Court Opinion

ID: 9900868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-20 17:08:14.345034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:20.906509
License: Public Domain

J-S32032-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: L.E.J.P., A            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    MINOR                                      :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
    APPEAL OF: A.T., MOTHER                    :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 729 MDA 2023

                Appeal from the Decree Entered April 17, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at
                             No(s): 87-ad-2022

BEFORE: DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                     FILED: NOVEMBERR 20, 2023

       Appellant A.T. (Mother) appeals1 from the order granting the petition

filed by the Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth (the

Agency) to terminate Mother’s parental rights to L.E.J.P. (Child), born in

September of 2017. On appeal, Mother contends that the Agency failed to

meet its burden of proof and that the trial court erred when it involuntarily

terminated Mother’s parental rights. We affirm.

       The trial court set forth an extensive recitation of the factual and

procedural history of this case. See Trial Ct. Op., 6/16/23, at 1-32. Briefly,

in June of 2019, Mother agreed to temporarily place Child with a host family

because she was undergoing a medical procedure and Father was unable to
____________________________________________

1 We note that the order also terminated B.P.’s (Father’s) parental rights.
While Father is not a party to the instant appeal, his appeal from the order
shall be addressed in a separate disposition. See In the Interest of:
L.E.J.P., a Minor, Appeal of B.P., Father, 728 MDA 2023.
J-S32032-23

care for Child because he was employed as a long-haul trucker. After Mother

suffered complications from her medical procedure, she entered into a

voluntary placement agreement with the Agency, placing Child in the Agency’s

care and custody.

      Following a hearing on July 24, 2019, the trial court adjudicated Child

dependent. At that time, the trial court ordered Mother to complete several

service plan objectives for reunification. Specifically, Mother was directed to

attend all court hearings, maintain a safe and sanitary home, ensure Child

receives routine medical and dental care and also attend Child’s scheduled

appointments, complete parenting classes, meet Child’s basic needs (including

hygiene, nutrition, housing, clothing, etc.), participate in Parent-Child

Interactive Therapy (PCIT), attend visitation with Child, maintain regular

contact with the Agency, and express interest in Child’s well-being. See N.T.

Hr’g, 2/27/23, at 118-27.     Following the adjudication hearing, Child was

subsequently placed in foster care.

      Throughout the course of the instant case, the trial court held ten

permanency review hearings, with the most recent taking place on June 9,

2022. Child remained in foster care throughout this entire period. During the

termination of parental rights hearing, the Agency’s primary caseworker Jillian

Kaminskie testified that neither Father nor Mother had “substantially complied

to the extent that the Agency would expect them to [comply] to [reunite with

Child]” over the course of four years. Id. at 138. Specifically, Ms. Kaminskie

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testified that she had not seen “any indication that [Father] or [Mother] really,

really want[ed] to work hard to get their child back”. Id.

      On September 28, 2022, Child’s guardian ad litem (GAL), Heather L.

Paterno, Esq., filed a motion requesting immediate termination of both Father

and Mother’s visitation.    Specifically, the trial court explained the GAL’s

position that:

      (1) Child resisted visits and often hid whenever Father came to
      pick him up at the foster home and that this has been a consistent
      pattern for more than a year; it often took up to an hour of coaxing
      for Child to come out of hiding; (2) school officials noticed a
      dramatic change in Child’s demeanor when the Parents would pick
      him up including that Child would become withdrawn, silent, and
      would tell teachers he did not want to go, prompting school
      officials (as mandated reporters) to contact the [GAL] and express
      their concerns; (3) the foster family stopped informing Child when
      visits would occur because he would feign illness to avoid visits;
      (4) Father made false promises to persuade Child to visit or
      admonished or reprimanded Child for his reluctance to visit, rather
      than engaging in positive reinforcement; and (5) Mother only
      sporadically attended PCIT sessions, that Child reported during
      visits Mother often did not come out of her room and that the
      Parents sometimes shouted at each other when he is with them.

