Court Opinion

ID: 9892947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 16:10:07.016694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:40.978108
License: Public Domain

J-S27004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DAVID ALLEN MYERS                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 317 MDA 2023

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 14, 2023
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-01-CR-0001565-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                        FILED: OCTOBER 25, 2023

       David Allen Myers, Appellant, appeals from the judgment of sentence

imposed following a non-jury trial for several convictions of driving under the

influence of alcohol (DUI), imposed following a non-jury trial. We affirm.

       At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth called Trooper Michael

Bivens of the Pennsylvania State Police, who testified that on November 3,

2021, he noticed Appellant operating a pickup truck lacking an inspection

sticker.   He turned around to follow Appellant and saw that Appellant had

pulled into a driveway. At this point, Trooper Bivens had not activated his

lights or sirens, as he “believed [Appellant] was in his own driveway.” N.T.,

5/17/22, at unnumbered 14.1              He then approached the vehicle, telling

Appellant, “this is about your inspection sticker.” Id. at 9. Appellant replied

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1 It was not Appellant’s driveway.
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that the vehicle was an antique and therefore did not require inspection;

Trooper Bivens informed him that the license plate did not show that

designation. Appellant then “admitted that it wasn’t a registered vehicle[.]”

Id. Trooper Bivens asked for paperwork related to the vehicle. Appellant

handed over his identification and told him that his license was suspended and

that he did not have any insurance. Id. at 24. Trooper Bivens then attempted

to observe the VIN2 through the window but was not able to see it due to the

vehicle’s height; he then asked Appellant to open the door panel. Appellant

“opened it and I wrote the VIN down on my notepad” to conduct a records

check. Id. at 25. After obtaining the VIN, Trooper Bivens “returned to [his]

vehicle to get the records and nothing [came] back from the registration”

check. Id. at 11. At this point in time, he had not noticed anything unusual

about Appellant except bloodshot eyes. A check of Appellant’s ID confirmed

that his license was suspended for a DUI.

       Trooper Bivens then returned to speak to Appellant “to make sure that

I wrote the VIN down correctly[.]” Id. The trooper “informed [Appellant that]

I needed to re-verify the VIN or recheck the VIN to ensure I recorded it

correctly the first time and I opened the door to do so.” Id. at 28. He then

smelled “an odor of alcohol on [Appellant’s] breath and [Appellant] did admit

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2 Federal regulations require that “each motor vehicle must contain a vehicle

identification number, also known as a VIN, which is a 17-character number
that encodes specific information about the particular vehicle.” See Vin
Decoder,       NATIONAL    HIGHWAY     TRAFFIC    SAFETY     ADMINISTRATION,
https://www.nhtsa.gov/vin-decoder (last visited Sept. 26, 2023).

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to drinking … three beers.” Id. at 11. Trooper Bivens asked Appellant to step

outside the vehicle to perform field sobriety tests.       Due to Appellant’s

performance on these tests and other indicia of intoxication, Appellant was

arrested. He consented to a blood draw and was charged with three counts

of DUI, driving under a license suspension, and one summary offense

pertaining to the invalid inspection.

       Appellant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that Trooper Bivens

“opened the driver’s side door of the vehicle” without permission. 3 The trial

court denied suppression by order and accompanying opinion, and Appellant

proceeded to a bench trial, where the Commonwealth called Trooper Bivens

to relate the above events, as well as Jolene Bierly, a forensic toxicologist.

Ms. Bierly testified that Appellant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was .169.

Additionally, his blood contained Tramadol, “a prescription opioid commonly

used to treat pain at a concentration of 35 plus or minus 11 nanograms per

milliliter.” N.T., 12/14/22, at 42.

       Appellant was convicted of driving with a BAC between 0.10 and 0.16,

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(b); driving while under the combined effects of a drug and

alcohol, 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(3); driving under a suspended license, 75

Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1.1)(iii), which was a third offense; and a summary offense

regarding the invalid inspection. In its sentencing order, the trial court noted

that this was Appellant’s eighth DUI offense overall, with each prior incident
____________________________________________

3 In this motion, Appellant did not distinguish the two separate times
Appellant’s door was opened.

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resulting in intermediate punishment. The court imposed an above-guidelines

range sentence of 3½ to 7 years of incarceration at the Section 3802(d)(3)

offense, which the court deemed to merge with the Section 3802(b) offense.

