Court Opinion

ID: 9918741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 16:07:35.005048+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:58.819951
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Calista Ents. v. Oxford Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 2024-Ohio-34.]

                                     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

                            TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO

                                             BUTLER COUNTY

 CALISTA ENTERPRISES, LLC,                               :

        Appellant,                                       :           CASE NO. CA2023-06-063

                                                         :                OPINION
     - vs -                                                                1/8/2024
                                                         :

 OXFORD BOARD OF ZONING                                  :
 APPEALS,
                                                         :
        Appellee.

          CIVIL APPEAL FROM BUTLER COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                            Case No. CV 2022 07 1142

Jack F. Grove, for appellant.

Coolidge Wall Co., L.P.A., Christopher R. Conard and Benjamin A. Mazer, for appellee.

        PIPER, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant, Calista Enterprises, LLC ("Calista"), appeals the Butler County

Common Pleas Court's judgment affirming the decision of the Oxford Board of Zoning

Appeals ("BZA") to deny Calista's request for a variance. Calista argues that it is only

making a de minimis request that should have been allowed.
                                                                     Butler CA2023-06-063

                         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      {¶ 2} This case concerns a parcel of land located at 314 University Avenue, Oxford,

Ohio ("Property").   The Property is currently being used as a single-family dwelling;

however, Calista intends to build a new three-family dwelling on the Property.

      {¶ 3} The record shows the Property was previously in a single-family zoning

district. In 2017, the Property was rezoned to allow for single-family dwellings, two-family

dwellings, and three-family dwellings, provided the parcel meets the lot requirements. The

only requirements relevant to this appeal are the minimum lot requirements set forth in the

table below:

         LOT                  SINGLE-           TWO-           THREE-
         REQUIREMENTS         FAMILY            FAMILY         FAMILY
                              DWELLINGS         DWELLINGS      DWELLINGS
         Minimum Lot Area     4,000             6,000          8,000
         (Square Feet)
         Minimum Lot          40                50             60
         Width (Feet)
         Minimum Lot          40                50             60
         Frontage (Feet)

      {¶ 4} It is undisputed that Calista's Property is 10,192 square feet and is 56 feet

wide by 182 feet long. Therefore, the construction of a three-family dwelling requires a

variance because it is below the minimum lot width by four feet.

      {¶ 5} Calista filed a petition requesting an area variance for a three-family dwelling.

Calista's petition came for a hearing before the BZA on June 28, 2022. The BZA heard

testimony from four people: (1) the City Planner, Zachary Moore, (2) an architect on behalf

of Calista, Scott Webb, (3) a zoning professional on behalf of Calista, Greg Dale, and (4)

an individual who owns property near Calista.

      {¶ 6} The testimony of Moore, Webb, and Dale mostly centered on the factors the

BZA must consider and weigh in determining whether practical difficulties exist sufficient to

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warrant a variance. Those factors are:

              A. Whether the property in question will yield reasonable return
              or whether there can be any beneficial use of the property
              without the variance;

              B. Whether the variance is substantial;

              C. Whether the essential character of the neighborhood would
              be substantially altered or whether adjoining properties would
              suffer a substantial detriment as a result of the variance;

              D. Whether the variance would adversely affect the delivery of
              governmental services (i.e. water, sewer, garbage);

              E. Whether the property owner purchased the property with
              knowledge of the zoning restriction;

              F. Whether the property owners' predicament feasibly can be
              obviated through some method other than a variance;

              G. Whether the spirit and intent behind the zoning requirement
              would be observed and substantial justice done by granting the
              variance.

              H. Any other relevant factor.

Oxford Zoning Ordinance 1139.02(c). After hearing the testimony, the BZA voted 3-1 to

deny the variance.

       {¶ 7} Calista appealed the BZA's resolution to the Butler County Court of Common

Pleas. The parties submitted briefs in support of their respective positions and appeared

before the common pleas court for argument. After considering the record before it, the

common pleas court affirmed the BZA's resolution finding that Calista "failed to meet its

burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence that the BZA decision is unreasonable,

arbitrary, and capricious." The common pleas court also found the BZA's decision was

"supported by the preponderance of the substantial, reliable, and probative evidence."

Calista timely appeals, raising a single assignment of error for review:

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                                                                        Butler CA2023-06-063

       {¶ 8} THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE BZA'S DENIAL OF AN

AREA VARIANCE WHICH WAS THE PRODUCT OF INCONSISTENT REASONING,

ARBITRARY ACTION, AND DISPARATE TREATMENT.

