Court Opinion

ID: 9619592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 05:30:01.501382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:42.618407
License: Public Domain

KENNETH W. SHRUM, Senior Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. In my view, this court’s analysis in In re Estate of Desterbecque, 800 S.W.2d 142 (Mo.App.1990), was correct, and it is In Re Estate of Forhan, 149 S.W.3d 537 (Mo.App.2004), that should be overruled.
I cannot improve on nor clarify what Desterbecque said on this issue. The problem with Forhan is that it ignores the following well-established and previously unchallenged principles (as laid out in Desterbecque): (1) that the time within which an appeal may be taken is a competent subject of the constitutionally granted rule-making power of the Supreme Court of Missouri, Id. at 147; (2) that the Rules of Civil Procedure which govern civil actions in the courts of appeal (including Rule 81.05) supersede all statutes, Id. at 146; (3) it is reasonable to presume that the legislature, when it enacted sections 472.180 and 472.210, intended that conflicts between statutory provisions and what the Rules of Civil Procedure provide about timely appeal should be resolved by applying the statutes as superseded by the rules, Id. at 147; and (4) sections 472.141 and 506.010 should be so construed. Id.
Applying those principles, as well as the rest of the Desterbecque analysis, I would hold that the notice of appeal filed in this case was timely filed.
In so stating, I find support in another case decided by this court, In the Matter of Sweeney, 899 S.W.2d 886 (Mo.App.1995). There, we noted with approval that Desterbecque held that Rule 81.05 is included in the rules referred to in sections 472.180 and 472.210, even though Rule 81 was not listed in the rules applicable to probate proceedings by Rule 41.01. Sweeney, 899 S.W.2d at 887-88. With that said, Sweeney continued:
“That leaves the question of whether the Motion for New Trial delayed the finality of the judgment until the expiration of ninety days after its filing or its earlier ruling. If it does not, then the appeal was untimely. Although Rule 78, pertaining to new trials and after-trial motions is not listed as applicable to probate proceedings in the circuit court, we have been pointed to no rule and find none that prevents their filing. Such motions were allowed at common law *753and are part of the common law adopted by Missouri.”
Id. at 899 (citations omitted).
There is absolutely no reason not to liberally construe rules and statutes governing so-called “interlocutory” appeals of certain probate orders. The purpose for such appeals is to allow “many matters of importance to be resolved while the estate is open, and prevent[ ] one complex appeal from all matters that occurred during administration of the estate.” In re Estate of Erwin, 611 S.W.2d 564, 567[2] (Mo.App. 1981). That purpose is not thwarted nor undercut by following the Desterbecque rationale.
More than that, adhering to Desterb-ecque and Sweeney is more in line with the common law allowance of after-trial motions in probate proceedings. Also, following these cases — as I believe we should— would be in keeping with what the Supreme Court of Missouri said in State ex rel. Baldwin v. Dandurand, 785 S.W.2d 547, 549[10] (Mo.banc 1990), namely, that “[statutes relating to appeals from probate judgments [should be] liberally construed to extend rather than restrict the right to appeal.” (Emphasis added.)
I respectfully suggest that the majority opinion, as well as the Forhan case, ignore these fundamental rules and, therefore, both are wrong. Since this is a case heard en banc by this court, I am in no position to certify it to the Supreme Court of Missouri per Rule 83.08. I would, however, do so if that were possible.