Court Opinion

ID: 9683135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:23:08.289164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:45.335407
License: Public Domain

P. A. Hollingsworth, Justice, dissenting. Charles Isaac Wilson, Jr., the appellant was convicted in Sebastian County of rape, aggravated robbery, and burglary. He was sentenced to forty years in prison and fined $15,000. The majority affirms, and I strongly disagree. The appellant’s argument is that the prosecutrix’s identification testimony was tainted by an unconstitutionally suggestive lineup and identification procedure an was therefore unreliable. I agree and would reverse the trial court as to this point. The appellant filed a pretrial motion to suppress identification testimony. The prosecutrix had given a report to the police immediately following the assault on her person. She stated to the officers that she rolled over in bed and saw somebody crouching in her doorway who lunged on top of her and covered her head with a blanket before she could get up. That was her only glimpse of the rapist who stayed with her for over an hour and a half. She described the rapist’s voice as Iranian type, “kind of like a broken English type.” She said he left out words “like ‘I cut you’ and things on that order.. . . He wouldn’t put all the words together. . . It could have been a Cuban accent.” She also estimated the rapist to be between 5'5" and 5'7" in height based on the time he spent lying next to her. Between the date of the rape, April 12, and the identification of the appellant, four voice lineups were conducted. On April 14, the prosecutrix indicated that she heard a voice similar to her attacker’s. The similar voice was a white male detective who was attempting to imitate a Spanish or foreign accent. In this one and the subsequent two, the lineups were not viewed by the prosecutrix; only their voices were heard. In the lineup where the appellant was identified, the prosecutrix viewed the lineup and simultaneously heard the five participants speak. Contrary to previous lineups, the prosecutrix was told by the police that a suspect was present in this lineup. While she was in the room marking her choice, a paper was in a typewriter in that same room with a list of the participants in the lineup clearly visible. After each participant’s name was a physical description, with the exception of the appellant. The word “SUSPECT” appeared after his name. Several other people who walked through the room stated that they clearly saw the paper and its contents. The prosecutrix admitted seeing the typewriter in the room, but she denied having seen the list. At the trial of this matter, the prosecutrix testified that she had received a phone call from the rapist. For the first time, at trial, she stated the voice of her attacker was that of a colored man. She buttressed her testimony by saying that she also saw the appellant at another one of his trials where he was accused of a similar charge and that he said hello to her there. She did not say that his voice was the same as her attacker. The prosecutrix states that the appellant speaking to her confirms in her mind that the appellant is the rapist. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111-112 (1977) emphasized the troublesome characteristic of such evidence: The driving force behind United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (right to counsel at a post-indictment lineup), and Stovall, all decided on the same day, was the Court’s concern with the problems of eyewitness identification. Usually the witness must testify about an encounter with a total stranger under circumstances of emergency or emotional stress. The witness’ recollection of the stranger can be distorted easily by the circumstances or by later actions of the police. To guard against this danger we hold inadmissible evidence tainted by suggested confrontation procedures and lacking adequate indicia of reliability as is present here. The appellant is a 6T" black male, American born and raised in Fort Smith, who does not speak with a foreign accent. There was testimony that appellant’s voice has no trace of any accent and his vocabulary and voice are good. A review of the tape of his voice included in the record is in agreement with this characterization of appellant. We have previously said that whether identification testimony is admissible is essentially a question of reliability. The opportunity to observe the criminal, the accuracy of the victim’s description, the amount of certainty of the victim at the time of the confrontation, and the length of time between the crime and the identification are all factors to be weighed against any suggestions. Washington v. State, 273 Ark. 482, 621 S.W.2d 216 (1981); McCraw v. State, 262 Ark. 707, 561 S.W.2d 71 (1978). When all of these elements are considered, the identification in this case has serious defects. Immediately after the rape, the prosecutrix described her assailant as talking with an accent, having dark hair of medium length, being 5'5" to 5'7" tall, and having repeated such phrases as: “I want you money”; “I tie you up”; “I no hurt you”. She indicated that all of these phrases are indicative of the mannerisms and the way the rapist speaks. The prosecutrix in this case instructed the police that a man who was about 5'6" in height and spoke with a foreign accent attacked her. She subsequently identified the appellant, a 6T" black man with no discernible accent. We upheld a conviction partially based on a voice identification in a more recent case. In Kellensworth v. State, 278 Ark. 261, 644 S.W.2d 933 (1983), however, the prosecutrix was able to: clearly hear, partially view and sketchily feel her attacker over the period of an hour. . . . Immediately after the crimes the prosecutrix accurately described the criminal to the first arriving police officer. . . . Thus, the description given immediately after the crimes was consistent with the lineup identification. Her degree of attention was impressive. She made no mis iden ti f ica tion. Here, the prosecutrix was only able to hear her attacker. The physical description she gave the police turned out to be inaccurate as was her characterization of her attacker’s voice. The identification stemming from the improperly conducted lineup should be excluded and the courtroom identification based on the lineup and identification that followed logically should be excluded as well. When viewing this case on the totality of the circumstances, I cannot say that the prosecutrix’s identification of the appellant as her rapist is so reliable as to avoid the possibility of misidentification. I would reverse. Purtle and Hays, JJ., join in this dissent.