Court Opinion

ID: 9733763
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:16:52.8564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:26.271628
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge McGINLEY.
I respectfully dissent to the majority’s conclusion that “[t]he delay here was caused by a breakdown in the applicable administrative processes of the Department of Labor and Industry. Employer should not be punished for these breakdowns in the system.”
The majority states:
By statute, Employer was entitled to fifteen calendar days to evaluate the UC Center’s decision and decide whether to appeal, giving it at least until July 3, 2003 to appeal. It filed on July 1, 2003, which satisfied the statutory limit. Any other result would allow the government. to exploit its own mistakes in derogation of the statute. (Footnote omitted).
Majority Opinion at 471.
However, the majority disregards the Board’s critical finding “that the employer was not misinformed or misled by the unemployment compensation authorities concerning its right or the necessity to appeal.” Board Decision, November 7, 2003, Finding of Fact No. 6 at 1. In unemployment compensation proceedings, the Board is the ultimate fact-finding body empow*472ered to resolve conflicts in evidence, to determine the credibility of witnesses, and to determine the weight to be accorded to evidence. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review v. Wright, 21 Pa.Cmwlth. 637, 347 A.2d 328 (1975). This Court must not interfere with the Board’s fact-finding role.
In Cook v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 543 Pa. 381, 671 A.2d 1130 (1996), Willie Cook’s (Cook’s) application for benefits was denied. Before the appeal period had expired, he collapsed and was hospitalized. By the time Cook was released from the hospital, the deadline passed. His appeal to the referee was dismissed as untimely. Subsequently, the Board and this Court affirmed. However, our Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that Cook, whose appeal was four days late because he was hospitalized, should have been allowed to appeal nunc pro tunc. The Supreme Court stated:
[W]here an appeal is not timely because of non-negligent circumstances, either as they relate to appellant or his counsel, and the appeal is filed within a short time after the appellant or his counsel learns of and has an opportunity to address the untimeliness, and the time period which elapses is of very short duration, and appellee is not prejudiced by the delay, the court may allow an appeal nunc pro tunc.
Id. at 384-385; 671 A.2d at 1131.
Here, it is undisputed that Employer received the service center’s determination beyond the appeal deadline. Unlike Cook, Employer did not promptly appeal after learning of the untimeliness. Nor did Employer seek leave to appeal nunc pro tunc but filed the standard form UC-46B REV 9-01 (Petition for Appeal) issued by the Department of Labor and Industry, UC Benefit Program. Further, the record contains no explanation why Employer delayed twelve days before filing its appeal, when the opportunity to do so was readily available.
Although the Supreme Court has not specified how many days is a “short time,” this Court has considered whether an eleven-day delay was unreasonable. In Stanton v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 154 Pa.Cmwlth. 350, 623 A.2d 925 (1993), this Court addressed the issue of whether the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County (trial court) properly denied Robert Allen Stanton’s (Stanton) petition for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc. On January 14, 1992, the Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing (DOT) notified Stanton that his driving privileges would be suspended for one year. Before the thirty^ day appeal period expired on February 13, 1992, Stanton visited the Cappellini law office- and spoke to the office manager about an appeal. Thereafter, the office manager missed work from February 10, to February 17, due to her daughter’s medical emergency. On February 28, 1992, counsel filed Stanton’s petition for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc, and the trial court denied his petition.
This Court determined that:
Licensee’s [Stanton’s] petition for leave to appeal nunc pro tunc must be denied because although the office manager returned on February 17, the petition was not filed until February 28, eleven days after her return. As we noted in Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Johnson, 131 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 51, 569 A.2d 409 (1990), a petitioner in an appeal nunc pro tunc must proceed with reasonable diligence once he knows of the necessity to take action. (Emphasis added).
Id. at 927.
In the present controversy, the twelve-day delay was longer than the lapse in *473Stanton. As in Stanton, Employer failed to proceed with reasonable diligence once Employer knew of the necessity to take action. Employer failed to meet the requirements for an appeal nunc pro tunc. The Board did not err when it dismissed Employer’s appeal. To hold otherwise would require us to overrule Stanton and risk being at odds with the Supreme Court’s decision in Cook.
The majority places a duty on the Board and, or the referee to inform Employer that it needed to explain why it took twelve days to appeal. Case law has historically and consistently refused to allocate any such burden in this fashion. The majority goes farther and holds that an appellant may not be deprived of the statutory minimum of fifteen days from the personal receipt of the UC Center’s determination to appeal. In other words, the majority holds that an appellant satisfies the requirements to appeal nunc pro tunc by filing an appeal within the statutory minimum from when the notice was personally delivered. This has never been the law. Even though the UC Center’s decision was mailed using the wrong zip code, the notice stated that the last day to appeal was May 27, 2003. Employer received the notice on June 19, 2003, after the appeal period expired. Rather than proceed with reasonable diligence it chose to wait twelve days to file an appeal of the UC Center’s decision, and also chose not to offer any explanation for the delay.1
Accordingly, I would affirm.

. It is noted that the majority indicates the determination notice was forwarded to counsel. However, a review of the record reveals that Employer’s human resource specialist forwarded the determination to the legal administrative assistant who filed an appeal by fax on July 1, 2003. See Notes of Testimony, October 14, 2003, at 5, 7-8; Reproduced Record at 46a, 48a-49a.