Court Opinion

ID: 9387411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-17 20:03:42.869604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.885838
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2023 IL App (3d) 220047-U

                                  Order filed April 17, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                    2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                       )       Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                        )       of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
                                                       )       Will County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                       )
                                                       )       Appeal No. 3-22-0047
             v.                                        )       Circuit No. 10-CF-1923
                                                       )
      WALTER J. BRZOWSKI,                              )       Honorable
                                                       )       Carmen J. Goodman,
             Defendant-Appellant.                      )       Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE ALBRECHT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Justices Hettel and Peterson concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                 ORDER

¶1          Held: The circuit court conducted a proper preliminary Krankel inquiry and did not err
                  in not appointing new counsel to represent defendant during such proceedings.

¶2          Defendant, Walter J. Brzowski, appeals the denial of his postplea claims of ineffective

     assistance of counsel, arguing that the Will County circuit court’s decision to deny him

     appointment of new counsel was manifestly erroneous. We affirm.

¶3                                          I. BACKGROUND
¶4           In July 2015, defendant entered a fully negotiated plea agreement to one count of

     violating an order of protection (720 ILCS 5/12-30(a)(1) (West 2010)). In exchange for his plea,

     defendant received a sentence of three years’ imprisonment and four years of mandatory

     supervised release. Defendant received credit for 1452 days already spent in custody. He was

     represented by an attorney from the Will County Public Defender’s Office. Approximately two

     months after the plea, defendant filed a motion to withdraw it. The court denied the motion, and

     on appeal we remanded the matter for compliance with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(d) (eff.

     July 1, 2017). People v. Brzowski, No. 3-16-0289 (2018) (unpublished minute order).

¶5          On remand, the circuit court reappointed plea counsel to represent defendant. Defendant

     filed his own motion requesting a change in his legal representation. At the next court date, plea

     counsel informed the court that defendant wished to represent himself. The court discharged plea

     counsel. Defendant stated that he wanted to represent himself; however, he also stated that he

     wanted to hire private counsel. He later asked the court to appoint a different public defender, to

     which the court informed him that it did not decide which attorney he received once counsel was

     appointed. At the hearing on the motion to withdraw the plea, defendant represented himself.

     The court denied the motion.

¶6          Defendant appealed, arguing that the matter must be remanded for a Krankel inquiry and

     that his postplea waiver of counsel was invalid. The State agreed with defendant on appeal. Thus,

     we once again remanded the cause and gave the circuit court directions to conduct de novo

     postplea proceedings that included an inquiry into defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel

     claims and to provide him with proper 401(a) admonishments if defendant again indicated he

     wished to represent himself in the proceedings. People v. Brzowski, No. 3-19-0072 (2020)

     (unpublished summary order under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).

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¶7          On March 3, 2021, defendant appeared in circuit court to address his ineffective

     assistance of counsel claims. On this date, the State explained to defendant that a preliminary

     Krankel inquiry would occur. Defendant would be given an opportunity to present his claims of

     ineffective assistance of counsel to the court and to question his plea counsel regarding his

     actions. The court would then “decide if he made a good enough showing of ineffectiveness to

     then appoint counsel for further Krankel inquiry.”

¶8          The court conducted the preliminary Krankel inquiry on March 31, 2021, and the

     procedures were again explained to defendant. The court explained that the purpose of the

     inquiry at that point was for defendant to present his arguments so the court could “make a

     determination if [defendant had] enough to say that [plea counsel] was ineffective.” The court

     also told defendant that “[t]his is not a time to argue every injustice that you feel that you have

     had within the judicial system. This is just on this issue on the ineffective assistance of counsel

     when you pled guilty.” Defendant agreed that this would be the focus of the hearing.

¶9          During the hearing, defendant argued that the court did not have jurisdiction over him

     because he resided in Cook County and that the order of protection which was the root of his

     charges was void due to the same jurisdictional issues. Defendant also questioned plea counsel

     regarding the jurisdictional issues he believed were prevalent in the case. The court intervened

     and explained to defendant, “the issue here is ineffective assistance of counsel at the time and at

     the point that this was a negotiated disposition.” It explained that any jurisdictional issue was “an

     altogether different issue” and not the focus of the inquiry. The court told defendant the only

     issue for the inquiry was “[d]id [plea counsel] do something that you relied on that you said you

     should not have that you received bad counsel.”

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¶ 10          When defendant asked plea counsel about the circumstances of defendant’s plea, counsel

       testified that at the time of plea discussions, defendant had already been incarcerated for longer

       than the maximum sentence he would receive for one offense. Plea counsel stated that he

       discussed with defendant whether he wanted to proceed on the motions defendant filed or if

       defendant wanted to plead guilty and receive a sentence which would allow him to be released.

       Defendant chose to plead guilty.

¶ 11          Defendant argued that his counsel was ineffective for allowing him to plead guilty when

       the charge was “highly probationable” and “a mild, mild, mild alleged crime.” He again argued

       that the order of protection was void for lack of jurisdiction. After hearing plea counsel’s

       testimony and defendant’s argument, the court stated that plea counsel’s representation was

       “adequate.” The court declined to conduct any further proceedings under Krankel. The court also

       denied defendant’s motions to reconsider this ruling and to withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant

       now appeals.

¶ 12                                             II. ANALYSIS

¶ 13          Defendant argues that the circuit court failed to follow this court’s directions on remand.

