Court Opinion

ID: 6602410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-20 20:08:55.268503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:58:03.736071
License: Public Domain

DeBRULER, Justice,
concurring in result.
The public policy of this State as embodied in Indiana Code §§ 16-8-3-1 and 16-8-4-2 is that "medical or surgical treatment" of a minor is authorized by law upon consent of a parent. These statutes declare that the decision reached by parents with the concurrence of a doctor, to provide a particular form of medical or surgical treatment for their child, is legally sufficient in the absence of court authorization to justify the battery of the child involved in the treatment. In order for courts to act in a manner consistent with this policy, they should, when considering the petition of a child seeking court protection from a treatment plan agreed upon by the child's parents and physicians, restrict their consideration to the question of whether or not the proposed plan is in fact one involving "medical or surgical treatment". Surgical sterilization can be either treatment or non-treatment. The case of A.L. v. G.R.H., (1975) 163 Ind.App. 636, 325 N.E.2d 501, presents a situation in which the court properly concluded that a proposed vasectomy was not part of a legitimate medical treatment plan for a retarded child. In the present case the hysterectomy proposed for P.S. falls within the scope of legitimate medical treatment of the individual, and as such, P.S. is not entitled to court protection from it. The trial court was correct therefore in denying the petition of P.S. However, unlike the majority, I find that in proper legal perspective, it is the statute and not the judgment denying the petition which gives legal sanction to the decision of the parents and doctors. This perspective reinforces again my long-held legal opinion that Indiana courts have no jurisdiction upon application of parents, relatives, legal representatives, doctors, hospitals, or others to authorize or order the sterilization of retarded or other incapacitated persons, in the absence of express enabling legislation. I am therefore not in accord with the majority on the jurisdictional point.
PRENTICE, J., concurs.