Court Opinion

ID: 9882772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:19:50.127998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:58.218195
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Arnoff v. Ferguson, 2023-Ohio-3511.]

STATE OF OHIO                    )                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                 )ss:                 NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF SUMMIT                 )

BRUCE ARNOFF                                          C.A. No.       30399

        Appellant

        v.                                            APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                      ENTERED IN THE
DENISE FERGUSON                                       COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                      COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO
        Appellee                                      CASE No.   CV 2021 10 3310

                                DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: September 29, 2023

        CARR, Judge.

        {¶1}    Plaintiff-Appellant Bruce Arnoff appeals, pro se, the judgment of the Summit

County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.

                                                 I.

        {¶2}    In October 2021, Mr. Arnoff filed a complaint, pro se, alleging that his former

appellate attorney, Defendant-Appellee Denise Ferguson, committed legal malpractice in her

representation of Mr. Arnoff in his direct appeal. In the related trial court proceedings, Mr. Arnoff

had pleaded guilty to multiple serious charges, including complicity to commit aggravated murder.

Mr. Arnoff was not represented by Ms. Ferguson in the trial court proceedings.

        {¶3}    Mr. Arnoff filed multiple motions for summary judgment. Ms. Ferguson opposed

Mr. Arnoff’s motions. Her own affidavit and an affidavit of another attorney accompanied one of

her filings in opposition. Ms. Ferguson also filed a motion for summary judgment accompanied

by an affidavit from another attorney and materials from the trial court proceedings. Mr. Arnoff
                                                  2

filed a brief in opposition. Mr. Arnoff did not submit evidentiary materials in support of his

motions for summary judgment, although his own affidavit accompanied the complaint.

       {¶4}    Ultimately, the trial court granted Ms. Ferguson’s motion for summary judgment

and denied Mr. Arnoff’s motions for summary judgment. In so doing, the trial court concluded

that Mr. Arnoff had not met his burden to demonstrate his entitlement to summary judgment and

that Ms. Ferguson had met her burden. The trial court determined that there was no genuine issue

of material fact with respect to whether Ms. Ferguson breached a duty of care or caused Mr.

Arnoff’s damages.

       {¶5}    Mr. Arnoff has appealed, raising five assignments of error for our review. Some of

his arguments will be addressed together to facilitate our analysis.

                                                 II.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

       SUMMIT COUNTY COURTS ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION AND
       VIOLATED JUDICIAL CODES OF CONDUCT[.]

       {¶6}    Mr. Arnoff appears to argue in his first assignment of error that the trial judge was

biased against him simply because the trial judge is a female attorney as is Ms. Ferguson and that

is the reason why the trial court ruled against him.

       {¶7}    “A party may seek to disqualify a judge who is allegedly prejudiced and biased by

filing an affidavit of disqualification with the Ohio Supreme Court in accordance with R.C.

2701.03. * * * [A]n appellate court lacks the authority to pass upon disqualification or to void the

judgment of the trial court upon that basis.” (Internal quotations and citations omitted.) King v.

Divoky, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29769, 2021-Ohio-1712, ¶ 44. “[A]n appellate court also lacks

jurisdiction to review a trial court’s decision on a motion to recuse.” Id.
                                                 3

        {¶8}   To the extent that Mr. Arnoff raises this type of judicial bias claim, the Court is

without authority to address it. See id.

        {¶9}   “Appellate courts, however, have jurisdiction to review a claim of judicial bias that

is alleged to result in a violation of a [party’s] due process rights.” (Alteration sic and internal

quotations and citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 45. Nonetheless, to the extent that Mr. Arnoff’s

allegations can be read to assert a due process violation, Mr. Arnoff’s allegations are just that,

allegations. Mr. Arnoff has developed no argument nor presented any evidence to support his

claims of judicial bias. Moreover, “disagreement[s] with a judge’s ruling on legal issues and the

management of the case are not evidence of bias or prejudice, but rather issues subject to appeal.”

Id. at ¶ 48.

        {¶10} Mr. Arnoff’s first assignment of error is overruled.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

        DENISE FERGUSON BLATANTLY VIOLATED THE PROFESSIONAL
        CODES OF CONDUCT * * * [.]

                                ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

        DENISE FERGUSON NEGLIGENTLY RAISED A LEGALLY INCORRECT
        ERROR[.]

                                ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

        DENISE FERGUSON ERRED WHEN SHE PRESENTED ERROR #2, MOTION
        TO VACATE[.]

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V

        DENISE FERGUSON WAS NEGLIGENT AGAIN WHEN SHE WAS
        NOTIFIED THAT THE APPEAL WAS OVERRULED[.]

        {¶11} Mr. Arnoff’s remaining arguments are somewhat difficult to follow, but we will

consider them in light of the issue before this Court: whether the trial court erred in granting Ms.
                                                 4

Ferguson’s motion for summary judgment and in denying Mr. Arnoff’s motions for summary

judgment.

       {¶12} This Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio

Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). This Court applies the same standard as the trial court,

viewing the facts in the case in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolving any

doubt in favor of the non-moving party. Viock v. Stowe-Woodward Co., 13 Ohio App.3d 7, 12

(6th Dist.1983).

       {¶13} Pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), summary judgment is proper if:

       (1) No genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving
       party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence
       that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence
       most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment
       is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party.

Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977).

