Court Opinion

ID: 9656575
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:51:24.393892+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:33.313230
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. If the procedural prerequisites1 for a writ are satisfied, “whether to grant or deny a petition for a writ is within the appellate court’s discretion.” 2 However, unless the petition alleges a double jeopardy bar,3 a court may grant extraordinary relief only when the party seeking the writ satisfies the threshold requirements for such relief.4 Thus, “[djiscretion is not properly exercised when the appropriate remedy is to appeal.” 5 In the case at bar, if Appellant is convicted of the felony offense, he will be able to litigate his KRS 17.510 claim in an appeal from the final judgment of conviction. Accordingly, Appellant has an adequate remedy by appeal. And, thus, without addressing the merits of Appellant’s claim, I would affirm the Court of Appeals’s denial of Appellant’s petition for extraordinary relief.
Four (4) months ago, in Flynt v. Commonwealth,6 this Court unanimously held *712that, although a criminal defendant must be convicted before he or she may appeal, traditional appellate review is adequate to address his or her allegations of pretrial error:
In his petition for relief, Appellant Flynt argued that extraordinary relief was appropriate because, if he sought appellate review of the trial court’s pretrial detention in an appeal from a final judgment of conviction, he would first have to suffer the collateral consequences associated with a felony conviction. Appellant Flynt attached an affidavit to his petition in which he referenced the adverse effect that his status as a convicted felon would have upon “his ability to vote, serve on a jury, and other civil rights afforded to non-felons while they are participating in the Kenton County Diversion Program” as well as his employment “in the operation of sexually oriented businesses,” which are, according to Appellant Flynt, subject to licensing laws that prohibit the employment of convicted felons. To accept Appellant Flynt’s argument that the disqualifications associated with a felony conviction render his direct appeal right an inadequate remedy, however, we would have to hold that any ruling in a felony case can be reviewed via mandamus or prohibition prior to final judgment. And, because we have consistently found that traditional appellate review of allegations of error in felony cases constitute[s] an adequate remedy, we agree with the Court of Appeals that Appellant Flynt’s right of direct appeal from any future judgment of conviction would afford him an adequate forum in which to raise his allegation of error.7
Today’s majority, however, concludes that Appellant does not have an adequate remedy by appeal. In so doing, the majority hangs its hat on the very same argument that we expressly rejected late this spring:
We observe that Appellant has no other adequate remedy available at his disposal. If a writ were not issued, Appellant would experience great injustice in that he would have to endure a trial and possibly face conviction of a Class D felony, when the maximum charge he should face is a Class A misdemeanor.8
If post hoc appellate review is inadequate whenever a defendant will have to “endure a trial” and/or “possibly face conviction,” then any criminal defendant with a complaint concerning a pretrial ruling — e.g., any defense motion to dismiss, motion to suppress, or motion in limine that was denied by the trial court — can circumvent “the ordinary administration of the laws”9 by bringing what amounts to an interlocutory appeal in the form of a petition for extraordinary relief. As such, the majority appears to have taken the “extra” out of “extraordinary relief.”
In my view, the Court was right in Flynt v. Commonwealth, and the majority is wrong today. Appellant has not made the required threshold showing for the relief he requests, and the Court of Appeals correctly denied Appellant’s writ petition. I recognize that Appellant’s writ petition raised an issue concerning the interpretation of KRS 17.510 that should be addressed by this Court, and I understand that it is tempting to decide that issue *713today and ignore the well-settled rule that extraordinary relief “is unavailable unless the petitioner can demonstrate that traditional post hoc appellate procedures do not provide him or her with an adequate remedy.”10 This issue will inevitably appear before the Court in a procedural posture that permits us to reach the merits, however, and the Court should “reserve extraordinary relief for extraordinary cases”11 by waiting for an appropriate case to interpret KRS 17.510.
GRAVES and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.

. See Southeastern United Medigroup v. Hughes, Ky., 952 S.W.2d 195, 199 (1997) (“[A] writ ... should be granted only upon a showing that: 1) the lower court is proceeding or is about to proceed outside its jurisdiction and there is no adequate remedy by appeal, or 2) the lower court is about to act incorrectly, although within its jurisdiction, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great justice and irreparable injury would result.”) (quoting Tipton v. Commonwealth, Ky.App., 770 S.W.2d 239 (1989)).

. Commonwealth v. Deloney, Ky., 20 S.W.3d 471, 473 (2000). Cf. St. Clair v. Roark, Ky., 10 S.W.3d 482, 485 (2000) (referencing "the oft-repeated maxim that although a writ of prohibition will issue only in exceptional circumstances, whether to do so lies within the sound discretion of the court in which the writ is sought.”); Haight v. Williamson, Ky., 833 S.W.2d 821, 823 (1992) ("Issuance of, or refusal to issue a writ of prohibition is in the sound discretion of the trial court.”); Rowley v. Lampe, Ky., 331 S.W.2d 887 (1960) ("The granting of prohibition may not be demanded as a matter of right, but the granting or refusal thereof lies within the sound discretion of this Court.”).

. See Commonwealth v. Stephenson, Ky., 82 S.W.3d 876, 880 (2002); St. Clair v. Roark, supra note 2 at 485 (authorizing the issuance of writs in double jeopardy cases notwithstanding the availability of an adequate remedy by appeal).

. Graham v. Mills, Ky., 694 S.W.2d 698, 700 (1985) ("[Writs] may be used by a court in a discretionary manner and only when the situation is so exceptional that there is no adequate remedy at law to prevent a miscarriage of justice.” (emphasis added)); Southeastern United Medigroup v. Hughes, supra note 1 at 199 ("Where a petition for one of the extraordinary writs alleges that a lower adjudicatory body within its jurisdiction has acted incorrectly, and the threshold factors of inadequate remedy and irreparable injury are satisfied, the writ should be issued only upon a showing that the challenged action reflects an abuse of discretion." (emphasis added)). See also 52 AM. TUR. 2D Mandamus § 26 (2000) ("The issuing court’s decision will not be disturbed on appeal unless there was an abuse of discretion. This means sound juridical discretion ... in accordance with the principles governing the granting of extraordinary remedies.” (footnotes omitted)).

. 52 AM. JUR. 2D Mandamus § 28 (2000)

. Ky., 105 S.W.3d 415 (2003).

. Id. at 422-3 (footnote omitted and emphasis added).

. Peterson v. Shake, Ky., 120 S.W.3d 707, 710 (2003).

.Ohio River Contract Co. v. Gordon, 170 Ky. 412, 186 S.W. 178, 181 (1916), aff'd 244 U.S. 68, 37 S.Ct. 599, 61 L.Ed. 997 (1917).

. Flynt v. Commonwealth, supra note 6 at 422 (citing Kentucky Labor Cabinet v. Graham, Ky., 43 S.W.3d 247, 251 (2001)).

. Roman Catholic Diocese of Lexington v. Noble, Ky., 92 S.W.3d 724, 739 (2002) (Lambert, C J. and Keller and Stumbo, J J., dissenting) (citing Garrard Co. Board of Education v. Jackson, Ky., 12 S.W.3d 686, 689 (2000)).