Court Opinion

ID: 9881126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-29 18:04:05.957281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:09.834001
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/29/23 In re K.P. CA4/2

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
                                     or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re K.P., a Person Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.

 SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                           E080784

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super.Ct.No. J281784)

 v.                                                                      OPINION

 R.C. et al,

          Defendants and Appellants.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Erin K. Alexander,

Judge. Affirmed.

         Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant, R.C.

         Joseph T. Tavano, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant, D.P.

                                                             1
       Tom Bunton, County Counsel, and Joseph R. Barrell, Deputy County Counsel, for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

       This is an appeal taken by a mother and father from the order of the San

Bernardino County Juvenile Court terminating their parental rights pursuant to Welfare

and Institutions Code section 366.26 as to their child, K.P.1 The sole issue is whether the

juvenile court erred when found the beneficial parent-child relationship exception to

termination of parental rights did not apply. We will affirm.

                                     BACKGROUND

       In July 2019, the San Bernardino County Children and Family Service (the

Department) took then three-year-old K.P. into protective custody after a Chino police

officer reported she was living with her parents in a warehouse that had been red tagged

as uninhabitable. Old furniture, broken down vehicles, clothing, machinery, and trash

were strewn throughout the warehouse. The police officer found a broken meth pipe and

a small trailer filled with blankets, toys, and old food inside the building. K.P.’s clothing

was dirty, her hair was dirty and matted, and she had marks from bug bites all over her

legs, arms, and face. The Department filed a juvenile dependency petition alleging the

child came within subdivision (b)(1) of section 300.

       The juvenile court sustained the petition, adjudged K.P. a dependent of the court,

detained her from her parents, and ordered the Department to provide family

       1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise indicated.

                                              2
reunification services. Visits between the parents and the child were to take place a

minimum of once a week for two hours.

       Reunification efforts were not successful and, at the contested 18-month review

hearing in February 2021, the court terminated them. It set K.P.’s case for a permanent

plan review hearing pending approval of an out-of-state relative adoptive placement. In

October 2022, the Department reported that K.P. had been placed in the approved relative

home of the S. family, and recommended a section 366.26 permanent plan selection

hearing be set so adoption by the relatives could take place.

       The section 366.26 hearing was combined with a hearing on mother’s section 388

petition seeking unsupervised visits with K.P. and her placement in a transitional home

on the grounds K.P. wanted to reunify with her. Neither parent was present at the

hearing. The court denied mother’s petition and went on to find K.P. was likely to be

adopted, she did not have a substantial positive, emotional attachment to her parents such

that she would benefit from continuing her relationship with them, and there was no

evidence of detriment that outweighed the benefit of a stable adoptive home. It ordered

termination of parental rights. Each of the parents filed a timely notice of this appeal.

                                      DISCUSSION

       On appeal, mother (joined by father) argues the juvenile court erred when it found

the evidence insufficient to support the application of the beneficial parent-child

exception to termination of parental rights. We disagree.

                                              3
       In cases like the present one in which family reunification efforts have failed and

the court has found the child is likely to be adopted, the juvenile court is required to

terminate parental rights unless the child comes within the exceptions to termination set

forth in subdivision (c) of section 366.26. (In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630-

631 (Caden C.).) One of those exceptions permits the selection of a permanent plan other

than adoption if the parent has established three elements by a preponderance of

evidence: (i) the parent maintained regular visitation and contact with the child, (ii) the

child has, and would benefit from continuing, a substantial, positive, emotional

attachment to the parent, and (iii) termination of that relationship would be detrimental to

the child even when balanced against the benefits of an adoptive home. (§ 366.26,

subd. (c)(1)(B)(i); Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 636-637.)

       The first two elements are generally reviewed for substantial evidence and the

third is reviewed for abuse of discretion. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639-640.)

If the issue is one of a failure of proof, however, then the appropriate standard of review

is not whether substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding, but rather

whether as a matter of law the evidence compels a finding in favor of the parent. (In re

Luis H. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 1223, 1227; see In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517,

1528, disapproved on other grounds as stated in Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th

989, 1010, fn. 7.) Whether the child has a relationship with the parent sufficient to come

within the exception is determined by taking into consideration the child’s age, the

portion of the child’s life spent in the parent’s custody, the effect on the child of

                                               4
interaction with the parent, and the child’s particular needs. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th

at p. 632.)

       In this case, the parties do not dispute, and the record supports, the juvenile court’s

finding that the parents had maintained regular visits and contacts with K.P. over the

course of the dependency proceedings. What is lacking, however, is evidence compelling

a finding that K.P. has such a substantial, positive, emotional attachment to her parents

such that the benefit of continuing those relationships—and the detriment of severing it—

would outweigh the benefit to the child of adoption by the S. family.

       The parents make two claims in support of their argument that the court should

have applied the beneficial parent-child relationship.

