Court Opinion

ID: 9896198
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-09 19:04:09.970724+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:23.244929
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN THE MATTER OF A MEMBER §
OF THE BAR OF THE SUPREME §
COURT OF DELAWARE         §
                          § No. 25, 2023
RICHARD L. ABBOTT,        § Board Case No. 112512-B
ESQUIRE,                  §
                          §
     Respondent.          §
                          §

                        Submitted: June 28, 2023
                        Decided:   November 9, 2023

Before TRAYNOR, LEGROW, and GRIFFITHS, Justices.

Upon Review of the Reports of the Board on Professional Responsibility.
DISBARRED.

David A. White, Esquire, Chief Disciplinary Counsel, and Kathleen M.
Vavala, Esquire, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, Office of Disciplinary
Counsel, Wilmington, Delaware.

Richard L. Abbott, Esquire, Hockessin, Delaware.
PER CURIAM:

      This lawyer disciplinary proceeding arises from Respondent Richard L.

Abbott’s conduct in Seabreeze Homeowners Assoc. v. Jenney, C.A. No. 8635-

VCG (Del. Ch.) (“Seabreeze Litigation”)—a dispute over the trimming of

trees and shrubbery between a homeowners’ association and a property

owner—as well as statements he made in filings related to this disciplinary

proceeding. We cannot help but lament that a seemingly mundane lawsuit

would escalate into a nasty feud and, in turn, prompt Abbott, an experienced

litigator, to ignore fundamental ethical constraints, putting his privilege to

practice law at risk. The genesis of this disciplinary action was advice Abbott

gave to his client to help the client violate an order and bench rulings issued

by the Court of Chancery. The advice and the documentation that effectuated

it was followed by misrepresentations to the court as to the client’s status vis-

à-vis the court’s order and rulings. And when the trial judge who had issued

the order and rulings learned of Abbott’s dodgy stratagem and reported the

matter to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel (“ODC”), Abbott’s conduct only

got worse. Abbott eschewed a lawyerly defense of his questionable actions

and, despite being previously disciplined for similar misconduct, unleashed a

persistent flurry of false invective impugning the integrity of the trial judge,

ODC, and eventually this Court.

                                       2
       Not surprisingly, Abbott’s conduct in the Seabreeze Litigation

prompted ODC to open an investigation in 2015, which led to a petition for

discipline in 2020. Through a variety of procedural maneuvers, Abbott

succeeded in delaying ODC’s filing of the petition and the Board on

Professional Responsibility’s consideration of the petition for years.

       In due course, however, a panel of the Board on Professional

Responsibility (“Panel”) found that ODC established by clear and convincing

evidence that Abbott violated Rules 3.5(d),1 8.4(c),2 and 8.4(d)3 of the

Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“DLRPC”). The Panel

found that ODC did not establish by clear and convincing evidence that

Abbott violated Rules 3.4(c)4 or 8.4(a).5 A majority of the Panel (“Panel

Majority”) recommended a two-year suspension for Abbott’s disciplinary

violations. The chair of the Panel (“Panel Chair”) recommended disbarment.

1
  Rule 3.5(d) provides that a lawyer shall not “engage in conduct intended to disrupt a
tribunal or engage in undignified or discourteous conduct that is degrading to a tribunal.”
2
  Rule 8.4(c) provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in
conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”
3
  Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to “engage in conduct
that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
4
  Rule 3.4(c) provides that a lawyer shall not “knowingly disobey an obligation under the
rules of a tribunal, except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists.”
5
  Rule 8.4(a) provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . violate or
attempt to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another
to do so or do so through the acts of another.”

                                              3
      Both ODC and Abbott have filed objections to the Panel’s findings and

recommendations.       After our independent review of the Panel’s

recommendations, we conclude that Abbott violated Rules 3.4(c), 3.5(d),

8.4(a), 8.4(c) and 8.4(d) of the DLRPC and that the appropriate sanction is

disbarment.

                                      I.

                                     A.

      The Seabreeze Litigation arose from a dispute between Marshall

Jenney, the owner of two properties at 317 Salisbury Street and 318 Salisbury

Street in Rehoboth Beach (collectively, the “Properties”), and the Seabreeze

Homeowners’ Association, Inc. (“Seabreeze”). In 2011, Seabreeze filed a

Court of Chancery action against Jenney for a mandatory injunction requiring

Jenney to trim trees and shrubs on the Properties. Jenney and Seabreeze

resolved the action in a settlement agreement dated December 21, 2012

(“Settlement Agreement”). Under the Settlement Agreement, Jenney agreed

to trim the trees and shrubs on the Properties and Seabreeze agreed to dismiss

the action.

      After Jenney failed to comply with the Settlement Agreement,

Seabreeze instituted the Seabreeze Litigation in June 2013. Seabreeze sought

specific performance of the Settlement Agreement. Jenney and Seabreeze

                                      4
resolved the matter in a stipulation and consent order granted by the Court of

Chancery on July 11, 2014 (“Consent Order”). Under the Consent Order,

Jenney was required to take steps to ensure that the trees and shrubs on the

Properties would be trimmed by October 31, 2014.6 Time was of the essence.7

Paragraph 17 of the Consent Order provided that it was “for the benefit of,

and shall be binding on, all Parties and their respective successors, heirs,

assigns, officers, and directors.”8 After Jenney failed to take the necessary

steps for completion of the work by October 31, 2014, Seabreeze filed a

motion for a rule to show cause hearing on November 3, 2014. On November

6, 2014, Jenney filed a response stating that he did “not refuse to have the

work performed as expeditiously as possible” and requested an extension to

have the work completed by November 21, 2014.9

                                                B.

       On December 5, 2014, Abbott entered his appearance for Jenney in the

Seabreeze Litigation. Abbott was Jenney’s fourth or fifth attorney since the

filing of the original action in 2011. Between December 2014 and March

2015, the parties filed competing motions and appeared before the Vice

6
  Consent Order ¶ 2, Admitted Hearing Exhibit (hereinafter referred to as “Ex. __”), Ex.
196 at Ex. 1 ¶ 2.
7
  Id. ¶ 13.
8
  Id. ¶ 17.
9
   Respondent’s Response to Petitioner’s Motion for Rule to Show Cause Hearing for
Respondent’s Violation of the July 11, 2014 Consent Order, Ex. 197 ¶ 11.

                                           5
Chancellor multiple times. As described by the Panel, “Seabreeze generally

alleged that Jenney failed to comply with the Consent Order by not trimming

the trees and shrubs; Jenney generally accused Seabreeze of interfering with

Jenney’s attempts to comply with the Consent Order.”10 The Vice Chancellor

reaffirmed Jenney’s obligation to trim the trees and shrubs in bench rulings

on January 15, 2015 and February 23, 2015.

       At the February 23, 2015 hearing, the Vice Chancellor directed the

parties to submit a proposed form of order encompassing how the trees and

shrubs were to be trimmed within a reasonable amount of time and the

attorneys’ fees to be awarded to Seabreeze for Jenney’s breach of the Consent

Order. Abbott and Seabreeze’s counsel exchanged emails regarding the

proposed form of order.         On February 25, 2015, Seabreeze’s counsel

submitted a form of order to the Court of Chancery (“February 25, 2015

Order”). The Vice Chancellor granted the order shortly thereafter.

       Later that day, Abbott filed a motion for reargument, arguing that

Seabreeze’s counsel had misrepresented Abbott’s agreement to the form of

order and included language in the order that was not discussed or

contemplated at the February 23, 2015 hearing. On behalf of Jenney, he

10
  July 11, 2022 Recommendation of Panel of Board on Professional Responsibility on the
Discipline of Richard L. Abbott, Esquire (hereinafter referred to as “July 11, 2022
Recommendation at __”) at 15.

                                          6
sought attorneys’ fees incurred in filing the motion for reargument.

Seabreeze’s counsel objected to Abbott’s statements and filed a counter-

motion for Rule 11 sanctions.

          After additional submissions by the parties, the Vice Chancellor held a

hearing on March 3, 2015, and made several rulings (“March 3, 2015 Bench

Rulings”). The Vice Chancellor modified the February 25, 2015 Order to,

among other things, remove language finding Jenney in contempt. As a result

of the March 3, 2015 Bench Rulings, Jenney had to complete the trimming of

the trees and shrubs on 318 Salisbury Street within eight weeks of the

February 25, 2015 Order, which was April 22, 2015.

          The Vice Chancellor directed the parties to submit additional

documents regarding the amount of attorneys’ fees sought by Seabreeze. As

to Jenney’s request for attorneys’ fees, the Vice Chancellor described

Seabreeze counsel’s conduct as possibly “less than precise or best practice

legal work,” but found no intentional misrepresentation or bad-faith litigation

conduct that merited an award of attorneys’ fees.11 Seabreeze withdrew the

motion for Rule 11 sanctions. On March 6, 2015, Seabreeze informed the

Court of Chancery that more trimming work needed to be performed at 317

Salisbury Street.

11
     Ex. 52 at 21.

                                         7
                                           C.

      On March 7, 2015, Abbott sent Jenney an email outlining a legal

strategy to avoid enforcement of the Settlement Agreement, Consent Order,

and March 3, 2015 Bench Rulings. Abbott first opined that it was clear

Seabreeze would not stop harassing Jenney while he owned the Properties and

that the Vice Chancellor did not understand this or care about the amount of

harassment over trees and shrubs. He then stated that, as previously discussed,

conveying title to another entity controlled by Jenney was not a viable option

for circumvention of the Settlement Agreement and Consent Order because

the Vice Chancellor would likely exercise his equitable powers to make

Jenney personally responsible. Abbott went on to advise:

      So this morning I came up with this theory – CONVEY BOTH
      PROPERTIES to [Jenney’s wife].

      No tax consequences will result since she is your wife. And then
      I can advise the Court and [Seabreeze’s counsel] that there is no
      need for any further activity in the case since it is now moot—
      i.e.[,] you are no longer the title owner AND the Settlement
      Agreement and Consent Order are purely personal obligations of
      yours that it would then be impossible for you to perform.

      If Seabreeze and [Seabreeze’s counsel] wanted to make the
      obligation on trees and hedges to be perpetual, then they should
      have made them run with the land. But they did not—enabling
      me to happily point out that [Seabreeze’s counsel] probably
      committed malpractice. Indeed, if you sold the properties on the
      market, then you would be off the hook. The same follows if you
      convey to [your wife].

                                      8
         Now Seabreeze might file a new action against [your wife], but
         then we would have a clean slate to fight against them and get
         the case tossed out. [Seabreeze’s counsel] will kick and scream
         that the transfer is a sham, but the law is the law. And a wife has
         not legally been deemed to be a mere legal extension/appendage
         of her husband since the Married Woman’s Property Act passed
         in Delaware about 140 years ago.

         Let me know if you can do this, based on an Pre-Nuptial
         Agreement, any Trust, and any other financial or legal issues
         unique to you situation. You can just wait a few years and then
         have [your wife] convey the parcels back to you, at which time
         Seabreeze would likely do nothing (and if they did they would
         probably have to file a new case against you).12

         Abbott did not mention the language in Paragraph 17 of the Consent

Order providing that it was binding on Jenney’s successors, heirs, and assigns.

Jenney agreed to Abbott’s proposed strategy.            During the disciplinary

proceeding, Jenney testified that Seabreeze had been harassing him and that

Abbott advised him transferring the Properties would be a way to end the

Seabreeze Litigation. Jenney also testified that at the time of Abbott’s advice

he “maybe, most likely” would transfer the Properties back to himself within

six months.13 After Jenney agreed to the proposed strategy, Abbott instructed

his assistant to prepare the deed transfers and a letter to the Vice Chancellor

informing him of the transfer of the Properties.

12
     Mar. 7, 2015 Email, Ex. 236.
13
     Nov. 10, 2021 Tr. at 991–92.

                                         9
       In a March 9, 2015 email, Jenney told Abbott that his wife was

amenable to the transfer and asked about establishing a post office box as a

legal address “to make it as hard as possible for her to be served.”14 Abbott

responded that same day, advising that Abbott’s address would appear on the

deed and he would not accept service of any new filing.15 Abbott also

acknowledged Paragraph 17 of the Consent Order:

       First we will have to deal with [Seabreeze counsel’s] inevitable
       filing with the Court challenging the effect of the transfer. I am
       hoping the Court wants to be rid of the matter and shoots him
       down. I am sure [Seabreeze’s counsel] will argue that [your
       wife] takes title subject to all of the requirements imposed on
       you, which would be based on some unfortunate language in the
       Consent Order . . . “binding on heirs, successors, assigns.” It is
       clear that the original Settlement Agreement did not run with the
       land, and was only binding on you[] personally, but the Order
       language could give [Seabreeze’s counsel] a shot at arguing that
       it ran with the land.16

Based on Abbott’s advice and assistance, on March 12, 2015, Jenney executed

two deeds transferring the Properties to his wife, each for the nominal amount

of $10.00. Abbott’s office then recorded the deeds.

                                      D.

       In his March 16, 2015 letter to the Vice Chancellor (“March 16, 2015

Letter”), Abbott stated:

14
   Mar. 9, 2015 emails, Ex. 237.
15
   Id.
16
   Id.

                                      10
          I am writing to advise the Court that no further proceedings in
          this action will be necessary, other than on the pending requests
          for awards of attorneys’ fees. The remainder of the action is now
          legally moot.

          Enclosed please find a copy of the Deeds transferring title from
          Marshall T. Jenney to Erin C. Jenney, which were recorded on
          March 13, 2015. As a result, Mr. Jenney no longer has any
          ownership interest in the properties and is therefore relieved of
          the purely in personam obligations under the Settlement
          Agreement.

          Mr. Jenney and I appreciate the Court’s courtesies in this
          matter.17

Abbott did not mention Paragraph 17 of the Consent Order or that Jenney

would continue to exercise control over the Properties.

          On March 17, 2015, Seabreeze filed a renewed motion for a rule to

show cause hearing on Jenney’s violation of the Consent Order and a motion

to join Jenney’s wife as an indispensable party. Jenney opposed the motions

and filed a motion to strike statements in Seabreeze’s filings and a Rule 60(b)

motion to reopen the Consent Order.

          On April 13, 2015, the Vice Chancellor granted Seabreeze’s motion to

join Jenney’s wife as an indispensable party. The Vice Chancellor also held

an evidentiary hearing on Seabreeze’s renewed motion for a rule to show

cause that day. At the beginning of the hearing, the Vice Chancellor denied

17
     Ex. 57.

                                         11
Jenney’s motion to strike and Rule 60(b) motion. The Vice Chancellor then

heard testimony from several witnesses including Jenney. When Jenney was

asked if he ever had any intent of complying with the Consent Order, he

testified:

          Well, I was so upset with my neighbors and the way I was treated,
          considering I was born and raised in this neighborhood that, you
          know, I figured that I still might sell the property. So I wanted
          to make sure with my lawyer that there was no language, you
          know, that would state that it would run with land or pass to the
          person I sold it to. So that was my thought process.18

          Jenney initially denied discussing the transfer of the Properties with

Abbott, but then admitted otherwise:

          Question: So you did discuss with Mr. Abbott the reasons for
          transfer from you to Erin Jenney of the two properties?

