Court Opinion

ID: 9427831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:22:03.020496+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:56.601327
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Blackmun,
concurring in the judgment.
I concur in the judgment because, under United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, post, p. 388, respondents’ appeal of the order denying class certification is not moot. I agree with the Court that the ruling on a class certification motion stands as a litigated issue which does not become moot just because the named plaintiff’s suit on the merits is mooted. I would not limit appealability of this procedural motion, however, to situations where there is a possibility that the named plaintiff will be able to recover attorney’s fees from either the defendant or the fund awarded to the class.
Mr. Justice Powell,
with whom Mr. Justice Stewart joins, dissenting.
Respondents are two credit card holders who claim that petitioner charged them usurious interest in violation of the National Bank Act and Mississippi law.1 They filed this *345action late in 1971 to recover those charges plus a penalty equal to the same amount, for individual totals of $683.30. and $322.70. App. 59. Respondents also sought relief on behalf of a class alleged to include 90,000 persons with claims aggregating $12 million. After four years of litigation, the District Court denied respondents’ motion for class certification. Seven months later, petitioner tendered to respondents the full amount of their individual claims plus legal interest and court costs. Over respondents’ objection, the District Court entered final judgment in their favor. Petitioner then deposited the full amount due with the Clerk of the Court.
No one disputes that the petitioner has tendered everything that respondents could have recovered from it in this action. Nevertheless, the Court of Appeals, for the Fifth Circuit rejected petitioner’s suggestion of mootness and reversed the denial of class certification. This Court affirms thé judgment of the Court of Appeals, after finding that respondents retain a personal stake in sharing the expense of litigation with members of the putative class. Ante, at 334, n. 6, 336. This speculative interest simply will not sustain the jurisdiction of an Art. Ill court under established and controlling precedents. Accordingly, I dissent.
I
Although there are differences, this case is similar to United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, post, p. 388, in one important respect: both require us to decide whether putative class representatives may appeal the denial of class certification when they can derive no benefit whatever from the relief sought in the action. Here, as in Geraghty, the District Court refused to certify a class. In this case, however, the Court recognizes established Art. Ill doctrine. It states that the “right ... to employ Rule 23” is a “procedural right only, ancillary to the litigation of substantive claims.” Ante, at 332. It also agrees that a federal court “retains no juris*346diction over the controversy” when the parties’ “substantive claims become moot in the Art. III sense.” Ibid. Moreover, the Court acknowledges the familiar principle that a party who has no personal stake in the outcome of an action presents no case or controversy cognizable in a federal court of appeals. Ante, at 334, 336. These are indeed the dispositive principles. My disagreement is with the way in which the Court applies them in this case. In my view, these principles unambiguously require a finding of mootness.
A
Since no class has been certified and no one has sought to intervene, respondents are the only plaintiffs arguably present in court. Yet respondents have no continuing interest in the injuries alleged in their complaint. They sought only damages; those damages have been tendered in full.2 Respondents make no claim that success on the certification motion would entitle them to additional relief of any kind from the petitioner.3 Their personal claims to relief have been abandoned so completely that no appeal was taken in their own names. The notice of appeal filed with the District Court recites that respondents appeal only “on behalf of all others similarly situated. . . .” App. 63.
This in itself is compelling evidence that respondents have no interest in the “individual and private case or controversy” relied on by the Court today. Ante, at 332. But even without such evidence, this and other courts routinely have held that *347a tender of full relief remedies a plaintiff’s injuries and eliminates his stake in the outcome. California v. San Pablo & Tulare R. Co., 149 U. S. 308, 313-314 (1893); Drs. Hill & Thomas Co. v. United States, 392 F. 2d 204 (CA6 1968) (per curiam); Lamb v. Commissioner, 390 F. 2d 157. (CA2 1-968) (per curiam); A. A. Allen Revivals, Inc. v. Campbell, 353 F. 2d 89 (CA5 1965) (per curiam). It is the tender itself that moots the case whether or not a judgment is entered. Ibid. Thus, the law is clear that a federal court is powerless to review the abstract questions remaining in a case when the plaintiff has refused to accept a proffered settlement that fully satisfies his claims.
