Court Opinion

ID: 9696072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:34:57.684819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:18.152071
License: Public Domain

Blandin, J.,
dissenting: The case of Neault v. Company, 86 N. H. 231, decided in 1933, makes clear that under our Workmen’s Compensation Law (RSA ch. 281), the New Hampshire rule is unlike that in some other jurisdictions upon which the majority opinion relies. In the Neault case, the court speaks as follows: “The principle that if it is reasonable to submit to an operation, the consequences of a refusal are not a part of the disability for which compensation is to be given, is generally recognized. It is stated in various forms of expression. Often distinctions between minor and major operations, the matter of amputations, and the chances or assurance of success of the operation are treated as legal propositions in their bearing on the reasonableness of incurring the operation, where here they are items of fact for the trier to take into account.” (Emphasis supplied). Id., 233.
The court also says that the test is the simple one which has always been applied to the effect that “Reasonable conduct being that ordinarily exercised by men in general, all persons who are hurt are expected to take proper care of themselves.” Id., 231. It holds that “The usual rule of distinctions between law and fact is to be employed,” and says that “If the claimant is not to be subjected to unusual risk and danger arising from the anesthetic to be employed or from the nature of the proposed operation, it is the claimant’s duty to submit, if it fairly appears that the result of such operation will be a substantial physical gain.” Id., 234. In the present case, the Court found all essential facts against the plaintiff, faithfully following the above rule, even to the extent of using its precise wording.
The Neault opinion makes it plain that the test adopted in the majority opinion, “was the employee’s conduct in refusing to submit to an operation so arbitrary and unreasonable that the continued disability could be said to have resulted from his own misconduct,” *397is not in accord with our law. Furthermore, this test in effect shifts the burden of proof from the plaintiff to the defendant. Unless changed by the Legislature, as in the matter of contributory negligence in tort cases (RSA 507:8) the burden remains on the plaintiff to satisfy the trier that his conduct is reasonable. The direction that the Law be construed liberally is not an authorization to rewrite it. Bodeau v. Bodeau, 92 N. H. 183, 184.
The Workmen’s Compensation Law, since the Neault decision nearly thirty years ago, has been re-enacted without relevant change, and that decision is therefore binding on this court. As was unequivocally stated in Bilodeau v. Insurance Co., 84 N. H. 405, the court must follow the principle “that the reenactment of a statute without change adopts its prior judicial interpretation, a rule announced as early as 1816 in Tomson v. Ward, 1 N. H. 9, and since followed consistently . . . . ” Id., 407. See also, Hackett v. Railroad, 95 N. H. 45. In fact, we have approved the Neault holding as recently as in Morono v. Cody, 99 N. H. 479, 482.
The cases of Gidley v. Industrial Commission, 355 Ill. 586; Evans v. Stearns-Rogers Manufacturing Co., 253 F. 2d 383 (10th Cir. 1958); and Mancini v. Superior Court, 78 R. I. 373, relied upon in the majority opinion, are not authority for it here. In Gidley, not only were the findings diametrically opposed to those in our case, but the Illinois rule differs radically from ours in that it holds: “In such a case it is proper to resolve all doubts in favor of the employee.” Id., 593 (Emphasis supplied).
In the Evans case, the court applies the rule that the distinctions between minor and major operation and the chances of success are to be treated as legal propositions in their bearing on the reasonableness of incurring the operation. This is directly contrary to the Neault case, which holds that these circumstances are items of fact for the trier to take into account.
In Mancini v. Superior Court, the opinion says that no workman need submit “to a surgical operation of any extent or degree in order to retain the benefits of the act,” (lb., 382) and furthermore there was no finding in that case that the operation was not dangerous to life or limb or that it was reasonably calculated to help the plaintiff. Again, the implication in the proposed opinion, relying on Mancini, that silence in RSA ch. 281 on the question of whether the injured workman shall or shall not submit to an operation, is a strong indication that the Legislature did not intend to impose on the employees a mandate to so submit or else suffer *398a loss of compensation payments, is not only unsupported in our law, but is directly refuted by the Neault case. This opinion holds that our Law does require that the workman, to retain the full benefits of compensation, must act reasonably even to the extent of undergoing an operation.
Another difficulty which I have with the majority opinion is that the Court made a finding of fact which was unexcepted to by the plaintiff at the trial and which raises an issue neither briefed nor argued before us, namely, the Court found that on October 20, 1955 and again in October, 1957, the plaintiff’s own doctor recommended the operation. It is also undisputed upon the record that the only other physician to testify was of the opinion from December 2, 1955, when he first examined the plaintiff, up to and including the time of trial, that an operation was advisable. It thus appears that from the time of the injury until after October, 1957, there was no medical evidence whatsoever to support his refusal to be operated upon. I am unable to perceive how, under any theory, his conduct during that time could be found reasonable. Yet the majority opinion ignores this point altogether.
In conclusion,, it appears that the Neault case laid down the rule for this jurisdiction. Although it has had repeated opportunities to change it, the Legislature has not seen fit to do so. Under all our established law, we are therefore bound by the construction placed upon this statute by our court in the Neault case. Bilodeau v. Insurance Co., supra, 84 N. H. 405, 407. As we recently observed in Prassas v. Company, 100 N. H. 209, 211, however appealing the arguments for reaching a different conclusion, “the stark fact remains that the remedy for this situation is legislative and not judicial.”
It seems to me that in overruling the Neault decision, we are in effect putting into operation a different statute than the one enacted and approved by our Legislature. I am convinced that the preservation of the principle of the separation of powers, as enunciated in Prassas, is more important than reaching what may seem a. desirable result in the present case. I would therefore deny the appeal and uphold the rulings and decree of the Trial Court.