Court Opinion

ID: 9576166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:21:23.166391+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:01:26.773252
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe the trial court was absolutely correct in granting summary judgment to appellee. I therefore respectfully dissent.
The uncontroverted facts are as follows: Appellant, a certified welder, was hired by Jack Heaton Erectors to work at Six Flags with another Heaton employee, Henry Buster Newmon. Cecil Hale, a Heaton company supervisor introduced appellant and Newmon to Nelson Boyd, mechanical engineer at Six Flags. Boyd had an agreement with Heaton Erectors under which appellant and Newmon were to work under the supervision of Boyd or one of his designees. The agreement placed control of the day to day work assignments in the hands of Six Flags. Appellant and Newmon reported directly to Six Flags, and Boyd or his designee had the power to discharge appellant or Newmon from work at Six Flags. Heaton company supervisor Hale made periodic checks with Six Flags to determine whether appellant and Newmon were performing in a satisfactory manner. On the date of the injury, appellant and Newmon were welding in the Six Flags “shop.” However, one of the *460Mind Bender ride trains had become stuck in the “barrel” portion of the Mind Bender. Appellant and Newmon were instructed to cease welding and ride over to the Mind Bender structure, where they were to help the Six Flags crew dislodge the ride train. Appellant and Newmon were instructed to climb the Mind Bender structure and assist in rigging a cable to the ride train. A Six Flags employee assisted them on the structure. David Bryan, from his position on the ground, supervised and directed the entire operation. While appellant was on the structure, a cable snapped, causing him to fall and injure himself.
“The real test by which to determine whether a person was acting as the servant of another at the time of the infliction of an injury by him is to ascertain whether at the particular time when the injury was inflicted he was subject to the other person’s orders and control, and was liable to be discharged from the particular employment for disobedience of orders or misconduct. Brown v. Smith, 86 Ga. 277 (12 SE 411, 22 Am. St. Rep. 456). ‘One person may be taken to have been the servant of another in respect of a given transaction, although he did not occupy that position for all purposes. In order to establish the relationship, it is merely necessary to show that he was a servant as regards the particular piece of work in which he was engaged at the time when he sustained or inflicted the injury complained of... The special master is alone liable to third persons for injuries caused by such wrongful acts as the special servant may commit in the course of his employment.’ LaBatt on Master & Servant (2d ed.), § 42.” (Emphasis supplied.) Reaves v. Columbus Electric &c. Co., 32 Ga. App. 140, 148 (122 SE 824) (1924); Adams v. Johnson, 88 Ga. App. 94 (1) (76 SE2d 135) (1953). “The law as to lent employees is well settled, the test being (1) that the special master must have complete control and direction of the servant for the occasion; (2) that the general master must have no such control; (3) that the special master must have the exclusive right to discharge the servant, to put another in his place or to put him to other work.” (Emphasis supplied.) Fulghum Industries v. Pollard Lumber Co., 106 Ga. App. 49, 52 (126 SE2d 432) (1962); Pilcher v. Wise Electric Co., 129 Ga. App. 92, 93 (198 SE2d 713) (1973).
Appellant contends a question of fact exists as to whether he was a borrowed servant of appellee because of the following averment contained in his affidavit: “While at Six-Flags, any needed job assignments were given by the Six-Flags supervisor to Buster Newman [sic], my foreman, and Newman [sic] would then give me the work assignments. I did not have to receive or obey any orders from any Six-Flags employees or supervisors.” I find this position untenable. Although appellant’s affidavit states that he “did not *461have to receive or obey any orders from any Six-Flags employees or supervisors . . .”, “the trial court is bound by the facts presented in affidavits, depositions, etc., and not the conclusions stated therein.” Varnadoe v. State Farm Automobile Ins. Co., 112 Ga. App. 366, 368 (145 SE2d 104) (1965); Hyman v. Horwitz, 148 Ga. App. 647, 649 (252 SE2d 74) (1979). In the instant case, the conclusory statement in appellant’s affidavit must yield to appellant’s own deposition testimony setting forth the sequence of events at the time of injury. Appellant testified: “Q. Who was in charge of saying what’s going to be done here and here (indicating)? A. I believe David Brian [sic] was — he was there. Q. Well, did you — did you actually hear David Brian [sic] giving orders? A. I am — now, I am not sure. They already had knew [sic] what they were going to do. Q. Who is they? A. Six Flags employees, when we got over there — when we went over there with them, they knew what they were going to do. Q. And you just did what they told you to do? A. Right, voluntarily, we just did what they said do.”(Emphasis supplied.)
The remaining averment upon which this appeal is based, that “job assignments were given by the Six-Flags supervisor to Buster Newman [sic], my foreman, and Newman [sic] would then give me the work assignments,” also fails to raise a genuine issue of material fact. Appellant’s general statement concerning “job assignments” has no legal significance in view of appellant’s own sworn testimony that David Bryan and other Six Flags personnel were in complete charge of both appellant and Newmon at the time of injury. See Brewer v. Southeast Fidelity Ins. Co., 147 Ga. App. 562, 564 (249 SE2d 668) (1978); Backus v. Ray Jones, Inc., 150 Ga. App. 753, 755 (258 SE2d 693) (1979). Nowhere in the record is appellant’s testimony controverted by “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” CPA § 56 (e) (Code Ann. § 81A-156 (e)); Dunaway v. North Georgia Co., 150 Ga. App. 66 (256 SE2d 669) (1979). “ Tt is the duty of each party to present his case in full at the hearing on motion for summary judgment. [Cit.]’ Colodny v. Dominion Mtg. &c., 141 Ga. App. 139, 141 (232 SE2d 601).” Baker v. C. & S. Nat. Bank, 147 Ga. App. 188, 189 (248 SE2d 224) (1978).
I conclude that at the time of the injury appellant was appellee’s “borrowed servant,” as this term is defined in U. S. Fidelity &c. Co. v. Forrester, 230 Ga. 182, 183 (196 SE2d 133) (1973). In my view, the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to appellee was clearly correct. I therefore cannot join in the erroneous conclusion reached by the majority in this case.