Court Opinion

ID: 9854298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:04:43.052644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:00.391655
License: Public Domain

McDONOUGH, Justice
(concurring).
The opinion of Mr. Justice HENRIOD correctly points out that neither in the briefs nor in the court’s opinion in this case has the construction of Chapter 126, Laws of Utah 1947, been discussed. The reason it has not is that it was assumed that if the use of the interest on the land grant fund would not be prohibited by application of the “restrictive special fund doctrine” or the provisions of the Constitution and Enabling Act relative to the land grant funds, then it could be used under the provisions of the statute. Mr. Justice HENRIOD concludes that the statute itself does not authorize the use of the funds in question. I am of the contrary opinion.
Section 1 of Chapter 126, Laws of Utah 1947, now Section 53-38-1, U.C.A.1953, authorizes the University to build certain enumerated types of structures and “other self-liquidating projects, and other revenue producing buildings”. The use of expression “self-liquidating”  does not, of course, mean that the indebtedness incurred in errecting the structure, plus the interest thereon, must be obtained from the revenues from the structure *194itself. This is evident from the body of the Act which defines what is meant by self-liquidating. Thus, the Board of Eegents is authorized to
“collect student building fees from all students and to pledge said fees to the payment of building bonds”; Section 53-38-3, U. C. A. 1953, subsection (3).
In addition, the University is authorized to borrow the money upon the credit of those various items and “other sources other than by appropriations by the legislature of the state of Utah”. The expression “self-liquidating” is not, in all cases, as restricted in meaning as to require that the structure itself produce all of the moneys to pay off the indebtedness incurred in its erection. See Greenhalgh v. Woolworth, 361 Pa. 543, 64 A.2d. 659, 662, 663.
Addressing next Section 2 of the Act: It authorizes the Board of Eegents
“to borrow money on the credit of the income and revenues to be derived from the operation of the building, and on the imposition of student building fees or both, or from other sources other than by appropriations by the Legislature of the State of Utah * *
Section 2, upon which much reliance is placed in the opinion of Mr. Justice HENEIOD, provides that the bonds
“shall be special obligations payable solely from the revenues to be derived from the operation of the building and student building fees, etc. * *
It must be conceded that the use of “etc.” in a statute is not only unusual, but, were it standing alone without context to give it meaning, it would be too indefinite to permit its application. But it seems clear in view of the previous section of the act that “etc.” is used to mean precisely what “other sources” means in Sec. 53-38-2, U.C.A. 1953, namely, “from other sources other than by appropriations by the legislature of the state of Utah.” Unless given that meaning in Section 53-38-3, then the em*195ployment of such words in the previous section becomes meaningless. What clearly was meant is that the Regents of the University might look to any other source which is available to the University for building purposes. I shall return to this concept later on. Presently, I address myself to subsection (7) of 53-38-8.
Subsection (7) is one of 11 subsections of the section referred to. Those 11 subsections relate to the authority of the Board in taking action to assure payment of the bonds which are to be issued. The introduction to such subsections is as follows:
“In order to secure the prompt payment of such principal and interest and the proper application of the revenues pledged thereto the Board is authorized by appropriate provisions in the resolution or resolutions authorizing the bonds”;
to do various things. Among them are those specified in subsection (7). That subsection authorizes the Board
“to fix rents, charges and fees, including student building fees, to be imposed in connection with and for the use of the building and the facilities supplied thereby, which rents, charges and fees shall be considered to be income and revenues derived from the operation of the building, and are expressly required to be fully sufficient to assure the prompt payment of principal and interest on the bonds as each becomes due * * (Emphasis added.)
The requirement, it is to be noted, is not that those fees specifically enumerated are to be sufficient to pay the principal and interest on the bonds, but to assure the prompt payment thereof. This wording is significant. It is plain from the very section of the statute in which this requirement is found, as well as the previous section, that it was the intention of the Legislature that other sources be available for payment of the principal and interest of the obligations. The grant of authority to the Board to resort to “other sources” is contained in the preceding section. The section under discussion deals with the steps to be taken to provide for liquidation of the bonds. Hence the *196Board in fixing fees, charges and rents which will be sufficient to assure prompt payment of the principal and interest of the bonds, may take into account other sources of income pledged to their payment. To give any more restricted meaning to the requirement of subsection (7) is by implication to give no meaning to the “other sources” provision of both Sections 2 and 3. We cannot ascribe to the Legislature an intention to withdraw an authorization given in one sentence by another sentence in the same section. If this be the proper construction of subsection (7), then we have merely to determine whether or not the income derived from the land grant funds is encompassed within the phrase “other sources other than by appropriations by the legislature of the state.” That is, other sources available for building purposes.
