Court Opinion

ID: 9572551
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:42:46.072888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:28.996275
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice PARKER
concurring in the result only.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in failing to exclude, for cause prospective juror Billy Goodson, a Lieutenant with the Carolina Beach Police Department, who expressed concern over his own ability to consider evidence in defense or in mitigation, specifically evidence that would support guilt phase defenses of diminished capacity attributable to intoxication and statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances relating to defendant’s mental state, intoxication, child abuse, and the effects of domestic violence. For the reasons stated herein, I concur in the result only.
When considering whether a defendant' had the right to question jurors whether they would automatically impose a sentence of death upon conviction in a capital trial, the U.S. Supreme Court noted:
It may be that a juror could, in good conscience, swear to uphold the law and yet be unaware that maintaining such dogmatic beliefs about the death penalty would prevent him or her from doing so. A defendant on trial for his life must be permitted on voir dire to ascertain whether his prospective jurors function under such misconception. The risk that such jurors may have been empaneled in this case and “infected petitioner’s capital sentencing [is] unacceptable in light of the ease with which that risk could have been minimized.”
*480Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 735-36, 119 L. Ed. 2d 492, 507 (1992) (footnote omitted) (quoting Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 36, 90 L. Ed. 2d 27, 36 (1986) (plurality) (alteration in original).
During voir dire in this case, prospective juror Goodson, a law enforcement officer with experience investigating murder cases, interrupted questioning by the defense to offer an observation that he thought would “shorten this process for you and the Court.” He then stated:
I’m going to have a great propensity to scrutinize the mitigating circumstances that [defense counsel] alluded to yesterday in his voir dire of some of the other counselors [sic]. And based on that, I will have a natural inclination to look at some of those mitigating circumstances in a little more detail than perhaps others may or may not. And I can say that unless I see a mitigating circumstance that is a non self-induced condition, then I’m not inclined to give a lot of weight to it.
Without — there is no other persons here, so I’m going to say it, if it’s not a mental condition, that is, it’s not self-induced, I hope you know how hard it is to say, if it’s not a capital offense punishment. And that’s my interpretation of what mitigating means to me as an individual.
And I’m saying that it’s not an excuse, as some people think. It’s an explanation of why things occurred. And because of the nature of the investigations that I have done over the past umpteen years, that an explanation in some cases are a logical mitigating circumstance.
[Defense]: Do you find mental illness to be one?
[Juror]: I do, yes, sir. I can say in my personal viewpoint that mental illness is a condition that takes out the rationalization that you and I grew up with, from right and wrong. Short of that, there is not a whole lot on that list that I would consider.
Short of mental illness, medically defined attributed mental illness, that would rationally justify our actions, I don’t personally see any other type of mitigating circumstances that can justify the taking of a life. And, again, as was alluded to in your presenta*481tions yesterday, there may be some other issues that you’re going to be broaching that. . . many cause for consideration of mitigation. Having investigated numerous cases of that, and listening to people everyday—
Cases where that type of explanation as to why crimes were perpetrated.
[Defense]: Mental illness?
[Juror]: No.
[Defense]: Another explanation you’re not talking about?
[Juror]: Domestic violence, drug use, broken homes . . . learned violence. I don’t find those as acceptable mitigating circumstances for someone having committed a homicide.
[Defense]: AJ1 right. Now, that’s — I do thank you for telling me that. You prefaced that by saying, I think, that might expedite what we’re doing here this morning. That is a view that developed over your years as a law enforcement officer?
[Juror]: Yes, sir.
[Defense]: And it involved the cases that you worked on and things of that nature?
[Juror]: Yes, sir.
The prospective juror would later state:
I can follow the law, as I told the State, regardless of having the knowledge of the circumstances that’s been [alluded] to by [the defense], I would follow the law down to the line. I can reach a conclusion as to what I think would be the appropriate punishment if, in fact, he was found guilty of it.
But as I pointed out to you earlier, counselor’s explanations of as use of justification of why something occurred or didn’t occur under mitigating circumstances, I’m going to take a crucial look at. And in my personal viewpoint, has nothing to do with law enforcement, I just think that it’s going to be, short of mental illness, some major issues along those lines that I’m not going to put much credence to justifying or rationalizing acts that we take — that we have control over.
*482[Defense]: Having that view of things, do you feel that that would in any way influence or have an impact on the way you would hear what we’ll call the guilt phase?
[Juror]: I would say it will obviously have an [effect]. I will be as objective as I can to listen to the mitigating circumstances surrounding this particular case, but I think I’m going to have a very limited window in which things that I would consider that would negate the death penalty.
[Defense]: Your window is limited to mental illness, isn’t it?
