Court Opinion

ID: 9739447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:14:58.072483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:12.252511
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: I agree that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), applies retroactively and that the matter before us is subject to the principles decided in that case. Contrary to the majority, however, I believe that Apprendi requires us to vacate Ford’s extended-term sentence. Apprendi holds that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. Under this rule, the prescribed maximum sentence is the maximum sentence a court could impose based on the jury’s verdict of guilty. It does not include enhanced sentences which require findings in addition to the determination of guilt. If an additional finding is required to impose a more severe sentence than would be authorized based on the guilty verdict alone, Apprendi holds that the finding must be made by a jury based on facts proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, 147 L. Ed. 2d at 455, 120 S. Ct. at 2362-63. The prescribed statutory maximum for first degree murder, the crime for which Ford was convicted, is 60 years’ imprisonment. 730 ILCS 5/5 — 8—1(a)(1)(a) (West 1998); see People v. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d 693, 706-08 (2000); People v. Kaczmarek, 318 Ill. App. 3d 340, 350 (2000). That is the highest punishment that can be imposed based solely on the facts reflected in the jury’s verdict of guilty. Additional imprisonment is possible, but the 60-year maximum cannot be exceeded without an additional finding that the murder was accompanied by “exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty” (730 ILCS 5/5—8—1(a)(1)(b), 5—8—2(a), 5—5—3.2(b)(2) (West 1998)) or one of various other enumerated statutory aggravating factors (730 ILCS 5/5—8—2(a), 5—5—3.2(b) (West 1998)). If a finding of “exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty” is made, a defendant convicted of first degree murder is subject to an extended term of not less than 60 years and not more than 100 years (730 ILCS 5/5—8—2(a)(1), 5 —5—3.2(b)(2) (West 1998)) or natural life (730 ILCS 5/5—8—1(a)(1)(b) (West 1998)). Under a plain reading of Apprendi, such a sentencing scheme is valid only if the existence of the aggravating factor is made by the jury, and the State has the burden of proving the aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt. The Illinois statutes, however, expressly provide that the aggravating factor necessary to support an enhanced sentence is to be made by the court, not a jury, and the law contains no requirement that the aggravating factor be proved by the State beyond a reasonable doubt. See 730 ILCS 5/5—8—1(a)(1)(b), 5—8—2(a) (West 1998).2 Because of those deficiencies, extended terms imposed under the statutes cannot, as a general rule, pass constitutional muster under Apprendi. See People v. Swift, 322 Ill. App. 3d 127, 130 (2001); People v. Lee, 319 Ill. App. 3d 289, 307-08 (2001); People v. Chanthaloth, 318 Ill. App. 3d 806, 816-18 (2001); People v. Kaczmarek, 318 Ill. App. 3d 340, 353 (2000); People v. Lee, 318 Ill. App. 3d 417, 422 (2000); People v. Beachem, 317 Ill. App. 3d 693, 708 (2000); People v. Joyner, 317 Ill. App. 3d 93, 109-10 (2000). An exception to this rule applies where the State seeks the death penalty, but the defendant waives a jury for capital sentencing. If the circuit court finds the defendant eligible for death, but instead of death, imposes an extended term based on the same aggravating factor on which the finding of death eligibility was predicated, no Apprendi violations occurs. See People v. Tye, 323 Ill. App. 3d 872 (2001). The reason is this: the defendant cannot complain that he was denied the right to a jury because he affirmatively waived a jury, and he cannot complain that the standard of proof was too lax because under section 9—1(f) of the Criminal Code of 1961 (720 ILCS 5/9—1(f) (West 1998)), the death-eligibility factors must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt even where the proceedings are before the court sitting without a jury. Accordingly, the concerns underlying Apprendi are not implicated. This exception is inapplicable to the case before us because the trial court did not rely on the same factor to support the 100-year extended term as it used to find Ford death eligible. Ford was found death eligible because the murder was committed in the course of another felony and because the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. While the trial court was required to find those eligibility factors beyond a reasonable doubt, it had no similar requirement under the law then in effect with respect to the question of whether the offense was accompanied by “exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty” (730 ILCS 5/5—5—3.2(b)(2) (West 1998)), which was the aggravating factor invoked by the trial court to justify the 100-year extended term under section 5— 8—2(a)(1) (730 ILCS 5/5—8—2(a)(1) (West 1998)). Because the court was not required to find that aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, the extended term cannot stand under Apprendi. The extended-term portion of Ford’s sentence should therefore be vacated.  Public Act 91—953, § 10, which took effect February 23, 2001, amended section 5—8—1(a)(1)(b) and section 5—8—2(a) to specify that the aggravating factors necessary to support enhanced sentences must now to be found by the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt.