Court Opinion

ID: 9852450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:30:40.442635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:28.014095
License: Public Domain

*98MacLaughuin, Justice.
The sole issue in this case is whether a defendant testifying on his own behalf may have his credibility impeached by evidence of a prior conviction of a municipal ordinance. We hold that he cannot and reverse for a new trial.
Defendant, Carl DiBucci, was found guilty of simple assault by a district court jury in a de novo trial following his appeal from a conviction in the municipal court of St. Paul. During his trial in district court, while defendant was testifying on his own behalf, the city attorney attempted to impeach defendant’s credibility by introducing evidence of a prior conviction of an ordinance violation. The previous conviction, for unlawful appropriation of goods under a Roseville municipal ordinance, occurred in May 1973. Defendant, out of the presence of the jury, unsuccessfully objected to the admission of the ordinance violation conviction. The trial court gave an appropriate precautionary instruction to the jury on the use of such evidence for impeachment purposes only.
Minn. St. 595.07 provides in relevant part:
“Every person convicted of crime shall be a competent witness in any civil or criminal proceeding, but his conviction may be proved for the purpose of affecting the weight of his testimony * * * f>
Section 609.02, subd. 1, provides:
“ ‘Crime’ means conduct which is prohibited by statute and for which the actor may be sentenced to imprisonment, with or without a fine.”
Section 595.07 has been interpreted by this court to permit the impeachment of witnesses by evidence of prior convictions of either felonies or misdemeanors. State v. Lipscomb, 289 Minn. 511, 183 N. W. 2d 790 (1971); Brase v. Williams Sanatorium, Inc. 192 Minn. 304, 256 N. W. 176 (1934); State v. West, 285 Minn. 188, 173 N. W. 2d 468 (1969). However, we have consistently held that evidence of prior convictions of municipal ordi*99nance violations is not admissible for impeachment purposes. State v. Currie, 267 Minn. 294, 126 N. W. 2d 389 (1964); Carter v. Duluth Yellow Cab Co. 170 Minn. 250, 212 N. W. 413 (1927). The principal reasons advanced for excluding convictions for municipal ordinance violations from the general rule have been that municipal ordinance violations were not considered criminal offenses, and that such violations were not governed by the rules of criminal law. Carter v. Duluth Yellow Cab Co. supra. See, State v. Robitshek, 60 Minn. 123, 61 N. W. 1023 (1895).
Respondent, city of St. Paul, takes the position, shared by the trial court, that our recent decision in City of St. Paul v. Whidby, 295 Minn. 129, 203 N. W. 2d 823 (1972), necessarily leads to the conclusion that post-Whidby ordinance convictions should now be admissible for the purpose of impeachment. In Whidby, we held that, in all trials for violations of municipal ordinances which may result in imprisonment, the defendant is entitled to a presumption of innocence until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We also held that convictions of ordinance violations must be based upon unanimous verdicts and that accepted rules of criminal procedure must be followed. The basis for our holding in Whidby was that a judicial proceeding which may result in a defendant’s incarceration is one seriously affecting his rights and should therefore be conducted as a criminal proceeding.
Hence, in those cases in which a defendant risks incarceration, Whidby has afforded one who is charged with the violation of an ordinance the same rights as defendants in other criminal proceedings. The question we confront in this case, then, is whether the defendant convicted of an ordinance violation should also be subjected to the rule that that conviction may be used against him in later trials to impeach his credibility as a witness.
Much has been written of the wisdom and fairness, or lack thereof, of admitting prior convictions for the purpose of impeachment. This court held in State v. West, supra, that the prosecutor has absolute discretion to use prior felony or misde*100meanor convictions to impeach a defendant who is testifying in his own behalf in a criminal proceeding.1
Support for the West rule rests on a belief that it aids the jury by allowing the jury to see “the whole person” and thus to judge better the truth of his testimony. The trial court, of course, is obligated to caution the jury that the conviction may be considered only as it relates to the credibility of the witness. In other words, the jury is instructed not to use the evidence of conviction of prior crimes to determine whether the defendant committed the crime charged, but only for the limited purpose of evaluating the credibility of the defendant. Whether that instruction sufficiently overcomes the possible prejudicial effect of admitting the record of conviction has been the subject of considerable discussion. This, of course, leads to the ultimate question of whether the probative value of admitting evidence of the prior conviction for impeachment purposes outweighs its possible prejudicial effect upon the jury.
After carefully considering the underlying rationale of the West rule, we have concluded that we will not overrule our prior decisions and will not extend the West rule to convictions of ordinance violations. That conclusion is based on the following considerations :
(1) Minn. St. 595.07, the pertinent statute, provides that a person “convicted of [a] crime” may have that conviction proved in subsequent court proceedings to affect the weight of his testimony as a witness.
*101Section 609.02, subd. 1, provides that “[c]rime means conduct which is prohibited by statute * * Since ordinance violations are not statutory, we hold that, for the limited and narrow purpose of the issue in this case, an ordinance violation is not a crime as that word is used in § 595.07, and therefore the statute does not apply to convictions based upon the violation of an ordinance.
(2) As a matter of sound public policy, and in the interest of justice, we believe that the conviction of an ordinance violation should not follow a defendant through future litigation in which he may be a party or a witness. Ordinance violations generally involve petty offenses, with penalties less serious than statutory violations; it is reasonable to assume, therefore, that defendants more readily plead guilty to such charges and are less likely to fully exercise their rights, including the right to appeal. This, in turn, leads to the conclusion that convictions of ordinance violations, because of the nature of the offenses involved, may be of doubtful reliability as evidence of the credibility of a witness and that their prejudicial effect upon a jury may therefore outweigh their probative value.
Whidby was intended to afford certain due process and statutory protections to defendants, but was not intended to take away from the convicted ordinance violator a right which he previously possessed, namely, the right to insist that previous convictions of ordinance violations not be used against him in a subsequent trial. While the threat of incarceration is sufficient to require that an accused ordinance violator be entitled to the rights of other alleged criminals, the conviction of an ordinance violation does not in our judgment rise to the level of such probative value as to place it in the same classification as the conviction of a felony or a misdemeanor. As a result of these considerations, we believe that the admission of evidence of prior convictions of ordinance violations for purposes of credibility impeachment will have a net prejudicial effect upon the rights of the accused.
*102For the foregoing reasons, we reverse and remand for a new trial.

 An advisory committee has been appointed by this court charged with the duty of recommending rules of evidence for this court’s con-' sideration which will include, presumably, recommendations to the court concerning the rule promulgated in State v. West, 285 Minn. 188, 173 N. W. 2d 468 (1969). See, also, State v. Stewart, 297 Minn. 57, 209 N. W. 2d 913 (1973). In the meantime, Rules of Evidence for United States Courts and Magistrates have been adopted, to be effective July 1, 1975. P. L. 93-595, U. S. C. Cong. & Adm. News, 93d Cong. Second Session. See, Rule 609, Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime.