Court Opinion

ID: 9403385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 22:03:31.395202+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:06.541706
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/16/23 In re I.A. CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
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             IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    In re I.A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
    Court Law.

    STANISLAUS COUNTY COMMUNITY                                                              F085555
    SERVICES AGENCY,
                                                                           (Super. Ct. No. JVDP-21-000235)
             Plaintiff and Respondent,

                    v.                                                                    OPINION
    I.D.,

             Defendant and Appellant.

                                                   THE COURT *
            APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Stanislaus County. Annette
Rees, Judge.
            Aida Aslanian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
            No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-

*           Before Poochigian, Acting P. J., Detjen, J. and Smith, J.
          Appellant I.D. (father) appealed from the juvenile court’s order terminating his
parental rights pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 1 to his then
one-year-old son, I.A. After reviewing the juvenile court record, father’s court-appointed
counsel informed this court she could find no arguable issues to raise on father’s behalf.
This court granted father leave to personally file a letter setting forth good cause showing
that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. (In re Phoenix H. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 835,
844.) Father filed a letter but failed to address the termination findings or orders, or set
forth a good cause showing that any arguable issue of reversible error arose from the
termination of his parental rights. (Phoenix H., at p. 844.) Consequently, we dismiss the
appeal.
                    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Referral
          In November 2021, father helped G.A. (mother) deliver I.A. in his truck while on
the way to the hospital. Afterwards, an ambulance arrived and transported mother and
I.A. to the hospital, but father could not go because there was an active protective order
preventing him from being near mother. At the hospital, I.A. tested positive for
amphetamines and a referral ensued. A social worker from the Stanislaus County
Community Services Agency (agency) responded to the hospital and interviewed mother.
Mother identified I.D. as I.A.’s father and reported he was unable to go to the hospital
due to the protective order. She denied having his contact information or knowing his
whereabouts. The nurse informed the social worker that I.A. had been born at 31 weeks
and would likely remain hospitalized. In the days that followed, the agency
unsuccessfully attempted to locate father.
          On November 16, 2021, father contacted the agency, agreed to meet with social
workers, and stated his preferred language was Spanish. The next day, two social

1         All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

                                                2.
workers met with father. The meeting was conducted in Spanish. He reported he helped
deliver I.A. while on the way to the hospital but did not accompany them to the hospital
afterwards due to the protective order.
       On November 19, 2021, social workers met with father to provide him with a copy
of the protective custody warrant and other information, including the date and time of
the detention hearing. Father asked about obtaining a DNA test because he was unsure if
he was I.A.’s father. That same day, I.A. was placed in protective custody. A few days
later, a social worker contacted father and informed him the time of the detention hearing
had changed. Father stated he might not be able to attend because he had just started
working, but would try to attend.
Petition and Detention
       On November 23, 2021, the agency filed a petition on behalf of I.A. pursuant to
section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling), alleging
mother and father had unresolved substance abuse and domestic violence issues, and
mother was suffering from mental health problems. Additionally, the petition alleged
I.A.’s half sibling was found to be abused or neglected in other dependency proceed ings
and mother’s reunification services had been terminated. The petition identified father as
I.A.’s alleged father.
       On November 24, 2021, the juvenile court held a detention hearing. Mother and
father did not appear, but were both appointed counsel. County counsel acknowledged
father had requested DNA testing. She said, “If at any time the father does want that, we
can also put a motion on to order that or the [c]ourt could defer and order that DNA
testing occur upon father’s request. We can do that since it looks like he does want to
establish paternity because he is unsure of the biological connection.” The court agreed.
The court found prima facie evidence supported the allegations, ordered I.A. detained,
deferred ordering DNA testing until father was present in court or counsel had an
opportunity to speak with him, and set a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing.

