Court Opinion

ID: 9607883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 03:02:50.984412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:41.230025
License: Public Domain

MacIntyre, P. J.,
concurring specially. The tender of improper evidence by the solicitor-general is not controlling upon the question of whether or not a mistrial should be granted. The controlling question is, to my mind, always whether the defendant on trial has had a fair trial, not whether the solicitor-general has been guilty of improper conduct.
The indictment for perjury was in two counts. The defendant pleaded guilty to both counts. The solicitor-general recommended that the defendant be given a suspended sentence and fined the court costs. The court did not follow the recommendation, but gave the defendant a sentence of two years in the penitentiary. Thereafter, the court allowed the defendant to withdraw his pl'ea of guilty to both counts and then to plead not guilty to both counts. On the trial the jury found the defendant not guilty on count 1, but guilty on count 2.
The defendant made no request to erase or cover the pleas of guilty which were on the indictment when the jury retired to the jury room and such pleas were not concealed. It will be seen that although the defendant had pleaded guilty to both counts, the jury found him guilty on the second count only.
The corrective measures of the court, in not permitting the introduction of these pleas in evidence and in instructing the *475jury that it should not and must not consider this improper evidence (tendered but not 'allowed) and that it would be improper to let such evidence in anywise affect their judgment as jurors, were sufficient, under the circumstances shown by the record.
I am reinforced in the belief that the jury followed the direct and positive instruction of the court to entirely disregard this improper tender of evidence by the fact that the jury did not find the defendant guilty in accordance with his pleas of guilty to both counts, but only found him guilty on one count. In short, the corrective measures used were effective and sufficient under the circumstances. Georgia Life Ins. Co. v. Hanvey, 143 Ga. 787 (85 S. E. 1036); Trammell v. Atlanta Coach Co., 51 Ga. App. 705, 711 (181 S. E. 315).
I am of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.