Court Opinion

ID: 9730490
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:14:00.14037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:06.877323
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM G. CALLOW, J.
(concurring). In this case we are asked to decide when failure to complete restitution constitutes cause for extension of probation under sec. 973.09(3)(a), Stats. Because I believe the majority fails to address this question adequately and fails to give full recognition to victims' rights, I write separately.
When a person is convicted of a crime, sec. 973.09, Stats., "gives the court the discretion to stay the sentence, place the defendant on probation, and impose any conditions which appear reasonable and appropriate." State v. Gerard, 57 Wis. 2d 611, 618-19, 205 N.W.2d 374 (1973). Probation, therefore, is not a matter of right; it is a privilege. Id. at 619. Its purpose is to rehabilitate those convicted of a crime and to protect the state and community interest. Huggett v. State, 83 Wis. 2d 790, 798, 266 N.W.2d 403 (1978).
One permissible and appropriate condition of probation is restitution. Gerard, 57 Wis. 2d at 619. "The old saw 'crime does not pay' should become a legal reality whenever possible. Society and the law should require that the 'criminal shall repay.' . . . [Ejvery reasonable effort should be made to require the defendant to make restitu*505tion and to recognize that victims should not suffer financial loss." Huggett, 83 Wis. 2d at 806 (Callow, J., dissenting). This must apply when the victim is an individual, as in a robbery case, and when the victim is society, as in a welfare fraud case.
We noted in Huggett that by imposing restitution as a condition of probation, a court "can aid an offender's rehabilitation by strengthening the individual's sense of responsibility. The probationer may learn to consider more carefully the consequences of his or her actions." Id. at 798. A probationer who successfully completes probation and makes restitution will have earned society's respect and will have tangible evidence of his or her ability to alter old behavior patterns and to lead a law-abiding life. Id. By imposing restitution as a condition of probation, the court also can further the community's interest in having the victims of crimes made financially whole. Id.
In determining the amount of restitution, however, the court should not establish a restitution obligation which exceeds the probationer's ability to pay. Id. at 797. An excessive restitution requirement may not serve the rehabilitative function of probation. Establishing a goal which cannot be met creates frustration rather than instilling in the probationer a sense of responsibility. In addition, an excessive restitution obligation can create problems for the court. Á court can expect that a probationer saddled with an excessive restitution obligation will fail to complete restitution during the initial term of probation, forcing the court to decide the question of probation extension, or provoking the probation department to attempt revocation of probation. We addressed this question several years ago in Huggett, and we are asked to address it again in this case.
The probationer in Huggett pleaded guilty to theft for receiving over $6,000 in public assistance funds, while neglecting to report income as required by statute. Id. at 791-92. The trial court imposed a five-year sentence but *506stayed execution of the sentence and placed Huggett on probation for five years. Id. at 792. "The only condition of probation specified in the trial court's judgment was that she 'make payments in such manner as the Department of Health and Social Services shall direct as follows: Restitution: $6,473.96; costs: $59.00.'" Id.
Shortly before the end of the five-year probationary period, Huggett signed a waiver form. The form was entitled "Waiver of Court Appearance and Order of Court," and "was intended to fulfill the statutory requirement that a court may, for cause, order extension of probation." Id. at 793-94. In Huggett's case, the "cause" for extending probation was her failure to fulfill her restitution obligation. In nearly five years of probation, Huggett had repaid only $675. Id. at 795. The court order extended Huggett's probation for two years. Id. at 794.
Six months into the extended probation period, Hug-gett was charged as an absconder. She waived her probation revocation hearing. Her probation was revoked in February, 1976. Shortly thereafter she began serving her five-year sentence. Id. at 795.
Huggett moved for postconviction relief. The trial court denied relief, concluding "that Huggett waived her appearance at the extension hearing and that the revocation of probation 'was for rule violations other than for failure to pay restitution.'" Id.
On appeal, we concluded "that the real controversy . . . has not been fully tried, namely whether the trial court had cause to extend probation. . . . [T]he issue is whether Huggett's failure to make full restitution was adequate cause for extension." Id. at 802. Even though Hug-gett had signed a waiver form, had never requested a hearing to modify the restitution requirement, and had paid only $675 of the amount she owed in restitution, this court concluded that the record did not adequately document the existence of "cause." Accordingly, the court re*507manded the case for a hearing to determine whether there was cause to extend probation.
I dissented in Huggett for two reasons. First, I believed the majority's holding would be detrimental to indigent defendants. When the trial court imposes restitution as a condition of probation, I said "[t]he trial judge and the defendant should . . . anticipate that the defendant's failure to meet the restitution condition of probation will likely result in revocation of probation and a return of the defendant to court for the imposition of the [prescribed sentence]." Id. at 805. By creating a rule which allows defendants who are unable to fulfill their restitution obligations to be released from probation, the Huggett majority essentially reduced the probability that the sentence would be imposed and reduced a major incentive for fulfillment of restitution. This approach discourages trial judges from granting probation in some circumstances. For example, a trial judge likely will grant probation conditioned upon restitution to a wealthy defendant whose ability to pay is certain. A trial judge likely will not grant probation conditioned upon restitution to an indigent defendant whose ability to pay is suspect, however, because under the reasoning of Huggett the defendant can escape serving any sentence even if the defendant fails to fulfill the restitution obligation by demonstrating other evidence of rehabilitation.
