Court Opinion

ID: 9551269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:50:27.66569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:25.573564
License: Public Domain

TONGUE, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent because I believe that the majority opinion represents a departure from the rule and the practice as adopted and applied by this court in a series of decisions over the last five years, particularly in its emphasis upon the right of a defendant to his "day in court.” In that series of cases this court has affirmed the refusal by trial courts to set aside default judgments entered after the failure of defendants to enter appearances within the time required by statute because of what they claimed to be "excusable neglect” within the meaning of ORS 18.160. See Lowe v. Institutional Investors Trust, 270 Or 814, 817-19, 529 P2d 920 (1974); Fleetwood Investment v. Thompson, 270 Or 584, 587, 528 P2d 518 (1974); St. Arnold v. Star Expansion Ind., 268 Or 640, 651-53, 659, 521 P2d 526, 522 P2d 477 (1974); Rogue Val. Mem. Hosp. v. Salem Ins., 265 Or 603, 609, 510 P2d 845 (1973); Stirling v. Dari-Delite, Inc., 262 Or 359, 363, 491 P2d 1168, 494 P2d 252, 498 P2d 753 (1972); Burke v. Rachau, 262 Or 323, 337-38, 497 P2d 1154 (1972); Coleman v. Meyer, 261 Or 129, 493 P2d 48 (1972).1
*835These cases state the familiar rule, as also stated by the majority, that this court will not reverse a trial court in its determination whether a defendant has made a sufficient showing to establish that his neglect was excusable in the absence of a "clear showing” of a "manifest abuse of discretion.” Of more importance, however, is the fact that it is implicit in these cases that the "discretion” conferred by ORS 18.160 upon a trial judge to grant or deny a motion to set aside a default judgment has been construed to mean that the trial judge will not be reversed when there are any facts in the record from which he could reasonably find that the defendant failed to make a sufficient showing to establish that his neglect was "excusable,” even though members of this court, if sitting as trial judges, might reach a contrary result.
An out-of-state plaintiff who sues an insurance company and mails a complaint and summons to the clerk of a court in Oregon by regular mail a few days before the expiration of the statute of limitations could expect no sympathy from the insurance company or relief from the court if that mail was delayed or miscarried. While that is by no means a perfect analogy, this trial court apparently concluded that an out-of-state insurance company which relied upon the regular mail for delivery to it by its registered agent in Oregon of an equally important document, i.e., a summons and complaint, without any additional precautions or procedures, failed to exercise reasonable diligence in a degree commensurate with the importance of the occasion and in this day when it is common knowledge that regular mail is not infrequently delayed or miscarried. I am of the opinion that unless the above-cited cases are overruled or limited in their *836application, the rule as recognized and as applied in practice by this court in those cases during the past five years requires that we hold that this was not an abuse of discretion by the trial court.

In Washington County v. Clark, 276 Or 33, 37-38, 554 P2d 163 (1976), this court held that the trial court erred in refusing to set aside a default decree. The problem in that case, however, was not whether defendant had shown "excusable neglect” in failing to file an appearance, but that the *835plaintiff took a default judgment in breach of an agreement not to do so, with the result that "the integrity of the judicial process is blemished.” We also noted that in "so deciding we are not digressing from the frequently stated principle: 'A motion to vacate an order of default and judgment under the provisions of ORS 18.160 is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial judge.’ ”