Court Opinion

ID: 9439886
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 06:50:14.905369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:26:39.904622
License: Public Domain

CYR, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
Although I am pleased to concur in the result reached in the ably crafted majority opinion, I write separately on the due process claim.
On direct appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court (“Law Court”), citing State v. Plante, 417 A.2d 991, 994 (1980) (pre-Ne-ville ), erroneously concluded that “the right to a warning of the consequences of refusing a chemical test is not one of constitutional dimensions.” State v. Roberts, 609 A.2d 702, 703 (Me.1992).3 The district court below likewise erred in ruling that a “requirement that a driver submit to a chemical test does not implicate the due process clause of the Constitution,” Roberts v. Maine, No. 93-0154-B, slip op. at 3 (D.Me. Sept. 24, 1993) (magistrate-judge’s proposed findings and recommendation), aff'd, slip op. at 1 (D.Me. Oct. 27, 1993) (emphasis added). Consequently, neither court reached Roberts’ due process claim.
The Law Court premised its conclusion in large part on South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). See Roberts, 609 A.2d at 703 (“the [Neville] Court reasoned that allowing the suspect to choose whether to submit to testing is ‘a matter of legislative grace’ bestowed by the state legislature and thus, not subject to constitutional protections.”). However, the statement relied on by the Law Court related to Neville’s Fifth Amendment self-incrimination claim, not the due process claim. See infra at p. 1297. The Neville Court explicitly qualified its statement so as to obviate any intimation that penalties for refusing to submit to chemical testing are beyond the scope of the Due Process Clause. Neville, 459 U.S. at 560, 103 S.Ct. at 920 (“Such penalty for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test is unquestionably legitimate, assuming appropriate procedural safeguards.”) (emphasis added).4
The constitutional underpinnings for the more recent Supreme Court pronouncements on “implied consent” procedures stem from Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). See Ny-flot v. Minnesota Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 474 U.S. 1027, 1027-29, 106 S.Ct. 586, 586-88, 88 *1297L.Ed.2d 567 (1984) (summary dismissal for want of substantial federal question) (opinion of White, J., dissenting from summary dismissal); Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916; see also Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979); Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 97 S.Ct. 1723, 52 L.Ed.2d 172 (1977); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539, 91 S.Ct. 1586, 1589, 29 L.Ed.2d 90 (1971); Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 77 S.Ct. 408, 1 L.Ed.2d 448 (1957). Schmerber held the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination inapplicable because blood-alcohol level testing (“chemical testing”), albeit a Fourth Amendment search and seizure, simply yields real or physical evidence as distinguished from “testimonial” evidence. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 765, 86 S.Ct. at 1832-33. Accordingly, the State may force a non-consenting suspect to submit to a reasonable chemical test under exigent circumstances, without a warrant, provided there is probable cause to arrest the suspect for “operating under the influence” (“OUI”). Id. at 766-72, 86 S.Ct. at 1833-37. And since alcohol and drugs are evanescent substances inexorably metabolized by the body, the “exigent circumstances” requirement is almost invariably met by the urgent need to test before a warrant can be obtained. Id. at .770-71, 86 S.Ct. at 1835-36.
Years later, in Neville, the Supreme Court rejected two distinct constitutional challenges to an “implied consent” statute which empowered South Dakota to introduce into evidence an OUI suspect’s refusal to submit, to chemical testing. First, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination was never implicated because the State did not impermissibly coerce the refusal. Neville, 459 U.S. at 562-64, 103 S.Ct. at 921-23. Second, and more to the present point, the Court rejected Neville’s substantive due process claim premised on Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). Neville, 459 U.S. at 564-66, 103 S.Ct. at 922-24. Even though Neville was not warned that his refusal to submit to chemical testing could be offered against him at trial, and notwithstanding the fact that the police had advised him that his silence could not be used against him, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-73, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1624-27, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the Supreme Court nevertheless found no “misleading implicit assurances” that the refusal to be tested would not be introduced in evidence, since “the warning that [Neville] could lose his driver’s license made it clear that refusing the test was not a ‘safe harbor,’ free of adverse consequences.” Neville, 459 U.S. at 565-66, 103 S.Ct. at 923-24. Neville thus upheld the power of the State to penalize refusals to submit to chemical testing, but explicitly conditioned its exercise on the availability of “appropriate procedural protections.” Id.
The procedural due process analysis appropriate to the present context contrasts starkly with the substantive due process analysis in Neville, where the only unwarned adverse consequence was that the State ultimately might be allowed to request the trier of fact, at trial, to infer that the refusal to be tested constituted evidence of his consciousness of guilt (intoxication). See S.D.Codified Laws § 32-23-10.1. (1980) (“such refusal may be admissible” in evidence at trial.) In such a setting, a defendant would be afforded the full panoply of procedural protections available at trial. First, the State’s eviden-tiary proffer of the refusal to be tested would be subject to objection by the defendant; for example, on grounds that it did not evince the suspect’s consciousness of guilt but mere confusion as to his legal rights. See Fed. R.Evid. 401, 403. Second, if the refusal were admitted in evidence, the defendant would be allowed to introduce evidence to rebut any “consciousness of guilt” inference. Finally, the trier of fact would be permitted, and could not be required, see Carella v. California, 491 U.S. 263, 265, 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2420, 105 L.Ed.2d 218 (1989) (per curiam); Sandstram v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 514, 99 S.Ct. 2450, 2454, 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979), to infer “consciousness of guilt,” but only to consider it, along with all other evidence, in determining whether the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, in Neville, no unwarned consequence flowed inexorably from the refusal to be tested. All conventional trial procedures for barring and rebutting the refusal evidence remained available, *1298including the right to defend against it on the issue of guilt.
