Court Opinion

ID: 9660830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:21:52.768062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:22.544821
License: Public Domain

Murphy, J. (concurring).
I concur in the result reached by Judge Cavanagh, because of this Court’s decision in Hohendorf v Meagher, 188 Mich App 400; 470 NW2d 418 (1991), which adopted the majority opinion in Gagliardi v Flack, 180 Mich App 62; 446 NW2d 858 (1989). Administrative Order No. 1990-6, 436 Mich lxxxiv, requires me to follow Hohendorf. If not so restrained, I would reaffirm and adopt my dissent in Gagliardi, which basically held that the period of limitation does not start to run until the injured party *80knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that the injury threshold has been reached under the no-fault statute. In my view, all the elements of a cause of action under the no-fault statute have not occurred and cannot be alleged in a proper complaint until the injury threshold has been met. See Filcek v Utica Building Co, 131 Mich App 396, 399; 345 NW2d 707 (1984); McCann v Brody-Built Construction Co, Inc, 197 Mich App 512; 496 NW2d 349 (1992). Nor would I distinguish between a latent injury and the misjudging of the severity of a known injury or consequent symptoms or ailments, as Judge Cavanagh has accomplished so artfully in an effort to reconcile Mielke and Horan1 with Gagliardi and Hohendorf. Nevertheless, I concur because I find the injury in this case to be an appropriate one for utilization of the discovery rule.

 Mielke v Waterman, 145 Mich App 22; 377 NW2d 328 (1985), and Horan v Brown, 148 Mich App 464; 384 NW2d 805 (1986).