Court Opinion

ID: 9897530
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:15:43.891339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:33.599497
License: Public Domain

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office
of the Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor
approved by the Court and may not summarize all portions of the opinion.

                         Cardali v. Cardali (A-25-22) (087340)

Argued April 25, 2023 -- Decided August 8, 2023

PATTERSON, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

      The Court considers the prima facie showing of cohabitation that a party
seeking to suspend or terminate alimony must present in order to obtain discovery.

       Plaintiff Suzanne Cardali and defendant Michael Cardali entered into a
property settlement agreement (PSA), which was incorporated in their judgment of
divorce in December 2006. The PSA provided that defendant’s obligation to pay
plaintiff alimony would end upon her “cohabitation,” as defined by New Jersey law.

       In December 2020, defendant filed a motion to terminate alimony, stating he
believed that plaintiff and an individual named Bruce McDermott had been in “a
relationship tantamount to marriage” for more than 8 years, over the course of which
they attended family functions and other social events as a couple, memorialized
their relationship on social media, and vacationed together. Defendant submitted the
report of a private investigator indicating that plaintiff and McDermott were together
on all of the 44 days that they were under surveillance, and that they were together
overnight on more than half of those days. The investigator’s report included
photographs of plaintiff and McDermott carrying groceries, bags of personal
belongings, and laundry in and out of one another’s residences. The investigator
stated plaintiff had access to McDermott’s home when McDermott was not at home.

      The trial court denied defendant’s application, and the Appellate Division
affirmed. The Court granted certification limited to questions about the prima facie
showing and discovery issues. 252 N.J. 465 (2023).

HELD: A movant need not present evidence on all of the cohabitation factors set
forth in Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 202 (1999) -- or in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-
23(n), for cases in which the PSA was executed after the statute’s enactment -- to
make a prima facie showing. If the movant’s certification addresses some of the
relevant factors and is supported by competent evidence, and if that evidence would
warrant a finding of cohabitation if unrebutted, the trial court should find that the
movant has presented prima facie evidence of cohabitation and should grant limited

                                          1
discovery tailored to the issues contested in the motion, subject to any protective
order necessary to safeguard confidential information. Here, defendant presented
prima facie evidence as to several of the Konzelman cohabitation factors, and that
evidence, if unrebutted, would warrant a finding of cohabitation. Defendant was
therefore entitled to limited discovery.

1. Agreements to terminate alimony upon the cohabitation of the recipient spouse
are enforceable so long as the relationship constitutes cohabitation and the
cohabitation provision of the PSA was voluntary, knowing, and consensual. In
Konzelman, the Court observed that “[c]ohabitation involves an intimate
relationship in which the couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are
commonly associated with marriage,” including, but “not limited to, living together,
intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts, sharing living expenses and
household chores, and recognition of the relationship in the couple’s social and
family circle.” 158 N.J. at 202. In 2014, the Legislature amended the alimony
statute, which now prescribes a standard for trial courts to apply when they
determine whether the record supports a finding of cohabitation, including factors
similar to those identified in Konzelman. See N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n). The financial
relationship between the spouse or civil union partner receiving alimony and the
alleged cohabitant is not itself dispositive; it is instead addressed in three of the
seven statutory factors to be considered by the trial court. (pp. 13-19)

2. The Court has not yet addressed the prima facie showing necessary for a court to
order discovery in a dispute over cohabitation, but the Appellate Division recently
rejected the argument that, in a case governed by the 2014 amendments to the
alimony statute, evidence of all specific factors prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n)
“must be presented for a movant to establish a prima facie case of cohabitation.”
Temple v. Temple, 468 N.J. Super. 364, 370 (App. Div. 2021). The Appellate
Division held that, for a prima facie showing, “[i]t is enough that the movant present
evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude the supported spouse and another
are in ‘a mutually supportive, intimate personal relationship’ in which they have
‘undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly associated with marriage or
civil union.’” Id. at 371 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n)). (pp. 20-22)

3. In this case, because the parties’ PSA was executed before N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n)
was enacted, the appeal is governed by the definition of “cohabitation” and the
factors identified in Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 202, not by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n). The
two standards are closely analogous, however, and the Court addresses the
requirements for a prima facie showing in both categories of cases. A prima facie
showing is distinct from the final proofs that are the basis for an adjudication on the
merits; it is simply a threshold showing required so that the privacy of the spouse or
civil union partner receiving alimony is not invaded in pursuit of a baseless
cohabitation claim. Nothing in Konzelman or N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) suggests that
                                           2
the movant must present evidence relevant to all of the factors in order to set forth a
prima facie case. Indeed, any such requirement would impose an unfair burden on a
movant at the preliminary stage. Absent discovery, a movant is unlikely to have
access to documents relevant to the financial factors. The Court holds that if the
movant presents a certification supported by competent evidence as to at least some
of the relevant factors, and if that evidence, if unrebutted, would sustain the
movant’s burden of proof as to cohabitation, the court should find that the movant
has made a prima facie showing even if the spouse or civil union partner receiving
alimony presents a certification contesting facts asserted by the movant. (pp. 23-28)

4. If the trial court finds that the movant has presented a prima facie showing of
cohabitation, it should order limited discovery as to discrete issues relevant to one or
more of the cohabitation factors that govern the case. In fashioning its discovery
order, the trial court should take appropriate steps to safeguard the privacy of the
spouse or civil union partner receiving alimony and the individual with whom that
person is alleged to be cohabiting. New Jersey’s current Family Part court rules do
not address post-judgment discovery in connection with a motion to terminate or
suspend alimony based on cohabitation, and the Court requests that the Family
Practice Committee propose amendments to the court rules governing such
discovery and uniform interrogatories to streamline the discovery process in such
cases. Following the completion of limited discovery, the parties should file
supplemental certifications. If material facts remain in dispute after that, the court
must conduct a plenary hearing to determine the motion. The movant bears the
burden of proving cohabitation at all stages of the proceeding. (pp. 28-30)

