Court Opinion

ID: 9629438
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:42:55.000415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:19.242797
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J.,
Concurring. — Were this a matter of first impression, we
should hold defendant’s failure to object constitutes consent to the declaration of a mistrial, estopping him from now entering a plea of once in jeopardy.
The purpose of the constitutional provision against double jeopardy is to prevent harassment of a defendant by repeated trials on the same criminal charge. (People v. Upshaw (1974) 13 Cal.3d 29, 34 [117 Cal.Rptr. 668, 528 P.2d 756].) That purpose is not served by barring further trial in this case, for there is not the slightest hint of intent to harass here. To the contrary, it is absolutely clear that the mistrial was declared solely to protect defendant’s constitutional right to an unbiased jury. Because the action was taken for defendant’s benefit, his silence may reasonably be understood as acquiescence. To permit defendant to assert the bar of *334former jeopardy in these circumstances elevates form over sense, frustrating substantial justice. This court has before held defendant’s failure to object does not constitute consent to declaration of mistrial. (See Curry v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 707, 713 [87 Cal.Rptr. 361, 470 P.2d 345]; People v. Compton (1971) 6 Cal.3d 55, 63 [98 Cal.Rptr. 217, 490 P.2d 537]; see also People v. Valenti (1957) 49 Cal.2d 199, 202, 208-209 [316 P.2d 633].) In deference to the doctrine of stare decisis, I reluctantly concur in today’s judgment.