Court Opinion

ID: 9897655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:19:41.4901+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:38.045588
License: Public Domain

11/06/2023
        IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
                          AT JACKSON
                          Assigned on Briefs October 3, 2023

         DOUGLAS EUGENE HORTON v. STATE OF TENNESSEE

                Appeal from the Circuit Court for Henderson County
                    No. 18088-1         Joseph T. Howell, Judge

                             No. W2022-01371-CCA-R3-PC

The Petitioner, Douglas Eugene Horton, appeals from the Henderson County Circuit
Court’s denial of his petition for post-conviction relief from his 2018 convictions for two
counts of possession with intent to sell a controlled substance, four counts of possession
of a firearm with intent to go armed during the commission of a dangerous felony, and
four counts of facilitation of possession of a firearm with intent to go armed during the
commission of a dangerous felony, for which he is serving an effective fifteen-year
sentence. On appeal, the Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by
denying relief on his ineffective assistance of counsel allegations for counsel’s (1) failure
to obtain adequate discovery, (2) failure to challenge the search warrant resulting in the
Petitioner’s arrest, (3) failure to subpoena the Petitioner’s daughter and his girlfriend as
witnesses at the trial, (4) failure to play a body camera recording purporting to show
officer misconduct, and (5) cumulative errors during the trial. We affirm the judgment of
the post-conviction court.

  Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed

ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CAMILLE
R. MCMULLEN, P.J., and J. ROSS DYER, J., joined.

William J. Milam, Jackson, Tennessee, for the Appellant, Douglas Eugene Horton.

Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter; Abigail H. Rinard, Assistant Attorney
General; Jody S. Pickens, District Attorney General; Albert Earls, Assistant District
Attorney General for the Appellee, State of Tennessee.

                                       OPINION
       The Petitioner’s convictions relate to evidence recovered after officers conducted
surveillance and executed a search warrant at a Henderson County residence. The facts
of the case in which the Petitioner was tried with a codefendant were summarized by this
court in the Petitioner’s appeal of his convictions:

              After conducting surveillance on the residence at 2825 New
      Flanagan Road for several months and observing the [Petitioner] and his
      [codefendant], Kenneth Alan Smith, at the residence, officers with the
      Lexington Police Department (LPD) obtained a search warrant and
      searched the residence. Upon entry into the residence, officers found the
      [Petitioner] in the living room on the couch, but [codefendant] Smith was
      not present during the search. After detaining the [Petitioner] and searching
      the residence and the outbuilding, officers located and seized
      methamphetamine, hydrocodone pills, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, and
      several firearms. The [Petitioner] and [codefendant] Smith were arrested
      and indicted on the same charges related to the seized contraband. The
      following evidence was adduced at the [Petitioner’s] trial, which took place
      on November 14-15, 2018.

              Investigator James Robert McCready, who, at the time of this
      offense, was a narcotics investigator for the City of Lexington, testified that
      he was the lead investigator on the [Petitioiner’s] case. He began his
      investigation by conducting surveillance at 2825 New Flanagan Road in
      September 2017, which took place for “at least a couple of months[.]”
      While conducting surveillance, which he said took place on multiple
      occasions and consisted of “stationary drive[-]bys where [they] did some
      mild still shots[,]” he observed the [Petitioner] and [codefendant] Smith at
      the residence on a “regular basis.” Investigator McCready observed the
      [Petitioner] in the front yard of the residence and “particularly sometimes
      driving to the residence coming from another location but at the residence
      in general.” He saw the [Petitioner] driving an “older model” Chevrolet
      pickup truck, which was parked at the residence on the day that the search
      warrant was executed. Investigator McCready obtained a search warrant
      for the residence, and, along with several other officers, conducted a search
      of the residence.

             Investigator McCready stated that he executed the search warrant at
      approximately 6:30 a.m. on November 14, 2017. Upon entry into the
      residence, he found the [Petitioner] lying on a couch in the living room
      wearing flannel pajama bottoms and a white t-shirt. . . . Officers then
      conducted a “sweep of the couch cushions to make sure there [were] no
      firearms or anything like that,” and, when they pulled back the couch

                                           -2-
cushion, officers located a “large bag of green leafy substance which had
been identified as marijuana.” . . .

