Court Opinion

ID: 9781856
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 17:34:10.821594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:40.668929
License: Public Domain

OPINION PICKARD, Judge. {1} This case requires us to review and clarify the current case law interpreting the definition of “dependent Indian community” contained in 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) (1994), for the purpose of determining whether the State has jurisdiction over this Navajo Defendant. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit established a two-step analysis to determine what constitutes a “dependent Indian community.” See Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Watchman, 52 F.3d 1531 (10th Cir.1995). We adopted that analysis in a prior opinion in this case. See State v. Frank, 1997-NMCA-093, ¶ 2, 123 N.M. 734, 945 P.2d 464. However, that analysis was recently called into question when the United States Supreme Court interpreted the meaning of 18 U.S.C, § 1151(b) for the first time since its inception and established a somewhat different test to determine jurisdiction in what is argued to be Indian country. See Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 118 S.Ct. 948, 140 L.Ed.2d 30 (1998) (hereinafter Venetie). {2} Since that time, the Tenth Circuit has twice interpreted the Venetie analysis, first in United States v. Roberts, 185 F.3d 1125 (10th Cir.1999), and then in HRI, Inc. v. Environmental Protection Agency, 198 F.3d 1224, 1248 (10th Cir.2000). We now adopt the Tenth Circuit’s analysis of the threshold issue of defining the appropriate “community of reference” as established in Watchman, adopted in Frank, and reiterated in HRI. We then require application of the United States Supreme Court’s two-factor test for determining the meaning of “dependent Indian community” established in Venetie, which modifies the second step of the Watchman analysis. We hold that the district court, in failing to analyze the community of reference issue, applied incorrect criteria in determining jurisdiction in this ease. We reverse and remand for additional findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this decision. ISSUES {3} Defendant makes three claims on appeal: (1) the district court did not follow the mandate of this Court in the first appeal of the case because it did not use the two-step analysis ordered in Frank; (2) the district court’s findings of fact are insufficient for it to have analyzed the jurisdiction issue under Venetie as applied in the Tenth Circuit; and (3) the area in question is a “dependent Indian community” as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151, as a matter of law. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY {4} Defendant appeals his convictions of six counts of vehicular homicide stemming from an accident that occurred on Highway 44, a state road that traverses northwestern New Mexico. The following facts are uncontested. Highway 44 runs through an area known as the checkerboard, so-called because of its pattern of land owned or administered by the federal government, the Navajo Nation, Navajo allottees, the state, and private non-Indians. The accident occurred on land owned by the federal government and administered by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM). Though the situs of the accident is not within the boundaries of the Navajo Reservation, it is within a political subdivision of the Navajo Nation known as the Nageezi Chapter. Defendant, a registered member of the Navajo Nation, moved for the charges to be dismissed for lack of state court jurisdiction, arguing that the area in question was a dependent Indian community as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b). The district court denied his motion. Defendant then pleaded guilty to the charges, pursuant to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162 (1970), and reserved his right to appeal on the jurisdiction issue. On appeal, this Court held that the district court applied incorrect criteria in determining whether the accident occurred in Indian country as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b). See Frank, 123 N.M. 734, 945 P.2d 464, 1997-NMCA-093, ¶ 2. We remanded the case to the district court for additional findings and conclusions and instructed it to apply the two-step analysis set out in Watchman. See id. On remand, the district court again made findings of fact and conclusions of law, determining that the area in question is not a dependent Indian community under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b). Defendant now appeals from this second district court decision. DISCUSSION Issue One: The Mandate of This Court on Remand.  {5} Defendant is correct in arguing that the general rule is that the lower court’s duty on remand is to comply with the mandate of the appellate court and to follow the order without variation. See Vinton Eppsco Inc. v. Showe Homes, Inc., 97 N.M. 225, 226, 638 P.2d 1070, 1071 (1981). However, the general rule does not apply in this case because new law was announced in the interval between our remand and the district court’s re-hearing of the ease. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at 527, 118 S.Ct. 948 (noting that this decision was the first occasion for the Supreme Coui’t to interpret the term “dependent Indian communities” since 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) was enacted in 1948, rejecting the six-factor test established by the Ninth Circuit, and establishing a new two-factor test to determine what constitutes a dependent Indian community under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b)). Defendant does not cite any authority that discusses a lower court’s mandate in the event of intervening new law, so we need not address Defendant’s direct claims. See Fernandez v. Farmers Ins. Co., 115 N.M. 622, 627, 857 P.2d 22, 27 (1993) (stating the general rule is that cases are not authority for propositions not considered).  {6} Here, the district court did not follow our mandate because it concluded that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Venetie, announced subsequent to the remand, superseded previous law. The district court is correct, because the Supreme Court has held that when it applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, it is a controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all cases still open on review, even if the events predated the announcement of the rule. See Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 96, 113 S.Ct. 2510, 125 L.Ed.2d 74 (1993); see also State v. Dick, 1999-NMCA-062, ¶¶ 13-14, 127 N.M. 382, 981 P.2d 796 (applying Venetie analysis on appeal of case in which trial court used Watchman analysis); cf. Clark v. Tansy 118 N.M. 486, 491, 882 P.2d 527, 532 (1994) (holding that when a habeas petitioner in a criminal case can show that there has been an intervening change of law, relitigation of an issue decided adversely on direct appeal is not barred). However, “[i]n applying federal law, [the Court of Appeals] follow[s] the precedent established by the federal courts, particularly the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.” State v. Snyder, 1998-NMCA-166, ¶ 9, 126 N.M. 168, 967 P.2d 843. The Tenth Circuit has twice discussed the Supreme Court’s decision in Venetie, interpreting the Supreme Court’s analysis in relation to Indian country in the southwest. Before we can discuss Defendant’s remaining issues, we must first consider how to apply the Supreme Court’s and Tenth Circuit’s decisions to this case. Background {7} 18 U.S.C. § 1151 provides: “Indian country”, as used in this chapter, means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same. {8} In its interpretation of this statute prior to Venetie, the Tenth Circuit’s analysis was a two-step analysis. See Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1543. The first step was to determine the appropriate “community of reference.” Id. at 1542. In so doing, the “[t]he two guiding principles are: (1) the status of the area in question as a community and (2) consideration of that locale or community of reference within the context of the surrounding area.” Frank, 123 N.M. 734, 945 P.2d 464, 1997-NMCA-093, ¶ 9 (internal quotations and citations omitted). The second step was a four-factor test to determine whether the land in question is a dependent Indian community within the meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1151: “(1) whether the United States has retained ‘title to the lands which it permits the Indians to occupy’ and ‘authority to enact regulations and protective laws respecting this territory,’; (2) ‘the nature of the area in question, the relationship of the inhabitants in the area to Indian tribes and to the federal government, and the established practice of government agencies toward the area,’; (3) whether there is ‘an element of cohesiveness ... manifested either by economic pursuits in the area, common interests, or needs of the inhabitants as supplied by that locality,’; and (4) ‘whether such lands have been set apart for the use, occupancy and protection of dependent Indian peoples.’ ” Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1545 (quoting United States v. South Dakota, 665 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir.1981)). {9} In Venetie, the Supreme Court held that an Alaska Native village occupying former reservation land was not a dependent Indian community because the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act effectively removed federal supervision of all Native lands in Alaska. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at 533. The Court also held that the term “dependent Indian communities” referred to a “limited category of Indian lands that are neither reservations nor allotments, and that satisfy two requirements-first, they must have been set aside by the Federal Government for the use of the Indians as Indian land; second, they must be under federal superintendence.” Id. at 527, 118 S.Ct. 948. {10} The Tenth Circuit has distinguished its decisions from Venetie both times it has addressed the question. The Tenth Circuit first addressed Venetie as it related to the Choctaw Nation’s disputed land in Oklahoma. See Roberts, 185 F.3d at 1132. In Roberts, the court conceded that under Venetie, the relationship between informal reservations and dependent Indian communities is no longer entirely clear, but concluded that dependent Indian communities, whether formal reservations or not, continue to exist under 18 U.S.C. § 1151 and under United States Supreme Court jurisprudence. See id. at 1133. The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue the second time as it related to New Mexico’s checkerboard area in a decision announced in January 2000. See HRI, 198 F.3d at 1231-32.  {11} The HRI court concluded that nothing in Venetie speaks to the first step of its Watchman test, that of determining a proper community of reference prior to determining whether the area in question is a dependent Indian community under 18 U.S.C. § 1151. See HRI, 198 F.3d at 1248-49. The court noted that the United States Supreme Court did not address the need to define a proper community of reference because of the categorical effect of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act on virtually all Alaskan native lands. See id. at 1249. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit court stated, “[bjecause Venetie does not speak directly to the issue, barring en bane review by th[e] court, Watchman ... continues to require a ‘community of reference’ analysis prior to determining whether land qualifies as a dependent Indian community under the set-aside and supervision requirements of 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b).” HRI, 198 F.3d at 1249. Therefore a district court, as the first step in its analysis, is to determine the proper community of reference as required by Watchman and as discussed in detail in our first opinion, noting that this analysis must require a broader view than just the accident site. See Frank, 123 N.M. 734, 945 P.2d 464, 1997-NMCA-093, ¶ 8. {12} The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the second step of its Watchman test may require “some modification” because of Venetie. See HRI, 198 F.3d at 1248. It also recognized that the impact of Venetie on the Watchman analysis would raise potentially difficult questions. See id. at 1254. But the HRI court did not reach the second step of the analysis in its HRI decision. The court did presume that Venetie would reduce the weight afforded to two of the four factors of the second step in the Watchman analysis, but did not discuss what “modification” might be needed. However, the HRI court did use the two-part Venetie analysis in determining whether one parcel of the land in question qualified as Indian country under 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a). See id. at 1250-54. Analysis of the Venetie test.  {13} Factor one: in determining whether land has been set aside by the federal government for use as Indian land, the Tenth Circuit stated that “land purchased under congressional appropriation of funds for the purpose of ‘procuring home and farm sites, with adequate water rights’ and ‘[f]or the purchase of land and water rights’ for Indians was validly set aside for the purposes of the Indian country determination.” Id. at 1251 (quoting United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535, 537-39 & n. 4, 58 S.Ct. 286, 82 L.Ed. 410 (1938)). Indian country status does not need a formal designation of reservation, but can merely be lands which Congress intended to reserve for a tribe and over which Congress intended primary jurisdiction to rest in federal and tribal governments, such as trust lands and allotted lands. See HRI, 198 F.3d at 1251. {14} Factor two: in determining whether the land is under the superintendence of the federal government, the HRI court determined several ways that land could be considered to be under federal supervision for the purpose of establishing dependent Indian communities: (1) land supervised by the Bureau of Indian Affairs, (2) land where the United States retains title or oversees the property, and (3) land that is under the jurisdiction and control of Congress. See id. at 1253; see also Dick, 1999-NMCA-062, ¶ 14 (noting that congressional enactment is an express set-aside of land that ensures that the land is occupied by an Indian community). Of note, however, is the Venetie Court’s finding that government social programs alone are not indicia of active federal control. See Venetie, 522 U.S. at 534, 118 S.Ct. 948. The Venetie Court calls for the government to have active control of the lands in question, “effectively acting as a guardian for the Indians.” Id. at 533, 118 S.Ct. 948. Issue Two: Insufficient Facts to Use Venetie as Applied by the Tenth Circuit.  {15} The district court concluded that Venetie obviated the need to use the analysis set out in Frank. However, as we have noted, a community of reference analysis must be undertaken as a first step to determine what is the land in question prior' to applying the Venetie factors to that land. In its decision, contrary to the statement in the dissent that the district court did not “focus myopically on just the site of the actual automobile collision,” the district court continually and exclusively referred to the “area in question,” the “surrounding land,” the “collision site,” the “crash site,” the “area in which the crash occurred,” and “the land immediately surrounding the collision site.” There is no suggestion that the district court considered an area larger than the immediate accident site, much less “looked toward the horizon where essentially [it] saw nothing,” or that it analyzed a community of reference when determining that the state had jurisdiction to prosecute Defendant. A broader view of the community of reference is required. See Frank, 123 N.M. 734, 945 P.2d 464, 1997-NMCA-093, ¶ 8; see also Dick, 1999-NMCA-062, ¶¶ 14-15 (analyzing the 13,150 acres of Fort Wingate as a community of reference to determine if place where Defendant was arrested was dependent Indian community); United States v. Adair, 111 F.3d 770 (10th Cir.1997) (analyzing the six to twelve square miles surrounding the Rocky Mountain School to determine if the situs of the offense occurred in dependent Indian community); HRI, 198 F.3d 1224 (considering the entire parcel of 200 acres in determining jurisdiction over the site of the Churchroek mine). The district court, as a threshold inquiry, must look for an appropriate community of reference before it applies the Venetie factors. The district court must discern an appropriate area for its community of reference inquiry according to the evidence presented in both hearings.  {16} The purpose of locating an appropriate community of reference before undertaking the Venetie analysis is to identify the land at issue and, in doing so, attempt to identify the community, if any, most affected by an action. If the community is a “dependent Indian community,” then we owe due deference to tribal sovereignty and jurisdiction. See State v. Ortiz, 105 N.M. 308, 310, 731 P.2d 1352, 1354 (Ct.App.1986). While we agree with the dissent that the State has a legitimate interest in prosecuting crimes committed within its borders, we also recognize that tribes have an similar interest in sovereignty and self-government. See Watchman, 52 F.3d at 1536. “Jurisdictional status of land implicates not only ownership, but also the core sovereignty interests of Indian tribes and the federal government in exercising civil and criminal authority over tribal territory.” HRI, 198 F.3d at 1245-46. It is these core sovereignty interests that are glossed over by the dissent. {17} Although the Navajo Nation would lack jurisdiction to prosecute Defendant for manslaughter under the federal Major Crimes Act as the dissent points out, the tribe may potentially wish to exercise jurisdiction over other offenses, such as the DWI at issue in Dick. See Dick, 1999-NMCA-062, ¶ 2. As the jurisdictional analysis applies equally to major crimes prosecuted by the federal government and minor crimes that the tribe may wish to handle on a local level in their tribal courts with tribal services, the determination of an appropriate community of reference is not a “sociological expedition,” but is an attempt to identify the real interests at stake and to determine jurisdictional issues with a degree of flexibility that gives due respect to state, federal, and tribal interests. {18} We also note that Ortiz, a case relied on by the dissent, is not contrary to our holding. In Ortiz, the State was attempting to expand its jurisdiction to include crimes committed within the exterior boundaries of the San Juan Pueblo. See 105 N.M. at 309, 731 P.2d at 1353. The State argued that land designated to the Pueblo was distinguishable from land designated as a reservation, such that 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a), which defines “Indian country” to include “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation,” did not apply. See id. at 311, 731 P.2d at 1355. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the two were indistinguishable. See id. at 312, 731 P.2d at 1356. The quotation cited by the dissent is not critical of the “community of reference” analysis per se, but recognizes that in the context of established Pueblo boundaries, such analysis is both unnecessary and undesirable. See id. In the case at bar, however, there are no clear boundaries, and it is the land itself that is checkerboard. It is therefore necessary for the district court to discern an appropriate area in which to evaluate jurisdiction. Issue Three: Dependent Indian Community as a Matter of Law.  {19} Defendant argues that the facts presented below establish as a matter of law that the Nageezi Chapter or a portion thereof is a dependent Indian community as defined by 18 U.S.C. § 1151(b) using the Watchman, HRI, or Venetie tests. Because determination of a dependent Indian community turns on specific findings of fact unique to this case, and because there are conflicting facts or facts susceptible to conflicting inferences regarding the determinations of the proper community of reference, we cannot say, as a matter of law, that the Nageezi Chapter is a dependent Indian community. Evidence of Community of Reference. {20} The United States Supreme Court has refused to precisely define “community,” recognizing that challenges to vagueness in the statute must be examined in light of the facts of the case at hand. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 549-50, 95 S.Ct. 710, 42 L.Ed.2d 706 (1975). Defendant argued in the first hearing that the entire Nageezi Chapter was the appropriate community of reference. In the second hearing, he argued that a representative portion of a five-by-five mile area around the accident site is the appropriate community of reference. In his brief in chief, he argues that even a five-mile radius around the accident site is an appropriate area to analyze as a community of reference because it meets all the criteria described in Frank to determine community. See Frank, 123 N.M. 734, 945 P.2d 464, 1997-NMCA-093, ¶¶ 9-11. Defendant asked the court in the second hearing to consider that the people who inhabit Nageezi make it a community, even though the land is a checkerboard area. Defendant notes that the Nageezi Chapter has a strong element of cohesiveness because inhabitants share a common membership in the chapter and share common economic pursuits. Within a five-mile radius of the accident site, there is a traditional Navajo church, a BIA school, a post office, a gas station, and a trading post that offers basic necessities. The Nageezi Chapter itself is made up of approximately 40 percent Indian land. The land is part of the traditional Navajo homeland. Defendant admitted at the second hearing that he had no demographic data, but according to the undisputed testimony of a Nageezi landlord at the first hearing, the entire Nageezi chapter is inhabited exclusively by Navajos, with the exception of the Anglo owners of the Nageezi and Blanco trading posts. The trading post owners trade almost exclusively with Navajos. Most BLM grazing permits