Court Opinion

ID: 9941995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 14:02:40.182843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:34.901126
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: February 20, 2024

                        S23A0840. GREEN v. THE STATE.

       PINSON, Justice.

       Appellant Donald Berry Green entered a guilty plea for felony

murder and aggravated assault in connection with the shooting

death of Andre Winter.1 The record shows that Green entered that

       1 The crimes occurred on February 12, 2000. On March 21, 2000, a Fulton

County grand jury indicted Green for malice murder (Count 1), felony murder
(Count 2), aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (Count 3), armed robbery
(Count 4), and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony (Count
5). On September 18, 2000, Green entered a negotiated guilty plea to Counts 2
and 3; Count 3 merged into Count 2 and Counts 1, 4, and 5 were dead-docketed.
Green was sentenced to life for Count 2. In March of 2010, Green began to file
motions seeking an out-of-time appeal, and other relief. On November 3, 2021,
the trial court held a hearing on Green’s motion for an out-of-time appeal,
which it ultimately granted. Green filed his notice of appeal in December
2021.This Court issued an order dismissing that appeal under Seals v. State,
311 Ga. 739 (860 SE2d 419) (2021), because Green’s criminal case was not fi-
nal, as three counts of his indictment had been dead-docketed. See Green v.
State, S22A0713 (Mar. 30, 2022) (explaining that “[u]pon remittitur, the case
will return to the trial court, and [Green] will then have an opportunity to se-
cure a final disposition that includes all counts of the indictment”). On April 4,
2023, the dead-docketed counts were nolle prossed and the trial court entered
a final disposition leaving unchanged the sentence for the two counts to which
plea of his own free choice, and that when he entered it, he was

aware of the relevant circumstances and the likely consequences of

pleading guilty, including the charges to which he was pleading, the

various rights that he would waive by doing so, and the range of

punishments to which he would be exposed.

      Under any reasonable reading of United States Supreme Court

precedent, that record gave the trial court an adequate basis for ac-

cepting Green’s guilty plea as a matter of federal constitutional law,

because the record as a whole showed that Green’s plea was both

voluntary and intelligent. But a line of our decisions over the past

two decades would nonetheless call this plea into question because

Green was not expressly advised on the record of one of three specific

rights that were listed in Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (89 SCt

1709, 23 LE2d 274) (1969), as examples of the rights someone waives

when they enter a guilty plea. Under our line of decisions, accepting

a guilty plea when the record does not specifically indicate that the

Green initially pled guilty. On April 4, 2023, Green filed this appeal from the
final judgment.
                                      2
defendant was informed that he was waiving all three of these

“Boykin rights”—the right to a jury trial, the right to confront ad-

verse witnesses, and the right to be protected from compelled self-

incrimination—is a violation of federal constitutional law that re-

quires automatic reversal of the plea. The problem is that neither

Boykin itself nor any Supreme Court decision that followed it even

hints at that formalistic rule, and virtually every court across the

country to have considered it—federal and state alike—has rejected

that reading of Supreme Court precedent. In fact, in Goodman v.

State, 249 Ga. 11, 12-13 (1) (287 SE2d 26) (1982), even this Court

rejected that rule—a fact this Court failed to notice when we started

applying this automatic-reversal rule in the years following Good-

man.

       Today, we correct course. After careful review of the relevant

United States Supreme Court precedent, which binds our Court as

to questions of federal law, we conclude that our decisions reversing

a guilty plea because the record does not expressly indicate that the

defendant was informed that he was waiving each of the so-called

                                  3
“Boykin rights” is in conflict with Supreme Court precedent and

must be overruled. Our law thus returns to the standard outlined in

Goodman, which follows Supreme Court precedent: a guilty plea is

valid as a matter of federal constitutional law if the record affirma-

tively shows that it is voluntary and intelligent under the totality of

the circumstances. Trial courts must continue to accept guilty pleas

only with great care and discernment, following the procedures set

out in our Uniform Rule of Superior Court 33.8 and otherwise en-

suring that the defendant entering a plea does so voluntarily and

with awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely conse-

quences. But the failure to specifically advise the defendant of his

right against self-incrimination—or any of the three rights listed in

Boykin—on the record does not require the reversal of a guilty plea

as a matter of federal constitutional law if the record as a whole

shows that the defendant’s plea was voluntary and intelligent.

      Under this corrected standard of federal constitutional law,

Green’s claim here fails because the record as a whole shows that

Green’s guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent. So we affirm

                                  4
Green’s convictions.

     I. Background

     Green entered a guilty plea for felony murder and aggravated

assault in connection with the shooting death of Andre Winter. At

Green’s plea colloquy, the trial court informed Green of several of

the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty:

     COURT: By pleading guilty, you give up the right to a jury
     trial on this case. You also give up the right to cross-ex-
     amine any witnesses the State puts up. You would give
     up the right to challenge any evidence the State may put
     up. You also give up the right to present witnesses and
     evidence in your favor if you choose to do that. And finally
     you would have the right to testify if you choose to do that.
     You would also have a right to appeal a jury verdict if it
     came back guilty in this case. Do you understand by
     pleading guilty on these two counts only, you give up
     those rights?

     GREEN: Yes, I do.

     COURT: Your waiver is made intelligently and knowingly
     in this case?

     GREEN: Yes, it is.

     COURT: You understand the facts of the charges against
     you?

     GREEN: Yes, I do.

                                  5
Green was sentenced to life in prison.

     About ten years later, Green began to file motions seeking an

out-of-time appeal and other relief. During a hearing on Green’s mo-

tion for out-of-time-appeal, plea counsel testified about her discus-

sions with Green before the plea. She did not specifically recall her

representation of Green, but she testified about her general prac-

tices with plea clients. Plea counsel testified that, among other

things, she advises such clients of the rights they waive by pleading

guilty. As plea counsel was naming the particular rights that she

advises clients about, the State objected that this testimony was out-

side the scope of the hearing, since the hearing concerned whether

Green had been made aware of his appellate rights. The trial court

sustained the objection. That colloquy went as follows:

     Q: All right. Did you have a general practice in 2000 about
     what you would advise clients regarding a plea?

     A: Yes.

     Q: What would you advise them?

     A: That they give up their rights to trial. They give up
     their rights to confrontation. They give up –

                                  6
     STATE: Your Honor, I would object to this testimony. It’s
     sort of outside the scope of what the issue is before the
     Court. The issue . . . before [the] Court is whether [plea
     counsel] talked to Mr. Green about his appellate rights or
     made any efforts to discover what his wishes were with
     regard to those.

     COURT: Why don’t we get to that point, please?

The hearing went on, and plea counsel never revisited the specific

rights she discusses with her plea clients.

     Plea counsel also submitted an affidavit in support of Green’s

motion for out-of-time appeal. In the affidavit, plea counsel testified

substantially as she did at the hearing:

     My general practice has always been to discuss fully
     [with] each Defendant what the Plea offer is from the
     State: if there is any type of Negotiated Plea and a non
     Negotiated Plea. I would also discuss the rights they give
     up by entering a Plea of course. I would discuss any de-
     fenses for the trial, the evidence, the witnesses, and any
     Motions. . . . In general I would advise what rights you
     give up by entering a Guilty Plea.

     The trial court entered a final disposition leaving unchanged

the sentence for the two counts to which Green initially pled guilty

                                  7
but dismissing the remaining charges. 2 Green never moved to with-

draw his guilty plea, see Tyner v. State, 289 Ga. 592, 594 (2) (714

SE2d 577) (2011), overruled on other grounds by Lejeune v.

McLaughlin, 296 Ga. 291 (766 SE2d 803) (2014) (“Lejeune I”) (“A

defendant who hopes to appeal successfully from a guilty plea is not

required to first file a motion to withdraw the plea.” (cleaned up)),

but timely filed this appeal from the final judgment.

      II. Analysis

      Pleading guilty to a crime is a “grave and solemn act.” Brady v.

United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (I) (90 SCt 1463, 25 LE2d 747)

(1970). A guilty plea is not only the defendant’s admission in open

court that he committed the crimes he has been charged with, but

also his consent to having a judgment of conviction entered against

him without a trial—a waiver of his constitutional right to a jury

      2 The record also includes the trial court’s order granting Green an out-

of-time appeal.But that order is not part of this appeal because our decision in
Cook v. State, 313 Ga. 471 (870 SE2d 758) (2022), eliminated the out-of-time
appeal, and Green’s conviction was not final at that time because some of the
counts in his indictment had been dead-docketed, see Seals, 311 Ga. 739, so an
appeal at that point would have been premature. Green’s current appeal is
timely from his final judgment of conviction.
                                       8
trial and attendant constitutional protections. See id. In light of the

guilty plea’s nature and its consequences, as a matter of federal con-

stitutional law the plea must be both voluntary (made of the defend-

ant’s own free choice) and intelligent (made with awareness of the

relevant circumstances and likely consequences). See id. If it is not,

the plea is obtained in violation of federal due process. See McCarthy

v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 466 (I) (89 SCt 1166, 22 LE2d 418)

(1969).

     In Boykin, the United States Supreme Court held that a court

may not presume a guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent based

on a “silent record,” 395 U.S. at 243. The next court term, the Court

explained that Boykin had added a “requirement that the record

must affirmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty en-

tered his plea understandingly and voluntarily.” Brady, 397 U.S. at

747 (I) & n.4 (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. 238).

