Court Opinion

ID: 9410302
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-20 19:04:01.327537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:56.479962
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/20/23 P. v. Jones CA2/4

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                       DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                      B320040

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. YA037935)
           v.

 MARCUS JONES,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Laura C. Ellison, Judge. Affirmed.
      Tracy Dressner, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and John Yang, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       Appellant Marcus Jones and his cousin, Melvin Jones
(Melvin), robbed a small store when they were teenagers. During
the robbery, the owner of the store was shot and killed.
Appellant and Melvin were both convicted of robbery and
murder.
       Appellant subsequently filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6 (former section 1170.95),
which the trial court denied after an evidentiary hearing.1
Appellant contends the trial court’s findings that he was a major
participant in the crime and acted with reckless indifference to
human life are not supported by substantial evidence. We
disagree and affirm.
                    FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       We draw the facts below from the evidence admitted at
appellant’s section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3) evidentiary hearing
pursuant to the parties’ stipulation. That evidence consisted of:
(1) a transcript of percipient witness Antonio Ochoa’s trial
testimony; (2) an investigatory police report from the Inglewood
Police Department (police report); (3) a transcript of a
surreptitiously recorded conversation between appellant and
Melvin following their arrest shortly after the crime; (4) a
psychiatric report prepared in 1996 to determine appellant’s
fitness for juvenile court treatment (psychiatric report); (5) a
transcript of appellant’s trial testimony; (6) a probation report
prepared when appellant was sentenced; (7) the Supreme Court’s

1      Effective June 30, 2022, the Legislature renumbered
section 1170.95 to section 1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.)
There were no substantive changes to the statute. We hereafter
refer to the statute as section 1172.6. All further statutory
references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                2
opinion in People v. Superior Court (Jones) (1998) 18 Cal.4th 667;
and (8) the opinion a different panel of this court issued in
appellant’s direct appeal, People v. Jones (Sept. 25, 2001,
B143098) [nonpub. opn.].2
I.    Ochoa’s Trial Testimony
      Around 7:45 p.m. on May 23, 1996, Ochoa was sweeping
outside his workplace, the Park Avenue Market in Inglewood.
The store’s owner, Won Hee Lee, was seated behind the counter
inside the store, near the two cash registers. There was only one
way into and out of the small store, and only one way to get
behind the counter.
      Ochoa saw two black males who appeared to be about 16 or
17 years old, later identified as appellant and Melvin, emerge
from a “small alcove” and walk toward the store. One was
wearing dark blue pants, and the other was wearing green pants.
As they neared Ochoa, they covered their faces with beanies or
masks. Ochoa said the person in the green pants drew a revolver
from his waistband, and then both individuals “backed up and
went inside the store.” Ochoa “had a feeling” that they “were
robbing the store.”
      While still outside but only about four or five feet from the
person with the gun, Ochoa looked into the store and saw that
the person with the gun “had it on Mr. Lee, facing Mr. Lee,” with
an outstretched arm. Ochoa lost sight of the person in the blue
pants when he went around a freezer. Ochoa heard one of them
say, “Okay. This is –.” As he turned to another person outside
and told them to call the police, Ochoa heard a gunshot. About

2     The witness testimony and psychiatric report were the only
pieces of this evidence also admitted at appellant’s trial.

                                 3
30 seconds later, Ochoa saw the two males walk out of the store,
cross the street, then start running away together.
      Ochoa saw a police officer nearby and yelled that his boss
had been shot. He then got into his car and followed appellant
and Melvin as they fled. After he saw them jump a fence
surrounding an elementary school, Ochoa drove around the
school and saw them walking into “some apartments.” By that
time the police had arrived, and Ochoa drove back to the store,
where he spoke to additional police officers and saw money lying
in the doorway of the store. The police later drove Ochoa back to
the apartments, where he identified appellant and Melvin as the
people he had seen in the store. At trial, he identified appellant
as the person who did not have the gun.
II.   Police Report
      The police report contains the statements of several
percipient witnesses. Three witnesses reported seeing two Black
male teenagers near the store before the incident. Two of the
witnesses recognized Melvin and said he was wearing black
pants; one said she knew him to be a gang member. Another
witness said one of the males was wearing black, and the other,
who wore green, was “doing something near his waistband.” All
three witnesses saw the same teens running away from the store
a short time later. A fourth witness who lived next to the store
heard a gunshot and then saw two Black males running away
from the store. He said one of them was wearing green pants and
carrying a gun. All four witnesses identified appellant and
Melvin as the people they had seen during a field show-up.
      The police report also contains statements from officers.
Around the time of the shooting, police officers Goodro and
Vaselenko were near the store making an unrelated arrest.

                                4
Goodro heard a gunshot and turned to see two suspects run out of
the Park Avenue Market. One of them was holding a revolver.
Goodro heard witnesses yelling that someone had been shot.
Goodro chased the suspects on foot, and Vaselenko pursued them
in the officers’ vehicle. Vaselenko saw the suspects run down a
driveway toward an apartment building; they were detained at
the top of the building’s staircase.
       Investigating officer and report author Harkins responded
to the Park Avenue Market around 10:00 p.m. on May 23, 1996.
Harkins “observed an unknown amount of U.S. paper currency on
the floor, located west of the store’s entrance/exit.” Officer Flores,
who was one of the first to arrive on the scene and had located
five witnesses, told Harkins that two suspects had entered the
store that evening, and one of them was armed with a revolver.
Flores said the armed suspect shot Lee in the head, and “[t]he
suspect’s [sic] then removed paper currency from the cash
register and left the store running n/b on Park Ave.” Flores also
reported that the suspects dropped or discarded “numerous pieces
of evidence” between the store and the location where they were
detained. Other officers showed Harkins a dollar bill and green
button on the sidewalk, a green scarf and a “blue rubber mask-
like object” in a nearby front yard, a gray sweatshirt by the
school, and a revolver lying in the front yard of the home next to
the apartments where the suspects were apprehended.
       When he was arrested, appellant was wearing a gray t-
shirt and green sweatpants. Melvin was wearing a white t-shirt
and black pants. The booking officer recovered $31 in cash from
appellant’s pants pockets: two $5 bills from the left front pocket,
and two $10 bills and one $1 bill from the right front pocket.

