Court Opinion

ID: 9400773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-09 14:07:05.461916+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:47.781042
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 2, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                            NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                              Court of Appeals
                                  NO. 2022-CA-0151-MR

JOHN FAIRLEY, III                                                     APPELLANT

                    APPEAL FROM CHRISTIAN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                     HONORABLE ANDREW SELF, JUDGE
                            ACTION NO. 14-CR-00551

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                APPELLEE

                                         OPINION
                                        AFFIRMING

                                       ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND EASTON, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: John Fairley, III, appeals the order of the Christian Circuit

Court, entered on January 9, 2022, denying his RCr1 11.42 motion to vacate his

convictions. After careful review of the briefs, record, and law, we affirm.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
            BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                After a jury trial, Fairley was convicted of first-degree robbery,2

receiving stolen property (firearm),3 first-degree possession of a controlled

substance (while armed),4 and possession of marijuana (while armed),5 and

sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment by judgment entered January 4, 2016. The

Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed on direct appeal, and we adopt those facts, as

follows:

                         On September 2, 2014, Charles “Bird Dog” Page
                . . . hitched a ride with two . . . men in a blue car. After
                driving for some time, the driver turned down an alley.
                Subsequently, the passenger in the front seat (later
                identified by Page as Fairley) pointed a handgun at Page
                and commanded “Give me your money.” Page fled the
                vehicle and ran towards a law office. Fairley gave chase
                and struck Page in the back of the head with his pistol.
                Page then began to yell for help.

                       Hearing the disturbance, Lucius Hawes[] exited his
                law office and saw [a man matching Fairley’s
                description], dressed in dark clothing, and carrying a
                large semi-automatic pistol, fleeing the scene headed in
                the direction of Clay Street. [Page later reported that the
                assailant also stole his money.]

                ....

2
    A class B felony. Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS ) 515.020.
3
    A class D felony. KRS 514.110(3)(c) (2009).
4
    Enhanced to a class C felony. KRS 218A.1415; KRS 218A.992.
5
    Enhanced to a class D felony. KRS 218A.1422; KRS 218A.992.

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                   [Police] received tips which suggested Fairley’s
            involvement . . . [and] learned that at the time of the
            robbery [he] had been wearing a GPS ankle monitor as
            part of a court-ordered home incarceration. . . . Fairley’s
            monitoring device was registered as being near Hawes’s
            office and moving away from that location towards Clay
            Street at the time of the robbery.

                   [During his first police interview, Fairley claimed
            to have been out submitting employment applications in
            a red car on the day of the robbery.] The following day,
            September 4, 2014, police using GPS tracking located
            Fairley sitting alone in the back seat of a white vehicle
            parked in a vacant lot. [I]n the rear of the vehicle,
            approximately a foot away from Fairley, was a firearm
            which . . . had previously been reported stolen. Also in
            the vacant lot was a blue Malibu vehicle . . . registered to
            Fairley’s mother.

                    After Fairley’s arrest he was again interviewed by
            the police . . . . Fairley initially claimed that he had been
            at his home during the time of the robbery. However,
            later in the interview, he stated that he had witnessed
            someone attacking Page and he gave that person a ride
            away from the area.

                   [Police recovered cocaine and marijuana from a]
            later search of the blue Malibu . . . [, and] forensic testing
            established the presence of [Page’s] blood on the
            passenger’s side door handle of the blue Malibu, the
            firearm, and [a pair of socks recovered from Fairley’s
            home].

Fairley v. Commonwealth, 527 S.W.3d 792, 795-96 (Ky. 2017) (footnote omitted).

            On April 1, 2019, Fairley filed the underlying motion asserting that he

received ineffective assistance of counsel. An evidentiary hearing was conducted

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on September 2, 2021, wherein he and his trial counsel testified concerning

counsel’s investigative efforts and his preparation of Fairley’s trial testimony.

After briefing, the court entered an order denying relief on January 9, 2022, and

this appeal followed. Additional facts will be introduced as they become relevant.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

             Ineffective assistance of counsel claims are evaluated under the two-

prong standard articulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct.

2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), and adopted by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in

Gall v. Commonwealth, 702 S.W.2d 37 (Ky. 1985). To merit relief, the movant

must demonstrate that counsel’s performance was deficient and that said

deficiency prejudiced the defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064.

“Unless a [movant] makes both showings, it cannot be said that the conviction . . .

resulted from a breakdown in the adversary process that renders the result

unreliable.” Id.

             Deficiency is proven if counsel’s performance was outside the wide

range of prevailing professional norms based on an objective standard of

reasonableness. Id. at 687-89, 104 S. Ct. at 2064-66. To establish prejudice, the

movant “must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

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outcome.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. “The likelihood of a different result must

be substantial, not just conceivable.” Commonwealth v. Pridham, 394 S.W.3d 867,

876 (Ky. 2012) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112, 131 S. Ct. 770,

792, 178 L. Ed. 2d 624 (2011)). On appeal, “we review the trial court’s factual

findings only for clear error, but its application of legal standards and precedents

. . . we review de novo.” Id. at 875 (citations omitted).

                                     LEGAL ANALYSIS

               On appeal, Fairley asserts the court’s finding that trial counsel was not

deficient is clearly erroneous given counsel’s admissions that he did not interview

any witnesses except the GPS technician and that he failed to prepare Fairley to

testify. We need not resolve this claim, however, because we agree with the

court’s alternative finding that, regardless, Fairley has failed to demonstrate

prejudice. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. at 2069.6

               In dispensing with an analysis on the sufficiency of trial counsel’s

representation, we note that Fairley has made only the most generalized claims of

prejudice. After referencing his 20-year sentence and his steadfast claims of

innocence, Fairley asserts that “though there was indeed evidence presented

against him, it is probable that with an attack on any one piece of evidence” he

6
  “The object of an ineffectiveness claim is not to grade counsel’s performance. If it is easier to
dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, . . . that course
should be followed.”

                                                -5-
may have achieved “a lesser sentence or acquittal.” The law is well-settled that

“[m]ere speculation as to how other counsel might have performed either better or

differently without any indication of what favorable facts would have resulted is

not sufficient.” Hodge v. Commonwealth, 116 S.W.3d 463, 470 (Ky. 2003),

overruled on other grounds by Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151 (Ky.

2009). Likewise, “[c]onjecture that a different strategy might have proved

beneficial is also not sufficient.” Id. (citing Baze v. Commonwealth, 23 S.W.3d

619 (Ky. 2000); Harper v. Commonwealth, 978 S.W.2d 311 (Ky. 1998)).

             Here, Fairley has not met his burden of proof because he has failed to

identify with any specificity how he could have reasonably fared better but for the

alleged errors of counsel. As the circuit court noted in its order denying relief, the

evidence of Fairley’s guilt was overwhelming. GPS monitoring placed him in the

area of the robbery, and his movements coincided with third-party testimony

detailing the assailant’s flight from the scene. Additionally, Fairley’s guilt was

corroborated by the presence of the victim’s DNA on clothing seized from his

home, a stolen firearm located in close proximity to him, and on a vehicle

registered to his mother, which also contained cocaine and marijuana.

Additionally, despite this wealth of unbiased evidence, Fairley’s 20-year sentence

is on the lower end of the 10- to 40-year sentencing range he faced if found guilty

on all charges. Accordingly, Fairley has not demonstrated sufficient prejudice to

                                          -6-
sustain a conclusion that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and we find

no error.

                                 CONCLUSION

             Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the

Christian Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Kara Stinson Lewis                       Daniel Cameron
 LaGrange, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                          Perry T. Ryan
                                          Assistant Attorney General
                                          Frankfort, Kentucky

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