     The vast majority of jurisdictions across the country have un-

derstood Boykin to impose only a procedural requirement: that a

trial court accepting a guilty plea must ensure that the record,

                                  9
viewed as a whole, shows that the defendant’s plea was voluntary

and intelligent. In Georgia, however, Boykin’s procedural require-

ment has been transformed into a rigid and formalistic rule. Relying

on language plucked from Boykin’s discussion of the rights that are

waived when a defendant enters a guilty plea, this Court has re-

quired (at least in more recent cases) that either the trial court or at

least defendant’s counsel must recite on the record that the defend-

ant was advised of three particular rights that he would be waiving

by entering a guilty plea—the right to a jury trial, the right to con-

front witnesses against him, and the right against self-incrimina-

tion. And we have held that if any part of this requirement is not

satisfied, the plea is automatically reversed. See, e.g., Tyner, 289 Ga.

at 595 (4) (noting that Georgia courts have “interpreted advice and

waiver of the ‘three Boykin rights’ as a strict constitutional require-

ment, with reversal the automatic consequence if any deviation is

found to have occurred”); Arnold v. Howerton, 282 Ga. 66, 68 (646

SE2d 75) (2007), overruled on other grounds by Lejeune I, 296 Ga.

291 (reversing judgment of conviction based on guilty plea because

                                  10
“the record in this case fails to show that any comment by the trial

court, or by Arnold’s counsel, informed him that by pleading guilty

he would waive his privilege against compulsory self-incrimina-

tion”). See also Britt v. Smith, 274 Ga. 611, 612 (556 SE2d 435)

(2001) (framing the question whether a guilty plea is valid around

whether the defendant was advised of the “three Boykin rights”).

     This Court’s outlier reading of Boykin is the basis of Green’s

claim on appeal here. He contends that his guilty plea is invalid be-

cause the record does not expressly show that he was specifically

advised that he was waiving his right against compelled self-incrim-

ination, which is one of the three “Boykin rights.” The State responds

that federal due process does not require an on-the-record recitation

of all “three Boykin rights” if the record otherwise shows that the

plea was voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circum-

stances (as the State says it does here). To the extent our precedent

says differently, the State asks us to reconsider it.

     To address these arguments, we first review the relevant fed-

                                  11
eral constitutional law of guilty pleas, focusing on the well-estab-

lished standard that pleas must be voluntary and intelligent and

Boykin’s requirement that the record must affirmatively show a vol-

untary and intelligent plea. We then canvass decisions of the United

States Supreme Court, the federal courts of appeals, and state

courts that have addressed Boykin’s role in the assessment of the

validity of guilty pleas under federal constitutional law. We go on to

compare the approach of those courts with our decisions in Georgia,

and then we address whether we must reconsider our more recent

decisions. Finally, we apply the resulting standard to this case.

     A. Federal Constitutional Law of Guilty Pleas

     1. The Voluntary and Intelligent Standard

     The standard for whether a guilty plea satisfies constitutional

due process is well established: guilty pleas are valid if they are

“both ‘voluntary’ and ‘intelligent.’” Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 (I). A vol-

untary and intelligent guilty plea is one that is made of the defend-

ant’s “own choice” “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circum-

stances and likely consequences.” Id. at 748 (I). See also Lejeune I,

                                  12
296 Ga. at 291-292 (1).3 These “relevant circumstances and likely

consequences” generally include the nature of the charge to which

the defendant is admitting guilt, the factual basis of the charge, the

punishment to which the plea will expose him, the terms of any ne-

gotiated agreement with the government, and the rights the defend-

ant will waive by entering the plea. See, e.g., Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244

n.7; Smith v. Magnuson, 297 Ga. 210, 213 (1) (773 SE2d 205) (2015).

      2. Boykin’s Record Requirement

      Courts may not simply presume that a defendant’s plea was

voluntary and intelligent: the record has to show that it was. This

was the lesson of Boykin, a case that involved a defendant in Ala-

bama who was sentenced to death after he pleaded guilty to five

counts of common-law robbery. See 395 U.S. at 239. Boykin entered

that guilty plea just three days after he was appointed counsel (and

a few weeks after he was indicted), and the record gave no indication

      3 In the decisions of both the United States Supreme Court and our
Court, the terms “intelligent” and “knowing” are used in this context inter-
changeably (and sometimes collectively). They refer to the same concept: suffi-
cient awareness of the circumstances and likely consequences that are im-
portant to the defendant’s decision to enter a guilty plea.
                                      13
that he was aware of any of the circumstances or potential conse-

quences (including a death sentence) that would have been im-

portant to his decision to plead guilty: no pretrial motions or pro-

ceedings, and only a 55-word summary of the plea hearing, which

did not show that the judge ever addressed Boykin (or that Boykin

addressed the court) about his rights, the consequences of his plea,

or anything else. See id. at 245 & n.1 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (quot-

ing the summary). On appeal, the United States Supreme Court re-

versed, holding that “[i]t was error, plain on the face of the record,

for the trial judge to accept petitioner’s guilty plea without an af-

firmative showing that it was intelligent and voluntary.” Id. at 242.

     The Boykin Court’s reasoning was brief and straightforward.

The Court pointed out that it had recognized a similar record-mak-

ing requirement when a defendant waives the Sixth Amendment

right to counsel. There, it had held that “[p]resuming waiver from a

silent record is impermissible. The record must show, or there must

be an allegation and evidence which show, that an accused was of-

                                 14
fered counsel but intelligently and understandingly rejected the of-

fer.” Id. at 242 (quoting Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 516 (82

SCt 884, 8 LE2d 70) (1962)). The Court reasoned that “the same

standard must be applied to determining whether a guilty plea is

voluntarily made,” and then listed “[s]everal federal constitutional

rights . . . involved in a waiver that takes place when a plea of guilty

is entered in a state criminal trial”: the privilege against compelled

self-incrimination, the right to a trial by jury, and the right to con-

front one’s accusers. Id. at 242-243. So, echoing the language from

its decision about the right to counsel, the Court reiterated that

“[w]e cannot presume a waiver of these three important federal

rights from a silent record.” Id. at 243.

     The Court concluded by describing what an affirmative show-

ing that a guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent would look like.

Notably, that description was not a set of magic words or a list of

specific rights to recite. Instead, the Court simply urged trial courts

to make a record showing that the well-known constitutional stand-

ard was met. Given the stakes of a guilty plea, the Court said that

                                  15
it “demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in can-

vassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full un-

derstanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.” Id. at

243-244 (emphasis added).4 And “[w]hen the judge discharges that

function, he leaves a record adequate for any review that may be

later sought.” Id. at 244.

      In sum, fairly read, Boykin established a critical but modest

record requirement for courts deciding whether to accept a guilty

plea. To make sure that defendants understand the serious conse-

quences of entering a guilty plea, evidence of that understanding

must be apparent from the record. Absent a record that shows that

      4 In support of this approach, the Court cited a Pennsylvania Supreme

Court decision that spoke in similarly general terms:

      “A majority of criminal convictions are obtained after a plea of
      guilty. If these convictions are to be insulated from attack, the trial
      court is best advised to conduct an on the record examination of
      the defendant which should include, inter alia, an attempt to sat-
      isfy itself that the defendant understands the nature of the
      charges, his right to a jury trial, the acts sufficient to constitute
      the offenses for which he is charged and the permissible range of
      sentences.”

Id. at 244 n.7 (quoting Commonwealth ex rel. West v. Rundle, 237 A2d 196, 197-
198 (Pa. 1968)).
                                        16
the defendant’s guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent, the judg-

ment of conviction based on that plea must be reversed. Id. at 243-

244; Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 (I) & n.4.

     3. The National Consensus on Boykin

     After Boykin, decisions from across the country confirmed what

that decision added—and did not add—to the standards for deter-

mining whether a guilty plea satisfies due process. These deci-

sions—from the United States Supreme Court, lower federal courts,

and state appellate courts alike—make clear that Boykin added a

requirement that the record must affirmatively show that the de-

fendant’s guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent, but that it did

not change the substantive standard used to determine the consti-

tutionality of a guilty plea. That standard was and remains whether

the defendant’s guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent (as those

terms have long been understood), considering the totality of the cir-

cumstances. As long as the record shows that standard is satisfied,

federal due process is satisfied, whether or not someone has ex-

pressly recited the three “Boykin rights” somewhere in that record.

                                 17
     (a) Start with the United States Supreme Court. In the court

term after Boykin was decided, the Supreme Court told us in Brady

what Boykin contributed to the assessment of the constitutionality

of a guilty plea. The Court was clear that Boykin did not change the

substantive standard for assessing the validity of a guilty plea as a

matter of federal constitutional law, explaining “[t]he requirement

that a plea of guilty must be intelligent and voluntary to be valid

has long been recognized.” Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 (I) n.4. Instead,

the Court explained that “[t]he new element added in Boykin was

the requirement that the record must affirmatively disclose that a

defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea understandingly and

voluntarily.” Id. (emphasis added). That explanation tracked the

Court’s statement in North Carolina v. Alford earlier that same

term, when it said, citing Boykin, that the “test for determining the

validity of guilty pleas . . . was and remains whether the plea repre-

sents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative

courses of action open to the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford,

400 U.S. 25, 31 (91 SCt 160, 27 LE2d 162) (1970) (citing Boykin, 395

                                 18
U.S. at 242; Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 493 (82 SCt

510, 7 LE2d 473) (1962); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220,

223 (47 SCt 582, 71 LEd 1009) (1927)).

