Court Opinion

ID: 9395669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 16:01:13.605615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:10.500793
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-1125   Document: 59     Page: 1   Filed: 05/18/2023

        NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

   United States Court of Appeals
       for the Federal Circuit
                 ______________________

     XR COMMUNICATIONS, LLC, DBA VIVATO
              TECHNOLOGIES,
              Plaintiff-Appellant

                            v.

   ARRIS SOLUTIONS, INC., RUCKUS WIRELESS,
                     INC.,
              Defendants-Appellees
             ______________________

                  2022-1125, 2022-1141
                 ______________________

    Appeals from the United States District Court for the
 Northern District of California in Nos. 3:18-cv-01992-
 WHO, 3:18-cv-02736-WHO, Judge William H. Orrick, III.
                 ______________________

                 Decided: May 18, 2023
                 ______________________

    REZA MIRZAIE, Russ August & Kabat, Los Angeles, CA,
 argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by MINNA
 CHAN, MARC A. FENSTER, BRIAN DAVID LEDAHL, JAMES
 PICKENS.

    MATTHEW YUNGWIRTH, Duane Morris LLP, Atlanta,
 GA, argued for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
 ALICE SNEDEKER.
Case: 22-1125    Document: 59      Page: 2    Filed: 05/18/2023

 2           XR COMMUNICATIONS, LLC   v. ARRIS SOLUTIONS, INC.

                  ______________________

     Before PROST, REYNA, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
 PROST, Circuit Judge.
      XR Communications, LLC dba Vivato Technologies
 (“Vivato”) appeals an order and judgment of the U.S. Dis-
 trict Court for the Northern District of California that con-
 strued a claim term in U.S. Patent No. 6,611,231 (“the
 ’231 patent”) as subject to 35 U.S.C. § 112 ¶ 6 1 and held
 claims 1–9 and 12 of the ’231 patent invalid as indefinite.
 We affirm.
                               I
    The ’231 patent relates to wireless communication sys-
 tems. The term at issue is “search receiver logic,” which
 appears in illustrative claim 1 as follows:
     search receiver logic operatively coupled to said
     control logic and said at least one receiver and con-
     figured to update said routing information based at
     least in part on cross-correlated signal information
     that is received by said receiver using said adaptive
     antenna.
 ’231 patent claim 1.
     In a well-considered order, the district court evaluated
 (1) whether “search receiver logic” is a means-plus-function

     1    The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”) re-
 designated § 112 ¶¶ 2 and 6 as, respectively, § 112(b) and
 (f). Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29,
 sec. 4(c), 125 Stat. 284, 296 (2011). We refer to the pre-AIA
 version because the application resulting in the ’231 patent
 was filed before September 16, 2012. See id. sec. 4(e),
 125 Stat. at 297; see also Media Rights Techs., Inc. v. Cap.
 One Fin. Corp., 800 F.3d 1366, 1371 n.1 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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 XR COMMUNICATIONS, LLC   v. ARRIS SOLUTIONS, INC.           3

 term subject to § 112 ¶ 6 and, if so, (2) whether the ’231 pa-
 tent’s specification discloses adequate corresponding struc-
 ture to avoid indefiniteness under § 112 ¶ 2. See XR
 Commc’ns, LLC v. Ruckus Wireless, Inc., No. 18-cv-01992,
 2021 WL 3918136, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2021) (“Claim
 Construction Order”).
      On the first issue, the district court concluded that
 “search receiver logic” invokes § 112 ¶ 6. The court cor-
 rectly noted that, because this term lacks the word
 “means,” there is a rebuttable presumption against appli-
 cation of § 112 ¶ 6. Id. (citing Williamson v. Citrix Online,
 LLC, 792 F.3d 1339, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc in rele-
 vant part)). It also correctly noted that such a presumption
 “can be overcome and [§ 112 ¶ 6] will apply if the chal-
 lenger demonstrates that the claim term fails to recite suf-
 ficiently definite structure or else recites function without
 reciting sufficient structure for performing that function.”
 Id. at *4 (emphasis added) (cleaned up) (quoting William-
 son, 792 F.3d at 1349). The court observed that “Vivato
 agree[d] that one of the claimed functions of ‘search re-
 ceiver logic’ is to ‘update said routing information.’” Id.
 at *6; see also ’231 patent claim 1. And it concluded that
 defendants-appellees ARRIS Solutions, Inc. and Ruckus
 Wireless, Inc. (collectively, “Ruckus”) overcame the pre-
 sumption against application of § 112 ¶ 6 by showing that
 the term does not recite sufficient structure for performing
 that function. Id. at *6–10.
     The district court acknowledged that a person of ordi-
 nary skill in the art (“POSITA”) might have understood,
 from different fields like electronic warfare or Global Posi-
 tioning System (“GPS”) receivers, that “search receiver” or
 “search receiver logic” connoted some structure. Id. at
 *6–9. But the court observed: “The inquiry is not whether
 a POSITA would have some general understanding as to
 the structure of the term ‘search receiver logic.’ It is
 whether a POSITA would associate a sufficiently definite
 structure with ‘search receiver logic’ for performing the
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 4           XR COMMUNICATIONS, LLC   v. ARRIS SOLUTIONS, INC.

