Court Opinion

ID: 9789239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:31:18.918347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:20.739554
License: Public Domain

Judge TAUBMAN
dissenting.
Because I would conclude that plaintiff, Russel M. Boles, was denied due process at his disciplinary hearing since he was not allowed to cross-examine the complaining officer about her alleged anti-semitism, I respectfully dissent.
As the majority notes, plaintiff was found to have violated a provision of the Code of Penal Discipline (COPD) of the Department of Corrections entitled, "Abuse of Medication," a class II, Rule 14 violation. The charge was based on the alleged discovery of two prescription pills in a dental floss container on a shelf in his assigned footlocker. At the hearing, three witnesses testified: (1) a prison official who simply related the charging incident report filed against plaintiff, (2) the complaining officer, who testified that she found the two pills in plaintiff's dental floss container, and (8) plaintiff, who denied the allegations against him. Because there were no other witnesses, the case turned on the issue of credibility.
Plaintiff sought to impeach the complaining officer's credibility, inter alia, because of her alleged anti-semitism. The hearing officer refused to allow plaintiff to conduct any cross-examination on these issues, advising plaintiff that if he had any concerns about the propriety of the complaining officer's conduct he should raise them at a grievance hearing.
I. Applicable Law
In a C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4) proceeding, review is limited to whether the governmental body's decision was an abuse of discretion or was made without jurisdiction. An abuse of discretion occurs, as relevant here, when an agency misinterprets or misapplies governing law. See Gallegos v. Garcia, 155 P.3d 405, 406 (Colo.App.2006).
In Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 563, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974), the seminal procedural due process case involving prison inmates, the Supreme Court held that the limited due process rights to which inmates are entitled are advance written notice of an alleged violation, the ability to call witnesses and present documentary evidence when not unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals, and a written statement of the evidence relied on and the reasons for the disciplinary action taken. The Wolff Court declined to hold inmates' due process rights extended to confrontation or cross-examination of witnesses. However, the Wolff Court acknowledged that there was "a narrow range of cases where interest balancing may well dictate cross-examination. . .." Id. at 568-69, 94 S.Ct. 2963; Smith v. Mass. Dep't of Corr., 936 F.2d 1390, 1399 (1st Cir.1991).
Later, as the majority notes, in Ponte v. Real, 471 U.S. 491, 497, 105 S.Ct. 2192, 85 L.Ed.2d 553 (1985), the Supreme Court ree-ognized that prison officials "may be required to explain, in a limited manner, the reasons why witnesses were not allowed to testify," "but so long as the reasons are logically related to preventing undue hazards to 'institutional safety or correctional goals, the explanation should meet the due process requirements as outlined in Wolff."
When an agency creates procedures for review, due process of law requires the agency to adhere to those procedures even if they exceed what is constitutionally required. Dep't of Health v. Donahue, 690 P.2d 243, 249 (Colo.1984); Williams v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 926 P.2d 110, 112 (Colo.App.1996).
Thus, I believe that defendants were required to comply with the due process protections provided by Colorado's prison regu*190lations even in light of the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 115 S.Ct. 2293, 132 L.Ed.2d 418, which limited the creation of liberty interests protected by due process when those asserted liberty interests were established by internal prison regulations. In Sandin, the court held that "these interests will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which ... imposes a typical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidence of prison life." Id. at 484, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Significantly, this language does not limit liberty interests to the above-described cireumstances. Further, reither the district court, nor the defendants on appeal assert that Sandin is a barrier to plaintiff's due process claim.
Additionally, other appellate courts have found due process violations of inmates' rights without addressing Sundin. See, e.g., Howard v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 487 F.3d 808 (10th Cir.2007) (prison officials violated inmate's due process rights by refusing to produce and review videotape of alleged assault for inmate's use at disciplinary hearing, which inmate asserted would refute charges against him); Piggie v. McBride, 277 F.3d 922 (7th Cir.2002) (inmate's due process rights were violated by prison official's refusal to view or permit him access to surveillance tape that inmate said was exculpatory); Ayers v. Ryan, 152 F.3d 77 (2d Cir.1998) (prison official violated inmate's due process rights by failing without rational explanation to obtain the testimony of witnesses requested by inmate during disciplinary hearing).
In any event, the Sandin Court stated that prisoners retained their right to invoke the First Amendment where appropriate and could draw on state judicial review where available. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 487 n. 11, 115 S.Ct. 2293. Here, the underlying basis of plaintiffs claim is alleged violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of his religion.