     In neither Brady nor Alford did the Court suggest a new, spe-

cial role in the plea procedures for the three constitutional rights the

Court listed in Boykin. Indeed, neither Brady nor Alford even men-

tioned all three of these rights. Instead, in both cases, the Supreme

Court evaluated the validity of the guilty plea in question by “con-

sidering all of the relevant circumstances surrounding it.” Brady,

397 U.S. at 749 (II). In Alford, the Court specially noted that the

case presented “no issues of substance under Boykin” because “the

record in this case affirmatively indicate[d] that Alford was aware

of the consequences of his plea of guilty and of the rights waived by

the plea,” without mentioning the three particular rights Boykin

listed. 400 U.S. at 29 n.3. If Boykin were properly understood as re-

quiring automatic reversal of a guilty plea if the record failed to

show that the defendant was not advised that he was waiving all

three “Boykin rights,” one would think that the Court would have

                                  19
said so in these decisions. Yet neither these decisions nor any of the

Court’s later decisions addressing how to evaluate the validity of a

guilty plea have even hinted at such a rule.

      (b) In the years after Boykin, federal courts of appeals also ad-

dressed the question of just what that decision required a record to

show to be able to conclude that a guilty plea was valid as a matter

of federal constitutional law. 5 Every one of the courts that addressed

this question arrived at the same answer: Boykin left unchanged the

totality-of-the-circumstances analysis used in determining whether

a guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent, and it did not make an

on-the-record recitation of the three rights it listed as a prerequisite

to concluding that a guilty plea was constitutionally valid.

      5 Although we are bound to follow only the decisions of the United States

Supreme Court on questions of federal law, we often look to the decisions of
other federal courts as persuasive authority. See Lofton v. State, 310 Ga. 770,
777 (2) n.6 (854 SE2d 690) (2021); Macon-Bibb County Hosp. Auth. v. Natl.
Treasury Employees Union, 265 Ga. 557, 558 (1) (458 SE2d 95) (1995).
                                      20
      The former U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 6 for in-

stance, was “aware of no precedent, from the Supreme Court or else-

where, for the proposition that due process requires that a defendant

be informed of each and every right which is waived by a guilty plea.”

United States v. Frontero, 452 F2d 406, 415 (III) (5th Cir. 1971). The

court explained that a defendant’s reliance on Boykin to support that

proposition was “misplaced” because Boykin “involved a silent rec-

ord,” whereas the record in the defendant’s case revealed “affirma-

tive awareness of the ‘consequences’ of a guilty plea.” Id. A few years

later, that court held expressly that “there is no requirement that

there be express articulation and waiver of the three constitutional

rights referred to in Boykin, by the defendant at the time of ac-

ceptance of his guilty plea, if it appears from the record that the ac-

cused’s plea was intelligently and voluntarily made, with knowledge

of its consequences.” McChesney v. Henderson, 482 F2d 1101, 1110

      6 See Bonner v. Pritchard, 661 F2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (explain-

ing that the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit was established on
October 1, 1981 pursuant to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization
Act, and adopting as binding precedent all decisions of the former Fifth Circuit
handed down prior to that date).
                                      21
(5th Cir. 1973).

     The Tenth Circuit reached the same conclusion. See Stinson v.

Turner, 473 F2d 913, 915 (10th Cir. 1973). After reviewing Boykin

and Brady, that court noted that Boykin “does expressly discuss the

three enumerated constitutional rights,” but it reasoned that “these

rights were set out to demonstrate the gravity of the trial court’s

responsibility,” not to impose a “procedural requirement . . . that

they be enumerated.” Id. Boykin, it held, “imposed only that require-

ment of an affirmative record showing of a voluntary and intelligent

plea,” its “purpose” being “‘to make sure [the defendant] has full un-

derstanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence.’” Id.

(quoting Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244).

     The other federal courts of appeals are in accord. Several more

of those courts have expressly rejected the argument that Boykin

required that the record expressly show the defendant was advised

about all three “Boykin rights” to avoid reversal of a guilty plea. See

United States v. Stewart, 977 F2d 81, 84-85 (IV) (3d Cir. 1992)

(“[T]he failure to specifically articulate the Boykin rights does not

                                  22
carry the day for the defendant if the circumstances otherwise es-

tablish the plea was constitutionally acceptable.”); Wade v. Coiner,

468 F2d 1059, 1060-1061 (4th Cir. 1972) (rejecting the proposition

that Boykin requires “that all of the several constitutional rights

that are given up by entry of a guilty plea must be separately called

to the attention of the accused”); Pitts v. United States, 763 F2d 197,

200 (6th Cir. 1985) (“The mere failure to advise a defendant of each

right enumerated in Boykin does not automatically invalidate the

plea.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Henry, 933 F2d 553, 560

(7th Cir. 1991) (“[W]hen a court advises the defendant that by plead-

ing guilty he is waiving his rights to trial by jury and to confront the

witnesses against him, ‘a ritualistic question to a defendant asking

if he understands that he is waiving his right against self-incrimi-

nation’ is unnecessary.”); Todd v. Lockhart, 490 F2d 626, 628 n.1

(8th Cir. 1974) (“[W]e agree that Boykin does not require the express

articulation and waiver of these three rights at the time the plea is

entered.” (citations omitted)); Wilkins v. Erickson, 505 F2d 761, 763

(I) (9th Cir. 1974) (relying on Brady and Alford to conclude that

                                  23
“Boykin does not require specific articulation of the [ ] three rights

[mentioned in Boykin] in a state proceeding”); United States v. Sim-

mons, 961 F2d 183, 187 (II) (B) (11th Cir. 1992) (noting that Boykin

mentioned three specific rights, but explaining that the Eleventh

Circuit “has construed Boykin to require only that courts establish

a record that generally ‘reveals affirmative awareness of the ‘conse-

quences’ of a guilty plea,’” and therefore “a trial court may suffi-

ciently apprise a defendant of the consequences of his plea without

obtaining express waivers of his right to confront adverse witnesses

and his right against compulsory self-incrimination” (citations omit-

ted)). And even the handful of courts of appeals that have not re-

jected that argument in so many words have considered the totality

of the circumstances to determine whether the record showed that

the defendant’s plea was voluntary and intelligent, rather than look-

ing for the recitation of any specific rights. See United States v.

Ward, 518 F3d 75, 83-84 (IV) (1st Cir. 2008) (after reviewing Boykin

and Brady, explaining, “[i]n deciding whether there is an affirmative

showing of voluntariness in the state court record of [defendant’s]

                                 24
plea, we examine the totality of the circumstances surrounding the

plea”) (citations omitted)); Hanson v. Phillips, 442 F3d 789, 798 (II)

(B) (2d Cir. 2006) (“The voluntariness of a guilty plea is reviewed by

examining the totality of the relevant circumstances.” (citations

omitted)); Sanderlin v. United States, 794 F2d 727, 734 (II) (D.C.

Cir. 1986) (noting Boykin’s rule that a waiver of certain constitu-

tional rights cannot be presumed “from a silent record” (citations

omitted)). See also United States v. Tursi, 576 F2d 396, 399 (B) (1st

Cir. 1978) (“[T]he failure of the court to mention defendant’s right

against self-incrimination does not rise to the level of prejudicial er-

ror.”).

      In short, we are aware of no decision of a federal appellate court

adopting a rule that a guilty plea is subject to automatic reversal if

the record does not expressly indicate that a defendant was specifi-

cally informed about each of the three “Boykin rights,” and most of

them have expressly rejected that reading of Boykin.

      (c) A survey of the federal case law on the constitutionality of

guilty pleas is not complete without a discussion of Rule 11 of the

                                   25
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. That rule, which, like other

federal court rules, is reviewed (and revised as needed) by the

United States Supreme Court,7 has long governed plea procedures

in federal courts. The rule’s evolution after Boykin—and the deci-

sions applying it—confirm yet again that Boykin does not require

advising the defendant of specific rights on the record to avoid auto-

matic reversal of a guilty plea.

     Before Boykin, Rule 11 tracked the basic constitutional re-

quirements for a valid plea. In 1966 (three years before Boykin),

Rule 11 told district courts not to accept a guilty plea without ad-

dressing the defendant personally to determine whether the plea

was made “voluntarily” with an understanding of its “consequences”

     7   The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure are promulgated (and
amended) through an elaborate process beginning with drafts developed by an
Advisory Committee of experts in criminal procedure from the judiciary, aca-
demia, and law practice. See Charles Alan Wright et al., 1 Fed. Prac. & Proc.
Crim. § 2 Promulgation and Amendment of the Rules (5th ed. 2023). The drafts
are then reviewed and may then be revised by the Standing Committee on
Rules, which is similarly comprised, and then by the United States Supreme
Court. See id. Under the Rules Enabling Act, Congress has the final authority
to revise the proposed rule. See 28 USC §§ 2071-2077.
                                     26
and “the nature of the charge,” and to ensure that there was a fac-

tual basis for the plea. See Charles Alan Wright et al., 1A Fed. Prac.

