Court Opinion

ID: 9542909
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:40:08.533773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:09:14.415787
License: Public Domain

O’BRIEN, District Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with that part of the court’s opinion titled: “WAIVER OF IMMUNITY THROUGH FAILURE TO TIMELY ASSERT IT AS AN AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE.” I dissent from the remainder of the opinion which may make Platte County liable for another’s negligence.
When the legislature enacted the Wyoming Governmental Claims Act (W.S. § 1-39-101, et seq.) in 1979, it intended only to waive immunity in certain instances; a “close-ended” waiver. Boehm v. Cody Country Chamber of Commerce, 748 P.2d 704, 709 (Wyo.1987). The claims act does not create new forms of action nor does it impose new duties upon governmental entities. W.S. § 1-39-104(a). Indeed, proper analysis requires the court to inquire whether a duty of care exists before it undertakes to consider immunity issues. Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal.3d 197, 185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 254-5, 649 P.2d 894, 896 (1982). The majority holds that the statutes relating to real estate subdivisions, in particular W.S. § 18-5-306(a)(iv), impose a special tort duty upon the counties to superintend subdivision development. The statute imposes no such duty in this instance; and even if it did, the record discloses no breach affecting these plaintiffs.
A general duty to enforce statutes is one which the government owes to the general public. However, public entities and functionaries do not owe a duty in tort to individual members of the public unless: 1) there was a special relationship between the governmental body and those individuals [Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California, 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 CaL.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334, 83 A.L.R.3d 1166 (1976) ]; or, 2)it is clearly the intent of the legislature to impose a tort duty for the benefit of the plaintiffs, irrespective of any special relationship [Halvorson v. Dahl, 89 Wash.2d 673, 574 P.2d 1190 (1978)].
The special relationship test has been applied in many jurisdictions to deal with cases seeking to establish liability against governmental entities based upon a general duty to provide:
1) police protection [Davidson v. City of Westminster, supra, 649 P.2d 894—no duty; Chambers-Castanes v. King County, 100 Wash.2d 275, 669 P.2d 451, 39 A.L.R.4th 671 (1983)—no general duty, special duty found],
2) fire protection [Frye v. Clark County, 97 Nev. 632, 637 P.2d 1215 (1981)—no duty],
3) health inspections [Stannik v. Bellingham-Whatcom Bd. of Health, 48 Wash.App. 160, 737 P.2d 1054 (1987)—no duty],
4) flood zone planning and authorization [Office Park Corporation v. County of Onondaga, 64 A.D.2d 252, 409 N.Y.S.2d 854 (1978)—no duty],
5) subdivision approval and permitting [Cootey v. Sun Inv., Inc., 718 P.2d 1086 (Haw.1986)—no duty],
6) enforcement of building codes [Taylor v. Stevens County, 111 Wash.2d 159, 759 P.2d 447 (1988)—no duty],
7) careful issuance of special use permit [Meaney v. Dodd, 111 Wash.2d 174, 759 P.2d 455 (1988)—no duty], and
8) other government services (See cases collected at 38 A.L.R.4th 1194, 1197-1200 (1985)).
Most states use the special relationship test, but a few do not as they consider it merely a corollary of the sovereign immunity doctrine. The latter view is incorrect because the test is not peculiar to governmental entities, but a matter of general tort law. In Davidson v. City of Westminster, supra, 649 P.2d at 897, the court said:
As a general rule, one owes no duty to control the conduct of another, nor to warn those endangered by such conduct. Such a duty may arise, however, if “(a) a special relation exists between the actor and the third person which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person’s conduct, or (b) a special relation *271exists between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to protection.” (Rest.2d Torts (1965) § 315; Thompson v. County of Alameda (1980) 27 Cal.3d 741, 751-752, 167 Cal.Rptr. 70, 614 P.2d 728; Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California (1976) 17 Cal.3d 425, 131 Cal.Rptr. 14, 551 P.2d 334.)
Plaintiffs have not alleged, nor does the record disclose, facts which could support a special relationship between them and the Board of County Commissioners. To the contrary, plaintiffs had no contact with the Board during the relevant period of time. The application for the subdivision permit was filed in January 1977 and was issued on May 4, 1977 to the developers, Donald and Yernell Britton; not plaintiffs. The Brittons did not sell the lots until years later. The lot sales were as follows:
1) On May 7, 1980, Brittons sold a lot to people named McIntosh (later sold to plaintiffs Cassera).
2) On May 31, 1981, the Brittons sold a lot to plaintiffs Cathcart (the only plaintiffs who purchased from the developers).
3) On December 11,1981, Brittons sold a lot to the Webers (later sold to plaintiffs Pickle).
4) On February 16, 1982, Mclntoshes sold to Casseras.
5) On September 27, 1982, Webers sold to Pickles.
If the Board owed these defendants a duty of care, it came not from a course of conduct creating a special relationship but from a legislative intent to protect a class of persons of which they are members.
