Court Opinion

ID: 9527166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:28:02.463016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:36.209724
License: Public Domain

N. J. Kaufman, J.
(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent.
The conviction which prompts my disagreement with the majority opinion is attempted use of a stolen credit card. Use of a stolen credit card is prohibited by MCL 750.157q; MSA 28.354(16), providing as follows:
"Any person who delivers, circulates or sells a credit *539card which was obtained or is held by such person under circumstances which would constitute an offense under sections 157n or 157p, or uses or permits or causes or procures the same to be used, delivered, circulated or sold, knowing the same to be obtained or held under circumstances which would constitute an offense under sections 157n or 157p, shall be guilty of a felony.”
Since MCL 750.157q; MSA 28.354(16) does not contain a penalty provision, reference must be had to MCL 750.503; MSA 28.771, wherein it is provided:
"A person convicted of a crime declared in this or any other act of the state of Michigan, to be a felony, for which no other punishment is specially prescribed by any statute in force at the time of the conviction and sentence, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for not more than 4 years or by a fine of not more than 2,000 dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.”
Therefore, a violation of MCL 750.157q; MSA 28.354 (16) is punishable by a term of imprisonment of not more than four years; and, under MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287, the crime of attempted use of a stolen credit card is thus a misdemeanor.1
In this case, defense counsel objected on two occasions, both prior to defendant taking the stand, to the prosecutor’s suggestion that attempted use of a stolen credit card constituted a felony. The trial court agreed with the prosecutor.
*540I would hold that the trial court erred in determining that attempted use of a stolen credit card was a felony. Accordingly, I would hold that under People v Renno, 392 Mich 45; 219 NW2d 422 (1974), use of that misdemeanor conviction for impeachment purposes is forbidden.2
I do not believe that this Court can validly distinguish between so-called types of misdemeanors. The Supreme Court clearly stated "misdemeanor convictions”. Had the Supreme Court wanted to exclude high misdemeanors or crimes with sentences greater than one year, it certainly could have done so, as was done in MRE 609(a)(1).3
I would reverse defendant’s conviction and remand for a new trial._ *542Plaintiff Laura Smith appeals from an order of the Wayne County Circuit Court affirming the decision of the Court of Common Pleas which granted defendant Highland Park Board of Education’s motion for summary judgment.

 In pertinent part, MCL 750.92; MSA 28.287 states:
"3. If the offense so attempted to be committed is punishable by imprisonment in the state prison for a term less than 5 years, or imprisonment in the county jail or by fine, the offender convicted of such attempt shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment in the state prison or reformatory not more than 2 years or in any county jail not more than 1 year or by a fine not to exceed 1,000 dollars; but in no case shall the imprisonment exceed 1/2 of the greatest punishment which might have been inflicted if the offense so attempted had been committed.”

 I acknowledge that it was defense counsel who elicited evidence of the misdemeanor conviction. However, I agree with the resolution that People v Peabody, 37 Mich App 87, 89-90; 194 NW2d 532 (1971), adopted to meet this situation:
"To hold that a defendant’s lawyer opens the door by adverting to a defendant’s prior conviction record during direct examination would confront defendants and their lawyers with an unnecessary dilemma: whether to reveal a prior record on direct examination and thereby open the door to inquiry otherwise impermissible, or to leave it to the prosecutor to bring out the record for the first time on cross-examination. A defendant should not be penalized because his lawyer seeks to soften the unfavorable impact on the jury of his client’s conviction record by bringing it out himself rather than standing by so that the prosecutor can belabor it on cross-examination.” (Emphasis supplied.)

 I further note that with the adoption of MRE 609, the felony-misdemeanor distinction is unimportant because "the crime involved theft, dishonesty, or false statement, regardless of the punishment”. MRE 609(a)(1). Nevertheless, were defendant to get a new trial, the trial court would still have to determine "that the probative value of admitting this evidence on the issue of credibility outweighs its prejudicial effect”. MRE 609(a)(2).