Court Opinion

ID: 9402562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 05:05:41.709815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:00.716947
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
               revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                         STATE OF MICHIGAN

                         COURT OF APPEALS

MARGARET GATHRIGHT, Individually and as                           UNPUBLISHED
Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF                          June 15, 2023
NATHANIEL GATHRIGHT, NATALYN NEWSOM,
ANNETTA GATHRIGHT, and NATONYA
GATHRIGHT,

            Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                                                 No. 362182
                                                                  Berrien Circuit Court
MISSION HILLS MEMORIAL GARDENS, INC.,                             LC No. 2021-000127-CZ

            Defendant,
and

CRYSTAL SPRINGS CEMETERY, also known as
CRYSTAL SPRINGS CEMENTARY,

            Defendant/Cross-Defendant-Appellant,
and

CITY OF BENTON HARBOR,

            Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff/Cross-
            Defendant-Appellant,

and

C MANAGEMENT, INC., doing business as
CRYSTAL SPRINGS CEMETERY
MANAGEMENT,

            Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff/Cross-
            Defendant.

                                            -1-
MARGARET GATHRIGHT, Individually and as
Personal Representative of the ESTATE OF
NATHANIEL GATHRIGHT, NATALYN NEWSOM,
ANNETTA GATHRIGHT, and NATONYA
GATHRIGHT,

              Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v                                                   No. 362424
                                                    Berrien Circuit Court
MISSION HILLS MEMORIAL GARDENS, INC.,               LC No. 2021-000127-CZ

              Defendant,
and

CRYSTAL SPRINGS CEMETERY, also known as
CRYSTAL SPRINGS CEMENTARY,

              Defendant/Cross-Defendant,
and

CITY OF BENTON HARBOR,

              Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff/Cross-
              Defendant,

and

C MANAGEMENT, INC., doing business as
CRYSTAL SPRINGS CEMETERY
MANAGEMENT,

              Defendant/Cross-Plaintiff/Cross-
              Defendant-Appellant.

Before: CAMERON, P.J., and MURRAY and GADOLA, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

                                             -2-
        In these consolidated appeals,1 defendants-appellants Crystal Springs Cemetery (the
Cemetery), the City of Benton Harbor (the City), and C Management, Inc., appeal by right the trial
court’s order denying their motions for summary disposition, in part, pursuant to MCR
2.116(C)(7)2 on governmental immunity grounds. In Docket No. 362182, the Cemetery and the
City (referred to collectively as “City defendants”) argue that the trial court erred by denying their
motion for summary disposition because plaintiffs’ claim under the Prepaid Funeral and Cemetery
Sales Act (PFCSA) MCL 328.211 et seq., was barred by governmental immunity under the
Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA), MCL 691.1401 et seq. In Docket No. 362424,
defendant C Management argues that the trial court erred by finding that it was not entitled to
governmental immunity although it was acting as City defendants’ “agent” when the alleged torts
occurred. We affirm.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

        This case arises from a prepaid contract entered between plaintiff Margaret Gathright and
the Cemetery on June 7, 2013, when Margaret purchased a burial plot, identified as number 19,
for herself at the Cemetery. Margaret purchased the burial plot located directly beside her late
husband, Nathaniel Gathright, who was buried in plot 18 the year prior.

        In the latter part of 2013, City defendants entered into a cemetery management and
operation agreement with C Management, Inc., for C Management to manage and operate the
Cemetery. The agreement defined C Management as an independent contractor to the City.
According to the agreement, the term was set to end on September 30, 2033, but included an option
to terminate. Although several years later, C Management exercised its option to terminate the
agreement with City defendants, effective March 15, 2020, C Management continued to manage
and operate the Cemetery under the oversight of the City and at the direction of the Chairperson
of the Cemetery board.

       The dispute arose in December of 2020 when Margaret was visiting her husband’s grave
and discovered that a woman named Cleavy Bradley had been buried in the plot that Margaret
purchased for herself in 2013. The record shows that Mrs. Bradley’s son, Joe Bradley Jr.,
purchased plot number 20 for his mother, but that Mrs. Bradley was mistakenly buried in plot
number 19.

                                  II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       Margaret and her three daughters, Natalyn Newsom, Annetta Gathright, and Natonya
Gathright filed suit against defendants, asserting the following 12 counts in their second amended

1
 Gathright v Mission Hills Memorial Gardens, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered
August 9, 2022 (Docket Nos. 362182 and 362424).
2
 The Cemetery and the City, together, moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7)
and (C)(10). Defendant C Management moved for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7),
(C)(8), and (C)(10). Defendants’ arguments on appeal relate only to the trial court’s denial of
governmental immunity under MCR 2.116(C)(7) on their related claims.

                                                 -3-
complaint: the violation of the PFCSA (Count I) and the Michigan Consumer Protection Act
(MCPA) (Count II), wrongful interference with the right of burial (Count III), breach of fiduciary
duty (Count IV), negligence (Count V), gross negligence (Count VI), negligent infliction of
emotional distress (NIED) (Count VII), fraudulent misrepresentation (Count VIII),
negligent/innocent misrepresentation (Count IX), breach of contract (Count X), conversion (Count
XI), and specific performance (Count XII). Plaintiffs sought damages in excess of $25,000 for
compensatory and punitive damages, treble damages, and costs and attorney fees.

        Each count asserted in plaintiffs’ complaint rested in some way on allegations that
defendants had a duty to reserve Margaret’s pre-purchased burial plot, that they breached their
duty by burying another person in her plot, and that plaintiffs were harmed as a result. The subject
of these appeals are plaintiffs’ claims under the PFCSA against City defendants and C
Management and plaintiffs’ claims for negligence and gross negligence against C Management.
In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that defendants violated the PFCSA by failing to keep
“accurate accounts, books, and records of all transactions and accounts regulated by [the PFCSA],”
MCL 328.218(1), and sought enforcement and damages under MCL 328.234. Plaintiffs further
alleged that C Management was negligent in its management and operation of the Cemetery and
breached its duty owed to plaintiffs to secure Margaret’s burial plot beside her late husband by
negligently burying another person in that plot, resulting in harm to plaintiffs. Plaintiffs alleged
that C Management’s conduct amounted to gross negligence, demonstrating a substantial lack of
concern for whether injury would result by infringing on Margaret’s use of her plot. The City
subsequently filed a crossclaim against C Management and C Management filed a separate
crossclaim against City defendants, both asserting indemnity and breach of contract against each
other.3