                                  5
When he was asked how much money he had, appellant told the
officer he “should have ten dollars.”
       After he was advised of his rights under Miranda v.
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436, appellant told officers that he and
Melvin went to Melvin’s apartment after school that day. Around
5:00 p.m., he and Melvin went to a liquor store and got someone
to buy them a bottle of vodka, which they shared. They then
walked around the area of the Park Avenue Market, which
Melvin had been talking about robbing since that morning,
“because they could get away with it here.” Appellant told
Melvin “he wasn’t ready to do this” and tried to persuade Melvin
not to rob the store. He also said, however, that he did not want
Melvin to go in alone “because he didn’t want him to get shot.”
       The plan was to go into the store, tell everyone in there to
get down on the floor, “rush the cash register,” get the money,
and leave. Appellant “figured Melvin wouldn’t rob a liquor store
without” a gun, and, indeed, Melvin withdrew a revolver from his
sock right before they entered the store. Appellant did not know
where Melvin got the gun, and he stated that “[t]he plan wasn’t
to shoot anyone.” He also told the officers, “It never works like
you plan.”
       Before they entered the store, appellant “put a black facial
thing around his head” and donned one black glove. Appellant
thought Melvin “might have put a blue beanie or something on
his head.” Melvin then entered the store, and appellant followed,
standing “between the doorway and the front counter.” Appellant
“‘heard the blam’ and saw the victim fall back.” He thought
Melvin “reached over the counter and took the money out of the
register.” Melvin gave the money to appellant, who had about
$17 before entering the store. Melvin and appellant then left the

                                6
store and ran to Melvin’s house, hopping the fence of a nearby
school on the way.
       Harkins attended Lee’s autopsy a few days later. The
coroner concluded that Lee died of a single gunshot wound to the
head. The bullet entered the left corner of Lee’s mouth and
traveled through his teeth, tongue, and brain before coming to
rest near his right ear. The coroner observed “stifling [sic]” and
black powder near Lee’s mouth and concluded he was shot at
close range “of less than eighteen inches and probably as close as
six inches.”
III. Surreptitious Recording
       After arresting appellant and Melvin, the police placed
them in the back of a police cruiser that had a tape recorder
running. Appellant and Melvin proceeded to have an expletive-
laden conversation about the incident.
       Appellant repeatedly told Melvin that he should not have
“blasted” or “busted” Lee in the face. Melvin said several times
that he “didn’t try to,” though he also said to appellant, “I don’t
know why you even busted him, dude.” At one point, appellant
told Melvin, “you shot that n***** in cold blood, though, cuz.”
Later, appellant said, “I knew I shouldn’t do this shit. I tried to
do a fuckin’ favor, … like n***** don’t do it. You still made me go
in there, and I couldn’t even stop you from busting that n*****.
Fucked my life up.” Appellant also stated, “I saw you went into
the store. I saw you blastin’ on that n***** like bam, I was like
damn, you know what I’m saying? We can’t do shit but grab

                                 7
money, man, we fuckin’ just sweatin’ like . . . .” Melvin
responded, “We got like 20 bucks, n*****.”3
       Appellant said, many times in many ways, that Melvin had
“fucked up.” He also said, however, that he did not “blame”
Melvin, once adding, “That’s why I got hell fuckin’ drunk, so you
can be like – you know what I’m saying, no, I don’t do that shit. I
know you shouldn’t have fuckin’ held the gun, man. I know you
fuckin’ shouldn’t have.” Appellant made a similar remark earlier
in the conversation, after Melvin said he “dumped” the gun “in
the yard and shit.” Appellant responded, “n*****, we just get
away, man. I’m on the run now, you shouldn’t have fucked up
like that and blasted on that n***** man. I told you to give me
the heat in the first place.” Appellant also made an additional
comment suggesting he became intoxicated for the purpose of
committing the robbery: “I didn’t want to do that shit, man,
that’s why we got faded out like a mother fucker.”
       Appellant suggested several times that he and Melvin
would not have been caught if Melvin had not lost his apartment

3     Appellant points out in his briefing that the Supreme Court
opinion addressing appellant and Melvin’s suitability for juvenile
court, discussed infra, also quoted Melvin as saying, “I wouldn’t
have shot, man I was like fuck it. I just grabbed for the cash and
ran.” (See People v. Superior Court (Jones), supra, 18 Cal.4th at
p. 673.) The transcript of the surreptitious recording admitted
into evidence at the evidentiary hearing does not contain that
statement. It quotes Melvin as saying, “I know I did, too, then I
wouldn’t have shot, man. I was like fucked up. I just grabbed
the [unintelligible].” The court also attributes to Melvin the
statement, “‘That’s why I got hell fuckin’ drunk,’” which is
attributed to appellant in the transcript. (Ibid.) We note that the
recording itself is not in the appellate record and was not
admitted at either appellant’s trial or the evidentiary hearing.

                                 8
keys, and said they should “break” or “run” from the police car,
“first chance we get.” He also stated several times that he and
Melvin would get life in prison or “the electric chair.” At one
point, he added, “I bet we can’t get off on a fuckin’ first offense,
n*****”; he later reiterated, “If you wouldn’t have shot him in the
face it would have been our first offense.” He also stated, “You
should have never did this shit on me. If you wouldn’t have shot
that n***** in the face, we’d be out clean. Cause I would have
dumped it on somebody else. But we about to go to jail, n*****.
You shot that n***** in the face.” He and Melvin both remarked
that there would be “[n]o more dank” or “weed” for them while
they were in “the penn [sic].”
IV. Psychiatric Report and Supreme Court Opinion
       In July 1996, about two months after the incident,
psychiatrist Jack Rothberg, M.D., Ph.D., evaluated appellant at
his attorney’s request. The purpose of the exam “was to assess
his mental state, and determine whether he is amenable to the
procedures, treatment and programs available through the
Juvenile Court system.”
       According to Rothberg’s report, appellant stated during the
exam that Melvin wanted to rob the store for cash. Appellant
was reluctant to participate, “but was concerned that Melvin
might get hurt, and so he came along, in essence to protect him.”
Appellant “insist[ed] that he does not use drugs,” but admitted
that he and Melvin consumed alcohol—wine and vodka—before
the incident. Appellant said he had previously seen Melvin with
a gun, but also said neither he nor Melvin had experience using a
gun; the report noted,“[w]hen loading it they had apparently
cocked the trigger, but had no idea how to uncock it.”

                                 9
       When appellant and Melvin entered the store, it “seemed
only a matter of seconds before [appellant] heard ‘pow.’”
Appellant maintained that Melvin did not intend to shoot anyone,
and that the gun “simply discharged while he was pointing it at
the store owner.” The report continued, “Marcus explains that
after that he ‘did something stupid’ emptying the register and
running out.” Appellant said he was “‘not in my right mind,’
apparently because he had some alcohol to drink.”
       Rothberg noted that appellant “expressed considerable
remorse about the crime, both with respect to the victim and the
victim’s family.” He concluded that appellant would be an
appropriate candidate for juvenile court.
       The Supreme Court ultimately disagreed. It determined
that the juvenile court’s findings that appellant and Melvin were
suitable for treatment under the juvenile court law were not
supported by substantial evidence. (See People v. Superior Court
(Jones), supra, 18 Cal.4th 667.) In its opinion, which was issued
before appellant and Melvin were tried, the Supreme Court made
two statements that appellant cites as facts in his briefing: (1)
the quotation noted above about “grabbing the money” and its
attribution to Melvin, and (2) “The minors waited in an alcove
near the store for customers to leave.” (Id. at p. 672.) We note
that the Supreme Court also said, (3) “About 6 or 7 p.m., after
returning to Melvin’s home, the minors continued a discussion
they had begun earlier in the day about getting some money for
the school prom by robbing someone . . . . According to Melvin, he
and his friends frequently talked about ‘jacking’ someone for
money,” and (4) “The minors brought masks, apparently obtained
from the school lost-and-found, and two gloves.” (Ibid.) We also

