Court Opinion

ID: 9647592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:41:31.51593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:51.023121
License: Public Domain

ESQUIVEL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
This is an appeal from a conviction for cruelty to an animal. TEX.PENAL CODE § 42.11(a)(4) (Vernon Supp.1986). The defendant attacks the sufficiency of the evidence and the constitutionality of the stat*204ute. I would reverse because the evidence is insufficient to support the conviction.
The undisputed facts show that the appellant and his wife went to a movie the-atre and left the dog in their automobile which was parked in the theatre parking lot. Admittedly, there was evidence that it was a very hot day. However, the State’s burden under the “information” was to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the dog was confined in an automobile without adequate ventilation.
The information charged appellant under Section 42.11 of the Texas Penal Code with intentionally and knowingly confining an animal in a cruel manner. The information also contained excess language: “by confining said dog in an automobile without adequate ventilation.” In Upchurch v. State, 703 S.W.2d 638, 640 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) the Court of Criminal Appeals in an en banc decision stated:
The distinction between unnecessary matter that must be proven, and that which is surplusage requiring no proof, is thus: When the unnecessary matter in the charging instrument describes an es- . sential element of the offense, the unnecessary matter must be proven at trial. Where it does not describe an esential element, it need not be proven.
Since the excess language clearly describes the “essential element” of confining an animal in a cruel manner, it was incumbent upon the State to prove that the ventilation was inadequate. Furthermore, the State, whether relying upon circumstantial evidence or direct evidence, was required to prove each element of its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Crocker v. State, 573 S.W.2d 190, 207 (Tex.Crim.App.1978).
The standard of review, in both direct and circumstantial evidence cases, is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-17, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2787-88, 61 L.Ed.2d 560, 572 (1979); Chambers v. State, 711 S.W.2d 240, 245 (Tex.Crim.App.1986). The only evidence presented with respect to the ventilation was that the windows of the automobile were left open approximately an inch and one-half on each side and that it was hot inside the car. This evidence is clearly insufficient, as the circumstances do not exclude every reasonably hypothesis except the guilt of appellant. Chambers, 711 S.W.2d at 245; Moore v. State, 640 S.W.2d 300, 302 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). I would sustain appellant’s first point of error.