Court Opinion

ID: 9399996
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 06:00:14.258762+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:41.418289
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     DEBORAH J. MCGREGOR, M.D,                       DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         AT-1221-15-0846-B-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: June 6, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

                  THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Sarah Dragotta, Esquire, Exton, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.

           Tsopei Robinson, Montgomery, Alabama, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                     REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed her individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. For
     the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review,
     FIND that she established the Board’s jurisdiction over her claims, VACATE the

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                    2

     initial decision, and REMAND the appeal to the Atlanta Regional Office for
     further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                    BACKGROUND
¶2          The procedural history in this matter is long and involved. Many of the
     essential facts are set forth in the Board’s 2016 Remand Order , and we rely on
     that decision as appropriate. McGregor v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB
     Docket No. AT 1221-15-0846-W-2, Remand Order (July 5, 2016) (Remand
     Order).
¶3        Effective August 15, 2010, the agency appointed the appellant to an
     excepted-service position as a Physician with the agency’s Central Alabama
     Veterans Healthcare System (CAVHCS) under the authority of 38 U.S.C.
     § 7401(1). Id., ¶ 2. Her appointment was subject to a 2-year trial period. Id. By
     letter dated December 7, 2011, the agency informed the appellant that she would
     be terminated during her trial period, effective December 28, 2011, based on the
     recommendation of the agency’s Professional Standards Board (PSB), which
     found that she had engaged in “substandard care, professional misconduct, or
     professional incompetence.”   Id. On September 1, 2015, the appellant filed a
     Board appeal, challenging her termination and arguing that she received an
     unjustified unsatisfactory performance appraisal in reprisal for her filing a
     complaint with the Office of Inspector General (OIG) and for disclosing
     operational concerns regarding: (1) the lack of basic equipment; (2) the lack of
     security guards when dealing with difficult patients; (3) the practice of
     over-prescribing pain medication; and (4) inadequate patient care resulting from
     staffing issues and negligent staff. McGregor v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
     MSPB Docket No. AT-1221-15-0846-W-1, Appeal File (W-1 AF), Tab 1 at 5, 12.
¶4        Without holding the appellant’s requested hearing, the administrative judge
     dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Remand Order, ¶ 7. He found that
     the appellant could not directly appeal her termination to the Board because she
     was not an “employee” with 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 appeal rights, and that, although
                                                                                       3

     the appellant exhausted her administrative remedy with the Office of Special
     Counsel (OSC), the Board otherwise lacked jurisdiction over the her claims as an
     IRA appeal because an agency physician appointed under 38 U.S.C. § 7401(1)
     whose termination involved a question of professional conduct or competence ,
     such as the appellant’s, is excluded by that same statute from Board jurisdiction
     over IRA appeals. Id.
¶5        The appellant filed a petition for review of that initial decision, which the
     Board granted. The Board found that the administrative judge correc tly decided
     that the Board lacked jurisdiction over the appellant’s claims as a direct appeal to
     the Board under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75.       Remand Order, ¶ 9.      However, citing
     Harding v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 448 F.3d 1373, 1375-77 (Fed. Cir.
     2006), the Board vacated the administrative judge’s finding that it lacked
     jurisdiction over the IRA appeal because the appellant’s termination involved a
     question of professional conduct or competence, finding that such a termination
     did not preclude jurisdiction.   Remand Order, ¶¶ 10-11.       It also vacated the
     administrative judge’s finding that the appellant had shown that she exhausted her
     administrative remedy with OSC. Id., ¶ 18. The Board remanded the appeal for
     the administrative judge to issue a jurisdictional order informing the appellant of
     the burden and elements of proof for establishing jurisdiction over her IRA
     appeal, and to afford the parties an opportunity to submit evidence and argument
     regarding the timeliness of any claims that she exhausted before OSC.           Id.,
     ¶¶ 18-19.
¶6        On remand, the administrative judge issued an order regardi ng jurisdiction
     and timeliness.   McGregor v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket
     No. AT-1221-15-0846-B-1, Remand File (RF), Tab 2. In response, the appellant
     recounted numerous events that occurred during her tenure at CAVH CS that she
     alleges constitute injustices, lapses in policy and procedure, and “micro
     aggression towards patients and professional staff” that reveal a health care
     system without sufficient safeguards for quality of care. RF, Tab 3. She also
                                                                                        4

