Court Opinion

ID: 9707798
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:21:24.681568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:55.871376
License: Public Domain

NETTESHEIM, J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the majority's holding that the family court erred by applying the Department of Health and Social Services percentage standards when fixing Tommy's support obligation. I also disagree with the majority's new theory of law which bifurcates present and future support. Finally, I disagree with the majority's holding that the family court erred by creating a trust, with the consent of the custodial parent, to receive a portion of the support payments to fund Tukker's possible future college education expenses.
*465THE PERCENTAGE GUIDELINES

A. The Trial Court's Exercise of Discretion

The determination of child support is committed to the discretion of the family court. Weidner v. W.G.N., 131 Wis. 2d 301, 315, 388 N.W.2d 615, 622 (1986). The majority holds that the family court misused this discretion by employing the percentage standards to fix Tommy's support obligation.
I contend that the family court's decision was correct. I begin with the fundamental principle that a support order must serve the best interests of the child. Section 767.51(3), Stats.; Weidner, 131 Wis. 2d at 317, 388 N.W.2d at 622. As to the application of the percentage standards, we have held that "in cases where the parties have a substantial marital estate and income far beyond the average income of most people, the. robotistic utilization of the percentage standards may give absurd results." Hubert v. Hubert, 159 Wis. 2d 803, 814, 465 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Ct. App. 1990). I contend that the family court's application of the percentage standards in this case was neither robotistic nor a misuse of discretion.
The paternity support statute provides that support may be expressed as a percentage of the parent's income. Section 767.51(4), STATS. In addition, the statute provides that the court shall determine child support payments by using the percentage standards established by the department. Section 767.51(4m). However, the statute permits the court to deviate from the presumptive application of the standards if the court finds by the greater weight of the credible evidence that the use of the standards is unfair to the child or to the party requesting such deviation. Section 767.51(5).
*466Here, the family court's use of the percentage standards was not robotistic. Instead, in a series of elaborate decisions, the court detailed why the use of the standards did not produce an unfair or absurd result to any interested party, particularly Tommy. In its role as fact finder, the court determined that Tommy had not satisfied his burden of proof to show that the presumptive application of the percentage standards would be unfair to him or Tukker. I contend that both the evidence and the law support the court's determination.
In its bench decision of February 17, 1993, when considering whether to apply the percentage standards, the family court gave a textbook example of a proper exercise of judicial discretion. In this decision, the court addressed each and every factor set out in § 767.51(5), STATS., consuming some twelve pages of the trial transcript.1 The court considered: (1) each parent's earning capacity; (2) each parent's relative financial circumstances; (3) Tukker's needs; (4) Tuk-ker's physical, mental and emotional health needs; (5) each parent's standard of living and economic circumstances; (6) the need and capacity of Tukker for education; (7) Tukker's age; (8) Tukker's financial resources and earning ability; (9) the physical custody arrangement; (10) any extraordinary travel expenses related to periods of physical placement; (11) the responsibility of the parties for the support of others; (12) the value of the services contributed by Mary as the custodial parent; and (13) Tukker's best interests.
*467While addressing these statutory factors, the court determined that Tommy had the clear ability to pay the level of support called for under the percentage standards. Tommy does not dispute this point. The family court then found that the career expectancy of a special teams NFL punter is 4.03 years. At the time of trial, Tommy's punting career had already exceeded this projection. In addition, Tommy testified that although he hoped to continue with his NFL career, he was not even under contract as of the trial. Based on this evidence, the family court correctly noted in its bench decision, "[Tommy's] future as a special teams player has limitations, and probably in the near future, he won't be doing that any more."
Based on this analysis, the family court concluded that the application of the percentage standards would not be unfair to Tommy. In the face of this detailed reasoning, the majority accuses the family court of having "picked an arbitrary figure" under the percentage standard. Majority op. at 452, 525 N.W.2d at 798. Even if wrong, the family court's detailed explanation can hardly be labeled arbitrary. Adding insult to injury, the majority does not even address the family court's reasons, much less explain why they represent a misuse of discretion. I contend that when we reverse a trial court's discretionary determination which is supported by an abundance of reasoning, we at least owe the trial court an explanation as to why those reasons fail to pass muster on appellate review.
A simple mathematical analysis of the family court's decision reveals why it makes sense. Under the family court's base support award of $18,000 per year (a figure with which neither the majority nor Tommy quarrels), Tommy's support obligation over eighteen years will total $324,000. If Tommy remains in the *468NFL for two more years (an inference well allowed by the evidence) and assuming a $400,000 per year salary, Tommy would pay $136,000 of that total support obligation during this two-year period. The balance would be paid over the remaining sixteen years of Tukker's minority at a far lesser rate under the percentage standards because Tommy will be earning far less money.
For instance, if Tommy should earn $50,000 per year after his NFL career ends, he would pay support for those sixteen remaining years at the rate of $8500 per year, or a total of $136,000. Added to the same amount paid for the first two years, Tommy's total support payments would total $272,000, a $52,000 shortfall based on Tukker's present needs.
The family court minimized the risk of such a shortfall by simply requiring Tommy to pay a greater portion of the support obligation pursuant to the percentage standards at the present time when Tommy has greater income available, rather than at a later time when he will have less. The court's structuring of the support payments in this fashion serves the best interests of Tukker because it assures a present fund to meet his needs both now and in the future. It also is fair to Tommy because it allows him to satisfy a greater portion of his support obligation at a time when he can better afford it. This was wise, prudent and creative judging. We should respect it.
The majority, however, seizes on the family court's statement that the support award produces money beyond the average standard of living level established by the evidence. Of course it does for the moment. But the family court properly did not confine itself to just the immediate moment. Rather, the court also looked to the evidence regarding Tommy's future ability to *469satisfy the support obligation based on Tukker's present needs.
Thus, the family court's application of the percentage standards in this short-term, high-income case was not robotistic and did not produce the absurd result which can sometimes result in a long-term, high-income situation.2 See Hubert, 159 Wis. 2d at 814, 465 N.W.2d at 256. To the contrary, the application of the standards do not even assure that Tukker will receive the full amount of support to which he will be entitled over his minority even measured from his present needs. The majority deprives Tukker of the fair and proper level of support to which he is presently entitled. That loss of support can never be recovered.
If the evidentiary projections upon which the family court's support order is based prove to be faulty, Tommy's remedy is to seek modification of the judgment. The family court expressly recognized this eventuality in its decision. We should allow that process to work.

