Court Opinion

ID: 9407446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-07 13:00:46.807013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:38.426514
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13426   Document: 54-1    Date Filed: 07/07/2023   Page: 1 of 12

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 21-13426
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        In re:
         TAQUAN RAHSHE GULLETT-EL,
                                                               Debtor.
        ___________________________________________________
        TAQUAN RAHSHE GULLETT-EL,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
        AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

                                                Defendants- Appellees.
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        2                    Opinion of the Court                21-13426

                          ____________________

                 Appeals from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-01075-TJC,
                          Bkcy. No. 3:20-bk-00618-JAF
                           ____________________

                          ____________________

                                 No. 21-13429
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

        In re: TAQUAN RAHSHE GULLETT-EL,
                                                                  Debtor.
        ___________________________________________________
        TAQUAN RAHSHE GULLETT-EL,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
        AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,

                                                    Defendants-Appellees.
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        21-13426               Opinion of the Court                         3

                             ____________________

                   Appeals from the United States District Court
                        for the Middle District of Florida
                       D.C. Docket No. 3:20-cv-01047-TJC,
                            Bkcy. No. 3:20-bk-00618-JAF
                             ____________________

        Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Taquan Rahshe Gullett-El appeals from the district court’s
        order (1) holding that his appeal from the bankruptcy court’s
        dismissal of his adversary complaint was untimely and otherwise
        frivolous, and (2) denying his request for permission to proceed in
        forma pauperis (“IFP”) on appeal. Gullett-El argues that he timely
        filed his administrative appeal from the bankruptcy court’s
        adversary proceeding to the district court and that the district court
        erred in denying him IFP status on appeal. Additionally, he asserts
        that both the bankruptcy court and the district court made multiple
        errors in the disposition of his adversary complaint. After review,
        we conclude that we lack jurisdiction. Accordingly, the appeal is
        dismissed.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                21-13426

                                  I.    Background
               Although this appeal arises out of a dismissal of two
        bankruptcy court appeals, a brief summary of events leading to that
        ruling is necessary for context.
               In 2017, Gullett-El was convicted in the Central District of
        California of two counts of submitting false, fictious, or fraudulent
        claims to the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”), and two counts of
        attempting to file a false lien or encumbrance against the property
        of government employees. See United States v. Taquan-Rashe, 752 F.
        App’x 531, 531 (9th Cir. 2019) (unpublished).
                Thereafter, in 2020, while imprisoned for those crimes,
        Gullett-El, filed a pro se petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in the
        bankruptcy court for the Middle District of Florida. He alleged,
        among other types of debt, that he had judicial liens, statutory
        liens, and tax liens. And he listed as creditors, among others, the
        California Franchise Tax Board and the United States of America.
        On July 23, 2020, Gullett-El received a discharge from the
        bankruptcy court. The discharge notice explained generally that
        some debts are not dischargeable, including “debts for most taxes.”
        The bankruptcy court closed the bankruptcy proceeding in
        September 2021.
              In March 2020, prior to receiving the bankruptcy discharge,
        Gullett-El filed a pro se adversary complaint in the bankruptcy court
        against the IRS, the American Bar Association (“ABA”), and several
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        21-13426                 Opinion of the Court                            5

        other defendants.1 In the adversary complaint, he cited numerous
        international treaties and alleged that (1) the IRS had instituted an
        unlawful lien against him in 2010; (2) he was the victim of malicious
        prosecution and his convictions were unlawful and violated
        various international laws; (3) the California district court judge
        breached a “contract” that Gullett-El filed in his criminal case
        (which he contended created a binding contract between himself
        and the district court judge over various matters); (4) the Federal
        Bureau of Prisons attempted to force him via threats and extortion
        to enter into a contract setting up a schedule of payments for the
        allegedly unlawful $400 special assessment imposed as part of his
        criminal sentence; (5) he was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus
        from the bankruptcy court; (6) he was entitled to billions in
        damages from the “United States Federal Corporation” and its
        privies; (7) he was entitled to specific performance of the “contract”
        he filed in his criminal case; and (8) he sought to invoke the
        jurisdiction of the international court of criminal justice and the
        international criminal court because he was a “non-immigrant
        alien” and he was subject to genocide, war crimes, crimes against
        humanity, and the denial of procedural justice by the United States,

