Court Opinion

ID: 9366002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-25 17:07:54.810668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:48.688686
License: Public Domain

J-A24040-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    CHARLES L. TRAMEL                          :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 381 EDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 20, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-09-CR-0004082-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.:                           FILED JANUARY 25, 2023

        Charles Tramel (“Tramel”) appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following his convictions for persons not to possess a firearm and

related offenses.1 We affirm.

        The trial court set forth the following factual and procedural history:

              On July 9, 2020, [Tramel] was observed operating a white
        Dodge Caravan driving on Rockhill Drive in Bensalem by Officer
        Robert Schwarting.       Officer Schwarting noticed [Tramel]
        repeatedly moving toward the center console of the vehicle. In
        accordance with standard procedure, Officer Schwarting ran the
        vehicle’s registration through National Criminal Intelligence
        Center (“NCIC”) which revealed the owner of the vehicle was a
        male born in 1975 with dark hair and brown eyes and that the
        owner had a suspended driver’s license. Upon viewing [Tramel]
        looking in his rearview mirror while traveling behind the vehicle
        and observing the vehicle make a left turn, Officer Schwarting
        determined the driver was more likely than not the registered
        owner of the vehicle.

____________________________________________

1   See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(a)(1).
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            Officer Schwarting activated his emergency siren and lights,
     prompting [Tramel] to pull the vehicle over into the horizontal
     double yellow striped median area between the two opposite
     travel lanes of traffic. The median area was located shortly before
     a left-hand turning lane leading into a business or shopping center
     area. When [Tramel] lowered the vehicle’s window, Officer
     Schwarting immediately detected a strong odor of marijuana.
     [Tramel] acknowledged he was the owner of the vehicle and that
     he had a suspended license.

           Officer Schwarting returned to his patrol car and ran
     [Tramel’s] name for a second time through NCIC and Bucks
     County Radio which indicated he had four outstanding traffic
     warrants out of Magisterial District Court 07-1-01. Bensalem
     Police headquarters contacted Magisterial District Judge
     Gallagher’s Court who directed Officer Schwarting to bring
     [Tramel] into Court on the outstanding warrants.           Officer
     Schwarting then called for a backup officer to assist him with
     taking [Tramel] into custody and transporting [Tramel] by van, as
     was Bensalem Police Department's policy and standard procedure.

           Officer Schwarting reapproached [Tramel’s] vehicle and
     asked him to step out of the minivan. A pat-down for weapons
     was then conducted. In conversation with Officer Schwarting,
     [Tramel] admitted to having marijuana in the vehicle. [Tramel]
     and Officer Schwarting discussed the possibility of moving the
     vehicle into the nearby shopping center parking lot rather than
     having the vehicle towed. However, [Tramel] could not operate
     the vehicle as his license was suspended and Officer Schwarting
     was prohibited from driving the vehicle under Bensalem Police
     Department policy.

           In light of [Tramel’s] admission to possessing marijuana,
     Officer Schwarting searched the vehicle and found marijuana in
     the center console. He also looked behind the [front passenger]
     seat and noticed a gray bag in plain view. Inside the gray bag
     was another smaller black Nike bag containing a stolen loaded
     Baretta 9mm gun. While no bullet was present in the chamber,
     there were bullets in the magazine. [Tramel] stated that the gun
     did not belong to him and that he did not have a license to carry.
     Also inside the bag was PCP, THC, gummies, cash[,] and apple
     baggies that are commonly used to package narcotics. A bank
     band for money as well as glass bottles which were later
     determined to contain PCP residue were found throughout the
     vehicle.

                                    -2-
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           After arriving on the scene, Officer Flanagan placed [Tramel]
     under arrest and removed a necklace with a knife attached which
     [Tramel] was wearing prior to placing him in the transport van.
     [Tramel] was asked by Officer Schwarting if he would like to talk
     about the gun in the vehicle, to which [Tramel] responded[,]
     “[N]o.” Officer Schwarting then called the duty tow truck as the
     vehicle was parked unsafely in the double yellow horizontal striped
     median in the middle of a four-lane busy intersection during
     weekday travel hours.

