Court Opinion

ID: 9412842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-01 19:05:52.837269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:39:27.294561
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/1/23 Ora v. Hollywood Chamber of Commerce CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

SCOTT DOUGLAS ORA,                                                B321734

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                                 (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No.
         v.                                                       21STCV23999)

HOLLYWOOD CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE,

         Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Bruce G. Iwasaki, Judge. Affirmed.

         Scott Douglas Ora, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.

      Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani, Reid E. Dammann and
Violaine Brunet for Defendant and Respondent.

                               _________________________
      Plaintiff and appellant Scott Douglas Ora (Ora) appeals
from a judgment of dismissal entered after the trial court
sustained the demurrer of defendant and respondent Hollywood
Chamber of Commerce (the Chamber of Commerce) to Ora’s first
amended complaint (FAC) without leave to amend.
      We affirm.
        FACTS1 AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.    The Star Mishap
      The Chamber of Commerce administers Hollywood’s “Walk
of Fame,” a network of sidewalks along Hollywood Boulevard and
Vine Street embedded with decorative stars honoring notable
persons in the entertainment industry. To receive a star, a
person must be nominated via written application. Each year,
the Chamber of Commerce awards stars to a handful of these
applicants.
      Once an application is approved, the Chamber of Commerce
sends an award notification letter informing the honoree that he
must set a date for the dedication ceremony within a certain
timeframe and pay a sponsorship fee. If these conditions are not
met within a specified timeframe, the award expires and the
honoree must resubmit his application.
      In 1988, Academy-Award-winning songwriter and lyricist
Leo Robin (Robin) was nominated by his wife to receive a
posthumous star. The nomination was co-sponsored by veteran
actor and performer Bob Hope (Hope).

1      “Because this matter comes to us on demurrer, we take the
facts from plaintiff’s [FAC], the allegations of which are deemed
true for the limited purpose of determining whether plaintiff has
stated a viable cause of action. [Citation].” (Stevenson v.
Superior Court (1997) 16 Cal.4th 880, 885.)

                                2
       In June 1990, the Chamber of Commerce sent Robin’s wife
an award notification letter informing her that Robin had been
selected to receive a star. At that time, the period for scheduling
a ceremony was five years and the sponsorship fee was $4,000.
       Unfortunately, Robin’s wife passed away before the letter
arrived. The unopened letter was returned to the sender and
placed in the Chamber of Commerce’s files. Per the Chamber of
Commerce’s practices at the time, no further attempts were made
to notify Hope or Robin’s surviving relatives. And because no one
responded to the letter, Robin’s star was never installed.
II.    Ora’s Campaign to Reinstate Robin’s Star
       In 2017, Ora, Robin’s grandson and trustee of the Leo
Robin Trust, first discovered that Robin had been awarded a star
and confirmed that the star was never claimed.
       Ora immediately wrote a letter to Ana Martinez (Martinez),
then the Vice President of Media Relations for the Chamber of
Commerce, “request[ing] that the Walk of Fame Committee
reinstate the award to [Robin] of the posthumous star.” Ora
initially said that he would “not [want] to have too much fanfare
in connection with the [dedication] ceremony.”
       In July 2018, Martinez told Ora that she “d[id]n’t know [if]
that [reinstatement] will happen as [the star] has to be sponsored
and you said you didn’t want to have a ceremony or the fanfare
that comes with the event which is why we do this.”
       A few days later, before the Chamber of Commerce had
communicated any decision about the potential reinstatement,
Ora wrote a second letter informing Martinez that he now
wanted to have a star-studded dedication ceremony that he hoped
would be “a grand celebration” with an “exceptional turnout.”
Martinez responded: “From what I gather[,] you are now willing

