Court Opinion

ID: 9409404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-18 07:00:20.247156+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.245789
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     SHELLY S. SMITH,                                DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        SF-0752-14-0085-I-3

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY,                         DATE: July 17, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Shelly S. Smith, Monterey, California, pro se.

           Michael L. Halperin, Esquire, Monterey, California, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     sustained her removal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the
     following circumstances:      the initial decision contains erroneous findings of
     material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute
     or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                        2

     administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial
     decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of
     discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and
     material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.       Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).            After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review and AFFIRM the initial decision,
     which is now the Board’s final decision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.113(b).

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant was employed as an Assistant Professor in the Hebrew
     Department at the agency’s Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center
     (DLIFLC) in Monterey, California.       Smith v. Department of the Army, MSPB
     Docket No. SF-0752-14-0085-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 10 at 17. The
     agency proposed the appellant’s removal from her position based on three
     charges: (1) creating a disturbance (four specifications); (2) discourtesy (two
     specifications); and (3) failure to follow instructions (one specification).     Id.
     at 11-15. After reviewing the appellant’s written response and affording her two
     oral responses, the deciding official sustained the proposal and removed the
     appellant from her position. Id. at 7-9.
¶3        The appellant timely appealed her removal to the Board. IAF, Tab 1. The
     appeal was dismissed without prejudice twice to afford the parties more time to
     prepare for a hearing and as a result of an injury the appellant suffered.     IAF,
     Tab 15; Smith v. Department of the Army, MSPB Docket No. SF-0752-14-0085-
     I-2, Appeal File, Tabs 1, 17. After the second refiling, the administrative judge
     held a hearing and issued an initial decision sustaining all of the specifications
     and charges and upholding the removal. Smith v. Department of the Army, MSPB
                                                                                              3

     Docket No. SF-0752-14-0085-I-3, Appeal File (I-3 AF), Tabs 22-26, Tab 29,
     Initial Decision (ID) at 4-15.       The administrative judge also found that the
     appellant failed to prove her affirmative defenses of alleged due process
     violations and equal opportunity employment (EEO) retaliation.              ID at 15-22.
     She also found that the agency proved that the charges bore a nexus to the
     efficiency of the service and that the penalty of removal was reasonable.               ID
     at 22-27.
¶4         The appellant has filed a petition for review challenging the administrative
     judge’s credibility findings and reasserting her claim that the agency violated her
     due process rights in the removal process. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 10
     at 3-20. 2 The agency has filed an opposition to the appellant’s petition, to which
     she has replied. PFR File, Tabs 14-15.

     2
       In her petition for review, the appellant makes various general claims of retaliation,
     PFR File, Tab 10 at 4, 11-12, Tab 15 at 5, 11, 13-14, but does not appear to directly
     dispute the administrative judge’s findings regarding the alleged EEO retaliation claim,
     ID at 19-22. In the initial decision, the administrative judge stated that the appellant
     could prove her EEO retaliation claim through direct evidence, circumstantial evidence,
     or both. ID at 19-21; see Savage v. Department of the Army, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 42
     (2015). However, after the Board’s decision in Savage, in which it discussed these
     different types of evidence, the Board subsequently held that all evidence belongs in a
     single pile and must be evaluated as a whole. See Gardner v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶ 29 (2016). Here, we find no prejudicial error in the
     administrative judge’s discussion of direct versus circumstantial evidence because her
     analysis of all of the relevant evidence reflects a consideration of the record as a whole.
     ID at 21-22. Further, after our review of the record, we discern no reason to disturb the
     administrative judge’s finding that the appellant failed to prove by preponderant
     evidence that retaliation for prior EEO activity was a motivating factor in the agency’s
     removal action. Id.; see Savage, 122 M.S.P.R. 612, ¶ 41. Because we discern no error
     with the administrative judge’s motivating factor analysis or conclusion regarding this
     claim, we do not reach the question of whether retaliation was a “but-for” cause of the
     removal action. See Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31,
     ¶¶ 22-25.
                                                                                          4

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The agency proved all three charges by preponderant evidence.
¶5         Generally, an agency is required to prove its charges in an adverse action
     appeal by preponderant evidence. 5 U.S.C. § 7701(c)(1)(B). A preponderance of
     the evidence is that degree of relevant evidence that a reasonable person,
     considering the record as a whole, would accept as sufficient to find that a
     contested fact is more likely to be true than untrue. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(q). After
     our review of the record and in consideration of the appellant’s arguments on
     review, we agree with the administrative judge that the agency proved all three
     charges by preponderant evidence.

