Court Opinion

ID: 9965626
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-02 21:05:29.538856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:18.678332
License: Public Domain

NOTICE                2024 IL App (4th) 230614-U
This Order was filed under
                                                                                FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is             NO. 4-23-0614                          May 1, 2024
not precedent except in the                                                    Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed                                              4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).
                                 IN THE APPELLATE COURT                          Court, IL

                                         OF ILLINOIS

                                      FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                        )      Appeal from the
           Plaintiff-Appellee,                              )      Circuit Court of
           v.                                               )      Sangamon County
JEROME H. WALLACE,                                          )      No. 19CF268
           Defendant-Appellant.                             )
                                                            )      Honorable
                                                            )      Raylene D. Grischow,
                                                            )      Judge Presiding.

                JUSTICE TURNER delivered the judgment of the court.
                Justices Zenoff and DeArmond concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1     Held: Defendant was not denied his right to a fair trial and sentencing hearing.

¶2              In March 2019, the State charged defendant, Jerome H. Wallace, by information

with three counts of delivery of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 2018)) and

one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance (720 ILCS 570/402(c) (West 2018)).

After a September 2022 trial, a jury found defendant guilty of one count of delivery of a

controlled substance and one count of unlawful possession of a controlled substance. Defendant

filed a timely posttrial motion and later amended the motion to include an argument the

prosecutor made an improper statement regarding the constitution in his rebuttal closing

argument. At a joint December 2022 hearing, the Sangamon County circuit court denied

defendant’s amended posttrial motion and sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of eight

years for delivery of a controlled substance and two years for unlawful possession of a controlled
substance. Defendant filed a timely motion to reconsider his sentence, which the court denied in

June 2023.

¶3             Defendant appeals, contending he was denied his right to a fair (1) trial because of

an improper statement by the prosecutor in rebuttal closing argument and (2) sentencing hearing

because the trial court considered the harm to society inherent in the delivery of a controlled

substance as a factor in aggravation. We affirm.

¶4                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶5             Count I of the information alleged, on March 14, 2019, defendant knowingly and

unlawfully possessed with the intent to deliver less than one gram of a substance containing

cocaine. Count II asserted defendant committed the same actions on March 15, 2019, and count

III alleged the same for March 20, 2019. Count IV charged, on March 20, 2019, defendant

knowingly had in his possession less than 15 grams of a substance containing cocaine.

¶6             In September 2022, the trial court held a jury trial on the aforementioned charges.

In the prosecutor’s opening statement, he explained how law enforcement conducted controlled

purchases of drugs and used confidential informants. He indicated the “confidential informant”

in this case was not expected to testify. In her opening statement, defense counsel noted the

State did not have a “confidential” informant to show the jury. She indicated no one would

testify they bought drugs from defendant.

¶7             The State presented the testimony of the following individuals: (1) Lynn Evans,

an employee of the Sangamon County Sheriff’s Office; (2) Lee Rowden, a detective for the

Sangamon County Sheriff’s Office; (3) Stacey Komnick, a detective for the Sangamon County

Sheriff’s Office; (4) Nicholas Waters, a former correctional officer at the Sangamon County jail;

(5) Devon Birks, an investigator for the Sangamon County Sheriff’s Office; (6) Patrick

                                                -2-
McMasters, a detective for the Sangamon County Sheriff’s Office; and (7) Joshua Stern, a

scientist with the Illinois State Police Forensic Laboratory. Defendant did not present any

evidence.

¶8             Detective Rowden gave an in-depth description of the use of confidential

informants in apprehending drug dealers. In late January 2019, he registered an informant

named Nikita Feig. At that time, Feig had recently been arrested for possession of a controlled

substance. From March 14, 2019, to March 20, 2019, Feig assisted in a series of controlled buys

targeted at defendant. Feig had chosen defendant as the target. She arranged the meetings

between her and defendant. Detective Rowden also testified Feig was paid $50 for each

controlled buy and he believed her possession of a controlled substance charge was dismissed.

