Court Opinion

ID: 9697778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:29:55.270537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:35.139299
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, Russell A., Justice
(dissenting).
The court’s task in this case should have been an easy one, as rarely has the court been presented with language so explicit and so pervasive, in the Minnesota Constitution, the applicable statute, and our previous case law. That language expressly provides that a vacancy is effected when the governor files an order for a judge’s retirement with the secretary of state, and that the governor must then appoint a successor. Despite the clarity of this rule of law, the court injects needless uncertainty into both the election and appointment process by requiring a determination of whether a gap in service is “significant” enough to warrant an appointment, where and when the “potential for delay” becomes important and whether an election is “feasible.” For this reason, and because I believe that respect for precedent requires use of the appointment process in this instance, I respectfully dissent.
The court’s analysis properly begins with the Minnesota Constitution, but then ignores the explicit language in article VI, section 8 regarding a vacancy.
*852Sec. 8 Vacancy. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of judge the governor shall appoint in the manner provided by law a qualified person to fill the vacancy until a successor is elected and qualified. The successor shall be elected for a six year term at the next general election occurring more than one year after the appointment.
Following the constitutional directive to provide “by law” the appointment procedure, the legislature did just that in Minn. Stat. § 490.126, subd. 2:
Any judge may make written application to the governor for retirement. The governor thereupon shall direct the judge’s retirement by written order which, when filed in the office of the secretary of state, shall effect a vacancy in the office to be filled as provided by law.
(Emphasis ad'ded.)
In Diemer v. Carlson, 550 N.W.2d 875 (Minn.1996), this court relied squarely on what we referred to as the “unambiguous provisions of the Minnesota Constitution as implemented by the legislature” 1 and ruled: “The filing of that order with the secretary of state is designated by statute as the operative act by which a vacancy in judicial office is effected,” and once the vacancy exists, even if the resignation may be effective at a specified future date, the governor is mandated to appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy. 550 N.W.2d at 876-77. In this case, the governor’s order for retirement was filed on July 1, 2002, which effected a vacancy. Thus, Article VI, section 8 expressly requires an appointment.
.We held in Diemer that a vacancy was effected when the order for retirement was filed with the secretary of state regardless of the effective date of the resignation. 550 N.W.2d at 876. The court today not only finds the effective date of the resignation significant, but seemingly dis-positive of the question whether an appointment is appropriate. We considered the.possibility of a gap in service in Diem-er, but only to address the petitioner’s argument that the outcome was controlled by Page v. Carlson, 488 N.W.2d 274 (Minn.1992), in which the court restated the constitutional requirement that judges be elected. Diemer, 550 N.W.2d at 877-78. A gap in judicial service was not a part of the analysis of whether a vacancy existed, and was clearly at most a secondary consideration — a “useful purpose” as we put it in Diemer. •
Now, only six years later, to reach its conclusion, the court completely ignores our ruling in Diemer as to both the dispos-itive issue of when a vacancy occurs, and the force of the analysis in Diemer. While the doctrine of stare decisis is not inflexible, it is not to be abandoned on a whim; its purpose is to provide stability in the law, and we are “extremely reluctant” to overrule our previous cases. Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 406 (Minn.2000). Yet Diemer is effectively overruled *853by the court’s decision,2 because no longer is it clear when a “vacancy” occurs in a judicial seat, and no longer is it clear when use of the appointment process is appror priate.
The court’s analysis is that whenever a vacancy arises and an election is “feasible,” without leaving a “significant” gap in service, an election should be held. The secretary of state regularly administers special elections for unanticipated vacancies in state offices. See Minn.Stat. § 204D.19 (2000). Thus, an election is almost always “feasible.” While the court purports to express no preference for an election over appointment as the proper method for filling judicial vacancies, the court does exactly that by holding that if an election is feasible, one should be held regardless of whether a vacancy exists as provided by law.
And what is a “significant” gap in service? Significance may depend on characteristics unique to the district affected, such as number of judges, workload, and geographic area. Determining whether a gap in service is significant will require a qualitative analysis that defies any bright line or predictability. The court by its decision invites a case by case analysis for every judicial retirement, and consequently seriatim petitions for relief under Minn. Stat. § 204B.44, decided on a scant record and an expedited basis. In this case the court adopts a new rule of law and leaves uncertain when use of the appointment process is proper.3 The constitution and section 490.126, subd. 2 clearly define when a vacancy occurs and filling the vacancy by appointment; the court’s opinion injects an evanescence in, the process that is inappropriate and unnecessary.
Diemer established the rule of law to be applied here. Government by the rule of law:
is the main bulwark to'our democratic form of government, demands a decent respect for the' rule of stare decisis in order that citizens will be assured that decisions of the court are good for more than “one trip and one day only.”
State ex rel. Foster v. Naftalin, 246 Minn. 181, 205, 74 N.W.2d 249, 264 (1956). Because the court’s ruling eviscerates the rule of law from Diemer for no apparent reason, I respectfully dissent.

. The majority casts this dissent as exalting the statute over the constitution. However, as noted above, the constitution explicitly provides that the appointment is accomplished “in the manner provided by law,” thereby deferring to the legislature the establishment .of when the vacancy occurs. Minn. Const, art. VI, § 8. This analysis does not “blindly” rely on the statute, as the majority suggests, but gives full effect to both the constitutional and legislátive directives. In addition, given its constitutional underpinnings, there is nothing “formalistic” or “superficial” about section 490.126, subd. 2, nor does the statute, as the majority claims, ignore the necessary interplay between the election and appointment provisions. The statute simply provides clarity to when a vacancy occurs so that the governor can exercise the appointing authority-

. While language in a dissent cannot expand or limit the scope of a majority holding, it is nonetheless troubling that the dissent in Diemer raised a factual scenario almost identical to that presented in this case, 550 N.W.2d at 882 (Page, J., dissenting) and the majority in Diemer therefore was not unaware of the implications of its holding, a holding directly contrary to that reached by the majority in this case.

. The court’s ruling usurps the legislative determination in section 490:126, subd. 2, of when a vacancy occurs by injecting into that determination considerations of whether an election is feasible, and whether there will be a significant gap in service. While most matters of judicial administration are properly within this court’s jurisdiction to decide, the election of judges and the appointment process for new judges is properly left to the coequal branches of government to administer. Minn. Const, art. VI § 8.