Court Opinion

ID: 9695341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:15:47.996422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:10.921722
License: Public Domain

MADDOX, Justice
(concurring specially).
I concur wholeheartedly in the opinion with the exception of that part which holds Section 4 of Act 698, Acts, 1969 [Title 14, Section 374(16m)] is unconstitutional. Section 4 of Act 698 provides:
“(a) No prosecution may be commenced against any person for violating Sections 2 and 3 of this Act unless the accused is first served with prior written notice that there is reasonable cause to believe the material upon which such prosecution is based violates this Act, and the accused has, after receiving such notice violated this Act.
“(b) The written notice provided for in paragraph (a) of this Section 4 may be given by only the following officials: the State Attorney General and any Assistant Attorney General; the district attorney, county solicitor, their assistants and deputies, or any person whose office and duty is to prosecute criminal actions before any state, county or municipal court; the sheriff; the chief of police *471of any municipality or town; and the duly authorized law enforcement employees of the Department of Public Safety.
“(c) Any person receiving such written notice provided for in paragraph (a) of this Section 4 shall have the right within 30 days from such notice to file an appropriate action for declaratory judgment to determine the validity of such written notice, but no such action shall, by reason of the commencement thereof, stay or in any way delay or postpone any prosecution for the violation of this Act.”
I realize that a three-judge District Court has held that not only Section 4, but Act 698, in its entirety, is unconstitutional, but as Justice Harwood points out, that decision is not binding upon us. In fact, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 93 S.Ct. 2607, 37 L.Ed.2d 419 (1973), reaffirmed the principle that it is the function of the states to regulate obscenity and that this is “ . . .a power reserved to them under the Constitution, a power which they have exercised continuously from before the adoption of the First Amendment to this day.”
Under the guidance of Miller, I believe the Federal District Court is incorrect about Section 4 (the notice provision). The authority which the Federal District Court cites is all pre-Miller. In Miller, the majority of the Supreme Court of the United States pointed out:
“Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution for the sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depicit or describe patently offensive ‘hard core’ sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as written or construed. We are satisfied that these specific prerequisites will provide fair notice to a dealer in such materials that his public and commercial activities may bring prosecution. See Roth v. United States, supra, 354 U.S. 476, at 491-492, 77 S.Ct. 1304, at 1312-1313, 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957). Cf. Ginsberg v. New York, supra, 390 U.S. 629, at 643, 88 S.Ct. 1274, at 1282, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1969).” [Emphasis added.]
As I read this admonition in Miller, a majority of the Supreme Court seems to think a notice to peddlers of obscenity that they could suffer prosecution is not constitutionally impermissible.
As a matter of fact, in Gable v. Jenkins, 309 F.Supp. 998 (N.D.Ga.1970), aff’d per curiam, 397 U.S. 592, 90 S.Ct. 1351, 25 L. Ed.2d 595 (1970), Georgia Code, § 26-2101, which is similar to Act 698 in its definition of obscene material, was upheld as being constitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States. While the Court there held that a prior adversary hearing is constitutionally necessary before seizure of obscene material can be made, the Court nevertheless suggested a procedure which could be followed, which procedure closely follows the “notice” provision of Act 698. The Court pointed out (309 F.Supp. at page 1001) :
“However, as to the necessity of the prior adversary hearing, this goes merely to the competency of the evidence in an obscenity prosecution and would not bar a prosecution based on other legally obtained evidence. Matter seized illegally, i. e., without a hearing, must be returned. In Marcus v. Search Warrants of Property, 367 U.S. 717, 81 S.Ct. 1708, 6 L.Ed.2d 1127 (1961), the evil was that the hearing as to the obscene nature of the material was held after seizure; thereby, the Supreme Court concluded that the procedure employed was unconstitutional. There is proper procedure existing in the Georgia law that can achieve constitutional standards, i. e., a prior adversary judicial proceeding before the seizure of the allegedly obscene items.3 Accordingly, Georgia Code 26-*4722101 is not unconstitutional in that it does not establish a prior judicial hearing within itself.
The obscene material in this case was purchased after the seller had been warned that the material was considered obscene. It was not seized under a warrant or incident to an arrest.
From a policy standpoint, the notice provision of Act 698 puts an additional requirement on the prosecution — to give written notice to a seller advising him that his material is considered obscene. This notice is required before a prosecution can be commenced.
Most violators of the law are not favored with a warning before a prosecution can be commenced. Since I do not believe that a prior judicial determination that material is obscene must be held before a prosecution can be commenced, I cannot agree with the majority on this point.
I think the majority here and the Federal District Court have both misinterpreted the purpose of the notice provision. I believe the legislative purpose was probably designed to notify book dealers that a book or magazine he was selling was obscene. He could not be prosecuted until he was notified. Many citizens might object to the state policj' which requires that a seller of obscene material should he forewarned, but the Legislature has decided differently. Under Miller, the regulation of obscenity, within the guidelines- there announced, is one for the individual state legislatures or state judges interpreting state law. At least, that is what I think Miller says.
I believe these notice provisions are beneficial to a potential defendant in an obscenity case. In Hawkins v. State, 124 Ga.App. 53, 183 S.E.2d 239 (1971), the defendant considered the notice provisions to be beneficial. Hawkins was being prosecuted for violating one of Georgia’s obscenity statutes. He claimed that the “notice” provision of the subsequent law (which dealt only with minors, but which contained a notice provision like Section 4 of Act 698) required that he be notified in writing before the prosecution could be commenced. The court did not rule in Hawkins’ favor, but it seems obvious that to require that the prosecutor notify a potential defendant that what he is doing is considered illegal before the state can prosecute is beneficial to the defendant.
There is another reason why I think the notice provision is not unconstitutional. The fact that a crime is “knowingly” committed is always an important consideration. It is conceivable that a dealer might not be aware of each and every thing which is contained in the books or magazines he sells. I think that is the reason the Legislature put the notice provision in the statute. Miller sets up the latest guidelines for prosecution of obscenity cases. I do not believe that the State must establish in an adversary hearing the obscenity vel non of every film, book, magazine, or other material before a prosecution can be commenced. Consequently, I disagree that Section 4 is unconstitutional.

. As examples, the following are presented : When a search warrant is applied for to seize the alleged obscene materials, the person possessing the same *472could be given notice of the intent to apply for the search warrant, and be given an opportunity to be present at such time, and present evidence in opposition to the issuance of the search warrant. Or an order to show cause why the alleged obscene film is not obscene could be served on the possessor, or a petition to have the film declared contraband, and subject to destruction could be served on the possessor.”