Court Opinion

ID: 9931507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-09 13:01:41.029536+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:29.165675
License: Public Domain

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   CAZENOVIA CREEK FUNDING I, LLC v. LOUIS
     ROMAN, IN TRUST FOR ALEXANDRIA K.
                ROMAN ET AL.
                  (AC 45810)
                      Alvord, Elgo and Eveleigh, Js.

                                  Syllabus

The plaintiff sought to foreclose on certain real property owned by the
   named defendant, a trust. R filed a self-represented appearance in the
   action on behalf of the trust, and the trial court sua sponte struck R’s
   appearance as improper, finding that the trust could only be represented
   by counsel. The court rendered a judgment of foreclosure by sale, and
   R appealed to this court, which dismissed the appeal on the basis that
   R was not a party to the action and could not file an appeal on behalf
   of the trust in a representative capacity. Thereafter, in the trial court,
   R filed two motions to dismiss the action against the trust, which the
   trial court denied. R subsequently filed a motion to substitute himself
   as the defendant, to which he attached a quitclaim deed that transferred
   the property from R as trustee to himself individually, which the court
   denied. The court then denied R’s third motion to dismiss the action
   for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and R appealed to this court.
   Held that this court dismissed the appeal because R, who was neither
   a party to the action nor an attorney, appeared without counsel on
   behalf of a trust and did not have the authority to represent the trust
   pursuant to statute (§ 51-88): to the extent that the appeal was brought
   by R in his individual capacity, the appeal was dismissed on the basis
   that R was not a party to the action, as the defendant in the action was
   the trust, and, although R filed documents indicating that the property
   had been transferred from the trust to himself, R had not moved to
   intervene in the action in his individual capacity, and the court had
   denied his motion to substitute himself in his individual capacity for
   the trust; moreover, to the extent that R, a nonattorney, appeared on
   behalf of the trust in a representative capacity, R was not representing
   his own cause in this appeal and, therefore, did not have the authority
   pursuant to § 51-88 (d) (2) to represent the trust.
  Submitted on briefs January 4—officially released February 13, 2024

