Court Opinion

ID: 9393692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 20:03:36.867756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:54.811873
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 211383-U

                                                                                THIRD DIVISION
                                                                                    May 10, 2023

                                          No. 1-21-1383

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                    IN THE
                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                           FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
      Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )     Cook County.
                                                )
v.                                              )     No. 07 CR 16031
                                                )
OSCAR FLORES,                                   )     Honorable
                                                )     Peggy Chiampas,
      Defendant-Appellant.                      )     Judge Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________

       PRESIDING JUSTICE McBRIDE delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Reyes and Burke concurred in the judgment.

                                             ORDER

¶1     Held: The trial court did not err in summarily dismissing defendant’s pro se
             postconviction petition because his appellate counsel was not ineffective for
             failing to raise a meritless claim on direct appeal.

¶2     Defendant Oscar Flores appeals the trial court’s first stage dismissal of his postconviction

petition, arguing he set forth the gist of a constitutional claim of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel. Specifically, he contends that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing

to argue that the trial court erred in refusing defendant’s request to ask potential jurors questions

regarding their opinions toward gangs when gang evidence would be prevalent at trial.
No. 1-21-1383

¶3      Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of the May 2007 first-degree murder of

Victor Casillas, with the additional finding that defendant personally discharged a firearm that

proximately caused Casillas’s death. Defendant was also found guilty of the attempted murder

and aggravated battery with a firearm of Leonel Medina. The trial court subsequently sentenced

defendant to a term of 29 years for the first-degree murder conviction with an additional 25-year

firearm enhancement, 20 years for the attempted murder conviction, and 6 years for the

aggravated battery conviction, to be served consecutively, for a total sentence of 80 years’

imprisonment.

¶4      In his initial direct appeal, this court reversed and remanded for a new trial based on a

finding that defendant had invoked his right to remain silent and any subsequent statements were

inadmissible. People v. Flores (Flores I), 2014 IL App (1st) 121786, ¶ 63. This court also found

MySpace photographs introduced by the State to be admissible, but held that the captions were to

be redacted because the State could not establish who wrote the captions. Id. ¶ 79.

¶5      On remand, defendant’s second jury trial was conducted in July 2015. Prior to jury

selection, defense counsel requested the trial court question the prospective jurors “about any

bias or prejudice they may have regarding gangs because the courts have held that it’s such a

sensitive issue and people have very strong feelings about it.” Counsel explained that she had

drafted “questions designed to determine whether or not they know people in gangs, whether or

not they have had any interaction with gangs, and whether or not they have strong feelings about

gangs that would affect their ability to be fair.” Counsel also requested questions about whether

the prospective jurors had ties to any community watchdog groups and had strong feelings about

guns that would affect their ability to be fair.

¶6      In response, the prosecutor argued that the appropriate question was something similar to

                                                   2
No. 1-21-1383

questions posed regarding the credibility of the testimony of police witnesses. He suggested a

question informing the jurors that they would hear evidence of gang involvement in the case, and

asked if that would cause them to be unfair. The prosecutor contended that the questions

requested by the defense were not appropriate questions. After the discussion, the court ruled that

she would ask the standard question the same way the court would ask about the testimony of

police witnesses and denied the rest of the defense’s questions.

¶7     During voir dire, the court asked the following questions of the first potential juror.

                       “Q. And sir, this next question, would you judge the testimony or weigh

                the testimony of each witness the same, regardless of their profession or what they

                do for a living?

                       And what this boils down to, for everyone, is this, that you’re not going to

                take [the credibility of] a policeman more than a civilian witness or less than a

                civilian witness, that you’re going to take it the same manner on each witness and

                base it on how they testify, regardless of their profession.

                       A. Yes.

                       Q. And sir — and this is for everyone.

                       Ladies and gentlemen, there may be — there will be evidence presented or

                testified to or alleged in regards to gang activity in this case, and individuals that

                testify may or may not be affiliated with certain gangs.

                       And sir, can you take their testimony in the same light, manner as any

                other witness in the case?

                       A. Yes.”

¶8     For the subsequent potential jurors, the trial court asked a similar version of this question,

                                                  3
No. 1-21-1383

                “would you give each witness that testifies the same weight, level of credibility,

                regardless of if they are a police officer, alleged gang member, or any other

                witness ***?”

Each of the selected jurors answered in the affirmative.

¶9     The pertinent evidence presented at defendant’s jury trial was the following.

