Court Opinion

ID: 9927577
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 15:06:54.861459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:22.588797
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1426-22

IONNA KOTSOGIANNIS,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOHN DIMARAS,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Argued November 28, 2023 – Decided January 29, 2024

                   Before Judges Whipple, Mayer and Enright.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County,
                   Docket No. FM-02-1593-14.

                   Evan R. Weinstein argued the cause for appellant
                   (Weinstein Family Law, attorneys; Evan R. Weinstein,
                   of counsel and on the brief; Erika Ponne Handler and
                   Julianne E. Kallas, on the briefs).

                   Sarir Zandi Silver argued the cause for respondent
                   (Loren M. LaForge, LLC, attorneys; Loren M. LaForge,
                   of counsel and on the brief; Sarir Zandi Silver, on the
                   brief).
PER CURIAM

      In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, defendant John Dimaras

appeals from certain paragraphs of orders dated August 2, and December 20,

2022,1 and the entirety of a January 4, 2023 order. Because the contested

provisions of these orders resulted from an unenforceable February 16, 2022

consent order (CO), we reverse and remand for further proceedings.

                                        I.

      Defendant and plaintiff, Ioanna Kotsogiannis, divorced in 2015 and have

an eleven-year-old son together.       The parties' January 20, 2015 marital

settlement agreement (MSA) was incorporated into a judgment of divorce

(JOD), and designated plaintiff as the child's parent of primary residence and

defendant as the "secondary residential custodial parent."

      The MSA also incorporated certain terms from a prior court order, and

provided defendant's parenting time would expand to alternating weekends and

Wednesday overnights with the child, beginning on July 1, 2015. However,

given concerns plaintiff had about defendant traveling with their son, the MSA

1
  Defendant specifically appeals from: paragraphs one to eight, ten, twenty to
twenty-two, and twenty-six to twenty-eight of the August 2, 2022 order; and
paragraphs one to twelve of the December 20, 2022 order. The challenged
portions of these two orders pertained to issues of child support, parenting time,
and counsel fees.
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provided neither party could "remove the minor child . . . more than a 125[-]mile

radius [from] the George Washington Bridge," nor obtain a passport for the child

without written consent from the other party. The MSA also obliged the parties

to utilize a Parent Coordinator (PC) to resolve future custody and parenting time

issues, and stated they also would "attempt to settle . . . disputes [arising under

the MSA] by mediation before using the courts for any determination."

      Moreover, the MSA obliged defendant to pay child support through the

Probation Department (Probation) at the rate of $172 per week until July 1,

2015, when his child support payments would decrease to $67 per week to

coincide with an anticipated increase in his parenting time. Notably, the child

support figures were based on plaintiff grossing $160,000 per year, defendant

grossing $80,000 per year, and defendant having 104 overnights with the child

each year. But the MSA further stated the parties' income figures were "subject

to income verification," which would "include the exchange of the prior year's

income tax return[s], W-2[s], three most recent pay statements and any relevant

employment contract."     The parties also agreed "[i]f the[ir] incomes ha[d]

changed, . . . child support w[ould] be recalculated."

      Less than a year after the entry of JOD, defendant's parenting time was

temporarily restricted and he was permitted to exercise only supervised

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parenting time, due to an ongoing investigation by the Division of Child

Protection and Permanency. This modified arrangement continued until July

2017, when defendant again was allowed unsupervised parenting time.

Thereafter, the parties returned to the parenting schedule set forth in the MSA.

      In 2018, after the parties consulted with their son's therapist and their PC,

they agreed to modify the parenting schedule so defendant would have

alternating   Wednesday    overnights,       instead   of   weekly   overnights   on

Wednesdays. They further stipulated defendant's alternating weekends would

include Sunday overnights going forward.

      Probation attempted to conduct a triennial review of defendant's child

support obligation in 2018, but it could not complete the process due to

defendant's failure to "respon[d] to the Triennial Review Financial Request."

Thus, his child support obligation remained at $67 per week. Three years later,

Probation again was unable to complete its triennial review, this time because it

could not "verify [defendant's o]ut-[o]f-[s]tate [e]mployment."

      In September 2020, defendant provided the PC with his tax returns for

2017, 2018, and 2019 so the PC could address the parties' ongoing disputes over

child support. The next month, the PC determined defendant was grossing

$192,500, and plaintiff's average income over the prior three years was

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$170,000. Therefore, the PC calculated defendant should pay $199 per week in

child support, and possibly a supplemental amount, considering the parties'

combined income was "above the [Child Support] Guideline[s] threshold." The

PC suggested the parties discuss this "legal issue . . . with [their] attorneys" or

agree on an amount to "add to the $199 per week." According to defendant, he

began paying $199 per week in child support as of January 2021.

      In October 2021, the parties agreed to mediate additional unresolved child

support and parenting time issues. However, they failed to agree on a mediation

date. Therefore, on November 23, 2021, plaintiff filed a motion for various

relief, including: (1) a recalculation of defendant's child support obligation; (2)

modification of the parenting time schedule; and (3) an award of counsel fees.

Defendant opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion, asking the court for

additional relief, including an order: (1) fixing a holiday and vacation parenting

schedule; (2) removing the travel ban incorporated into the MSA and JOD; and

(3) compelling plaintiff to cooperate in securing a passport for the parties' child.

      In February 2022, the trial court ordered the parties to immediately attend

mediation and promptly report back to the court afterwards so it could resolve

any remaining issues in their cross-applications.       Although mediation was

unsuccessful, the parties agreed, through counsel, to allow the mediator to

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arbitrate the issues raised in their respective motions and make binding

recommendations on all but one issue—whether the child could travel

internationally. Both parties also agreed to waive any conflict arising from the

mediator assuming the role of arbitrator. 2

        Following extensive negotiations between counsel, they memorialized the

terms of an arbitration agreement in a draft order, laying the groundwork for

further litigation between the parties and ultimately, this appeal. The parties

and counsel signed the CO before it was filed with the court on February 16,

2022.

        The CO directed the parties would exchange income information,

including their 2021 year-end paystubs, and return to the arbitrator "for [a] final

determination of all issues . . . on March 2, 2022." The CO also stated, a "[c]ourt

[o]rder with all binding decisions and the parties' signatures shall be presented

to the [c]ourt no later than March 11, 2022." Additionally, the CO provided that

"[i]f either party fail[ed] to abide by the [arbitrator's] binding recommendations

2
  In Minkowitz v. Israeli, we considered "the compatibility of the same party
assuming the role of mediator and arbitrator," and held that "absent the parties'
contract to the contrary, once a neutral assumes the role of mediator, [they] may
not assume the role of arbitrator." 433 N.J. Super. 111, 142, 147-48 (App. Div.
2013).

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                                        6
and enter into [a] consent order by March 11, 2022," the draft consent order

would be "converted into an [o]rder under the [five]-day rule,"3 and forwarded

to the court by the arbitrator. The arbitrator would also recommend "to the

[c]ourt . . . whether the party refusing to abide by the terms of th[e CO] and the

subsequent [o]rder containing the binding recommendations should be

responsible to pay the counsel fees of the other [party]."

        The parties met with the arbitrator on March 2, 2022, consistent with the

CO. Five days later, defendant's attorney wrote to the arbitrator, asking that she

"not issue any 'binding recommendation[s]'. . . and . . . not issue any 'non-binding

recommendation' concerning international travel in this matter on March 11,

2022," notwithstanding the terms of the CO. Defendant's attorney claimed he

expected "the proceedings" between the parties and the arbitrator would consist

of two days. Further, he expressed concern that "[t]here was no mediation" and

defendant was "not given any time" on March 2 "to present [his] positions" to

the arbitrator.

        Additionally,   defendant's   counsel   asserted   that   in   "[a]rbitration

proceedings involving custody or parenting time," such as the proceedings in

this case, there should have been "a record of all documentary evidence" and

3
    R. 4:42-1(c).
                                                                               A-1426-22
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any testimony should have been "recorded verbatim." Counsel stated, "[t]hat

did not happen."        Therefore, he contended the arbitrator's "binding

recommendation[s could] not be transmitted to the [c]ourt."

      Critically, defendant's counsel also argued in his March 7 letter that the

CO was "not consistent with the Rules of Court" and specifically "d[id] not

adhere to R[ule] 5:1-5(b)(3)." Thus, he warned if the arbitrator issued binding

recommendations which were "not acceptable to one of the litigants, that litigant

c[ould] commence litigation to vacate any [c]ourt [o]rder which set[] forth [her]

recommendations."       Therefore, defendant's counsel suggested the parties

prepare an amended consent order consistent with the Rules of Court, stating,

"[w]e cannot . . . ignore the procedural flaws which were created, without intent

on any of our parts."

