Court Opinion

ID: 9374225
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 17:07:42.868104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:45.652868
License: Public Domain

J-S42019-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN RE: THE ESTATE OF ANGELA                :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    DIMATTEO                                   :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: SILVIA DIMATTEO,                :
    ENRICO DIMATTEO, AND ROSSELLA              :
    DIMATTEO                                   :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 363 WDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered March 2, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
                           No(s): No. 02-18-6412

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                            FILED: FEBRUARY 22, 2023

        Appellants, Silvia DiMatteo, Enrico DiMatteo, and Rosella DiMatteo

(Appellants), appeal from the order entered on March 2, 2022, setting aside

a conveyance of real property from the estate of Angela DiMatteo to

Appellants, following the prior removal of Casimiro DiMatteo (Casimiro) as

executor of the estate.1 We affirm.

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1  Casimiro and Silvia DiMatteo are married; Enrico and Rosella DiMatteo are
their adult children. Angela DiMatteo was Casimiro’s mother. Casimiro, in
his own right, separately appealed the March 2, 2022 order voiding the sale
of the property at issue herein. That appeal is docketed in this Court at 362
WDA 2022. The trial court issued a separate opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) on May 31, 2022, that specifically addressed the issues pertaining to
Casimiro. On September 12, 2022, this Court received correspondence from
Casimiro’s attorney stating that Casimiro “joins in the brief and argument
presented by Appellants” but he would “not be filing a brief or participating in
oral arguments.” Correspondence, 9/11/2022, at *1.
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     We briefly set forth the facts and procedural history of this case as

follows. On September 25, 2013, Angela DiMatteo executed a last will and

testament naming Casimiro as executor of her estate. The will further stated

that, should Casimiro be unable to serve as executor, then his wife, Silvia

Collucio DiMatteo, should serve in his stead.    On October 5, 2018, Angela

DiMatteo died.   On October 18, 2018, letters testamentary were issued to

Casimiro.   On December 12, 2019, Annina Radakovich DiMatteo, Angela

DiMatteo’s daughter and one of the other heirs to the estate, filed a petition

to compel Casimiro to file an accounting of the estate. Thereafter,

     [a]lmost a year later, during a conference with the orphans' court,
     the parties reached a consent order, dated January 20, 2021, and
     recorded January 25, 2021. In relevant part, it required that
     Bodnar Real Estate perform an appraisal of the real estate at 412
     Pearl Street, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania (“Pearl Street property”)
     within 30 days. Additionally, Casimiro was to file state and federal
     fiduciary tax returns within 30 days after he received the last 1099
     for estate income, receipt of which was to be provided to all
     counsel. Casimiro was then to file a formal first and final account
     within 30 days after the tax returns were filed.

     On February 12, 2021, before [the arrival of Casimiro’s deadline]
     to comply with [the consent] order, Annina filed an emergency
     petition to remove [Appellant] as executor. Annina claimed that
     Casimiro failed to adhere to the terms of the consent order, filed
     a $180,000[.00] claim with the estate for caretaking services,
     transferred the Pearl Street property from the estate to his wife
     and children for one dollar, and filed a claim for an executor's fee.
     Additionally, as a result of Casimiro’s actions and failure to adhere
     to legal advice, his counsel sought permission to withdraw.
     Casimiro filed a pro se response to Annina's petition.

     On February 19, 2021, the orphans' court granted counsel's
     request. Following a hearing on Annina's emergency petition, the
     court also revoked the letters testamentary issued to Casimiro and
     directed that Warner Mariani, Esquire, be appointed administrator

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     of the Estate of Angela DiMatteo upon proper application to the
     Wills Division of the Allegheny County Department of Court
     Records.

     Notably, the orphans' court bypassed the substitute executrix
     named in Ms. DiMatteo's Will, Casimiro’s wife Silvia, because of
     her participation in [the transfer of] property from the estate to
     herself and [her] children.

In re Est. of DiMatteo, 272 A.3d 486, at *1-2 (Pa. Super. 2022)

(unpublished memorandum).