Second, I dissented because I believed the defendant should have the burden of asserting that the restitution which the court establishes exceeds the defendant's ability to pay. I said,
"[when] the defendant requests probation at the time of sentencing and accepts restitution as a condition of probation, restitution [should] be presumed to be within the ability of the defendant to pay until the defendant petitions the court for a hearing on the reasonableness of the order for restitution.... If the defendant chooses to consent to an extension of probation *508because the restitution condition . . . has not been met, the court may approve the extension without hearing." Id. at 806.
Shortly after our decision in Huggett, the legislature addressed the issue and modified the statutes relating to restitution as a condition of probation. Two changes are particularly relevant to the majority and dissenting opinions in Huggett. First, the legislature added sec. 973.09(3)(b), Stats., which provides in relevant part that "[a] probationer shall not be discharged from probation until payment of the ordered restitution . . . has been made or the court determines that there is substantial reason not to continue to require payment." This language specifically qualifies the language of sec. 973.09(3)(a), which served as a basis for the majority decision in Huggett. Section 973.09(3)(a) states: "Prior to the expiration of any probation period, the court, for cause and by order, may extend probation for a stated period or modify the terms and conditions thereof." While the majority in Huggett read sec. 973.09(3)(a) to presume probation should cease and to place a burden on the state to show cause for extending probation, sec. 973.09(3)03) specifically directs that probation should be extended unless the probationer can prove there is substantial reason not to continue to require payment. This modification demonstrates the legislature's increased emphasis on a victim's right to compensation and a defendant's fulfillment of the restitution obligation.
Second, the legislature added sec. 973.09(lm)(a), Stats., which provides that "[i]n determining the amount and method of payment of restitution, the court shall consider the financial resources and future ability of the probationer to pay. The court may provide for payment of restitution to the victim up to but not in excess of the pecuniary loss caused by the offense." While this section also provides that the court could order payment of costs, the *509legislature recognized the importance of restitution by saying: "The court shall consider the interest of the victim in receiving restitution when determining whether to order payment of costs." Id. To facilitate restitution we often have emphasized that trial courts should determine a probationer's ability to pay when imposing restitution. See Huggett, 83 Wis. 2d at 800; State v. Gerard, 57 Wis. 2d at 621. Because the legislature now has placed increased emphasis on restitution, the importance of a court's initial determination of the appropriate amount of restitution has increased as well. The enactment of sec. 973.09(1m)(a) demonstrates the legislature's awareness of the importance of the initial restitution determination.
Taken together, secs. 973.09(1m)(a) and 973.09(3)(b), Stats., alleviate many of the concerns I expressed in my dissent in Huggett. Under sec. 973.09(1m)(a), the court must consider the defendant's financial resources and future ability to pay when imposing restitution. A presen-tence investigation report to the court should set forth the defendant's financial situation, and the state and defendant should be prepared to offer to the court a realistic restitution proposal. As an alternative, in the absence of a presentence report and recommendations by the parties, if the trial court establishes restitution as a condition of probation, the court should direct the probationer and the probation officer to return to the court within thirty days with a proposed payment plan which is feasible in light of the probationer's present and future ability to pay. The report should be made available to the state and to the victim. If the sum of the proposed payments for the entire term of probation appears insufficient to fulfill the restitution which the court previously assessed, the court could modify the amount of restitution, or could indicate that it will utilize the statutory provisions for extension, depending upon the defendant's financial circumstances at the end of the probationary period. Because the probationer is involved in structuring a feasible payment plan, *510it makes sense that under sec. 973.09(3)(b) the probation should be extended if restitution is not completed according to the plan, unless the probationer establishes substantial reason for discontinuing payment.
This prospective approach serves the interests of the victim, the probationer, and society. The victim receives restitution, the probationer develops responsibility, and society does not have to incarcerate the defendant. Further, it treats all defendants equitably, regardless of their wealth, offering indigent defendants the same opportunity for probation as wealthy defendants. By working together with this prospective approach, the probation officer, the trial judge, and the probationer can avoid the miscommunication, evidenced in this case and in Huggett, which can result in subsequent extensions of probation, release from probation prior to fulfillment of restitution, or revocation of probation.
Turning to the instant case, the facts are similar to those in Huggett. In 1975 Davis was found guilty of welfare fraud. She was placed on probation for five years, with probation conditioned upon her payment of $1,467 in restitution, in the manner directed by the Department of Health and Social Services (Department). When Davis failed to satisfy her restitution obligation in the five-year probationary period, the court extended her probation for one year. When Davis still had not completed payments, the court extended her probation for two more years. Finally, in 1983, after eight years had expired, the court extended Davis's probation for two more years, again noting that she had not fulfilled her restitution obligation. This appeal focuses on the trial court's most re ‘ent decision to extend probation for two years.
