Court Opinion

ID: 9630803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:21:00.10112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:43.873794
License: Public Domain

OP ALA Justice,
with whom SIMMS, Justice, joins, dissenting.
Today’s opinion holds that the provisions of 12 O.S.1991 § 100,1 the so-called “saving statute”, will protect from destruction by lapse of time claims under the Government Tort Claims Act [GTCA].2 Because I view § 157(B)3 not as a true statute of limitations *1006but rather as a condition upon the exercise of a newly-created right — the common law’s ius maius 4 — I cannot accede to today’s pronouncement.
The court’s analysis is likely to affect adversely the symmetry and stability of our public tort system by bringing about at least two harmful consequences: (1) it will expose the provisions of § 157(B) to a serious cloud of infirmity as a “special law” constitutionally condemned by Okl. Const. ART. 5, § 465 and (2) claims arising from out-of-state torts pressed in foreign fora against Oklahoma’s governmental entities will doubtless be treated as subject to longer and more expansive sister-state limitations. The latter result clearly is repugnant to the now-prevailing national choice-of-law rules.
I
THE ANATOMY OF LITIGATION
Harry and Maude Cruse [the Cruses] timely notified6 the Atoka County clerk [the County] of their claim for bodily injury and property damage arising out of a single-automobile accident on a washed-out county road. That claim, which was not met with a favorable response within the statutory time of ninety (90) days, is hence to be deemed legally denied.7 The Cruses brought a district court action against the County within the GTCA’s 180-day period. They then voluntarily dismissed the suit without prejudice 8 and later refiled it more than 180 days after the effective date of the claim’s denial. The trial court dismissed the second action because it was not commenced within the statutory interval of 180 days.
The Court of Appeals affirmed this nisi prius order. We granted certiorari and today declare the provisions of 12 O.S.1991 § 100 effective to rescue the dead right of the Cruses from the 51 O.S.1991 § 157(B) time bar.
II
THE TIME LIMIT IN WHICH A GTCA CLAIM MAY BE BROUGHT OR MUST BE AFTERWARD FOREVER LOST MUST BE TREATED AS SUBSTANTIVE IN CHARACTER AND AS A CONDITION UPON THE EXERCISE OF A RIGHT RATHER THAN A TRUE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The common law is the only legal system in the world having a right/remedy dichotomy. While a right can never die,9 limitations of time merely bar the demandant’s remedy.,10 A lost remedy may be revived by an *1007obligor’s renewed promise or payment upon the extinguished obligation; when so revitalized, it will rejoin the onee-detaehed but still viable right to become actionable once again. As Justice Jackson so aptly explained in Chase Securities Corporation v. Donaldson 11:
“Statutes of limitations always have vexed the philosophical mind for it is difficult to fit them into a completely logical and symmetrical system of law. There has been controversy as to their effect. Some are of the opinion that like the analogous civil law doctrine of prescription limitations statutes should be viewed as extinguishing the claim and destroying the right itself. Admittedly it is troublesome to sustain as a ‘right’ a claim that can find no remedy for its invasion. On the other hand, some common-law courts have regarded true statutes of limitation as doing no more than to cut off resort to the courts for enforcement of a claim. We do not need to settle these arguments.” (Emphasis mine.) (Footnotes omitted.)
The right/remedy dichotomy of the English common law survives today in the form of two conceptually distinct time bars — (1) an “ordinary” or “true” statute of limitations that regulates the time to bring an action and (2) a time limit that conditions the exercise of a right and is hence to be treated as a substantive-law element of the claim. When the statute of limitations expires, merely the remedy is extinguished; when a substantive-law time bar lapses, the right dies. A dead right can never be revived. This ancient verity finds repeated expressions in our extant jurisprudence.12 The common-law “right” is to be distinguished from the term “right of action”. The latter phrase — which identifies a concept borrowed from the New York Field Code — is found in our state constitution 13 and means the right effectively to pursue an available remedy,14 not the common law’s concept of an immortal right — ius maius.
