Court Opinion

ID: 9566365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:38:20.833375+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:22.218038
License: Public Domain

McInturff, C.J.
(dissenting)—I respectfully disagree with the majority, not with its conclusion concerning the apex issue, but with its conclusion that “Sunshine has failed to sustain its burden of proving ouster by adverse possession as a matter of law.” (Italics mine.) The crux of the majority’s reasoning is that there was no substantial evidence of open, notorious, and unequivocal acts by Sunshine upon which the trial court could conclude that Sur-prize had actual knowledge of Sunshine’s entry into Sur-prize’s property or such knowledge or inquiry notice as would lead Surprize to investigate prior to 1959.1 disagree.
It is clear that stronger proof is needed for a finding of adverse possession between cotenants than between strangers.11 However, whether the actions and total circumstances are open, notorious, and hostile and a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact is still applicable.12 The decision is made within the context of the locality, nature, and character of the property, and the use made of it.13 The court said, in Hill v. L.W. Weidert Farms, Inc., 75 Wn.2d 871, 874, 454 P.2d 220 (1969):
Whether or not respondents are entitled to the land by a claim of adverse possession is a question of fact, and as *33we have often stated, when the findings of the trial court are amply sustained by the record, as they are in the instant case, this court will not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. [Citations omitted.]
Does the evidence support the trial court’s finding of actual or inquiry notice? It is urged by the majority that the findings of fact and memorandum opinion of the trial court do not contain that quality of evidence necessary for ouster of a cotenant by adverse possession as a matter of law. I disagree, particularly when considering other proof not mentioned in the findings of fact or memorandum opinion which indicates by direct evidence actual notice that not only was Sunshine working the YGV, but was claiming adversely to Surprize. It is axiomatic that the trial court’s decision, if correct, can be sustained on appeal on any ground within the pleadings and proof.14 The trial court found that there was actual or inquiry notice based upon certain findings. Additional proof, not in the findings, lends further credence to the trial court’s findings and ultimate conclusion of actual or inquiry notice.
The testimony of John Edgar, now of California working for the Bechtel Corporation, reveals that he commenced working for Sunshine in 1935 as an engineer, was promoted through chief engineer, mine superintendent, general superintendent of the Kellogg operations, general manager, vice-president, and eventually director. In 1946 he became mine superintendent, around 1950, general superintendent, and then general manager.
Mr. Edgar stated that Mr. A. V. McCarty visited them two to three times a week when Mr. McCarty was living on the Surprize claims. He often came in to see Mr. Leisk (superintendent of the mine), but when Mr. Leisk was not there, he talked to Mr. Edgar. If Mr. Edgar wasn’t there, McCarty would stop in the engineering office and visit with *34Jim Durnham, particularly, who was the chief engineer during the years that much of the work in question was being done. John Edgar was asked:
Do you have any particular recollections regarding any specific conversation about the fact that you were mining in the YGV within the Surprize property? Answer: Again not specific in the sense of a particular date but as superintendent I occupied the ground floor office on the southeast corner of the building of what was then the office building at the Sunshine Mine . . . That we always had a longitudinal section of the Sunshine Mine at the scale of 100 feet to the inch on the wall and any time that Mr. McCarty came to see me I reviewed by pointing out on the map on the wall what it was we were doing within the Silver Surprize. And his concern always was for an exploration program [other than YGV]. He showed little interest in what we were doing on the YGV. It was pointed out to him not only by me, but, . . . I assume by other departments as well.
This occurred prior to 1956.
From this testimony, it is clear that when Mr. McCarty came to the mine there was always a longitudinal map of the mine at a scale of 100 feet to the inch on the wall showing “what we were doing within . . . Surprize.” His concern was for exploration programs or activity other than the YGV. Mr. Edgar went on to say “he showed little interest in what we were doing on the YGV. It was pointed out to him not only by me, . . .”
Additionally, in portions of Vance McCarty’s deposition published in the record (at page 851),15 McCarty stated in *35essence that he knew the YGV intersected with the Silver Surprize property; that it was common knowledge; that Sunshine made them aware of the fact; and that Sunshine was working in the YGV.
Further evidence of Sunshine’s claim of extralateral rights to the YGV is found in Vance McCarty’s answers to questions by the court.16 Mr. McCarty stated that his father *36on many occasions told Mr. Leisk that “you can claim the extralateral rights to that ore but he said you prove it and if you can conclusively prove it it is your ore, you take it all.”
Though the trial court in its memorandum opinion expressed disbelief of testimony by Vance McCarty as to certain points, and perhaps in general, this testimony constitutes an admission against the interests of Mr. McCarty, giving it greater credence.
