Court Opinion

ID: 9957894
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-05 16:01:45.090068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:16:01.896594
License: Public Domain

[PUBLISH]
                        In the
         United States Court of Appeals
               For the Eleventh Circuit

                 ____________________

                     No. 22-12946
                 ____________________

AMBER JACKSON,
                                          Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
versus
CITY OF ATLANTA, GEORGIA,
CODY SWANGER,
in his individual capacity,
JEREMIAH BRANDT,
in his individual capacity,

                                    Defendants-Appellants.

                 ____________________
2                      Opinion of the Court                22-12946

           Appeal from the United States District Court
              for the Northern District of Georgia
              D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cv-02578-MHC
                    ____________________

Before WILLIAM PRYOR, Chief Judge, and ABUDU and ED CARNES,
Circuit Judges.
ED CARNES, Circuit Judge:
       This is an attempted interlocutory appeal by Atlanta police
oﬃcers Cody Swanger and Jeremiah Brandt from the district
court’s failure to dismiss on qualiﬁed immunity grounds two of
Amber Jackson’s claims against them.
        One of the claims Jackson brought in her 42 U.S.C. § 1983
complaint against the oﬃcers is that they violated her constitu-
tional rights by seizing her “without actual or arguable reasonable
suspicion and/or probable cause.” Another claim is that Brandt
violated Jackson’s constitutional rights by failing to intervene in
Swanger’s use of excessive force in making the seizure. As part of
their appeal, the oﬃcers contend that in the course of reaching its
decision against them the district court abused its discretion by re-
fusing to consider some of the video footage of the incident giving
rise to the claims against them that was hyperlinked in their motion
to dismiss.
       Because we lack jurisdiction at this stage of the proceedings
to review the district court’s discretionary ruling not to consider
that video footage, we dismiss that part of the oﬃcers’ appeal. We
22-12946               Opinion of the Court                        3

do have jurisdiction to review the denial of qualiﬁed immunity on
the unlawful seizure claim against both oﬃcers and the failure to
intervene claim against Brandt. For reasons we will explain, we will
aﬃrm the denial of the oﬃcers’ motion to dismiss the unlawful
seizure claim, but we will vacate the denial of Brandt’s motion to
dismiss the failure to intervene claim and remand with instructions
for the district court to dismiss that claim.
           I. Background Facts and Procedural History
        These facts are drawn from Jackson’s ﬁrst amended com-
plaint, which is the operative one, and from the part of the video
evidence hyperlinked in the oﬃcers’ motion to dismiss that the dis-
trict court did consider when reviewing the pleadings.
       In late May of 2020 Jackson and her ﬁancé participated in a
peaceful protest in downtown Atlanta in response to the death of
George Floyd in Minneapolis a few days earlier. Later that night,
at about 1:00 a.m., the couple went to Atlanta’s Lenox Square Mall
in the hope of joining a peaceful protest there. They drove into the
mall’s parking lot but were unable to ﬁnd any fellow protestors, so
they decided to head home.
       Attempting to leave the parking lot through a diﬀerent en-
trance than the one they had used to enter the mall area, Jackson
and her ﬁancé (who was driving) encountered a barricade. There
were no law enforcement oﬃcers present at the exit and no sign
prohibiting the relocation of the barricade. Jackson got out of the
vehicle, moved the barricade a few feet so that their car could pass,
and got back into the passenger’s seat.
4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12946

       Before the couple could leave the parking lot, Oﬃcers
Brandt and Swanger in an Atlanta Police Department patrol car
pulled up behind their vehicle. Brandt approached Jackson’s ﬁancé
on the driver’s side of the vehicle, and Swanger approached Jackson
on the passenger’s side. Swanger pointed his ﬁrearm at Jackson and
shouted at her to “[g]et out of the fucking car.” Before she could
comply with his command, Swanger pulled Jackson out of the ve-
hicle and onto her knees, placed his arm around her neck, lifted her
oﬀ the ground, and “body slam[med]” her into the pavement. The
impact broke Jackson’s right clavicle.
       Swanger then turned Jackson over on her stomach, hand-
cuﬀed her, got her to her feet, and pushed her toward the patrol
vehicle while calling her “stupid.” Jackson and her ﬁancé remained
handcuﬀed in the back of the vehicle for nearly an hour.

       Based on these allegations, Jackson asserted three constitu-
tional claims against the oﬃcers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: unlawful
seizure in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,
against both Swanger and Brandt; excessive use of force in viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment, against Swanger; and failure to in-
tervene to stop Swanger’s excessive use of force in violation of the
Fourth Amendment, against Brandt. The unlawful seizure claim
was based on allegations that the oﬃcers lacked reasonable suspi-
cion, much less probable cause. Jackson brought related claims
against the City of Atlanta for having a custom or policy of using
excessive force and for failing to train or supervise its police oﬃcers.
22-12946              Opinion of the Court                        5

She also brought state-law claims against the officers, along with
derivative claims for punitive damages and attorney’s fees.
       Swanger and Brandt jointly moved to dismiss the amended
complaint for failure to state a claim. Among other things, they
contended that they were entitled to qualiﬁed immunity on Jack-
son’s unlawful seizure, excessive force, and failure to intervene
claims. As exhibits to their motion to dismiss, the oﬃcers included
hyperlinks to four video recordings: (1) one from Swanger’s body
camera; (2) one from Brandt’s body camera (which was not turned
on until after the seizure); (3) one from the dash camera on their
patrol car video; and (4) one they titled “Bystander/Spliced BWC
[body-worn camera] Video.” They asserted that the fourth video
recording was a combination of footage that a bystander took
spliced with footage from Swanger’s body camera video (“the
spliced video”). Unlike the motion to dismiss, the amended com-
plaint did not contain any hyperlinks. But the amended complaint
did reference one of the oﬃcers’ video exhibits: Swanger’s body
camera video.
       On the unlawful seizure claim, Swanger and Brandt asserted
in their motion to dismiss that they had reasonable suspicion to
stop the vehicle in which Jackson was riding, and that they also had
probable cause to arrest her. The oﬃcers also asserted that some
footage from Swanger’s body camera video showed that, after he
had removed Jackson from the car and before he “took her . . . to
the ground,” Jackson had taken multiple steps away from him and
toward the road. Based on that, the oﬃcers argued that Jackson
6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12946

had attempted to ﬂee, giving Swanger probable cause to arrest her
and justifying the force that he had used to make the arrest.
        In ruling on the motion to dismiss, the district court consid-
ered not only the pleadings but also some –– only some –– of the
footage from Swanger’s body camera that was hyperlinked in the
motion. The court stated that it was permitted to consider an ex-
hibit attached to a motion to dismiss without converting that mo-
tion to one for summary judgment where the exhibit was “central
to the plaintiﬀ’s claim” and where its “authenticity [was] unchal-
lenged.” See Day v. Taylor, 400 F.3d 1272, 1276 (11th Cir. 2005) (ex-
plaining that a district court “may consider a document attached to
a motion to dismiss without converting the motion into one for
summary judgment if the attached document is (1) central to the
plaintiff’s claim and (2) undisputed[,] . . . mean[ing] that the authen-
ticity of the document is not challenged”).
       In the district court’s view, however, the footage from
Swanger’s body camera video that it considered did not resolve all
of the issues in the oﬃcers’ favor. On Jackson’s seizure claim, the
court noted that, “aside from showing that Jackson attempted to
move away from Swanger after she was pulled out of the vehicle,
Swanger’s Body Cam footage fails to clearly indicate what hap-
pened prior to Swanger taking Jackson to the ground.” The court
disagreed with the oﬃcers’ assertion that it could “deﬁnitively con-
clude from watching the footage that Jackson ‘ran’ in an attempt
to evade the oﬃcers or ‘dragged’ or ‘struggled to pull away from’
Swanger.”
22-12946               Opinion of the Court                         7

