Court Opinion

ID: 9429101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:25:39.45011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:17.061678
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice Burger,
with whom Justice Powell, Justice Rehnquist, and Justice O’Connor join, dissenting.
The Court decides today that Congress may dictate to the states, and their political subdivisions, detailed standards governing the selection of state employees, including those charged with protecting people and homes from crimes and fires. Although the opinion reads the Constitution to allow Congress to usurp this fundamental state function, I have reexamined that document and I fail to see where it grants to the National Government the power to impose such strictures on the states either expressly or by implication. Those strictures are not required by any holding of this Court, and it is not wholly without significance that Congress has not placed similar limits on itself in the exercise of its own sovereign powers. Accordingly, I would hold the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (Age Act) unconstitutional as applied to the states, and affirm the judgment of the District Court.
I
I begin by analyzing the Commerce Clause rationale, for it was upon this power that Congress expressly relied when it originally enacted the Age Act in 1967, see 29 U. S. C. § 621, and when it extended its protections to state and local government employees, see H. R. Rep. No. 93-913, pp. 1-2 (1974).1
*252We have had several occasions in recent years to investigate the scope of congressional authority to legislate under the Commerce Clause, see, e. g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., Inc., 452 U. S. 264 (1981); United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982). The wisdom to be drawn from these cases is that Congress’ authority under the Commerce Clause is restricted by the protections afforded the states by the Tenth Amendment. To decide whether a particular enactment has improperly intruded into Tenth Amendment rights, we have adopted a three-prong test:
“First, there must be a showing that the challenged statute regulates the ‘States as States.’ [National League of Cities, 426 U. S.], at 854. Second, the federal regulation must address matters that are indisputably ‘attribute[s] of state sovereignty.’ Id., at 845. And third, it must be apparent that the States’ compliance with the federal law would directly impair their ability ‘to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions.’ Id., at 852.” Hodel, 452 U. S., at 287-288.
For statutes that meet each prong of this test, a final inquiry must be made to decide whether “the federal interest advanced [is] such that it justifies state submission.” Id., at 288, n. 29, citing Fry v. United States, 421 U. S. 542 (1975); National League of Cities, supra, at 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
We need not pause on the first prong of this test, for the legislation is indisputably aimed at regulating the states in their capacity as states, 29 U. S. C. § 630(b). The Commission argues, however, that the legislation does not run counter to the other two prongs of the test. Turning then to prong two, whether the Age Act addresses matters that are “attributes of state sovereignty,” we may assume that in enacting the Wyoming State Highway Patrol and Game and *253Fish Warden Retirement Act, Wyo. Stat. § 31-3-101 et seq. (1977 and Supp. 1982), Wyoming sought to assure the physical preparedness of its game wardens and others who enforce its laws. Tr. of Oral Arg. 5. This goal is surely an attribute of sovereignty, for parks and recreation services were identified in National League of Cities, swpra, at 851, as traditional state activities protected by the Tenth Amendment. Even more important, it is the essence of state power to choose— subject only to constitutional limits — who is to be part of the state government. Cf. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112, 123 (1970) (Black, J.). If poachers destroy the fish and game reserves of Wyoming, it is not to the Congress that people are going to complain, but to state and local authorities who will have to justify their actions in selecting wardens. Since it is the State that bears the responsibility for delivering the services, it is clearly an attribute of state sovereignty to choose who will perform these duties.
To decide whether a challenged activity is an attribute of sovereignty, it is instructive to inquire whether other government entities have attempted to enact similar legislation. A finding that other governmental units have passed mandatory retirement laws, although not conclusive, is persuasive evidence that such laws are traditional methods for insuring an efficient work force for certain governmental functions. My research indicates that more than one-half the states have retirement laws that, like the Wyoming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden Retirement Act, violate the Age Act.2 More important, Congress, while mandating *254compliance in the states, carefully preserved its own freedom to select employees on any basis it chooses. Although the Age Act was expressly made to apply to the National Government, 29 U. S. C. §633a (1976 ed. and Supp. V), exceptions were built into the enactment. Certain categories of federal employment — such as law enforcement officers — were explicitly excluded, and in addition, the statute provides that “[r]easonable exemptions to the provisions of this section may be established by the [Civil Service] Commission.”3 29 U. S. C. §633a(b). I conclude that defining the qualifications of employees is an essential of sovereignty.
*255The third prong of the National League of Cities test is that the federal intrusion must impair the ability of the state to structure integral operations. Wyoming cites several ways in which the Age Act interferes with its ability to structure state services, and several amici inform us of additional difficulties, some economic, some not, that are engendered by the Act.
It is beyond dispute that the statute can give rise to increased employment costs caused by forced employment of older individuals. Since these employees tend to be at the upper end of the pay scale, the cost of their wages while they are still in the work force is greater. And since most pension plans calculate retirement benefits on the basis of maximum salary or number of years of service, pension costs are greater when an older employee retires.4 The employer is also forced to pay more for insuring the health of older employees because, as a group, they inevitably carry a higher-than-average risk of illness. See, e. g., Pollock, Gettman, & Meyer, Analysis of Physical Fitness and Coronary Heart Disease Risk of Dallas Area Police Officers, 20 J. Occup. Med. 393 (1978); N. Shock, Cardiac Performance and Age, in Cardiovascular Problems, Perspectives and Progress 3-24 (H. Russek ed. 1976); J. Hall & J. Zwemer, Prospective Medicine (2d ed. 1979). Since they are — especially in law enforce*256ment — also more prone to on-the-job injuries, it is reasonable to conclude that the employer’s disability costs are increased. See generally, D. Gregg & V. Lucas, Life and Health Insurance Handbook (3d ed. 1973); S. Huebner & K. Black, Life Insurance (10th ed. 1982).
Noneconomic hardships are equally severe. Employers are prevented from hiring those physically best able to do the job. Since older workers occupy a disproportionate share of the upper-level and supervisory positions, a bar on mandatory retirement also impedes promotion opportunities. Lack of such opportunities tends to undermine younger employees’ incentive to strive for excellence, and impedes the state from fulfilling affirmative-action objectives.