¶9             On March 14, 2019, Detective Rowden met with Feig before the first controlled

buy. She arrived at the meeting place by car, and Detective Rowden searched both her and her

car for any controlled substance. He did not find any. Detective Rowden provided Feig with

$40 or $50 in cash, which was official advanced funds, and placed a video recording device on

an article Feig could carry. Feig drove away, and Detective Rowden followed her. Feig parked

at a strip mall, and Detective Rowden continued to keep Feig under surveillance. Eventually, a

blue Chevrolet sedan arrived and parked next to Feig’s vehicle. Feig exited her vehicle and got

into the driver’s side rear seat of the blue Chevrolet. Detective Rowden could only tell the driver

was a black male. He was unable to positively identify the driver. Feig was in the car for about

a minute and then returned to her car. Both vehicles drove away, and Detective Rowden kept

Feig under surveillance as she drove to their designated meeting place. There, Feig gave him

approximately a half gram of crack cocaine that was not packaged. Detective Rowden again

searched Feig’s person and vehicle and found no controlled substances. Detective Rowden later

                                               -3-
reviewed the video for the controlled buy. The video accurately showed the day’s events but did

not capture the controlled buy because the camera was not pointed in the correct direction.

¶ 10           The second controlled buy was planned for March 15, 2019. The same events

took place on that day as well. However, when Detective Rowden and Feig were at their

meeting spot, Feig received communication from defendant. Feig left the strip mall and went to

a residence on South 17th Street. There, Feig parked in the driveway, and a person fitting

defendant’s description approached the passenger side of the vehicle. Detective Rowden could

observe the person but could not make a positive identification due to his distance from Feig’s

vehicle. The person leaned into the passenger side of Feig’s vehicle and appeared to make an

exchange. The person then went back into the residence but immediately returned to Feig’s

vehicle and entered the passenger side. Feig drove the person to the 1900 block of South 19th

Street, where she stopped the vehicle. Detective Rowden testified defendant lived in the 1900

block of South 19th Street in March 2019. There, the person exited the vehicle and walked in the

roadway. Feig drove away and went to the prearranged meeting spot. There, Detective Rowden

received the crack cocaine and recording device from Feig. Detective Rowden kept Feig under

surveillance the entire time. Like the day before, the video did not capture the controlled buy.

¶ 11           A third controlled buy was set for March 20, 2019. With this buy, the plan was to

stop defendant’s vehicle after the controlled buy. Feig again made the arrangements for the

controlled buy. On March 20, 2019, Feig arrived on foot. The same protocols were followed,

except there was no vehicle to search. This time Feig waited on foot in front of a store. A silver

Tahoe arrived, which was occupied by two black males. Feig entered the vehicle through the

rear passenger door. Detective Rowden testified Feig was in the vehicle for about a minute and

the vehicle immediately left upon her exit. Detective Komnick was responsible for maintaining

                                               -4-
surveillance of the Tahoe, and Detective Rowden met with Feig, who gave him crack cocaine

and the video recording equipment. The trial court admitted four still photographs from the

recording on March 20, 2019, and Detective Rowden identified defendant in one of the

photographs. Moreover, the video recordings of all three controlled buys were played for the

jury. Those videos lacked an audio component.

¶ 12           After meeting with Feig, Detective Rowden went to the location where Detective

Komnick had stopped the Tahoe. He identified Terrance Wallace as the driver of the vehicle and

defendant as the front passenger. Detective Rowden found the official advanced funds provided

to Feig on March 20, 2019, in defendant’s coat pocket. A crack pipe and cocaine were later

recovered from defendant’s person. Additionally, a cell phone was located in the Tahoe.

Detective Rowden called the number that had been used in the narcotics transactions, and the cell

phone rang. Defendant’s face was also the background photograph on the cell phone. No drugs

were found in the Tahoe.

¶ 13           The State also played a recording of a call defendant made to a female from the

Sangamon County jail on March 20, 2019. Defendant stated “Nikita” twice and also stated

“Brent, white car.” Detective Rowden testified Feig drove a white car at the time and had dated

a man named Brent.