The Section 1543(b)(1.1) offense required a mandatory minimum of two

years, and the court imposed a sentence of two to four years, concurrent to

the foregoing term.    No additional penalty was imposed for the summary

offense. Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion, and he filed a timely

notice of appeal. He complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) statement, and we now review Appellant’s five claims.

      1) The [c]ourt erred in denying [A]ppellant’s Motion for
      Suppression of Evidence. The arresting officer conducted an
      “extended search” in violation of the appellant’s rights pursuant
      to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article 1,
      Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.

      2) The [c]ourt erred in denying [A]ppellant’s Motion to Dismiss
      Count 4 of the information, an alleged violation of 75 Pa. C.S.A.
      Section 1543(b)(1.1)(iii). Appellant asserts that the mandatory
      minimum sentence required under this section is violative of law.

      3) On March 17, 2022, the Commonwealth moved to amend Count
      2 of the information as a third offense for sentencing purposes,
      rather than a fourth offense as indicated in the document itself.
      The Commonwealth later sought and was granted permission to
      re-amend the charge as a fourth offense. The Commonwealth
      should have been barred from doing this.

      4) The [c]ourt erred at trial in finding [A]ppellant guilty of Count
      3, Driving Under the Influence as a result of the combined
      influence of alcohol and a controlled substance.                 The
      Commonwealth’s own witness testified that the amount of
      [T]ramadol in [A]ppellant’s blood stream was barely above the
      reporting threshold and was hypothetically consistent with
      treating a toothache the night before a blood sample was
      obtained. There was no testimony that the [T]ramadol in this case
      contributed to an inability to drive safely.

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       5) The [c]ourt erred in sentencing [A]ppellant to a term of
       imprisonment in excess of the Pennsylvania sentencing guidelines.

Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.

       Appellant’s first argument on appeal contends that the trial court

erroneously denied suppression.           According to Appellant, Trooper Bivens

exceeded the mission of the stop pursuant to Rodriguez v. United States,

575 U.S. 348 (2015), which holds that the authority to detain an individual

for a traffic stop terminates when the “mission” of the stop ends, absent the

development of any additional reasonable suspicion or probable cause to

extend the stop due to things learned during the stop.4 Appellant argues that

the trooper was not authorized to open his driver’s side door, which he argues

“was a pretext of wanting to check the veracity of the VIN he had already

recorded,” as Trooper Bivens could have simply issued citations.             See

Appellant’s Brief at 19 (asserting that “the trooper had sufficient information”

to issue a citation for “not having a valid inspection, not having a valid

registration and driving under suspension”).

       We find that Appellant’s Rodriguez argument is misplaced. Rodriguez

addresses the reasonableness of a seizure, not the authority to search and,

thus, the claim that Trooper Bivens did not have consent to open the door has

little connection to Rodriguez.          The claim that Trooper Bivens unlawfully

____________________________________________

4 It is doubtful that Appellant preserved this argument, as his motion to
suppress did not distinguish between the two separate times that Appellant’s
car door was opened. However, we note at the close of the suppression
hearing Appellant handed a copy of an unspecified case to the Commonwealth
and the trial court, and the Commonwealth addresses the claim on the merits.

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extended the stop by opening the door without consent does not actually bear

on how long the stop should have taken. To illustrate, even under Appellant’s

theory that the trooper could have just issued citations instead of opening the

car door upon checking the VIN, preparing those citations would have almost

certainly taken more time (as in this hypothetical world, Trooper Bivens would

have had to prepare the citations).5 Trooper Bivens did not observe indicia of

intoxication, which in turn justified a continuation of the detention to

investigate a DUI, due to an unlawful prolongation of the seizure. He learned

that information due to opening the door, which requires an analysis of the

search.

       Additionally, Appellant ignores the trial court’s findings of fact. Trooper

Bivens testified that he thought he may have incorrectly recorded the VIN,

and the order/opinion denying suppression credited this testimony. Order and

Opinion, 6/10/22, at 3 ¶ 12. (“Because [Trooper Bivens’] investigation did

not return any records after running the truck’s VIN[,] … [he] decided to verify

that he recorded properly the truck’s VIN.”).          Thus, the record does not

support that there was a pretextual reason for opening the vehicle’s door.

Accordingly,    the    question    is   simply   whether   it   was   constitutionally

unreasonable for Trooper Bivens to confirm whether he mistakenly recorded

____________________________________________

5  Moreover, Appellant does not point to any authority that says a law
enforcement official is required to take the least intrusive step; if that were
the case, presumably the Fourth Amendment would never allow a roadside
seizure under any circumstance for minor offenses such as an inoperable
taillight since those citations could simply be handled by mail.

