Court Opinion

ID: 9717104
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:58:18.500993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:51.289071
License: Public Domain

GARRARD, Judge,
dissenting.
As the majority points out there are three distinct authorizations in Indiana for the termination of parental rights.
The adoption statute, IC 31-3-1-1 et seq., permits an adoption to be granted without the consent of the natural father of a child born out of wedlock whose paternity has not been established by a court proceeding. IC 31-3-1-6(g)(2). I agree with the majority that the adoption statute does not apply in this proceeding because no current adoption was being sought. See IC 31-3-1-1 (petition only authorized by person(s) proposing to adopt.)
Secondly, IC 31-6-5-2 authorizes the county department or a licensed child placing agency to petition "for the voluntary termination of the parent-child relationship if requested by the parents." (emphasis added).
I believe the majority has misread and thereby overextended the meaning of subsection (f) [IC 81-6-5-2(f)] when it states that this statute permits termination "when *555one parent has given such consent and the other parent is unavailable."
The opening paragraph restricts the seetion's operation to instances concerning voluntary terminations requested by both parents. Pursuant to subsection (a) the petition must allege that:
"(2) the parents, including the alleged or adjudicated father if the child was born out of wedlock, knowingly and voluntarily consent to the termination of the parent-child relationship;"
Then subsection (c) requires:
"The parents must give their consent in open court unless the juvenile court makes findings of fact upon the record that:
(1) the parents gave their consent in writing before a person authorized by law to take acknowledgements;
(2) they were notified of their constitutional and other legal rights and of the consequences of their actions under seetion 3 of this chapter; and
(3) they failed to appear."
Thus, it appears to me that a plain reading of the statute authorizes its application only to cases where both parents (including a putative father) have consented to a termination. Subsection (£) does not alter that requirement. It only relieves the petitioner of the requirement that an absent parent consent in open court, and only permits that departure where the absent parent has at some time given his or her consent "in writing before a person authorized by law to take acknowledgements."
It is undisputed that Wade did not consent in open court and that he gave no written consent.
Therefore, the court could not grant a termination pursuant to IC 31-6-5-2.
Finally, IC 81-6-5-4 provides for involuntary termination of parental rights to delinquent children and children in need of services. As the majority points out, a petition under this section may only be instituted by the attorney for the county department or the prosecutor. Therefore, it is inapplicable here.
There being no basis for maintaining the proceeding, the judgment should be reversed and the petition be dismissed.