      Plaintiff disagreed with defendant's position. Accordingly, on March 11,

2022, the arbitrator submitted a proposed form of order to the trial court entitled,

"Order of Binding Recommendations of Arbitrator in Connection with Pending

Motion and Cross[-]Motion," consistent with the terms of the CO. One of the

arbitrator's binding recommendations was that defendant pay $1,333.33 per

month in child support, based on his gross base salary of $180,000, plaintiff's

gross earned income of $170,000 per year, and defendant exercising 104

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overnights per year with the parties' son. Further, the arbitrator recommended

defendant pay supplemental child support in the sum of 7.5% of "any additional

gross income he earn[ed]."

      In the arbitrator's accompanying statement of reasons, she concluded

defendant should have paid more child support than he did following the entry

of the JOD, given his substantially increased income. Thus, she recommended

he pay arrears of $33,532 for the period between July 1, 2015, and November

22, 2021, and additional arrears of $4,615.37 for the period between plaintiff

filing her November 23, 2021 motion and March 8, 2022.            The arbitrator

reasoned that under the terms of the MSA, "the child support effective July 1,

2015 was temporary[,] . . . as the MSA specifically provided that the amount

was subject to verification of income[,] which did not occur." The arbitrator

further explained, "[d]efendant failed to provide his income information to . . .

Probation when requested for the triennial review dating back to 2018." She

added, "[d]efendant did not fulfill his obligation to support the child in a

meaningful manner as he earned significantly more than $80,000 in July 2015

and as a result, the minor child did not share in the current income of both

parties, namely [d]efendant."

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                                       9
      Regarding the parties' parenting time issues, the arbitrator recommended

defendant's alternating "Wednesday overnight parenting time . . . be converted

to a dinner visit every Wednesday," and the last six weeks of summer parenting

time be alternated between the parties pursuant to her recommended schedule.

In her statement of reasons, the arbitrator explained she recommended against

the child traveling between his parents' homes in New Jersey and New York City

"during the school week," based on his "present difficulties . . . in school," as

documented in an "Intervention & Referral Services" report submitted to her by

defendant. In that vein, although the arbitrator submitted a Child Support

Guidelines Shared Parenting Worksheet with her recommendations, and the

worksheet included an allocation of 104 overnights to defendant, she did not

explain how she determined the applicable number of overnights, considering

she recommended defendant no longer exercise overnight parenting time on

alternating Wednesdays.

      Finally, the arbitrator recommended each party submit a proposed holiday

and vacation parenting plan to her by the end of March 2022 so she could issue

a binding recommendation based on their proposals.

      Defendant's attorney immediately wrote to the trial court on March 11,

2022, stating he "opposed the rendering of any form of binding or non[-]binding

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                                      10
recommendations" by the arbitrator, "[g]iven the procedurally defective manner

in which [arbitration] was conducted." Defendant's attorney urged the judge not

to sign the proposed order reflecting the arbitrator's recommendations,

explaining the arbitrator did "not allow any testimony as to the issues of

parenting time, child support, and travel," and "[n]o attempt was made to

mediate any issue subsequent to [the arbitrator's] receipt of the parties'

respective submissions[,] despite [defendant's] request . . .           of the

mediator/arbitrator to do so." Defendant's attorney also argued the CO was "not

consistent with the Rules of Court," identifying various provisions of Rule 5:1-

5 to which the CO did not "adhere[]." Defendant's attorney asked "the [c]ourt

not [to] enter the [proposed form of o]rder without a hearing or conference."

Nevertheless, the judge executed the arbitrator's proposed order on March 15,

2022, incorporating the binding recommendations therein.

      Less than a month later, defendant moved for various forms of relief,

including an order: (1) vacating the CO and the March 15, 2022 order; (2)

vacating all travel restrictions incorporated into the MSA and JOD; (3)

expanding his parenting time; (4) compelling the parties to engage in additional

financial discovery; and (5) granting him an award of counsel fees and costs.

Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for additional relief, including:

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                                      11
(1) enforcement of the CO and the March 15 order; and (2) an award of counsel

fees.

