Court Opinion

ID: 9719516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:55:08.857364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:32.167266
License: Public Domain

CANE, P.J.
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority's decision construing sec. 940.27(2), Stats. (1987), to allow multiple felony convictions for felony nonsupport. The dispositive issue is whether the convictions are mul-tiplicitous and that depends on whether the legislature *567contemplated only a single felony nonsupport charge.1
Under sec. 940.27(2), Stats. (1987), it is a Class E felony for: "any person who intentionally fails for 120 or more consecutive days to provide . . . child support which the person knows or reasonably should know the person is legally obligated to provide . . ,."2
Because the legislative history of this statute suggests that the 120-day period was introduced only to distinguish a felony from a misdemeanor, and because ambiguities in penal statutes should be resolved in favor of the accused, I would strictly construe the statute to allow only one felony charge. Multiplicity is the charging of a single offense in separate counts, State v. Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d 155, 161, 378 N.W.2d 883, 885 (1985), and it violates the double jeopardy provisions of art. I, sec. 8, of the state constitution, and the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. Regardless of whether there is a violation of double jeopardy, the charging of multiple counts may still be multiplicitous if the legislature intended only one unit of prosecution. Id. at 164, 378 N.W.2d at 887.3
*568Statutory construction involves a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Nixa, 121 Wis. 2d 160, 163, 360 N.W.2d 52, 54 (Ct. App. 1984). In determining legislative intent, the relevant factors include the language of the statute, its legislative history and context, the nature of the proscribed conduct and the appropriateness of the multiple punishment. Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 413, 422, 304 N.W.2d 729, 734 (1981). Finally, if there is ambiguity, we apply the rule of lenity, that is, the statute is strictly construed to safeguard a defendant's rights. State v. Bohacheff, 114 Wis. 2d 402, 417, 338 N.W.2d 466, 473 (1983).
The express language of the statute does not resolve the issue. It penalizes anyone who intentionally fails to pay child support for 120 consecutive days or more. The "or more" language certainly permits the charging in a single count of felony nonsupport for the failure to pay for more than 120 days. However, the statute is silent as to whether the prosecution is limited to a single count.
The absence of express authority for separate offenses may, in itself, be instructive. The legislature has frequently given express authority for separate prosecutions for continuing illegal conduct in matters affecting the economic well being of its citizens. For example, crimes relating to worker's compensation, unemployment compensation and wage rates on state work provide that each such act or omission ''constitute[s] a separate offense." See secs. 102.17(3), 108.24(1), (2) and (3), and 103.49(4), Stats.
What the legislature did in these areas, however, is only marginally relevant to the present statute, and we must, therefore, examine the statute's language. It is appropriate to consider whether previous codifications of the criminal conduct in question have allowed multiple counts. See, for example, Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at *569166-67, 378 N.W.2d at 888; State v. Eisch, 96 Wis. 2d 25, 35, 291 N.W.2d 800, 805 (1980).
Similar to the present nonsupport statute, the two former sections that defined felony and misdemeanor nonsupport respectively were silent as to multiple prosecutions. Section 52.05, Stats. (1983), provided in part:
Any person who deserts or wilfully neglects or refuses to provide for the support and maintenance of his or her . . . child under 18 years in destitute or necessitous circumstances shall be fined not more than $500 or imprisoned not more than 2 years or both.
Section 52.055, Stats. (1983), provided in part:
Any parent who intentionally neglects or refuses to provide for the necessary and adequate support of his or her . . . child under 18 years . . . shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined not more than $100 or imprisoned not more than 3 months in the county jail or both.
While the express terms of the former statutes were similarly silent on the issue, there is a historical explanation for the introduction of the 120-day provision in the present statute. That explanation does not suggest that the 120-day provision was created for the purpose of permitting multiple prosecutions. The former nonsupport statutes were declared unconstitutional by a Milwaukee County Circuit Court based upon its conclusion that the elements of the two provisions were identical but had different penalties. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed that decision in an unpublished opinion. However, the Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and declared the provisions of the former nonsupport statutes to be constitutionally sound. State v. Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d 205, 378 N. W.2d 691 (1985).
*570Prior to the supreme court's decision resolving the dispute, the lower court decision was presented to the legislature. According to a legislative drafting request, the new legislation would "remove the bar to criminal nonsupport actions caused by a Milwaukee circuit court finding that the present law is unconstitutional." This statement in the drafting request demonstrates that the 120-day period is used to provide a precise demarcation between the felony and the misdemeanor offense, and not to provide for multiple felony counts. This purpose for the 120-day provision was also recognized in Cissell, 127 Wis. 2d at 215, 378 N.W.2d at 695, when the court stated that "[t]he new statute, sec. 940.27, differentiates between sentence exposures on the basis of the length of time that a person fails to provide support."
Nothing else in the legislative record suggests that the current statute created the opportunity of multiple prosecutions. The analysis prepared by the legislative reference bureau states only that:
This bill revises and reorganizes various laws relating to the duty to support dependents. Current law contains various provisions concerning abandonment or neglect of or failure to support a dependent child or spouse. In some cases these provisions appear to overlap by offering the same remedies; in other cases they appear to conflict by, for example, providing different penalties for nearly identical conduct.
The analysis also states that the bill
increasefs] the penalty for failure to pay child support from a fíne of up to $100 or not more than 3 months in jail or both to a fine of up to $10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 9 months or both or, if the person does not pay for at least 120 days, to a fine of up to *571$10,000 or imprisonment not to exceed 2 years or both.
The stated purpose of the legislation is thus to increase penalties and to eliminate possible constitutional problems.
An examination of the nature of the proscribed conduct and the appropriateness of multiple punishments does not resolve the issue of legislative intent. The state argues that the offenses are separated in time in that each 120-day period of failure to provide support was alleged to have occurred in a separate calendar year. However, these allegedly distinct offenses were arbitrarily imposed by the state in its charging. Furthermore, it may be argued that the nature of the necessary intent required for nonsupport is a continuing one and not formed separately in 120-day increments.
I recognize that failure to pay child support is a major problem in our society today. See Dennis v. State, 117 Wis. 2d 249, 268, 344 N.W.2d 128, 137 (1984) (Abra-hamson, J., concurring). Sound public policy may call for the imposition of multiple or graded penalties for aggravated offenders like Grayson. Whether a different statutory scheme would more efficiently address the evils of nonsupport, however, is a decision that must be deliberately made by the legislature. I am not convinced that the present statute contemplated multiple prosecutions. I would reverse the judgment and order of the trial court and remand the matter for sentencing on one felony count of nonsupport.

Section 940.27, Stats. (1987), became effective July 20, 1985. Grayson also maintains that his trial counsel was ineffective because he failed to seek dismissal of nonsupport charges relating to the years 1983,1984 and 1985, periods of time prior to the existence of the statute under which he was charged. My holding that only one nonsupport conviction may stand renders the ineffective assistance of counsel claim moot.

Section 940.27, Stats. (1987), has been renumbered to sec. 948.22, Stats., but the wording of sec. 940.27 with which we are concerned has not been changed.

The question of double jeopardy and legislative intent in claims of multiplicity may be one and the same issue. See Tappa, 127 Wis. 2d at 173 n.3, 378 N.W.2d at 891 n.3 (Abrahamson, J., dissenting) (citing Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983)).