Court Opinion

ID: 9940327
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-13 23:02:14.885422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:46.474007
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/13/24 Sky Partners v. Briggs CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 SKY PARTNERS, INC., et al.,
 Cross-Defendants and Appellants,
                                                                        A165697
 v.
 JUSTIN BRIGGS,                                                         (Alameda County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. RG21111126)
 Cross-Complainant and Respondent.

         Appellants Sky Partners, Inc. and Craig Miller, Sky Partners’ CEO,
appeal from the partial denial of their anti-SLAPP motion (Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 425.16).1 Sky Partners owns and operates charter aircraft. At one time,
respondent Justin Briggs worked in conjunction with Sky Partners as
essentially a link between individuals who wanted to charter a flight and Sky
Partners which provided the aircraft. After Briggs terminated his
relationship with Sky Partners, Miller learned from a Sky Partners client
that Briggs was continuing to hold himself out as working in conjunction with
the charter company. Sky Partners sued Briggs for a variety of business
torts.
         Briggs, in turn, counter-claimed for reputational torts based on
statements Miller made to several clients after Briggs left, stating Sky

        All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure
         1

unless otherwise indicated.

                                                               1
Partners had retained an attorney and was preparing to sue Briggs. Sky
Partners and Miller filed an anti-SLAPP motion, which the trial court
granted as to one cause of action but denied as to the remainder of Briggs’s
cross-complaint. The court ruled Sky Partners and Miller had carried their
burden under step one of the anti-SLAPP analysis and Briggs’s counter-
claims were based on statements made “in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a . . . judicial body.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)
However, it also ruled Briggs had carried his burden under step two of the
analysis and had made a prima facie showing he would defeat the litigation
privilege defense Sky Partners and Miller had interposed as to his cross-
claims. Sky Partners and Miller challenge the latter ruling and claim
Miller’s statements are absolutely protected under the litigation privilege
(Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)). We agree and reverse the anti-SLAPP order to
the extent the trial court denied the motion.
                                BACKGROUND
      Sky Partners owns and operates aircraft chartered for private air
travel. It also operates aircraft owned by other companies. The company was
incorporated in August 2013, and shortly thereafter Briggs began working
for, or with, the company. The exact nature of their relationship, i.e.,
whether Briggs was a Sky Partners employee or worked collaboratively in a
relationship akin to a joint venture, is disputed. However, the particulars of
their relationship are immaterial for purposes of the issue on appeal. What
is undisputed is that Briggs worked as a broker with individuals seeking
private air travel and arranged for flights on aircraft owned and/or managed
by Sky Partners (as well as other air charter operators). Sky Partners, in
turn, provided vendor services, as well as back-office accounting, billing, and
related services to Briggs in exchange for 30 percent of the profits of each

                                         2
flight booked. According to Briggs, both parties had an equal right to use the
Sky Partners name.
      At some point, the parties’ relationship began to deteriorate. Briggs
claims Sky Partners often delayed his “ ‘true up payments’ ” citing cash flow
as its excuse and the company became less reliable in confirming receipt of
client funds and processing payments to vendors. Additionally, a high-limit
credit card Sky Partners had provided to Briggs was cancelled because of,
according to Briggs, Sky Partners’ declining business operations and loss of
investor capital. On June 6, 2021, Briggs sent a one-sentence e-mail to Miller
resigning from Sky Partners.
      The following month, Miller contacted certain clients to inform them of
Briggs’s resignation. The instant dispute arose from subsequent
communications with some of these clients.
      Among the clients Miller contacted was Jonathan Rosenberg. In his e-
mail, Miller told Rosenberg he and Briggs had parted company, that Briggs
was going forward on his own, and that if Rosenberg wanted to fly on one of
Sky Partners’ planes in the future to contact Miller. Rosenberg replied that
he anticipated continuing to work with Briggs.
      Less than two weeks later, Rosenberg e-mailed Miller with the subject
title “Confused.” Rosenberg wrote that he was confused about which person
was with which entity and he sought clarification about Miller’s prior e-mail.
Miller replied that he and Briggs had commenced charter operations in 2014
under the name Sky Partners, at which time he hired Briggs. Miller stated
Briggs did not found or own Sky Partners. Rather, Briggs had primarily
funneled charters to Sky Partners for Rosenberg and one other high-volume
client. Briggs subsequently convinced the latter client to move its aircraft off
Sky Partners’ certificate so Briggs could manage the plane himself.