                                              3.
Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
       In its jurisdiction and disposition report, the agency recommended the allegations
in the petition be found true, I.A. be adjudged a dependent of the court, mother and father
be denied reunification services, and a section 366.26 hearing be set. The department
recommended father not be given reunification services specifically because he was an
alleged father. I.A. was now two months old and had been placed in a resource family
approval home with his half sibling. Mother’s whereabouts were unknown. Neither
mother nor father had scheduled visits or engaged in services. The agency recommend ed
the juvenile court find visits with mother and father would not be detrimental and order
visits continue.
       On December 29, 2021, the juvenile court held a combined jurisdiction and
disposition hearing but trailed the matter due to the social worker’s unavailability. Father
arrived after the hearing had concluded. He was provided with a copy of the minute
order and contact information for his counsel.
       On January 19, 2022, the juvenile court held the continued hearing. Mother and
father were not present. Father’s counsel informed the court he had been unable to speak
with father. The court found the allegations in the petition true. The court then addressed
the agency’s recommendation to find that visits would not be detrimental. The following
colloquy ensued:

               “THE COURT: [¶] My other question in regards to visitation, the
       report indicates not being detrimental and allowing that contact. Given
       dad’s status and the [criminal protective order] and given mom’s complete
       lack of contact, why wouldn’t the [c]ourt find it detrimental to have visits?

              “[COUNTY COUNSEL]: Well, Your Honor, as to the father, he’s
       an alleged father; so he wouldn’t be entitled to visitation. [¶] As to the
       mother, we have these cases where, you know, she might come up and she
       could be appropriate. I think it is kind of a wobbler in that regard. [¶] I’ll
       submit the issue to the [c]ourt.”

                                             4.
       The court found visits with mother and father would be detrimental, adjudged I.A.
a dependent of the court, denied mother and father reunification services, struck the
agency’s recommendation that visits should continue, and set a section 366.26 hearing.
Initial Section 366.26 Hearing
       In its section 366.26 report, the agency recommended parental rights be terminated
with a permanent plan of adoption. I.A. was still in the same resource family approval
home and his caregivers wished to adopt him. Mother had been located. She was living
in Mexico and visiting I.A. via video conference. Father had not requested visits. The
social worker reported she had not had contact with father, and he had not asked about
I.A. since his birth. His whereabouts were unknown at that time.
       On May 17, 2022, the court held a section 366.26 hearing where father made his
first appearance. The court continued the matter to September 2022 so that mother could
be provided with adequate notice. Father’s counsel informed the court father had not
received a copy of the reports and requested the agency provide father with a copy of all
reports in Spanish at his new address. The court ordered the agency to make all efforts to
provide father with a copy of “the report” in Spanish, or have someone review the entire
report in a language he understood.
       On June 2, 2022, a social worker met with father and provided him with copies of
all reports the agency had filed and reviewed them with him in Spanish. Father asked
what he could do to obtain reunification services and the social worker advised him to
contact his counsel for legal advice.
Father’s Section 388 Request to Change Court Order
       On July 7, 2022, father filed a “REQUEST TO CHANGE COURT ORDER”
(JV-180), requesting the juvenile court change the order denying him reunification
services. He stated that since the order was made, he had been accepted into a residential
treatment program and had begun engaging in services on his own. He attached various
documents from his domestic violence treatment provider showing proof of enrollment in

                                            5.
March 2022, and a letter from his residential treatment provider confirming his
acceptance into the program in April 2022. He requested the court order a DNA test. If
he was found to be I.A.’s biological father, he requested to be elevated to presumed father
status and ordered reunification services. He believed his request was in I.A.’s best
interest because he wanted to be in his life. He did not want I.A. to grow up thinking he
did not have a father or that he did not want to reunite with him.
       On July 29, 2022, the juvenile court held a hearing to determine if it would grant
or deny an evidentiary hearing on father’s section 388 petition. The court denied the
requests for an evidentiary hearing and DNA testing, stating father had counsel for
eight months, knew of the proceedings, and had not requested testing or visited I.A.
Continued Section 366.26 Hearings and Father’s DNA Testing
       In its second section 366.26 report, the agency again recommended parental rights
be terminated with a permanent plan of adoption. Mother was back in California and was
residing in an outreach program, but had not visited I.A. since returning. The report
stated father had not been granted visits due to his alleged father status. I.A.’s caregivers
still wished to adopt him.
       On September 20, 2022, the juvenile court held the continued section 366.26
hearing. Both mother and father were present. Mother requested a contested hearing,
which the court granted. Additionally, the court revisited father’s request for DNA
testing and set a hearing to address the issue.
       On October 11, 2022, the juvenile court ordered DNA testing for father, which he
subsequently participated in.
       On November 30, 2022, the juvenile court held a section 366.26 hearing but
trailed the hearing as the DNA test results had not been received.
       On January 3, 2023, the juvenile court held the contested section 366.26 hearing.
Only father appeared. The DNA results indicated he was I.A.’s biological father and his
status was elevated to biological father. Father’s counsel informed the court father

