Court Opinion

ID: 9533763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:34:21.887658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:09.948116
License: Public Domain

G. Schnelz, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent.
In the instant case, the criminal prosecution of the insured Boughton resulted in a determination that Boughton was not guilty by reason of insanity. In contrast to a finding of guilty but mentally ill or a finding based on believed defenses of excuse or justification, a finding of insanity legally negates the requisite felonious intent. See People v Ramsey, 422 Mich 500, 547; 375 NW2d 297 (1985) (Levin, J., dissenting); LaFave & Scott, Criminal *262Law (Hornbook Series, 1972), pp 268-274. The fact that the finding of insanity was made by way of a directed verdict rather than a verdict actually delivered by the jury does not undermine the dispositive nature of the verdict. A directed verdict is a judgment on the merits of an issue actually litigated. Latimer v William Mueller & Son, Inc, 149 Mich App 620, 641; 386 NW2d 618 (1986).
I believe that it is an exercise in sophistry to conclude that a person who is found not guilty by reason of insanity could, in a later action, be declared to have committed an act that was "expected or intended” by that party. The finding of insanity cannot be legally or logically reconciled with the trial court’s findings in the declaratory action that Boughton was not insane at the time of the shooting. The lower standard of proof in a civil case just cannot be applied. It merely begs the question.
I note in particular that another panel of this Court has recently addressed the issue whether a person’s insanity precludes him or her from acting "intentionally” within an exclusionary clause under a homeowner’s insurance policy. See Allstate Ins Co v Miller, 175 Mich App 515; 438 NW2d 638 (1989). In Allstate, the panel agreed with the line of cases which hold that, if an insured suffers from insanity, the insured’s act cannot be intentional for purposes of an exclusion in an insurance policy. Contra, Johnson v Ins Co of North America, 232 Va 340; 350 SE2d 616 (1986). This Court in Allstate further concluded that an exclusionary clause similar in language to the exclusionary clause in the instant case was ambiguous and therefore would have to be construed against the insurer.
I agree with the above conclusions reached by *263the panel in Allstate. I do not find the instant case to be distinguishable from Allstate. Since an adjudication of the insured’s insanity was made in the instant case, I believe the exclusionary clause cannot be invoked and coverage precluded under the homeowner’s insurance policy. Moreover, if the insurance companies are concerned over this, it would be a simple matter to make insanity a specific exclusion.
I would reverse the judgment in favor of plaintiff and remand this matter to the trial court for entry of a judgment declaring that plaintiff has a duty to provide coverage to and defend Boughton in the wrongful death action.