                                       3
      Rosenberg then called Miller and, according to Miller, it was during
this telephone call that he realized Briggs was continuing to hold himself out
as working in conjunction with Sky Partners. Rosenberg also told Miller that
he was going to contact his friend, Marissa Mayer (Briggs’s other high-
volume client), about Briggs. Miller followed up with an e-mail to Rosenberg
with information about Sky Partners’ relationship with Mayer.
      On August 8, Rosenberg provided Miller with copies of 18 invoices
dated between June 29, 2020, and June 16, 2021, four of which were dated
after Briggs’s resignation, and all of which bore the Sky Partners name but
requested payment to a Wells Fargo account Miller claims was “fictitious”
because, while it was in Sky Partners’ name, Sky Partners, in fact, did not
authorize the creation of the account or have access to it. Moreover, the
purported Sky Partners’ address on the invoices was an address Miller
understood to be Briggs’s brother’s address.
      Rosenberg also sent Miller an invoice he had received from Briggs in
June 2020 that notified Rosenberg of supposed “ADJUSTED WIRE
DETAILS!” and stated “they [meaning Sky Partners] have established a new
[Wells Fargo] account to separate some operations to make sure tracking is
clear” and it provided “SKY Partners—Wire Instructions.” The supposedly
new account name was listed as Sky Partners. In light of this information,
Miller concluded Rosenberg had made wire payments to Briggs’s “fictitious”
account and Briggs had also, without advising Rosenberg, charged a higher
commission rate than the five percent Sky Partners, in fact, charged to
customers.
      Rosenberg then e-mailed Miller that he had concerns about having
referred acquaintances to Briggs, thinking Briggs had also misled them by
saying the commission rate for his services was five percent. Miller replied

                                      4
on August 9, telling Rosenberg he was going to call Wells Fargo and would let
Rosenberg know what the bank said about the supposedly new account.
Miller continued, “I am also going to make contact with an attorney I know
who, coincidently, just recently worked on a fraud/embezzlement case for a
biomedical company funded by a venture capitalist who is [a] close friend of
mine. I will be asking him what he suggests as next steps for you and I.”
      Rosenberg sent Miller another e-mail on August 19, asking how his
friend, Laszlo Bock, who he copied on the e-mail, should proceed with Sky
Partners invoices Briggs had sent. Rosenberg told Miller that Bock had
recently completed travel coordinated by Briggs in which Briggs represented
himself as affiliated with Sky Partners, and Bock now had unpaid invoices
and needed advice on how to handle them. Rosenberg also inquired as to how
“things stand with your attorney and law enforcement.” In reply, Miller said
his “attorney, who is handling both the civil and criminal lawsuits on our
behalf suggested NOT to pay the invoices to [Briggs].” Miller also said that if
Bock forwarded his unpaid invoices to Miller, he would determine the flight
operator and cost and Bock could pay the operator directly. Miller went on to
say that “our call today with the attorneys was brief and we are still
uncovering issues. We are meeting again on Monday to agree on a legal
strategy for moving this case forward under two separate complaints—one a
civil complaint and the other a criminal complaint that will [be] separated
into state criminal offenses and federal crimes.” Bock, in turn, replied to
Miller, provided three invoices, and said Miller could “feel free to enjoin (sic)
me as a John Doe.”
      The following week, on August 27, Sky Partners filed the instant
lawsuit against Briggs asserting causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty,
fraud, misappropriation, intentional interference with prospective economic