Whether the § 157(B) time period in which a public-tort claim may be commenced represents a limit on the exercise of a right or an ordinary limitation (to bring an action) is a question of legislative intent.15 The terms of § 157(B) plainly evince concern for expediency in prosecuting all GTCA claims. That section’s language spells out that no tort claim shall be maintained beyond the 180-day period. In short, the § 157(B) time interval is not intended to be merely remedial. It is a condition on the exercise of a right and cannot hence be extended by the one-year saving statute. Nothing can ever revive a right that has died.16 In contrast to the terms of § 157(B), certain provisions of 12 O.S.1991 § 9517 — the true statute of limita*1008tions applicable to negligence actions (and keenly ignored by today’s opinion) — do not presume to limit judicial cognizance of a tardy claim. They allow a negligence action to be brought within a specific time but not afterward. While the § 100 saving statute18 may be invoked to extend the time for the pursuit of a private tort remedy, it can never avail to resurrect a lost right to press a public tort.
Ill
TODAY’S OPINION, WHEN MEASURED BY NATIONAL STANDARDS, REPRESENTS ABERRATIONAL JURISPRUDENCE FOR PUBLIC TORT LAW
This court has previously committed itself to not treating the § 157(B) time limit as an ordinary statute of limitations. Extant jurisprudence — Johns v. Wynnewood School Bd. of Educ.19 — rests on the principle that because the GTCA crafts a right unknown at common law, its time bar for pressing a claim constitutes a substantive-law condition on the exercise of that right.20 The GTCA’s time limit controls over general statutory law.21 Other states similarly consider public-tort limits to be substantive-law preconditions to suing the government, not statutes of limitations,22 Federal jurisprudence does not treat the time limit for pressing torts against the United States government as an “ordinary limitation”.23 In a case from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, the Oklahoma “saving statute” was explicitly held unavailable as a device for extending the time to file a federal-tort claim.24 Today’s pronouncement rejects the teachings of Johns and its progeny. It sets us adrift on an uncharted sea away from the national mainstream.
IV
THE COURT CONSTRUES § 157(B) IN A MANNER THAT MAKES ITS PROVISIONS AND THOSE OF § 156(B) 25 VIOLATIVE OF OUR FUNDAMENTAL LAW
Since today’s opinion declares the § 157(B) bar to be a true statute of limitations extendible by a timely § 100 refiling, it implicitly characterizes that time-limit provision as purely procedural and indistinguishable from that which applies to private torts. “Special” limitations for actions that fall within the same class run directly afoul of Okl.Const. Art. 5, § 46.26 Section 46 mandates a procedural uniformity for an entire class of similarly situated persons or things.27 Legislative enactments must be construed, if possible, to give them constitu*1009tional validity.28 If the § 157(B) time limit is merely a procedural statute of limitations, the regime for vindication of government torts must be identical to that prescribed for private wrongs; and government tortfeasors cannot hence be singled out for the benefit of a “special” pre-suit notice and of its negative limitations period during which no litigation may be brought.29 Because neither of these provisions applies to private tortfeasors, it could not be extended to govern public actors.30 In short, only if we recognize government torts as a class sui generis, can we justify applying to them the pre-suit notice and negative statute of limitations provisions embodied in the GTCA. Where there are two possible meanings of a statute — only one of which would render its text unconstitutional — the court should adopt the construction that would uphold the enactment.31 Today’s pronouncement that the terms of § 157(B) — which apply only to claims against public actors — create a true statute of limitations (and are hence purely procedural) casts a cloud on the constitutional validity of that section when its provisions are measured by the standards of Okl. Const. Art. 5, § 46.32 My own view — that the § 157(B) text establishes a substantive-law condition upon the new right to sue the sovereign — would place the 180-day time limit beyond the prohibitory reach of § 46.
