Court Opinion

ID: 9742341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:11:10.772289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:31.304113
License: Public Domain

CONOVER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
On appeal, we accept as true the statement entered of record by the lower court of the matter constituting the contempt, and also may examine the record, if necessary, to determine whether the acts alleged to be contemptuous do, in fact, constitute acts of contempt. State ex rel. Stanton v. Murray, (1952) 231 Ind. 223, 235, 108 N.E.2d 251, 257. From the record before us, it is easy to determine the nature of the contumacious conduct here involved.
The colloquy between attorney Russell and the deputy prosecutor, fully set forth in the majority’s opinion, involved Russell’s attempt to use the State’s copy of a deposition. It is clearly apparent from the record this exchange between attorneys became more heated the longer it continued, ending in this manner:
“MR. RUSSELL: ... This is a criminal trial. This man is faced with armed robbery.
MR. COMMONS: Judge, I think at this time it would be appropriate to—
MR. RUSSELL: I would like to finish my statement, Your Honor.
MR. COMMONS: Excuse me Mr. Russell. MR. RUSSELL: I will excuse you if you sit down and shut up.
THE COURT: Both of you, please sit down. Mr. Russell!!1... (To bailiff) Would you please excuse the jury? ...”
The exchange had become so heated, Judge Gifford had to intervene, twice prompt Mr. Russell to sit down, and order the jury to retire. It is clear from this record the colloquy between Russell and Commons had disturbed the transaction of the court’s business, namely, the jury trial in progress and constituted a direct contempt of court, cf. IC 34-4-7-1.2 The trial *1278court in such circumstances not only has the right, it has the duty to intervene to preserve order.
It is true, Judge Gifford’s choice of words as to Russell’s contumacious conduct could have been more descriptive at the time.3 However, Judge Gifford’s amendment seventy-five days later which changed the word “utter” to “shouting” did not constitute a material change in the grounds upon which Russell’s contempt conviction had been based, it merely gave a more precise description of the contumacious conduct to present a clearer record on appeal. The change was made pursuant to Russell’s filing of a motion to reconsider, and prior to her ruling on Russell’s Belated Motion to Correct Errors. The change was made seventy-five days later, well within the time provided by statute during which it retained power and control over the contempt judgment, cf. IC 33-1-6-3. No written note or memorandum was required to make such change.
It has long been recognized in this state that the trial court has the inherent power to amend the record based on its own knowledge and recollection before rendition of the final judgment. Moerecke v. Branyan, (1915) 183 Ind. 591, 108 N.E. 948. Thereafter, the Indiana courts have traditionally possessed broad powers in “term time” to modify, set aside or vacate their judgments. Clouser v. Mock, (1959) 239 Ind. 143, 155 N.E.2d 745. See also 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 229, p. 436; Tri-City Electric Service Co. v. Jarvis, (1933) 206 Ind. 5, 185 N.E. 136; Livingston v. Livingston, (1921) 190 Ind. 223, 130 N.E. 122; Ryon, Receiver v. Thomas, (1885) 104 Ind. 59, 3 N.E. 653; Merrill v. Shirk, (1891) 128 Ind. 503, 28 N.E. 95.
Before terms of court were abolished in 1967, it was the general rule that “a court has full and complete control of the record of its proceedings during the term at which the proceedings are had, and during such term, for good cause, may correct, or vacate any of its judgments or orders made therein.” State ex rel. Neal v. Superior Court of Marion County, Room No. 2, et al., (1930) 202 Ind. 456, 174 N.E. 732. When terms of court were abolished [T.R. 72(A)], the traditional power of a court over its record was limited to 90 days after judgment. Ind. Code 33-1-6-3. Courts now have the same power to act during the 90-day period following rendition of a judgment as they did during the former term time, including the power to amend the records to conform to the truth. State ex rel. Jackson v. Owen Circuit Court, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 685, 314 N.E.2d 73; Wadkins v. Thornton, (1972) 151 Ind.App. 380, 279 N.E.2d 849.
