Court Opinion

ID: 9844455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:02:59.979043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:35.403579
License: Public Domain

SHEPARD, Justice,
dissenting, in which McFADDEN, Justice, concurs.
I concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it reverses the order of the trial court denying the petition of the father.
I dissent from the majority opinion insofar as, aside from the welfare worker’s report, the action of the trial court is inferentially affirmed. The majority opinion tacitly at least approves the action of a trial court which deprives a natural parent of the custody, care and control of his minor child and turns custody of that child over to persons, who for all the record shows are complete strangers to the child and her family.
I have labored under the impression that the termination of a parent-child relationship in Idaho could only take place pursuant to our stringent statutory procedures under the Idaho Child Protective Act (I.C. § 16-2001, et seq.). See: State ex rel. Child v. Clouse, 93 Idaho 893, 477 P.2d 834. It is my opinion that the majority herein overturns what has been the long established law in Idaho, both by statute and an unbroken line of decisions culminating most recently in Freund v. English, 83 Idaho 140, 358 P.2d 1038; Spaulding v. Children’s Home Finding and Aid Society, 89 Idaho 10, 402 P.2d 52; and Blankenship v. Brookshier, 91 Idaho 317, 420 P.2d 800. Those cases, and' others cited therein, have uniformly held that in accordance with I.C. § 32-1007 and I.C. § 15-1805, the natural parent has the right to custody and guardianship of his children.
I disagree with the statement in the majority opinion that the general rule in Idaho is that in normal situations the natural parents are entitled to custody of the child. I would state the rule thusly: Natural parents are entitled to custody of their children except under the most extraordinary situations. In such extraordinary situations it must be shown that the parent has abandoned the child or that the parent is patently unfit to have custody, or unable to provide the necessaries for such child. I emphatically disagree that any rule should be adopted in Idaho stating that a trial court can divest a parent of the custody of a child and give it to a stranger merely on the showing that the stranger may be more suitable to have custody than would be the parent.
Perhaps the most striking recent indication of judicial thinking in this field was this court’s decision in Duncan v. Davis, 94 Idaho 205, 485 P.2d 603. In that case a 19 year old mother sought the return of her illegitimate child which she had voluntarily relinquished and abandoned to a child adoption agency approximately one and a half years before. The court in that case essentially concluded that the parental-child relationship was so strong and so protected by the law that it should return the child to its mother. In that case there was no discussion of the greater suitability of the custodial persons vis-a-vis, the natural mother, nor of the welfare of the child. The custodial right of the natural parent therein was assumed to be almost absolute. I suggest that the decision of the majority herein cannot possibly be-squared with the decision in Duncan v. Davis, supra.
I believe it necessary to emphasize that the father herein initially delivered the child to the Butlers because he was unable to care for her himself. He was em*672ployed in a job that took him away from home and at that time he also had severe economic problems. The mother of the appellant, the paternal grandmother of the child, was at that time employed full time and also had the care of an invalid husband. The grandmother has since retired from employment and her invalid husband is deceased. The mother of the child was alleged to have neglected the child and although no finding to that effect was entered by the trial court, it may be strongly inferred since the trial court took the custody of the child away from the mother. The trial court then ratified the action of the father in placing the child with the Butlers and ordered that he pay child support in the amount of $50.00 per month. Later in an order completely unsupported by any petition, notice, service or hearing, the father was required to increase that child support to $75.00 per month.
The father later petitioned the court for an order giving him custody of the child. That petition was supported by an affidavit stating the then conditions of the father and that he could now provide a home for the child. The files of the district court reflect service of the petition and affidavit on counsel for the plaintiff-mother. When the petition of the father came on for hearing the mother did not appear in person or by counsel.
At the hearing on the petition the only evidence presented was the testimony of the father, his sister, his aunt and his mother. Although a trial court has broad discretion in accepting or rejecting the testimony of witnesses who appear before him, in this case the testimony was uncontradicted, not inherently improbable and touched only upon the love the father had for his daughter, his desire to have her and the type of home and surroundings he would provide for her. Nowhere in the testimony was there more than mere mention of the Butlers or of the child’s mother. Although examination of witnesses by the court is ordinarily frowned ■upon, in a case of this type the court, if it entertained doubts, could have examined any of the witnesses for additional information. The record reveals that the trial court did not examine any of the witnesses.
I then conclude that the trial court was required to accept the uncontroverted evidence of the father and his witnesses. There is nothing in the record to indicate that the father is not a fit and proper person to have the custody of his child, nor is there any testimony that he has abandoned his child. To the contrary the out-of-court statement solicited by the trial court reveals that the appellant and his mother are fit persons and would provide a suitable home for the child.
Almost the complete thrust of the majority opinion is based on the case of Application of Altmiller, 76 Idaho 521, 285 P.2d 1064 (1955). Therein the natural father of an eleven year old female child sought to regain custody from the maternal grandmother of the child. The father and mother of the child had been divorced, at which time the child was four years old. The court noted that during the next seven years until the commencement of the action the father had seen his child on only one occasion. He had never corresponded with her, nor had he contributed to her support in any way, shape or form, although he had been ordered to do so by the divorce decree.