Whether the subdivision statutes create a tort duty to a class of persons must rest upon an analysis of legislative intent and public policy. I do not believe the legislature intended the result reached here, and there are sound policy reasons not to expand the duties owed by regulatory bodies to create potential tort liability for the political subdivisions of the state and perhaps the state itself. In Cootey v. Sun Inv., Inc., supra, 718 P.2d 1086, the Hawaii Supreme Court was faced with a case markedly similar to this one. In deciding that governmental entities responsible for permitting subdivisions did not owe a duty to neighbors of the subdivision, the court said [at 1090-91]:
The question of whether a special relationship exists is another way of asking whether a duty of care exists to a third party. Seibel v. City and County of Honolulu, 61 Haw. 253, 602 P.2d 532 (1979).
“[I]t should be recognized that ‘duty’ is not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to protection.” Waugh v. University of Hawaii, 63 Haw. 117, 135, 621 P.2d 957, 970 (1980) (quoting Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. [204] at 207, 532 P.2d [673] at 675 [1975]).
In determining whether there was a duty owed by the County to the Cooteys who suffered injury, our task is to balance the policy considerations supporting recovery by the injured party against those favoring a limitation of the County’s liability. First Insurance Co. of Hawaii v. International Harvester Co., 66 Haw. [185] at 189, 659 P.2d [64] at 67-68 [1983]; Ajirogi v. State, 59 Haw. 515, 527, 583 P.2d 980, 988 (1978); Kelley v. Kokua Sales & Supply, Ltd., 56 Haw. at 207, 532 P.2d at 675.
“Government is not intended to be an insurer of all the dangers of modern life, despite its ever-increasing effort to protect its citizens from peril.” Lorshbough v. Township of Buzzle, 258 N.W.2d 96, 102 (Minn.1977). Despite our expanding expectations of government action, Ajirogi v. State, 59 Haw. at 522, n. 3, 583 P.2d at 985, we do not hold that government is liable for all injuries sustained by private persons as a result of government activity, even though doing so would spread the losses over the largest possible base, Van Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: A Public Policy Prospectus, 10 UCLA L.Rev. 463, 469 (1963) (hereinafter Van Alstyne).
In deciding whether a duty exists or not, we must “determine how far it is *272desirable and socially expedient to permit the loss distributing function of tort law to apply to governmental agencies, without thereby unduly interfering with the effective functioning of such agencies for their own socially approved ends.” Van Alstyne, 10 UCLA L.Rev. at 469. Government entities are mandated by law to perform a variety of activities which have no counterpart in the voluntary activities of private persons. Van Alstyne, 10 UCLA L.Rev. at 468. Our system of separate but equal branches of government demands restraint on the part of the courts from reordering priorities and forcing reallocation of resources upon the other branches which make policy decisions in this regard. Comment, A Unified Approach to State and Municipal Tort Liability in Washington, 59 Wash.L.Rev. 533 (1984).
See also, Taylor v. Stevens County, supra, 759 P.2d at 452 where the Washington Supreme Court said:
J & B Dev. Co. [J & B Dev. Co. v. King Cy., 100 Wash.2d 299, 669 P.2d 468, 41 A.L.R.4th 86 (1983) ], in effect, held that local government is under a legal duty to verify that a permit application and the construction of a building is in compliance with all applicable codes. The court, however, imposed this duty without evaluating relevant public policy considerations. We now engage in a weighing of public policy considerations. In doing so, we find no alternative but to overrule J & B Dev. Co.
After discussion of policy considerations, the Court concluded [at 453]:
Finally, J & B Dev. Co. has caused local government to become guarantors of each and every construction project. J & B Dev. Co. has shifted the risk of erroneous permit issuance and inspections from individuals to local governments. * * * Requiring local government to indemnify an individual for losses resulting from the negligent administration of building codes imposes substantial costs on local government with little or no corresponding benefit.1
The subdivision statutes are intended to promote orderly land development for the general welfare. Regulating subdivisions through a permit system is an effort to require developers to meet the responsibilities imposed upon them by the legislature. Nowhere do the subdivision statutes either state or clearly imply a legislative intent to create a right of action for damages against the county by virtue of the permitting process. The majority confounds the regulatory purpose by engrafting upon it risk-shifting and risk-spreading features. The remedies should be limited to those expressly provided in the statutes and under existing law. The statutes provide for civil (W.S. § 18-5-312) and criminal (W.S. § 18-5-314) sanctions for violations by sub-dividers. In addition, a civil remedy exists to force compliance with the statutes. Plaintiffs’ complain that the Platte County Board of Commissioners refused to enforce the subdivision statutes against the subdi-vider. Since the Board’s acts or refusals to act are ministerial duties, mandamus would lie (W.S. § 1-30-101, et seq.). Mandamus, not damages, is plaintiffs’ remedy against the Board of County Commissioners.
