Court Opinion

ID: 9885570
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:07:29.363719+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:43:55.479701
License: Public Domain

Judge ROY
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part. I concur with the majority opinion on the sufficiency of the evidence issue (Part II). I dissent on the issue relating to the management of the jury (Part III).
The most common irregularity is the jury's receipt of evidence or information from outside sources. See People v. Harlan, 109 P.3d 616 (Colo.2005) (Bible); People v. Wadle, 97 P.3d 932 (Colo.2004) (extraneous information from the Internet); Harper v. People, 817 P.2d 77 (Colo.1991) (media reports); Wiser v. People, 732 P.2d 1139 (Colo.1987) (dictionary and outside inquiry on source of instructions); Perry v. People, 63 Colo. 60, 163 P. 844 (1917) (media reports). In the most recent case, our supreme court stated: "These cases establish a two-part inquiry: first, a court makes a determination that extraneous information was improperly before the jury; and second, based on an objective "typical juror' standard, makes a determination whether use of that extraneous information posed the reasonable possibility of prejudice to the defendant." Harlan, 109 P.3d at 624 (citing Wadle, 97 P.3d at 936-37).
A second line of cases deals with the failure or inability of a juror to deliberate. As the majority states, these cases deal primarily with the problems associated with substituting an alternate juror after deliberations have commeneed-an option not available here. Garcia v. People, 997 P.2d 1 (Colo.2000); Carrillo v. People, 974 P.2d 478 (Colo.1999); People v. Burnette, 775 P.2d 583 (Colo.1989).
In Carrillo, a juror dissented from the verdict on one count during the polling of the jury prior to discharge. Carrillo, 974 P.2d at 482-83. The court ordered the jury to return to deliberations on all counts. Subsequently, the foreman of the jury sent a note to the court advising that the dissenting juror (1) was hearing impaired; (2) had not heard substantial testimony during the trial; (3) did not understand all the charges and instructions; and (4) had difficulty hearing the jury deliberations. Id. at 483. The court then conducted an in camera hearing with the parties and the juror during which the juror was afforded the opportunity to respond to the foreman's note. The juror stated that he had missed substantial testimony during the trial and was lip reading during deliberations. Id.
Based on the juror's statements, the trial court exeused the juror and substituted an alternate who had not been discharged, after verifying with the alternate that she had obeyed the court's continuing instructions on juror conduct. The trial court then instructed the eleven remaining jurors to put aside their deliberations and begin anew with the alternate juror. The trial court had each juror verify that he or she could and would obey the instructions. Id.
With respect to the discharge of the juror, the supreme court stated:
Turning to the specific[s] of this case, we find that the potential for prejudice that arose when [the juror] was dismissed following the announcement of verdicts was overcome. Here, we may be confident that the cause of [the juror's] dismissal-his hearing problem-was not manufactured in response to undue pressure from the other jurors. During voir dire, [the juror] was forthcoming about his hearing problem, and his difficulty hearing was evident to such an extent that the prosecutor offered to stipulate to cause. When the jury sent out the note in order to bring this issue to the attention of the court, the court's inquiry of [the juror] revealed no evidence of undue pressure. Rather, [the juror's] forthright responses to the court's questions revealed that he missed signifi*421cant portions of the trial testimony and was unable to hear the other jurors during deliberations.
Id. at 492 (footnote omitted).
Burnette dealt exclusively with the problems associated with the substitution of the alternate juror after deliberations had commenced. Despite this limitation, it sheds some light on the necessity of an inquiry by the trial court. There, a juror called the judge early in the morning prior to the jury's recommencing deliberations and advised that she could not get to the courthouse because of inclement weather. Burnette, 775 P.2d at 585. At the time, both the relevant rule of criminal procedure and statute required that alternate jurors be discharged when the jurors retired to deliberate. The trial court then recalled the discharged alternate juror, who was permitted to join the deliberations. The resulting conviction was reversed because the trial court had failed to determine whether the alternate juror had formed opinions based on information received after discharge, did not determine his activities subsequent to discharge, and did not determine his present ability to deliberate. Id. at 590-91.
