Court Opinion

ID: 9732196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:11:08.967845+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:33.650787
License: Public Domain

Matson, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. After carefully considering the record as a whole, taking the view of the evidence most favorable to the verdict, I can only conclude that plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, first, because he knowingly operated his vehicle on the highway after he once knew that it was in such condition that it could not be properly steered or turned in order to avoid collisions in case of an emergency, and, secondly, for failure to keep a proper lookout by reason of which failure he did not see the Williamson trailer in time either to stop or to turn to one side to avoid the collision. In coming to this conclusion I have assumed that the rear lights on the Williamson trailer were not burning immediately before the accident.
The majority rely upon the low temperature as a factor justifying plaintiff’s conduct. I cannot agree. The extremely low temperature cannot of itself be a factor which may be considered in the absence of some evidence that it was a proximate cause of plaintiff’s failure to see the parked units in time to avoid the collision. Plaintiff testified that his defroster was working, that his windshield was free of dirt or anything that would impair his vision, and that he could see through it perfectly. His engine was working normally and he had no trouble with his gasline. The intense cold did, however, make the grease on the fifth wheel of his tractor-trailer unit stiff so that he had difficulty in turning. Plaintiff testified that this was a “main thing” why he could not turn out in time to avoid the collision, and he further said that he had had difficulty with the stiffness of the fifth wheel more or less throughout his entire journey from Winnipeg. In other words, he Imowingly operated his truck on the highway for about 300 miles with a frozen fifth wheel which he knew deprived him of proper steering control of the vehicle. Such knowledge and conduct on his part is indicative only of his own contributory negligence. He who, after he has once dis*331covered that his vehicle is defective and cannot be properly steered, continues to operate it on the highway, except at a speed slow enough to assure him of full and instant control, is guilty of gross contributory negligence as a matter of law. Plaintiff also drove from Winnipeg with a broken exhaust pipe with the knowledge that dangerous and sleep-producing fumes were as a result being discharged beneath the cab occupied by himself and his assistant.
Aside from the 40-degree below zero temperature, the weather, road surface, and visibility conditions were excellent for highway travel. There was no fog, wind-driven snow, or other atmospheric condition to hamper a driver’s vision. With the exception of a few “spotted clouds,” it was a clear, bright night with a nearly full moon and the stars shining. Shadows cast over the snow, telephone poles, trees, houses, mailboxes, and the like could easily be seen without the aid of any artificial light. The 22-foot wide pavement provided excellent traction and a seven-and-one-half-foot wide tarvia shoulder was available for use on either side of the concrete. The highway east of Bluffton slopes slightly downward for about one-half mile to a creek and then, just beyond a bridge over the creek after a slight curve to the right, extends eastward in a straight line for about four-tenths of a mile up a slight incline to the place of the accident. Beyond the place of the accident the highway continues its slight eastward incline for an additional 1,000 or 1,300 feet where the incline reaches its crest.
In interpreting and depicting the character of the locus of the accident, I cannot agree with the following statement in the majority opinion:
“* * * The record is silent as to the topography of fluctation of the incline. There is nothing to indicate that it was wholly of an even plane to the extent the defendants suggest.”
The pictorial exhibits and the record itself belie the above statement. The state highway patrolman, who was familiar with this road area, testified as follows when examined by plaintiff’s counsel:
*332“Q. And is there a steady incline or ascending grade from the Leaf River up to and beyond the scene of the accident?
“A. Yes, sir.” (Italics supplied.)
Counsel’s carefully chosen question and the patrolman’s positive answer establish that the slight incline, over its entire length from 3,100 to 3,400 feet, involves only a gradual change in elevation which at all times proceeds substantially in the same plane. Unless we are to disregard the record and indulge in pure speculation, we can only conclude that the slight incline involved a gradual or steady ascent in the same plane and involved no perceptible undulations. Imperceptible unevenness in the road surface is immaterial and cam provide no background into which the silhouette of a truck 8 feet wide and 12 feet high will blend amd be hidden on a bright moonlit night. This holds true regardless of any similarity in the color of the truck body and the color of the road surface.