The Federal Government can hardly claim that the objectives of decreasing costs and increasing promotional opportunities are impermissible: many of the same goals are cited repeatedly to justify the “enclaves” of federal exceptions to the Age Act. For example, mandatory retirement is still the rule in the Armed Services, 10 U. S. C. §1251 (1976 ed., Supp. V), and the Foreign Service, 22 U. S. C. §4052 (1976 ed., Supp. V), despite passage of the Age Act. The House Committee on Armed Services continues, apparently, to think it essential to have a mechanism to assure that officers from positions of command are vigorous and free from infirmities generally associated with age. H. R. Rep. No. 96-1462, p. 8 (1980). Similarly, the House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, while acknowledging the “unfairness of a mandatory retirement age,” H. R. Rep. No. 96-992, pt. 2, p. 30 (1980), concluded that it remains necessary in the Foreign Service “for the maintenance of predictable career patterns,” ibid., to prevent “unavailability for worldwide assignment,” ibid., and to “restore the ‘flow’ [L e., promotional opportunities] to the system,” id., at 15. See also 5 U. S. C. § 335. It is difficult to grasp just how Congress reconciles that view with its legislation forcing the states to comply with rigid standards.
*257The Commission answers the State’s contentions by arguing that even under the Age Act, it is possible to effectuate some of the State’s goals. According to appellant, adverse economic impact is mitigated by 29 U. S. C. § 623(f)(2) (1976 ed., Supp. V), which provides that an employer may “observe the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this chapter . . .
I reject the notion that this exception ameliorates the State’s problem to any significant extent. The reality is that, for Wyoming to benefit from this exception, it will have to enact new laws and develop new regulations to reduce its insurance coverage on older employees. Drafting and enacting these new laws is a burden Congress has no power to impose on the states. Second, it is doubtful that Wyoming could, as a practical matter, lower the health and disability insurance coverage on employees who fall under mandatory retirement laws. It is these employees who are, for the most part, in the most physically hazardous occupations, and thus most need protection. Stated another way, perhaps Crump would not want to keep his job if the State were unwilling to bear the economic risks of his injuries. Section 623(f)(2) is thus a shallow alternative to mandatory retirement.
Section 623(f)(1), the Commission’s answer to the problem of protecting the State’s ability to deliver its services effectively, provides no solution either. That section provides that mandatory early retirement is permissible “where age is a bona fide occupational qualification [BFOQ] reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular business . . . .” Although superficially, this section appears to offer the states a means for lessening the administrative burden of retiring unfit employees on a case-by-case basis, the exception does not work in practice. In the absence of statutory guidelines, the courts that have faced the question have — in response to this appellant’s urgings — established a *258high standard of what constitutes a bona fide occupational qualification. Typical seems to be the approach taken in Arritt v. Grisell, 567 F. 2d 1267, 1271 (CA4 1977), requiring the employer to prove
“(1) that the bfoq which it invokes is reasonably necessary to the essence of its business . . . , and (2) that the employer has reasonable cause, i. e., a factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons within the class . . . would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job involved, or that it is impossible or impractical to deal with persons over the age limit on an individualized basis.”
See also Usery v. Tamiami Trail Tours, Inc., 531 F. 2d 224 (CA5 1976). Given the state of modern medicine, it is virtually impossible to prove that all persons within a class are unable to perform a particular job or that it is impossible to test employees on an individual basis, see, e. g., Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 515 F. Supp. 1287, 1299 (Md. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U. S. 944 (1982).
In the face of this track record, I find it impossible to say that § 623(f)(1) provides an adequate method for avoiding significant impairment to the state’s ability to structure its integral governmental operations.5
Since I am satisfied that the Age Act runs afoul of the three prongs of the National League of Cities test, I turn to the balancing test alluded to in Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in National League of Cities, and in Hodel. The Commission argues that the federal interest in preventing unnecessary demands on the social security system and other maintenance programs, in protecting employees from arbitrary discrimination, and in eliminating unnecessary burdens on the free flow of commerce “is more than sufficient in the *259face of. . . Wyoming’s bald assertion of a prerogative to be arbitrary.” Brief for Appellant 19.
It is simply not accurate to state that Wyoming is resting its challenge to the Age Act on a “sovereign” right to discriminate; as I read it, Wyoming is asserting a right to set standards to meet local needs. Nor do I believe that these largely theoretical benefits to the Federal Government outweigh the very real danger that a fire may burn out of control because the firefighters are not physically able to cope; or that a criminal may escape because a law enforcement officer’s reflexes are too slow to react swiftly enough to apprehend an offender; or that an officer may be injured or killed for want of capacity to defend himself. These factors may not be real to Congress but it is not Congress’ responsibility to prevent them; they are nonetheless real to the states. I would hold that Commerce Clause powers are wholly insufficient to bar the states from dealing with or preventing these dangers in a rational manner. Wyoming’s solution is plainly a rational means.
II
Since it was ratified after the Tenth Amendment, the Fourteenth Amendment is not subject to the constraints discussed earlier in connection with the Commerce Clause. Indeed, it is well established that Congress may, under the powers bestowed by § 5, enact legislation affecting the states, Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339, 345 (1880); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U. S. 445 (1976). But this does not mean that Congress has been given a “blank check” to intrude into details of states’ governments at will. The Tenth Amendment was not, after all, repealed when the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified: it was merely limited. The question then becomes whether the Fourteenth Amendment operates to transfer from the states to the Federal Government the essentially local governmental function of deciding who will protect citizens from lawbreakers.
