Court Opinion

ID: 9531930
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:16:02.941463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:37.745036
License: Public Domain

OPINION
MATTINGLY, Judge.
Demetrius Taylor appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. We consolidate and restate his issues as:
1. Whether improper references at trial to Taylor’s post-arrest silence constituted reversible error; and
2. Whether Taylor was subjected to double jeopardy when he was convicted of both rape and confinement.1
We reverse and remand.

FACTS

On December 18, 1989, the victim left her apartment door slightly open when she went to the front of her apartment building to meet a neighbor who was to take the victim’s daughter to school. When the victim returned to her bedroom, she was confronted by Taylor, who had a knife. Taylor ordered the victim to disrobe and lie on the bed, where he forced her to have intercourse. Afterwards, Taylor asked the victim if she had any money and also inquired about the contents of some packages under a Christmas tree. Taylor left after he warned the victim not to call the police.
A jury found Taylor guilty of Rape, a class A felony,2 Confinement, a class B felony3 and Burglary, a class B felony.4
Additional facts will be provided as needed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

An action for post-conviction relief is a special quasi-civil remedy where a party can raise an error which, for various reasons, was not available or known at the time of the original trial or appeal. Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1); Long v. State, 679 N.E.2d 981, 983 (Ind.Ct.App.1997). A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of establishing grounds for relief by a preponderance of the evidence. P-C.R. 1(5); Long, 679 N.E.2d at 983. The standard of review for a post-conviction hearing is similar to that of other trials where the trial judge hears the evidence and we review the trial court’s ruling. The judge who presides over the post-conviction hearing has exclusive authority to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. Id. So, we will not set aside the trial court’s ruling on a post-conviction petition unless the evidence is without conflict and leads solely to a result *273different from that reached by the trial court. Id.

