Court Opinion

ID: 9695867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:30:33.932502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:02.249517
License: Public Domain

HOFFMAN, Judge,
dissenting:
Appellant contends that the colloquy conducted at the time of his plea of “nolo contendere” 1 did not comport with Commonwealth v. Ingram, 455 Pa. 198, 316 A.2d 77 *526(1974), and Rule 319, Pa.R.Crim.P. I agree and, therefore, dissent.2
Appellant was charged with two counts of forgery and related offenses. On June 24, 1975, he pleaded “nolo contendere” to all of the charges. The following is excerpted from the colloquy conducted at that time:
“THE COURT: Do you understand that the charges against you are forgery, and your plea, nolo contendere, no contest; that you’re asking the Commonwealth to meet their burden of proof, to prove to the Court what you’re guilty of here?
“THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
“THE COURT: Do you understand that the charge of forgery, forgery of money, stamps, official legal tender, that would be a felony of the second degree having up to ten years imprisonment and/or a twenty-Five Thousand Dollar fine and that the forgery of anything else such as; a deed or official document would be a felony of the third degree bringing in a maximum fine of Ten Thousand Dollars and a five year sentence or both. And on any other forgery it would be a misdemeanor of the third degree having up to five years and a Ten Thousand Dollar fine. Do you understand that ?
“THE WITNESS: Yes.
“THE COURT: All right. There’s some other bills against you, and I ask you if you’re pleading nolo contendere to those? There’s two bills of indictment charging forgery; one, that you altered a check in the amount of Four Hundred and Fifty Dollars payable to William Jordan and signed by Barry Sherman; and the other forgery is that you altered or uttered a check in the *527amount of Three Hundred and Fifty Dollars, a withdrawal slip of William Jordan. Do you understand that?
“THE WITNESS: Yes.
“THE COURT: Do you plead nolo contendere to those two bills, is that so?
“THE WITNESS: Yes.
“THE COURT: There’s also a bill charging you with theft of deception [sic] saying, that you took Three Hundred and Fifty Dollars of money belonging to Girard Bank. Is your plea nolo contendere to that charge ?
“THE WITNESS: Yes.
“THE COURT: And, there’s also a bill of indictment charging criminal conspiracy in that you conspired with Barry Sherman to commit these two crimes of forgery and theft by deception. Do you understand that?
“THE WITNESS: Yes.”
In response to questions from defense counsel, appointed after the above portion of the colloquy, the appellant stated as follows:
“Q. Do you understand the nature of the charges against you?
“A. Yes. I do.
“Q. And by telling [the district attorney] that you’re doing this of your own free will, that means, that no threats have been made to you, nobody has forced you to take this plea, is that right?
“A. Right.
“Q. Have you had sufficient time to confer with me ?
“A. Yes. I have.
“Q. Are you satisfied with my advice?
“A. Yes.”
Appellant contends that the colloquy is inadequate to show that he voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to trial.
*528It is well-settled that “[a] plea of guilty may be involuntary either because the accused does not understand the nature of the constitutional protections that he is waiving, see, e. g., Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-465, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461, or because he has such an incomplete understanding of the charge that his plea cannot stand as an intelligent admission of guilt. Without adequate notice of the nature of the charge against him, or proof that he in fact understood the charge, the plea cannot be voluntary in this latter sense. Smith v. O’Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 61 S.Ct. 512, 85 L.Ed. 859.” Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976). Those constitutional principles are embodied in Rule 319, Pa.R.Crim.P.: “(a) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, or, with the consent of the court, nolo contendere. The judge may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept it unless he determines after inquiry of the defendant that the plea is voluntary and understandingly tendered. Such inquiry shall appear on record.” In turn, our Supreme Court has held that “[i]n order to demonstrate that a defendant possesses such understanding, he certainly must be told more than just that he has been charged with murder or robbery, for example. While such terms clearly connote some meaning to the layman, this meaning does not always embrace the basic legal elements of the crime. . . . Thus, for an examination to demonstrate a defendant’s understanding of the charge, the record must disclose that the elements of the crime or crimes charged were outlined in understandable terms.” Commonwealth v. Ingram, supra, 455 Pa. at 203-04, 316 A.2d at 80. (Emphasis added).
From my reading of the colloquy in the instant case, I conclude that the appellant was not informed of the elements of forgery, theft by deception and conspiracy. In its brief, the Commonwealth impliedly concedes that point, but attempts to distinguish Ingram: “[This] *529Court in Commonwealth v. Kulp, [supra], recently held that this demonstration is not required to be issued only from the Court. It was stated in that case at 344 A.2d 603 that ‘Commonwealth v. Ingram, supra, does not require the trial judge to explain the nature of the offenses charged to a defendant who already evidences such an understanding.’ . . .
“In this case, the [appellant] through his statements made to the Court, has shown an awareness of his acts which constituted the crimes for which he was charged, much like the defendant in Kulp, supra. Indeed on page 28 of the record, the [appellant] states that all of his problems ‘criminal wise’ were related to the use of drugs, and that if he were given some form of aid he would be able to stay out of trouble with the law. More importantly, the [appellant] during the colloquy, stated in response to a question posed by his defense counsel that he did understand the nature of the charges against him and that he nevertheless voluntarily entered his plea.”
First, appellant’s statement that his problems “criminal wise” were related to drugs is irrelevant to a showing that he knew the elements of the offense. Appellant’s extensive criminal record was fully explored during the Commonwealth’s examination of appellant; his criminal history included convictions for several narcotics offenses, burglary, larceny, and receiving stolen property, but did not include prior forgery charges. Thus, even if we were to give Kulp the broad reading urged by the Commonwealth, nothing in that criminal history could inferentially have instructed appellant on the elements of forgery or theft by deception. Second, appellant’s statement during the colloquy that he understood the nature of the charges is meaningless absent some showing that appellant was informed of the nature of the charges. Cf. Henderson v. Morgan, supra. The purpose of the Court’s holding in Ingram was to make meaningful the protection of Rule 319, that, in fact, an accused *530had available relevant information on the charges against him. Appellant could not meaningfully answer that he understood the nature of the charges unless he was first apprised of the elements of those offenses.
Therefore, I would reverse the judgment of sentence and remand the case for trial.

. As the lower court correctly points out in its opinion, we must treat appellant’s plea of “nolo contendere” in the same manner as we would treat a plea of guilty. Commonwealth v. Warner, 228 Pa.Super. 31, 324 A.2d 362 (1974).

. This Court recently decided a similar issue in Commonwealth v. Kulp, 235 Pa.Super. 397, 344 A.2d 602 (1975). Normally, I would merely dissent on the basis of my dissent in Kulp. As will be obvious from the discussion, infra, I believe that, even based on the standard set forth by the Majority in Kulp, appellant is entitled to a reversal.