Court Opinion

ID: 9647696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:47:31.645528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:52.186111
License: Public Domain

PASHMAN, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Under present law, those who wish to vote in a political primary cannot obtain a complete list of candidates until 34 days before the election. See N.J.S.A. 19:23-14. Nonetheless, they are required to declare their party affiliation and thus limit the individuals for whom they can cast their ballot at least 50 days prior, to the date of the primary. N.J.S.A. 19:23-45. Voters are thus deprived of the opportunity to make an informed decision as to party affiliation in light of the available candidates.
This system is apparently permissible under the federal constitution, see Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752, 93 S.Ct. 1245, 36 L.Ed.2d 1 (1973). It is well established, however, that we are entirely free to interpret the provisions of our State Constitution so as to provide greater protection of individual rights than that offered by its federal counterpart. See, e. g., State v. *79Slockbower, 79 N.J. 1 (1979); So. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Tp. of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151 (1975); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J. 473 (1973). In my view, the statutory scheme here at issue is violative of N.J.Const. (1947), Art. II, par. 3.1
I
Preliminarily, I feel constrained to comment upon the majority’s intimation that a plaintiff must bear a heavier burden in order to overturn a statute on state constitutional grounds than to invalidate it as repugnant to the federal constitution. This conclusion on the majority’s part is premised upon the fact that “the federal government possesses only those powers ceded to it by the states in the Federal Constitution; the states possess all other powers of government.” See ante at 74. From this undeniably true premise, however, the majority is led to conclude erroneously that state legislatures possess almost limitless ability to enact laws which do not transcend the federal constitution.
The fallacy in the majority’s argument is easily perceived. The Tenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that those powers not delegated to the federal government are reserved to the states. It does not repose these powers in state legislatures. Rather, states remain free to distribute these powers as they see fit among the executive and legislative branches of government, or not to allow either entity to exercise them.2
*80In this state, the people—through the adoption of the 1947 Constitution—have determined that the ability of the legislature to enact various types of laws shall be limited. One such limitation—the one relied upon by plaintiff—is contained in Art. II, par. 3 (supra at 79, n. 1). If the statutory scheme here at issue has violated this constitutional provision, that statutory scheme must fall. And this is so, regardless of whether a violation of the federal constitution has occurred.
It therefore makes no sense to say that a plaintiff must bear a heavier burden in order to overturn a statute on state constitutional grounds than to invalidate it as repugnant to the federal constitution. Whether a law is challenged on state or federal constitutional grounds, the plaintiff bears the same burden. In order to prevail, all he need do is demonstrate that in enacting that law, the Legislature has exceeded the limits imposed by a particular constitutional provision.
The majority’s conclusion to the contrary represents a serious departure from precedent. We have not hesitated in the past to strike down legislation that has contravened our state constitution, regardless of its validity under federal law. See, e. g., State v. Baker, 81 N.J. 99 (1979); State v. Celmer, 80 N.J. 405 (1979); State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200 (1977); Robinson v. Cahill (I through V), 62 N.J. 473, cert. den. sub nom., Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973); 63 N.J. 196, cert. den. sub nom., Dickey v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 976, 94 S.Ct. 292, 38 L.Ed.2d 219 (1973); 69 N.J. 133 (1975); 70 N.J. 155 (1976); 70 N.J. 464 (1976); Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 72 N.J. 481 (1977); So. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Tp. of Mt. Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, app. dism. and cert. den., 423 U.S. 808, 96 S.Ct. 18, 46 L.Ed.2d 28 (1975); Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292 (1977). Cf. State v. Tropea, 78 N.J. 309 (1978); Bor. of Neptune City v. Bor. of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. *81296 (1972). See generally, Brennan, “State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,” 90 Harv.L.Rev. 489 (1977).
II
