Court Opinion

ID: 9707190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:04:46.166034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:28.965510
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. Cross-appellant, the City of Philadelphia, contends that a “would-be civil litigant” does not have a cause of action against a municipality for the failure of its police officers to investigate properly an accident and that the court should have granted its motion for judgment n.o.v. and not awarded a new trial. Appellant contends in response that the jury’s verdict should be reinstated because the City’s acts gave rise to a legally cognizable claim for damages. Because I believe that the jury was not properly charged, I would affirm the lower court's order granting a new trial.
In the early evening on February 17, 1975, appellant and her friend Charles Wiley were struck by an automobile as they were walking across an intersection. Appellant was knocked to the ground and sustained various injuries. Wi*423ley, who was not seriously injured, directed traffic to prevent any further injury to appellant while she was lying in the street. Shortly after the accident, two police vehicles, a cruiser and a van, arrived at the scene. The two officers in the van and the sergeant who arrived in the cruiser placed appellant on a stretcher and began to lift her into the van. As they were placing her in the van, a man approached them and identified himself as the driver of the car that struck appellant. One of the police officers told the driver to “stand by” until they could get appellant on her way to the hospital. Wiley testified that he then attempted to approach the man and obtain some identification from him but was stopped by the police who told him that they would take care of it. N.T. October 26, 1982 at 14. The police then directed Wiley to get inside the van. Some time following the accident, two other patrol cars arrived. Sergeant Smith, the first police officer to arrive, testified that he believed, but was not certain, that the two patrol cars arrived after appellant had been taken to the hospital in the van. Id. at 34-35. Wiley testified that the officers who arrived in the two patrol cars had been on the scene directing traffic around appellant when she was lying in the street. By the time the van left for the hospital, the driver had disappeared from the scene.
On February 10, 1977, appellant filed a complaint against the City alleging that the police officers at the scene of the accident negligently failed to obtain the driver’s identification and thus deprived her of the ability to sue the driver for her injuries. The City filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings contending that appellant had failed to state a cause of action because the City does not have a duty to investigate civil accident claims. The motion was denied and the case was tried before a jury on October 25, 1982. The jury returned a verdict in favor of appellant in the amount of $175,000. The City filed post-verdict motions for a new trial and for judgment n.o.v. The motions were argued before the lower court en banc. A majority of the three-judge en banc panel granted the City’s motion for a new trial and denied its motion for judgment n.o.v. Appel*424lant has appealed from the grant of a new trial. The City filed a cross-appeal from the order insofar as the court failed to grant its motion for judgment n.o.v.
The City, on cross-appeal, contends that the lower court erred in failing to grant its motion for judgment n.o.v. because “a disappointed would-be civil litigant does not have a cause of action against a municipality for damages in the nature of a ‘lost’ verdict based on the failure of its police officers to act as her civil accident investigators and provide her with a defendant.” 1 Brief for the City of Philadelphia at 12. Appellant responds that the jury verdict was proper because, under the instant circumstances, there was a special relationship between the police officers and herself that imposed a duty on them to obtain the drivers identification.
Whether a municipality may be held liable for the failure of its police officers to obtain the identification of a hit-and-run driver for the benefit of a victim is an issue of first impression in this Commonwealth. The City first argues that it did not owe appellant a duty to exercise reasonable care in obtaining the driver’s identification. To resolve this question, I would inquire (1) whether an ordinary citizen in the same position as the police officers would have a duty to obtain the driver’s identification, and (2) whether the officers’ status as municipal employees affords a shield from a civil liability for the failure to perform properly an official police function.
As a general rule, a person does not have a duty to aid another even if he or she realizes that his or her aid is necessary. See Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement) § 314 (1966). See also Yania v. Bigan, 397 Pa. 316, 155 A.2d 343 (1959). Once a person begins to aid another, *425however, he or she may be liable for injuries that result from a failure to exercise reasonable care in that undertaking. This tort concept, known as the good Samaritan rule, is stated in § 323 of the Restatement, which provides that:
One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
* * * * * *
(b) the harm is suffered because of the other’s reliance upon the undertaking.
Restatement § 323. See also Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978) (applying § 323); DeJesus v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 423 Pa. 198, 223 A.2d 849 (1966) (applying § 323).
