Court Opinion

ID: 9579607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:56:41.611662+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:37.397018
License: Public Domain

Hall, Presiding Judge,
dissenting. I dissent from the holding that the evidence authorized a finding that the mother’s automobile was "a temporary substitute automobile” under the policy. The policy provides coverage for "A temporary substitute automobile,” which it defines as "any automobile . . . used with the permission of the owner ... as a substitute for the owned automobile . . . when withdrawn from normal use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.”
The evidence is uncontradicted that Godley was driving the automobile owned by his mother and insured by Phoenix. On January 15, 1966, the mother borrowed the automobile belonging to Godley and left her own automobile for the use of Godley. Godley testified that "She told me that she wanted to go to Albany, Ga. And my car was newer than her car, and in better shape. It had better tires and she asked me could she use my car to go and leave her car there.” Godley also swore in an affidavit in the previous trial "That the only reason he was driving his mother’s 1958 Chevrolet automobile on said 16th day of January, 1966, was because she had his 1963 Ford automobile with her on said trip and left her 1958 Chevrolet automobile at home for his use, in the event he needed to use it, while she was away from home using his 1963 Ford automobile.” Godley drove his mother’s car on January 16, 1966, when he had the accident. On this same day his mother was driving his car to Albany. A finding is demanded that his mother’s car was a substitute for his car and that his car was a substitute for his mother’s car and that neither car had been "withdrawn from use because of its breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction.”
*368A leading authority on insurance explains this type of policy provision as follows: "The standard policy presently extends protection to a vehicle temporarily used as a substitute for the automobile insured when the latter is withdrawn from normal use for specified reasons. These include such things as breakdown, repair, servicing, loss or destruction. The purpose is to extend a temporary protection, as distinguished from the replacement or transfer provisions of the policy, when such a contingency prevents the insured from making use of the vehicle he had protected by insurance, thus necessitating an emergency or temporary substitution. It is contemplated that the same use will be made of the substituted vehicle as would have been made of the one originally insured. Actualities, and not possibilities, determine whether an automobile is a substitute automobile within such a provision. If the vehicle insured can be operated, some overt act is required to prove its withdrawal from service. . 7 Appleman, Insurance Law and Practice 95, § 4293.5.
At this trial Godley further testified that he took his mother’s automobile home Saturday night, that on Sunday after he had cleaned up he intended to go to St. Marys to see a friend, and that he drove his mother’s automobile. He was then asked by his attorney "Why didn’t you use your pickup?” He testified "It had a tire going down. . .” In response to another question from his attorney, "And the truck was disabled?” He stated "Yes, sir.” This in no way conflicts with his previous testimony that he and his mother had exchanged automobiles and that her automobile was a substitute for his which was not disabled but was being used by his mother. However, if this latter testimony could be considered contradictory or equivocal, it is elementary hornbook law in Georgia that after verdict when a party, relying upon his own testimony to establish his claim, testifies contradictorily or equivocally, or gives more than one version of the matter, this court must adopt as his testimony that version most unfavorable to him. See cases collected and cited in Chandler v. Gately, 119 Ga. App. 513, 521 (167 SE2d 697); Southern R. Co. v. Hobbs, 121 Ga. 428 (1) (49 SE 294).
In my opinion, the evidence will not authorize a finding that his mother’s automobile was a temporary substitute for his truck. On *369the contrary, the evidence demands a finding that her automobile was temporarily substituted for his sedan which was not disabled nor withdrawn from normal use, but was in fact being driven by the mother on the day of the accident.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Jordan and Judges Eberhardt and Whitman concur in this dissent.