Court Opinion

ID: 9449317
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:07:56.978827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:29.177220
License: Public Domain

J-S20004-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                    :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                                  :
                v.                                :
                                                  :
                                                  :
  AARON HARRIS                                    :
                                                  :
                       Appellant                  :   No. 2110 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered July 26, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-51-CR-0002900-2015

BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                                   FILED AUGUST 4, 2023

       Appellant, Aaron Harris, appeals from the July 26, 2022 Order entered

in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas dismissing his petition filed

pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-46,

as meritless. After careful review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history, as gleaned from the certified

record and a prior opinion of this Court, are as follows. On February 27, 2017,

Appellant entered a guilty plea to Aggravated Assault and Conspiracy arising

from an incident in which he and a co-conspirator assaulted and stole from

Appellant’s brother, Rashad Harris.              On May 24, 2017, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 4 ½ to 9 years of incarceration

followed by 5 years of probation.              On June 15, 2017, Appellant filed an

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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untimely post-sentence motion.      Notwithstanding its untimeliness, the trial

court held a hearing on June 30, 2017, after which it agreed to consider

Appellant’s motion nunc pro tunc. However, Appellant withdrew the motion

on November 20, 2017, and did not file a direct appeal from his judgment of

sentence.

      On July 6, 2018, Appellant, represented by the same counsel as at his

plea hearing and at sentencing, filed a PCRA petition seeking relief based on

purported after-discovered evidence in the form of affidavits from his brother,

Rashad, and his father, Aaron Mitchell. Appellant appended the affidavits to

his petition. Rashad’s affidavit stated:

      My brother Aaron Harris is currently in prison for a family
      altercation that we got into. I am requesting that he is released
      early. This incident should not have happened and we both have
      learned from our mistake. My brother and I had a mutual friend
      named Artrell, who was like family to us. Artrell and I were really
      close up until the day that we got into that fight. When Art[r]ell
      and I began to fight my brother tried to restrain me. I was angry
      and upset, and I began to fight with my brother too. The fight
      escalated into much more than I would have ever expected. I was
      hurt and angry so I pressed charges. I love my brother and I
      never meant for things to go as far as they did. Since my brother
      has been incarcerated, I have spoken to him on the phone
      numerous times and I have sent him money. We have forgiven
      each other and we have moved on from this situation. I don’t
      want a family fight to keep him in prison, so I am asking that he
      gets released.

R. Harris Affidavit, 5/13/18.

      Aaron Mitchell’s affidavit stated:

      I am the biological father of Aaron Harris, but I have taken care
      of Rashad Harris since their mother left him with me at the age of
      two. I consider Rashad Harris just as much of a son as Aaron.

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       The night of the incident with Aaron and Rashad Harris, I took
       Rashad down to the police station myself. I wanted to teach Aaron
       a lesson about going against his brother. I did not know at the
       time that Rashad had done a few things to Aaron and their friends
       to upset them[.] I found out later[] that Rashad had stolen money
       from them and did other things. If I had known that Rashad was
       doing things to Aaron and his friends, I would not have taken him
       to the police station to file a complaint against Aaron. Aaron has
       had time to think about what he did to his brother and I believe
       that he has learned the lesson that I was attempting to teach him.
       I would like for my son Aaron Harris to get out of prison so that
       he can move on, enroll in school and start his professional boxing
       career.

A. Mitchell Affidavit, 5/14/18.

       Appellant’s petition did not address the PCRA’s jurisdictional time-bar or

plead any exceptions thereto.

       On October 10, 2019, the PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s petition as

meritless.    Appellant timely appealed, and his counsel filed a motion to

withdraw from representation and an Anders brief. Following our review, we

concluded that Appellant’s first PCRA petition was untimely and that counsel’s

failure to plead or prove any exceptions to the PCRA’s time-bar constituted

per se ineffectiveness.1 See Commonwealth v. Harris, No. 3240 EDA 2019,

unpublished     memorandum         at   4      (Pa.   Super.   filed   March   25,   2021)

(memorandum) (citing Commonwealth v. Peterson, 192 A.3d 1123, 1130

(Pa. 2018)).      We, therefore, reversed the PCRA court’s order dismissing

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1 In particular, we found that the trial court was without jurisdiction to hold a

hearing on and ultimately grant Appellant’s post-sentence motion nunc pro
tunc because the court failed to do so within 30 days of imposing Appellant’s
sentence. Harris, No. 3240 EDA 2019, at 3. Thus, we concluded that
Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final 30 days after his May 24, 2017
sentencing. Id.

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Appellant’s petition, granted counsel’s petition to withdraw, and remanded for

appointment of new PCRA counsel.

