Court Opinion

ID: 9894831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 14:00:39.875771+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:49.827608
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13152    Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 11/03/2023   Page: 1 of 15

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13152
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        LUIS RAUL VICENTE FONSECA,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-20844-RNS-1
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13152     Document: 42-1     Date Filed: 11/03/2023   Page: 2 of 15

        2                     Opinion of the Court               22-13152

        Before NEWSOM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
              Luis Raul Vicente Fonseca appeals his conviction for
        possession and distribution of child pornography. He argues that
        the district court erred three times: by denying his motion to
        suppress evidence obtained from a forensic search of his
        cellphones, by denying his motions to dismiss on speedy trial
        grounds, and by denying his motion for a new trial based on the
        government’s failure to provide him Jencks Act material. We find
        no error in the district court’s rulings and therefore affirm
        Fonseca’s conviction.
                                        I.
               On December 11, 2019, a Customs and Border Protection
        officer stopped Luis Fonseca at Miami International Airport as he
        entered the country via a flight from Panama. Department of
        Homeland Security officials had earlier begun an investigation of
        Fonseca after receiving a tip from the National Center for Missing
        and Exploited Children that somebody had downloaded over one
        thousand files containing suspected child pornography to a Yahoo
        account registered in his name. Agents searched Fonseca and his
        luggage, discovering three cellphones.
               Fonseca informed the customs officer who took possession
        of these phones that he was an attorney in Venezuela. But he could
        not provide any details regarding his law practice, which led the
        officer to doubt the veracity of this claim. Even so, Homeland
USCA11 Case: 22-13152     Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 11/03/2023    Page: 3 of 15

        22-13152              Opinion of the Court                        3

        Security internal directives required customs officers to contact an
        associate assistant chief counsel or U.S. Attorney before searching
        information that might be subject to attorney-client privilege.
        Here though, investigators did not make such contact; they did,
        however, consult in-house agency counsel about Fonseca’s
        privilege claims.
               Invoking its border search authority, a Homeland Security
        analyst performed an initial forensic search of these cellphones.
        This initial search was limited to images and video to avoid
        reviewing any text communications in the phones, which agency
        counsel had advised was the likeliest place any attorney-client
        privileged material would be. The search revealed over one
        thousand child pornography files across the three phones.
              Following this initial search, Homeland Security obtained a
        search warrant and established a privilege filter team in
        coordination with the U.S. Attorney’s Office. No privileged
        information or any evidence substantiating Fonseca’s claim that he
        was an attorney was ever discovered during the more complete
        search that followed.
                Fonseca was indicted on two counts of possessing and
        distributing child pornography.       Due to numerous trial
        continuances granted by the district court—some on Fonseca’s
        motion, some on joint motion by Fonseca and the government,
        and the rest by the court sua sponte—over two years passed
        between Fonseca’s January 2020 arraignment and the beginning of
        his trial in August 2022. One important factor—in March of 2020,
USCA11 Case: 22-13152      Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 11/03/2023      Page: 4 of 15

        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13152

        national and international authorities declared that the outbreak of
        Covid-19 constituted a pandemic, prompting the closure of many
        institutions. See United States v. Dunn, 83 F.4th 1305, 1307 (11th Cir.
        2023). The Chief Judge of the Southern District of Florida issued
        eleven administrative orders between 2020 and 2021, which
        automatically continued all jury trials between March 16, 2020, and
        July 19, 2021. See Administrative Order 2020-18, S.D. Fla. (March
        13, 2020); Administrative Order 2021-65, S.D. Fla. (July 8, 2021).
        Some jury trials resumed in a limited fashion between July 19 and
        September 6, 2021. Administrative Order 2021-65, S.D. Fla. (July
        8, 2021). The orders also purported to stop the clock on all Speedy
        Trial Act calculations during this entire period. Id.
               Before trial, Fonseca moved to suppress all evidence
        obtained from the search of his cellphones, arguing that a forensic
        cellphone search without reasonable suspicion was not justified by
        the border search exception to the warrant requirement, and that
        Homeland Security had failed to follow its internal directives and
        establish a filter team before searching phones that could have
        contained privileged material. Fonseca also twice moved to
        dismiss his criminal indictment before trial, arguing that the
        government had violated the Speedy Trial Act via excessive delay.
        The district court denied these motions.
              After a two-day trial, a jury found Fonseca guilty on both
        counts. But following the verdict, the government discovered a
        problem. It had called Special Agent Pablo Llabre, the lead case
        agent on Fonseca’s investigation, to testify regarding the National
USCA11 Case: 22-13152      Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 11/03/2023    Page: 5 of 15

