Court Opinion

ID: 9844296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:00:30.162893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:31.946050
License: Public Domain

Defendant’s Motion To Strike.
Briefly stated, the allegations sought to be stricken out of the complaint are as follows: (1) allegations of negligence and recklessness in paragraph 14; allegations of negligence in paragraph 22 (together with an allegation stricken out by Judge Moss) ; allegations in paragraph 27 charging the defendant with discrimination against the plaintiff in favor of other landowners on other rivers, by the construction of *514protecting engineering works, and by the payment to some of them of large sums of money in consideration of the damage done to them by water; (2) paragraph 31 alleging that this action is brought for damage suffered by the plaintiff up to the date of the summons herein only; (3) allegations in paragraph 16 relating to the Federal Power Act, to the effect that the defendant under and by virtue thereof has become pecuniarily liable for all damage occasioned to the property of others by the construction, maintenance or operation of its engineering works; (4) allegations in paragraph 18 to the effect that by reason of the acts of the defendant, it has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff; and (5) allegations in paragraphs 24 and 25 relating to the rights of hunting, fowling and fishing on the plaintiff’s land.

No. (1) Allegations Relating to Tort

Certainly the allegations complained of, and mentioned in No. (1), directly attempt to state a cause of action against the defendant in tort; and it is of course quite obvious that these allegations are irrelevant, and should be stricken out, if the defendant as a governmental agency, or as an integral part of the State, is immune from an action ex delicto. Hence we must first consider the nature and status of the defendant.
The South Carolina Public Service Authority was created in and by an act of the General Assembly of 1934, incorporated in the 1942 Code as Sections 8555-11 to 8555-24, both inclusive, (and there is a subsequent amendment immaterial here) ; and it is therein stipulated that the Authority shall have power “to develop the Cooper River, the Santee River, and Congaree River in this State, as instrumentalities of intrastate, interstate and foreign commerce and navigation; to produce, distribute and sell electric power; to reclaim and drain swampy and flooded lands; and to reforest the water sheds of rivers in this State;” together with all powers necessary or convenient in the exercise of the powers stated; and it is further recited that the Authority shall have other powers including: “To sue and be sued.”
*515Without entering into any unnecessary detail, it may be noted that the act creating the Public Service Authority especially confers the power of eminent domain, and also contains the following significant section, to wit, Section 8555-19: “The South Carolina public service authority is a corporation completely owned by and to be operated for the benefit of the people of South Carolina, and any and all net earnings thereof not necessary or desirable for the prudent conduct and operation of its business or to pay the principal of and interest on its bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness or other obligations or to fullfill the terms and provisions of any agreements made with the purchasers or holders thereof or others shall be paid over semi-annually to the state treasurer for the general funds of the State and shall be used to reduce the tax burdens on the people of this State.”
In order that some other pertinent terms of the act may be before the Court, in considering the points raised by-counsel, the following section thereof is also quoted, to wit, Section 8555-21 : “Nothing contained in the provisions of §⅜ 8555-11 through 8555-24 shall, at any time or in any manner, involve the credit and taxing power of the State of South Carolina, or of any of its political subdivisions; nor shall any of the securities or other evidences of indebtedness authorized to be issued in and by §§ 8555-11 through 8555-24 ever be or constitute obligations of the State of South Carolina or of any of its political subdivisions; nor shall the State of South Carolina or any of its political subdivisions ever be liable or responsible, in any way, for the payment of the principal or interest of or on such security or other evidences of indebtedness.”
The status of the South Carolina Public Service Authority has heretofore been considered and determined by this Court, and we think the following statement from the unanimous opinion in the case of Creech v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 200 S. C. 127, 20 S. E. (2d) 645, 648, succinctly and correctly describes *516it: “In our opinion, the South Carolina Public Service Authority is a public corporation in the nature of a quasi municipal corporation, exercising certain governmental functions as an agency of the State.” See also Clarke v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 177 S. C. 427, 181 S. E. 481. Manifestly, a quasi-municipal corporation, as an agency of the State, is also in a real sense a part of the State, and shares in its sovereignty; and the South Carolina Public Service Authority was created “for the convenient accomplishment of what must be regarded as an important governmental function.” Dillon Catfish Drainage District v. Bank of Dillon, 143 S. C. 178, 141 S. E. 274, 276.
