absent his whistleblowing disclosures or protected activity. 13
¶25           In determining whether an agency has shown by clear and convincing
      evidence that it      would have taken        the same personnel action absen t
      whistleblowing disclosures and/or protected activity, the Board will consider the
      strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its action, the existence and
      strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency officials who were
      involved in the decision, and any evidence that the agency takes similar actions
      against employees who are not whistleblowers or who did not engage in protected
      activity but who are otherwise similarly situated.       See Carr v. Social Security
      Administration, 185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Alarid, 122 M.S.P.R. 600,
      ¶ 14.
¶26           The administrative judge assessed the relevant evidence, made credib ility
      determinations, and concluded that the agency had “legitimate reasons” to
      suspend the appellant in 2013 and 2015. ID at 19-23. Regarding the agency’s
      motive to retaliate, the administrative judge acknowledged the appellant’s
      assertion that the charges were fabricated because the Chief of the Medicine
      Service and other agency management officials “favored” Dr. S.D., but she
      concluded that this argument was not persuasive.                ID at 23-24.        The
      administrative judge noted that the third Carr factor was not significant because
      the record did not contain any evidence to show that the agency took similar
      actions against employees who did not make whistleblowing disclosures or

      13
        In the administrative judge’s clear and convincing analysis, she stated that she would
      “accept as true that the appellant’s protected disclosures were a contributing factor in
      the decision to remove him.” ID at 18. We assume that this statement was a
      typographical error because she previously found, as noted above, that the appellant
      proved by preponderant evidence he made whistleblowing disclosures and engaged in
      protected activity and such disclosures and activity were a contributing factor in the
      agency’s decision to impose the 2013 and 2015 suspensions. ID at 10-18.
                                                                                      15

      did not engage in protected activity but who were otherwise similarly situated.
      ID at 24 & n.5. 14
¶27         The appellant admitted to most of the misconduct underlying the 2013
      suspension, including calling another employee “inept,” failing to meet with the
      Chief of the Medicine Service as directed, and, during a different meeting with
      the Chief of the Medicine Service, raising his voice, pounding his fist on the
      table, and slamming the door behind him.        E.g., IAF, Tab 22 at 36-41; HT
      at 54-56 (testimony of the appellant). He contends on review, however, that the
      Chief of the Medicine Service (who was also the proposing official) provoked
      him by calling him a liar and dismissing his complaint with the UCLA Academic
      Senate regarding his allegations against Dr. S.D. PFR File, Tab 4 at 14. Even if
      the appellant’s allegations of provocation were true, it would not change our view
      of the strength of the agency’s evidence concerning the specifications that
      involved other employees, and they do not explain his otherwise inappropriate
      and unprofessional behavior described in the specifications invo lving the Chief of
      the Medicine Service.
¶28         Regarding the 2015 suspension, the appellant asserts on review that the
      underlying specifications “largely occurred off-site in 2013.” PFR File, Tab 4
      at 23. The administrative judge addressed this argument in the initial decision,
      noting that the delay was due to the agency’s decision to convene an independent
      ABI, which sustained the misconduct and provided written recommendations in
      July 2014. ID at 22-23; IAF, Tab 4 at 131-34. The appellant has not persuaded
      us that the administrative judge erred when she concluded that the delay did not
      harm him or alter the facts surrounding the alleged misconduct. ID at 22-23.
¶29         We have considered the appellant’s arguments regarding some of the
      specifications of the inappropriate conduct charge, but we find that a different

      14
         The administrative judge acknowledged that one witness testified that other
      physicians who were not whistleblowers have been suspended; however, she noted that
      the particular misconduct was not identified. ID at 24 & n.5.
                                                                                       16

      outcome is not warranted. For instance, the appellant argues on review that his
      use of vulgar language to describe Dr. S.D. and UCLA personnel was “jovial and
      impulsive” and not out of anger. PFR File, Tab 4 at 24 (emphasis omitted). This
      argument is inconsistent with his admission that it was not appropriate to use such
      vulgarity in the agency hospital and that he viewed Dr. S.D. “in this light.” IAF,
      Tab 4 at 69-70; PFR File, Tab 4 at 24 (emphasis omitted).         Additionally, the
      appellant asserts that he never hit Dr. H.H., PFR File, Tab 4 at 24, but he
      acknowledged in his response to the notice of proposed suspension that he “ patted
      [Dr. H.H.’s] shoulder,” IAF, Tab 4 at 70. The appellant’s version of events is
      contradicted by an email written by Dr. H.H. on the same day as the incident in
      question, which described that the appellant hit him “very hard.” Id. at 137. The
      appellant admitted below that he had a confrontation with Dr. R.R. because he
      reacted to Dr. R.R.’s “open disrespect[]” for him in front of faculty and students.
      Id. at 71, 126. Additionally, on review, he admits that he “informed [Dr. R.R.] in
      measured tones that if he disrespected [the appellant] again in a public forum, that
      there would be consequences.”      PFR File, Tab 4 at 24 (emphasis in original).
      Given the appellant’s admissions, we agree with the administrative judge that the
      agency’s evidence to support the 2013 and 2015 suspensions was very strong.
¶30        Because we have modified the initial decision to find that additional
      individuals had knowledge of the appellant’s whistleblowing disclosures and/or
      protected activity, we also modify the administrative judge’s evaluation of the
      second Carr factor, concerning the agency’s motive to retaliate. The appellant
      asserts on review that he was “raising very significant issues regarding executive
      integrity and fiscal impropriety that directly implicated high leve l [agency] and
      [UCLA] officials [and accused them] of incompetence and corruption.” Id. at 13.
      We agree.    Given the serious nature of the appellant’s allegations to agency
      management officials and OIG, coupled with the positions of authority occupied
      by the individuals who were involved in the decision-making process concerning
                                                                                        17

