Court Opinion

ID: 9577979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:40:11.959028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:22:12.917567
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
specially concurring.
This $390 lawsuit will have a lasting impact on the practice of law in Idaho under what commonly are referred to as the “Federal Rules” of Civil Procedure. For that reason I concur in the Court’s opinion insofar as it holds that the failure to plead an affirmative defense does not across-the-board constitute a waiver of that defense which precludes it from being raised later. This is a commendable holding and strongly reinforces my own view of the “Federal Rules” as set forth in a number of opinions. It has been suggested that an absence of prejudice is a prerequisite finding necessary to substantiate a trial court ruling that a defense has been waived. However, I see it as a question of timeliness, and hence concur in the reversal of the appellate district court’s opinion.1
Obviously, as in this very case, Mathewson is prejudiced by a holding which allows Bluestone to raise an affirmative defense, the application of which is fatal to the validity of his counterclaim. When Blue-stone, in her reply to Mathewson’s counterclaim, and in moving for summary judgment, did not raise the affirmative defense of the Statute of Frauds,2 Judge Maynard, *457on one view of the language of Idaho Buies of Civil Procedure 8(c) and 12(b), properly could have concluded (as he did) that she had waived that defense. For certain it has long been thought by a number of Idaho’s judges and practitioners that Rule 8(c), which requires that “In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively ... statute of frauds ...” (emphasis added), is indeed mandatory and unyielding, and equally, if not more so, is the language of Rule 12(b): “Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief in any pleading, whether a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party claim, shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one (1) is required .... ” (Emphasis added.)3 A closer reading of Rule 12(b), however, results in the conclusion that notwithstanding the use of the word “shall,” the plain import of the rule is to require that the eight defenses enumerated therein be raised by motion, obviously in advance of filing a responsive pleading which could also, at the pleader’s option, raise those same defenses. Note that the rule says that such a motion “shall be made before pleading,” (emphasis added) but then proceeds to say that no defense or objection is waived, if incorporated in a responsive pleading or motion. So, although “shall” often means “must,” nevertheless it certainly does not so mean when viewed in the self-contradictory language of Rule 12(b), at least not to the extent that the failure to comply with “shall” always results in waiving a defense.
Rule 12(h)4 is the rule to which resort may be had to eliminate any doubts. Therein it is declared without ambiguity which defenses are capable of being irrevocably waived, but only certain defenses listed in Rule 12(h) have been incorporated from 12(b): “(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, which motion shall state the grounds therefore and be considered as a motion for proper venue, but need not be accompanied by an affidavit, (4) insufficiency of process, [and] (5) insufficiency of service of process .... ” Thus it is seen that Rule 12(h) is the only rule which goes so far as to declare that a waiver takes place when those certain above set-forth defenses are not raised by motion or in appropriate responsive pleadings. No other rule is so worded.
Further enlightenment is found in I.R. C.P. 13(f) and 15(a). Rule 13(f) allows the late pleading of a counterclaim by way of amendment when it was pleaded earlier and the excuse is “oversight, inadvertence, or excusable neglect.” Even more broadly, such amendment is to be allowed “when justice requires.” It should follow, as night does day, that if a belated counterclaim will be readily allowed, then a like construction of the rules would allow a belated amendment to a reply to a counterclaim.
Rule 15(a) speaks to allowing belated amendments with equally liberal language. No mention of prejudice to the opposing party is mentioned, but instead the focal point is whether the action has been set for trial — “placed upon the trial calendar.” Some amendments may be made as a matter of course, and, as to those requiring leave of court first obtained, “leave shall be freely given when justice so requires.”
In the case at hand there is no suggestion that the case was on the trial docket. On the contrary, the motion for summary judg*458ment followed on the heels of extensive discovery proceedings, and there had not been any pre-trial conference. Apparently, during the discovery, or in briefing the motion, Bluestone’s counsel discovered the possible applicability of the Statute of Frauds, and thereupon argued it. Timewise this was less than three weeks after Bluestone’s reply was filed, and at that stage of the proceedings the raising of the defense was not untimely.5 Such being the state of affairs, and it already having been established in Idaho jurisprudence that a motion for summary judgment effectively amends the pleadings and is not an improper manner in which to raise an affirmative defense, Cook v. Soltman, 96 Idaho 187, 525 P.2d 969 (1974); see Harbaugh v. Myron Harbough Motor, Inc., 100 Idaho 295, 597 P.2d 18 (1979); Trosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54, 577 P.2d 33 (1978), the magistrate did not err in entertaining the motion, and I am not persuaded that there was error in granting it. In that respect, it should be made clear that the Court’s opinion treats the oral lease agreement entirely as a matter of contract. I do not myself see the Court wanting to be understood as holding that oral one-year leases, a common thing in farming and ranching transactions,6 as well as in other types of tenancy, are invalid because made a few days, weeks, or even months before the commencement of the lease term — a contention which most definitely was not presented, briefed, or argued below or in this Court.
The judgment of the magistrate should be reinstated on the basis of the defense having not been untimely raised, and in the interests of justice. Jones v. Watson, 98 Idaho 606, 570 P.2d 284 (1977).

