Court Opinion

ID: 9516801
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:52:49.961281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:17.664846
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE O’MALLEY, specially concurring: Petitioner asks us to clarify the standards governing removal of judges in light of the apparently conflicting treatment the issue has received in Illinois case law. Petitioner notes in his brief that, according to Hoellen, a party seeking substitution for cause must demonstrate the judge’s subjective bias as well as “evidence of prejudicial trial conduct” (Hoellen, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 248), and he questions how Hoellen can be reconciled with Wheatley, a decision in which, without reference to any prejudicial conduct of the original trial judge and without a showing of any subjective bias, the Fifth District reversed and remanded the cause for a hearing before a new trial judge because there had been an objective appearance of the original trial judge’s impropriety under the Judicial Code Wheatley, 297 Ill. App. 3d at 858-59). The majority responds by citing case law that the majority says “inescapably” (393 Ill. App. 3d at 375) supports the proposition that the appearance of impropriety under the Judicial Code alone can stand as a basis for a motion to remove a judge, then by saying that that case law did not “state[ ] an intent to depart from *** authority that actual prejudice is generally required” (393 Ill. App. 3d at 378), and then by saying that the case law “creat[es] only an exception to the actual prejudice requirement” (393 Ill. App. 3d at 378). Thus the majority uses several pages to discuss what it terms a “tension” in the law before attempting an unworkable reconciliation6 and then offering an internally contradictory resolution. According to the majority, there are three bases on which a party may file a motion to have a judge removed from a case: a motion for substitution as of right under the Code, a motion for substitution for cause under the Code, and a motion based on the Judicial Code. The majority thus identifies Rule 63(C)(1) of the Judicial Code as a basis for a motion to remove a judge (and a basis for vacating a judgment by a judge who should have been removed) separate from a motion for substitution under the Code. 393 Ill. App. 3d at 375 (“Inescapably, Barth reflects that Rule 63(C)(1) may be the basis for a motion for substitution for cause”). Rule 63(C)(1) states that a judge “shall disqualify himself or herself’ if the judge’s “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 210 Ill. 2d R. 63(C)(1).7 This rule sets out an objective test for requiring recusal: according to the rule as applied by Wheatley and repeated by the majority, a judgment may be vacated for the trial judge’s failure to recuse himself or herself where his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned, even if the judge was not actually biased. However, as the majority notes, a judgment may be vacated for the improper denial of a motion to substitute the trial judge for cause only if the appellant can demonstrate the trial judge’s “ ‘personal bias’ ” as well as “ ‘prejudicial trial conduct.’ ” 393 Ill. App. 3d at 373, quoting Hoellen, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 248. This subjective standard, and this requirement of prejudicial trial conduct, cannot be reconciled with the objective standard described in Rule 63(C)(1) and Wheatley. The standard for vacating a judgment for improper denial of a motion to substitute for cause is far more rigorous than is the standard for vacating a judgment for improper failure to recuse, even though both seek the same remedy. Because there appears to be no cohesive scheme clarifying these two inconsistent standards, the interplay between them leaves open several procedural questions. Is a litigant at the trial court level supposed to pursue one avenue over the other? If so, under what circumstances should the litigant choose a “motion to recuse” under Rule 63(C)(1), and under what circumstances should the litigant choose the motion to substitute under the Code? Or should a litigant always move first for recusal under the lesser burden detailed in Rule 63(C)(1), and then move to have another judge decide a motion for substitution under the more onerous subjective standard only if the motion to recuse fails? And how do the conflicting standards work on appeal? Must both avenues be exhausted at trial before the litigant can raise a removal issue on appeal, or is a motion for substitution sufficient to put the judge on notice of a potential conflict? Can a litigant on appeal argue that the trial court’s judgment should be vacated for either failure