Court Opinion

ID: 9732917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:43:53.91935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:36.232064
License: Public Domain

CHEZEM, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In reviewing the dismissal of a proposed complaint under the Medical Malpractice Act, this court asks whether the trial court abused its discretion. Jones v. Wasserman, 656 N.E.2d 1195, 1196 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), trans. denied. “An abuse of discretion occurs only if the trial court’s decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court.” Benton v. Moore, 622 N.E.2d 1002, 1005 (Ind.Ct.App.1993). “The judgment will be affirmed if there is any evidence supporting the trial court’s decision.” Id. Thus, once the trial court has held a hearing and determined to impose the sanction of dismissal for noncompliance with reasonable procedural requirements, “it is incumbent upon the plaintiff to demonstrate why the trial court should have been required to rule differently as a matter of law.” Wasserman, 656 N.E.2d at 1197 (emphasis added).
The evidence indicated that on July 21, 1995, Chairman Hill invited the parties to contact him if they had any objection concerning the schedule and stated that he would assume that it was acceptable if he did not receive any objection. At that time, the Beemers’ attorney (the “Attorney”) had known since March of 1995 that he had lost one associate, yet he made no reply or objection to the schedule. Moreover, rather than notifying Chairman Hill of his inability to meet the September 11 submission deadline prior to or even on that date, the Attorney waited until four days after the Beemers’ submissions were due before telephoning Chairman Hill and telling him. that the submission was near completion. On October 13, 1995, Chairman Hill sent a letter asking the Attorney to let him know when to expect the Beemers’ completed submission. At the time he received this letter, the Attorney already knew of his second associate’s departure, yet the Attorney failed to respond to the chairman’s letter and did not ask for an extension. The Attorney finally filed the submission five days after the 180-day time limit within which the panel was to have rendered an opinion.
In view of the aforementioned conduct of the Attorney, I believe the trial court was within its discretion when it dismissed the Beemers’ malpractice action. I cannot say 1) that there was no evidence supporting the trial court’s decision; 2) that the Beemers demonstrated why the trial court should have been required to rule differently as a matter of law; or 3) that the trial court’s decision was against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Furthermore, neither Chairman Hill nor Dr. Elskens should have been required to continually prod the Beemers to make their submission. As the parties who brought the suit, the Beemers should have had an inherent interest in reaching a result in their case, not in causing delays. Instead of acquiescing to delays in our legal system, we should be fighting them.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm.