Court Opinion

ID: 9958130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 12:01:52.295565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:57.413266
License: Public Domain

************************************************
   The “officially released” date that appears near the
beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be
published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it
is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the
beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin-
ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi-
cially released” date appearing in the opinion.
   All opinions are subject to modification and technical
correction prior to official publication in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports. In the event
of discrepancies between the advance release version of
an opinion and the version appearing in the Connecti-
cut Law Journal and subsequently in the Connecticut
Reports or Connecticut Appellate Reports, the latest
version is to be considered authoritative.
  The syllabus and procedural history accompanying
an opinion that appear in the Connecticut Law Jour-
nal and subsequently in the Connecticut Reports or
Connecticut Appellate Reports are copyrighted by the
Secretary of the State, State of Connecticut, and may
not be reproduced or distributed without the express
written permission of the Commission on Official Legal
Publications, Judicial Branch, State of Connecticut.
************************************************
Page 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     0, 0

         2                          ,0                            0 Conn. App. 1
                             Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

         MIGUEL VEGA v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION
                          (AC 46077)
                                 Moll, Clark and Eveleigh, Js.

                                           Syllabus

         The petitioner, who had been convicted, after a jury trial, of various crimes
            in connection with a home invasion and the shooting of two victims,
            sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the state had suppressed
            exculpatory information in violation of Brady v. Maryland (373 U.S.
            83) and that his trial counsel, K, had rendered ineffective assistance by
            failing to consult with or retain an expert on eyewitness identification
            and by failing to impeach P, one of the eyewitnesses who testified for
            the state. After an altercation with the two victims at a bar hours earlier,
            the petitioner and another man entered an apartment where a group of
            individuals had gathered, including the two victims, several of whom
            had known the petitioner for years. Both men were armed and had their
            heads and faces covered. When the petitioner reached the living room,
            he pulled down his mask and fired toward the window. He then fired
            two shots at the first victim, striking him. The two men chased the
            second victim out of the apartment, firing and striking him. At the
            apartment, P called 911 and stated that the first victim had been shot.
            After being transported to a hospital, the first victim died, and the second
            victim survived. After the police arrived on the scene, several people
            who were present during the shooting identified the petitioner as one of
            the shooters. At the petitioner’s criminal trial in 2016, several witnesses
            testified that the petitioner was the shooter, and at least two witnesses
            testified that they had heard an eyewitness scream the petitioner’s name
            during the shooting. A recording of P’s 911 call, in which she identified
            the petitioner as the individual who had shot the first victim, was admit-
            ted at the petitioner’s criminal trial. The spontaneous excited utterances
            identifying the petitioner as the shooter made by both an eyewitness
            when she phoned her mother shortly after the shooting and by the
            second victim, when he spoke to a police officer as he was being treated
            for his gunshot wounds in the hospital, were also admitted at the petition-
            er’s criminal trial. Two years after the petitioner was convicted, in an
            appeal in an unrelated habeas case brought by T, this court held that
            the state’s failure to correct the false testimony of P in T’s 2009 criminal
            trial violated T’s due process rights. At the habeas trial in the present
            case, K testified that he had requested that the state disclose all exculpa-
            tory material but did not recall whether the state had disclosed any
            exculpatory material related to P, and the prosecutor in the petitioner’s
            criminal trial, R, testified that he believed that he had turned over all
            exculpatory material that was in his possession to the defense. The
0, 0                          CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                        Page 1

