Court Opinion

ID: 9916820
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-10 18:05:36.61388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:01.425380
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                     No. 23-1712
                               Filed January 10, 2024

IN THE INTEREST OF R.R.,
Minor Child,

R.M., Father,
       Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Wapello County, Richelle Mahaffey,

District Associate Judge.

      The father challenges the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.

      Michael S. Fisher of Fisher Law Office, New Sharon, for appellant father.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

      Samuel K. Erhardt, Ottumwa, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

      Considered by Greer, P.J., and Ahlers and Buller, JJ.
                                            2

GREER, Presiding Judge.

       The juvenile court terminated the father’s parental rights to R.R., born in

July 2022, pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (2023). 1 The

father appeals, challenging one of the grounds for termination and asserting the

loss of his rights is not in the child’s best interests. Alternatively, the father requests

additional time to work toward reunification with the child.

       Our review is de novo. In re J.J.S. Jr., 628 N.W.2d 25, 28 (Iowa Ct. App.

2001). Our primary concern is the best interests of the child. Id.

       Statutory Grounds. The father, who remained incarcerated at the time of

the termination hearing, recognizes the child could not be returned to his custody

at that time; he concedes that the State proved the statutory ground for termination

under paragraph (h). While the father challenges some of the elements under

paragraph (g), we need only one ground to affirm. See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d

764, 774 (Iowa 2012).          So, without considering the father’s challenge to

paragraph (g), we conclude there is clear and convincing evidence for termination

under section 232.116(1)(h). See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010)

(recognizing the court need not address if a ground for termination exists when the

parent does not dispute the existence of a ground).

       Best Interests. The father argues termination of his parental rights is not

in R.R.’s best interests. When making a best-interests determination, we focus on

the child’s safety and need for a permanent home. In re J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793,

801 (Iowa 2006) (Cady, J., concurring specially).           And we consider the best

1 The mother’s parental rights were terminated pursuant to section 232.116(1)(g),

(h), and (j); she does not appeal.
                                           3

placement for furthering the child’s long-term nurturing and growth and their

physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs. Iowa Code § 232.116(2).

       R.R. was born in July 2022 with his intestines outside of his body. Because

of his need for additional medical intervention and ongoing care, he remained in

the hospital for a number of months—until early November. The Iowa Department

of Health and Human Services was involved with the family during this time

because R.R.’s umbilical cord blood tested positive for methamphetamine. Before

R.R.’s discharge from the hospital, both the mother and father were incarcerated;

they were each eventually sentenced to prison terms.

       The father remained incarcerated as of the final date of the termination trial

in late August 2023 although he expected to be released in just a few days. In part

because of R.R.’s fragile medical state, the father and R.R. had no in-person

interactions from the date the father went to jail on September 5, 2022, through the

end of the termination trial; the father and baby’s only interactions during this nearly

year-long period consisted of a few video visits. While the father had “sporadically”

visited R.R. at the hospital during the first two months of the child’s life, the father

was actively using methamphetamine at that time and was afraid to physically

interact with R.R. Because of his decision to not be involved early on, the father

failed to engage in the training on how to provide the special care R.R. requires.

And the child’s current condition, after many medical interventions, still requires

knowledgeable care taking—all of which has been handled during the father’s

incarceration, leaving us with no history about the father’s abilities. In contrast,

R.R.’s foster mother—to whose home he went immediately upon his discharge

form the hospital in November 2022—was well-versed in his care and ensured he
                                          4

attended all his medical appointments. The foster mother was a pre-adoptive

home, and she indicated her willingness to adopt R.R.              See Iowa Code

§ 232.116(2)(b).

       While the father claimed he maintained sobriety during the nearly one year

he was incarcerated,2 we measure this period of sobriety—occurring in an

institutionalized setting—against his several years of methamphetamine addiction

before his incarceration. We hope the father continues living a sober lifestyle

outside of the institutional setting, but he has not yet shown he is able to do so.

And while all children deserve sober parents, we recognize R.R. has a particular

need for sober, attentive caregivers due to his unique and complicated medical

needs. For these reasons, we conclude termination of the father’s parental rights

is in R.R.’s best interests.

       Additional Time. In the alternative, the father asks us to delay reaching a

permanency decision and give him additional time to work toward reunification with

R.R. After the termination trial, the juvenile court may decide to not terminate

parental rights if it finds there is clear and convincing evidence that child-in-need-

of-assistance proceedings should continue and enters an order to extend the time

for reunification in accordance with section 232.104(2)(b). Id. § 232.117(5). The

court may continue the proceedings for an additional six months if it finds “the need

for removal . . . will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.”

Id. § 232.104(2)(b).

2 We note the father tested positive for fentanyl while incarcerated; the father

maintains he did not knowingly take fentanyl and suggests a number of inmates
tested positive during the same time period without intentionally taking the
substance.
                                           5

       Here, we recognize the father was just days from being released from prison

at the time the termination trial concluded and claimed to have nearly a year of

sobriety. But we cannot say that the need for R.R.’s removal from the father’s

custody would be resolved within six months, as the father needed to establish he

could remain sober outside of a structured, custodial setting and show he could

now handle R.R.’s medical needs before the child could be placed in his physical

custody. See, e.g., In re P.F., No. 15-1103, 2015 WL 5970017, at *3 (Iowa Ct.

App. Oct. 14, 2015) (recognizing that sobriety in a structured, custodial setting

does not demonstrate an ability to maintain sobriety in the community). When

considering the father’s approximately six-year addiction3 to methamphetamine

before his incarceration and the fact that the father had not yet shown any time of

sobriety in the community, we cannot say six months is enough time for him to

show his commitment to a sober lifestyle. See, e.g., In re K.V., No. 19-1775, 2020

WL 110439, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020) (“Even assuming the mother has

managed six months of sobriety, a short period of sobriety is not a reliable indicator

of her ability to remain sober when considered in light of her history, which includes

ten years of substance use and several prior failed attempts at sobriety.”). So,

delaying permanency is neither warranted nor in R.R.’s best interests.

       We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.

       AFFIRMED.

3 Based on the father’s birth date, he was twenty-four when he went to jail.      And at
trial, the father testified, “[W]hen I was [eighteen], I started getting high. I stuck a
needle in my arm, you know, and I’ve been basically balls to the walls ever since.
I haven’t taken no more than a month or two off at any given time [until becoming
incarcerated].”