Court Opinion

ID: 9739410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:14:30.566225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:12.059300
License: Public Domain

SUNDBY, J.
(dissenting). Fortuitously, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has very recently cut the Gordian knot which has tied the hands of trial courts in resolving custody and physical placement disputes betweén biological parents and persons who have established a parent-relationship with a child. See In re H.S.H.-K., 193 Wis. 2d 649, 533 N.W.2d 419 (1995). The court decided that in this same-sex marriage, the biological mother had "exercised her constitutional rights to include another adult to act as a parent." Id. at 694, 533 N.W.2d at 435. The court concluded that when the biological parent has permitted another adult to establish a parent-like relationship with his or her child, the court may exercise its equitable powers to protect the child's best interest by preserving the child's relationship with that adult.
This exercise of equitable power protects parental autonomy and constitutional rights by requiring that the parent-like relationship develop only with the consent and assistance of the biological or adoptive parent. It also protects a child's best interest by preserving the child's relationship with an adult who has been like a parent.
Id. at 696, 533 N.W.2d at 436.
*28Here, when the biological mother, Jean R., petitioned the court to appoint Howard M. guardian of her child, Jenae K.S., she exercised her constitutional right to include Howard to act as Jenae's parent. Barstad v. Frazier, 118 Wis. 2d 549, 348 N.W.2d 479 (1984), upon which the majority relies, does not apply where the parent-like relationship between a third party and the child developed with the consent and assistance of the biological parent. In this case, as in H.S.H.-K., the biological mother exercised her constitutional right to include another adult to act as a parent when she petitioned the circuit court to appoint Howard guardian of Jenae.
In her petition to establish a guardianship over Jenae, Jean stated that Jenae was in need of a guardian for the following reasons: "The ward is a minor. I desire for the benefit of my child that my child be permitted to reside at this time with Howard [M.] ... and it is necessary for him to be appointed legal guardian so he can properly care for my child at this time." In its order appointing Howard as Jenae's guardian, entered September 12,1989, the court found that Jenae was "a proper subject for guardianship" and Howard was "a competent and suitable person" to be appointed guardian. of the person and estate of Jenae. The mother does not challenge these findings.
On September 14, 1992, the mother filed a petition for termination of Howard's guardianship of Jenae pursuant to § 880.08(4), Stats., which provides: "Notice of a rehearing to determine if a ward is a proper subject to continue under guardianship shall be given as required for the appointment of a guardian." The legislature's use of the word "rehearing" is unusual if the legislature intended to include in its meaning a proceeding to terminate a guardianship. "Rehearing" ordinarily refers *29to "a second or new hearing ... by the same tribunal . . . ." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1914 (1976). Black defines "rehearing" as the "[s]econd consideration of cause for [the] purpose of calling to court's or administrative board's attention any error, omission, or oversight in first consideration." Black's Law Dictionary 1287 (6th ed. 1990).
A "rehearing" usually follows close upon a decision entered after a hearing. A person who seeks a rehearing generally considers that the tribunal has reached the wrong result and seeks to correct the order or action of the tribunal. See § 227.49, Stats. ("Any person aggrieved by a final order may, within 20 days after service of the order, file a written petition for rehearing which shall specify in detail the grounds for the relief sought and supporting authorities."). The intention of the legislature in enacting § 880.08(4), Stats., is unclear; however, because there is no other procedure in ch. 880, Stats., to terminate a guardianship, it must have intended that the court could act under § 880.08(4). A guardian may be removed under § 880.16(1) and (2), STATS., without terminating the guardianship, but only for cause or by a minor ward who has reached the age of fourteen years. Jenae is now eleven years old. She will shortly be able to make her own decision as to whom she wishes as her guardian or whether she wishes the guardianship ended. Section 880.26, Stats., prescribes when a guardianship of the person shall terminate but does not include the circumstance where an interested person believes that the guardianship is no longer necessary and should be terminated. A guardian may be removed for the reasons stated in § 880.251, Stats., none of which apply here.
