Court Opinion

ID: 9353085
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 21:02:24.697199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:07:30.695470
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/10/23 Wilgenbusch v. Metalclad Insulation CA1/3

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

         IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 RONALD WILGENBUSCH et al.,
             Plaintiffs and Respondents,
                                                                        A161916
 v.
 METALCLAD INSULATION LLC.,                                             (Alameda County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. RG19029791)
             Defendant and Appellant.

         Metalclad Insulation LLC appeals from a judgment awarding damages
to Ronald and Judith Wilgenbusch for personal injury resulting from
Ronald’s exposure to asbestos during his military career.1 The judgment
holds Metalclad negligent and strictly liable for Ronald’s injury, and includes
an award of noneconomic damages totaling $542,500, which represents the
percentage of responsibility for Ronald’s injury that the jury attributed to
Metalclad (7 percent) plus the percentage of responsibility assigned to two
other entities that manufactured Metalclad’s asbestos products (12 percent
each).

         We use given names to distinguish between the respondents and
         1

refer to them collective as the Wilgenbuschs. On June 1, 2022, this court
granted the Wilgenbuschs’ motion for substitution of Judith as successor in
interest to Ronald, who has passed away. (Code Civ. Proc., § 377.31.)

                                                               1
      On appeal, Metalclad contends the judgment must be vacated and
remanded with directions to reduce the noneconomic damages award to
Metalclad’s proportionate share of fault (i.e., 7 percent) pursuant to
Proposition 51. (Civ. Code, § 1431.1–1431.5; statutory references are to this
code, unless another statute is cited.) The trial court found otherwise,
applying the rule that Metalclad is strictly liable for noneconomic damages
caused by manufacturers of the defective products in Metalclad’s chain of
distribution. (Arena v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th
1178, 1198 (Arena).) We affirm.
                    OVERVIEW OF LEGAL PRINCIPLES
      In 1986, California voters passed Proposition 51 in order to ameliorate
inequities that can arise by applying the common law joint and several
liability doctrine to hold a defendant liable for damages attributable to a
more culpable joint tortfeasor. (See Schreiber v. Lee (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th
745, 751–757 (Schreiber).) Section 1431.2, enacted by Proposition 51,
provides: “In any action for personal injury . . . based upon principles of
comparative fault, the liability of each defendant for non-economic damages
shall be several only and shall not be joint. Each defendant shall be liable
only for the amount of non-economic damages allocated to that defendant in
direct proportion to that defendant’s percentage of fault, and a separate
judgment shall be rendered against that defendant for that amount.”
(§ 1431.2, subd. (a).)
      “Thus, in an action subject to Proposition 51, each tortfeasor remains
jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for economic damages, but is liable
to the plaintiff for only its proportionate share of noneconomic damages.”
(Garcia v. Duro Dyne Corp. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 92, 102.) “ ‘With respect
to these noneconomic damages, the plaintiff alone now assumes the risk that

                                        2
a proportionate contribution cannot be obtained from each person responsible
for the injury.’ ” (Henry v. Superior Court (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 440, 450.)
“However, even in cases seeking recovery for personal injury, property
damage, or wrongful death, there are some contexts in which Proposition 51
does not limit a defendant’s liability for noneconomic damages” because the
defendant’s liability is not based on fault but some other policy or legal
principle. (Schreiber, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 753.)
      In strict liability actions, for example, courts do not always apply
Proposition 51. Wholly aside from Proposition 51, our Supreme Court has
held that comparative fault principles apply when apportioning liability
between a strictly liable party and a negligent party. (See e.g., Daly v.
General Motors Corp. (1978) 20 Cal.3d 725, 736–737; Safeway Stores, Inc. v.
Nest-Kart (1978) 21 Cal.3d 322, 330.) But when a plaintiff’s injury is
attributable to a single defective product, courts have declined to apply
Proposition 51 to apportion liability based on fault among tortfeasors in the
product’s chain of distribution. (Wimberly v. Derby Cycle Corp. (1997) 56
Cal.App.4th 618 (Wimberly); Bostick v. Flex Equipment Co., Inc. (2007) 147
Cal.App.4th 80, 88–89.)
      Metalclad intimates that Wimberly and Bostick create a conflict in the
law by holding that Proposition 51 does not apply in strict liability cases,
notwithstanding our Supreme Court’s directive that comparative fault
principles do apply in strict liability cases. However, as Division One of this
court has explained, these two lines of authority are not inconsistent. (Arena,
supra, 63.App.4th at p. 1193.) Arena, a strict liability case involving
asbestos-related personal injuries, holds that Proposition 51 requires
“apportionment (when supported by the evidence), of noneconomic damages
between separate products which have caused a plaintiff’s injuries,” but