¶ 10   Leonel Medina testified that in March 2007, he was a member of the Two Six gang, but

at the time of trial, was no longer a gang member. On March 19, 2007, at approximately 8:30

p.m., Medina was walking east on 30th Street near South Kildare Avenue in Chicago on his way

to a friend’s house. He turned to walk north on Kildare and noticed a blue and gray Astro van

stop at the intersection. He observed two people in the van, a driver and a passenger. He

described the occupants as male Hispanics, and “they seemed young.” The passenger then pulled

out a gun and began to shoot. Medina estimated that he was 20 feet away from the passenger side

of the van. The passenger fired four to six times in Medina’s direction and Medina began to run

north on Kildare. He observed the van turn east onto 30th Street and heard the tires “peal out

[sic]” and someone yelled the word, “king.” Medina continued to his friend’s house on South

Kildare Avenue. When he arrived, he noticed blood on his thighs and realized he had been shot.

He had four gunshot wounds, two on each of his thighs. He called 911 and an ambulance arrived

to transport him to the hospital. He later spoke with the police about the shooting. Medina

subsequently viewed a photo array and lineups, but did not identify anyone.

¶ 11   Leonardo Gonzalez testified that he was a former member of the Two Six street gang

with Victor Casillas. In March 2007, Gonzalez was 16 years old, and Casillas was 15 years old.

¶ 12   On March 19, 2007, Gonzalez spent the day with Casillas at both Casillas’s house and

Gonzalez’s house. They smoked marijuana and played video games. Around 4 p.m., they went to

                                                4
No. 1-21-1383

Piotrowski Park to “hang out.” Gonzalez was unsure what time they left the park, but testified

that it “was still just a little bit light but it was getting dark.” They were walking on West 30th

Street near South Karlov Avenue when he heard three or four gunshots behind them. Gonzalez

told Casillas that they needed to “get the heck out of here.” Gonzalez thought a rival gang might

have fired the shots and testified that the rivals of the Two Six were the Latin Kings and Maniac

Latin Disciples. They started to walk away toward Gonzalez’s house at South Karlov Avenue

and West 26th Street.

¶ 13   As they were walking, a van drove behind them and caught Gonzalez’s attention.

Gonzalez could not remember the color of the van, but described it as an Astro van. According to

Gonzalez, Casillas made a gang sign disrespectful to the Latin Kings, specifically, “throwing the

crown down.” Gonzalez testified that he was on the passenger side of the van. The passenger in

the van pulled out a gun and Gonzalez “froze” as Casillas started to run. Gonzalez could not see

the passenger and he was unable to tell if the passenger was a man or a woman, black or white or

Hispanic. Gonzalez described the gun as an automatic, square, and black. The passenger then

fired the gun.

¶ 14   Gonzalez fell to the pavement. He then heard Casillas scream as he had been shot.

Gonzalez went toward Casillas. Gonzalez testified he threw bottles from the street at the van.

The van then drove off towards South Pulaski Road. Gonzalez remained with Casillas until the

police arrived. He told the police that he did not know who the shooter was.

¶ 15   Later, on May 24, 2007, Gonzalez went to the police station and viewed a lineup.

Gonzalez testified that he identified someone in the lineup, but he told the police that he did not

know “if it’s him.” He identified defendant in court as the person he selected in the lineup.

                                                 5
No. 1-21-1383

¶ 16   Gonzalez did not remember speaking with Assistant State’s Attorney (ASA) Stephanie

Miller on May 24, 2007, but admitted that his signature appeared on a handwritten statement

prepared by ASA Miller. He also identified two exhibits attached to the statement, one was a

photograph of Casillas and the other was a photograph of defendant. Gonzalez admitted that he

spoke with ASA Miller because the police “were making [him] mad.” Gonzalez wanted to go to

the hospital to visit his friend, and the police told him that he could not go until he talked to

them. The prosecutor then asked a question to clarify Gonzalez’s testimony and asked Gonzalez

if the statement he gave in May 2007 was given because of the way the police treated him after

Casillas’s murder in March. Gonzalez again responded that “they were making me mad because

they wouldn’t let me see my friend.” Gonzalez admitted that in the statement he told the ASA

that the passenger pulled out a black semiautomatic handgun and fired two shots, hitting Casillas,

and he identified an attached photograph of defendant as the shooter. Gonzalez also testified he

did not remember telling ASA Miller that he had not been threatened or made promises in order

for him to provide the statement about the shooting. Gonzalez then testified that he was “really

high” when giving the statement. He did not remember if he said that he was under the influence

of drugs or alcohol in the statement. Gonzalez also did not remember testifying before the grand

jury in June 2007. The prosecutor asked Gonzalez about specific testimony he gave before the

grand jury, but Gonzalez did not recall any of the testimony.

¶ 17   On cross-examination, Gonzalez testified that on the night of the shooting in March 2007,

he did not identify anyone. Later in May 2007, he identified defendant in a lineup. Between

those dates, Casillas’s brother, Antonio Casillas came to Gonzalez with defendant’s photograph

and told Gonzalez to identify defendant. Antonio was not present at the time of the shooting.