                                        5
relations, conversion, violations of Business and Professions Code sections
17200 and 17500, and constructive trust. The complaint alleged Briggs had
outsourced flights using the Sky Partners name after he had resigned, used
fictitious Sky Partners invoices, instructed clients to pay a bank account
Briggs had set up, misappropriated the Sky Partners account name while
falsely representing to clients that payments would be received by Sky
Partners, and falsely told clients he had a commission rate of five percent.
On December 2, Sky Partners filed the operative first amended complaint
based on the same alleged wrongful acts.
      A few days after Sky Partners filed its original complaint, Miller
received an e-mail from Melinda Osterloh, another friend of Rosenberg,
asking Miller for a flight operator’s information to ensure it was paid. Miller
replied and also provided an update on the litigation, including: Sky Partners
had filed a civil complaint; a temporary restraining order had been issued;
the Wells Fargo bank account had been seized; and the operator for her flight
had been fully paid. Miller also told Osterloh Briggs had “fraudulently”
charged her an additional 12 percent commission, not five percent, and that
his attorneys recommended funds be wired to the “real” Sky Partners
account.
      In November 2021, Miller testified at deposition to the following: He
did not file a police report and, to his knowledge, the matter had not been
referred to the district attorney’s office, federal prosecutors, or the FBI.
When he wrote the e-mail to Rosenberg referencing his attorney handling
civil and criminal lawsuits, he thought there probably would be criminal
actions filed. When asked why he mentioned civil and criminal lawsuits in
his e-mail, Miller answered, “I don’t know. I have no idea why I put it in

                                        6
there, other than the fact that I thought that’s probably what was going to
happen.”
     Three months later, in February 2022, Briggs filed a cross-complaint
against Sky Partners and Miller asserting 10 causes of action, including for
defamation, interference with contractual relations and with prospective
business advantage, inducing breach of contract, and unfair competition,
based on Miller’s statements to Rosenberg, Mayer, Bock, and Osterloh.
Briggs asserts Miller made false and defamatory statements, “including that
Briggs is embezzling and stealing money, Briggs is engaged in and under
investigation for criminal activity and fraud, and Briggs is a crook and cannot
be trusted[,]” and “Briggs is engaged in and under investigation for
embezzlement, criminal activity and fraud, and is dishonest and deceptive in
his business dealings.”
      Sky Partners and Miller filed an anti-SLAPP statute motion, claiming
Miller’s challenged statements to the clients constituted protected activity
under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) and were absolutely protected under
the litigation privilege set forth in Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b).
      After Briggs filed opposition and the trial court heard argument by
counsel, the court issued an order denying the motion as to all but the cause
of action for negligent interference with contractual relations. The court first
ruled that while “it is a somewhat close issue[,]” Sky Partners and Miller met
their burden of demonstrating that Briggs’s cross-claims arose from protected
activity under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). The court also pointed out
that in his opposition Briggs failed to cite any cases analyzing the first step of
the anti-SLAPP analysis generally, or section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2)
specifically. The court further ruled that Briggs had established he would
prevail on Sky Partners’ and Miller’s litigation privilege defense and had

                                         7
demonstrated his claims had at least minimal merit. With respect to the
litigation privilege, the court stated the company and Miller had not
explained how Miller’s statements “falsely” indicating they were bringing
criminal charges against Briggs had a tendency to achieve the objects of the
civil litigation, functioned as either a necessary or useful next step in the
litigation process, or advanced the civil claims against Briggs.
                                 DISCUSSION
      The anti-SLAPP statute is designed to prevent meritless lawsuits from
chilling individuals’ exercise of their rights of petition or free speech. (Wilson
v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871, 883–884.) A special motion
to strike may be brought against claims “arising from any act of that person
in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with
a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated
through a two-step process. Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden
of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’
protected activity in which the defendant has engaged. [Citations.] If the
defendant carries its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims
have at least ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061.) If the plaintiff cannot make this
demonstration the court will strike the claim. (Wilson, at p. 884.)
      We review the trial court’s ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion de novo.
(Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 325 (Flatley).) We consider the
pleadings and supporting and opposing affidavits stating the facts upon
which the liability or defense is based. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2).) In the second
step, the “court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting factual claims.
Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a legally sufficient