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to have the star dedication happen with a ceremony?? There is
the sponsorship fee involved of 40,000.00. Please let me know
when you would like to do the ceremony and once you give me a
date we can move forward. I do have to get it re-instated by the
Chair.”
       Ora sent Martinez a letter selecting a date for the
ceremony and enclosed a check for $4,000. Ora acknowledged
that the sponsorship fee had increased tenfold since Robin was
awarded a star, but believed that “it would only be logical for the
sponsor of [Robin] to pay the same amount” as the other honorees
selected in 1990.
       Martinez promptly returned Ora’s check. She explained
that because “[t]he approval of Mr. Robin’s star lapsed many
years ago . . . [i]t would need to be reinstated by the Walk of
Fame Committee,” which would “very likely . . . require that the
fee be raised to the current approved level.” Accordingly, the
Chamber of Commerce could not accept Ora’s check.
       When Ora objected to the Chamber of Commerce’s position,
Martinez told him that “[i]t shouldn’t be a problem to reinstate[,]
but the fee is $40,000. Prices have gone up.”
       In September 2018, Leon Gubler (Gubler), then the
President and Chief Executive Officer of the Chamber of
Commerce, informed Ora that “[a]s [Martinez] has explained to
you, we have existing protocols that must be followed to reinstate
star approval.” Per those protocols, Gubler said that Ora’s
“request[] [for] the fee to be reduced to $4,000 . . . is not possible.
The committee will never approve the reinstatement unless there
is a sponsorship in place to pay the fee at the current rate.”

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        Ora persisted in his attempts to get the star installed at the
1990 rate for the next three years. Robin’s star was never
reinstated.
III. The Lawsuit
        Unable to reach an agreement with the Chamber of
Commerce, Ora’s journey to a star culminated in this lawsuit.
On June 29, 2021, he filed his original complaint, suing the
Chamber of Commerce for breach of contract and negligence.2
        Ora alleged that the Chamber of Commerce entered into a
contractual agreement to install the star by sending the 1990
award notification letter, and that it violated that agreement by
not installing the star despite Ora “d[oing] everything in his
power to fulfill performance of the Robin [Star] Contract
. . . within two years of [his] discovery of Robin’s star” in 2017.
He also argued that this breach constituted negligence, and that
the Chamber of Commerce compounded this negligence by failing
to (1) ensure that Robin’s family or Hope were notified of the star
award in 1990 and (2) follow through on its promise to consider
reinstatement of Robin’s star at successive Walk of Fame
Committee meetings from 2019 through 2021.
        The Chamber of Commerce demurred to Ora’s complaint,
alleging, inter alia, that the complaint was time-barred, that Ora
lacked standing, and that no contract existed between the
parties. Ora filed an opposition to the demurrer, and the
Chamber of Commerce filed a reply supporting it. On

2     Ora’s complaint also (1) improperly attempted to sue
several subsidiary entities, including the Hollywood Walk of
Fame itself, and (2) contained a third cause of action for
injunctive relief, which, as noted by the trial court, was “actually
a request for a type of remedy . . . for the alleged breach of
contract.”

                                  5
February 16, 2022, the trial court granted the demurrer with
leave to amend.
       On March 17, 2022, Ora filed the FAC. The causes of
action in the FAC are substantially similar to those in the
original complaint.3 Again, the Chamber of Commerce demurred,
and the parties filed papers opposing and supporting the
demurrer.
       On May 17, 2022, the trial court sustained the Chamber of
Commerce’s second demurrer without leave to amend. With
respect to Ora’s claim for breach of contract, the trial court
determined that no contract was entered into, construing the
Chamber of Commerce’s 1990 award notification letter as an offer
which was not timely accepted. Alternatively, the trial court
found that, assuming a contract did exist, its conditions
precedent—namely the timely scheduling of a star ceremony and
payment of a sponsorship fee—were not performed until 13 years
after the contractual period of limitations expired. Under either
theory, the trial court held that there was no viable claim for
breach of contract. The trial court also sustained the demurrer
as to Ora’s negligence cause of action, which it found to be
derivative of his contractual claim.

3       The only substantive amendments in the FAC are the
following additions: (1) the allegation that by “plac[ing] the
award letter in its files and always ke[eping] it a secret from
. . . Hope,” the Chamber of Commerce “obstruct[ed]” Hope from
“schedul[ing] . . . Robin’s ceremony and . . . pa[ying] for Robin’s
[star]”; (2) the argument that the Chamber of Commerce’s acts,
including their “obstruction” of Hope’s ability to timely fulfill the
agreement, violated the implied duty of good faith and fair
dealing; and (3) an exhibit containing information about Hope’s
stars.