The franchise is one of our most fundamental and cherished rights. This Court has proclaimed the vote to be the “keystone of a truly democratic society.” Gangemi v. Rosengard, 44 N.J. 166, 170 (1965). Other rights, “even the most basic, are illusory if the right to vote is undermined.” Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 17, 84 S.Ct. 526, 535, 11 L.Ed.2d 481, 492 (1964). Moreover, this right is equally applicable to both general elections and political primaries. See, e. g., Quaremba v. Allan, 67 N.J. 1, 11 (1975); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 146-147, 92 S.Ct. 849, 857-858, 31 L.Ed.2d 92, 101-102 (1972); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152 (1953); Echevarria v. Carey, 402 F.Supp. 183 (S.D.N.Y.1975), aff’d, 538 F.2d 309 (2d Cir.), vacated and remanded for mootness, 429 U.S. 808, 97 S.Ct. 44, 50 L.Ed.2d 68 (1976); Friedland v. State, 149 N.J.Super. 483, 490 (Law Div.1977). The majority’s suggestion that primary matters are not protected by N.J.Const. (1947) Art. II, par. 3 is surprising in light of this Court’s holdings in Quaremba v. Allan, supra, and Stevenson v. Gilfert, 13 N.J. 496, 503, 506 (1953).
The right to vote does not encompass merely the ability to cast a ballot. That right “would be empty indeed if it did not include the right of choice for whom to vote.” Gangemi v. Rosengard, supra, 44 N.J. at 170; see Quaremba v. Allan, supra, 67 N.J. at 11; Sadloch v. Allan, 25 N.J. 118 (1957); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1378, 12 L.Ed.2d 506, 523 (1964) (“The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government.”). Without the option to choose, the vote itself is devoid of practical significance. It is with respect to this freedom that the *82current statutory scheme unnecessarily infringes upon the exercise of the franchise.
As previously noted, persons interested in voting in a political primary must, with certain exceptions not here relevant, declare their party affiliation before they are able to ascertain the complete list of those running for office. Once having declared their affiliation, they may not change it in light of a new candidacy announced after the 50-day deadline. Thus, a voter may be precluded from supporting the primary candidate of his choice.3 And, unless that candidate wins the primary election, the voter will never have the opportunity to cast his ballot for the preferred officer seeker. The 50-day deadline therefore results in a serious incursion upon the voting rights of our citizenry.
Because of the critical importance of the vote to the functioning of our society, in order not to transcend constitutional bounds, substantial restrictions upon its exercise must be, necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest. See, e. g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342, 92 S.Ct. 995, 1003, 31 L.Ed. 2d 274, 284 (1972); Echevarria v. Carey, supra, 402 F.Supp. at 187; Wurtzel v. Falcey, 69 N.J. 401, 403 (1976); Worden v. Mercer County Bd. of Elections, 61 N.J. 325, 346 (1972). That is, such restrictions must both serve a paramount governmental goal and impinge upon the franchise to a lesser extent than any other feasible means of attaining that goal.
The majority identifies two State interests which it concludes justify the present restriction upon voter freedom. First, it asserts that the “integrity of the electoral process” is preserved *83in that “raiding” is deterred. Second, it emphasizes that the present scheme enables political parties to maintain their distinct and separate identities and ideologies. To this list might be added a concern for administrative efficiency. Although I agree that all three of these goals are legitimate, nevertheless I am convinced that each could be adequately effectuated by less restrictive measures. Consequently, the present statutory scheme violates the imperative of voter freedom and must be stricken.
The most frequently offered justification for durational affiliation requirements is the deterrence of “raiding”—that is, the practice of registering for the primary election of a rival party for the purpose of nominating a weak candidate likely to lose in the general election. At the outset, it should be noted that the majority’s concern with the frequency of “raiding” appears to be more a product of judicial imagination than reality. See “Developments in the Law-Elections,” 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1111, 1173 (1975) (noting that evidence suggests that the likelihood of “raiding” is overstated). A large number of our sister states have “open” or “blanket” primaries in which citizens may vote in either or both of the primaries. Id. at 1163 n.65. Several other states require declarations of affiliation but allow them to be made up to and including the date of the election. Id. at 1164, 1164 n.66. Surely their experience belies any contention that lengthy deadlines are necessary to prevent “raiding.” Thus, a shorter deadline—one which would allow voters to know the candidates before opting for a party—would adequately further the State’s speculative interest in deterring any “raiding” that might otherwise occur.
