Court Opinion

ID: 9668374
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:10:43.09766+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:31.419045
License: Public Domain

MESCHKE, Justice,
concurring.
I write separately only to footnote the shape of our finality doctrine for appeals.
In Gast Construction Co. v. Brighton Partnership, 422 N.W.2d 389 (N.D.1988), we tried to bring coherence to our concept of finality for appellate review. We structured a yardstick for gauging finality when reviewing orders other than judgments final in fact:
“First, the order appealed from must meet one of the statutory criteria of ap-pealability set forth in NDCC § 28-27-02. If it does not, our inquiry need go no further and the appeal must be dismissed. Gillan v. Saffell, supra. [395 N.W.2d 148 (N.D.1986]. If it does, then Rule 54(b), NDRCivP, must be complied with. E.g., Production Credit Ass’n of Grafton v. Porter, 390 N.W.2d 50 (N.D.1986). If it is not, we are without jurisdiction. Ibid.” 422 N.W.2d at 390.
Since Gast, we have used that gauge as a bright and certain measure of finality. Matter of Estate of Stuckle, 427 N.W.2d 96, 101 (N.D.1988); Regstad v. Steffes, 433 N.W.2d 202 (N.D.1988); Sargent County Bank v. Wentworth, 434 N.W.2d 562; and Jerry Harmon Motors, Inc. v. 1st National Bank & Trust Co., 436 N.W.2d 240 (N.D.1989). Even when no one has questioned reviewability, we have done so on our own initiative.
Several times, while concurring in those rulings, I have questioned the wisdom of extending our new formula for finality to orders which grant or deny injunctive relief, traditionally reviewable without finality. Today, I wonder about the hesitancy to extend the use of our recent formulation to this order, obviously non-final, although the issue was not raised by the parties.
An order granting a new trial is not final in fact, although in the past it has been held reviewable under NDCC 28-27-02(6). Boulger v. Northern Pac. Ry., 41 N.D. 316, 171 N.W. 632 (1918). Compare Anderson v. Bothum, 45 N.W.2d 488 (N.D.1950). However, if we followed the finality gauge given in Gast and its sequels, we would deem this order for a new trial interlocutory and non-final, and we would decline to review it until the trial court entered a final judgment or a Rule 54(b) certification.
Elsewhere, an order granting a new trial is generally considered interlocutory, non-final and therefore non-reviewable. 4 Am. Jur.2d Appeal and Error §§ 123 and 124 (1962). That is true in the federal practice on which we modeled our present repository of the finality principle, NDRCivP 54(b). See 15 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Trial and Post-Trial Orders § 3915 (1976); United States v. Hitchmon, 602 F.2d 689 (5 Cir.1979).
When this court chooses not to address this problem today, even though aware of it, some might think that it demonstrates continuing incoherence, incompleteness, or inconsistency in our finality jurisprudence. It may. I prefer to think of it as an invitation to appellate counsel to anticipate the potential of an appropriate motion in another appeal to put the issue precisely before us. In that way, the merits and *558demerits of carrying out our current concept of finality can be fully explored and developed after careful briefing and argument.