Court Opinion

ID: 9353820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 20:02:11.625704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:12:00.354644
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/11/23 Ghazarian v. Saperstein CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 ARMOND GHAZARIAN et al.,                                     B307904

           Plaintiffs and Appellants,                         (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BC635257)
           v.

 RICHARD SAPERSTEIN et al.,

           Defendants and
           Respondents.

      APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Stephanie M. Bowick, Judge. Affirmed.
      The Jamison Law Firm, Guy E. Jamison, Chelsea M.
Clayton; Mazur & Mazur and Janice R. Mazur for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
      Rufus-Isaacs Acland & Grantham and Alexander Rufus-
Isaacs for Defendants and Respondents.
                _______________________________
       Plaintiffs and appellants Armond Ghazarian dba Car
Expert, Saro Diashian, and Good Vibes productions, LLC
(collectively, appellants) appeal from judgments entered against
them after the trial court granted the summary judgment
motions of defendants and respondents Richard Saperstein,
Brian Witten, The Genre Company, Inc., and Elysium Films, Inc.
(collectively, respondents) in this action for breach of contract,
fraud, and other causes of action, arising from appellants’
monetary investments in respondents’ independent films.
Appellants contend the trial court erred in excluding their
expert’s conclusions and opinions and in declining to consider
certain theories of liability. They also contend they have shown
triable issues of material fact precluding summary judgment.
For the reasons explained below, we reject appellants’
contentions and affirm the judgments.
                           BACKGROUND
I.     The Investment Agreements
       At all times relevant to the causes of action appellants
assert in this action, defendants and respondents The Genre
Company, Inc. (Genre) and Elysium Films, Inc. (Elysium) were
film production companies. Appellants invested money with
Genre for the development of certain films, under investment
agreements described below. Other plaintiffs in this action, who
are not parties to this appeal, invested money with Elysium for
the development of other films. Defendant and respondent
Richard Saperstein is a film producer, who was an officer of
Genre and Elysium. Defendant and respondent Brian Witten is a
film producer, who worked with Saperstein on the development of
the films at issue in this appeal. Saperstein and Witten signed
the investment agreements plaintiffs and appellants Saro

                                2
Diashian and Ghazarian dba Car Expert (Ghazarian) entered
into with Genre; only Saperstein signed the investment
agreement plaintiff and appellant Good Vibes entered into with
Genre.
      A.    Plaintiff and appellant Saro Diashian
                                                  1
       On February 8, 2011, Saro Diashian (Saro) entered into a
“Development Funds Investment Agreement” with Genre.
Thereunder, Saro contributed $25,000, and he and Genre agreed
Genre “may utilize the Contribution to pay for any costs in
connection with the development of the Picture [known as ‘The
Blob’] as Company [Genre] deems appropriate.” The agreement
provides that if the film The Blob is produced before the
“deadline” (defined as 14 months after the date of the agreement),
Saro is entitled to “reimbursement” (defined as “an amount equal
to one hundred and fifteen percent (115%) of the Contribution”),
not later than the first day of the film’s principal photography. If
the film The Blob has not commenced principal photography by
the same “deadline,” at any time after the deadline, Saro may
elect to receive his “reimbursement” from the adjusted gross
receipts (AGR), “if any,” “actually paid” to Genre on “The
Barrens” or “Silent Night, Deadly Night” (Silent Night), two of
Genre’s other film projects. The agreement also states that if the
reimbursement amount has not been paid to Saro from
production funds of The Blob or AGR on The Barrens or Silent
Night, Genre “shall repay the amount of the Reimbursement to

      1
        Hereafter, we refer to plaintiff and appellant Saro
Diashian by his first name because his relative, Sam Diashian
(Sam), also invested money with Genre and is involved in events
at issue here, although he is not a party to this action.

                                 3
[Saro] from any amounts Richard Saperstein and/or Brian Witten
are personally entitled to receive from any of the Company’s film
projects other than” The Blob, The Barrens and Silent Night.
The agreement also provides for contingent compensation (an
enumerated percentage of AGR on each of the three named films)
and an associate producer credit on The Blob “[i]f the Picture is
produced.” The agreement states Genre “does not make any
express or implied representation, warranty, guarantee or
agreement as to the amount of Gross Receipts or Adjusted Gross
Receipts which will be derived or received from the distribution
or other exploitation of any of the Pictures” (the three named
films).
      The Barrens and Silent Night were produced before
appellants filed this action. The Blob was not produced before
appellants filed this action, and apparently it still has not been
produced.
      In the operative first amended complaint, Saro alleges he is
owed money under the agreement. In their summary judgment
motion, respondents argued Saro is not owed any money under
the agreement because they repaid his $25,000 contribution (by a
check made payable to his relative, Sam), notwithstanding that
The Blob was not produced, Saro did not elect to receive
reimbursement from AGR on The Barrens or Silent Night, and,
even if he had, neither of those films generated AGR. We discuss
more fully below the parties’ arguments and evidence in
connection with the summary judgment motion.
      B.    Plaintiff and appellant Ghazarian
      On April 14, 2011, Ghazarian (through his business entity,
Car Expert) entered into a “Development Funds Investment
Agreement” with Genre. Thereunder, Ghazarian contributed

                                4
$100,000, and he and Genre agreed to the terms summarized
above in our discussion of Saro’s Development Funds Investment
Agreement with Genre.
       In the first amended complaint, Ghazarian alleges he is
owed reimbursement (115% of his contribution under the terms
of the agreement), and he is entitled to quarterly statements and
accounting records from respondents and associate producer
credit, under the agreement. In their summary judgment motion,
respondents argued Ghazarian is not owed reimbursement under
the agreement because The Blob was not produced, Ghazarian
did not elect to receive reimbursement from AGR on The Barrens
or Silent Night, and, even if he had, neither of those films
generated AGR. Respondents also argued Ghazarian cannot
receive associate producer credit on The Blob because the film
was not produced, and the agreement does not include a
provision requiring respondents to provide him with quarterly
statements and accounting records. We discuss more fully below
the parties’ arguments and evidence in connection with the
summary judgment motion.
       C.     Plaintiff and appellant Good Vibes
       On September 19, 2012, Good Vibes entered into a “Funds
Investment Agreement” with Genre regarding development of
The Blob and “Stephen King’s Cell.” Thereunder, Good Vibes
contributed $85,000, and Good Vibes and Genre agreed Genre
“will utilize the Contribution to pay for any development or
overhead costs Company [Genre] deems appropriate.” Good
Vibes is entitled to reimbursement under the agreement as
follows: “Investor [Good Vibes] shall be entitled to receive fifty
percent (50%) of the Reimbursement amount [defined in the
agreement as 115% of Good Vibes’s contribution], equivalent to

