Court Opinion

ID: 9539416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:04:11.354419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:49.066135
License: Public Domain

Deen, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
While basically concurring with Chief Judge McMurray’s dissent, some additional analysis may clarify the threshold determination of liability of an employer for injuries sustained by a third party in a collision allegedly caused by the negligent intoxication of the employee. In Chastain v. Litton Systems, Inc., 694 F2d 957 (4th Cir. 1982), the court employed essentially a three prong analysis: (1) was the employee’s consumption of alcoholic beverage within the scope of employment; (2) was the employee negligent in consuming excessive *186alcoholic beverage and becoming intoxicated; and (3) did the employee’s negligent intoxication which occurred within the scope of employment continue until the time of the collision and thus constitute the proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries? (The fact that the employee was on the way home at the time of the collision, without more, would not insulate the employer from liability.) That uncomplicated respondeat superior analysis is cogent and fair, and this court should observe it.
If the answer to any of the above questions is an uncontroverted “no,” the employer, of course, would be entitled to summary judgment. In the instant case, however, the evidence certainly was sufficient to make these questions at least matters for jury resolution. The trial court thus properly denied the employer’s motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Judge Beasley joins in this dissent.