Court Opinion

ID: 9537800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:24:43.144045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:03.162441
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ADAIR:
(dissenting).
A careful consideration of respondent’s petition for rehearing, and of the briefs in support of and in opposition to such petition, has convinced me that the majority opinion herein is contrary to the express statutes of Montana in effect and controlling at the time of the husband’s death and that under the plain provisions of such governing statutes, the widow’s petition for a rehearing should have been allowed and the cause should have been further considered to the end that the judgment given and rendered in the district court by District Judge C. B. Elwell in favor of the respondent widow, Loretto Lohman Roberts, and against her deceased husband’s brother, Franklin H. Roberts, and the decedent’s sister, Helen Robert Truax, be affirmed.
George W. Roberts and Loretto Lohman Roberts were longtime residents of the State of Montana. To their marriage the state made itself a party. See Franklin v. Franklin, 40 Mont. 348, at page 350, 106 Pac. 353, 26 L.R.A., N.S., 490.
Their marriage resulted in a change in the status of each of the parties. Under the law it involved a change in their respective rights, duties, obligations and responsibilities.
Right to Make a Will. The power to leave property by will *158is derived from tbe law and depends solely on tbe law for its extent and enforcement. This power is nat a nqutral right, as is the right of living men to own and control property created by their labor. When brain and hand no' longer act, the natural right ceases and the right to control property is then only that given by the law.
In the case of In re Noyes’ Estate, 40 Mont. 178, at page 185, 105 Pac. 1013, at page 1015, Mr. Chief Justice Brantly speaking for this court said:
“The right to make a testamentary dispostion of property is not an inherent right; nor is it a right guaranteed by the fundamental law. Its exercise to any extent depends entirely upon the consent of the Legislature, as expressed in the statute enacted on the subject. It can withhold or grant the right, and, if it grants it, it may make its exercise subject to stich regulations and requirements as it pleases.” Emphasis supplied.
In the case of In re Mahaffay’s Estate, 79 Mont. 10, 23, 254 Pac. 875, 879,'this court said:
“The right to make testamentary disposition of property is one. wholly within the province of the Legislature of the state. In United States v. Perkins, 163 U.S. 625, 16 S. Ct. 1073, 41 L. Ed. 287, the court said: ‘We know of no legal principle to prevent the Legislature from taking away or limiting the right of testamentary disposition or imposing such conditions upon its exercise as it may deem conducive to public good.’ The state having the power to deny the right of testamentary disposition altogether (In re Noyes’ Estate, 40 Mont. 178, 105 Pac. 1013), ‘when it grants it, it may annex to the grant my conditions which it supposes to be required by its. interest or policy. * Mager v. Grrima, 8 How. 490, 12 L. Ed. 1168.” Emphasis supplied.
The Montana legislature has enacted laws which grant to both the husband and the wife the right to make wills but to such grants are annexed certain limitations and conditions.
The Revised Codes of Montana of 1947, provide:
“91-101. (6974) Who may make a will. Every person *159over the age of eighteen years, of sound mind, may, by last will, dispose of all of his estate, real and personal, and such estate not disposed of by will is succeeded to as provided in sections 91-401 to 91-422, being chargeable in both cases with the payment of all the decedent’s debts, as provided in this Title.”
“91-102. (6975) Mamed women, wills by. A married woman may make a will in the same manner and with the same effect as if she were sole, except that such will shall not, without the written consent of her husband, operate to deprive him of more than two-thirds of her real esate, or of more than two-thirds of her personal estate.”
Thus has the Montana legislature, in enacting section 91-102, supra, granted to a wife the right to make a will, but to this grant it has annexed the limitation and condition that her “will shall not, without the written consent of her husband, operate to deprive him of more than two-thirds of her real estate, or more than two-thirds of her personal estate. ’ ’ See In re Mahaffay’s Estate, supra.
Survivor’s Share. Section 91-403 of the Revised Codes of Montana of 1947, being one of the sections included “in sections 91-401 to 91-422” referred to in section 91-101, supra, specifies the share or portion a surviving husband or wife shall have and take in the estate of the spouse who died without disposing of the estate by will.