¶ 14           Birks testified his job responsibilities included serving subpoenas. He explained

he needed to have face-to-face contact with the person to whom he was serving the subpoena. A

few weeks before trial, Birks had been asked to locate Feig. Defense counsel objected to the

testimony asserting it was irrelevant. The prosecutor argued defense counsel had been calling

into question the State’s efforts to have Feig testify at defendant’s trial and believed defense

counsel would argue her absence created reasonable doubt. The trial court allowed Birks to

                                                -5-
testify over defense counsel’s objection. Birks testified he was able to speak to Feig’s mother,

who provided him with a telephone number for Feig. Birks called the telephone number, and a

female answered. The female was very agitated he had called. Birks explained to her what she

needed to do, and the female was adamant not to call her anymore. She noted “that was in the

past” and she wanted nothing to do with this case. Birks believed the female was Feig. Birks

was never able to serve Feig with a subpoena and believed he had utilized every tool he could to

serve her.

¶ 15           Stern testified all of the substances recovered from the three controlled buys and

the one substance recovered from defendant’s person were tested and each one was found to be

less than a gram of a chunky substance containing cocaine.

¶ 16           During closing arguments, defense counsel questioned Feig’s absence from

defendant’s trial and argued that created reasonable doubt. She also asserted defendant never got

his constitutional right to confront Feig. Defense counsel explained defendants have a

constitutional right to confront their accuser and contended the State did not think defendant was

worthy of that right. In rebuttal, the prosecutor contended defense counsel wanted the jurors to

believe the law was something it was not. He further told the jury they would not hear anything

about the constitutional right to confrontation and noted that was something for a judge to

decide. The prosecutor then told the jury they did not need to worry about the constitution.

Defense counsel did not object to the rebuttal argument.

¶ 17           At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found defendant guilty of delivery of a

controlled substance on March 20, 2019, and unlawful possession of a controlled substance but

not guilty of delivery of a controlled substance on March 14, 2019, and March 15, 2019.

¶ 18           On October 25, 2022, defendant filed a motion for acquittal or, in the alternative,

                                               -6-
a motion for a new trial. In December 2022, defendant filed an amended posttrial motion, which

argued, among other things, the prosecutor’s statement regarding the constitution in his rebuttal

closing argument was improper. At the beginning of the hearing on December 28, 2022, the trial

court addressed defendant’s amended posttrial motion. After hearing the parties’ arguments, the

court denied defendant’s amended posttrial motion. The court then proceeded to defendant’s

sentencing hearing. The parties agreed the delivery of a controlled substance count was a Class

2 felony (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 2018)), was probation eligible, and the applicable prison

sentencing range was 3 to 14 years (730 ILCS 5/5-4.5-35(a), 5-8-2(a), 5-5-3.2(b)(1) (West

2018)). In sentencing defendant to concurrent prison terms of eight years for delivery of a

controlled substance and two years for possession of a controlled substance, the court agreed

with the State’s assessment of the factors in aggravation and stated the following: “I did too note

his conduct threatened serious harm, and while there was no actual physical harm, I did consider

the drug dealing in the community and the effect that it has on individuals in our community.”

¶ 19           On January 8, 2023, defendant filed a motion to reconsider his sentence, asserting

his sentence was excessive and the trial court failed to accord sufficient weight to the applicable

mitigating factors, including defendant’s conduct did not cause or threaten serious physical harm

and defendant did not contemplate his conduct would cause or threaten serious physical harm.

At a June 16, 2023, hearing, the court denied defendant’s motion to reconsider his sentence.

¶ 20           On July 11, 2023, defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, but it did not comply

with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 606 (eff. Mar. 12, 2021). On August 8, 2023, defendant filed a

timely motion for leave to file an amended notice of appeal, which this court allowed. See Ill. S.

Ct. R. 606 (eff. Mar. 12, 2021); R. 303(b)(5), (d) (eff. July 1, 2017). The August 10, 2023,

amended notice of appeal complied with Rule 606. Thus, this court has jurisdiction of

                                                -7-
defendant’s appeal under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 603 (eff. Feb 6, 2013).

¶ 21                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 22                                    A. Closing Argument

¶ 23           Defendant first argues he was denied his right to a fair trial due to a prosecutorial

statement during closing arguments. He recognizes he did not preserve the error for review and

requests this court review the matter under the plain-error doctrine (Ill. S. Ct. R. 615(a) (eff. Jan.

1, 1967)). Defendant also contends trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by not objecting

to the prosecutor’s improper statement.

