Court Opinion

ID: 9395199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 15:04:12.129243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:06.122187
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                          Opinion filed May 17, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-1273
                       Lower Tribunal No. 20-27207
                          ________________

                         Vereit Real Estate, L.P.,
                                Appellant,

                                     vs.

                        Fitness International, LLC,
                                 Appellee.

    An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, William
Thomas, Judge.

     Ballard Spahr LLP, and Katherine E. Anderson (Phoenix, AZ), and
Michael Schuster (Denver, CO), for appellant.

      Shutts & Bowen LLP, and Daniel Nordby (Tallahassee); Shutts &
Bowen LLP, and Matthew R. Chait and Sean M. Smith (West Palm Beach),
for appellee.

Before SCALES, LINDSEY and GORDO, JJ.

     SCALES, J.
          In this case, concerning a commercial tenant’s obligation to pay rent

for the two-and-half month period (“closure period”)1 that executive and

emergency orders (“closure orders”) prevented the operation of gyms and

fitness facilities in Florida due to the Covid-19 pandemic, Vereit Real Estate,

L.P. (“Landlord”), the defendant/counter-plaintiff below, appeals a final

summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff/counter-defendant below, Fitness

International, Inc. (“Tenant”). The trial court determined that Tenant was not

obligated to pay rents during the closure period pursuant to the underlying

lease agreement’s force majeure clause and, in the alternative, under the

equitable doctrines of impossibility of performance, impracticability of

performance and frustration of purpose. Because the subject force majeure

clause, by its express terms, does not relieve Tenant of its rent obligations,

and the equitable doctrines asserted by Tenant are similarly inapplicable, we

reverse the final judgment and remand this cause back to the trial court with

directions that final summary judgment be entered for Landlord.

     I.     RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

          The facts of this case are relatively simple and are not in dispute. In

November 2016, Tenant entered into a fifteen-year lease agreement with

Landlord’s predecessor-in-interest that permits Tenant to use the leased

1
    Between March 20, 2020, and June 8, 2020.

                                         2
premises in exchange for Tenant’s payment of rent (“Lease”). The Lease

contains a force majeure clause that excuses either party’s obligation to

perform any act required by the Lease if “restrictive laws” hamper the party’s

ability to perform that act:

      22.3 FORCE MAJEURE. If either party is delayed or hindered in
      or prevented from the performance of any act required hereunder
      because of strikes, lockouts, inability to procure labor or
      materials, failure of power, restrictive laws, riots, insurrection,
      war, acts of terrorism, fire, severe inclement weather such as
      snow or ice or other casualty or other reason of a similar or
      dissimilar nature beyond the reasonable control of the party
      delayed, financial inability excepted (any “Force Majeure Event”),
      performance of such act shall be excused for the delay caused
      by the Force Majeure Event. Delays or failure to perform resulting
      from lack of funds or which can be cured by the payment of
      money shall not be Force Majeure Events.

(Emphasis in italics added).

      Tenant operates an LA Fitness health club and fitness facility on the

leased premises. Tenant met its monthly rent obligation through March 2020,

but decided to temporarily close the subject LA Fitness on March 17, 2020,

due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Three days later, Florida Governor Ron

DeSantis issued an executive order that, as of March 20, 2020, required all

gyms and fitness centers in Florida to close temporarily in order to prevent

the spread of Covid-19. Through subsequent governor-issued executive

orders and emergency orders issued by Miami-Dade County (collectively,

the closure orders), Tenant was prevented from operating the LA Fitness

                                      3
until June 8, 2020. Tenant did not pay rent for the leased premises in April,

May, or June 2020.

     In December 2020, Tenant filed the instant two-count declaratory

judgment action against Landlord in the Miami-Dade County Circuit Court.