           Charge one: creating a disturbance
¶6         Regarding the charge of creating a disturbance, the agency alleged in
     specification one that during a faculty meeting held by her first -line supervisor,
     the appellant was disruptive, uncooperative, and defiant. IAF, Tab 10 at 11. The
     agency also alleged in specification one that the appellant was confrontational
     and accused her first-line supervisor of discriminating against her and blocking
     her “free communication.” Id. In specification two, the agency alleged that the
     appellant made unwarranted inquiries into personal employee matters such as
     leave use and absences that caused colleagues undue concern.                   Id.   In
     specifications three and four, the agency alleged that the appellant inappropriately
     interrupted another teacher’s classroom on two separate oc casions while he was
     teaching and stated that the classroom was too loud and made her unable to
     concentrate.   Id. at 11-12.     The fourth specification also adds that after
     interrupting the classroom for the second time, the appellant proceeded to have a
     loud conversation just outside the classroom, prompting the teacher to ask the
     appellant to lower her voice so that his class could concentrate. Id. at 12.
¶7         In the initial decision, the administrative judge considered the relevant
     documentary evidence, including emails, memoranda, and handwritten notes
     related to the facts alleged in charge one. ID at 6-10; IAF, Tab 9 at 14-15, 19-25.
                                                                                       5

     She also discussed the relevant testimony provided by the appellant, who she
     found to be not credible.    ID at 6-10.    In addition, the administrative judge
     considered testimony from the appellant’s first-line supervisor, her former team
     leader who also was present at the meeting detailed in specification one, the
     coworker with whom the appellant made inquiries regarding leave usage and
     absences who is discussed in specification two, and the teacher referenced in
     specifications three and four. Id. As discussed by the administrative judge, all of
     this testimony appears consistent with what was alleged in the proposal notice.
     Id.; I-3 AF, Tab 22, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD).         The administrative judge
     found the witness’s testimony to be specific, detailed, consistent with the record,
     and not inherently improbable.      ID at 6-10.     Based on the foregoing, the
     administrative judge found that the agency proved specifications one through four
     by preponderant evidence, and she sustained the charge. ID at 7-10.
¶8        On review, the appellant challenges the administrative judge’s credibility
     findings regarding her first-line supervisor and generally argues that she was
     “heavily and closely coached” at the hearing and that she was not a credible
     witness. PFR File, Tab 10 at 11-13. She also challenges the credibility findings
     regarding the appellant’s former team leader who was present at th e meeting
     described in specification one and the employee with whom the appellant spoke
     concerning personal employment matters as discussed in specification two.
     PFR File, Tab 15 at 4-6. When an administrative judge has held a hearing and
     has made credibility determinations that were explicitly or implicitly based on the
     witness’s demeanor while testifying, the Board must defer to those credibility
     determinations and may overturn such determinations only when it has
     “sufficiently sound” reasons for doing so.    Purifoy v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, 838 F.3d 1367, 1372-73 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Haebe v. Department of
     Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002). Here, the administrative judge
     appropriately relied on the factors set forth in Hillen v. Department of the Army,
     35 M.S.P.R. 453, 458 (1987), to assess witness credibility and found these
                                                                                        6

      witnesses to be credible.      ID at 6-10.         Given the administrative judge’s
      demeanor-based findings, we find that the appellant has failed to provide a
      “sufficiently sound” reason to disturb these conclusions.
¶9         The appellant also submits on review unauthenticated emails intended to
      impeach the testimony of the teacher whose classroom the appellant interrupted
      as detailed in specifications three and four, thereby trying to undermine his
      credibility. PFR File, Tab 10 at 22-23. The Board generally will only consider
      new evidence submitted on review that is material and not available when the
      record closed. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). Evidence offered on a petition for review
      merely to impeach a witness’s credibility is generally not considered new and
      material.     Brown v. Department of the Navy, 71 M.S.P.R. 479, 482 (1996).
      Moreover, even after our review of the emails, we find them to be immateri al.
      The substance of the emails deals with the degree to which the t eacher used the
      classroom and details of a faculty dance and has no relevance to the facts alleged
      by the agency in charge one. PFR File, Tab 10 at 22-23. Accordingly, we find
      the appellant’s arguments to be without merit, and we affirm the administrative
      judge’s findings regarding charge one.        ID at 6-10; see Purifoy, 838 F.3d
      at 1372-73.

