Court Opinion

ID: 9459564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:24:05.527752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:13.209897
License: Public Domain

MacKINNON, Circuit Judge
(concurring in part and dissenting in part):
The opinion of the majority consists of five separate parts which will be discussed in order. I dissent in part from Part I and concur in part, concur substantially with Parts II, III and IV, and I dissent from Part V.
I. — The Special Land Use Permits (Part I of the Majority Opinion)
In this part of its opinion the majority holds that it would be illegal for the Secretary of the Interior to issue the requested special land use permits (also referred to as revocable permits). The majority maintains that this alleged illegality rests upon two grounds: (1) The first is the contention that the legislative history of section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act requires that statute to be interpreted as prohibiting the issuance of the requested revocable permits because Congress in section 28 “intended all construction work to take place within the [54 foot] width limitation of the statute.”1 (2) The second ground is the argument that it would be illegal to issue the requested revocable permits because they would not be revocable in fact.2
A. Legislative History
Regardless of the validity of the second ground it is important to point out the fatal flaws in the majority’s first contention with regard to the legislative history, because the claimed illegality of revocable permits for pipeline purposes, which the majority asserts, rests upon an incorrect interpretation of the statute by the majority that would affect all prior and future applications of the Act. This infirmity in the opinion of the majority should be pointed out for the benefit of other courts who may be called upon to interpret section 28. It is thus essential to examine those instances of congressional action upon which the majority opinion relies for support of its interpretation of the legislative history because the validity of any decision based on legislative history is no better than its ability to stand analysis that it correctly translates specific legislative action into demonstrable legislative intent. It is in this area that the opinion of the majority fails.
Basically the opinion of the majority contends that the legislative debates with respect to section 28 indicate that *894Congress intended thereby to prohibit the issuance of any special land use permits for temporary construction purposes.3 However, when Congress enacted section 28 and thereby fixed the amount of land to be granted as permanent right of way for the operation of a pipeline as a transportation facility they were not considering and they did not decide how much space and material they would permit to be used temporarily in its construction. To assume, as the majority opinion does, that the one decision included the other is completely illogical. The one decision, fixing the amount of land that would be permanently granted for construction, maintenance and operation, which Congress did make, simply did not include any expression of intent as to the extent of allowable temporary permits for the use of additional public lands in such projects. Temporary revocable permits were not involved in any of the provisions of the congressional bills which preceded the enactment of section 28, nor in any of the amendments proposed to these bills while they were being acted upon by Congress.
*893If the use is really not temporary or occasional, but is permanent (or at least long-lasting), the matter cannot be papered over merely by designating it as “revocable” when it is not intended to be revocable and, in the nature of things, is not in fact revocable.
*8941. The Rejection by Congress of the Amendment Authorizing the Taking of Necessary Materials, Earth and Stone
The majority opinion rests its contrary interpretation of the legislative history partially upon the fact that Congress at one time defeated a proposed amendment to an earlier Mineral Leasing Bill which contained a provision that would have authorized all pipelines being constructed over United States lands “to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said pipe line material, earth and stone necessary for the construction of said pipe line.” 4 From the defeat of the proposed amendment containing this provision the opinion of the majority concludes: “Congress voted down the amendment, however, clearly indicating its desire to restrict construction to the statutory right-of-way.” 5 However, the action by the House on the amendment does not support such conclusion because the amendment that was offered included substantial additional propositions. Thus, the action by the House cannot be construed as expressing the claimed intention with respect to the single proposition that related to the use of materials outside the right of way.
To make the first point clear it is only necessary to compare the provision in the bill that was sought to be amended with the proposed amendment because these two provisions composed the entirety of the propositions on this issue considered by the House. The provision of the bill that was sought to be amended provided:
Sec. 17. That rights of way through the public lands of the United States are hereby granted for pipe line purposes to any applicant possessing the qualifications provided in section 1 of this act to the extent of the ground occupied by the said pipe line and 10 feet on each side of the same, under such regulations as to survey, location, application, and use as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior, and upon the express condition that such pipe lines shall be constructed, operated, and maintained as common carriers: Provided, That no right of way shall hereafter be granted over the public lands for the transportation of oil or natural gas except under and subject to the provisions, limitations, and conditions of this section.
51 Cong.Rec. 15418 (emphasis added).
The proposed amendment would have inserted in lieu of the foregoing the following :
That the right of way through the public lands of the United States is hereby granted to any applicant qualified under this act, any pipe-line company or corporation formed for the *895purpose of transporting oils, crude or refined, which shall have filed or may hereafter file with the Secretary of the Interior a copy of its articles of incorporation and due proofs of its organization under the same, to the extent of the ground occupied by said pipe line and 25 feet on each side of the center of line of the same: also the right to take from the public lands adjacent to the line of said pipe line, material, earth, and stone necessary for the construction of said pipe line.
That any company or corporation desiring to secure the benefits of this act shall within 12 months after the location of 10 miles of the pipe line if the same be upon surveyed lands, and if the same be upon unsurveyed lands, within 12 months after the survey thereof by the United States, file with the register of the land office for the district where such land is located a map of its line, and upon the approval thereof by the Secretary of the Interi- or the same shall be noted upon the plats in said office, and thereafter all such lands over which such right of way shall pass shall be disposed of subject to such right of way.
That if any section of said pipe line shall not be completed within five years after the location of said section the right hereto granted shall be forfeited, as to any incomplete section of said pipe line, to the extent that the same is not completed at the date of the forfeiture.
That nothing in this act shall authorize the use of such right of way except for the pipe line, and then only so far as may be necessary for its construction, maintenance, and care.
That all pipe lines built under the provisions of said act shall be common carriers.
51 Cong.ReC. 15421 (emphasis added). A mere reading of this amendment makes it obvious that the House was not expressing any view on the italicized portion of the amendment separate and apart from the rest of the amendment. To summarize, the amendment proposed the following changes over the provisions of the pending bill:
1. The right of way to be permanently granted would be increased from 10 feet to 25 feet on each side of the pipeline.
2. The express requirement of the bill that applicants for pipeline right of way must possess the citizenship and nationality “qualifications provided in section 1 of this Act” in the proposed amendment would be replaced by a provision authorizing a grant “to any applicant qualified under the Act.” (Emphasis added.) This would have effectively removed the requirement that applicants for pipeline rights of way possess United States citizenship or be state corporations.
3. The proposed amendment would have excluded the provision “That no right of way shall hereafter be granted except under and subject to the provisions, limitations and conditions of this section.” This was a material provision of the bill and its intent was obviously far from duplicated by the provision in the proposed amendment:
That nothing in this Act shall authorize the use of such right of way except for the pipeline, and then only so far as may be necessary for its construction, maintenance and care.
4. The proposed amendment would also have authorized the pipeline companies to take “from [adjacent] public lands . . . material, earth, and stone necessary for the construction of [the] pipelines.” 6
