Court Opinion

ID: 9570197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:20:52.852214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:04:23.365435
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(concurring in the result) — This is an unusual case. The State failed to lay the most rudimentary foundation for the evidence it sought to introduce in this case. In addition, its expert does not appear to be qualified to testify upon the subject matter proffered. Because the State failed to meet the requirements of ER 703, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
I write separately, however, to express my disagreement with the way the majority has apparently closed the door to the admission of expert testimony in an area of great sensitivity, even in cases where the requirements of ER 703 are met. It has done so needlessly in a case of first impression that arrived before this court with a wholly inadequate foundation. The majority unnecessarily and prematurely forecloses potentially meritorious cases where the trier of fact could benefit greatly from the testimony of experts.
The majority asserts that the State may admit lay testimony as evidence of emotional or psychological trauma after an alleged rape, and "the jury is free to evaluate it as it would any other evidence." Majority, at 349. There are, however, many circumstances in which a judge or jury may need assistance in understanding the evidence put before *351them, where the subject matter is strange, emotional, and overladen with historical assumptions and possibly misapprehensions.
A jury punishes, excuses, exonerates, ignores, or selects from a hodgepodge of social and psychological information received in the courtroom. . . . The theory of our system is that jurors can separate out the facts which legally determine guilt in a particular incident. The reality may be that human beings cannot suppress or sort out the social and psychological information which is received and processed constantly during a criminal trial. Rape cases are a particularly fruitful area of interdisciplinary study because attitudes toward sexual behavior are blatantly personal, social, idiosyncratic, and emotional. Most members of the public probably do not have strong opinions about whether or not the government should pay damages to a railway trainman injured on the tracks. Most members of the public have very definite opinions as to whether or not a particular circumstance involving sexual intercourse should be classified as criminal.
H. Feild & L. Bienen, Jurors and Rape 7 (1980).
The main criticism offered by the majority of rape trauma syndrome is that it is not a scientifically reliable means of proving rape. I agree with this general proposition. The State should prove each case it brings against a subject on its own merits by proving each element of the crime charged. Where the issue at bar is simply whether the offense occurred, the prosecution should not be permitted to bring in an expert to describe a "typical" crime victim, tell the fact finder that the complaining witness is such a person, and conclude that the defendant is guilty. In fairly straightforward cases such as the instant one, the finder of fact is able to perform its traditional function unaided by expert opinion.
We should reserve judgment, however, in those problematical cases where the circumstances are more involved, and the defendant has opened the door to such a line of inquiry by bringing the mental state or behavior of the alleged victim into question to show that a rape could not have *352occurred. In such an instance, the State should be permitted to rebut the defense's theory of the case to show the fact finder that it is possible that a rape occurred. Such use of expert testimony does not invade the province of the finder of fact. Rather, it gives the determination of the ultimate fact at issue back to the judge or jury.
ER 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
The majority's survey of the scientific literature reveals that the theory proffered may well be valuable and admissible under ER 702.
One overriding theme permeates the literature on this subject: namely, that there is no "typical" response to rape. . . . Moreover, Burgess & Holmstrom concede that victims of rape may display one of two directly conflicting emotional manifestations which are referred to as "styles". Some women display an "expressed style" (outwardly emotional) while others display a "controlled style" (calm, composed and subdued). Among the latter group, some display no visible symptoms at all.
Majority, at 343-44.
This court could, in the future, be presented with a case where the State alleges a woman was the victim of a particularly brutal rape, possibly with multiple attackers. If she responds in the "controlled style," the defense could seize upon her apparently incongruous lack of hysteria to allege that no attack occurred, or that the woman consented. The intuitive response of the average juror may well be to assume that a woman could not possibly respond calmly to such an assault. In such a case, the evidence presented to the jury by both parties concerning the victim's mental state and behavior is counterintuitive, and may appeal to the unconscious assumptions and prejudices of the average juror — or judge. Under circumstances such as these, an *353expert witness who, in the language of ER 702, "qualifiefs] as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education," could provide the useful information to the trier of fact that, contrary to what may be expected, a rape victim may very well suppress her (or his) emotions in order to cope with the assault.