                            Procedural History

  Action to foreclose a mortgage on certain real prop-
erty of the named defendant, and for other relief,
brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of
Fairfield, where the named defendant was defaulted
for failure to appear; thereafter, the court, Bruno, J.,
rendered judgment of foreclosure by sale; subsequently,
the court, Hon. Dale Radcliffe, judge trial referee,
denied the motion to dismiss filed by Louis Roman;
thereafter, Benchmark Municipal Tax Services, Ltd.,
was substituted as the plaintiff, and Louis Roman
appealed to this court. Appeal dismissed.
  Louis Roman, self-represented, filed a brief as the
appellant.
  Juda J. Epstein, filed a brief for the appellee (substi-
tute plaintiff).
  PER CURIAM. Louis Roman appeals from the judg-
ment of the trial court denying his motion to dismiss
this foreclosure action for lack of subject matter juris-
diction. Roman filed this appeal as a self-represented
litigant seeking to represent the interests of the named
defendant, Louis Roman, in Trust for Alexandria K.
Roman and Dakota T. Roman (trust).1 Because Roman,
who is neither a party to this action nor an attorney,
has appeared without counsel on behalf of a trust, we
conclude that Roman does not have the authority to
represent the trust. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
   The following procedural history is relevant to our
resolution of this appeal. In June, 2017, the plaintiff,
Cazenovia Creek Funding I, LLC,2 commenced a foreclo-
sure action against the trust. On August 10, 2017, Roman
filed a self-represented appearance in this foreclosure
action on behalf of the trust. On December 21, 2018,
the trial court, Bellis, J., sua sponte struck Roman’s
appearance and any filings filed on behalf of the trust
as improper, finding that the trust may only be repre-
sented by counsel. A default for failure to appear was
granted against the trust on January 24, 2019. On Janu-
ary 31, 2019, Roman filed another appearance, as ‘‘Louis
Roman, under a power of attorney from the trust,’’
apparently seeking again to represent the trust. On Feb-
ruary 11, 2019, the trial court, Bruno, J., rendered a
judgment of foreclosure by sale and set a sale date
of June 15, 2019. On June 12, 2019, Roman filed an
appearance as ‘‘Louis Roman, Pro Se,’’ despite not being
named individually as a defendant in the complaint.
  Roman appealed from the court’s February 11, 2019
judgment of foreclosure, and this court dismissed the
appeal on the basis that, first, Roman is not a party to
the action and, second, he cannot file an appeal on
behalf of the trust in a representative capacity.
   Thereafter, Roman filed with the trial court two
motions to dismiss the foreclosure action against the
trust, arguing, inter alia, that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the action. The plaintiff
objected to both motions and argued, inter alia, that
Roman is not an attorney and is improperly appearing
on behalf of the trust. The court denied both motions.
   On January 28, 2022, Roman filed a motion to substi-
tute ‘‘Louis Roman for Louis Roman in trust for Alexan-
dria K. Roman and Dakota T. Roman, et al. as party
defendant,’’ attaching a quitclaim deed that transferred
the property from Roman as trustee to himself individu-
ally.3 The trial court, Hon. Dale W. Radcliffe, judge trial
referee, denied the motion on April 7, 2022, stating:
‘‘Roman represents that the trusts have been terminated
or revoked. Therefore, any interest they might have had
is an interest that he has individually, and he is already a
self-represented party. The motions . . . are DENIED
without prejudice. To the extent that . . . Roman rep-
resents his own interest, he has standing to do so as a
self-represented party.’’
   The plaintiff filed a motion to reset the sale date,
alleging that Roman had filed a bankruptcy petition and
a bankruptcy court had granted the plaintiff’s motion
for relief from stay. The court granted the plaintiff’s
motion and set a new sale date of July 16, 2022. Roman
again appealed, and this court issued a delinquency
order dismissing the appeal for Roman’s failure to file
any of the Practice Book § 63-4 documents.
   On July 1, 2022, Roman filed with the trial court a
third motion to dismiss the foreclosure action against
the trust on the basis that the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction over the action. The plaintiff filed
an objection to Roman’s motion to dismiss on August
4, 2022, and argued, inter alia, that the motion ‘‘is . . .
procedurally deficient. [Roman] . . . can only repre-
sent himself and his own interests. He is not permitted
under Connecticut law to represent the interests of
others, which would constitute the unauthorized prac-
tice of law.’’ On August 24, 2022, the court held argument
on the third motion to dismiss. The court orally denied
the motion to dismiss and subsequently issued a written
order that same day reiterating its denial of the motion
on the basis that the court does have subject matter
jurisdiction over the action. This appeal followed.
  Prior to oral argument in this appeal, this court issued
an order, sua sponte, instructing the parties to be pre-
pared to address ‘‘whether this appeal should be dis-
missed as to . . . Roman, individually, because he is
not a party to this action . . . and whether this appeal
should be dismissed as to [the trust], because . . .
Roman is not an attorney and cannot file an appeal in
a representative capacity.’’ (Citation omitted.) Roman
did not appear before this court for oral argument and,
instead, filed a request to have argument rescheduled
or have his case taken on the papers. This court granted
Roman’s request to consider his appeal on the papers.
   We first address whether this appeal, to the extent
that it is brought by Roman in his individual capacity,
should be dismissed on the basis that he is not a party
to this action. General Statutes § 52-263 provides in
relevant part: ‘‘[I]f either party is aggrieved by the deci-
sion of the court . . . he may appeal to the court having
jurisdiction from the final judgment . . . .’’ Accord-
ingly, ‘‘the appellant must be a party’’ in order to ‘‘estab-
lish subject matter jurisdiction for appellate review
. . . .’’ State v. Salmon, 250 Conn. 147, 153, 735 A.2d
333 (1999).
   In this case, the defendant in the underlying foreclo-
sure action is the trust and not Roman in his individual
capacity. Although Roman filed documents with the
trial court indicating that the subject property has been
transferred from the trust to him, even if that is true,
the fact remains that Roman is not a party to the action.
Roman has not moved to intervene in the action in his
individual capacity, and his motion to substitute himself
in his individual capacity for the trust was denied by the
court. Thus, this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
over the portion of the appeal brought by Roman in his
individual capacity because he is not a party to the
underlying action.
   We next address whether this appeal should be dis-
missed to the extent that Roman appears on behalf of
the trust in a representative capacity. General Statutes
§ 51-88 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘Unless a person
is providing legal services pursuant to statute or rule
of the Superior Court, a person who has not been admit-
ted as an attorney under the provisions of section 51-
80 . . . shall not: (1) Practice law or appear as an attor-
ney-at-law for another in any court of record in this
state . . . or (8) otherwise engage in the practice of
law as defined by statute or rule of the Superior Court.’’
Subsection (d) of § 51-88, however, provides in relevant
part: ‘‘The provisions of this section shall not be con-
strued as prohibiting . . . (2) any person from practic-
ing law or pleading at the bar of any court of this state
in his or her own cause . . . .’’
   ‘‘The authorization to appear pro se is limited to rep-
resenting one’s own cause, and does not permit individ-
uals to appear pro se in a representative capacity.’’
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ellis v. Cohen, 118
Conn. App. 211, 215, 982 A.2d 1130 (2009). ‘‘It is well
established in our jurisprudence that a nonattorney
does not have the authority to maintain an appeal on
behalf of a trust. . . . The authorization to appear [self-
represented] is limited to representing one’s own cause,
and does not permit individuals to appear [self-repre-
sented] in a representative capacity.’’ (Citation omit-
ted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omit-
ted.) Cook v. Purtill, 195 Conn. App. 828, 830–31, 228
A.3d 128 (2020).
   In the present case, Roman, who is not an attorney,
filed this appeal in his capacity as representative of
the trust. Because Roman is not representing his ‘‘own
cause’’ in this appeal; General Statutes § 51-88 (d) (2);
he does not have the authority pursuant to § 51-88 to
represent the trust.
      The appeal is dismissed.
  1
     Edward McGivern and Aquarion Water Company of Connecticut were
also named as defendants in this action, but they did not appear in the
trial court and are not participating in this appeal. Water Pollution Control
Authority of the City of Bridgeport, Fairfield County Federal Credit Union,
and the Department of the Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, also were
named as defendants in this action and, although they appeared in the trial
court, they are not participating in this appeal.
   2
     The action originally was commenced by Cazenovia Creek Funding I,
LLC, but, on April 7, 2022, the trial court granted a motion to substitute
Benchmark Municipal Tax Services, Ltd., as the plaintiff.
   3
     Roman filed two motions to substitute on January 28, 2022. The only
difference between the motions is that one does not have the exhibits
referenced in the motion included as attachments.