Court Opinion

ID: 9397101
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 15:05:53.209893+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:21.450058
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                    No. 23-0262
                                Filed May 24, 2023

IN THE INTEREST OF R.E.,
Minor Child,

M.B., Mother,
      Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal    from    the    Iowa      District   Court   for   Muscatine   County,

Gary P. Strausser, District Associate Judge.

      A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

      Larry J. Brock of Brock Law Office, Washington, for appellant mother.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Diane Murphy Smith, Assistant Attorney

General, for Appellee State.

      Jeannette Keller of Bowman, Depree, and Murphy, West Liberty, attorney

and guardian ad litem for minor child.

      Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

          A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to R.E., born in

December 2019. Because of the mother’s unwillingness to engage with mental-

health services, immaturity, and general apathy to the duties of being a parent, we

affirm.

          I.    Background Facts and Proceedings

          This case first came to the attention of the Iowa Department of Health and

Human Services (HHS) in July 2020, when R.E. arrived at the hospital with a brain

bleed and other injuries consistent with abusive head trauma. At the time of injury,

R.E. was in the care of his mother and her then-paramour. In its assessment of

the situation, HHS determined that the paramour was responsible for the physical

abuse, but voiced concerns about the mother as she may have known about the

abuse and failed to prevent it. R.E. also tested positive for THC, which HHS held

both caregivers responsible for.

          As a result of this incident, HHS made a safety plan for the mother and R.E.

Under the plan, R.E. was placed with his maternal grandmother, the mother was

permitted supervised contact with her son, and the paramour was allowed no

contact with R.E. In October 2020, the mother stipulated to an adjudication finding

R.E. as a child in need of assistance (CINA). As part of the adjudication order, the

child was formally removed from parental custody. The court held a dispositional

hearing the next month and ordered that the removal from parental custody

continue (although the mother continued to reside in the home of the grandmother

where the child was placed).
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      Between August 2020 and February 2021, the mother allowed R.E.’s father,

who abused marijuana products and was not engaged in any services, to live in

the home and have unauthorized contact with R.E. Because of this, the juvenile

court modified R.E.’s placement to his maternal aunt in March 2021. HHS provided

transportation for the mother to and from the aunt’s house for all-day visits with

R.E., but the mother did not take full advantage of these opportunities, choosing

instead to sleep in during the mornings and work in the afternoon.

      HHS referred the mother and father to mental-health services, but neither

promptly followed through with treatment, if at all. The mother was eventually

diagnosed with several mental disorders, and a psychologist recommended

several years of ongoing mental-health treatment. The mother did not consistently

take her medications or attend therapy sessions, and she was discharged from

therapy for lack of attendance.

      HHS provided several opportunities for the mother and father to take

parenting classes. The mother attended some classes, but she did not stay

engaged, was often distracted, and expressed her belief that she did not need to

go. She similarly struggled with engagement while visiting R.E., which a social

worker attributed to the mother’s immaturity.

      The mother entered into multiple romantic relationships throughout the life

of the case. As noted above, the mother became involved with the father again

after R.E. was adjudicated as a CINA. The father continued to abuse marijuana

products and, although the mother told HHS she broke off her relationship with the

father, she continued to associate with him. The mother also entered into a

relationship with another paramour and moved in with him after a few months,
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without informing HHS or taking any steps to ensure the paramour would not be

dangerous to R.E.

       The juvenile court held a permanency hearing over three days in July,

August, and November 2021. The court found that the parents had not made

sufficient progress toward reunification with their child and directed HHS to petition

for the termination of both parents’ rights. After the hearing, the mother had a

mental-health crisis that led to her hospitalization and recommendations for a

change in medication and attendance at therapy. Still, the mother rarely attended

her therapy appointments. By the time of the termination hearing, the mother’s

visits with her son had never progressed past fully supervised.

       The matter proceeded to hearing in October 2022. In February 2023, the

juvenile court terminated both parents’ rights, finding the State proved the statutory

elements of termination for both parents under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h)

(2022). The mother appeals, but the father does not.

       II.    Standard of Review

       “We review termination of parental rights de novo.” In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d

280, 293 (Iowa 2021). “The primary interest in termination proceedings is the best

interests of the child.” In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 492 (Iowa 2000).

       III.   Discussion

       The mother argues that the State did not prove by clear and convincing

evidence that her son could not be returned to her at the present time, that HHS

did not make reasonable efforts at reunification, and that she should have been

given another six months for reunification. We reject each argument for the

reasons that follow.
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       A.     Statutory Grounds

       The mother first challenges a single element of the statutory grounds for

termination: whether “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot

be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at

the present time.” Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(4).

       The record shows that R.E. could not be returned to his mother at the time

of the termination hearing. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010)

(interpreting “at the present time” to mean at the time of the termination hearing).

