Court Opinion

ID: 6641981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 20:46:27.227743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:59:16.654925
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Gantt
concurred in the foregoing opinion. Chief Justice Lake concurred in the judgment denying the writ, but dissented from the views taken by the majority of the court upon the construction of the statute, and filed the following opinion.
Lake, Ch. J.
"While I am clearly of the opinion that the prayer of the relators must be denied, it is impossible for me to give my assent to several • of the propositions advanced by a majority of the court. I will therefore, very briefly, give the reasons why, in my opinion, this writ should be withheld.
From the pleadings and testimony, it appears that the commissioners of Buffalo county, being desirous to construct a wagon bridge across the Platte river, invited proposals therefor without having previously determined ■the precise kind or description of bridge they would have, leaving it to the respective bidders to furnish, together with their bids, plans and specifications of their own, from which the commissioners would select the one, which under all the circumstances they should consider the best. On the 29th day of July, 1873, bids were made by the King Wrought Iron Bridge Company and by Henry T. Clarke, respectively, upon substantially the same general plan, but differing in the details so widely as to leave it quite doubtful, and difficult to determine, which one would, in fact, prove to be the more desirable, or valuable to the county, in case it were adopted.
The bid of the King Wrought Iron Bridge Company was for thirteen dollars per lineal foot, payable in the *163bonds of Kearney precinct, which it seems had been voted for this purpose, while that of Clarke was for eight dollars and seventy-five cents per lineal foot, but payable in money. Subsequently, however, on the same day, Clarke offered to take the bonds in payment at eighty cents on the dollar, which made his bid the lowest, provided his bridge were equally as good as that of his competitor. "Without very much reflection, apparently, and in exceeding great haste, the bid and plans of the King Wrought Iron Bridge Company were accepted by the commissioners, the contract in question entered into, and the bonds of said precinct actually delivered in payment before a single blow towards the construction-of the bridge had been struck. But, notwithstanding the fact that the testimony shows, very satisfactorily to my mind, that the course pursued in this instance by the commissioners was not at all calculated to promote the best interests of the people, yet I do not think such a case is made out as calls for, or would at all justify, the application of the corrective which is here sought.
In my opinion, the radical difficulty in respect of the control of county commissioners in the erection of bridges lies in the almost unlimited discretion with which our statutes vest them in dealing with this subject. And it is in this particular, that I find myself wholly unable to agree with my associates. In many of the states we find ample provision made by statute for the guidance and control of officers intrusted with the erection of public buildings, bridges, and the like, by which they must advertise for a certain time, and in a certain manner, for bids to do the work according to plan's and specifications previously agreed upon. But, in respect of bridges, especially, we have no similar statute in this state; the whole matter is left to the wisdom and sound discretion of the commissioners of the several counties; which discretion, so long as exercised in good faith, is *164entirely beyond the reach or control of any authority whatsoever. ” But, while this is true, it by no means follows, if it be clearly shown that the commissioners are proceeding corruptly in the exercise of such discretion, to the prejudice of the public interests, or of individual rights, that they may not be enjoined by the courts, or compelled to answer in damages for their malfeasance.
In the opinion of my associates, section 16, chap. 67, General Statutes, requires that contracts for the erection of permanent bridges within a county, shall be let to “the lowest competent bidder” and that this necessitates the previous procurement of plans and specifications to which all bids must conform. I do not so understand this provision. It is clear to my mind that this section has reference -solely to such work, grading, turnpiking, and the like, which may be paid for out of the county road fund proper, and not to those expensive, permanent bridges, referred to in the last proviso of the preceding section, which are to be built “under the direction of the county commissioners,” and paid for out of a fund raised especially for that purpose, as in said section provided.
There is another consideration that, in my opinion, ought to have much weight in the determination of this particular question, and lead this court to hesitate long before announcing the conclusion that all contracts for permanent bridges must be let to the lowest bidder. It is a fact of common notoriety that most, if not all, of the very best bridges are patented, and can only be built by the respective patentees, or the person who has purchased the right for the particular state or territory. In such case it is clear that there can be no competition as to the building of a bridge of any one particular patent; and it would be an act of folly for the commissioners to announce that they had settled upon a structure which only a single individual, or company had the right to build, and *165then to advertise for proposals, in the expectation of competition, for its erection. The • only sensible course to pursue in such case would be the one ostensibly taken by these commissioners, to invite competition bétween the owners of the most valuable patents, leaving the selection to be made after due consideration of their respective merits, as well as the cost of each. This I believe to be the course that a prudent, careful man would take, in such case, if the matter concerned him alone, and I can see nothing in our statutes which ought to prevent the commissioners of a county from acting in like manner, in behalf of the public.
On the argument of the case, no question was raised, either as to the legality of the fund out oUwhich payment was to be made for the bridge, or as to the right of the commissioners to deal with it. But, notwithstanding this fact, I cannot forbear -the suggestion that the authority of, Kearney" precinct to issue these bonds, to my mind is not altogether clear, and may admit of very serious doubt. Should it be here adjudged that these bonds were issued without authority, ‘it would of course be fatal to the claim of the relators. Inasmuch, however, as I am satisfied, that for other reasons, already stated, the writ must be denied, and for the further reason that no argument - has been heard thereon, I forbear the expression of an opinion on this point, at this time.
For the reason therefore, that under our statutes the duties of county commissioners in the building of permanent bridges, are chiefly of a judicial, or discretionary character, especially so of the particular kind of structure they will have, I do not think this court has any authority to compel them to adopt Clarke’s plan, or any other definite description of bridge, but that in this matter they should be left to the exercise of their own judgment entirely.
For these reasons, I concur in the opinion, that the *166peremptory writ must be withheld, and the case dismissed at the cost of the relators.
"Writ denied.