Court Opinion

ID: 9678072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:09:58.648967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:01.674619
License: Public Domain

DUNCAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the summary judgment because the Gon-zalezes failed to raise an issue of fact with respect to one critical element of each of their causes of action — damages.
The majority holds that Temple-Inland’s interrogatory response showing how the Gonzalezes’ $5,868.06 payment was applied “was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact ... as to whether the Gonza-lezes suffered actual damages.” However, the Gonzalezes did not rely on this evidence in responding to the appellees’ no evidence motion for summary judgment. Rather, the Gonzalezes’ response cites only to their affidavits, which, as the majority correctly holds, are too conclusory to raise a genuine issue of fact on the issue of damages.1 Because the only evidence to which the Gonzalezes cited is “no evidence” of actual damages, I would affirm the trial court’s summary judgment based on the Gonzalezes’ failure to raise a genuine issue of material fact on the element of damages.2 I would not consider evidence *627the Gonzalezes did not cite, ie., Temple-Inland’s interrogatory response. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) (“Issues not expressly presented to the trial court by written motion, answer or other response shall not be considered on appeal as grounds for reversal.”); Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) cmt. (“To defeat a motion made under paragraph (i), the respondent is not required to marshal its proof; its response need only point out evidence that raises a fact issue on the challenged elements.”); McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist, 858 S.W.2d 337, 341-42 (Tex.1993); Weiss v. Mechanical Associated Sews. Inc., 989 S.W.2d 120, 123-24 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1999, pet. denied)
I also disagree with the majority’s holding that there is some evidence the appel-lees misrepresented the amount of debt due. The December 1995 statement notifying the Gonzalezes they were past due on their mortgage was sent by Temple-Inland’s predecessor, Lomas Mortgage USA And the January 18, 1996 notice of acceleration stating that the amount necessary to cure the default was $5868.06 was sent by the attorney for Bankers Trust Company, Max Wernick. Neither suggests either Temple-Inland or Curt Spicher was involved in demanding or collecting the $5868.06 payment. Nor does any other record evidence.
Finally, I am perplexed by the majority’s holding to the extent it purports to address all of the grounds for summary judgment. The appellees attacked elements of each of the Gonzalezes’ causes of action under articles 5069-11.02(c), 5069-11.02(h), 5069-11.04(b), and 5069-11.05(g) of the Texas Debt Collection Act, the common law on unreasonable debt collection, and sections 17.46(b)(12) and 17.50(a)(3) of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. The majority analyzes the evidence supporting only two of the attacked elements: (1) whether Temple-Inland misrepresented the amount due and (2) whether the Gonzalezes suffered damages. Yet, the appellees attacked the Gonzalezes’ causes of action under Texas Debt Collection Act articles 11.02(c) and 11.04(b) and DTPA section 17.50(a)(3) on elements distinct from those addressed by the majority. Before the majority can remand all of the Gonzalezes causes of action, it must determine there is some evidence to support each of the elements attacked in the appel-lees’ motion for summary judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i); Weiner v. Wasson 900 S.W.2d 316, 317 n. 2 (Tex.1995).
For these reasons, I must dissent from the majority’s judgment.

. Because it holds the Gonzalezes’ affidavits were too conclusory to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether they sustained mental anguish damages, the majority affirms "[t]he portion of the summary judgment dismissing the Gonzalezes’ claim for mental anguish damages ." However, the Gonzalezes did not assert an independent claim for mental anguish damages. Rather, the Gonzalezes’ asserted mental anguish damages as an element of recovery under their Texas Debt Collection Act, common law unreasonable debt collection, and DTPA causes of action. Therefore, I must disagree with the majority to the extent it attempts to affirm a summary judgment on an element of damages. See Motel 6 G.P., Inc. v. Lopez, 929 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex.1996).

. It should also be noted that the Gonzalezes have failed to point to Temple-Inland’s interrogatory response on appeal as evidence of damages. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(h); Flume v. State Bar of Texas, 974 S.W.2d 55, 62 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1998, no pet.) (”[T]he burden is on appellant to demonstrate the record supports her contentions and to make *627accurate references to the record to support her complaints on appeal.”) (citing Casteel-Diebolt v. Diebolt, 912 S.W.2d 302, 305 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1995, no writ)).