                                                6
No. 1-21-1383

Gonzalez testified that defendant was not the shooter. Defendant was a Latin King, and he

believed a Latin King had committed the crime.

¶ 18   On redirect, Gonzalez remembered meeting with defense counsel and an investigator in

June 2015. During that meeting, Gonzalez told them that Antonio and Casillas’s mother wanted

him to identify defendant because “the mom wanted justice.” Gonzalez admitted that the June

2015 meeting was the first time he mentioned that Casillas’s mother asked him to identify

defendant.

¶ 19   ASA Stephanie Miller testified that she met with Gonzalez on May 26, 2007, and into

May 27, 2007, at the Area 4 police district. She had a conversation with Gonzalez with a

detective present and later took a handwritten statement from Gonzalez. In the statement,

Gonzalez identified defendant in a photograph as the person who shot Casillas. During the

interview, Gonzalez did not appear to be under the influence of drugs or alcohol. ASA Miller

asked Gonzalez outside the presence of any police officers how he had been treated and if he had

been threatened by anyone. Gonzalez told her that he had not been threatened and did not

disclose any threats from Antonio Casillas.

¶ 20   ASA Bonnie Greenstein testified that she presented Gonzalez to the grand jury on June

14, 2007. When she spoke with him prior to his testimony, Gonzalez did not tell her that he was

forced to make an identification in a lineup. He did not make any complaints about the police or

ASA Miller. Gonzalez also did not state that he was forced to make an identification by Antonio

Casillas. During his testimony, Gonzalez identified defendant as the shooter and the passenger in

the van. Gonzalez could not view the driver because the driver was wearing a “hoodie.” He also

testified that he was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol and that he had been treated

“good.”

                                                 7
No. 1-21-1383

¶ 21   Lorena Aguilar testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on March 19, 2007, she was walking

east on West 30th Street, between South Tripp Avenue and South Kildare Avenue, with her

friend Elizabeth Hernandez when they heard gunshots. She looked behind them and observed a

Chevy Astro van. When the van passed them, Aguilar saw two Hispanic males about 19 or 20

years old. She described the passenger as wearing a white t-shirt. After the van passed them, she

heard more gunshots. They ran toward the gunshots and observed a boy on the ground “choking

up” blood. She remained on the scene until the police arrived and told them which direction the

van had traveled. Aguilar later viewed a photo array and two lineups but was unable to identify

anyone.

¶ 22   Lizette Martinez and Rita Serrano testified similarly that around 8:30 p.m. on March 19,

2007, they were walking Martinez’s dog eastward on West 30th Street, when they heard

gunshots behind them. Both women observed a gray van pass them with two occupants, a driver

and a passenger. They then heard two more gunshots in front of them, near West 30th Street and

South Karlov Avenue. When they went to that location, they each observed a young man on the

sidewalk who had been shot.

¶ 23   Serrano described the passenger in the van as a bald Hispanic male wearing a white t-

shirt. Martinez observed the van occupants were male but was unable to discern their race. Both

women separately viewed a photo array and a lineup, but neither made an identification.

¶ 24   Antonio Casillas testified that Victor Casillas was his younger brother. On March 19,

2007, Antonio was at home with his mother at the time of the shooting. His mother answered a

phone call and learned that Casillas had been shot. Antonio went to West 30th Street and South

Karlov Avenue with his mother. When he arrived, Antonio observed Casillas on the ground and

the paramedics were trying to revive him. Casillas was taken from the scene and Antonio later

                                               8
No. 1-21-1383

learned that his brother had passed away. On March 21, 2007, Antonio received a phone call

from an individual named Angel Rodriguez. Rodriguez told him that an individual from Farragut

High School known as “Little Rowdy” was “bragging” about shooting Casillas. Rodriguez also

told him that “Little Rowdy” was a Latin King member from near West 27th Street and South

Drake Avenue. Antonio had heard the name “Little Rowdy,” but did not know who “Little

Rowdy” was.

¶ 25   Also on March 21, 2007, Antonio was visited by his cousin Cindy Bahena. Bahena had a

MySpace social media account at that time, but Antonio did not. They logged into MySpace

through the account of an individual named Gladys. They looked for photographs of “Little

Rowdy.” They sent a friend request to “Little Rowdy,” which he accepted. They were then able

to view photographs on that account. On “Little Rowdy’s” account, they viewed photographs of

Casillas and defendant. Antonio did not know defendant’s name when he viewed the

photographs on MySpace. Antonio subsequently obtained a Farragut High School yearbook and

found a photograph showing the same individual as the MySpace photograph and the name listed

was Oscar Flores. Antonio identified defendant in court as the individual in the photographs.

Antonio later shared this information with a detective working on the investigation and also

provided the detective with login information to access MySpace.

¶ 26   On cross-examination, Antonio admitted that he was formerly a member of the Two Six

gang, but testified that he quit in 2004 or 2005. He denied knowing that Casillas or Gonzalez

were Two Six members. Antonio did not recall the year of the Farragut yearbook he viewed.

Defense counsel asked Antonio if he recalled prior testimony in which he testified viewing the

2006 to 2007 yearbook, but he could not recall. Antonio denied “having it out for Little Rowdy”

after speaking with Rodriguez.

                                              9
No. 1-21-1383

¶ 27   Antonio also denied showing defendant’s picture to Gonzalez. Antonio testified that he

knew of Gonzalez, but did not know Gonzalez was friends with his brother. He admitted that he

called Gonzalez to tell him that the police were looking for him, but did not tell Gonzalez about

the MySpace photograph.

¶ 28   Evangeline Martinez testified that she was Casillas’s mother. She knew Gonzalez was

friends with Casillas, but denied having any conversations with Gonzalez after Casillas’s death.

Martinez further denied telling Gonzalez that he needed to identify anyone in the case, and

specifically did not tell him to identify defendant.

¶ 29   Yolanda Gutierrez testified that her 1989 Chevy Astro van was stolen on March 16, 2007,

and she did not know who stole her vehicle.

¶ 30   Detective Greg Swiderek testified that on March 19, 2007 around 8:40 p.m., he and his

partner, Detective David Roberts, were assigned to investigate a shooting that occurred near

West 30th Street and South Karlov Avenue. They proceeded to that location, and when they

arrived, Casillas had already been removed from the scene. Detective Swiderek then learned of

another crime scene at West 30th Street and South Kildare Avenue and he went to that location.

There were forensic investigators at both locations collecting evidence and taking photographs.

He also spoke with Medina about the shooting, but after their conversation, Detective Swiderek

did not have a suspect in the shooting.

¶ 31   On March 28, 2007, Detective Swiderek spoke with another officer who informed him

that Antonio told that officer that an individual called Little Rowdy was bragging about the

shooting on MySpace and at Farragut High School. The officer gave him the name Oscar Flores,

but the officer knew defendant as Little Panther, not Little Rowdy.

                                                 10
No. 1-21-1383

¶ 32   Detective Swiderek obtained a photograph of defendant and showed it to Antonio.

Antonio told the detective it was same picture he had viewed on MySpace of the individual

bragging about the shooting. Detective Swiderek received the two MySpace photographs

obtained by Antonio of defendant and Casillas. Detective Swiderek created a photo array which

was shown separately to Martinez, Serrano, Aguilar, and Hernandez, but none of the women

were able to make an identification.

¶ 33   In May 2007, Martinez, Serrano, Aguilar, and Hernandez each viewed a lineup which

included defendant, but none were able to make an identification. Gonzalez also viewed the

lineup and identified defendant as the person who shot Casillas. Gonzalez did not tell Detective

Swiderek that he was having second thoughts about identifying defendant. Detective Swiderek

also testified that no one in his presence threatened Gonzalez to make an identification. Gonzalez

did not tell him that Antonio had threatened him to identify defendant, that he identified

defendant because Casillas’s mother begged him to make an identification, or that he identified

defendant because he was a Latin King.

¶ 34   In June 2007, Detective Swiderek interviewed codefendant Macias about the shootings.

Detective Swiderek showed Macias defendant’s photograph. The detective asked Macias if

defendant was involved in the shooting. He also showed Casillas’s picture to Macias and asked if

he knew who Casillas was. During the interview, Macias made an incriminating statement and

was subsequently charged with murder and attempted murder. Gonzalez, Medina, Aguilar,

Serrano, and Martinez each viewed a lineup with Macias, but no one made an identification.

Defendant was arrested in July 2007.

¶ 35   On cross-examination, Detective Swiderek testified that he was given the photographs of

defendant and Casillas by another officer, and later Antonio showed him the photos on a

                                               11
No. 1-21-1383

computer at Antonio’s house. Defense counsel asked if it was correct that the only person who

could connect defendant to the nickname Little Rowdy was Antonio. Detective Swiderek

responded that Macias connected defendant to the name. Counsel asked the detective if he

remembered prior testimony in which he testified that Antonio and Bahena were the only people

who could connect defendant to the nickname, and Detective Swiderek answered that he could

have said that. He admitted that he never spoke with Bahena, but another detective spoke with

her. Detective Swiderek admitted that he was never on the MySpace page for Little Rowdy, nor

did he make any efforts to connect defendant to the MySpace page.