On the other hand, no meaningful procedure remained for Roberts to defend against the term of confinement mandated upon conviction for OUI as a consequence of the unwarned refusal to be tested. See Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 133-34, 88 S.Ct. 254, 256-57, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967) (sentencing is critical stage in criminal process); see also Palmer v. City of Euclid, 402 U.S. 544, 546, 91 S.Ct. 1563, 1564-65, 29 L.Ed.2d 98 (1971) (per curiam); cf. Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129, 137-39, 111 S.Ct. 2182, 2187, 115 L.Ed.2d 123 (1991) (even where sentencing court is vested with explicit sentencing discretion, sua sponte upward departure — absent prior notice to defendant — raises serious due process concerns).
Under the Maine “implied consent” procedure, see 29 M.R.S.A. §§ 1312, 1312-B (Supp.1994) (collectively: “section 1312”), the suspect is never warned that refusal to be tested entails a mandatory minimum sentence upon conviction for OUI. No matter how compelling or innocent the suspect’s reason for refusing to be tested, see, e.g., Jamros v. Jensen, 221 Neb. 426, 377 N.W.2d 119, 123 (1985), the sentencing court must impose a minimum term of confinement, without regard to whether either the trier of fact or the sentencing judge ascribes the slightest “consciousness of guilt” to the suspect’s refusal to be tested. Thus, in due process terms Maine’s standard “implied consent” procedure differs essentially from the process upheld in Neville, particularly with respect to the absence of adequate predeprivation notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1493, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985).
The State need not acquiesce in an OUI suspect’s refusal to submit to testing under an “implied consent” statute. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. at 1835-36. But once it opts to allow suspects to refuse chemical testing, it may not disregard procedural due process constraints under the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving suspects of their protected liberty interest in remaining free from incarceration, without affording either adequate predeprivation notice or meaningful postdeprivation process. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 541, 105 S.Ct. at 1493 ("While the legislature may elect not to confer [an interest], it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards.”)
The majority opinion in the present case essentially relies on a Doyle-based substantive due process analysis, see Doyle, 426 U.S. at 617-19, 96 S.Ct. at 2244-45, in concluding that it was fundamentally unfair for the State of Maine to subject Roberts to an unwarned mandatory minimum term of confinement for refusing to be tested. See supra pp. 1291-92. Although I am in substantial agreement with its substantive due process analysis, particularly that the warnings given Roberts included seriously “misleading implicit assurances” — a subject neither reached by the Law Court nor discussed by the district court — it is less clear to me that a substantive due process analysis is appropriate following Albright v. Oliver, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 807, 127 L.Ed.2d 114 (1994).
Even though the Fourteenth Amendment affords both substantive and procedural due process protections, the Supreme Court cautioned in Albright that “where a particular amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection against a particular sort of government behavior, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of substantive due process must be the guide for analyzing these claims.” Id. at-, 114 S.Ct. at 813. In the present context, therefore, Albright appears to require at least initial resort to the procedural due process jurisprudence having particular application to similar proceedings. See Mackey, 443 U.S. at 10-19, 99 S.Ct. at 2617-22 (applying procedural due process analysis to license suspension for refusal to submit to chemical testing).5
*1299The cornerstone regimen for identifying the particular process appropriate to deprivations of life, liberty or property is limned in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 819, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).
Identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.
Id. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903.
Under section 1312-B(2)(B)(4) (1987), a person convicted as a first-time OUI offender must serve not less than a two-day term of confinement if he refused to submit to chemical testing. Maine alone mandates a minimum term of confinement upon conviction for OUI after failing to submit to chemical testing, yet inexplicably withholds from its standard “implied consent” advisory any mention of the mandatory minimum term of confinement attending the refusal to submit. See supra p. 1289.6
The standard advisory contemplates that the police provide two explicit warnings before requesting an OUI suspect to submit to chemical testing. First, the suspect is to be informed that refusal to be tested will result in an administrative suspension of motor vehicle operating privileges for not less than six months nor more than three years. Id. § 1312(1) (first offense). Second, the police “should also inform the [suspect] that the failure to comply with the duty to submit to a chemical test is admissible in evidence” at a subsequent OUI trial. Id. Although a failure so to inform the suspect does not render any chemical-test result inadmissible, see id., no sanction omitted from the standard advisory can be imposed upon the accused, except the mandatory minimum sentence at issue in this appeal: See id. § 1312(1), (2), (8).7
*1300Among the other forty-nine states, only four impose any nonadministrative sanction for refusing chemical testing. Two states, New York and New Jersey, prescribe mandatory minimum civil fines following an adjudication in a separate proceeding, based on an independent showing that the suspect failed to submit to chemical testing. See N.Y.Veh. & Traf.Law § 1194(2)(c) (1994) (separate administrative proceeding); N.J.Stat.Ann. § 39:4-50.4a (1994) (separate judicial proceeding). See also State v. DiSomma, 262 N.J.Super. 375, 621 A.2d 55 (App.Div.1993).8 Three states, Alaska, Minnesota and Nebraska, have made it a separate criminal offense to refuse to submit to chemical testing, but only if the suspect was so informed at the time the request to submit was made. See Ak.Stat.Ann. § 28.35.032(a) (1994) (“after being advised ... that the refusal is a crime”); Minn.Stat. § 169.123(b) (1994) (“At the time the test is requested, the person shall be informed ... that refusal to take a test is a crime.); Neb. Rev.Stat. § 60-6,197(10) (1993) (“Any person who is required to submit to a ... chemical blood test ... shall be advised of (a) the consequences of refusing to submit to such test or tests.... ”); see also Jamros, 377 N.W.2d at 123 (holding that defendant cannot be convicted unless forewarned that refusal to submit is separate crime).
In sum, then, section 1312, unlike the “implied consent” procedure in any other state, neither criminalizes the refusal to submit to chemical testing nor contemplates that the suspect be forewarned that a criminal penalty, let alone a mandatory minimum term of confinement, may attend the refusal.