To attempt to restrict the meaning of the “other sources” as used in the statute under the doctrine of “ejustem generis,” to revenues derived from the building other than the customary revenues received therefrom is to give it no meaning at all; because in the very sentence in which the phrase “other sources” is used, all of the income and revenues to be derived from the operation of the building are specifically mentioned as a source for the payment of the bonds. Furthermore, if “other sources” as used in the Act does not authorize recourse to the building and maintenance fund hereinafter referred to, I am unable to apply such Words to any other source. If grants, devises, or bequests were made to the University for building purposes, the Regents have, and have had for many years, authority to use them for that purpose without authorization in the 1947 enactment. By Section 53-31-3, U.C.A. 1953, the University is given authority to take such grants, devises or bequests of money or property. It is therein provided that
“it may convert property received by gift, grant, devise or bequest and not suitable for its uses into other property so available or into money. Such property so received or converted shall be held, invested and managed, and the proceeds thereof used by the board, for the *197purposes and under the conditions prescribed in the grant or donation.”
It may well be, as suggested in the opinion of Mr. Justice HENRIOD, that the “dedicated credits” mentioned in Chapter 85, Laws of Utah 1951, may, under the construction here given of the statute, be available to supplement revenues and income from the building and student building fees in the construction of a building or buildings authorized by Chapter 126, Laws of Utah 1947. The credits mentioned in Ch. 85 have since 1915 been set aside for a specified purpose. Chapter 30, Laws of Utah 1915, provided
“All moneys received by the University of Utah as entrance or tuition fees or moneys received from any source whatsoever shall be paid into the State Treasury at the close of each month, and shall he placed to the credit of the maintenance account of the University of Utah.”
This provision remained substantially unchanged until 1939 when, by amendment, such moneys were placed to the credit of the maintenance and building accounts. As amended the provision reads:
“All money received by the university of Utah or Utah state agricultural college from any source whatsoever, except as otherwise provided, shall be paid into the state treasury at the close of the months of June and December of each year, and shall be placed to the credit of the maintenance and building accounts of the respective institutions”. See Chapter 70, Laws of Utah 1939, and Section 75-2-6, Utah Code Annotated 1943.
Interestingly, although in 1951 it was provided that the “dedicated credits” should be retained by the University of Utah and used in its work program, the provision quoted above from the 1939 statutes was carried into the Utah Code Annotated 1953 as Section 53-34-6. Such credits, then, are still set aside in a maintenance and building account.
While such dedicated credits might be so used, I am not so fearful of the dangerous implications of the construe*198tion indulged as is my associate. This for two reasons: First, such “other sources other than by appropriation” are to be used to supplement the revenues from the building and student building fees. Secondly, should the Board of Regents of the University of Utah be so unmindful of the maintenance requirements of the University as to attempt to use the total of the dedicated credits for building purposes — an attitude upon the part of the Board of Regents which their past conduct and their standing in the community would not justify us in anticipating — the Legislature has the authority to curb such raids. It is not likely that the visualized building expansion program will be undertaken before the next legislative session. If the grant of authority relative to the use of the “dedicated credits” be thought to be too broad, the Legislature can narrow it.
As to whether or not the interest on the land grant funds is available for building purposes, we are required to define “support and maintenance” as used in Section 5, Article 10, of the Utah State Constitution quoted in the opinion of Mr. Justice Wade. I agree with the meaning  given thereto in the opinion, namely, that such phrase is not so restrictive as not to include the building of buildings or the purchase of sites therefor. So concluding, I am compelled to likewise conclude that the income from such funds is encompassed within the phrase “other sources other than by appropriations by the legislature.” I think we must so conclude unless we are of the opinion that in using such phrase the Legislature had in mind what is termed in the opinion of Mr. Justice WADE the “restrictive special fund theory,” and legislated with that concept in mind. I do not think that they did. I find nothing in the words used or the implications thereof which would justify such conclusion. I therefore think the act itself authorizes the use of the funds and in accordance with the opinion of Mr. Justice WADE believe that the restricted special fund theory as applied to the constitutional pro*199vision invoked should not be adopted to preclude the securing of the bond issue by the income from such funds.