                                        8
claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a
favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and evaluates
the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s claim as
a matter of law.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384–385.)
Step One: Claims Arising from Protected Activity
      The trial court ruled in favor of Sky Partners and Miller as to the first
step of the anti-SLAPP analysis, concluding Briggs’s cross-claims arise from
protected activity as defined by section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), namely
from statements by Miller “made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a . . . judicial body.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(2).)
Accordingly, Sky Partners and Miller do not challenge this aspect of the
court’s anti-SLAPP ruling on appeal. Rather, they challenge the court’s step-
two ruling which was adverse to them.
      Briggs, however, claims the trial court erred in its step-one ruling.
Ordinarily, “a respondent who has not appealed from the judgment may not
urge error on appeal.” (Hutchinson v. City of Sacramento (1993)
17 Cal.App.4th 791, 798.) “ ‘ “To obtain affirmative relief by way of appeal,
respondents must themselves file a notice of appeal and become cross-
appellants.” ’ ” (Gutierrez v. Chopard USA Ltd. (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 383,
394.) However, a “limited exception to this rule is provided by Code of Civil
Procedure section 906, which states in pertinent part: ‘The respondent . . .
may, without appealing from [the] judgment, request the reviewing court to
and it may review any of the foregoing [described orders or rulings] for the
purpose of determining whether or not the appellant was prejudiced by the
error or errors upon which he relies for reversal or modification of the
judgment from which the appeal is taken.’ ‘The purpose of the statutory

                                         9
exception is to allow a respondent to assert a legal theory which may result in
affirmance of the judgment.’ ” (Hutchinson, at p. 798.)
      Even assuming we have jurisdiction to consider Briggs’s challenge to
the court’s step-one ruling, he advances arguments on appeal that he never
made in the trial court. Relying on Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th 299, he now
argues Miller falsely accused him of a crime, which constitutes defamation
per se and illegal conduct. However, he never made this argument in the
trial court. Briggs also now maintains Miller’s statements do not constitute
protected activity as defined under section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). Again,
he never made such an argument in the trial court. While he included a
subheading in his opposing memorandum of points and authorities that Sky
Partners and Miller failed to meet their burden under step one, his argument
pertained solely to the litigation privilege, an issue relevant to the step-two
analysis and which we discuss shortly. In the trial court, Briggs did not
discuss section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) or offer any argument as to why
Miller’s statements do not fall within its provisions. Nor did he cite any cases
discussing the scope of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2). “It is axiomatic that
arguments not asserted below are waived and will not be considered for the
first time on appeal.” (Ochoa v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1998)
61 Cal.App.4th 1480, 1488, fn. 3.) In short, Briggs forfeited the arguments he
now advances as to step one. (Ibid.)
      But even if Briggs did not forfeit his arguments, they lack merit. He is
correct that in Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at page 320, our Supreme Court
held that illegal speech is not protected and the anti-SLAPP statute cannot
be wielded to strike causes of action based on such speech.
      “Flatley, however, is a very narrow exception. It applies only ‘where
either the defendant concedes the illegality of its conduct or the illegality is