& Proc. Crim. § 171 History of the Rule (5th ed. 2023) (“Wright &

Miller”). See also McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 465-466.8 In McCarthy, the

United States Supreme Court held that any violation of that earlier

version of Rule 11 required reversal. See McCarthy, 394 U.S. at 471-

472. As the former Fifth Circuit explained, this was because when

McCarthy was decided, all that Rule 11 “treated were the values ly-

ing at the heart of the rule’s concerns: absence of coercion, under-

standing of the accusation, and knowledge of the direct conse-

quences of the plea,” so “a failure by the trial court to address any

one or more of the rule’s three core concerns as occurred in McCarthy

require[d] automatic reversal.” United States v. Dayton, 604 F2d

931, 939 (5th Cir. 1979) (en banc). And these “core concerns,” of

      8 When the rule was first adopted in 1944, it simply instructed district

courts that they should not accept a guilty plea “without first determining that
the plea[ ] is made voluntarily with [an] understanding of the nature of the
charge.” Charles Alan Wright et al., 1A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. § 171 History
of the Rule n.1 (5th ed. 2023) (“Wright & Miller”).
                                      27
course, were the same concerns animating the constitutional stand-

ard. See, e.g., Brady, 397 U.S. at 747-748 (I) & n.4 (citations omit-

ted).

        But in the wake of Boykin, the Rule’s approach to ensuring the

constitutionality of guilty pleas changed. In 1974 and 1975, major

amendments were made to Rule 11 to give district courts clear and

specific directions for the plea colloquy. Those amendments, which

were “designed” to incorporate Boykin, instruct district courts to “in-

form the defendant of, and determine that the defendant under-

stands,” all kinds of information relevant to the plea, including the

nature of the charges, the range of possible sentences, and a number

of constitutional rights that are waived by entering a guilty plea.

Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, Advisory Committee notes on 1974 and 1975

amendments; see also Wright & Miller, supra, § 171. The rights

listed by the revised Rule 11 include not only the three rights Boykin

listed—the right to a jury trial, to confront adverse witnesses, and

to be protected from compelled self-incrimination—but many others,

including the right to plead not guilty, to be represented by counsel,

                                   28
to testify, and to compel the attendance of witnesses. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11 (b) (1).9 And Rule 11 has been amended several times

      9 Rule 11 (b) currently reads as follows, with the three constitutional

rights referenced in Boykin italicized:

      (1) Advising and Questioning the Defendant. Before the court accepts a
plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the defendant may be placed under oath, and
the court must address the defendant personally in open court. During this
address, the court must inform the defendant of, and determine that the de-
fendant understands, the following:
             (A) the government’s right, in a prosecution for perjury or false
      statement, to use against the defendant any statement that the defend-
      ant gives under oath;
             (B) the right to plead not guilty, or having already so pleaded, to
      persist in that plea;
             (C) the right to a jury trial;
             (D) the right to be represented by counsel – and if necessary have
      the court appoint counsel – at trial and at every other stage of the pro-
      ceeding;
             (E) the right at trial to confront and cross-examine adverse wit-
      nesses, to be protected from compelled self-incrimination, to testify and
      present evidence, and to compel the attendance of witnesses;
             (F) the defendant’s waiver of these trial rights if the court accepts
      a plea of guilty or nolo contendere;
             (G) the nature of each charge to which the defendant is pleading;
             (H) any maximum possible penalty, including imprisonment, fine,
      and term of supervised release;
             (I) any mandatory minimum penalty;
             (J) any applicable forfeiture;
             (K) the court’s authority to order restitution;
             (L) the court's obligation to impose a special assessment;
             (M) in determining a sentence, the court’s obligation to calculate
      the applicable sentencing-guideline range and to consider that range,
      possible departures under the Sentencing Guidelines, and other sentenc-
      ing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a);
             (N) the terms of any plea-agreement provision waiving the right to

                                          29
since 1975 to add to this list other consequences of a guilty plea that

may be of importance to determining whether it has been entered

voluntarily and intelligently. See Wright & Miller, supra, § 171 &

n.6 (describing the history of Rule 11’s amendment including the ad-

dition of new subsections to Rule 11 (b) including, for example, a

requirement that courts notify defendants of the terms of a plea-

agreement provision waiving the right to appeal or collaterally at-

tack the sentence, see Rule 11 (b) (1) (N), and advise defendants that

if convicted, a defendant who is not a United States citizen may be

removed from the United States, denied citizenship, and denied ad-

mission to the United States in the future, see Rule 11 (b) (1) (O)).

      Here is what matters most about this post-Boykin Rule 11 for

      appeal or to collaterally attack the sentence; and
             (O) that, if convicted, a defendant who is not a United States citi-
      zen may be removed from the United States, denied citizenship, and de-
      nied admission to the United States in the future.
      (2) Ensuring That a Plea Is Voluntary. Before accepting a plea of guilty
or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant personally in open
court and determine that the plea is voluntary and did not result from force,
threats, or promises (other than promises in a plea agreement).
      (3) Determining the Factual Basis for a Plea. Before entering judgment
on a guilty plea, the court must determine that there is a factual basis for the
plea.

                                       30
our purposes: it is now well settled that a district court’s failure to

comply with any particular piece of Rule 11’s plea procedures does

not necessarily require reversal. Instead, after federal courts had

reached different answers about the remedy for a Rule 11 violation,

Rule 11 was amended to clarify that “a variance from the require-

ments of this rule is harmless error if it does not affect substantial

rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 (h). 10

      By its terms, this harmless-error provision applies to all viola-

tions of Rule 11—which include, of course, the failure to list one of

the three “Boykin rights.” That understanding finds support in at

least three Supreme Court decisions issued since the harmless-error

standard was added. See United States v. Davila, 569 U.S. 597, 609

      10 With respect to this amendment, the Advisory Committee explained,

“[a]n inevitable consequence of the 1975 amendments [that codified Boykin]
was some increase in the risk that a trial judge, in a particular case, might
inadvertently deviate to some degree from the procedure which a very literal
reading of Rule 11 would appear to require.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, Advisory
Committee notes on 1983 amendments. The Advisory Committee went on:
“‘[D]istrict courts are required to act in substantial compliance with [the rule],’”
but “‘ritualistic compliance is not required,’” and “even when it may be con-
cluded Rule 11 has not been complied with in all respects, it does not inevitably
follow that the defendant’s plea of guilty or nolo contendere is invalid and sub-
ject to being overturned by any remedial device then available to the defend-
ant.” Id. (citation omitted).
                                        31
(III) (133 SCt 2139, 186 LE2d 139) (2013) (“Errors or omissions in

following Rule 11’s plea-colloquy instructions . . . are properly typed

procedural, and are therefore properly assessed under the harmless-

error instruction of Rule 11(h).”); United States v. Vonn, 535 U.S. 55,

60 (I), 70 (II) (B) (122 SCt 1043, 152 LE2d 90) (2002) (addressing an

alleged violation of what is now Rule 11 (b) (1) (D), involving the

failure to advise the defendant of his right to counsel if he went to

trial and noting that “by 1983 the practice of automatic reversal for

error threatening little prejudice to a defendant or disgrace to the

legal system prompted further revision of Rule 11 [to add subsection

(h)]”); United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 76-78 (I), 80

(II) (A), 81 (II) (B) & n.6 (124 SCt 2333, 159 LE2d 157) (2004) (ex-

plaining that “[i]t is only for certain structural errors undermining

the fairness of a criminal proceeding as a whole that even preserved

error requires reversal without regard to the mistake’s effect on the

proceeding,” and that “[t]he omission of a single Rule 11 warning

without more is not colorably structural”); id. at 84 (II) (C) n.10 (dis-

tinguishing the automatic reversal result in Boykin as involving the

                                   32
situation “when the record of a criminal conviction obtained by

guilty plea contains no evidence that a defendant knew of the rights

he was putatively waiving” (emphasis added)).

     And the federal courts of appeals that have addressed the issue

have explicitly applied Rule 11 (h)’s harmless-error standard to the

failure to advise the defendant on the record that a guilty plea would

waive one of the “Boykin rights.” See, e.g., United States v. Johnson,

1 F3d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1993) (“[N]o failure in the plea colloquy—

regardless of whether it might be one of omission or commission,

total or partial, core or non-core—will mandate an automatic rever-

sal of a conviction and vacatur of a sentence. Rather, reversal and

vacatur will be required when—but only when—the challenged ‘var-

iance from the procedures required by [Rule 11] . . . affect[s] sub-

stantial rights’ of the defendant.” (citations omitted)); United States

v. Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F2d 1521, 1525 (10th Cir. 1990) (“The failure

to advise a criminal defendant of his right to confront and cross-ex-

amine witnesses is harmless error when the guilty plea is voluntary

and the defendant understands the nature of the charges against

                                  33
him.”); United States v. Stead, 746 F2d 355, 356-357 (6th Cir. 1984)

(holding that the district court’s failure to advise the defendant of

his right against self-incrimination and his right to confront and

cross-examine witnesses did not “preclude a finding that [the de-

fendant] voluntarily and intelligently entered his guilty plea” and

concluding that “the district court’s omission constitutes harmless

error”).

     Rule 11 and its harmless-error provision apply only to federal

courts, but they offer compelling evidence about Boykin’s scope.

Boykin is a central focus of the plea procedures set out in Rule 11,

which are put in place to ensure that guilty pleas are valid as a mat-

ter of federal constitutional law, and Rule 11 cannot provide less pro-

tection to defendants than the Constitution provides. See Fed. R.

