Court Opinion

ID: 9851130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:07:42.423608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:49.306936
License: Public Domain

Browning, President,
dissenting:
I dissent. I do not disagree with the first point of the syllabus of the opinion of the Court, it having been quoted many times in other opinions of this Court. Actually, it is not a rule of this Court but a reiteration of the constitutional commandment as to the separation of powers of the three branches of government of this State:
Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, there is no basis for application of rules of statutory construction; but courts must apply the statute according to the legislative intent plainly expressed therein. (Emphasis added.)
*127The statute in question is Chapter 18, entitled “Education,” although that is not mentioned in the majority opinion. It is my opinion also that the language of this statute is plain and unambiguous and, that being true, this Court must apply the statute according to the legislative intent plainly expressed therein. Although Chapter 18 contains twenty-six articles, scores of sections and subsections, and many thousands of words, the majority selected a few words from one of eleven subsections of Article 5, Section 13, discarded all else pertinent therein, and found those few words “plain and unambiguous.” It is true that Subsection 6 of that section states:. “To provide at public expense adequate means of transportation for all children of school age who live more than two miles distant from school . . . ,” but the whole chapter is dedicated solely to public education and no one can read it without realizing that the majority has simply taken a few words out of context to give to that subsection a meaning that the legislature never intended.
Article 1 of Chapter 18 is entitled “Definitions; Limitations of Chapter,” and this is subsection (e): “‘State superintendent’ shall mean the State superintendent of free schools.” (Emphasis added.) Subsection (g) of Section 1 reads: “ ‘Teacher’ shall mean teacher, supervisor, principal, superintendent, public school librarian or any other person regularly employed for instructional purposes in a public school in this State.” (Emphasis added.) Article 2 is entitled “State Board of Education,” and Section 5 of that article sets forth the duties of the Board:
Subject to and in conformity with, the Constitution and laws of this State, the State board of education shall determine the educational policies of the State, except as to the West Virginia University and Potomac State school, and shall make rules for carrying into effect the laws and policies of the State relating to education, including rules relating to the physical welfare of pupils, the education of feeble-minded and physically disabled or crippled children of school age, school attendance, evening and continuation or part-time day schools, school extension work, the classification of schools, the *128issuing of certificates upon credentials, the distribution and care of free textbooks by the county boards of education, the general powers and duties of county boards of education, and of teachers, principals, supervisors and superintendents, and such other matters pertaining to the public schools of the State as may seem to the State board to be necessary and expedient. (Emphasis added.)
Article 5 is entitled “County Board of Education” and provides that each school district shall be under the supervision and control of a county board of education. Subsection (2) of Section 9 states that the board shall provide “The necessary furniture, fixtures) apparatus, fuel and all necessary supplies for the schools.” Code, 18-5-13, to repeat, is the controversial section and since the majority has not seen fit to do so I shall quote all of the section insofar as it is pertinent:
The boards, subject to the provisions of this chapter and the rules and regulations of the State board, shall have authority:
(1) To control and manage all of the schools and school interests for all school activities and upon all school property, whether owned or leased by the county, including the authority to require that records be kept of all receipts and disbursements of all funds collected or received by any principal, teacher, student or other person in connection therewith, any programs, activities or other endeavors of any nature operated or carried on by or in the name of the school, or any organization or body directly connected with the school, to audit such records and to conserve such funds, which shall be deemed quasi-public moneys, including securing surety bonds by expenditure of board moneys;
(2) To establish schools, from preschool through high school, inclusive of vocational schools; and to establish schools and/or programs for post high school instruction, subject to approval of the State board of education;
(3) To close any school which is unnecessary and to assign the pupils thereof to other schools: Provided, that such closing shall be officially acted upon *129and teachers and service personnel involved notified on or before the first Monday in May, in the same manner as provided in section four [§18-5-4] of this article, except in an emergency, subject to the approval of the State superintendent, or under subdivision (5);
(4) To consolidate schools;
(5) To close any elementary school whose average daily attendance falls below twenty pupils for two months in succession, and send the pupils to other schools in the district or to schools in adjoining districts. If the teachers in the schools so closed are not transferred or reassigned to other schools, they shall receive one month’s salary;
(6) To provide at public expense adequate means of transportation for all children of school age who live more than two miles distant from school by the nearest available road and to provide at public expense and according to such regulations as the board may establish, adequate means of transportation for school children participating in board-approved curricular and extracurricular activities; and provide in addition thereto, by rules and regulations and within the available revenues, transportation for those within two miles distance: Provided, that in all cases the buses or other transportation facilities owned by the board of education shall be driven or operated only by drivers regularly employed by the board of education: Provided, however, that buses shall be used for extracurricular activities as herein provided only when the insurance provided for by this section shall have been effected;
(7) To provide at public expense for insurance against the negligence of the drivers of school buses, trucks, or other vehicles operated by the board; and if the transportation of pupils be let out to contract, then the contract therefor shall provide that the contractor shall carry insurance against negligence in such an amount as the board shall specify;
(8) To employ and to provide in-service training for teacher aides, the training to be in accordance with rules and regulations of the State board;
(9) To establish and conduct a self-supporting dormitory for the accommodation of the pupils *130attending a high school or participating in a post high school program and of persons employed to teach therein;
(10) The board shall be authorized to provide at public expense, adequate public liability insurance;
# * *
The board of any district shall expend under such regulations as it establishes for each' child an amount not to exceed the proportion of all school funds of the district that each child would be entitled to receive if all the funds were distributed equally among all the children of school age in the district upon a per capita basis. (Emphasis added.)
