Court Opinion

ID: 9906432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-02 07:09:47.641216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:22.582072
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed November 30, 2023

                                      In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                   __________

                              No. 11-22-00209-CV
                                  __________

                        PAULA MORRIS, Appellant
                                         V.
                 CITY OF MIDLAND, TEXAS, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 385th District Court
                           Midland County, Texas
                       Trial Court Cause No. CV57069

                     MEMORANDUM OPINION
      Appellant, Paula Morris, appeals the trial court’s grant of summary judgment
in favor of the City of Midland (the City) and the trial court’s final judgment for a
permanent injunction against Morris because of her repeated violations of certain
municipal ordinances. Morris contends on appeal that: (1) the trial court abused its
discretion when it denied Morris’s request for court-appointed counsel; (2) the trial
court erred when it considered the City’s requests for summary judgment and a
permanent injunction without a record being made of the proceedings; (3) the
permanent injunction ordered by the trial court was “unconstitutionally vague” and
violated Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; (4) the trial court abused
its discretion when it granted permanent injunctive relief because the City did not
make a showing of irreparable injury and the lack of an adequate remedy at law;
(5) the trial court’s grant of the City’s motion for summary judgment was improper
because the nuisance ordinance is invalid, issues of material fact exist, and the trial
court did not view the facts in a light most favorable to Morris; and (6) the trial
court’s contempt findings were illegal, violated due process, and the fines imposed
exceeded the per incident cap. We affirm.
                                  I.   Factual Background
      This case originates from Morris’s use of residential property in violation of
multiple City of Midland Municipal Code provisions. Beginning on July 18, 2011,
the City took numerous photographs documenting the accumulation of debris and
other city ordinance violations occurring on properties owned by Morris. Ordinance
violations were documented through September 2020. The City filed actions against
Morris in municipal court and Morris was found guilty of ten independent violations
of city ordinances between August 23, 2012 and July 12, 2019. The violations for
which she was found guilty included accumulations of debris and parking a trailer
or recreational vehicle in a residential area. Numerous garage sales also occurred
on the property from 2012 through 2020, in excess of the number permitted by city
ordinance.1 As a consequence of her ongoing violations of the city ordinances, the
municipal court fined Morris. Morris did not pay all of the fines, and the City sent
her multiple letters requesting payment.
      Because of Morris’s repeated violations of City ordinances, the City filed its
original petition against Morris in this case on September 28, 2020, seeking a

      1
       These facts are established by deemed admissions. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 198.2(c).
                                                 2
temporary injunction, a permanent injunction, and civil penalties under Sections
54.017 and 211.012(c) of the Local Government Code. See TEX. LOCAL GOV’T
CODE ANN. § 54.017 (West 2021), § 211.012(c) (West 2016). Morris filed a pro se
answer on October 23, 2020. 2 The trial court set a hearing on the City’s request for
a temporary injunction for November 20, 2020. On the day of the temporary
injunction hearing, Morris filed a motion for continuance. The City objected to
Morris’s request for a continuance and expressed concerns regarding Morris’s
history of requesting continuances in previous cases. Despite the City’s arguments,
the trial court granted the continuance and reset the hearing for December 10, 2020.
The hearing was again reset for December 18, 2020. On December 22, 2020, the
trial court granted the City’s request for a temporary injunction against Morris and
set a trial on the merits for February 23, 2021.
        On January 13, 2021, the City filed a motion to show cause against Morris;
the motion was based on her alleged violations of the temporary injunction. The
underlying basis of the motion concerned Morris’s alleged ongoing violations of the
Midland Municipal Code, which the temporary injunction enjoined her from
violating. After several resets, the trial court set the show-cause hearing for February
23, 2021. On February 22, Morris again filed a motion for continuance due to
complications associated with an ice storm, which the trial court granted.
        On the same day that she filed her motion for continuance, Morris filed a
motion for a court-appointed attorney. Morris re-urged this motion on March 5,
2021. The trial court denied the motion on March 12. On the same day, the trial
court held a hearing on the City’s motion to show cause and signed its first order

