Court Opinion

ID: 9730733
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:22:03.552875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:08.897628
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s conclusion giving limited retroactive effect to the Fountain decision. As noted by the majority, Michigan and U. S. Courts have traditionally applied a three-factor test to measure the necessity of retroactive application: (1) the purpose to be served by the new rule, (2) the degree to which law enforcement agencies relied upon the former rule or standard, and (3) the effect of retroactive application on the administration of justice. People v Hampton, 384 Mich 669, 677; 187 NW2d 404 (1971), Hankerson v North Carolina, 432 US 233; 97 S Ct 2339; 53 L Ed 2d 306 (1977). The purpose to be served by the new rule has been accorded paramount status, Desist v United States, 394 US 244, 249; 89 S Ct 1030; 22 L Ed 2d 248 (1969), with the remaining factors to be given controlling significance where "the purpose of the rule in question [does] not clearly favor either retroactivity or prospectivity”. Desist v United States, supra, 251, Michigan v Payne, 412 US 47; 93 S Ct 1966; 36 L Ed 2d 736 (1973).
*634The purpose of the new rule announced in Fountain is "to provide fair notice to the accused and avoid an appearance of prosecutorial impropriety”. People v Fountain, supra, 99. See also People v Wilson, 99 Mich App 348; 297 NW2d 660 (1980), and People v Rice, 101 Mich App 1; 300 NW2d 428 (1980). The Supreme Court has held that where a new rule does not affect the determination of guilt or innocence, a retrospective application is not mandated. People v Hampton, supra, 677, citing Tehan v United States, ex rel Shott, 382 US 406; 86 S Ct 459; 15 L Ed 2d 453 (1966). The Fountain rule should be particularly subject to this analysis. Time alone is its scope, fair notice of all charges to the accused; the rule does not affect the substantive determination of guilt or innocence as to the principal or supplemental charge. I think that retroactive effect is unwarranted.
Consideration of the second and third factors of the Hampton retroactivity test emphasize the need for a prospective-only purpose. As noted in Hampton, these elements may be considered together because the degree of prior law enforcement agency reliance will often determine the impact of retroactive application on the administration of justice. The discussion of these factors in People v Wilson, supra, is instructive:
"If retroactivity were ordered it would have a significant impact on the administration of justice. The enhanced sentences imposed upon many habitual criminals would have to be vacated. New sentence hearings, with the attendant problem of stale presentence information, would be required in some cases, while in others, sentences imposed after conviction of the principal offense would be reinstated resulting in disproportionately light penalties. A review would be required of all cases of habitual offenders sentenced prior to August 28, 1979, who could obtain an ingenious lawyer to *635process a delayed appeal. The result would be a clogging of appellate pipelines with many technical claims and there would be released into society many of the very people the Legislature saw fit to longer detain.” Wilson, supra, 352.
See also the similar conclusion regarding the potential adverse effect of retroactive application, in People v Rice, supra, and the probative analysis in People v Stankiewicz, 101 Mich App 476; 300 NW2d 611 (1980), finding that retroactive application would benefit defendants unable to demonstrate actual prejudice and penalize prosecutors for failing to meet a previously nonexistent standard. Cf. People v Wallace, 102 Mich App 386; 301 NW2d 540 (1980), and People v Doran, 100 Mich App 795; 300 NW2d 415 (1980).
I would affirm.