Court Opinion

ID: 9606489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:50:19.391728+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:13.249285
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
Nominal damages are recoverable in a legal malpractice action provided plaintiff carries the burden of proving that he or she was wronged. Thus, a cause of action for legal malpractice can be maintained whether or not actual damages are proven and submitted to the jury on the issue of nominal damages. Spence v. Hilliard, 181 Ga. App. 767, 768 (353 SE2d 634). While the majority would distinguish Spence and other cases predicated upon Jankowski v. Taylor, Bishop & Lee, 246 Ga. 804, 806 (1) (273 SE2d 16), so as not to require an application of the rules stated therein to the case sub judice, I do not agree and therefore respectfully dissent.
Rather than distinguishing Spence v. Hilliard, 181 Ga. App. 767, supra, I would distinguish the authority cited by the majority for the proposition that nominal damages are not recoverable in the case sub judice. While Spence may reflect peculiar eccentricities of the law in Georgia regarding the award of nominal damages, it faithfully follows many cases which preceded it. On the other hand, Rogers v. Norvell, 174 Ga. App. 453, 457 (2) (330 SE2d 392), cited by the majority for the proposition that in a legal malpractice action proof that the attorney’s negligence proximately caused the client harm is necessary for recovery is a two-judge case of this court and is not binding authority. Parten v. Swan, 183 Ga. App. 364, 365 (358 SE2d 906), adopts the position of the Rogers case without , any mention of, and thus apparently overlooking, the decision in Spence v. Hilliard, 181 Ga. App. 767, supra.
Additionally, in my view Black v. New Holland Baptist Church, 122 Ga. App. 606, 609 (1) (178 SE2d 571), cited by the majority, does not stand for the proposition for which it is cited. The majority opinion cites this case for the proposition that “the plaintiff must show he sustained injury or damages as a result of the negligent act or omission to act in some duty owed to him.” In Black the plaintiff was injured when a rotten step broke and there is no question arising from an absence of a showing of injury in that case.
The majority’s reliance upon Clements v. Hendi, 182 Ga. App. 118, 119 (2) (354 SE2d 700), and Meeks v. Coan, 165 Ga. App. 731, 733-734 (2) (302 SE2d 418), is also misplaced. Both of these cases are the progeny of Carroll v. Griffin, 96 Ga. App. 826, 828-829 (101 SE2d 764). Carroll, which some 30 years ago announced without any citation of authority a supposedly “well settled” general rule “that before an action for a tort will lie, there must be an injury accompanying such tort,” has been cited in the interval for the proposition advocated by the majority only in the two cases cited by the majority. I suggest that Carroll which precedes notice pleading under the Civil *355Practice Act is hardly authority in relation to the issue of nominal damages, which was not discussed in the case and may not have been pleaded. Moreover, Carroll clearly conflicts with the line of cases which led to Spence and Jankowski.
Indeed, the reasoning of the majority is broadly applicable to negligence cases in general and if adopted would radically alter Georgia law by terminating the award of nominal damages in negligence cases where damages are not proven. Therefore, I would reverse the grant of summary judgment to appellee in both cases.
I am authorized to state that Judge Pope joins in this dissent.