Court Opinion

ID: 9584641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:51:01.702422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:11:11.694639
License: Public Domain

Taylor, Chief Justice
(concurring).
I see no question of ambiguity presented in the record before us. After taking considerable testimony, the Court made the following inquiry: “What question am I going to have this jury pass on, in interpreting this contract?” After a short discussion, counsel for Appellants stated:
“Your Honor, so far as we are concerned, we will submit the whole thing to you.
‘The Court: As a matter of law?”
Counsel: “Yes, sir.”
“The Court: And let me decide the facts and the law?”
Counsel: “The whole thing. We will do that, too.”
Further testimony was taken with the statement by the Court that it would rule later whether “I think it is a question of law or of fact.” Thereafter, when Respondents moved for a nonsuit, the Court stated: “Let the record show I have overruled the motion for a nonsuit, and that the Court agrees with counsel for the defendant that there is no question of fact presented here by the plaintiff, and the Court agrees with counsel for the plaintiff that there is no question of fact presented by the plaintiff, and it is entirely a question of law for the Court, and the Court in its discretion, is permitting the defendant to put up such witnesses to testify to such relevant facts as it may deem proper. Is that what you want?” The jury was then dismissed; and in his Order, the Trial Judge made the following statement which is not questioned: “All the parties contend that the agreement being sued on is free from ambiguity * * *.”
The case was heard with all parties contending that the contract under consideration was unambiguous. It therefore *166became the duty of the Court to, as it did, construe the contract without regard to the extrinsic evidence presented.
Appellants now contend on appeal that the contract is ambiguous and seek to have the case remanded to the Circuit Court for the purpose of introducing certain extrinsic evidence which would be admissible only in case of ambiguity, as in instant case, there is no contention of fraud, accident, or mistake in the procurement of the contract.
In an action at law, tried by the Judge without a jury, the Judge’s findings have the same force and effect as the verdict of a jury, and unless the Judge committed some error of law leading him to an erroneous conclusion, or the evidence is reasonably susceptible of the opposite conclusion only, his findings must be accepted by the reviewing Court. Robinson v. Carolina Casualty Insurance Company, 232 S. C. 268, 101 S. E. (2d) 664.
It is not contended that the evidence is reasonably susceptible of the opposite conclusion only to that reached by the hearing Judge, and I therefore concur in the Opinion of Justice Moss.
Moss and Lewis, JJ., concur.
Bussey and Brailsford, JJ., dissent.