       0 Conn. App. 1                                    ,0                             3
                            Vega v. Commissioner of Correction
            petitioner presented the testimony of B, a professor of psychology spe-
            cializing in memory and psychology in the legal system. In his testimony,
            B detailed factors that can reduce identification accuracy or impact
            memory and testified that he would have been able to assist the petition-
            er’s trial counsel in connection with cross-examination and arguments
            and in pursuit of a motion to suppress. On cross-examination, B testified
            that an eyewitness’ familiarity with a suspect would make an identifica-
            tion more reliable. The habeas court rendered judgment denying the
            petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Thereafter, the habeas court denied
            the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to
            this court. Held:
       1. The habeas court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition for
            certification to appeal, the petitioner having failed to demonstrate that
            his claims involved issues that were debatable among jurists of reason,
            that a court could resolve the issues in a different manner or that the
            questions raised were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
            further.
       2. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improp-
            erly determined that he was not deprived of his rights to due process
            and to a fair trial in violation of Brady because the state failed to disclose
            that P had testified falsely in T’s criminal trial: pursuant to State v.
            Guerrera (331 Conn. 628), R was not required to search the file in T’s
            unrelated criminal case to exclude the possibility that the file contained
            exculpatory information; moreover, there was no evidence presented
            and no findings made by the habeas court that R had actual knowledge
            or cause to know of the existence of Brady material in T’s file, R’s lack
            of memory as to whether he had exculpatory information regarding P
            did not, without more, equate to affirmative proof of any fact, and there
            was no evidence at the habeas trial and the habeas court made no
            factual finding that K had made a specific request for that information,
            which was required in order to trigger the state’s examination of that
            file under the circumstances of this case.
       3. The petitioner could not prevail on his claim that the habeas court improp-
            erly concluded that he had failed to establish that K rendered ineffective
            assistance during his criminal trial:
           a. Contrary to the petitioner’s argument, the habeas court properly con-
           cluded that K did not render ineffective assistance by failing to consult
           with or call an expert on eyewitness identification to testify at the peti-
           tioner’s criminal trial: K offered a legitimate strategic reason for his
           decision not to consult an expert on eyewitness identification in which
           he recognized that the primary concern with eyewitness identifications
           was not present because the eyewitnesses knew the petitioner prior to
           the shooting; moreover, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that there
           was a reasonable probability that the result of his criminal trial would
           have been different if K had consulted such an expert, as the witnesses
           knew the petitioner and were therefore likely to identify him accurately,
Page 2                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     0, 0

         4                          ,0                            0 Conn. App. 1
                             Vega v. Commissioner of Correction
             B testified on cross-examination that familiarity makes an eyewitness
             identification more reliable, the petitioner admitted that K had attempted
             to impeach all of the eyewitnesses by testing their credibility and the
             consistency of their accounts, and the petitioner offered no evidence to
             undermine the fact that the witnesses who identified the petitioner at
             his criminal trial knew him for a long time before the shooting occurred.
             b. The petitioner could not prevail on his alternative claim that, if the
             state had disclosed P’s prior false testimony, then K rendered ineffective
             assistance by failing to impeach her concerning that false testimony; the
             evidence adduced at the habeas trial did not establish that the state
             failed to disclose P’s false testimony in T’s criminal case to the defense,
             and the petitioner failed to call P to testify at the habeas trial to offer
             the additional information he claims should have been elicited by more
             thorough cross-examination or to show how alternative cross-examina-
             tion questions would have impacted her credibility.
                     Argued February 8—officially released April 9, 2024

                                      Procedural History

           Amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
         brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
         Tolland and tried to the court, Newson, J.; judgment
         denying the petition; thereafter, the court, Newson, J.,
         denied the petition for certification to appeal, and the
         petitioner appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
           Robert L. O’Brien, assigned counsel, with whom, on
         the brief, was Christopher Y. Duby, assigned counsel,
         for the appellant (petitioner).
            Denise B. Smoker, senior assistant state’s attorney,
         with whom, on the brief, were Paul J. Narducci, state’s
         attorney, and Donna Fusco, deputy assistant state’s
         attorney, for the appellee (respondent).
                                            Opinion

           EVELEIGH, J. The petitioner, Miguel Vega, appeals
         following the denial of his petition for certification to
         appeal from the judgment of the habeas court denying
         his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner
         claims that the habeas court (1) abused its discretion
         in denying his petition for certification to appeal, (2)
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                     Page 3

