Court Opinion

ID: 9839077
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-11 16:08:07.079292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:59.714205
License: Public Domain

J-S11034-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellee            :
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
 JERREL JAYNES                          :
                                        :
                    Appellant           :       No. 1864 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 22, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0001351-2017,
                            CP-46-CR-0006380-2016

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA           :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                    Appellee            :
                                        :
              v.                        :
                                        :
 JERREL JAYNES                          :
                                        :
                    Appellant           :       No. 1865 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered June 22, 2022
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
             Criminal Division at No(s): CP-46-CR-0001351-2017,
                            CP-46-CR-0006380-2016

BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                      FILED SEPTEMBER 11, 2023

     Appellant, Jerrel Jaynes, appeals pro se from the order entered in the

Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, dismissing his first petition filed

under the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), at 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

We affirm.
J-S11034-23

     A prior panel of this Court summarized the underlying facts of this

appeal as follows:

        [Appellant] participated in a sophisticated criminal
        enterprise that was responsible for committing a string of
        burglaries in Montgomery, Chester, and Delaware counties.2
        This large-scale burglary ring targeted affluent homes in
        these counties, stealing high value and easily transportable
        items such as jewelry, designer purses, and cash. The
        police used cellular phone records, surveillance videos, and
        DNA evidence to link [Appellant] and his confederates to
        these burglaries.

           2 The other co-conspirators involved in the criminal
           enterprise were Kebbie Ramseur, Shron Linder, Ralph
           Mayrant, and Wasim Shazad.

        Following his arrest, [Appellant] filed pre-trial motions
        challenging (a) car stops in Whitpain Township,
        Pennsylvania and Cherry Hill, New Jersey; (b) the admission
        of phone records as business records; (c) allegedly
        unreliable expert testimony; and (d) an allegedly defective
        search warrant. The trial court addressed these motions
        during a three-day suppression hearing.

        At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth presented
        evidence of the contested car stops. First, Sergeant Peter
        Benedetti of the Cherry Hill, New Jersey Police Department
        testified he responded to an attempted home invasion and
        thereafter conducted a search of the neighborhood for
        suspicious vehicles.      During the canvass, Sergeant
        Benedetti encountered a parked vehicle—with its lights off—
        in a dead-end area of the neighborhood, a quarter mile from
        where the attempted burglary occurred.

        As he approached the vehicle, Sergeant Benedetti observed
        Ralph Mayrant in the driver’s seat and Shron Linder in the
        front passenger seat. During the encounter, neither of the
        men could explain their presence in the neighborhood, and
        so Sergeant Benedetti asked them to step out of the car.

        He then placed the men in a police cruiser and conducted
        identification and warrant checks. Based on his search,

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       Sergeant Benedetti discovered that Linder had an active
       arrest warrant. As a result, Linder was placed in custody.
       Thereafter, Sergeant Benedetti entered the vehicle and, in
       plain view, noticed several high-end watches in the center
       console and passenger compartments. Officer Benedetti
       confiscated the watches and impounded the car.

       Next, Officer Francis Rippert of the Whitpain Township,
       Pennsylvania Police Department testified he responded to a
       report of three shadowy figures in a housing development
       with flashlights. Following his arrival, he observed a parked
       car in the development with its lights on. Officer Rippert,
       without activating his emergency lights, pulled alongside the
       vehicle.

       Officer Rippert testified that he stopped merely to inquire if
       the occupants were lost.        However, as the encounter
       continued, the driver, Kebbie Ramseur, and his passengers,
       [Appellant] and Linder, exhibited signs of nervousness and
       provided conflicting explanations for being in the
       development. Officer Rippert also noticed that [Appellant]
       and Linder were actively trying to conceal suspicious items
       between their seats.

       This suspicious activity, coupled with Linder’s refusal to
       hand over a bag, led Officer Rippert to believe the occupants
       were involved in criminal activity. He then had [Appellant]
       and the other occupants removed from the car, handcuffed,
       and detained near the vehicle.