            Charges two and three: discourtesy and failure to follow instructions
¶10        Regarding charge two, discourtesy, the agency alleged in specification one
      that the appellant was disrespectful and passive aggressive in her conversations
      with her first-line supervisor and the assistant dean concerning her displeasure
      with not receiving a congratulatory email for her team’s graduating class. IAF,
      Tab 10 at 12.      The specification also alleged that the appellant’s supervisor
      reminded the appellant that she had sent a congratulatory card and flowers and
      that the supervisor asked the appellant to focus on her job, rather than worry
      about receiving a congratulatory email.      Id.    In specification two, the agency
      alleged that the appellant was disrespectful, defiant, and argumentative with her
      supervisor during a performance-review discussion. Id.
                                                                                         7

¶11         Regarding charge three, failure to follow instructions, the agency alleged
      that the appellant’s supervisor asked her to schedule her meeting on an EEO
      matter after 3:00 p.m. to minimize disruption to her teaching schedule, but the
      appellant later requested last-minute permission to attend a 9:00 a.m. meeting on
      the EEO matter. Id. at 13. The agency argues that the appellant did not seek
      clarification or reconsideration of her supervisor’s request, and it asserts that the
      appellant failed to follow her supervisor’s instruction regarding the appropriate
      time to schedule the meeting. Id.
¶12         In the initial decision, the administrative judge considered the relevant
      documentary evidence for charge two, including a series of emails between the
      appellant, her supervisor, and the assistant dean regarding the congratulatory
      email, and an email from the appellant’s supervisor wherein she outlined what
      occurred at the performance-review session. ID at 11-13; IAF, Tab 9 at 26-31.
      She also considered the relevant documentary evidence for charge three,
      including a series of emails related to the appellant’s request to attend the EEO
      meeting at 9:00 a.m. ID at 14; IAF, Tab 9 at 32-36. The administrative judge,
      moreover, discussed the relevant testimony from the appellant and h er supervisor,
      and she found that the supervisor’s testimony, which largely comported with the
      alleged facts in the proposal notice, was specific, detailed, consistent with the
      record, not inherently improbable, and, therefore, credible. ID at 11-15. Thus,
      the administrative judge found that the agency proved all of the specifications
      included in charges two and three, and she sustained both of those charges. ID
      at 13, 15.
¶13         The appellant does not appear to dispute the facts alleged in charges two
      and three and generally asserts, as discussed above, that her supervisor was not a
      credible witness. PFR File, Tab 10 at 11-13. We already have found that the
      appellant has failed to provide a “sufficiently sound” reason to encroach on the
      deference owed to the administrative judge’s credibility determinations,
      supra ¶ 8, and we reiterate that finding here, see Purifoy, 838 F.3d at 1372-73;
                                                                                        8

      Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301. Accordingly, we will not disturb the administrative
      judge’s findings regarding charges two and three.
¶14        Based on the foregoing, we agree with the administrative judge that the
      agency proved all three of its charges by preponderant evidence. Despite the
      appellant’s argument on review that the administrative judge inadequately
      analyzed and gave little or insufficient weight to relevant evidence, and arrived at
      the wrong findings and conclusions, PFR File, Tab 15 at 14, we find that her
      arguments   amount    to   nothing   more    than   mere   disagreement   with   the
      administrative judge’s conclusions, and we find no basis to disturb these findings,
      see, e.g., Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98, 106 (1997) (finding no
      reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she considered the
      evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned
      conclusions); Broughton v. Department of Health and Human Services,
      33 M.S.P.R. 357, 359 (1987) (same).         In addition, the administrative judge’s
      failure to mention all of the evidence of record does not mean that she did not
      consider it in reaching her decision.       Marques v. Department of Health and
      Human Services, 22 M.S.P.R. 129, 132 (1984), aff’d, 776 F.2d 1062 (Fed. Cir.
      1985) (Table).

      The appellant failed to prove that the agency violated her due process rights.
¶15        The appellant argued before the administrative judge, and argues again on
      review, that the agency violated her due process rights in several ways. I-3 AF,
      Tab 19 at 4-5; PFR File, Tab 10 at 3-19. The appellant’s due process arguments
      on review can be summarized as follows: the deciding official did not adequately
      consider the materials she provided in her written response to the proposed
      removal; the deciding official was improperly influenced in her decision by other
      agency officials; and she did not receive several documents relied upon by the
      agency in arriving at the decision to remove her from her position. PFR File,
      Tab 10 at 3-19.   After our review of the record and in consideration of the
      appellant’s arguments on review, we find that she has failed to prove that the
                                                                                             9

      agency     violated   her   due   process   rights   as   alleged.       See   5   C.F.R.
      § 1201.56(b)(2)(i)(C).

