Court Opinion

ID: 9566928
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:45:01.061295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:36.556978
License: Public Domain

*480Brailsford, Justice
(concurring) :
The direct wrong done by defendant was to plaintiff’s wife and daughter, who sustained personal injuries by his tortious conduct. Each of them has recovered actual and punitive damages against the defendant. As husband and father, plaintiff sustained consequential damages for which he is entitled to sue in his own right. In such cases, the courts have been astute to separate the elements of damage sustained by the injured child or wife from those accruing to the father or husband.* This is important to assure that each element of damage is awarded to the person justly entitled thereto and to protect the defendant from being mulct twice for the same loss. This salutary policy has been consistently followed by the courts with respect to compensatory damages. It seems reasonable and just that it should be applied to punitive damages, which, as pointed out in the dissent, have a compensatory aspect. We reach this desirable result without deviation from any prior decision of this court, and with the support of virtually all of the decisions on the point from other jurisdictions.
Admittedly, the issue is close. However, I can not regard a father’s right of recovery as completely independent from that of his injured child when proof that the child (or wife) was contributorily negligent, or reckless, will defeat his recovery altogether. 39 Am. Jur., Parent and Child, Sections 81, 85; 27 Am. Jur., Husband and Wife, Section 507.
Neither Webb v. Southern Ry., 104 S. C. 89, 88 S. E. 297, nor Fennell v. Littlejohn, 240 S. C. 189, 125 S. E. (2d) 408, is persuasive on the issue sub judice. The gravamen of the mother’s cause of action in Webb was that the defendant willfully and without her consent enticed her minor son away from her and put him to work at a hazardous occupation. Her cause of action was original and she was *481not required to prove that her son was injured through the negligence of the defendant. His injury was not the gist of her action, but only an aggravation of her damages. In Fennell, the basis of the husband’s cause of action was the defendant’s invasion of his marital relationship by having adulterous intercourse with his wife. As in Webb, the husband’s cause of action was original. Neither case was based upon a wrong or injury which would also have supported an action by the son or wife. Therefore, the problem of duplicate recovery which we resolve here could not have arisen.
Moss, C. J., and Lewis and Littlejohn, JJ., concur.

For example, see Annotation “What items of damages on account of personal injury to infant belong to him, and what to parent.” 32 A. L. R. (2d) 1060, supplementing 37 A. L. R. 11.