Court Opinion

ID: 9466633
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:21:26.000543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:50.382389
License: Public Domain

SEYMOUR, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority holds that there is no search or seizure at the termination point of a “controlled delivery” and, therefore, a search warrant is not required. Because the majority’s “single search” analysis effectively insulates Fourth Amendment violations from challenge by Andrews, I must respectfully dissent.
The majority relies on our decision in United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1975), where we reviewed a similar governmental seizure of narcotics after airline officials had discovered the contraband. In holding that there was no separate search or seizure at the place the heroin was delivered, this court stated that “official dominion continued unbroken because close surveillance followed the seized contraband, insuring that it remain within official possession.” Id. at 1313; and see United States v. Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320,1325 n. 8 (10th Cir. 1979). While recognizing that Ford cannot be overturned except by an en banc decision of this court, I cannot agree with its reasoning or result.
The proper inquiry is whether the government conducted a new or different search at the point of delivery of the package. The conclusion in Ford that there is no second search is based on the assumption that the contraband remained in “official possession” until the arrest was completed. However, Andrews is charged with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. It was only at the point of delivery in Denver that Andrews was capable of committing the crime with which he is charged. The government may not claim that it had sufficient dominion over the cocaine to obviate consideration of Andrews' Fourth Amendment rights while at the same time it is prosecuting him for a crime in which possession of the seized evidence is itself an essential element. “Proper administration of criminal justice should not include such contradictory assertions of governmental power.” United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365, 1370-1371 (8th Cir. 1976). Because Andrews could not be charged with the crime until he was arrested with the package in Denver, the police activity there must be viewed as separate and apart from the original seizure in Miami.
Moreover, regardless of the nature of the crime, the Ford analysis results in complete denial of Fourth Amendment protection to *655an addressee of a package where the contents of that package have been previously discovered at the point of shipment. As the district court below reluctantly recognized, and the majority here applauds, the Fourth Amendment is inapplicable at the point of shipment where the shipper opens the package and turns the contents over to the government, because the search was conducted by a private party. Nevertheless, I do not believe a lawful private search should always insulate subsequent police action, regardless of the circumstances, from the constitutional guarantees afforded by the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, even had the search at the point of shipment been purely governmental, the case of Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), which was decided after Ford, makes it extremely doubtful that an addressee of a package has a sufficiently legitimate expectation of privacy at the point of shipment to raise Fourth Amendment questions concerning a search made at that time.
Under the Ford analysis, although the addressee’s rights have ripened at the point of delivery, there is no search or seizure to be challenged. Thus, the addressee has no point at which he may assert a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. It is my opinion that both the majority’s result and reasoning unconstitutionally impinge on Andrews’ rights. I would hold that the search by different police in a different state at a different time constituted a new search. The majority’s conclusion, based on Ford, carves an exception to the Fourth Amendment where no exception is warranted.
Turning to the validity of the “second” search, this time by government officials in Denver, the determinative question is whether the search was unreasonable and therefore proscribed by the Fourth Amendment. The search was not unreasonable if Andrews did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the sealed package which was delivered to him. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978).
In United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 97 S.Ct. 2476, 53 L.Ed.2d 538 (1977), it was held that one has a legitimate expectation of privacy in a locked footlocker. Recently, the Court held that such an expectation of privacy also exists in an unlocked suitcase. Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979).
Here the search involved the opening of a sealed package addressed to Andrews and picked up by him at the airport. The mere surrender of the package to a carrier for shipment has been held not to forfeit the right to privacy in the contents of the package. Ex Parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 24 L.Ed. 877 (1877); Corngold v. United States, 367 F.2d 1, 7 (9th Cir. 1966). Although the law permits the carrier’s inspection of Andrews’ package, the regulation providing this right may not be extended to remove all legitimate expectation of privacy from governmental intrusion into packages that have been shipped. United States v. Kelly, 529 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1976). Certainly an individual’s expectation of privacy in a sealed package is as legitimate as his expectation of privacy in an unlocked suitcase. See Sanders, 99 S.Ct. at 2592 n. 9. And see United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d 1038 (2d Cir. 1979) (by sealing marijuana inside a plain cardboard box, the defendants manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public inspection).
