Court Opinion

ID: 9553572
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:32:03.739692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:41.839034
License: Public Domain

EDMONDS, J.
— I concur in the conclusion that section 108 of the Civil Code limits the right to a divorce upon the ground of incurable insanity to those persons whose spouses have been confined to an institution in this state for the statutory period. But I do not agree that the requirement as to proof of ability to support is unconstitutional.
In Escobedo v. State of California, 35 Cal.2d 870, 879 [222 *354P.2d 1], the petitioner'was deprived of his license to operate an automobile because he failed to meet the demand for financial security specified by the Vehicle Code. The statute was challenged upon the ground, among others, that it violates constitutional guarantees because those who are financially . able to carry insurance or post security are favored as against those who cannot do so.
In rejecting this contention, the court held: “Financial responsibility laws such as this do not unconstitutionally discriminate against the poor . . . The fallacy of the argument that the law favored the rich over the poor [as stated in Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles, 212 Cal. 279 [298 P. 481]] ‘lies in the failure to distinguish between equality of opportunity and ability to take advantage of the opportunity which is offered to all. The equality of the Constitution is the equality of right, and not of enjoyment.’ ” It was also said in the Watson case: “So long as the statute does not permit one [with certain financial ability] to exercise the privilege while refusing it to another of like qualifications, under like conditions and circumstances, it is unobjectionable upon this ground.” (212 Cal. at p. 284.)
Although the statute concerning support prevents equality of enjoyment, it is nevertheless constitutional if its provisions bear any reasonable relation to the purpose of the enactment. Otherwise stated, the question is whether the classification is a natural one; is the classification reasonably related to the end in view? (Power Mfg. Co. v. Saunders, 274 U.S. 490 [47 S.Ct. 678, 71 L.Ed. 1165].) When considering this question, the courts should approach with caution. They “. . . have nothing to do with the wisdom, policy, or expediency of the law for the power to make the law carries with it the power to judge of its necessity, expediency, and justice, and,- primarily at least, of the reasonableness of the means and methods used to accomplish the end sought to be obtained.” (Watson v. Division of Motor Vehicles, supra, at pp. 285-286.) A canon of constitutional construction is that a statute is constitutional if there is any reasonable basis for its enactment.
A declared purpose of section 108 as stated in the majority opinion, is “ ‘. . . to provide a means of securing continuing financial, support for the insane spouse.’ ” One means chosen by the Legislature to accomplish this purpose is the requirement laid upon the party seeking a divorce upon the ground of incurable insanity to plead and prove *355(1) that he has the reasonable ability to support the insane spouse for the remainder of the life expectancy, or (2) the insane spouse has sufficient property for that purpose. Certainly, there is a natural and reasonable relation between the means and the end.
Paraphrasing the reasoning of a key sentence in the Escobedo case, “Those divorced by their indigent spouses may be indigent also, and as little able, as the divorcing spouses to bear the cost of their support.” Under such circumstances, the insane spouse, like the person injured in an automobile accident, may become a public charge. If a divorce is granted on the ground of insanity, the plaintiff will be free to remarry and incur the burden of supporting another spouse in addition to the continuing duty to support the insane person who has been cast off. Obviously, the ability to fulfill the duty toward the insane person may be, and under ordinary circumstances will be, decreased by permitting a divorce. However, the wisdom of the enactment is not a question for the courts; they cannot properly be concerned with the policy or expediency of the law.
The statute attacked by Dribin gives to every person married to an insane spouse the right to secure a divorce upon the ground of that insanity under certain specified conditions applicable alike to all such persons. Everyone whose spouse is incurably insane and is confined under the conditions stated by the Legislature has the requisite “equality of opportunity,” the test laid down in the Escobedo case. That Dribin has not the “ability to take advantage of the opportunity which is offered to all” does not make the law unconstitutional. The “equality of right” which Escobedo had, in common with all other operators of motor vehicles, was the right to establish his financial responsibility in some manner authorized by the Vehicle Code. That he did not have the ability to enjoy that right did not, it was held, affect the constitutionality of the provisions of the Vehicle Code, which were upheld. For the same reason, in my opinion, section 108 of the Civil Code is not unconstitutional insofar as it requires proof of financial responsibility.
Traynor, J., and Spence, J., concurred.