Court Opinion

ID: 9752895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 18:42:46.360602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:55.619521
License: Public Domain

GLASSMAN, J.,
with whom ROBERTS and COLLINS, JJ., join, dissenting
I must respectfully dissent. Pursuant to the provisions of 17-A M.R.S.A. § 1103 (1983 & Supp.1990), it is not sufficient that a person knows or believes a certain substance to be any scheduled drug; the substance must in fact be a scheduled drug. Under the terms of 17 M.R.S.A. § 152 (1983), stating that impossibility is no defense to a prosecution for attempt “provided that it would have been committed had the factual and legal attendant circumstances specified in the definition of the crime been as the defendant believed them to be” does not prevent Glover’s de*1089fense that in fact the substance was not cocaine. Accordingly, absent evidence that the substance in question was in fact cocaine, it is irrelevant what Glover believed it to be, and the trial court should have granted Glover’s motion for a judgment of acquittal. The contrary would be true if the substance were in fact cocaine but Glover testified he believed it to be baking soda.