Court Opinion

ID: 9643134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:20:30.020514+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:57.763947
License: Public Domain

OPINION
KELLEHER, Justice.
Most Rhode Islanders remember February 6, 1978, as the day when the Great Blizzard roared through the state, leaving behind snow that was as high as an elephant’s eye and many memories. This litigation will engender some of those memories, for it relates to a three-vehicle collision that occurred on February 6, 1978, on Interstate 95.
Norma Cole (Norma) left work early that memorable day in an attempt to arrive home safely before the gathering storm and rush-hour traffic \yould make attaining that goal impossible. Unfortunately for Norma, she never made it home that day because her car was twice struck by vehicles she encountered along the highway. The first collision occurred while Norma was proceeding southward along Interstate Route 95 through the city of Pawtucket. Her vehicle was struck by a tractor-trailer rig that was owned by Greylawn Poultry Co. (Greylawn) of Cranston and being operated by Robert E. Charron (Charron). The force of the collision forced Norma’s vehicle up against the concrete abutment that separated northbound traffic from vehicles heading south. Within a matter of minutes, insult was heaped upon injury when a dark “red or maroon” automobile struck Norma’s motionless car in the rear and, in her words, “pulled out and left” the scene. A police ear came by and transported Norma to a nearby motel where she remained snowbound for the next four days.
Immediately following this two-collision incident, she began to experience back and shoulder pain. Norma first looked to her insurance carrier for any compensation that might be due her under the uninsured-motorist, hit-and-run-driver protection afforded by her liability policy.
Since the amount of compensation could not be determined to the mutual satisfaction of Norma and her insurance carrier, the matter was submitted to arbitration. Thereafter, the arbitrator ordered Norma’s insurer to pay her $4,750. She immediately petitioned the Superior Court to confirm the award under G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 10-3-11, and this petition was granted.
Having achieved satisfaction for the injuries attributable to the hit-and-run driver, Norma next sought damages from Grey-lawn and its driver, Charron, when she instituted a Superior Court civil action in which she sought $12,000.
The defendants moved to dismiss her Superior Court suit. The motion to dismiss was based upon the theory that as a result of the arbitrator’s award, Norma was collaterally estopped from proceeding with the litigation; and since her damages were ascertained by the arbitrator to be $4,750, the Superior Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because the amount in controversy did not exceed $5,000. This jurisdictional argument is based upon the pertinent provisions of G.L.1956 (1969 Reenactment) § 8-2-14, as amended by P.L.1981, ch. 215, § 1, which confer upon the Superi- or and District Courts concurrent jurisdiction to consider controversies in which the amount sought exceeds $5,000 but does not exceed $10,000. The trial justice was persuaded by the arguments presented by the defense and dismissed Norma’s suit because, in the trial justice’s opinion, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.
The defense, in pressing its motion, alluded to portions of Norma’s deposition taken in November 1981 in which she was asked about the hearing before the arbitrator. The inquiries and the responses would *961indicate that the injuries, loss of income, and medical expenses for which she sought reimbursement from her insurer were identical to the items for which she was seeking damages from Greylawn and Charron in this litigation. Norma responded affirmatively when she was asked if she was dissatisfied with the arbitrator’s award and if she hoped to get a higher award in the Superior Court.
We shall first consider the question of the Superior Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. Long ago this court ruled that the amount of money that confers jurisdiction upon a court to hear such a dispute is to be determined by the amount of the “debt or damages laid in the writ” rather than “the value of the matter in controversy.” Ryder v. Brennan, 28 R.I. 538, 68 A. 477, 478 (1908). Recent cases in which it was said that the crucial factor in determining jurisdiction was the amount specified in the complaint have affirmed this principle. Carvalho v. Coletta, R.I., 457 A.2d 614, 616 (1983); Berberian v. New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., 117 R.I. 629, 633-34, 369 A.2d 1109, 1112 (1977).
As we previously noted, in her complaint against Greylawn and Charron, Norma, in pursuing her Superior Court civil action, is seeking damages from Greylawn and Char-ron in the amount of $12,000. Section 8-2-14 gives to the Superior Court original and exclusive jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds $10,000.
Leaving, for the moment, the question of jurisdiction and returning to the question of collateral estoppel, we are reminded by Providence Teachers Union v. McGovern, 113 R.I. 169, 172, 319 A.2d 358, 361 (1974), that collateral estoppel makes conclusive in a subsequent action on a different claim the determination of particular issues actually litigated in a prior action as long as the issues are identical, the prior judgment was final, and the individual who is the subject of the estoppel was a party or in privity with a party in the prior action. In reviewing the correctness of the trial justice’s dismissal, we need only consider whether the issue to be resolved by the jury was identical to the issue decided by the arbitrator.
The issue submitted to the arbitrator was the extent of the damages sustained by Norma when her vehicle was struck by the hit-and-run motorist. Since the extent of Greylawn and Charron’s responsibility for the initial damages sustained by Norma was not and could not be determined by the arbitrator, Norma was not estopped from proceeding with her civil action. It may be that when the jury is made aware of the contents of Norma’s deposition, she may not prevail. Again, she may be able to explain away those responses in such a way that a jury would be justified in returning a verdict for Norma. We cannot prophesy what would happen at trial, but we have no doubt that the trial justice erred in dismissing Norma’s civil action on the basis of a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
The plaintiff’s appeal is sustained, the judgment appealed from is vacated, and the case is remanded to the Superior Court for further proceedings.
WEISBERGER, J., did not participate.