The following language of the court in Altmiller adequately demonstrates the distinction between that case and the case at bar. Therein the court said:
“The evidence discloses that respondent did not take the interest in his child that a normal father would have, nor assume any responsibility for her. The appellant has had the child in her home since the child’s parents separated in August, 1948, and the evidence discloses that there is a devotion between her and the child, while the father is a stranger to the child, having seen her only once since the separation. Although it is undisputed that the respondent is morally a fit and proper person to have the care, *673custody and control of his minor daughter, Nancy, it is disputed whether or not he has a suitable and proper place to care for and educate her. The evidence discloses that he has not remarried, and he proposes to take Nancy to the State of Washington to live with him in a farm house on a 12,000-acre farm, where he has employment doing farm work. He testified that his employer’s wife, who is 42 years of age and has never seen Nancy, will assist in caring for her. She and her husband live approximately one-fourth of a mile from the house that respondent proposes to occupy with his daughter. The evidence shows that respondent believes that his widowed aunt, 62 years of age, who lives in Oroville, Washington, three or four miles from where respondent proposes to live, would also assist in caring for Nancy. There would be no woman living in respondent’s home.
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“Several witnesses testified as to appellant’s fitness and the suitability of her home for caring for Nancy. In cases of this nature, three rights of interest are to be considered: First, that of the parents; second, that of the person who has for years discharged all the obligations of the parents; third, and chiefly, that of the child. (Citations) Each case of this nature, where the future welfare of a minor child is involved, must stand or fall upon the peculiar or particular facts and circumstances of the case before the court. There can be no binding — and very little helpful — precedent found in the decisions of the courts on this subject, because of this fact.
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“Custody of a minor child should be awarded to a parent unless it be affirmatively shown that he is unfit to have such care and custody, or that on account of circumstances surrounding him he is unable to provide proper training and education. Ordinarily, poverty of a parent is not sufficient reason for depriving him of the custody of his child. Whether the proceeding be habeas corpus or a divorce proceeding involving the custody of a minor child, the same principles should govern the action of the courts in awarding custody.”
In the case of Spaulding v. Children’s Home Finding and Aid Society, supra, this court stated:
“If the parent is competent to transact his or her own business, and is not otherwise unsuitable, the custody of the child is not to be given to another, even though such other may be a more suitable person.” (Emphasis supplied)
The court further said, quoting from In re Martin, 29 Idaho 716, 161 P. 573:
“Parents should not be permanently deprived of the custody of their children and the right to act as their legal guardians, even when under certain circumstances the custody of the children must be temporarily surrendered, except in strict accordance with the statute and under circumstances which fully warrant such drastic action.
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“While either of the parents are competent, and not unsuitable, they are absolutely entitled to the guardianship of their minor children. * * * ” (Emphasis supplied)
The court in Piatt v. Piatt, 32 Idaho 407, 184 P. 470, stated:
“It is sometimes said that the welfare of the child is the only matter for consideration in making an order for its custody, but we think this expression is only qualifiedly true. The welfare of the child is perhaps of paramount importance, but it is not the only matter to be considered in determining to whom the custody of the child should be given. (Citations) In a divorce action, the custody of the children should be awarded to one or both of the parents, unless it be affirmatively shown that both parents are unfit to have such care or custody, or that they are unable to properly maintain them and provide for their proper training and education. Or*674dinarily, poverty of a parent is not a sufficient reason for depriving him of the custody of his child.”
Contrary to the assertions contained in the majority opinion I find no basis in the record whatsoever to sustain any finding or conclusion that the father herein was “unsuited” to have custody of his child. In 1966 as aforesaid, the father having secured temporary custody of his child voluntarily delivered her to the Butlers for care. That action of the father was ratified by the trial court. The reason, as I perceive it for that action, was that the father was unable to properly care for the child at that time. Such is not the case at the present time.
I would point out that in many instances the record discloses remarks and conclusions by the trial judge which do not square with the record herein. The strong inference contained therein is that the trial judge had information which is not contained in the record presented to us. I believe we must presume that the trial judge gained knowledge and opinions in this matter from prior proceedings, the record of which is not available to us. While in an ordinary case, the action of an appellate court should be based solely upon the record, it is my conclusion that the matter should not be reversed and remanded with instructions for the trial court to grant the petition of the father. Rather, I conclude that the matter should be reversed and remanded to the trial court with directions that a full hearing be held upon the subject of the father’s petition. The welfare of the child concerned in this matter demands that full hearing and investigation be made by the trial court into all matters, including the prior proceedings, the fitness and suitability of both parents, the fitness and suitability of the persons presently having custody, and the desires of the child. To that end and absent any action by the parties. the court should, upon its own motion, require the attendance and testimony of all parties concerned. If in the determination of the trial judge the child in question should not be examined in open court, the trial judge should interview the child in chambers. Thereafter, the trial court should be directed to make full findings and conclusions touching all matters as discussed herein.