       0 Conn. App. 1                        ,0                5
                     Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

       improperly concluded that he failed to prove that the
       state had suppressed exculpatory information in viola-
       tion of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S. Ct.
       1194, 10 L. Ed. 2d 215 (1963), and (3) improperly con-
       cluded that he failed to establish that his trial counsel
       rendered ineffective assistance. Because the petitioner
       has failed to demonstrate that the court improperly
       denied his petition for certification to appeal, we dis-
       miss the appeal.
          The facts underlying the petitioner’s conviction were
       recounted in the decision of this court on direct appeal
       in State v. Vega, 181 Conn. App. 456, 187 A.3d 424, cert.
       denied, 330 Conn. 928, 194 A.3d 777 (2018), and can be
       summarized for our purposes as follows. On the night
       of March 2, 2010, Michael Ellis, Jr. (Ellis), Altareika
       Parrish, Rahmel Perry, Shariymah James, Alice Phillips,
       Keyireh Kirkwood, and others gathered in a New Lon-
       don apartment. Id., 459. In the early morning of March
       3, 2010, some individuals from the group went to a bar
       where the petitioner and a few of his associates were
       also present. Id. The petitioner motioned to Ellis to step
       away from Kirkwood, with whom the petitioner had a
       child. Id., 459–60. When Ellis did not do so, the peti-
       tioner approached Ellis and punched him in the face.
       Id., 460. A fight then broke out in the bar between the
       two groups, during which Perry began punching and
       kicking the petitioner, who was on the losing end of
       the fight. Id. Outside of the bar, another altercation
       ensued between the two groups, which was quickly
       broken up. Id.
          After both groups left the bar, Ellis, Perry, Parrish,
       Kirkwood, Phillips, and James returned to the New
       London apartment at approximately 1:30 a.m. Id. Shaun-
       tay Ellis was also present in the apartment when the
       group returned. Id. At approximately 2 a.m., the peti-
       tioner and another man entered the apartment. Id. Both
       men were armed, were dressed in all black clothing, and
Page 4                       CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                  0, 0

         6                        ,0                          0 Conn. App. 1
                           Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

         had their heads and faces covered. Id. The petitioner
         proceeded directly to the living room where Ellis and
         Perry were located. Id. He pulled down his mask and
         ordered everyone in the room to get on the floor. Id.
         The petitioner then fired toward the window, in Ellis’
         direction, but did not hit Ellis. Id. He then fired two
         shots at Perry, who was on the couch, striking him. Id.
         Meanwhile, Ellis ran out of the living room and toward
         the back door where the men had entered. Id. The
         intruders left the apartment and chased Ellis, firing
         approximately four shots and striking Ellis twice. Id.,
         461. At the apartment, Phillips called 911 and stated
         that Perry had been shot. Id. After being transported
         to the hospital, Perry succumbed to his injuries and
         Ellis survived. Id. After the police arrived on the scene,
         several people who were present during the shooting
         identified the petitioner as one of the shooters. Id.
            In connection with these events, the petitioner was
         charged and convicted, following a jury trial in 2016,1
         of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a),
         felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-
         54c, home invasion in violation of General Statutes
         § 53a-100aa (a) (2), burglary in the first degree in viola-
         tion of General Statutes § 53a-101 (a) (3), attempt to
         commit murder in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-
         49 (a) (2) and 53a-54a, attempt to commit assault in
         the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-
         49 (a) (2) and 53a-59 (a) (5), and carrying a pistol with-
         out a permit in violation of General Statutes § 29-35 (a).
         Id., 462–63. He was sentenced to a total effective term
         of seventy-five years of imprisonment. Id., 463. His con-
         viction was affirmed on direct appeal. Id., 492.
           In 2018, the petitioner filed a petition for a writ of
         habeas corpus, which he later amended. He alleged in
           1
             A trial occurred in 2015 that ended in a hung jury and the trial court
         declared a mistrial. See State v. Vega, supra, 181 Conn. App. 462.
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                      Page 5