Although a writing to evidence a change in the record is required after the “term” time, it has historically not been a requirement during that time. The purpose of a writing is to protect against fraud and failing memories and to ensure an accurate basis for the entry. State ex rel. Jackson v. Owen Circuit Court, (1974) 160 Ind.App. 685, 314 N.E.2d 73. In this case, the amendment to the facts in the record was made 75 days after judgment. We can assume the trial court’s memory of the incident had not dimmed in 75 days, and we have no reason to think the trial court intentionally misrepresented the facts to which it was a witness.
Moreover, the power of the court to modify its record and to grant relief from its own judgment is the foundation of most of our post-judgment trial rules. It is not coincidental that most of a trial court’s powers over a record are lost when it rules on the motion to correct errors. Both Trial Rules 59 and 60 are indicative of the broad powers available to the trial court during the “term” period.
I do not think the law nor reason requires us to dismiss the court’s clarification of the record. I believe the trial court could and should have amended its record to conform to the truth. It was not required to prove what it knew by introducing a contempora*1279neous writing. Such a rule is an erosion of long-standing and traditional powers of the court.
Judge Gifford’s judgment on this subject matter is not clearly wrong, based upon the record before us. Thus, we cannot interfere on appeal. Blankenbaker v. State, (1929) 201 Ind. 142, 153, 166 N.E. 265, 268.
The trial court’s modification merely clarified the original basis upon which Russell’s conviction was based. A change or modification of a judgment to make it more explicit is proper. 17 I.L.E. (Judgments) ¶ 113, p. 228. Error may not be predicated upon the amendment of a pleading where a defendant’s substantial rights are not prejudiced thereby. Henderson v. State, (1980) Ind., 403 N.E.2d 1088, 1093; 9 I.L.E. (Crim. Law) ¶ 883, p. 111.
In Grimm, the trial court charged the attorney’s language accused the court of fraud. Its later amendment substantially altered the original finding by saying the attorney’s statements were made “in a rude, insolent and disrespectful manner.” Grimm v. State, (1959) 240 Ind. 125, 162 N.E.2d 454, 455. Of course, such a material change created a confused state of the record in that case. Such confusion is not here present.
Judge Gifford’s modification did not prejudice Russell. It is clear from Russell’s response to the finding of contempt he knew the precise reasons for that finding. Further, he filed his Petition for Leave and his Belated Motion to Correct Errors nine days after entry of the modification order. Thus, Russell was additionally provided with a concise statement of why he was found in contempt, as an assistance to him “in setting his course for an appeal.” The modification also provided this court “with a clear statement of the allegedly contumacious conduct,” upon which Russell had been convicted, cf. Skolnick v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 388 N.E.2d 1156, 1163-4, cert. den’d, (1980) 445 U.S. 906, 100 S.Ct. 1085, 63 L.Ed.2d 323.
The question of contempt should be considered in light of the amended record which has been certified to this court as complete and true by the trial judge. A boisterous colloquy between opposing counsel in court while a jury trial is in progress is obviously disruptive of the court’s business, cf. People v. Hanna, (1976) 37 Ill.App.3d 98, 345 N.E.2d 179, 180. Based upon that record, I would affirm the trial court’s judgment.

. Russell evidently did not comply when the Court first directed both counsel to sit down, thus requiring Judge Gifford to additionally instruct Russell to do so by the specific and forceful use of his name.

. Taking attorney Russell’s response to the trial court’s finding of contempt at face value, one wonders why the deputy prosecutor was not also “hauled up short” by a similar finding at the end of that exchange, if he had been “yelling and screaming” at Russell “at the top of his voice” and “for the humpteenth time.” However, that question must go unanswered because it is not before us.

. “THE COURT: Mr. Russell, this Court finds that your behavior is contemptuous. For you to utter the words ‘to shut up’ to an officer of this court in the presence of the judge is a contemptuous act ...”