We turn to plaintiff’s conduct immediately prior to the accident. He testified that immediately prior to the collision he was driving at a speed of about 40 miles per hour. He had placed his lights on low beam when he passed an approaching car shortly after he had crossed the little bridge over the creek. He had kept the lights on low beam because he thought another car was approaching. While proceeding along the slight upgrade, plaintiff admits that with his lights on dim he could easily distinguish objects — such as mailboxes — up to a distance of 250 or 300 feet ahead. Despite such unimpeded vision for at least 250 feet, plaintiff proceeded along his traffic lane without seeing the Williamson trailer until it was only 75 feet away. According to his own testimony he traveled another 40 or 45 feet while he was attempting to apply the brakes and to turn to the left. In the remaining 30 feet he turned about 4 feet to the left with the result that the right front of his tractor struck the Williamson unit and drove the same against the Shue unit. Apparently plaintiff’s brakes did not take hold until approximately the moment of the impact.
The majority opinion seeks to justify plaintiff’s failure to see the Williamson trailer in time to stop, or in time to turn his vehicle *333sufficiently to avoid a collision, on the grounds that he saw no lights or reflectors on the rear of the Williamson trailer; that the aluminum trailer body presented a dirty-gray color which blended into the color of the concrete pavement; and further because the Shue and Williamson units were standing on an upgrade so that the only background afforded them was a concrete highway at night whereby they did not appear in clear relief by being silhouetted against the sky.
Although I accept as true plaintiff’s contention that no lights were burning on the rear of the Williamson trailer, I cannot agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the jury might have found that the reflectors on the Williamson unit were covered with dirt and snow which rendered them ineffectual as warning signals and thus further excused plaintiff’s failure to see the trailer. There is no support in the record to show that the back end of the Williamson unit (unit No. 2), with which plaintiff collided, was covered with dirt or snow so as to conceal or render ineffectual either the red reflectors or the red lenses of the taillights. A photograph introduced in evidence, which plaintiff himself testified showed substantially the condition of the bach end of the trailer when he collided with it, demonstrates beyond all reasonable doubt that the reflectors and taillights were free of snow and dirt. This is corroborated in part by five witnesses who all testified that, when the driver of the Williamson unit stopped at Perham for coffee, the rear lights of the unit were clearly visible. There was no precipitation, or blowing snow or dirt of any kind, which could have covered the rear end reflectors while the unit traveled the 18 or 20 miles on a bare concrete pavement from Perham to the scene of the accident. Apparently the majority have been misled by the photographic exhibit of the snow-covered rear end of the Shue unit which was parked directly in front of the Williamson unit which completely shielded it from plaintiff’s vision. The Shue unit had been covered with snow while passing through Washington, Idaho, and Montana in a snowstorm. We are not here concerned with the rear signal lights or reflectors on the Shue unit. Furthermore, any assumption that the *334headlights of the Williamson tractor shone on the rear end of the Shne trailer and thereby caused a diffusion of light which misled the plaintiff into believing that he was encountering another car has no foundation whatever in the record and belongs wholly to the field of conjecture. The evidentiary base of a verdict must be found in the record and not in the realm of speculation.