        1 The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure provide that certain bankruptcy
        related proceedings are “adversary proceedings,” including a proceeding for
        money damages, and a proceeding “to determine the dischargeability of a
        debt.” See Fed. R. Bank. P. 7001. “[A]n adversary proceeding in the
        bankruptcy court and the companion bankruptcy case are two distinct
        proceedings.” In re Morris, 950 F.2d 1531, 1534 (11th Cir. 1992).
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13426

        citing various international laws, treaties, and conventions. As
        relief, he requested the bankruptcy court order: (1) specific
        performance of the “contract” in his criminal case; (2) discharge of
        the IRS’s allegedly unlawful tax lien, the $100,000 assessment owed
        to State of California, and the $400 special assessment imposed as
        part of his sentence; (3) his immediate discharge from unlawful
        detainment; and (4) reparations, restitution, and damages related
        to the unlawful convictions.
               In response, the United States moved to dismiss the
        adversary proceeding for lack of service, lack of subject matter
        jurisdiction, and because the complaint was an impermissible
        shotgun pleading. Similarly, the ABA moved to dismiss the
        complaint, arguing that it was a shotgun pleading and alternatively
        because it alleged no injuries caused by the ABA. Gullett-El
        opposed the motions to dismiss.
               On July 21, 2020 (the “July 21 order”), the bankruptcy court
        granted the motions to dismiss and dismissed Gullett-El’s
        adversary complaint. As an initial matter, the bankruptcy court
        concluded that Gullett-El failed to state a claim concerning his
        request for release from prison and for damages based on his
        convictions, and it dismissed these claims with prejudice. Next, it
        determined that Gullett-El failed to allege a legal or factual basis
        concerning the dischargeability of his state or federal tax debts, but
        it granted him leave to amend his adversary complaint as to those
        claims within 30 days.
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        21-13426               Opinion of the Court                       7

                Instead of filing an amended adversary complaint, however,
        Gullett-El filed a notice of appeal in the bankruptcy court. In the
        notice of appeal, he asserted that “[d]ue to Defendants’ mail
        tampering/obstruction/delay/hindering /withholding,” he did
        not receive notice of the dismissal order, and that this delay
        constituted “excusable neglect and good cause” for an extension of
        time to appeal, citing various provisions of Federal Rule of
        Appellate Procedure 4. Meanwhile, Gullett-El filed an identical
        notice of appeal with the district court seeking to appeal the
        bankruptcy court’s dismissal of the adversary complaint. The
        district court docketed the appeal as Case No. 3:20-cv-01075.
               With regard to the notice of appeal filed in the bankruptcy
        court, the bankruptcy court dismissed it as untimely because it was
        not filed within 14 days of the entry of the order dismissing the
        adversary complaint as required by the bankruptcy rules. Gullett-
        El appealed the bankruptcy court’s order dismissing his notice of
        appeal as untimely to the district court. This appeal was docketed
        in the district court as Case No. 3:20-cv-01047.
               On September 20, 2021, in a single order, the district court
        held that both the appeal from the dismissal of the notice of appeal
        as untimely and the appeal from the dismissal of the adversary
        complaint were frivolous. Specifically, as to the bankruptcy court’s
        dismissal of the notice of appeal as untimely, the district court
        concluded that “the record includes no information upon which
        the Court could find the decision as to [the] untimeliness [of the
        appeal of the order dismissing the adversary complaint] to be
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        8                        Opinion of the Court                    21-13426