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the VIN, and Rodriguez itself suggests that this was authorized as the stop’s

“mission” had yet to terminate. As the High Court explained:
       Beyond determining whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer’s
       mission during a traffic stop typically includes checking the
       driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding
       warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s
       registration and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same
       objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that
       vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 349.

       The records check did not reveal any information about the vehicle, and

we conclude that Trooper Bivens was authorized to confirm the VIN due to

this anomalous result.         At minimum, Trooper Bivens was certainly not

precluded from taking further steps; Appellant does not explain why the

Fourth Amendment would require a trooper to release the vehicle when a VIN

check fails to produce any results. On this point, in response to the trial court’s

questioning, Trooper Bivens stated that the vehicle “wasn’t going to go

anywhere” because it was not legal to drive. N.T., 5/17/22, at 28.

       In making this determination, we note that we do not address whether

the search was constitutionally authorized.6 The trial court’s finding of fact
____________________________________________

6 The trial court expressed uncertainty that opening the door was a search.

The Commonwealth submits that no search occurred, relying primarily on
Commonwealth v. Grabowski, 452 A.2d 827 (Pa. Super. 1982), which held
that searching the exterior of a vehicle to record its VIN was not a search.

     While we need not decide this issue, the Commonwealth’s argument
warrants a brief response. First, Grabowski explicitly addressed examining
the exterior of the vehicle, whereas here, Trooper Bivens manipulated the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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that Trooper Bivens had consent to view the VIN does not account for the fact

that the door had been shut by the time Trooper Bivens returned. Arguably,

the scope of Appellant’s consent to open the door was limited to the first

request and any consent to search ended when the door was closed. By way

of analogy, we think it is unlikely that the Fourth Amendment would permit a

police officer, who had left a home after being given consent to search, to turn

around several minutes later and forcibly open the door to the home on the

____________________________________________

door to access the vehicle’s interior. This is not a minor detail. See Arizona
v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 325 (1987) (stating that “the distinction between
‘looking’ at a suspicious object in plain view and ‘moving’ it even a few inches
is much more than trivial for purposes of the Fourth Amendment”) (cleaned
up); see also Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 5 (2013) (“When the
Government obtains information by physically intruding on persons, houses,
papers, or effects, a search within the original meaning of the Fourth
Amendment has undoubtedly occurred.”) (quotation marks and citation
omitted). Thus, Grabowski is not on point.

       Additionally, in New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986), the United
States Supreme Court addressed a case involving somewhat comparable
facts. There, while one officer spoke to the driver after effectuating a traffic
stop, a second officer opened the door of the vehicle and moved some papers
that were obscuring the area where the VIN would be printed. In the course
of this search, the officer observed a firearm, which the defendant sought to
suppress. The Court held that a search had occurred by accessing the interior
of the vehicle, but concluded that the search was constitutionally reasonable.
“[T]his search was sufficiently unintrusive to be constitutionally permissible in
light of the lack of a reasonable expectation of privacy in the VIN and the fact
that the officers observed [the] respondent commit two traffic violations.” Id.
at 119. We note that, like the Grabowski Court, the Class Court relied, in
part, on the diminished expectation of privacy inherent in automobiles to
support its ruling. Appellant briefly alluded to an Article I, Section 8 claim in
his motion to suppress, and this Commonwealth rejects the federal automobile
exception. Commonwealth v. Alexander, 243 A.3d 177 (Pa. 2020).

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grounds he forgot to check a certain room. The consent to open the door was

given, the VIN was recorded, and the search had ended. However, as we

have explained, Appellant’s argument has little to do with whether the search

was constitutionally authorized. We thus simply reject Appellant’s argument

that the stop was unlawfully prolonged.

     In Appellant’s second issue, he challenges the constitutionality of the

mandatory minimum penalty authorized by 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1.1)(iii) on

the grounds that the statute fails to specify a maximum penalty.           In

Commonwealth v. Eid, 249 A.3d 1030 (Pa. 2021), our Supreme Court held

that a similar penalty provision contained within Section 1543(b)(1) was

constitutionally infirm. We disagree that the Eid result extends to this case,

as Appellant’s argument fails to account for the decision in Commonwealth

v. Rollins, 292 A.3d 873 (Pa. 2023).