The outer reaches of congressional power under the Civil War Amendments have always been uncertain. One factor *260is, however, clear: Congress may act only where a violation lurks. The flaw in the Commission’s analysis is that in this instance, no one — not the Court, not the Congress6 — has determined that mandatory retirement plans violate any rights protected by these Amendments. We cannot say that the Judiciary made this determination, for we have considered the constitutionality of mandatory retirement schemes twice, in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U. S. 307 (1976), for state police, and Vance v. Bradley, 440 U. S. 93 (1979), for Foreign Service officers; we rejected both equal protection challenges. In both instances, we arrived at our conclusion by examining, arguendo, the retirement schemes under the rational-basis standard. It was not necessary that we be convinced that equal protection guarantees extend to classes defined by age because governmental employment is not a fundamental right and those who are mandatorily retired are not a suspect class.
In Murgia, we found that early retirement of policemen was justified by the states’ objective of “protecting] the public by assuring physical preparedness of its uniformed police,” 427 U. S., at 314; in Bradley, we held that early retirement of Foreign Service personnel was justified by Congress’ perception of a need to assure “opportunities for promotion would be available” and “the high quality of those occupying positions critical to the conduct of our foreign relations,” and in order to “minimiz[e] the risk of less than superior performance by reason of poor health or loss of vitality,” 440 U. S., at 101 and 103-104. Congress was simply using a rational means for solving a practical governmental problem within its constitutional jurisdiction.
Were we asked to review the constitutionality of the Wyoming State Highway Patrol and Game and Fish Warden Re*261tirement Act, we would reach a result consistent with Bradley and Murgia. Like Congress dealing with military personnel, FBI agents, and Foreign Service officers, the State of Wyoming has an interest in the physical ability of its highway patrol and game and fish wardens. It is within Wyoming’s authority to motivate personnel to high performance by assuring opportunities for advancement; Wyoming reasonably considers safety conditions on its highways and game preserves critical to the well-being of its citizenry. In short, it cannot be said that in applying the Age Act to the states Congress has acted to enforce equal protection guarantees as they have been defined by this Court.
Nor can appellant claim that Congress has used the powers we recognized in City of Rome v. United States, 446 U. S. 156, 176-177 (1980); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U. S. 112 (1970); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U. S. 409, 437-444 (1968); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U. S. 301 (1966); and Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U. S. 641 (1966), to enact legislation that prohibits conduct not in itself unconstitutional because it considered the prohibition necessary to guard against encroachment of guaranteed rights or to rectify past discrimination. There has been no finding, as there was in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 309, that the abrogated state law infringed on rights identified by this Court.7 *262Nor did Congress use, as it did in Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra, at 656, its “specially informed legislative competence” to decide that the state law it invalidated was too intrusive on federal rights to be an appropriate means to achieve the ends sought by the state. Instead, the Age Act can be sustained only if we assume first, that Congress can define rights wholly independently of our case law, and second, that Congress has done so here. I agree with neither proposition.
Allowing Congress to protect constitutional rights statutorily that it has independently defined fundamentally alters our scheme of government. Although the South Carolina v. Katzenbach line of cases may be read to allow Congress a degree of flexibility in deciding what the Fourteenth Amendment safeguards, I have always read Oregon v. Mitchell as finally imposing a limitation on the extent to which Congress may substitute its own judgment for that of the states and assume this Court’s “role of final arbiter,” Mitchell, supra, at 205 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Mitchell, after all, involved legislation in the area of suffrage, where Congress had special competence and special reasons to limit the powers of the states. It is significant, however, that while we there sustained the portions of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 lowering the minimum age of voters from 21 to 18 in federal elections, barring literacy tests in state and federal elections, and prohibiting states from disqualifying voters in Presidential elections for failure to meet state residency requirements, a majority of the Mitchell Court did not agree to allow Congress to alter voting requirements in state elections. We struck that portion of the Voting Rights Act because we thought it a “plain fact of history” that Congress lacked this power, see 400 U. S., at 125 and 294 (Black and Stewart, JJ.); id., at 154-215 (Harlan, J.); and because we thought that the Fourteenth Amendment *263was not a license to “overstep the letter or spirit of any constitutional restriction,” id., at 287 (Stewart, J.).
For me, this same reasoning leads inevitably to the conclusion that Congress lacked power to apply the Age Act to the states. There is no hint in the body of the Constitution ratified in 1789 or in the relevant Amendments that every classification based on age is outlawed. Yet there is much in the Constitution and the relevant Amendments to indicate that states retain sovereign powers not expressly surrendered, and these surely include the power to choose the employees they feel are best able to serve and protect their citizens.8
And even were we to assume, arguendo, that Congress could redefine the Fourteenth Amendment, I would still reject the power of Congress to impose the Age Act on the states when Congress, in the same year that the Age Act was extended to the states, passed mandatory retirement legislation of its own, Pub. L. 93-350, 88 Stat. 356, codified at 5 U. S. C. § 8335, for law enforcement officers and firefighters. Over eight years have elapsed since the Age Act was extended to the states, yet early retirement is still required of federal air traffic controllers, 5 U. S. C. §8335(a) (1976 ed., Supp. V), federal law enforcement officers, § 8335(b), federal firefighters, ibid., employees of the Panama Canal Commission and the Alaska Railroad, § 8335(c), members of the Foreign Service, 22 U. S. C. §4052 (1976 ed., Supp. V), and members of the Armed Services, 10 U. S. C. §1251 (1976 ed., Supp. V).
*264I — < HH
I believe I have demonstrated that neither the Constitution nor any of its Amendments have transferred from the states to the Federal Government the essentially local function of establishing standards for choosing state employees. The Framers did not give Congress the power to decide local employment standards because they wisely realized that as a body, Congress lacked the means to analyze the factors that bear on this decision, such as the diversity of occupational risks, climate, geography, and demography. Since local conditions generally determine how a job should be performed, and who should perform it, the authority and responsibility for making employment decisions must be in the hands of local governments, subject only to those restrictions unmistakably contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment. Intrusion by Congress into this area can lead only to ill-informed decisionmaking.
