Court Opinion

ID: 9963061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-24 15:50:22.524279+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:39.611877
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WYOMING

                                             2024 WY 44

                                                                       APRIL TERM, A.D. 2024

                                                                                April 24, 2024

 WESLEY WALTER STOREY,

 Appellant
 (Defendant),

 v.                                                               S-23-0236

 THE STATE OF WYOMING,

 Appellee
 (Plaintiff).

                      Appeal from the District Court of Campbell County
                        The Honorable Matthew F.G. Castano, Judge

Representing Appellant:
      Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Kirk Allan Morgan, Chief Appellate
      Counsel; Jeremy William Meerkreebs, Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee:
      Bridget L. Hill, Wyoming Attorney General; Jenny L. Craig, Deputy Attorney
      General; Kristen R. Jones, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Donovan Burton,
      Assistant Attorney General.

Before FOX, C.J., and *KAUTZ, BOOMGAARDEN, GRAY, and FENN JJ.

* Justice Kautz retired from judicial office effective March 26, 2024, and, pursuant to Article 5, § 5 of
the Wyoming Constitution and Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 5-1-106(f) (2023), he was reassigned to act on this
matter on March 27, 2024.
NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in Pacific Reporter Third.
Readers are requested to notify the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Supreme Court Building, Cheyenne,
Wyoming 82002, of any typographical or other formal errors so that correction may be made before
final publication in the permanent volume.
BOOMGAARDEN, Justice.

[¶1] Wesley Walter Storey appeals his conviction for felony stalking. Mr. Storey argues
that the evidence presented at his jury trial was insufficient to support his conviction under
Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-506(b) and (e)(iv) (2023). We affirm.

                                            ISSUE

[¶2] We rephrase the issue as whether the State presented sufficient evidence to the jury
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt Mr. Storey intended to harass the victim.

                                           FACTS

[¶3] Mr. Storey and his ex-wife, Ms. Storey, were married for nine years and have two
children. On February 23, 2022, the Campbell County Circuit Court issued a “Stalking
Order of Protection,” effective until February 23, 2025. The order prohibits Mr. Storey
from having contact with Ms. Storey, including “communication by telephone or other
electronic means.” The order states “all contact regarding children will be pursuant to the
divorce decree,” limited to “text or email contact only to exchange children or pass on info
pertaining to children.”

[¶4] In October 2022, Ms. Storey reported to law enforcement that Mr. Storey violated
the protection order by calling and texting her repeatedly. The State charged Mr. Storey
with one count of felony stalking in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(b) and (e)(iv)
related to his conduct the weekend beginning on October 7.

[¶5] At trial, the State presented evidence that Mr. Storey sent Ms. Storey thirty-nine text
messages between October 7 and 9. While many of the messages demanded information
about the children, others contained malicious name-calling and disturbing statements. The
State also presented evidence that Mr. Storey called her thirty-three times during the same
period. Ms. Storey did not answer his calls. Lastly, the State presented evidence that Mr.
Storey sent Ms. Storey an audio recording in which he disguised his voice, impersonated
the devil, and purportedly made a death threat against himself.

[¶6] Ms. Storey testified the communications caused her emotional distress and she
perceived the text messages as threatening because “they’re not normal messages that we
send to people that we care about, even if we share the kids with each other.” Ms. Storey
also testified that she feared for her and the children’s safety and felt emotionally distressed
due to her history with Mr. Storey and the totality of the communications she received,
including the number, timing, and content of the messages, phone calls, and audio
recording.

                                               1
[¶7] At the close of the State’s case, Mr. Storey moved for a judgment of acquittal under
W.R.Cr.P. 29, claiming the State presented insufficient evidence that he intended to harass
Ms. Storey. The district court denied the motion. The jury then returned a guilty verdict
against Mr. Storey for felony stalking. The district court sentenced him to three and one-
half to five years of incarceration. Mr. Storey timely appeals.

                                    STANDARD OF REVIEW

[¶8] In reviewing whether sufficient evidence was presented to the jury to sustain a
conviction,
                [we] decide whether any rational trier of fact could have found
                that the essential elements of a charged crime were proven
                beyond a reasonable doubt on the evidence presented. In doing
                so, we assume that the State’s evidence is true, disregard any
                evidence favoring the defendant, and give the State the benefit
                of every favorable inference that may reasonably be drawn
                from the evidence. We will not reweigh the evidence or re-
                examine witness credibility. Because direct evidence of intent
                is rare, and circumstantial evidence is most often the only proof
                available, we have held that intent may be proven by
                circumstantial evidence alone.

Fox v. State, 2020 WY 88, ¶ 9, 467 P.3d 140, 142 (Wyo. 2020) (citation omitted).

