Court Opinion

ID: 9646638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:05:47.870415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:40.298247
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
I believe, as did the lower court, that the information contained in the affidavit was too “stale” to support a finding of probable cause.
In Commonwealth v. Nycz, 274 Pa.Super. 305, 418 A.2d 418 (1980), we said:
It is well settled that probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant must be established at the time the warrant is issued, Commonwealth v. Conner, 452 Pa. 333, 305 A.2d 341 (1973); Commonwealth v. Simmons, 450 Pa. 624, 301 A.2d 819 (1973); Commonwealth v. Hagan, 240 Pa.Super. 444, 368 A.2d 318 (1976), and “stale” information will thus not support a finding of present probable cause. Commonwealth v. Eazer, 455 Pa. 320, 312 A.2d 398 (1973); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 461 Pa. 632, 337 A.2d 582 (1975); Commonwealth v. Albert, 264 Pa.Super. 390, 399 A.2d 1106 (1979).
The standard by which we are guided in examining the affidavit underlying a search warrant is well stated in Commonwealth v. Shaw, 444 Pa. 110, 281 A.2d 897 (1971):
“In order for the issuance of a search warrant to be constitutionally valid, the issuing officer must reach the conclusion that probable cause exists at the time he issues the warrant. Such a decision may not be made arbitrarily and must be based on facts which are closely related in time to the date the warrant is issued. Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206, 53 S.Ct. 138, 77 L.Ed. 260 (1932); Durham v. United States, 403 F.2d 190 (9th Cir. *5631968); Schoeneman v. United States, 317 F.2d 173 (D.C. Cir. 1963); and Dandrea v. United States, 7 F.2d 861 (8th Cir. 1925). See also IV Wharton Criminal Law and Procedure § 1546 (12th Ed. 1957), and authorities cited in 100 A.L.R.2d 525 (1965). If the issuing officer is presented with evidence of criminal activity at some prior time, this will not support a finding of probable cause as of the date the warrant issues, unless it is also shown that the criminal activity continued up to or about that time.” Id. [444 Pa.] at 113-14, 281 A.2d at 899.
Id., 274 Pa.Super. at 308-09, 418 A.2d at 420.
See also Commonwealth v. Tolbert, 492 Pa. 576, 424 A.2d 1342 (1981).
Here, the affidavit provided the magistrate with no information of criminal activity “closely related in time to the date the warrant . . . issued.” The affidavit stated that the affiant had “received many complaints from neighbors . . . over the last several months relating to an unusual amount of activity at 1619 Manor.” It did not state either when the complaints had been received or when the activity complained about had occurred. The affidavit next identified an informant—a married woman neighbor with a family who had resided “at her present address for several years”— as having said that “on many occasions” people had knocked on her door and had asked for drugs, telling her that “Lonnie” 1 was to have “the stuff” for them. However, the affidavit did not state when the affiant had spoken with this informant or when any of the occasions described had happened. The affidavit next identified a second informant— also a married woman neighbor—as having said that she saw marijuana in a fishing tackle box in the living room at appellees’ address. Again, however, the affidavit did not state when the affiant had spoken with this informant or when she saw the marijuana. The affidavit next stated that “approximately two months ago” the affiant himself had attended a community meeting of “irate neighbors . . . *564demanding a stop to dope sells.” Finally, the affidavit stated that on November 21, 1979—the date of the affidavit—an informant—described as someone who had been in appellees’ house and who had, at some unspecified occasion or occasions, bought drugs from them—told the affiant that appellees were “dealing heavy in marihuana and Coke” and that he had seen cocaine, marijuana, and stolen beer in appellees’ house “as recently as a month ago.”
Thus, none of the information was specifically dated, and the most recent information provided the magistrate was at least a month old. Standing alone, such information could not support a finding that it was probable that the evidence sought was at the premises to be searched. Commonwealth v. Shaw, supra, 444 Pa. at 113, 281 A.2d at 899. See also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 461 Pa. 632, 337 A.2d 582 (1975) (five month old information stale); Commonwealth v. Eazer, 455 Pa. 320, 312 A.2d 398 (1973) (61 day old information stale); Commonwealth v. Hagen, 240 Pa.Super. 444, 368 A.2d 318 (1976) (information at least one and one-half months old stale); Commonwealth v. Novak, 233 Pa.Super. 236, 335 A.2d 773 (1975) (seven week old information stale); Commonwealth v. Suppa, 223 Pa.Super. 513, 302 A.2d 357 (1973) (16 day old information stale without evidence of continuing activity); Commonwealth v. Bove, 221 Pa.Super. 345, 293 A.2d 67 (1972) (34 day old information stale).
However, as the majority points out, “evidence of criminal activity at some prior time” may “support a finding of probable cause as of the date the warrant issues” if “itfis also shown that the criminal activity continued up to or about that time.” Commonwealth v. Shaw, supra, 444 Pa. at 113-14, 281 A.2d at 899.
In Commonwealth v. Eazer, supra, the Court said:
If, however, it is demonstrated that criminal activity has in fact continued, then the relevant information, in spite of its vintage, may not be deemed stale ....
Evidence, to demonstrate continuing conduct, must establish actual continuity of the illegal enterprise. A police officer’s unsubstantiated impression that a particular *565crime is of the sort which usually is continuing is not sufficient; nor may a magistrate issue a warrant upon such an impression.
Id., 455 Pa. at 324, 312 A.2d at 399-400 (emphasis added; citations omitted).

See also Commonwealth v. Jackson, supra; Commonwealth v. Nycz, supra; Commonwealth v. Hagen, supra; Commonwealth v. Suppa, supra.

It is true that the affidavit reports the third informant as having told the affiant—on the day that the warrant was issued—that appellees “are dealing heavy in marihuana and Coke,” “that cocaine is kept under a bed in the upstairs bedroom & that the marijuana is in a fishing tackle box,” and that appellees “delivers [sic] both drugs and or beer on request.” In quoting these statements, the majority emphasizes that they are in the present tense. At 641. However, the affidavit identifies the informant as someone who saw the drugs and beer “as recently as a month ago.” Nothing suggests that his statements, albeit phrased in the affidavit in the present tense, were based on any information more recent than a month old.
Thus, the most recent information regarding any continuing activity was at least one month old. The majority, however, finds, at 641, that it was probable that appellees’ illegal activities continued up to the time the warrant was issued because of “the nature of the criminal activity” and the fact that “a series of illegal acts [were] observed over a period of time.” Commonwealth v. Suppa, supra, 223 Pa.Super. at 516 n. 1, 302 A.2d at 358 n. 1. I agree that probable cause may dissipate more slowly when the suspected illegal activity is the sale of drugs on a large scale—rather than possession of drugs—when there is evidence that the activity has continued over a substantial period of time in the past. I do not believe, however, that we can assume that such illegal enterprises continue indefinitely.
I should therefore affirm the order of the lower court.

. Appellee McClellan’s first name is Alonzo.