      Upon remand to the PCRA court, on August 16, 2021, new counsel filed

an Amended PCRA petition, in which he asserted prior PCRA counsel’s

ineffectiveness pursuant to Peterson.         Amended Petition, 8/16/21, at 3

(citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii)).

      On June 22, 2022, the PCRA court issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss

Appellant’s petition without a hearing pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, again

concluding that Appellant’s after-discovered evidence claim was meritless.

Appellant did not file a response to the Rule 907 Notice.

      This timely appeal followed.       Both Appellant and the PCRA court

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

      1. Did the [PCRA] court err, abuse its discretion, and/or make a
         mistake of law when it denied, as a matter of law, [Appellant’s]
         PCRA claim that the notarized affidavit of Rashad Harris
         constituted exculpatory evidence that had subsequently
         become available and that would have changed the outcome of
         trial?

      2. Did the [PCRA] court err, abuse its discretion, and/or make a
         mistake of law when it denied, as a matter of law, [Appellant’s]
         PCRA claim that the notarized affidavit of Aaron Mitchell
         constituted exculpatory evidence that had subsequently
         become available and that would have changed the outcome of
         the trial?

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6.

                                        A.

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      Both of Appellant’s issues challenge the PCRA court’s denial of

Appellant’s after-discovered evidence claims.

      Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition

is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller,

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s

findings will not be disturbed unless there is no support for the findings in the

certified record.”   Commonwealth v. Lawson, 90 A.3d 1, 4 (Pa. Super.

2014) (citations omitted). “This Court grants great deference to the findings

of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those findings merely because the

record could support a contrary holding.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799

A.2d 136, 140 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted).          We give no such

deference, however, to the court’s legal conclusions.       Commonwealth v.

Ford, 44 A.3d 1190, 1194 (Pa. Super. 2012).

      To receive a new trial based on after-discovered evidence, a petitioner

must satisfy the following four-part test:

      the petitioner [must] demonstrate the evidence: (1) could not
      have been obtained prior to the conclusion of the trial by the
      exercise of reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely corroborative
      or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach the credibility
      of a witness; and (4) would likely result in a different verdict if a
      new trial were granted.

Commonwealth v.         Small,   189    A.3d   961,   972   (Pa.   2018)   (citing

Commonwealth v. Pagan, 950 A.2d 270, 292 (Pa. 2008)).               “The test is

conjunctive; the [petitioner] must show by a preponderance of the evidence

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that each of these factors has been met in order for a new trial to be

warranted.” Commonwealth v. Padillas, 997 A.2d 356, 363 (Pa. Super.

2010).

                                               B.

       In his brief to this Court, Appellant argues that the PCRA court erred in

dismissing his petition because the after-discovered evidence set forth in the

affidavits of his brother and his father conflicted with their initial statements

to police. Appellant’s Brief at 15-16. He concludes, therefore, that “if Rashad

Harris had testified at trial to the version of events set forth in the affidavit of

probable cause, and then recanted this testimony with the version set forth in

his 2018 notarized signed statement, [Appellant] would have been granted a

new trial.” Id. at 15.2

       The PCRA court explained that it dismissed Appellant’s petition asserting

a claim of after-discovered evidence because, simply, “[t]he affidavits of

[A]ppellant’s father [] and his brother are about their desire to see him

released from prison[]” and “cannot realistically be considered evidence.”

PCRA Ct. Op., 11/4/22, at 4. The PCRA court aptly observed that: (1) the

affidavits do not contain any relevant facts pertaining to guilt, culpability, or

innocence; or any information that contradicts any of the facts in the case;
____________________________________________

2 He also asserts that “this evidence is not merely cumulative,” “would not be

used solely to impeach Mr. Harris,” and “could not have been obtained prior
to trial.” Appellant’s Brief at 15-16. Appellant does not, however, argue that,
had he known of these affidavits he would not have pleaded guilty and would
have instead chosen to go to trial.

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and (2) neither affiant provides facts refuting Appellant’s criminal conduct.

The court, therefore, concluded that because Appellant “cannot show that the

affidavits would have compelled a different outcome if [Appellant] had gone

to trial rather than pleading guilty, his after-discovered evidence claim must

fail.” Id.

      We agree. As the PCRA court opined, Appellant’s “arguments and the

affidavits submitted are a compassionate, emotional plea of family members

[] for a reduction of [A]ppellant’s prison sentence, and a request for a release

from prison.” Id. at 5. These affidavits are “not evidence that, if known at

the time Appellant entered his guilty plea, would have compelled a different

outcome.” Id. The record supports the PCRA court’s findings, and its decision

to dismiss Appellant’s petition is free of legal error. Appellant is, thus, not

entitled to relief.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/04/2023

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