Court Opinion

ID: 9626632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:20:13.993309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:31.495251
License: Public Domain

Lovins, President,
dissenting:
Being fully aware of the constitutional provisions contained in the organic law of this State, I feel it is my duty to dissent from the holding of the Court in permitting a recovery from the State on the sole basis that the State, through its agents and employees, has committed a wrong.
I apprehend there is no controversy over the effect of Section 35, Article VI and Section 6, Article X of the Constitution of this State, which, in my view, prevent recovery from the State for the tortious acts of its officials, agents, and employees. Moreover, it has been repeatedly held that the state road commission of this State cannot be made a defendant in an action to recover against it, even in instances where invasion of privately owned land is involved. See Mahone v. Road Commission, 99 W. Va. 397, 129 S. E. 320; Stewart v. Commission, 117 W. Va. 352, 185 S. E. 567; and Watts v. Road Commission, 117 W. Va. 398, 185 S. E. 570.
Nevertheless, a new principle has been injected into the jurisprudence of this State, which is referred to as a “moral obligation.” By adherence to that principle, and giving it wide effect, this Court has opened the door to permit recovery from the State for all torts allegedly committed in the performance of governmental functions. I think that the principle of “moral obligation” should be restricted to instances where there is a prior statute, or where services are rendered and goods or money received, such as in the cases of Woodall v. Darst, 71 W. Va. 350, 77 S. E. 264; Slack v. Jacobs, 8 W. Va. 612; and Glover v. Sims, 121 W. Va. 407, 3 S. E. 2d 612.
*618The repair and maintenance of public roads is a high governmental function, and in this proceeding there is no denial that the tort complained of by relator resulted from the maintenance of Route No. 60, a public highway.
The Constitution of this State should not be circumvented by the doubtful application of a principle heretofore circumscribed and restricted. If the people of this State desire to pay damages arising from wrongs committed by their government in the performance of governmental functions, they should modify their organic law so that all claims against the State could be inquired into and adjudicated according to the course of the common law and a general statute applicable to all persons and property within its borders.
I admit that the trend in other jurisdictions is toward holding the sovereign liable for torts. But to my mind there are insuperable obstacles in this jurisdiction which prevent the enactment of such laws: the constitutional provisions above adverted to.
It approaches sophistry to say that the holding herein imposes no liability on the State. From whose funds will the allowance be paid; from what source will the money come to pay it? The answers are obvious.
It is unnecessary further to elaborate my reasons for dissenting, as most of the reasons for this dissent are stated in a dissenting opinion filed by me in the case of Trust Co. v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 623, 639, 46 S. E. 2d 90, 99. All of the reasons set forth therein, except those relating to scienter and the causal connection between the acts of the convict and the acts of the State officials, are equally applicable to this proceeding.
In my opinion, this Court, commencing with its decision in the case of Cashman v. Sims, 130 W. Va. 430, 43 S. E. 2d 805, has placed itself in an unenviable position which gives rise to a confused concept of law and a chaotic condition. Ultimately, this Court must resolve itself to adopt either the principles enunciated in this dissent, or, in the *619alternative, accept as final any legislative finding of the existence of a moral obligation. At present this Court is merely astride a thorny fence, and the decision in this case exemplifies that it is now giving effect to a distinction without a difference as to the liability of the State.
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent, and would deny the writ.