Court Opinion

ID: 9910695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-18 10:10:06.434454+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:51.092692
License: Public Domain

In the
        Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
         at Fort Worth
     ___________________________

          No. 02-23-00110-CR
          No. 02-23-00111-CR
     ___________________________

       MANUEL MATA, Appellant

                      V.

          THE STATE OF TEXAS

On Appeal from County Criminal Court No. 6
           Tarrant County, Texas
    Trial Court Nos. 1736671, 1736673

  Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Bassel, JJ.
  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Bassel
                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                  I. Introduction

      A jury convicted Appellant Manuel Mata of resisting arrest, search, or

transportation (resisting transportation) and of interference with public duties and

assessed his punishment in each case at 180 days in jail and a $2,000 fine. In two

issues,1 Mata argues that the evidence is insufficient to support his convictions.

Because the record, which includes body-cam footage, supports Mata’s convictions,

we affirm both judgments.

                                  II. Background

      A. Facts Related to the Interference-with-Public-Duties Conviction

      Officer Jose Palomares with the Fort Worth Police Department (FWPD)

testified that on the date in question he was off duty 2 but was working in uniform to

provide security for Community Crossroads on Hemphill Street in Fort Worth.

Officer Palomares explained that Community Crossroads is an outreach center that

provides formula, diapers, groceries, and clothing to people in need.          Officer

      1
        Mata filed two briefs—one for each of his convictions—and incorrectly used
No. 02-23-00110-CR to refer to the appeal from his conviction for interference with
public duties when the appeal for that conviction was filed in No. 02-23-00111-CR
and vice versa for his conviction for resisting transportation. The State responded by
filing a single brief that addresses both sufficiency challenges. For purposes of this
opinion, we will use the order of the appellate case numbers and will treat the
challenge to Mata’s conviction for resisting transportation as his first issue and the
challenge to his conviction for interference with public duties as his second issue.
      2
       Officer Palomares was later asked, “As a police officer, you are always on duty,
right?” He answered, “Yes, sir.”

                                          2
Palomares described the area around Community Crossroads, noting that there was a

Boys and Girls Club, a high school for pregnant teens, and Tarrant County MHMR

for youth. He explained that Community Crossroads often has people show up high

on drugs and that this is of particular concern because of the women and children

who come to the center and because of the youth who attend or visit the nearby club,

high school, and MHMR.

      On the morning in question, a man came inside Community Crossroads and

told Officer Palomares that he was afraid to go outside because he had been

threatened by an alleged drug dealer named Jay Fennell.3 The male explained that

Fennell wanted to beat him up and that Fennell had drugs on him at that moment.

Officer Palomares went outside and spoke to Fennell and captured the interaction on

his body-cam video.

      Officer Palomares asked the man who was seated beside Fennell to move to

another location and told Fennell to sit on the ground against the wall; both complied.

Officer Palomares was concerned that Fennell had drugs on him and received

Fennell’s permission to search him, but Fennell did not allow a search of his backpack

or his cooler. While Officer Palomares was conducting his investigation, a backup

officer arrived. Multiple people walked past the scene during the investigation, but

none of them interfered with the investigation.

      3
        The spelling used for the suspect’s last name in the reporter’s record is Finnel,
which differs from the spelling that Officer Palomares copied from the suspect’s
driver’s license. We use the spelling obtained by the officer.

                                           3
      Officer Palomares left the backup officer with Fennell and went back inside the

center to speak to the man who had reported that Fennell had threatened him. It

took a moment to find the man as numerous people were inside the center. After

Officer Palomares found him and started taking down his information, a woman came

up and told Officer Palomares that Fennell possibly had a fake weapon with him.

Officer Palomares returned outside to where Fennell was and called for a drug dog.