       0 Conn. App. 1                         ,0                7
                      Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

       his amended petition, among other things, that his rights
       to due process and a fair trial were violated by the
       state’s alleged failure to disclose material exculpatory
       evidence and that his trial counsel rendered ineffective
       assistance at his criminal trial. The court denied his
       petition. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for
       certification to appeal. After the court denied the peti-
       tion for certification to appeal, this appeal followed.
       Additional facts will be set forth as necessary in the
       context of the petitioner’s claims.
                                      I
         The petitioner first claims that the court abused its
       discretion by denying his petition for certification to
       appeal. We disagree.
          We first set forth certain legal principles that guide
       us in our review. ‘‘Faced with a habeas court’s denial
       of a petition for certification to appeal, a petitioner can
       obtain appellate review of the dismissal of his petition
       for habeas corpus only by satisfying the two-pronged
       test enunciated by our Supreme Court in Simms v.
       Warden, 229 Conn. 178, 640 A.2d 601 (1994), and
       adopted in Simms v. Warden, 230 Conn. 608, 612, 646
       A.2d 126 (1994). First, he must demonstrate that the
       denial of his petition for certification constituted an
       abuse of discretion. . . . To prove an abuse of discre-
       tion, the petitioner must demonstrate that the [resolu-
       tion of the underlying claim involves issues that] are
       debatable among jurists of reason; that a court could
       resolve the issues [in a different manner]; or that the
       questions are adequate to deserve encouragement to
       proceed further. . . . In determining whether the
       habeas court abused its discretion in denying the peti-
       tioner’s request for certification, we necessarily must
       consider the merits of the petitioner’s underlying claims
       to determine whether the habeas court reasonably
       determined that the petitioner’s appeal was frivolous.
Page 6                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        0, 0

         8                    ,0                        0 Conn. App. 1
                        Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

         In other words, we review the petitioner’s substantive
         claims for the purpose of ascertaining whether those
         claims satisfy one or more of the three criteria . . .
         adopted by this court for determining the propriety of
         the habeas court’s denial of the petition for certifica-
         tion.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Howard v.
         Commissioner of Correction, 217 Conn. App. 119, 124–
         25, 287 A.3d 602 (2022). As we discuss more fully in
         parts II and III of this opinion, because the resolution
         of the petitioner’s underlying claims involve issues that
         are not debatable among jurists of reason, could not
         have been resolved by a court in a different manner, and
         are not adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
         further, we conclude that the habeas court did not abuse
         its discretion in denying the petition for certification
         to appeal from the denial of the petition for a writ of
         habeas corpus.
                                        II
            The petitioner claims that the court improperly deter-
         mined that he was not deprived of his rights to due
         process and to a fair trial in violation of Brady v. Mary-
         land, supra, 373 U.S. 83. Specifically, he contends that
         the state failed to disclose that Phillips, who testified for
         the state in the petitioner’s criminal trial, had testified
         falsely in the prior unrelated 2009 trial of Kurtis Turner.
         He does not claim that Phillips testified falsely in his
         criminal trial but argues that ‘‘it is clear that the state
         was on notice that exculpatory impeachment evidence
         existed in 2009. It is clear from the record that it was
         not disclosed to the defense. As a result, the habeas
         court erred in finding that the state did not suppress
         evidence by failing to tell the defense about Phillips’
         2009 false testimony.’’ We disagree.
            ‘‘The fourteenth amendment to the United States con-
         stitution demands that [n]o [s]tate shall . . . deprive
         any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                     Page 7

       0 Conn. App. 1                        ,0                9
                     Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

       process of law . . . . Due process principles require
       the prosecution to disclose to the defense evidence that
       is favorable to the defendant and material to his guilt
       or punishment. . . . In order to obtain a new trial for
       improper suppression of evidence, the petitioner must
       establish three essential components: (1) that the evi-
       dence was favorable to the accused; (2) that the evi-
       dence was suppressed by the state—either inadver-
       tently or wilfully; and (3) that the evidence was material
       to the case, i.e., that the accused was prejudiced by the
       lack of disclosure.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quota-
       tion marks omitted.) Marquez v. Commissioner of Cor-
       rection, 330 Conn. 575, 591–92, 198 A.3d 562 (2019).
       ‘‘Whether the petitioner was deprived of his due process
       rights due to a Brady violation is a question of law, to
       which we grant plenary review.’’ Walker v. Commis-
       sioner of Correction, 103 Conn. App. 485, 491, 930 A.2d
       65, cert. denied, 284 Conn. 940, 937 A.2d 698 (2007).
          In Turner v. Commissioner of Correction, 181 Conn.
       App. 743, 187 A.3d 1163 (2018), this court held that the
       state’s failure to correct the false testimony of Phillips
       that she did not expect any consideration for her testi-
       mony in the 2009 criminal trial of Kurtis Turner violated
       Turner’s due process rights to a fair trial under Brady.
       See id., 747, 753–58. At the habeas trial in the present
       case, Attorney Michael Regan, who was the prosecutor
       in the petitioner’s criminal trial, testified that he had
       an open file policy that meant that ‘‘whatever I had,
       [the] defense had’’ and that it was his belief that he had
       turned over all exculpatory material that was in his
       possession. Attorney Robert Kappes, who was assigned
       to represent the petitioner, testified that he had
       requested that the state disclose all exculpatory mate-
       rial but did not recall whether the state had disclosed
       any exculpatory material related to Phillips.
         In rejecting the petitioner’s Brady claim, the habeas
       court reasoned that the petitioner’s argument that the
Page 8                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                         0, 0