       Following [Appellant’s] removal from the car, Officer Rippert
       conducted a warrant check. The encounter eventually
       ended with the arrest of [Appellant] and Ramseur for
       outstanding warrants. Linder, on the other hand, was free
       to leave.

       In addition, the suppression court addressed [Appellant’s]
       claim that the call detail records of his T-Mobile cellular
       phone should not be admitted as business records under the
       hearsay exception. [Appellant] also argued that his cell
       phone records—obtained pursuant to a search warrant
       issued in the state of Delaware—should be suppressed
       because the warrant lacked probable cause. Moreover,
       [Appellant] argued that the Commonwealth’s expert

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          witness, Detective Kerr, was unqualified to testify as to
          [Appellant’s] location during the burglaries via cellphone
          records.

          The court denied [Appellant’s] motions. Immediately after
          the denial of his motions, [Appellant] proceeded to a
          stipulated bench trial in which the Commonwealth
          incorporated the affidavits of probable cause for each
          docket. On Docket 1351-2017, the court found [Appellant]
          guilty of four counts of burglary and one count of robbery
          (inflicts serious bodily injury).3 On Docket 6380-2016,
          [Appellant] was found guilty of one count of attempted
          burglary.4 The court sentenced [Appellant] to an aggregate
          sentence of 10 to 20 years’ imprisonment on both dockets
          in addition to restitution. Thereafter, [Appellant] filed a
          post-sentence motion, which the trial court denied.

              3 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(2) and 3701(a)(1)(i).

              4 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3502(a)(2) and 901(a).

Commonwealth v. Jaynes, Nos. 2435 EDA 2018 and 2436 EDA 2018,

unpublished memorandum at 2-5 (Pa.Super. filed February 6, 2020), appeal

denied, 661 Pa. 9, 235 A.3d 269 (2020) (internal citations omitted). This

Court affirmed the judgment of sentence on February 6, 2020, and our

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on June 1,

2020. See id.

       On May 18, 2021, Appellant filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The

court appointed counsel, who submitted a “no-merit letter”1 and petition to

withdraw on May 3, 2022. The PCRA court gave notice of its intent to dismiss

____________________________________________

1 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 518 Pa. 491, 544 A.2d 927 (1988) and

Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).

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the PCRA petition without a hearing on May 10, 2022, and granted counsel’s

petition to withdraw. Appellant filed a pro se response on June 1, 2022. The

court denied PCRA relief on June 22, 2022. Appellant filed timely notices of

appeal on July 18, 2022 at each underlying docket.2 Both the PCRA court and

Appellant complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

       Appellant now raises four issues for our review:

         I.   Whether the PCRA court abused discretion and/or
              committed reversible error in dismissing [the] PCRA
              Petition as being “without merit” when [Appellant]
              presented the [PCRA] Court “sprint” call detail records
              (CDR) in “Objections” substantiating his claim that both
              Detective Fink and Pitchford knowingly and intentionally
              or with reckless disregard for the truth, included
              fabricated falsified material facts: falsified cellphone call
              detail records (CDR), and cell site location information
              (CSLI) in the warrant affidavit to establish probable
              cause [] violated [Appellant’s rights under] Article I, § 8
              of the Pennsylvania Constitution, [the IV and XIV
              Amendment[s] of the United Stated Constitution] as
              interpreted by Commonwealth v. D’Angelo; Franks v.
              Delaware.

         II. Whether the PCRA court abuse[d] discretion and/or
             committed reversible error in dismissing [Appellant’s]
             PCRA [Petition] by not requiring an evidentiary hearing
             where the warrant authorizing cellular telephone records
             was constitutionally defective because it was issued
             without a showing of probable cause [as it contained
             false and misleading information] which violated Article I
             Section 8 of [the] Pennsylvania Constitution, the IV and
             XIV Amendment of the United States Constitution.

