Court Opinion

ID: 9740961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:46:04.940361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:31:13.787271
License: Public Domain

Gehl, J.
(dissenting). The only difference between sec. 42.535, the statute which we struck down as invalid in State ex rel. Thomson v. Giessel (1952), 262 Wis. 51, 53 N. W. (2d) 726, and sec. 38.25, which is under attack here, is that the former was intended to provide additional benefits to retired teachers throughout the state, and the latter would provide additional benefits only to the retired teachers of the city of Milwaukee. In the former case it was contended, among other things, that the statute might be sustained as a contract with no involvements concerning past services or extra compensation, because by its terms the state agreed to provide a new annuity for a new consideration, — the payment by the retired teacher of $100 into the general fund. To that contention we replied (p. 63) :
“When the applicants rest their claims on their former service they are entangled with sec. 26, art. IV, Const. When they free themselves from that by relying only upon the new consideration to support a new contract they put themselves into the class of other private citizens, with former teaching status as an identifying mark only, and the special benefit *139•granted • them is a use of public funds for a private interest ■and, hence, unconstitutional.”
We said also in that case that even if the legislature had in its enactment of sec. 42.535, Stats., expressed its gratitude and declared that the payments of additional benefits were to be made in furtherance of a public purpose (p. 59),—
“. . .we would be unable to find that such an expression cleared away the difficulties and established a gratuity to them as a public purpose justifying the expenditure of public fuhds. Noble and useful as the profession of teaching in the public schools and institutions of higher education may be, as much may be said for most other forms of service to the public. If such a declaration by the legislature is sufficient to support, as an expenditure for a public purpose, a bonus for former teachers and an inducement to bring successors into this field of public service, we see no way to exclude from similar benefits any individual or group of individuals who have performed public service at least as fundamental to the survival of government and as essential to public welfare as the teaching profession. If gratitude for past services and a concern for the future of former teachers will validate the constitutionality of legislation granting bonuses to them when their services have been rendered and their contracts not only entered into but on their part fully executed, so must the same considerations support and require judicial approval of whatever, for the same declared purpose, the legislature sees fit to confer on any other person who has labored in the public interest. If an alleged public purpose justifies such legislation today in behalf of one person because once he was a teacher, it must tomorrow equally justify similar legislation in behalf of another because once he served as an executive or administrative officer, a legislator, or judge.”
There can, therefore, be no doubt that it has been declared as the law of this state that payment of public moneys to teachers who have retired from the service is a use of public funds for a private purpose or interest, and that any legisla*140tion which purports to authorize it is unconstitutional. It is immaterial that in the former case the money of the state was involved and that here it is the money of Milwaukee county; in such case it is public funds sought to be paid for a private purpose. Because I think that we are bound by what we said and held in the former case, I would reverse.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Brown joins in this dissent.
Fairchild, C. J., also dissents.