Court Opinion

ID: 9856730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:56:19.355092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:26.973080
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice
(dissenting):
I do not disagree with the majority’s analysis of the law relating to the sufficiency of evidence required to corroborate the testimony of an accomplice. However, I must specifically dissent from the majority opinion for two major reasons. First, it is my opinion that the statement made by appellant’s husband cannot be used as evidence corroborating the testimony of the accomplice as the majority uses it; and, secondly, that statement was so prejudicial that appellant’s motion for a new trial should have been granted.
The trial court allowed Officer Harry B. Capul to testify over objection that when he arrested appellant her husband stated, “See, I told you they would catch you for what you did.” In discussing this statement, the majority opinion states:
“Another of the state’s witnesses, a police officer, testified that at the time the defendant was arrested, Larry Swenor, the defendant’s husband stated to her, ‘See, I told you they would catch you for what you did.’ This statement was made in the defendant’s presence and no reply was made to it by the defendant. Under the circumstances this statement would be corroborative evidence. The defendant, however, argues that this could not be considered as corroborative evidence *332because it was made by an accomplice and also had to be corroborated. Even though the defendant objected to the statement made by her husband, which objection was overruled by the trial court, no assignment of error is predicated on this point.” (Emphasis added).
Although the record does not indicate the trial court’s reason for overruling appellant’s objection to this testimony, the statement is clearly hearsay. Gayhart v. Schwabe, 80 Idaho 354, 330 P.2d 327 (1958); Bell, Handbook of Evidence for the Idaho Lawyer, 2d Ed. (1972), at p. 126, and as such was inadmissible. Even if the statement had been offered not for proof of the facts stated therein, but as a tacit admission of guilt based upon appellant’s silence in the face of this statement, the objection should have been sustained. Under certain circumstances the failure to deny incriminating statements made in a defendant’s presence may operate as an admission and be received in evidence against the accused in a subsequent prosecution. 3 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (13th Ed., 1973), § 700, p. 501. However, to come within that rule a proper foundation must be laid showing (1) that the statement was incriminatory or accusatory; (2) that it was made within the presence and hearing of the defendant; (3) that the defendant understood the statement; (4) that the circumstances were such that he would have naturally denied the statement; and (5) that the defendant was not under arrest at the time the statement was made.1
The record in the instant case fails to establish that the above requisites were met. There was no foundation established by the police officer who testified that appellant heard the statement, or where she was located at the time the statement was made. Moreover, appellant had been placed under arrest by Officer Stuker before the statement was made. Ever since Miranda2 it has been settled law, and hopefully settled practice, that a defendant who has been placed under arrest is to be advised of his rights under the United States Constitution, including his right to remain silent. The rule announced by the majority which attempts to construe that silence as an admission, and thus corroborating evidence, flies in the face of that constitutional right.
My second reason for disagreeing with the majority is that I feel that the inadmissible statement was so prejudicial that a new trial should have been granted. The alleged statement by appellant’s husband, “See, I told you they would catch you for what you did,” certainly must have weighed heavily in the minds of the jury. In effect, what the trial court and the majority of this Court did, was to let the husband “point the accusatory finger” at his wife although in other cases we refuse to allow such an action because of the husband-wife privilege. I.C. § 19-3002; I.C. § 9-203; State v. McGonigal, 89 Idaho 177, 403 P.2d 745 (1965). In actuality, it is the police officer who is permitted to point the husband’s accusatory finger at the wife. What evidence could be more damning and more fundamentally prejudicial to a defendant than to stand accused by one’s own spouse. The damage such evidence could have on a jury is incalculable.
The majority refuses to weigh the effects of this statement and the trial court’s action in overruling appellant’s objection to the statement at the trial, on the ground that “no assignment of error is predicated on this point,” 3 even though that issue was discussed at length in oral argument before this Court. To overlook the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant on the ten*333uous ground that there was no assignment of error appears to me to be a manifest denial of due process, especially in view of the history of this Court’s application of that rule and other rules of appellate procedure. In State v. Haggard, 94 Idaho 249, 486 P.2d 260 (1971), appellant-defendant Haggard was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and burglary in the nighttime. During the course of the trial the prosecution, in the cross-examination of appellant, questioned appellant concerning his failure to disclose his alibi at the preliminary hearing. Counsel for appellant failed to raise an objection to the cross examination at the time of trial. In ruling upon appellant’s contention that he was deprived of a fair trial because of the statement, this Court stated:
“Counsel for defendant failed to raise an objection to the cross-examination at the time of trial and ordinarily this Court would not consider this assignment of error. However, the obligation of the state to see that defendant receives a fair trial is primary and fundamental. Pulver v. State, 93 Idaho 687, 471 P.2d 74 (1970) quoting McIntosh v. Commonwealth, Ky., 368 S.W.2d 331 (Ky.Ct. App.1963). In case of fundamental error in a criminal case the Supreme Court may consider the same even though no objection had been made at time of trial. Shier v. People, 116 Colo. 353, 181 P.2d 366 (1947); State v. Cummings, 49 Haw. 522, 423 P.2d 438 (1967); State v. Bunn, 50 Haw. 351, 440 P.2d 528 (1968); People v. Rodriguez, 58 Cal.App.2d 415, 136 P.2d 626 (1943); State v. Redmond, 75 Wash.2d 62, 448 P.2d 938 (1968).” 94 Idaho at 251, 486 P.2d at 262.
Deciding an issue sua sponte is nothing new to the American judicial system. Many landmark decisions have been rendered deciding issues not raised by the parties. In Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938), the United States Supreme Court overruled one hundred years of jurisprudence by deciding that in diversity cases the substantive law of the state of trial must be applied, which issue had not been raised by the parties before either the lower courts or the Supreme Court. The Court also, in Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454, 457, 81 S.Ct. 182, 5 L.Ed.2d 206, in order to avoid considering two broad constitutional issues which were the only questions presented by petitioner, considered and resolved a statutory issue not presented by the petition in spite of Supreme Court Rule 23(1)(c).4 Also, in Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S. 354, 359, 77 S.Ct. 481, 1 L.Ed.2d 393, the Court considered certain issues raised for the first time in the brief on the merits. Likewise, in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, 9 N.Y.2d 34, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961), the New York Court of Appeals announced that in conflict-in-laws cases, it would no longer follow the law-of-the-place-of-the-tort rule. Again, the issue was not before the court. Although there is a long line of cases espousing the rule that there must be an assignment of error on a specific issue before this Court will rule on that issue, there are also numerous cases wherein this Court has disregarded the rule. See, State v. Webb, 96 Idaho 315, 528 P.2d 669 (1974); Paullus v. Liedkie, 92 Idaho 323, 442 P.2d 733 (1968); McLean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 430 P.2d 670 (1967); Garren v. Rollis, 85 Idaho 86, 375 P.2d 994 (1962). There have been instances wherein appellant’s briefs have been submitted to this Court without any assignments of error and, at the suggestion of the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court that such briefs did not comply with Rule 41, amended briefs have been submitted setting out assignments of error. Under Rule 54(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, which this Court *334adopted in 1958 for the purpose of promoting justice and simplifying court procedures, “every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his pleadings.” I have never been able to understand why the “interests of justice” require the trial courts to grant the relief which the facts show a party is entitled to regardless of whether he has requested it in his pleadings, and the same “interests of justice” require this Court to refuse to grant the relief to which a party is entitled because he has not demanded such relief in his pleadings on appeal, i. e., assignments of error. While assignments of error are helpful in having issues reasonably but not rigidly clarified in advance, they should not become a vehicle by which this Court regresses to the 19th century technicalities of the common law pleading system.
Further, the fact that this Court has on occasion granted relief from failure to assign points as error under the doctrine of fundamental error, or permitting oral amendments of briefs to include assignments of error, or sua sponte, would appear to be a violation of Article 5, Section 26, of the Idaho. Constitution which requires all laws relating to courts to be general and uniform. Also, the indiscriminate application of the assignment of error rule is as much a denial of due process under the federal constitution as is the indiscriminate application of the death penalty as was recently found by the United States Supreme Court in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972). The principle is the same.
I fear that the majority’s decision today is only the conclusion of round one of appellant’s case. Round two will be an action under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedures Act, I.C. § 19-4901 et seq. on the ground that appellant’s constitutional rights were violated because of the due process argument and on the ground of competency of counsel for failure to assign as error the obvious defect in this case.5 If round two proves unfruitful for the defendant, then round three will be a petition in the federal courts under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 to set aside the conviction. State courts often bemoan the intervention of the federal courts in state cases, but so long as highly prejudicial errors, such as the admission into evidence of the statement allegedly made by appellant’s husband, remain uncorrected in state courts it is probably a good thing that federal courts are available to correct such mistakes.
One final point. Although I concur in the majority’s analysis of the state of the law relating to instructions on circumstantial evidence, I feel that in cases in which there is both direct and circumstantial evidence, the better practice would be to instruct the jury on the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence.6
For these reasons I would reverse the judgment of conviction and remand the case for a new trial.
McQUADE, J., concurs.