B. Present /Future Support

In undoing the family court's support order, the majority creates a new theory of support law which draws a distinction between present and future support. Under this theory, the majority concludes that a support order may only address the immediate situation. The majority further holds that any accommodation to future events reasonably predicted by the evidence can only be addressed by a minority trust.
*470On a threshold basis, I fear that the majority does not appreciate the breadth and consequence of its opinion. The majority says that "to use percentage standards to generate money for future support is simply not what the percentage standards were intended to do." Majority op. at 449, 525 N.W.2d at 797. However, the use of the percentage standards represents an "evidentiary shortcut" in lieu of the statutory factors by which the family court fixes support. See Weidner, 131 Wis. 2d at 317-18, 388 N.W.2d at 622-23. Thus, the majority's statement applies with equal force to all support orders whether fixed under the statutory factors or under the percentage standards. This must be borne in mind as I detail my objections to this new theory of law.
When a family court enters a support order, the expectation of all concerned (the child, the parents, the lawyers and the court) is that the order will endure into the future until circumstances change warranting a modification of the award. In short, every support order reaches into the future.
This is eloquently demonstrated by what occurred in this case. The family court's support order was premised upon Tukker's present needs and the legitimate assumption that such needs would continue into the future unless or until a change in circumstances demonstrated otherwise. Now, however, the majority grafts onto this procedure its new theory which invalidates the "future" aspects of this support order.
The majority theory raises a host of troubling questions. The most obvious is, when does the "present" end and the "future" begin? I contend that the family court's discretionary authority to set appropriate support, coupled with the law of support order *471modification, provides an efficient vehicle for addressing these concerns.
Equally disturbing is the majority's holding that the "future" component of a support order (whatever that is) can only be addressed by the cumbersome procedure of a minority trust. Since nearly all support orders have a futuristic reach, such trusts will now become routine (perhaps even mandatory) under the majority opinion.3 And in the process, the custodial parent is stripped of the right to direct control over support moneys. See Resong v. Vier, 157 Wis. 2d 382, 391-92, 459 N.W.2d 591, 595 (Ct. App. 1990). Instead, the majority sends the custodial parent off to a trustee to plead for release of support moneys.
Finally, since the family court may now order support only to meet the immediate needs of the child, the already overburdened family courts of this state will find themselves besieged with repeated motions for modification of support awards seeking to update existing support orders. I contend that our existing law which envisions future application of a present support order, coupled with the law of support order modification, efficiently addresses the majority's concern. We should not substitute this very workable system with the majority's new approach.
In conclusion, I contend that the distinction drawn by the majority is a phantom in the real world of sup*472port law. Moreover, the majority's theory and the procedure it imposes on litigants and the judicial system are unnecessary, burdensome and unworkable.

