Court Opinion

ID: 9926842
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 19:02:36.197215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:03.828504
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/25/24 P. v. Begin CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G061826

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 18NF3240)

 MICHAEL EUGENE BEGIN,                                                 OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Scott A.
Steiner, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.
                   Britton Donaldson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
                   Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Steve Oetting and Evan Stele,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
              A jury convicted Michael Eugene Begin of assault with a deadly weapon
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upon two victims (counts 1 & 3; Pen. Code, § 245, subd. (a)(1)) and one count of hit and
run with injury (count 2; Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a)). It also found true the
allegations he personally inflicted great bodily injury on both victims (§§ 12022.7, subd.
(a), 1192.7, 667.5). The court sentenced Begin to three years in prison on count 1,
imposed and stayed the sentence on count 2, and sentenced him to one year in prison on
count three, consecutive to the sentence on count one. As to the great bodily injury
allegation for count one, the court sentenced Begin to three years in prison, consecutive
to the other prison terms. Pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B), the court
dismissed the great bodily injury allegation for count three. In this appeal, Begin
contends the court erred in denying his motion to exclude prearrest statements he made to
police officers on the ground those statements were obtained in violation of Miranda v.
Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda). Begin also argues the court’s minutes and
abstract of judgment inaccurately reflect the sentence imposed by the trial court. We
conclude only the latter argument has merit. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment in
part to correct the abstract of judgment and court minutes. In all other respects the
judgment is affirmed.
                                             FACTS
              Begin was driving his truck when he approached two other individuals,
Charles M., and Richard L., who were riding their motorcycles. Begin swerved around
Charles M. and Richard L. in an unsafe manner. Richard L. approached Begin’s truck at
a red light. At the light, Richard L. headbutted the side of Begin’s truck with his helmet.
Richard L. rode to Begin’s window where he observed Begin on his cell phone – which

1
              All further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
stated.

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angered Richard L. Richard L. reached into the truck and grabbed Begin’s cell phone.
Richard L. placed the phone on top of Begin’s car. Begin punched Richard L. in the
shoulder and arm and used a steering wheel lock to hit him.
              Richard L. and Charles M. drove away once the light changed to green.
Begin followed them, sped up, and abruptly hit Richard L.’s motorcycle. This caused
Richard L. to lose control, flying off his bike and hitting the sidewalk. A nearby
pedestrian was struck by Richard L.’s motorcycle. Begin fled the scene, running red
lights in the process. Richard L. and the pedestrian sustained major injuries.
              Officers located Begin the following day and interviewed him without
Miranda warnings. Begin admitted to hitting Richard L. and fleeing the scene.
              The prosecution charged Begin with felony violations of assault with a
deadly weapon as to three victims (counts 1 [Richard L.], 3 [the pedestrian], & 4 [Charles
M.]). For counts 1 and 3, the prosecution alleged Begin personally inflicted great bodily
injury. The prosecution also charged Begin with one count of felony hit and run with
injury (count 2).
              Begin filed a motion in limine to exclude his statements made to the
officers on the grounds that his rights were violated as stated in Miranda, supra, 384 U.S.
436. The trial court held a hearing on the issue pursuant to Evidence Code section 402.
After considering the officer’s testimony, listening to the audio recording of the
interaction with Begin, and reviewing the accompanying transcript, the court denied the
motion to exclude. A jury found Begin guilty of counts 1, 2, and 3, and found Begin
personally inflicted great bodily injury on Richard L., and the pedestrian. The court
dismissed count 4.
              The trial court sentenced Begin to three years in prison for count 1 and a
consecutive three years in prison for the personal infliction of great bodily injury attached
to count 1. The court imposed and stayed the sentence on count 2. The court sentenced
Begin to one year on count 3, consecutive to the sentence on count 1, for a total prison

