Court Opinion

ID: 9380202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 17:00:52.784468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:23.417952
License: Public Domain

FILED
                           NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                              MAR 17 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                         MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                            U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETER ANGELO ALDEN,                              No.   21-16002

              Plaintiff-Appellant,               D.C. No. 5:18-cv-03258-SVK

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
AECOM TECHNOLOGY
CORPORATION, a Delaware corporation;
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND
SPACE ADMINISTRATION, NASA, a
Federal Agency,

              Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of California
                 Susan G. Van Keulen, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted March 16, 2023**

Before: WALLACE, FERNANDEZ, and SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      Peter Alden appeals from the district court’s judgment in favor of the

defendants in his action claiming that his former employer, AECOM, fired him in

violation of the Defense Contractor Whistleblower Protection Act, 10 U.S.C. §

2409 (2008).1 We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.2 We review the

district court’s interpretation of the statute and grant of summary judgment de

novo. Avery v. First Resol. Mgmt. Corp., 568 F.3d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir. 2009).

We affirm.

      Summary judgment was proper for AECOM because the plain language of

the statute only protected NASA contractor employees who reported what they

reasonably believed to be “a substantial and specific danger to public health or

safety.” 10 U.S.C. § 2409(a) (2008). Protection for other reports, including

contract mismanagement, was limited to Department of Defense contracts, grants,

or funds. See id. (protecting a contractor employee from discrimination for

reporting “information that the employee reasonably believes is evidence of gross

      1
          Alden waived his claims against NASA on appeal.
      2
        Alden’s failure to list the reconsideration order in his notice of appeal,
which was filed after the district court denied reconsideration, does not preclude
this court from considering the reconsideration order. “A mistake in designating
the order being appealed is not fatal as long as the intent to appeal a specific
judgment can be fairly inferred and the appellee is not prejudiced or misled by the
mistake.” McCarthy v. Mayo, 827 F.2d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1987) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
                                          2
mismanagement of a Department of Defense contract or grant, a gross waste of

Department of Defense funds. . .”). Because this issue is dispositive, we decline to

consider the alternative arguments regarding summary judgment.

       The district court did not abuse its discretion by rejecting on reconsideration

new arguments and allegations that could have been made during summary

judgment.3 United Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Worldwide, Inc., 555 F.3d 772, 780

(9th Cir. 2009). The district court was not biased merely because it ruled against

Alden. Leslie v. Grupo ICA, 198 F.3d 1152, 1160 (9th Cir. 1999). To the extent

Alden argues that the district court abused its discretion in limiting discovery, he

has not established actual and substantial prejudice. See Hallett v. Morgan, 296

F.3d 732, 751 (9th Cir. 2002) (setting forth the standard).

      AFFIRMED.

      3
       To the extent that Alden filed his reconsideration motion pursuant to
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e), the motion was untimely. The district court
lacked the authority to extend the deadline. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2); Harman v.
Harper, 7 F.3d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1993). However, the district court also
considered the reconsideration motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(b). The Rule 60(b) motion was timely under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
60(c)(1).
                                           3