Court Opinion

ID: 9615475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:37:14.736645+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:15.595469
License: Public Domain

CARLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
Retired police officer Jack Dodd and his wife sued the City of Gainesville for breach of contract and negligence. The City answered and subsequently moved for summary judgment on several grounds, two of which the trial court found to be meritorious. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals found neither to be a valid basis for the grant of summary judgment, and reversed the trial court. Dodd v. City of Gainesville, 250 Ga. App. 722-724 (1), (2) (551 SE2d 62) (2001). As alternative support for the trial court’s ruling, the City urged a number of the additional grounds that it had raised below, but the Court of Appeals declined to apply the “right for any reason” principle. Dodd v. City of Gainesville, supra at 724 (3). We granted certiorari to review that latter holding, and the majority now affirms by concluding that
this case illustrates one of the major dangers of blind, rote application of the “right-for-any-reason” rule without the appellate court’s discretion; automatic application of the rule would have resulted in a decision on the merits of the arguments advanced by the City, but without those arguments being properly briefed by all parties on appeal.
Majority opinion, p. 839. In my opinion, the Court of Appeals seriously misconstrued the “right for any reason” principle and its applicability in this case, and the majority compounds, rather than corrects, that error. Accordingly, I dissent.
“[A] judgment that is right for any reason should be affirmed . . . .” Pryor Organization v. Stewart, 274 Ga. 487, 489 (2) (554 SE2d 132) (2001). “A grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if right for any reason, whether stated or unstated. [Cit.] It is the grant itself that is to be reviewed for error, and not the analysis employed. [Cit.]” Albany Oil Mill v. Sumter EMC, 212 Ga. App. 242, 243 (3) (441 SE2d 524) (1994). “An appellate court in reviewing a lower court decision will look to the basic question, which is whether or not the judgment is valid as a matter of law; the reasons contained in the judgments are not controlling. [Cit.]” Adams v. Emory University Clinic, 179 Ga. App. 620, 621 (347 SE2d 670) (1986).
The Court of Appeals nevertheless concluded that this “right for any reason” principle does not apply here “[bjecause the trial court based its ruling on an erroneous legal theory. . . .” Dodd v. City of Gainesville, supra at 724 (3). However, the controlling “legal theory” applicable in this case is that
*841[t]he grant of summary judgment is authorized only when there is no remaining genuine issue of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Cit.] The movant does not show entitlement to judgment as a matter of law unless, construing the evidence most favorably for the non-moving party, a prima facie case is shown. [Cit.] (Emphasis omitted.)
Dental One Assoc. v. JKR Realty Assoc., 269 Ga. 616, 617 (1) (501 SE2d 497) (1998). There is nothing to indicate that the trial court failed to adhere to this legal theory in ruling on the City’s motion for summary judgment. Instead, the record shows that, in its application of that theory, the trial court reached an erroneous conclusion that summary judgment was proper for the two reasons that it cited. Obviously there is a significant distinction between a trial court’s application of a completely erroneous legal theory in disposing of a case, and its mere misapplication of the proper legal theory to reach its result. As construed by the Court of Appeals, the “erroneous legal theory” exception would completely obviate the “right for any reason” rule, since any error in the reasoning advanced by a trial court would preclude further appellate consideration of the validity of the judgment on any other grounds. Obviously, the erroneous grant of summary judgment on one or more grounds does not authorize an appellate court to decline to consider whether the ruling was correct for another reason. The Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary is in direct conflict with controlling “right for any reason” authority. Abellera v. Williamson, 274 Ga. 324 (553 SE2d 806) (2001); Porquez v. Washington, 268 Ga. 649, 652 (3) (492 SE2d 665) (1997).
The Court of Appeals also based its ruling on the “general principle that the appellate courts do not consider issues not ruled on below.” Dodd v. City of Gainsville, supra at 724 (3). However, the only issue raised below was the City’s entitlement to summary judgment, and the trial court certainly considered that issue because it granted summary judgment. On motion for summary judgment, “[i]t is the responsibility of the trial court to review the evidence and determine whether a prima facie case has been proven by the movant.” Dental One Assoc. v. JKR Realty Assoc., supra at 618 (1). Likewise, on the appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment,
it is appropriate for an appellate court to determine whether the trial court’s ruling was right for any reason, including whether it was right for a ground asserted in the summary judgment motion that the trial court chose not to address in granting summary judgment. (Emphasis supplied.)
*842Abellera v. Williamson, supra at 327 (2). See also Porquez v. Washington, supra at 652 (3). Therefore, the Court of Appeals clearly erred when it refused to apply the “right for any reason” rule because of the trial court’s failure to include in its order an express ruling on each and every ground of the City’s motion.