     reiterated her claim that she was retaliated against for discl osing her concerns
     regarding the state of operations at the CAVHCS facility, as detailed above. Id.
     at 5-6, 8, 14-15, 17, 19, 21.
¶7         In a remand initial decision, the administrative judge found that none of the
     documentation submitted by the appellant established exhaustion with OSC by
     preponderant evidence. RF, Tab 4, Remand Initial Decision (RID) at 6-7. He
     further observed that the appellant failed to submit a copy of her OSC complaint
     and that she did not otherwise claim before the Board that she exhausted her
     claims with OSC.      RID at 7-8.    Thus, he found that the appellant failed to
     establish the exhaustion requirement, and he dismissed the appeal for lack of
     jurisdiction. RID at 9-10.
¶8         The appellant has filed the instant petition for review of the remand initial
     decision.    McGregor v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket
     No. AT-1221-15-0846-B-1, Remand Petition for Review File, (RPFR File), Tab 1.
     She relies on her sworn statement before the Pennsylvania State Board of
     Medicine to show that she made protected disclosures and generally appears to
     suggest that the Board should similarly find that she was credible. Id. at 5, 8.
     She states that she presented OSC with the same examples of agency wrongdoing
     that she presented to the Board. Id. at 11. The agency has not responded to the
     appellant’s petition for review.

                      DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶9         We start our analysis by explaining that, because all of the appellant’s
     alleged disclosures and the personnel actions at issue in this appeal occurred prior
     to the December 27, 2012 effective date of the Whistleblower Protection
     Enhancement Act (WPEA), the applicable statute is the Whistleblower Protection
     Act of 1989 (WPA). Pub. L. No. 112-199, § 202, 126 Stat 1465, 1476; Pub. L.
     No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16. While this decision occasionally cites to post-WPEA
                                                                                     5

      case law, it does so only when the premise for which a case is cited is not
      implicated by a change in law under the WPEA.
¶10        Under the WPA, the Board has jurisdiction over an IRA appeal if the
      appellant has exhausted her administrative remed y before OSC and makes
      nonfrivolous allegations that she engaged in whistleblowing activity by making a
      protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) and that the disclosure was a
      contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a personnel
      action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a).      Yunus v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 242 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Mason v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 7 (2011). As noted, the essence of the appellant’s
      argument is that, in reprisal for filing an OIG complaint and making disclosures
      about a lack of proper equipment, lack of security guards, the practice of
      over-prescribing pain medication, and inadequate patient care resulting from
      staffing issues and negligent staff, the agency gave her a unsatisfactory
      performance evaluation and terminated her.    W-1 AF, Tab 1 at 5, Tab 5; RF,
      Tab 3; RPFR File, Tab 1. She also alleges that she exhausted her remedy before
      OSC. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 11. We first address the exhaustion element.

      The appellant proved by preponderant evidence that she exhausted her
      administrative remedy with OSC.
¶11        To satisfy the exhaustion requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an appellant
      must have provided OSC with a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation into
      her allegations of whistleblower reprisal.   Skarada v. Department of Veterans
      Affairs, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 7; Chambers v. Department of Homeland Security,
      2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10.     Generally, exhaustion can be demonstrated through the
      appellant’s OSC complaint, evidence the original complaint was amended
      (including but not limited to OSC’s determination letter and other letters from
      OSC referencing any amended allegations), and the appellant’s written responses
      to OSC.    Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 7; Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 8.
      Alternatively, exhaustion may be proven through other sufficiently reliable
                                                                                            6