The first count of Tenant’s operative complaint seeks a declaration that,

pursuant to the Lease’s force majeure clause, Tenant was excused from

paying rent during the closure period because the closure orders prevented

Tenant from operating the subject LA Fitness on the leased premises during

that timeframe. The second count seeks a declaration that Tenant was

excused from paying rent during the closure period pursuant to the equitable

doctrines of impossibility of performance, impracticability of performance and

frustration of purpose. Tenant’s operative complaint also alleges claims for

Landlord’s purported breach of the Lease’s force majeure clause and unjust

enrichment, seeking partial reimbursement for the rent monies Tenant paid

for March 2020, after the closure period commenced.

     In May 2021, Landlord filed a responsive pleading and counterclaim

that alleges Tenant breached the Lease by not paying rent during the closure

period. Tenant’s answer thereto alleges the affirmative defenses of

impossibility of performance, impracticability of performance and frustration

of purpose.

                                      4
          The parties filed competing motions for summary judgment on their

respective pleadings. Following a hearing thereon, on June 8, 2022, the trial

court entered separate summary judgment orders granting Tenant’s motion

and denying Landlord’s motion. Specifically, the trial court determined that,

pursuant to the Lease’s force majeure clause, Tenant was excused from

paying rent during the closure period because the closure orders prevented

Tenant from operating the LA Fitness on the leased premises during that

timeframe. The trial court determined further, in the alternative, that Tenant’s

rent obligation was excused during the closure period pursuant to the

equitable doctrines of impossibility of performance, impracticability of

performance and frustration of purpose. On June 30, 2022, the trial court

entered final judgment in favor of Tenant, awarding Tenant damages,

attorney’s fees and costs totaling $88,310.82, plus interest. Landlord timely

appealed this final summary judgment.

    II.     ANALYSIS2

    A. The Force Majeure Clause

          1. Introduction

2
  “This Court reviews de novo an order granting summary judgment.” Garcia
v. Milport Invs. Ltd., 334 So. 3d 734, 737 n.2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2022). Similarly,
we review de novo the trial court’s interpretation of the force majeure clause
in the Lease. See Rockwell at Amelia Passage, LLC v. Williams, 343 So. 3d
627, 629-30 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).

                                       5
          Tenant’s reliance on the subject force majeure clause to excuse its

obligation to pay rent is misplaced because a plain reading of either of the

two sentences comprising the subject clause precludes Tenant’s sought rent

relief.

          A force majeure clause is a contractual provision that excuses a party’s

non-performance when extraordinary events that are beyond that party’s

control prevent the party from performing under the contract. See Home

Devco/Tivoli Isles LLC v. Silver, 26 So. 3d 718, 722-23 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

“Even so, it ‘is not an opt-out provision; it is limited in scope.’” Rockwell at

Amelia Passage, LLC, 343 So. 3d at 630 (quoting Stein v. Paradigm Mirasol,

LLC, 586 F.3d 849, 858 (11th Cir. 2009)). The plain language of the force

majeure clause itself defines when, and under what circumstances, the

contracting parties are excused from performing under the agreement. See

KRG Oldsmar Project Co., LLC v. CWI, Inc., 48 Fla. L. Weekly D597, 2023

WL 2588634, at *3 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 22, 2023). “When a contract is clear

and unambiguous, the court’s role is to enforce the contract as written, not

to rewrite the contract to make it more reasonable for one of the parties.” Id.

(quoting Snyder v. Fla. Prepaid Coll. Bd., 269 So. 3d 586, 592 (Fla. 1st DCA

2019)).

          2. The first sentence

                                          6
      The first sentence of the subject force majeure clause provides, in

relevant part, that “[i]f either party is delayed or hindered in or prevented from

the performance of any act required hereunder because of . . . restrictive

laws . . . performance of such act shall be excused for the delay caused by

the Force Majeure Event.” (Emphasis added). Hence, for Tenant to

successfully assert the clause to excuse Tenant’s rent obligations, Tenant

had the summary judgment burden to establish that the closure orders (i.e.,

“restrictive laws”3) delayed, hindered or prevented Tenant from paying rent.