C. Tukker's Standard of Living

Another erroneous premise of the majority opinion is its holding that the percentage standards do not accommodate a higher standard of living for a child commensurate with a higher income of the payor. The error of the majority's thinking is self-evident from the standards themselves: as the level of income increases, so does the level of support. Obviously, a higher level of support will ordinarily produce a concomitant higher standard of living for the child. This alone refutes the majority's theory.
In addition, I again recall that the percentage standards are but an evidentiary shortcut for the application of the statutory factors. See Weidner, 131 Wis. 2d at 317-18, 388 N.W.2d at 622-23. Thus, the percentage standards already subsume the statutory standard of living factor. The majority writes this factor out of the standards.
The law requires a family court to consider the appropriate standard of living when making a support award, and the family court in this case complied. Based on Mary's testimony and certain expert testimony regarding the needs of an average child in Sheboygan County, the family court found that Tuk-ker's current needs could be met by a base support order of $1500 per month, or $18,000 per year. As noted, Tommy did not dispute this amount. However, the family court also observed that merely satisfying Tukker's subsistence needs was not the only relevant factor when fixing Tommy's support obligation. As noted earlier, the court proceeded to address all of the *473statutory factors set out in § 767.51(5), Stats., including Tukker's standard of living.
In Hubert, the court of appeals rejected the theme sounded by the majority that such a consideration is off limits:
The [family] court's ruling that it would be absurd to continue to provide the children with the same standard of living they enjoyed dining the marriage was error. It ignores the statutory directive that the court consider what the children would have had had the marriage continued. Section 767.25(lm)(c), Stats.
Hubert, 159 Wis. 2d at 815, 465 N.W.2d at 256 (footnote omitted).
Standard of living means the level of subsistence and comfort in everyday life that was enjoyed by the children because of their parents' financial resources. Id. at 815 n.2, 465 N.W.2d at 256. Here, of course, the realities of a paternity case set in. Because Tukker is a nonmarital infant in a paternity proceeding, he was unable to present direct evidence of an established family standard of living pattern.4 However, the family court properly did not penalize Tukker because of this status. Instead, the court analyzed the evidence bearing upon the parties' total economic circumstances. From this, the family court logically concluded that Mary and Tommy, as responsible parents, would have maintained Tukker at a standard of living commensurate with Tommy's substantial income.
The majority ignores the family court's reasoning on this point. Instead, the majority focuses on Mary's *474modest standard of living testimony and the expert testimony regarding the average cost to rear an ordinary child in Sheboygan County. By measuring Tukker's support only from this narrow and limited perspective, the majority treats Tommy as if he was still working in a shoe factory instead of kicking footballs for an NFL team. Instead of judging this case on its particular facts, the majority instead employs a theory of "socialized support" which reduces Tukker's standard of living level to a theoretical average or common denominator. This approach has no basis in law or common sense.

