Court Opinion

ID: 9720862
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:43:29.948858+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:21.831935
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I believe section 3 — 103(2) of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3 — 103(2) (West 2004)) permits Ultsch to add the Board of Trustees as a defendant after the expiration of the 35-day limitations period. Thus, I believe this court should address the constitutional issue presented in this appeal. Section 3 — 103(2) allows an otherwise timely complaint to be amended belatedly: “to add an employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, who acted in an official capacity as a party of record to the administrative proceeding, if the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity is a party to the administrative review action ***.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 103(2) (West 2004). Here, determining if this section applies requires us to consider whether: (1) IMRF is an “administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity”; (2) IMRF is “a party to the administrative review action”; (3) the Board of Trustees is “an employee, agent, or member” of IMRF; and (4) the Board acted “in an official capacity as a party of record to the administrative proceeding.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 103(2) (West 2004). The answers to the second and fourth inquiries are undisputably “yes.” IMRF is a party named in the administrative review action, and the Board was a party of record when it rendered its final administrative decision in its official capacity. Thus, the only pending questions are whether IMRF is an “administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity” and whether the Board is “an employee, agent, or member” of IMRF within the meaning of the statute. To resolve these questions, the court must employ our traditional rules of statutory construction. As the majority notes (226 Ill. 2d at 181), the goal of statutory construction is to effectuate the legislature’s intent, as best revealed by the plain and ordinary meaning of the language used in the statute. Applying this rule, the court must first consider the plain and ordinary meaning of the word “entity.” The dictionary defines “entity” to mean “BEING, EXISTENCE; esp.: independent, separate, or self-contained existence.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 758 (1993). To determine whether IMRF meets this definition, the court looks to IMRF’s legislative roots and its real-world functions. The legislature created IMRF in section 7 — 101 of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/7 — 101 (West 2004)) for the stated purpose of “providing] a sound and efficient system for the payment of annuities and other benefits, *** to certain officers and employees, and to their beneficiaries, of municipalities” (40 ILCS 5/7 — 102 (West 2004)). Its mission is “to efficiently and impartially develop, implement and administer programs that provide income protection to members and their beneficiaries on behalf of participating employers in a prudent manner.” 40 ILCS 5/7 — 102 (West 2004). Notably, the legislature expressly granted IMRF, not the Board, statutory authority to institute litigation against participating municipalities and instrumentalities to recover delinquent contributions when other statutory measures have failed. 40 ILCS 5/7 — 172.1 (West 2004). Thus, the enabling legislation recognized IMRF as a separate government entity, capable of actions independent of the Board. Indeed, the record on appeal further establishes IMRF as a separate entity. In its supplemental brief, IMRF does not argue that it is not a government entity. IMRF’s court filings, including its motion to dismiss Ultsch’s complaint for administrative review and related documents, were filed in its own name. IMRF has a main office, a mailing address, its own letterhead, and a staff, including the associate general counsel involved in this case. Ultsch’s 1987 “Notice of Participation in IMRF” was on a form bearing only IMRF’s name in the heading. In addition, Ultsch applied for disability benefits on an IMRF form stating its mailing address and the phone number of its own service representatives, with no reference to the Board. Similarly, other forms in the record noted IMRF’s unique contact information. IMRF and members of its disability claims department were also expressly named in extensive correspondence with the medical experts who reviewed Ultsch’s claim, but the Board was not mentioned. Similar designations appear on correspondence between IMRF and Ultsch, or her counsel. The record contains no evidence that the Board originally received or sent any of these materials. Moreover, Ultsch’s initial denial letter was from the IMRF benefits manager on IMRF letterhead. That letter stated, “We reviewed [Ultsch’s] disability claim to determine [her] eligibility for temporary disability benefits. Our decision is that, based on the medical evidence in our file, you do not meet IMRF’s definition of temporary disability as defined by IMRF law.” (Emphases added.) The letter further explained that any appeal hearings before the Board of Trustee’s Benefit Review Committee would be conducted “in the IMRF office.” Nothing in the denial letter indicated that IMRF was simply acting on behalf of the Board. Similarly, the letter notifying Ultsch’s employer, Lake County, of the denial of benefits was also submitted by the IMRF benefits manager rather than the Board. Based on the documentary evidence, it is apparent that IMRF was the sole entity processing Ultsch’s disability claim. Perhaps most importantly, the IMRF benefits manager, not