Court Opinion

ID: 9942617
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-21 17:04:49.35377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:48:20.634370
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Feb 21 2024, 9:03 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

                                            IN THE

            Court of Appeals of Indiana
                                      Jacquelyn Ivankovic,
                                        Appellant-Respondent

                                                    v.

                                         Milan Ivankovic,
                                          Appellee-Petitioner

                                          February 21, 2024
                                    Court of Appeals Case No.
                                          23A-DC-1954
                              Appeal from the Lake Superior Court
                       The Honorable Thomas P. Hallett, Special Judge
                                       Trial Court Cause No.
                                        45D03-2201-DC-2

                                Opinion by Judge Mathias
                           Judges Tavitas and Weissmann concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1954 | February 21, 2024                    Page 1 of 10
      Mathias, Judge.

[1]   The Lake Superior Court, sitting here as a dissolution court, denied Jacquelyn

      Ivankovic’s (“Wife’s”) request for a temporary restraining order and a

      permanent injunction, asking that Milan Ivankovic (“Husband”) be enjoined

      from contacting Wife’s employer to make allegations that Wife had engaged in

      wrongdoing. The court concluded that it lacked the authority to prohibit

      Husband from making statements concerning Wife to third parties outside the

      presence of the parties’ minor children. Wife appeals, arguing that the trial

      court has statutory authority to issue the requested injunction because doing so

      would protect the financial well-being of the parties’ minor children.

[2]   We affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[3]   During the parties’ marriage, Wife was the director of pharmacy for a hospital

      in Merrillville and Husband was a middle school teacher. The parties have three

      children, and, during the marriage, they purchased a Boston terrier named

      Roxy.

[4]   The parties’ marriage was dissolved in Lake Superior Court on November 18,

      2022. Wife appealed the division of marital property, specifically the order

      requiring Wife to pay Husband for one-half of his share of the family dog’s

      value. Wife also appealed the order so far as it allowed the children to take the

      dog to Husband’s residence during his parenting time. See Ivankovic v. Ivankovic,

      205 N.E.3d 1061 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023).
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1954 | February 21, 2024    Page 2 of 10
[5]   Our court issued its opinion on March 15, 2023, and agreed with the trial court

      that, for the purpose of a dissolution action, Roxy should be treated as personal

      property. See id. at 1064. Therefore, “whichever spouse is awarded the canine

      will have sole possession to the complete exclusion of the other.” Id. For this

      reason, our court concluded that the trial court erred when it awarded the

      children “discretionary decision-making authority to transport Wife’s personal

      property to Husband’s residence during parenting time.” Id. at 1065.

[6]   The day after our court’s opinion issued, Husband began a campaign of

      harassment against Wife. In response, Wife filed a request for a temporary

      restraining order and permanent injunction against Husband. In support, Wife

      alleged that Husband had contacted Wife’s employer and made claims that

      Wife had engaged in wrongdoing during the course of her employment. Wife

      believed Husband wanted her employer to fire her. Because Wife’s income is

      significantly greater than Husband’s, she pays the children’s fixed expenses and

      child support to Husband, who is the non-custodial parent. Wife claimed that

      Husband’s attempt to interfere with her job threatened the children’s economic

      stability. Appellant’s App. p. 60. And Wife stated that her employer is

      investigating Husband’s claims that she had engaged in wrongdoing during her

      employment, and her job may be in jeopardy. Id.

[7]   The trial court held a hearing on Wife’s request on April 4. The parties

      presented evidence concerning Husband’s communications with Wife’s

      employer. After considering the parties’ arguments whether the trial court could

      lawfully restrict Husband’s speech, the court concluded that it lacked the

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1954 | February 21, 2024      Page 3 of 10
       authority to prohibit Husband from making statements concerning Wife to third

       parties outside the children’s presence. Appellant’s App. pp. 22-23.

[8]    Wife filed a motion to correct error, arguing that Husband’s communications

       were not entitled to First Amendment protection but were slanderous and

       defamatory speech. Id. at 73-74. On August 10, the trial court denied Wife’s

       motion because Husband’s communications with third parties involved

       allegations that Wife committed illegal conduct, which is speech protected

       under the First Amendment. Id. at 20-21.

[9]    Wife now appeals.

