Court Opinion

ID: 9864579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 14:06:50.213181+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:18:36.354147
License: Public Domain

THE COURT
The petition for rehearing is denied. We think it necessary to say, however, that we do not approve of all that is said in the opinion of the district court of appeal on the subject of the instructions given and refused.
[8] The opinion appears to approve the pernicious practice sometimes indulged in by the trial courts of repeating, over and over again, instructions couched in varying, language, but embodying the same principle of law. This is especially prevalent with regard to instructions relating to the presumption of innocence, reasonable doubt, and the degree of proof required of the prosecution. Repetitions of this character are not necessary and should be avoided as far as possible. Several of the instructions criticised in this case were given, in effect, in other instructions using somewhat different forms of expression but having the same meaning. The trial judge should take care to give to the jury, once in clear language, every principle of law applicable to the particular case. When he has done this, he is not required to repeat any of them, no matter how many separate instructions are asked which may include them. Such continual repetition tends to give undue emphasis to the particular point to which they may relate and operates to confuse the jury in their consideration of the evidence.
The instruction defining reasonable doubt criticised in People v. Paulsell, 115 Cal. 12, [46 Pac. 734], was approved in People v. White, 116 Cal. 17, [47 Pac. 771], and in People v. Shaughnessy, 110 Cal. 604, [43 Pac. 2], [9] The instruction given on that subject in the present case is not substantially different from that under consideration in the three cases just cited, and we think it should not be considered erroneous, although it is not as full and possibly not as clear as the instruction usually given. We fully approve what is said in the Paulsell case, to the effect that trial judges should adhere to the well-established precedents in framing or approving instructions on the subject of reasonable doubt, and should avoid any attempt to frame new definitions of the term.
All the Justices concurred.