Court Opinion

ID: 9831413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:05:18.588401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:34.617869
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
As said by the Supreme Court in Bank v. Bank, 84 Tex. 369, 19 S. W. 567, in discussing a description of- cattle in a mortgage:
“Written descriptions are to be interpreted in the light of the facts known and in the minds of the parties at the time. They are not prepared for strangers, but for those they are to affect—the parties and their privies.”
The description in the chattel mortgage was sufficient to put appellant upon inquiry, and by such inquiry he could have learned that the cow he intended to buy had been mortgaged by Vaughn to appellee. It does not appear that he even asked Peddicord how he obtained the cow. Blythe v. Crump, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 327, 66 S. W. 885. In the case cited the contest was between a man claiming to be an innocent purchaser and the mortgagee, and the court held that the description, “two gray mares sold by Sirup-trine to Vandiver,” was sufficient to excite inquiry.
[6] Appellant bought the cow from Peddi-cord, and made no inquiry as to how he came in possession of the cow, and did not make inquiries of any one or consult the records. Doubtless, if he had asked Peddicord from whom he obtained the cow, he would have learned that Vaughn had sold the cow, and then the chattel mortgage notified him that Vaughn had mortgaged a Jersey cow, and further inquiry would have given him the knowledge that the cow held by Peddicord was the identical animal mortgaged by Vaughn. Instead of such vigilance, he trusted in Mr. Peddicord, who “stood well in the community and was reputed to be worth 142,000.” No matter how accurately the cow may have been described, if appellant’s trust and confidence in Mr. Peddicord can transform him into an innocent purchaser, appellee would lose its security.
It is not necessary that mortgaged property should be so described as to be capable of being identified by the written recital, but the description is sufficient if it points to evidence whereby the precise thing mortgaged may be ascertained. Jones on Chattel Mortgages, §§ 53 and 54; Frick v. Fritz, 115 Iowa, 438, 88 N. W. 961, 91 Am. St. Rep. 165; Scrafford v. Gibbons, 44 Kan. 533, 24 Pac. 968. As said in the Kansas case (Mills v. Kansas Lumber Co., 26 Kan. 579):
“Resort must be had in nearly all cases to other evidence than that furnished by the mortgage itself, to enable third persons to identify mortgaged property; and generally where there is a description of the property mortgaged, and the description is true, and by the aid of such description, and the surrounding circumstances, tho third person would, in the ordinary course of things, know the property that was mortgaged, the description should be held to be sufficient.”
The description in that case was “one bay horse, aged six years.”
The motion for rehearing is overruled.