Court Opinion

ID: 9624852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:19:40.280203+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:55.656390
License: Public Domain

Durham, J.
(dissenting) — The majority's analysis of the construction statute of repose effectively repeals it, contrary to established rules of statutory interpretation and plain sense. Thus, I dissent.
Pursuant to RCW 4.16.310, a builder is protected from any cause of action arising out of defective construction unless it accrues within 6 years of the substantial completion of construction, or the termination of the builder's activities, whichever comes later. It is undisputed that the builder in this case, Island Construction Company, completed the condominium at issue here in 1979, and the plaintiff's cause of action did not accrue until a fire in 1986. Therefore, if the statute of repose applies, it bars the plaintiff's claims.
The construction statute of repose applies to a wide range of claims:
[The statute of repose] shall apply to all claims or causes of action of any kind against any person, arising from such person having constructed, altered or repaired any improvement upon real property, or having performed or furnished any design, planning, surveying, architectural or construction or engineering services, or supervision or observation of construction, or administration of construction contracts for any construction, alteration or repair of any improvement upon real property. . . .
RCW 4.16.300.
The majority holds that this statute protects builders from claims alleging defects in construction, but not from claims alleging a failure to disclose those defects when the *572property is sold to others. The majority bases this interpretation on the absence of any language in the statute expressly extending protection to builders for failing to disclose their own construction defects.
Where this analysis breaks down is in its failure to realistically measure its impact. As the record demonstrates, residential construction commonly takes two forms. In "spec" construction, a builder constructs an improvement on "speculation" that a buyer can later be found to purchase the property. In custom construction, another party has already contracted to purchase the property. In "virtually 100%" of "spec" construction, and in "typically one-half" of the custom projects, the builder owns the property during the construction process.1 Moreover, general contractors often have ownership interests even in larger commercial construction projects. Most construction projects, therefore, involve builders owning the property for subsequent resale.
When a builder/owner is involved, any claim that the builder defectively constructed a project is just as easily framed as a claim that the builder failed to disclose those defects when he sold the property after construction was complete.2 Thus, the majority's analysis allows plaintiffs in most cases to avoid operation of the statute by simply recasting their allegations of defective construction as allegations of inadequate disclosure.
The majority attempts to downplay the effect of its holding with the curious statement that even though the statute of repose does not apply to builder/sellers in this case, it "would still protect builder/sellers charged with *573negligence." Majority, at 570. The statute, however, contains no language suggesting a distinction for negligence claims. Apparently, the majority conjured up this explanation in an attempt to assign meaning to a statute that will have little use after today's decision.
This court should not attribute to the Legislature an intent to so severely restrict what was obviously intended to be a statute of sweeping application. "A statute is a solemn enactment of the state acting through its legislature and it must be assumed that this process achieves an effective and operative result." 2A N. Singer, Statutory Construction § 45.12, at 54 (4th ed. 1984) (and cases cited therein). A statute must be given a reasonable interpretation so as to give effect to its purpose and avoid absurd results. Pasco v. Napier, 109 Wn.2d 769, 773, 755 P.2d 170 (1988); 2A N. Singer, at § 45.12.
Analysis of the statute's purpose reveals that a defendant who builds and sells an improvement should be treated in the same manner as one who only builds the improvement. Statutes of repose are designed to avoid placing undue burdens on potential defendants by limiting the applicability of the discovery rule; liability attaches only for those causes of action that accrue within a certain period of time after the defendant has acted.3 See Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wn.2d 215, 222 & n.2, 543 P.2d 338 (1975); RCW 4.16.310. The policy is to protect defendants from having to defend against stale claims, because such claims are more likely to be spurious and supported by untrustworthy evidence, and the defendant often has not been in control of the improvement for a number of years. See Gazija, at 222; New Meadows Holding Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 34 Wn. App. 25, 29, 659 P.2d 1113 (1983), aff’d in part, rev'd in part, 102 Wn.2d 495, 687 P.2d *574212 (1984). The builder's lack of control over the premises is important because " [t]he longer the owner has possession of the improvement, the more likely it is that the damage was the owner's fault or the result of natural forces." Jones v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 48 Wn. App. 894, 899, 741 P.2d 75 (1987).
These expressions of legislative policy are served equally when the defendant is a builder/seller as when the defendant is only a builder. In each instance, the defendant is burdened with litigating stale claims relating to alleged defects in the defendant's construction activity. That one claim involves defective construction and the other involves failure to disclose those defects does not affect the burden on the defendant in having to defend himself from tardy claims. Because the two claims are so intimately related, and because one claim can so easily be transformed into the other, no distinction should be drawn between the two in applying the construction statute of repose. The majority's limitation of the statute simply cannot be squared with a reasonable interpretation of legislative intent.4
By deciding that the statute should apply, I need to address the argument raised by amicus curiae calling for a judicially created exception to RCW 4.16.310 for fraudulent concealment. This court long ago stated that absent "a statute making concealment an exception to the statute of limitations, the court cannot create one." Reeves v. John Davis & Co., 164 Wash. 287, 295, 2 P.2d 732 (1931) (citing Cornell v. Edsen, 78 Wash. 662, 139 P. 602 (1914)). This statement is equally applicable in the context of a statute of repose. Although the proposed exception might make sense as a matter of policy, the argument raised by amicus should be addressed to the Legislature, not this court.
*575The trial court's summary judgment in favor of Island Construction Company should be affirmed.
Callow, C.J., concurs with Durham, J.

In custom projects, the builder's ownership serves to assist and simplify the ' construction financing.

The present case serves as a good example. Pfeifer's original complaint in this case predicated Island Construction Company's liability solely on its activities of building and inspecting the condominium. Pfeifer later amended her complaint, however, to add a claim that Island Construction Company actively concealed, or failed to disclose, these defects to the buyer.

A cause of action "accrues" under this statute . .at the time the plaintiff knew or should have known all of the essential elements of the cause of action."' Del Guzzi Constr. Co. v. Global Northwest Ltd., 105 Wn.2d 878, 884, 719 P.2d 120 (1986) (quoting White v. Johns-Manville Corp., 103 Wn.2d 344, 348, 693 P.2d 687, 49 A.L.R.4th 955 (1985)).

My dissent should not be taken as a criticism of the majority's holding that the construction statute of repose calls for an activity analysis. I differ from the majority, however, in concluding that the Legislature intended builders to be protected in both their selling and building activities when the two activities are so intimately related.