     Casimiro challenged his removal as executor in a prior appeal to this

Court. Ultimately, we affirmed Casimiro’s removal as executor and approved

the appointment of Attorney Mariani as successor. See id. More specifically,

and important to the current appeal, this Court determined:

     Shortly after issuance of the consent order, Casimiro sent a family
     settlement agreement to the other beneficiaries proposing to
     distribute the remaining Estate assets, apparently to resolve [the
     distribution of the estate] informally. He filed a status report
     indicating that the administration of the Estate was complete. He
     did this despite being directed by the orphans' court to obtain an
     appraisal of the Pearl Street property and to file a formal account.

     Additionally, Casimiro created a substantial conflict of interest
     with his fiduciary duties as executor of the Estate, when he
     claimed the Estate owed him $180,000[.00] for taking care of his
     mother prior to her death.

                         *            *           *

     Furthermore, Casimiro engaged in self-dealing by paying his
     caretaking claim out of the Estate and transferring the Pearl Street
     property to his wife and children. We [] therefore conclude[d] that
     the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing Casimiro as
     executor of the Estate.

                         *            *           *

     [Moreover], the orphans' court explained that Silvia clearly was
     aligned with her husband by advancing his position that he was

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       entitled to payment for caretaker services and accepting the
       transfer of the property. Casimiro had conveyed a valuable parcel
       of real estate from the estate to his wife and children for the
       nominal consideration of one dollar. Silvia's participation in that
       conveyance severely compromised her fitness to serve as a
       successor executrix.

Id. at *3 (quotations, case citations, and original brackets omitted).          No

further appeal resulted.

       On December 21, 2022, Attorney Mariani, as successor executor, filed

a petition to revoke the conveyance of the Pearl Street property to Appellants.

On March 1, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the petition to revoke. At

that hearing, Casimiro appeared but did not testify and, instead, invoked his

right against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment of the United

States Constitution. Appellants also attended the hearing, but did not testify

or otherwise present evidence.         On March 2, 2022, the trial court entered an

order voiding the sale of the Pearl Street property to Appellants. This appeal

resulted.2

       On appeal, Appellants raise the following issues for our review:

____________________________________________

2  Appellants filed a notice of appeal on March 31, 2022. On April 7, 2022, the
trial court directed Appellants to file a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellants complied timely on
April 25, 2022. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
on May 31, 2022.

Finally, we note that upon review of the certified record, the trial court
subsequently approved the sale of the Pearl Street property to an independent
third-party by order entered on May 18, 2022. Neither Casimirio nor
Appellants appealed that decision.

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        I.    Whether the trial court’s issuance of an order revoking
              conveyance of real property by the former executor of the
              estate constituted a surcharge action[?]

       II.    If a surcharge action, whether the trial court erred as a
              matter of law and fact and abused its discretion in issuing
              the order revoking conveyance of real property without
              giving any interested party an opportunity to be heard and
              without taking any evidence[?]

      III.    If not a surcharge action, whether the trial court erred as a
              matter of law and fact and abused its discretion in issuing
              the order revoking conveyance of real property without
              giving any interested party an opportunity to be heard and
              without taking any evidence[?]

       IV.    Whether the order revoking conveyance of real property by
              the former executor of the estate was a denial of the claim
              filed against the estate[?]

        V.    If the order was a denial of the claim, whether the trial court
              erred as a matter of law and fact and abused its discretion
              in issuing an order revoking conveyance of real property by
              the former executor of the estate, thus denying the claim
              filed against the estate that the conveyance satisfied,
              without giving any interested party an opportunity to be
              heard and without taking any evidence[?]

Appellants’ Brief at 3-4 (complete capitalization omitted).3

       In their first issue presented, Appellants argue that the trial court’s

revocation of the conveyance of real property by the former executor,

Casimiro, constituted a surcharge action.        Id. at 8-9.    More specifically,

Appellants suggest that “when the executor of an estate fails to fulfill his

____________________________________________

3  Initially, we note that Appellants concede that issues four and five as set
forth above are both moot. See Appellants’ Brief at 8 and 14-15. As such,
we need not address the merits of those claims.

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fiduciary duty of care, the court may impose a surcharge against him.” Id. at

9 (case citations omitted). Appellants claim that, because the transfer of the

Pearl Street property constituted a “settlement of a claim made partially by”

Casimiro for alleged services rendered to the decedent, the court’s revocation

of the sale was a surcharge. Id.

