Court Opinion

ID: 9493756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:18:33.243999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:01.389848
License: Public Domain

KING, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Because of Spencer’s detrimental reliance on the fourteen-day extension granted by the district court’s Order of February 3, 1998, he is entitled to invoke the “unique circumstances” exception to the jurisdictional bar his untimely claim would otherwise present. I would therefore vacate the dismissal of Spencer’s petition, and I would remand his case for further consideration.
I.
The majority correctly concludes that the district court erroneously tolled the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations to account for delays inherent in the delivery of the mail. Ante, at 630. Indeed, an ordinary delay in mail delivery cannot be regarded as a “circumstance! ] external to [a] party’s own conduct” within the meaning of equitable tolling. Ante, at 629. In my view, however, the inquiry should not end there.
A.
Spencer’s state petition was filed in time to toll the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations — exactly one day before it expired. Later recognizing that slow mail delivery might cause the anticipated federal petition to be untimely, Spencer sought and received a fourteen-day extension from the district court (providing him, after exhaustion of his state post-conviction remedies, a putative total of fifteen days within which to file his federal petition). Spencer reasonably relied on the extension Order — and that reliance was fatal. My friend Judge Luttig, in considering Spencer’s habitual dilatoriness, has concluded that Spencer does not have “a special call on equity.” Ante, at 631. I respectfully disagree. Had the extension Order not been granted, Spencer could otherwise have filed his petition in a timely manner. His detrimental reliance on the extension Order therefore presents a compelling case for the exercise of our jurisdiction under the “unique circumstances” doctrine.
B.
The Supreme Court, for over thirty-five years, has recognized our power to equitably alter jurisdictional deadlines when a litigant has detrimentally relied on a court order or statement. In Thompson v. INS, 375 U.S. 384, 84 S.Ct. 397, 11 L.Ed.2d 404 (1964) (per curiam), the petitioner filed a naturalization petition with the district court, which was denied on April 18, 1962. Id. at 384, 84 S.Ct. 397. Twelve days later (April 30), the petitioner filed a motion to amend, along with a motion for a new trial. Those motions were, under the applicable rules, two days late. The government did not object, however, and the court specifically held the post-trial motions to be time*632ly. The motions were then denied on October 16, 1962, and a notice of appeal was filed on December 6, 1962. The appeal was therefore filed within sixty days from the denial of the post-trial motions, but not within sixty days from the April 18 denial of the naturalization petition. Id. at 385, 84 S.Ct. 397.
The Supreme Court acknowledged that, under a literal application of the rules, Thompson’s appeal was untimely because the tardy post-trial motions were ineffective to toll the sixty-day period for filing the appeal. The Court held, however, that since the petitioner “filed the appeal within the assumedly new deadline but beyond the old deadline .... ‘unique circumstances’” mandated that the appeal be deemed timely. Id. at 387, 84 S.Ct. 397.
Given his detrimental reliance on the extension Order, Spencer presents an equally compelling case of “unique circumstances.” Indeed, this exception has been used widely by appellate courts to hear otherwise untimely appeals. Wolfsohn v. Hankin, 376 U.S. 203, 84 S.Ct. 699, 11 L.Ed.2d 636 (1964) (per curiam); Hollins v. Department of Corrections, 191 F.3d 1324, 1326-28 (11th Cir.1999) (habeas counsel’s reliance on court’s computerized docket information sheet constituted unique circumstance when final judgment was never shown on the system); Estle v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 476, 478 (8th Cir.1992) (finding notice of appeal timely because the plaintiff was “lulled into inactivity” by district court’s erroneously granted extension) (quoting Willis v. Newsome, 747 F.2d 605, 606 (11th Cir.1984)); Fairley v. Jones, 824 F.2d 440, 442-43 (5th Cir.1987) (detrimental reliance on magistrate’s unauthorized extension of time for filing notice of appeal constituted “unique circumstances justifying our exercise of jurisdiction”); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 603 F.2d 438 (3d Cir.1979) (applying unique circumstances doctrine to jurisdictional deadline for filing motion to reduce prior sentence). See also Myers v. Stephenson, 748 F.2d 202, 205 (4th Cir.1984) (dicta) (“To the extent Myers’ failure to request an extension is attributable to the district court’s [erroneous] assurance, he may be entitled to appellate consideration of his claims in spite of his failure to comply fully with [the applicable time limits].”).
While the validity of the unique circumstances doctrine has been sometimes called into doubt, its vitality continues to be recognized. United States v. Heller, 957 F.2d 26, 28-29 (1st Cir.1992) (noting that many courts have questioned the doctrine, but that “[t]he Supreme Court [ ] passed up an opportunity to repudiate it” and “courts of appeals generally have continued to assume that the doctrine remains viable.”); In re Mouradick, 13 F.3d 326, 329 n. 5 (9th Cir.1994). See also Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535, 103 S.Ct. 1343, 75 L.Ed.2d 260 (1983) (per curiam) (“Needless to say, only this Court may overrule one of its precedents. Until that occurs, [Supreme Court precedent] is the law.”).
Furthermore, proscriptions properly placed on the unique circumstances doctrine have no application here. In this situation, Spencer received specific assurance from the extension Order, unchallenged by the State of North Carolina, that the statute would be tolled for fourteen additional days. Cf. Moore v. South Carolina Labor Bd., 100 F.3d 162, 164 (D.C.Cir.1996) (doctrine limited to “written court orders or oral rulings made in the course of a hearing”); Hope v. United States, 43 F.3d 1140, 1143-44 (7th Cir.1994); Heller, 957 F.2d at 30-31. Nor was Spencer’s reliance on the extension Order unreasonable. Cf. Feinstein v. Moses, 951 F.2d 16, 19-20 (1st Cir.1991); Pinion v. Dow Chemical, U.S.A., 928 F.2d 1522, 1532 (11th Cir.1991); Kraus v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 899 F.2d 1360, 1365-66 (3d Cir.1990). Moreover, nothing in AEDPA expressly forbade the district court from granting the extension. Cf. Weitz v. Lovelace Health System, Inc., 214 F.3d 1175, 1178-80 (10th Cir.2000) (“unique circumstances” did not apply because “[u]nlike a situation where some extension of time *633was permissible, here the rules specifically and directly prohibit courts from granting any extensions”).*
Spencer’s reliance on an explicit and valid court order should not render his habe-as corpus petition unreviewable. In the unusual situation presented here, I believe Spencer to be entitled to consideration of his petition. I respectfully dissent.

 Indeed, we have acknowledged that equitable tolling is available in some situations. Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 329-330 (4th Cir.2000). It is not until today that we have specifically held that district courts are without power to grant an equitable extension under the facts presented here. Thus, Spencer’s reliance on the extension Order would not present the problems the Tenth Circuit found determinative in Weitz.