The case of Brooks v. One Motor Bus, 190 S. C. 379, 3 S. E. (2d) 42, 43, covers an important phase of the matter before us so fully that no further citation of authority really seems to be necessary. We quote the following from the opinion: “In this State neither the commonwealth nor any of its political subdivisions is liable in an action ex delicto unless made liable by express enactments of the General Assembly, except where the acts complained of, in effect, constitute a taking of private property for public use without just compensation.” It was further held in this case that immunities attaching to sovereignty “are never to be considered as waived or surrendered by any inference or implication”, and statutes permitting suits “for damages to property and persons, being in derogation of sovereignty, should be construed strictly.”
In the case of Sherbert v. School District No. 85, Spartanburg County, 169 S. C. 191, 168 S. E. 391, 393, the Court held that a statute providing that a school district “may sue and be sued” cannot be construed “to make a school district liable in an action ex delicto, as it is not so expressly provided by its terms.”
It follows from what we have said that the power conferred upon the South Carolina Public Service Authority “to sue and be sued” cannot reasonably be construed to authorize an action ex delicto.
*517Counsel for the respondent, however, urge that since the credit of the State is not granted to the Authority, the effect is to give it such separate corporate existence as to make it liable in an action for tort. But we do not think this conclusion is warranted. This provision of the statute does no more than to provide that the project shall be financed as self-liquidating; a method of financing which in recent years has become fairly common, under which bonds are executed known as revenue bonds. See Clarke v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, 177 S. C. 427, 181 S. E. 481, supra. The governmental character of the functions of the Authority cannot be deemed impaired by this financial provision, nor can it be made liable in tort by any such far reaching or remote implication.
A very significant case in this connection is the recent case of South Carolina Electric & Gas Co. v. South Carolina Public Service Authority, decided August 1, 1949, 215 S. C. 193, 54 S. E. (2d) 777, 786, wherein this Court held that the South Carolina Public Service Authority “is, in effect, a State agency just as the Public Service Commission is and both are subject to constitutional legislation which may be enacted by the General Assembly of the State.” Surely this is sufficient to show that the Authority is completely identified with the State in the performance of its public functions, which are unquestionably of a governmental character.
Counsel for the respondent cite the well known case of Hopkins v. Clemson Agricultural College, 221 U. S. 636, 31 S. Ct. 654, 55 L. Ed. 890, 35 L. R. A., N. S., 243, as an authority in contravention of the views above expressed. In that case the plaintiff sued for damages to his farm due to the College having built a dyke which caused the waters of the Seneca River to overflow his land. The Court of Common Pleas dismissed the complaint, upon the ground that the State was a necessary party and had not consented to be sued, and this Court affirmed the judgment of the Circuit Court. 77 S. C. 12, 57 S. E. 551. The Supreme Court of the *518United States reversed the decision of this Court, holding that the plaintiff was constitutionally entitled to compensation for the taking of his property by the defendant for a public use. This declaration of the law was cited and strongly relied upon in the majority opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Cothran in the Chick Springs case above mentioned, a cause celebre, establishing a proper remedy whereby an action at law will lie to recover just compensation for private property taken for public use, pursuant to the provisions of Section 17, Article I, of our Constitution. Hence the Hopkins case and the case before us are actually not in conflict.
But incidentally it may be mentioned that the status of the South Carolina Public Service Authority is quite different from that of Clemson College; which, although most highly useful and valuable to the State, is not an institution or corporation wholly owned and controlled by the State, especially in view of the will of Thomas G. Clemson, its founder, pursuant to which seven of the board of thirteen trustees were to consist of members nominated by the testator, with the continuing right to fill vacancies in their own number; the remaining six trustees to be elected by the Legislature of South Carolina in joint assembly; and of course this method of choice of the trustees prevails under the law. Section 5732, Code 1942.
It follows therefore that the allegations of negligence appropriate in a tort action should be stricken out, especially because they are not proper in an action for the recovery of just compensation for property “taken”. Sheriff v. City of Easley, 178 S. C. 504, 183 S. E. 311; and Baynham v. State Highway Department, 181 S. C. 435, 187 S. E. 528. It is proper, however, to add this word of explanation to what has just been said: It is quite true that one’s property might sometimes be taken, within the constitutional meaning, as a result of negligence. Indeed, this is precisely what happened in the Chick Springs case. But the reason for the rule, eliminating the allegation of negligence, is well explained in the opinion delivered by Mr. Justice Baker (now *519Chief justice) in the case of Sheriff v. City of Easley, 178 S. C. 504, 183 S. E. 311, 316, supra, from which we quote the following: “We hold that in an action against a municipal corporation under article 1, § 17, of the Constitution, for the taking of private property for public use without compensation, it is not necessary to allege or offer proof that such municipal corporation has negligently established, maintained, or operated that which has caused damages amounting to a taking, and that if there has been a taking without compensation, and a denial of the right of compensation, it is immaterial if the taking was due to the negligence of such municipal corporation; otherwise there could easily be cases of a taking without compensation, and the one whose property has been taken would be without remedy or redress if such municipal corporation was not guilty of negligence and denied the right of compensation.”
