Court Opinion

ID: 9367956
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 17:00:32.21831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:04.045415
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1086     Document: 010110807239         Date Filed: 02/02/2023      Page: 1
                                                                                     FILED
                                                                         United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                            Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            February 2, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  RUSSELL MARSHALL BOLES,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                            No. 22-1086
                                                   (D.C. No. 1:19-CV-01158-RMR-STV)
  COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF                                         (D. Colo.)
  CORRECTIONS; CHARLENE
  CROCKET; RABBI YISROEL
  ROSSKAMM, Rabbi; CYRUS
  CLARKSON,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and MATHESON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

        Russell Marshall Boles, a pro se prisoner, appeals from a district court order that

 denied his request for preliminary injunctive relief. Exercising jurisdiction under 28

 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we affirm.

        *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-1086      Document: 010110807239           Date Filed: 02/02/2023         Page: 2

                                     I. BACKGROUND

        Mr. Boles is an inmate held by the Colorado Department of Corrections (CDOC)

 at its Sterling Correctional Facility (SCF). He actively practices Orthodox Judaism.

        In 2019, he filed the instant 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit against CDOC and various

 prison personnel, challenging the conditions of his confinement. He complained that

 CDOC failed to provide a diet that satisfies his medical and religious needs, offered

 inadequate medical care,1 did not accommodate his disabilities, and unlawfully deducted

 money from his prison account.

        The district court denied his motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ifp),

 noting that as a three-strike litigant, he is subject to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g)’s filing fee

 restriction and had not satisfied the exception for cases involving imminent danger of

 serious physical injury. When Mr. Boles failed to pay the filing fee in full, the district

 court dismissed his case. We granted Mr. Boles ifp status on appeal and reversed the

 district court, finding he had satisfied the imminent-danger exception.

        On remand to the district court, Mr. Boles filed an amended complaint, naming as

 defendants CDOC, the rabbi responsible for ensuring compliance with kosher standards,

 a physician, a dietician, and multiple CDOC administrators, managers, and supervisors.

 He asserted claims for inadequate food and medical care, disability and religious

        1
          Mr. Boles suffers from a variety of ailments, including sleep apnea, irritable
 bowel syndrome, and compressed vertebra. He “is confined to a wheelchair by
 disabilities.” R. at 93.

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 discrimination, improperly taking money from his prison account and property from his

 cell, and restricting access to legal resources.

        On the Defendants’ motions, the district court dismissed much of the complaint,

 leaving only claims alleging that (1) CDOC failed to accommodate Mr. Boles’s need for

 a wheelchair-accessible cell, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act and the

 Rehabilitation Act; (2) CDOC and Food/Laundry Services Administrator Charleen

 Crockett failed to provide Mr. Boles an adequate kosher diet, in violation of the Religious

 Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA); (3) CDOC, Ms. Crockett, and

 Rabbi Yisroel Rosskamm failed to provide Mr. Boles an adequate kosher diet, in

 violation of the First Amendment; and (4) Ms. Crockett and Food Service Manager Cyrus

 Clarkson denied Mr. Boles kosher meals from June through December 2019, including

 kosher meals for the Sukkot holiday, in violation of the First Amendment. At this point,

 CDOC had moved Mr. Boles into a wheelchair-accessible cell.

        In July 2021, Mr. Boles moved for a preliminary injunction “ordering [an

 irrevocable] . . . wheelchair accessible cell and [a] nutritionally adequate authen[t]ic

 kosher diet.” R. at 142.2 After briefing and oral argument, a magistrate judge

 recommended denying Mr. Boles’s motion. Regarding a wheelchair-accessible cell, the

 magistrate judge determined that Mr. Boles had failed to show irreparable harm if denied

 injunctive relief because he had not identified a risk of being moved out of a wheelchair-

        2
         Although Mr. Boles described the relief he wanted as permanent, the district
 court construed his motion as seeking preliminary injunctive relief. On appeal, he
 agrees with that construction. See Reply Br. at 5, 11.

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 accessible cell. Regarding a kosher diet, the magistrate judge concluded that Mr. Boles

 was seeking to change the status quo and had not shown likely success on the merits. In

 particular, the magistrate judge said (1) Mr. Boles had not demonstrated that SCF’s

 kosher diet substantially burdened his religious beliefs; (2) the allegations in his affidavit

 about the authenticity and nutritional content of that diet were speculative, lacking in

 detail, and conclusory and (3) therefore insufficient to enable an analysis of how an

 injunction would affect prison operations.

