Court Opinion

ID: 9768897
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 13:55:05.550939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:48.842936
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Smith
concurring.
On this the 14th day of November 1960, I have concluded, after further consideration of the record, that petitioners’ motion for rehearing should be granted; that the judgments of both the trial court and the Court of Civil Appeals should be reversed, and judgment here rendered for the petitioners. My reasons are expressed in the following opinion:
The primary question this court has for decision is this: Do the facts, impliedly found by the trial court, show that the death of the insured was effected solely or directly and independently of all other causes through “external, violent and accidental means?” That is the real question here, and it should be answered in the negative for the reasons now to be briefly state.
This is a suit wherein Mrs. Elizabeth Cotton Andrews, as Guardian of a designated minor-beneficiary is seeking to recover double indemnity or accidental death benefits on two policies of insurance issued by Pan American and the Continental Assurance Company on the life of Harrington G. Simmons, now deceased.
The policy issued by Pan American contains the following pertinent provision:
“Upon receipt of due proof that the death of the insured occurred in consequence of bodily injuries effected solely through external, violent and accidental means, of which (except in the case of drowning or of internal injuries revealed by an autopsy) there is a visible contusion or wound on the body, and that such death occurred within sixty days after such injury was sustained, and as a direct result thereof, independently of any other cause, * * * the Company will, upon surrender of the policy, in lieu of all other benefits under this policy, pay to the beneficiary or beneficiaries under this policy, subject to the change of beneficiary clause, double the face amount of this policy.”
The policy issued by Continental contains substantially the same provision.1 The conclusions, reached as to one would na;*404turally apply to the other. Both of these contracts of insurance are plain and unambiguous. They provide for double payment only where death results from bodily injuries brought about solely (directly and independently of all other causes) through external, violent and accidental means.
Respondent agrees that both of the policy provisions, supra were written to insure against “death by accidental means” rather than “accidental death.” The parties are in practical agreement on the evidence. The facts are sufficiently set out in the opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals. Therefore, it is not necessary to detail the facts except as may be necessary for a clearer understanding of the conclusions reached. It is sufficient to point out at this juncture that the court could not from the evidence have impliedly made findings other than:
1. The fire in the insured’s office was not the cause or means of his death.
2. The death of the insured resulted from a clot in an artery of the brain.
3. The clot in the artery was an internal bodily injury revealed by the autopsy.
4. 34 days before his death, the insured witnessed the destruction of his office and records by fire.
5. The witnessing of the fire produced a mental reaction (described as a phychic trauma) which was the means through which the clot in the artery was effected.
6. These means were entirely mental or psychic, wholly free of and unaccompanied by any physical force.”
If the fire was not the means of the insured’s death, then what was? There is no evidence which would give rise to a reasonable inference that the clot in the artery, or the thrombosis, if you choose to so label it, occurred on the day of the *405fire, neither does the record show anything other than the fire which could be “external, violent and accidental.” These plain and unmistakable words in the two policies, in other words, the language of the policies must control. There is no evidence that Mr. Simmons died as the consequence of bodily injury effected solely through external, violent and accidental means producing a visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body, drowning, or internal injuries revealed by autopsy.
The policies do not provide recovery for accidental death where the evidence shows, as here, that the fire at best was only a contributing cause, causing a purely mental reaction upon the insured. The policies simply do not afford coverage where the cause of death was an unanticipated reaction to the insured’s environment. There is no casual relationship between the claimed bodily injury as the result of witnessing the fire and Mr. Simmons’ death. The most that can be said of the medical testimony offered by the petitioner is that the petitioner’s doctor testified that the witnessing of the fire by the insured may have caused a psychic trauma and was a possible- cause of the insured’s death. The doctor for the respondent stated, in effect, that there was- a reasonable probability that psychic trauma was caused by witenssing the fire, which caused the insured’s death. This testimony does not constitute any evidence that the sole cause of the insured’s death was by violent, external and accidental means.
It should be noted that double indemnity coverage is provided in both policies for bodily injuries only. It is clear from the evidence that the image or contents of the insured’s brain and nervous system was not the sole efficient cause, independent of all other means or causes of the cerebral arterio-thrombosis; but that the sole cause of his death came about as the result of the intervening agency of his mind and nervous system working on the image, which was an entirely internal means-, and, therefore, not external.
The poison, inhalation and sunstroke cases are those where there was physical trauma which could be traced into the insured’s body and which was the sole and proximate cause of the insured’s death without the intervention of any other cause. In the present case, there is no physical trauma which can be traced into the insured’s body as the sole cause of the insured’s death, without the intervention of any other casual means. The respondents have failed to discharge the burden resting upon them to prove that the death of Mr. Simmons resulted solely or directly and independently of all other causes from external, violent and accidental means.
*406The judgments of both courts should be reversed and judgment rendered that respondents take nothing. Accordingly, I concur in the opinion of the Court delivered on the 23rd day of November 1960.
Opinion ddlivered November 23 ,1960.

. — “Upon receipt at its home office in Chicago, Illinois, of due proof that the death of the insured has resulted from bodily injuries effected directly and independently of all other causes through external, violent and accidntal means *404and that said death occurred while said policy and this supplementary contract are in full force and within ninety (90) days from the accident causing such injuries, it will pay to the beneficiary designated in said policy a sum equal to the face amount of the policy. In addition to the amount otherwise payable under the said policy.
“This supplementary contract does not cover death resulting from:
"(a) Bodily injuries of which there is no visible contusion or wound on the exterior of the body, except in case of drowning or internal injuries revealed by an autopsy.”