¶ 36   On redirect, Detective Swiderek testified that he showed Macias a picture and Macias

indicated that defendant was Little Rowdy. On recross, he admitted that when Antonio gave him

the MySpace photographs and said he had been bragging about the shooting, that information

was a tip. On redirect, over defense counsel’s objection, Detective Swiderek identified two

exhibits, one was a MySpace photograph used at trial which had a redaction at the bottom and

the second was another copy of the same photograph without the redaction of the caption. The

caption read, “Little Bonez Rotsk.” Detective Swiderek testified that “Little Bonez” was

Casillas’s nickname and that the phrase in gang terminology meant that Little Bonez “rots, rots

in hell. He’s dead.” Detective Swiderek further testified that the photograph with the caption

came from Little Rowdy’s MySpace page.

¶ 37   Officer Timothy Finley testified that he previously was assigned to the gang team in the

10th district, which included the area of the shooting. In March 2007, he was assigned to the 10th

district. During his time on the gang team, he became familiar with gangs, primarily the Latin

Kings, Two Six, Two Two Boys, and the Satan Disciples. He described the territory for the Latin

Kings and the Two Six, the hand symbols used for each gang, and how to use the hand symbols

                                               12
No. 1-21-1383

to show disrespect for a gang. He testified about the caption in the MySpace photo, “Little Bonez

Rotsk.” In gang context, he stated that “tsk” means “Two Six Killer” and was used by members

of the Latin Kings to show disrespect to the Two Six gang.

¶ 38   The parties entered stipulations from three investigators about statements made by

Gonzalez. Gonzalez told an investigator in 2009 that one guy in the van was wearing a hooded

sweatshirt and the other was bald, he did not observe their faces, but the shooter had a long black

gun. Gonzalez and his girlfriend were at Antonio’s house two or three days after the shooting

and Antonio showed them MySpace photos and were told that the people in the photographs

were called “King Trouble” and “King Criminal” and were bragging about the shooting.

Gonzalez stated that was when his memory came back, and he told Antonio the guys in the

photographs were the ones who did the shooting. Gonzalez told another investigator in 2011 that

he remembered observing the gun stick out of the vehicle and he remembered the gun “very

well,” but he did not get a look at the shooter. Gonzalez did not recognize the person in the

MySpace photograph, but agreed to say he was the shooter because Antonio asked him, and he

felt “paternalistic” towards Casillas. When he identified defendant in a lineup, he felt bad about

the false identification, but he identified defendant because Antonio asked him. He identified

defendant because he was a Latin King. Gonzalez told a third investigator in 2015 that Antonio

told him to the tell the police that the person in the MySpace photograph was the person who

shot Casillas. At first Gonzalez did not agree to do it, but Casillas’s mother begged him and

cried. He then agreed to do it. When he viewed the lineup, Gonzalez tried to tell the police that

he did not recognize the shooter. He said the police told him he could be charged if he did not

pick the same person as the individual depicted in the MySpace photo.

                                                13
No. 1-21-1383

¶ 39      The State then rested. Defendant moved for a directed finding, which the trial court

denied. In defendant’s case, the parties stipulated that Detective Swiderek testified on October

26, 2011, that Antonio handed him two photographs, and that Antonio and Bahena were the only

two people who could connect the nickname Little Rowdy to Oscar Flores. The defense then

rested.

¶ 40      Following closing arguments, the jury found defendant guilty of the first degree murder

of Casillas and that he personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused Casillas’s death.

The jury also found defendant guilty of the attempted murder of Medina, and aggravated battery.

Defendant filed a motion for a new trial, which the trial court denied. At the sentencing hearing,

the court sentenced defendant to consecutive terms of 29 years, 25 years, 20 years, and 6 years in

the Illinois Department of Corrections. The trial court denied an oral motion to reconsider the

sentence.

¶ 41      On direct appeal, defendant argued that (1) the State failed to proved him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt where the only evidence linking defendant to the shooting was a single

unbelievable witness; (2) defendant was deprived of his rights to a fair trial and to confront and

cross-examine witnesses against him when the State called codefendant Macias who refused to

answer any questions; (3) defendant was deprived of his right to a fair trial by the State’s

introduction of prejudicial hearsay testimony; (4) defendant was deprived of his right to a fair

trial based on pervasive misconduct by the prosecutors throughout trial; (5) the trial court erred

in allowing the State to introduce a caption from a MySpace photo without foundation and in

violation of this court’s decision in Flores I; and (6) on remand, this court should assign this case

to a different trial judge. People v. Flores (Flores II), 2019 IL App (1st) 160404-U. This court

rejected defendant’s claims and affirmed his conviction. Id. ¶ 116.

