Court Opinion

ID: 9776161
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:20:35.972962+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:35.035541
License: Public Domain

As described in the majority opinion, the prosecutor had not completed preparation of her case before beginning trial. The following time-line indicates the pertinent events and illustrates the abundance of preparation time available to, yet unused by, the state.1
 Sep. 6, 1992 Alleged offense occurred. Tr. at 5.
 Oct. 9, 1992 Felony indictment filed.
 Nov. 5, 1992 Agreed setting for jury trial set for 3/22/93. Tr. at 13.
 Mar. 22, 1993 Agreed setting for jury trial set for 6/14/93.2 The setting notes, "State not ready for trial on 3/22/93." Tr. at 16.
 Apr. 6, 1993 Agreed setting for jury trial set for 5/17/93. Tr. at 17.
 May 17, 1993 Agreed setting for jury trial set for 6/1/93. Tr. at 18.
 May 26, 1993 Motion for Discovery, Production and Inspection of Evidence filed by defense. Number thirteen states, "The results of any scientific tests. The Defendant would further show that he has no means of ascertaining the existence of this evidence and the possibility of expert testimony without the disclosure herein sought and without it his counsel will be unable to effectively confront and cross examine the witnesses against him." Tr. at 20.
 Jun. 2, 1993 (Wed) The state dismissed counts one and two, both aggravated sexual assault charges, and proceeded with count three, aggravated robbery. S.F. vol. III, at 15-16.
 Jun. 2, 1993 (Wed) Jury panel was summoned. The jury was impaneled at 6:00 p.m.
 Jun. 3, 1993 (Th) In a pretrial discussion in front of the trial court, the prosecutor and defense attorney were "agreed" as to discovery motion number thirteen. S.F. vol. III, at 9.
 11:40 a.m.; Jury was sworn. State and defense made opening statements.
 12:00 p.m.; Testimony began.
 After the jury was recessed until Monday, June 7, the prosecutor stated, in the presence of appellant, "It has come to our attention that there is semen over at the crime lab at H.P.D. in an amount *Page 753 
sufficient to get a DNA test result . . ." S.F. vol. IV, at 257.
 Jun. 4, 1993 (Fri) Approx. 1:40 p.m.; Blood drawn from appellant. State began DNA testing. S.F. vol. VI, at 465-66.
 Jun. 7, 1993 (Mon) 11:30 a.m.; Testimony resumed, with the state continuing its case-in-chief.
 The state rested.
 Defense testimony began.
 5:10 p.m.; Court recessed for the day.
 Jun. 8, 1993 (Tue) The first daily entry in the transcript is "State made motion for continuance. Court denied motion."
 11:45 a.m.; Defense testimony resumed.
 11:55 a.m.; Defense rested.
 11:56 a.m.; State began its rebuttal testimony.
 State introduced the possibility of DNA evidence through Officer Bolding. S.F. vol. VI, at 476-77.
 During direct examination of Bolding, the prosecutor stated, "Your Honor, the State of Texas certainly is not going to oppose any motion by the defense attorney here to move for a continuance." S.F. vol. VI, at 479.
 During redirect examination of Bolding, the prosecutor stated, "Your Honor, again the State will offer to not oppose any motion by the defense to find out the bottom line on this question." S.F. vol. VI, at 486.
 At the conclusion of Bolding's testimony, the prosecutor stated, "Your Honor, at this time the State of Texas rests unless there is a motion." S.F. vol. VI, at 490.
 Defense stated there was no motion. Defense rested. Id.
 12:30 p.m.; Court recessed for lunch.
 2:00 p.m.; Court resumed and the charge was presented to the jury.
 2:56 p.m.; Jury retired for deliberations.
As noted above, the alleged offense occurred on September 6, 1992, and appellant was indicted on October 9, 1992. Although trial commenced on June 3, 1993, almost eight months after indictment, the state did not even begin DNA testing until Friday, June 4, 1993, after trial began, and did not mention the possibility of DNA evidence to the jury until rebuttal on Tuesday, June 8. Appellant appears to have been unaware of the possibility of DNA testing until the prosecutor revealed it on Thursday, June 3, after conclusion of the first day of testimony.3 After obtaining a search warrant, Officer Hubly of the Houston Police Department drew blood from appellant on Friday, June 4. On Tuesday, June 8, the state called Officer Bolding as a rebuttal witness. He testified that he had compared blood taken from appellant and semen samples taken from the complainant.4
The results were inconclusive. As noted by the majority, "Bolding concluded that a DNA test was the best scientific method of determining whether the semen sample linked appellant to the crime. However, he explained that a DNA analysis would take a minimum of four weeks to complete." Ante, at 750.
It should be noted that the trial had been reset three times, and at least one reset was granted because the state was not ready for trial. During the defense case-in-chief and after the state began its DNA testing, the prosecutor moved for a continuance. The trial court denied the motion. Testimony resumed, and the defense rested ten minutes later. During the state's rebuttal, in front of the jury and after just having been denied her own continuance, the prosecutor tried to force defense counsel into requesting a continuance. Defense counsel resisted. After the prosecutor tried a second time to force defense counsel into requesting a continuance, defense counsel properly requested *Page 754 
that, if the state wished to request a continuance, it be discussed before the bench and not in front of the jury. But the state did not stop there. At the conclusion of Bolding's rebuttal testimony, the prosecutor for the third time prodded the defense to request a continuance, stating that the state "rests unless there is a motion." The defense stated there was no motion and also rested.
In addition to the blatant and repeated attempts to force the defense to make up for her failure to prepare, during final argument the prosecutor turned the burden of proof on its head. Her argument to the jury portrayed the defense as attempting to hide the results of the DNA testing, and painted herself as having nothing to hide. While almost admitting some responsibility for the problem,5 in the next breath she shifted blame back to appellant and faulted him for failing to challenge the rebuttal case before it was presented, saying, "Don't reward him because they laid low until the end of the trial and got lucky enough for us not to have a DNA result." Ante, at 751. Luck had nothing to do with her lack of preparation.
Unfortunately, for the most part defense counsel did not preserve error. No objection was lodged to the repeated attempts to force the defense into requesting a continuance after the state had been denied its own continuance earlier the same morning. Three of four objections to the jury argument were sustained, but counsel did not ask for an instruction to disregard or move for mistrial; counsel did not pursue the objection to an adverse ruling and so did not preserve error.
The remaining objection was overruled, thus error was preserved. Ante, at 751. However, the majority finds that "the prosecutor's statement qualifies as a permissible answer to argument of opposing counsel." Ante, at 751. This is analogous to picking a fight, then complaining when the victim defends himself. If the state had properly prepared before trial, the defense counsel could not have made the argument that the state now uses to justify its own excesses. The state opened the door, kicked appellant through it, and now complains that appellant has gone where he should not be. I do not wish to condone such misconduct.
I respectfully dissent. I would affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
1 Unless otherwise noted, all entries on the time-line are found on the Docket Sheet, Tr. 49-54.
2 Although the transcript indicates that the agreed setting was for 6/14/93, the agreed setting notices that followed indicate that the date should have been written as 4/6/93.
3 After the first day of testimony and outside the presence of the jury, the prosecutor declared, "[i]t has come to our attention that there is semen over at the crime lab at H.P.D. in an amount sufficient to get a DNA test result, and we ask the defense attorney if his client would be willing to consent to a voluntary blood sample."
4 The test performed was a "secreter status test," also referred to as a "body fluids comparison test."
5 "Again, if we didn't get the results in time, by all means, I'm taking the hit on that one. . . ." Ante, at 751 (emphasis added).