Court Opinion

ID: 9707245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:06:19.350357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:29.734042
License: Public Domain

McAULIFFE, Judge,
concurring.
I agree that testimony explaining post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is admissible in rape prosecutions. I do not agree that opinion testimony should be received on the question of whether the complainant actually suffered PTSD.
The relevant scientific community has long accepted the proposition that certain physical and emotional traumas may cause a person to suffer physical and emotional responses. Certain of these responses are so commonly known and understood that expert testimony is unnecessary to establish a causal relationship between the trauma and the response. For example, testimony that a complainant was crying and upset when she reported a rape is accepted, usually without question. The evidence is circumstantial, corroborative and relevant. It does not prove that a rape occurred. It does prove that something probably occurred in the life of the complainant sufficient to provoke the reaction. Furthermore, it is within the common knowledge and understanding of laypersons that a rape may well produce such a response. To borrow the language of the psychiatrist, the act of rape is a “recognizable stressor.” It is also common knowledge that many other stressors, physical and emotional, are capable of producing the same symptoms. Thus, we do not indulge the hypothesis that because a complainant is upset and crying she was therefore raped. Rather, we accept the evidence for its proper circumstantial value.
Evidence of PTSD is offered for the same purpose, and similarly should be admissible if it is proven that the same kind of causal relationship exists between a stressor such as rape and an identifiable coalescence of certain symptoms. *126That such a relationship does exist, and that both the recognizable stressors and the resulting symptoms have been identified, are beyond reasonable dispute. The relevant scientific community accepts this phenomenon as PTSD. The difference between the commonly accepted concept that a rape will often cause a victim to become upset and cry, and the medically accepted concept of PTSD, is not that one is valid and the other is not. They are both valid. The only difference is that PTSD is not within the common knowledge of laypersons. Thus, expert testimony is required to provide an understanding of PTSD.
The question therefore arises: What expert testimony is needed to allow the trier of fact to utilize evidence of PTSD in the same manner it customarily utilizes evidence of the more commonly known and immediate reactions to trauma? In answering this question, we must keep in sharp focus the legitimate purpose for which this type of evidence is offered.
The trier of facts needs to know only this: What is PTSD? What are the recognized stressors? What are the recognized symptoms? What, if any, are the temporal limitations on the cause-effect relationship? Armed with this information, the trier of fact will be in the same position as when such matters are within its common knowledge — it may accept or reject the permissible inference, and if accepted, afford the inference such weight as may be appropriate.
Allowing the expert to go beyond providing this information, and to opine that a particular complainant is suffering from PTSD, is error. As Doctor Spodak made clear, in order to make a diagnosis of PTSD, the physician must assume the existence of a recognizable stressor — in this case a rape. Injecting the issue of diagnosis is wholly unnecessary and gives rise to the very real possibility that a jury will conclude that the physician believes the complainant is telling the truth about the occurrence of a rape. Doctor Spodak was in no better position than the jurors to *127assess the credibility of the complainant. The value of his testimony lay in furnishing the jurors information that would permit them to draw a rational inference corroborative of the complaint of rape, if they believed the complainant’s testimony concerning her symptoms and concerning the absence of any other recognizable stressors in her life.
This is not a personal injury case where the trauma is usually conceded and expert testimony of a diagnosis is received to demonstrate the extent of damage. This is a case where the jury should determine whether certain symptoms exist, whether any recognized stressors other than the rape were present, and what, if any, inferences are to be drawn from those findings. The jury needs only the information to which we have earlier referred to make these determinations.
The physician may be asked hypothetical questions to elicit information that will aid the jury in its understanding of how the particular facts of the case square with the recognized concepts of PTSD. Assuming the existence of a sufficient foundation or proffer of facts, the State may ask a physician whether a certain set of symptoms are or are not consistent with the existence of PTSD. The State may ask whether a rape as described by the complainant would constitute a recognized stressor, and whether the temporal factors indicated by the testimony are consistent or inconsistent with the existence of PTSD. In each instance, the physician is asked to assume the truth of certain facts, and the expertise of the physician is used to inform the jury whether the facts fit the known mold of PTSD. The physician is not expressly or implicitly asked to assess the credibility of the complainant.
I concede that the line I draw is a fine one and that a skillful prosecutor might fashion a question which so clearly reveals the hypothetical nature of the included facts that it would be appropriate as a predicate for a hypothetical *128diagnosis. But the danger that the jury may understand the answer to involve an assessment of credibility is too great, particularly where the necessity for a diagnosis does not exist. The better course is to prohibit the State from eliciting testimony concerning a diagnosis of PTSD.
In the case before us, the prosecutor skillfully developed the necessary and appropriate information during the initial portion of his direct examination of Doctor Spodak. He went astray, in my judgment, when he asked the doctor to express his opinion as to whether this complainant suffered PTSD after June 25, 1983, and to identify the particular trauma that precipitated her condition. Concededly the prosecutor wove into each question the request that Doctor Spodak assume the truth of certain facts, but for reasons previously stated I conclude the better course is to avoid such questions entirely.
The error, however, was not preserved for appellate review. Allewalt’s objection was to the admissibility of any evidence relating to PTSD on the grounds that 1) such evidence could not furnish assistance to the jury, 2) the concept of PTSD had not received general acceptance within the relevant scientific community, and 3) allowing PTSD evidence would usurp the jury’s function. His objection was made at the conclusion of the hearing conducted out of the presence of the jury and was properly overruled because expert testimony concerning PTSD was admissible. Thereafter, Allewalt interposed no objection as the evidence was presented to the jury, except to suggest that Doctor Spodak could not be an expert in the field of PTSD because no such specialty existed. Allewalt’s approach, therefore, was all-or-nothing, and he may not now complain that specific questions were objectionable on other grounds.
As I am in agreement with Parts II and III of the majority opinion, and reach the same result as the majority in Part I, I concur in the result.