t- * *
As observed. by Judge Berry in his able dissent, if the majority has found Subsection 6 clear and .unambiguous surely the other subsections are just as clear and unambiguous. If so, that means that a board of education “may close any school” which is unnecessary and assign the pupils thereof to other schools. Does this include parochial and other private schools? It has the power without any limiting language “to consolidate schools.” May it consolidate parochial schools or consolidate a parochial and a public school? The other powers given in that subsection do not have the magic limiting words “free” or “public.”
It has been alleged and not denied that if writs were granted in these cases it would be necessary to rearrange bus schedules, perhaps purchase new buses, hire extra drivers, mechanics, etc., and that all of those expenses would be borne by the taxpayers. It will be noted that W. Va. Const., art. XII, § 4, created the “Existing Permanent and Invested School Fund,” the interest of which was to be “annually applied to the support of free schools throughout the State, and to no other purpose whatever.” (Emphasis added.) “The Irreducible School Fund Amendment” amended this section, ordering that the fund be “paid into the treasury to the credit of the general school fund for the support of the free schools of the State.” (Emphasis added.) *131And, as Judge Haymond of the majority in this case said in Bd. of Educ. of Wyoming County v. Bd. of Public Works, 144 W.Va. 593, 109 S.E.2d 552, “Article XII, Section 4 of the Constitution of this State as modified by the Irreducible School Fund Amendment, establishes the general school fund for the support of the free schools of this State.” (Emphasis added.) “Free” schools, of course, are not parochial or private schools. Are not the respondent county boards of education funded by the general school fund? Would not the providing of transportation by these Boards for the “Catholic parochial schools” be in violation of the state constitution and previous decisions of this Court? We must look further, however. Code, 18-9-6, as amended, provides for the general school fund “set apart for the support of the free schools of the State . . . . ” (Emphasis added.) Article 9A concerns “Allocation of State Aid for Schools.” What kind of “schools”? Section 1, entitled “Public school support program,” answered by saying, “The intent of this article is to provide a plan of financial support for the public schools of the State . . . . ” (Emphasis added.) Subsection 1 says that one of the purposes the legislature had in mind in enacting this plan is “[t]o provide a basic foundation support for the free schools of the State thát will assure a minimum educational base for all children and youth irrespective of where they may live.” (Emphasis added.)'- A lawyer or judge could not find a clearer expression of legislative intent.
The State Board of School Finance was created by Article 9B because, as stated in Section 1, the legislature recognized that “it has become necessary for the State to participate to an increasing degree in the financing of the free public schools.” (Emphasis added.) By and large, nowhere else in that article did the legislature find it necessary to repeat the phrase “free public schools.” On the contrary, from that point on they are referred to only as “schools.” By following the majority’s “logic” and “reasoning” one must conclude that the other twenty-one sections apply to all schools. Article 9C concerns “State aid for repair and construction of public school buildings,” and this is expressed in Section 1. Again, that is the last time we see “public schools” referred to.