     In Eid, our Supreme Court held that Section 1543(b)(1.1)(i) was

unconstitutionally vague because it failed to provide a clear statutory

maximum.    That provision, in broad terms, creates a separate offense for

offenders who commit a DUI while having a license suspended due to a prior

DUI. The specific statute analyzed in Eid stated that the offense was graded

as a summary and carried a mandatory minimum penalty of 90 days but did

not specify a maximum penalty.     The Commonwealth had argued that the

Court should infer a maximum of six months, i.e., twice the minimum. The

Court declined to do so, in part because there was no statutory authority for

that proposition, and the statute examined did not state an exception to the

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general rule of Section 9756(b)(1) of the Sentencing Code, which states that

a minimum sentence shall not exceed one-half of the maximum. The Court

also declined to authorize a flat sentence of 90 days.

      Presently, Appellant was convicted of a provision similar to the one in

Eid, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1.1)(iii), which states that a “third or subsequent

violation of this paragraph shall constitute a misdemeanor of the first degree,

and upon conviction thereof the person shall be sentenced to pay a fine of

$5,000 and to undergo imprisonment for not less than two years.” In Rollins,

the Court held that Eid did not require the same result with respect to Section

1543(b)(1)(iii), which is similar to (b)(1.1), but differs in that the former

applies to non-DUI offenses, i.e., a person commits that offense by merely

driving while their license is DUI suspended. Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) is likewise

a recidivist provision, and states that a “third or subsequent violation of this

paragraph shall constitute a misdemeanor of the third degree and, upon

conviction of this paragraph, a person shall be sentenced to pay a fine of

$2,500 and to undergo imprisonment for not less than six months.” Thus, the

(b)(1.1)(iii) statute is essentially the same as the (b)(1)(iii) statute analyzed

in Rollins, with the only material difference being the higher misdemeanor

grading.   The salient analysis for our purposes is the Rollins Court’s

observation that Section 1543(b)(1)(iii), while also requiring a mandatory

minimum with no specific statutory maximum, was not constitutionally infirm

because a maximum penalty could be inferred by reference to 18 Pa.C.S. §

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106. The Rollins case dictates the result here.7 Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) is

graded as a misdemeanor of the third degree whereas the Section

1543(b)(1.1)(iii) offense at issue here is graded as a misdemeanor of the first

degree. In both cases, the Rollins Court’s conclusion that a maximum term

of imprisonment may be inferred from Section 106 applies.                       That statute

specifies that a misdemeanor of the first degree carries a maximum penalty

of five years. Because a maximum penalty may be inferred, the statute is not

unconstitutionally vague.

       Appellant’s third issue is that the trial court erred by permitting the

Commonwealth to amend the information a second time.                            Briefly, the

Commonwealth initially indicated in its criminal information that Appellant had

three prior DUI offenses, thereby treating the instant offense as his fourth.

The Commonwealth later amended the information to state that Appellant only

had two prior DUI offenses. The Commonwealth filed a pre-trial motion to

amend     the   information,     stating       that   while   preparing   for    trial,   “the

Commonwealth discovered that [Appellant] has three prior DUI offenses, not

two, all out of York County, within the last ten (10) years.” Motion to Amend,

9/14/22, at unnumbered 1 ¶ 4.               The court granted the amendment on

September 16, 2022. Appellant filed a motion in opposition, which the court

denied.
____________________________________________

7 In Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 291 A.3d 912, 915 (Pa. Super. 2023),

we held that Section 1543(b)(1)(iii) was not unconstitutionally vague,
acknowledging that the Supreme Court had granted the allowance of appeal
in Rollins from our unpublished memorandum decision in that case.

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      Appellant has waived his argument on this issue due to defective

briefing. Rule 564 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure states that a court may

allow amendment, “provided that the information as amended does not charge

offenses arising from a different set of events and that the amended charges

are not so materially different from the original charge that the defendant

would be unfairly prejudiced.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 564. Appellant’s entire argument

is as follows: “Appellant urges that the Commonwealth should be barred or

estopped from seeking to the increase the enumeration [sic] of the offense

after it had previously moved to decrease it.”        Appellant’s Brief at 25.

Appellant offers no argument as to how he was unfairly prejudiced by an

accurate counting of his prior convictions. The failure to do so authorizes this

Court to deem the issue waived for failing to present an argument. We have

previously recognized that,

      [w]hen briefing the various issues that have been preserved, it is
      an appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently
      developed for our review. Commonwealth v. Gould, 912 A.2d
      869, 873 (Pa. Super. 2006). The brief must support the claims
      with pertinent discussion, with references to the record and with
      citations to legal authorities. Id.; Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a), (b), (c).
      Citations to authorities must articulate the principles for which
      they are cited. Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b).