Since there was no division of the four questions when the amendment was *896rejected by the House,7 the expressed intent of the House obviously did not indicate any separate position on any of the single provisions contained in the amendment. Thus no separate intent was expressed by Congress on the proposal to authorize the taking of materials outside the right of way. To hold to the contrary, as the majority opinion does, is unreasonable, illogical and unwarranted. The same logic which the opinion of the majority applies in asserting its position would conclude that if a Congressman refused to order soup, fish, steak and pie ala mode from a menu on September 1, 1914,8 and he went into another restaurant9 six years later on February 25, 192010 and ordered only steak,11 that it could be concluded positively from such actions that he would never order ice cream.12 Ordinary people do not believe that such acts on their part will be so interpreted; nor should they.
From the foregoing comparison of the bill and the proposed amendment it is self-evident that Congress did not by its rejection of the particular amendment, with the numerous changes it suggested, indicate that it intended absolutely to restrict the space and materials that might be available for construction to that solely within the confines of the permanent statutory right of way by prohibiting the issuance of temporary revocable permits for construction purposes.
Questions of this sort come up most frequently in congressional debates when an amendment containing two propositions is rejected and then later one of the propositions is offered singly. That the offering of the single proposition presents a substantially different question to the House, than when it was offered in combination, is recognized by parliamentary law based on congressional precedents.13 And since Congress (and all parliamentary law) recognizes that the rejection of the amendment containing several propositions does not indicate any position on the individual propositions in isolation, the action by Congress here cannot be interpreted as taking any position on that portion of the amendment dealing solely with the use of adjacent lands.
Moreover, even if the amendment to allow pipeline companies to take “material, earth and stone necessary for construction” from public lands adjacent to the permanent right of way had been offered singly and rejected by a separate vote it would not indicate that Congress thereby indicated an intention to prevent the Secretary from issuing temporary revocable permits for construction purposes. This conclusion is deducible because each of the two provisions embody substantially different considerations. The former would amount to a permanent statutory grant, over which the Secretary would only have limited authority to see that the statute was not violated by the pipeline company, while the latter would be merely a temporary permit, which the Secretary could issue or not within his discretion, which he could condition as he deemed best, and which was required to be revocable. It *897is thus obvious that the denial of the first in no way indicates an intention to deny the latter. The requirement of revocability alone, which is present in one and not in the other, is a sufficient basis for concluding that the House did not intend to prohibit the issuance of revocable permits when it rejected the amendment to give pipelines a permanent statutory right to obtain construction materials from adjacent public lands.14
2. The Reliance of the Majority Opinion on the Act Specifically Authorizing the Secretary to Issue Revocable Permits for Pipeline Purposes Over Indian Lands
The majority opinion, in respect to this same issue (its interpretation of the legislative history of section 28, supra n. 45), also relies upon another false prop when it cites the action of Congress in passing the statute authorizing grants over Indian lands for pipeline purposes as another indication of legislative history which supports its claimed interpretation.
By the Act of March 2, 1917, c. 146, 39 Stat. 969, Congress amended the Act “authorizing the Secretary of the Interi- or to grant right of way for pipe lines through Indian lands,” March 11, 1904, c. 505, 33 Stat. 65, so as to provide that the Secretary of the Interior may, under such rules and regulations as he may prescribe, grant temporary permits revocable in his discretion for the construction of such [pipelines. (39 Stat. 974, emphasis added.)
The opinion of the majority interprets passage of this 1917 legislation authorizing the Secretary to grant temporary revocable permits for pipeline purposes over Indian lands as indicating that Congress intentionally withheld such authorization from the Secretary with respect to pipelines running over United States lands. Such interpretation is unwarranted and will not withstand analysis.
Rather, the fact that one Congress (1917) that was considering the Mineral Leasing Act (but did not enact it) found it necessary to enact a specific law authorizing the Secretary to issue revocable permits for pipelines being constructed over Indian lands, in addition to the authority previously conferred by statute, with respect to Indian lands, to issue permanent rights of way for such purposes, clearly demonstrates that Congress was aware that revocable permits were necessary for the “construction, operation and maintenance,” 33 Stat. 65, of pipelines in addition to even the liberal right of way authorized by the Indian *898Lands Pipeline Act, 33 Stat. 65. And the fact that Congress did not expressly authorize the Secretary to issue revocable permits for similar purposes with respect to pipelines being constructed over lands owned by the United States, indicates that Congress considered the Secretary already possessed such authority, as he did (see authorities cited, note 15, infra). This interpretation is obvious because the construction, maintenance and operation of a pipeline over United States lands requires exactly the same space and materials as over Indian lands, and it is certain that Congress never intended to discriminate against the pipelines which run over both United States lands and Indian lands by depriving those running over United States lands of the same temporary construction assistance it considered to be necessary for pipelines constructed over Indian lands.
On the basis of the foregoing it is concluded that the analysis of the legislative history in the opinion of the majority is unsupported, and therefore any statutory interpretation based upon that analysis must fall.
B. The Revocability of a Portion of the Special Land Use Permits
The majority opinion contends that it would violate departmental regulations, applicable decisional law, Attorney General opinions and administrative rulings to issue the requested special land use permits. Among the alleged deficiencies, the opinion of the majority finds that the so-called revocable permits would not in fact be temporary or revocable. I disagree with all the grounds asserted in the majority opinion as a basis for this conclusion except that based on the finding that a portion of the uses would not be temporary and revocable in fact. In sum, it is my opinion that the requested permits could be validly issued for construction purposes, but not for operational and maintenance purposes. Under no circumstances could I concur in any opinion holding that a permit for construction purposes was not temporary or revocable in fact. Given the long history of the issuance of revocable permits and the temporary nature of construction, it strains credulity to even suggest the contrary. It is, however, important to determine the exact basis of illegality because of the precedential nature of our decision and the weight it may have with Congress and other courts in other matters.
1. Alyeska’s Request for a Special Land Use Permit
When we analyze the request made by Alyeska Pipeline Service Company on February 4, 1972 to the Department of the Interior for a “Special Land Use Permit Necessary for Trans Alaska Pipeline Construction,” we note that it is a request to use land in the requested amounts adjacent to and in addition to the 54-foot pipeline right of way authorized by 30 U.S.C. § 185. The application was made under 43 C.F.R. Part 2920,15 and stated that the requested permits were for
Temporary use, during construction, of land adjacent to the proposed pipeline right-of-way . . . [which would be] temporary, revocable at the will of the government and that any special land use permit or permits issued will not give rise to any easement or other form of interest affecting title to land involved. The applicants agree that they will accept the special land use permit(s) subject to all terms and conditions of applicable regulations and to such *899stipulations as may generally be applicable to the construction and operation of the trans-Alaska pipeline system (Emphasis added.)
The last sentence above makes the conditions upon which the application might be granted rather open ended and indicates that the requested permit will be used for “operation of the trans-Alaska pipeline” (a permanent use) as well as for construction, a temporary use. Basically, the application is for the use of Government lands for a “construction zone” of such “width [to be] requested at each point along the pipeline right-of-way” as Alyeska would “demonstrate to the authorized officer [to be a] reasonably necessity.” This amount of land, in addition to the land included in the right of way, which would be needed for construction purposes “will vary depending on the mode of construction, topography, soil types and conditions, amount of cut spoil, and utilization of construction techniques designed to minimize environmental disturbance.”16 Estimates of the amount of land needed accompanies the application in the form of alignment maps. The application also stated:
