Court Opinion

ID: 9571431
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:31:46.688623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:26.551507
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(dissenting). Tbe trial court correctly stated that “since tbe factual aspects are not in question, adjudication of tbe issue presented requires only the proper application of tbe law to tbe facts.”
Tbe five attempts to apply tbe law have resulted in three decisions1 that claimants are disqualified from receiving benefits for the period of unemployment and two decisions2 that claimants are not disqualified.
In this dissent from Justice Smith’s opinion I am joining the three who have decided that claimants are disqualified.
My Brother agrees with tbe appeal board that Park v. Employment Security Commission, 355 Mich 103, is a precedent for allowing benefits to present claimants.
I agree with tbe referee and tbe trial court that Park serves no such purpose.
In tbe Park Case tbe majority opinion stressed tbe fact that while functional integration of and by itself would not disqualify claimants, there were other factual criteria that should be examined, and stated (pp 120, 121):
“Tbe record in tbe cases considered herewith indicates for all plants concerned entirely separate and distinct plant managements and plant production schedules, as well as separate and distinct industrial relations and employment offices, employee seniority lists, local unions, and local labor-management agreements.”
*137To emphasize that point the Parle decision quoted with approval the Minnesota supreme court decision in Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Minn 68 (42 NW2d 576, 28 ALR2d 272), which, after making reference to the fact that functional integrality, general unity and physical proximity are not absolute tests in all cases, stated (p 127):
“ ‘We believe the better rule to be that these factors, together with other facts, must be taken into consideration in determining whether the unit under consideration is in fact a separate establishment from the standpoint of employment. The St. Paul branch of the Ford Motor Company is highly integrated with other units of the company for purposes of efficient management and operation, but is separate insofar as the employees are concerned for the purpose of employment. The employees are hired and discharged by the St. Paul manager. They are members of a local union which has no connection with the locals at Dearborn, except that all locals are members of the same international, as are many others not connected with the Ford Motor Company. The seniority rights of the employees extend only to operations at the St. Paul plant. No showing has been made, nor do we believe that any can be made, that an employee at the St. Paul branch can “bump” an employee at the Rouge plant, the Los Angeles plant, the Georgia plant, or anywhere else than at the St. Paul plant.’ ”
The following five quotes from the agreed “Statement of Proceedings and Pacts,” as set forth in my Brother’s opinion, disclose that not only are facts absent in the present case that were deemed important in granting claimants’ request in Parle, but that facts exist in this appeal that are completely opposite to the facts in Parle and contrary to granting claimants’ request:
*1381. “For the purpose of union representation the entire system was treated as a single bargaining unit.”
2. “There were no local labor-management agreements and local employees in Michigan were cov■ered by systemwide agreements which provided ■systemwide seniority. Employees, regardless of location, have systemwide seniority and are promoted, demoted, or laid off based on systemwide seniority.”
3. “The company had an operations manager in Detroit who might and did recruit employees. Prospective employees might be interviewed in Minneapolis or locally by an interviewer from Minneapolis, or by a local interviewer, but their ultimate employment was subject to approval by the director of employment at Minneapolis.”
4. “The local manager could not discharge a worker for an infraction of rules until a hearing was held with a final decision being made normally with the manager’s recommendation to the company. In the case such as theft, the manager could directly discharge the employee.”
5. “The payroll department for the entire system was located at Minneapolis. All time cards were checked by the local manager and forwarded to Minneapolis for compiling and for payment. All payroll checks were drawn on the First National Bank of Minneapolis; these being forwarded to the various points of the company’s system around the country.”
The appeal board took the position that it was not necessary to determine the flight engineers’ establishment, and appellee comments on that fact as follows:
“The board, by rejecting appellee’s arguments with respect to the Michigan establishment and by rejecting appellee’s arguments with respect to a system establishment, left the flight engineers ‘in the air,’ as it were, without any establishment. Such *139an absurd and afforced result demonstrates the fallacy of the board’s decision.”
Northwest Airlines scheduled 21 flights daily into the Detroit Metropolitan Airport and under Fed-, eral regulations no landing or take-off could be made without a flight engineer aboard.
