Court Opinion

ID: 9761450
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:43:08.282489+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:23.786832
License: Public Domain

MANDERINO, Justice,
dissenting:
The majority today irreversibly terminates appellant’s rights as a natural mother to Baby Boy R. The trial court’s determination is upheld in spite of the failure to consider a totality of the circumstances as required by this Court; an error concerning the admissibility of evidence; and the fact that appellee deliberately concealed from appellant its plans to petition for a termination of parental rights. I dissent.
This Court has found that appellant failed to perform parental duties under Section 311(1) of the Adoption Act of July 24, 1970, P.L. 620, art. III, 1 P.S. § 311(1). Examining whether a parent has failed or refused to act in a manner which will preserve the parent-child relationship is a most subjective and difficult task and given the consequences of such, this Court has in the past stated this decision must be made in light of the totality of the circumstances after examining the individual situation. In re Adoption of Orwick, 464 Pa. 549, 347 A.2d 677 (1975). However, today the majority rather summarily permits termination “[gjiven the fact that during a 39-month period, appellant visited her child on only 5 occasions, did not attend 2 other scheduled meetings with her child, did not send any cards, letters or gifts to her child, and did not provide her child with any financial support” [page 1367]. Yet, the majority opinion, *612trial court, and appellee all concede that appellant was disabled, had a total of six children and a very limited income. Indeed, the trial court recognized that appellant suffered from emotional and economic disabilities and yet refused to consider these as circumstances controlling appellant’s behavior toward her child. Appellant did visit although because of her other problems this was not often. She did orally communicate with her child. Given her limited resources and other children, termination cannot be based upon lack of financial support or gifts. I am equally unpersuaded that grounds for termination exist because appellant failed to follow a middle class custom of sending greeting cards. Health, financial and emotional problems must be considered justification for failure to perform parental duties. In re Burns, 474 Pa. 615, 628, 379 A.2d 535, 542 (Manderino, J., dissenting).
The trial court admitted into evidence a highly prejudicial discharge summary from Children’s Hospital. The majority finds no error since this testimony predates the 39-month period upon which it bases its affirmance of the termination. In effect, the majority is finding the admission of this evidence to be harmless error. The record in question is admitted by appellee to be an unauthenticated medical report charging “suspected” abuse or neglect. A reading of the trial judge’s opinion as a whole does indicate that he was very much influenced by this inadmissible evidence, even though he states at one point in his opinion that he was not. Appellee argues it was introduced purely for historical purposes and the majority would have us believe a termination is clearly warranted even without this evidence. Both contentions are facetious.
Finally, the majority notes in a footnote that appellee did not deliberately mislead appellant as to its intentions to terminate her. parental rights. However, it is clear from the record and appellee’s brief that appellee did conceal from appellant its plans to petition for termination of parental rights in order that the foster parents could adopt. Appellee justifies this because it feared appellant would not voluntar*613ily agree and would take action to insure this did not happen to other children already placed by appellee. Although this Court has not imposed a legal obligation on a child welfare agency such as appellee, to assist parents to maintain the parent-child relationship, we have recognized that they should “offer education, training and encouragement,” In re W. M. III, 482 Pa. 123, 393 A.2d 410, 412 (1978). Appellee did not merely fail to encourage the parent in this case. Can it be that we will now permit concealment by an agency to expedite a termination of parental rights?
Today’s termination means that the child is “dead” so far as appellant is concerned. I cannot agree with the majority’s value judgment that this child will grow up to be a better adult by being cut off forever from any ties with the natural mother. In re William L., 477 Pa. 322, 369, 383 A.2d 1228, 1252 (1978) (Manderino, J., dissenting).
Mr. Justice NIX joins in this dissenting opinion.