5. Here, although defendant did not proffer evidence that plaintiff and McDermott
had “intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts” or that they were “sharing
living expenses,” he did present evidence about other Konzelman factors, including
evidence relevant to whether plaintiff and McDermott were “living together,”
evidence that they shared household chores, and evidence relevant to “recognition of
the relationship in the couple’s social and family circle.” The Court does not
address whether that evidence -- in its current form or as potentially buttressed by
financial information following discovery -- establishes cohabitation under the
Konzelman standard. But assuming, for purposes of the prima facie inquiry, that
defendant’s contentions are correct, the evidence he presented constitutes a prima
facie showing of cohabitation, and the trial court did not properly exercise its
discretion when it denied defendant’s motion without discovery. (pp. 30-32)

      REVERSED and REMANDED to the trial court.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES SOLOMON, PIERRE-LOUIS,
WAINER APTER, and FASCIALE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s opinion.
JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily assigned) did not participate.
                                           3
       SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
             A-25 September Term 2022
                       087340

                   Suzanne Cardali,

                Plaintiff-Respondent,

                          v.

                   Michael Cardali,

                Defendant-Appellant.

        On certification to the Superior Court,
                  Appellate Division.

       Argued                      Decided
    April 25, 2023               August 8, 2023

Matheu D. Nunn argued the cause for appellant (Einhorn,
Barbarito, Frost & Botwinick, and DeTommaso Law
Group, attorneys; Matheu D. Nunn, of counsel and on the
briefs, and Jessie M. Mills, Bonnie C. Frost, and Taryn R.
Zimmerman, on the briefs).

Thomas D. Baldwin argued the cause for respondent
(Chiesa, Shahinian & Giantomasi, attorneys; Thomas D.
Baldwin, on the brief).

Jeralyn L. Lawrence, President, argued the cause for
amicus curiae New Jersey State Bar Association (New
Jersey State Bar Association, attorneys; Jeralyn L.
Lawrence, of counsel and on the brief, and Derek M.
Freed, Timothy F. McGoughran, Catherine Murphy, and
Brian G. Paul, on the brief).

                          1
            Carolyn N. Daly argued the cause for amicus curiae
            New Jersey Chapter of American Academy of
            Matrimonial Lawyers (Cohen Seglias Pallas Greenhall
            & Furman, attorneys; Carolyn N. Daly, Jeralyn
            Lawrence, Dina M. Mikulka, and Sheryl J. Seiden, on
            the brief).

          JUSTICE PATTERSON delivered the opinion of the Court.

      In actions for divorce, “courts may award alimony ‘as the circumstances

of the parties and the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and just.’”

Quinn v. Quinn, 225 N.J. 34, 48 (2016) (quoting Innes v. Innes, 117 N.J. 496,

503 (1990)); see also N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 (prescribing the factors for a court to

apply in determining alimony). An award of alimony, however, is “always

subject to review and modification on a showing of ‘changed circumstances.’”

Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980); see also Quinn, 225 N.J. at 48-49.

      We have long recognized, as one example of “changed circumstances,”

the decision of a spouse or civil union partner receiving alimony to cohabit

with another person, and we have authorized courts to suspend or terminate

alimony in certain settings on cohabitation grounds. Quinn, 225 N.J. at 49-55;

Konzelman v. Konzelman, 158 N.J. 185, 197-203 (1999); Gayet v. Gayet, 92

N.J. 149, 150-55 (1983). In Konzelman, we defined cohabitation as “an

intimate relationship in which the couple has undertaken duties and privileges

that are commonly associated with marriage,” and we identified factors that a

                                         2
court should apply to determine whether to find cohabitation in a given case.

158 N.J. at 202.

      In 2014, the Legislature amended the alimony statute to codify the

standard governing motions to suspend or terminate alimony based on

cohabitation, applying the amendments prospectively. L. 2014, c. 42, § 1. It

defined cohabitation to “involve[] a mutually supportive, intimate personal

relationship in which a couple has undertaken duties and privileges that are

commonly associated with marriage or civil union but does not necessarily

maintain a single common household,” and prescribed seven factors, most of

which are analogous to the factors identified in Konzelman, to guide the

court’s determination. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n).

      In this appeal, we consider the prima facie showing of cohabitation that

a party seeking to suspend or terminate alimony must present to obtain

discovery. Plaintiff Suzanne Cardali and defendant Michael Cardali entered

into a property settlement agreement (PSA), incorporated in their Dual

Judgment of Divorce. The PSA provided that defendant’s obligation to pay

alimony to plaintiff would terminate upon her “cohabitation,” as defined by

New Jersey law. Because the parties’ PSA was executed before the enactment

of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n), the definition of “cohabitation” in Konzelman and

the factors identified in that decision apply.

                                         3
      Defendant filed a motion to terminate his alimony obligation, claiming

that plaintiff was in a long-term romantic relationship with an individual

named Bruce McDermott and that the relationship constituted “cohabitation”

as that term was defined in our decisions in Konzelman and Quinn. Defendant

presented evidence relevant to some of the cohabitation factors identified in

Konzelman but submitted no evidence of any financial relationship between

plaintiff and McDermott. He argued that he needed discovery in order to

provide such proofs.