        2
         Although Morris is not pro se on appeal, we note that we hold pro se litigants to the same standards
as licensed attorneys and require them to be familiar with and comply with all applicable laws and rules of
procedure. Mansfield State Bank v. Cohn, 573 S.W.2d 181, 184–85 (Tex. 1978); Aaron v. Fisher, 645
S.W.3d 299, 312 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.).
                                                     3
finding Morris in contempt for violating the temporary injunction. Morris was fined
$500, which she paid on March 26, 2021. On March 12, Morris filed a “motion for
permission to file an amicus brief,” which included an affidavit by an acquaintance
of Morris who commented about Morris’s health and general well-being.
      After Morris requested a jury trial and paid the jury fee, the trial court
scheduled the case for a jury trial on August 2, 2021. Morris then filed another
motion for continuance on July 16, 2021, claiming that she could not participate in
the trial because of a head injury she had sustained in an automobile accident, and
related mental health issues. The trial court granted the continuance and reset the
trial for November 1, 2021. On October 6, 2021, Morris filed another continuance
because of a claimed family emergency.         The trial court, again, granted the
continuance and reset the trial for March 14, 2022. On March 3, 2022, Morris filed
yet another motion for a continuance, alleging that she was suffering from
complications from a new head injury, various illnesses, and other health ailments—
the City opposed this motion and the trial court denied it. Morris did not appear at
trial on March 14, 2022, because she was allegedly hospitalized. Therefore, the trial
court reset the trial for July 11, 2022.
      On March 16, 2022, the City filed its second motion to show cause due to
Morris’s failure to comply with the temporary injunction; the trial court set this
motion for a hearing for March 21, 2022. Subsequently, the trial court signed its
second order on April 1, 2022, finding Morris in contempt. On April 29, Morris
filed a motion for leave to file a motion for a new show-cause hearing; she again
requested a court-appointed attorney. In support of her request for a court-appointed
attorney, Morris alleged, as she had before, that she suffered from mental health
issues and numerous head injuries. Morris filed a second motion for leave and for a
court-appointed attorney on May 31, 2022, citing again to her various illnesses to
support her argument.
                                           4
      On May 16, 2022, the City filed a motion for summary judgment and a third
motion to show cause. The trial court set a hearing on these motions for June 23,
2022. Morris did not appear. On July 24, 2022, the trial court signed an order
granting the City’s motion for summary judgment and later signed a final judgment
for a permanent injunction against Morris on June 28, 2022. On July 6, 2022, Morris
filed a motion to set aside the final judgment claiming that she was out of town on
“family business” when these motions were presented to the trial court.
      Morris filed a notice of appeal on July 22, 2022. Morris later filed a request
for a court-appointed attorney for purposes of appeal on September 28, 2022. On
November 29, 2022, the City filed a fourth motion to show cause, and on December
16, 2022, the trial court signed its third order finding Morris in contempt.
                              II. Standards of Review
      We review the trial court’s decision whether to appoint counsel for an abuse
of discretion. Gibson v. Tolbert, 102 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tex. 2003). “The test for
abuse of discretion is whether the trial court acted without reference to any guiding
rules or principles; in other words, whether the act was arbitrary or unreasonable.”
Worford v. Stamper, 801 S.W.2d 108, 109 (Tex. 1990). A trial court also abuses its
discretion by failing to analyze or apply the law correctly. Walker v. Packer, 827
S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992).
      The grant or refusal of either a permanent or temporary injunction is ordinarily
within the sound discretion of the trial court; and, on appeal, review of the trial
court’s action is limited to the question of whether the action constituted a clear
abuse of discretion. Walter v. Walter, 127 S.W.3d 396, 398 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2004, no pet.). “But when the trial court issues a permanent injunction in response
to a party’s motion for summary judgment, our review is governed by the summary
judgment standards of review.” See Reed v. Lake Country Prop. Owners Ass’n, Inc.,
No. 02-14-00282-CV, 2016 WL 3655589, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth July 7,
                                          5
2016, no pet.) (mem. op); Jim Rutherford Invs., Inc. v. Terramar Beach Cmty. Ass’n,
25 S.W.3d 845, 849 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).
      We review a trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Concho Res.,
Inc. v. Ellison, 627 S.W.3d 226, 233 (Tex. 2021) (citing Valence Operating Co. v.
Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005)). To prevail under the traditional
summary judgment standard, the movant has the burden to establish that there is no
genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(a), (c); ConocoPhillips Co. v. Koopmann, 547 S.W.3d 858, 865
(Tex. 2018); Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex.
2003). If the movant establishes its summary judgment burden, the burden shifts to
the nonmovant to present evidence that raises a genuine issue of material fact that
would preclude the grant of summary judgment. Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home
Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 510–11 (Tex. 2014); M.D. Anderson Hosp. &
Tumor Inst. v. Willrich, 28 S.W.3d 22, 23 (Tex. 2000). To determine if a genuine
issue of material fact exists, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts
in the nonmovant’s favor. KMS Retail Rowlett, LP v. City of Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d
175, 181 (Tex. 2019); Knott, 128 S.W.3d at 215.
                                    III. Analysis
      Morris raises seven issues on appeal: (1) the trial court abused its discretion
when it denied Morris’s request for court-appointed counsel because “exceptional
circumstances” existed and because confinement was a possible punishment option
for any contempt finding; (2) the trial court erred when it permitted the summary
judgment and permanent injunction hearings to proceed without a record of the
hearings being made; (3) the trial court’s permanent injunction is “unconstitutionally
vague” and violates Rule 683 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; (4) the trial
court erred when it granted the permanent injunction because the City did not make
                                          6
a showing of irreparable injury and the lack of an adequate remedy at law; (5) the
trial court erred when it granted the City’s motion for summary judgment because
the nuisance ordinance is invalid and issues of material fact exist; (6) the trial court’s
grant of summary judgment was improper because the trial court did not view the
facts in a light most favorable to Morris; and (7) the trial court’s contempt findings
are illegal, violate Morris’s rights to due process, and the fines imposed exceed the
per incident cap.
      We note at the outset that some of Morris’s complaints are raised for the first
time on appeal. To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the complaining party
must first raise the complaint before the trial court. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1.
      A. Validity of Municipal Ordinance
      One such argument is her fifth issue, wherein Morris contends that Section 8-
7-3—the nuisance ordinance—of the Midland Municipal Code is invalid. Within
this issue, she argues that, because this ordinance is invalid, genuine issues of
material fact exist, and the trial court therefore erred when it granted the City’s
motion for summary judgment.
      Statutes enacted by the legislature are presumed to be constitutional;
therefore, any challenges to this presumption should generally be raised as an
affirmative defense to the enforcement of the statute. In re Doe 2, 19 S.W.3d 278,
284 (Tex. 2000); see Powell v. City of Houston, 628 S.W.3d 838, 842 (Tex. 2021)
(noting that courts construe municipal ordinances in the same manner they construe
statutes and that municipal ordinances are “presumed to be valid.”) (quoting City of
Brookside Village v. Comeau, 633 S.W.2d 790, 792 (Tex. 1982)). The record does
not show that Morris presented any arguments, objections, or other complaints to the
trial court concerning the validity of Section 8-7-3 of the Midland Municipal Code.
As such, the trial court did not have the opportunity to rule on, or refuse to rule on,
the constitutionality or validity of this ordinance or other provisions in the
                                            7
permanent-injunction order that Morris now challenges on appeal. Thus, Morris
failed to preserve these complaints for our review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).
Further, because these complaints were not preserved, we need not address Morris’s
contention that genuine issues of material fact exist regarding the ordinance’s
validity. See id.; TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
      Accordingly, Morris’s fifth issue is overruled.
      B. Appointment of Counsel
      In her first issue, Morris argues that the trial court abused its discretion when
it denied her request for court-appointed counsel because Morris did not have the
financial ability to retain counsel to represent her interests in the case or because
“exceptional circumstances” existed to support her request for the appointment of
counsel.
      Generally, a civil litigant is not entitled to court-appointed counsel absent a
legislative mandate. In re State, 556 S.W.3d 821, 827 (Tex. 2018) (citing Gibson v.
Tolbert, 102 S.W.3d 710, 712 (Tex. 2003)). A trial court may appoint counsel for
an indigent party in a civil case in “exceptional” instances in which the
circumstances are such that the proper administration of justice may be best served
by the appointment of counsel. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 24.016 (West 2023);
Travelers Indem. Co. of Conn. v. Mayfield, 923 S.W.2d 590, 594 (Tex. 1996).
However, the appointment of counsel is not required when the record does not
contain, at a minimum, an affidavit regarding the requesting party’s financial
inability to employ counsel and there is no finding or determination by the trial court
of the requesting party’s indigency. Thomas v. Anderson, 861 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 1993, no writ).
      Morris filed a motion for a continuance on November 20, 2020. In this
motion, Morris stated in an unsworn affidavit that she “[spoke] with an attorney and
[was] making arrangements to retain him.” On April 29, 2022, Morris filed a motion
                                           8
requesting court-appointed counsel and stated that she had contacted at least thirty
attorneys in the previous months concerning possible representation in this case;
however, none of the attorneys were “willing” to represent her or litigate against the
City. Morris filed several motions requesting a court-appointed attorney but each
time she failed to explain her financial inability to employ counsel or include any
affidavit of indigency with her request. Further, there is no trial court finding or
determination in the record concerning Morris’s alleged indigency. As such, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Morris’s requests for court-
appointed counsel on that basis. See Thomas, 861 S.W.2d at 60.
      Additionally, Morris argues that the “prolonged nature of the case, [her]
physical and mental health . . . , and the tragic personal losses [she] suffered” created
an “exceptional circumstance,” which required that the trial court appoint an attorney
to represent her in this case. While Morris may have suffered from personal and
health-related issues throughout the pendency of the case, the record does not
support the conclusion that an “exceptional circumstance” existed to justify the
appointment of counsel. The supreme court in Gibson noted that “[o]nly by
evaluating the unique circumstances of a given civil case could a [trial] court ever
determine that it has no reasonable alternative but to appoint counsel.” See Gibson,
102 S.W.3d at 713. While this case was pending below, Morris filed numerous
motions on her behalf, including several motions for continuance, many of which
the trial court granted. The City, in opposing Morris’s motions for continuance,
presented the trial court with copies of motions filed by Morris from previous cases
where she had appeared pro se and, as in this case, referenced various health and
family issues in support of her continuance requests.
      Although Morris cites to various life events and illnesses that allegedly befell
her while this case was pending in the trial court below, we cannot say based on
these alleged circumstances alone that the only reasonable alternative available to
                                           9
the trial court was for it to appoint counsel for Morris. Gibson, 102 S.W.3d at 713.
In fact, the trial court repeatedly accommodated Morris by granting her multiple
continuances when she contended that circumstances prevented her from
participating in the matters that the trial court had scheduled.
      Moreover, Morris refers to her interest in her “physical and mental health”
and her neighbor’s interest in Morris’s compliance with the Midland Municipal
Code as reasons for why she should have been appointed counsel. However, we
may not substitute our judgment for that of the trial court when reviewing matters
committed to the trial court’s discretion. Walker, 827 S.W.2d at 839–40. Therefore,
we agree with the trial court’s conclusion that the circumstances presented are not
of such an “exceptional” character as to require the appointment of counsel. Id.
Further, Morris has failed to demonstrate that the public and private interests at stake
here are such that the appointment of counsel is required. See Travelers Indem. Co.
of Conn., 923 S.W.2d at 594. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion
when it denied Morris’s request for court-appointed counsel.
      Alternatively, Morris argues that the trial court was required to appoint
counsel to represent her interests because contempt hearings carry a possible
punishment of confinement. None of the trial court’s show-cause orders, or any of
its contempt orders, refer to or include a finding of confinement or criminal
contempt. However, Morris points to the “criminal contempt” language used by the
City in its various show-cause motions in support of her contention that confinement
was a possibility.
      The due process guarantee provided by the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution incorporates the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel and
imposes a duty on the state to provide counsel to an indigent person who cannot
afford a lawyer; however, this right to counsel is contingent on whether there is a
deprivation of liberty that may result from a proceeding, not upon the
                                          10
characterization of the proceeding as either “criminal” or “civil.” Ridgway v. Baker,
720 F.2d 1409, 1413 (5th Cir. 1983). Further, the right to counsel is dependent on
whether the person found in contempt was actually sentenced to a term of
confinement. Ex parte Hamill, 718 S.W.2d 78, 79 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1986,
no writ) (citing Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373–74 (1979)). Here, the trial court
did not make a finding of criminal contempt, nor did it order Morris to serve or
sentence Morris to any term of confinement. Therefore, Morris was not entitled to
court-appointed counsel as she claims.
      Accordingly, we overrule Morris’s first issue.
      C. The Absence of a Hearing Record
      In her second issue, Morris contends that the trial court abused its discretion
when it did not assure that a record of the summary judgment hearing was made.
She further argues that she was harmed in formulating issues for appeal because of
the absence of a summary-judgment-hearing record.
      Rule 13.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a court
reporter must attend and make a record of all court proceedings “unless [doing so is]
excused by agreement of the parties.” TEX. R. APP. P. 13.1(a). The Government
Code imposes similar obligations on an official court reporter to take full shorthand
notes pursuant to the request of the parties. See GOV’T § 52.046(a) (West 2023). A
reporter’s record of a summary judgment hearing is generally unnecessary for
appellate purposes because oral testimony may not be received at these hearings.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); see FieldTurf USA, Inc. v. Pleasant Grove Indep. Sch. Dist.,
642 S.W.3d 829, 838 (Tex. 2022); see also McConnell v. Southside Indep. Sch. Dist.,
858 S.W.2d 337, 343 n.7 (Tex. 1993) (stating that the creation of a reporter’s record
at a summary judgment hearing is “a practice neither necessary nor appropriate to
the purposes of such a hearing”).

