Court Opinion

ID: 9730947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:29:06.829894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:11.470421
License: Public Domain

WOLFF, Judge,
dissenting.
Because I cannot find evidence of deliberation — a period of cool reflection however brief — I dissent from affirming the first-degree murder conviction and death sentence. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision, Cooper Industries Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., — U.S.-, 121 S.Ct. 1678, 149 L.Ed.2d 674 (2001), which requires de novo review in punitive damages cases, should apply with equal force to the imposition of the death penalty. Whether the *794review is de novo, or just careful, it seems that Black’s death sentence is the result of trial strategy, not evidence.
The Standard of Review
Before addressing the particular and troublesome issues raised by this conviction and death sentence, it seems appropriate in light of the Cooper Industries decision briefly to consider the standard of review in death penalty cases. When reviewing the constitutionality of the imposition of punitive damages, the Supreme Court holds that an appellate court’s review is de novo. Id. at 1683. Liability for and imposition of punitive damages invokes moral condemnation of reprehensible conduct and, thus, requires de novo review of the constitutionality of such punishment in a given case. Id. The Supreme Court’s opinion cites some of its death penalty jurisprudence in reaching this conclusion. Id. at 1684.1 Even without reference to the Supreme Court’s death penalty cases, it seems beyond argument that each imposition of the death penalty presents a constitutional issue and merits the same kind of de novo review.
Because of the moral condemnation, punitive damages cases are different, to be used sparingly in only the most extreme cases. Rodriguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 936 S.W.2d 104, 110 (Mo. banc 1996).
Punitive damages cases are different. So are death penalty cases.
In punitive damages cases, special judicial scrutiny is warranted: the mere fact that a horrible event has occurred, through the fault of a defendant, may be considered by the jury to supply the necessary element that the defendant acted in conscious disregard for the safety of others even though the conduct was not tantamount to intentional wrongdoing. See, e.g., Alcorn v. Union Pacific Railroad, 50 S.W.3d 226, 248 (Mo. banc 2001). Similarly, in this case, the conduct of the defendant Black was loathsome, and a death resulted. These facts may supply, as far as the jury is concerned, the elements needed for conviction and a death sentence.
The de novo review required by the Cooper Industries reasoning involves a dispassionate review of the punishment. If that kind of protection is to be afforded to corporate defendants under a due process standard, individuals facing death sentences should be afforded no less due process.
While we may leave it to future cases to explore the ramifications of de novo review in cases imposing the death penalty, the penalty phase is where de novo review is particularly appropriate. One could argue that the independent or proportionality review mandated by section 565.035 meets the standard in Cooper Industries for the penalty phase. The statute does call for a review to ensure that the sentence of death is not “imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice, or any other arbitrary factor,” and that the Court should determine whether the sentence “is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime, the strength of the evidence and the defendant.” Section 565.035.3(1) and (3). This Court has eschewed the statutory invitation to treat like cases alike by refusing to consider similar cases (or even the same case) where lesser sentences are given to other defendants. See, e.g., State v. Rousan, 961 S.W.2d 831 (Mo. banc *7951998). Instead, most of our proportionality review consists of finding some similar cases where the death penalty has been imposed-a task that can rather conveniently be done by computer now that there have been 150 or so cases in which the death penalty has been imposed in recent years.
I do not now propose to revisit the issue of our proportionality review. The premise of “proportionality” — when the term refers to eliminating disparities in sentencing — seems flawed. Regardless of similarities in criminal behavior, no two defendants are alike. More importantly, an effort to treat like crimes alike can create a system that is more regulatory than just, as the federal sentencing guidelines system has demonstrated.2 The proportionality review should be aimed at eliminating disparities that are not based on differences in crimes and defendants. When applied as a formula, such review becomes a game of “count the factors” — -if there are enough, then the sentence is right. That mechanistic counting of factors, on appellate review, avoids confronting directly the important question of whether this particular defendant can be said to a moral certainty to have committed a crime that justifies what should be a rare use of the death penalty.
Anyone familiar with the frailties of human institutions, including legal and governmental systems, should not be surprised that our legal system makes mistakes. As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor is reported to have said in a recent speech, “If statistics are any indication, the system may well be allowing some innocent defendants to be executed.”3
Because we humans are prone to err, even with the strictest standards of proof and judicial review, execution of the innocent is a cost of having the death penalty. The decision of whether or not to have the death penalty, and its attendant and virtually inevitable cost of innocent human life, is a question for the Missouri legislature or the people of this state by constitutional amendment. Courts do not enact statutes or constitutional provisions.
But courts do set standards within the framework of the constitution and statutes. Appropriate judicial review can minimize the cost in human life of errors by the legal system. Appellate de novo review is appropriate, and I believe constitutionally required, for both guilt and penalty phases in order to minimize the number of fatal errors.
