Court Opinion

ID: 9529648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:53:03.410442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:52.989073
License: Public Domain

KAUGER, Vice Chief Justice,
dissenting, with whom SIMMS, Justice, joins by reason of stare decisis:
The majority finds a factual question exists concerning the causal link between the shooting and the operation of the vehicle. It does so on a record devoid of any evidence that anyone other than the driver controlled the *849vehicle when he turned to follow the Byus car.1 It then concludes that even if the trier of fact determines that the shooting arose from the use of the vehicle, it might still conclude that the shooting was an intervening force severing the vehicle operator’s liability. In doing so, it avoids a question of law squarely presented — whether uninsured motorist coverage extends to the acts of a passenger who discharges a firearm from an uninsured motor vehicle.2 Pursuant to 36 O.S.1991 § 3636 3 and the contractual language4 of the appellant’s, Mid-Century Insurance Company (Mid-Century/insurer), policy, recovery is limited to damages the insured may recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle. Because I would find that a passenger not in control of the vehicle, who discharges a firearm from an uninsured automobile, is not an owner or operator of the uninsured motor car within the meaning of 36 O.S.1991 § 3636 or the policy language at issue, I dissent.
PURSUANT TO 36 O.S.1991 § 3636 AND THE CONTRACTUAL LANGUAGE OF THE MID-CENTURY POLICY, RECOVERY IS LIMITED TO DAMAGES THE INSURED MAY RECOVER FROM THE OWNER OR OPERATOR OF AN UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE. A PASSENGER NOT IN CONTROL OF AN AUTOMOBILE, WHO DISCHARGES A FIREARM FROM AN UNINSURED VEHICLE, IS NOT AN OWNER OR OPERATOR OF THE UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE WITHIN THE MEANING OF 36 O.S.1991 § 3636 OR THE POLICY LANGUAGE AT ISSUE.
Without the aid of any cited authority, the administratrix asserts that uninsured motor*850ist coverage exists because Cooper was convicted of the murder of her son.5 Alternately, she argues that Corrales and De La Cruz were operators of the uninsured motor vehicle within the meaning of 36 O.S.1991 § 3636.6 Mid-Century insists that because Byus was not shot by an operator of the uninsured motor vehicle there is no coverage. I agree.
Both parties find support in this Court’s pronouncement in Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Sanders, 803 P.2d 688, 693 (Okla.1990). In Safeco, two men abducted a couple and forced them into the trunk of an uninsured car. The couple was driven to a remote area where the abductors parked the car, cut the fuel line and set the car on fire. The couple died from burns and smoke inhalation. Personal representatives of the victims filed claims with Safeco to collect uninsured motorist benefits. The insurer filed a declaratory judgment action in federal court to determine coverage. This Court answered four questions in Safeco holding that: 1) the murder of the couple arose out of the use of the motor vehicle, as contemplated by the uninsured motorist statute; 2) there was a causal connection between the use of the vehicle and the murders; 3) the kidnappers’ setting the car on fire after it was parked was an act of independent significance severing the causal link between the transportation use of the car and the injury; and 4) although both the abductors had driven the car at some point during the incident, they were not “operators” of the car when the fire was set.
In Safeco, the Court acknowledged that the term “operator” was not defined in the uninsured motorist statute. In assigning a definition to the term, we relied upon the common interpretation of the word.7 The pertinent language in Safeco provides:
“As stated previously, § 3636 does not define ‘operator of an uninsured motor vehicle’ or otherwise provide guidance for its interpretation. It is a common word and should be read in its ordinary sense. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, 1963, at page 1581, defines operator as ‘1. one that produces a physical effect or engages himself in the mechanical aspect of any process or activity’. Accordingly, we hold that ‘operator,’ as contemplated by § 3636, includes any person who is engaged in activity related to the transportation nature of the vehicle.” (Footnotes omitted.)
Although it is undisputed that neither Corrales nor De La Cruz drove the Cooper car on the evening of the shooting — and that there is no evidence presented that anyone other than the driver controlled the vehicle when he turned to follow Byus, the administratrix argues that they were operators within the meaning of 36 O.S.1991 § 3636 as defined in Safeco. Her argument is grounded on the premise that passengers, while riding in a vehicle, are engaged in the transportation nature of the automobile. Mid-Century insists that under Safeco one must produce a physical effect or engage in some mechanical aspect of the operation of a vehicle before the person becomes an “operator” within the meaning of § 3636.
Reading the last sentence quoted from Safeco in isolation, one might be inclined to agree with the administratrix that a passenger is an operator within the meaning of the uninsured motorist vehicle statute. However, this Court also relied upon a common definition of operator in Safeco which specifically refers to an operator as one who “produces a physical effect” or “engages ... in the mechanical aspect of any process or activity.” We recognized in Safeco that the definition of operator found in 47 O.S.1991 § 1-140 of the Highway Safety Code (Safety Code) was tailored for drivers’ licensing. Nevertheless, a definition of “operator” within the meaning of § 3636 requiring a more active involvement in the operation of the vehicle than a passenger affords is consistent *851with the statutory definition found in § 1-140. The Safety Code defines an operator as:
“Every person, other than a commercial chauffeur or chauffeur, who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway or who is exercising control over or steering a vehicle being towed by a motor vehicle.”
Although not enacted for the purpose of construing insurance contracts, one court has found that motor vehicle codes are at least instructive in determining the definition of “operator” in the insurance context.8 In Schaffer v. Mill Owners Mut. Ins. Co., 242 Or. 150, 407 P.2d 614-15 (1965), the Oregon court found that the word “operator” within the liability portion of an automobile insurance policy was synonymous with the word driver. Similarly, other courts, as we did in Safeco, have generally found that “operate” within the insurance context means to regulate and control the actual operation of a vehicle.9
On the evening of the shooting, neither of the passengers here were ever in a position to be in the actual physical control of the Cooper vehicle. They did not take actions which produced either a physical effect on the vehicle or which related to its mechanical operation. They were not “operators” within the meaning of the term as defined in Safe-co — and there is no evidence presented that anyone other than the driver controlled the vehicle when he turned to follow Byus. Under these facts, a passenger, who discharges a firearm from an uninsured vehicle, is not an owner or operator of the uninsured motor vehicle within the meaning of 36 O.S.1991 § 3636 or the policy language at issue.
CONCLUSION
Although my sympathies lie with the Byus parents over the loss of their son, the protection afforded by the coverage under consideration here clearly is both legislatively10 and contractually11 confined to damages the insured is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle.12 The purpose of this coverage is to provide insured persons who are legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of an uninsured or under-insured vehicle with a means of recovery.13 The clear, plain mandate of 36 O.S.1991 § 3636 is that insureds shall be protected from injury caused by wrongdoing owners or operators of uninsured vehicles.14 Both Corrales and De La Cruz were undisputedly passengers in the Cooper car. They did not exercise control over the operation of the vehicle. Because, under the facts presented, they were not *852owners or operators within the meaning of the uninsured motorist statute or the policy language at issue,15 the administratrix should not recover uninsured benefits from the insurer.