                                          11
      While the reporter’s record from the summary judgment hearing in this case
is incomplete, the clerk’s record includes the City’s motion for summary judgment
and the evidence and exhibits submitted in support of the City’s motion. Morris,
who was pro se at the time of the summary judgment hearing, did not appear at the
hearing, nor did she file a response to the City’s motion. As such, the City’s motion,
and the evidence and exhibits it submitted with its motion, was uncontroverted. The
City—who appeared at the summary judgment hearing through counsel—advised
the trial court that they did not require a record of the hearing, which is within their
right to waive a record of the hearing. Further, neither party requested full shorthand
notes of the hearing.
      Despite her contentions, Morris was not deprived of a proper record. The
absence of a reporter’s record did not prejudice Morris or prevent her from
effectively pursuing this appeal because the clerk’s record contains the only filings,
information, and evidence—all of the motions, responses, affidavits, and exhibits—
that the trial court could have considered in making its decision. City of Houston v.
Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 677 (Tex. 1979). Morris argues that the
City’s statement that they “don’t need a record for this hearing other than [their]
request that the Court take notice of its file,” implicated Section 52.046(a) and
required the court reporter to take full shorthand notes of the hearing; however,
Morris does not point to any authority to support her contention. The City’s
statement to the trial court of its waiver of a hearing record, which we recognize is
common in summary judgment practice, was not an affirmative request for a record
of the hearing. Because the trial court was not required to assure that the court
reporter made a record of the summary judgment hearing, Morris was not harmed
by the lack of a reporter’s record.
      Accordingly, we overrule Morris’s second issue.

