Court Opinion

ID: 9771411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:42:36.847216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:00.704631
License: Public Domain

BLACKMAR, Judge,
dissenting.
I do not disagree with the legal principles enunciated in the principal opinion. The St. Louis lawyers, according to the trial court’s findings, withdrew with the assent of their client. They are entitled to recover only in quantum meruit, with their recovery measured by the value of their services to the client. These principles are established in our carefully considered and well reasoned opinions in Craig v. Jo B. Gardner, Inc., *897586 S.W.2d 316 (Mo. banc 1979), and Plaza Shoe Store v. Hermel, Inc., 636 S.W.2d 53 (Mo. banc 1982). I have found no cases from other jurisdictions which enunciate the governing law so clearly.
I am persuaded, however, that the trial judge was quite aware of the governing rules, that he applied them in reaching his judgment, that his finding that the St. Louis lawyers “did contribute to the final victory” is clearly supported by the evidence, that it is a sufficient finding of “value to the client,” and that we may properly dispose of the case without further proceedings.
The principal opinion holds that more findings are necessary. The problem with this disposition is that no additional findings were requested. The trial judge is not obliged to make any findings unless requested. Rule 73.01(a)(2) so provides, and continues as follows:
All fact issues upon which no specific findings are made shall be considered as having been found in accordance with the result reached.
The burden is on the appellants to demonstrate error in the trial court’s judgment. The first step in demonstrating error is a proper brief. We would be entirely justified in dismissing the appeal because of the appellants’ flagrant violation of Rule 8).-04(c). The appellants do not fairly state the facts relevant to the questions to be determined. Their statement sets forth, without qualification, items from their own evidence which the trial court was not obliged to credit. It fails to state the facts which could have been found in support of the judgment. The fault is compounded by the utter absence in the initial brief of any reference to Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30 (Mo. banc 1976), and by citation of pro-Murphy cases. When the respondents protested about the omission, the appellants in their reply brief tendered the wholly unmeritorious proposition that Murphy v. Carron applies only to jury-waived cases, and not to cases of an equitable nature in which there is no jury trial of right. Counsel for the appellants have not provided the professional assistance that the Court has a right to expect. The principal opinion nevertheless indulges them by going beyond their arguments.
By practice long established we confine appellate relief to the points asserted by counsel, unless extraordinary circumstances are present. Of the six points in the appellants’ brief, the only one bearing on the issues dealt with in the principal opinion reads as follows:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING MOVANTS A FEE BASED ON THEIR ALLEGED HOURS WORKED FOR THE REASON THAT THE COURT FAILED TO CALCULATE THE FEE UNDER THE PLAZA SHOE CRITERIA, AS MOVANTS FAILED TO SUBSTANTIATE THEIR CLAIM AND THE TRIAL COURT IGNORED THE FACTOR “RESULTS PRODUCED,” WHICH HERE WERE NEGLIGIBLE.
In arguing this point, the appellants first complain that Wolff reconstructed his records without presenting time sheets. The trial court was satisfied that his hourly claims were accurate. Appellants next argue that no results were achieved because the St. Louis lawyers got no judgment or settlement offer. The balance of the argument simply asks the appellate courts to reweigh the trial court’s determination.
Neither an offer or a judgment was essential to an award in quantum meruit, if the attorneys' services had value. The appellants at trial did not ask for or argue for a determination as to the value of each segment of the attorneys’ efforts. Had they done so, the trial judge would surely have obliged them, or would have stated explicitly what I believe is implicit in his holding, which is that all of the services contributed to the final victory. The appellants do not demonstrate error in the trial court’s findings and conclusions.
The evidence supports a finding that the St. Louis lawyers filed a response in litigation instituted by the opposing party, resisted an application for temporary injunction, undertook discovery, searched through voluminous documents, obtained an important formula under seal which was made available to their successors, filed an *898action in federal court when matters were not moving (as is so often the case) in the Circuit Court of St. Louis County, secured correction in federal court of an improper dismissal with prejudice, and turned their files and discovered documents over to their successors, so as to present them with a lawsuit in place. The trial judge could clearly find that all of these services were necessary in the processing of the litigation and that, because the appellants availed themselves of the benefit of these services, they should be liable in quantum meruit. The trial court could also find that the value of the services to the clients is properly measured by the lawyers’ customary hourly rates. He properly rejected the St. Louis lawyers’ claim for a percentage of the recovery. Considering the trial court’s finding that the services contributed to the result, the fees awarded seem quite modest in view of the settlement amount and the Springfield lawyers’ contingent fee.
