Court Opinion

ID: 9453628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:19:24.344618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:44.334758
License: Public Domain

BAZELON, Chief Judge
(concurring):
I concur in affirmance, and agree with much of the majority opinion. I have an additional observation to make regarding the preindictment delay issue, and my reasoning on the Luck1 issue differs somewhat from that of the majority.
I
The majority finds no significant probability that appellant was harmed by the absence of the missing witness. Since I agree with this conclusion, I concur. However, the majority also notes 2 that defense counsel may have been less than diligent in seeking the missing witness.3 *963Though I do not understand my colleagues to suggest that the responsibility for locating the witness was entirely appellant’s, I wish to dispel any possible notion that the government may leave indigent defendants to their own inadequate devices to find missing witnesses.
The question of the missing witness was raised by appellant at the hearing on the motion to dismiss the indictment, and again at trial. The government was thus well aware that appellant desired to locate her but had been unable to do so. In fact, the district court denied the motion to dismiss the indictment on the express assumption that the government would “exercise a muscle or so, and get this witness.” 4 Despite this, the government apparently made little or no effort to find her.5
The “sporting” theory of justice is no longer appropriate in criminal cases; the stakes are far too high, and the sides too unequal.6 Particularly in the case of an indigent defendant represented by court-appointed counsel, the government’s resources are overwhelmingly superior.7 Elemental principles of fairness and decency thus demand that the government lend needed assistance to obtain any witness sought in good faith by the defendant.
II
I agree with the majority that one of the central concerns of the Luck decision was with the defendant who wishes to testify but fears that he will be prejudiced by evidence of prior convictions. In that situation past convictions should be excluded if the trial judge believes that “the cause of truth would be helped more by letting the jury hear the defendant’s story than by the defendant’s foregoing that opportunity because of the fear of prejudice founded upon a prior conviction.” 8 Obviously there is no occasion for such a determination when the accused’s story has already been told. But Luck also contemplates a decision whether “the prejudicial effect of impeachment far outweighs the probative relevance of the prior conviction to the issue of credibility.” 9 The latter determination is plainly relevant and necessary whether or not the accused has already testified. Indeed, Luck itself in*964volved an objection made when the prosecutor sought to admit a prior conviction during the course of the accused’s testimony.10 I vote to affirm only because I believe there is a basis in the record for the finding that the prejudicial effect of appellant's criminal record did not far outweigh its probative value for impeachment.11
The majority suggests that, in gauging the prejudice from prior convictions, the trial judge may properly presume that the decision to take the stand before seeking a ruling under Luck reflects defense counsel’s judgment as to the likelihood of prejudice. But there is no indication here that the court considered that factor, and in reviewing its exercise of discretion we should not consider it either. Moreover, even when the Luck issue is raised before the defendant takes the stand there is no guarantee that he will not thereafter testify, whatever the court’s ruling. Thus it is not at all clear that counsel’s timing in raising the issue reflects a judgment regarding prejudice.
There may well be sound reasons for requiring the Luck issue to be raised before the defendant testifies. For one thing, such a rule would insulate the trial judge’s discretion from the influence of his own impressions as to the accused’s credibility. Also, the accused would be better protected since in all cases the decision whether to testify would be made in light of the court’s ruling. But here it plainly appears that counsel believed the Luck objection could properly be made at any time before the convictions were actually admitted. We should not infer a “waiver” without any basis for believing it to have been intelligent. Indeed, if there is a duty to raise the Luck issue before the defendant takes the stand, I think we should consider whether that duty does not belong equally to the court and the prosecution.12

. Luck v. United States, 121 U.S.App.D.C. 151, 348 F.2d 763 (1965).

. Majority opinion, footnote 8.

. Appellant was represented at trial by an attorney of the District of Columbia Legal Aid Agency, which maintains its own staff of investigators. It appears that the services of Legal Aid investigators may also be available without cost to other court-appointed counsel. See The Operation op the Criminal Justice Act in the District op Columbia, Report of the Committee to Study *963the Operation of the Criminal Justice Act, Junior Bar Section, Bar Association of the District of Columbia, at 27 (1967). It is imperative, of course, that all appointed counsel take full advantage of the services available through the Legal Aid Agency, the Criminal Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A, and any other sources. See The Operation oe the Criminal Justice Act in the District oe Columbia, supra, at 27-28 (pointing out that during 1966 few claims for compensation for experts, and none for investigators, were submitted by appointed counsel, and suggesting that “one of the most valuable provisions of the [Criminal Justice] Act [see note 7, infra] is lying virtually dormant”).

. Transcript of hearing on motion to dismiss indictment, p. 12.

. The motion to dismiss the indictment was heard July 15, and the trial did not commence until September 1.

. See, e. g., Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); Gregory v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 140, 143-144, 369 F.2d 185, 188-189 (1966); Levin v. Katzenbach, 124 U.S.App.D.C. 158, 363 F.2d 287 (1966); Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth, 1963 Wash.U.L.Q. 279; Gold-stein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 Yale L.J. 1149 (1960); Note, 60 Colum.L.Rev. 858 (1960).

. Under the Criminal Justice Act, appointed counsel are not fully compensated for the value of their services. See, e. g., United States v. Hanrahan, 260 F.Supp. 728 (D.D.C.1966). The Act does make separate provision for compensation for the services of investigators, experts, etc. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e). However, the Act limits compensation to be paid an individual investigator or expert to $300. While this amount may be adequate in some cases, it obviously cannot reconcile the great disparity which exists generally between the resources of the government and those of the indigent defendant.

. 121 U.S.App.D.C. at 156, 348 F.2d at 768.

. Ibid.

. Id. at 154, 348 F.2d at 766.

. I would observe, however, that the trial judge’s statement, quoted in footnote 11 of the majority opinion, leaves room for doubt that such a finding was made, and certainly falls short of the “on-the-record consideration” contemplated by Lucie. Gordon v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 343, 383 F.2d 936, 939 (1967). Nevertheless, the relevant considerations were brought to the court’s attention, and there is no indication that the judge misunderstood or misapplied the Luck standards. Compare Brown v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 220, 370 F.2d 242 (1966).

. See Lewis v. United States, 127 U.S.App.D.C. 115, 381 F.2d 894 (1967); Stevens v. United States, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 239, 370 F.2d 485 (1966) (Fahy, J., dissenting).