      Approximately fifty minutes into Officer Palomares’s investigation, Mata

approached the scene on a scooter. Mata initially rode past the officers but then

turned around and came back toward them. Officer Palomares’s body-cam video

shows that he told Mata,

      Do me a favor for your safety -- for your safety hang -- hang tight over
      there for me or on the other side. Do you understand what I’m telling
      you? Sir, we’ve got a guy with drugs here, sir. Sir, you cannot be in this
      spot. You can record over there.[4]

Instead of moving away, Mata rode his scooter up “[v]ery close” to Officer

Palomares, retrieved his phone (which was attached to a tripod), and placed it very

near Officer Palomares’s body camera. Mata stayed put and repeatedly asked for

Officer Palomares’s name and badge number. Officer Palomares warned Mata that

he would be arrested for interfering. Mata eventually parked his scooter several feet

away while stating that it would be illegal for Officer Palomares to arrest him. Officer

Palomares repeatedly told Mata that he had already asked him to move and that he

      4
        Officer Palomares testified that FWPD has a policy that anyone can film or
take pictures of police officers.

                                           4
needed to move away. Mata took a few steps forward toward Officer Palomares.

Officer Palomares ultimately handcuffed Mata and had to escort him to the ground

because he refused multiple commands to sit down. Throughout this time and while

they waited for additional officers to transport him, Mata cursed at Officer Palomares

and yelled that the arrest was illegal.

       Officer Palomares testified that Mata inserted himself into the investigation

with Fennell and that, as a result, he had to turn his back on Fennell—an action that

Officer Palomares described as being very dangerous for him—in order to deal with

Mata. Officer Palomares confirmed that Mata had interrupted, disrupted, impeded, or

interfered with his investigation because he had prevented Officer Palomares from

keeping an eye on Fennell.

       On cross-examination, Officer Palomares agreed that Mata had eventually

moved away, that Mata had taken about two steps forward toward the scene, and that

even then he was farther away from Fennell than a lady who was sitting on a concrete

abutment. Officer Palomares testified that there had been briefing regarding Mata, so

he was aware of who he was and that he filmed officers.

       B.     Facts Related to the Resisting-Transportation Conviction

       Officer Jake Smith with FWPD testified that when he and his training officer

(Officer Stroemer)5 arrived on the scene, Mata was sitting on the ground in handcuffs.

       5
        The officer’s name is misspelled in the reporter’s record; the correct spelling is
reflected on the officer’s badge in Officer Palomares’s body-cam video.

                                            5
Officer Smith, with his body camera recording, helped Mata to a standing position

and took him to the police vehicle so that he could be transported. While Officer

Smith was trying to get Mata from the ground to the vehicle, Mata was very agitated;

he repeatedly said, “Call your supervisor”; complained that his hands hurt; 6 and

cursed. Officer Smith said that he “had to walk with a purpose” to get Mata to the

vehicle because he was afraid that Mata would run off. As Officer Smith tried to get

Mata into the vehicle, “[t]here definitely was, like, some resistance [he] could feel,” but

at that point, he was not resisting arrest or transportation. Mata did say, “I’m not

going to cooperate.”

      As Officer Smith assisted Mata with getting into the police vehicle, Mata

continued to curse. Officer Smith testified that as he

       started to close the door, [Mata] positioned himself in a way that stopped
       [Officer Smith] from being able to. He physically used force with his
       feet to hold the door. And . . . when [Officer Smith] first went to shut
       the door, [he] had to stop [him]self because [he] didn’t want to hurt
       [Mata] with the door because he had pushed his feet and/or [was] using
       his feet and knee area to push the door open[]. [Officer Smith] had to
       open the door again and physically grab [Mata’s] legs and put them in
       the vehicle before [he] could secure the door.

Officer Smith explained that he could feel the pressure from Mata’s knee/shin area

pushing against the door, and that pressure stopped Officer Smith from being able to

      6
       Because Mata complained about the handcuffs, one of the arresting officers
and an EMS paramedic checked them. They found no issues.

                                            6
shut the door.7 During this time, Mata stated, “I’m resisting your illegal arrest.”

Officer Smith was questioned specifically regarding whether Mata had resisted

transportation:

      Q. When you were trying to . . . arrange for transportation, did [Mata]
      prevent you from doing that?

           A. Yes, sir. He prevented and made it much more difficult, but
      we were eventually able to get him in the vehicle and transport him.

             Q. Did he obstruct you from furthering that arrest and transport?

             A. Yes, sir.

             Q. How did he do that?

            A. By the way he put himself in that doorway and held the door
      open with his feet. And, obviously, having . . . multiple attempts to get
      him inside the patrol vehicle. It just made everything even longer, the
      whole circumstances.

