Court Opinion

ID: 9697336
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:14:34.206824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:31.826780
License: Public Domain

OPINION OF THE COURT
LARSEN, Justice.
Appellant Dennis E. Myers appeals from the order of the Commonwealth Court, which affirmed the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board), upholding the referee’s denial of benefits. The referee determined that appellant was discharged for willful misconduct and was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits.
Pursuant to § 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law:
An employe shall be ineligible for compensation for any week—
(e) In which his unemployment is due to his discharge or temporary suspension from work for willful misconduct connected with his work, irrespective of whether or not such work is “employment” as defined in this act....
Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex.Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897 as amended, 43 P.S. § 802(e) (emphasis added). Thus, appellant herein is eligible for unemployment compensation benefits if his discharge was not due to willful misconduct. Because we find that appellant’s discharge was not due to his willful misconduct, we reverse.
From April 24, 1978 until September 6, 1989, appellant was employed by Yourga Trucking, Inc., as an over-the-road truck driver. In the six months prior to his discharge, appellant was involved in three accidents involving his employer’s tractor-trailer. These accidents resulted in damages in excess of $14,000 and in appellant’s discharge on September 6, 1989.
*376Appellant applied for unemployment compensation benefits following his discharge, but the Pennsylvania Department of Labor and Industry Office of Employment Security determined that he was ineligible under § 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law. Appellant appealed this determination to the referee. At the referee’s hearing, appellant and his employer Marion E. Doutt (employer) testified. In addition, the referee admitted into evidence the police reports of the three accidents. Based on the evidence, the referee determined that appellant’s negligence caused all three accidents, and that appellant failed to report the third accident to his employer, in violation of the employer’s rules. The referee concluded that: 1) appellant’s “continued negligence in operating his employer’s vehicle indicates an intentional disregard of the employer’s interests and a disregard of [appellant’s] duties and obligations to the employer,” 2) appellant’s conduct rose to the level of willful misconduct contemplated by § 402(e) and 3) appellant was ineligible for unemployment compensation benefits. Appellant appealed to the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, which affirmed.
Appellant then appealed to the Commonwealth Court arguing that he did not commit willful misconduct and that the referee based her decision on objected to, uncorroborated hearsay. That court determined that, while the police reports were indeed hearsay, they were corroborated by both appellant’s and employer’s testimony, which in turn supported the referee’s findings of fact. That court also held that the admission of the hearsay evidence was not reversible error and affirmed the Board’s order.
Our scope of review in an appeal from an adjudication of the Board is such that we must affirm unless the adjudication violates the constitutional rights of the appellant, the adjudication is contrary to law, there is a violation of the Board’s procedure, or a finding of fact necessary to the decision is not supported by substantial evidence. Hoffman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 524 Pa. 470, 476-78, 574 A.2d 57, 60 (1990). Appellant contends that the evidence is not substantial to support the referee’s findings of *377fact because the referee relied on incompetent hearsay evidence, i.e., the police reports and the employer’s testimony regarding the three accidents.
The Commonwealth Court found and the Board conceded that the police reports constituted objected to hearsay evidence. Nonetheless, that court concluded that the employer’s testimony regarding the accidents corroborated the hearsay police reports, and therefore, the police reports were to be given their natural probative effect and could support the referee’s findings. See Palmer v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 68 Pa.Cmwlth. 388, 449 A.2d 126 (1982) and Perminter v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 57 Pa.Cmwlth. 426, 426 A.2d 245 (1981).
The Commonwealth Court, however, ignored the fact that the employer’s testimony regarding the accidents was itself objected to hearsay evidence. The employer was not at the scene of any of the accidents and his testimony regarding the accidents was based on what others told him. “[Njothing is more adamantly established in American trial procedure than that no one may testify to what somebody else told him. He may only relate what is within the sphere of his own memory brought to him by the couriers of his own senses.” Johnson v. Peoples Cab Company, 386 Pa. 513, 515, 126 A.2d 720, 721 (1956). Because the employer had no first hand knowledge of any of the accidents, his testimony regarding the accidents was hearsay. Appellant recognized the hearsay nature of the employer’s testimony and objected to it (H.T., 2/2/90, p. 11).
It has long been established in this Commonwealth that hearsay evidence, properly objected to, is not competent evidence to support a finding of the Board, whether or not corroborated by other evidence. Walker v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 27 Pa.Cmwlth. 522, 527-28, 367 A.2d 366, 370 (1976).1 Therefore, the only competent evidence regarding the accidents was appellant’s testimony and handwritten notes, in which he described the events *378leading to each accident. Our review of this evidence shows that appellant’s conduct was not willful misconduct.
