Court Opinion

ID: 2965001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:33:58.086139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:04.221264
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                              _________________________

          Nos. 97-1261
               97-1263

                    INMATES OF SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL, ETC., ET AL.,
                                Plaintiffs, Appellees,

                                          v.

                           RICHARD J. ROUSE, ETC., ET AL.,
                               Defendants, Appellants.

                              _________________________

          No. 97-1262

                    INMATES OF SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL, ETC., ET AL.,
                               Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                                          v.

                           RICHARD J. ROUSE, ETC., ET AL.,
                                Defendants, Appellees.

                              _________________________

          No. 97-1334

                    INMATES OF SUFFOLK COUNTY JAIL, ETC., ET AL.,
                                Plaintiffs, Appellees,

                                          v.

                           RICHARD J. ROUSE, ETC., ET AL.,
                                Defendants, Appellees,

                              _________________________

                              UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                Intervenor, Appellant.

                              _________________________

                    APPEALS FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Robert E. Keeton, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                              _________________________

                                        Before

                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                                       _____________

                      Aldrich and Coffin, Senior Circuit Judges.
                                          _____________________

                              _________________________

               Max D. Stern, with  whom Lynn Weissberg and Stern,  Shapiro,
               ____________             ______________     ________________
          Weissberg & Garin were on brief, for plaintiffs.
          _________________
               John D.  Hanify, with whom  Robyn J. Bartlett, Owen  P. Kane
               _______________             _________________  _____________
          and Hanify  & King were on brief, for defendant Richard J. Rouse,
              ______________
          Sheriff of Suffolk County.
               Douglas H. Wilkins,  Assistant Attorney  General, with  whom
               __________________
          Scott  Harshbarger,  Attorney  General,   and  Thomas  O.   Bean,
          __________________                             _________________
          Assistant  Attorneys  General,  were  on  brief,  for  defendants
          Commonwealth of Massachusetts and Commissioner of Correction.
               Robert  M.  Loeb,  with  whom  Frank  W.  Hunger,  Assistant
               ________________               _________________
          Attorney General, Donald  K. Stern, United States  Attorney , and
                            ________________
          Barbara L. Herwig and  John C. Hoyle, Attorneys,  Civil Division,
          _________________      _____________
          Department of Justice, were on brief, for the intervenor.

                              _________________________

                                   November 7, 1997

                               _______________________

                    SELYA,  Circuit Judge.    The  passage  of  the  Prison
                    SELYA,  Circuit Judge.
                            _____________

          Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C.A.    3626 (Supp. 1997) (the PLRA

          or  the  Act),  brought  cheers   to  the  lips  of  many  prison

          administrators.  In  its wake, the Sheriff of  Suffolk County and

          the Massachusetts  Commissioner of Correction  (collectively, the

          defendants)  cast  their gaze  toward a  consent decree  that has

          governed important aspects  of the county's handling  of pretrial

          detainees  since  1979.    Spying an  opportunity  to  sever  the

          shackles  of judicial oversight,  the defendants invoked  the new

          law  and  asked  the  supervising  tribunal,  the  United  States

          District  Court for the District of  Massachusetts, to vacate the

          decree  or,  in  the alternative,  to  terminate  all prospective

          relief  under   it.     The  plaintiffs   questioned  the   Act's

          constitutionality and  raised a host  of other objections  to the

          defendants'   motions.      The  district   court   repulsed  the

          constitutional  attack but construed the PLRA to require only the

          termination of prospective relief, not the vacatur of the consent

          decree itself.  See  Inmates of Suffolk County Jail v. Sheriff of
                          ___  ______________________________    __________

          Suffolk County, 952 F. Supp. 869 (D. Mass. 1997) (D. Ct. Op.).
          ______________                                    __________

                    After careful consideration of the meaning of the PLRA,

          we vouchsafe the  Act's constitutionality against  the challenges

          asserted here and  construe it to entitle  correctional officials

          to the termination of  existing consent decrees in civil  actions

          involving   prison  conditions   (except  in   the  presence   of

          statutorily   prescribed    conditions   that    forestall   such

          termination).

                                          3

          I.  BACKGROUND
          I.  BACKGROUND

                    This  litigation  deals  almost  exclusively  with  the

          effect  of  the PLRA  on  an extant  consent  decree.   Thus, the

          history  of the  conflict is  of  minimal import,  and we  merely

          sketch  it.    The shelves  of  any  reasonably  well-stocked law

          library afford readers who hunger for  more exegetic detail ample

          opportunity to  dine elsewhere.   See, e.g.,  Inmates of  Suffolk
                                            ___  ____   ___________________

          County Jail  v. Eisenstadt,  360 F. Supp.  676, 679-84  (D. Mass.
          ___________     __________

          1973), aff'd, 494  F.2d 1196 (1st Cir. 1974);  Inmates of Suffolk
                 _____                                   __________________

          County  Jail v.  Kearney, 734  F. Supp.  561, 562-63  (D. Mass.),
          ____________     _______

          aff'd, 915 F.2d  1557 (1st Cir. 1990) (table),  vacated, 502 U.S.
          _____                                           _______

          367 (1992); Inmates  of Suffolk County Jail v.  Kearney, 928 F.2d
                      _______________________________     _______

          33, 34 (1st Cir. 1991); D. Ct. Op., 952 F. Supp. at 871-73.
                                  __________

                    In  1971 the plaintiff class, which consists of present

          and future pretrial detainees held or  to be held in the  Suffolk

          County  jail  (collectively,  the plaintiffs),  brought  a  civil

          action  alleging that  the  conditions  of  their  confinement   

          particularly  double bunking    violated the Eighth  Amendment to

          the United States Constitution.  After extensive skirmishing, not

          relevant here, the parties reached a rapprochement,  subsequently

          approved by the  district court and embodied in  the 1979 consent

          decree, in  which they ratified  an architectural plan for  a new

          facility  featuring   single-occupancy  cells.     The  agreement

          contemplated  the phasing-out of the existing Charles Street jail

          once the new structure was in place.

