Court Opinion

ID: 9470759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:15:23.66635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:05.761175
License: Public Domain

LAY, Chief Judge,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur that the appeals council had the authority to reopen this case. However, I do not agree that the Secretary was entitled to offset Munsinger’s lump sum settlement páyment against her federal disability insurance payments.
It is true that the federal statute1 determines whether Munsinger’s federal benefits may be offset by periodic payments or a commutation of such payments provided under a state worker’s compensation law or plan. Contrary to the majority’s holding, however, I would think it obvious that the determination of that federal question requires the court to look to state law to discern the true nature of any payments made.
Section 424a(b) of title 42, United States Code (1976 & Supp. V 1981), allows the Secretary to calculate the proper reduction of federal disability insurance payments when the recipient receives “any periodic benefit for a total or partial disability under a law or plan described in subsection (a)(2)” that is payable on other than a monthly basis. The “law or plan described in subsection (a)(2)” in this case is the work*1218er’s compensation law of the State of Iowa.2 Section 424a(b) thus requires that we look to state law to determine whether a payment which the Secretary seeks to offset against federal disability insurance payments is in fact a periodic benefit under the state worker’s compensation law. From this it follows that it is necessary to look to the state worker’s compensation law to determine whether a lump sum benefit is in fact a commutation of or substitute for periodic payments under the state worker’s compensation law.
The majority holds that Munsinger’s lump sum settlement represented periodic payments, without considering the state’s definition of “periodic payments” under its worker’s compensation law. Such a holding makes a nullity of the exclusion contained in section 424a(b) of “a benefit payable as a lump sum.... ” The majority provides only conclusory reasoning, totally contradicting Iowa law,3 for its holding that this settlement payment represented periodic payments. The majority does not indicate in what circumstances it would find that a “lump sum benefit” was not a commutation of or substitute for periodic payments. The only means to determine those circumstances is to look to the manner in which the state worker’s compensation law defines “periodic payments,” and whether certain types of lump sum payments are or are not included within that definition.
The majority ignores the clear command of section 424a that the determination of whether a payment is — or is a commutation of — periodic payments be made by looking to the state worker’s compensation law. Instead, the court looks to the policy underlying section 424a, and concludes that the State of Iowa’s decision to exclude settlement payments from the definition of periodic payments4 is contrary to that policy and therefore, regardless of what the state worker’s compensation law provides, any settlement payment between the employee and the compensation carrier will be construed to represent periodic payments. This ignores the plain meaning of the federal statute which excludes lump sum settlements which are not substitutes for periodic payments.
I would conclude that the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the Secretary was inappropriate, and its decision should be vacated.

. 42 U.S.C. § 424a(b) (1976 & Supp. V 1981).

. See 42 U.S.C. § 424a(a)(2)(A) (1976 & Supp. V 1981), which authorizes the reduction of federal disability insurance payments when the recipient is entitled to periodic benefits “under ... a workmen’s compensation Jaw or plan of ... a State_” Id. (emphasis added).

. The Iowa Supreme Court has held that evidence of a settlement agreement between an employee and the worker’s compensation insurance carrier does not necessarily establish that the settlement payment is to be characterized as compensation under the worker’s compensation law. Unless it is intended to comply with the Iowa worker’s compensation statutory procedure, such a settlement is nothing more than a resolution of a disputed claim. Rich v. Dyna Technology, Inc., 204 N.W.2d 867, 871-72 (Iowa 1973). In addition, the Iowa statutes provide that payment received by virtue of the settlement of a contested case “shall not be construed as the payment of weekly compensation.” Iowa Code Ann. § 85.35 (West Supp. 1982) (emphasis added).
In footnote 3 of the court’s opinion, the majority holds that since Munsinger’s sole cause of action against her employer arose under the worker’s compensation statute, her ability to achieve a settlement arose as a function of the worker’s compensation statute. The Iowa Supreme Court effectively disposed of a similar contention in Rich when it held:
Plaintiff might have received some intangible, esoteric benefit because of the workmen’s compensation law which permitted him to make a settlement with the employer and its compensation carrier. But that type of benefit is certainly not the type of “benefits” contemplated by the exclusionary language of the policy.
204 N.W.2d at 872.
Similarly, in this case the “benefit” Munsinger received as a result of section 85.35 of the Iowa Code certainly is not the type of benefit contemplated by 42 U.S.C. § 424a(b).

.Iowa Code Ann. § 85.35 (West Supp. 1982).