DEFENDANT’S POST-ARREST SILENCE

Taylor asserts the prosecution improperly used his post-arrest, post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes, in violation of the Due Process Clause’s prohibition against fundamental unfairness as interpreted in Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 2240, 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976). The Miranda warnings give a criminal defendant implicit assurances that silence will carry no penalty; so, in some circumstances, it is fundamentally unfaii- and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial. Id. at 618, 96 S.Ct. 2240; Bevis v. State, 614 N.E.2d 599, 602 (Ind.Ct. App.1993). Because the nature of a Doyle error is so egregious and so inherently prejudicial, reversal is the norm rather than the exception. White v. State, 647 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Ind.Ct.App.1995). A Doyle violation is fundamental error, and a party does not, by failing to object at trial, waive his or her right to subsequently raise the issue. Id.
Taylor testified at trial that he had known the victim prior to the date of the offense, that the two had engaged in a sexual encounter about a month before the incident, that the victim had invited Taylor to her apartment on the date of the offense, and that the two engaged in consensual intercourse. He denied raping the victim. On cross examination, the State questioned Taylor about why he had not raised this consent defense earlier:
Q. So meanwhile, there’s been six months since then, ...
A. Yes.
Q. ... isn’t that correct? And, all this time you knew that you were accused of rape, ...
A. Yes.
Q. ... of raping [the victim]?
A. That’s what I was accused of.
Q. And Lt. Daggy asked to interview you,
A. Uh Hum.
!|: *
Q. Okay, and you didn’t choose to tell him any of this, did you?
A. No.
Q. But you sat here, yesterday and today, and you heard [the victim’s] evidence,....
A. Yes.
R. 449-50. At that point Taylor’s counsel objected. The State withdrew its question after the court sustained the objection.
Shortly thereafter, the State asked Taylor “So it’s now that you choose to offer a story that would explain your being in [the victim’s] apartment, right?” Taylor’s counsel again objected, and his objection was overruled. Taylor responded that he told his mother the same story the day after he was arrested, and his mother so testified. R. 454. Later, the State called Lieutenant Daggy, an investigating officer, back to the stand and the following exchange occurred:
Q. Did you do all the investigation you felt necessary?
A. Yes.
Q. Is there anything more you could have done, uh, if you thought there was a defense of consent?
A. Well, if anybody would tell me that there was a defense of consent, you know, I would ask questions, uh, you know, “Where did you meet the person, how long have you known them, if it was consensual, how many times have you had consensual sex, where were you at when you had the consensual sex,” and then you try to corroborate those kinds of statements with an investigation.
Q. Who would you ask those questions of?
A. Uh, Demetrius Taylor.
Q. Before asking him questions, what are you required to do?
A. Advise him of his rights.
Q. Did you advise Mr. Taylor of his rights?
*274A. Yes, I did.
R. at 512-13.
The State’s questions were impermissible under the Doyle standard, as they were used to impeach Taylor’s exculpatory testimony by making direct reference to his post-arrest silence. However, under some circumstances, a Doyle violation may be harmless error. To determine whether the error is harmless, we assess the record as a whole to measure the probable impact of the improper evidence on the jury. If we can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not influence the jury verdict, the error is harmless. Henson v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1064, 1067 (Ind.1987).
We look to five factors in conducting our analysis:
1) the use to which the prosecution puts the post-arrest silence;
2) who elected to pursue the line of questioning;
3) the quantum of other evidence indicative of guilt;
4) the intensity and frequency of the reference; and
5) the availability to the trial judge of the opportunity to grant a motion for a mistrial or to give curative instructions.
Id. We will examine the factors in turn.
1. Based on the previously set out questions, it is clear that the State used the testimony about Taylor’s post-arrest silence for the impermissible purpose of impeaching Taylor’s exculpatory testimony.
2. The line of questioning was pursued primarily, but not exclusively, by the State.5
3. The quantum of evidence of Taylor’s guilt was not so overwhelming as to render the error harmless. The State points out that the victim provided detailed testimony describing the rape, and correctly notes that the uncorroborated testimony of the victim is sufficient to support a rape conviction. However, we decline to hold that evidence which is merely sufficient to sustain a conviction is necessarily so “overwhelming” that it outweighs the harmful effect of the State’s inquiry into the defendant’s silence. See White v. State, 647 N.E.2d 684, 688 (Ind.Ct.App.1995), where we found that a Doyle violation was reversible error, in part because the trial came down to a credibility judgment: it was the victim’s word against the Defendant’s. The State’s evidence against Taylor was of the same nature.
4. Like the statements in White, the State’s “repeated references cannot be characterized as inadvertent. The prosecutor spread these comments throughout the trial in an effort to convince the jury that [the defendant’s] silence indicated guilt and proved his in-court explanation false.” Id. The references to Taylor’s silence were numerous, and they shifted the focus of his trial to the question of whether he had recently fabricated the consent defense.6 The frequency and intensity of the remarks were such that we cannot conclude the error was harmless.
5. Finally, we look to the question whether the trial judge had the opportunity to warn the jury of the dangers of this type of testimony. The judge did sustain Taylor’s objection to the initial reference to Taylor’s post-Miranda silence. Upon objection, the judge stated “If that was the question or the *275inference, there is no inference permitted and, of course, that question will be disregarded by the jury, because each person has a right not to testify or not discuss anything with the lieutenant or anyone else.” R. at 452.
We do not believe the judge’s remarks sufficiently cured the Doyle error so as to render it harmless. The judge referred to “the right not to testify,” which was not the basis for the objection and which right Taylor was not asserting at his trial. The reference to the right to “not discuss anything” was also insufficient to mitigate the damage from the improper testimony, as that vague reference to the Doyle protections could not clearly convey to the jury the reason the comments were objectionable and were to be disregarded. Further, the trial judge allowed, over objection, subsequent testimony to the effect that Taylor had not previously asserted his consent defense and that it must therefore have been a recent fabrication.
We cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error arising from the testimony regarding Taylor’s post-arrest, post-Miranda silence did not influence the jury’s verdict. The error was not harmless, and Taylor’s convictions must be reversed.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