And even if Congress had infinite factfinding means at its disposal, conditions in various parts of the country are too diverse to be susceptible to a uniformly applicable solution. Wyoming is a State with large sparsely populated areas, where law enforcement often requires substantial physical stamina; the same conditions are not always encountered by law enforcement officers in Rhode Island, which has far less land area, no mountains, and no wilderness. Problems confronting law enforcement officers in Alaska or Maine may be unlike those encountered in Hawaii and Florida. Barring states from making employment decisions tailored to meet specific local needs undermines the flexibility that has long allowed industrial states to live under the same flag as rural states, and small, densely populated states to coexist with large, sparsely populated ones.
The reserved powers of the states and Justice Brandéis’ classic conception of the states as laboratories, New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U. S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandéis, J., dissenting), are turned on their heads when national rather than state governments assert the authority to make decisions on *265the age standard of state law enforcement officers. Flexibility for experimentation not only permits each state to find the best solutions to its own problems, it is the means by which each state may profit from the experiences and activities of all the rest. Nothing in the Constitution permits Congress to force the states into a Procrustean national mold that takes no account of local needs and conditions. That is the antithesis of what the authors of the Constitution contemplated for our federal system.
Justice Powell, with whom Justice O’Connor joins, dissenting.
I join The Chief Justice’s dissenting opinion, but write separately to record a personal dissent from Justice Stevens’ novel view of our Nation’s history.
HH
Justice Stevens begins his concurring opinion with the startling observation that the Commerce Clause “was the Framers’ response to the central problem that gave rise to the Constitution itself.” Ante, at 244 (emphasis added). At a subsequent point in his opinion, he observes that “this Court has construed the Commerce Clause to reflect the intent of the Framers ... to confer a power on the National Government adequate to discharge its central mission.” Ante, at 246-247 (emphasis added).1 Justice Stevens further states that “National League of Cities not only was incorrectly decided, but also is inconsistent with the central purpose of the Constitution itself . . . .” Ante, at 249 (emphasis added).
No one would deny that removing trade barriers between the States was one of the Constitution’s purposes. I sug*266gest, however, that there were other purposes of equal or greater importance motivating the statesmen who assembled in Philadelphia and the delegates who debated the ratification issue in the state conventions. No doubt there were differences of opinion as to the principal shortcomings of the Articles of Confederation. But one can be reasonably sure that few of the Founding Fathers thought that trade barriers among the States were “the central problem,” or that their elimination was the “central mission” of the Constitutional Convention. Creating a National Government within a federal system was far more central than any 18th-century concern for interstate commerce.
It is true, of course, that this Court properly has construed the Commerce Clause, and extended its reach, to accommodate the unanticipated and unimaginable changes, particularly in transportation and communication, that have occurred in our country since the Constitution was ratified. If Justice Stevens had written that the Founders’ intent in adopting the Commerce Clause nearly two centuries ago is of little relevance to the world in which we live today, I would not have disagreed. But his concurring opinion purports to rely on their intent. Ante, at 246. I therefore write — briefly, in view of the scope of the subject — to place the Commerce Clause in proper historical perspective, and further to suggest that even today federalism is not, as Justice Stevens appears to believe, utterly subservient to that Clause.
II
The Constitution’s central purpose was, as the name implies, to constitute a government. The most important provisions, therefore, are those in the first three Articles relating to the establishment of that government. The system of checks and balances, for example, is far more central to the larger perspective than any single power conferred on any branch. Indeed, the Virginia Plan, the initial proposal from which the entire Convention began its work, focuses on the *267framework of the National Government without even mentioning the power to regulate commerce.2
Apart from the framework of government itself, the Founders stated their motivating purposes in the Preamble to the Constitution:
“to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty . . .
These purposes differ little from the concerns motivating the States in the Articles of Confederation: “their common de-fence, the security of their liberties, and their mutual and general welfare.” Art. III. Although the “general Welfare” recognized by the Constitution could embrace the free flow of trade among States (despite the fact that the same language in the Articles of Confederation did not), it is clear that security “against foreign invasion [and] against dissen-*268tions between members of the Union” was of at least equal importance. See Speech by Edmund Randolph (May 29, 1787), reprinted in 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 18 (rev. ed. 1937) (J. Madison).3
The power to achieve the purposes identified in the Preamble was not delegated solely to Congress. If, however, one looks at the powers that were so delegated, the position of the Commerce Clause hardly suggests that it was the “central” concern of the patriots who formed our Union. The enumeration of powers in Art. I, § 8, begins with the “Power To lay and collect Taxes.”4 This is followed by the power “to pay the Debts” of the United States. Then, consistent with the Preamble, comes the power to “provide for the common Defence and general Welfare.” See n. 3, supra. The power to regulate interstate commerce is only one among nearly a score of other powers that followed. It is evident that the authority to tax and to “provide for the common Defence” loomed larger among the concerns of the Founders than other powers granted Congress. The Commerce Clause was given no place of particular prominence. So much for what the Constitution’s language and structure teach about the Framers’ intent.
Ill
One would never know from the concurring opinion that the Constitution formed a federal system, comprising a Na*269tional Government with delegated powers and state governments that retained a significant measure of sovereign authority. This is clear from the Constitution itself, from the debates surrounding its adoption and ratification, from the early history of our constitutional development, and from the decisions of this Court. It is impossible to believe that the Constitution would have been recommended by the Convention, much less ratified, if it had been understood that the Commerce Clause embodied the National Government’s “central mission,” a mission to be accomplished even at the expense of regulating the personnel practices of state and local governments.5
A
