Court Opinion

ID: 9486668
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:55:47.870329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:51.742222
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The District Court and the majority have concluded that the executrix had standing to bring this action. I disagree and respectfully dissent. I fully agree with the majority’s holding that plaintiffs statutory damages are limited to $1000.00.
I begin with 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a), which governs a debt collector’s civil liability, “any debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter with respect to any person is liable to such person.” Unfortunately, the phrase “any person” is not defined in the statute. The majority holds that “with respect to any person” includes more than just the addressee of the letters. It holds that the phrase includes those who stand in the shoes of the debtor or have the same authority as the debtor to open and read the letters of the debtor. Thus, it con-*652eludes that Wright, as executrix, had standing to bring her claims under the FDCPA.
To be liable under section 1692k(a), the debt collector must have violated a provision of the subchapter. The plaintiff has sued under section 1692d, which also uses the broad language of “any person” and section 1692e(l), (5), (8) and (11), which does not limit recovery to a person or to a consumer.
Under the definitions section, 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3), “[t]he term ‘consumer’ means any natural person obligated or allegedly obligated to pay any debt.” Plaintiff has brought this action as executrix of decedent’s estate. Thus, the real party in interest is the estate which, since it is not a natural person, cannot be a consumer. As pointed out in appellant’s brief, the letters in this case were all sent after Gladys Finch’s death. At that time, the debt or obligation was owed by the estate. Thus, the letters were not attempts to collect a debt of a consumer, which must be a natural person. Further, “debt” is defined as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction.”
Additionally, under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(d), which governs communications in relation to debt collection, the definition of consumer is specifically expanded to include “the consumer’s spouse, parent (if the consumer is a minor), guardian, executor, or administrator.” By this specific inclusion of executor as a consumer under section 1692c, Congress has inferentially indicated that an executrix is not otherwise considered a consumer.
The purposes behind the FDCPA include deterring abusive debt collectors and protecting consumers. For example, one of the congressional findings found in 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a) of the statute is that “[t]here is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies, to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual privacy.” Clearly, most of these findings do not apply to an estate. For example, an estate does not experience marital instability, loss of jobs or invasion of privacy. While sections 1692d and 1692e use broad language, an overview of the FDCPA leads me to the conclusion that an executor or executrix representing an estate does not have standing under sections 1692d and 1692e. While this would be clearer if the executor were a bank or trust company, the fortuitous circumstance that the personal representative is an individual should not be the dispositive fact. The statute does not provide remedies to estates simply because the debt was a consumer debt contracted by the deceased.