Crim. P. 11, Advisory Committee notes on 1974 Amendments (“The

amendment identifies more specifically what must be explained to

the defendant and also codifies, in the rule, the requirements

of Boykin [ ], which held that a defendant must be apprised of the

fact that he relinquishes certain constitutional rights by pleading

                                  34
guilty.”). See also Davila, 569 U.S. at 609 (III) (“The advice and ques-

tions now specified in Rules 11(b) and 11(c)(3)(B), Davila observes,

are designed to ensure that a defendant’s plea is fully informed and

intelligently made.”). If Boykin required automatic reversal of a

guilty plea as a matter of federal constitutional law any time the

defendant is not advised on the record that he is waiving one of the

three “Boykin rights,” Rule 11 would have to require reversal as

well. Yet Rule 11—a rule that is put in place and amended only after

review by the United States Supreme Court and Congress, among

others—excuses the failure to recite one of the “Boykin rights” if it is

harmless error. That approach to the “Boykin rights” gives us an-

other sign that Boykin did not carve out the three rights it listed for

special constitutional treatment.

                                    *

     In sum, every data point from federal law tells us that the “rit-

ual of the colloquy,” including the articulation of the rights being

waived by entering a guilty plea, “is but a means toward determin-

ing whether the plea was voluntary and knowing.” Stewart, 977 F2d

                                    35
at 84 (IV). Going through those procedures “furnishes strong, alt-

hough not necessarily conclusive, evidence that the accused entered

his plea without coercion and with an appreciation of its conse-

quences.” Id. But “the failure to specifically articulate the Boykin

rights does not carry the day for the defendant if the circumstances

otherwise establish the plea was constitutionally acceptable.” Id. at

85 (IV).

     (d) State appellate courts applying the federal constitutional

law to guilty pleas are almost universally in accord with the federal

case law just discussed. The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals,

for example, has explained that “Boykin simply requires that the

transcript of a guilty plea proceeding affirmatively show that the

defendant voluntarily and understandingly entered his plea of

guilty.” Clark v. State, 800 SW2d 500, 504 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990)

(citations and footnotes omitted). The court agreed that no “precise

litany” or “catechism of the constitutional rights that are waived by

entry of a guilty plea” is “compelled by Boykin or the Constitution,”

and it noted that federal courts of appeals had “held that the failure

                                 36
of a trial judge to articulate a right mentioned in Boykin does not, as

a matter of law, render a judgment constitutionally infirm.” Id. (ci-

tations and footnotes omitted). Many other states have reached the

same conclusion on similar reasoning. See e.g., State v. Smith, 167

So3d 736, 740 (La. Ct. App. 2014) (“We find that in the context of all

the advice given, the trial court’s failure to mention specifically the

privilege protecting a defendant from compelled self-incrimination

at trial cannot support a finding that defendant entered each of his

guilty pleas without a full understanding of what the plea connotes

and of its consequences. . . . [W]e think the extensive colloquy con-

ducted by the trial court resulted in a knowing and voluntary plea

by defendant.” (citation omitted)); Lacy v. People, 775 P2d 1, 5 (II)

(A) (1) (Colo. 1989) (“[D]ue process does not require a specific waiver

of even the three constitutional rights highlighted in Boykin.” (cita-

tion and footnote omitted)); Barrett v. State, 544 P2d 830, 834 (II)

(Alaska 1975), on rehearing, 546 P2d 161 (Alaska 1976) (“What mat-

ters is whether from the totality of circumstances surrounding the

                                  37
plea it can be determined that the plea was voluntarily and intelli-

gently made.”). See also Oleson v. Young, 869 NW2d 452, 455-459

(S.D. 2015) (leaving open the question of whether a “‘complete ab-

sence’ of any Boykin waiver” should result in automatic reversal but

holding that “‘specific articulation of the Boykin rights by the trial

judge is not an indispensable requisite for the record to establish a

valid plea.’ . . . To determine whether a guilty plea is voluntary and

knowing ‘as required to satisfy due process requirements, we must

look to the “totality of the circumstances”’” (citations omitted)). See

generally Wayne R. LaFave, et al., Criminal Procedure, § 21.4 (e)

(4th ed. updated Dec. 2023) (explaining that “most courts, often

stressing the uniqueness of Boykin,” have held that Boykin does not

“mean that a guilty plea is constitutionally defective whenever the

judge failed to articulate specifically the constitutional rights listed

in [ ] Boykin”).

     In the years shortly after Boykin, a couple of states did read

Boykin to require an on-the-record recitation of the three “Boykin

rights,” but that view didn’t stick.

                                  38
     One of those states was California. Five months after Boykin,

“before a substantial body of federal law on the point had developed,”

the California Supreme Court read it to require that “each of the

three rights mentioned—self-incrimination, confrontation, and jury

trial—must be specifically and expressly enumerated for the benefit

of and waived by the accused prior to acceptance of his guilty plea.”

In re Tahl, 460 P2d 449, 456 (III) (Cal. 1969). See also In re Yurko,

519 P2d 561 (Cal. 1974). But by 1992, citing “the overwhelming

weight of authority” in conflict with that view of Boykin, the court

saw “no choice but to revisit [its] prior holdings.” People v. Howard,

824 P2d 1315, 1339 (II) (H) (Cal. 1992). Acknowledging that “[t]he

question of an effective waiver of a federal constitutional right in a

proceeding is of course governed by federal standards,” that court

held that under the governing federal test, “a plea is valid if the rec-

ord affirmatively shows that it is voluntary and intelligent under

the totality of the circumstances.” Id. (citing Alford, 400 U.S. at 31

and Brady, 397 U.S. at 747-748 (I)). The court explained its change

of heart:

                                  39
     In the 22 years since Tahl, our interpretation of federal
     law in that opinion has not garnered significant support
     in the federal courts. Indeed, the high court has never
     read Boykin as requiring explicit admonitions on each of
     the three constitutional rights. Instead, the court has said
     that the standard for determining the validity of a guilty
     plea “was and remains whether the plea represents a vol-
     untary and intelligent choice among the alternative
     courses of action open to the defendant.” [quoting Alford
     and citing Brady]. “The new element added in Boykin”
     was not a requirement of explicit admonitions and waiv-
     ers but rather “the requirement that the record must af-
     firmatively disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty
     entered his plea understandingly and voluntarily.” [quot-
     ing Brady].

     While the high court has never accepted our interpreta-
     tion of Boykin, the federal appellate courts have expressly
     rejected it. Consequently, the weight of authority today
     makes it abundantly clear that “the California interpre-
     tation of Boykin announced in Tahl is not required by the
     federal Constitution . . . .” “Boykin does not require spe-
     cific articulation of each of the three rights waived by the
     guilty plea, as long as it is clear from the record that the
     plea was voluntary and intelligent . . . .” There is wide
     agreement both on this point and on the applicable test:
     The record must affirmatively demonstrate that the plea
     was voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the cir-
     cumstances. Because the effectiveness of a waiver of fed-
     eral constitutional rights is governed by federal standards
     we adopt the federal test in place of the rule that the ab-
     sence of express admonitions and waivers requires rever-
     sal regardless of prejudice.

Id. at 1341-1342 (II) (H) (citations omitted).

                                  40
     California was not alone in abandoning the “three Boykin

rights”-focused, automatic-reversal interpretation of Boykin. The

Louisiana Supreme Court also adopted a “three-right rule” shortly

after Boykin, but it, too, has since acknowledged that the rule “was

not constitutionally required” and “reflected a minority view” be-

cause “a majority of state decisions required ‘only that the trial judge

canvass the matter with the defendant to verify that the plea is

freely and understandingly made.’” State v. Balsano, 11 So3d 475,

477 (La. 2009) (citations omitted). That court held on collateral re-

view that the “trial court’s failure to mention specifically . . . the

privilege protecting a defendant from compelled self-incrimination

at trial . . . cannot support a finding that defendant entered each of

his guilty pleas without ‘a full understanding of what the plea con-

notes and of its consequences.’” Id. at 483 (quoting Boykin, 395 U.S.

at 244).

     As far as we can tell, of all the other jurisdictions across our

country, only Michigan still clearly applies a rule that requires au-

tomatic reversal of a guilty plea as a matter of federal constitutional

                                  41
law if any one of the three “Boykin rights” are not recited on the

record. See People v. Jaworski, 194 NW2d 868, 872 (I), 872-873 (II)

(Mich. 1972). And even that rule, which was announced in a divided

opinion issued soon after Boykin, has been limited to claims raised

on direct rather than collateral review. See People v. Ingram, 484

NW2d 241, 246-247 (II) (Mich. 1992).

     B. Georgia’s Misapplication of Boykin

     And then there is Georgia. For almost three decades after

Boykin, our Court took the same, totality-of-the-circumstances ap-

proach to constitutional challenges to guilty pleas as the courts

across the country that we have just canvassed. But then, without

explanation, and in conflict with our own precedent, we gradually

elevated the United States Supreme Court’s advice about the three

rights listed in Boykin to constitutional prerequisites for a valid

guilty plea and began to automatically reverse guilty pleas if those

rights were not recited on the record.

     1. For many years after Boykin, our Court evaluated constitu-

tional challenges to guilty pleas like most other courts did: we looked

                                  42
at the full record and asked whether the defendant’s guilty plea was

voluntary and intelligent based on the totality of the circumstances,

with no particular focus on whether the three “Boykin rights” had

been explicitly conveyed to the defendant. See, e.g., Thomason v.