The allegations of recklessness, which might be appropriate in an action for tort, where punitive damages are sought, certainly have no place here and should be stricken out. The plaintiff does not ask for punitive damages in its complaint, and yet the charge of recklessness is made, which would indeed be proper in an action for tort, especially where punitive damages are sought, but has no place in an action for just compensation.
The plaintiff also includes allegations charging the defendant with discrimination against the plaintiff, upon the ground that it has heretofore paid large sums of money to other landowners by way of damages to their property due to the invasion of water, or has constructed protective engineering works, and these allegations might possibly be appropriate in an action for tort, under the authority of the case of Gadsden v. Catawba Water Power Co., 71 S. C. 340, 51 S. E. 121, which was an action in tort by an employee against his employer, and in which there were abundant allegations upon which punitive damages might be allowed. But obviously such allegations have no place in the suit at bar. “Just compensation” does not include punitive or exemplary damages.
*520No. (2) Allegations Relating to Future Damages
Paragraph 31 of the complain alleges that this action is brought for damages suffered by the plaintiff up to the date of the summons herein, and is not intended to include any future damages to plaintiff’s land which might be done hereafter by the defendant. We think this paragraph should be stricken out as irrelevant under any theory of the complaint. If the injury complained of is of a permanent character, then it follows that the plaintiff has a single cause of action which cannot be split. Furthermore, the well settled rule is that in an eminent domain proceeding all loss occurring by the “taking” should he assessed in one proceeding. Sec 18 Am. Jur. 887, and the annotation in 75 A. L. R. 855, wherein is cited, among others, the South Carolina case of Wateree Power Co. v. Rion, 113 S. C. 303, 102 S. E. 331, in which it was held that the amount of compensation in a condemnation case should take into account future use of the property involved. This would seem to be applicable to the instant case, as the converse of an eminent domain proceeding.
On the other hand, however, if for any reason a new cause of action should hereafter arise in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant, it would not be necessary or proper to make any allusion in the complaint herein to any such anticipated or speculative cause of action with which the Court could not now be concerned.
No. (3) Allegations Relating to the Federal Power Act
The complaint alleges in paragraph 16 thereof that the Authority obtained a license from the Federal Power Commission, under which it has operated, and that it has therefore subjected itself to all the requirements of the Federal Power Act, and that by virtue thereof the Authority has become pecuniarily liable for all damages occasioned to the property of others by the construction, maintenance or operation of its engineering works; and so much of these alie-*521gations as purport to impose liability upon the defendant are sought to be stricken out in the motion before us.
It appears that the act of the General Assembly embodied in Code Section 8555-27 confirms and ratifies the acquisition of the license issued by the Federal Power Commission, and the South Carolina Public Service Authority was thereby fully and completely authorized and empowered to construct “the Santee-Cooper Hydro-Electric and Navigation Project”. And it also appears that the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. A. § 803(c), provides that a licensee “shall be liable for all damages occasioned to the property of others by the construction, maintenance, or operation of the project works or of the works appurtenant or accessory thereto, constructed under the license, and in no event shall the United States be liable therefor.”
Counsel for the respondent state in their brief that of the several legal rights asserted by it in its complaint, the primary right upon which it relies, as the main basis of its cause of action, is the Federal Power Act from which the above quotation is taken. We do not think, however, that the quoted language from the Federal Power Act can be construed to devolve upon the licensee a newly created liability, but that it merely means to say that if there is legal liability arising because of damages to the property of others, in the construction, maintenance or operation of the project works, it shall be the liability of the licensee, and not that of the Federal Government as the licensor; but this was not left to implication, for the Federal Power Act, 16 U. S. C. A., § 821, specifically provides as follows: “Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed as affecting or intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the laws of the respective States relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of water used in irrigation or for municipal or other uses, or any vested right acquired therein.”