                                  STANDARD OF REVIEW

       {¶ 9} R.C. Chapter 2506 governs appeals to the courts of common pleas from final

orders of administrative officers and agencies of political subdivisions, including municipal

boards of zoning appeals. Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Cleveland Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 141

Ohio St.3d 318, 2014-Ohio-4809, ¶ 22.

       {¶ 10} "'A common pleas court reviewing an administrative appeal pursuant to R.C.

2506.04 weighs the evidence in the whole record and determines whether the

administrative order is unconstitutional, illegal, arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or

unsupported by the preponderance of the substantial, reliable, and probative evidence.'"

Richard J. Conie Co. v. W. Jefferson Village Council, 12th Dist. Madison No. CA2022-04-

007, 2023-Ohio-876, ¶ 14, quoting Bingham v. Wilmington Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 12th Dist.

Clinton No. CA2012-05-012, 2013-Ohio-61, ¶ 6.

       {¶ 11} "'An appeal to the court of appeals, pursuant to R.C. 2506.04, is more limited

in scope."' Queen v. Union Twp. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 12th Dist. Fayette No. CA2015-05-

011, 2016-Ohio-161, ¶ 13, quoting Kisil v. Sandusky, 12 Ohio St.3d 30, 34 (1984). The

court of appeals reviews the common pleas court's judgment only on questions of law. We

do not have the same extensive authority to weigh the evidence. Mills v. Walnut Twp. Bd.

of Zoning Appeals, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 22CA14, 2023-Ohio-4234, ¶ 45. "Within the

ambit of questions of law for appellate-court review is whether the common pleas court

abused its discretion." Richard J. Conie Co. at ¶ 16. "'In this context, a reversal 'as a matter

of law' can occur only when, having viewed the evidence most favorably to the decision,

there are no facts to support' the trial court's decision." Mills at ¶ 45, quoting Austin v.

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                                                                       Butler CA2023-06-063

Cuyahoga Metro. Hous. Auth., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107247, 2019-Ohio-636, ¶ 23.

                                        VARIANCES

       {¶ 12} The purpose of a variance is to permit a variation from the strict interpretation

of the Code so that no specific provision prevents development of a specific site that would

otherwise not be possible and that would satisfy the general intent of the Code. Oxford

Zoning Ordinance 1139.01(a). Generally, a variance permits a property owner to use his

or her property in a manner that is otherwise prohibited. Nunamaker v. Bd. of Zoning

Appeals, 2 Ohio St.3d 115, 118 (1982).

       {¶ 13} In essence, the general purpose of the Code is to (a) encourage and facilitate

orderly growth and development, (b) establish population densities in correlation to various

public services, (c) conserve property value and encourage the most appropriate use of

land, (d) protect from incompatible uses, (e) avoid inappropriate development of land and

avoid damage from land development, and (f) further the future implementation of planning

objectives while protecting existing uses and structures. Oxford Zoning Ordinance 1123.01.

       {¶ 14} There are two types of variances, area variances and use variances.

Schomaeker v. First Nat'l Bank, 66 Ohio St.2d 304, 306 (1981).

              A use variance permits land uses for purposes other than those
              permitted in the district as prescribed in the relevant regulation.
              An example of a use variance is a commercial use in a
              residential district. Area variances do not involve uses, but
              rather structural or lot restrictions. An example of an area
              variance is relaxation of setback lines or height restrictions.

Id. at 307.

       {¶ 15} The standard for granting an area variance is a lesser standard than when a

use variance is at stake. The applicant need only show "practical difficulties" for an area

variance rather than "unnecessary hardship" for a use variance. Kisil, 12 Ohio St.3d at

syllabus. The supreme court in Duncan set forth the seven factors to be considered and

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weighed in determining whether a property owner seeking an area variance has

encountered practical difficulties in the use of the property. Those factors include, but are

not limited to:

                  (1) whether the property in question will yield a reasonable
                  return or whether there can be any beneficial use of the property
                  without the variance; (2) whether the variance is substantial; (3)
                  whether the essential character of the neighborhood would be
                  substantially altered or whether adjoining properties would
                  suffer a substantial detriment as a result of the variance; (4)
                  whether the variance would adversely affect the delivery of
                  governmental services (e.g., water, sewer, garbage); (5)
                  whether the property owner purchased the property with
                  knowledge of the zoning restriction; (6) whether the property
                  owner's predicament feasibly can be obviated through some
                  method other than a variance; (7) whether the spirit and intent
                  behind the zoning requirement would be observed and
                  substantial justice done by granting the variance.

