Court Opinion

ID: 9892619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-24 16:15:22.927819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:01.483218
License: Public Domain

J-S28039-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JUSTIN JAMES CENTRA                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1097 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 1, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-17-CR-0000182-2021

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JUSTIN JAMES CENTRA                          :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1165 WDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered April 1, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-17-CR-0000942-2020

BEFORE:      PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                      FILED: October 24, 2023

       Appellant, Justin James Centra, appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Clearfield County after a jury found

him guilty of Attempt to Commit Aggravated Indecent Assault of a Child; three

counts of Indecent Assault; Indecent Exposure; three counts of Corruption of

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S28039-23

a Minor; Terroristic Threats, nineteen counts of Intimidation of Witnesses or

Victims; and nineteen counts of Intimidation, Retaliation or Obstruction in

Child Abuse Cases. Classified as a sexually violent predator and sentenced to

an aggregate term of incarceration of eighteen years and three months to

forty-two-years’ incarceration, Appellant challenges the consolidation of his

cases, the jury instruction on the charge of Intimidation of Witnesses, and the

legality of his sentence on the charge of Intimidation of Witnesses. We affirm.

      The trial court sets forth the relevant facts and procedural history, as

follows:

      On August 24, 2020, Lawrence Township Police Department
      received a call regarding sexual abuse of a minor. [K.W.] reported
      that her stepdaughter, L.W., had returned home in the middle of
      the night from her grandmother, [S.C.’s], house. Also at the
      house was J.C., L.W.’s cousin, and Defendant [hereinafter
      “Appellant”], Justin Centra. Appellant is [related to all persons
      noted]. L.W. reported that she woke up around 3 a.m. to find
      Appellant rubbing her legs and trying to get into her pants.
      Appellant also asked L.W. if she would show Appellant “hers”, and
      if L.W. would like to see “his.” L.W. then contacted a friend and
      asked the friend to give her a ride home.

      L.W. was taken to the Child Advocacy Century (“CAC”) for an
      interview. While L.W. was being interviewed, J.C. contacted K.W.
      and stated that Appellant had also been abusing J.C. for several
      years. Subsequently, J.C. was interviewed at the CAC. During
      her interview, J.C. recalled multiple instances of sexual abuse by
      Appellant. J.C. additionally claimed that Appellant was verbally
      and physically abusive.

      Based on the statements of J.C. and L.W., a Criminal Complaint
      was filed against Appellant on August 25, 2020. The Complaint
      charged Appellant with Aggravated Indecent Assault of a Child, 18
      Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(b); Attempted Aggravated Indecent Assault of a
      Child, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(b); Corruption of Minors, 18 Pa.C.S.A.
      § 6301(a)(1)(ii); Indecent Exposure, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3127(a);

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     Terroristic Threats, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1); and Disorderly
     Conduct, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(4).        Appellant had his
     preliminary hearing on September 9, 2020, and all charges were
     waived to Court.

     While Appellant was detained pending trial on the Aggravated
     Indecent Assault case, Appellant wrote sixteen letters to J.C. and
     made a total of twenty phone calls to J.C., [S.C.], and [K.W.]
     Within the majority of the letters, Appellant instructed J.C. to tell
     the doctor, the District Attorney, and the Judge that she wanted
     Appellant to be released from jail. Additionally, Appellant told J.C.
     that she needed to tell the District Attorney that J.C. heard
     Appellant snoring during the time that L.W. accused Appellant of
     assaulting her. Moreover, Appellant instructed J.C. to tell the
     doctor and the District Attorney that J.C. only said that Appellant
     was abusing her because J.C. was upset that Appellant was not
     spending his money on J.C.

     Between August 28, 2020, and December 15, 2020, Appellant
     made numerous phone calls while he was incarcerated. Over the
     phone, Appellant instructed [S.C.], J.C, and [K.W.] to tell the
     District Attorney that L.W. was lying. He further instructed [S.C.]
     and [K.W.] to take L.W. to the District Attorney’s office and have
     L.W. tell them she was lying about the incident. On December 16,
     2020, [K.W.] took L.W. to the District Attorney’s Office; once
     there, L.W. left a message that she needed to tell the District
     Attorney that she lied about the incident.

     Based on the letters and phone calls made by Appellant, a second
     Criminal Complaint was filed on February 10, 2021. The second
     Complaint charged Appellant with Intimidation of Witnesses or
     Victims, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4952(a)(2); Intimidation, Retaliation or
     Obstruction in Child Abuse Cases, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4958(a)(2)(ii);
     and Obstruction 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4958(b.1). Appellant waived his
     preliminary hearing on February 24, 2021, and all charges were
     bound over to Court. Afterwards, both cases proceeded with the
     normal pre-trial filings and procedures. On May 25, 2021, the
     Commonwealth filed a Motion to Consolidate the two cases. A
     hearing on the Commonwealth’s Motion was held on June 28,
     2021. Subsequently, [the trial court] granted the Motion, and the
     two cases were joined for the purposes of a jury trial.

