Court Opinion

ID: 9862405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 01:09:43.361564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:26.294806
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE TULLY, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. As our supreme court recently observed: “The purpose behind the felony-murder statute is to limit the violence that accompanies the commission of forcible felonies, so that anyone engaged in such violence will be automatically subject to a murder prosecution should someone be killed during the commission of a forcible felony.” People v. Belk, 203 Ill. 2d 187, 192 (2003). Because of the extremely violent nature of felony murder, Illinois courts have sought the broadest bounds for the attachment of criminal liability. People v. Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d 87, 105 (1998). However, I believe that the felony murder rule, as applied by the majority, has been given too broad a scope. At common law, any unlawful killing occurring during the commission of any felony was murder. See People v. Morgan, 197 Ill. 2d 404, 445-46 (2001). In Illinois the common law definition of felony murder has been expanded in two significant ways. Under the so-called “felony-murder escape rule,” Illinois courts expanded the definition of during the commission of a felony to include a killing committed during an attempt to escape after the commission of a felony. See People v. Bongiorno, 358 Ill. 171 (1934); but see Dennis, 181 Ill. 2d at 105 (holding that the escape rule is solely applicable to felony murder and not a general rule of accountability). Similarly, Illinois courts have applied the proximate cause theory of felony murder to expand the reach to the felony murder beyond deaths caused by the actions of a defendant or his accomplices to deaths caused by third parties acting in response to the forcible felony. See People v. Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d 462, 470 (1997). The proximate cause theory has even been applied to create a liability for felony murder when the individual killed is an accomplice in the underlying felony. See People v. Dekens, 182 Ill. 2d 247, 252 (1998). The rationale underlying Dekens and Lowery was that those who commit forcible felonies should know that they may encounter violent resistance. See Lowery, 178 Ill. 2d at 470. In the case before us, the majority expands the felony murder rule in both directions simultaneously. In doing so, I believe the majority has stretched the felony murder rule beyond the breaking point. I believe that it is reasonable to assume that a defendant who contemplates the commission of a violent felony also contemplates the potential for violence during any escape from the scene of the crime. I also believe that it is reasonable to assume that a defendant who contemplates the commission of a violent felony can anticipate a potentially violent response. I do not, however, believe that such a felon contemplates the possibility that an unarmed accomplice will be shot by the police while attempting to escape. Accordingly, I do not believe that the deterrent effect of the felony murder rule is served by imposing criminal liability in response to such an unlikely turn of events. I believe that under the facts before us, the majority’s errors are twofold. First, the majority defines force too broadly and improperly extends the duration of the attempted robbery to include an escape attempt that did not include the use of force, or at most involved a use of force distinct from the force used in the robbery attempt. Second, the majority adopts a view of proximate cause that is too broad. I believe that under the circumstances of this case the use of force by the police was an intervening cause. Therefore, I would reverse defendant’s conviction for felony murder.