Court Opinion

ID: 9488877
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:58:09.113944+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:09.490995
License: Public Domain

BOOCHEVER, Circuit Judge,
partial concurrence and partial dissent:
If we take judicial notice of 1990 census data showing the number of Hispanics eligible for jury service, which was presented to us two weeks before the oral arguments on this appeal, I would agree with the majority’s opinion holding that Esquivel has failed to make a prima facie case of a Sixth Amendment violation. Esquivel opposed the request contending that the late presentation did not afford her the opportunity to confer with experts and to place experts’ opinions before the court.
If this case merely affected Esquivel, I would have no hesitancy in joining the majority opinion, but it affects the jury representation of a “distinctive,” “cognizable” group whose numbers are between one-fourth and one-third of the residents of the Southern District of California. In order to preserve the appearance of fairness and to recognize the interest of this sizable group of residents, I believe that the better procedure is to remand the judicial notice request to the district court so that Esquivel has a full opportunity to challenge the figures.
I note that in a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the Supreme Court has granted certiorari to review the government’s refusal to correct alleged errors in the 1990 census count concerning omissions of a disproportionate number of Black and Hispanic residents of large cities. *552See City of N.Y. v. United States Dep’t of Commerce, 34 F.3d 1114 (2d Cir.1994), cert. granted sub nom., Wisconsin v. City of N.Y., — U.S. -, 116 S.Ct. 38, 132 L.Ed.2d 919 (1995).
If it were not for the additional statistics presented in the request to take judicial notice, this would present a very close case of whether there was sufficient statistical representation to place the burden on the government for an explanation. Compare Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 359, 90 S.Ct. 532, 539-40, 24 L.Ed.2d 567 (1970) (disparity of 23% sufficient to create presumption); Whitus v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 545, 550, 87 S.Ct. 643, 646-47, 17 L.Ed.2d 599 (1967) (18%); Gibson v. Zant, 705 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir.1983) (20%) with United States v. Sanchez-Lopez, 879 F.2d 541, 547 (9th Cir.1989) (disparity of 2.8% insufficient to create presumption); United States v. Rodriguez, 776 F.2d 1509, 1511 (11th Cir.1985) (6.7%); United States v. Suttiswad, 696 F.2d 645, 648 (9th Cir.1982) (7.7%). It will be unnecessary for us to determine whether a threshold lower than that relied upon in previous cases is sufficient, if the request for judicial notice is granted. I, however, believe that the preferable course is a remand.