      The trial court found that defendant had failed to present evidence that

plaintiff and McDermott supported one another financially or in other respects ,

or that the relationship between plaintiff and McDermott was analogous to

marriage. It held that defendant had not presented a prima facie showing of

cohabitation and denied his motion without prejudice to a future application to

terminate alimony. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court’s

determination.

      We granted in part defendant’s petition for certification, and now reverse

the Appellate Division’s judgment. We do not view the case law, or N.J.S.A.

2A:34-23(n) in cases governed by the statute, to require evidence of a financial

relationship between the spouse or civil union partner receiving alimony and

the other person as a prerequisite to discovery; as a practical matter, such a

                                        4
showing may be impossible without discovery. Accordingly, we hold that a

movant need not present evidence on all of the cohabitation factors in order to

make a prima facie showing. If the movant’s certification addresses some of

the relevant factors and is supported by competent evidence, and if that

evidence would warrant a finding of cohabitation if unrebutted, the trial court

should find that the movant has presented prima facie evidence of

cohabitation.

      If the movant presents such prima facie evidence, the court should grant

limited discovery tailored to the issues contested in the motion, subject to any

protective order necessary to safeguard confidential information. If material

facts remain in dispute after discovery and the filing of supplemental

certifications, the court must conduct a plenary hearing before deciding the

motion to terminate or suspend alimony.

      In this appeal, we find that defendant presented prima facie evidence as

to several of the Konzelman cohabitation factors, and we view that evidence, if

unrebutted, to warrant a finding of cohabitation. Defendant was therefore

entitled to limited discovery, and the trial court erred when it denied his

motion to terminate alimony without ordering discovery. Accordingly, we

reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment and remand this matter to the trial

court for further proceedings.

                                        5
                                          I.

                                         A.

      Plaintiff and defendant were married on June 18, 1988. They had two

children, a son born in 1992 and a daughter born in 1995.

      After initiating divorce proceedings, the parties, represented by counsel,

negotiated the terms of a PSA. The parties executed the PSA on October 17,

2006, and it was incorporated in their Dual Judgment of Divorce entered on

December 4, 2006. The PSA provided that defendant would pay permanent

alimony to plaintiff in the amount of $5,417 per month. It stated that

defendant’s “obligation to pay alimony shall terminate upon [plaintiff’s]

remarriage or cohabitation (as defined by NJ law) or [plaintiff’s] or

[defendant’s] death, whichever occurs first.”

      On December 1, 2020, defendant filed a motion to terminate alimony

and for other relief that is not relevant to this appeal. In a certification filed in

support of his motion, defendant stated that he believed that plaintiff and

McDermott had been in “a relationship tantamount to marriage” for more than

eight years, interrupted by a brief separation in 2014. He certified that he had

learned in the summer of 2013 that McDermott “had proposed marriage to

[plaintiff] and she declined.” Relying on photographs and social media posts,

defendant contended that plaintiff and McDermott had attended family

                                          6
functions and other social events as a couple, memorialized their relationship

on social media, and vacationed together.

      Defendant also submitted the report of a private investigator whom he

retained to conduct surveillance of plaintiff and McDermott. The investigator

reported that plaintiff and McDermott were together on all of the forty-four

days that they were under surveillance in May through September 2019 and in

October 2020, and that they were together overnight on more than half of those

days. The investigator’s report included photographs of plaintiff and

McDermott carrying groceries, bags of personal belongings, and laundry in

and out of one another’s residences. The investigator stated that plaintiff had

access to McDermott’s home when McDermott was not at home.

      Plaintiff opposed defendant’s motion to terminate alimony. She certified

that “McDermott, with whom I have had an off and on dating relationship over

the years, has never proposed marriage to me, nor I to him,” and that she had

“no interest in another relationship akin to or actually like marriage.” She

represented that she and McDermott maintained separate residences, primarily

lived apart, and did not “share economics, either by way of contributing

toward the other’s expenses, sharing joint bank or financial accounts, loaning

the other money, or supporting the other in any way.” Plaintiff stated that

although she and McDermott “certainly enjoy spending time with and are fond

                                        7
of each other,” they were not “in a mutually supportive, intimate personal

relationship” in which they undertook “duties and privileges commonly

associated with marriage.”

      Although the parties’ PSA preceded the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-

23(n), the trial court based its determination on the statute. The court opined

that it is unclear precisely what evidence is necessary for a prima facie

showing of cohabitation under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n). It reasoned that

“[s]erious committed dating relationships” are “vastly different than those of

thirty or forty years ago,” and that the relationship must be considered “under

current social norms.” The court cautioned that “the supported spouse is not to

be financially punished for dating or even trying to find a future spouse” and

held that “[t]he financial relief stemming from a finding of cohabitation is that

the supported spouse no longer needs the financial support of the supportin g

spouse because that support is being provided, in whole or in part, by another

person.”

      The trial court viewed the record to establish that plaintiff and

McDermott saw one another frequently, that their relationship was recognized

by their respective social circles, that they might occasionally have

independent access to one another’s homes, that they vacationed together, and

that McDermott had a close relationship with the parties’ children. The trial

                                        8
court found these factors to constitute “hallmarks” that McDermott was

“plaintiff’s long-term romantic partner.” The court ruled, however, that “the

evidence provided does not suggest that their relationship is marriage-like or

that they mutually support each other financially or otherwise.” The trial court

therefore denied defendant’s application, without prejudice to his opportunity

to renew his application at a later stage “if the facts change.”

                                        B.

      Defendant appealed the trial court’s order. He agreed with the trial court

that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) governed his application to terminate alimony.

