Court Opinion

ID: 9705390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:04:58.427015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:10.799989
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 60. (concurring). Although I concur with the mandate, I write separately to address the majority's conclusion that a landlord's duty to test for lead-based paint arises "whenever the *74landlord of a residential property constructed before 1978 either knows or in the use of ordinary care should know that there is peeling or chipping paint on the rental property." Majority op. at 62.1 agree that a landlord's duty arises when the landlord knows or, in the use of ordinary care, should know that paint that is flaking, peeling or chipping from the walls contains lead. I concur because I disagree with the majority's quite arbitrary distinction between residential property constructed before and after 1978. Rather, I conclude that a trier of fact should examine all of the circumstances presented in a given case to determine if a landlord had a duty to test for contamination from lead-based paint. Certainly, the age of the premises is but one factor to consider.
¶ 61. The majority begins the analysis by stating that the issue in this case is whether the landlord involved should have known of the presence of lead-based paint. See majority op. at 56. This issue pertains to the second element of the majority's test for ascertaining the foreseeability that flaking, peeling or chipping paint would result in lead poisoning.1 See majority op. at 56. The majority bases its foreseeability test, in part, on both Wis JI — Civil 8020 and the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 358 (1965).2 I first *75note that the language in the majority's foreseeability test is not consistent with the language in § 358. Subsections 358(l)(a) and (b) employ the expression, "has reason to know of the condition. ..." While the phrase "has reason to know" may seem congruent with the majority's phrase, "should have known," the Restatement (Second) specifically differentiates the two phrases. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12. Comment (a) to § 12 explains that "[t]hese two phrases. . .differ in that 'reason to know' implies no duty of knowledge on the part of the actor whereas 'should know' implies that the actor owes another the duty of ascertaining the fact in question." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 12 cmt. a (1965). I agree with the majority, however, that we should express the test using the phrase, "should have known," because it is more consistent with the language in Wis JI — Civil 80203 and with the case law in Wisconsin.4
*76¶ 62. As stated above, the majority premises a landlord's duty to test for lead-based paint on whether a residential rental property was constructed before 1978. See majority op. at 60.1 disagree with the majority's conclusion that a property's age alone, creates circumstances from which a landlord "should have known" that lead exists in chipping or peeling paint. I disagree for several reasons.
¶ 63. First, the 1978 date is arbitrary. The majority points out that lead-based paint was banned for residential uses in 1978 by the United States Consumer Products Safety Commission. See majority op. at 58 n.7. While the use of lead-based paint became illegal after 1978, undoubtedly some homes continued to be painted with such paint after that date. In some situations, the majority's test may result in a person that rents a residence built after 1978 not having the same protection as one renting a residence built before 1978, even though the rental residence involved does contain lead-based paint.5 A landlord should not have a differ*77ent duty to test solely based on the age of the residence he or she owns.
¶ 64. Second, the ban on the use of lead-based paint in 1978, and the media coverage surrounding it, is not enough to provide a particular landlord with constructive notice of the possibility of lead-based paint in a rental residence. The majority cites to both federal and state legislation prohibiting the use of lead-based paint, as well as media reports documenting the dangers of lead-based paint. See majority op. at 58-61. The majority implies that because the danger of lead-based paint is now more well-known, landlords who own residences built before 1978 should know that their residences may contain lead-based paint. See majority op. at 60.
¶ 65. The majority opinion states that Wisconsin prohibited the use of lead-based paint in 1980, and that the City of Racine adopted an ordinance in 1975 that banned the use of lead-based paint on most surfaces. See majority op. at 61. If we are to adopt a "magic" date, why should it be 1978, rather than 1975 or 1980?
¶ 66. However, the majority never cites evidence of any communication from which a landlord should know that the "magic" year upon which the duty to test is based is 1978. Indeed, the mere fact that lead-based paint's dangers have been publicized does not amount to constructive notice,6 as required by the majority's *78test. See Felton by Felton v. Spratley, 640 A.2d 1358, 1363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994). Constructive notice should not be attributed to a landlord simply because his or her property was built before 1978. The majority's distinction, arbitrarily based on the 1978 ban, creates a duty on landlords. The majority has not adequately demonstrated, however, that landlords have had sufficient notice communicated to them that the federal ban on the use of paint containing lead occurred in 1978. If the majority's test remains intact, such a showing may be needed in each and every case.7 Id.
¶ 67. Third, the majority has not cited any legal support for its arbitrary selection of 1978. In discussing constructive notice, the Maryland court of appeals held that "[k]nowledge of a condition which involves unreasonable risk of physical harm to persons on the land may not be imputed to a landlord merely from general knowledge that other properties of like age, construction, or design might possibly contain such hazardous conditions." Richwind v. Brunson, 645 A.2d 1147, 1154-55 (Md. Ct. App. 1994). Instead, other jurisdictions have held that constructive notice may be *79inferred from a landlord's reasonable inspection of a residence. See, e.g., Norwood v. Lazarus, 634 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that a jury found a landlord knew or should have known that a residence contained lead-based paint because the landlord's manager inspected the property weekly and bought paint for the residence); Felton, 640 A.2d at 1361. Another court held that a landlord must retain sufficient control of a residential rental premises to have constructive notice of lead-based paint on the property. Brown by Brown v. Marathon Realty, Inc., 565 N.Y.S.2d 219, 221 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991). I favor an approach whereby a trier of fact examines the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a landlord had constructive notice that flaking, chipping, or peeling paint in a residence contained lead. Age of the premises is one factor to consider.
¶ 68. Finally, I disagree with the majority's use of the 1978 distinction because the creation of such a distinction is more properly left to the legislature. In State v. Amoco Oil Co., 97 Wis. 2d 226, 259, 293 N.W.2d 487 (1980) (citing Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730-731 (1963)), this court stated:
The court should not substitute its social and economic beliefs for the judgment of the legislative body. The legislature has broad scope to experiment with solutions to economic problems and has the power to regulate injurious commercial and business practices as long as it does not run afoul of the federal constitution, state constitution, or federal statutes.
In incorporating the 1978 date into its test, the majority is usurping the role of the legislature. With the 1978 date, the majority creates more than a common law *80duty — it engages in judicial legislating by substituting its social and economic beliefs for the legislature's judgment. See Amoco Oil Co., 97 Wis. 2d at 259.
¶ 69. In summary, I agree with the mandate that .a landlord's duty to test for lead-based paint arises when the landlord knows or should have known that flaking, peeling or chipping paint contains lead. I write only to state my concern with the majority's distinction between residential properties constructed before or after 1978, especially in light of the lack of legal support for that distinction, and the negative ramifications such a line may have on both landlords and tenants who may be victims of lead poisoning. I conclude that the trier of fact should examine all relevant circumstances in each case to determine if a landlord knew or should have known that flaking, chipping or peeling paint on the premises involved contained lead. The duty to test should not be based on the selection of an arbitrary date.
¶ 70. For these reasons, I concur.
¶ 71. I am authorized to state that Justice JON P. WILCOX joins this concurrence.