     A three-day jury trial began on September 29, 2021. On October
     1, 2021, the jury convicted Appellant of Attempt to Commit

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      Aggravated Indecent Assault of a Child; three counts of Indecent
      Assault; Indecent Exposure; three counts of Corruption of a Minor;
      Terroristic Threats; nineteen counts of Intimidation of Witnesses
      or Victims; and nineteen counts of Intimidation, Retaliation or
      Obstruction in Child Abuse Cases.fn A hearing to determine
      whether Appellant is a sexually violent predator and a sentencing
      hearing was held on April 1, 2022. [The trial court] classified
      Appellant as a sexually violent predator and sentenced Appellant
      to an aggregate term of incarceration of eighteen years and three
      months to forty-two years.

         Fn:     Appellant was found not guilty of the Aggravated
         Indecent Assault of a Child charge regarding J.C.;
         Intimidation of Witnesses or Victims regarding L.W.;
         Intimidation, Retaliation or Obstruction in Child Abuse
         Cases regarding L.W.; and twenty counts of Obstruction.

      Appellant filed a Post-Sentence Motion on April 27, 2022. On
      October 24, 2022, [the trial court] entered an Order denying
      Appellant’s Post-Sentence Motion by operation of law due to the
      expiration of the 120-day deadline. Appellant filed a Notice of
      Appeal on September 22, 2022. Following Order of this Court, the
      Appellant submitted [its] Matters Complained of on Appeal
      [pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)].

Trial Court Opinion, 12/21/2022, at 1-3.

      Appellant raises in his counseled appellate brief the following preserved

issues for our consideration:

      1. Whether the [trial court] erred when it granted the
         Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate Case No. CP-17-CR-
         942-2020 and CP-17-CR-182-2021 for Trial?

      2. Whether the [trial court] erred when it failed to instruct the
         jury that they must find that the Intimidation of Witnesses
         counts amount to a Felony of the 1st Degree?

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      3. Whether the Trial Court erred when it sentenced [Appellant]
         for counts of Intimidation of Witnesses as felonies of the first
         degree, when a finding that such counts were felony 1 offenses
         was required to be made by the jury beyond a reasonable
         doubt?

Brief of Appellant at 6.

      Appellant first contends that the trial court erred when it granted the

Commonwealth’s motion to consolidate the case at No. 182 of 2021, charging

him with witness intimidation and/or improper interaction with victims and

witnesses, with the case at No. 942 of 2020, charging him with the underlying

offenses committed against L.W. The trial court's decision in this regard is

reviewable under an abuse of discretion standard, as this Court has

consistently held that whether “separate indictments should be consolidated

for trial is within the sole discretion of the trial court and such discretion will

be reversed only for a manifest abuse of discretion or prejudice and clear

injustice to the defendant.” Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 107 A.3d 206,

210 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations omitted). “Appellant bears the burden of

establishing such prejudice.” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Melendez–

Rodriguez, 856 A.2d 1278, 1282 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc )).

      The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure govern the joinder and

severance of offenses as follows:

      Rule 582. Joinder—Trial          of    Separate    Indictments      or
      Informations

      (A) Standards

      (1) Offenses charged in separate indictments or informations may
      be tried together if:

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J-S28039-23

      (a) the evidence of each of the offenses would be admissible in a
      separate trial for the other and is capable of separation by the jury
      so that there is no danger of confusion; or

      (b) the offenses charged are based on the same act or transaction.

      ***

Pa.R.Crim.P. 582(A)(1).

      Rule 583. Severance of Offenses or Defendants.

      The court may order separate trials of offenses or defendants, or
      provide other appropriate relief, if it appears that any party may
      be prejudiced by offenses or defendants being tried together.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 583. Under Rule 583, the prejudice the defendant suffers due

to the joinder must be greater than the general prejudice any defendant

suffers   when   the   Commonwealth's     evidence   links   him   to   a   crime.

Commonwealth v. Lauro, 819 A.2d 100, 107 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal

denied, 574 Pa. 752, 830 A.2d 975 (2003).

      The prejudice of which Rule [583] speaks is, rather, that which
      would occur if the evidence tended to convict [the] appellant only
      by showing his propensity to commit crimes, or because the jury
      was incapable of separating the evidence or could not avoid
      cumulating the evidence. Additionally, the admission of relevant
      evidence connecting a defendant to the crimes charged is a
      natural consequence of a criminal trial, and it is not grounds for
      severance by itself.

Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Collins, 703 A.2d 418, 422 (Pa. 1997), cert.

denied, 525 U.S. 1015, 119 S.Ct. 538, 142 L.Ed.2d 447 (1998)) (internal

citations omitted).

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      From these two rules, our Supreme Court established the following test

for deciding whether a court should join or sever charges:

      [1] whether the evidence of each of the offenses would be
      admissible in a separate trial for the other; [2] whether such
      evidence is capable of separation by the jury so as to avoid danger
      of confusion; and, if the answers to these questions are in the
      affirmative, [3] whether the defendant will be unduly prejudiced
      by the consolidation of offenses.

Collins, 703 A.2d at 422 (quoting Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491,

496–97 (Pa.1988)).

      Nevertheless, evidence of other crimes is admissible to demonstrate:

      (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a
      common scheme, plan or design embracing the commission of two
      or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one tends to
      prove the others; or (5) to establish the identity of the person
      charged with the commission of the crime on trial, in other words,
      where there is such a logical connection between the crimes that
      proof of one will naturally tend to show that the accused is the
      person who committed the other.

Commonwealth v. Janda, 14 A.3d 147, 156 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Morris, 425 A.2d 715, 720 (Pa. 1981)).

      Evidence of other crimes also may be admitted to demonstrate the

defendant's consciousness of guilt. Commonwealth v. Selenski, 919 A.2d

229 (Pa. Super. 2007), aff'd, 994 A.2d 1083 (Pa. 2010) (stating: “[T]he

offenses were properly consolidated, as evidence of the escape would be

admissible in the homicide trial to show the Defendant's consciousness of

guilt; evidence of the homicide would be admissible in the escape trial to show

the Defendant's motive for escaping...”).    “Additionally, evidence of other

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crimes may be admitted where such evidence is part of the history of the case

and forms part of the natural development of the facts.” Commonwealth v.

Dozzo, 991 A.2d 898, 902 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting Collins, 703 A.2d at

423).

        The above jurisprudence applies in the case sub judice. Here, the sexual

assault-related offenses were admissible to establish motive for the charged

witness intimidation—which allegedly began four days after the assault

charges were filed—and the witness intimidation offense was admissible to

show consciousness of guilt of the charged sexual assault.       Moreover, the

overarching timeline of events comprising the two charges would be

admissible at a trial at each docket to relate the complete sequence of relevant

events. See Rule 582, supra. Finally, unfair prejudice would not result, as a

jury could easily separate the evidence to the extent they involved distinct

allegations of conduct occurring on different dates and locations. Accordingly,

we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the

Commonwealth’s motion for joinder.

        In his remaining argument, Appellant addresses both his second and

third issues assailing, respectively, jury instructions to the intimidation of

witnesses charges and the legality of his sentences on those convictions. The

basis for each issue is Appellant’s contention that the trial court violated

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Apprendi and its progeny1 by instructing the jury that the most serious crime

the Commonwealth had charged him with was a felony of the first degree,

rather than allowing the jury to determine the most serious charges filed

against him. Appellant misconstrues the factual determination to be made by

the jury in deliberating on a witness intimidation case.

        When reviewing a challenge to a jury instruction, we review the charge

as a whole to determine if it is fair and complete. Commonwealth v. Lake,

281 A.3d 341, 347 (Pa. Super. 2022), appeal denied, 291 A.3d 333 (Pa. 2023)

(citing Commonwealth v. Postie, 200 A.3d 1015, 1026 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(en banc)). “The trial court commits an abuse of discretion only when there

is an inaccurate statement of the law.” Id. (citation omitted). “A charge is

considered adequate unless the jury was palpably misled by what the trial

judge said or there is an omission which is tantamount to fundamental error.”

Id. (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

1 In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490, 120 S.Ct. 2348, 147
L.Ed.2d 435 (2000) the U.S. Supreme Court found that the Sixth Amendment
requires a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt “any fact that increases the
penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum[.]” In other
words, “any fact that increase[s] the prescribed statutory maximum sentence
must be an ‘element’ of the offense [and] be found by a jury.” Alleyne v.
United States, 570 U.S. 99, 106, 133 S.Ct. 2151, 186 L.Ed.2d 314 (2013).
The U.S. Supreme Court applied this principle to a criminal statute that
increased the mandatory minimum sentence based on a finding that the
defendant “brandished” a firearm and concluded that “facts that increase the
mandatory minimum sentence are therefore elements and must be submitted
to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 117, 133 S.Ct.
2151.

