Court Opinion

ID: 9852445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:30:25.360314+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:27.776217
License: Public Domain

*19ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
*20Williams & Skopil and Al J. Laue, Salem, for the petition.
Before McAllister, Chief Justice, and Bossman, Perry, Sloan, O’Connell, Goodwin and Denecke, Justices.
GOODWIN, J.
On petition for rehearing the defendants urge that we erroneously disposed of certain of their assignments of error.
In the original opinion we said that the plaintiff’s negligence, if any, and its causal connection with the collision were properly left to the jury. Contributory negligence had not, however, been submitted to the jury. In attempting to abbreviate our discussion of several assignments of error which we deemed to be of secondary importance, we not only obscured our meaning but unfortunately rekindled in the defendants a vain hope that the judgment might yet be reversed.
We meant to say first that the defendants’ several assignments of error in which they contended that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter' of law were without merit. The defendants were contending, inter alia, that there should have been a directed verdict in their favor. On that score, we should have said merely that there was no occasion for a directed verdict for the defendants.
There were other assignments of error, however, *21which challenged the refusal of the trial court to submit to the jury the defendants’ various specifications of contributory negligence. The defendants alleged that the plaintiff was negligent with respect to speed, lookout, and control. There were also two specifications of contributory negligence in failing to stop for the school bus. One such allegation attempted to charge the plaintiff with negligence at common law. The other charged a violation of OES 485.020 and thus attempted to allege contributory negligence as a matter of law. The trial court withdrew all the above specifications of contributory negligence from the jury. There was no error in refusing to submit the issue of contributory negligence.
It is true that neither the plaintiff nor the defendant stopped for the school bus. It does not follow, however, that this undisputed fact made a question for the jury on the plaintiff’s contributory negligence. Upon this point Burke v. Olson, 206 Or 149, 291 P2d 759 (1955), is controlling. There we held that whenever any person would claim a right arising out of a statutory enactment, he must bring himself within the purview of the act.
There is nothing in the record of the case at bar which gives the defendants the right to set up as a defense for their negligence a statute that requires a motor vehicle operator to stop upon meeting or overtaking a school bus that is loading or unloading children. The provisions of OES 485.020 had no operation as between these parties. There was no breach by the plaintiff of any statutory duty owed either to herself or to the defendants. Cf. Henthorne v. Hopwood et al, 218 Or 336, 338 P2d 373, 345 P2d 249 (1959), 39 Or L Rev 68 (1959), 40 Or L Rev 285 (1961), where the jaywalking pedestrian was in violation of an ordi*22nance specifically intended to prevent the very Mnd of accident that occurred.
There was likewise in the case at bar no evidence of common-law contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff vis a vis the defendants. As far as the record shows, the plaintiff was driving on her own side of the road at a normal rate of speed when she was struck head-on by the defendants’ truck. Apart from the admitted fact that she failed to stop for the school bus, there is no evidence that the plaintiff’s driving was in any particular subject to criticism. Her fault, if any, in failing to stop for the bus was no violation of any duty owed the defendants, or to any one in their position. It does no good to say that the statute prescribes a “standard of care” without giving attention to the kinds of harms to be guarded against. A failure to act in a particular manner, whether characterized as negligence as a matter of law or as common-law negligence, gives rise to no legal liability unless the party claiming a breach of duty can show that his claim is within the scope of such duty. See 2 Harper & James, Torts 1018, § 18.2 (1956).
Petition denied.