                                            DISCUSSION

[¶9] The jury convicted Mr. Storey of one count of felony stalking in violation of Wyo.
Stat. Ann. §§ 6-2-506(b) and (e)(iv). 1 Stalking is a specific intent crime that requires the
State to prove the defendant, with the intent to harass, engaged in a course of conduct
reasonably likely to harass another person. Bittleston v. State, 2019 WY 64, ¶ 25, 442 P.3d
1287, 1294 (Wyo. 2019) (citing Dean v. State, 2014 WY 158, ¶ 10, 339 P.3d 509, 512
(Wyo. 2014)). The statute provides:
                (a) As used in this section:

                        (i) “Course of conduct” means a pattern of conduct
                        composed of a series of acts over any period of time
                        evidencing a continuity of purpose;
                        (ii) “Harass” means to engage in a course of conduct,
                        including but not limited to verbal threats, written
1
 “[A] person commits the crime of stalking if, with intent to harass another person, the person engages in
a course of conduct reasonably likely to harass that person[.]” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(b).

                                                    2
                      threats, lewd or obscene statements . . . directed at a
                      specific person that the defendant knew or should have
                      known would cause:
                             (A) A reasonable person to suffer substantial
                             emotional distress[.]

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(a). “A person convicted of stalking . . . is guilty of felony
stalking . . . if: [t]he defendant committed the offense of stalking in violation of a temporary
or permanent order of protection . . .” Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 6-2-506(e)(iv).

[¶10] Mr. Storey concedes he engaged in a course of conduct that would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress and he violated a valid order of
protection. However, Mr. Storey argues, as he did at trial, that the State presented
insufficient evidence to the jury to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed the
specific intent to harass the victim. We disagree.

[¶11] “Specific intent to cause the particular harm may be proven by reasonable inferences
from the character of the conduct and surrounding circumstances.” Bittleston, 2019 WY
64, ¶ 25, 442 P.3d at 1294 (quoting Dean, 2014 WY 158, ¶ 10, 339 P.3d at 512). “The
mind of an alleged offender may be read from his acts, his conduct, his words, and the
reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the circumstances of the case. To hold
otherwise would create an impossible burden in a case requiring a finding of specific
intent.” Id. (quoting Jones v. State, 2012 WY 82, ¶ 27, 278 P.3d 729, 736 (Wyo. 2012)).

[¶12] Mr. Storey argues his intent was not to harass Ms. Storey because most of his
messages and phone calls were inquiries regarding their children. Given the State’s
evidence, we are unpersuaded. The evidence showed that Mr. Storey engaged in malicious
name-calling and sent disturbing messages to Ms. Storey including: “Get that bull shot
picture off my fucking wall right now and answer the phone idiot;” “Protection orders don’t
work on JESUS;” “Idiot;” “You are in so much shit you fucking red and black god damned
whore;” “Where are my kids? You take that fucking picture of that bull off my wall idiot;”
“JESUS Christ will crack this planet in half you k ow exactly who the duck I am Jesus
pissed of Christ stupid idiot!!!” The audio recording stated “I’m coming for you, Storey.
This is the devil and I’m coming for the worthless coward soul of yours. You’re gonna
fucking die.” The frequency and content of these communications are sufficient for a
rational trier of fact to reasonably infer a specific intent to harass. See id. at ¶ 29, 442 P.3d
at 1295.

[¶13] In Bittleston, the defendant sent a series of similarly malicious and lewd text
messages to the victim. The messages also implied he was watching the victim and

                                               3
included direct threats of violence against her stating, “Just a matter of time;” “Peak a boo
i see you;” “I got a new toy just for the occasion to;” “Cant wait to use my new toy oh boy
oh boy this is gonna rock;” “Good morning is it today;” “its ok if not im not going a damn
place tell its done;” “It wont be long at all.” Id. at ¶¶ 27–28, 442 P.3d at 1294–95. We
held that a rational trier of fact could reasonably infer that the menacing content of the text
messages created a reasonable inference of a specific intent to harass. Id. at ¶ 29, 442 P.3d
at 1295.

[¶14] Mr. Storey contends his communications with Ms. Storey are distinguishable from
those in Bittleston because his communications do not include threats of harm, nor do they
imply that he was watching Ms. Storey. We reject his claim. While Mr. Storey’s texts
may not have contained direct threats of violence or that he was watching Ms. Storey, their
repetitive and malicious nature creates a reasonable inference he specifically intended to
harass her. In addition to the texts, Mr. Storey called Ms. Storey thirty-three times over
three days in violation of the protection order. Giving every favorable inference to the
State’s evidence, Fox, 2020 WY 88, ¶ 9, 467 P.3d at 142, a rational jury could find that
Mr. Storey’s repeated acts, conduct and words, and the malicious nature of many of his
communications, proved a specific intent to harass beyond a reasonable doubt.

[¶15] We affirm.

                                              4