Court Opinion

ID: 9697926
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:37:14.458219+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:36.897757
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Judge,
concurring.
I concur with the Majority’s conclusion that the warnings given Licensee were sufficient to enable him to make a knowledgeable decision on whether to submit to a chemical test. However, I cannot subscribe to the rationale used to reach the result, and express my concern over the Court’s failure to seize this opportunity to reexamine the guidelines set forth in Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Sorg, 147 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 82, 606 A.2d *321270, appeal denied, 531 Pa. 657, 613 A.2d 561 (1992), and its progeny.
The required warnings enunciated by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242, 555 A.2d 873 (1989), have been recently reaffirmed by that Court in Commonwealth v. Danforth, 530 Pa. 327, 608 A.2d 1044 (1992). The holding in Danforth centers on the principle that O’Connell warnings clarifying the extent of the right to counsel are “easily understandable by the motoring public and will not unnecessarily delay the performance of chemical testing.” Danforth, 530 Pa. at 333, 608 A.2d at 1046-47. Nonetheless, this Court by judicial construct has continually expanded the requirements of O’Connell in a manner which is burdensome and serves to further confuse the average motorist and potentially law enforcement officers who have not had the benefit of a law school education.
In the companion case to Sorg, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Hoover, 147 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 70, 606 A.2d 1264, appeal denied, 531 Pa. 656, 613 A.2d 561 (1992), a dissenting Judge Palladino exhibited remarkable prescience when she wrote:
[T]o pursue the analysis the court proposes would have the effect of transforming a simple rule by the legislature into a procedural morass and thereby provide escape routes for drivers who are highway menaces. An expansion of the ‘knowing and conscious refusal’ standard could be perceived as an additional avenue through which drunk drivers can try to avoid basic societal responsibilities.
Id. at 76, 606 A.2d at 1267. Judge Palladino’s warning has been borne out by subsequent history, and each succeeding case appears not to clarify the rights of the arrestee, but rather to further obfuscate the precise intent of O’Connell.
It further appears that the Court has lost sight of the fact that among the conditions imposed upon a licensee’s privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this Commonwealth is the implied consent to submit to chemical testing where there is *33reasonable cause to believe a licensee is driving under the influence of alcohol and/or a controlled substance. By our decision today, this Court has missed the opportunity to reconsider its progressive misapplication of the requirements of O’Connell and of the clear legislative intent expressed in Section 1547 of the Vehicle Code, as amended, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547.