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       In this Court’s recent decision in Lake, we clarified that “the factual

determination [required of a jury deliberating over a witness intimidation

charge] is whether the act of intimidation is connected to the particular

prosecution.” Id. at 350. We set forth the governing statutory scheme, and

explained that the statute’s focus is on the most serious crime charged, since

that is the one a criminal defendant attempts to escape by use of intimidation:

      The Crimes Code provides that when determining the grade for a
      conviction for Intimidation, the sentencing court must grade an
      Intimidation conviction according to the most serious crime that a
      defendant prevented a witness from reporting or testifying about.
      Of most importance to our analysis, however, is that the
      sentencing court must consider the charge that the
      Commonwealth filed against a defendant to determine the grading
      of the crime that the defendant prevented a witness from
      reporting. The statute does not require the sentencing court to
      consider whether the defendant is convicted of the underlying
      crime:

        (b) Grading.—

            (1) The offense is a felony of the degree indicated in
            paragraphs (2) through (4) if:

                                    ***

            (2) The offense is a felony of the first-degree if a
            felony of the first-degree or murder in the first or
            second degree was charged in the case in which the
            actor sought to influence or intimidate a witness or
            victim as specified in this subsection.

            (3) The offense is a felony of the second degree if a
            felony of the second degree is the most serious
            offense charged in the case in which the actor
            sought to influence or intimidate a witness or victim
            as specified in this subsection.

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            (4) The offense is a felony of the third degree in any
            other case in which the actor sought to influence or
            intimidate a witness or victim as specified in this
            subsection.

            (5) Otherwise the offense is a misdemeanor of the
            second degree.

      18 Pa.C.S. §§ 4952(b)(1)-(5) (some emphasis added).

Id. at 348–49.

      Lake then discussed the recent decision in Commonwealth v. Dixon,

255 A.3d 1258, 1264 (Pa. 2021), in which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court

held an Apprendi violation occurred because the jury instruction represented

the first time the jury learned that Dixon’s first-degree felony charge of

witness intimidation was connected to his attempt to suppress testimony in a

separate murder trial.    Initially, the Court observed that under Section

4952(b)(2), “if a defendant intimidated a witness from testifying at a trial in

which the Commonwealth had charged a defendant with a first-degree felony,

then the sentencing court is to grade the Intimidation conviction as a first-

degree felony. 18 Pa.C.S. § 4952(b)(2).” Id. at 350-51. Turning to the facts

before it, however, the Supreme Court noted that although defendant Dixon

was charged with intimidating a murder trial witness, the Commonwealth had

not presented at his trial any evidence about the charge brought at the

separate trial. It held, therefore, that this omission precluded the jury from

making the factual connection between Dixon’s act of Intimidation and the

first-degree felony charge prosecuted in his friend’s trial. Instead, it was the

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trial court that made the factual connection, which brought about the

Apprendi violation.

      Dixon   affords   Appellant   no   relief,   however,   for   its   facts   are

distinguishable from those in the case sub judice. Here, the record establishes

that the Commonwealth presented evidence to the jury that Appellant was

charged with first-degree felony sexual assault and thereafter attempted to

intimidate and influence his alleged victims and other prospective witnesses

to make statements that would result in his release. As such, this case comes

squarely under Lake, as jury was presented with facts connecting the act of

intimidation to a particular prosecution. Accordingly, Appellant’s Apprendi-

based challenge to the jury charge fails.

      Our disposition of Appellant’s second issue is likewise dispositive of his

final issue directed at the legality of his sentence.    “The defendant or the

Commonwealth may appeal as of right the legality of the sentence.”                42

Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(a). “A challenge to the legality of sentence is a question of

law; our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.”

Commonwealth v. Alston, 212 A.3d 526, 528 (Pa. Super. 2019).

            A claim that implicates the fundamental legal authority of
      the court to impose a particular sentence constitutes a challenge
      to the legality of the sentence. If no statutory authorization exists
      for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject to
      correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated. Likewise, a
      sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum is illegal. If a court
      imposes a sentence outside of the legal parameters prescribed by
      the applicable statute, the sentence is illegal and should be
      remanded for correction.

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Commonwealth v. Infante, 63 A.3d 358, 363 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

      “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the

penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be

submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”           Apprendi,

supra at 490, 120 S.Ct. at 2362-63, 147 L.Ed.2d at ––––.

      As discussed, supra, the Commonwealth presented to the jury a factual

predicate for the first-degree felony charge under Section 4952(b)(2), and the

jury found this and every other element to the charge proven beyond a

reasonable doubt. Consequently, because the Appellant’s sentence was within

statutorily prescribed legal parameters for a first-degree felony grade of

Intimidation of a Witness, Appellant’s challenge is without merit.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 10/24/2023

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