Court Opinion

ID: 9546133
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:25:23.451492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:02.224373
License: Public Domain

Dore, J.
(dissenting) — The majority characterizes the allegedly defamatory remarks in the letter Dr. Wayne presented to Dunlap's employer as nonactionable statements of opinion. As a result, the majority upholds a summary judgment dismissal of the plaintiff's defamation suit. I cannot agree with this court's characterization of this letter, and therefore I would overturn the trial court's summary judgment and remand the case for trial.
The distinction between actionable statements of fact, and nonactionable statements of opinion, as the majority states, is by no means clear. Merely labeling a comment as "an opinion" does not ensure that the statement is nonac-tionable. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566 (1977), which the majority in my opinion correctly adopts, states that
A defamatory communication may consist of a statement in the form of an opinion, but a statement of this nature *544is actionable only if it implies the allegation of undisclosed defamatory facts as the basis for the opinion.
(Italics mine.) Restatement (Second) of Torts § 566, at 170 (1977). I believe that the letter does imply allegations of undisclosed facts which are defamatory to Dunlap, and I would not deny Dunlap's right to damages before trial by holding the letter is a nonactionable opinion.
The letter states in part that " [i]t appears from the background information . . . that this Agreement . . . constitutes a solicitation for a 'kick-back' to Mr. Dunlap for his services in trying to obtain financing from, among other sources, his own savings and loan association." Brief of Appellant, exhibit 1. The majority focuses on the word "kick-back" and holds that this was an opinion characterizing the actions of the plaintiff. This may be true. Nevertheless the majority in my mind ignores that it is not this characterization which is actionable, but the allegation of underlying facts on which it is based.
The defendant has stated that Dunlap attempted to enforce an agreement compensating him for services in trying to obtain financing for the condominium project. Such action would be highly improper for a man in Dunlap's position, irrespective of whether the defendant labels it a "kick-back" or any other term. Dr. Wayne's publication of the letter implying the facts surrounding the "kick-back" in my mind therefore, if incorrect (which must be assumed for the purpose of this summary judgment motion) is actionable.
In other cases we have held that a statement about an employee which implies by opinion defamatory facts is actionable. Getchell v. Auto Bar Sys. Northwest, Inc., 73 Wn.2d 831, 440 P.2d 843 (1968) (previous employer's statements that plaintiff wrongly retained company funds actionable); Romano v. United Buckingham Freight Lines, 4 Wn. App. 929, 484 P.2d 450 (1971) (previous employer's comment that plaintiffs were dishonest actionable). This is especially true when the facts which the defendant alleges are compared with the facts asserted by the plaintiff. Dun*545lap has submitted affidavits and depositions which, if true, tell a story materially different from Dr. Wayne's. Dunlap asserts that he located the real estate to be used for the condominium on his own time, but lacked the financial resources to develop it. He therefore told a friend, Robert Koivisto, about the project, and Koivisto formed a partnership with Dr. Wayne and two others to acquire and develop the land. Dunlap, on his own time, and with his wife's help in typing various documents, consulted with the partnership and offered valuable advice, spending as much as 100 hours on the project.
Furthermore, the partnership agreed to pay Dunlap in January 1978 at Koivisto's, and not Dunlap's, request. It was not until April 1978 that the partnership sought financing, and Dunlap played no role in the partnership's attempt to secure financing with Dunlap's bank. Dunlap's bank in fact denied its application. The only assistance which Dunlap gave the partnership to obtain financing was one letter written on its behalf to another financing company located in Southern California.
If these facts are true, then the defendant's publication of a letter to Dunlap's employer stating that the agreement between the partnership and Dunlap was a solicitation for a "kick-back" is defamatory. The question is not whether the word "kick-back" is a nonactionable opinion, but whether the word implies undisclosed facts which are defamatory. I believe it does, and I would reverse the Court of Appeals and remand this case to trial.
Dolliver, C.J., Goodloe, J., and Petrie, J. Pro Tern., concur with Dore, J.