Court Opinion

ID: 9701348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 22:16:10.927862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:22.626897
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
BROSKY, J.
¶ 1 After careful review, I am constrained to conclude that Appellant is entitled to judgment n.o.v. and, accordingly, I dissent.
¶ 2 Appellant contends that Ted does not have a valid cause of action against it for wrongful discharge, and that it is therefore entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. This first argument requires a discussion of our Supreme Court’s decision *121in Shick v. Shirey, 552 Pa. 590, 716 A.2d 1231 (1998), which addressed an issue of first impression: “whether Pennsylvania law recognizes a common law cause of action for wrongful discharge of an at-will employee for fifing a workers’ compensation claim.” Id., 716 A.2d at 1232.3
¶3 In Shick, an employee filed suit against his former employer, alleging that the employer had wrongfully discharged him from his employment in retaliation for his fifing of a workers’ compensation claim. The employer filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, which the trial court sustained, and this Court affirmed on the basis that no existing statutory or case law existed to find the cause of action viable. On appeal, our Supreme Court noted the general rule of the doctrine of at-will employment, that “no cause of action exists based upon an employer’s termination of an at-will employment relationship.” Id., 716 A.2d at 1233.
Generally, an employer ‘may discharge an employee with or without cause, at pleasure, unless restrained by some contract.’ Henry v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad Company, 139 Pa. 289, 297, 21 A. 157 (1891). ‘Absent a statutory or contractual provision to the contrary, the law has taken for granted the power of either party to terminate an employment relationship for any or no reason.’ Geary v. U.S. Steel Corporation, 456 Pa. 171, 175, 319 A.2d 174, 176 (1974).
Id., 716 A.2d at 1233. The Court went on to recognize, however, that public policy may operate to qualify this privilege enjoyed by an employer. It noted that public policy must be ascertained by reference to laws and legal precedent, not from general considerations of the public interest. Id., 716 A.2d at 1237 (citation omitted). After analysis of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. §§ 1 et seq., as well as acknowledgement of the power of the courts to pronounce public policy, our Supreme Court held that “a cause of action exists under Pennsylvania law for wrongful discharge of an employee who files a claim for workers’ compensation benefits.” Shick, 716 A.2d at 1238. In a concurring opinion, then-Chief Justice Flaherty emphasized, however, that Shick did not create or expand any cause of action: “The at-will employment doctrine remains the law in Pennsylvania and exceptions are extremely limited.” Id., 716 A.2d at 1238 (Flaherty, C.J., concurring).
¶4 The novel question presented is whether Shick should be interpreted to permit Ted’s cause of action as a eo-worker and/or father of an employee fifing a claim for workers’ compensation benefits. Stated another way, it must be decided whether a cause of action exists for the wrongful discharge of a third party in retaliation for another employee’s claim for workers’ compensation benefits. My research has revealed few cases where a similar issue was presented, and none directly resolving the question. See, e.g., Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, Inc., 522 Pa. 86, 559 A.2d 917 (1989) (where our Supreme Court did not reach the question of whether a husband and wife could pursue an action for wrongful discharge when they alleged that their employment was terminated following the wife’s rejection of the sexual advances of a supervisor; the Court instead agreed with the trial court that the plaintiffs faded to exhaust the administrative remedies available under the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 P.S. §§ 951 et seq., specifieal*122ly by asserting a claim before the Human Relations Commission which had initial jurisdiction over the matter); Burkholder v. Hutchison, 403 Pa.Super. 498, 589 A.2d 721 (1991) (stating that the public policy exception to at-will employment is inapplicable to third parties who have not themselves fallen victim to an alleged wrongful discharge, but concluding that the appellant was not discharged and thus failed to establish her cause of action). The trial court, however, concluded that as a logical application of Shick, an at-will employee who fails or refuses to persuade a fellow employee to withdraw a claim for worker’s compensation benefits may maintain a cause of action against the employer. Trial Court Opinion, 7/19/01, at 4.
¶ 5 Historically, the Courts of this Commonwealth have recognized the limited circumstances which allow a wrongful discharge claim by an at-will employee. I must reiterate our Supreme Court’s recent caution in Shick that any public policy exception arises solely by reference to laws and legal precedent, and not from “general considerations of supposed public interest.” 716 A.2d at 1237. See also Pipkin v. Pennsylvania State Police, 548 Pa. 1, 693 A.2d 190, 191 (1997) (no cause of action may be maintained for termination of the at-will relationship except where “clear mandates of public policy” are threatened). It is the public policy of this Commonwealth that is determinative, which is ascertained by examination of our own constitution, judicial decisions and legislation. McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc., 561 Pa. 307, 750 A.2d 283 (2000) (also noting that our Supreme Court “has steadfastly resisted any attempt to weaken the presumption of at-will employment in this Commonwealth.”)
¶ 6 In its analysis in Shick, the Court explained that the Workers’ Compensation Act addresses the relationship between employers and employees who have been injured and have suffered an economic loss. The Act itself is a compromise, giving immunity from lawsuits to an employer in exchange for a process for paying immediate, set benefits to an injured employee. As such, the balance achieved by this compromise would be disrupted if an employer could terminate an employee for filing a workers’ compensation claim. Id., 716 A.2d at 1237. Consequently, public policy dictates that an employee who files such a claim may institute a wrongful discharge action against his employer. Id.
¶ 7 In contrast, extending this cause of action to other persons has no clear basis in the Workers’ Compensation Act, nor any other legal precedent herein applicable. While I am not unsympathetic to Ted’s belief that he was unfairly placed in an awkward position, and am cognizant that some facets of general public interest might favor extending protection to him under these unique factual circumstances, such considerations are not sufficient. The fact remains that his cause of action must be rooted in the law. Public policy has, to date, been strictly limited to protecting the employee who files the workers compensation claim, and I am not persuaded that the narrow exception to the doctrine of at-will employment should be extended to coworkers, even one who is related to the injured employee.4 Absent a clear mandate of public policy in this Commonwealth that third persons should also benefit from this narrow exception to the at-will employment doctrine, I conclude that his claim must necessarily fail.
*123¶ 8 In summary, I believe that the trial court erred as a matter of law in permitting Ted’s cause of action for wrongful discharge to be presented to the jury. Accordingly, I would conclude that Appellant is entitled to judgment n.o.v. on Ted’s claims,5 and would reverse the judgment entered in favor of Appellee Theodore Rothrock, and remand with instructions to the trial court to enter judgment n.o.v. in favor of Appellant on this claim.

. There is no dispute that Ted was an at-will employee of Appellant. See Brief for Appellant at 15; Brief for Appellee at 6.

. Equally problematic in a case such as this is the question of where the line should be drawn.

. I would, therefore, find it unnecessary to address remaining issues raised in Appellant's brief.