In incest rape cases, the defense frequently chooses to attack the credibility of the alleged victim where the complainant is the only witness. Under such circumstances, it is not unusual for the trier of fact to be presented with evidence of an extremely unstable family unit. A child has accused his or her parent of rape, and the parent accuses the child of making false and malicious accusations of a particularly abhorrent nature. In the face of such distasteful, contradictory, emotional, and perturbing testimony, a judge or juror who did not have personal knowledge or some type of exposure to such familial patterns may well not know how to understand the actions and reactions of the parties. See generally Comment, Statutes of Limitations in Civil Incest Suits: Preserving the Victim's Remedy, 7 Harv. Women's L.J. 189 (1984).
The Supreme Court of Oregon, faced with such a case, concluded that the trial court acted properly in admitting expert testimony from two social workers (a juvenile counselor and a child protective social worker) on the emotional reactions of child incest victims. In State v. Middleton, 294 Or. 427, 657 P.2d 1215 (1983), the trial court admitted testimony on some of the common emotional reactions in incest rape victims. The State's experts testified that a young incest victim tends to internalize guilt and frequently recants his or her accusations. The Oregon Supreme Court held that the testimony was useful to the trier of fact.
If a complaining witness in a burglary trial, after making the initial report, denied several times before testifying at trial that the crime had happened, the jury would have good reason to doubt seriously her credibility at any time. However, in this instance we are concerned with a *354child who states she has been the victim of sexual abuse by a member of her family. The experts testified that in this situation the young victim often feels guilty about testifying against someone she loves and wonders if she is doing the right thing in so testifying. It would be useful to the jury to know that not just this victim but many child victims are ambivalent about the forcefulness with which they want to pursue the complaint, and it is not uncommon for them to deny the act ever happened. . . .
State v. Middleton, supra at 435-36. The court concluded that the jury would be aided by an explanation of this "superficially bizarre behavior." The Supreme Court of Hawaii came to the same conclusion on similar facts in State v. Kim, 64 Hawaii 598, 645 P.2d 1330 (1982).
Obstacles to rape prosecutions in the form of challenges to the complaining witnesses' credibility have permeated the legal system for years. Juries have a general tendency to view rape charges with skepticism and suspicion, especially when there is a suggestion of willingness or agreement on the part of the victim. H. Kalven & H. Zeisel, The American Jury 249-57 (1966). See also Commonwealth v. Bailey, 370 Mass. 388, 394, 348 N.E.2d 746, 750 (1976). Convictions, in the absence of aggravating circumstances, are the exception rather than the rule. L. Holmstrom & A. Burgess, The Victim of Rape: Institutional Reactions 238 (1973). Rape victims have been subjected to reluctance on the part of the police to prosecute, harsh treatment in hospitals, and social stigma. Prejudice against rape victims has been manifested in the judicial system in the form of special eviden-tiary requirements that are not imposed in other criminal prosecutions, including other forms of assault.
One example is the requirement that a complaining witness' report of rape be corroborated by some independent source.1 The reasons for the corroboration requirement are at once contradictory and legion. "An examination of these rationales reveals a tangled web of legitimate concerns, out*355dated beliefs, and deep-seated prejudices." United States v. Wiley, 492 F.2d 547, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring). Proponents of a corroboration requirement argue that unfounded rape charges are common, either because women are malicious or ashamed, or they fantasize rape. In 1680, Lord Chief Justice Hale wrote, in a passage often repeated in pattern jury instructions, that rape is "an accusation easily to be made and hard to be proved, and harder to be defended by the party accused, tho never so innocent." 1 M. Hale, Pleas of the Crown 634 (1st Am. ed. Philadelphia 1847) (1680).
