Court Opinion

ID: 9689109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:20:03.495174+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:44.787110
License: Public Domain

White, C. J.,
dissenting.
In my opinion, the court itself is embarking on a “private enterprise” in abrogating the Legislature’s power to control and limit the state’s basic immunity to liability for tort. The majority opinion cites Shear v. State (1929), 117 Neb. 865, 223 N. W. 130, but fails to note its basic holding as follows: “The legislature has not by law granted to any one the right to recover against the state damages for negligence of any of its officers, agents, or employees, and until such legislation is enacted, no recovery against the state can be had for such negligence.” (Emphasis supplied.) This precise holding was reaffirmed in 1946. Schmutte v. State, 147 Neb. 193, 22 N. W. 2d 691. This rule follows the overwhelming weight of authority. See 81 C. J. S., States, §§ 130, 131, pp. 1137, 1143. It cannot be questioned that the Board of Regents is a direct agency of the state and is cloaked with the same immunity.
Beyond the other considerations of public policy inherent in the sovereign immunity doctrine, the reason for the special rule as to nonliability for tort is tersely expressed in Robertson v. Sichel, 127 U. S. 507, 8 S. Ct. 1286, 32 L. Ed. 203, as follows: “The government itself is not responsible for the misfeasances, or wrongs, or negligences, or omissions of duty, of the subordinate officers or agents employed in the public service; for it does not undertake to guarantee to any person the fidelity of any of the officers or agents whom it employs; since that would involve it, in all its operations, in endless embarrassments, and difficulties, and losses, which would be subversive of the public interests.”
There is no statute whereby this state has assumed' a liability for the negligence of its officers or agents; and I can find no established principle of law sustaining such liability in the absence of such statutory assumption. *16To change substantive law is the province of the Legislature, and not of this court.
While I agree with the other dissents filed herein that the renting of this house was in no sense a business enterprise or a “proprietary” function, I point out that the Legislature has not authorized the Board of Regents, as a state agency, to embark on a private or commercial enterprise or engage in a “proprietary” capacity. Its control and management of property is incidental to and a part of its performance of its governmental function of operation and management of the University of Nebraska. As Judge Newton’s dissent points out, the analogy to our cases holding counties free from liability unless provided by statute would seem to be controlling.
The majority opinion cites Sorensen v. Chimney Rock Public Power Dist., 138 Neb. 350, 293 N. W. 121. This case does not deal with tort liability of the state or its direct agencies. It establishes the liability of a public power district for the purchase of supplies used in connection with the business of supplying and selling electric power, the court finding that the statute authorized contracting for the purchase of supplies and therefore the Legislature had provided for liability for the same. We have no doubt that in such a case the Legislature has waived immunity and that a power district, engaged in a commercial enterprise, is liable for a purchase of supplies within the scope of legislatively authorized power to contract. But this is far different from a legislative waiver of immunity for unauthorized negligent tortious acts of misfeasance or nonfeasance.
By judicial fiat today we sever from the Legislature the power to determine the state’s liability for tort. But we cannot sever its power to determine whether such a judgment can be enforced. The Legislature can still pay all or any part of such a judgment and formulate any criteria for payment as it sees fit, which power it has now. Would anyone suggest that the Legislature could be mandamused to appropriate the necessary *17funds? This situation graphically illustrates that what we are doing today usurps our proper authority contrary to the constitutional command as to the division of powers of our state government. The legislative body of this state has plenary and absolute control over the state’s finances. Even the majority would not suggest otherwise. Any power to create a liability on the state treasury must be derived from statute, and state courts have no inherent power to create such liability. 81 C. J. S., States, § 128, p. 1134; Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 156 Fla. 45, 22 So. 2d 397; Armory Commission v. Palmer, 253 Ky. 425, 69 S. W. 2d 681; State ex rel. Plant v. Board of Commissioners, 80 W. Va. 506, 92 S. E. 747; Estate of Buxton, 246 Wis. 97, 16 N. W. 2d 399. The inseparability of the two functions is recognized in the rule that even where specific legislative authority for suit exists, an agency of the state may not be sued in tort if there are no funds available for satisfaction of a judgment, or no power reposed in the agency for the raising of funds necessary to satisfy a recovery against it. 81 C. J. S., States, § 131, p. 1144. In University of Maryland v. Maas (1938), 173 Md. 554, 197 A. 123, the court said: “The decided cases here and elsewhere recognize and affirm the principle that purely governmental agencies, because of their relation to the state, are entitled to immunity from suits as is the state itself, unless the legislature has expressly authorized suits to be brought against it, but this authority to sue is not free from restrictions, even though they are not expressly made by the legislature, for this court has held that suits may not be maintained unless money has been appropriated for the payment of such damages as may be awarded, or the agency itself is authorized to raise money for that purpose.”
The University has no profits or funds from a business or industrial activity to pay such a judgment and the Legislature might or might not appropriate funds for such payment. The conclusion from all of this is *18inevitable—this is exclusively a legislative power and prerogative and should remain so.
Now that this uncertain course is created, does the Legislature’s power under the constitutional provision still prevail? Is a legislative act limiting the rule adopted today merely advisory in nature? Is the Legislature’s power to create political subdivisions and state agencies and define their power and liabilities limited? In the wilderness of the nebulous doctrine of “proprietary” functions, can this court and the Legislature avoid conflict and confusion?
The power of restraint imposed on the judiciary is the power of self-restraint. The tendency to usurp power to achieve a laudable policy objective is all too prevalent. The principle of division of power should not be crucified lightly. It is our solemn and perhaps paramount duty to preserve it. How can we preserve it by honoring it in the breach? And if there is doubt, judicial self-restraint requires resolution against the exercise of that very power. What we are doing today is responding to the “felt necessities of the time,” under the guise of judicial power. The end does not justify the means and an objective born of judicial impatience should not be accomplished by judicial usurpation.
Carter and Newton, JJ., join in this dissent.