      evidence, such as an affidavit or declaration attesting that the app ellant raised
      with OSC the substance of the facts in her appeal. Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 7;
      Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11.
¶12         With the appellant’s initial appeal, she included an August 3, 2015 letter to
      OSC referencing her OSC case file number MA-15-3687 and setting forth her
      reprisal claims for disclosures concerning, among other things, inadequate patient
      care resulting from staffing issues and negligent staff and the lack of basic
      equipment and adequate security. W-1 AF, Tab 1 at 9-15. She also submitted an
      August 27, 2015 close-out letter from OSC for that case, which addressed her
      claims of retaliation. Id. at 16-17. Additionally, following the Board’s Remand
      Order, the appellant attached to her response to the administrative judge’s
      jurisdictional order a copy of a January 17, 2012 letter from OSC concerning a
      complaint docketed as case file number MA-11-2861. RF, Tab 3 at 38. The letter
      discusses some of the allegations regarding her refusal to prescribe pain
      medication to patients whose condition did not warrant a prescription. Id.
¶13         In the remand initial decision, the administrative judge found that OSC’s
      January 17, 2012 letter denying relief in the complaint docketed as MA -11-2861
      revealed that the appellant’s claim with OSC filed in 2011 did not contain
      allegations of whistleblower reprisal.     RID at 6-7.    He also considered OSC’s
      August 27, 2015 close-out letter concerning OSC File No. MA-15-3687 but
      ultimately found that the appellant neither provided a copy of her complaint to
      OSC nor described her allegations of exhaustion in an affidavit, sworn statement,
      or declaration under penalty of perjury. RID at 7-8. Thus, he found that the
      appellant failed to establish the exhaustion requirement. 2

      2
        In making these findings, the administrative judge relied on the Board’s pre -Chambers
      case law, which required the appellant to show by preponderant evidence that she
      informed OSC of the “precise grounds” of her charge of whistleblowing. R ID at 4-5;
      Ward v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 981 F.2d 521, 526 (Fed. Cir. 1992). In
      Chambers, the Board clarified that the substantive requirements of exhaustion are met
      when an appellant has provided OSC with sufficient basis to pursue an investigation
                                                                                        7

¶14        On review, the appellant challenges this finding and asserts that she brought
      all her claims to OSC. RPFR File, Tab 1 at 11. This assertion, made under the
      penalty of perjury, id. at 3, in conjunction with the appellant’s August 3, 2015
      letter to OSC and OSC’s August 27, 2015 close-out letter leads us to conclude
      that she met the exhaustion requirement, see Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11. In
      the August 27, 2015 close-out letter, OSC acknowledged the appellant’s
      allegations that she was retaliated against for making disclosures regarding the
      “lack of equipment, poor assignment of available staff, poor patient care, and the
      absence of security guards.”    W-1 AF, Tab 1 at 17.        It also referenced the
      appellant’s claims regarding the agency’s alleged practi ce of over-prescribing
      pain medication. Id. Additionally, her August 3, 2015 letter to OSC discussed
      her disclosure regarding the negligent treatment of patients and staff due to
      staffing issues, the lack of proper equipment, and the absence of security guards.
      Id. at 12-14. She also stated in the August 3, 2015 letter to OSC that she was also
      retaliated against for filing a complaint with the agency’s OIG. Id. at 13. Based
      on the foregoing, we find that the appellant proved by preponderant evidence and
      through appropriate means that she provided OSC with a sufficient basis to
      pursue an investigation. The appellant’s failure to submit her OSC complaint
      does not change this finding.      See Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 11; Smart
      v. Department of the Army, 98 M.S.P.R. 566, ¶ 10 n.4, aff’d, 157 F. App’x 260
      (Fed. Cir. 2005).
¶15        Because the administrative judge found in the remand decision that the
      appellant failed to exhaust her administrative remedy, he did not consider whether
      she nonfrivolously alleged that she made a protected disclosure under 5 U.S.C.

      and that an appellant may give a more detailed account of their whistleblowing
      activities before the Board than they did to OSC. Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 7;
      Chambers, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10. The remand initial decision in this matter was issued
      prior to the Board’s issuance of Chambers.
                                                                                          8

      § 2302(b)(8) that was a contributing factor in a personnel action. Thus, we do so
      here.