V
THE COURT’S CONCLUSION WILL SUBJECT OKLAHOMA GOVERNMENTAL ENTITIES TO FOREIGN STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
According to nationally accepted choice-of-law norms, a forum will apply its own statute of limitations to an action grounded in foreign law33 unless the foreign limitation bars the right and not merely the remedy.34 In the latter event the substantive law of the other state would govern. Legislative limits *1010on time to bring an action against a government tortfeasor generally fall into this latter category. They constitute a substantive-law component of the cause of action, thus making forum law (lex fori) inapplicable. The court today not only invites sister states to apply their longer limitations to claims against Oklahoma governmental entities but also abdicates our law’s control over the maximum time for filing these claims. The course it takes is clearly contrary to the extant national jurisprudence. The latter strongly counsels against treating substantive time limits as true statutes of limitations.35
YI
THE GTCA DOES NOT CREATE A “STATUTORY TORT”
At common law a tort is a civil wrong.36 A “statutory tort” creates a legislatively-crafted duty, unknown to the common law, and authorizes a recovery for its breach.37 The legislature may explicitly define a new actionable wrong,38 or a court may divine its availability from a regulatory scheme if (1) a redress-seeking party belongs to a class— narrower than the public at large — for whose special benefit the new tort was devised, (2) the statutory scheme indicates the law-making body’s intent to create rather than to deny a private right of action and (3) the new claim’s private nature does not render it inconsistent with the statute’s underlying purpose.39
The GTCA fashions no new actionable civil wrong that is alien to the common-law catalogue of delicts. Neither does it craft a regulatory scheme which implicitly creates a new right of delictual action. By the GTCA’s explicit terms, private tort law is neither expanded nor constricted,40 The Act recognizes government tort accountability, which, where present, is to be coextensive with that of private wrongdoers41 and establishes a sui generis 42 rubric of tort liability for government actors.43 It does not introduce a new *1011civil -wrong but rather a new class of tortfea-sors. In short, the GTCA cannot be analogized to a statutory tort.
The provisions of § 100 have been widely construed as purely remedial. Much like the statutory limitations intended for them to affect, they operate solely on the remedy and keep it from being extinguished. Nowhere in the Anglo-American world of law, in which similar enactments are common, is there a body of recognized authority that would give a statute, like ours, the capacity to resurrect a dead right.44
YII
SUMMARY
Today’s opinion erroneously treats the § 157(B) time limit as extendible by the terms of Oklahoma’s “saving statute”, 12 O.S. 1991 § 100. It erases from the living memory of the law and withholds from obedience nearly nine decades of this state’s consistent jurisprudence.45
I view § 157(B) as a condition upon the exercise of the right to sue the government in tort. Its time bar’s expiration deals death not to the legislative remedy but to the right itself. A plaintiffs right to a vindicated government wrong — his (or her) legislatively-created ius maius — is not immortal. It dies with the lapse of the § 157(B) time limit. Nothing can thereafter revive it. My reasons for this conclusion are: (1) § 157(B)’s language clearly demonstrates a legislative intent to withhold judicial cognizance from all public-tort claims after the prescribed 180-day period had lapsed, (2) the court’s view exposes § 157(B) to the infirmity of a “special law” within the meaning of Okl. Const. Art. 5, § 46, and (3) today’s conelusion invites foreign tribunals to apply to public-tort claims pressed against Oklahoma governmental entities their own, much longer limitations.
I hence recede from today’s pronouncement and would affirm the trial court’s dismissal order or would deny certiorari to allow the Court of Appeals’ opinion to stand as the correct exposition of our law.

