Court Opinion

ID: 9541112
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:22:52.423232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:06.551784
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in the resolution of Issues I, II, III; IV, and dissent on Issue V.
Pertinent to this appeal, Ind.Code § 35-50-2-2 authorized the sentencing judge below to suspend any part of a sentence for a felony unless “the felony committed was murder (I.C. 35-42-1-1)”. The majority concludes that by this reference to murder, the Legislature intended to proscribe attempted murder also. The express reference here is to “murder (I.C. 35^42-1-1)”, which means to me the distinct and substantive crime of murder established in Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1. As we said in Kee v. State, (1982) Ind., 438 N.E.2d 993, the crime of attempted murder is defined by reading Ind.Code § 35-41-5-1, the general attempt statute, in conjunction with Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1, the murder statute. It may be that attempted murder is an offense defined in major part by Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1, but it is clear to me that it is not “murder (I.C. 35-42-1-1)”. I would therefore affirm the conviction but remand to the trial court for resentencing and in so doing mandate that the trial court give due regard to the sus-pendable nature of the sentence for attempted murder.