Court Opinion

ID: 9946873
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 17:11:33.191294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:42.358596
License: Public Domain

J-A28017-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  WILLIE N. SEABROOKS, III                     :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ESSENCE L. MASON                             :
                                               :
                        Appellant              :   No. 2020 EDA 2023

                     Appeal from the Order Entered July 21, 2023
                     In the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County
                            Civil Division at No: 662-2021

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                               FILED MARCH 1, 2024

        Essence L. Mason (“Mother”) appeals from the July 21, 2023 custody

order that modified the existing custody order and awarded Willie N.

Seabrooks III (“Father”) primary physical custody and Mother partial physical

custody of the parties’ four-year-old daughter, N.S. (“Child”), born in March

2019.     The order further maintained shared legal custody.       After careful

review, we affirm.1

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 To the extent Mother additionally appeals the April 26, 2023 order denying

her motion for transfer of venue and jurisdiction to Wake County, North
Carolina, we conclude that this issue is waived insofar as she failed to raise
the issue in the Statement of Questions Involved portion of her brief and failed
to offer any such discussion of it in the Argument section of her brief. See In
re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted)
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-A28017-23

       The trial court aptly stated:

              The parties hereto are the natural parents of [Child] who is
       the subject of this custody action. The case was initiated on July
       2, 2021 with [Father]’s filing of a pro se complaint for custody
       alleging that [Mother] had left the parties’ residence [in] East
       Stroudsburg, Pike County, Pennsylvania with [Child] and moved
       to North Carolina without [Father]’s consent or leave of court, and
       with [Father] seeking shared legal and partial physical custody.

             On November 9, 2021, [Mother] filed a counterclaim for
       custody . . . averring that she had moved to North Carolina due
       to domestic violence. On December 16, 2021, [Father] filed an
       answer and new matter to [Mother]’s counterclaim again averring
       that [Mother] had impermissibly moved to North Carolina with
       [Child] and . . . denying [Mother]’s allegations of domestic
       violence. . . .

Trial Court Opinion, 9/1/23, at 1-2 (cleaned up).

       This ultimately resulted in a May 16, 2022 custody order (“existing

custody order”).

                                          ...

       5. Under the May 16, 2022 custody order, the parties ha[d] shared
       legal custody and shared physical custody of [Child] on an
       alternating week-to-week basis.[2]

____________________________________________

(explaining this Court will not review an appellant’s claim unless it is included
in the statement of questions involved, developed in his or her argument, and
supported by citation to relevant legal authority).

2 Less than two weeks later, on May 27, 2022, Mother filed an emergency
petition for special relief raising allegations of physical abuse, and an order
was entered suspending Father’s custodial time pending hearing. Pursuant to
order of June 3, 2022, Mother withdrew her petition, and Father’s custodial
time was restored. Thereafter, upon his request, Father was awarded make-
up time.

                                           -2-
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       6. Mother . . . failed to produce [Child] for the court-ordered
       alternating week visits on several occasions.[3]

       7. Mother has made reports to Pike County Children and Youth
       Services, Monroe County Children and Youth Services, and the
       Pennsylvania State Police during and/or following Father’s periods
       of physical custody with [Child].

       8. None of the reports made to Children and Youth agencies have
       been deemed “indicated” or “founded,” and no criminal charges
       have been filed against Father.

       9. On April 25, 2023, Mother filed an emergency motion for special
       relief and a petition to modify custody based on her alleged
       concerns for [Child]’s welfare while with Father.[4]

       10. Mother [requested] primary physical custody of [Child] with
       supervised physical custody for Father [due to concerns of
       substance abuse by Father and/or physical abuse of Child].