I know of no authority remotely suggesting that the result should differ because the District Court has entered a judgment in favor of respondents instead of dismissing their lawsuit as moot.4 It is certainly true, as the Court observes, that the entry of-judgment in favor of a party does not in itself moot his case. Ante, at 332-333. There never has been any doubt that a party may appeal those aspects of a generally favorable judgment that affect him adversely. See 15 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3902 (1976); 9 J. Moore, Federal Practice ¶ 203.06 (2d ed. 1975). But the requirement of adverse effect is more than a rule “of federal appellate practice.” Ante, at 333. As we have held repeatedly, and as the Court concedes, ante, at 334, 336, Art. Ill itself requires a live controversy in which a personal stake is at issue “throughout the entirety of the litigation.” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U. S. 393, 402 (1975). See, e. g., Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S. 395, 401-402 (1975).
It is this constitutional limitation, and not any rule of practice, that has impelled federal courts uniformly to require a *348showing of continuing adverse effect in order to confer “standing to appeal.” Barry v. District of Columbia Bd. of Elections, 188 U. S. App. D. C. 432, 433, 580 F. 2d 695, 696 (1978); 15 Wright, Miller, & Cooper, supra, § 3902; see Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U. S. 359 (1943); Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., 307 U. S. 241 (1939); Kapp v. National Football League, 586 F. 2d 644, 650 (CA9 1978); Cover v. Schwartz, 133 F. 2d 541 (1942), cert. denied, 319 U. S. 748 (1943).5 As these cases show, the requirements of Art. Ill are not affected by the “factual context” in which a suggestion of mootness arises. See ante, at 332. Whatever the context, Art. Ill asks but a single question: Is there a continuing controversy between adverse parties who retain the requisite stake in the outcome of the action?
Electrical Fittings Corp. v. Thomas & Betts Co., supra, is the case primarily relied upon by the Court. It provides little or no support for today's ruling. In Electrical Fittings, a limited appeal was allowed because the petitioner himself was prejudiced by the inclusion of an unnecessary and adverse finding in a generally favorable decree. See ante, at 337. *349Here, the existence of the District Court's order denying certification has no effect whatever on the respondents.- Thus, the personal stake that justified the Electrical Fittings appeal is not present in this case. Absent such a stake, it is simply irrelevant that “policy considerations” sometimes may favor an appeal from “a procedural ruling, collateral to the merits of a litigation.” Nor is it significant that the ruling “stands as an adjudication of one of the issues litigated.” Ante, at 335, 336. Collateral rulings — like other rulings — may be appealed only when the requirements of Art. Ill are satisfied.
B
After recognizing that the right to appeal is subject to the “jurisdictional limitations of Art. Ill,” the Court agrees that only a “party [who] retains a' stake in. the' appeal [can satisfy] the requirements of Art. III.” Ante, at 334; see ante, at 336. The Court also agrees that respondents have no remaining stake in “the merits of the substantive controversy.” Ibid. Nevertheless, it holds that respondents retain a personal stake in this appeal because they “desire to shift to successful class litigants .a portion of those fees and expenses that have been incurred in this litigation and for which they assert a continuing obligation.” Ante, at 334, n. 6; see ante, at 336.6 This conclusion is neither legally sound nor supported by the record.
*350The Court fails to identify a single item of expense, chargeable to the petitioner, that was incurred by respondents before the petitioner’s tender. Similarly, respondents have been conspicuously vague in identifying the “fees and expenses” relied upon as supplying the adverse interest essential to a live controversy.7 The only expense mentioned by respondents, apart from court costs included in the petitioner’s tender, is not a present obligation at all. It is an offer to provide security for costs in the event a class ultimately is certified. Brief for Respondents 33; App. 78. Nor does the attorney’s fee arrangement in this case create any obligation, present or future, that can be affected by the certification of a class. Respondents’ complaint identifies the fee to be paid, subject to court approval, as “twenty-five per cent (25%)” of the amount of the final judgment. Id., at 14, 16.8 No arrange*351ment other than this customary type contingent fee is identified in the record or the briefs. Yet, no one has explained how respondents’ obligation to pay 25% of their recovery to counsel could be reduced if a class is certified and its members become similarly obligated to pay 25% of their recovery. Thus, the asserted interest in “spreading [of] attorney’s fees and expenses”9 relates to no present obligation. It is at most an expectation — of the respondents’ and particularly of their counsel — that certain fees and expenses may become payable in the event a class is certified. That expectation is wholly irrelevant to the existence of a present controversy between petitioner and respondents.
