Court Opinion

ID: 9649921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:14:18.082701+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:46.020726
License: Public Domain

TAMILIA, Judge,
dissenting:
While I believe the analysis by the majority is correct up to the point where the Federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA) is discussed, I respectfully dissent from the majority in its finding the federal law requires relinquishing jurisdiction to North Dakota. The majority has overstated the implications of the Federal Act as to the facts of this case and attributes a fixed immutable jurisdictional override to all interstate (and by implication intrastate) custody actions.
I believe the majority is correct in stating the facts are not so clear that we may reverse the actions of the Columbia County Court in awarding custody to the father and that remand for further hearing on issues relating to significant contacts would clearly be in the children’s best interest. Having found that under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (UCCJA), 42 Pa.C.S. § 5341 et seq., Pennsylvania has at least colorable jurisdiction, and although reluctantly North Dakota has refused to entertain jurisdiction, no reading of the PKPA compels a finding that, despite a failure to address the jurisdictional issue, the PKPA requires this Court to address that issue and find as a matter of law that jurisdiction in Pennsylvania does not exist.
The majority cites no Pennsylvania cases which attribute such omnipotent attributes to the federal law that a per se finding of lack of jurisdiction under the facts of this case is required. The law espoused in other jurisdictions is at best evolving and relatively little assistance has as yet been *339forthcoming from federal authorities. There are two ways in which federal legislation may impact on causes of actions arising under state laws such as domestic relations law. The first and most intrusive is to preempt state jurisdiction and allow such matters to be tried in federal courts. Domestic relations, particularly divorce and custody matters since they frequently involve interstate parties and legal actions, provides a tempting target for the exercise of expansionistic federal policies. This is almost assuredly an approach which will not be taken as the federal judiciary is overwhelmed and seriously behind in its handling of civil and criminal cases. A recent study by the Federal Judiciary, chaired by Judge Joseph Weis, is recommending a serious reduction in federal jurisdiction in most criminal and some civil areas, thrusting these matters into the arena of the state courts.
The Supreme Court, when it has been called upon to address the issue of federal versus state jurisdiction in family matters, including custody and divorce, has exempted such proceedings from federal jurisdiction. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 16 L.Ed. 226 (1858). Despite the act of Congress giving apparent federal jurisdiction, many authorities and states reviewing this legislation have failed to apply the federal statute in an absolutist manner as would the majority. To do so creates a 180° reversal in the long progression of family law, in which the federal courts have wisely left decisions in family matters to the various state courts. The legislative notes accompanying the PKPA do not indicate a congressional mandate to deviate from that path. H. Clark, The Law of Domestic Relations in the United States (2d ed. 1987), discusses this problem:
If the possible conflicts between the PKPA and the UCCJA are not enough to warm the heart of the most technical of lawyers, there is always the question whether the federal courts have jurisdiction in custody matters by virtue of the PKPA. The “domestic relations exception” to federal jurisdiction is discussed in another section, in *340which are cited numerous cases in which the federal courts have expressed reluctance to decide custody disputes. The enactment of the PKPA provides another occasion for the debate over the “domestic relations exception”. In addition it raises the question whether the PKPA itself creates federal question jurisdiction over custody disputes as a way of resolving interstate conflicts. Although there is persuasive material in the legislative history of the PKPA to the effect that that Act was not intended to establish federal jurisdiction over jurisdictional conflicts between state courts in custody cases,98 some courts have held that where a state court has violated the PKPA by refusing to enforce the custody decree of another state court, a federal court has federal question jurisdiction to enjoin that violation and enforce the Act. Due to the obvious impact which the PKPA and UCCJA have upon the merits of custody decisions, the federal courts in these cases, may well have embarked upon a course which will involve them more deeply in the decision of custody conflicts than many judges will find desirable, and than the usual application of the “domestic relations exception” would permit. The extent of federal involvement in these cases could be reduced to some extent by the imposition of a requirement of the exhaustion of state judicial remedies before recourse to the federal courts.
*341Id. at p. 478 (emphasis added; footnotes 97 and 99 omitted).
This leads to the second basis upon which reliance may be placed on federal law to effect decisions in domestic relations matters. Relying on the supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution, a case can be made that once federal law or courts have spoken in matters relating to rights and procedures cognizable in state courts, federal law preempts the field and must be followed. This, however, is not a given, and to avoid undue stress in relation to state versus federal rights, federal law generally will not supersede state law except where state law has not provided an adequate remedy for protection of rights. This is generally recognized in the area of civil rights and criminal law. The pressure to intercede in civil matters and family matters, such as this case, is far less clear. The PKPA does make it clear that it is a companion act to the UCCJA and does not supersede it. Only when the UCCJA fails to provide for the rights which it intended to protect will the PKPA be applied. Since the federal courts have questionable jurisdiction in implementing the act, we must all proceed with caution in compelling the application of the act to state court jurisdiction under the supremacy clause.
The majority creates a mosaic of interlocking state decisions to reach the conclusion that Pennsylvania either lacked jurisdiction under the UCCJA or that despite jurisdiction arguably being present under that Act, provisions of the PKPA superseded the UCCJA to deny jurisdiction in Pennsylvania and vest it in North Dakota. The reasoning of the majority becomes too attenuated and esoteric in reaching its conclusions. North Dakota, in fact, declined any right it had to exercise jurisdiction, deferring to Pennsylvania. The majority acknowledges the record is inadequate to determine Pennsylvania was without jurisdiction in this case and more testimony is needed to determine whether the factual issue of maximum contacts test was met (Majority Op., at 329-332, 580 A.2d 324-325) but then turns to federal law to reach a different conclusion.
