Court Opinion

ID: 9797976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:33:33.373241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:59:58.777876
License: Public Domain

PICKARD, Judge (dissenting). {19} I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. Although the majority recognizes the State’s “persuasive policy arguments,” it rejects the State’s conclusion that the guards are school employees covered by Section 30-3-9 on two primary grounds-the first based on the various technical, legal tests utilized in employment law and the second based on the notion that the Legislature could have been more explicit. In my view, neither of these grounds has merit. {20} The State’s policy arguments rely on the purpose of the enactment of Section 30-3-9, entitled “An Act Relating to Public School Violence ...1989 N.M. Laws eh. 344, § 1, which is to lessen violence at schools by providing enhancement of penalties when the offense is committed against certain people, including “school employee[s],” who are further defined as “employees of [the school] board.” In contrast to the majority’s defining “employees” with reference to technical employment law, and thereby excluding GSS’s guards from the statute’s coverage, I would first utilize ordinary dictionary definitions in my search for plain meaning. {21} According to Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 743 (1966), an “employee” is “one employed by another.” “Employ” in turn includes “to use or engage the services of.” Under this definition, the guards could be considered to be employed by the board. And because so considering them would afford them the measure of protection that the Legislature obviously intended, I would hold that the dictionary definition is the appropriate one to use when considering whether a battery on GSS’s guards should be covered by Section 30-3-9. Cf. Ogden, 118 N.M. at 242-46, 880 P.2d at 853-857 (holding that a community service officer is a peace officer for purposes of death penalty aggravating circumstances because “peace officer” is not specifically defined in the death penalty statute and that statute’s purpose is to provide an additional measure of protection to people who enforce the law). {22} The second rationale advanced by the majority is that the “Legislature could have chosen to expand the definition of school employee, but it did not.” Majority opinion, ¶ 12. Yet, we must recognize that “[o]ur ultimate goal in statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature. It is the high duty and responsibility of the judicial branch of government to facilitate and promote the legislature’s accomplishment of its purpose.” State v. Smith, 2004-NMSC-032, ¶ 8, 136 N.M. 372, 98 P.3d 1022 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In construing statutes, we “will not construe a statute to defeat the intended purpose____Rather, statutes are to be interpreted in order to facilitate their operation and the achievement of their goals. We also have the duty to recognize what is necessarily implicit in the statutory language.” Padilla v. Montano, 116 N.M. 398, 403, 862 P.2d 1257, 1262 (Ct.App.1993) (citations omitted). Based on these authorities, the guards who are hired by the school to help maintain order, whether they are direct employees of the school or of a company that contracts with the school, seem to be deserving of the protection afforded by Section 30-3-9. The fact that the guards are employed by GSS does not, to me, mean that they cannot also be school employees under Section 30-3-9. {23} I would hold that the district court erred in dismissing the charges against Defendant.