Court Opinion

ID: 9635653
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:58:21.657805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:18.812813
License: Public Domain

CASTILLE, Justice,
Concurring.
I agree that appellant is not entitled to PCRA relief and I am generally in agreement with the lead opinion’s analysis of the claims presented. I write separately, however, to address further my views concerning the essential substantive difference between waived claims and waived claims recast as ineffectiveness claims under the PCRA, as well as the constitutional nature and contours of ineffectiveness claims.
As the lead opinion correctly notes, the first nineteen of appellant’s claims are, for the most part, briefed as allegations of error in the guilt and penalty phases of trial, accompanied by a boilerplate assertion that prior counsel was ineffective for failing to “properly preserve, raise and litigate this claim.” 1 *260But for the ineffectiveness tag-line, the arguments are presented in such a manner as if this were a direct appeal involving claims of trial court error, rather than the PCRA appeal that it is. As the lead opinion also notes, appellant justifies the manner in which she presents her claims by-asserting in her Statement of the Scope and Standard of Review that the addition of an ineffectiveness label placed upon claims argued as trial court error renders the claims immune from the waiver provisions of the PCRA.
These claims are not reviewable as claims of trial court error because those versions of the claims could have been raised at trial and on direct appeal, but were not; thus, the claims are waived under the explicit terms of the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9543(a)(3), 9544a(b). Moreover, as we have made clear, our practice of relaxing our own rules of waiver in direct capital appeals cannot act to excuse waivers that arise from the terms of the PCRA. E.g., Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 554 Pa. 31, 720 A.2d 693, 700 (1998). A contrary practice, in addition to destroying any prospect of finality in criminal cases, would run “afoul of the very terms of the [PCRA,] which excludes waived issues from the class of cognizable PCRA claims.” Id. at 700. Moreover, “[t]he legislature has clearly directed that the PCRA provide[s] the sole means for obtaining collateral review and relief, encompassing all other common law rights and remedies, .including habeas corpus.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 557 Pa. 358, 733 A.2d 1242, 1250-51 (1999) (PCRA subsumes remedy of habeas corpus with respect to remedies offered under PCRA). See also Commonwealth v. Hall, 565 Pa. 92, 771 A.2d 1232, 1235 (2001) (“By its own language, and by judicial decisions interpreting such language, *261the PCRA provides the sole means for obtaining state collateral relief’); Commonwealth v. Peterkin, 554 Pa. 547, 722 A.2d 688, 640 (1998) (same). Accordingly, constitutional claims, which might otherwise be cognizable under the PCRA, are simply unavailable if they are waived. Thus, contrary to appellant’s apparent misunderstanding, her boilerplate allegations of ineffectiveness of trial counsel do not “revive” her waived claims of trial error, nor do they “excuse” her waiver of those, claims.
The significance of appellant’s allegations of ineffectiveness is that those are stand-alone, substantive, constitutional claims, which decidedly are cognizable under the PCRA, because the PCRA explicitly states that they are. 42 Pa,C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(ii). Although often “derivative” from waived claims of trial error, Commonwealth v. Williams, 782 A.2d 517, 526 n. 5 (Pa.2001), claims of counsel ineffectiveness are nevertheless analytically and constitutionally distinct from the underlying claims to which they relate. They are assessed under the U.S. Supreme Court’s settled construct as outlined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) and its progeny.2 Moreover, appellant’s ineffectiveness claims are not waived under the PCRA because, appellant having been represented by the same counsel on direct appeal as at trial, this PCRA proceeding is deemed to represent appellant’s first opportunity to raise claims respecting the stewardship of trial/direct appeal counsel. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b) (issue is waived under PCRA only if petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so before trial, at trial, on appeal, or in prior state postconviction proceeding).3
*262Ineffectiveness claims, of course, have become the lifeblood of the PCRA. PCRA petitioners routinely take waived claims of trial error and raise them under the rubric of ineffectiveness, alleging however many “layers” of ineffectiveness as are necessary to obtain review. But, as I have recently stressed at length elsewhere, it is absolutely essential to recognize that ineffectiveness claims are not the same as the waived underlying claims from which they often derive. See generally Williams, 782 A.2d at 534-536 (discussing distinct nature of claims of ineffective assistance).
Turning to the merits of appellant’s ineffectiveness claims, it should be emphasized that, while this Court has shown a degree of latitude in its construction of our appellate rules and has, accordingly, deemed boilerplate allegations of ineffectiveness to be sufficient for the claim to survive outright dismissal as waived, we have not purported to relax (nor are we empowered to relax) the substantive standard that governs merits review of Sixth Amendment claims of counsel ineffectiveness. Williams, 782 A.2d at 526 n. 5 (“we make no suggestion here that there should be a relaxation of the substantive Sixth Amendment standard”); see also id. at 527 (Zappala, J., concurring) (Marrero merely expressed view that boilerplate assertion of ineffectiveness is sufficient to overcome waiver, but did not set forth how such claims should be' developed); id. at 530 (Castille, J., concurring) (noting distinction between waiver under PCRA and waiver as question of appellate jurisprudence, and noting separate *263question of substantive standards for analyzing claims of ineffective assistance). As the lead opinion correctly notes, appellant’s cognizable ineffectiveness claims are subject to specific requirements under the PCRA and under the settled Sixth Amendment test for ineffectiveness. Mere boilerplate assertions, such as those made by appellant here, are inadequate to prove the effective denial of the right to counsel necessary to warrant PCRA relief.