Section 91-403, supra, so far as pertinent here reads:
“91-403. (7073) Succession to and distribution of estates. When any person having title to any estate not limited by marriage contract 'dies without disposing of the estate by will, it is succeeded to and must be distributed, unless otherwise expressly provided by the laws of Montana, subject to the payment of his debts, in the following manner:
“1. If the decedent leaves a surviving husband or wife, and only one (1) child, or the lawful issue of one (1) child, in equal shares to the surviving husband, or wife and child, or issue of such child. * * *
*160‘■2. If the decedent leaves no issue, the whole of the estate shall go to the surviving husband or wife. If the decedent leaves', no issue, nor husband nor wife, the estate must go to the father and mother in equal shares, or if either be dead then to the other.
“3. If here be neither issue, husband, wife, father, nor mother, then in equal'shares to the brothers and sisters of the decedent, and to the'-children of any deceased brother or sister, by right of representation.”
On November 9, 1954, George W. Roberts, the husband, then, and for many years prior thereto, a resident of Blaine County, Montana, died leaving estate in that county consisting wholly of personal property. He left surviving him his widow, Lorretto Lohman Roberts. There were no issue of the marriage and no descendent of any issue, hence no lineal descendents.
Widow’s Share. In the event the husband should die without either issue or the descendents of issue and without disposing of his estate by will, then under the express provisions of the law of Montana, as set forth in the first sentence of subdivision 2 of section 91-403 of the Codes, supra, “the whole of the estate shall go to the surviving * * * wife.”
Under this law, subdivision 2 of section 91-403, supra, the widow’s share or portion of her deceased husband’s estate amounts to “the whole of the estate” after the payment of all the decedent’s debts and the costs and expenses of administration. Where the estate consists solely of personal property —where there were and are no issue and where the husband dies wihout disposing of the estate by will, the law says “the whole of the estate shall go to the surviving * * * wife.” Such, under the law, is the childless’ widow’s share or portion in the absence of a will.
The Husband’s Will. However, George W. Roberts did exercise the right granted him by the law, section 91-101, supra, and he did make a will which bears date of April 2, 1953, wherein, inter alia, he declared:
“Third: I give and bequeath to my sister, Helen Roberts *161Traax, the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00).
“Fourth: I give and bequeath to my brother, Franklin H. Roberts, the sum of Twenty Thousand Dollars ($20,000.00).
“Fifth: All of the rest and residue of my property and estate, both real and personal '* * * I give devise and bequeath to my wife, Loretto Lohman Roberts.”
In December 1954, the above will was admitted to probate in the district court for Blaine County, Montana.
While it was within the province of the legislature to grant the right to make testamentary disposition of property yet it may withhold or deny such right or repeal, amend, abrogate or change or limit the exercise of such right in any manner that the legislature may deem advisable so long as its action is not violative of the limitations imposed upon it by the Constitution.
Widow’s Right to Repudiate Will. While the legislature granted to the husband, George W. Roberts, the right to make the will which he made, the legislature also granted to the surviving wife, Loretto Lohman Roberts, the right to decline and refuse to take any bequest or devise provided for her in the will and to repudiate, renounce and forego all such benefits as she should receive under the will, and in lieu thereof to elect, demand, and take her dower in the lands, if any, and to take “her share in the personal estate” as is provided for her by the laws of this state.
Widow’s Right to Elect and Renounce. At the time of the husband’s death which occurred on November 9, 1954, the Revised Codes of Montana of 1947, then provided:
“22-107. (5819) Widow may elect. Every devise or bequest shall bar a widow’s dower in lands or her share in personal estate unless otherwise expressed in the will; but she may elect whether she will take such devise or bequest, or whether she will renounce the benefit of such devise or bequest, and take her dower in the lands and her share in the personal estate.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus by its enactment of section 22-107, supra, did the Mon*162tana legislature place a limitation on the right of the husband to devise or bequeath to his childless widow any lesser share, portion or amount of his estate than she would be entitled to take under the law, as it is set forth in section 91-403, subd. 2, supra.
The above-quoted statute constituted the law of Montana continuously from the first day of July 1895 when the Montana Codes of 1895 took effect to the first day of July 1955, on which latter date Chapter 231 of the Montana Session Laws of 1955, pages 501, 502, amending section 22-107, supra, became effective. Such was the law on November 9, 1954, whereon the husband died and the title to his property passed, either under his will or under the law as it was then written in the Montana statutes.