*30I conclude that the mother's attempt to terminate the guardianship of her daughter may be considered by the court under § 880.08(4), Stats. However, the circuit court must determine whether Jenae is "a proper subject" to continue under guardianship. A rehearing does not include a redetermination as to whether the guardian is "a proper guardian." See § 880.09, Stats. Thus, the circuit court is not required to substitute for the guardian a parent who is "suitable and willing" to act as the child's guardian.
Section 880.09(2), Stats., provides in part: "If one or both of the parents of a minor . . . are suitable and willing, the court shall appoint one or both of them as guardian unless the proposed ward objects." Jenae testified she did not want to live with her mother in Crandon, and that if she had to go there to live, she would run away. She also testified that she loved her "father" very much and wanted to stay with him. "[T]here is no way I am going to go live with her. I am too scared of her after she spanked me black and blue and left me in the bedroom just because I didn't eat." According to the report of Gina Koeppl, Ph.D., who evaluated Jenae, Jenae stated that she was happy in both settings and finds it hard to decide with whom she wishes to live. Dr. Koeppl reported that "Dad" put pressure on Jenae to say that she wished to live with him. At the beginning of the hearing on August 4, 1993, Jenae handed the judge a note which read: "About my dad[:] My dad is a kind loving man. He is not [cruel] like my mom. My dad never spank me. We always ta[l]k things out. I love him and I'll never leave him."
Child Protective Services filed a home study with the court. The worker reported that Jean had given birth to two other non-marital children that she gave up for adoption. In March 1988, the mother moved to *31Crandon to live with William R. Jenae lived with them at this time. However, in May 1988, Jenae stated that she wanted to go back to live with Howard and Rita M. The mother felt she needed to explore her relationship with William R. so she encouraged Jenae's decision.
The mother married William October 28, 1989. The mother and William have been involved in Alcoholics Anonymous for eight years. William wishes to adopt Jenae. The mother informed the psychologist that Jenae was excited about having "two grandmas" and "two grandpas." The worker concluded that the mother and William R. "appear to be loving and concerned 'parents.'"
Psychiatric Associates of Beaver Dam made a clinical examination of Jenae on November 10, 1992. The social worker found that Jenae would not benefit from a change of physical custody at this time. However, Jenae's mood was positive but with some mixed feelings respecting her mother's attempt to seek custody. She expressed her concerns "protective of her father and home." The worker concluded:
It would seem more constructive for Jenae to continue to see her mother on a regular basis increasing the length of visits if all goes well. Jenae indicated that she would like to see her mother more often.
The social worker supported a slow reintegration process consistent with Jenae's protective feelings as to her "dad." Dr. Koeppl supported Jenae's return to her mother as soon as deemed feasible by the therapist and the guardian ad litem. She agreed with Dr. Sionag Black's recommendation that Jenae be gradually reunified with her mother.
*32The trial court made no determination as to the credibility of the witnesses and, therefore, did not determine Jenae's wishes. The court felt bound to apply the Barstad v. Frazier standard. The court found that the mother was a fit parent and was entitled to custody of Jenae in the absence of compelling reasons for continuing the guardianship. The court, therefore, ordered that Jenae be informed immediately that the court had terminated the guardianship so that Jenae could make an adjustment to the transfer of custody to her mother. Because the standard the trial court should have applied was Jenae's best interest, the trial court erred in terminating the guardianship and awarding custody to Jenae's mother.
H.S.H.-K. confirms the opinion I expressed in my dissent to the certification of this case to the supreme court. I call particular attention to my discussion of In re Guardianship of Schmidt, 71 Wis. 2d 317, 237 N.W.2d 919 (1976). In Schmidt, the court first considered what standard governed its decision to choose as guardian the deceased mother's sister-in-law or the maternal grandparents. The court held:
The trial court aptly noted that the hearing was directed to a choice of a guardian; it was not a divorce custody or adoption hearing. Sec. 880.09, Stats., provides that in selecting a guardian:
The court shall consider nominations made by any interested person and, in its discretion, shall appoint a proper guardian, having due regard for the following:
*33The relevant factors include a preference for a minor's parent to be the guardian if "suitable and willing,"....