There are two general kinds of cases where de novo review is particularly needed. The first are the easier cases — where there is serious question whether the defendant was involved in the crime. In State v. Chaney, 967 S.W.2d 47, 61 (Mo. banc 1998), three judges of this Court were unpersuaded that the state had enough evidence even to submit the case to *796a jury. The Chaney majority, acknowledging the weakness of the evidence, affirmed the conviction with a life sentence. Id. at 60. The use of such review has been quite limited. See State v. Wolfe, 13 S.W.3d 248, 276-78 (Mo. banc 2000) (Wolff, J., dissenting). The other, more difficult, category of cases involve death sentences where the evidence is extraordinarily weak as to an essential element of the crime or as to aggravating circumstances that justify the death penalty. The weakness may be, as here, that the essential element of deliberation is lacking. Those are cases often involving heated emotions, such as street fights, saloon fights — and this case.
De Novo Review in this Case
In this case, whether or not we apply the de novo review rationale of Cooper . Industries, the two troubling aspects are:
1. There is no evidence of deliberation, that is, “cool reflection.” In fact, the testimony of Black’s girlfriend in the penalty phase undercuts-the notion that this was a premeditated murder. In its all-or-nothing instructions, the trial court did not give the jury the option of convicting Black of anything but first-degree murder.
2. The girlfriend was used by the state in the penalty phase to show racial hatred on Black’s part to support its ill-founded submission of “depravity of mind” as an aggravating circumstance. In doing so, the racist language obscures the absence of deliberation that this Court ought to correct through de novo review.
Omission of lesser-included offenses
The facts in this case would amply support a conviction of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter, but not first-degree murder. The options of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter were not presented in the trial court’s instructions.
There is nothing recorded as to the reasons for the defense failure to request instruction on a lesser-included offense. The state and the principal opinion correctly point out the fallacy of plain-error review on such instruction matters at this stage — often the failure is deliberate trial strategy employed with the hope that the case for first-degree murder will seem so insubstantial that the jury will acquit because that is its only alternative. If requested, the instruction of a lesser-included offense is usually warranted in a murder case. State v. Santillan, 948 S.W.2d 574, 576 (Mo. banc 1997)
But there is no record of such a request. The defense in this case told the jury in argument in the penalty phase that there are lesser forms of murder, and that this might really only be a second-degree murder. The argument bolsters the impression that there was an “all or nothing” strategy in the guilt phase and, failing that, perhaps the jury would realize in the penalty phase that this was only a second-degree murder case. That is, in the usual course, a matter to be explored in the post-conviction proceeding. It may well be, in light of Black’s experience with the legal system, that the failed strategy was directed by a fully informed client.
In death penalty cases, this strategy becomes a twisted version of “you bet your life.” The defense ought not to be granted a new trial, on direct appeal, as a result of such strategy. Instead, it seems entirely appropriate to determine whether this really is a set of facts that supports first-degree murder. And, if not, the Court has the option of remanding for sentencing on the offense of second-degree murder supported by the evidence. State v. O’Brien, 857 S.W.2d 212, 220 (Mo. banc 1993).
*797The facts in this case, stripped to their essentials and stated favorably to the state are simple: Black’s girlfriend complained to Black that, while she was in a convenience store, Jason Johnson made a pass at her. Black, in his car, chased down the truck in which Johnson was riding. During the chase, according to the girlfriend’s testimony in the penalty phase, Black said he was going to “hurt that nigger.” (Emphasis added.) When Black caught up with the truck, he and Johnson exchanged words. Black got out of his car and stabbed Johnson in the neck, and Johnson threw a beer bottle at Black. Johnson died three days later. After the stabbing, according to the girlfriend, Black said that was “one nigger down.”
The girlfriend testified only in the penalty phase. Her testimony is recounted here to give a brief but accurate picture, including her account of Black’s racially hateful speech. But does the evidence support the state’s contention that this killing met the standard for firs1>degree murder, i.e., that it was done, as the instruction says, “after deliberation, which means cool reflection upon the matter for any length of time no matter how brief?”
There was time in this case for deliberation but no indication of “cool reflection;” however, time in these circumstances cannot alone suffice to supply evidence of “cool reflection.” The evidence showed rage, not cool reflection.
The record reflects that the jury sent the verdict-directing instruction back to the trial judge with a circle around the phrase “cool reflection” and a note: “Judge, please define this phrase.” The phrase, of course, was not defined in the judge’s response to the note. The jury note, in my view, zeroed in on precisely the issue presented on these facts — whether there was evidence of “cool reflection.”
At most the evidence showed that Black purposely injured Jason Johnson. When a defendant “with the purpose of causing serious physical injury” causes a victim’s death, that is second-degree murder.4 “Both second degree murder and first degree murder require that the act be intentionally done. Only first degree murder requires the cold blood, the unimpas-sioned premeditation that the law calls deliberation.” O’Brien, 857 S.W.2d at 218 (emphasis added). Black’s crime was second-degree murder.
