Court Opinion

ID: 9759521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 00:19:09.164313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:02.587410
License: Public Domain

GRIMM, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding on the first point that the trial court erred in refusing to admit evidence of Freese’s drinking intoxicating beverages prior to the accident.
In Karashin v. Haggard Hauling & Rigging, Inc., 663 S.W.2d 203 (Mo. banc 1983), the Supreme Court stated that an offer of proof must (1) demonstrate to the trial court the relevancy of the testimony offered, (2) be specific, and (3) be definite. Here, Jones’ attorney said that “His [Breese] drinking is a relevant factor to what he saw and his ability to see it.” (emphasis added). Jones did not attempt to demonstrate the relevancy of the drinking testimony as it pertains to erratic driving. Rather, he focused his comments solely on the question of lookout (i.e., “what he saw and his ability to see it”). However, as stated in the majority opinion, “Evidence of defendant’s drinking was only admissible if his driving could be classified as erratic.”
In his offer of proof, Jones did not bring to the trial court’s attention any evidence of erratic driving. All he said on that subject was the conclusionary statement, “Well, there’s certainly some evidence of erratic driving.” He did not point out to the trial court any facts to support that conclusion.
Later, during the colloquy, when the offer of proof was actually made, the basis for the offer was again, not erratic driving, but on the question of lookout. For Jones’ counsel said, “I believe that I have layed a sufficient foundation in view of his not seeing the officer to the rear [Jones] when there was nothing to obstruct his vision, Officer Kentzinger waving him to stop and *459him not seeing him.” In my judgment, the entire offer of proof was directed towards linking the drinking with failure to keep a lookout and the offer of proof did not concern itself with erratic driving. As such, the offer of proof never established the relevancy of the testimony offered.
A trial court is granted broad discretion in admitting or rejecting evidence on relevancy grounds. Moreland v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Company, 662 S.W.2d 556 (Mo.App.S.D.1983). And unless there was an abuse of that discretion, its action will not be grounds for reversal. Karashin at 205.
An appellant should be held to his offer of proof when the trial court sustains an objection, just as appellate courts hold other litigants to the objection made to evidence at the trial court. Sorrell v. Hudson, 335 S.W.2d 1 (Mo.Div. 2 1960).
Based on the offer of proof, and the stated reasons for its admissibility, I do not find that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to admit evidence of Freese’s drinking.
I concur in the majority opinion as to points II and III. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.