[Approximately 85 per cent of the right-of-way (approximately 662 miles) will require the temporary use of widths ranging from 46 to 146 feet.17 Approximately two-thirds of this distance (about 456 miles) will require temporary widths of 96 feet or less. . . . [G]reater widths will be necessary ... at river crossings, road crossings, and in mountainous terrain. Temporary widths exceeding 246 feet [would] . comprise only about 28 miles of the 789-mile pipeline route, occurring primarily at river crossings and in particularly difficult terrain.
[T] he total amount of land required for temporary use during construction is estimated to be approximately 9,600 acres. Of this amount, however, only about 3,600 acres will be necessary for working area, the remainder being utilized for cut spoil and for the graded slopes which are necessitated by slope stability considerations. . * . The 3,600-acre temporary working área will ordinarily be approximately 46 feet in width, although the topography, the construction mode, and other special situations, such as road crossings, and river crossings, will require variations in the width of this space. The remaining “temporarily affected” area, approximately 6,000 acres, will, after proper grading, be revegetated and otherwise dealt with in order to assure slope stability, to control erosion, and to mitigate any adverse slope stability, to control erosion, and to mitigate any adverse aesthetic affects.
. With respect to the gravel working surface, Alyeska will adhere to the instructions of the Authorized Officer concerning its removal and/or maintenance. Alyeska recognizes that any authorization to use the space requested by this application will remain at all times revocable at will by the government, without cause or justification, and without giving rise to any claim against the government arising out of such revocation.
* * * * * *
. All other space temporarily occupied pursuant to this permit will be rehabilitated in accordance with such stipulations as may generally be applicable to the construction of the trans-Alaska pipeline system and such further instructions as the Authorized Officer may deem appropriate.18
The application also included detailed descriptions and sketches describing and *900picturing the construction zone requirements for varying conditions, to wit: Below Ground Construction; Ditching Operation; Side-Cut Construction; Thru-Cut Construction; River Crossing Construction; Road Crossing Construction ; Berm Construction19; Pile Bent Construction.20
The majority opinion holds that the use of special land use permits for such purposes, to the extent requested, “violates the agency’s [Interior Department] own regulations governing the granting of special land use permits.” 21 I disagree with this conclusion. The majority opinion bases this portion of its decision upon the contention that such permits would violate 43 C.P.R. § 2920.0-2(a) which restricts any permit to those “purposes not specifically provided for by existing law” and provides that revocable permits will not be issued “where the provisions of any law may be invoked.” Under the reasoning of the majority on this point, section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act is an “existing law” specifically providing for such purposes and represents a law that might “be invoked” by applicants for additional space and material for construction. However, on this point the majority opinion admits that its holding that Alyeska’s request is invalid on these grounds is based upon the “previous analysis [that] . . . section 28 [of the Mineral Leasing Act] was violated.”22 And since this portion of the majority opinion rested on the erroneous interpretation of the legislative history, as pointed out above, it follows that this portion of the decision of the majority is likewise erroneous. Actually, for reasons pointed out above, it is clear that section 28 in nowise restricts the power of the Secretary to issue bona fide revocable permits for temporary construction purposes.
2. The Requirement of Revocability
A second ground asserted by the majority opinion in support of its conclusion that the agency’s regulations would be violated rests upon the requirement of the departmental regulation that special land use permits must be revocable.23 This requirement of revocability is also recognized in a number of Attorney General opinions. All parties, and the majority opinion, refer to an opinion by Attorney General Sargent in 1928 involving a revocable permit to build a railroad across the Benicia Arsenal Military Reservation.24 That opinion permitted the Secretary of War to issue a revocable permit to the Southern Pacific Railroad to construct a section of railroad line consisting of two or more tracks constituting part of its main lines to be built and maintained across the Benicia Arsenal Military Reservation pending action by Congress on a permanent grant. The opinion recognized that the Secretary of War had “no power to grant a permanent right of way over the reservation, and at most can grant only a revocable permit, and that it will be necessary to apply to Congress for the grant of a permanent easement ” 25
[T]here is no express statutory authority for the grant of revocable licenses or permits for temporary use of Government property for railway purposes, but it has long been the practice for the Secretary of War to grant revocable licenses for the use of parts of military reservations, and the long-continued exercise of this power and the open use of Government reservations by such licensees without legislative objective from Congress implies the tacit assent of Congress to this custom.
35 Op.Att’y Gen. at 487.
*901Following this recitation the opinion notes that “where it will benefit the public interest, the Secretary of War may grant a revocable permit or license” 26 and suggests that
[T]he permit may not be granted if it appears that the permittee, because of the nature of the improvements which he proposes to erect, hopes and expects that the license will continue in force indefinitely. .
“It (referring to a revocable license) cannot be used as a basis for granting, under the guise of a temporary license, a substantially permanent right to maintain a railroad.” [citing 22 Op.Att’y Gen. 240]
35 Op.Att’y Gen. at 487.
The Sargent opinion also notes that as far back as 1878 Opinions of the Attorney General have recognized that Government officials (Secretary of the Navy) could grant a revocable permit “pending application to Congress for grant of a permanent right.” 27 It also distinguished the West Point Chapel opinion, cited here by the majority,28 which involved a proposal to erect a Roman Catholic chapel on the military reservation at West Point, by pointing out that a revocable license was not involved there because the contract in question provided that after the building was erected the United States would take over the chapel and permanently maintain it. I find the West Point opinion to be inapplicable here for the same reasons that Attorney General Sargent found it to be inapplicable to Benicia.
It was also pointed out in the Sargent opinion that while some prior opinions indicated that revocable license could not be used as a guise for granting a substantially permanent right, there were instances, which he pointed out, where revocable licenses had been issued which contemplated structures of a permanent character, intended for long use, and which the licensees undoubtedly hoped and expected would be allowed to remain indefinitely. In this respect the Sargent opinion observed:
The essential thing is to preserve unimpaired the title of the United States and its right at any time to occupy and use its property and to prevent any use by the licensee which would permanently damage or destroy the property for governmental use. If the permit is revocable at will by its terms, and if the structures which the licensee proposes to erect are capable of being removed in case of revocation, and if upon revocation the land may be left in suitable condition for Government use, the fact that the licensee expects that the United States may not soon find it to its interest to revoke the license has no real bearing on the legal situation.
35 Op.Att’y Gen. at 489.
Attorney General Sargent summarized his view of the relevant principles and set forth four conditions that must be met:
If an effort were made to evolve from the prior opinions of the Attorneys General a rule which may be reconciled with all of them, it would be that the Secretary of War has power to grant revocable permits- for occupancy of parts of military reservations for railway purposes provided (1) the permits are made expressly revocable at will, (2) the structures which the licensee proposes to erect are capable of being removed in case of revocation, and the use to which the licensee proposes to put the land will not permanently damage or destroy it for Government use, (3) the granting of the permit and the use of the property under it will be of direct benefit to the United States.
In eases where it appears that the permittee intends to make substantial improvements the removal of which would cause him a great loss in case *902of revocation of the permit, it is a matter of departmental policy whether a situation should be created by the issue of a permit which may after-wards embarrass the head of the department in the exercise of the power of revocation.
35 Op.Att’y Gen. at 489-90.
Relying on these principles, and the fact that the Secretary of War had previously determined that the change in the location of the railroad would be of military advantage and directly to the benefit of the United States because of the improvement in transportation facilities for the arsenal and for other purposes, the opinion held that it was permissible for the Secretary of War to issue a revocable permit for the construction and maintenance of the proposed railway lines with the express provision that the permit may be revoked at any time at the pleasure of the Secretary of War, that it shall expire by its own limits at some specified date not more than five years from its issue, that the right of occupancy will then cease unless the permittee has meanwhile obtained authority from Congress, and on the further conditions that stipulations be made for the removal of structures and for leaving the property in suitable condition for Government use. Under such circumstances the opinion concludes it could not be said that under the guise of a temporary license a substantially permanent right to maintain a railroad has been granted.