. Conceivably, demonstrable prejudice might in some situations be an element for consideration in determining timeliness. Generally, however, the rules hereinafter discussed should be controlling.

. There was no trial; hence the statement of facts in the Court’s opinion is gleaned from the allegations of the parties, and the statements and argument of the parties in briefs.
Plaintiff Bluestone in her complaint sought the return of $390 which she alleged Defendant Mathewson owed her when a tentative renting agreement fell through, the amount sought being a deposit which she contended placed her next in line. Mathewson in his answer and counter-claim sought damages for her breach of an alleged firm rental agreement;
“On August 15, 1977 (plaintiff) JOYCE BLUESTONE rented premises at 128 W. 3rd St., Cheney, Washington from JOHN MATHEWSON (defendant and cross complainant). “Rent period to start September l, 1977 and run for one year ending August 31, 1978. Rental to be One Hundred Forty Five Dollars ($145.00) per month, damage deposit to be forfeited in case of damage or failure to rent for the entire year. One Hundred Forty Five Dollars ($145.00) for the first month rent, One Hundred Forty Five Dollars ($145.00) for the last months rent, One Hundred Dollars ($100.00) damage deposit making a total of Three Hundred Ninety Dollars ($390.00).
“A cashiers check was given defendant and cross complainant on August 15, 1977.” Before she replied to the counter-claim, defendant amended to allege the basis of his claim against her in this language:
“1.
“On August 15, 1977, Plaintiff and cross-defendant, JOYCE BLUESTONE rented premises at 128 W. 3rd St., Cheney, Washington from defendant and cross-plaintiff, JOHN B. MATHEWSON who resides at 2415 —16th Ave., Lewiston, Idaho, on the following terms:
“11.
“Plaintiff and cross-defendant agreed to rent premises for one year, starting on September 1, 1977 to August 31, 1978. Rental to be one hundred forty five dollars ($145.00) per month, damage deposit to be forfeited in case of damage or failure to rent for the entire year. One hundred forty five dollars ($145.00) for the first months rent, one hundred forty five dollars ($145.00) for the last months rent, one hundred dollars ($100.00) damage deposit making a total of three hundred ninety dollars ($390.00). A cashiers check was given to defendant and cross-plaintiff on August 15, 1977. The above was subject to be confirmed by the defendant and cross-plaintiff prior to September 1, 1977.
“111.
“On August 23, 1977 the plaintiff and cross-defendant was told that she had rented the premises at 128 W. 3rd St., Cheney, Washington.”
Bluestone filed a Reply to the Counter-claim, but made no affirmative defense based on the Statute of Frauds. She then moved for summary judgment, again not raising the Statute of Frauds as a defense, but apparently raised the proposition as an issue in her argument before *457the magistrate, perhaps in a brief, or orally. At any rate, she prevailed, and her motion was granted and the case at that level ended with a monetary judgment in her favor.
Mathewson, who until that time had appeared pro se, retained counsel and appealed to the district court which reviewed the case as an appellate court, and reversed the magistrate, on the basis of Bluestone’s failure to timely raise the affirmative defense, the district court holding that such failure to raise the defense amounted to a waiver. Bluestone appeals that decision to this Court.

. A noble gesture would be to remove the parenthetical (1). “One,” in the sense used, has nothing to do with numerical count, but is a pronoun referencing back to “responsive pleading.” The rule is confusing enough without it.

. Here again, it would nobly advance the practice of law if the capital “A” and “B” were stricken from the rule. Both are totally unnecessary and add nothing but confusion to a reader.

. Bluestone’s brief argues that Mathewson was not prejudiced by her delay in raising that issue because Mathewson still had the opportunity to argue the point. As previously stated, the question is not one of prejudice. Timeliness is the proper criterion.

. A good discussion is found in 72 Am.Jur.2d, Statute of Frauds § 27 (Agreement for Lease of Realty).