Defendant contended, however, that at a preliminary stage in which his only

obligation was to present a prima facie showing, the trial court had improperly

imposed on him a burden to proffer evidence on all cohabitation factors set

forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) without the benefit of discovery and had thereby

deprived him of the opportunity to prove his claim.

      Plaintiff disputed defendant’s contention that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n)

governs this case. She argued that our law provides no precise definition of a

prima facie showing of cohabitation, and that the trial court had properly

exercised its discretion when it denied defendant’s motion.

      The Appellate Division acknowledged that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) applies

only prospectively. The court stated, however, that neither party challenged

                                         9
the trial court’s application of the statute to their dispute, and that the statute

essentially adopted Konzelman’s definition of cohabitation. The appellate

court agreed with defendant that N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) does not mandate proof

as to all of the statutory cohabitation factors in a prima facie showing. The

Appellate Division found, however, that defendant “provided no evidence to

counter plaintiff’s assertion there was no financial entanglement between

[plaintiff and McDermott] and that McDermott maintained his own residence.”

Nor, in the court’s view, did defendant provide evidence that “McDermott

made any enforceable promise of support to plaintiff.” The appellate court

recognized no justification for any invasion of plaintiff’s privacy and held that

defendant was not entitled to discovery. It affirmed the trial court’s judgment.

                                         C.

      We granted defendant’s petition for certification, limited to the first two

questions raised: (1) whether “evidence of intertwined finances and joint

responsibility for living expenses” is required for a movant seeking to

terminate alimony to establish a prima facie cohabitation showing, even when

the alleged relationship is long-term and exclusive; and (2) whether a payee

spouse suspected of cohabiting with another in a long-term relationship -- who

entered a post-marital agreement providing that alimony terminates upon

cohabitation by the payee spouse -- has “privacy rights sufficient to avoid

                                         10
discovery where that payee makes the relationship widely known to the

public.” See 252 N.J. 465 (2023).1

      We also granted the applications of the New Jersey State Bar

Association and the New Jersey Chapter of the American Academy of

Matrimonial Lawyers to participate as amici curiae.

                                        II.

                                        A.

      Defendant contends that the Appellate Division improperly mandated

that he demonstrate a financial relationship between plaintiff and McDermott

at the prima facie stage, without access to discovery that might have allowed

him to make such a showing. He argues that nothing in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-

23(n)’s plain language or legislative history supports the Appellate Division’s

view that a movant must make a prima facie showing on all of the statutory

factors in order to obtain discovery.

                                        B.

      Plaintiff counters that the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion was

proper and is entitled to deference on appeal. She argues that neither N.J.S.A.

1
  We denied certification on the third issue raised by defendant: whether
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) should retroactively apply to settlement agreements
executed prior to the statute’s enactment in 2014 that do not specify a standard
to determine cohabitation.
                                       11
2A:34-23(n) nor case law precisely defines the prima facie showing of

cohabitation that a payor spouse must present. Plaintiff asserts that trial courts

should retain the discretion to deny cohabitation applications without

discovery to avoid harassment and oppression of former spouses and civil

union partners who are entitled to alimony.

                                        C.

      Amicus curiae the New Jersey State Bar Association argues that a

movant in a cohabitation case makes a prima facie showing if the evidence

presented would support a factfinder’s conclusion that the spouse or civil

union partner and another person are in a mutually supportive, intimate

personal relationship in which they have undertaken duties and privileges

commonly associated with marriage or civil union. Amicus asserts that if such

a showing is made, the burden of proof should shift to the spouse or civi l

union partner receiving alimony to disprove cohabitation.

                                       D.

      Amicus curiae the New Jersey Chapter of the American Academy of

Matrimonial Lawyers asserts that a movant need not provide proof as to all

factors identified in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) in order to present a prima facie

showing of cohabitation.

                                       12
                                        III.

                                        A.

      New Jersey’s alimony statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, provides in part that,

            [p]ending any matrimonial action or action for
            dissolution of a civil union . . . , or after judgment of
            divorce or dissolution or maintenance, . . . the court
            may make such order as to the alimony or maintenance
            of the parties . . . as the circumstances of the parties and
            the nature of the case shall render fit, reasonable and
            just.

An award of alimony permits a spouse or civil union partner “to share in the

accumulated marital assets to which he or she contributed.” Konzelman, 158

N.J. at 195. “Alimony is an ‘economic right that arises out of the marital

relationship and provides the dependent spouse with “a level of support and

standard of living . . . .”’” Quinn, 225 N.J. at 48 (quoting Mani v. Mani, 183

N.J. 70, 80 (2005)).

      Alimony “may clearly be the subject of a voluntary and consensual

agreement undertaken as part of the termination of marriage and divorce.”

Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 194-95. “Like other spousal agreements, those

covering alimony may be modified in light of changed circumstances.” Id. at

195; see also Quinn, 225 N.J. at 49. “Agreements to terminate alimony upon

the cohabitation of the recipient spouse are enforceable so long as the

relationship constitutes cohabitation and ‘the cohabitation provision of the

                                        13
[PSA] was voluntary, knowing and consensual.’” Quinn, 225 N.J. at 50

(alteration in original) (quoting Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 203).

      In Lepis, we established principles governing the modification of

alimony by virtue of changed circumstances. 83 N.J. at 150-59. We observed

that “[t]he equitable authority of a court to modify support obligations in

response to changed circumstances, regardless of their source, cannot be

restricted,” and that “‘changed circumstances’ are not limited in scope to

events that were unforeseeable at the time of divorce.” Id. at 149, 152; see

also J.B. v. W.B., 215 N.J. 305, 327 (2013) (noting that “[c]hanged

circumstances are not confined to events unknown or unanticipated at the time

of the agreement,” but that “care must be taken not to upset the reasonable

expectations of the parties”).

