Court Opinion

ID: 9533018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:27:34.953794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:53.712093
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE EGAN, dissenting: This case is one more of too many such cases: An 11th hour and 59th minute request by a defendant for substitution of attorneys and an attendant, and more important, request for a continuance. Certain facts appear in almost all of them: A serious offense; a strong case for the prosecution; a defendant who is no stranger to the criminal justice system; and an oral motion for substitution made on the day of trial. This case fits the pattern: Overwhelming evidence of shocking and disgusting crimes committed by the defendant, who had previously been convicted of the murder of a four-year-old child in 1978 and had been sentenced to 20 years in the penitentiary; and an oral motion for substitution on the day of trial. The defendant and a codefendant were present on September 13, 1993, when the case was continued until October 18, 1993. A private attorney filed his appearance on behalf of the codefendant on September 13. Colloquy ensued in which the trial judge made it clear that he was allowing a substitution of attorney on behalf of the codefendant with the understanding that the case would go to trial on October 18. The assistant public defender who represented the defendant told the judge, "On behalf of Mr. Childress, we’ll go by agreement. We are ready.” (Emphasis added.) The judge then continued the case until October 18. He again made it clear that the case would go to trial on that date. On October 18, it was the judge who initiated the inquiry about a possible substitution by questioning the defendant. He asked the defendant if he had told the new attorney that his case was scheduled for trial and the defendant said, "Well, I didn’t understand that it was set for trial today myself, Your Honor.” The judge made remarks later that obviously show that he did not believe the defendant. He said, "You knew well that this case was set for trial.” He also said that the defendant had misled his lawyer and "was disingenuous as far as [the judge was] concerned.” Those conclusions by the judge are amply supported by the record. During the colloquy, the assistant public defender told the judge that the defendant had told him three weeks before that he had hired a private attorney. The granting of a continuance rests within the discretion of the trial judge. Among the factors to be considered in the exercise of that discretion are whether the defendant has shown diligence (People v. West (1990), 137 Ill. 2d 558, 560 N.E.2d 594); the failure of the defendant to articulate an acceptable reason for desiring new counsel when he was already represented by an experienced court-appointed criminal lawyer (People v. Jackson (1991), 216 Ill. App. 3d 1, 574 N.E.2d 719); and the representation by current counsel for a lengthy period prior to the request for new counsel (People v. Bodoh (1990), 200 Ill. App. 3d 415, 558 N.E.2d 178). The defendant has not shown diligence; during the 11 months the case was pending, the defendant never expressed any dissatisfaction with the assistant public defender who had represented him for a considerable amount of time and who answered ready for trial on September 13; and he failed to articulate any reason for desiring new counsel. The case had been continued by agreement 14 times. I refuse to accept the claim that the responsibility for those continuances may not in any way be attributed to the defendant. Insofar as the record is concerned, every single one of them could just as easily have been acquiescence on the part of the State to requests of the defendant. The three cases relied upon by the majority, Little, Washington and Young, cite People v. Green (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 555, 248 N.E.2d 116, in support of their reversals. In Green, the defendant was arrested on May 17, 1968, and charged with petty theft. On July 2, 1968, the second trial date, the defendant appeared without an attorney and requested a continuance. He represented that his lawyer was in Washington and had been paid by his church. The judge then appointed a public defender and compelled the defendant to go to trial that day. As is obvious, the facts of People v. Green are far removed from the facts of those cases, and they certainly are far removed from the facts of this case. In any event, Washington, Little and Young are distinguishable. In Washington, the public defender told the judge that the defendant had informed him that his family had retained an attorney who asked that the case be continued for seven days. The judge denied the motion without making any further inquiry. The appellate court reversed and emphasized the fact that the trial court "failed to conduct any inquiry into the stated reason for the request for the continuance when it summarily denied the request.” (Washington, 195 Ill. App. 3d at 525.) In Little, which relied on Washington, the court pointed out that the trial judge "conducted no inquiry into the truth or falsity of the assertions by defendant or the public defender,” and the court stressed the fact that the trial judge erroneously concluded that he could not grant a continuance because the defendant had previously demanded trial. (Little, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 727.) I point out that neither Washington nor Little involved a codefendant. In Young, there was a codefendant whose lawyer objected to any continuance. But the court, in reversing the conviction, emphasized the fact that the trial judge never determined whether the substituting attorney was prepared to go to trial. Young, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 134. In sharp contrast to those cases, the trial judge here made a conscientious attempt to determine the facts. In sharp contrast to those cases, the trial judge here had a defendant who not only attempted to mislead the judge but did mislead the substituting lawyer. Before leaving this point, I wish to make it clear that in my judgment the substituting lawyer, who had been retained three weeks before, had the obligation at least to contact the assistant public defender who was then representing the defendant in order to ascertain the facts. And there was nothing to prevent him from filing a written motion weeks before October 18 asking for a continuance. During the hearing, the substituting lawyer, who said he was not able to proceed that day but never said how much time he would need, indicated a willingness to proceed as co-counsel with the assistant public defender, but the assistant public defender stated that that would be contrary to office policy. The judge then said that the substituting lawyer would not be permitted to file an appearance. The substituting lawyer then asked if the judge was finding that the request for continuance was "primarily for the purpose of delay,” and the judge said, "Not necessarily.” He added some remarks. The substituting lawyer again asked the judge if he was finding that the defendant was requesting a continuance "primarily for the purpose of delay,” and the judge again said, "Not necessarily.” The judge again made additional remarks. The defendant’s lawyer on appeal, who is the substituting lawyer, has now seized on those answers by the judge as proof that the motion for continuance was not made for the purpose of delay. I believe that the judge’s answers were equivocal, and I point out that the judge did make a finding that "the interest of justice” required that the case go to trial that day; he also said that he did not feel that a "continuance at this juncture is just.” At this point, I must express a respectful refusal to accept the general language quoted by the majority from People v. Young that "[ujnless the court specifically finds that defendant is utilizing his right to counsel to thwart the administration of justice, defendant’s right to counsel of his choice ought to be respected.” (Young, 207 Ill. App. 3d at 135.) No citation is made to support such an all-encompassing pronouncement; and my research has found none, certainly none from the supreme court. But if there is such a requirement, I believe the judge’s findings satisfy it. Another fact in the record should be noted. There was another lawyer representing the codefendant who was prepared to go to trial on October 18. The trial judge called another judge a few days before October 18 and requested that the codefendant’s lawyer not be held to trial before her to enable him to go to. trial on October 18. The plans of the other lawyer, of course, the right of his client to a quick trial and the efforts of the trial judge and the accommodation by another judge are all to be held for naught because of the desires of an undiligent and untruthful defendant. It has been said that the right to be represented by counsel of one’s own choosing "may not be employed as a weapon to indefinitely thwart the administration of justice or to otherwise embarrass the effective prosecution of crime.” (People v. Friedman (1980), 79 Ill. 2d 341, 349, 403 N.E.2d 229.) In my judgment, regardless of how charitably the trial judge may have characterized the motion to substitute, the result sought by the defendant would embarrass the effective prosecution of crime. The trial judge pithily said it all when he said that the granting of a continuance would not be "just.” He exercised his discretion after careful consideration, and that discretion was not abused. For these reasons, I dissent.