Court Opinion

ID: 9849649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:43:35.328335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:21.566567
License: Public Domain

HUDSON, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that defendant has not preserved the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying his challenges for cause to two veniremembers. Because I believe that defendant has preserved his right to bring forward this assignment of error pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1214(h) (2004), I respectfully dissent.
During jury selection, a party may challenge a potential juror for cause on the ground that he is unable to render a fair and improper verdict. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1212(9) (2004). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1214 provides the “statutory method for preserving a defendant’s right to seek appellate relief when a trial court refuses to allow a challenge for cause . . . and is the only method by which such rulings may be preserved for appellate review.” State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 148, 604 S.E.2d 886, 896 (2004). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1214(h) states that:
In order for a defendant to seek reversal of the case on appeal on the ground that the judge refused to allow a challenge made for cause, he must have:
(1) Exhausted the peremptory challenges available to him;
(2) Renewed his challenge as provided in subsection (i) of this section; and
(3) Had his renewal motion denied as to the juror in question.
Id. Subsection (i) states that a party who has exhausted his peremptory challenges may move to renew a challenge for cause previously denied if the party had peremptorily challenged the juror or states in a motion, that he would have done so if his challenges had not been exhausted. Id. Here, I conclude that defendant complied with N.C. *400Gen. Stat. § 1214: he moved to excuse prospective jurors McFarland and Byrd for cause, he employed peremptory challenges to remove both from the jury after the court denied his motions for cause, he exhausted the peremptory challenges available to him, and he renewed his motions for cause as to the jurors in question, which motions the court denied.
“[I]n addition to preserving error, defendant must show error by (1) demonstrating that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the challenge, and (2) showing defendant was prejudiced by this abuse of discretion.” State v. Smith, 359 N.C. 199, 206, 607 S.E.2d 607, 614 (2005), citing State v. Grooms, 353 N.C. 50, 68, 540 S.E.2d 713, 725 (2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 838, 151 L. Ed. 2d 54, 122 S. Ct. 93 (2001). In order to show prejudice, in addition to complying with the procedures of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1214, defendant must also have challenged an additional juror after exhausting his peremptory challenges. State v. Hartman, 344 N.C. 445, 459-60, 476 S.E.2d 328, 336 (1996). In some cases, our courts have referred to this challenge to an additional juror as requesting “an additional peremptory challenge.” State v. Call, 349 N.C. 382, 402, 508 S.E.2d 496, 509 (1998). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1214(i) states that after a party moves to renew a challenge for cause previously denied:
The judge may reconsider his denial of the challenge for cause, reconsidering facts and arguments previously adduced or taking cognizance of additional facts and arguments presented. If upon reconsideration the judge determines that the juror should have been excused for cause, he must allow the party an additional peremptory challenge.
Id. However, the official commentary refers to this as the “restoration of a previously used challenge ... an attempt to exercise the peremptory challenge which the party asserts should be restored to him.” Id. Thus, if the court grants the renewed motion for cause as to a juror previously peremptorily removed, the peremptory challenge that had been used to eliminate that juror would be restored. Indeed, although the trial court has authority “to restore a peremptory challenge ... [it] ha[s] no authority to provide defendant with additional peremptory challenges.” State v. Smith, 359 N.C. at 207-08, 607 S.E.2d at 615. I conclude that whether the party refers to this challenge to an additional juror as a renewed challenge for cause or a request for an “additional” peremptory is inconsequential: if the court grants the renewed challenge for cause, it will restore a peremptory challenge to *401defendant. The essence of the requirement is that defendant “show[] that [he] was forced to seat a juror whom he did not want because of the exhaustion of his peremptory challenges.” State v. Hartman, 344 N.C. at 459-60, 476 S.E.2d at 336.
Here, after the court denied defendant’s motions to excuse prospective jurors McFarland and Byrd for cause, defendant exercised peremptory challenges to remove McFarland and Byrd. Defendant also exercised four additional peremptory challenges, thus exhausting the six peremptory challenges allowed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1217(b)(l) (2004). After eleven jurors were seated and defendant had exhausted all of his peremptory challenges, defense counsel approached the bench during voir dire of the twelfth juror, Mr. Leggett. Following an off-the-record bench conference, defendant passed on Mr. Leggett, who had a pending DWI charge and whose mother had been a crime victim. At the conclusion of jury selection, the court stated that there were matters that needed to go on the record outside the presence of the jury and stated for the record that after eleven jurors were seated
defendant had renewed motions here at the bench with regard to jurors about which he had moved to excuse for cause, and had been denied by the court . . . The motion was renewed at a point in time where the defendant had used six peremptory challenges after a previous challenge for cause had been denied, and here at the bench renew the motion to excuse those folks for cause. And that motion was denied, and is now documented on the record. . . .At which point... the defendant being without further peremptory challenges . . . accepted the final juror on the original 12.
