Court Opinion

ID: 9380397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 21:00:24.646562+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:24.784824
License: Public Domain

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                                             UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-4049

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee,

                      v.

        NEDELTCHO VLADIMIROV,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
        Charleston. Irene C. Berger, District Judge. (2:20−cr−00054−1)

        Argued: January 27, 2023                                          Decided: March 16, 2023

        Before HARRIS, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ARGUED: Richard W. Weston, WESTON LAW, Lexington, Kentucky, for Appellant.
        Erik S. Goes, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West
        Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: William S. Thompson, United States Attorney,
        Andrew J. Tessman, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
        STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Nedeltcho Vladimirov was charged with various federal crimes related to his

        operation of a “mobile pawnshop.” After a three-day trial, a jury convicted Vladimirov of

        one count of conspiracy to commit money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h), and three

        counts of money laundering, 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a). Vladimirov raises several arguments on

        appeal, including a Confrontation Clause challenge to the district court’s ruling requiring

        all witnesses to wear masks, a Sixth Amendment speedy trial challenge, and various

        challenges to the court’s evidentiary rulings. He also appeals the district court’s denial of

        his motions for judgment of acquittal. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

                                                      I.

               In March 2020, a grand jury indicted Vladimirov on several federal charges related

        to his mobile pawnshop business. 1 The district court initially scheduled trial for May 2020

        but, in April 2020, Vladimirov moved to continue the trial “[d]ue to the exigent

        circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic.” The court granted the motion and, over the

        next year, granted another motion by Vladimirov and multiple motions by the government

        to continue the trial due to the public health crisis. In February 2021, a grand jury returned

        a superseding indictment charging Vladimirov with one count of conspiracy to commit

               1
                 The superseding indictment also charged Vladimirov with one count of fraud
        conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 1349, which count the government voluntarily dismissed
        before trial.

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        money laundering under 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) and three counts of money laundering under

        18 U.S.C. § 1957(a).

               Vladimirov’s trial ultimately was scheduled for July 2021. Days before the trial

        was set to begin, Vladimirov filed a pro se motion to dismiss the indictment based on an

        alleged Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation. Before trial, Vladimirov’s counsel asked

        the district court to consider Vladimirov’s pro se motion. The court considered and denied

        Vladimirov’s motion to dismiss.

               Vladimirov’s counsel also asked the district court to allow the witnesses to testify

        without masks, explaining that the witnesses’ “demeanor” and “credibility” would “be very

        important in this case.” At that time, a standing court order was in effect in the Southern

        District of West Virginia, which provided COVID-19 protocols and required that all jurors

        and unvaccinated individuals wear masks. The court denied Vladimirov’s motion, stating

        that because the court did not know what precautions the witnesses had taken, all witnesses

        would be required to wear masks.

               During the trial, the government presented testimony from several witnesses,

        including four shoplifters, or “boosters,” who repeatedly stole goods from retail stores for

        the purpose of reselling them to Vladimirov. The four boosters testified that they met with

        Vladimirov between 40 and 100 times each and that, over the course of these meetings,

        they sold Vladimirov hundreds of stolen new-in-box items for about 30 percent of the

        items’ “eBay value.” These items often included computer hard drives, vacuum cleaners,

        and non-prescription medications.      Immediately after stealing various products, the

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        boosters would schedule a meeting with Vladimirov, which often took place at either a

        local gas station or a bank parking lot.

               According to the boosters, Vladimirov typically operated from his car at those

        locations. He referred to eBay to determine the anticipated sale price of the new products,

        and purchased the products from the boosters for about 30 percent of that price. Vladimirov

        always paid the boosters in cash for these items. The evidence further showed that

        Vladimirov later sold the same products he purchased from the boosters through his eBay

        platform.

               Vladimirov told the boosters on at least a few occasions that he did not accept stolen

        goods. However, after one of the boosters accidentally stated to Vladimirov that an item

        was stolen, Vladimirov nevertheless purchased the item after the booster corrected himself

        and stated that he had “got” the item.       This same booster testified that he showed

        Vladimirov a tool that the booster had devised to remove security devices from stolen items

        and demonstrated to Vladimirov its utility. That booster also stated that Vladimirov had

        his own tools for removing security devices.