The majority states that Andrews could not have had an expectation of privacy in the package “after he had been informed by Agent Roth that it contained drugs.” Supra at 652. However, Andrews did not know Roth was a government agent. Simply because an individual shares his privacy with a few others, it does not follow that he has voluntarily surrendered his legitimate expectation of privacy from improper governmental intrusion. Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968). Thus, in Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52, 88 S.Ct. 507, 511, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), the Court stated:
“What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment pro*656tection. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210, 87 S.Ct. 424, 17 L.Ed.2d 312, 315; United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed.2d 1202, 1204. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected. See Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 80 S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688; Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 733, 24 L.Ed. 877, 879.” (Emphasis added).
Moreover, Andrews paid Agent Roth $50 to agree not to report the contents of the package to the police. In Rakas, 439 U.S. at 149, 99 S.Ct. at 433, the Court considered it relevant that in Katz, 389 U.S. at 352, 88 S.Ct. at 511, the defendant paid for his privacy:
“Likewise in Katz, the defendant occupied the telephone booth, shut the door behind him to exclude all others and paid the toll, which ‘entitled [him] to assume that the words he utter[ed] into the mouthpiece [would] not be broadcast to the world.’ Id., [389 U.S.] at 352, [88 S.Ct. 507, at 512], Katz . . . could legitimately expect privacy in the areas which were the subject of the search and seizure [he] sought to contest.” (Emphasis added).
The Rakas Court also noted that in Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 80 S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 (1960), the defendant had “hired” the taxicab, thereby distinguishing Rios from Rakas. 439 U.S. at 149 n. 16, 99 S.Ct. at 433 n. 16. In the instant case, Andrews similarly paid to maintain his privacy. Under these circumstances, I would hold that Andrews’ expectation of privacy was legitimate and reasonable.
It is my opinion that this case is controlled by Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 99 S.Ct. 2586, 2590-91, 61 L.Ed.2d 235 (1979). After noting that ordinarily a search must be both reasonable and pursuant to a properly obtained warrant, the Court said:
“[A] few ‘jealously and carefully drawn’ exceptions provide for those cases where the societal costs of obtaining a warrant, such as danger to law officers or the risk of loss or destruction of evidence, outweigh the reasons for prior recourse to a neutral magistrate. See United States v. United States District Court, supra [407 U.S. 297] at 318 [92 S.Ct. 2125, at 2137, 32 L.Ed.2d 752]. But because each exception to the warrant requirement invariably impinges to some extent on the protective purpose of the Fourth Amendment, the few situations in which a search may be conducted in the absence of a warrant have been carefully delineated and ‘the burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it.’ United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 [72 S.Ct. 93, 95, 96 L.Ed. 59] (1951). See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 [89 S.Ct. 2034, 2039, 23 L.Ed.2d 685] (1969); Katz v. United States, supra, [389 U.S.] at 357, [88 S.Ct. 507, at 514]. Moreover, we have limited the reach of each exception to that which is necessary to accommodate the identified needs of society. See Mincey v. Arizona, supra [437 U.S. 385], at 393 [98 S.Ct. 2408 at 2414, 57 L.Ed.2d 290]; United States v. Chadwick, supra [433 U.S.] at 15 [97 S.Ct. 2476] (1977); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, supra [403 U.S. 443], at 455 [91 S.Ct. 2022 at 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564].”
In the case before us, the government admitted in oral argument that no exigencies were present and, after impounding the package, a warrant could easily have been obtained. While Roth’s “knowledge” of the contents of the package, which- is based on telephone information from Miami and not his own personal knowledge, provides ample probable cause, it cannot be a substitute for a search warrant. Sanders teaches us that:
“Where — as in the' present case — the police, without endangering themselves or risking loss of the evidence, lawfully have detained one suspected of criminal activity and secured his suitcase, they should delay the search thereof until after judicial approval has been obtained. In this way, the unconstitutional right of suspects to prior judicial review of searches will be fully protected.”
Id. at 2594.
In considering warrantless searches, we must be mindful of Mr. Justice Bradley’s *657admonition in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 635, 6 S.Ct. 524, 535, 29 L.Ed. 746 (1886), which is repeated in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2031, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971):
“ ‘[Ijllegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing . by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction deprives them of half their efficacy, and leads to gradual depreciation of the right, as if it consisted more in sound than in substance. It is the duty of courts to be watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy encroachments thereon.’ ” I would affirm the district court’s grant-
ing of Andrews’ Motion to Suppress.