Court Opinion

ID: 9442364
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:45:18.055179+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:04.657216
License: Public Domain

HALL, District Judge.
I concur in the result.
The record in this case presents a very narrow question for decision on appeal.
The original interpleader required judicial determination only as to whether Hagan or Central Avenue Dairy was entitled to the sum of $1,750.00 deposited with the Title Company in escrow. The only terms, of the escrow instructions disclosed in the record concerning $1,750.00 were that it was to be disbursed upon instructions “from both Evert Hagan and Central Avenue Dairy, Inc., or from a court of competent jurisdiction.” The other terms of the escrow were all alleged to have been complied with. But such instructions for the disbursement of the $1,750.00 were not received by the escrow holder, although both Hagan and the Central Dairy had laid claim to it by demands upon the escrow holder. After the original interpleader suit was filed, and process therein issued and served upon both Hagan and Central Dairy, Hagan came into Court and claimed the $1,750.00. Central Dairy did not. It defaulted. On that record, the money was ordered paid to Hagan. There was nothing that called for judicial determination as to whether or not the Central Dairy was entitled to $1,750.00, or any of it.
Thus, the only question for determination on this appeal was whether or not Hagan could file a cross-claim against the defaulting non-resident Central Dairy on matters which were not before the court concerning the $1,750.00: there was no issue before the District Court concerning any benefits or obligations 1 arising out of the instrument providing for the payment *505of the money (the escrow instructions), nor any of the transactions or occurrences which gave rise to the escrow.2 On such record it is clear that process issued by the District Court of Southern California could not obtain jurisdiction over the defaulting non-resident Central Dairy on the cross-claim of Hagan for a personal money judgment for damages. Any statements beyond that in the opinion as to the jurisdiction of the United States District Court under the Interpleader Statute, or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not necessary to the decision, and can only give rise to confusion. The Inter-pleader Statute was expanded only comparatively recently (1936) to permit interpleader in the Federal Courts on other than benefits arising under various forms of insurance, and is now couched in very broad terms.
I am not prepared to say, and the record in this case does not call for determination of the question as to whether or not the District Court would have jurisdiction of such cross-claim had it been necessary to determine the rights, benefits or obligations of the parties under the escrow instructions in order to make a judicial determination as to whether or not the $1,750.00 should be awarded to Plagan. INTor does the record in this case call upon this court to say, the ingenuity of man being what it is and the Interpleader Statute and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure being as broad as they are, that a situation cannot arise in an interpleader action, or one in the nature of interpleader, where one of the defendant-claimants may or may not lawfully cross-claim therein against another defendant-claimant, or even a third party, concerning benefits or obligations arising out of the terms of the instrument which may be required to be construed in the interpleader suit, or out of the transactions or occurrences relating to such instrument, although such cross-claim as an independent action would fail because the court in which the suit was brought could not obtain personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant.
A determination as to whether the Interpleader Statutes and F.R.C.P. considered together would give jurisdiction to cross-claims arising in such suits in interpleader, or in the nature of interpleader, should be left until such occasion arises.2
3

. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1335 (a) (1).

. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 22, 13(g), 28 U.S.C.A.

. See “Broadening the Second Stage of Federal Interpleader,” Chafee, 56 Harvard U.R. 029 (1943).