Court Opinion

ID: 9726425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:48:21.715775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:26.974745
License: Public Domain

COAKLEY, J.
I dissent. I do so primarily with respect to the holding in the majority opinion that In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 [25 L.Ed.2d 368, 90 S.Ct. 1068], applies retroactively to cases such as this, i.e., cases pending on appeal on the date the Winship opinion was filed, March 31, 1970. There has as yet been no such determination by either the United States Supreme Court or by our California Supreme Court. I do not read either Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 [22 L.Ed.2d 248, 89 S.Ct. 1030], or People v. Edwards, 71 Cal.2d 1096 [80 Cal.Rptr. 633, 458 P.2d 713], as requiring retroactive application of Winship in this case.
The issue in both of the cited cases was whether a prior decision of the United States Supreme Court involving, as here, alleged rights under the *706Constitution should be given retroactive application. In Desist, the court held that Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 [19 L.Ed.2d 576, 88 S.Ct. 507], which proscribed electronic eavesdropping on private conversations, “should be given wholly prospective application.” In People v. Edwards, 71 Cal.2d 1096 [80 Cal.Rptr. 633, 458 P.2d 713], where the issue was the prospective or retroactive application of the decision in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 [23 L.Ed.2d 685, 89 S.Ct. 2034], a case involving the validity of a search and seizure, the court held: “that there should be no distinction between final judgments and those not yet final and that Chimel is to apply only to cases in which the search was conducted after the date of that decision.”
In rejecting the appellant’s contention that because it had recently given retroactive application to other decisions of the United States Supreme Court in newly declaring certain constitutional rights1 it should do so in Edwards, the court said, at page 1110: ‘“Each . . . rule of criminal procedure has its own distinct functions, its own background of precedent, and its own impact on the administration of justice, and the way in which these factors combine must inevitably vary with the dictate involved.’ ” (Citing Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 728 [16 L.Ed.2d 882, 86 S.Ct. 1772].)
The minors in this case received a fair hearing under the then existing and long-established rules governing hearings in juvenile courts, and though the record is silent as to whether the court believed that violation of Penal Code section 647, subdivision (f), was established beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence only,2 my review of the record satisfies me that the proof amply met the newly declared standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, called for by In re Winship, supra.
It should be noted that unlike our case where the court made no statement as to the quantum of proof, the court in Winship noted that the judge of the New York Family Court, who made the adjudication of delinquency, expressly “acknowledged that the proof might not have established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Finally, I point out that Winship holds only that proof that a minor *707committed the offense charged must be established beyond a reasonable doubt. It does not hold that the failure of the judge to declare that such quantum of proof is present requires a reversal if, in fact, the higher standard of proof is met.
I would affirm the judgment.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied July 16,1970.

(People v. Rollins, 65 Cal.2d 681 [56 Cal.Rptr. 293, 423 P.2d 221]; People v. Charles, 66 Cal.2d 330 [57 Cal.Rptr. 745, 425 P.2d 545].)

This undoubtedly is because such a finding is not required by the Juvenile Court Law (Welf. & Inst. Code, div. 2, pt. 1, ch. 2, art. 9), and it is not the practice of juvenile court judges to make súch a finding. (See Welf. & Inst. Code § 702 for the required finding, and for the suggested form of finding see Cal. Juvenile Court Practices (Cont.Ed.Bar.) §§ 150-151, pp. 135-136.)