Court Opinion

ID: 9697579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:22:04.424541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:06.189893
License: Public Domain

FRIEDMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority holds that a court of record must give preclusive effect to the ultimate resolution of issues arising from a formal expulsion hearing before a local school board. The question appears to be a matter of first impression in Pennsylvania. The majority cites no decision, and I have found none, where a court has applied the principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel to a local school board expulsion proceeding. For the reasons that follow, I would not establish such a precedent.
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to address whether this court should even consider the res judicata and collateral estoppel issues. The Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County (trial court) held that the civil rights claims of J.S. (Student) against the Bethlehem Area School District, Thomas Doluisio and A. Thomas Kartsotis (collectively, School District) are barred by technical res judicata. In so holding, the trial court specifically stated that it would not consider the School District’s alternative argument that Student’s civil rights claims are barred by collateral estoppel. (Trial court op. at 18.)
The majority asserts that, in his brief, Student does not challenge the trial court’s conclusion that Student’s claims are barred by res judicata;1 according to the majority, Student argues only that collateral es-toppel does not apply. (Majority op. at 939-940.) I respectfully, submit that, if Student did not challenge the trial court’s holding, then (1) Student has waived any challenge to the trial court’s holding, (2) *943Student’s claims are barred by res judicata and (3) any discussion of the collateral estoppel issue is irrelevant and unnecessary.2
However, I do not agree that Student failed to challenge the trial court’s ror. judicata holding in his brief. In his Statement of the Questions Involved, Student specifically asks whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment both “on the grounds of res judicata and collateral estoppel.” (Student’s brief at 7.) In the Argument portion of his brief, Student presents the rule of law governing both res judicata and collateral estoppel. (Student’s brief at 12-13.) Student also properly cites authority indicating that, under both res judicta and collateral estoppel, the party against whom the doctrine is asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim.3 (Student’s brief at 13.) Student then specifically argues that he did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims before the local school board. (Student’s brief at 13-14.) Thus, Student presented a challenge to the trial court’s res judicata holding. Unlike the majority, then, I believe it is quite appropriate to address whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment based solely on res judicata.4
I. Res Judicata
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is a doctrine by which a former adjudication bars a later action on all or part of the claim that was the subject of the first action. Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 542 Pa. 555, 669 A.2d 309 (1995). In order to prevail based on res judicata, there must be a concurrence of four conditions: (1) an identity of the thing sued for;5 (2) an identity of causes of action; (3) an identity of persons and parties to the action; and (4) an identity of the quality or capacity of the parties suing or being sued. Gow v. Department of Education, 763 A.2d 528 (Pa.Cmwlth.2000), appeal denied, 566 Pa. 651, 781 A.2d 149 (2001).
If all four conditions have not been met, the inquiry ends.6 However, even when all four conditions are met in a case, it is still necessary to address whether the party *944against whom res judicata is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter brought before the administrative tribunal. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83 (1982) provides as follows:
(2) An adjudicative determination by an administrative tribunal is conclusive under the rules of res judicata only insofar as the proceeding resulting in the determination entailed the essential elements of adjudication, including:
(b) The right on behalf of a party to ... [a] fair opportunity to rebut evidence and argument by opposing parties.... (e) Such ... procedural elements as may be necessary to constitute the proceeding a sufficient means of conclusively determining the matter in question, having regard for [1] the magnitude and complexity of the matter in question, [2] the urgency with which the matter must be resolved, and [3] the opportunity of the parties to obtain evidence and formulate legal contentions.