            Upon arrival at Bensalem Police headquarters, [Tramel] was
     read his Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)] Rights by
     Officer Brian Bielecki.     Prior to his arraignment, [Tramel]
     voluntarily addressed Officer Schwarting and asked if he would be
     able to leave that day and call his wife. [Tramel] also volunteered
     and made the following statement, “It wasn’t mine, I was throwing
     it out in a dumpster.” Officer Schwarting sought clarification, to
     which [Tramel] indicated the bag and its contents, including the
     loaded weapon.

                                   ****

            [Tramel] filed a motion to suppress on October 16, 2020
     seeking to preclude all evidence produced as a result of the alleged
     illegal vehicle stop and vehicle search. A hearing on the Motion to
     Suppress was held . . . on August 9, 2021 and August 10, 2021.
     The requested relief was denied, and th[e c]ourt set forth the
     following Findings and Conclusions of Law[:]

              1. The stop of [Tramel’s] vehicle must be based on
        reasonable suspicion because further investigation was
        required to determine whether the operator of the vehicle
        was the registered owner. . . ..

               2. The stop of [Tramel] was lawful as it was based on
        reasonable suspicion because the officer had specific and
        articulable facts indicating that the operator of the vehicle
        more likely than not matched the description given to the
        officer. . . . 75 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6[3]08(b).

              3. When a person operates a vehicle with a suspended
        license, a law enforcement officer shall immobilize the
        vehicle or, in the interest of public safety, direct that the
        vehicle be towed and stored by the appropriate towing and
        storage agent. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6309.2(a)(1).

                                    -3-
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             4. T[ramel’s] vehicle [was] parked in the double
       yellow hash-lined area shortly before a turning lane in a
       four-lane roadway which is a high trafficked area, was a risk
       to public safety, and therefore the officer appropriately
       directed the vehicle be towed. See id.

             5. “In no case shall parking on public roads, streets or
       thoroughfares be permitted in nonresidential districts.”
       Bensalem, Pennsylvania Code of Ordinances § 232-586.

             6. An inventory search is permissible when the officer
       has lawfully impounded the vehicle, and the police have
       acted in accordance with a reasonable standard of policy
       routinely securing and inventorying the contents of the
       impounded vehicle. Commonwealth v. Lag[e]nella, 83
       A.3d 94 (Pa. 2013). The vehicle was lawfully impounded
       when it was in police custody.

             7. Bensalem Township Police Department Policy
       requires the entire motor vehicle to be impounded shall be
       inventoried. The interior will be inventoried according to the
       major areas of the vehicle. The inventory will extend to all
       areas of the vehicle where personal property or hazardous
       materials may reasonably be found, including but not
       limited to, the console, passenger compartment, trunk,
       glove compartment, storage compartment and any
       containers.

              8. Furthermore, the inventory search conducted on
       [Tramel’s] vehicle and interior was also permissible under
       the inevitable discovery rule. [Tramel] admitted to owning
       the car, the outstanding traffic warrants, the suspended
       license[,] and to marijuana being present in the vehicle prior
       to the search. The vehicle in question was to be removed
       and towed from the center of the four-lane roadway,
       regardless of the marijuana alone, because [Tramel] could
       not operate the car without a valid driver’s license and was
       to be taken into custody as a result of the outstanding traffic
       warrants. . . . Therefore, the car was to be inventoried, as
       a result of either the outstanding warrants or the contraband
       found inside the vehicle. Thus, the evidence would have
       inevitably been discovered.

             9. The statement made in a custodial setting will not
       be suppressed where [a d]efendant “spontaneously blurts
       out” the statement or makes the incriminating statement in

                                    -4-
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         the   course   of      “small   talk”   with  authorities.
         Commonwealth v. Garvin, 50 A.3d 694 (Pa. 2012).
         T[ramel] volunteered the statement to Officer Schwarting
         without questioning, and therefore the statement shall not
         be suppressed.

            [Tramel] subsequently proceeded to a negotiated stipulated
      waiver trial before th[e trial c]ourt. Th[e trial c]ourt found
      [Tramel] [g]uilty of [the lead charge, person not to possess a
      firearm, and several related offenses. The court sentenced Tramel
      to an aggregate term of fifty to one hundred and twenty months
      of incarceration; the conviction for the lead charge carried a
      penalty of fifty to one hundred and twenty months, and Tramel
      received a combination of concurrent sentences and no further
      penalties for the remaining convictions.] [Tramel] timely filed an
      appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania and complied with
      th[e trial c]ourt’s [o]rder issued pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) . .
      ..

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 1-6 (footnotes, unnecessary capitalization,

and citations to the record omitted).