                                        3
“defendants who are within the same chain of distribution of a single product
remain jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for the harm caused by that
product.” (Ibid.)
      In the present appeal, both parties rely on Arena, but they disagree
about how it should be applied. We agree that Arena is the controlling
precedent and are persuaded by its reasoning, which effectuates a
“compromise between the inherently contradictory policies of strict products
liability, which protects the plaintiff at the expense of a deep-pockets
defendant, and Proposition 51, which protects the defendant from paying
more than its share of noneconomic damages.” (Arena, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1193.; see id. at pp. 1195–1197 [harmonizing Wimberly, supra, 56
Cal.App.4th 618]; see also Wilson v. John Crane, Inc. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th
847, 852–853 (Wilson) [following Arena].) As we will explain, applying Arena
leads us to affirm the judgment.
                                BACKGROUND
I.    The Wilgenbuschs’ Claims and Trial Theories
      In August 2019, the Wilgenbuschs filed this action for personal injury
and loss of consortium, alleging that Ronald developed mesothelioma caused
by exposure to asbestos. Ronald’s alleged exposure occurred during his
service in the U.S. Navy from 1956 through 1978, while working on ships
that underwent repairs at shipyards in San Diego, Long Beach, Seattle, and
Pearl Harbor. Metalclad and multiple other entities were named as
“ ‘Product Defendants,’ ” based on allegations that they were engaged in the
business of placing asbestos-containing products into the stream of commerce
during the period of Ronald’s exposure. The Wilgenbuschs’ claims included
causes of action for negligence and strict products liability.

                                        4
      In July 2020, this case was called for trial. By the time the jury was
empaneled, Metalclad was the only remaining defendant. The Wilgenbuschs
pursued four theories of liability: (1) strict liability for a product defect;
(2) strict liability for failure to warn; (3) negligence based on a failure to
warn; and (4) negligence for failure to recall or retrofit a defective product.
      At trial, Ronald testified that while serving on ships during his Naval
career, he observed repair work that involved the removal and installation of
insulation. Ronald did not know the brand name or manufacturer of these
insulation products, but he recalled seeing the name “Metalclad” stenciled in
red on boxes that contained new insulation.
      Other trial evidence showed that Metalclad sold asbestos insulation
from at least 1946 until the end of 1973. Prior to 1967, Metalclad sold
“Kaylo” brand asbestos insulation manufactured by Owens Corning Fiberglas
(Owens Corning). After 1967, Metalclad switched to asbestos insulation
manufactured by Fiberboard under the brand name Pabco (Pabco).
II.   Jury Instructions Regarding Allocating Harm
      On September 16, 2020, after the close of evidence, the court held a
hearing to discuss jury instructions. The Wilgenbuschs requested that the
court instruct the jury Metalclad could not allocate fault for harm caused by
asbestos-containing products it sold to the manufacturers of those products.
Metalclad objected, arguing that this “single product rule,” which prevents
shifting of fault within the chain of distribution, applies only to strict
liability; it does not apply to negligence, so Metalclad had a right under
Proposition 51 to “shift fault based on negligence to others in the chain of
distribution of the products that it distributed.” Accordingly, Metalclad
proposed a special verdict form that would require the jury to allocate

                                          5
responsibility for Ronald’s injury among several entities, including Owens
Corning and Pabco.
       After extensive argument, the court ruled that because the
Wilgenbuschs were alleging negligence as well as strict liability, Metalclad
had a right to claim comparative negligence. Therefore, Owens Corning and
Pabco would be included on a list of entities among which the jury would be
asked to allocate responsibility for Ronald’s injury, and the court would give a
revised version of the special instruction proposed by the Wilgenbuschs,
which would state that Metalclad cannot allocate strict liability fault to the
manufacturers of products its sold.
       On September 17, the trial court instructed the jury.2 After instructing
regarding general principles of law, the court turned to “the specific claims in
this case and the standards that apply to those claims.” The court defined
the basic standard of care under negligence law and instructed the jury
regarding the rule that a defendant cannot avoid responsibility for its own
negligence just because some other factor was a substantial cause of harm.
Then it gave separate instructions addressing each of the plaintiffs’ theories
of liability.
       After the jury was instructed regarding the elements of plaintiffs’ two
strict liability theories, the court addressed Metalclad’s defenses. Metalclad
claimed first that Ronald’s own negligence contributed to his harm. The
court instructed that if Metalclad proved this defense, Ronald’s damages
would be reduced by the jury’s “determination of the percentage of [Ronald’s]

       2The Appellant’s Appendix contains copies of several jury instructions,
which are not marked in any way to indicate that they were filed with the
court or delivered to the jury. These instructions appear to correspond to
instructions that were read to the jury, but they are not a complete set, and
they are not in the order that instructions were actually delivered.

