Court Opinion

ID: 9585194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:57:23.398381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:34:01.205964
License: Public Domain

Thompson, J.
(dissenting in part) — The first three divisions of the majority opinion appear to be based upon sound principles of law, and I concur in the reasoning therein. From Division IY, however, I must respectfully dissent.
I. As the majority recites, appellee’s brief contained a motion to dismiss the appeal, based upon a claimed lack of jurisdiction in this court to consider it. The reason assigned is that no notice of appeal was given. The appeal is from an order before final judgment. It is what is known in the trade as an “interlocutory” appeal. The order objected to by the appellant was entered on November 5, 1954. Application for permission to appeal there*693from was filed in this court on December 1, 1954, and on that date tbe matter was set for hearing on December 10 next. On tbe latter date tbe application was granted. But no notice of appeal was served on tbe appellee until February 9, 1955.
Rule 335, R. C. P., provides, so far as material: * * where an application to tbe supreme court or any justice thereof to grant an appeal in advance of final judgment under rule 332 is made within thirty days from tbe date of such ruling or decision, the supreme court or any justice thereof may extend tbe time for filing tbe notice of appeal in tbe event tbe appeal is granted and tbe appeal, in such event, may be perfected within tbe time thus specified. * *
Upon oral argument in this court on February 8, 1955, tbe failure to serve notice was urged by tbe appellee. It is true appellee also argued the case upon tbe merits, both in written and oral presentation. He could not well do less; it would have been placing all bis eggs in one basket to rely solely upon tbe jurisdictional question. Nor is it important; if we did not have jurisdiction to consider tbe appeal, tbe appellee did not waive his right to have it so ruled by arguing tbe merits as well as the failure to give notice. Upon tbe same day the case was submitted by oral argument, a majority of tbis court, confronted with tbe lack of jurisdiction, made an order allowing tbe appellant to serve notice of appeal not later than February 10 next, and when tbis opportunity was embraced, tbe appeal was submitted on its merits. Tbis order and tbe following service of notice of appeal were, I believe, in contravention of well settled legal principles and of our previous decisions. Tbe whole procedure is an attempt to raise ourselves by our bootstraps; to breathe life into a carcass long dead.
II. I do not apprehend tbe majority will take serious issue with the statement that service of notice of appeal is the first requirement for jurisdiction in this court. R. C. P. 336 says: “Appeal is taken and perfected by filing a notice with tbe clerk of tbe court where tbe order, judgment or decree was entered, signed by tbe appellant or his attorney. * * (Italics supplied.) The pertinent part of R. C. P. 335 is set out above. Tbe majority by its order of February 8, 1955, has interpreted rule *694335 to mean that, although no extension of time was granted prior to the expiration of the thirty days fixed for taking appeals, it may be granted thereafter, and after a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction has been made and submitted, and jurisdiction will thereupon be lodged in this court. The instant case may or may not be one of hardship to the appellant; but such considerations should not determine jurisdiction.
There is a line of cases concerning the filing of the abstract of the record which is directly parallel with the situation in the case at bar. Section 4120, Code of Iowa, 1897, is herewith quoted:
“If an abstract of the record is not filed by appellant thirty days before the second term after the appeal was taken, unless further time is given by the court or a judge thereof for cause shown, the appellee may file an abstract of such matters of record as are necessary, or may file a copy of the final judgment or order appealed from, or other matters required, certified to by the clerk of the trial court, and cause the case to be docketed, and the appeal upon motion shall be dismissed, or the judgment or order affirmed. Denial of abstracts, additional abstracts or transcripts may also be filed.”
This section had been in the preceding Codes of 1873 and the Eevision of 1860. It was interpreted in Newbury v. Getchell & Martin Lbr. & Mfg. Co., 106 Iowa 140, 76 N.W. 514; White v. Guarantee Abstract Co., 96 Iowa 343, 65 N.W. 305; Rosenbaum v. Partch, 85 Iowa 409, 52 N.W. 181; and Short v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 79 Iowa 73, 44 N.W. 539. The question in each case was whether the trial court might extend the time for filing a bill of exceptions after it had expired; the identical point which the majority has decided in favor of the appellant in the instant case, except that we are here concerned .with the right to serve and file a notice of appeal after the prescribed time therefor has lapsed. It will be noted the cases last above cited were concerned with the power of the court to permit filings of bills of exceptions, which were an essential part of the abstract of the record under the then prevailing practice; while in the case at bar we are considering the right to serve and file a notice *695of appeal, which is a matter of jurisdiction. This distinction is pointed out in Newbury v. Getchell & Martin .Lbr. & Mfg. Co., supra, at page 150 of 106 Iowa, page 517 of 76 N.W., “It is not jurisdictional in the sense that the service of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional.” More care should be taken not to assume jurisdiction than power. The language and reasoning of the cases cited is directly opposed to the action taken by the majority here.