      The [GAL] expressed concern that Child’s extreme reactions
      anticipating visits were traumatizing and that his resistance had
      not diminished in the past year. The [GAL] believed that the
      family should participate in more intensive parenting education
      classes to address Child’s resistance, learn positive parenting
      techniques, and help him better adjust to and develop comfort in
      his Parents’ home. She requested that visits thus be suspended
      pending the [termination of parental rights] hearing, then initially
      scheduled just three weeks later (on October 19, 2022). The
      [GAL] also requested that the [trial court] appoint legal counsel
      for Child, who might accurately represent and convey his wishes
      to [the trial court]. On September 29, 2022, [the trial court]
      granted the [GAL’s] motion, suspending the Parents’ visitation and
      appointing Sarah Hoffman[, Esq., legal] counsel for Child.

                                      -3-
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Trial Ct. Op. at 11-12.

      On October 6, 2022, the Agency filed a petition seeking termination of

Father and Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5),

(8), and (b). The trial court explained:

      After the [termination of parental rights] petition was filed, Child’s
      attorney, [Attorney] Hoffman, filed a petition statement with the
      [trial] court averring that she had met with Child on multiple
      occasions, had spoken with him in accordance with his age and
      developmental level, and that it was clear to her that Child agreed
      with the termination of parental rights of both [Father and Mother]
      and a goal change to adoption. Hearings on the [termination of
      parental rights] petition and goal change were held before [the
      trial court] on February 27, March 2, [and] April 17, 2023.

Trial Ct. Op. at 13 (citations omitted) (some formatting altered).

      Ultimately, the trial court granted the Agency’s petition to terminate

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a) (1),

(2), (5), (8), and (b) and to change Child’s permanency goal to adoption.

Mother filed a timely notice of appeal and complied with Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a) opinion explaining its

reasons for terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

      Mother raises the following issues for our review:

      1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an
         error of law when it found, despite a lack of clear and
         convincing evidence, that enough grounds existed for a
         termination of [Mother’s] parental rights under Section 2511(a)
         of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)[?]

      2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an
         error of law in determining it would be in [Child’s] best interest
         to have [Mother’s] parental rights terminated, when it failed to
         primarily consider [Child’s] developmental, physical, and

                                      -4-
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         emotional needs and welfare, thus contravening Section
         2511(b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)[?]

      3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an
         error of law in ordering that [Mother’s] visitation be suspended
         without affording [Mother] a meaningful opportunity to
         respond to and/or be heard[?]

Mother’s Brief at 4 (some formatting altered).

      We begin with our well-settled standard of review:

      The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
      requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
      credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
      by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
      courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
      or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
      of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
      unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
      court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
      the record would support a different result. We have previously
      emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
      observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted). “[T]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and

resolve conflicts in the evidence.”    In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

      Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
      seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
      that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
      termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
      determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his

                                      -5-
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      or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
      the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
      needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
      of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
      concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
      parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
      of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We note

that we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section

2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), to affirm an order terminating parental

rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).

                              Section 2511(a)(1)

      Mother argues that the trial court erred in concluding that the Agency

presented clear and convincing evidence to terminate her parental rights

under Section 2511(a)(1).       Mother’s Brief at 10-13.      Specifically, Mother

argues that the trial court failed to properly weigh the evidence demonstrating

Mother’s progress toward achieving her service plan objectives. Id. at 11.

Mother further argues that her efforts to establish a “more nurturing

relationship” with Child “were often thwarted by the limitations resulting from

her   significant   medical   issues   outside   of   her   own   control,   lack   of

communication and clarity from the Agency, and the difficulties posed because

of the effects of the global pandemic.” Id. at 12. Mother alleges that at no

time did she “refuse to be a parent to her son or in any way give up her

parental claim to him and no evidence was presented by the Agency to

demonstrate otherwise.” Id.

      Section 2511(a)(1) provides as follows:

                                        -6-
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     § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

     (a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
     be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
     grounds:

        (1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least
        six months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
        has evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental
        claim to a child or has refused or failed to perform parental
        duties.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).

