Court Opinion

ID: 9842882
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:20:34.75269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:03.636901
License: Public Domain

ALDRICH, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I am in full accord with the opinion of the court, but cannot resist commenting upon the pretrial practice, or rather, lack of it, that in all probability produced the situation requiring a new trial, and in any event set the stage for much of this appeal. This case was tried by a district judge from outside of the district. I do not know the reason, but presumably it was not unconnected with the fact that the case was advertised as one that would take six or more weeks to try. It was obviously a complicated and sizable matter. As the court points out, the complaint was 21 pages long, and not a model of clarity. Extensive depositions had been taken by the parties and a thousand exhibits had been obtained. Trial briefs had been filed. Yet we find that no pretrial proceedings had been conducted, and that the trial court’s familiarity with the case apparently began with an examination of the papers the night before trial. When plaintiffs’ counsel began his opening the court proceeded to examine him at length in attempting to shorten the issues, as well as rule on general questions of law. Whether a particular judge wishes to prepare himself in advance must be entirely up to him as an individual, difficult as this may be for the parties in some instances, who may feel that further preparation might have resulted in greater understanding. But when the court states, as here, that a colloquy between court and counsel during the opening constitutes a pretrial under Rule 16, I think that this is both an improper interpretation of the rule, and an excessive burden upon counsel. If the court wished to shorten the case, earlier consideration might have avoided many difficulties. Certainly this seems a classic case for an advance pretrial.
In this particular ease counsel, either from politeness, fear of offending the court, or some other reason acquiesced in the court’s elimination or reduction of what he now claims were issues. In view of that acquiescence, the question is closed. Consequently, what I am stating is no longer relevant to this case, and I have not asked my brethren to include it in the opinion. *41nial of injunctions prayed for, but such denial presented only question of discretion and record contained no suggestion of abuse of such discretion, Court of Appeals would treat appellees’ motions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction as, alternatively, motions to dismiss appeal or affirm for want of substantial question, and as such would grant motions. Sherman Anti-Trust Act, §§ 1, 2, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2; Clayton Act, § 2(a) as amended 15 U.S.C.A. § 13(a); 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1291, 1292(a) (1), (b); Fed.Rules Civ. Proc. rule 54(b), 28 U.S.C.A.