This is as true under the constitutional standard as under the requirements of the PCRA. The PCRA provisions regarding ineffectiveness require no more than that which a constitutional ineffectiveness analysis has always required, regardless of whether the claim is posed under the PCRA or at an earlier appropriate stage of the litigation, e.g., where new counsel enters an appearance on direct appeal. Counsel is always presumed effective; the unshifting burden to prove ineffectiveness always rests upon the defendant; and the defendant must always plead and prove both that counsel’s performance was deficient (the arguable merit and lack of reasonable basis prongs of our test), and that actual prejudice resulted from the deficient performance. Boilerplate allegations have never been sufficient to discharge this affirmative burden to rebut the presumption of effectiveness. Commonwealth v. Pettus, 492 Pa. 558, 424 A.2d 1332, 1335 (1981) (court will not consider boilerplate claims of ineffective assistance). See also Commonwealth v. Morris, 546 Pa. 296, 684 A.2d 1037, 1045 (1996) (speculative claim of ineffectiveness summarily rejected; ineffectiveness claims cannot be raised in vacuum) (citing cases); Commonwealth v. Hutchinson, 521 Pa. 482, 556 A.2d 370, 372 (1989) (defendant bears burden of proving allegations of ineffective assistance by submission of relevant proofs); Commonwealth v. Hentosh, 520 Pa. 325, 554 A.2d 20, 24 (1989) (same). Accord Commonwealth v. Ragan, 538 Pa. 2, 645 A.2d 811, 829 (1994) (boilerplate allegation is no basis for relief in capital PCRA appeal).
Similarly, the PCRA’s requirements that ineffectiveness claims be considered “in the circumstances of the case,” and that the petitioner show that counsel’s deficient performance *264resulted in an unreliable adjudication of guilt or innocence, simply mirror the constitutional ineffectiveness analysis under Strickland’s prejudice requirement. See Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 558 Pa. 214, 736 A.2d 564, 570 & n. 6 (1999); Commonwealth v. Kimball, 555 Pa. 299, 724 A.2d 326, 333 (1999). The Strickland Court noted that, in determining prejudice, the court “must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury.” 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Indeed, as the Federal Circuit Courts have recognized, it is impossible to determine Strickland prejudice without considering the circumstances of, the trial. See Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163, 172 (3d Cir.1999) (since Strickland’s prejudice prong requires court to determine whether there is reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, result of trial would have been different, court simply cannot make prejudice determination “without considering the strength of the evidence against the accused;” furthermore, “every other circuit has also recognized that, in analyzing Strickland’s prejudice prong, a court must consider the magnitude of the evidence against the defendant”). Strickland also specifically defined prejudice in terms of the reliability of the verdict. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (prejudice prong “requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable”). See also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. at 390-91, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (same). Obviously, in drafting the PCRA, the General Assembly was aware of what was required to prove ineffectiveness under the Sixth Amendment. The PCRA largely mirrors the constitutional framework.
In short, the standards governing review of ineffectiveness claims, including the pleading and proof requirements, are familiar and well-settled. Consistent with both the terms of the PCRA and settled constitutional authority, the lead opinion has' properly held that appellant’s boilerplate assertions of ineffectiveness do not entitle her to relief under the PCRA.
The lead opinion concludes with dicta stating that this Court “will no longer address the merits of claims which do not comply with the requirements of the PCRA.” But, as I under*265stand the lead opinion, including its distinction of Marrero, it has addressed the merits of appellant’s claims here, concluding that appellant’s failure to address necessary elements of the governing requirements of the PCRA and the constitutional ineffectiveness standard requires their rejection. Moreover, although I still agree with Justice Nigro’s position as stated in his concurrence in Marrero, which I joined, I accept the force of stare decisis. As I understand the majority opinion in Marrero, which the author of the present majority opinion joined, and this Court’s more recent dicta interpreting Marrero in Williams, we must continue to entertain the merits of these boilerplate claims, notwithstanding that the deficiencies in their presentation inevitably will prove fatal.
I would simply add that, like any legal claim, an ineffectiveness claim may fail on the merits for a number of independently valid reasons. So long as there is no jurisdictional question (i.e., the PCRA petition was timely filed), a court rejecting a particular PCRA claim is not required to prefer one proper ground of disposition over another. In Marrero, this Court rejected layered, boilerplate claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness because it deemed the underlying claims of counsel ineffectiveness to be meritless, rather than focusing on the failure of the appellant to address other, equally necessary elements of the ineffectiveness standards. I view the Marrero disposition as an available and appropriate, but not a required and exclusive, approach to the merits of a reviewable ineffectiveness claim. This is so because both the U.S. Supreme Court and this Court have made clear that a court is not required to analyze the elements of an ineffectiveness claim in any particular order of priority; instead, if a claim fails under any necessary element of the Strickland test, the court may proceed to that element first. See Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 286 n. 14, 120 S.Ct. 746, 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000), citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052; Albrecht, 720 A.2d at 701.
The more difficult question is what sort of a message this Court sends to PCRA petitioners and practitioners by choosing, or preferring, one available method of disposition over *266another. Appellant’s arguments in this case, like the non-argument forwarded in Marrero, at best may be construed as attempting to establish the arguable merit of her underlying waived claims while she then simply assumes that the failure to pursue such claims renders counsel per se ineffective. This per se approach to ineffectiveness fails to establish either the performance prong (i.e., lack of reasonable basis) or the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. Accordingly, the claims must, inevitably, fail. The advantage of discussing the fatal deficiency in such an argument on the merits is that it reinforces for PCRA petitioners and practitioners alike the necessity that they address all necessary substantive elements of a claim in order to actually obtain relief on it, as opposed to the decidedly Pyrrhic victory that will result when a claim is undeveloped and survives waiver only as a matter of this Court’s grace. At least in cases where the substantive deficiency in the argument is pervasive, as in this case, I think we better serve by focusing on those substantive deficiencies, as the majority has done here.