        City defendants moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7) and
(C)(10), arguing that plaintiffs’ tort claims were barred by governmental immunity. City
defendants argued that they were immune from liability under the GTLA, MCL 691.1407(1), as
the alleged tortious conduct occurred during the exercise or discharge of a governmental function
and plaintiffs had otherwise failed to state a claim that fit within any of the statutorily enumerated
exceptions under the GTLA. According to the City, it’s operation of a cemetery was a
governmental function, as defined by MCL 691.1401(c), because the Michigan Constitution, Const
1963 art 7 § 23, and Home Rule Cities Act, MCL 117.1 and MCL 117.4e, explicitly authorized a
municipality to own and operate a cemetery, as did the city charter and ordinances, Benton Harbor
Ordinances, § 12-20. Moreover, the City argued, the Cemetery was not a separate legal entity
from the City and, therefore, not subject to suit. MCR 2.201(C). City defendants further argued
that plaintiffs failed to state a claim under the PFCSA because the Act did not apply to the sale or
resale of the cemetery burial plot at issue. Rather, their argument goes, the PFCSA regulated
funeral and cemetery merchandise and services, and the use of funds received by sellers and
providers of those goods and services. City defendants argued that the PFCSA did not contemplate
the sale of land, including the sale of cemetery plots, citing MCL 328.214(2), MCL 328.213(g),
and MCL 328.214(e).

3
  Defendants do not raise any issues on appeal related to the trial court’s rulings on their
crossclaims.

                                                 -4-
         C Management also moved for summary disposition pursuant to MCR 2.116(C)(7), (C)(8),
and (C)(10), seeking dismissal on all counts of plaintiffs’ complaint. C Management first argued
that it was immune from plaintiffs’ tort claims pursuant to MCL 691.1407(2) because “agents” of
government entities are cloaked with governmental immunity under the GTLA when acting within
the scope of their employment. C Management alleged that it was an agent of the Cemetery under
common law agency principles because the Cemetery’s board controlled the actions of C
Management. C Management alleged that it acted within its authority when selling the burial plot
to the Bradley family and that its operation of a public cemetery was an exercise of the Cemetery’s
governmental function, as delineated under the city ordinances. C Management argued that it did
not engage in grossly negligent conduct, considering that it reviewed the available records and
inspected the burial plot prior to selling it to the Bradley family. C Management also argued that
the sale to the Bradley family occurred after it had already terminated the cemetery management
agreement with City defendants and relinquished all control over the cemetery operations to the
Cemetery’s board members.

         C Management also sought dismissal of plaintiffs’ complaint on other grounds, asserting,
in relevant part, that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on plaintiffs’ claims related to
the PFCSA, negligence, and gross negligence. C Management argued that it was not managing
the Cemetery when Margaret purchased the subject burial plot in 2013 because that event pre-
dates the effective date of the cemetery management agreement between defendants. C
Management also argued that after contracting to provide management services for the Cemetery,
it acted reasonably under the circumstances despite City defendants’ poor recordkeeping, pointing
fault at City defendants for their purported failure to record Margaret’s purchase of burial plot 19.

        Plaintiffs filed one brief in response to both C Management and City defendants’ motions
for summary disposition and voluntarily dismissed several claims against defendants.4 Remaining
were plaintiffs’ claims related to the PFCSA, gross negligence, breach of contract, and their request
for specific performance against all defendants and plaintiffs’ claims for negligence, wrongful
interference with the right of burial, and conversion against only C Management. Plaintiffs
conceded that City defendants were entitled to immunity from tort liability under the GTLA.
However, plaintiffs argued that C Management was not governmentally immune from liability
because only governmental agencies and their employees could enjoy the GTLA’s grant of
immunity, MCL 691.1407. Plaintiffs argued that private entities, such as C Management, are not
government agencies nor employees, even when the private entity contracts with, or acts on behalf
of, a governmental agency. Aside from the management agreement, C Management retained its
separate identity as a for-profit corporation, which was governed by its own board of directors,
and unlike a governmental agency, C Management’s creation was not mandated by law.
Therefore, immunity under the GTLA was inapplicable to C Management.

     Plaintiffs further argued in their response that defendants violated MCL 328.218(1) of the
PFCSA by failing to keep accurate accounts, books, and records of all transactions and accounts,

4
  Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed against all defendants their claims under the MCPA and for
breach of fiduciary duty, NIED, fraudulent misrepresentation, and negligent/innocent
misrepresentation. Plaintiffs further agreed to dismiss three counts for wrongful interference with
the right of burial, negligence, and conversion against only City defendants.

                                                 -5-
including the record evidencing Margaret’s purchase of plot 19. According to plaintiffs,
defendants admitted in their crossclaims against each other that the other failed to properly
maintain the cemetery records. Plaintiffs alleged that the Bradley family was permitted to purchase
and bury Ms. Bradley in the plot owned by Margaret solely because defendants failed to maintain
accurate records of their transactions. Had defendants complied with the statute, Margaret’s burial
plot would not have been resold to the Bradley family and the lawsuit would have never occurred.
Plaintiffs acknowledged that C Management was not involved in the original sale of plot 19 to
Margaret, but asserted that C Management facilitated the resale of the plot to the Bradley family
and the subsequent burial of Mrs. Bradley in the plot owned by Margaret. Plaintiffs argued that
governmental immunity did not apply and that a city ordinance could not preempt state law such
as the PFCSA. Nor could defendants contract or indemnify themselves around the mandates of
the PFCSA explicitly authorizing the court to award damages and other relief to plaintiffs under
MCL 328.234.

        In reply, City defendants argued that plaintiffs’ claim for monetary damages under the
PFCSA was barred by governmental immunity and that plaintiffs failed to plead in avoidance of
governmental immunity. City defendants argued that although the PFCSA may permit a private
enforcement action under MCL 328.234, the statute does not otherwise create a private cause of
action for the negligent maintenance of cemetery records. Nor does the statute contain an express
legislative authorization in avoidance of governmental immunity. City defendants argued that the
PFCSA does not apply to the sale of funeral plots under MCL 328.216(1) and that cemeteries
owned and operated by municipalities were exempt from the requirements of the Cemetery
Regulation Act under MCL 456.530(1). Moreover, City defendants alleged that while MCL
328.218(1) imposed a statutory duty on registrants to maintain accurate records, they were not
“registrants” as defined by the Act, considering that they did not register with the Department of
Labor and Economic Growth under MCL 328.215(g).

