Court Opinion

ID: 9539394
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:03:40.092738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:47.697733
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, J.,
dissenting: In my opinion the court ignores the plain meaning of G. S. 1949, 60-3310. The language is clear. It authorizes any notice of appeal to be amended at any time by bringing in additional parties, before the hearing, as to the appellate court may seem fit.
This section of the statute was construed in Grant v. Reed, 163 Kan. 105, 179 P. 2d 945, and in Grant v. Reed, 163 Kan. 697, 186 P. 2d 239. On the second appearance of the case before the Supreme Court the statute was construed in accordance with its clear meaning in no uncertain language when it said:
*529“While more might be said upon the question we think that it is unnecessary. Our problem is to interpret our own statute and to follow it, and where our statute says that the notice of an appeal may be amended as to parties at any time before the hearing we do not feel justified in saying that the amendment has to be made within some other period of time.” (p. 699.)
The foregoing construction of the statute was followed in Matthews v. Jackson, 176 Kan. 397, 271 P. 2d 798, and up to this time no case has departed from such construction where amendment of the notice of appeal sought to bring in additional parties.
To say this court has no jurisdiction because an appeal has not been properly perfected by serving all adverse parties with the notice of appeal under G. S. 1949, 60-3306, within the period of time authorized for appeal under G. S. 1949, 60-3309, is, in my opinion, nonsense. To adopt the construction the court now places on 60-3310, supra, is to write such section out of the code so far as amendment as to parties is concerned. The legislature certainly meant something by adding the section immediately after 60-3309, supra. What it meant was to give the appellate court authority to permit amendment as to parties “at any time” in accordance with the plain language of 60-3310, supra.
An analysis of other cases upon which the court relies will disclose they were controlled by different factual situations then confronting the court, and general language used in disposing of these cases did not have the effect of overruling the construction of 60-3310, supra, placed upon it by the Grant case. In Thompson v. Groendyke Transport, Inc., 182 Kan. 616, 322 P. 2d 341, for example, the appellant failed to perfect an appeal by making proof of service within two months from the date of judgment and was held not to have perfected an appeal in accordance with 60-3306, supra.
This court was confronted with the prior construction of a statute in Prowant, Administratrix v. Kings-X, 184 Kan. 413, 337 P. 2d 1021; reversed on rehearing in 185 Kan. 602, 347 P. 2d 254. The majority of the court ultimately felt in that decision the statute under consideration was erroneously construed in the first instance. Decisions following the prior construction announced in McCarthy, Adm'r, v. Railroad Co., 18 Kan. 46, while criticizing the rule, followed the doctrine of stare decisis.
Here, however, there has never been criticism of the construction of 60-3310, supra, in accordance with its plain and unambiguous language. In the Prowant case the court overruled a long line of *530decisions and switched to a construction of the statute which was in accordance with its clear and unambiguous language, while here the court is doing absolutely the opposite.
There is another reason why a departure from the construction of 60-3310, supra, as heretofore made is erroneous.
Legal history reveals that the system of jurisprudence in any given organized governmental society gradually goes through a process of evolution in which it matures. Those societies which are said to be more mature pay less attention to procedural matters and more attention to the substantive rights of the parties in resolving matters litigated. In my opinion the decision of the court herein leads in the wrong direction. It promotes the disposition of matters litigated at the procedural stage of a case. Maturity in our system of jurisprudence would suggest the litigation should be determined on the basis of the parties’ substantive rights.
The court should exact of itself the same discipline that it requires of a trial judge when he is called upon to exercise the power of judicial discretion. In Fisher v. Pendleton, 184 Kan. 322, 336 P. 2d 472, 74 A. L. R. 2d 1274, in speaking of the discretionary powers of a trial judge this court said:
“. . . Such discretionary power is granted under the statute in the furtherance of justice relative to the substantive rights of the parties, and not to impede justice with respect to such rights. In other words, procedural matters are designed to aid parties litigant in a court of law to resolve conflicts on the basis of their substantive rights, and they are not designed for use by a trial court to the prejudice of such rights. . . .” (p. 333.)
The decision of the court herein not only fails to recognize the foregoing mandate, but has usurped the power of the legislature in writing 60-3310, supra, out of our code insofar as amendment of the notice of appeal as to parties is concerned.
Where the plain meaning of a statute has heretofore consistently been construed by the court in accordance with its plain and unequivocal language, the doctrine of stare decisis should be persuasive and control the decision. (See dissenting opinions in Prowant, Administratrix v. Kings-X, 185 Kan. 602, 603, 347 P. 2d 254; and in Williams v. Davis, 188 Kan. 385, 390, 362, P. 2d 641.)
In my opinion the court, having granted the appellant leave to amend her notice of appeal to include an additional party, should adhere to its prior decision and to the construction placed upon 60-3310, supra, in the Grant case. Disposition of this litigation should be on the basis of the parties’ substantive rights.