the Board, sent the official letter notifying Ultsch that both the Benefit Review Committee’s decision and the Board of Trustees’ final administrative decision had upheld the denial of her claim. That letter, submitted on IMRF letterhead, also noted that the “action by the Board of Trustees constitutes its final administrative decision, and IMRF will take no further action regarding this disability claim.” (Emphasis added.) Notably, this wording formally recognized the termination of IMRF’s processing of the claim. The record establishes that IMRF actually processed Ultsch’s disability claim through the issuance of the final administrative decision. Accordingly, whether viewed from a functional or a statutory perspective, IMRF is a government entity separate from the Board, capable of independent action. Thus, I conclude that IMRF is a “government entity.” The majority does not address the effect that the IMRF’s status as a government entity has on the application of section 3 — 103(2), however. Instead, it avoids the question by simply concluding that because IMRF is not the administrative “agency that rendered the decision in this case,” section 3 — 103(2) does not apply. 226 Ill. 2d at 186. The majority’s analysis fails to address the critical language in section 3 — 103(2) that also allows the late addition of “an employee, agent, or member of *** [a] government entity.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3— 103(2) (West 2004). The majority appears to recognize only the portion of the statutory exception allowing the late naming of “an employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency.” (Emphasis added.) See 735 ILCS 5/3 — 101 (West 2004); 226 Ill. 2d at 189-90. The majority’s position excludes the possibility that the Board can fulfill dual roles, being both a decision-making administrative agency and “an employee, agent, or member” of another government entity, such as IMRF. See Cuny v. Annunzio, 411 Ill. 613, 616-17 (1952) (recognizing that the Board of Review of the Department of Labor is both an administrative agency and “a division or arm” of the Department of Labor). Thus, the majority’s view improperly renders the portion of the section allowing the addition of “an employee, agent, or member *** of a government entity” mere surplusage. That result effectively eliminates a portion of section 3 — 103(2) and violates one of this court’s cardinal rules of statutory construction. See Fisher, 221 Ill. 2d at 115; 226 Ill. 2d at 187, quoting Land v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 202 Ill. 2d 414, 422 (2002). That rule mandates that each word, clause, and sentence in a statute be given a reasonable meaning whenever possible. Advincula v. United Blood Services, 176 Ill. 2d 1, 26 (1996). Applying that rule here compels the court to conclude that IMRF is covered by section 3 — 103(2) and is a “government entity” within the plain meaning of that section. Having made this determination, the court must next consider whether the Board is “an employee, agent, or member” of IMRF within the meaning of section 3 — 103(2). The Board is not an “employee” of IMRF as that term is defined in the Pension Code because its members do not “[r]eceive[ ] earnings as payment for the performance of personal services or official duties out of the general fund of a municipality, or out of any special fund or funds.” 40 ILCS 5/7 — 109 (West 2004). Indeed, section 7 — 175 of the Pension Code specifically precludes Board members from receiving payments for their services, stating that they “shall serve without compensation.” 40 ILCS 5/7 — 174(g) (West 2004). The term “agent,” however, does fit the Board’s role with IMRF. An “agent” is “[o]ne who is authorized to act for or in place of another; a representative.” Black’s Law Dictionary 68 (8th ed. 2004). See also Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 40 (1993) (defining an “agent” as “one that acts for or in the place of another by authority from him: as *** a representative, emissary, or official of a government”). Among the powers and duties statutorily granted to the Board (40 ILCS 5/7 — 178 (West 2004)) are preparing IMRF’s operating budget (40 ILCS 5/7 — 180 (West 2004)), compelling witnesses “to testify upon any necessary matter concerning the fund” (40 ILCS 5/7 — 181 (West 2004)), requesting information “as is necessary for the proper operation of the fund” (40 ILCS 5/7 — 183 (West 2004)), keeping permanent records of Board proceedings and other records “necessary or desirable for administration of the Fund” (40 ILCS 5/7 — 197 (West 2004)), and “carrying] on generally any other reasonable activities, including, without limitation, the making of administrative decisions on participation and coverage, which are necessary for carrying out the intent of this fund” (40 ILCS 5/7— 200 (West 2004)). By performing these duties, the Board acts as a representative of IMRF, making it an agent of the fund. Thus, adhering strictly to the plain language of the statute, the Board is an agent of IMRF, a government entity already named as a party on administrative review, that acted in its official capacity as a party of record in this administrative proceeding. That is all that is required under section 3 — 103(2) to allow Ultsch to amend her administrative complaint to name the Board after the expiration of the 35-day limitations period. See 735 ILCS 5/3 — 103(2) (West 2004). Nonetheless, the majority attempts to support its contrary conclusion by reading section 3 — 103(2) with section 3 — 107(a) (735 ILCS 5/3 — 107(a) (West 2004)) and the definitions in section 3 — 101 (735 ILCS 5/3 — 101 (West 2004)). 226 Ill. 2d at 185-89. The majority first correctly states that section 3 — 107(a) mandates that “ ‘the administrative agency *** shall be made [a] defendant ].’ ” 226 Ill. 2d at 179, quoting 735 ILCS 5/3— 107(a) (West 2004). Relying on the definitions in section 3 — 101 (735 ILCS 5/3 — 101 (West 2004)), the majority next states that the Board is “the administrative agency” that must be named because it had the power to make the administrative decision denying Ultsch benefits. 226 Ill. 2d at 189. While I agree with these statements, I believe the majority’s subsequent statutory construction, based on a flawed comparison of the language in section 3 — 103(2) and section 3 — 107(a), is unsound. Section 3 — 107(a) precludes the dismissal for lack of jurisdiction of any administrative review action “based upon the failure to name an employee, agent, or member, who acted in his or her official capacity, of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 — 107(a) (West 2004). Section 3 — 103(2), meanwhile, allows the late naming of “an employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, who acted in an official capacity.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 — 103(2) (West 2004). Although the hmiting language used in the two sections is similar, one critical difference undeniably remains. In section 3 — 107(a), the legislature chose to use the words “his or her” to describe the type of “employee, agent or member” at issue; i.e., “an employee, agent, or member, who acted in his or her official capacity,” thus limiting its application to individuals. (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 — 107(a) (West 2004). To its credit, the majority recognizes the import of this language. 226 Ill. 2d at 185 (recognizing that the term “his or her” limited the application of section 3 — 107(a) to individuals). Its analysis falters, however, when it carries that same restriction over to the type of “employee, agent, or member” addressed in section 3 — 103(2). 226 Ill. 2d at 185-86. A comparison of the plain language reveals the legislature’s intent to identify different groups in these two sections. Unlike section 3 — 107(a), section 3 — 103(2) does not use the descriptive words “his or her” in its restrictive language. Instead, the scope of the exception in section 3 — 103(2) is limited to an “employee, agent, or member *** who acted in an official capacity.” (Emphasis added.) 735 ILCS 5/3 — 103(2) (West 2004). Thus, the legislature’s decision to use different words to describe the relevant limitations requires this court to interpret those sections differently. While the “his or her” used in section 3 — 107(a) is properly construed to limit the covered group to individual persons, the broader, impersonal “an” of section 3 — 103(2) suggests no such restriction. If the legislature intended the two sections to address the same group, it would have used identical descriptive language to signal that intent. Indeed, the legislature chose to use virtually identical language in the remaining portions of the two provisions. Compare 735 ILCS 5/3 — 103(2) (West 2004) (addressing “an employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity *** if the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity is a party to the administrative review action”) with 735 ILCS 5/3 — 107(a) (West 2004) (addressing “an employee, agent, or member, *** of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, where the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, has been named as a defendant”). The legislature’s decision to use different descriptions to identify the “employee[s], agent[s], or member[s]” at issue in sections 3 — 103(2) and 3 — 107(a) signals its intent to create distinct qualifications for each group. As repeatedly noted by the majority (226 Ill. 2d at 181, 184, 185, 190), the plain meaning of the language adopted by the legislature is the best indicator of its intentions. Town & Country Utilities, Inc. v. Illinois Pollution Control Board, 225 Ill. 2d 103, 117 (2007). Despite this overt acknowledgment, however, the majority strays from this principle by overlooking the obvious linguistic differences in the language used to describe the groups covered by the two sections, thereby concluding that the legislature intended that both sections be applied only to individuals. 226 Ill. 2d at 185-86. While the majority’s interpretation unduly limits the broad reach of section 3 — 103(2) by ignoring the legislature’s language choices, the proper statutory analysis reads section 3 — 103(2) and section 3 — 107(a) in harmony, without rendering any portion of the statutes inoperative. See Flynn v. Industrial Comm’n, 211 Ill. 2d 546, 555 (2004). Properly construed, the two sections address different types of situations that may arise on administrative review. After mandating the naming of the administrative agency issuing the final administrative decision, section 3 — 107(a) precludes the dismissal of any administrative review action for want of jurisdiction because an individual “employee, agent, or member, who acted in his or her official capacity” was not named, as long as the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity has already been named. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 107(a) (West 2004). On the other hand, section 3 — 103(2) extends a deadline for administrative review complainants, allowing them to amend their complaints belatedly to name any type of “employee, agent, or member *** who acted in an official capacity” relevant to an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity that is already a party to the action. 