Court Opinion

ID: 9679261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:45:37.267338+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:11.882830
License: Public Domain

EDELMAN, Justice,
concurring.
Glover moved for summary judgment in this case on the ground that:
Under the terms of the referral con-traet[s], the day-to-day handling of the cases was to be performed by Joe Weiss & Associates. Weiss could not complete that contract requirement after he had been disbarred. Accordingly, [Glover] cannot, and should not, pay any portion of the attorney fees it earns on these cases to Joe Weiss, his professional corporation, or any person claiming through them.
An affidavit attached to Glover’s motion specified that all of the cases in question either had or would have judgments or settlements reached and any proceeds collected after the date Weiss was disbarred.1
Wright’s summary judgment response argued that the referral agreements did not obligate Weiss to perform any legal work and that a fact issue was raised as to the level of Weiss’s involvement in the cases after the effective date of the referral agreements. However, it did not contend that the referral agreements were ambiguous. On appeal, Wright argues that: (i) the referral agreements did not require the rendition of any legal services by Weiss; (ii) the referral agreements are ambiguous as to whether “day to day handling” refers to handling legal matters or purely administrative matters; and (iii) Glover failed to sustain its summary judgment burden to prove that Weiss had any obligation to perform legal services under the referral agreements or that he failed to complete any such obligations before he was disbarred.
This case turns on an interpretation of whether the referral agreements obligated Weiss to continue performing legal work, and, if so, what legal work and for how long. This is because, if Weiss did not remain obligated to perform legal work, then any fact question concerning what happened after the agreements were entered is not material.
The majority opinion bases its reversal on a finding that the referral agreements are ambiguous and thereby present a fact question as to their meaning. Although I agree that the agreements are ambiguous, I would note that, as described below, an anomaly has emerged in the case law concerning whether such an ambiguity in an agreement may be a ground for reversal of a summary judgment if it is only raised by the non-movant for the first time on appeal.
As general rules: (1) whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law for the court;2 (2) the interpretation of an unambiguous contract is a question of law for the court;3 (3) the interpretation of an ambiguous contract is a question of fact;4 (4) where the parties have not claimed *472ambiguity, the interpretation of a contract is decided by the court as a question of law;5 (5) issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal;6 and (6) except for the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support a summary judgment, a non-movant may not, on appeal, raise any ground for reversing the summary judgment that was not presented to the trial court by written response to the motion.7
Wright neither pled nor asserted in its summary judgment response that the referral agreement was ambiguous.8 On the contrary, it’s response took the position that the language should be interpreted in its favor.9 It then asserted that a fact issue existed as to what involvement Wright had in the cases after the agreements were entered: “At this juncture, it is apparent that, at a minimum, a fact issue is raised as to the level of involvement of [Wright] after the effective date of the referral Agreements with respect to whether a question of “abandonment” exists under Cherry."
Under the foregoing rules, Wright would not be able to raise ambiguity for the first time on appeal, nor would an appeals court be able to determine that the agreements were ambiguous sua sponte . However, in at least one case, the Texas Supreme Court has reversed a summary judgment because an ambiguity in the disputed agreement created a fact issue, even though both parties asserted that the agreement was unambiguous and sought summary judgment based on his or her respective interpretation. See Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 392, 394-95 (Tex.1983).10 Although a reversal of this case based on a finding of ambiguity is consis*473tent with Coker, it is not apparent to me how that approach can be reconciled with the rules outlined above, particularly in that it allows a judgment to be reversed on an issue upon which the trial court was never given an opportunity to rule.11

.A non-lawyer may recover a referral fee if he was licensed when he referred the case, the referral ended his legal duties to the client, and he had performed all that was required of him under the referral contract prior to his resignation or disbarment. See Cherry v. Lee, 899 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ). In this case, Glover’s motion for summary judgment did not state what legal services Weiss remained obligated to perform under the referral agreements or for how long.

. See, e.g., State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Vaughan, 968 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Tex.1998).

. See, e.g., ACS Investors, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 943 S.W.2d 426, 430 (Tex.1997).

. See, e.g., Columbia Gas Transmission Corp. v. New Ulm Gas, Ltd., 940 S.W.2d 587, 589 (Tex.1996).

. See, e.g., Memorial Med. Ctr. v. Keszler, 943 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Tex.1997) (per curiam).

. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c).

. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex.1979); see also Yancey v. Floyd West & Co., 755 S.W.2d 914, 917 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1988, writ denied) (holding ambiguity waived by failure to raise it in the trial court); Dorchester Dev. Corp. v. Safeco Ins. Co., 737 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987, no writ) (same).

. Nor did Glover's reply to White's summary judgment response address ambiguity as if White's response had asserted it. Rather, Glover’s reply simply objected to White’s par-ol evidence on the ground that it was not admissible to vary the terms of the unambiguous referral agreements. A footnote to Glover's reply asserted that White was also precluded from asserting ambiguity because it had not been pled by either party.

. The pertinent portion of the response stated: The above-referenced referral-letter language actually only indicated that Frances Cisneros and Belinda Gonzales, as non-attorneys working in the referral department of [Wright], were responsible solely for the periodically checking with the referral attorney to make sure that [Wright] would timely receive its referral fee.... The duties of Frances Cisneros and Belinda Gonzales did not include drafting any discovery, the making of any court appearances, the forming of any strategy with regard to the handling of the case, the drafting or approving of any pleadings, or the taking of any other substantive action associated with the legal representation of any particular client. Once a. file was referred to the referral attorney, that referral attorney had complete autonomy with regard to the handling of the file. The effect of the referral to [Glover] was to end [Wright’s] legal duties to the client; this is apparent when one considers that it was non-attorneys who were responsible for the "day to day handling” of the referral cases. Many of these cases settled years after the date of the particular Referral Agreement and these individuals were responsible for making sure none of the cases slipped through the cracks.

. Compare Calhoun v. Killian, 888 S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex.App.-Tyler 1994, writ denied) (stating that if a document is ambiguous, it cannot support a summary judgment, since its meaning raises a fact issue, even if the parties fail to allege the ambiguity) with Praeger v. Wilson, 721 S.W.2d 597, 600 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (stating that where neither party has alleged that a contract is ambiguous, or ambiguity is raised for the first time on appeal, construction of the contract is a question of law for the court).

. Although not pertinent to this case, it is also not apparent how the approach followed in Coker can be reconciled with the rule prohibiting reversal of judgments on unassigned error. See, e .g., Pat Baker Co., Inc. v. Wilson, 971 S.W.2d 447, 450 (Tex.1998); Vawter v. Garvey, 786 S.W.2d 263, 264 (Tex.1990).