Court Opinion

ID: 9571539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:32:32.161305+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:33.592304
License: Public Domain

TEIGEN, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent to the latter part of the majority opinion holding that certiorari will lie in this case. In all other respects I concur in the majority opinion.
It is well-settled in this State that cer-tiorari does not lie unless the inferior court has exceeded its jurisdiction and there is no appeal or other plain, speedy or adequate remedy available to the petitioner or when in the judgment of the court it is deemed necessary to prevent miscarriage of justice. Mazakahomni v. State, 75 N.D. 73-90, 25 N.W.2d 772; State ex rel. Enderlin State Bank v. Rose, 4 N.D. 319, 58 N.W. 514, 26 L.R.A. 593; State ex rel. Clyde v. Lauder, 11 N.D. 136, 90 N.W. 564; Baker v. Lenhart, 50 N.D. 30, 195 N.W. 16; State ex rel. Claver v. Broute, 50 N.D. 753, 197 N.W. 871; State ex rel. Noggle v. Crawford, 24 N.D. 8, 138 N.W. 2; State ex rel. Wehe v. Frazier, 47 N.D. 314, 182 N.W. 545. The laws of this State provide:
“A writ of certiorari shall be granted by the supreme court * * * when an * * * inferior court has exceeded the jurisdiction of such * * * inferior court, * * * and there is no appeal, nor, in the judgment of the court, any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy, and also when, in the judgment of the court, it is deemed necessary to prevent miscarriage of justice.” Section 32-33-01, N.D.C.C.
“Except as otherwise provided by law, the review upon a writ of certiorari cannot be extended further than to determine whether the inferior court * * * has pursued regularly the authority of such court * * *.” Section 32-33-09, N. D.C.C.
These statutory provisions, originally enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Dakota, have been continued in force as part of the laws of this State. In some respects these provisions are in a class by themselves. They differ both from the common law and from the statutes of many other states. In fact, the statutes and the decisions in several states differ to such a degree that in 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1629b (1), it is stated:
“It is difficult to state any precise general rules as to when certiorari will lie, because of statutory regulations which have been enacted in various jurisdictions and also because of different views as to the scope of the writ which obtain.”
Also, in 14 C.J.S. Certiorari § 6, it says:
“General propositions precisely defining when certiorari will lie are practically impossible of formulation because of the nature of the writ and of varying statutory provisions.
It is impossible to lay down any rule which will precisely define when cer-tiorari will lie. This is sometimes true even as to the law of a particular state, and is especially true when it is attempted to formulate a rule broad enough to cover all jurisdictions.”
In this State we have held that in all cases review on certiorari is limited to questions of jurisdiction. Baker v. Lenhart, 50 N.D. 30, 195 N.W. 16; Livingston v. Peterson, 59 N.D. 104, 228 N.W. 816; State ex rel. Johnson v. Clark, 21 N.D. 517, 131 N.W. 715; City of Fargo v. Annexation Review Commission, N.D., 123 N.W.2d 281; Posin v. State Board of Higher Education, N.D., 86 N.W.2d 31; Common School Dist. No. 126 of Cass County v. City of Fargo, 78 N.D. 583, 51 N.W.2d 364; State ex rel. Dreyer v. Brekke, 75 N.D. 468, 28 N.W.2d 598; State ex rel. Olson v. Welford, 65 N.D. 522, 260 N.W. 593. In other words, certiorari will lie only where there is a *524want or excess of jurisdiction in the proceeding sought to be reviewed. Jurisdiction has been defined as “power and authority to act with respect to any particular subject-matter.” State ex rel. Dreyer v. Brek-ke, supra. In that case we also said that error in judgment does not constitute excessive jurisdiction reviewable on certiorari. “Jurisdiction” is power to hear and determine, and does not depend upon regularity of its exercise nor upon correctness of the decision. Baker v. Lenhart, supra. Christenson v. Grandy, 46 N.D. 418-426, 180 N.W. 18.
“Test of jurisdiction * * * is whether the tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry, and not whether its conclusions in the course of it were right or wrong.” Clark v. Rossier, 10 Idaho 348, 78 P. 358,3 Ann. Cas. 231.