[Juror]: I’m saying that is one example. Yes, I’m sure there is some others out there that perhaps I haven’t thought about. However, listening to what’s been proffered by the defense, at this point, I’m saying mental defense, mental illness would be something along the lines. It’s going to take to satisfy me that first degree — or that the death penalty is not warranted.
[Defense]: In all the time that you sat here and listened to the examination of other jurors, would you say that that — of all the information you’ve heard is the most significant sticking point as to whether or not you feel you could be a fit juror in this case?
[Juror]: Absolutely. Up until you brought this subject up yesterday, I was sitting in the middle of the fence, you know, either way I had no preponderance of decision or any opinion one way or the other, would have been a very fair — I think I would have been fair. But I’m just honest with you with regard to what I call explanations of why incidents occur.
[Defense]: These [ ] thoughts didn’t develop just over the last day or two. They’ve been thoughts that have gone through your mind over some time, haven’t they?
[Juror]: I’ve investigated too many cases for that not to have been an issue in my developments.
[Defense]: And when you say it’s an issue, you do in your way of thinking, equate some explanations, as just being, can we use the word cop-out, for criminal acts?
[Juror]: It’s an adequate term, yes, sir.
*483[Defense]: And is it fair to say you really just don’t think very much of that at all positive?
[Juror]: No, sir. As I said before, we’re all responsible for what we do or don’t do, getting drunk, drunk driving is not a homicidal explanation of why we go out there and have wrecks and people die or the use of drugs or any of these others that I heard everyday.
[Defense]: And as you’ve thought about it, you believe that that is an aspect of your value system based on your own personal values, your own professional experiences, that would color your understanding as you hear the evidence in this case?
[Juror]: It has a potential to do that, yes, sir.
[Defense]: And that gives you concern, too?
[Juror]: Yes, it does.
[Defense]: A significant concern?
[Juror]: Now that I’ve heard the defense’s line of approach to this trial, yes, sir.
[Defense]: Now, you may receive some legal instructions relating to certain matters pertaining to say whether or not someone had consumed alcoholic beverages and whether or not that would diminish their capacity. You’ve heard [the prosecutor] talk about felony murder, which you are aware of; armed robbery, which you’re aware of; breaking and entering, you are aware of that?
[Juror]: Yes, sir.
[Defense]: Premeditation, deliberation, you’re very familiar with those terms. And [diminished] capacity, that is a defense that could be involved in a case, you’ve heard of this before?
[Juror]: Yes, sir.
[Defense]: And when you’ve talked for the last number of minutes . . . about these matters relating to mitigation, it’s things like that that you just kind of come to the end of your road on, isn’t that it?
*484That is an intellectual rub for you?
[Juror]: Yes, sir. I think everybody has their limits of what tolerance for various things. That would be, to me, the end of that, I think.
[Defense]: If the Judge were to say — give you an instruction relating to certain matters that would pertain to things short of your window, and I understand you, your window could be tainted, but the window you indicated of mental illness, if he were to give you instructions relating to something beyond that, do you feel that that is an instruction you would find difficult to follow?
[Juror]: If the Court instructs me to follow certain guidelines, I will follow them to the end.
[Defense]: Understanding that you would try, if you took an oath to be a juror in this case, to follow all the instructions the Court gave you. I’ll ask you to think, do you believe it would be a difficult one for you to do if it related to something that went beyond the issue of mental illness?
[Juror]: No, sir. If the Court directed me to consider it, then that’s going to happen. To me, I don’t find — to me it’s black or white. If the Court says that we should consider that and that’s within the realm of the thing that I have to do, then I’ll do that.
[Defense]: But let me ask you, before you get to the place that the Judge may give you that instruction, you’ll be listening to evidence and information and things of that nature. . . .
Do you feel it would be — we’re not up to the place where the Judge is giving the instructions. That would come at the end of the trial, as you know. But I’m talking about during the course of the trial, as you’re hearing information from witnesses and things of that nature, do you think that your point of view would make it more difficult for you to receive that information in a fair-minded way?
[Juror]: I would say no, it would not impede me receiving it. I’m open to a myriad of explanations with possibilities of things *485that evidence, whatever it might have been. I’m not a close-minded individual. But I would say that, obviously, if it wasn’t something of a substantial nature, it wouldn’t change my philosophy or my attitude.
Later counsel for the defense read the prospective juror the pattern jury instruction concerning the voluntary intoxication defense to first-degree murder:
[Defense]: “You may find there is evidence which tends to show that the Defendant was intoxicated or drugged at the time of the acts alleged in this case. Generally, voluntary intoxication is not a legal excuse for crime. However, if you should find that the Defendant was intoxicated, was ever drugged, you should consider whether this condition affected his ability to formulate the specific intent which is required for a conviction of first-degree murder.”
