Court Opinion

ID: 9775114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:44:08.80944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:20.586444
License: Public Domain

Justice NEHRING,
concurring and dissenting in part:
129 I concur in Part I of the majority's opinion.
{30 I am compelled to dissent, however, from the majority's conclusion that Messrs. Bond and Dorius conducted themselves in a *582manner that was unfair to Mr. Pyper. In my view, it was unreasonable for the court of appeals to hold that Mr. Pyper's former lawyers took unfair advantage of his ignorance of the redemption process when they refused to negotiate a settlement or communicate with Mr. Pyper.
31 First, I am troubled by the majority's pejorative characterization of Messrs. Bond's and Dorius's nonparticipation in settlement negotiations or conversations about the redemption process with Mr. Pyper. We have little information about the cireum-stances surrounding Mr. Bond's and Mr. Dorius's decision not to participate in settlement negotiations with Mr. Pyper. In fact, the record shows that a finding of unfair cireumstances arising before the expiration of the redemption period could stem from only three occurrences.1 First, Mr. Pyper unsuccessfully attempted to contact Mr. Bond for the first time eighteen days before the 180-day redemption period expired. Mr. Bond never returned the phone call. Second, five days later, Mr. Pyper spoke with Mr. Dorius who indicated that he either would not or could not negotiate any kind of a settlement without first speaking to Mr. Bond. Thereafter, neither Mr. Dorius nor Mr. Bond spoke with Mr. Pyper. And third, neither Mr. Bond nor Mr. Dorius responded to any of the daily telephone calls from Mr. Pyper.
132 I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that this conduct was an indication of "willingness to negotiate a settlement.2 Nor do I agree that such conduct would lead a reasonable person to conclude that the redemption process was not necessary to protect one's rights. Rather, I believe that the facts more reasonably convey that Mr. Bond persistently and consistently communicated his refusal to negotiate any kind of a settlement when he did not return a single telephone call from Mr. Pyper. Mr. Bond presented no explanation for his refusal to return Mr. Pyper's phone calls. He has no obligation to provide such an explanation. Instead, Mr. Dorius and Mr. Bond were perfectly within their rights to refuse to negotiate a settlement of their judgment against Mr. Pyper and to insist that Mr. Pyper follow the proper procedures if he wanted to redeem his property. Nothing that Mr. Pyper did, including persistent unreciprocated telephone calls placed to the Firm, changes the conclusion that Mr. Bond and Mr. Dorfus had no duty to correspond with Mr. Pyper.
133 Second, even if Messrs. Bond and Dorius had participated in negotiations with Mr. Pyper, we cannot know what the nature of that participation would have been or whether it would have prevented the controversy before us. Although he describes Mr. Bond's and Mr. Dortus's conduct as unfair, Mr, Pyper has presented no evidence that these actions caused him to forgo the opportunity to redeem his property. Instead, Mr. Pyper's failure to redeem and the forfeiture of this right were more likely based on his ignorance that the law allowed him to unilaterally redeem his property within 180 days of the sheriffs sale. Nothing in the record suggests that Mr. Bond or Mr. Dorius created, encouraged, or exploited Mr. Pyper's ignorance. However, we can be sure that Mr. Pyper had no reason to expect that Mr. Bond and/or Mr. Dortus would rescue him from his ignorance given that they had already pursued an action, obtained a judgment, and levied upon Mr. Pyper's property. Quite simply, Messrs. Bond's and Dorius's interests were adverse to those of their former client, and they had no reason to save him from his ignorance.
34 The court of appeals concluded that "[als Pyper's former counsel, Bond and Dori-us had some obligation not to take advantage of Pyper's known ignorance.3 Under Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.9(c)(1), "(al *583lawyer who has formerly represented a client . shall not thereafter ... use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage of the former client.4 However, any knowledge regarding Mr. Pyper's ignorance of redemption law was not related to Bond's or Dorius's representation of Mr. Py-per in the probate matter, but instead arose after their representation had ended in the context of their fee dispute. While Messrs. Bond and Dorius have an ethical obligation not to affirmatively mislead Mr. Pyper, they have no obligation to advise him regarding the law onee their representation ends and their interests become adverse.5 Without some affirmative legal or ethical duty to communicate, Messrs. Bond's and Dortus's non-communication cannot create even the "slight cireumstances of unfairness" upon which the majority opinion relies for its result.
T35 Finally, we should not overlook the fact that Mr. Pyper was represented by counsel during and after the redemption period. While the record is not entirely clear, if Messrs. Bond and Dortus were aware that Mr. Pyper was represented by legal counsel, they had an ethical obligation to refrain from communicating directly with Mr. Pyper or returning any of his phone calls.6 More importantly, it is fundamental to a lawyer's representation that he protect his client from the deleterious effects of ignorance of the law.7 Mr. Pyper's lawyer had a duty to inform him of his rights in the redemption process and to timely assert those rights on Mr. Pyper's behalf, Given that Messrs. Bond and Dorius no longer represented Mr. Pyper, that their interests were adverse, and that Mr. Pyper had obtained separate legal counsel, I do not see any unfairness in requiring Mr. Pyper to timely assert his redemption rights.
1 36 I would therefore reverse the court of appeals.
137 Justice LEE concurs in Justice NEHRING's concurring and dissenting opinion.

. The court of appeals' and the majority's opinions outline additional interactions between the parties that occurred after May 8, 2007, when the redemption period expired. However, the relevant inquiry is whether there were "slight circumstances of unfairness during the redemption period caused by conduct of the party bene-fitted by the sale." See supra 123 (emphasis added). As a result, any events occurring after the redemption period expired are irrelevant to our analysis.

. Supra

. Pyper v. Bond, 2009 UT App 331, ¶ 17, 224 P.3d 713.

. Urau R. Pro's Conpuct 1.9(c)(1) (emphasis added).

. Under Utah Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6(b)(5), an attorney "may reveal information relating to the representation of a client ... to establish a claim or defense ... in a controversy between the lawyer and the client." If the duty of confidentiality is abridged because attorney client interests become adverse due to a fee dispute, it reasonably follows that the attorney no longer has an obligation to advise the former client of the law with respect to their dispute for the very reason that their interests are adverse.

. Uran R. Pror't Conpucr 4.2(a) ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter.").

. See Urag R. Pror'c Conpuct pmbl. ("As a representative of clients, a lawyer performs various functions. As an advisor, a lawyer provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights and obligations and explains their practical implications. As advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system.").