      As we held in Lepis, “[t]he party seeking modification has the burden of

showing such ‘changed circumstances’ as would warrant relief from the

support or maintenance provisions involved,” and “[a] prima facie showing of

changed circumstances must be made before a court will order discovery of an

ex-spouse’s financial status.” 83 N.J. at 157. In Lepis, we identified “the

dependent spouse’s cohabitation with another” as one example of “changed

circumstances” recognized in prior case law, but we did not address the

standard for a finding of cohabitation. Id. at 151.

                                       14
      We first applied the principles of Lepis to an application to terminate

alimony based on a finding of cohabitation in Gayet, 92 N.J. at 151, 154-55.

In Gayet, we authorized “modification for changed circumstances resulting

from cohabitation only if one cohabitant supports or subsidizes the other under

circumstances sufficient to entitle the supporting spouse to relief.” Id. at 153-

54. We recognized that “parties might attempt to conceal a new economic

dependency by adopting different living arrangements from remarriage” but

were “satisfied that our courts will have little difficulty in determining the true

nature of the relationship.” Id. at 155.

      In Konzelman, we refined the cohabitation standard, recognizing that

cohabitation “can be a valid basis for discontinuing alimony, without regard to

the economic consequences of that relationship.” 158 N.J. at 196; cf. Gayet,

92 N.J. at 154-55. We held that “a specific consensual agreement between the

parties to terminate or reduce alimony based on a predetermined change of

circumstances does not require an inquiry into the financial circumstances or

economic status of the dependent spouse so long as the provision itself is fair.”

Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 197. We reasoned that “where the parties have agreed

that cohabitation will constitute a material changed circumstance, and that

agreement has been judged fair and equitable, the court should defer to the

arrangements undertaken by the parties.” Ibid.

                                           15
      We reaffirmed in Konzelman, however, that “[a] mere romantic, casual

or social relationship is not sufficient to justify the enforcement of a settlement

agreement provision terminating alimony,” which instead “must be predicated

on a relationship of cohabitation that can be shown to have stability,

permanency and mutual interdependence.” Id. at 202. As we observed,

            [t]he ordinary understanding of cohabitation is based on
            those factors that make the relationship close and
            enduring and requires more than a common residence,
            although that is an important factor. Cohabitation
            involves an intimate relationship in which the couple
            has undertaken duties and privileges that are commonly
            associated with marriage. These can include, but are
            not limited to, living together, intertwined finances
            such as joint bank accounts, sharing living expenses
            and household chores, and recognition of the
            relationship in the couple’s social and family circle.

            [Ibid.]

      We acknowledged in Konzelman that an application to enforce a

cohabitation provision in a PSA requires careful oversight by the trial court,

noting that “[p]rivacy concerns may be addressed and mitigated by judicial

supervision over agreements” so that the provision is not “an instrument for

vindictive, vengeful, or oppressive actions on the part of the supporting

spouse.” Id. at 201. We cautioned that a court applying a cohabitation

provision “does not abrogate its equitable jurisdiction over divorce

                                        16
arrangements and its responsibility to assure fairness in the implementation of

such arrangements.” Ibid.

      In Konzelman, we did not address the prima facie showing that warrants

discovery and a plenary hearing; in that appeal, the trial court had conducted a

plenary hearing and had determined the merits of the application. Id. at 192-

93. We did not impose the burden to disprove cohabitation on the spouse or

civil union partner receiving alimony; to the contrary, we made clear that in a

motion to terminate or suspend alimony because of alleged cohabitation, the

movant has the burden to “show cohabitation to the satisfaction of the court.”

Id. at 202. We found that the movant in that appeal had met that burden, and

we terminated alimony. Id. at 202-03.

                                        B.

      On September 10, 2014, the Legislature enacted a comprehensive

amendment to the alimony statute. L. 2014, c. 42, § 1. As amended, the

statute prescribes a standard for trial courts to apply when they determine

whether the record supports a finding of cohabitation, including factors similar

to those identified in Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 202. N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n)

provides in relevant part that

            [a]limony may be suspended or terminated if the payee
            cohabits with another person. Cohabitation involves a
            mutually supportive, intimate personal relationship in
            which a couple has undertaken duties and privileges
                                        17
            that are commonly associated with marriage or civil
            union but does not necessarily maintain a single
            common household.

            When assessing whether cohabitation is occurring, the
            court shall consider the following:

               (1) Intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts
               and other joint holdings or liabilities;

               (2) Sharing or joint responsibility for living
               expenses;

               (3) Recognition of the relationship in the couple’s
               social and family circle;

               (4) Living together, the frequency of contact, the
               duration of the relationship, and other indicia of a
               mutually supportive intimate personal relationship;

               (5) Sharing household chores;

               (6) Whether the recipient of alimony has received
               an enforceable promise of support from another
               person within the meaning of subsection h. of
               [N.J.S.A.] 25:1-5; and

               (7) All other relevant evidence.

            In evaluating whether cohabitation is occurring and
            whether alimony should be suspended or terminated,
            the court shall also consider the length of the
            relationship. A court may not find an absence of
            cohabitation solely on grounds that the couple does not
            live together on a full-time basis.

