Court Opinion

ID: 9929500
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-02 20:02:21.591793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:51.160116
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/2/24 P. v. Garcia CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C098251

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 21FE004756)

           v.

 JOE RAYMOND GARCIA,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

          Defendant Joe Raymond Garcia pleaded no contest to felony driving with a blood-
alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more and causing great bodily injury while speeding.
He also admitted two sentencing enhancements: personally inflicting great bodily injury
and personally inflicting great bodily injury resulting in paralysis. Consistent with the
terms of his plea agreement, the trial court sentenced defendant to 10 years in state
prison.

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       Defendant’s sole claim on appeal is that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss
one of his two sentencing enhancements. The People contend defendant’s claim is barred
on multiple grounds: (1) failure to obtain a certificate of probable cause, (2) waiver, and
(3) forfeiture. We agree defendant failed to preserve his claim in the trial court and will
affirm the judgment.

                       FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
       On November 8, 2020, after drinking alcohol at a bar, defendant drove his Chevy
Silverado at approximately 68-72 miles per hour in a 35-mile-per-hour zone. Defendant
crashed his Silverado into the back corner of a stopped Toyota Tacoma, forcing the
Tacoma off the road into a fence and a guardrail. Jesus and Leticia A., who were inside
the Tacoma, were both taken to the hospital. As a result of the crash, Leticia suffered a
concussion and a lower back fracture; Jesus was paralyzed from the neck down.
       The People charged defendant with driving while under the influence of alcohol
and causing bodily injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a) – count one); driving while
having a blood-alcohol content of 0.08 percent or more causing great bodily injury (Veh.
Code, § 23153, subd. (b) – count two); and hit and run involving serious injury (Veh.
Code, § 20001, subd. (b)(2) – count three). Related to counts one and two, the People
alleged defendant drove at a speed greater than is reasonable or prudent (Veh. Code,
§ 22350) and refused a chemical test (Veh. Code, § 23578). Appended to all counts were
sentencing enhancement allegations that defendant personally inflicted great bodily
injury (Pen. Code, § 12022.7, subd. (a); statutory section citations that follow are found
in the Penal Code unless otherwise stated) and personally inflicted great bodily injury
resulting in paralysis (§ 12022.7, subd. (b)). As aggravating factors, the People also
alleged that defendant’s “crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of great
bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or callousness
in violation of [California Rules of Court,] [r]ule 4.421(a)(1).”

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       Defendant pleaded no contest to driving with a blood-alcohol content at or above
0.08 percent and causing bodily injury while speeding. He also admitted both sentencing
enhancements to be true. In exchange for defendant’s plea, the People agreed to a
sentencing lid of 10 years in state prison and dismissal of the remaining charges and
allegations.
       Prior to sentencing, defendant submitted a statement in mitigation to the court. In
his statement, defendant argued for probation. He argued, in the alternative, for the
middle term. He asked the trial court to “use S[enate] B[ill No.] 81 and . . . section 1385
to strike the enhancements in this matter.” The enhancements alone, he argued, added up
to more time in prison than the crimes themselves: “S[enate] B[ill No.] 81 is designed
for use in this case especially when he has no criminal history and the support of family,
was hardworking, and the facts show no malice or intent . . . .”
       At the sentencing hearing on March 24, 2023, defendant continued to argue for
probation. If not probation, defendant argued he should be sentenced to no more than
“2.8 years in prison.” Defendant renewed his argument that “S[enate] B[ill No.] 81”
applies: “I know there are factors the Court has to go through, and the way I look at the
code is of what it’s trying to do. It’s trying to say that when the enhancements are so
large versus the crime itself that maybe courts can start striking them.”
       The court denied defendant’s request for probation, finding probation would not
be “just,” and sentenced him to an aggregate term of 10 years in state prison. The court
explained that “yes, in mitigation you have no record, but you know what’s aggravating
on your side of the ledger is you have so many people here that love and support you that
would have done anything to keep you out of that car that night. You’re 38 years old. If
you’re a 20-year-old, it’s a different story, but you’re a grown man. You had other
options that night, and so I do [sic]. I understand I have the discretion under new laws
passed by our Legislature, but I’d like the Legislature to sit here in this courtroom and
look at the carnage and look at the damage that’s been done here and ask themselves,

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would you honestly think it would be the appropriate thing to do to let [Jesus] leave this
courtroom in a wheelchair unable to scratch his nose and because [defendant] has no
record and because he has shown remorse and because the enhancements are larger than
the underlying crime – maybe that’s the problem. Maybe the underlying crime triad is
not enough. That’s the other way to look at it. But I’m not the Legislature. I only
enforce the laws to the best of my ability.”
       The court thus found the aggravating factors outweighed any factors in mitigation:
“you’re 38 years old and you have such a great support system and you had so many
other options, I think the fact that you were at .21 blood alcohol level – that is just mind-
blowingly drunk – the fact that you were speeding in a 35-mile-an-hour zone between 68
and 72 miles an hour, so you not only endangered [this] family, you endangered
everybody else out there, so I think that’s actually way more aggravating than all the
mitigating circumstances that I have considered.” In short, the court ruled, “this was not
an accident. There were decisions that you made and you need to pay the consequences.”
       Defendant appeals from the judgment without a certificate of probable cause.