                                5
Forty-Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-Five United
States Dollars (U.S. $48,875.00) from Stephen King’s Cell and the
remaining fifty percent (50%) of the Reimbursement amount,
equivalent to Forty-Eight Thousand Eight Hundred Seventy-Five
United States Dollars (U.S. $48,875.00) from The Blob’s
production financing. Investor shall be reimbursed this amount
no later than the conclusion of production from Stephen King’s
Cell and The Blob.” If either film “has not commenced principal
photography on or prior to the Deadline [defined as nine months
after the date of the agreement], then Investor has the right to
extend the term of this agreement, indefinitely, until Company
secures financing for production of the Picture and the Picture
commences principal photography. Alternatively, Investor may
elect to receive Reimbursement from Company’s share of [AGR]
on future Company projects.” The agreement also provides for
contingent compensation (an enumerated percentage of AGR on
Stephen King’s Cell and The Blob) and an associate producer
credit on these films. The agreement states Genre “has not made
and specifically does not make any express or implied
representation, warranty, guarantee or agreement as to the
amount of Gross Receipts or Adjusted Gross Receipts which will
be derived or received from the distribution or other exploitation
of any of the Pictures.” The agreement also requires Genre to
send Good Vibes “quarterly statements relating to the
distribution of the picture for which Investor’s Contribution was
utilized for the first two (2) years after the date of first general
release of such Picture in the U.S.” and to provide additional
statements thereafter as specified in the agreement.
       The film “Cell” was produced, and in February 2013, Genre
reimbursed Good Vibes $48,875 for its investment in Cell. One of

                                 6
Good Vibes’s principals, Vagram Shalvardzhyan (who signed the
Funds Investment Agreement on behalf of Good Vibes), received
an associate producer credit on Cell. As discussed above, The
Blob was not produced before appellants filed this action, and
apparently it still has not been produced.
       In the first amended complaint, Good Vibes alleges it is
owed reimbursement (115% of its contribution under the terms of
the agreement), and it is entitled to quarterly statements and
accounting records from respondents and associate producer
credit, under the agreement. Good Vibes acknowledges Genre
reimbursed $48,875 of its contribution. In their summary
judgment motion, respondents argued Good Vibes is not owed
reimbursement of the other half of its contribution under the
agreement because The Blob was not produced, Good Vibes did
not elect to receive reimbursement from AGR on another of
Genre’s film projects, and none of Genre’s films (Cell, Silent
Night, and The Barrens) generated AGR. Respondents also
asserted Good Vibes cannot receive associate producer credit on
The Blob because the film was not produced, and one of its
principals received associate producer credit on Cell.
Respondents further argued that if Genre failed to provide
quarterly statements for Cell, Good Vibes cannot demonstrate it
was damaged by such a failure because Genre paid Good Vibes
reimbursement of 115% of its contribution for Cell, and none of
the films at issue have generated AGR. We discuss more fully
below the parties’ arguments and evidence in connection with the
summary judgment motion.
II.    The Operative First Amended Complaint
       In September 2016, appellants and 11 other plaintiffs who
invested with Genre or Elysium filed this action against

                               7
              2
Respondents. On December 12, 2018, after the parties
conducted discovery, appellants and the other plaintiffs filed the
operative first amended complaint, asserting causes of action for
breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing, anticipatory breach of contract, fraud,
promissory fraud, negligent misrepresentation, violation of Penal
                                              3
Code section 496 (receiving stolen property), unjust enrichment,
                       4
declaratory judgment, and violation of Business and Professions
Code section 17200.
       In the first amended complaint, Good Vibes alleges
respondents breached their written agreement with Good Vibes
by failing to “[r]eimburse Good Vibes . . . as per the terms of the
agreement”; by failing to “[p]rovide quarterly statements and
accounting records”; and by failing to “[c]redit Good Vibes . . . as
an associate producer in Cell and/or other productions.”

      2
        As set forth above, “appellants” refers to Ghazarian, Saro,
and Good Vibes. “Respondents” refers to Genre, Elysium,
Saperstein, and Witten. We use “plaintiffs” below to refer
collectively to the 14 plaintiffs who brought this action against
respondents, 11 of whom are not parties to this appeal.
      3
       Plaintiffs allege in the first amended complaint that
respondents “received and/or withheld Plaintiffs’ monies in a
manner constituting theft under Penal Code § 496,” a statute
criminalizing receipt of stolen property.
      4
        Appellants and the other plaintiffs seek a declaratory
judgment relating to certain terms in the agreements. They
“seek judicial determination resolving the issue of the interest
rates, penalties, and contingent compensation.” It is not clear
how this cause of action relates to the agreements at issue in this
appeal.

                                 8
Ghazarian alleges respondents breached their written agreement
with him by “failing to reimburse [him] the total principal
amount of $100,000 (USD) on or before the first day of principle
                                 5
[sic] photography for The Blob”; by failing to “[p]rovide quarterly
statements and account records”; and by failing to “[c]redit [him]
as associate producer in The Blob and/or other film and television
projects.” Saro alleges respondents breached their written
agreement with him “by failing to reimburse [him] as per the
terms of the agreement.” Appellants (and the other plaintiffs)
allege respondents breached the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing by failing to “[r]eimburse the provided funds”
and by failing to “[p]rovide statements and accounting of the use
of the monies.” They further allege the written agreements are
“anticipatorily breached” because respondents “have, through
their actions, clearly and positively indicated that they will not or
cannot perform the requirements of the parties’ agreements and
contracts.”
       Appellants (and the other plaintiffs) allege in the first
amended complaint that Saperstein made representations to
them relating to the terms of the written agreements. The
alleged representations are listed as relating to all plaintiffs,
collectively, and include that Saperstein “would provide
statements and accounting for the projects so as to keep Plaintiffs
apprised as to the progress and happenings”; that plaintiffs
“would receive high interest rate returns on the funds loaned,
further compensation contingent on [AGR] and proceeds from

      5
        As discussed above, The Blob was not produced. The first
day of principal photography for The Blob did not occur.

                                 9
                                         6
[respondents’] projects, and/or penalties[ ] in the event that
[respondents] were unable to reimburse the money provided
within the agreed-upon timeframe,” as “included” in “express
language in the agreements”; and that plaintiffs “would be
credited in the motion picture films, television productions,
and/or projects to which the funds loaned were used to create or
produce.” In the fraud cause of action, plaintiffs allege these
representations were material and substantially false. Plaintiffs
further allege they “reasonably relied upon [respondents’]
representations which were used to induce[] Plaintiffs to execute
the agreements and to provide [respondents] with large sums of
          7
money.” Appellants contend the 14 plaintiffs provided a total of
                           8
$1,082,000 to respondents.
      As relevant to appellants’ claims against respondents, the
cause of action for violation of Business and Professions Code
section 17200 alleges respondents “fraudulently induced
Plaintiffs to repeatedly delay collection of outstanding payments
with false representations of guaranteed future success.”