¶ 24           The plain-error doctrine permits a reviewing court to consider unpreserved error

under the following two scenarios:

               “(1) a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is so closely balanced that

               the error alone threatened to tip the scales of justice against the defendant,

               regardless of the seriousness of the error, or (2) a clear or obvious error occurred

               and that error is so serious that it affected the fairness of the defendant’s trial and

               challenged the integrity of the judicial process, regardless of the closeness of the

               evidence.” People v. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d 166, 189, 940 N.E.2d 1045, 1058

               (2010).

¶ 25           With a plain-error analysis, the reviewing court first determines whether any error

occurred at all. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d at 189, 940 N.E.2d at 1059. If error did occur, this court

then considers whether either of the two prongs of the plain-error doctrine has been satisfied.

Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d at 189-90, 940 N.E.2d at 1059. Under both prongs, the defendant bears the

burden of persuasion. Sargent, 239 Ill. 2d at 190, 940 N.E.2d at 1059.

¶ 26           This court analyzes ineffective assistance of counsel claims under the standard set

                                                 -8-
forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). People v. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d 83, 93, 708

N.E.2d 1158, 1163 (1999). To obtain reversal under Strickland, a defendant must prove

(1) counsel’s performance failed to meet an objective standard of competence and (2) counsel’s

deficient performance resulted in prejudice to the defendant. Evans, 186 Ill. 2d at 93, 708

N.E.2d at 1163-64.

¶ 27           Our supreme court has explained the review of prosecutorial statements made

during closing arguments as follows:

                      “Prosecutors are afforded wide latitude in closing argument. [Citation.]

               In reviewing comments made at closing arguments, this court asks whether or not

               the comments engender substantial prejudice against a defendant such that it is

               impossible to say whether or not a verdict of guilt resulted from them. [Citation.]

               Misconduct in closing argument is substantial and warrants reversal and a new

               trial if the improper remarks constituted a material factor in a defendant’s

               conviction. [Citation.] If the jury could have reached a contrary verdict had the

               improper remarks not been made, or the reviewing court cannot say that the

               prosecutor’s improper remarks did not contribute to the defendant’s conviction, a

               new trial should be granted. [Citation.]” People v. Wheeler, 226 Ill. 2d 92, 123,

               871 N.E.2d 728, 745 (2007).

Moreover, a prosecutor may respond to defense counsel’s comments in closing argument which

clearly invite a response. People v. Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d 53, 113, 803 N.E.2d 405, 439 (2003).

“Such comments must be considered in the proper context by examining the entire closing

argument of the parties.” Johnson, 208 Ill. 2d at 113, 803 N.E.2d at 439.

¶ 28           Near the end of her closing argument, defense counsel argued defendant never got

                                               -9-
his constitutional right to confront Feig, the informant. She further stated, “You have a

constitutional right to confront your accuser, and the Government didn’t think that that was

something that my client was worthy of, I guess.” In rebuttal argument, the prosecutor noted he

had stated in opening statements Feig would not testify and explained why. He further argued

the law does not provide the defendant must be acquitted if the informant does not testify. The

prosecutor then stated the following:

                       “You’re not going to hear anything about some constitutional right to

               confrontation. That would be something that the Judge decides. Don’t worry,

               you don’t have to worry about constitution here.”

¶ 29           Defendant contends the prosecutor’s comments rendered his trial unfair for two

reasons. He first asserts the prosecutor’s language suggests the right to confront one’s accuser

was not a real right. Second, defendant contends the prosecutor instructed the jury to disregard

the constitution. He suggests it is a “reversed form of jury nullification.” The State asserts

defendant is estopped from raising this argument based on the invited error doctrine. While

defense counsel’s closing argument invited a response, it did not invite error. Thus, we decline

to find defendant is estopped from raising his argument.

¶ 30           We begin by examining the right to confrontation. The sixth amendment (U.S.

Const., amend. VI) and the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8) grant an accused the

right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

People v. Learn, 396 Ill. App. 3d 891, 900, 919 N.E.2d 1042, 1049 (2009). The United States

Supreme Court has explained the confrontation clause “applies to ‘witnesses’ against the

accused—in other words, those who ‘bear testimony.’ ” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,

51 (2004) (quoting 2 N. Webster, An American Dictionary of the English Language (1828)).