                                          12
      D. The Permanent Injunction
      In her third issue, Morris contends that the permanent injunction issued by the
trial court (1) is unconstitutionally vague and (2) violates Rule 683 of Texas Rules
of Civil Procedure. We first address Morris’s constitutional challenge.
      Morris argues in her brief “that all Midland Municipal Code sections cited in
the injunction, except one, are unconstitutionally vague as listed in the injunction
and makes the injunction void.” Morris concedes that she “did not plead or prove
general invalidity” of the ordinances “in other settings,” and we note that Morris did
not raise in the trial court the challenge, complaint, or objection to the
constitutionality of the injunction that she now advances on appeal.
      “As a prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review, the record
must show” that a complaint was made to the trial court by an objection that “stated
the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court with
sufficient specificity to make the trial court aware of the complaint.” TEX. R.
APP. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). For the same reasons, even a constitutional claim cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal. Carrizales v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul.
Servs., 5 S.W.3d 922, 925 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, pet. denied). Because Morris
failed to raise in the trial court, the complaint or argument that she now asserts, that
the provisions of the municipal code are unconstitutionally vague, we conclude that
she has waived appellate review of this complaint. See Livingston v. Livingston, 537
S.W.3d 578, 598 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2017, no pet.). We now turn to
Morris’s Rule 683 argument.
      There are three classifications of injunctions: (1) a restraining order that has
been defined as an interlocutory order made a part of a motion for a preliminary
injunction, by which a party is restrained pending a hearing on the motion for a
temporary injunction; (2) an order issued after a temporary injunction hearing that
is effective until the final hearing on the merits, unless dissolved by an interlocutory
                                          13
order; and (3) a permanent injunction that can be dissolved only in a final decree or
judgment. Bolen v. Imperial Petroleum, Inc., No. 11-06-00018-CV, 2007 WL
2010991, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland July 12, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Morris
claims that the permanent injunction she challenges does not comply with Rule 683.
However, Morris is mistaken as to the scope of Rule 683. Rule 683 only applies to
the effectiveness of temporary restraining orders and temporary injunctions; it does
not apply to permanent injunctions. Qaddura v. Indo-European Foods, Inc., 141
S.W.3d 882, 892 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, pet. denied); Shields v. State, 27 S.W.3d
267, 273 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, no pet.); Carrell v. Richie, 697 S.W.2d 43, 46
(Tex. App.—Austin 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.); Spinuzzi v. Town of Corinth, 665 S.W.2d
530, 534 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, no writ); Alexander Schroeder Lumber
Co. v. Corona, 288 S.W.2d 829, 835 (Tex. App.—Galveston 1956, writ ref’d n.r.e.).
Because Rule 683 is not applicable here, Morris’s argument is without merit.3
        In her brief, Morris contends that the specific sections of the Midland
Municipal Code that are referred to in the trial court’s final judgment and permanent
injunction, render the judgment indefinite and unclear. The trial court’s final
judgment includes and refers to the sections of the Midland Municipal Code that
Morris violated—Sections 11-1-4.03, 6-1-22, 8-6-18, and 8-7-3—and explains and
specifies what Morris is enjoined from doing.                      See Midland, Tex., Code of
Ordinances ch. 11-1, § 11-1-4.03 (2019) (Use Chart); ch. 6-1, § 6-1-22 (1998)
(garage and estate sales); ch. 8-6, § 8-6-18 (2012) (accumulation of stagnant water,
filth, weeds, brush, and debris on lots); ch. 8-7 § 8-7-3 (1983) (nuisance generally).
The code sections cited by the trial court in its judgment have been cited, in part, in