               Whether the appellant’s replies to the proposal notice were
               adequately considered
¶16         The essential requirements of procedural due process are prior notice of the
      charges against the employee and a meaningful opportunity to respond to those
      charges. Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 546
      (1985).    Here, the appellant does not dispute that she received a notice of
      proposed removal, that she submitted a written response, and that sh e presented
      two oral replies; rather, she argues that the deciding official did not adequately
      consider her replies. PFR File, Tab 10 at 4, 9-10. In the initial decision, the
      administrative judge discussed the deciding official’s testimony that she spent
      extensive time reviewing the materials submitted by the appellant and ultimately
      found that the appellant was provided with an adequate opportunity to present her
      case to the deciding official. ID at 16.
¶17         The appellant dedicates a significant portion of her petition for review to
      challenging the deciding official’s credibility. PFR File, Tab 10 at 3-6, 11-12,
      18-19.     She attempts to highlight inconsistencies in the deciding official’s
      testimony concerning when the deciding official received and considered the
      appellant’s written response and whether she subsequently received the
      appellant’s supplemental documentation.        Id. at 3, 5-6.        She also points out
      alleged inconsistencies in the deciding official’s testimony regarding how long
      the decision process took and the content and duration of the “separation
      meeting” wherein the deciding official informed the appellant of her decision to
      remove her. Id. at 15-19. To support these allegations, the appellant points to
      deposition testimony juxtaposed with the deciding official’s hearing testimony.
      Id. at 3, 5, 15. The deposition transcript, however, is not included in the record.
      PFR File, Tab 16. We therefore decline to consider the appellant’s credibility
      arguments. See Brown, 71 M.S.P.R. at 482; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). Given the
                                                                                        10

      administrative judge’s demeanor-based credibility determinations, we will not
      disturb her finding that the deciding official was a credible witness and that she
      adequately considered the appellant’s written and oral responses pursuant to due
      process requirements. ID at 16, 18; see Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546; Purifoy, 838
      F.3d at 1372-73; Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301.

            Whether the deciding official was improperly influenced
¶18         On review, the appellant also argues that the deciding official was
      improperly influenced by other agency officials and by other employees who
      provided her with “false accusations” not contained in the proposal notice. PFR
      File, Tab 10 at 4, 11, 16-17. Although an appellant’s right to due process can
      extend to ex parte information provided to a deciding official, only ex parte
      communications that introduce new and material evidence to the deciding official
      constitute due process violations. Ward v. U.S. Postal Service, 634 F.3d 1274,
      1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
      179 F.3d 1368, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The ultimate question is whether the
      information is “so substantial and so likely to cause prejudice that no employee
      can fairly be required to be subjected to a deprivation of prop erty under such
      circumstances.” Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377.
¶19         The administrative judge considered this argument below. ID at 17-18. She
      discussed the appellant’s testimony that she believed that her supervisor was
      working in concert with the DLIFLC Provost to have her removed, and she
      considered the deciding official’s testimony that she relied solely on the removal
      notice, the appellant’s written and oral replies, and her discussions with human
      resources staff, upon whom she relied for technical guidance.              Id.   The
      administrative judge also considered testimony from the deciding official, the
      appellant’s supervisor, and the DLIFLC Provost, wherein all three witnesses
      testified that they did not speak to each other at any time after the proposal notice
      was issued. ID at 18. In observing these agency officials’ testimony, she found
      them to be credible. Id.
                                                                                            11

¶20         After our review of the record and the appellant’s challenges to the
      administrative judge’s credibility determinations on review, we find that the
      appellant has not provided a “sufficiently sound” reason to disturb the credibility
      determinations, and so we defer to them. See Purifoy, 838 F.3d at 1372-73; see
      also Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301.           Further, we find that the only ex parte
      communication proven to have occurred was between the deciding official and
      human resources personnel, wherein the deciding official sought technical
      guidance and further explanation of the Douglas 3 factors, HCD (testimony of the
      deciding official). 4   We find that the appellant has failed to prove that this
      communication was “so substantial and so likely to cause prejudice” that she
      could not fairly be required to be subjected to a deprivation of property under
      such circumstances. Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377. Accordingly, we will not disturb
      the administrative judge’s findings in this regard.