          Answer: Yes. So it was either I take the properties to market and
          sell them to circumvent, or, you know, my attorney said, “If you
          want to retain it, stay in the neighborhood and keep your family
          home, you can transfer it to your wife.”

          Question: And you had that discussion about transferring it to
          your wife so that you didn’t have to comply with the court order.
          Correct?

          Answer: Can you ask your question again?

          Question: Yeah. You had the discussion about transferring the
          two properties from you to your wife so you did not have to
          comply with the court order. Correct?

18
     Apr. 13, 2015 Tr. (Del. Ch.) at 56–57, Ex. 64.

                                              12
          Answer: I mean, it was—yeah. Yes.19

          Jenney testified similarly at the disciplinary hearing, stating that the

purpose of the transfer of the Properties was to end the Seabreeze Litigation

and to force Seabreeze to start the case over again. Abbott also testified that

the purpose of the transfer was to end the Seabreeze Litigation:

          [T]he deed transfer became a necessity, because essentially it
          was never going to end, otherwise, in my estimation, based on,
          you know, a few—two, three months of experience in seeing this,
          and No. 1, [Seabreeze’s counsel] was going to continue I think I
          used at one point, “ad finitum” and “ad nauseam.”20

          After the witnesses testified at the April 13, 2015 hearing, Abbott

argued, among other things, that he thought the Vice Chancellor was going to

issue another written order after the March 3, 2015 hearing, but also said that

he had calculated the eight-week deadline to complete the trimming work

from the February 25, 2015 Order. He contended that Jenney was entitled to

transfer the Properties and that, in any event, the transfer caused no harm

because the Vice Chancellor had granted Seabreeze’s motion to join Erin

Jenney as a party.

          At the conclusion of the hearing, the Vice Chancellor expressed his

disbelief at what had transpired:

19
     Id. at 61–62. Abbott did not object to this line of questioning at the hearing.
20
     Nov. 10, 2021 Tr. at 1225–27.

                                               13
      [D]espite having done many, many, many homeowner cases, I
      have never had a defendant in one of those cases sit in a witness
      chair and tell me that he didn’t intend to comply with his
      agreement because he was upset with his neighbors and he might
      want to sell the property. Nor have I ever had anybody sit in a
      witness chair and tell me that on advice of counsel, he had
      entered into a sham transaction to frustrate the specific
      performance of an agreement.

      It is shocking to me. It is unacceptable. It is unacceptable
      behavior for a litigant in this Court. It is unacceptable behavior
      for an attorney in this Court.

      So it’s clear to me there was contempt of my bench order and of
      the stipulation and order of this Court. But we’re not going to
      end this hearing today with me finding contempt because, like
      Mr. Abbott, I want to kill this action. I want it over.21

The Vice Chancellor suspended the hearing to be reconvened at the Properties

to determine what needed to be trimmed and the proper remedy for contempt.

The reconvened hearing at the Properties was scheduled for May 21, 2015.

      On May 8, 2015, the Jenneys filed a notice of appeal in this Court. The

Court dismissed the appeal because it was interlocutory and the Jenneys had

not complied with Rule 42.22

                                        E.

      On May 21, 2015, the Vice Chancellor conducted a hearing at the

Properties to determine the necessary trimming and then reconvened the

21
  Ex. 64 at 112–13.
22
  Jenney v. Seabreeze Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 116 A.3d 1244, 2015 WL 3824867, at *2
(Del. June 18, 2015) (TABLE).

                                        14
hearing at the courthouse. At the courthouse, the Vice Chancellor confirmed

his previous finding of contempt based on a sham transfer intended solely to

avoid enforcement of a court order. The Vice Chancellor awarded Seabreeze

its costs and attorneys’ fees in responding to the transfer of the Properties and

left it to Abbott and Jenney to determine who would pay. Recognizing this

Court’s exclusive role in addressing ethical violations, the Vice Chancellor

stated that he would refer the matter to ODC.

      On June 1, 2015, the Court of Chancery entered an order ruling that the

necessary work had been completed at 317 Salisbury Street and setting forth

the work on 318 Salisbury Street to be completed by June 30, 2015. On June

10, 2015, a Court of Chancery employee sent a letter to the then-Chief

Disciplinary Counsel informing her of the Vice Chancellor’s May 21, 2015

bench ruling and providing the docket entries and transcripts in the Seabreeze

Litigation for a review of Abbott’s conduct. On June 11, 2015, the Vice

Chancellor reconfirmed his previous contempt findings and awarded

Seabreeze fees and costs. The required work was completed and the case was

dismissed on August 21, 2015.

      Eight months after the transfer, Jenney reconveyed the Properties back

to himself because he wanted to refinance loans that had remained in his name.

During the disciplinary hearing, Jenney testified that he had just as much

                                       15
control over the Properties after the transfer to his wife as he did before. As

to 317 Salisbury Street, Jenney paid the taxes, bills, and maintenance, hired

contractors as necessary, and collected rent. As to 318 Salisbury Street, he

paid all the property taxes, bills, and maintenance costs.                 No one else

undertook these responsibilities for either property.

                                            II.

       Since his referral to ODC in June 2015, Abbott has challenged or

litigated aspects of this disciplinary proceeding in multiple venues. Some of

his statements in this proceeding and other proceedings gave rise to additional

disciplinary violations.

                                            A.

       In June 2015, Abbott filed a complaint against the Vice Chancellor in

the Court on the Judiciary.23 He alleged that the Vice Chancellor acted with

bias against him in the Seabreeze Litigation. The former Chief Justice

23
   Court on the Judiciary proceedings are normally confidential. Ct. Jud. R. 17. But as
discussed in then-Chief Justice Strine’s denial of Abbott’s motion for recusal in Abbott v.
Del. State Pub. Integrity Comm’n, it could be fairly inferred from Abbott’s filings in the
Public Integrity Commission (“PIC”), discussed in more detail herein, that he had filed a
complaint against the Vice Chancellor in the Court on the Judiciary. No. 155, 2018, Order
(Del. Feb. 25, 2019). After learning of Abbott’s complaint, ODC contacted the Clerk of
the Court on the Judiciary for access to the Court on the Judiciary records. Id. at 6. See
also Abbott v. Del. State Pub. Integrity Comm’n, 206 A.3d 260, 2019 WL 937184, at *6-7
(Del. Feb. 25, 2019) (TABLE). The Vice Chancellor consented to waive the confidentiality
of the Court on the Judiciary records for the limited purpose of In re Abbott, ODC File No.
112512B. Id.

                                           16
dismissed the complaint, concluding that the record was devoid of any facts

or reason showing why the Vice Chancellor would be biased against Abbott.

         On July 23, 2015, ODC advised Abbott that it had opened a file

following the Vice Chancellor’s referral. ODC asked Abbott to provide any

documents he thought would be relevant to ODC’s investigation. Abbott

objected to the Vice Chancellor’s referral, but indicated that he would provide

documents.

         In April 2016, ODC advised Abbott that ODC intended to proceed with

a formal investigation because there was a reasonable inference that he had

violated Rules 3.5(d), 4.4(a), and 8.4(d) of the DLRPC. As part of this

investigation, ODC would determine whether to present the matter to a panel

of the Preliminary Review Committee (“PRC”).24 The PRC could dismiss the

matter, offer a sanction of a private admonition, or approve the filing of a

petition for discipline with the Board.25 Between May and September 2016,

ODC and Abbott engaged in frequent communications and motion practice

regarding various issues. These issues included ODC’s efforts to obtain

documents relating to Abbott’s advice to Jenney about the transfer of the

Properties, Abbott’s requests that the then-Chief Disciplinary Counsel and the

24
     Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Disciplinary Procedure (“DLRDP”) 9(b).
25
     Id.

                                          17
then-Board Chair recuse themselves, and Abbott’s requests for a stay pending

resolution of his recusal requests.

      On July 13, 2016, ODC filed a motion to compel the production of

documents from Abbott concerning his advice about the transfer of the

Properties. ODC also informed Abbott that it would present a disciplinary

petition to the PRC on August 3, 2016, and that Abbott could submit written

materials for the PRC to consider by July 26, 2016. ODC agreed later to defer

presentation of the petition to the PRC until October.

      On July 22, 2016, Abbott filed a complaint against then-Chief

Disciplinary Counsel with the Public Integrity Commission (“PIC”). He

alleged that there was an appearance of impropriety because she was pursuing

the investigation to advance her own judicial ambitions and improperly

seeking privileged documents. On August 24, 2016, the PIC dismissed the

complaint for lack of jurisdiction.

      On September 13, 2016, ODC informed Abbott that it would present a

petition for discipline to the PRC on October 5, 2016. ODC also advised

Abbott that he had to provide any materials he wished the PRC to consider by

September 29, 2016.

                                      18
       On September 16, 2016, Abbott filed three motions with the Board that

inappropriately attacked the Vice Chancellor. Abbott alleged, among other

things, that:

           • Obviously, the Vice Chancellor wanted to mete out his
             anger all the more by attempting to harm me as a
             punishment for daring to do my job in furtherance of his
             own personal and emotional issues.26

           • The Court conducted a last minute, surprise “Star
             Chamber” proceeding, first announced at the end of the
             site visit, in order to tongue lash me and doctor up the
             record with conclusory, unsupported, and false ad
             hominem attacks on me.27

           • The allegation of “vexatious” transfer of title is also a
             figment of the Vice Chancellor’s very active
             imagination.28

           • Rather than congratulating and applauding the
             undersigned counsel for his zealous representation
             through appropriate and permissible means, the Vice
             Chancellor’s frustration, aggravation, and anger literally
             caused his emotions to get him carried away. He lashed
             out at the undersigned counsel and spouted out wildly
             unsupported and false statements in an effort to gin-up a
             record for purposes of this personal retribution
             proceeding.29

           • The fact that Vice Chancellor went to the lengths he did in
             attempting to besmirch the reputation of the undersigned
             counsel through false attack commentary constitutes clear
             evidence of his ill-intent and bad faith. He concocted a

26
   Sept. 16, 2016 Response in Opposition to Motion to Compel ¶ 9, Ex. 105.
27
   Id. ¶ 14(f) (emphasis in original).
28
   Id. ¶ 30.
29
   Sept. 16, 2016 Motion for Stay and Recusal of Board Chair ¶ 12, Ex. 240.

                                          19
              fairytale story in the hopes that he could sell it to someone
              who would buy his spin and abuse the system by meting
              out his revenge on undersigned counsel despite the fact
              that no misconduct of any sort had occurred.30

       That same day Abbott filed a complaint against the then-Board Chair

with the PIC. With the complaint, he included two of the Board filings in

which he made numerous inappropriate attacks on the Vice Chancellor.31 The

PIC dismissed the complaint.

       On September 20, 2016, the then-Board Chair stayed ODC’s motion to

compel pending resolution of Abbott’s motion to recuse. On September 21,

2016, Abbott filed a complaint for a writ of certiorari in the Superior Court,

challenging the PIC’s dismissal of his complaint against then-Chief

Disciplinary Counsel. On September 23, 2016, the Jenneys filed a complaint

against then-Chief Disciplinary Counsel with ODC. The Court appointed

outside counsel to act as Special Disciplinary Counsel and to investigate the

matter.32

       On September 29, 2016, in anticipation of the October 5, 2016 PRC

hearing, Abbott submitted information for the PRC to consider. He also

30
   Id. ¶ 14. See also Sept. 16, 2016 Motion for Stay and Disqualification of ODC Counsel
¶ 15, Ex. 239 (describing the Vice Chancellor’s referral of Abbott to ODC as a “bogus,
unfounded, and ill-intended Complaint”).
31
   Ex. 241 (enclosing copy of Motion for Stay and Recusal of Board Chair, Ex. 240 and
Sept. 16, 2016 Response in Opposition to Motion to Compel, Ex. 105). See also supra nn.
26–29.
32
   This attorney later became Chief Disciplinary Counsel in 2021.

                                          20
requested a stay of the matter. On September 30, 2016, ODC informed Abbott

that it would withdraw its intended presentation to the PRC in light of his

pending motion to stay and his request that the PRC stay its consideration of

the matter.

       On November 29, 2016, Special Disciplinary Counsel recommended

that this Court dismiss the Jenneys’ complaint based on his opinion that then-

Chief Disciplinary Counsel did not violate the ethical rules by seeking

discovery of Abbott’s advice to the Jenneys regarding transfer of the

Properties. This Court accepted the recommendation and dismissed the

complaint.

       On February 28, 2018, the Superior Court affirmed the PIC’s dismissal

of Abbott’s complaint against then-Chief Disciplinary Counsel.33 Abbott

appealed the Superior Court’s decision to this Court.

                                         B.

       On March 12, 2018, ODC filed a petition for Abbott’s immediate

interim suspension pending final disposition of the disciplinary proceeding.

ODC alleged that Abbott’s false and frivolous filings in this proceeding and

other venues had interfered with ODC’s disciplinary efforts and caused ODC

33
  Abbott v. Del. State Pub. Integrity Comm’n, 2018 WL 1110852, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct.
Feb. 28, 2018).

                                         21
to stay the disciplinary proceeding. On April 13, 2018, this Court held that

consideration of the petition for interim suspension should be stayed while the

matters forming the basis for the petition remained pending in the Delaware

courts.

         On February 25, 2019, this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s

decision in Abbott v. Del. State Pub. Integrity Comm’n.34 On April 11, 2019,

ODC, which had new Chief Disciplinary Counsel, moved to withdraw the

petition for Abbott’s interim suspension. Instead of moving to lift the stay of

the petition, ODC had determined to proceed with investigation and, as

warranted, proceedings before the PRC and Board. Abbott objected, arguing

that the petition should be dismissed. The Court granted the motion to

withdraw the petition.

         In September 2019, the new Board Chair held a status conference and

set a schedule to complete briefing on ODC’s July 2016 motion to compel

production of Abbott’s advice to Jenney regarding the transfer. In his filings

with the Board, which included a motion to dismiss, Abbott continued his

inappropriate attacks on the Vice Chancellor and mounted one on this Court.

For example, Abbott alleged that:

             • ODC was acting in bad faith upon “the vindictive urging
               of the emotionally unhinged Vice Chancellor,” the “wild

34
     206 A.3d 260, 2019 WL 937184, at *1 (Del. Feb. 25, 2019) (TABLE).