Both parties appear to accept the standard of "the best interest of the child" as controlling here. We think the conclusion is inescapable that the best interests test be followed. Nothing in the guardianship section indicates otherwise, although preference is given to certain nominations. This test, however, does not consist of concentration solely on the objective factors to the exclusion of the rights, legal or moral, of parents. See sec. 48.01(3), Stats., cited in Adoption of Randolph (1975), 68 Wis. 2d 64, 77, 227 N.W.2d 634. It must be considered in the balance, as the child's best interest may direct that a relationship be allowed between the child and the natural parent or other close relative that is known to him.
Id. at 327-28, 237 N.W.2d at 924 (emphasis added).
Where the natural parent voluntarily petitions to name a guardian for his or her child, the custody change from the parent to a third party is not only consented to but advocated by the parent. That parent cannot expect that his or her constitutionally protected parental rights may be enforced with the same vigor as in the case of a dispute between the natural parent and a third party who seeks to usurp the parent's rights. Those rights, however, must be balanced in determining the child's best interest. Schmidt, 71 Wis. 2d at 328, 237 N.W.2d at 924-25.
H.S.H.-K. clarifies that one of a biological parent's constitutionally protected rights is the right to "allow another adult to develop a parent-like relationship with the child." 193 Wis. 2d at 695 n.40, 533 N.W.2d at 436. The court stated that "on the basis of the record before us, a circuit court could find that Knott [the *34biological parent] had consented to and fostered Holtzman's formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with the child, thereby sharing her parental rights." Id. (emphasis added).
We must reverse the judgment of the trial court. For the sake of all the parties, but especially Jenae's, we should conclude as a matter of law that Jenae's best interests would not be served by terminating the guardianship. A remand to the trial court will keep Jenae's status unsettled. We have previously noted that "[a] child's time is not an adult's time." In re R.H., 147 Wis. 2d 22, 37, 433 N.W.2d 16, 22 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting J.R. Milligan & E. Loth, Permanency Planning for Children (A New Ballgame in Appellate Courts), 4 Appellate Court Administration Rev. 37, 38 (1982-83)), aff'd, 150 Wis. 2d 432, 441 N.W.2d 233 (1989). "[To] avoid irreparable psychological injury, placement, whenever in dispute, must be treated as the emergency that it is for the child." Id. (quoting J. Goldstein et al., Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 43 (1973)).
When the mother petitioned the circuit court to appoint Howard guardian of Jenae, she represented to the court that she sought the guardianship. I believe we can conclude as a matter of law that the mother has not shown that Jenae is not "a proper subject" to continue under guardianship; nor has she shown that Howard is not "a proper guardian" for Jenae. The mother seeks to terminate the guardianship simply because she now feels strong enough to re-establish a parental relationship with her daughter. I agree with Psychiatric Associates that that process should be slow and should consider Jenae's wish to protect Howard.
The equitable power which the H.S.H.-K. court has held a trial court may exercise to protect parental *35autonomy and the constitutional rights of biological parents permits the trial court to continue Howard's guardianship upon conditions which advance Jenae's best interests.
As long as the guardianship continues, Howard will have "care, custody and control" of Jenae. See § 880.01(3), Stats. The trial court is free, however, to exercise its equitable powers to ensure that Jenae's mother will have ample opportunity to develop her relationship with Jenae. Howard is seventy-five and may shortly welcome the mother's help in raising Jenae.
For some time, the legislature and the courts pursued policies which tended to limit the child's family. Perhaps that trend can now be reversed if the equitable powers announced in H.S.H.-K. are exercised by trial courts to provide the child with as extended a family as may be consistent with the child's best interest. Biological parents and persons having a parent-like relationship with a child should cooperate so that the child is not forced to make "Sophie's choice."