            Whether the appellant received the documents relied upon by the
            deciding official in arriving at her decision
¶21         On review, the appellant also argues that the deciding official’s notes from
      the oral responses and notes from any other agency official should have been
      delivered to her with the final decision. PFR File, Tab 10 at 6 -8. Specifically,
      the appellant argues that the deciding official did not forward her notes until the
      appellant requested them in discovery. Id. at 7. She also argues that two other
      agency officials, one who was present during the oral responses and another who
      was present at the “separation meeting,” both took handwritten notes that were
      never provided to her. Id. at 7-8.

      3
        In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 306 (1981), the Board
      provided a nonexhaustive list of 12 factors to be considered when assessing a penalty .
      4
        The deciding official testified that she was new to the process of having to remove an
      employee and sought assistance to help her further understand the nature of the Douglas
      factors because she believed that they were “not necessarily 100% clear on the surface .”
      HCD (testimony of the deciding official).
                                                                                          12

¶22         We find the appellant’s arguments to be unpersuasive. By the appellant’s
      own admission, the deciding official provided her with the notes in response to
      the appellant’s discovery request. Id. at 7. We have found no evidence in the
      record that the appellant requested the notes prior to discovery, and she has
      pointed to no law, rule, or regulation that would require the deciding official to
      provide the appellant with her notes without being requested to do so and we
      know of none.     See 5 C.F.R. § 752.406(c) (requiring the agency to maintain
      copies of summaries of the employee’s oral reply to furnish to the Board or the
      employee upon request). Further, even if the agency erred in not providing any
      additional notes from other agency officials who were present at the appellant’s
      oral responses and “separation meeting,” we find that this does not constitute a
      due process violation. The appellant has not provided any evidence proving that
      the agency’s alleged failure to provide her with the notes interfered with her
      notice of the agency’s charges against her or that it deprived her of a meaningful
      opportunity to respond to the charges. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546. Having
      found no due process violation, we must also consider whether the agency
      committed harmful procedural error.       Stone, 179 F.3d at 1377-78.      Procedural
      error warrants reversal of an agency’s action when the appellant establishes that
      the agency committed a procedural error, whether regulatory or statutory, that
      likely had a harmful effect on the outcome of the case before the agency. Powers
      v. Department of the Treasury, 86 M.S.P.R. 256, ¶ 10 (2000); 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.56(c). Here, even if we assume that the agency committed a procedural
      error, the appellant did not show that the agency’s failure to provide her with any
      notes that may have been taken by the two agency officials in question had a
      harmful effect on the outcome of her removal action. 5 As a result, we find that
      the appellant’s argument fails in this regard.

      5
       The appellant also appears to argue that the deciding official erred in not submitting
      her notes directly to human resources personnel following the oral responses. PFR File,
      Tab 10 at 7-8. However, the appellant has not pointed to any law, rule, or regulation
                                                                                        13

      The appellant failed to show any error in the agency’s penalty determination.
¶23         On review, the appellant makes two arguments concerning the agency’s
      penalty determination. First, given the agency’s reliance on prior discipline in
      selecting the penalty of removal, IAF, Tab 10 at 13, the appellant argues that two
      previous suspensions from 2007 and 2013 were not legitimate suspensions, PFR
      File, Tab 10 at 19.    Second, she argues that other employees have similarly
      caused disturbances and were either not disciplined or received less discipline.
      Id. at 19-20. We find both arguments to be meritless.
¶24         Regarding the appellant’s prior discipline argument, the 2007 suspension
      was not included in the proposal notice, and there is no evidence that it was relied
      upon by the deciding official in arriving at her decision.      IAF, Tab 10 at 13.
      Regarding the 2013 suspension, id., the appellant alleged that the deciding
      official in that suspension, who is also the deciding official in the instant action,
      retaliated against her for her EEO activity, I-3 AF, Tab 11 at 395. The appellant
      also alleged that her supervisor manipulated her colleagues and other employees
      to turn them against her.     Id. at 7, 19.    The Board’s review of a previous
      disciplinary action relied upon by the agency to assist in determining the
      appropriate penalty for the instant action is limited to determining whether it was
      clearly erroneous.      Guzman-Muelling v.       Social Security Administration,
      91 M.S.P.R. 601, ¶ 15 (2002). The administrative judge considered this argument
      below and found that the appellant’s allegations “lack sufficient specificity” to
      demonstrate that the 2013 suspension was clearly erroneous. ID at 26. We have
      reviewed the record, and without any additional evidence or argument being
      presented by the appellant on review, we agree with the administrative judge.
      Accordingly, we discern no error by the agency in assessing the appellant’s prior
      discipline in its decision to remove her from her position.