Widow’s Bight. The provisions of section 22-107, supra, granted to the surviving widow the right to “elect whether she will take such * * * bequest” as her husband had provided in his will “or whether she will renounce the benefit of such * * * bequest and take * * * her share in the personal estate” left by the testator, George "W. Roberts. Such was and is the widow’s statutory right under the law then in force.
Three times in the single sentence comprising section 22-107, supra, did the legislature use the words “devise or bequest. ’ ’
A “devise” is: “A testamentary disposition of land or realty; a gift of real property by the last will and testament of the donor.” Black’s Law Dictionary, De Luxe 3rd edition page 572. The testator, George "W. Roberts, left no land or realty. He left no property to which a widow’s dower could attach.
Á “Request” is: “A gift by will of personal property a legacy.” Black’s Law Dictionary, supra, at page 210. Personal property alone constituted the testator’s entire estate, and this he declared he did “give and bequeath” to his sister, his brother and his wife.
*163This court in In re Fratt’s Estate, 60 Mont. 526, at page 537, 199 Pac. 711, at page 713, 714 said: “Bouvier defines ‘devise’ as ‘a gift of real property by a last will add testament,’ and .‘bequest’ as ‘a gift by will of personal property.’
“Undoubtedly the Legislature, in framing our statutes, used both these words in their correct and approved legal and technical sense. ’ ’
.Section 22-108, Revised Codes of Montana of 1947, reads:
“22-108. (5820), Renunciation and form of. When a woman is entitled to. an election under this chapter, she shall be. deemed to have taken such devise,, unless, within one year after the .authentication or probate of the will, she shall deliver or transmit to the district court of the proper.. county a written renunciation, which may be in the following form, to-wit: ‘ I, A B, widow of C D, late of the county of-, state of Montana, do hereby renounce and quit all claims to the/benefit of any bequest or devise made to me by the last will and testament of my said deceased husband, which has been exhibited and proved according to law (or otherwise, as the ease may be), and I do elect to take in lieu thereof my dower, or legal share of - the estate of my said husband, ’ which said letter of renunciation shall be filed in the office of the clerk of the. district court, and shall operate as a complete bar. against' any claim which such widow may afterwards set up to any provision which may have been thus made for her in the will of any testator, in lieu of dower; and by thus renouncing all claims as aforesaid, such widow shall thereupon be', entitled to dower in the lands or share in the personal estate of her husband.”
In strict compliance with- the mandates of sections 22-107 and 22-108, supra, the widow of George W. Roberts, on May 27, 1955, delivered to and caused to be filed in the district court for Blaine County, Montana, her timely and proper written renunciation of any and all claims to the benefit of any bequest or devise made to her by the last will and testa*164ment of her late husband, which renunciation, omitting the title of the court and cause reads as follows:
“Widow’s Renunciation of Will
“To The District Court of The Twelfth Judicial District of The State of Montana, In and For The County of Blaine:
“I, Loretto Lohman Roberts, widow of the above named decedent, George W. Roberts, late of the County of Blaine, State of Montana, do hereby renounce and quit all claims to the benefit of any request or devise made to me by the Last Will and Testament of my said deceased husband, which has been exhibited and proved according to law in the above Court, and I do elect to take in lieu thereof of my dower in any real property owned by my said husband at the time of his death and my legal share in the personal esate of my said husband.
“Dated this 15th day of March, 1955.
“/s/ Loretto Lohman Roberts.
“Witness:
“/s/ H. C. Hall
“Filed: May 27, 1955.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Effect of Renunciation. By her above-written renunciation, the childless widow did in the precise manner expressly provided in sections 22-107 and 22-108, supra, clearly “renounce and quit all claims to the benefits of any bequest or devise made to” her by her late husband’s will. Thus did the childless widow elect to take nothing whatever under the will.
Instead of taking under the will the- childless widow declared: “I do elect to take in lieu thereof my dower in any real property owned by my said husband at the time of his death and my legal share in the personal estate of my said husband.” Emphasis supplied.