While § 323 of the Restatement, by its terms, applies only to liability for physical harm, I believe that in Pennsylvania the principle embodied in the section also applies to liability for economic harm such as that allegedly suffered here. This rule was the law in this Commonwealth before any of our appellate courts had expressly relied on § 323 itself. In Pascarella v. Kelley, 378 Pa. 18, 105 A.2d 70 (1954) our Supreme Court held that a party could recover for a negligent undertaking, but did not expressly require that the injured party suffer physical harm. The Court stated that:
“If a party make a gratuitous engagement and actually enters on the execution of the business and so negligently does it from want of care that another suffers damage thereby, an action will lie for this misfeasance.”
Id., 378 Pa. at 23, 105 A.2d at 73 (quoting Rehder v. Miller, 35 Pa.Superior Ct. 344, 347 (1908)). Similarly, in Pirocchi v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 365 F.Supp. 277 (E.D.Pa.1973), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, applying Pennsylvania law, employed this rule in a case alleging harm similar to that in *426the instant case. There, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant claim adjuster’s failure to preserve physical evidence in its custody had destroyed his cause of action against a third party. Id. at 279. The defendant contended that it did not have a duty towards the plaintiff to maintain the evidence. The court refused to grant summary judgment on this ground, concluding that the jury could find that the defendant had undertaken a duty to preserve the evidence once it assumed control over it. Id. at 281-82. See also Quinones v. United States, 492 F.2d 1269 (3d Cir.1974) (plaintiff stated cause of action where he alleged that former employer had undertaken duty to maintain proper employment records and breach of that duty resulted in his rejection by potential employers); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Direnzi, 442 F.Supp. 1 (E.D.Pa.1977) (plaintiff may state cause of action for money damages where plaintiff undertook to perform act although- under no initial duty to so perform). Courts in other jurisdictions, applying § 323, have permitted recovery for other than physical harm. See, e.g., Adkins & Ainley, Inc. v. Busada, 270 A.2d 135 (D.C.1970) (negligent undertaking to provide insurance; monetary loss); Blackmon v. Nelson, Hesse, Cyril, Weber & Sparrow, 419 So.2d 405 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) (per curiam) (law firm undertaking to provide employee with health insurance; monetary loss); McDonald v. Title Insurance Co., 49 Or.App. 1055, 621 P.2d 654 (1980) (negligent undertaking to provide legal advice; monetary loss); Schwartz v. Greenfield, Stein & Weisinger, 90 Misc.2d 882, 396 N.Y.S.2d 582 (Sup.Ct.1977) (negligent undertaking to perfect security interest; monetary loss). I would therefore conclude that an ordinary citizen would not be precluded from recovery under § 323 of the Restatement simply because the harm alleged is economic rather than physical.
I also do not believe that appellant’s recovery is precluded by Stupka v. Peoples Cab Co., 436 Pa. 509, 264 A.2d 373 (1970). In Stupka, the plaintiff was injured when the taxicab in which she was a passenger was struck from behind by another vehicle. The cab driver got out of his *427cab and spoke to the driver of the other vehicle, but failed to secure his name or other identification before he left the scene of the accident. The plaintiff sued the cab driver for negligently failing to obtain the identification of the hit-and-run driver and her consequent loss of a financial recovery from the driver. The Court held that the cab driver was not under a duty to protect his passenger’s financial interest. Id., 486 Pa. at 512-13, 264 A.2d at 374. The Court thus ruled only that the cab driver lacked an affirmative duty to obtain the driver’s identification. It did not address whether or not the driver had undertaken to perform this service for the plaintiff and had thereby induced her reliance. Stupka is therefore not controlling.
If the inquiry ended here, I would conclude that the jury should have been instructed pursuant to § 323 that the officers had a duty to exercise reasonable care in obtaining the driver’s identification if their acts at the scene of the accident constituted an undertaking to obtain the identification, and the undertaking induced appellant’s reliance on them to so perform. Because, however, the police officers are agents of a municipality, the question whether that status shields them from liability here must be addressed. Our courts have held that there is a distinction between duties that the police owe to the public at-large and those to an individual.
“[I]f the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty to the public, then, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a public not an individual injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public prosecution.”
Berlin v. Drexel University, 10 D. & C.3d 319, 326 (C.P.Phila.Co.1979) (quoting 2 Cooley on Torts § 300, at 385-86 (4th ed. 1932)).