Caldwell, 229 Ga. 637, 642-643 (194 SE2d 112) (1972) (concluding

that plea was voluntary and understanding and noting that the pe-

titioner had been advised of many rights, including his right to a

jury trial, but not mentioning the other two Boykin rights). See also

McCrary v. Ricketts, 232 Ga. 890, 891 (209 SE2d 148) (1974); Mason

v. Balcom, 230 Ga. 838, 838 (199 SE2d 313) (1973); Wyatt v. Cald-

well, 229 Ga. 597, 597 (1) (193 SE2d 607) (1972).

     In fact, 15 years after Boykin, our Court was presented with

the question whether the failure of the trial court to advise the de-

fendant of one of those “Boykin rights” on the record required auto-

matic reversal of his guilty plea. We squarely rejected that view of

Boykin in a unanimous and well-reasoned opinion. In Goodman v.

Davis, the trial court held a plea hearing in which the court ques-

tioned Goodman “at some length” to make sure he understood the

                                 43
charges against him and the consequences of pleading guilty,

whether he was entering his plea freely, and whether there was a

factual basis for the plea, and the court “advised Goodman of his

rights to trial by jury and to confront the witnesses against him.”

249 Ga. at 12. In a petition for habeas corpus, Goodman argued that

his plea was invalid because he was not specifically advised of the

right against self-incrimination. See id. We rejected that argument,

and in doing so, articulated an understanding of Boykin that was in

line with United States Supreme Court precedent and the national

consensus. We explained:

     we read Boykin as requiring that there be a record of the
     guilty plea hearing adequate for the reviewing court to
     determine whether (1) the defendant has freely and vol-
     untarily entered the plea with (2) an understanding of the
     nature of the charges against him and (3) an understand-
     ing of the consequences of his plea.

Id. at 13 (1). And we “decline[d] to adopt a rule which would demand

that failure to advise an accused of his right against self-incrimina-

tion invalidates a guilty plea in a case where the record reflects that

the central considerations of Boykin have otherwise been met,” rely-

ing in part on persuasive federal case law addressing Boykin and
                                  44
Rule 11. See id. at 14 (1) & n.2. Applying that understanding of

Boykin to the case then before us, we noted that the “record . . .

show[ed] that Goodman understood the nature of the charges

against him and the consequences of his guilty plea and that the

plea was not induced by coercion, but was voluntarily entered,” and

we were “satisfied from our study of the record that Goodman com-

prehended the significance of the constitutional rights he was waiv-

ing.” Id. at 14 (1).

     After Goodman, we continued with this approach for a number

of years. See, e.g., Haggins v. State, 259 Ga. 188, 189 (380 SE2d 711)

(1989) (“We have reviewed the record of the guilty pleas and find

that at the time Haggins’ pleas were accepted he was cognizant of

all the rights that he was waiving, and of the possible consequences

of his voluntary pleas of guilty.” (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 238));

Shaw v. State, 258 Ga. 719, 719-720 (373 SE2d 628) (1988) (“The

requirements of Boykin that the record reflect that defendant en-

tered the plea voluntarily and with understanding were met by the

                                 45
trial court’s examination of the appellant. . . . Under all the circum-

stances, we find that the record reflects a voluntary plea of guilty to

murder given with knowledge of the rights relinquished.” (citation

omitted)); Carroll v. Holt, 251 Ga. 144, 144-145 (304 SE2d 60) (1983)

(“A review of the record reveals that Carroll was interrogated con-

cerning whether he understood the nature of the charge and that he

had no questions concerning the crime. The procedure conducted in

this case meets the requirements set forth in Boykin.” (citation omit-

ted)). Several of our decisions cited Goodman for the proposition that

Boykin requires only that the record show “(1) the defendant has

freely and voluntarily entered the plea with (2) an understanding of

the nature of the charges against him and (3) an understanding of

the consequences of his plea.” King v. State, 270 Ga. 367, 369 (1) (509

SE2d 32) (1998) (quoting Goodman, 249 Ga. at 13 (1)). See also

McDaniel v. State, 271 Ga. 552, 554 (2) (522 SE2d 648) (1999); Ca-

zanas v. State, 270 Ga. 130, 134-135 (508 SE2d 412) (1998) (Sears,

J., concurring); Green v. State, 265 Ga. 263, 263 (1) (454 SE2d 466)

(1995); Price v. State, 259 Ga. 834, 835 (388 SE2d 857) (1990).

                                  46
      2. But gradually, our Court wandered away from Goodman’s

approach to Boykin and the national consensus that Goodman was

aligned with. We took the first step off course about 14 years after

Goodman, and it appears to have been entirely unintentional and

driven by a case with unusual facts. In Bowers v. Moore,11 the de-

fendant, who was found in his habeas proceeding to have an IQ of

60, separately pleaded guilty to two aggravated assaults. 266 Ga.

893, 893-894 (471 SE2d 869) (1996). In his first plea, he was not

informed of his right to confront adverse witnesses or his privilege

against self-incrimination, while the second plea was riddled with

omissions: he was not informed of these rights or told about the pre-

sumption of innocence or minimum and maximum penalties for the

crime to which he was pleading guilty, the State did not submit a

factual basis for his plea, and the judge did not ask if Moore was

      11 The holdings in Bowers v. Moore and many of the other cases discussed

below that the State bears the burden of proving that a guilty plea was volun-
tary and intelligent on habeas corpus review were overruled in Lejeune I, 296
Ga. at 299 (2). That subsequent history is omitted from the citations to those
cases.
                                     47
under the influence or if he had been coerced. Id. Yet the Court con-

cluded that the pleas were invalid simply because “Moore was not

advised of his constitutional rights—specifically his right to confront

witnesses and privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at 895 (2).

The Court offered this basis for reversal without citing Goodman. In

hindsight, the reversal in Bowers is better grounded in the multiple

deficiencies of the plea procedures and the surrounding circum-

stances, including Moore’s apparent intellectual disability, which

made the omissions rather obviously harmful.

     A few years after Bowers, our Court struck off fully in the

wrong direction. In Nash v. State, 271 Ga. 281, 281, 284-285 (519

SE2d 893) (1999), three full decades after Boykin, we mentioned the

“three Boykin rights” for the first time—quoting a Louisiana case

that used that phrase—in a case holding that under certain circum-

stances, the burden shifts to a recidivist defendant in non-death pen-

alty cases to prove that an earlier guilty plea was not voluntarily

and intelligently entered. Nash, 271 Ga. at 285 (quoting State v.

                                  48
Shelton, 621 So2d 769, 779-780 (La. 1993)).12 Two years later, in

Britt v. Smith, we cited Nash for the assertion that “our decisions

dealing with the validity of a guilty plea are generally couched in

terms of the defendant’s waiver of the three Boykin rights.” 274 Ga.

at 614. Of course, that assertion was not accurate: we cited only

Nash in support, and Nash was the first and only time we had actu-

ally “couched” the issue in those terms. But that sentence was all it

took: with the “three Boykin rights” as a brand-new touchstone, we

then rejected Britt’s argument that the trial court’s failure to inform

the defendant of other constitutional rights (to the presumption of

innocence, the assistance of counsel, and to subpoena witnesses)

might invalidate the defendant’s guilty plea—because those other

rights were not “Boykin rights.” See id. at 611, 615; see also id. at

616 (Sears, J., dissenting) (noting the other constitutional rights

Britt argued he was not told about).

      12 Notably, two years later, in a case holding that a defendant does not

need to give a verbal response to sufficiently waive his “Boykin rights,” the
Court disavowed Nash’s adoption of Louisiana’s requirement that “a guilty
plea must be made ‘with an articulated waiver of the three Boykin rights.’” See
Motley v. State, 273 Ga. 732, 733 n.3 (546 SE2d 468) (2001) (emphasis omitted).
                                      49
     With Britt, then, our Court left in the dust our decisions calling

for a totality-of-the-circumstances review of whether a guilty plea

was voluntary and intelligent and thus valid as a matter of federal

constitutional law. In its place, we adopted an arbitrary and inflex-

ible rule focused only on whether the defendant was advised of and

had waived, on the record, the three constitutional rights mentioned

in Boykin. And this analytical shift happened without any explana-

tion at all, much less any express analysis of Boykin, or Goodman,

or the extensive jurisprudence interpreting and applying Boykin in

this and many other courts.

     That shift was not a clean break. A few decisions continued to

consider all of the circumstances in deciding whether a guilty plea

was voluntary and intelligent. See, e.g., Romano v. State, 272 Ga.

238, 241 (3) (527 SE2d 184) (2000) (“Our review of the record shows

nothing unacceptable regarding appellant’s plea hearing, and we

conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that appel-

lant freely, knowingly, and intelligently entered his guilty pleas to

two counts of murder.” (citing Boykin, 395 U.S. at 238)); Harrell v.

                                  50
State, 275 Ga. 519, 520-521 (2) (570 SE2d 315) (2002); Moore v.

State, 285 Ga. 855, 856-858 (1) (684 SE2d 605) (2009). But other de-

cisions picked up on Britt and simply accepted it as a correct state-

ment of the law, with no further scrutiny. See, e.g., State v. Cooper,

281 Ga. 63, 64-67 (1)-(2) (636 SE2d 493) (2006). And that second set

of decisions snowballed into our current approach: determining the

constitutionality of a guilty plea based only on whether the record

expressly shows that the defendant was specifically advised that he

was waiving the “three Boykin rights,” and automatically reversing

the plea when even one of those rights is not mentioned on the rec-

ord. See, e.g., Wilson v. Kemp, 288 Ga. 779, 779-780 (727 SE2d 90)

(2011) (reversing denial of habeas petition where plea hearing rec-

ord showed limited discussion of the defendant’s right to remain si-

lent at the guilty plea hearing without explaining that defendant

would have that right at trial); Sutton v. Sanders, 283 Ga. 28, 28-29

(656 SE2d 796) (2008) (reversing denial of habeas petition because

plea hearing record did not expressly indicate that the defendant

was advised of his right to a jury trial); Arnold, 282 Ga. at 67-68

                                 51
(reversing denial of habeas petition because record did not expressly

indicate the defendant was advised of his privilege against compul-

sory self-incrimination); Hawes v. State, 281 Ga. 822, 825 (642 SE2d

92) (2007) (reversing denial of habeas petition because trial court’s

informing defendant of his right to testify if he “so desired” failed to

notify the defendant specifically about his “right . . . not to testify

during the plea proceeding that he committed the acts charged in

the indictment”).