The Court’s reliance on unidentified fees and expenses cannot be reconciled with the repeated admonition that “unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal judicial power.” E. g., Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U. S. 26, 44 (1976). Such speculation is particularly inappropriate in this case, since neither the Court nor the respondents have suggested that the petitioner is or ever will be liable for the fees or expenses relied upon. Indeed, the American Rule would bar an award of attorney’s fees against this petitioner. Thus, respondents’ “injury” — if any exists— is not one that “fairly can be traced” to the petitioner. Id., at 41-42; see Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 99 (1979).10 Whatever may be the basis for the *352respondents’ asserted desire to share fees and expenses with unnamed members of a class, the petitioner is merely a bystander. “[F]ederal courts are without power to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.” North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U. S. 244, 246 (1971). This elementary principle should dispose of the case.
C
Since respondents have no continuing personal stake in the outcome of this action, Art. III and the precedents of this Court require that the case be dismissed as moot. E. g., Ashcroft v. Mattis, 431 U. S. 171, 172-173 (1977) (per curiam); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975) (per curiam); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U. S., at 401-404; Indianapolis School Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U. S. 312, 316-320 (1974) (per curiam); North Carolina v. Rice, supra, at 246; SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U. S. 403, 407 (1972).11
Respondents do not suggest that their claims are “capable of repetition, yet evading review.” Cf. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U. S. 103, 110-111, n. 11 (1975).12 And not a single one of the alleged 90,000 class members has sought to intervene in the nine years since this action was filed. Cf. United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977). Nor has anyone challenged the allegedly usurious charges by informal com*353plaint or protest. Tr. of Oral Arg. 4. Even after certification was denied, the action lay dormant during the seven months in which respondents sought to take an interlocutory appeal, without provoking a response from anyone who previously may have thought that the class action would protect his rights. Apart from the persistence of the lawyers, this has been a noncase since the petitioner tendered full satisfaction of the respondents’ individual claims. To be sure, respondents’ counsel may have the same interest in an enlarged recovery that is inherent in any contingent fee arrangement. But I know of no decision by any court that holds that a lawyer’s interest in a larger fee, to be paid day third persons not present in court, creates the personal stake in the outcome required by Art. III.
II
Despite the absence of an Art. Ill controversy, the Court directs a remand in which this federal action will be litigated by lawyers whose only “clients” are unidentified class members who have shown no desire to be represented by anyone.13 The Court appears to endorse this form of litigation for reasons of policy and practice. It is said to be an effective “response to the existence of injuries unremedied by the regulatory action of government.” Ante, at 339. I am not aware that such a consideration ever before has influenced this Court in determining whether the Constitution confers jurisdiction on the federal courts. In any event, the consequences of a finding of mootness are not likely to be as restrictive as the Court seems to fear. And the. Court fails to recognize that allowing this action to proceed without an interested plaintiff will itself generate practical difficulties of some magnitude.
*354A
A finding of mootness would have repercussions primarily in two situations. The first involves a named plaintiff who fails to obtain class certification and then pursues his case to a successful, litigated judgment. I believe that a subsequent attempt by that plaintiff to appeal the denial of certification generally would be barred by Art. III. But the consequences of applying settled rules of mootness in that situation would not be unjust. If injunctive or declaratory relief were granted, the absent members of the putative class would have obtained by force of stare decisis or the decree itself most of the benefits of actual class membership. If, on the other hand, damages were awarded and an appeal permitted, reversal of the certification ruling would enable putative class members to take advantage of a favorable judgment on the issue of liability without assuming the risk of being bound by an unfavorable judgment. Thus, the Court’s decision to allow appeals in this situation will reinstate the “one-way intervention” that the 1966 amendments to Rule 23 were intended to eliminate.14