Upon no reasonable theory of the evidence can a justification be found on the ground of distracting circumstances for plaintiff’s failure to see the Williamson trailer in time to avoid the collision. The night instead of being dark was unusually bright. Admittedly plaintiff’s headlights enabled him to distinguish objects 250 or 300 feet ahead. Contrary to the holding of the majority opinion, there were no distracting circumstances to divert plaintiff’s attention. The majority opinion overlooks the significant fact that plaintiff did not at any time claim that he was suddenly blinded by the glaring headlights of any approaching car. His only testimony is that somewhere on the four-tenths of a mile pavement (or over 2,100 feet) between the Leaf River bridge and the point of collision he dimmed his lights for an oncoming car. This fact is of no significance since it is the general rule that:
“When automobiles meet at night each driver must anticipate the possibility of interference with his vision by the headlights of the other car, and if he cannot see the road beyond it, must have his own machine under such control as will enable him to stop immediately, or within such distance as he can see ahead.”3
The normal and regular flow of oncoming headlights on a highway is one of the reasonably expected hazards with which every motorist must cope in the exercise of due care, and before he can be excused for failure to exercise such due care, he must show that in the moment of peril when confronted by one danger his attention was diverted by some other independent circumstance which also reasonably portended danger. Here the approaching car, wholly removed from the locus of the accident, provided for plaintiff no such dis*335tracting circumstance justifying any reasonable apprehension of danger. He testified that he did not switch his lights off dim because he thought other lights were coming over the grade or hill crest. It must be remembered that the crest of the incline was located from 1,000 to 1,300 feet east of the accident scene and that plaintiff was then a considerable distance to the west of the point of collision. Whatever plaintiff may have seen, or imagined that he had seen, he was confronted with no circumstance which provided him with any reasonable basis for apprehending danger so as to justify a diversion of his attention from the road ahead and excuse his failure to see the parked trucks located between him and the hill crest. Despite the fact that he had his headlights on dim, he frankly admitted that he could clearly discern objects for a distance of 250 feet ahead. There is no reason why, in the exercise of the alertness of ordinary care, he should not have seen at least the silhouette of the parked vehicles.
The majority opinion’s theory of distracting circumstances has no basis either in fact or in law. Unlike the factual situations in Johnson v. Kutches, 205 Minn. 383, 285 N. W. 881, and in Brown v. Raymond Bros. Motor Transp. Inc. 186 Minn. 321, 243 N. W. 112 (cited in the majority opinion), wherein the vision of the respective drivers was interfered with and diverted by glaring and blinding headlights of cars suddenly approaching from the opposite direction, plaintiff here was faced with no oncoming lights since the headlights on the parked Shue and Williamson units were directed in the same direction as plaintiff was traveling. Any diffused light from the Shue and Williamson headlights, instead of portending danger as to be a source of distraction, would serve to illuminate, accentuate, and disclose to plaintiff the parked vehicles. It is both elementary and clear that in order to find distracting circumstances which will excuse what is otherwise negligent conduct “there must be not only another danger from which attention may be diverted, but also that the circumstances relied upon as distracting must be such as *336of themselves may reasonably be considered to portend danger,”4 (Italics supplied.)
The Williamson trailer (as well as the Shue unit) was 12 feet high and 8 feet wide. Despite the dirty or silver-gray color of the trailer body, plaintiff ought to have seen it since it was equipped with red glass reflectors, one on each of the rear lower corners. Furthermore, the wheels and undercarriage were of a dark color which would not naturally blend with the pavement. In addition, on this clear, moonlit night the trailer, both within and beyond the admitted range of plaintiff’s headlights, must have been outlined against the horizon and presented a silhouette visible to any approaching driver proceeding with the alertness of ordinary care. Plaintiff’s contention that no silhouette was presented because of the slight upgrade extending to a crest 1,000 or 1,300 feet away does not, as already indicated, accord with the physical facts. Obviously where, on a bright, moonlit night, one vehicle follows or approaches another vehicle on a straight upgrade which is so gradual and uniform that both vehicles are traveling in the same plane except as to imperceptible pavement undulations, the vehicle ahead cannot possibly blend with the pavement so that its bulk and outline (here 8 feet wide by 12 feet high) will be concealed from the driver of the vehicle to the rear.