                                        DISCUSSION
       Defendant claims the trial court erred when it refused to strike one of his
enhancements pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c). In response, the People argue
defendant’s claim is barred either because he did not obtain a certificate of probable
cause, defendant waived the claim by agreeing the court had authority to impose a 10-
year sentence without limitations, or the claim was forfeited.
       Whether a certificate of probable cause is required, or defendant waived the claim
by entering into the plea agreement, we agree defendant’s claim on appeal was forfeited.
       Under section 1237.5, “an appeal may not be taken after a plea of guilty or no
contest unless the defendant has filed a statement showing reasonable grounds for appeal
and the trial court has executed and filed a certificate of probable cause. This

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requirement does not apply, however, if the appeal is based upon grounds that arose after
entry of the plea and that do not affect the validity of the plea.” (People v. French (2008)
43 Cal.4th 36, 43.) To determine “ ‘whether section 1237.5 applies to a challenge of a
sentence imposed after a plea of guilty or no contest, courts must look to the substance of
the appeal: “the crucial issue is what the defendant is challenging, not the time or manner
in which the challenge is made.” [Citation.] Hence, the critical inquiry is whether a
challenge to the sentence is in substance a challenge to the validity of the plea, thus
rendering the appeal subject to the requirements of section 1237.5.’ ” (Id. at p. 44.)
       Here, defendant argues that “where public safety is not endangered, the trial court
relinquishes discretion.” In other words, without a finding of danger to the public, the
court lacked the authority to impose the maximum agreed-upon term. Such a challenge
may require a certificate of probable cause. (See People v. Stamps (2020) 9 Cal.5th 685,
694-695 [in certain contexts, claims that seek to avoid a term of the plea agreement can
be viewed as a challenge to the validity of the plea itself]; see also People v. Shelton
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 770-771.) We need not resolve this issue, however, because
whether or not a certificate or probable cause is required for defendant to pursue this
appeal, defendant did not preserve his claim.
       “When a defendant maintains that the trial court’s sentence violates rules which
would have required the imposition of a more lenient sentence, yet the defendant avoided
a potentially harsher sentence by entering into the plea bargain, it may be implied that the
defendant waived any rights under such rules by choosing to accept the plea bargain.”
(People v. Couch (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1053, 1057.) “[D]efendants who have received
the benefit of their bargain should not be allowed to trifle with the courts by attempting to
better the bargain through the appellate process.” (People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th
290, 295.)
       Had defendant been convicted of all the charges and enhancement allegations, he
faced a maximum term of 12 years eight months in state prison. The agreed-upon 10-

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year-lid, thus resulted in a more than two-year reduction in his sentence. Importantly, at
the time defendant entered into his plea agreement, the relevant changes to section 1385
had been in effect for a year. (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1.) Defendant nevertheless agreed
to the 10-year sentencing lid without an agreement that the trial court was precluded from
imposing that lid unless it found a shorter sentence would result in danger to the public.
In so doing, defendant, charged with knowing of the relevant changes to section 1385
waived the claim he is now raising on appeal when he made his plea agreement. (Hester,
supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 295.)
       Moreover, whether defendant’s claim is otherwise barred, he forfeited his right to
raise the claim on appeal by failing to raise it first in the trial court. “ ‘A party in a
criminal case may not, on appeal, raise “claims involving the trial court’s failure to
properly make or articulate its discretionary sentencing choices” if the party did not
object to the sentence at trial. [Citation.] The rule applies to “cases in which the stated
reasons allegedly do not apply to the particular case, and cases in which the court
purportedly erred because it double-counted a particular sentencing factor, misweighed
the various factors, or failed to state any reasons or give a sufficient number of valid
reasons.” ’ ” (People v. Scott (2015) 61 Cal.4th 363, 406.)
       In his statement in mitigation, defendant referenced Senate Bill No. 81. He raised
it again at the sentencing hearing, and the trial court noted its discretion to strike
enhancements under section 1385, as amended by Senate Bill No. 81. At no time,
however, did counsel argue the court was required to make a finding of danger to the
public if it intended not to strike an enhancement as he argues now on appeal. Nor did
counsel object when the trial court imposed the 10-year-lid. Because defendant did not
raise this objection in the trial court, defendant has forfeited the claim on appeal.

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                                       DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                  HULL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

MESIWALA, J.

WISEMAN, J.

 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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