      6
        It is not clear from the record before us what this
reference to “penalties” means and how it relates to appellants, if
at all.
      7
       Plaintiffs’ causes of action for promissory fraud and
negligent misrepresentation are based on the same alleged
representations that form the basis of their fraud cause of action.
      8
       We do not discuss in this opinion the allegations of the
other 11 plaintiffs regarding how much they claim to be owed
under their agreements because that is not germane to the issues
on appeal.

                                10
      The first amended complaint includes a group of allegations
under the heading, “As to Defendant Saperstein’s Dominion &
Control Over the Corporate Entities” (Genre and Elysium).
Therein, plaintiffs allege upon information and belief, among
other things, that Saperstein used Genre and Elysium “as shells
in order to move, transfer, and/or hide funds and money”; that
Genre and/or Elysium “have been inadequately capitalized”; that
Genre and Elysium are Saperstein’s “alter egos”; that “there has
been a failure to distinguish between Richard Saperstein’s
personal assets and the assets of [Genre and Elysium]”; and that
Genre and/or Elysium “were created for the purposes of avoiding
an obligation and/or perpetuating a fraud.” Under this same
heading in the first amended complaint, plaintiffs allege, “It
would be an inequitable result for Richard Saperstein’s actions to
be treated as distinct from those of [Genre and/or Elysium].”
      The first amended complaint identifies “Schur &
Sugarman” as “Doe Defendant 1.” Plaintiffs allege Schur and
Sugarman provided management and accounting services to
Genre and Elysium. Under a section of the first amended
complaint labeled “Parties,” plaintiffs allege upon information
and belief, among other things, that Schur & Sugarman
conspired with Saperstein in “failing to maintain accurate books
and records, by agreeing that Saperstein could undercapitalize
[Genre and Elysium], [and] by failing to follow proper
formalities.” Plaintiffs also allege upon information and belief in
the “Parties” section of the first amended complaint that Schur &
Sugarman, “in their position as signatories to the business
accounts” of Genre and Elysium, “knew about and facilitated and
agreed to the fraud by failure to disclose and conversion of funds
by Saperstein to personal uses. . . .” Plaintiffs further allege

                                11
Schur & Sugarman knew Genre and Elysium “went many years
without revenue, knew and facilitated the use of one investor’s
funds to repay another, and knew, agreed to and facilitated the
conversion by Saperstein of such funds to personal uses.” There
is nothing in the record before us showing Schur & Sugarman’s
involvement, if any, in the litigation below, and Schur &
Sugarman is not a party to this appeal. There are no other
allegations in the first amended complaint—aside from those in
the paragraph regarding Schur & Sugarman in the “Parties”
section—that allege Saperstein converted investor funds to his
personal use or used one investor’s funds to pay another; and
there is no indication in the first amended complaint that any of
the causes of action is based on such alleged conduct by
Saperstein.
III. The Motions for Summary Judgment
      In March 2019, respondents filed 13 motions for summary
judgment/summary adjudication, including the three motions at
issue in this appeal.
      A.     Summary judgment motion against Saro
      In their motion for summary judgment/summary
adjudication against Saro, respondents asserted Saro cannot
establish breach of contract because respondents reimbursed
Saro’s $25,000 contribution, notwithstanding that The Blob was
not produced, Saro did not elect to receive reimbursement from
AGR on The Barrens or Silent Night, and, even if he had, neither
of those films generated AGR. In connection with their motion,
respondents presented a check for $25,000, dated August 5, 2011,
and made payable to Sam Diashian, Saro’s relative. In a
declaration in support of respondents’ motion against Saro,
Saperstein stated this $25,000 check was for reimbursement of

                               12
Saro’s contribution. Respondents presented three agreements
between Genre and Sam and/or his company, Diashian
Consulting, under which Sam invested $100,000 for development
of The Blob and Sam/Diashian Consulting lent Genre an
additional $72,000 for development of Silent Night and The
Barrens, for a total contribution of $172,000. Respondents also
presented checks and wire transfers to Diashian Consulting
totaling $177,750. In his declaration, Saperstein stated these
checks and wire transfers to Diashian Consulting reimbursed
Sam/Diashian Consulting under their agreements with Genre;
and the $25,000 check, dated August 5, 2011 was reimbursement
for Saro’s $25,000 contribution, although the check was made
payable to Sam.
       Respondents asserted in their motion that Saro cannot
establish breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing because Genre reimbursed his contribution, and the
agreement does not include a provision requiring Genre to
provide Saro with statements or an accounting. These are the
only two ways alleged in the first amended complaint that
respondents breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing. Respondents also produced evidence that none of its
films generated AGR, to the extent Saro claims he is entitled
AGR under the agreement.
       Respondents asserted in their motion that Saro cannot
establish anticipatory breach because respondents “never
expressly repudiated the [agreement] by an unequivocal refusal
to perform.” In his declaration, Saperstein stated Genre is still
developing The Blob and “stands ready to honor the terms” of the
agreement if The Blob is produced and other contingencies occur
(the films referenced in the agreement generate AGR).

                               13
      Respondents asserted in their motion that Saro cannot
establish fraud because none of the alleged misrepresentations he
identified in his discovery responses are actionable as fraud; and
he cannot establish he was damaged as a result of any of the
misrepresentations because Genre reimbursed his contribution,
and he was not entitled to any additional compensation under the
agreement. The three alleged misrepresentations on which Saro
bases his fraud cause of action, as set forth in his discovery
responses are: (1) Genre stated in the agreement it was the sole
owner of all rights in and to The Blob; (2) Genre stated in the
agreement it would provide quarterly reports and maintain
auditable records; and (3) Genre stated in the agreement that
Saro’s investment would be for “Company” use. As to alleged
misrepresentation (1), Saperstein stated in his declaration, “The
reason why The Blob has not yet been made into a film is because
Genre has not been able to raise enough money to produce it, not
because it does not have the necessary rights.” (Italics omitted.)
As to alleged misrepresentation (2), the agreement between Saro
and Genre does not contain such a provision regarding reports
and records, and Saro could not identify in his discovery
responses an oral representation regarding reports and records.
As to alleged misrepresentation (3), respondents presented
evidence demonstrating they spent more money on development
of The Blob than Saro invested. Thus, respondents argued Saro
could not establish his contribution, which respondents asserted
was reimbursed, was not put to company use. For the same
reasons, respondents argued Saro cannot establish negligent
misrepresentation.
      Respondents asserted in their motion that Saro cannot
establish promissory fraud because the agreement contains an

                               14
integration clause, and based on his discovery responses, Saro
has no evidence respondents did not intend to perform their
alleged promises.
       With respect to Saro’s cause of action for violation of Penal
Code section 496, respondents asserted Saro’s discovery
responses demonstrate he has no evidence that respondents
knowingly received stolen property.
       Finally, with respect to Saro’s causes of action for unjust
enrichment, declaratory judgment, and violation of Business and
Professions Code section 17200 seeking restitution, respondents
argued the agreement limits Saro’s remedies to damages at law.
In addition, respondents asserted Saro cannot establish
respondents were unjustly enriched; the issues Saro seeks to
have adjudicated in his cause of action for declaratory judgment
are covered by other causes of action; and Saro cannot establish
respondents acted unfairly or illegally within the meaning of
Business and Professions Code section 17200.
       B.    Summary judgment motion against Ghazarian
       In their motion for summary judgment/summary
adjudication against Ghazarian, respondents asserted Ghazarian
cannot establish they breached their written agreement with him
by failing to reimburse him when Genre began principal
photography on The Blob and by failing to give him associate
producer credit on The Blob, as he alleged in the first amended
complaint, because The Blob was not produced. Accordingly, the
first day of principal photography for The Blob did not occur, and
Genre could not give Ghazarian associate producer credit on a
film that was not made. Ghazarian also alleged in the first
amended complaint that respondents breached the agreement by
failing to provide quarterly statements and account records, but

                                 15
as respondents pointed out in their motion, the agreement does
not include a provision requiring respondents to provide him with
such statements and records.
       Respondents asserted in their motion that Ghazarian
cannot establish breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing based on his allegations in the first amended
complaint that Genre failed to reimburse his contribution and
failed to provide statements and accounting. Respondents
argued Ghazarian is not owed reimbursement of his contribution
under the agreement because The Blob was not produced,
Ghazarian did not elect to receive reimbursement from AGR on
The Barrens or Silent Night, and, even if he had, neither of those
films generated AGR. And, as set forth above, the agreement
does not include a provision requiring respondents to provide him
with statements and accounting, and respondents argue there is
no basis to imply such a term.
       With respect to the causes of action for anticipatory breach,
promissory fraud, negligent misrepresentation, violation of Penal
Code section 496, unjust enrichment, declaratory judgment, and
violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200,
respondents made the same arguments they made in their
motion against Saro, as summarized above.
       Respondents asserted in their motion that Ghazarian
cannot establish fraud because he could not identify in his
discovery responses any specific statement on which he based his
fraud cause of action; he did not have evidence that any alleged
misrepresentation was false, based on his discovery responses;
and he did not have evidence that respondents knew any alleged
misrepresentation was false, based on his discovery responses.

                                16
As respondents noted, in his discovery responses, Ghazarian
identified three alleged misrepresentations:
“1. Misrepresentation that [respondents’] business was successful
and capable of repaying the short-term loans on time.
2. Misrepresentation that Elysium Films was worth millions of
                     [9]
dollars as a company. 3. Misrepresentation that everyone
would get paid as long as [respondents] continued to make films.”
Respondents pointed out that Ghazarian did not identify in his
discovery responses any writing or oral statement that included
any of the alleged misrepresentations.
       C.     Summary judgment motion against Good Vibes
       In their motion for summary judgment/summary
adjudication against Good Vibes, respondents asserted Good
Vibes cannot establish they breached their agreement by failing
to reimburse half of Good Vibes’s contribution, as Good Vibes is
not owed such reimbursement because The Blob was not
produced, Good Vibes did not elect to receive reimbursement from
AGR on another of Genre’s film projects, and none of Genre’s
films (Cell, Silent Night, and The Barrens) generated AGR.
Respondents also asserted they did not breach the agreement by
failing to give Good Vibes associate producer credit, as Good
Vibes cannot receive associate producer credit on The Blob
because the film was not produced, and one of its principals
received associate producer credit on Cell. Respondents further
argued that if Genre failed to provide quarterly statements for
Cell as required under the agreement, Good Vibes cannot
demonstrate it was damaged by such a failure because Genre

     9
       Ghazarian entered into the Development Funds
Investment Agreement with Genre.

                               17
paid Good Vibes reimbursement of 115% of its contribution for
Cell, and the film has not generated AGR. For the same reasons,
respondents also asserted they did not breach the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to reimburse
Good Vibes’ contribution and failing to provide quarterly
statements.
       With respect to the causes of action for anticipatory breach,
promissory fraud, negligent misrepresentation, violation of Penal
Code section 496, unjust enrichment, declaratory judgment, and
violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200,
respondents made the same arguments they made in their
motion against Saro, as summarized above.
       As respondents pointed out in their motion, in its discovery
responses, Good Vibes identified documents (emails) it contended
contained misrepresentations. Respondents asserted Good Vibes
cannot establish fraud because it did not have evidence that any
alleged misrepresentation was false, based on its discovery
responses; and Good Vibes did not have evidence that
respondents knew any alleged misrepresentation was false, based
on its discovery responses. We need not summarize herein the
contents of these documents because Good Vibes does not raise
any issue on appeal related to these emails.
IV. Opposition to Motions for Summary Judgment,
       Evidentiary Objections, and Reply Briefs
       A.    Opposition to summary judgment motions
       In May 2019, plaintiffs filed a 26-page combined “omnibus
opposition” to respondents’ 13 motions for summary
judgment/summary adjudication. Therein, they asserted each
written agreement “has a specified due date (‘Deadline’) within
which [respondents] were obligated to pay the Reimbursement

                                18
regardless of whether any film or other project specified in the
                                                 10
contract was produced, financed, or profitable.” In the
alternative, they argued respondents “constructively abandoned”
The Blob and were required to reimburse appellants’
contributions within a reasonable time after such constructive
abandonment. In support of this latter argument, plaintiffs cited
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) Accounting
Standards Codification (ASC), providing in pertinent part: “An
entity shall periodically review properties in development to
determine whether they will ultimately be used in the production
of a film. It shall be presumed that an entity will dispose of a
property (whether by sale or abandonment) if it has not been set
for production within three years from the time of the first
capitalized transaction.” (Id. at § 926-20-40-1, bold font omitted.)
        Plaintiffs argued in their opposition that their causes of
action were also based on respondents’ misuse of investor funds
and operation of an unlawful Ponzi scheme. Plaintiffs asserted:
“As it happens, [respondents] did not use [plaintiffs’]
Contributions only to pay development costs. [Respondents]
diverted investor funds to Saperstein, Witten and their affiliated
companies by making ‘loans’ and unauthorized distributions of
‘production equity’ from Genre and Elysium; [respondents] used
investor funds to pay general and administrative expenses,
‘business management fees’ and ‘legal fees’ not authorized for

      10
         As set forth above, the agreements at issue here state if
principal photography has not commenced on The Blob by the
“deadline,” as defined in each agreement, appellants may elect to
receive their reimbursement from AGR, if any, on Genre’s other
films.

