Court Opinion

ID: 9517297
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:13:00.720356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:17.099021
License: Public Domain

Adams, J.
(dissenting in part and concurring in part). In Carman v. Hare (1971), 384 Mich 443, this Court decided that the people duly adopted an amendment to the Constitution, submitted as Proposal C at the general election of November 3,1970, and that its language became a part of the Michigan Constitution on the following December 18. If this added provision does not violate the Federal Constitution (Questions 6 and 7), it is controlling and our duty in this case, in answering the stated questions, is simply to apply and, if need be, to construe its provisions.
I agree with Justice Williams that this case raises the question of the construction of Article 8, § 2, as amended. I agree with him as to the rules of construction, but would add that we recently had occasion to consider the language of the first paragraph of Article 8, § 2, in the case of Bond v. Ann Arbor School District (1970), 383 Mich 693. In that case, in a unanimous per curiam opinion, this Court stated (pp 699, 700):
“The first rule a court should follow in ascertaining the meaning of words in a constitution is to give effect to the plain meaning of such words as under*438stood by the people who adopted it. See People, ex rel. Twitchell, v. Blodgett (1865), 13 Mich 127, 141, 167; People v. Board of State Canvassers (1949), 323 Mich 523, 528, 529; and Michigan Farm Bureau v. Secretary of State (1967), 379 Mich 387, 390, 391.” (Emphasis added.)
The petitions to place Proposal C on the ballot were drafted and circulated before the legislative enactment appropriating $22,000,000 for private schools, commonly known as “parochiaid,” became law. The petitions were circulated in February and March of 1970 and were filed with the Secretary of State on June 25 and July 2, 1970. Parochiaid did not become law until July 20, 1970. Prior to the adoption of parochiaid, other proposals by way of tax relief to parents of children attending private schools, or to individual taxpayers for expenses connected with attendance at schools or colleges, were considered by the legislature.
Before the adoption of Proposal C, the Constitution clearly provided for “free public elementary and secondary schools * * * without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or national origin.” Proposal C addressed itself to state involvement in private schools in the light of the debate that had been raging in the legislature and among the public as to whether there should be any such involvement, whether in the form of parochiaid, tax credits, or whatsoever. The language of Proposal C is clearly aimed at no involvement in whatever form it might take with the one exception that the legislature could provide for the transportation of students to and from any school.
Turning to the certified questions, as to question number one, my answer is: At the public school, “No”; on nonpublic school premises, “Yes.” I would leave for future determination on a case-by-case *439basis whether or not so-called leased premises constitute a bona fide portion of the public school premises or are merely a device to attempt to circumvent the prohibitions of Proposal C. It seems obvious that to provide shared-time programs in private schools would constitute the use of public moneys to aid or maintain such schools in their operations and that it would tend to support the attendance of students at such nonpublic schools. Once the door is open to shared-time programs in private schools, it would be a simple matter, by the use of such programs, to achieve all of the objectives attempted by parochiaid and to defeat completely what the people attempted to achieve by adopting Proposal C.
I agree with Justice Williams that Proposal C does not prohibit shared-time instruction for private school students in the public schools. In such a situation, the so-called shared-time student is nothing more than a part-time public school student. His status is no different from that of any other student who is enrolled less than full time. In dealing with this constitutional question, I would therefore determine a student’s status at a given time by the school he attends. Students who attend both public school and nonpublic school for different courses of study are, in my opinion, both public and nonpublic school students.
This is the rationale of the released time student who attends a private school for religious instruction. If he were considered to be a public school student while in attendance at the religious school, this would be constitutionally forbidden. There is nothing about attendance at a public school or a private school that justifies tagging a student as belonging exclusively to one or the other. Therefore, I can find no partial invalidity in what Justice Williams refers to as Proposal ,C’s fourth and fifth *440prohibitions. A student attending public school, even for only a portion of the day, is a public school student while attending public school classes.
If place of attendance is not used as the test of student status, all rules of constitutional construction as to the meaning of Proposal C are violated— (1) we fail to give effect to the plain meaning of the words of Proposal C as understood by the people who adopted it — the “common understanding”; (2) we fail to take account of the circumstances surrounding the adoption of Proposal C; and (3) we ignore an interpretation that does not create constitutional invalidity, going out of our way to adopt an interpretation that does.
The language of Proposal C and the prohibitions therein contained are aimed at private schools and institutions — to expand the prohibitions as applying to public schools runs counter to the plain meaning and intent of Proposal C and of the language used. In any event, Federal and state equal protection guarantees require that programs offered in the public school be made available to all students, whether from public or private schools, on an equal basis.
I agree with Justice Williams’ answer to question number two — Auxiliary Services. General health and safety measures are not within the reach of the prohibitions contained in Proposal C.
I agree with Justice Williams’ answer to question number three — Federal' Moneys under Title I.
I am unable to agree with Justice Williams’ answer to question number four — Private Foster Homes. The question which confronts us here is not whether a probate judge has authority to place a minor in a private foster home but whether public moneys paid to private foster homes may be used to provide educational facilities and instruction for *441the minor who resides in the home. The prohibitions of Proposal C are against the expenditure of public moneys “to aid or maintain any private, denominational or other nonpublic, pre-elementary, elementary, or secondary school,” and against payment “to support the attendance of any student or the employment of any person at any such nonpublic school or at any location or institution where instruction is offered in whole or in part to such nonpublic school students.” A school is a school, whether conducted by a private foster home, by a church, or by the state.
Neglected or dependent children are wards of the state. The state owes a special obligation to them, especially the neglected child who, through no fault of his own, lacks a proper home atmosphere. In fulfilling its obligation, some such children are sent to state institutions. Others are placed in private foster homes. The responsibility to provide schooling for all children is a state responsibility, specifically enunciated in the first paragraph of Article 8, § 2, wherein the legislature is required to maintain and support a system of “free public elementary and secondary schools * * * without discrimination as to religion, creed, race, color or national origin.” I fail to see how this responsibility can be shifted to private foster homes at public expense without unduly discriminating against the neglected or dependent children who are sent to those private foster homes and are thereby relegated to private schooling wholly outside the bounds of the state’s constitutional responsibility.
I agree with Justice Williams that the answer to question number five is “Yes” as to parents, and “No” as to schools.
With regard to questions number six and number seven — Constitutional Questions — as I would con*442strue Proposal C, there is no violation of due process of law or equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, or of the right to free exercise of religion and other enumerated rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States as made applicable to the State of Michigan through the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.