        22-13152               Opinion of the Court                        5

        Center for Missing and Exploited Children tip and the contents of
        Fonseca’s phones. Llabre had also earlier testified before the grand
        jury, but the government had not provided Llabre’s grand jury
        testimony to the defense before trial, as required by the Jencks Act
        and the district court’s scheduling order. The government
        provided the missing material to the defense after the conclusion
        of the trial when it discovered the error. Fonseca moved for a new
        trial on the grounds that the government’s failure to turn over
        Jencks Act material related to Agent Llabre’s testimony had
        prejudiced Fonseca’s defense. The district court denied this
        motion. Fonseca appeals.
                                         II.
               We review a denial of a motion to suppress under a mixed
        standard of review. We review factual findings for clear error,
        construing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        government, and legal conclusions de novo. United States v. Whyte,
        928 F.3d 1317, 1327 (11th Cir. 2019).
               We review whether the government violated a defendant’s
        speedy trial rights under either the Speedy Trial Act or the Sixth
        Amendment under a mixed standard of review. We review de
        novo the district court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on a
        violation of the Speedy Trial Act and for clear error the court’s
        factual determinations as to excludable time. Dunn, 83 F.4th at
        1314. A district court’s decision to grant or deny an ends-of-justice
        continuance under the Act is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
        Id. We review a district court’s legal conclusions regarding the
USCA11 Case: 22-13152       Document: 42-1       Date Filed: 11/03/2023      Page: 6 of 15

        6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-13152

        constitutional right to a speedy trial under the Sixth Amendment
        de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Oliva,
        909 F.3d 1292, 1301 (11th Cir. 2018).
                We review the denial of a motion for a new trial based on
        an alleged Jencks Act violation for abuse of discretion. United States
        v. Naranjo, 634 F.3d 1198, 1206 (11th Cir. 2011). A new trial is not
        warranted if the Jencks Act violation is harmless. United States v.
        Jones, 601 F.3d 1247, 1266 (11th Cir. 2010).
                                          III.
                                           A.
                Fonseca argues that the district court erred by denying his
        motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of his
        cellphones at Miami International Airport. He correctly admits
        that his first argument for suppression—that forensic searches of
        cellphones at the border still require individualized reasonable
        suspicion—is foreclosed by this Circuit’s precedent. See United
        States v. Touset, 890 F.3d 1227, 1232–37 (11th Cir. 2018).
               Fonseca’s second argument is that the DHS agents searching
        his phones violated the Fourth Amendment by failing to follow
        their agency’s privilege procedures after Fonseca informed them
        that he was an attorney in Venezuela and that the phones might
        contain privileged material. But as this Court has explained in the
        due process context, an agency’s failure to follow its own internal
        operating procedures does not automatically result in a
        constitutional violation. See Dacostagomez-Aguilar v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
        40 F.4th 1312, 1319 (11th Cir. 2022). It is true, as Fonseca argues,
USCA11 Case: 22-13152       Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 11/03/2023      Page: 7 of 15