     When reviewing the involuntary termination of parental rights under

Section 2511(a)(1), this Court has explained:

     Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties
     or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the court
     must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s explanation
     for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment contact between
     parent and child; and (3) consideration of the effect of termination
     of parental rights on the child pursuant to Section 2511(b).

     Further, the trial court must consider the whole history of a given
     case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory
     provision. The court must examine the individual circumstances
     of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent
     facing termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if the
     evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly
     warrants the involuntary termination.

     Our courts have explained that parental duty “is best understood
     in relation to the needs of a child. A child needs love, protection,
     guidance, and support. These needs, physical and emotional,
     cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the development of
     the child. Thus, [our Supreme] Court has held that the parental
     obligation is a positive duty which requires affirmative
     performance. This affirmative duty encompasses more than a
     financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and
     a genuine effort to maintain communication and association with
     the child. Because a child needs more than a benefactor, parental
     duty requires that a parent exert himself to take and maintain a
     place of importance in the child’s life.

                                     -7-
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In Interest of: T.J.J.M., 190 A.3d 618, 628 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citations

omitted).

     This Court has long recognized that a parent is required to make
     diligent efforts toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full
     parental responsibilities. A parent’s vow to cooperate, after a long
     period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability
     of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.

     In Adoption of S.P., our Supreme Court reiterated the standard
     with which a parent must comply in order to avoid a finding that
     [he] abandoned [his] child.

        Applying [In re Adoption of McCray, 331 A.2d 652, 655
        (Pa. 1975),] the provision for termination of parental rights
        based upon abandonment, now codified as § 2511(a)(1), we
        noted that a parent “has an affirmative duty to love, protect
        and support his child and to make an effort to maintain
        communication and association with that child.” [McCray,
        331 A.2d at 655].

                                 *    *    *

        Where the parent does not exercise reasonable firmness in
        declining to yield to obstacles, his other rights may be
        forfeited.

     In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 2012).

In re J.R.E., 218 A.3d 920, 925 (Pa. Super. 2019) (some citations omitted;

some formatting altered).

     Here, the trial court addressed Section 2511(a)(1) as follows:

     The evidence established under [Section 2511](a)(1) that “the
     parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six months
     immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has
     evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a
     child or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.” Most
     notably, for a period of thirty-nine (39) months—between July
     2019, when Mother voluntary relinquished custody of [] Child to
     the Agency and the filing of the [termination of parental rights]

                                     -8-
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       petition, on October 6, 2022—Mother failed to perform a
       substantial host of parental duties.

       At the initial adjudication hearing, Mother was directed to undergo
       a complete psychological evaluation with a parenting component
       and to follow all recommendations.         Dr. Rosen[2] thereafter
       completed the evaluation and specifically recommended, at the
       next permanency review hearing on October 24, 2019, that
       Mother undergo a number of programs to address her myriad
       issues borne of her own background of childhood trauma and
       abuse. The recommendations included that Mother get a bonding
       assessment, undergo partial hospitalization, attend programs at
       the Mental Health Association or the YWCA for Advocacy
       Education, become active with adult case management services
       [], and attend couples’ counseling with Father. Despite Mother’s
       false claims that Dr. Rosen only gave her a couple of
       recommendations, the record reflects that Mother was present in
       [c]ourt when Dr. Rosen made these recommendations and in fact
       asked a few questions of him at that proceeding. Mother failed to
       complete any of these recommendations and thus squandered this
       opportunity to potentially bolster her ability to fulfill her parental
       duties.

       This stage of the case was extremely important in [] Child’s life,
       as Mother was warned by Dr. Rosen, because [] Child would be
       developing caregiver attachment. Dr. [Rosen] conveyed his
       concern of the real possibility that [] Child would be bonding with
       his consistent caregivers (i.e. Foster Parents). Thus, a bonding
       assessment, with recommendations, was particularly critical at
       this stage of [] Child’s life.

       The [trial court] further note[d] that the evidence presented
       reflected that couples counseling was also particularly important
       in this case wherein Mother admitted in a number of social media
       posts that she was being abused by Father, including an incident
       where she claimed he had choked her.