The issues that gave rise to this termination have not been rectified, and no

evidence suggests that the mother is effectively managing her problems. First, the

mother has refused to meaningfully address her mental-health issues.            Her

attendance at therapy has been sporadic at best, and she has reported she does

not believe she needs therapy.           Considering the consistent treatment

recommendations, we agree with the juvenile court that the mother’s mental-health

issues remain pervasive.

       Second, the mother’s immaturity weighs against returning the child to her.

The mother, who was nineteen years old during the termination hearing, prioritized

her romantic relationships over caring for her son, showing little foresight or

concern for R.E.’s well-being. The mother’s inability to look out for her child is

especially concerning given the history of a past paramour injuring R.E. and

blowing marijuana smoke into the child’s face.

       The mother’s immaturity also bleeds into her seeming apathy toward the

duties of being a parent. She has not consistently attended parenting classes, and

when she has, she has been disengaged. The mother has had similar struggles
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with disengagement when visiting R.E. HHS offered all-day visits to the mother,

but the mother did not use them fully, choosing instead to sleep late into the

morning and work during the afternoon. The mother also has not financially

contributed to her son’s well-being. These unaddressed mental-health issues,

along with the mother’s immaturity and apathy towards being a parent, illustrate

that R.E. could not be returned to his mother without facing some adjudicatory

harm. See Iowa Code §§ 232.102(4)(a)(2), .116(1)(e)(4).

       B.     Reasonable Efforts

       Second, the mother argues HHS did not make reasonable reunification

efforts. She claims that she requested but was not provided mental-health and

substance-abuse services, transportation, assistance with a psychological

evaluation, additional visitation, longer visitation periods, less supervision of visits,

and several other services. The mother also complains that HHS placed several

“obstacles . . . in front of [her,] which prevented her from effectively working toward

reunification.” We find these complaints, even if preserved, do not establish

reversible error. We also agree with the State’s observation that, to the extent any

obstacles were placed in front of the mother, they were obstacles of her own

making.

       “Although [HHS] must make reasonable efforts in furtherance of

reunification, with some exceptions not applicable here, parents have a

responsibility to object when they claim the nature or extent of services is

inadequate.” In re L.M., 904 N.W.2d 835, 839–40 (Iowa 2017) (footnote omitted).

“A parent’s objection to the sufficiency of services should be made ‘early in the

process so appropriate changes can be made.’” Id. at 840 (quoting C.B., 611
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N.W.2d at 493–94). The mother here does not point to any occasion where the

juvenile court considered and ruled on any of her complaints about the services

HHS offered. For that reason, the mother waived her objections to HHS’s efforts.

See id. (“In general, if a parent fails to request other services at the proper time,

the parent waives the issue and may not later challenge it at the termination

proceeding.” (quoting In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 148 (Iowa 2002)).

       Even if the mother properly presented her objection to HHS’s efforts, we

would find HHS made reasonable efforts to reunite mother and son. “Reasonable

efforts are services ‘to preserve and unify a family prior to the out-of-home

placement of a child in foster care or to eliminate the need for removal of the child

or make it possible for the child to safely return to the family’s home.’” In re L.T.,

924 N.W.2d 521, 529 (Iowa 2019) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.102(10)(a) (2019)).

HHS offered multiple services to the mother, including solution-based casework,

individual   supervision,   parenting   classes,   medication   management,      and

substance-abuse and mental-health evaluation and treatment. The mother also

had the opportunity to live with her son at the beginning of this case, but because

of the father moving in, the son was moved to the aunt’s home by court order

following a review hearing. Once the son moved residences, HHS provided the

mother with transportation for all-day visits, but she did not take full advantage of

these opportunities. HHS made reasonable efforts. See id.

       C.     Additional Time

       Third, the mother argues she should have been granted an additional six

months to work towards reunification. As a general matter, “the juvenile court may

deny termination and give the parent an additional six months for reunification only
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if the need for removal ‘will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month

period.’”       In re W.T., 967 N.W.2d 315, 323 (Iowa 2021) (quoting Iowa Code

§ 232.104(2)(b)). In this case, the mother showed little meaningful improvement

between the CINA adjudication and termination hearing—a period of around two

years. Given the extensive mental-health treatment needed by the mother, as well

as her immaturity, apathy toward parenting, and lack of protective capacity, we

cannot say that the need for removal would not exist at the end of another six-

month period. “It is well-settled law that we cannot deprive a child of permanency

after the State has proved a ground for termination . . . by hoping someday a parent

will learn to be a parent and provide a stable home for the child.” In re P.L., 778

N.W.2d 33, 41 (Iowa 2010).

          IV.     Disposition

          We find the State proved a statutory ground for termination, the mother

waived her challenge to the services HHS offered, and additional time for

reunification is not appropriate. We affirm termination of the mother’s parental

rights.

          AFFIRMED.