Court Opinion

ID: 9649128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:43:03.858748+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:07.919433
License: Public Domain

MANSFIELD, J.,
delivered the dissenting opinion.
Because I believe appellant was clearly entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of necessity and counsel was ineffective for failing to request such instruction, I respectfully dissent.
As set forth in the opinion of the majority, appellant was “arrested” by two civilian individuals, Brad and Don Hilliard, and forced to get into their truck. Appellant testified he was in fear of his life and attempted to escape by grabbing the nearest door handle. Donald Hilliard testified appellant threatened to kill them and subsequently grabbed the steering wheel and stepped on the gas pedal, causing the truck to crash into some gasoline pumps at a convenience store.1 No instruction as to the defense of necessity was requested and none was given. The jury found appellant guilty of attempted murder as charged in the indictment.
The court of appeals, agreeing with appellant’s assertion counsel was ineffective due to his failure to request a jury instruction on the defense of necessity, reversed appellant’s conviction. Young v. State, 957 S.W.2d 923 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1997).
The standards for testing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). First, the claimant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his counsel’s representation was deficient. Second, he must also prove that counsel’s deficient performance prejudiced his defense to such an extent as to deprive him of a fair trial, therefore resulting in a trial whose result is not reliable. Strickland, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. On appeal, scrutiny of counsel’s performance must be highly deferential; the reviewing court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s representation falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance, that is, counsel’s actions (or inactions) might be considered “sound trial strategy.” Strickland, supra, at 2065.
Turning to the present case, appellant testified his behavior which caused the Hil-liards’ truck to crash was in response to his being held captive by the Hilliards, which caused him to be confused and frightened for his safety. Testimony at trial does not establish clearly whether or not the “arrest” of appellant by the Hilli-ards was valid under Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, Article 14.01.
A defendant is entitled to an affirmative defensive instruction on every issue raised by the evidence, even if that evidence is weak, impeached or if the trial court finds it not believable. The defendant’s testimony alone may be enough to raise a defensive theory requiring a jury charge. Vasquez v. State, 830 S.W.2d 948, 951 (Tex.Crim.App.1992); Thomas v. State, 678 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tex.Crim.App.1984).
*841Appellant’s testimony at trial clearly raised the defensive theory of necessity.2 He was entitled to a charge as to this defense if he reasonably believed the conduct was necessary to avoid immediate harm; the harm sought to be avoided is clearly greater than the harm caused and; a legislative purpose to exclude the justification claimed does not otherwise plainly appear. Tex. Penal Code, § 9.22; Williams v. State, 680 S.W.2d 640, 642-643 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). Appellant, however, bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that counsel’s decision not to request a jury instruction as to the necessity defense could be considered sound trial strategy. Strickland, supra; Jackson v. State, 877 S.W.2d 768, 771-772 (Tex.Crim.App.1994).
The only vehicle by which the jury could give proper consideration to appellant’s testimony was an instruction as to the defense of necessity. Without such an instruction giving the jury an opportunity to consider this defense, conviction was a foregone conclusion. Young, 957 S.W.2d at 927, citing Vasquez, supra, at 951. Accordingly, I must agree with the court of appeals that the failure of counsel to request an instruction on necessity precluded the jury from factoring in appellant’s testimony he acted out of fear for his life, thereby depriving him of his only viable defense. I agree further that had the instruction been requested and given, the outcome of the trial might well have been different; therefore, the second prong of Strickland has been satisfied.
I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals. I respectfully dissent.

. The Hilliards, as well as appellant, were injured in the accident and were taken to a hospital.

. Appellant was outnumbered two to one. He testified the Hilliards “threw him” in the truck and refused to tell him where they were taking him. He testified further he was scared and felt his life was in danger. He finally testified that after they refused to let him out of the truck, he reached for the door to open it and jump out and that the collision with the gas pumps occurred during his struggle to open the door.