Court Opinion

ID: 9559425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:28:58.868667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:58.449893
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING
*563On respondent’s petition for rehearing.
McCarty So Rosacker, Portland, and Paul C. Eeeton, Lewiston, Idaho, for the petition.
Hutchinson, Schwab & Burdick, Portland, and Min-nick So Hahner, Walla Walla, Washington, contra.
DENECEE, J.
In our previous opinion we modified a judgment for plaintiff’s first cause of action against the defendant USF So G. Under the power of this court *564under Art VII, § 3, of the Oregon Constitution, we reduced the amount of the judgment. We reversed the trial court’s entering judgment on the second cause of action against USF & G- for the reason that no proper notice of claim had been filed. The trial court entered no judgment against the intervening defendants.
The plaintiff has petitioned for a rehearing, asking either that this court enter judgment on the second cause of action against the intervening defendants, Braden, or that the case be remanded to the trial court to permit it to enter such judgment.
Plaintiff, in its pleadings, consisting only of a complaint, did not ask for judgment against the intervening defendants. The intervening defendants, in their “Amended Complaint in Intervention,” answered plaintiff’s complaint. However, plaintiff did not file a pleading in response thereto. Plaintiff proposed a conclusion of law that plaintiff have judgment against intervening defendants for both causes of action. All defendants objected to this upon the ground, among others, that the action was not against the intervening defendants. No order was entered upon this proposal or the objections thereto because the plaintiff moved to reopen. Upon the reopening being allowed, plaintiff introduced evidence of notice of claim and amended its pleadings by alleging this notice. The plaintiff filed new proposed conclusions of law which were signed by the trial court. These recited that the intervening defendants were liable to the plaintiff for the amounts claimed in both causes of action and “were obligated to pay plaintiff” the total sum. The final conclusion stated: “Defendant United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company is obligated to plaintiff for the payment of said sum, and joint venturersintervening defendants are liable over to defendant *565United States Fidelity & G-naranty Company in the total amount it is required to pay to plaintiff.” Judgment was against USF & G-, alone.
The trial judge, when passing upon plaintiff’s motion to reopen, questioned the correctness of the order permitting Braden to intervene, hut went on to state: “Since it was allowed, I went solely into the merits of the case as to the defendants, Cora Graham and Clarence Braden, and more or less completely ignored the case against the United States Fidelity and G-uaranty Company. Now, technically I may have been wrong in doing so and I don’t recall and didn’t follow any particular testimony as to the bonding company.”
It is apparent from these proceedings that it clearly was found that the intervening defendants were indebted to plaintiff. On the other hand, the pleadings before this court do not provide any basis for entering a judgment against the intervening defendants. The •trial court considered the case as one against intervening defendants, rather than USF & G, yet the trial court did not enter judgment against the intervening defendants. The intervening defendants speculate that plaintiff may have proceeded in this manner in a belief that such a course was necessary in order to secure an award of attorneys fees against USF & G. This may or may not be correct.
Obviously, it is the desire of this court to end litigation without the necessity of other actions being filed. However, it is not the desire of this court to encourage a procedure whereby a party selects one theory upon which to proceed and when that theory is unsuccessful upon appeal, attempts to change to another theory.
Our former opinion is modified to the extent that the judgment on the second cause of action is reversed, *566but shall now be remanded. The trial court shall proceed in whatever manner is deemed necessary to determine whether or not judgment in the second cause of action shall be entered against the intervening defendants. The trial court’s discretion shall be governed by ORS 16.390 and its general discretion to regulate the proceedings in its court.
As to the first cause of action, affirmed as previously modified; as to the second cause of action, reversed and remanded.