              Q. When you put him back in the car the second time, did he
      resist again?

            A. Not the same way he did the first time. He still tried to get his
      body in the way, but then he moved[,] and we were able to shut the
      door.

             Q. And Officer Stro[e]mer was with you trying to further that
      arrest and affect that transportation; is that correct?

             A. That is correct.

             Q. So he was trying to resist your efforts; is that correct?

             A. That is correct.

      7
        Officer Smith said that he had to close the door to contain Mata, to lower the
threat level to others in the area, and to transport him to jail.

                                           7
             Q. And Officer Stro[e]mer’s efforts?

             A. That’s correct.

             Q. On an arrest that Officer Palomares initially made?

             A. That is correct.

      C.     Disposition

      After hearing the testimony and watching the officers’ body-cam videos, which

were admitted into evidence, the jury found Mata guilty of both charges. The jury

assessed Mata’s punishment in each case at 180 days’ confinement and a $2,000 fine.

The trial court sentenced Mata in accordance with the jury’s assessment.

                               III. Standard of Review

      In our evidentiary-sufficiency review, we view all the evidence in the light most

favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found

the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789 (1979); Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to

resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable

inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at

2789; Harrell v. State, 620 S.W.3d 910, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

      The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code

Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Martin v. State, 635 S.W.3d 672, 679 (Tex. Crim. App.

2021). We may not re-evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute

                                           8
our judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman, 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine

whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on the evidence’s cumulative

force when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Braughton v. State, 569

S.W.3d 592, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); see Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a

‘divide and conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the

evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved any conflicting inferences

in favor of the verdict, and we must defer to that resolution. Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at

608.

       IV. Sufficient Evidence Supports Resisting-Transportation Conviction

        In his first issue, Mata challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his

conviction for resisting transportation. Specifically, Mata argues that he applied force

against the door, not against Officer Smith; thus, Mata contends that there is no

evidence that he directed force at or in opposition to Officer Smith. As explained

below, the door was not an impenetrable barrier that precluded Officer Smith from

detecting the force that Mata directed at or in opposition to Officer Smith as he

attempted to close the door so that he could transport Mata to jail.

        Texas Penal Code Section 38.03 sets forth the offense of resisting

transportation:

        (a) A person commits an offense if he intentionally prevents or obstructs
        a person he knows is a peace officer or a person acting in a peace
        officer’s presence and at his direction from effecting an arrest, search, or

                                             9
      transportation of the actor or another by using force against the peace officer
      or another.

      (b) It is no defense to prosecution under this section that the arrest or
      search was unlawful.

Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.03(a)–(b) (emphasis added). The Court of Criminal

Appeals has defined “against” in Section 38.03(a) as “in opposition or hostility to”;

“contrary to”; “directly opposite”; “in the direction of and into contact with”; or “in a

direction opposite to the motion or course of.” Dobbs v. State, 434 S.W.3d 166, 171

(Tex. Crim. App. 2014) (quoting Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary 21 (10th

ed. 1996)). In essence, “using force against the peace officer or another” means

“violence or physical aggression, or an immediate threat thereof, in the direction of

and/or into contact with, or in opposition or hostility to, a peace officer or another.”

Id.

      Here, the information charged that Mata used “force against said peace officer,

namely by using force to keep his leg outside of a patrol vehicle or by using force to

push his leg outside of a patrol vehicle.” On appeal, Mata does not deny using force

but rather focuses solely on whether there is any evidence to show that the force that

he used was against the peace officer.

      Mata attempts to analogize his actions to those in Dobbs. As summarized in a

later opinion by the Court of Criminal Appeals,

      In Dobbs, the defendant held a gun to his own head and threatened to
      take his own life. Dobbs never pointed or threatened the officers with
      the gun. He did not use force against the officers—only against himself

                                            10
       to prevent the arrest. As such, [the Court of Criminal Appeals] held that
       Dobbs’s use of force did not constitute resisting arrest because he
       ultimately did not use force against the officers.

Finley v. State, 484 S.W.3d 926, 928 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (footnote omitted). The

facts in Dobbs are distinguishable from the facts here.