       11. On April 27, 2023, the court scheduled a pre-trial conference
       on Mother’s filings for May 10, 2023, and a custody trial for July
       3, 2023.
____________________________________________

3 Mother confirmed that she withheld Child from Father on the following dates:

October 14, 2022 through October 21, 2022; November 11, 2022 through
November 18, 2022; November 25, 2022 through December 2, 2022;
December 23, 2022 through December 30, 2022; January 6, 2023 to January
13, 2023; January 20, 2023 through January 27, 2023; February 3, 2023
through February 10, 2023; February 17, 2023 through February 24, 2023.
See N.T., 7/3/23, at 92-94. Father additionally testified that Mother withheld
Child April 14, 2023 through April 21, 2023 and April 28, 2023 through May
5, 2023. See id. at 155. Father filed a petition for contempt on May 12,
2023, due to Mother’s withholding of Child.

 The court held an evidentiary hearing on May 31, 2023, and found Mother in
contempt. Mother was sentenced to a period of seven days incarceration with
the provision that she may purge herself by bringing Child on June 2, 2023,
for Father to resume his custodial time.

4 Mother additionally filed a motion to transfer venue and jurisdiction which

the court denied pursuant to order of May 26, 2023.

                                           -3-
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       12. On May 3, 3023, Father filed a counter-petition for
       modification of custody seeking sole legal and physical custody of
       [Child] based upon Mother’s constant alleged ongoing interference
       with his custody rights and relationship with [Child].

       13. On May 10, 2023, at the pre-trial conference, Mother
       requested that Father undergo a 10-panel hair follicle drug
       screening at her expense. The same was incorporated into the
       May 11, 2023 court order, which resulted from the pre-trial
       conference.[5]

       14. Mother did not pay for Father’s drug test within the designated
       time frame in the May 11, 2023 court [order].

       15. Father did not go for the drug test as Mother had not made
       timely payment for same.

       16. Mother credibly explained why her payment for the drug test
       was a few days late based on a lag in her receipt of the May 11,
       2023 order.

       17. At the conclusion of the [subject proceeding] and with the
       agreement of both parties, the court kept the record open to allow
       Father to take the 10-panel hair follicle drug test so that the court
       could consider the results in making these conclusions.

                                          ...

Order, 7/21/23 (cleaned up).

       The trial court held a custody trial on July 3, 2023. Mother and Father

were each present and represented by counsel.             Mother proffered the

testimony of her mother, S.M. (“Maternal Grandmother”), as well as Clinical

____________________________________________

5 The court notes that negative results were received on July 14, 2023.   Trial
Court Opinion, 9/1/23, at 3, ¶ 19. While not included in the certified record,
the test results are undisputed.

                                           -4-
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Mental Health Counselor Associate Bryanna Smith, Child’s treating counselor.

While offered as an expert in the areas of clinical mental health and

psychology, the court declined to accept Ms. Smith’s testimony in that

capacity. Instead, the court permitted her testimony as a “North Carolina

Licensed Health Counselor Associate who has provided services to [Child].”

N.T., 7/3/23, at 39, 43. Father proffered the testimony of his mother, T.W.

(“Paternal Grandmother”), as well as Adrianna Stares of Monroe County

Children and Youth Services and Christine Irwin of Pike County Children and

Youth Services. Mother and Father also each testified on their own behalf.

The court additionally interviewed Child in camera.

     As summarized by the trial court, the testimony revealed the following:

                                   ...

     25. Mother resides with her parents and brother [in] Morrisville,
     North Carolina.

     26. Mother is a phlebotomist and works full time.

     27. Mother scheduled a time to enroll [Child] in pre-K in North
     Carolina in August.

     28. [Maternal Grandmother] rents the home where Mother
     resides.

     29. Maternal Grandmother watches [Child] while Mother works.

     30. Father resides [in] East Stroudsburg,           Pike   County,
     Pennsylvania, with his [parents] and brothers.

     31. Father sends [Child] to Precious Moments pre-K in
     Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania from approximately 6:30 a.m. until
     4.00 p.m. Monday through Thursday on his weeks of custody.