The Bill of Rights imposes express limitations on national powers. The Tenth Amendment, in particular, explicitly recognizes the retained power of the States: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor pro*270hibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” This limitation was, of course, implicit in the Constitution as originally ratified. Even those who opposed the adoption of a Bill of Rights did not dispute the propriety of such a limitation. Rather, they argued that it was unnecessary, for the Constitution delegated certain powers to the central government, and those not delegated were necessarily retained by the States or the people.6 Furthermore, the inherent federal nature of the system is clear from the structure of the National Government itself. Members of Congress and Presidential electors are chosen by States. Representation in the Senate is apportioned by States, regardless of population. The Full Faith and Credit Clause gives particular recognition to the States’ “public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings.” Article IV, §4, requires a republican form of government in each State. The initial ratification of the Constitution was accomplished on a state-by-state basis, and subsequent Amendments require approval by three-fourths of the States.
It was also clear from the contemporary debates that the Founding Fathers intended the Constitution to establish a federal system. As James Madison, “the Father of the Constitution,” explained to the people of New York:
“The powers delegated by the proposed Constitution to the Federal Government, are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State Governments are numerous and indefinite. The former will be exercised *271principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce .... The powers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects, which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties and properties of the people; and the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State.” The Federalist No. 45, p. 313 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
There can be no doubt that Madison’s contemporaries shared this view. See, e. g., Letter of Roger Sherman and Oliver Ellsworth to the Governor of Connecticut (Sept. 26, 1787), reprinted in 3 Farrand, supra n. 2, at 99 (description of proposed Constitution) (The “powers [vested in Congress] extend only to matters respecting the common interests of the union, and are specially defined, so that the particular states retain their sovereignty in all other matters”).
During the earliest years of our constitutional development, principles of federalism were not only well recognized, they formed the basis for virtually every State in the Union to assert its rights as a State against the Federal Government. In'1798, for example, Thomas Jefferson drafted the Kentucky Resolutions,7 which were passed by the Kentucky Legislature to protest the unpopular Alien and Sedition Acts, Act of June 18, 1798, 1 Stat. 566; Act of June 25, 1798, 1 Stat. 570; Act of July 6, 1798, 1 Stat. 577; Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596. At the same time, Madison drafted similar Virginia Resolutions, which were adopted by the Virginia *272General Assembly. See 4 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 528-529 (2d ed. 1863). In both cases it was clear that the powers reserved to the States were treated as a substantive limitation on the authority of Congress. It was asserted that these powers enabled a State to interpose its will against any action by the National Government. Thirty years later, Jefferson and Madison’s views were expanded by John C. Calhoun in his nullification doctrine— the extreme view that eventually led to the War Between the States.8 See 6 The Works of John C. Calhoun 1-57 (R. Cralle ed. 1859) (original draft of South" Carolina Exposition of 1828).
The view that the reserved powers of the States limited the delegated powers of the National Government was not confined to the South. The New England States, for example, vehemently opposed the Embargo Act of Dec. 22, 1807, ch. 5, 2 Stat. 451, and they turned to their rights as States in defense. In 1809, the Governor of Connecticut, with the support of the legislature, refused to comply with the Act of Jan. 9, 1809, 2 Stat. 506, which Congress passed to enforce the embargo.9 In Massachusetts the story was similar: The *273legislature denounced the enforcement Act as “unjust, oppressive and unconstitutional, and not legally binding on the citizens of this state.” Resolutions of the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 15, 1809), reprinted in H. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations 35 (1906). When Congress enacted the Embargo Act of Dec. 17, 1813, 3 Stat. 88, the Massachusetts Legislature declared it “a manifest. . . abuse of power” that infringed the “sovereignty reserved to the States”10 and justified the legislature in “interpos[ing] its power” to protect its citizens from “oppression,” Resolutions of the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 22, 1814), reprinted in Ames, supra, at 71-72. Even Daniel Webster, famous for his defense of the rights of the National Government, recognized that principles of federalism limit the power of Congress.11
B
It is clear beyond question that state sovereignty always has been a basic assumption of American political theory. Although its contours have changed over two centuries, state sovereignty remains a fundamental component of our system that this Court has recognized time and time again. Even to *274refer to the highlights would go far beyond the scope of this dissent. I therefore mention only a few of the decisions from last Term alone in which the Court expressly noted that States retain significant sovereign powers.12 In Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U. S. 40 (1982), we considered the state-action exemption from the antitrust laws. Since “‘under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority,’” id., at 49 (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 341, 351 (1943)), we had previously recognized an antitrust exemption for States acting “in the exercise of [their] sovereign powers,” 455 U. S., at 48. We held that this exemption does not extend to cities, but in so doing we repeatedly stressed the sovereign nature of States. See id., at 48-54. In United Transportation Union v. Long Island R. Co., 455 U. S. 678 (1982), we unanimously upheld the application of the Railway Labor Act to a state-owned railroad. We reached this conclusion, however, only by finding that operation of the railroad was not one of the State’s “constitutionally preserved sovereign function[s].” Id., at 683. And in FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U. S. 742 (1982), we considered whether parts of the Public Utility Regulatory Poli*275cies Act “constituted an invasion of state sovereignty in violation of the Tenth Amendment,” id., at 752. Although the Court upheld the statute, it was clear that state sovereignty was an essential element to be considered in reaching that conclusion. See id., at 758-771.
In sum, all of the evidence reminds us of the importance of the principles of federalism in our constitutional system. The Founding Fathers, and those who participated in the earliest phases of constitutional development, understood the States’ reserved powers to be a limitation on the power of Congress — including its power under the Commerce Clause. And the Court has recognized and accepted this fact for almost 200 years.13
IV
Justice Stevens’ concurring opinion recognizes no limitation on the ability of Congress to override state sovereignty in exercising its powers under the Commerce Clause. His opinion does not mention explicitly either federalism or state sovereignty. Instead it declares that “[t]he only basis for questioning the federal statute at issue here is the pure judicial fiat found in this Court’s opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery.” Ante, at 248 (emphasis added). Under this view it is not easy to think of any state function — however sovereign — that could not be pre-empted.