      Tramel raises the following issues for our review:

         1. The lower court erred in denying [Tramel’s] motion to
            suppress the vehicle stop[,] as the Commonwealth failed to
            establish that Officer Schwarting had the requisite probable
            cause to perform a vehicle stop.

         2. An inventory search [wa]s improper because the Officer’s
            decision to tow [Tramel’s] vehicle was based on the
            unlawfully obtained evidence. Accordingly, an inventory
            search would not have been conducted and therefore the
            inevitable discovery doctrine does not apply.

         3. [Tramel’s] response to Officer Schwarting’s request for
            clarification of [Tramel’s] statement “it wasn’t mine” was
            likely to invoke an incriminating response. Accordingly, the
            statement was made in violation of Miranda and therefore
            should have been suppressed.

                                        -5-
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Tramel’s Brief at 14, 16, 26 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).2

        Our standard of review for an order denying a suppression motion is

well-settled:

               [Our review] is limited to determining whether the factual
        findings are supported by the record and whether the legal
        conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. We are bound by
        the suppression court’s factual findings so long as they are
        supported by the record; our standard of review on questions of
        law is de novo. Where, as here, the defendant is appealing the
        ruling of the suppression court, we may consider only the evidence
        of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence for the defense
        as remains uncontradicted. Our scope of review of suppression
        rulings includes only the suppression hearing record and excludes
        evidence elicited at trial.

Commonwealth v. Singleton, 169 A.3d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal

citations omitted).

        In his first issue, Tramel challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion

to suppress the fruits of an allegedly illegal vehicle stop. Section 6308(b) of

the Motor Vehicle Code (“MVC”)3 provides the requisite quantum of suspicion

for a traffic stop:

              (b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police
              officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking
              vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a
____________________________________________

2 Tramel purports to raise six issues in his statement of questions involved.
See Tramel’s Brief at 6. However, we note with disapproval that Tramel’s
argument section is divided only into three parts corresponding to the issues
as stated above. We address the issues as stated in Tramel’s argument
section. Cf. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (stating that “[t]he argument shall be divided
into as many parts as there are questions to be argued; and shall have at the
head of each part . . . the particular point treated therein, followed by such
discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”).
3   See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 101 et seq.

                                           -6-
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            violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he
            may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the
            purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of
            financial responsibility, vehicle identification number
            or engine number or the driver’s license, or to secure
            such other information as the officer may reasonably
            believe to be necessary to enforce the provisions of
            this title.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b). This Court has further explained that, consistent with

section 6308(b),

      [w]hen considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable
      cause is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the
      nature of the violation has to be considered. If it is not necessary
      to stop the vehicle to establish that a violation of the [MVC] has
      occurred, an officer must possess probable cause to stop the
      vehicle. Where a violation is suspected, but a stop is necessary
      to further investigate whether a violation has occurred, an officer
      need only possess reasonable suspicion to make the stop.
      Illustrative of these two standards are stops for speeding and DUI.
      If a vehicle is stopped for speeding, the officer must possess
      probable cause to stop the vehicle. This is so because when a
      vehicle is stopped, nothing more can be determined as to the
      speed of the vehicle when it was observed while traveling upon a
      highway. On the other hand, if an officer possesses sufficient
      knowledge based upon behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer
      may stop the vehicle upon reasonable suspicion of a [MVC]
      violation, since a stop would provide the officer the needed
      opportunity to investigate further if the driver was operating under
      the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance.

Commonwealth v. Haines, 166 A.3d 449, 455 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A3d 987, 993 (Pa. Super. 2015)).

      The MVC prohibits driving with a suspended license. See 75 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 1543(a). An officer need only reasonable suspicion to effect a traffic stop

based on section 1543. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Farnan, 55 A.3d 113,

117-18 (Pa. Super. 2012) (holding that a traffic stop was legal based on the

                                     -7-
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officer’s reasonable suspicion that the operator was driving a vehicle with a

suspended license, though that information was thirty days’ old); accord

Commonwealth v. Hilliar, 943 A.2d 984, 992 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating

that “ the officer . . . formed a reasonable suspicion to conclude that [Hilliar]

was driving under suspension while [he] and the officer were still in the

officer’s primary jurisdiction. Thus, it would have been entirely legal for the

officer to execute a traffic stop at that time and at that location”).