Absent adequate notice that particular conduct has been criminalized, a person may not be convicted or punished for it. See Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 361-63, 84 S.Ct. 1697, 1706-08, 12 L.Ed.2d 894 (1964) (failure to afford notice that statute criminalized particular activity); Wright v. Georgia, 373 U.S. 284, 293, 83 S.Ct. 1240, 1246, 10 L.Ed.2d 349 (1963) (same); Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 227, 78 S.Ct. 240, 242, 2 L.Ed.2d 228 (1957) (“Notice is required before property interests are disturbed, before assessments are made, before penalties are assessed.”). As a general rule, of course, publication of a criminal statute affords adequate notice to the public at large. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199, 111 S.Ct. 604, 609, 112 L.Ed.2d 617 (1991) (“Based on the notion that the law is definite and knowable, the common law presumed that every person knew the law.”). And, of course, the common-law rule — that every person is presumed to know the law — not only applies in criminal cases, United States v. International Mins. & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563, 91 S.Ct. 1697, 1700-01, 29 L.Ed.2d 178 (1970), but has prompted little concern in the usual course.
The common-law rule would be perverted, however, were it used to shield from constitutional challenge a deceptive State advisory that is delivered directly to the individual suspect and implicitly undermines any constructive notice presumptively afforded by publication. See Raley v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 423, *1301438-39, 79 S.Ct. 1257, 1266-67, 3 L.Ed.2d 1344 (1959); see also Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 n. 3, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 3169 n. 3, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (citing Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228, 78 S.Ct. at 242) (“If the regulation in question established a standard of conduct to which the probationer had to conform on pain of penalty — e.g. a restriction on his movements — the state court could not constitutionally adopt so unnatural an interpretation of the language that the regulation would fail to provide adequate notice.”) (emphasis added). Accordingly, in my view, constructive notice by publication cannot insulate from procedural due process challenge the deceptive assurances the standard “implied consent” form instructs the police to communicate directly to the suspect immediately prior to the decision to refuse to submit to chemical testing. See Raley, 360 U.S. at 438-39, 79 S.Ct. at 1266-67.
The Supreme Court made clear in Neville, 459 U.S. at 566, 103 S.Ct. at 924, that courts should be realistic in their assessment of the context in which the allegedly misleading assurances are communicated to the suspect. It would be unrealistic in the extreme to suggest that a suspect in custody, whose only actual knowledge comes directly from the police in the form prescribed by law, nonetheless must be deemed on notice that the police advisory incorrectly states the actual consequences of refusing to be tested.9 See Raley, 360 U.S. at 438-39, 79 S.Ct. at 1266-67 (Although the Commission gave erroneous advice to the witnesses, “the fact remains that at the inquiry [it was] the voice of the State most presently speaking to the appellants.”) (emphasis added); see also supra notes 8 & 9. Implicit in any such unrealistic assessment is the premise that a suspect in custody — denied access to counsel and totally dependent upon the State for the integrity of the implied consent advisory — should be presumed to have had not merely constructive notice, but the requisite actual knowledge of the procedural provisions of the “implied consent” statute that alone might alert him, but see infra note 13, to the criminal sanction attendant to a refusal to submit to testing. See supra note 5.
The standard “implied consent” advisory, naturally interpreted, see Griffin, 483 U.S. at 875, n. 3, 107 S.Ct. at 3169, n. 3, realistically and in context, see Neville, 459 U.S. at 566, 103 S.Ct. at 924, undermines whatever constructive notice might normally be presumed from mere publication of section 1312. See Raley, 360 U.S. at 438-39, 79 S.Ct. at 1266-67.10 The Court in Raley concluded that certain witnesses had been convicted without due process “for exercising a privilege which the State clearly had told [them] was available. ...” Id. at 438, 79 S.Ct. at 1266 (emphasis added). The Court even reversed the conviction of another witness, Brown, who was never advised that a privilege existed, but whose attempts to assert privilege had been facilitated by the Commission.11 Id. at *1302430, 79 S.Ct. at 1262. See Neville, 469 U.S. at 666, 103 S.Ct. at 924 (leaving open the possibility that the State might “unfairly trick” a person with an “implicit promise”); cf. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 659, 571, 85 S.Ct. 476, 484, 13 L.Ed.2d 487 (1965) (vacating convictions, as violative of procedural due process, on grounds that defendants had been advised by police officials that picketing was permitted at the arrest site).
Similarly, the standard “implied consent” advisory challenged by Roberts conveys not merely a “mixed message,” see United States v. Smith, 940 F.2d 710, 715 (1st Cir.1991), but one likely to befuddle a Philadelphia lawyer. While it requires the police to advise the suspect that he has the duty to submit to testing, it also requires that the suspect be told that he may elect not to submit to testing, subject only to certain administrative and evidentiary consequences. Although it is conceivable that “lesser included” sanctions for refusing testing might be encompassed within Neville’s “no safe harbor” rationale, see Neville, 459 U.S. at 565-66, 103 S.Ct. at 923-24, Maine’s standard advisory could only be salvaged on the coun-terintuitive theory that notice of the lesser sanction should be deemed to encompass the greater — both in terms of severity and constitutional dimension — thereby abandoning the central constitutional concern for meaningful process. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 551, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965) (due process clause envisions that the process due be accorded “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner”); Raley, 360 U.S. at 438, 79 S.Ct. at 1266; cf. United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176-77, 73 S.Ct. 189, 190, 97 L.Ed. 200 (1952) (“We cannot sanction taking a man by the heels for refusing to grant the permission which this Act on its face apparently gave him the right to withhold. That would be making an act criminal without fair and effective notice.”) (overturning criminal conviction for refusing admittance to government inspector in reliance on regulatory provision that appeared to confer right to refuse).12