        Following argument, the judge entered an order on August 2, 2022: (1)

denying defendant's request to vacate the CO and March 15 order; (2) granting

plaintiff's request to enforce these orders; (3) denying defendant's request for

counsel fees; and (4) awarding plaintiff counsel fees in the sum of $3,754.35. 4

The judge found there was no "basis . . . to support vacating the [CO] or March

[15,] 2022 . . . [o]rder[]," considering "all parties were involved in the drafting

of the [CO] and both [attorneys] discussed the language [of the CO at] great

length, specifically as it related to the arbitration process." He added, "[t]his

[c]ourt puts great emphasis on the fact that [d]efendant's counsel . . . assisted in

the drafting of the language [of the CO]."

        Regarding his counsel fee decision, the judge cited Rules 4:42-9 and 5:3-

5(c), and stated:

              This [c]ourt does not find [d]efendant to be entitled to
              an award of counsel fees. The majority of [his]
              requested relief was denied and lacked [a] sufficient
              basis. Further, . . . [he] exhibits the ability to pay his
              own . . . counsel fees. . . . [T]he majority of the relief
              sought is based upon [his] counsel's contention that the

4
 Given our decision, we do not list the remaining challenged provisions of the
August 2 order.

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                                         12
              [CO] should be vacated entirely, which this [c]ourt
              found no basis for. . . .

                    Instead, . . . [p]laintiff shall be entitled to an
              award of counsel fees based on having to defend the
              enforceability of the [CO], even though both parties
              agreed and willingly entered into same, with every
              opportunity to object to its validity and process during
              mediation. Accordingly, this [c]ourt finds a partial
              award of counsel fees, in the amount of $3,754.35, to
              be equitable and appropriate given the circumstances.

         Defendant moved for reconsideration of the August 2, 2022 order.

Following argument, the judge denied the motion by order dated December 20,

2022. In the statement of reasons attached to the December 20 order, the judge

found defendant primarily contested "three major rulings within the March [15,]

2022 order," which were "all affirmed in the August [2,] 2022 [o]rder,"

specifically: the loss of his "bimonthly Wednesday overnight parenting time";

the increase of his child support obligation to $1,333.33 per month; and the order

that he "pay child support arrears for the period of 2015 to 2021 when he was

paying $67 per week due [to] his lack of financial disclosure."          The judge

concluded defendant provided no evidence to support vacatur of the CO or

March 15, 2022 order, and by extension, no basis to reconsider the August 2

order.

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                                        13
         The judge further observed neither party provided evidence that "any of

the six factors" set forth under N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23(a)5 existed, and defendant

5
      Under N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23(a), a court will vacate an arbitration award only
if:

               (1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or
               other undue means;

               (2) the court finds evident partiality by an arbitrator;
               corruption by an arbitrator; or misconduct by an
               arbitrator prejudicing the rights of a party to the
               arbitration proceeding;

               (3) an arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon
               showing of sufficient cause for postponement, refused
               to consider evidence material to the controversy, or
               otherwise conducted the hearing contrary to section 15
               of [the Arbitration Act (Act), N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-1 to -
               36], so as to substantially prejudice the rights of a party
               to the arbitration proceeding;

               (4) an arbitrator exceeded the arbitrator's powers;

               (5) there was no agreement to arbitrate, unless the
               person participated in the arbitration proceeding
               without raising the objection pursuant to subsection c.
               of section 15 of th[e A]ct not later than the beginning
               of the arbitration hearing; or

               (6) the arbitration was conducted without proper notice
               of the initiation of an arbitration as required in section
               9 of th[e A]ct so as to substantially prejudice the rights
               of a party to the arbitration proceeding.

               [N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23(a).]
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                                          14
failed to show "the child [wa]s threatened to be harmed by the change in

[defendant's] parenting time." Moreover, the judge determined defendant's child

support obligation, including the "award of supplemental child support" was

properly based on the parties' combined incomes, as well as "the child's needs

and the financial circumstances of the parties." He also found the arbitrator's

"child support calculation was based on [d]efendant having 104 overnights when

he has substantially less, approximately [seventy]," and "[d]efendant's income

in 2021 exceeded $220,000." Accordingly, the judge found "the arbitrator's

calculation [was] favorable to [d]efendant in more ways than one."

      Regarding defendant's arrearage argument, the judge concluded there was

no basis to reconsider the amount of arrears calculated by the arbitrator ,

considering the arrearages were based on defendant's significantly increased

income following the entry of the JOD, which he failed to disclose in a timely

fashion. Considering these findings, the judge concluded "[d]efendant failed to

provide any evidence and failed to make any cogent argument that the . . .