                                 19
payment under the Contracts; and [respondents] used the
Contributions and other investor funds to operate an unlawful
‘Ponzi scheme.’ ”
      Plaintiffs asserted respondents defrauded them by
misrepresenting how their contributions would be used; by
“making false guarantees that Plaintiffs would be paid from any
funds that [respondents] actually received from the exploitation
of” The Barrens, Silent Night, and Cell; and by misrepresenting
that The Blob was “ ‘set for production.’ ”
      Plaintiffs argued respondents violated Penal Code section
496, receipt of stolen property, based on their assertion
“Saperstein simply took Plaintiffs[’] investment money, deposited
a large percentage in his bank account and reported it as ‘loans to
shareholder.’ ”
      Plaintiffs also asserted they were “entitled to a declaration
from the Court that the terms of the contract[s] at issue should
be interpreted, as it relates to development costs etc., as
understood in the [film] industry. Such a declaration will assist
the parties in reaching an adjudication.”
      B.     Plaintiffs’ Proposed Expert’s Declaration
      In support of their assertions and arguments regarding
respondents’ misuse of investor funds and operation of a Ponzi
scheme, plaintiffs relied on the declaration of Michael McEwen,
dated May 17, 2019. Therein, McEwen set forth his
qualifications as follows:
      “I am a Certified Public Accountant (CPA) licensed to
practice in the State of California. I also have a master’s in
business administration. I am certified in Financial Forensics
(CFF) by the AICPA. In addition to these formal credentials, for
the past 22 years I have acted in either the capacity as a

                                20
detective or Sargent in economic crimes for the San Diego Police
Department. As a detective in the Economics Crimes Section I
have used my forensic accounting expertise in conducting
investigations into various sophisticated fraud schemes. My
assignments have included two Federal Task Forces, United
States Secret Service Regional Fraud Task Force and the
Internal Revenue Service-Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI)
Southwest Border Financial Crimes Task Force. Prior to joining
the San Diego Police Department, I worked for nearly ten years
as a forensic account[ant], auditor, and director for two of the ‘Big
Four’ international public accounting firms (Price Waterhouse
Coopers and KPMG) and an international engineering and
construction company. As an accountant and detective, I have
conducted many investigations into thefts from business and
individuals. As a forensic accountant and financial expert, I have
worked and consulted with the San Diego Police Department
Homicide Unit, United States Secret Service, FBI, and Homeland
Security on cases involving murder for financial gain, money
laundering, Ponzi schemes, probate fraud, bank fraud, real estate
fraud and tax fraud. During these investigations, I have spoken
with numerous victims, witnesses and suspects of said crimes.
From these conversations and training, I learned the different
methods by which suspects commit these crimes as well as the
manner in which they attempt to hide them from their victims
and law enforcement. Most importantly, I have experience in
working in the film industry as an auditor for Tri-Star Motion
pictures, and motion picture royalty and pension audits for the
Screen Actors Guild. As a point of interest, I handled some
original M.A.S.H. audits.”

                                 21
      McEwen stated he was “retained by Plaintiffs’ counsel as a
forensic expert to review the financial books and records of
[respondents] and render findings about whether [respondents]
used Plaintiffs’ investment/loan money for its intended purpose
and whether there are badges of fraud associated with these
transactions.”
      McEwen described in his declaration certain costs and
expenses that do and do not constitute “film costs” and
“development costs.” McEwen asserted: “To be sure,
development costs do not include general expenses of [Genre and
Elysium], such as attorney fees, accounting fees, paying back
interest or principal to prior investors, or more specifically paying
back Saperstein’s undocumented and yet alleged shareholder
                                                11
loans he made to either of these corporations.”
      McEwen stated that based on his review of Genre’s and
Elysium’s banking records, respondents converted some of
plaintiffs’ investment funds for their personal use. McEwen also
asserted: “As a law enforcement officer, it is my opinion that
[respondents] have fraudulently converted investor funds and
have violated Penal Code section 487(a) [grand theft], a felony.”

      11
         Saperstein testified at his deposition, and respondents
produced spreadsheets indicating, that Saperstein lent over $4
million to Genre and Elysium between 2007 and 2018, and Genre
and Elysium made payments to Saperstein to repay the loans.
As McEwen stated in his declaration, Genre’s tax returns during
this period do not reflect the loans listed in respondents’
spreadsheet. McEwen asserted the companies’ payments to
Saperstein were loans to Saperstein and not repayment of loans
from Saperstein.

                                 22
       In his declaration, McEwen stated he required access to
Saperstein’s bank records “so that light may be shed on the entire
Ponzi scheme.” He further stated: “These banking records are
critical in proving both the fraud and breach of contract claims
because they will demonstrate that the money invested was not
used as set forth in the various complaints [sic].”
       As we explain below, the trial court sustained respondents’
objections to all of McEwen’s assertions and conclusions
summarized above.
       C.     Appellants’ separate statements of disputed
              material facts and declarations
       Appellants each filed a separate statement of disputed
material facts and an individual declaration. As we discuss
below, the separate statements are defective in that they are
filled with pages of improper argument and do not link alleged
disputed facts with the specific evidence on which appellants base
their purported disputes.
       In his separate statement of disputed material facts, Saro
disputed Genre repaid his $25,000 contribution. He disputed this
fact by stating the check respondents presented was not made out
to him. In his declaration, however, Saro did not reference the
check, and he did not deny he received the proceeds from the
check. In discussing the terms of his agreement with Genre, Saro
stated in his declaration, “I am owed the principal amount of
$25,000 plus interest . . . .”

                               23
      D.   Respondents’ evidentiary objections and reply
           brief
      Respondents filed written objections to plaintiffs’
           12
evidence. The only objections and rulings that are at issue on
appeal are respondents’ objections to McEwen’s declaration.
Respondents objected to numerous statements in McEwen’s
declaration, including the assertions and conclusions summarized
above, on grounds (1) the declaration does not show McEwen is
competent to testify “as an expert on any film industry
accounting issues,” and (2) the statements are conclusory and
lack foundation because “McEwen states conclusions and does
not state the basis for his opinions.”
       Respondents filed separate reply briefs in support of their
motions for summary judgment/summary adjudication against
appellants. Respondents argued, among other things, that the
trial court should not consider theories raised in the omnibus
opposition that respondents contended were not pleaded in the
first amended complaint: alleged misuse of investor funds, and
operation of a Ponzi scheme. Respondents also urged the trial
court to deny a continuance so plaintiffs could obtain Saperstein’s
personal banking records. Respondents asserted such records
would only pertain to theories that plaintiffs did not plead in the
first amended complaint.

      12
         Plaintiffs also filed written evidentiary objections, which
the trial court overruled. In this appeal, appellants do not
challenge the trial court’s rulings on their evidentiary objections.

                                 24
      E.     Trial court’s order allowing plaintiffs access to
             some of Saperstein’s banking records
       On May 31, 2019, before ruling on plaintiffs’ motions for
summary judgment/summary adjudication, the trial court ruled
plaintiffs could obtain Saperstein’s banking records by subpoena
for the period January 1, 2011 to December 31, 2012, and
plaintiffs obtained these records. The court found, “Plaintiffs
have provided a compelling reason for the discovery of Defendant
Saperstein’s bank records, as they are directly relevant to the
lawsuit based upon the Plaintiffs’ allegations, including alter ego
liability, and the transfers shown by Plaintiffs that were made to
Defendant’s personal bank account. Therefore discovery of the
records are essential to a fair determination of the action.” The
court further stated: “If Plaintiffs can provide the Court with
sufficient evidence of ‘[P]onzi scheme’ activity or improper use of
investment funds warranting expanding the time period, they
may request such by way of an Informal Discovery Conference
with the Court, and a motion to compel to follow if necessary.”
       The trial court did not allow plaintiffs to obtain additional
personal banking records from Saperstein. Plaintiffs did not seek
leave to amend their complaint to plead misuse of investor funds
or operation of a Ponzi scheme.
       F.    Supplemental opposition to summary judgment
             motions and supplemental declaration of
             McEwen
       In September 2019, plaintiffs filed a “supplemental
omnibus opposition” to the 13 motions for summary
judgment/summary adjudication. Plaintiffs maintained that the
trial court should deny respondents’ summary judgment motions
based on their Ponzi scheme and misuse of investor funds

                                25
theories. Plaintiffs did not address respondents’ arguments in
their previously filed reply briefs that these theories were not
pleaded in the first amended complaint. Plaintiffs further
asserted, based on a supplemental declaration of McEwen, that
during 2011 and 2012 Saperstein “embezzled a total of
$853,682.90 by transferring investor money to his personal
account from the Genre and Elysium bank accounts,” and he used
the majority of the money “for his own personal use.” McEwen
stated in his supplemental declaration that, after reviewing
Saperstein’s personal banking records for 2011 and 2012, he
“reconfirmed Mr. Saperstein is operating a Ponzi Scheme.”
       G.    Respondents’ supplemental evidentiary
             objections and reply brief
       Respondents objected to the assertions and conclusions in
McEwen’s supplemental declaration on the same grounds they
objected to his original declaration: (1) McEwen is not qualified
as an expert on the subject to which his opinions relate, and
(2) the statements are conclusory and lack foundation.
       In their reply to plaintiffs’ supplemental omnibus
opposition, respondents argued the Ponzi scheme and misuse of
investor funds theories are irrelevant to the motions for summary
judgment/summary adjudication because the theories were not
pleaded in the first amended complaint. Respondents also
pointed to evidence they produced indicating respondents spent
over $2.5 million on development of the films. Respondents
denied Saperstein embezzled any money, and pointed to evidence
they produced indicating transfers to Saperstein from Genre and
Elysium in 2011 and 2012 repaid earlier loans Saperstein made
to his companies. With this reply brief, respondents submitted a
declaration of Saperstein and attached the evidence they cited.

                               26
V.     Rulings on Motions for Summary Judgment
       At an October 31, 2019 hearing on some of the summary
judgment motions, the trial court asked plaintiffs’ counsel to
reference allegations in the first amended complaint that
articulate a Ponzi scheme theory. Plaintiffs’ counsel responded,
“A Ponzi scheme is not asserted in the first amended complaint.”
Respondents’ counsel noted that plaintiffs’ counsel served them
with a declaration of McEwen that advanced a Ponzi scheme
theory in October 2018 (apparently in connection with a discovery
matter). Two months later, in December 2018, plaintiffs filed
their first amended complaint and did not include a Ponzi scheme
or misuse of investor funds theory as the basis for any of their
causes of action.
       On June 26, 2020, the trial court issued a 216-page ruling
on many of the motions for summary judgment/summary
adjudication, including the three motions at issue in this appeal.
The court sustained respondents’ evidentiary objections,
including the objections to the assertions and conclusions in
McEwen’s declaration and supplemental declaration. The court
sustained the objections on both grounds asserted by
respondents: (1) that McEwen “has not established that he is
qualified as an expert on the particular subject to which the
opinion relates, i.e., accounting issues pertaining to development
of independent films”; and (2) that McEwen “does not lay a
sufficient foundation” for the statements.
       The trial court granted respondents’ summary judgment
motions against appellants and entered judgments in favor of
respondents. We address below two portions of the court’s ruling
that relate specifically to arguments appellants raise in this
appeal.

                               27
       The trial court stated in its ruling as to each appellant:
“Plaintiff attempts to raise a triable issue by arguing that
[respondents] misused Plaintiffs’ funds and engaged in a ‘Ponzi’
scheme. [Citation.] [Respondents] argue that these arguments
exceed the scope of the FAC [first amended complaint] and
therefore it would be inappropriate for the Court to deny
[respondents’] motion on unpled theories. In Opposition and in
the Supplemental Opposition, Plaintiff failed to respond to
[respondents’] argument on this point. At previous oral
argument hearings, the Court asked Plaintiffs whether any
allegations in the FAC allege misuse of funds or a ‘Ponzi’ scheme,
and Plaintiffs failed to point the Court to any allegations in the
FAC where these theories are alleged. Therefore, the Court finds
that it would be inappropriate to deny [respondents’] motion
based on theories not alleged in the FAC and does not consider
Plaintiff’s arguments on misuse of funds or ‘Ponzi’ scheme.”
       As to Saro, the trial court concluded he may not argue
respondents breached the written agreement or implied covenant
of good faith and fair dealing by failing to pay contingency
compensation, as plaintiffs collectively argued in their omnibus
opposition. The court found he only alleged in the first amended
complaint that respondents breached the agreement between him
and Genre by failing to reimburse his contribution, and breached
the implied covenant by failing to provide statements and failing
to reimburse his contribution. In any event, the court found Saro
did not raise a triable issue of fact that he was entitled to
contingency compensation. The court made consistent rulings on
this issue against Ghazarian and Good Vibes, based on their
decision not to plead respondents’ failure to pay contingency
compensation constitutes a breach.