D. Conclusion

I view the family court's support order as the product of precisely what the law requires — judicial consideration of Tukker's best interests during his minority based on his needs and likely standard of living measured against his parents' ability to satisfy those considerations. Based on its consideration of all the statutory factors, the family court concluded that the amount of support provided under the percentage standards was not unfair to any party. Even though the family court ultimately applied the standards, the thoroughness of the family court's opinion demonstrates that the court did not take the "evidentiary shortcut" which the guidelines envision and permit. See Weidner, 131 Wis. 2d at 318, 388 N.W.2d at 623. Instead, the family court has provided us and the parties with a decision which, in my judgment, withstands appellate review be it under the guidelines or under the statutory factors.
In light of the family court's thoroughness, the majority understandably cannot label the court's decision "robotistic" in contravention of Hubert, 159 Wis. *4752d at 814, 465 N.W.2d at 256. Instead, the majority is forced to find a different way to reverse. Its answer is to create a new legal creature which draws an impractical and artificial distinction between present and future support.
As previously noted, if the evidentiary projections upon which the family court premised the support order prove to be faulty, Tommy's remedy is to seek modification of the judgment. The majority short circuits this orderly process. Instead, from this lofty perch, the majority now micromanages the support aspects of this case into the future. This is not our function. We should leave any necessary support adjustments in this case to the family court based upon any changes in circumstances as they occur.
THE TRUST
Having concluded that the family court's support order was a proper exercise of discretion pursuant to the paternity support statute, I now address the majority opinion’s further holding that the family court erred by creating a trust fund to receive a portion of the support payments.
The majority jettisons the trust in this case based on its mistaken belief that the family court improperly imposed a postmajority support obligation on Tommy. As I have already explained, this is not what the family court did. Instead, the court determined the appropriate level of Tukker's support based on his present needs projected over the duration of his minority. The court's support order does not require Tommy to expend one dime beyond Tukker's eighteenth birthday. Nor does the order accidentally or intentionally camouflage a postmajority support obligation against Tommy.
*476Having correctly fixed Tommy's support obligation, the family court then considered the parties' pretrial proposals to segregate a portion of the present support in a trust fund to meet Tukker's possible college education expenses. In so doing, the court correctly followed the law. Absent the consent of the custodial parent, the judicial imposition of a trust which diverts present support money to a trust fund to cover the anticipated costs of postmajority education is improper because it deprives the custodial parent of the present right to receive support money and to make the discretionary decisions as to how that money is to be spent for the child. See Resong, 157 Wis. 2d at 391-92, 459 N.W.2d at 595. Here, however, Mary has consented to the diversion of a portion of the present support money into a trust fund to meet Tukker's possible postmajority educational expenses. Therefore, the court's trust did not run afoul of Resong.
Here again, the Hubert case comes into play. There, the custodial parent asked the trial court to divert a portion of the presently ordered support into a trust fund to meet the postmajority educational needs of the children. The family court rejected this request, holding that it had no authority to order a payor to support a child beyond the age of majority. The Hubert court reversed, saying, "[§ 767.25(2), STATS.,] gives the court an attractive means of providing for the future educational needs of children with child support that is paid while the children are under the age of majority." Hubert, 159 Wis. 2d at 817, 465 N.W.2d at 257 (emphasis added).
Although the majority sees ambiguity in this language, it correctly interprets Hubert to say that support money which is paid while the children are *477under the age of majority may be diverted into a college trust fund with the consent of the custodial parent.
Thus, Resong, and Hubert rest comfortably with each other. In both cases, moneys earmarked for present support were proposed to a trust for postmajority education expenses. In Resong, the effort was doomed because the custodial parent did not consent to the diversion of the funds. In Hubert, the request was proper because the custodial parent did consent. This case obviously falls under Hubert because Mary has consented to the trust.
In summary, the creation of such a trust is proper where: (1) the custodial parent agrees to invest a portion of presently needed support into a prudent investment program to meet a postmajority need of the child, (2) such is in the best interests of the child, and (3) such is approved by the family court.5
Because the family court properly determined Tukker's support pursuant to the paternity support statute, the court was free, with Mary's consent, to divert a portion of those moneys to a trust fund to meet Tukker's potential postmajority education expenses. I *478respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion which reverses the court's discretionary decision to create such a trust.
CONCLUSION
I conclude by addressing the incongruities resulting from the majority opinion. First, the majority invalidates the trust created with the consent of Mary. Yet nothing bars Mary from creating such a trust on her own.
Second, the trust created by the family court assured that the bulk of the support would be preserved for Tukker under judicial control and supervision. Since the majority invalidates the trust, that assurance is now lost. While I have no reason to doubt Mary's good intentions, I much preferred the certainty of the trust created by the family court.
Third, the trust created by the family court named Tommy and Mary as cotrustees with authority to make joint expenditure decisions.6 I cannot recall a case where the noncustodial support payor had been granted such a prominent role regarding the expenditure of support money. That privilege and opportunity are now lost to Tommy under the majority opinion.
Fourth, the trust created by the family court directed the return of the remaining trust assets to Tommy: (1) at Tukker's nineteenth birthday if Tukker should not pursue a college education and, in any event; (2) at Tukker's twenty-fifth birthday.7 By prevailing on this appeal, Tommy has now lost this *479opportunity to recoup these funds. This consequence represents my only solace from the majority opinion since Tukker no longer has to return his support money to his father.
I would leave the family court's judgment intact. This case, like Tukker, is still in its infancy. Family court cases are fluid situations. Most of the concerns raised by Tommy are more properly addressed by any changes in the circumstances upon which the family court's judgment is premised. And, the family court has repeatedly expressed its willingness to exercise discretion on this front. For the moment, we should allow the mechanism of the family court's well-reasoned judgment to work. I respectfully dissent.

