Court Opinion

ID: 9773009
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:34:57.279893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.590647
License: Public Domain

John I. Purtle, Justice, dissenting. I agree with the majority that it was error to allow witness Van Kirk to testify as set out in the first page of the opinion. However, I disagree with their conclusion that it was harmless error. The testimony was presented at the start of the state’s case. Although such testimony may have been proper in the appropriate circumstances it was obviously prejudicial as presented in the case before us. At the time the witness testified, the 9 year old victim had not yet taken the stand nor had any of the “overwhelming evidence” relied upon by the majority been presented. It is extremely difficult to state in exact or express terms the meaning of “prejudicial error.” I have found no case which specifically defines “prejudicial error.” Black’s Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition, defines the term as: “Error substantially affecting appellant’s legal rights and obligations.” Neither the majority nor the dissenters can determine the effect this testimony had on the jury. This victim had been the prosecuting witness in a previous sexual abuse case against another defendant. The evidence thus becomes less convincing with respect to this defendant. With which incident was the victim’s testimony consistent? It may be sound judicial economy to refuse to reverse this case but judicial economy should not be accomplished at the expense of the criminal justice system and more particularly at the expense of individual rights. This witness testified to the same effect in Hall v. State, 15 Ark. App. 309, 692 S.W.2d 769 (1985). In Hall the Court of Appeals stated: It is our conclusion from the record in the case before us that the evidence of the expert, Dr. Van Kirk, tended to focus the attention of the jury upon whether the evidence against the defendant matched the evidence in the usual case involving sexual abuse of a young child. . . . Other details could be recited but it is enough to say that we feel this type evidence was not of proper benefit to the jury in this case and that, as in Bledsoe, it was not introduced to rebut a misconception about the presumed behavior of a rape victim but to prove, as in Saldana, that the circumstances and details in this case match the circumstances and details usually found in child abuse cases. Of course, some of the expert’s testimony in this case could be of benefit to the jury. Her testimony regarding the vocabulary that young children have to express their experience in sexual abuse cases is legitimate and beneficial evidence for the jury. But, overall, we find much of the expert’s testimony distractive and prejudicial. . . . Because of the admission of the evidence discussed above, over objections to testimonial generalities concerning the “dynamics” of child abuse, the conviction in this case must be reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. The testimony of Dr. Van Kirk was not relevant at this point of the trial. It may have never been relevant. Perhaps the victim would not have testified exactly as she did, or maybe not at all, if this witness had not paved the way and set the pattern of thinking for the jury. Certainly the “dynamics” of “child abuse syndrome” is of great assistance to society in general and people involved in matters relating to sexual abuse of children. It may have been proper later in the present trial but as in Hall I find it was prejudicial in this case. The “overwhelming evidence” referred to in the majority opinion is only the testimony of the victim. While her testimony alone might have been sufficient to sustain the conviction, in my opinion it does not, merely by virtue of its detailed nature, in the circumstances of this case, become so overwhelming as to overcome the error I regard as prejudicial. I would reverse and remand for a new trial. Newbern, J., joins in this dissent.