                                        10
conclusively shown by the evidence.’ ” (Finton Construction, Inc. v. Bidna &
Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 210.) Thus, if “a factual dispute
exists about the legitimacy of the defendant’s conduct, it cannot be resolved
within the first step but must be raised by the plaintiff in connection with the
plaintiff’s burden to show a probability of prevailing on the merits.” (Flatley,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 316.) Indeed, the Supreme Court cautioned that
“rude, aggressive, or even belligerent prelitigation negotiations, whether
verbal or written, that may include threats to file a lawsuit, report criminal
behavior to authorities or publicize allegations of wrongdoing” do not
“necessarily constitute extortion.” (Id. at p. 332, fn. 16.) Moreover, “the
question of whether the defendant’s underlying conduct was illegal as a
matter of law is preliminary, and unrelated to the second prong question of
whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a probability of prevailing, and the
showing required to establish conduct illegal as a matter of law—either
through defendant’s concession or by uncontroverted and conclusive
evidence—is not the same showing as the plaintiff’s second prong showing of
probability of prevailing.”2 (Flatley, at p. 320.)
      Here, Sky Partners and Miller do not concede that Miller engaged in
any criminal conduct, and the record before us is not remotely comparable to
that in Flatley. In Flatley, there was a detailed record of sustained and

      2  Thus, as the courts have recognized, the Flatley exception only
applies when the conduct is criminal, not just a violation of a statute. (See
Mendoza v. ADP Screening & Selection Services, Inc. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th
1644, 1654 [“[o]ur reading of Flatley leads us to conclude that the Supreme
Court’s use of the phrase ‘illegal’ was intended to mean criminal, and not
merely violative of a statute”]; Fremont Reorganizing Corp. v. Faigin (2011)
198 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1169 [reviewing cases]; Price v. Operating Engineers
Local Union No. 3 (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 962, 971 [defamation is not
“illegal” within the meaning of Flatley].)

                                        11
egregious conduct by the defendant lawyer demanding a nine-figure
settlement on threat of publicizing a supposed sexual assault, instigating a
criminal investigation, and hounding Flatley around the world if the demand
was not met. The demand letters, alone, consisted of a barrage of threats,
highlighted in a multitude of respects to emphasize their threatening
character. There were also a series of threatening telephone calls. The tenor
and character of this campaign added up to only thing—extortion. (Flatley,
supra, 39 Cal.4th at pp. 307–311.)
      Similarly, in Cohen v. Brown (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 302, 310–311,
317–318 (Cohen), the attorney’s conduct, while not quite as egregious as that
in Flatley, was extreme, culminating in the attorney preparing a false
complaint to the State Bar and signing his client’s name to it, followed by a
lengthy e-mail that the plaintiff would “live to regret” having a complaint
filed against him, the State Bar would make the plaintiff’s life “a living hell”
and he should immediately sign the disputed settlement checks. (Id. at
pp. 311, 317.) The record here is not close to having the same weight and
character.
      As for section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2), the court in Pech v. Doniger
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 443, 461–462 (Pech) well summarized the breadth of
this definition. “Communications protected under the anti-SLAPP statute
include ‘any written or oral statement or writing made before a legislative,
executive, or judicial proceeding’ (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)) or ‘in connection with
an issue under consideration or review’ in such proceedings (id., subd. (e)(2)).
‘Statements made in preparation for litigation or in anticipation of bringing
an action fall within these categories. [Citations.]’ [¶] Counseling others in
anticipation of litigation or encouraging others to sue is considered protected
prelitigation activity.” (Ibid., fn. omitted.)

                                         12
      Given the breadth with which section 425.16, subdivision (e)(2) has
been applied by the courts, Miller’s statements can reasonably be
characterized as having been made in anticipation of bringing an action.
Indeed, Miller made explicit reference to consulting with counsel about
moving forward with litigation against Briggs, and Sky Partners filed suit
against Briggs within six weeks of Miller’s first communication with
Rosenberg. (See Taheri Law Group v. Evans (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 482 [law
firm’s suit for intentional interference with business relations based on
defendant attorney’s statements to former firm clients inducing them to leave
firm with promises of unrealistic litigation objectives was properly subject to
a special motion to strike; appellate court rejected firm’s argument that
lawsuit arose from defendant attorney’s act of soliciting a client, concluding
lawsuit arose directly from communications between the defendant attorney
and the client about litigation pending against the client].)
      Even assuming, “by analogy to the litigation privilege of Civil Code
section 47, subdivision (b), that prelitigation statements must be made in
connection with proposed litigation contemplated in good faith and under
serious consideration in order to be protected under the anti-SLAPP statute”
(Pech, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at pp. 462–463), the limited record before us
does not conclusively establish any lack of good faith by Miller or suggest Sky
Partners and Miller were not, at the time, seriously considering litigation
against Briggs.3

