Court Opinion

ID: 9836869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:17.619157+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.104587
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge
(concurring in part and in the result):
I would face the granted issue head on. The core of appellant’s complaint is that he was denied information which would have helped him cross-examine and impeach the alleged victim of rape in this case. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 94 S.Ct. 1105, 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974). However, the record in the instant ease shows that appellant and his defense counsel had most of the information on the prior allegation of rape by the alleged victim at the time of his Article 32 hearing and certainly prior to trial. In addition, looking at the undisclosed trial counsel’s opinion (that the alleged victim’s prior complaint of rape “was very weak”) in light of the entire record, it is evident that the prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute the prior rape cannot reasonably be considered as exculpatory evidence in the sense of Davis v. Alaska.
In the case at bar, there was no finding by any court that the victim’s prior rape accusation was false. There also was no hint from the victim that she had falsely reported the prior rape. In addition, there was evidence that the perpetrator in the prior rape may have made some damaging admissions indicating that he did rape her. See Avery, No. 9500062, unpublished op. at 4, 10 (Army Ct. Crim.App. July 21, 1998). Thus, it is clear that appellant has failed to prove a reasonable probability of prejudice in this case. Accordingly, since there was no significant impairment of the right to present a defense, I would affirm on this basis. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 317, 118 S.Ct. 1261,140 L.Ed.2d 413 (1998).