Court Opinion

ID: 9373664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:06:34.258616+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.067767
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     LUIS R. MARQUEZ,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        SF-315H-16-0521-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF LABOR,                            DATE: May 27, 2022
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Jim Dougherty, Esquire, Walnut Creek, California, for the appellant.

           David M. Kahn, Esquire, San Francisco, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed the probationary termination appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For the
     reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and
     REMAND his Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of
     1994 (USERRA) claim to the Western Regional Office for further adjudication in
     accordance with this Order.

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                             2

                                        BACKGROUND
¶2         Effective May 13, 2016, the agency terminated the appellant ’s employment
     during his 1-year probationary period for unacceptable performance. 2              Initial
     Appeal File (IAF), Tab 1 at 12. The termination letter specified the deficiencies
     in his performance and advised him of his Board appeal rights. Id. at 12-13.
¶3         The appellant filed an appeal, challenging the merits of his termination and
     alleging that he was terminated due to his disabilit y, race, color, national origin,
     sex, and age, and for unspecified, preappointment reasons.            IAF, Tab 1 at 7,
     Tab 10 at 51-55, Tab 12 at 4. He claimed that he had 15 years and 3 months of
     Federal service, including 6 years of prior employment with a different agency,
     and that a probationary period was “not applicable” to his situation. IAF, Tab 1
     at 3, 62.   He also argued that the agency terminated him without providing
     “notice, a right to answer, and then a final decision.” IAF, Tab 12 at 4.              He
     further alleged that by terminating him, the agency violated his USERRA rights
     under 38 U.S.C. § 4311 and obstructed his right to compete for employment in
     violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(4). Id. at 4, 18-20.
¶4         The administrative judge notified the appellant that the Board may lack
     jurisdiction over his termination, informed him of his burden of establishing that
     he was an employee with statutory appeal rights under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 or a
     probationer with regulatory appeal rights under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806, and afforded
     him an opportunity to respond. IAF, Tab 2 at 2-5. The administrative judge also
     granted the agency’s motion to stay discovery pending a rul ing on the
     jurisdictional issue. IAF, Tabs 5, 7, 11. Although the appellant agreed to the
     extension, he later submitted a pleading reflecting that he wished to engage in
     discovery. IAF Tab 5 at 2, Tab 9 at 5.

     2
       Although neither party supplied documentation reflecting the nature of the appellant’s
     appointment, it appears that it was in the competitive service. Initial Appeal File, Tab 1
     at 12-13; see 5 C.F.R. § 315.201(a) (discussing a career-conditional appointment, like
     the appellant’s, as a type of competitive-service appointment).
                                                                                            3

¶5         The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for
     lack of jurisdiction, without holding the requested hearing.         IAF, Tab 1 at 4 ;
     Tab 15, Initial Decision (ID) at 1, 3.         He found that the appellant was a
     probationary employee. ID at 1. He also found that the appellant failed to allege
     a preappointment reason for his termination and, thus, was not entitled to the
     procedural protections under 5 C.F.R. § 315.805. ID at 3. He further found that
     the appellant did not allege any other basis for Board jurisdiction over his
     termination. Id. He therefore found that the Board also lacked jurisdiction over
     the appellant’s prohibited personnel practice claims.         Id.   The administrative
     judge received the appellant’s additional jurisdictional response after the initial
     decision’s issuance and therefore rejected it.          IAF, Tab 17; see 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.112(a) (explaining that after the initial decision is issued, the
     administrative judge retains only limited jurisdiction over the case).
¶6         The appellant has filed a petition for review. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tabs 1, 3. The agency has filed a response, to which the appellant has
     replied. 3 PFR File, Tabs 4, 7.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶7         The appellant alleges that the administrative judge erred by rejecting his
     additional jurisdictional response as untimely, denying his right to discovery, and
     failing to adjudicate his discrimination claims. PFR File, Tab 1 at 4, Tab 7 at 4-9.
     He also claims that the administrative judge erroneously found that he was

