Court Opinion

ID: 9788366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:44:52.221468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:51.906051
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Presiding Judge
(dissenting):
¶ 61 Historically, in Utah and elsewhere, the majority of cases were decided by trial, not by summary judgment. See Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm’n, 657 P.2d 1293, 1296 (Utah 1982) (“It has always been the policy of. our law to resolve doubts in favor of permitting parties to have their day in court on the merits of a controversy.” (footnote and quotations omitted)); D. Theodore Rave, Questioning the Efficiency of Summary Judgment, 81 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 875, 877 (2006) (“Forms of summary judgment were available in several U.S. jurisdictions prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938, but the use of summary judgment was not widespread or consistent.”).
¶ 62 The traditional rule is that summary judgment is available only where the moving party can affirmatively demonstrate that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); see, e.g., Lamb v. B & B Amusements Corp., 869 P.2d 926, 928 (Utah 1993) (“As the moving party, [defendant] had the affirmative burden of establishing that there were no material issues of fact....”); Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design Assocs., 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981) (“[A] party entitled to summary judgment must bear the burden of establishing the indisputability of the facts which warrant judgment in his favor.” (citation and quotations omitted)). Further, in deciding a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to “view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Surety Underwriters v. E & C Trucking, Inc., 2000 UT 71,¶ 15, 10 P.3d 338 (emphasis omitted).
¶ 63 Due to various factors, including the dramatic increase in the volume of cases, some courts began to make it easier for defendants, at least, to be awarded summary judgment. See generally Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Cliches Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 982, 1018 (2003) (discussing reasons for growing prevalence of summary judgment). In 1986, the United States Supreme Court reevaluated the burdens for summary judgment and set forth the standard to be applied in federal courts. In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986), the Supreme Court tied the movant’s production burden for summary judgment to the burden of proof that party would bear at trial, holding that:
In our view, the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary *573judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be “no genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial. The moving party is “entitled to a judgment as a matter of law” because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her ease with respect to which she has the burden of proof.
Id. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (citation omitted). Therefore, in the federal system, the burden of a defendant moving for summary judgment “may be discharged by showing— that is, pointing out to the district court— that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548; see also Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 Yale L.J. 73, 81-82 (1990) (noting that movant’s burden is simply that of informing the court of the absence of key facts in dispute).
¶ 64 Some states, including Utah, have refused to adopt the burden-shifting approach of Celotex. See, e.g., Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 445 n. 13 (Utah 1996) (“This court has not previously adopted the reasoning of the majority opinion in Celotex, which is not binding on us as a matter of law, and declines to do so today.”); Jarboe v. Landmark Cmty. Newspapers of Indiana, Inc., 644 N.E.2d 118, 123 (Ind.1994) (“Indiana does not adhere to Celotex and the federal methodology.”). Unfortunately, language and reasoning from the Celotex line of cases have nevertheless crept into a few Utah cases, including those relied upon by the main opinion. See, e.g., Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 69,¶ 31, 54 P.3d 1054; Andalex Res., Inc. v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct.App. 1994). But no Utah case has ever overruled the longstanding precedent for summary judgments in this jurisdiction.
¶ 65 In order to protect against the inadvertent overruling of precedent, Utah has adopted a very exacting standard for changing the common law. In State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393 (Utah 1994), the Utah Supreme Court stated that “[tjhose asking [the court] to overturn prior precedent have a substantial burden of persuasion. This burden is mandated by the doctrine of stare decisis.” Id. at 398 (citation omitted). “ ‘This doctrine [of stare decisis], under which the first decision by a court on a particular question of law governs later decisions by the same court, is a cornerstone of the Anglo-American jurisprudence that is crucial to the predictability of the law and the fairness of adjudication.’ ” Id. at 399 (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269 (Utah 1993)).
¶ 66 “The general American doctrine ... is that a court ... will follow the rule of law which it has established in earlier cases, unless clearly convinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of changing conditions and that more good than harm will come by departing from precedent.” Id. (emphasis added) (quotations and citation omitted). When departing from a long-standing precedent, “it is incumbent on [the court] to explain why [it is] overruling] it.” Id. Absent such an explanation, the traditional approach to summary judgment remains the controlling law in Utah. If Defendants cannot establish before trial that Plaintiffs’ claims are unavailing as a matter of law, Plaintiffs are entitled to their day in court, which is where Plaintiffs’ burden to prove their case is properly triggered.
¶ 67 Defendants, as the moving party here, have failed to carry their traditional burden. The main opinion does not even attempt to explain why Defendants are entitled to “judgment as a matter of law” on most of Plaintiffs’ causes of action. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). Furthermore, after erroneously shifting the burden to the nonmoving party, the main opinion holds that for some causes of action the disputed facts are merely speculative or conjectural. I respectfully suggest that, in so holding, my colleagues have engaged in the process of weighing the evidence. In W.M. Barnes Company v. Sohio Natural Resources Company, 627 P.2d 56 *574(Utah 1981), the Utah Supreme Court succinctly stated as follows:
On a motion for summary judgment, it is not appropriate for a court to weigh disputed evidence ...; the sole inquiry to be determined is whether there is a material issue of fact to be decided. In making that determination, a court should not evaluate the credibility of the witness. It is of no moment that the evidence on one side may appear to be strong or even compelling. ...
Id. at 59 (citation omitted).
¶ 68 In sum, Defendants have failed to demonstrate that there are no disputed material issues of fact and that they are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. I would therefore reverse the summary judgment and remand the case for trial.
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