Court Opinion

ID: 9913629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-28 16:05:47.627115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:08:00.807143
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-1059

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                            DWAYNE J. RICHARDSON.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       In 2014, the defendant was convicted by a jury of two

 counts of unlawful possession of a shotgun and one count of

 unlawful possession of a rifle, all in violation of G. L.

 c. 269, § 10 (a). 1     Each of the indictments further alleged that

 the defendant, having previously been convicted of three violent

 crimes or serious drug offenses, was an armed career criminal

 (ACC), subjecting him to enhanced sentencing under the Armed

 Career Criminal Act (ACCA), G. L. c. 269, § 10G.              After a jury-

 waived trial on the ACC components of the indictments, the trial

 judge, who also presided over the initial trial, found that the

 defendant had committed two predicate offenses and sentenced

 1 The defendant was also charged with two counts of receiving
 stolen property in violation of G. L. c. 266, § 60, but these
 charges were nol prossed.
him, as a level two ACC offender, to concurrent, mandatory-

minimum sentences of ten years to ten years and one day for each

of the three counts.    See G. L. c. 269, § 10G (b).   A different

panel of this court affirmed these convictions in an unpublished

memorandum and order.    See Commonwealth v. Richardson, 93 Mass.

App. Ct. 1121 (2018).

     Approximately four years later, in 2022, the defendant

filed a motion for a new sentencing hearing, arguing that, as

relevant here, he should be resentenced as a level one ACC

offender because the Commonwealth did not introduce sufficient

evidence of his guilt with respect to one of the predicate

offenses supporting his sentencing enhancement and that, also at

sentencing, he received ineffective assistance of counsel.       That

motion for a new sentencing hearing was denied by a different

judge (motion judge), and this appeal followed. 2   We affirm.

     Discussion.   1.   Findings in support of ACC enhancement.

The defendant first argues that the Commonwealth introduced no

evidence to demonstrate that the facts he admitted to during his

guilty plea in one of the two predicate offenses were sufficient

to support a finding that the conviction was based on a harmful,

2 As part of his motion, the defendant also made a second motion
for a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Richardson, 93 Mass. App.
Ct. 1121 (2018) (affirming order denying defendant's first
motion for new trial). The motion judge did not rule on the
second motion for a new trial, and it is not part of this
appeal.

                                  2
rather than a reckless, battery.       See Commonwealth v. Eberhart,

461 Mass. 809, 818 (2012).    He concedes that, however, because

he did not raise this issue during his direct appeal, the

argument is waived.    We accordingly review for a substantial

risk of a miscarriage of justice, Commonwealth v. Roberts, 472

Mass. 355, 359 (2015), and discern no such risk.

     "When an individual is convicted of illegally possessing a

firearm or ammunition, the ACCA, G. L. c. 269, § 10G, imposes

harsher sentences based on the number of times that the

individual previously has been convicted of a serious drug

offense or 'violent crime.'"    Commonwealth v. Ashford, 486 Mass.

450, 456 (2020).    "The statutory crime of assault and battery,

G. L. c. 265, § 13A, encompasses three common-law crimes:

harmful battery, reckless battery, and offensive battery."

Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 818.    "Harmful battery is [a]ny touching

with such violence that bodily harm is likely to result"

(quotations and citations omitted).      Commonwealth v. Vieira, 483

Mass. 417, 423 (2019).    For the purposes of the ACCA, harmful

battery constitutes a violent crime, but reckless and offensive

battery do not.    Commonwealth v. Perez, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 7,

12-13 (2021).   The Commonwealth, therefore, bore the burden at

the ACC bench trial to prove that the factual basis for the

defendant's guilty plea could support a finding that the

defendant had committed a harmful battery.      See id.

                                   3
     Here, the motion judge did not err in concluding that the

Commonwealth met its burden during the ACC phase of the trial.

With respect to the predicate offense of assault and battery on

a police officer, the Commonwealth called a police lieutenant to

testify as to the incident.   The motion judge described the

officer's testimony as follows:

     "Lt. John Boyle of the Cambridge Police Department
     testified that on October 27, 2004, he encountered the
     defendant at the Galleria Mall. After Lt. Boyle identified
     himself as a police officer, the defendant fled. Following
     a pursuit Boyle and the defendant began fighting. The
     defendant had his hands around the officer's waist and
     attempted to lift him from the ground. With assistance
     from a passerby, Lt. Boyle was able to place the defendant
     in handcuffs."

The latter half of this testimony, as described here, leaves no

ambiguity as to the harmful nature of the defendant's alleged

actions and was sufficient to permit the trial judge to conclude

that the defendant pleaded guilty to a harmful battery.    See

Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 818.