. In its factual statement, the majority opinion provides that the operator of the vehicle made the U-tum to follow the Byus automobile at the direction of one of the alleged shooters. This conclusion rests upon Mid-Century’s failure to contest a statement made by Byus in the motion for summary judgment. Nevertheless, the statement by Byus is unsupported by any evidentiary material (Although the motion for summary judgment refers to an Exhibit "A” for corroboration of this statement, no such exhibit is attached to the motion.). The only reference in the record to a statement about the operation of thé vehicle is found in Exhibit "A” to Mid-Century’s motion for summary judgment. In response to the question: “Isn't it true that after someone in the other car made a gesture towards your car somebody inside the car said, ‘turn around’?" An unidentified female, presumably one of the passengers, responded to the question: “Yes.”
The administratrix asserts that Corrales and De La Cruz were in control of the car because they directed Cooper to turn and to pursue the Byus vehicle. However, under these facts, the argument is unpersuasive. See, Pfeiffer v. Weiland, note 9, infra (Where boat owner’s brother, at time of water skiing accident, was in water behind boat preparing to ski and was communicating with occupants of boat, which the owner usually operated according to directions he received from the skier either directly or through other passengers, the brother was not an “operator” whose negligent conduct could by statute be charged to owner.). The record contains nothing to support a finding that the driver's decision to pursue the Byus vehicle was controlled by the passengers.