     3
       We deny the appellant’s motion for leave to file additional pleadings on the timeliness
     of his July 12, 2016 jurisdictional response. PFR File, Tab 10. As discussed below, we
     find his response to be timely filed, and we consider it on review. The appellant also
     filed a motion for leave to submit a list of six Board decisions he argues are “relevant”
     to his timeliness claim. PFR File, Tab 12. To the extent these decisions would
     constitute new and material evidence, an adjudicatory body is presumed to be “aware of
     relevant precedent in [its jurisdiction].” Boyer v. United States, 84 Fed. Cl. 751, 756
     (2008). Therefore, the appellant’s motion for leave is denied.
                                                                                          4

     terminated for postappointment reasons and was not entitl ed to the processes
     afforded by 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) or 5 C.F.R. § 315.805. PFR File, Tab 7 at 9-11.

     The appellant failed to nonfrivolously allege Board jurisdiction over his
     probationary termination.
¶8         During a June 28, 2016 telephonic conference with the parties, the appellant
     requested an extension of time to file his jurisdictional response, which the
     administrative judge granted. PFR File, Tab 4 at 9, Tab 7 at 6. He ordered the
     appellant to file his response on or before July 12, 2016. 4 Id. The appellant
     submitted a copy of the tracking information and the envelope showing that his
     response was mailed on July 12, 2016. PFR File, Tab 3, Subtab 4 at 3, Subtab 15.
     The date of filing by mail is determined by the postmark date.               5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.4(l). Accordingly, we find that his July 12, 2016 response was tim ely
     filed, even though the administrative judge did not receive it until July 13, 2016.
     Thus, we consider his response on review. PFR File, Tab 3. Nonetheless, we
     find that these additional arguments do not provide a basis for altering the
     administrative judge’s finding that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the
     appellant’s probationary termination.
¶9         The appellant bears the burden of proving jurisdiction by preponderant
     evidence. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(A). To have Board appeal rights under
     5 U.S.C. chapter 75, an appellant must, among other things, show that he satisfied
     one of the definitions of “employee” in 5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1).               5 U.S.C.
     § 7513(d). If he fails to satisfy the definition of “employee,” he nevertheless may
     have the right to appeal his termination to the Board under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806. In
     relevant part, under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(c), a probationary employee whose
     termination was based in whole or in part on conditions arising before his

     4
       The administrative judge apparently did not issue a written order on the appellant’s
     request for an extension of time to file. While the parties disagree as to whether the
     appellant’s jurisdictional response was timely filed, both acknowledge that the
     administrative judge ordered the appellant “to file” his jurisdictional res ponse on or
     before July 12, 2016. PFR File, Tab 4 at 7, Tab 7 at 6.
                                                                                            5

      appointment may appeal his termination on the ground that it was not effected in
      accordance with the procedures set forth in 5 C.F.R. § 315.805. 5
¶10         Although the appellant claims entitlement to appeal rights under 5 U.S.C.
      chapter 75, he does not challenge the administrative judge’s finding that he was a
      probationary employee at the time of his termination.           ID at 3.     Moreover,
      according to the appellant’s additional evidence, he has no prior Federal civilian
      service. PFR File, Tab 3, Subtab 27 at 46-48, 57. Apparently, his 15 years of
      prior Federal service was military service, and his other prior Government service
      was with the State of California. Id. Thus, the appellant failed to nonfrivolously
      allege that he was an employee with Board appeal rights under 5 U.S.C.
      chapter 75. See Baggan v. Department of State, 109 M.S.P.R. 572, ¶ 5 (2008)
      (finding that a competitive-service appointee can tack certain prior service in the
      same agency onto his current appointment to complete his probationary period).
¶11         The appellant also argues in his additional jurisdictional response that the
      agency terminated him due to his preexisting disability, race, and national origin.
      PFR File, Tab 3, Subtab 2 at 1-4.         The procedural safeguards of 5 C.F.R.
      § 315.805 do not apply to physical conditions predating emplo yment that affect
      an employee’s performance. Holloman v. Department of the Navy, 31 M.S.P.R.
      107, 110 (1986). Rather, they are required if the separation of the employee was
      proposed for reasons other than performance deficiencies. Id. Thus, his medical
      condition, race, and accent, although preexisting, are not preappointment
      conditions within the meaning of 5 C.F.R. § 315.805. Id. We therefore find that
      he was not entitled to the process afforded by that provision and failed to allege a
      basis for jurisdiction under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806.