are passed down through Navajo families. The Nageezi Chapter provides business and housing services to members, and the Chapter House hosts social gatherings and elan meetings. There is tribal housing consisting of 15-20 homes to the west of the accident site and six homes located two miles north of the accident site. Nageezi contracts with Jemez Electric for power in the area. The volunteer firefighters are funded by the county, but are all Navajo. Though Navajo Department of Public Safety officers do not usually patrol Highway 44, they will take Navajo drivers who commit misdemeanors to tribal court. The district court must determine whether or not this or other evidence is sufficient to constitute a meaningful community of reference. See Frank, 123 N.M. 734, 945 P.2d 464, 1997-NMCA-093, ¶¶ 10-11. {21} At the second hearing, the State suggested that the community of reference should properly be Farmington, Aztec, and Bloomfield, since they are the closest places that provide comprehensive services such as shopping and health care. However, the community of reference must necessarily contain the situs of the offense, so we reject those communities for this analysis. In its answer brief, the State suggests that the two-mile radius around the accident site is an appropriate community of reference. The State presented evidence showing that the two-mile area is essentially vacant land administered by the BLM and used only for grazing purposes. Since no one can legally live on BLM land, it cannot be a community. On one side of the highway at the accident site is a grazing permit held by a Navajo, but the grazing permit on the other side is held by an Anglo. In addition, the State presented evidence that the San Juan County Sheriffs Department patrols Highway 44 and does not cite Navajo traffic offenders to tribal court. It presented evidence that firefighting services are funded by the state or the county and supervised by the San Juan County Fire Marshall, emergency medical services are provided by San Juan Region EMS and not by Indian Health Services, and Bloomfield Public Schools serves the area and many residents choose to bus their children to Bloomfield. The State also presented evidence that the Navajo Nation does not provide a school at Nageezi and the BIA school accepts Native American children from outside Nageezi, that the Navajo Department of Public Safety officer who was first on the scene declined to accept jurisdiction over the scene or the ensuing investigation and criminal charges, and Navajo officers do not handle criminal investigations on Highway 44. At the hearing, the State also noted that members of the Nageezi Chapter can live anywhere and still be members of the Chapter. The district court must determine whether or not this or other evidence is sufficient to determine that there is not a meaningful community of reference surrounding the accident site. See Frank, 123 N.M. 734, 945 P.2d 464, 1997-NMCA-093, ¶¶ 10-11. {22} The district court may conclude, as the Adair Court did, that there is no appropriate community of reference in which the accident occurred. The foregoing facts would support such a conclusion. If, after analyzing the relevant community the court finds no community of reference, then the analysis ends and the Venetie test need not be undertaken. See Frank, 123 N.M. 734, 945 P.2d 464, 1997-NMCA-093, ¶9. If an appropriate community of reference emerges from any of the facts presented, the district court must then analyze that community using the two Venetie factors as described in this decision. Application of Venetie.  {23} In applying the Venetie factors discussed above to the appropriate community of reference, the district court must first consider whether significant portions of that community were set aside for the use of Indians as Indian trust land or allotments. See HRI, 198 F.3d at 1251. We note that the presence of non-Indian owned land does not necessarily mean that the area is not Indian country for the purposes of the statute. See State v. Ortiz, 105 N.M. 308, 312, 731 P.2d 1352, 1356 (Ct.App.1986) (finding that land outside of the exterior boundaries of a pueblo constituted Indian land for the purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994)); see also Dick, 1999-NMCA-062, ¶ 25 (indicating that privately held land can constitute “Indian country” when it is within the boundaries of land that is properly considered “Indian country”). In applying the second factor, the district court must consider whether significant portions of the land constituting the .community of reference are owned and supervised by the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the United States government and are under active federal control. See HRI, 198 F.3d at 1253. This is a factual inquiry that is necessarily dependant on the court’s first-step conclusions regarding an appropriate community of reference. Analysis of the Venetie factors in relation to the community of reference are also subject to conflicting facts and facts susceptible to conflicting inferences as discussed above. The district court could find that the appropriate community of reference does or does not meet the Venetie factor requirements. CONCLUSION {24} We reverse and remand to the district court to make particularized findings of fact and conclusions of law consistent with this opinion. The district court may, but is not required to, hold a hearing, and it may, but is not required to, take further written submissions. {25} IT IS SO ORDERED. M. CHRISTINA ARMIJO, Judge, concurs. RICHARD C. BOSSON, Chief Judge, dissents.