 In so doing, the family court went beyond the requirements of the law. A court need consider only those factors which are relevant. See DeLaMatter v. DeLaMatter, 151 Wis. 2d 576, 586, 445 N.W.2d 676, 680 (Ct. App. 1989). Here, the court considered all the statutory factors, relevant or not.

 As the family court aptly put it, "This is a little different than Doctor Hubert who can sit there and say, well, listen, why are you worried about the future. I am going to knock down a million dollars a year from now to the next 20 years."

 As with the entire law of support, the creation of a trust is committed to the discretion of the family court. See Hubert v. Hubert, 159 Wis. 2d 803, 817, 465 N.W.2d 252, 257 (Ct. App. 1990). By holding that the "future" component of a support order can only be accommodated by a minority trust, the court must use a trust even if the court is well satisfied that the custodial parent would be an efficient and responsible manager of the support money.

 The only standard of living history was that Mary and Tukker had lived in low-income housing and had been maintained by AFDC payments.

 The majority also uses § 767.5I(5)(e), Stats., to undo the trust in this case. This statute allows the family court to consider, inter alia, the "need and capacity of the child for education, including higher education" when fixing support. The majority agrees that this language contemplates "preparation for higher education." Majority op. at 454, 525 N.W.2d at 799. But in its next breath, the majority holds that this does not include financial preparation. Common sense would dictate that financial preparation is one of the most important planning ingredients for higher education.
Again, I would hold that if the funds proposed for the postmajority education of the child come from moneys which otherwise would be properly applied to current support, then neither § 767.51(5)(e), STATS., nor any other law is violated.

 If Tommy and Mary could not agree as to expenditures, the trust provided that the family court would resolve the dispute.

 This provision initially troubled me because it created the prospect of a child having to return support moneys to the *479payor. However, the issue was not appealed by Mary nor by anyone on Tukker's behalf.