                    As the Scottish poet warned,  "the best laid schemes o'

                                          4

          mice and men gang aft  a-gley," Robert Burns, To a  Mouse (1785),
                                                        ___________

          and in  this case time proved  a formidable opponent.   Growth in

          prison  population  and  delays  in  construction  both  exceeded

          expectations.  The new facility  (the Nashua Street jail) was not

          completed until mid-1990 and  was hard-pressed from the start  to

          cope with the  Sheriff's escalating needs.  In  response to these

          volatile conditions,  the consent  decree was  modified by  court

          order in  1985,  1990, and  1994.    The last  of  these  changes

          permitted  limited double bunking  at the Nashua  Street facility

          (the  Sheriff having  closed the  Charles  Street facility  prior

          thereto).1

                    In   July  1996  the   Sheriff  initiated  the  current

          engagement.  He  grasped the weapon that Congress  had forged and

          moved to terminate all  prospective relief pursuant to the  PLRA.

          Not to be  outdone, the Commissioner moved to  vacate the consent

          decree outright, thus  formalizing a suggestion that  the Sheriff

          had omitted  from his motion  but had included in  the memorandum

          supporting the  motion.  When the plaintiffs  indicated that they

          would  challenge the  Act's constitutionality  as  part of  their

          opposition, the federal government intervened.  After sorting out

          the  components of  the parties' extensive  asseverational array,

          Judge  Keeton  gave  the  pertinent  provisions  of  the  PLRA  a

          narrowing   construction  and   on   that   basis  upheld   their

          constitutionality.   He thereupon granted the Sheriff's motion to
                              
          ____________________

               1Notwithstanding the several emendations that have been made
          to  the original  consent  decree,  we refer  to  the decree,  as
          modified from time to time, as the "1979 consent decree."

                                          5

          the extent that  the consent decree would "no  longer be enforced

          by  an order  of  specific performance,"  but declined  either to

          vacate  the  decree  or  to  "terminate  the  obligations  stated

          [therein]"  because  those  obligations  represented  "consensual

          undertakings of the defendants with court approval."  Id. at 883.
                                                                ___

          All parties appealed.

                    In an effort to cut a passable swath through this legal

          thicket, we start by construing  the termination provision of the

          PLRA.  We  then test its constitutionality and,  finding no merit

          in the plaintiffs'  constitutional challenges, apply the  Act and

          evaluate the  extent of the  remediation to which  the defendants

          are entitled.

          II.  THE PLRA
          II.  THE PLRA

                    In parsing  the PLRA,  we afford de  novo review.   See
                                                                        ___

          United States  v. Gifford, 17  F.3d 462, 471-72 (1st  Cir. 1994).
          _____________     _______

          Such an exercise  in statutory interpretation always  begins with

          the  language of the  statute itself.   See Stowell v.  Ives, 976
                                                  ___ _______     ____

          F.2d 65, 69 (1st Cir. 1992).  At this stage, an inquisitive court

          should assume  that the  words of the  statute, if  not specially

          defined, comport with their ordinary meaning, and that the words,

          so read, accurately  express the legislature's  intent.  See  FMC
                                                                   ___  ___

          Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 57 (1990).  In keeping  with this
          _____    ________

          principle,  the court should  "resort to legislative  history and

          other aids of statutory construction only  when the literal words

          of  the  statute create  ambiguity  or  lead  to an  unreasonable

          result."  United States v.  Charles George Trucking Co., 823 F.2d
                    _____________     ___________________________

                                          6

          685, 688 (1st  Cir. 1987) (citation and  internal quotation marks

          omitted).

                    The PLRA is  not a paragon  of clarity.   In regard  to

          existing  federal court orders,  it declares  that "in  any civil

          action   with  respect  to  prison  conditions,  a  defendant  or

          intervenor shall be entitled to the  immediate termination of any

          prospective relief if  the relief was approved or  granted in the

          absence  of a finding  by the court  that the  relief is narrowly

          drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation

          of the Federal right, and  is the least intrusive means necessary

          to correct  the violation of  the Federal right."   18 U.S.C.A.  

          3626(b)(2).    Such  prospective  relief  shall   not  terminate,

          however, "if the court makes written findings based on the record

          that prospective relief remains necessary to correct a current or

          ongoing violation of the  Federal right, extends no  further than

          necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and that

          the prospective relief is narrowly  drawn and the least intrusive

          means to correct the  violation."  Id.   3626(b)(3).  With regard
                                             ___

          to   relief  not   yet  obtained,   the   Act  contains   similar

          proscriptions.   It  forbids courts  from  granting or  approving

          prospective relief "unless  the court finds  that such relief  is

          narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary  to correct the

          violation of the Federal right,  and is the least intrusive means

          necessary to correct the violation of  the Federal right."  Id.  
                                                                      ___

          3626(a)(1)(A).

                    These iterations  are  clear  enough,  but  uncertainty

                                          7

          arises when we examine the  Act's definitional instructions.  One

          such  passage defines "prospective relief" to include "all relief

          other  than  compensatory  monetary damages,"  and  then  defines

          "relief" to "mean[] all relief in any form that may be granted or

          approved by the  court . . . includ[ing] consent decrees."  Id.  
                                                                      ___

          3626(g)(7), (9).   "Consent decree," in  turn, means "any  relief

          entered by  the court that is based in whole  or in part upon the

          consent  or acquiescence  of  the parties  but  does not  include

          private  settlements."   Id.     3626(b)(1).   In  a vacuum,  the
                                   ___

          interaction  of  the  Act's mechanics  and  these  definitions is

          manageable:  terminating  "prospective relief"  as prescribed  by

          section 3626(b)(2)  would  terminate "all  relief,"  see  section
                                                               ___

          3626(g)(7),  which  under  section 3626(g)(9)  "includes  consent

          decrees."    Read   literally,  therefore,  once   defendants  or

          intervenors  show  their  entitlement  to  terminate  prospective

          relief, the  Act seemingly  requires termination  of the  consent

          decree itself.

                    As the district court astutely observed, this result is

          counterintuitive  in that it  contradicts the usual understanding

          of both "relief"  and "consent decree."   See D. Ct. Op.,  952 F.
                                                    ___ __________

          Supp.  at  878.   The  customary definition  of  "consent decree"

          likens such decrees to judgments, see Black's  Law Dictionary 410
                                            ___ _______________________

          (6th  ed. 1990)  (defining  "consent  decree"  as  "[a]  judgment

          entered by consent of the parties whereby the defendant agrees to

          stop  alleged  illegal   activity  without  admitting  guilt   or

          wrongdoing"),  and in  ordinary usage  a judgment  is "[a]  final

                                          8

          decision of the  court resolving the dispute  and determining the

          rights and obligations of the parties," id. at 841-42.  "Relief,"
                                                  ___

          on the  other hand,  typically is equated  with "remedy,"  id. at
                                                                     ___

          1292,  which is "the  means by which  a right is  enforced or the

          violation  of a right  is prevented, redressed,  or compensated,"

          id. at 1294.   Inasmuch as a remedy  effectuates the adjudication
          ___

          expressed  in  a  judgment,  one  ordinarily  would  assume  that

          "relief," by extension, effectuates  the legal decision,  arrived

          at by consent, in a "consent decree."

