Court Opinion

ID: 9571642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:33:48.274361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:44.752343
License: Public Domain

VAN CISE, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
The parties here stipulated to matters pertaining to property and debts, maintenance, attorney’s fees and costs, and the amount of child support to be paid by the father. The court properly found from the evidence that both parents were “fit and proper persons for custodial rights to the child, and that both will act with love and affection toward the child, and will act for the best interest of the child.” There was no dispute that the primary residence of the child should be with the mother, and that the father should have a considerable amount of time with the child. They were in agreement that both should participate in any major decisions concerning the child’s welfare, including her education, health care, and religious training. See § 14-10-130(1), C.R.S.1973.
The only matter on which they disagree is what to call the arrangement. The court used the words “custody with both parties,” and referred to the father’s time with the child as his “custodial right with the child.” The mother does not ask for a change in the basic provisions of the order; all she wants is to have herself declared as the only “custodian” and to have the father’s time with the child be called “visitation.”
Inasmuch as the mother does not ask for other changes in the order, continuing the arrangement under the terminology used by the trial court cannot possibly prejudice her. “In reviewing an order affecting the custody of a child, an appellate court will make every reasonable presumption in favor of the acts of the trial court.” Searle v. Searle, 115 Colo. 266, 172 P.2d 837 (1946). We should not reverse on a matter of semantics.