      The trial court held that “[o]nce [Tenant’s] right to operate a health club

in the Premises – the very thing for which [Tenant] bargained in entering into

the Lease – was taken away, the Rent obligation necessarily must be

excused. Those obligations go hand in hand.” It appears that the trial court

conflated Tenant’s contractual right to operate a fitness facility at the leased

premises with Tenant’s separate and distinct contractual requirement to pay

rent. While the closure orders no doubt prevented Tenant from operating a

fitness facility at the leased premises, the Lease did not require Tenant to

operate a fitness facility at the leased premises.

3
 Landlord concedes that the closure orders are the type of “restrictive laws”
contemplated by the subject force majeure clause.

                                        7
      The Lease does provide that “[t]he ‘Initial Use[]’ of the Building shall be

for the operation of a health club and fitness facility,” but it further provides

that, subject to certain conditions and limitations, “Tenant may also use the

Building for such other use as Tenant may determine in Tenant’s reasonable

business judgment.” In addition, the Lease provides that “Tenant shall at all

times and from time to time have the right to cease business operations from

the Parcel, provided that Tenant continues to . . . pay Rent due under the

Lease . . . .” Thus, while Tenant certainly has the right to operate a fitness

facility on the leased premises, it is not contractually required to do so. Nor

is Tenant even required to conduct any business operations on the leased

premises so long as Tenant continues to pay rent to Landlord.

      The Lease requires Tenant to pay rent. But the summary judgment

record contains no evidence that Tenant’s payment of rent during the closure

period was delayed, hindered, or prevented by the closure orders. Indeed,

the closure orders did not make it illegal for Tenant to pay rent, and Tenant

concedes that it had the ability to pay rent during the entirety of the closure

period. See Fitness Int’l, LLC v. DDRM Hill Top Plaza L.P., SACV 21-

00142CJC(ADSx), 2021 WL 5456666, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 20, 2021)

(interpreting a similar force majeure provision, concluding that “even if the

Court were to construe the restrictive laws at issue as a force majeure event,

                                       8
Tenant has not shown that its failure to pay rent was proximately caused by

the restrictive laws, as required under the force majeure provision . . . .

Indeed, Tenant concedes that it had the ability to pay the rent during the

entirety of the closure periods.”) (citation omitted).

      We are not unsympathetic to Tenant’s unassailable assertion that its

ability to operate its business – a fitness center – was prevented by the

closure orders. But, our inquiry is whether the Tenant’s obligation to pay rent

was excused by the Lease’s force majeure clause; it was not. The first

sentence of the force majeure clause excuses only acts required to be

performed under the Lease, and, while it was certainly contemplated that

Tenant would operate a fitness facility at the leased premises, the Lease

simply did not require Tenant to do so. Further, Tenant concedes that the

closure orders did not hinder Tenant’s ability to pay rent, an obligation that

was required of Tenant under the Lease. Thus, Tenant failed to meet its

summary judgment burden to establish that “restrictive laws” prevented

Tenant from performing an act that the Lease required.

      3. The second sentence

      Even if the closure orders did hamper Tenant’s ability to pay rent to

Landlord, Tenant would not be excused from paying rent pursuant to the

plain language of the second sentence of the Lease’s subject force majeure

                                        9
clause. This sentence provides, in relevant part, that a party’s “failure to

perform . . . which can be cured by the payment of money shall not be Force

Majeure Events.” Put another way, the force majeure clause applies only to

“Force Majeure Events” and, if a failure to perform can be cured by the

payment of money, that failure to perform, by express definition, does not

constitute a “Force Majeure Event.”

       The act that Tenant failed to perform here was the payment of rent.

