Court Opinion

ID: 2963680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:13:53.120057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:19.819397
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USCA1 Opinion

	

        November 8, 1995        [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

                           

                                 ____________________

        No. 94-2183 

                                 MICHAEL A. CROOKER,

                                Plaintiff, Appellant,

                                          v.

                              KENNETH VARRIALE, ET AL.,

                                Defendants, Appellees.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                    [Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                                Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                           ___________
                            Cyr and Stahl, Circuit Judges.
                                           ______________

                                 ____________________

            Michael Alan Crooker on brief pro se.
            ____________________
            Donald K. Stern,  United States  Attorney, and  Karen L.  Goodwin,
            _______________                                 _________________
        Assistant United States Attorney, on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                 ____________________

                 Per Curiam.  Plaintiff,  Michael A. Crooker, appeals the
                 __________

            grant  of summary  judgment in  favor  of the  defendant, ATF

            Agent Kenneth Varriale, in this  Bivens action, see Bivens v.
                                             ______         ___ ______

            Six  Unknown   Named  Agents,  403  U.S.   388  (1971),  that
            ____________________________

            challenged a  November 1991 search  of, and seizure  of items

            from, Crooker's residence and a seizure of an additional item

            pursuant  to a  July  1992 search  of  that residence.    The

            district  court  concluded  that  Crooker   was  collaterally

            estopped  from asserting several of the Bivens claims.  As to
                                                    ______

            those Bivens claims not precluded by collateral estoppel, the
                  ______

            district   court   determined  that   the   items  had   been

            constitutionally seized  as within the scope  of the warrant,

            in plain view, and/or Agent Varriale was not liable as he was

            entitled to qualified immunity.

                 Upon careful review,  we conclude that summary  judgment

            was appropriate on all counts; although as to certain counts,

            we  affirm on grounds different from the district court.  See
                                                                      ___

            Four  Corners Serv. Station, Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 51 F.3d
            _________________________________    _______________

            306, 314 (1st Cir.  1995) (appellate court is free  to affirm

            on any ground supported by the record).  We pass the issue of

            collateral  estoppel, affirming,  instead, on  an alternative

            ground of  qualified immunity, the grant  of summary judgment

            on the counts deemed  precluded.  As to the  counts involving

            the November  1991 seizure of  antique firearms and  the July

                                         -2-

            1992 seizure of  ammunition, Crooker has  failed to allege  a

            violation of his own Fourth Amendment rights.

                                          I.

                 The district court, in a comprehensive memorandum, dated

            October  26,  1994,  explained  the  factual  and  procedural

            background.   We  set out  an abbreviated  version, outlining

            only  those facts  and  the procedural  history necessary  to

            explain the basis for our determination.

                 Crooker was released from  prison in February 1991 after

            serving a 4-to-5 year state prison sentence for possession of

            a machine  gun.    Pursuant  to  a  warrant,  Agent  Varriale

            searched  Crooker's   residence  on  November  8,  1991,  for

            firearms, ammunition,  and related material.   Agent Varriale

            seized, among  other things, several antique  and non-antique

            firearms, numerous  rounds of ammunition, an  address book, a

            firearms record card, and firearms publications.1

                 Crooker  was indicted  on charges  of being  a felon-in-

            possession of  firearms in violation  of 18 U.S.C.    922(g).

            In this  criminal proceeding,  Crooker moved to  suppress the

                                
            ____________________

            1.  As noted  in our  opening paragraph,  there was a  second
            search  of  Crooker's  residence  conducted  in  July   1992.
            Pursuant to a separate warrant issued in the course of an IRS
            investigation of Crooker for  filing false tax refund claims,
            Agent Varriale assisted IRS agents in executing the July 1992
            warrant and seized ammunition from an antique firearm.
                 In  this Bivens  action,  Crooker does  not contest  the
                          ______
            issuance of  the July 1992 warrant.   He claims only that the
            July 1992 warrant did not authorize or encompass a seizure of
            that ammunition.