        City defendants further argued that plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract and request for
specific performance was limited by Benton Harbor Ordinances, § 12-20, which provided that the
supervisor of cemeteries could correct any errors made in the interment of remains by refunding
money or removing and reinterring remains in a plot of equal value and similar location.
According to City defendants, the Cemetery supervisor attempted to remedy the errors by offering
to refund Margaret for the price of her burial plot or to locate two unused plots for both Margaret
and Nathaniel. City defendants argued that plaintiffs were contractually limited to the supervisor’s
remedies and were not otherwise entitled to further relief.

                                  III. TRIAL COURT DECISION

        Following oral argument on City defendants and C Management’s motions for summary
disposition, the trial court entered its written order, granting in part and denying in part defendants’
motions for summary disposition. Regarding the four remaining claims against City defendants,
the court granted summary disposition on plaintiffs’ gross negligence claim, but denied summary
disposition regarding plaintiffs’ claims related to the PFCSA, breach of contract, and specific
performance. As to the seven counts remaining against C Management, the trial court granted
summary disposition to C Management regarding plaintiffs’ wrongful interference with the right
of burial and conversion claims, but denied summary disposition on plaintiffs’ remaining claims

                                                  -6-
under the PFCSA and for negligence, gross negligence, breach of contract, and specific
performance.

        The trial court found that City defendants were immune from tort liability under the GTLA.
The court found that City defendants, as political subdivisions under MCL 691.1401(e), were
governmental agencies for the purposes of the GTLA, MCL 691.1407(1). The court further found
that cemetery responsibilities constituted governmental functions, MCL 691.1401(b), and the city
ordinance governed cemeteries, Benton Harbor Ordinances, § 12-1. The court found that plaintiffs
had not met their burden of pleading in avoidance of governmental immunity under any exception,
and held that based on the facts before it, the proprietary-function exception to governmental
immunity, MCL 691.1413, did not apply. Having found that governmental immunity applied to
City defendants, the court dismissed plaintiffs’ claim that City defendants engaged in grossly
negligent conduct when the alleged torts occurred, as MCL 691.1407(2)(c) only permits liability
against the individual actor and not the governmental entity.

        On the other hand, the court found that C Management was not immune from tort liability
under the GTLA, MCL 691.1407(2). The court found that C Management was an agent of City
defendants, acting under a contract, whose actions were ministerial and therefore not shielded by
governmental immunity under the GTLA. The court found that C Management was responsible
for the Cemetery and its accompanying duties during the term of the agreement, between
September of 2013 and March of 2020. After C Management exercised its option to terminate the
agreement, it continued its obligations by acting on the Cemetery board’s behalf and at the
direction of the Cemetery board chairperson, receiving compensation for its services. The court
held that while C Management presented sufficient evidence establishing its agency relationship
with City defendants, it was unprotected by governmental immunity because its actions while
serving as an agent were ministerial.

        The trial court further found that dismissal was not warranted under MCR 2.116(C)(7) as
to plaintiffs’ claims related to the PFCSA, breach of contract, and specific performance on
governmental immunity grounds, as the GTLA’s grant of immunity from tort liability did not
extend to claims sounding in contract law. Concerning plaintiffs’ claim under the PFCSA, the
court found that “[g]overnmental immunity does not encompass a breach of contract claim, for
which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages.” The court also declined
to dismiss that claim under MCR 2.116(C)(10), finding that there remained genuine issues of
material fact on the PFCSA’s applicability to the contract for the sale of the burial plots and
services. The court considered the statutory definitions of burial rights, cemetery services, funeral
services, interment, and prepaid contract, and found that reasonable minds could differ as to
whether the PFCSA’s meaning of those words could encompass the issues in the case at bar. MCL
328.214(e), 213(a) and (g), and 214(e) and (i), and 215(d).

       The trial court further found genuine issues of material fact regarding plaintiffs’ breach of
contract claim, precluding summary disposition as to all defendants under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
The court found that plaintiffs adequately presented evidence demonstrating the elements for a
breach of contract, as Margaret purchased the burial plot for adequate consideration, with the
expectations of being buried therein, and that Margaret, because of defendants’ alleged breach of
contract, could no longer be buried in that plot without a significant change of circumstances. The

                                                -7-
court additionally found that specific performance was an available remedy because burial plots
constitute real property.

        As to plaintiffs’ remaining tort claims against C Management, the trial court granted
summary disposition in favor of C Management for the wrongful interference with the right of
burial and conversion claims, but denied summary disposition regarding plaintiffs’ gross
negligence and negligence claims. The court found no interference by C Management with
plaintiffs’ right to bury Nathaniel nor Margaret, and that an action for conversion could not lie
with respect to realty such as burial plots. The court further found genuine issues of material fact
regarding C Management’s gross negligence and negligence. The court found that while C
Management provided in its affidavit that it took reasonable steps to verify the correct burial plot,
by reviewing records available to it and awaiting approval from the Cemetery board, plaintiffs
countered by a showing of their receipts, exhibits, and allegations of other facts to the contrary,
precluding summary disposition in favor of C Management.

        In Docket No. 362424, C Management argues on appeal that the trial court erred by finding
that it was not immune from tort liability under the GTLA, MCL 691.1407(2). C Management
argues that the trial court properly found that it had established an agency relationship with City
defendants and that its agency relationship with City defendants met the standard of an “employee”
under MCL 691.1407(2). C Management argues that it is immune from tort liability under the
GTLA because the alleged torts occurred while serving in its capacity as City defendants’ agent
and during the exercise or discharge of a governmental function, and no exception to governmental
immunity applied. Moreover, C Management did not engage in grossly negligent conduct when
the alleged torts occurred. On this basis, C Management argues that it is entitled to governmental
immunity under MCL 691.1407(2), but that the trial court erred by ultimately denying
governmental immunity to C Management based on its erroneous findings that C Management’s
actions while serving as an agent to City defendants were ministerial in nature. And, its entitlement
to governmental immunity necessarily bars plaintiffs’ claim under the PFCSA and for gross
negligence and ordinary negligence.

         In Docket No. 362182, City defendants argue that the trial court erred by treating the
Cemetery as a separate legal entity from the City. Additionally, City defendants argue that any
liability under the PFCSA is tort liability against which governmental immunity under the GTLA
applies.