735 ILCS 5/3— 103(2) (West 2004). Nothing in the sections states, or even implies, that the exception in section 3 — 103(2) cannot be used to cure the defect addressed in section 3 — 107(a), namely, the failure to name all appropriate parties. The majority claims that this interpretation “overlooks” the second sentence of section 3 — 103(2). That sentence allows the addition of “the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity” when “the director or agency head, in his or her official capacity, is a party to the administrative review.” 735 ILCS 5/3 — 103(2) (West 2004); 226 Ill. 2d at 187. The majority concludes that the sentence “plainly describes the only circumstance whereby a plaintiff may amend” an administrative review complaint to add a board. (Emphasis added.) 226 Ill. 2d at 187. That conclusion is flawed because it does not comport with the plain wording of the second sentence. That sentence simply provides one path for adding a board, i.e., when its head has already been named. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 103(2) (West 2004). Nothing in the sentence declares, or even suggests, that this is the sole statutory means of adding a board. The first sentence in section 3 — 103(2) presents additional ways the legislature has seen fit for a plaintiff to add a board, or any other entity, falling within the strictures in that sentence. Here, Ultsch does not seek to invoke the second sentence of section 3 — 103(2). In fact, that sentence is inapplicable here because Ultsch did not make the head of the Board a party. Even though it is not implicated here, however, that sentence continues to govern cases where a complaint timely names a director or agency head in his or her official capacity but fails to name the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity. The rationale in this dissent does not render that sentence superfluous. There is no conflict between this rationale and the continued application of the second sentence of section 3 — 103(2) in appropriate cases. Yet another flaw exists in the majority’s interpretation of the second sentence of section 3 — 103(2). The majority’s conclusion that the second sentence of section 3 — 103(2) provides the only way for a plaintiff to add a board suffers from a fatal error already refuted in this dissent. The majority’s interpretation erroneously presumes that a board cannot fulfill multiple roles within the statutory scheme. See Cuny, 411 Ill. at 616-17 (noting that a Board of Review may be both an administrative agency and “a division or arm” of another governmental department). Interestingly, the majority accepts this very proposition, recognizing that here “the Board of Trustees may be an arm of IMRF” as well as an administrative agency. 226 Ill. 2d at 189. In this case, the Board of Trustees also serves as “an employee, agent, or member” of IMRF, a government entity, a proposition that remains uncontradicted by the majority. It is the Board’s role as an agent of IMRF that brings it within the control of the first sentence of section 3 — 107(3) and permits Ultsch to amend her complaint to name the Board as a necessary party. The majority argues that this interpretation of section 3 — 103(2) makes section 3 — 107(a) “meaningless” because it would preclude the dismissal for want of jurisdiction of any case where a board could be later added as a defendant. 226 Ill. 2d at 187. This argument fails for a number of reasons. First, the sole purpose of the relevant portion of section 3 — 103(2), as shown by its plain language, is to allow plaintiffs to overcome their prior omissions by belatedly adding “an employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity” if they can fulfill all the statutory requirements. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 103(2) (West 2004). It is not the role of this court to contravene the clear legislative purpose as expressed by the plain language of the statute because it believes another result would be preferable. See 226 Ill. 2d at 184 (“There is no rule of statutory construction that authorizes a court to declare that the legislature did not mean what the plain language of the statute says”), citing Midstate Siding & Window Co. v. Rogers, 204 Ill. 2d 314, 320-21 (2003). See also People v. Boclair, 202 Ill. 2d 89, 100 (2002) (noting that if the legislature’s intent may be determined from the plain language of the statute, this court cannot read into the statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions in conflict with that intent). Moreover, the majority’s view of the first sentence of section 3 — 107(a) infers that it is intended to provide defendants with a means of dismissing plaintiffs’ complaints for want of jurisdiction. 226 Ill. 2d at 187 (“Because the plaintiff failed to name the Board of Trustees as a defendant, her action clearly was subject to dismissal pursuant to section 3 — 107(a)”). The actual purpose of that portion of section 3 — 107(a) is simply to specify the parties that must be named as defendants. 226 Ill. 2d at 187 (quoting the first sentence of section 3 — 107(a)). The first sentence merely requires the plaintiff to name as defendants “all persons, other than the plaintiff, who were parties of record to the proceedings before the administrative agency,” as well as the agency. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 107(a) (West 2004). Nothing in the section states or implies that the legislature intended to make it impossible for plaintiffs to overcome their initial failures to name mandatory parties. Indeed, the remainder of section 3 — 107(a) provides plaintiffs with a variety of ways to avoid dismissal. The plain language of the statute does not convey the same fatalistic approach taken by the majority, making dismissals for want of jurisdiction the favored dispositions when administrative plaintiffs’ original complaints mistakenly fail to include all necessary parties. Rather, the legislature’s approach, as expressed in the plain words of section 3 — 107(a), is to present the rule specifying the necessary parties and then to provide multiple methods for plaintiffs not initially meeting that hurdle to overcome it. The same may be said for the savings provisions in section 3 — 103(2), at issue in this case. Simply permitting plaintiffs to use the additional methods enacted by the legislature in section 3 — 103(2) to add previously unnamed parties does not mean that those savings provisions, read in full accord with their plain, uncontradicted meaning, render section 3 — 107(a) superfluous. On the contrary, this interpretation upholds the clear intent of the legislature, namely, to provide plaintiffs with the means to name additional parties, and thus avoid dismissal, despite their initial failures to name all necessary defendants. In addition, the majority’s claim that the interpretation of sections 3 — 103(2) and 3 — 107(a) presented in this dissent will inevitably render section 3 — 107(a) superfluous erroneously presupposes that every plaintiff can satisfy the requirements of section 3 — 103(2). See 226 Ill. 2d at 187 (“Yet, under the dissent’s interpretation of section 3 — 103(2), a complaint that improperly fails to name the Board of Trustees as a defendant could never be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, because the plaintiff could amend the complaint to include the Board of Trustees as a defendant whenever it saw fit” (emphasis added)). There is no guarantee, however, that a given plaintiff will successfully exercise the savings provision of section 3 — 103(2). To be successful, a plaintiff must satisfy the statutory requirements that the additional defendant be “an employee, agent, or member of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity, who acted in an official capacity as a party of record to the administrative proceeding, if the administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity is a party to the administrative review action” (735 ILCS 5/3 — 103(2) (West 2004)). The uncertainty of successfully making this showing demonstrates the patent error of the absolutist approach taken by the majority. The complaint of any plaintiff who could not make the showing required in section 3 — 103(2) would still be subject to dismissal for want of jurisdiction under section 3 — 107(a). Finally, although the majority emphasizes that the statute is unambiguous, thus requiring us to apply its plain words “without resorting to other aids for construction” (226 Ill. 2d at 184, 190) and without making any “modification” of the “mandatory and specific” statutory language (226 Ill. 2d at 179, 190), it ignores these principles not only by reading the controlling portions of section 3 — 103(2) out of the statute but also by relying on an outside construction aid itself. The majority cites legislative history in an attempt to bolster its flawed construction of the plain statutory language by quoting from Senator Hawkinson’s brief summary introduction of the amendments. 226 Ill. 2d at 188. Not only is this reliance sorely misplaced for the exact reasons cited by the majority (226 Ill. 2d at 179, 184, 190), but the cited quotation does not even purport to outline the amendments in their entirety. In relevant part, the cited statements specifically acknowledge only two aspects of the amendments, one allowing an agency to be served if its head has already been served and one allowing an agency employee acting in “his” official capacity to be added if the agency has already been served. 89th Ill. Gen. Assem., Senate Proceedings, May 8, 1996, at 12-13 (statements of Senator Hawkinson). The brief summary comments do not address any of the other conditions specifically set forth in the sections. The best indicator of the true intent of the amendments is derived from the actual language enacted by the legislature. Unlike the intentionally limited scope of Senator Hawkinson’s summary comments, the plain language of sections 3 — 103(2) and 3 — 107(a) expressly governs a far broader set of circumstances. It permits the addition of any employee, agent or member, who acted in the specified capacity, of an administrative agency, board, committee, or government entity that was already a defendant or a party to the administrative review action. 735 ILCS 5/3 — 103(2), 3 — 107(a) (West 2004). This language refutes the majority’s conclusion that the amendments were only “intended to allow a plaintiff to amend *** by adding an individual if the individual was an employee of a properly named agency.” (Emphasis added.) 226 Ill. 2d at 188. This conclusion selectively acknowledges only one small portion of the legislation and fails to implement the statutory language in its entirety, improperly rendering the remainder mere surplusage. See Fisher v. Waldrop, 221 Ill. 2d 102, 115 (2006). Surely unambiguous statutory language cannot be ignored merely because a brief oral introduction on the Senate floor failed to incorporate a detailed description of all aspects of the legislation. See 226 Ill. 2d at 184, 190 (rejecting the use of outside aids to interpret an unambiguous statute and advocating the use of only the plain statutory language). Accordingly, I would hold that section 3 — 103(2) applies in this case. Ultsch had a statutory right to amend her administrative review complaint to name the Board as an agent of IMRF. This court should address the constitutionality of section 3 — 103(2) as originally raised by the parties to this appeal because Ultsch properly seeks relief under the challenged statute. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. JUSTICE KARMEIER joins in this dissent.