to substitute under the Code or failure to recuse under Rule 63(C)(1)? If so, won’t the litigant always choose to frame the argument in terms of failure to recuse, so as to invoke the lower standard contained in Rule 63(C)(1)? And would this result not allow litigants on appeal to circumvent the substitution of judge statute and therefore allow Rule 63(C)(1) to sub silentio abrogate the statute? See Moses W., 363 Ill. App. 3d 182 (vacating trial court’s decision for failure to grant motion for substitution for cause but applying the Rule 63(C)(1) standard instead of the statutory standard). And how can the “actual prejudice” standard survive in light of the due process requirement that a judge be removed for the objective appearanee of bias, even without subjective actual bias? Does due process require that Illinois abandon the “actual prejudice” standard? If so, does the due process standard differ from the Rule 63(C)(1) standard Illinois courts have in some cases applied? The interplay between statutory substitution, Rule 63(C)(1) recusal, and due process raises a number of questions that have no answers in our current law. If I were operating from a clean slate, I would hold that Rule 63(C)(1), and its standard requiring recusal in the face of an objective appearance of impropriety, does not provide a basis for a motion by a litigant. Instead, I would hold that it sets out ethical guidelines for judicial conduct. I would also hold that the statement that a litigant pursuing a motion for substitution for cause under the Code must establish “actual prejudice” refers not to actual trial prejudice {i.e., harm to the litigant’s case), but rather to bias on the part of the trial judge {i.e., that he or she was “actually prejudiced”). I would then point out that, pursuant to the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1208, 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009), Illinois courts’ application of the Code’s “actual prejudice” standard must be adjusted to comport with the minimum due process standards described in Caperton. However, I am not working from a clean slate. As the majority demonstrates, there is ample authority to support all of the conflicting ideas contained in the majority opinion. Instead of uncritically repeating those conflicting standards or attempting a facile reconciliation, I prefer to point out the problems. As I see it, the law on removal of judges suffers from far more than a tension — it is confused beyond this court’s power to repair. I describe below the many problems I see with the law as it is described in the majority opinion. First, as I have already discussed, Rule 63(C)(1) and the Code supply different standards. If a party may use the Rule 63(C)(1) standard to remove a judge (or even to obtain reversal on appeal for the judge’s failure to remove himself), the stricter statutory standard has no use. Second, the use of Rule 63(C)(1) as a basis for vacating a decision by a judge who should have recused himself or herself is incongruous to the purpose of the rule, as stated in the preamble to the Judicial Code, which is “to provide guidance to judges and candidates for judicial office and to provide a structure for regulating conduct through disciplinary agencies,” not to form the “basis for civil liability or criminal prosecution” or to be “invoked by lawyers for mere tactical advantage in a proceeding.” 145 Ill. 2d Code of Judicial Conduct, Preamble, at xxviii. The language from the preamble, the fact that the supreme court rules comprising the Judicial Code are labeled as “canons” (see 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 61 through 67), and the fact that the Judicial Code appears in a section of the supreme court rules dealing entirely with internal court procedures (see 134 Ill. 2d Rs. 1 through 76), all strongly indicate that the Judicial Code was placed in the supreme court rules to guide judicial disciplinary proceedings and provide a baseline for judges’ ethical decisions, not to alter our courts’ civil procedure standards. The preamble therefore can be read to suggest that Rule 63(C)(1) could provide persuasive authority as to what may constitute “cause” for substitution under the Code of Civil Procedure or even as to what judicial actions might violate constitutional fair trial protections, but it cannot be read to contemplate Rule 63(C)(1) as controlling a litigant’s attempts to remove a judge. See People v. Buck, 361 Ill. App. 3d 923, 931-32 (2005) (appearing to use the Judicial Code for guidance in applying the substitution of judge for cause provisions in the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/114 — 5 (West 2000)); cf. People v. Kegel, 392 Ill. App. 3d 538 (2009) (stating that rules