. 3 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, §§ 700, 701, 702, 703 & 704, 13th Ed.1973; Orser v. United States, 362 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1966); State v. Poynter, 34 Idaho 504, 205 P. 561, 208 P. 871 (1922), aff’d, rehearing; People v. Ridley, 63 Cal.2d 671, 47 Cal.Rptr. 796, 408 P.2d 124 (1965).

. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

. Rule 41(2), Appellate Rules of the Supreme Court of Idaho.

. “(c) The questions presented for review, expressed in the terms and circumstances of the case but without unnecessary detail. The statement of a question presented will be deemed to include every subsidiary question fairly comprised therein. Only the questions set forth in the petition or fairly comprised therein will be considered by the ■ court.”

. That appellant is not presently incarcerated, but on probation, is of no import in view of this Court’s decision in Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469, 491 P.2d 733 (1971), and the United States Supreme Court holding in Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968), wherein the Supreme Court ruled that “a criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal eonsequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction.” (Emphasis added).

. An example of such an instruction is contained in California Jury Instructions, Criminal, 1970, 3d revised edition, § 2.00, at p. 21. See also 1 Devitt & Blackmer Fed.Jury Instr., 2d Ed., § 11.02, at p. 208. Idaho Pattern Jury Instructions, No. 113 (effective January 1, 1974).