       Standard of Review
[10]   Husband does not participate in this appeal. In this circumstance, we “need not

       develop an argument for [Husband] but instead will reverse the trial court’s

       judgment if [Wife’s] brief presents a case of prima facie error.” In re Adoption of

       E.B., 163 N.E.3d 931, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citation and quotation marks

       omitted). Prima facie error means “at first sight, on first appearance, or on the

       face of it.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 17 N.E.3d 350, 352 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). “Still, we

       are obligated to correctly apply the law to the facts in the record to determine

       whether reversal is required.” Id.

[11]   We also observe that the denial of injunctive relief lies within the sound

       discretion of the trial court and will not be overturned unless it was arbitrary or

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1954 | February 21, 2024      Page 4 of 10
       amounted to an abuse of discretion. 1 Ferrell v. Dunescape Beach Club Condos. Phase

       I, Inc., 751 N.E.2d 702, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). The trial court considers four

       factors in determining the propriety of injunctive relief: (1) whether the

       plaintiff’s remedies at law are inadequate; (2) whether the plaintiff can

       demonstrate a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits; (3) whether the

       threatened injury to the plaintiff outweighs the threatened harm a grant of relief

       would occasion upon the defendant; and (4) whether the public interest would

       be disserved by granting relief. Id. Because Wife sought a permanent injunction,

       the second of the four traditional factors is slightly modified because the issue is

       not whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success on

       the merits, but whether she has in fact succeeded on the merits. See id. at 713.

       Wife bore the burden to demonstrate that certain and irreparable injury would

       result if the injunction was denied. See Crawley v. Oak Bend Estates Homeowners

       Ass'n, Inc., 753 N.E.2d 740, 744 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001), trans. denied.

       Discussion and Decision
[12]   Wife argues that the trial court had statutory authority to issue the requested

       injunction and the restraint on Husband’s speech under these circumstances

       was not constitutionally impermissible. The trial court concluded that it lacked

       1
           Wife only appeals the trial court’s denial of her request for a permanent injunction.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1954 | February 21, 2024                       Page 5 of 10
       authority to issue the injunction because doing so would violate Husband’s

       First Amendment right to free speech.2

[13]   Wife acknowledges our court’s prior decisions holding that a trial court cannot

       restrain a prior spouse from making disparaging remarks about his or her

       former spouse outside the presence of their children. See e.g. Israel v. Israel, 189

       N.E.3d 170, 180 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023), trans. denied; In re Paternity of G.R.G., 829

       N.E.2d 114, 125 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). But Wife argues that restricting Husband

       from making statements that she engaged in wrongdoing during the course of

       her employment to her employers and co-workers is permissible to safeguard

       the children’s financial well-being. Appellant’s App. p. 19.

[14]   Before we address Wife’s argument, we consider our court’s decision in Israel.

       In that case, the husband argued that the non-disparagement clause in the

       court’s final decree was an unconstitutional prior restraint of speech. Israel, 189

       N.E.3d at 179. Specifically, the decree provided that the parties would not make

       disparaging comments about the other “in the presence of [Child], friends,

       2
         The First Amendment, made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that
       “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .” U.S. Const. amend. I. First
       Amendment protections against prior restraints on speech are trigged by state action. In re Paternity of K.D.,
       929 N.E.2d 863, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). A trial court’s issuance of an injunction constitutes a state action
       triggering First Amendment protections. Id.
       Article 1, Section 9 of the Indiana Constitution provides independent protections for freedom of
       speech. See State v. Katz, 179 N.E.3d 431, 442 (Ind. 2022). In Katz, our supreme court encouraged litigants to
       raise constitutional claims under both our state and federal constitutions. Id. at 443. Husband only argued his
       right to free speech under the First Amendment and the trial court appropriately confined its analysis to the
       federal constitutional right to free speech. However, we feel compelled to observe that Husband’s speech in
       this case would likewise be protected under Article 1, Section 9.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1954 | February 21, 2024                              Page 6 of 10
       family members, doctors, teachers, associated parties, co-workers, employers,

       the parenting coordinator, media, the press, or anyone.” Id. at 175 (record

       citation omitted).

[15]   Our court noted that “‘[non-disparagement] orders are, by definition, a prior

       restraint on speech,’” which is a term describing “‘administrative and judicial

       orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance of the time

       that such communications are about to occur.’” Id. at 179 (citations omitted). A

       prior restraint on speech is not per se unconstitutional but “does come to a

       court ‘bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.’” Id.