Perhaps more commonly, the mpotness question will arise when the defendant attempts to force a settlement before judgment, as petitioner did in this case. A defendant certainly will have a substantial incentive to use this tactic in some cases. The Court argues that the result will be to deny compensation to putative class members and jeopardize the enforcement of certain legal rights by “ ‘private attorney[s] general.’ ” Ante, at 338. The practical argument is not without force. But predicating a judgment on these concerns *355amounts to judicial policymaking with respect to the adequacy of compensation and enforcement available for particular substantive claims. Such a judgment ordinarily is best left to Congress. At the very least, the result should be consistent with the substantive law giving rise to the claim. Today, however, the Court never pauses to consider the law of usury. Since Mississippi law condemns the aggregation of usury claims,15 the Court’s concern for compensation of putative, class members in this case is at best misplaced and at worst inconsistent with the command of the Rules Enabling Act.16
The Court’s concern for putative class members would be more telling in a more appropriate case. A pattern of forced settlement could indeed waste judicial resources on the litigation of successive suits by members of the putative class. I do not doubt that the consequent problems of judicial administration would be real. But these problems can and should be addressed by measures short of undercutting the law of mootness, as the Court seems to have done today. The first step should be the authorization of interlocutory appeals from the denial of class certification in appropriate circumstances.17 *356District courts already are empowered by 28 U. S. C. § 1292 (b) to certify such appeals when they involve certain controlling questions of law. In many cases, a class-action defendant undoubtedly would forgo the opportunity to settle with an individual plaintiff in order to obtain an immediate and-final determination of the,class certification question on appeal.
Where a defendant does attempt to moot a class action by forced settlement, the district court is not powerless. In at least some circumstances, it may require that putative class members receive some sort of notice and an opportunity to intervene within the appeal period. Rule 23 (d)(2). The availability of such measures could be a significant deterrent to the deliberate mooting of class actions. Indeed, district court management of the problem by’measures tailored to the case at hand may well be preferable to the Court’s open-ended approval of appeals in all circumstances. To the extent interlocutory appeals are unavailable or managerial powers are lacking, it is for Congress—not this Court — to correct the deficiency.18
B
Since a court is limited to the decision of the case before.it, judicially fashioned “solutions” to legislative problems often *357are attended by unfortunate practical consequences, of their own. Today’s holding is no exception. On remand, respondents will serve as “quasi-class representatives” solely for the purpose of obtaining class certification. Since they can gain nothing more from the action, their participation can be intended only to benefit counsel and the members of a putative class who have indicated no interest in the claims asserted in this case. Respondents serve on their own motion — if indeed they serve at all.19 Since no court has certified the class, there has been no considered determination that respondents will fairly and adequately represent its members. Nothing in Rule 23 authorizes this novel procedure, and the requirements of the Rule are not easily adapted to it. Are respondents members of the class they seek to represent? See East Texas Motor Freight v. Rodriguez, 431 U. S. 395, 403-404 (1977). Are their currently nonexistent claims “typical of the claims ... of the class” within the meaning of Rule 23 (a)(3)?20
The Court’s holding well may prevent future “forced settlements” of class-action litigation. Thus, the difficulties faced by the District Court on remand in this case may not arise again in precisely analogous circumstances. But today’s result also authorizes appeals by putative class representatives who have litigated and prevailed on the merits of their individual claims. If the order denying class certification is reversed in that situation, the named plaintiffs on remand will have no more continuing relationship to the putative class than respondents have here. A remand for certification could also lead to “one-way intervention” in direct violation of Rule 23. See supra, at 354, and n. 14. These tensions, *358arising from the express terms of the Rule, undermine the Court’s conclusion that the policies underlying Rule 23 dictate the result reached today.
Ill
In sum, the Court’s attempted solution to the problem of forced settlements in consumer class actions departs from settled principles of Art. Ill jurisprudence.21 It unneces*359sarily creates significant problems in the administration of Rule 23. And it may work a serious injustice in this case.22 I would vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot.