      the two suspensions, 15 we find that this Carr factor favors the appellant. See,
      e.g., Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
      (“Those responsible for the agency’s performance overall may well be motivated
      to retaliate even if they are not directly implicated by the disclosures, and even if
      they do not know the whistleblower personally, as the criticism reflects on them
      in their capacities as managers and employees.”).
¶31         The appellant also asserts that the decision to convene the ABI was
      improper, the ABI was presented with a “pre-determined narrative,” it did not
      properly consider the evidence before it, and its conclusion that his research
      activities should be curtailed is inconsistent with the charged offenses. PFR File,
      Tab 4 at 26-27.    We find these arguments unavailing.         Indeed, there is no
      persuasive evidence that any agency management official with knowledge of his
      whistleblowing disclosures and/or protected activity influenced anyone on the
      ABI, nor is there any evidence that any ABI members acted in retaliation for his
      whistleblowing disclosures and/or protected activity.
¶32         Regarding the third Carr factor, the appellant contends that the
      administrative judge “discount[ed]” the testimony of the deciding official on the
      2013 suspension that “no physician was suspended without pay for weeks for
      raising their voices, complaining about staff ineptitude, using vulgarities, or
      asserting rights” that the appellant believed were in the agency’s best interests.
      Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted), 20-21. The appellant does not provide a citation to
      this testimony, and we could not independently find it. Based on our review of
      the initial decision and the relevant evidence, however, it appears that there is
      little, if any, evidence, to support this factor. To the extent evidence on Carr
      factor 3 exists, the agency is required to come forward with all reasonably

      15
        We also include in our consideration the Chief of Staff, even though he was not a
      proposing, concurring, or deciding official in either of the suspensions, because he
      concurred with the ABI’s findings and forwarded those findings to the Chief of the
      Medicine Service. IAF, Tab 4 at 130.
                                                                                       18

      pertinent evidence; the failure to do so may be at the agency’s peril. Whitmore,
      680 F.3d at 1374.   Absent relevant comparator evidence, Carr factor 3 cannot
      weigh in favor of the Government.        Siler v. Environmental Protection Agency,
      908 F.3d 1291, 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2018).       We find, therefore, that Carr factor 3
      weighs against the agency.
¶33        The court has also held that the Carr factors are “nonexclusive.” Miller v.
      Department of Justice, 842 F.3d 1252, 1257 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Therefore, we have
      considered other evidence discussed by the appellant on review, including, among
      other things, the frequency with which he raised concerns to agency officials, the
      “negligence (inaction)” of agency officials starting in 2004 -2005, the harm done
      to his career and personal life as a consequence of his communications with OIG
      and agency management officials, the relationship between the agency and
      UCLA, and the complex personnel issues that arose as a result of this
      relationship. E.g., PFR File, Tab 4 at 9-18, 22-35. However, given the serious
      nature of the charged misconduct and the appellant’s admission that he engaged
      in most of the charged misconduct, we are left with a strong belief that the agency
      would have suspended the appellant in 2013 and 2015 absent his whistleblowing
      disclosures and protected activity. See Carr, 185 F.3d at 1326 (noting that the
      whistleblower protection statutes are not meant to protect employees from their
      own misconduct).

      The appellant’s other arguments on review do not warrant a different outcome.
¶34        We have considered the appellant’s remaining arguments, but we find them
      unavailing. For instance, regarding his assertion that the agency’s actions were
      the product of race discrimination, e.g., PFR File, Tab 4 at 11, the Board lacks the
      authority to decide, in conjunction with an IRA appeal, the merits of an allegation
      of prohibited discrimination, Fishbein v. Department of Health & Human
      Services, 102 M.S.P.R. 4, ¶ 18 (2006).
¶35        We also have reviewed the 300 pages of documentation that the appellant
      submitted on review. Many of these documents, such as email correspondence
                                                                                           19

      between him and the Chief of the Medicine Service and between him and OIG,
      his written response to the 2013 notice of proposed suspension, and his formal
      complaint of faculty misconduct against Dr. S.D. that he sent to the UCLA
      Academic Senate, e.g., PFR File, Tab 4 at 55-56, 61-66, 71-73, 96-134, are not
      new evidence because they were already part of the record below, Meier v.
      Department of the Interior, 3 M.S.P.R. 247, 256 (1980). As to the remaining
      documents, the Board generally will not consider evidence submitted for the first
      time with the petition for review absent a showing that it was unavailable before
      the record was closed despite the party’s due diligence. Avansino v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980).          The appellant has not made such a
      showing. Even if we assumed for the purposes of our analysis that the appellant
      included “new” evidence on review, we are not persuaded that such evidence is of
      sufficient weight to warrant an outcome different from that of the initial decision .
      Russo v. Veterans Administration, 3 M.S.P.R. 345, 349 (1980).

      Conclusion
¶36         For the reasons described herein, we find that the appellant prove d that he
      made whistleblowing disclosures and engaged in protected activity and that these
      whistleblowing disclosures and protected activity were a contributing factor in
      the agency’s decision to suspend him in 2013 and 2015. We further find that the
      agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have suspended the
      appellant in the absence of his whistleblowing disclosures or protected activity.
      Therefore, we deny the appellant’s request for corrective action.

                               NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 16
            The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
      Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain

      16
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                      20

review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
                                                                                    21

relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit ou r website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their res pective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
                                                                                     22

      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then yo u must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review    pursuant    to   the    Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b)   other   than   practices   described    in   section 2302(b)(8),   or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
                                                                                     23

of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 17 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

17
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       24

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                          /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.