Court Opinion

ID: 9942052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 14:12:03.736716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:38.325399
License: Public Domain

Fourth Court of Appeals
                                        San Antonio, Texas
                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                          No. 04-22-00600-CR

                                   EX PARTE Rafael Alfaro LEIJA

                             From the County Court, Kinney County, Texas
                                       Trial Court No. 10469CR
                               Honorable Tully Shahan, Judge Presiding

Opinion by:       Irene Rios, Justice

Sitting:          Irene Rios, Justice
                  Liza A. Rodriguez, Justice
                  Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice

Delivered and Filed: February 14, 2024

DISMISSED FOR WANT OF JURISDICTION; PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
DENIED

           Appellant, Rafael Alfaro Leija, appeals from the denial of his pretrial application for writ

of habeas corpus. Leija further requests, in the event we determine we lack jurisdiction over his

appeal, that we consider his appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. Because we lack jurisdiction

over his habeas appeal, we dismiss Leija’s appeal for want of jurisdiction, consider his appeal as

a mandamus petition, and conclude he is not entitled to relief.

                                             BACKGROUND

           Leija, a noncitizen, was arrested and charged with criminal trespass as part of Operation

Lone Star—a state initiative devoted to deterring unauthorized border crossings. See TEX. PENAL

CODE ANN. § 30.05(a). Leija was subsequently released from custody on bond.
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         Leija alleges that after he was released on bond, the United States government removed

him from this country.

         Through counsel, Leija filed a pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus, seeking

dismissal of the charges against him for purported violations of his right to due process and his

right to counsel under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution. See U.S. CONST.

amends. V, VI. 1 He argued the State coordinated his removal with the federal government, leaving

him unable to return to the United States for his trial and thereby violating these rights.

         In a hearing addressing several similarly situated defendants, including Leija, the trial court

briefly discussed the defendants’ pending applications for writs of habeas corpus. The trial court

did not, however, issue a writ in Leija’s case or hold a hearing on the merits of his application, but

instead denied the application, finding it was “manifest from the Application for Pretrial Writ of

Habeas Corpus itself that [Leija was] not entitled to the relief requested[.]”

         On appeal, Leija originally asserted the same issues he presented to the trial court in his

habeas application: while released on bond after his arrest, his subsequent removal from the United

States prevented his appearance at certain pretrial hearings and his jury trial and therefore violated

his due process rights and his right to counsel. However, following this court’s decision in Ex parte

Dominguez Ortiz, 668 S.W.3d 126 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023, no pet.) (en banc) (op. on

reh’g), Leija filed a supplemental brief, 2 abandoning his claims explicitly precluded by Dominguez

Ortiz and requesting “a new form of relief and address[ing] a difference in procedural posture than

the one existent in Ex parte [Dominguez] Ortiz.”

1
  Leija also asserted claims under article I, sections 10 and 19 and article V, section 1 of the Texas Constitution;
however, he did not separately argue his state and federal constitutional claims or argue that the Texas Constitution
provides different or broader protections than the United States Constitution. Therefore, consistent with binding
precedent, we address Leija’s claims solely on federal constitutional grounds. See Bohannan v. State, 546 S.W.3d 166,
179 n.7 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017); Jackson v. State, 992 S.W.2d 469, 475 n.8 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
2
  Leija filed a motion for leave to file a supplemental brief concurrently with his supplemental brief. We granted the
motion and accepted Leija’s supplemental brief as well as the State’s response thereto.

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        Specifically, Leija raised the following new issue:

        Whether it is manifest on the face of [Leija]’s application for habeas corpus that he
        is entitled to no relief as a matter of law without the issuance of his writ to develop
        his claim when he alleges his right to compel trial has been violated due to his
        removal from and his inability to enter the country?

Based on this new issue, Leija requests his case be remanded to allow him to develop his claim in

a hearing on the merits of his habeas application. In the alternative, Leija requests that, in the event

this court does not order his case remanded, we construe his appeal as a petition for a writ of

mandamus.

                                            JURISDICTION

        We must first determine whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See Ex parte

Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d 391, 393–94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Ex parte Pool, 71 S.W.3d 462, 465

(Tex. App.—Tyler 2002, no pet.).

        A. Applicable Law

        A pretrial habeas corpus proceeding is a separate criminal action, distinct from the

underlying criminal prosecution. Greenwell v. Court of Appeals for the Thirteenth Judicial Dist.,

159 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Whether a trial court’s disposition in a habeas

proceeding may be appealed depends on whether the trial court considered and resolved the merits

of the habeas application. See id. at 650; Purchase v. State, 176 S.W.3d 406, 407 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, no pet.). If the trial court considers and rules on the merits of a habeas

claim, the losing party may appeal, regardless of whether the court formally issued a writ. See

Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d at 394, 395; Ex parte Hargett, 819 S.W.2d 866, 869 (Tex. Crim. App.