      3 Pech expressed serious doubt that the anti-SLAPP step one inquiry
embraces such requirements. (Pech, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 463; accord,
RGC Gaslamp, LLC v. Ehmcke Sheet Metal Co., Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th
413, 427–431.)

                                       13
Step Two: Probability of Prevailing
      Sky Partners and Miller maintain the trial court erred in concluding
Briggs met his burden under step two of the anti-SLAPP analysis.
Specifically, they claim the court erred in ruling Miller’s challenged
statements are not protected under the litigation privilege set forth in Civil
Code section 47, subdivision (b). We agree.
      “Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b) defines what is commonly known
as the ‘litigation privilege.’ ” (Kashian v. Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th
892, 912 (Kashian).) The privilege presents “a substantive defense a plaintiff
[or, in this case, a cross-complainant] must overcome to demonstrate a
probability of prevailing.” (Flatley, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 323.)
      The privilege typically “applies to any communication (1) made in
judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants
authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that
have some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v. Anderson
(1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 212 (Silberg).) “Thus, ‘communications with “some
relation” to judicial proceedings’ are ‘absolutely immune from tort liability’ by
the litigation privilege [citation].” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048,
1057.) “Many cases have explained that [Civil Code] section 47(b)
encompasses not only testimony in court and statements made in pleadings,
but also statements made prior to the filing of a lawsuit, whether in
preparation for anticipated litigation or to investigate the feasibility of filing
a lawsuit.” (Hagberg v. California Federal Bank (2004) 32 Cal.4th 350, 361;
see Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106,
1115 [“ ‘communications preparatory to or in anticipation of the bringing of
an action . . . are within the litigation privilege’ ”].) Accordingly, the privilege
“is not limited to statements made during a trial or other proceedings, but

                                        14
may extend to steps taken prior thereto, or afterwards.” (Rusheen, at
p. 1057.)
      Doubt about whether the privilege applies is decided in favor of
applying it. (Kashian, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 913.) “ ‘The principal
purpose of [the litigation privilege] is to afford litigants and witnesses
[citation] the utmost freedom of access to the courts without fear of being
harassed subsequently by derivative tort actions. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] In
order to achieve this purpose of curtailing derivative lawsuits, we have given
the litigation privilege a broad interpretation.” (Action Apartment Assn., Inc.
v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1241.)
      The trial court concluded Sky Partners’ and Miller’s litigation privilege
defense faltered on the third and fourth factors—that Miller’s statements
were not made “ ‘to achieve the objects of the litigation’ ” and did not have
“ ‘some connection or logical relation to the action’ ” that Sky Partners
subsequently filed. Specifically, the court ruled Sky Partners and Miller had
not explained how the statements “falsely” indicating they were bringing
criminal charges had a tendency to achieve the objects of the civil litigation,
functioned as either a necessary or useful next step in the litigation process,
or advanced their civil claims against Briggs. In short, the trial court ruled
the litigation privilege did not apply because of Miller’s postulation about
pursuing criminal complaints, as well as civil litigation.
      At this juncture, we briefly recap the statements by Miller at issue.
The first was made in an e-mail dated August 9, 2021, responding to
Rosenberg’s concern about referring acquaintances to Briggs for assistance in
securing charter air travel. Miller stated, “I am also going to make contact
with an attorney I know who, coincidently, just recently worked on a
fraud/embezzlement case for a biomedical company funded by a venture

