Court Opinion

ID: 9774184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:10:52.842945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:03.321030
License: Public Domain

Ed. F. McFaddiN, Associate Justice (dissenting). I agree with all that the majority opinion says about the condemnation of lotteries and the fact that the Courts of this State will not aid anyone to prevail through a lottery ; but the problem in this case cannot be solved by such pronouncements. As I understand our cases, the rule is that, when a party asks the Courts to aid him, he must prove that he and those through whom he claims are clear of the stigma of lottery in the transaction in which he is asking the courts to help him. Such rule is the basis of my dissent. Here, Dr. Shuffield is entirely clear and innocent of participating in any lottery, but the person through whom he claims title — Mr. Eaney — was not clear of such participation; and Eaney’s participation affects the claim of Shuffield because Shuffield’s mortgage tuas not recorded until after Thomas had recorded his deed and taken actual possession of the property. I emphasize that Thomas recorded his deed and went into actual possession of the property before Dr. Shuffield recorded his mortgage; and that Dr. Shuffield brought this suit, and not Thomas. Because of the wording of our mortgage recording Statute (§ 51-1002, Ark. Stats.),1 the matter of a bona fide holder does not enter into this case. An unrecorded mortgage is good only between the parties. If Thomas had known all about Eaney’s mortgage to Shuffield and had paid Eaney a valuable consideration for the property before the Shuffield mortgage was recorded, then Thomas would have received a title superior to the Shuffield mortgage. An unrecorded mortgage is not binding upon a third person, though such person may have actual notice of its existence. Fry v. Martin, 33 Ark. 203; Dodd v. Parker, 40 Ark. 536; Merchants & Farmers Bank v. Citizens Bank, 125 Ark. 131, 187 S. W. 650; Bridges v. Haney, 132 Ark. 166, 200 S. W. 788; Simpson v. First Nat. Bank, 173 Ark. 284, 292 S. W. 138; Polster v. Langley, 201 Ark. 396, 144 S. W. 2d 1063. Since his mortgage was not recorded prior to Thomas ’ possession, Shuffield’s right to recover the property is the same as Raney’s right to recover would have been. The question, then, is: could Raney have recovered the property herein from Thomas? The answer is NO; and Carey v. Watkins, 97 Ark. 153, 133 S. W. 1016, is directly in point.2 Carey owned a wagon and raffled it off for $45.00, intending for the winner to have it. The raffle was held. It was declared that Watkins was the winner and Watkins’ father went to Carey’s house and got the wagon, with Carey present and making no objections. Later, Carey sought to recover the wagon on the claim that Watkins did not win it. This Court held that Carey had no right to recover, saying: “. . . the illegal contract having been executed, the law leaves the parties where they placed themselves and affords no relief to either.”3  So here: Raney executed the deed to Fullerton and Fullerton to Thomas and Thomas went into possession; so certainly Raney could not have recovered if he had brought the suit. Since Thomas’ possession occurred prior to the time Shuffield recorded his mortgage, Shuf-field stands only in the shoes of Raney, and, since Raney could not recover, neither can Shuffield, because “ ... the law leaves the parties where they placed themselves and affords no relief to either.” Now if Shuffield had been in possession of the property and Thomas had brought this suit, then Thomas could not have recovered, because “. . . the law leaves the parties where they placed themselves.” Therefore, since Shuffield is in the shoes of Raney, and since Raney could not have recovered, I think we should apply the rule stated in Carey v. Watkins (supra): . . the law leaves the parties where they placed themselves. ’ ’ Therefore, I dissent from the majority holding.   Section 51-1002, Ark. Stats., reads: “Every mortgage, whether for real or personal property, shall be a lien on the mortgaged property from the time the same is filed in the Recorder’s Office for record and not before; which filing shall be notice to all persons of the existence ■of such mortgage.”    There are several other Arkansas cases involving lotteries: see Martin v. Hodge, 47 Ark. 378, 1 S. W. 694; Grant v. Owens, 55 Ark. 49, 17 S. W. 338; Burks v. Harris, 91 Ark. 205, 120 S. W. 979; Watkins v. Curry, 103 Ark. 414, 147 S. W. 43; and Simpson v. Brooks, 208 Ark. 1093, 189 S. W. 2d 364.    The majority opinion quotes Carey v. Watkins to this effect: “A person cannot be said to have lost his property when he receives its value in exchange for its possession. Carey received the value he placed upon his wagon and did not risk anything on the lottery.” That quotation emphasizes the point I am trying to make. The evidence here shows that from the proceeds of the raffle Raney received somewhere between $2,500.00 and $15,000.00 for the property. Certainly that was substantial and, since he could not recover, neither should Shuffield; because his rights could be no greater than Raney’s, due to the failure to record the mortgage before Thomas acquired actual possession.