                                 IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) is appropriate based on immunity granted
by law. MCR 2.116(C)(7). Whether governmental immunity applies under the GTLA is a
question of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal. Kendricks v Rehfield, 270 Mich App 679,
682; 716 NW2d 623 (2006). When reviewing a summary disposition motion under MCR
2.116(C)(7), “the court considers all documentary evidence submitted by the parties in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Citizens Ins Co of America v Univ Physician Group, 319
Mich App 642, 648; 902 NW2d 896 (2017). “If no material facts are in dispute, or if reasonable
minds could not differ regarding the legal effect of the facts, the question whether the claim is
barred by governmental immunity is an issue of law.” Mays v Snyder, 323 Mich App 1, 25; 916
NW2d 227 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted), aff’d sub nom Mays v Governor, 506

                                                -8-
Mich 157; 954 NW2d 139 (2020). However, if a question of fact does exist, dismissal is
inappropriate. Dextrom v Wexford Co, 287 Mich App 406, 429; 789 NW2d 211 (2010). Whether
this Court has jurisdiction is a question of law that is also reviewed de novo. Chen v Wayne State
Univ, 284 Mich App 172, 191; 771 NW2d 820 (2009). Similarly, we review de novo issues of
statutory interpretation. In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich 367, 377; 835 NW2d 545 (2013).

                                        V. JURISDICTION

        Preliminarily, we address plaintiffs’ argument that this Court does not have jurisdiction as
to City defendants’ appeal because “all of the claims [] [to which] governmental immunity applied,
were dismissed, either voluntarily or by the trial [c]ourt.” Plaintiffs also argue that this Court lacks
jurisdiction over C Management’s appeal because C Management is a private, for-profit
corporation with no standing to claim governmental immunity protection.5

        This Court’s jurisdiction is governed by statute and court rule. Chen, 284 Mich App at
191. A defendant may appeal as of right an order denying summary disposition under MCR
2.116(C)(7) if the order denied governmental immunity to a governmental party. MCR
7.202(6)(a)(v) (stating that a “final order” includes “an order denying governmental immunity to
a governmental party, including a governmental agency, official, or employee under MCR
2.116(C)(7) or an order denying a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) based
on a claim of governmental immunity”); MCR 7.203(A)(1) (provides an appeal of right from a
final judgment or order as defined in MCR 7.202(6)). In an appeal by right from an order denying
a claim of governmental immunity, “this Court does not have the authority to consider issues
beyond the portion of the trial court’s order denying the defendant’s claim of governmental
immunity.” Pierce v Lansing, 265 Mich App 174, 182; 694 NW2d 65 (2005).

         Here, the trial court denied, in part, City defendants’ motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(7) on plaintiffs’ counts for the alleged violation of the PFCSA and breach of
contract. Although the trial court found that City defendants were a governmental agency shielded
by governmental immunity, the court ultimately held that governmental immunity does not
encompass claims sounding in contract law. City defendants appealed by right the portion of the
trial court’s order denying their motion for summary disposition on governmental immunity
grounds regarding the PFCSA claim, arguing that any liability under the PFCSA is a form of tort
liability for which governmental immunity should apply.

5
  Plaintiffs assert that C Management and City defendants’ appeals were improperly filed on the
eve of trial in order to stop the trial court proceedings and give them more time to file an application
for leave to appeal. However, plaintiffs’ argument, speculating as to why defendants’ claims of
appeal were filed, is irrelevant to this Court’s jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the record shows that
defendants timely filed their claims of appeal, as City defendants filed a claim of appeal within
two days and C Management filed its claim of appeal within 21 days after the trial court denied
their motions for summary disposition on governmental immunity grounds. See MCR
7.204(A)(1)(a) (providing that an appeal by right must be taken within 21 days of the judgment or
order appealed from).

                                                  -9-
        The trial court also denied, in part, C Management’s motion for summary disposition under
MCR 2.116(C)(7), holding that C Management was not entitled to governmental immunity. While
the court found that C Management demonstrated sufficient evidence of its agency relationship
with City defendants, the court ultimately held that agents of a governmental agency are not
cloaked with immunity under the GTLA when the agent’s duties were ministerial in nature. C
Management appealed by right that portion of the trial court’s order denying its motion for
summary disposition on the basis of governmental immunity, arguing that the trial court erred
because agents are immune from tort liability under MCL 691.1407(2) of the GTLA, irrespective
of whether the agents’ duties were discretionary or ministerial. C Management also appealed
plaintiffs’ tort claims remaining against C Management, arguing that those claims are barred by
governmental immunity.

       City defendants and C Management each appealed as of right the trial court’s order denying
them, in some fashion, governmental immunity under MCR 2.116(C)(7). See MCR 7.203(A)(1)
and MCR 7.202(6)(a)(v). City defendants appeal the trial court’s denial of governmental immunity
under MCR 2.116(C)(7) on the PFCSA claim, while C Management appeals the trial court’s
complete denial of its immunity as to any of plaintifffs’ claims. In both matters, defendants’
arguments were directly considered and denied by the trial court in the context of governmental
immunity. The trial court’s order fits squarely within the final order definition in MCR
7.202(6)(a)(v) (an order denying governmental immunity to a governmental party under MCR
2.116(C)(7)). This Court has jurisdiction over the claims of appeal. MCR 7.203(A); MCR
7.202(6)(a)(v).

                      VI. DOCKET NO. 362182—CITY DEFENDANTS

       City defendants argue that the trial court erred when it determined that plaintiffs’ claim
under the PFCSA was a breach of contract claim not barred by the GTLA. Specifically, City
defendants argue any liability under the PFCSA is a form of tort liability against which
governmental immunity applies and that plaintiffs failed to plead in avoidance of that immunity.

        Under the GTLA, MCL 691.1407, government agencies are immune from tort liability “if
the governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function.”
MCL 691.1407(1). The GTLA “speaks only to immunity from tort liability and does not grant
immunity from contract claims.” Rocco v Mich Dep’t of Mental Health, 114 Mich App 792, 799;
319 NW2d 674 (1982), aff’d sub nom Ross v Consumers Power Co, 420 Mich 567; 363 NW2d
641 (1984). The GTLA defines “governmental function” to mean “an activity that is expressly or
impliedly mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or ordinance, or other law.”
MCL 691.1401(b). Under certain narrowly construed exceptions, “the Legislature has pulled back
the veil of immunity and allowed suit by citizens against the government.” Mack v Detroit, 467
Mich 186, 195; 649 NW2d 47 (2002). The GTLA provides several narrow exceptions to
governmental immunity, including (1) the highway exception, MCL 691.1402, (2) the motor
vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405, (3) the public building exception, MCL 691.1406, (4) the
governmental hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4), (5) the proprietary function exception, MCL
691.1413, and (6) the sewage system event exception, MCL 691.1417.