        The magistrate judge warned that objections to his recommendation had to be filed

 within 14 days to avoid waiver of an appeal. Mr. Boles obtained an extension of that

 time period but did not file any objections. The district court accepted and adopted the

 recommendation and denied Mr. Boles’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Further

 facts are included below.

                                      II. DISCUSSION

                                        A. IFP Status

        We first must address Mr. Boles’s accrual of three strikes for having brought

 actions or appeals in federal court that were dismissed because they were frivolous,

 malicious, or failed to state a claim for relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). This three-

 strikes provision is “applicable to indigent prisoners [and] requires so-called ‘frequent

 filer’ prisoners to prepay the entire filing fee before federal courts may consider their

 civil actions and appeals.” Hafed v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 635 F.3d 1172, 1176 (10th

 Cir. 2011) (brackets and quotations omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Coleman v.

 Tollefson, 575 U.S. 532 (2015).

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        In his application to proceed ifp on appeal, Mr. Boles argues that he qualifies for

 the only exception to this filing restriction—that he “is under imminent danger of serious

 physical injury.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). He contends that CDOC’s kosher diet is

 “fraudulent” because it is infused with additives that make it undigestible, causing bowel

 dysfunction, hematuria, and bone/cartilage “degenerat[ion].” Mot. to Proceed ifp,

 Addendum at 5-6.

        We previously granted an ifp motion in Mr. Boles’s first appeal in this case when

 he challenged the district court’s dismissal of his complaint for having three strikes and

 failing to satisfy § 1915(g)’s exception. See Boles v. Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 794 F. App’x

 767, 771-72 (10th Cir. 2019). There, Mr. Boles argued he required a fresh-food diet to

 treat his irritable bowel syndrome and that CDOC’s refusal to provide such a diet caused

 “excruciating pain” and aggravated his “degenerative bone condition.” Id. at 770-71

 (quotations omitted). We concluded that Mr. Boles’s allegations were specific and

 credible, noting that a pro se prisoner’s claims of “prison officials refusing to treat [the]

 prisoner’s chronic condition that causes severe pain or aggravates debilitating symptoms

 are enough to facially satisfy the imminent-danger exception.” Id. at 771. We found a

 “sufficient nexus” between the danger Mr. Boles alleged and his claim for deliberate

 indifference to his serious medical needs. Id. We therefore granted his motion to

 proceed ifp on appeal, vacated the district court’s order dismissing the case, and

 remanded for further proceedings. Id. at 772-73.

        Although on remand Mr. Boles amended his complaint, his diet-related allegations

 persist. In particular, he contends that the “[d]enial of a proper kosher food diet hurts

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 both [his] religious practice and health,” contrary to his “religious and medical needs.”

 R. at 74. We fail to see how Mr. Boles’s ifp status for the instant appeal differs

 materially from his ifp status in the prior appeal. Indeed, when “determining if a

 prisoner’s allegations are sufficient to meet the imminent-danger exception, we construe

 his filings liberally and accept his well-pled allegations as true, and we require only that

 his allegations facially satisfy the threshold showing that the imminent-danger exception

 applies.” Boles, 794 F. App’x at 770 (citation omitted).

        As in his prior appeal, Mr. Boles has identified an imminent danger to his health

 that can be remedied if he prevails on his claim that his prison diet violates his

 constitutional rights. See Pettus v. Morgenthau, 554 F.3d 293, 298-99 (2d Cir. 2009)

 (indicating there is a sufficient nexus for ifp purposes between imminent danger and the

 prisoner’s complaint when the danger of serious physical injury “is fairly traceable to

 unlawful conduct asserted in the complaint and . . . a favorable judicial outcome would

 redress that injury” (emphasis omitted)). We therefore conclude that Mr. Boles has

 satisfied § 1915(g)’s imminent-danger exception and may proceed ifp in this appeal.3

        3
         Because Mr. Boles meets the § 1915(g) exception for ifp status on at least
 one of his claims, we need not address whether all of his claims qualify. See Chavis
 v. Chappius, 618 F.3d 162, 171, 172 n.7 (2d Cir. 2010) (collecting cases and
 observing that “[n]othing in the text of § 1915 provides any justification for dividing
 an action into individual claims and requiring a filing fee for those that do not relate
 to imminent danger”).