       ....

        Investigator McCready located a loaded Smith & Wesson revolver in
the front bedroom of the residence. He said that the door to this room was
not locked and that “everything [was] open in the house[.]” Investigator
McCready also located a loaded, small caliber pistol from North American
Arms (NAA) in the front bedroom. He located a Titan revolver in a “small
outbuilding” outside the residence that he said was being used for “various
barbecues and things of that nature.” He said this building was part of the
property covered by the search warrant. Lastly, he located a Springfield
Savage Arms rifle from the front bedroom of the residence. . . .
Investigator McCready stated that he found the Smith & Wesson revolver
on top of a “curio cabinet” in the corner of the front bedroom, and he found
the Springfield rifle in the closet of that room. Investigator McCready
testified that LPD Investigator Bradley Wilson collected $784 from a wallet
that contained the [Petitioner’s] identification, which was found in a pair of
blue jeans in the front bedroom. . . .

       ....

        On cross-examination, Investigator McCready stated that he did not
have any evidence regarding the [Petitioner’s] whereabouts prior to when
he started surveillance at the residence in September 2017. Based on his
surveillance, he concluded that the [Petitioner] lived at the residence.
Investigator McCready could not recall if the [Petitioner] was lying down
or sitting on the couch when he entered the residence, but he observed a
blanket and a pillow on the couch and believed the [Petitioner] was startled
when they entered. Investigator McCready discovered the bag of marijuana
when he pulled up on the far left couch cushion. He said the marijuana was
in “plain view” after he removed the cushion and stated, “If you were
seated in a seat on a couch, it would be down basically at your right hip in a
corner.” He agreed that someone sitting on the couch would not be able to
feel the bag of marijuana through the couch cushion.

        . . . . The hydrocodone pills found in the front bedroom were located
in a medicine bag that also contained “a bunch of medication that had [the
Petitioner’s] name on it[.]” Investigator McCready said most of the other
medication in the bag “looked like blood pressure medication, cholesterol
pills, and things of that nature[,]” so he did not seize it as evidence. . . .

                                     -3-
               Investigator McCready stated that the only indicia of ownership of
       any of the evidence seized pertained to the location where the evidence was
       found. He said the names had been scratched off the pill bottles that they
       seized, so he could not determine to whom they belonged. He believed that
       the master bedroom at the back of the residence was [codefendant] Smith’s
       room, which he shared with a woman. He did not find any contraband or
       firearms in [codefendant] Smith’s room.              Investigator McCready
       determined that the residence belonged to [codefendant] Smith, although he
       did not specify whether he rented or owned the property. . . . On redirect
       examination, Investigator McCready said that he discovered a title to a
       vehicle with the [Petitioner’s] name on it in the front bedroom. On recross
       examination, Investigator McCready stated that there was no bed in the
       front bedroom, and he was unsure if there was any mail addressed to the
       [Petitioner] in that room. He said that the blue jeans that contained the
       [Petitioner’s] wallet were wadded up in a pile of clothes on the floor, and
       he observed a stack of photographs on the floor, leading him to believe that
       someone had just moved into the room.

              ....

              TBI Special Agent Carter Dupew tested the evidence in this case and
       presented the following results: 2.99 grams of methamphetamine, 47.60
       grams of marijuana, and hydrocodone. . . . The [Petitioner] did not present
       any evidence on his own behalf.

               Following deliberations, the jury convicted the [Petitioner] of
       possession of methamphetamine, hydrocodone, and marijuana with intent
       to sell (Count 1, 3, and 5), facilitation of possession of methamphetamine,
       hydrocodone, and marijuana with intent to deliver (Count 2, 4, and 6), six
       counts of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed during the
       commission of a dangerous felony (Counts 9, 10, 17, 18, 25, and 26), six
       counts of facilitation of possession of a firearm with the intent to go armed
       during the commission of a dangerous felony (Counts 7, 8, 15, 16, 23, and
       24), and one count of possession of drug paraphernalia (Count 31).