                    Congress  conflated the  two  terms  when it  described

          consent decrees  as a form  of relief rather  than as  a judgment
                                ____

          that  engenders relief.  The  PLRA's equation of "consent decree"
                _________

          and "relief" contradicts  conventional understandings and creates

          a situation in which a strict, language-based construction of the

          PLRA requires that  commonplace legal  terms be  used in  curious

          ways.   This circumstance fosters uncertainty, for a court cannot

          really  tell, without  further  inquiry,  whether the  linguistic

          anomaly  is accidental or purposeful (and, thus, whether Congress

          meant to uproot  consent decrees themselves or  merely to vitiate

          the relief attendant to them,  when it directed federal courts to

          facilitate  "the immediate termination of any prospective relief"

          at the behest  of prison litigation defendants  and intervenors).

          This uncertainty impels us to consult extrinsic sources in search

          of guidance as to Congress's intent.

                    In  this  instance,   the  PLRA's  legislative  history

          persuades us to embrace the unusual.  Congress passed the PLRA in

                                          9

          an effort, in part, to oust the federal judiciary from day-to-day

          prison  management.  See 141 Cong.  Rec. 14,419 (1995) (statement
                               ___

          of  Sen. Abraham)  ("[N]o longer  will  prison administration  be

          turned over to  Federal judges for the indefinite  future for the

          slightest reason.");  id. at 14,418 (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("I
                                ___

          believe that  the courts have  gone too far in  micromanaging our

          Nation's prisons.").  This evidence of ambient intent inclines us

          to interpret the statute literally  (i.e., as directing courts to

          terminate  consent decrees  outright), for  it strongly  suggests

          that  the  PLRA's   sponsors  wanted  to  truncate   the  federal

          judiciary's  involvement  in prison  administration.    The House

          Conference Report provides  even more powerful direction  on this

          score.   The Report describes  the "explanation of the  effect of

          the  action  agreed  upon by  the  [legislation's]  managers" and

          states that, by virtue of  the PLRA, "[p]rior consent decrees are

          made  terminable upon  the motion  of  either party,  and can  be

          continued  only if  the court  finds that  the imposed  relief is

          necessary to correct  the violation of the federal  right."  H.R.

          Conf. Rep. No. 104-378 at 166 (1995).  This plain language leaves

          little room for doubt  that Congress intended the PLRA  as a last

          rite for those  consent decrees that  are incapable of  surviving

          the rigors of section 3626(b)(2).

                    Of  course, we recognize  that the plain  meaning rule,

          while a bedrock principle of statutory construction, may yield if

          giving  effect to literal meaning would produce a bizarre result.

          See Sullivan v. CIA, 992 F.2d 1249, 1252 (1st Cir. 1993); Charles
          ___ ________    ___                                       _______

                                          10

          George  Trucking,  823  F.2d  at  688.   But  this  exception  is
          ________________

          sparingly employed, and the circumstances of this case give it no

          purchase.   The result  that Congress's  plain language  portends

          here  involves a  somewhat unusual  use of  terms, but it  is not

          unreasonable.

                    We  will  not paint  the  lily.   Given  the congruence

          between  the text  of the  statute  and the  legislature's easily

          discerned  intent, we conclude that Congress meant precisely what

          it said   however deviant from ordinary  usage that may be   when

          it wrote the PLRA and specially  defined its operative terms.  We

          are therefore duty  bound to interpret the PLRA  as mandating the

          termination  of  extant  consent  decrees  altogether unless  the

          district court makes the specific findings that  are necessary to

          keep a particular decree alive.2

          III.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PLRA
          III.  THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PLRA

                    Having construed the PLRA, we next must essay a de novo

          determination  of whether it  passes constitutional muster.   The

          plaintiffs  say that the Act's termination provision violates the

          Constitution three times over by transgressing (1) the separation

          of  powers principle,  (2) the  Due Process  Clause, and  (3) the
                              
          ____________________

               2Because   Congress   intended  the   PLRA  to   effect  the
          termination of consent decrees, we  need not elaborate upon  what
          consequences might  follow  from the  termination of  prospective
          relief  alone.   We note,  however, that  the Second  Circuit has
          invested   substantial   time    in   exploring   the   potential
          ramifications of  terminating prospective relief while  leaving a
          consent  decree otherwise intact.  See  Benjamin v. Jacobson, ___
                                             ___  ________    ________
          F.3d  ___,  ___ (2d  Cir.  1997)  [1997  WL 523896,  at  *15-16].
          Inasmuch as our interpretation of  the PLRA obviates the need for
          any  such exercise,  we  take  no view  of  the Benjamin  court's
                                                          ________
          conclusions.

                                          11

          Equal Protection  Clause.  Though  ably presented, none  of these

          assertions carries the day.

                              A.  Separation of Powers.
                              A.  Separation of Powers.
                                  ____________________

                    Few  tenets  are  more  central to  the  genius  of our

          constitutional  system than the  separation of  powers principle.

          See  O'Donoghue  v.  United  States,  289 U.S.  516,  530  (1933)
          ___  __________      ______________

          (describing  separation of  powers as  "basic  and vital"  to our

          scheme of government).  This principle has many incarnations.  In

          one  such   configuration,  it   insulates  the   judiciary  from

          unwarranted legislative intrusions.

                    The  courts' historic independence has its roots in the

          Constitution,  which  explicitly  provides  that "[t]he  judicial

          Power of the United States shall  be vested in one Supreme Court,

          and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time

          ordain  and  establish."    U.S.  Const. art.  III,     1.   This

          delegation of power serves "to safeguard litigants' right to have

          claims   decided  before  judges  who  are  free  from  potential

          domination by other  branches of government."   Commodity Futures
                                                          _________________

          Trading Comm'n v.  Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848  (1986) (citation and
          ______________     _____

          internal quotation  marks omitted).   The  due administration  of

          justice  demands  that  this separation  remain  inviolate.   The

          plaintiffs  lament that  the  PLRA  infringes  upon  the  courts'

          guaranteed separateness in two distinct ways.

