Court Opinion

ID: 9420069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:52:47.165065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:22.173992
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Rutledge,
dissenting.
But for this Court’s decisions in the Levinson and Ispass cases, my views in this case would be in substantial accord with those expressed by Mr. Justice Murphy. See Levinson v. Spector Motor Service, 330 U. S. 649, dissenting opinion at 685; Pyramid Motor Freight Corp. v. Ispass, 330 U. S. 695. I thought the decisions in those cases foreshadowed the extreme result here, which goes so far as to exclude from the Fair Labor Standards Act’s protection at least two employees who made no trips in what petitioner regards as the interstate phase of his business. While on the other hand one driver made 97 such trips, there were others who made only very occasional ones.
*441Although I regarded the Levinson and Ispass decisions as foreshadowing and perhaps concluding any situation where the employee’s work would substantially affect safety in interstate operations, and thus as going to the extent of exempting from Fair Labor Standards Act coverage any employee whose work substantially affects such safety, I did not understand that all employees driving for a company engaged principally in intrastate commerce but doing a very small amount of interstate commerce would be lumped together, for purposes of the exclusion, on the basis of the proportionate amounts of work done by the company in those phases of its business. That I think is the effect of the present decision. To that extent, I also think the ruling constitutes an extension of the exemption beyond that sustained in the Levinson and Ispass cases.
On the basis of the decision last term in United States v. Yellow Cab Company, 332 U. S. 218, I also have difficulty with the view that any of the carrier’s services here were rendered in interstate commerce. That decision held that the transportation in Chicago of passengers and their luggage from their homes, offices, hotels, etc. to railroad stations for the purpose of boarding trains on interstate journeys, and conversely the like use of taxicabs in the reverse direction after leaving trains on arrival in Chicago following such journeys, were “too unrelated to interstate commerce to constitute a part thereof within the meaning of the Sherman Act.” 332 U. S. at 230. While I was not in agreement with the Yellow Cab decision, the same ruling, if applied to the facts here, would make the so-called “interstate commerce,” i. e., the transportation of freight from petitioner’s customers’ places of business to shipping terminals, intrastate rather than interstate commerce.1
I am unable to agree with the Court’s opinion.

 I do not read the stipulation of facts in this case as showing that petitioner engaged in transportation from terminal to terminal.