Court Opinion

ID: 9423818
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:09:09.012983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:46.254336
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Fortas,
with whom Mr. Justice Marshall joins,
concurring.
With profound deference to the opinions of my Brethren who have filed opinions in this case, I am impelled to add this note. Upon oral argument and further study after the writ was granted, it became apparent that the facts necessary for evaluation of the dispositive *599constitutional issues in this case are not adequately presented by the record before us. It is also entirely clear that they cannot now be developed on remand with any verisimilitude.
The central issue that this case appeared to present for decision when certiorari was granted is of great importance. It is whether the police, seeing a pedestrian who fits the description of a person suspected of murder, may accost the pedestrian and stop him; and when and to what extent is the accosted person justified in refusing to cooperate with efforts of the police to establish that he is or is not the person whom they seek.
I am not prepared to say that, regardless of the presence or absence of adequate cause for police action, the arrest or the attempt by the officers to search is unlawful, as my Brother Harlan's opinion suggests, where the accosted person produces no identification, attempts three times to walk away, and refuses to dispel any doubt by showing that his forearm is not tattooed. I should want to know whether, in fact, there was constitutionally adequate cause for the police to suspect that the pedestrian was the man sought for murder.
If the Court should, on an adequate record, determine that the police action in stopping and arresting petitioner violated his constitutional rights, there would remain, among other issues the question of culpability for the scuffle that ensued. My Brethren who have written in this case seem agreed that the record is too sketchy to permit decision of this issue.
The Court has properly dismissed the writ as improvidently granted. I respectfully submit that the Court is correct to leave the matter there. I should regret any inference that might be derived from the opinions of my Brethren that this Court would or should hold that the police may not arrest and seek by reasonable means to identify a pedestrian whom, for adequate cause, they *600believe to be a suspect in a murder case. I do not believe that this Court would or should, without careful analysis, endorse the right of a pedestrian, accosted by the police because he fits the description of a person wanted for murder, to resist the officers so vigorously that they are “bounced from wall to wall physically” or to react “like a football player going through a line.” Our jurisprudence teaches that we should decide issues on the basis of facts of record. This is especially important in the difficult, dangerous, and subtle field where the essential office of the policeman impinges upon the basic freedom of the citizen.