Court Opinion

ID: 9928026
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 18:04:20.300609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:46:38.333311
License: Public Domain

THIRD DIVISION
                              DOYLE, P. J.,
                 GOBEIL, J., and SENIOR JUDGE FULLER

                   NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be
                   physically received in our clerk’s office within ten
                   days of the date of decision to be deemed timely filed.
                              https://www.gaappeals.us/rules

                                                                   January 30, 2024

In the Court of Appeals of Georgia
 A23A1699. WHITE v. THE STATE.

      FULLER, Senior Judge.

      Joseph Michael White pled guilty to voluntary manslaughter and aggravated

assault in connection with the shooting death of his brother. He appeals from the

denial of his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, arguing that his convictions merged

as a matter of fact. Because White cannot show factual merger on the limited record

before us, we affirm.

      The record shows that White was charged with committing malice murder by

“shooting the victim in the head” and with aggravated assault by “shooting [a] gun

at the victim[.]” He also was charged with felony murder and two gun possession

offenses. Through counsel, White negotiated a deal with the State to plead guilty to
voluntary manslaughter — as a lesser included offense of malice murder — and

aggravated assault, in exchange for the State recommending an order of nolle prosequi

on the remaining charges. The plea was “blind,” meaning the State did not make a

sentencing recommendation.

      At the plea hearing, the prosecutor recited the factual basis for the plea,

explaining that White and his brother were having an argument outside when their

mother and aunt “heard some commotion” and “a gunshot,” then saw White

“fleeing the scene.” White’s brother had been struck in the face with a bullet, and he

died as a result of the shooting. The prosecutor stated that some witnesses heard two

shots fired, but only one bullet struck the victim. Police found White, shirtless, at a

nearby business. White said that he was “on drugs, not sure what happened” and was

“looking for the killer of his brother.” In a field near the shooting, police found a .22

rifle with White’s DNA on it.

      After the prosecutor concluded the factual recitation, White confirmed that he

had no “substantial disagreement with it” and nothing to add. The trial court

accepted White’s plea and sentenced him to 20 years of imprisonment on the

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voluntary manslaughter charge and 15 years on the aggravated assault charge, to run

consecutively. As agreed, the court nolle prossed the remaining charges.

      Within the same term of court,1 White moved to withdraw his guilty plea,

arguing that his sentence violated the doctrine of substantive double jeopardy because

the aggravated assault conviction was included as a matter of fact in the voluntary

manslaughter conviction. After a hearing, the trial court denied the motion,2 and

White appeals.

      Under Georgia law, a defendant may not be legally convicted of a crime that is

included as a matter of fact in another crime for which the defendant also stands

convicted. See OCGA § 16-7-1 (a). Thus, “[w]hen a defendant is convicted of

multiple crimes based upon the same act, the principle of factual merger operates to

avoid the injustice[,]” such that “the lesser offense merges into the greater.” Huber

      1
         Terms of court for Grady County begin on the third Monday in March and
September. OCGA § 15-6-3 (34) (D). White was sentenced on March 24, 2022, and
filed his motion to withdraw the plea on June 15, 2022, before the start of the next
term.
      2
        The trial court did not expressly address White’s merger argument.
Nonetheless, we address it here because appellate courts “have the discretion to
correct merger errors sua sponte.” Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 697 (4) (808 SE2d
696) (2017).
                                          3
v. State, 368 Ga. App. 401, 404 (1) (b) (890 SE2d 271) (2023) (citations and

punctuation omitted). In determining whether two crimes factually merge, courts

apply the “required evidence test” to “determine whether . . . one of the crimes was

established by proof of the same or less than all of the facts that were required to

establish the other crime.” Metcalf v. State, 349 Ga. App. 408, 419 (2) (d) (825 SE2d

909) (2019) (citation and punctuation omitted). “The question of whether offenses

merge is a legal question that we review de novo.” Morris v. State, 340 Ga. App. 295,

312 (7) (797 SE2d 207) (2017) (citation and punctuation omitted).

