Court Opinion

ID: 9916845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 18:05:57.242182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:02.605309
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                     No. 23-0284
                               Filed January 10, 2024

DENICO LYDELL JOHNSON,
     Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Rustin T.

Davenport, Judge.

      The applicant appeals the denial of his application for postconviction relief.

AFFIRMED.

      Eric S. Mail and Eric D. Puryear of Puryear Law P.C., Davenport, for

appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Considered by Greer, P.J., Buller, J., and Mullins, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2024).
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GREER, Presiding Judge.

      After pleading guilty to sexual exploitation by a school employee by pattern,

practice, or scheme in 2018, DeNico Johnson1 filed an application for PCR,

alleging he received ineffective assistance from trial counsel. The district court

denied Johnson’s application. On appeal, he reiterates his claim, asserting trial

counsel failed to inform him that if he engaged in sexual exploitation of a student

without using a pattern, practice, or scheme, the offense was not a felony and, if

known, he would have elected to go to trial.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

      In the fall of 2017, while he worked as a paraeducator at a local high school,

it was alleged that Johnson met a student in the course of his job, began

communicating with that student outside of school hours, and then had sex with

the student. The State charged Johnson with sexual exploitation by a school

employee by pattern, practice, or scheme, which is a class “D” felony. See Iowa

Code § 709.15(3)(a)(1) (Supp. 2017).

      After initially pleading not guilty, Johnson reached an agreement with the

State where he would plead guilty to the charged offense and the State would

recommend a five-year prison term, which it would ask the court to suspend, and

Johnson would only serve two years of formal probation. Johnson would be free

to ask the court for a deferred judgment.

1 The applicant’s name is not expressed consistently in the record; at times he is

referred to as Denico. Because the name DeNico was more often used in the
postconviction-relief (PCR) proceedings, we use that name.
                                         3

       Johnson pled guilty, and the district court later sentenced him in line with

the State’s recommendations.

       Johnson applied for PCR, alleging trial counsel provided ineffective

assistance by failing “to advise him as to the lesser included aggravated

misdemeanor” of sexual exploitation by a school employee without the element of

engaging in a pattern, practice, or scheme.        See id. § 709.15(3)(a)(2).    He

contended he would not have pled guilty if he had known of the other option.

       Trial counsel testified at the PCR trial by way of deposition. He testified as

to the plea negotiations he had with the State, remembering that during her

deposition, the student “claimed that during the sex act that she had

told·Mr. Johnson . . .to stop and that he didn’t. He said something along the lines

of just·let me finish.” Based on this anticipated testimony, the State first offered

Johnson an opportunity to plead guilty to the charged “D” felony with a joint

recommendation for prison time—if Johnson did not take it and instead went to

trial, the State would charge Johnson with third-degree sexual abuse, a class “C”

forcible felony. While the trial attorney tried to negotiate a deferred judgment for

Johnson, the State’s final, best offer was the plea agreement Johnson took—a

guilty plea with the State recommending a suspended prison sentence and no

additional charges. The trial attorney did not recall ever speaking with Johnson

about the aggravated misdemeanor of sexual exploitation by a school employee;

he opined it was not a lesser-included offense of the class “D” felony because

“[y]ou can commit the [‘D’] felony without committing the aggravated

misdemeanor.”
                                           4

       Johnson also testified at the PCR trial. He testified that, before pleading

guilty, he was not aware there was a similar crime of sexual exploitation by a school

employee. He asserted that if he knew the other offense existed, he would not

have pled guilty to the class “D” felony and instead would have insisted on going

to trial. On direct examination at the PCR trial, Johnson testified that he did not

have sex with the student. On cross-examination, the State then asked Johnson

why—while under oath at the plea hearing—he told the court he did. Johnson

responded he was advised “to agree to what they’re accusing you of.”

       The court asked Johnson:

       This doesn’t totally make sense to me, so I’ll try to explain why it’s
       not making sense to me.
               So you’re sitting looking at a class “D” felony charge with a
       five-year sentence. Now, the contention here is that there wasn’t a
       factual basis to one of those elements, the part about the—the plan
       or scheme, or whatever the wording is.
               So if I’m in your shoes, I’m thinking, “Well, if the State can’t
       prove that, then I’m going to be—instead of serving five years in
       prison possibly, I’m going to have—serve zero years in prison
       possibly.”
               So the fact that there’s a possible two-year sentence that
       would be available if you went to trial, to me, that doesn’t make any
       sense, because if I think the State can’t prove that element and I
       know I’d be acquitted and have a zero instead of a five, then I
       wouldn’t plead guilty to that and put the State to the proof.
               So I don’t understand how the two-year aggravated factored
       into that. And, Mr. Johnson, if you can try to explain that to me, that’d
       be great.
               JOHNSON: Yes, sir. So [trial counsel] explained to me,
       respectfully, that in Fort Dodge and in the state of Iowa, it would be
       in my best bet to take a plea and not go to trial because of my age
       and my race.[2] That is what he explained to me.
               And I kind of sound [offended] about it, but I trusted [trial
       counsel]. I took his word for it. And he said that in a town like this, it
       was not my best judgment to be in front of a trial. That’s what he
       said. So he said that it would actually be wiser to take the plea,
       because that keeps me out of prison.