*342Since the effect of the PKPA is not clear, and federal decisions do not specify how far that law may deviate from the federal exception in domestic relations, we should not be too hasty to reject our previous holdings and in one fell swoop adopt a position which takes us to the furthest reaches of the federal law. A conservative Supreme Court could reasonably expect to limit the federal dominance in this area, which is traditionally relegated to the states. One of the clearest reasons for not applying the PKPA to an interstate case involving modification of an Order entered in a sister state is where the initial state declined to exercise jurisdiction. See UCCJA § 14. Clark addresses this issue in the following manner:
With advent of the UCCJA and the PKPA the analysis of the continuing jurisdiction problem has changed but the uncertainty and unpredictability of result in the case law has not been reduced. Although the problem was recognized by all who dealt with interstate custody, for some unexplained reason it was not explicitly covered by the UCCJA. The crucial section of that Act is section 1460 which provides that the custody decree of another state shall not be modified unless 1) the court of the other state does not presently have jurisdiction substantially in accord with the Act or has declined to exercise jurisdiction to modify, and 2) the court of this state does have jurisdiction. The language of this section must of course be construed with the statutory purposes in mind, particularly those purposes related to the avoidance of the relitigation of custody disputes and to the elimination of continuing controversies over custody. The Commissioners’ Comments to section 14 assert that in order to achieve those purposes petitions for modification must be submitted to the state rendering the initial decree so long as that state meets the requirements for jurisdiction imposed by section 3 of the Act. Unfortunately those requirements are often so difficult to apply to specific situations that the Commissioners’ precepts are not helpful in most instances.
*343The PKPA does have a provision explicitly defining the extent of continuing jurisdiction, but it just refers to the local law of the state which entered the decree, which of course now means the UCCJA.54
Id. at p. 482 (footnotes 51, 52 and 53 omitted).
Despite the fact the federal legislation was enacted to fill the gaps left by the UCJJA, and to overcome its inadequacies, significant problems are suggested by authorities following this legislation which could lead to greater confusion with no greater solutions than before. Clark goes on to say:
The cases decided since the enactment of PKPA exhibit the same ambivalence on the question whether jurisdiction continues after the custodian and the child leave the state. If anything, the injection of the PKPA into the continuing jurisdiction issue has amplified the confusion *344already evident under the UCCJA. The cases holding that the jurisdiction continues generally are based upon a technical reading of the PKPA. The cases holding that the initial jurisdiction did not continue follow the same pattbrn, although there is sometimes a tendency to make continuing jurisdiction turn on the continuance of the state as the child’s home state, a position which, as has already been stated, is not supported by the. language of the PKPA.
Id. at p. 485 (footnotes omitted).
Finally, I am very concerned that the majority passed over, without serious consideration, the factual aspects of this case to reach the jurisdictional issue when jurisdiction was never raised in the trial court or on appeal. The only issues presented to the trial court were the standard issues in matters of custody, that is, whether or not there was a change of circumstances and what was in the best interest of the children. On appeal, the complete statements of question presented is as follows:
1. The court made its decision who should get custody based on the principle of the best interests of the children.
a. When there is an existing custody order, whether the lower court should first determine if a substantial change in circumstances has occurred since the entry of an existing Order.
b. If the correct standard is best interests of the children, whether the lower court drew the proper inferences from the evidence presented when deciding which parent should get custody.
2. Whether the lower court made a thorough analysis of the evidence on which to base its decision regarding custody.
. 3. Whether the court had a full and complete récord on which to base its decision.
Brief for Appellant at p. 3.
The only request for exercise of North Dakota jurisdiction was to hold an evidentiary hearing to inquire into the *345fitness of the mother, because relevant witnesses were available in North Dakota and it would not have been cost effective to make such an inquiry in Pennsylvania (Brief for Appellant at pp. 47-48).
The one-year agreement by the mother to have the children reside in Pennsylvania raises serious question as to whether this type of custody case was within the contemplation of the drafters of the PKPA. The majority, in sua sponte injecting the question of jurisdiction and applying the PKPA to this case, in face of the refusal of the North Dakota court to assume jurisdiction and the requirement that the PKPA must follow state law, which would treat such action as a release of jurisdiction, creates an untenable basis for its decision. The PKPA does not apply in this case and its application in such a broad sweeping fashion as proposed by the majority is a dangerous precedent which will require its application in every interstate custody case in Pennsylvania, whether the facts warrant it or not. As such, it will immeasurably increase the complexity, not to mention the confusion which will be injected into these matters, when the most basic approach serves the interest of justice and the needs of the litigants.
I would decide the case on its merits or at most remand for further hearing on the relative fitness of the parents and the best interest of the children since the mother alleges, with some reason, she has had little opportunity to present her witnesses on that issue.
To certify this case to North Dakota under the theory espoused by the majority cannot be justified.

. Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Child and Human Development of the Committee on Labor and Human Resources, U.S. Senate, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. on S. 105 (1980), statement of Congressman Duncan, co-sponsor of the bill, at 19, 20, indicating a desire to keep federal interference in custody to a minimum. See *341also Coombs, Interstate Child Custody: Jurisdiction, Recognition, and Enforcement, 66 Minn.L.Rev. 711, 825 (1982).

- UCCJA § 14 reads: “(a) If a court of another state has made a custody decree, a court of this State shall not modify that decree unless (1) it appears to the court of this State that the court which rendered the decree does not now have jurisdiction under jurisdictional prerequisites substantially in accordance with this Act or has declined to assume jurisdiction to modify the decree and (2) the court of this State has jurisdiction.

 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(d) reads as follows: "(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant." Subsection (c)(1) of the section provides: "(c) A child custody determination made by a court of a State is consistent with the provisions of this section only if — (1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State;”.
The modification provision of PKPA is similar to that of the UCCJA. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1738A(f) reads as follows: “(f) A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same child made by a court of another State, if—
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination.”