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       A judgment of dismissal was entered, and this timely
appeal ensued.
                           DISCUSSION
I.     Standard of Review
       “Our Supreme Court has set forth the standard of review
for ruling on a demurrer dismissal as follows: ‘On appeal from a
judgment dismissing an action after sustaining a demurrer
without leave to amend, the standard of review is well settled.
The reviewing court gives the complaint a reasonable
interpretation, and treats the demurrer as admitting all material
facts properly pleaded. [Citations.] The court does not, however,
assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.
[Citation.] The judgment must be affirmed “if any one of the
several grounds of demurrer is well taken. [Citations.]”
[Citation.] However, it is error for a trial court to sustain a
demurrer when the plaintiff has stated a cause of action under
any possible legal theory. [Citation.] And it is an abuse of
discretion to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if the
plaintiff shows there is a reasonable possibility any defect
identified by the defendant can be cured by amendment.
[Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Payne v. National Collection Systems,
Inc. (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1037, 1043–1044.)
II.    Analysis
       On appeal, Ora admits that his negligence claims “are
dependent on the gravamen breach of contract claim.” Therefore,
we need only determine whether the trial court properly
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend with respect to
Ora’s breach of contract claim. We conclude that it did.

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      To withstand demurrer on a cause of action for breach of
contract, a plaintiff must plead, among other things, “the
existence of a contract [and] his or her performance of the
contract or excuse for nonperformance.” (Harris v. Rudin,
Richman & Appel (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 299, 307.) Ora’s breach
of contract claim fails to clear this threshold.
      The parties dispute whether and how a contract was
formed between them.4 Ora insists that the 1988 nomination
application constituted an offer to sponsor Robin’s star per the
Chamber of Commerce’s policies, and that the Chamber of
Commerce accepted that offer without qualifications by sending
the 1990 award notification letter. The Chamber of Commerce
contends that the award notification letter constituted an offer to
award the star, and that since the offer was never accepted, no
contract ever formed. Assuming, arguendo, that Ora’s theory of
the contract is correct, he still cannot establish performance of
the contract’s conditions precedent or a viable excuse for
nonperformance.5

4      The Chamber of Commerce also disputes whether Ora has
standing to enforce any purported agreement between it and the
original sponsors of Robin’s star. We agree with Ora that, at
minimum, he has standing in his representative capacity to
pursue a colorable claim regarding reinstatement of the star.
Indeed, in 2020, the Chamber of Commerce publicly admitted
that it would need to work with “someone representing [Robin’s]
estate” to reinstate the star.

5     Because we resolve the appeal on these grounds, we need
not address the parties’ arguments about issues of contract
formation or the statute of limitations applicable to breach of
contract claims.

                                 8
       As relevant here, “a condition precedent is . . . an act of a
party that must be performed . . . before a contractual right
accrues or the contractual duty arises.” (Platt Pacific, Inc. v.
Andelson (1993) 6 Cal.4th 307, 313.) “Generally, a party’s failure
to perform a condition precedent will preclude an action for
breach of contract.” (Richman v. Hartley (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th
1182, 1192.)
       In the FAC, Ora states that the terms of the alleged
contract required Robin’s sponsors to schedule a ceremony within
five years from the award of the star and to pay a set sponsorship
fee “at time right after selection[.]” Ora alleges that if these
conditions are not met, the award expires and “a new application
must be submitted.” Thus, as alleged, these terms are conditions
precedent that must be performed within a contractually
specified period to prevent the automatic revocation of the
Chamber of Commerce’s acceptance.
       The award notification letter was sent to the address of
Robin’s sponsor in June 1990. Under Ora’s theory of the contract,
the conditions precedent needed to be performed by June 1995 to
trigger the Chamber of Commerce’s contractual obligations. Yet
Ora admits that no one attempted to satisfy these conditions
until he mailed the Chamber of Commerce a letter containing a
proposed date for the dedication ceremony and a $4,000 check in
July 2018, more than 23 years after the contract expired.

