Court Opinion

ID: 9697306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:12:36.958577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:31.317953
License: Public Domain

Jacobs, J., joined by Burling, J.
(dissenting). Our courts may no longer view judicial trials simply as contests to be played strictly according to rules and they may no longer direct new trials for harmless procedural violations. In civil cases they are now governed by the modern concept embodied in R. R. 1:5-3 (6) which unequivocally provides that a new trial may not be granted unless denial of the application therefor “appears to the court to be inconsistent with substantial justice.” However, as Meszaros v. Gransamer, 23 N. J. 179 (1957), points out and as the result reached by the majority vividly illustrates, R. R. 1:5-3(6) may become meaningless if it is implemented by a narrow or hostile judicial approach. It seems to me that fair regard for R. R. 1:5-3(6) and its enlightened test of substantial justice dictates affirmance of the judgment entered below.
When originally interrogated, the prospective jurors were told that the ease involved an “automobile accident” in which the plaintiff Constance Wright suffered injuries, and when counsel for the defendants inquired whether any jurors or close family members had been “involved in an accident out of which lawsuit arose” five jurors, including Mr. Shibla, raised their hands — they were later joined by a sixth juror. Mr. Shibla stated that his mother had a matter “three or four years ago” but “she was not injured. It was property damage.” He evidently thought that the question was confined to automobile accident cases and he did not mention that his mother had a pending case for personal injuries resulting from a fall on a slippery floor in a shoe store. One of the other jurors stated that his brother had a case against a railroad for a broken foot and that it had not yet been settled; two of the jurors stated that they had matters which were no longer pending; and the remaining two jurors were *298not asked any questions at all about the matter despite the fact that the court specifically pointed out to counsel that they had raised their hands. None of the jurors was challenged or excused because of any suggested connection with other lawsuits. After the discharge of the first jury and the selection of a new jury, which also included Mr. Shibla, there was omnibus questioning (as indicated in the majority opinion) which brought no response from any of the jurors. See State v. Grillo, 16 N. J. 103 (1954).
The jury duly returned its verdict for the plaintiffs; it was unanimous, though five-sixths would have sufficed. See N. J. S. 2A :80-2. Later, Mr. Shibla was interrogated by the trial judge. He explained that the introductory remarks of counsel related to an automobile accident case and it seemed to him that “automobile accident and accident were used synonymously”; that his mother’s case against the storekeeper had not entered his mind; that he and one othéx juror had voted for the defendants on the first two or three polls; and that although he was dead set against a plaintiffs’ verdict for a while, he eventually went along. The trial judge found that Mr. Shibla had a “straightforward attitude” and sincerely believed that “the questions were directed to automobile accident cases only.” Although not called to be present when the trial judge interrogated Mr. Shibla, counsel for the defendants, at oral argument, expressly disavowed any suggestion that Mr. Shibla had intentionally misled him. Nor did he at any time take any steps to establish that there was any bias or harm, or that Mr. Shibla’s report as to his participation in the jury’s deliberations and particularly as to how the voting actually went in the jury room was not in every respect accurate. See State v. Kociolek, 20 N. J. 92 (1955). Instead, his position has been that since the literal falsity of Mr. Shibla’s answer may have led him into not exercising a peremptory challenge there was prejudicial error per se. This contention is not only in direct opposition to the very terms and purposes of B. B. 1:5-3(5) but seems *299to be in conflict with the great weight of authority throughout the country. See Springdale Park v. Andriotis, 30 N. J. Super. 257, 265 (App. Div. 1954); Maher v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., 290 Ill. App. 267, 8 N. E. 2d 512 (1937); Pearson v. Gardner Cartage Co., 148 Ohio St. 425, 76 N. E. 2d 67 (1947); O’Brien v. Vandalia Bus Lines, 351 Mo. 500, 173 S. W. 2d 76 (1943). See also Annotation, “Effect of juror’s false or erroneous answer on voir dire in personal injury or death action as to previous claims or actions for damages by himself or his family,” 38 A. L. R. 2d 624 (1954), where many of the cases are collected and summarized :
“It is generally recognized that a false answer on voir dire which has the effect of depriving counsel of the opportunity to make a proper determination of whether to exercise the right to challenge a juror will not in itself require the granting of a new trial. The courts are almost all agreed that to justify a new trial it must appear that the party seeking it has been prejudiced in his case by the false answers.” 38 A. L. R. 2d, at page 627.