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                                    B. Firm Waiver Rule

        Defendants argue that this appeal should be dismissed because Mr. Boles failed to

 object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation. This court’s firm-waiver rule “bars

 appellate review of both factual and legal questions if a party fails to timely object to the

 magistrate judge’s findings or recommendations.” Silva v. United States, 45 F.4th 1134,

 1136 n.2 (10th Cir. 2022) (quotations omitted). But “[o]ne exception to the firm waiver

 rule is when the interests of justice require review.” Sinclair Wyo. Refin. Co. v. A & B

 Builders, Ltd., 989 F.3d 747, 783 (10th Cir. 2021) (ellipsis and quotations omitted). This

 exception implicates “such factors as a pro se litigant’s effort to comply, the force and

 plausibility of his explanation for not complying and the importance of the issues raised.”

 Klein v. Harper, 777 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir. 2015); see also Sinclair, 989 F.3d at

 783-84 (applying the interests-of-justice exception in a counseled case). We find this

 exception applicable here.

        On the same day the magistrate judge issued his recommendation, the district

 court appointed pro bono counsel for Mr. Boles. Nevertheless, Mr. Boles filed a pro se

 motion for an extension of time to file objections to the recommendation. The district

 court granted the extension and instructed that his appointed counsel should make any

 further filings. But his counsel never objected to the recommendation. According to Mr.

 Boles, he mailed his appointed attorneys the objections he had prepared, but they neither

 filed them nor their own. Instead, on the day before the deadline, they informed him that

 they did not intend to object.

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        Several days after the objection deadline, the district court noted on the court’s

 docket that Mr. Boles had become dissatisfied with his attorneys’ representation, and it

 directed him to discuss the matter with them, with the possibility that they move to

 withdraw. The next day, counsel moved to withdraw, and the district court adopted the

 magistrate judge’s recommendation in full. The district court later permitted the

 withdrawal. Mr. Boles, proceeding pro se, then moved for an extension of time to object

 to the recommendation. When that request was denied, he sought reconsideration of the

 order adopting the recommendation, which also was denied.

        The foregoing shows that Mr. Boles attempted to timely object to the magistrate

 judge’s recommendation but was unable to do so because of a disagreement with his

 court-appointed attorneys. Further, after they withdrew from the case, Mr. Boles

 continued his attempts to challenge the recommendation. Finally, Mr. Boles seeks to

 raise important issues about his continuing need for a wheelchair-accessible cell and an

 adequate kosher diet. We therefore decline to apply the firm-waiver rule. See Wirsching

 v. Colorado, 360 F.3d 1191, 1197-98 (10th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that firm waiver rule

 is not jurisdictional, and applying interests-of-justice exception where pro se party

 claimed he had not received magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, had

 otherwise been an attentive litigant, and had raised important issues).

                             C. Preliminary Injunctive Relief

        “[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of

 right.” See Benisek v. Lamone, --- U.S. ---, 138 S. Ct. 1942, 1943 (2018) (quotations

 omitted). “[I]t is the exception rather than the rule.” Harmon v. City of Norman, 981

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 F.3d 1141, 1146 (10th Cir. 2020) (quotations omitted). To obtain a preliminary

 injunction, plaintiffs must show “(1) they are substantially likely to succeed on the

 merits of their claims, (2) they will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied,

 (3) their threatened injury without the injunction outweighs any harm to the party

 opposing the injunction, and (4) the injunction, if issued, is not adverse to the public

 interest.” Id. “Because a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy, the

 movant’s right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.” Diné Citizens Against

 Ruining Our Env’t v. Jewell, 839 F.3d 1276, 1281 (10th Cir. 2016) (quotations

 omitted)..

       We review the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of

 discretion. See Benisek, 138 S. Ct. at 1943, 1945; Diné Citizens, 839 F.3d at 1281.

 “A district court’s decision crosses the abuse-of-discretion line if it rests on an

 erroneous legal conclusion or lacks a rational basis in the record.” Courthouse News

 Serv. v. N.M. Admin. Off. of Cts., 53 F.4th 1245, 1254 (10th Cir. 2022) (quotations

 omitted). “[W]e thus examine the court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal

 conclusions de novo.” Id. at 1255 (quotations omitted).4

       4
          We note that Mr. Boles’s remaining claims survived a motion to dismiss and
 that the Defendants have not moved for, and therefore the district court has not
 decided, a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule
 56, so we remand to the district court for further proceedings.

