Court Opinion

ID: 9784352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:42:53.398117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:47.315849
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion By
Justice MURPHY.
A prerequisite to presenting a complaint for appellate review is a timely request, objection, or motion that states the grounds for the ruling that the complaining party sought from the trial court. Tex. R.App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A). This Court has cited or quoted this mandate repeatedly to emphasize that the trial court must have the opportunity to rule on an issue or to correct an erroneous ruling before we can review the issue on appeal, much less mandamus a trial court for a clear abuse of discretion. Yet we are conditionally granting mandamus to require the trial court to allow relators the opportunity to replead facts relating to their motion to designate a responsible third party (RTP) when rela-tors never asked the trial court for that opportunity and stated at oral argument that there is “no need to replead.” I respectfully dissent.
The only chapter 33 arguments before the trial court related to the merits of whether the driver of the vehicle in Melvia Lewis’s underlying personal injury lawsuit could be an RTP in his subsequent malpractice lawsuit against his former attorneys. For the first time in their petition *290for writ of mandamus, relators claim the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing them the opportunity to replead facts; yet the facts related to the RTP designation were not disputed. The parties’ dispute is a legal issue. And while I agree that counsel for real party in interest agreed at oral argument that relators are entitled to replead, I would conclude they did not preserve that right for purposes of their petition for writ of mandamus and that they have an adequate remedy at law. Relators can file a motion with the trial court seeking reconsideration on the basis urged to this Court or ask for leave to amend. Relators could have already repleaded at the trial court and readdressed the merits of their substantive arguments as to the capacity of the driver in the underlying personal injury lawsuit to be an RTP in this subsequent legal malpractice lawsuit.
The majority relies on our recent decision in In re Oncor Electric Delivery Co. LLC, 355 S.W.3d 304 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2011, orig. proceeding), as controlling authority for the proposition that the trial court was required on its own motion to allow relators leave to amend their petition under chapter 33. The opinion in that case, as noted by the majority, is silent as to whether there was a request for leave to replead. Notwithstanding that silence, which often is used to distinguish cases, the majority assumes there was no request to replead in Oncor by concluding it “would be inconsistent with Oncor to deny relators relief in this case because they did not specifically request leave to replead.” Chapter 33 no doubt contains mandatory language. Yet we have found waiver or lack of preservation in similar circumstances.
For example, an opposing party must have the opportunity to amend a summary judgment affidavit in response to an objection to the form. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(f); Hewitt v. Biscaro, 353 S.W.3d 304, 307-08 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2011, no pet.). The trial court is required to give a party that opportunity to amend. Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(f). For purposes of appeal, however, that right is waived if the proponent of the evidence fails to request a continuance or “otherwise assert its right to amend.” Brown v. Wong, No. 05-99-00706-CV, 2000 WL 433973, at *3 (Tex.App.-Dallas Apr. 24, 2000, pet. denied) (not designated for publication) (citing Eckmann v. Des Rosiers, 940 S.W.2d 394, 400 (Tex.App.-Austin 1997, no writ)). Similarly, when a trial court sustains special exceptions, the court “must give the pleader an opportunity to amend the pleading” — the trial court has no discretion. Friesenhahn v. Ryan, 960 S.W.2d 656, 658 (Tex.1998). The complaining party must, however, prove “the opportunity to replead was requested and denied to preserve the error for review.” Parker v. Barefield, 206 S.W.3d 119, 120 (Tex.2006) (per curiam); Cadle Co. v. Jenkins, 266 S.W.3d 4, 7 n. 5 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.).
It is incumbent on counsel, when possible, to allow trial judges and opposing parties the opportunity to consider new arguments before raising those for the first time in a petition for writ of mandamus or on appeal. Similarly, we are empowered as an appellate court to address only those issues preserved for review. See Tex.R.App. P. 33.1. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to grant mandamus.