         10                    ,0                       0 Conn. App. 1
                        Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

         state was on notice of Phillips’ false testimony in the
         Turner case was unavailing because that false testimony
         ‘‘was in a wholly unrelated proceeding.’’ We agree that
         the knowledge that Phillips had previously testified
         falsely in the unrelated Turner case cannot be imputed
         onto the prosecutor in the petitioner’s criminal trial.
            In State v. Guerrera, 331 Conn. 628, 206 A.3d 160
         (2019), our Supreme Court noted the well established
         law that ‘‘[t]he state has a duty under Brady to disclose
         to the accused evidence that is both favorable to the
         defense and material to the case. . . . As the state’s
         representative, the prosecutor has a broad obligation
         to disclose Brady material because principles of funda-
         mental fairness demand no less. . . . This obligation
         extends to evidence favorable to the defense that is not
         in the possession of the individual prosecutor responsi-
         ble for trying the case; indeed, the obligation may
         encompass such evidence even if it is not known to the
         prosecutor. . . . More specifically, the prosecutor’s
         duty of disclosure extends to Brady material that is
         known to the others acting on the government’s behalf
         in [the] case, including, but not limited to, the police.’’
         (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.)
         Id., 646–47.
            Our Supreme Court in Guerrera rejected the defen-
         dant’s claim that the state’s attorney had a duty to
         review for exculpatory Brady material 1552 telephone
         calls made by his codefendants that were recorded but
         not reviewed by the Department of Correction (depart-
         ment). Id., 646–56. The court concluded that ‘‘the 1552
         calls that were not reviewed by the department, cannot
         reasonably be characterized as part of the state’s inves-
         tigatory file. Consequently, the defendant’s claim that
         he was entitled to a review of those calls because they
         were part of the file must fail.’’ Id., 655–56. Our Supreme
         Court adopted the reasoning set forth in United States
         v. Joseph, 996 F.2d 36, 41 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 510
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                       Page 9

       0 Conn. App. 1                        ,0                 11
                      Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

       U.S. 937, 114 S. Ct. 357, 126 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1993), that
       Brady does not ‘‘require prosecutors to search their
       unrelated files to exclude the possibility, however
       remote, that they contain exculpatory information. . . .
       [When] a prosecutor has no actual knowledge or cause
       to know of the existence of Brady material in a file
       unrelated to the case under prosecution, a defendant,
       in order to trigger an examination of such unrelated
       files, must make a specific request for that informa-
       tion—specific in the sense that it explicitly identifies
       the desired material and is objectively limited in scope.’’
       (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Guerrera,
       supra, 331 Conn. 653.
          In the present case, the petitioner’s argument that
       ‘‘the state knew in 2009 that [Phillips] provided false
       testimony’’ in the Turner trial and therefore was obli-
       gated to turn that information over to the defense is
       premised on a misapprehension of the law. (Emphasis
       in original.) According to Guerrera, Regan was not
       required to search the unrelated file in the Turner case
       to exclude the possibility that that file contained excul-
       patory information. See State v. Guerrera, supra, 331
       Conn. 653. No evidence was adduced at the habeas trial
       that Regan had actual knowledge of the existence of
       Brady material in the Turner file. Rather, Regan testi-
       fied that, ‘‘if I had exculpatory information on [Phillips],
       I would have disclosed it, but I don’t recall the specifics
       if I had any.’’ The court found that Regan ‘‘had little
       specific memory of any specific discovery provided to
       the defense in this matter’’ and concluded that ‘‘[a] lack
       of memory does not, without more, equate to affirma-
       tive proof of any fact.’’ Because there was no evidence
       presented and no findings made by the habeas court
       that Regan had actual knowledge or cause to know of
       the existence of Brady material in the unrelated Turner
       file, the defense was required to have made a specific
       request for that information in order to trigger the
Page 10                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     0, 0