       A defendant who pleads guilty does not waive appellate review of a factual

merger claim. Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 480 (746 SE2d 109) (2013). See also

Andrews v. State, 328 Ga. App. 344, 345 (764 SE2d 553) (2014) (considering

defendant’s factual merger claim, which he raised in a timely motion to withdraw his

guilty plea). But, “as a practical matter, because the factual record in a guilty plea case

is usually very limited, defendants who raise merger claims after pleading guilty,

particularly claims that a conviction merged as a matter of fact, will rarely prevail.”

Nazario, 293 Ga. at 480. This is because we are limited to finding error based on the

existing record, and when a defendant pleads guilty, he usually “cannot establish (and

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the court cannot discern) that any of his convictions merged, particularly as a matter

of fact, based on the limited record.” Id. at 488 (2) (d).

      White argues that “a separate judgment of conviction and sentence for

aggravated assault would be authorized only if the indictment averred, and the State

proved, that [he] committed an aggravated assault independent of the act which

caused the victim’s death.” In presenting the factual basis for the guilty plea, the

prosecutor said that some witnesses had reported two shots, although only one shot

actually hit — and ultimately killed — the victim. The shot that hit and killed the

victim is, of course, the basis for White’s manslaughter conviction. As for the other

reported shot, the law is clear that shooting at a victim, without hitting him, is an

aggravated assault. See Johnson v. State, 190 Ga. App. 172, 172-173 (378 SE2d 700)

(1989). The question here is whether White’s firing of that other shot constituted a

completed aggravated assault independent of the act that killed his brother. See Ortiz

v. State, 291 Ga. 3, 6 (3) (727 SE2d 103) (2012) (“a separate judgment of conviction

and sentence is authorized if a defendant commits an aggravated assault independent

of the act which caused the victim’s death”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

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      Aggravated assault generally merges into a greater charge when the evidence

shows that the defendant engaged in a “single act of firing a series of shots in quick

succession at the victim.” Brown v. State, 246 Ga. App. 60, 64 (1) (539 SE2d 545)

(2000) (citation and punctuation omitted) (aggravated assault with intent to murder

merged with aggravated battery where the defendant shot the victim three times in

quick succession). See also Slaughter v. State, 292 Ga. 573, 575 (1) (740 SE2d 119)

(2013) (the defendant’s aggravated assault and malice murder convictions merged

because “the interval between the victim’s injuries was minimal, and the fatal gunshot

wound to the victim’s chest preceded the non-fatal gunshot wound to his leg”).3

Factual merger generally does not occur, on the other hand, where the evidence shows

that there was “a deliberate interval between the critical shots.” Price v. State, 313 Ga.

578, 580-582 (872 SE2d 275) (2022) (aggravated assault and aggravated battery

convictions did not merge because they “derived from two gunshots that did not

occur almost immediately one after the other, but were separated by a period of time

and resulted in distinct injuries”) (punctuation omitted).

      3
       But see Scott v. State, 356 Ga. App. 152, 160-161 (846 SE2d 241) (2020)
(“That the interval [between criminal acts] is merely minutes or even seconds . . .
cannot be a solely determinative factor. The resolution of this factor is not solved by
a stopwatch approach.”).
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      Based on the limited factual record in this case, we know only that there was

evidence that White fired two gunshots during an argument with his brother, one of

which struck and killed him. We have no further details about these gunshots, such

as which shot struck the victim, the length of time between the shots, and what — if

anything — transpired during the interval. Under these circumstances, “[n]othing in

the indictment or the factual basis elicited at the plea hearing requires a finding” that

the two shots were fired in quick succession as part of a single act, such that White’s

aggravated assault and voluntary manslaughter convictions should have merged.

McCranie v. State, 335 Ga. App. 548, 554 (3) (782 SE2d 453) (2016), overruled in part

on other grounds, Collier v. State, 307 Ga. 363, 378 (834 SE2d 769) (2019).

      Perhaps further facts regarding these two charges would have emerged
      had there been a trial, but [White] chose to plead guilty instead of going
      to trial. The indictment on its face charges two distinct crimes, of which
      [White] admitted he was guilty, and based on the record we have before
      us, we cannot say that [the voluntary manslaughter conviction]
      necessarily merged with [the aggravated assault count] as a matter of fact
      or law.

Nazario, 293 Ga. at 490 (3) (a).

      Judgment affirmed. Doyle, P. J., and Gobeil, J., concur.

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