 claimed function [of updating said routing information].”
 Id. at *5 (relying on Williamson and Egenera, Inc. v. Cisco
 Sys., Inc., 972 F.3d 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2020)). After reviewing
 the ’231 patent’s specification and Vivato’s and Ruckus’s
 competing expert declarations, the court concluded that a
 POSITA would not understand “search receiver logic” as
 structure for updating said routing information. See, e.g.,
 id. at *9 (“As [Ruckus’s expert] Dr. Negus explains, a
 POSITA would not understand that a ‘receiver’ or ‘search
 receiver,’ or any known structures of ‘receiver’ and ‘search
 receiver’ from different fields, perform the function of up-
 dating routing information.”); see also id. at *6 (observing
 that the specification “describes at length the functional
 flow of the exemplary search receiver process, but only does
 so in generic functional terms without referring to any
 search receiver structure, whether from electronic warfare,
 GPS receivers, or any other field” (cleaned up)). The court
 therefore construed the term as invoking § 112 ¶ 6.
     On the second issue, the district court concluded that
 the specification fails to disclose adequate structure corre-
 sponding to the claimed function of updating said routing
 information. In particular, the court rejected Vivato’s ar-
 guments that “search receiver 164” in Figure 18 and steps
 610 and 612 of Figure 22 disclose adequate corresponding
 structure. Id. at *11–15. As a result, the court held the
 claims at issue invalid as indefinite under § 112 ¶ 2 and
 entered final judgment accordingly.
    Vivato timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
                              II
     “Regarding questions of claim construction, including
 whether claim language invokes [§ 112 ¶ 6], the district
 court’s determinations based on evidence intrinsic to the
 patent as well as its ultimate interpretations of the patent
 claims are legal questions that we review de novo.” Wil-
 liamson, 792 F.3d at 1346. “To the extent the district court,
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 XR COMMUNICATIONS, LLC    v. ARRIS SOLUTIONS, INC.             5

 in construing the claims, makes underlying findings of fact
 based on extrinsic evidence, we review such findings of fact
 for clear error.” Id.
     Vivato makes two arguments on appeal—first, that the
 district court erred in concluding that “search receiver
 logic” invokes § 112 ¶ 6; and second, that the district court
 erred in concluding that the specification fails to disclose
 adequate structure corresponding to the claimed function
 of updating said routing information. We address each ar-
 gument in turn.
                                A
      The first step of a § 112 ¶ 6 analysis is determining
 whether a claim term has invoked that statutory provision
 by being drafted in means-plus-function format. See, e.g.,
 Dyfan, LLC v. Target Corp., 28 F.4th 1360, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
 2022). This inquiry turns on a POSITA’s understanding.
 Id. at 1366. When, as here, the disputed term lacks the
 word “means,” there is a rebuttable presumption that the
 term is not drafted in means-plus-function format. Id. at
 1365. But “the presumption can be overcome and [§ 112
 ¶ 6] will apply if the challenger demonstrates that the
 claim term fails to ‘recite[] sufficiently definite structure’ or
 else recites ‘function without reciting sufficient structure for
 performing that function.’” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348
 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting Watts v.
 XL Sys., Inc., 232 F.3d 877, 880 (Fed. Cir. 2000)); id.
 at 1349.
     The district court asked whether a POSITA would un-
 derstand “search receiver logic” as structure for updating
 said routing information. 2 To frame the question like this,

     2  More precisely (given the presumption): the court
 asked whether Ruckus had demonstrated that a POSITA
 would not understand “search receiver logic” as structure
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 6           XR COMMUNICATIONS, LLC    v. ARRIS SOLUTIONS, INC.

 the court relied on the Williamson standard (emphasized
 above) and our decision in Egenera applying that standard.
 In Egenera, we concluded that the term “logic to modify”
 invoked § 112 ¶ 6. In reaching that conclusion, we ob-
 served that the patentee (who opposed § 112 ¶ 6 treatment)
 did “not explain how its ‘logic’—even assuming it connotes
 some possible structure in the general sense of software,
 firmware, or circuitry—amounts to sufficient structure for
 performing the modification function.” Egenera, 972 F.3d
 at 1374 (emphasis in original) (cleaned up); see id.
 (“[A]gain, the question is not whether ‘logic’ is utterly de-
 void of structure but whether the claim term recites suffi-
 cient structure to perform the claimed functions.”).
      Vivato argues that the district court asked the wrong
 question. According to Vivato, the court shouldn’t have
 asked whether a POSITA would have understood “search
 receiver logic” as structure for updating said routing infor-
 mation; instead, it should have asked only whether a
 POSITA would have understood “search receiver logic” as
 structure—period. See, e.g., Appellant’s Br. 3, 23, 27–28,
 38; Reply Br. 2. We disagree. Vivato’s argument simply
 fails to meaningfully reckon with this court’s precedent, in-
 cluding Williamson’s en banc articulation of the legal
 standard and Egenera. Given this precedent, we conclude
 that the district court properly asked whether a POSITA
 would understand the disputed term not just as structure,
 but as sufficient structure “for performing [the claimed]
 function.” Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1348–49.
     Vivato also sees error in the district court’s statement
 that “[a] so-called ‘known class of circuit structures’ cannot
 be sufficient under the Williamson standard.” Claim Con-
 struction Order, 2021 WL 3918136, at *6. In context, how-
 ever, this statement is unproblematic. True, “[c]laim terms

