Court Opinion

ID: 9668117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:02:52.837561+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:28.909408
License: Public Domain

*545Krivosha, C.J.,
concurring.
I concur in the result reached by the plurality in this case. I do not agree, however, with the method by which the plurality reaches its result, and for that reason I write separately.
The plurality has concluded that a dismissal with prejudice, absent a court order, is not a bar to the bringing of another suit, although the subsequent action may be subject to the defense of estoppel or some related legal doctrine not now before us.
In my view the action of the city attorney in dismissing case No. 7203 was void. Obviously, if the action was void, we need not engage in any discussion regarding res judicata. Under the facts of this case the city attorney’s action cannot give rise to any defense of estoppel or other related legal doctrine, and the city is free to seek the collection of the delinquent assessment. In reaching that conclusion I find myself somewhere between the opinion expressed by the plurality and the concurring opinion filed by White, J., and joined by Shanahan, J.
In my view the single issue presented to us by this case is whether the voluntary dismissal filed by the city attorney on September 20, 1982, in case No. 7203, bars the city from seeking to collect the delinquencies due on paving district No. 395 in case No. 7829.
To begin with we have held that the power to sue and be sued, conferred on a city of the first class by Neb. Rev. Stat. § 16-201 (Reissue 1983), gives the power to compromise and settle the amount of a special assessment only to the mayor and city council of cities acting in their legislative capacity. See Farnham v. City of Lincoln, 75 Neb. 502, 106 N.W. 666 (1906). In Communication Workers of America, AFL-CIO v. City of Hastings, 198 Neb. 668, 672, 254 N.W.2d 695, 697 (1977), we said: “ [A] city attorney is essentially the legal advisor to the city council and city officers. The city attorney serves at the pleasure of the mayor and the city council. He or she has no statutory power to make governmental decisions which affect the city.”
I do not agree with the concurring opinion by White, J., that the city attorney has unlimited authority to sue or settle unless directly limited by a specific statute. The authority of a city attorney, like any lawyer, is limited to carrying out the goals and objectives of the client. Moreover, the authority of a city attorney is further limited by the responsibilities given by law to *546elected city officials.
The critical issue in this case, then, is not whether the dismissal constitutes res judicata and therefore bars any subsequent action but, rather, whether a city attorney without lawful authority who voluntarily dismisses a cause of action for the collection of a special assessment can thereby bar a city from collecting the taxes otherwise due. I do not believe the city attorney can. Nor do I believe under the facts of this case and the law as it presently exists that the presence or absence of a court order makes any significant difference.
Had the city attorney, acting alone, intended to compromise the tax claim and waive payment of the assessment for paving district No. 395, he would have been without authority to do so. The city attorney’s “contract” with Johnson was beyond his authority, and void, and therefore could not have been the basis for any suit to enforce the agreement.
In 10 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 29.17 at 265 (3d ed. rev. 1981), the noted author observes: “If the wrong officer or board makes a contract in behalf of a municipality . . . [the municipality] may successfully set up the defense that the contract was unauthorized, and the contract will be declared void . . . .” The general rule has long been followed in Nebraska. In Heese v. Wenke, 161 Neb. 311, 73 N.W.2d 223 (1955), we observed that a contract entered into with a village, contrary to law, was void. See, also, Nebraska State Bank Liquidation Ass’n v. Village of Burton, 134 Neb. 623, 279 N.W. 319 (1938); Campbell Co. v. City of Harvard, 123 Neb. 539, 243 N.W. 653 (1932). In Helleberg v. City of Kearney, 139 Neb. 413, 417, 297 N.W. 672, 674 (1941), we said:
No member of a city council or the mayor or the city attorney, each acting separately as an individual, can bind the city by a contractual obligation creatable only by official action of the city council, nor can any one of them ratify or reinstate a void city contract or estop the city from denying the validity thereof. Scott v. City of Lincoln, 104 Neb. 546, 178 N.W. 203.
Does the fact, then, that the city attorney filed a dismissal with prejudice in the earlier case without a hearing on the merits give validity to an act which was otherwise invalid? The *547authorities, both in this state and elsewhere, seem to be to the contrary.
To begin with we have previously held that even if a judgment is entered into by the consent of an officer to a matter in which he has no authority to bind the public, and the judgment was not a decision by a court after a hearing on the merits, it affords no basis for a plea of res judicata as against the public interest involved. See Warren v. County of Stanton, 145 Neb. 220, 15 N.W.2d 757 (1944). See, also, Loup County v. Rumbaugh, 151 Neb. 563, 38 N.W.2d 745 (1949).
In State ex rel. Goodsell v. Tunnicliff, 169 Neb. 128, 132-33, 98 N.W.2d 710, 713-14 (1959), we said:
It is the declared policy of the law in this state that a county attorney may not confess judgment against a county without appropriate authority to do so. This rule is for the protection of the public against results arising by improper or inept handling of litigation by a county attorney. In the instant case the county attorney confessed judgment for the county and the county board of equalization without any authority to prevent the filing of a contempt action against certain county officers. Certainly, the county attorney should not be permitted as a matter of public policy to trade away the rights of the public as a means of protecting individuals against personal action for their conduct. The county attorney operates counter to these provisions of law when he does so. Having no authority to confess judgment, any judgment based thereon is absolutely void and subject to collateral attack. If this were not so, and the judgment became final if no appeal were taken, the policy of the law could be easily thwarted, particularly as to those who were not parties to the action and yet bound by it because of its class nature. We conclude that the judgment in the Cassidy case is void, subject to collateral attack, and ineffective to defeat this issuance of a writ of mandamus.
An appointed city attorney certainly has no greater authority in this regard than an elected county attorney.
In the few cases which have been decided elsewhere, similar conclusions have been reached. In an annotation found in 67 *548A.L.R. 1503, 1505 (1930), the author notes: “A consent judgment in which the officials representing the municipality assume obligations against the municipality unauthorized by law is void.” In City of St. Paul v. Chicago, St. P.M.& O. Ry. Co., 139 Minn. 322, 166 N.W. 335 (1918), the court held that the fact that by consent of the municipal officers an agreement or stipulation made by them had been put in the form of a judgment in an effort to give it the force and effect of a judgment did not cure the lack of power in the officers to make it, and if such power was lacking, the judgment as well as the stipulation was void. See, also, State ex rel. City of St. Paul v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 134 Minn. 249, 158 N.W. 972 (1916); Kelley v. Milan, 127 U.S. 139, 8 S. Ct. 1101, 32 L. Ed. 77 (1888). Without attempting to define all of the authority possessed by a city attorney in representing the municipality, it is nevertheless clear that where, as here, the action involved is one which emanates from the legislative branch of government and, by statute, requires formal action to be taken by the legislative branch before any action may be taken by the city, a city attorney who voluntarily dismisses an action which he had no authority in the first instance to bring is without authority to so act, and any action taken by the city attorney, including consenting to a court order, in that regard is without authority and is wholly void.
One may argue that persons should be entitled to rely upon a court record and not be required to look behind it. Perhaps there are situations where such a rule applies. But where, as here, the record clearly shows that the city attorney voluntarily dismissed an action which he was not authorized to bring in the first instance, the rule constituting an exception as to when res judicata applies is proper. If the person signing the stipulation as city attorney was not in fact the city attorney, the city would not be bound. I see little reason to hold otherwise where, as here, the person signing is the city attorney but without authority to take the action he did. I do not believe that the absence of a court order is significant to the decision of this case.
Caporale, J., joins in this concurrence.