                                        6
responsibility,” but that the court rather than the jury would “calculate the
actual reduction.” Metalclad also contended that the negligence of other
entities contributed to Ronald’s harm. The jury was instructed regarding the
elements of this defense, and then the court gave three follow-up instructions,
which are relevant to our resolution of this appeal.
      First, the court instructed about a question on the special verdict form
that would ask the jury to allocate responsibility for Ronald’s injury: “If you
find that the negligence or fault of more than one person, including Metalclad
Insulation LLC, [Ronald], and any of the other entities listed in the jury
verdict form, was a substantial factor in causing [Ronald’s] harm, you must
then decide how much responsibility each has by assigning percentages of
responsibility to each person [or entity] listed on the verdict form. The
percentages must total 100 percent.” Next, the jury was instructed that it
would be asked to make a separate finding regarding Ronald’s total damages,
if any, and in determining the total amount of damages, it should not
consider any person’s or business entity’s “assigned percentage of
responsibility.” Then, the court instructed the jury that “Metalclad cannot
allocate fault in strict liability to the manufacturers of asbestos insulation
products it sold.”3

      3  The instruction delivered orally by the trial court stated: “Metalclad
Insulation cannot allocate fault or strict liability to the manufacturers of
asbestos insulation products it sold.” However, an instruction in the
Appellant’s Appendix states: “Metalclad cannot allocate fault in strict
liability to the manufacturers of the asbestos insulation products it sold.” We
base our review on the wording of the written instruction for two related
reasons. The jury was instructed to treat the written instructions as “the
controlling instructions,” and the parties agree that the instruction in the
Appellant’s Appendix was delivered to the jury.

                                        7
III.   The Jury’s Special Verdict
       On September 28, 2020, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the
Wilgenbuschs, recording findings on the special verdict form. The jury found
that Ronald was exposed to asbestos from insulation products sold by
Metalclad, and that Metalclad is liable for Ronald’s injuries pursuant to three
of the four theories the Wilgenbuschs presented at trial.
       First, Metalclad is strictly liable for a design defect in its asbestos
insulation products. Those products failed to perform as safely as an
ordinary consumer would expect, and the products’ failure to perform safely
was a substantial factor in causing Ronald’s harm.
       Second, Metalclad is strictly liable for failure to warn about potential
risks of using the asbestos insulation products it sold. These risks would not
have been recognized by an ordinary consumer but were known or knowable
at the time Metalclad’s products were manufactured, distributed, or sold.
These risks presented a substantial danger when the products were used in a
foreseeable way, and the lack of sufficient warnings was a substantial factor
in causing harm to Ronald.
       Third, Metalclad is liable in negligence for failing to adequately warn
consumers about the danger or instruct on the safe use of the asbestos
insulation products it sold. It knew or should have known its products were
dangerous and that users would not realize this danger. A reasonable
manufacturer, distributor or seller would have provided adequate warning,
and Metalclad’s failure to warn was a substantial factor in causing harm to
Ronald.
       Because it found Metalclad liable for the Wilgenbuschs’ harms and
losses, the jury completed an additional section of the special verdict form
assessing damages. The jury found that economic damages for medical

                                          8
expenses, income loss, and lost household services totaled $795,000. The
Wilgenbuschs’ noneconomic damages totaled of $1,750,000.
      The jury also completed a section of the special verdict form titled
“Apportionment,” which asked: “What percentage of responsibility, if any, for
[Ronald’s] mesothelioma do you assign to each of the following? (The total
must equal 100%):” This question was accompanied by a list of names, which
includes Metalclad, Ronald, the U.S. Navy, and nine other companies,
including Owens Corning and Pabco.
      The jury assigned 4 percent responsibility for Ronald’s mesothelioma to
Ronald, 51 percent responsibility to the U.S. Navy, 7 percent responsibility to
Metalclad, 12 percent responsibility to Owens Corning, and 12 percent
responsibility to Pabco. It divided the remaining 14 percent among other
companies on the list.
IV.   Post-Verdict Motions and Entry of Judgment
      After the verdict was returned, the parties failed to agree on a proposed
judgment. On October 20, 2020, the Wilgenbuschs filed an ex parte
application for entry of judgment nunc pro tunc to September 28 for the full
amount of economic damages and 7 percent of the noneconomic damages.
Plaintiffs argued that backdating the judgment was appropriate because it
should have been entered immediately after the jury reached a verdict in
order to preserve Ronald’s right to noneconomic damages in the event of his
passing,4 and they proposed entering damages figures that could be adjusted
via an amended judgment once issues regarding the final amount of the