       As detailed above, Mother failed in multiple ways to visit [] Child
       early in the case when her attachment to [] Child was very much
       in the balance. For example, just a few months into placement,
       in September 2019, Mother missed numerous supervised
____________________________________________

2 Dr. Howard Rosen was the psychologist who performed Mother’s
psychological evaluation as part of her court-ordered service plan objectives.
See Trial Ct. Op. at 14.

                                           -9-
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       visitation sessions at the Northern Dauphin facility despite being
       offered transportation and despite then living fairly close to that
       facility. A short time later, Mother failed to complete the Pressley
       Ridge parenting program (the first time around), missing five
       appointments between December 2019 and January 2020. As a
       result, Pressley Ridge unsuccessfully discharged her. Similarly, in
       March 2020, Mother was discharged from the YWCA Visitation
       Center for non-compliance after completing only a single visit.
       After COVID restrictions limited in-person visitation, she and
       Father both failed to consistently adhere to the remote visitation
       schedule set up with [] Foster Parents from the early part of 2020
       through the summer of 2020. At this point, [] Child had already
       been in placement for approximately one year and Mother was
       additionally squandering these vital opportunities to establish
       regular visitation and/or complete parenting training to address
       attachment issues, and to seek a bonding assessment, as was
       recommended by Dr. Rosen in order to get a professional
       evaluation and recommendations regarding her relationship with
       [] Child.

       In December 2020, [] Parents began supervised visitation with
       Pressley Ridge. This time, Mother was more amenable to the
       program and sustained her attendance. Originally, she was
       permitted only supervised visits with [] Child, later broadened to
       partial[] supervision. The visits were progressing to the point that
       the hearing officer at the July 29, 2021 permanency review
       hearing recommended increased visitation.             Mother never
       advanced far enough with Pressley Ridge, however, to obtain
       unsupervised visitation with [] Child despite [the] lengthy duration
       in that program. As noted, she was [] Child’s primary caregiver,
       as between Mother and Father.

       Even when a visitation occurred, there were problems noted by
       third parties. For instance, at a November 6, 2020 supervised
       visit at ChildFirst,[3] [] Child turned his back on [] Parents and
       mumbled and whined. When the supervisor asked [] Parents to
       come over to [] Child, Mother refused, a clearly inappropriate
       response to [] Child’s rejection of her. As a result of this incident,
       ChildFirst recommended to the Agency [that] Parents undergo
       parenting education. On July 29, 2021, while in the Agency
____________________________________________

3 ChildFirst Family Services provided supervision for some of Mother and
Father’s visits with Child. See e.g. Trial Ct. Op. at 6, 37, 44; Agency’s Pet.
for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, 10/6/22, at ¶ 41.

                                          - 10 -
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       waiting room prior to a permanency review hearing, a caseworker
       observed [] Parents having no interaction with [] Child and that []
       Parents left without saying goodbye to [] Child. This incident was
       relayed to the [GAL] who requested a bonding assessment, which
       was granted. In addition, there was credible evidence presented
       that daycare personnel and/or [] Foster Parents reported that []
       Child returned from parental visits without a fresh diaper or that
       he had not eaten properly. Caseworker [Kaminskie] credibly
       testified that she believed from her observations that [] Parents
       never really wanted to visit [] Child and that in Mother’s case, she
       appeared to treat visitation as an inconvenience.

       Beginning around August 2021, the tenor of the exchanges
       between [] Parents and [] Child dramatically changed to the point
       they became extremely traumatic and distressing to [] Child[].
       These emotional transitions, which Agency personnel testified
       were without precedent in their experience, occurred on at least
       nineteen (19) occasions through early January 2022, a period of
       only four months. While Father alone picked up [] Child on
       numerous occasions, Mother was also present for others and there
       is no evidence that her presence had any positive influence.

       The bonding assessments, completed on October 26, 2021,
       unequivocally reflected that Mother was failing to perform parental
       duties.    [Donna Mae] Fierras[4] found that [] Child had a
       disorganized attachment to Mother and Father and perceived both
       as sources of threat and distress, and that placement of [] Child
       with them would be detrimental to [] Child’s physical, emotional
       and mental health. [Ms.] Fierras found that Mother had the
       intellectual capacity to learn new skills and that she and Father
       needed PCIT to smooth any reintegration process as well as play
       therapy for [] Child.