          Here, Tramel argues Officer Schwarting required probable cause to

effect the vehicle stop.      Tramel maintains that, because the officer lacked

probable cause, the stop was illegal. Tramel does not contend that Officer

Schwarting lacked reasonable suspicion. See Tramel’s Brief at 15.

          The trial court considered Tramel’s argument and concluded it merits no

relief:

                 In this case, Officer Schwarting ran the registration of the
          vehicle and discovered the registered owner of the vehicle had a
          suspended license. Running the registration also revealed a
          description of the registered owner. Officer Schwarting testified
          he was able to observe the operator of the vehicle when the driver
          looked in his rearview mirror a few times and as he was turning
          and determined the operator to “more likely than not” fit the
          description of the registered owner. While Officer Schwarting
          suspected the operator of the vehicle was the owner based on the
          description provided, the offense of Driving With a Suspended
          License required further investigation to determine if the operator
          was, in fact, the registered owner. Here, a violation of the [MVC]
          was suspected, but a stop was necessary to further investigate
          whether a violation has occurred. Therefore, the appropriate test
          in this case was reasonable suspicion. See Salter, 121 A.3d at
          993.

                                         -8-
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             An officer has reasonable suspicion if it is based on specific
       and articulable facts.    75 Pa.C.S.[A. §] 6[3]08(b).        Officer
       Schwarting testified he observed a male approximately 40 years
       of age operating the motor vehicle and compared that observation
       with the description of the registered owner. This comparison
       gave Officer Schwarting a reasonable suspicion the operator of the
       vehicle was driving with a suspended license.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 8-9.

       Based on our review, we conclude the trial court applied the proper

standard and that Tramel’s claim rests on a misapprehension of the quantum

of suspicion required for this traffic stop. Officer Schwarting initiated the stop

to investigate a possible violation of section 1543(a), which only required

reasonable suspicion. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b); see also Haines, 166

A.3d at 455; Farnan, 55 A.3d at 117-18. As Tramel makes no argument

concerning Officer Schwarting’s reasonable suspicion, this issue, vis-à-vis the

correct standard, is waived.        See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Murchinson,

899 A.2d 1159, 1162 (Pa. Super. 2006) (stating that this Court may find

waiver pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) based on an appellant’s “failure to

develop meaningful argument with specific reference to the record in support

of his claims”). Accordingly, Tramel is due no relief on his first issue.4

____________________________________________

4 Even if not waived, Tramel would be due no relief because Officer Schwarting
determined Tramel’s license was suspended and observed a male who
appeared to be the appropriate age consistent with the registered owner of
the vehicle, which gave rise to reasonable suspicion to effect the stop to
further investigate whether it was in fact Tramel operating the vehicle. See
Farnan, 55 A.3d at 117-18.

                                           -9-
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      In his second issue, Tramel argues the trial court erred in denying his

suppression motion because the contraband was only found due to an

improper tow of his vehicle.      Section 6309.2 of the MVC outlines the

procedures for the immobilization or towing of a vehicle when the driver is

operating without a license or proper registration:

      (a) General rule.— . . .

             (1) If a person operates a motor vehicle . . . on a highway or
      trafficway of this Commonwealth while the person’s operating privilege
      is suspended, revoked, canceled, recalled or disqualified or where the
      person is unlicensed . . . the law enforcement officer shall
      immobilize the vehicle . . . or, in the interest of public safety,
      direct that the vehicle be towed and stored by the appropriate
      towing and storage agent pursuant to subsection (c), and the
      appropriate judicial authority shall be so notified.

                                       ****

      (c) Procedure upon towing and storage.—

            (1) [T]he following steps shall be taken:

            (i) The appropriate judicial authority shall notify the appropriate
      law enforcement officer of the county in which the violation occurred.

             (ii) The officer notified under subparagraph (i) shall notify the
      appropriate towing and storage agent to tow and store the vehicle or
      combination and provide notice by the most expeditious means and by
      first class mail, proof of service, of the towing, storage and location of
      the vehicle . . . to the owner of the vehicle . . ..

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6309.2(a)(1), (c)(1)(i)-(ii) (emphasis added); see also

Commonwealth v. Peak, 230 A.3d 1220, 1225–26 (Pa. Super. 2020),

appeal denied, 239 A.3d 1096 (Pa. 2020), and cert. denied sub nom. Peak v.