      The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she made protected disclosures under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
¶16           Under the WPA, an appellant makes a protected disclosure when she
      discloses something that she reasonably believes evidences a violation of law,
      rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
      authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health and safety.
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8); Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 17.           The proper test for
      determining whether an employee had a reasonable belief that her disclosures
      were protected is whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the
      essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the employee could
      reasonably conclude that the actions evidence any of the wrongdoing set forth in
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). Id. As set forth above, the appellant asserted that she
      disclosed to agency officials on numerous occasions a lack of basic equipment, a
      lack of security for staff dealing with difficult patients, the practice of some staff
      to over-prescribe pain medication, and inadequate patient care resulting from
      staffing issues and negligent staff.
¶17           Regarding the disclosure concerning the lack of equipment, the appellant
      asserted that she personally observed as soon as she began her position with the
      agency that there was a “lack of basic medical equipment” and that she
      complained to upper management, including the Manager of Nursing and the
      Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff, who was her “[r]eporting [o]fficer” at the time
      about these conditions.      W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 5-6, 12-13, 23-24, 26, 34-35.
      Specifically, she asserted that there was no equipment for serious medical
      emergencies, which resulted in staff summoning an ambulance to take patients to
      other facilities, no stable cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) equipment, no
      equipment to remove a deer tick in a patient, and no equipment to remove
      stitches. Id. at 12-13; RF, Tab 3 at 23-24. Of the categories of wrongdoing set
                                                                                        9

      forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), this disclosure most closely aligns with “a
      substantial and specific danger to public health or safety” because it directly
      impacts the agency’s care for patients.       Notably, regarding the allegation
      concerning the lack of CPR equipment, the nature and harm that could result from
      this lack of equipment is severe because patients could potentially die without the
      proper equipment. See Parikh v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 116 M.S.P.R.
      197, ¶ 15 (2011). Regarding the appellant’s reasonable belief in this disclosure,
      the Board has reasoned that allegations based on a “personal observation” can
      constitute a nonfrivolous allegation that an appellant had a reasonable belief that
      her disclosures evidenced the wrongdoing set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
      See Kinsey v. Department of the Navy, 107 M.S.P.R. 426, ¶ 17 (2007). Based on
      the foregoing, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that, when she
      disclosed the lack of proper medical equipment, she disclosed matters that she
      reasonably believed evidenced a substantial and specific danger to public health
      or safety, and that she, therefore, made a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected
      disclosure in this regard.
¶18         The appellant also alleged that she disclosed a lack of security for staff
      members dealing with difficult patients. Specifically, she asserted that the East
      Campus of CAVHCS had only two security guards assigned to cover its 180 -acre
      campus, and that, in one instance, “two male patients double -teamed [her] for a
      ‘hasty’ prescription refill and travel money.” W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 16. She further
      explained that she “frequently feared for her personal safety” because of the
      inadequate number of security guards to protect from “disgruntled patients who
      physically confronted her.”      Id.    She asserted that she emailed senior
      management, including the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff and the Assistant
      Chief of Staff of Ambulatory Care about these concerns.        Id. at 31.   Of the
      categories of wrongdoing, this allegation most closely aligns with an allegation of
      gross mismanagement.         Gross mismanagement is more than de minimis
      wrongdoing or negligence, and it does not mean action or inaction which
                                                                                          10