                               10
note that none of these statements appears elsewhere in the
record.
        After the Supreme Court issued its opinion, appellant and
Melvin were tried together in criminal court. The jury convicted
Melvin of first degree murder and robbery, but the court declared
a mistrial as to appellant. Appellant was later retried separately.
(People v. Jones (Sept. 25, 2001, No. B143098) [nonpub. opn.].)
V.      Appellant’s Trial Testimony
        At his retrial, appellant “relied on an intoxication defense”
and testified on his own behalf. (People v. Jones (Sept. 25, 2001,
No. B143098) [nonpub. opn.].) He testified that he and Melvin
were both 15 at the time of the shooting; appellant was one
month older than Melvin and therefore was “over-protective” of
him. Melvin was like a brother to him; they spent the night at
each others’ homes, went to the same school and church, and
played on the same basketball team.
        On May 23, 1996, appellant wore his “green Nike sweats”
to school. During homeroom, appellant saw Melvin, who was
wearing “blue dark pants.” Melvin told appellant he wanted to
“do something to get some money,” which appellant understood to
mean “[r]obbery, stealing something, something illegal.” Melvin
had made similar comments “in the past,” “like a little here, a
little there,” but appellant “shoved it off” because he had never
known Melvin to actually do anything like that before. Appellant
did not see Melvin again until lunch time; appellant again
ignored Melvin when he raised the issue of trying to get money.
        After school, appellant and Melvin went to a friend’s house
to play video games. They also smoked marijuana and shared a
pint of vodka with the friend. On the way home from the friend’s
house, appellant and Melvin stopped at the liquor store and got

                                 11
someone to buy them another pint of vodka. Appellant and
Melvin shared the bottle as they walked toward Melvin’s house.
On the way, they stopped at a nearby elementary school where
they often hung out. Appellant felt very drunk by that point; he
vomited twice.
       While appellant and Melvin were sitting at the school,
Melvin pulled a gun out of his sock and told appellant “he wanted
to rob Mr. Lee’s store.” Melvin said it would be “easy”: they
would “go in there and get the money and get out.” Appellant
said he did not want to do it, and that it was wrong. Melvin used
“peer pressure words” and taunted appellant, telling him that he
was “acting like a punk” and was “fat-ass scared.” Appellant
testified that he was indeed scared of “the whole situation,”
because he “didn’t want to get killed” and “didn’t want to go to
jail.” Appellant refused to participate, and Melvin eventually
said, “Fuck it. I’m going with or without you.” When Melvin got
up and started walking away, appellant felt “like that was the
last time I was gonna see my cousin, my brother, alive again,”
because he thought Melvin “was gonna get himself killed.”
Appellant decided to go with Melvin to prevent him from getting
hurt and “[k]eep him from hurting anyone.”
       Appellant tried to talk Melvin out of it the whole way to the
store. The pair stopped in an alcove near the store, and Melvin
put on a mask and handed appellant a glove. Appellant put the
glove in his pocket because he “wasn’t going to touch nothing,”
but he wrapped his basketball bandana around his face because
he did not want anyone to think he was “doing what Melvin was
thinking about doing.” Appellant added that “wasn’t the correct
thing to do. I was intoxicated. I wasn’t thinking rationally.”
Appellant gave the same explanation for why he did not call his

                                12
mother, Melvin’s parents, or the police to attempt to prevent the
crime. Appellant did not try to take the gun away from Melvin
because he “didn’t know if the gun was loaded” and “wasn’t about
to risk me accidentally getting shot or him accidentally getting
shot. Both of us drunk, tussling with a gun. No. No.”
       Melvin and appellant left the alcove, and Melvin entered
the store. Appellant testified that he did not go into the store.
Instead, he stood in the doorway. He thought his presence there
would help prevent anyone from getting hurt. Melvin ran to the
counter and “bark[ed] a couple words” before appellant heard a
gunshot. Appellant then saw Melvin reach over the counter
toward the cash register. Appellant said, “What the fuck you
doing?” and wondered why Melvin was grabbing money when
someone had just been shot. From the doorway, appellant
reached for Melvin as Melvin was getting the money and tried to
pull him out of the store. Melvin handed money to appellant,
who “snatched” it and put it in his pocket before pushing Melvin
out the door ahead of him.
       Appellant ran with Melvin back toward the elementary
school. As they were running, Melvin asked for appellant’s
bandana; appellant “snatched it off and gave it to him.”
Appellant did not know what Melvin did with the bandana or his
own ski mask. When appellant and Melvin reached the school,
they climbed the fence; appellant said he “almost fell down”
because he was “still fuzzy a little bit.” He and Melvin then ran
through the schoolyard and climbed over another fence. They
then walked to Melvin’s apartment.
       Appellant and Melvin climbed the stairs to the apartment.
“Not very long” after that, police arrived, pulled them down the
stairs, and detained them. In the police car, appellant

                               13
“express[ed] [his] true feelings” to Melvin, “that I felt like he
fucked up our life personally.” Appellant said he felt “helpless” at
the time, because he had seen someone get shot and “couldn’t
stop it.”
       On cross-examination, appellant admitted that he lied to
Rothberg about using drugs, though on redirect he said that he
thought Rothberg had been referring to hard drugs, not
marijuana. He said he did not recall telling Rothberg that he had
previously seen Melvin with a gun. Appellant also said that he
told Rothberg that Melvin had cocked the trigger, because “both
of us can’t cock the trigger.” Appellant denied telling Rothberg, “I
did something stupid” by emptying the register. On redirect, he
explained that he told Rothberg that Melvin did something stupid
by emptying the register.
       Appellant stated that he watched Melvin load the gun
while they were sitting at the elementary school, contradicting
his earlier testimony that he did not know if the gun was loaded.
When pressed by the prosecutor about his understanding of the
plan and awareness that Melvin was loading the gun, appellant
explained that he was drunk but not “pissy drunk.” He further
agreed that he “knew at that time that in the course of robbing
that store, somebody could get killed.”
       Appellant said he “wasn’t scared of” Melvin and “[d]idn’t
feel pressure” from Melvin’s taunts and use of what he called “the
usual peer pressure.” He took Melvin seriously when Melvin said
he would do it with or without appellant, however, and agreed
with the prosecutor’s characterization that he thought Melvin
“had a death wish” when Melvin started walking away from him.
Appellant nevertheless “lazily dragged up and I followed him.”
He reiterated that he tried to talk Melvin out of the plan, and

