Court Opinion

ID: 9475619
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:32:46.879442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:49.249792
License: Public Domain

FLAUM, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment.
The role of a circuit court reviewing the denial of a preliminary injunction is limited. The reviewing court is to determine whether or not the court below abused its discretion in declining to issue the injunction. See Lawson Products v. Avnet, 782 F.2d 1429, 1438 (7th Cir.1986); American Hospital Supply v. Hospital Products, 780 F.2d 589, 594 (7th Cir.1986). While the majority notes the limits that should constrain its review, I am compelled to conclude that its opinion goes beyond the limits with which it seeks to comply. I also write separately because the majority advances views, which we are not called upon to offer, that appear to conflict with current decisions of the Supreme Court. Therefore, I respectfully cannot join in its opinion.
The majority focuses on the merits of McTravel’s claim. That emphasis, I believe, is not required. In reviewing a denial of a preliminary injunction, this court must make three determinations. First, we must determine whether the district court employed the correct preliminary injunction standard. Second, we must review whether in deciding the “threshold” questions— the adequacy of the movant’s remedy at law, the danger of irreparable harm, and the existence of some likelihood that the movant will succeed on the merits — the trial court made correct legal determinations and factual findings that were not clearly erroneous. Finally, we must consider whether the district court abused its broad, equitable discretion in its weighing and balancing of the relevant factors. See Lawson, 782 F.2d at 1433, 1436-39.
The district court found that McTravel had met its threshold burden of demonstrating that it had some possibility of succeeding on the merits. Illinois Corporate Travel v. American Airlines, No. 85 C 07079, slip op. at 19 (N.D.Ill. Sept. 16, 1985) [Available on WESTLAW, DCTU database] (Memorandum and Order). This was easily done. All McTravel needed to do was to prove that its “ ‘chances [were] better than negligible,’ ” Roland Machinery v. Dresser Industries, 749 F.2d 380, 387 (7th Cir.1984) (citation omitted). Notwithstanding its finding that McTravel had met its threshold burden, the district court declined to issue the preliminary injunction. This was because the court found that McTravel had not demonstrated that irreparable harm would result without the injunction, Illinois Corporate Travel, slip op. at 22, and because the court concluded that the balance of the equities weighed in American’s favor, id. at 19-21.
Had the district court declined to issue the injunction because it believed that McTravel had shown no possibility of success on the merits, the majority’s detailed assessment of the merits might be appropriate. However, because the court found for the plaintiff on the issue of possible success, our review should focus on the issues that made a difference — the court’s evaluation of irreparable harm and its balancing of the equities.
The majority uses the correct approach in assessing the district court’s finding of no irreparable harm. See supra at 729. That finding, standing alone, is enough to uphold the decision of the court below. See Lawson, 782 F.2d at 1443.
I do not agree with the majority’s approach to reviewing the balance of the equities. The majority states that if American’s policy “is illegal per se, then the district judge surely abused her discretion in denying MeTravel’s request for preliminary relief.” Supra at 724. The majority *731uses this observation as a vehicle for its detailed consideration of the strength of McTravel’s claims. We have made clear previously that “the ultimate evaluation and balancing of the equitable factors is a highly discretionary decision and one to which this court must give substantial deference.” Lawson, 782 F.2d at 1437. Consequently, our review of a trial court’s use of its equitable discretion will normally not provide justification for this court to review the entire spectrum of contested issues raised by a plaintiff’s complaint.
We will have ample opportunity to review the factual and legal issues in this case if it comes to us on appeal following a final order. At that point we will have the benefit of a complete record and the full input of opposing counsel. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 2169, 2176-77, 90 L.Ed.2d 779 (1986) (“[A] court of appeals ordinarily will limit its review [of the denial of a preliminary injunction] to abuse of discretion” except where the legal issues are “clear” and “the facts are established or of no controlling relevance.”).
In light of the above, it would be inappropriate for me to engage in a protracted discussion of the merits of the plaintiff’s claims. However, I must express reservation about the majority’s suggestion, although only dicta, that the alleged vertical price restraint at issue here is to be evaluated under a Rule of Reason standard. This issue, it should be noted, was not discussed by the parties in their briefs or at oral argument. The Supreme Court has recently reconsidered, and refused to abandon, its position that resale price maintenance should be judged under a per se standard. See Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761 n. 7, 104 S.Ct. 1464, 1469 n. 7, 79 L.Ed.2d 755 (1984); Continental T. V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 51 n. 18, 97 S.Ct. 2549, 2558 n. 18, 53 L.Ed.2d 568 (1977). The Court may alter its view in the future. However, until it does, we are not free to depart from long-standing precedent.
Turning, briefly, to the issues actually before us on this appeal, it is not entirely clear from the record produced below that the district court applied the appropriate preliminary injunction standard.1 Nonetheless, I conclude that, as a matter of law, the district court was correct in concluding that the plaintiff had some possibility of succeeding on the merits and that it did not abuse its broad discretion in its balancing of the equities between the parties. For that reason, I concur in the judgment of the court.

. The district court may have interpreted our cases to require that it reach its decision solely by determining whether McTravel’s probability of success balanced against the harm it would suffer if the court denied the injunction exceeded American’s probability of success balanced against the harm that it would suffer were the injunction granted. While a district court has discretion to consider these factors as part of its effort to weigh the equities, it is not required to do so. This circuit continues to adhere to the traditional equitable doctrines governing preliminary injunctions. We have not adopted "a new legal standard ... intended ... to force analysis into a quantitative straight jacket,” American Hospital Supply, 780 F.2d at 593.