.The terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 100 provide in pertinent part:
"If any action is commenced within due time, and ... the plaintiff fail in such action other than upon the merits, the plaintiff ... may commence a new action within one (1) year after the ... failure although the time limit for commencing the action shall have expired before the new action is filed.”

. 51 O.S.1991 § 151 et seg.

. The terms of 51 O.S.1991 § 157(B) provide in pertinent part:
"No action for any cause arising under [the GTCA] shall be maintained unless valid notice has been given and the action is commenced within one hundred eighty (180) days after denial of the claim ” (Emphasis added.)

. For a definition of ius maius see infra note 9.

. See infra note 26 for the terms of Okl. Const. Art. 5, § 46.

. The terms of 51 O.S.1991 § 156 provide in pertinent part:
"A. Any person having a claim against the state or a political subdivision within the scope of [the GTCA] shall present a claim to the state or political subdivision for any appropriate relief including the award of money damages. B. Claims against the state or a political subdivision are to be presented within ninety (90) days of the date the loss occurs. * * * "

. The terms of 51 O.S.1991 § 157(A) provide in pertinent part:
"A claim is deemed denied if the state or political subdivision fails to approve the claim in its entirety within ninety (90) days....”

. The terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 683 provide in pertinent part:
“An action may be dismissed, without prejudice to a future action:
First, By the plaintiff, before the final submission of the case to the jury, or to the court, where the trial is by the court. * * * ”

. See Coke on Littleton, Institutes of the Law of England §§ 279 and 478 (1853). An aggrieved party at common law always retained a ius mai-us (a greater right), called in the Norman French mere dreit (droit majeur). 3 Holdsworth, A History of English Common Law 89 (1926). "An immortal right to bring an eternally prohibited action is a metaphysical subtlety” produced for the English common law by medieval jurists. Ames, Lectures on Legal History and Miscellaneous Legal Essays 199 (1913). Jus merum is the original Latin term by which the old English law referred to a "mere or bare right” which is without either possession or the right of possession. Pryse Monument Co. v. District Court, etc., Okl., 595 P.2d 435, 438 n. 14 (1979); Stolfa v. Gaines, 140 Okl. 292, 283 P. 563, 567-570 (1930). It is also used to describe a ius maius after its detachment from the remedy.

. See Wood, Limitations of Actions 18 (1882).

. 325 U.S. 304, 313, 65 S.Ct. 1137, 1142, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945).

. See Hiskett v. Wells, Okl., 351 P.2d 300 (1959) (the court’s syllabus ¶ 1), where the court says "A substantive statute of limitation is a condition or limitation on the right sought to be enforced, and is generally a part of the right of action created by the same statute, which generally creates a new liability, authorizes an action to enforce it, and limits the time within which [it may be brought].”; Matter of the Estate of Speake, Okl., 743 P.2d 648, 653 (1987); Trinity Broadcasting Corp. v. Leeco Oil Co., Okl., 692 P.2d 1364, 1367 (1984); Phillips Petroleum Company v. United States Fidel. & G. Co., Okl., 442 P.2d 303, 305 (1968); Saak v. Hicks, Okl., 321 P.2d 425, 429 (1958); Pinson v. Robertson, 197 Okl. 419, 172 P.2d 625, 627 (1946). See also Whitley v. Oologah S.D. 1-4 of Rogers County, Okl., 741 P.2d 455, 457-459 (1987) (Opala, J., concurring), where the author explained the difference between (1) the GTCA’s 90-day pre-suit notice provision and (2) its 180-day claim-commencement time bar.

. Okl. Const. Art. 23, § 7; Williams, The Constitution of Oklahoma 300-301 (1941). See also in this connection N.Y. Const. Art. 1, § 16.

. Roberts v. Merrill, Okl., 386 P.2d 780, 785-786 (1963).

. Speake, supra note 12 at 653; State ex rel. Cent. State Griffin Mem. Hosp. v. Reed, Okl., 493 P.2d 815, 817-818 (1972).

. See Marian P. Opala, Praescriptio Temporis and Its Relation to Prescriptive Easements in the Anglo-American Law, 7 Tulsa L.J. 107, 108-109 (1971).

. The terms of 12 O.S.1991 § 95 provide in pertinent part;
"Civil actions other than for the recovery of real property can only be brought within the following periods, after the cause of action shall have accrued, and not afterwards:
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Third. Within two (2) years: An action ... for injury to the rights of another....” (Emphasis added.)
*1008See Hester v. Purex Corporation, Ltd.., Okl., 534 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1975).

. 12 O.S.1991 § 100, supra note 1.

. Okl., 656 P.2d 248 (1982).

. Johns, supra note 19 at 249.

. Fuller v. Odom, Okl., 741 P.2d 449, 451 (1987); Hamilton v. Vaden, Okl., 721 P.2d 412, 419 (1986); Conway v. Ohio Casualty Ins. Co., Okl., 669 P.2d 766, 768 (1983); Graves v. Rose, Okl., 663 P.2d 733, 735 (1983); Johns, supra note 19 at 249; McCracken v. City of Lawton, Okl., 648 P.2d 18, 20 (1982).