      constitutes simple negligence or wrongdoing.        See Smith v. Department of the
      Army, 80 M.S.P.R. 311, ¶ 8 (1998).           Rather, an appellant discloses gross
      mismanagement when she alleges that a management action or inaction creates a
      substantial risk of significant adverse impact on the agency’s ability to
      accomplish its mission. Cassidy v. Department of Justice, 118 M.S.P.R. 74, ¶ 8
      (2012); see Smith, 80 M.S.P.R. 311, ¶ 8.         Here, we construe the appellant’s
      allegation as one asserting that the lack of security guards to protect physicians
      presents the serious risk that physicians may not be able to effectively treat
      patients and carry out the agency’s core mission of caring for veterans.
      Additionally, the appellant has alleged that her belief in this wrongdoing is based
      on her own personal experiences with difficult patients without security guards on
      duty. Based on the foregoing, we find that the appellant nonfrivol ously alleged
      that, when she disclosed the lack of security guards for staff dealing with difficult
      patients, she disclosed conduct that she reasonably believed evidenced gross
      mismanagement, and that she, therefore, made a nonfrivolous allegation of a
      protected disclosure in this regard. See Cassidy, 118 M.S.P.R. 74, ¶ 8; Kinsey,
      107 M.S.P.R. 426, ¶ 17.
¶19         Regarding the appellant’s disclosure concerning some staff’s practice of
      over-prescribing pain medication, she alleged that she disclosed to at least the
      Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff that there was “an illegal ‘pi ll mill’ atmosphere”
      at the CAVHCS. W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 83; RF, Tab 3 at 27. To support her belief in
      this allegation, the appellant asserted that she had witnessed a quantity of pain
      medication passing through one provider with an estimated street value of
      4-5 million dollars annually despite no documented need for such medication.
      W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 22-23, 33, 36. Such an allegation aligns with several categories
      of wrongdoing set forth in section 2302(b)(8), including an abuse of authority, 3 a

      3
        An employee discloses an abuse of authority when she allege s that a Federal official
      has arbitrarily or capriciously exercised power which has adversely affected the rights
      of any person or has resulted in personal gain or advantage to herself or to other
                                                                                        11

      substantial and specific danger to public health and safety, and a violation of law,
      rule, or regulation, as the substance of the appellant’s disclosure raises questions
      regarding whether a Federal official arbitrarily exercised his or her power for
      personal gain or the gain of others, whether a large quantity of pain medication
      would be distributed into the community without authorization, and whether the
      physician and/or others broke any laws, rules, or regulations regarding the
      distribution and use or prescription medications. In any event, the Board does not
      require, as a basis for jurisdiction, that an appellant correctly label a category of
      wrongdoing under the WPA.            See Rzucidlo v. Department of the Army,
      101 M.S.P.R. 616, ¶ 13 (2006).      Further, the appellant again alleged that she
      personally witnessed at least one instance of this practice. W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 22.
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that, when she
      disclosed the purported improper prescribing of pain medication, she was
      disclosing conduct that she reasonably believed evidenced the sort of wrongdoing
      set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8), and that she, therefore, made a nonfrivolous
      allegation of a protected disclosure in this regard. See Kinsey, 107 M.S.P.R. 426,
      ¶ 17.
¶20           The appellant also alleged that she continuously disclosed inadequate
      patient care resulting from staffing issues and negligent staff.           W-1 AF,
      Tab 5 at 34-35. For example, she explained that walk-in patients would not be
      discovered until several hours after their arrival and that some of the few nurses
      on staff would ignore patients in observable distress . RF, Tab 3 at 15, 19, 21.
      She asserted that she constantly disclosed these concerns to the Nurse Manager
      and the Assistant Chief of Staff. Id. at 15. As with the appellant’s disclosure
      regarding the lack of security to deal with difficult patients, we believe this
      allegation is one of gross mismanagement.          Again, an allegation of gross
      mismanagement involves an allegation of management action or inaction which

      preferred persons.   Webb v. Department of the Interior, 122 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 10 n.3
      (2015).
                                                                                      12