        A party pleads in avoidance of governmental immunity by stating a claim that fits within
one of the statutory exceptions or by pleading facts that demonstrate that the alleged tort occurred

                                                -10-
outside the exercise or discharge of a governmental function. Genesee Co Drain Comm’r v
Genesee Co, 309 Mich App 317, 327; 869 NW2d 635 (2015). “A party filing suit against a
governmental agency bears the burden of pleading his or her claim in avoidance of governmental
immunity.” In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich at 377.

       As discussed below, although the trial court erred in holding that plaintiffs’ claim arising
under the PFCSA sounded in contract, the trial court properly denied summary disposition to City
defendants, albeit for the wrong reasons. Southfield Ed Ass’n v Bd of Ed of Southfield Pub Sch,
320 Mich App 353, 374; 909 NW2d 1 (2017) (holding that a trial court’s ruling will be undisturbed
on appeal where the right result was reached, but for the wrong reason).

                                      A. TORT LIABILITY

        The trial court erred by finding that plaintiffs’ claim under the PFCSA sounded in contract,
not tort, as the underlying claim was premised on City defendants’ breach of a noncontractual duty
imposed by law. The GTLA does not apply when a lawsuit against a governmental agency does
not seek to impose “tort liability.” Eplee v Lansing, 327 Mich App 635, 646; 935 NW2d 104
(2019). “Tort liability” as used in MCL 691.1407(1) of the GTLA, “means all legal responsibility
arising from a noncontractual civil wrong for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of
compensatory damages.” In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich at 385. In determining whether a claim
imposes “tort liability,” courts must “first focus on the nature of the duty that gives rise to the
claim.” Id. at 388-389.

       If the wrong alleged is premised on the breach of a contractual duty, then no tort
       has occurred, and the GTLA is inapplicable. However, if the wrong is not premised
       on a breach of a contractual duty, but rather is premised on some other civil wrong,
       i.e., some other breach of a legal duty, then the GTLA might apply to bar the claim.
       In that instance, the court must further consider the nature of the liability the claim
       seeks to impose. If the action permits an award of damages to a private party as
       compensation for an injury caused by the noncontractual civil wrong, then the
       action, no matter how it is labeled, seeks to impose tort liability and the GTLA is
       applicable. [Id. at 389 (footnotes omitted).]

An action in tort will lie when the legal duty arises “separately and distinctly” from the contractual
agreement. Loweke v Ann Arbor Ceiling & Partition Co, LLC, 489 Mich 157, 169; 809 NW2d
553 (2011). See also Sherman v Sea Ray Boats, Inc, 251 Mich App 41, 52; 649 NW2d 783 (2002)
(“[A]n action in tort may not be maintained where a contractual agreement exists, unless a duty,
separate and distinct from the contractual obligation, is established.”).

        The precise nature of the duty that gave rise to plaintiffs’ claim under the PFCSA was
noncontractual, as plaintiffs’ allegations concerned City defendants’ violation of an obligation
imposed by law under the PFCSA. In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich at 384 (“when a party breaches
a duty stemming from a legal obligation, other than a contractual one, the claim sounds in tort”).
Plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that City defendants violated MCL 328.218(1) of the PFCSA
by failing to keep “accurate accounts, books, and records” of its transactions, resulting in City
defendants’ mistaken burial of another person in the plot owned by Margaret. Plaintiffs sought
enforcement and relief for City defendants’ purported violation of the Act under MCL 328.234,
which permits any person to bring an action, “whether or not that person has purchased a prepaid

                                                -11-
contract,” to force compliance with the PFCSA.6 Although the PFCSA governs prepaid contracts
concerning funeral and cemetery merchandise and services, a cause of action alleging violations
of the PFCSA may be premised on “a wrong independent of a contract,” In re Bradley Estate, 494
Mich at 383 (quotation marks and citation omitted), as is the case here.

         Plaintiffs’ claim was premised on their allegation that City defendants breached their
statutory duty to maintain their records under MCL 328.218(1). That duty was “separate and
distinct” from their contractual obligations with plaintiffs. Loweke, 489 Mich at 169. In fact,
plaintiffs separately asserted their claim for breach of contract in their complaint, alleging that City
defendants breached the prepaid contract by failing to perform a specific contracted for promise,
i.e., securing Margaret’s plot, and sought specific performance. Plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim
concerned only those duties that were voluntarily assumed in the contract and arose out of the
intentions of the parties themselves when entering into the agreement. Hart v Ludwig, 347 Mich
559, 565-566; 79 NW2d 895 (1956); Fultz v Union-Commerce Ass’n, 470 Mich 460, 469-470; 683
NW2d 587 (2004) (“[I]f defendant fails or refuses to perform a promise, the action is in contract.”).
In contrast, plaintiffs’ claim under the PFCSA was predicated on their assertions that City
defendants owed them a duty independent of the contract, that is, the statutory duty to maintain
their records under MCL 328.218(1). See Loweke, 489 Mich at 169 (recognizing that a legal duty,
including duties imposed by law, may support a cause of action in tort). And, MCL 328.234
provided plaintiffs with “a right to maintain an action without regard to whether there was a
contractual relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.” Ferrett v Gen Motors Corp, 438
Mich 235, 245; 475 NW2d 243 (1991). See also MCL 328.234. Plaintiffs’ cause of action for City
defendants’ breach of a legal duty imposed by law under the PFCSA sounded in tort.

        Because plaintiffs’ cause of action for City defendants’ alleged violation of MCL
328.218(1) was premised on a civil wrong independent of the underlying contract, the GTLA will
bar plaintiffs’ claim “[i]f the action permits an award of damages to a private party as compensation
for an injury caused by the noncontractual civil wrong.” In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich at 389.
See also Nat’l Copper Co v Minnesota Min Co, 57 Mich 83, 93; 23 NW 781 (1885) (“[D]amage
alone does not give a right of action there must be a concurrence of wrong and damage.”). We
conclude that plaintiffs sought to impose tort liability under MCL 328.234 of the PFCSA, as the
statute permits a private cause of action by any person to force compliance with the Act and
authorizes a court to “award damages, issue equitable orders in accordance with the Michigan
court rules to restrain conduct in violation of this act, and award reasonable attorney fees and costs
to a prevailing party.” MCL 328.234. Plaintiffs requested compensatory and punitive relief7 for