       {¶14} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of informing the

trial court of the basis for the motion and pointing to parts of the record that show the absence of

a genuine issue of material fact. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293 (1996). Specifically,

the moving party must support the motion by pointing to some evidence in the record of the type

listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. Once a moving party satisfies its burden of supporting its motion for

summary judgment with acceptable evidence pursuant to Civ.R. 56(C), Civ.R. 56(E) provides that

the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the moving party’s

pleadings. Id. at 293. Rather, the non-moving party has a reciprocal burden of responding by

setting forth specific facts, demonstrating that a “genuine triable issue” exists to be litigated at

trial. State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 449 (1996).
                                                  5

       {¶15} “A claim for legal malpractice requires the plaintiff to prove the following: (1) that

the attorney owed a duty or obligation to the plaintiff, (2) that there was a breach of that duty or

obligation and that the attorney failed to conform to the standard required by law, and (3) that there

is a causal connection between the conduct complained of and the resulting damage or loss.”

(Internal quotations omitted.) Alonso v. Thomas, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 19CA011483, 2021-Ohio-

341, ¶ 56, quoting Vahila v. Hall, 77 Ohio St.3d 421 (1997), syllabus.

       The attorney’s duty is to exercise the knowledge, skill, and ability ordinarily
       possessed and exercised by members of the legal profession similarly situated, and
       to be ordinarily and reasonably diligent, careful, and prudent[.] [I]n an action for
       legal malpractice, one must set forth expert testimony to establish an attorney’s
       alleged malpractice or breach of duty and care, unless the breach is so obvious that
       it can be determined by the court or is within the ordinary knowledge and
       experience of laymen. Furthermore, an affidavit from the acting attorney is a
       legally sufficient basis upon which to grant a motion for summary judgment in a
       legal malpractice action absent any opposing affidavit of a qualified expert witness
       for the plaintiff.

(Alterations sic.) Lopez v. Hulburt, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29309, 2019-Ohio-5331, ¶ 28.

       {¶16} Here, the record discloses that Mr. Arnoff pleaded guilty to several serious criminal

charges and was not represented by Ms. Ferguson at the trial court level. Instead, Ms. Ferguson

was only appointed to represent Mr. Arnoff in his direct appeal. Ms. Ferguson did represent Mr.

Arnoff in his direct appeal and raised two assignments of error in the brief she filed. This Court

overruled Ms. Ferguson’s first assignment of error and declined to address the merits of the second

assignment of error as the motion at issue was still pending in the lower court. See State v. Arnoff,

9th Dist. Lorain No. 19CA011475, 2020-Ohio-3520, ¶ 12, 14.

       {¶17} While Mr. Arnoff claims that there were many issues Ms. Ferguson should have

raised in the direct appeal, Mr. Arnoff’s guilty plea limited the viability of those arguments. See

State v. Atkinson, 9th Dist. Medina No. 05CA0079-M, 2006-Ohio-5806, ¶ 21 (“A defendant who

enters a plea of guilty waives the right to appeal all nonjurisdictional issues arising at prior stages
                                                   6

of the proceedings, although the defendant may contest the constitutionality of the plea itself.”)

(Internal quotes and citations omitted.); State v. McDaniel, 9th Dist. Sumit No. 26997, 2014-Ohio-

183, ¶ 17 (noting that by pleading guilty a defendant waives any deficiencies in the indictment);

State v. Carroll, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 06CA009037, 2007-Ohio-3298, ¶ 5 (“A guilty plea waives

the right to appeal issues of ineffective assistance of counsel, unless the ineffective assistance of

counsel caused the guilty plea to be involuntary.”). Moreover, any challenges that Mr. Arnoff

alleges should have been raised in the direct appeal that involved evidence not within the trial court

record could not have been successful. See State v. Papotto, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29188, 2019-

Ohio-5405, ¶ 8 (observing that challenges involving statements and exchanges not contained in

the trial court record are not appropriate for a direct appeal).

       {¶18} In the instant proceedings, Ms. Ferguson submitted the affidavit of another criminal

defense attorney who averred that there was nothing Ms. Ferguson could have done to further

prosecute Mr. Arnoff’s outstanding motion to withdraw his plea within the direct appeal. Further,

the attorney maintained that “Mr. Arnoff did not suffer a manifest injustice nor [was] there any

fundamental flaw in the plea and sentencing proceedings.” That attorney went on to assert that it

was his opinion there was no legal basis to justify Mr. Arnoff withdrawing his plea. In addition,

the attorney concluded that Mr. Arnoff’s allegations pertaining to Ms. Ferguson’s alleged

ineffective appellate representation were unfounded in light of the record that the attorney

reviewed.

       {¶19} Mr. Arnoff did not submit expert testimony in response or any evidence that would

counter the evidence submitted by Ms. Ferguson.             See Lopez, 2019-Ohio-5331, at ¶ 28.

Accordingly, Mr. Arnoff has not demonstrated that the trial court erred in granting Ms. Ferguson’s

summary judgment motion. Mr. Arnoff failed to establish that the trial court erred in concluding
                                                 7

that Ms. Ferguson met her burden, that Mr. Arnoff failed to meet his burden, and that there were

no genuine issues of material fact with respect to whether Ms. Ferguson breached her duties or

caused Mr. Arnoff damage.

       {¶20} Mr. Arnoff’s second through fifth assignments of error are overruled.

                                                III.

       {¶21} Mr. Arnoff’s assignments of error are overruled. Any outstanding motions are

denied. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                               Judgment affirmed.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy

of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                       DONNA J. CARR
                                                       FOR THE COURT
                                            8

HENSAL, P. J.
STEVENSON, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

BRUCE ARNOFF, pro se, Appellant.

ORVILLE L. REED, III, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.