Court Opinion

ID: 9530669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:02:28.223834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:12.757065
License: Public Domain

JENNINGS, Justice
(dissenting).
I do not agree with the decision reached by the majority of the court in this case, for quasi estoppel is clearly applicable.
One who participates in the procurement of and accepts the benefits from a judicial order or decree is estopped to deny the validity thereof, although such person was not a technical party to the proceedings. United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, 149 F.Supp. 696 (N.D.Ohio 1957); State v. Elkins for use of Ireland, 84 Colo. 409, 270 P. 875 (1928). The rationale of the principle is that “the conscience of the court is repelled by the assertion of rights inconsistent with a litigant’s past conduct.” Unruh v. Industrial Commission, 81 Ariz. 118, 120, 301 P.2d 1029, 1031 (1956).
“ ‘The principle opposing such action is one of estoppel in the interest of a sound administration of the laws whereby the regularity or even validity of an act procured by one himself cannot be raised- — -not that the act is valid, for it may not be, and estoppel does not make valid the thing complained of but merely closes the mouth *33of the complainant. * * * The principle is known as the doctrine of acquiesence, often referred to as quasi estoppel.’ ” Harlan v. Harlan, infra, 70 Cal.App.2d at 662, 161 P.2d at 493.
This rule has been applied to divorce decrees repeatedly. Based thereon, many courts have adopted the view that one who takes an active part in obtaining for another a divorce decree so that they might be married is estopped to deny the validity of such decree in an action to annul the subsequent marriage. Mussey v. Mussey, 251 Ala. 439, 37 So.2d 921 (1948); Harlan v. Harlan, 70 Cal.App.2d 657, 161 P.2d 490 (1945); Zirkalos v. Zirkalos, 326 Mich. 420, 40 N.W.2d 313 (1949); Judkins v. Judkins, 22 N.J.Super. 516, 92 A.2d 120 (1952).
In the instant case there is no doubt that appellant participated in the procurement of the purported divorce and accepted the benefit thereof by immediately marrying appellee. It is repugnant to the principles of equity, which are applicable in divorce proceedings, to permit the appellant to escape his obligation to support the appellee by this device. As it is persuasively stated in Harlan v. Harlan, supra, with reference to the husband’s suit for annulment:
“Plaintiff, however, is not in a position to take advantage of the invalidity of the Mexican divorce decree which the defendant obtained from Mr. Karlsson. The record is clear that plaintiff paid the attorney’s fee and expenses for obtaining said divorce and that he had an active and dominant part in arranging for same and in seeing that it was carried through expeditiously. Plaintiff herein was not technically a party to the Mexican suit. But he certainly was interested in its outcome. He was anxious that defendant be in a position so that he could marry her. He would thereby extricate himself from the immoral and illegal relationship in which he had been living. He as much as any other, not excepting the defendant, was responsible for institution of the suit and obtaining the decree. His interest then was to procure the result which he now seeks to nullify, after having lived with defendant as husband and wife for over twelve years. That the sweet may have turned sour does not make it conscionable that the plaintiff should be allowed now to undo what his own hand and mind had so much to do in creating. Plaintiff is therefore not in a position to question the validity of defendant’s divorce. This is on the principle of quasi estoppel ‘which is based upon the principle that one cannot blow both hot and cold, or that one “with full knowledge of the facts shall not be permitted to act in a manner inconsistent with his former position or conduct to the injury of *34another.” * * * 70 Cal.App.2d at 661-662, 161 P.2d at 493.
The majority attempt to justify their position on the dubious grounds that they refuse to give validity to a void divorce or to validate a subsequent bigamous marriage. This argument strikes wide of the mark. By refusing to permit the appellant to escape his obligations to the appellee, this Court does not recognize as valid a judgment of divorce which necessarily is assumed to be invalid, but merely prevents the appellant from avoiding the responsibility which he voluntarily incurred. Krause v. Krause, 282 N.Y. 355, 26 N.E. 2d 290 (1940). Nor is the marriage recognized as valid by reason of the estoppel. The Supreme Court of California met this argument squarely in Spellens v. Spellens, 49 Cal.2d 210, 317 P.2d 613 (1957), holding the theory to be that the estopped party by reason of his conduct will not be permitted to question the validity of the marriage; not that the marriage is found to be valid. The court therein unequivocally approved the policy of the Harlan case and quoted with approval that:
“ ‘To hold otherwise protects neither the welfare nor morals of society but, on the contrary, such holding is a flagrant invitation to others to attempt to circumvent the law, cohabit in unlawful state, and when tired of such situation, apply to the courts for a release from the indicia of the marriage status.’ ” 49 Cal .2d at 219, 317 P.2d at 618.
The majority opinion also seeks to distinguish prior Arizona cases wherein this Court has applied quasi estoppel in divorce proceedings by making a distinction between cases in which the proceeding is directly for the purpose of attacking the marital status as opposed to actions in which the determination of property rights is the object of litigation. This is a shadowy distinction which may prove difficult in application, for in most cases of this type, as in Unruh v. Industrial Commission, supra, the ultimate determination of the issues depends, first, upon a determination of the marital status of one or more litigants. In Green v. Green, 77 Ariz. 219, 269 P.2d 718 (1954), the plaintiff sought to set aside a judgment of divorce on the grounds that the court had been without jurisdiction to render it. There could not be a clearer case in which the proceeding was directly for the purpose of attacking the marital status, and yet this Court held that the plaintiff was estopped to assert the invalidity of the divorce. The Court stated therein that:
“As applied to a divorce decree, the general rule is that if one’s conduct has led to the obtaining of the decree, or if his conduct for any other reason has been such as would make it inequitable to allow him to deny the validity *35of the decree, the courts will not listen to his pleas of invalidity. * * * Under such circumstances, equity closes the door and refuses to disturb the situation thus created.” 77 Ariz. at 222, 269 P.2d at 720.
The decision rendered today is a clear departure from the principle of the Green case. The judgment should be affirmed.