               The government also called as a witness Stephen Rowley, a former Internal Revenue

        Service special agent. Rowley examined Vladimirov’s PayPal, bank, and eBay records.

        Rowley testified that Vladimirov deposited his eBay proceeds into his PayPal account, and

        then regularly transferred funds from that PayPal account to his City National Bank

        account. Vladimirov also regularly withdrew $700 from his City National Bank account.

               From late 2017 to July 2019, Vladimirov repeated this pattern of deposits and

        withdrawals, depositing by late 2019 about $300,000 in eBay proceeds into his City
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        National Bank account. In July 2019, Vladimirov made three transfers of over $150,000,

        one from his City National Bank savings account to his City National Bank checking

        account, one from his City National Bank checking account to a new account with Chase

        Bank, and one from his Chase Bank account to a bank in Bulgaria (the bank transfers).

               The government also presented the testimony of two witnesses who were retail

        crime investigators. Jose Varela was a senior manager for the organized retail crime team

        at CVS Health, and Nicholas Niehaus formerly served as an organized retail crime

        investigator for Target. In his position with CVS Health, Varela had led about 50

        investigations related to the resale of stolen goods. He also had investigated similar crimes

        in his prior position as a special agent with the Miami, Florida, Police Department’s

        Organized Retail Crime Unit. Niehaus had worked in about 30 organized retail fraud

        investigations and had trained about 100 other individuals in conducting such

        investigations.   Varela and Niehaus each had participated in the investigation of

        Vladimirov and, accordingly, testified both as fact witnesses based on their personal

        observations and as expert witnesses based on their investigative experience.

               At trial, the two witnesses described their investigations of Vladimirov, including

        their review of Vladimirov’s eBay sales, their interviews with boosters, and certain

        controlled purchases involving Vladimirov. Niehaus further described the government’s

        search of Vladimirov’s home, during which Niehaus identified a large volume of new-in-

        box products next to a “cleaning station,” an area containing tools “to remove any

        identifying labels, devices, or security” features.

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               Finally, both witnesses explained that a fencing operation refers to “an illicit

        business that purchases stolen merchandise, gathers that merchandise, and then resells that

        merchandise.” Both witnesses opined that Vladimirov was either running a fencing

        operation or that his operation was consistent with one. After the government rested its

        case, Vladimirov moved under Rule 29 for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court

        denied.

               Vladimirov testified in his own defense and also presented the testimony of a police

        officer who, in his personal capacity, had sold Vladimirov a used camera and a used

        computer. Vladimirov testified that, in his mobile pawnshop business, he bought both new

        and used items from about 300 people per year. He denied knowing that the new products

        he purchased from the boosters were stolen.

               After the jury returned its verdict convicting Vladimirov of one count of conspiracy

        to commit money laundering and three counts of money laundering, Vladimirov filed a

        post-trial Rule 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. The

        court thereafter imposed a sentence of 97 months’ imprisonment and entered final

        judgment in the case. Vladimirov later filed the present appeal.

                                                    II.

               On appeal, Vladimirov raises two Sixth Amendment challenges. First, he argues

        that the district court violated his Confrontation Clause rights when the court required all

        witnesses to wear masks. Second, he contends that the delay between his March 2020

        indictment and his July 2021 trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
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        Vladimirov also challenges several aspects of the government’s expert witness testimony

        and argues that the district court erred when it denied his Rule 29 motions. We address

        each argument in turn, beginning with Vladimirov’s Sixth Amendment challenges.

                                                   A.

                                                    i.

               Before we can consider the merits of Vladimirov’s Confrontation Clause challenge,

        we first must determine whether Vladimirov has preserved this issue for appeal. See United

        States v. Cabrera-Beltran, 660 F.3d 742, 751 (4th Cir. 2011). If Vladimirov made a timely

        and specific Confrontation Clause objection before the district court, we will review his

        constitutional challenge de novo. See United States v. Mackins, 315 F.3d 399, 405–06 (4th

        Cir. 2003). However, if Vladimirov failed to raise a timely and specific objection in the

        district court, he must satisfy the more deferential “plain error” standard of review in

        Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b). See United States v. Miller, 41 F.4th 302, 310

        (4th Cir. 2022).

