Court Opinion

ID: 9956958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-03 15:02:11.206731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:01.339089
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 23-1881
                         ___________________________

                             United States of America

                                       Plaintiff - Appellee

                                         v.

                                Jake Hunter Brown

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
                   for the Eastern District of Arkansas - Central
                                  ____________

                          Submitted: December 11, 2023
                              Filed: April 3, 2024
                                 [Unpublished]
                                 ____________

Before ERICKSON, MELLOY, and STRAS, Circuit Judges.
                          ____________

PER CURIAM.

      Jake Hunter Brown pled guilty to carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119.
At sentencing, the district court 1 varied upwards from Brown’s advisory Sentencing

      1
       The Honorable James M. Moody, Jr., United States District Judge for the
Eastern District of Arkansas.
Guidelines range sua sponte and sentenced him to 300 months of incarceration.
Brown challenges the district court’s upward variance, and we affirm.

        When reviewing “the imposition of sentences, whether inside or outside the
Guidelines range, we apply ‘a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.’” United
States v. Feemster, 572 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v.
Hayes, 518 F.3d 989, 995 (8th Cir. 2008)). “A sentencing court abuses its discretion
if it fails to consider a relevant factor that should have received significant weight,
gives significant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or considers only the
appropriate factors but commits a clear error of judgment in weighing those factors.”
United States v. Watson, 480 F.3d 1175, 1177 (8th Cir. 2007). A defendant’s
disagreement with the district court’s balancing of relevant sentencing
considerations, however, does not amount to an abuse of discretion. United States
v. Hogue, 66 F.4th 756, 766 (8th Cir. 2023).

       Brown asserts the district court’s reasons for varying upwards were already
accounted for in his Sentencing Guidelines calculation, so the court afforded those
factors improper weight by considering them twice. In particular, he contends his
alleged use of a firearm during the instant offense and his criminal history were
factored into his Sentencing Guidelines calculation, increasing the top end of his
sentencing range from 37 months to 150 months.

       Brown first asserts the district court erred when it relied on the information in
the Presentence Investigation Report (“PSIR”) describing his use of a firearm.
Although Brown later insisted that he never shot anyone, he raised the issue only
after the district court accepted the uncontested facts in the PSIR and announced its
sentence. His objection was too late. See United States v. Lindsey, 827 F.3d 733,
738 (8th Cir. 2016). Because Brown failed to timely object to the facts in the PSIR,
the district court was permitted to rely on the uncontested facts when considering a
variance. See United States v. Cloud, 956 F.3d 985, 987 (8th Cir. 2019) (citing
United States v. Zayas, 758 F.3d 986, 990 (8th Cir. 2014)). Nor did Brown object to

                                          -2-
application of the firearm enhancement, waiving any argument on its applicability.
See United States v. Harrison, 393 F.3d 805, 806 (8th Cir. 2005).

       Brown also contends the district court improperly considered his criminal
history because this factor was already accounted for in the Sentencing Guidelines
calculation. Brown’s criminal history score amounted to 26 points, which is twice
the amount required for placement into the highest criminal history category. Even
so, factors already considered when calculating a defendant’s Sentencing Guidelines
range can form the basis for a variance. See United States v. David, 682 F.3d 1074,
1077 (8th Cir. 2012) (affirming the sentencing court’s reliance on the defendant’s
prior convictions as a reason for varying upwards).

       Here, the district court detailed its bases for varying upwards and discussed
the most relevant § 3553(a) factors that weighed into its sentence determination. In
doing so, the district court emphasized three main reasons for its sentence, which
included: (1) Brown’s lengthy and unabated criminal history beginning at age 17;
(2) Brown’s decision to shoot someone in the head, which the court characterized as
“an attempted murder for the sake of stealing a car”; and (3) Brown’s mental health
history in conjunction with his statement that he can control his anger if he wants to
but he just doesn’t want to because he “like[s] messing with people.” In conclusion,
the district court reiterated that an above-Guidelines sentence was warranted because
the applicable Sentencing Guidelines did not account for the fact that Brown “almost
killed somebody by putting a gun to somebody’s temple in reckless disregard of
life.”

      Because the district court neither abused its sentencing discretion nor imposed
a substantively unreasonable sentence when it decided to impose a variant sentence,
we affirm the judgment of the district court.
                       ______________________________

                                         -3-