         The court relied on Swanger’s body camera video only to
make three ﬁndings. First, there was nothing to indicate any crim-
inal activity connected to the mall or the car. Second, after
Swanger had pulled Jackson from the car, she also “took several
steps towards the road and away from [him].” And third, within
about three minutes after the arrest, an ambulance was “apparently
. . . called to the scene.”
       Swanger and Brandt had requested that the court consider
other parts of Swanger’s body camera footage showing Swanger
walking around the area more than four minutes after the arrest
and capturing comments he made to Jackson and her ﬁancé while
they sat detained in the police vehicle. The court declined to con-
sider any of that footage because the recorded events were not
“central to the Amended Complaint,” making consideration of it
inappropriate at the motion to dismiss stage. Some other footage
the oﬃcers unsuccessfully requested the court to consider hap-
pened more than a half hour after the seizure.
       The district court also declined to consider any of the spliced
video that Swanger and Brandt had hyperlinked in their motion to
dismiss. It did so after deciding that particular video exhibit was
“not authenticated” and “lack[ed] the same credibility as the police
oﬃcer’s body cam footage.”
        The court denied the oﬃcers’ motion to dismiss the unlaw-
ful seizure claim. It concluded that on the facts alleged, the oﬃcers
“had no articulable basis to conduct a traffic stop on Jackson’s ve-
hicle or otherwise detain Jackson.” According to the court,
8                             Opinion of the Court                      22-12946

qualified immunity was not available because “a reasonable police
oﬃcer would have known that he lacked reasonable suspicion for
stopping Plaintiﬀ and that he was violating clearly established law
in doing so.” Having denied the officers’ motion to dismiss the un-
lawful seizure claim based on the absence of reasonable suspicion
under clearly established law, the court did not reach the probable
cause issue. But given that probable cause is a more demanding
standard than reasonable suspicion, the absence of reasonable sus-
picion necessarily rules out probable cause.
       The court dismissed the excessive force claim against
Swanger as derivative of the unlawful seizure claim and, therefore
redundant in light of that claim. See Bashir v. Rockdale County, 445
F.3d 1323, 1332 (11th Cir. 2006) (“[I]f an arresting officer does not
have the right to make an arrest, he does not have the right to use
any degree of force in making that arrest.”); Jackson v. Sauls, 206
F.3d 1156, 1171 (11th Cir. 2000) (“[A] claim that any force in an il-
legal stop or arrest is excessive is subsumed in the illegal stop or
                          1
arrest claim . . . .”).

1 We do not mean to imply that it is proper to dismiss before trial an excessive

force claim as redundant to another claim that the jury may end up rejecting
at trial. See Bashir, 445 F.3d at 1332 (explaining that a claim that officers “used
excessive force in the arrest because they lacked the right to make the arrest .
. . is dependent upon and inseparable from [an] unlawful arrest claim,” while
“an excessive force claim presents a discrete constitutional violation relating
to the manner in which an arrest was carried out, and is independent of
whether law enforcement had the power to arrest”); Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1171
(explaining that “a claim that any force in an illegal stop or arrest is excessive
is subsumed in the illegal stop or arrest claim and is not a discrete excessive
22-12946                   Opinion of the Court                                  9

       But the court denied qualified immunity to Brandt on Jack-
son’s related claim that Brandt had failed to intervene in Swanger’s
use of excessive force. (There was no excessive force claim against
Brandt himself.) The court also declined to dismiss the claims for
punitive damages and attorney’s fees that were derivative of Jack-
son’s surviving constitutional claims. It did, however, address the
merits of the state-law claims and the claims that were derivative
of them, and it dismissed those claims with prejudice. The dismis-
                                                            2
sal of those claims is not before us in this appeal.
        Swanger and Brandt jointly appeal the denial of qualified im-
munity on the unlawful seizure claim against both of them and on
the failure to intervene claim against Brandt, including the district
court’s ruling that it would not consider some of the various videos
or footage that captured the events and the aftermath, such as
Swanger’s comments to Jackson and her fiancé.
       Jackson moves to dismiss the officers’ appeal for lack of ap-
pellate jurisdiction and alternatively argues that their arguments on
the merits lack merit.
                          II. Standard of Review

force claim,” but that “a claim for excessive force during a legal stop or arrest
is a discrete claim”). But we do not have jurisdiction to decide that issue in
this interlocutory appeal by Swanger and Brandt, when Jackson is the party
who had the excessive force claim dismissed as redundant.
2 The City also filed a motion to dismiss the claims against it, which the district

court granted. That dismissal is not before us, and the City is not a party in
this appeal.
10                        Opinion of the Court                      22-12946

       To defeat a qualified immunity defense on a motion to dis-
miss, the operative complaint must plausibly plead that the defend-
ant violated the plaintiff’s federal rights and those rights were
clearly established. See Carollo v. Boria, 833 F.3d 1322, 1328 (11th
            3
Cir. 2016). We review the district court’s judgment de novo to de-
termine whether the complaint alleges a violation of clearly estab-
lished law, accepting the facts alleged in the complaint as true and
drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See Chesser
v. Sparks, 248 F.3d 1117, 1121 (11th Cir. 2001).
         When assessing the sufficiency of a complaint on a motion
to dismiss, a district court has some “discretion” to decide whether
to consider “matters outside of the pleadings.” Jones v. Auto. Ins.
Co. of Hartford, 917 F.2d 1528, 1531–32 (11th Cir. 1990); see also Day,
400 F.3d at 1276 (explaining that a district court “may consider a
document attached to a motion to dismiss without converting the
motion into one for summary judgment”) (emphasis added). Ex-
trinsic material that is referred to in the operative complaint and
attached to a motion to dismiss may be considered by the court at
the pleading stage if the attached material “(1) central to the plain-
tiff’s claim” and (2) “the authenticity of the document is not chal-
lenged.” Horsley v. Feldt, 304 F.3d 1125, 1134 (11th Cir. 2002).

3 To assert a qualified immunity defense, the defendant must be acting in a

discretionary capacity. See Carollo, 833 F.3d at 1328. Jackson does not dispute
that the district court correctly determined that Brandt and Swanger were act-
ing in their discretionary capacities.
22-12946                Opinion of the Court                         11

        When a district court, within its discretion, has properly con-
sidered materials outside the pleadings as part of its review of the
operative complaint, we may consider those same extrinsic mate-
rials on appeal. See Baker v. City of Madison, 67 F.4th 1268, 1277–78
(11th Cir. 2023) (concluding that “the district court properly con-
sidered [a defendant officer’s] body camera footage . . . when ruling
on the motions to dismiss” and taking into account that same foot-
age when reviewing the pleadings de novo); Day, 400 F.3d at 1276–
78 (explaining that “we may consider” an external, undisputed doc-
ument central to the plaintiff’s claims that is attached to a motion
to dismiss, and taking into account an external document that the
district court chose to consider when reviewing the sufficiency of
the complaint on appeal).
        When we review video footage at the motion to dismiss
stage, we “must construe all ambiguities in the video footage in
favor of the plaintiff.” Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277. “[W]here [the] video
is clear and obviously contradicts the plaintiff’s alleged facts, we ac-
cept the video’s depiction instead of the complaint’s account, and
[we] view the facts in the light depicted by the video.” Id. at 1277–
78 (internal citations omitted).
       Before we apply these principles and review the district
court’s partial denial of the officers’ motion to dismiss, we must
determine whether we have jurisdiction over their appeal.
      III. Jurisdiction Under the Collateral Order Doctrine
        “We have a threshold obligation to ensure that we have ju-
risdiction to hear an appeal, for ‘without jurisdiction we cannot
12                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12946

