Court Opinion

ID: 4678092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2021-04-16 16:12:48.341902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:42.695850
License: Public Domain

04/16/2021
                    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TENNESSEE
                                    November 4, 2020 Session

                  STATE OF TENNESSEE v. MICHAEL RIMMER

                  Automatic Appeal from the Court of Criminal Appeals
                           Criminal Court for Shelby County
                     Nos. 98-01033, 98-01034    Chris Craft, Judge
                       ___________________________________

                               No. W2017-00504-SC-DDT-DD
                           ___________________________________

SHARON G. LEE, J., concurring.

       I concur in the Court’s opinion except for the analysis of the proportionality review.
In 1997, this Court narrowed the scope of the proportionality review required by Tennessee
Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) (2018 & Supp. 2020) by limiting
consideration to only those cases in which the State sought the death penalty. State v. Bland,
958 S.W.2d 651, 666 (Tenn. 1997). A majority of this Court reaffirmed this truncated
approach in State v. Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d 180, 217 (Tenn. 2013).

        In Pruitt, I joined Justice William C. Koch, Jr. in dissenting from the Court’s
decision to continue following the Bland approach, as it improperly narrowed the
proportionality review required by Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(D).
Pruitt, 415 S.W.3d at 230 (Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring and dissenting). We determined
that the Court should return to its pre-Bland proportionality analysis by considering “all
first-degree murder cases in which life imprisonment or a sentence of death has been
imposed” and focusing on whether the case under review is more like cases in which the
State sought the death penalty than those in which the death penalty was not sought. Id. at
226, 230–31.1 By considering only cases in which the State sought a death sentence, the
Bland approach “hides the full picture” from view. Id. at 230.

        1
           See also State v. Jones, 568 S.W.3d 101, 146–47 (Tenn. 2019) (Lee, J., concurring) (applying this
broader comparative approach); State v. Clayton, 535 S.W.3d 829, 863–64 (Tenn. 2017) (Lee, J.,
concurring) (same); State v. Hawkins, 519 S.W.3d 1, 54–55 (Tenn. 2017) (Lee, J., concurring) (same); State
v. Willis, 496 S.W.3d 653, 762 (Tenn. 2016) (Lee, J., concurring) (same); State v. Hall, 461 S.W.3d 469,
504–05 (Tenn. 2015) (Lee, J., concurring) (same); State v. Dotson, 450 S.W.3d 1, 84–85 (Tenn. 2014)
(Koch and Lee, JJ., concurring) (same); State v. Freeland, 451 S.W.3d 791, 826–27 (Tenn. 2014) (Koch
and Lee, JJ., concurring) (same).
        Thus, after reviewing similar first-degree murder cases, including those in which
the State did not seek the death penalty, I conclude that Mr. Rimmer’s personal background
and the nature of the crimes he committed are more like the personal backgrounds and the
crimes committed by other persons who have received a death sentence than those who
have not. Based on Tennessee Code Annotated section 39-13-206(c)(1)(D) and the
evidence, I find that Mr. Rimmer’s death sentence is neither excessive nor disproportionate
to the penalty imposed in similar cases.

                                                _________________________________
                                                SHARON G. LEE, JUSTICE