       Specifically, he contends that the court did not conduct proper Krankel proceedings and that it

       did not obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel to proceed without an

       attorney for those proceedings. He argues that, because the circuit court did not admonish him

       regarding the potential to have newly appointed counsel during the Krankel hearing, it did not

       conduct the hearing per this court’s directions. We review compliance with this court’s mandate

       de novo. Clemens v. Mechanical Devices Co., 202 Ill. 2d 344, 352 (2002).

¶ 14          We remanded this cause for the circuit court to conduct a postplea Krankel inquiry, as

       well as provide defendant with the proper admonishments if he elected to proceed without

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       counsel. Ill. S. Ct. R. 401(a) (eff. July 1, 1984). Through People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181

       (1984), and its progeny, our supreme court has developed a procedural framework for the

       resolution of posttrial claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. When a defendant, as a self-

       represented litigant, raises an ineffective assistance of counsel claim after a plea, the circuit court

       must first conduct a preliminary inquiry to determine whether new counsel should be appointed

       to further address the issue. People v. Jolly, 2014 IL 117142, ¶ 29. The purpose of the

       preliminary inquiry is to determine the underlying factual basis of the claims and to provide

       defendant an opportunity to argue his claims to the court. People v. Ayres, 2017 IL 120071, ¶ 24.

       It is not necessary for the court to appoint new counsel until after the preliminary inquiry has

       occurred. People v. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d 68, 78 (2003). If, after conducting an adequate

       preliminary inquiry, the court finds defendant’s claims lack merit, there is no need to appoint

       new counsel. People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶¶ 35, 61, 67. It is only when the court believes

       defendant may have a valid claim of possible neglect by counsel that defendant has a right to

       newly appointed counsel. Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78; People v. Boose, 2014 IL App (2d) 130810, ¶

       35.

¶ 15           At a preliminary Krankel inquiry, the circuit court may consider the legal merit of the

       claim as well as the factual basis. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶ 61. “[S]ome interchange between

       the trial court and trial counsel regarding the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegedly

       ineffective representation is *** usually necessary in assessing what further action, if any, is

       warranted on a defendant’s claim.” Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78. The court may base its decision on

       “its knowledge of defense counsel’s performance at trial and the insufficiency of the defendant’s

       allegations on their face.” Id. at 79.

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¶ 16          The court here engaged both defendant and counsel and gave each the opportunity to

       explain his respective position. In addition, the court allowed defendant to question plea counsel

       regarding his arguments that there were jurisdictional issues in his felony charges and whether

       the underlying order of protection was void, both of which were topics that were unrelated to

       counsel’s involvement as plea counsel. Further, the court repeatedly explained to defendant that

       the focus of the hearing was on plea counsel’s representation of him, and that it could not review

       defendant’s other arguments as they were not relevant to counsel’s representation. Defendant

       then proceeded to argue that counsel’s ineffectiveness stemmed from the fact that he was

       allowed to plead guilty to such a “mild” offense. The court determined that defendant’s

       presentation of his claims did not provide a sufficient showing of possible neglect, and the court

       found counsel’s representation to be “adequate.” Based on the record and the court’s findings,

       we cannot say that it was indisputable that defendant demonstrated possible neglect,

       necessitating further proceedings with newly appointed counsel. The court’s finding that further

       inquiry was unnecessary is not manifestly erroneous. See People v. Maya, 2019 IL App (3d)

       180275, ¶ 17.

¶ 17          Defendant also argues that the court erred by not exercising its discretion to appoint

       counsel to represent him during the preliminary inquiry. It is a well settled principle that

       defendant is not entitled to counsel during a preliminary inquiry. See Moore, 207 Ill. 2d at 78.

       Defendant further contends that this court should follow the reasoning in People v. Miller, 2020

       IL App (1st) 163304, ¶¶ 62-65, to find that defendant should have been admonished as to his

       right to counsel at a Krankel hearing before the preliminary inquiry took place. The court in

       Miller found that the court erred in not appointing counsel for a Krankel hearing when the court

       erroneously operated under the belief that defendant’s general waiver of counsel for postplea

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       proceedings also applied the Krankel hearing. Id. However, the court in Miller cites to People v.

       Boose, 2014 IL App (2d) 130810, ¶ 35, to explain that, if the court determines, after a

       preliminary inquiry, that a defendant’s claims have merit, the defendant has a right to new

       counsel to represent him during the Krankel hearing. Miller, 2020 IL App (1st) 163304, ¶ 65.

       Neither court furthers defendant’s argument that the court here should have considered

       appointing counsel before the preliminary inquiry took place, nor do they require the court to

       specifically admonish defendant prior to a preliminary inquiry that if his claims have merit, he

       has a right to counsel for further proceedings. As defendant was not entitled to counsel for the

       preliminary inquiry and the Krankel proceedings did not continue beyond it, there was no need

       for the court to admonish defendant regarding his right to counsel or to appoint counsel for

       further Krankel proceedings. Thus, the court did not err in allowing defendant to proceed without

       counsel at the preliminary inquiry.

¶ 18          We find that the circuit court complied with our mandate to conduct Krankel

       proceedings. The court held a preliminary inquiry and determined that it need not proceed further

       on the matter. Considering the efforts made by the court to adequately conduct the preliminary

       Krankel inquiry, there was no manifest error in the court’s conclusion. We further find that it was

       not necessary for the court to obtain a knowing and intelligent waiver of counsel when counsel is

       not required during a preliminary inquiry. Accordingly, we decline to remand for the

       appointment of independent counsel and further Krankel proceedings.

¶ 19                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20          The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

¶ 21          Affirmed.

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