       Officer Smith testified to the ways that Mata opposed being transported to the

jail. The officers were unable to depart for the jail after putting Mata in the patrol

vehicle because Mata resisted having the door closed; Mata “physically used force

with his feet to hold the door” and used his “feet and knee area to push the door

open[].” Mata’s action was “in opposition or hostility to” Officer Smith’s attempts to

close the door and necessitated Officer Smith’s “physically grab[bing Mata’s] legs and

put[ting] them in the vehicle before [Officer Smith] could secure the door.” Although

Mata’s legs did not make direct contact with Officer Smith, Mata did exhibit “violence

or physical aggression[] . . . in the direction of and . . . in opposition or hostility to[] a

peace officer” when he used his legs to prevent the officer from closing the patrol

vehicle’s door. See Dobbs, 434 S.W.3d at 171. Mata’s actions thus met the Dobbs

definition of “using force against the peace officer”—the challenged element of his

resisting-transportation conviction. Cf. Thompson v. State, No. 09-96-022 CR, 1998 WL

428862, at *2 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 1998) (not designated for publication) (holding

that appellant’s continued forceful resistance of officer’s attempts to transport

appellant constituted “using force against the officer” because appellant “had to have

been exerting force against [the officer]—even if those exertions amounted only to

                                             11
digging in his heels and refusing to move”), pet. ref’d, 987 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Crim. App.

1999).

         At the end of his argument, Mata references the discomfort and pain that he

experienced while in handcuffs and contends that “[i]t is possible he was applying

force to the door as a way to deal with his pain.” Broadly construing his argument, it

appears that he is attempting to negate the intent element. Mata’s argument fails

because he ignores that he specifically stated his intent: “I’m resisting your illegal

arrest.” See generally Martin v. State, No. 09-19-00458-CR, 2022 WL 551140, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Beaumont Feb. 23, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(stating in sufficiency analysis of resisting-arrest conviction that “[j]uries may infer

intent from circumstantial evidence, such as the accused’s acts, words, and conduct”).

And though it would have been more accurate to have said that he was resisting

transport, the intent is still clear from the words that he used, and he demonstrated

that intent by using his leg to prevent the officer from closing the door. See Jackson,

443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Braughton, 569 S.W.3d at 608; Queeman, 520 S.W.3d

at 622 (requiring appellate court to view the evidence in the light most favorable to

the verdict and to presume that the factfinder resolved conflicting inferences in favor

of the verdict).

         Based on the record, there is sufficient evidence from which a rational trier of

fact could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Mata had used force against the

                                            12
peace officers as they attempted to transport him. Accordingly, we overrule Mata’s

first issue.

 V. Sufficient Evidence Supports Interference-with-Public-Duties Conviction

       In his second issue, Mata challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support

his conviction for interference with public duties. Within his second issue, Mata

raises a myriad of arguments, none of which wins the day.

       To establish the misdemeanor offense of interference with public duties, the

State must prove that the defendant, acting with criminal negligence, interrupts,

disrupts, impedes, or otherwise interferes with a peace officer “while the peace officer

is performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted by law[.]” Tex. Penal

Code Ann. § 38.15(a)(1), (b). Refusing to leave the scene when instructed to do so

and distracting an officer from performing his duty constitute interference under

Section 38.15. See Hernandez v. State, No. 07-22-00042-CR, 2022 WL 15334312, at *2

(Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Russell v. State, No. 02-20-00024-CR, 2022 WL 1043129, at *4 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth Apr. 7, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). However, “[i]t is a defense to prosecution under [Section 38.15] that the

interruption, disruption, impediment, or interference alleged consisted of speech

only.” Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.15(d).

       The misdemeanor information charged that Mata—acting with criminal

negligence—interrupted, disrupted, impeded, or interfered with Officer Palomares, “a

                                          13
peace officer who was performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted

by law, namely conducting a criminal investigation, by approaching [Officer]

Palomares and being belligerent in a manner that cause[d Officer] Palomares to stop

what he was doing and to engage with [Mata].” The jury charge instructed the jury

that if they found that Mata had committed the offense of interference with public

duties as alleged in the information and if they further found, or had a reasonable

doubt, that the interruption, disruption, impediment, or interference alleged consisted

of speech only, then they should find him not guilty.

      In his initial argument, Mata argues that Officer Palomares “was acting as an

off-duty security guard” whose “duty was to provide security, not to investigate drug

offenses.” To the extent that Mata’s argument can be read as challenging whether

Officer Palomares was a peace officer because he was off duty, Mata failed to object

to the jury charge, which instructed the jury that “J. Palomares is a peace officer.”

With regard to Officer Palomares’s duties, Mata contends that it was not within

Officer Palomares’s purview to investigate possible narcotics activities because he had

called for a narcotics officer with a drug dog to come to the scene. Mata’s argument,

however, ignores that a peace officer has a duty to prevent an offense within his

presence or view. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 6.06 (“Whenever, in the

presence of a peace officer, or within his view, one person is about to commit an

offense against the person or property of another, . . . it is his duty to prevent

it . . . .”). Moreover, on its face, investigating information about a potential crime—

                                          14
that a man, who is an alleged drug dealer and who is onsite with a possible weapon,

has threatened to assault another man—would normally fall within the duties of an

officer who stated that his role was “to provide safety[ and] security” in order to

maintain the safety and security of all those who were in and around the center. Thus,

Officer Palomares was “performing a duty or exercising authority imposed or granted

by law.” See generally Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 38.15(a)(1).

      Mata further argues that Officer Palomares was not conducting an investigation

at the time that Mata approached the center because Officer Palomares had called for

a narcotics officer to investigate. Mata cites to no authority for his contention, and

the facts belie it. Officer Palomares was the officer who received the tip as to Fennell

and took the lead in the investigation; Officer Palomares stated during the incident

that he had reasonable suspicion to believe that Fennell had drugs and possibly a gun.

Fennell, however, would not permit Officer Palomares to search his backpack or his

cooler, so Officer Palomares called for a drug dog. Officer Palomares was detaining

Fennell and was awaiting the arrival of the drug dog when Mata approached; thus, the

evidence reflects that the investigation was still in progress.8 And because of that, the

      8
       Officer Palomares was questioned about the investigation as follows:

      Q. Okay. So when you are dealing with this individual, possible drugs,
      possible weapons?

             A. Yes.

                                           15
record reflects that Officer Palomares and the backup officer sought to maintain an

implied perimeter around Fennell by asking those who lingered nearby to move.

      Mata argues, alternatively, that even if Officer Palomares were deemed to have

been conducting an investigation at the time that Mata arrived, Officer Palomares

failed to articulate to the jury how Mata had interfered with the investigation. Mata

             Q. What is the next logical step you want to do during this
      investigation?

            A. So now what I have done at that time is I have got a hold of a
      narcotics supervisor and asked --

             Q. Let me stop you right there. Did you want to search him?

             A. Yes, I do.

             Q. Did he allow you to search him?

             A. No, he did not.

            Q. Did he just give you a carte blanche, no, you can’t look at any
      of my stuff o[r] piece it out, you can look at some stuff, not the other?

             A. So when I asked him if I can search him, he said, [“]No, you
      can check me, but you cannot check my backpack or the cooler on my
      bike[,” which was] next to him.

             Q. During this time, were you conducting an investigation?

             A. Yes, sir.

            Q. Were you a peace officer performing a duty or exercising
      authority imposed or granted by law?

             A. Yes, sir.

                                         16
recognizes that Officer Palomares testified that Mata had come “within feet of him

and [had] asked for his name and badge number” but makes no mention that Officer

Palomares had instructed him multiple times to move to another location away from

the area where Fennell was being detained. Mata ignored repeated instructions and

came back towards Officer Palomares while shouting and being belligerent.9 Due to

Mata’s belligerent behavior, which was directed at Officer Palomares, Officer

Palomares had to take his attention off Fennell and deal with Mata.

      Mata next argues that the backup officer “was present and [was] able to

maintain control and supervision over [Fennell, who] was seated, compliant, and not

moving.” It is not for us to judge how many officers are necessary to detain a person

who is suspected of possessing drugs and possibly a weapon. We therefore do not see

how this argument helps Mata’s sufficiency challenge.