         III. Whether the PCRA Court abused [its] discretion and/or
              committed reversible error in dismissing [Appellant’s]
              PCRA by not requiring an evidentiary hearing where there
____________________________________________

2 This Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte on October 18, 2022.

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            exists “falsified material facts in dispute” pertaining to
            cell phone records [(CDR)] as they relate to [Appellant’s]
            case, to establish “authenticity” of all material evidence
            as it relates to Detective Kerr “false and misleading
            testimony” and the overall impact said evidence had on
            [Appellant’s] court proceedings. The prosecutor knew or
            should had known the calls was non-existent and the
            Sprint and T-Mobile cell phone records [(CDR)] are both
            [irrefutable].

        IV. Whether the PCRA Court abused [its] discretion and/or
            committed reversible error in dismissing [Appellant’s]
            PCRA [Petition] by not requiring an evidentiary hearing
            on the effectiveness of counsel, prior to trial, during trial
            and/or on direct appeal regarding [A]ppellant’s three
            discussed issues: I, II, AND III.

(Appellant’s Brief at vi-vii) (bracketing in original).

      “Our standard of review of the denial of a PCRA petition is limited to

examining whether the evidence of record supports the court’s determination

and whether its decision is free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Beatty,

207 A.3d 957, 960-61 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal denied, 655 Pa. 482, 218

A.3d 850 (2019).      “[W]e review the court’s legal conclusions de novo.”

Commonwealth v. Prater, 256 A.3d 1274, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2021), appeal

denied, ___ Pa. ___, 268 A.3d 386 (2021). “In order to be eligible for PCRA

relief, a defendant must plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence

that his conviction or sentence arose from one or more of the errors listed at

42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2).” Commonwealth v. Jones, 590 Pa. 202, 216, 912

A.2d 268, 276 (2006).

      Preliminarily, we note that the questions presented in the first three

issues on appeal appear to raise claims of trial court error.        However, in

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Appellant’s brief he presents these claims as underlying meritorious claims

forming the basis of both appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness and trial counsel’s

ineffectiveness. (See Appellant’s Brief at 10 (stating: “[Appellant’s] crucial

argument for relief on this essential issue is based on his constitutional right

to effective assistance of counsel prior to, at trial and/or on appeal”); id. at

11 n.1 (stating: “For the purpose of convenience…Appellant will incorporate

all of his claims of trial and appellate counsel’s ineffectiveness into each of his

essential claims, ISSUES I, II, and III”)). Because Appellant has couched his

claims of trial court error in the context of ineffective assistance of counsel,

these claims are cognizable under the PCRA and we will review them as

ineffectiveness claims. See Jones, supra at 218, 912 A.2d at 277 (reviewing

claims despite boilerplate language used to frame them as ones of ineffective

assistance of counsel); 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).

      Appellant’s first two issues are related, and we address them together.

In both issues, Appellant challenges trial counsel’s litigation of his suppression

motion related to the affidavit of probable cause, and appellate counsel’s

failure to preserve the specific claim on appeal. Specifically, he insists that

trial counsel should have more thoroughly litigated Appellant’s claim that the

results of the search warrant should have been suppressed because the

affidavit of probable cause, upon which the warrant was issued, contained

deliberate falsehoods. Appellant insists that the affidavit misstated that he

made a phone call with his co-defendant Ramseur in close proximity to one of

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the burglaries, but he claims that cell phone call detail records do not support

this statement. Furthermore, Appellant contends that the affidavit of probable

cause incorrectly stated that he was involved in fifteen burglaries in

Pennsylvania. Appellant concludes counsel were ineffective in connection with

litigation of his suppression motion, and this Court must grant relief.     We

disagree.

      “Counsel   is   presumed   to   have   rendered   effective   assistance.”

Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 231 A.3d 855, 871 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal

denied, 663 Pa. 418, 242 A.3d 908 (2020).