This rule that want or excess of jurisdiction is the only ground for certiorari prevails in Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, the Philippines, South Dakota and Utah. See State ex rel. Dreyer v. Brekke, supra, p. 481, of 75 North Dakota Report, 28 N.W.2d 598.
The majority opinion cites from In re Taber, 13 S.D. 62, 82 N.W. 398, and quotes with approval therefrom. The Taber case was an inquiry by habeas corpus and not certiorari, and in such a proceeding in this State habeas corpus would also be an appropriate remedy to inquire into the “authority to render the particular judgment.” Section 32-22-01, authorizing habeas corpus as a remedy, provides that a person imprisoned or restrained of his liberty may obtain release from such imprisonment or restraint if it is unlawful. The question in a habeas corpus proceeding does not necessarily go to that of jurisdiction as is required in certiorari.
The majority have also quoted at length from 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 107. This, however, is a general section under the heading of the-nature and scope of jurisdiction. I do not construe this quote to provide that the term “jurisdiction” as applied to criminal court means the power “to declare the punishment for an offense in a regular course of judicial proceeding” within the time limits provided by the law. On the same subject, in 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1559, dealing with termination of jurisdiction, we find the following:
“However, where an erroneous judgment is entered, the jurisdiction of the court continues until a lawful judgment is entered, * * * ”
and
“Similarly the rendition of a void judgment does not terminate the court’s jurisdiction to render a valid judgment even after the term expires.”
Continuing in 24 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1584, dealing with excess sentences, it says:
“According to the weight of authority, sometimes by express statutory requirement, where the court imposes a sentence in excess of that authorized by law, the whole sentence is not illegal and void but is valid to the extent that the court had power to impose and void merely as to such excess, provided such excess is separable and may be dealt with without disturbing the valid portion of the sentence. In other words, such sentence is not void as being beyond the jurisdiction of the court, but merely erroneous, and voidable on appropriate proceedings.” [Emphasis supplied]
The Arkansas cases cited in the majority opinion are distinguishable. The crime charged to which the defendant pleaded was a misdemeanor punishable only by a fine. The court found that the statute did not authorize imposition of a sentence to the penitentiary. However, the trial court in those cases sentenced the defendants to long terms in the penitentiary. The entire sentence was void. The court had no jurisdiction over the offense on which it sentenced, for the reason that it was not alleged in *525the charge and was not the offense of which the defendants were convicted.
In the instant case it is agreed the trial court had jurisdiction of the person and of the offense. The court was also authorized by statute to impose a sentence to the State Farm. The sentence is valid insofar as the power of the court extended, to wit: to sentence to the State Farm for a period of thirty days. State v. Ziesemer, N.D., 93 N.W.2d 803. When that part of the sentence in excess of that which could be lawfully imposed commences the petitioner has a good cause in habeas corpus. He is not without a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy. Where the petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to him when the lawful portion of the sentence has expired, there need be no miscarriage of justice. Further, in view of the majority decision holding that the extent of the power of the trial court to sentence was for a term not exceeding thirty days, the petitioner is placed in a position where he may petition the trial court to modify and correct its sentence or to- vacate the excessive portion thereof. There is no reason why it should be necessary to serve any of the excess.
As we said in Bishop v. Depositors’ Guaranty Fund Commission, 55 N.D. 178-182, 212 N.W. 828, 829:
“Where the inferior tribunal acts within its jurisdiction, no matter how erroneous the decision may be, the reviewing court has no power to change, annul, or reverse it in a proceeding in certiorari.”
See also Albrecht v. Zimmerly, 23 N.D. 337, 136 N.W. 240; State ex rel. Mayo v. Thursby-Butte Special School District, 45 N.D. 555, 178 N.W. 787; Baker v. Lenhart, supra; State ex rel. Claver v. Broute, supra; State ex rel. Craig v. North Dakota Workmen’s Compensation Bureau, 53 N.D. 649, 207 N.W. 555.
It is my opinion that the majority in this case have overturned all previous decisions of this state on the subject and have also encroached upon the powers of the Legislature. It is, in my opinion, judicial legislation. The writ should be quashed.
KNUDSON; J., concurs.