Court Opinion

ID: 9784816
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:54:47.277653+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:59.808165
License: Public Domain

ARMSTRONG, J.,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that, on these facts, the notice requirement of ORS 656.265 is satisfied. I also agree that the best construction of the statute is to conclude that a report or statement secured by the employer need not be in writing from the worker. I write to explain that, to the extent that the statute does require a writing, that requirement is satisfied here.
The majority is correct to conclude that the Supreme Court’s statement in Vsetecka v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 337 Or 502, 510, 98 P3d 1116 (2004), that “the one constant, which the last sentence in subsection (6) makes clear, is that the notice must be in writing,” is dictum. As the majority keenly observes, in Vsetecka, the claimant gave the employer written notice; therefore, the question whether the notice had to be in writing was not before the court and was not necessary to the decision. Thus, the court’s statement that “the notice must be in writing” is dictum in the classic sense of the term. The majority is also correct that the statement is in tension with the ultimate conclusion in Vsetecka. Therefore, the majority’s reasoning that we must follow the logic of Vsetecka’s holding rather than its dictum is sound. But, we need not necessarily reject the Supreme Court’s dictum in this case. Even assuming that the Supreme Court was correct that the notice must be in writing, the writing requirement is satisfied here because the electronic record created by employer is, by operation of ORS 84.019, a writing. Before explaining the operation of that statute, I grapple further with the Supreme Court’s dictum in Vsetecka.
In Vsetecka, the Supreme Court relied on ORS 656.265(6) to support its statement that “the one constant [among the three ways to provide notice], which the last sentence in subsection (6) makes clear, is that the notice must be in writing.” 337 Or at 510. ORS 656.265(6) provides:
“The director shall promulgate and prescribe uniform forms to be used by workers in reporting their injuries to their employers. These forms shall be supplied by all employers to injured workers upon request of the injured worker or some other person on behalf of the worker. The failure of the worker to use a specified form shall not, in *692itself, defeat the claim of the worker if the worker has complied with the requirement that the claim he presented in writing.”
(Emphasis added.) As the majority notes, subsection (6) “reflects a requirement that 'the claim’ * * * be presented in writing.” 202 Or App at 679. In other words, subsection (6) does not impose that requirement, it merely references it. The requirement that the claim be presented in writing comes from ORS 656.005(6), which defines “claim” to mean “a written request for compensation from a subject worker or someone on the worker’s behalf.” (Emphasis added.) It is undebatable that a claim for compensation must be presented in writing; the debate in this case is whether notice of a potentially compensable injury must be presented in writing. The significance of that distinction comes to light when one compares the language of ORS 656.265 with the Supreme Court’s statement in Vsetecka. The “one constant” identified by the Supreme Court is not that the notice must be presented in writing, but “that the notice must be in writing.” Thus, the Supreme Court’s statement in Vsetecka could be understood to mean that, so long as there is a writing, the statute is satisfied and the source of the writing is irrelevant. Thus, it is possible to be faithful to both the holding and the dictum in Vsetecka by construing ORS 656.265(2) to permit an oral report or statement by a worker, reduced to writing by the employer, to constitute notice.
Under such a construction, claimant satisfied the notice requirement. Admittedly, entering claimant’s statement into an electronic database seems to be an action of a different quality than physically taking pen to paper to record the statement. However, it is a distinction without a difference.
In 2001, Oregon passed the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA), codified at ORS 84.001 to 84.061. The UETA applies to electronic records, which are defined as records “created, generated, sent, communicated, received or stored by electronic means.” ORS 84.004(7). For purposes of the act, “ ‘[ejlectronic’ means relating to technology having electrical, digital, magnetic, wireless, optical, electromagnetic or similar capabilities.” ORS 84.004(5). However, the *693UETA applies only to electronic records related to “transactions between parties, each of which has agreed to conduct transactions by electronic means. Whether the parties agree to conduct a transaction by electronic means is determined from the context and surrounding circumstances, including the parties’ conduct.” ORS 84.013(2); ORS 84.007. A “transaction” is “an action or set of actions occurring between two or more persons relating to the conduct of business, commercial or governmental affairs.” ORS 84.004(16). Most crucially to this case, ORS 84.019(3) provides that, “[i]f a law requires a record to be in writing, an electronic record satisfies the law.”
The transaction in question here consists of the reporting and recording actions by claimant and employer, respectively, relating to claimant’s purported on-the-job injury. An on-the-job injury is certainly a business affair, and the actions by claimant and employer were related to it; therefore, this was a transaction for purposes of ORS 84.004(16). Furthermore, it can be inferred from the parties’ conduct that both agreed to conduct the transaction by electronic means. See ORS 84.013(2). Thus, the reporting and recording of claimant’s injury was a transaction within the scope of the UETA. Consequently, by operation of ORS 84.019(3), the electronic record that employer created of claimant’s statement was a writing. Thus, the employer secured an oral report or statement from claimant and reduced it to a writing, satisfying the notice requirement of ORS 656.265.
The fact that neither party cited the UETA to us or to the Workers’ Compensation Board is of no import. Claimant argued to the board below that, “[o]nce text is entered into a database, a ‘writing’ exists in fact, only to be retrieved by the party in control of such, the employer. To deny the existence of a ‘writing’ * * * is to ignore the very nature of electronic communications.” She renews that argument before us. Claimant’s arguments capture the underlying policy behind the UETA, although she does not cite that statute. Nonetheless, “the parties may not prevent a court from noticing and invoking an applicable statute by relying only on other sources of law.” Miller v. Water Wonderland Improvement District, 326 Or 306, 309 n 3, 951 P2d 720 (1998). Thus, we may consider the effect of the UETA on this case.
*694In sum, employer secured an oral statement from claimant and reduced it to writing by entering it into its electronic database. Thus, to the extent that ORS 656.265 requires a writing, that requirement is satisfied on these facts.
For those reasons, I concur in the majority’s result.