These plaintiffs dealt with and presumably relied upon a builder to select a proper site for the structures erected and upon the developer to “exercise reasonable care to insure that the subdivided lots are suitable for construction of some type of ordinary, average dwelling house and * * * disclose * * * any condition which he knows or reasonably ought to know makes the subdivided lots unsuitable for such residential building.” Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Wyo.1984). If plaintiffs’ trust was misplaced and a builder or developer was negligent, then that party, not the county, should be responsible for any resultant damages.
In its rush to make the county an insurer of proper subdivision development, this court has held that the Platte County *273Board of County Commissioners was obliged to enforce subdivision standards under the pain of civil liability. Not only is the premise flawed but the rationale rests on an assumption not supported in the record. Plaintiffs’ complaints center on the Board’s failure to obtain an engineer’s certificate for the sewage disposal system as required by statute. Indeed, W.S. § 18-5-306(a)(iv) requires a licensed Wyoming engineer’s certificate as to “the adequacy and safety of the sewage disposal system proposed for the subdivision.” (Emphasis supplied.) But it goes on to provide: “If no public sewage disposal system is proposed by the subdivider, the words ‘NO PROPOSED PUBLIC SEWAGE DISPOSAL SYSTEM,’ in bold capital letters shall appear on all offers, solicitations, advertisements, contracts, agreements and plats relating to the subdivision.” (Emphasis supplied.) “Public” is not defined in the subdivision statutes, but it is a word of common understanding to which ordinary meaning should be ascribed; it means “of or relating to business or community interests as opposed to private affairs.” Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary, G. & C. Merriam Co. (1979). Applying the plain meaning of the word, the legislative intent seems clear enough— if a public [common] system is proposed, it must be certified, but if there is to be no public [common] system, a warning is required in lieu of certification.
If the legislative intent is followed, the subdivision statutes strike a nice balance between reasonable government regulation and undue government interference. When public systems beyond the control of any one individual landowner are contemplated, the statutes require they be certified. That, of course, would facilitate the eventual formation of an Improvement and Service District (W.S. § 18-12-101, et seq.) or annexation to a city or town. On the other hand, those who prefer to have individual water and/or sewer systems may do so. However, it necessarily follows that the right to choose implies responsibility for choices made.
In this case there was no sewage disposal system. Instead, the developer installed evapotranspirational septic beds on the individual lots. The plaintiffs’ complaint alleges: “41. THAT the subdividers designed and installed evapotranspirational septic beds, approximately 60 feet by 60 feet in outside measure.” It goes on: “42. THAT the said septic beds are not within design parameters currently in force and mandated by the Department of Environmental Quality of the State of Wyoming, and are of inadequate size and capacity.” Plaintiffs also submitted an affidavit of Theodore Coyer, a licensed engineer, who stated: “Affiant has examined the attached copies of the Permits for Small Wastewater Facilities, for Lots 2, 3, and 4, Colt Tracks, which permits set forth the size of the evapotranspirational septic beds installed on Colt Track Acres * * Attached to the affidavit are three separate permits for three separate small wastewater facilities. Each is signed by Donald D. Britton as applicant, and they were approved in 1978.
During the permitting process, and now, the county apparently thought that certification was not required since no public facilities were proposed. In the deposition of J. Kenneth Kennedy, certified engineer [apparently the County Planner and/or Engineer], the following appears:
Q. Now, in some companion litigation, I know there is an affidavit from you on file where you state the opinion that where septic systems are involved this requirement [for an engineer’s certificate] does not apply. Is that still your opinion?
A. I believe that to be true.
Q. What is the basis of your opinion on that matter? Is that just your reading of the statutes, or has some external authority led you to having that opinion? A. It is my interpretation of the statute that way, but, also, to my knowledge the only time that we as a consulting engineer have certified to the stipulations of that paragraph you just read are with a public disposal system.
The county correctly interpreted the statute; warnings, not certifications, were required. These plaintiffs chose a subdivi*274sion without public water or sewer systems and relied upon the developer to provide adequate private systems. They now wish to shift to the county the responsibility for their choice and the possible negligence of a builder or the developers.2 This court assists in that effort by creating remedies not contemplated in the statutes and unreasonably extending tort duties to instrumen-talities of government. This decision sets the stage for insured cities and counties to be joined as litigants in every case involving a subdivision or building locations approved by government. It may be a costly error.
The judgment of the district court should have been affirmed.

. After five years, the Washington Supreme Court recognized the policy implications of its decision and confessed error. It is unfortunate that we are unable to learn from the experience of others.

. The developers are apparently defendants in another civil action brought by these plaintiffs. In that action they blame the county sanitarian for the choice of the individual evapotranspira-tional systems. If, as they claim, the sanitarian undertook to set standards, make demands or give advice to the developers, there may have been a special relationship which would support county liability to the developer. Cf. Rogers v. City of Toppenish, 23 Wash.App. 554, 596 P.2d 1096 (1979) with Stannik v. Bellingham-Whatcom Bd. of Health, 48 Wash.App. 160, 737 P.2d 1054 (1987). But see, Taylor v. Stevens County, supra, 759 P.2d at 453 and Meaney v. Dodd, supra, 759 P.2d at 458.