 Jurisdiction was premised on the National Bank Act, 12 U. S. C. §§ 85, 86, which adopts the interest limits set by state law, and on 28 U. S. C. § 1355.

 Although respondents also asked for attorney’s fees, their complaint shows that fees were to be granted only from- the damages ultimately awarded to them or the class. App. 13-14. There is no possibility of prospective relief because the Mississippi usury statute was amended in 1974 to authorize, inter alia, the charges at issue in this case. 1974 Miss. Gen. Laws, ch. 564, §7; see Miss. Code Ann. § 75-17-1 (6) (Supp. 1979).

 Neither the Court nor the respondents have asserted that the petitioner’s tender fails to include all costs and fees for which it could be held liable. See Part II-B, infra.

 The “statutory right” to appeal, ante, at 333, itself cannot supply a personal stake in the outcome, for. Congress cannot abrogate Art. Ill limitations on the jurisdiction of the federal courts. Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 100 (1979).

 United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U. S. 385 (1977), and Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), are not to the contrary. Incidental dictum in both cases stated that the denial of class certification is subject to appellate review after final judgment at the behest of the named plaintiffs. Neither case discussed mootness, and neither analyzed the proposition in any way. Indeed, the only authority cited in Coopers & Lybrand was United Airlines, see 437 U. S., at 469, and the only authority cited in United Airlines was a concession made by the defendant and a list of cases from the Courts of Appeals, not one of which dealt with a suggestion of mootness in an analogous situation, see 432 U. S., at 393, and n. 14. Such statements, casually enunciated without a word of explanation in opinions dealing with unrelated legal questions, are not controlling or even persuasive when they are shown on further reflection to have been inconsistent with settled law. As the Court agrees today, neither case creates an exception to the fundamental rule that “[fjederal appellate jurisdiction is limited by the appellant’s personal stake in the appeal.” Ante, at 336.

 The Court also mentions that “[t]he use of the class-action procedure for litigation of individual claims may offer substantial advantages for named plaintiffs. . . ” Ante, at 338. But any such advantages cannot accrue to these respondents, who will not be litigating their own claims on remand. Indeed, the Court refers to respondents in this context only to point out- that their total damages were so small that they “would be unlikely to obtain legal redress at an acceptable .cost” if they could not do so by means of a class action. Ante, at 338, n. 9. We may assume that respondents had some interest in the class-action procedure as. a means of interesting their lawyers in the case or obtaining a satisfactory *350settlement. This may be an interest properly furthered by Rule 23, but once respondents obtained both access to court and full individual relief that interest disappeared.

 Perhaps the strongest of respondents’ statements is:
“Of course, the interest of the [respondents] in assertion of the right to proceed on behalf of the class includes such matters as the prospect for spreading attorney’s fees and expenses among more claimants and thus reducing the percentage that would otherwise be payable by them.” Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Appeal and Reply Brief, filed in Roper v. Consurve, Inc., No. 76-3600 (CA5, Jan. 10, 1977).

 Respondents’ “Demand for Judgment” asks the court to award the “[c]ost of this action as well as attorney fees in the amount of 25% as hereinabove alleged, or such other amount as may be deemed fit and proper by the Court.” App. 16. The request for fees was clarified in Paragraph VI of the amended complaint, which reads as follows:
“Plaintiff alleges that the Clerk of this Court be designated custodian of the funds and judgment to be paid Plaintiff and other persons similarly situated, by Defendants and the Clerk deposit said funds in a suitable depository and, upon proper order of this Court, disburse said funds after deduction of necessary expenses and attorney fees to Plaintiff's attorneys herein of twenty-five per cent (25%) of the amount so paid, the same being reasonable by all standards, including that alleged and *351utilized by Defendants in suing certain members in of [sic] the class in State Courts for unpaid accounts.” Id., at 13-14.