      4 When the jury decided this case, a plaintiff’s death prior to entry of
judgment would have extinguished the plaintiff’s right to recover
noneconomic damages. (See former Code Civ. Proc., § 377.34; Sullivan v.
Delta Air Lines, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 288, 298–303; see e.g., Cadlo v.
Metalclad Insulation Corp. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318 (Cadlo).)

                                       9
judgment were resolved. Opposing this request, Metalclad faulted plaintiffs
for the delay in entry of judgment. The court ordered the parties to attempt
to agree on a proposed judgment, and if they could not resolve their issues to
submit briefs to the court.
      On November 3, the Wilgenbuschs filed a motion for “Apportionment of
Liability,” requesting that the 24 percent responsibility for Ronald’s injury
that the jury assigned to Owens Corning and Pabco be allocated to Metalclad
for purposes of calculating the noneconomic damages award. Metalclad
opposed this motion, arguing that pursuant to Proposition 51, Metalclad was
not jointly and severally liable for the percentage of harm that the jury
attributed to Owens Corning and Pabco. Both parties relied on Arena, supra,
63 Cal.App.4th at page 1198, but they adopted materially different views
about how to interpret the jury’s allocation of responsibility. The
Wilgenbuschs argued that the percentages attributed to Owens Corning and
Pabco pertained to asbestos-containing products in Metalclad’s chain of
distribution. Metalclad disagreed, arguing that the percentages pertained to
products manufactured by Owens Corning and Pabco that were distributed
outside Metalclad’s chain of distribution.
      Following a hearing, the trial court issued a “Ruling re Entry of
Judgment,” which was filed on November 13, 2020. The order addresses the
two issues that the parties failed to resolve after meeting and conferring
about the proposed judgment.
      First, the court found that Metalclad could not apportion to Owens
Corning and Pabco part of the damages accruing from plaintiffs’ strict
liability claim. The court reasoned that the jury’s allocation of responsibility
applied to Metalclad’s liability for negligence, but not to Metalclad’s strict
liability for causing Ronald’s injury. Because the Wilgenbuschs prevailed on

                                        10
both theories, they were entitled to a judgment reflecting the greater amount,
and under strict products liability law, Metalclad could not “reduce its share
of damages based on the asserted greater fault of other entities” in the chain
of distribution for its own products. (Citing Wimberly, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th
at p. 633.)
      In reaching this conclusion, the court recognized that if Ronald was
exposed to asbestos products manufactured by Owens Corning or Pabco that
were outside Metalclad’s chain of distribution, Metalclad would not be strictly
liable for the harm attributed to those products. (Citing Arena, supra, 63
Cal.App.4th at p. 1198.) However, Metalclad did not cite any evidence to
show that Ronald was actually exposed to an asbestos product manufactured
by either entity that was outside Metalclad’s chain of distribution. Because
the only finding supported by the evidence was that Ronald was exposed to
Owens Corning and Pabco products in Metalclad’s chain of distribution, “the
court apportion[ed] 31% of the non-economic damages to Metalclad.”
      The second unresolved issue before the court pertained to the
Wilgenbuschs’ request to enter the judgment nunc pro tunc, which the court
denied. It found that the delay in entry of judgment was attributable to a
“protracted meet and confer process,” and that plaintiffs were responsible for
a significant portion of the delay. Moreover, there were no special equity
considerations, such as those that arise when a plaintiff dies prior to entry of
judgment.
      On November 20, 2022, a judgment was filed that requires Metalclad to
pay the Wilgenbuschs damages totaling $1,012,044. This amount includes
$469,544 in economic damages, which reduces the jury’s award to reflect
prior settlements and Ronald’s comparative fault. The judgment also