                                14
that he put the bandana on because he “didn’t want nobody
seeing me, thinking I was part of what Melvin was doing.”
Appellant denied ever touching the gun or even “paying
attention” to it during the robbery. Because he had “less
maturity” at the time, he never tried to take the gun away from
Melvin or yell that he was armed; he thought his mere “presence”
in the doorway would help the situation. After the shooting,
appellant did not shout for help or check on Lee; he did not “want
to see if Mr. Lee was alive” because he had “never seen a dead
body before, and I didn’t want to see one.”
                     PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.     Conviction and Direct Appeal
       On February 11, 1999, the People filed an information
charging appellant and Melvin with the murder (§ 187, subd. (a))
and robbery (§ 211) of Lee.4 The information also alleged as to
both counts that a principal was armed with a handgun (§ 12022,
subd. (a)(1)). A robbery-murder special circumstance (§ 190.2,
subd. (a)(17)) was alleged but appears to have been stricken.
       On May 22, 2000, a jury found appellant guilty of first
degree murder and second degree robbery and found the firearm
allegations true. On July 13, 2000, the court sentenced him to 25
years to life for the murder conviction, plus one year consecutive
for the related firearm enhancement. The court stayed sentence
on the robbery conviction under section 654. A different panel of
this court affirmed appellant’s convictions and sentence on direct

4     The People filed the information in superior court after the
Supreme Court determined the juvenile court’s findings that
appellant and Melvin suitable for treatment under the juvenile
court law were not supported by substantial evidence. (See
People v. Superior Court (Jones), supra18 Cal.4th 667.)

                                15
appeal. (See People v. Jones (Sept. 25, 2001, No. B143098)
[nonpub. opn.].) The factual summary portion of the opinion,
summarized appellant’s testimony, including his assertions that
he tried to dissuade Melvin, participated reluctantly in an effort
to prevent anyone from getting hurt, and did not shoot Lee.
II.    Section 1172.6 Proceedings
       A.    Petition
       On May 15, 2019, appellant, through counsel, filed a
petition for resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. In his
petition, appellant made the representations required by section
1172.6, subdivisions (a) and (b). Appellant also characterized the
factual summary of his testimony in the direct appeal opinion as
specific findings “that Mr. Jones did not personally kill the
victim, that the victim was shot by Mr. Jones’s co-defendant, and
that Mr. Jones did not want to participate in the underlying
robbery, tried to dissuade his co-defendant, and only
accompanied his co-defendant because he hoped his presence
would prevent anyone from getting hurt.” “Based on the
aforementioned,” appellant asserted that he was entitled to
resentencing.
       B.    Initial Briefing and Hearing
       The People filed a response5 arguing that appellant was
ineligible for resentencing because he was a major participant in

5     The People’s response and attachments thereto are not
included in the record on appeal, nor are the materials appellant
originally filed in reply. On our own motion, we take judicial
notice of the appellate record in appellant’s previous section
1172.6 appeal, People v. Jones, No. B304692, which contains
those documents. (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) We
note that the record on appeal does include the reply brief and
attachments appellant filed after we remanded the matter.

                                16
the crime under People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 (Banks)
and acted with reckless indifference toward human life under
People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522 (Clark). The People
attached our opinion from appellant’s direct appeal, as well as
some transcripts from appellant’s trial. Appellant filed a reply, to
which he attached several documents. He argued that he was
entitled to resentencing because “[t]he People failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Jones was both a major
participant and acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
Appellant further contended that he was not a major participant
and did not act with reckless indifference to human life under
Banks and Clark.
       After a hearing, the court found that appellant was a major
participant in the crime and acted with reckless indifference
toward Lee’s life and accordingly denied the motion. Appellant
timely appealed.
       C.    Previous Appeal
       On appeal, appellant contended the court erred by making
factual findings at the prima facie stage of the case. A different
panel of this court agreed and reversed the trial court’s order
denying the petition. The opinion remanded the matter with
directions to issue an order to show cause and proceed
consistently with section 1172.6, subdivision (d). (See People v.
Jones (Apr. 22, 2021, No. B304692) [nonpub. opn.].)
       D.     Evidentiary Hearing and Ruling
       On remand, appellant filed a second reply brief. He again
argued that he was not a major participant in the crime and did
not act with reckless indifference to human life. He also asserted
that his age at the time of the crime decreased his culpability.
Appellant provided a statement of facts based on the eight

                                17
exhibits that were attached to his brief and ultimately were
admitted at the evidentiary hearing. It does not appear that the
People made any additional filings.
       At the evidentiary hearing, the parties stipulated to the
admission of all the exhibits attached to appellant’s second reply
brief, which are listed above in the Factual Background.6 The
matter then proceeded to argument.
       The People began by incorporating the arguments in their
“original moving papers,” which we understand to mean their
response to the petition. They contended that appellant was a
major participant who acted with reckless indifference to human
life, emphasizing evidence suggesting he took money from the
store after Melvin shot Lee in the face and his post-arrest
statements that Melvin should not have had the gun in the first
place. The People further asserted that various portions of
appellant’s trial testimony were not credible, including his
assertion that he never entered the store during the crime. They
acknowledged that at least one of the Clark factors favored
appellant, but urged the court to find that he was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
       Appellant contended the People failed to carry their burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that he was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
He emphasized that he was only 15 at the time and was not the
actual killer. Despite repeatedly asserting that “the basic facts of

6      Three of those exhibits, Ochoa’s trial testimony, appellant’s
trial testimony, and the transcript of the surreptitious recording,
were also offered by the People. The parties also stipulated that
Ochoa was legally unavailable to testify at the evidentiary
hearing.

                                 18
this case are generally agreed upon by both parties,” appellant
maintained that he never entered the store and that Melvin took
the money. Appellant argued that all the Banks factors indicated
he was not a major participant; he asserted that his involvement
in the planning and execution of the crime was minimal, and that
he intended only to “persuade Melvin out of it” and “keep Melvin
from getting killed or hurting anyone.” Appellant also argued
that all the Clark factors indicated that he did not act with
reckless indifference to human life. Appellant acknowledged that
fleeing the scene without aiding Lee was “not the most admirable
course of action he could have taken,” but asserted that it did not
“tip the scales in favor of him being convicted on murder on this
case, and it’s not probative of reckless disregard.” He also
reiterated that neither he nor Melvin had a history of violence, he
“thought that his presence during the robbery would minimize”
the risk of violence, and the shooting happened moments after
Melvin entered the store.
       In rebuttal, the People argued that the “youth factor” did
not prevent appellant from “reaching over and taking the money,”
or making statements and engaging in conduct indicating that he
“clearly understood the consequences of his actions.” In
surrebuttal, appellant argued that his knowledge that Melvin
had a loaded gun was insufficient to establish reckless
indifference. He also reiterated that he was in the doorway of the
store, but asserted that even if he was inside the store, he did not
have an opportunity to prevent the shooting because it happened
quickly. Finally, appellant asserted that his age at the time
limited his ability to appreciate the consequences of his actions.
       The court began its oral ruling by noting that it was “very
important to consider . . . the defendant’s age at the time of this

                                19
incident.” It found, however, that the transcript of the post-
arrest conversation evinced appellant’s “sophistication,” “fears . . .
for himself,” and awareness that Melvin “shot the person in the
face.” The court also noted that appellant “lament[ed] the fact
that he didn’t have the gun instead of his younger cousin.” The
court said “[t]hose facts are very important to the court for two
reasons: one, they come directly from the defendant himself, the
petitioner himself. This is what the petitioner has in his mind
immediately after this heinous act; two, it shows that he is not an
unsophisticated typical 15 year old. He’s talking about the
money, . . . he talks about being in the pen for some while. He’s
very aware of the nature of what happened.”
       After incorporating by reference “in my findings here all of
the factors” the People outlined,7 the court found that appellant
and Melvin planned the incident over a full day, that appellant
was present when the gun was being loaded, and that appellant
knew that an armed robbery “presents a whole other level of
dangerousness to a typical robbery.” The court further found
that appellant “was immediately interested in the money,” that
he and Melvin took steps to conceal their identities before the
robbery, and that they ran away together afterward rather than
rendering aid to Lee.
       The court ultimately concluded: “I think from all of the
factors it’s pretty clear that the People have proven beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant was a major participant, not
only in the planning and the execution of this crime, but in the

7     The court did not clarify whether it intended to incorporate
the People’s oral argument, written argument, or both. The
People asserted in both arguments that appellant entered the
store and took the money.