 The Age Act was extended to the states along with the Fair Labor Standards Act. Pub. L. 93-259, §28, 88 Stat. 74. Extension of the FLSA was declared unconstitutional in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U. S. 833 (1976).

 See, e. g., Ala. Code § 36-27-16(a)(l)(e) (Supp. 1982) (police; age 60); Ark. Stat. Ann. §42-455 (1977) (police; 65); Cal. Gov’t Code Ann. §20980 (West 1980) (highway patrol; 60); Del. Code Ann., Tit. 11, §8323 (1979) (police; 55); Idaho Code §50~1514(a) (Supp. 1981) (police; 65); Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 24, ¶ 10-2.1-17 (1979) (police and firemen; 65); Ind. Code §36-8-3.5-20 (1981) (police and firemen; 65); Iowa Code §97B.46(3) (Supp. 1982-1983) (peace officers and firefighters; 65); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 74-4975(b) (1980) (patrolmen; 60); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 42-691 (West Supp. 1983) (law enforcement personnel and firefighters; 65); Md. Ann. Code, *254Art. 88B, §53(l)(c) (1979) (police; 60); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann., ch. 32, § 69(d) (West 1966) and §83A(d) (Supp. 1982-1983) (police; 65); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 38.556(l)(c) (Supp. 1982) (police and firemen; 65); Minn. Stat. § 423.075(1) (Supp. 1983) (police and firemen; 65); Miss. Code Ann. §25-13-11 (Supp. 1982) (highway patrol; 55) and §21-29-245 (Supp. 1982) (police and firemen; 60); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 104.010 and § 104.080 (Vernon Supp. 1983) (highway patrol; 60); Mont. Code Ann. § 19-6-504 (1981) (highway patrol; 60) and § 19-9-801 (1981) (police; 65); Neb. Rev. Stat. §81-2025(2) (1981) (patrolmen; 60); N. Y. Retire. & Soc. Sec. Law §381-b(e) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983) (police; 65); N. D. Cent. Code §39-03.1-18 (1980) (highway patrol; 60); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §5505.16 (Supp. 1982) (highway patrol; 55); Okla. Stat., Tit. 47, §2-305A (Supp. 1982-1983) (police; 60); Ore. Rev. Stat. §237.129(1) (1981) (police and firemen; 60); Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 71, § 65(d) (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983) (police; 60); R. I. Gen. Laws § 45-21.2-5 (1980) (police and firemen; 65); S. C. Code §9-1-1535 (Supp. 1982) (conservation officers; 65); Tenn. Code Ann. §8-36-205(1) (1980) (police; 60 or 65); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., Art. 6423g-l, § 11(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983) (police; 65); Vt. Stat. Ann., Tit. 3, § 459(a)(2) (Supp. 1982) (police; 55); Wash. Rev. Code §43.43.250(1) (1981) (state patrol; 60); W. Va. Code § 8-22-25(d) (Supp. 1982) (police and firemen; 65); Wis. Stat. §41.02(23) (1979-1980) (police and firemen; 55); Wyo. Stat. § 15-5-307(a) (Supp. 1982) (police; 60). See also App. to Brief for National Institute of Municipal Law Enforcement Officers as Amicus Curiae la-7a, citing 160 municipalities that have laws violating the Age Act.