Pennsylvania, 141 S.Ct. 1426 (2021). Further, “it is clear that pursuant to

Lagenella, the police could have towed [a suspect’s] car if it was impeding

                                    - 10 -
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the flow of traffic or parked illegally on the street.” Peak, 230 A.3d at 1227

(internal quotations omitted).

      This Court has previously set forth the law concerning an inventory

search of a towed vehicle:

            An inventory search of an automobile is permissible when
      (1) the police have lawfully impounded the vehicle; and (2) the
      police have acted in accordance with a reasonable, standard policy
      of routinely securing and inventorying the contents of the
      impounded vehicle.

             In determining whether a proper inventory search has
      occurred, the first inquiry is whether the police have lawfully
      impounded the automobile, i.e., have lawful custody of the
      automobile. The authority of the police to impound vehicles
      derives from the police’s reasonable community care-taking
      functions. Such functions include removing disabled or damaged
      vehicles from the highway, impounding automobiles which violate
      parking ordinances (thereby jeopardizing public safety and
      efficient traffic flow), and protecting the community’s safety.

              The second inquiry is whether the police have conducted a
      reasonable inventory search. An inventory search is reasonable if
      it is conducted pursuant to reasonable standard police procedures
      and in good faith and not for the sole purpose of investigation.

Peak, 230 A.3d at 1226 (emphasis in original; internal citations and

indentation omitted).

      Under the inevitable discovery doctrine,

      [e]vidence which would have been discovered was sufficiently
      purged of the original illegality to allow admission of the evidence.
      . . . [I]mplicit in this doctrine is the fact that the evidence would
      have been discovered despite the initial illegality.

            If the prosecution can establish by a preponderance of the
      evidence that the illegally obtained evidence ultimately or
      inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means, the
      evidence is admissible. The purpose of the inevitable discovery

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       rule is to block setting aside convictions that would have been
       obtained without police misconduct.

Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 522 (Pa. Super. 2021) (internal

citation and indentation omitted).         Even where it is alleged that an officer

performs an inventory search prior to the “proper impoundment” of the

vehicle, suppression is not required, provided the evidence would have been

discovered during a lawful inventory search. See id.

       Here, Tramel contests the tow of his vehicle. He argues “there was no

reason for Officer Schwarting to tow [his] vehicle, as the vehicle was not

impeding the flow of traffic in any way.” Tramel’s Brief at 18. Tramel argues

his vehicle, which was parked in the median of the road, could have “easily

been moved to one of the parking lots adjacent to the median.” Id. at 20.5

He also maintains that the tow was improper because there was an “unlawful

vehicle search” during which Officer Schwarting discovered incriminating

evidence, which, Tramel maintains, contributed to the officer’s decision to tow

the vehicle. See id. at 20-21. Tramel contends that the inevitable discovery

doctrine does not apply because police would not have inevitably towed the

vehicle and discovered the evidence but for the improper search. See id. at

23-25.

____________________________________________

5 Tramel also points out that the officer had briefly considered moving the car
himself. See N.T., 8/9/21, at 84. We observe that the officer later testified
that it would have been against his department policy to take the keys and
park the vehicle somewhere else because of liability concerns. See id. at 107.

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      The trial court considered Tramel’s arguments and determined they

merit no relief:

            In this case, [Tramel’s] vehicle was parked in the median
      yellow hash area shortly before a turning lane in a high traffic area
      on this four-lane roadway. It was a clear risk to public safety to
      leave the car parked where it was as it impaired visibility of the
      turning lane at the intersection and was centered between
      opposite lanes of travel as the video evidence demonstrated.
      Therefore, the vehicle was effectively in police custody because
      the car was being lawfully towed[,] as neither [Tramel] nor the
      Bensalem police officer could drive the vehicle.

                                    ****

            [Tramel’s] car was required to be towed as it posed a risk
      to public safety while stopped in the yellow median hash area
      between opposing lanes of traffic in a high traffic area shortly
      before a turning lane.       Under Bensalem Township Police
      Department Policy, the entire car, including its interior, is to be
      inventoried after a duty tow. See Exhibit CS-1, p. 4. Therefore,
      the personal property evidence located within [Tramel’s] vehicle
      would have inevitably been discovered by the officer during the
      routine personal property inventory search of this vehicle which
      was to be towed to impoundment.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 11-12 (internal citation omitted).