3. The Application Here of the Four Conditions Prescribed in Benicia
Applying the principles of Benicia to the case at hand, it is essential that the special land use permits be revocable in fact so that it may not be said that under the guise of a temporary license a substantially permanent right to maintain and operate a pipeline has been granted.
When the permits that are requested by Alyeska truly for construction purposes are evaluated I have no hesitation in finding that they are actually revocable in fact and that they satisfy the other requirements outlined above. To my mind it is clear that:
(1) The permits are made expressly revocable at will. The application so provides.
(2) The structures which the licensee proposes to erect are capable of being removed in case of revocation. It is unquestioned that every structure could be removed and the ground covered by the gravel pad could be restored. See discussion at p. 903, infra.
(3) The use to which the pipeline proposes to put the land outside the permanent right of way will not permanently damage or destroy it for Government use. Most of the land is open land that has never been put to any other use and it would be as capable of being used for such purposes after construction as before. The slope easements that are necessary for slope modification here are a necessary protection to the environment and one that the Secretary might order and insist upon. The Government acte'd similarly to protect the environment under the Act of March 3, 1875 (granting railroads rights of way through public lands) and required railroads to go outside the 200-foot statutory right of way and “clear and keep clear” timber for fire breaks.29 I would thus find the authority to authorize slope easements, where necessary, to be within that grant of power conferred by 30 U.S.C. § 189 providing: “The Secretary of the Interior is authorized . . . to do any and all things necessary to carry out and accomplish the purposes of this chapter [the Mineral Leasing Act], . . . ” This was one of the original provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act, February 25, 1920, c. 85, § 32, 41 Stat. 450, the intent of which as declared in its title was to “promote the mining of . oil . .” 41 Stat. 437. Authorizing slope easements which are necessary to *903the construction of a pipeline would be in furtherance of this declared objective of the statute and would not prevent the future use of the affected areas. After all, the steep hills that would be involved here have limited use in their present posture and may be subject to more use after their slopes are modified.
Also, I find, contrary to the majority opinion, that the record does not support its conclusion that “the [gravel] pad cannot be removed without producing permanent and deleterious changes in the underlying land [and] that it would be impossible to remove the pad and return the underlying land to a condition suitable for other uses.” 30 In support of this conclusion the majority opinion refers to statements in the Impact Statement which recite some of the diffieultes which would be created 31 but it overlooks the significant statement in the Impact Statement which follows and indicates that such lands could be restored:
Intact [gravel] workpads and abandoned roads could be plowed and covered with a layer of loose, fine material with qualities of low erodability. Riprap and a layer of finer material similar to gold dredge tailings could be placed on exposed ice-rich permafrost and allowed to become vegetated naturally. Such procedures would permit the reestablishment of native species. [Emphasis added.]
Final Environmental Impact Statement —Proposed Trans-Alaska Pipeline, Vol. 1, p. 117 (1972). This belies the statement of the majority opinion that it would be “impossible” to restore the land in the permafrost areas.
(4) Also, I have no difficulty in finding that “the granting of the permit and the use of the property under it will be of direct benefit to the United States.” The direct and unquestioned benefit to our national security, by making us less dependent upon foreign oil, the tremendous revenues it will produce for the up-building of the fledgling State of Alaska and its people, the assistance that North Slope oil will be to our economy by assisting in reducing our unfavorable balance of trade, and the assistance it will give to help alleviate our critical oil shortage which is becoming more serious every day, all stamp the Alaska Pipeline project as one of direct benefit to the United States and to its people. In fact, in my opinion, the Alaska pipeline is a national necessity and some way must be found to construct it as soon as possible.
Having said all this, I conclude that a special land use permit which was truly for construction purposes would meet all the legal standards of statutory, regulatory and decisional law and would be revocable in fact. I include in this conclusion the requested permits for camps, temporary access roads and pipe storage sites. Such uses are obviously temporary. I also include the space necessary for material sites which are used temporarily and which the Secretary by his supervision and direction can require to be so levelled and restored as to permit substantially the same use after such use as before.
However, as I interpret, Alyeska’s application, I find that it does intend that a portion of the land covered by its application for the revocable permit will be put to permanent use in connection with the “operation of the . . . pipeline system.” In this one respect my finding is substantially the same as that of the majority opinion, except it is not quite so far reaching. As I read the majority opinion, it applies its conclusion that the requested permits would be “nonrevoca-ble in fact” to all the lands covered by the gravel pad which would be used for construction purposes; but I would only conclude that the permit was not revocable in fact with regard to those lands which after construction would be necessary for the operation and maintenance of the pipeline.
*904My analysis of this permanent need for the use of additional land in the “operation of the . . . pipeline” indicates that this use would generally include a strip of land that in some places might be less, but in most instances would not exceed, about 50 feet in addition to the 54-foot statutory right of way. It is this strip of about 50 feet, covered by a “gravel working surface,” 32 that Alyeska places in a nebulous state by indicating in its application that it “will adhere to the instructions of the Authorized Officer concerning its removal and/or maintenance.” 33 But the size of the pipeline, the nature of the terrain, the severe climatic conditions that exist over a large part of its intended route, and the almost complete absence of established highways adjacent to the pipeline over a great deal of its length, all combine to make it clear that a substantial strip of land adjacent to the pipeline right of way is a virtual necessity, not just for construction purposes, but for its continued operation and maintenance and that the application inferentially so states. The need for this gravel strip, to this extent and for this purpose, is thus as permanent as the right of way and is intended to be so and thus it is not in fact temporary and revocable,34
I recognize that revocable permits have been issued for the construction of railroads, street railways, a sewer, etc., but while some of these may seem to have been permanent uses they involved comparatively small projects extending for relatively short distances over Government lands of limited areas and their revocation would not have resulted in the destruction of the project. Actually those permits were merely matters of *905temporary convenience, rather than of continuing necessity, which in my opinion illustrates the dividing line that distinguishes the permit here requested from those permits for projects extending over a few miles at the most, which are cited by Alyeska in support of their claim of validity.
Here we are talking about a strip of land containing a gravel pad that is upwards of 50 feet or more in width extending for 789 miles, much of it in what is actually an Arctic wilderness. To my mind, a special land use permit of that extent and degree of permanence cannot be justified upon the strength of an Attorney General’s opinion that allowed a railroad to build a line of track as a short cut across a relatively small military reservation with the further condition ■ that the permit would terminate after five years if Congress had not granted a permanent right of way in the interim.
I thus concur in the majority opinion to the extent that it holds that the requested special land use permits are invalid to the extent that they are intended to be used for operations and maintenance of the pipeline, but I would uphold their validity had they been requested solely for construction purposes. In so deciding I recognize that Alyeska must now go to Congress for an amendment to a law that never contemplated that a pipeline of this magnitude would be required to be built under the harsh conditions of soil and climate that exist in Alaska. That is regrettable because the construction of the pipeline is urgent and becomes more necessary with each passing day and legislation may further delay construction that is vital to our nation’s welfare, but it is Congress that has the legislative power and not this court.