1991), superseded in part by statute as discussed in Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d at 397; Ex parte

Sifuentes, 639 S.W.3d 842, 846 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, pet. ref’d) (citing Nichlos v. State,

255 S.W.2d 522, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1952) (op. on reh’g)). But if the trial court refuses to issue

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a writ or dismisses or denies a habeas application without ruling on the merits of the applicant’s

claim or claims, the applicant has no right to appeal. See Villanueva, 252 S.W.3d at 394; Hargett,

819 S.W.2d at 868; Ex parte Garcia, ___ S.W.3d ___, No. 04-22-00473-CR, 2023 WL 8102426,

at *2–3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Nov. 22, 2023, no pet.) (en banc).

          We may review the entire record to determine whether the trial court ruled on the merits of

a habeas application. See Ex parte Bowers, 36 S.W.3d 926, 927 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2001, pet.

ref’d).

          B. Application

          In this case, it is undisputed that the trial court did not issue the writ. Further, although the

trial court briefly discussed the habeas applications filed by Leija and several similarly situated

habeas applicants with the applicants’ counsel and the State, the trial court stated that it was not

going to hold hearings on the applications because the applicants were not within the United States

and “if they’re not in the United States, makes it a moot point in my opinion.” Finally, the trial

court found, in denying Leija’s habeas application, that it was “manifest” from the application that

Leija was not entitled to the relief he requested.

          Consequently, we conclude that neither the trial court’s order nor anything else in the

record reflects that the trial court considered or expressed an opinion on the merits of Leija’s

specific habeas claims. See Garcia, 2023 WL 8102426, at *3; Purchase, 176 S.W.3d at 407;

Bowers, 36 S.W.3d at 927. In fact, the trial court’s statement that the habeas applications filed by

Leija and the other similarly situated habeas applicants were moot indicates that the trial court did

not consider and rule on the merits of Leija’s habeas application. See Gen. Land Off. of State of

Tex. v. OXY U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Tex. 1990) (stating that courts have no jurisdiction

to decide the merits of a moot case absent an exception to the mootness doctrine).

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       Because our review of the entire record establishes that the trial court did not rule on the

merits of Leija’s habeas application, we lack jurisdiction to review his appeal. See Villanueva, 252

S.W.3d at 394; Hargett, 819 S.W.2d at 868; Garcia, 2023 WL 8102426, at *3.

               REQUEST TO TREAT HABEAS APPEAL AS A MANDAMUS PETITION

       We may, in certain circumstances, treat an appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus, if

specifically requested to do so by the appellant. See CMH Homes v. Perez, 340 S.W.3d 444, 452–

53 (Tex. 2011); Hodge v. Kraft, 490 S.W.3d 510, 516 n.2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015, no pet.).

As stated above, Leija specifically requests that we construe his appeal as a mandamus petition if

we determine the trial court’s order is not appealable and do not remand for a hearing to develop

his case based on the new issue presented in his supplemental brief. We will therefore consider

Leija’s appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus.

       In Ex parte Garcia, we treated Garcia’s appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus and

considered whether Garcia was entitled to mandamus relief. 2023 WL 8102426, at *3–5. In his

original appellate brief, Garcia argued that “his release from jail on bond and subsequent removal

from the United States prevented his appearance at certain pretrial hearings and his jury trial

thereby violating his due process rights and his right to counsel.” Id. at *4. Garcia further argued,

in a supplemental brief, that his right to compel trial had been violated by his removal from the

country, and we construed Garcia’s issue in his supplemental brief as an argument that his right to

a speedy trial had been violated. Id. Relying on Ex parte Dominguez Ortiz, we determined that

Garcia was not entitled to mandamus relief based on the arguments in his original brief. Id. (citing

Dominguez Ortiz, 668 S.W.3d at 134–40). We further determined that because Garcia had failed

to raise an issue regarding his right to compel trial in the trial court and had not requested relief

from the trial court by presenting a motion to dismiss based on his right to a speedy trial, he was

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not entitled to mandamus relief based on the issue presented in his supplemental brief. Id. at *4–

5. We therefore denied Garcia’s mandamus petition. Id. at *5.

       Leija’s claims in this case are identical to those we addressed in Ex parte Garcia. Further,

Leija, like Garcia, failed to raise an issue regarding his right to compel trial in the trial court and

has not requested relief from the trial court by presenting a motion to dismiss based on his right to

a speedy trial. Therefore, for the reasons described in Ex parte Garcia, we deny Leija’s request for

mandamus relief.

                                            CONCLUSION

       Because the trial court’s denial of Leija’s habeas application was not based on the merits,

we lack jurisdiction to review his habeas appeal. We therefore dismiss his appeal for want of

jurisdiction and, at Leija’s request, treat his appeal as a petition for writ of mandamus. Finally, for

the reasons described in Ex parte Garcia, we deny Leija’s petition for writ of mandamus. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 52.8(a).

                                                   Irene Rios, Justice

DO NOT PUBLISH

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