Section 22-101, Revised Codes of Montana of 1947, so far as pertinent here, provides:
“22-101 (5813) Rower. A widow shall be endowed of the third part of all lands whereof her husband was seized of an estate of inheritance at any time during the marriage, unless *165the same shall have been relinquished in legal form. * * *”
The record shows that at the time of his death George W. Roberts owned no real property of any kind or character hence the surviving wife took and takes nothing whatever under the dower statute, being section 22-101, supra.
Since in the instant case the entire estate left by the deceased husband consisted of personal property only, his widow, under the law as it stood at the time of the husband’s death on November 9, 1954, became entitled to renounce all the benefits conferred upon her by her husband’s will and, in lieu thereof, to elect to take “her legal share in the personal estate” left by the husband which “legal share” consists of all that part, portion or quantity to which the law of Montana then declared a childless widow shall succeed and have distributed to her in the event her deceased husband leaves no issue. That so-called “legal share” of the surviving childless widow, being “the whole of the estate,” the law declares “is succeeded to and must be distributed * * * in the following manner: * * *
“2. If the decedent leaves no issue, the whole of the estate shall go to the surviving * * # wife” as is provided for in subdivision 2 of section 91-403, Revised Codes of Montana of 1947.
In the Thirty-fourth State Legislative Assembly which convened on January 3, 1955, being less than two months after the death of the testator, George W. Roberts, Senator Donovan Worden of Missoula County and Senator Glenn B. Larson of Mineral County introduced in the state senate a bill for an act entitled, “An Act Relating to Widows’ Election and Amending Section 22-107 of the Revised Codes of Montana of 1947” which thereafter was duly enacted into law, approved by the governor and became and now is Chapter 231, of the Montana Session Laws of 1955, at pages 501 and 502 and effective from and after the first day of July 1955.
Notwithstanding that this Act was not the law at the time of testator’s death, November 9, 1954, and therefore has no*166thing whatever to do with the instant case, yet the majority opinion quotes ' such amendatory statute in full and follows with the observation that “The 1955 amendment is not applicable here and is to be considered only as it might aid in statutory construction.”
How may this act of the • Thirty-fourth (1955) Montana State Legislature, effective only from and after the first day of- July 1955, be considered as an aid in statutory construction.’ ’ of section. 22-107 of the' Bevised Codes of 1947, originally enacted seventy-nine years before as section 7 at page 65 of the Laws of the Ninth Territorial Legislative Assembly (1876) and reenacted sixty years ago as section 234 of the Montana Civil Code of 1895?
•In 4 page on Wills, (3d ed.), section 1383, at pages 72 and 73, it is said
-“Election to take against the will is a renunciation of the provisions' of the' will which -are intended primarily for the behe'fit' o'f the party who so elect's , and deprives the will of its effect as to such person for such purposes. * * *
'"“The rights of the person electing to take- against the will cannot be cut' down by its provisions. It is said that, the will is' :to be construed as though the' provisions which are renounced, were not included therein. In the absence of a statute fixing the rights of a person renouncing1 .a will, such person is said to take as though there were no will.”
•In'97 C.J.S. Wills, section 1288, subd. a, page 134, .notes 30-34, it is said:
“A widow’s renunciation of her husband’s will operates as a renunciation of the will in toto, and vests in her her dower and statutory rights in her husband’s estate, as though, as far as she is concerned, he had died intestate, unless a statute otherwise provides. A renunciation in .general terms will have this effect even though it does not specify the particular estate or rights to which the widow is entitled under the statute; *= # # > >
In Thompson on Wills, (3d ed.), section 478, page 694, *167notes 89 and 92, it is said: “Where a surviving spouse renounces a will, the usual laws of descent apply. * * *
"The election of the widow to take against the will entitles her to the benefits of statutes of descent and distribution as fully as though there was no will.”
In 3 Bancroft’s Probate Practice (2d ed.), section 741, page 445, it is said: "Plainly, if the widow repudiates the will and contests its probate, she is entitled to the benefit of the estate as fully and completely as if there had been no will. ’ ’
In 69 C.J., Wills, section 2438, pages 1137 and 1138, it is said:
"A widow’s renunciation of her husband’s will operates as a renunciation of the will in toto, and vests in her her dower and statutory rights in her husband’s estate, as though so far as she is concerned, he died intestate * * * and a renunciation in general terms will have this effect even though it does not specify the particular estate or rights to which the widow is entitled under the statute * * *”
Again in 69 C. J., Wills, section 2439, at page 1138, it is said:
"Generally, the widow’s renunciation of her husband’s will precludes her from claiming or accepting any benefits thereunder * * * and the provisions made for her in the will lapse * * * the property passing under the law of succession * # *”
In First National Exchange Bank of Roanoke v. Hughson, 194 Va. 736, 745-747, 74 S.E. (2d) 797, 803, 804, it is said:
‘ Statutory right of a widow to renounce the provisions made for her in her husband’s will existed in Virginia in early Colonial days. * * *
"The widow’s right to her share of her deceased husband’s estate thus secured to her by statute is an absolute, paramount and certain right which her husband may not deny her.