                               28
                           DISCUSSION
       In their appellate briefing, appellants do not contend
respondents failed to meet their burden on summary judgment.
In their opening appellate brief, appellants contend: (1) the trial
court abused its discretion in sustaining respondent’s objections
to McEwen’s declarations as to one of the two grounds
respondents raised (although the court sustained the objections
on both grounds); (2) the court erred in declining to consider
appellants’ Ponzi scheme and misuse of investor funds theories
based on its conclusion the theories were not pleaded in the
complaint; (3) the court erred in declining to consider plaintiffs’
collective argument in the omnibus oppositions regarding
plaintiffs’ entitlement to contingent compensation based on its
conclusion appellants did not allege their specific claims of breach
were based on a failure to pay contingent compensation; and
(4) there are triable issues of material fact as to whether
respondents abandoned the production of The Blob and were
required to reimburse appellant’s contributions within a
reasonable time thereafter. Appellants further contend, even if
this court upholds the trial court’s evidentiary rulings on
respondents’ objections to McEwen’s declarations, appellants
have shown triable issues of material fact precluding summary
judgment. For the reasons explained below, we reject appellants’
contentions and affirm the summary judgments.
I.     Standard of Review
       A trial court should grant summary judgment “if all the
papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment

                                29
                                                        13
as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) A
defendant may establish a right to summary judgment by
showing that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot
be established or that there is a complete defense to the cause of
action. (§ 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Once the moving defendant has
satisfied this burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show
that a triable issue of material fact exists as to each cause of
action. (Ibid.) A triable issue of material fact exists where “the
evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the
underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v.
Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
       “We review the trial court’s decision de novo, considering
all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers
except that to which objections were made and sustained.”
(Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 65-66.) We
view the evidence and the inferences reasonably drawn from the
evidence “in the light most favorable to the opposing party.”
(Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)
II.    Defects in Appellants’ Papers
       Before we address the contentions appellants raise in this
appeal, we must note defects in appellants’ papers below and on
appeal that interfere with our ability to review the contentions.
       First, appellants’ separate statements of disputed material
facts do not link alleged disputed facts with the specific evidence
on which they base the purported dispute, in violation of statute
and court rule. (§ 437c, subd. (b)(3) [“Each material fact

      13
        Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure.

                                30
contended by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed
by a reference to the supporting evidence. Failure to comply with
this requirement of a separate statement may constitute a
sufficient ground, in the court’s discretion, for granting the
motion”]; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1350(f)(2) [“An opposing
party who contends that a fact is disputed must state, on the
right side of the page directly opposite the fact in dispute, the
nature of the dispute and describe the evidence that supports the
position that the fact is controverted”].) For the majority of the
facts put forth by respondents that appellants contend are
disputed, appellants improperly refer the court to pages of
argument intermixed with citations to evidence, leaving it to the
court to try to discern which evidence might support a claim that
a particular fact is disputed. This court is not tasked with
attempting to match up appellants’ asserted disputed material
facts with admissible evidence to support them.
         Second, in the statement of facts in their appellate briefing,
appellants largely cite to their oppositions to the motions for
summary judgment, rather than citing to admissible evidence.
“ ‘ “It is not the function of this court to comb the record looking
for the evidence or absence of evidence to support [a party’s]
argument.” ’ ” (Garcia v. Seacon Logix, Inc. (2015) 238
Cal.App.4th 1476, 1489.) Appellants must “point out portions of
the record that support the position taken on appeal.” (Del Real
v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 768.)
         Third, aside from appellants’ improper citation to
McEwen’s declarations, which we address below, appellants cite
other evidence the trial court excluded, although they do not
challenge the evidentiary rulings excluding such evidence. For
example, the trial court sustained respondents’ objections to 10

                                  31
exhibits attached to the declaration of appellants’ counsel, Guy
Jamison, on numerous grounds. In attempting to make their
case that they have shown triable issues of material fact,
appellants rely on four of these exhibits (numbered 128-131),
purported summaries of respondents’ financial records, without
challenging on appeal the trial court’s exclusion of this evidence.
      We could affirm the summary judgments based on only
these defects in appellants’ papers below and on appeal. Instead,
we review appellants’ contentions on the merits, noting however
that the defects in the papers make it difficult for us to review
appellants’ contention that they have shown a triable issue of
material fact precluding summary judgment.
III. Sustained Objections to McEwen’s Declarations
      In its written ruling, the trial court sustained respondents’
objections to McEwen’s declarations on both grounds respondents
raised in their written objections: (1) that McEwen “has not
established that he is qualified as an expert on the particular
subject to which the opinion relates, i.e., accounting issues
pertaining to development of independent films”; and (2) that
McEwen “does not lay a sufficient foundation” for the statements
to which respondents objected. “A court’s decision to exclude
expert testimony” in connection with a motion for summary
judgment “is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” (Avivi v. Centro
Medico Urgente Medical Center (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)
      In their appellate briefing, appellants argue the trial court
erred in sustaining the objections based on McEwen’s
qualification, but they ignore that the trial court also sustained
the objections based on a lack of foundation for the particular
statements made. Accordingly, we need not review appellants’
challenge to these evidentiary rulings because even if we agreed

                                32
with appellants’ argument, the evidence would remain excluded
based on the ground appellants do not address. Respondents
pointed out in their appellate brief that appellants did not
address the other ground on which the trial court sustained the
objections. In their reply brief on appeal, appellants again only
focused on the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence based on
McEwen’s qualification and did not argue the foundation for the
statements to which respondents objected. Without addressing
the alternative ground, appellants cannot demonstrate the court
abused its discretion in excluding the evidence.
      We summarized above the information the trial court
excluded from McEwen’s two declarations in sustaining
respondents’ objections, including the objections that there was a
lack of foundation for the information. The excluded information
includes, but is not limited to, McEwen’s opinions (1) as to
categories of expenditures respondents allegedly made that do
not constitute development costs; (2) that Saperstein converted
investors’ contributions to his personal use; (3) that Saperstein
embezzled $853,682.90; and (4) that respondents operated a
Ponzi scheme. The trial court also excluded McEwen’s
calculations on which he based his opinions. Respondents had
argued, in part, that the calculations lacked foundation and
included mathematical errors.
IV. Ponzi Scheme and Misuse of Investor Funds
      Theories
      A.     Appellants Did Not Properly Plead These
             Theories in the First Amended Complaint
      “The complaint limits the issues to be addressed at the
motion for summary judgment. The rationale is clear: It is the
allegations in the complaint to which the summary judgment