Several federal courts have allowed inmates to pursue freedom of religion claims, concluding that they are not barred by Son-din. See Davis v. Biller, 41 Fed.Appx. 845 (7th Cir.2002) (not selected for publication) (Sandin did not apply to inmate's First Amendment claim that he was denied access to his Bible and to religious services while in segregation); Nyholm v. Pryce, 2009 WL 1106528 (D.N.J. No. 08-4824 RMB, Apr. 20, 2009) (unpublished order) (inmate could pursue claim that he was prohibited from attending religious services during confinement in administrative segregation); see also Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220 (3d Cir.2000) (inmate's claim that he was kept in administrative segregation in retaliation for filing civil rights suits against prison officials was not foreclosed by Sandin ).
In any event, even if plaintiff's claim is not viable under the Due Process Clause, I would still conclude that defendants abused their discretion by incorrectly applying the prison regulations discussed below. See Gallegos v. Garcia, 155 P.3d 405, 406-08 (Colo.App.2006) (inmate may obtain relief under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(d) when prison officials misinterpret or misapply prison regulations).
The Department of Corrections has promulgated detailed regulations concerning the presentation of witness testimony at disciplinary hearings. One regulation provides, "[Tlhe offender should be permitted to offer explanation, defense, or rebuttal to the charge.... An offender's defense should be relevant to the specific charge and may be limited at the discretion of the hearing officer or board." DOC Admin. Reg. 150-O1(IV)(E)(B)@(2). As relevant here, the regulations also provide that an offender should have the right to request the testimony of witnesses at the hearing and that DOC employees should cooperate with all hearing officers' requests to testify. Further, "witnesses may be limited by the hearing officer . if their testimony is determined to be irrelevant, incompetent, or unduly repetitious and that determination is documented in the record. The offender may request testimony of persons who witnessed and/or investigated the violations charged, whenever feasible." DOC Admin. Reg. 150-01[IV)(E)®)()(QM). An additional regulation provides, "In no event should an accused offender, or his representative be allowed to question, or to continue addressing questions to a witness, when it appears that the questions are primarily intended to harass the witness or are unduly *191repetitious or irrelevant." DOC Admin. Reg. 150-01(IV)(E)(8)G)(8).
Because DOC has promulgated these procedures, they establish the requirements of due process at prison disciplinary hearings.
II. Analysis
At the disciplinary hearing, plaintiff indicated that he wished to question the complaining officer about her credibility because he recognized that this case involved his word against hers. The hearing officer immediately responded that he would not allow any such testimony, and that he would limit plaintiff's questions to those about the charged incident. He commented, "When you start saying you're going to question [her] on eredibility, I guess what I'm looking at is that you're going to harass her." Plaintiff denied that was his intention and indicated that he wanted to ask the complaining officer questions "like how she feels about [his] Judaism." Again, the hearing officer indicated that he would not allow such questions. Plaintiff then responded that the complaining officer had previously taken items out of his locker like matzah and "some religious stuff." 1
Once again, the hearing officer advised plaintiff that if he had any concerns about items taken from his cell, he was required to pursue them at a grievance hearing. The hearing officer added that he was not going to allow plaintiff to "harass the staff member" or ask her irrelevant questions.
In my view, the hearing officer violated plaintiff's due process rights and abused his discretion in not allowing plaintiff to ask any questions of the complaining officer concerning her alleged anti-semitism. Because this case turned on credibility, it was important for plaintiff to have an opportunity to establish that the complaining officer was biased against him because of his Jewish faith,. If plaintiff could have shown that matzah and other religious items had been improperly taken from his cell, this evidence would have supported plaintiff's contention that the hearing officer was biased against him and falsely accused him of the abuse of medication offense.2 Thus, the hearing officer erred in concluding that such evidence was irrelevant.
In criminal proceedings, the ability to impeach a witness by bias is broad. People v. Sommers, 200 P.3d 1089, 1096, (Colo.App.2008). Further, motive is "always relevant to the question whether one did what is alleged against him and to the reason why" and "[the previous relations of the parties to any transaction may have been sufficient to excite motive." Wagman v. Knorr, 69 Colo. 468, 470, 195 P. 1034, 1035 (1921); see also Belden v. State, 73 P.3d 1041, 1083 (Wyo.2003) (proof of motive is always relevant and admissible, particularly where the intent of the accused is at issue or the accused denies the commission of the crime).