                                        15
capitalist who is [a] close friend of mine. I will be asking him what he
suggests as next steps for you and I.” The next statement was made 10 days
later, in an e-mail by Miller dated August 19, responding to Rosenberg’s
inquiries as to what his acquaintance and another client of Briggs, Laszlo
Bock, should do with invoices he had received from Briggs and “where things
[stood] with your attorney and law enforcement.” Miller replied his
“attorney, who is handling both the civil and criminal lawsuits on our behalf
suggested NOT to pay the invoices to [Briggs].” Miller continued, “our call
today with the attorneys was brief and we are still uncovering other issues.
We are meeting again on Monday to agree on a legal strategy for moving this
case forward under two separate complaints—one a civil complaint and the
other a criminal complaint that will [be] separated into state criminal
offenses and federal crimes.” Sky Partners filed the instant lawsuit less than
six weeks after Miller first communicated with Rosenberg.
      Our Supreme Court has explained, “[t]he requirement that the
communication be in furtherance of the objects of the litigation is, in essence,
simply part of the requirement that the communication be connected with, or
have some logical relation to, the action, i.e., that it not be extraneous to the
action. A good example of an application of the principle is found in the cases
holding that a statement made in a judicial proceeding is not privileged
unless it has some reasonable relevancy to the subject matter of the action.
[Citations.] The ‘furtherance’ requirement was never intended as a test of a
participant’s motives, morals, ethics or intent.” (Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at
pp. 219–220.)
      Here, Miller’s statements in the e-mail exchanges with Rosenberg had
“some logical relation to” the instant lawsuit Sky Partners filed shortly
thereafter. In the course of these e-mail exchanges, Miller acquired salient

                                        16
information about the misrepresentations Briggs had made in the name of
Sky Partners, both as to his purported continuing affiliation with Sky
Partners and the supposedly newly opened Sky Partners’ bank account to
which he instructed clients of his and/or Sky Partners to send payment on
invoices purportedly sent by Sky Partners. In short, Miller’s statements were
not “extraneous” to the claims asserted in Sky Partners’ complaint. (See
Silberg, supra, 50 Cal.3d at pp. 219–220; see also Dziubla v. Piazza (2020)
59 Cal.App.5th 140, 155 [“Because the privilege ‘attaches to any publication
that has any reasonable relation to [a court] action and is made to achieve
the objects of the litigation,’ ” court had “little trouble concluding” that e-mail
to supporters railing against alleged malfeasors and asking for donations to
support litigation “generally falls under [litigation privilege’s] broad scope”; e-
mail “informed” supporters about the litigation and “asked for their help to
fund it” and thus “was written and distributed to achieve the ends of [the
plaintiff’s] petition for judicial relief.”].)
       Citing Rothman v. Jackson (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 1134 (Rothman),
Briggs maintains the trial court correctly ruled Miller’s “false” criminal
accusations failed to “ ‘function as a necessary or useful step in the litigation
process and [] serve its purposes.’ ” Rothman is readily distinguishable.
       In that case, a celebrity’s representatives claimed at a press conference
that an attorney and his clients had falsely accused the celebrity of sexual
abuse to extort money. (Rothman, supra, 49 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1138–1139.)
The Court of Appeal concluded the litigation privilege did not extend to
“ ‘litigating in the press.’ ” (Id. at p. 1149.) To come within the litigation
privilege a statement must have a functional connection to litigation—the
communicative act “must function as a necessary or useful step in the
litigation process and must serve its purposes.” (Id. at p. 1146.) The