        erroneous,” even under the prison mailbox rule. Furthermore,
        because the appeal was untimely, the district court concluded that
        it “need not consider Gullett-El’s appeal of the [bankruptcy court’s]
        order dismissing his adversary complaint.” Nevertheless, the
        district court noted that even if it considered the merits of his
        appeal from the dismissal of the adversary complaint, the appeal
        would still be frivolous because the bankruptcy court (1) concluded
        correctly that it lacked jurisdiction over Gullett-El’s claims seeking
        discharge from prison and damages from his convictions, and
        (2) granted Gullett-El leave to amend his claim for dischargeability
        of the tax debts, and a dismissal with leave to amend is not final and
        appealable.
               Thereafter, Gullett-El filed a motion to proceed on appeal
        IFP in both cases. The district court denied the motions in a single
        order, concluding that any appeal would be frivolous for the
        reasons stated in its prior order.
               Gullett-El appealed to this Court the district court’s order
        concluding that the appeals were frivolous and its order denying
        his motions to proceed on appeal IFP. 2 Gullet also moved for IFP
        status on appeal in this Court, and a judge of this Court granted his
        IFP motion.
                                     II.     Discussion

        2 These appeals were initially docketed as two separate cases (case nos. 21-
        13426 and 21-13429) and were later consolidated.
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        21-13426                Opinion of the Court                          9

               As a threshold matter, we must consider whether we have
        jurisdiction over this case. See In re Trusted Net Media Holdings, LLC,
        550 F.3d 1035, 1042 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[C]ourts have an independent
        obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists,
        even if no party raises the issue, and if the court determines that
        subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, it must dismiss the entire
        case.” (quotations omitted)).
                Under Article III of the United States Constitution, a federal
        court’s jurisdiction is limited to active “[c]ases” and
        “[c]ontroversies.”       U.S. Const., art. III, § 2. An “actual
        controversy” must exist throughout all stages of the litigation.
        Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 90–91 (2013). “A case
        becomes moot . . . when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’
        or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Id.
        at 91 (quotations omitted). In considering whether a case is moot,
        we “look at the events at the present time, not at the time the
        complaint was filed or when the federal order on review was
        issued.” Dow Jones & Co. v. Kaye, 256 F.3d 1251, 1254 (11th Cir.
        2001). “When events subsequent to the commencement of a
        lawsuit create a situation in which the court can no longer give the
        plaintiff meaningful relief, the case is moot and must be dismissed.”
        Fla. Ass’n of Rehab. Facilities, Inc. v. State of Fla. Dep’t of Health &
        Rehab. Servs., 225 F.3d 1208, 1217 (11th Cir. 2000).
              As an initial matter, we note that the district court’s denial
        of Gullett-El’s motion for leave to proceed IFP on appeal is not an
        appealable order. See Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(5) & advisory
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        10                         Opinion of the Court                       21-13426

        committee notes (1967 Adoption) (noting that Rule 24(a)(5)
        “establishes a subsequent motion in the court of appeals, rather
        than an appeal from the order of denial . . . as the proper procedure
        for calling in question the correctness of the action of the district
        court”); see also Gomez v. United States, 245 F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir.
        1957) (indicating that “[a]n application for leave to proceed [IFP on
        appeal] is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and an
        order denying such an application is not a final order from which
        an appeal will lie”). 3 Regardless, because we subsequently granted
        Gullett-El IFP status on appeal, this issue is rendered moot.
              Turning to the substantive issues on appeal, even assuming
        that Gullett-El’s notice of appeal from the dismissal of the
        adversary complaint was timely, 4 meaningful relief is not available
        to Gullett-El. In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceeding, an order of