                                    -5-
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       32. [Child] takes swim lessons at the YMCA in Stroudsburg twice
       weekly when with Father.

       33. Father is employed full-time [at night] as a warehouse packer
       and works a second job [during the day as a] hotel manager. . . .

       34. Father raised concerns over Mother’s alleged failure to care
       for [Child]’s teeth.

       35. Father has been with his current significant other for
       approximately one year but has not had her spend time with
       [Child].

       36. [Paternal Grandmother] testified that she has done many
       custody exchanges on Father’s behalf.

       37. Paternal Grandmother testified that someone is always home
       at their house to care for [Child].

       38. Paternal Grandmother testified that Pike County and Monroe
       County Children and Youth Services members regularly appear at
       her home when Father has custody of [Child].

       39. Paternal Grandmother testified that [Child] had so many
       cavities when she was taken to the dentist that they had to be
       filled while she was under sedation.

       40. Adrianna Stares of Monroe County Children and Youth
       Services testified that the Agency has been to Father’s home and
       has no concerns.

       41. Christine Irwin of Pike County Children and Youth Services
       testified that all general requests made of the Agency have been
       invalidated and that the Agency has been to Father’s home and
       has no concerns.[6]

       42. According to Ms. Irwin, [Child] has never confirmed any of the
       allegations received by the Agency.
____________________________________________

6 Of 25 referrals since July 2022, nine, all from June 2023, remained pending

at the time of the subject proceeding. See N.T., 7/3/23, at 127; Respondent’s
Exhibit 1. Those which had been resolved were all either unfounded or
invalidated. See N.T., 7/3/23, at 128.

                                           -6-
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                                     ...

      46. Maternal Grandmother and Paternal Grandmother are actively
      involved in [Child]’s life.

Order, 7/21/23.

      By order dated and entered July 21, 2023, the trial court modified the

existing custody order and awarded Father primary physical custody and

Mother partial physical custody of Child. Specifically, the court granted Mother

custodial time as follows:

      3. Mother shall have partial physical custody of [Child] as follows:

            i. Columbus Day weekend from the Friday before
            Columbus Day at 6:00 p.m. until Columbus Day
            Monday at 6:00 p.m.;

            ii. Thanksgiving from the Wednesday before
            Thanksgiving at 6:00 p.m. until the Sunday after
            Thanksgiving at 6:00 p.m.;

            iii. Christmas/New Year from 6 p.m. on December 23
            until January 1st at 6:00 p.m.

            iv. President’s Day weekend from the Friday before
            the holiday at 6:00 p.m. until the President’s Day
            Monday at 6:00 p.m.

            v. Easter from the Wednesday before Easter at 6:00
            p.m. until Easter Sunday at 6:00 p.m.

            vi. Mother’s Day weekend from the Friday before
            Mother’s Day at 6:00 p.m. until Mother’s Day Sunday
            at 6:00 p.m.

            vii. Starting in 2024, from the first Saturday in July at
            6:00 p.m. until the following Saturday at 6:00 p.m.

                                      -7-
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            viii. Starting in 2024, from the first Saturday in August
            until the following Saturday at 6:00 p.m.

Order, 7/21/23, at 12, ¶ 3 (cleaned up). The court further maintained shared

legal custody.     However, the court named Father Child’s medical and

educational decision-maker should there be disagreement.

      On August 2, 2023, Mother filed a timely notice of appeal, along with a

concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). Thereafter, on September 1, 2023, the trial court filed

a responsive Rule 1925(a) opinion.

      On appeal, Mother raises the following issue for our review:

      Did the [trial court] abuse its discretion and fail to further the best
      interests of [Child] in ruling that [M]other, who has been her
      daughter’s primary and at times sole caretaker since birth, will
      have only limited custodial time moving forward, with primary
      custody for [F]ather – a man who works two jobs, including
      several overnight shifts per week, and who has continually been
      investigated for abuse and neglect – within nine “open
      investigations” pending even at time of the custody hearing
      below?