     None of these decisions applying this new approach to Boykin

even mentioned Goodman or our stark departure from the national

consensus on Boykin. We first identified (but did not resolve) the

conflict between Goodman and our more recent precedent in Tyner,

noting that “[i]t is not entirely clear how this Court got from Good-

man to Wilson,” and that “Goodman remains on the books” and is

“plainly inconsistent with our more recent precedent.” 289 Ga. at

595-596 (4). That conflict was flagged a second time in a dissenting

opinion in Lejeune v. McLaughlin, 299 Ga. 546, 548 (789 SE2d 191)

                                  52
(2016) (“Lejeune II”) (Nahmias, J., dissenting). But the conflict re-

mains unresolved.

     C. Reconsidering Georgia’s Outlier Approach to Boykin

     The State now asks us to reconsider our decisions that require

automatic reversal of a guilty plea if one of the so-called “Boykin

rights” is not recited on the record. The State contends that as a

matter of federal law, the question is simply whether the record,

viewed as a whole, shows that the guilty plea in question was volun-

tary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances. In other

words, the State asks us to return to the approach that we adopted

in our reasoned decision in Goodman, which is consistent with the

approach to Boykin and the evaluation of guilty pleas generally that

is followed by virtually every other court across the country.

     Unlike many decisions to reconsider our precedent, this course

correction is one we have no choice but to make. Requests to recon-

sider our own past decisions typically face the high bar of stare de-

cisis. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 315 Ga. 876, 887 (3) (885 SE2d 725)

(2023). On questions of federal law, however, our Court is bound by

                                  53
holdings of the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., Nordahl v.

State, 306 Ga. 15, 20 (1) (829 SE2d 99) (2019); Marchman v. March-

man, 198 Ga. 739, 742 (32 SE2d 790) (1945). So if one of our deci-

sions on a question of federal law conflicts with Supreme Court prec-

edent, the high court’s precedent controls, and our contrary decision

must be overruled. See Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 565

U.S. 530, 531 (132 SCt 1201, 182 LE2d 42) (2012) (per curiam)

(“When this Court has fulfilled its duty to interpret federal law, a

state court may not contradict or fail to implement the rule so estab-

lished.”); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Martin, 283 U.S. 209, 221

(51 SCt 453, 75 LEd 983) (1931) (“The determination by this court

of [a federal] question is binding upon the state courts and must be

followed, any state law, decision, or rule to the contrary notwith-

standing.”). In other words, “even the venerable doctrine of stare de-

cisis does not permit us to persist in an error of federal constitutional

law.” Lejeune I, 296 Ga. at 298.13

     13 This is so whether our decision interpreting federal law is more or less

protective of a right than the United States Supreme Court’s precedent. A

                                      54
      These principles apply to our decisions that have narrowed the

question whether a guilty plea is constitutionally valid into a record

search for the three “Boykin rights.” Some of those decisions reject

challenges to guilty pleas merely because the three “Boykin rights”

show up in the record, without considering whether other deficien-

cies in the plea hearing render a guilty plea invalid. See, e.g., Britt,

274 Ga. at 611, 615; Cooper, 281 Ga. at 64 (1) (“Whether the trial

court establishes on the record a factual basis for the guilty plea does

not enter into the determination of the constitutional validity of the

plea under Boykin. As the habeas court itself recognized, that re-

quirement is only imposed on the trial court pursuant to Uniform

Superior Court Rule (USCR) 33.9.”). Others—the ones Green would

State is free to provide greater or lesser protection of a right as a matter of state
law, but we do not have that freedom as a matter of federal constitutional law,
at least when the Supreme Court has “specifically refrain[ed]” from doing so.
Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 719 (II) (1) (95 SCt 1215, 43 LE2d 570) (1975)
(explaining that “a State is free as a matter of its own law to impose greater
restrictions on police activity than those this Court holds to be necessary upon
federal constitutional standards. . . . But, of course, a State may not impose
such greater restrictions as a matter of federal constitutional law when this
Court specifically refrains from imposing them.”).
                                         55
have us rely on here—require reversal of guilty pleas merely be-

cause one of those rights was not recited on the record. Sutton, 283

Ga. at 28-29; Arnold, 282 Ga. at 67-68; Hawes, 281 Ga. at 825. Both

kinds of decisions share the same unsupported premise: that finding

a recitation of the “Boykin rights” on the record is both necessary

and sufficient to concluding that a guilty plea is valid as a matter of

federal constitutional law. As we have explained at length, this

premise finds no meaningful support in Boykin or any other United

States Supreme Court precedent.

     The Supreme Court has not said expressly that our outlier

rule—that a record that does not expressly indicate that the defend-

ant was specifically informed about all three “Boykin rights” re-

quires automatic reversal of a guilty plea—is wrong. But that rule

is such a clear misreading of Supreme Court precedent that we are

required to overrule it. That rule is not reasonably extracted from

Boykin itself—particularly now that the Supreme Court has de-

scribed Boykin as adding only “that the record must affirmatively

                                  56
disclose that a defendant who pleaded guilty entered his plea under-

standingly and voluntarily,” Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 (I) n.4, with no

hint then or since that the three “Boykin rights” have any outsized

importance in the assessment of a guilty plea’s validity. And alt-

hough the national consensus we described above is only persuasive

authority, it is quite persuasive. The near-universal rejection of our

rule across the country in cases applying Boykin bolsters the case

that our automatic-reversal rule simply cannot be reconciled with

the Supreme Court’s precedent. Finally, it is telling that at least two

state courts that once applied a “Boykin rights”-focused automatic-

reversal rule like ours—California and Louisiana—have each since

concluded that the overwhelming weight of authority required them

to abandon that rule in favor of the consensus federal standard,

without addressing stare decisis. See Howard, 824 P2d at 1341-1342

(II) (H) & n.18 (explaining that the federal courts of appeals “have

expressly rejected” the rule that Boykin requires a specific recitation

of the three rights mentioned and collecting cases); Balsano, 11 So3d

                                  57
at 477 (acknowledging that Louisiana’s “three-right rule . . . re-

flected a minority view” and “was not constitutionally required”).

     All of that said, stare decisis likely would not require us to pre-

serve our “three Boykin rights” approach to guilty pleas in any event.

As we have just recounted, that approach was not a result of rea-

soned decision making. And our decisions that started that approach

are not just unreasoned, but an unreasoned departure from our own

earlier decisions—in particular, Goodman, which was, by contrast,

thoroughly reasoned and well-grounded in United States Supreme

Court precedent. Compare Britt, 274 Ga. at 612 (citing Nash, 271

Ga. at 285, for the proposition that the State’s “only burden” was to

prove the defendant’s “articulated waiver of the three Boykin

rights”) with Goodman, 249 Ga. at 13-15 (I) & n.2 (discussing

Boykin, our own prior precedent, and Boykin decisions from the fed-

eral courts of appeals (citing State v. Germany, 245 Ga. 326, 328 (265

SE2d 13) (1980); Andrews v. State, 237 Ga. 66, 67 (1) & n.1 (226

                                  58
SE2d 597) (1976))).14 Nor are there any reliance interests to speak

of. Compare Olevik v. State, 302 Ga. 228, 245 (2) (c) (iv) (806 SE2d

505) (2017) (explaining that reliance interests are an “important

consideration for precedents involving contract and property rights”

because “parties may have acted in conformance with existing legal

rules in order to conduct transactions” (punctuation omitted)). Even

if we had a choice between continuing to follow such a rule and re-

turning to the consensus understanding of Boykin, stare decisis

likely would not require us to push farther down the wrong path.