It is thus my conclusion that the Secretary of the Interior is not authorized to issue a special land use permit upon appellee’s application for that strip of land upwards of 50 feet in width which is adjacent to the 54-foot right of way to the extent that it will actually be used in the permanent operation and mainte-* nance of the pipeline. If a revocable permit were requested for bona fide construction purposes only, the Secretary would be authorized to issue it, but since it appears that the pending application is not for a revocable construction permit but for a permit to be used for construction and operation and maintenance, the permit applied for must be completely rejected.
II. Parts II, III and IV of the Majority Opinion
With respect to Part II, I concur in the result reached and with the reasoning insofar as the pumping stations are concerned; however, with respect to the pipeline communication facilities that are not temporary but are part of the “permanent ‘backbone’ communications system” I would reach substantially the same result as the majority opinion by finding that such facilities were part of the pipeline, the same as a telegraph line is part of a railroad. I also concur with the results and the reasoning of Parts III and IV which relate to the rights of way of the State of Alaska for public highways, airports and the use of gravel, and to the Valdez Tank Farm.
III. Part V — The Sufficiency of the Environmental Impact Statement
Finally, I dissent from the refusal of the majority to decide whether the Environmental Impact Statement is sufficient or not sufficient. This is a monstrous refusal to perform a judicial obligation with respect to a vital matter and in my opinion is completely unjustified. When the majority claims that this disposition of the ease will “expedite” it; that it questions “whether resolution of the NEPA issues presented to [it] at this time will have any practical significance” (pp. 889, 890, supra), it is attempting to deny the obvious. The issue is presented to us, it is ripe for decision and the parties (as well as the nation) have a right to have it decided now in its present form. Since this portion of the majority decision also relies heavily *906upon its misinterpretation of the legislative history involving section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act, the decision is infirm in that respect and it should not be assumed that another court would follow that part of the decision in the event it undertakes to pass upon the sufficiency of the Environmental Impact Statement.
Moreover, there is little likelihood that the controlling environmental facts will change with the passage of time and hence the present is as good a time to decide the issue as the future. The argument that the Canadian alternative and Canadian studies may alter the situation is highly speculative and is insufficient to support a refusal of this court to pass on the issue before it. The calculation by the court as to the extent of the delay its opinion will cause may also prove to be unfounded. Because of the great importance of the matter Congress or the Supreme Court may act quickly and thus there would be no substantial change in the material facts affecting the issues surrounding the Impact Statement.
The majority opinion tells the parties that on this question they should come back another day. I believe such judicial insouciance to be indefensible. On a matter as important as this, are we going to compel the United States Government, the State of Alaska and our citizens to accept piecemeal decisions, send them away from our court uninformed on probably the most important issue in the case and compel them to come back again several years later only to be sent back again because the Impact Statement may, in their opinion, contain a deficiency it might claim exists now? Is this controversy of mammoth public concern to be another recurring Three Sisters Bridge situation where this court finds new obstacles each time the case comes up ? 35
In my view the Impact Statement adequately furnishes all the material necessary for a resolution of the issues.
The major challenge to the adequacy of the Impact Statement raised by appellants has been that its discussion of the alternatives to the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) has not complied with the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). NEPA directs not only that an agency must make a “detailed statement ... on alternatives to the proposed action,”36 but also that the agency shall “study, develop, and describe appropriate alternatives to recommended courses of action in any proposal which involves unresolved conflicts concerning alternative uses of available resources.”37 The Guidelines of the Counsel on Environmental Quality, promulgated to advise federal agencies concerning compliance with NEPA, state that these sections require
[a] rigorous exploration and objective evaluation of alternative actions that might avoid some or all of the adverse environmental effects. . . . Sufficient analysis of such alternatives and their costs and impact on the environment should accompany the proposed action through the agency review process in order not to foreclose prematurely options which might have less detrimental effects.38
Further, recent decisions in our circuit have developed guidelines to direct agency compliance with these sections. In Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Committee v. A. E. C., 146 U.S.App.D.C. 33, 449 F. 2d 1109 (1971), we said the purpose of the requirement to discuss alternatives in the Impact Statement was
*907to ensure that each agency decision maker has before him and takes into proper account all possible approaches to a particular project (including total abandonment of the project) which would alter the environmental impact and the cost-benefit balance. Only in that fashion is it likely that the most intelligent, optimally beneficial decision will ultimately be made.
146 U.S.App.D.C. at 38, 449 F.2d at 1114.
More recently in NRDC v. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827 (1972) we spoke specifically to the scope of the alternatives requirement and the extent to which such alternatives must be discussed in the Impact Statement. There we adopted a rule of reason with respect to NEPA’s requirements concerning discussion of alternatives, finding that there must be “a presentation of the environmental risks incident to reasonable alternative courses of action.”39 We noted that the discussion of the environmental effects of alternatives need not be exhaustive, but “[w]hat is required is information sufficient to permit a reasoned choice of alternatives so far as environmental aspects are concerned.” 40 Implicit in this rule of reason approach is that the environmental effects of such reasonable alternatives need be discussed only reasonably. We stated there that in discussing alternatives, NEPA did not require “ ‘crystal ball’ inquiry,” and that the “statute must be construed in the light of reason if it is not to demand what is, fairly speaking, not meaningfully possible, given the obvious, that the resources of energy and research — and time — available to meet the Nation’s needs are not infinite.” 41
Thus, as I see it, the inquiry for the court here is to determine whether the discussion of the alternatives in the Impact Statement presented sufficient information to permit the Secretary of the Interior to make a reasoned choice of alternatives insofar as environmental aspects are concerned, being mindful of the fact that the adequacy of the discussion of the environmental consequences of a particular alternative shall be judged in light of the reasonable feasi: bility of pursuing that alternative.
In this proceeding two alternatives have borne the brunt of objections — the alternative of building a trans-Canada pipeline, and the alternative of deferral, i. e., deferring a decision on the permit to build TAPS. In my opinion the discussion of each alternative in the Impact Statement is in sufficient compliance with the requirements of NEPA.
A. The Canadian Alternative
In my view an examination of the record before us reveals that the Department of the Interior expended sufficient efforts to gather information concerning the environmental effects of a Canadian alternative to make a meaningful decision. The possibility of a Canadian alternative was mentioned in the draft Impact Statement issued in January, 1971, and thereafter testimony was taken from the public at hearings held in Washington and Alaska. When the study for the final Impact Statement was begun in early 1971, Task Force C, comprised initially of scientists from the Geological Survey and headed by the Director, was directed to study literature and available information concerning the environment along possible Canadian routes. Later, this study group was expanded to include experts in wildlife biology and land planning. This Task Force developed a description of the environment that would be affected by various trans-Canadian routes, and it analyzed the environmental impact of building pipelines along each route. Their report formed the basis for the discussion of the environmental impact of the Canadian alternative in the final Impact Statement.
In addition to this - Task Force, the Department of the Interior requested in*908formation on a trans-Canadian pipeline from both Alyeska and the Candían government. Alyeska responded by furnishing the Department with seven studies it had conducted on Canadian routes between 1968 and 1971. Further, these applicants were requested by the Secretary to confer with the Canadian government concerning a Canadian pipeline, and the results of this conference were reported to the Secretary. The information received from the Canadian government appears to have been insubstantial.42