State v. Douglas Eugene Horton, No. W2019-00948-CCA-R3-CD, 2021 WL 2556646, at
*1-5 (Tenn. Crim. App. June 22, 2021). This court reversed and vacated counts 1, 2, 7, 8,
9, 10, and 31 due to insufficient evidence of constructive possession by the Petitioner. Id.
at *6-9. The Petitioner filed a timely pro se petition for post-conviction relief alleging the
ineffective assistance of counsel, and post-conviction counsel was appointed.

                                             -4-
       At the September 9, 2022 post-conviction hearing, trial counsel testified that she
was an assistant public defender and was appointed to represent the Petitioner at the time
of his arraignment in circuit court. She recalled that the case involved a thirty-one count
indictment regarding narcotics and the possession of firearms. She said that she filed a
motion for discovery but did not file any other pretrial motions.

        Trial counsel testified that she reviewed discovery with the Petitioner and that he
understood the materials. She was aware of the Petitioner’s history of depression and
mental health concerns but said she found “no indication of any competency issues or
that any of those conditions would justify requesting a forensic evaluation.” She recalled
that the Petitioner rejected the State’s plea offer because the Petitioner would only accept
an offer reducing the charges to misdemeanors and for time-served probation.

       Trial counsel testified that she spoke with the State’s investigators and with the
Petitioner’s daughter before the trial. According to counsel, the daughter “didn’t have
any information that would be of assistance to the defense.” Counsel said that she did not
call any witnesses at trial, and the Petitioner did not testify.

       Trial counsel identified the search warrant issued in the Petitioner’s case which
listed both the Petitioner and the Petitioner’s codefendant. She said the Petitioner
maintained that he and the codefendant were friends and that he did not live at the
codefendant’s house. Counsel stated that she did not file a motion to suppress evidence
seized as a result of the search because she felt there was no legal basis to do so.

        Trial counsel testified that she did not recall the Petitioner’s requesting a particular
body camera recording be introduced at trial, although other recordings were played at
the trial which showed officers conducting the search. She also did not recall whether the
Petitioner wanted her to request a continuance in order to subpoena certain witnesses.

       On cross-examination, trial counsel testified that she discussed the State’s
evidence with the Petitioner. She explained that in order to file a motion to suppress, she
would have had to concede that the Petitioner had standing to bring the motion, which
would have directly contradicted the defense theory that the Petitioner’s mere presence at
the codefendant’s house did not establish that the items obtained from the search were in
the Petitioner’s possession. As a result of this theory, she stated that the Petitioner was
found not guilty of several counts at trial and, on appeal, this court reversed additional
convictions based on the same argument.

       Trial counsel testified that the Petitioner was present during the search. She stated
that the Petitioner was convicted of possessing drugs and a firearm that were found
among his personal property at the codefendant’s house. She stated that she was
prepared for trial, that she requested a plea offer and made a counteroffer, and that she

                                              -5-
was not surprised by any trial evidence. Counsel also said that recordings depicting an
undercover sale of drugs to the Petitioner would have been detrimental to the defense had
they been presented at the trial.

      Lexington Police Department Investigator Ricky Montgomery testified that he
executed the search warrant. He stated that he believed the Petitioner lived at the house
because officers saw the Petitioner there on multiple occasions.

       On cross-examination, Investigator Montgomery described the property identified
in the search warrant as being “an acre and a half to two acres” with “three mobile
homes, an outdoor cooking facility and numerous cars and other items scattered
throughout the yard.” He stated that the Petitioner was present during the search of the
property, that the search warrant included “the residence and any outbuildings and
vehicles,” that drugs were found where the Petitioner was lying on a couch, and that a
firearm was found in the Petitioner’s clothing.

        The Petitioner testified that he discussed plea offers with trial counsel and that he
rejected them. He said that he met with counsel four times before the trial, that he “went
over what was presented to me as discovery,” and that he understood what was being
presented to him. He said that he had been diagnosed with depression, anxiety, post-
traumatic stress disorder, and nerve damage and that he was “on medication” during the
trial. He stated that the only discovery counsel presented was information regarding three
undercover drug sales. According to the Petitioner, he never received “any proof of the
investigation.”

        The Petitioner testified that he asked trial counsel to subpoena his daughter and his
girlfriend so they could testify that he was not living at the house, but counsel did not.
He said that when he realized that his daughter and his girlfriend were not at the trial, he
asked counsel to request a continuance, but she refused. He said that he asked counsel to
file a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search of the house, but she did not.
He stated that he also asked counsel to introduce a body camera recording that he
believed would show an officer placing marijuana in the couch where the Petitioner sat
when officers searched the house. He admitted, however, that he had never seen such a
recording.

       On cross-examination, the Petitioner testified that he was at the house during the
search and his subsequent arrest and that he wanted trial counsel to introduce recordings
of the three undercover drug sales made at the house. He said that he and counsel
discussed “the evidence,” including recordings made during the search. He agreed that as
a result of counsel’s work, he was acquitted of multiple counts.

                                            -6-
       At the conclusion of the hearing, the post-conviction court denied relief. The
court credited the testimony of trial counsel and Investigator Montgomery. The court
noted that counsel “saw no basis for [a motion for] suppression” of the evidence obtained
from the search warrant and did not find the Petitioner incompetent to stand trial. The
court found that the Petitioner did not offer any proof that a motion to suppress would
have been successful, nor did the Petitioner offer any proof of a recording depicting an
officer placing marijuana in the couch where the Petitioner sat at the time of the search.
The court noted that because neither the Petitioner’s daughter nor his girlfriend testified
at the post-conviction hearing, the court could not determine the substance of their
testimony which could have been presented at the trial. The court also noted that counsel
spoke with the Petitioner’s daughter and concluded the daughter’s testimony would not
have been helpful to the defense.

        As pertinent to this appeal, the post-conviction court made the following findings
in a written order: (1) the court credited trial counsel’s testimony that she filed and
obtained discovery, that she discussed the evidence and facts of the case with the
Petitioner, that she attempted to negotiate a plea agreement, and that the Petitioner
rejected the State’s plea offers; (2) the court credited counsel’s testimony that she
reviewed the warrant and found no legal basis for filing a motion to suppress; (3) the
court found the Petitioner did not demonstrate any legal basis to suppress the evidence
obtained based upon the warrant or demonstrate that he would have been likely to prevail
on a motion to suppress; (3) the court credited counsel’s testimony that she interviewed
the Petitioner’s daughter and concluded that the daughter’s testimony would not have
been helpful to the defense at trial; (4) the court concluded that it could not speculate as
to the testimony of the Petitioner’s daughter and his girlfriend because they did not testify
at the post-conviction hearing; and (5) the court found that counsel “was in every way
effective” and that her performance did not result in any breach or denial of any right
guaranteed to the Petitioner. This appeal followed.

        The Petitioner contends that the post-conviction court erred by denying relief. He
argues that he is entitled to relief because counsel (1) failed to obtain adequate discovery,
(2) failed to file a motion to suppress evidence obtained from the search, (3) failed to call
the Petitioner’s daughter and the Petitioner’s girlfriend as witnesses at the trial, and (4)
failed to play a recording purporting to show an officer placing marijuana in a couch
during the search of the house. The Petitioner also argues for the first time that he is
entitled to relief under the “cumulative error doctrine.” The State counters that the post-
conviction court properly denied relief. We agree with the State.

       Post-conviction relief is available “when the conviction or sentence is void or
voidable because of the abridgment of any right guaranteed by the Constitution of
Tennessee or the Constitution of the United States.” T.C.A. § 40-30-103 (2018). A
petitioner has the burden of proving his factual allegations by clear and convincing

                                            -7-
evidence. Id. § 40-30-110(f) (2018). A post-conviction court’s findings of fact are
binding on appeal, and this court must defer to them “unless the evidence in the record
preponderates against those findings.” Henley v. State, 960 S.W.2d 572, 578 (Tenn.
1997); see Fields v. State, 40 S.W.3d 450, 456-57 (Tenn. 2001). A post-conviction
court’s application of law to its factual findings is subject to a de novo standard of review
without a presumption of correctness. Fields, 40 S.W.3d at 457-58.