See Johnson, 315 Ga. at 887-888 (3) (overruling decision that was

“not only wrong but obviously so; unreasoned (bordering on acci-

dental); in conflict with our own decisions; and . . . work[ed] genuine

      14 We generally presume that a later decision that conflicts with an ear-

lier decision has tacitly overruled the earlier decision. Taylor v. Devereux
Found., Inc., 316 Ga. 44, 62-63 (III) (C) (885 SE2d 671) (2023) (declining to
follow earlier decision where later decision that conflicted properly recited and
applied a “bedrock principle”). But when that tacit overruling was not only un-
noticed by the Court that did it but also unreasoned, as in Nash and Britt, stare
decisis arguably applies to the new decision with less force. See Ammons v.
State, 315 Ga. 149, 171-172 (1) (880 SE2d 544) (2022) (Pinson, J., concurring)
(“If the past decision in question is unreasoned, or if it disregards the basic
legal principles that courts use to do law, the argument for overruling is easier
to make.”).
                                       59
harm to important review rights of . . . criminal defendants”).15

      In short, our decisions reversing a guilty plea merely because

the record does not show that the defendant was expressly apprised

of all three of the so-called “Boykin rights” are overruled. 16

      With these decisions cleared away, our law finds its way back

      15 When asked to reconsider our past decisions, this Court has “typically”

considered a list of factors that include the “soundness” of the precedent’s rea-
soning, its “age,” its “workability,” and the “reliance interests at stake.” John-
son, 315 Ga. at 888 (3). “This list of factors has never purported to be exclusive,
and several of us have expressed concerns with those factors, or at least with
how they are usually applied.” Id. at 888-889 (3) (cleaned up). This case is a
good example of one for which at least some of these factors would seem a poor
fit. For instance, how are we to characterize the “age” of the precedent in ques-
tion when that precedent comprises a line of decisions spanning the latest 25
years—and which way does that cut given the presence of an older line of con-
flicting precedent that has not been expressly overruled? And it is perhaps
more “workable” for an appellate court to have to review only whether the three
“Boykin rights” have been recited on the record, but if that approach does not
reflect a reasonable understanding of the actual federal standard for assessing
whether a guilty plea is valid, it is hard to see how “workability” could play a
meaningful role in the stare decisis analysis. In any event, we need not resolve
these concerns here given our conclusion that the conflict with United States
Supreme Court precedent requires us to overrule our decisions applying the
“three Boykin rights” approach to guilty pleas.
       16 These decisions include Nash, 271 Ga. 281, Britt, 274 Ga. 611, Arnold,

282 Ga. 66, Hawes, 281 Ga. 822, Sutton, 283 Ga. 28, Wilson, 288 Ga. 779,
Tyner, 289 Ga. 592, Lejeune II, 299 Ga. 546, Foskey v. Battle, 277 Ga. 480 (591
SE2d 802) (2004); Pulliam v. State, 278 Ga. 354 (602 SE2d 833) (2004), Baisden
v. State, 279 Ga. 702 (620 SE2d 369) (2005), Johnson v. Smith, 280 Ga. 235
(626 SE2d 470) (2006), Beckworth v. State, 281 Ga. 41 (635 SE2d 769) (2006),
State v. Hemdani, 282 Ga. 511 (651 SE2d 734) (2007), Denson v. Frazier, 284
Ga. 858 (672 SE2d 625) (2009), and Sanders v. Holder, 285 Ga. 760 (684 SE2d
239) (2009).
                                        60
to the rule outlined in Goodman and explained years before by the

United States Supreme Court: a guilty plea is valid as a matter of

federal constitutional law if the record affirmatively shows that it is

voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circumstances.

See, e.g., Goodman, 249 Ga. at 14-15 (1); Thomason, 229 Ga. at 642-

643. See also Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 (I) n.4, 748 (I)-749 (II) & n.6.

As Goodman explained, that means there must be “a record of the

guilty plea hearing adequate for the reviewing court to determine

whether (1) the defendant has freely and voluntarily entered the

plea with (2) an understanding of the nature of the charges against

him and (3) an understanding of the consequences of his plea.” 249

Ga. at 13 (1). But the “failure to advise an accused of his right

against self-incrimination” (or the other two “Boykin rights”) does

not require the reversal of a guilty plea where the longstanding “in-

telligent and voluntary” standard has otherwise been met. See id. at

13-15 (1) (citation omitted).17

      17 A word on harmless error. When a defendant in Georgia courts claims

that a guilty plea is invalid as a matter of federal due process, harmless-error

                                      61
      This does not mean that a trial court may neglect to undertake

a careful and searching plea hearing with the defendant. As the

United States Supreme Court has noted, “a guilty plea is a grave

and solemn act to be accepted only with care and discernment.”

Brady, 397 U.S. at 748 (I). In Georgia, our trial courts have always

been required to carefully follow the procedures laid out in Uniform

Rule of Superior Court 33.8 (Georgia’s analogue to the federal Rule

11), 18 and our many cases explaining that the defendant must be

review is not part of the analysis of that claim. Review for harmless error typ-
ically happens in federal courts because such challenges are ordinarily raised
under Rule 11 rather than directly under the Constitution. See, e.g., See e.g.,
United States v. Stead, 746 F2d 355, 356-357 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v.
Gomez-Cuevas, 917 F2d 1521, 1525 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Johnson,
1 F3d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1993). Because a deviation from the mandatory proce-
dures of Rule 11 is an “error,” the question becomes whether it is “harmless
error” under Rule 11 (h). By contrast, when a defendant claims that a guilty
plea violates federal due process directly, the question reduces to whether the
record affirmatively shows that the defendant’s guilty plea was voluntary and
intelligent under all the circumstances. Boykin, 395 U.S. 238; Brady, 397 U.S.
at 747-748 (I). If it was, there is no “error” to review for harm. If, on the other
hand, the guilty plea was not voluntary and intelligent under the circum-
stances, that constitutional error requires reversal without further assessment
of harm. See Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 (I) & n.4; see also id. at 748 (I) n.5 (collect-
ing cases); Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 618 (118 SCt 1604, 140
LEd2d 828) (1998) (“A plea of guilty is constitutionally valid only to the extent
it is ‘voluntary’ and ‘intelligent.’”) (citations omitted).
        18 The current version of USCR 33.8 reads in full:

                                        62
aware of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences of en-

tering a guilty plea. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. State, 308 Ga. 743, 746-

747 (2) (a) (843 SE2d 571) (2020); Bradley v. State, 305 Ga. 857, 859

(2) (828 SE2d 322) (2019); Lewis v. State, 293 Ga. 544, 547 (1) (748

       The judge should not accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere from a
defendant without first:
       (A) Determining on the record that the defendant understands the na-
ture of the charge(s);
       (B) Informing the defendant on the record that by entering a plea of
guilty or nolo contendere one waives:
              (1) the right to trial by jury;
              (2) the presumption of innocence;
              (3) the right to confront witnesses against oneself;
              (4) the right to subpoena witnesses;
              (5) the right to testify and to offer other evidence;
              (6) the right to assistance of counsel during trial;
              (7) the right not to incriminate oneself; and that by pleading not
                  guilty or remaining silent and not entering a plea, one obtains
                  a jury trial;
       (C) Where a defendant is not represented by counsel, informing the de-
fendant of his right to be assisted by counsel in entering the plea, as well as at
trial, and that the defendant is knowingly and voluntarily waiving that right;
and
       (D) Informing the defendant on the record:
          (1) of the terms of any negotiated plea;
          (2) that a plea of guilty may have an impact on his or her immigration
              status if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States;
          (3) of the maximum possible sentence on the charge, including that
              possible from consecutive sentences and enhanced sentences
              where provided by law; and/or
          (4) of the mandatory minimum sentence, if any, on the charge. This
              information may be developed by questions from the judge, the
              prosecuting attorney or the defense attorney or a combination of
              any of these.

                                       63
SE2d 414) (2013); Phelps v. State, 293 Ga. 873, 878 (II) (b) n.5 (750

SE2d 340) (2013); Smith v. State, 287 Ga. 391, 394 (2) (a) (697 SE2d

177) (2010); Adams v. State, 285 Ga. 744, 746-747 (3) (683 SE2d 586)

(2009). When a trial court follows these procedures, thereby “can-

vassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has a full un-

derstanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence,” the

court “leaves a record adequate for any review that may be later

sought.” Boykin, 395 U.S. at 244. But the failure to follow any par-

ticular part of these procedures, including informing a defendant

about the waiver of the three “Boykin rights,” is not automatic

grounds for reversal as long as the procedures the court followed

show that the defendant’s guilty plea was voluntary and intelligent

under the totality of the circumstances.

     D. Application

     This returns us to Green’s appeal. Green’s only claim on appeal

is that his guilty plea is invalid because the record doesn’t show that

he was informed of his privilege against self-incrimination. His

claim fails.

                                  64
     The record as a whole demonstrates that Green’s guilty plea

was voluntary and intelligent under the totality of the circum-

stances. At the plea hearing, Green indicated that he was aware of

the charges he was facing, the maximum sentences for those

charges, which charges he would be pleading guilty to, and what the

recommended sentence would be. Green affirmed that his guilty plea

was made knowingly and freely and that no one promised him any-

thing outside the negotiated plea. The trial court confirmed that

Green understood the rights he would waive by pleading guilty, in-

cluding his rights to a jury trial, to cross-examine the State’s wit-

nesses, to challenge the State’s evidence, to present evidence and

witnesses in his favor if Green chose, to testify if he chose, and to

appeal a jury’s potential verdict of guilty. Then, at the hearing on

Green’s motion for an out-of-time appeal, plea counsel testified that

she discussed the charges with Green, informed him of the possible

minimum and maximum sentences, and conveyed the plea offer, and

that Green wanted to accept the guilty plea. Plea counsel also testi-

fied, albeit through objections by opposing counsel, that she has a

                                 65
general practice of telling clients who plead guilty about the rights

they give up by doing so. And plea counsel submitted an affidavit in

which she averred substantially the same thing.

     This record, taken as a whole, demonstrates that Green en-

tered his guilty plea voluntarily and with awareness of the relevant

circumstances and likely consequences, including the constitutional

rights he would be waiving by entering a guilty plea. This satisfies

the requirements of federal due process, see Boykin, 395 U.S. at 243-

244; Brady, 397 U.S. at 747 (I) n.4. So, notwithstanding the lack of

an express indication on the record that Green was specifically in-

formed about his waiver of the right against self-incrimination, his

guilty plea was valid.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                 66