                                33
motion must respond. [Citation.] Upon a motion for summary
judgment, amendments to the pleadings are readily allowed.
[Citation.] If plaintiff wishes to expand the issues presented, it is
incumbent on plaintiff to seek leave to amend the complaint
either prior to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment,
or at the hearing itself. [Citation.] To allow a party to expand its
pleadings by way of opposition papers creates . . . an unwieldly
process.” (Laabs v. City of Victorville (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th
1242, 1258.) “To allow an issue that has not been pled to be
raised in opposition to a motion for summary judgment in the
absence of an amended pleading, allows nothing more than a
moving target. For . . . section 437c to have procedural viability,
the parties must be acting on a known set stage.” (Ibid., fn. 7.)
       Appellants do not dispute that the words Ponzi and misuse
do not appear in the first amended complaint. Nor do plaintiffs
dispute that they referenced the Ponzi theory in connection with
a discovery motion two months before they filed their first
amended complaint. And yet they chose not to plead these
theories in the first amended complaint as the bases for any of
their causes of action against respondents. When respondents
pointed out in their initial reply briefs in support of their
summary judgment motions that appellants did not plead these
theories, appellants did not seek leave to amend their complaint
or address respondents’ argument in their supplemental
opposition to the summary judgment motions. After the initial
round of papers were filed in connection with the summary
judgment motions, the trial court allowed appellants to obtain
two years of Saperstein’s personal banking records, concluding
the records related to appellants’ alter ego theory pleaded in the
first amended complaint. The court informed appellants in its

                                 34
ruling: “If Plaintiffs can provide the Court with sufficient
evidence of ‘[P]onzi scheme’ activity or improper use of
investment funds warranting expanding the time period, they
may request such by way of an Informal Discovery Conference
with the Court, and a motion to compel to follow if necessary.”
And yet appellants still chose not to seek leave to amend to plead
how the Ponzi scheme and misuse of investor funds theories
relate to their causes of action against respondents.
       Appellants point to allegations in the first amended
complaint, taken out of context, in arguing these theories are
actually pleaded in the first amended complaint—
notwithstanding that they could not point the trial court to any
such allegations at a hearing on the summary judgment motions.
Now, appellants point us to the paragraph about Schur &
Sugarman under the “Parties” section of the first amended
complaint (discussed above) and the allegations in the section of
the first amended complaint regarding Saperstein’s alleged
dominion and control over Genre and Elysium, describing these
entities as his alter egos (also discussed above). These
allegations do not indicate that a Ponzi scheme or misuse of
investor funds are theories on which appellants’ causes of action
against respondents are based. The trial court did not err in
declining to consider these theories because they were not
pleaded in the first amended complaint.
       B.    In Any Event, Appellants Cannot Show a
             Triable Issue of Material Fact on These
             Theories
       Even if we considered the Ponzi scheme and misuse of
investor funds theories in reviewing respondents’ summary
judgment motions, appellants cannot show a triable issue of

                                35
material fact. These theories rely on McEwen’s interpretation of,
conclusions regarding, and calculations relating to respondents’
financial documents. The trial court excluded these
interpretations, conclusions, and calculations, and appellants
cannot demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion, as
discussed above, because appellants have not challenged the trial
court’s rulings that the interpretations, conclusions, and
calculations lack foundation.
V.     Saperstein’s Use of Company Funds
       Appellants cite to Saperstein’s deposition and Genre’s and
Elysium’s tax returns in support of their claims that Saperstein
made improper payments to himself and others from Genre’s and
Elysium’s bank accounts. We need not address the propriety of
any such payments because appellants have not shown a nexus
between such payments and respondents’ failure to reimburse
appellants under the investment agreements. As explained
above, under the investment agreements, appellants were
entitled to reimbursement if certain contingencies occurred:
Principal photography on The Blob commenced and/or the other
films at issue generated AGR (assuming appellants elected to
receive reimbursement from AGR, which they did not).
Appellants have not raised a triable issue of material fact that
the contingencies entitling them to reimbursement did not occur
because Saperstein made payments to himself and others from
Genre’s and Elysium’s bank accounts. Appellants cite to no
admissible evidence indicating The Blob was not produced and/or
the other films at issue did not generate AGR because Saperstein
made such payments.

                               36
VI.    Contingent Compensation
       Appellants contend the trial court erred in declining to
consider they are entitled to contingent compensation under the
agreements. As set forth above, appellants’ agreements with
Genre provide that appellants are entitled to receive contingent
compensation, defined as a certain percentage of AGR on Genre’s
films (as specified in each agreement), if any AGR is derived or
received on the films. In the first amended complaint, appellants
allege the specific ways in which they claim respondents
breached the agreements. None of them allege respondents
breached the agreement or the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing by failing to pay contingent compensation. Again,
appellants cite to general allegations in the first amended
complaint that are not related to appellant’s causes of action
against respondents, in arguing they pleaded this theory of
recovery.
       Although appellants ask us to consider their entitlement to
contingent compensation, they do not explain how they could
show a triable issue of material fact warranting our reversal of
the summary judgment motions. Respondents presented
evidence indicating none of the films referenced in the
agreements generated AGR, so appellants are entitled to no
contingent compensation. In their appellate briefing, appellants
do not direct us to any evidence indicating otherwise. “ ‘ “It is not
the function of this court to comb the record looking for the
evidence or absence of evidence to support [a party’s]
argument.” ’ ” (Garcia v. Seacon Logix, Inc., supra, 238
Cal.App.4th at p. 1489.)

                                 37
VII. Abandonment of Production of The Blob
       Appellants contend they have shown a triable issue of
material fact as to whether respondents abandoned production of
The Blob and were required to reimburse appellants’
contributions within a reasonable time thereafter. Appellants do
not point to evidence disputing Saperstein’s statements in his
declaration that Genre is still developing The Blob and “stands
ready to honor the terms” of the agreement if The Blob is
produced and other contingencies occur (the films referenced in
the agreement generate AGR).
       As discussed above, appellants cite the FASB ASC,
providing in pertinent part: “An entity shall periodically review
properties in development to determine whether they will
ultimately be used in the production of a film. It shall be
presumed that an entity will dispose of a property (whether by
sale or abandonment) if it has not been set for production within
three years from the time of the first capitalized transaction.”
(Id. at § 926-20-40-1, bold font omitted.) But appellants do not
explain how these accounting standards relate to respondents’
obligations under the agreements. The agreements expressly
contemplate that The Blob may not be produced, and that the
                                        14
other films may not generate any AGR.

      14
         In their reply brief on appeal, appellants argue there is a
triable issue of material fact as to whether Genre reimbursed
Saro’s contribution by check made payable to his relative, Sam.
We note Saro did not reference the check in his declaration or
state therein that he did not receive the proceeds from the check.
In any event, this fact is immaterial because The Blob has not
been produced, and appellants have not shown the other films

                                 38
      Appellants have not demonstrated any error in the
granting of the summary judgment motions.

                         DISPOSITION
      The judgments are affirmed. Respondents are entitled to
recover costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                           CHANEY, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             BENKE, J.*

generated AGR. Appellants have not shown a triable issue of
material fact that Saro is entitled to reimbursement under the
agreement for the reasons discussed herein.
      *Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fourth
Appellate District, Division One, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                39