        22-13152                Opinion of the Court                          7

        that we have previously blessed the use of filter teams as
        sufficiently protective of Fourth Amendment rights. E.g., In re
        Sealed Search Warrant & Application for a Warrant by Tel. or Other
        Reliable Elec. Means, 11 F.4th 1235 (11th Cir. 2021). But that has
        little bearing on whether DHS’s search of Fonseca’s cellphones
        here was constitutional. Our approval of a particular filter
        procedure does not imply that it is the only way an agency can
        constitutionally search materials that may be privileged.
               As the district court found, the precautions DHS took during
        the search of Fonseca’s phones likely complied with DHS’s internal
        directives for searches implicating purportedly privileged material.
        But even if they hadn’t, Fonseca has not made any further showing
        that the government violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The
        government took adequate precautions to safeguard against
        disclosing privileged material: the agents consulted with in-house
        counsel about how to handle the phones given privilege concerns;
        they limited their initial search to only pictures and videos, not text,
        to avoid discovering any attorney-client communications; and they
        obtained a warrant and assembled a filter team before more fully
        examining the phones’ contents. And ultimately, no privileged
        material was ever found. We thus find no error in the district
        court’s denial of Fonseca’s motion to suppress.
                                          B.
                                           1.
               Fonseca next argues that he was denied a speedy trial in
        violation of both the Speedy Trial Act and the Sixth Amendment.
USCA11 Case: 22-13152      Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 11/03/2023      Page: 8 of 15

        8                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13152

        We first consider his claim under the Speedy Trial Act, which
        provides that the trial of a criminal defendant who pleads not guilty
        must begin within seventy days of either the indictment being filed
        or the defendant’s first appearance before a judicial officer,
        whichever is later. 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1). If the defendant is not
        tried within that time, the district court must grant the defendant’s
        motion to dismiss the indictment. Id. § 3162(a)(2).
                The Act’s seventy-day period may be tolled for certain
        statutorily enumerated reasons. See id. § 3161(h). Relevant here,
        the duration of a continuance granted by the district court is
        excluded from the calculation of the seventy days, but only “if the
        judge granted such continuance on the basis of his findings that the
        ends of justice served by” the continuance “outweigh the best
        interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.” Id.
        § 3161(h)(7)(A). The Act provides a series of factors for the district
        court to consider when deciding whether the continuance serves
        the ends of justice and requires the court to set forth its reasons for
        its decision in the record. Id. § 3161(h)(7)(A)–(B). The district court
        need not make its findings regarding an ends-of-justice continuance
        contemporaneously with granting the continuance so long as the
        findings are on the record by the time the court rules on the
        defendant’s motion to dismiss for a speedy trial violation. United
        States v. Ammar, 842 F.3d 1203, 1207 (11th Cir. 2016).
               The Southern District of Florida’s administrative orders
        related to the Covid-19 pandemic purported to toll all Speedy Trial
        Act periods from March 16, 2020 through September 6, 2021 and
USCA11 Case: 22-13152      Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 11/03/2023      Page: 9 of 15

        22-13152               Opinion of the Court                          9

        set forth detailed ends-of-justice findings to that end. See
        Administrative Order 2020-18, S.D. Fla. (March 13, 2020);
        Administrative Order 2021-65, S.D. Fla. (July 8, 2021). In United
        States v. Dunn, this Court declined to reach the question of whether
        these blanket, district-wide administrative orders satisfied the
        Speedy Trial Act on their own. See Dunn, 83 F.4th at 1315–16. Dunn
        held instead that the continuances entered by the magistrate judge
        in that case were sufficient to stop the speedy trial clock because
        they cited the “fact that all grand jury sessions in the Southern
        District were temporarily continued due to the COVID-19
        pandemic.” Id. at 1317. Under the “COVID-19 pandemic
        circumstances,” district courts “were not required to make more
        case-specific, ends-of-justice findings, beyond the COVID-19
        pandemic-related one, in order to comply with § 3161(h)(7)(A).”
        Id.
                Fonseca argues that the district court failed to adequately
        state its findings why its continuances served the ends of justice on
        the record. Adding the time represented by those continuances
        back to the calculation, Fonseca argues, more than two years had
        run on the speedy trial clock before his trial began. We disagree.
        True, the district court’s continuance orders did not provide
        extensive explanations for its ends-of-justice findings. But its orders
        denying Fonseca’s motions to dismiss on speedy trial grounds
        explained how its previous continuances served the ends of justice,
        including by referencing the Southern District’s administrative
        orders suspending jury trials during the pandemic. Because a court
        may set out its ends-of-justice findings retroactively in this manner,
USCA11 Case: 22-13152         Document: 42-1         Date Filed: 11/03/2023         Page: 10 of 15