Here, of course, the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses is necessarily cir-cumseribed because of the prison environment. However, the regulations quoted above do not preclude all eross-examination. Rather, an accused offender should not be allowed to question or continue addressing questions to a witness "when it appears that the questions are primarily intended to harass the witness or are unduly repetitious or irrelevant." DOC Admin. Reg. 150-01(IV)(E)B))GB).
Here, plaintiff's proposed cross-examination was not irrelevant, repetitious, or ha-rasging. Plaintiff questioned the complaining officer during the hearing, but was complete*192ly prohibited from asking her any questions about her alleged anti-semitism. As noted above, such a line of questioning would have been relevant. To the extent that there was a valid concern about such questioning being repetitious, the hearing officer could exercise his discretion to limit the extent and manner of such questions.
In my view, plaintiff's proposed questions regarding the hearing officer's alleged antisemitism could not be considered harassment.
In construing an administrative rule or regulation, we apply the same rules of construction as we do when interpreting a statute. See Woolsey v. Colo. Dep't of Corrections, 66 P.3d 151, 153 (Colo.App.2002). When the statute or regulatory scheme does not define a word, it is appropriate to look to the dictionary definition of that term. See Tidwell v. City & Cty. of Denver, 83 P.3d 75, 82 (Colo.2003) (because statute did not define "pursuit," court looked to dictionary to determine its plain and ordinary meaning).
Harassment is defined as "words, conduct or action (usually repeated or persistent) that, being directed at a specific person, annoys, alarms, or causes substantial emotional distress in that person and serves no legitimate purpose." Black's Law Dictionary 733 (8th ed.2004). Plaintiffs intended questions were intended to serve the legitimate purpose of challenging the complaining officer's credibility. It is difficult for me to conclude that a proposed line of questioning would necessarily be considered harassment, particularly when no questions at all had been asked. As noted above, if plaintiff had been allowed to question the complaining officer about her alleged anti-semitism, the hearing officer could have limited such questions so that they would not be harassing. Indeed, during the initial colloquy at the hearing, plaintiff advised the hearing officer that he did not intend to directly ask the complaining officer if she was prejudiced against him because of his religion. Accordingly, he recognized that the questions he desired to ask could not be asked in a harassing manner.
Finally, recognizing a prison's legitimate interest in curtailing testimony that would be hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals, I cannot conclude that a blanket prohibition against testimony about alleged anti-semitism is warranted. Otherwise, prison officials could persecute inmates on religious grounds, limited only by an inmate's possible relief in a grievance proceeding or civil rights case. See Boles v. Neet, 486 F.3d 1177 (10th Cir.2007) (when prison regulation impinges on an inmate's constitutional rights, it is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests; plaintiff here, Russell Boles, established in that case that prison officials did not establish a legitimate penological interest for regulation that prohibited him from being transported from prison to hospital for eye surgery wearing Jewish religious garments). The legitimate interest in institutional safety and correctional goals does not justify decisions in every instance in favor of prison officials, as recognized by the numerous cases cited by the majority, in which courts have found due process violations in other cireumstances. See Villa v. Gunter, 862 P.2d 1033, 1034 (Colo.App.1993); see also Howard, 487 F.3d at 814 (rejecting prison officials' contention that production of incident videotape would be "unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals"); Substantive Rights Retained by Prisoners, 37 Georgetown L.J. Ann. Rev. Crim. Proc. 944, 975-77 (2008).
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent. Because I would reverse on this issue, I do not address the other alleged errors asserted by plaintiff.

. At the hearing, plaintiff did not identify what other religious items were allegedly taken from him, but in his brief on appeal, he asserts that the complaining officer had taken his phylacteries. Phylacteries, also known as tefillin, are "leather boxes with attached leather straps containing passages from the Torah that are used in Jewish prayer" by Conservative and Orthodox Jews. See Searles v. Bruce, 216 Fed.Appx. 812, 813 n. 2 (10th Cir.2007) (not selected for publication); see also Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1705 (2002) (defining "phylactery").

. Phylacteries are "allowable personal faith property" and matzah is an allowable faith item of group property, which inmates may have or use in specified circumstances. See DOC Admin. Reg. 800-01(IV)(Q)-(R). While DOC employees may search personal faith property, they must treat such property with professional respect. DOC Admin. Reg. 800-01(IV)(P).