August [2,] 2022 [o]rder was based on a palpably incorrect basis or that [the

judge] failed to consider or appreciate the significance of probative, competent

evidence."

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                                      15
      Lastly, the judge awarded plaintiff $5,000 in counsel fees, finding

"[d]efendant's financial circumstances exceed that of [p]laintiff's," defendant

"ha[d] the ability to pay his own fees," and he "acted in bad faith by consenting

to the use of an arbitrator[,] then filing to vacate the arbitrator's order shortly

after it was imposed, and . . . filing for . . . reconsideration based . . . on his

dissatisfaction with the arbitrator's decision without attempting to meet the

standards for a motion for reconsideration."

      On January 4, 2023, the judge executed an order submitted by the

arbitrator, establishing a holiday and vacation parenting schedule consistent

with the terms of the CO and the March 15, 2022 order. The order reflected that

the arbitrator had prepared the order after considering the parties' respective

proposals for a holiday and vacation parenting plan, as well as the CO and the

March 15, 2022 order. This appeal followed.

                                        II.

      On appeal, defendant raises three main arguments and multiple secondary

arguments. He primarily contends the trial court erred by: (1) "upholding the

parties' February 16, 2022 [CO]," even though it "failed to comport with" Rule

5:1-5(b); (2) denying his reconsideration motion; and (3) awarding counsel fees

to plaintiff. Therefore, as discussed, he seeks reversal of: (1) paragraphs one

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                                       16
through eight, ten, twenty through twenty-two, and twenty-six through twenty-

eight of the August 2, 2022 order; (2) paragraphs one through twelve of the

December 20, 2022 order; and (3) the entirety of the January 4, 2023 order.

      Because we agree with defendant that the CO was mistakenly entered and

enforced, we now reverse the challenged provisions of the August 2, and

December 20, 2022 orders, and the January 4, 2023 order, and remand for further

proceedings. Given this determination, we do not reach defendant's remaining

arguments. We add the following comments.

      As a threshold matter, we recognize "[a]rbitration should spell [a]

litigation's conclusion, rather than its beginning." Borough of E. Rutherford v.

E. Rutherford PBA Loc. 275, 213 N.J. 190, 201 (2013) (first alteration in

original) (quoting N.J. Tpk. Auth. v. Loc. 196, 190 N.J. 283, 292 (2007)). In

fact, "[t]he public policy of this State favors arbitration as a means of settling

disputes that otherwise would be litigated in a court." Badiali v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins.

Grp., 220 N.J. 544, 556 (2015). This "strong public policy" also favors "using

arbitration in family litigation."    Minkowitz, 433 N.J. Super. at 131-32.

Accordingly, "courts grant arbitration awards considerable deference."           E.

Rutherford PBA Loc., 213 N.J. at 201.

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                                       17
      Although "the scope of review of an arbitration award is narrow," Fawzy

v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 470 (2009), a court's constitutional duty to protect

children from harm may command appellate review of arbitration awards

involving custody and parenting time, Johnson v. Johnson, 204 N.J. 529, 547

(2010) ("[W]here a prima facie claim of harm [to a child] is advanced, our

substantive review is compelled."); see also Fawzy, 199 N.J. at 462 ("Only a

threat of harm will justify judicial infringement on the fundamental right of

parents to decide how to resolve disputes over their children's upbringing.").

And, as already discussed, N.J.S.A. 2A:23B-23 further specifies the limited

grounds for vacating an arbitration award. Because the trial court's decision to

affirm or vacate an arbitration award is a decision of law, our review is de novo.

Minkowitz, 433 N.J. Super. at 136; see also Manger v. Manger, 417 N.J. Super.

370, 376 (App. Div. 2010).

      By contrast, we review a Family Part judge's decision concerning custody

and parenting time for an abuse of discretion. See Randazzo v. Randazzo, 184

N.J. 101, 113 (2005). An abuse of discretion occurs when a trial court's decision

"rested on an impermissible basis, considered irrelevant or inappropriate factors,

failed to consider controlling legal principles[,] or made findings inconsistent

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                                       18
with or unsupported by competent evidence." Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super.

424, 434 (App. Div. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

      Likewise, a Family Part judge is afforded "substantial discretion in

making a child support award" and "[i]f consistent with the law, such an award

'will not be disturbed unless it is manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly

contrary to reason or to other evidence.'" Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312,

315-16 (App. Div. 2001) (quoting Raynor v. Raynor, 319 N.J. Super. 591, 605

(App. Div. 1999)).