Consequently, because Tenant’s failure to meet its rent obligation obviously

could be “cured by the payment of money,” such failure does not constitute

a “Force Majeure Event.” Based on the clause’s second sentence, Tenant’s

obligation to pay rent was not excused by the force majeure clause. See

SVAP III Poway Crossings, LLC v. Fitness Int’l, LLC, 303 Cal. Rptr. 3d 863,

872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2023) (“[T]he lease explicitly excludes from the definition

of force majeure event any ‘failures to perform resulting from lack of funds or

which can be cured by the payment of money.’ We thus conclude that the

plain text of the force majeure provision precludes its application here.”);

Fitness Int’l, LLC, 2021 WL 5456666, at *4 (“The force majeure provision

explicitly states that ‘[d]elays or failures to perform . . . which can be cured

by the payment of money shall not be Force Majeure Events[.]’ Here,

Tenant’s ‘failure[] to perform,’ i.e., its failures to pay rent, can ‘be cured by

                                       10
the payment of money’ and thus cannot constitute a force majeure event.”)

(citation omitted). 4

      Because we conclude that Tenant’s obligation to pay rent was not

excused by the Lease’s force majeure clause, we are compelled to reverse

the trial court’s entry of final summary judgment on this basis. We now turn

to the alternate bases cited by the trial court for entering judgment for Tenant:

the equitable doctrines.

    B. The Equitable Doctrines of Impossibility of Performance,
       Impracticability of Performance and Frustration of Purpose

      The doctrines of impossibility of performance, impracticability of

performance and frustration of purpose are affirmative defenses to a breach

of contract claim. See 11 Fla. Jur. 2d Contracts § 262. 5 “Because of the

4
  At oral argument, Landlord’s counsel conceded that the second sentence’s
definitional restriction would likely preclude Tenant from ever successfully
asserting the force majeure clause as a defense to Tenant’s obligation to pay
rent because a failure to pay rent can always be cured by the payment of
money. Sophisticated parties, however, negotiated the Lease, and, as stated
above, Florida’s courts are powerless to rewrite an unambiguous contractual
provision to make it fairer to one party. See KRG Oldsmar Project Co., LLC,
2023 WL 2588634, at *3.
5
  Under the doctrine of impossibility of performance, “a party is discharged
from performing a contractual obligation which is impossible to perform and
the party neither assumed the risk of impossibility nor could have acted to
prevent the event rendering the performance impossible.” Marathon
Sunsets, Inc. v. Coldiron, 189 So. 3d 235, 236 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016). The
closely related doctrine of impracticability of performance differs in that it
includes a party’s inability to perform “due to unreasonable expense.” Fla.

                                       11
central importance placed upon the enforceability of contracts in our culture,

the defense of impossibility (and its cousins, impracticability and frustration

of purpose) must therefore be applied with great caution if the contingency

was foreseeable at the inception of the agreement.” Ferguson v. Ferguson,

54 So. 3d 553, 556 (Fla. 3d DCA 2011); Am. Aviation, Inc. v. Aero-Flight

Serv., Inc., 712 So. 2d 809, 810 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (“The doctrine of

impossibility of performance should be employed with great caution if the

relevant business risk was foreseeable at the inception of the agreement and

could have been the subject of an express provision of the agreement.”);

Genuinely Loving Childcare, LLC v. Bre Mariner Conway Crossings, LLC,

209 So. 3d 622, 625 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (“The common thread between

these . . . affirmative defenses is foreseeability at the inception of the

lease.”).

      Where a business risk was foreseeable at the inception of the parties’

agreement, “there exists an inference that the risk was either allocated by

Laundry Servs., Inc. v. Sage Condo. Ass’n, 193 So. 3d 68, 68 (Fla. 3d DCA
2016) (quoting Hopfenspirger v. West, 949 So. 2d 1050, 1054 (Fla. 5th DCA
2006)). “In contrast, frustration of purpose arises when one of the parties
finds that the purposes for which he or she bargained, and which purposes
were known to the other party, have been frustrated because of the failure
of consideration or impossibility of performance by the other party.” 11 Fla.
Jur. 2d Contracts § 262.