proceed at all in any cause.’” English v. City of Gainesville, 75 F.4th
1151, 1155 (11th Cir. 2023) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 506, 514 (1869)).
         Swanger and Brandt contend that we have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. That statute provides that “[t]he courts of appeals
. . . shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States . . . except where a direct review
may be had in the Supreme Court.” 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
       Generally, a statute allowing for review of “final decisions”
does not vest us with jurisdiction to consider the denial of a motion
to dismiss. See Carollo, 833 F.3d at 1327 (“[A] district court’s denial
of a motion to dismiss ordinarily is not a ‘final decision.’”) (altera-
tion adopted). But under the collateral order doctrine, a party may
immediately appeal an order under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 before final
judgment if that order satisfies three conditions.                  See
SmileDirectClub, LLC v. Battle, 4 F.4th 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2021) (en
banc). “The ‘order must [1] conclusively determine the disputed
question, [2] resolve an important issue completely separate from
the merits of the action, and [3] be effectively unreviewable on ap-
peal from a final judgment.’” Id. (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Live-
say, 437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978)).
       A district court’s denial of qualiﬁed immunity on a motion
to dismiss “can fall within the narrow class of appealable orders”
covered by the collateral order doctrine, “[p]rovided [the denial]
‘turns on an issue of law.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 671–72
(2009) (quoting Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985)). Issues
22-12946               Opinion of the Court                         13

of law include the question of “whether the legal norms allegedly
violated by the defendant were clearly established at the time of
the challenged actions.” Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480, 1484 (11th
Cir. 1996) (quoting Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528). That is a “core quali-
fied immunity issue[].” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
       So it follows that the question of whether a complaint states
a violation of clearly established law sufficient to overcome a qual-
ified immunity defense does present an abstract issue of law re-
viewable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 671–74; Pi-
azza v. Jefferson County, 923 F.3d 947, 951 n.5 (11th Cir. 2019) (“We
have jurisdiction over the officers’ interlocutory appeal under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 because the district court denied qualified immunity
[on a motion to dismiss] based on questions of law — namely,
whether the officers violated . . . constitutional rights and whether
those rights were clearly established.”); Keating v. City of Miami, 598
F.3d 753, 760 (11th Cir. 2010) (“This Court’s appellate jurisdiction
in matters challenging the denial of qualified immunity in a motion
to dismiss extends only to the legal issues surrounding the district
court’s denial of [defendants’] motions to dismiss, i.e., issues con-
cerning whether [the operative] complaint sufficiently alleged the
violation of a clearly established right.”) (quotation marks omit-
ted). That’s because when a district court, “in ruling on . . . [a]
motion[] to dismiss, consider[s] the allegations of the . . . complaint
in the light most favorable to the [plaintiff],” that court has “elimi-
nated any material issues of fact and its ruling turn[s] on a question
of law.” Morris v. Town of Lexington Alabama, 748 F.3d 1316, 1319
n.3 (11th Cir. 2014).
14                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12946

        Issues about “which facts a party may, or may not, be able
to prove at trial” are not legal issues that will support an interlocu-
tory appeal. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 313 (1995). Likewise,
erroneous evidentiary rulings are among the types of orders we
lack jurisdiction to review interlocutorily. See Digital Equip. Corp.
v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863, 872 (1994) (discussing scope of
the collateral order doctrine). Whether we have interlocutory ap-
pellate jurisdiction over any part of Swanger’s and Brandt’s appeal
depends on whether their challenges to the denials of qualiﬁed im-
munity present any abstract legal issues, such as whether Jackson
plausibly stated a violation of clearly established law. See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 671–74.
             IV. Jurisdiction Over Swanger’s Appeal
       We begin with Swanger’s appeal. He raises two types of is-
sues to challenge the denial of qualiﬁed immunity on Jackson’s un-
lawful seizure claim against him and Brandt. Swanger contends
there was no clearly established law that the stop of the vehicle
Jackson was riding in violated her constitutional rights. That’s an
abstract question of law subject to interlocutory appeal. He also
contends that the district court should have considered certain
video footage that he and Brandt hyperlinked to their motion to
dismiss Jackson’s amended complaint. That’s an evidentiary ruling
issue that is not interlocutorily appealable.
     A. Jurisdiction Over Whether Swanger Violated Clearly Es-
              tablished Law When He Stopped the Vehicle
22-12946               Opinion of the Court                        15

       Swanger’s appeal raises the issue of whether the law was
clearly established that he lacked reasonable suspicion to stop the
vehicle in which Jackson was riding. Pointing to factors including
Jackson’s own allegation that she moved a barricade as well as foot-
age showing the vehicle’s location after it was pulled over, Swanger
contends that no clearly established law prohibited him from mak-
ing the stop.
        Jackson argues in her motion to dismiss this appeal for lack
of jurisdiction that this part of Swanger’s appeal presents “merely a
fact issue in a legal issue’s clothing.” In her view, Swanger’s appeal
“is really just a list of alleged facts” presented to challenge “which
facts the District Court did or did not consider.” To the contrary,
Swanger’s argument that under the pleaded facts he did not violate
clearly established law raises a “core qualified immunity issue[].”
Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1484 (quotation marks omitted). Under the col-
lateral order doctrine we have interlocutory jurisdiction to review
that qualified immunity issue. See id.; Piazza, 923 F.3d at 951 n.5;
Keating, 598 F.3d at 760; cf. Nelson v. Tompkins, 89 F.4th 1289, 1296
(11th Cir. 2024) (explaining in a summary judgment case that when
both the evidentiary sufficiency and clearly established issues are
raised on appeal, the appellate court may accept the district court’s
factual findings or conduct its own analysis of the facts in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff).
    B. Lack of Jurisdiction Over Whether District Court Abused
       Its Discretion in Ruling that It Would Not Consider Cer-
                        tain of the Video Footage
16                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12946

       Swanger also contends that, in the course of deciding to
deny him qualiﬁed immunity on Jackson’s unlawful seizure claim,
the district court erred in failing to consider the “undisputed or in-
disputable video evidence.” He argues that the court failed to ap-
ply what he characterizes as the “rule” that “if there is clear video
of the facts giving rise to the litigation, that video should provide
the factual predicates for a court’s determination of dispositive mo-
tions” — a rule that he says is “especially important when the issue
is qualiﬁed immunity.”
       Swanger points ﬁrst to the district court’s refusal to consider
the spliced video that was hyperlinked to the motion to dismiss.
That video appears to combine footage of Jackson’s arrest that was
captured on a bystander’s cell phone camera with footage from
Swanger’s body camera. Jackson asserts in her motion to dismiss
this part of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction that the oﬃcers pulled
that entire spliced video, consisting of those two parts, from an
online news program. But there was no evidence of that presented
to the district court, nor was there any evidence of who spliced that
video or whether it was a complete recording of the events it pur-
ported to show.
       In Swanger’s view, the spliced video is “central” to Jackson’s
claims and, therefore, the district court must consider it at the mo-
tion to dismiss stage. He argues the district court was wrong to
suggest such a video should have been “formally authenticated”
when Jackson did not dispute its authenticity or contents, which
she did not do. And he argues that the same video was
22-12946               Opinion of the Court                         17

