Court Opinion

ID: 9857214
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 14:02:46.443854+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:12.833473
License: Public Domain

PAEZ, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because I do not believe that reasonable suspicion supported Trooper Christensen’s decision to prolong his traffic stop of Tur-vin, I would affirm the district court’s order granting Turvin’s motion to suppress. I therefore respectfully dissent.
First, I agree with the majority that after the Supreme Court’s decision in Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 125 S.Ct. 1465, 161 L.Ed.2d 299 (2005), our analysis of the Fourth Amendment issues in this case must be guided by our recent decision in United States v. Mendez, 476 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir.2007). There, we recognized that in Muehler, the Court decided that “mere police questioning does not constitute a seizure unless it prolongs the detention of the individual, and, thus, no reasonable suspicion is required to justify questioning that does not prolong the stop.” Mendez, 476 F.3d at 1080 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although Muehler did not arise in the context of a traffic stop, we further recognized that the Court’s reasoning applied to such an encounter. Id.
In several eases prior to Muehler, we had held that during the course of a traffic stop “[a]n officer must initially restrict the questions he asks ... to those that are reasonably related to the justification for the stop.” United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d 719, 724 (9th Cir.2001) (citing United States v. Perez, 37 F.3d 510, 513 (9th Cir.1994)). See also United States v. Murillo, 255 F.3d 1169, 1174 (9th Cir.2001). We had emphasized that an officer could expand the scope of questioning “only if he notices particularized, objective factors arousing his suspicion.” Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d at 724 (citation omitted). After Muehler, this line of reasoning could not pass constitutional muster, and we so held in Mendez. We therefore concluded that: “[t]o the extent that Chavez-Valenzuela, Murillo, and Perez hold that such questioning must be supported by separate reasonable suspicion, they have been overruled by Muehler.” Mendez, 476 F.3d at 1080. Recognizing this new legal landscape, we rejected Mendez’s Fourth Amendment challenge to his arrest, explaining that, “because ... the officers’ questioning did not prolong the stop, we are compelled to hold that the expanded questioning need not have been supported by separate reasonable suspicion.” Id. at 1080-81.
Here, to the extent that the district court’s suppression ruling relied on the portion of Chavez-Valenzuela that was overruled by Mendez, it was incorrect. As the majority recognizes, however, this was not the only basis for the district court’s ruling. In the magistrate judge’s Final Recommendation Regarding Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, he explained:
[As the [Initial] Recommendation concluded the traffic stop of Turvin and his passenger Cunningham was extended or prolonged because of the comments by late arriving Trooper Powell who advised Trooper Christiansen [sic] of a pri- or police contact with Turvin involving a rolling meth lab. Although Trooper Christiansen [sic] had been writing traffic tickets to Turvin and Christiansen [sic] (for not wearing a seat belt), he stopped his ticket-issuing process and used a tape recorder solely for the pur*1105pose of asking Turvin about drugs and for a consent to search Ms vehicle. Normally, an officer engaged in a traffic stop will not use a tape recorder. Tr. 25. The magistrate judge reaffirms his finding that the police prolonged the otherwise lawful detention of Turvin and his passenger on grounds for which they did not have reasonable suspicion for doing so.]
I agree with the district court that reasonable suspicion did not exist to prolong the stop of Turvin and his companion. It is clear from Trooper Christensen’s testimony that until Trooper Powell arrived on the scene, Christensen did not have any reason to suspect that either Turvin or his companion had been or were engaged in any illegal drug activity.
Christensen had stopped Turvin’s truck because of its loud exhaust, rapid acceleration around a corner, minor skidding and speeding. As Christensen approached the truck, he observed that neither occupant appeared to be wearing a seatbelt and the truck’s registration was expired. After Christensen conducted a license and warrants check on Turvin, he was informed that Turvin’s license was current and valid. Trooper Christensen then decided to issue traffic citations to Turvin and his companion.
About ten minutes after the stop began, while Christensen sat in his vehicle writing out the traffic citations, Trooper Powell arrived at the scene. Powell had heard Christensen on the police radio and recognized Turvin’s name, because he knew that a “rolling meth lab” had been found in Turvin’s vehicle following a traffic stop earlier in 2005.
When Powell arrived at the scene, he recognized Turvin and his truck and informed Christensen about the prior incident, Christensen then (1) “stopped his ticket-issuing process,” (2) turned on the tape recorder in his police vehicle “solely for the purpose of asking Turvin about drugs and for a consent to search his vehicle,” and (3) exited his vehicle and returned to Turvin’s truck, while Powell positioned himself at the rear of Turvin’s vehicle to stand by as backup. At this point, the troopers had not seen anything in the truck to indicate that it might contain methamphetamine or that Turvin and his companion were involved with meth.
