Court Opinion

ID: 9375421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 18:03:17.859418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:58.790504
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/27/23 Zhang v. Yu CA1/2
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION TWO

 LIAN ZHANG,
             Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   A163811

 v.                                                                    (Alameda County
 TAO YU,                                                               Super. Ct. No. RG20082952)
             Defendant and Respondent.

         Plaintiff and appellant Lian Zhang (Lian)1 appeals following the trial
court’s order granting defendant and respondent Tao Yu’s motion to quash
service for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court held that Lian failed
to meet her burden of establishing that Yu, a nonresident, was subject to
either general or specific jurisdiction in California. We agree and affirm.
                                                  BACKGROUND
                                                               I.
                                         Allegations in Complaint
         The subject dispute involves a condominium unit located in Beijing,
China (“Property”). Prior to 1989, Lian’s mother, Nai Sun, resided at but did
not own the Property. In 1989, Sun immigrated to the United States and

         Since this opinion discusses Lian’s sister, Lesheng Zhang, we refer to
         1

the sisters by their first names to avoid confusion and mean no disrespect by
it.

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moved to Berkeley, California, where Lian worked. The complaint alleged
that in 1993, Lian purchased the Property, with Sun agreeing to hold title to
it in trust for Lian.2 Following the purchase and with Lian’s consent, Sun
rented out the Property and used the proceeds towards her living expenses.
In early 2007, Lian’s sister, Leshang Zhang (Lesheng) immigrated from
Beijing to the United States and also settled in Berkeley. Lesheng offered to
manage the Property since Sun was getting old and Lesheng already owned
and managed other units in Beijing. Lian and Sun agreed to this.
      In October 2007, Lesheng and Sun traveled back to China to visit
family. The complaint alleged that while in China, Lesheng called Lian and
informed her of a new rule in Beijing that prohibited non-resident owners
from renting out their property. Lesheng’s daughter, Yu, was also on this
call. Lesheng told Lian that if Sun wished to continue receiving rental
income, she would have to transfer the Property’s title to Yu since Yu was a
resident of Beijing. Lesheng assured Lian she had nothing to worry about
and that Yu would hold title to the Property for Lian and would return the
Property whenever Lian wanted it back. Yu allegedly confirmed Lesheng’s
statements during this call, including that she would hold the Property in
trust for Lian so that Sun could continue receiving rental income. Lian
agreed and title to the Property was transferred from Sun to Yu. In 2015, Yu
moved to North Carolina.

      2  Lian later explained in a declaration that in 1993, Sun became
eligible to purchase the Property as a private citizen following a property
ownership reform in China. Sun gave Lian the right to purchase the
Property but agreed to hold title to it since Lian was not eligible to hold title
as she was not an employee of the Chinese government nor the spouse of such
an employee.

                                       2
      In May 2020, Sun passed away. The complaint alleged that shortly
after this, Lian demanded the return of the Property from Lesheng and Yu
but was ignored. In October 2020, Lesheng and Yu sold the Property and
kept the proceeds for themselves. Lian filed suit against Lesheng and Yu for
elder abuse, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, promissory estoppel and
conversion.
                                       II.
                              Motion to Quash
      Yu moved to quash service of the summons based on lack of personal
jurisdiction. Yu argued that California lacked both general and specific
jurisdiction over her as a nonresident. With respect to the lack of specific
jurisdiction, Yu argued that the dispute involved property in China as well as
alleged trusts established in China. Yu further contended that the exercise of
jurisdiction would be unfair since she was a resident of North Carolina and
should not be required to defend this case in California. In the alternative,
Yu moved to be dismissed from the lawsuit based on inconvenient forum.
      In her supporting declaration, Yu stated that she lived in China until
December 2014 and then temporarily lived in California until April 2015 as
an international student before moving to North Carolina permanently. She
further averred that she has never spoken to Lian on the phone and has
never discussed the Property with Lian. According to Yu, her grandmother
(Sun) purchased the Property in 1993 and sold the Property to her mother
(Lesheng) in 2007. A few years later, Lesheng sold the Property to Yu. The
declaration did not include any supporting purchase documents but asserted
that copies of the relevant records “exist at the relevant Chinese government
authorities in China, which records will not be in English.”

