Court Opinion

ID: 9714519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:39:48.34442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:26.849732
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE BILANDIC, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the defendant has established ineffective assistance of appellate counsel under the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 466 U.S. 668, 687, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064. Specifically, I reject the majority’s holding that the defendant suffered prejudice as a result of appellate counsel’s failure to contest the sufficiency of the eligibility verdict on direct appeal. As the majority acknowledges, a finding of prejudice resulting from an alleged error is required if a defendant is to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. (People v. Harris (1994), 164 Ill. 2d 322, 348.) It is appropriate for this court to resolve an ineffective-assistance claim by addressing the prejudice prong alone. (Harris, 164 Ill. 2d at 349 (where it was held that if no prejudice ensued, a claim may be disposed of on that ground alone), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 699, 104 S. Ct. at 2069.) In the instant case, the language of the jury’s eligibility verdict could not have caused prejudice to the defendant. The majority finds that prejudice resulted because the eligibility verdict form failed to specify that the defendant acted with the requisite mental state. I disagree. The omission of the defendant’s mental state in the eligibility verdict is a minor technical defect which, when the entire record of this case is reviewed, did not cause prejudice to the defendant. The majority correctly notes that all parts of the record will be searched and interpreted together to ascertain the meaning of a verdict. (167 Ill. 2d at 537.) The majority, however, appears to abandon this principle in resolving this case. When the complete record of the defendant’s sentencing hearing is reviewed, it is clear that the jury’s eligibility verdict was proper. The record clearly demonstrates that the jury was adequately informed that eligibility, premised upon murder in the course of a felony, required a finding that the defendant acted intentionally or knowingly. It is uncontested that the jury was properly instructed at the eligibility stage in both the oral and the written instructions that, in order to find the defendant eligible for the death penalty, the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant killed the victim: "intentionally or with the knowledge that the acts which caused the death created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to Joseph Kolar.” The many admonishments to the jury, which detailed the elements it had to find beyond a reasonable doubt for the defendant to be eligible for death, were clear and precise. It is evident that the jury was repeatedly told that it had to find that the defendant possessed intent or knowledge when he killed the victim. (See People v. Hester (1989), 131 Ill. 2d 91, 98 (where it was held that instructions should not be viewed in isolation but should be considered as a whole).) The failure of the verdict form to repeat this admonishment did not, in my view, constitute a defect so prejudicial as to require reversal of the jury’s finding. A trial court’s determination in a post-conviction proceeding will not be reversed unless it is contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. (People v. Eddmonds (1991), 143 Ill. 2d 501, 514.) In view of the fact that the defendant has not established ineffective assistance of counsel regarding the eligibility verdict, I find that the trial court’s decision to grant the defendant post-conviction relief and ordering a new sentencing hearing was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the circuit court vacating the defendant’s death sentence on this ground, and I would remand to the trial court for examination of the remaining issues raised in the defendant’s post-conviction petition. For these reasons, I dissent from the majority’s decision. JUSTICES MILLER and HEIPLE join in this dissent.