Court Opinion

ID: 9853256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:45:14.087124+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:43.611076
License: Public Domain

NEPTUNE, Presiding Judge,
dissenting:
The critical issue in this case is: after a divorce decree approves the agreement of the parties disposing of issues relating to property, alimony, child support, and other attendant matters over which the divorce court exercises its statutory and equitable powers, is the court thereafter without jurisdiction to entertain applications of the parties for an order of the court relating thereto based upon the parties’ further agreement which would modify or supplement the original agreement?
When a property settlement agreement is submitted in connection with a divorce, the court may approve in whole or in part, reject, or modify the contract as facts and circumstances warrant. Miller v. Miller, Okl., 456 P.2d 113 (1969). This rule recognizes that the court must make a disposition despite the agreement that is equitable. When, as in this case, the parties propose a supplement to the agreement, it is logical and a recognition of the objective of the court in the first instance that the parties submit to the court an application for approval of the supplement. The sanction of the court provides a protection of the rights and duties of both parties. In the circumstances of a consent decree such as obtained in the instant case, modification of the decree should be available with consent of the parties. See Stuart v. Stuart, Okl., 555 P.2d 611 (1976).
I think the applications made by the parties reasonably solicited modifications to which the parties agreed, and the court accommodated them. A party who applies for affirmative relief from a court and obtains it in the form of an order should not be permitted to later challenge the jurisdiction of the court to issue the order he requested.
I would affirm.