 See n. 7, supra.

 Far-reaching consequences could flow from a rule that fees recoverable from putative class members may be “traced” to the class defendant for purposes of the case-or-controversy requirement. At the least, this rule would support a claim that a person who has accepted full settlement of his individual claim is entitled to file suit on behalf of an unrecompensed class. Apparently, the putative plaintiff need only “asser[t],” ante, at 334, h. 6, that fees incurred in anticipation of the litigation ultimately might be shared with a prevailing class.

 These cases are discussed more fully in United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, post, at 410-413, 417-419 (Powell, J., dissenting).

 If a class-action defendant were shown to have embarked on a course of conduct designed to insulate the class certification issue from appellate review in order to avoid classwide liability, a court in proper circumstances might find the Gerstein test satisfied and the case not moot. See Susman v. Lincoln American Corp., 587 F. 2d 866 (CA7 1978); 13 C. Wright, A. Miller, & E. Cooper, Federal. Practice and Procedure § 3533, p. 208 (Cum. Supp. 1980); Comment, Continuation and Representation of Class Actions Following Dismissal of the Class Representative, 1974 Duke L. J. 573, 599-600.

 I do not suggest that counsel acted improperly in pursuing this case. Since they have prevailed both in this Court and in the Court of Appeals, the responsibility for allowing clientless litigation falls on the federal courts.

 See Comment, Immediate Appealability of Orders Denying Class Certification, 40 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 470-471 (1979). In actions brought under Rule 23 (b)(3), a class member must decide at the time of certification whether to “opt out” of the action under Rule 23 (c) (2). This provision was designed to bring an end to the “spurious” class action in which class members were permitted to intervene after a decision on the merits in order to secure the benefits of that decision. Notes of the Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 28 U. S. C. App., p. 430.

 Liddell v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 So. 2d 455 (1974) (rejecting borrower’s class action); Fry v. Layton, 191 Miss. 17, 2 So. 2d 561 (1941). Petitioner is a national bank, and its alleged failure to comply with Mississippi’s interest limits would violate the National Bank Act. 12 U. S. C. § 85. But I do not understand that the National Bank Act displaces state policy disfavoring the aggregation of usury claims. A primary purpose of that Act is to protect national banks from discriminatory treatment or undue penalties that may be imposed by state law. See 12 U. S. C. § 86.

 The Act provides that rules of procedure promulgated by this Court “shall not . . . enlarge or modify any substantive right.” 28 U. S. C. § 2072. See American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U. S. 538, 557-558 (1974); Developments in the Law — Class Actions, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1318, 1358-1359 (1976). See generally Landers, Of Legalized Blackmail and Legalized Theft: Consumer Class Actions and the Substance-Procedure Dilemma, 47 S. Cal. L. Rev. 842 (1974).

 In Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U. S. 463 (1978), this Court held that the denial of class certification is not a “final decision” appeal-*356able as of right under 28 U. S. C. § 1291. We relied in that case on the dangers of “indiscriminate” interloctitory review. 437 U. S., at 474. Although Coopers & Lybrand now prevents review in cases in which it would be desirable, Congress may remedy the problem by appropriate legislation.

 Congress currently has before it a bill that attempts to remedy the ' difficulties infecting this troubled. area. H. R. 5103, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979). The bill, supported by the Department-of Justice, proposes to bypass the Rules Enabling Act problem, see n. 16, supra, and to eliminate some of the problems of claims too small to justify individual lawsuits, by creating a new federal right of action for damages. The bill provides for the' enforcement of this right in some instances through actions brought in the name of the United States. The bill also authorizes interlocutory appeals from the grant or denial of the ruling that will replace class certification under the proposed procedures.