The duty to the public, however, may become a duty to an individual if the police have a “special relationship” to the complainant that differs from that of the police to the general public. See Melendez v. City of Philadelphia, 320 Pa.Superior Ct. 59, 64, 466 A.2d 1060, 1063 (1988); Chap*428man v. City of Philadelphia, 290 Pa.Superior Ct. 281, 283, 434 A.2d 753, 754 (1981); Berlin v. Drexel University, supra at 328. See also Miller v. United States, 561 F.Supp. 1129, 1134 (E.D.Pa.1983), aff'd sub nom. Appeal of Miller, 729 F.2d 1448 (3d Cir.1984).
In Berlin, the court held that a special relationship exists when “a member of the public has been exposed to a special danger ... and the authorities have undertaken the responsibility to provide adequate protection.” Berlin v. Drexel University, supra at 328. See also Miller v. United States, supra at 1134; Chapman v. City of Philadelphia, supra 290 Pa.Super. at 283, 434 A.2d at 754. In Melendez v. City of Philadelphia, supra, this Court further defined a special relationship to include the following three elements: (1) police awareness of the individual’s particular situation; (2) knowledge by the police of the potential for the particular harm suffered; and (3) a voluntary assumption by the police of the protection of the individual from the precise harm. Id. 320 Pa.Super. at 64, 466 A.2d at 1063-64. Examples of such a special relationship include that of the police to a prosecution witness, a police informant, and an undercover agent. Berlin v. Drexel University, supra at 328.
Courts in other jurisdictions have ruled on the issue presented here, whether the police have a duty to obtain a tortfeasor’s identification for an injured party, and have analyzed the municipality’s duty under the rubric of the special relationship test. In Williams v. State, 34 Cal.3d 18, 664 P.2d 137, 192 Cal.Rptr. 233 (1983), the plaintiff, a passenger in an automobile, was injured when a heated brake drum from a passing truck was propelled through the car windshield. Several police officers arrived at the scene of the accident and assumed the responsibility of investigating it. The plaintiff alleged that the police officers’ failure to identify witnesses and pursue the truck owner prevented her from instituting a civil action for damages against the party who caused her injuries. Id. at 21-22, 664 P.2d at 138, 192 Cal.Rptr. at 234. In determining whether the police owed plaintiff a duty to investigate her accident, the *429California Supreme Court noted that, although highway patrol members do not have a special relationship to the motoring public in general, the existence of certain factors would impose a duty on the patrol officers to exercise the standard of care to which an ordinary person is held. The court stated that, “when the state, through its agents, voluntarily assumes a protective duty towards a certain member of the public and undertakes action on behalf of that member, thereby inducing reliance, it is held to the same standard of care as a private person....” Id. at 24, 664 P.2d at 140, 192 Cal.Rptr. at 236. In Williams, however, the plaintiff had alleged only nonfeasance, or the failure to the police to perform certain investigatory functions. The court noted that she did not allege that the officers assured her that they would investigate, that they induced her to rely on them, that they prevented her from conducting her own investigation, or that a police investigation would have identified the responsible party. Id. at 27 n. 8, 664 P.2d at 142 n. 8, 192 Cal.Rptr. at 238 n. 8. Accordingly, the court concluded that the plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action against the state because she did not establish that it owed her a duty of care. Id. at 27-28, 664 P.2d at 143, 192 Cal.Rptr. at 239.
In Clemente v. State, 40 Cal.3d 202, 707 P.2d 818, 219 Cal.Rptr. 445 (1985), the California Supreme Court applied the Williams analysis to a fact pattern similar to that in the instant case. In Clemente the plaintiff was struck by a motorcycle as he was crossing the street at an intersection. A state highway patrol officer arrived at the scene just as a group of bystanders had begun to assist the plaintiff. The motorcyclist approached the officer and told him that he had struck the plaintiff. The officer directed the motorcyclist not to leave the scene but to await the arrival of the Los Angeles Police Department. The officer then left the scene without obtaining the motorcyclist’s name or license number, and his identity was never discovered. Id. at 209, 707 P.2d at 821, 219 Cal.Rptr. at 448. Relying on its prior *430decision in Williams, the court recalled that there it had recognized that a duty of care may arise when a patrol officer’s conduct results in a plaintiff’s detrimental reliance on the officer for protection. Id. at 212, 707 P.2d at 823, 219 Cal.Rptr. at 450. The Clemente court noted that the officer had induced the plaintiff's reliance, and that the officer’s conduct had prevented bystanders from obtaining the driver’s identification for the plaintiff. Thus, the court concluded that the plaintiff could properly state a cause of action against the State of California and its highway patrol officer. Id. at 213, 707 P.2d at 824, 219 Cal.Rptr. at 451.
