Court Opinion

ID: 9777788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:24:17.157757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:01.681322
License: Public Domain

COHEN, Justice,
concurring.
The issue dividing this panel is whether á tape recording should be excluded from evidence because of a possibility that it has been altered. I would require more than a possibility, as outlined below.
Further, I find the authorities relied on in the dissenting opinion unpersuasive. Of the five cases cited in the dissenting opinion, only two reversed judgments. One of these did not involve tape recordings, and the other, a federal case from Pennsylvania, resulted from a grossly unfair trial, involving Government misconduct and judicial errors unlike anything that occurred here. Both cases are discussed below.
Appellant never proved, by expert or other evidence, that these tapes had been altered. Further, he never proved that if they had been altered, the alteration would have been impossible to detect with present technology. If alteration had been proved, I would vote to reverse, assuming that there was a reasonable probability that the alteration affected the missing, allegedly exculpatory conversations.
I would also vote to reverse, without conclusive proof of alteration, if: (1) appellant reasonably claimed that a prejudicial alteration had occurred; (2) the manner of preserving the tapes showed that there was a reasonable opportunity for such an alteration; and (3) expert testimony showed that, given present technology, there was no reasonable probability that an alteration could be detected. In these circumstances, the penalty of excluding the tapes from evidence should fall on the State, because of the possibility of alteration, the State’s exclusive ability to prevent alteration, and the impossibility of the defendant ever proving alteration.
Appellant proved that exposure to certain levels of magnetism could erase the tapes, but he never proved that the tapes were or probably were exposed to such magnetism or that alteration by magnetism or by “static” removal would have been impractical or impossible to detect. For all we know, an expert witness, using readily available technology, could have examined these tapes and reliably determined whether they had been altered. However, unlike the defendant in United States v. Starks, *151515 F.2d 112 (3rd Cir.1975), cited in the dissenting opinion, appellant never requested an expert examination. If such an examination had shown no alteration, there would have been no error in admitting the tapes. Further, if such an expert examination could have proved a prejudicial alteration, appellant should have produced such evidence. A party’s failure to present available evidence, including expert testimony, may suggest that it was not produced because it would have hurt his case.
We should not assume that the tapes were altered, and therefore exclude them, nor should we relieve appellant from having proved that they were altered, unless he showed at trial that such proof could not reasonably be made. Reasons that such proof could not be made might include technological impossibility or extreme difficulty or expense amounting to impracticality-
This case differs from Easley v. State, 472 S.W.2d 128 (Tex.Crim.App.1971), which had nothing to do with tape recordings. In Easley, a marijuana conviction was reversed because the State failed to prove chain of custody. The reason for requiring a chain of custody over scientifically tested evidence, such as marijuana, is to guarantee that the scientist has tested the same item that the police officer seized — not an altered, contaminated, or different item. The testimony concerning the pre-test handling of a tested substance may enable the defendant to show that the way the evidence was handled between its seizure and its testing made it more likely that the test result would favor the State or less likely that it would favor the defendant. That reason for requiring chain of custody does not exist in this case, because the tape recordings were never scientifically tested. See generally, Teague, Texas Criminal Practice Guide, section 73.05(12) (Bancroft Whitney 1986). Compare United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112,118-24 (3rd Cir.1975), which differs from the present case in the following respects:
1)Defense counsel prior to trial requested that an expert examine the tape to determine if it was original or had been altered in any way;
2) The tape admitted in evidence was never identified as the original;
3) The tape admitted in evidence was “much clearer” than the one furnished to defense counsel before trial, which was “inaudible and untrustworthy”;
4) The tape’s whereabouts were unknown in the four months before trial;
5) The court refused to play for the jury the tape that had been furnished to defense counsel before trial;
6) The court refused to order disclosure to the defense of government employees who had had custody of the tape in the four months before trial.
Finally, I do not consider Officer Scalia’s testimony sufficient to show that the tapes were unreliable, as a matter of law, thus requiring their exclusion. While he testified that tapes removed from police premises would not be reliable, Scalia never testified to actual or probable alteration or to the impossibility of proving alteration. No one testified that particular conditions surrounding the storage and handling of these tapes exposed them to significant risks of alteration from magnetism or other specific hazards. Taken as a whole, Scalia’s testimony amounts only to a distrust of the tapes because they were removed from his custody, where careful procedures were routinely followed in order to guarantee security. While this testimony may be entitled to great weight, it goes only to the weight, not the admissibility, of the evidence.