Court Opinion

ID: 9684793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:14:13.540603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:59.653604
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING
TOM G. DAVIS, Judge.
Appeal is taken from a conviction for prostitution. V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 43.-02(a)(1). Following her plea of guilty, the court assessed appellant’s punishment at 30 days and $500.00.
In her sole ground of error, appellant contends the court erred in failing to grant her motion to quash the information in this cause. The information alleges in pertinent part that on October 2, 1979, appellant did:
“... knowingly offer and agree to engage, and engage in, sexual conduct with T.L. Keen for a fee.”
The motion to quash complained that the information was insufficient to give appellant notice of the offense with which she was charged due to the numerous meanings of the term “sexual conduct.” See V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 43.01(4). On original submission, a panel of this Court concluded that the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s motion to quash.
In Craven v. State, 613 S.W.2d 488, this Court considered whether a defendant who pleads guilty may complain on appeal of the overruling of a motion to quash. There, it was stated:
“... in earlier times the Helms rule would mandate our finding that appellant has waived ‘all nonjurisdictional defects’ in the proceedings below, Helms v. State, 484 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). “However, since Helms, supra, the Legislature has added a proviso to the Article 44.02, V.A.C.C.P. that ‘abrogated this rule regarding the effect of a guilty plea in cases of plea bargains before the court,’ thereby superceding ‘the prior case law as stated in Helms, supra.’ Ferguson v. State, 571 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978). Therefore, we must first deter*466mine whether our review of the single ground of error is authorized by the Article 44.02 proviso or is circumscribed by the Helms rule. That determination turns, of course, on whether there was a plea bargain honored by the trial court.” Id. at 489.
In Craven, the Court ultimately concluded that the record revealed that the guilty plea was the result of a plea bargain. It was therefore stated that under Art. 44.02, supra, the defendant could appeal from an adverse ruling on his motion to quash.
The record in the instant case reveals as follows:
“THE COURT: You are charged with prostitution, how do you plead to that guilty or not guilty?
“MS. KASS: Guilty.
“THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty because you are guilty and for no other reason?
“MS. KASS: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: Recommendation?
“MR. BEERS: 30 days confinement in jail and a five hundred dollar fine.
“THE COURT: On your plea of guilty, the Court finds you guilty and assesses your penalty a 30 days in jail, five hundred dollar fine plus cost of Court.”
In Rodriguez v. State, 509 S.W:2d 319 (Tex.Cr.App.), this Court stated that the question of whether a guilty plea is the result of a plea bargain, is a question of fact to be determined from evidence presented at trial. See King v. State, 511 S.W.2d 32 (Tex.Cr.App.). In those cases in which this Court has considered a negotiated plea, there has been evidence in the record to support the finding that plea bargaining occurred. See Miller v. State, 608 S.W.2d 931 (Tex.Cr.App.); Carter v. State, 608 S.W.2d 691 (Tex.Cr.App.); Bass v. State, 576 S.W.2d 400 (Tex.Cr.App.).
The record in the instant case reveals that the prosecutor recommended a certain punishment and that the recommendation was followed by the court. However, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the recommendation had been agreed upon by the prosecutor, appellant and her attorney as the result of a plea bargain. We thus conclude that the record fails to reflect the existence of a plea bargain.
Since the record fails to reflect that the plea in the instant case was the result of a negotiated plea bargain, appellant’s plea of guilty waived her right to complain of the court’s action in overruling the motion to quash. Craven v. State, supra. Nothing is presented for review.
The State’s motion for rehearing is granted and the judgment is affirmed.
ROBERTS and TEAGUE, JJ., dissent.