       (quoting In re Paternity of K.D., 929 N.E.2d 863, 868 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)

       (quoting N.Y. Times Co., v. U.S., 403 U.S. 713, 824 (1971))). A “prior censorship

       of expression can be justified only by the most compelling governmental

       interest.” Id. at 180 (citation omitted).

[16]   Without question, protecting children from exposure to disparagement between

       their parents is a compelling governmental interest. Id. For this reason, our

       court concluded that the non-disparagement clause furthered the compelling

       State interest in protecting the parties’ child’s best interests and did not violate

       the First Amendment. Id. However, our court agreed with the husband that the

       clause at issue “goes far beyond furthering that compelling interest to the extent

       that it prohibits the parents from ‘making disparaging comments’ about the

       other in the presence of ‘anyone’ even when Child is not present.” Id. (record

       citation omitted). Because that portion of the non-disparagement clause was an

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1954 | February 21, 2024       Page 7 of 10
       unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, our court ordered it stricken from the

       parties’ final decree. Id.

[17]   Citing the Israel opinion, the trial court in this case denied Wife’s request to

       enjoin Husband from making disparaging remarks about her to her employers

       and co-workers. See Appellant’s App. pp. 21, 23. Wife argues that the trial court

       interpreted the Israel holding too narrowly. She observes that she did not request

       that the court issue an injunction against Husband from “making disparaging

       remarks about her to anyone and everyone” but simply to her employer and co-

       workers. Appellant’s Br. at 18-19. Wife argues that doing so promotes the

       “compelling state interest of safeguarding the financial well-being of the

       children” Id. at 19.

[18]   Husband’s claims about Wife’s alleged misconduct during her employment,

       including an allegation that she engaged in criminal conduct, could negatively

       affect Wife’s employment, and, therefore, the children’s financial well-being,

       but only if Husband’s allegations are proven to be true. 3 And, if Wife

       committed misconduct during her employment, which results in a demotion or

       3
         Wife argues that Husband’s “disparaging statements about [Wife] constitute defamation because the
       statements have alleged misconduct on the part of [Wife] as well as alleging criminal conduct or misconduct
       by [Wife] in her trade, profession, or occupation. Accordingly, [Husband’s] slanderous and defamatory
       statements are unprotected speech.” Appellant’s Br. at 20. Whether Husband’s statements are defamatory is
       not an issue that was before the trial court or properly presented to our court. The trial court was only asked
       to consider whether Husband can be enjoined from making disparaging remarks about Wife. We agree that
       “the right to free speech does not entitle the speaker to make false accusations.” Appellant’s Br. at 21
       (quoting In re the Paternity of K.D., 929 N.E.2d 863, 872 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)). But the veracity of Husband’s
       allegations is not at issue in this appeal.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1954 | February 21, 2024                              Page 8 of 10
       termination of her employment, Wife is the one responsible for failing to

       safeguard her children’s financial well-being.

[19]   We agree with Wife that the State has a compelling state interest in protecting

       and preserving a child’s financial well-being. See Champion v. Secretary of State,

       761 N.W.2d 747, 754 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008). In addition, we do not condone

       vindictive behavior. However, Husband has alleged that Wife engaged in

       criminal wrongdoing, and “[a]llegations of criminal activity are public as a

       matter of course.” In re Paternity of K.D., 929 N.E.2d at 872. Ultimately, the

       children’s financial well-being will be adversely affected only if Wife has in fact

       engaged in the wrongdoing as Husband has alleged. If that is the case, it is her

       own conduct, not Husband’s, that would have a potentially adverse effect on

       her employment. It is also important to remember that Wife has an adequate

       remedy at law if Husband’s prior or future statements constitute defamation

       and she suffers damages as a result. See Daugherty v. Allen, 729 N.E.2d 228, 235-

       36 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000).

[20]   For all of these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order denying Wife’s request

       for a permanent injunction against Husband.

[21]   Affirmed.

       Tavitas, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1954 | February 21, 2024      Page 9 of 10
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Debra Lynch Dubovich
Levy & Dubovich
Merrillville, Indiana

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-DC-1954 | February 21, 2024   Page 10 of 10