It is also my conclusion that the information actually present in the Impact Statement was sufficient to permit the Secretary of the Interior and the other parties specified by NEPA 43 to make a reasoned choice of alternatives, with respect to environmental aspects. The Impact Statement examined five oil pipeline alternative routes through Canada.44 Each discussion of an alternative route contained a detailed description of many ecological elements in the area of that particular pipeline route, including: topography, drainage, vegetation, surficial deposits, permafrost, bedrock, seismicity, climate, fishery resources, and wildlife resources. Then each alternative contained an evaluation of the potential environmental impact that the area would experience during both construction and operation of the pipeline. Finally, the discussion of the Canadian alternatives ends with a summary of the environmental effects of each alternative and the potential natural hazards which the area would pose to a pipeline. Also, after discussion of rail and sea routes, all land and sea routes are compared in a table.45 The Impact Statement also contained various discussions of alternative gas pipeline routes.46
The major objection voiced by the appellants is that the Impact Statement does not systematically examine the environmental advantages of the concept of a common corridor where both a gas pipeline and -an oil pipeline would traverse Canada. While the common corridor concept could have been studied and analyzed more than it was, it is my conclusion that the Impact Statement’s treatment of it was not impermissibly deficient. As mentioned above, the Impact Statement contained considerable discussion and comparison of both oil and gas pipelines across Canada. A common corridor approach is only a variation of the concept of a trans-Canadian pipeline — which alternative was discussed in detail. Though the common corridor approach is not neatly analyzed in one place, the elements of that approach are discussed so as to put all of the environmental facts, as well as they were known at that time,47 sufficiently *909before the decision makers.48 In my view a failure to organize the particular environmental effects and impact of a common corridor into one easily readable table, when such information is already present though not in cumulative form, cannot alone support a finding that the requirements of NEPA have not been met.49 In this respect all one has to do is to consider the material for the oil pipeline and the gas pipeline together.
My conclusion that this alternative was sufficiently treated is also based upon an appraisal of the facts in the record relating to the feasibility of a common corridor, and the practical difficulties inherent in conducting an analysis of such a hypothetical corridor.50 The factors which bear on the “reasonableness” of the Canadian alternative apply equally to a common corridor, which is but a variation of that alternative and are discussed below. While intuitively it would seem that it should not be too difficult to quantify the environmental advantages of a common corridor over the TAPS proposal, the contrary appears to be the case. An inherent limitation on the detail of such a quantification is the fact that neither the trans-Canadian oil pipeline, nor the trans-Canadian gas pipeline is even in the planning stage.51 When the Department was comparing various trans-Canadian oil pipeline alternatives in preparing the Impact Statement it refrained from quantifying these various routes because of a dearth of concrete information, due to the fact that such pipelines were unplanned.52 It would seem to me to be unreasonable to require more exactness of the Department when additional uncertainties are introduced for comparison, i. e., the environmental effects and savings of an unplanned oil pipeline and an unplanned gas pipeline in a common corridor. I thus find the Impact Statement to be sufficient on the only serious attack made by appellants — the claim that the Canadian alternatives were insufficiently covered. In addition there are other factors which indicate that the alternative of an oil (or oil and gas) pipeline through Canada is not a reasonable present alternative and these facts also bear on the sufficiency of the treatment actually given this alternative in the Impact Statement.
No person has applied to build an oil pipeline through Canada and there is no proof that Canada could adequately finance a 51% share of the tremendous construction cost that would be required (see discussion below). The route through Canada is uncharted and unknown but of necessity would be much longer. It would possibly cause greater damage to the environment and greatly increase the cost of the pipeline and the share of the cost that Canada would have to bear.
Moreover, requiring the pipeline to be routed through Canada would involve factors that might indicate the route *910would be contrary to the national interest of the United States, particularly to our national security. What is needed now is a 48-inch pipeline for oil from the North Slope of Alaska and not a pipeline that can be compelled to share its throughput capacity with whatever oil may be discovered in the adjoining MacKenzie Basin in Canada. That might require another pipeline. Some of the same considerations which rule out a Canadian pipeline for oil, which is vital to the national interest and security of the United States, are of the same character as the considerations that induced Canada to build the Canadian Pacific as an all-Canadian railroad through the barren and unprofitable Laurentian shield north of Lake Superior.53
In addition United States law may prohibit the granting of right of way over our public lands for a pipeline that, because it also would run through Canada, would have to be owned and effectively controlled by Canada. The exact Canadian requirement in this respect is not known, but if Canada did require that it control a 51% interest in the Canadian portion of the pipeline, as Canada has indicated it would require,54 a legal impediment might exist under our existing statutes. Actually, control of 51% of the Canadian portion would be effective control of 100% of the entire pipeline. No law in the United States imposes a similar restriction on Canadians constructing a pipeline in the United States. This 51% control requirement might bring into play the following statutes: The Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 181,55 provides that deposits of oil and gas shall be subject to disposition to citizens of the United States or to any corporation organized under the laws of the United States or of any state. This would permit Canadian citizens to control 100% of a United States corporation and to act through such corporation. This same *911statute, however, provides that citizens of another country, whose laws or regulations deny similar or like privileges, to citizens or corporations of this country, “shall not by stock ownership, stock holding, or stock control, own any interest in any lease acquired under the provisions of this chapter.”
Another section of the Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. § 185,56 provides that the provisions of section 181 apply mu-tatis mutandis to oil and gas pipelines. Thus, since United States laws provide that rights of way for oil. pipelines through public lands may only be granted by the Secretary of the Interior to applicants who possess the citizenship and nationality qualifications required by section 181, a Canadian insistence on 51% control of a pipeline through Canada might mean that a United States pipeline controlled as to its throughput capacity by Canadian citizens could not acquire a grant of any right of way in the United States because Canadian laws, customs and regulations do not permit a pipeline in Canada to be controlled by United States Citizens through a Canadian corporation. In the language of section 181, citizens and corporations of the United States would be denied the “similar or like privilege of” controlling pipelines in Canada.
Canadian control of the throughput capacity of the pipeline might also prevent the Secretary of the Interior from regulating the “use” of the pipeline and from controlling the “proportionate amounts” of oil from U.S. Government lands that the pipeline must carry. The statute imposes such powers and duties upon the Secretary.57
B. The Alternative of Deferral
The main objection raised concerning the Impact Statement’s treatment of the alternative of temporarily deferring approval of the TAPS permit is that this treatment does not systematically quantify and describe environmental studies that are presently planned or in progress, or that should be undertaken, that would be helpful to fill in the gaps of the present knowledge. Despite this objection, however, it is clear that the Impact Statement does refer to a number of studies which are presently taking place which would provide relevant information for the construction and operation of the pipeline.58 Further, the Impact Statement on numerous occasions points out where knowledge on a certain issue is incomplete and refers to research, if any, which is under way.59 In my opinion this treatment was sufficient to permit an informed decision on the environmental benefits of the alternative of deferral.
All these factors make it unnecessary, in my opinion, for the current Environmental Impact Statement to discuss further an oil pipeline through Canada; and with respect to the discussion of the Canadian alternatives and all other issues, I find the Environmental Impact Statement to be sufficient under the statute.
*912I respectfully dissent to the extent indicated above.

. Pp. 856, 858, 859, 862, 863, 864, 869, supra.

. P. 875, supra:

. See note 1, supra.

. Page 858, supra; 51 Cong.Rec. 15421.

. Page 859, supra.

. The Secretary’s right under the bill to prescribe regulations relating to the “survey, location, application and use” of the right of way would be replaced with the few specific limitations dealing with these matters that were specified in the proposed amendment,

. 51 Cong.Rec. 15422.

. The date the omnibus amendment was rejected by the House in the 63rd Congress.

. The 66th Congress.

. The effective date of the law authorizing a 25-foot right of way.

. The 25-foot right of way.

. Temporary Special Land Use Permits, which are a lesser right than the permanent statutory grant (pie ala mode).

. 8 Cannon’s Precedents of the House of Representatives § 2841, p. 439 (1935), where it was held that a negative vote on an amendment embodying two propositions does not prevent the offering of another amendment embodying the substance of one of the rejected propositions.
The Supreme Court also enunciated the same principle in Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244, 265, 65 S.Ct. 605, 617, 89 L.Ed. 921 (1945) where it remarked that, “Rejection of an entire bill cannot be taken to be a specific rejection of each and every feature . . . . ”

. At page 854 the opinion of the majority argues that “licenses are [an] interest in land” and hence the term revocable permit is included within the term right of way. That really is beside the point because our only concern here is whether a revocable license is a right of way as that term is used in section 28. When the question is considered in that light it is perfectly apparent that a revocable license, which is what SLUPs are, is not the type of permanent right of way that Congress was' referring to in section 28. All the legislative debates indicate that Congress in this section was referring to permanent rights of way and not to revocable licenses. If there were any doubt about this, that doubt is completely dispelled by the last sentence of section 28 where Congress provided that any “right of way” they were referring to in the forepart of the section could only be forfeited for a violation of the Act through a court proceeding. Revocable licenses' by their very nature and terms are revocable by the Secretary without the necessity of court proceedings. So it is clear that Congress indicated the rights of way it was referring to in section 28 were permanent rights of way revocable by court action and did not include revocable licenses (SLUPs) revocable by the Secretary. This means that the so-called “exclusivity provision” of section 28 cannot be interpreted as prohibiting the Secretary from issuing revocable permits to aid temporarily in the construction of oil pipelines because section 28 only forbids the issuance of any additional permanent “right of way” for pipeline purposes and a temporary revocable permit, as pointed out above, is not a “right of way” as Congress used that term in section 28.

. This regulation sets forth the principles and procedures with respect to “Special Land Use Permits”:
Authority: The provisions of this Part 2920 issued under secs. 446, 453, 2478, Revised Statutes (1875), as amended; 43 U.S.C. secs. 1, 2, 1201 (1964); Act of Sept. 19, 1964 (78 Stat. 986; 43 U.S.C. secs. 1411-1418 (1964); Act of July 14, 1960 (74 Stat. 506; 43 U.S.C. secs. 1361-1364 (1964)).
Subpart 2920 — Principles and Procedures — General
Source: The provisions of this sub-part 2920 appear at 35 F.R. 9667, June 13, 1970, unless otherwise noted.

. Page 3 of attachment to letter of Feb. 4, 1972.

. These widths will be in addition to the 54-foot permanent right of way to be acquired under 30 U.S.C. § 185.

. Attachment to letter of February 4, 1972.

. Construction upon a narrow raised gravel ledge.

. Construction upon raised pilings or piers.

. Page 870, supra.

. Page 871, supra.

. Pages 871-875, supra.

. 35 Op. Att’y Gen. 485 (1928).

. Id. at 486-87.

. Id. at 487.

. 16 Op. Att’y Gen. 152 (1878).

. Page 871, supra; 21 Op. Att’y Gen. 537 (1897).

. See Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. v. United States, 244 U.S. 351, 37 S.Ct. 625, 61 L.Ed. 1184 (1917); see Tr. 38-39, 44-45.

. Page 874, supra.

. Final Environmental Impact Statement—Proposed Trans-Alaska Pipeline, Vol. 1, pp. 115-117 (1972).

. Letter of Feb. 4, 1972, supra, p. 3 of attachment.

. Id.

