Court Opinion

ID: 9841439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 14:07:09.099433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:30.980108
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1073

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                                  JESUS AYALA.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       The defendant appeals from the denial of his motion to

 withdraw a guilty plea he entered on November 25, 2014 (2014

 plea) and for a new trial.        On appeal, he argues that the judge

 abused his discretion in denying the motion for two reasons.

 First, he contends that the judge should have released him from

 the consequences of a waiver he entered into at the time of the

 2014 plea.     Second, he contends that he was entitled to withdraw

 the 2014 plea because the plea judge did not inform him, as

 required by G. L. c. 279, § 25 (d), of the potential collateral

 consequences of the plea.        We affirm.

       Background.     We recite the facts as the motion judge found

 them, noting that they are not in dispute.            In 2005, the

 defendant was charged with trafficking in cocaine in an amount

 exceeding 200 grams, two counts of assault and battery on a
police officer, and resisting arrest (2005 case).    The 2005

trafficking charge carried a minimum mandatory sentence of

fifteen years in State prison.    The drugs at issue in the 2005

case were tested at the Hinton drug lab, and the drug

certificate was signed by Annie Dookhan as the secondary

chemist.   In 2006, the defendant was charged with trafficking in

heroin in an amount between twenty-eight and one hundred grams,

in a school zone, and with unlawful possession of marijuana

(2006 case).   The 2006 trafficking charge carried a minimum

mandatory sentence of seven years in State prison.    The drugs at

issue in the 2006 case were not tested at the Hinton drug lab,

but rather by the Massachusetts State Police Crime Lab.

    The defendant, represented by counsel, reached a global

resolution of both cases.    The Commonwealth agreed to reduce the

trafficking charges in both cases, and to drop the school zone

violation in the 2006 case.    In exchange, the defendant agreed

to plead guilty to the charges in both cases (as reduced) and to

join in recommending a sentence of eight to ten years in State

prison.    On April 19, 2007, a judge of the Superior Court

accepted the defendant's plea, and he was sentenced to

concurrent sentences of eight to ten years on the two

trafficking charges, with probation to run for a period

thereafter on the nondrug charges.

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    In 2013, the defendant moved to withdraw his guilty plea

because Annie Dookhan had tested the drugs at issue in the 2005

case.   That motion was allowed on July 3, 2014.    Thereafter, on

November 25, 2014, the defendant again tendered a guilty plea in

both cases.   On this occasion, he pleaded guilty to all four

charges in the 2005 case, and to the heroin trafficking charge

in the 2006 case.     The Commonwealth dismissed the school zone

and marijuana charges, and amended the 2005 cocaine trafficking

charge from 200 grams to 36 to 100 grams.     The Commonwealth also

agreed to recommend a reduced sentence of seven years to seven

years and one day deemed served, and to three (rather than five)

years of probation.     The defendant waived in writing any further

discovery rights arising from Dookhan's involvement in the 2005

case, and orally waived during the plea colloquy "any right to

fight, or contest or dispute this charge based on any misconduct

on the part of Annie Dookhan."     The 2014 plea judge accepted the

plea, and imposed the jointly-recommended sentence.     Of note for

purposes of this appeal, the 2014 plea judge did not inform the

defendant of the potential collateral consequences under the

habitual offender statute.

    In 2018, the defendant was charged with new drug offenses

subject to habitual offender enhancements based on the 2005 and

2006 charges to which the defendant had pleaded guilty in 2014.

In 2019, the defendant pleaded guilty to the 2018 charges, and

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was sentenced to eight to ten years in prison.   As part of the

2019 plea, the Commonwealth dismissed the habitual offender

enhancements that had been based on the 2005 and 2006 cases.

    In 2021, the defendant filed the motion to withdraw guilty

plea and for a new trial that is the subject of this appeal.

This appeal followed after the denial of that motion.

    Discussion.     The defendant raises two primary arguments on

appeal.    First, he contends that, in light of the Commonwealth's

changed position in 2021 regarding the handling of "list two"

and "list three" cases in the unrelated case of Commonwealth vs.

Escobar, Mass. Super. Ct. No. 0984CR0059 (Suffolk County), the

motion judge should not have held the defendant to the waiver he

made as part of the 2014 plea.   Unlike the position he took

below, however, the defendant no longer seeks to withdraw the

2014 plea on this basis, nor does he seek a new trial.    Instead,

he seeks only to be permitted to have the sentence amended so as

not to trigger any consequence under the habitual offender

statute.   See G. L. c. 279, § 25.

    There are several reasons this argument fails.      To begin

with, it is being raised for the first time on appeal and is

accordingly waived.    Even were we to overlook waiver, to the

extent the defendant now asks us to find that the motion judge

abused his discretion, it is virtually self-evident that a judge

cannot be said to have abused his discretion in failing to

                                  4
afford relief the defendant did not request.     To the extent the

defendant may be arguing that his unpreserved claim of error

resulted in a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, see

Commonwealth v. Santos, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 791, 795 (2019), we

note that the defendant has not argued, let alone shown, that

his 2014 waiver was not knowing and voluntary.    Nor has he

argued that he did not receive effective assistance of counsel

in connection with the 2014 plea.     Even setting all of those

matters to the side, the defendant has not attempted to explain

how or why he would be entitled to an amended sentence with

respect to the 2006 case, which did not involve the Hinton drug

lab.    See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 96 Mass. App. Ct. 354, 357-358

(2019).   For all of these reasons, we discern no abuse of

discretion on the part of the motion judge in not considering

the waived argument, and no substantial risk of a miscarriage of

justice as the matter is presented in this appeal.1

       Second, the defendant argues that the motion judge should

have allowed him to withdraw the 2014 plea because the plea

judge did not inform him, as required under G. L. c. 279,

§ 25 (d), that the plea could implicate the habitual offender

1 Our conclusion in this regard does not foreclose the defendant
from filing a new Rule 30 (b) motion to amend the sentence he
received on the drug charge in the 2005 case. See Mass. R. Civ.
P. 30 (b), as appearing in 435 Mass. 1501 (2001). We offer no
opinion on the likely merits or strength of such a motion.

                                  5
statute.   The defendant acknowledges that the statute provides

that "[n]o otherwise valid plea or conviction shall be vacated

based upon the failure to give such warnings."     However, he

argues that this provision is unconstitutional because it

infringes on the courts' inherent authority.     We have considered

and rejected this argument with respect to a similar provision

contained in G. L. c. 6, § 176E (d).   See Commonwealth v.

Shindell, 63 Mass. App. Ct. 503, 506 (2005).    As we noted there,

"although it may appear anomalous to require such a warning but

to provide that no consequence follows if the requirement is not

met, we are constrained by the wording of the statute."     Id.

    Nor has the defendant shown that the judge erred in

deciding that the defendant had failed to show prejudice

stemming from the absence of the G. L. c. 279, § 25 (d),

warning.   The judge did not credit the defendant's affidavit

that he would not have pleaded guilty had he received the

warning, nor was the judge required to do so.    See Commonwealth

v. Welch, 487 Mass. 425, 446 (2021).   As the judge noted, the

affidavit's credibility was undercut by the defendant's delay in

raising the claim, the timing of the new trial motion, the

favorable treatment the defendant received as a result of the

                                 6
2014 plea, and the absence of an affidavit from plea counsel.

       For all of these reasons, we affirm the denial of the

defendant's motion to withdraw guilty plea and for a new trial.

                                      So ordered.

                                      By the Court (Wolohojian,
                                        Shin & Ditkoff, JJ.2),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    September 22, 2023.

2   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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