Court Opinion

ID: 9643480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:30:54.022613+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:00.898406
License: Public Domain

Roberts, J.,
concurring. I concur in the decision to remit this case to the superior court for a new trial on the merits for reasons in addition to those stated by Mr. Justice Powers. It is my opinion that the trial justice erred in sustaining the plaintiff’s objections to inquiries made in cross-examination of the plaintiff as to whether he had instituted an action against Julia A. Tavares, the owner of the car involved and the person to whom the policy of insurance was issued. If such evidence established that plaintiff had *323'instituted an action against her for injuries resulting to-him arising out of this same accident, it would raise a substantial question as to whether the action directly against 'the insurer upon a return of process non est inventus provided in the statute would be available to- him.
In Maczuga v. American Universal Ins. Co., 166 A.2d 227, 92 R. I. 76, the plaintiff, injured in an automobile collision, had issued her writ against the defendant operator of the other car involved therein. This writ was subsequently returned non est inventus by the officer, who set out in his return, in substance, that he was unable to find the defendant operator within his precinct. Pursuant to the provisions of G. L. 1956, §27-7-2, the plaintiff then brought her .action directly against the insurance company that had insured the defendant operator. The defendant insurer thereafter filed a plea in abatement, alleging therein that the defendant operator was within this state -and living at an address in Pawtucket where, at that time, he could be served .with process. To this plea the plaintiff demurred, and after a hearing thereon the demurrer was sustained on the ground that the acquisition of information by the plaintiff as to .the whereabouts of the defendant operator after the issuance of her first writ and a return thereon non est inventus was not a ground for a dismissal of the action that she had brought pursuant to the pertinent provisions of said §27-7-2. In other words, this court noted that the issue raised was not whether the writ returned non est inventus had been issued in bad faith but whether subsequent availability .of the defendant operator for service divested the court of jurisdiction in the later suit.
In my opinion Maczuga clearly stands for the proposition that when the court obtains jurisdiction to hear and determine an action brought directly against the insurer by virtue of the pertinent provisions of §27-7-2, that court will not be divested of such jurisdiction by reason of the sub*324sequent availability for service of process of the defendant named in the writ returned non est inventus, and this though such defendant is made available by the defendant insurer. We noted therein that had the legislature intended to divest the court of the jurisdiction acquired upon the return of the writ non est inventus by a disclosure that the defendant named in such writ was now available for service, it would have so provided.
In the instant case defendant insurer argues under its exceptions numbered 4 and 5 that if plaintiff had an action pending against the owner, he could have heard and determined therein all the issues that could be heard in an action brought against the insurer directly and, therefore, the statute under consideration does not contemplate that the remedy of a direct action against the insurer would be available to a plaintiff who had pending an action against the owner. In these circumstances the issue is one of statutory construction, that is, whether the legislature intended in §27-7-2 to vest jurisdiction in the superior court to hear and determine a case brought directly against the insurer by a plaintiff who then had pending an action against the owner arising out of the same transaction.
I am constrained then to conclude that the evidence excluded by the trial justice concerning the pendency of an action brought by the plaintiff against the owner in this case could well establish a fact situation that would be relevant and material on the question of the jurisdiction of the superior court to hear and determine the instant case by virtue, of the provisions of §27-7-2. It is well settled that questions going to the jurisdiction of a court over the subject matter of an action pending before it may be raised by either party or by the court on its own motion at any time during the course of the proceedings prior to judgment. Landry v. Cornell Construction Co., 87 R. I. 4; State Loan Co. v. Barry, 71 R. I. 188. It is, therefore, my opinion that the rulings of the trial justice sustaining objections to the *325questions asked by the defendant on cross-examination of the plaintiff deprived said defendant of an opportunity to establish facts upon which it could have raised a question as to the jurisdiction of the court to proceed further in the matter and for this reason constituted prejudicial error.
Gunning & LaFazia, Bruce M. Selya, Edward L. Gnys, Jr., for plaintiff.
Boss, Conlon, Keenan, Bulman & Rice, John T. Keenan, for defendant.
Joslin, J., concurs in the concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Roberts.