Court Opinion

ID: 9759299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:11:38.418363+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:00.950289
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
The Court adheres to our traditional rule under Article I, § 14, as to when jeopardy attaches in a bench trial. See at 420. While joining that reaffirmation, I deem it appropriate to address some ancillary problems presented in the trial proceedings after appellee pled not guilty to the charging instrument.
The rule is particularly applicable here in that after denying the motion to amend the trial court invited the State to present its evidence;1 the prosecutor responded the State had no evidence.2 The judge then inquired whether the State was “thereby dismissing at this time,” and the prosecutor replied it was. Asked if he had any objection, defense counsel said he had none, but pointed out jeopardy had attached and added that “the State understands they’ll not refile on these charges.” The judge then pronounced the judgment of the court: “The case is hereby dismissed for want of prosecution.”3
*423Regardless of the prosecutor’s concern about the numerical designation of the court ordering issuance of the arrest warrant, the fact is that the indictment alleged an offense and thus was a “valid” charging instrument. Jeopardy having attached, once the State opted not to present evidence but instead moved to dismiss and the court did effectively dismiss the criminal action, Article I, § 14, barred a second prosecution for the same offense. Rameriz v. State, 171 Tex.Cr.R. 507, 352 S.W.2d 131 (1961); see McClendon v. State, supra; McLelland v. State, 420 S.W.2d 417 (Tex.Cr.App.1967); see also Collins v. State, 429 S.W.2d 650 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th] 1968), no writ.
Accordingly, I join the judgment of the Court.

.Under the federal Double Jeopardy Clause jeopardy attaches in a bench trial when the judge begins to receive evidence. United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 569, 97 S.Ct. 1349, 1353, 51 L.Ed.2d 642, 650 (1977); Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388, 95 S.Ct. 1055, 1062, 43 L.Ed.2d 265, 274 (1975); McCarthy v. Zerbst, 85 F.2d 640, 642 (CA 10 1936).

. At that point, in my judgment, appellee was entitled to a finding of not guilty and a judgment of acquittal. Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P. Although it formerly embraced only pleas of guilty and nolo contendere, since 1966 the statute is applicable as well to a plea of not guilty. Thus it is incumbent upon the State "to introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant!)]" When the State failed to discharge its burden to prove allegations in the indictment, the trial court had no alternative but to acquit appellee. See McClendon v. State, 583 S.W.2d 777, at 779-780 (Tex.Cr.App.1979).

. The common law provides no authority and there is none in the code of criminal procedure for a trial court to dismiss a criminal action for "want of prosecution." At common law only the prosecuting attorney is empowered to nolle *423pros. State v. Anderson, District Judge, 119 Tex. 110, 26 S.W.2d 174, at 176-178 (1930); see Black’s Law Dictionary (Revised Fourth Edition 1968) 1198. By its 1876 enactment of the predecessor statute to Article 32.02, V.A.C.C.P., the Legislature conferred upon district courts no more than “a veto power upon the action of the district attorney;" it did not grant courts independent power to dismiss a criminal action. State v. Anderson, supra, 26 S.W.2d at 178-179; Malley v. State, 125 Tex.Cr.R. 625, 69 S.W.2d 765, at 766 (1934); accord: Wallace v. State, 145 Tex.Cr.R. 625, 170 S.W.2d 762, at 761 (1943) (power of dismissal rests primarily in initiative of prosecuting attorney, requiring consent of presiding judge of court).