                                          22
             ravings of the Angry Vice Chancellor,” and the “ravings
             of an unhinged personality (the ‘Maniacal Rant’).”35

          • The Maniacal Rant is unsupported by any evidence or
            legal analysis. It was simply a conclusory harangue of
            inflammatory buzzwords, which were carefully selected
            by the Angry Vice Chancellor to manufacture a record to
            further his diabolical plot to destroy Abbott for purely
            personal reasons.36

          • The ODC foolishly relies upon the absurd and completely
            unfounded assertions of the Angry Vice Chancellor,
            whose every statement in this matter is inherently
            unreliable and non-credible based upon his obviously
            disturbed state of mind and ulterior motive to harm
            Abbott.37

          • The Angry Vice Chancellor’s extremely poor attitude and
            inability to think clearly and cogently is evident.38

          • The Angry Vice Chancellor hoped to ruin Abbott’s legal
            career based on a doctored up record and referral to the
            ODC.39

          • If the ODC were to proceed against Abbott, he needs to
            take discovery from the Angry Vice Chancellor,
            including: (1) a deposition ad testificandum and duces
            tecum; (2) a physical examination through a psychiatrist
            and/or medical doctor; (3) document production regarding
            medications and records regarding any medical and/or any
            psychiatric condition(s).40

35
   Oct. 4, 2019 Sur-Reply in Opposition to Motion to Compel Lawyer-Client Privileged
Documents ¶¶ 1, 5, 14, Ex. 242.
36
   Id. ¶ 18 n.9.
37
   Id. ¶ 25.
38
   Id.
39
   Oct. 4, 2019 Motion to Dismiss ¶ 1, Ex. 243.
40
   Nov. 12, 2019 Reply in Support of Motion to Dismiss ¶ 48, Ex. 122.

                                        23
           • Psychological conditions such as mental transference,
             delusional episodes, memory lapses, or other disorders
             that the Angry Vice Chancellor may have suffered in 2015
             must be discovered so as to explain why he was unable to
             competently assess and comment upon Abbott’s
             (appropriate) conduct.41

           • Disappointingly, the Delaware Supreme Court failed to
             intervene and promptly discipline the Disgraced Past CDC
             for her misconduct in that regard [the petition for interim
             suspension], instead looking a blind eye to corruption that
             has infected the ODC’s dealings in this matter.42

           • The Supreme Court is simply out to lunch and cannot be
             expected to exercise any legitimate supervision of the
             ODC….43

On November 14, 2019, the Board Chair granted ODC’s motion to compel

and denied Abbott’s motion to dismiss. On December 9, 2019, the Board

Chair denied Abbott’s motion for reargument.

       On December 16, 2019, ODC notified Abbott that it planned to present

a petition for discipline to the PRC on January 8, 2020 for Abbott’s violation

of Rules 3.4(c), 3.5(d), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d). Abbott requested a postponement

of the presentation, to which ODC agreed.

41
   Id.
42
   Oct. 4, 2019 Motion to Dismiss ¶ 16, Ex. 243.
43
   Id. ¶ 17.

                                           24
       On January 2, 2020, Abbott sent a motion to dismiss the disciplinary

proceeding to the Justices by Federal Express. Abbott continued to attack the

Vice Chancellor and the Court, alleging, among other things:

           • The Vice Chancellor hoped to harm Abbott based on a
             doctored up record and referral to the ODC.44

           • Disappointingly, the Delaware Supreme Court failed to
             intervene and promptly discipline the Disgraced Past CDC
             for her misconduct in that regard [the petition for interim
             suspension], instead looking a blind eye to the corruption
             that has infected the ODC’s dealings vis-à-vis Abbott for
             lo these many years now.45

       On January 2, 2020, Abbott also sent PRC members a motion for

recusal of any lawyer members who regularly practiced in the Court of

Chancery. The motion contained many of the same inappropriate attacks

Abbott had made in previous motions.46 On January 7, 2020, Abbott filed a

motion to recuse the Board Chair. On January 14, 2020, ODC notified Abbott

that it planned to present a petition for discipline to the PRC on February 5,

2020 for Abbott’s violations of Rules 3.4(c), 3.5(d), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d).

44
   Jan. 2, 2020 Motion to Dismiss ¶ 1, Ex. 244.
45
   Id. ¶ 26.
46
   See, e.g., Jan. 2, 2020 Motion for Recusal of Certain Members ¶ 12, Ex. 129 (“Rather
than congratulating and applauding Abbott for his zealous representation through
appropriate and permissible means, the Vice Chancellor’s frustration, aggravation, and
anger caused him to lose touch with reality. He lashed out at the undersigned counsel and
spouted out wildly unsupported statements in an effort to gin-up a record for purposes of
this bad faith, personal retribution proceeding.”).

                                           25
       On January 27, 2020, Abbott filed an action against all of the then-

current Justices,47 then-Chief Disciplinary Counsel, and Deputy Disciplinary

Counsel in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware.

Abbott asserted federal RICO and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims as well as state

law claims based on the disciplinary proceeding. He also filed a motion for a

temporary restraining order of the disciplinary proceedings, which the District

Court denied. Abbott’s complaint and exhibits included allegations about the

Vice Chancellor that were similar to the inappropriate attacks in Abbott’s

filings with the Board and PIC.48 The District Court ultimately dismissed the

federal action based on the Younger abstention doctrine.49 The United States

Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision.50

       On January 30, 2020, Abbott asked PRC members to stay their

consideration of ODC’s petition pending resolution of his recusal motions and

federal lawsuit. Abbott also submitted materials, including the January 2,

47
   At that time, the Justices were Chief Justice Seitz, Justice Valihura, Justice Vaughn,
Justice Traynor, and Justice Montgomery-Reeves.
48
   See, e.g., Abbott v. Mette, C.A. No. 1:20-cv-131, Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21–22, 50 (D. Del. Mar.
9, 2020), 2020 WL 3604108 (alleging that the Vice Chancellor “arranged to trump up
defamatory and disparaging remarks about Abbott” and had a “purposeful desire to harm
Abbott without any factual or legal basis”); Am. Compl. Ex. D at 1, 6 (a letter Abbott
submitted to the PRC that referred to an “utterly frivolous complaint by a Vice Chancellor
who let his emotions get carried away,” “[t]he subjective personal opinion of a Vice
Chancellor stated in conclusory hyperbole is nothing more than a judicial rant,” and the
Vice Chancellor “hijack[ing] the lawyer disciplinary system to mete out his personal
dislike of my litigation approach.”).
49
   Abbott v. Mette, 2021 WL 1168958, at *4–5 (D. Del. Mar. 26, 2021).
50
   Abbott v. Mette, 2021 WL 5906146, at *1 (3d Cir. Dec. 14, 2021).

                                           26
2020 Motion to Dismiss that attacked the Vice Chancellor and this Court, for

the February 5, 2020 PRC hearing that were provided to the PRC panel.

                                      C.

      After the filing of the disciplinary petition, Abbott sought discovery and

continued to assert claims relating to the disciplinary proceeding in other

venues.

                                      1.

      On February 5, 2020, the PRC panel determined that there was probable

cause that Abbott engaged in professional misconduct and recommended the

filing of ODC’s petition for discipline (“Petition”). The Petition asserted the

following counts:

      Count I—violation of Rule 3.4(c) based on Abbott knowingly
      advising and assisting Jenney to disobey the Consent Order;

      Count II—violation of Rule 8.4(a) based on Abbott’s violation
      or attempted violation of Rule 3.4(c) and/or doing so through the
      acts of another;

      Count III—violation of Rule 8.4(c) based on Abbott making
      affirmative statements to the Court of Chancery and Seabreeze’s
      counsel, including but not limited to statements in his March 16,
      2015 Letter, that were contrary to his legal strategy, advice to
      Jenney, and understanding of the facts and law;

      Count IV—violation of Rule 3.5(d) based on Abbott making
      degrading statements about the Vice Chancellor and this Court
      in submissions to the Board, the PIC, and/or this Court; and

                                      27
      Count V—violation of Rule 8.4(d) based on the misconduct
      alleged in Counts I-IV.

      On July 1, 2020, Abbott filed an Answer to the Petition and asserted 96

affirmative defenses. Later that month, he obtained subpoenas for depositions

of the Justices, then-Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Deputy Disciplinary

Counsel, and former Chief Disciplinary Counsel. He also obtained subpoenas

for a deposition of the Vice Chancellor and production of his medical records

as well as a deposition of the former Chief Justice and production of his

records concerning Abbott’s Court on the Judiciary complaint. The recipients

moved to quash the subpoenas. Abbott withdrew the subpoenas before the

Board Chair could resolve the motions to quash.

      On September 14, 2020, the Board Administrative Assistant appointed

the Panel and issued a notice of hearing for December 10, 2020.           On

September 18, 2020, Abbott moved to recuse the Panel Chair based on his

legal practice in the Court of Chancery. He also advocated for holding the

schedule in abeyance until the motion for recusal was decided.

      At an October 5, 2020 status conference and in a subsequent written

decision, the Panel Chair denied the motion for recusal, stating that he had

retired in March 2018 and had not appeared in the Court of Chancery since

then. As to scheduling, Abbott sought a year to take discovery and to litigate

the matter while ODC sought to maintain the December 10, 2020 hearing date.

                                     28
The Panel Chair rejected ODC’s position and ultimately set a schedule for

Abbott to seek discovery subpoenas and for briefing on expected motions to

quash.

      In October 2020, Abbott again obtained subpoenas for depositions of

the Justices, then-Chief Disciplinary counsel, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel,

and former Chief Disciplinary Counsel. He again obtained subpoenas for a

deposition of the Vice Chancellor and production of his medical records and

a deposition of the former Chief Justice and production of his records

concerning Abbott’s Court on the Judiciary complaint. He also obtained a

subpoena for a deposition and documents of ODC’s records custodian and the

Board Administrative Assistant. The subpoena recipients filed motions to

quash, which the Panel Chair granted in a 118-page decision in February 2021.

Abbott filed that decision in the District Court litigation.

      On January 18, 2021, Abbott filed another motion for recusal of the

Panel Chair. The Panel Chair denied the motion. Abbott filed motions for

reargument of the Panel Chair’s decisions on the motions to quash and motion

for recusal, which the Panel Chair denied.

      On May 10, 2021, the Panel Chair entered an order scheduling the

portion of the disciplinary hearing on whether Abbott violated the DLRPC for

November 8, 2021 to November 12, 2021.              The scheduling order also

                                       29
established deadlines for expert reports, discovery, and motions in limine.

The Panel Chair denied Abbott’s subsequent request to extend the dates and

later motion to postpone the November 8, 2021 hearing.

                                            2.

         On May 10, 2021, Abbott filed an action in the Court of Chancery

against the Justices and ODC counsel. Abbott asserted claims similar to the

claims he had asserted in his federal action. At the Court of Chancery’s

request, the Chief Justice designated a Superior Court judge to sit as Vice

Chancellor under Article IV, §13(2) of the Delaware Constitution. The Court

of Chancery denied Abbott’s motions for a temporary restraining order and

expedition, and ultimately dismissed Abbott’s complaint based on this Court’s

exclusive authority in disciplinary proceedings.51              A panel of Justices

designated under Article IV, §§ 12 and 38 of the Delaware Constitution

affirmed the Court of Chancery’s decisions.52

         On May 11, 2021, Abbott obtained interrogatory subpoenas for the

Justices, the Vice Chancellor, the Board Administrative Assistant, the Clerk

of this Court, ODC, and former Chief Disciplinary Counsel. The recipients

51
     Abbott v. Vavala, 2022 WL 453609, at *3, 13 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2022).
52
     Abbott v. Vavala, 284 A.3d 77, 2022 WL 3642947, at *7 (Del. Aug. 22, 2022) (TABLE).

                                            30
filed motions to quash the interrogatory subpoenas, which the Panel Chair

granted.

         To protect the effective functioning of the disciplinary process, this

Court enjoined Abbott, on May 18, 2021, from serving or filing any new

complaints or actions in State courts or with the Court on the Judiciary, ODC,

or any State administrative board arising out of or relating to this disciplinary

proceeding (“May 18, 2021 Order”).53 The Court also stayed any pending

complaints Abbott had filed against present or former ODC attorneys and

stated that any objections to the conduct of the ODC attorneys or the Panel

would be considered when the Court reviewed the Panel’s report and

recommendations. In late 2021, Abbott sought partial relief from the May 18,

2021 Order, stating that he wished to pursue disqualification and discipline

against the Panel Chair. On January 19, 2022, the Court denied the motion,

noting that it had already ruled it would consider any objections concerning

the Panel, which included the Panel Chair, when it reviewed the Panel’s final

report and recommendations.

         Throughout the summer and fall of 2021, ODC and Abbott litigated

motions in limine and Abbott’s motion to quash ODC’s second subpoena

directed to him.        In October 2021, Abbott obtained subpoenas for the

53
     In re Abbott, 267 A.3d 995, 2021 WL 1996927 (Del. May 18, 2021) (TABLE).

                                          31
appearances of the Justices, the former Chief Justice, the Vice Chancellor,

former Chief Disciplinary Counsel, Deputy Disciplinary Counsel, the Board

Chair, the Board Administrative Assistant, the ODC records custodian, and

three Court of Chancery employees at the November 2021 hearing. The

recipients moved to quash the subpoenas.

          On October 25, 2021, Abbott moved to postpone the November

hearing. He argued, among other things, that the Panel Chair lacked authority

to resolve the motions to quash. ODC opposed the motion. On October 28,

2021, Abbott filed an emergency petition with this Court for enforcement of

his subpoenas. On November 1, 2021, the Panel Chair denied Abbott’s

motion for postponement. Abbott filed a motion for reargument, which the

Panel Chair denied. On November 2, 2021, the Court denied Abbott’s

emergency petition.54

                                                   3.

          At the November 2021 hearing, which stretched from the originally

scheduled five days to seven days, the Panel heard testimony from

Seabreeze’s counsel, Jenney, and Abbott, as a fact witness and an expert

witness. After the hearing, ODC and Abbott submitted briefing and exhibits

in support of their positions.

54
     The Court issued a lengthier decision with its reasoning on January 19, 2022.

                                              32
         On July 11, 2022, the Panel issued its report and recommendations

regarding whether Abbott had violated the DLRPC. As to Rule 3.4(c), the

Panel concluded that ODC did not establish by clear and convincing evidence

that Abbott had caused the violation of a court order issued under the Court

of Chancery Rules. Although the Panel described this as a “close issue” and

Abbott’s advice to Jenney as “contrary to the spirit of Rule 3.4(c),”55 the Panel

found that, as of March 16, 2015, there was no violation of a court order

because the then-current March 3, 2015 Bench Rulings did not require Jenney

to complete trimming of the trees and shrubs until April 22, 2015.

