Court Opinion

ID: 9537852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:25:48.635821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:57:05.824756
License: Public Domain

Fontron, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part: While I approve of the disposition made of this appeal, I disagree with the legal concept expressed in Syllabus No. 2. The rule embodied therein is far too broad, as I see it.
In my view an expert witness should be required to base his conclusions on factors which are relevant, and his testimony should be so restricted. To decree that a court cannot regulate the factors used by an expert in forming his opinion is tantamount to giving him free rein to consider any and all factors which may please his fancy. Certainly this cannot be a valid or a salutary rule.
The determination of relevancy, materiality and the admissibility *194of evidence is a judicial function and courts should not abrogate their responsibilities in such regard without sober reflection. The obligation of a trial court to rule on evidentiary matters pertains to the testimony of all witnesses, expert and common alike. The rule expressed in the offending syllabus is a novel departure from that principle.
Accordingly, I must record my dissent from what is said in Syllabus No. 2 and in the corresponding portion of the opinion. In so doing I recognize that identical language appears in City of Bonner Springs v. Coleman, 206 Kan. 689, 481 P. 2d 950, the import of which unfortunately escaped me when the opinion was handed down. The language was not, however, essential to the decision in the Bonner Springs case, and I take this early opportunity to rectify my inadvertent error.
Fromme, J., joins in the foregoing concurring and dissenting opinion.