 for updating said routing information. See Claim Con-
 struction Order, 2021 WL 3918136, at *7.
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 XR COMMUNICATIONS, LLC   v. ARRIS SOLUTIONS, INC.           7

 need not connote a single, specific structure, and may in-
 stead describe a class of structures” while still avoiding
 § 112 ¶ 6. Dyfan, 28 F.4th at 1366 (cleaned up). But it’s
 clear from context that the court wasn’t disputing that
 point. Instead, it was rejecting Vivato’s position that § 112
 ¶ 6 is avoided by reciting something a POSITA would un-
 derstand as structure—even if a POSITA wouldn’t under-
 stand it as sufficient structure for performing the claimed
 function. As discussed above, that is the position our prec-
 edent compels rejecting. We therefore see no error in this
 statement by the district court.
     The district court applied the correct legal standard
 here, and Vivato’s arguments to the contrary are unpersua-
 sive. Vivato also hasn’t shown error in the court’s applica-
 tion of that standard to the record. We therefore affirm the
 court’s conclusion—based on the ’231 patent’s specification
 and expert testimony—that “search receiver logic” invokes
 § 112 ¶ 6.
                               B
     If, as here, a claim term is construed to invoke § 112
 ¶ 6, we proceed to the second step of the analysis: “deter-
 mining what structure, if any, disclosed in the specification
 corresponds to the claimed function.” Dyfan, 28 F.4th
 at 1365 (cleaned up). “Structure disclosed in the specifica-
 tion qualifies as corresponding structure if the intrinsic ev-
 idence clearly links or associates that structure to the
 function recited in the claim.” Williamson, 792 F.3d
 at 1352 (emphasis added) (cleaned up). And “[e]ven if the
 specification discloses corresponding structure, the disclo-
 sure must be of adequate corresponding structure to
 achieve the claimed function.” Id. (emphasis added)
 (cleaned up). If the specification fails to disclose adequate
 corresponding structure to perform the claimed function,
 the claim is indefinite. Traxcell Techs., LLC v. Sprint
 Commc’ns Co., 15 F.4th 1121, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citing
 Williamson, 792 F.3d at 1351–52).
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 8            XR COMMUNICATIONS, LLC      v. ARRIS SOLUTIONS, INC.

      On appeal, Vivato again advances as adequate corre-
 sponding structure “search receiver 164” in Figure 18 and
 steps 610 and 612 of Figure 22. The district court compre-
 hensively analyzed these (among other) disclosures and
 concluded that none satisfied the standard for adequate
 structure clearly linked to the claimed function of updating
 said routing information. For example, as to “search re-
 ceiver 164” in Figure 18, it noted that the specification de-
 scribes Figure 18 as a “functional block diagram for an
 exemplary scheduling capability,” Claim Construction Or-
 der, 2021 WL 3918136, at *13 (emphasis in original) (quot-
 ing ’231 patent col. 24 ll. 40–41), and it concluded that none
 of the referenced disclosure concerning Figure 18 “reveals
 the structure of ‘search receiver 164’” or “clearly link[s] the
 ‘search receiver 164’ to any claimed function,” id. (citing
 ’231 patent col. 24 ll. 40–41, col. 25 ll. 1–3, col. 25 ll. 12–15).
 As to steps 610 and 612 of Figure 22, the court observed
 that Figure 22 depicts a process involving a function differ-
 ent from the relevant claim 1 function, and it rejected Vi-
 vato’s attempt to isolate steps 610 and 612 from their
 context in this figure—reasoning that such an attempt in
 this case “does not meet the threshold of clearly linked cor-
 responding structure.” Id.; see id. at *12. We find the dis-
 trict court’s analysis on this second step well supported and
 are unpersuaded to disturb its ultimate conclusion—i.e.,
 that the specification’s failure to disclose adequate corre-
 sponding structure renders the claims at issue indefinite
 under § 112 ¶ 2.
                                III
     We have considered Vivato’s remaining arguments and
 find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we af-
 firm.
                          AFFIRMED