Three other jurisdictions have addressed whether a municipality may be held liable for its police officers’ negligent failure to obtain a tortfeasor’s identification. In each case, the court began its analysis by determining whether a special relationship obtained between the police and the plaintiff and concluded that such a relationship was absent. In Warren v. District of Columbia, 444 A.2d 1 (D.C.1981), the plaintiff was assaulted by occupants of a car that stopped behind him at a traffic light. A police officer arrived at the scene and directed the plaintiffs companion to cease his efforts to obtain the assailants’ identification in order to break up the fight. The officer left the scene without obtaining identification. Id. at 3. The plaintiff sued the District of Columbia and the police officer for failing to obtain the assailants’ identification. The court held that any duty that the officer had to obtain the identification was related to his duty to the public and that there was no additional element that created a special relationship between the plaintiff and the police officer. Id. at 3-4. Warren is distinguishable from the instant case, however, because there the police officer prevented the plaintiff from obtaining his assailants’ identification in an attempt to halt the melee. The officer did not, as here, promise the plaintiff that he would obtain the identification. Thus, all of the elements necessary to show an undertaking were not present.
*431In Jackson v. Heymann, 126 N.J.Super. 281, 314 A.2d 82 (Law Div.1973) the plaintiff sued the City because a police investigation failed to discover the identity of a hit-and-run driver who had injured her child. Id. at 282-83, 314 A.2d at 83. The New Jersey Superior Court held that the municipality did not owe the plaintiff a duty to conduct a motor vehicle accident investigation. Id. at 287, 314 A.2d at 85-86. Jackson, like Warren, can be distinguished from the instant case. In Jackson, the police did not know who struck the child. The police arrived after the driver had fled, and then attempted to carry out an investigation to discover the tortfeasor’s identity. Thus, the elements of dependence and reliance were missing because the police did not promise to secure nor prevent the plaintiff from obtaining the driver’s identification.
Finally, in Falco v. City of New York, 34 A.D.2d 673, 310 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1970), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 918, 329 N.Y.S.2d 97, 279 N.E.2d 854 (1972), the court also considered a case factually similar to the instant case and found that there was no special relationship. There, the plaintiff was injured when he was hit by a car while riding his motorcycle. While lying on the ground injured, he asked a police officer to obtain for him the name and license number of the driver. The police officer told the plaintiff that he would take care of everything. The plaintiff then observed the police officer talking with the driver, but the officer failed to obtain any identification, precluding the plaintiff from instituting suit against the driver. Id. at 674, 310 N.Y.S.2d at 525. The court concluded summarily that no relationship existed between the plaintiff and the police officer that created a duty to use care for the plaintiff’s benefit and that would impose liability on the municipality for the police officer’s negligence. Id. See also McNeil v. Town of Hempstead, 60 Misc.2d 797, 303 N.Y.S.2d 803 (Sup.Ct.1969), aff'd, 34 A.D.2d 958, 313 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1970). The New York Court of Appeals, then, would hold that police officers do not have a duty of care under facts similar to those in the instant case. I would decline to follow that case.
*432After considering the caselaw of this Commonwealth that would impose a duty to use reasonable care on one who undertakes to perform a service to prevent harm to another who relies on that performance, caselaw defining the elements of a special relationship in this Commonwealth, and the conclusion of the California Supreme Court that the elements of an undertaking in combination with facts showing that a police officer prevented other aid also create the special relationship necessary to impose a duty on a police officer towards an individual citizen, I believe that there is evidence in the record here that would support the conclusion that the police officers owed appellant such a duty. In Clemente v. State, supra, the court recounted that the plaintiff was in a position of dependence on the patrol officer, that the driver approached the officer and admitted that he was at fault and that the officer’s conduct prevented the plaintiff from obtaining the driver’s identification. The court held that a duty of care to the plaintiff could be predicated on this conduct. Here, there is evidence in the record that the driver approached the police and stated that he was at fault, that the police prevented the plaintiff from obtaining the driver’s identification, and that the plaintiff therefore became dependent on and relied on the police officer.2
I emphasize that I would not create a new duty on the part of the police to obtain a tortfeasor’s identification for the benefit of an accident victim. Instead, I would hold only that if a police officer prevents a victim from obtaining a tortfeasor’s identification and assures the victim that he or she will obtain it, and if the tortfeasor is available and *433known to the police, the good Samaritan rule of § 323 of the Restatement will apply to a police officer as though he or she were a private citizen to impose a duty to exercise reasonable care in that undertaking.