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      In opposition to the motion, Lian submitted a supporting declaration
that largely tracked the allegations made in the complaint. The declaration
included the 2007 call in which Lesheng informed Lian of the new rule in
Beijing that prohibited property rentals by non-resident owners, with Yu
confirming this rule and offering to hold the Property in trust for Lian so that
Sun could continue receiving her rental income. The opposition did not
include any other evidence to support the exercise of jurisdiction over Yu.
      Following full briefing by the parties, the trial court continued the
motion and ordered supplemental briefing. The court commented that it was
“unclear whether this case is about the obligations of trustees under a trust
that might have been formed in California under California law or whether
this case is about ownership of real estate in China.” Accordingly, the court
requested, to the extent any documents existed, that Lian produce a copy of
the 1993 trust document between herself and Sun as well as the 2007
transfer of trustee document with Yu. In response, the only trust document
Lian produced was a 1997 First Amendment to the 1995 De Lian Trust. In
her supplemental brief, Lian asserted that this trust was formed in
California in 1995 “during a personal crisis” and amended in 1997, with the
Property added to the trust in 1998. Lian explained that she added the
Property at this time in anticipation of receiving legal title to it soon.
      Following oral argument, the trial court granted Yu’s motion. With
respect to the trust, the court held, “The relevant trust [document] in this
case is the alleged trust created by [Sun] in China and not the de Lian Trust
that was created by Lian in California.” The court also made the following
factual findings: “First, in 1996 [Sun] bought the property and thereafter
owned the property, although it is disputed whether [Sun] owned the
property for herself or in trust for Daughter Lian. Second, in 2007 [Sun] sold

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the property to daughter Lesheng who then sold the property to
Granddaughter [Yu].” This all took place in China. In 2020, Yu sold the
Property while she resided in North Carolina. Based on this, the court
concluded that Yu lacked minimum contacts with California to support the
imposition of personal jurisdiction.
      Finally, the trial court noted that at the motion hearing, Lian “argued
that in 2007 [Yu] had a telephone call with a person in California concerning
the property and that contact could support specific jurisdiction.” The court
acknowledged that the evidence was in conflict as to whether this call
occurred. The court then stated it “assumes that there was this one
telephone call” and found that “the single phone call is not sufficient to create
specific jurisdiction.” Lian now appeals.
                                 DISCUSSION
                                        I.
                             Standard of Review
      In reviewing an order granting a motion to quash on jurisdictional
grounds, “[w]hen there is conflicting evidence, the trial court’s factual
determinations are not disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial
evidence. [Citation.] When no conflict in the evidence exists, however, the
question of jurisdiction is purely one of law and the reviewing court engages
in an independent review of the record.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest
Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434, 449 (Vons).)
      “If there is conflicting evidence about whether a nonresident defendant
committed acts or omissions outside the state, intending to cause a tortious
effect in California, then we apply the substantial evidence rule to determine
the validity of the trial court’s finding of fact. On conflicting evidence, we
must support the trial court’s resolution of the conflict, including any implied

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finding that acts and omissions were not committed outside the state with an
intent to cause tortious effects in California.” (In re Automobile Antitrust
Cases I & II (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 100, 123.) All reasonable references are
drawn in support of the trial court’s order. (Burdick v. Superior Court (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 8, 17.)
                                        II.
                            Governing Principles
      California courts may exercise jurisdiction on any basis that is
consistent with the Constitutions of California and the United States. (Code
Civ. Proc., § 410.10.) Jurisdiction is proper if a defendant has minimum
contacts with the state “such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’ ” (International Shoe
Co. v. State of Washington, etc. (1945) 326 U.S. 310, 316.) Personal
jurisdiction can be general or specific. (Vons, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 445.) “A
nonresident defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of the forum
if his or her contacts in the forum state are ‘substantial . . . continuous and
systematic.’ ” (Ibid.)
      If such substantial contacts are lacking, a nonresident defendant may
still be subject to specific jurisdiction “if the defendant has purposefully
availed himself or herself of forum benefits [citation], and the ‘controversy is
related to or “arises out of” a defendant’s contacts with the forum.’ ” (Vons,
supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 446.) The first requirement is met if a defendant
“ ‘purposefully directs’ his [or her] activities toward forum residents” (Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz (1985) 471 U.S. 462, 473 (Burger King)) such that he
or she should “ ‘reasonably anticipate’ ” being haled into the forum for
litigation. (Id. at p. 474.) To that end, it is the defendant’s actions that are
material in determining whether there has been sufficient contact with the