        3 Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding that
        decisions of the former Fifth Circuit issued prior to the close of business on
        September 30, 1981, are binding in the Eleventh Circuit).
        4 Adversary proceedings incorporate Fed. R. Civ. P. 58, which requires a court
        to set out a judgment in a separate document. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58; Fed. R.
        Bankr. P. 7058. Thus, in adversary proceedings, a judgment is entered for
        purposes of filing a notice of appeal at the earliest of when the judgment is set
        out in a separate document or once 150 days have run from the entry of the
        order. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(5)(ii). The bankruptcy court’s order
        dismissing the adversary complaint was dated July 21, 2020, and it was entered
        on the bankruptcy docket on July 22. But the bankruptcy court failed to issue
        a separate judgment as required by Rule 58. Thus, Gullett-El had 150 days to
        file his notice of appeal, such that his notice of appeal from August 19, 2020,
        was timely. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8002(a)(5)(ii).
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        21-13426                   Opinion of the Court                               11

        discharge is a final order marking the end of the adjudication of
        claims against the bankruptcy estate. See In re McLean, 794 F.3d
        1313, 1322 (11th Cir. 2015). Here, two days after the bankruptcy
        court dismissed Gullett-El’s adversary complaint, it issued him a
        Chapter 7 discharge, and it later closed the bankruptcy case.
        Gullett-El’s challenge to the dismissal of the adversary complaint
        was rendered moot by the bankruptcy court’s discharge order and
        closing of his bankruptcy case. See In re Morris, 950 F.2d 1531, 1534
        (11th Cir. 1992). Specifically, although “[a]n adversary proceeding
        in the bankruptcy court and the companion bankruptcy case are
        two distinct proceedings,” we have noted that “the dismissal of a
        bankruptcy case normally results in the dismissal of related
        proceedings because federal jurisdiction is premised upon the
        nexus between the underlying bankruptcy case and the related
        proceedings.” Id. (citing In re Smith, 866 F.2d 576, 580 (3d Cir.
        1989)); see also In re Stardust Inn, Inc., 70 B.R. 888, 890 (Bankr. E.D.
        Pa. 1987) (“As a general rule, the dismissal of a bankruptcy case
        should result in the dismissal of all remaining adversary
        proceedings.”). 5 In the adversary proceeding, Gullett-El sought a

        5 This general rule of dismissal is not without exception, however, because
        “nothing in the statute governing jurisdiction granted to the bankruptcy
        courts prohibits the continuance of federal jurisdiction over an adversary
        proceeding which arose in or was related to a bankruptcy case following
        dismissal of the underlying bankruptcy case.” In re Morris, 950 F.2d at 1534.
        We have identified certain factors that a court should consider in determining
        whether discretionary jurisdiction over an adversary proceeding should be
        retained following the dismissal of the related bankruptcy proceeding:
        “(1) judicial economy; (2) fairness and convenience to the litigants; and (3) the
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        12                          Opinion of the Court                        21-13426

        declaration that certain debts were dischargeable in the related
        bankruptcy proceeding. The order of discharge, however, marked
        the end of the claims against the bankruptcy estate and the
        bankruptcy proceeding is closed. In other words, any ruling as to
        the dischargeability of those debts was rendered moot by Gullett-
        El’s discharge and the closing of his bankruptcy case.
                Gullett-El also sought relief from his convictions and
        damages related to the allegedly wrongful convictions.6 But such
        relief is not available in bankruptcy proceedings. Rather, a motion
        to vacate sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is the exclusive
        procedure for a federal prisoner to collaterally attack his sentence,
        and such motions must be filed in the district where the defendant
        was convicted and sentenced—in this case the United States
        District Court for the Central District of California. See 28 U.S.C.
        § 2255(a); Amodeo v. FCC Coleman—Low Warden, 984 F.3d 992, 997
        (11th Cir. 2021). Thus, we lack jurisdiction to grant the requested
        relief.
               Accordingly, Gullett-El’s appeal is dismissed for lack of
        jurisdiction.
                DISMISSED.

        degree of difficulty of the related legal issues involved.” Id. at 1535. None of
        these factors weigh in favor of the court’s discretionary jurisdiction in this case.
        6 We note that, since filing this appeal, Gullett-El has been released from
        prison.