Now, up to that point, are you understanding what the instruction is asking you?
[Juror]: Yes, sir.
[Defense]: In order for you to find the Defendant guilty of first-degree murder, you must find beyond a reasonable doubt that he killed the deceased with malice and in the execution of an actual specific intent to kill, formed after premeditation and deliberation.
Now, this next line in the instructions goes to the mental state of the Defendant, “If, as a result of intoxication, a drugged condition, the Defendant did not have the specific intent to kill the deceased, formed after premeditation and deliberation, he is not guilty of first-degree murder.”
Let me ask: Do you understand what the instruction is saying?
[Juror]: I understand.
[Defense]: Now, on the basis of your years in investigations and such, is it that issue that gives you some concern, the issue of someone being voluntarily intoxicated or the use of some drug?
[Juror]: Yes.
*486[Defense]: And that is a matter that you do not find to be an excuse for a crime?
[Juror]: No.
[Defense]: And it’s not a matter that you find mitigating, is it?
[Juror]: No, sir.
[Defense]: And you have come to that belief after considerable thought, I would imagine. This is not a matter that’s just popped into your mind. This is something that’s been a part of your work for some years, hasn’t it?
[Juror]: Yes, sir.
[Defense]: The many offenses that you may have seen [during your law enforcement experience], you’ve seen actions by people who have been either impaired or drugged, haven’t you?
[Juror]: Yes, sir.
[Defense]: And everything about that, you just find to be offensive, don’t you? I mean—
[Juror]: I won’t say it’s offensive. I just don’t believe it is a justification or rationalization or an excuse, whatever label one wants to attach to it.
[Defense]: Lieutenant, do you feel that your views relating to self-imposed impairment or intoxication would it make it difficult for you to follow the law with respect to the instruction that’s been read?
[Juror]: I could follow it. Do you mean do I agree with it?
[Defense]: Well, do you feel that your [disagreement with it that’s carried with you into this courtroom, is one that would make it difficult for you to follow that instruction?
[Juror]: I can follow the instruction. Like I said, I don’t necessarily agree, but I would evaluate and make a decision based on what the Court tells me to do.
[Defense]: There is some reluctance, though, on your part that is bom of difficulty.
*487[Juror]: Absolutely.
[Defense]: And even though an instruction may be given, it would certainly be a part of your life experience that would be carried into the jury room as well; is that fair to say?
[Juror]: Yes, sir.
Defendant challenged this prospective juror for cause. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, stating:
The Court has had occasion to observe [the prospective juror] for some time. He’s been examined by the Court, by counsel for the State and counsel for the Defendant. And there is just no doubt about it, he is a man of strong conviction and he is with [sic] viewed with strong beliefs, including matters in mitigation. •
But the Court is, likewise, convinced that he will follow the law. And if his belief or beliefs differ from the law, he will yield and try to obey and follow the law as he is instructed to him [sic] by the Court.
In looking at his face, he’s got a face that’s been chiseled in stone and I imagine his convictions are just the same way. His convictions are strong. And if he sits there and tells us that he will yield a matter of personal preference or belief and follow the law, I think he will do so. The evidence demonstrates that he is a soldier. He is a patriot, a good man and good juror.
The Court is of the view[ ] that he should not be excused for cause and motion to challenge for cause is denied.
Defendant excepted to this ruling and then exercised a peremptory challenge as to the prospective juror. Defendant later renewed his challenge for cause as to the prospective juror, which was again denied. In denying the renewed challenge for cause, the trial court stated:
All right, the Court does, on the motion pursuant to 15(A)-1214(h) and (i), revisit the ruling [denying the challenge for cause of the prospective juror], [He] is the gentleman identified by the Court as the soldier, patriot, good man, good juror, a man of strong convictions, views with strong beliefs, including the matters in mitigation. The Court concluded he would follow the law even if his beliefs differed. And looking back at his comments, I think any person could pull out any one comment by any *488one juror to probably support a position either for or against the juror being discharged.
And so the Court, likewise, has had an occasion to review his examination by the Court by Counsel for the State and by Counsel for the Defendant and considered his examination in its totality and I do note that he did indicate that he could follow the law, even though he may disagree with it. He was being asked at that time about self-imposed alcoholism, which again is just one comment by the juror, but the total of his comments and the examination of this Court of his demeanor and his responses and his approach to his views convinces this Court that the ruling should stand. [The prospective juror] should not be excused for cause upon the renewed motion. The motion to remove him for cause is denied.
Defendant exhausted his peremptory challenges and asked to exercise an additional peremptory challenge as to an additional juror, who was then empaneled. The requirements of N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-1214(h) and (i) were thus satisfied, thereby preserving any error for review and establishing prejudice to the defendant in the event an abuse of discretion occurred.
