Court Opinion

ID: 9794041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:57:10.760735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:09:44.770912
License: Public Domain

Armstrong, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent. DCR presented the trial court with the declarations of two experts. One testified that: “It is my professional opinion that requiring dancers to maintain such distance [10 feet] directly and unmistakably effects (sic) the content of the erotic message sought to be conveyed by the performer.”22 The other expert concluded that distance is an expressive component of the dance, and that requiring a 10-foot separation between a dancer and a patron regulates the content of the dance.23
In the face of this, the majority holds as a matter of law that the “proximity” of the dance is not an element of the “content” of the dance. This is not only contrary to the *690rules of summary judgment, but inconsistent with Ino Ino, Inc. v. City of Bellevue, 132 Wn.2d 103, 937 P.2d 154 (1997), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1077, 118 S. Ct. 856, 139 L. Ed. 2d 755 (1998), which treated the issue as one of fact.24
DCR also presented the trial court with the declaration of Richard L. Wilson, an attorney and business consultant for adult entertainment establishments in several states.25 Wilson testified that: “Without, table dances, entertainers would not be able to earn a living, and adult nightclubs would suffer severe financial losses and be forced to close, thus terminating their presentation of entertainment which is protected by the First Amendment.”26
DCR thus presents us with the proposition, which we must accept on summary judgment, that enforcement of the 10-foot rule will inevitably close the businesses and stop the dancing. In Ino Ino, the Washington Supreme Court said, “[i]f such a failure [of the adult cabarets] was inevitable, then the distance requirement would be unconstitutional.” Ino Ino, 132 Wn.2d at 130. Ino Ino cited Go-million v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340-41, 81 S. Ct. 125, 126-27, 5 L. Ed. 2d 110 (1960), for the proposition. But the majority believes it is not bound by this because the state*691ment is “dicta,”27 and because Gomillion does not support the statement. I disagree. Although Gomillion was a voting rights case, not a nude dancing case, the Supreme Court cited it for the proposition that any ordinance that totally deprives one of a constitutionally guaranteed right must fail. I agree. It is not an answer to attempt to distinguish nude dancing from voting rights because nude dancing is “the least protected expressive conduct” as the majority does.28 If nude dancing is entitled to some First Amendment protection, then any ordinance that totally eliminates the dancing is unconstitutional. Ino Ino, 132 Wn.2d at 130. DCR is entitled to a hearing on whether enforcement of the 10-foot rule will inevitably close the business and thus prevent any dancing. If the trial court finds such failure inevitable, then the Ordinance is unconstitutional.
I also question the majority’s conclusion, under its time, place, and manner analysis that ample alternative avenues of communication remain. If the dancers are correct that the Ordinance will stop them from dancing, clearly no alternative channels of communication will be open.
I further disagree with the majority’s discussion of the economic impact of the ordinance. The majority relies primarily upon City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 106 S. Ct. 925, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1986), and Spokane Arcade, Inc. v. City of Spokane, 75 F.3d 663 (9th Cir. 1996). Neither case faced the issue we have here: The validity of an ordinance that will totally stop the dancing. Playtime Theatres dealt with a zoning ordinance and the trial court found that under the challenged ordinance, the adult theaters had “ample, accessible real estate,” on which to put their theaters. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 53. The Supreme Court concluded that the city had not effectively denied “respondents a reasonable opportunity to open and operate an adult theater within the city . . . .” Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 54. But the court reiterated its con*692cern about any zoning regulation that had “the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to, lawful speech . . . .” Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. at 54. Here, if the dancers are correct, the Ordinance will totally suppress their protected expression.
In Spokane Arcade, the court discussed the appropriate consideration to be given to the economic impact of a regulation. The court distinguished between an impact that prevents entry into the market place and one that only makes success in the market more difficult. Spokane Arcade, 75 F.3d at 666. Only the former, according to Spokane Arcade is an appropriate consideration in a First Amendment challenge. The court upheld the ordinances in question because they “do not deny World Video the opportunity to operate its establishments, but merely (or rather, allegedly) increase the costs of its doing so.” Spokane Arcade, 75 F.3d at 667. I find no meaningful distinction between an ordinance that prohibits entry to the market and one that allows entry, but dooms the business to inevitable failure. But assuming such a distinction to exist, here, if the dancers are correct, the ordinance will close the present dance clubs and prevent the opening of new clubs, thus denying the dancers access to the market.
In short, DCR and the dancers have raised issues of material fact as to whether proximity is part of the content of their dance and whether the ordinance will inevitably cause economic failure and, thus, closing of the clubs. They are entitled to a hearing on these issues.
Reconsideration denied November 24, 1998.
Review denied at 137 Wn.2d 1030 (1999).

Clerk’s Papers at 383 (Declaration of Dr. Judith Hanna).

Clerk’s Papers at 320-21 (Declaration of Edward Donnerstein).

Ino Ino stood in a different procedural posture than the present case. Ino Ino came before the Washington Supreme Court after a trial on the merits, which was tried in the King County Superior Court. The trial court found that “distance restrictions did not prevent patrons from perceiving the eroticism of the dancers’ performance” and “that a dancer can convey eroticism from a distance of four feet from the patron’s torso.” Ino Ino, 132 Wn.2d at 113-14. These findings of fact were upheld by the Supreme Court as supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 114.

DCR also presented the declarations of Steve Fueston, a general partner in the corporation which ran the Papagayo’s adult club in Bellevue which was the subject of the Ino Ino case, and the declaration of Paul E. Bern, the Director of Operations for the management company of the Deja-Vu adult nightclub located in Federal Way. The principal thrust of both declarations was that regulation of the distance between the dancers and the patrons caused the establishments to operate at a loss, caused dancers to cease their dancing at establishments covered by distance regulations, and caused these clubs to sustain economic losses which had, or would, result in their closure.

Clerk’s Papers at 413 (Declaration of Richard L. Wilson).

Majority op. at 680.

Majority op. at 680.