. It is deducible from Alyeska’s application for “Special Land Use Permit” of February 4, 1972 that the land area applied for comprises “approximately 9.600 acres” (p. 3). Of this “about 3,600 acres will be necessary for working area }>
The 3,600-acre temporary working area will ordinarily be approximately 46 feet in width, although the topography, the construction mode, and other special situations, such as road crossings, and river crossings, will require variations in the width of this space, (p. 4)
As to the remaining area of “approximately 6,000 acres,” the application indicates this is a “temporarily affected” area and indicates it will be restored (p.
4). The application then makes the significant statement that:
After construction has been completed, no continuing interest in this additional space is or will be claimed by Alyeska. (p. 4)
The disclaimer of any “continuing interest in this additional space (6,000 acres) ” indicates that Alyeska does have a “continuing interest” in the remaining 3.600 acres — the area covered by the gravel pad. With respect to this, the application states further:
With respect to the gravel working surface, Alyeska will adhere to the instructions of the Authorized Officer concerning its removal and/or maintenance. (p. 4)
It is also significant as bearing on the use Alyeska intended for the requested permits that its application stated it would accept such permits subject to all terms, conditions, regulations and stipulations “applicable to the construction and operation of the trans-Alaska pipeline system.” This indicates a permanent use.
Alyeska’s interest in this additional strip which adjoins its right of way is obvious when one studies the cross section sketches of construction methods to be employed. These indicate that a strip of about 50 feet minimum in width is necessary to accommodate the construction machinery necessary to dig the trench and to lay the pipeline in place. Such strip also serves the purpose of an access roadway along the pipeline. These are construction needs but the maintenance and operation needs may be similar. It is well known that pipelines may break at any place on the line and substantially the same equipment that was needed to construct the pipeline will be needed to repair it and this will necessitate a continuing need for the access strip which will be as permanent as the operation of the pipeline. It is thus concluded that the Alyeska application in fact involves what to all intents and purposes is a request for a permanent special land use permit.

. D.C. Federation of Civic Associations v. Volpe, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 162, 434 F.2d 436 (decided April 6, 1970); 148 U.S. App.D.C. 207, 459 F.2d 1231 (decided Oct. 12, 1971) ; Supplemental Opinion and denial of rehearing, 148 U.S.App. D.C. 239, 459 F.2d 1263 (March 2, 1972), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030, 92 S.Ct. 1290, 31 L.Ed.2d 489 (1972), and the end is not yet.

. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (iii) (1970).

. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (D) (1970).

. 36 Fed.Reg. 7724 (1971).

. 458 F.2cl at 834.

. Id. at 836.

. Id,, at 837.

. On July 9, 1971 an aide memoire was transmitted to the Canadian government through the Department of State requesting information relevant to TAPS and its alternatives. The parties here disagree on the scope of this request. The Secretary of the Interior in his deposition and another official from the Department stated that this request was open-ended, and sought all relevant information. The appellants maintain that the request was much more limited, citing the deposition of the man in charge of drafting the final Impact Statement and who was involved in the discussions that led to the aide memoire. However, there is no dispute that at no time did the Canadian government furnish the Department with any technical information.

. XEPA specifies that copies of the “detailed statement,” i. e., the Impact Statement, shall be made available to the President, the CEQ, and to the public. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (C) (1970).

. V Final Impact Statement (hereinafter cited as FIS) at 123-200.

. Id. at 233-42.

. I FIS at 81-84, 176-83, 226-27, 243-56; IV FIS at 492-503, 583-84, 603-04, 619 ; V FIS at 123-26.

. There is considerable dispute among the parties over exactly what scientific information was available at the time the final Impact Statement was issued. Both appellants Wilderness Society and David Anderson maintain that there were a number of relevant Canadian government and private studies available. The ap-pellees argue that at best only some of the studies were in the investigation stage, and that none of them was completed.

. Subsequent to the issuance of the final Impact Statement, Secretary Morton requested the Deputy Undersecretary to prepare a memorandum (known as the “Horton Memorandum”) presenting the common corridor in its most favorable light. This memorandum listed seven environmental advantages of the common corridor, and also assessed political, international, economic, and energy considerations. At oral argument it was not denied that “the facts [discussed in the Horton Memorandum, were] all from the Impact Statement.” The memorandum is reproduced in the Supplemental Joint Appendix at 3-7.

. The environmental impact of a common corridor is briefly alluded to on a number of occasions throughout the Impact Statement. See, e. g., I FIS at 226, 243, 273; IV FIS at 492, 583, 603-04; V FIS at 125-26.

. The Impact Statement considered five possible trans-Canadian oil pipeline routes, see V PIS at 123-200, though of course to date there has been no application to build such an oil pipeline. Neither has there been application for a gas pipeline across Canada, nor does the record disclose what route such a pipeline would take if it were built.

. IV PIS at 492.

. Deposition of Deputy Undersecretary Horton at 196-97. See also Deposition of Dr. Brew (the individual in charge of preparing the Pinal Impact Statement) at 26-7.

. Van Horne, one of the builders of the Canadian Pacific, described the route north of Lake Superior as “200 miles of engineering impossibilities.” Berton, The Impossible Railway (1972).
George Stephen’s (one of the Directors of the Canadian Pacific during the construction era) 1882 letter to the Grand Trunk share-holders defended the Canadian Pacific route through British territory and described the route north of Lake Superior as:
[A] National enterprise which is regarded by the Canadian people as a means whereby they are to be rendered independent of United States railway lines ....
Gibbon, History of the Canadian Pacific 248 (1937).
An historical fact of present interest is that it was the purchase of Alaska by the United States in 1867 that led to the decision of the Canadian Confederation to build the Canadian Pacific Railway “to connect the seaboard of British Columbia with the railway system of Canada” as a device to stop British Columbia from being “snapped up” by the United States. The Report to the United States Senate on the Pacific Railways had stated that the opening of the Northern Pacific Railways “seals the destiny of the British Possessions west of the ninety-first meridian. They will become so Americanized in interests and feelings that they will be in effect severed from the new Dominion, and the question of their annexation will be but a question of time:" History of the Canadian Pacific, supra at 177. The decision to build the Canadian Pacific Railroad was formulated in an agreement between the Government of the Dominion and the Province of British Columbia on July 7, 1870. After the Dominion Parliament accepted this agreement British Columbia entered the Canadian Confederation on July 20, 1871. History of the Canadian Pacific, supra at 157.

. Secretary Morton testified before Congress : “Canadian authorities have indicated that they must control 51% of any system through their country” (J.A. 82). See also, Sec. of Interior’s Statement of Reasons for Approval, (J.A. 34, 66). When a Canadian Cabinet Minister speaks on such a matter he is expressing government policy, since they operate on the parliamentary system.

. 30 U.S.C. § 181 provides:
Deposits of . . . oil shall be subject to disposition in the form and manner provided by this chapter to citizens of the United States, or to associations of such citizens, or to any corporation organized under the laws of the United States, or of any State or Territory thereof ....

. 30 U.S.C. § 185 provides :
Rights-of-way through the public lands, including the forest reserves of the United States, may be granted by the Secretary of the Interior for pipeline purposes for the transportation of oil or natural gas to any applicant possessing the qualifications provided in section 181 of this title, to the extent of the ground occupied by the said pipe line and twenty-five feet on each side of the same under such regulations and conditions as to survey, location, application, and use as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Interior and upon the express condition that such pipe lines shall be constructed, operated, and maintained as common carriers and shall accept, convey, transport, or purchase without discrimination, oil or natural gas produced from Government lands in the vicinity of the pipe line in such proportionate amoimts as the Secretary of the Interior may, after a full hearing with due notice thereof to the interested parties and a proper finding of facts, determine to he reasonable . . . . [Emphasis added.]

. Id.

. V FIS at 8-10.

. Supporting Documents of Alyeska NEPA Brief, Vol. 3 at Tab. 21.