(Emphasis added). The clear implication of this excerpt is that defendant only accepted the twelfth juror because he had no more challenges. I thus conclude that defendant has adequately shown that he “was forced to seat a juror whom he did not want because of the exhaustion of his peremptory challenges.” Hartman, 344 N.C. at 460, 476 S.E.2d at 336.
Further, I would conclude that the court abused its discretion in denying defendant’s motions for cause and would remand for a new trial. It is well-established that we review the trial court’s decision to deny a challenge for cause for abuse of discretion. See, e.g., State v. Lee, 292 N.C. 617, 621, 234 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1977). During voir dire, prospective juror McFarland revealed that he had served as a police *402officer for eleven years and had worked with some of the officers who were witnesses in this case. The prosecutor asked him if he would “be able to listen to the testimony of law enforcement officers with the same test of credibility as any witness that would testify,” to which McFarland replied that “it would be difficult. All I can say is that this is my first time. I’d give it my best shot.” During defense counsel’s voir dire examination of McFarland, the following exchange took place:
.Q: . . . would it be fair to say that you already had leanings or inclinations with respect to criminal cases where law enforcement is involved?
A: I just felt like that — although I’m not employed, per se, with the police now ... I guess symbolically I feel like I’m part... of the team or some loyalty to it simply because I had worked with a lot of the guys and gone through some of this. That’s basically what I feel.
Q: Sure. Let me ask you this. You indicated that with respect to the testimony of the law enforcement officers, you’d believe what they said?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That’s because the position that they occupy and because of your own-personal feelings as part of a team or whatever?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Okay. And that’s as we sit here before you’ve even heard any testimony or heard any cross examination of any of the evidence?
A: I’m sorry?
Q: And you feel that way now before you’ve even heard anyone, any law enforcement officer testify, or anybody testify?
A: Well, it’s the first time I’ve been on a jury, so all of it’s new to me. But I’d do the best I can to be impartial and objective. Although it would be, like I stated before, it would be difficult in having worked with some of these guys that are here today.
* * *
Q: But as you’re sitting there, you indicated that you already have some feelings about the testimony of law enforcement in this case?
*403A: Right.
Q: Okay. You feel like you’re part of that team, so to speak?
A: Right.
Q: Would it be fair to say that, you know, that you might be leaning one way or the other just as we sit here without knowing anything else about it, not hearing anything, but that you might be leaning one way or the other in the case?
A: Well, I think when he called out the list of potential witnesses, and told — given the opportunity to — names of persons who I’m familiar with, such as Kenny Lee, Sergeant Jaggers, so forth, I think that persons I dealt with in law enforcement, I worked beside— ... I think if they’re on the stand that I would believe what they’re saying, their testimony, based on my experience with those particular officers on the list.
* * *
Q: It would be difficult for you to set aside what you know about those officers already and base your verdict just on what you heard here, wouldn’t you agree with me on that?
A: It would be difficult, but, again, having my first time, I’m more than willing to do my best and try to be objective.
Q: Sure. And I know you would try to be fair.
A: Right.
Q: But would you agree with me that it would be difficult for you to view these peoples’ testimony through the same lens that you would view people you don’t know—
A: I would agree that it probably would be difficult for any law enforcement officer in my position to come up here and do that, so it would put me in the same boat with them, yes.
Q: You feel like that might substantially impair your ability to be fair and impartial during this trial?
A: I stated before that I felt that it would be a problem, but, again, I’m willing to give it my best shot and listen to all testimony.
Q: Well, let me back up again and ask you again, or maybe a little different way, and I know you’re trying to be fair. I know you want to be fair. You understand why I’m concerned?
*404A: Oh, absolutely.
Q: And you understand that try as you might, that if it turned out you weren’t able to view it impartially, it’s really too late at that point?
A: Uh-huh.