There is substantial evidence that Surprize knew work was being done by Sunshine on the YGV within the Sur-prize claim; that Sunshine was claiming extralateral rights; and that Surprize was acquiescing in that contention.
Surprize contends that Sunshine was rightly within Sur-prize’s claims as a cotenant; that this leads to a presumption that any ore taken therefrom would belong to both cotenants. This contention cannot stand when there is substantial evidence that Surprize had seen maps indicating the mining of YGV within Surprize, had been told that Sunshine was mining the YGV within Surprize property, and that no accounting was ever made under the 1946 agreement because of Sunshine’s claimed extralateral rights.
The fact that this was taking place over 3,000 feet under ground does not make the acts of Sunshine any less notorious, open, or unequivocal when (1) McCarty was told by at least Mr. Edgar that Sunshine was mining the YGV within Surprize and additionally indicated on maps which showed this fact to be true; and (2) there was free access to the mine and never a refusal to Surprize personnel for an inspection. Possibly there would be no notice if the persons involved were unfamiliar with mining and its ways; but, A. V. McCarty and other officers of Surprize *37were not novices in the mining business. Further, substantial evidence indicates that McCarty conceded the extralat-eral rights to YGV but was only interested in other explorations within the Surprize property.
Consequently, I would hold that there is substantial evidence of open, notorious, and unequivocal acts by Sunshine from which the trier of fact. (the trial court in this instance) could properly conclude there was an ouster of Sur-prize by adverse possession. This substantial evidence, when considered in light of the voluminous additional findings of fact, makes it clear that the trial court had more than ample evidence for its determination of ouster by adverse possession of its cotenant, Surprize.
The doctrine of laches also appears to be applicable against Surprize. The elements of laches are:
(1) knowledge or reasonable opportunity to discover on the part of a potential plaintiff that he has a cause of action against a defendant; (2) an unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in commencing that cause of action; (3) damage to defendant resulting from the unreasonable delay.[17]
In considering these elements, (1) there is substantial evidence that A. V. McCarty had knowledge of Sunshine’s work in the YGV within Surprize prior to 1956, in fact, he threatened to bring an action against defendants at that time; (2) action was not commenced until 1965; and (3) the statement of Judge Williams in his memorandum opinion states well the prejudice to the parties by delay:
In the present case it appears that the laches doctrine is applicable to the extent that there were sufficient facts present which amounted to notice or would be sufficient to put Surprize on inquiry to at least conduct independent research to determine whether its rights were being violated by the defendant. This Surprize apparently failed to do and if in fact it was commenced or any inquiry was made through its officials, evidence in support thereof is lacking. The lack of this evidence is attributed primarily to the fact that the principal parties were involved in the mining scene during the years of alleged *38wrongdoing by defendant are now deceased. It is thus impossible and improper for the court to speculate as to the quantum of knowledge possessed by A. V. McCarty of any fact of wrongdoing on Sunshine’s part during the years of the alleged wrongdoing. It is equally speculative to determine what extent R. D. Leisk or others concerned with Sunshine fairly dealt with representatives of Sur-prize.
(Italics mine.) The action is stale and should not be condoned in equity.
In summary, this action involved a trial which had 14 witnesses, 349 exhibits, lasted 3 to 4 weeks and was very technical in nature. I cannot say that the trial court necessarily intended its listing of evidence giving rise to notice to be an exclusive listing, particularly in view of this deluge of testimony and exhibits. It would do an injustice to second guess the trier of fact and say that he did not also rely upon other testimony, including that cited in this dissent, but not detailed in the findings. The court in In re Estate of Mikelson, 41 Wn.2d 97, 247 P.2d 540 (1952), stated at pages 99-100: “[The trial court] is not required to include evidentiary facts in its findings, but need only find the ultimate facts on the material issues.”18 The ultimate fact at issue here is the existence of actual or inquiry notice of intent to hold adversely. The court found such notice to have existed. This finding was upon conflicting evidence and is entitled to great weight.19
*39In my opinion the quote of Justice Weaver in In re Estate of Dand, 41 Wn.2d 158, 247 P.2d 1016 (1952), at 163, is especially applicable:
This case is a striking example of the wisdom of our rule that the trial court, having the witnesses before it, is in a better position to arrive at the truth than is the appellate court. The respondents are entitled to the benefit of all evidence and reasonable inference therefrom in support of the findings of fact entered by the trial court. Two different theories were presented. The trial court rejected one and accepted the other. After an examination of the record, we cannot say that the evidence preponderates against the findings.
I would affirm the Superior Court.
Petitions for rehearing denied May 17, 1976.
Appealed to Supreme Court May 26, 1976.
Review granted by Supreme Court July 27,1976.

