Court Opinion

ID: 9925655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-22 18:01:22.151321+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:21.148660
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                          FILED
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       JAN 22 2024

                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                     MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                         U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

BARRY BLAKELEY,                                  No. 23-35061

                   Plaintiff-Appellant,          D.C. No. 3:22-cv-00035-SLG

     v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
DANIEL G. GUNDERSON;
CHRISTOPHER RAFFERTY; TIMOTHY
WOLFF; THOMAS V. JAMGOCHIAN;
STATE OF ALASKA,

                   Defendants-Appellees.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                               for the District of Alaska
                   Sharon L. Gleason, Chief District Judge, Presiding

                              Submitted January 22, 2024**

Before: BENNETT, BADE, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

          On February 6, 2021, Barry Blakeley was stopped by Defendant Daniel

Gunderson, an Alaska state trooper, on an Alaska highway. Defendants

Christopher Rafferty and Timothy Wolff, who are also state troopers, subsequently

arrived on the scene. Gunderson ultimately issued Blakeley a citation for failing to

*
 This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as
provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
  The panel unanimously concludes that this case is suitable for decision without
oral argument. See FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
have installed on his vehicle an adequate “device which effectively reduces the

wheel spray or splash of water or other substance to the rear of the vehicle.” See

ALASKA ADMIN. CODE title 13, § 04.265(a).

         Blakeley did not thereafter correct this deficiency. Instead, he mailed the

state district court various documents objecting to the court’s jurisdiction over him.

He asserted, inter alia, that the “State of Alaska” was a “Fiction of Law, not a real

entity” and that, as a result, the state troopers and state attorneys pursuing the

matter lacked “standing to proceed” and the court lacked “subject matter

jurisdiction.” He also contended that, because he “was not acting as a driver

engaged in Commerce,” he was not subject to the provision under which he was

cited.

         The Alaska District Court served Blakeley by mail with a notice informing

him of the date and time of the trial for his violation of § 04.265(a), but Blakeley

did not appear at the trial. The state court proceeded to enter a default judgment

against him in the total amount of $105. Because the violation underlying this

judgment “is not considered a criminal offense” under Alaska law, see ALASKA

STAT. § 28.90.010(d), the resulting judgment is civil in nature. Blakeley did not

appeal the judgment.

         In February 2022, Blakeley filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in

federal district court against the three state troopers and the state court judge who

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entered the default judgment. The 89-claim complaint alleged violations of

multiple federal constitutional provisions, as well as various state law claims. The

complaint sought vacatur of the state court judgment and monetary damages.

      The federal district court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the

pleadings and dismissed the complaint without leave to amend. The court held that

this suit was a de facto appeal of a state court judgment and that the court therefore

lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Alternatively, the court

concluded that Blakeley failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.

Blakeley timely appealed. We affirm.

      “The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars lower federal courts from exercising

jurisdiction ‘to review the final determinations of a state court in judicial

proceedings,’” Benavidez v. County of San Diego, 993 F.3d 1134, 1142 (9th Cir.

2021) (citation omitted), and this prohibition extends to an action that is the “‘de

facto equivalent’ of such an appeal,” Cooper v. Ramos, 704 F.3d 772, 777 (9th Cir.

2012) (citation omitted). Reviewing de novo, see Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148,

1154 (9th Cir. 2003), we agree that Blakeley’s claims relating to the issuance of

the citation, the disposition of the citation, and the resulting state court judgment

are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. These claims allege, as the predicate

legal wrong, “an erroneous decision from the state court,” namely, its rejection of

Blakeley’s jurisdictional and constitutional challenges to the issuance and

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disposition of the citation. Maldonado v. Harris, 370 F.3d 945, 950 (9th Cir.

2004). In addition, the complaint seeks vacatur of that judgment and damages

flowing from the judgment, and the complaint does not seek prospective relief

against future enforcement of the statutes at issue. See id. Thus, these claims fall

squarely within the core of what Rooker-Feldman prohibits. See Noel, 341 F.3d at

1156 (“[W]hen a losing plaintiff in state court brings a suit in federal district court

asserting as legal wrongs the allegedly erroneous legal rulings of the state court

and seeks to vacate or set aside the judgment of that court, the federal suit is a

forbidden de facto appeal.”); see also D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462, 486 (1983) (holding that the bar of Rooker-Feldman extends to legal claims in

the federal suit that are “inextricably intertwined” with the state court’s case-

specific judgment ruling against the federal plaintiff).

      However, Blakeley’s claims relating to the lawfulness of the initial stop and

the alleged examination of his vehicle and papers do not assert injuries arising

from the state court’s judgment and are not barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Noel,

341 F.3d at 1164. Nonetheless, reviewing de novo, Burgert v. Lokelani Bernice

Pauahi Bishop Tr., 200 F.3d 661, 663 (9th Cir. 2000), we conclude that the district

court correctly dismissed these claims on the alternative ground that Blakeley

failed to state a cause of action.

      Taking as true only the “well-pleaded factual allegations” of the complaint,

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we conclude that they fail to “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”

Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 566 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). As to the initial stop, the complaint

alleges that Gunderson pulled over Blakeley’s vehicle for driving too slowly in

violation of Alaska law. Cf. ALASKA ADMIN. CODE title 13, § 02.295. The

complaint, however, fails to allege any facts that would support a conclusion that

the initial stop was unlawful. See Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014)

(holding that, to justify a traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment, “officers need

only ‘reasonable suspicion’” that the driver has committed a violation (citation

omitted)); see also United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43,

50–51 (1993) (holding that constitutional claims involving an “initial detention,”

arrest, or search generally must be evaluated exclusively under Fourth Amendment

standards).

      As to the alleged “search” of the vehicle, the complaint alleges only that the

state troopers “looked inside” Blakeley’s vehicle while positioned outside that

vehicle. This allegation fails to state a claim. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,

740 (1983) (plurality) (holding that the Fourth Amendment is not violated by

police actions in examining, from the outside, “that portion of the interior of an

automobile which may be viewed from outside the vehicle by either inquisitive

passersby or diligent police officers”); id at 745–46 (Powell, J., concurring in the

judgment) (agreeing with the plurality on this point). To the extent that Blakeley

                                           5
also challenges the officers’ demands to see his license and registration, he fails to

state a Fourth Amendment violation. See Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S.

348, 355 (2015) (holding that, during a traffic stop, police may “check[] the

driver’s license, determin[e] whether there are outstanding warrants against the

driver, and inspect[] the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance”).

      Blakeley’s contention that the state troopers lacked governmental authority

on the ground that they were merely agents of the “fictional” State of Alaska is

frivolous. Subject to the limitations of the Constitution, the States retain traditional

“police powers” to adopt laws and regulations “that relate to public health, safety,

and welfare.” Velasquez-Rios v. Wilkinson, 988 F.3d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 2021).

Under the complaint’s own factual allegations, the state troopers were enforcing

such regulations and, as we have explained, Blakeley has failed to state a claim

that the limits of the Constitution were transgressed during the traffic stop.

      Finally, applying the liberal standard applicable to pro se litigants, we

conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Blakeley

leave to amend his complaint. See Rutman Wine Co. v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 829

F.2d 729, 738 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1131 (9th

Cir. 2000) (en banc). Given the factual allegations that Blakeley has already made

in his 100-page complaint, the frivolous nature of Blakeley’s theories, and his

wholesale failure to articulate any potentially plausible amendments that could

                                           6
cure the complaint’s defects, it was not an abuse of discretion to conclude that “it

is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by

amendment.” Rouse v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 567 F.3d 408, 418 (9th Cir. 2009)

(citation omitted).

      The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

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