Court Opinion

ID: 9569576
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:15:15.952678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:03:32.960759
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in Division 1, wherein the majority concludes that the trial court erred in its recharge on unauthorized entry as an essential element of the crime of burglary. Because the jury returned a general verdict on the felony murder count, the erroneous recharge requires reversal of Thompson’s convictions for that offense, as well as reversal of his convictions for the separate offenses of burglary and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. Dunagan v. State, *110269 Ga. 590, 594 (3) (502 SE2d 726) (1998). In Division 2, however, the majority further holds that the evidence was not sufficient to authorize Thompson’s conviction for burglary. As a consequence, the State cannot retry him either for burglary or for felony murder with burglary as the predicate offense. Priest v. State, 265 Ga. 399 (1) (456 SE2d 503) (1995). I do not agree with this holding, because the evidence of Thompson’s guilt for the burglary offense satisfies the standard of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307 (99 SC 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979). I also concur in Divisions 3, 4 and 5, of the Court’s opinion. Thus, I concur in the affirmance of Thompson’s conviction for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, and in the reversal of his convictions for felony murder, burglary and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime. However, I believe that the State may retry Thompson for all three of the latter offenses as originally alleged in the indictment.
The majority finds the theory that Thompson was a party to the crime of burglary inapplicable, because there is no evidence that the co-defendant Ray made an unauthorized entry into the victim’s house “even for the brief time leading up to the victim’s shooting.” (Majority opinion p. 108.) Even assuming this to be a correct assessment of the transcript, there nevertheless is evidence that Ray did enter the victim’s home without authority. In his statement, Thompson told officers that “I know that Ray stepped at least into the doorway” after the shooting. Although this statement would not be admissible against Ray, it is admissible against Thompson himself. “Any references in [his] statement regarding what transpired shortly before, during, or shortly after the murder would be admissible as res gestae evidence. [Cit.]” Garcia v. State, 267 Ga. 257, 258 (4) (477 SE2d 112) (1996). See also Johnson v. State, 264 Ga. 456, 457 (1) (448 SE2d 177) (1994). Compare Gober v. State, 264 Ga. 226, 228 (3) (443 SE2d 616) (1994) (inculpatory reference to co-defendant redacted when introduced at a joint trial). It does not matter whether Thompson’s statement was based upon his own personal observation of Ray’s entry, his assessment of the scene after the shooting or what Ray subsequently told him. The statement attributes an inculpatory act to a conspirator in the furtherance of the criminal conspiracy, and, pursuant to OCGA § 24-3-52, it is admissible against Thompson, as the declarant, even though it would not be admissible against Ray under OCGA § 24-3-5. An incriminating statement made after the criminal enterprise has ended is admissible against the person who made it. Munsford v. State, 235 Ga. 38, 42 (218 SE2d 792) (1975). It is immaterial that the unauthorized entry by Ray into the victim’s house was after, rather than before, the shooting. It is the actual occurrence, not the precise timing, of an unauthorized entry which constitutes the relevant inquiry. If Ray fired the shot first, his subse*111quent entry into the victim’s house would certainly be no less unauthorized than if he had used the gun to gain entry and only then shot the victim. See Robbins v. State, 269 Ga. 500, 501 (1) (499 SE2d 323) (1998) (defendant guilty of burglary where the victim was first shot outside home, and then pursued inside and shot again). The evidence of a conspiracy between Thompson, Ray and the other co-defendant to commit a theft of property from the victim’s home was overwhelming. Thus, there is evidence which, if believed by the jury, would authorize a finding that Thompson’s co-defendant Ray shot the victim and then made an unauthorized entry into the victim’s house with the intent to commit a theft therein. Insofar as commission of a burglary is concerned, it is irrelevant that Ray may have entered the victim’s house only momentarily and that he stole nothing while there. Williams v. State, 205 Ga. App. 445 (1) (422 SE2d 309) (1992); Mullinnix v. State, 177 Ga. App. 168 (338 SE2d 752) (1985). In my opinion, the evidence is sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Thompson was a party to Ray’s commission of a burglary. Jackson v. Virginia, supra. See Graham v. State, 197 Ga. App. 102 (397 SE2d 600) (1990); Coursey v. State, 196 Ga. App. 135 (1) (395 SE2d 574) (1990). The evidence of Ray’s unauthorized entry subsequent to the shooting is not uncontradicted. At trial, Thompson testified that “[t]here was no entry ever made into that house [.]” In addressing the general grounds, however, the evidence must be construed most favorably for the State and against Thompson. The jury was entitled to reject Thompson’s exculpatory trial testimony, and to believe his prior inconsistent inculpatory statement to the officers. Gibbons v. State, 248 Ga. 858, 863-864 (286 SE2d 717) (1982). Therefore, I disagree with Division 2, and believe that Thompson may be retried for felony murder, burglary and possession of a firearm during the commission of a crime.
Decided May 17, 1999.
John F. McClellan, Jr., for appellant.
TambraR Colston, District Attorney, Martha P. Jacobs, Assistant District Attorney, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, H. Maddox Kilgore, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.