Court Opinion

ID: 9572915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:45:44.684016+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:38.465828
License: Public Domain

WELLS, Judge.
*596Defendant’s first assignment of error is grounded on the contention that Officer Galliher lacked probable cause to stop and detain defendant and therefore violated defendant’s rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. At the voir dire examination held for the purpose of determining the basis for probable cause for the stop, Officer Galliher testified that his attention was attracted to defendant’s car on 5 March, initially because of a twelve inch piece of cloth hanging out of the trunk over the rear bumper. Galliher also observed that the car’s trunk lid was tied down over a washing machine and that another white appliance, a dryer, was in the rear passenger area of the vehicle. These circumstances at the time of night, 12:34 a.m., aroused Galliher’s suspicion. Galliher explained that he was aware of several prior thefts of washers and dryers from Conner Mobile Homes, and that he felt it was necessary “to stop the vehicle and advise him that there was in fact something hanging out of the vehicle and to inquire as to what he was doing with the two appliances and material hanging out of the vehicle.” Defendant contends that Galliher’s suspicions were not sufficiently articulable or reasonable to justify a stop of defendant’s vehicle. We disagree.
In appropriate circumstances even absent probable cause to arrest, police officers may temporarily approach and detain an individual for purposes of investigating “possible criminal behavior.” State v. Greenwood, 47 N.C. App. 731, 735, 268 S.E. 2d 835, 838 (1980), reversed on other grounds, 301 N.C. 866, 273 S.E. 2d 438 (1981); see, State v. Tillett, 50 N.C. App. 520, 274 S.E. 2d 361 (1981). If a police officer can specify an articulable and reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, State v. Streeter, 283 N.C. 203, 210,195 S.E. 2d 502, 507 (1973), then a brief stop of the suspicious individual in order to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information does not violate Fourth Amendment rights. State v. Thompson, 296 N.C. 703, 706, 252 S.E. 2d 776, 779, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907, 62 L. Ed. 2d 143, 100 S. Ct. 220 (1979). Based on the totality of the circumstances as perceived by Officer Galliher, we hold that Galliher possessed such articulable and reasonable suspicion, State v. Thompson, supra, as would justify the investigatory stop of defendant in this case. See, State v. Greenwood, supra, at 736-38, 268 S.E. 2d at 838-39; In re Beddingfield, 42 N.C. App. 712, 715-16, 257 S.E. 2d 643, 645 (1979); G.S. 20-183(a). Noting that *597defendant did not appeal from the trial court’s finding of fact at the conclusion of the voir dire that Galliher was informed of the break-in at Conner Mobile Home within a “very short time” of the stop, we uphold the trial court’s conclusion of law that defendant’s detention for this short period of time was reasonable and did not violate defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. See, State v. Bridges, 35 N.C. App. 81, 239 S.E. 2d 856 (1978).
Defendant also asserts that the washer and dryer were illegally seized by the police and that it was error not to exclude such evidence. Stating the four requisite elements of the plain view doctrine — a prior valid intrusion, inadvertent discovery, a nexus between the items and criminal behavior, and plain view — State v. Wynn, 45 N.C. App. 267, 262 S.E. 2d 689 (1980); see also, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 446, 29 L. Ed. 2d 564, 91 S. Ct. 2022 (1971), but see, State v. Mitchell, 300 N.C. 305, 310-11, 266 S.E. 2d 605, 609 (1980) (questioning the requirement that the discovery be inadvertent), defendant argues that two of the elements were not present in this case. Defendant’s first contention, i.e., that Officer Galliher was not in a place where he had a right to be, is without merit because of our determination that the investigatory stop of defendant’s vehicle was permissible. Defendant’s second contention is that the washer and dryer viewed by Galliher were not incriminating in any manner. This contention is without merit because the seizure of the washer and dryer did not occur until after Galliher was informed by Ingold that a washer and dryer had been removed from a nearby Conner mobile home. At that point, a nexus was established between the items and criminal behavior, State v. Wynn, supra, and the plain view doctrine applied to justify the warrantless seizure. State v. Bridges, supra, at 85, 239 S.E. 2d at 859.
Defendant next assigns error to the admission of defendant’s confession into evidence. Defendant bases this assignment on the alleged illegality of the stop of defendant’s vehicle, the detention and arrest of defendant, and the seizure of the washer and dryer. As we have already concluded that each of these acts was proper, this assignment is without merit and is therefore overruled.
Defendant’s fourth assignment of error concerns the charges contained in the indictment of defendant. Defendant was charged with violating G.S. 14-54, which provides:
*598§ 14-54. Breaking or entering buildings generally. —
(a)Any person who breaks or enters any building with intent to commit any felony or larceny therein is guilty of a felony and is punishable under G.S. 14-2.
(b) Any person who wrongfully breaks or enters any building is guilty of a misdemeanor and is punishable under G.S. 14-3(a).
(c) As used in this section, “building” shall be construed to include any dwelling, dwelling house, uninhabited house, building under construction, building within the curtilage of a dwelling house, and any other structure designed to house or secure within it any activity or property.
Defendant asserts that the State’s evidence showed only a violation of G.S. 14-56 (Supp. 1979), which prohibits breaking and entering “any railroad car, motor vehicle, trailer, aircraft, boat, or other watercraft of any kind containing any goods, wares, freight, or other thing of value. ...” Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying defendant’s motion to quash the indictment.
The question presented is whether an unoccupied mobile home not affixed to the premises and intended for retail sale, is a “building” within the meaning of G.S. 14-54. We hold that it is. A mobile home is clearly a “structure designed to house or secure within it ... activity or property.” Such a structure that is uninhabited or under construction also is within the statute’s language. The mere fact of a mobile home’s capability of being transported from place to place on wheels attached to its frame, should not remove it from the ambit of G.S. 14-54. See, United States v. Lavender, 602 F. 2d 639 (4th Cir., 1979).
Defendant’s final assignment of error concerns the admission of Donald Harwood’s testimony identifying the curtains, bedspread and pillows found in defendant’s vehicle as those items missing from the Conner mobile home. On voir dire Harwood testified that the items found in defendant’s vehicle were the identical color and size as those taken from the mobile home but that he could not “say for a fact that they were ours.” After the voir dire, the trial j udge made findings of fact and concluded that the identification testimony was admissible. There was no error in this ruling. Evidence is relevant if it has any logical *599tendency to prove the fact in issue. See, State v. Collins, 35 N.C. App. 250, 252, 241 S.E. 2d 98, 99 (1978); 1 Stansbury’s N.C. Evidence § 77, at 234 (Brandis rev. 1973). Harwood’s ability to identify the items was sufficient to provide the basis upon which the jury might reasonably infer that the items found in defendant’s vehicle were those taken from the mobile home. See, State v. Bembery, 33 N.C. App. 31, 37, 234 S.E. 2d 33, 37, disc. rev. denied, 293 N.C. 160, 236 S.E. 2d 704 (1977). This assignment of error is overruled.
No error.
Judge Vaughn concurs.
Judge Becton dissents.