. City of Ft. Wayne v. Cameron, 267 Ind. 329, 370 N.E.2d 338, 340 (1977); City of Birmingham v. Weston, 233 Ala. 563, 172 So. 643, 645 (1937); Peoples v. City of Valparaiso, 178 Ind. 673, 100 N.E. 70, 71 (1912) (overruled on other grounds, Aaron v. Tipton, 218 Ind. 227, 32 N.E.2d 88, 90 (1941)).

. Benge v. U.S., 17 F.3d 1286, 1288 (10th Cir.1994); Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 274 (10th Cir.1991).

. Benge, supra note 23 at 1288.

. For the provisions of 51 O.S.1991 § 156(B), see supra note 6.

. The terms of Okl. Const. Art. 5, § 46. provide in pertinent part:
“The legislature shall not, except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, pass any local or special laws authorizing:
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For limitation of civil or criminal actions; * ⅜ * " (Emphasis added.)
City of Tulsa v. Macura, 186 Okl. 674, 100 P.2d 269, 270 (1940) (the court’s syllabus ¶ 2).

. Reynolds v. Porter, Okl., 760 P.2d 816, 823 (1988).

. It is a principle of our constitutional law that every statute is to be treated as valid until its nonconformity to fundamental law is clearly shown. Black v. Ball Janitorial Service, Inc., Okl., 730 P.2d 510, 512 (1986); Public Service Company of Oklahoma v. State, Okl., 645 P.2d 465, 466 (1982); Oklahoma Gas & Electric Company v. Corporation Commission, Okl., 543 P.2d 546, 551 (1975); McCrady v. Western Farmers Electric Cooperative, Okl., 323 P.2d 356, 361 (1958).

. These special provisions are found in 51 O.S. 1991 § 156, supra note 6.

. Reynolds, supra note 27 at 823; Macura, supra note 26, 100 P.2d at 270.

. State v. Oklahoma State Board for Property, Okl., 731 P.2d 394, 398-99 (1986) (the reviewing court is bound to accept an interpretation that avoids constitutional doubt); see also Gilbert Central Corporation v. State, Okl., 716 P.2d 654, 658 (1986); Ricks Exploration v. Oklahoma Water Resources Board, Okl., 695 P.2d 498, 504 (1984); Oklahoma State Election Board v. Coats, Okl., 610 P.2d 776, 780 (1980).

. Today’s characterization of the public-tort time bar regime as indistinguishable from that applicable to private torts casts a heavy cloud on the validity of the GTCA’s notice provisions, 51 O.S.1991 § 156(B), supra note 6. Pre-suit notice requirements for less than an entire litigation class are condemned as “special” laws offensive to Okl Const Art. 5, § 46. See Macura, supra note 26, 100 P.2d at 270.

. Restatement (Second) Op Conflict Of Laws, § 142 (1971 version) provides:
"(1) An action will not be maintained if it is barred by the statute of limitations of the forum, including a provision borrowing the statute of limitations of another state.
(2) An action will be maintained if it is not barred by the statute of limitations of the forum, even though it would be barred by the statute of limitations of another state...." (Emphasis added.)

. Restatement (Second) Op Conflict Of Laws, § 143 (1971 version) provides:
“An action will not be entertained in another state if it is barred in the state of the otherwise applicable law by a statute of limitations which bars the right and not merely the remedy.” (Emphasis added.)
Stephens v. Household Finance Carp., Okl., 566 P.2d 1163, 1165 (1977); Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., 220 F.2d 152, 156 (2d Cir.1955). See also Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 453-454, 24 S.Ct. 692, 693, 48 L.Ed. 1067 (1904). It is, of course, for the forum to determine how the foreign court would characterize its own limitation. Earnhardt v. Shattuck, 232 F.Supp. 845, 847 (D.Vt.1964). "The major problem with this inquiry lies in the fact that the foreign characterization may not have been made for conflicts purposes." (Emphasis added.) Eugene F. Scoles and Peter Hay, Conflict of Laws § 3.10 n. 6 (1982).