               Our review of the record shows that Vladimirov’s pretrial request was insufficient

        to preserve his Confrontation Clause challenge raised on appeal. Vladimirov’s counsel

        stated to the district court his “concern [with] the witnesses . . . being masked during

        questioning,” and explained that the case would “in large part[] have to do with the

        credibility of certain witnesses” who “have long and lengthy drug histories.” He further

        stated that the “credibility” and “demeanor” of these witnesses would be “vastly important

        for the jury” and, accordingly, asked the court to allow the witnesses to testify without

        masks. The government did not oppose Vladimirov’s motion.
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               Critically, Vladimirov did not identify a legal basis for his request to have the

        witnesses testify without masks. See In re Under Seal, 749 F.3d 276, 287 (4th Cir. 2014)

        (explaining that a defendant must “state the grounds on which [his argument] is based”

        (citation omitted)). He did not refer to the Confrontation Clause, to the Sixth Amendment,

        or to the Constitution generally. Likewise, Vladimirov did not cite any case law that would

        have alerted the district court to the grounds for his objection. See United States v. Bennett,

        698 F.3d 194, 199 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The entire purpose of an objection is to alert the district

        court to the actual basis of asserted error.”). Because Vladimirov’s motion lacked any

        stated connection to the constitutional challenge he now brings, the district court did not

        have reason to treat his request as implicating his constitutional right to face-to-face

        confrontation and the requirement that the court make case-specific findings under

        Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).

               Our conclusion is not altered by Vladimirov’s contention raised during oral

        argument that his Confrontation Clause challenge was “apparent from the context.”

        Cf. Mackins, 315 F.3d at 407 (identifying instances in which a constitutional objection may

        be preserved even if the proponent does not identify the specific constitutional provision).

        Certainly, in his oral motion before the district court, Vladimirov’s counsel referred to the

        witnesses’ demeanor and credibility.       And the Supreme Court has recognized that

        “observation of demeanor by the trier of fact” is an “element[] of confrontation” that helps

        ensure the reliability of admitted evidence. Craig, 497 U.S. at 845–46.

               Nevertheless, Vladimirov offered only general statements to the district court about

        the effect of masks on the witnesses’ demeanor and credibility. We cannot ignore his
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        failure to invoke the Constitution, to cite any relevant case law, or to state any other relevant

        concepts that might have signaled to the district court that he objected based on the

        Confrontation Clause. Because Vladimirov’s counsel did not give the district court any

        meaningful indication that he was objecting on this constitutional basis, we review his

        Confrontation Clause challenge for plain error.

                                                       ii.

               To establish plain error, a defendant must show that (1) the district court erred,

        (2) the error was plain, and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights. See

        United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732–34 (1993). Even if the defendant meets his

        burden, we will “exercise [our] discretion to correct the error only if it ‘seriously affects

        the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” United States v. Lynn,

        592 F.3d 572, 577 (4th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Massenburg, 564 F.3d 337,

        343 (4th Cir. 2009)).

               The Confrontation Clause guarantees a defendant “the right . . . to be confronted

        with witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. Even if we assume, without deciding,

        that the district court violated this right to face-to-face confrontation when it required

        witnesses to wear masks, Vladimirov’s challenge falters at the second step of the plain

        error inquiry because he cannot show that the error was “clear” or “obvious.” United States

        v. Garcia-Lagunas, 835 F.3d 479, 493 (4th Cir. 2016). “At a minimum, [we] cannot correct

        an error pursuant to Rule 52(b) unless the error is clear under current law.” Olano, 507

        U.S. at 734.

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               Neither the Supreme Court nor this Circuit has addressed many of the questions

        relevant to Vladimirov’s Confrontation Clause challenge, including the threshold question

        whether requiring a witness to wear a mask impairs a defendant’s constitutional right to

        face-to-face confrontation. We also note that guidance from other circuit courts on this

        issue remains limited. See United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 516 n.14 (4th Cir.