So I submit that no remand is necessary or desirable. But if there is to be a remand, it should be free from encumbrances such as the suggestion in the principal opinion that “it is doubtful that the value of the lawyers’ services is one hundred percent of the time spent at the customary hourly fee.” There is no basis for that suggestion, unless we are to usurp the province of the trial judge. As I have said, the record would support a contrary finding, and, by the norms of appellate procedure, we should assume that such a finding has been made. Likewise impertinent is the suggestion that the trial court “will be able, if necessary, to reassess the testimony of the Springfield lawyers ...” that the services of the St. Louis lawyers were without value to them. The trial judge must necessarily have rejected that testimony in finding as he did. I am not aware of local practice on remand. If the case goes back to the same trial judge, then we should not encumber his judgment by suggestions such as this. If a different trial judge is to be named, there would be gross inefficiency which demonstrates the wisdom of following the normal rules of appellate practice.
Inasmuch as the principal opinion undertakes to instruct the trial court about the additional findings which should be made, the instruction should be complete. The trial court should realize that the hourly rate is only one circumstance to be considered, and does not operate as either a ceiling or a floor. Craig, 586 S.W.2d 316, 326 (Mo. banc 1979), is instructive. There the trial court allowed the withdrawing attorneys a percentage of the recovery. The Court found error and determined, ourselves, what a proper award would be. The opinion considered the modest recovery, which did not reward successor counsel very well. Here the recovery is substantial and the successful counsel were well paid. There are circumstances in which a contingency enhancement is appropriate, even when the lawyer has no claim to a percentage of the recovery. See the opinion of Judge John R. Gibson in Morris v. American National Can Corp., 952 F.2d 200, 204-07 (8th Cir.1991). The court, in determining the value of the services to the clients in this case, is quite entitled to consider the gross recovery in excess of $2,000,000 and the length of time between the rendition of the services and the termination of the case. The present award seems quite reasonable to me, based on the factors the trial judge could have considered.
An example might clarify my conception of what the trial judge found. After discovery in the state court phase of the St. Louis action came to a halt because of constant objections and the trial judge’s delay in ruling, the plaintiffs filed suit in federal court. That suit presented a jurisdictional problem which was initially ruled favorably to the plaintiff. After considerable discovery had been had, the federal judge reversed his position and dismissed the suit. The trial judge well could find that this abortive suit served as a vehicle for discovery which was of value in obtaining the final result. He should not be obliged to disallow compensation for detours and misadventures, such as the substantial time required in briefing the jurisdictional issue, or time required in obtaining continuances, even though tangible val*899ue cannot be demonstrated in the time so spent. The case is overwhelming for a finding that all services contributed to the settlement.
I also believe that it is inappropriate here to lecture counsel about the desirability of prior counsel and successor counsel reaching an agreement. I do not dispute the abstract proposition, but it has no pertinence to this case. Nor is the comment that the Springfield lawyers “drove a hard bargain” in order. They were asked to make a massive commitment of time to a lawsuit which, at the time, might have appeared to have very doubtful prospects. There is no indication that other lawyers were willing to make this commitment. The new counsel properly bargained with appellants and their regular corporate counsel about the contingency percentage appropriate to the undertaking. At the time, they apparently had no contact with the St. Louis lawyers, but expressed concern about the fee that would be due their predecessors. It was entirely appropriate under these circumstances for the clients to agree, with input from their corporate counsel, that they would be responsible for any fees owed to the St. Louis lawyers. It is not necessary for the principal opinion even to suggest that the St. Louis lawyers might have a claim against the Springfield lawyers. The clients demanded that the St. Louis lawyers turn over their entire work product, and surely are liable for compensation to the extent that this product had value, as the trial court found it did.
There is another problem with the principal opinion. Although judges do not have to make findings in court-tried cases unless requested, I think that it is desirable that they do so. When I practiced, I appreciated judges who were willing to explain their rulings. Here the trial court made findings which are legally correct, and sufficient to support the judgment. Now he is told that they are “incomplete,” even though no further findings were requested. Trial judges will take the hint, and will elect to say nothing except “judgment for the plaintiff” or “judgment for the defendant.” The word will get out that they are in trouble if they say too much. This is not desirable.
We should finally dispose of cases and issues on appeal, if this is possible. Remands should be ordered only when strictly necessary. Helm v. Wismar, 820 S.W.2d 495 (Mo. banc 1991). Here the record amply supports the judgment rendered, as against any challenge made by the appellants either in the trial court or on appeal. The remand is an unwise departure from the normal course of appellate practice.
I would affirm.