Although the standard “implied consent” advisories on the administrative (license suspension) and evidentiary (admission of test refusal) sanctions for refusing testing afford fair notice that refusal is “not a safe harbor”, Neville, 459 U.S. at 566, 103 S.Ct. at 924, Neville does not insulate from constitutional challenge state-prescribed advisories that actively instigate the natural and realistic interpretation that no sanction more serious than the warned sanctions will attach to the suspect’s refusal to submit to testing.13 See, *1303e.g., Raley, 360 U.S. at 426, 79 S.Ct. at 1259-60. Furthermore, by instructing the police to bait the “no-test” option with the implicit assurance that “the consequences” for refusing chemical testing are noncriminal in nature, see supra p. 1299, the standard advisory seems well suited to snare even the most wary suspect. After all, rarely in the experience of courts, let alone ordinary citizens, are law enforcement officers cast as exclusive advisors to custodial suspects concerning a state-tendered option not to perform an implied duty, and then instructed to warn individual suspects of the noneriminal sanctions for abjuring their duty, without mentioning the criminal consequences. Under no natural interpretation of the standard advisory is it fair to say that a suspect is afforded meaningful pre-refusal notice of the mandatory minimum sentence.14 See Raley, 360 U.S. at 438-39, 79 S.Ct. at 1266-67; cf. Reich v. Collins, — U.S. -, -, 115 S.Ct. 547, 550-51, 130 L.Ed.2d 454 (1994) (denial of procedural due process results where statute, naturally read, allowed citizen choice between predeprivation or postdeprivation challenge to tax assessment, but state supreme court disallowed postdeprivation review after citizen had elected to prepay tax assessment).
A coordinate procedural safeguard under the Due Process Clause dictates that any opportunity to be heard shall be provided “at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Armstrong, 380 U.S. at 552, 85 S.Ct. at 1191. As there is no meaningful post-refusal opportunity to be heard on the imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence under section 1312, and no suggestion that the state sentencing court contemplated a two-day term of confinement irrespective of the mandated minimum imposed pursuant to section 1312-B(2)(B)(4), I can only conclude that the process accorded Roberts violated fundamental notions of procedural due process.15
Finally, the analyses contemplated by the Supreme Court in Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335, 96 S.Ct. at 903, clearly indicate that all appropriate process can be accorded under section 1312 simply by adding a few words to the standard “implied consent” advisory.
(i) The Private Interest
The core liberty interest Roberts asserts in remaining free from incarceration is entitled to full procedural due process protection. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72, 92 S.Ct. 2701, 2706-07, 33 L.Ed.2d 548 (1972); Bouie, 378 U.S. at 362, 84 S.Ct. at 1707 (overturning criminal conviction obtained through procedural due process violation); Wright, 373 U.S. at 287, 83 S.Ct. at 1242-43 (same).
(ii) The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The risk that an erroneous deprivation of liberty will occur is roughly commensurate *1304with the relevance the unwarned consequence bears - to the decision to refuse testing. ' The unwarned mandatory term of confinement — the most serious consequence— surely bears great relevance to the “no-test” decision; even a presumptively determinative relevance in the present circumstances.
Significant, derivative risks attach to the inaccurate advisory as well. No doubt there are many first-time OUI suspects with neither the knowledge nor the experience to assess whether their blood-alcohol content exceeds the prima facie intoxication level prescribed by statute. For such suspects, at least, it cannot be claimed that an accurate advisory on the mandatory minimum term of confinement attendant upon a refusal to submit to testing would not materially influence their decision. Thus, the deceptive “implied consent” advisory not only risks erroneous conviction (e.g., as a consequence of allowing an unwarned refusal in evidence where chemical testing may have revealed a blood-alcohol content below the prima facie level) but a sentence more severe than would have been imposed by the court but for the suspect’s unwarned refusal to be tested (e.g., where reliable test results would have disclosed a blood-alcohol content below the pri-ma facie intoxication level).
The undeniable value of a ready alternative to the deceptive advisory is obvious. The legitimate interests of the State, as well as the accused, would be significantly advanced by the simple inclusion of a straightforward warning that a first-time refusal to submit to chemical testing must be followed by a minimum term of confinement upon conviction for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs. The State would advance its prospects for obtaining the most reliable evidence of intoxication — the suspect’s blood-alcohol level, see Mackey, 443 U.S. at 19, 99 S.Ct. at 2621 (characterizing “chemical test” results as “the most reliable form of evidence of intoxication for use in subsequent proceedings.”)— while the suspect in custody would receive full, fair, and timely notice of the relevant options and their consequences.
(iii) Governmental Interests
Lastly, the governmental interests at stake, and the administrative and fiscal burdens attendant to any additional procedural safeguard, must be considered. See Mathews, 424 U.S. at 347-48, 96 S.Ct. at 908-09. Although the police power is among the least limitable, Lambert, 355 U.S. at 228, 78 S.Ct. at 242-43, the State of Maine points to no governmental interest in omitting mention of the mandatory minimum sentence in its standard advisory. Indeed, it is difficult to posit a legitimate governmental interest served by implicitly misleading OUI suspects into refusing to be tested. Rather, the State’s legitimate interest in obtaining the most reliable evidence of intoxication, through the voluntary cooperation of OUI suspects, is better served by advising the suspect of all sanctions for refusing testing.
The State has a paramount interest in minimizing any pre-testing delay which might render chemical-test results unreliable. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71, 86 S.Ct. at 1835-36. In all likelihood, however, a simple, straightforward amendment to the standard advisory would expedite chemical testing; certainly, it would not delay it.16 And the effort to eradicate the tragic consequences of drunken driving on Maine highways would be advanced thereby, rather than hindered.
The ease with which an alternative procedure can be implemented likewise weighs heavily in favor of an amendment to the standard advisory, see Mathews, 424 U.S. at 348, 96 S.Ct. at 909 (“At some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the individual ... may be outweighed by the cost.”), especially since it would occasion, neither pretesting delay nor significant expense.
As the mandatory minimum sentence was imposed in violation of the Due Process Clause, I agree that the writ should enter in *1305the event the State of Maine does not vacate the mandatory minimum sentence and afford petitioner a meaningful sentencing hearing at which section 1312~B(2)(B)(4) is not applied.

.Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, we accord de novo review to state court rulings on federal constitutional issues, Wellman v. Maine, 962 F.2d 70, 72 (1st Cir.1992), as well as to mixed questions of fact and law, id. ("Federal court may give different weight to the facts as found by the state court and may reach a different conclusion in light of the legal standard”) (quoting Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591, 597, 102 S.Ct. 1303, 1306-07, 71 L.Ed.2d 480 (1982)). See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 541, 105 S.Ct. 1487, 1492, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985) ("minimum procedural requirements are a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action.”).

.Indeed, the Plante case itself, upon which the Law Court directly relied in Roberts, 609 A.2d at 703, involved a self-incrimination claim as well. See Plante, 417 A.2d at 994. Viewed in context, the statement that an OUI suspect's "right to refuse" testing is "simply a matter of grace bestowed by the ... Legislature,” Neville, 459 U.S. at 565, 103 S.Ct. at 923, was meant merely to emphasize that the right to refuse testing, unlike the right to silence underlying Miranda warnings, is not of “constitutional dimension.” Id. Thus, Neville in no sense eroded the "constitutional dimension” inherent in the traditional procedural safeguards attending deprivations of protected liberty interests. Id. at 560, 103 S.Ct. at 920-21. See Mackey v. Montrym, 443 U.S. 1, 17-19, 99 S.Ct. 2612, 2620-22, 61 L.Ed.2d 321 (1979).