          12                          ,0                           0 Conn. App. 1
                              Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

          state’s examination of the unrelated Turner file. See
          State v. Guerrera, supra, 331 Conn. 653. There was no
          evidence at the habeas trial and the habeas court made
          no factual finding that Kappes had made such a request.
          Accordingly, because Regan was not required to review
          the Turner file for Brady information, the petitioner’s
          Brady claim is without merit.2 In light of the foregoing,
          we conclude that the petitioner has not demonstrated
          that the habeas court abused its discretion in denying
          certification to appeal with respect to this claim.
                                               III
             The petitioner next claims that the habeas court
          improperly concluded that he failed to establish that
          Kappes rendered ineffective assistance by failing to (a)
          consult with and/or call an expert on eyewitness identi-
          fication at the petitioner’s criminal trial and (b) impeach
          Phillips concerning her false testimony in the unrelated
          Turner case. We disagree.
             ‘‘Our standard of review of a habeas court’s judgment
          on ineffective assistance of counsel claims is well set-
          tled. In a habeas appeal, this court cannot disturb the
          underlying facts found by the habeas court unless they
          are clearly erroneous, but our review of whether the
          facts as found by the habeas court constituted a viola-
          tion of the petitioner’s constitutional right to effective
          assistance of counsel is plenary. . . .
            ‘‘To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of
          counsel, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the two-
          pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington,
          [466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674
            2
              Additionally, the court alternatively found that, even if it were assumed
          that the state was required to disclose Phillips’ false testimony, the evidence
          presented at the habeas trial did not establish that the state had failed to
          disclose it. This finding further supports our conclusion that the court did
          not abuse its discretion in denying certification to appeal with respect to
          this claim.
0, 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                      Page 11

       0 Conn. App. 1                                 ,0                           13
                           Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

       (1984)]. Strickland requires that a petitioner satisfy
       both a performance prong and a prejudice prong. To
       satisfy the performance prong, a claimant must demon-
       strate that counsel made errors so serious that counsel
       was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed . . . by
       the [s]ixth [a]mendment. . . . To satisfy the prejudice
       prong, a claimant must demonstrate that there is a rea-
       sonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofes-
       sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
       been different. . . . Because both prongs . . . must
       be established for a habeas petitioner to prevail, a court
       may [deny] a petitioner’s claim if he fails to meet either
       prong.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks
       omitted.) Godfrey-Hill v. Commissioner of Correction,
       221 Conn. App. 526, 535, 302 A.3d 923, cert. denied, 348
       Conn. 929, 304 A.3d 861 (2023).
                                             A
         The petitioner argues that the court improperly con-
       cluded that Kappes did not render ineffective assistance
       for failing to consult with and/or call an expert on eye-
       witness identification. We disagree.
          As noted by the habeas court, the petitioner was
       identified as the shooter at the petitioner’s criminal
       trial by Shauntay Ellis; Parrish, who had known the
       petitioner since middle school; James, whose best
       friend had a child with the petitioner; and Ellis.3 Also
       admitted at the petitioner’s criminal trial was a
       recording of Phillips’ 911 telephone call in which she
       identified the petitioner as the one who had shot Perry.
       See State v. Vega, supra, 181 Conn. App. 491. Addition-
       ally, at least two witnesses testified at the petitioner’s
       criminal trial that they had heard Kirkwood scream the
       petitioner’s name during the shooting. Id. Also admitted
         3
           Because Ellis refused to testify at the petitioner’s second trial, his prior
       identification testimony from the petitioner’s first trial was allowed to be
       read into the record.
Page 12                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                         0, 0

          14                    ,0                       0 Conn. App. 1
                         Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

          at the petitioner’s criminal trial were the spontaneous
          excited utterances identifying the petitioner as the
          shooter made by Kirkwood, when she telephoned her
          mother shortly after the shooting, and by Ellis, when
          he spoke to a police officer as he was being treated for
          his gunshot wounds in the hospital. Id., 464–78.