Mother’s Brief at 1.

      We review custody orders for an abuse of discretion. See R.L. v. M.A.,

209 A.3d 391, 395 (Pa. Super. 2019). We will not find such an abuse merely

because we would have reached a different conclusion. See id. Rather, an

abuse of discretion occurs only if the trial court overrode or misapplied the law

in reaching its conclusion, or the record shows the trial court’s judgment was

manifestly unreasonable or the product of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.

See id.

                                       -8-
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      Moreover, our scope of review is broad. See id. Because this Court

does not make independent factual determinations, however, we must accept

findings of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of record.

See S.C.B. v. J.S.B., 218 A.3d 905, 913 (Pa. Super. 2019). Importantly, we

defer to the trial court on matters of credibility and weight of the evidence, as

the trial court viewed and assessed witnesses firsthand. See id. We are not,

however, bound by the trial court’s deductions or inferences. See id.

      “Ultimately, the test is whether the trial court’s conclusions are

unreasonable as shown by the evidence of record.           We may reject the

conclusions of the trial court only if they involve an error of law[] or are

unreasonable in light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.” E.D. v.

M.P., 33 A.3d 73, 76 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting A.D. v. M.A.B., 989 A.2d

32, 35-36 (Pa. Super. 2010)). As we stated in King v. King, 889 A.2d 630,

632 (Pa. Super. 2005), “It is not this Court’s function to determine whether

the trial court reached the ‘right’ decision; rather, we must consider whether,

‘based on the evidence presented, given [sic] due deference to the trial court’s

weight and credibility determinations,’ the trial court erred or abused its

discretion. . . .” (quoting Hanson v. Hanson, 878 A.2d 127, 129 (Pa. Super.

2005)).

      “When a trial court orders a form of custody, the best interest of the

child is paramount.” S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa. Super. 2014).

“The best-interests standard, decided on a case-by-case basis, considers all

                                      -9-
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factors which legitimately have an effect upon the child’s physical, intellectual,

moral and spiritual well-being.” M.J.N. v. J.K., 169 A.3d 108, 112 (Pa. Super.

2017). To that end, the Child Custody Act sets forth sixteen factors that a

court must consider before making any custody determination. See E.B. v.

D.B., 209 A.3d 451, 460 (Pa. Super. 2019).         “It is within the trial court’s

purview as the finder of fact to determine which factors are most salient and

critical in each particular case.” Id. at 468 (quoting M.J.M. v. M.L.G., 63

A.3d 331, 339 (Pa. Super. 2013)). The statutorily required factors are as

follows:

      § 5328. Factors to consider when awarding custody.

            (a) Factors. – In ordering any form of custody, the court
      shall determine the best interest of the child by considering all
      relevant factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors
      which affect the safety of the child, including the following:

             (1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
           frequent and continuing contact between the child and
           another party.

             (2) The present and past abuse committed by a party or
           member of the party’s household, whether there is a
           continued risk of harm to the child or an abused party and
           which party can better provide adequate physical safeguards
           and supervision of the child.

             (2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)(1) and
           (2) (relating to consideration of child abuse and involvement
           with protective services).

             (3) The parental duties performed by each party on behalf
           of the child.

             (4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
           education, family life and community life.

                                     - 10 -
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            (5) The availability of extended family.

            (6) The child’s sibling relationships.

            (7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based on the
          child's maturity and judgment.

            (8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against the
          other parent, except in cases of domestic violence where
          reasonable safety measures are necessary to protect the
          child from harm.

            (9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving, stable,
          consistent and nurturing relationship with the child adequate
          for the child’s emotional needs.

            (10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
          physical, emotional, developmental, educational and special
          needs of the child.

            (11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.

            (12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or ability
          to make appropriate child-care arrangements.

            (13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
          willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with one
          another. A party’s effort to protect a child from abuse by
          another party is not evidence of unwillingness or inability to
          cooperate with that party.