      We adhere to the following standard of review:

      When reviewing a decree entered by the Orphans' Court, this
      Court must determine whether the record is free from legal error
      and [whether] the trial court's factual findings are supported by
      the evidence. Because the Orphans' Court sits as the fact-finder,
      it determines the credibility of the witnesses and, on review, this
      Court will not reverse the trial court's credibility determinations
      absent an abuse of discretion.

In re Est. of Aiello, 993 A.2d 283, 287 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

      Primarily, the trial court noted that Appellants stated, in their concise

statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), “that the first two matters

complained of [were] only pertinent if the order of court that revoked the

conveyance of real estate between the estate and [Appellants] constituted a

surcharge action” but “[b]ecause that order did not involve a surcharge[,]”

the trial court did not address those issues. Trial Court Opinion, 5/31/2022,

at 3-4.

      Our Supreme Court has explained that “the power to set aside” an estate

administrator’s sale of real property “is delimited by Section 3360” of the

Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries Code. Est. of Bosico, 412 A.2d 505, 506

(Pa. 1980), citing 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3360. More specifically, under Section 3360:

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      (a) Inadequacy of consideration or better offer.--When a personal
      representative shall make a contract not requiring approval of
      court, or when the court shall approve a contract of a personal
      representative requiring approval of the court, neither inadequacy
      of consideration, nor the receipt of an offer to deal on other terms
      shall, except as otherwise agreed by the parties, relieve the
      personal representative of the obligation to perform his contract
      or shall constitute ground for any court to set aside the contract,
      or to refuse to enforce it by specific performance or otherwise:
      Provided, That this subsection shall not affect or change the
      inherent right of the court to set aside a contract for fraud,
      accident or mistake. Nothing in this subsection shall affect
      the liability of a personal representative for surcharge on
      the ground of negligence or bad faith in making a contract.

20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3360(a) (emphasis added). “[A]bsent a showing of fraud, if

an administrator fails to comply with his fiduciary duties in a manner

evidencing neglect or bad faith, the remedy of surcharge is available under

Section 3360.”     Est. of Bosico, 412 A.2d at 507.         “The intent of the

legislature in enacting this statute was to prevent courts from [assuming] the

position of [a] super executor/administrator, and to leave essentially private

transactions in the hands of the individuals involved.” In re Est. of Hughes,

538 A.2d 470, 472 (Pa. 1988) (citation omitted).

      This Court has further explained:

      An executor, as a fiduciary of the estate, is required to use such
      common skill, prudence and caution as a prudent man, under
      similar circumstances, would exercise in connection with the
      management of his own estate. [….A] surcharge may be imposed
      on the executor to compensate the estate for any losses incurred
      by the executor's lack of due care. When seeking to impose a
      surcharge against an executor for the mismanagement of an
      estate, those who seek the surcharge bear the burden of proving
      the executor's wrongdoing.       However, where a significant
      discrepancy appears on the face of the record, the burden shifts

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      to the executor to present exculpatory evidence and thereby avoid
      the surcharge.

In re Est. of Geniviva, 675 A.2d 306, 310–311 (Pa. Super. 1996) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

      Whereas,

      this Court has recognized the rule forbidding an executor from
      placing his own interests ahead of the interests of other
      beneficiaries:

         An executor is a fiduciary no less than is a trustee and, as
         such, primarily owes a duty of loyalty to a beneficiary of his
         trust. Executors, as well as other fiduciaries, are under an
         obligation to make full disclosure to beneficiaries respecting
         their rights and to deal with them with utmost fairness.

      The Supreme Court has elaborated accordingly that:

         He that is entrusted with the interest of others, cannot be
         allowed to make the business an object of interest to
         himself; because from the frailty of nature, one who has the
         power will be too readily seized with the inclination to use
         the opportunity for serving his own interest at the expense
         of others for whom he is entrusted.

      Thus, the rule forbidding self-dealing serves both to shield the
      estate and its beneficiaries and ensures the propriety of the
      executor's conduct. Consequently, the rule is inflexible, without
      regard to the consideration paid, or the honesty of intent.

In re Est. of Walter, 191 A.3d 873, 881 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal

quotations, citations, and original brackets omitted).