 This function was later transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, see § 2 of the Reorg. Plan No. 1 of 1978, 3 CFR 321 (1979), 92 Stat. 3781, 5 U. S. C. App. 426 (1976 ed., Supp. V).

 This problem is exacerbated by the special retirement schemes often used in connection with mandatory early retirement laws. In Wyoming, for example, state employees who are not subject to early retirement contribute less per month towards retirement than those in occupations where early retirement is required. So long as the early retirement laws are in effect, this system is actuarily sound because the employees who will spend less years at work pay into the system more rapidly. Simple invalidation of the early retirement system would work an inequity by requiring these workers to contribute more towards retirement than other state employees. Brief for Appellees 12, n. 5. Of course, Wyoming could revamp its pension system to correct this problem. Forcing the State to do so is another example of the adverse impact wrought by the Age Act.

 In addition, states that choose to invoke the BFOQ exception expose themselves to lawsuits requiring them to defend their choices. Defense of lawsuits is a costly and time-consuming endeavor that is, in itself, a burden impermissible for Congress to impose on the states.

 The ability of Congress to define independently protected classes is an issue that need not be resolved here because I think that the Age Act is unconstitutional even if it is assumed that Congress has this power.

 At oral argument, the Solicitor General argued that in applying the rational-basis test in Murgia and Bradley, the Court sub silentio agreed that age. discrimination is protected by the Equal Protection Clause, and that Congress has merely altered the burden needed to prove compliance with its guarantees. Tr. of Oral Arg. 17-18. I do not read these decisions to support this notion. Murgia and Bradley presented us with no occasion to determine the scope of the equal protection guarantee because we found the legislation challenged there sustainable even if we assumed the class was protected.
This is not to say definitively that age discrimination is not protected by the Fourteenth Amendment because this case does not squarely raise that issue. Rather, I am pointing out that since this Court has not decided the *262question, the Government cannot support this enactment on the ground that Congress was attempting to establish further safeguards for a class we have found to be constitutionally protected.

 It has been suggested that where a congressional resolution of a policy question hinges on legislative facts, the Court should defer to Congress’ judgment because Congress is in a better position than the Court to find the relevant facts. Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. Cin. L. Rev. 187, 229-230 (1971). While this theory may have some importance in matters of strictly federal concern, it has no place in deciding between the legislative judgments of Congress and that of the Wyoming Legislature. Congress is simply not as well equipped as state legislators to make decisions involving purely local needs.

 The authority on which Justice Stevens primarily relies is an extrajudicial lecture delivered by Justice Rutledge in 1946. Ante, at 244-245. Justice Rutledge declared that the “proximate cause of our national existence” was not the desire to assure the great “democratic freedoms”; rather it was the need “to secure freedom of trade” within the former Colonies. W. Rutledge, A Declaration of Legal Faith 25 (1947).

 Whatever may have sparked the Annapolis Convention, see ante, at 245, and 245-246, n. 1, it is clear that the focus of attention at the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia was the formation of a new government. Madison’s report of the proceedings begins: “Monday May 14th 1787 was the day fixed for the meeting of the deputies in Convention for revising the federal system of Government.” 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, p. 3 (rev. ed. 1937) (footnote omitted). After dealing with several preliminary matters, see id., at 1-17, the “main business,” id., at 18 (J. Madison), opened on May 29 with Edmund Randolph’s speech proposing the Virginia Plan. Almost all of the Plan’s resolutions dealt with the appropriate structure for the new government. Only the sixth resolution dealt with legislative powers at all. And far from stressing any power to regulate interstate commerce, it simply declared, in relevant part, that “the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confederation & moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual Legislation . . . .” Id., at 21. While this language was, no doubt, broad enough to include the power to regulate interstate commerce, there was certainly no emphasis on that particular power.

 No one in the ratification debate doubted that the power to defend the country was essential, and must be given to the central government. See The Federalist No. 41, pp. 269-276 (J. Cooke ed. 1961) (J. Madison). Even under the Articles of Confederation, it was considered necessary to give Congress “the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war.” Art. IX.

 A major weakness of the system created by the Articles of Confederation was the central government’s inability to collect taxes directly. See 1 Farrand, supra n. 2, at 284 (remarks of A. Hamilton). Remedying this defect was thus one of the most important purposes of the Constitutional Convention. See R. Paul, Taxation in the United States 4-5 (1954); The Federalist No. 30 (A. Hamilton).

