Court Opinion

ID: 9720341
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:26:50.667019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:16.240924
License: Public Domain

Cavanagh, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). While I concur with parts I, n, v, and vi of the majority’s reasoning, and, for the reasons outlined below, with the resulting reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals, I am compelled to dissent from parts m, iv, and vn of the majority’s opinion, because I *105find the majority’s reasoning to be ill-grounded and contrary to the statute itself. While I agree that the evidence was sufficient to support a bindover on the felony charge, I believe the majority has created a rule contrary to logic and the statute, and that there is neither the need nor a reason to support such an endeavor.
i
The majority correctly analyzes the history of this statute, noting that the 1978 amendment divided the first paragraph of the former statute to create both a misdemeanor and felony offense, distinguished by the presence or absence of an intent to mislead. The language which is now subsection 415(3), however, was not changed in the least, and bears no reference to either the felony or the misdemeanor charge. Indeed, there were no changes at all to this subsection, other than its renumbering. Thus subsection 415(3) only states that, “[i]n all prosecutions under this section,” possession of the described contraband “shall be prima facie evidence of violation of this section.” There is no reference to whether such possession is evidence of the misdemeanor contained in subsection 415(1) or the felony contained in subsection 415(2).
It would seem then that possession of the contraband must amount to a prima facie showing of the common elements of subsections 415(1) and 415(2)— the elements other than the intent that can raise this offense to the level of a felony. This must be so because the statutory presumption here predates the division of the offense into felony and misdemeanor offenses, and because it is not possible that possession can serve as prima facie evidence of two diamet*106rically opposed alternatives — that one did or did not have “the intent to mislead another as to the identity of a vehicle.”
n
The majority states that “[t]o hold that the misdemeanor and felony offenses of subsections 415(1) and (2) are opposite alternatives because of the absence or presence of an ‘intent to mislead’ is in direct conflict with legislative intent.”1 Such reasoning misconstrues the analysis above. The felony and misdemeanor statutes, with all elements save one being common to both offenses, can hardly be said to be “opposite alternatives.” The presence or absence of any particular condition, whether it be light or darkness, pregnancy or lack thereof, or intent or no intent, is, however, mutually exclusive. Prima facie evidence refers to evidence sufficient on its face to establish a given fact.2 It remains, to my mind, impossible for something, on its face, to establish that it is indeed simultaneously both day and night.
*107While the majority is technically correct in stating “[t]he absence of an ‘intent to mislead’ is not an element of the misdemeanor offense,”3 the presence of such an intent removes the offense from the class of a misdemeanor, and, under the statute, is a contraindication of the misdemeanor. Thus, if such intent is present, the offense is a felony. If it is absent, the crime is a misdemeanor. And, in any event, it is one or the other. The subsections defining the offenses use the terms “with” and “without.” It is impossible for possession of the contraband to simultaneously amount to a prima facie showing of both these two mutually exclusive possibilities.4
in
While I cannot join the majority’s strained reading of this section, I nonetheless believe that the circuit court was correct, and that the defendant should have been bound over on the felony charge. His possession of an engine and transmission from which the serial numbers had been removed was prima facie evidence of a violation of the statutory section, i.e., evidence of all but the felony intent element. In addition, feloni*108ous intent may be inferred from all the circumstances, including the defendant’s three separate stories regarding the source of the engine, his attempt to induce Mr. Rogers to lie to the police regarding the source of the engine, particularly when combined with his replacement of the engine seized by the police at no charge, and, on these facts, his possession of materials for removing a serial number and restamping a new false number. In sum, these facts serve as evidence that the defendant had an intent to mislead with respect to the identity of a vehicle at the time this transaction took place in April 1991.
Accordingly, I join the majority in reversing the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and reinstating the judgment of the circuit court, but, as noted above, dissent in part from the rationale the majority subscribes to.
Brickley and Kelly, JJ., concurred with Cavanagh, J.

 Ante at 101.
One might also wonder about an assertion of a “direct conflict” with legislative intent regarding a subsection created before this division, and left unchanged when the Legislature amended this section. Certainly, at the time this subsection was originally enacted, the Legislature lacked any sort of intent whatsoever toward a felony/misdemeanor division that did not yet exist. Whether some other intent came to be expressed when it amended the other subsections, but did not change the one in question, seems, at best, to be a question that could be answered only by inference. While that might be possible, resolving the question with the degree of certainty the majority claims to have seems much less so.

 Prima facie evidence. Evidence good and sufficient on its face. Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the group or chain of facts constituting the party’s claim or defense, and which if not rebutted or contradicted, will remain sufficient. [Black’s Law Dictionary (6th ed), p 1190.]

 Ante at 101-102.

 The majority also states that subsection 415(1) (the misdemeanor subsection) “merely provides a charging option to the prosecution and a trial defense to the defendant.” Ante at 100.1 find this a curious way to refer to a statute which, itself, defines a specific offense. Certainly, given the facts of a case, a prosecutor might, in his discretion, elect to charge either of the crimes defined in this section if he believes probable cause to do so exists, but it seems clear that the statute defines two discrete offenses, rather than merely an offense and a lesser “charging option” for the prosecutor. Indeed, the felony subsection clearly aims to deal with those who would knowingly traffic in or possess such goods with fraudulent intent, where, as the effect of the misdemeanor subsection is to make all such goods contraband (when read in conjunction with subsection 415[3]), and prohibit their creation, regardless of intent.