      that imposes such a requirement on the deciding official, and we know of none.
      Accordingly, we find the appellant’s argument to be without merit.
                                                                                       14

¶25        The appellant’s second argument, that other employees engaged in
      disruptive behavior and received lesser or no discipline, is similarly without
      merit. The appellant makes four arguments regarding disparate penalties. First,
      she alleges that several teachers in the Hebrew Department engaged in “conduct
      [that] caused [a] major disruption” and that only one of them was reprimanded
      and suspended. PFR File, Tab 10 at 19. Second, she argues that the teacher
      whose classroom she disrupted also disrupted her classroom, but he was never
      disciplined. Id. at 19-20. Third, she argues that another employee “violated tests
      security safety [sic]” and received a “lightly phrased [w]arning letter.” Id. at 20.
      Lastly, she argues that another employee made an inappropriate joke and only
      received verbal counseling. Id.
¶26        We find that the appellant has not provided sufficient information to prove
      a claim of disparate penalties.      The record does not appear to contain any
      substantiating evidence proving the appellant’s claims that the             alleged
      comparators actually engaged in the conduct alleged, that the alleged conduct was
      similar to the appellant’s misconduct, and that the alleged comparators received a
      lesser penalty or were not disciplined at all for their conduct.       Further, the
      appellant has not provided any details, such as when the alleged misconduct
      occurred, who the employees’ supervisors were, or any other facts indicating that
      they were similarly situated to the appellant. As a result, we find that there is no
      evidence that the agency treated similarly situated employees differently. In any
      event, the consistency of the penalty with those imposed upon other employees
      for the same or similar offenses is simply one of a nonexhaustive list of 12 factors
      that are relevant for consideration in determining the appropriateness of a penalty.
      Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981).

      The administrative judge did not err in denying some of the appellant’s witnesses.
¶27        The appellant also argues on review that the administrative judge abused
      her discretion when she denied several of the appellant’s requested witnesses.
      PFR File, Tab 15 at 13-14.        An administrative judge has wide discretion to
                                                                                      15

      control the proceedings, including the authority to exclude testimony she believes
      would be irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious. Vaughn v. Department of
      the Treasury, 119 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 12 (2013); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b). The Board
      has held that in order to obtain reversal of an initial decision on the ground that
      the administrative judge abused her discretion in excluding evidence, the
      petitioning party must show on review that relevant evidence, which could have
      affected the outcome, was disallowed. Vaughn, 119 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 12.
¶28         Here, the administrative judge approved five of the appellant’ s witnesses
      and provided her with an opportunity to submit additional information regarding
      four other witnesses. I-3 AF, Tab 16 at 2. The administrative judge also allowed
      the appellant to provide additional information for the 11 witnesses that were
      denied.   Id.   It does not appear that the appellant submitted any additional
      evidence on the 4 witnesses on whom the administrative judge had not yet ruled,
      or for the 11 witnesses that she excluded. Regarding those four witnesses, we
      find that the administrative judge’s ultimate denial of those witnesses can
      partially be attributed to the appellant’s own failure to provide supplemental
      information on their relevance and not to any error by the administrative judge.
      See Gardner v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 647, ¶ 18 (2016),
      clarified by Pridgen v. Office of Management and Budget, 2022 MSPB 31,
      ¶¶ 23-24. Regarding the remaining witnesses, the appellant’s vague assertions on
      review that the administrative judge erred in disallowing these witnesses do not
      show that their testimony would have been relevant, material, not repetitious, or
      that they could have affected the outcome of the case. PFR File, Tab 15 at 13-14.
      Therefore, we find that the appellant has failed to show that the administrative
      judge abused her discretion in disallowing some of her witnesses.
¶29         We have considered the appellant’s other arguments on review, but we
      conclude that a different outcome is not warranted. Accordingly, we affirm the
      initial decision.
                                                                                       16

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 6
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.               5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the M erit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review yo ur case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Ap peals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:

6
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                   17

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals f or the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving   a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
                                                                                18

requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower     Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                     19

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 7 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

7
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                       20

      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                  /s/ for
                                        Jennifer Everling
                                        Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.