. Restatement. § 143, supra note 34. The 1988 revision of Restatement, § 142, supra note 33, and deletion of § 143 abandons the substantive/procedural dichotomy in favor of choosing the statute of limitations of the state having the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties; i.e., always treating statutes of limitation as substantive. This new approach is derived from a single case—Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N.J. 130, 305 A.2d 412, 418 (1973).

. A tort is "[a] civil wrong for which the remedy is a common law action for unliquidated damages, which is not exclusively the breach of a contract or the breach of a trust or other merely equitable obligation.” (Emphasis added.) Salmond, Law of Torts 13 (10th ed. 1945).

. Bellikka v. Green, 306 Or. 630, 762 P.2d 997, 1001 (1988).

. Loyal Order of Moose, Lodge 1785 v. Cavaness, Okl., 563 P.2d 143, 146 (1977). Examples of legislatively-crafted torts are afforded by 85 O.S. 1991 § 5 (prohibiting the discharge of an employee in retaliation for bringing a workers’ compensation claim) and 18 O.S.1991 § 1053(A) (establishing liability of corporate directors for willful or negligent mispayment of dividends). See Gunn v. Consolidated Rural Water & Sewer, Okl., 839 P.2d 1345, 1346 (1992); Gay v. Akin, Okl., 766 P.2d 985, 991 (1988); Pierce v. Franklin Elec. Co., Okl., 737 P.2d 921, 923 (1987).

. Walter v. Chouteau Lime Co., Inc., Okl., 849 P.2d 1085, 1086 (1993); Holbert v. Echeverria, Okl., 744 P.2d 960, 963 (1987).

. Hughey v. Grand River Dam Authority, Okl., 897 P.2d 1138, 1141 (1995).

. The terms of 51 O.S.1991 § 153(A) provide in pertinent part:
“The state ... shall be liable for loss resulting from its torts ... subject to the limitations and exceptions specified in this act and only where the state, ... if a private person or entity, would be liable for money damages under the laws of this state.... ” (Emphasis added.)

. A sui generis category is said to be that which is “the only one of its kind or class ". See Black’s Law Dictionary 1434 (6th ed.1990).

. The GTCA represents a legislative response to our abrogation of sovereign immunity in Vanderpool v. State, Okl., 672 P.2d 1153, 1156-1157 (1983). The act is both an adoption of and a conditional waiver of the sovereign immunity doctrine. The terms of 51 O.S.1991 § 152.1 provide in pertinent part:
"A. The State of Oklahoma does hereby adopt the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The state ... whether performing governmental or proprietary functions shall be immune from liability for torts.
B. The state, only to the extent and in the manner provided in this act waives its immunity....” (Emphasis added.)
The terms of 51 O.S.1991 § 153(A) provide in pertinent part:
"The state ... shall be liable for loss resulting from its torts ... subject to the limitations and *1011exceptions specified in this act and only where the state, ... if a private person or entity, would be liable for money damages under the laws of this state_” (Emphasis added.)

. For the historical antecedents of 12 O.S.1991 § 100, see Speake, supra note 12 at 650 n. 2, where the court refers to Justice Cardozo’s opinion in Gaines v. City of New York, 215 N.Y. 533, 109 N.E. 594, 595-596 (1915). There, Justice Cardozo traces the evolution of “saving statutes” from the English Limitation Act of 1623 (21 Jac. I, c. 16, § 4).

. Speake, supra note 12 at 653; Trinity Broadcasting, supra note 12 at 1367; Johns, supra note 19 at 249; Phillips Petroleum, supra note 12 at 305; Hiskett, supra note 12 at 300; Saak, supra note 12 at 429; Pinson, supra note 12, 172 P.2d at 627. See also in this connection Rock Island Coal Mining Co. v. Allen, 106 Okl. 188, 233 P. 1060, 1063-1064 (1924); Amsden v. Johnson, 74 Okl. 295, 158 P. 1148, 1150 (1916).