This Court, in McLean v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 476 Pa. 617, 620, 383 A.2d 533, 535 (1978) (quoting Moyer Unemployment Compensation Case, 177 Pa.Super. 72, 74, 110 A.2d 753, 754 (1955)), defined “willful misconduct” as:
... an act of wanton or willful disregard of the employer’s interest, a deliberate violation of the employer’s rules, a disregard of standards of behavior which the employer has a right to expect of an employee, or negligence indicating an intentional disregard of the employer’s interest or of the employe’s duties and obligations to the employer. (Emphasis omitted).
Thus, the Commonwealth Court has held that an employee’s negligence constitutes willful misconduct only if:
... it is of ‘such a degree or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or evil design, or show an intentional and substantial disregard of the employer’s interest or of the employee’s duties and obligations to the employer.’
Coleman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 47 Pa.Cmwlth. 113, 115 407 A.2d 130, 131-32 (1979) (quoting Harmer v. Unemployment Compensation Case, 206 Pa.Super. 270, 272, 213 A.2d 221, 223 (1965)). Therefore, it follows that an employer cannot demonstrate willful misconduct by “merely showing that an employee committed a negligent act, but instead must present evidence indicating that the conduct was of an intentional and deliberate nature.” Bucher v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 76 Pa.Cmwlth. 282, 284-85, 463 A.2d 1241, 1243 (1983).
In the present case, the employer failed to present any competent evidence indicating appellant’s intentional disregard of the employer’s interest or of appellant’s duties to the employer. Appellant’s own statements are the only competent evidence regarding the accidents, and they reveal no such intentional and deliberate conduct on his part.
*379According to appellant’s testimony, the first accident, on May 1, 1989, occurred when appellant attempted to make a right-hand turn from a one-lane road, and his truck collided with another vehicle, which was improperly passing on appellant’s right (H.T., 2/2/90, p. 23). Appellant testified that prior to attempting the turn he activated his turn signal and checked his mirrors (H.T., 2/2/90, p. 23).
Appellant next testified that on- September 4, 1989, he was involved in a second accident when his truck collided with another vehicle while attempting to make a lane change (H.T., 2/2/90, pp. 26-27). Appellant stated that before changing lanes he indicated his intention to change lanes by activating his turn signal, he checked all available mirrors and he checked traffic for other cars (H.T., 2/2/90, p. 26). Only after confirming that there were no vehicles around him did he attempt the lane change (H.T., 2/2/90, p. 26).
Finally, appellant testified that the next day, on September 5, 1989, he was involved in a third accident when his truck rear ended a pickup truck, which in turn collided with another tractor-trailer owned by appellant’s employer, Yourga Trucking, Inc. (H.T., 2/2/90, pp. 27-28). Appellant testified that three school buses entering the highway and failing to yield the right of way forced his truck into the left lane, and that there was not sufficient room to stop before impacting with the pickup truck because traffic in the left lane was forced to stop to avoid another, uninvolved vehicle making a left hand turn (H.T., 2/2/90, pp. 27-28).
The evidence fails to show any intentional and deliberate conduct on the part of appellant.2 This being so, we find that appellant’s involvement in the three accidents does not constitute willful misconduct.3
*380Likewise, our review of the record reveals no substantially compelling evidence to support a finding that appellant failed properly to report the third accident, thereby committing willful misconduct. The Commonwealth Court found that, in addition to appellant’s negligent involvement in the three accidents, his failure to immediately report his third accident to his employer constituted grounds for discharge and denial of unemployment compensation benefits. However, the employer’s disciplinary policy does not oblige an employee to report an accident immediately. Article VII, § I of the employer’s disciplinary policy states, in pertinent part, that:
The Employer shall not discharge nor suspend any employee without just cause, but in respect to discharge or suspension shall give at least one warning notice of the complaint against such employee to the employee, in writing, and a copy of the same to the Union affected, except that warning notice need not be given to an employee before discharge if the cause of such discharge is ... failure to report an *381accident which the employee would normally be aware of
(Emphasis added).
Thus, the employer’s own rules do not require that an accident be reported immediately to the employer.
Even so, appellant did report the accident immediately after it occurred. He accompanied the driver of the other Yourga (appellant’s employer) truck involved in the same accident to a telephone in order to report the accident. The other driver placed the call to make the report, while appellant stood beside him (H.T., 2/2/90, p. 28). The employer admitted at the hearing that the purpose of the phone call was to report the accident, and that he was aware that the appellant was with the other driver when the call was placed (H.T., 2/2/90, pp. 21-22).
Additionally, appellant again reported the accident in person upon his return to his place of employment in Pennsylvania from the scene of the accident in New Jersey. The employer’s own testimony reveals that appellant reported the accident in person 12 hours after it occurred (H.T., 2/2/90, p. 12). Thus, the evidence shows that there was no violation — much less a deliberate violation — of the employer’s rules so as to constitute willful misconduct as defined in McLean, 476 Pa. at 619-21, 383 A.2d at 535.
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the Commonwealth Court and remand to the Board for computation of benefits.
NIX, C.J., joins this opinion and files a concurring opinion.
ZAPPALA, J., files a dissenting opinion joined by FLAH-ERTY and CAPPY, JJ.