             At the habeas trial, the petitioner presented the testi-
          mony of Garrett Berman, a professor of psychology at
          Roger Williams University specializing in applied psy-
          chology, memory, and psychology in the legal system. In
          his testimony, Berman detailed factors that can reduce
          identification accuracy or impact memory, including
          lighting, stress, disguise, weapons focus, the length of
          time a witness is exposed to a particular event, alcohol
          use, and contamination, including witnesses talking to
          each other after an event. He testified that he would
          have been able to assist the petitioner’s trial counsel in
          numerous ways in connection with cross-examination
          and arguments and in pursuit of a motion to suppress.
          On cross-examination, he testified that an eyewitness’
          familiarity with a suspect would make an identification
          more reliable.

             The court determined that the petitioner failed to prove
          ineffective assistance of counsel. The court reasoned
          that the petitioner failed to connect Berman’s testimony
          or expertise ‘‘with any affirmative evidence as to how
          counsel’s consultation with such an expert would actu-
          ally have impacted the identification of the petitioner in
          this particular case. None of the identification witnesses
          from the criminal proceedings were called to testify at
          the habeas trial. The petitioner offered possibility and
          theory through his expert, but nothing in the way of
          actual evidence to undermine the fact that the witnesses
          who identified the petitioner at trial were personally
          familiar with him long before the shooting in question.
0, 0                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                        Page 13

       0 Conn. App. 1                        ,0                  15
                      Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

       The petitioner also failed to present any evidence dis-
       puting the procedures used to identify him in connec-
       tion with his arrest or during the trial. Given the above,
       the petitioner has failed to meet his burden to prove,
       under the circumstances of this particular case, that it
       was professionally unreasonable for [Kappes] not to
       have consulted with an expert in eyewitness identifica-
       tion or that use of such an expert would have had any
       reasonable likelihood of a different result.’’
         The court properly determined that Kappes did not
       render constitutionally deficient performance. Kappes
       testified at the habeas trial that the eyewitnesses knew
       the petitioner prior to the incident and that, just before
       the shooting, the petitioner pulled his mask down,
       revealing his entire face. Kappes stated that he did not
       consult with or present the testimony of an eyewitness
       identification expert because ‘‘raising that type of claim
       would tarnish my credibility with the jury by trying
       to convince them that multiple people who knew [the
       petitioner] for such a long time couldn’t recognize him
       when he pulled his mask down.’’
          ‘‘[T]here is no per se rule that requires a trial attorney
       to call an expert in a criminal case. . . . [F]ailing to
       retain or utilize an expert witness is not deficient when
       part of a legitimate and reasonable defense strategy.
       . . . Our appellate courts repeatedly have rejected a
       petitioner’s claim that his trial counsel rendered defi-
       cient performance by failing to call an expert witness
       at trial on the ground that trial counsel’s decision was
       supported by a legitimate strategic reason.’’ (Citations
       omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Brown v.
       Commissioner of Correction, 222 Conn. App. 278, 294–
       95, 304 A.3d 862 (2023), cert. denied, 348 Conn. 940,
       307 A.3d 275 (2024).
         Kappes offered a legitimate strategic reason for his
       decision in which he recognized that the primary con-
       cern with eyewitness identifications was not present
Page 14                   CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                         0, 0