      creates a substantial risk of significant adverse impact on the agency’s ability to
      accomplish its mission. Cassidy, 118 M.S.P.R. 74, ¶ 8; see Smith, 80 M.S.P.R.
      311, ¶ 8. Here, the agency’s foremost mission is to provide adequate care for
      veterans. Thus, complaints that management’s decisions regarding staffing and
      its practice of ignoring complaints of inadequate care suggest that the agency
      both engaged and failed to engage in conduct that created a substantial risk of
      adverse impact on the agency’s ability to accomplish its mission. Moreover, the
      appellant’s allegations appear to be based on her personal experiences and
      observations. RF, Tab 3 at 15, 19, 21. Therefore, we find that the appellant
      nonfrivolously alleged that, when she disclosed inadequate patient care and
      management’s refusal to address it, she was disclosing conduct that she
      reasonably believed evidenced gross mismanagement, and that she, therefore,
      made a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected disclosure in this regard.       See
      Cassidy, 118 M.S.P.R. 74, ¶ 8; Kinsey, 107 M.S.P.R. 426, ¶ 17.
¶21         Turning to the appellant’s OIG complaint, she alleges that sometime in
      2011, she filed a complaint with the agency’s OIG regarding her concern about
      physicians over-prescribing pain medication. W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 8. Under the
      WPA, a disclosure to the OIG is protected when the employee making the
      disclosure reasonably believes that the contents of the complaint evidences a
      violation of law, rule, or regulation, gross mismanagement, a gross waste of
      funds, an abuse of authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health
      or safety.   See 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B). Because we already found that the
      appellant nonfrivolously alleged that she reasonably belie ved that she was
      reporting wrongdoing under section 2302(b)(8)(A) when she allegedly disclosed
      her concerns about the over-prescribing of pain medication, see supra ¶ 19, we
      also find that the appellant made a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected
      disclosure under section 2302(b)(8)(B) when she filed her OIG complaint.
                                                                                       13

      The appellant nonfrivolously alleged that the agency took personnel actions
      against her.
¶22         The appellant has alleged that the agency gave her an unsatisfactory
      performance evaluation and terminated her. W-1 AF, Tab 1 at 5. A termination
      and performance evaluation are covered personnel actions under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A)(iii), (viii).   Thus, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously
      alleged that the agency took personnel actions against her.

      The appellant has nonfrivolously alleged that her protected disclosures and OIG
      complaint were a contributing factor in her termination and that her protected
      disclosures were a contributing factor in her unsatisfactory performance
      appraisal, but she failed to nonfrivolously allege that the OIG complaint was a
      contributing factor to the unsatisfactory performance appraisal.
¶23         To satisfy the contributing factor criterion at the jurisdictional stage of an
      IRA appeal, an appellant need only raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the fact of,
      or content of, the protected disclosure was one factor that tended to affect the
      personnel action in any way.      Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 26.       One way to
      establish this criterion is the knowledge/timing test, under which an employee
      may nonfrivolously allege that the disclosure was a contributing factor in a
      personnel action through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the
      official taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure, and that the personnel
      action occurred within a period of time such that a rea sonable person could
      conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel action. Id.
¶24         Addressing the application of the knowledge/timing test to the four alleged
      disclosures to agency managers set forth above, the appellant asserted that the
      “[a]gency officials responsible for the personnel actions . . . were aware of her
      disclosures and acted within such time that a reasonable person could find that the
      disclosures contributed to their egregious actions against her.” RF, Tab 3 at 33.
      Specifically, regarding her unsatisfactory performance appraisal, the appellant
      alleged that the Assistant Chief of Staff of Ambulatory Care rated her
      “Unsatisfactory” in a June 6, 2011 performance evaluation and that he was aware
                                                                                             14

