Court Opinion

ID: 9681934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:01:40.587296+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:36.677468
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
SMITH, Justice.
The Petitioner, Charles Satterfield, argues on motion for rehearing that we erred: (1) in holding that the Respondent, Jess Satterfield, was not a “guest” within the meaning of Article 6701b, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes, while riding in, but not operating, his own automobile; (2) in failing to pass upon the question of whether Petitioner was entitled to contribution from Respondent, Marshall; and (3) in holding that the Petitioner did not “properly preserve the point that the lower courts erred in ruling that the parties [Charles and Jess Satterfield] were engaged in a joint enterprise, as a matter of law.”
We have concluded that there is no merit to the first and third contentions. In addition to the authorities cited for our holding on the first contention, see Prosch v. Cater, 448 P.2d 380 (Ore.Sup.1968); Leonard v. Helms, 269 F.2d 48 (4th Cir.1959); 65 A.L.R.2d 312 (1959). We agree, however, that this court should pass upon the question of whether Petitioner was entitled to contribution from the Respondent Marshall. The question has been properly raised in the Courts below and in this Court. Petitioner contends that since the jury found Petitioner and Marshall to be joint tort-feasors, judgment should have been rendered in his favor, against Marshall, as provided in Article 2212, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes.1 We do not agree.
*461In his brief in the Court of Civil Appeals and in his application for writ of error, Petitioner simply states, without argument, that Article 2212, supra, provides for contribution between joint tort-feasors, and that since the jury found Petitioner and Marshall to be joint tort-feasors, Petitioner is entitled to contribution from Marshall.
We hold that Marshall is not a joint tort-feasor within the meaning of Article 2212, supra. In Patterson v. Tomlinson, 118 S.W.2d 645 (Tex.Civ.App.1938, writ ref’d), a very similar fact situation was presented. There, J. F. Paul, owner-driver of one vehicle had a collision with R. H. Patterson, owner-driver of a second vehicle. Plaintiff, a passenger in the Paul vehicle, brought an action and recovered a judgment against Patterson. In the same cause, Patterson brought a cross-action against Paul for contribution as a joint tort-feasor. The trial court instructed a verdict for Paul in the cross action. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed on the ground that since the charges of negligence against Paul were such as would establish only ordinary negligence, and that since Plaintiff could not recover against Paul because of Article 6701b, Vernon’s Annotated Civil Statutes, then no contribution could be recovered from Paul. The Court stated, in holding that Paul was not a joint tort-feasor within the meaning of Article 2212, supra:
“Since under the undisputed facts, viewed in light of the guest statute, Paul, the host driver of the car, is not liable to his nonpaying guest for damages for injuries sustained by her in the collision, he is not a joint tort-feasor, and is therefore not liable for contribution to appellant, who under the undisputed facts is alone liable to plaintiff for her injuries and damages sustained in the collision. To subject Paul to liability through contribution for his ordinary negligence would by indirection compel him to pay his guest for his ordinary negligence, in contravention of the provisions of the guest statute, which exclude recovery of the host for ordinary negligence.
“Nor do we sustain the contention of appellant that the guest statute was intended to apply only as between the host and the guest, and not as between the parties to an automobile collision in which the guest is injured. In attempting to sustain this contention, appellant cites Art. 2212, R.S.1925, which provides that joint tort-feasors equally guilty of negligence are entitled to contribution, one from the other; and that joint tort-feasors unequally guilty of negligence are not entitled to contribution, but that the one least negligent may recover of the one most negligent full contribution. The answer to this contention is our holding that a host driver is not liable to his guest for ordinary negligence, and is therefore not a joint tort-feasor. * * * ”
Although the facts in Patterson are not identical to the facts in Satterfield, the reasoning of the Court in Patterson is applicable. The trial court held that Petitioner and Jess Satterfield were engaged in a joint enterprise as a matter of law. As noted in the original opinion, Petitioner did not preserve this point for appellate review ; therefore we did not pass upon such point. As the record reaches us, then, Marshall can not be held liable to Jess Satterfield because of the doctrine of imputed negligence. Therefore, Marshall can not be held indirectly liable through contribution for damages for which he can not be held directly liable. Patterson v. Tomlinson, supra; City of Houston v. Watson, 376 S.W.2d 23 (Tex.Civ.App.1964, writ ref’d n. r. e.); American Cooperage Co. v. Clemons, 364 S.W.2d 705 (Tex.Civ.App. 1963 writ ref’d n. r. e.) ; City of Houston *462v. Selph, 356 S.W.2d 850 (Tex.Civ.App. 1962, no writ hist).
Petitioner’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
HAMILTON, J., dissents.

. “Any person against whom, with one or more others, a judgment is rendered in any suit on an action arising out of, or based on tort, except in causes wherein the right of contribution or of indemnity, or of recovery, over, by and between the defendants is given by statute or exists under the common law, shall, upon payment of said judgment, have a right of action against his co-defendant or co-defendants and may recover from each a sum equal to the proportion of all of the defendants named in said judgment rendered to the whole amount of said judgment. If any of said persons co-defendant be insolvent, then recovery may be had in propor*461tion as such defendant or defendants are not insolvent; and the right of recovery-over against such insolvent defendant or defendants in judgment shall exist in favor of each defendant in judgment in proportion as he has been caused to pay by reason of such insolvency. Acts 1917, p. 360.”