In determining whether fundamentally erroneous instructions require the grant of a new trial, whether such instructions did or did not bring about the complained of verdict is not the question. If it appears that such instructions might have been responsible for the verdict, a new trial is mandatory.
Jones v. Montefiore Hospital, 494 Pa. 410, 420, 431 A.2d 920, 925 (1981) (quoting Riesberg v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Railroad, 407 Pa. 434, 180 A.2d 575 (1962). See also McCann v. Amy Joy Donut Shops, 325 Pa.Superior Ct. 340, 342, 472 A.2d 1149, 1150 (1984).
Here, the only instruction given to the jury on duty was the following: “[i]t is the duty of every person to use ordinary care, not only for his own safety and the protection of his property, but also to avoid injury to others.” N.T. October 28, 1982 at 3.52. Because I would conclude that the City owed appellant a duty only if its actions contained all of the elements of an undertaking, I would also conclude that the jury instruction was erroneous. Because the jury may have reached its verdict based on the general duty instruction, I would remand for a new trial. At the new trial, I would direct that the jury be instructed that the police officers undertook a duty to exercise reasonable care to obtain the driver’s identification if it finds that (1) the officers began to obtain the driver’s identification, (2) the officers induced appellant’s reliance, and (3) the officers prevented appellant, or someone acting in her behalf, from obtaining the identification.
The City also contends that the lower court erred in failing to grant its motion for judgment n.o.v. because the police officers did not cause appellant’s physical injuries. The City relies on Stupka v. Peoples Cab Co., supra *434(JONES, C.J., concurring), for the proposition that there was no causal relationship between the police officer’s breach of duty and appellant’s injuries, and thus there can be no recovery. I disagree. The Stupka majority did not reach the causation issue because it concluded that the cabdriver there did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care. Stupka v. People’s Cab Co., supra 437 Pa. at 512-13, 264 A.2d at 374. Thus, Stupka has no bearing on the disposition of the causation issue.
Furthermore, appellant does not contend that the City caused her physical injuries, but that it was the proximate cause of her financial loss. I agree. Appellant’s claim is similar to a client’s malpractice suit against his or her attorney for the loss of a favorable judgment. In such cases,
[t]he orthodox view, and indeed virtually the universal one, is that when a plaintiff alleges that the defendant lawyer negligently provided services to him or her as a plaintiff in the underlying action, he or she must establish ... that he or she would have recovered a judgment in the underlying action in order to be awarded damages in the malpractice action, which are measured by the lost judgment.
Duke & Co. v. Anderson, 275 Pa.Superior Ct. 65, 71, 418 A.2d 613, 616 (1980) (quoting Williams v. Bashman, 457 F.Supp. 322, 326 (E.D.Pa.1978)). Here, the lower court instructed the jury that it had to resolve whether appellant could have recovered against the driver in order to recover from the City. N.T. October 28, 1982 at 3.53. Thus, I would conclude that the court did not err in refusing to grant the City’s motion for judgment n.o.v. on this ground.
For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the lower court’s order granting the City’s motion for a new trial and denying its motion for judgment n.o.v. and remand for a new trial. Upon remand, I would direct that the jury be charged in accordance with this opinion.

. This is the City’s paraphrase of the lower court’s conclusions that (1) there was no special relationship between the police officers and appellant, Lower Court Opinion at 9, 11, 12; and (2) the City’s acts or failure to act were not the proximate cause of appellant's injuries and, therefore, appellant could not recover from the City, id. at 14. Were the lower court’s conclusions correct, I would agree with the City that the court should have granted its motion for judgment n.o.v. rather than its motion for a new trial.

. The City argues that the police should not be required to "choose between jostling a seriously injured individual ... and protecting any potential interest in civil litigation she might decide to pursue after her recovery.” Brief for the City of Philadelphia at 13. This concern is not relevant to whether the police had undertaken a duty, but whether they exercised reasonable care in carrying out that duty. Here, the officers who placed appellant in the police wagon and who were approached by the driver could have refrained from assuring Wiley that they would take care of securing the driver’s identification. Alternatively, they could have allowed Wiley to get the necessary information, or directed one of the other officers to do so.