Court Opinion

ID: 9800988
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 08:44:40.646726+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:16.406520
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
¶ 10. concurring. In essence, this is a continuation of my concurring opinion in State v. Morse, 2014 VT 84, 197 Vt. 495, 106 A.3d 902. As in Morse, I concur in the opinion of the Court but believe this case shows a serious need for rule-making in an area that is not covered specifically by Vermont Rule of Criminal Procedure 32, but arguably is subject to its terms. Following the federal rule as it read when the Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure were adopted, Rule 32(e) notes the availability of *301probation but leaves any special procedure to the statutes. See V.R.Cr.P. 32, Reporter’s Notes. The relevant statutes, 28 V.S.A. §§ 201-255, provide some procedure, but leave major gaps. As this case demonstrates, filling some of these gaps is necessary.
¶ 11. The major gap involves procedures related to objections to probation conditions. In this case, the presentence investigation report (PSI) arguably proposed thirty-two “specialized conditions of probation.” I say arguably because none of these conditions were separately checked, as the majority decision notes. I understand from the argument that this list of conditions is routinely proposed by the Department of Corrections as part of sentencing for sexual-misconduct crimes, at least in Bennington County. In addition, the court considered a large number of standard conditions that are part of the court’s computer system. In this case, the court ordered nineteen of these conditions and added two others, one of which (labeled number “32”) was “you must abide by all sex offender conditions as directed by your probation officer.” Thus, in this case, fifty-three probation conditions were somehow in play.
¶ 12. As defendant has noted in challenging many of the conditions, the proliferation of conditions has caused serious questions regarding which conditions are actually in effect. Where we need precision, see State v. Hemingway, 2014 VT 48, ¶ 15, 196 Vt. 441, 97 A.3d 465, we instead have a muddle. In this case, a standard condition provides: “You shall not drink alcoholic beverages to the extent they interfere with your employment or the welfare of your family, yourself or any other person.” A special sex-offender condition reads “You may not purchase, consume or possess alcohol.”
¶ 13. We have held that a probation condition must be challenged at sentencing, by a Rule 35 motion,5 or by appeal from the sentence, and may not be raised as a defense to revocation of probation based on a violation of the condition. State v. Austin, 165 Vt. 389, 401-02, 685 A.2d 1076, 1084-85 (1996). Each of the permissible methods for challenge has its own complications.
¶ 14. This is particularly true of challenges at time of sentencing. There is nothing in Rule 32, the governing sentencing rule, that requires a defendant to object to proposed sentencing *302recommendations before the sentencing hearing. As the majority points out, there is a provision that requires a defendant to submit “[a]ny objection to facts contained in the [PSI]” in writing at least three days prior to the sentencing hearing. V.R.Cr.P. 32(c)(4)(A). But this requirement does not apply to proposed probation conditions, whether in the PSI, a plea agreement or the prosecutor’s sentencing position. Presumably then, the defendant will state any objection to probation conditions as part of defense counsel’s presentation at the sentencing hearing. See V.R.Cr.P. 32(a)(1)(B).
¶ 15. In some instances, this opportunity is inadequate. The trial court may include all of, or only some of, the computer-generated standard conditions, and some additional conditions not raised by any party. In this case the trial court added a condition that stated: “You must abide by all sex offender conditions as directed by your probation officer.” The record contains no indication that such a condition would be included. Apparently, defendant learned of the condition only when he received the signed, written probation order. It is unclear when defendant could have objected to this condition.
¶ 16. In many instances, an objection at sentencing comes very late and will give inadequate time to resolve the conflict or force a sentencing delay. In State v. Freeman, 2013 VT 25, ¶ 17, 193 Vt. 454, 70 A.3d 1008, we struck down a probation condition in part because the court made no findings indicating its necessity. Of course, there was no evidence in that case from which the court could have made findings just as there was no factual statement in the PSI in support of the proposed conditions in this case and no specific facts supporting the probation conditions the court imposed.
¶ 17. The State makes the argument in this case that it had to have the opportunity to respond with evidence to any challenge to conditions proposed in the PSI. Again, Rule 32 as it currently exists does not require prior notice of a challenge to a probation condition and gives no opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.
¶ 18. Many of the challenges to probation conditions have been raised on direct appeal to this Court. See, e.g., State v. Moses, 159 Vt. 294, 295-96, 618 A.2d 478, 479 (1992). In Freeman, 2013 VT 25, ¶ 11, we ruled that an appellate challenge was available, even in the absence of any objection in the trial court, under a plain error standard of review. As noted aboye, Freeman struck down a *303condition in the absence of an objection below in part because there were no findings to support it. Freeman suggests that the findings were necessary even in the absence of an objection to the condition in the trial court. A clarification by rule of when findings are necessary in support of a probation condition would be appropriate.
¶ 19. As in Morse, I recommend that the Criminal Rules Committee draft and recommend additions to Criminal Rule 32 to address specifically the process of creating and implementing probation conditions and the procedures for objecting to or challenging proposed conditions.

 I have not addressed challenges under Rule 35(a) because this procedure has not arisen in this case.