        3
          We do note, however, that the trial court’s judgment for permanent injunction complies with the
applicable rule, Rule 301 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, and is definite, clear, and precise. See
TEX. R. CIV. P. 301; San Antonio Bar Ass’n v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 291 S.W.2d 697, 702 (Tex.
1956) (As a rule, “[a]n injunction decree must be as definite, clear and precise as possible and when
practicable it should inform the defendant of the acts he is restrained from doing, without calling on him
for inferences or conclusions about which persons might well differ.”).
                                                     14
endnotes within the final judgment. Morris argues that the use of these “endnotes”
in the final judgment make the judgment indefinite and unclear because some of the
cited language in the endnotes “could easily be read as a list of permitted uses.”
      Contrary to Morris’s contentions, we cannot say that the Midland Municipal
Code sections that are recited within the final judgment render the trial court’s
permanent injunction void. The permanent injunction is clear, definite, and precise
as to what actions Morris is enjoined from committing and clearly states that “Morris
immediately cease and desist from violations of the Midland Municipal Code by way
of using her property . . . for purposes other than those permitted for residential
property per Midland Municipal Code § 11-1-4.03.”
      Section 11-1-4.03 directs the reader to the “Use Chart” within the City’s
Zoning Ordinance, which denotes what types of activities are permitted.              See
Attachment 1-Use Chart, https://ecode360.com/attachment/MI6651/MI6651-011-
1a%20Use%20Chart.pdf (last visited on November 29, 2023). The trial court, in
endnote (i), cites to relevant sections of nonpermitted uses which the City argued
Morris violated—these nonpermitted uses are also located in the City’s “Use Chart.”
As such, this language is not indefinite, unclear, or imprecise, as Morris suggests.
We further conclude that the other code sections cited in the final judgment properly
indicate the specific and relevant actions which Morris is enjoined from violating,
and the trial court set forth proper reasons for granting the City’s request for a
permanent injunction.
      Accordingly, we overrule Morris’s third issue.
      E. The Grant of Summary Judgment on the Permanent Injunction
      In Morris’s fourth issue, she contends that the City failed to show irreparable
injury and a lack of an adequate remedy which are necessary to establish one’s
entitlement to a permanent injunction.

