Court Opinion

ID: 9426539
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:18:14.68371+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:01.568002
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Powell,
concurring.
Although I join the opinion of the Court, in view of the importance of the case I write to emphasize the unique burden that rests upon the party, whether it be the State or a defendant, who undertakes to show the necessity for prior restraint on pretrial publicity.*
In my judgment a prior restraint properly may issue only when it is shown to be necessary to prevent the dissemination of prejudicial publicity that otherwise poses a high likelihood of preventing, directly and irreparably, the impaneling of a jury meeting the Sixth Amendment requirement of impartiality. This requires a showing that (i) there is a clear threat to the fairness of trial, (ii) such a threat is posed by the actual publicity to be restrained, and (iii) no less restrictive alternatives are available. Notwithstanding such a showing, a restraint may not issue unless it also is shown that previous publicity or publicity from unrestrained sources will not render the restraint inefficacious. The threat to the fair*572ness of the trial is to be evaluated in the context of Sixth Amendment law on impartiality, and any restraint must comply with the standards of specificity always required in the First Amendment context.
I believe these factors are sufficiently addressed in the Court’s opinion to demonstrate beyond question that the prior restraint here was impermissible.

In Times-Picayune Pub. Corp. v. Schulingkamp, 419 U. S. 1301, 1307 (1974), an in-chambers opinion, I noted that there is a heavy presumption against the constitutional validity of a court order restraining pretrial publicity.