Court Opinion

ID: 8295104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-10-17 11:01:18.32432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:44:00.916665
License: Public Domain

LOCKEMY, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully dissent only as to the majority’s decision to affirm the trial court’s dismissal as to McNeil’s public policy discharge claim.
In South Carolina, an at-will employee may be terminated for any reason or no reason at all. Barron v. Labor Finders of S.C., 393 S.C. 609, 614, 713 S.E.2d 634, 636 (2011). Our supreme court recognized an exception to this doctrine in Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 337 S.E.2d 213 (1985). Under the “public policy exception” to the at-will employment doctrine, an at-will employee has a cause of action in tort for wrongful termination where there is a retaliatory termination of the at-will employee in violation of a clear mandate of public policy. Ludwick, 287 S.C. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216. Our supreme court has determined the public policy exception clearly applies in cases in which either: (1) the employer requires the employee to violate the law; or (2) the reason for the employee’s termination itself is a violation *196of criminal law. See id.; Culler v. Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op., Inc., 309 S.C. 243, 246, 422 S.E.2d 91, 92-93 (1992). These two situations seem to have been the sole focus of the trial court.
While the trial court and, to some extent, the majority, seem focused on only these two situations, our supreme court has made clear the public policy exception is not limited to only these situations. See Barron, 393 S.C. at 614, 713 S.E.2d at 637 (holding the public policy exception was not limited to situations where an employer requires an employee to violate the law or the reason for the termination itself is a violation of criminal law). In fact, in at least two cases our courts have reversed trial court grants of Rule 12(b)(6), SCRCP motions on wrongful termination claims based on the public policy exception because the allegations were novel and deserved further development of the facts. See Garner v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 318 S.C. 223, 226, 456 S.E.2d 907, 909 (1995); Keiger v. Citgo, Coastal Petroleum, Inc., 326 S.C. 369, 373, 482 S.E.2d 792, 794 (Ct.App.1997). In addition, our supreme court has also held that when there is a statutory remedy for wrongful termination, the public policy exception does not apply. See Barron, 393 S.C. at 615, 713 S.E.2d at 637.
Consequently, the public policy exception has developed beyond just a consideration of whether the termination was due to an employee refusing to violate the law or the termination itself was a violation of the law. Here, however, it appears the trial court only considered these two situations when it granted SCDC’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The trial court elucidated the basis for its decision in the following passage:
[McNeil] points to no violation of any statute or act by the General Assembly, but as stated above claims that her discharge was for “personal, pretextual and scapegoating purposes.” [McNeil] also points to no case in this state that has found a violation of public policy without a violation of a statute or act by the General Assembly. For these reasons, the Court finds that [McNeil] fails to allege a violation of a clear mandate of public policy.
The trial court failed to consider whether this case posed a novel issue and whether the facts should have been developed further. In addition, the trial court did not consider whether *197a statutory remedy for wrongful discharge justifying the dismissal of McNeil’s case existed. Although the trial court and the majority both mentioned the public policy exception is not limited to the two situations stated above, they noted no court has extended the public policy exception beyond them.
The majority relies heavily on Barron in affirming the trial court’s decision. Respectfully, I read Barron as making clear the public policy exception is not limited to situations in which an employee was required to break the law or the termination itself was a violation of the law. Further, Barron declares solidly that the decision of whether there was a violation of a clear mandate of public policy is a question of law for the court and not a jury. It is interesting that Barron makes a strong effort to clarify that the public policy exception is not limited to the two stated situations, yet the majority cites it while affirming a decision limited to those situations.
To be clear, I do not interpret our law as holding mere allegations of a termination of an at-will employee in violation of a clear mandate of public policy are sufficient to avoid the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. The court should permit the facts to be developed only when there is an issue that, based on guidance from previous cases, is sufficiently novel to at least permit some discovery before summarily dismissing the action. In this case, McNeil intimates that her compliance with a subpoena and testimony at a deposition angered SCDC. In her complaint, McNeil asserts she was terminated as a scapegoat to relieve legislative pressure on SCDC officials. She alleges she was terminated although SCDC knew she had done nothing wrong and had promoted her subsequent to the incident in question. McNeil has alleged enough to at least raise the issue of a retaliatory termination. The trial court held that even if her allegations were true, she did not state a viable cause of action for a violation of a clear mandate of public policy.
The majority decision, in upholding the trial court, seems to be based on the conclusion that McNeil must allege that she was required to break the law, that her termination was a violation of law, or that the facts of this case are identical to previous cases in this area. I do not interpret the law to be so limited. The issues raised by McNeil are sufficiently novel, and she deserves at least an opportunity to develop the facts. *198Obviously, the facts here are not the same as in Gamer or Keiger, but then again if they were then they would not meet the definition of novel. Indeed, both Gamer and Keiger involved different fact situations.
I would reverse the trial court as to this issue only and remand for further proceedings. This in no way implies any evidence has been presented that would justify a cause of action for termination in clear violation of public policy. Further, it could very well be that McNeil’s action is dismissed by summary judgment or some other action, but prior decisions by our courts hold she at least deserves an opportunity to develop the facts. Thereafter, the trial court, as is required, should make a ruling as a matter of law if the facts warrant the continuation of McNeil’s cause of action.
For the above reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.