     The defendant argues that our holding in Perez precludes a

conclusion that this testimony alone was sufficient to establish

that he committed a harmful battery, but in doing so, he

misunderstands our precedent.   We concluded in Perez that, if

the Commonwealth seeks to prove that the defendant pleaded

guilty to a violent crime, "a transcript of the plea hearing or

a related document, such as a plea agreement, will be the best

evidence of what the defendant was 'convicted of.'"   Perez, 100

                                  4
Mass. App. Ct. at 14, quoting G. L. c. 269, § 10G.     This

admonition should not be read to require such a document,

however.    See Perez, supra (permitting "the Commonwealth . . .

to use other evidence" that is "sufficiently tied to the

defendant's plea to support a reasonable conclusion about the

facts of the crime to which the defendant actually pleaded

guilty").    In Perez, the officers' testimony was insufficient to

establish harmful battery because it "could have supported a

finding of either intentional or reckless conduct."     Id. at 15.

Cf. Eberhart, 461 Mass. at 819-820 (evidence insufficient to

establish predicate offense of harmful battery where "only

evidence . . . was a certified conviction . . . and the

testimony of [the] arresting [o]fficer . . . to the effect that

the defendant was charged with '[a]ssault and battery

domestic'").    Here, by contrast, the testimonial evidence

supported the conclusion that the underlying offense was

unambiguously harmful.    Accordingly, there was no error, let

alone a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice, in denying

the motion for resentencing.    See Perez, supra at 14-15.

     2.    Ineffective assistance of counsel.   The defendant

further contends that he received ineffective assistance of

counsel because his attorney did not advocate for him with

sufficient vigor during sentencing.    As before, the defendant

did not raise this argument during his direct appeal, so the

                                  5
argument is accordingly waived.      See Roberts, 472 Mass. at 359.

Again, we review for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of

justice.    Roberts, supra.

       To establish a basis for relief on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, the defendant must show that (1)

counsel's conduct fell below the standard of an ordinary,

fallible lawyer, and (2) that shortcoming prejudiced him in some

way.    Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89, 96 (1974).      "When

making a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel at

sentencing, the defendant has the burden of showing 'that he

would have received a lighter sentence had his counsel conducted

himself any differently at sentencing.'"      Commonwealth v.

Gilbert, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 168, 175 (2018), quoting Commonwealth

v. Fanelli, 412 Mass. 497, 503 (1992).

       Here, assuming without deciding that counsel's limited

argument during the sentencing hearing was ineffective, the

defendant is nevertheless unable to meet the second prong of the

Saferian standard.    After finding that he had committed two

predicate offenses under the ACCA, the trial judge sentenced the

defendant to concurrent sentences of the mandatory minimum

period of incarceration.      The defendant concedes that these

sentences were the minimum penalty that could be imposed on him,

and instead argues that counsel should have made a more forceful

showing so that he might have been sentenced nunc pro tunc to

                                    6
the effective date of an unrelated sentence he was presently

serving.   The Supreme Judicial Court, however, has stated that

     "[w]hen faced with a request for jail time credit regarding
     unrelated offenses, a judge must give due consideration to
     two guiding principles. First, where possible, in the
     interest of fairness, a prisoner should not be required to
     serve dead time. Second, care should be taken to ensure
     that a prisoner is not banking time or getting double
     credit for time" (quotation and citation omitted). 3

Williams v. Superintendent, Mass. Treatment Ctr., 463 Mass. 627,

632 (2012).     See also Commonwealth v. Caliz, 486 Mass. 888, 891

(2021) ("Where there is no controlling statute, we have looked

to considerations of fairness to determine whether a defendant

is owed credit toward a conviction" [quotation and citation

omitted]).      The defendant has not suggested any reason that the

circumstances in this case warrant a departure from these

principles. 4    Discerning none ourselves, we conclude that there

3 "The term 'dead time' refers to time spent in confinement for
which no day-to-day credit is given against any sentence."
Commonwealth v. Milton, 427 Mass. 18, 21 n.4 (1998).
4 The defendant contends that the holding in Commonwealth v.

Lydon, 477 Mass. 1013, 1015 (2017), should be read to suggest
that a nunc pro tunc sentence was available to the defendant,
and, therefore, that counsel should have argued more forcefully
for such a sentence. While it is doubtless true that judges
have discretion to consider whether a nunc pro tunc sentence is
appropriate, the circumstances supporting such a sentence are
not implicated here. See Commonwealth v. Barton, 74 Mass. App.
Ct. 912, 914 (2009). See also Williams, 463 Mass. at 632.

                                    7
was no substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.

                                      Order denying motion for new
                                        sentencing hearing
                                        affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Green, C.J.,
                                        Desmond & Hodgens, JJ. 5),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    December 28, 2023.

5   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

                                  8