Court Opinion

ID: 9896169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 17:10:13.428275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:10.388209
License: Public Domain

J-A22042-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  ANTONIO TREVELLE LANKO                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1477 WDA 2022

            Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 1, 2022
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000022-2018

BEFORE: BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                              FILED: November 9, 2023

       Appellant, Antonio Trevelle Lanko, appeals pro se from the order entered

in the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas, which denied his first petition

filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 We affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On

August 7, 2019, a jury convicted Appellant of third-degree murder, receiving

stolen property, possession of a firearm prohibited, firearms not to be carried

without a license, and tampering with physical evidence. The court sentenced

Appellant on September 26, 2019, to an aggregate term of 31 to 62 years’

imprisonment. This Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on November

13, 2020, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on April 20,

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1 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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2021.     See Commonwealth v. Lanko, 242 A.3d 411 (Pa.Super. 2020)

(unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 252 A.3d 1072

(2021).

        On January 5, 2022, Appellant timely filed the current PCRA petition pro

se. The court appointed PCRA counsel, who filed a Turner/Finley2 no-merit

letter and request to withdraw on October 7, 2022. On October 24, 2022,

Appellant filed a pro se response.             The court issued notice of its intent to

dismiss the petition without a hearing on November 8, 2022, pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P 907, and granted counsel’s request to withdraw. On December

1, 2022, the court denied PCRA relief. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal

on December 19, 2022, along with a voluntary Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. 3

        Appellant raises one issue for our review:

           Was trial counsel ineffective for failing to raise the issue of
           the misleading jury charge?

(Appellant’s Brief at 4).

        “Our standard of review of [an] order granting or denying relief under

the PCRA calls upon us to determine whether the determination of the PCRA

court is supported by the evidence of record and is free of legal error.”

Commonwealth v. Parker, 249 A.3d 590, 594 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

____________________________________________

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988) and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).

3 The court subsequently ordered Appellant to file a Rule 1925(b) statement,

and he re-filed the same concise statement.

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Commonwealth v. Barndt, 74 A.3d 185, 191-92 (Pa.Super. 2013)). “The

PCRA court’s factual findings are binding if the record supports them, and we

review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.” Commonwealth v. Prater,

256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 268 A.3d

386 (2021). Further, a petitioner is not entitled to a PCRA hearing as a matter

of right; the PCRA court can decline to hold a hearing if there is no genuine

issue concerning any material fact, the petitioner is not entitled to PCRA relief,

and     no   purpose       would    be   served   by   any    further   proceedings.

Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335 (Pa.Super. 2012).

        Appellant argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request

a     jury   instruction    on     voluntary   manslaughter    and/or    involuntary

manslaughter.4 Appellant asserts that trial counsel’s failure to object to the

jury charge prevented Appellant from raising an issue challenging the jury

instructions on direct appeal. In the absence of such instructions, Appellant

insists the jury was bound to convict him of murder. Appellant concludes trial

counsel’s failure to request a jury charge on voluntary and/or involuntary

manslaughter prejudiced him, and this Court must grant a new trial or other

____________________________________________

4  We observe that the court did issue a jury charge regarding involuntary
manslaughter. (See N.T. Trial, 8/7/19, at 354-56). Trial counsel also
requested a charge on voluntary manslaughter, but the court declined to give
it where the evidence of record did not support that jury instruction. (See id.
at 337, 340-41). Nevertheless, trial counsel did not object to the court’s
failure to issue a voluntary manslaughter instruction at the conclusion of the
charge. (Id. at 363).

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appropriate relief. We disagree.

      “Counsel   is   presumed     to   have   rendered   effective   assistance.”

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal

denied, 663 Pa. 418, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).

         [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
         defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
         ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
         of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
         process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
         could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to
         prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying
         claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no
         reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction;
         and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is
         a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
         proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019),

appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).    The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for

ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011).

      As a preliminary matter, we observe that Appellant has not developed

his argument adequately on appeal.        Specifically, although Appellant cites

general law concerning the ineffective assistance of counsel test and the

requirement to preserve a challenge to a jury charge, he does not cite any law

regarding voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter.           Likewise,

Appellant fails to explain how his claim has arguable merit. In other words,

Appellant does not explain why he would have been entitled to a jury charge

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on voluntary manslaughter or involuntary manslaughter based on the facts of

his case.

       Similarly, Appellant does not explain why trial counsel lacked a

reasonable basis for failing to request these charges.        Instead, Appellant

merely states: “Arguable merit can be proven by the reasonable basis of [trial

counsel’s] inaction.” (Appellant’s Brief at 10). Thus, Appellant has failed to

develop his ineffectiveness claim in a meaningful way on appeal.            See

Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012 (Pa.Super. 2014) (holding

appellant’s failure to develop argument or present pertinent authority

constituted waiver of claim on appeal; appellant failed to develop argument

that counsel had no reasonable basis not to request additional jury instruction,

or reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s alleged unprofessional error

in not requesting second instruction, result of proceedings would have been

different; this Court shall not develop argument for appellant or scour record

to find evidence to support argument). Therefore, Appellant’s sole issue on

appeal is waived.5 Accordingly, we affirm.

____________________________________________

5 Moreover, Appellant did not mention in his Rule 1925(b) statement trial
counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness concerning a voluntary manslaughter
instruction. Instead, Appellant presented his claim as follows:

            Trial counsel failed to object, and/or raise on appeal, the
            judge’s misleading jury charge, that left jurors to believe
            that they had no choice but to find [A]ppellant guilty of 3rd
            degree murder. [A]ppellant is innocent of third degree
            murder, and involuntary manslaughter was a viable option,
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -5-
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       Order affirmed.

 11/9/2023

____________________________________________

          but the misleading jury charge, led the jury to believe that
          it was not [an] option they could receive.

(Rule 1925(b) Statement, filed 12/19/22, at 1).             Thus, Appellant’s
ineffectiveness claim regarding counsel’s failure to preserve a claim of error
concerning the lack of a voluntary manslaughter instruction is waived on this
basis as well. See Commonwealth v. Nobles, 941 A.2d 50 (Pa.Super. 2008)
(explaining that where appellant files concise statement on his own accord,
he is limited on appeal to raising only those issues he presented in his
voluntary Rule 1925(b) statement).

Further, we reiterate that the court did issue a jury charge regarding
involuntary manslaughter. To the extent Appellant purports to complain that
the court’s instruction was somehow inadequate, Appellant fails to develop
that argument on appeal. See Charleston, supra.

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