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statements at issue served to vindicate the celebrity in the public press, and
while his interest in vindication in the press paralleled his interest in
vindication through litigation, the press statements did not function to
advance his litigation interests. (Id. at pp. 1147–1148.) The type of act to
which the privilege affords its protection—“the uninhibited airing, discussion
and resolution of disputes in, and only in, judicial or quasi-judicial arenas”—
does not include “[p]ublic mudslinging.” (Id. at p. 1146.) Miller’s statements,
in contrast, were not an effort to prevail on claims in the court of public
opinion. Rather, they were expressly preparatory to filing suit.
      Briggs also cites to Nguyen v. Proton Technology Corp. (1999)
69 Cal.App.4th 140. In that case, an employee of a technology company,
along with several other employees, left to work for a competitor. (Id. at
p. 143.) After becoming concerned its competitor was improperly soliciting its
employees and customers, the company’s attorney sent a letter to the
competitor’s chief executive officer, warning the competitor that its acts of
unfair competition would not be tolerated and advising that the technology
company would take advantage of its legal rights in filing a lawsuit. As to
the plaintiff, specifically, the letter made the competitor “ ‘aware that’ ” the
plaintiff had been in prison “ ‘for repeatedly and violently assaulting his
wife.’ ” (Id. at pp. 143–144.) In fact, while the plaintiff had been in county
jail (not prison), the conviction was for shooting a gun at an unoccupied
vehicle and vandalism. (Id. at p. 151.) The Nguyen court held the litigation
privilege did not apply to the letter’s inclusion of references to the plaintiff’s
criminal record. (Ibid.) Not only was the recitation of the plaintiff’s criminal
history incorrect, “any ‘connection’ between such a conviction and the civil
unfair competition focus of [the attorney’s] demand letter [was], to be

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charitable about it, tenuous.” (Ibid.) The circumstances in the instant case
are, again, not remotely similar.
      Briggs also claims Miller’s statements were meant to harm and
humiliate him, steal his clients, and put him out of business. However, as we
have recited, the litigation privilege applies “regardless [of] whether the
communication was made with malice or the intent to harm. [Citation.] Put
another way, application of the privilege does not depend on the publisher’s
‘motives, morals, ethics or intent.’ (Silberg[ ], supra, 50 Cal.3d at p. 220.)”
(Kashian, supra, 98 Cal.App.4th at p. 913; see Jacob B. v. County of Shasta
(2007) 40 Cal.4th 948, 955 [litigation privilege “is absolute and applies
regardless of malice”].) Briggs also makes a one-sentence remark that
statements made to nonparticipants in the litigation, like the Sky Partners
and/or Briggs clients here, are generally not privileged. However, the
litigation privilege includes “publication to nonparties with a substantial
interest in the proceeding” (Susan A. v. County of Sonoma (1991)
2 Cal.App.4th 88, 94), and the clients here had a clear interest in Sky
Partners’ efforts to proceed against Briggs.
      In sum, the trial court erred in denying Sky Partners’ and Miller’s anti-
SLAPP motion on the ground Briggs would defeat their litigation privilege
defense. The litigation privilege applies and affords an absolute defense to
Briggs’s counter-claims. We therefore need not, and do not, consider whether
Briggs also established that his counter-claims had some minimal merit.
Motion for Sanctions
      Briggs filed a motion for sanctions pursuant to section 907 and
California Rules of Court, rule 8.276, on the ground Sky Partners’ and
Miller’s appeal was frivolous and prosecuted for the improper purpose of

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harassing Briggs and causing delay. Given our disposition, we deny Briggs’s
motion without further discussion.
                               DISPOSITION
      The trial court’s order denying appellants’ special motion to strike is
REVERSED as to the first through fifth and seventh through tenth causes of
action in Briggs’s cross-complaint, and the matter is remanded with
directions that the trial court vacate the order and issue a new order granting
appellants’ motion in its entirety. Costs on appeal to appellants.

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                                           _________________________
                                           Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Humes, P.J.

_________________________
Getty, J.*

**Judge of the Solano County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

A165697, Sky Partners, Inc. et al. v. Briggs

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