         [T]o establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a
         defendant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence,
         ineffective assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances
         of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining
         process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence
         could have taken place. The burden is on the defendant to
         prove all three of the following prongs: (1) the underlying
         claim is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no
         reasonable strategic basis for his or her action or inaction;
         and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel, there is
         a reasonable probability that the outcome of the
         proceedings would have been different.

Commonwealth v. Sandusky, 203 A.3d 1033, 1043 (Pa.Super. 2019),

appeal denied, 654 Pa. 568, 216 A.3d 1029 (2019) (internal citations and

quotation marks omitted).    The failure to satisfy any prong of the test for

ineffectiveness will cause the claim to fail. Commonwealth v. Chmiel, 612

Pa. 333, 30 A.3d 1111 (2011).

      “The threshold inquiry in ineffectiveness claims is whether the

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis

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for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit[.]” Commonwealth

v. Smith, 167 A.3d 782, 788 (Pa.Super. 2017), appeal denied, 645 Pa. 175,

179 A.3d 6 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Pierce, 537 Pa. 514, 524,

645 A.2d 189, 194 (1994)). “Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failing

to pursue a baseless or meritless claim.” Commonwealth v. Poplawski,

852 A.2d 323, 327 (Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting Commonwealth v. Geathers,

847 A.2d 730, 733 (Pa.Super. 2004)).

      “Once this threshold is met we apply the ‘reasonable basis’ test to

determine whether counsel’s chosen course was designed to effectuate his

client’s interests.”   Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1012

(Pa.Super. 2016) (quoting Pierce, supra at 524, 645 A.2d at 194-95).

         The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable
         basis for his action or inaction is whether no competent
         counsel would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the
         alternative, not chosen, offered a significantly greater
         potential chance of success. Counsel’s decisions will be
         considered reasonable if they effectuated his client’s
         interests.   We do not employ a hindsight analysis in
         comparing trial counsel’s actions with other efforts he may
         have taken.

Commonwealth v. King, 259 A.3d 511, 520 (Pa.Super. 2021) (quoting

Sandusky, supra at 1043-44).

      “To demonstrate prejudice, the petitioner must show that there is a

reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result

of the proceedings would have been different. [A] reasonable probability is a

probability that is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the

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proceeding.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 624 Pa. 4, 33-34, 84 A.3d 294, 312

(2014) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).         “[A] criminal

defendant alleging prejudice must show that counsel’s errors were so serious

as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”

Hopkins, supra at 876 (quoting Commonwealth v. Chambers, 570 Pa. 3,

22, 807 A.2d 872, 883 (2002)).

      Regarding suppression motions:

         Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to the
         denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining
         whether the suppression court’s factual findings are
         supported by the record and whether the legal conclusions
         drawn from those facts are correct.            Because the
         Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we
         may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and
         so much of the evidence for the defense as remains
         uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
         whole. Where the suppression court’s factual findings are
         supported by the record, we are bound by these findings
         and may reverse only if the court’s legal conclusions are
         erroneous. Where, as here, the appeal of the determination
         of the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error,
         the suppression court’s legal conclusions are not binding on
         an appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the
         suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.
         Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts below are subject
         to our plenary review.

Commonwealth v. Baker, 24 A.3d 1006, 1015 (Pa.Super. 2011), aff’d, 621

Pa. 401, 78 A.3d 1044 (2013) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted).

         In order to secure a valid search warrant, an affiant must
         provide a magistrate with information sufficient to persuade
         a reasonable person that there is probable cause for a
         search. The information must give the magistrate the

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         opportunity to know and weigh the facts and to determine
         objectively whether there is a need to invade a person’s
         privacy to enforce the law.

Id. at 1017 (citations omitted).    Furthermore, “misstatements of fact will

invalidate a search warrant and require suppression of the fruits of the search

only if the misstatements of fact are deliberate and material.”            Id.

(emphasis in original).    “The question of whether a misstatement was

deliberately made is to be answered by the lower court.” Id. A fact is material

if without it, probable cause to search would not exist. Id. at 1018.