The principal authorities relating to this phase of the case are the two cases cited by counsel on each side, to wit, Henry *522Ford & Son v. Little Falls Fibre Co., 280 U. S. 369, 50 S. Ct. 140, 74 L. Ed. 483, and Pike Rapids Power Co. v. Minneapolis, St. P & S. S. M. Railroad Co., 8 Cir., 99 F. (2d) 902, 912. We think it is clear that these decisions properly construed sustain the views that we have expressed.
In the first case mentioned, to wit, the Ford case, the Supreme Court of the United States held that such a license could not be used as a shield to protect the licensee from liability under the State law; and furthermore that the acts complained of constituted, “under local law”, an actionable wrong entitling the injured parties to relief; and it was expressly recognized that this liability was one created by the State law.
In the other case mentioned, the Pike Rapids case, the Court held that the wording of the Federal Power Act as to liability for damages meant “lawful damages”. And the Court rejected the contention that the Federal Power Act created any new cause of action, and held “that the rights and liabilities of the parties are to be determined by the laws of Minnesota.” It should be observed that in this case the Supreme Court of the United States denied the petition for a writ of certiorari, 306 U. S. 640, 59 S. Ct. 488, 83 L. Ed. 1040.
It was likewise held in the Alabama case of Alabama Power Co. v. Smith, 229 Ala. 105, 155 So. 601, that the licensee’s assumption of liability refers only to a liability “otherwise existing”. We are therefore of opinion that the particular allegations in the complaint now under consideration should have been stricken out.
No. (4) Allegations Relating to Quasi-Contract
It is alleged in paragraph 18 of the complaint that by the reason of the acts of the defendant it “has been unjustly enriched at the expense of the plaintiff”; and it is further alleged that the unjust enrichment arises because the defendant has invaded with salt water and taken the use of plaintiff’s land for the purpose of defendant’s power de*523velopment, without the consent of the plaintiff, and without making any payment for such use. The allegations of unjust enrichment seem to have been made as the basis of an action in quasi-contract. But no such cause of action is really stated, for the reason, inter alia, that there is no factual basis for the allegation of “unjust enrichment’’, because the facts stated in the complaint, if established by the evidence, merely show that the defendant in the exercise of its legal duties and powers has taken the property of the plaintiff for a public use, for which just compensation should be made. The exclusive remedy provided by law for the taking by a governmental agency of one’s property for a public use, in the absence of a statute to the contrary, is the right to recover just compensation for the same, and that cause of action is set up in the complaint before us.
It should further be said that the plaintiff here could not have an action in quasi-contract, unless it also had an action in tort; for if there was any unjust enrichment, it would be the result of a tort, which in a proper case might be waived and the action treated as one in pwim'-contract. See annotation in 97 A. L. R. 250. But, as we have already shown, the defendant is immune from an action in tort, and would therefore be immune from an action in ¿/Movi-contract based upon tort.
No. (5) Allegations Relating to Hunting and Fishing Rights
This brings us down to the allegations of the complaint, in paragraphs 24 and 25 thereof, charging that the alleged action of the defendant in increasing the salinity of the waters on plaintiff’s property has decreased the value thereof, because the plaintiff’s hunting and fishing rights have thus been damaged or destroyed; although the plaintiff expressly admits that the actions of the defendant did not result in the death of game or fish on the property or in the waters owned by the plaintiff; but it is alleged that the actions of the defendant have rendered the property and waters owned by *524the plaintiff unsuited and inhospitable to game and fish, and that this changed condition of the property results in damages to the same.
Every landowner has, as an incident to the ownership thereof, the right to hunt and fish thereon, subject to reasonable governmental regulations, although game and fish are really the property of the State, and the preservation thereof is a matter of public interest. However, it remains true that the right to hunt and fish on one’s own premises is a right of property incident thereto which may even be granted or leased to others. 24 Am. Jur. 377-379.
Upon due reflection we have therefore concluded that it cannot be said, as a matter of law, that the impairment of the right of hunting, fowling and fishing upon the plaintiff's land, if indeed there was such impairment, is not an element which might affect the matter of just compensation for the alleged taking of property by the defendant. Hence these particular allegations were properly allowed to remain in the complaint.
The result of our holding with regard to defendant’s motion to strike from the complaint therefore is that all the allegations complained of should have been stricken out, save and except only the allegations contained in paragraphs 24 and 25 relating to the rights of hunting, fowling and fishing, and that these two paragraphs should remain as they are without the elimination of any part thereof.