Court Opinion

ID: 9809235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:04:42.51041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:25:33.894315
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/31/23 In re E.F. CA2/1
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

   IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                            SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                           DIVISION ONE

 In re E.F., et al., Persons Coming                                 B323174
 Under the Juvenile Court Law.
 _________________________________                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                    Super. Ct. No. 21CCJP04253)
 LOS ANGELES COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
 AND FAMILY SERVICES,

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.

 T.F.,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Diane C. Reyes, Judge Pro Tempore. Dismissed.
      Roni Keller, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant
County Counsel, and Stephen Watson, Deputy County Counsel, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

                              ______________________________
       At a January 21, 2022 jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
the juvenile court removed T.F.’s (Father) four children from
his custody, placing the children with their mother, K.F. (Mother).
Father asks us to reverse the court’s findings and orders at that
hearing, urging that we must remand the matter because the
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to
comply fully with the inquiry and notice requirements imposed
by the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.)
and related California law.
       The record, however, indicates that the children remained
in Mother’s care throughout the proceedings and that DCFS never
pursued a foster care placement for the children or termination
of parental rights. Because “ICWA and its attendant notice
requirements do not apply to a proceeding in which a dependent
child is removed from one parent and placed with another,” we
conclude that Father’s appeal is moot and remand is unnecessary.
(In re M.R. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 886, 904 (M.R.); see In re Austin J.
(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 881, fn. 5 (Austin J.) [when a court
terminates foster care placement and returns a child to a parent’s
custody, the “question whether to reverse the prior order based on
noncompliance with ICWA is . . . moot”].) We therefore dismiss the
appeal.

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           FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY1
      A.    Overview
      Father and Mother share four adopted children: E.F. (age 13),
K.F. (age 12), J.F. (age 11), and A.F. (age 9) (collectively, the
children).
      On September 9, 2021, DCFS filed a Welfare and Institutions
Code section 3002 petition alleging that Father’s mental health
issues and the parents’ history of domestic violence placed the
children at risk of harm. The petition alleged, inter alia, that Father
had “brandished a gun at . . . [M]other, while the children were in the
family home,” and that his “mental and emotional problems,”
including “suicidal ideation, . . . endanger[ed] the children’s physical
health and safety.” The petition alleged further that Mother had
failed to protect children from Father.
       The addendum report filed in connection with the petition
indicated that DCFS had not detained the children from Mother,
and recommended that the children remain in her care. The report
recommended further that the juvenile court detain the children
from Father and permit him monitored visitation.
       At the September 14, 2021 detention hearing, the juvenile
court adopted DCFS’s recommendation, ordering continued
placement of the children with Mother and detention of the children
from Father. The court also ordered monitored visitation for Father
and granted Mother’s request for a temporary restraining order

      1 As Father’s sole argument on appeal concerns the duties of
inquiry and notice imposed by ICWA and related California law,
we limit our factual and procedural summary accordingly.
      2 Unless otherwise specified, all statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.

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against Father. The court then set the jurisdiction and disposition
hearing for November 1, 2021.
       In advance of the scheduled hearing, DCFS submitted an
October 15, 2021 jurisdiction and disposition report in which it
recommended that the juvenile court sustain the section 300 petition
and that the children remain in Mother’s care. DCFS recommended
further that the court order family maintenance services for
Mother and the children and enhancement services for Father.
In an October 27, 2021 last minute information filing for the court,
DCFS reported that both parents were participating in services and
reiterated the recommendations in its October 15, 2021 report.
       The court subsequently continued the jurisdiction and
disposition hearing to January 21, 2022. In advance of the hearing,
DCFS submitted a January 19, 2022 last minute information
filing providing new information relevant to concerns over Mother’s
behavior, but which did not alter the recommendations in the
October 15, 2021 jurisdiction and disposition report.
       At the January 21, 2022 jurisdiction and disposition hearing,
the juvenile court sustained the section 300 petition, with certain
amendments,3 and ordered the continued removal of the children
from Father. The court further ordered the children’s continued
placement with Mother, services for both parents, and monitored
visitation for Father. The court then set a hearing on possible
transfer of the case to Riverside County for February 18, 2022,
and set a section 364 hearing for July 22, 2022.

      3 The record does not contain a copy of the amended petition.
The transcript of the January 21, 2022 hearing, however, reflects
that the juvenile court amended the petition by, inter alia, striking
the allegation that Mother failed to protect the children from Father.

                                  4
      Father filed a timely notice of appeal from the court’s findings
and orders at the January 21, 2022 hearing that same day.

      B.    ICWA Proceedings
       Throughout the underlying dependency proceedings,
Father disclaimed any Indian4 heritage. The ICWA child inquiry
attachments (Judicial Council Forms, form ICWA-010(A)) appended
to the section 300 petition indicate that, at the time of the petition’s
filing, DCFS had “no reason to believe the child[ren] [were] or
[might] be . . . Indian child[ren].” In addition, Father submitted a
parental notification of Indian status form (Judicial Council Forms,
form ICWA-020 (ICWA-020 form)) indicating that none of the form’s
enumerated indicators of Indian status applied to him.
       Mother, however, attested in her ICWA-020 form that she
might be a member of, or eligible for membership in, a Cherokee
tribe through her maternal grandmother. At the September 14,
2021 detention hearing, the juvenile court therefore found ICWA
inapplicable as to Father, but ordered DCFS to investigate Mother’s
claim of possible Indian ancestry by “interview[ing] maternal
relatives, specifically the maternal grandmother, regarding
[Mother’s] possible Cherokee heritage.” The court ordered further
that DCFS provide ICWA notice to the Cherokee tribes and to the
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA).
       In its subsequent October 15, 2021 jurisdiction and disposition
report, DCFS indicated its belief that ICWA did not apply because
Mother stated during an October 12, 2021 follow-up interview that,
although she had “heard there [was] lineage approximately [seven]