                    1.    Reopening  Final Judgments.    The  separation of
                    1.    Reopening  Final Judgments.
                          __________________________

          powers  principle  forbids  Congress  from  reopening  the  final

          judgments of Article III courts.   See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
                                             ___ _____    _________________

                                          12

          Inc., 514  U.S. 211, 240 (1995).   After all,  if the judiciary's
          ____

          power   to   render   definitive  judgments   were   subject   to

          congressional control,  then the  judiciary would  become, within

          its own sphere, subordinate to the legislature.

                    Moving   from  the  general   to  the  particular,  the

          plaintiffs  maintain  that  the PLRA  offends  this  principle by

          requiring a  district  court to  rescind  relief that  the  court

          already  has seen fit  to award.  In  mounting this argument, the

          plaintiffs rely heavily on the Justices' observation, made in  an

          earlier round  of this  litigation, that "a  consent decree  is a

          final  judgment that  may be  reopened  only to  the extent  that

          equity requires."  Rufo, 502 U.S. at  391.  From this thread, the
                             ____

          plaintiffs   weave  a  syllogism:    Congress  cannot  order  the

          reopening  of final judgments without offending the separation of

          powers  principle,  a consent  decree  is a  final  judgment, and

          therefore  Congress  cannot  mandate  the  reopening  of  consent

          decrees.

                    This  reasoning  frays because  consent decrees  of the

          type at issue here are not "final judgments" for the purpose of a

          separation of powers  analysis.  In a recent  articulation of the

          rule that the  legislature cannot interfere with  final judgments

          of Article III courts, the  Supreme Court carefully carved out an

          exception  and endorsed a  line of cases  sanctioning legislation

          "that  altered the prospective  effect of injunctions  entered by

          Article III courts."  Plaut, 514 U.S. at 232.  This exception did
                                _____

          not  spring  full-blown  from  Justice Scalia's  brow.    To  the

                                          13

          contrary, its roots burrow deep into our constitutional soil.  An

          early exemplar is Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont  Bridge Co.,
                            ____________    ______________________________

          59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1855).  That hoary case  established that,

          although a judgment at law is impervious  to legislative assault,

          a forward-looking judgment  in equity can succumb  to legislative

          action if the legislature alters the underlying rule of law.  See
                                                                        ___

          id. at  431-32.   More recent  examples also  exist.  See,  e.g.,
          ___                                                   ___   ____

          Landgraf v.  USI Film  Prods., 511 U.S.  244, 273  (1994); System
          ________     ________________                              ______

          Fed'n No. 91 v. Wright, 364 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1961).
          ____________    ______

                    Lower courts sometimes are required to follow precedent

          for precedent's sake, no matter how much the yoke  chafes.  Here,

          however,  our burden is light,  for the Wheeling Bridge exception
                                                  _______________

          is not only  mandated by precedent but also  makes logical sense.

          The legitimacy  of prospective  equitable relief  rests upon  the

          presumed persistence  of the conditions that originally justified

          the   relief.    If  forward-looking  judgments  in  equity  were

          inviolate, then one  of two scenarios would develop:   either the

          legislature   would  be  stripped   of  the  ability   to  change

          substantive law  once an injunction  had been issued  pursuant to

          that law,  or an issued  injunction would continue to  have force

          after the law  that originally gave the injunction legitimacy had

          been found  wanting (and,  hence, altered).   The first  of these

          possible results would  work an undue judicial  interference with

          the  legislative  process,  while  the  second  would  create  an

          intolerable tangle in which some laws applied to some persons and

          not to  others.   Since the separation  of powers principle  is a

                                          14

          two-way street,  courts must  be careful not  to embrace  a legal

          regime that promotes such awkward scenarios.

                    To recapitulate, consent  decrees are final  judgments,

          but they are  final judgments subject to revision  "to the extent

          that  equity  requires."   Rufo,  502  U.S. at  391.    Plaut and
                                     ____                         _____

          Wheeling Bridge, read  together, teach that equity  requires, and
          _______________

          the separation  of  powers  principle  permits,  legislatures  to

          direct  that courts  respond  to changes  in  substantive law  by

          revisiting forward-looking injunctions.  See Plyler v. Moore, 100
                                                   ___ ______    _____

          F.3d 365,  371 (4th Cir. 1996).  The  Court stated the point with

          great clarity earlier in this litigation:  "A consent decree must

          of course be modified if, as it  later turns out, one or more  of

          the  obligations  [it  imposes]  has  become  impermissible under

          federal law."  Rufo, 502 U.S. at 388.
                         ____

                    The  plaintiffs try  to turn  these  verities to  their

          advantage by asserting that the  underlying law here   the Eighth

          Amendment   has not changed.  This is resupinate reasoning.   The

          relevant underlying law in this case is not the Eighth Amendment,

          as  there  has  been  no finding  of  an  ongoing  constitutional

          violation.   Rather, the relevant  underlying law relates  to the

          district  court's  authority to  issue  and maintain  prospective

          relief absent  a violation of  a federal right, and  the PLRA has

          truncated  that authority.   See  Benjamin v. Jacobson,  ___ F.3d
                                       ___  ________    ________

          ___, ___ (2d Cir. 1997) [1997 WL 523896, at *9].  The termination

          of a  consent decree in  response to the PLRA,  therefore, merely

          effectuates  Congress's decision to divest district courts of the

                                          15

          ability to  construct or  perpetuate prospective  relief when  no

          violation of  a federal right  exists.   Given this shift  in the

          relevant underlying  law, the  termination of  prospective relief

          pursuant to the  PLRA does not amount to  a legislative reopening

          of a final judgment.

