Court Opinion

ID: 9453994
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:31:52.360937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:55.097249
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent principally on two grounds. First, the Government failed at the hearing to sustain its burden of proving that the convictions were untainted by the illegal eavesdropping on the BurrisSigelbaum conversation. Second, the Government failed at the trial to disclose to either the district court or the *388defense counsel the existence of statements that were arguably within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 3500.
I.
The salient facts surrounding the illegally overheard conversation and the use the Government made of it are as follows.
During 1962, 1963, and part of January 1964, Federal Bureau of Investigation agent John Connors, who was assigned to the F.B.I. office in Miami, Florida, conducted an investigation of defendant Samuel Hyman and his Key West Foundation Company properties, defendant Calvin Koven’s activities in connection with the Pension Fund, and defendant James R. Hoffa’s activities in connection with Pension Fund loans. Agent Connors initially examined the records of the Key West Foundation on two separate occasions in 1962. He again examined these records in 1963 and 1964 while he was working in Chicago with the Government prosecutors in preparation for the trial of this case which occurred during the summer months of 1964. At the trial, agent Connors testified on behalf of the Government. His testimony related mainly to the contents of the books and records of the Key West Foundation.
At the hearing in 1967 in the district court, conducted pursuant to the remand ordered by the Supreme Court, Hoffa v. United States, 387 U.S. 231, 87 S.Ct. 1583, 18 L.Ed.2d 738 (1967), the Government disclosed that a conversation between Benjamin Sigelbaum and the defendant George Burris, occurring on December 2, 1963 in Sigelbaum’s Miami, Florida office, had been overheard surreptitiously by means of an electronic device. According to the testimony at the hearing, the two F.B.I. clerks, who were monitoring the conversation, contemporaneously prepared a log of the eavesdropped conversation.1 Thereafter the log was routed by an F.B.I. supervisor to agent Connors, although another F.B.I. agent was assigned to the investigation being conducted of Sigelbaum in connection with activity unrelated to the instant case. .
After studying the log, agent Connors prepared a summary report of the information contained in the log. This report, dated December 26, 1963 and containing direct quotations from the log, was sent to F.B.I. headquarters in Washington, D. C. No attempt was made to conceal the fact that the report reflected an overheard conversation.
On January 11, 1964 agent Connors prepared a second report of the information contained in the log. According to agent Connor’s testimony at the hearing, this report was a “resubmission of the December 26, 1963 memo after administrative corrections.” A comparison of the two reports indicates that, unlike the first report, the second report was written in an attempt to camouflage the fact that the information in the report was obtained from a “bugged” conversation. Copies of this second report were forwarded to the F.B.I. headquarters and also to that agency’s Chicago office where it was turned over to the Government prosecutors in charge of the instant prosecution. This copy of the January 11 report shows notations and comments in the margin of the document placed there by the Government attorneys. In addition certain words of the report are underlined, presumably by these same attorneys. The pertinent part of the report, insofar as it concerns the Key West Foundation loans from the Pension Funds, reads: “Burris felt, according to the source, that in the Key West case, Sam Hyman used the money a little differently when he first obtained it and then ultimately put it into *389the property.”2 (Emphasis in original.) In the margin of the report adjacent to this statement appears the comment of a Government attorney, “Does this check out?”
At the trial in 1964, agent Connors testified extensively with regard to information contained in an accounting summary he prepared which reflected the income and expenditures of the Key West Foundation during the period from November 1, 1959 to December 31, 1960. On voir dire examination conducted by defense counsel prior to the admission of the summary into evidence, agent Connors testified that this document and the underlying work sheets were not prepared until two weeks before he testified. He also testified that he had been instructed by the Government trial counsel that his summarization of the Key West Foundation records should terminate as of December 31, 1960. During this same examination, he admitted that he had destroyed work sheets which he had prepared earlier.3
At the hearing on remand in 1967, the Government produced a document prepared by agent Connors on October 8, 1963 which he characterized as a “memorandum.”4 This document disclosed the fact that around September 30, 1963 agent Connors had consulted with Government trial counsel “concerning accounting summaries [of the records of the Key West Foundation] to be prepared for the forthcoming trial. * * *» The document indicated that
these summaries should reflect the “source of all funds” received by the Key West Foundation and the “disposition of such funds” for the period “10/27/59 — 4/30/61.” 5