                                      12
the contract or was assumed by the party.” Genuinely Loving Childcare, LLC,

209 So. 3d at 625. While the foreseeability of a business risk’s occurrence

in the context of contractual defenses is generally an issue of fact, summary

judgment may be entered in a breach of contract action where the business

risk was expressly addressed by the parties’ agreement. Id. at 625-26. Put

another way, if the agreement provides that a party assumes the risk that a

future event may prevent the party from performing a contractual obligation,

then the equitable defenses are unavailing in an action alleging the party’s

breach for non-performance. Id.; Leon Cnty. v. Gluesenkamp, 873 So. 2d

460, 463 (Fla. 1st DCA 2004) (“Where, after a contract is made, a party’s

performance is made impracticable without his fault by the occurrence of an

event the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the

contract was made, his duty to render that performance is discharged, unless

the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.” (quoting

RESTATEMENT (SECOND)        OF   CONTRACTS § 261 (1981))); see also

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 261, cmt. a. (1981) (“The principle,

like others in this Chapter,[6] yields to a contrary agreement by which a party

may assume a greater as well as a lesser obligation. By such an agreement,

6
 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS: CHAPTER 11. IMPRACTICABILITY            OF
PERFORMANCE AND FRUSTRATION OF PURPOSE.

                                      13
for example, a party may undertake to achieve a result irrespective of

supervening events that may render its achievement impossible, and if he

does so his non-performance is a breach even if it is caused by such an

event.”); 1700 Rinehart, LLC v. Advance Am., 51 So. 3d 535, 537-38 (Fla.

5th DCA 2010) (concluding that the frustration of purpose doctrine did not

apply where “the particular potential obstacle was not only foreseen by the

parties, but . . . specifically bargained [for], with the risks of its occurrence

divided by and between the parties in the agreement itself”); City of Miami

Beach v. Championship Sports, Inc., 200 So. 2d 583, 586 (Fla. 3d DCA

1967) (concluding that the doctrines of impossibility of performance and

frustration of purpose did not excuse a lessee from paying rent where the

parties’ lease expressly provided that the lessee was responsible for paying

rent should, for any reason, the lessee fail to take possession of the

premises).

        As discussed above, 7 and as evidenced by the text of the Lease’s force

majeure clause, the parties expressly agreed that Tenant would bear the risk

of having to pay rent to Landlord even if Tenant were financially harmed by

the government’s passage of “restrictive laws.” The Covid-19 pandemic was

definitely unpredictable, but, as evidenced by the force majeure clause’s

7
    See Section II. A. supra.

                                       14
express inclusion of “restrictive laws” in its text, the government’s adoption

of “restrictive laws” was not unpredictable. The parties agreed in the Lease

that Tenant’s rent obligations would not be excused even if government

adopted “restrictive laws.” Hence, Tenant’s rent obligation cannot be

excused under the equitable doctrines. See VEREIT Real Estate, LP v.

Fitness Int’l, LLC, 1 CA-CV 22-0402, 2023 WL 2879976, at *6 (Ariz. Ct. App.

Apr. 11, 2023) (interpreting an identical force majeure clause, concluding

that “[b]ecause Tenant bears the risk of loss under the lease provisions, its

performance cannot be excused under the doctrine of frustration of

purpose”) (citation omitted).

          We, therefore, are compelled to reverse the trial court’s entry of final

summary judgment in favor of Tenant because the equitable doctrines of

impossibility of performance, impracticability of performance and frustration

of purpose are inapplicable to excuse Tenant’s rent obligations in this case.

   III.      CONCLUSION

          Tenant’s obligation to pay rent is not excused by the Lease’s force

majeure clause and Tenant’s equitable defenses are inapplicable to

Landlord’s rent claims. We, therefore, reverse the challenged final judgment

and remand this cause back to the trial court with directions that final

summary judgment be entered in Landlord’s favor.

                                         15
Reversed and remanded with instructions.

                             16