       PCIT was later arranged with Dr. Allen,[5] however, Mother failed
       to attend the vast majority of the interactive therapy sessions
       throughout much of 2022, attending only three out of dozens of
       the sessions. PCIT was specifically designed to provide immediate
       feedback to Mother as to parenting skills so that she could care
____________________________________________

4 Ms. Fierras was the psychologist who conducted the bonding assessment.

See N.T. Hr’g, 2/27/23, at 21, 23.

5 Dr. Brian Allen conducted PCIT with Child, Mother, and Father.    See Trial Ct.
Op. at 11.

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      for [] Child without supervision, which was imperative given her
      primary caregiver status. Mother’s excuse, that she could not get
      to the sessions due to foot surgery, was not credible wherein the
      Agency offered evidence it would transport Mother to the sessions
      as needed and had confirmed that Dr. Allen’s office was wheelchair
      accessible. Mother failed to provide any medical evidence or
      excuse supporting her claim.

      Mother also failed to take the initiative to regularly contact []
      Foster Parents or the Agency over the life of the case to find out
      how Child was doing. What contacts were made were mostly
      initiated by Father. The record further reflected that Mother’s
      parental rights to her older child were terminated in October 2020
      and Mother thus was aware early in this case of the demands that
      would be made upon her to reunify with [] Child.

      Finally, the evidence also reflected Mother’s overall compliance
      with Agency objectives remained largely minimal or non-
      compliant throughout the life of the case. Mother’s primary
      caseworker credibly testified that Mother and Father had not
      worked very hard to reunify with [] Child, that she failed [to] see
      any attachment or a nurturing bond between them, and observed
      nothing beneficial to [] Child from his relationship with either
      parent. The caseworker also credibly testified that she had never
      seen either parent demonstrate an ability to care for [] Child
      independently or together as a couple, nor demonstrate a full
      understanding of what was needed to properly care for a child.

Trial Ct. Op. at 35-39 (some formatting altered).

      Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion or

error of law in the trial court’s conclusion that the Agency presented clear and

convincing evidence to support termination of Mother’s parental rights under

Section 2511(a)(1). See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

      The record reflects that, at the time of the termination hearing, Child

had been in the Agency’s care for forty-two months. See N.T. Hr’g, 2/27/23,

at 78.   Although Mother has been aware of her service plan objectives

throughout the life of the case, she has made only minimal progress towards

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reunification. Specifically, over a six-month period, Mother attended two PCIT

therapy sessions. Id. at 126. Further, the record reflects that Mother’s direct

communications with the Agency regarding Child’s well-being were limited to

approximately thirty times over a nearly four-year period. Id. at 127. Ms.

Kaminskie also testified that the Agency had concerns that Child was not being

fed appropriately during his visits with Mother and Father.         Id. at 125.

Therefore, we agree with the trial court that, for a period far in excess of the

six-month statutory minimum, Mother has refused to perform her parental

duties to Child. J.R.E., 218 A.3d at 925; T.J.J.M., 190 A.3d at 628.

      With respect to Mother’s explanation for her conduct, the record reflects

that Mother denied the Agency’s allegations. Specifically, in response to the

Agency’s allegation that Child would return from visits with Father and Mother

with a wet diaper or pullup, Mother testified that she and Father regularly

changed Child’s diaper as needed. See N.T. Hr’g, 3/2/23, at 21-22. Mother

also attributed issues with Child returning from visits with a wet diaper or

pullup to Child’s failure to communicate his needs. Id. at 22. Additionally,

Mother testified that she had initially attempted to keep in regular contact with

the Agency, however, Agency employees failed to promptly return her calls

and Mother alleged that Ms. Kaminskie would get “snippy” with her, so Mother

would “try to avoid that.” Id. at 16-17. Mother stated that Father would

communicate with the Agency on her behalf. Id. at 17. With regard to the

Agency’s allegation that she failed to comply with the recommendations

following her psychological evaluation, Mother testified that she was never

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notified of all of the recommendations. Id. at 17-18. Ultimately, the trial

court credited Ms. Kaminskie’s testimony that Mother “had not worked very

hard” to unify with Child. See Trial Ct. Op. at 39; N.T. Hr’g, 2/27/23, at 138;

see also S.P., 47 A.3d at 828 (stating that where a “parent does not exercise

reasonable firmness in declining to yield to obstacles, [her] other rights may

be forfeited” (citation omitted)).

