Court Opinion

ID: 9698860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:01:45.893078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:44.116049
License: Public Domain

*377J. X. Theiler, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The majority determines that the rule1 and statute2 in referring to "trustee” means also "trustee in bankruptcy”. The modifying phrase, "in bankruptcy”, like the traditional modifier to "yankee”, is such that the one should not be found without the other. Had the drafters of the rule and statute intended such a person to be the proper one to be served, they should have said so, specifically.
A trustee in bankruptcy is an arm of the court, not the bankrupt. Being a creation of Federal law, duties cannot be imposed on him by state action.
The statue and rule seek means of service that are "reasonably calculated to give him actual notice of the proceedings and an opportunity to be heard * * *”. This is the standard used in GCR 1963, 105.8, whereby a court may authorize another form of service than that specified by other rules.
The result of service on a trustee in bankruptcy can easily be predicted. Having no obligation to give notice, having no personal interest in the bankrupt and the administration of the estate not being involved, it is no small wonder that nothing is done and notice dies aborning. As the majority recognizes, "[a] suit filed subsequent to an adjudication in bankruptcy, as in this case, is not provable in bankruptcy”. Since the assets being administered are not affected, why is there any reasonable expectation that the trustee in bankruptcy would bother to forward notice to the. real party in interest?
The majority further rule that noncompliance with the mailing requirement of GCR 1963, *378105.4(2) is excused and hold the requirement to provide notice by mail may be met by something "more expensive and reliable”. It should be noted that the attempt to give such notice was totally ineffective; so in what way such attempt was better, I am at a loss to understand. A letter in hand may have been passed on, or so the rule and statute contemplated. Where jurisdiction and procedural due process are involved, compliance with the rule should be required. If liberality be indicated, it should not be in the ad hoc rewriting of the rule, but in the exercise of discretion as provided in GCR 1963, 105.8.

 GCR 1963, 105.4(2).

 MCL 600.1920(2); MSA 27A.1920(2).