incorporated into Jackson’s amended complaint. Swanger bases
that argument on Jackson having attached as an exhibit to the
amended complaint a pre-lawsuit notice to the City, which is re-
quired to assert claims against the City for money damages. In-
cluded in that attached exhibit were still photo images of the arrest
that Swanger insists came from the spliced video. But the actual
video was not in the exhibit attached to the amended complaint.
        Turning to another video, Swanger also takes issue with the
district court considering only some of his body camera footage ––
the part recording the seizure and its immediate aftermath — but
not other parts of that video he believes are relevant to the reason-
able suspicion analysis. He contends that it was improper for the
court to refuse to consider parts of the video that showed the extent
of civil unrest in the area (speciﬁcally the presence of the National
Guard) and the oﬃcers’ recorded post-arrest statements evidencing
their perception of that unrest. Swanger contends that those parts
of the video are essential to show the totality of the circumstances
facing the oﬃcers at Lenox Square Mall, which gave them reason-
able suspicion to stop the vehicle in which Jackson was a passenger.
       Based in part on its review of Jackson’s pleadings and
Swanger’s body camera footage, the district court ruled that Jack-
son had plausibly alleged that Swanger violated her clearly estab-
lished right to be free from an unreasonable seizure. Swanger is
asking us to hold that the district court abused its discretion in rul-
ing that it would consider only part of his body camera video. The
part the court did consider captured events before, during, and
18                      Opinion of the Court                  22-12946

immediately after the seizure. But the court refused to consider
the parts of the same video that captured events that occurred
more than four minutes after the seizure. It also refused to con-
sider any footage from the spliced video, which the district court
found had not been authenticated.
       Swanger’s challenge to the district court’s rulings against
considering some parts of the video footage is not an abstract legal
issue. Instead, it is the pleading stage equivalent of an appeal con-
tending that the court made an erroneous evidentiary ruling,
which is a type of appeal that we have no interlocutory jurisdiction
to decide. See Digital, 511 U.S. at 872.
       Consider our decision in English, where we held that we had
no interlocutory jurisdiction to second-guess how the district court
treated video evidence when denying qualified immunity. See 75
F.4th at 1156. Because English was decided at the summary judg-
ment stage, it posed the question of whether there was a genuine
issue of material fact that the defendant officials had violated clearly
established law. See id. at 1155. Although that is different from the
question before us in this pleading-stage case, our analysis in English
helps illuminate the limits of the collateral order doctrine.
       The defendant officers in English were denied qualified im-
munity on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim after they
shot a man who was purportedly reaching for a gun. Id. at 1154.
The officers insisted that their use of deadly force was objectively
reasonable under the circumstances. Id. at 1156. The district court
considered a video recording of the shooting that was submitted as
22-12946                Opinion of the Court                         19

evidence and, based in part on that video, determined that there
was a genuine issue of material fact preventing summary judg-
ment. Id. at 1154.
       In concluding that we lacked jurisdiction to interlocutorily
review the denial of summary judgment in English, we pointed to
the district court’s finding that the video evidence left “up for inter-
pretation” whether the man had moved his hand as if to reach for
a gun. Id. at 1156 (quotation marks omitted). We concluded that
“the dispute is about what the evidence could prove at trial; it is
not a dispute about principles of law.” Id.; see also Smith v. Finkley,
10 F.4th 725, 738–41 (7th Cir. 2021) (holding that there was no in-
terlocutory jurisdiction to review a denial of qualified immunity
where defendant officers “argue[d] that the district court errone-
ously disregarded undisputed facts and substituted its own inter-
pretation of the body camera videos”).
        Swanger has not presented “a dispute about principles of
law,” either. English, 75 F.4th at 1156. He asks us to examine the
video footage hyperlinked in his motion to dismiss and tell the dis-
trict court which parts of the footage it must consider when review-
ing Jackson’s amended complaint. That kind of instruction about
an evidentiary ruling –– and a discretionary one at that –– is outside
the scope of the collateral order doctrine. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 674;
Coopers, 437 U.S. at 469–477 (holding that a district court’s “discre-
tionary” determination that a suit may not proceed as a class action
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 was not a “final decision”
appealable under § 1291).
20                         Opinion of the Court                        22-12946

      Swanger relies on decisions where we and other courts have
on occasion exercised pendent appellate jurisdiction in qualified
                       4
immunity appeals. But the exercise of pendent appellate jurisdic-
tion is discretionary, and we have not been shy about declining to
indulge in it. See Hibiscus Assocs. Ltd. v. Bd. of Trs. of Policemen &
Firemen Ret. Sys. of Detroit, 50 F.3d 908, 922 (11th Cir. 1995) (“Alt-
hough we have discretion as an exercise of pendant appellate juris-
diction to review the issue, we decline to exercise that discretion
here.”) (internal citation omitted); Crymes v. DeKalb Cnty., 923 F.2d
1482, 1485 (11th Cir. 1991) (declining to exercise pendant appellate
jurisdiction, which is “within this court’s discretion”); United States
v. Masino, 869 F.3d 1301, 1305 (11th Cir. 2017) (“[E]ven if we have
[pendant appellate] jurisdiction . . . , we decline to exercise it.”);
McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1366 (11th Cir.
2007) (expressing “considerable doubt” over whether this Court
could exercise pendant jurisdiction over an issue and “exercis[ing]
discretion” not to do so anyway); Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263,

4 See Tillis ex rel. Wuenschel v. Brown, 12 F.4th 1291, 1297 (11th Cir. 2021) (con-

cluding that this Court had “jurisdiction to review the denial of qualified im-
munity and state-law immunity” under the collateral order doctrine and as-
serting pendant appellate jurisdiction over additional issues); Smith v. LePage,
834 F.3d 1285, 1291–92 (11th Cir. 2016) (exercising pendent appellate jurisdic-
tion over plaintiffs’ claims on cross-appeal where it was “undisputed that this
Court ha[d] jurisdiction over the officers’ appeal from the denial of qualified
and official immunity”); Jewett v. Anders, 521 F.3d 818, 822–25 & n.5 (7th Cir.
2008) (concluding that court had jurisdiction to review on summary judgment
whether the undisputed facts showed a violation of clearly established law and
exercising pendant appellate jurisdiction over an issue “intertwined with” the
qualified immunity issue).
22-12946                    Opinion of the Court                                 21

1272 (11th Cir. 1999) (declining to exercise “discretionary pendent
appellate jurisdiction” to the extent that a basis for that jurisdiction
was present).
       As for the district court’s decision not to consider the spliced
video, we decline to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction because
the record is not clear whether that video is authentic, and the par-
ties have not had an opportunity to participate in an evidentiary
hearing on that question, if one is required. The issue of that
video’s authenticity is more properly addressed at the summary
judgment stage or in another pretrial hearing or at trial, and if
Swanger loses on it and is denied qualified immunity, he can appeal
and include the authenticity issue in his appeal, assuming he has
                           5
properly preserved it. The same reasoning informs our decision