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forum for purposes of jurisdiction and not the unilateral activity of the
plaintiff or another party. (Id. at p. 475.)
        When a defendant moves to quash service based on lack of personal
jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears “the initial burden of demonstrating facts by a
preponderance of evidence justifying the exercise of jurisdiction in
California.” (In re Automobile Antitrust Cases I & II, supra, 135 Cal.App.4th
at p. 110.) In meeting this burden, “[t]he plaintiff must do more than merely
allege jurisdictional facts. . . . The plaintiff must provide affidavits and other
authenticated documents in order to demonstrate competent evidence of
jurisdictional facts.” (Ibid.) If this initial burden is satisfied, “the burden
shifts to the defendant to present a compelling case demonstrating that the
exercise of jurisdiction by our courts would be unreasonable.” (Id. at pp. 110-
111.)
                                        III.
    Lian Has Not Met Her Initial Burden to Justify the Exercise of
                      Jurisdiction Over Yu.
        Only specific jurisdiction is at issue here. Lian contends that Yu
purposefully availed herself of forum benefits to justify the exercise of specific
jurisdiction. Specifically, Lian argues that (1) Yu made a call in 2007 that
purposefully directed her activities at Lian, a California resident; (2) Yu
agreed to a continuing obligation to support Sun, a California resident, with
rental income from the Property; and (3) Yu’s misconduct against Lian
caused harm in California. We are not persuaded this was sufficient to
establish minimum contacts for purposes of creating personal jurisdiction.
        As an initial matter, the trial court was presented with conflicting
evidence as to whether a telephone call occurred in 2007 between Yu and
Lian regarding the Property. Lian detailed the 2007 call in a supporting
declaration, while Yu in her declaration denied ever speaking to Lian on the

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phone or discussing the Property with Lian. The trial court acknowledged
this conflict and concluded that even assuming the call occurred, it was “not
sufficient to create specific jurisdiction.” Though it is arguable whether the
trial court made an explicit factual finding that a call occurred in 2007, we
agree that even assuming the call did occur, it is insufficient to show that Yu
purposefully directed her activities at a California resident such that she
should reasonably anticipate being haled into court here for litigation.
      Lian cites Moncrief v. Clark (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 1000 for the
proposition that a single communication may be sufficient to establish
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident. There, the court held that Clark, an
Arizona attorney, purposefully availed himself of the benefits of California
when he made misrepresentations via telephone and email to Moncrief, a
California attorney, to facilitate the sale of farm equipment on behalf of
Clark’s Arizona client. (Id. at pp. 1003, 1006.) The court concluded that
“while Moncrief and Clark engaged in a single transaction, Clark targeted
Moncrief with the specific purpose of inducing Moncrief’s client to finalize the
purchase of farm equipment in [Arizona.]” (Id. at p. 1007.) The court further
concluded that “Clark’s communications with Moncrief were purposely and
voluntarily directed toward California” such that Clark should expect to be
subject to jurisdiction in California. (Ibid.) As Moncrief’s client was a
California general partnership, there was no question that Clark knew he
was targeting a buyer based in California. (Id. at p. 1003.)
      Here, Lian’s declaration stated only that she received a call from
Lesheng while Lesheng was in China, and that Yu was also on the call. It is
unclear whether Yu played any role in initiating that call or perpetrating the
fraud that was the alleged purpose of the call. Yu had lived in China from
birth until approximately December 2014, and later lived in California for