*132Thus, we see that the people of this State through its Constitution and Legislature have commanded that the general school fund, comprised of their tax money, is to be used for free schools. It is not within the province of this Court to legislate. To repeat, it is my opinion that the language used in the statute, that is, Chapter 18, when its component parts are read is not ambiguous and that it is evident that when the legislature used the phrase “all children of school age” in Subsection 6 of Section 13 that it clearly meant children who attend public schools. By assuming that the failure to put the word “free” or “public” in front of the word “school” every time that word appeared over and over for more than two hundred pages created an ambiguity then it is clear that the ambiguity is easily resolved and that it was the intent of the legislature to authorize county boards of education to use public tax moneys only for the purpose of transporting children of school age to attend public schools who live more than two miles from such schools.
The majority in this case assumed that the “statute” in question is clear and unambiguous. This was the very issue to be determined in this litigation. To ascertain the meaning of words in any statute, some very basic principles have to be applied, all of which are certainly familiar to the majority. A basic principle apparently ignored here is that a statute is explained from all its parts read together — ex tota materia emergat resolutio. We cannot isolate one word of one sentence of one subsection of one section of one article of one chapter of our Code, and make an intelligent determination of its connotation or whether it is ambiguous or “plain and unambiguous.” We must look at the entire statute — the chapter on education or at least the section from which the word in question was taken. When we look at the constitutional and the statutory commandments with regard to all school funding by the county and state we can clearly see what the term “school” means when used in statutes regarding education. “School” plainly means “free (or public) school.” This necessarily excludes parochial and all other private schools from the definition — expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Another recognized principle, noscitur a sociis, *133directs that a word is to be interpreted with reference to other words around it, and that words are limited in meaning by implications arising from other words. Ex Parte James Watson, 82 W.Va. 201, 95 S.E. 648. In conjunction with this we apply the principle of ejusdem generis which also limits general words and phrases where specific words and phrases have been used. The use of “free (or public) schools” in a statute would limit the word “school” to only free (or public) schools when used in other articles and sections. Thus, the majority’s interpretation of the isolated phrase “all children of school age” becomes incredible. The legislature could only have meant “all children of school age who attend free (or public) schools.” The majority, of course, asks, “Why didn’t the legislature write it this way?” The reason is simply that the legislature knew that public money could not be spent for private purposes, and to repeatedly say “public” everytime the word “school” was used would have resulted in ludicrous repetition. The legislature could not foresee that this Court might someday ignore the established rules used in ascertaining the meaning of statutes. I am aware that the aforementioned rules are those associated with statutory interpretation and construction, but they must also be applied to statutes to determine the question of whether words (or statutes) are ambiguous. I also conclude the phrase “all children of school age” is unambiguous, just as did the majority.
By applying to a statute this rule of “plain and unambiguous” indiscriminately a court can read into a statute almost anything that it desires. An example is Chapter 11 of the Code entitled “Taxation.” Article 3, Section 1, of that chapter begins thus: “All property shall be assessed annually as of the first day of July at its true and actual value . . . ,” for the purpose of taxing such property. That word “all” is spelled exactly the same way it is spelled in 18-5-13 and means exactly the same thing. Therefore, if this Court should stop there in ascertaining the meaning of 11-3-1, that would work a grave hardship upon those owning property affected by 11-3-9 where property belonging to the United States, to this State, property used exclusively for divine worship, etc., *134is exempted from taxation and, of course, the legislative intent is clearly expressed.
Under the provisions of Article X, Section 6, of the Constitution of this State, this Court has held that the legislature is without power to appropriate public funds for other than public purposes. State ex rel. Adkins v. Sims, 130 W.Va. 645, 46 S.E.2d 81; State ex rel. Charleston v. Sims, 132 W.Va. 826, 54 S.E.2d. 729; State ex rel. Lippert v. Gainer, 146 W.Va. 840, 122 S.E.2d 618. In State ex rel. Bd. of Governors v. Sims, 140 W.Va. 64, 82 S.E.2d 321, this Court clearly and unequivocally held that an appropriation by the legislature of public revenue for a purely private purpose is beyond its power of legislation and for that reason is null and void. In the very recent decision of State ex rel. County Court of Marion County v. Demus, 148 W.Va. 398, 135 S.E.2d 352, this Court held that Article X, Section 6, applied to counties and municipalities as well as to the State of West Virginia. Article X, Section 10, of the Constitution of this State begins thus: “Notwithstanding any other provision of the Constitution to the contrary, the maximum rates authorized and allocated by law for tax levies on the several classes of property for the support of public schools may be increased in any school district for a period not to exceed five years . . . .” (Emphasis added.) It will be observed in the majority opinion that Article III, Section 15, of the Constitution of this State is quoted in part, but this particular language is not included: “. . . and the legislature shall not prescribe any religious test whatever, or confer any peculiar privileges or advantages on any sect or denomination.” Perhaps this was merely an oversight.