 Justice Stevens’ citation of Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1 (1824), in support of his position, see ante, at 248-249, n. 8, is essentially irrelevant, for Chief Justice Marshall was not concerned with a State’s sovereign power. Gibbons carried passengers between New Jersey and New York on two steamboats licensed under an Act of Congress, while Ogden claimed the benefit of a New York law granting an exclusive right to navigate steamboats on New York waters. The power to grant such a monopoly clearly is not one of a State’s traditional sovereign powers. On the contrary, it is part of the power to regulate interstate navigation that lies within the very core of the Commerce Clause. I certainly do not suggest that principles of federalism should prevent Congress from regulating navigation. The present case, however, concerns the power to determine the terms and conditions of employment for the officers and employees who constitute a State’s government. This is as sovereign a power as any that a State possesses, and it is far removed from the original concerns of the Commerce Clause. Indeed, this case illustrates how far the Federal Government, with the Court’s approval, has departed from the principles upon which our federal union was formed. The “commerce” at issue, incredible as it would have seemed even a few years ago, let alone in Chief Justice Marshall’s day, is the effect on trade among the States of Wyoming’s requirement that its game wardens retire at age 65 rather than 70.

 Alexander Hamilton, for example, made this argument in The Federalist No. 84, pp. 678-579 (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also United States v. Darby, 312 U. S. 100, 124 (1941) (Tenth Amendment “declaratory of the relationship between the national and state governments as it had been established by the Constitution before the amendment”); United States v. Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 733 (1931) (“The Tenth Amendment was intended to confirm the understanding of the people at the time the Constitution was adopted, that powers not granted to the United States were reserved to the States or to the people. It added nothing to the instrument as originally ratified . . .”).

 In the first Resolution, Jefferson explained
“[t]hat the several states composing the United States of America are not united on the principle of unlimited submission to their general government; but that, by compact, under the style and title of a Constitution for the United States, and of amendments thereto, they constituted a general government for special purposes, delegated to that government certain definite powers, reserving, each state to itself, the residuary mass of right to their own self-government; and that whensoever the general government assumes undelegated powers, its acts are unauthoritative, void, and of no force.” Kentucky Resolution of 1798, reprinted in 4 J. Elliot, Debates on the Federal Constitution 540 (2d ed. 1863).

 In referring to this early and interesting history, I do not suggest that either the doctrine of interposition or that of nullification was constitutionally sound. In any event, they were laid to rest in one of history’s bloodiest fratricides, ending at Appomattox in 1865. The views of these great figures in our history are, however, directly pertinent to the question whether there was ever any intention that the Commerce Clause would empower the Federal Government to intrude expansively upon the sovereign powers reserved to the States. See n. 5, supra.

 The Governor explained to a special session of the state legislature that “[wjhenever our national legislature is led to overleap the prescribed bounds of their [sic] constitutional powers, on the State Legislatures, in great emergencies, devolves the arduous task — it is their right — it becomes their duty, to interpose their protecting shield between the right and liberty of the people, and the assumed power of the General Government.” Speech of Governor Jonathan Trumbull (Feb. 23, 1809), reprinted in H. Ames, State Documents on Federal Relations 40 (1906). The Assembly promptly passed resolutions supporting the Governor’s position *273and concluding that the embargo legislation was “incompatible with the constitution of the United States, and encroach[ed] upon the immunites of [the] State.” Resolutions of the General Assembly (Feb. 23, 1809), reprinted in Ames, supra, at 41. In view of its duty to support the Constitution, the legislature declined “to assist, or concur in giving effect to the aforesaid unconstitutional act, passed, to enforce the Embargo.” Ibid.

 The legislature explained that the State’s sovereignty was reserved, in part, to protect its citizens from excessive federal power. Resolutions of the Massachusetts Legislature (Feb. 22, 1814), reprinted in Ames, supra, at 71.

 During a debate in Congress on a conscription bill and a bill for the enlistment of minors, Webster declared that if these measures were enacted it would be “the solemn duty of the State Governments” to interpose their authority to prevent enforcement. In his view, this was “among the objects for which the State Governments exist.” Speech on the Conscription Bill (Dec. 9, 1814), reprinted in 14 The Writings and Speeches of Daniel Webster 55, 68 (1903).

 See, e. g., Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 467 U. S. 1, 8 (1982) (“Puerto Rico, like a state, is an autonomous political entity, ‘sovereign over matters not ruled by the Constitution’ ”) (quoting Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U. S. 668, 673 (1974)); Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guiñee, 456 U. S. 694, 703, n. 10 (1982) (States are “ ‘coequal sovereigns in a federal system’ ”) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U. S. 286, 292 (1980)); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U. S. 107, 128 (1982) (discussing “the States’ sovereign power to punish offenders”); Underwriters National Assurance Co. v. North Carolina Life & Accident & Health Ins. Guaranty Assn., 455 U. S. 691, 704 (1982) (recognizing “the structure of our Nation as a union of States, each possessing equal sovereign powers”); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U. S. 432, 444-447 (1982) (relying on State’s “sovereign” police powers); Fair Assessment in Real Estate Assn. v. McNary, 454 U. S. 100, 108 (1981) (state courts are those “ ‘of a different, though paramount sovereignty’ ”) (quoting Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U. S. 521, 525 (1932)).

 Of course I do not denigrate the importance of the Commerce Clause. It is essential to the functioning of our National Government. It is, however, only one provision of a Constitution that embodies strong principles of federalism.