      Instantly, the PCRA court found that Appellant’s underlying claim was

meritless. The court explained:

         [Appellant’s] claim that Detectives Fink and Pitchford made
         material misrepresentations in the affidavit of probable
         cause is not substantiated by any facts. His PCRA petition
         alleges that Detectives Fink and Pitchford “made up” a
         number of paragraphs in the affidavit of probable cause, but
         in support of this claim, his petition only generally cites to
         these paragraphs and exhibits that he fails to attach.
         [Appellant] offers no specific evidence or proposed
         witnesses establishing that either detective made a material
         misstatement, or even if a material misstatement was
         made, that it was made deliberately or knowingly as
         required to invalidate a search warrant….

(PCRA Court Opinion, filed 9/19/22, at 6). The court further explained that

ultimately, the search warrant was supported by probable cause:

         In this case, [Appellant] was charged with corrupt
         organizations, conspiracy, and multiple burglaries. It was
         abundantly clear that members of this corrupt organization
         relied heavily on the use of cell phones to carry out criminal
         activity and communicate with each other in “casing” homes
         before burglaries, as well as to communicate during and
         after burglaries.     The affidavit explicitly details the

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         investigation of police and how each member of the
         conspiracy was identified.         [Appellant] was tied to
         individuals who clearly committed burglaries that shared
         similarities to later burglaries. Those individuals were then
         found at the scene of an attempted burglary, in possession
         of stolen watches from a different burglary, in [Appellant’s]
         car. Based on the cell phone records of the co-conspirators
         already in possession of the police, [Appellant] had been in
         constant contact with his co-conspirators during at least one
         other known burglary.

         Under the totality of the circumstances test, there was a
         “fair probability” that evidence of criminal activity
         associated with a crime would be recovered from the phone
         records of [Appellant]. The extensive history set forth in
         the affidavit established the existence of a broad ranging
         conspiracy and corrupt organization, the use of cell phones
         in the commission of criminal activity, and clear evidence
         that co-defendants listed in the affidavit did not work alone.
         Therefore, the conclusion that there was in fact probable
         cause to support that contention was well supported by the
         affidavit, and there was no reason to suppress the evidence
         obtained pursuant to the warrant. Thus, [Appellant’s] claim
         that the warrant authorizing phone records lacked probable
         cause is meritless.

(Id. at 8).

      Upon review, we agree with the PCRA court that there is no merit to

Appellant’s underlying suppression claim. Appellant has not met his burden

to prove that detectives deliberately made a misstatement in the affidavit of

probable cause. See Baker, supra. Therefore, Appellant cannot establish

that the search warrant was invalid because of the alleged material

misrepresentations.    See id.     Accordingly, because Appellant has not

established that his underlying claim has merit, we conclude that he is not

entitled to relief on his claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate

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counsel. See Smith, supra; Poplawski, supra. Appellant is not entitled

relief on either of his first two claims.

       In his third claim of ineffective assistance, Appellant argues that trial

counsel failed to object to falsified testimony given by Detective Kerr during

both the preliminary and suppression hearings. Specifically, Appellant claims

that Detective Kerr testified that Appellant called co-defendant Ramseur near

the time of one of the burglaries while in close proximity to where the burglary

occurred. Appellant insists that this representation was false based on his

review of co-defendant Ramseur’s Sprint call detail records and Appellant’s T-

Mobile call detail records. (Appellant’s Brief at 18-19). Appellant submits that

this claim differs from that which he raised in his direct appeal, which was that

the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine to preclude Detective Kerr’s

testimony as an expert witness.3               Appellant concludes counsel rendered

ineffective assistance, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

       The PCRA court discussed the underlying merits of Appellant’s claim

concerning Detective Kerr’s false testimony as follows:

          …[Appellant’s] argument that Detective Kerr provided “false
          and misleading” testimony is unpersuasive.             Here,
          [Appellant] alleges that Detective Kerr committed perjury,
          quoting several lines of transcript testimony from the
          preliminary hearing where Detective Kerr speaks to cell
          phone and cell tower location data placing [Appellant]
          “approximately one and one half to two miles from that
          location” and “not at that cell tower near that property” on
____________________________________________

3 We agree with Appellant that he did not previously litigate on direct appeal

a challenge to Detective Kerr’s allegedly false testimony.

