Court Opinion

ID: 9854215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:03:19.046631+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:58.623591
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice TOAL:
I concur in the result reached by the majority. I write separately, however, to address two curiosities in this case on the issue of standing.
In the federal courts, the requirements for what is commonly termed as “constitutional standing” have been relatively long-established. These requirements provide that in order to maintain a cause of action, (1) the plaintiff must have suffered an invasion of a legally protected interest (an “injury in fact”) which is concrete and particularized, and actual or imminent; (2) there must be a causal connection between the plaintiffs injury and the conduct of which the plaintiff complains; and (3) it must be likely that the plaintiffs injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). We have used these boundaries of federal constitutional standing *88to outline the requirements of the minimum a plaintiff must show in order to bring an action in a South Carolina court. E.g., Sea Pines Ass’n for Prot. of Wildlife, Inc. v. S.C. Dep’t of Natural Res., 345 S.C. 594, 601, 550 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2001) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130).
I find the land management ordinance in this case interesting in two regards. First, I would interpret the ordinance’s requirement that a neighboring landowner either sustain or be in danger of sustaining special damages as not bearing on the issue of standing. Instead, I would hold that the requirement of special damages goes to the substantive adequacy of the neighbor’s claim. The federal courts have adopted a rule providing that when a statutory limitation is not expressly characterized as jurisdictional, courts should treat the restriction as non-jurisdictional in character. See Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 515, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 1245, 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006). I would follow their lead. Holding otherwise would require the neighbor in the instant case to effectively prove his case before he can go to court.
But this distinction reveals the second curiosity. In essence, the land management ordinance at issue in this case authorizes a neighboring property owner to bring a lawsuit to prevent any action which may inflict upon him “special damages.” Failing to see how this ordinance does anything other than repeat the constitutional standing requirement of an “injury in fact,” I would resolve the case on those grounds alone.