Women were also required to "resist to the utmost"2 a rape assault in order for a prosecution to go forward, because to a "good" woman, rape was a "fate worse than death." Conversely, a seductive woman who invited her attack may well decide that she enjoyed the assault and cried rape falsely later to protect her reputation. (See, e.g., State v. Rusk, 289 Md. 230, 247, 424 A.2d 720 (1981) (Cole, J., dissenting), arguing that prosecutrix willingly engaged in intercourse although defendant choked her, reasoning that because she had air enough to plead with defendant the choking was not serious enough to find a rape.) In most jurisdictions, the chastity of a rape complainant was considered probative on the woman's general character, and hence, upon her credibility. A woman's propensity for falsehood was presumed to increase in proportion to her sexual experience. Note, Rape, Racism, and the Law, 6 Harv. Women's L.J. 103,126 (1983).
There is no evidence showing that sex crime charges are frequently falsified or that sexual victims are an inherently unreliable class whose testimony should not be believed in the absence of corroboration. See Note, The Rape Corroboration Requirement: Repeal Not Reform, 81 Yale L.J. 1365 *356(1972). On the contrary, evidence indicates that it is more difficult to convict for rape than for other major crimes. See People v. Rincon-Pineda, 14 Cal. 3d 864, 538 P.2d 247, 123 Cal. Rptr. 119 (1975). Nor has it been shown that false charges of rape are brought more commonly than charges of other crimes. In fact, there are many countervailing reasons not to report a rape.
A victim may fear being accused of provocation, active participation, or irresponsibility, or she may fear retaliation by the offender. She may experience shame or a desire to protect her reputation. She may also fear the reactions of her husband or parents. . . .
(Footnote omitted.) Comment, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in Society and Law, 61 Cal. L. Rev. 919, 921-22 (1973). Humiliating defense attacks on rape victims' reputations led to the widespread passage of "rape shield” laws in the late 1970's.
Repudiation of the discredited corroboration requirement is not, even today, unanimous among the jurisdictions. Nebraska still retains the corroboration requirement. Other jurisdictions have only recently rejected the special corroboration requirement for rape victims, either legislatively or by judicial decision — Florida, 1979; Delaware, 1974; Connecticut, 1974; Alabama, 1976; Indiana, 1976; Michigan, 1975; Minnesota, 1975; District of Columbia, 1985. Other states have eliminated the absolute corroboration requirement only in a qualified and begrudging manner — Mississippi, New Hampshire, New York, and Illinois. People v. Kilgore, 39 Ill. App. 3d 1000, 350 N.E.2d 810 (1976) (retaining requirement of prompt complaint to corroborate).
Changes in social attitudes and legislation since the early 1970's have occurred which have affected the judicial treatment of rape victims.
These reforms, though they have not taken place in the majority of states, represent an important step toward the recognition that rape is a violent, assaultive crime against women which bears no relationship to consensual *357sexual activity. Until society internalizes that reality, women will continue to be . . . degraded and humiliated by our social and judicial institutions which carry the message to the victim that whatever happened to her, it was her fault.
H. Feild & L. Bienen, Jurors and Rape 187 (1980).
I agree with the conclusion of the majority. The facts presented in this case and the failure of the State to lay an adequate foundation for its offered evidence compel the result reached. I do not believe that we should keep from juries and judges in all cases the potential benefit of a field of study accepted in many other jurisdictions.3 This type of testimony, properly qualified, may help triers of fact to understand the mental state and behavior of the rape victim with muted demeanor and behavior, or an incest victim who recants, or other rape victims who do not conform to our legal system's shameful legacy of "out-dated beliefs, and deep-seated prejudices."
Brachtenbach, J., and Cunningham, J. Pro Tern., concur with Utter, J.

 This requirement has been eliminated by statute in the state of Washington. RCW 9A.44.020U).

 Evidence indicates that resistance offered by victims to violent crimes "often causes the attacker to escalate the level of violence he is using to effectuate the crime.'" People v. Dorsey, 104 Misc. 2d 963, 966, 429 N.Y.S.2d 828 (1980), citing Snyder, Reform of New York's Rape Law Proposed, New York L.J., Dec. 13, 1978, at 6, col. 1.

 See generally Annot., Admissibility, at Criminal Prosecution, of Expert Testimony on Rape Trauma Syndrome, 42 A.L.R.4th 879 (1985).