Court Opinion

ID: 9588867
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:39:23.373184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:29:30.660045
License: Public Domain

Per curiam.
The wife appeals from a final divorce decree entered in Fulton Superior Court on August 14, 1975, which incorporates an oral settlement agreement negotiated by the parties and their counsel at the interlocutory hearing in the case.
It is urged on appeal that the settlement was never finalized, that the trial court erred in denying the wife a hearing on temporary alimony and attorney fees, and that the trial court erred in hearing evidence on the divorce issue before the case was ripe for trial. In addition, the wife argues that the trial court also erred in entering the final decree without hearing evidence at that time and that she was denied her right to a jury trial on the divorce *103and on the oral settlement agreement between the parties.
Argued January 15, 1976
Decided January 27, 1976.
Claude E. Hambrick, for appellant.
Claude R. Ross, A. Russell Blank, Carnes & White, Charles R. Carnes, for appellee.
The record shows the husband filed a complaint for divorce on May 27, 1975, on the grounds of cruel treatment and the wife acknowledged service on May 29, 1975. The transcript of the hearing before the court on June 20, 1975, shows an oral but complete settlement agreement was negotiated by the parties and their counsel on that date and was approved by both parties and their lawyers. It was submitted to the trial judge for approval as the temporary order of the court and for inclusion in the final divorce decree. The parties also stated under oath to the trial judge that their marriage was irretrievably broken but the entry of the final divorce decree was not made by the trial judge until August 14, 1975, on written motion of husband’s counsel. Held:
1. We find no error. The trial court was authorized to approve the terms of the oral settlement agreed to by the parties and to enter the same as the temporary order of the court and incorporate it in the final decree. See Vereen v. Vereen, 226 Ga. 500 (175 SE2d 865) (1970).
2. The prior written demand for a jury trial on the issues in this case must be construed as having been waived under the circumstances of this case. See Dodd v. Dodd, 224 Ga. 746 (164 SE2d 726) (1968).
3. The trial court was authorized to grant a final divorce on August 14, 1975, based upon the parties’ earlier statements under oath to the court that their marriage was irretrievably broken. See Friedman v. Friedman, 233 Ga. 254 (210 SE2d 754) (1974), and Marshall v. Marshall, 234 Ga. 393 (216 SE2d 117) (1975).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Ingram, J., who concurs specially.