Court Opinion

ID: 9789482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:36:57.846681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:22.524832
License: Public Domain

Justice LOHR
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur in part II of the majority opinion, affirming the Colorado Court of Appeals’ reversal of the judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and in part IV, reversing the court of appeals' determination that the verdict be modified to make the defendants jointly and severally liable. I disagree, however, with the court’s analysis in part III, in which it adopts section 13-25-127(2), 6A C.R.S. (1987), as the burden of proof governing punitive damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). Section 13-25-127(2) permits punitive damages only when the jury finds “beyond a reasonable doubt” that a defendant's actions satisfy the relevant standard of conduct for award of such damages. I do not believe that Colorado’s statutory burden of proof is applicable to section 1983 claims. First, federal common law governs punitive damages under section 1983, so uniform federal damages standards- displace any state punitive damages rules. Second, the Colorado burden of proof for punitive damages is incompatible with the section 1983 punitive damages remedy. I would hold that “preponderance of the evidence” is the burden of proof for punitive damages in section 1983 actions, based on federal common law.
I.
Section 1983 creates “a species of tort liability” to remedy violations of federal civil rights by those wielding state authority. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 34, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1629, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983) (quoting Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 1047, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978)). That section -provides “a uniquely federal remedy,” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239, 92 S.Ct. 2151, 2160, 32 L.Ed.2d 705 (1972), that encompasses all necessary and appropriate remedies, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239, 90 S.Ct. 400, 405, 24 L.Ed.2d 386 (1969), and includes punitive damages, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1473-74, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). Thus, the burden of proof for punitive damages, whether drawn from federal or state sources, is a federal standard responsive to the injury inflicted by the deprivation of a federal right. Sullivan, 396 U.S. at 240, 90 S.Ct. at 406. The federal rights protected by section 1983 have the same content in each state; the remedy for their deprivation should not vary with the forum.
The federal cases fashioning the section 1983 punitive damages remedies have created uniform federal rules. In Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983), the United States Supreme Court examined the degree of misconduct justifying the assessment of punitive damages. The Court analyzed general common law principles concerning punitive damages and concluded that in the majority of the states, “punitive damages in tort cases may be awarded not only for actual intent to injure or evil motive, but also for recklessness, serious indifference to or dis*1095regard for the rights of others, or even gross negligence.” Id. at 48, 103 S.Ct. at 1636. The Court then adopted the “reckless or callous indifference” standard of conduct as the threshold of liability in section 1983 actions. Id. at 56, 103 S.Ct. at 1640. Although state common law informed the Court’s decision, the Court did not adopt the local standard of conduct of the forum state. Instead, the Court adopted a uniform federal standard. Even the Smith dissent did not question the propriety of a uniform federal punitive damages standard. This uniform federal standard is necessarily inconsistent with the incorporation of the punitive damages standard of conduct of the forum state.
Local state restrictions on punitive damages have been repeatedly rejected in favor of uniform federal punitive damages rules. Punitive damages may be awarded under section 1983 even when local state law would bar their recovery. Garrick v. City and County of Denver, 652 F.2d 969, 971 (10th Cir.1981) (Colorado standards for evaluating excessiveness of punitive damages inapplicable); Thompson v. Village of Hales Corners, 115 Wis.2d 289, 340 N.W.2d 704, 711 (1983) (state ceiling on liability inapplicable to section 1983 actions). A section 1983 plaintiff may recover punitive damages without receiving compensatory damages, see Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1473 n. 9, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1979),1 despite contrary local law. Erwin v. County of Manitowoc, 872 F.2d 1292, 1299 (7th Cir.1989). In City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 271, 101 S.Ct. 2748, 2761, 69 L.Ed.2d 616 (1981), the Court held that municipalities are immune from punitive damages in section 1983 actions, an immunity conferred by federal law rather than state law.