                    2.  Rules  of Decision.   The  plaintiffs next  contend
                    2.  Rules  of Decision.
                        __________________

          that the PLRA's termination provision violates a different aspect

          of  the separation  of powers  principle,  articulated in  United
                                                                     ______

          States v. Klein,  80 U.S. (13 Wall.)  128 (1871).  Klein  had its
          ______    _____                                    _____

          genesis in the aftermath of the Civil War, when Congress passed a

          statute  that permitted  noncombatant  Confederate landowners  to

          recover  confiscated goods  upon proof  of their  loyalty  to the

          Union.   Klein,  the administrator  of  the estate  of Wilson,  a

          Confederate sympathizer,  attempted  to  recover  Wilson's  goods

          pursuant to  this statute.   Mindful that  the Supreme  Court had

          previously  declared that  a presidential  pardon was  conclusive

          proof  of loyalty,  see United  States v.  Padelford, 76  U.S. (9
                              ___ ______________     _________

          Wall.)  531 (1869),  Klein  tendered  evidence  that  Wilson  had

          received such  a pardon.   While the  case was  pending, Congress

          passed a  statute which declared  that a presidential  pardon was

          proof of  disloyalty and  directed the  dismissal of any  pending

          recovery action  brought on  behalf of a  pardon recipient.   See
                                                                        ___

          Klein, 80 U.S. at 131-34.
          _____

                    The  Supreme  Court  invalidated  the  new  statute  on

          separation  of powers  grounds.  It  ruled that  if the  law were

          allowed to stand,  then the trial court  would have "jurisdiction

                                          16

          of the  cause to  a given point;  but when  it ascertains  that a

          certain state of things exists,  its jurisdiction is to cease and

          it is  required to dismiss  the cause for want  of jurisdiction."

          Id.  at 146.   Such  a  requirement "is  not an  exercise  of the
          ___

          acknowledged power of  Congress to make exceptions  and prescribe

          regulations to the appellate power" and  thus "passe[s] the limit

          which separates the legislative from the judicial power."  Id. at
                                                                     ___

          146-47.   The  Klein  Court distinguished  Wheeling  Bridge as  a
                         _____                       ________________

          situation  in which  "the court  was left  to apply  its ordinary

          rules to  the new  circumstances created by  the act  [whereas in

          Klein] no  new circumstances  have been  created by  legislation.
          _____

          But the  court is forbidden to give the effect to evidence which,

          in its own  judgment, such evidence should have,  and is directed

          to give it an effect precisely contrary."  Id. at 147.
                                                     ___

                    The  plaintiffs argue that  the case at  hand resembles

          Klein  more than Wheeling  Bridge because the  law underlying the
          _____            ________________

          consent decree   the Eighth Amendment   remains constant, yet the

          PLRA  imposes  a  rule  of  decision  by  instructing  courts  to

          terminate  prospective relief.   This argument  misapprehends the

          situation.   As  noted  above, the  relevant  underlying law  for

          present purposes  is not the  Eighth Amendment, but the  power of

          federal courts to grant prospective relief absent  a violation of

          a  federal right.   Thus, the  PLRA does  not run afoul  of Klein
                                                                      _____

          because it does  not tamper with courts' decisional  rules   that

          is,  courts remain  free to interpret  and apply  the law  to the

          facts as they  discern them.  Because the PLRA leaves the courts'

                                          17

          adjudicatory processes intact,  it does not transgress  the Klein
                                                                      _____

          doctrine.   See Gavin v.  Barnstad, ___  F.3d ___, ___  (8th Cir.
                      ___ _____     ________

          1997) [1997 WL 434633, at *7-8].

                                   B.  Due Process.
                                   B.  Due Process.
                                       ___________

                    The  plaintiffs base their  next two objections  on the

          Due Process Clause.   The first rests  on the postulate that  the

          consent decree is a final  judgment, the existence of which vests

          property  rights  in the  parties  that  cannot be  alienated  by

          Congress.    By  purporting to  terminate  consent  decrees, this

          thesis runs, the  PLRA not only reopens final  judgments but also

          robs  the  judgments'  beneficiaries of  rights  secured  to them

          thereunder.   The plaintiffs'  second objection  posits that  the

          1979 consent decree constitutes a  contract and that due  process

          limits  the extent  to  which the  federal  government can  enact

          legislation  that  has  a   deleterious  effect  on   preexisting

          contracts.  Both objections lack force.

                    1.   Vested Rights.   The  plaintiffs' first  objection
                    1.   Vested Rights.
                         _____________

          fails  because,   at  least   in  the   absence  of   exceptional

          circumstances  well beyond  any that  are  present here,  frankly

          modifiable  decrees cannot create  vested rights.   See Landgraf,
                                                              ___ ________

          511 U.S.  at 273 (noting  that "relief by injunction  operates in

          futuro, and  that [a party]  ha[s] no vested right  in the decree

          entered by  the trial  court") (citation  and internal  quotation

          marks omitted).  As we  have already pointed out, consent decrees

          are not  merely final  judgments, but a  special species  of that

          genre   final judgments that can be "reopened . . . to the extent

                                          18

          that equity requires."   Rufo, 502 U.S.  at 391.  In  the instant
                                   ____

          case,  equity requires  termination of  the  1979 decree  because

          Congress has withdrawn  the power that animated the  decree.  See
                                                                        ___

          18 U.S.C.A.   3626(a)(1)(A), (b)(2).

                    To be sure, the plaintiffs argue that this reasoning is

          circular.  But, given the tenuous nature of consent decrees, that

          argument will not wash.   There is a  basic difference between  a

          money  judgment and  a  consent  decree:   the  former is  fixed,

          whereas the latter is necessarily impermanent.  Thus, insofar  as

          a consent  decree has  prospective effect, it  must on  motion be

          adjusted  to accommodate material changes of  fact or law germane

          to its issuance.3  See Rufo, 502 U.S. at 393.  Here, the PLRA has
                             ___ ____

          altered the standard by which courts can continue forward-looking

          relief, and this profound  change in the relevant underlying  law

          entitles the defendants to termination of the decree.

                    2.   Contract  Rights.    The  plaintiffs'  second  due
                    2.   Contract  Rights.
                         ________________

          process objection  is equally  unavailing.  Even  if we  make two

          broad assumptions  that are integral to their  position   namely,

          that the consent decree is  a contract and that the PLRA  impairs

          that contract     the  objection  founders.   The  Supreme  Court

          delineated  the standard of  review for federal  legislation that

          impairs contractual relations in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v.
                                           _____________________________

                              
          ____________________

               3This  precept  could  not   come  as  a  surprise   to  the
          plaintiffs.   In  the  last modification  of the  consent decree,
          under  date of  June 14,  1994,  the district  court advised  the
          parties that it would entertain  future motions to modify "upon a
          showing of good cause . . .  or upon a showing of material change
          in circumstances."