In addition, the trial court failed to determine whether the remaining jurors could begin deliberations anew, whether they were capable of disregarding their previous deliberations, and whether they would be receptive to the alternate juror's attempt to assert nonconforming views. These inquiries were necessary to rebut the presumption of prejudice to the defendant occasioned by the substitution of the alternate juror after deliberations had commenced. Id. "
Finally, in Garcia, a case factually similar to this case, the foreman of the jury sent a note to the trial court stating that a juror refused to accept medical expert testimony, said he would not follow the instructions, and said that there was no evidence, presumably of guilt, and he would never change his mind. Garcia, 997 P.2d at 3. In response, the trial court sent a message telling the jury to review all the instructions with particular emphasis on the burden of proof, credibility of witnesses, and expert witnesses. Id. Other than requests for particular items of evidence, matters appeared to proceed normally.
Prior to adjournment on the first day of deliberations, the foreman sent a message asking for a copy of the juror's oath, which was provided. Early in the second day of deliberations, the foreman sent a message similar to the first and referring to the same juror. Id. at 4.
The trial court then interviewed the foreman, who stated that the juror (1) was violating the juror's oath; (2) was not following the instructions; and (8) was not deliberating. The foreman also reported that the juror had said to others, "I know how you are going to vote and I have a feeling this is going to be a hung jury." Id.
The trial court then interviewed the juror but only as to the hung jury comment, with which the juror did not agree. The juror was excused, and an alternate juror substituted after verifying that the alternate had not discussed the case since her dismissal and the remaining jurors were willing to begin deliberations anew. Id. at 5.
The supreme court reversed and, after reviewing Carrillo and Burnette with some emphasis on the substitution issue, discussed the trial court's inquiry:
Despite our ultimate holding in Carrillo, we expressed special concern about replacing jurors in cases in which "the juror excused was a lone holdout for acquittal": ["JCourts should particularly strive to avoid the practice of mid-deliberation substitution of a juror when the deliberation process has already progressed to the stage of announcing verdicts and where the juror who is the source of non-unanimity is the one who is subsequently excused.["] [Carrillo, 974 P.2d] at 491.
In such cases there is a danger that the court's act of dismissing the juror "will be interpreted as a comment on the merits of the case-in effect, that the juror is being exeused because, in the court's opinion, the Juror reached the wrong result." Id.
We find this very concern of particular force in this case. Here, the trial court's inquiry was incomplete. The record fails to show a sufficient inquiry of [the juror] *422as to whether he was willing to follow the trial judge's instructions prior to deliberations or during the course of deliberations. Therefore, on this record, we are compelled to reverse the jury's verdict.
Garcia, 997 P.2d at 6 (emphasis added).
In People v. Evans, 710 P.2d 1167 (Colo.App.1985), a juror apparently slept during defense counsel's closing arguments. The trial court was so advised by the bailiff but made no inquiry and took no action prior to the verdict. After the verdict was rendered, the trial court commenced contempt proceedings against the juror. A division of this court reversed the conviction. Id. at 1168.
In this case, the jury was instructed: "The verdict must represent the considered judgment of each juror. In order to return a verdict, it is necessary that each juror agree to it. Your verdict must be unanimous." The juror's oath stated, among other things: "[¥Jou and each of you will well and truly try the matter at issue ... and render a true verdict according to the law and evidence."
A juror, in the midst of deliberations, expressed a lack of interest in the proceedings, announced that she would no longer participate in the deliberations, stated that she would agree to any verdict reached by a majority, and withdrew from the deliberations. The trial court was made aware of the event but conducted no inquiry to determine what had upset the juror, or whether she could and would return to the deliberations and fulfill her duties to independently determine the matter on the evidence presented and the applicable law. In addition, the trial court made no inquiry of the remaining jurors as to whether they could continue to deliberate with the juror.
In my view, the fact that deliberations resumed after a break and the foreman reported that "all 12 jurors seem to be fine and are proceeding" does not substitute for an inquiry, because while it may indicate appropriate deliberations, without more, it could equally indicate acquiescence by the juror. Further, I conclude that the jury poll after the verdict does not vitiate the need for the inquiry. The absence of an inquiry leaves the appellate court without a sufficient ree-ord, findings of fact, or conclusions of law to make the matter reviewable on appeal.
Therefore, I would reverse defendant's conviction and remand the matter for a new trial. Having so concluded, I would not address the remaining issues raised by defendant on appeal as they are unlikely to arise on retrial.