Court Opinion

ID: 9554027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:40:06.603468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:50.374240
License: Public Domain

GARBARINO, Judge,
dissenting:
¶ 26 I respectfully dissent.
¶ 27 The Phoenix police stopped and cited petitioner for driving on a DUI-suspended driver’s license, no proof of insurance, no registration, no proof of identity, and failure to remain on the right side of the road. Petitioner did not request a jury trial. Following a bench trial, the magistrate sentenced petitioner to a three-month suspension of his driver’s license, two days in jail, and a $1,010 fine.
¶28 Petitioner appealed to the superior court, arguing that he had a constitutional right to a jury trial concerning the charge of driving on a DUI-suspended license. The superior court found that the offense of driving on a DUI-suspended license was not a jury-eligible offense. Petitioner then filed this special action. The superior court granted petitioner’s request to stay his sentence pending the outcome of this action.
¶ 29 Disregarding the fact that petitioner did not initially request a jury, I will go right to the issue of his entitlement to a jury based on the nature of his offense. Generally, the constitutional right to a jury trial does not apply to petty offenses. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541, 109 S.Ct. 1289; Rothweiler, 100 Ariz. at 41, 410 P.2d at 482. However, there are exceptions to the rule. Recognized exceptions include petty offenses that carry the possibility of a severe penalty, involve moral turpitude, or traditionally have merited a jury trial. See State v. Miller, 172 Ariz. 294, *230295, 836 P.2d 1004, 1005 (App.1992); Dolny, 161 Ariz. at 299, 778 P.2d at 1195.
¶ 30 Petitioner challenges only the superior court’s determination that his conviction and sentence neither involved moral turpitude nor carried a severe penalty. Thus, we should first determine whether petitioner’s offense was petty. If petitioner’s offense was not petty, we should reverse and remand for a jury trial. If petitioner’s offense was petty, we should next decide if it involved moral turpitude or carried a severe penalty. If either of these exceptions apply, we should reverse and remand for a jury trial. If neither exception applies, we should deny relief.
¶ 31 To determine if an offense is petty, we must look at the maximum penalty attached to the offense. See Lewis v. United States, 518 U.S. 322, 324, 116 S.Ct. 2163, 135 L.Ed.2d 590 (1996). “An offense carrying a maximum prison term of six months or less is presumed petty____” Id. at 326, 116 S.Ct. 2163. Also, the United States Supreme Court has held that a DUI conviction that carries a maximum potential fine of $5,000 does not entitle a defendant to a jury trial. See United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5, 113 S.Ct. 1072, 122 L.Ed.2d 374 (1993). Here, petitioner faced, at most, a six-month jail term and a $2,500 fine. Thus, we should presume that his offense was petty.
¶ 32 The second question, then, is whether petitioner’s offense involved moral turpitude. License suspension is not a moral turpitude offense. Moral turpitude encompasses conduct of a depraved and intrinsically base person, actions that negatively reflect on a person’s honesty and integrity, and conduct that would support an inference of one’s readiness to commit evil or lie. See Campbell v. Superior Ct., 186 Ariz. 526, 528, 924 P.2d 1045, 1047 (App.1996).
¶ 33 Instead of this Court determining the moral seriousness of a crime, “[t]he better rule is to gauge the moral impact and the seriousness of a crime based upon the legislative response to it.” Harrison, 164 Ariz. at 319, 792 P.2d at 782. As demonstrated in Harrison, suspension of a driver’s license is not necessarily a serious sanction. See id. at 318, 792 P.2d at 781. In fact, the legislature expressly made it a civil sanction rather than a criminal sanction, removing from it any stigma of criminal punishment. See id.
¶ 34 Finally, we should consider whether petitioner’s offense carried a severe penalty. A defendant is entitled to a jury for a petty offense if he or she “can demonstrate that any additional statutory penalties, viewed in conjunction with the maximum authorized period of incarceration, are so severe that they clearly reflect a legislative determination that the offense ... is a ‘serious’ one.” Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543, 109 S.Ct. 1289.
¶ 35 We already discussed the fact that the amount of possible jail time did not rise to the level of seriousness required to warrant a jury trial. See Lewis, 518 U.S. at 326, 116 S.Ct. 2163. Petitioner’s only remaining argument is based on any additional statutory penalties that may be imposed. The only additional penalty that petitioner faced was the possibility of a driver’s license suspension. We held in Harrison that loss of a driving privilege may be an inconvenience, but it is not a severe penalty. See 164 Ariz. at 318, 792 P.2d at 781. I concede that the suspension was only ninety days in Harrison. See id. at 317, 792 P.2d at 780. However, because a license suspension is a civil sanction, as opposed to a criminal penalty, a one-year suspension should not be sufficient additional punishment to warrant a jury trial.
¶ 36 Petitioner was not entitled to a jury trial. Whether he validly waived his right to demand a jury trial by his failure to make a timely demand is irrelevant. We should accept jurisdiction and deny relief.