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     Wheelchair-Accessible Cell

         The district court determined that Mr. Boles had failed to show he would be

  irreparably harmed without a preliminary injunction barring his removal from a

  wheelchair-accessible cell. We discern no abuse of discretion.

         Irreparable harm requires a risk that the applicant will suffer great harm from the

  denial of an injunction. Colorado v. EPA, 989 F.3d 874, 884 (10th Cir. 2021). The risk

  of “injury must . . . be of such imminence that there is a clear and present need for

  equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Id. (quotations omitted). “[S]peculative or

  theoretical injury will not suffice.” Id. Rather, the risk that the harm will occur must be

  “significant,” if not “certain.” Id. (quotations omitted).

         As noted above, SCF moved Mr. Boles to a wheelchair-accessible cell. As the

  magistrate judge explained, Mr. Boles failed to identify evidence that prison officials had

  threatened to move him out of a wheelchair-accessible cell. Instead, he asserted it is

  possible he might be moved because there are more wheelchair-bound inmates than

  wheelchair-accessible cells, his cell is in a “transition unit,” and his cell is in a pod

  “slated for conversion to a kitchen worker pod.” R. at 251 (quotations omitted). On

  appeal, Mr. Boles argues “there is a lot of room to disagree” with the magistrate judge’s

  conclusion regarding imminent harm, but he provides few details. Opening Br. at 7. He

  complains there are “collateral injuries . . . imposed on him for every little inch gained,”

  but he does not explain what they are or how they relate to his retention of a wheelchair-

  accessible cell. Id. at 5; see also id. at 8.

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         “Although a pro se litigant’s pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a

  less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, . . . the court cannot take

  on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and

  searching the record.” Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840

  (10th Cir. 2005) (brackets and quotations omitted). Because Mr. Boles has not

  adequately shown he is in imminent danger of being moved from a wheelchair-accessible

  cell, he has failed to satisfy the irreparable-harm element necessary for a preliminary

  injunction. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying that relief. See EPA,

  989 F.3d at 884 (stating that “irreparable injury . . . [is] the single most important

  prerequisite for the issuance of a preliminary injunction” (quotations omitted)).

     Kosher Diet

         Mr. Boles requested a preliminary injunction requiring that SCF’s kosher meals

  better conform to kosher standards,5 or alternatively, that kosher meals be supplied by a

  catering company. Given that Mr. Boles sought to change the status quo, the magistrate

         5
           In his motion, Mr. Boles suggested that SCF’s “[k]osher food might . . . be
  acceptable if it were essentially the same as mandated or agreed in” Beerheide v.
  Suthers, 286 F.3d 1179 (10th Cir. 2002). R. at 102-03. In Beerheide, this court
  affirmed the district court’s decision that the First Amendment required CDOC to
  make a kosher diet available to Orthodox Jewish prisoners, and at no cost. 286 F.3d
  at 1182, 1184.
         Beerheide is distinguishable. It was an appeal by CDOC following a trial that
  ended in the prisoner-plaintiffs’ favor requiring CDOC to offer a free kosher diet. In
  contrast, Mr. Boles has brought an interlocutory appeal from the denial of a
  preliminary injunction. Also, SCF offers a kosher diet (albeit alleged to be
  insufficient), and SCF does not charge a fee for the diet. Mr. Boles does not explain
  how Beerheide applies here.

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  judge correctly observed that he had to “make a strong showing . . . on the likelihood of

  success on the merits,” id. at 883-84 (quotations omitted). To show a likelihood of

  success on his First Amendment and RLUIPA claims, he had to make a strong showing

  that SCF’s kosher diet is substandard.

         The magistrate judge found Mr. Boles’s general allegations to be unsupported and

  insufficient to show likelihood of success on the merits. In particular, the magistrate

  judge observed that Mr. Boles offered no evidence to support his claim other than his

  own affidavit, which was conclusory, “based upon hearsay, and/or relate[d] to food

  preparation generally and not to SCF’s compliance with Plaintiff’s firmly held religious

  beliefs.” R. at 254-55 (footnote omitted). And although Mr. Boles included more

  allegations in his briefs, the magistrate judge noted that Mr. Boles’s briefing “was not

  submitted under penalty of perjury” and his “assertions [were] conclusory, not based

  upon personal knowledge, and/or based upon hearsay for which Plaintiff has provided no

  information to substantiate its reliability.” R. at 256.

