Court Opinion

ID: 9703899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:12:01.542841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:52.868670
License: Public Domain

MORGAN, Justice
(concurring in part, dissenting in part).
I concur on the first issue but respectfully dissent on the second issue.
This would appear to be a classic case for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loqui-tur. The glass plate was under the control of the defendant, plate glass windows do not come flying into the street as a matter of course or without negligence on the part of those having control, and the plaintiff’s injury concededly resulted from the accident. But, the issue revolves around whether the defendant waived the doctrine by introduction of evidence of specific acts of negligence attributable to the occurrence and resulting injury.
In Barger v. Chelpon, 60 S.D. 66, 243 N.W. 97 (1932), this court set out the three alternatives regarding application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, found in outside authorities: (1) Any allegation of specific acts of negligence foreclosed invocation of the doctrine; (2) plaintiff is not deprived of the right to invoke the doctrine where specific acts of negligence merely are alleged; or (3) plaintiff is not denied the right to rely upon the doctrine, though he alleges specific acts of negligence and fails to substantiate these specific acts, if he also alleges negligence in general terms. *638The Barger Court went on to adopt the third alternative as the South Dakota rule, stating: “If a plaintiff fails to prove or abandons the claim of specific acts of negligence and relies on general allegations, we are of the opinion that he should not be deprived of the benefits of the doctrine under consideration.” 60 S.D. at 73, 243 N.W. at 100. The opinion further stated: “The rule, however, is founded on an absence of specific proof of facts or omissions constituting negligence[.]” 60 S.D. at 73, 243 N.W. at 100.
In discussing the first issue, the majority points out that Malloy’s evidence of specific acts of negligence, “rested primarily on Professor Groves’ testimonial explanation ...” which he terms “explanatory postulations.” The majority then goes on to point out six specific aspects of that testimony rebutted on cross-examination and sums it up as follows: “At best, Professor Groves’ testimony was discredited on cross-examination, if not contradicted, .... ” A review of the record indicates that that indeed was the case; and I take no issue with the trial court’s denial of the directed verdict motion. The evidence was so weak and he would probably have been subject to reversal if he had granted it.
My problem is that it is that same evidence, theoretical and discredited as it was, which the majority described as a “substantial quantum of evidence introduced in an attempt to prove specific acts of negligence.” The rule this court adopted in Barger, supra, would be classified as the liberal rule. It permits the introduction of such evidence as is available rather than to offer inconclusive evidence and rely on the doctrine. The liberal rule may also be justified because of the unpredictability of just where the court will draw the line. Annot., 33 A.L.R.2d 791, 795 (1954).
We have a classic example before us where the majority opinion permits introduction of “some evidence” but nowhere does it offer any definition or criteria to determine when “some” is “too much.” I grant that that terminology in the opinion is a direct quote from our earlier decision, Fleege v. Cimpl, 305 N.W.2d 409, 414 (S.D.1981). That terminology in Fleege again was a direct quotation from 33 A.L.R.2d at 795. The A.L.R. quotation continues, however: “... or, as it is sometimes more concisely phrased, that the plaintiff’s unsuccessful attempt to prove specific negligence will not deprive him of the inferences or presumption otherwise available under res ipsa loquitur.” Id. As Dean Prosser comments:
Plaintiff is of course bound by his own evidence; but proof of some specific act does not necessarily exclude inferences of others.... It is only in this sense that when the facts are known there is no inference and res ipsa loquitur simply vanishes from the case. On the basis of such reasoning as this, it is generally agreed that the introduction of some evidence which tends to show specific acts of negligence on the part of the defendant, but which does not purport to furnish a full and complete explanation of the occurrence does not destroy the inferences which are consistent with the evidence, and so does not deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of res ipsa loqui-tur. (Emphasis added)
Prosser, Law of Torts § 40 (4th ed. 1971). We then come to the question: When should the trial court give the instruction on res ipsa loquitur?
I think the Wisconsin Supreme Court, which subscribes to Dean Prosser’s theory of inferences cited above, stated rather well the guidelines in Fehrman v. Smirl, 131 N.W.2d 314, 318 (Wis.1964), when it said:
When proof of negligence is offered, the trial judge, in contemplating the instructions which he will give to the jury, must evaluate the testimony to determine if there has been such substantial proof of negligence as to render superfluous the giving of an instruction on res ipsa loquitur. Sometimes the question as to the adequacy of the proof of negligence will be a close one; it will be within the sound discretion of the trial *639judge to determine whether the giving of the instruction will be redundant.
Thus, we see that the decision is not resolved around the mere offering of evidence of specific acts of negligence by the plaintiff but, rather, it is resolved around the trial court’s determination whether the proof is of such strength as to render superfluous the inferences that are attendant to res ipsa loquitur. I would hold that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur and I would reverse the decision and remand for a new trial.