The prosecution strategy
The prosecution’s decision to call the girlfriend in the penalty phase, not the guilt phase, was clever for two reasons. The obvious reason is that the poisonous testimony of racial hate is saved for the penalty phase. But even better for the prosecution was the fact that the girlfriend’s testimony undercuts the state’s contention that there was deliberation. Black’s reported use of the term “nigger” is shocking. The racial epithet distracts from the stated intent to “hurt” Jason Johnson. The statement does not show intent to kill him. Had such testimony been presented in the guilt phase of the trial it would have weakened an already virtually nonexistent case for first-degree murder.
Because of the all-or-nothing submission of first-degree murder instructions, the jury was confronted with two bad choices: acquittal of an awful crime or ignoring the *798“cool reflection” language and convicting Black of first-degree murder.
On this appeal, this Court has a choice not available to the jury. This Court can affirm a conviction for a lesser-included offense that is supported by the evidence and remand for sentencing. O'Brien, 857 S.W.2d at 220.
The penalty phase submission
The evidence adduced by the state to show that Gary Black was afflicted with depravity of mind was particularly poisonous. If the girlfriend’s testimony is believed, Black was possessed by racial hatred. The racial epithets that she attributed to Black were used by the state to show “depravity of mind.”
As to the “depravity of mind” aggravator, the trial court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:
In determining the punishment to be assessed against the defendant for the murder of Jason 0. Johnson, you must first unanimously determine whether one or more of the following statutory aggravating circumstances exists:
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2. Whether the murder of Jason 0. Johnson involved depravity of mind and whether, as a result thereof, the murder was outrageously and wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman. You can make a determination of depravity of mind only if you find:
That the defendant killed Jason 0. Johnson for the purpose of causing suffering to another person and thereby exhibited a callous disregard for the sanctity of all human life.
The state correctly concedes in this appeal that the “depravity of mind” aggravator was not justified in this, case. See State v. Smith, 756 S.W.2d 493, 501 (Mo. banc 1988).5 Under our cases, cited in the principal opinion, proof of one statutory aggravating circumstance is the threshold requirement for the jury to consider whether the death penalty is justified. State v. Shafer, 969 S.W.2d 719, 739 (Mo. banc 1998). Black’s two 1976 convictions suffice to meet this threshold.
However, the jury heard the evidence of racist motive, the trial court’s instruction on “depravity of mind,” and the prosecution’s arguments that tied the racist motive to “depravity of mind.” This is not simply a question of evidence to be governed by section 565.032.1(2), as the principal opinion contends. Here the evidence was augmented by the “depravity of mind” submission, and the jury’s verdict tainted by submission of the evidence as proof of depravity of mind.
Errors in the penalty phase “can prejudice the defendant by preempting the jury from choosing the ‘life’ alternative,” as this Court pointed out in State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 447, 463 (Mo. banc 1993) (citing Espinosa v. Florida, 505 U.S. 1079, 112 S.Ct. 2926, 120 L.Ed.2d 854 (1992)). Errors of evidence in the penalty phase can sometimes be disregarded because trial judges can be presumed not to consider improper evidence when sentencing defendants.
The presumption that the trial court did not consider an improper submission in sentencing does not apply here because the trial court concluded, incorrectly, that the depravity of mind aggravator was warranted.
The possible prejudicial preemption of the life-sentence alternative from the jury *799echoes in this appeal. The principal opinion relies on evidence of Black’s racially hateful speech and his other assaultive behavior — apparently also introduced to show “depravity of mind” — to justify affirming the sentence. In the circumstances of an improper submission this is, to put it mildly, an unusually high degree of deference to a tainted verdict. That, it seems to me, is not even close to the de novo review this Court would and should grant in a punitive damages case.
A function of de novo review is to evaluate the evidence supporting the death penalty dispassionately. As the Supreme Court said of punitive damages in the Cooper Industries case, the punishment is not a fact found by the jury, but is a condemnation to be subjected to de novo appellate review. 121 S.Ct. at 1686.
In this death penalty case, the jury’s determination is not a finding of fact — it is a recommendation to the trial court judge. In this case the jury’s recommendation was tainted by the evidence of racial hatred that was linked to the unsupported notion of “depravity of mind.” To get the death penalty, it may have been necessary for the state to show that Black is a racist bully. It certainly helped the state in sustaining the penalty on appeal to this Court.
The erstwhile girlfriend, who for all anyone knows was in some legal jeopardy of her own because of her participation in Black’s flight, supplied what the state needed. But in proper context, on de novo review, her testimony exposes the nonexistence of the state’s case as to deliberation, supplying evidence not of an intent to kill but to hurt.
Conclusion
The defense’s apparent trial strategy of all-or-nothing on first-degree murder clearly failed. And the prosecution’s trial strategy was more clever than that of the defense. But when a death sentence is the result of trial strategy, not evidence, correction on appeal is constitutionally required. Gary Black is guilty of a serious crime, second-degree murder, for which he could serve a life sentence. But he should not be executed for a failed trial strategy.
Black’s conviction should be reversed, and the case remanded to the trial court for entry of a judgment and sentence for second-degree murder.