                                              6.
wanted to testify, but understood he did not have a right to present evidence due to his
status. The court stated, “I understand he may not have a right to it, but I will hear his
testimony if you wish to put him on the stand.”
          Father testified he met I.A. when he was born as he “helped … take him out of his
mother’s womb” in his truck. However, he did not go to the hospital because of the
protective order. The police officer told him he would be arrested if he went. He had not
seen I.A. since birth because “[he hadn’t] had the opportunity,” but was asking the court
to give him that chance now. On cross-examination, he testified he was incarcerated in
April 2022 for one month and his first appearance in juvenile court was in May 2022, but
did have contact with social workers prior to that.
          County counsel argued the juvenile court should terminate parental rights, choose
adoption as the permanent plan, and find the parental-benefit exception inapplicable.
Father’s counsel argued against adoption as father wanted to be involved in I.A.’s life.
He said, “There is the option of guardianship, where the father can still get discretionary
services [or] visitation. So[,] he is asking for visits. I can’t really make a good faith
argument of consistent visitation, but I do want the [c]ourt to know that he is here,
wanting to be involved in the minor’s life, however that may be.” He said father
acknowledged he had not participated in the beginning of the case and took responsibility
for it.
          The court found I.A. was likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights. In
finding the parental-benefit exception inapplicable, the court stated as follows:

                  “I do find that there is clear and convincing evidence that this child
          is very likely to be adopted. The current caregiver certainly is desirous of
          that; has provided a stable and loving home for the child since he was
          removed.

                 “Once I find that it is very likely that the child will be adopted, then
          I … must use adoption as the permanent plan unless a legal exception
          applies. And, of course, the [c]ourt will follow In re Caden C., which is at

                                                 7.
11 Cal.5th 614, and the following cases in regard to the test for that parental
bond exception.

        “The first element being regular visitation and contact. In this case,
there is very little to none. Basically [father] was present for the birth of his
child which occurred outside of the hospital. The mother and child then, of
course, were whisked away to the hospital, and he was precluded from
visiting due to the criminal protective order that was in place.

       “However, he was out of custody at that time. He was properly
noticed—both parents were properly noticed of the detention hearing on
November 24th of 2021. They did not appear; however, counsel was
appointed.

       “Then at the jurisdiction/disposition [hearing] on January 19th of
2022, again, notice was proper. Notice was sent out on January 10th of
2022, and neither parent appeared.

        “[Father] remained out of custody, as did, of course, the mother,
until April of 2022, when [father] indicates he was incarcerated, but for
approximately one month. During that interim period of time, there was no
contact, no regular visitation. [Father] did appear in May [2022], when he
had been accepted to the Victory Outreach program and has remained in
that program. And as [father’s counsel] argued, has appeared at each
hearing since then with his case manager from Victory Outreach. And
other than that, there has been no contact.

        “So the next prong then, if there is not regular visitation and contact,
is the relationship between the parent and the child, the continuation of
which would be of benefit to the child, such that a substantial, positive,
emotional attachment has been made that would benefit the child, and
withdrawal of that relationship would be of detriment to the child.

        “In this case, unfortunately, as [minor’s counsel] and other counsel
pointed out, the child does not know his parents. There is not a
relationship. There has not been regular visitation and contact. Has
certainly not been substantial progress in terms of addressing any services.
However, that is not the issue at a [section 366].26 hearing. The focus is on
the child, and the stability and permanency for that child.