The State’s concern with preserving party identity can similarly be assured through less severe restrictions. Political parties are not, and probably never were, tightly knit, static organizations of ideologically identical individuals. Rather, as Justice Powell has noted, they “have been characterized by a fluidity and overlap of philosophy and membership.” Rosario v. Rocke*84feller, supra, 410 U.S. at 769, 93 S.Ct. at 1256, 36 L.Ed.2d at 14 (Powell, J., dissenting). Citizens “customarily choose a party and vote in its primary simply because it presents candidates and issues more responsive to their immediate concerns and aspirations.” Id.4
Even assuming, however, that the affiliation requirements are of some aid in the preservation of party identity, it is difficult to accept the proposition that a 30-day deadline, for example, would less fully protect that interest than the present 50-day limitation. A 30-day filing requirement, moreover, would not preclude a voter from making an informed choice as to party affiliation in light of available candidates. It thus represents a more reasonable method of achieving the State’s legitimate goal.
The majority does not attempt to support the present registration scheme on grounds of administrative efficiency. Yet, it is clear that the mechanics of processing party registrations would justify the imposition of a reasonable deadline for submitting a declaration of affiliation. However,' a 30-day limitation would appear more than adequate to satisfy this need.
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the State interests here involved are insufficient to outweigh the significant incursion upon the right of our citizens to vote for candidates of their own unfettered choosing. Voters should not be precluded from altering their party affiliation in response to a promising candidate or an important issue. The current system, by compelling voters to make an uninformed choice as to party membership, severely curtails that freedom. It thereby impermissibly burdens the right to exercise the franchise and hence violates N.J.Const. (1947), Art. II, par. 3.
*85Although the 50-day durational affiliation requirement, as it presently stands, contravenes the State Constitution, nevertheless it could be argued that it is not necessary to invalidate the statutory registration scheme in toto. Rather, it might be possible—as an interim measure pending legislative action—for us to reduce the deadline to 30 days before the election. In this way the interests of both the State and the voters would be reasonably effectuated and our citizens would be able to exercise their franchise in a more informed and effective manner. Inasmuch as the majority has concluded that the statutory scheme is wholly constitutional, it is not necessary to consider the merits of such a proposal.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Appellate Division and hold that N.J.S.A. 19:23-45 is unconstitutional.
Justice SULLIVAN joins in this dissenting opinion.
For affirmance—Chief Justice HUGHES and Justices MOUNTAIN, CLIFFORD, SCHREIBER and HANDLER—5.
For reversal—Justices SULLIVAN and PASHMAN—2.

Art. II, par. 3 provides in pertinent part:
(a) Every citizen of the United States, of the age of 18 years, who shall have been a resident of this State and of the county in which he claims his vote 30 days, next before the election, shall be entitled to vote for all officers that now are or hereafter may be elective by the people, and upon all questions which may be submitted to a vote of the people * * *.

In fact, it should be noted that our own Constitution provides that “[a]ll political power is inherent in the people * * N.J.Const. (1947), Art. I, par. 2.

The majority points out that in this case no candidate actually filed after the 50-day affiliation deadline. Although this is correct, it is irrelevant to the legal analysis involved. The gravamen of plaintiffs complaint is that she could not intelligently choose a party without being certain of the complete list of candidates. Her quandary was in no way affected by occurrences—or non-occurrences—which took place after the deadline had passed.

The majority states that plaintiff’s case is bottomed on the belief “that voters are more interested in candidates than in parties.” See ante at 78. This clearly overstates the case. Instead, plaintiffs claim is based upon the undeniably true conclusion that some people will be desirous of changing their affiliation in light of a particular candidate who raises new issues or takes a new stance on old issues.