Court Opinion

ID: 9592855
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:17:35.927549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:34.610250
License: Public Domain

LOUIS J. CECI, J.
(concurring). I agree with the decision of the court, but write separately for the following reasons.
The present case involves one of the most deadly and devastating drugs affecting our society today— cocaine. The majority holds in this case that the warrantless search of the car was justified because the search of the vehicle by the police was made on probable cause. Accordingly, the cocaine evidence seized was found to have been admissible. With this decision I firmly agree.
In a recently reported case that bears striking resemblance to the present case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found a warrantless search and seizure of an automobile to be lawful where agents had observed a defendant retrieve what appeared to be narcotics from the vehicle’s trunk and discovered that keys confiscated from that defendant matched those of the vehicle. United States v. Rivera, 825 F.2d 152 (7th Cir. 1987). The court in Rivera stated: "The automobile exception allows a warrantless search and seizure of a car so long as the search is justified by probable cause.” 825 F.2d at 158. This decision embodies the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court establishing a decreased expectation of privacy in automobiles. Interestingly, *139one of the judges on the panel deciding Rivera was Senior Circuit Judge Thomas E. Fairchild, Sr., a distinguished and recognized scholar and former member of this court.
The dissent would have this court adhere to a requirement of "exigent circumstances” in searching automobiles, the same requirement for search of a dwelling if done without a warrant. The dissent tells us that "exigent circumstances” is a "bright line rule,” meaning that it is easy to recognize and easy to apply. But such is not the case. That which constitutes "exigent circumstances” is frequently "in the eye of beholder,” often requiring an on-the-scene judgment call by a police officer, often under stressful circumstances. Months later, in hindsight, it might not so appear to a judge far removed in time and place from the point of decision. "Exigent circumstances,” far from being a "bright line,” is often a difficult conclusion about which reasonable minds may differ. Such a requirement can result in the loss to the state of essential evidence even though probable cause existed to make such search.
The need to assure that law enforcement officials are not unnecessarily thwarted in obtaining admissible evidence is highlighted by the rising production of drugs and increase in drug trafficking which has been described as "a scourge that threatens to sap the energy and resources of nations ....” Gray, Rising Drug Production Called Scourge of World, Wis. State J., Apr. 10, 1988, at 1-D. The albatross of worldwide illicit drug production and trafficking has reached epidemic proportions: the costs of this drug situation are tremendous. One presidential candidate has described the severity of the problem as follows: "Our children are in trouble, the number one threat to *140national security today is drugs.” Jackson Jabs at Bush, Pushes Political Unity, Wis. State J., Mar. 25, 1988, at 1-3. To date, we are losing the war against drugs. See, e.g., Reagan Gets Sour Drug News, Wis. State J., Apr. 30, 1988, at 1-1. I submit that courts must, in response to the demands of public safety, fashion decisions which will assure that the war against drugs is not one which is fought by the state, with disabling handicaps imposed by overbroad constitutional interpretations.
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the United States Supreme Court held that the exclusionary rule applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment as an essential means to assure the protection of the fourth amendment. As explained by the majority, while this court had previously, in Hoyer v. State, 180 Wis. 407, 415, 193 N.W. 89 (1923), recognized an exclusionary rule under our state constitution, that decision was supported by a foundation laid by federal law. We have steadfastly followed federal law in search and seizure cases both insofar as defining the scope of protected rights and in deterring the impingement of those rights by means of the enforcement of an exclusionary rule. As observed by this court in State v. Fry, 131 Wis. 2d 153, 175-76, 388 N.W.2d 565 (1986): "[Conforming Wisconsin’s search and seizure law to that developed by the Supreme Court under the fourth amendment is not only consistent with the text of Wisconsin’s search and seizure provision, its constitutional history and its judicial history, but it is also in accord with sound public policy.” We must not depart from federal case law which has, by requiring only probable cause to justify a warrantless search of a vehicle, reintroduced stability to the balance between *141privacy rights and the need of law enforcement agents to procure evidence.
We explained the nature of the exclusionary rule in Conrad v. State, 63 Wis. 2d 616, 636, 218 N.W.2d 252 (1974), as follows: "The exclusionary rule is a judge-made one in furtherance of conduct that courts have considered to be in the public interest and to suppress conduct that is not.” The public interest is furthered by the application of the exclusionary rule only where the police conduct sought to be deterred impinges upon a privacy interest, in violation of the fourth amendment. See, e.g., State v. Brady, 130 Wis. 2d 443, 453, 388 N.W.2d 151 (1986) (citing United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 910 (1984)). To extend the exclusionary rule to bar the admission of evidence obtained from a warrantless search of a vehicle where there exists probable cause for the search would not further "the public interest” because, as recognized by federal case law, an individual has a "decreased expectation of privacy” in a car. Rivera, 825 F.2d at 158 (citing California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985)).
We should not let our acceptance of a more enlightened interpretation of the fourth amendment by the United States Supreme Court remain shackled by prior restrictive interpretations of search and seizure law by that Court. We would be remiss if we failed to seize the opportunity presented by federal case law to restore equilibrium between law enforcement and the judicial enforcement of constitutional rights. A majority of our people who are neither dependent on nor making a profit from this nefarious trade will welcome this small but hopefully significant addition to the arsenal of law enforcement in the war on drugs that the majority decision provides.
*142I am authorized to state that JUSTICE ROLAND B. DAY joins in this concurring opinion.