First, as to the magnitude and complexity of the matter in question here, this is a case of the highest magnitude involving Student’s First Amendment right to free speech. Moreover, it is a complex matter because the ease involves the effect on an entire school community of an alleged threat made against one teacher on a student’s web site.7 Second, with respect to urgency, the regulation governing a local school board’s formal expulsion proceeding specifically states that the “proceeding must be held with all reasonable speed.” 22 Pa.Code § 12.8(b)(l)(ix). Third, because pre-hearing discovery is not permitted, the parties have little, if any, opportunity to obtain evidence prior to the hearing. See 22 Pa.Code § 12.8. Moreover, absent pre-hearing discovery, a party does not have a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence and argument of the opposing party. Considering these factors, I conclude that the final determination by the School Board in this case is not conclusive under the rules of res judi-cata.
II. Collateral Estoppel
Although res judicata does not apply here, both proceedings did involve the question of Student’s First Amendment rights. Therefore, it is appropriate for us to consider whether the doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, bars Student’s claims in this case.
The doctrine of collateral estoppel applies where the following four prongs are met: (1) an issue decided in a prior action is identical to one presented in a later action; (2) the prior action resulted in a final judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior action, or is in privity with a party to the prior action; and (4) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior action.8 Rue v. K-Mart Corpora*945tion, 552 Pa. 18, 713 A.2d 82 (1998). Student argues that the fourth prong was not met in this case, and I agree.
In Rue, our supreme court held that the determination of an issue in an unemployment compensation proceeding should not be accorded preclusive effect. The court reasoned that, although proceedings before unemployment compensation referees satisfy the minimum requirements of due process,9 the proceedings do not allow the parties to litigate the issues in the manner available in a court of record. Id. The court found especially significant the fact that unemployment compensation proceedings (1) are designed to adjudicate matters quickly, (2) do not allow for pre-hearing discovery and (3) do not follow the rules of evidence. Id.
The same can be said of a local school board’s formal expulsion proceeding. Such proceedings must be held with all reasonable speed, do not allow for a period for pre-hearing discovery and do not follow the technical rules of evidence. See section 554 of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. § 554; 22 Pa.Code § 12.8(b)(l)(ix). If collateral estoppel does not apply to unemployment compensation proceedings, Rue, for the same reasons, collateral estoppel should not apply to a local school board’s formal expulsion proceedings.10
In this particular case, Student certainly did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims. By letter dated August 5, 1998, the School Board gave Student notice of the three charges against him and informed him that the School Board had scheduled a hearing for August 19, *9461998. (O.R., Item No. 6, Exh. A at 1.) Thus, Student had less than two weeks to prepare his defense to the charges. Moreover, under School Board procedures, Student was precluded from pre-hearing discovery and was prohibited from deposing for rebuttal purposes the eight witnesses who testified on behalf of the School District.
Before the trial court, the parties conducted extensive discovery prior to the grant of summary judgment. (See O.R., Item Nos. 53, 57, 59, 61, 63.) During the discovery period, Student attempted to obtain a copy of the investigation file of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), which had declined to prosecute Student for any crime. (O.R., Item No. 53.) The FBI indicated to Student that it would not release the file without a court order from a court of record. (O.R., Item No. 59.) Thus, Student could not have acquired the FBI file for the proceeding before the School Board. Student also attempted to obtain the investigation file of the local authorities, which likewise had declined to prosecute Student for any crime. However, Student learned that the authorities would not release the file without a court order because Student was a juvenile. (O.R., Item No. 61.) Thus, Student could not have acquired the police investigation file for the proceeding before the School Board. Because Student needed court orders to obtain discovery materials, Student did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claims before the School Board.11
Accordingly, I conclude that neither res judicata nor collateral estoppel applies here, and, therefore, I would reverse and remand.