6
 MCL 328.234 provides that “[t]he department or any other person, in order to force compliance
with this act, may bring an action in a circuit court in any county in which the registrant or any
other person has solicited or sold prepaid contracts, whether or not that person has purchased a
prepaid contract or is personally aggrieved by a violation of this act. The court may award
damages, issue equitable orders in accordance with the Michigan court rules to restrain conduct in
violation of this act, and award reasonable attorney fees and costs to a prevailing party.”
7
  In their complaint, plaintiffs provided a blanket request for the award of damages in excess of
$25,000 for compensatory and punitive damages, costs, and attorney fees. Although plaintiffs also
requested specific performance in their complaint, the request was premised on City defendants’

                                                 -12-
the damages they allegedly sustained as a result of City defendants’ failure to comply with the
statutory duty imposed by the Act under MCL 328.218(1). See In re Bradley Estate, 494 Mich at
388 (providing that tort damages generally take the form of compensatory damages). Given that
the statutory language of MCL 328.234 permits an award of damages to plaintiffs for a
noncontractual civil wrong and plaintiffs sought that relief in their complaint, we hold that
plaintiffs cause of action sought to impose “tort liability” for purposes of the GTLA. Id. at 385
(defining “tort liability” to mean “all legal responsibility arising from a noncontractual civil wrong
for which a remedy may be obtained in the form of compensatory damages”); Eplee, 327 Mich
App at 648. We conclude that the trial court erred in concluding that plaintiffs’ allegation that
City defendants violated the duties imposed by the PFCSA was a claim for breach of contract
because that claim sought to impose tort liability against City defendants. In light of our holding,
plaintiffs’ claim under the PFCSA is barred by statutory governmental immunity unless plaintiffs
pleaded in avoidance of immunity.

                     B. AVOIDANCE OF GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

         Having concluded that plaintiffs’ claim under the PFCSA imposed tort liability for the
purposes of the GTLA, the dispositive issue concerns whether plaintiffs pleaded in avoidance of
governmental immunity. Genesee Co Drain Comm’r, 309 Mich App at 327 (providing that a party
pleads in avoidance of governmental immunity by pleading facts that demonstrate that the alleged
tort occurred outside the exercise or discharge of a governmental function or by stating a claim
that fits within one of the statutory exceptions enumerated under the GTLA).

       The trial court found that the City is a governmental agency and that the City’s operation
of the Cemetery constitutes a governmental function. A governmental agency is defined under
MCL 691.1401(a) as “this state or a political subdivision.” Subsection (e) defines political
subdivision to include “municipal corporation,” which is defined in subsection (d) to include a
city. MCL 691.1401(e) and (d). Thus, the City, as a municipal corporation, constitutes a
governmental agency for purposes of the GTLA.8 Mack, 467 Mich at 204. The trial court found

purported breach of the underlying contract, without any mention or reasoning justifying that relief
on the basis of City defendants’ purported violation of the PFCSA. Specifically, in their request
for specific performance, plaintiffs asserted that Margaret had a “contractual right to possession”
of the burial plot and requested that the court order defendant to locate two unused plots for
Margaret and Nathaniel. Plaintiffs reaffirmed this point in their response to City defendants and
C Management’s motions for summary disposition by further requesting that the court order
specific performance by way of City defendants’ fulfillment of “what was bargained for and an
equitable remedy for what their mistake caused: plots where Nathaniel Gathright and Margaret
Gathright can rest, in peace, together for eternity.” Similarly, plaintiffs’ request for treble damages
in their complaint was unrelated to their claim under the PFCSA. Plaintiffs sought treble damages
for City defendants’ alleged conversion of the underlying burial plot under MCL 600.2919a, but
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their conversion claims against City defendants.
8
  Although plaintiffs’ complaint named both the City and the Cemetery as defendants, the
Cemetery is not a separate legal entity against which a tort action can be directed or from which
plaintiffs can recover. Omelenchuk v Warren, 466 Mich 524, 526 n 3; 647 NW2d 493 (2002) (“It

                                                 -13-
that the City’s operation of the Cemetery was a “governmental function” under MCL 691.1401(b)
because those responsibilities were mandated or authorized by chapter 12 of the City’s ordinances.
See MCL 6911401(b) (“ ‘Governmental function’ means an activity that is expressly or impliedly
mandated or authorized by constitution, statute, local charter or ordinance, or other law.”); Benton
Harbor Ordinances, § 12-1. Because the parties do not dispute that City defendants were a
governmental agency engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function when the
alleged torts occurred, City defendants are immune from tort liability unless plaintiffs stated a
claim that fits within one of the enumerated statutory exceptions. Genesee Co Drain Comm’r, 309
Mich App at 327.

        Plaintiffs do not dispute that the enumerated statutory exceptions to governmental
immunity do not apply, but instead argue that MCL 328.234 of the PFCSA establishes an exception
to the general rule that government agencies are immune from tort liability when performing a
governmental function. Although “the Legislature remains free to create additional exceptions,
either within the GTLA or another statute[,]” governmental immunity under the Act “may not be
held to have been waived or abrogated except that result has been accomplished by an express
statutory enactment or by necessary inference from a statute.” State Farm Fire & Cas Co v Corby
Energy Servs, Inc, 271 Mich App 480, 485; 722 NW2d 906 (2006) (quotation marks and citations
omitted). “Whether an express statutory enactment creates an exception to governmental
immunity is resolved by reference to the language of the statute.” Id. MCL 328.234 specifically
provides that:

       The department or any other person, in order to force compliance with this act, may
       bring an action in a circuit court in any county in which the registrant or any other
       person has solicited or sold prepaid contracts, whether or not that person has
       purchased a prepaid contract or is personally aggrieved by a violation of this act.
       The court may award damages, issue equitable orders in accordance with the
       Michigan court rules to restrain conduct in violation of this act, and award
       reasonable attorney fees and costs to a prevailing party. [Emphasis added.]

The PFCSA defines the word “person” to include a “government agency.” MCL 328.215(b). On
this basis, plaintiffs allege that the Legislature created an exception to governmental immunity
from tort liability in the PFCSA because it included governmental agencies among those “persons”
subject to a cause of action for damages.

