Court Opinion

ID: 9544937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:03:43.207988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:47.893598
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent.
As the majority must acknowledge, there was overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt of premeditated first degree murder. Nonetheless, the majority reverses his murder conviction, relying upon supposed “errors” which, in my view, could not possibly have affected the jury’s verdict. Such a ruling directly contravenes the constitutional mandate which, it bears repeating, forbids reversal of a judgment in the absence of a “miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.) No such miscarriage of justice occurred here.
The evidence of defendant’s guilt was indeed overwhelming. He confessed to having murdered Marilyn Milner and Leila Blessing by repeatedly striking them on the head with a cast iron frying pan. Defendant first killed Blessing, in order to prevent her from interfering with his intended murder of Milner. Blessing suffered 10 to 12 blows to the head; Milner was struck on the head at least 5 times with “considerable force” and also was stabbed repeatedly in the back. Defendant confessed his crimes to two nurses, to a hospital psychiatrist, and to various police officers. He also confessed to Dr. Lieberman, a psychiatrist who was appointed to investigate his sanity.
In reversing defendant’s murder conviction, the majority focuses on two alleged evidentiary errors. In light of the exceedingly strong evidence of defendant’s guilt, neither error justifies a reversal.
1.) Mrs. Baer gen’s Testimony
The victim Milner’s mother was permitted to testify that her daughter told her that defendant was acting “weird” and was following her around, that she feared he might hit her and “beat her up,” and that she had ordered defendant to move out of the apartment occupied by *532Milner and defendant by June 1. The foregoing testimony was inadmissible hearsay. It was also unquestionably harmless.
The majority concludes that the admission of Mrs. Baergen’s testimony was reversible, prejudicial error because that testimony represented “the only evidence of previous threatening behavior by appellant which might have suggested premeditation or deliberation.” (Ante, p. 529, fn. omitted.) The majority further speculates that testimony regarding the victim’s June 1 “ultimatum” to defendant may have constituted further improper evidence of defendant’s premeditation. Yet, the majority overlooks the following conclusive and uncontradicted evidence of premeditation which was properly admitted (primarily through defendant’s own lengthy confession to police officers); Defendant, over a period of time, had become infatuated with victim Milner who nonetheless spurned him, engaging in sex with several other men while treating defendant (in the words of Milner’s brother) as a “sugar daddy” by accepting his money without providing sexual favors in return. Defendant’s infatuation thereafter turned to jealousy and frustration. According to defendant, Milner was “always telling me she’s going to throw me out of the apartment,” and that “she says she doesn’t like me anymore.”
On the night of the murders, defendant (admittedly “frustrated” by Milner’s lengthy telephone conversation with one of her paramours) first killed victim Blessing for no other reason than to prevent her from finding out “what’s going on” and to keep her from calling the police. Next, defendant brutally and methodically struck and viciously stabbed Milner to death. Under such circumstances, disclosing a long period of frustration and resentment by defendant, how could any reasonable juror fail to conclude that these murders were premeditated? Disregarding entirely Mrs. Baergen’s testimony, there was ample confirmation of the premeditation.
The majority insists, however, that “The evidence in this case certainly is open to the interpretation that the killings were committed in a sudden rage ... .” (Ante, p. 524.) With due respect, I suggest that the evidence fails to support any such fanciful speculation. Defendant expressed no “rage,” malice or ill will whatever toward his first victim, Julie Blessing; as defendant’s own confession makes clear, her murder was coldly and deliberately plotted to facilitate the planned and premeditated murder of victim Milner, and to eliminate Blessing as a witness. It is clear, of course, that defendant harbored resentment and malice aforethought toward Milner, but to say that such malice manifested it*533self in the form of an unpremeditated “sudden rage” is wholly unsupported by this record.
