Court Opinion

ID: 9926169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 22:03:20.455151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:07.717844
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                          2024 IL App (3d) 230580-U

                                 Order filed January 22, 2024
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                     IN THE

                                     APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                               THIRD DISTRICT

                                                      2024

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                         )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                          )       of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                                         )       Will County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                         )
                                                         )       Appeal No. 3-23-0580
             v.                                          )       Circuit No. 23-CF-1963
                                                         )
      TREVONN JAHEIM LAVELLE WALKER,                     )       Honorable
                                                         )       Donald DeWilkins,
             Defendant-Appellant.                        )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment.
            Presiding Justice McDade dissented.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   ORDER

¶1          Held:    The court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s petition to deny pretrial
                    release.

¶2          Defendant, Trevonn Jaheim Lavelle Walker, was charged on October 27, 2023, with

     aggravated unlawful use of a weapon (AUUW) (720 ILCS 5/24-1.6(a)(1), (d)(1) (West 2022)) and

     unlawful possession of a weapon by a felon (UUWF) (id. § 24-1.1(a), (e)). The State filed a

     verified petition to deny pretrial release, alleging defendant was charged with a nonprobationable
     offense, and his release posed a real and present threat to the safety of any person, persons, or the

     community under section 110-6.1(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963 (725 ILCS

     5/110-6.1(a)(1) (West 2022)).

¶3                                           I. BACKGROUND

¶4           The State’s factual basis provided that three police officers were inside an unmarked squad

     car when they observed four individuals walk into traffic, causing a vehicle to stop abruptly. The

     officers approached the individuals, and three of them stopped. However, defendant fled on foot.

     During the chase, defendant dropped a loaded nine-millimeter handgun. The handgun had a round

     in the chamber. Defendant was stopped and arrested soon after dropping the firearm. Defendant

     admitting that he borrowed the firearm from a friend for protection. Defendant had been placed on

     probation on August 16, 2023, for AUUW. The pretrial risk assessment indicated that he was a

     Level 2 risk (with Level 6 being the highest).

¶5          A hearing was held on the petition on October 27, 2023. The court asked both parties if

     they were going to provide any evidence other than what had been presented in the proffer, and

     they both said no. The State argued that defendant had access to a firearm, was a felon, was on

     probation, and stated, “I posit the defendant is a threat to the community when he was told several

     times not to have a gun and still maintained to have one. He doesn’t listen to court orders as

     evidenced by the fact that he was just placed on probation and now has a gun again.” Defense

     counsel stated that defendant’s previous AUUW was his only other felony, and argued defendant

     was not a threat to anyone. Counsel asked that defendant be placed on electronic monitoring. The

     court granted the State’s petition, finding that it met its burden by clear and convincing evidence.

     The court stated,

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            “The Court finds the State has met their burden by clear and convincing evidence

            that the defendant poses a real and present threat to the safety of the community by

            his conduct.

                    So that leaves the Court, whether or not there’s *** conditions that the Court

            can put in place *** that can mitigate the real present threat and the safety of the

            community.

                    All right. The Court finds the State has met their burden by clear and

            convincing evidence that there are no conditions that can be met that would mitigate

            the real present danger for the following reasons: The nature and circumstances of

            the offense charged being two counts *** of [AUUW] and [UUWF] and both of

            the matters being non-probationable. The history of the defendant, while the

            defendant, and I will acknowledge ***, he does not have a long history. The

            problem is this history is for the same thing that he’s now on probation for. The

            Court has to take that into consideration. The Court also takes into consideration in

            its decision he was possessing a weapon, a firearm when he was specifically

            ordered not to possess a weapon and, also, the fact that the defendant is presently

            on probation for the same charge and picked up another offense.

                    The Court finds that there’s no combination of offense of commissions that

            can mitigate the real present danger to the community in this matter.”

¶6   The written court form stated,

            “The Court’s reasons for concluding that the Defendant should be denied pre-trial

            release and why less restrictive conditions would not avoid a real and present threat

            to the safety of any person or persons or the community, based on the specific

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                    articulable facts of the case, or prevent the Defendant’s willful flight from

                    prosecution are based upon the following[.]”

     The court checked the boxes next to the nature and circumstances of the offense(s) charged;

     defendant’s prior criminal history indicative of violent, abusive, or assaultive behavior; defendant

     is known to possess or have access to weapons; and at the time of the offense, defendant was on

     probation.

¶7                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶8          On appeal, defendant contends that the court abused its discretion in granting the petition

     to detain. Specifically, he argues the court “overestimated [his] alleged dangerousness and ***

     erroneously focused on generic factors inherent in the offense rather than individualized factors

     required by the statute.” We consider factual findings for the manifest weight of the evidence, but

     the ultimate decision to grant or deny the State’s petition to detain is considered for an abuse of

     discretion. People v. Trottier, 2023 IL App (2d) 230317, ¶ 13. Under either standard, we consider

     whether the court’s determination is arbitrary or unreasonable. Id.; see also People v. Horne, 2023

     IL App (2d) 230382, ¶ 19.

¶9          Everyone charged with an offense is eligible for pretrial release, which may only be denied

     in certain situations. 725 ILCS 5/110-2(a), 110-6.1 (West 2022). The State must file a verified

     petition requesting the denial of pretrial release. Id. § 110-6.1. The State then has the burden of

     proving by clear and convincing evidence (1) the proof is evident or presumption great that

     defendant committed a detainable offense, (2) defendant poses a real and present threat to any

     person, persons, or the community or is a flight risk, and (3) no conditions could mitigate this

     threat or risk of flight. Id. § 110-6.1(e). When determining a defendant’s dangerousness and the

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       conditions of release, the statute includes a nonexhaustive list of factors the court can consider.

       Id. §§ 110-6.1(g), 110-5.

¶ 10          We find that the court did not err in granting the State’s petition. As stated above, the statute

       includes a list of factors the court can consider when determining a defendant’s dangerousness and

       the conditions of release. The oral and written findings of the court show that it considered these

       factors. Moreover, the court’s oral pronouncement shows that it did more than provide “lip

       service” to the factors, but instead applied them to the facts of defendant’s case. While defendant

       may believe his dangerousness was “overestimated,” he was a felon, was in possession of a loaded

       firearm with a bullet in the chamber, and was on probation for the same offense. Further, defendant

       had been on probation for only approximately two months before violating his probation by

       committing this offense. As the State argued, defendant was unlikely to listen to a court order of

       conditions. Therefore, the court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s petition.

¶ 11                                            III. CONCLUSION

¶ 12          The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

¶ 13          Affirmed.

¶ 14          PRESIDING JUSTICE McDade, dissenting:

¶ 15          I dissent from the decision of the majority affirming the circuit court’s grant of the State’s

       petition to deny pretrial release for this defendant.

¶ 16          Even assuming that the State met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence

       that Walker posed a “real and present threat to any person, persons, or the community” (725 ILCS

       5/110-6.1(e)), the State presented no evidence at all on its burden that no conditions could mitigate

       that threat. The statute clearly requires the State to provide evidence on all three elements; proof

       of the second element is not proof of the third element. See id. Excusing the State’s burden of

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proof on the third element is to act inconsistent with the statute’s explicit presumption in favor of

pretrial release. Id. § 110-2(a). Under these circumstances, I would reverse the circuit court’s

decision.

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