In Maher v. New York, C. & St. L. R. Co., supra [290 Ill. App. 267, 8 N. E. 2d 515], the court declined to upset a verdict where a juror had misstated that no member of his family had been involved in personal injury cases; in the course of its opinion it said:
“In the instant case, as in all eases, ‘the rule of reason’ must constantly be kept in mind. Judgments are not reversed for every error that appears in the record. If this were so, few, if any, would be permitted to stand. But we think the true test in the case at bar is not whether the prospective juror answered truthfully and fully the questions put to him, but, has the petitioner been prejudiced in the case? Swan v. Boston Store, 191 Ill. App. 84; Pienta v. Chicago City Ry. Co., 208 Ill. App. 309; Edwall v. Chicago R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 208 Ill. App. 489; Raub v. Carpenter, 187 U. S. 159, 23 S. Ct. 72, 47 L. Ed. 119; U. S. v. Rosenstein, 2 Cir., 34 F. (2d) 630; O’Brien v. Gen. Accident, etc., Corp., 8 Cir., 42 F. (2d) 48; James v. State, 68 Ark. 464, 60 S. W. 29; State v. Cleary, 40 Kan. 287, 19 P. 776; State v. Brown, 114 Kan. 452, 219 P. 279; Schmidt v. Rose, 6 Mo. App. 579; Hayes v. Thompson, N. Y., 15 Abb. Prac., N. S., 220; Burden v. Stephens, 174 Okl. 312, *30049 P. (2d) 1098; Suggs v. State, 46 Okl. Cr. 340, 285 P. 985; Sansouver v. Glenlyon Dye Works, 28 R. I. 539, 68 A. 545; Leeper v. State, 29 Tex. App. 63, 14 S. W. 398; Goad v. State, 106 Tenn. 175, 61 S. W. 79; Beck v. Thompson, 31 W. Va. 459, 7 S. E. 447, 13 Am. St. Rep. 870.”
The uncontroverted circumstances establish that Mr. Shibla’s statement, though inadvertently inaccurate, was not actually harmful or prejudicial and in nowise impaired the complete fairness of the trial nor the justness of the verdict. If the controlling test of substantial justice is to have any significant meaning, then the course which should be taken in the instant matter seems reasonably clear. See Meszaros v. Gransamer, supra:
“Throughout history the ever present goal has been to attain a better system of justice which affords to every person a fair, inexpensive and speedy trial, unshackled by needless technicality and formalism. This goal is frustrated by every new trial for a procedural error which did not impair the fairness of the first trial nor the justness of the original verdict. In this day there should be ready recognition of the absence of justification for such new trial except in the unusual instance where it is really essential to insure future observance of a prescribed practice safeguard or the vindication of a fundamental principle. It will not suffice that we have solemnly set forth in a formal practice rule (R. R. 1:5-3(6)) that a new trial will not be granted ‘unless a denial of the relief sought appears to the court to be inconsistent with substantial justice’ ; as Professor Sunderland properly pointed out almost 30 years ago, we must go further and always interpret and apply the rule with sympathetic understanding that trial procedure is not the end in itself but is merely the vehicle for attaining justice:
‘The problem of prejudicial error is a problem in professional psychology. No rules can be framed which will solve it, for rules can only be drawn in general terms, and it is in the interpretation of the rules that the difficulty comes * * * The only permanent and effective cure for technicality in this respect is a better conception of the purpose of all procedure. In England in the year 1924 not a single case from the King’s Bench Division was reversed for error in admitting or excluding evidence. That simple fact explains why the intricacies of practice no longer annoy the English lawyer. And it explains the success of the whole judicial establishment. Procedure has become a practical means to an end. Its rules are no more exacting than efficiency requires. * * * Every judgment which is reversed merely because obtained contrary to rules, shows a failure of the courts to serve the main purpose of *301their existence.’ Sunderland, ‘The Problem of Appellate Review,’ 5 Texas L. Rev. 126, 146 (1927), as quoted in 7 Moore, supra, at 1002.”
I would affirm.
For reversal — Chief Justice Vanderbilt, and Justices Heher, Oliphant, Wachenfeld and Weintraub. — 5.
For affirmance — Justices Burling and Jacobs — 2.