        The plain language of the PFCSA demonstrates the Legislature’s intent to waive
governmental immunity under the GTLA and submit government agencies to the jurisdiction of
the circuit court. The Legislature expressly applied the PFCSA to City defendants by including
“governmental agency” in the definition of a “person” that can be sued. MCL 328.234; MCL
328.215(b). City defendants do not dispute that they are a “government agency” for the purposes

is agreed that the fire department is not a separate entity from which plaintiffs can recover. Any
recovery would be from the city of Warren.”); Davis v Chrysler Corp, 151 Mich App 463, 466 n
1; 391 NW2d 376 (1986) (“Although plaintiffs’ complaint named the Detroit Public Lighting
Department as a defendant, the Department is not a separate legal entity against which a tort action
can be directed.”); and Michonski v Detroit, 162 Mich App 485, 490; 413 NW2d 438 (1987).

                                               -14-
of the PFCSA but argue that the Legislature did not provide specific and express authorization to
sue a governmental entity under the PFCSA. Although the PFCSA does not specifically mention
governmental immunity, the Act otherwise imposes duties on a “person,” i.e., a government
agency, and further permits a private cause of action against the “person” for breaches of the duties
imposed by the Act, to which the court may award damages or equitable relief. MCL 328.234.
The Legislature’s imposition of liability on any “person,” which explicitly includes a governmental
agency, MCL 328.215(b), for their failure to abide by the provisions of the Act demonstrates an
express waiver to governmental immunity provided by the GTLA. Compare: Ballard v Ypsilanti
Twp, 457 Mich 564, 576; 577 NW2d 890 (1998) (holding that the recreational land use act did not
create an express statutory enactment subjecting the state to liability because the Act mentions
neither the state nor its political subdivisions), with Anzaldua v Band, 457 Mich 530, 551; 578
NW2d 306 (1998) (holding that the Legislature intended to create an exception to immunity in the
Whistleblowers’ Protection Act by including the state and its political subdivisions in the definition
of “employer”).

        Additional support for this conclusion is found in the legislative history of the GTLA and
the later enacted PFCSA. The Legislature enacted MCL 691.1407 of the GTLA in 1964 to provide
immunity from tort liability to governmental agencies. 1964 PA 170. Decades later, in 1986, the
Legislature enacted the PFCSA, formerly known as the Prepaid Funeral Contracting Funding Act,
to govern the sale of funeral cemetery services, “to prescribe powers and duties of the departments
of licensing and regulation . . . and certain other state and local officers[,] . . . and to provide certain
penalties and remedies[.]” 1986 PA 255. In 2004, the Legislature amended the definition of
“person” under MCL 328.215(b) of the PFCSA to include a “government agency” within its
meaning, whereas the predecessor statute read, in part, only to include “agency.” 2004 PA 21;
1986 PA 255. The Legislature’s express inclusion of governmental agencies within the definition
of “person” under MCL 328.215(b) was made notwithstanding its knowledge of governmental
immunity under the GTLA. Walen v Dep’t of Corrections, 443 Mich 240, 248; 505 NW2d 519
(1993) (“It is a well-known principle that the Legislature is presumed to be aware of, and thus to
have considered the effect on, all existing statutes when enacting new laws.”). Following the 2004
amendment, any “person,” i.e., governmental agency, in violation of the PFCSA was subject to
suit in circuit court under MCL 328.234, and, in effect, the historical grant of immunity to
governmental agencies under the GTLA was waived.

        Accordingly, the trial court did not err by denying City defendants’ motion for summary
disposition because, despite the PFCSA’s imposition of tort liability, the PFCSA’s direct inclusion
of a “government agency” as a “person” that can be sued for damages indicates the Legislature’s
intent to waive the immunity conferred by MCL 691.1407(1) for governmental agencies.
Southfield Ed Ass’n, 320 Mich App at 374.

                         VII. DOCKET NO. 362424—C MANAGEMENT

         C Management argues that it is entitled to governmental immunity under MCL 691.1407(2)
because it was acting as an “agent” of City defendants when the alleged torts occurred, and that
the trial court erred by relying on an abrogated principle that considered whether C Management’s
duties were discretionary or ministerial.

                                                   -15-
         The trial court found that although C Management was an agent acting under contract of
City defendants, the GTLA’s grant of immunity did not apply because its duties were ministerial.
The GTLA shields the officers, employees, members, or volunteers of a governmental agency from
tort liability for injuries or damages they cause while in the course of employment or services, or
while acting on behalf of the governmental agency if all of the following conditions are met:

       (a) The officer, employee, member, or volunteer is acting or reasonably believes he
       or she is acting within the scope of his or her authority.

       (b) The governmental agency is engaged in the exercise or discharge of a
       governmental function.

       (c) The officer’s, employee’s, member’s, or volunteer’s conduct does not amount
       to gross negligence that is the proximate cause of the injury or damage. [MCL
       691.1407(2)(a) through (c).]

        C Management argues that it was entitled to governmental immunity under MCL
691.1407(2) because it was acting as an agent of City defendants when the alleged torts occurred
and that agents constitute “employees” for purposes of the GTLA. 9 However, even if C
Management was an agent of City defendants, “agents” do not fall under the categories of persons
entitled to governmental immunity under MCL 691.1407(2), which lists the individuals entitled to
the grant of immunity as officers, employees, members, or volunteers of governmental agencies.
Because agents are not listed as an individual entitled to immunity under MCL 691.1407(2), C
Management is not entitled to governmental immunity under that statutory provision.

         The trial court erroneously relied on Ross v Consumers Power Co, 420 Mich at 592,
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Ray v Swager, 501 Mich 52, 81; 903 NW2d
366 (2017), as the Ross Court did not construe the statute at issue here. In fact, the Legislature
amended the GTLA in response to Ross, Odom v Wayne Co, 482 Mich 459, 468; 760 NW2d 217
(2006), and MCL 691.1407(2), as amended, applies only to those individual governmental actors
listed in the statute.10

9
  C Management improperly relies on Pomilee v Detroit, 121 Mich App 121; 328 NW2d 595
(1982), for the proposition that “agents” are immune from liability under MCL 691.1407(2) by
quoting the following language from Pomilee: “Officers, agents and employees of immune
institutions are themselves cloaked with governmental immunity when acting within the scope of
their employment.” Id. at 125. However, the Pomilee Court indicated that the quoted language
was a paraphrased statement drawn from Everhart v Bd of Ed of Roseville Co Sch, 108 Mich App
218, 222; 310 NW2d 338 (1981). Neither Pomilee nor Everhart considered what effect, if any, an
agency relationship had on governmental immunity under MCL 691.1407(2). In fact, the words
“agent” or “agency” do not appear anywhere in the Everhart decision.
10
   The trial court ultimately held that governmental immunity under the GTLA did not apply to C
Management because its actions while serving as agent were “ministerial” in nature. The court
cited Ross, which conditioned immunity to government actors on whether they were: “a) acting

