Court Opinion

ID: 9865963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 23:55:34.355562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:08:23.282203
License: Public Domain

On the Merits.
No good purpose could be served by entering into an extended discussion of *821tlio testimony of the various witnesses in the case. It is sufficient to say that a very careful analysis of all the evidence leads us to the conclusion that the driver of the plaintiff’s car was proceeding at a slow rate of speed in a northerly direction on the right side of the road; that he was slowing down preparatory to making a left turn into a driveway and that when he was approximately one hundred feet from this driveway the left rear fender of the car he was driving was struck by the right front bumper or right front -part of the truck as it attempted to pass; that the driver of the car held out his hand to signal for the left turn. It is further our opinion that the cause of the accident was the fact that the truck was being driven too close to the forward car and at an excessive rate of speed taking into consideration its proximity to this car, together with the failure of the driver to notice the signal and the slowing down motion of plaintiff’s car in preparation for the left turn. Under our conception of the evidence the driver of the truck did not sound his horn or give any other signal to call attention of the driver of the forward car to his intention to pass nor did he observe the other precautions required for passing by Rule 7 of Section 3 of Act 286 of 1938. We hold with the Judge of the lower Court that the collision between the car of plaintiff and the truck of defendant was caused solely by the negligence of the driver of defendant's truck and that, therefore, defendant is liable for whatever damages may have been suffered by plaintiff.
The counsel for defendant strenuously urges that since the plaintiff swore falsely on the trial of the case with reference to certain claims for damages, not only should all of his testimony be disregarded, but his entire claim should be rejected. We. know of no legal authority for such action. The maxim “falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus” is, like many other maxims, not wholly correct either in ordinary affairs of life or judicial proceedings. The true rule is that if a witness wilfully testifies falsely to a material fact and there is no circumstance in the case tending to corroborate his evidence, the Courts have the right to reject all of his uncorroborated evidence as unworthy of credit; but they should not reject such portions of it as may be corroborated by other unobjectionable evidence in the cause. R. C. L. Vol. 28, page 660. Courts have the right to accept plausible portions of a litigant’s testimony and reject any portions of it that appear to the contrary. Santos v. Duvic, 16 La.App. 105, 133 So. 399.
The plaintiff files in evidence an itemized statement of the repairs made necessary to his car by reason of the accident and the costs thereof. There is no evidence to the contrary in the record, and we see no reason why this testimony should be rejected by reason of the possible unreliability of his evidence as to the other damages. This item of damage is sufficiently proved.
As regards the proof of the damage suffered by reason of the loss of the use of his car, we feel constrained to say that the evidence is utterly insufficient to prove this item with any legal certainty. The testimony of the plaintiff in this regard is to say the least uncertain and unsatisfactory. In his petition,- he claims $540 for the loss of the use of his car for fifty-four days at ten dollars ($10) per day. On the trial he stated that he rented another car for fifty-four days at five dollars ($5) per day, which would amount to $270, and then he testified that he paid $400 for rent for a car for his wife to use in her job as a welfare worker. Being pressed under cross-examination, he finally stated that he paid $150 cash for the rent of another car but he did not produce the witness Smith, who lived at Hammond, to whom he claimed to have paid this amount, nor did he produce any testimony to show that the necessary repairs to the car required any particular number of days within which to be done. As regards the item for $150 general damage to the car, we find no evidence on which to base a judgment. As to this latter item, plaintiff claims that the doors and trunk of the car will not close and that the cardboard back of the upholstering is torn and he estimates this damage at $150. A litigant cannot be permitted to estimate damages in globo out of the pocket of his adversary. He must make his claim certain and support it by competent evidence. See 3 La.Dig., Verbo Evidence, Paragraph 351. This item too will be rejected.
It is, therefore, ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the lower Court be amended by reducing the amount thereof from $432 to $282 and, as thus amended, that it be affirmed; costs of the appeal to be paid by the appellee and all other costs to be paid by appellant.