                                         -3-

            evidence seized  in November  1991, arguing that  the warrant

            had  been issued without probable cause and that items seized

            were  outside  the  scope of  the  warrant.    The motion  to

            suppress was denied by Chief Judge Tauro.

                 Thereafter, in exchange for  the dismissal of the felon-

            in-possession   indictment,  Crooker   pled   guilty  to   an

            information charging him with  conspiracy to possess firearms

            by  a  felon, in  violation  of  18 U.S.C.     371.   By  the

            dismissal  of  the  felon-in-possession  indictment,  Crooker

            avoided  the  imposition  of  a  mandatory  15-year  term  of

            imprisonment.    The  parties  agreed  to,  and  Judge  Tauro

            imposed,  an  eight-year sentence  for  the  charge to  which

            Crooker pled guilty.

                 After  pleading guilty  in  his  criminal case,  Crooker

            moved to lift  a stay that  had been entered  in his  earlier

            Bivens action  against Agent  Varriale.   Some of the  Bivens
            ______                                                 ______

            claims  duplicated  the  allegations  forming  the  basis for

            Crooker's  suppression motion, i.e., that the application for

            the 1991 search warrant included deliberate false statements,

            that  the 1991 search  warrant was not  supported by probable

            cause, and that  the 1991  search exceeded the  scope of  the

            warrant.  Relying  on Allen  v. McCurry, 449  U.S. 90  (1980)
                                  _____     _______

            (collateral estoppel applies to   1983 actions), the district

            court  determined  in  the  Bivens action  that  Crooker  was
                                        ______

            collaterally estopped from relitigating the issues decided in

                                         -4-

            the  suppression  ruling previously  entered in  the criminal

            case.  The  district court granted summary judgment  in favor

            of  Agent  Varriale  as   to  the  remaining  Bivens  claims,
                                                          ______

            concluding  that the  items which were  the subject  of these

            counts  were lawfully  seized  or detained  or  that, in  any

            event, Agent Varriale was entitled to qualified immunity.

                                         II.

                 Crooker  contends  that  the  district  court  erred  in

            concluding  that he  is collaterally  estopped.  He  cites to

            Haring v. Prosise, 462  U.S. 306 (1983), for  the proposition
            ______    _______

            that entry of a guilty plea does not preclude a litigant from

            bringing a civil claim based  on a Fourth Amendment violation

            arising out  of the same set of operative facts.  The Prosise
                                                                  _______

            Court held, inter alia, that since  a plea can be accepted on
                        _____ ____

            the basis of inadmissible evidence, the legality of  a search

            is not "necessarily  determined" by  a guilty plea.   Id.  at
                                                                  ___

            316.    We need  not consider  whether  the issues  raised by

            Crooker were  precluded by  any adjudication in  the criminal

            case,2  because we  affirm on  alternative grounds  -- namely

                                
            ____________________

            2.  We  note, however, that the Prosise Court stated that one
                                            _______
            concern  which  animated  its  decision  was  the  desire  to
            preserve judicial resources.  "The rule [rejected in Prosise]
                                                                 _______
            would  require an  otherwise  unwilling party  to try  Fourth
            Amendment questions to the hilt and prevail in state court in
            order  to preserve the mere possibility of later bringing a  
            1983  claim in  federal court."   Prosise,  462 U.S.  at 322.
                                              _______
            Further,  the Court noted that  in the case  before it, there
            was  "no   repetitive  use  of  judicial   resources  and  no
            possibility  of  inconsistent  decisions  that  could justify
            precluding  the bringing of such  claims."  Id.  at 322 n.11.
                                                        ___

                                         -5-

            qualified immunity  -- the district court's  grant of summary

            judgment on the counts it deemed precluded.  See Four Corners
                                                         ___ ____________

            Serv.  Station, Inc., 51 F.3d at 314 (appellate court is free
            ____________________

            to affirm on any ground supported by the record).