                                         15
       Section 211.012(c) of the Local Government Code grants authority to the City
to pursue an injunction action against Morris to address her violations of its zoning
ordinances. LOC. GOV’T § 211.012(c). Additionally, Sections 54.012 and 54.017
authorize a municipality, such as the City, to bring a civil action to enforce its
ordinances and request civil penalties for the violations of its ordinances. Id.
§§ 54.012, 54.017. Of the four Municipal Code Ordinances that Morris violated,
only Section 11-1-4.03, regarding the permitted uses of property, is a zoning
ordinance. However, Morris’s continued violations of the other three sections of the
Municipal Code—6-1-22 (garage sales), 8-6-18 (accumulation of debris), and 8-7-3
(nuisance)—are directly related to and further her actions in violating the City’s
zoning ordinance. Therefore, the trial court appropriately granted an injunction
against Morris to enjoin her from continuing to violate these ordinances. See id.
§ 211.012(c)(1) (“If . . . land is used in violation of . . . an ordinance or regulation
adopted under this subchapter, the appropriate municipal authority, in addition to
other remedies, may institute appropriate action to . . . prevent the unlawful . . . use
. . . restrain, correct, or abate the violation . . . [or] prevent any illegal act, conduct,
business, or use on or about the premises.”).
       To obtain permanent injunctive relief, a party must show (1) the existence of
a wrongful act, (2) the existence of imminent harm, (3) the existence of irreparable
injury, and (4) the absence of an adequate remedy at law. Chehab v. Huttenbach,
No. 11-20-00180-CV, 2022 WL 2165532, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland June 16,
2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); Livingston, 537 S.W.3d at 587 (citing Risner v. Harris
Cnty. Republican Party, 444 S.W.3d 327, 339 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
2014, no pet.)). As discussed below, the City’s summary judgment evidence, which