         Turning to Rule 8.4(a), the Panel found that ODC satisfied its burden

of showing that Abbott attempted to cause Jenney to disobey the terms of the

Consent Order and March 3, 2015 Bench Rulings by executing the transfer of

the Properties. The Panel also found, however, that the Rule 3.4(c) “open

refusal” exception applied to Rule 8.4(a) and the March 16, 2015 Letter

satisfied this exception, notwithstanding certain misrepresentations in that

letter. As a result, the Panel concluded that ODC had not established a

violation of Rule 8.4(a) by clear and convincing evidence.

         The Panel next determined that there was clear and convincing

evidence that Abbott had violated Rule 8.4(c) by making misrepresentations

55
     July 11, 2022 Panel Recommendation at 91.

                                           33
in the March 16, 2015 Letter. Specifically, Abbott misrepresented that Jenney

no longer had any ownership interest in the Properties and that Jenney’s

obligations under the Settlement Agreement were purely in personam without

mentioning the expansion of Jenney’s obligations to his successors and

assigns under the Consent Order.

      The Panel also held that there was clear and convincing evidence that

Abbott violated Rule 3.5(d) by making improper statements about the Vice

Chancellor in submissions to the Board, PIC, and this Court and by making

improper statements about the Court in filings with the Board and the Court.

      As to Rule 8.4(d), the Panel concluded that there was clear and

convincing evidence that Abbott engaged in conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice by making misrepresentations in the March 16, 2015

Letter and by repeatedly making statements that were degrading to a tribunal.

      Finally, the Panel addressed and rejected Abbott’s arguments

concerning subject matter jurisdiction, the statute of limitations, laches,

attorney-client privilege, Due Process, the Confrontation Clause, Equal

Protection, prosecutorial misconduct, and RICO.

                                     4.

      The Panel Chair set the sanctions hearing for August 24, 2022,

scheduled a pre-hearing conference for August 17, 2022, and directed the

                                     34
parties to submit pre-hearing submissions by August 11, 2022. The Panel

Chair denied Abbott’s motions for an extension of the time to file a motion

for partial reargument of the Panel’s report and recommendations, partial

reargument, and an extension of the sanctions hearing.

          In August, Abbott obtained subpoenas for the appearances of the

Justices, three former Justices who were members of the Court that imposed

discipline upon him in 2007,56 the Vice Chancellor, current and former ODC

counsel, current and former Board Chairs, and the Board Administrative

Assistant at the August 24, 2022 hearing. The recipients moved to quash those

subpoenas. The Panel Chair granted the motions to quash. Abbott also

obtained a subpoena for the Panel Chair to testify at the August 24, 2022

hearing. ODC objected and the Panel Chair concluded that he would not be

called to testify.

          The Panel held the sanctions hearing on August 24, 2022. The Panel

heard testimony from Abbott, his wife, two of Abbott’s clients, and a

Delaware lawyer who had positive working experiences with Abbott. Abbott

argued for a minor sanction such as a private admonition, while ODC sought,

at a minimum, a three-year suspension with conditions. The parties engaged

in post-hearing briefing and motion practice.

56
     In re Abbott, 925 A.2d 482, 489 (Del. 2007).

                                             35
      On January 23, 2023, the Panel issued its report and recommendations

on sanctions. The Panel issued a revised report on January 25, 2023. The

Panel Majority recommended a two-year suspension.           The Panel Chair

recommended disbarment.

      Applying the factors set forth in the ABA Standards for Imposing

Lawyer Sanctions (“ABA Standards”), as approved in February 1986 and as

amended in February 1992, the Panel found that Abbott’s misrepresentations

in his March 16, 2015 Letter violated Rules 8.4(c) and (d), which constituted

breaches of a lawyer’s duty to the public (ABA Standard 5.0) and the legal

system (ABA Standard 6.0). The Panel further found that Abbott’s mental

state was intentional and knowing.        The Panel Majority concluded that

Abbott’s knowing misconduct caused actual and potential injury to the public,

the legal system, and the profession. The Panel Chair concluded that Abbott’s

misrepresentations caused serious and potentially even greater serious injury

to Seabreeze and a significant adverse impact and potentially even more

serious adverse impact on the Seabreeze Litigation. The Panel Majority found

that Abbott’s misrepresentations adversely reflected on his fitness to practice

while the Panel Chair found that Abbott’s misrepresentations seriously

adversely reflected on his fitness to practice.

                                       36
      The Panel determined that the degrading statements, which violated

Rules 3.5(d) and 8.4(d), constituted breaches of a lawyer’s duty to the public

(ABA Standard 6.0) and legal profession (ABA Standard 7.0). The Panel also

found that the statements caused potential injury to the public, to the legal

system, and to the profession.

      The Panel next considered the presumptive sanction.            For the

misrepresentations in the March 16, 2015 Letter, the Panel Majority found

that Standards 5.13 and 6.12 were most applicable and provided collectively

for a presumptive sanction of suspension.        The Panel Chair found that

Standards 5.11(b) and 6.11 were most applicable and provided for a

presumptive sanction of disbarment. For the degrading statements, the Panel

agreed that Standard 8.2 was most applicable and provided for a presumptive

sanction of suspension.

      Finally, the Panel considered the aggravating and mitigating factors to

determine the appropriate sanction.        The Panel Majority found that the

aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors, but did not warrant

enhanced sanctions in a matter that ultimately arose from a dispute over trees

and shrubs and was similar to matters where attorneys were suspended. The

Panel Chair found that the aggravating factors and lack of mitigating factors

provided for enhanced sanctions, but it was not possible to increase the

                                      37
presumptive sanction of disbarment.         If disbarment was not already a

presumptive sanction for the Properties transfer misrepresentations, the Panel

Chair stated that he would likely recommend a three-year suspension for the

degrading statements.

                                           III.

                                           A.

      On January 24, 2023, the Supreme Court Clerk docketed the Panel’s

reports and recommendations in In re Abbott, No. 25, 2023. Abbott sought

an extension of the 20-day deadline for the parties to file objections. Noting

that this matter had been pending for eight years and stating that there was no

hurry, Abbott proposed having 60 days to file objections to the Panel’s first

report and then another 60 days to file objections to the Panel’s second report.

He also lodged a motion for recusal of all of the Justices. ODC objected to

the schedule proposed by Abbott.

      On February 9, 2023, the Court granted in part and denied in part

Abbott’s motion for an extension. The Court ordered the parties to submit

objections of no more than 15,000 words to both reports by March 15, 2023,

responses of no more than 15,000 words to the other party’s objections by

April 14, 2023, and replies of no more than 8,000 words by May 1, 2023.

Abbott filed a motion for reargument, which the Court denied.

                                      38
      Abbott purported to serve subpoenas on the Court Clerk, the Board

Administrative Assistant, ODC, and current and former ODC counsel for

documents he had sought in the Board proceedings. This Court struck the

subpoenas as unauthorized by the DLRDP and the Supreme Court Rules and

directed that Abbott not serve or file any additional discovery requests in No.

25, 2023.

      On March 15, 2023, ODC and Abbott filed objections to the Panel’s

reports. Abbott’s objections were 229 pages long, significantly exceeding the

15,000 word-count limit ordered by the Court.          The Court struck the

objections and directed Abbott to file objections of no more than 15,000

words, along with a Rule 13(a) certificate of compliance, by March 17, 2023.

Abbott, who said he was on vacation March 16 and March 17, 2023, informed

the Clerk on March 20th that if the Court did not identify which objections to

shorten or delete by March 22nd, he would involuntarily decide what to cut.

On March 22, 2023, Abbott filed 72 pages of objections, or 14,978 words

according to his certificate of compliance.

      On April 12, 2023, Chief Justice Seitz, Justice Vaughn, and Justice

Traynor denied the motion for their recusals. Justice Valihura recused herself.

Abbott filed a motion for reargument, which the Court denied. This matter

was submitted for decision on June 28, 2023.

                                      39
                                            B.

       ODC’s objections may be summarized as follows: (i) the Panel erred

as a matter of law by not finding clear and convincing evidence that Abbott

violated Rules 3.4(c), 8.4(a), and 8.4(d) when he counseled and assisted

Jenney to disobey a court order and bench ruling; (ii) the Panel abused its

discretion in qualifying Abbott as an expert witness; and (iii) the Panel erred

as a matter of law when it misapplied the aggravating factors to the

presumptive sanction.

       Without considering the objections Abbott improperly incorporated by

reference,57 Abbott’s objections may be summarized as follows: (i) ODC

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he violated Rules 3.4(c),

3.5(d), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d); (ii) the Vice Chancellor, the Panel Chair, and

ODC attorneys committed misconduct; (iii) the statute of limitations and

laches barred ODC’s claims; (iv) there were violations of Abbott’s rights

57
  Supr. Ct. R. 14; Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811, 822–23 (Del. 2013). These objections may
include claims for violations of federal civil and Delaware RICO statutes that Abbott raised
in his federal and Court of Chancery complaints. Both this Court and the District Court
held that Abbott could raise the substance of these claims in the disciplinary proceeding.
Abbott, 2022 WL 3642947, at *3; Abbott, 2021 WL 1168958, at *2. The Panel considered
the facts underlying Abbott’s RICO claims, which were based on essentially the same
factual allegations and defenses as in the disciplinary proceeding, and concluded that
Abbott had not shown any professional or judicial misconduct or constitutional violations.
Abbott has not properly asserted any objections to the Panel’s handling of his RICO claims
and has therefore waived those claims.

                                            40
under the First, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution; and (v) the Panel misapplied the ABA Standards and Delaware

disciplinary cases in recommending a sanction.58

                                             IV.

       This Court has the “‘inherent and exclusive authority’ to discipline

members of the Delaware Bar.”59 Although the Panel’s recommendations are

helpful, the Court is not bound by them.60 The Court has an obligation to

review the record independently and to determine whether there is substantial

evidence to support the Panel’s factual findings.61 The Court reviews the

Panel’s conclusions of law de novo.62

                                             A.

                                             1.

       ODC contends that the Panel erred in failing to find that Abbott violated

Rule 3.4(c) (knowingly disobeying an obligation under the rules of a tribunal)

by advising and assisting Jenney to disobey the Consent Order and March 3,

2015 Bench Rulings. The source of this error, according to ODC, was the

58
   The Court has considered these objections notwithstanding Abbott’s flagrant violation
of its Feb. 9, 2023 order establishing the word count limits and deadlines for the objections.
59
   In re Froelich, 838 A.2d 1117, 1120 (Del. 2003) (citing In re Benson, 774 A.2d 258, 262
(Del. 2001)).
60
   In re Nadel, 82 A.3d 716, 720 (Del. 2013).
61
   Abbott, 925 A.2d at 484.
62
   Id.

                                             41
Panel’s reliance on the April 22, 2015 deadline established in the March 3,

2015 Bench Rulings for the trimming of the trees and shrubs. The Panel

reasoned that there was no violation of Rule 3.4(c) because, as of March 16,

2015 the deadline for Jenney to trim the trees and shrubs had not yet passed

and thus there was no disobedience of a court order. Abbott argues that ODC

failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he violated Rule 3.4(c).

          We must independently review the record to determine if there is clear

and convincing evidence to support a finding of knowing misconduct.63

“Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that produces an abiding

conviction that the truth of the contention is ‘highly probable.’”64

          Having considered the evidence presented, the Panel’s report and

recommendations, and the parties’ positions, we conclude that ODC

established, by clear and convincing evidence, that Abbott violated Rule

3.4(c) when he advised and assisted Jenney to disobey the Consent Order and

March 3, 2015 Bench Rulings by transferring the Properties to his wife for

nominal consideration while maintaining his control of the Properties. The

Panel’s reliance on the April 22, 2015 deadline established in the March 3,

2015 Bench Rulings to find otherwise was misplaced. Although the April 22,

63
     In re Koyste, 111 A.3d 581, 588 (Del. 2015).
64
     In re Bailey, 821 A.2d 851, 863 (Del. 2003).

                                             42
2015 deadline had not passed at the time of Abbott’s March 16, 2015 Letter,

Jenney was obligated under the Consent Order and March 3, 2015 Bench

Rulings to trim the trees and shrubs on the Properties. Contrary to Abbott’s

suggestion, the passing of the October 31, 2014 deadline for Jenney’s

completion of the trimming work under the Consent Order did not mean that

Jenney was no longer obligated to perform that work. The Consent Order still

contained a time-is-of-the-essence provision. The March 3, 2015 Bench

Rulings also required Jenney to trim the trees and shrubs on the Properties.

         Through the transfer of the Properties, Abbott intended to make

Jenney’s compliance with his obligations under the Consent Order and the

March 3, 2015 Bench Rulings impossible, even though the April 22, 2015

deadline had not yet passed. The evidence clearly establishes that this was

the intended purpose of the transfer. As Abbott advised Jenney, “you are no

longer the title owner AND the Settlement Agreement and Consent Order are

purely personal obligations of yours that it would then be impossible for you

to perform.”65 Jenney admitted that he transferred the Properties as advised

by Abbott so that he would not have to comply with the court orders.66 Abbott

intentionally designed the transfer to end the Seabreeze Litigation and to force

65
     Mar. 7, 2015 Email, Ex. 236.
66
     See supra Section I.D.

                                      43
Seabreeze to start over, thereby depriving Seabreeze of its rights under the

Consent Order and March 3, 2015 Bench Rulings.67 The Court of Chancery’s

prompt action to ensure that this did not happen as Abbott intended does not

erase Abbott’s violation of Rule 3.4(c).

       It is also clear that Abbott acted knowingly. Under the DLRPC, an

attorney acts “knowingly” when he has “actual knowledge of the fact in

question.”68         An     attorney’s   “knowledge   may   be   inferred   from

circumstances.”69 Abbott was well-aware of Jenney’s obligation to the trim

the trees and shrubs on the Properties under the Consent Order and March 3,

2015 Bench Rulings.70 He knew that Jenney did not want to comply with

those obligations and that Seabreeze was insistent that those obligations be

performed soon.71 Abbott knowingly devised and executed the plan for

Jenney to disobey his obligations under the Consent Order and March 3, 2015

Bench Rulings by transferring the Properties to his wife for nominal

consideration.72

       Abbott contends that Rule 3.4(c) applies only to “an obligation under

the rules of a tribunal,” not a court ruling like the Consent Order or March 3,

67
   See supra Sections I.C., I.D.
68
   DLRPC R. 1.0(f).
69
   Id.
70
   See supra Sections I.B., I.C., I.D.
71
   See id.
72
   See supra Sections I.C., I.D.