Where, as here, an appellee urges alternative grounds in support of the trial court’s grant of summary judgment, the appellate court must apply the “right for any reason” rule and address those grounds. Abellera v. Williamson, supra. “[A] judgment right for any reason must be affirmed.” (Emphasis supplied.) Simmons v. Boros, 255 Ga. 524, 525 (341 SE2d 2) (1986). “A trial court’s ruling granting summary judgment that is right for any reason must be affirmed. [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Royal v. Ferrellgas, 254 Ga. App. 696, 702 (1) (563 SE2d 451) (2002). See also Kirkley v. Jones, 250 Ga. App. 113, 114 (1) (550 SE2d 686) (2001); Magueur v. Dept. of Transp., 248 Ga. App. 575, 577 (547 SE2d 304) (2001); Busby v. Webb, 247 Ga. App. 781, 782 (545 SE2d 132) (2001); Costrini v. Hansen Architects, 247 Ga. App. 136, 138 (1) (543 SE2d 760) (2000); Conmac Corp. v. Southern Diversified Development, 245 Ga. App. 895, 898 (1) (539 SE2d 532) (2000); Davis v. Bushnell, 245 Ga. App. 221, 223 (537 SE2d 477) (2000); Bennett v. Cotton, 244 Ga. App. 784, 787 (2) (536 SE2d 802) (2000); Cox v. Edelson, 243 Ga. App. 5, 7 (1) (530 SE2d 250) (2000); Caswell v. Anderson, 241 Ga. App. 703, 706 (527 SE2d 582) (2000); In re Estate of Williams, 241 Ga. App. 17 (1) (525 SE2d 742) (1999); Grant v. Ga. Pacific Corp., 239 Ga. App. 748, 750 (1) (521 SE2d 868) (1999); Garner v. Roberts, 238 Ga. App. 738, 739 (520 SE2d 255) (1999).
Thus, the refusal to consider the City’s alternative grounds was not a proper exercise of the Court of Appeals’ discretion. Instead, as in Abellera v. Williamson, supra at 324, “the Court of Appeals erred in failing to apply the right-for-any-reason rule, and thus-erred in failing to consider the [City’s] contention that the trial court correctly granted ; . . summary judgment in this . . . action” for those reasons that were raised below and then urged on appeal. See also Porquez v. Washington, supra at 652 (3).
Here . . . the trial court granted summary judgment on the claim that is the subject of appellate review, but based the grant of summary judgment on only . . . two grounds asserted in support of the motion by the [City]. Under these circumstances, it is appropriate for an appellate court to determine whether the trial court’s ruling was right for any reason, including whether it was right for a ground asserted in the summary judgment motion that the trial court chose not to address in granting summary judgment.
*843Decided November 26, 2002
Reconsideration denied December 13, 2002.
Freeman, Mathis & Gary, Benton J. Mathis, Jr., Mary A. Ackourey, for appellant.
Jack E. Dodd, Richard C. Bellows, for appellees.
Abellera v. Williamson, supra at 327 (2). Therefore, the only proper disposition of this case is a reversal of the judgment of the Court of Appeals and a remand of the case to that Court with direction that it consider the merits of those grounds raised by the City in support of the grant of the motion for summary judgment.
Although today’s decision results in an affirmance of the Court of Appeals, I would point out for the benefit of the bench and bar that a majority of this Court, comprised of the two Justices who specially concur and the three Justices who dissent, continue to adhere to the long-standing principle that the right for any reason rule does apply on appellate review of the grant of summary judgment even where, as here, the trial court based its ruling on an erroneous legal ground. “This Court will affirm the judgment of a lower court so long as it is right for any reason, even if it is based upon erroneous legal reasoning. [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Shadix v. Carroll County, 274. Ga. 560, 565 (3) (c) (554 SE2d 465) (2001). The only real distinction that I perceive between the special concurrence and this dissent concerns whether the appellate court must apply the principle in such a case or whether it can decline to do so. As to that procedural matter, the two Justices who specially concur join with the three-Justice majority in holding that the application by this Court or the Court of Appeals of the right for any reason rule is not mandatory in every case. Thus, the affirmance of this case should not be construed as an approval of the Court of Appeals’ anomalous interpretation of the “erroneous legal theory” exception to application of the right for any reason rule.
Today, the Court not only reaches the wrong result, it also overrules, sub silentio, Abellera, Dental One Assoc., Porquez, and many other decisions of this Court and the Court of Appeals holding that a trial court’s grant of summary judgment must be affirmed if it is correct for any reason. The ultimate effect of this decision is to weaken, if not destroy, the “right for any reason” rule.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham and Justice Hun-stein join in this dissent.