"This paramount right to share in the estate under and as allowed' by statute must be exercised within a year of the time of admission of the will to probate to become effective. That limitation, however, merely restricts the time in which the *168right may be availed of and does not lessen its certainty.
“ ‘By this provision * * * whether the provision for her in this will was much or little, she could accept it independent of and beyond her dower in the real estate, or at her election renounce the provision made in the will, and take absolutely her distributive share of the personal estate. * * * In other words, in such ease, if she renounced the provision made, or if no provision was made, she was thereby placed in precisely the attitude she would have been in had the husband died intestate as to his personal estate. This is illustrated by many decided cases.’ (Italics added.) Nelson’s Adm’r v. Kownslar’s Ex’r, supra, 79 Va. 468, at page 477.”
In 97 C.J.S. Wills, section 1288, page 134, notes 37, 38, 41-48, it is said:
“Time of vesting of interest; right to increment. The widow’s election against the will, confirming her preexisting rights in her husband’s estate, vests such estate in her immediately at the date of the election * * *. The vesting of the title relates back to the time of the testator’s death with the result that from that moment the elector is the absolute owner of the ultimately distributable sum, although the right to immediate payment of such sum is postponed for the convenience of the estate and as security for the potential rights of creditors and others having prior claims.”
In 57 Am. Jur., Wills, section 1527, note 20 at page 1038, it is said that the right of a widow to elect “is a personal right as distinguished from a property right.”
To illustrate the error of the majority opinion all that is necessary is an examination of the result it reaches. By the will of the deceased all of his property except $40,000 was to go to his widow. The widow elected to take against the will and is fully bound by her election. By reason of such election it is provided in section 22-108, R.C.M. 1947, that the renunciation by the widow “shall operate as a complee bar against any claim which such widow may afterwards set up to any provi*169sion which may have been thus made for her in the will of any testator, in lieu of dower; * * *” Having elected to take against the will, the widow cannot take under it. The majority opinion says she shall not take her legal full share and gives her all of the estate except $40,000 or exactly what she would have received under the will. Since she has renounced the will, and since the renunciation is valid and in full force and effect, by what legal right may this court make the widow take what she has renounced? The majority says she may not take this property pursuant to section 91-403, B.C.M. 1947. By what right then does she take the portion of the estate the majority has assigned to her? What statute or provision of our Constitution gives to this court or to any court of this state the authority to grant this widow what the majority opinion here assumes to give her?
There is no statute nor is there any provision of our Constitution granting this widow the share given her by the majority opinion herein long after she had renounced the will. The share which she is entitled to is set out in section 91-403, E.C.M. 1947, being the section providing for distribution of property not disposed of by will. The statute, section 91-403, does not require intestacy in order to entitle the widow to its benefits.
Unfortunately the size of this estate, consisting wholly of personal property, appears to have greatly influenced the majority in reaching its decision in this case wherein it makes sacred the specific bequests. Such was not the intent of the Legislature in enacting the statutes granting the right to make-a will and it is directly contrary to the legislative intent in enacting the dower statutes. The widow’s share was and is what the Legislature sought to protect — not the shares granted to others. For example, let us view the effect of the majority decision as it would affect a lesser estate' In the instant case had the decedent left an estate of but $40,000 or less, consisting solely of personal property, then under the majority decision the widow would have been, left penniless under the' will. *170All would have been consumed by the specific bequests to the decedent’s brother and sister and the majority say she must stay penniless even though she had elected to take against such will. This court should not so legislate. District Judge Elwell correctly adjudged and allowed the widow her rights under the law as it stood at the time of his decision. That decision should be affirmed.