                                          44
2015 Bench Rulings, and that he did not disobey any obligations he had under

the Court of Chancery Rules. In making this argument, Abbott points out that

the predecessor to Rule 3.4(c) in Delaware included the word “ruling” and

that other States’ ethical rules expressly provide that a lawyer may not disobey

a ruling. This interpretation of Rule 3.4(c) is contrary to our disciplinary

cases, disciplinary cases in other jurisdictions, and the ABA Standards.73

       Abbott also argues that he could not have violated Rule 3.4(c) because

he was not subject to the Consent Order or the March 3, 2015 Bench Rulings.

We reject this argument. An attorney may object to a court’s ruling and

preserve a claim of error, but may not “advise a client not to comply” with the

court’s ruling.74 This Court has previously found attorneys violated Rule

3.4(c) when they assisted someone other than themselves subject to a court

73
   See, e.g., In re Woods, 143 A.3d 1223, 1226 (Del. 2016) (describing failure to comply
with the terms of a court order as a violation of Rule 3.4(c)); In re Tonwe, 929 A.2d 774,
778 (Del. 2007) (lawyer knowingly violated Rule 3.4(c) by flouting an order to cease and
desist unauthorized practice); In re Shearin, 765 A.2d 930, 937 (Del. 2000) (holding that
an attorney violated Rule 3.4(c) when she disobeyed a court order that enjoined her and
her client from interfering with another party’s title to certain property and from holding
themselves out as having an ownership interest in the properties); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y
Disciplinary Bd. v. Baldwin, 857 N.W.2d 195, 211 (Iowa 2014) (recognizing that this rule
applies to court orders and rules); ABA Standards 6.2 (including court orders in discussing
sanctions for failure to obey any obligation under the rules of the tribunal).
74
   Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458 (1975). See also In re Ford, 128 P.3d 178, 182
(Alaska 2006) (“An attorney may challenge a court order by motion, appeal, or other legal
means, but may not simply disregard it.”); Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing
Lawyers § 94(2) (Am. Law Inst. 2000) (providing that lawyer may not assist a client in
conduct that violates a court order unless the lawyer reasonably believes the conduct
constitutes a good faith effort to determine the scope of a court order or that the client can
assert a non-frivolous argument that the conduct will not violate a court order).

                                             45
order to disobey that court order.75 Other courts have also found Rule 3.4(c)

violations when a lawyer knowingly advised or assisted a client to disobey a

court order.76

       Although Abbott correctly points out that neither the Consent Order nor

the March 3, 2015 Bench Rulings prohibited Jenney from transferring the

Properties, he ignores that those orders required Jenney to trim the trees and

shrubs on the Properties. So while Jenney did not disobey a court order

prohibiting transfer of the Properties, he did disobey a court order requiring

him to trim the trees and shrubs on the Properties.

       Finally, Rule 3.4(c) makes an exception for “open refusal based on an

assertion that no valid obligation exists.” This exception is inapplicable here

because there was no open refusal before the transfer of the Properties.

Although Abbott stated that he had considered whether there was a viable

75
   In re Martin, 105 A.3d 967, 971–72, 975 (Del. 2014) (concluding that there was clear
and convincing evidence that attorney violated Rule 3.4(c) by assisting suspended attorney
in his practice of law in violation of the order suspending the attorney); In re Kingsley, 950
A.2d 659, 2008 WL 2310289, at *4-5 (Del. June 4, 2008) (TABLE) (disbarring non-
Delaware attorney whose failure to respond to ODC’s petition was deemed an admission
of, among other things, the allegation that he violated Rule 3.4(c) by performing legal work
for an accountant after the accountant was subject to a cease and desist order not to engage
in the unauthorized practice of law).
76
   See, e.g., In re McCarthy, 668 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Ind. 1996) (holding that attorney violated
Rule 3.4(c) by preparing a quitclaim deed conveying marital property in violation of a
restraining order against his client); Iowa Sup. Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Vandel, 889
N.W.2d 659, 666–67 (Iowa 2017) (concluding that there was Rule 3.4(c) violation where
attorney failed to answer disciplinary petition and therefore admitted allegation that she
advised her client to deny visitation to her ex-husband despite visitation schedule in
dissolution decree).

                                             46
Court of Chancery Rule 60(b) motion in the January 8, 2015 response to

Seabreeze’s notice to show cause, he went on to state that Jenney would have

the trimming work performed. At the January 15, February 23, and March 3,

2015 hearings, Abbott continued to represent that Jenney was taking the

necessary steps to complete the trimming work, not that Jenney had no

obligation or intention to do so.

                                           2.

      ODC also objects to the Panel’s failure to find that Abbott violated Rule

8.4(a) (violating or attempting to violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or

knowingly assisting another to do so) by violating the Consent Order and

March 3, 2015 Bench Rulings directly, inducing Jenney to violate those

orders, and directing his non-lawyer assistant to assist in violating the orders

by drafting, notarizing, and recording the deeds. The Panel, again relying on

the April 22, 2015 trimming deadline, concluded that ODC had not shown

that Abbott violated Rule 8.4(a) by procuring violation of the Consent Order.

As previously discussed, the Panel’s reliance on the April 22, 20215 deadline

was misplaced.

      ODC also argued that Abbott attempted to cause Jenney to disobey the

Consent Order and March 3, 2015 Bench Rulings by transferring the

Properties to his wife. The Panel agreed, but found that the “open refusal”

                                      47
exception of Rule 3.4(c) applies to Rule 8.4(a) and that Abbott’s March 16,

2015 Letter constituted an “open refusal” because the April 22, 2015 trimming

deadline had not passed. Again, the Panel’s reliance on the April 22, 2015

deadline was misplaced.

       Abbott argues that Rule 8.4(a) only applies to attorneys who assist or

induce other attorneys to violate the DLRPC, but this interpretation of Rule

8.4(a) is incorrect.77 ODC has shown by clear and convincing evidence that

Abbott violated Rule 8.4(a).

                                                3.

       Abbott objects to the Panel’s conclusion that there was clear and

convincing evidence he violated Rule 8.4(c) (engaging in conduct involving

dishonest, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation) by making two material

misrepresentations in his March 16, 2015 Letter. The Panel found that Abbott

violated Rule 8.4(c) by misrepresenting to the Court of Chancery that: (i)

Jenney no longer had any ownership interest in the Properties, even though

Jenney continued to hold de facto ownership rights in the Properties and

intended to reconvey title back to himself; and (ii) stating that Jenney’s

77
   In re Davis, 974 A.2d 170, 175 (Del. 2009) (holding lawyer violated Rule 8.4(a) by
causing staff members to notarize documents when the lawyer did not sign the documents
in the notary’s presence); State v. Grossberg, 705 A.2d 608, 612–13 (Del. Super. Ct. 1997)
(revoking attorney’s pro hac admission after he gave statements violating court order and
Rule 3.6 and arranged for his client and parents to do interviews during which they made
statements that he could not have made under Rule 3.6).

                                           48
obligations under the Settlement Agreement were purely in personam without

disclosing the provisions of Paragraph 17 in the Consent Order.

       Abbott contends that these statements were omissions, not affirmative

statements as required for violation of Rule 8.4(c). This Court, however, has

found that a lawyer’s incomplete or misleading statements to a court violate

Rule 8.4(c).78      In addition, Abbott contends that the Petition pleaded

affirmative misrepresentations, not misrepresentations by omission. Count III

of the Petition alleged that “[b]y making affirmative statements to the Court

and opposing counsel, including but not limited to statements [in the March

16, 2015 Letter] . . . that were contrary to Respondent’s legal strategy,

Respondent’s advice to his client and/or Respondent’s understanding of the

facts and law, Respondent engaged in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,

deceit or misrepresentation, in violation of Rule 8.4(c)).”                 The Petition

sufficiently pleaded, and put Abbott on notice of, the basis for the alleged Rule

8.4(c) violation.

78
   See, e.g., In re Favata, 119 A.3d 1283, 1287-90 (Del. 2015) (finding Rule 8.4(c)
violations where lawyer made statements that he intended the defendant to overhear, told
the trial judge that he was not communicating with the defendant, and failed to correct
those false statements); In re Poliquin, 49 A.3d 1115, 1133 (Del. 2012) (finding Rule 8.4(c)
violations where lawyer failed to disclose a previous admonition and failed to correct his
counsel’s statements that he had performed within expectations of the judicial system since
admission to the Bar at a rule to show cause hearing).

                                            49
      Abbott also argues that his statements in the March 16, 2015 Letter

were factually and legally accurate. This argument is without merit. Abbott

advised the Court that Jenney no longer had any ownership interest in the

Properties, even though he knew that the only purpose of the transfer was for

Jenney to avoid his trimming obligations and he had advised Jenney that he

could have his wife transfer the Properties back to him in the future. Abbott

claims that he did not know who would control the Properties after the

transfer, but again, he had advised Jenney that he could transfer the Properties

back to himself in the future. This advice reflects that Abbott knew Jenney,

not his wife, would control what happened to the Properties after the transfer.

Even if we accepted Abbott’s claim that he did not know Jenney would

continue to exercise ownership rights over the Properties after the transfer, he

made no effort to determine who would actually be in control of the Properties

after the transfer. Other than a March 9, 2015 email in which Jenney’s wife

authorized transfer of the Properties to her, Abbott had no communications

with her about what she knew or had in mind regarding the transfer or plans

for the Properties after the transfer. As the Panel recognized, “[o]nce a plan

is provided and initiated, a lawyer cannot then stick his head in the sand like

an ostrich and claim that he was unaware of the exact methods of his client’s

                                      50
execution of the plan.”79 Nor may lawyers “stick their heads in the sand and

blind themselves to their professional obligations.”80

      Abbott further contends that he was not required to mention the Consent

Order in the March 16, 2015 Letter because he did not believe it remained in

effect. Abbott, however, had advised Jenney that Paragraph 17 of the Consent

Order expanded his obligation to trim the trees and shrubs to his successors,

heirs, and assigns and that Seabreeze would rely on that language to challenge

the transfer. As discussed by the Panel, Abbott referred to the Consent Order

in an earlier draft of the March 16, 2015 Letter, but removed that reference

from the final version submitted to the Court of Chancery. It is clear that

Abbott deliberately and strategically chose not to mention the Consent Order

in the March 16, 2015 Letter.

      Finally, Abbott contends that ODC failed to prove the fourth and fifth

elements of common law fraud (reliance upon and damage from the

misrepresentations) as required by this Court in In re Lyle81 for a violation of

Rule 8.4(c). Abbott misreads Lyle. In that case, the Court concluded that a

public defender who shared a co-defendant’s privileged statement with his

client did not violate Rule 8.4(c). The Court found that the attorney’s conduct

79
   July 11, 2022 Panel Recommendation at 28 n.79.
80
   In re Beauregard, 189 A.3d 1236, 1251 (Del. 2018).
81
   74 A.3d 654, 2013 WL 4543284, at *8 (Del. Aug. 23, 2013) (TABLE).

                                        51
was “qualitatively distinguishable” from the conduct of attorneys in cases

where it found Rule 8.4(c) violations.82 The Court approved the Panel’s

report, which reviewed the elements of common law fraud before finding that

the attorney had not deceived anyone or made any false representations, but

neither the Court nor the Board held that a Rule 8.4(c) violation requires proof

of reliance and damages. ODC proved by clear and convincing evidence that

Abbott violated Rule 8.4(c) by making misrepresentations in his March 16,

2015 Letter.

                                                4.

       Abbott asserts several objections to the Panel’s finding that he violated

Rule 3.5(d) (conduct degrading to a tribunal) by making statements degrading

to the Vice Chancellor and the Court in submissions to the Board, PIC, and

the Court. As discussed by the Panel, this Court has found violations of Rule

3.5(d) (or its predecessor, 3.5(c)) where attorneys: (i) accused a tribunal of

reaching decisions based on bias, prejudice, or improper motivations, rather

than on the merits;83 and (ii) used personal and inflammatory language to

82
   Id. at *2.
83
   Abbott, 925 A.2d at 486 (holding that attorney violated Rule 3.5(d) by suggesting in a
reply brief that the judge would rule on a basis other than the merits of the case); In re
Ramunno, 625 A.2d 248, 250 (Del. 1993) (finding that attorney violated Rule 3.5(c) when
he “engaged in an insolent colloquy with the trial judge . . . which, implicitly if not
explicitly challenged the court’s integrity” and stating that disparagement of a court’s
integrity is “unacceptable by any standard”).

                                           52
attack opposing counsel or the tribunal.84 Consistent with this precedent, the

Panel found that there was clear and convincing evidence that Abbott had

violated Rule 3.5(d) by making statements in submissions to the Board, PIC,

and this Court that the Vice Chancellor fabricated the record and reached

decisions based on mental instability or personal dislike of Abbott instead of

the merits. The Panel also found that there was clear and convincing evidence

that Abbott violated Rule 3.5(d) by making statements in submissions to the

Board and this Court that this Court was turning a blind eye to corruption in

the ODC.

       Abbott does not dispute that he made the statements, but contends that

he did not violate Rule 3.5(d) because: (i) he was acting as a pro se litigant,

not a lawyer, when he made the statements; (ii) the Board and PIC are not

tribunals under Rule 3.5(d); (iii) his statements could not be degrading to a

tribunal because the Vice Chancellor and this Court were unaware of the

84
   Abbott, 925 A.2d at 484-85 (concluding that attorney’s statements in Superior Court
briefs referring, among other things, to opposing counsel’s “fictionalized” account of a
hearing, the tribunal’s “imaginary, make-believe set of reasons” for its findings, and
appointment of “a group of monkeys” to the tribunal violated Rule 3.5(d)); In re Shearin,
721 A.2d 157, 162, 165 (Del. 1998) (finding Rule 3.5(c) violation where the attorney
suggested in appellate reply brief that there were rumors the Vice Chancellor had been
bribed by the opposing party). See also In re Johnston, 520 P.3d 737, 779, 792 (Kan. 2022)
(finding attorney violated Rule 3.5(d) where she, among other things, accused court, bar,
and others of engaging in collusion and racketeering without providing any evidence and
accused judge who directed her to self-report to disciplinary authority as acting so contrary
to the record that the allegations had appearance of retaliatory harassment).

                                            53
statements; (iv) he made the statements in confidential proceedings and his

statements should be immune from discipline; and (v) his statements are

protected by the First Amendment. These objections are without merit.