. Were it otherwise, however, it should be noted that "fundamental fairness” was disserved in the instant case by the presence of an important factor specifically found absent in Neville, 459 U.S. at 563-64, 103 S.Ct. at 922-23. That is, the Maine “implied consent” advisory, whether by *1299design or inadvertence, assuredly has the effect of "subtly coerc[ing] [suspects] into choosing the option [viz., refusal to be tested] that the State ha[s] no right to compel, rather than offering a true choice.” Id. (emphasis added). Cf. Roberts, 609 A.2d at 703 n. 1 ("As in Neville, the warnings provided in this case were not designed to "trick" the defendant into refusing a test, then using the refusal against him at trial.”) (emphasis added). As the Supreme Court excepted such subtle coercion from the sweep of its ruling rejecting Ne-ville's Fifth Amendment claim against self-incrimination, Neville, 459 U.S. at 566, 103 S.Ct. at 924, this factor too would weigh heavily against the Maine “implied consent” advisory under any substantive due process analysis which may remain open following Albright. See Albright,-U.S. at -, 114 S.Ct. at 820-21 (Souter, J., concurring) (due process clause affords protections not directly addressed by more particular constitutional provision).
Under either a procedural or substantive due process analysis, however, the State may not deprive a person of the core liberty interest in remaining free from incarceration, without affording either adequate advance notice or meaningful post-refusal process, by imposing a mandatory minimum term of confinement upon an unwarned suspect for electing to accept a state-tendered option to refuse chemical testing. Cf. Burns, 501 U.S. at 137-39, 111 S.Ct. at 2187; Neville, 459 U.S. at 563, 103 S.Ct. at 922 (noting that it is legitimate for the State to "offer [the] option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice.”) (emphasis added).

