Court Opinion

ID: 9499292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:43:21.472178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:23.820872
License: Public Domain

KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the United States has produced a neutral explanation for its use of a peremptory challenge to exclude Juror 298 from Watford’s jury. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The majority is correct in stating that Watford must be presumed to have established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination. See Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 359, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991) (holding that a prosecutor’s proffer of a race-neutral justification for a challenged peremptory strike renders moot the question whether the defendant first established a prima facie claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)); Lancaster v. Adams, 324 F.3d 423, 434-35 *919(6th Cir.2003) (applying the Hernandez rule). The majority errs, however, in stating that, in this case, the government has proffered a race-neutral explanation with regard to Juror 298. On the contrary, the government has admitted that it “struck that one in error,” Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 202 (Voir Dire Tr. at 41), because the prosecutor “had a question mark by [the juror’s name] for reasons unknown, ” id. at 202 (Voir Dire Tr. at 41) (emphasis added). Indeed, the prosecutor went even further at the Batson hearing, stating, “I don’t see any reason to strike the person. Probably a good juror.” Id. at 203 (Voir Dire Tr. at 42).1
The majority misinterprets my argument as holding that “a mistaken belief will not satisfy the second prong of a Bat-son analysis where the peremptory strike appears to be racially based.” Maj. Op. at 912. This characterization obscures the vitally important distinction between a peremptory strike motivated by an erroneous belief and a peremptory strike erroneously exercised. The majority mistakes the latter for the former in this ease. While it is true that courts have held that a genuine, non-discriminatory, but mistaken belief may defeat a Batson challenge, see Hurd v. Pittsburg State Univ., 109 F.3d 1540, 1547 (10th Cir.1997), no such belief is proffered here. Rather, the prosecution in this case concedes that it struck Juror 298 not for a mistaken reason but for no reason at all.
The majority’s quotation, Maj. Op. at 913, of our opinion in United States v. McFerron, 163 F.3d 952 (6th Cir.1998), is telling. In that case, we noted “the requirement that the proponent of a strike give a ‘clear and reasonably specific’ explanation of the legitimate reasons for exercising a peremptory challenge.” Id. at 955 (quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20, 106 S.Ct. 1712). The majority fails to disclose how it is that the “explanation” for a strike can possibly be any less specific than a disavowal of any reason at all. And, indeed, the Supreme Court has plainly stated that Batson’s step two requires the proponent of a strike to proffer an explanation based on some identifiable characteristic of the stricken juror:
As with race-based Batson claims, a party alleging gender discrimination must make a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination before the party exercising the challenge is required to explain the basis for the strike. When an explanation is required, it need not rise to the level of a “for cause” challenge; rather, it merely must be based on a juror characteristic other than gender, and the proffered explanation may not be pretextual.
J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 144-45, 114 S.Ct. 1419, 128 L.Ed.2d 89 (1994) (emphasis added).
In sum, Batson and its progeny stand for the proposition that assertions of simple coincidence or mistake will not suffice as justifications for peremptory strikes that otherwise appear to be based upon race.2 That is the thrust of the first prong *920of the Batson standard, which gives rise to a “necessary inference of purposeful discrimination” once a defendant has established his prima facie claim. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96, 106 S.Ct. 1712. The rule established today eviscerates the first Batson prong by allowing a prosecutor to defeat the inference of discrimination simply by denying that the strike was racially motivated. See Maj. Op. at 914 (“Where the prosecutor has represented that he did not know juror 298 was an African-American, we are hard-pressed, on the record before us, to find discriminatory intent inherent in the proffered explanation.”). To permit the United States to avoid the implications of the step-one inference by simply conceding — but not explaining — its error is to invite future violations.
Moreover, after construing the prosecution’s disavowal of any reason for striking Juror 298 as a “reason,” the majority compounds its error by affirming the district court’s finding that Watford has not carried his ultimate burden of persuasion regarding the racially discriminatory nature of the strike. Maj. Op. at 914-15. The Supreme Court has recently indicated in dictum that, even if, under circumstances such as these, a court may correctly reach step three of the Batson analysis, its ultimate conclusion should be the opposite of that reached by the majority here:
In the unlikely hypothetical in which the prosecutor declines to respond to a trial judge’s inquiry regarding his justification for making a strike, the evidence before the judge [at step three] would consist not only of the original facts from which the prima facie case was established, but also the prosecutor’s refusal to justify his strike in light of the court’s request. Such a refusal would provide additional support for the inference of discrimination raised by a defendant’s prima facie case.
Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 171 n. 6, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005) (emphasis added).
Accordingly, I would hold that the United States has failed to carry its burden at the second stage of the Batson inquiry; that Watford has, should we reach the third stage, carried his ultimate burden of persuasion; and, therefore, that the judgment must be vacated and the case remanded for new trial. I respectfully dissent.

. Although the prosecutor also mentioned that Juror 298 might initially have been singled out because of a family history of drug abuse, the prosecutor never claimed that he exercised the peremptory strike for that reason. Moreover, the prosecutor's other comments, quoted above, establish conclusively that there was no reason for the strike. Indeed, the prosecutor's admission, during the Batson hearing, that he remembered standing beside Juror 298 during a bench conference undermines his claim to have been mistaken about the juror's face. See id. at 202 (Voir Dire Tr. at 41) ("I struck that one in error. I don't really have any reason to strike that person. I now recall, he was the fellow that came to the bench that had drug use in his family, so — ”).

. It should be noted that Batson has long applied to all race-based peremptory strikes, *920regardless of the race of the defendant or the stricken juror or of whether the two are of the same or different races. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402, 111 S.Ct. 1364, 113 L.Ed.2d 411 (1991).