In Newbury v. Getchell & Martin Lbr. & Mfg. Co., supra, at page 151 of 106 Iowa, page 518 of 76 N.W., this court said: “The rule of interpretation which required the extension of time for which section 2831 of the Code of 1873 provided, to be granted before the right to file a bill of exceptions had expired, requires us to hold that the extension of time authorized by section 4120 of the Code, to be effectual, must be granted, before the right to file the abstract has expired. In other words, neither this court, nor a judge thereof, can grant to an appellant the right, which has once been lost, to file cm abstract, but while that right exists the time for its exercise may be extended by this court or by one of its judges.” (Italics supplied.)
To the same effect is White v. Guarantee Abstract Co., supra, where it is said, at page 345 of 96 Iowa, page 306 of 65 N.W.: “It. will be well to specifically state that when the time for filing a bill of exceptions, as fixed by law, the consent of .parties., or the order of the court or judg.e. expires, so that the right must be revived, rather than extended, neither the court nor. judge has. that right. While, either may possess the right., by proper order, ta extend or continue the time for the exercise of such right, neither has the right, when it is once lost to restore it.” (Italics supplied.)
The language of R. C. P. 335, giving this court or a justice thereof the right to extend the time for service of notice of appeal upon appeals from orders before final judgment is identical in substance with the provisions of section 4120, Code of Iowa, 1897, and the like section of the Code of 1873, which the court was considering in the eases cited. It seems to me to be beyond argument that rule 335 was intended to give the court or a judge the right to extend time for service of notice of appeal when, because of the necessity for making application for leave to take an *696interlocutory appeal, and fixing time for hearing and notice, the thirty-day period fixed for giving such notice would expire or be materially shortened before it was known whether leave would be granted; but logic and the authority of the cases cited preclude the thought that the time for service of such notice might be extended after it had expired. I do not refer to or rely upon cases decided after the Fortieth Extra General Assembly added to the previous language of section 4120 the words “before the expiration of said time.” This did nothing more than add express words which followed the law as previously settled by the interpretation of the statute fixed by the Newbury and other cases cited above. The cases have never been overruled, but have now been entirely disregarded by the majority, without discussion.
III. It is a much more serious matter to arrogate to ourselves jurisdiction of the subject matter of an appeal than it would have been to assume power not granted by the statutes, as was attempted and denied in the Newbury and other cases, supra. Without service of á notice of appeal we have no jurisdiction. Ball v. James (not in Iowa Reports), 155 N.W. 961.
In Stolar v. Turner, 236 Iowa 628, 640, 19 N.W.2d 585, 590, a majority of this court held we might in a proper case waive strict application of certain of its Rules of Civil Procedure, the particular ones there involved being rules 340 to 353 inclusive. The opinion relies upon R.C.P. 371, which says: “The supreme court shall have power tO' revoke, change or supplement any of these rules which prescribe the procedure in that court. Under this power the court may revoke, change or supplement any rule in division XVI hereof except rules 331-339 inclusive. Any such change or addition shall take effect at such time as the court shall prescribe.”
It will be noted the legislature therein granted us the right to “revoke, change or supplement” any of the rules prescribing the procedure in this court; with, however, the notable exception of rules 331 to 339' inclusive. In this category are included what may be termed the jurisdictional rules, particularly rules 335 and 336, which most concern us here. We have no right to waive these jurisdictional provisions. Unless we are to overrule the sound reasoning and definite pronouncements of Newbury v. *697Getchell & Martin Lbr. & Mfg. Co. and White v. Guarantee Abstract Co., both supra, and other cases cited, we cannot hold service of notice of appeal after the time for appeal has expired gives us any jurisdiction whatever of the subject matter of this appeal.
IV. It may be that appellee will be benefited instead of harmed by having the question of venue decided here, rather than after the case has been tried in the lower court. Perhaps it would not profit him to try his case in the court in which venue is now lodged by the decision of the District Court, since if he prevailed there a reversal upon appeal might be required. But this consideration still does not give us jurisdiction. Appellee has raised the question; his legal rights should be respected. I suggest we should follow the established law; in the end, justice and the rights of litigants will be far better served if we disregard questions of expediency and adhere to settled principles.
I would dismiss the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
Bliss, Larson and Oliver, JJ., join in this dissent.