Court Opinion

ID: 9486536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:51:34.048603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:46.892660
License: Public Domain

SKOPIL, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the majority that U.S.S.G. Chapter 7 policy statements are not binding on the sentencing court, but must be considered prior to sentencing. See United States v. Baclaan, 948 F.2d 628, 631 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam). I also agree that the district court adequately considered the policy statements before sentencing Forrester. Accordingly, I concur.
I write separately only to express my disagreement with the majority’s statement that Chapter 7 apparently conflicts with the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2). I believe that any apparent conflict is resolved by the policy statement that provides:
Where the minimum term of imprisonment required by statute, if any, is greater than the maximum of the applicable range, the minimum term of imprisonment required by statute shall be substituted for the applicable range.
U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(b)(2).
The majority’s holding that the policy statements are in apparent conflict with the statute rests on the difference between the sentence suggested by Chapter 7’s “applicable range” (3 to 9 months) and the sentence “available under subehapter A at the time of the initial sentencing” (33 to 41 months). The very existence of such a conflict leads to the conclusion that this is a case where “the minimum term of imprisonment required by statute ... is greater than the maximum of the applicable range,” and thus that the appropriate sentence under Chapter 7 is “the minimum term of imprisonment required by statute.” U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(b)(2). This is precisely the sentence that Forrester received.
In Baclaan, we remanded for resentencing because the district court failed to consider section 7B1.4(b)(2) when imposing a sentence longer than the minimum required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g) on revocation of supervised release for possession of a controlled substance. 948 F.2d at 630-31. I see no reason to treat probation revocations under section 3565(a)(2) differently. I believe that our holding in Baclaan requires the court to consider imposing the minimum sentence “available under subchapter A at the time of the initial sentencing,” 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2), before imposing a longer sentence in a probation revocation proceeding to which section 3565 applies. Because the court did impose the minimum available sentence in this ease, it did not run afoul of Baclaan.