5 Though “qualified immunity questions should be resolved at the earliest pos-

sible stage of a litigation,” Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1487 (quotation marks omitted),
defendants may raise the defense “at any stage of the proceedings,” Johnson v.
Fankell, 520 U.S. 911, 915 (1997). Not only may Swanger and Brandt reassert
qualified immunity on any motion for summary judgment. See Behrens v. Pelle-
tier, 516 U.S. 299, 313 (1996). If need be, they may also assert the defense at
trial, in which case the district court should “use special verdicts or written
interrogatories to the jury to resolve disputed facts [relevant to . . .] the quali-
fied-immunity question.” Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1487 (quotation marks omitted);
see also Butler v. Smith, 85 F.4th 1102, 1118 n.6 (11th Cir. 2023) (“Of course, [the
defendant officer] can raise qualified immunity at trial, urge the jury to view
the record as she has framed it, seek special interrogatories to resolve the his-
torical facts underlying her immunity argument, and then resubmit the issue
to the district court for decision.”).
22                     Opinion of the Court                22-12946

not to exercise pendent appellate jurisdiction over any rulings in-
volving Swanger’s body camera footage either.
       Swanger relies on Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007), where
the Supreme Court reviewed the denial of qualified immunity on
summary judgment and rejected the district and appellate courts’
reliance on a “version of events” that was “utterly discredited by
the record,” including video evidence. Id. at 380. The Supreme
Court concluded that the courts “should have viewed the facts in
the light depicted by [a] videotape” that “captur[ed] the events in
question.” Id. at 381, 378.
        But Scott doesn’t stand for the principle that an appellate
court has interlocutory jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to re-
view a district court’s discretionary decisions about incorporating
video footage into the pleadings. Scott was decided on summary
judgment, and there was no dispute that the video evidence was
authentic, was admissible, and was admitted. See 550 U.S. at 378–
79. Here we don’t get that far along the procedural path. The col-
lateral order doctrine does not give us jurisdiction at the motion to
dismiss stage to review whether it was an abuse of discretion not
to consider certain video footage.
       We turn to the merits of the issue raised in Swanger’s appeal
over which we do have and exercise jurisdiction: whether his stop
of Jackson and her fiancé’s vehicle violated clearly established law.
 V. Whether it Was Clearly Established that Swanger Lacked
         Reasonable Suspicion to Stop the Vehicle
22-12946               Opinion of the Court                         23

       Swanger argues that his stop of the vehicle in which Jackson
was riding did not violate her clearly established Fourth Amend-
ment rights. The law is clearly established that an oﬃcer’s “brief,
investigatory stop” of a suspect does not violate the Fourth Amend-
ment “when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot.” Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1165 (quotation
marks omitted). When assessing reasonable suspicion, we “must
look at the totality of the circumstances of each case to see whether
the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for sus-
pecting legal wrongdoing.” United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266,
273 (2002) (quotation marks omitted). An officer exercising a dis-
cretionary function is entitled to qualified immunity on a claim that
his investigatory stop violated the Fourth Amendment unless “he
was violating clearly established law.” Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1164–66.
There is no dispute that in making an investigatory stop an officer
is exercising a discretionary function. Whether a stop violated
clearly established law given the circumstances is another question.
       According to Jackson’s amended complaint, she and her fi-
ancé drove into the Lenox Square Mall area. When they attempted
to leave the parking lot, they encountered a “barricade.” No police
oﬃcers were present to allow them to leave or to tell Jackson not
to move the barricade, and there was no sign prohibiting her from
moving the barricade. Jackson got out of the vehicle and moved
the barricade a few feet so that she and her ﬁancé could leave the
mall parking lot. Then she got back into the vehicle, and as it “was
preparing to exit” the mall parking lot, Swanger and Brandt
stopped the vehicle.
24                         Opinion of the Court                          22-12946

        In addition to those allegations from the amended com-
plaint, the district court also considered some of the footage from
Swanger’s body camera that was referred to, and incorporated by
hyperlink into, the motion to dismiss. The court limited its consid-
eration to video footage of events it deemed “central” to Jackson’s
claims. Those were, the court reasoned, the events that occurred
immediately before, during, or immediately after the stop of the
vehicle and the arrest. The court declined to consider video record-
ings of events occurring between about four and thirty-five
minutes after Jackson had been put in the patrol car.
        We will consider the same footage that the district court did.
See Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277–78. Specifically, we will consider footage
from the moment before Swanger and Brandt drove their car for-
ward to pull over the vehicle in which Jackson was riding through
the point at which the officers called an ambulance for Jackson
about three minutes after the arrest. No party disputes the authen-
ticity of that particular footage or its centrality to Jackson’s claims
                                                                     6
in her amended complaint. See Horsley, 304 F.3d at 1134. We will
hereafter refer to that footage as “the considered video footage.”

6 Jackson argues that none of the footage from Swanger’s body camera — in-
cluding the part that the district court considered — is “properly in the appel-
late record.” The basis for her argument is that the officers submitted it by
hyperlink in violation of the district court’s local rules. But Jackson did not
make that argument before the district court, so we will not consider it. See
Access Now, Inc. v. Sw. Airlines Co., 385 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This
Court has repeatedly held that an issue not raised in the district court and
22-12946                   Opinion of the Court                                 25

        The considered video footage shows that Swanger and
Brandt’s patrol car was not moving at ﬁrst, but then Swanger
turned the wheel and drove the car forward for about eleven sec-
onds. He stopped the patrol car, apparently put it into park, and
got out. That was when the considered video footage for the ﬁrst
time shows the vehicle that Jackson and her ﬁancé were in. Their
vehicle was facing barricades that were lining a street perpendicular
to the roadway in the parking lot on which the vehicle was stopped.
The barricades consisted of sets of vertical metal bars that reached
a height of about the bottom of a car window, and the length of
each barricade was approximately a car’s length or less. Jackson
and her ﬁancé’s vehicle was located at least a car’s length away from
those barricades. It was positioned mostly to the right of a solid
white line on the pavement, but its left side partially crossed the
line, leaving the vehicle straddling the line to some extent.

raised for the first time in an appeal will not be considered by this court.”)
(quotation marks omitted).
         In any event, as Jackson acknowledges, the district court’s decision not
to exclude an exhibit based on the application of its local rules was discretion-
ary. See Mann v. Taser Int’l, Inc., 588 F.3d 1291, 1302 (11th Cir. 2009) (“We give
great deference to a district court’s interpretation of its local rules and review
a district court’s application of local rules for an abuse of discretion.”) (quota-
tion marks omitted). To the extent Jackson argues that the district court
abused its discretion in considering footage that was submitted in violation of
its local rules, she is challenging an evidentiary ruling over which we have no
interlocutory jurisdiction, and if we have pendent appellate jurisdiction over
that issue, we choose not to exercise it. See Part IV.B supra.
26                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12946

        Taking the considered video footage into account, the dis-
trict court found that there was no indication of criminal activity
by Jackson or the driver that would have justiﬁed the stop. The
court concluded that Jackson’s allegations were suﬃcient to state a
claim for unlawful seizure and to overcome Swanger’s qualiﬁed im-
munity defense. Swanger argues the district court was wrong and
asserts that the totality of circumstances alleged in the amended
complaint and shown in parts of the video footage hyperlinked to
his motion to dismiss support a reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, so that the circumstances of the stop did not violate clearly
established law. He puts forward a number of factors or reasons
that he says separately or in combination justified the stop of the
vehicle.
     A. That the Officers Were Aware of the Presence of Looting,
             Protestors, and the National Guard in the Area
        Swanger emphasizes footage from his body camera show-
ing, in his view, that he and his partner “had been under siege and
the targets of violent protests,” that they were “aware there was
widespread looting in the area around Lenox Mall,” and that the
National Guard was present in the area. But the portions of the
body camera footage he cites captured events occurring more than
four minutes after the stop and seizure. As Swanger acknowledges,
that footage isn’t part of the considered video footage. At this stage
of the proceedings, we have no collateral order jurisdiction (and we
assert no pendant appellate jurisdiction) to review whether the
22-12946               Opinion of the Court                         27

district court’s ruling excluding that particular footage from con-
sideration was an abuse of discretion. See Part IV.B supra.
                B. That Jackson Moved the Barricade
       Swanger contends that Jackson’s own allegations in her
amended complaint establish that she was interfering with a barri-
cade by moving it. But moving the barricade, as she did, is not
criminal. Swanger’s counsel acknowledged at oral argument that
no provision of the Georgia Code prohibits moving a barricade per
se. And it is no wonder why it doesn’t. Presumably barricades are
used to stop people from getting into private or otherwise re-
stricted locations. Here, Jackson was moving the barricade so that
she could get out of a private or otherwise restricted area. There
is no allegation or video evidence that she moved any barricade to
get into the mall parking area.
       Swanger cites two decisions in which courts concluded that
crossing a barricade or refusing to move away from one involved
criminal activity. In McCrosky v. State, the Court of Appeals of
Georgia aﬃrmed a conviction for criminal trespass where the de-
fendant crossed a barricade that had been set up in anticipation of
protests, where the police had “announced over a megaphone that
anyone crossing the barricade would be arrested,” and where signs
were visible stating “private drive” and “no trespassing.” See 506
S.E.2d 400, 401–02 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998). And in Kass v. City of New
York the Second Circuit held that officers had probable cause to ar-
rest the plaintiff for violating a state law prohibiting obstruction of
the administration of governmental functions. See 864 F.3d 200,
28                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12946