After returning to the truck, Christensen told Turvin, who was standing outside his vehicle, that he knew about the rolling meth lab, which Turvin acknowledged. After stating that he could see something behind Turvin’s seat, which Turvin said was a speaker box, Christensen asked Tur-vin if he could search his vehicle. The purpose of seeking Turvin’s consent was to search for contraband.
Although the majority faults the magistrate judge for erroneously finding that Christensen asked for consent to search before observing the speaker box, I agree with his determination that whether this observation occurred before or after Christensen asked for consent, is immaterial. What is important in my view is that, when Powell informed Christensen about his pri- or encounter with Turvin earlier in 2005, Christensen did not just “briefly pause” in writing the traffic citations so that he could ask Turvin for consent to search his truck. Rather, Christensen completely stopped writing the citations and decided to embark upon a drug investigation. Indeed, he turned on his tape recorder for the purpose of asking Turvin about drugs and for consent to search his vehicle. Because, as the magistrate judge correctly found, this new endeavor prolonged the length of the stop, Christensen needed reasonable suspicion to do so.
Here, reasonable suspicion did not exist. Reasonable suspicion requires a “particularized and objective basis for suspecting *1106the person stopped of criminal activity.” United States v. Tiong, 224 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir.2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). There was nothing about the traffic infractions or Turvin’s conduct after the stop that provided an objective basis for a reasonable officer to suspect that illegal drug activity was afoot. Moreover, Christensen did not immediately see anything in the truck that aroused his suspicion. It was not until Powell arrived at the scene with information about his prior contact with Turvin that Christensen even considered inquiring about illegal drug activity. This new information that centered on Turvin’s prior criminal record, by itself, was insufficient to support reasonable suspicion. Burrell v. McIlroy, 464 F.3d 853, 858 n. 3 (9th Cir.2006) (“Although a prior criminal history cannot alone establish reasonable suspicion or probable cause to support a detention or an arrest, it is permissible to consider such a fact as part of the total calculus of information in these determinations.”). See also United States v. Chamberlin, 644 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir.1980); United States v. Santos, 403 F.3d 1120, 1132 (10th Cir.2005).
The majority finds it significant that Christensen did not ask for consent until after he observed the speaker box behind Turvin’s seat. The majority’s emphasis on this observation, however, minimizes Christensen’s response to the information provided by Powell. It seems obvious, that, with this new information, Christensen had a hunch that if he were to search the truck he might well find drugs, drug paraphernalia, or even a “rolling meth lab.” A hunch, while it might reflect good police intuition, does not amount to reasonable suspicion. See United States v. Thomas, 211 F.3d 1186, 1191 (9th Cir.2000) (“Reasonable suspicion must be based on more than an officer’s ‘inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ’ ” (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968))); Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d at 724 (“Conversely, an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch’ cannot withstand scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7, 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989))).
In sum, I agree with the district court’s determination that reasonable suspicion did not exist to prolong the traffic stop. The majority does not directly address this issue. Maj. Opin. at 1104. (“[W]e do not reach the issue of whether reasonable suspicion supported Christensen’s questioning.”). Instead, the majority, while invoking a fact-specific Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry, concludes that “we must examine the “totality of the circumstances” surrounding the stop, and determine whether Christensen’s conduct was reasonable.” Maj. Opin. at 1101. Ultimately, the majority holds that “Mendez’s conclusion that officers do not need reasonable suspicion to ask questions unrelated to the purpose of an initially lawful stop applies here because Christensen’s question and request for consent to search did not unreasonably prolong the duration of the stop.” Maj. Opin. at 1103-1104. In the context of this case, this approach can not be sanctioned by Mendez, or Chavez-Valenzuela, or by the district court’s findings.
As I read Mendez (and Muehler), when a police officer asks questions that exceed the purposes of a traffic stop, such questioning “does not constitute a seizure unless it prolongs the detention of the individual.” Mendez, 476 F.3d at 1080 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted). When the expanded questioning prolongs the duration of an initially lawful stop, however, such questioning must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. Although Mendez overruled portions of Chavez-Valenzuela, id. at 1080, it left intact its primary hold*1107ing — that an officer cannot ask questions that extend the duration of a traffic stop beyond its initial purpose without having reasonable suspicion for doing so. Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d at 725-26. Thus, as I have discussed, the critical question here is whether reasonable suspicion existed for the extended stop, and not whether the extended duration was reasonable under all the circumstances.
In support of its holding, the majority points to the information provided by Powell about his prior contact with Turvin, characterizes the interruption in the ticket writing as brief, emphasizes Christensen’s observation of the speaker box behind Tur-vin’s seat, and finds that the duration of the stop to the point at which Turvin consented to the search — approximately fourteen minutes — “is no longer than an ordinary traffic stop could reasonably take.” Maj. Opin. at 1101. There is nothing in the record to support the latter finding. The Government did not present any evidence on this issue, and the district court did not make such a finding. This is a factual determination that is best left to the district court. In any event, because the majority adopts an approach that is inconsistent with Mendez and Chavez-Valenzuela, I am not persuaded by its assessment of Trooper Christensen’s conduct.
