Court Opinion

ID: 9567314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:52:09.764663+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:32.289375
License: Public Domain

McCOMB, J.
I dissent. I would affirm the judgments for the reasons expressed by Mr. Justice Fourt in the opinion prepared by him for the Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, and concurred in by Mr. Presiding Justice Wood and Justice Lillie, which is quoted in full below:
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery.
In an information filed in Los Angeles County on June 16, 1965, defendant, with Russell Gordon, was charged in count I with kidnaping Homer Coran on May 29, 1965, for the purpose of robbery and it was alleged that at the time of the commisison of the offense the defendants were armed with a deadly weapon, to wit, a .32 caliber automatic pistol. In count II defendant, with Russell Gordon, was charged with robbing Homer Coran on May 29, 1965, of $59 and it was alleged that at the time of the commission of the offense the defendants were armed with a deadly weapon, namely, a .32 caliber automatic pistol. Appellant here, Carter, was the only defendant at the trial with which we are here concerned. In a jury trial he was found guilty as charged and, further, it was found that he was armed at the time of his arrest.
*674On June 22, 1965, appellant was brought before the court for arraignment and requested a continuance to June 25, 1965, to allow him time to employ counsel. On June 25, 1965, the public defender was appointed to represent appellant and his codefendant Gordon. On July 1, 1965, each of the defendants, with their counsel present, pleaded not guilty and trial was set for August 10th, 1965. On August 10, 1965, the defendants moved for a continuance of the trial to August 17, 1965, to enable them to secure private counsel. On August 17th, 1965, defendant Gordon appeared with the public defender as counsel and appellant appeared with William Leeds as his attorney. A motion was made by appellant to substitute Leeds as his attorney and the same was granted. Each defendant made a motion to continue the trial date to September 21, 1965. On September 21, 1965, appellant was present in court with his attorney, William Leeds. Attorney Jermiah was substituted as counsel for appellant in place of William Leeds. On motion of defendants the trial was continued to October 19, 1965. On October 19, 1965, a motion by the appellant for a continuance was denied. The motion of attorney J. Casselman to substitute out as the attorney of record for appellant was denied. Appellant thereupon made a motion to substitute himself as his own attorney and that motion was denied. Trial of appellant was transferred to Department Southwest E forthwith. In the latter named department, on October 19,1965, the case was called for trial at 1:52 p.m. and attorney R. Adieu of the firm of Adíen and Casselman made a motion that he be relieved as attorney of record and that appellant be substituted in propria persona. Such motion was granted. Outside of the hearing of the prospective jurors appellant’s motion for a continuance was denied, “it having first been established that the Defendant was competent to represent himself. ’ ’
Mr. Adíen stated to the court after the granting of the motion to relieve him from representing the appellant that “the defendant would request the privilege to use the law library as he is incarcerated.” The judge replied, “I don’t know how we can do that. We will try and work it out some way.” and continuing, “All right. In other words, Mr. Carter, you want to represent yourself ? ’ ’ and Carter replied, “Yes, sir.” The judge then said, “So you join in the motion to release your lawyer from further responsibility in the proceedings ? ’’ and Carter said, “Yes, sir. ’’
Inquiry was then made about Carter’s age and schooling; *675it was ascertained that he was thirty years of age and a high-school graduate. When asked if he felt that he was capable of representing himself, he said, “Yes, I do, if I am granted the use of the law library.” He was fully aware of the seriousness of the crimes with which he was charged. The court found that Carter was “capable of defending himself” and proceeded with the trial.
Outside of the hearing of the prospective jurors Carter stated that he wanted time to go to the law library to review the ease before he went to trial. The judge indicated that it was too late and called attention to the fact that the arraignment was in June 1965. Carter then indicated that it would be impossible for him to defend himself without permission to use the law library. The judge properly advised Carter that he, Carter, had brought the entire situation onto himself; that he, Carter, had been told that the ease was going to trial, that he had a lawyer who was ready and able to represent him and that he, Carter, had “fired” his lawyer that very day. A jury was selected and the cause proceeded to trial.