                                                 14
No. 1-21-1383

¶ 42   In March 2021, defendant filed his pro se postconviction petition as well as a

memorandum of law in support of his petition. In his petition, defendant raised multiple claims,

including that he was denied his right to a fair trial because: (1) the State was allowed to question

Macias: (2) the trial court denied his request to ask the jury venire about gangs; (3) the State was

allowed to repeatedly introduce the prior consistent statements of Gonzalez; (4) Gonzalez

repeatedly referred to defendant’s first trial; (5) the trial court allowed Detective Swiderek and

Officer Finley to testify about the their belief concerning the meaning of a photo caption; (6) the

State committed multiple acts of prosecutorial misconduct; (7) the trial court abused its

discretion multiple times; and (8) the cumulative effect of these errors denied him a fair trial. He

also asserted that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise several meritorious

claims on direct appeal, that he was denied his right to confront witnesses, and that he was

denied his right to a fair trial and impartial “adjudicator.” In support of his claims, defendant

attached multiple excerpts from the report of proceedings at trial as well as the proposed

modified jury instructions to his petition. In April 2021, the trial court summarily dismissed

defendant’s petition in a written order and found defendant’s claims were frivolous and patently

without merit.

¶ 43   This appeal followed.

¶ 44   On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred in dismissing his postconviction

petition at the first stage because he set forth the gist of a claim of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel. Specifically, he contends that his appellate counsel was arguably ineffective

for failing to raise a claim that the trial court erred in refusing defendant’s request to ask the

potential jurors questions about their attitudes toward gangs when gang issues, including

defendant’s gang membership, would be introduced at trial. Defendant has not challenged the

                                                 15
No. 1-21-1383

remaining claims presented in his petition on appeal and has therefore forfeited those claims.

People v. Munson, 206 Ill. 2d 104, 113 (2002) (concluding that the petitioner abandoned several

postconviction claims by failing to raise them on appeal); see also Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff.

Oct. 1, 2020) (“Points not argued are forfeited and shall not be raised in the reply brief, in oral

argument, or on petition for rehearing”).

¶ 45   The Post-Conviction Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 through 122-8 (West 2018)) provides a tool

by which those under criminal sentence in this state can assert that their convictions were the

result of a substantial denial of their rights under the United States Constitution or the Illinois

Constitution or both. 725 ILCS 5/122-1(a) (West 2018); People v. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d 366, 378-

79 (1998). Postconviction relief is limited to constitutional deprivations that occurred at the

original trial. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 380. “A proceeding brought under the [Post-Conviction

Act] is not an appeal of a defendant’s underlying judgment. Rather, it is a collateral attack on the

judgment.” People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 89 (1999). “The purpose of [a postconviction]

proceeding is to allow inquiry into constitutional issues relating to the conviction or sentence that

were not, and could not have been, determined on direct appeal.” People v. Barrow, 195 Ill. 2d

506, 519 (2001).

¶ 46   At the first stage, the circuit court must independently review the postconviction petition

within 90 days of its filing and determine whether “the petition is frivolous or is patently without

merit.” 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2018). “A postconviction petition is frivolous or

patently without merit when its allegations, taken as true and liberally construed, fail to present

the gist of a constitutional claim.” People v. Harris, 224 Ill. 2d 115, 126 (2007). A petition is

frivolous or patently without merit only if it has no arguable basis in law or fact. People v.

Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 16 (2009). A petition lacks an arguable basis in law or fact if it is “based

                                                 16
No. 1-21-1383

on an indisputably meritless legal theory,” such as one that is “completely contradicted by the

record,” or “a fanciful factual allegation,” including “those which are fantastic or delusional.” Id.

at 16-17.

¶ 47   If the court determines that the petition is either frivolous or patently without merit, the

court must dismiss the petition in a written order. 725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West 2018). At the

dismissal stage of a postconviction proceeding, the trial court is concerned merely with

determining whether the petition’s allegations sufficiently demonstrate a constitutional infirmity

that would necessitate relief under the Act. Coleman, 183 Ill. 2d at 380. The circuit court is not

permitted to engage in any fact-finding or credibility determinations. Id. at 385. We are to accept

well-pleaded factual allegations of a postconviction petition and its supporting evidence as true

unless they are positively rebutted by the record of the original trial proceedings. Sanders, 2016

IL 118123, ¶ 48. We review the summary dismissal of defendant’s petition de novo. People v.

Tate, 2012 IL 112214, ¶ 10.