. The police are required to read a standard advisory to the OUI suspect, see Roberts, 609 A.2d at 703, and no more, see id. at 704. The Law Court concluded that it is “without authority to expand the warning to encompass the full range of potential penalties,” id., and we are bound by its interpretation of the Maine statute, see Ortiz v. Dubois, 19 F.3d 708, 713 n. 5 (1st Cir.1994), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 739, 130 L.Ed.2d 641 (1995). Thus, the omission of the mandatory minimum sentence from, the standard advisory plainly originates in section 1312.

. Section 1312(1) states:
Before any test specified is given, the law enforcement officer shall, inform the person as to whom there is probable cause that, if the person fails to comply with the duty to submit to and complete the required chemical tests at the direction of the law enforcement officer, that person's license ... will be suspended for a minimum of 6 months and may be as long as 3 years. The officer should also inform the person that the failure to comply with the duty to submit to a chemical tests (sic) is admissible in evidence against that person at any trial for operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs.
*1300No test results may be excluded as evidence in any proceeding before any administrative officer or court of this State as a result of the failure of the law enforcement officer to comply with this prerequisite. The only effects of the failure of the officer to comply with this prerequisite are as provided in subsections 2 and 8.
Section 1312(2) states in relevant part:
Any suspension in effect shall be removed if, after hearing, it is determined that the person who failed to submit to the test would not have failed to submit but for the failure of the law enforcement officer to give either or both of the warnings required by subsection 1.
Section 1312(8) states in relevant part:
If the law enforcement officer ... fails to give either of the warnings required under subsection 1, the failure of the person to comply with the duty to submit to the chemical tests shall not be admissible, except when a test was required pursuant to subsection 11, paragraph D [testing after an accident involving death],

. Under New Jersey law, the mandatory $250 civil fine is to be imposed following a separate' judicial proceeding, but only if the suspect was so informed prior to refusing testing. N.J.Stat. Ann. § 39:4-50.2. Under New York law, a mandatory minimum $250 fine is to be imposed, following a separate administrative proceeding, provided the suspect was forewarned that refusal to be tested may result in a license suspension. N.Y.V.eh. & Traf.Law § 1194(2)(c).

. A compelling public interest normally -warrants invoking the common-law presumption of constructive notice based on publication; quite simply, there is no practicable alternative. See International Mins. & Chem. Corp., 402 U.S. at 563, 91 S.Ct. at 1701 ("The principle that ignorance of the law is no defense applies whether the .law be a statute or a duly promulgated and published regulation.”) But where the only purpose served by the presumption is to perpetuate a seriously flawed "implied consent” advisory that is inherently unfair to the suspect and counterproductive to any legitimate State interest, due process must be first served. See infra pp. 1303-05.

. In Raley, certain witnesses were advised by the Ohio Un-American Activities Commission, a creature of the Ohio Legislature, that they were entitled to assert a state-created privilege against self-incrimination. Raley, 360 U.S. at 424-25, 79 S.Ct. at 1259-60. The Commission advisory was inaccurate, however, as an Ohio statute conferred automatic transactional immunity upon witnesses in return for their testimony. Id. at 431, 79 S.Ct. at 1263 (quoting Ohio Rev.Code § 101.44). After the witnesses were convicted of criminal contempt of the Ohio Legislature for refusing to answer questions put by its Commission, id. at 432, 79 S.Ct. at 1263, the United States Supreme Court set aside their convictions as violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 437, 79 S.Ct. at 1265-66.