      “Where there is self-dealing on the part of a fiduciary, it is immaterial

to the question of his liability in the premises whether he acted without

fraudulent intent or whether the price received for his sale of trust property

was fair and adequate.” In re Noonan's Est., 63 A.2d 80, 84 (Pa. 1949)

(citation omitted).   “[T]he situation is no different where the breach consists

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of the fiduciary's marked preference of a third person over the beneficiary in

respect of a disposition of estate property.”         Id.   “As in the case of

self-dealing, such conduct constitutes a violation of the fiduciary's basic duty

to the beneficiary.”   Id.   (citation omitted).   “In the case of an offending

fiduciary, if the trust property which he improperly sold is held by or for him,

the remedy is a direct setting aside of the sale upon attack by one having

standing to complain, e.g., a testamentary beneficiary or cestui que trust.”

Id. (citation omitted; emphasis added).

      Within the context of a prior appeal, this Court determined that

Casimiro’s conveyance of the Pearl Street property to Appellants for nominal

consideration constituted an act of self-dealing and, thus, a breach of his

duties to other beneficiaries of the estate. This prior determination constitutes

the law of the case, which this Court has previously explained as follows:

      The law of the case doctrine refers to a family of rules which
      embody the concept that a court involved in the later phases of a
      litigated matter should not reopen questions decided by another
      judge of that same court or by a higher court in the earlier phases
      of the matter.... The various rules which make up the law of the
      case doctrine serve not only to promote the goal of judicial
      economy ... but also operate (1) to protect the settled
      expectations of the parties; (2) to insure uniformity of decisions;
      (3) to maintain consistency during the course of a single case; (4)
      to effectuate the proper and streamlined administration of justice;
      and (5) to bring litigation to an end.

      Thus, under the doctrine of the law of the case,

         when an appellate court has considered and decided a
         question submitted to it upon appeal, it will not, upon a
         subsequent appeal on another phase of the case, reverse its
         previous ruling even though convinced it was erroneous.
         This rule has been adopted and frequently applied in our

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         own [Commonwealth]. It is not, however, inflexible. It does
         not have the finality of the doctrine of res judicata. “The
         prior ruling may have been followed as the law of the case
         but there is a difference between such adherence and res
         judicata; one directs discretion, and the other supercedes
         [sic] it and compels judgment. In other words, in one it is
         a question of power, in the other of submission.” The rule
         of the “law of the case” is one largely of convenience and
         public policy, both of which are served by stability in judicial
         decisions, and it must be accommodated to the needs of
         justice by the discriminating exercise of judicial power.

Neidert v. Charlie, 143 A.3d 384, 390–391 (Pa. Super. 2016) (internal

citations omitted).

      Here, the trial court first recognized that “Appellants fail to consider that

the matter of Casimiro’s conduct as an executor including, specifically, the

transfer [of] the Pearl Street property to [Appellants] for de minimus

consideration has already been addressed by” this Court in our January 2022

decision wherein a prior panel “concluded that Casimiro’s conduct constituted

self-dealing which warranted his removal from the position as executor.” Trial

Court Opinion, 5/31/2022, at 4. It further opined:

      In the matter at hand, Casimiro had transferred the property to
      [Appellants] for token consideration, engaging in a degree of
      self-dealing that severely compromised estate assets. Indeed,
      even if it were determined that Casimiro’s conduct had not been
      prompted by self-interest but had merely been an occasion of
      misapprehending the duties and functions of an executor, the
      transaction was so extraordinarily inconsistent with the proper
      function of an executor and competent administration of estate
      assets that neither Casimiro nor Silvia could be entrusted to
      administer the estate in forthright, competent fashion.

Id. at 4-5.

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      Having already determined, in a prior appeal, that Casimiro engaged in

self-dealing by paying his alleged caretaking claim out of the estate and

transferring the Pearl Street property to Appellants and that this conveyance

constituted a substantial conflict of interest with his fiduciary duties as

executor of the estate, we discern no trial court abuse of discretion in setting

aside the property sale.   We are bound by the prior panel’s determination

under the law of the case doctrine.   Through self-dealing, Casimiro’s conduct

constituted a violation of his basic duty as fiduciary to the beneficiaries.

Therefore, as set forth at length above, the proper remedy was to set aside

the property sale. Moreover, we note that the orphans’ court never ordered

Casimiro to pay a penalty as punishment for improper fiduciary conduct.