Northwest Airlines had 34 airport locations within the United States, and each of these geographical locations was an integral part of the entire system.' of operation.
The flight engineers, who were important employees in conducting the planes from one location to another, performed work at all locations,3 and the entire system was “the establishment” of the flight engineers.
The ground force, of which claimants were part, and the “sky force,” of which the flight engineers were an important part, depended upon each other to make the joint endeavor a successful financial venture. When the flight engineers struck there was nothing for claimants to do and this fact is aptly set forth in appellee’s brief, as follows:
“The work of the claimants-appellants consisted of selling space aboard the aircraft that serviced the Detroit area. This space was sold to passengers and shippers. In addition, the claimants-appellants were responsible for loading and unloading the aircraft, making reservations, preparing tickets, receiving, checking and otherwise processing incoming and outgoing baggage, freight, mail and express. The work of the claimants-appellants abutted the work of the flight engineers directly at the aircraft itself. The work of each complemented the work' *140of the other, and the work of both was essential to the conduct of the appellee’s business in the Detroit metropolitan area.
“In essence and in fact, the striking flight engineers were employed side by side with claimants-appellants prior to the strike. And this is the distinguishing feature that applies to each and every decision cited by claimants-appellants for authority for their position. In each of those cases there was no work contact between the striking employees and those employees who were making claim for compensation.”
That the referee realized the importance of the factual criteria, namely: (1) Whether a local or systemwide seniority list prevailed; and (2) Whether there were local unions and local labor-management or union representation, with the entire system being treated as a single bargaining unit, is disclosed by the following from the referee’s opinion:
“Applying the various tests laid down by the Court in Park to the facts of the case at bar, important and salient distinctions in the factual situations are immediately apparent: Unlike the situation referred to in the Minnesota decision with reference to the St. Paul plant of the Ford Motor Company, and likewise, in contradistinction of the factual situation reflected in Park, with reference to localized employment conditions at the Ford Motor Company’s Canton, Ohio and Dearborn plants, the facts herein show that the employer’s airline system is highly integrated with all units along its route, not only for the purposes of management and operation, but for employment purposes as well. Almost all employees are hired under systemwide collective bargaining ag’reements and, although certain classifications may be recruited locally, all employment contracts are finalized at the company’s headquarters in St. Paul. Employees are not members of local bargaining units and, for *141the most part, exercised systemwide seniority, both with reference to bumping privileges in times of layoffs as well as bidding privileges for promotional purposes. In short, the indicia marshalled by the decision of the Court point up the dissimilarity in the employment situation of the claimants herein, as contrasted with those found to exist in Park. Unlike the Ford-Canton factual situation, where the employees worked at distinct locations, the Northwest Airlines flight engineers worked in each location and throughout each jurisdiction serviced by the company. Therefore, in applying the tests set forth by the Court in Park to the facts of the instant case, it is not concluded, as a matter of law, that claimants were employed at a separate establishment from that in which the stoppage of work due to the labor disputes existed.
“In view of the undisputed fact that the flight engineers, prior to the strike, performed daily services at all points of the company’s far-flung operations, both within and without the State of Michigan, it must be held, regardless of the fact that flight engineers were not based at the Michigan facility, that a stoppage of work due to a labor dispute existed within the establishment in which the claimants were employed.”
. The lengthy decision of the appeal board avoided any reference to the question of labor-management relationship or seniority rights despite the fact that the referee had clearly and emphatically stated why he deemed these factual criteria important.
The fact that the trial court considered these questions important is disclosed by the following from the trial court’s opinion:
“The court is of the opinion that the commission’s conclusion that the case of Park v. Employment Security Commission, 355 Mich 103, is controlling of the issues involved in these cases now before this court, is not correct. The Park Case deter*142mined that ‘integral functioning’ was not the basic test of the extent of ‘the establishment’ in the act. The Court, in the Park Case, quoted from Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Minn 68 (42 NW2d 576, 28 ALR2d 272). It was pointed out, in those cases, that in the Canton plant and the St. Paul plant, the local management had considerable independent authority over employees; that local unions represented the workers; seniority rights were local; et cetera. The installations of the Northwest Airlines, Inc., in Detroit Metropolitan area enjoyed no such independence. It could hardly be said that the claimants were employed at a ‘separate establishment.’ They were employed at a systemwide establishment, as a matter of law.” (Emphasis ours.)