                                          19

          Atchison,  Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co.,  470 U.S. 451 (1985).  If a
          ____________________________________

          substantial  impairment of a contract right  is found or assumed,

          "the reviewing court next determines whether the impairment is of

          constitutional  dimension."   Id. at  472.   It  engages in  this
                                        ___

          analysis by  examining the statute and identifying the parties to

          the contract.   See id.  "When the contract is a private one, and
                          ___ ___

          when the impairing statute is a federal one, this next inquiry is

          especially limited, and the judicial scrutiny quite minimal.  The

          party  asserting a  Fifth Amendment  due  process violation  must

          overcome a  presumption of  constitutionality and  establish that

          the legislature  has acted in  an arbitrary and  irrational way."

          Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
          ___

                    Even  though the federal  government is not  a party to

          the "contract" in issue here (the consent decree), the plaintiffs

          seek to upgrade the level of scrutiny.  Their gambit depends upon

          the Court's  opinion  in Garcia  v.  San Antonio  Metro.  Transit
                                   ______      ____________________________

          Auth.,  469 U.S.  528 (1985),  which,  they say,  stands for  the
          _____

          proposition that the states have sufficient representation in the

          federal  government  to  influence  its  actions,  and  that,  by

          extension, the  federal sovereign's actions  should be attributed

          to the  states.   From this  coign of  vantage, they  argue that,

          since federal laws are enacted  by a government organized for the

          benefit  of the  several states,  a  federal act  that impairs  a

          contract to  which a  state is  a party  should receive  the same

          degree of scrutiny  as a federal  act that impairs a  contract to

          which the United States is a party.

                                          20

                    This ratiocination  is predicated on a strained reading

          of Garcia.  The Garcia Court held that state participation in the
             ______       ______

          federal  government provides  a sufficient  safeguard to  prevent

          federal overreaching  vis- -vis  the states.    See id.  at  552.
                                                          ___ ___

          There is,  however, no  basis in Garcia  or elsewhere  to suggest
                                           ______

          that  federal legislation  which  benefits state  governments  is

          tantamount   to  self-dealing  and  thus  subject  to  heightened

          scrutiny.   We therefore summarily reject the plaintiffs' reading

          of  Garcia and  the attendant claim  that the  federal government
              ______

          somehow became a constructive party to the 1979 consent decree.

                    This  gets the  grease  from the  goose.   Because  the

          federal sovereign is not a party to the consent decree, either in

          fact  or by  indirection,  we need  only subject  the  PLRA to  a

          rational basis review.  See  National Passenger, 470 U.S. at 471-
                                  ___  __________________

          72; see also United  States Trust Co. v. New Jersey,  431 U.S. 1,
              ___ ____ ________________________    __________

          22 (1977) (holding  that "[l]egislation adjusting the  rights and

          responsibilities  of contracting  parties  must  be [based]  upon

          reasonable  conditions  and  of a  character  appropriate  to the

          public purpose justifying its adoption").

                    Stressing    that   the    PLRA   abrogates    existing

          responsibilities,  the  plaintiffs make  the  obligatory argument

          that   the  law  is   arbitrary  and   irrational.     But  these

          animadversions vastly  overstate the case.  The PLRA only affects

          agreements  that   have  at   all  times   remained  subject   to

          modification  should  circumstances change.    And,  moreover, by

          facilitating termination, the PLRA's termination provision forges

                                          21

          a practical, commonsense linkage between a changed circumstance  

          the  district  courts'  newfound inability  to  grant  or enforce

          prospective relief absent a violation of a federal right   and an

          existing  consent  decree.     Consequently,  section  3626(b)(2)

          survives rational basis scrutiny.

                                C.  Equal Protection.
                                C.  Equal Protection.
                                    ________________

                    The plaintiffs also  advance a pair of  arguments based

          on the Equal  Protection Clause.  First, they  note that pretrial

          detainees, by  definition, have  not  yet been  convicted of  the

          crime(s) with  which they  have been charged.   Thus,  they enjoy

          both the  presumption of innocence,  see In re Winship,  397 U.S.
                                               ___ _____________

          358 (1970),  and the  right not to  be punished  prematurely, see
                                                                        ___

          Bell  v.  Wolfish,  441  U.S.  520  (1979).    Building  on  this
          ____      _______

          foundation,  the plaintiffs  assert that  the PLRA is  subject to

          strict  scrutiny (which  it  fails)  because  it  abridges  these

          fundamental rights.  In the  alternative, they claim that the Act

          violates core  principles of equal  protection because it  has no

          rational relationship to legitimate state interests.

                    1.      Fundamental   Rights.      Although  the   PLRA
                    1.      Fundamental   Rights.
                            ____________________

          circumscribes a  district court's ability  to provide prospective

          relief to  pretrial detainees  (as well  as all other  prisoners)

          absent  a violation  of a  federal right,  we conclude  that this

          feature of the Act does not abridge the pretrial detainees' right

          to be free  from punishment.   Prison  conditions either  violate

          fundamental  rights (in which  event they also  violate federally

          secured rights)  or they  do not  violate fundamental  rights (in

                                          22

          which event  they do not  violate federally secured rights).   In

          the   former  case,  the  PLRA  permits   relief  to  redeem  the

          fundamental right.  In the latter case, the PLRA does  not permit

          relief, but as  no violation exists, the PLRA's  denial of relief

          does not imperil pretrial detainees' fundamental rights.

                    It is also possible  to argue that the  PLRA implicates

          the  fundamental right  of access  to  the courts,  see Wolff  v.
                                                              ___ _____

          McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 578 (1974), and that, by withdrawing the
          _________

          power to  grant inmates prospective relief in  a manner available

          to other classes of people,  the PLRA trammels inmates' rights of

          access.    This  line  of  reasoning  does  not  withstand  close

          examination.  Under  the PLRA, the  courthouse doors remain  open

          and the withdrawal of prospective  relief   above and beyond what

          is  necessary to  correct the  violation  of federally  protected

          rights   does not  diminish the right of access.   In a nutshell,

          while there is  a constitutional right to court  access, there is

          no complementary constitutional  right to receive or  be eligible

          for a particular  form of  relief.  See  Crowder v. Sinyard,  884
                                              ___  _______    _______

          F.2d  804, 814  (5th Cir.  1989), abrogated  on other  grounds by
                                            _______________________________

          Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990).
          ______    __________

                    2.     Rational   Basis.      The   plaintiffs'   final
                    2.     Rational   Basis.
                           ________________

          constitutional  challenge  suggests  that the  PLRA  violates the

          Equal Protection Clause because it "singl[es] out a certain class

          of citizens for  disfavored legal status or  general hardship[]."

          Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1628 (1996).  This suggestion is
          _____    _____

          ill-conceived.   A statute  that neither  abridges a  fundamental

                                          23

          right  nor operates  against a  suspect  class receives  rational

          basis review  when it is  challenged under  the Equal  Protection

          Clause.  See  Heller v. Doe,  509 U.S. 312,  318-19 (1993).   The
                   ___  ______    ___

          PLRA is such  a statute:  as  we already have explained,  it does

          not impair a fundamental right,  and the plaintiffs do not assert

          that  pretrial  detainees are  a suspect  class.   Thus, rational

          basis review applies.

                    A  statute survives rationality review if it "bear[s] a

          rational   relationship   to   an   independent  and   legitimate

          legislative  end."   Romer,  116  S. Ct.  at  1627.   The  PLRA's
                               _____

          legislative  history indicates that the drafters intended the Act

          to "address  the alarming  explosion in  the number of  frivolous

          lawsuits  filed by State  and Federal  prisoners," to  "mak[e] it

          much more  difficult for Federal judges to issue orders directing

          the  release of  convicted criminals  from  prison custody,"  141

          Cong. Rec. 14,413  (1995) (statement of Sen. Dole),  and to wrest

          control  of  state  penitentiaries from  federal  courts  so that

          states "will be able to run prisons  as they see fit unless there

          is a constitutional violation," id.  at 14,419 (statement of Sen.
                                          ___

          Abraham).   These purposes are clearly  legitimate.  They involve

          the allocation  of public  resources, the  maintenance of  public

          safety,  and  the  desire  to  institutionalize  a  state-centric

          conception of  our federal  system.  The  means chosen  to effect

          these  ends  are  stern, but  they  certainly  bear a  reasonable

          relationship  to  the  announced legislative  goals.    From this

          perspective, the PLRA easily passes rational basis review.

                                          24

                    The  plaintiffs try  to  undermine  this  appraisal  by

          asserting that an anti-inmate animus drove Congress's approval of

          the PLRA.   They  claim that  such an invidiously  discriminatory

          intent  violates the Court's admonition that a legislature cannot

          construct legislation  "for  the purpose  of  disadvantaging  the

          group burdened  by the law."  Romer, 116 S. Ct. at 1628; see also
                                        _____                      ___ ____

          United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)
          _____________________________    ______

          ("[I]f  the constitutional conception of `equal protection of the

          laws' means anything, it must at the  very least mean that a bare

          congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot

          constitute a legitimate governmental interest.").

                    We need  not grapple  with the  intriguing question  of

          whether the  Romer Court meant to add a  new "animus test" to the
                       _____

          armamentarium   of  rationality  review.    The  short,  entirely

          dispositive  answer to the  plaintiffs' supplication is  that the

          evidence in the record simply  does not show that the legislature

          inappropriately sought to disadvantage the plaintiff class.

                    The  only "proof" that the plaintiffs offer consists of

          political rhetoric,  such as  the statement  on the  Senate floor

          that "criminals, while they must be accorded their constitutional

          rights, deserve  to be punished.   Obviously, they should  not be

          tortured or treated cruelly.  At the same time,  they also should

          not have  all the  rights and  privileges the rest  of us  enjoy.

          Rather, their lives  should, on the whole, be  describable by the

          old concept known as `hard time.'"  141 Cong. Rec.  14,419 (1995)

          (statement of Sen. Abraham).  Passing the obvious point that such

                                          25

          rhetoric must  be taken with a grain of salt   elected officials,

          after all, have been known to strike poses for public consumption

             the most that fairly can be said  is that oratory of this sort

          may  evince  a   philosophical  shift;  it  hardly   betokens  an

          impermissible animus.   In all  events, the state is  well within

          its  right  to  punish   persons  convicted  of  crimes,   and  a

          retributive  desire to  effect such punishment  consequently does

          not   offend  any  supposed  "animus  test."    Furthermore,  the

          plaintiffs are not  criminals, but pretrial detainees;  they have

          not been found guilty of any crimes.  Thus, even if the political

          rhetoric  spotlighted  by  the  plaintiffs  qualified  as  animus

          directed  at criminals, it would not constitute cognizable animus

          for present purposes.

                    In sum, an objective reading of the legislative history

          demonstrates that the plaintiffs' inability to obtain prospective

          relief does not spring from Congress's wish  to do them harm, but

          from its  desire to minimize  the occasion for federal  courts to

          administer  state prisons.    Consequently,  the  PLRA  does  not

          succumb to  any theoretical  "animus test"  contained within  the

          Equal Protection Clause.

          IV.  APPLYING THE PLRA
          IV.  APPLYING THE PLRA

                    The  plaintiffs have a fallback position.  They contend

          that, even if the PLRA is constitutional, the 1979 consent decree

          should  remain intact because  (1) the district  court previously

          made findings sufficient  to save the decree by  operation of the

          Act, see 18 U.S.C.A.   3626(b)(2), or (2) if the findings to date
               ___

                                          26

          are  inadequate,  the  district court  should  have  conducted an

          inquiry into  whether  a  violation  of a  federal  right  exists

          currently (or probably will come into existence if the strictures

          of the consent decree are lifted) before  implementing the PLRA's

          termination provision.  We reject both contentions.

                    Answering  the  question of  whether  prison conditions

          constitute an ongoing violation of a federal right under the PLRA

          necessitates  both a  definition of  the  right at  stake and  an

          assessment  of  a  specific   compendium  of  prison  conditions.

          Accordingly, such a  question comprises a mixed  question of fact

          and  law, the  answer  to  which we  review  "along a  degree-of-

          deference  continuum,  ranging  from  plenary  review   for  law-

          dominated  questions  to  clear-error review  for  fact-dominated

          questions."  Johnson  v. Watts Regulator Co., 63  F.3d 1129, 1132
                       _______     ___________________

          (1st Cir. 1995).   Here, the question is more factual than legal:

          inasmuch as the double bunking  of pretrial detainees does not in

          and of itself violate the  Constitution, see Bell v. Wolfish, 441
                                                   ___ ____    _______

          U.S. at  541, the  district  court's conclusion  that the  double

          bunking of  which the plaintiffs  continue to complain is  not in

          violation  of a  federal right  must  be challenged,  if at  all,

          principally on the facts.  Thus, the standard of review is highly

          deferential.  See Huguley v.  General Motors Corp., 999 F.2d 142,
                        ___ _______     ____________________

          146 (6th Cir. 1993).