Uniform federal rules govern the availability, scope, standard of actionable conduct, municipal immunity, ceilings, and other criteria concerning damage remedies in section 1983 actions. The “federal common law of damages” has imposed uniformity when enforcing the Civil Rights Act. Erwin, 872 F.2d at 1299 (federal law allows punitive damages award despite no compensatory damages award and despite state law to the contrary); Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194 (3d Cir.1989) (federal law controls availability of prejudgment interest). The burden of proof would be a peculiar omission from this federal common law; in fact, lower federal courts have recognized that federal rules control the burden of proof for punitive damages. Coulter v. Vitale, 882 F.2d 1286, 1289 (7th Cir.1989) (federal standard for burden of proof, not Illinois’s standard, governs § 1983 punitive damages awards; failure to object to jury instructions made it unnecessary to delineate the federal standard); Bird v. Figel, 725 F.Supp. 406, 411-12 (N.D.Ind.1989). Furthermore, because several states bar punitive damages awards, see 1 J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, Punitive Damages: Law & Practice, §§ 4.07-4.12, 4.19 (1985 & 1990 Supp.) (listing states that bar punitive damages), a federal rule on the burden of proof for punitive damages must be developed for use in those states.
The majority holds, however, that state law should be applied by reason of 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). That statute provides that protection and vindication of civil rights shall be governed by “the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect” but that the state law of the forum governs civil rights actions “in all cases where [the federal laws] are not adapted to the object, or deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies_” Id.2 Sec*1096tion 1988 envisions a three step process, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 267, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1942, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985).3 In the initial step, as it applies to punitive damages, a court must determine whether federal law is suitable to give effect to the section 1983 punitive damages remedy. Because the federal common law of damages provides the remedy, the section 1988 process terminates, and the consideration of the applicability of state law is unnecessary. “[R]esort to state law — the second step in the process — should not be undertaken before principles of federal law are exhausted.” Wilson, 471 U.S. at 268, 105 S.Ct. at 1943. The uniquely federal nature of the punitive damages remedy requires uniformity, and the federal courts have responded by crafting uniform federal punitive damages rules.4 Thus, the federal common law of damages leaves no room for incorporation of local state rules on the burden of proof.5
II.
The Colorado punitive damages law does not embody the federal common law of damages for section 1983 actions, for it is incompatible with the policies and purposes underlying that statute. Colorado has taken a restrictive approach towards the imposition of punitive damages. At the time of the trial, the jury could award reasonable punitive damages in appropriate cases only when the injury complained of was “attended by circumstances of fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton and reckless disregard *1097of the injured party’s rights and feelings.. .§ 13-21-102, 6A C.R.S. (1985).6 The party seeking punitive damages was required to prove “beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of a wrong under the circumstances set forth in section 13-21-102 [fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings].” Id. at § 13-25-127(2). Section 13-21-102, 6A C.R.S. (1985), enacted in 1889, displaced the law created by earlier cases completely banning punitive damage awards. See Greeley, S.L. & P. Ry. v. Yeager, 11 Colo. 345, 350, 18 P. 211, 214 (1888); Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119 (1884).
The statutes governing punitive damages awards in Colorado at the time of the trial in the present case reflected Colorado’s historical and continuing restrictions on punitive damages. Punitive damages are available only pursuant to statute and therefore are not recoverable in equity actions. Kaitz v. District Court, 650 P.2d 553, 556 (Colo.1982). A major legislative purpose underlying section 13-21-102 as it existed at the time of the trial was to avoid purely punitive civil damages awards. Wagner v. Dan Unfug Motors, Inc., 35 Colo.App. 102, 106, 529 P.2d 656, 659 (1974). In addition, the Colorado courts have strictly examined punitive damages awards to ensure they were not excessive. See Comment, Exemplary Damages — In Colorado — Punitive or Puny?, 35 Colo.L.Rev. 394, 394-96 (1963) (cases generally limit punitive damages awards to the amount of compensatory damages). Colorado’s restrictive policies conflict with the liberal availability of the section 1983 punitive damages remedy. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2307, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988). (The section 1983 remedy must “be ‘accorded a sweep as broad as its language.’ ” (quoting United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 801, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1160, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966))). “The importation of the policies and purposes of the States on matters of civil rights is not the primary office of the borrowing provision in § 1988....” Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 269, 105 S.Ct. at 1943.
