Court Opinion

ID: 8034228
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-09 03:18:54.573448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:37:04.365542
License: Public Domain

Shepherd, District Judge,
dissenting.
Because of the following, I dissent from the majority opinion.
Shippers and feeders commonly handle more or less diseased stock, not of intention, but because it cannot be avoided — stock infected with cholera, tuberculosis and other-communicable diseases. One hundred and fifty carloads, a year through a narrow runway on a man’s farm expose him to no small risk through danger of infection to his own stock. Cattle, horses and hogs go eagerly to smell and to-lick the fencing along such a runway. The runway in question permits the lessee, not only to drive away upon it for shipment by the Missouri Pacific, but to bring in by it for feeding from 100 points accessible by the county highways. Is Hall’s injury in this particular reparable because he may sue Bowers at law when his cattle fall sick from such a cause? And must he incur the hazards of proof in a law action time after time as loss occurs, when the danger is at all times obvious and when he might have complete relief by a single suit in equity? The very question suggests a negative answer. Used as it is, this runway decreases the salable value of plaintiff’s place by many hundreds of dollars, though no doubt such a use was never thought of when the land 'was condemned. In addition to this, he has been postponed In his prior acquired right of crossing to the present privilege now granted to the defendant — in his access from one part of his farm to another, given him long before by the company. It seems to the writer that it is being blind to the evidence and to patent conditions to dismiss Hall’s damage with the statement that it is neither special nor irreparable. Hitherto it has been widely accepted as elementary that what is improper and illegal, except in certain cases of special and peculiar character, may be restrained without reference *627to the degree of injury involved. The plaintiff may have a penchant for disagreement with his friends and neighbors, though this appears rather by statement of counsel than by the record; but, even so, he should not be stripped of his legal rights as he stands before the court.
With due regard for the views of the majority, the pronouncement that the railroad company may use its right of way in any manner beneficial to it or to its patrons is much too strong. It not. only extends the power of railroad companies over their right of way far beyond the bounds heretofore established by our decisions, but it creates in substance a new estate almost as desirable as an estate in fee simple. Under and by virtue of power derived from condemnation, as recognized by the opinion, a railroad might construct a speedway for motor vehicles upon its right of way, or for a valuable consideration commit the right to do so to third parties. And hardly could it be enjoined if a nuisance were there maintained in that connection. The point is, we are abandoning the old ground that railroads may condemn and use their right of way only for such things as are naturally incident to operating a railroad, and going to a doctrine which has little support in logic and which promises many difficulties.
I think that the power which the company asshmed to exercise in giving Bowers a right to build a private cattle road upon Hall’s farm was a power which it did not possess. As before stated, nothing of the kind was contemplated on original condemnation or considered in the award of damages. Yet, from the simple easement acquired for railroad purposes, the company proceeded to carve out and convey a leasehold estate, i. e., to grant Bowers this private way for his stock over his neighbor’s land. If power to do a thing of this kind is within the powers of rail-' roads generally, why should they be troubling themselves in these latter days to get deeds to ground long ago condemned by them for right of way?
Perhaps giving Bowers a privilege so- valuable (he tes-? *628tifies that it is worth $5,000 year to him) was not strictly a rebate, but it was a buying of his shipping business, and practically tantamount thereto. ■ It was, in the opinion of the writer, an undue and unreasonable preference such as the law prohibits. Comp. St. 1922, sec. 5510; sections 5440 and 5509 of said statutes, as amended by chapter 160, Laws of 1923, and chapter 164, Laws 1925. “Under the law in this state, a railroad company or other common carrier may not exchange transportation for services or property by way of barter, uniformity of charge- being required.” State v. Union P. R. Co., 87 Neb. 29. This transaction between the Missouri Pacific and Bowers was a barter by which in effect the latter secured a reduction in his shipping charges. This court stated in State v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 112 Neb. 248, that at common law a carrier of goods or passengers was under no obligation to treat all persons equally, but might grant one individual an unreasonably low rate or even carry for him without making any charge whatever. But it concluded in said case, in view of section 7, art. X of the Constitution, providing that.the legislature shall pass laws to correct abuses and prevent unjust discrimination by telegraph and railroad companies in Nebraska, that such power on the part of common carriers has been taken away. The case will be remembered as the suit brought to prohibit railroads from giving transportation to ministers. The favor granted to Bowers should not receive the sanction of the court.
The opinion, I am quite sure, does some violence to fundamental rules of pleadings. As clearly presented in the argument of plaintiff, the general denial filed by the defendant was not sufficient to entitle him to show the lease which he obtained from the company after the commencement of the case at bar. If he desired to defend upon this lease — and without it he would have been without any defense whatever — it was incumbent upon him to plead it, just, as the maker of a note is required to plead payment if he would avail himself of that defense 'in a suit upon *629said note. And the objection of “incompetent” to the offer of said lease upon trial was enough to exclude it, unless we go upon the subversive theory that the one at fault is to have more tender consideration at the hands of the court than the one who is without blame. So far from requiring the party to particularize his objection, it would seem more reasonable to oblige the trial court to inquire as to the specific end to be reached by the general objection of “incompetent” before the objector is to be deprived of any exception which he is entitled to under the broadest meaning of the term. The matter is of much importance to the plaintiff in this case, but it is of far greater importance in its effect upon rules of constant application.
For these reasons, I consider the majority opinion unsound, and think that the decision should be in favor of the appellant, and that he should be awarded the relief prayed.