                    We  have carefully reviewed  the record and  culled out

          the sparse factual  findings that the court made  in the relevant

          time frame.  No useful purpose would be served by examining these

                                          27

          findings in minute detail.   Judge Keeton concluded that they did

          not satisfy the  requirements of section 3626(a) or (b).   See D.
                                                                     ___ __

          Ct. Op., 952 F. Supp. at 880.  A trial court generally is thought
          _______

          to be the best interpreter of its own prior rulings and findings,

          see,   e.g.,  Martha's  Vineyard   Scuba  Headquarters,  Inc.  v.
          ___    ____   _______________________________________________

          Unidentified,  Wrecked & Abandoned  Steam Vessel, 833  F.2d 1059,
          ________________________________________________

          1066-67 (1st Cir. 1987);  Lefkowitz v. Fair, 816 F.2d 17, 22 (1st
                                    _________    ____

          Cir. 1987), and this case is no exception.  At any rate, we agree

          with Judge  Keeton's conclusion.    It is  simply implausible  to

          suggest, on this record, that  the district court's assessment of

          the existing factual findings is clearly erroneous.

                    The  plaintiffs'  follow-on  argument   gains  them  no

          ground.  As  to the conditions that presently exist,  we defer to

          the  district court's  intimate familiarity with  this protracted

          litigation  and  to  its informed  evaluation  of  current prison

          conditions.  See D. Ct. Op., 952 F. Supp. at 880  (observing that
                       ___ __________

          "no  evidence  is  before  the court  to  support  findings  that

          defendants are not  in compliance with the terms  of the modified

          Consent  Decree").    Deference  is  especially appropriate  here

          since, under the  terms of an order  that it entered on  June 14,

          1994, the  district court  for some time  had been  receiving and

          evaluating periodic reports from the Sheriff concerning incidents

          of assaultive behavior, rape, disease, and the like at the Nashua

          Street jail.

                    As  to what the  future may bring,  we cannot criticize

          Judge Keeton's reluctance to play the oracle.  Presented with the

                                          28

          opportunity  to  make  further   findings  before  deciding   the

          defendants' motions, the judge declined.  He noted several cogent

          reasons  why it  made sense to  leave the  question of  whether a

          violation of  a  federal right  might follow  the termination  of

          prospective relief under the consent  decree to another day.  See
                                                                        ___

          id.
          ___

                    We discern no error.   This is neither the time nor the

          place to press  an inherently speculative claim of  harm to come.

          The PLRA  imposes no  obligation on  the  trial court  to make  a

          predictive inquiry  into future conditions before  terminating an

          existing consent decree, and we are not aware of  any other basis

          for burdening  the court with  such a requirement.   Quite often,

          "[p]resent fears  are less  than horrible  imaginings."   William

          Shakespeare, Macbeth, act 1, sc. 3 (1605).  If, in this instance,
                       _______

          the plaintiffs' trepidation proves justified, they remain free to

          initiate a new  round of proceedings designed to  show that post-

          termination prison conditions actually do violate their federally

          protected rights.

          V.  VACATING THE CONSENT DECREE
          V.  VACATING THE CONSENT DECREE

                    Having  construed the  PLRA  and established  that  its

          termination-of-prospective-relief provision passes constitutional

          muster, that the conditions for  exemption have not been met, and

          that the Act's mandate  requires the district court to  terminate

          the consent decree,  we now mull whether that  mandate means that

          an order must be entered  not only terminating the consent decree

          but actually vacating it.  The  district court thought not.   See
                                                                        ___

                                          29

          D. Ct. Op., 952 F. Supp. at 883-84.  We agree.
          __________

                    The  defendants'   opposition  is   easily  dispatched.

          Nothing in the PLRA or its legislative history speaks of vacating

          consent decrees.  Congress chose  to use the verb "terminate" and

          to eschew the  verb "vacate."  The distinction  between these two

          words is clear:   "terminate"  means "to  put an end  to" or  "to

          end,"  Black's Law Dictionary at 1471, whereas "vacate" means "to
                 ______________________

          annul" or "to render . . . void," id. at 1548.
                                            ___

                    In  the  present  context, this  distinction  may  well

          possess practical  significance.  Cf.  Benjamin, ___ F.3d  at ___
                                            ___  ________

          [1997 WL 523896, at *15-16]  (explaining that court's view of the

          distinction between terminating prospective relief and vacating a

          consent decree).  While terminating a consent decree strips it of

          future  potency, the  decree's past  puissance  is preserved  and

          certain of its collateral effects may endure.  Vacating a consent

          decree,  however, wipes the  slate clean, not  only rendering the

          decree sterile  for future  purposes, but  also eviscerating  any

          collateral effects and, indeed, casting a shadow on past  actions

          taken under the decree's imprimatur.  As nothing in the PLRA even

          hints  that  consent  decrees must  be  vacated  when prospective

          relief is terminated,  we uphold the district court's ruling that

          the PLRA does not require vacation of the 1979 decree.

          VI.  CONCLUSION
          VI.  CONCLUSION

                    We need go no further.   To the extent that the parties

          advance  other arguments,  we  reject  them out  of  hand.   None

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          requires elaboration.4

                    For the reasons stated herein, we affirm so much of the

          judgment below that (a) found  the PLRA to be constitutional, (b)

          terminated  all prospective relief under the 1979 consent decree,

          and (c) refused to vacate that decree.   We direct, however, that

          the judgment be  revised to terminate  the consent decree  itself

          and  we  remand for  the entry of  a modified judgment  (together

          with such further proceedings, if  any, as the district court may

          deem necessary in light of this opinion).

                    Affirmed as modified  and remanded.  All  parties shall
                    Affirmed as modified  and remanded.  All  parties shall
                    __________________________________   __________________

          bear their own costs.
          bear their own costs.
          ____________________

                              
          ____________________

               4The  Commissioner  moved  below for  vacation  of  the 1979
          consent decree under Fed.  R. Civ. P. 60(b)  and now appeals  the
          denial of that  motion.  We need  not address that aspect  of the
          matter.  At oral argument  in this court, the Commissioner agreed
          that if the consent decree were to be terminated, the  Rule 60(b)
          issue could  be set to one side.  We take the Commissioner at his
          word and  therefore express  no opinion as  to the merits  of the
          Rule 60(b) claim.

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