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five months in 2014 and 2015 as an international student, and then moved
and took up permanent residence in North Carolina. Aside from the 2007
call that Yu disputes occurred, Yu has spoken to Lian only twice; once at a
Christmas party in 2014 and once at a family party in 2015. According to
Lian, it was Lesheng who initiated the call to Lian while on a visit to Beijing
in 2007 and, with Yu present, represented that there was a new local rule in
Beijing that prohibited property rentals by non-resident owners and assured
Lian that Yu could hold the Property for her. Yu confirmed Lesheng’s
statements and assurances. On this thin record, we cannot say that Yu
“purposefully directed” her activities towards a California resident such that
she should “reasonably anticipate” being haled into a California court.
(Burger King, supra, 471 U.S. at pp. 473-474.)
      Indeed, as the high court held, in establishing specific jurisdiction over
a nonresident defendant, “the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the
defendant and the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that must
form the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis for its
jurisdiction over him.” (Walden v. Fiore (2014) 571 U.S. 277, 285 (Walden),
italics added.) Here, the 2007 call with Lian cannot form the basis of specific
jurisdiction where Yu did not otherwise engage in any conduct to establish a
necessary connection between herself and the forum. Her brief residence in
California seven years later and once yearly visits to her family in California,
which have no apparent connection with the alleged fraud, does not provide
that connection for purposes of specific jurisdiction, and Zhang does not argue
otherwise.
      Nor are we persuaded by Lian’s second argument that Yu’s minimum
contacts with the forum were established by her ongoing obligation to support
Sun, a California resident, with rental income from the Property. First, the

                                       9
trial court found that in 2007, Sun sold the Property to Lesheng who then
sold the Property to Yu. The court made no mention or findings as to
whether there were any support obligations between Yu and Sun with
respect to income from the Property. Second, the complaint itself alleges that
it was Lesheng who took over management of the Property and gave Sun
money from the Property’s rental income. Moreover, there is no evidence
that Yu sent any funds on a regular basis (or any basis) to Sun or anyone else
in California. Lian has not met her burden in demonstrating facts sufficient
to establish the necessary connection between Yu and California.
      Lian attempts to analogize the facts here to those in Gilmore Bank v.
AsiaTrust New Zealand Ltd. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1558. There, the court
held that the “purposeful availment” requirement for specific jurisdiction was
met where there was a “ ‘ “latticework” ’ ” of contacts that linked the
nonresident defendant to California, including many calls to California, the
execution of legal documents in California, continuous payments from the
defendant to California, as well as a “continuing receipt by [defendant] of
compensation from the California trustee of a California trust.” (Id. at
p. 1573.)
      Lian contends that Yu likewise had continuing contacts with California
because Lian paid for the Property, Sun held title to it and received rental
income from it for many years. However, Lian overlooks the critical rule that
“unilateral activity of another party or a third person is not an appropriate
consideration when determining whether a defendant has sufficient contacts
with a forum State to justify an assertion of jurisdiction.” (Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall (1984) 466 U.S. 408, 417.) In Gilmore
Bank, it was the defendant’s many activities with California that established
the necessary connection with the forum. Here however, Lian cites mainly to

                                       10
the unilateral activity of two California residents (herself and Sun) with
respect to the Property, but this fails to show that Yu herself directed any
activity toward California.
      Lastly, Lian contends that Yu’s misconduct against Lian caused harm
in California. The only harm Yu allegedly caused however, was harm to
Lian. As discussed above, Lian as the plaintiff “cannot be the only link
between the defendant and the forum.” (Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 285.)
Though Lian cites to Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783 to support that
activity that causes harm to be suffered in California is sufficient, the high
court in Walden clarified its earlier holding that “Calder made clear that
mere injury to a forum resident is not a sufficient connection to the forum.
Regardless of where a plaintiff lives or works, an injury is jurisdictionally
relevant only insofar as it shows that the defendant has formed a contact
with the forum State.” (Walden, supra, 571 U.S. at p. 290.) Thus, “[t]he
proper question is not where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or
effect but whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a
meaningful way.” (Ibid.) That Lian was a California resident harmed by
Yu’s conduct is insufficient to establish a connection between Yu as a
nonresident and California where the dispute involves property in China and
related property transfers that all took place in China.
      Since Lian has not met her burden in showing that Yu purposefully
availed herself of forum benefits, we need not reach the second question of
whether the controversy relates to or arises out of defendant’s contacts with
the forum for purposes of establishing specific jurisdiction.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Yu shall recover her costs on appeal.

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                             STEWART, P.J.

We concur.

RICHMAN, J.

MILLER, J.

Zhang v. Yu (A163811)

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