*390Furthermore, at the hearing, agent Connors again admitted (on cross-examination) that after he had consulted with the Government prosecutors, he had destroyed his work sheets prepared prior to those from which he testified at the trial. On this occasion, he also admitted that the destroyed work sheets had covered a period of time different from the period covered by those used at the trial.6
Testimony at the trial in 1964 by a defense accounting expert concerning the records of the Key West Foundation showed that the Key West Foundation had expended a large sum of money for building improvements and construction not only in 1960 but also in 1961. The work sheets which agent Connors prepared after consultation with the Government prosecutors around September 30, 1963 presumably also reflected the expenditures for both years. However, the accounting summary prepared by agent Connors, shortly before he testified at the trial but shortly after the Government was aware of the content of *391the Burris-Sigelbaum conversation, did not reflect the 1961 expenditures.
The inferences from the foregoing facts are apparent. After the Government learned through the overheard conversation, that Hyman’s defense would probably be that although he had used the Pension Fund loan proceeds “a little bit differently when he first obtained” them, he had “ultimately put * * * [them] into the property,” the Government prosecutors instructed agent Connors to terminate his accounting summary of the Key West Foundation records as of December 31, 1960 and to destroy his previous work sheets which reflected a longer time period.
The Government insists, however, that it made no use of the overheard conversation. In support of this contention, the Government argues that its prosecutive theory was to show that defendant Hyman made “false representations to the Pension Fund that he [Key West Foundation] had, during 1960, incurred construction expenditures totalling over $700,000”; that evidence independent of agent Connors’ testimony showed that no such construction expenditures had been incurred; and that agent Connors’ testimony corroborated this evidence by showing that the Key West Foundation records indicated no disbursement of funds during 1960 for construction in the amount Hyman represented. In sum, the Government argues that what the Key West Foundation expended for construction in 1961 “was irrelevant to the government’s theory. * * *”
The Government’s argument misses the point. The facts contained in the Key West Foundation records were known by both the Government and the defendants. But what the Government did not know, save for the overheard conversation, was what Hyman intended to assert as a defense to the Government’s charges. When the Government gained that knowledge, agent Connors, pursuant to the directions of the Government prosecutors, tailored his accounting summary and his testimony. Thus, the Government attempted to forestall or destroy the defense indicated in the overheard conversation, namely, that Hyman, regardless of what had gone on before, had ultimately invested the entire proceeds of the Pension Fund loans in improvements to and construction of the properties secured by the loans. These considerations demonstrate the lack of substance in the Government’s contention.
The Government conceded that it had the burden at the hearing of showing that its illegal activities in respect to the eavesdropped conversation did not taint the convictions of the defendants. Silverthorne Lumber Company, Inc. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392, 40 S.Ct. 182, 64 L.Ed. 319, 24 A.L.R. 1426 (1920); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 28 A.L.R.2d 1041 (2d Cir. 1950); United States v. Goldstein, 120 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1941), affd 316 U.S. 114, 62 S.Ct. 1000, 86 L.Ed. 1312 (1942). In my opinion, the Government did not meet that burden in this case.
II.
At the trial, there was an understanding that Government counsel “would provide * * * [defense counsel with statements required by 18 U.S.C. § 3500] as soon as the witness takes the stand.” Prior to the testimony of agent Connors at the trial,* however, Government counsel proffered no section 3500 statements to defense counsel relating to his testimony. In response to defense counsel’s queries to discover if any such statements were in existence, agent Connors denied that he had rendered “any report concerning * * * [his work].” Subsequent efforts by defense counsel to discover the existence of such statements were objected to. The district judge sustained the objection, saying, “You went all over that yesterday looking for 3500 statements.”
Despite the Government’s initial denial that agent Connors had prepared any reports, it was disclosed at the hearing conducted pursuant to the Supreme Court’s remand that he had in fact prepared three reports in 1963 and 1964. *392Two of the reports were the summaries, dated December 26, 1963 and January 11, 1964, of the electronically overheard Burris-Sigelbaum conversation. In the third report (“memorandum”),7 written on October 8, 1963, agent Connors set forth the type of accounting summaries he was to prepare for use at the trial.