 The test, as stated by the majority: "(1) whether the landlord knew or in the use of ordinary care should have known about the presence of peeling and chipping paint; and (2) whether the landlord knew or in the use of ordinary care should have known that the chipping and peeling paint contained lead." Majority op. at 56.

 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 358 (1965), "Undisclosed Dangerous Conditions Known to Lessor," states:
(1) A lessor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his lessee any condition, whether natural or artificial, which involves unrea*75sonable risk of physical harm to persons on the land, is subject to liability to the lessee and others upon the land with the consent of the lessee or his sublessee for physical harm caused by the condition after the lessee has taken possession, if
(a) the lessee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or the risk involved, and
(b) the lessor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes or should realize the risk involved, and has reason to expect that the lessee will not discover the condition or realize the risk.
(2) If the lessee actively conceals the condition, the liability stated in Subsection (1) continues until the lessee discovers it and has reasonable opportunity to take effective precautions against it. Otherwise the liability continues only until the vendee has had reasonable opportunity to discover the condition and to take such precautions.

 The language of Wis JI — Civil 8020 mimics the majority's "know" and "should have known" language: "[i]f an unreasonable risk of harm existed and the owner was aware of it, or, if in *76the use of ordinary care he or she should have been aware of it, then it was his or her duty to either correct the condition or danger or warn other persons of the condition or risk as was reasonable under the circumstances." We recognize that while the phrase, "should have been aware of it," is not exactly the same as the phrase, "should have known," the two phrases are analogous.

 See Maci v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 105 Wis. 2d 710, 717, 314 N.W.2d 914 (Ct. App. 1981)(quoting Wis JI — Civil 8020). See also Rockweit v. Senecal, 197 Wis. 2d 409, 423 n.6, 541 N.W.2d 742 (1995)(citing Wis JI — Civil 8020 with approval).

 For instance, if a tenant lives at a property built after 1978 where the landlord did not know of lead-based paint in the residence, the tenant may have no recourse since the landlord's constructive notice is not triggered by the age of the residence. *77Moreover, tenants may actually be put in danger by the test as stated by the majority because landlords who own residences built after 1978 may be lulled into a false sense of security.

 In Franklin Mutual Insurance Co. v. Meeme Town Mutual, 68 Wis. 2d 179, 184, 228 N.W.2d 165 (1975)(quoting Thompson v. Fairyland, Mutual Insurance Co., 30 Wis. 2d 187, 192, 140 N.W.2d 200 (1966)), this court defined constructive notice as "neither notice nor knowledge but.. .a policy determination that *78under certain circumstances a person should be treated as if he had actual notice." The majority's use of the phrase, "should have known," appears to be an adoption of a constructive notice approach.

 The majority cites EPA and HUD regulations which require the attachment of statements regarding lead-based paint to contracts for the sale of pre-1978 residential housing. However, such statements would not provide notice to those landlords which have not bought or sold pre-1978 housing since these EPA and HUD regulations became effective. Accordingly, the fact that such statements might be required does not obviate the need to evaluate the extent of the landlord's notice under the facts and circumstances of each particular case.