Duncan v. Middlefield, 23 Ohio St.3d 83, 86 (1986).1

                                              ANALYSIS

       {¶ 16} Calista argues that the evidence established practical difficulties because

while having excess square footage over-all, it lacked only four feet in the lot width

requirement. Calista maintains that the facts support the Duncan factors in favor of the

requested variance. The BZA suggests that while the most reasonable return for the

property would be a three-family structure, Calista could demolish the existing single-family

and receive a reasonable return from building a two-family structure.              This appears

incongruous with the general purpose of promoting the most appropriate use, rather than

the second most appropriate use.

       {¶ 17} However, we are unable to complete our limited review of the common pleas

court's judgment because it does not rely on factual determinations or findings from the BZA

1. These are the same factors listed in the Oxford Zoning Ordinance.

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                                                                        Butler CA2023-06-063

in support of its denial of the variance. The common pleas court identified R.C. 2506.04 as

authority for the appeal, stated that it had considered the entire record, the briefs and

considered the oral arguments presented by counsel, and found "the decision denying the

area variance was supported by the substantial, reliable, and probative evidence." The

common pleas court's judgment entry does not identify or analyze the evidence in the

record, does not discuss any relevant testimony, and does not apply any evidence in the

record to the "practical difficulties" factors articulated in Duncan.

       {¶ 18} The common pleas court grappled with the applicable standard of review

when the parties appeared for argument. The common pleas court stated that it was unsure

if the proceedings were de novo and expressed uncertainty on whether it could "substitute

my judgment on these other factors * * * and the weighing of the Duncan factors." While a

hearing before the common pleas court "is not a de novo review, 'it often in fact resembles

a de novo proceeding.'" Cleveland Clinic Found., 2014-Ohio-4809 at ¶ 24, citing Cincinnati

Bell, Inc. v. Glendale, 42 Ohio St.2d 368, 370 (1975). "R. C. 2506.04 requires the court to

examine the substantial, reliable and probative evidence on the whole record, which in turn

necessitates both factual and legal determinations." Cincinnati Bell at 370.

       {¶ 19} Although in an administrative appeal, a common pleas court need not issue a

detailed opinion in an administrative appeal or issue findings of fact and conclusions of law

pursuant to Civ.R. 52, "for an appellate court to conduct a meaningful review, sufficiently

detailed reasoning should be specified in the trial court's order." ProTerra, Inc. v. Cleveland

Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109278, 2020-Ohio-6739, ¶ 35; Vang v.

Cleveland, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104994, 2017-Ohio-4187, ¶ 13. Here, absent any

explanation or analysis by the common pleas court of the evidence in the record and

whether Calista established practical difficulties, we cannot determine whether the common

pleas court fulfilled its obligation under R.C. 2506.04, nor are we able to perform our more

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limited appellate review. See Vang at ¶ 12 (reversing the trial court's decision affirming the

zoning board's decision because the trial court's opinion lacked sufficient detail for the

appellate court to determine if the trial court had abused its discretion)

        {¶ 20} We note the BZA's decision itself was of little assistance to the trial court. And

at the BZA hearing, the board members disagreed on whether the evidence supported

various Duncan factors. In its complaint, Calista attached a copy of the denial decision from

the BZA. The letter stated that the BZA voted 3-1 to deny the variance, "basing their

decision upon the Decision Standards" listed below:

                Criterion A— Whether the property in question will yield
                reasonable return or whether there can be any beneficial use of
                the property without the variance
                Criterion E— [W]hether the property owner purchased the
                property with knowledge of the zoning restrictions
                Criterion G— [W]hether the spirit and intent behind the zoning
                requirement would be observed and substantial justice done by
                granting the variance.
                Criterion H— Any other relevant factor
        {¶ 21} The decision letter did not mention any findings or refer to any evidence or

testimony supporting the denial of the variance.2 For example, the decision letter simply

states "[a]ny other relevant factor" without any suggestion of what finding supported another

relevant factor. Similarly, the decision letter does not address why the requested variance

would not support the "spirit and intent" behind the zoning requirement and as to why

substantial justice would not be done by granting a variance.

                                            CONCLUSION

        {¶ 22} Because the common pleas court affirmed the BZA's resolution without

2. This seems contrary to Section 1139.02(d)(1) of the Zoning Ordinance, which states the BZA "shall grant,
grant with conditions, or deny a variance application as presented and shall clearly state the findings upon
which its decision is based." (Emphasis added).

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                                                                Butler CA2023-06-063

sufficient detail to allow us to perform our limited review, we sustain Calista's sole

assignment of error.

      {¶ 23} Judgment reversed and remanded.

      HENDRICKSON, P.J., and BYRNE, J., concur.

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