          16                    ,0                       0 Conn. App. 1
                         Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

          because the eyewitnesses knew the petitioner prior to
          the shooting. ‘‘The primary concern expressed in cases
          discussing the problems with eyewitness identification
          relates to a witness observing and subsequently identi-
          fying a stranger. . . . Witnesses are very likely to rec-
          ognize under any circumstance the people in their lives
          with whom they are most familiar, and any prior
          acquaintance with another person substantially increases
          the likelihood of an accurate identification.’’ (Internal
          quotation marks omitted.) State v. Guilbert, 306 Conn.
          218, 260 n.39, 49 A.3d 705 (2012).
             The court also properly determined that the peti-
          tioner had not proven that there was a reasonable prob-
          ability that, had Kappes called Berman to testify at the
          petitioner’s criminal trial, the result of the trial likely
          would have been different. The witnesses knew the
          petitioner and therefore were likely to identify him
          accurately. See id. Berman testified on cross-examina-
          tion that familiarity makes an eyewitness identification
          more reliable. Additionally, as stated by the petitioner
          in his appellate brief, Kappes ‘‘did try to impeach all
          of [the eyewitnesses], testing their credibility and the
          consistency of their accounts.’’ Furthermore, as rea-
          soned by the habeas court, the petitioner offered no
          evidence to undermine the fact that the witnesses who
          identified the petitioner at his criminal trial knew him
          for a long time before the shooting occurred. For the
          foregoing reasons, we conclude that the court properly
          determined that the petitioner failed to establish that
          Kappes rendered ineffective assistance at trial by
          declining to consult with and/or call an expert on eye-
          witness identification, and, therefore, the court did not
          abuse its discretion in denying the petition for certifica-
          tion to appeal as to this claim.
                                         B
            The petitioner argues, in the alternative, that if the
          state had disclosed Phillips’ prior false testimony, then
0, 0                         CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                                     Page 15

       0 Conn. App. 1                                ,0                           17
                           Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

       Kappes rendered ineffective assistance for failing to
       impeach her concerning that false testimony. We dis-
       agree.
          The habeas court found, in the alternative, that the
       evidence adduced at the habeas trial did not establish
       that the state failed to disclose Phillips’ false testimony
       in the Turner case to the defense.4 The court concluded
       that the petitioner’s claim that Kappes rendered ineffec-
       tive assistance due to his failure to cross-examine Phil-
       lips adequately regarding her false testimony in the
       Turner case failed for lack of evidence. The court rea-
       soned that the petitioner failed to call Phillips to testify
       at the habeas trial ‘‘to offer the additional information
       he claims should have been elicited by more thorough
       cross-examination or to show how alternative cross-
       examination questions would have impacted [her] cred-
       ibility.’’
          We conclude that the habeas court properly con-
       cluded that the petitioner could not prevail on his claim
       due to a lack of evidence. ‘‘It is axiomatic that a habeas
       petitioner who claims prejudice based on counsel’s
       alleged failure to present helpful evidence from a partic-
       ular witness, must call that witness to testify before
       the habeas court or otherwise prove what the witness
       would or could have stated had he been questioned at
       trial, as the petitioner claims he should have been. See,
       e.g., Taft v. Commissioner of Correction, 159 Conn.
       App. 537, 554, 124 A.3d 1 (petitioner failed to prove
       prejudice when he ‘did not offer evidence regarding
       how [the witnesses] would have testified if they had
       been cross-examined [differently]’), cert. denied, 320
       Conn. 910, 128 A.3d 954 (2015).’’ Benitez v. Commis-
       sioner of Correction, 197 Conn. App. 344, 351, 231 A.3d
         4
           In so concluding, the court noted that Kappes testified at the habeas trial
       that he did not remember whether he had received any specific exculpatory
       information related to Phillips from the state and Regan had little memory
       of any specific discovery provided to the defense in this matter.
Page 16                    CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL                         0, 0

          18                     ,0                       0 Conn. App. 1
                          Vega v. Commissioner of Correction

          1285, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 924, 233 A.3d 1091 (2020).
          Accordingly, we conclude that the habeas court prop-
          erly determined that the petitioner failed to establish
          ineffective assistance of counsel, and, therefore, the
          court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition
          for certification to appeal as to this claim.
             For the foregoing reasons, we determine with respect
          to the substantive claims raised by the petitioner in the
          present appeal that he failed to demonstrate that those
          issues are debatable among jurists of reason, could be
          resolved by a court in a different manner, or deserve
          encouragement to proceed further. Accordingly, we
          conclude that the habeas court did not abuse its discre-
          tion in denying the petitioner’s petition for certification
          to appeal as to the substantive claims raised in the
          present appeal.
               The appeal is dismissed.
               In this opinion the other judges concurred.