Court Opinion

ID: 9421053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:56:49.636127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:28.378366
License: Public Domain

*258Mr. Justice Douglas,
with whom Mr. Justice Black and Mr. Justice Minton concur, dissenting.
Section 10 (d) of the Federal Power Act, 41 Stat. 1069, as amended, 16 U. S. C. § 803 (d), requires licensees to set up amortization reserves out of their surplus earnings. The Commission enforced this requirement by ordering Niagara to make a book transfer of surplus earnings to an amortization reserve account. In determining the amount of earnings available for amortization the Commission refused to allow certain water-right payments as expenses. The only question before the Court is whether the Commission could lawfully disregard these expenses in computing Niagara’s earnings for § 10 (d) purposes.
The amortization reserve required by § 10 (d) serves the function of reducing Niagara’s net investment. § 3 (13). Niagara’s net investment is the measure of the amount the United States must pay if it decides to recapture Niagara’s plant under § 14 of the Act.1 By allowing these water-right payments as expenses for this purpose the Court increases the ultimate obligation of the United States.
It may be that Niagara is under a legal duty to pay for its water rights under state law. And I agree that the Federal Power Act was not intended to interfere with water rights created by state law. But it is not true that the United States can be made to pay, directly or indirectly, for the use of the waters of a navigable stream. That has been settled at least since United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U. S. 53.2 “Ownership of a private stream wholly upon the lands of an individual is *259conceivable; but that the running water in a great navigable stream is capable of private ownership is inconceivable.” Id., p. 69. If Niagara must pay for its water rights without being reimbursed by the United States, that is the price Niagara must pay for its federal license. See United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U. S. 377; cf. Regents v. Carroll, 338 U. S. 586. The Federal Power Act should not be construed as requiring the United States to pay for something it already owns.3 But that is precisely what the Court does today.

 The same is true in ease the United States moves to acquire the properties under § 26 by judicial sale.

 See also United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 312 U. S. 592; United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U. S. 386; United States v. Willow River Co., 324 U. S. 499.

 The command of § 14 is otherwise. It excludes from the “net investment,” which must be paid if the Federal Government decides to recapture the project, “the value of any lands, rights-of-way, or other property of the United States licensed by the Commission under this Act.”