         On appeal, Mr. Boles offers no convincing argument that the magistrate judge

  abused his discretion. Instead, he advances some of the same broad and conclusory

  assertions he made in the district court, including that “[n]o one knows how to clean to

  kosher standards” and SCF’s kosher diet contains “difficult (or impossible) to digest

  food-like substances.” Opening Br. at 18. Although he maintains that “[t]he CDOC

  kosher guidelines [prepared by Rabbi Rosskamm] are a subversion of Jewish law,” he

  offers no support other than to broadly assert that “[a] comparison of [the Shulchan

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  Aruch6 and the guidelines] clearly reveals that the CDOC version of kosher is not

  kosher.” Id. at 19. And while he claims that “ordinary public media . . . support[s] the

  glaring fact [that] the CDOC version of a kosher diet is not only not kosher but does not

  and cannot supply adequate nutrition,” id. at 20, he does not identify a source of

  information that would allow us to assess whether SCF’s diet fails to meet Kosher

  standards.

         Preliminary injunctive relief requires evidentiary support. See Prairie Band of

  Potawatomi Indians v. Pierce, 253 F.3d 1234, 1246 (10th Cir. 2001); 11A Charles A.

  Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2949 (2d ed. 2012)

  (“Evidence that goes beyond the unverified allegations of the pleadings[7] and motion

  papers must be presented to support or oppose a motion for a preliminary injunction.”).

  Mr. Boles’s bare allegations are not a substitute for evidence and do not constitute “a

  strong showing . . . with regard to [his] likelihood of success on the merits.” McDonnell

  v. City & County of Denver, 878 F.3d 1247, 1252 (10th Cir. 2018) (emphasis added;

  quotations omitted).

         6
          The Shulchan Aruch is “a compellation of Jewish laws of the Orthodox
  Hasidic tradition.” Congregation Rabbinical Coll. of Tartikov, Inc. v. Vill. of
  Pomona, 138 F. Supp. 3d 352, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 2015), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, and
  vacated in part, 945 F.3d 83 (2d Cir. 2019).
         7
          Although Mr. Boles “affirm[ed] everything in th[e] complaint is true and
  accurate,” R. at 81, it was not verified. See Goodman v. Diggs, 986 F.3d 493, 495
  (4th Cir. 2021) (“A complaint is ‘verified’ if it is signed, sworn, and submitted under
  penalty of perjury.” (quotations omitted)).

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             In particular Mr. Boles needed to identify evidence showing the inadequacy of

  SCF’s kosher meals, see Gallagher v. Shelton, 587 F.3d 1063, 1070 (10th Cir. 2009)

  (First Amendment free exercise claim); Abdulhaseeb v. Calbone, 600 F.3d 1301, 1321

  (10th Cir. 2010) (RLUIPA); id. at 1325 (Gorsuch, J. concurring). He did not do so.

  Again, “the court cannot take on the responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in

  constructing arguments and searching the record.” Garrett, 425 F.3d at 840.

             Because Mr. Boles failed to make a strong showing of deficiencies in SCF’s

  kosher diet, he failed to satisfy the likelihood-of-success-on-the-merits element necessary

  for a preliminary injunction. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying that

  relief.8

             8
           We review only whether the district court abused its discretion in denying
  Mr. Boles’s request for a preliminary injunction. Mr. Boles has a heavier burden to
  secure this “extraordinary remedy,” Benisek, 138 S. Ct. at 1943, than to avoid
  dismissal of this suit. See New Hope Fam. Servs., Inc. v. Poole, 966 F.3d 145, 165
  (2d Cir. 2020) (there is a “heavier burden” for a plaintiff to secure a preliminary
  injunction than to “plead[] the plausible claim necessary to avoid dismissal”);
  compare Diné Citizens, 839 F.3d at 1281 (“[T]o receive a preliminary injunction, the
  plaintiff must establish . . . a substantial likelihood of prevailing on the merits” and
  the plaintiff’s “right to relief must be clear and unequivocal.” (quotations omitted)),
  with Sinclair Wyo. Ref. Co., 989 F.3d at 765 (in reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal
  de novo, “[w]e accept all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true”
  and “view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party” (quotations and
  alterations omitted)). We express no view on whether Mr. Boles may overcome a
  motion for summary judgment or succeed at trial after this case returns to the district
  court.

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                                   III. CONCLUSION

        We grant Mr. Boles’s motion for leave to proceed ifp. We affirm the district

  court’s judgment and remand.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Scott M. Matheson, Jr.
                                             Circuit Judge

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