 As noted supra, at 346, respondents took no appeal in their own names. One would think that this candid disclaimer of personal interest would destroy the foundation upon which the Court predicates Art. Ill jurisdiction. Ante, at 336; see supra, at 349.

 The District Court properly may conclude on remand that respondents, for these or other reasons, cannot adequately represent the class.

 Mr. Justice SteveNs states in his concurring opinion that all persons alleged to be members of a putative class “should be considered parties to the case or controversy at least for the limited purpose” of Art. III, and that they “remain parties until a final determination has been made that the action may not be maintained as a class action.” Ante, at 342. This novel view apparently derives from early cases in which the Court referred to class members who would be bound by a judgment as “absent parties,” Hamberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 42 (1940), or “parties in interest,” Smith v. Swormstedt, 16 How. 288, 303 (1854). Ante, at 343, n. 3. But these cases were decided before certification was established as the method by which a class achieves judicial recognition. Under Rule 23, the members of a putative class will not be bound by a judgment unless a proper certification order is entered. That they may be “interested parties” before that time does not make them parties to the litigation in any sense, as this Court has recognized. In Indianapolis School Comm’rs v. Jacobs, 420 U. S. 128 (1975), the Court held that an oral certification order was insufficient to identify the interests of absent class members for Art. Ill purposes. The result hardly could be different when the class has not been identified at all. See also Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 8 (1978); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U. S. 308, 310-311, n. 1 (1976); Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U. S. 147 (1975); Pasadena City Bd. of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424, 430 (1976).
Mr. Justice Stevens indicates that unnamed members of an uncerti-fied class may be “present” as parties for some purposes and not for others. No authority is cited for such selective “presence” in an action. Nor is any explanation offered as to how a court is to determine when these unidentified “parties” are present. If their presence is to be limited to the satisfaction of the Art. III case-or-eontroversy requirement, then the rule of party status would have no content apart from Art. III and could only be described as a legal fiction. If, on the other hand, the proposed rule is to apply outside the Art. III context, it may have troublesome and far-reaching implications that could prejudice the bringing of *359class actions. Presumably, a purpose of the rule of party status would be to assure that satisfaction of the claims of named parties would .not terminate the litigation. Nor could the rights of unnamed parties be extinguished by the failure of the named parties to appeal. Thus, if the rule proposed by Mr. Justice Stevens is to accomplish its purpose, I suppose that a fiduciary duty must be imposed upon named parties to continue the litigation where — as- here — the unnamed parties remain unidentified and fail to intervene. As fiduciaries, would the named parties be required not only to continue to litigate, but also to assume personal responsibility for costs and attorney’s fees if the case ultimately is lost? Would responsible litigants be willing to file class actions if they thereby assumed such long-term fiduciary obligations? These and like questions are substantial. They are not resolved by Rule 23. I believe they merit careful study by Congress before this Court — perhaps unwittingly — creates a major category of clientless litigation unique in our system.

 The Court’s resurrection of this dead controversy may result in irreparable injury to innocent parties, as well as to the petitioner bank. When the District Court denied certification on September 29, 1975, it assigned as one of its reasons the possible “destruction of the [petitioner] bank” by damages then alleged to total $12 million and now potentially augmented by the accrual of interest. App. 47; see ante, at 329, n. 2. The possible destruction of the bank is irrelevant to the jurisdictional issue, but serious indeed to depositors, stockholders, and the community served. It is said that this is necessary to redress injuries possibly suffered by members of the putative class. Yet, no such person has come forward in the nearly nine years that have passed since this action was filed. Indeed, the challenged conduct was authorized by statute almost six years ago. As the District Court may be called upon to determine whether the equitable doctrine of “relation back” permits it to toll the statute of limitations on remand, ante, at 330, n. 3, it will hardly be inappropriate for that court to consider the equities on both sides. In the circumstances presented, the District Court may well see no reason to exercise its equitable discretion in favor of putative class members who have slept on their rights these many years.