                                 9
       Critically, the FAC does not plead a legally valid excuse for
nonperformance of these conditions during the contractual
period.6 The FAC alleges that the Chamber of Commerce
“unfairly interfere[d] with [Ora’s] right . . . to receive the benefits
of the contract” by keeping the returned, unopened award
notification letter in its files. But we disagree that the simple act
of retaining a letter returned to the offeree by the postal service
constitutes “unfair interfere[nce]” with the offeror’s contractual
rights.
       On appeal, Ora argues that the Chamber of Commerce
waived performance of the conditions precedent by “continuing to
deal with [him] after the dates specified in the contract.” This
argument fails both procedurally and substantively.
Procedurally, the FAC did not specifically allege that the
Chamber of Commerce waived the performance of these
conditions. (Hale v. Sharp Healthcare (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th
1373, 1388 [“‘[E]xcuses must be pleaded specifically.’
[Citation.]”].)

6      The mere failure of an offeror to actually receive a mailed
letter communicating acceptance is not a legally valid excuse for
nonperformance under California law. (Civ. Code, § 1583
[“Consent is deemed to be fully communicated between the
parties as soon as the party accepting a proposal has put his
acceptance in the course of transmission to the proposer”].)

                                  10
       Substantively, the exhibits attached to the FAC
demonstrate that the Chamber of Commerce did not waive
performance of the conditions precedent.7 Instead, its
representatives consistently stated that Robin’s star award had
lapsed and would need to be reinstated according to the Walk of
Fame Committee’s policies, and that Ora would need to pay a
sponsorship fee at contemporary rates. Tellingly, the Chamber of
Commerce expressly rejected and returned the document with
which Ora attempted to perform the lapsed conditions
precedent—namely, his letter selecting a date for the ceremony
and containing a $4,000 sponsorship fee. This conduct is not
consistent with an intent to waive Ora’s performance of
conditions precedent. (Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Public
Utilities Com. (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1086, 1107 [“‘“‘Waiver
always rests upon intent. Waiver is the intentional
relinquishment of a known right after knowledge of the facts.
[Citations.] The burden, moreover, is on the party claiming a
waiver of a right to prove it by clear and convincing evidence that
does not leave the matter to speculation, and “doubtful cases will
be decided against a waiver.”’” [Citations.]’”].)
       Ora insists that “the silent acquiescence by the [trial] court
and the [Chamber of Commerce] on [his] argument regarding the
waiver . . . of the conditions precedent” means that his “argument

7      To the extent that Ora’s allegations characterize his
correspondence with the Chamber of Commerce in a manner that
conflicts with the actual text of that correspondence, we disregard
those allegations. While we generally must take all facts alleged
in the FAC as true, “[i]f facts appearing in the exhibits contradict
those alleged, the facts in the exhibits take precedence.”
(Holland v. Morse Diesel Internat., Inc. (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th
1443, 1447.)

                                 11
must be granted deference.” (Bolding omitted.) He does not
support this proposition with citations to authority. (See Cahill
v. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956
[“‘The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority
allows this court to treat the contention as waived.’
[Citations.]”].) And the cases Ora does cite to support finding
waiver are inapposite. (Galdjie v. Darwish (2003)
113 Cal.App.4th 1331, 1339 [describing cases in which a party’s
“‘tacit approval’” of alternate payment plans or express
acceptance of untimely payments waived performance]; Wind
Dancer Production Group v. Walt Disney Pictures (2017)
10 Cal.App.5th 56, 78–81 [a party that approves sporadic tolling
agreements during a contractual period of limitations may waive
the right to enforce the original period of limitations].)
       In brief, the demurrer was properly sustained as to Ora’s
breach of contract claim because the conditions that triggered the
Chamber of Commerce’s alleged contractual duty were never
performed. Moreover, because amendment cannot cure this
defect, the demurrer was properly sustained without leave to
amend.8

8      Ora argues that the trial court abused its discretion by
sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend, as he maintains
that amendment could have cured the FAC. This contention is
not borne out by the minimal alterations he proposes on appeal,
which would not have any substantive impact on the fatal defects
in the FAC. (Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 [it is
the plaintiff’s burden to show “in what manner he can amend his
complaint and how that amendment will change the legal effect
of his pleading”].)

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                         DISPOSITION
    The judgment of dismissal is affirmed. The Chamber of
Commerce is entitled to costs on appeal.

     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                            _____________________, Acting P. J.
                            ASHMANN-GERST

We concur:

_________________________, J.
CHAVEZ

_________________________, J.
HOFFSTADT

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