                                       11
requires Metalclad to pay 31 percent of the noneconomic damages award, i.e.,
$542,500.5
                                 DISCUSSION
      Metalclad contends the trial court erred by refusing to limit the
noneconomic damages award to the “small percentage of fault” that the jury
attributed to Metalclad. There are three strands to this claim of error, which
frame our discussion: (1) under Proposition 51, Metalclad is not liable for
noneconomic damages caused by Ronald’s exposure to an asbestos product
Metalclad did not distribute; (2) the jury’s allocation of responsibility for
Ronald’s injury constitutes a finding that Metalclad is liable for only 7
percent of Ronald’s noneconomic damages; and (3) the trial court lacked
authority to enter a judgment that does not conform to the jury’s verdict.
      We begin with Metalclad’s argument that the judgment violates
Proposition 51. Citing Arena and its progeny, Metalclad contends Proposition
51 requires apportionment of liability when different asbestos products
distributed through different distribution chains contributed to the plaintiff’s
asbestos-related injury. We agree. (Arena, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1193–1199; Wilson, supra, 81 Cal.App.4th at pp. 851–859.) However,
Metalclad’s logic falters when it argues further that Arena precludes
apportioning 31 percent of the Wilgenbuschs’ noneconomic damages to
Metalclad. According to this argument, “[i]f the jury found that [Ronald] was
exposed to Owens Corning and Pabco products from sources other than
Metalclad, it was appropriate . . . to apportion responsibility to Owens
Corning and Pabco directly.”

      5  On December 18, 2022, the judgment was amended pursuant to the
parties’ stipulation to correct errors unrelated to the present appeal.

                                        12
      This what if argument is an insufficient basis upon which to claim
error on appeal. “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to be
correct on appeal.” (In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130,
1133.) “ ‘All intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on
matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be affirmatively
shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an
ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.)
      In the present case, the jury was not asked to decide if Ronald was
exposed to Owens Corning and Pabco products outside Metalclad’s chain of
distribution, and the special verdict does not address this issue at all.
Instead, the disputed issue at trial was whether Ronald was actually exposed
to the asbestos insulation products that Metalclad distributed, products
which were manufactured by Owens Corning or Pabco. The special verdicts
show that the jury resolved this dispute in favor of the plaintiffs. It found
that Ronald “was exposed to asbestos from asbestos insulation products sold
by Metalclad Insulation LLC,” and that Metalclad’s asbestos insulation
products caused Ronald substantial harm because they were defectively
designed and Metalclad failed to warn consumers about the potential risks of
substantial danger associated with their use and misuse. Metalclad does not
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support these findings. And it
concedes on appeal that it may be held jointly and severally liable under
strict liability law for all injury caused by products in its chain of
distribution. (Arena, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1193, 1198.) Thus,
contrary to Metalclad’s appellate argument, the noneconomic damages award
does not violate Proposition 51.

                                        13
      The second strand of Metalclad’s claim is that the special verdict
constitutes a substantive finding that Ronald was exposed to Owens Corning
and Pabco products that were not in Metalclad’s chain of distribution.
According to this argument, “it must be assumed that the jury’s 7%
apportionment of responsibility to Metalclad included all responsibility
attributable to the products Metalclad distributed. And in apportioning 12%
responsibility to each of Owens Corning and Pabco, the jury necessarily found
that this responsibility fell outside of Metalclad’s chain of distribution.” We
are not persuaded.6
      Metalclad reasons that the percentage allocations must be construed as
a cap on Metalclad’s liability for noneconomic damages because the jury was
instructed that Metalclad could not apportion fault in strict liability to
manufacturers of the asbestos products it sold. Metalclad construes this
instruction as a clear directive to the jury to apportion responsibility to
Owens Corning and Pabco for products that “fell outside of Metalclad’s chain
of distribution.” We disagree. For one thing, the instruction did not tell the
jury to do anything. It advised that Metalclad could not apportion its strict
liability to the manufacturers of the products that it sold. Furthermore,
Metalclad errs by reading this instruction “in a vacuum” without considering
the other instructions to which it relates. (Woodcock v. Fontana Scaffolding
& Equip. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 452, 458 (Woodcock).)

      6 Metalclad attempts to eschew the presumption in favor of the
judgment by pointing out that there is no presumption in favor of upholding a
special verdict that contains inconsistent findings. (Citing Orthopedic
Systems, Inc. v. Schlein (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 529, 542.) This principle does
not assist Metalclad because it is not challenging the special verdict, but
argues instead that the judgment does not conform to the verdict.

