Court Opinion

ID: 9903279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:34:05.953069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:41.326189
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                      NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                      FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                      DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

JESUS G. GONSALEZ,

            Appellant,

v.                                         Case No. 5D22-940
                                           LT Case No. 2017-CF-0589

STATE OF FLORIDA,

          Appellee.
________________________________/

Opinion filed April 21, 2023

3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Putnam County,
Howard O. McGillin, Jr., Judge.

Jesus G. Gonsalez, Lowell, pro se.

Ashley Moody, Attorney General,
Tallahassee, and Rebecca Rock McGuigan,
Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach,
for Appellee.

EISNAUGLE, J.

      Appellant, Jesus G. Gonsalez, appeals the summary denial of his

Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 motion challenging his convictions

after an open plea for leaving the scene of a crash involving serious bodily
injury, leaving the scene of a crash involving damage, careless operation of

a motor vehicle without a valid driver’s license, and driving a commercial

vehicle while license suspended. We reverse as to Grounds 2, 3, 6, and 9,

and otherwise affirm.

                        Failure to Investigate Witnesses

         In Ground 2, Gonsalez alleged that he was forced to enter an open

plea1 because his counsel failed to investigate and prepare certain defense

witnesses for trial. Specifically, Gonsalez alleged that these fact and expert

witnesses would have established that he did not know he was in a collision

because a heart condition caused him to black out while driving.

         In summarily denying this claim, the postconviction court reasoned that

the record conclusively refutes this claim because counsel was prepared

enough at sentencing to cross-examine certain witnesses on this subject. On

appeal, Gonsalez argues that counsel’s preparation for sentencing, which

was more than two months after entry of the plea, does not conclusively refute

this claim.

     1
      The record attachments do not include the plea colloquy, nor does our
record indicate whether a trial was imminent at the time of the plea. Given
our very limited record, we consider the issues only as framed, and find no
grounds for a “tipsy coachman” affirmance. See Robertson v. State, 829 So.
2d 901, 906 (Fla. 2002).

                                        2
       As to the expert witnesses, Gonsalez alleged a sufficient claim. See

State v. Lucas, 183 So. 3d 1027 (Fla. 2016). Moreover, we agree with

Gonsalez that the record attachments, which largely focus on the sentencing

hearing, do not conclusively refute the claim. We therefore reverse and

remand for the postconviction court to conduct an evidentiary hearing or to

attach records conclusively refuting this part of the claim.

       As to the fact witnesses, however, Gonsalez’s claim was conclusory

and insufficiently pled. See Nelson v. State, 875 So. 2d 579, 583–84 (Fla.

2004). Therefore, on remand, the postconviction court must give Gonsalez

an opportunity to amend this claim as to the fact witnesses. See Fla. R. Crim.

P. 3.850(f)(3).

                         Plea to Mutually Exclusive Crimes

       In Ground 3, Gonsalez alleged that his counsel was ineffective, as we

read the claim, for advising him to enter an open plea to both leaving the

scene of an accident with serious bodily injury and leaving the scene of an

accident with only property damage. See §§ 316.027(2)(b), .061(1), Fla. Stat.

(2016). Ground 3 fully analyzes the pertinent statutory language to argue that

these two crimes are mutually exclusive, quoting Linen v. State, 268 So. 3d

874, 876 (Fla. 2d DCA 2019) in support, and concludes with an allegation that

if counsel had been effective, “the plea process would have been different.”

                                       3
      While the substance of Ground 3 is clear to us, at times Gonsalez

inartfully labeled counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness as allowing “true

inconsistent verdicts” despite the fact there was no verdict in Gonsalez’s

case. Nevertheless, the motion also more accurately described this ground

as allowing “inconsistent judgments” and “inconsistent convictions and

sentences.”

      In summarily denying this claim, the postconviction court focused on

the phrase “inconsistent verdicts” and reasoned that there could not be an

inconsistent verdict in this case because Gonsalez entered a plea.

      On appeal, Gonsalez argues that the postconviction court erred in

denying this ground. We agree. Considering Ground 3 in its entirety, we

conclude that a fair reading of the ground is not that Gonsalez somehow

suffered truly inconsistent jury verdicts. See Gunn v. State, 378 So. 2d 105,

106 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980) (employing “a fair reading” of pro se postconviction

motion). Instead, Ground 3 alleges that counsel was ineffective for advising

Gonsalez to enter a plea to mutually exclusive crimes, as explained in Linen.2

      2
        Importantly, other than recognizing that Gonsalez mistakenly used
the term “inconsistent verdict,” we need not rewrite or add to the motion to
reach our interpretation of Ground 3.

                                      4
      Given that the postconviction court misinterpreted Ground 3, we

reverse and remand for the court to either conduct an evidentiary hearing or

attach records conclusively refuting this claim.

                    Plea Based on Incorrect Sentencing Score

      In Ground 6, Gonsalez alleged that his counsel was ineffective for

advising him to enter an open plea based on a scoresheet that incorrectly

indicated he qualified for a non-prison sanction. The motion explains that the

State submitted an amended scoresheet at sentencing, which increased

Gonsalez’s lowest permissible sentence to 55.4 months in prison. In the

motion, Gonsalez alleged that no reasonable attorney would advise a

defendant to plead open based on the possibility of a non-prison sanction

when the correct scoresheet required a minimum sentence of 55.4 months.

      In summarily denying Ground 6, the postconviction court interpreted

the claim as alleging that Gonsalez was sentenced using an incorrect

scoresheet. On appeal, Gonsalez argues that he was not challenging the

scoresheet used at sentencing, but instead argued that his counsel was

ineffective for advising him that he would qualify for a non-prison sanction if

he entered a plea. We agree that the postconviction court misinterpreted

Gonsalez’s argument, and we reverse and remand for the court to either

                                       5
conduct an evidentiary hearing or attach records conclusively refuting the

claim.

         Given our disposition on Grounds 2, 3, and 6, we also reverse as to

Ground 9, which alleges cumulative error. We otherwise affirm.

         AFFIRMED in part; REVERSED in part; and REMANDED.

LAMBERT, C.J., and EDWARDS, J., concur.

                                       6