Accordingly, we reject Appellants’ suggestion that the court’s remedy

constituted a surcharge. Hence, Appellants are not entitled to relief on their

first claim.

      Next, in their second and third issues presented on appeal, which we

examine together, Appellants argue that the trial court erred as a matter of

law or abused its discretion in revoking the conveyance of real property

without giving any interested party an opportunity to be heard and without

taking any evidence.    Appellants’ Brief at 10.     Appellants complain that

“before the court can impose a surcharge, it must give the executor an

opportunity to be heard.” Id. (case citation omitted). Appellants maintain

that the trial court could not determine whether the parties met their burdens

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of proof without gathering and weighing evidence at a hearing and the

arguments of counsel cannot be used as a substitute.            Id. at 11-12.

Appellants suggest that the trial court’s “rationale appears to be that any

action of the [t]rial [c]ourt is justified when an executor is removed.” Id. at

13-14. Appellants concede that “the conveyance of the [Pearl Street property]

look[ed] like text-book self-dealing” by Casimiro, but they argue that

proffered evidence established that he was acting to benefit the estate while

executor. Id. at 13.

      We adhere to the following standards:

      A question regarding whether a due process violation occurred is
      a question of law for which the standard of review is de novo and
      the scope of review is plenary. Due process requires that the
      litigants receive notice of the issues before the court and an
      opportunity to present their case in relation to those issues. It is
      well settled that procedural due process requires, at its core,
      adequate notice, opportunity to be heard, and the chance to
      defend oneself before a fair and impartial tribunal having
      jurisdiction over the case.

Int. of S.L., 202 A.3d 723, 729 (Pa. Super. 2019) (internal citations and

quotations omitted”). “Due process requires only that a party be provided an

opportunity to be heard; it does not confer an absolute right to be heard.”

Captline v. County of Allegheny, 718 A.2d 273, 275 (Pa. 1998) (citations

omitted).

      Appellants’ claims presume that the revocation of the transfer of the

Pearl Street property constituted a surcharge action and that, within the

context of such a proceeding, they were entitled to, but denied, certain

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procedural rights such as notice, opportunity to be heard, and the chance to

present evidence. As set forth above, we have rejected Appellants’ suggestion

that a surcharge was imposed or that surcharge was the appropriate remedy

for the improper sale of the property at issue. Furthermore, as the trial court

properly observed, “[o]n March 1, 2022, Casimiro was given the opportunity

to present testimony regarding his claim and conduct as [e]xecutor” but,

instead, “invoke[ed] his right against self-incrimination under the Fifth and

Fourteen Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, declin[ing] to

testify regarding either matter.”      Trial Court Opinion, 5/31/2022, at 6.

Further, the orphans’ court rejected the argument “that [Casimiro] had been

denied an opportunity to be heard” since such a contention conflicted “with

his filing of a thirty-eight[-]page response, inclusive of exhibits, in advance of

the March 1[, 2022] hearing and his subsequent assertion of a right not to

testify at the hearing.”   Id.   Upon review, we agree with the trial court’s

assessment. Casimiro was given the opportunity to be heard at the March 1,

2022 hearing, which was convened on the successor administrator’s petition

to revoke the conveyance of the Pearl Street property. There is no dispute

that Casimiro received notice of the issues before the court (i.e. the proposed

revocation of the property sale) and was given an opportunity to present his

case in relation to those issues but, ultimately, he invoked his right not to

testify and did not avail himself of the opportunity to contest the

administrator’s contentions.      See N.T., 3/1/2022, at 20.        Furthermore,

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Appellants were present, and represented by counsel, at the March 1, 2022

hearing on the proposed revocation. See id. at 17. Counsel for Appellants

argued that surcharge was the appropriate remedy and requested a separate

surcharge hearing. Id. at 7. As explained at length above, however, we have

already rejected Appellants’ argument regarding surcharge.        Furthermore,

upon further review of the certified record, Appellants did not testify, present

evidence, or otherwise complain that they were denied due process at the

March 1, 2022 hearing on the proposed revocation. Accordingly, for all of the

foregoing reasons, Appellants are not entitled to relief on their second and

third appellate issues.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/22/2023

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