Court Opinion

ID: 9774604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:26:22.606689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:11.425141
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
 Appellees San Felipe Agricultural, Manufacturing and Irrigation Company and W. Fred West have filed a joint motion for rehearing, and appellee Palafox Exploration Company has filed a separate motion for rehearing. In each of these motions appellees contend that the decisions of the Austin Court of Civil Appeals in Posey v. Williamson, 134 S.W.2d 335, and Carleton v. Dierks, Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W.2d 834, are in point and controlling here. We remain convinced that those cases are readily distinguishable for the reason stated in our original opinion, that plaintiffs in the instant case are claiming no easement or interest in any of the defendants’ lands. We shall discuss only the Posey case, for the reason that the Court in the Carleton *772case simply followed the holding- in the Posey case. If it can he contended that the Posey case has any application here, we nevertheless decline to follow that case. An easement is not only an interest in the servient estate but also an appurtenance to the dominant estate, and as such passes with title thereto. Lakeside Irrigation Co. v. Markham Irrigation Co., 116 Tex. 65, 285 S.W. 593; 15 Tex.Jur. 782, Easements, § 4. Thus, we think the holding of the Court in the Posey case, to the effect that on a venue hearing plaintiff must actually establish that he has an easement appurtenant to his land before he can maintain venue in the county of suit, has been overruled by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Piazza v. Phillips, 153 Tex. 115, 264 S.W.2d 428, and Cowden v. Cowden, 143 Tex. 446, 186 S.W.2d 69. Since the decisions in those cases, the law is settled that on a venue hearing plaintiff’s petition determines the nature of the suit, and if the facts alleged therein show that plaintiff seeks to establish title to land or an interest therein, or to remove cloud from title thereto, or seeks compensation for damages to land, it is not necessary for plaintiff to prove that he actually has title to the land. Of course, it is necessary for him to make such proof before he can recover on the merits.
Appellees vigorously contend that the decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Gulf Television Company, 157 Tex. 607, 306 S.W.2d 706, is controlling, and that venue in the suit is governed by Art. 4656, Vernon’s Ann.Civ.Stats., because they say that the suit is primarily and principally one for injunction and must be brought in the county of defendants’ residence. We disagree with that contention. In the Brown case there was no dispute as to title to the lands of the parties. The suit was primarily one for perpetual injunction against defendant’s maintaining on its land an antenna which interfered with the approach to plaintiff’s airport, and in the alternative for damage to his airport business, not to his land. On the other hand, the nrimary and principal purpose of the instant suit is to establish, by declaratory judgment, the correlative water rights of plaintiffs and defendants in the waters of the Rio Grande River and the respective priorities thereto, undoubtedly appurtenances to the lands. The injunction sought is only incidental to the main relief and to protect and enforce the rights so established. Lakeside Irrigation Company v. Markham Irrigation Company, supra.
We adhere to our original opinion. The motions for rehearing are overruled.