¶ 48   Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are resolved under the standard set forth in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the Supreme Court delineated a

two-part test to use when evaluating whether a defendant was denied the effective assistance of

counsel in violation of the sixth amendment. Under Strickland, a defendant must demonstrate

that counsel’s performance was deficient and that such deficient performance substantially

prejudiced defendant. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To demonstrate performance deficiency, a

defendant must establish that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness. People v. Edwards, 195 Ill. 2d 142, 163 (2001). In evaluating sufficient

prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

                                                 17
No. 1-21-1383

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

¶ 49   “The Strickland standard applies equally to claims of ineffective appellate counsel, and a

defendant raising such a claim must show both that appellate counsel’s performance was

deficient and that, but for counsel’s errors, there is a reasonable probability that the appeal would

have been successful.” People v. Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d 490, 497 (2010). “Appellate counsel is not

obligated to brief and argue every conceivable issue on appeal, and a defendant cannot claim

prejudice based on appellate counsel’s failure to raise an issue that is not meritorious.” People v.

Pingelton, 2022 IL 127680, ¶ 64. “If the underlying claim would not have succeeded on direct

appeal, then ‘there is no arguable legal basis’ for defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel, and dismissal is ‘proper.’ ” People v. Randall, 2021 IL App (1st) 191194, ¶ 66

(quoting Petrenko, 237 Ill. 2d at 501-02).

¶ 50   At the first stage of postconviction proceedings, a petition alleging ineffective assistance

of counsel may not be dismissed if: (1) counsel’s performance arguably fell below an objective

standard of reasonableness; and (2) the petitioner was arguably prejudiced as a result. Hodges,

234 Ill. 2d at 17. “To adequately plead a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the petition

must satisfy both prongs of the test.” People v. Bush, 2022 IL App (1st) 210509, ¶ 31 (citing

Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17).

¶ 51   Here, defendant’s underlying claim is that the trial court erred in denying his attorney’s

request for additional questions during voir dire regarding the prospective jurors attitudes and

bias toward gangs. Prior to jury selection, defense counsel asked the court to ask the venire

questions regarding whether they know people in gangs, whether they have had any interaction

with gangs, whether they have strong feelings about gangs that would affect their ability to be

                                                 18
No. 1-21-1383

fair, whether they had ties to any community watchdog groups, and whether they had strong

feelings about guns that would affect their ability to be fair. The State objected to these questions

and argued that defense counsel’s requested questions were not appropriate. The prosecutor

contended that the appropriate question regarding gang bias was the same question used for

police officers, i.e., “You’re going to hear evidence that there is a gang involved in this case.

Would that cause you to be *** not impartial.” Following this discussion, the trial court denied

defendant’s request and held that she would ask the standard question the same way the court

would ask about the credibility of police witnesses.

¶ 52   During jury selection, the court asked the prospective jurors whether they would be able

to give each witness who testifies the same weight, level of credibility, regardless of if they are a

police officer, alleged gang member, or any other witness. Defendant argues that the court’s

failure to ask the additional questions about gang-related prejudices was an error because this

evidence was integral to the trial.

¶ 53   Voir dire examination is to assure the selection of an impartial jury; it is not to be used as

a means of indoctrinating a jury or impaneling a jury with a particular predisposition. People v.

Bowel, 111 Ill. 2d 58, 64 (1986). Stated another way, the purpose of voir dire “is to obtain

enough information about the beliefs and opinions of potential jurors as would allow for the

removal of those members of the venire whose minds are so closed by bias and prejudice that

they cannot apply the law as instructed by the trial court.” People v. Sanders, 238 Ill. 2d 391, 400

(2010) (citing People v. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d 467, 476-77 (2000)).

¶ 54   “[T]he trial court is given the primary responsibility of conducting the voir dire

examination, and the extent and scope of the examination rests within its discretion.” Strain, 194

Ill. 2d at 476. “However, the trial court should exercise its discretion in a manner that is

                                                 19
No. 1-21-1383

consistent with the goals of voir dire. Voir dire is conducted to assure the selection of an

impartial jury, free from bias or prejudice, and grant counsel an intelligent basis on which to

exercise peremptory challenges.” People v. Dixon, 382 Ill. App. 3d 233, 243 (2008). “ ‘To be

constitutionally compelled, it is not enough that a voir dire question be helpful; rather, the trial

court’s failure to ask the question must render the defendant’s proceedings fundamentally

unfair.’ ” People v. Encalado, 2018 IL 122059, ¶ 25 (quoting People v. Terrell, 185 Ill. 2d 467,

485 (1998)).

¶ 55   In Strain, the supreme court held that when testimony pertaining to gang membership and

gang-related activity was an integral part of the defendant’s trial, the defendant must be afforded

an opportunity to question prospective jurors concerning any gang bias. Strain, 194 Ill. 2d at

477. In that case, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder. The State’s theory was

that the defendant, a gang member, shot the victim while attempting to retaliate against a rival

gang for allegedly shooting the defendant in the leg on an earlier occasion. Id. at 470. Prior to the

start of voir dire, the trial court stated that it would ask prospective jurors about their

involvement, if any, with gangs. Id.