       Acting pro se does not exempt an attorney from the DLRPC. DLRDP

7(a) provides that “[i]t shall be grounds for disciplinary action for a lawyer to

. . . [v]iolate any of the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct . . .

whether or not the violation occurred in the course of a lawyer-client

relationship.” This Court has held that lawyers representing themselves in

disciplinary proceedings remain subject to the DLRPC.85 As the Panel also

highlighted, Abbott presented himself as an attorney in many of the

submissions containing the degrading statements by including his law firm

letterhead, referring to himself as “undersigned counsel,” or including his law

firm or Esquire signature designations.86

85
   In re Hurley, 183 A.3d 703, 2018 WL 1319010, at *3–5 (Del. Mar. 14, 2018) (TABLE)
(accepting Board panel’s finding that an attorney violated Rule 4.4(a) (respect for third
persons) in his response on behalf of himself to disciplinary complaint); In re Lankenau,
158 A.3d 451, 2017 WL 934709, at *1 (Del. Mar. 9, 2017) (TABLE) (accepting Board
panel’s finding that attorney violated Rule 3.3(a)(1) (candor to tribunal) when he failed to
disclose he did not give complete and accurate testimony in previous disciplinary
proceeding); In re Kennedy, 503 A.2d 1198, 1202, 1208–09 (Del. 1985) (affirming Board
panel’s finding that attorney who was representing himself in a disciplinary proceeding
violated the predecessor to Rule 4.4(a) by threatening the attorney who referred him during
the disciplinary proceeding). See also Barrett v. Va. State Bar ex rel. Second Dist. Comm.
634 S.E.2d 341, 345 (Va. 2006) (“It would be a manifest absurdity and a distortion of these
Rules [of Professional Conduct] if a lawyer representing himself commits an act that
violates the Rules but is able to escape accountability for such violation solely because the
lawyer is representing himself.”).
86
   See, e.g., Exs. 105 at 19–20, 243 at 12, 244 at 17.

                                            54
       Abbott argues that the Board and PIC are not tribunals because they do

not fall within the definition of a tribunal under the DLRPC. The DLRPC

define a tribunal as:

       [A] court, an arbitrator in a binding arbitration proceeding or a
       legislative body, administrative agency or other body acting in
       an adjudicative capacity. A legislative body, administrative
       agency or other body acts in an adjudicative capacity when a
       neutral official, after the presentation of evidence or legal
       argument by a party or parties, will render a binding legal
       judgment directly affecting a party’s interests in a particular
       matter.87

Although the Board’s findings are not binding upon this Court, the Board is

authorized to make numerous decisions throughout the disciplinary

proceedings that bind the parties during those proceedings.88 For example,

“[a]ll discovery orders by the Chair or Vice Chair of the Board or the chair of

a Hearing Panel are interlocutory and may not be appealed prior to the Board’s

submission to the Court of the final report.”89 Like judges of tribunals, Board

members do not participate in proceedings “in which a judge, similarly

situated, would be required to abstain” under the Delaware Judges’ Code of

Judicial Conduct.90 Finally, this Court has treated the Board like a tribunal in

87
   DLRPC 1(m).
88
   DLRDP 2(c) (describing the Board’s power to conduct hearings and issue orders and the
Panel chair’s power to decide scheduling, evidentiary, and procedural matters); DLRDP
12(g) (describing powers of Board Chair, Board Vice Chair, and Panel Chair to decide
discovery disputes).
89
   DLRDP 12(g).
90
   DLRDP 2(d).

                                          55
accepting recommendations that a lawyer who made false statements to the

Board violated Rule 3.3(a)(1), which prohibits a lawyer from making false

statements of fact or law to a tribunal.91

      Contrary to Abbott’s contentions, the PIC is also a tribunal. The PIC’s

decisions are binding and are subject to limited judicial review.92

      Abbott next argues that there was no violation of Rule 3.5(d) because

the Vice Chancellor and the Court were unaware of his derogatory statements.

His understanding of Rule 3.5(d) is flawed. As the Panel stated:

      The text of Rule 3.5(d) does not limit this prohibition of a
      lawyer’s degrading conduct that is aimed only to the tribunal
      before which the lawyer is then appearing. The underlying
      policy for Rule 3.5(d) is not to protect the subjective feelings of
      judiciary members made to them during a proceeding, but to
      protect the trust and confidence of the judicial system by barring
      a lawyer’s undignified, and discourteous statements about the
      judiciary.93

This Court has affirmed the Board’s finding that a lawyer violated the

predecessor to Rule 3.5(d) by making “castigating” statements about a Vice

Chancellor in her appellate reply brief.94 Similarly, in In re Abbott, this Court

discussed and relied upon cases in other jurisdictions where courts found

91
   In re Lankenau, 2017 WL 934709, at *1; In re Vanderslice, 116 A.3d 1244, 2015 WL
3858865, at *1, 9 (Del. June 19, 2015) (TABLE).
92
   29 Del. C. § 5810; 29 Del. C. § 5810A.
93
   July 11, 2022 Panel Recommendation at 121.
94
   In re Shearin, 721 A.2d at 162.

                                        56
attorneys violated Rule 3.5(d) by making disparaging statements about a

lower court’s decision.95

         In addition, Abbott made some of the statements concerning this Court

in a motion to dismiss he sent by Federal Express to each of the Justices in

January 2020. He claims that there was no violation of Rule 3.5(d) in the

absence of proof that the Justices read the motion, but cites no authority in

support of the proposition that a document submitted to a tribunal is not

degrading unless there is proof that the judicial officer read the degrading

statement. Abbott also does not claim that any of the motions were returned

to him or otherwise not delivered.

         Abbott contends that his statements are protected by confidentiality and

immunity provisions in the DLRDP and PIC statute and therefore cannot

violate Rule 3.5(d). This contention is unpersuasive. DLRDP 10 provides

that all communications to and from the Board, the PRC, or ODC are

“absolutely privileged, and no civil suit predicated on these proceedings may

be instituted against any complainant, witness or lawyer.”96 This language

provides immunity from civil lawsuits, not disciplinary proceedings for

ethical violations. “Disciplinary proceedings are neither civil nor criminal,

95
     925 A.2d at 485–87.
96
     DLRDP 10.

                                        57
but are sui generis.”97 DLRDP 13 provides for confidentiality of certain

disciplinary information, but again, does not immunize a lawyer for ethical

violations he commits during his disciplinary proceeding. In fact, this Court

has imposed discipline upon attorneys who committed ethical violations

during their disciplinary proceedings.98 Under Abbott’s interpretation of Rule

13, a lawyer could engage in professional misconduct during a disciplinary

proceeding by destroying evidence or threatening opposing counsel without

suffering any professional consequences. Such an interpretation is illogical

and unreasonable.

       As to the PIC statute, § 5810(h)(1) provides that all proceedings relating

to a charged violation remain confidential unless the person charged requests

public disclosure or the PIC determines after a hearing that a violation

occurred. Section 5810 does not immunize Abbott from any ethical violations

he committed in his PIC filings.

       Abbott also argues that the absolute litigation privilege protects his

statements. The absolute litigation privilege “is a common law rule, long

recognized in Delaware, that protects from actions for defamation statements

97
   DLRDP 15(a).
98
   See, e.g., Hurley, 2018 WL 1319010, at *3–5 (accepting Board panel’s finding that an
attorney violated Rule 4.4(a) (respect for third persons) in his response on behalf of himself
to disciplinary complaint); Lankenau, 2017 WL 934709, at *1 (accepting Board panel’s
finding that attorney violated Rule 3.3(a)(1) (candor to tribunal) when he failed to disclose
he did not give complete and accurate testimony in previous disciplinary proceeding).

                                             58
of judges, parties, witnesses and attorneys offered in the course of judicial

proceedings so long as the party claiming the privilege shows that the

statements issued as part of a judicial proceeding and were relevant to a matter

at issue in the case.”99        Statements falling under the absolute litigation

privilege are privileged “regardless of the tort theory by which the plaintiff

seeks to impose liability.”100

       This Court has not extended the absolute litigation privilege to attorney

disciplinary proceedings. Other courts have held that the litigation privilege

does not insulate an attorney from discipline for unethical conduct.101

       Abbott relies on Cohen v. King102 to argue that the absolute litigation

privilege precludes professional discipline for his statements, but this reliance

is misplaced. In Cohen, the plaintiff was an attorney who had been the subject

of disciplinary proceedings. During the disciplinary proceedings, the plaintiff

filed a grievance complaint against the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, who

asserted that the complaint was without merit. The complaint was dismissed.

99
   Barker v. Huang, 610 A.2d 1341, 1345 (Del. 1992).
100
    Id. at 1349.
101
    See, e.g., Hawkins v. Harris, 661 A.2d 284, 288 (N.J. 1995) (recognizing that the
absolute litigation privilege “does not protect against professional discipline for an
attorney’s unethical conduct”); Ruberton v. Gabage, 654 A.2d 1002, 1007 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1995) (“It must be emphasized that the absolute privilege . . . applies to claims
of tortious conduct; it does not apply to a claim of unprofessional conduct, or to summary
contempt proceedings against the offending attorney.”).
102
    206 A.3d 188 (Conn. App. Ct. 2019).

                                           59
The plaintiff then filed a lawsuit against the Chief Disciplinary Counsel,

alleging that her answer in the disciplinary proceedings contained defamatory

statements. The Connecticut court held that the litigation privilege extended

absolute immunity to statements made by the respondent to the disciplinary

authority and dismissed the complaint.                 Cohen does not stand for the

proposition that the litigation privilege insulates Abbott from attorney

discipline for his statements.

       Finally, Abbott argues that his statements are protected by the First

Amendment. The Panel correctly determined that the First Amendment did

not protect Abbott’s degrading statements. A lawyer’s right to free speech is

not unlimited. As this Court has observed:

       Based upon the United States Supreme Court’s decision in
       Gentile, this Court has held that there are ethical obligations
       imposed upon a Delaware lawyer, which qualify the lawyer’s
       constitutional right to freedom of speech. Accordingly, members
       of the Delaware Bar are subject to disciplinary sanctions for
       speech consisting of intemperate and reckless personal attacks on
       the integrity of judicial officers.103

103
   Shearin, 765 A.2d at 938 (citations omitted). See also Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada,
501 U.S. 1030, 1081-82 (1991) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Lawyers are officers of the
court and, as such, may legitimately be subject to ethical precepts that keep them from
engaging in what otherwise might be constitutionally protected speech.”); In re Guy, 756
A.2d 875, 877-79 (Del. 2000) (affirming the Board’s conclusion that attorney had violated
Rule 8.2, in the course of representing a criminal defendant, based upon his written
assertions in a letter to a Superior Court Judge that the Judge acted with racial bias against
him).

                                             60
       Abbott relies on cases like Standing Comm. on Discipline of U.S. Dist.

Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal. v. Yagman104 to argue that he expressed personal

opinions or true statements protected by the First Amendment. But this Court

has rejected Yagman as inconsistent “with the holdings of the Court on the

issue of constitutionally protected speech as applied to lawyers.”105 Instead,

this Court has approvingly cited In re Palmisano, in which the United States

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that there must be some factual

basis for a lawyer’s accusations against a judge before First Amendment

protections will apply.106 There was no factual basis for Abbott’s statements

that the Vice Chancellor fabricated the basis for Abbott’s referral to ODC or

acted out of spite or mental instability. Nor is there any factual basis for

Abbott’s claim that this Court has ignored corruption in the ODC.

       Abbott also invokes the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which “provides

broad immunity from liability to those who petition the government, including

administrative agencies and courts, for redress of their grievances.”107

Because this is not a civil proceeding and Abbott is not being held liable for

104
    55 F.3d 1430 (9th Cir. 1995).
105
    Shearin, 765 A.2d at 938.
106
    Id. (citing In re Palmisano, 70 F.3d 483 (7th Cir. 1995)).
107
    Hanover 3201 Realty, LLC v. Village Supermarkets, Inc., 806 F.3d 162, 178 (3d Cir.
2015).

                                         61
his statements, Noerr-Pennington does not apply here. ODC has shown by

clear and convincing evidence that Abbott violated Rule 3.5(d).

                                            5.

       ODC has also shown by clear and convincing evidence that Abbott’s

conduct in connection with the transfer of the Properties and his degrading

statements violated Rule 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of

justice).108

                                            6.

       In addition to his objections to specific findings of the Panel as

discussed above, Abbott has asserted other objections to the disciplinary

proceedings.

       Abbott claims, and has claimed throughout the various proceedings,

that ODC engaged in a “fishing expedition” against him because the Court of

Chancery sent the Seabreeze Litigation record to ODC without any

explanation. This claim is unfounded. In the June 10, 2015 letter referring

Abbott to ODC and enclosing the record in the Seabreeze Litigation, the first

sentence states the “Vice Chancellor issued a bench ruling on May 21,

108
    See, e.g., In re Koyste, 111 A.3d 581, 588-89 (Del. 2015) (lawyer’s knowing
disobedience of court order and directing his non-lawyer assistant to violate the order
violated both Rule 3.4(c) and 8.4(d)); Abbott, 925 A.2d at 486–87 (lawyer’s degrading
statements violated Rules 3.5(d) and 8.4(d)); Shearin, 765 A.2d at 939 (“Violations of court
orders constitute conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.”).

                                            62
2015.”109 The transcript of the May 21, 2015 hearing is less than 35 pages,

with discussion of Abbott’s role in the sham transfer of the Properties starting

on page 20. No “fishing expedition” was necessary.

      Abbott also argues that ODC failed to prove that the PRC approved the

Petition, thus rendering this entire proceeding “infirm.”110 The Panel correctly

rejected this argument. As required by DLRDP 9(b), ODC notified Abbott of

the PRC meeting and informed him that he could submit materials to ODC

that ODC would provide to the PRC. After approval of the Petition, ODC, as

required by DLRDP 9(d)(1), filed the Petition with the Board Administrative

Assistant and served it upon Abbott. Nothing more is required by ODC as far

as the PRC’s approval of the Petition.

      Abbott next accuses the Vice Chancellor, Panel Chair, and ODC of

misconduct. The record does not reflect any such misconduct. The Court on

the Judiciary previously dismissed Abbott’s complaint alleging judicial

misconduct by the Vice Chancellor in the Seabreeze Litigation. As a judicial

officer, the Vice Chancellor was supposed to take action when he became

aware of reliable evidence indicating the likelihood of unprofessional conduct

109
    Ex. 73.
110
     Mar. 22, 2023 Pro Se Respondent/Third Party Petitioner’s Objections to the
Proceedings, Recommendations, & Misconduct of ODC Counsel and Board Panel Chair
at 24.

                                      63
by Abbott.111 The Vice Chancellor’s compliance with his ethical obligations

does not, as Abbott insists, constitute misconduct.

       Abbott’s claims of misconduct by the Panel Chair, including denial of

his motions for recusal, also fail. These claims are based primarily on

Abbott’s disagreement with the Panel Chair’s rulings, but ruling against a

party does not mean a hearing officer is biased or otherwise engaging in

misconduct as Abbott believes.112 Abbott’s contention, without any factual

basis, that former Chief Disciplinary Counsel arranged for the appointment of

the Panel Chair to rig the proceeding against Abbott is also meritless. Nor is

there anything sinister in the Panel Chair, a former member of the Board of

Bar Examiners, serving as the chair of a panel for a matter before the Board

of Bar Examiners while this matter, in a different tribunal, was proceeding.