McKnight v. Basilides, 19 Wn.2d 391, 143 P.2d 307 (1943); see also Annot., 82 A.L.R.2d 5-306 for an extensive annotation on all aspects of adverse possession, especially section 90, at 305 which states: “The question of whether the possessor’s cotenant had notice of the adverse character of his possession is ordinarily one for the jury or other trier of the facts.”

Hunt v. Matthews, 8 Wn. App. 233, 505 P.2d 819 (1973); Northwest Cities Gas Co. v. Western Fuel Co., 13 Wn.2d 75, 123 P.2d 771 (1942).

Frolund v. Frankland, 71 Wn.2d 812, 431 P.2d 188 (1967).

State v. Klinker, 85 Wn.2d 509, 514, 537 P.2d 268 (1975); Thompson v. Thompson, 82 Wn.2d 352, 510 P.2d 827 (1973); Northwest Collectors, Inc. v. Enders, 74 Wn.2d 585, 595, 446 P.2d 200 (1968); Lundgren v. Kieren, 64 Wn.2d 672, 393 P.2d 625 (1964); McDaniel v. McDaniel, 14 Wn. App. 194, 198, 539 P.2d 699 (1975).

“Q As of 1957 you knew that they were mining in the 3400-level of the Metropolitan area?
“A Well, I knew that they were mining on this Yankee Girl vein hut I didn’t know what level but I had somehow or another been informed that they had been down to the 3700-level.
“Q This was about 1957?
“A Yes.
“Q And let’s go back to say, I will take an arbitrary date, 1952, 1953, 1954, in that era of time, were you generally familiar that they were mining in that area?
“A In that area, yes.
“Q And you knew that the same vein intersected the Silver Sur-*35prize property at the easterly limits of the Silver Surprize property?
“A Yes.
“Q And you knew that the Yankee Girl vein did intercept the Silver Surprize property?
“A yes.
“Q It was common knowledge?
“A Common knowledge by—I mean Sunshine made us aware of that. That it would.
“Q All right, now, it was common knowledge in any event?
“A Yes.
“Q All right, you mentioned the common knowledge that was generally available in respect to the fact that Sunshine was working the Yankee Girl vein. The Yankee Girl vein is a well-known vein, is it not?
“A Right.
“Q Been a lot of discussion generally?
“A Well, generally there has been.
“Q In the area about it?
“A Newspaper talk on it.
“Q And it is a productive vein, is that correct?
“A Telling of their production and so forth. Yes.
“Q You knew it abutted your property?
“A Yes.
“Q Known that generally in the various degrees that you have previously described here from 1947 to 1950 on, haven’t you?
“A Yes.”

Statement of facts, page 959, line 4 through line 21 states:
“Q Were you ever in any of the negotiations with Sunshine or discussions with them as to the ownership of the Yankee Girl vein? You say that they contended that they owned it, the dip right, and you claimed it, and you people never conceded that. That you felt you owned the Yankee Girl or anything within the limits within your property. Were you ever in the discussions with them about that?
“A Not during the period when the negotiating was going on for the agreement.
“Q But I mean subsequently.
*36“A I wasn’t, but I was after that with my father and possibly a director or two, and this would come up and it would be discussed and argued in Mr. Leisk’s office. My father on many occasions told Mr. Leisk that, he says, you claim the—you can claim the extralateral rights to that ore but he said you prove it and if you conclusively prove it it is your ore, you take it all.”

17Buell v. Bremerton, 80 Wn.2d 518, 522, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972).

Eickerman v. Eickerman, 42 Wn.2d 165, 253 P.2d 962 (1953), states at page 169:
“To make the picture clearer, we have included in our statement of the case some of the findings the trial court declined to make. This does not imply that the court was under any duty to make them as specific findings. The trial court is not required to include every undisputed bit of testimony in its findings of fact (though undisputed, it may not be believed), nor is it required to include every conceded bit of testimony, which may or may not have bearing upon its decision. We have frequently and recently said that the trial court is not required to include evidentiary facts in its findings, but need only find the ultimate facts upon the material issues.” See also Wagner v. Wagner, 1 Wn. App. 328, 330-31, 461 P.2d 577 (1969).

In re Estate of Mikelson, supra at 99; see In re Estate of Martinson, 29 Wn.2d 912, 920, 190 P.2d 96 (1948); In re Estate of Chapman, 37 Wn.2d 682, 691, 225 P.2d 883 (1950).