Court Opinion

ID: 9958068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-06 21:00:24.905606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:44.370973
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-4503

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                            Plaintiff - Appellee,

                     v.

        THOMAS WAYNE STANBACK, a/k/a Chief,

                            Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, at
        Greensboro. Loretta C. Biggs, District Judge. (1:21-cr-00356-LCB-2)

        Submitted: March 28, 2024                                         Decided: April 5, 2024

        Before GREGORY, AGEE, and WYNN, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Sarah M. Powell, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. Kyle David
        Pousson, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEY, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Thomas Wayne Stanback pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to two

        counts of brandishing a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (carjacking),

        in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii); and conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery,

        in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a). The district court sentenced him to a total term of 300

        months’ imprisonment. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.

        California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal

        but questioning whether Stanback received ineffective assistance of counsel during the

        guilty plea proceedings that rendered his plea involuntary and uninformed, as well as

        during sentencing, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Stanback has

        filed a pro se supplemental brief in which he challenges the sufficiency of the factual basis

        supporting his plea. The Government moves to dismiss Stanback’s appeal pursuant to the

        appellate waiver in his plea agreement. We affirm in part and dismiss in part.

               “We review an appellate waiver de novo to determine whether the waiver is

        enforceable” and “will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls

        within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir.

        2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). An appellate waiver is valid if the defendant

        enters it “knowingly and intelligently, a determination that we make by considering the

        totality of the circumstances.” Id. “Generally though, if a district court questions a

        defendant regarding the waiver of appellate rights during the [Fed. R. Crim. P. 11] colloquy

        and the record indicates that the defendant understood the full significance of the waiver,

        the waiver is valid.” United States v. McCoy, 895 F.3d 358, 362 (4th Cir. 2018) (internal

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        quotation marks omitted). Our review of the record, including the plea agreement and the

        transcript of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, confirms that Stanback knowingly and

        intelligently waived his right to appeal his convictions and sentence. We therefore

        conclude that the waiver is valid and enforceable as to all issues that fall within its scope.

               However, even a valid appeal waiver does not preclude a defendant from raising a

        colorable constitutional challenge to the validity of his guilty plea. See United States v.

        Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732-33, 733 n.2 (4th Cir. 1994). This includes a challenge to those

        proceedings leading to the plea that affected the knowing and voluntary nature of the plea

        itself, including the ineffective assistance claims raised here. See United States v. Johnson,

        410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th Cir. 2005) (“Even if the [district] court engages in a complete plea

        colloquy, a waiver of the right to appeal may not be knowing and voluntary if tainted by

        the advice of constitutionally ineffective trial counsel.”); see also United States v. Craig,

        985 F.2d 175, 178 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting that where defendant’s “challenge to the denial

        of his plea-withdrawal motion incorporates a claim that the waiver of appeal as well as the

        guilty plea itself was tainted by his counsel’s ineffectiveness,” dismissal of the appeal is

        not warranted because “the waiver of appeal itself [is] being challenged by the motion to

        withdraw the guilty plea”). Similarly, “even valid appeal waivers do not bar claims that a

        factual basis is insufficient to support a guilty plea,” as such a claim “goes to the heart of

        whether the guilty plea, including the waiver of appeal, is enforceable.” McCoy, 895 F.3d

        at 364 (internal quotation marks omitted).

               Additionally, “[a] defendant who waives his right to appeal a plea retains the right

        to obtain appellate review of his sentence on certain limited grounds,” including that “the

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        underlying conviction was obtained in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”

        Id. at 363 (internal quotation marks omitted). Therefore, Stanback did not waive his right

        to effective counsel during sentencing. Attar, 38 F.3d at 732-33 (holding that general

        appeal waiver does not waive a defendant’s right to appeal a sentence “on the ground that

        the proceedings following entry of the guilty plea”—including the sentencing hearing

        itself—“were conducted in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, for a

        defendant’s agreement to waive appellate review of his sentence is implicitly conditioned

        on the assumption that the proceedings following entry of the plea will be conducted in

        accordance with constitutional limitations”).

               Accordingly, we conclude that Anders counsel’s ineffective assistance claims and

        Stanback’s supplemental pro se claims regarding the adequacy of the factual basis fall

        outside the scope of the otherwise valid appeal waiver. However, we will reverse on

        grounds of ineffective assistance “only if it conclusively appears in the trial record itself

        that the defendant was not provided effective representation.” United States v. Freeman,

        24 F.4th 320, 326 (4th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (cleaned up). Because the present record does

        not conclusively show that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, Stanback’s claims

        are not cognizable on direct appeal and “should be raised, if at all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255

        motion.” United States v. Faulls, 821 F.3d 502, 508 (4th Cir. 2016). Additionally, we

        conclude that Stanback’s plea was supported by an adequate factual basis.

               In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have

        found no potentially meritorious issues outside the scope of Stanback’s valid appellate

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        waiver. We therefore grant the Government’s motion to dismiss in part and dismiss the

        appeal as to all issues covered by the waiver. We otherwise affirm.

               This court requires that counsel inform Stanback, in writing, of the right to petition

        the Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Stanback requests that a

        petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel

        may move in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must

        state that a copy thereof was served on Stanback. We dispense with oral argument because

        the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court

        and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                               AFFIRMED IN PART,
                                                                               DISMISSED IN PART

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