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          a handful of dates in question. See Amended PCRA Petition,
          [at] 10-12. Nowhere does [Appellant] point to any evidence
          to support his assertion that this testimony constituted
          perjury, instead cursorily concluding that “the entire line of
          [questioning] along with [its] answers” is “false and
          misleading” for discussing “non-existent” phone calls.
          [Appellant] fails to elaborate on these conclusory
          statements, leaving the [PCRA c]ourt to speculate as to the
          exact nature of this alleged error. The [PCRA c]ourt can
          only assume [Appellant] is revisiting a previously litigated
          issue from his direct appeal, where he contended that cell
          phone pings placing him several miles from the burglary
          location made the verdict against the weight of the
          evidence. As [the trial c]ourt explained in its [o]pinion, cell
          phone records placing [Appellant] at locations that do not
          precisely match the burglary location at the time of the
          crime do not make it less likely that he was involved in the
          burglary or otherwise negate the sufficiency and weight of
          the evidence against him, where he is liable as an
          accomplice with his co-conspirators.        See Trial Court
          Opinion, 11/6/18, at 30-37. [Appellant] provides no basis
          in fact to substantiate claims that Detective Kerr committed
          perjury[.]

(PCRA Court Opinion at 9-10).

       The record supports the PCRA court’s analysis. Appellant makes only

conclusory statements that Detective Kerr gave false testimony and provides

no relevant evidence to support these assertions. On this record, we discern

no error in the court’s determination that Appellant failed to demonstrate

arguable merit on this claim such that he could succeed on his ineffectiveness

claim. See Poplawski, supra.4

____________________________________________

4 To the extent Appellant also argues appellate counsel was ineffective for
failing to litigate this issue on direct appeal, that claim also fails as counsel
cannot be ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim. See id.

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      In his fourth and final issue, Appellant alleges that the PCRA court erred

when it dismissed his PCRA petition without a hearing. Appellant claims that

evidence of the call detail records required an evidentiary hearing to show that

counsel had no reasonable basis for not using this allegedly exculpatory

evidence.   Appellant concludes the court erred by denying relief without a

hearing, and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

      “[A] petitioner is not entitled to a PCRA hearing as a matter of right; the

PCRA court can decline to hold a hearing if there is no genuine issue

concerning any material fact, the petitioner is not entitled to relief, and no

purpose would be served by any further proceedings.” Commonwealth v.

Hill, 242 A.3d 438 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 256 A.3d

422 (2021) (citing Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335 (Pa.Super. 2012)).

“With respect to the PCRA court’s decision to deny a request for an evidentiary

hearing, or to hold a limited evidentiary hearing, such a decision is within the

discretion of the PCRA court and will not be overturned absent an abuse of

discretion.” Commonwealth v. Mason, 634 Pa. 359, 387, 130 A.3d 601,

617 (2015). This Court has further explained that:

         It is well settled that [t]here is no absolute right to an
         evidentiary hearing on a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA
         court can determine from the record that no genuine issues
         of material fact exist, then a hearing is not necessary. [T]o
         obtain reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a
         petition without a hearing, an appellant must show that he
         raised a genuine issue of fact which, if resolved in his favor,
         would have entitled him to relief, or that the court otherwise
         abused its discretion in denying a hearing.

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Commonwealth v. Maddrey, 205 A.3d 323, 328 (Pa.Super. 2019) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted).

      Here, Appellant has not established any genuine issue of fact exists that

would entitle him to relief. As such, we cannot conclude that the PCRA court’s

denial of an evidentiary hearing was an abuse of discretion.          See id.

Accordingly, we affirm.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/11/2023

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