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sentence of seven years. The court dismissed the personal infliction of great bodily
injury enhancement attached to count 3 pursuant to section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B).
              Appellant timely appealed.
                                      DISCUSSION
              Begin challenges the admissibility of his statements made to police officers.
He argues the statements were the unlawful product of an un-Mirandized custodial
interrogation. We disagree.
I. Admissibility of Appellant’s Statements
              A. Procedural History
              Begin filed a motion in limine to exclude his statements made to the
officers on the grounds that his rights were violated as stated in Miranda, supra, 384 U.S.
436. The trial court held a hearing on the issue pursuant to Evidence Code section 402.
              At the hearing, the prosecution called one witness, a police officer. The
officer testified he was following Begin with his partner. They were in plain clothes and
in an unmarked police car. They wanted to contact Begin to further their investigation
into him as a possible suspect in a hit and run with injury.
              Prior to contacting Begin, the officers requested the Orange County
Sheriff’s Department send two patrol units and uniformed officers to the scene. The
officer testified he wanted Begin to know it was law enforcement coming to speak with
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him. Four uniformed sheriff’s deputies arrived to assist the officers.

2
               The testimony on the exact number of officers present was not clear. At
one point the officer testified there were four uniformed deputies. At another point, he
testified there were only four total officers. The trial court made no specific factual
findings on this point, noting only the ratio of officers to Begin was a factor weighing in
favor of a finding of custody. Since it is the prosecution’s burden to establish Begin was
not in custody, we assume, for the purposes of this opinion, there were six total officers,
four uniformed deputies and two plain clothed officers. (People v. Villasenor (2015) 242
Cal.App.4th 42, 59 (Villasenor).)

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              The officers contacted Begin outside of his truck once the patrol units
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arrived. Because they were investigating a possible violent felony, the officers’ weapons
were drawn and in the “low-ready” position. This means the firearms were in the
officers’ hands, drawn from their holster, and pointed at a 45-degree angle towards the
ground. The weapons were not pointed directly at Begin but were pointed in Begin’s
general direction.
              Upon approaching Begin, the officers identified themselves, informed
Begin he was being detained, and placed him in handcuffs. The officer testified he told
Begin he was not under arrest but was only being detained.
              The officers told Begin to sit on a nearby curb while they searched the car
for safety reasons. After officers searched the car, they removed the handcuffs, and
questioned Begin. Begin was in handcuffs for less than 10 minutes. During the
questioning, the uniformed deputies were across the street, 25 yards away. They did not
participate in the interview.
              The interview lasted approximately 20 minutes and was audio recorded.
The officer testified that his questions were designed to learn Begin’s side of the story.
Begin was not read his Miranda rights prior to questioning.
              Officers asked Begin several questions about the incident, including if the
truck was his, if he was involved in an altercation the night before, if he hit anyone with
his car, and if he left the scene. Begin explained he passed a couple of guys on
motorcycles, and, after doing so, one of the men stopped next to his truck, punched him,
grabbed his phone, and rode off. Begin admitted to hitting a man with his truck and

3
               Begin stopped at a particular street address, but the record is not clear as to
the nature of that address. The trial court indicated it could hear traffic in the background
of the audio. For the purposes of this opinion, we note the interrogation did not take
place in a confined space, such as the stationhouse.

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driving away. Begin told the officers he should have called the police and turned himself
in.
              The trial court described the officers’ demeanor from the audio as
extremely calm, restrained, nonconfrontational, and nonaggressive. The trial court stated
Begin sounded rational, composed, and made free flowing and spontaneous statements
throughout the interview.
              B. Standard of Review
              In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to exclude evidence based on
a Miranda violation, we accept the trial court’s resolution of disputed facts and
inferences, as well as credibility evaluations, if supported by substantial evidence.
(People v. Thomas (2011) 51 Cal.4th 449, 476 (Thomas).) We independently determine
from the undisputed facts and facts properly found by the trial court whether the
challenged statement was obtained in violation of Miranda. (Thomas, supra, at p. 476.)
              C. Applicable Law
              The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States protects
persons accused of crimes from being compelled to incriminate themselves. The
landmark case, Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. 436, arose out of problems applying the Fifth
Amendment privilege to individuals subject to out-of-court custodial police interrogation.
In Miranda, the Supreme Court held that, in all criminal proceedings, prosecutors are
precluded from using the statements of a defendant made during a “custodial
interrogation” unless prosecutors showed the use of procedural safeguards to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination. (Miranda, at p. 444.) These safeguards, devised to
inform accused persons of their right to silence, their right to the presence of an attorney
or to have one appointed for them, and to provide warning that any statement made may
be used as evidence against them, are collectively known as the Miranda rights (also
referred to as a Miranda warning or Miranda advisement). (Ibid.)

