Court Opinion

ID: 9542084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:31:03.350913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:02:34.445739
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, with whom RAPER, J., joins.
While I agree with the result reached in the majority opinion affirming the district court with respect to Holso’s termination and reversing the judgment against the School Board for damages, I must dissent from the conclusion of the Court to affirm the judgment against A. L. Albert. However much any of us may object to Albert’s conduct in this matter, our response to his conduct is limited by the dual strictures of the law and reason.
The elements of a cause of action under title 42, U.S.C. § 1983 are:
1. That the “defendant act under color of” state or local law, and
2. That the plaintiff be subjected to a “deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”
Adickes v. S. H. Kress and Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970); Preb-ble v. Brodrick, 535 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1976); Smith v. Young Men’s Christian Association of Montgomery, Inc., 462 F.2d 634 (5th Cir. 1972); Sigler v. Lowrie, 404 F.2d 659 (8th Cir. 1969); Marland v. Heyse, 315 F.2d 312 (10th Cir. 1963); Stringer v. Dil-ger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963); Marshall v. Sawyer, 301 F.2d 639 (9th Cir. 1962); Williams v. Hot Shoppes, Inc., 110 U.S.App. D.C. 358, 293 F.2d 835 (1961); Baron v. Carson, 410 F.Supp. 299 (N.D.I11.1976); Davidson v. Dixon, 386 F.Supp. 482 (D.Del. 1974); Ames v. Vavreck, 356 F.Supp. 931 (D.Minn.1973); Flood v. Margis, 322 F.Supp. 1086 (E.D.Wis.1971). See particularly Lombard v. Board of Education of the City of New York, 407 F.Supp. 1166 (E.D.N. Y.1976).
In setting forth these elements, and in the results which are reached, the cases, including those cited in the majority opin*1033ion, contemplate and encompass an actual deprivation of a constitutional right. This is a limitation upon the federal rule of liability which we are applying, and since it is a federal rule of liability a state court is not justified in extending the limits of the rule which the federal authorities announce.
The district court in this instance, and the ■ majority of this Court, do not describe an actual deprivation of Holso’s constitutional right of freedom of association. It must be noted that the majority describes what A. L. Albert did as “attempting to deprive plaintiff of his teaching career on the basis of constitutionally impermissible reasons.” Several courts, have pointed to the necessity for a causal relationship between the conduct of a defendant and the deprivation of the constitutionally protected right asserted by the plaintiff. Hoffman v. Halden, 268 F.2d 280, 296 (9th Cir. 1959); Cuiksa v. City of Mansfield, 250 F.2d 700 (6th Cir. 1957); Kenney v. Fox, 232 F.2d 288 (6th Cir. 1956); Whittington v. Johnston, 201 F.2d 810 (5th Cir. 1953). The factual circumstances in these cases differ from this case, but the reasoning relating to the concept of proximate causation is quite apt.
The majority of the Court assumes that the focus of Holso’s action is a complaint anent the deprivation of his right to freely associate with whom he pleases. In actuality his cause of action is related to his property right in his employment, and in demonstrating his right to recover under Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 it is incumbent upon Holso to show that he lost his job because he exercised his constitutional right freely to associate. In fact that was not a ground which was relied upon by the School Board for his discharge, and the district court did not find that it was either an actual or concealed basis for his discharge. It follows that Albert did not succeed in causing Holso to be deprived of his job for that constitutionally impermissible reason, and the legal effect of that circumstance is that the tort described in Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was not committed. Liability for damages does not follow when a tort is not committed.
I am dismayed by the effect of this decision because while the Court does not say that immorality is constitutionally protected conduct so far as a teacher is concerned the effect of the ruling may be substantially the same. Under this decision, whenever a school administrator is informed of circumstances which may manifest .immoral conduct he investigates that situation and reports it to the school board at his peril. If he is wrong, he is subject to suit. If he is right, the teacher will be discharged. I hope that school administrators are blessed with the courage and commitment to pursue their responsibilities in the face of that peril, but I fear that not all will be possessed of that degree of courage and commitment. My witness is that the performance by school administrators of an appropriate aspect of their'duties is chilled substantially by this extension of the federal tort to cover attempted conduct rather than consummated conduct.
With respect to the grading practices these were a ground for discharge by the Board. I cannot agree that a teacher’s grading practices are constitutionally protected conduct. No case is cited in the majority opinion which so holds. Reason dictates that evaluation of students is something quite different from instruction of students. The rationale which the courts have structured relative to the concept of academic freedom is that it is a species of free speech which is protected by the First Amendment. E. g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969); Pickering v. Board of Education of Township High School District 205, Will County, Illinois, 391 U.S. 563, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S.Ct. 675,17 L.Ed.2d 629 (1967); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S.Ct. 247, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School District, 344 F.Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F.Supp. 1387 (D.Mass.1971); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F.Supp. 352 (M.D.Ala.1970).
In developing this rationale the courts have emphasized the necessity of protecting the free communication of ideas in an aca*1034demic setting. Grading or evaluation of students is not a function that involves the communication of ideas, and for that reason grading does not logically fit within the protection of the First Amendment. Every student under our system of public education has an interest in a grade which is at least equal if not paramount to the interest of the teacher in that grade. If the grade is to be challenged it likely must be done through the channel of administrative authority within the school. The student or the administrative authority must assume the burden of demonstrating that the grade was erroneous, but to foreclose relief by protecting the teacher’s grading practice .under the First Amendment is not fair.
Since I conclude that Holso’s discharge by the School Board was not caused by Albert insofar as the protected right to freedom of association is concerned (see Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 97 S.Ct. 568, 50 L.Ed.2d 471 (1977)), and since I conclude that the grading practice which was a ground for discharge is not constitutionally protected conduct, I am convinced that Albert did not commit the tort described in Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Since the tort was not committed there is no basis for Albert’s liability, and the judgment against Albert personally should be reversed. He has been punished without due process of law.