                                 20
getting away safely afterwards of the crime, and he acted with
absolutely reckless disregard for the life of Mr. Lee. Both before
when he planned the crime he had no fear about the fact that
they were going in with an armed gun, a loaded gun, and
afterwards he showed that he was absolutely indifferent to
whether or not Mr. Lee lived or died. His only concern at that
point was getting away, splitting the money, avoiding a life
sentence. So for that reason the motion is denied. The court does
find beyond a reasonable doubt that the People have met their
burden in proving that the defendant did act with reckless
disregard, that he was a major participant, and he could still
today be convicted of murder.”
        Appellant timely appealed.
                             DISCUSSION
I.      Section 1172.6
        The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018
Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) “to amend the felony murder rule and the
natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 1, subd. (f); accord, § 189, subd. (e); People v. Lewis (2021)
11 Cal.5th 952, 959 (Lewis).) As amended by SB 1437, section
189 now limits liability under a felony-murder theory to “actual
killer[s]” (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)) and those who, “with the intent to
kill,” aid or abet “the actual killer in the commission of murder in
the first degree” (id., subd. (e)(2)). Individuals who do not fall
into those categories can be held liable for murder only if they
were “major participant[s] in the underlying felony and acted

                                 21
with reckless indifference to human life, as described in
subdivision (d) of [Penal Code] Section 190.2” —the statute
defining the felony-murder special circumstance. (Id., § 189,
subd. (e)(3); see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 708
(Strong).)
       SB 1437 also added section 1172.6 to the Penal Code,
permitting individuals who were convicted of felony murder or
murder under a natural and probable consequences theory, but
who could not be convicted of murder following SB 1437’s changes
to sections 188 and 189, to petition the sentencing court to vacate
the conviction and resentence on any remaining counts.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).) When a petitioner files a “complying
petition,” the court must appoint counsel if requested, “the issue
is briefed[,] and then the court makes one (not two) prima facie
determination.” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 966.) In the
limited prima facie inquiry, the court issues an order to show
cause if the petitioner’s factual allegations, if true, would
demonstrate an entitlement to relief. (See id. at p. 971.)
       Once an order to show cause issues, the matter proceeds to
an evidentiary hearing at which the People have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt “that the petitioner is guilty of
murder or attempted murder under California law as amended
by the changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1,
2019.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).) At the hearing, the court “may
consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or
trial that is admissible under current law, including witness
testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed.
The court may also consider the procedural history of the case
recited in any prior appellate opinion.” (Ibid.) Additionally, both
the petitioner and the People “may also offer new or additional

                                22
evidence to meet their respective burdens.” (Ibid.) “A finding
that there is substantial evidence to support a conviction for
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter is insufficient to
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is ineligible
for resentencing. If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of
proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and
enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and
the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.”
(Ibid.) Resentencing is unavailable if the petitioner was a major
participant in the underlying felony and acted with reckless
indifference to human life. (Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 710.)
The trial court acts as an independent factfinder and determines
whether the prosecution has met its burden. (People v. Ramirez
(2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 970, 984 (Ramirez).)
II.    Standard of Review
       The trial court concluded that appellant was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Appellant contends the record does not support this conclusion.
On appeal from an order denying a section 1172.6 petition after
an evidentiary hearing, we review the trial court’s factual
findings for substantial evidence. (People v. Richardson (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 1085, 1090; People v. Clements (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th
276, 298 (Clements).) “We ‘“examine the entire record in the light
most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it contains
substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value that would support a rational trier of
fact in finding [the defendant guilty] beyond a reasonable
doubt.’”” (Clements, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 298, quoting
People v. San Nicolas (2004) 34 Cal.4th 614, 657-658.) “Our job
on review is different from the trial judge’s job in deciding the

                                23
petition. While the trial judge must review all the relevant
evidence, evaluate and resolve contradictions, and make
determinations as to credibility, all under the reasonable doubt
standard, our job is to determine whether there is any
substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, to support a
rational fact finder’s findings beyond a reasonable doubt.”
(Clements, surpa, at p. 298.)
       As particularly relevant here, we do not reweigh evidence
or revisit credibility determinations made by the trial court. (See
People v. Cody (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 87, ___. Thus, appellant’s
repeated contentions that he did not enter the store and that
“[t]he bulk of the evidence actually supports that Melvin took the
money” are not well-taken. We are not concerned with the “bulk”
of the evidence; so long as substantial evidence supports the trial
court’s implicit or explicit findings, we are obligated to accept
those findings.
       Reversal on insufficiency of the evidence is unwarranted
unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the ruling].” (People v.
Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.) “If the circumstances
reasonably justify the findings made by the trier of fact, reversal
of the judgment is not warranted simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616,
639.)
III. The Banks and Clark Factors
       In Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788, and Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th 522, the California Supreme Court set forth the factors
relevant to determining whether a defendant is a major
participant in a felony who acted with reckless indifference to

                                24
life. The major participant and reckless indifference factors
“significantly overlap” in that “‘the greater the defendant's
participation in the felony murder, the more likely that he acted
with reckless indifference to human life.’” (Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at pp. 614-615, quoting Tison v. Arizona (1987) 481 U.S.
137, 153 (Tison).)
       In Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th 788, the Supreme Court set out
a nonexhaustive list of considerations relevant to whether a
defendant’s participation in criminal activities known to carry a
grave risk of death is sufficiently significant to render him or her
a “major participant” in the crime. (See Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th
at p. 705, citing Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp. 705-706.) Those
considerations are: “What role did the defendant have in
planning the criminal enterprise that led to one or more deaths?
What role did the defendant have in supplying or using lethal
weapons? What awareness did the defendant have of particular
dangers posed by the nature of the crime, weapons used, or past
experience or conduct of the other participants? Was the
defendant present at the scene of the killing, in a position to
facilitate or prevent the actual murder, and did his or her own
actions or inaction play a particular role in the death? What did
the defendant do after lethal force was used?” (Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at p. 803, fn. omitted.)
       Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618-623, similarly set forth
a list of considerations relevant to determining whether a
defendant acted with reckless indifference to human life. The
first factor relates to weapons: was the defendant aware that
weapons would be used in the felony? Did the defendant use a
weapon? How many weapons were used in the crime? (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) The court cautioned that “[t]he mere

                                25
fact of a defendant’s awareness that a gun will be used in the
felony is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference to human
life.” (Ibid.; see also id. at p. 617, fn. 74 [“A robbery in which the
only factor supporting reckless indifference to human life is the
fact of the use of a gun is what we meant by ‘a garden-variety
armed robbery’ in Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at p. 802.”].) The
second factor is the defendant’s physical proximity to the murder
and the events leading up to it, and the opportunities that
proximity afforded to restrain the crime or aid the victim. (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 619.) The third factor is the duration of
the felony, particularly the duration of the interaction between
victims and perpetrators; more prolonged incidents provide “‘a
greater window of opportunity for violence.’” (Id. at pp. 620-621.)
The fourth factor is the defendant’s awareness of his or her
codefendants’ propensity for violence or likelihood of killing a
victim. (Id. at p. 621.) The final factor is the defendant’s efforts
to minimize the risk of violence during the felony, though the
court cautioned that “some effort to minimize the risk of violence
does not, in itself, necessarily foreclose a finding that defendant
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Id. at pp. 621-
622.) The court further cautioned that although recklessness has
a subjective element, “it is the jury’s objective determination that
ultimately determines recklessness”; “a defendant’s good faith
but unreasonable belief that he or she was not posing a risk to
human life in pursuing the felony does not suffice to foreclose a
determination of reckless indifference to human life.” (Id. at p.
622.) At bottom, reckless indifference “encompasses a willingness
to kill (or assist another in killing) to achieve a distinct aim, even
if the defendant does not specifically desire that death as the
outcome of his [or her] actions.” (Id. at p. 617.)

                                 26
       No single Banks or Clark factor is determinative. (Clark,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 618, 621–623.) Instead, courts must
assess the totality of a defendant’s culpability along a spectrum
spanning from Enmund v. Florida (1982) 458 U.S. 782
(Enmund), in which defendant, a classic getaway driver for an
armed robbery, was minimally culpable for the murder that
ensued, to Tison, supra, 481 U.S. 137, in which the very culpable
defendants helped convicted murderers escape from prison,
provided weapons, and stood by as their confederates debated
killing, then killed, an innocent family. (See Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th at pp. 794, 801–803; Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 609,
612-614, 618; Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 705 [discussing the
Enmund-Tison spectrum of culpability].)
       A defendant’s youth at the time of the crime is a
circumstance that may be relevant to his or her placement on the
culpability spectrum. (See In re Moore (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th
434, 453-454 (Moore); Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 987.)
This is because children generally lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment of adults, and are also generally less
responsible and mature. (Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p.
453.) Further, children tend to act more immaturely or
impetuously than adults and may fail to appreciate the risks and
consequences of their actions. (Id. at p. 454.) Like all the other
factors, youth alone is not dispositive. (In re Harper (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 450, 470.)
IV. Analysis
       Before proceeding to our analysis of the Banks and Clark
factors, we note that appellant complains that the trial court “did
not discuss any factors or any case law before denying appellant’s
petition nor did the court distinguish between major participant

                                27
and reckless indifference to human life” and instead “focused on
how appellant and Melvin spoke to each other in the police car
after their arrest.”8 Appellant contends this constituted an
impermissible imposition of the court’s own views “without any
reference to or application of relevant case law.” He further
asserts that the court “did not reveal what parts of the evidence it
had considered beyond the secret recording from the police car,”
and, even with regard to that piece of evidence, “did not fully
examine what appellant and Melvin actually revealed in their
conversation.” However, on appeal we review the correctness of
the lower court’s decision, not its rationale. (See People v. Zapien
(1993) 4 Cal.4th 929, 976; People v. Chism (2014) 58 Cal.4th
1266, 1295, fn. 12; see also US Ecology, Inc. v. State of California
(2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 909 [“We do not review the rationale
for the court’s decision. Rather, if there is substantial evidence to
support the result under the correct standard, we will affirm.”].)

8      Appellant also asserts the court “acknowledged that it had
not read all of the exhibits that constituted the evidence at the
hearing before denying appellant’s petition.” The court actually
said, “I appreciate the exhibits, I’ve gone through most of them
before today’s hearing. I’m going through, again, the transcript
of the recording of your client’s statements after, immediately
following the shooting, and I’ve refreshed my memory about the
facts inside of that transcript.” Reading this language in the
light most favorable to the ruling suggests the court had
refreshed its recollection of some of the exhibits immediately
before the hearing. There is no evidence in the record suggesting
the court failed to review all the exhibits, which were provided
with multiple filings. “In the usual case, the fact that a court did
not specifically mention certain evidence does not mean that the
court ‘ignored’ that evidence.” (People v. Jones (2022) 86
Cal.App.5th 1076, 1092.)

                                 28
Moreover, the major participant and reckless indifference factors
“significantly overlap” (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 615);
separate discussion of those factors may not be necessary in every
case, though we discuss them separately here for clarity.
       A.     Major Participant (Banks)
       We apply the Banks factors and consider the totality of the
circumstances. We conclude substantial evidence supports a
finding that appellant was a major participant in the robbery.
       With regard to the first factor, appellant’s role in planning,
appellant asserts that the only evidence “came from appellant’s
statements” that Melvin was the mastermind and appellant’s
only role was, essentially, trying to talk Melvin out of it. “Thus,
this factor does not support that appellant had a role in planning
the robbery.” We disagree. Appellant’s testimony, originally
offered in support of his defense at trial, indeed minimizes his
planning role. Other evidence in the record suggests he was more
actively involved, however. The Supreme Court opinion—on
which we again note that appellant relies to support factual
assertions—indicates that appellant and Melvin frequently
talked about “jacking” someone for money, engaged in an ongoing
“discussion” about the robbery throughout the day, and took the
preparatory step of acquiring facial coverings from the lost-and-
found at their school. Even setting aside those statements, the
psychiatric report suggests appellant and Melvin jointly loaded
and cocked the gun. More telling are appellant’s surreptitiously
recorded statements, which indicate that he “got hell fuckin’
drunk” and “faded out like a mother fucker” to build himself up
for the robbery hours before his testimony indicated that he knew
of the full plan. Appellant also stated twice that he knew Melvin
should have given him the gun, from which it can reasonably be

                                 29
inferred that he was more extensively involved in planning the
logistics of the robbery than his self-serving testimony indicated.
       As to the second factor, his role in supplying or using lethal
weapons, appellant contends he was uninvolved in either aspect.
We agree the evidence indicates that Melvin procured the gun
and fired at Lee. As noted above, however, the psychiatric report
indicates that appellant was involved in loading and cocking (and
then unsuccessfully attempting to uncock) the gun. Additionally,
eyewitness Ochoa said he saw the person in green pants remove a
gun from his waistband before the two males entered the store.
Another eyewitness said the person in green pants was carrying
the gun as the two males ran from the store. This substantial
evidence suggests appellant had some involvement with the
lethal weapon.
       The third factor is appellant’s awareness of particular
dangers posed by the crime, weapons used, or past experience or
conduct of other participants. Appellant acknowledges that he
“knew that an armed robbery was illegal and dangerous,” but
asserts that neither he nor Melvin had prior experience with
crimes, violence, or guns, and appellant “had no reason to even
suspect that Melvin might actually fire the gun.” Respondent
Attorney General points out that the psychiatric report states
that appellant previously had seen Melvin with a gun.
Respondent also suggests, and we agree, that appellant’s post-
arrest comments that he should have been the one to hold the
gun evince an awareness that Melvin posed a danger with the
weapon.9 Respondent’s suggestion that Melvin’s possible status

9    Appellant maintains that the People and respondent “have
taken appellant’s comment out of context,” because he “said this

                                 30
as a gang member rendered him more dangerous is less well-
taken; gang membership alone does not demonstrate a propensity
to commit lethal violence. (See Banks, supra, 61 Cal.4th at pp.
810-811; In re Ramirez (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 384, 405.) More
relevant in our view is appellant’s testimony that he did not try
to take the gun from Melvin because he did not want to “risk me
accidentally getting shot or him accidentally getting shot. Both of
us drunk, tussling with a gun.” It is reasonable to conclude from
all this evidence that appellant recognized that the robbery posed
a particular danger.
       The fourth factor considers whether appellant was present
at the scene and in a position to facilitate or prevent the murder,
and whether his actions or inaction played a particular role in the
death. Appellant concedes he was at the scene, but asserts the
shooting happened so quickly that he had no realistic opportunity
to prevent it. He also emphasizes Melvin’s post-arrest comments
suggesting the shooting was unintended. Respondent argues
that appellant was “actively involved in the execution of the
robbery, including the wearing of masks,” but it is unclear what
relevance appellant’s attire had to his presence or ability to
prevent Melvin from shooting. What is clear is that appellant
was not only present but very close to Melvin throughout the
incident. Ochoa testified that he (Ochoa) was only four or five

right after asking Melvin what he did with the gun,” such that
the “implication is that appellant was referring to the time
during which they were fleeing.” Even if we were to accept this
inference, which the standard of review precludes here, we note
that appellant omits any mention of the other time he said “I
know you shouldn’t have fuckin’ held the gun, man. I know you
fuckin’ shouldn’t have,” which is nowhere proximate to any
statements about fleeing.

                                31
feet away from the shooter, despite being outside the store, which
means appellant necessarily was close enough to exercise a
restraining effect. (See In re Ramirez, supra, 32 Cal.App.5th at
p. 405 [suggesting that proximity of “feet away” may be “close
enough to exercise a restraining effect on the crime”].) Appellant
also had ample opportunity to scuttle the plan or take the gun
prior to arriving at the store. On the other hand, as discussed
more fully below, courts have recognized that defendants may
have limited opportunity to intervene at the scene when a
shooting occurs quickly. In short, this factor is somewhat mixed.
       The final factor is what appellant did after lethal force was
used. Appellant contends that he simply fled the scene with
Melvin; he disputes the People’s assertion that he disposed of
evidence. Elsewhere in his briefing, indeed throughout it, he also
maintains that the “bulk of the evidence” shows that Melvin was
the one who took the money after Lee was shot. As discussed
above, we do not weigh the evidence on appeal. Instead, we
consider whether substantial evidence supports the court’s
adopted finding that appellant took the money after Lee was
shot. We conclude it does. Appellant’s self-serving trial
testimony indicated that Melvin took the money, but the money
was found in appellant’s pocket, not Melvin’s, when they were
arrested. The psychiatric report also noted that appellant said he
“‘did something stupid’ emptying the register and running out,”
and appellant remarked during the post-arrest conversation that
after the shooting, “We can’t do shit but grab money, man . . . .” A
reasonable factfinder certainly could conclude from this evidence
that appellant took the money after Lee was shot, rather than
rendering aid or even simply fleeing. We thus agree with
respondent that “[t]his factor does not help appellant.”

                                32
       In sum, the record contains substantial evidence to support
the conclusion that appellant was a major participant in the
robbery.
       B.     Reckless Indifference (Clark)
       As we observed above, there is significant overlap between
being a major participant and having a reckless indifference to
human life, and “‘the greater the defendant’s participation in the
felony murder, the more likely that he acted with reckless
indifference to human life.’” Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 614-
615.) Applying the Clark factors and considering the totality of
the circumstances, we conclude the record contains sufficient
evidence from which the trial court could conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that appellant acted with reckless indifference
to the life of Lee.
       The first Clark factor overlaps with the second Banks
factor: what did the defendant know about the weapons used in
the felony? Did the defendant use a weapon? How many
weapons were used in the crime? (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p.
618.) We agree with appellant that mere knowledge a weapon
would be used is not sufficient to establish reckless indifference.
(See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 618.) The evidence suggests,
however, that appellant had more than “mere knowledge” that a
weapon was present. At a minimum, he knew the weapon was
not only loaded with multiple rounds but also cocked, and two
witnesses testified they saw him with the weapon before and/or
after the robbery. (Contra People v. Keel (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th
546, 559 (Keel) [no evidence that defendant knew codefendant’s
gun was loaded].) Appellant’s assertion that he “did not have any
reason to believe Melvin would fire the gun” is also not
persuasive on this record. As discussed above, appellant stated

                                33
multiple times that he should have been the one to wield the gun,
suggesting an awareness that the weapon posed more risk in
Melvin’s hands. Appellant also recognized that the risk of an
accidental shooting was heightened because both he and Melvin
were intoxicated; that recognition prevented him from disarming
Melvin so as to protect himself, but not from moving forward with
the robbery and placing others at risk.
       The second Clark factor, the defendant’s physical proximity
to the murder and the events leading up to it, and the
opportunities that proximity afforded to restrain the crime or aid
the victim, is similar to the fourth Banks factor. As already
discussed, appellant was with Melvin for several hours prior to
the robbery, present throughout the robbery and murder, and
fled with Melvin afterward. Despite his contentions that he did
not enter the store or take money from the register, substantial
evidence—Ochoa’s testimony and the money in his pockets at the
time of his arrest—supports the opposite conclusion. Appellant
also had ample opportunity prior to the robbery to alert someone
or undertake more active efforts to stop the crime.
       Appellant nevertheless argues that this factor weighs
against a finding of reckless indifference because the shooting
happened quickly and unexpectedly. (See, e.g., In re Scoggins
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 667, 679 (Scoggins) [“although Scoggins was in
close contact with his accomplices before the shooting, he lacked
control over their actions once they arrived on the crime scene,
especially given how quickly the shooting occurred”]; Moore,
supra, 68 Cal.App.5th at p. 452 [the “short duration of the
robbery and the sudden and unprovoked nature of the shooting
reinforce” the conclusion that a defendant present in a car near
the robbery did not act with reckless indifference]; Ramirez,