      of her disclosures at that time. Id. at 25, 28; W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 37. Thus, the
      appellant has nonfrivolously alleged that the agency official responsible for this
      personnel action had knowledge of her disclosures, thereby satisfying the
      knowledge prong of the knowing/timing test at the jurisdictional stage.
¶25         Regarding the timing prong of the knowledge/timing test, the appellant
      alleged that she disclosed the lack of basic medical equipment “[s]oon after
      assuming her position” in August of 2010.          W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 34.         She also
      asserted that she disclosed the lack of security for the first time in
      December 2010, W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 12 n.2, the over-prescribing of pain
      medications beginning in late 2010 through at least July 2011, id. at 83; RF,
      Tab 3 at 27, and the inadequate care of patients for the first time in October 2010,
      W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 12 n.2. 4 The Board has explained that personnel actions that
      occur within 1-2 years of a protected disclosure meet the timing prong of the
      knowledge/timing test. Wilson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 7,
      ¶ 41; Mastrullo v. Department of Labor, 123 M.S.P.R. 110, ¶¶ 18, 21 (2015).
      Because these disclosures all occurred within 1 year of the June 6, 2011
      performance appraisal, we find that the appellant’s allegations regarding all four
      disclosures meet the timing prong of the knowledge/timing test. Based on the
      foregoing, we find that the appellant’s allegations satisfy both prongs of the
      knowledge/timing test, and that she has, therefore, nonfrivolously alleged that her
      protected disclosures were a contributing factor to the performance evaluation.
      See Mason, 116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 26
¶26         Turning to the appellant’s termination, we are unable to ascertain from the
      record whether the appellant is alleging that the deciding official had knowledge

      4
        Specifically regarding the appellant’s disclosures about the lack of security and the
      inadequate care of patients, the appellant alleged that the referenced dates represent the
      “first of many complaints,” W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 12 n.2, and her pleadings generally
      suggest that she continually complained of these issues.            For purposes of the
      contributing factor analysis, the last time a disclosure is made prior to the personnel
      action at issue is the relevant date for the timing prong of the knowledge/timing test.
                                                                                            15

      of her disclosures. However, the deciding official explained in t he December 7,
      2011 termination notice that the PSB convened to review the appellant’s conduct
      and performance and recommended that the appellant be separated during her
      probationary period, and the appellant has alleged that the members of the PSB
      had knowledge of her disclosures.        W-1 AF, Tab 1 at 7, 14.         In addition to
      showing actual knowledge, an appellant can also nonfrivolously allege that a
      disclosure was a contributing factor to a personnel action by alleging that the
      official taking the action had constructive knowledge of the disclosure.             See
      Dorney v. Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 11 (2012). An appellant
      may nonfrivolously allege constructive knowledge by alleging that an individual
      with actual knowledge of the disclosure influenced the official accused of taking
      the retaliatory action. See id. Because the appellant has alleged that the members
      of the PSB had knowledge of her disclosures and influenced the agency’s
      decision to terminate her, we find that she nonfrivolously alleged that the
      deciding official had constructive knowledge of her disclosures. 5 As such, the
      appellant’s allegations meet the knowledge prong of the knowledge/timing test.
¶27         Regarding the timing prong, the appellant has alleged that the PSB members
      learned of her disclosures “early on.”       W-1 AF, Tab 1 at 14.        Although this
      allegation is imprecise, we construe allegations liberally in favor of finding
      jurisdiction, given the minimal showing required to meet the nonfrivolous
      standard. See Skarada, 2022 MSPB 17, ¶ 6 (stating that any doubt or ambiguity

      5
        As previously discussed, the appellant alleged that she received an unsatisfactory
      performance appraisal on June 6, 2011, RF, Tab 3 at 25, and that the PSB met in late
      2011 to discuss her conduct and performance, W-1 AF, Tab 11 at 16. Given the
      timeline, it is conceivable that the June 6, 2011 performance appraisal was considered
      as a part of the PSB’s review. As noted above, the appellant has alleged that the
      Assistant Chief of Ambulatory Care—the agency official responsible for the
      performance appraisal—had knowledge of her disclosures. W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 37; RF,
      Tab 3 at 25, 28. Thus, we construe these claims as allegations asserting that the
      Assistant Chief of Ambulatory Care also influenced the agency’s decision to terminate
      the appellant, further supporting the finding that the deciding official had constructive
      knowledge of the appellant’s disclosures.
                                                                                         16