      Before enacting the 2014 amendment to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23, the

Legislature considered and rejected bills that would have authorized trial

                                       18
courts to “modify, suspend, or terminate” alimony “only if . . . the economic

benefit inuring to the payee is sufficiently material to constitute a change of

circumstances.” See S. 488 (2014); A. 845 (2014). In the statute as enacted,

the financial relationship between the spouse or civil union partner receiving

alimony and the alleged cohabitant is not itself dispositive, but is instead

addressed in three of the factors to be considered by the trial court:

“[i]ntertwined finances such as joint bank accounts and other joint holdings or

liabilities,” N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n)(1); “[s]haring or joint responsibility for

living expenses,” id. at (n)(2); and the existence of an “enforceable promise of

support” to the spouse or civil union partner receiving alimony , id. at (n)(6).

      The 2014 amendment to the alimony statute provided that it

            shall take effect immediately and shall not be construed
            either to modify the duration of alimony ordered or
            agreed upon or other specifically bargained for
            contractual provisions that have been incorporated into

                a. a final judgment of divorce or dissolution;

                b. a final order that has concluded post-judgment
                litigation; or

                c. any enforceable written agreement between the
                parties.

            [L. 2014, c. 42, § 2.]

In Quinn, we held that the statute did not govern the motion for termination in

that case because it “was enacted after the PSA was entered.” 225 N.J. at 51
                                        19
n.3; accord Spangenberg v. Kolakowski, 442 N.J. Super. 529, 538-39 (App.

Div. 2015).

                                       C.

      Our decisions in Gayet, Konzelman, and Quinn did not address the prima

facie showing necessary for a court to order discovery in a dispute over

cohabitation. See Quinn, 225 N.J. at 48-55; Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 193-203;

Gayet, 92 N.J. at 150-55. The Appellate Division, however, has recently

addressed that issue in two precedential decisions.

      In Landau v. Landau, the Appellate Division rejected the contention of a

plaintiff former spouse seeking to terminate, suspend, or modify alimony that,

after the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n), it was no longer necessary to

make a prima facie showing of cohabitation before being permitted to conduct

discovery. 461 N.J. Super. 107, 114-19 (App. Div. 2019). The appellate court

found “no indication the Legislature evinced any intention to alter the Lepis

changed circumstances paradigm when it defined cohabitation and enumerated

the factors a court is to consider in determining ‘whether cohabitation is

occurring’ in the 2014 amendments to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.” Id. at 116. It held

that, in the wake of the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute, “the Lepis

paradigm requiring the party seeking modification to establish ‘[a] prima facie

showing of changed circumstances . . . before a court will order discovery of

                                       20
an ex-spouse’s financial status’ continues to strike a fair and workable balance

between the parties’ competing interests.” Id. at 118-19 (quoting Lepis, 83

N.J. at 157). The appellate court stated “that a prima facie showing of

cohabitation can be difficult to establish,” but commented that the burden “is

hardly a new problem and it cannot justify the invasion of defendant’s privacy

represented by the order entered here.” Id. at 118. It reversed the trial court’s

order compelling discovery. Id. at 119.

      In Temple v. Temple, the Appellate Division acknowledged that the

issue presented in Landau was whether a prima facie showing is necessary

before discovery is ordered, not the contours of that prima facie showing; it

noted that “[w]hat constitutes that showing has not been precisely defined

since the 2014 enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n).” 468 N.J. Super. 364, 368-

69 (App. Div. 2021). The appellate court rejected the argument that in a case

governed by the 2014 amendments to the alimony statute, evidence of all six

specific factors prescribed by N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) “must be presented for a

movant to establish a prima facie case of cohabitation.” Id. at 370.2 The

Appellate Division questioned how any movant could present a prima facie

2
  Noting that the PSA in Temple preceded the enactment of N.J.S.A. 2A:34-
23(n) but the allegations focused on the alleged cohabitation “after the
statute’s enactment,” and acknowledging the lack of clear evidence regarding
the parties’ intent, the appellate court declined to decide in Temple whether the
statute governed the parties’ dispute. 468 N.J. Super. at 376 n.8.
                                         21
showing of “[i]ntertwined finances such as joint bank accounts and other joint

holdings or liabilities” under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n)(1), or “sharing or joint

responsibility for living expenses” under N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n)(2), without

discovery. Id. at 369-70.

      Acknowledging that “family judges should be careful not to permit a

fishing expedition into a supported spouse’s private affairs on a weak claim, ”

the Appellate Division found it unfair that the plaintiff had “the burden of

demonstrating the factual sufficiency of his claim when most of the relevant

information” was in the defendant’s possession. Id. at 375-76.

      The Appellate Division held in Temple that, for a prima facie showing,

“[i]t is enough that the movant present evidence from which a trier of fact

could conclude the supported spouse and another are in ‘a mutually supportive,

intimate personal relationship’ in which they have ‘undertaken duties and

privileges that are commonly associated with marriage or civil union.’” Id. at

371 (quoting N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n)). Concluding that the plaintiff had met that

standard, the appellate court remanded the matter for discovery and an

evidentiary hearing. Id. at 377.

                                       22
                                       IV.

                                        A.

      We review the trial court’s decision denying defendant’s motion under a

deferential standard, giving “‘due recognition to the wide discretion . . . our

law rightly affords to the trial judges who deal with these matters.’”

Spangenberg, 442 N.J. Super. at 536 (quoting Martindell v. Martindell, 21 N.J.

341, 355 (1956)); see also Innes, 117 N.J. at 504 (“The modification of

alimony is best left to the sound discretion of the trial court.”). We limit our

review to the question “whether the court made findings inconsistent with the

evidence or unsupported by the record, or erred as a matter of law.” Reese v.

Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 572 (App. Div. 2013). However, to the extent that

the trial court premised its decision on an interpretation of N.J.S.A. 2A:34 -

23(n), we review de novo that legal determination. W.S. v. Hildreth, 252 N.J.

506, 518 (2023).

                                        B.

      We first address the question whether the cohabitation standard of

Konzelman or the test prescribed in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) governs this appeal.

      In this case, because the parties’ PSA was executed before N.J.S.A.

2A:34-23(n) was enacted, we view the appeal to be governed by the definition

of “cohabitation” and the factors identified in Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 202, not

                                        23
by the statutory definition and factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n). See

Quinn, 225 N.J. at 51 n.3 (declining to apply N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) to a case in

which the parties’ PSA was executed before the statute was in effect); L. 2014,

c. 42, § 2 (providing that the 2014 amendments to N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23 do not

“modify . . . specifically bargained for contractual provisions that have be en

incorporated into . . . a final judgment of divorce”).

      We recognize, however, that the two standards are closely analogous.

See Landau, 461 N.J. Super. at 117 n.8 (noting that the Legislature “essentially

adopted the definition of cohabitation the Court endorsed in Konzelman”).

Compare Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 202, with N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n). We view

the procedure for a prima facie showing of cohabitation in cases governed by

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) to be virtually identical to the procedure for a prima

facie showing of cohabitation in cases governed by Konzelman, and we thus

address the requirements for such a showing in both categories of cases.

                                        C.

      As our case law recognizes, the prima facie showing is distinct from the

final proofs that are the basis for an adjudication on the merits; it is simply a

threshold showing required so that the privacy of the spouse or civil union

partner receiving alimony is not invaded in pursuit of a baseless cohabitation

claim. See Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 201 (noting the trial court’s obligation to

                                        24
protect the party receiving alimony from abusive tactics); Temple, 468 N.J.

Super. at 375 (cautioning trial courts not to permit intrusive discovery based

on a weak claim); Landau, 461 N.J. Super. at 118-119 (discussing the

requirement of a prima facie showing). We respectfully disagree with the

Appellate Division’s observation in Landau that “[t]here is no question but that

a prima facie showing of cohabitation can be difficult to establish.” 461 N.J.

Super. at 117 (citing Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 191-92). Although a litigant may

devote considerable resources to gathering information to support a motion to

terminate or suspend alimony, as did the movant in Konzelman, the mandate

that a movant present a prima facie showing in order to obtain discovery is not

intended to impose a high bar.

      To the contrary, prima facie evidence is defined as “evidence that, if

unrebutted, would sustain a judgment in the proponent’s favor.” Baures v.

Lewis, 167 N.J. 91, 118 (2001), overruled on other grounds by Bisbing v.

Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 328-36 (2017). In a prima facie showing, the movant is

“entitled to an assumption of the truth of his allegations and the benefit of all

reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence he had marshaled.”

Temple, 468 N.J. Super. at 368. The movant’s burden at the preliminary stage

is not an onerous one.

                                        25
      Consistent with that standard, the movant’s certifications, if supported

by competent evidence, “should not be read restrictively or literally to

determine whether alone they spell out a claim for relief, nor should their

probative worth be neutralized or discounted by the opposing certifications.”

Conforti v. Guliadis, 128 N.J. 318, 328 (1992); see also Temple, 468 N.J.

Super. at 375 (noting that “[t]here may be non-cohabitation explanations” for

evidence presented by the movant in his prima facie showing, “but the only

question for the judge . . . was whether [the movant] presented enough to

entitle him to discovery and an evidentiary hearing”).3 In other words, the trial

court should not find that the movant has failed to present a prima facie

showing simply because the parties’ certifications dispute relevant facts.

      We next address the question whether the movant must proffer evidence

on all of the applicable cohabitation factors, or just some of the factors, in

order to present a prima facie showing.

      In cases that are governed by Konzelman rather than N.J.S.A. 2A:34-

23(n), the relevant factors “include, but are not limited to, living together,

3
  Although the evidence presented to the trial court in Temple constitutes an
example of a sufficient prima facie showing, 468 N.J. Super. at 371-75,
Temple does not establish the minimum quantum of evidence required for such
a showing. The trial court’s inquiry is case-specific, and the evidence that is
sufficient to establish a prima facie showing will vary depending on the
circumstances of a given case.
                                        26
intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts, sharing living expenses and

household chores, and recognition of the relationship in the couple’s social and

family circle.” 158 N.J. at 202. In cases to which N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n)

applies, the court must “consider” the statute’s seven enumerated factors,

including “[a]ll other relevant evidence.” N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n)(7).

      Nothing in Konzelman or N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n) suggests that the movant

must present evidence relevant to all of the factors in order to set forth a prima

facie case. Indeed, any such requirement would impose an unfair burden on a

movant at the preliminary stage. Absent discovery, a movant is unlikely to

have access to the financial records and other documents relevant to

Konzelman’s financial factors -- “intertwined finances such as joint bank

accounts” and “sharing living expenses” -- or their statutory counterparts,

N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(n)(1) and (n)(2).

      As the Appellate Division noted in Temple, “[p]eople tend to treat

financial information as confidential and do not normally volunteer it to

others, let alone former spouses obligated to pay them alimony.” 468 N.J.

Super. at 370. When the court determines whether there is a prima facie

showing, “most information relevant to cohabitation is not readily available to

movants,” and the motion at that stage is thus “akin to summary judgment

motions filed prior to the completion of discovery.” Id. at 375. We agree with

                                        27
defendant that at the prima facie stage, any requirement that a movant present

financial evidence showing cohabitation would impose too onerous a burden.