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              Law enforcement officers are not required to issue Miranda warnings to
every person whom they question. (Oregon v. Mathiason (1977) 429 U.S. 492, 495.)
Miranda warnings are only required when a person is subject to “custodial interrogation”
by law enforcement officers. (Id. at p. 494.)
              A suspect is in custody when placed under arrest or when a reasonable
person in the suspect’s position would believe his or her “freedom of action is curtailed to
a ‘degree associated with formal arrest.’ [Citation.]” (Berkemer v. McCarty (1984) 468
U.S. 420, 440.) “‘Custody determinations are resolved by an objective standard: Would a
reasonable person interpret the restraints used by the police as tantamount to a formal
arrest? [Citations.] The totality of the circumstances surrounding an incident must be
considered as a whole.’ [Citation.]” (In re I.F. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 735, 759.)
              “A more comprehensive, although not exhaustive, list of relevant
circumstances includes [1] ‘whether contact with law enforcement was initiated by the
police or the person interrogated, and if by the police, whether the person voluntarily
agreed to an interview; [2] whether the express purpose of the interview was to question
the person as a witness or a suspect; [3] where the interview took place; [4] whether
police informed the person that he or she was under arrest or in custody; [5] whether they
informed the person that he or she was free to terminate the interview and leave at any
time and/or whether the person’s conduct indicated an awareness of such freedom; [6]
whether there were restrictions on the person’s freedom of movement during the
interview; [7] how long the interrogation lasted; [8] how many police officers
participated; [9] whether they dominated and controlled the course of the interrogation;
[10] whether they manifested a belief that the person was culpable and they had evidence
to prove it; [11] whether the police were aggressive, confrontational, and/or accusatory;
[12] whether the police used interrogation techniques to pressure the suspect; and [13]
whether the person was arrested at the end of the interrogation.’ [Citation.]” (People v.
Potter (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 528, 539-540.)

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              We consider “‘the interplay [between] and combined effect of all the
[factors and] circumstances to determine whether on balance they created a coercive
atmosphere such that a reasonable person would have experienced a restraint tantamount
to an arrest.’” (People v. Aguilera, (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1162.)
              “It is the prosecution’s burden to prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, the accused’s rights under Miranda were not violated.” (Villasenor, supra, 242
Cal.App.4th at p. 59.)
              D. Was Begin Interrogated?
              The Attorney General argues Begin was not interrogated within the
meaning of Miranda and, the argument goes, it does not matter if he was in custody or
not. We are not persuaded.
              “[I]nterrogation” refers not only to express questioning, but to words and
actions by police which officers should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response. (Rhode Island v. Innis (1980) 446 U.S. 291, 301.) The focus is
on the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police. (People v. Davis
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 554.)
              As they initiated contact with Begin, officers handcuffed him and searched
his truck. Officers initiated the questioning with Begin as a potential suspect in a crime.
They asked Begin several questions, including, for example: “Who else drives your
truck?” “Were you involved in some type of collision last night?” “You had an
altercation?” “Did you see what happened after he bounced off?” “[T]he reason you
didn’t call the police was because you figured since he assaulted you first . . . or, am I
correct in saying that, or is there a different reason?” These questions are directly
relevant to the crime Begin was suspected of committing.
              Begin may have provided some spontaneous statements and responses
without struggle, but that does not detract from the fact it was the officers’ questions
which were the onus behind those statements and responses. This is not a case where