                                            16
is uncontroverted, conclusively establishes that the City is entitled to the permanent
injunctive relief it requested.4
        In Morris’s sixth issue, she contends that, as the nonmovant, the trial court did
not view the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to her. The
City, in support of its motion for summary judgment, submitted, among other things,
Morris’s deemed admissions, Morris’s previous Municipal Court convictions, and
affidavits that discussed her numerous violations of Midland Municipal Code. For
example, one of Morris’s neighbors, Darrell Hawkins, stated in his affidavit that
Morris had been holding about one garage sale per month, each lasting
approximately five days. Hawkins further stated that “there has been traffic at or
around [Morris’s property] relating to the items in place in the front yard that
severely inhibits and sometimes prevents other persons residing in the neighborhood
from accessing their property, becoming an annoyance to the other persons who live
near [Morris’s property].” The City also attached photographs of Morris’s property
on various days where debris is visible on the property.
        The City’s summary judgment evidence further shows that Morris admitted
that she had furniture, tires, a trailer, cardboard, tables, a television, blankets, plastic
bins, a racecar bed, a grill, fencing, an umbrella table, a lawn mower, highchairs,
toys, mattresses, and rugs in her yard at various times in 2020 and through 2021.
Morris admitted that these items were available for purchase, and that she sold items
from her home as a source of income. Morris further admitted that several neighbors
complained about the items that she left in her front yard. Finally, Morris admitted
that she held more than four garage sales each year from 2012 through 2020.

