Court Opinion

ID: 9386500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 19:00:44.911661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.933501
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11643   Document: 51-1    Date Filed: 04/12/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-11643
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       ALEXANDER HARVIN,
                                                   Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A.,
       NATIONWIDE TITLE CLEARING, INC.,
       WARGO FRENCH, LLP,
       KUTAK ROCK, L.P,
       ALDRIDGE PITE, LLP,

                                               Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11643         Document: 51-1        Date Filed: 04/12/2023         Page: 2 of 6

       2                          Opinion of the Court                      22-11643

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Northern District of Georgia
                      D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-03355-MHC
                            ____________________

       Before JORDAN, BRANCH, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Alexander Harvin, proceeding pro se, 1 appeals the district
       court’s dismissal -- for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed. R.
       Civ. P. 12(b)(6) -- of his pro se complaint challenging the 2018 fore-
       closure proceedings on his home. The district court determined
       that Harvin’s claims were barred by res judicata. No reversible er-
       ror has been shown; we affirm.2
            Harvin filed this civil action against Defendants JPMorgan
       Chase Bank, N.A. (“Chase”), Nationwide Title Clearing

       1 We read liberally appellate briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v.
       Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se
       pleadings. See Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir.
       1998).
       2 Harvin’s “Revised Motion for Judicial Notice of Adjudicative Facts” is
       DENIED. The documents Harvin seeks to have judicially noticed (documents
       Harvin says pertain to the underlying merits of his claims against Defendants)
       are not pertinent to whether Harvin’s claims were barred by res judicata: the
       sole issue before us on appeal. See Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Frosty Bites Distrib.,
       LLC, 369 F.3d 1197, 1204 (11th Cir. 2004) (noting that “adjudicative facts” that
       may be judicially noticed under Fed. R. Evid. 201 “are facts that are relevant
       to a determination of the claims presented in a case”).
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       22-11643                    Opinion of the Court                                 3

       (“Nationwide”), and three law firms that represented Chase during
       the challenged legal proceedings (Wargo & French, L.P., Kutak
       Rock, L.P., and Aldridge Pite, L.P.). Briefly stated, Harvin con-
       tends that the 2013 assignment of a security deed to Chase was
       fraudulent and thus rendered unlawful Chase’s following foreclo-
       sure on Harvin’s home. Harvin purported to assert claims against
       Defendants for (1) violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
       rupt Organizations Act (“RICO”), 18 U.S.C. § 1961; (2) violation of
       the Georgia RICO Act, O.C.G.A. § 16-14-4; and (3) civil conspiracy
       to commit fraud.
               The district court dismissed Harvin’s claims as barred by res
       judicata. The district court relied chiefly on a 2014 civil action filed
       by Harvin in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
       trict of Georgia: Harvin v. Nationwide Title Clearing, No. 1:14-CV-
       2130-MHC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 191680, at *1 (N.D. Ga., Jan. 28,
       2015), aff’d 632 F. App’x 599 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Harvin I”). 3
             In Harvin I, Harvin filed suit against (among others) Nation-
       wide, Chase, and Wargo French. Harvin asserted various claims,
       each of which stemmed from Harvin’s allegation that the 2013

       3 The district court also listed several civil actions filed by Harvin in the Geor-
       gia courts in which Harvin sought to challenge the validity of the 2013 assign-
       ment. The district court noted further that, in several of those cases, the Geor-
       gia courts determined that Harvin’s claims were barred by res judicata or col-
       lateral estoppel.
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       4                         Opinion of the Court                      22-11643

       security-deed assignment was unlawful.4 The district court in
       Harvin I dismissed Harvin’s complaint for failure to state a claim,
       concluding (1) that Harvin lacked standing to challenge the 2013
       assignment and (2) that Harvin’s arguments attacking the validity
       of the 2013 assignment were without merit.
              We review de novo a district court’s decision that a claim is
       barred by res judicata. See Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d
       1235, 1238 (11th Cir. 1999). We review for clear error a district
       court’s factual determination that a party is in privity with another
       for purposes of res judicata. See Griswold v. Cty. of Hillsborough,
       598 F.3d 1289, 1292 (11th Cir. 2010).
               “Res judicata bars the filing of claims which were raised or
       could have been raised in an earlier proceeding.” Id. A claim is
       barred by earlier litigation if these four elements are met: “(1) there
       is a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision was rendered by
       a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity
       with them, are identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of
       action is involved in both cases.” Id.

       4 Harvin purported to assert claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices
       Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692; the Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1641; the Fair
       Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681; the Federal False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
       § 3729; and the Georgia Fair Business Practices Act, O.C.G.A. § 10-1-390.
       Harvin also asserted claims for conspiracy to commit fraud, mail fraud, and
       theft of property.
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       22-11643                Opinion of the Court                         5

               That the first two elements are met is clear. Harvin I re-
       sulted in a dismissal with prejudice under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6):
       a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent
       jurisdiction.
               About the third element, the district court committed no
       clear error in determining that the Defendants in this case are iden-
       tical to, or in privity with, the defendants involved in Harvin I. Na-
       tionwide, Chase, and Wargo French were named as defendants in
       both Harvin I and in this civil action. Although Aldridge Pite and
       Kutak Rock were not defendants in Harvin I, the district court de-
       termined reasonably that they were in privity with Chase: the cli-
       ent for whom these two law firms performed the alleged com-
       plained-of conduct. See Griswold, 598 F.3d at 1292 (noting that
       privity exists for res judicata purposes when there exists a “substan-
       tive legal relationship” between a non-party and a party to an ear-
       lier judgment).
              The district court also concluded correctly that Harvin’s pre-
       sent civil action and Harvin I involved the same cause of action un-
       der the fourth res judicata element. “[C]ases involve the same
       cause of action for purposes of res judicata if the present case arises
       out of the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based on the same
       factual predicate, as a former action.” Israel Disc. Bank Ltd. v. En-
       tin, 951 F.2d 311, 315 (11th Cir. 1992) (quotation omitted). “The
       test for a common nucleus of operative fact is whether the same
       facts are involved in both cases, so that the present claim could
       have been effectively litigated with the prior one.” Lobo v.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                22-11643

       Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 704 F.3d 882, 893 (11th Cir. 2013) (quota-
       tion omitted).
               Here, Harvin’s claims in this civil action and his claims in
       Harvin I arise from the same nucleus of operative fact and revolve
       around the same factual issue: the validity of the 2013 security-deed
       assignment. That Harvin sought relief under different legal theo-
       ries in this case and in Harvin I does not change the conclusion that
       both civil actions involved the same cause of action. See Baloco v.
       Drummond Co., 767 F.3d 1229, 1247 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[R]es judi-
       cata applies not only to the precise legal theory presented in the
       prior case, but to all legal theories and claims arising out of the
       same nucleus of operative fact which could have been raised in the
       prior case.” (brackets omitted)).
              We see no error in the district court’s determination that
       Harvin’s complaint was subject to dismissal as barred by res judi-
       cata; we affirm.
             AFFIRMED.