                               34
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 989 [“[t]he attempted carjacking was
executed quickly, providing Ramirez no realistic opportunity to
intervene before Rios opened fire”].) While the cases appellant
cites support the proposition that a defendant may not have an
opportunity to intervene if a shooting happens quickly, they are
distinguishable in that the defendants were far less proximate to
the shooting. In Scoggins, the defendant “was not physically
present at the crime scene,” and it was “not clear whether
Scoggins could even see the confrontation between his
accomplices and [the victim] from his position.” (Scoggins, supra,
9 Cal.5th at p. 678.) In Moore, the defendant “likely saw Russell
rob and shoot [the victim] while he sat in the stolen Mazda,” but
“he never left the car” and thus was “not ‘close enough to exercise
a restraining effect on the crime.’” (Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th
at p. 452.) In Ramirez, the defendant was at the scene but on the
opposite side of the car from the codefendant who began shooting.
(Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 989.) Here, appellant was
not only at the scene but was mere feet from Melvin the entire
time. He was thus sufficiently proximate to “exercise a
restraining effect on the crime,” yet according to his own
testimony instead chose to not pay attention. This factor
accordingly is more mixed than in the cases appellant cites,
notwithstanding the short duration of the crime.
       The duration of the crime is, incidentally, the third Clark
factor. “[C]rimes of longer duration present greater risk of
violence and therefore evince more reckless indifference.” (People
v. Saibu (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 709, 740.) Here, there is no real
dispute that the robbery was brief; even respondent concedes this
factor “was at best neutral as the shot was fired not long after the

                                35
two entered the store.” We agree with appellant that the short
duration of the crime suggests a lack of reckless indifference.
       The fourth factor is whether the defendant is aware of his
or her codefendants’ propensity for violence or likelihood of
killing a victim. (Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th. at p. 621.) This factor
overlaps the third Banks factor, and we incorporate our previous
discussion of the substantial evidence from which a reasonable
factfinder could conclude that appellant knew the robbery posed
a particular danger. Appellant contends that “[m]ore telling was
the shock and surprise appellant expressed at the shooting
during his conversation with Melvin in the police car after their
arrest,” which “shows that appellant did not harbor a reckless
indifference to human life.” We are disinclined to ascribe
particular emotions to the cold record of the transcript or give
such emotions controlling weight in our analysis; “the cold record
seldom captures indications like facial expressions, tones of voice,
or hesitancy.” (People v. Poore (2022) 13 Cal.5th 266, 297.)
Appellant’s words speak for themselves, and they support the
inference that appellant recognized it was dangerous for Melvin
to handle the gun and proceeded with the crime regardless.
       The final Clark factor is the defendant’s efforts to minimize
the risk of violence during the felony. In Clark, such efforts
included planning to use an unloaded gun and scheduling the
robbery when the store was closed to minimize risks to
employees. (See Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pp. 621-622.)
Appellant contends his efforts to minimize violence included
trying to talk Melvin out of committing the robbery and taking no
action “that increased the risk of violence beyond the risk
inherent in Melvin carrying a loaded gun into the store to obtain
money.” He also points to the Supreme Court’s statement that he

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and Melvin “waited near the store for customers to leave” before
entering, reiterates his contention that Melvin stole the money,
and asserts that his immediate flight from the scene did nothing
to heighten the danger to Lee. Even crediting appellant’s
testimony about his efforts to persuade Melvin not to go through
with the robbery and the Supreme Court’s statement that he and
Melvin actively waited for customers to leave, sufficient evidence
supports a finding that appellant did not take steps to minimize
the risk of violence. He and Melvin committed the robbery when
the store was open and employees and numerous bystanders
were present. Indeed, their plan expressly accounted for the
presence of bystanders. Rather than insisting that no gun be
used or that the gun be unloaded, appellant helped Melvin load
and cock the gun. Appellant also got “hell fuckin’ drunk” and
“faded” before accompanying Melvin, who he said should not have
been the one to carry the weapon and was fearful of disarming.
       Appellant contends there was no evidence that Lee could
have survived if he had stayed at the scene, and that he “could
have believed that help would arrive,” given the numerous other
people near the store. However, the police report indicates that
Lee was not pronounced dead until he arrived at the hospital,
from which it can be inferred that he remained alive at the scene.
Appellant’s speculation about his own possible beliefs is not
persuasive, particularly given the extensive amount of his
testimony in the record. Neither is his reliance on In re Taylor
(2019) 34 Cal.App.5th 543, 559, in which “there was no evidence
that Taylor appreciated how badly [the victim] was wounded” and
apparently “knew help was arriving.” Here, appellant’s post-
arrest statements indicate he was well aware that Lee had been
shot in the face and was grievously wounded, and he testified at

                               37
trial that he did not “want to see if Mr. Lee was alive” because he
feared Lee would not be.
       At trial, appellant cited his lack of “maturity” as a reason
he believed he could prevent injury by accompanying Melvin
during the robbery. In his appellate briefing, he characterizes
himself as “a scared and angry 15-year-old who, having joined his
15-year old cousin in a planned robbery after failing to talk him
out of it, saw his cousin inexplicably shoot the store owner in the
head seconds after entering the store.” He contends his “youth
significantly undercuts any argument that appellant acted with
reckless indifference to human life.” He finds support for this
contention in Moore, supra, 68 Cal.App.5th 434, Keel, supra, 84
Cal.App.5th 546, and Ramirez, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th 970.
       As we acknowledged above, appellant’s age at the time of
the offense is relevant to whether he acted with reckless
indifference. Case law in this area recognizes that youth are
relatively more impulsive than adults and may be vulnerable to
peer pressure. (People v. Oliver (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 466, 489.)
The trial court expressly considered appellant’s age and
concluded that the totality of the circumstances, including
appellant’s post-arrest statements, demonstrated an appreciation
of the risks akin to that of an adult. Although the evidence could
perhaps be viewed differently, substantial evidence supports the
trial court’s conclusion.
       Appellant testified that he did not succumb to peer
pressure from his younger cousin Melvin. Substantial evidence
also showed he was aware of the risks posed by the loaded,
cocked gun in the hands of his intoxicated cousin: he testified
that he feared being accidentally shot before the robbery even
commenced. He also testified that he was aware of the risk that

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he or Melvin might die during the robbery, or face substantial
consequences if they were caught. Immediately after the
incident, appellant stated that he “got faded out like a mother
fucker” for the purpose of engaging in the crime, “thought Melvin
was gonna get himself killed,” knew Melvin “shouldn’t have
fuckin’ held the gun,” and recognized they could not “do shit but
grab money” and faced life in prison after Lee was shot. Evidence
of this type of self- and situational awareness shows that
appellant acted with a mental state “encompass[ing] a
willingness to kill (or to assist another in killing) to achieve a
distinct aim, even if the defendant does not specifically desire
that death as the outcome of his actions.” (Clark, supra, 63
Cal.4th at p. 617.) Analogous evidence is notably absent from the
cases appellant cites.
                               DISPOSITION
       The order of the trial court is affirmed.
  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                           COLLINS, J.

We concur:

CURREY, P.J.

ZUKIN, J.

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