. Not presented is the question of whether a passenger might exercise an extent of control over the driver so as to step into his/her shoes as controlling the operation of the vehicle.

. The contractual language provides in pertinent part:
"... PART II — UNINSURED MOTORIST Coverage C — Uninsured Motorist Coverage. We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover as damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of bodily injury sustained by the insured person. The bodily injury must be caused by accident and arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured motor vehicle. ...”

. Assignments of error not argued or supported in the brief with citation of authority are treated as waived. Peters v. Golden Oil Co., 600 P.2d 330-31 (Okla.1979).

. Title 36 O.S.1991 § 3636, see note 3, supra.

. Title 25 O.S.1991 § 1 provides:
"Words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense, except when a contrary intention plainly appears, and except also that the words hereinafter explained are to be understood as thus explained.”

. Schaffer v. Mill Owners Mut. Ins. Co., 242 Or. 150, 407 P.2d 614-15 (1965); Kuzinski v. Boretti, 182 Mich.App. 177, 451 N.W.2d 859, 861 (1989) (Determining the meaning of “operation” of an ambulance in the context of the Governmental Tort Claims Act.).

. Orth v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 284 F.2d 857 (9th Cir.1960); Pfeiffer v. Weiland, 226 N.W.2d 218, 224 (Iowa 1975); Heritage Ins. Co. v. Phelan, 59 Ill.2d 389, 321 N.E.2d 257, 262 (1974); Cochran v. M & M Transp. Co., 112 F.2d 241, 243-44 (1940); Schaffer v. Mill Owners Mut. Ins. Co., see note 8, supra; Reetz v. Mansfield, 119 Conn. 563, 178 A. 53, 56 (1935); Kuzinski v. Boretti, see note 8, supra; Bats, Inc. v. Shikuma, 1 Haw.App. 231, 617 P.2d 575 (1980); Zurich-American Ins. Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 85 Cal.App.3d 481, 149 Cal.Rptr. 472, 476 (1978); Annot., "Automobile Liability Insurance; Operator's Policy," 88 A.L.R.2d 995, 1011 (1963) (An operator's policy normally affords the insured no coverage where he/she is neither actually nor constructively driving the vehicle at the time of the accident.); J. Appleman, Insurance Law & Practice, § 4314 (1979) provides in pertinent part:
"The term 'operation' is included within the insuring expression of many older forms of policies, and runs throughout the arterial structure of automobile insurance law. The better definition of the expression is that it involves personal physical management of the automobile by the person in question....”
See also, State v. Dellinger, 73 N.C.App. 685, 327 S.E.2d 609, 611 (1985). But see, Neel v. Indemnity Ins. Co. of North America, 122 N.J.L. 560, 6 A.2d 722, aff'd, 124 N.J.L. 130, 11 A.2d 106 (1939).

. Title 36 O.S.1991 § 3636, see note 3, supra.

. See contract language, note 4, supra.

. Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Sanders, 803 P.2d 688, 690-91 (Okla.1990).

. Welch v. Armer, 776 P.2d 847, 849 (Okla.1989).

. Title 36 O.S.1991 § 3636. see note 3, supra; Safeco Ins. Co. of America v. Sanders, see note 12 at 694, supra.

. Title 36 O.S.1991 § 3636, see note 3, supra; see the contractual language, note 4, supra.