Court Opinion

ID: 9862723
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:59:58.223791+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:31:10.022906
License: Public Domain

Justice RIVERA-SOTO,
dissenting.
In this appeal we have been asked to “answer a question of law certified to [this Court] by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit____” Rule 2:12A-1 (emphasis supplied). That question, as modified, was: “Is the arbitration agreement at issue, or any provision thereof, unconscionable under New Jersey law, *63and, if so, should such provision or provisions be severed?” Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 185 N.J. 255, 883 A.2d 1055 (2005). Stated succinctly, the question before us is whether the arbitration agreement here is unconscionable.
The majority enjoins at the outset that “the purpose of the certification process is to answer the question of law submitted pursuant to Rule 2:12A, not to resolve those factual differences [between the parties]. See R. 2:12A-1.” Ante, 189 N.J. at 35, 912 A.2d at 108 (2006). However, by proceeding to analyze whether any provision of the arbitration agreement at issue is unconscionable, the majority does not observe that injunction when it concedes that “the defense of unconscionability, specifically, calls for a fact-sensitive analysis in each case, even when a contract of adhesion is involved.” Ante, 189 N.J. at 39, 912 A.2d at 111 (2006) (citation omitted). Instead, the majority engages in the resolution of facts in order to reach its conclusions that (1) “[t]he agreement as written, and as yet uninterpreted by an arbitrator, could force Harris to bear the risk that she will be required to pay all arbitration costs[, and that such] risk is unconscionable in that it is a deterrent to the vindication of her statutory rights[,]” ante, 189 N.J. at 43, 912 A.2d at 113 (2006); (2) “[t]o the extent that this provision [for prevailing party fee-shifting] in Harris’s consumer contract of adhesion would prevent her from recovering discretionary attorney’s fees and costs under [the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) ], it is unconseionable[,]” ante, 189 N.J. at 45, 912 A.2d at 114 (2006); and (3) “the appeals provision [requiring the appealing party to bear all appeal costs regardless of outcome] is unconscionable to the extent that it would bar Harris from being awarded costs if she prevailed on her appeal.” Ante, 189 N.J. at 45, 912 A.2d at 114 (2006).
Because Rudbart plainly instructs that unconscionability is a concept that draws breath only from specific facts, the better view is the one adopted by Judge Lifland of the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey, who denied Harris’s motion *64for summary judgment and granted Delta’s cross-motion to compel arbitration, explaining that Harris’s unconscionability claims require “a fact-sensitive analysis and must therefore be determined on a case-by-case basis.” Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 396 F.Supp.2d 512, 516 (D.N.J.2004). Against that backdrop, Judge Lifland narrowed the issue to “[wjhether the Arbitration Agreement is an unenforceable contract of adhesion thus depends on whether it contains terms that are oppressive or unconscionable.” Id. at 517.
In this certified question, I would not reach the merits of Harris’s unconscionability claims. Therefore, in recognition of the limitation of Rule 2:12A-1,1 would dismiss the certification of the question presented by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit as improvidently granted.
I respectfully dissent.
For the judgment — Chief Justice PORITZ and Justices LONG, LaVECCHIA and WALLACE — 4.
For concurrence in part/dissent in part — Justice ZAZZALI — 1.
For dissent — Justice RIVERA-SOTO — 1.
Not Participating — Justice ALBIN.