. However, hearsay evidence, admitted without objection, is given its natural probative effect, if supported by other competent evidence. Id. at 527-28, 367 A.2d at 370.

. Even appellant's handwritten statements regarding the accidents do not indicate any intentional and deliberate conduct on the part of appellant. These statements merely reflect appellant's testimony at the hearing, albeit in an imprecise and confusing manner. Therefore, these handwritten statements do not demonstrate appellant's willful misconduct either.

. In his dissent, Justice Zappala states that “[fjrom Myers's descriptions alone, the referee was presented with sufficient competent evidence to *380support his finding that Myers was negligent in the operation of his employer's vehicle.” Dissenting Opinion at 629. He then ignores this Court’s decision in McLean v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 476 Pa. 617, 619-21, 383 A.2d 533, 535 (1978), and instead adopts a Commonwealth Court standard for determining "willful misconduct,” stating that:
Evidence of a series of accidents, attributable to negligence, occurring periodically and with consistent regularity, which produce substantial financial loss to the employer is sufficient to support the conclusion that an employee is guilty of willful misconduct. Walton v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 96 Pa.Cmwlth. 472, 508 A.2d 380 (1986); Coulter v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 16 Pa.Cmwlth. 462, 332 A.2d 876 (1975).
Dissenting Opinion at 630. Thus, he concludes that appellant’s actions constituted willful misconduct, despite the employer’s failure to show any intentional conduct by the appellant.
We refuse to adopt this standard because it improperly equates "negligence” and “willful misconduct” — which are not interchangeable. Mere "negligence” does not rise to the level of "willful misconduct” without the additional element of an intentional disregard of the employer's interests. See McLean, at 619-21, 383 A.2d at 535. Additionally, this standard ignores the fact that the legislature specifically used the term "willful misconduct” in § 402(e) of the Unemployment Compensation Law and not mere "negligence.”