. The majority indicates in a footnote that the trial court based its holding solely on the doctrine of res judicata. (Majority op. at 940 n. 8.)

. After making its observation, the majority inexplicably proceeds to address Student's collateral estoppel argument.

. Student cited the case of Ham v. Sulek, 422 Pa.Super. 615, 620 A.2d 5, 8 (1993), for the proposition that res judicata applies only where a party has been "afforded an opportunity to litigate a claim.” (Student’s brief at 13.) There is no question that this is a correct statement of the law. See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 83 (1982).

. I note that "the term 'res judicata’ is a somewhat sloppy term and that it is sometimes used to cover both res judicata itself (claim preclusion) as well as collateral estop-pel (‘broad’ res judicata or issue preclusion).” Hebden v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board (Bethenergy Mines, Inc.), 534 Pa. 327, 330, 632 A.2d 1302, 1304 (1993). The fact that there is some confusion in the law as to the use of the term res judicata is more reason not to ignore Student’s challenge to the trial court’s res judicata holding.

. In the local school board proceeding, the school board "sued for” Student’s expulsion; in the trial court proceeding, Student sued for compensatory and punitive damages. Thus, there was not an identity of "things sued for” in the two proceedings. Cf. Christopher v. Council of Plymouth Township, 160 Pa.Cmwlth. 670, 635 A.2d 749, 752 (1993) (stating that a "worker’s [sic] compensation claim and a common law cause of action are not identical and consequently res judicata is not applicable”).

. Although I would conclude that at least one of the four conditions has not been met here, I will continue my inquiry to address the issue raised by Student, i.e., whether Student had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his First Amendment claim before the local school board.

. I have found no cases prior to this one in any jurisdiction where the court addressed whether an alleged threat made against a teacher on a student's web site is protected by the First Amendment. Nor can I envision a court’s contemplation of such a weighty issue without a full opportunity for the litigants to establish necessary facts.

. I note that the Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 28 (1982) provides:
Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the' determination is essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the following circumstances:
(3) A new determination of the issue is warranted by differences in the quality or ex*945tensiveness of the procedures followed in the two [proceedings] ... or...
(5) [The] party sought to be precluded ... did not have an adequate opportunity or incentive to obtain a full and fair adjudication in the initial action.

. Thus, the court made clear that the standard used to determine whether collateral estoppel applies is different from the standard for determining whether a litigant has been afforded his or her due process rights.

. In reaching a contrary result, the majority relies upon Christopher and Frederick v. Action Tire Company, 744 A.2d 762 (Pa.Super.1999), appeal denied, 564 Pa. 711, 764 A.2d 1070 (2000). However, neither of these cases applies here.
To begin, Christopher and Frederick involved workers' compensation cases, not local school board expulsion proceedings. Although both are administrative proceedings, the procedures that govern workers’ compensation cases are different from those that govern local school board expulsions. This is especially true with respect to pre-hearing discovery. In workers’ compensation cases, the parties have ample opportunity for pre-hearing discovery; however, a student has no opportunity for pre-hearing discovery in an expulsion proceeding. This is critical where, as here, the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted argues that there was not a full and fair opportunity to litigate the claim before the administrative agency.
Moreover, the issue raised in Christopher involved the first prong of collateral estoppel, not the fourth prong. The question was whether the issues presented before the trial court were identical to the issues presented before the administrative tribunals. Thus, the court in Christopher never addressed whether the litigant in a workers’ compensation proceeding has a full and fair opportunity to litigate a claim.
Our superior court did address the fourth prong in Frederick, holding that the litigant in a workers’ compensation proceeding has a full and fair opportunity to litigate his or her claim. The court distinguished Rue, stating that the procedures in workers’ compensation proceedings are different from those in unemployment compensation proceedings. See Frederick. As I indicate above, the procedures in local school board expulsion proceedings are different from those in workers’ compensation proceedings, but they are similar to those in unemployment compensation proceedings. Thus, unlike the majority, I would conclude that Rue, rather than Christopher or Frederick, governs the outcome of this case.

. The majority concludes that Student was afforded "discovery” before the local school board because he had an opportunity to cross-examine two witnesses. (Majority op. at 940.) I submit that cross-examination is not equivalent to pre-hearing discovery.
The majority also concludes that Student had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the alleged violations of his constitutional rights because the school board was acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. (Majority op. at 940-941.) However, our supreme court held in Rue that unemployment compensation referees, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity, do not provide litigants with a full and fair opportunity to litigate claims. Thus, I believe that the majority’s analysis of this issue is deficient. Indeed, the majority never addresses the fact that an administrative agency does not have authority to decide the constitutionality of its own action. Ruszin v. Department of Labor and Industry, Bureau of Workers' Compensation, 675 A.2d 366 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996). Therefore, the local school board in this case could not fully litigate Student's constitutional challenge to the school board’s action.