The defendants argue that by concealing the existence of these reports at the trial, the Government unilaterally determined whether the reports came within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 3500, thereby usurping the district court’s authority to make such determinations. The Government argues in reply that the defendants’ claim of prejudice due to noncompliance with section 3500 “rests upon an unwarranted assumption as to the importance of agent Connors’ direct testimony”; that the two summaries of the Burris-Sigelbaum conversation did not relate to agent Connors’ direct testimony and were not within the purview of section 3500; that the summaries of the Burris-Sigelbaum conversation “added nothing to what the defense already knew”; and that “in any event, even if * * * [the] October 1963 memorandum were a statement of the witness [Connors] * * * within the reach of 18 U.S.C. 3500, it had negligible — if any —impeaching worth.” 8
I am unable to agree with the majority’s resolution of the issues raised by the Government’s failure to produce the three reports. After observing that agent Connors’ reports failed to meet the requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 3500, the majority states, “the conclusion is inescapable that it had no impeachment value to the defendants.”
In Rosenberg v. United States, 360 U.S. 367, 371, 79 S.Ct. 1231, 1234, 3 L.Ed.2d 1304 (1959), the Supreme Court said: “An appellate court should not confidently guess what defendant’s attorney might have found useful for impeachment purposes in withheld documents to which the defense is entitled.” The question whether the “defense is entitled” to the production of a given statement is reserved for the determination of the district court. Thus, “when it is doubtful whether the production of a particular statement is compelled by the statute, we approve the practice of having the Government submit the statement to the trial judge for an in camera determination.” Palermo v. United States, 360 U.S. 343, 354, 79 S.Ct. 1217, 1225, 3 L.Ed.2d 1287 (1959).
Both the Rosenberg and Palermo cases make clear that the Supreme Court viewed the district court, not Government counsel, as the arbiter of whether statements are producible under 18 U.S. C. § 3500. By refusing to admit that agent Connors had prepared any reports, the Government unilaterally usurped the district court’s function in this regard. Bary v. United States, 292 F.2d 53, 58 (10th Cir. 1961). Irrespective of how the district court might have resolved the issue whether the reports in question were within the purview of 18 U.S. C. § 3500, it was improper and prejudicial9 for the Government to preclude the court from ever reaching such a resolution.
I am likewise unconvinced by the majority’s discussion of the defendants’ contention that the Government’s willful suppression of the three reports violated their rights to due process. In Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), the Supreme Court said, “the suppression by *393the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.” I have already sought to demonstrate that the three reports were relevant and material to the defense. Thus, the willful suppression of these reports by the Government, standing alone, would seem to lead to the conclusion that the defendants’ due process rights were violated. This conclusion is strengthened when the fact that agent Connors lied on the witness stand is also considered. Although agent Connors emphatically denied at the trial that he had made any reports during his investigation, he had in fact prepared and circulated the three reports in question, as he admitted at the hearing.
III.
In its per curiam opinion, the Supreme Court remanded this cause to the district court to consider “any other electronically eavesdropped conversations.” Hoffa v. United States, 387 U.S. at 233, 87 S.Ct. at 1584. Despite this explicit direction, the district court refused the request of the defendants for the production by the Government of all logs and reports of eavesdropped conversations of defense counsel. The Government took the position with regard to these requests that it was required to disclose only those eavesdropped conversations in which a defendant participated.10 The Government’s position was reiterated in its brief filed in this court. In response to a question from this court during the oral argument, Government counsel admitted that the Government possessed logs of eavesdropped conversations of certain defense attorneys. At the conclusion of the oral argument, Government counsel left with the Clerk of this court an envelope containing these logs, with instructions that the contents be made available only for the use of the court.
Two observations are in order with respect to the manner of the Government’s disclosure of the logs of overheard conversations of the defense counsel. First, the Government’s narrow and cavalier response to the Supreme Court’s broad direction ought not to be condoned. Second, for reasons similar to those I expressed in my dissent in United States v. Battaglia, 7 Cir., 394 F.2d 327, decided April 10, 1968 on motion to remand, I believe that it is improper for this court to initially examine these logs, whether in camera or not, to determine their relevancy to the issues in this case.
IV.
With regard to certain issues raised by the defendants in the original appeal in this case and reasserted by them in the present appeal, I adhere to both the reasoning and the suggested disposition expressed in my dissent in the original appeal. United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698, 716 (7th Cir. 1966).