                                                - 10 -
The “ ‘confrontation’ ” is “a witness’s bearing of testimony against the defendant; the defendant

then has the right to rigorously test that testimony through cross-examination.” Learn, 396 Ill.

App. 3d at 900, 919 N.E.2d at 1050.

¶ 31           Here, Feig was the person who executed the police’s controlled buy, but she

refused to cooperate with the subpoena process. She did not bear testimony against defendant at

his trial, and in his brief, defendant does not identify any out-of-court statements by Feig used at

his trial. Moreover, no confrontation clause issues were raised during defendant’s trial. Defense

counsel did not demonstrate how Feig’s mere absence from defendant’s trial violated his

constitutional right to confrontation, and it was proper for the State to respond to defense

counsel’s argument. The State was correct a violation of defendant’s constitutional right to

confrontation was not an issue in the manner suggested by defense counsel. We disagree with

defendant’s allegation the State’s comment suggested the right to confrontation was not real.

The prosecutor was pointing out the right to confront Feig was not at issue in the case.

¶ 32           Regarding defendant’s suggestion the prosecutor’s comments instructed the jury

to ignore the constitution, defendant reads the statement in isolation. When the sentence is read

in the context of the entire closing arguments, the prosecutor is referencing the fact the jury need

not be concerned with a violation of the constitutional right to confrontation. Given no

confrontation clause violations were at issue in this case, we disagree with defendant the

prosecutor’s statement threatened the integrity of his trial.

¶ 33           Accordingly, the prosecutor’s statements in rebuttal closing argument were not

improper. As such, we need not address defendant’s arguments regarding plain error and

ineffective assistance of counsel.

¶ 34                                       B. Sentencing

                                                - 11 -
¶ 35           Defendant also alleges the trial court denied him a fair sentencing hearing by

considering the harm to the community as a factor in aggravation when the legislature had

considered the harm to society in establishing the sentencing range for delivery of a controlled

substance. The State asserts defendant has forfeited this issue and fails to argue plain error. In

his rebuttal brief, defendant asserts, if the issue is forfeited, then he seeks review under the

plain-error doctrine. We agree with the State defendant did not raise his claim in his motion to

reconsider his sentence, and thus defendant must establish plain error. In the context of

sentencing, the defendant must show either “(1) the evidence at the sentencing hearing was

closely balanced, or (2) the error was so egregious as to deny the defendant a fair sentencing

hearing.” People v. Hillier, 237 Ill. 2d 539, 545, 931 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (2010).

¶ 36           The parties also disagree on the standard of review. Defendant asserts the

de novo standard of review applies. See People v. Abdelhadi, 2012 IL App (2d) 111053, ¶ 8, 973

N.E.2d 459 (addressing the allegation of consideration of an improper sentencing factor). The

State suggests the abuse of discretion standard is appropriate. See People v. Schnoor, 2019 IL

App (4th) 170571, ¶ 99, 145 N.E.3d 544 (addressing an excessive sentence claim). We find the

alleged error raised by defendant is essentially a claim the trial court imposed an excessive

sentence. See People v. Johnson, 2019 IL 122956, ¶ 39, 129 N.E.3d 1239 (noting the defendant

raised an excessive sentence argument when the defendant claimed he would have received a

lower sentence if the court had not erred in its application of the statute and, thus, erroneously

considered statutory factors). With excessive sentence claims, this court has explained appellate

review of a defendant’s sentence as follows:

                       “A trial court’s sentencing determination must be based on the particular

               circumstances of each case, including factors such as the defendant’s credibility,

                                                - 12 -
               demeanor, general moral character, mentality, social environment, habits, and

               age. [Citations.] Generally, the trial court is in a better position than a court of

               review to determine an appropriate sentence based upon the particular facts and

               circumstances of each individual case. [Citation.] Thus, the trial court is the

               proper forum for the determination of a defendant’s sentence, and the trial court’s

               decisions in regard to sentencing are entitled to great deference and weight.

               [Citation.] Absent an abuse of discretion by the trial court, a sentence may not be

               altered upon review. [Citation.] If the sentence imposed is within the statutory

               range, it will not be deemed excessive unless it is greatly at variance with the

               spirit and purpose of the law or is manifestly disproportionate to the nature of the

               offense.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Price, 2011 IL App (4th)

               100311, ¶ 36, 958 N.E.2d 341.