While we reverse Taylor’s convictions because of the Doyle violation, we address Taylor’s double jeopardy claim as well, as it is certain to be an issue again on remand.
Taylor asserts that double jeopardy principles were violated when he was convicted of rape and criminal confinement. A double jeopardy violation, like a Doyle violation, is fundamental error and so is not waived by a defendant’s failure to present it on direct appeal. See, e.g., Grafe v. State, 686 N.E.2d 890, 892-93 (Ind.Ct.App.1997), where we determined that a petitioner who had been denied post-conviction relief did not waive his double jeopardy claim by failure to present it on direct appeal because a double jeopardy violation is fundamental error.
For purposes of double jeopardy, two offenses are the same when the same act constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions which do not require proof of an additional fact. Cossel v. State, 675 N.E.2d 355, 362 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). Our analysis must include not only an evaluation and comparison of the statutory provisions, but must examine the factual bases contained in the information or indictment. Id.
Where the crime of rape is charged as forcible rape, it necessarily includes the crime of confinement to the extent force, or threat of force, effectuates the rape. Webster v. State, 628 N.E.2d 1212, 1214 (Ind.1994). As a result, we must look to the facts of the case and the factual bases contained in the information to determine whether a separate confinement occurred. Wethington v. State, 560 N.E.2d 496, 508 (Ind.1990). A separate violation of the confinement statute will be found where any other confinement of the victim beyond that inherent in the force used to effectuate the rape exists. Id.
In Cossel, 675 N.E.2d at 362, also a rape and confinement case, there was found to be no double jeopardy violation where “the evidence presented at trial shows that after Cossel had finished having sexual intercourse with K.D., he turned her onto her back. Record at 415. A pillow covered KD.’s face and Cossel began ‘jabbing’ K.D. with his knife. Record at 415. He then threatened K.D. and warned her not to tell her husband or call the police because he would kill her. Record at 415. Cossel also told K.D. that he would come back and ‘shoot your little boy laying there next to you.’ Record at 415.”
That is not the case here. Taylor’s confinement of his victim was limited to the circumstances surrounding the other crime charged. The record reflects that after the rape, Taylor got up and asked the victim if she had any money, and she tried to hand him a jar of pennies, which he would not take. R. 198. She then testified that he got the knife out and said “I’m sorry”, at which point she stated that “he didn’t have to do that, that I wouldn’t call the police, I had a police record, and it wouldn’t do anything but get me in trouble.” R. 243. The following testimony was then elicited:
Q. So what did he do with the knife then?
*276A. Then that’s when he turned around and walked towards the living room.
Q. Where were you?
A. Following behind him.
Q. Did he just keep walking toward ... into the living room?
A. Yes.
Q. Didn’t stop?
A. No. By the ... when he got to the living room he stopped.
Q. And, you just followed him out there, then, is that right?
A. Yes ...
Q. Were you still naked?
A. I can’t recall. I think I threw my flannel shirt on.
Q. And, when you got out to the living room, that’s when he asked you about the Christmas presents, if you don’t have any money, how could you have all these Christmas presents?
A. That’s right.
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Q. Did he take [the presents]?
A. No. He just kind of looked around ... told me I’d better not be lying about calling the police.
******
Q. So this fellow just raped you and, uh, asked for money, and, uh, you told him you had some ... he didn’t take it ... and then, uh, he just said good-bye and left the apartment, ...
A. That’s correct.
R. 243-246.
This evidence does not demonstrate confinement beyond that necessary to effectuate the rape, so Taylor was subjected to double jeopardy when he was convicted of both crimes. After the rape, Taylor’s victim not only was apparently free to put on some clothing, but she also followed Taylor from the bedroom to the living room. This is insufficient evidence to support a separate confinement charge. Taylor was improperly convicted of both rape and confinement, and his conviction of confinement must be vacated as a result.

CONCLUSION

The references at trial to Taylor’s post-arrest silence were reversible error, and Taylor was subjected to double jeopardy when he was charged with and convicted of confinement when the force used to confine his victim was coextensive with the force used to support the rape charge. His convictions are reversed and the cause is remanded.
DARDEN, J., concurs.
FRIEDLANDER, J., dissents with opinion.

.Taylor argues in the alternative that he was denied his right to effective assistance of counsel on direct appeal because counsel failed to raise the issues of the improper reference to Taylor's post-arrest silence and the double jeopardy violation. Because we believe Taylor has demonstrated fundamental error, his post-conviction claims are not waived by counsel's failure to raise them on direct appeal. Therefore, we need not analyze Taylor’s substantive issues within the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.

. Indiana Code Sec. 35-42-4-1.

. Indiana Code Sec. 35-42-3-3.

. Indiana Code Sec. 35-43-2-1.

. After the testimony quoted at length above, Taylor’s counsel called the deputy prosecutor as a witness in order to demonstrate to the jury that the deputy had been made aware of the consent defense several months prior to trial. The deputy prosecutor stated she was aware Taylor's counsel had suggested that would be a defense, but she went on to say "I heard nothing from your client.” R. at 522. The deputy prosecutor then stated that she could not recall whether she had discussed the defense with Lieutenant Daggy at that time. She went on to say "My understanding was that he had done a thorough investigation of all possible defenses that we could address, without speaking to the defendant, as you know we are not allowed to speak to the defendant.” R. at 522. The State argues that by eliciting that testimony following the State’s questioning of Taylor and Lieutenant Daggy, Taylor’s counsel "invited the very error he now claims is fundamental.” Brief of Appellee at 9. We decline to characterize this attempt by Taylor’s counsel to salvage his client's consent defense as an "invitation of error.”

. We must reject the State's characterization of the references to Taylor’s post-Miranda silence as "oblique,” "cryptic,” Brief of Appellee at 8, and "isolated," Brief of Appellee at 10.