With the majority’s approach, it will take very little for traffic officers to invoke T.V. Detective Columbo’s infamous strategy of asking “just one more question.” See United States v. Chavez-Valenzuela, 281 F.3d 897, 897-98 n. 1 (9th Cir.2002) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). So long as there is some basis to briefly prolong a stop, even when the purpose of the stop has ended, there will be no Fourth Amendment violation. Although it does not take much to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard — particularized objective facts that criminal activity is afoot — the majority’s new approach lowers Fourth Amendment protection another notch.
The majority’s discussion of cases from several of our sister circuits is not persuasive. In United States v. Stewart, 473 F.3d 1265 (10th Cir.2007), the county sheriffs expanded questioning occurred while the motorist was in the process of retrieving his driver’s license, and, as the defendant conceded, the questions did not appreciably prolong the stop. In United States v. Alcaraz-Arellano, 441 F.3d 1252, 1256-58 (10th Cir.2006), the expanded questioning occurred while the officer was gathering and verifying information provided by the driver of the vehicle. Notably, when the officer returned the license to the driver, and then began to ask additional questions, the court determined that the officer prolonged the stop, which could only be justified if the officer had reasonable suspicion. Id. at 1259-60. After considering all of the information that the officer had acquired during the course of the stop, the court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to further detain the driver. Id.
In United States v. Patterson, 472 F.3d 767, 777 (10th Cir.2006), Patterson alleged that the trooper prolonged the detention while obtaining his documents and conversing with him as the trooper waited for verification of Patterson’s license and vehicle registration. He argued that the trooper deliberately extended the time necessary to complete the stop so that another trooper could arrive with a drug detection dog to inspect Patterson’s vehicle, which took place approximately ten minutes into the stop. Id. at 773, 777. In evaluating the reasonableness of the stop from the initial detention to the issuance of the traffic ticket, the court held that the trooper did not unreasonably prolong the stop and relied upon the fact that Patterson did the majority of the talking. Id. at *1108777. As the trooper finished writing a warning ticket, a drug detection dog alerted to a scent on the vehicle. Id. at 773. After the dog alerted several more times, the trooper searched the vehicle and found illegal drugs in a hidden compartment. Id. The dog alert provided reasonable suspicion for the troopers to prolong their detention of Patterson from the alert to the arrest. Id. at 776.
In Patterson, the court disagreed with the defendant’s argument that the trooper prolonged the stop by taking too long to complete those actions necessary to issue a traffic ticket; the court further held that the shift in focus to a drug investigation did prolong the stop but was supported by reasonable suspicion. Id. at 777-78. Here, Christensen did not extend the detention of Turvin while he obtained information from Turvin immediately after the stop or while he waited for the warrants check and verification of Turvin’s license. Nor do the facts suggest that Turvin was overly talkative. Only after Powell arrived on the scene, did Christensen stop writing the traffic citations and refocus the stop into a drug investigation, thus prolonging it. He did so without reasonable suspicion.
Without much explanation or analysis, the majority is persuaded by and adopts the Seventh Circuit’s approach in United States v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc). There, the court held “that where a seizure of a person is based on probable cause to believe that a traffic violation was committed, an officer does not violate the Fourth Amendment by asking a few questions about matters unrelated to the traffic violation, even if this conversation briefly extends the length of the detention.” United States v. Olivera-Mendez, 484 F.3d 505, 510 (8th Cir.2007). Several other circuits, the Eighth in Olivera-Mendez, id. at 511, and the Sixth in United States v. Burton, 334 F.3d 514, 518-19 (6th Cir.2003), have also adopted the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning in Childs.
In our circuit, however, the majority does not write on a clean slate. As I read Chavez-Valenzuela and Mendez, when an officer prolongs a traffic stop with expansive questioning, the extended duration must be supported by reasonable suspicion. Although we concluded that probable cause existed to stop Chavez-Valenzuela for speeding, we proceeded to examine whether the extended detention was supported by reasonable suspicion. Chavez-Valenzuela, 268 F.3d at 725-727. In Mendez, the validity of the initial stop was not disputed. Nonetheless, we clearly held that questioning that extends the duration of a stop must be supported by reasonable suspicion. See Mendez, 476 F.3d at 1080. That holding is consistent with the part of Chavez-Valenzuela that remains good law. In my view, the majority’s approach to this important Fourth Amendment issue is at odds with Chavez-Valenzuela and with our bottom line holding in Mendez.
For all the above reasons, I would affirm the district court’s suppression ruling. I therefore respectfully dissent.