of professional conduct for attorneys can underlie a disciplinary action or a malpractice action, but they are not grounds for a defendant’s criminal appeal). Likewise, Rule 63(C)(1) itself, which speaks of a judge disqualifying “himself or herself’ and not of a judge’s disqualification by operation of law, does not seem to support the notion that the rule was meant as a direct means of relief to be pursued by litigants. There is foreign authority to support this view. See Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1086 (Fla. 1984) (noting that the Code of Judicial Conduct “sets forth basic principles” for judges’ conduct but then noting that the principles were “consistent with” case law and listing the Florida Statutes, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Florida Rules of Civil Procedure as describing the processes for litigants seeking to disqualify judges); Radcliffe 10, L.L.C. v. Zip Tube Systems of Louisiana, Inc., 2007-1801 at 10 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/29/08), 998 So. 2d 107, 115 (La. App. 2008) (agreeing with trial court that “the Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3 C does not provide an independent basis for recusal of a judge” and that the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure “creates an exclusive list of grounds for mandatory recusal of a judge”); Schmidt v. Bermudez, 2006 — CT—00765—SCT (Miss. 2009) (noting that appeal did not present the question of whether the trial judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct — a question that the court might consider after review by the Judicial Performance Commission — but nonetheless finding review of the canons to be “appropriate” to help determine whether the trial judge denied the litigants a fair trial); see also In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceeding in Petroleum Products Antitrust Litigation, 658 F.2d 1355, 1360 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The reporter for the ABA Committee that drafted the Code of Professional Responsibility recently noted that the Code’s Disciplinary Rules were drafted for use in disciplinary proceedings and were not intended to be used as rules governing disqualification motions. [Citation.] Nevertheless, the Code will continue to provide guidance to the courts.” (Based on policy considerations, the court nonetheless adopted a canon of professional responsibility as a basis for disqualifying an attorney)); Handelman v. Weiss, 368 F. Supp. 258, 263 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (“the courts have looked to the [Code of Professional Responsibility] primarily as an aid in [their] determination of acceptable practices. The power of this court to disqualify lawyers is based on the court’s general supervisory powers”); cf 28 U.S.C. §455 (2006) (codifying the Code of Judicial Ethics as part of statutes governing removal of a judge for cause); Germain v. Labrie, 108 Conn. App. 587, 595, 949 A.2d 518, 524 (2008) (noting that court rules adopted the judicial canon on disqualification as a basis for a litigant moving to remove a judge); Powell v. Anderson, 660 N.W.2d 107, 114-15 (Minn. 2003) (overruling cases holding that the Code of Judicial Conduct is not a controlling basis for disqualification of a judge by expressly adopting a rule that the provisions of the Code may provide a basis for a litigant’s disqualifying a judge).8  However, I have uncovered no Illinois case considering this issue; the cases uniformly assume without discussion that Rule 63(C)(1) can stand alone as a basis to vacate a judgment due to a judge’s improper failure to remove himself or herself from a case. E.g., People v. Kliner, 185 Ill. 2d 81, 169-70 (1998); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. O’Malley, 163 Ill. 2d 130, 137-42 (1994); People v. Storms, 155 Ill. 2d 498, 502-06 (1993). Absent some ruling either adopting the canons as an independent basis for vacating a judgment or declaring them as nonbinding guidance for purposes of a motion to remove a judge, the discrepancy between this use of Rule 63(C)(1) and the apparent purpose of Rule 63(C)(1) stands unresolved in Illinois law, just as does the conflict between the standards for applying Rule 63(C)(1) and the standards for applying the provisions of the Code governing substitution of judges for cause. Third, if the standards for a statutory motion for substitution of judge for cause remain in effect in light of the above-described conflict with Rule 63(C)(1), the requirement that a litigant seeking to vacate a judgment for improper denial of a motion for substitution for cause must demonstrate “prejudicial trial conduct” presents another quandary in this area of the law. The requirement appears to derive from a mistake propounded by McCormick v. McCormick, 180 Ill. App. 3d 184, 194 (1988), and perpetuated by a line of cases that followed. See Hoellen, 367 Ill. App. 3d at 248; In re Marriage of Petersen, 319 Ill. App. 3d 325, 339 (2001); Hartnett v. Stack, 241 Ill. App. 3d 157, 169 (1993); Hartian, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 569.9 The supreme court has nonetheless endorsed the above line of cases and therefore adopted “prejudicial trial conduct” as a necessary component of “actual prejudice” in the substitution-of-judge context. See Eychaner, 202 Ill. 2d at 280, citing Petersen, 319 Ill. App. 3d at 339, and Hartian, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 569. This requirement creates yet another contradiction in our law Illinois case law on substitution of judge for cause has long used the term “actual prejudice” or “prejudice” to describe the requirement that the movant establish that the trial judge was prejudiced in the sense that the judge was biased against the movant, not to describe a requirement that the movant establish prejudice in the sense of actual harm to the movant’s case. A requirement of a showing of prejudice in the sense of bias, and not in the sense of harm, is consistent with the statute on substitution and the rule on recusal, both of which protect a litigant’s right to a hearing before an impartial tribunal regardless of whether the bias in the hearing affected the result of the case. See American State Bank v. County of Woodford, 55 Ill. App. 3d 123, 128 (1977) (“The salutary principle is that one should not be compelled to plead his cause before a judge who is prejudiced, whether actually or only by suspicion,” but, once the time for substitution of judge as of right has passed, “the one seeking change is put [to] his proof to demonstrate actual prejudice”). In fact, those Illinois cases that have defined the “actual prejudice” requirement for substitution of judge for cause have equated it with bias. See People v. Patterson, 192 Ill. 2d 93, 131 (2000) (to establish “actual prejudice,” a party seeking substitution under the Code of Criminal Procedure must “establish ‘animosity, hostility, ill will, or distrust towards’ ” the party), quoting People v. Vance, 76 Ill. 2d 171, 181 (1979); People v. Robinson, 18 Ill. App. 3d 804, 807 (1974) (defining the term “prejudice” in the context of a challenge to the denial of a motion for substitution for cause as “a condition of the mind that imports the formation of a fixed anticipatory judgment as distinguished from opinions which yield to evidence”).10 It is difficult to reconcile this definition of “prejudice” with the case law’s interpretation of “prejudice” as requiring “prejudicial trial conduct.” Further, the “prejudicial trial conduct” requirement for substitution of judge for cause begs several unfortunate results. First, a requirement that a movant demonstrate “prejudicial trial conduct” in order to obtain a substitution forces the movant to wait for unfair conduct before attempting to have a biased judge removed from his case. Second, if no substitution for cause can be obtained without proof of “prejudicial trial conduct,” then even a patently unfair trial can be insulated on review if the record reveals no error in the result ultimately obtained. The impartiality of the tribunal overseeing a case, and the fairness of the trial process, are paramount to our legal system, and the law should not condone a biased hearing under any circumstances. Third, a party who has received a biased hearing will face practical difficulty in establishing that the result received was incorrect, because the bias at the hearing may have denied the party a full chance to advocate the merits of his or her position and explore the weaknesses in his or her opponent’s case. Fourth, again if the law surrounding a motion for substitution of judge for cause under the Code remains in effect in light of courts’ application of Rule 63(C)(1), the requirement that the movant demonstrate the trial judge’s actual bias invokes a solely subjective test that has been widely repudiated in favor of a test that allows removal when the movant can show either subjective bias or an objective appearance of partiality. See Alley v. State, 882 S.W.2d 810, 820 n.16 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994) (collecting cases). The jurisdictions following this course reason that “ ‘it is of immense importance, not only that justice be administered *** but that [the public] shall have no sound reason for supposing that it is not administered.’ ” Davis v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co., 38 S.W.3d 560, 564 (Tenn. 2001), quoting In re Cameron, 151 S.W. 64, 76 (Tenn. 1912). The United States Supreme Court has agreed — it has stated that due process requires more than just “an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases,” because, “to perform its high function in the best way ‘justice must satisfy the appearance of justice.’ "In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 99 L. Ed. 942, 946, 75 S. Ct. 623, 625 (1955), quoting Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14, 99 L. Ed. 11, 16, 75 S. Ct. 11, 13 (1954). In fact, the Supreme Court very recently criticized the subjective “actual bias” standard as insufficient under due process, because “[t]he difficulties of inquiring into actual bias, and the fact that the inquiry is often a private one,” led it to the conclusion that an inquiry into actual bias “is not one that the law can easily superintend or review” unless the judge in question affirmatively discloses such bias. Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883, 173 L. Ed. 2d at 1222, 129 S. Ct. at 2263. Thus, according to the Supreme Court, “the Due Process Clause has been implemented by objective standards that do not require proof of actual bias.” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 883, 173 L. Ed. 2d at 1222, 129 S. Ct. at 2263. Those objective standards ask “not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is ‘likely’ to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional ‘potential for bias.’ ” Caperton, 556 U.S. at 881, 173 L. Ed. 2d at 1221, 129 S. Ct. at 2262. Although the Supreme Court indicated that the objective standard described in Caperton is less protective than the objective standard described in most states’ codes of judicial conduct (see Caperton, 556 U.S. at 890, 173 L. Ed. 2d at 1226, 129 S. Ct. at 2267 (“Because the codes of judicial conduct provide more protection than due process requires ***”)), I question whether there is any practical difference between the application of the two standards.11 But there can be no question that the due process standard is less onerous for a movant than the “actual prejudice” standard upon which so many Illinois authorities rely. Something has to give. I have additional problems, beyond the failure to address the conflict in the law surrounding removal of judges, with the majority opinion. The majority refers to petitioner’s allegation that respondent “approached” the trial judge outside the courthouse (393 Ill. App. 3d at 367-68), but, when it analyzes the issue, the majority says that “petitioner does not allege that the interactions *** involved anything more than *** chance encounters” (393 Ill. App. 3d at 379). If respondent approached the judge, then, at least as to her, the meetings were not by “chance,” and the majority’s description of petitioner’s allegations is inconsistent. I would resolve this discrepancy by deferring to the trial court’s finding that petitioner did not prove that the encounters were anything more than “in passing.” The majority also refers to petitioner’s allegation that the judge disclosed respondent’s approaching him on “ ‘several’ ” occasions outside the courthouse. 393 Ill. App. 3d at 368. However, when it analyzes the issue, the majority says it will consider only two occasions, because the remaining occasions petitioner alleges were not described in petitioner’s motion to substitute and were supported only by his repetition of his former lawyer’s hearsay statement. 393 Ill. App. 3d at 378-79. Again, I would be more direct and defer to the trial court’s finding that petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to establish more than two encounters. Instead of taking the direct approach that I describe, the majority discounts the above discrepancies on the basis that the “approached” and the “several” language come from petitioner’s repetition of his attorney’s hearsay recapitulation of an off-the-record disclosure from the trial judge. See 393 Ill. App. 3d at 379. However, just before dismissing this hearsay statement as unreliable, the majority relies on it to establish that the judge “did disclose” (emphasis in original) his encounters with respondent. 393 Ill. App. 3d at 379. The majority even says that “[t]he fact that the disclosure occurred off the record is of no import.” 393 Ill. App. 3d at 379. If the hearsay nature of petitioner’s attorney’s statement is of no import as it pertains to portions of the judge’s disclosure that support the majority’s result, then it must also be of no import as it pertains to the portions of the judge’s disclosure that do not support the majority’s result. Again, I would take the more direct approach and defer to the trial court’s finding that petitioner presented sufficient evidence to establish only two chance encounters. I agree with the majority that the trial court did not err in denying the motion for substitution, but I disagree with the inconsistent and indirect reasoning the majority uses to decide the issue. I also disagree with its refusal to acknowledge the problems plaguing the law for removal of judges.   