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Begin freely availed himself to law enforcement to confess or clear his conscience. (Cf.
People v. Ray (1996) 13 Cal.4th 313, 337-338.) This was an interrogation.
              E. Was Begin in Custody?
              We acknowledge there are several factors weighing in favor of finding
Begin was in custody while he was interrogated. Begin was approached by six officers at
gunpoint. Their weapons were at the “low-ready” position and pointed in Begin’s
direction. Officers told Begin to sit on the curb where he was handcuffed for 10 minutes
while his car was searched.
              Undoubtedly, these circumstances present an intimidating situation and, at
the point and time the officers’ guns were drawn and he was handcuffed, Begin was
certainly not free to leave. A reasonable person would not think otherwise. Moreover,
this initial display of force was reasonable for the officers’ safety and to maintain control
of the situation while they conducted their investigation under the circumstances present
according to this record. (See In re Joseph R. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 954, 958 [holding
minor was not in custody even though he was initially handcuffed and placed in patrol
car, where officers did so to maintain control of the minor while they carried on other
aspects of investigation].) However, our inquiry, for purposes of Miranda, must focus on
“‘the degree of coercive restraint to which a reasonable citizen believes he is subject at
the time of questioning.’ [Citation.]” (Thomas, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 478.)
              During the interrogation itself, Begin was neither handcuffed nor
restrained. There were no weapons drawn nor any show of force. The four uniformed
deputies were 25 yards away and were not participating in the interview. The two
interrogating officers told Begin he was only being detained and was not under arrest.
Also, the trial court found the officers were calm, restrained, and nonconfrontational in
their demeanor. Begin was not questioned in a confined space such as the stationhouse,
and the interview was relatively short. Under the totality of these circumstances, we
conclude Begin was not in custody when he was interrogated by the two officers.

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              F. Did Begin Suffer Prejudice?
              Even if Begin’s statements were obtained in violation of Miranda, Begin
elected to testify at his trial. In doing so, he vitiated any prejudice which resulted from
the use of his statements. As the Attorney General correctly points out, Begin “cannot
rely on prejudice arising out of the tendency of the statements to rebut [his] own
testimony because the statements would have been admissible to impeach that testimony,
regardless of the Miranda violation.” (People v. Polk (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1183,
1197-1198.)
              Begin makes no contention he would not have testified if the pretrial
motion to suppress was granted. Nor does he argue his trial strategy or testimony would
have differed in any way. Begin claims he was prejudiced because the use of his
statements affected his credibility. Even if true, that would be a perfectly permissible use
of statements obtained in violation of Miranda. (Harris v. New York (1971) 401 U.S.
222, 225.)
              Begin also argues prejudice because his statements supplied the officers
with the necessary probable cause to arrest and prosecute him. However, the record does
not support this argument, nor does Begin cite to anywhere in the record for support.
Even if there were support, our inquiry focuses on the effect of the statements at trial, not
in aiding an arrest or prosecution. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 21-22,
26.)
              Lastly, Begin argues he was prejudiced because if his statements were not
admitted, the officers would not have been able to justify his arrest to the jury at trial.
But the record contains no questioning of the officers by the parties at trial pertaining to
the justification for Begin’s arrest.
II. Need to Correct the Abstract of Judgment
              Begin asks us to correct the court minutes and the abstract of judgment to
reflect the sentence handed down by the court. He claims these documents mistakenly

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indicate the court stayed the sentence on count three and imposed a one year consecutive
sentence for the enhancement. Begin argues the trial court actually sentenced him to a
one year consecutive prison term for count 3 and dismissed the enhancement pursuant to
section 1385, subdivision (c)(2)(B). The Attorney General agrees. Upon our review of
the record, we accept this concession and remand the case for the purpose of correcting
the court minutes and abstract of judgment.

                                     DISPOSITION
              The convictions are affirmed. The judgment is partially reversed and
remanded with directions for the trial court to modify the court minutes and abstract of
judgment to accurately reflect the sentence imposed. Specifically, the record must
accurately reflect the court sentenced Begin to a one year consecutive prison term on
count 3 and dismissed the accompanying enhancement pursuant to section 1385,
subdivision (c)(2)(B). The court is directed to prepare an amended abstract of judgment
and forward a certified copy to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

                                                   DELANEY, J.

WE CONCUR:

SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J.

MOTOIKE, J.

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