Court Opinion

ID: 9830852
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:34:07.452292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:27.731244
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[7] On motion fok rehearing appellant insists the testimony of Brumley and appellant show that appellant was acting for Greenwood in showing the land. The answers of the jury to issues 1 and 2 find that Lofland authorized Brumley to show the land to Greenwood; and to the sixth issue they answer that Lofland directed Greenwood and Brumley to call upon Crawley to point out the land; and by their answers to the fourth issue, they find that the parties did call upon Crawley, and that he pointed out the boundaries as being on the fences. The evidence, aside from that of Brumley and Lofland, is sufficient to support the findings of the jury. If the appellant had sent Greenwood alone to Crawley for information upon which to act, and upon the information so obtained Greenwood did act, appellant would be liable for the damages so occasioned. In the sense that ■Crawley was the duly authorized agent, appointed by appellant, the finding of the jury to the fifth issue may be correct; yet it does not necessarily conflict with the fact that Brumley and Greenwood were directed by appellant to get Crawley to show the land. Brumley was the agent, and he was directed and authorized to show the land, and, in doing so, he proceeded according to direction. Whether Crawley, under such circumstances, was appellant’s duly authorized agent, within the meaning of that term, is immaterial. The agent Brumley, who was to show the land, did show it, through the use he made of Crawley, and in so far as appellee and appellant are affected under the circumstances of this case, Crawley’s authority was immaterial since Brumley’s authority was established ; and appellant made the knowledge of Crawley the knowledge of appellant and Brumley. In effect, appellant asserted “Crawley’s representations are true or will be true, and you may rely on them.” Boles v. Aldridge (Sup.) 175 S. W. 1052; Maddox v. Clarke (Sup.) 175 S. W. 1053.
[8] Appellant will not be permitted to use an irresponsible person or agency to perpetrate a fraud, and avoid liability by asserting that he had not given such party authority to do the thing done, when through the party he put in motion the machinery to cause the act and to accomplish his purpose through such agency. 1-Ie used Crawley for his purpose, but perhaps did not authorize him, as an agent, to act for him. In the original opinion we found that appellant paid 2y2 *520per cent, commission to Brumley in tbs trade. The evidence of Brumley and appellant is contrary to this finding. Brumley, according to Greenwood’s evidence, was directed by appellant to show tlie land. The jury accepted tbis testimony and disregarded appellant’s contention. Greenwood paid 2% per cent, commission to Brumley on tbe property lie exchanged with appellant. This record shows conclusively to our mind that Brumley was appellant’s agent in this transaction. It occurs to us that the contention that the findings of the jury are contradictory is forced. We believe it to be our duty to sustain the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court based thereon, when it can be done upon a reasonable interpretation of the jury’s findings and the facts of the case.
The motion is overruled.