Court Opinion

ID: 9426351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:17:38.350427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:00.458651
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stewart,
dissenting.
Congress amended the Suits in Admiralty Act in 1960 to eliminate the distinction the Act formerly drew between public vessels and merchant vessels owned or operated by the United States. 74 Stat. 912. See S. Rep. No. 1894, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., 3 (1960). See also S. Rep. No. 92-1079, pp. 5-6 (1972). Six years later the then Solicitor General explained the effect of that amendment in a brief filed on behalf of the Government in this Court:
“As originally enacted, the Suits in Admiralty Act was limited to government merchant vessels and tugboats, and excluded public vessels. The latter were separately covered in the Public Vessels Act . . . . Because of uncertainty engendered by the public-merchant vessel distinction, . . . Congress in 1960 amended Section 2 of the Suits in Admiralty Act *183to delete the reference to merchant vessels. . . . Thus, the Suits in Admiralty Act now extends to government public as well as merchant vessels.” Brief for United States 9 n. 1, in Amell v. United States, No. 282, O. T. 1963.1
In the present case the Government has steered an entirely different course, arguing that Congress did not intend to expand the scope of the Suits in Admiralty Act to include public vessels, and that the plain language of the Act should be ignored. I cannot accept this boxing of the compass. At best, the United States has demonstrated only that the legislative history indicates that Congress was concerned with more than one problem in amending the law. But ambiguous legislative history surely cannot suffice to undermine the plain words of the statute, when no persuasive policy considerations2 and no repeal by implication3 are involved.
*184The plain language of the Suits in Admiralty Act authorizes anyone to sue the United States for damages caused by any United States vessel. There is no need to inquire further: “When there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a Court in departing from the plain meaning of words ... in search of an intention which the words themselves did not suggest.” United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95-96 (Marshall, C. J.). As the Court said 10 years ago in. construing the Suits in Admiralty Act: “If we are here misconstruing the intent of Congress, it can easily set the matter to rest by explicit language.” Amell v. United States, 384 U. S. 158, 166. So long as the law reads as it now does, I think the Court of Appeals correctly understood it, and I would, therefore, affirm the judgment before us.4

 This Court agreed: “In 1960, . . . Congress abolished the distinction between public and merchant vessels, a matter which had sorely confused attorneys . . . .” Amell v. United States, 384 U. S. 158, 164.

 Since the United States could have sued the owners of the fishing boat in the Philippines had the fishing boat rammed the destroyer, it would do no violence to the concept of reciprocity to allow the owners of the boat to sue the United States in a federal court. And while the United States would no longer be able sua sponte to prevent the enforcement of subpoenas or stay proceedings against naval vessels and their crews, it is not realistic to think that a federal court would refuse such relief if national security were in any way at stake. Finally, prejudgment interest is awardable under the Suits in Admiralty Act, and not under the Public Vessels Act, but the amount of money involved in such awards is not large and the award of interest is discretionary in any event. The Scotland, 118 U. S. 507, 519. None of these governmental interests supposedly served by the Public Vessels Act, but not by the Suits in Admiralty Act, is, therefore, significant.

 The judgment of the Court of Appeals does not amount to a repeal of the Public Vessels Act, since there will still be eases cog*184nizable only under that Act by reason of its broader venue provisions. Compare 46 U. S. C. § 742 with 46 U. S. C. § 782.

 While no other Court of Appeals has ruled on the precise issue presented here, two have indicated that they would reach the same result as did the Ninth Circuit. United Philippine Lines, Inc. v. The Daniel Boone, 475 F. 2d 478, 480 n. 5 (CA4); Ira S. Bushey & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 398 F. 2d 167, 169 (CA2). See also De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F. 2d 140, 145-146 (CA5).