           (14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
          member of a party’s household.

           (15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
          member of a party’s household.

            (16) Any other relevant factor.

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(a).

     In assessing these factors,

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      [a] trial court must “delineate the reasons for its decision when
      making an award of custody either on the record or in a written
      opinion.” S.W.D., [96 A.3d at 401]. See also 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] §
      5323(a) and (d). However, “there is no required amount of detail
      for the trial court’s explanation; all that is required is that the
      enumerated factors are considered and that the custody decision
      is based on those considerations.” M.J.M.[, 63 A.3d at 336.].

R.L., 209 A.3d at 395.      While a parent’s role in caring for a child may be

considered in light of the statutory factors, “the primary caretaker doctrine,

insofar as it required positive emphasis on the primary caretaker’s status, is

no longer viable.” M.J.M., 63 A.3d 331 at 339.

      In the case sub judice, the trial court addressed and analyzed the

custody factors pursuant to Section 5328(a). See Order, 7/21/23, at 7-11.

The court did not determine that any factors were in favor of Mother. Rather,

the court determined that all factors were in favor of Father, neutral, or not

applicable.    See id.    See id.    The court found determinative Mother’s

obstruction of Father’s relationship with Child which was relevant to Section

5328(a)(1), (2), (4), (8), (9), (10), and (16). The court found as follows:

            The first custody factor requires the court to consider
      “which party is more likely to encourage and permit frequent and
      continuing contact between the child and another party.” 23
      Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(1). Through her conduct, Mother has shown her
      unwillingness and inability to allow [Child] to have frequent and
      continuing contact with Father. Without leave of court, Mother
      has repeatedly withheld [Child] from Father and denied him his
      periods of physical custody. Based on the trial record, Father is
      more likely to encourage and permit frequent and continuing
      contact between Mother and [Child].

              This factor weighs in favor of Father.

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              The second custody factor requires the court to consider
       “the present and past abuse committed by a party or member of
       the party’s household, whether there is a continued risk of harm
       to the child, or an abused party, and which party can better
       provide adequate physical safeguards and supervision of the
       child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(2). Father has not made any
       allegations that [Child] has been abused by Mother or any of
       Mother’s household members. Mother has repeatedly alleged that
       [Child] is physically abused by Father and/or his household
       members during Father’s periods of physical custody. To date, all
       of the same have been unfounded. Pike Countv and Monroe
       Countv Children and Youth Services have repeatedly appeared at
       Father’s residence during Father’s periods of physical custody and
       have reported that they do not have any concerns about Father’s
       home or the environment. Mother testified that she intends to
       continue making reports of abuse to the authorities if Child has
       any bruises or anything of concern to her. Mother’s reporting of
       past concerns has not been rational or reasonable.[7]

             Mother does not have the insight to see the negative effects
       of her ongoing reports on both Child and Father. Not only do the
       repeated and unsupported allegations disrupt Father’s relationship
       with his daughter, but they are traumatic for [Child]. Child should
       not see social workers and/or law enforcement officers
       unnecessarily coming to her father’s house when she is with him.

              This factor weighs in favor of Father.

                                          ...

             The fourth custody factor is “the need for stability and
       continuity in the child’s education, family life, and community life.”
       23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(4). Father is better suited to provide stability
       and continuity in [Child]’s life. Father lives in Pennsylvania, where
       [Child] was living since her birth. Father works two jobs and can
       financially support [Child]. Father’s home has been investigated
       by both Pike County and Monroe County Children and Youth
       Services, who have deemed the home and environment suitable
       for [Child]. Paternal Grandmother is involved in community
____________________________________________

7 Mother freely admitted that she made frequent and continued reports to
child service agencies, as well as the police. See N.T., 7/3/23, at 96-98.

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     activities which she shares with [Child]. [Child] is already in a
     preschool program with swim lessons in place when she is with
     Father.

