Court Opinion

ID: 9723208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:06:43.565122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:45.547873
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GREIMAN, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I would concur with the majority in affirming as to issues touching upon fraudulent concealment and estoppel. However, as to the other issue of when the plaintiff or Mrs. Wolf knew or should have known of Dr. Bueser’s malpractice, I dissent. Simply stated the issue raised is when the statute of limitations begins to run where Mrs. Wolf (1) has been misdiagnosed for cancer in its earlier stages, (2) discovers the misdiagnoses, (3) fails to bring an action against the negligent doctor, (4) then discovers, before the running of the initial limitations period, that there is a cancerous metastasis linked to the earlier cancer and (5) brings an action against all of the other medical providers before the end of that limitations period but fails to join the negligent doctor until after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The majority suggests that this is a factual question for the trier of fact ánd that the court cannot deal with this on a section 2 — 619 motion. The burden of such proof must rest upon the plaintiff, and I am somewhat at a loss how that burden will be carried in light of Mrs. Wolfs testimony. Mrs. Wolfs deposition reveals that she was aware of the poor quality of the mammogram produced by Dr. Bueser before her mastectomy. Her deposition does not reveal any notion that she believed all was well after the first operation or that she was unaware of the doctors’ negligence. To the contrary, suit was filed against the other health care providers before the running of the original statute of limitations. The record indicates that she knew of her condition after her meeting with Dr. Caldwell; however, if her awareness was not acute at that time, she certainly knew at the time of her mastectomy in May of 1988. She acknowledges that she was aware that Dr. Bueser’s work was "no good” and illegible. At the very least, these facts afforded Mrs. Wolf sufficient information concerning the injury to place the burden upon her to inquire further as to the existence of a cause of action against Dr. Bueser. See Nolan v. Johns-Manville Asbestos, 85 Ill. 2d 161, 421 N.E.2d 864 (1981). Accordingly, I believe, the record shows Mrs. Wolf knew of the existence of the injury, i.e., cancer, and the possibility of wrongful conduct, i.e., failure to diagnose, in 1988. Therefore, plaintiffs cause of action against Dr. Bueser, filed on January 31, 1991, is barred by the statute of limitations. The majority seeks to avoid this inescapable conclusion by treating as two separate and distinct injuries Mrs. Wolfs breast cancer of 1988 and the 1989 metastasis of that cancer. This distinction fails to recognize that the origin of the metastasis was the cancer Dr. Bueser failed to diagnose in 1987. The distinction drawn by the majority also ignores the language of the complaint against Dr. Bueser, which pleads Dr. Bueser’s negligence in failing to "diagnose and treat the Plaintiffs Decedent’s breast cancer” in 1987. (Emphasis added.) The Illinois cases cited by the majority as support for its decision are readily distinguishable from the instant case. In Kaplan v. Berger, 184 Ill. App. 3d 224, 539 N.E.2d 1267 (1989), where plaintiff was faced with what I call the "second opinion quandary,” no less than seven physicians failed to correctly diagnose plaintiffs condition as cancer until a growth was removed and microscopically examined. The court declined to place a burden on a "lay patient” to diagnose or ascertain the nature of a medical condition when her physicians did not diagnose that condition. Kaplan, 184 Ill. App. 3d at 233. Here, Dr. Caldwell diagnosed and treated Mrs. Wolfs cancer. Thus, the burden of diagnosis was not shifted to Mrs. Wolf, only the burden of further investigation. Similarly, in Janetis v. Christensen, 200 Ill. App. 3d 581, 587, 558 N.E.2d 304 (1990), the court found a question of fact existed as to when decedent became aware of his cause of action because plaintiffs deposition did not demonstrate that the decedent "knew or should have known of defendants’ misdiagnosis.” In Janetis, the defendant had first diagnosed decedent’s rectal bleeding as hemorrhoids. Subsequently, decedent was found to have cancer and an operation was performed upon his colon. The subsequent physician did not advise decedent that the bleeding was a result of the cancer and, in fact, "repeatedly assured [decedent], a lay person who plaintiff testified trusted doctors, that the bleeding was due to his hemorrhoids.” 200 El. App. 3d at 587. Unlike the case at bar, the second doctor did not advise plaintiff of the first doctor’s malpractice. Plaintiff cites Bradtke v. Reotutar, 214 Ill. App. 3d 611, 574 N.E.2d 110 (1991), for the proposition that there is no per se rule imposing an "absolute duty” on a patient to investigate once he has been correctly diagnosed by a second physician "because the fact that a second diagnosis is correct is ascertainable only in retrospect.” Bradtke, 214 Ill. App. 3d at 618. A patient has no absolute duty to investigate following conflicting diagnoses, but given the facts of this case, the patient had ample information concerning the cancer and causation "to put a reasonable person on inquiry to determine whether actionable conduct [was] involved.” Knox College v. Celotex Corp., 88 Ill. 2d 407, 416, 430 N.E.2d 976 (1981). In the case at bar, Mrs. Wolfs awareness and knowledge were so clear that she did, in fact, file a suit against all of the other medical practitioners for the 1987 malpractice. By this dissent, by no means do I reject the conclusions of the court in Kaplan, Janetis or the several cases from other jurisdictions cited by the majority. I dissent merely because the facts of this case do not fit the holdings in those decisions.