        Although the City argues that, to prevail on its request for injunctive relief, it is not required to
        4

show the existence of an irreparable injury and the absence of an adequate remedy at law, see Butnaru v.
Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 210 (Tex. 2002), we have nonetheless concluded that the City has in this
case conclusively established the four elements that are necessary to obtain permanent injunctive relief.
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      The City’s summary judgment evidence conclusively shows that Morris’s
behavior violated the Midland Municipal Code, as Morris was continuously
(1) engaged in activities outside the permitted uses outlined in the code in violation
of Section 11-1-4.03; (2) selling items from her home more than four times a year in
violation of Section 6-1-22; (3) storing debris in her yard in violation of Section 8-
6-18; and (4) conducting a business which occasions annoyance to the public or the
inhabitants of the neighborhood in violation of Section 8-7-3. Further, this evidence
conclusively supports the findings that were necessary for the trial court to grant a
permanent injunction—that Morris’s actions are harmful to her neighbors, that her
actions would continue and cause imminent harm and irreparable injury to her
neighbor’s use and enjoyment of their property, and that the City’s previous
enforcement of the Midland Municipal Code against Morris did not effectively deter
her harmful conduct. See Livingston, 537 S.W.3d at 587, 596; see also Positive
Feed, Inc. v. Wendt, No. 01-96-00614-CV, 1998 WL 43321, at *10 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 5, 1998, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that the “loss of
enjoyment or the reasonable use of one’s home can be an irreparable injury for
purposes of injunctive relief”).
      Morris did not file a response or submit any evidence to controvert the City’s
summary judgment evidence. As such, and even when we view the evidence in the
light most favorable to Morris, we conclude that no genuine issue of material fact
exists as to Morris’s violations of the Midland Municipal Code sections referred to
in the permanent injunction. Therefore, the trial court did not err when it granted
the City’s motion. KMS Retail Rowlett, 593 S.W.3d at 181.
      Accordingly, we overrule Morris’s fourth and sixth issues.
      F. Contempt of Court
      In her seventh issue, Morris contends that the trial court abused its discretion
when it issued its contempt findings and signed its contempt orders. A court of
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appeals lacks jurisdiction to review a contempt order by direct appeal. Tex. Animal
Health Comm’n v. Nunley, 647 S.W.2d 951, 952 (Tex. 1983); Tracy v. Tracy, 219
S.W.3d 527, 530 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, no pet.). Contempt orders that do not
involve confinement may be reviewed via a petition for writ of mandamus. In re
Janson, 614 S.W.3d 724, 727 (Tex. 2020); In re Long, 984 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex.
1999); Tracy, 219 S.W.3d at 530; Adams v. Bell, 94 S.W.3d 759, 762 (Tex. App.—
Eastland 2002, no pet.). Here, Morris directly appealed the trial court’s contempt
orders, none of which involved a finding of confinement.                              Because we lack
jurisdiction to review this complaint, we do not address Morris’s seventh issue.
                                      IV. This Court’s Ruling
        We affirm the judgments of the trial court.

                                                           W. STACY TROTTER
                                                           JUSTICE

November 30, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Wright, S.C.J. 5

Williams, J., not participating.

        5
          Jim R. Wright, Senior Chief Justice (Retired), Court of Appeals, 11th District of Texas at Eastland,
sitting by assignment.
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