Court Opinion

ID: 9782283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 18:16:19.163093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:34.897122
License: Public Domain

MINZNER, Justice (dissenting). {25} I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals to remand this matter to the district court for further proceedings. I believe that the Court of Appeals majority correctly perceived difficulties in applying Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 118 S.Ct. 948, 140 L.Ed.2d 30 (1998), to the facts of this case and wisely elected to exercise caution in departing from Tenth Circuit precedent. I suspect that its perception of difficulties in applying Venetie arose from a concern that the test applied in that case might require some modification when applied in other situations. I think members of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals share that concern. {26} The Tenth Circuit made clear in HRI, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 198 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir.2000), that federal courts in this circuit must, even after Venetie, still apply a community of reference analysis in determining whether a particular location is a dependent Indian community under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (2000). In HRI, the court stated, Presumably because of the categorical effect of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (“ANSCA”) on virtually all Alaskan native lands, the Supreme Court in Venetie was not even presented with the question of defining the proper means of determining a community of reference for analysis under § 1151(b). Because Venetie does not speak directly to the issue, barring en banc review by this court, [Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir.1995)] continues to require a “community of reference” analysis prior to determining whether land qualifies as a dependent Indian community under the set-aside and supervision requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b). 198 F.3d at 1249 (citation omitted). {27} I agree with my colleagues that we are free to reject the analysis of the Tenth Circuit, even when we interpret federal law. The fact that we may do so, of course, does not necessarily mean that we should. {28} The history of Indian country in Alaska and the exercise of jurisdiction over criminal offenses and civil causes of action within Indian country in that state seems to have been unique._ See generally Felix S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law 763-67 (Rennard Strickland et al. eds., 1982 ed.) (discussing the extension of state law over criminal offenses and civil causes of action in Indian country within Alaska). In this state the jurisdictional issues are more complicated. See State v. Frank, 2001-NMCA-026, ¶¶ 16-17, 130 N.M. 306, 24 P.3d 338 (describing the purpose of determining “an appropriate community of reference”). {29} I think the Court of Appeals majority was attempting to ensure that facts that might distinguish circumstances in New Mexico from those in Alaska were not overlooked. The judges in the majority were not prepared to say that any differences would be irrelevant. I also think those judges foresaw that after conviction in state court a prisoner would pursue any federal post-conviction remedies within the Tenth Circuit. The judges in the majority seem to have reasoned that following Tenth Circuit precedent in criminal cases would reduce the potential for jurisdictional conflicts. If Venetie does require some modification of the Tenth Circuit’s analysis, reducing that potential in the interim seems a desirable goal. {30} On balance, I think the Court of Appeals majority had the better view. A majority of this Court concluding otherwise, I respectfully dissent.