Court Opinion

ID: 9776706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:42:39.349218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:41.439483
License: Public Domain

WELLIVER, Justice,
dissenting.
. I respectfully dissent.
We transferred this case to determine whether the court of appeals had correctly followed our decisions in Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo.1969), (a sump pump) and Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. banc 1977), (a three-wheel golf cart) both of which applied strict liability as set forth in § 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. It now appears that the principal opinion would use this occasion to convert what was formerly strict liability into absolute liability.
The majority opinion arrives at this result by stating that “[i]t is a plaintiff’s prerogative to choose the theory upon which he will submit his case,” thereby permitting plaintiff to make the decision as to whether the facts constitute a manufacturer’s defective design case or a case of an inherently dangerous product. The type of case the facts constitute is a matter of law to be determined by the court. A plaintiff cannot by his choice of a name, determine the law or instruction applicable to his case. If in a given case the question turns on what amount or percentage of *440asbestos used in the end product will result in a danger or health hazard, then that case may well be a design defect case that should be submitted on MAI 24.04 (Strict Liability-Product Design). But such was not the case here. The only evidence in the case is that the manufacturer’s end product, Kaylo, contained asbestos and that after a given point of time in history, the manufacturer either knew or should have known that asbestos was an “inherently dangerous” product thereby creating a duty to warn those who would use or handle the product. In this instance the proper submission is MAI 25.05 (Strict Liability-Failure To Warn).
There is no question that plaintiff can put on evidence to establish the point in time at which the manufacturer either knew or should have known that asbestos was inherently dangerous thereby creating the manufacturer’s duty to warn. This is what an asbestos case is all about. This is state of the arts. If plaintiff can put on such evidence, I know of nothing in the law that precludes defendant from putting on contradictory evidence on the same question. To deny defendant the right to controvert this evidence is to make him an insuror. Submission of a case against any defendant and prohibiting such defendant from asserting his only available defense, cannot result in other than the imposition of absolute liability.
It is self-evident that under § 402A one does not have a legal obligation to warn until such time as he may reasonably be held to know of the “inherently dangerous defect” in the asbestos. See § 402A, comment (j). The only way to determine that issue is by admitting evidence (and hearing argument) on the question of the date on which the manufacturer received or should have received knowledge of the danger. Hearing evidence as to when doctors, scientists and engineers knew enough about the product to establish that it is inherently dangerous is the only way either the jury or the Court could know the point in time when the duty to warn attached to the manufacturer.
The principal opinion also is flawed in its misplaced reliance on Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869, 95 S.Ct. 127, 42 L.Ed.2d 107 (1974); Keener v. Dayton Electric Manufacturing Co., supra; Blevins v. Cushman Motors, supra.
Borel was the first case to affirm a victory by an asbestos victim. The U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the asbestos industry had a duty to warn anyone who might come in contact with its products that asbestos posed a serious health hazard and that this danger had been foreseeable from and after a certain point in time which was established by the evidence. There was no way to recover from asbestosis prior to Borel. Borel was tried and submitted under a failure to warn theory and not under a defective design theory. Moreover, state of the art evidence was received and argued at length in that case. The principal opinion cites Borel as authority for its conclusion that “plaintiffs established that Kaylo was ‘defective’ when they proved that it was unreasonably dangerous as designed; they were not required to show additionally that the manufacturer or designer was ‘at fault' as that concept is employed in the negligence context.” Language from Borel is quite to the contrary:
Here, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ product was unreasonably dangerous because of the failure to give adequate warnings of the known or knowable dangers involved. As explained in comment j to section 402a, a seller has a responsibility to inform users and consumers of dangers which the seller either knows or should know at the time the product is sold. The requirement that the danger be reasonably foreseeable, or scientifically discoverable, is an important limitation of the seller’s liability. In general, “[t]he rule of strict liability subjects the seller to lability to the user or consumer even though he has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of the product.” Section *441402A, Comment a. This is not the case where the product is alleged to be unreasonably dangerous because of a failure to give adequate warnings. Rather, a seller is under a duty to warn of only those dangers that are reasonably foreseeable.
Id. at 1088. (Emphasis added, footnote omitted.) As I read Borel, it persuasively states the case for the position the principal opinion rejects. As for Keener and Blevins, the principal opinion attributes holdings which their author, Donnelly, J., also here dissenting, rejects as neither intended nor contemplated.
The principal opinion also is at odds with the prevailing views in other jurisdictions. With one notable exception, a state of the art defense has been permitted in all prior asbestos cases. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506 (5th Cir.1984); Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811 (6th Cir.1982); Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir.1982); Karjala v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir.1975); Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., supra; Carter v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 557 F.Supp. 1317 (E.D.Tex.1983); Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 548 F.Supp. 357 (E.D.Penn.1982); In re Related Asbestos Cases, 543 F.Supp. 1142 (N.D.Cal.1982). State of the art evidence was held inadmissible in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). Significantly the New Jersey Supreme Court retreated from the holding in Beshada the following year in O’Brien v. Mushin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983), when it held that state of the art evidence was admissible even in defective design cases.
The principal opinion is also unique in that, so far as I can determine, there has been no other instance among the multitude of asbestos cases where a case has been submitted on a defective design theory. All other cases involving asbestos-related injuries have been treated as failure to warn eases. See, e.g., Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., supra; Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., supra; Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., supra; Karjala v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., supra; Borel v. Fibreboard Paper Products Corp., supra; Neal v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., supra; Johns-Manville/Asbestosis Cases, 511 F.Supp. 1229 (N.D.Ill.1981); Hammond v. North American Asbestos Corp., 97 Ill.2d 195, 73 Ill.Dec. 350, 454 N.E.2d 210 (1983); Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., supra; Myles v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 9 Ohio App.3d 257, 459 N.E.2d 620 (1983); Thiry v. Armstrong World Industries, 661 P.2d 515 (Okla.1983); Daniels v. Combustion Engineering, Inc., 583 S.W.2d 768 (Tenn.App.1978) (defective design and failure to warn alleged).
For there to be a lawsuit, there must be some issue to litigate. The bottom line is that the principal opinion takes away all defenses and leaves respondent without issue to either argue or litigate. Under the principal opinion, all that respondent is permitted to do is sit through the trial and await the jury announcement as to the amount of its liability as an insuror of the plaintiff.
State of the art is an issue in this case and the cause should be remanded for retrial of that issue. Rawls’ principle of fairness 1 is the premise upon which comparative fault is based. That principle of fairness can and should be made a reality by permitting the jury on retrial to compare the fault of the parties as mandated by Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. Banc.1983).

. Parks v. Union Carbide Corp. 602 S.W.2d 188, 193, n. 1 (Mo. banc 1980) (Welliver, J., dissenting); Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466, 469, n. 4 (Mo. banc 1978).