                                               -16-
        We further reject C Management’s contentions that “employee” under MCL 691.1407(2)
includes private for-profit corporations serving as agents to a governmental agency. Two reasons
support this conclusion. First, as already noted, the Legislature did not include the term “agent”
when describing those who are entitled to immunity under MCL 691.1407(2). That term was
included, however, within several other provisions of the GTLA,11 and the inclusion of the term
in those sections allows us to presume that the exclusion of the term from MCL 691.1407(2) was
intentional. See Detroit v Redford Twp, 253 Mich 453, 456; 235 NW2d 217 (1931) (“Express
mention in a statute of one thing implies the exclusion of other similar things, expressio unius est
exclusio alterius.”) (citation omitted); Robinson v Detroit, 462 Mich 439, 459; 613 NW2d 307
(2000) (“The Court may not assume that the Legislature inadvertently made use of one word or
phrase instead of another.”); and Coblentz v Novi, 475 Mich 558, 572; 719 NW2d 73 (2006)
(providing that “[t]he words chosen by the Legislature are presumed intentional[,] and this Court
“will not speculate that it used one word when it meant another”).

         Second, because “employee” is not defined by the GTLA, it must be given its plain and
ordinary meaning, and we may consult a dictionary for guidance. Rakowski v Sarb, 269 Mich App
619, 626; 713 NW2d 787 (2006). In Rakowski, this Court considered whether the defendant was
an employee for purposes of MCL 691.1407(2), and determined that the “Random House
Webster’s College Dictionary (1992) defines ‘employee’ as ‘a person who has been hired to work
for another.’ ” Id. at 626. That an “employee” means an individual “person” is consistent with
the Legislature’s use of that word in subsection 2, which only immunizes certain individual actors,
that is, officers, employees, members, or volunteers12 of a governmental agency, from tort liability,
and does not include private entities within the immunity in MCL 691.1407(2). The remaining
subsections of MCL 691.1407 are also void of any language evidencing the Legislature’s intent
for the GTLA’s grant of immunity to apply to nongovernmental business entities. C Management
is a private for-profit organization that, notwithstanding its purported agency relationship with City

during the course of their employment and are acting, or reasonably believe they are acting, within
the scope of their authority; b) acting in good faith; and c) performing discretionary-decisional, as
opposed to ministerial-operational, acts.” Ross, 420 Mich at 592. As C Management argues, the
court erred by relying on the abrogated principles outlined in Ross, which distinguished
discretionary and ministerial acts. The Legislature amended the GTLA in 1986 in response to
Ross, and the amended statute immunized individual governmental actors “without regard to the
discretionary or ministerial nature of the conduct in question.” MCL 691.1407(2); Odom v Wayne
Co, 482 Mich at 468. Thus, except as to intentional torts brought against individuals, the
ministerial act consideration is no longer relevant to determining whether an individual is entitled
to governmental immunity. Odom, 482 Mich at 480. Even still, Odom only refers to those
individuals designated under the statute—officers and employees—without any inclusion of
“agents” being lower-ranking governmental actors under MCL 691.1407(2). Id. at 479-480.
11
  The term “agent” is explicitly mentioned in the motor vehicle exception, MCL 691.1405, and
the governmental hospital exception, MCL 691.1407(4), under the GTLA.
12
  In fact, the GTLA defines “volunteer” to mean “an individual who is specifically designated as
a volunteer and who is acting solely on behalf of a governmental agency.” MCL 691.1401(i)
(emphasis added).

                                                -17-
defendants, retained its separate corporate identity as a nongovernmental actor or entity. C
Management is not an “employee” considered by the Legislature as immune from tort liability
under MCL 691.1407(2) of the GTLA.13

        C Management has not cited any relevant authority showing that private for-profit entities
such as C Management may be immune from tort liability under MCL 691.1407(2), which cloaks
certain individuals with governmental immunity. On the other hand, Michigan courts have
repeatedly declined to extend the protection of governmental immunity to private entities in
application of the related subsections in MCL 691.1407. Vargo v Sauer, 457 Mich 49, 68; 576
NW2d 656 (1998) (“[T]he definition of ‘governmental agency’ does not include, or remotely
contemplate, joint ventures, partnerships, arrangements between governmental agencies and
private entities, or any other combined state-private endeavors.”), (quotation marks and citation
omitted); Jackson v New Ctr Community Mental Health Servs, 158 Mich App 25, 34; 404 NW2d
688 (1987) (“A private entity’s performance of a governmental function does not confer
governmental agency status on that entity”); and Roberts v Pontiac, 176 Mich App 572, 578; 440
NW2d 55 (1989) (holding that there is “no reason to extend the protection of governmental
immunity to a private entity merely because it contracts with the government”). Michigan courts
have even held that the employees of a private entity doing business with a public agency also are
not entitled to governmental immunity. See Rambus v Wayne Co Gen Hosp, 193 Mich App 268,
270-273; 483 NW2d 455 (1992); Roberts, 176 Mich App at 578; and Vargo v Sauer, 457 Mich at
71 (“[O]ur examination of the governmental tort immunity statute reveals that although the
Legislature extended immunity to a large number of individuals for broad categories of conduct,
there is no indication that the statute, when read in conjunction with its definitional sources, even
remotely contemplates a grant of immunity for agents who are simultaneously serving a private
entity.”)

        We conclude that the trial court properly denied summary disposition to C Management
on governmental immunity grounds, albeit for the wrong reasons. However, a trial court’s ruling
will be undisturbed on appeal where the right result was reached, but for the wrong reason.
Southfield Ed Ass’n, 320 Mich App at 374 (citation omitted). Because C Management was not
entitled to tort immunity under the GTLA, we need not discuss its remaining issues on appeal.

13
   C Management argues for the first time on appeal that under the economic-realities test, see
Rakowski, 269 Mich App at 625, it qualified as an “employee” for purposes of MCL 691.1407(2).
However, because C Management raised this argument for the first time on appeal, it is not
properly preserved. See Polkton Charter Twp v Pellegrom, 265 Mich App 88, 95; 693 NW2d 170
(2005) (holding that an issue is generally preserved for review if it was raised before, addressed,
or decided by the trial court). In any event, our reading of MCL 691.1407(2) renders the argument
moot.

                                                -18-
Affirmed.

                   /s/ Thomas C. Cameron
                   /s/ Christopher M. Murray
                   /s/ Michael F. Gadola

            -19-