       To establish a post-conviction claim of the ineffective assistance of counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment, a petitioner has the burden of proving that (1)
counsel’s performance was deficient and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); see Lockhart v. Fretwell,
506 U.S. 364, 368-72 (1993). The Tennessee Supreme Court has applied the Strickland
standard to an accused’s right to counsel under article I, section 9 of the Tennessee
Constitution. See State v. Melson, 772 S.W.2d 417, 419 n.2 (Tenn. 1989).

       A petitioner must satisfy both prongs of the Strickland test in order to prevail in an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Henley, 960 S.W.2d at 580. “[F]ailure to prove
either deficiency or prejudice provides a sufficient basis to deny relief on the ineffective
assistance claim.” Goad v. State, 938 S.W.2d 363, 370 (Tenn. 1996). To establish the
performance prong, a petitioner must show that “the advice given, or the services
rendered . . . are [not] within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal
cases.” Baxter v. Rose, 523 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Tenn. 1975); see Strickland, 466 U.S. at
690. The post-conviction court must determine if these acts or omissions, viewed in light
of all of the circumstances, fell “outside the wide range of professionally competent
assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. A petitioner “is not entitled to the benefit of
hindsight, may not second-guess a reasonably based trial strategy by his counsel, and
cannot criticize a sound, but unsuccessful, tactical decision.” Adkins v. State, 911 S.W.2d
334, 347 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994); see Pylant v. State, 263 S.W.3d 854, 874 (Tenn.
2008). This deference, however, only applies “if the choices are informed . . . based upon
adequate preparation.” Cooper v. State, 847 S.W.2d 521, 528 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992).
To establish the prejudice prong, a petitioner must show that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. “A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id.

       Citations and page references to the record are conspicuously absent from the
Petitioner’s brief. See T.R.A.P. 27(a)(6). The rules of this court warn counsel that
“[i]ssues which are not supported by argument, citation to authorities, or appropriate
references to the record will be treated as waived in this court.” Tenn. Ct. Crim. App. R.
10(b). Despite the Petitioner’s waiver, we have decided to address the issues raised in
order for this appeal to be disposed of in an expeditious manner and brought to a proper

                                            -8-
conclusion. See T.R.A.P. 2. We caution counsel that compliance with the rules of
appellate procedure and of this court is expected.

1.     Discovery

       The Petitioner alleges that trial counsel failed to obtain sufficient discovery, and,
as a result, he was not informed of “any proof of the underlying narcotics investigation.”
The record reflects that the investigation involved several undercover drug transactions
with the Petitioner and the codefendant. The Petitioner also acknowledged that he
discussed the recordings of the undercover sales with counsel. The post-conviction court
credited counsel’s testimony that she obtained discovery, which she discussed with the
Petitioner. The record supports the court’s determination that the Petitioner did not
establish any deficiency on this issue by clear and convincing evidence. The Petitioner is
not entitled to relief on this basis.

2.     Motion to Suppress

      The Petitioner alleges that trial counsel was deficient for failing to file a motion to
suppress evidence obtained as a result of the search of the house.

        Our supreme court has held that the two-pronged Strickland test requires a
petitioner to present additional proof when alleging that counsel was ineffective for
failing to file a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds. See Phillips
v. State, 647 S.W.3d 389, 402 (Tenn. 2022) (citations omitted). The Petitioner must also
prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and that there is a reasonable
probability that the verdict would have been different absent the excludable evidence in
order to demonstrate actual prejudice. Id. (quoting Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S.
365, 375 (1986)).

       The post-conviction court credited counsel’s testimony that she found no legal
basis for filing a motion to suppress. Further, counsel testified that her defense strategy
was to assert that the Petitioner was not in possession of the items obtained from the
search because he was “merely present” at the house. Filing a motion to suppress would
have required counsel to assert that the Petitioner had a reasonable expectation of privacy
at the house, a position at odds with the defense’s strategy. The Petitioner may not
“second-guess a reasonably based trial strategy by his counsel.” Adkins, 911 S.W.2d at
347. The Petitioner has failed to demonstrate deficient performance by counsel. In
addition, the Petitioner was found not guilty on numerous counts at the trial, and this
court reversed seven convictions as a result of the defense’s theory. The record supports
the court’s determination that the Petitioner did not establish any deficiency on this issue
by clear and convincing evidence. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this basis.