       For these reasons, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court

in concluding that termination was appropriate under Section 2511(a)(1).6

See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 J.R.E., 218 A.3d at 925; T.J.J.M., 190 A.3d at

628. Accordingly, Mother is not entitled to relief.

                                   Section 2511(b)

       Mother also challenges the trial court’s conclusions concerning Section

2511(b). Specifically, Mother argues that the trial court erroneously “gave

great weight” to the bonding assessment conducted by Ms. Fierras. Mother’s

Brief at 15. Mother further argues that the bonding assessment used by Ms.

Fierras was “designed for children younger than [Child] was at the time, and

this was only the second assessment that [Ms.] Fierras performed.”          Id.

Additionally, Mother contends that while the trial court heard evidence

regarding Child’s negative reactions to visitations with Mother and Father,

“there was evidence of [] Child’s positive and happy reactions during visitation

____________________________________________

6 We reiterate that we need only agree with the trial court as to one subsection

of Section 2511(a). B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.

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that spanned over a long period of time during the dependency case which

suggests that [] Child and Mother possess a mother-son bond.” Id.

     Section 2511(b) provides as follows:

     (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
     of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
     physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
     of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
     environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
     income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
     control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
     to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
     efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
     which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
     filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

     This Court has explained:

     While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
     aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
     nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
     court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

     [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
     emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
     the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
     the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, . . . the
     trial court should consider the importance of continuity of
     relationships . . .

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)), abrogated in part on other

grounds by Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085 (Pa. 2023).

     Our Supreme Court has stated that “if the child has any bond with the

biological parent, the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which ‘is

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not always an easy task.’” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. In K.T., our Supreme

Court explained that “a court conducting the Section 2511(b) needs and

welfare analysis must consider more than proof of an adverse or detrimental

impact from severance of the parental bond.” Interest of K.T., 296 A.3d

1085, 1113 (Pa. 2023). Indeed, the parent-child bond analysis must include

“a determination of whether the bond is necessary and beneficial to the child,

i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s developmental, physical,

and emotional needs and welfare.” Id.

      “Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they

have a bond with their foster parents.”       T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268 (citation

omitted).   More specifically, courts must consider “the child’s need for

permanency and length of time in foster care[;] whether the child is in a

preadoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster

home meets the child’s developmental, physical and emotional needs,

including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.”

K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113.

      In weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b),

“courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” T.S.M., 71

A.3d at 269. “Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have

an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail .

. . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

      In the instant case, the trial court addressed Section 2511(b) as follows:

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      The overwhelming bonding evidence presented was that the
      termination of Mother’s parental rights will have no detrimental
      effect on [] Child whereas a severance of any bond between []
      Child and [] Foster Parents would be highly detrimental to [] Child.
      The evidence upon which [Ms.] Fierras based her conclusions was
      further corroborated by numerous other witnesses, including
      evidence of traumatic and highly distressing transitions with the
      Parents and [] Child, and the absence of a perceivable bond
      between them. Contrary to Mother’s argument, there was no
      credible evidence presented that termination of Mother’s
      [parental] rights would have a negative impact upon [] Child’s
      developmental, physical and emotional needs, and the welfare of
      [] Child. As noted, [Ms.] Fierras presented evidence that [] Child
      established predominantly secure and positive attachments or
      bonding with his Foster Parents and that [] Child would suffer
      harm if his bonds with [] Foster Parents were severed.

      . . . [T]he record strongly supported that [] Child’s developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare are best served by
      termination of Mother’s parental rights.