210 (2d Cir. 2017). The plaintiff in Kass had “physically interfered
with the officers’ efforts to confine [a] protest to [a] park and keep
the sidewalk clear for pedestrians” by pulling away from an officer
who tried “to guide [the plaintiﬀ] away from the barricades” that
had been set up to separate protestors from pedestrians. Id.
       The McCrosky and Kass cases are readily distinguishable from
this one. There’s no allegation in the amended complaint or indi-
cation in the body camera video that Jackson moved the barricade
after a warning from an oﬃcer not to do so, or that she moved it
in disregard of any sign warning she would be entering private
property where no trespassing was allowed, or that she violated
any law or police instructions to stay away from the barricade. In-
stead, without any warning that she should not do so, Jackson
moved the barricade so that she and her ﬁancé could leave the mall
parking lot.
     C. That Jackson’s Fiancé Drove in the Wrong Direction or on
                       the Wrong Side of the Road.
       Swanger argues that “the car in which Jackson was riding . . .
attempted to exit in the wrong direction at the particular access
point at which the driver chose to attempt to leave.” Swanger has
not pointed to any of Georgia’s Rules on the Road, or any other
rule or statutory provision that makes it a crime to drive on the
wrong side of a lane marked oﬀ in a private parking lot, as distin-
guished from a public road. In any event, we need not decide if
there is such a provision because the allegations of the amended
complaint do not allege, and the considered video footage does not
22-12946                    Opinion of the Court                           29

show, that the vehicle was going the wrong way in the parking lot
at or before the time it was stopped.
       The considered video footage does show that the vehicle
was stopped on a paved roadway that apparently had at least two
lanes. And that the vehicle was facing an entrance or exit to a
street. But there are no visible signs that indicate the car had been
moving in the wrong direction. The stopped vehicle is straddling a
white line, but Swanger has not argued that the vehicle was illegally
changing lanes or not driving in one lane. Nor would the consid-
ered video footage clearly support such a position; just as plausibly,
the vehicle was mid-turn when the police pulled it over, driving into
the right-hand lane to reach the opening from which Jackson had
                        7
moved the barricade.
       At the motion to dismiss stage, where video footage incor-
porated into the pleadings “is clear and obviously contradicts the
plaintiff’s alleged facts,” we can disregard the operative complaint’s
contradictory allegations. Baker, 67 F.4th at 1277–78. But that is
not the case here. The considered video footage does not affirma-
tively establish that Jackson’s vehicle was traveling in the wrong
direction or on the wrong side of the road when it was stopped.

7 Swanger points to additional footage from his body worn camera that he

contends shows that the vehicle was driving the wrong way or on the wrong
side of the road. That footage captures events that occurred more than four
minutes after Swanger and Brandt pulled over and seized Jackson and her fi-
ancé. Because it is not part of the considered video footage, we will not take
it into account at this stage.
30                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12946

Accepting the facts that the amended complaint alleges, and the
absence of a fact that it does not allege, we conclude that Jackson’s
fiancé was not driving in the wrong direction or on the wrong side
of the road.
         D. That Jackson’s Fiancé’s Driving Was “Peculiar.”
        Swanger argues that, even if Jackson and her fiancé were not
breaking laws, the “peculiar” circumstances of their drive through
the mall parking lot provided reasonable suspicion. He notes that
they were present in the parking lot after midnight. And he points
to LeRoux v. State, 684 S.E. 2d 424 (Ga. Ct. App. 2009), where the
Court of Appeals of Georgia concluded that an oﬃcer had reason-
able suspicion to stop a car that entered a university golf course at
2:30 a.m. where “numerous crimes had been committed . . . after
hours.” Id. at 426. In that case, the vehicle subject to the stop drove
“past signs clearly indicating that the roadway was private prop-
erty[,] . . . drove past many places where [the driver] could have
turned around or stopped if he had taken a wrong turn or stopped
if he needed to consult a map or make a telephone call[, ] . . . en-
tered a parking lot and began circling, and . . . continued to circle
rather than exit the parking lot when he returned to the entrance.”
Id.
       Of course, we are not bound by decisions of any state court
about whether a given set of facts amounts to reasonable suspicion
for Fourth Amendment purposes. See Deen v. Egleston, 597 F.3d
1223, 1234 n.3 (11th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t goes without saying . . . that
the opinions of state supreme courts do not bind us on questions
22-12946               Opinion of the Court                         31

of federal constitutional law.”). And, even if we were bound by
LeRoux, it is distinguishable. There is nothing in the amended com-
plaint or the considered video footage indicating that the vehicle
that Jackson and her fiancé were in was circling continuously on
private property that was known to be a hot spot for crime, all the
while ignoring opportunities to exit and leave. They were, instead,
actively searching for a way to exit and leave the mall parking lot
and get back onto the main road. Otherwise, Jackson would have
had no reason to move the barricade that was blocking them from
leaving.
       E. Under the Totality of the Circumstances, It Was Clearly
       Established that Swanger Lacked Reasonable Suspicion to
                            Stop the Vehicle.
       Accepting Jackson’s allegations as true and taking into ac-
count the considered video footage, we conclude that Jackson’s fi-
ancé was attempting to drive out of the mall parking lot. The ve-
hicle did not violate any applicable traffic rules. She moved a bar-
ricade so that they could exit the mall area, which was not an illegal
act given the circumstances.
       It is clearly established that there was no reasonable suspi-
cion to stop the vehicle on these facts. See Jackson, 206 F.3d at 1161,
1166 (affirming the denial of qualified immunity where officers
made an investigatory stop of the plaintiffs based on their allegedly
suspicious behavior while driving where the evidence showed,
among other things, that they had “obeyed all traffic laws” and
“acted normally”). Development of the factual record may bring
32                        Opinion of the Court                        22-12946

to light additional factors showing that it was not a violation of
clearly established law for Swanger to stop the vehicle. But at this
stage, we accept the allegations in the pleadings and the considered
video footage. We affirm the district court’s denial of Swanger’s
                                                                  8
motion to dismiss on Jackson’s unlawful seizure claim.
                VI. Jurisdiction Over Brandt’s Appeal
       We turn next to Brandt’s appeal of the district court’s denial
of qualiﬁed immunity for Jackson’s two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims
against him: that Brandt unlawfully seized her, and that he failed to
intervene in Swanger’s use of excessive force against her. We begin
with a discussion of our jurisdiction to review the denial of those
two claims.
A. Jurisdiction over and Resolution of the Unlawful Seizure Claim
       Brandt’s position on the district court’s denial of his motion
to dismiss the unlawful seizure claim is identical to Swanger’s posi-
                      9
tion on that issue. Like Swanger, Brandt challenges both (1) the

