Court Opinion

ID: 9957631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-04 18:01:31.469221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:31.768749
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11791    Document: 21-1     Date Filed: 04/04/2024   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-11791
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       ANTONIOUS G. LOCKHART,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Georgia
                 D.C. Docket No. 5:17-cr-00001-LAG-CHW-1
                           ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11791

       Before WILSON, ROSENBAUM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Antonious Lockhart, proceeding pro se, appeals from the
       district court’s denial of his motion seeking credit for time served
       in a prior state sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b) and a modifica-
       tion of his sentence based on an alleged misapplication of U.S.S.G.
       § 5G1.3(b). In response, the government argues that Lockhart’s ap-
       peal should be dismissed for two reasons: (1) Lockhart’s appeal is
       untimely, and (2) he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
              We initially remanded to the district court to determine
       whether Lockhart timely appealed. The district court found that
       he did. Now, we turn to the government’s second argument about
       dismissal—Lockhart’s failure to exhaust his administrative reme-
       dies. We find that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdic-
       tion to entertain Lockhart’s motion because Lockhart failed to ex-
       haust his administrative remedies. Thus, we vacate and remand to
       the district court to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
                                        I.
               In 2017, a grand jury indicted Lockhart on the following
       charges: one count of possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
       in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C); one count of car-
       rying a firearm in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, in violation
       of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); one count of being a felon in possession
       of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and one count of
       simple possession of marijuana and methamphetamine, in viola-
       tion of 21 U.S.C. § 844(a). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Lockhart
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       22-11791                   Opinion of the Court                                  3

       pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a fire-
       arm, and the government agreed to dismiss the other charges. In
       December 2017, the district court sentenced Lockhart to 120
       months’ imprisonment, to run consecutive to his sentence for rev-
       ocation of parole in prior state conviction, followed by three years
       of supervised release.
              In March 2022, Lockhart moved to receive credit against his
       federal sentence for time-served in state custody under 18 U.S.C.
       § 3585(b) and U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(b). The district court denied Lock-
       hart’s motion for a reduction of sentence, explaining that his mo-
       tion was “tantamount to his prior request for a concurrent sen-
       tence,” and that any argument that his federal detainer delayed his
       state parole was speculative and “ha[d] no bearing on the [c]ourt’s
       intention that the federal sentence begin after service of the state
       sentence to achieve reasonable punishment for the instant of-
       fense.”
               The district court dated its order March 13, 2022, but it was
       not entered on the docket until April 13, 2022. Lockhart filed a no-
       tice of appeal, which this court docketed on May 23, 2022.
              On appeal, the government argued that Lockhart’s appeal
       was untimely. When the government asserts timeliness as an issue
       on appeal, we must apply the time limits of Federal Rule of Appel-
       late Procedure 4(b). 1 United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1314

       1 We treat post-judgment motions for a sentence reduction as a continuation

       of a criminal case. See United States v. Fair, 326 F.3d 1317, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003)
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       4                          Opinion of the Court                       22-11791

       (11th Cir. 2009). But in this case, there was conflicting evidence
       about whether Lockhart delivered his notice of appeal to prison
       authorities. While there was no date on his paperwork, under pen-
       alty of perjury Lockhart said that he gave his packet to the mail-
       room on April 21—six days before the deadline to appeal. Because
       this was a factual question for the district court to resolve, Sanders
       v. United States, 113 F.3d 184, 186 n.2 (11th Cir. 1997) (per curiam),
       we remanded the case to the district court to determine, as a factual
       matter, whether Lockhart’s notice of appeal was timely. United
       States v. Lockhart, No. 22-11791, 2023 WL 1097777, at *1 (11th Cir.
       Jan. 30, 2023) (per curiam).
                At the request of the district court, the government filed a
       response to the question of timeliness, and Lockhart replied. The
       district court explained that, when a filing is undated, the burden is
       on the government to prove that the prisoner did not deliver the
       filing to the prison officials when the prisoner claimed to have de-
       livered it. The government submitted an affidavit from the super-
       visor of the mailroom at FCI Williamsburg, where Lockhart was
       located, and said that once an inmate brings mail to the mailroom,
       it is taken to the post office no later than the next business day but
       often sooner. Yet the supervisor did not have specific knowledge
       about Lockhart bringing his mail to the mailroom. Considering
       this evidence, which the district court described as bare, the district
       court found the government did not meet its burden nor had it

       (per curiam). Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) provides a 14-day pe-
       riod to file a notice of appeal in criminal cases. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i).
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       22-11791               Opinion of the Court                         5

       shown that Lockhart’s statement under penalty of perjury was not
       credible. Thus, the district court found that Lockhart timely ap-
       pealed.
             The case was returned to this court, and now we address the
       government’s second jurisdictional argument.
                                           II.
             The government argues that Lockhart failed to exhaust his
       administrative remedies and, as a result, the district court lacked
       subject matter jurisdiction to hear Lockhart’s motion. This court
       reviews the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction de novo.
       United States v. Iguaran, 821 F.3d 1335, 1336 (11th Cir. 2016) (per
       curiam).
              Under 18 U.S.C. § 3585(b), “a defendant shall be given credit
       toward the service of a term of imprisonment for any time he has
       spent in official detention prior to the date the sentence com-
       mences as a result of the offense for which the sentence was im-
       posed,” or “as a result of any other charge for which the defendant
       was arrested after the commission of the offense for which the sen-
       tence was imposed.” “Authority to calculate credit for time served
       under [§] 3585(b) is vested in the Attorney General [through the
       Bureau of Prisons], not the sentencing court.” United States v. Alex-
       ander, 609 F.3d 1250, 1259 (11th Cir. 2010). “Federal regulations
       have afforded prisoners administrative review of the computation
       of their credits, and prisoners have been able to seek judicial review
       of these computations after exhausting their administrative reme-
       dies.” United States v. Wilson, 503 U.S. 329, 335 (1992) (internal
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       6                          Opinion of the Court                       22-11791

       citations omitted). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a ju-
       risdictional requirement. United States v. Lucas, 898 F.2d 1554, 1556
       (11th Cir. 1990) (per curiam).
               Here, no evidence exists in the record, either before the dis-
       trict court or this court, that Lockhart exhausted his administrative
       remedies with the Bureau of Prisons before moving under
       § 3585(b) for credit against his federal sentence for time-served in
       prior state custody. Thus, the district court lacked jurisdiction to
       rule on the merits of Lockhart’s motion for sentencing credit under
       § 3585(b).
               We vacate the district court’s order and remand to the dis-
       trict court with instructions to enter an order dismissing the mo-
       tion for lack of jurisdiction. 2
               VACATED and REMANDED.

       2 The government also argued that on the merits, the district court properly

       denied Lockhart’s motion to modify his sentence. Because we find that the
       district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider the merits of Lock-
       hart’s motion, we do not address this argument.