See also People v. Alexander, 239 Ill. 2d 205, 212-13, 940 N.E.2d 1062, 1066 (2010). Here,

defendant was extended-term eligible, and thus the sentencing range for delivery of a controlled

substance (720 ILCS 570/401(d) (West 2018)) was 3 to 14 years’ imprisonment (730 ILCS

5/5-4.5-35(a) (West 2018)). Accordingly, the trial court’s eight-year sentence was within the

statutory sentencing range.

¶ 37           The prohibition against consideration in aggravation of a factor inherent in the

offense “is based on the assumption that, in designating the appropriate range of punishment for

a criminal offense, the legislature necessarily considered the factors inherent in the offense.”

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. McGath, 2017 IL App (4th) 150608, ¶ 64, 83

N.E.3d 671. However, the trial court can consider the nature and circumstances of the offense.

People v. Saldivar, 113 Ill. 2d 256, 268, 497 N.E.2d 1138, 1143 (1986). “It is not improper

                                               - 13 -
per se for a sentencing court to refer to the significant harm inflicted upon society by drug

trafficking.” People v. McCain, 248 Ill. App. 3d 844, 852, 617 N.E.2d 1294, 1300 (1993).

¶ 38           Some of the statutory aggravating factors have the opposite statutory mitigating

factor. Section 5-5-3.2(a)(1) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code) (730 ILCS

5/5-5-3.2(a)(1) (West 2018)) lists as a factor in aggravation “the defendant’s conduct caused or

threatened serious harm.” On the other hand, section 5-5-3.1(a) of the Unified Code provides the

following as mitigating factors:

                        “(1) The defendant’s criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened

               serious physical harm to another.

                        (2) The defendant did not contemplate that his criminal conduct would

               cause or threaten serious physical harm to another.” 730 ILCS 5/5-5-3.1(a) (West

               2018).

¶ 39           It is well-established it is improper for a sentencing court to consider the general

societal harm as a statutory aggravating factor under section 5-5-3.2(a)(1). McCain, 248 Ill.

App. 3d at 852, 617 N.E.2d at 1300. However, it is proper for the court to consider the societal

harm in finding the mitigating factors set forth in sections 5-5-3.1(a)(1) and (2) do not apply.

People v. Solis, 2019 IL App (4th) 170084, ¶ 28, 138 N.E.3d 247. As such, it is understandable

how a court could “muddle” the consideration of the general threat to society in drug cases.

While the alleged error in this case seems to be the result of careless language, we recognize the

prosecutor in this case should not have noted the impact drugs have on the community in general

in addressing the applicable statutory aggravating factors. Instead, the prosecutor should have

argued the general harm to the community in asserting why the statutory mitigating factors

related to harm did not apply. The prosecutor’s inarticulate argument led the trial court to

                                               - 14 -
improperly find the general threat of harm to the community was a statutory aggravating factor.

¶ 40           However, defendant has failed to show the improper finding was plain error. As

to first prong error, we disagree with defendant the evidence was closely balanced. While

defendant was an addict, had a rough childhood, and had two very young children, he had an

extensive criminal history. Defendant had eight prior felony convictions and four prior

misdemeanor convictions. He committed the offenses in this case while on bond and had more

than a dozen charges pending in three different counties at the time of his sentencing. As

defendant himself recognizes, the need for deterrence was also present in this case.

¶ 41           Defendant also fails to establish second prong plain error. Defendant simply

asserts any finding of an improper aggravating factor is second prong plain error. However, in

this case, the record shows the weight given to the threat of harm did not lead to a greater

sentence. The trial court explained the fact defendant had been given opportunities to help

himself and he did not take advantage of those opportunities “weighed heavily” on the court.

The court also found probation would deprecate the seriousness of the offense. Defendant had

an extensive criminal history and inability to comply with court orders, as he committed these

offenses while on bail. His 8-year sentence was in the middle of the sentencing range and

significantly less than the 12 years requested by the State.

¶ 42           Accordingly, we find defendant has not established the trial court’s comments

regarding the threat of harm to the community was plain error.

¶ 43                                    III. CONCLUSION

¶ 44           For the reasons stated, we affirm the Sangamon County circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 45           Affirmed.

                                               - 15 -