The prosecution called two witnesses, the victim, a taxi-cab driver, and an arresting police officer. The victim positively identified Carter as the man who had placed a gun close to his head and demanded his money and, further, as one of the men who had directed at gunpoint that he get into the passenger or right seat of his taxi-cab. He said that thereafter one of the men held a gun pointed at him while the other drove the cab away. The victim identified the gun found in Carter’s possession as being like the one used in the robbery and the kidnaping. He testified that several blocks from where the robbery occurred, defendants caused the cab to stop, directed the victim to undress and had him get into the trunk of the cab; that he, the victim, later, and after Gordon and Carter left the scene, extricated himself from the trunk of the cab, called his dispatcher, who, in turn, called the police. Approximately $59 in money was taken from the victim by Carter. One of the bills or currency was torn at one of the corners. "When the police arrived, the victim gave them a complete description of the men who had robbed and kidnaped him.
Officer Munoz testified that shortly after receiving the police radio call about the robbery, he and his partner saw two men who matched the description of the robbers hurrying across a street intersection. The officers stopped the men shortly thereafter and conducted a weapon search during which they found a Colt .32 automatic pistol in the rear hip *676pocket of Carter. The gun was loaded with live ammunition in the magazine and chamber and was ready to fire. The gun was taken from Carter, a further search was conducted and some currency was taken from the pants of Carter. The victim identified some of the currency taken from Carter as being some of the currency taken from him in the robbery. A police lineup was conducted and the victim identified Carter and his codefendant as being the robbers and kidnapers.
Carter was asked at the trial if he desired to ask the officer any questions and he declined, saying:
“The Dependant: Tour Honor, I would like to put in the record that I refuse to ask the witnesses any questions in any way or participate in any way such as this because I am not qualified to, and I didn’t intend to defend myself pro per today because I intended to have time to prepare myself for this particular trial. ’'
The judge replied:
“The Court: Well, Mr. Carter, that just isn’t a true statement. Here on June 22 you appeared at that time. You asked for a lawyer and so the Public Defender’s Office appointed a lawyer for you, and on June 22 they asked for a continuance at that time so that you could • produce. any other facts or whatever you wanted to do.

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“The Court: And it was continued until June 25. Then at that time the trial was asked to be continued again and the trial was continued again—continued again until August 10 so they could comply with your request. Then on August 10 it was continued again. It was continued until August 17. Then at that time you said you wanted to change lawyers so you did. You changed lawyers and you hired a Mr. William Leeds, so Mr. Leeds then represented you, and he asked for—that the trial be continued, and the Court granted your request and it continued it again, and it continued it until September 21. Then at that time we came on for trial on September 21. You wanted the case continued. You didn’t want to go to trial and you said you wanted to change lawyers, so you did. The Court granted you an opportunity to change the lawyers. You did. You changed the lawyers again, and a lawyer named Mr. James Casselman was appointed as your lawyer, and then the case was continued again, and it was continued again until October 19. That’s today.
*677“The Court: Then on today you come on for trial today. You have had the benefit now of three different lawyers and you come on today now and then when you get ready to try it, you advise that you want to dismiss the lawyer that appeared here today, too.
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‘ ‘ The Court : So we have done—every posible legal advice has been given to you, everything we can possibly do. Then you ask for permission to use the library, so I tell you all right, you designate, tell us what you want out of the library and we will get it for you. We have it right here and I will get it for you, but there wasn’t anything that you designated so I don’t think there is anything we can possibly do that we haven’t already done to give you every opportunity to. Now, is there anything you want to ask this witness right here ?
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'‘ The Court : Is there anything you want to ask this witness here ?’ ’
Carter responded by saying:
“The Dependant : I refuse to ask the witness any questions. I would like not to be asked to participate in the trial whatsoever because I am not qualified. ’ ’
The judge then dismissed the policeman from further attendance at the trial. The prosecution rested its case and at 3 :30 p.m. the matter was continued to the following day at 9 :30 a.m. On the next day Carter offered no testimony in his behalf. The cause was argued. The jury retired to deliberate at 10 :05 a.m. and returned with a verdict of guilty as charged in the information and further found that Carter was armed at the time of his arrest. A time of sentence and the hearing of a report of the probation officer was set. At that hearing the judge noted:
“The Court: Very well. I have read the probation report and it is very unfavorable. It starts with a number of actions going back as far as 1953, some in '55, ’56, some in ’57, ’58, ’60, ’61, ’62, ’64, '65. It will be the sentence of this Court that the request for probation be denied, that the defendant be sentenced to the State Prison for a term to be fixed by the Adult Authority. ’ ’
Carter was sentenced on November 22, 1965, for the crime of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery (Pen. Code, § 209) as charged in count I of the information, “defendant having *678been found armed as alleged.” No sentence was imposed for the robbery charges.