At the time of trial, Colorado required fraud, malice or insult, or a wanton and reckless disregard of the injured party’s rights and feelings to impose punitive damages, a higher degree of misconduct than the section 1983 threshold standard of reckless disregard or callous indifference. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 1640, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983). Wanton and reckless conduct creates a substantial risk of harm to another and “is purposefully performed with an awareness of the risk in disregard of the consequences.” Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 215 (Colo.1984) (emphasis added). Thus, the conduct must be performed with “an evil intent” or with “wanton and reckless disregard ... evidencing] a wrongful motive.” Pizza v. Wolf Creek Ski Development Corp., 711 P.2d 671, 684 (Colo.1985) (quoting Frick v. Abell, 198 Colo. 508, 511, 602 P.2d 852, 854 (1979), and Ress v. Rediess, 130 Colo. 572, 579, 278 P.2d 183, 187 (1954)). This standard of evil intent or wrongful motive exceeds the section 1983 threshold. Unlike other tort plaintiffs in Colorado, section 1983 plaintiffs may recover punitive damages despite receiving no compensatory damage award. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1473 n. 9, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980); Erwin v. *1098County of Manitowoc, 872 F.2d 1292, 1299 (7th Cir.1989). Garrick v. City & County of Denver, 652 F.2d 969, 971 (10th Cir.1981), held the Colorado standards on excessive punitive damages inapplicable to section 1983 actions. These conflicts between the Colorado punitive damages policy and the section 1983 remedy illustrate the incompatibility between the Colorado punitive damages provisions and the federal common law of damages.
Utilization of Colorado’s elevated burden of proof in section 1983 actions is inappropriate in light of this incompatibility. The third step of the process of applying section 1988 requires the rejection of state law when that law is inconsistent with federal law. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 269, 105 S.Ct. at 1943. The “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof is an integral part of the Colorado punitive damages system, and embodies Colorado’s restrictive policy. Because that policy conflicts with the liberal federal policy, Colorado’s burden of proof cannot be applied in section 1983 actions.7
The “beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof for punitive damages is particularly inappropriate in civil rights cases. The 1871 Congress that enacted section 1983 held a mistrust for the factfinding processes of state institutions. See Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 506, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2563, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982) (discussing legislative history). In fact, Congress granted federal court jurisdiction for section 1983 because “federal courts would be less susceptible to local prejudice and to the existing defects in the factfind-ing processes of the state courts.” Id. These factfinding defects would prevent aggrieved parties from vindicating their civil rights in the state forum. An extremely elevated burden of proof would compound the perceived defects. The additional obstacle of an elevated burden of proof is unwarranted given the Congress’s mistrust of the factfinding process. A very demanding burden of proof8 severely limits the availability of punitive damages. However, punitive damages are especially appropriate to redress violations by government officials of citizens’ constitutional rights.9 Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 22, 100 S.Ct. 1468, 1473, 64 L.Ed.2d 15 (1980). The severe limitation does not harmonize with this remedy.
III.
The United States Supreme Court has not determined the burden of proof standard to be applied under federal common law to claims for punitive damages under section 1983. In view of the intent to allow *1099a broad sweep for remedies in section 1983 actions, see Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 139, 108 S.Ct. 2302, 2307, 101 L.Ed.2d 123 (1988), I would follow the standard of “preponderance of the evidence” adopted by lower federal courts that have considered this issue. See Bird v. Figel, 725 F.Supp. 406, 411-12 (N.D.Ind.1989), and cases there cited. Without specifically addressing the burden of proof standard, several federal circuits have approved jury instructions on punitive damages that contained the preponderance burden of proof. Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 205 n. 5, 206 (1st Cir.1987) (instruction was “proper”); Wren v. Spurlock, 798 F.2d 1313, 1322 (10th Cir.1986) (instruction “was proper on the facts of this case”); McKinley v. Trattles, 732 F.2d 1320, 1326 & n. 2 (7th Cir.1984) (instruction was “accurate and complete”). See also Abraham v. Pekarski, 728 F.2d 167, 172 n. 2 (3d Cir.1984) (noting without comment that instruction used preponderance burden for punitive damages); Savarese v. Agriss, 883 F.2d 1194, 1202 n. 13 (3d Cir.1989) (instruction containing preponderance burden — remanded on punitive damages issue because the standard of conduct was too elevated); 3 E. Devitt, C. Blackmar & M. Wolff, Federal Jury Practice & Instructions § 85.19 (4th ed. 1987) (employs a preponderance burden). Federal trial courts have used the preponderance burden when imposing punitive damages in trials to the court under section 1983. Taylor v. Canton, 544 F.Supp. 783, 794 (N.D.Ohio 1982); Hopkins v. City of Wilmington, 615 F.Supp. 1455, 1465 (Del.1985).
IV.
I concur in parts II and IV of the majority opinion. Contrary to the majority’s holding in part III, I would hold that the burden of proof for an award of punitive damages in a section 1983 action is a preponderance of the evidence. I would remand the case for a new trial and would direct the trial court to employ that burden of proof.
KIRSHBAUM and MULLARKEY, JJ., join in this concurrence and dissent.

