Court Opinion

ID: 9393479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 15:03:41.548337+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.855527
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                          Opinion filed May 10, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-1066
                       Lower Tribunal No. 18-31893
                          ________________

                             Boris Tarlo, et al.,
                                Appellants,

                                     vs.

                 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company,
                               Appellee.

     An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Mark
Blumstein, Judge.

      Pomeranz & Associates, P.A., and Mark L. Pomeranz (Hallandale), for
appellants.

     DeLuca Law Group, PLLC, and Joseph G. Paggi, III and Kimberly
George (Fort Lauderdale), for appellee.

Before EMAS, SCALES and LOBREE, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
      Appellants Margarita Golkova and Boris Tarlo challenge the trial

court’s final foreclosure judgment in favor of appellee Metropolitan Life

Insurance Company, asserting that the trial court erred in denying appellants’

third motion seeking to continue the trial. We review a denial of a motion for

continuance for an abuse of discretion. Taylor v. Mazda Motor of Am., Inc.,

934 So. 2d 518, 520 (Fla. 3d DCA 2005).

      A week before the bench trial was scheduled to begin, appellants filed

their motion for continuance, suggesting that appellant, Boris Tarlo, had a

medical condition that would prevent him from testifying that he never

received the default notice of Metropolitan Life’s loan servicer.

      In adjudicating appellants’ continuance motion, the trial court was

confronted with the following: (i) multiple requests for continuance by

appellants; (ii) a case that was over three and one-half years old; (iii) Tarlo’s

not providing a sworn proffer as to what he would testify to at trial; (iv) the

failure of the appellants and their counsel to appear for a court-ordered

mediation; (v) the continuance motion made only a week before the

scheduled start of trial; and (vi) the prejudice to the appellee associated with

another continuance based on what appeared to the trial court to be an open-

ended medical condition.

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      On this record, we are unable to conclude that the trial court abused

its discretion. See Bahad v. Wilmington Sav. Fund Soc’y, FSB, 278 So. 3d

740, 740 (Fla. 3d DCA 2019) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s

denial of an ore tenus motion to continue a foreclosure final hearing after

having granted “prior numerous requests to continue”).

      Affirmed.

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