                                       14
      As discussed in our background summary, the jury was instructed that
because Metalclad claimed that the negligence of Ronald and of other entities
was a substantial factor in causing Ronald’s mesothelioma, the jury would be
asked to assign “percentages of responsibility to each person [or entity] listed
on the verdict form” and that the percentages had to total 100 percent. The
jury was also instructed not to consider these assigned percentages when
assessing damages. If Metalclad proved its contributory negligence defense,
the court rather than the jury would “calculate the actual reduction.” And if
the Wilgenbuschs proved their strict liability claims, Metalclad could not
allocate fault to manufacturers of products its sold.
      Considered together, these instructions required the jury to assign
percentages of responsibility among a list of people and entities that included
but was not limited to Metalclad, Owens Corning and Pabco, based on a
qualitative assessment of each person’s or entity’s respective breach of the
standard of care. This exercise had nothing to do with whether the asbestos
products to which Ronald was exposed were distributed in or outside
Metalclad’s chain of distribution. As best we can determine, that issue was
never even discussed with the jury. For example, it appears the jury heard
neither evidence nor argument about the extent to which Ronald’s exposure
to products outside Metalclad’s distribution chain involved Owens Corning or
Pabco products. Further, the jury was told that the court rather than the
jury would use these percentages to adjust the damages award, if need be.
Metalclad ignores all of these circumstances, which undermine its contention
that the allocations in the special verdict form constitute a finding regarding
the manufacturers’ percentage of fault for products outside Metalclad’s
distribution chain.

                                       15
      The final strand of Metalclad’s claim is that the trial court lacked
authority to enter a judgment that does not conform to the verdict. Metalclad
bases this argument on section 664 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
states: “When trial by jury has been had, judgment must be entered by the
clerk, in conformity to the verdict within 24 hours after the rendition of the
verdict, whether or not a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is
pending, unless the court order the case to be reserved for argument or
further consideration, or grant a stay of proceedings.” Together with amicus
curie Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., Metalclad argues that section 664
and cases applying this statute have long held that a trial court is powerless
to “ ‘substitute [its] judgment for that of the jury and enter a judgment which
is not based upon the verdict . . .’ ” (Quoting City & County of San Francisco
v. Superior Court (1928) 94 Cal.App. 318, 321 (San Francisco v. Superior
Court).)
      First, because section 664 is directory rather than mandatory, it is not
necessary to the validity of the judgment that it be entered within 24 hours.
(Churchill v. Louie (1902) 135 Cal. 608, 612; Cadlo, supra, 151 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1319.) Second, Metalclad and amicus curie misconstrue San Francisco v.
Superior Court, a case that discusses situations in which a judgment may
differ from a verdict. (San Francisco v. Superior Court, supra, 94 Cal.App. at
pp. 321–322.) Regardless, Metalclad fails to demonstrate that the judgment
does not conform to the verdict, and amicus curie does not even address this
substantive issue.
      Metalclad acknowledges that when a special verdict is ambiguous, the
trial court has authority to interpret it by considering the language of the
verdict in connection with the pleadings, evidence and instructions.
(Woodcock, supra, 69 Cal.2d at pp. 456–457.) But it argues that the trial

                                       16
court had no such authority here because the special verdict unambiguously
limits Metalclad’s liability to 7 percent of the Wilgenbuschs’ noneconomic
damages. Again, we disagree.
         The special verdict question asked the jury to apportion responsibility
for an injury resulting from the failure to exercise reasonable care, not to
quantify percentages of liability for the Wilgenbuschs’ noneconomic damages.
To the extent there was any ambiguity as to this issue, the record shows that
the trial court’s ruling is supported by the language of the verdict, the
pertinent instructions, and the evidence, as we have discussed. The trial
court also explained that since the Wilgenbuschs prevailed on both of their
claims—negligence and strict liability—they are entitled to a judgment that
reflects the greater amount of damages. (Tavaglione v. Billings (1993)
4 Cal.4th 1150, 1159; see also Roby v. McKesson Corp. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 686,
702.) And, as Metalclad concedes, Metalclad is jointly and severally liable
under strict liability law for all injury caused by asbestos insulation products
in its chain of distribution. (Arena, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1193, 1198.)
Thus, the trial court’s construction of the special verdict is supported by the
law and the evidence, and the judgment does conform to the verdict.
                                                DISPOSITION
         The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to respondent.

                                                                 TUCHER, P.J.

WE CONCUR:

PETROU, J.
RODRÍGUEZ, J.

Wilgenbusch et al. v. Metalclad Insulation LLC. (A161916)

                                                            17