¶ 56   During voir dire, the trial court asked potential jurors if they, any member of their family,

or a close friend had any involvement with a gang. The court also asked each prospective juror

whether he or she could be fair to both sides. However, the court refused defense counsel’s

request to ask each prospective juror whether the juror would find the defendant less believable

if the juror learned that the defendant belonged to a gang. Id. at 470-72. At trial, the State

introduced the defendant’s alleged statement into evidence, as well as the testimony of several

police officers and members of a rival gang in support of its theory that the defendant shot and

killed the victim in an attempt for revenge against a rival gang. Id. at 473.

                                                 20
No. 1-21-1383

¶ 57   As the supreme court acknowledged, gang information permeated the testimony of

almost every witness at the defendant’s trial and the outcome of the trial turned upon the

credibility of the defendant, the testifying police officers, and rival gang members. Id. The Strain

court acknowledged that “street gangs are regarded with considerable disfavor by other segments

of our society” and “there may be strong prejudice against street gangs.” Id. at 477. In

considering the prejudicial effect of bias against gangs, the court held that “when testimony

regarding gang membership and gang-related activity is to be an integral part of the defendant’s

trial, the defendant must be afforded an opportunity to question the prospective jurors, either

directly or through questions submitted to the trial court, concerning gang bias.” Id.

¶ 58   Following this holding, the supreme court in Strain concluded that the trial court erred in

denying the defendant’s request to question the venire regarding gang bias and “defendant was

denied an informed and intelligent basis on which to assert challenges for cause or to exercise

peremptory challenges.” Id. at 481.

¶ 59   Defendant contends that the trial court’s question asking if the prospective jurors could

give each witness, including police officers and alleged gang members, the same level of

credibility was not sufficient under Strain. According to defendant, this question “failed to

adequately probe whether the jurors would be prejudiced by evidence” that defendant and some

witnesses were “gang members and lived a gang lifestyle.” We disagree.

¶ 60   The requested question in Strain sought to ask whether the prospective jurors would find

the defendant less credible based on his alleged gang membership. Id. at 471. In this case, the

trial court essentially asked each prospective juror whether they would judge the credibility of a

gang member as they would judge the credibility of any other witness. Contrary to defendant’s

contention, Strain did not hold that a trial court is required to ask the venire multiple questions

                                                21
No. 1-21-1383

about their knowledge and involvement with gangs. Strain did not establish such a rule; rather,

the supreme court held that the defendant must be afforded an opportunity to question

prospective jurors about gang bias. Id. at 481. The trial court in this case complied with Strain by

asking the prospective jurors about their ability to weigh the credibility of witnesses involved in

gangs the same way they would any other witnesses who testified.

¶ 61   Further, we point out that the questions sought by defense counsel relating to gang

involvement were similar to those asked in Strain but found insufficient to determine bias. “A

juror might well answer a question regarding gang involvement in the negative, while harboring

an opinion of gang members that would affect his ability to weigh the evidence fairly and

impartially.” Strain, 194 Ill. 2d at 474; see also People v. Gardner, 348 Ill. App. 3d 479, 482,

486 (2004) (observing that Strain held “gang bias does not depend on one’s involvement with

gangs”). The supreme court later explained its holding in Strain:

                “The voir dire questions in Strain were not required because gang members feel

                ashamed of being in a gang, or simply because gang membership provokes strong

                feelings in the public. Instead, the questions were required because the public

                views the testimony of gang members with skepticism and may, therefore, fail to

                consider the testimony of a gang member without prejudice.” People v. Encalado,

                2018 IL 122059, ¶ 30 (declining to extend the holding in Strain to voir dire

                questions about a bias against prostitution).

Defendant has not cited any cases extending Strain to find an abuse of discretion for failing to

ask additional questions during voir dire about gang involvement as sufficient to elicit a bias.

Under Strain, the trial court was required to ask the venire a question about any bias against the

testimony of gang members and the court complied. Since the trial court properly questioned the

                                                 22
No. 1-21-1383

venire about gang bias, the court did not err in denying defense counsel’s requested jury

questions.

¶ 62    Since we have concluded that defendant’s underlying issue lacks merit, defendant cannot

show that he was arguably prejudiced by counsel’s failure to raise this claim on appeal. People v.

Easley, 192 Ill. 2d 307, 329 (2000). Accordingly, defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel fails and the trial court properly dismissed defendant’s postconviction petition

at the first stage.

¶ 63    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 64    Affirmed.

                                                23