.Significantly, the Commission permitted Brown to utilize a "shorthand” method for claiming privilege, id. 360 U.S. at 430-31, 79 S.Ct. at 1262 ("the Chairman's concern [as to whether Brown was asserting privilege] is inexplicable on any other basis than that he deemed the privilege available at the inquiry, and his statements would tend to create such an impression in one appearing at the inquiry”), without *1302informing him that the claim was invalid, id. at 431-32, 79 S.Ct. at 1262-63.

. The Law Court observed that § 1312 was not designed to trick Roberts into refusing to be tested. Roberts, 609 A.2d at 703 n. 1, ("As in Neville, the warnings provided in [Roberts’] case were not designed to "trick” the defendant into refusing a test, then using the refusal against him at trial.”) Supreme Court case law makes clear, however, that where an "established state procedure” deprives a person of a protected liberty interest without appropriate safeguards, a violation of procedural due process obtains. See Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 436, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 1158, 71 L.Ed.2d 265 (1982); see also Raley, 360 U.S. at 438, 79 S.Ct. at 1266 ("While there is no suggestion that the Commission had any intent to deceive the appellants, ... to sustain the judgment of the Ohio Supreme Court on such a basis after the Commission had acted as it did would be to sanction the most indefensible sort of entrapment by the State— convicting a citizen for exercising a privilege which the State clearly had told him was available to him.”)

. The standard “implied consent” advisory presents suspects with a deceptive choice in two vital respects. First, the suspect is never informed of the most serious, unmitigable, and irremediable sanction for refusing to be tested. . Second, were the State to choose to force testing upon the suspect notwithstanding his refusal, it is far from clear that the "option” of refusal would avail the suspect anything other than a mandatory minimum sentence. Compare Me. Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 29, § 1312 (1987) with Me.Rev. Stat.Ann. tit. 29, § 1312(2) (Supp.1985-86).
Unlike the defendant in Smith, 940 F.2d at 715 (rejecting entrapment-by-estoppel claim), there is no suggestion that Roberts had any knowledge that the "no-test” option tendered by the arresting officer was punishable by a mandatory term of confinement. The Smith court reasoned that an alleged “mixed message” from a police officer "could not have reasonably invited [the defendant's] reliance ...” because it was never claimed that the officer informed Smith that his conduct was lawful. Id. at 715. In the present' case, however, reliance upon the deceptive advisory was plainly reasonable. The alternative conclusion would be either that the information *1303actually provided the suspect at the scene is immaterial, but see id., or that constructive notice of the statutory language trumps the knowledge actually acquired by the suspect from the police officer at the scene. But see Raley, 360 U.S. at 438-39, 79 S.Ct. at 1266-67.

. Moreover, trader the rule of lenity, any ambiguity in the standard "implied consent” advisory must be resolved in favor of the accused. See United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 952, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 2764, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988) (identifying purposes underlying rule of lenity as: the promotion of fair notice "to those subject to the criminal laws, minimiz[ing] the risk of selective or arbitrary enforcement, , and ... maintaining] the proper balance between [the legislature], prosecutors and courts_”).

. It is neither plausible to suggest, nor discernible from the record, that the mandatory minimum term of confinement was imposed simply as punishment for the underlying OUI offense. First, the mandatory minimum sentence was not preordained by the OUI conviction but by the unwarned refusal to submit to testing in the moments following the arrest. Although it is preconditioned on an OUI conviction, all meaningful discretion on the part of the sentencing court is withdrawn as an unwarned consequence of the defendant's noncriminal refusal to submit to testing. Second, no mitigating circumstances, either in relation to the refusal to be tested or the commission of the underlying offense, can enable the court to sentence below the mandatory minimum. Third, the statutory description of the mandatory minimum sentence for refusing testing — as an "aggravating factor," see § 1312 — B(2) ("refusal to submit to a chemical test shall in every case be an aggravating factor”) — is itself a misleading euphemism'for what is in reality a conclusive sentencing mandate which the court is required not merely" to consider but to impose without regard to any mitigating circumstance.

. The majority opinion persuasively demonstrates that no Sixth Amendment right to counsel arose until well after Roberts refused to be tested. But though I share the view that Roberts was not accorded the process due when confronted with the choice whether to submit to chemical testing, I am unable to agree with the court that he was entitled to the assistance of counsel at that time, as distinguished from appropriate notice of the consequences of refusing.