Court Opinion

ID: 9838940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 21:00:24.774775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:55.471546
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 21-2073

        ROBERT MICHAEL MILLER,

                            Plaintiff - Appellant,

                     v.

        JELENA MCWILLIAMS,              Chairwoman;     FEDERAL       DEPOSIT     INSURANCE
        CORPORATION,

                            Defendants - Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Alexandria. Liam O’Grady, Senior District Judge. (1:20-cv-00671-LO-TCB)

        Submitted: February 28, 2023                                 Decided: September 7, 2023

        Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        Robert Michael Miller, Appellant Pro Se. Shari A. Rose, FEDERAL DEPOSIT
        INSURANCE CORPORATION, Arlington, Virginia, for Appellees.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Robert Michael Miller appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment

        to Jelena McWilliams, former Chairwoman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation

        (FDIC), and FDIC on Miller’s claims of age, sex, race, and disability discrimination and

        retaliation for prior EEO activities, under 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 12203, and dismissing

        Miller’s hostile work environment claim, under 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301 to 2302. We review a

        district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo, “view[ing] the facts and all

        justifiable inferences arising therefrom in the light most favorable to . . . the nonmoving

        party,” Jacobs v. N.C. Admin. Off. of the Cts., 780 F.3d 562, 565 n.1 (4th Cir. 2015)

        (internal quotation marks omitted); however, “the nonmoving party must rely on more than

        conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one inference upon another, or

        the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence,” Humphreys & Partners Architects, L.P. v.

        Lessard Design, Inc., 790 F.3d 532, 540 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

               When, as here, there is no direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation, “[a]

        plaintiff may prove that an employer took action with discriminatory or retaliatory

        intent . . . through the burden-shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.

        Green[, 411 U.S. 792 (1973)].”         Strothers v. City of Laurel, 895 F.3d 317, 327

        (4th Cir. 2018). If a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation,

        the burden shifts to his employer to provide a legitimate, nondiscriminatory, and

        nonretaliatory reason for the employment action. Jacobs, 780 F.3d at 575, 578. The

        plaintiff then must show by a preponderance of the evidence that his employer’s legitimate

        reasons were untrue and a pretext for intentional discrimination or retaliation. Id. at 575,

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        578.   “Although intermediate evidentiary burdens shift back and forth under [the

        McDonnell Douglas] framework, the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that

        the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the

        plaintiff.” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (cleaned

        up). We have reviewed the record and conclude that the district court did not err in finding

        that Miller failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination based on race or EEO

        activity and that, even if we were to assume he established a prima facie case of

        discrimination based on age, sex, or disability, he did not show that a reasonable trier of

        fact could find that Defendants’ legitimate reasons for selecting another candidate for the

        promotion were pretextual. We further conclude that the district court did not err in

        dismissing Miller’s claims under 5 U.S.C. §§ 2301 to 2302 for lack of jurisdiction.

               Miller also argues that the district court erred when it denied a stay of personnel

        actions against him and has filed a motion to expedite decision on that issue. Because we

        affirm the final judgment entered in this case, we cannot provide relief from the district

        court’s denial of Miller’s motion for a temporary restraining order or preliminary

        injunction. Accordingly, we deny his motion to expedite. See Mt. Graham Red Squirrel v.

        Madigan, 954 F.2d 1441, 1450 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting reversal of denial of preliminary

        relief “would have no practical consequences” following affirmance of court’s decision on

        merits and declining to address issue as moot); Burton v. Georgia, 953 F.2d 1266, 1272

        n.9 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Once a final judgment is rendered, the appeal is properly taken from

        the final judgment, not the preliminary injunction.”).

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               Finally, Miller challenges various procedural and discovery rulings made by the

        district court, including the district court’s order dismissing Miller’s first complaint sua

        sponte for failure to comply with Fed. R. Civ. P. 8, the court’s refusal to grant Fed. R. Civ.

        P. 11 sanctions based on Defendants’ answer, the district court’s decision to deny a

        discovery survey that would have required nearly 5,000 FDIC employees to disclose their

        political affiliation and voting history, the district court’s decision to deny a discovery

        extension two days before the discovery deadline, and the court’s denial of motions to

        compel and for Fed. R. Civ. P. 37 sanctions that Miller filed after the close of discovery.

        We are satisfied that none of the district court’s procedural or discovery rulings in this case

        constituted an abuse of discretion. See Jacksonville Airport, Inc. v. Michkeldel, Inc., 434

        F.3d 729, 732 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating standard of review).

               We therefore affirm the district court’s order and deny Miller’s motion to expedite.

        We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately

        presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional

        process.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

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