      5
        The appellant has not challenged, and we discern no error with, the administrative
      judge’s finding that the appellant made no claims that his termination was based on
      partisan political reasons or marital status discrimination under 5 C.F.R. § 315.806(b).
      ID at 3.
                                                                                        6

¶12         In the absence of an otherwise appealable action, the Board may not
      adjudicate the appellant’s nonUSERRA-related discrimination, due process, and
      prohibited personnel practice claims.    See Garcia v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 437 F.3d 1322, 1342-43 (2006) (reaffirming that the Board may not
      decide issues within its pendent or ancillary jurisdiction in the absence of an
      otherwise appealable action), superseded by regulation on other grounds, as
      stated in Kingsley v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 10 (2016).

      The appellant’s remaining challenges to the administrative judge’s finding that
      the Board lacks jurisdiction over his probationary terminat ion do not state a basis
      for review.
¶13         The appellant contends that the administrative judge erroneously denied
      him his right to discovery. PFR File, Tab 7 at 8; IAF, Tab 14. An appellant is
      entitled to request discovery of relevant materials to assist him in meeting his
      burden of establishing Board jurisdiction. See Russo v. Department of the Navy,
      85 M.S.P.R. 12, ¶ 8 (1999).     However, here, the appellant admitted that the
      purpose of his discovery requests was to obtain information on the merits of his
      termination and his pendant discrimination claims, which do not affect Board
      jurisdiction in this matter. IAF, Tab 8 at 14-15. He therefore has not shown that
      the administrative judge’s order to stay discovery prejudiced his ability to meet
      his jurisdictional burden. See Karapinka v. Department of Energy, 6 M.S.P.R.
      124, 127 (1981) (finding that an administrative judge’s procedural error is of no
      legal consequence unless it is shown to have adversely affected a party’s
      substantive rights).
¶14         We also find no merit to the appellant’s claim that the administrative judge
      exhibited bias warranting recusal by issuing the initial decision without
      considering his July 12, 2016 jurisdictional response and by denying his request
      for discovery. PFR File, Tab 7 at 6, 8. It is well settled that an administrative
      judge’s case-related rulings, even if erroneous, are insufficient to establish bias
                                                                                        7

      and that claims of perceived adjudicatory errors simply do not provide a basis for
      recusal. Hay v. U.S. Postal Service, 106 M.S.P.R. 151, ¶ 18 (2007).

      The administrative judge did not notify the appellant of his jurisdictional burden
      concerning his USERRA claim.
¶15         The appellant, whose veteran status is undisputed, reasserts on review his
      claim that the agency violated 38 U.S.C. § 4311 by terminating him. PFR File,
      Tab 3, Subtab 27, Exhibit 600 at 1, 17. The administrative judge, however, did
      not notify him of how to establish jurisdiction over his USERRA claims, and the
      agency’s responses below did not cure this error.       Thus, we must remand the
      appeal to ensure that the appellant receives notice of the jurisdictional burd en
      regarding his USERRA claim. 6 See Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board,
      758 F.2d 641, 643-44 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that an appellant must receive
      explicit information on what is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional
      issue).

                                           ORDER
                For the reasons discussed above, we remand the USERRA claims to the
      Western Regional Office for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand
      Order. The administrative judge should provide the appellant with the following
      as   to      his   USERRA    jurisdictional   burden:       specific   notice,   an

      6
        The appellant’s USERRA claims do not provide a basis for conferring Board
      jurisdiction over his due process, nonUSERRA discrimination, or prohibited personnel
      practice claims. See Metzenbaum v. Department of Justice, 89 M.S.P.R. 285, ¶ 15
      (2001) (reaffirming that the Board’s authority to review USERRA claims does not
      provide a basis for reviewing other claims of prohibited discrimination).
                                                                           8

opportunity to conduct discovery, and an opportunity to present evidence and
argument.

FOR THE BOARD:                       /s/ for
                                     Jennifer Everling
                                     Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.