. In Carlson v. Green, the United States Supreme Court noted that "punitive damages may be the only significant remedy available in some § 1983 actions where constitutional rights are maliciously violated but the victim cannot prove compensable injury.” 446 U.S. at 22 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. at 1473 n. 9.

. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 states as follows:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district court by the provisions of title 13, 24 and 70 of the Revised Statutes for the protection of all persons in the United States in their civil rights, and for their vindication, shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the United States, so far as such laws are suitable to carry the same into effect; but in all cases where they are not adapted to the object, or *1096are deficient in the provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein the court having jurisdiction of such civil or criminal cause is held, so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said courts in the trial and disposition of the cause, and, if it is of a criminal nature, in the infliction of punishment on the party found guilty. In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 [42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.

. The United States Supreme Court described the three steps as follows in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. at 267, 105 S.Ct. at 1942:
“First, courts are to look to the laws of the United States ‘so far as such laws are suitable to carry [the civil and criminal civil rights statutes] into effect.’ [42 U.S.C. § 1988.] If no suitable federal rule exists, courts undertake the second step by considering application of state ‘common law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes’ of the forum state. Ibid. A third step asserts the predominance of the federal interest: courts are to apply state law only if it is not ‘inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.’ Ibid."
Quoting Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48, 104 S.Ct. 2924, 2928, 82 L.Ed.2d 36 (1984) (brackets in Wilson).

. Although Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87 (3d Cir.1965), commented that the only perceived deficiency in the federal common law of damages was with respect to punitive damages, the court went on to state that “we cannot conclude that the federal common law may be applied in respect to compensatory or even nominal damages while state law ... would be applicable on the issue of exemplary or punitive damages. To so hold would be to create a legal hybrid of an incredible and unworkable kind.” Id. Furthermore, since 1965, the federal courts have developed to a considerable extent the punitive damages feature of the federal common law of damages. See, supra p. 1095.

.The United States Supreme Court has applied state law to § 1983 actions in only two areas: state survival statutes, Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 594, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 1997, 56 L.Ed.2d 554 (1978), and state statutes of limitation governing § 1983 actions, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 269, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1943, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985). In many cases the Court has decided issues concerning rights and remedies not explicitly resolved by § 1983 without any reference to § 1988. E.g., Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 103 S.Ct. 1625, 75 L.Ed.2d 632 (1983); Patsy v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516, 102 S.Ct. 2557, 2568, 73 L.Ed.2d 172 (1982) (exhaustion of state remedies not a prerequisite to a § 1983 action); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285, 100 S.Ct. 553, 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 481 (1980) (proximate cause); Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285-87, 97 S.Ct. 568, 575-76, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977) (causation). Cf. Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258, 101 S.Ct. 498, 504, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980) (accrual date for § 1981 cause of action); see generally Beermann, A Critical Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 Stanford L.Rev. 51, 57-65 (1989).

. Three months after the trial, Colorado implemented an even more restrictive policy governing punitive damage awards. The standard of conduct was changed to "circumstances of fraud, malice, or willful and wanton conduct ...,” and the amount of punitive damages may not exceed the amount of actual damages, § 13-21-102(l)(a), 6A C.R.S. (1987), although the court may increase the punitive damages award to three times the actual damages for egregious conduct by the defendant during the pendency of the case, § 13-21-102(3). The injured party receives only two-thirds of the punitive damages award, with the other one-third going to the state general fund. Id. at § 13-21-102(4). A party’s financial status may not be considered in determining the appropriateness or amount of the punitive damages. Id. at § 13-21-102(6). These additional restrictions widen the disparity between Colorado's punitive damages policy and section 1983. Most of these new provisions have been rejected by the federal courts in determining the contours of the section 1983 punitive damages remedy. See cases cited later in text, infra pp. 1097-98.

.The issue of whether Colorado law governs the burden of proof for punitive damages was not presented in either Espinoza v. O'Dell, 633 P.2d 455, 465 (Colo.1981), cert, dismissed, 456 U.S. 430, 102 S.Ct. 1865, 72 L.Ed.2d 237 (1982), or Higgs v. District Court, 713 P.2d 840, 862 (Colo.1986), cases on which the majority relies in part to support its adoption of a "beyond a reasonable doubt” burden of proof for punitive damages. Espinoza held that Colorado’s bar to recovery of punitive damages in a wrongful death action does not apply to a section 1983 claim, and reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the complaint for failure to stale a claim upon which the requested relief could be granted. Although we referred to the Colorado burden of proof for punitive damages, that passing reference had no relevance to the issues before the court, for the case had not proceeded beyond the pleadings. In Higgs, the plaintiff recovered punitive damages after the court instructed the jury that the beyond a reasonable doubt burden applied. The trial court set aside the punitive damages award as grossly excessive. On appeal this court recited the Colorado burden of proof for punitive damages and held that sufficient evidence supported the punitive damages award. Because the plaintiff had satisfied the higher burden of proof, the propriety of that higher burden was not presented.

. One court’s research caused it to conclude that Colorado is the only state that has adopted the beyond a reasonable doubt standard for punitive damages. Fogarty v. Greenwood, 724 F.Supp. 545, 547 n. 2 (N.D.Ill.1989). See also Annotation, Standard of Proof as to Conduct Underlying Punitive Damage Awards — Modern Status, 58 A.L.R. 4th § 6, at 878 (1987). See generally 1 J. Ghiardi & J. Kircher, Punitive Damages: Law & Practice § 9.12 (1985 & 1990 Supp.) (discussing the burdens of proof for punitive damages).

. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), and Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979), require a higher burden of proof to deprive individuals of important rights. The majority invokes those cases — inappropriately I believe — to hinder section 1983’s vindication of individuals' federal civil rights.