           Mother moved a significant distance away from Father.
     Mother has withheld [Child] from Father and has disrupted any
     continuity and stability in Child’s life.

           This factor weighs in favor of Father.

                                   ...

           The eighth custody factor is any “attempts of a parent to
     turn the child against the other parent, except in cases of domestic
     violence where reasonable safety measures are necessary to
     protect the child from harm.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(8). There was
     no evidence that Father has attempted to turn [Child] against
     Mother. There was overwhelming evidence that Mother, through
     her conduct, has attempted to turn [Child] against Father. [Child]
     has been withheld from Father. [Child] has seen social workers
     come to Father’s home when she is there. Mother’s actions are
     damaging [Child]’s relationship with Father. The appropriate
     authorities vetted the allegations made by Mother, and she has
     been unable to accept supported and documented findings made
     by the authorities.

           This factor weighs heavily in favor of Father.

            The ninth custody factor is “which party is more likely to
     maintain a loving, stable, consistent and nurturing relationship
     with the child adequate for the child’s emotional needs.” 23
     Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(9). Father demonstrated that he is more likely
     to maintain a loving and nurturing relationship with [Child]
     sufficient to meet her emotional needs.      Mother’s constant
     baseless accusations against Father do not allow her to meet
     [Child]’s emotional needs.

           This factor weighs in favor of Father.

           The tenth custody factor is “which party is more likely to
     attend to the daily physical, emotional, developmental,
     educational and special needs of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
     5328(10). [Child] does not have any recognized special needs.
     Both parties have demonstrated their ability to attend to [Child]’s

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      daily physical and educational needs. Father is more likely to
      attend to [Child]’s emotional and developmental needs by
      allowing her to have a healthy relationship with her parents and
      her extended family.

            This factor weighs in favor of Father.

                                    ...

            The sixteenth factor allows the court to consider “any
      other relevant factor.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 5328(16). We find Mother’s
      attempts to interfere with Father’s relationship with [Child] to be
      a very relevant factor, as discussed among the enumerated
      factors.

Id. at 7-11 (cleaned up) (bold in original).

      Mother argues that the record does not support the trial court’s factual

findings and its determinations regarding credibility and weight of the

evidence. See Mother’s Brief at 34-53. Specifically, in assailing the court’s

examination of the custody factors, including those decisive factors noted

supra, she asserts that the court ignored relevant evidence. Mother contends

that the court disregarded testimony of herself, Maternal Grandmother, and

Ms. Smith with regard to abuse and/or neglect of Child. See id. at 34-43, 50

(“These conclusions by [the court] disregarded the testimony of not just

[M]other, but [Maternal G]randmother and [Ms.] Smith, which show the

legitimate, child-safety reasons for [M]other’s decisions. The court’s findings

are manifestly unreasonable as shown by the evidence.”). Mother maintains

that the court disregarded that she was Child’s primary and/or sole caretaker.

See id. at 43-49 (“[The court] turned a blind eye to the first three-plus years

of [Child]’s life during which [M]other, not [F]ather, was the primary

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caretaker.”).    She further suggests that the court was punishing her for

relocating to North Carolina. See id. at 47-48. Moreover, she posits that the

court disregarded testimony that Father was working two jobs “with many

overnight shifts per week.”8 Id. at 51 (discussing Section 5328(a)(12)).

       In support of its examination of the custody factors, the court explained

in its Rule 1925(a) opinion:

             The making of reports to child service agencies alone is not
       persuasive. The agency vets the reports that are made to them.
       [Father] was the one who called witnesses from the child service
       agencies who had received these reports to testify on his behalf.
       There were no findings made as a result of the reports to child
       service agencies which raised concern for us. [Mother]’s reports
       have resulted in caseworkers and law enforcement officers
       appearing at [Father]’s home just about every time he has
       exercised physical custody of the child. We did not find [Mother]
       to have a sufficient factual basis to make the multiple reports and
       we did find that [Mother]’s unsupported reports have interfered
       with [Father]’s ability to have a relationship with [Child] to
       [C]hild’s detriment.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/1/23, at 5.

