Court Opinion

ID: 9639949
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:52:51.576918+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:23.415597
License: Public Domain

Petition for Rehearing.
Our position on the single trader issue does not destroy the principle that a trader has the right to select his own customers. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307, 39 S.Ct. 465, 63 L.Ed. 992, 7 A.L.R. 443. Because GMC is not bound to sell General Motors cars, it does not follow that in the case of sales actually made, it *412may impose the restriction in question upon its purchasers and sub-purchasers. The restriction bears no reasonable relation to manufacturer’s goodwill in automobiles, limits unduly the liberty of General Motors dealers to engage in business, prevents the free negotiation of retail sales, and enables the car manufacturer to increase the sales of another article without any apparent advantage to the public.
The opinion did not ignore the point made by appellants that the restraint on the commerce in cars was merely incidental to the accomplishment of the purpose to stimulate car sales. There was some evidence that the commercial purpose was the promotion of car sales, but on this record it would have been surprising had the jurors accepted it. Undoubtedly sound financing is essential to the proper movement of cars in the channels of trade. Admittedly GMAC financing is sound, but there is no contention that it is sui generis or the sine qua non of sales stimulation. At the most the promotion of car sales or the protection of goodwill in automobiles would have required dealers’ adherence to sound financing. Resort to the excessive means of record points unmistakably to a purpose other than the one asserted by the appellants. Unquestionably the dominant purpose was to stimulate GMAC finance sales.
The case of Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 512, 60 S.Ct. 982, 1002, 84 L.Ed. 1311, 128 A.L.R. 1044, announced the view that the Sherman Act is not directed at restraints “which fall short, both in their purpose and effect, of any form of market control of a commodity, such as to ‘monopolize the supply, control its price, or discriminate between its would-be purchasers.’ ” We are aware that this recent view of the Supreme Court throws a new light on the precedents, but we see no reason for changing our conclusions in this matter or for reconsidering anything we have said in the opinion. The intent of the appellants, or the necessary result or operation of their conspiracy, was the complete market control of the dealers’ commerce in General Motors cars. The GMAC finance restriction operated to discriminate between “would-be purchasers” of General Motors cars, and obviously interfered with the competitive forces that otherwise would control the marketing of these cars.
The petition for rehearing is denied.