. The only exception to this manner of presentation is Claim number X, alleging that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate and present mitigation evidence at the penalty phase. Unlike the other claims, this claim focuses on perceived inadequacies of counsel. Nevertheless, as the lead opinion recognizes, the claim still fails on the merits, since appellant summarily dismisses the actual case in mitigation presented by counsel, which portrayed appellant in a positive light, and instead faults counsel lor failing to present a different and contradictory case in mitigation, which would have portrayed her in a negative light. Such hindsight analysis does not prove ineffectiveness. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hardcastle, 549 Pa. 450, 701 A.2d 541, 546 (1997) (where complaint is not that counsel failed to investigate and present, mitigation evidence, but that he should have presented different case in mitigation, based in part upon evidence contradictory to that presented, counsel's strategy plainly was reasonable). Contrast Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 395, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000) (upholding state trial court’s determination that capital trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct investigation into defendant’s background, "no1 because of any strategic calculation but because [counsell incorrectly thought that state law barred access to such *260records”). The claim also fails because appellant states only that counsel "knew or should have known” of the alleged additional mitigation evidence subsequent counsel has discovered. Such a speculative allegation, unaccompanied by so much as an affidavit from trial counsel as to what investigation trial counsel actually undertook, and what he discovered, does not raise a colorable claim of ineffectiveness. Nor does the claim warrant an evidentiary hearing. See Commonwealth v. Scott, 561 Pa. 617, 752 A.2d 871, 877 n. 8 (2000) ("An evidentiary hearing ... is not meant to function as a fishing expedition for any possible evidence that may support some speculative claim of ineffectiveness").

. In Commonwealth v. Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973 (1987), this Court recognized that Strickland's two-part performance and prejudice test was the same test for ineffectiveness as under our Constitution. We have come to characterize the test as a tripartite one, by dividing the performance element into two distinct parts, i.e., arguable merit and lack of reasonable basis.

. A separate question, of course, is whether appellant's boilerplate ineffectiveness claims should be deemed waived under this Court's Rules of Appellate Procedure and principles of appellale jurisprudence concerning what is necessary to adequately present a claim for review. As I understand the lead opinion, it does not deem appellant’s inelfec-*262liveness claims to be waived, notwithstanding that they are stated in boilerplate fashion, but instead treats the failure to develop relevant arguments as a failure on the merits of tire claims. As the lead opinion notes, see op. at 933 n. 8, this approach is consistent with this Court's holding in Commonwealth v. Marrero, 561 Pa. 100, 748 A.2d 202 (2000). It is also consistent with the more recent, prevailing dicta in Commonwealth v. Williams, 782 A.2d 517, 525-526 (Pa.2001). But see id. at 530 (Castille, J., concurring) (constitutional claims that are undeveloped in briefs should be deemed waived); id. at 537 (Nigro, J., concurring) (ineffectiveness claim should be deemed waived unless each prong of test is discussed in argument section of brief); Marrero, 748 A.2d at 204-05 (Nigro, joined by Castille and Newman, JJ., concurring) (layered claims of appellate counsel ineffectiveness that were supported by no argument in brief should be deemed waived).