      Mata also contends that “[w]hat cannot be ignored is [FWPD’s] previous

interactions with [Mata].” Mata notes that FWPD had briefings with its officers

      9
        Mata’s brief includes a list of various actions that he never did—such as
stepping in Officer Palomares’s way, trying to speak with Fennell, etc. The list of
actions he did not take does not overshadow the fact that he did “com[e] back
towards” Officer Palomares despite numerous instructions to move away. Mata also
states in his brief that “another citizen unrelated to the supposed investigation was
actually closer in proximity to [Officer] Palomares than [Mata] during this interaction
that was deemed ‘interference’ [on his part].” The video reflects that an elderly
woman sat on the corner, that she obeyed when Officer Palomares told her not to
communicate with Fennell, and that she moved when Officer Palomares instructed
her to do so. Moreover, as explained below, Mata’s offense was not solely his
proximity to the detention area but rather his conduct while in close proximity to the
area where officers were detaining Fennell.

                                          17
discussing his filming activities and argues that is “why it only took [Officer]

Palomares about a minute and a half to make the decision to arrest [Mata].” Although

Officer Palomares mentioned at trial that he was familiar with Mata due to the

department’s briefings, on the video, he said, “I think I know who this guy is”; he

later said that he had heard of him before but that he had never run into him before.

But on the date in question, it was not Officer Palomares’s recognition of Mata but

rather Mata’s refusal to obey Officer Palomares’s repeated instructions—to move

away from the area—that led to Mata’s arrest.

      Mata’s brief references the fact that Fennell was ultimately released despite

having methamphetamine in his possession that day. 10 Mata implies that the offense

of interference with public duties requires the interfered-with investigation to produce

an arrest. The elements of the offense are listed above, and no such element exists.

Thus, the outcome of Fennell’s investigation in no way alters the outcome here in

which there is sufficient evidence that Mata interrupted, disrupted, impeded, or

interfered with a criminal investigation that Officer Palomares was conducting when

Mata arrived.

      Mata’s final argument is that he “merely used words and did nothing to

physically interfere with an investigation.” Mata’s attempt to fit within the defense to

      10
        On the body-cam footage, the narcotics officer explained that they had found
a personal-use amount of methamphetamine but that they believed Fennell had
information about some dealers in the area, so they wanted to transport him to
another location to gather information from him and then planned to release him.

                                          18
an interference-with-public-duties offense fails because the video reflects that he

physically interfered: he put his camera very near Officer Palomares, moved a few

feet away, and then came back towards Officer Palomares a second time, thus

disobeying Officer Palomares’s multiple commands to move to the other sidewalk to

film.

        Here, the jury had both Officer Palomares’s testimony, as well as his body-cam

footage, from which to discern whether Mata had interfered with public duties as

alleged in the indictment. Examining the aforementioned evidence in the light most

favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude that the jury could have determined

beyond a reasonable doubt that Mata—by his actions—interrupted, disrupted,

impeded, or otherwise interfered with Officer Palomares’s criminal investigation of

Fennell. See Lovett v. State, 523 S.W.3d 342, 345–46, 353 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth

June 15, 2017, pet. ref’d) (holding evidence sufficient to support interference-with-

public-duties conviction when appellant failed to disarm after being instructed to do

so by officers who were providing security for other officers who were nearby

performing a traffic stop); Poole v. State, No. 12-06-00290-CR, 2007 WL 2782746, at

*1, *3 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept. 26, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (holding evidence sufficient to support interference-with-public-duties

conviction when officer, who was stationed in front of a residence where a search

warrant was being executed, told appellant to continue on to another residence or to

leave the scene, appellant cursed at the officer and told him that he would go where

                                          19
he wanted to go, and then appellant aggressively started moving toward another

officer); Key v. State, 88 S.W.3d 672, 676 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, pet. ref’d) (holding

evidence sufficient to support interference-with-public-duties conviction when

appellant repeatedly stepped off the sidewalk after officers told him to remain on the

sidewalk). Accordingly, we overrule Mata’s second issue.

                                  VI. Conclusion

      Having overruled Mata’s two issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgments.

                                                    /s/ Dabney Bassel

                                                    Dabney Bassel
                                                    Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: December 14, 2023

                                         20