. The United States Supreme Court cited Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 787, 102 S.Ct. 3368, 73 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1982), and Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592, 97 S.Ct. 2861, 53 L.Ed.2d 982 (1977) (opinion of White, J.), as examples where it has enforced limits involving deprivations of life.

. Regarding the federal sentencing guidelines, see generally Kate Stith & Jose A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts (Univ. of Chicago Press 1998).

. Justice O’Connor's remarks were reported in The Minneapolis Star Tribune on July 3, 2001. Maria Elena Baca, Sandra Day O’Connor speaks in Minneapolis, Star Tribune Online, July 3, 2001, available at http://web-serv6.startribune.com. The statistics to which Justice O’Connor referred are as follows: In 1982, when she joined the United States Supreme Court, there were 856 inmates with death sentences, which has increased to 3,711 last year. In 1982 one person was executed; last year there were 85 executions. Also last year, according to Justice O’Connor, six inmates with death sentences were exonerated and released after review, bringing the total of such exonerations to 90 since 1973. There may not be reliable data on the number of persons executed who would have been exonerated.

. Section 565.021, “Second degree murder, penalty,” in pertinent part, is as follows:
1. A person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if he:
(1) Knowingly causes the death of another person or, with the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another person, causes the death of another person;
(Emphasis added).

. See also State v. Preston, 673 S.W.2d 1, 11 (Mo. banc 1984), and State v. Griffin, 756 S.W.2d 475, 490 (Mo. banc 1988), where the Court lists numerous factors as to what types of murders constitute "depravity of mind.”