      Notably, [Ms.] Fierras presented credible evidence that [] Child
      “has a disorganized attachment to [Mother and Father] and
      perceives them as sources of threat and distress and that
      placement with his biological parents would be detrimental
      to [] Child’s physical, emotional and mental health.” With
      regard to Mother in particular, she did not represent a safe
      emotional space for [] Child.        The poor attachment and
      attachment style [Ms.] Fierras observed between [Mother, Father,
      and] Child is one typically seen of a child who has experienced
      trauma and does not feel physically or emotionally safe. She
      noted that this attachment style is characterized by fear and a
      sense of mistrust and as such, [] Child did not seek out either
      [Mother or Father] to meet his emotional needs.

Trial Ct. Op. at 41-42 (emphasis in original).

      Based on our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s conclusion that termination of Mother’s parental rights would

best serve Child’s needs and welfare. See K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113; T.S.M.,

71 A.3d at 267. As noted by the trial court, Ms. Fierras testified that she

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performed a bonding assessment involving Child. N.T. Hr’g, 2/27/23, at 21,

23.   As part of the bonding assessment, Ms. Fierras performed bonding

assessments for Father, Mother, and Foster Parents. Id. at 23. Ms. Fierras

concluded that Child had a “secure attachment” with Foster Parents. Id. at

25-26. Ms. Fierras further testified that removing Child from Foster Parents

“would not be in his best interests.” Id. at 35.

      Relating to Mother and Father, Ms. Fierras testified that Child’s bonding

was a “resistant disorganized attachment type.”      Id. at 49.    Ms. Fierras

specifically stated that such an attachment style “usually stems from poor

attachment, inconsistently being able to meet a child’s physical and/or

emotional needs, not being able to console a child for whatever reason, [and]

low nurturance[.]” Id. at 50. Ms. Fierras further concluded that Child, during

the bonding assessment, did not seek out Mother or Father to meet his

emotional or other instrumental needs, and she observed that Child did not

try to maintain contact with Mother and Father. Id. at 51-52. Ms. Fierras

opined that such an attachment style is “characterized by fear and mistrust

toward Mother and Father.”      Id. at 52.   As noted above, the trial court

concluded that “the record strongly supported that [] Child’s developmental,

physical and emotional needs and welfare are best served by termination of

Mother’s parental rights.” See Trial Ct. Op. at 42. For these reasons, we

conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it terminated

Mother’s parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b); K.T., 296 A.3d at 1113;

T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267.

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                                 GAL’s Motion

     In her final issue on appeal, Mother argues that the trial court abused

its discretion and committed an error of law by granting the GAL’s motion for

suspension of visitation without providing Mother with the opportunity to

respond. Mother’s Brief at 16.

     The Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure require that appellate

arguments include “discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed

pertinent.” Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a). Specifically, we have stated that “[w]e shall

not develop an argument for an appellant, nor shall we scour the record to

find evidence to support an argument[,]” as doing so “would place this Court

in the conflicting roles of advocate and neutral arbiter.” Trust Under Deed

of Wallace F. Ott, 271 A.3d 409, 421 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citations omitted).

“Appellate arguments which fail to adhere to these rules may be considered

waived, and arguments which are not appropriately developed are waived.”

Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).

     Here, Mother fails to provide this Court with any discussion of or citation

to relevant authority pertaining to her final issue on appeal. In fact, aside

from her general claim of trial court error in her point heading, Mother

provides no analysis or argument as to how or why the trial court erred when

it granted the GAL’s motion for suspension of visitation. See Mother’s Brief

at 16.   Rather, Mother’s argument is little more than a recitation of the

relevant procedural history regarding the GAL’s motion. Id. We find that

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Mother has not sufficiently developed this issue for appellate review;

therefore, the issue is waived on appeal. See Trust of Ott, 271 A.3d at 421;

Coulter, 94 A.3d at 1088. Accordingly, Mother is not entitled to relief. For

these reasons we affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental

rights to Child, L.E.J.P.

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 11/20/2023

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