. The Government produced and filed the log in the district court prior to the hearing. The relevation of the existence of the log occurred when the Government informed the Supreme Court about it during the pendency of the defendants’ petition for a writ of certiorari to review the judgment of this court. The Government, however, did not furnish the log to the Supreme Court.

. That part of the log which is summarized in this statement reads:
HYMIN was supposed to have used the money this way, he spent the money a little bit differently but it was spent. Do you understand, he said “I’ll buy a hundred refrigerators.” — instead of that he bought other things and bought other equipment, but he spent the money because he was renting apartments, conditions were different, * * *

. Agent Connors’ pertinent testimony at the trial on this subject is as follows:
[By Mr. Walsh, defense counsel]
Q. * * * when did you prepare the work sheets?
A. Oh, about a week ago, sir, over a week, about ten days ago, sir.
Q. I see.
Did you have other work sheets prior to that time?
A. I had various work sheets, yes sir, at that time.
Q. Are they included in this Exhibit 105?
A. No, sir, they were destroyed. They were not kept.
Q. Well, were they destroyed after you showed them to the prosecutors or before?
A. I don’t recall, sir.
Q. Why were they destroyed?
A. Well, they were not to be used in connection with any results of an investigation.
Q. How did you find that out?
A. Discussion with the prosecutors.
Q. They told you they didn’t want to use those?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Did they see them?
A. I presume they saw them or we discussed them with them.
5[* 5¡S íjí «[•
Q. Will you tell us why you end this statement as of December 31, 1959 [1960]?
A. What [that] was the period of time I was requested to cover by government counsel, sir.
* * * # *
Q. But you had looked at the books for periods beyond that?
A. I had access to them, yes, sir.
Q. Well, had you examined them?
A. Yes, I had looked at them.
Q. And had you prepared work sheets for those longer periods?
A. I would say I did prepare some, perhaps, yes, sir. I would say I prepared some work sheets for that period, yes. * * * * *

. See note 7 infra.

. In pertinent part, the October 8 document read:
The A series of schedules will be captioned Total Funds Received and Disbursed by Teamster Pension Fund Loan Borrowers During Period Covered by Investigation. An individual schedule will be prepared * * * on each Pension Fund Loan Borrower to be included in the sum-
*390mary (as will be identified below) covering the period from the time of their first receipt of Pension Fund loan proceeds through the complete expenditure of the last of such proceeds. These schedules will show the source of all funds received by the Borrower during this period and the disposition of such funds. An example of the format of one of these individual schedules, as will be utilized with regard to the Key West Foundation Company, Inc. loans, is as follows:
Key West Foundation Co., Inc.—
10/27/59 — 4/30/61
Source of Funds
From Operations Teamster Pension Fund Loans Etc.
Total
Disposition of Funds
Operating Expenses
Construction Costs
Ben Dranow
Abe I. Weinblatt
S. George Burris
Davis Trust Account
(Orlando (Sun Valley)
Etc.
Total

. Agent Connors’ pertinent testimony at the hearing on this subject is as follows:
[By Mr. Walsh, defense counsel]
Q. Mr. Connors, you prepared worksheets, I assume, in order to reach the conclusions that you testified about yesterday?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. And at the time that you testified in 1964, did you have all of the worksheets that you had prepared in the investigation?
íjt S¡* ^ *** *1*
A. I don’t believe I understand what you mean, Mr. Walsh, by “all the worksheets that I had.”
Q. Which you had prepared in the investigation of the Poinciana and other properties related to Mr. Hyman?
A. I had some of them, yes, sir.
Q. Well, as I understand you, your answer is not yes, your answer is that you had some?
A. Yes.
Q. What happened to the others?
A. They had been destroyed.
Q. Now, did they cover a longer period than the one about which you testified at that time?
A. Some of those that had been destroyed had covered a longer period, yes, sir.
Q. And did that destruction occur after consultation with attorneys who were prosecuting the ease?
A. I would say it occurred after one or more consultations, yes, sir.
* * * * *
Q. They were schedules of abstracts that you made from the books?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Were they different from the ones that were presented at the trial in any respect? I am not saying they were distorted, just different.
A. I don’t think they were different, no sir.
Q. Did they cover different periods?
A. They would have covered perhaps a period — yes, a different period.
Q. So they were different in that respect ?
A. Somewhat, yes, sir.
Q. Did you show those to the prosecutors ?
A. I don’t recall at this time precisely whether I showed them to them or whether they saw them by their own review of what we had or not.
* * * Ht K«

. The Government argued that the October 8 document was “not a report on work,” but rather a “memorandum” concerning “a conversation in which work was asked to be performed.”

. At the hearing, Government counsel tendered the October 8 statement in response to a defense request for the “3500 statements of the witness [Connors].”

. As the defendants argue in their brief, if the defense counsel were aware that agent Connors both had knowledge of Hyman’s proposed defense and had deliberately changed his work sheets and accounting analysis after gaining such knowledge, agent Connors’ testimony might have been seriously impeached.

. Government counsel made the following statement to the district court:
Your Honor, the Government has made it plain in its memorandum in this case and its memorandum before the Supreme Court of the United States what the Government’s disclosure policy is.
It is to disclose all arguably relevant materials which have thus obtained from conversations of defendant. That goes far beyond any legal requirements that are imposed upon the Government.