It is urged that reversal is required by our holding in People v. Ireland (1969) 70 Cal.2d 522, 532 [75 Cal.Rptr. 188, 450 P.2d 580, 40 A.L.R.3d 1323], but that case is clearly distinguishable. There, the trial court improperly admitted a hearsay statement of the murder victim to a friend to the effect that “I know [defendant] is going to kill me” (Italics added, 70 Cal.2d at p. 528.) We quite correctly ruled that this decisive testimony was prejudicial, enabling the jury to find premeditation and striking “at the heart of the defense.” (P. 532.)
In contrast to Ireland, the victim Milner’s statement to her mother that she feared defendant might hit her or “beat her up” was considerably milder and added nothing of substance to the prosecution’s overwhelming evidence of premeditation. Defendant’s premeditated and deliberate murder of Milner was conclusively established by his own uncontradicted admission that he first killed victim Blessing because he was afraid she would stop him from- killing Milner. Thus, defendant’s prior intention to kill Milner was amply demonstrated by his own confession, and any evidence of Milner’s earlier subjective fear of harm was wholly cumulative and harmless. As we explained in People v. Anderson (1968) 70 Cal.2d 15, 26 [73 Cal.Rptr. 550, 447 P.2d 942], quoting from earlier cases, premeditation and deliberation involve a “preexisting reflection,” and a “deliberate judgment or plan” which is “carried on cooly [szc] and steadily, [especially] according to a preconceived design.” Defendant’s planning activities on the night of the murder amply fulfilled those standards.
2.) Dr. Lieberman’s Testimony
Dr. Lieberman, a psychiatrist, was permitted to testify that, in his opinion, based on personal interviews, defendant had been feigning mental illness to avoid trial, and that defendant was a “clever” and manipulative person, capable of deceiving professionals regarding his mental state. This testimony was inadmissible under Tarantino v. Superior Court (1975) 48 Cal.App.3d 465, 470 [122 Cal.Rptr. 61], which prohibits the testimonial use of statements made by an accused at a court-ordered competency hearing. The testimony was also harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The majority fails satisfactorily to explain how the admission of Dr. Lieberman’s version possibly could have prejudiced defendant. Al*534though this evidence bore upon defendant’s diminished capacity defense, the record discloses that this defense was extremely weak, because of defendant’s own admissions, the lack of any supporting expert testimony, and very substantial evidence to the contrary. Thus, once again, the majority is compelled to focus on the elements of premeditation and deliberation, speculating that defendant may have killed “in a sudden rage precluding mature and meaningful reflection . . .. ” {Ante, p. 524.) As I have explained, the record simply does not support such a theory. Moreover, because I do not understand how evidence of defendant’s “cleverness” in feigning mental illness following his arrest could in any sense have helped the People to establish the elements of premeditation and deliberation, I conclude that Dr. Lieberman’s opinions in this regard could not have possibly affected the verdict in this case.
The majority, characterizing the admission of Dr. Lieberman’s opinions as federal constitutional error (see Estelle v. Smith (1981) 451 U.S. 454 [68 L.Ed.2d 359, 101 S.Ct. 1866]), states that the “federal test” of harmless error must be applied. (Ante, p. 525.) But even federal constitutional error may be deemed harmless where the evidence of defendant’s guilt is “overwhelming.” (Harrington v. California (1969) 395 U.S. 250, 254 [23 L.Ed.2d 284, 287, 89 S.Ct. 1726].) As expressed by the high court in a recent case applying the Harrington rule, ‘“[A] defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one,’ for there are no perfect trials [citations].” (Brown v. United States (1973) 411 U.S. 223, 231 [36 L.Ed.2d 208, 215, 93 S.Ct. 1565], italics added.)
The record reflects that defendant both planned and committed multiple murders. He was properly tried and convicted by an impartial judge and by conscientious jurors who gave him a fair trial. The asserted errors were nonprejudicial. There was no miscarriage of justice. We should no longer frustrate the enforcement of the penalty which the law has imposed.
I would affirm the judgment.
Mosk, J., concurred.