Court Opinion

ID: 9589164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:41:53.151527+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:54.654057
License: Public Domain

STEPHENSON, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds that, irrespective of the City’s negligence, Stahl’s intervening negligence was, as a matter of law, the sole proximate cause of Banks’ injuries. Because I believe evidence exists from which a jury could find that the City was negligent and that its negligence was a proximate cause of Banks’ injuries, I conclude that the trial court erred in failing to submit the case to the jury.
It is well established that there can be more than one proximate cause of an event. Coleman v. Blankenship Oil Corp., 221 Va. 124, 131, 267 S.E.2d 143, 147 (1980). An intervening cause will not supersede a defendant’s negligence if his negligence contributes “in the slightest degree” to produce the injury. Id.
In cases involving concurrent negligence, the actors’ comparative degrees of fault should not be considered, “each being liable for the whole even though the other was equally culpable, or contributed in a greater degree to the injury.” Maroulis v. Elliott, 207 Va. 503, 510, 151 S.E.2d 339, 344 (1966). Proximate cause, *138as a legal term, implies closeness or nearness in causal connection rather than closeness or nearness in point of time or physical sequence of events. Appalachian Power Co. v. Hale, 133 Va. 416, 426, 113 S.E. 711, 713 (1922).
Negligence and proximate cause are ordinarily issues for a jury’s determination. A court decides these issues only when reasonable minds cannot differ. Meeks v. Hodges, 226 Va. 106, 109, 306 S.E.2d 879, 881 (1983). Indeed, we have said:
When the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s evidence is challenged by a motion to strike, the trial court should resolve any reasonable doubt as to the sufficiency of the evidence in plaintiff’s favor and should grant the motion only when it conclusively appears that the plaintiff has proved no cause of action against the defendant, or when it plainly appears that the trial court would be compelled to set aside any verdict found for the plaintiff as being without evidence to support it.
Newton v. Veney & Raines, 220 Va. 947, 951, 265 S.E.2d 707, 710 (1980); accord DHA, Inc. v. Leydig, 231 Va. 138, 140, 340 S.E.2d 831, 832 (1986). Finally, when a trial court strikes a plaintiff’s evidence, we must view that evidence and all reasonable inferences which could be drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Meeks, 226 Va. at 109, 306 S.E.2d at 881.
In this case, the defendant is a supplier of gas, a substance which is inherently dangerous. Although such a supplier is not an insurer, the law imposes upon him a standard of care higher than that imposed on other merchandisers. Once a gas supplier has knowledge that gas is escaping at a point past the point of the delivery, i.e., the supplier’s meter, the supplier has the duty to cut off the supply, warn the customer, and leave the meter closed until the leak has been repaired, either by the supplier or the customer.
Indeed, the City’s own regulation requires its service employees to provide the service of “[ljocating and repairing gas leaks in appliances and house piping when no material is required.” If the repair of a leak requires the use of material, the City’s policy is to place a “red tag” on the defective appliance and to cut off the gas at the meter. The red tag indicates that the appliance is not to be used until repairs are made. After repairs are made, a City em*139ployee inspects the appliance. If the repaired appliance is in satisfactory working order, it is placed back in service.
The City had actual knowledge of a gas leak in Banks’ oven. A City employee had discovered the leak four months before the explosion. Just twelve days prior to the explosion, another employee was informed of the problem. Neither employee, however, followed the City’s policy of “red tagging” the appliance and cutting off the gas at the meter. (Two months before the explosion, however, the City had found another gas leak in the furnace of the same apartment and cut off the gas at the meter pursuant to its policy.)
In my view, the City should have foreseen the possibility that the gas leak reported to its employee might not be timely and properly repaired by the landlord; that gas escaping into the confines of the apartment would create a volatile environment; and that a spark caused by metallic friction, static electricity, or a match struck by a cigarette smoker could cause an explosion.
I believe Banks presented evidence from which a jury reasonably could conclude that the City’s negligence concurred with that of Stahl to cause her injuries. If the City was negligent, I cannot say as a matter of law that its negligence did not contribute “in the slightest degree” to produce Banks’ injuries. I believe the case should have been submitted to the jury under proper instructions respecting negligence and proximate cause. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment and remand the case for a trial on the merits.
POFF, J., joins in dissent.