The record reflects that the Panel Chair exercised commendable diligence and

patience in resolving the multitude of arguments and attacks made by Abbott.

       Abbott also asserts multiple ethical violations and instances of

prosecutorial misconduct by ODC attorneys. Underlying most, if not all, of

these claims is Abbott’s “belief that he should not be under disciplinary

111
    Judges’ Code of Jud. Conduct R. 2.15 (“A judge should initiate appropriate action when
the judge becomes aware of reliable evidence indicating the likelihood of unprofessional
conduct by a judge or lawyer.”).
112
    See, e.g., Gattis v. State, 955 A.2d 1276, 1284 (Del. 2008) (recognizing that a judge’s
adverse rulings or critical remarks do not ordinarily support a bias or appearance of
impropriety claim).

                                           64
investigation, and that the person charged with that task should be disqualified

for performing it.”113 This misguided belief is not a legitimate basis for the

disqualification of every ODC attorney who ever worked on this case or for a

mistrial as Abbott has contended.

       As to the attorney-client privilege issues Abbott raises, ODC did not act

improperly in seeking his privileged communications with Jenney regarding

the transfer of the Properties. The Board Chair and Panel Chair correctly

determined that these communications were discoverable under In re

Kennedy.114 As the Board Chair and Panel also recognized, Jenney waived

the attorney-client privilege for these communications at the April 13, 2015

hearing in the Court of Chancery by voluntarily testifying that Abbott advised

him to transfer the Properties so he would not have to comply with the court

order.115

       Contrary to Abbott’s contentions, Chief Disciplinary Counsel’s

reference to other communications between Abbott and Jenney, which the

Panel later found to be privileged and inadmissible, in his opening statement

113
     Abbott, 2019 WL 937184, at *8.
114
     442 A.2d 79, 92–93 (Del. 1982) (holding attorney could not invoke the attorney-client
privilege to prevent this Court’s Censor Committee from conducting an audit of the
attorney’s financial records for compliance with guidelines on retention of client funds).
115
     DRE 510(a) (“A person waives a privilege conferred by these rules . . . if such person .
. . intentionally discloses or consents to disclosure of any significant part of the privileged
or protected communication or information.”).

                                             65
did not require a mistrial. Abbott objected to ODC counsel raising matters he

claimed were outside the scope of the disciplinary petition, but did not object

on the basis of attorney-client privilege. The Panel Chair ruled that Abbott

could raise the objection when a witness was testifying, which is what

occurred. Abbott has not shown any “manifest necessity” or other basis for a

mistrial.116

       Abbott also asserts statute of limitations and laches defenses. The Panel

correctly concluded that these defenses were without merit.          Under the

DLRDP, there is “no statute of limitations with respect to any proceedings

under these Rules.”117 As to his laches defense, Abbott had the burden of

proving the delay was unreasonable and prejudice resulted from the delay.118

Abbott has not satisfied this burden. Abbott repeatedly sought and obtained

postponements, stays, and extensions throughout the proceedings. Most, if

not all, of the delay is attributable to Abbott’s actions. He has also failed to

show prejudice to him from the delay for which he is primarily responsible.

       Finally, Abbott asserts multiple violations of his constitutional rights,

including his right to confront his accuser (the Vice Chancellor) under the

Sixth Amendment, his right to due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth

116
    Banther v. State, 977 A.2d 870, 890 (Del. 2009).
117
    DLRDP 26.
118
    In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109, 1111–12, 1127 (Del. 2007).

                                         66
Amendments, and his right to equal protection under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments.

       There was no violation of Abbott’s right to confront his accuser. The

Sixth Amendment protects an accused’s right to confront witnesses against

him in a criminal prosecution.              This proceeding was not a criminal

prosecution.119 In addition, the Vice Chancellor explained the reasons for his

rulings, as well as why he was referring Abbott to ODC, on the record in the

Seabreeze Litigation.

       As to Abbott’s due process claims, disciplinary proceedings contain

“extensive procedural due process protections” for respondents.120 These

protections include: (i) notice of ODC’s intent to present a matter to the PRC

and the opportunity to submit a written statement for the PRC to consider;121

(ii) the PRC’s determination of whether there is probable cause to support the

petition;122 (iii) if the petition is approved by the PRC, the opportunity to file

an answer to the petition;123 (iv) the ability to compel by subpoena the

production of documents or witness testimony;124 (v) a hearing that is

119
    See supra n.97 and accompanying text.
120
    Abbott, 2019 WL 937184, at *5.
121
    DLRDP 9(b)(1).
122
    Id. 9(b)(3).
123
    Id. 9(d).
124
    Id. 12(a)(2).

                                            67
recorded;125 and (vi) the opportunity to submit objections to the Panel’s report

and de novo review of the Panel’s report and recommendations by this

Court.126

       Abbott argues that he was deprived of due process because the Panel

Chair quashed his interrogatory subpoenas, deposition and document

subpoenas, and trial subpoenas. Denying a party discovery that they cannot

establish any entitlement to is not a due process violation. First, the Panel

Chair correctly concluded that the DLRDP do not authorize interrogatories.127

Second, the DLRDP permit parties to subpoena the testimony of witnesses

and the production of “pertinent” documents at a deposition or hearing, not to

compel the disclosure of irrelevant, privileged, or otherwise protected

information.128

       Despite the strong policy against discovery of judicial officers, Abbott

chose to direct the majority of his subpoenas to current and former judicial

officers and to seek disclosure of their mental processes in making or not

making certain rulings.        As the Panel Chair correctly concluded in his

February 22, 2021 decision granting the judicial officers’ motions to quash,

125
    Id. 9(d)(4).
126
    Id. 9(e); In re Martin, 105 A.3d 967, 974 (Del. 2014) (de novo review).
127
    DLRDP 12 cmt. (“Former section (c) concerning interrogatories has been eliminated.”);
DLRDP 15(b) (providing “that discovery procedures shall not be expanded beyond those
provided in Rule 12”).
128
    DLRDP 12(a)(2).

                                           68
such discovery is not permitted.129 The Panel Chair also did not err in finding

that Abbott could not compel the production of privileged information in the

possession of the Board’s Administrative Assistant and current and former

Board Chairs.

       As to Abbott’s subpoenas directed to opposing counsel and ODC, the

Panel Chair correctly determined that Abbott could not obtain disclosure of

privileged information and had not overcome the prosecutorial privilege by

asserting a colorable claim of vindictive prosecution (a violation of due

process) or selective prosecution (a violation of equal protection).

“[V]indictive prosecution arises from ‘specific animus or ill will.’” 130 “There

is no vindictiveness as long as the prosecutor’s decision is based upon the

normal factors ordinarily considered in determining what course to pursue,

rather than upon genuine animus against the defendant for an improper reason

129
    See, e.g., Evans v. J.P. No. 19, 652 A.2d 574, 577 (Del. 1995) (“[E]xamination of a
judge’s mental process would be destructive of judicial responsibility and undermine the
integrity of the judicial process.”); Brooks v. Johnson, 560 A.2d 1001, 1002 (Del. 1989)
(“Persons performing adjudicatory functions are not subject to examination in furtherance
of the litigation objectives of the parties.”); United States v. Roth, 332 F. Supp.2d 565, 567
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (recognizing that “the overwhelming authority from the federal courts in
this country, including the United States Supreme Court, makes it clear that a judge may
not be compelled to testify concerning the mental processes used in formulating official
judgments or the reasons that motivated him in the performance of his official duties.”);
State ex rel. Kaufman v. Zakaib, 535 S.E.2d 727, 735 (W.Va. 2000) (holding “judicial
officers may not be compelled to testify concerning their mental processes employed in
formulating official judgments or the reasons that motivated them in their official acts.”).
130
    In re Kelly, 283 A.3d 580, 2022 WL 32070230, at *9 (Del. Aug. 10, 2022) (TABLE)
(quoting State v. Wharton, 1991 WL 138417, at *10–11 (Del. Super. Ct. June 3, 1991)).

                                             69
or in retaliation for exercise of legal or constitutional rights.”131 ODC began

investigating Abbott after the Vice Chancellor referred him to ODC for his

conduct in the Seabreeze Litigation. ODC investigated Abbott’s conduct in

the Seabreeze Litigation and prepared a disciplinary petition that the PRC

approved for filing. The record is devoid of any credible evidence that ODC’s

investigation and filing of the disciplinary petition is based upon animus of

ODC counsel toward Abbott or retaliation for his exercise of constitutional

rights.

          Abbott also contends that he was entitled to discovery regarding ODC’s

selective prosecution of sole practitioners like himself in violation of the

Equal Protection Clause. “The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution protects against arbitrary and

capricious classifications, and requires that similarly situated persons be

treated equally.”132 A prima facie case of selective prosecution requires

showing: (i) a policy to prosecute that had a discriminatory effect on a

protected class; and (ii) was motivated by a discriminatory purpose.133 To

obtain discovery for a selective prosecution defense as Abbott does here, he

131
    United States v. DeMichael, 692 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1982).
132
    Sisson v. State, 903 A.2d 288, 314 (Del. 2006).
133
    Drummond v. State, 909 A.2d 594, 2006 WL 2842732, at *2 (Del. Oct. 5, 2006)
(TABLE).

                                        70
is not required to make a prima facie case, but must present some evidence

tending to show the essential elements of selective prosecution.134

         The Panel Chair correctly concluded that Abbott failed to make a

threshold showing of the essential elements of selective prosecution. Abbott

has not shown that sole practitioners are members of a protected class. Nor

has he shown ODC had a policy to prosecute having a discriminatory effect

on sole practitioners or was motivated to discriminate against sole

practitioners. To support his selective prosecution claim, Abbott relies on

ODC’s dismissal of five disciplinary complaints he filed against opposing

counsel who were not sole practitioners. But as the Panel Chair recognized,

none of those complaints involved a lawyer found to have committed

wrongdoing or referred to ODC by the trial judge like Abbott was. Abbott

has not shown selective prosecution by ODC.

                                             7.

         Finally, the Panel erred in qualifying Abbott as an expert witness on

Rule 3.4(c), Rule 3.5(d), and the First Amendment. Abbott did not have the

knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education to qualify as an expert

witness on these subjects under D.R.E. 702. The Panel’s reasoning that

Abbott qualified as an expert because he satisfied the low threshold for expert

134
      Wharton, 1991 WL 138417, at *5.

                                        71
qualification under D.R.E. 702 and had more knowledge as a lawyer than the

lay member of the Panel would make any respondent lawyer an expert witness

in a case with a hearing before a Board panel. Abbott could make his

arguments concerning the meaning and history of the DLRPC and the First

Amendment without being qualified as an expert. Although the Court rejects

the Panel’s qualification of Abbott as an expert witness, the Court has

nonetheless considered the arguments Abbott made as an expert witness.

                                           B.

       We next determine the appropriate sanction for Abbott’s violations of

Rules 3.4(c), 3.5(d), 8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d). “The objectives of the lawyer

disciplinary system [in Delaware] are to protect the public, to protect the

administration of justice, to preserve confidence in the legal profession, and

to deter other lawyers from similar misconduct.”135 Lawyer disciplinary

sanctions “are ‘not designed to be either punitive or penal.’”136 “The focus of

the lawyer disciplinary system in Delaware is not on the lawyer, but rather on

the danger to the public that is ascertainable from the lawyer’s record of

professional misconduct.”137

135
    In re Bailey, 821 A.2d 851, 866 (Del. 2003).
136
    In re Landis, 850 A.2d 291, 293 (Del. 2004) (quoting In re Garrett, 835 A.2d 514, 515
(Del. 2003)).
137
    In re Fountain, 878 A.2d 1167, 1173 (Del. 2005).

                                           72
       In determining the appropriate sanction, the Court considers the four

factors set forth in the ABA Standards and Delaware precedent.138 The ABA

factors are: (i) the ethical duty violated; (ii) the attorney’s mental state; (iii)

the extent of the actual or potential injury caused by the attorney’s

misconduct; and (iv) aggravating factors139 and mitigating factors.140 Based

on the first three factors, the Court makes an initial determination of the

presumptive sanction.141         The Court then considers the fourth factor to

determine whether the presumptive sanction should be increased or

decreased.142 The ABA Standards do not account for multiple charges of

misconduct, but provide that the “ultimate sanction imposed should at least be

consistent with the sanction for the most serious instance of misconduct

138
    Beauregard, 189 A.3d at 1251; In re Steiner, 817 A.2d 793, 796 (Del. 2003).
139
    Aggravating factors include prior disciplinary offenses, dishonest or selfish motive, a
pattern of misconduct, multiple offenses, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
proceeding, submission of false evidence or false statements during the disciplinary
process, refusal to acknowledge wrongful nature of conduct, vulnerability of victim,
substantial experience in the practice of law, indifference to making restitution, and illegal
conduct, including the use of controlled substances. ABA Standards 9.22.
140
    Mitigating factors include absence of a prior disciplinary record, absence of a dishonest
or selfish motive, personal or emotional problems, timely good faith effort to make
restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct, full and free disclosure to disciplinary
board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings, inexperience in the practice of law,
character or reputation, physical disability, mental disability or chemical dependence, delay
in disciplinary proceedings, imposition of other penalties or sanctions, remorse, and
remoteness of prior offenses. ABA Standards 9.32.
141
    Steiner, 817 A.2d at 796.
142
    Id.

                                             73
among a number of violations; it might well be and generally should be greater

than the sanction for the most serious misconduct.”143

          Abbott objects to what he sees as the Panel’s undue reliance on the

ABA Standards, but this Court has consistently looked to the ABA Standards

for guidance in determining the appropriate sanction for a disciplinary

violation.144 Abbott also argues that the Panel deviated from the four-step

framework by adding consideration of the presumptive sanction as an

improper, fifth step. He is mistaken. The Panel considered the first three steps

to make an initial determination of the presumptive sanction and then

considered the aggravating and mitigating factors as set forth in the ABA

Standards and Delaware disciplinary cases.

          ODC objects that the Panel erred in its application of the aggravating

factors to the presumptive sanction and should have recommended disbarment

as the appropriate sanction. We address these objections (to the extent

necessary) and Abbott’s remaining objections (to the extent they are not

simply a rehash of his arguments that he committed no violations of the

DLRPC) below.

143
      ABA Standards, II.
144
      Fountain, 878 A.2d at 1173.

                                        74
                                            1.

