Court Opinion

ID: 9461120
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:06:20.248442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:54.114609
License: Public Domain

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
I agree with the opinion as to the af-firmance of the conviction on count I, but am unable to agree as to count II and would reverse the conviction on that count.
The opinion reasons that we should decline review of count II because no possible adverse consequences can be discerned from refusal to treat the second conviction, the sentences of 18 months’ probation on each count being concurrent. However, as the Special Findings of the District Court made after trial point out, probation is not the only consequence involved here. Under 29 U.S.C.A. § 504 appellant also is barred from serving as an officer (he is President of Local 961 and holds other union offices) director, etc., of a labor organization for 5 years after such conviction, unless the Board of Parole determines that such person’s *461service would not be contrary to the purposes of the statute. The Supreme Court has pointed specifically to the effect of this bar of § 504 against serving as an official of a labor union in rejecting the contention of mootness where a sentence has already been served. Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237, 88 S.Ct. 1556, 20 L.Ed.2d 554. I feel that similar considerations apply here, calling for review.
In its Special Findings the District Court, after referring to the bar of § 504 on holding office, made several observations favorable to appellant, stating that the penalty is one the Court would not impose if it lay in its discretion, although the Court subscribed heartily to the general purpose o,f the statute.1
In these circumstances I feel we cannot say that adverse circumstances may not result for appellant from refusal to review count II. The Board of Parole will have power to determine whether or when appellant is to be relieved from the penalty of being unable for 5 years to serve in such positions as he has held. The District Court’s Special Findings will serve as a factor favorable to him. Whether there are one or two separate convictions will be another factor before the Board. I am not satisfied that the circumstance of two convictions, instead of one, might not affect the Board’s judgment and feel we should review count II.
As to this count, I am persuaded by appellant’s argument that the Government proof did not show a violation of 29 U.S.C.A. § 439(c). Among other things, that portion of § 439 prohibits wilfully making a false entry in any books, records, reports or statements required to be kept by the statute. Section 436 imposes a requirement to maintain records on the matters required to be reported which will provide in sufficient detail the necessary basic information and data from which the documents filed may be verified, explained or clarified, and checked for accuracy and completeness, including “vouchers, worksheets, receipts, and applicable resolutions. . .”
Here the proof as to count II was that there were false entries in the “Out-of-Work Benefits Report” forms sent down to Local 961 by the International and the Conference. The entries made were the signatures (which were forged) by persons acknowledging their receipt of funds. These reports were sent to the International and the Conference, but copies were kept in the Local’s files. The Reports were used by the International and the Conference to plan for disbursements of cash to local union members. As the opinion points out, the Local also obtained accurate signed receipts from the actual payees and kept them in the Local’s records.
To me the statute should not be construed to cover these Reports. They *462were initiated from the other union offices and served their planning purposes. Section 436 seems to be aimed at those vouchers, worksheets, receipts and the like which are the basic papers initiated and used by the reporting unit — here the Local. The statute’s application has been made to such vouchers, financial statements and cash disbursement journals of the reporting unit. E. g., United States v. Budzanoski, 462 F.2d 443 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 949, 93 S.Ct. 271, 34 L.Ed.2d 220; United States v. Haggerty, 419 F.2d 1003 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1064, 90 S.Ct. 1502, 25 L.Ed.2d 686. While the statute might in other circumstances reach reports having connection with two offices and their purposes, here it does not seem to me that the statute applies. As a -criminal statute it must be strictly construed and any ambiguity must be resolved in favor of lenity. United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396, 411, 93 S.Ct. 1007, 35 L.Ed.2d 379. Therefore I would set aside the conviction on count II.

. Among other things the Special Findings state:
In rhe view of the Court, the evidence presented during the trial of this case disclosed a technical violation of the provisions of 29 U.S.O. § 439. , There was no evidence of personal gain or profit to defendant and there was no evidence that defendant intended personal gain or profit. The evidence disclosed an intent on defendant’s part to benefit the local union and the members of the local union represented by defendant. In substantial part, defendant’s wrongful acts were the result of poor judgment, carelessness or reliance on the advice of others.
Read in the context with the crimes mentioned in the statute, the statutory penalty here imposed is fairly comparable to the imposition of statutory mandatory minimum sentences sometimes required by Congress under circumstances a court does not believe warrant such mandatory minimum penalties. The harsh penalty here imposed is one required by Congress, and the Court is given no power or discretion to lessen the impact of what will probably mean five years of economic hardship on defendant and his family. The penalty is one the Court would not impose if the penalty lay within the Court’s discretion. The Congressional purpose in enacting this statute is clear, and it is one to which the Court heartily subscribes, but in the Court's opinion, the facts proven as to this defendant do not fit the intended pattern of the declared Congressional purpose, although the conviction does come within the statutory provisions.