      Based on our review, we discern no basis to disturb the trial court’s

ruling.   Tramel’s vehicle was parked on “yellow lines, kind of in a center

median, [where the lines] alert[] oncoming traffic that there’s a turn lane

coming up. He stopped in the yellow lines just before the turn lane,” which

was not a legal parking spot. N.T., 8/9/21, at 35. Officer Schwarting testified

that the vehicle was towed pursuant to department policy because of the

location, which “was not a safe location,” and because Tramel was unable to

move the vehicle. See id. at 47. Further, as noted above, this was also not

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a legal parking spot. Officer Schwarting moreover testified that while he called

for a tow only after beginning his search of the vehicle, “throughout the

entire stop, unless we’re able to come up with some solution, the

vehicle needs to be towed.               It cannot be left there.”   Id. at 105

(emphasis added). Thus, Officer Schwarting was authorized to lawfully tow

Tramel’s vehicle. See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6309.2(a)(1); Peak, 230 A.3d at 1227.6

Furthermore, as noted above, Officer Schwarting searched the vehicle

pursuant to the departmental policy on inventory searches. See supra note

6. However, assuming arguendo that the search occurred prior to the tow

itself, police would nevertheless have inevitably discovered the contraband

during an inventory search subsequent to the lawful tow. See King, 259 A.3d

at 522. Therefore, Tramel’s second issue merits no relief.

       In his third issue, Tramel argues the trial court erred in denying his

motion to suppress the inculpatory statements he made to police without

being Mirandized. See Tramel’s Brief at 26-28.

       This Court has set forth the applicable law as follows:

             [N]ot every statement made by an individual during a police
       encounter constitutes an interrogation.       Miranda rights are
       required only prior to a custodial interrogation.       Custodial
       interrogation is questioning initiated by law enforcement officers
       after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived
____________________________________________

6 We note that pursuant to the police department’s policy, containers are to
be searched during inventory, and there is a preference for doing the
inventory “prior to towing the vehicle from the incident location if the officer
believes he can safely and practically conduct the inventory on scene.” See
N.T., 8/9/21, Com.’s Ex. CS-1, at 3-4.

                                          - 14 -
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     of [his] freedom of action in any significant way. Furthermore,
     volunteered or spontaneous utterances by an individual are
     admissible without the administration of Miranda warnings.
     When a defendant gives a statement without police interrogation,
     we consider the statement to be volunteered and not subject to
     suppression. . . . Interrogation is police conduct calculated to,
     expected to, or likely to evoke admission.

           In Commonwealth v. Sepulveda, [] 855 A.2d 783, 796–
     797 ([Pa.] 2004) . . .[,] our Supreme Court stated, inter alia, that
     a statement made in a custodial setting would not be suppressed
     where the suspect “spontaneously ‘blurts out’ the statement, . . .
     or makes an incriminating statement in the course of ‘small talk’
     with authorities, . . . or is merely responding to biographical
     questioning . . ..” [G]enerally speaking, general information such
     as name, height, weight, residence, occupation, etc. is not the
     kind of information which requires Miranda warnings since it is
     not information generally considered as part of an interrogation.
     Such questions are not calculated to, expected to, or likely to elicit
     an incriminating response, or ... asked with [the] intent to extract
     or an expectation of eliciting an incriminating [response].

                                    ****

           Miranda warnings are required when a suspect is in custody
     and subjected to interrogation. [Where] the interrogation had not
     yet begun[,] Miranda warnings [are] not required.

Commonwealth v. Garvin, 50 A.3d 694, 698–99 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(quotations, indentation, and some citations omitted).

     Further, a “confession given after a defendant invokes his right to

counsel need not be suppressed where the defendant: (1) initiated further

communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police, and (2)

knowingly and intelligently waived the right to counsel.” Commonwealth. v.

Poplawski, 130 A.3d 697, 712 (Pa. 2015) (internal citations, quotations, and

emphasis omitted).

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          Not every violation of Miranda requires reversal. As our Supreme Court

has provided:

                A suppression court’s error in failing to suppress statements
          by the accused, however, will not require reversal if the
          Commonwealth can establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
          error was harmless. Miranda violations are subject to this
          harmless error rule.