Appellant has appealed from the “judgment made and entered ... on the 20th day of October . . . 1965 and from the whole thereof.” The verdict of the jury was returned on October 20, 1965, but the judgment was made on November 22, 1965. We assume that the appeal is from the judgment of November 22, 1965.
Appellant now asserts that he did not make an intelligent waiver of counsel, that the jury found that he was armed at the time of his arrest while the information charged that he was armed at the time of the commission of the offenses.
No useful purpose would be served in again relating or listing the numerous continuances and the changes of attorneys in this case. Suffice it to say that appellant clearly stated that he wanted to represent himself. In People v. Thomas, 58 Cal.2d 121, 131-132 [23 Cal.Rptr. 161, 373 P.2d 97], it is appropriately said:
“It is manifest that no abuse of discretion can be charged to the court in bringing the matter to trial when it did. ‘To hold that a defendant charged with crime has an absolute right to counsel of his own selection, with unlimited right to insist upon continuances of his trial, would be subversive of the prompt administration and execution of the laws—upon which depends largely their effectiveness. It is at once apparent that the trial court must in the nature of things have some control over such matters, to the end that judicial business may be dispatched in an orderly manner; and if it has any discretion it is apparent to us that such discretion was not abused in this particular instance.’ [Citations.] On at least two prior occasions defendant’s statements to the court that he was proceeding in propria persona and did not want appointed counsel constituted waivers of his right thereto. ‘The right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the constitutional and statutory provisions, like any other legal right, may be invoked only in the course of orderly procedure. A defendant who, with an intelligent conception of the consequences of his act, declines the aid of counsel prior to or at the commencement of his trial, is not entitled thereafter to interrupt and delay the hearing at any stage he deems advantageous merely to interpose a demand for legal assistance. [Citations.] When petitioner stated at the time of his arraignment that he did not need an attorney, the court was justified in taking him at his word [citations]. His attitude, both at *679that time and at the commencement of the trial, was equivalent to a final declination of counsel. . . .’ [Citation.] In the instant case it cannot be said that the waiver was not comprehended and understood by defendant. [Citation.] ”
And in People v. Ortiz, 195 Cal.App.2d 112, 116-117 [15 Cal.Rptr. 398], it is stated -.
“. . . It has been declared to be a 'sound concept that it is the duty of the court to safeguard and promote the orderly •and expeditious conduct of its business and to guard against inept procedures and unnecessary indulgences which would tend to hinder, hamper or delay the conduct and dispatch of its proceedings. ’ [Citations.] ”
It is clear in this case that appellant was deliberately stalling, procrastinating and seeking one continuance after another to delay the trial of the cause. It was no abuse of discretion to refuse to further coddle appellant. There was no incapacity of counsel, indeed on the day of trial counsel was present and apparently ready to go to trial and appellant agreed that counsel should be relieved from representing him. If appellant was not prepared for trial, he should not have permitted the discharge of his then attorney. It was on the date of trial some four months after the arraignment when appellant made his last motion for a continuance. The People are entitled to some considerations in the disposition of criminal matters.
As heretofore stated, appellant was sentenced for the crime as charged in count I, kidnaping for the purpose of robbery. The information recited that appellant was armed at the time of the commission of the offense. The verdicts recite:
“We, the Jury in the above entitled action, find the Defendant Roy Leroy Carter guilty of violation of Section 209, Penal Code (Kidnaping for the Purpose of Robbery), a felony as charged in Count I of the information.
This 20 day of October 1965 W R JONES [s]
Foreman
Verdict (Guilty) ”
“We, the Jury in the above entitled action, find the charge against the Defendant Roy Leroy Carter of having been armed at the time of his arrest as contained in Count I (Kidnap) of the (Information true.
•(-Indictment
This 20 day of October 1965 W. R. JONES [s]
Foreman”
*680The charge in the information included the charge that appellant was at the time of the commission of the offense armed with a deadly weapon, a .32 caliber automatic pistol. The requisites of Penal Code section 1158a were fulfilled. (See People v. Flohr, 30 Cal.App.2d 576, 581 [86 P.2d 862] ; People v. Ahouse, 162 Cal.App.2d 586, 588-589 [328 P.2d 227] ; People v. Cooks, 235 Cal.App.2d 6, 14-15 [44 Cal.Rptr. 819].)
The uncontradieted evidence demonstrates that appellant was in fact armed with the automatic pistol at the time of the kidnaping and the robbery and at the time of his arrest.