Court Opinion

ID: 9431389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:32:12.273195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:28.258342
License: Public Domain

Justice White,
concurring.
It cannot be disputed that, if Congress had included a statute of limitations in 42 U. S. C. § 1983, any state court that entertained a § 1983 suit would have to apply that statute of limitations. As the Court observed in an early case brought under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act of 1908, 35 Stat. 65, 45 U. S. C. § 51 et seq., “[i]f [a federal Act] be available in a state court to found a right, and the record shows a lapse of *154time after which the [A]ct says that no action shall be maintained, the action must fail in the courts of a State as in those of the United States.” Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Burnette, 239 U. S. 199, 201 (1915). See also Engel v. Davenport, 271 U. S. 33, 38-39 (1926); McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 357 U. S. 221, 228 (1958) (Brennan, J., concurring).
Similarly, where the Court has determined that a particular state statute of limitations ought to be borrowed in order to effectuate the congressional intent underlying a federal cause of action that contains no statute of limitations of its own, any state court that entertains the same federal cause of action must apply the same state statute of limitations. We made such a determination in Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U. S. 261 (1985), which held that § 1983 suits must as a matter of federal law1 be governed by the state statute of limitations applicable to tort suits for the recovery of damages for personal injuries. We reasoned that the choice of a single statute of limitations within each State was supported by “[t]he federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation,” id., at 275, and that the choice of the personal-injury statute of limitations was supported by “the nature of the § 1983 remedy, and by the federal interest in ensuring that the borrowed period of limitations not discriminate against the federal civil rights remedy.” ' Id., at 276.
It has since been assumed that Wilson v. Garcia governs the timeliness of § 1983 suits brought in state as well as federal court. See, e. g., Russell v. Anchorage, 743 P. 2d 372, 374-375, and n. 8 (Alaska 1987); Ziccardi v. Pennsylvania Dept. of General Services, 109 Pa. Commw. 628, 634-*155635, 527 A. 2d 183, 185-186 (1987); Walker v. Maruffi, 105 N. M. 763, 766-769, 737 P. 2d 544, 547-550 (App.), cert. denied, 105 N. M. 707, 736 P. 2d 985 (1987) (table); Maddocks v. Salt Lake City Corp., 740 P. 2d 1337, 1338-1339 (Utah 1987); 423 South Salina Street, Inc. v. Syracuse, 68 N. Y. 2d 474, 486-487; 503 N. E. 2d 63, 69-70 (1986), appeal dism’d, 481 U. S. 1008 (1987); Fuchilla v. Layman, 210 N. J. Super. 574, 582-583, 510 A. 2d 281, 286 (1986), aff’d, 109 N. J. 319, 537 A. 2d 652 (1988); Henderson v. State, 110 Idaho 308, 311, 715 P. 2d 978, 981, cert. denied, 477 U. S. 907 (1986); Frisby v. Board of Education of Boyle County, 707 S. W. 2d 359, 361 (Ky. App. 1986); Vanaman v. Palmer, 506 A. 2d 190 (Del. Super. 1986); Hanson v. Madison Service Corp., 125 Wis. 2d 138, 141, 370 N. W. 2d 586, 588 (App. 1985).
The Wisconsin Supreme Court likewise assumed that Wilson v. Garcia governed which statute of limitations should apply to petitioner’s §1983 claim.2 The court then effectively truncated the applicable limitations period, however, by dismissing petitioner’s § 1983 suit for failure to file a notice of claim within 120 days of the events at issue as required by Wis. Stat. §893.80 (1983 and Supp. 1987).3 Hence, petitioner was allowed only about four months in which to investigate whether the facts and the law would support any claim *156against respondents (or retain a lawyer who would do so), and to notify respondents of his claim, rather than the two or three years that he would have been allowed under Wisconsin law had he sought to assert a similar personal-injury claim against a private party. It is also unlikely that any other State would apply a 120-day limitations period — or, indeed, a limitations period of less than one year — to such a personal-injury claim.4 This reflects a generally accepted belief among state policymakers that individuals who have suffered injuries to their personal rights cannot fairly be expected to seek redress within so short a period of time.
The application of the Wisconsin notice-of-claim statute to bar petitioner's § 1983 suit — which is “in reality, ‘an action for injury to personal rights’ ” 471 U. S., at 265 (quoting 731 F. 2d 640, 651 (CA10 1984) (opinion below)) — thus undermines the purposes of Wilson v. Garcia to promote “[t]he federal interests in uniformity, certainty, and the minimization of unnecessary litigation,” 471 U. S., at 275, and assure that state procedural rules do not “discriminate against the federal civil rights remedy.” Id., at 276. I therefore agree that in view of the adverse impact of Wisconsin’s notice-of-claim statute on the federal policies articulated in Wilson v. Garcia, the Supremacy Clause proscribes the statute’s application to § 1983 suits brought in Wisconsin state courts.

 In explaining that the characterization of § 1983 claims for statute-of-limitations purposes is a question of federal law, we observed that “Congress surely did not intend to assign to state courts and legislatures a conclusive role in the formative function of defining and characterizing the essential elements of a federal cause of action.” 471 U. S., at 269.

 The court did not decide whether the § 1983 claim was to be governed by the 2-year statute of limitations applicable to intentional torts, Wis. Stat. § 893.57 (1983), or the 3-year statute of limitations applicable generally to “injuries to the person,” §893.54(1).

 To be sure, § 893.80 provides that failure to file a notice of claim within the initial 120-day period “shall not bar an action on the claim if the . . . [governmental] subdivision or agency had actual notice of the claim and the claimant shows to the satisfaction of the court that the delay or failure to give the requisite notice has not been prejudicial to the defendant.” The facts of this case demonstrate, however, that the “actual notice” requirement is difficult to satisfy. For example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that respondents had not received “actual notice” of petitioner’s claim even though the local alderman had written directly to the chief of police requesting an investigation of the incident only three days after its occurrence. 139 Wis. 2d 614, 629-630, 408 N. W.2d 19, 25-26 (1987).

 See Shapiro, Choosing the Appropriate State Statute of Limitations for Section 1983 Claims After Wilson v. Garcia, 16 U. Balt. L. Rev. 242, 245-246 (1987) (listing potentially applicable limitations periods of 26 States and District of Columbia); Comment, 17 Memphis St. U. L. Rev. 127, 136-137, n. 74 (1986) (listing potentially applicable limitations periods of 29 States, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico).