Court Opinion

ID: 9692528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:56:35.730827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:35.146572
License: Public Domain

O’KELLEY, District Judge
(concurring) :
I agree completely with the opinion of Judge Moye in this case.
It would appear that the dissent has attempted to reach the merits of the case before deciding the threshold question, that is if it should even have the ease in the first place. The dissenting opinion would imply that our brothers on the state bench are neither willing nor able to apply the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. I do not agree that that is so. If a state trial judge errs, the Supreme Court of Georgia is available to correct his error. If they both err, that is not the end of the avenue when a federal constitutional right is at stake. The Supreme Court of the United States may accept certiorari and review the case even though it has found its course there through the state court system. This is federalism.
The Seventh Circuit has applied the principle of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971) to civil actions. Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603, (7 Cir. 1972). More recently, the Fourth Circuit, speaking through Judge Craven, extended that principle to the civil field saying:
“The long-standing public policy against federal court interference with state court proceedings [generally means that] the jurisdiction of a state court first obtained should not be interfered with by federal courts.
“[The] ‘pendency’ of state proceedings is one of the most important criteria in determining whether federal court intervention in state action is appropriate. . . . Because of the costs involved, in terms of both time and money, the divisive effect of unnecessary friction between coordinate courts, and the clear obligation of state courts to decide questions arising under the [United States] Constitution, . . . there is a presumption against federal interference.” Lynch v. Snepp, 472 F.2d 769 (4 Cir. 1973).
The Lynch case like this case dealt with a First Amendment question. The court implied that the statute at issue was possibly overbroad and imposed a prior restraint on the parties. That court felt, as does this court, that in or*1104der for the federal court to intervene, there must be no adequate remedy or appellate process in the state courts.
In the case sub judice, there is a single controversy pending in a court of the State of Georgia which may be litigated and appealed to a final determination. There is no allegation of harassment or inadequate remedy in the state court machinery.
If the statute under attack is so clearly unconstitutional as contended by the dissent, surely the Georgia courts will so hold. I am of the opinion that they should first have that opportunity since that statute has never been before them for consideration.
For the foregoing reasons, this court should abstain from interference in the pending litigation and I concur with the opinion and order of Judge Moye.