Q: Do you feel like the fact that you already know some of these officers, the fact that you have indicated you don’t think you could view their testimony quite the same as you could people you don’t know — ■
A: I stated that I would believe them.
Q: Sure. Sure. And I didn’t phrase it that way. I was trying to be a little more delicate. In fact you believe them, without hearing anything.
A: Right.
In State v. Lee, the North Carolina Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to excuse a prospective juror for cause who had been married to a police officer for eleven years, had been on friendly terms and socialized with officers who worked with her husband, and who initially stated that she would tend to lend more credibility to the testimony of police officers than to the testimony of strangers. 292 N.C. 617, 234 S.E.2d 574. In Lee, the following exchanges occurred between defense counsel and the prospective juror and between the trial judge and the prospective juror:
Q. I ask you, Mrs. Norvell, since you know Mr. Moore and Tom Smith and your husband is on the Wilson Police Department, if they should testify in this case, would you tend to put more weight on what they said about the case than some witness you had never seen before?
A. I don’t think so.
Q. But, you are not sure about that?
A. No, sir.
Q. It is possible that you might believe what they said more than somebody you didn’t know.
*405A. I would have a tendency to.
Mr. Daughtridge: If the Court please, we would challenge her for cause.
Court: Let me ask you one or two things myself. I don’t think anybody can make a positive statement as to who they would believe until they heard what they had to say. Do you have some genuine concern in your own mind that you might be swayed because of your husband’s employment?
A. No, sir.
Court: Do you feel you could be fair and impartial and give to the defendant’s testimony or that of his witnesses the same weight you would give to somebody else?
A. Yes, sir.
Court: I don’t think you have established enough.
Q. But, I did understand you to say that knowing Mr. Moore and Mr. Smith, you might tend to believe them more than somebody you don’t know at all?
Objection by Mr. Brown.
Overruled.
A. It’s hard for me to say.
* * *
Q. I asked you do you feel that there is a genuine possibility by reason of your knowledge of Mr. Moore and Mr. Smith, that you might believe their testimony in this case more so than some witness who you had never seen before?
A. I don’t think there’s a genuine possibility.
Q. Well, is there a possibility, Mrs. Norvell?
A. There might be.
Id. at 576-77, 234 S.E.2d at 619-21.
In holding that the trial court erred, the Court noted that although “a juror’s close relationship with a police officer, standing alone, is not grounds for a challenge for cause,” because juror Norvell was a *406police officer’s wife and had been friendly with members of the police force, she “was subject to strong influences which ran counter to defendant’s right to a trial by an impartial jury.” Id. at 579, 234 S.E.2d at 625. The Court further noted that “Norvell initially stated that she would have a tendency to lend more credibility to the testimony of the police officers than to a stranger,” and that she only stated that she could be impartial in response to a direct question by the trial judge. Id. Here, McFarland stated that he felt like he was part of the law enforcement team and repeatedly indicated that he would believe law enforcement officers based on his prior experiences with the officers and his feelings of loyalty to the law enforcement team. Although McFarland stated that he would do his best, he never indicated that he actually could be impartial. The State argues that our appellate courts have upheld the trial court’s refusal to excuse jurors who stated that they would lend more credence to testimony of law enforcement officers. State v. McKinnon, 328 N.C. 668, 675-78, 403 S.E.2d 474, 478-79 (1991); State v. Lynch, 300 N.C. 534, 548, 268 S.E.2d 161, 169 (1980). However, in these cases there was no significant relationship between the prospective jurors and law enforcement, and more importantly, in each of these cases the prospective juror affirmed his or her ability to remain impartial. McKinnon at 675-78, 403 S.E.2d at 478-79, Lynch at 548, 268 S.E.2d at 169. McFarland’s stated loyalty to the law enforcement team of which he had been a part for eleven years, his repeated statements that he would believe the officers’ testimony before hearing it, and his failure to state that he could remain impartial lead me to conclude that “under the particular circumstances of this case,” prospective juror McFarland could not “qualify as a disinterested and impartial juror.” Lee, 292 N.C. at 625, 234 S.E.2d at 579. Thus, I would hold that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to grant defendant’s challenge for cause as to McFarland and that defendant is entitled to a new trial.
Because I would grant defendant a new trial, I would not address defendant’s argument regarding prospective juror Byrd or his other assignment of error.