                                       ****

                Harmless error exists if the Commonwealth proves that (1)
          the error did not prejudice the defendant or the prejudice was de
          minimis; (2) the erroneously admitted evidence was merely
          cumulative of other untainted evidence which was substantially
          similar to the erroneously admitted evidence; or (3) the properly
          admitted and uncontradicted evidence of guilt was so
          overwhelming and the prejudicial effect of the error was so
          insignificant by comparison that the error could not have
          contributed to the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Frein, 206 A.3d 1049, 1070 (Pa. 2019) (internal citations

and quotations omitted).

          Tramel argues that the trial court erred in denying his suppression

motion. He maintains that he invoked his right to remain silent, and while he

stated, “[Y]ou know, it wasn’t mine. I was going to throw it out at Wal-Mart,”

Officer Schwarting then asked him for clarification at which point he stated he

was referring to the gun.        Tramel’s Brief at 27-28.    Tramel contends his

clarification that he was referring to the firearm violated his Miranda rights.

See id. at 28.

          The trial court considered Tramel’s issue and determined it merits no

relief:

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            The [c]ourt found in this case that [Tramel] voluntarily
      addressed Officer Schwarting to inquire whether he would be able
      to leave that day and if he could call his wife. Without questioning
      by any officer, [Tramel] also offered[,] “It wasn’t mine, I was
      throwing it out in a dumpster.” Upon a request for clarification
      from Officer Schwarting, [Tramel] specified he was referring to
      the seized bag and its contents, including the loaded firearm.

             The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has affirmed that a
      statement made in a custodial setting would not be suppressed
      where the suspect spontaneously blurts out the statement.
      Garvin, 50 A.3d at 698. Here, while [Tramel] was in custody
      awaiting his arraignment, the statements offered to Officer
      Schwarting were not the result of an interrogation, rather they
      were spontaneously blurted out by [Tramel]. The only question
      Officer Schwarting asked was a clarification question after
      [Tramel] initiated the conversation. Accordingly, th[e c]ourt did
      not err in refusing to suppress the statements made by [Tramel]
      because the statements were spontaneously volunteered and not
      initiated by police questioning.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 13 (internal quotations omitted).

      Based on our review, we agree with the trial court that Tramel is due no

relief. We note there was no Miranda violation initially. Tramel was properly

Mirandized and then volunteered that the contraband was not his and that

he was going to “throw it out.” See N.T., 8/9/21, at 76-77. By initiating a

further   exchange   with   police   following   his   Miranda   warnings,   and

volunteering further statements, Tramel waived his right to counsel.         See

Poplawski, 130 A.3d at 712.          We further note, however, that Tramel’s

subsequent clarificatory statement was in response to a question by Officer

Schwarting, and the question was likely to elicit an incriminating response—

and this occurred after Tramel’s invocation of his right to remain silent,

notwithstanding it also occurred after he voluntarily stated that he was going

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to “throw it out.” Assuming the latter clarificatory statement was obtained in

violation of Miranda, the trial court’s error in failing to suppress this

statement was harmless.7 The prejudice to Tramel was de minimis because

he had already indicated that “it” was not his and that he was throwing it out

in a dumpster. The improperly obtained statement, i.e., the clarification from

Tramel that he was referring to the bag containing another bag and a gun,

was an elaboration of his denial that the items were his. Given the evidence

of constructive possession8 (i.e., the gun was in a bag inside another bag

behind the front passenger seat of the vehicle, of which Tramel was the

registered owner, and in which he was the only occupant) and that Tramel

had indicated knowledge of the contraband in a generalized manner by noting

____________________________________________

7 “To the extent our legal reasoning differs from the trial court’s, we note
that as an appellate court, we may affirm on any legal basis supported by
the certified record.” Commonwealth v. Torres, 176 A.3d 292, 296 n.5
(Pa. Super. 2017) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

8   This Court has defined “constructive possession” as follows:

               [It] is a legal fiction, a pragmatic construct to deal with the
        realities of criminal law enforcement. Constructive possession is
        an inference arising from a set of facts that possession of the
        contraband was more likely than not.              We have defined
        constructive possession as conscious dominion. We subsequently
        defined conscious dominion as the power to control the
        contraband and the intent to exercise that control. To aid
        application, we have held that constructive possession may be
        established by the totality of the circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 67 A.3d 817, 820 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal
citation omitted).

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that “it” was not his, we conclude that any harm resulting from the erroneous

admission of the clarification is de minimis. See Frein, 206 A.3d at 1070.

     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/25/2023

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