Commonwealth v. Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa. Super. 2007)).                We

exercise this option here because Appellant presents no discussion.

      Appellant’s fourth claim concerns the sufficiency of the evidence to

sustain his conviction for 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(3), which states:

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      (d) Controlled substances.--An individual may not drive,
      operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a
      vehicle under any of the following circumstances:

                                      ***

         (3) The individual is under the combined influence of alcohol
         and a drug or combination of drugs to a degree which
         impairs the individual’s ability to safely drive, operate or be
         in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(3).

      Our standard of review is well-settled:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying the above test, we may not weigh
      the evidence and substitute our judgment for [that of] the fact-
      finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
      established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
      possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
      may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
      and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of fact may
      be drawn from the combined circumstances. The Commonwealth
      may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
      beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial
      evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test, the entire record
      must be evaluated and all evidence actually received must be
      considered. Finally, the trier of fact while passing upon the
      credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced,
      is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 181 A.3d 1168, 1184–85 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(citation omitted).

      The nature of Appellant’s sufficiency challenge is not clear. Appellant’s

argument reads in its entirety:
      Count 3 charges driving under the influence as a result of the
      combined influence of alcohol and a controlled substance
      [emphasis added]. The Commonwealth’s toxicological witness

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      testified that the amount of [T]ramadol in [A]ppellant’s
      bloodstream was barely above the reporting threshold and was
      hypothetically consistent with treating a toothache the night
      before the blood sample was obtained. Nowhere in the testimony
      was it proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the small amount
      of [T]ramadol somehow combined with [A]ppellant’s alcohol to
      make him incapable of driving safely. Appellant concedes that the
      alcohol alone was sufficient.

Appellant’s Brief at 26 (first bracketed insertion in original).

      Appellant references Ms. Bierly’s agreement on cross-examination that,

given the reporting range of 35 nanograms per milliliter and the plus/minus

of 11, Appellant’s results would be consistent, on the lower end, with taking a

pill for dental pain. However, on direct examination she testified, “Tramadol

is a low-potency op[i]oid. … However, in combination with alcohol, you can

see additives to the central nervous system depressant or sedative effect.”

N.T., 12/14/22, at 44. Appellant fails to address this testimony, as the statute

references the effect of a combination of drugs and alcohol. In light of the

relevant standard of review, the trial court was permitted to draw the

inference that Appellant was impaired due to the combination of alcohol and

Tramadol. See Commonwealth v. Graham, 81 A.3d 137, 147 (Pa. Super.

2013) (concluding that arresting officer’s testimony was sufficient to support

conviction for driving under the influence of drugs where the defendant

refused blood test but admitted to ingesting three different drugs).

      Appellant’s final claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his

sentence, arguing that the trial court should have only sentenced him to a

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period of two to four years’ incarceration at the Section 1543(b)(1.1)(iii)

count. We find that Appellant has waived this claim.

      Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
      entitle an appellant to review as of right. An appellant challenging
      the discretionary aspects of his sentence must invoke this Court’s
      jurisdiction by satisfying a four-part test:

      We conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1) whether [the]
      appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P. 902
      and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved at
      sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify sentence, see
      Pa.R.Crim.P. 720; (3) whether [the] appellant’s brief has a fatal
      defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial
      question that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under
      the Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.[] § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Durazo, 210 A.3d 316, 319–20 (Pa. Super. 2019)

(citation omitted; bracketing in original).

      Appellant’s issue has been waived for two independent reasons. First,

Appellant failed to file a post-sentence motion or otherwise preserve this issue

at the trial court level.   Additionally, Appellant has failed to comply with

Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f).       The Commonwealth has objected to this failure.

Commonwealth’s Brief at 17 (“Appellant in this matter has not complied …

with Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). As such, the Commonwealth first asserts that this

argument has been waived.”) When the Commonwealth objects to this defect,

we may not overlook the failure. Commonwealth v. Kiesel, 854 A.2d 530,

533 (Pa. Super. 2004) (stating that this Court may “determine if there is a

substantial question” even in the absence of a Rule 2119(f) statement, but

“this option is lost if the appellee objects”). We therefore find that Appellant

has waived this claim.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/25/2023

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