If, as the majority states, Rule 63(C)(1) is “merely” an exception to the Code’s standards for substitution of judges for cause, it is an exception that eviscerates the statute. Why would a party ever attempt to meet the higher statutory standard when it could have the judge removed under an “exception” that creates a lower standard?    The majority wonders why cases interpreting Rule 63(C)(1) have invoked the “appearance of impropriety” test, since, in the majority’s estimation, that concept is expressed by Rule 62, “not Rule 63(C)(1).” 393 Ill. App. 3d at 375 n.3. I do not join in the majority’s concern. Rule 62 does indeed dictate that a judge not act in a way that gives the appearance of impropriety, but Rule 62 does not expressly govern judicial disqualification. Rule 63(C)(1) does govern judicial disqualification, and it says that judges must disqualify themselves in proceedings in which their “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 210 Ill. 2d R. 63(C)(1). I struggle to read this rule in any way that does not invoke an “appearance of impropriety” test. Rule 62 says that judges must avoid the appearance of impropriety generally, and Rule 63(C)(1) applies the rule to judicial disqualification. In this area of the law, there are many problems worthy of critical examination, but the interplay between Rule 62 and Rule 63(C)(1) is not among them.    I find one additional case in which the appellee argued that the Code of Judicial Conduct “is an ethical code only and that a violation of the Code should not result in the invalidation of all of a judge’s previous rulings.” Mad-sen v. Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Ass’re, 767 E2d 538, 544 (Utah 1988). The court in Madsen declined to reach the issue, but it implied that the ethics rules could stand alone to provide a basis for vacating a judgment, because “[w]hile most of the Code is aimed exclusively at the regulation of judicial behavior, Canon 3 C not only regulates judicial conduct, but it also seeks to avoid unfairness by [e]nsuring each litigant an impartial judge.” Madsen, 767 E2d at 544. Because all of the judicial canons share this purpose, the reasoning from Madsen is unconvincing.    McCormick cited the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals decision, United States v. Bolden, 355 F.2d 453 (7th Cir. 1965), for the proposition that a party seeking substitution for cause must show prejudicial trial conduct. In Bolden, the defendant argued that his motion for substitution of judge should have been granted because the trial judge at one point told the jury that, in his opinion, the evidence sustained a guilty verdict (see United States v. Murdock, 290 U.S. 389, 78 L. Ed. 381, 54 S. Ct. 223 (1933)). Bolden, 355 F.2d at 456. The Seventh Circuit responded that the trial judge’s opinion “cannot be equated with personal bias.” Bolden, 355 F.2d at 456. The Seventh Circuit concluded its discussion with the passage upon which McCormick and its progeny seem to rely: “In short, prejudice must be shown by trial conduct; it may not be presumed or inferred from the subjective views of the judge.” Bolden, 355 F.2d at 456. This passage at first glance appears to support the notion that actual prejudicial trial conduct is required for substitution of judge for cause. However, the context of the statement indicates that the Seventh Circuit meant that a trial judge’s having an opinion of the evidence does not establish the prejudice necessary to effect a substitution of judge, not that prejudicial trial conduct is always required to establish bias.    Section 114 — 5(d) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (725 ILCS 5/114— 5(d) (West 2006)), the section governing substitution of judge in criminal cases, contains essentially the same “substitution of judge for cause” language as the section of the Code of Civil Procedure at issue here (see 735 ILCS 5/2— 1001(a)(3)(ii) (West 2006)).    The Caperton due process standard requires a judge’s removal where the average judge in the same position is not likely to remain neutral (Caper-ton, 556 U.S. at 881, 173 L. Ed. 2d at 1221, 129 S. Ct. at 2262), while the Judicial Code’s standard requires a judge’s recusal where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned (210 Ill. 2d R 63(C)(1)). How can either standard be applied, except through the construct of the reasonable observer’s assessment of the likelihood of bias for the average judge in the same position?