       The court noted that the two witnesses from the child service agencies,

Ms. Stares and Ms. Irwin, testified that they observed no issue with Father or

his home. See id. at 5-6. Significantly, Ms. Irwin explained that, upon receipt

____________________________________________

8 To the extent Mother argues that certain evidence was improperly excluded,

this issue is waived as Mother failed to raise such issue in the Statement of
Questions Involved portion of her brief. See M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d at 466
(reiterating that issues not included in a concise statement of errors
complained of on appeal and statement of questions involved are waived).

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of each report, the agency went out to see Child and/or to the home.9 See

N.T., 7/3/23, at 129, 136-137. She further testified that Child “has denied

any of the allegations.” Id. at 141. The court determined these witnesses

“to be unbiased and credible. Their testimony supports our conclusion that

[Father] can offer [C]hild a safe, stable, and consistent home.” Trial Court

Opinion, 9/1/23, at 6. Moreover, to the extent the allegations against Father

included claims of substance abuse, the court “did not find any credible

evidence of drug abuse by [Father].” Id. at 7.

       Further, inasmuch as Mother maintains that she was Child’s primary

caretaker, the court highlighted the finding of contempt against Mother for

withholding Child from Father.             The court stated, “But for [Mother]’s

contemptuous actions, [Child] would not have been with [Mother] on a near

daily basis.” Id.

       Because Mother’s issues, at their core, dispute the trial court’s

determinations regarding credibility and weight of the evidence, they fail. See

S.C.B. 218 A.3d at 913 (reiterating that we defer to the trial court on matters

of credibility and weight of the evidence, as the trial court viewed and assessed

witnesses firsthand). Further, in custody cases, it is well-established that it is

____________________________________________

9 As Child was in North Carolina at the time of some of the reports, Ms. Irwin

testified that the assigned caseworker did a video visit with Child. See id. at
129.

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within the purview of the trial court to determine which statutory factors “are

most salient and critical.” E.B., 209 A.3d at 460.

       Instantly, the trial court’s consideration of the custody factors was

careful and thorough. After careful review of the record, we hold that the

court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and the court’s

conclusions in light of those findings are reasonable.

       Notably, Ms. Stares and Ms. Irwin, whom the court found to be credible,

each testified that there were no concerns with Father or his home and that

all non-pending referrals were unfounded and/or invalidated. See id. at 121-

23, 128-29. Ms. Irwin testified, “We have no evidence that [Father] is abusing

any substances.”10 Id. at 141. She further confirmed that Child denied all

allegations of physical abuse and/or physical discipline, noting that Child was

interviewed by both the caseworker as well as the agency’s director. Id. at

141.    In response to inquiry regarding allegations that Father’s home was

unfit, Ms. Irwin further stated, “There was recently an allegation [that the

home was unkempt] and [at] the last home visit[,] which was completed by

our [d]irector, the home was completely went through and there were no

concerns for the condition of the home.” Id. Moreover, Father flatly denied

all allegations of abuse. See id. at 158.

____________________________________________

10 As further indicated supra, there is no dispute that the results of Father’s

10-panel drug test submitted following the subject proceeding were negative.

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     Mother conceded to recurrent reports to child service agencies, which,

but for those still pending, had been deemed to be without merit. See id. at

96-98. She further admitted to withholding Child from Father on numerous

occasions. See id. at 92-94. Notwithstanding, Mother was unapologetic and

expressed her intention to continue to do so. See id. at 92-98.

     Thus, as the record supports the court’s findings, we discern no abuse

of discretion. See S.C.B., 218 A.3d at 913; King, 889 A.2d at 632.

     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s orders.

     Orders affirmed.

Date: 3/1/2024

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