2 Johnson is Black.
                                          5

                And so I was twenty-two at the time, didn’t know what was
       going on. Again, I’m ignorant to law and ethics; and so knowing [trial
       counsel] prior to that, I felt that what he explained to me, I trusted
       what he said. And I honestly thought that it was brave for him to
       explain it to me that way, so I kind of accepted what he guided me to
       believe. I didn’t think I would have a chance in a trial, and—because
       of those circumstances.
                And he also was, like—you know, [trial counsel], he just—you
       know, he said, like, you’re handsome, you’re young, and then like he
       said, that a—a trial or jury would not side with me based off of my
       age and my—my race.
                And so with the five years or two years, or anything like that,
       he kind of made it seem—he made it to where the plea would keep
       me out of prison regardless. So I didn’t know about five years or two
       years, or anything. I didn’t know—We never really discussed
       anything outside of that. The only years of prison that I remember
       [trial counsel] saying was ten years in prison, and that was if I did not
       take the plea and they would charge me with third degree [sexual
       abuse].
                And so it was—only amount of years that was ever spoken
       was ten years in prison because of what I wouldn’t plead to. But I
       never knew anything about five years or two years or—Based on
       what [trial counsel] explained to me, I didn’t think I would have a
       chance of no years to be acquitted. I didn’t think that we—I don’t
       know. I really—I really—I really feel uncomfortable to play the race
       card, but that’s the truth of the matter.
                And so being from where I’m from, and being educated as
       being Black, it’s kind of said that the law is against us. And so when
       I heard [trial counsel] say that, my mind went to, like, “How can I stay
       out of prison, I guess, to the best of my ability?” And so that’s why I
       took the plea, based off of what my attorney educated me on.

The court denied Johnson’s application, concluding that Johnson (1) failed to

establish trial counsel breached an essential duty or performed less than

competently by not advising Johnson of the aggravated-misdemeanor crime of

sexual exploitation and (2) did not credibly show he would have insisted on going

to trial if counsel told him about the offense. The court concluded Johnson’s

“credibility is questionable following his testimony that he lied under oath when he

was pleading guilty to the class ‘D’ felony,” and it questioned the logic of Johnson’s
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assertion that, if he had known of the offense the State was more likely to be able

to prove he was guilty of, he would have elected to go to trial and face prison time.

       Johnson appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

       The Sixth Amendment guarantees defendants the right to effective

assistance of trial counsel. State v. Senn, 882 N.W.2d 1, 16 (Iowa 2016). So when

an applicant asserts they received ineffective assistance from trial counsel, their

PCR claim is constitutional in nature, and we review de novo. Lado v. State, 804

N.W.2d 248, 250 (Iowa 2011).

III. Discussion.

       “[A]ll [PCR] applicants who seek relief as a consequence of ineffective

assistance of counsel must establish counsel breached a duty and prejudice

resulted.” Castro v. State, 795 N.W.2d 789, 794 (Iowa 2011). “We start with the

presumption that the attorney performed competently and proceed to an

individualized fact-based analysis.” Lamasters v. State, 821 N.W.2d 856, 866

(Iowa 2012). In the guilty-plea context, to establish prejudice, an applicant must

show there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, he or she would

not have pled guilty and instead would have insisted on going to trial. Sothman v.

State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 523 (Iowa 2021).

       Johnson maintains sexual exploitation by a school employee pursuant to

Iowa Code section 709.15(3)(a)(2), which is an aggravated misdemeanor, is a

lesser-included offense of felony sexual exploitation by a school employee by

pattern, practice, or scheme under section 709.15(3)(a)(1). Compare Iowa Code

§ 709.15(5)(b), with id. § 709.15(5)(a). Relying solely on one out-of-state authority,
                                         7

Johnson claims that trial counsel has a duty to inform a defendant of any lesser-

included offenses before they plead guilty. In response, the State points out that

Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 2.8(2)(b) does not list lesser-included offenses

as one of the things a defendant pleading guilty must understand for a guilty plea

to be knowing and intelligent; the State contests whether trial counsel has a duty

to inform a defendant of possible lesser-included crimes. And, the State maintains,

sexual exploitation by a school employee is not a lesser-included offense of the

crime to which Johnson pled guilty, so even if counsel has a duty to inform the

defendant of them, there was no such duty in this case.

       Because “[w]e may affirm the district court’s rejection of an ineffective-

assistance-of-counsel claim if either element is lacking,” here we bypass the

parties’ fight over the duty element and resolve Johnson’s claim on the prejudice

prong. See Lamasters, 821 N.W.2d at 866 (citation omitted). The only evidence

Johnson would have elected to proceed to trial if he was aware of the aggravated

misdemeanor crime is his self-serving testimony; and that testimony was found to

be not credible.   See Dempsey v. State, 860 N.W.2d 860, 873 (Iowa 2015)

(rejecting applicant’s ineffective-assistance claim when applicant “presented little

more than his own subjective, self-serving testimony in support of” the claimed

prejudice). We defer to the district court’s credibility findings. See Ledezma v.

State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 141 (Iowa 2001). As the district court noted, Johnson’s

stated reason for electing to plead guilty was his concern that being a young, Black

man would make it difficult to get an acquittal from a jury. Those concerns would

not be alleviated by the inclusion of a possible lesser-included offense against him.

If anything, the State’s plan to bring another charge with more prison time if
                                         8

Johnson insisted on going to trial would have heightened Johnson’s concerns

about what was at stake in the jury trial. And as the district court noted, Johnson’s

counsel negotiated a plea agreement that was “successful in avoiding these

possible more severe consequences [a term of years in prison]” and the more

credible evidence reflected that the actual plea agreement was the best path for

Johnson to alleviate his concerns over going to prison.

       Because Johnson did not establish he would have insisted on going to trial

if he was told about sexual exploitation by a school employee, an aggravated

misdemeanor, his claim of ineffective assistance fails. We affirm.

       AFFIRMED.