      4 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same
for consistency, even though we recognize that other terms, such
as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are preferred by many.” (In re
Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

                                   5
generations ago, . . . no living relative [was] registered or affiliated
with any tribe.” The report noted further that “the children are not
biologically related to . . . [M]other and blood is used by American
Indian tribes to determine lineage.” The report did not state
whether DCFS had interviewed maternal grandmother or whether
it had provided notice to the Cherokee tribes or the BIA. Although
the report noted that DCFS had interviewed a maternal aunt, the
interview summary did not reflect that DCFS made any inquiry of
her concerning possible Indian ancestry.
      The juvenile court does not appear to have made any further
ICWA findings following DCFS’s submission of the October 15, 2021
report.
                            DISCUSSION
      Father’s sole contention on appeal is that DCFS failed
to comply fully with ICWA’s inquiry and notice requirements by
(1) neglecting to interview the children’s adoptive and biological
extended family members concerning possible Indian ancestry, and
(2) purportedly ignoring the juvenile court’s instruction to provide
notice to the Cherokee tribes and the BIA. He urges that, as a result
of these alleged failures, we either should reverse or conditionally
affirm the juvenile court’s findings and orders at the January 21,
2022 hearing and then remand the matter for ICWA compliance.
We disagree.
      “Although ICWA empowers an Indian child’s tribe to intervene
in any ‘Indian child custody proceeding’ [citations], it is not
implicated in every dependency case in which the child may have
some degree of Native American heritage.” (In re A.T. (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 267, 274 (A.T.), citing §§ 224, subd. (b), 224.4; 25 U.S.C.
§ 1911(c).) “Congress enacted ICWA in 1978 in response to ‘rising
concern in the mid-1970’s over the consequences to Indian children,
Indian families, and Indian tribes of abusive child welfare practices

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that resulted in the separation of large numbers of Indian children
and their families and tribes through adoption or foster care
placement, usually in non-Indian homes.’ [Citation.]” (In re Isaiah
W. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1, 7.) ICWA therefore applies only “ ‘when child
welfare authorities seek permanent foster care or termination of
parental rights [leading to adoption].’ ” (M.R., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th
at p. 904; see A.T., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 274.)
       Here, DCFS never pursued a foster care placement for the
children or termination of parental rights, and the children remained
in Mother’s care from the outset of the proceedings through the
January 21, 2022 jurisdiction and disposition hearing. ICWA thus
did not apply to the proceedings, and we therefore are not persuaded
that any failure by DCFS to comply with its ICWA duties requires
remand. (See A.T., supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 275 [concluding
ICWA inapplicable where “[n]either the court, the [child welfare
authorities], nor any other party sought to have [the child] placed in
foster care or pursued any placement other than with [the] [f]ather”];
M.R., supra, 7 Cal.App.5th at p. 904 [“ICWA and its attendant notice
requirements do not apply to a proceeding in which a dependent child
is removed from one parent and placed with another”]; In re K.L.
(2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 332, 339 [“[n]othing in the statutory language
suggests that . . . ICWA applies when custody of an Indian child is
transferred from one parent to another parent”].)
       Father’s two remaining arguments do not convince us
otherwise. First, he urges that we must remand the matter because
“the juvenile court affirmatively ordered compliance with . . . ICWA,”
and DCFS never complied with that order. But given our conclusion
that ICWA did not apply to the underlying dependency proceedings,
we fail to see why DCFS’s purported failure to comply with the
juvenile court’s order requires remand.

                                  7
      Second, citing the language of California Rules of Court,
rule 5.480, Father argues that “ICWA actually ‘applies to all
proceedings involving Indian children that may result in an
involuntary foster care placement.’ ”5 He urges that ICWA therefore
applies here because the underlying dependency proceedings remain
ongoing and “involuntary removal of the children [thus] remains a
possibility.”
      Father, however, “points us to no cases holding ICWA
applicable due to a merely theoretical possibility that a parental
placement by the social welfare agency could fall through.” (A.T.,
supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 275.) In re G.L. (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th
683, on which Father relies, does not so hold. G.L. addresses
the rights ICWA affords to a nonparent, Indian custodian and
merely cites in a footnote the text of California Rules of Court,
rule 5.480 on which Father’s argument hinges. (See G.L., supra,
177 Cal.App.4th at p. 692, fn. 3.) Moreover, Father fails to
distinguish the First District’s opinion in A.T., which considered
and rejected precisely the argument he advances here. (A.T., supra,
63 Cal.App.5th at pp. 274–275 [rejecting argument that, because
a dependency case “could have” resulted in a foster or adoptive
placement, ICWA applies even where a child is placed with a
parent].)
      Accordingly, we conclude that ICWA did not apply to the
underlying dependency proceedings, and the question whether to
remand the matter for ICWA compliance therefore is moot. (M.R.,

     5 We note that Father has misquoted California Rules of Court,
rule 5.480. It does not state that ICWA applies to “all proceedings
involving Indian children that may result in an involuntary foster
care placement.” (Italics added.) Rather, the rule provides that the
chapter of the California Rules of Court addressing ICWA applies to
“most” such proceedings. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.480.)

                                  8
supra, Cal.App.5th at p. 904; Austin J., supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at
p. 881, fn. 5.)

                          DISPOSITION
      The appeal is dismissed as moot.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                      ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:

                  CHANEY, J.

                  BENDIX, J.

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