                 Qualified   immunity    shields   government   officials

            performing discretionary  functions from liability  for civil

            damages so long  as their conduct  "does not violate  clearly

            established  statutory  or constitutional  rights of  which a

            reasonable  [police officer]  would have  known."   Harlow v.
                                                                ______

            Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).  The qualified immunity
            __________

            defense sweeps  broadly,  protecting  "all  but  the  plainly

            incompetent or those who knowingly  violate the law."  Hunter
                                                                   ______

            v.  Bryant, 502  U.S.  224,  229  (1991) (quoting  Malley  v.
                ______                                         ______

            Briggs,  475 U.S. 335, 341  (1986)).  As  this court recently
            ______

            explained,

                      appellate   assessment  of   a  qualified
                      immunity  claim  is apportioned  into two
                      analytic components.  First, if the right
                      asserted  by  the plaintiff  was "clearly
                      established" at  the time of  its alleged
                      violation, we are required to assume that
                      the right was recognized by the defendant
                      official;  second,  we   will  deny   the
                      immunity claim if  a reasonable  official
                      situated in the same circumstances should
                      have   understood  that   the  challenged
                      conduct violated that established right.

            Hegarty v.  Somerset County,  53 F.3d  1367,  1373 (1st  Cir.
            _______     _______________

            1995) (quoting Burns v.  Loranger, 907 F.2d 233,  235-36 (1st
                           _____     ________

                                
            ____________________

            Of course, Crooker's litigation of the suppression motion did
            require the expenditure of scarce judicial resources.

                                         -6-

            Cir. 1990) (citations omitted)).  In the context of qualified

            immunity, summary  judgment  is warranted  if  the  plaintiff

            fails  to generate  a  trialworthy issue  by undermining  the

            evidence  supporting  the  defendant   officer's  objectively

            reasonable  belief that  his actions  were lawful.   Dean  v.
                                                                 ____

            Worcester, 924 F.2d 364, 367 (1st Cir. 1991).
            _________

                 The rights which Crooker says were violated -- the right

            to  be free  from a  search conducted  pursuant to  a warrant

            premised on  deliberate misstatements,  the right to  be free

            from a search conducted pursuant to  a warrant unsupported by

            probable cause  and the right  to be  free from a  search for

            items not adequately described in  the warrant -- are clearly

            established.  Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1978)
                          ______    ________

            (reciting that the Fourth Amendment demands a factual showing

            sufficient to comprise probable cause and demands that  it be

            a  truthful showing); Krohn v. United States, 742 F.2d 24, 26
                                  _____    _____________

            (1st Cir. 1984) (same);  Berger v. New York, 388 U.S.  41, 55
                                     ______    ________

            (1967)  (reciting the  Fourth Amendment's requirement  that a

            warrant  particularly describe  the  things  to  be  seized);

            United  States v. Morris, 977  F.2d 677, 681  (1st Cir. 1992)
            ______________    ______

            (same), cert. denied, 113 S.  Ct. 1588 (1993).  Consequently,
                    ____________

            our  analysis  turns on  whether  a police  officer  in Agent

            Varriale's  position reasonably could  have believed that his

            actions did not violate those rights.  As regards the actions

            surrounding   the   1991  search   warrant,   an  objectively

                                         -7-

            reasonable   officer  could  have  believed  that  Varriale's

            actions did not violate clearly established law.

                 Crooker contends that the following statement, submitted

            by Agent Varriale in support of the 1991 warrant application,

            was deliberately false:

                      In  my  experience,   it  is  common  for
                      individuals   who  are   prohibited  from
                      legally possessing firearms--but who wish
                      to do  so illegally--to have  a household
                      or  family  member  or  associate  who is
                      properly  licensed  to possess  firearms,
                      make purchases of firearms and ammunition
                      which  are  then  in  fact  used  by  the
                      prohibited person.   In this way  persons
                      who    are   prohibited    from   legally
                      possessing firearms are  able to  possess
                      firearms without creating  any record  of
                      transactions in  their name.  Based on my
                      training and experience,  I believe  that
                      such  a ruse  is likely  where, as  here,
                      significant  amounts  of  ammunition  are
                      being  received  through mail  orders and
                      the purchasing party  need not appear  in
                      person.

            Crooker argues that this statement is false because it is not

            "common"  for  prohibited  individuals  to  buy  firearms and

            ammunition  through family  members  and that  the amount  of

            ammunition  bought was  not  "significant."   He proposed  to

            demonstrate that such schemes were not "common," by comparing

            the  large number of lawful  gun owners in  the United States

            with the small number of  "straw-purchasing" schemes detected

            each year by  law enforcement.3   And he  contended that  the

                                
            ____________________

            3.  Crooker  neither   produced  such  data,   nor  requested
            additional time within which to  do so.  See Fed. R.  Civ. P.
                                                     ___
            56(f).

                                         -8-

            amount   of   ammunition  purchased   could  not   be  termed

            "significant"  when compared with the 2,000 - 6,000 pounds of

            ammunition Crooker's supplier shipped daily.

                 Crooker's  claims  fall   far  short  of   generating  a

            trialworthy dispute as to whether Agent Varriale deliberately

            supported  his warrant  application  with false  information.

            Rather,  his argument amounts to  little more than a semantic

            game.  Crooker produced absolutely no evidence  to refute the

            statement  that  Agent  Varriale,  based  on his  experience,

            considered firearms purchases by close family members to be a

            common  method  by which  prohibited  individuals attempt  to

            acquire firearms illegally.   A law enforcement officer, with

            experience in such matters,  could reasonably conclude that a

            particular pattern of criminal  behavior was "common" without

            undertaking a  statistical analysis encompassing  all firearm

            purchases in  the United  States.   And a reasonable  officer

            reasonably  could  conclude  that  the  fifty-one  boxes   of

            ammunition which were delivered to Crooker's residence during

            the previous four months  represented a "significant"  amount

            of ammunition.

                 Crooker's  second  claim  is  that  the  search  of  his

            premises  violated  the  Fourth  Amendment because  the  1991

            search warrant  was not  supported by  probable cause.   Once

            again,  we inquire  whether  a reasonable  officer, in  Agent

                                         -9-

            Varriale's position, reasonably  could have  believed that  a

            search did not violate Crooker's rights.

                 In  United States  v.  Leon, 468  U.S.  897 (1984),  the
                     _____________      ____

            Supreme  Court held  that  evidence seized  under an  invalid

            warrant, believed in good  faith to be valid by  the officers

            who  executed   it,  should  not  be   suppressed  under  the

            exclusionary rule.   Leon explicitly noted  that the standard
                                 ____

            of "objective reasonableness"  used in assessing a  qualified
                                           ____ __ _________ _  _________

            immunity defense  should be  used to determine  when evidence
            ________ _______

            seized  under  a  technically  invalid  warrant,  should   be

            excluded.  Id. at 922.  The Court stated,
                       ___

                      [I]n most  such cases, there is no police
                                                      __ ______
                      illegality and thus nothing to deter. . .
                      __________
                      . In the ordinary case, an officer cannot
                      be expected to question  the magistrate's
                      probable-cause   determination   or   his
                      judgment  that the form of the warrant is
                      technically  sufficient.     '[O]nce  the
                      warrant   issues,   there  is   literally
                      nothing  more the  policeman  can  do  in
                      seeking to  comply with the law.'   Stone
                                                          _____
                      v.  Powell,  428  U.S.  465,  498  (1976)
                          ______
                      (Burger, C.J. concurring).

            Id. at 921 (emphasis added).
            ___

                 In Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), the Court made
                    ______    ______

            clear  that the Leon analysis serves as well in the qualified
                            ____

            immunity  analysis  applicable  to  police  officers  in  the

            position of Agent Varriale.

                      [W]e  hold  that  the  same  standard  of
                      objective reasonableness  that we applied
                      in  the context of  a suppression hearing
                      in Leon, [468  U.S. 897 (1984),]  defines
                         ____
                      the   qualified   immunity  accorded   an

                                         -10-

                      officer  whose  request  for   a  warrant
                      allegedly   caused  an   unconstitutional
                      arrest.      Only   where   the   warrant
                      application is so  lacking in indicia  of
                      probable  cause  as  to  render  official
                      belief  in  its  existence  unreasonable,
                      Leon,  [468 U.S.] at 923, will the shield
                      ____
                      of immunity be lost.

            Id. at 344-45 (footnote omitted).
            ___

                 The  Leon Court  set  forth three  circumstances wherein
                      ____

            good-faith  reliance  upon  a neutral  magistrate's  probable

            cause  determination   could  not   be  found.     First,  in

            circumstances  where  the  police  submitted   affidavits  in

            support  of  the warrant  application,  which  they knew,  or

            should have known,  were false.  Id.  at 923.  The  affidavit
                                             ___

            submitted in support of the 1991 search  warrant contained no

            such statements.  Second,  the police cannot place good-faith

            reliance  upon  a  warrant issued  by  a  magistrate who  has

            "wholly  abandoned his judicial role."  Id.  There is no such
                                                    ___

            suggestion in  this case.   Third,  the police  cannot assert

            good-faith  reliance on a warrant  issued on the  basis of an

            application  which was  "so  facially deficient  -- i.e.,  in
                                                                ____

            failing  to particularize  the  place to  be searched  or the

            things to  be seized  -- that  the executing officers  cannot

            reasonably presume it  to be valid."   Id.  The  1991 warrant
                                                   ___

            issued for  Crooker's residence  was entirely regular  on its

            face.   Consequently,  in  executing the  1991 warrant  Agent

            Varriale was  entitled to place good-faith  reliance upon the

                                         -11-

            search  warrant,  as  an  objectively  reasonable  basis  for

            executing the warranted search of Crooker's residence.

                 Crooker's third  claim is  that the search  conducted by

            Agent  Varriale exceeded  the  scope  of  the warrant.    The

            warrant  authorized a  search for  "ammunition  and firearms,

            possession  of  which constitute  a  violation  of Title  18,

            United  States Code,  Section  922(g),  firearms  maintenance

            equipment, records of  purchases, deliveries and receipts  of

            firearms and ammunition, including  invoices, bills of sale .

            . . and correspondence which constitute evidence of violation

            of [18 U.S.C.   922(g)]."

                 Crooker  first  contends  that  seizure  of  the  modern

            firearms was outside the scope of the warrant, because  Agent

            Varriale  did not  have probable  cause to  believe that  the

            firearms actually  belonged to him (and  hence were possessed

            in  violation of   922(g)) and not Susan Bartnicki, with whom

            he was living  at the time of  the November 1991 search  (and

            who   was  not   barred   from  possession   by      922(g)).

            Nonetheless, a  reasonable officer could reach the conclusion

            that the firearms were possessed by Crooker based upon 1) the

            fact that Crooker had signed for and tendered the payment for

            ten boxes of ammunition,  2) the fact that the  firearms were

            within  Crooker's residence and 3)  the fact that  the key to

            the gun safe was hanging in Crooker's bedroom.

                                         -12-

                 Crooker  also  contends  that  the  seizure  of  antique

            firearms was outside  the scope of the warrant,  because they

            are not  within the  purview of    922(g).   See 18  U.S.C.  
                                                         ___

            921(a)(3), (16) (defining antique firearms and exempting same

            from definition  of "firearms"  regulated under    922).   We

            affirm  summary judgment  for  Agent Varriale  on this  count

            because,  in any event, Crooker  did not allege any violation

            of  his Fourth Amendment right with respect to the seizure of
                ___

            the antique firearms.   "Fourth Amendment rights are personal

            rights which, like some  other constitutional rights, may not

            be  vicariously asserted."   Alderman  v. United  States, 394
                                         ________     ______________

            U.S.  165, 174  (1967).   The Fourth  Amendment's prohibition

            against  unreasonable seizures protects a possessory interest

            in  property.    "[A]  seizure  deprives  the  individual  of

            dominion  over his  or her  person or  property."   Horton v.
                                                                ______

            California, 496 U.S.  128, 133 (1990).4  Although Crooker has
            __________

            claimed  that, even as a convicted felon, he may lawfully own

            and possess antique firearms, he alleged in the Bivens "Third
                                                            ______

            Amended  Complaint"  that  the  particular  antique  firearms

            seized  pursuant to  the  November 1991  warrant belonged  to

                                
            ____________________

            4.  Of  course, the  Fourth  Amendment also  protects against
            unreasonable searches.  "A  search compromises the individual
            interest in  privacy."  Horton, 496 U.S. at 128.  Crooker had
                                    ______
            a legitimate expectation in  the privacy of his home.  As the
            searching officers had a  valid search warrant and discovered
            the antique firearms  during the  course of,  and within  the
            permissible  scope of,  their  authorized  search for  modern
            firearms,   however,  Crooker's  privacy   interest  was  not
            violated.

                                         -13-

            Bartnicki,  who is not a party to this complaint.  Similarly,

            Crooker  may not complain about the seizure of the ammunition

            taken from an antique  firearm during the course of  the July

            1992  search  as  he  has  alleged  that  that  firearm   and

            ammunition belonged to Bartnicki.5

                 As to the remaining items seized under the 1991 warrant,

            we agree with the district court.6  The address book and  the

            firearms record card and handwritten notes were either within

            the scope  of the warrant authorizing the seizure of "records

            of  purchases,  deliveries  and  receipts  of  firearms   and

            ammunition, including .  . . correspondence  which constitute

            evidence  of  violation  of  Title 18,  United  States  Code,

            Section 922(g)" or legitimately seized as being within "plain

            view."  We further  agree that, in any event,  Agent Varriale

            was  entitled  to  qualified  immunity because  a  reasonable

            officer in Varriale's position  could so believe.  Similarly,

            we conclude  that the legal papers  and firearms publications

            (counts which  the district court found  barred by collateral

            estoppel) were constitutionally seized as within the scope of

            the  warrant, in  plain view,  or that,  in any  event, Agent

            Varriale is entitled to qualified immunity.

                                
            ____________________

            5.  Crooker was never charged in his criminal proceeding with
            the unlawful possession of any of the antique firearms seized
            in November 1991 or the ammunition seized in July 1992.

            6.  We also  agree with the district  court's conclusion with
            respect  to  Crooker's complaint  about  the  detention of  a
            package from Shooter's Equipment Company.

                                         -14-

                 Finally, although not raised as a  separate count in his

            Bivens  complaint, during  the course  of the  district court
            ______

            proceedings Crooker  complained about the  retention of items

            seized.   Whether  Agent Varriale was  personally responsible
                                                   __________

            for the retention of the items and had authority to order the
                    _________

            return of items taken in the search  and, thus, is the proper

            defendant  with respect  to such  a claim  is of  some doubt.

            See, e.g., Go-Bart Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 354-55
            _________  ___________    _____________

            (1931) (reciting that because  the United States Attorney had

            control  of  the prosecution,  the  papers  seized were  held

            subject  to  his  control  and  direction,  although  in  the

            immediate care and  custody of the officer  who seized them);

            Thompson  v.   Williamson,  962  F.2d  12   (8th  Cir.  1992)
            ________       __________

            (unpublished  per  curiam)  (affirming  summary  judgment  in

            Bivens  action seeking  return  of property  in favor  of FBI
            ______

            agent who alleged  that he could not release property without

            approval of AUSA).  In any event,  Crooker has not been clear

            as to which items he refers.   He, of course, is not entitled

            to the return of  any contraband.  And, insofar as Crooker is

            referring to the antique firearms seized in November 1991 and

            the  ammunition seized  in  July 1992,  Crooker's failure  to

            establish that  he is the rightful owner,  see supra, defeats
                                                       ___ _____

            this  claim.   Finally,  insofar as  he  may be  referring to

            personal  papers, Crooker  now states  that his  property has

                                         -15-

            been returned.   We conclude, therefore,  that this claim  is

            moot.

                 Affirmed.
                 _________

                                         -16-