Court Opinion

ID: 9739953
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:24:07.374087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:14.928377
License: Public Domain

CADY, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
I would conclude there was insufficient evidence to support the submission of punitive damages to the jury as a matter of law.
The legal standard for an award of punitive damages is clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence of conduct constituting willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety of another. Iowa Code section 668A.1 (1997). The majority concludes this standard was met through evidence concerning the error in filling the prescription, the prior reports of dispensing errors, and the failure to warn Shari or her doctors of the side effects of the drug, including the side effects of discontinuing the drug. I would conclude the evidence fell far short of our legal standard. It supports a finding of negligence, but not punitive damages.
Although there was evidence of thirty-four prior incident reports, there was no further evidence introduced at trial to evaluate the incident reports in the context of willful and wanton disregard for the *238safety of another. Tort standards do not require perfection, and thirty-four incident reports over a three-year period may be entirely acceptable within the industry. Shari presented no evidence to interpret the meaning of the number of prior incident reports.
The main reason offered by the majority for submitting punitive damages, however, is the evidence that Walgreen failed to warn Shari of the dangers of the misfilled prescription after they learned a mistake had occurred. I agree the failure of a pharmacist to warn of the dangers of a misfilled prescription after acquiring knowledge of the mistake constitutes, by itself, egregious conduct. However, it is undisputed in this case that Shari was under the care of a physician at the time Walgreen learned of the mistake, and Walgreen knew the physician had undertaken a course of treatment for Shari in response to the mistake. This removes the conduct from the realm of punitive damages.
A health care practitioner has a duty to provide care that a reasonable health care practitioner would provide in the same circumstances. See Wambold v. Brock, 236 Iowa 758, 764, 19 N.W.2d 582, 585 (1945). Inherent in this basic principle, however, is that it would be reasonable for a health care practitioner to rely upon another health care practitioner to also conform to this standard. In other words, the duty of a pharmacist to a customer does not change the nature of the relationship between the customer and the treating physician. Thus, it was reasonable for Walgreen to assume the physician would pursue a reasonable course of treatment in response to its mistake and the failure to warn under these circumstances falls far short of the standard of willful and wanton disregard for Shari’s safety. Walgreen knew Shari’s safety was in the hands of a medical doctor. Its conduct in failing to warn Shari or the doctor, under these circumstances, does not show a lack of care with disregard for the consequences. See Beeman v. Manville Corp., 496 N.W.2d 247, 255 (Iowa 1993). Furthermore, Walgreen did not try to cover up its mistake. See Tratchel v. Essex Group, Inc., 452 N.W.2d 171, 176 (Iowa 1990) (concealment supports punitive damages). This case is clearly distinguishable from the Burke case used by the majority to support its position.
A jury should not be permitted to consider punitive damages based on negligent conduct alone. This is true even if the conduct consists of multiple instances of negligence.