       One claim is the juvenile court could not decide the exception’s applicability

without first making a determination of her wishes and best interests pursuant to

subdivision (h)(1) of section 366.26. They posit the court necessarily could not make that

finding because it was “improper” for the social worker to tell K.P. postadoption visits

with her parents were possible instead of explaining to the child that adoption would

terminate all relationships with her parents, including visitation. The other claim, which

is not separately stated but included in the discussion of their first one,2 is the beneficial

relationship exception to termination of parental rights should have been applied because

       2 Rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) of the California Rules of Court requires each point in a
brief to be stated under a separate heading or subheading summarizing the point, and
support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of authority. (See In re S.C.
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 396, 408.)

                                               5
there was a “general consensus” that K.P. would be traumatized if the relationship with

her parents was severed. The claims are without merit.

       We note first that there is nothing improper about the social worker telling K.P.

that visits with her biological parents were possible after adoption. Family Code section

8616.5 authorizes adoptive parents to enter voluntarily into an agreement to permit the

birth parents to visit a child who was adjudged a dependent of the court so long as the

child is represented by counsel for the purposes of the agreement. (Fam. Code, § 8616.5,

subds. (a) & (d).) K.P.’s adoptive parents were open to entering into such an agreement

if appropriate.

       Contrary to the parents’ argument, the notion that the child might benefit from

continued contact with her biological parents does not signal that it would be detrimental

to her to be adopted. It is clear from the plain language of Family Code section 8616.5

that the Legislature authorized postadoption voluntary contract agreements in recognition

that some children may benefit from contact with the birth parents after parental rights

are terminated. (Fam. Code, § 8616.5, subd. (a).) There is nothing in the statute to

suggest it is intended to undermine that statutory preference for termination of parental

rights to free a child for adoption set forth in subdivision (b) of section 366.26.

       Subdivision (h)(1) of section 366.26 requires the juvenile court to consider the

wishes of the child and to act in the best interests of the child in all permanent plan

selection proceedings conducted pursuant to the section. Here, the record clearly

establishes the juvenile court’s compliance with that provision. When making its order

                                              6
terminating parental rights, the court acknowledged K.P. “may have some residual

sadness if visits are terminated.” It then balanced the possibility of that sadness against

the possibility of K.P. spending 11-plus years in a home where she is happy, bonded, and

wished to be adopted, and found the stability of adoption “clearly” outweighed any

detriment related to termination of possible parental visits.

        The court’s conclusion is amply supported by the record. Although K.P. would

ask for her parents and cry following visits taking place early in the dependency

proceedings, the record establishes her emotional attachment to them waned during the

three years and six months she had been out of their home.

        By the time of the six-month review hearing, the Department reported no concerns

with the child’s visits with her parents and made no mention in the six-month status

report or in any reports thereafter of K.P. asking about them or crying when visits were

over.

        In October 2022, the Department reported K.P. had been placed with the S. family

in Nevada two months earlier, and the family wanted to adopt her. She was bonding well

with all members of the family. She wanted to be adopted by them and expressed fear

that people were going to come and take her away. K.P. needed constant assurance that

she would return to the S. home after visits and that she was going to be adopted by them.

During in-person visits with her parents, she chose to stay close to her prior foster parent

and Mr. and Mrs. S.

                                              7
       After being placed for adoption, K.P. would not engage with her parents during

two video phone calls and did not want to talk with them. On her seventh birthday (in

October 2022), K.P. did not want to sit with her parents, who became upset when the

child preferred to play rather than visit with them. K.P. also told her parents and several

others that her last name was going to change, and she seemed excited about it.

       In November 2022, K.P. reported mother told her during a visit that she would

never see her parents ever again if she is adopted, and told her to tell the social worker

she did not want to be adopted. The worker explained to K.P. that contact with her

biological parents would still be possible after adoption, and told her Mr. and Mrs. S.

(already referred to by K.P. as mom and dad), wanted to take care of her and have her

live with them and make important decisions for her until she was a grownup. The S.

family was open to K.P. having ongoing contact with the biological parents if they were

appropriate. Although K.P. loved her parents, she had developed strong bonds with her

new family, she was comfortable and content, and she continued to be excited about

being adopted.

       At the permanent plan selection hearing, K.P.’s counsel represented her client is

eager to be adopted by the S. family and, when interviewed in counsel’s office, K.P.’s

statements reflected those attributed to the child in the Department’s report.

                                      CONCLUSION

       In view of the foregoing, we do not find the record compels a finding that the

parents met their burden of establishing that K.P. had such a substantial, positive

                                              8
emotional attachment to them that it would be beneficial to her for those relationships to

continue. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in finding the

benefit to K.P. of adoption outweighed any potential detriment to her of severing her

relationship with her parents.

                                     DISPOSITION

       The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                               RAMIREZ
                                                                                        P. J.

We concur:

FIELDS
                          J.

RAPHAEL
                          J.

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