Court Opinion

ID: 9623758
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:42:48.050702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:34.606319
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Chief Justice,
concurring specially.
Although I agree with the majority’s opinion generally, I do not agree with the rationale in Division 4 that this Court can find trial counsel’s decision presumptively reasonable without examining whether the jury instructions were erroneous. Therefore, I write separately to complete the constitutional analysis.
Barner’s trial counsel could have preserved Barner’s right to challenge on appeal the trial court’s jury instructions by simply stat*295ing outside of the presence of the jury that he was reserving any objections. Instead, he told the trial court that he had no objections and, thereby, waived Barner’s right to raise any error in the jury instructions. The majority holds that Barner’s trial counsel’s decision did not constitute constitutionally deficient representation by presuming that (1) counsel’s decision was strategic and (2) this decision was reasonable.2
Decided March 10, 2003.
Noel L. Hurley, for appellant.
Paul L. Howard, Jr., District Attorney, Bettieanne C. Hart, Assis*296tant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Tammie J. Philbrick, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
*295Presuming that a decision not to preserve objections to the jury charge was reasonable assumes that such a decision could be reasonable under some scenario, which is a questionable assumption. Choosing not to reserve any objections does nothing to help the defendant and potentially does a lot to hurt him.3 All counsel had to do to preserve the issue for appeal was state, outside the presence of the jury, that he was reserving any objections.
The only way that counsel’s inadvisable decision not to reserve objections could be considered remotely reasonable is if counsel, having just heard the instructions read, correctly determined that the jury instructions were not erroneous.4 At a minimum, this scenario requires examination of the jury charges.
Here, the challenged jury instructions substantially followed the pattern charges, adequately informed the jury of the applicable legal principles,5 and, considering the charge as a whole, the single slip of the tongue made by the trial court would not have misled or confused the jury.6 Accordingly, Barner’s lawyer did not provide constitutionally deficient representation and Barner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim is without merit.
I am authorized to state that Justice Hunstein and Justice Carley join in this special concurrence.

 Jefferson v. Zant, 263 Ga. 316, 318 (431 SE2d 110) (1993) (“Whether an attorney’s trial tactics are reasonable ‘is a question of law,’ not fact.”); see also Totten v. State, 276 Ga. 199, 202 (577 SE2d 272) (2003) (finding counsel’s “trial strategy and tactics” were “within the bounds of reasonable professional conduct”); Kilpatrick v. State, 276 Ga. 151 (575 SE2d 478) (2003) (concluding that strategic decision “fell within scope of reasonable and professional representation”).

 See Bryant v. State, 268 Ga. 33, 34 (485 SE2d 763) (1997).

 Cf. Johnson v. State, 275 Ga. 650, 653-654 (571 SE2d 782) (2002) (holding that failure to object to particular jury charge was not constitutionally deficient performance if charge was correct).

 Oliver v. State, 274 Ga. 539, 542 (554 SE2d 474) (2001).

 See, e.g., Shorter v. State, 270 Ga. 280, 281 (507 SE2d 757) (1998).