Court Opinion

ID: 9702316
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:06:41.513133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:36.535223
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. Respectfully, I believe that the majority has misread the trial court opinion as requiring that the Commonwealth produce direct evidence that the items in question were in fact contraband. Rather, the lower court made it clear that the Commonwealth failed to meet its evidentia-ry burden because it did not, through direct or circumstantial evidence, provide a direct link between the property at issue and a criminal activity. This requirement of some form of direct link or nexus between the goods subject to forfeiture and a criminal act was discussed in Commonwealth v. Landy, 240 Pa.Super. 458, 362 A.2d 999 (1976), an opinion that was cited below.
In support of its conclusion that the lower court imposed a burden on the Commonwealth of producing direct evidence, the majority quotes a portion of the trial court opinion which states: “that property cannot be forfeited as derivative contraband since it has not been directly traced to illegal activity.” I submit that the above quote is a close paraphrase of the language in Landy and represents an accurate statement of the law.
I am also concerned with the majority’s emphasis on the appellee’s failure to testify or present evidence that the *136property in dispute was in fact owned by him. The burden at all times was on the Commonwealth to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that these items were derivative contraband. It was appellee’s absolute right to put the Commonwealth to its proofs, and we cannot, as the majority seems to suggest, draw any inferences whatever from appellee’s decision to allow this case to stand or fall on the Commonwealth’s evidence alone.
Finally, I would agree with the lower court’s determination that the Commonwealth failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the property at issue was contraband subject to forfeiture. The primary thrust of the Commonwealth’s case was that this property was found along with other items which were admittedly stolen goods, and that it therefore constitutes derivative contraband. In the nearly eight years that the property has remained in police custody, the Commonwealth has been unable to establish that these items are owned by anyone other than appellee. I would find that the Commonwealth’s evidence amounts to little more than an assertion of “contraband by association”, and is insufficient to overcome its burden of proof in this matter.