Court Opinion

ID: 9634517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:15:45.047455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:52.184821
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
dissenting.
While I agree with the majority view on the merits in this case as expressed in Part II of the Court’s opinion, I would reach neither the merits of the State’s appeal, nor the constitutional issues discussed in Part I. I would dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
The majority identify the jurisdictional issue as follows:
The precise issue is whether the State’s appeal from a judgment of acquittal, entered upon the order of the presiding justice after, and notwithstanding, return of a jury verdict of guilt, on the ground that the evidence was inadequate in law to sustain a conviction, would be consistent with the protection against double jeopardy afforded by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by Article I, § 8 of the Constitution of Maine.
Majority op. at 422 (footnotes omitted). To reach these constitutional issues the majority first determines that the legislative purpose in enacting 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115-A(2) was “to make the State’s right of appeal as plenary as is constitutionally permissible.” Majority op. at 423. This legislative purpose is declared to be the same as that of the United States Congress in enacting a totally different statute, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731,1 and is said to be supported by the “liberal construction” mandate of section 2115-A(6). Id. I reject the majority interpretation of section 2115-A(2) because I find nothing in the legislative history to suggest a purpose “to remove all statutory barriers” and “to allow appeals whenever the constitution would permit.” Id. quoting United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 337, 95 S.Ct. 1013, 1019, 43 L.Ed.2d 232 (1975).
Our legislature originally granted the State very limited rights of appeal in criminal prosecutions. P.L.1969, ch. 547.' As first enacted, section 2115-A provided in subsection (1) a limited right of appeal prior to trial “from a decision, order or judgment of the court suppressing evidence ..., allowing a motion to dismiss an indictment, complaint or information, quashing an arrest or search warrant or suppressing a confession or admission.” P.L.1971, ch. 215 added to the above quotation “or ruling against the State in any pretrial order.” In the original version of section 2115-A(2) *427appeals after trial were limited to cross appeals.
The original legislation was repealed and replaced by P.L.1979, ch. 243. The new section 2115-A(1) provided for an expanded right of appeal prior to trial while subsection (2) provided as follows:
2. Appeals after trial. An appeal may be taken by the State from the Superior Court or the District Court to the law court after trial and after a finding of guilty by a jury or the court from the granting of a motion for a new trial, from arrest of judgment, from dismissal or from other orders requiring a new trial or resulting in termination of the prosecution in favor of the accused, when an appeal of the order would be permitted by the double jeopardy provisions of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of Maine.
Subsection (6) stated:
6. Liberal construction. The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose, or purposes, of insuring that the State is able to proceed to trial with all the evidence it is legally entitled to introduce, in view of the limited ability of the State to have error reviewed after trial.
The statement of fact which accompanied this legislation declared that the act “delineates the pretrial rulings and orders which may be appealed by the State and clarifies the timing and nature of cross-appeals by the State in criminal cases.” L.D. No. 1375, 109th Leg., 1st Sess. (1979) (emphasis added).
I am persuaded that the original legislative purpose was quite modest. The broad language in subsection (2) granting the State a right of appeal “from other orders requiring a new trial or resulting in termination of the prosecution in favor of the accused” must be interpreted as being limited, as were the immediately preceding categories, to dispositions involving an adjudication of issues other than the sufficiency of the evidence. I find that limited interpretation particularly persuasive in light of the fact that neither this Court nor the United States Supreme Court has ever found consistent with double jeopardy protection any procedure permitting conviction after the trial court has entered a judgment of acquittal based on an evaluation of the evidence relating to guilt or innocence.
Against such persuasive indications of a narrow meaning of subsection (2) there is only the action of the legislature in 1980 in amending subsection (6) as follows:
6. Liberal construction. The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purpose, or purposes, of insuring that tho State is able to proceed to trial with all tho evidence it is legally entitled te-introduee, in view of the limited ability of the State to have error reviewed after trial.
This change originated, without explanation or debate, as part of Committee Amendment “A” to L.D.1925 in the second regular session of the 109th Legislature. L.D.1925 was an omnibus bill proposed by the Criminal Law Advisory Commission; its major component was a complete revision of the statutes dealing with post-conviction review (formerly post-conviction habeas corpus). There are no references in either the statement of facts or the Commission notes to an expansion of the State’s right of appeal.
Given the fact that original subsection (6) (enacted by P.L.1979, ch. 243) described the legislative purpose even more narrowly than the explicit language of section 2115-A, I would view the 1980 amendment as merely eliminating the inconsistency rather than as an expansion “to make the State’s right of appeal as plenary as is constitutionally permissible.” I would wait until the legislature manifests unmistakably such an intent before I would define the parameters mandated by the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution or by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of Maine. Since I find that existing legislation does not authorize the State’s appeal, I would dismiss it.

. In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3731 (Supp. 1981) permits appeal by the government “from a decision, judgment, or order of a district court dismissing an indictment or information ... except ... where the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution prohibits further prosecution.”