        10                         Opinion of the Court                        22-13152

        the speedy trial clock was properly stopped for the duration of the
        continuances. See Ammar, 842 F.3d at 1207; Dunn, 83 F.4th at 1318.
        There was no Speedy Trial Act violation. 1
                                               2.
                Moving on to Fonseca’s Sixth Amendment claim, that
        Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy
        trial. If a court finds a denial of this constitutional right, it must
        vacate any conviction and sentence imposed and dismiss the
        criminal indictment. United States v. Villarreal, 613 F.3d 1344, 1349
        (11th Cir. 2010). While “compliance with the Speedy Trial Act
        does not bar Sixth Amendment speedy trial claims, it will be an
        unusual case in which time limits of the Speedy Trial Act have been
        met but the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial has been
        violated.” United States v. Schlei, 122 F.3d 944, 986 (11th Cir. 1997)
        (alterations adopted and quotation omitted). In Barker v. Wingo,
        the Supreme Court established a four-factor test to determine
        whether a defendant’s constitutional, as opposed to statutory,
        speedy trial rights were denied. 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). We weigh

        1 Fonseca also argues that the district court violated 18 U.S.C. § 3174 by failing

        to follow its requirements for declaring a judicial emergency, which would
        have suspended the Speedy Trial Act period for up to 180 days. As the district
        court explained, the Southern District of Florida never invoked the judicial
        emergency provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3174 during the Covid-19 pandemic.
        Instead, it found good cause under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A) to toll the speedy
        trial period. See United States v. Dunn, 83 F.4th 1305, 1307–09 (11th Cir. 2023).
        The district court’s continuances thus could not have violated § 3174, because
        that provision was never active.
USCA11 Case: 22-13152      Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 11/03/2023      Page: 11 of 15

        22-13152                Opinion of the Court                         11

        (1) the length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) the
        defendant’s assertion of his right to a speedy trial, and (4) the actual
        prejudice borne by the defendant. Id.; see Villarreal, 613 F.3d at
        1350.
               The first factor of this test establishes a threshold inquiry:
        unless the defendant establishes that the delay between indictment
        and trial was “presumptively prejudicial,” the remaining factors
        will not be considered and his speedy trial claim will fail. Villarreal,
        613 F.3d at 1350. Here, that standard is met. Because more than
        one year passed between Fonseca’s indictment and his trial, the
        delay was presumptively prejudicial, and we may proceed to the
        remaining factors. Id. at 1351.
               The second factor does not weigh against the government.
        Fonseca argues that most of the delay was attributable to the
        Covid-19 pandemic, rather than to any fault of Fonseca. We agree,
        but the logic cuts both ways—the Covid-19 delay cannot be
        attributed to any fault of the government either. An unforeseen
        global health emergency is precisely the kind of “valid reason” out
        of the government’s control that justifies appropriate delay. Barker,
        407 U.S. at 531.
                We have repeatedly found that the third factor—assertion of
        the speedy trial right—does not weigh against the government
        when a defendant knows of pending charges against him but delays
        raising the speedy trial issue until a motion to dismiss. E.g., United
        States v. Dunn, 345 F.3d 1285, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v.
USCA11 Case: 22-13152        Document: 42-1         Date Filed: 11/03/2023        Page: 12 of 15

        12                        Opinion of the Court                       22-13152

        Hill, 622 F.2d 900, 909–10 (5th Cir. 1980). 2 Here, Fonseca initially
        waived his speedy trial rights, only re-asserting them for the first
        time in a motion to dismiss about nineteen months after his arrest
        and indictment. This alone makes it “difficult for him to prove that
        he was denied a speedy trial.” Villarreal, 613 F.3d at 1355 (alteration
        adopted and quotation omitted). Worse, Fonseca moved for
        several continuances both before and after moving to dismiss on
        speedy trial grounds—hardly the behavior of “a defendant
        aggressively asserting his desire to be tried promptly.” United States
        v. Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 212 (5th Cir. 2007); see United States v. Register,
        182 F.3d 820, 828 (11th Cir. 1999). The third factor thus weighs
        strongly against Fonseca.
               Because the first three factors do not uniformly weigh
        heavily against the government, Fonseca must show actual
        prejudice on the fourth factor to succeed in showing a violation of
        his constitutional right to a speedy trial. Villarreal, 613 F.3d at 1355.
        We assess the prejudice suffered by the defendant in light of the
        three interests protected by the speedy trial right: “(1) to prevent
        oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) to minimize anxiety and
        concern of the accused; and (3) to limit the possibility that the
        defense will be impaired.” Id. (quotation omitted). The last
        interest is the most important. Id.