8 Swanger also presents a one-sentence argument that he had probable cause

to arrest Jackson because she “obstructed Officer Swanger’s efforts [to detain
her] and attempted to flee.” The district court, having denied the motion to
dismiss the unlawful seizure claim on the ground that the officers lacked rea-
sonable suspicion based on clearly established law, did not reach the probable
cause issue. Because we affirm the district court’s denial of the motion to dis-
miss the unlawful seizure claim based on the absence of reasonable suspicion
under clearly established law, we also do not reach probable cause.
9 Brandt and Swanger jointly filed both their motion to dismiss before the dis-

trict court and all of their briefs to this Court. They were also represented by
22-12946                 Opinion of the Court                           33

district court’s ﬁnding that he violated clearly established law when
the two of them stopped Jackson and her ﬁancé’s vehicle without
reasonable suspicion, and (2) the district court’s decision not to in-
corporate some of Swanger’s body camera footage or any of the
spliced video into the pleadings.
       Brandt’s assertion that he did not violate clearly established
law when he stopped the vehicle is a “core qualified immunity is-
sue[].” Cottrell, 85 F.3d at 1484 (quotation marks omitted). We
have jurisdiction to review that issue for the reasons discussed in
Part IV.A concerning our jurisdiction over the denial of qualified
immunity to Swanger on the unlawful seizure claim. And we af-
firm the district court’s denial of Brandt’s motion to dismiss the un-
lawful seizure claim for the reasons explained in Part V concerning
the merits of Swanger’s qualified immunity defense to the unlawful
seizure claim.
       Brandt’s challenge to the district court’s discretionary deci-
sion not to incorporate certain extrinsic material into the pleadings
does not raise an abstract issue of law. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 671–
74; Digital, 511 U.S. at 872. We lack jurisdiction under the collateral
order doctrine to reach that part of Brandt’s appeal, and we decline
to assert pendant appellate jurisdiction, for the reasons explained
in Part IV.B concerning our lack of jurisdiction to address the same
issue raised by Swanger.

the same counsel during oral argument. Brandt hasn’t argued that his quali-
fied immunity defense to the unlawful seizure claim differs from Swanger’s.
34                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12946

        B. Jurisdiction over the Failure to Intervene Claim
       Brandt argues in part that he is entitled to qualified immun-
ity on Jackson’s failure to intervene claim because Jackson’s
amended complaint fails to adequately allege that he violated
clearly established law when he failed to intervene in Swanger’s al-
leged use of excessive force. That is an abstract legal issue which
we have jurisdiction to review under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Piazza,
923 F.3d at 951 n.5; Morris, 748 F.3d at 1319 n.3; Keating, 598 F.3d at
760.
       Jackson argues that we lack jurisdiction to reach the district
court’s dismissal of Brandt’s failure to intervene claim for two rea-
sons. First, she mistakenly contends that Brandt failed to make that
argument before the district court. Brandt’s motion to dismiss be-
fore the district court explicitly challenged the suﬃciency of Jack-
son’s allegations about that claim, and the district court ruled that
Jackson’s amended complaint did state a violation of clearly estab-
lished law regarding Brandt’s failure to intervene.
       Second, Jackson contends that Brandt’s argument is “base-
less.” But that is an argument about the merits, not an argument
about our jurisdiction. We do have interlocutory jurisdiction to
determine whether Jackson’s failure to intervene claim “suffi-
ciently alleged the violation of a clearly established right.” Keating,
22-12946                   Opinion of the Court                               35

598 F.3d at 760 (quotation marks omitted). We proceed to address
                             10
the merits of that claim.
VII. Whether Brandt Violated Clearly Established Law When
   He Did Not Intervene to Stop Swanger’s Alleged Use of
                     Excessive Force
        Jackson claims that Brandt violated the Fourth Amendment
by failing to intervene in Swanger’s use of excessive force. “An of-
ficer who is present at the scene and who fails to take reasonable
steps to protect the victim of another officer’s use of excessive
force[] can be held liable for his nonfeasance” if that officer “was in
a position to intervene yet failed to do so.” Crenshaw v. Lister, 556
F.3d 1283, 1293–94 (11th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Jackson al-
leges that Brandt “was in a position to intervene” physically and
verbally but “made no effort” to do so when Swanger (1) pursued
the vehicle without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, (2) un-
holstered his firearm, (3) pointed it at Jackson, (4) “physically as-
sault[ed]” her, and (5) threw her to the ground. According to Jack-
son’s amended complaint, Brandt “had the opportunity” to instruct

10 Brandt also asserts that the district court “erred by failing to consider” the

spliced video when it denied qualified immunity on the failure to intervene
claim against him. That is another way of arguing that the district court
abused its discretion by not considering certain video footage when it assessed
the sufficiency of Jackson’s pleadings. For the reasons discussed in connection
to Swanger’s challenge to the denial of qualified immunity on Jackson’s un-
lawful seizure claim against him, see Part IV.B infra, we lack interlocutory ju-
risdiction to consider this video footage issue. And to the extent that we have
pendent appellant jurisdiction over it, we decline to exercise it. See id.
36                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12946

Swanger not to take these actions, but Brandt “never told” Swanger
not to do so.
       Brandt argues that Jackson’s pleadings, along with the video
evidence, fail to state that he was in a position to intervene because
Brandt was “dealing with” another suspect at the time of the al-
leged excessive force: Jackson’s fiancé, the driver of the car. Brandt
relies on two sources to support that position. First, he cites the
following paragraph in Jackson’s amended complaint:
      One oﬃcer, now known to be Defendant Brandt, got
      out of the patrol car and went toward the driver’s side
      of the vehicle they had stopped, while a second oﬃcer,
      now known to be Defendant Swanger, ran around to
      Ms. Jackson’s passenger side of the vehicle.
In Brandt’s view, Jackson’s allegation that he approached her ﬁancé
on the other side of the car is inconsistent with her claim that he
was in a position to intervene.
       Second, Brandt points to the portion of Swanger’s body
camera footage hyperlinked in his motion to dismiss that captures
the alleged use of excessive force. That footage falls within the
considered video footage that the district court incorporated into
the pleadings, so we will also consider it. See Part V infra.
       Based on the considered video footage, Brandt argues that
“only 14 seconds” passed between the time Jackson was “out of the
car” and the time she was “on the ground.” Brandt asserts that he
could not have intervened in this time “[g]iven that [he] was deal-
ing with the driver on the other side of the car.”
22-12946               Opinion of the Court                         37

       An oﬃcer is obligated to take reasonable steps to intervene
in another oﬃcer’s use of excessive force, but only if he is in a po-
sition where he can reasonably do so. See Crenshaw, 556 F.3d at
1293–94. One method of intervention is by verbally commanding
or directing the other officer to stop using the force that is exces-
sive. See Priester v. City of Riviera Beach, Fla., 208 F.3d 919, 923–28
(11th Cir. 2000) (reversing the grant of qualified immunity to a ser-
geant who failed to intervene and tell an officer to restrain his dog
who attacked the plaintiff for up to two minutes).
       In many situations, an officer will not be in a position to in-
tervene in the use of force against one suspect if his attention is
focused on another suspect. See Alston v. Swarbrick, 954 F.3d 1312,
1321 (11th Cir. 2020) (aﬃrming grant of summary judgment to de-
fendant oﬃcer on failure to intervene claim where he “helped . . .
restrain” another suspect “while” another oﬃcer allegedly used ex-
cessive force against the plaintiﬀ); Ensley v. Soper, 142 F.3d 1402,
1407–08 (11th Cir. 1998) (reversing denial of qualiﬁed immunity to
defendant oﬃcer on summary judgment where the alleged exces-
sive force “occurred while [the defendant oﬃcer] was attempting
to restrain and arrest” another suspect).
      The Alston and Ensley rule makes sense. Oﬃcers, like other
mortals, cannot do two things in two diﬀerent locations at once.
And they cannot be expected to leave a potentially dangerous sus-
pect unattended to intervene between an oﬃcer and another sus-
pect. The facts of this case (the allegations in the pleadings along
with the considered video footage) illustrate why. According to
38                       Opinion of the Court                    22-12946