      Similarly, a trial court's counsel fee decision is reviewed under an abuse

of discretion standard. See Litton Indus., Inc. v. IMO Indus., Inc., 200 N.J. 372,

386 (2009). But a trial court's award of fees may be reversed where the judge's

findings in determining the award are unsupported or no longer accurate

following appeal. See Slutsky v. Slutsky, 451 N.J. Super. 332, 365-68 (App.

Div. 2017) ("The provision ordering defendant to pay plaintiff's fees is vacated"

"because it was based on insufficient, and now, vacated findings.").

      We also review a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion for

reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. See Cummings v. Bahr, 295 N.J.

Super. 374, 389 (App. Div. 1996). Reconsideration is reserved for "those cases

which fall into that narrow corridor in which either (1) the [c]ourt has expressed

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                                       19
its decision based upon a palpably incorrect or irrational basis, or (2) it is

obvious that the [c]ourt either did not consider, or failed to appreciate the

significance of probative, competent evidence." Castano v. Augustine, 475 N.J.

Super. 71, 78 (App. Div. 2023) (alterations in original) (quoting Triffin v. SHS

Grp., LLC, 466 N.J. Super. 460, 466 (App. Div. 2021)).

      Governed by these standards, the challenged provisions of the orders on

appeal cannot stand because they flow from a CO that failed to comport with

Rule 5:1-5(b).

      Rule 5:1-5 became effective on September 1, 2015, and—with few

exceptions not applicable here—"applies to all . . . [c]onsent [o]rders to

[a]rbitrate" disputes in the Family Part. R. 5:1-5(a). Further, Rule 5:1-5(b)

identifies the prerequisites for an enforceable consent order, including an

arbitration questionnaire, which "shall be signed by each party" and "attached

to the . . . [c]onsent [o]rder, and filed with the court."         R. 5:1-5(b)(1).

Additionally, the arbitrator selected by the parties must sign an arbitrator

disclosure form, attach it to the consent order, and file it with the court. R.

5:1-5(b)(2).

      Importantly, per Rule 5:1-5(b)(3)(A), a consent order to arbitrate must not

only be executed by the parties, but it must specifically state:

                                                                            A-1426-22
                                       20
            (i) the parties understand their entitlement to a judicial
            adjudication of their dispute and are willing to waive
            that right;

            (ii) the parties are aware of the limited circumstances
            under which a challenge to the award may be advanced
            and agree to those limitations;

            (iii) the parties have had sufficient time to consider the
            implications of their decision to arbitrate; and

            (iv) the parties have entered into the . . . [c]onsent
            [o]rder freely and voluntarily, after due consideration
            of the consequences of doing so.

            [Rule 5:1-5(b)(3)(A).]

     Moreover, Rule 5:1-5(b)(3)(B) states, in part,

            in all family proceedings involving child-custody and
            parenting-time issues, the . . . [c]onsent [o]rder shall
            provide that:

                  (i) a record of all documentary evidence shall be
                  kept;

                  (ii) all testimony shall be recorded verbatim; and

                  (iii) the award shall state, in writing, findings of
                  fact and conclusions of law with a focus on the
                  best interests of the child standard.

            [Rule 5:1-5(b)(3)(B).]

      Rule 5:1-5(b)(3)(C) further requires that "in all family proceedings

involving child support issues, the . . . [c]onsent [o]rder shall provide that the

                                                                            A-1426-22
                                       21
award shall state, in writing, findings of fact and conclusions of law with a focus

on the best-interests standard, and consistent with R[ule] 5:6A and Rules

Appendix IX."

      Here, the record shows that—other than signing the CO—the parties failed

to satisfy the prerequisites set forth under Rule 5:1-5(b), rendering the CO

unenforceable. And because the CO failed to include a mandatory questionnaire

signed by the parties, an arbitrator disclosure form, or the specific terms required

under Rule 5:1-5(b)(3), neither it, nor the challenged orders flowing from it, can

survive. Ultimately, we are persuaded the glaring omissions in the CO left the

trial court with no assurance the parties fully understood the consequences of

removing their disputes over parenting time, child support, counsel fees, and

other issues from the judicial arena to binding arbitration.

      Reversed and remanded for further proceedings.            We do not retain

jurisdiction.

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