Court Opinion

ID: 9526409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:16:59.785054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:19:43.072934
License: Public Domain

RUCKER, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In a case in which dealing in a controlled substance is charged, the State bears the burden of proving the substance sold is a proscribed drug within the applicable statutory definition. Willis v. State (1988), Ind.App., 528 N.E.2d 486. In my view, the State has failed to carry its burden.
First, I have no problem with the trial court admitting into evidence State's Exhibit Number 8, two vials which were purported to contain Valium brand Diazepam. Admission of exhibits into evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and we will reverse only upon a showing of abuse. Minnick v. State (1989), Ind., 544 N.E.2d 471, reh. denied. Where, as here, a proper foundation has been laid and the evidence is reasonably connected to the defendant and the offense to which defendant has been charged, then no abuse of discretion exists. See Maxwell v. State (1980), Ind.App., 408 N.E.2d 158. However, in my view, the trial court erred by allowing the chemist to give an opinion concerning the contents of the vials.
Unlike the majority, I am unpersuaded by cases from other jurisdictions which hold or suggest that visual examination of a package containing a suspected controlled substance is sufficient to prove the contents of the package. Cases from our own jurisdiction do not support the majority's view. For example, in Slettvet v. State (1972), 258 Ind. 312, 280 N.E.2d 806, Slettvet, the defendant, was convicted of possession of a dangerous drug, Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD). At trial, the only evidence of the drug's identity was the testimony of the wife of the person to whom Slettvet had sold the alleged drugs. Her testimony concerned her husband's apparent physical reaction to the consumption of pills alleged to have contained LSD and that the pills were known as "purple haze acid." This evidence was deemed insufficient to prove that the substance was LSD because the witness had no experience with drugs. Our supreme court indicated:
The State contends that proof of the nature of the substance can be proved by circumstantial evidence and we agree with this contention. (Cit. omit.) However, when the drugs themselves are not placed into evidence and there is no expert testimony based on a chemical analysis, then there must be testimony of someone sufficiently experienced with the drug indicating that the substance was indeed a dangerous drug.
Slettvet, 258 Ind. at 316, 280 N.E.2d at 808.
In this case, although the vials were properly introduced into evidence, there was no expert testimony based on chemical analysis indicating the contents of the vials were indeed dangerous drugs. More importantly, the chemist's opinion concerning the contents of the vials was unrelated to her skill, training and experience with drugs. When examined by the defense the chemist admitted she did not know what was in the vials. Record at 110. Rather, the chemist's opinion rested solely upon her visual examination of the vials which were labeled "Valium" and revealed no signs of tampering or alteration. This visual observation required no expert training; rather, it required little more than the ability to read and is not the type of "testimony of someone sufficiently experienced with the drug indicating that the substance was indeed a dangerous drug" anticipated in Slettvet, supra. There was no evidence here the manufacturer properly labeled the vials and indeed the vials very well could have contained nothing more than water.
In Copeland v. State (1982), Ind.App., 430 N.E.2d 393 the defendant was convict *671ed of two counts of dealing in Hydromor-phine, a narcotic. On appeal, Copeland challenged one of the counts on the grounds of insufficient evidence, namely: the only evidence identifying the alleged drug was the testimony of a drug addict who identified the substance by sight and did not inject, inhale, or ingest the substance. We reversed Copeland's conviction on the challenged count indicating our examination of relevant case authority failed to reveal a conviction being sustained by merely visual identification alone. In that case we held "there must be some evidence establishing the distinguishable characteristics of the substance. To hold otherwise would seriously infringe upon the defendant's presumption of innocence and the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." Copeland, supra, at 396.
In my view, the mandate of Slettvet and Copeland is clear. In order to sustain a conviction for an offense which requires proof of the identity of a drug there must be either expert testimony based on chemical analysis or testimony by one with sufficient experience with the drug. In the latter instance the opinion testimony must be based on a witness' physiological reaction to the drug. Here, there was no such testimony.
Absent the opinion testimony of the chemist, the remaining evidence before the trial court is not sufficient to sustain Morris' conviction. The majority takes the opposite view and places tremendous significance on Morris' trial testimony which, according to the majority, amounts to a "judicial admission" that she delivered Diazep-am to Penman.
Under the circumstances of this case, Morris' testimony at best can be viewed as little more than lay opinion concerning the contents of the vials. As discussed above, such testimony without more is insufficient to sustain a conviction for an offense which requires the State to prove the existence of a controlled substance beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in order to avoid the risk of convicting someone of a crime to which he or she has allegedly confessed, but which never occurred, a confession must be excluded unless the State introduces corroborating evidence establishing the corpus delicti. - This requires independent evidence, apart from the admission, that a criminal offense was committed. Clark v. State (1987), Ind.App., 512 N.E.2d 223.
For the reasons set forth I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.