Plaintiff testified he could apply his brakes and stop within 250 feet or within the space illuminated by his headlights. Obviously, except as he was prevented by his own negligence in driving with a frozen fifth wheel which prevented normal steering or turning, plaintiff could have turned into the clear onto one of the wide road shoulders in a very much shorter distance. Under the circumstances, without ignoring any of them, his failure to see the parked vehicle before a collision was inevitable can reasonably be construed only to mean that he neglected to exercise ordinary care in using his eyes to see what was obviously discernible in front of him.
*337In respect to its controlling facts, the instant case falls within the rule of Orrvar v. Morgan, 189 Minn. 306, 249 N. W. 42, as the rule of that decision is delimited by its own operative facts and by subsequent decisions. In the Orrvar case plaintiffs’ son Eobert, who was driving his parents’ car at an approximate speed of 30 miles per hour, struck the rear of defendant’s stalled truck, which he was endeavoring to remove from the highway. It appears that Eobert had his headlights on dim. He testified that he did not see the truck until it was too late to turn out to avoid striking it. Eobert further testified that he could see approximately 25 to 30 feet ahead of the car. A mechanic testified that the lights when dimmed should provide sufficient illumination to make an object clearly discernible at 150 feet under normal conditions. There was testimony tending to show that defendant did not have a lighted taillight on his truck. The accident occurred on a clear summer night, and the road was dry. It was held on appeal that Eobert was contributorily negligent as a matter of law since, if he could see only 25 or 30 feet ahead as he testified, he was overdriving his lights; and, if he could see 150 feet away as the mechanic testified, he failed to use his eyes and to see what was obviously in front of him. It is not claimed here that plaintiff was overdriving his headlights. That is, plaintiff could have brought his unit to a stop within the distance illuminated by his headlights. However, the alternative Orrvar holding that the driver was guilty of contributory negligence for the reason that he failed to use his eyes and to see what was obviously in front of him is controlling since the facts in the case at bar are even more compelling than those of the Orrvar case in establishing negligence as a matter of law.
In the instant case we have a night which was not merely clear but was so unusually bright that objects were discernible at a great distance without the aid of any artificial lights. In addition, plaintiff’s headlights, even though on low beam, illuminated the road for 250 to 300 feet ahead to such an extent that a reasonably alert driver could not fail seasonably to discover objects in his lane of travel. We here also have red reflectors which naturally did not blend into *338the pavement under the glare of oncoming headlights. Usually contributory negligence as a matter of law is based on no single or controlling circumstance but rather on a combination of circumstances arising from a consideration of all phases of the individual case. It follows that no fixed rule is to be deduced from our decisions to provide a uniform and infallible test for determining when contributory negligence is for the jury and when it is not. It is for this reason that the Orrvar case has been frequently distinguished to confine its authoritative effect to its own peculiar facts.5 Within its peculiar facts, the rule of the Orrvar case is still in effect, and that rule is strikingly applicable here. Easily distinguished on its facts is the case of Wicker v. North States Const. Co. Inc. 183 Minn. 79, 235 N. W. 630, wherein a concrete mixer was left in the middle of the road by a construction crew on a darle night.
I am of the opinion that the orders of the trial court, denying defendants’ motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, should be reversed on the ground that plaintiff is guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law.

 2 Berry, Law of Automobiles (7 ed.) § 2.460.

 Dreyer v. Otter Tail Power Co. 205 Minn. 286, 290, 285 N. W. 707, 709, 287 N. W. 13; City of Radford v. Calhoun, 165 Va. 24, 181 S. E. 345, 100 A. L. R. 1378; Carbone v. Boston & Maine R. 89 N. H. 12, 192 A. 858; see, 3 Blashfield, Cyc. of Auto. Law and Practice (Perm, ed.) § 1748.

 See, Jurgensen v. Schirmer Transp. Co. 242 Minn. 157, 64 N. W. (2d) 530, and cases cited therein; Schubitzke v. Minneapolis, St. P. & S. S. M. R. Co. 244 Minn. 156, 69 N. W. (2d) 104.