      as to whether the appellant made a nonfrivolous jurisdictional allegation should
      be resolved in favor of finding jurisdiction); Jessup v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 107 M.S.P.R. 1, ¶ 10 (2007) (observing that the appellant’s burden of
      making a nonfrivolous allegation is low and requires only a minimal sufficient
      showing).      Again, the appellant’s employment with the agency began in
      August 2010, and, according to the appellant, the PSB met to discuss her
      performance and conduct on October 31, 2011.          W-1 AF, Tab 1 at 10.         We
      reasonably construe the appellant’s claim that the members of the PSB became
      aware of her disclosures “early on” to at least allege that they became aware of
      them prior to October 31, 2011. The PSB recommended that the agency terminate
      the appellant sometime between October 31, 2011, and December 7, 2011, which
      is within 1-2 years of its members becoming aware of the disclosures. Thus, we
      find that the appellant’s allegations also meet the timing prong of the
      knowledge/timing     test.    Accordingly,    we   find   that   the   appellant   has
      nonfrivolously alleged that her four disclosures were contributing factors in her
      termination.
¶28         Regarding the appellant’s OIG complaint, the record demonstrates that this
      complaint was filed on or around June 23, 2011. W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 80-81. As set
      forth above, the appellant’s unsatisfactory performance appraisal was issued prior
      to the appellant’s OIG complaint, on June 6, 2011. RF, Tab 3 at 25. Given this
      timeline, the appellant’s OIG complaint could not have been a contributing factor
      to the performance appraisal because it occurred after the appraisal.         Mason,
      116 M.S.P.R. 135, ¶ 27 (finding that disclosures occurring after the personnel
      actions at issue could not have been contributing factors in those actions); Orr v.
      Department of the Treasury, 83 M.S.P.R. 117, ¶ 15 (1999) (same), aff’d per
      curiam 232 F.3d 912 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
¶29         Turning to the appellant’s termination, the appellant has not alleged that
      any of the officials involved in that action, including the deciding official and the
      PSB members, were aware of her OIG communications. W-1 AF, Tabs 1, 5; RF,
                                                                                       17

      Tab 3. Thus, she has not alleged facts that would satisfy the knowledge/timing
      test.    If an employee fails to satisfy the knowledge/timing test, the Board
      considers other evidence, such as that pertaining to the strength or weakness of
      the agency’s reasons for taking the actions, whether the whistleblowing was
      personally directed at the proposing or deciding officials, and whether those
      individuals had a desire or motive to retaliate against the appellant. Rumsey v.
      Department of Justice, 120 M.S.P.R. 259, ¶ 26 (2013); Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R.
      480, ¶ 15.
¶30           Regarding the strength or weakness of the agency’s reasons for taking the
      action, the appellant alleges that her termination was based on a recommendation
      from the PSB, which provided four bases for the appellant’s improper conduct
      and inadequate performance. W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 27-28. She further alleges that
      the Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine examined these claims and found her
      “not culpable” in three of them. Id. at 11, 106-130. This at least suggests that the
      agency’s reasons for terminating her were weak.          Regarding whether those
      responsible for the termination had a desire or motive to retaliate against the
      appellant, the general tenor of the appellant’s pleadings is that she believed
      agency management viewed her as a trouble maker who consisten tly complained
      about the state of operations at CAVHCS, for which, at least to some degree, they
      were responsible. W-1 AF, Tab 5 at 4. This again at least suggests that a motive
      to retaliate existed. Although the OIG complaint itself does not appear to be
      directed at any specific individual, we find that, after assessing these factors on
      balance, the appellant has met the low burden at this stage of the proceedings to
      nonfrivolously allege that her OIG complaint was a contributing factor in her
      termination.
¶31           In sum, we find that the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that her four
      protected disclosures were contributing factors in her June 2011 performance
      appraisal and her termination and that her OIG complaint was a contributing
                                                                                   18

      factor in her termination. Therefore, we find that the appellant has established
      the Board’s jurisdiction over those claims.

                                           ORDER
¶32        For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the Atlanta
      Regional Office for adjudication on the merits in accordance with this Remand
      Order.

      FOR THE BOARD:                                   /s/ for
                                                Jennifer Everling
                                                Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.