Jackson’s amended complaint, Swanger approached Jackson on the
passenger’s side of the vehicle, while Brandt approached Jackson’s
ﬁancé on the driver’s side of the vehicle. Brandt did not know the
identity of the driver. He had no way of knowing if the driver was
armed. For all he knew the stranger who had been driving in a
parking lot of a mall at about 1:00 a.m. was dangerous. A reasona-
ble oﬃcer in this situation would keep his eyes and attention on the
suspect for whom he was responsible, with the expectation that his
fellow oﬃcer was properly managing the other suspect on the
other side of the car. He would not focus his attention on moni-
toring the other oﬃcer’s behavior, or at least not every reasonable
oﬃcer would have done so.
        There are situations where a reasonable oﬃcer should divert
his attention from one suspect to intervene in another oﬃcer’s use
of excessive force. But here, any use of excessive force happened
quickly and was over quickly. Swanger’s body camera footage
demonstrates how quickly. It shows that Swanger took about
three seconds to open his own car door and run to the passenger’s
                                                           11
side of the other vehicle where Jackson was seated. Swanger re-
peatedly shouted at Jackson to “[g]et out of the car” and screamed
“shut the fuck up.” About two seconds later, the passenger-side
door opened. Jackson stepped out of the vehicle after about three
seconds, and then she began moving away from Swanger after

11 The amended complaint alleges that when he reached the other vehicle,

Swanger’s firearm was drawn. Because this fact was not clearly contradicted
by the footage, we accept it as true, but it does not change our conclusion.
22-12946               Opinion of the Court                       39

another four seconds. Swanger made physical contact with Jack-
son, and Jackson’s body blocked most of the camera’s view for
about seven seconds. Jackson was then seen on the ground, and
two seconds later, Swanger began putting Jackson in handcuﬀs. It
was done and over that quickly.
       Swanger’s body camera footage establishes that approxi-
mately nine seconds passed between the moment when Swanger
ﬁrst made physical contact with Jackson and the time when
Swanger had Jackson on the ground and began handcuﬃng her.
Jackson’s position is that the law was clearly established that in
those nine or so seconds, the Fourth Amendment required Brandt
to stop dealing with the driver and focus on what was happening
between Swanger and Jackson; and determine if she was resisting
or attempting to ﬂee; and assess the amount of force Swanger was
using on Jackson; and make a determination on whether it was too
much force in view of all the circumstances; and, if he decided it
was excessive, decide how he should intervene; and then intervene
in an appropriate and reasonable manner. All in the course of nine
seconds or so.
       It would not be reasonable to require anyone to think and
move that quickly in a diﬃcult and fast-evolving situation that is
fraught with uncertainty and peril. As we have emphasized before
in reversing the denial of qualiﬁed immunity in an excessive force
case, officers have to make rushed judgments “in circumstances
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving.” Corbitt v. Vickers,
929 F.3d 1304, 1321 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omitted).
40                     Opinion of the Court                 22-12946

The law does not require perfection, much less the super-human
perfection and speed that Jackson would have us demand of
Brandt. Instead, as we explained in Corbitt, Fourth Amendment ex-
cessive force claims are “evaluated pursuant to a calculus that must
embody allowance for the fact that police officers” are often forced
to make quick decisions in difficult circumstances. Id. (alterations
adopted) (quotation marks omitted). No binding authority re-
quires oﬃcers to engage in extraordinary feats of action, reaction,
speed, and movement. Clearly established law does not place that
burden on Brandt. See Hadley v. Gutierrez, 526 F.3d 1324, 1331 (11th
Cir. 2008) (reversing denial of qualiﬁed immunity on failure to in-
tervene claim against defendant oﬃcer who was in no position to
“anticipate[] and then stop[]” his fellow oﬃcer’s use of force).
“[O]n-the-scene officers are often hampered by incomplete infor-
mation and forced to make a split-second decision between action
and inaction.” Davis v. City of Apopka, 78 F.4th 1326, 1335 (11th Cir.
2023) (quotation marks omitted) (aﬃrming dismissal of Fourth
Amendment arrest claims). Reasonableness is required, and rea-
sonableness is not perfection.
       There is no decision of this Court or the Supreme Court es-
tablishing that, in the circumstances of this case, Brandt violated
Jackson’s clearly established rights by not intervening. The district
court based its contrary decision on four published opinions, but
two of them actually held that the defendant oﬃcers were entitled
to qualiﬁed immunity on the plaintiﬀs’ failure to intervene claims.
See Crenshaw, 556 F.3d at 1294; Ensley, 142 F.3d at 1407–08. A deci-
sion holding that an oﬃcer did not violate the Fourth Amendment
22-12946               Opinion of the Court                         41

by failing to intervene in that case cannot possibly establish ––
much less clearly establish –– that an oﬃcer did violate the Fourth
Amendment in another case by failing to intervene.
        In the other two decisions the district court relied on, there
were denials of summary judgment to the defendant officers, but
in circumstances different from the ones in this case. The officers
in those cases were not involved with rapidly evolving situations in
which they had to make nearly instantaneous decisions. See Ve-
lazquez v. City of Hialeah, 484 F.3d 1340, 1342 (11th Cir. 2007) (re-
versing grant of summary judgment to officers who allegedly used
excessive force or failed to intervene where plaintiff “alleged that
two officers were present when he was subjected to a beating while
handcuffed” and both officers “admitted being present”); Skrtich v.
Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2002) (affirming de-
nial of qualified immunity to prison officials who allegedly either
“administered a severe beating with no other purpose than the in-
ﬂiction of pain,” resulting in the prisoner being airlifted to a hospi-
tal, or stood by and watched the assault take place). Neither of
those two sets of facts resemble what happened here.
        We follow Baker’s holding that “where a video is clear and
obviously contradicts the plaintiﬀ’s alleged facts, we accept the
video’s depiction instead of the complaint’s account.” 67 F.4th at
1277–78. Doing so leads to the conclusion that Brandt did not have
a reasonable opportunity to intervene physically or verbally and
stop Swanger’s use of alleged excessive force against Jackson. As a
result, Brandt did not violate Jackson’s Fourth Amendment rights,
42                     Opinion of the Court                22-12946

much less her clearly established Fourth Amendment rights. The
district court should have granted his motion to dismiss the claim
on qualiﬁed immunity grounds.
                         VIII. Conclusion
        We lack jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 to consider
Swanger and Brandt’s appeal of the district court’s decision not to
incorporate certain video footage into the pleadings. And we de-
cline to assert pendant appellate jurisdiction over that issue. As a
result, we grant Jackson’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
the part of the appeal challenging the district court’s decision not
to incorporate into the amended complaint certain video footage,
and we dismiss that part of the appeal. If either party properly
raises them, the district court can and should reconsider for sum-
mary judgment and trial purposes any authentication and other is-
sues involving any part of the video footage.
        Because we do have interlocutory jurisdiction to review the
district court’s denial of Swanger and Brandt’s motion to dismiss
Jackson’s unlawful seizure claim, we deny Jackson’s motion to dis-
miss that part of this appeal. We aﬃrm the district court’s denial
of the oﬃcers’ motion to dismiss that claim.
       We also have interlocutory jurisdiction to review the district
court’s denial of Brandt’s motion to dismiss Jackson’s failure to in-
tervene claim, and we vacate and remand with instructions for the
court to dismiss that claim.
DISMISSED IN PART, AFFIRMED IN PART, AND VACATED
AND REMANDED IN PART.