      Accordingly, we decline to require a movant seeking to present a prima

facie showing to proffer evidence on all of the cohabitation factors in

Konzelman, or on all of the cohabitation factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2A:34-

23(n) in cases governed by the statute. Instead, if the movant presents a

certification supported by competent evidence as to at least some of the

relevant factors, and if that evidence, if unrebutted, would sustain the movant’s

burden of proof as to cohabitation, the trial court should find that the movant

has made a prima facie showing even if the spouse or civil union partner

receiving alimony presents a certification contesting facts asserted by the

movant. See Conforti, 128 N.J. at 328; Temple, 468 N.J. Super. at 375. The

movant need not address all of the factors identified in the governing standard.

      Finally, we briefly address the procedure to be followed by the trial

court if it finds that the movant has presented a prima facie showing of

cohabitation.

      If the trial court makes such a finding, it should order limited discovery

as to discrete issues that it determines to be relevant to one or more of the

cohabitation factors that govern the case. In fashioning its discovery order, the

trial court should take appropriate steps to safeguard the privacy of the spouse

                                        28
or civil union partner receiving alimony and the individual with whom that

person is alleged to be cohabiting. Those steps may include, but are not

limited to, constraints on the discovery to be provided to the movant and

protective orders limiting access to the information subject to discovery. See

Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 201 (noting the importance of judicial supervision to

address privacy concerns); see also Administrative Directive #02-22, “Family -

- Revised Standard Protective Order” (Apr. 5, 2022). See generally R. 4:10-3

(addressing protective orders in civil practice).

      Our current Family Part court rules do not address post-judgment

discovery in connection with a motion to terminate or suspend alimony based

on cohabitation. We therefore request that the Family Practice Committee

propose amendments to the court rules governing such discovery and uniform

interrogatories to streamline the discovery process in such cases.

      Following the completion of limited discovery, the parties should file

supplemental certifications in support of and in opposition to the motion. If

material facts remain in dispute following discovery and the submission of

supplemental certifications, the trial court must conduct a plenary hearing to

determine the motion to terminate or suspend alimony. We reiterate our

                                        29
holding in Konzelman, 158 N.J. at 202, that the movant bears the burden of

proving cohabitation at all stages of the proceeding.4

                                        D.

      Here, defendant asserted that plaintiff and McDermott were in a

mutually supportive relationship of at least eight years’ duration in which they

undertook duties commonly associated with marriage. See Konzelman, 158

N.J. at 202. Although defendant did not proffer evidence that plaintiff and

McDermott had “intertwined finances such as joint bank accounts” or that they

were “sharing living expenses,” ibid., he did present evidence regarding other

factors identified in Konzelman.

      First, defendant presented evidence relevant to whether plaintiff and

McDermott were “living together.” See ibid. Defendant submitted to the trial

court the report of his private investigator demonstrating that plaintiff and

4
  We decline to adopt the argument of defendant and amicus curiae the New
Jersey State Bar Association that a prima facie showing by the movant should
shift the burden of proof to the spouse or civil union partner receiving alimony
to disprove cohabitation. In the pre-Konzelman Appellate Division and trial
court decisions cited by defendant and amicus in which the courts shifted the
burden to the opposing party, the burden was shifted because the movant
lacked access to evidence relevant to cohabitation. See Ozolins v. Ozolins,
308 N.J. Super. 243, 248-49 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that it would be
unreasonable to impose the burden of proof on a party lacking access to the
evidence necessary to support that burden of proof); Frantz v. Frantz, 256 N.J.
Super. 90, 92-93 (Ch. Div. 1992) (same). A trial court’s order granting limited
discovery in cohabitation cases following a prima facie showing resolves the
concerns expressed in those decisions.
                                        30
McDermott were together on each of the forty-four days over which the

investigator conducted surveillance; that they were together overnight on more

than half of those days; and that plaintiff had access to McDermott’s home

whether or not he was present. Defendant also submitted photographs from

social media depicting plaintiff and McDermott on vacation together.

      Second, defendant presented evidence that plaintiff and McDermott

shared household chores. See ibid. The private investigator’s report included

the investigator’s observations and photographs of plaintiff and McDermott

transporting groceries, bags of personal belongings, and laundry at one

another’s residences.

      Third, defendant presented evidence relevant to “recognition of the

relationship in the couple’s social and family circle.” See ibid. He submitted

to the trial court photographs from social media accounts maintained by

plaintiff and McDermott depicting them at social events together and with the

parties’ children.

      We do not address whether the evidence presented by defendant -- in its

current form or as potentially buttressed by financial information following

discovery -- establishes cohabitation under the Konzelman standard. That

question will be addressed by the trial court on a full record. Assuming, for

purposes of the prima facie inquiry, that defendant’s contentions are correct,

                                       31
we view the evidence he presented to constitute a prima facie showing of

cohabitation.

      Accordingly, we find that the trial court did not properly exercise its

discretion when it denied defendant’s motion without discovery, and we

reverse the Appellate Division’s judgment affirming the trial court’s

determination. On remand, the trial court must order plaintiff to provide

limited discovery, and conduct a plenary hearing in the event that it finds

disputes of material fact after discovery and the submission of supplemental

certifications.

                                       V.

      The judgment of the Appellate Division is reversed, and the matter is

remanded to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this

opinion.

      CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES SOLOMON, PIERRE-
LOUIS, WAINER APTER, and FASCIALE join in JUSTICE PATTERSON’s
opinion. JUDGE SABATINO (temporarily assigned) did not participate.

                                       32