Court Opinion

ID: 9915831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-08 19:00:57.114783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:22.598618
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-3158      Document: 010110979768          Date Filed: 01/08/2024      Page: 1
                                                                                        FILED
                                                                            United States Court of Appeals
                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                              Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                                January 8, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                               Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                   Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                              No. 23-3158
                                                       (D.C. Nos. 6:23-CV-01117-JWB &
  BRUCE SEARS,                                              6:04-CR-10174-JWB-1)
                                                                    (D. Kan.)
        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
                    _________________________________

 Before MATHESON, KELLY, and MORITZ, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

        Before a federal inmate can file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion,

 he or she must obtain prior authorization from the appropriate court of appeals.

 § 2255(h). If the inmate files a second or successive § 2255 motion without

 authorization, the district court lacks jurisdiction to hear it. In re Cline, 531 F.3d 1249,

 1251 (10th Cir. 2008). But not every § 2255 motion filed second or later in time will be

 considered second or successive. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 944 (2007).

 If a claim was not ripe when the inmate’s first § 2255 proceedings concluded, for

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
 consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-3158      Document: 010110979768          Date Filed: 01/08/2024     Page: 2

 example, the claim will not be considered second or successive if the inmate asserts it

 once it ripens. See In re Weathersby, 717 F.3d 1108, 1110 (10th Cir. 2013).

        Bruce Sears is serving a life sentence in federal prison for committing a serious

 violent felony with at least two prior convictions for serious violent felonies. See

 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1). He recently filed a § 2255 motion, arguing that his Kansas

 robbery convictions (used as predicate convictions for his life sentence) do not qualify as

 serious violent felonies. He acknowledged that he had already sought relief through an

 earlier § 2255 motion, but he argued that his current claim did not become ripe until the

 Supreme Court issued its decision in Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). 1

 For that reason, he concluded, his motion should not be considered second or successive.

        The district court rejected Mr. Sears’s argument that his claim was not ripe until

 the decision in Borden came down. Treating Mr. Sears’s motion as an unauthorized

 second or successive one, the district court dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.

        Mr. Sears cannot appeal without a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C.

 § 2253(c)(1)(B). To obtain one, he must show that reasonable jurists would find it

 debatable whether the district court’s procedural ruling was correct. 2 See Slack v.

 McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 478 (2000).

        1
         Borden held that an offense does not count as a violent felony under the Armed
 Career Criminal Act if it requires a mens rea of mere recklessness. 141 S. Ct. at
 1821–22.

        Mr. Sears represents himself, so we construe his filings liberally. See Hall v.
        2

 Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).

                                               2
Appellate Case: 23-3158      Document: 010110979768           Date Filed: 01/08/2024      Page: 3

        The district court’s ruling is beyond debate. What makes a claim unripe is that its

 factual basis does not yet exist, not that caselaw does not yet support the claim. See

 United States v. Williams, 790 F.3d 1059, 1068–69 (10th Cir. 2015). Mr. Sears’s current

 claim asserts that his Kansas robbery convictions do not qualify as serious violent

 felonies and so cannot support a mandatory life sentence. That claim became ripe when

 the district court imposed the life sentence. 3 Because Mr. Sears’s claim was ripe when he

 filed his first § 2255 motion, the district court correctly treated his latest motion as an

 unauthorized second or successive one.

        We deny Mr. Sears’s application for a certificate of appealability. We grant his

 motion to proceed without prepaying costs or fees. We dismiss this matter.

                                                Entered for the Court

                                                CHRISTOPHER M. WOLPERT, Clerk

        3
         Mr. Sears’s motion also claimed (with less discussion) that the Kansas robbery
 convictions should not expose him to the career-offender provision of the sentencing
 guidelines. Our analysis of his primary claim (challenging his mandatory life sentence)
 also applies to his claim that he does not qualify as a career offender, for both claims
 became ripe when the district court imposed the sentence.

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