This Court has said,
A juror who reveals that he is unable to accept a particular defense or penalty recognized by law is prejudiced to such an extent that he can no longer be considered competent. One “who is unwilling to accept as a defense, if proved, that which the law recognizes as such” should be removed from the jury when challenged for cause.
State v. Leonard, 296 N.C. 58, 62-63, 248 S.E.2d 853, 855-56 (1978) (citations omitted) (holding that denial of defendant’s challenges for cause of three prospective jurors was error when prospective jurors indicated they would not be willing to return a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity even if satisfied by evidence that the defendant was insane at the time of the crime); see also State v. Cunningham, 333 N.C. 744, 754-55, 429 S.E.2d 718, 723 (1993) (holding that denial of defendant’s challenge for cause was error when transcript indicated prospective juror either did not understand or was reluctant to follow the principles of presumption of innocence); State v. Hightower, 331 N.C. 636, 641, 417 S.E.2d 237, 240 (1992) (holding that *489denial of defendant’s challenge for cause was error despite prospective juror’s assertions that he could follow the law when prospective juror repeatedly stated that the defendant’s failure to testify would “stick in the back of my mind”).
“[E]xcusal of a prospective juror for cause is not mandatory when he or she is able to disregard any personal convictions, follow the laws of the state as provided by the trial court, and render a fair and impartial verdict based on the evidence.” State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 148, 604 S.E.2d 886, 897 (2004) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 830, 163 L. Ed. 2d 79 (2005). Although the challenged juror here asserted that he would be able to follow the law “to the end,” “[t]he court is not bound by the answers of the juror on his voir dire when they are opposed to and inconsistent with the facts and circumstances disclosed by his examination.” State v. Lee, 292 N.C. 617, 624-25, 234 S.E.2d 574, 579 (1977) (citations and quotation marks omitted); see also Cunningham, 333 N.C. at 754-55, 429 S.E.2d at 723 (finding ambiguity in the context of the entire voir dire, despite some responses regarding the presumption of innocence that were appropriate, sufficient to render prospective juror excludable for cause).
From the record of voir dire before this Court, I am of the opinion that this particular prospective juror’s ability to consider impartially evidence relevant to both guilt phase defenses and various statutory and nonstatutory mitigating circumstances was questionable. I acknowledge that the prospective juror asserted his ability to follow the law and the trial court’s instructions, and I am confident that he intended to do so. Nevertheless, in the context of the entire voir dire, his expressions of his views regarding “self-imposed” conditions raise serious concerns as to his ability to consider impartially evidence in defense and in mitigation. The prospective juror’s statements suggest that he was perhaps the precise juror described in Morgan v. Illinois, the one who “by definition . . . cannot perform [his] duties in accordance with the law, [his] protestations to the contrary notwithstanding.” 504 U.S. at 735, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 506.
By his comments concerning relevant mitigating evidence, this prospective juror essentially stated that he could not follow the law. In State v. Jaynes this Court said:
If a juror determines that a statutory mitigating circumstance exists, however, the juror must give that circumstance mitigating *490value. The General Assembly has determined as a matter of law that statutory mitigating circumstances have mitigating value. Therefore, jurors must give them some weight in mitigation. Nevertheless, the amount of weight any particular statutory mitigating circumstance is to be given is a decision entirely for the jury.
342 N.C. 249, 285, 464 S.E.2d 448, 470 (1995) (internal citations omitted), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1024, 135 L. E. 2d 1080 (1996).
However, the trial court has broad discretion in overseeing voir dire, including whether to grant or deny a challenge for cause. State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 343, 451 S.E.2d 131, 145 (1994); State v. Quick, 329 N.C. 1, 17, 405 S.E.2d 179, 189 (1991). The standard of review is whether the trial court abused its discretion and whether this abuse of discretion prejudiced the defendant. Abraham, 338 N.C. at 343-44, 451 S.E.2d at 145-46. An abuse of discretion is established upon a showing that the trial court’s actions were “manifestly unsupported by reason” and “so arbitrary that [they] could not have been the result of a reasoned decision.” State v. Williams, 361 N.C. 78, 81, 637 S.E.2d 523, 525 (2006) (alteration in original) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). But see Hightower, 331 N.C. at 641, 417 S.E.2d at 240 (stating that “in a case ... in which a juror’s answers show that he could not follow the law as given... by the judge in his instructions to the jury, it is error not to excuse such a juror”).
Giving deference to the discretion of the trial judge who observed the prospective juror, heard the prospective juror’s voice, and opined at length as to the juror’s patriotism, chiseled looks, and firm beliefs, I concur in the result only.