        2 Decisions by the former Fifth Circuit handed down before October 1, 1981

        are binding on this Court. Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th
        Cir. 1981) (en banc).
USCA11 Case: 22-13152     Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 11/03/2023     Page: 13 of 15

        22-13152               Opinion of the Court                        13

                Two of these three interests were not impaired by the delay
        in Fonseca’s trial. While he may well have experienced anxiety and
        concern awaiting his trial on child pornography charges, Fonseca
        was neither subject to oppressive pretrial incarceration nor
        hindered from assisting in his own defense. He was released on
        bond and subject to house arrest for the majority of the pre-trial
        period: from January 2020 to July 2022. His bond was revoked on
        July 27, 2022, after the district court discovered that he lied during
        a plea colloquy related to a proffered guilty plea that was later
        withdrawn. Fonseca then was incarcerated for about one month
        before the start of his trial on August 29. This sequence was not so
        lengthy or oppressive as to implicate prejudice. See Kennedy v.
        Superintendent Dallas SCI, 50 F.4th 377, 384 (3d Cir. 2022); United
        States v. Hall, 551 F.3d 257, 272 (4th Cir. 2009). And Fonseca does
        not argue at all that the delay hindered his defense—the most
        important interest when considering actual prejudice. The fourth
        Barker factor thus heavily weighs against Fonseca.
               Because the first three Barker factors did not each weigh
        heavily against the government and Fonseca did not prove actual
        prejudice, we find that Fonseca’s constitutional speedy trial rights
        were not infringed. See Oliva, 909 F.3d at 1306.
                                         C.
              Finally, Fonseca argues that the government’s failure to
        provide him Jencks Act material warrants a new trial. The Jencks
        Act provides that, on a defendant’s motion, the district court “order
        the United States to produce any statement” of a witness called by
USCA11 Case: 22-13152     Document: 42-1      Date Filed: 11/03/2023    Page: 14 of 15

        14                     Opinion of the Court                22-13152

        the United States “in the possession of the United States which
        relates to the subject matter as to which the witness has testified.”
        18 U.S.C. § 3500(b). The purpose of this disclosure requirement is
        to permit the defense to impeach the government’s witness during
        cross-examination. United States v. Prieto, 505 F.2d 8, 11 (5th Cir.
        1974). Both parties agree that the government violated the Act by
        failing to disclose Agent Llabre’s grand jury testimony before trial.
        But a mere failure of disclosure is not enough to merit a new trial.
        Fonseca must also show that he was prejudiced. United States v.
        Hamaker, 455 F.3d 1316, 1327 (11th Cir. 2006).
               Fonseca’s main argument is that Llabre used the word
        “upload” when he described to the grand jury how Fonseca saved
        child pornography images and videos, but then used the word
        “share” during his trial testimony. The government’s failure to
        disclose Llabre’s grand jury testimony, he says, deprived him of the
        ability to cross-examine Llabre about the difference, if any,
        between those two words. But Fonseca had access to two other
        documents which used the word “upload”: an affidavit from Llabre
        and the report from the National Center for Missing and Exploited
        Children that tipped off the police that Fonseca might possess child
        pornography. The grand jury testimony was merely cumulative
        because Fonseca could have cross-examined Llabre about
        differences between the two words without it. That means the
        government’s failure to disclose Jencks Act material was harmless.
        See United States v. Valera, 845 F.2d 923, 928 (11th Cir. 1988).
USCA11 Case: 22-13152    Document: 42-1    Date Filed: 11/03/2023   Page: 15 of 15

        22-13152             Opinion of the Court                     15

                                 *     *      *
              The district court correctly found that the government’s
        search of Fonseca’s cellphones did not violate the Fourth
        Amendment, that Fonseca’s speedy trial rights were not violated,
        and that the government’s failure to disclose Jencks Act material
        was harmless. We therefore AFFIRM Fonseca’s conviction.