                                            -9-
3.     Witness Testimony

        The Petitioner alleges that trial counsel should have subpoenaed his daughter and
his girlfriend as witnesses at the trial in order to establish that he did not live at the
searched house. The post-conviction court credited counsel’s testimony that, after
interviewing the daughter, counsel determined that the daughter’s testimony would not be
helpful to the defense. The court also noted that it could not speculate as to the
daughter’s or girlfriend’s testimony, because they did not testify at the post-conviction
hearing. See Black v. State, 794 S.W.2d 752, 757 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990). The record
supports the court’s determination that the Petitioner did not establish any deficiency on
this issue by clear and convincing evidence. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this
basis.

4.     Body Camera Recording

       The Petitioner alleges that trial counsel should have introduced a body camera
recording depicting an officer placing marijuana in the couch where the Petitioner sat at
the time of the search. The record contains no evidence of such a recording, and the
Petitioner admitted that he was unaware of its existence. The post-conviction court
denied relief, noting that the Petitioner presented no proof regarding the recording. See
George Thurman Haynie, Jr. v. State, No. M2001-01522-CCA-R3-PC, 2002 WL
464822, at *7 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 26, 2002) (denial of post-conviction relief was
proper based upon a “total lack of evidence in the record to support [the] Petitioner’s
assertion”), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Sept. 16, 2002). The record supports the court’s
determination that the Petitioner did not establish deficiency on this issue by clear and
convincing evidence. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this basis.

5.     Cumulative Error

        The Petitioner argues that relief is appropriate under the “cumulative error
doctrine.” In the context of a trial, the cumulative error doctrine requires relief when
“multiple errors [are] committed in the trial proceedings, each of which in isolation
constitutes mere harmless error, but which when aggregated, have a cumulative effect on
the proceedings so great as to require reversal in order to preserve a defendant’s right to a
fair trial.” State v. Hester, 324 S.W.3d 1, 76-77 (Tenn. 2010) (internal citations omitted);
see State v. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d 1, 79 (Tenn. 2010) (“‘[T]he combination of multiple
errors may necessitate . . . reversal . . . even if individual errors do not require relief.’”)
(quoting State v. Cribbs, 967 S.W.2d 773, 789 (Tenn. 1998)).

       In contrast, in the context of post-conviction review, “when an attorney has made
a series of errors [at the trial] that prevents the proper presentation of a defense, it is
appropriate to consider the cumulative impact of the errors in assessing prejudice” of an

                                             -10-
ineffective assistance of counsel allegation. Timothy Terell McKinney v. State, No.
W2006-02132-CCA-R3-PD, 2010 WL 796939, at *37 (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 9, 2010),
perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010); see State v. Taylor, 968 S.W.2d 900 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1997). More than one instance of deficient performance, when considered
collectively, can result in a sufficient showing of prejudice pursuant to Strickland.
Timothy Terell McKinney, 2010 WL 796939, at *37; see Taylor, 968 S.W.2d at 909. The
question is whether counsel’s deficiencies “cumulatively prejudiced . . . the right to a fair
proceeding and undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Timothy Terell
McKinney, 2010 WL 796939, at *37. Counsel’s failure to conduct adequate pretrial
preparation and investigation may establish prejudice pursuant to Strickland. Id.

        The Petitioner failed to establish deficient performance by trial counsel.
Therefore, the Petitioner has failed to establish multiple deficiencies from which this
court might grant relief on the basis of prejudice resulting from the cumulative effect of
the alleged deficiencies. The Petitioner is not entitled to relief on this basis.

       In consideration of the foregoing and the record as a whole, the judgment of the
post-conviction court is affirmed.

                                              ____________________________________
                                              ROBERT H. MONTGOMERY, JR., JUDGE

                                            -11-