Although the facts of this case are similar to those in Huggett, the question we must answer here was left unanswered in Huggett: When is failure to complete restitution cause for extending probation under sec. 973.09(3)(a), Stats.? The majority opinion fails to address this question *511adequately, making only occasional references to factors which might affect the cause analysis.
To determine whether failure to complete restitution is cause for extending probation under sec. 973.09(3)(a), Stats., the majority should return to Huggett The Hug-gett majority concluded that the issue of "cause" for extension of probation had not been fully tried, and remanded the matter for a hearing to determine whether there was cause to extend probation. In dicta, the Huggett majority described two possible approaches for determining whether cause exists. Under the first approach, a court may find cause for extending probation if additional restitution would promote the objectives of probation and if the probationer can make more than negligible payments. Using the second approach, a court may not find cause if the probationer lacks the capacity to pay and has demonstrated a good faith effort to pay during probation.
In its opinion in this case, the majority does not use either of these approaches with any degree of clarity. Apparently focusing on the first approach, the majority makes reference to several facts from which it concludes that further restitution will not promote the objectives of probation because the restitution already paid sufficiently promoted the objectives of probation. Shifting to the second approach, which it quotes on page 16 of the slip opinion, the majority highlights several facts which purportedly demonstrate Davis's good faith effort to repay the debt, but neglects to mention that Davis still possesses the capacity to pay more than negligible amounts toward restitution and, in fact, offered to execute a wage assignment.
Purportedly applying sec. 973.09(3)(b), Stats., the majority also concludes that the trial court's extension of probation constitutes an abuse of discretion because the extension was intended solely to assure that the probationer would complete restitution and because the record "teems with substantial reasons" for discontinuing pay*512ments. I disagree with both rationales. First, the statute clearly directs courts to extend probation to assure that probationers complete restitution. Second, I do not believe the record "teems with substantial reasons" for discontinuing payments. Rather, I believe reasonable persons could disagree about whether Davis made a good faith effort to complete restitution.1
The majority not only fails to address adequately the question of "cause," it also ignores the legislature's enactment of sec. 973.09(3)(b), Stats., when it declares "the criminal justice system should not be employed to perform the functions of a collection agency," Majority opinion at p. 497, and concludes that this case is "of significant precedential importance ... because it demonstrates the improper use of the criminal process to collect what eventually became no more than a civil debt." Majority opinion at p. 499. The struggle to gain legislative and judicial recognition of victims' rights has made substantial progress. The majority's assertion that victims must seek a civil remedy deals victims' rights a severe blow and defies legislative directive and common sense. The enactment of sec. 973.09(3)(b), with its presumption that probation should continue until restitution is complete, demonstrates that the legislature intends to use the criminal justice system to make criminals pay monetary restitution to the victims of their crimes. The majority of the court may not believe this is an appropriate use of state resources, but that is a legislative decision, not a judicial decision. Further, extending probation because a defendant has failed to complete restitution does not violate any constitutional prohibitions. "Indeed, such an extension appears to *513have been contemplated by the Supreme Court when it required that alternative [s] [to incarceration] be considered, specifically, 'extending the time for payments.' [Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983)]." See United States v. Ortiz, 733 F.2d 1416, 1418 (10th Cir. 1984).
In this case the trial court imposed restitution in the amount of $1,467. Although our case law, even prior to sec. 973.09(1m)(a), Stats., instructed judges to assess a probationer's ability to pay and to impose a feasible payment plan, neither the trial court nor the Department assessed whether Davis had the financial capability to satisfy payment of this amount during the five-year period of probation. Davis admittedly made only nominal payments during the early years of probation, but during that period she was absent from work twice for maternity leave. She testified that the Department never told her to pay more toward her obligation. It was not until 1980 that the probation authorities attempted to determine the amount Davis could afford to pay in light of her income and her expenses.
I believe cause exists for extending probation whenever a probationer fails to complete restitution and has the capacity to continue to make restitution payments. In this case Davis clearly possessed the capacity to make further restitution. I also believe, however, that restitution is an inadequate condition of probation as a matter of law when the trial court fails to specify a reasonable payment plan. Clarity is fundamental to any payment plan. Trial courts should structure feasible payment plans and clearly explain the requirements of the plan to the probationer so that all parties have the same expectations. When a trial court delegates its authority to formulate a reasonable payment plan to the probation authorities, the trial court should not discipline the probationer for resulting ambiguities and misunderstandings. Davis's failure to complete the required restitution during her *514initial term of probation was attributable largely to the failure of the court and the Department to establish a structured payment plan, compatible with her ability to pay, through which she could satisfy her restitution obligation. Because the trial court failed to delineate a reasonable payment plan, restitution was an inadequate condition of probation, and Davis's failure to complete restitution cannot be cause for extending her probation even though she has the ability to continue payments. Accordingly, I concur.
I am authorized to state that Justice DONALD W. STEINMETZ joins in this concurring opinion.

 According to the majority, the record clearly showed that Davis was paying the maximum possible toward restitution. See majority opinion at p. 496. The record indicates, however, that Davis was contributing $100 per month to church. Although charitable giving is meritorious, it is substantially less meritorious when the contribution is made from funds which rightfully belong to another.