I agree with the conclusions of both the referee and the trial court that the facts that claimants had systemwide seniority and that they belonged to a systemwide bargaining unit are most important in deciding this appeal.
While there was a systemwide bargaining unit, the 5,740 employees of Northwest were represented by seven different unions for bargaining purposes. The flight engineers and some of the claimants belonged to the same union, namely, the International Association of Machinists.
The appeal board in its decision, referring to one of appellee’s contentions, said:
“The employer has contended that, since a portion of the claimants’ union dues went into a strike fund for the flight engineers and from which they benefited, these claimants are disqualified under section 29(1) (b)(2) of the act (CDS 1956, §421.29 [Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.531]).”
The trial court commented on this in an addendum to his opinion, as follows:
*143“The question of the per capita tax of 50 cents per month to provide a strike fund is mentioned in the decision of the appeal board, but was not considered as one of the determining factors in its decision. Counsel for the claimants argues that the per capita tax was a part of the dues and is, therefore, covered by section 29(1)(b)(2) of the act.
“The court is of the opinion that a serious question does exist insofar as the members of the International Association of Machinists are concerned. * * *
“If these cases should reach our Supreme Court, this question should not be overlooked.”
Section 29 lists four reasons why “an individual shall be disqualified for benefits,” and after subdivision (1) which refers to “a labor dispute in the establishment in which he was then employed,” subdivision (2) provides: 
“That he is participating in or financing or directly interested in the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work: Provided, however, That the payment of regular union dues shall not be construed as financing a labor dispute within the meaning of this subsection.”
The appellee, claiming that “the claimants-appellants were directly involved in the labor dispute, within the meaning of the act,” states:
“The claimants-appellants who wore represented by the International Association of Machinists both financed the dispute and were directly interested in the dispute which caused the stoppage of work under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement between the appellee and the International Association of Machinists, which is contained in *144the record as exhibit No 18. Each employee covered by that agreement is required to become a member of the International Association of Machinists and to remain a member of that organization in good standing during the term of the agreement. Prior to the strike of January 9, 1961, the International Association of Machinists had, by its constitution, established a general strike fund. This strike fund was supported by the contribution of 50 cents per month per member, in the form of a per capita tax levied against each member in accordance with the terms of the constitution. As such this fund was separate and distinct from the regular union dues which each employee paid to the organization on a monthly basis. Since, by its constitution, the International Association of Machinists earmarked the tax to be placed in the general strike fund to be used solely for the payment of strike benefits, and not be used for any other purpose, the payment of such tax was other than the payment of regular monthly dues. It is undisputed that the striking-flight engineers drew, strike benefits from the general strike fund. Therefore, claimants-appellants represented by the International Association of Machinists financed the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work as contemplated in section 29 (1) (b)(2) of the Michigan employment security act:
“‘(2) That he is * * * financing * * * the labor dispute which caused the stoppage of work.’ ”
Without discounting appellee’s argument we deem it sufficient to say the joint membership of claimants and engineers in the IAM is one more factor that justifies the trial judge’s conclusion that “It could hardly be said that the claimants were employed at a ‘separate establishment.’ They were employed at a systemwide establishment, as a matter of law.”
As the flight engineers were employed at the same systemwide establishment, we agree with the final *145paragraph of the opinion of the trial court that “the decision of the appeal board is erroneous, as a matter of law, and should be and the same hereby is reversed; and that the decision of the referee should be and the same hereby is reinstated.”
The judgment of the circuit court should be affirmed. Costs to appellee.
Dethmers and O’Hara, JJ., concurred with Kelly, £

 The commission, the referee, an d the trial court.

 Mr. Justice Smith and the appeal board.

 Prom the decision of the appeal board: “The transcript of testimony discloses that, when the aircraft arrived at Detroit Metropolitan Airport, the flight engineers usually walked around the plane in order to examine it in some respect and, also, perhaps employed their skills in some manner while the plane was being serviced and while passengers were either deplaning or emplaning.”