       “I do not find sufficient evidence. And the burden is on the parent,
of course, to prove that the exception exists by a preponderance of the
evidence. I do not find that there is evidence by a preponderance that

                                       8.
       termination of the parental relationship, termination of rights would be of
       detriment to the child in this case.”
       On January 9, 2023, father filed a notice of appeal.
                                       DISCUSSION
       “If the court cannot safely return a dependent child to a parent’s custody within
statutory time limits, the court must set a hearing under section 366.26.” (In re Caden C.
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630.) “[T]he goal at the section 366.26 hearing is ‘specifically …
to select and implement a permanent plan for the child.’ ” (Ibid.) “At [the] hearing, the
court may order one of three alternatives: adoption, guardianship or long-term foster
care.” (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 296.) “According to [the] procedure
[under section 366.26], the court must first determine by clear and convincing evidence
whether the child is likely to be adopted. [Citation.] If so, and if the court finds that
there has been a previous determination that reunification services be terminated, then the
court shall terminate parental rights to allow for adoption. [Citation.] But if the parent
shows that termination would be detrimental to the child for at least one specifically
enumerated reason, the court should decline to terminate parental rights and select
another permanent plan.” (Caden C., at pp. 630–631.) One exception to adoption is the
parental-benefit exception, which requires the parent to establish, by a preponderance of
the evidence, “that the parent has regularly visited with the child, that the child would
benefit from continuing the relationship, and that terminating the relationship would be
detrimental to the child.” (Id. at p. 629; § 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).)
       In the present case, father does not argue the juvenile court erred in finding I.A.
was likely to be adopted, or in finding the parental-benefit exception did not apply.
Neither does he argue that another exception to adoption should have been applied.
Rather, he expresses he took a DNA test and knows he is the father of I.A. and he has
“changed [his] life around and [is] here to be able to have that opportunity to get [his] son
back and have him in [his] life again.” He states he began trying to obtain custody of I.A.

                                              9.
since he was three months old, but had not been allowed to participate in visits until he
had a DNA test done. By the time he obtained DNA results, I.A. was one year old. He
did not sign the birth certificate because he could not go to the hospital due to the
protective order.
       Father was considered an alleged father up until the section 366.26 hearing, where
his status was elevated to biological father. Alleged fathers are not entitled to custody,
reunification services, or visitation. (In re Daniel F. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 701, 712.)
“Due process for an alleged father requires only that the alleged father be given notice
and ‘an opportunity to appear and assert a position and attempt to change his paternity
status. [Citations.]’ ” (In re Paul H. (2003) 111 Cal. App. 4th 753, 760.) While alleged
fathers are not entitled to appointed counsel either (ibid.), father was appointed counsel at
the detention hearing. Father received notice of the detention hearing and the jurisdiction
and disposition hearing, but did not appear. Father’s first appearance was at the initial
section 366.26 hearing in May 2022. Father did not request DNA testing in court until
July 2022—approximately eight months after proceedings had begun, despite having
appointed counsel for those entire eight months. While the court initially denied father’s
request for DNA testing, the court later ordered testing and declined to proceed with the
section 366.26 hearing until results were available. At the final section 366.26 hearing,
the court allowed father to elevate his status to biological father and allowed him to
present evidence before ruling on the termination of parental rights.
       We reiterate, father does not address how the termination findings or orders were
erroneous. An appealed-from judgment or order is presumed correct. (Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) It is the appellant’s burden to raise claims of
reversible error or other defect and present argument and authority on each point made.
If the appellant fails to do so, the appeal may be dismissed. (In re Sade C. (1996) 13
Cal.4th 952, 994.) On this record, we conclude father failed to make a good cause
showing that an arguable issue of reversible error exists. Further, although we are not

                                             10.
required to do so, we have reviewed the record as it relates to the section 366.26 hearing
and have found no arguable issues. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
                                     DISPOSITION
       This appeal is dismissed.

                                            11.