The majority, interestingly enough, says that the providing of this transportation “does not constitute an expenditure of public funds or of school funds for private purposes in violation of Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution of West Virginia.” (It is enigmatic indeed why the. majority did not here cite or discuss the more pertinent Constitution and Code provisions regarding school funds.) The majority goes on to say, “The legislature is clothed with a broad discretion in *135determining what are public purposes for which public funds may be expended.” The statement says the legislature has this broad discretion, but in this case, this Court is determining what are public purposes, not the legislature. This clearly is not an example of the legislature exercising this “broad discretion,” it is the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, by judicial legislation, exercising “broad discretion.”
This sentence also appears near the end of the majority opinion: “The decision of the Court in these cases relates solely to the duties of the respondent county boards of education in relation to Catholic parochial schools.” Can this Court constitutionally limit the import and effect of the decision in this case to “Catholic parochial schools”? I think not. This is discriminatory toward other parochial schools, e.g., Seventh Day Adventist and Church of the Nazarene schools, both of which exist in this State. If the Episcopalians, Methodists, Presbyterians, etc., instituted schools of primary and secondary education in this State, as they have in other states, should not the respondent boards of education also be compelled to provide transportation to “all children of school age”? This Court cannot ignore the equal protection and due process of law guarantees of the Constitution of the United States and of this State. The same laws and principles which apply to one also apply to others.
The majority attempted to defend their position by engaging in some judicial sophistry. They. say that for the mere exchange of transporting parochial school students or, I assume other private school students, by the use of public funds that “county boards of education are getting a splendid financial bargain.” My answer is that the majority read Article V, Section 1, the separation of powers provision of the Constitution of this State, all of Chapter 18 of the Code, and the aforementioned provisions of the State Constitution, all of which they apparently ignored. Furthermore, continuing their sophisticism, the majority suggests that in a great measure county boards of education maintain and operate school buses in order to protect the “health, safety and welfare of the students who are transported thereon. * * * The *136buses protect the children from all sorts of inclement weather, including rain, snow and sleet. By the system of bus transportation maintained by county boards of education, children are protected, in a great measure, from many of the dangers incident, in this day, to travel on public streets, sidewalks and highways arising from vehicular traffic hazards and from molestation, personal violence, kidnapping or other harm of a criminal character.” Not one word can be found with regard to that matter in the chapter on “Education.” The reason and only reason for the busing of children attending public schools was the consolidation of schools and a casual reading of the chapter will prove that. Furthermore, if all of the hazards that the majority are worried about are reasons for busing students who attend private schools, why has not the legislature provided that even public school students must be transported by bus if they live less than two miles from the school they attend? Are there no hazards in that two-mile journey?
It is interesting to note the following language of the majority:
We are of the opinion that the Court’s holding in these cases is sustained by the following decisions of appellate courts: * * *.
The majority then cites fourteen cases, without a discussion of any of these cases or quotations therefrom in support of the majority’s position. Why? A reading of each case discloses that they are all distinguishable from the case at bar in that there is a substantial difference between the constitutional and statutory provisions of the states involved when compared with the applicable Constitutional and Code provisions of this State. It is also interesting to note that other states, when confronted with the issue at bar and with strikingly similar statutory or constitutional provisions, or both, have reached a result opposite that of the majority in the instant case. See Matthews v. Quinton, 362 P.2d 932 (Alaska), appeal dismissed, 368 U.S. 517; Opinion of the Justices, 216 A.2d 668 (Del.); Silver Lake Consolidated School District v. Parker, 238 Iowa 984, 29 N.W.2d 214; Sherrard v. Jefferson *137County Bd. of Educ., 294 Ky. 469, 171 S.W.2d 963; Judd v. Bd. of Educ. of Union Free School District, 278 N.Y. 200, 15 N.E.2d 576; Gurney v. Ferguson, 190 Okla. 254, 122 P.2d 1002, cert. denied, 317 U.S. 588, rehearing denied, 317 U.S. 707; Visser v. Nooksack Valley School Dist., 33 Wash. 2d 699, 207 P.2d 198; Mitchell v. Consolidated School Dist., 17 Wash. 2d 61, 135 P.2d 79; State ex rel. Van Straten v. Milquet, 180 Wis. 109, 192 N.W. 392.
I would deny the writ of mandamus in each of these cases.