Court Opinion

ID: 9725761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:09:08.645668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:19.483715
License: Public Domain

Fairchild, J.
(dissenting in part). I agree with the opinion of the majority except as to the new trial on the issue of damages sustained by Irene Gennrich.
There does not appear to be any error upon the trial affecting the damage finding. The verdict has not been found to be perverse. The trial court set aside the jury finding as to Mrs. Gennrich’s damages solely because the amount ($16,500) is larger than the evidence can sustain.
The majority of this court, I must concede, is following precedent in determining that in such case defendant is entitled to a new trial unless the plaintiff elect to take judgment for the least amount an unprejudiced jury, properly instructed, would probably assess under the evidence. That has been the rule where a damage finding is simply in excess of the greatest amount the evidence would sustain as well as where there has been error on the trial or perversity of the jury.
I respectfully suggest that this rule be changed in cases like the one now before us where there is no demonstrable *94error on the trial and where perversity is not found. The theory of the rule is that it preserves the right of both parties to a trial, free from error, by an unprejudiced jury, heeding the court’s instructions. Plaintiff is .given the choice of a new trial if he desires it. Defendant will get a new trial unless plaintiff accepts the least amount a jury would assess and defendant will not be hurt by being required to pay that amount without a trial. This rule may be necessary where the excessive award of damages is the result of error or perversity because a defendant is entitled to a fair jury trial. But where there has been no error or perversity, there would be no injustice to defendant in giving plaintiff an option of a new trial or judgment for an amount fixed by the court as a fair and reasonable award under the evidence. Such a rule would give greater protection to the plaintiff. While he could still choose a new trial, his alternative would be more liberal to him than under the present rule. It would sufficiently protect the defendant from the excessive award.
In many personal-injury cases there is a wide range between the highest and lowest amounts which a jury might award under the evidence. Different people have widely differing judgments of the dollar value of disability and pain. In many cases their judgment will depend upon whether they believe that the plaintiff and his witnesses exaggerated the pain and disability suffered. In a case such as the present one, the jury has evidently believed the plaintiff and has simply fixed the award at too high a figure in evaluating the injury in money.
It is undoubtedly in the public interest to avoid unnecessary second trials and to seek an earlier determination of the litigation at a figure which is within the range of fairness. There is no reason, where the range is wide, for requiring the court to fix a low figure when the jury has already indicated that it thinks that the plaintiff deserves the highest figure the evidence will sustain.
*95The figure fixed by the trial court in the case before us ($12,000) would not be excessive and was evidently considered fair by the trial court. Therefore I would affirm the judgment even though the amount is not as low as would be required by the rule heretofore followed.