       Applying the ABA Standards, Abbott’s violations of Rules 3.4(c),

8.4(a), 8.4(c), and 8.4(d) in connection with the transfer of the Properties

constitute a breach of his duties owed to the public (ABA Standard 5.0) and

the legal system (ABA Standard 6.0), including abuse of the legal process

(ABA Standard 6.2). His mental state was intentional and knowing because

he purposefully advised Jenney to transfer the Properties so that Jenney would

not have to comply with his obligation under the Consent Order and March 3,

2015 Bench Rulings to trim the trees and shrubs on the Properties.145 Abbott

also advised Jenney that he could transfer the Properties back to himself.146

Abbott’s strategy was designed to benefit Jenney by allowing him to escape

obligations he did not want to perform under the Consent Order while staying

in the neighborhood and maintaining control of the Properties at a minimal

cost.147 Abbott also intentionally misrepresented the nature and effect of the

transfer of the Properties in his March 16, 2015 Letter to the Court of

Chancery.148

145
     The ABA Standards define “intent” as “the conscious objective or purpose to
accomplish a particular result” and “knowledge” as the conscious awareness of the nature
or attendant circumstances of the conduct but without the conscious objective or purpose
to accomplish a particular result.” ABA Standards, III Definitions. See also supra Sections
I.C., I.D.
146
    See supra Section I.C.
147
    See supra Sections I.C., I.D.
148
    See supra Section IV.A.3.

                                           75
       Abbott’s violations caused Seabreeze injury149 and, contrary to the

Panel Majority’s findings, potentially serious injury.150 As a result of Abbott’s

actions, Seabreeze had to spend additional time and incur additional legal fees

to enforce rights it had previously bargained for under the 2012 Settlement

Agreement and 2014 Consent Order.151 If Abbott’s tactics had worked as he

intended, the Court of Chancery would have dismissed the Seabreeze

Litigation for mootness and Seabreeze would have been forced to initiate and

pursue another legal action against Mrs. Jenney for trimming of trees and

shrubs on the Properties.152

       Abbott’s violations also caused significant and potentially serious

adverse effects on the Seabreeze Litigation as well as serious interference and

potentially serious interference with the Seabreeze Litigation. Disregard of a

court order “seriously undermines the legal system.”153 As a result of Abbott’s

actions, the Court of Chancery had to expend scarce judicial resources

149
    The ABA Standards define “injury” as “harm to a client, the public, the legal system or
the profession which results from a lawyer’s misconduct.” ABA Standards, III Definitions.
ABA Standards 6.11 and 6.21 include serious injury to a party.
150
    The ABA Standards define “potential injury” as the “harm to a client, the public, the
legal system or the profession that is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the lawyer’s
misconduct, and which, but for some intervening factor or event, would probably have
resulted from the lawyer’s misconduct.” ABA Standards, III Definitions. ABA Standards
6.11 and 6.21 include potentially serious injury to a party.
151
    See supra Section I.D.
152
    This would have included serving Mrs. Jenney, which Abbott and Jenney discussed how
to make difficult. See supra Section I.C.
153
    Tonwe, 929 A.2d at 780.

                                           76
resolving multiple motions and holding multiple hearings relating to the

Properties Transfer.154 If Abbott’s tactics had worked as intended, the Court

of Chancery would have been burdened with yet another case arising from

Jenney’s unwillingness to trim trees and shrubs on the Properties.

       Under our precedent, Abbott’s misrepresentations in the March 16,

2015 Letter to the Court of Chancery concerning a scheme he devised for his

client not to comply with a court order adversely reflected—to a significant

extent—on his fitness to practice law.155 Based on the analysis set forth above,

the presumptive sanction for Abbott’s violation of Rules 3.4(c), 8.4(a), 8.4(c),

and 8.4(d) in connection with the transfer of the Properties is disbarment under

ABA Standards 5.11,156 6.11,157 and 6.21.158

154
    See supra Section I.D.
155
    In re McCarthy, 173 A.3d 536, 2017 WL 4810769, at *2, 7 (Del. Oct. 23, 2017)
(TABLE) (approving Board panel’s recommendation of disbarment where attorney failed
to disclose to the court that his client had altered medical records); Vanderslice, 2015 WL
3858865, at *14 (approving Board panel’s recommendation of disbarment where attorney
misappropriated client fees and failed to disclose the full extent of his misappropriation
during disciplinary proceedings).
156
    ABA Standard 5.11(b) provides that “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a
lawyer engages in any other intentional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation that seriously adversely reflects on the lawyer’s fitness to practice.”
157
    ABA Standard 6.11 provides that “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer,
with the intent to deceive the court, makes a false statement, submits a false document, or
improperly withholds material information, and causes serious or potentially serious injury
to a party, or causes a significant or potentially significant adverse effect on the legal
proceeding.”
158
    ABA Standard 6.21 provides that “[d]isbarment is generally appropriate when a lawyer
knowingly violates a court order or rule with the intent to obtain a benefit for the lawyer or
another, and causes serious injury or potentially serious injury to a party or causes serious
or potentially serious interference with a legal proceeding.”

                                             77
       We agree with the Panel that Abbott’s degrading statements in violation

of Rules 3.5(d) and 8.4(d) involve breaches of duties owed to the legal system

(ABA Standard 6.0) and legal profession (ABA Standard 7.0). The Panel did

not address Abbott’s mental state, but we find that he intentionally and

knowingly made the degrading statements.159 The record in the Seabreeze

Litigation clearly demonstrates why the Vice Chancellor referred Abbott to

ODC yet Abbott persistently—and baselessly—stated that the Vice

Chancellor fabricated the record, the Vice Chancellor acted out of spite or

mental disability, and this Court ignored ODC’s misconduct in pursuing the

matter. He made these statements despite being publicly reprimanded in 2007

for making similarly improper statements.160 At that time, the Court warned

Abbott:

       Zealous advocacy never requires disruptive, disrespectful,
       degrading or disparaging rhetoric. The use of such rhetoric
       crosses the line from acceptable forceful advocacy into unethical

159
    A violation of Rule 3.5(d) does not require intent. Ramunno, 625 A.2d at 250 (“[I]t is
irrelevant whether Mr. Ramunno intended to cause disruptive effect. Instead, the sole
question before the Court is whether Mr. Ramunno’s rude and uncivil behavior was
degrading to the court below.”).
160
    Abbott, 925 A.2d at 485–86 (holding Abbott violated Rule 3.5(d) and 8.4(d) when he
made statements about opposing counsel fabricating legal grounds and implying the trial
court might rule on a basis other than the merits of the case). In August 2022, Abbott
moved to vacate the sanction—public reprimand—imposed in this 2007 case. The Court
denied the motion, concluding that even if Superior Court Civil Rule 60(b) applied as
Abbott contended, he had not shown a basis for relief under Rule 60(b)(1), (b)(4), and
(b)(6). Abbott also rehashed many of the same arguments that he had raised in his 2007
motion for reargument, which the Court had denied.

                                           78
          conduct that violates the Delaware Lawyers’ Rules of
          Professional Conduct.161

Abbott, however, chose to deploy such degrading rhetoric again.

          We also agree with the Panel that Abbott’s degrading statements caused

potential injury to the legal system and the legal profession. Public trust in

the legal system may be undermined if an attorney makes unsupported

statements that a judge ruled against him or his client for reasons other than

the merits of the case, such as personal dislike or emotional instability. Abbott

argues that there can be no injury because his statements were confidential,

but he made the degrading statements in multiple venues to be viewed by

multiple people. Based on the Court’s previous imposition of a public

reprimand in 2007 for Abbott’s violation of Rules 3.5(d) and 8.4(d), the Panel

correctly determined that Standard 8.2 applied. Standard 8.2 provides that

suspension is generally appropriate when a lawyer has been reprimanded for

similar misconduct and engages in similar acts of misconduct that cause injury

or potential injury to a client, the public, the legal system, or the profession.

                                        2.

          We agree with the Panel’s conclusion that the aggravating factors

outweigh the mitigating factors. Assuming without deciding that the Panel

161
      Id. at 489.

                                        79
correctly found that the aggravating factor of prior disciplinary history should

not apply here, we note the existence of numerous other aggravating factors,

including multiple offenses in a disciplinary proceeding, refusal to

acknowledge the wrongful nature of the conduct, and substantial experience

in the practice of law. The aggravating factors of vulnerability of the victim,

indifference to making restitution, and illegal conduct, including the use of

controlled substances, are not relevant here.

      Contrary to Abbott’s contentions, his actions in connection with the

transfer of the Properties were dishonest. He assisted Jenney’s disobedience

of his obligations under the Consent Order and March 3, 2015 Bench Rulings

while still maintaining control of the Properties and misrepresented Jenney’s

control over the Properties after the transfer to the Court. He made degrading

statements and threatened to create a public spectacle with the selfish motive

of pressuring ODC to drop this matter.

      We reject Abbott’s objection that his degrading statements about the

Vice Chancellor and this Court between 2016 and 2019 did not constitute a

pattern of misconduct. We also reject Abbott’s contention that his offenses

were not multiplicitous because he did not violate any of the DLRPC. As

previously discussed, Abbott did violate the DLRPC in connection with both

the transfer of the Properties and the degrading statements.

                                      80
       Whether Abbott’s filing of multiple motions for recusal of Board Chairs

and the Panel Chair and service of repetitive subpoenas constitute bad faith

obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding is a close question, but ultimately

we cannot find that Abbott violated the DLRDP or orders of the Board in this

respect.162 Nor does the aggravating factor relating to deceptive practices

apply here. Although Abbott argues that ODC engaged in deceptive practices,

this is based on his incorrect position that there was no basis for the

disciplinary proceedings.

       And it is beyond dispute that Abbott refuses to acknowledge the

wrongful nature of the conduct. Indeed, Abbott still insists, despite all

evidence to the contrary, that his legal work for Jenney was “Good

Lawyering.”163 He also continues to make spurious and unfounded statements

about the Vice Chancellor, ODC counsel, and the Panel Chair. Abbott objects

that this factor should receive little weight because he is entitled to defend

himself, but he could have defended himself without hurling unfounded

accusations of corruption and mental illness. As the Court previously warned

him, zealous advocacy does not encompass degrading or disrespectful

162
    To ensure the effective functioning of the disciplinary process, the Court had to enjoin
Abbott from filing additional complaints against disciplinary counsel and initiating new
actions in State court related to these proceedings in 2021. Abbott, 2021 WL 1996927, at
*1–2.
163
    March 22, 2022 Pro se Respondent/Third Party Petitioner’s Objections to Proceedings,
Recommendations & Misconduct of ODC Counsel and Board Panel Chair at 32, 57.

                                            81
language.164 Finally, Abbott’s substantial experience in the practice of law—

twenty-five years of experience as a Delaware lawyer when he was referred

to ODC in 2015—is an aggravating factor.

          As to the mitigating factors, Abbott cannot rely on the absence of a prior

disciplinary record because he was publicly reprimanded for making

statements degrading to a tribunal in 2007. Nor was there the absence of a

dishonest or selfish motive.165 As to personal or emotional problems as a

mitigating factor, Abbott objects that the Panel ignored his testimony and his

wife’s testimony concerning psychological trauma he has suffered as a result

of ODC bringing and pursuing these proceedings. We disagree. The Panel

correctly recognized that this alleged trauma did not contribute to Abbott’s

sanctionable misconduct. This objection also rests upon the faulty premise

that everyone but Abbott himself is responsible for what has transpired since

his actions in the Seabreeze Litigation.

          Timely restitution is not relevant here and thus cannot be counted as a

mitigating factor. And Abbott has not attempted to rectify the consequences

of his misconduct. Again, Abbott has been uncooperative throughout the

proceedings and has continued to make degrading statements. Thus, the

164
      Abbott, 925 A.2d at 488.
165
      See supra Section IV.B.2.

                                          82
mitigating factor relating to a lawyer’s cooperative attitude has no application

here. Abbott objects that he was entitled to defend himself and pursue

independent litigation to protect his rights, but fails to acknowledge that it was

unnecessary for him to degrade others and waste Board resources with

repetitive motions while doing so.

       As previously mentioned, Abbott is an experienced Delaware litigator.

Consequently, he cannot claim that inexperience mitigates the seriousness of

his offenses. Abbott submitted evidence of good character and reputation, but

we agree with the Panel that this evidence was insufficient to constitute a

mitigating factor. Abbott has not performed the amount of public service

found to constitute a mitigating factor in other disciplinary cases.166 Like the

Panel, we acknowledge that Abbott is an experienced and successful litigator

in real estate and land use matters. We also agree with the Panel that this only

makes Abbott’s misconduct in the Seabreeze Litigation and these proceedings

even more unnecessary and senseless.

       The mitigating factors relating to physical disability, mental disability,

or chemical dependency are not relevant here. The mitigating factor of delay

166
   See, e.g., In re Tenenbaum, 918 A.2d 1109, 1115, 1137 (Del. 2007) (accepting Board
panel’s recommended sanction of disbarment, which included finding that the lawyer’s
record of substantial public and community service, including significant work with
Community Legal Aid Society and participation in national and State bar association
sections and committees, was a mitigating factor).

                                         83
in disciplinary proceedings does not apply because Abbott was primarily

responsible for any delays.167 Imposition of other penalties or sanctions also

does not apply. Abbott objects that the psychological trauma he has suffered

from these proceedings is more than sufficient punishment, but fails to

acknowledge his own personal responsibility for what has occurred. Abbott

refuses to acknowledge that he committed any wrongdoing, so remorse is not

a mitigating factor. Finally, we reject Abbott’s contention that his degrading

statements in this proceeding are remote from the degrading statements for

which he was disciplined in 2007.

       Having considered the aggravating and mitigating factors, the Court

concludes that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors. There

is no basis for reducing the presumptive sanction of disbarment. Disbarment

is also consistent with Delaware authority. In McCarthy, the Court accepted

a Board panel’s recommended sanction of disbarment for a non-Delaware

attorney who failed to inform the court that his client had altered medical

records and failed to take remedial measures after his client’s false deposition

and trial testimony in a medical malpractice action.168 As in this case, ABA

167
   See supra Section IV.A.6.
168
   2017 WL 4810769, at *2–5. By devising the scheme for his client to escape his court-
ordered obligations, Abbott actually played a more active role than the disbarred attorney
in McCarthy.

                                           84
Standards 5.11(b), 6.11, and 6.21 provided for a presumptive sanction of

disbarment and the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factors.169

In fact, there were fewer aggravating and more mitigating factors present in

McCarthy than here.

                                         VI.

       For the reasons set forth above, Richard Abbott is DISBARRED

effective immediately.         Abbott shall pay the costs of the disciplinary

proceeding. ODC is directed to file a petition in the Court of Chancery for

the appointment of a receiver for Abbott’s law practice and to disseminate this

opinion in accordance with Rule 14 of the DLRDP.

       IT IS SO ORDERED.

169
    Neither ABA Standard 6.11 nor 6.21 applied in the Shearin cases that the Panel Majority
relied upon to recommend suspension.

                                           85