        2013) (“Plain error may arise on occasion when our sister circuits have uniformly taken a

        position on an issue that has never been squarely presented to this Court, however, such

        cases are exceedingly rare.” (quotation marks and citation omitted)). Because neither the

        Supreme Court nor this Circuit has provided any precedent addressing the constitutional

        implications of witnesses wearing masks while testifying during the COVID-19 pandemic,

        and our sister circuits have not adopted a uniform position on this issue, we will not find

        plain error in the district court’s ruling. See id. at 516, 516 n.14. Thus, we reject

        Vladimirov’s Confrontation Clause challenge because any such error was not plain.

                                                    B.

               We next turn to Vladimirov’s other Sixth Amendment argument, namely, that the

        delay between his March 2020 indictment and his July 2021 trial violated his right to a

        speedy trial. See U.S. Const. amend. VI (“[T]he accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy

        and public trial.”). We review de novo the district court’s denial of Vladimirov’s speedy

        trial motion. United States v. Robinson, 55 F.4th 390, 399 (4th Cir. 2022).

               When we consider whether a delay in bringing a case to trial has violated a

        defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, we balance the four factors identified

        by the Supreme Court in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972). These factors are: “(1) the
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        ‘length of the delay’; (2) ‘the reason for the delay’; (3) ‘the defendant’s assertion of his

        right’; and (4) the ‘prejudice to the defendant.’” Robinson, 55 F.4th at 399 (quoting Barker,

        407 U.S. at 530).

                  The delay that occurred in the trial of this case is presumptively prejudicial. See

        United States v. Burgess, 684 F.3d 445, 452 (4th Cir. 2012) (“The Supreme Court has

        observed that ‘post[-]accusation delay [is] presumptively prejudicial at least as it

        approaches one year.’” (citation omitted)). However, we must balance this fact with the

        three remaining Barker factors, which we conclude weigh in the government’s favor.

                  First, the delay did not result from a deliberate government attempt to forestall

        Vladimirov’s trial. Instead, the delay was attributable to the unpredictable and unavoidable

        public health crisis presented by the COVID-19 pandemic. See United States v. Hall, 551

        F.3d 257, 272 (4th Cir. 2009) (“[A] deliberate attempt by the prosecution to delay the trial

        of an accused would weigh heavily against the government, although a valid reason for

        delay, such as a missing witness, may be justified.”).

                  Second, although Vladimirov objected generally to two of the government’s

        motions to continue the trial, he also twice moved to continue the trial. Moreover,

        Vladimirov did not file his motion to dismiss until more than sixteen months after his

        indictment, mere days before his trial. See Robinson, 55 F.4th at 400 (holding that the third

        Barker factor weighed in the government’s favor when the defendant did not assert his

        speedy trial right until “over a year after his arrest” and approximately 100 days before his

        trial).

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               For the final Barker factor, we weigh the prejudice to Vladimirov by considering

        the interests of (1) “prevent[ing] oppressive pretrial incarceration”; (2) “minimiz[ing]

        anxiety and concern of the accused”; and (3) “limit[ing] the possibility that the defense will

        be impaired.” Barker, 407 U.S. at 532. With regard to the first two considerations,

        Vladimirov has not explained how the conditions he faced caused him oppression, anxiety,

        or concern “greater than that faced by anyone openly subject to criminal investigation.”

        Robinson, 55 F.4th at 400 (quoting Hall, 551 F.3d at 272). Indeed, although Vladimirov

        described an attack he personally experienced in jail more than one year before he filed his

        motion, he also asserted that “this is happening in jails around the U.S. . . . all the time.”

        And, most importantly, regarding the third, “most serious,” prejudice consideration,

        Vladimirov does not contend that the delay impaired his defense. See Hall, 551 F.3d at

        273. Therefore, after balancing the Barker factors in this case, we conclude that the four

        factors do not weigh as a whole in Vladimirov’s favor. Accordingly, we hold that

        Vladimirov was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.

                                                      C.

               Vladimirov next raises several arguments regarding the testimony of two

        government witnesses, Varela and Niehaus. After a complete review of the record, we

        conclude that only two of these arguments warrant discussion.              We first address

        Vladimirov’s objection at trial that Varela’s and Niehaus’s testimony was unreliable, and

        next turn to his argument raised for the first time on appeal that the district court failed to

        implement adequate safeguards regarding their dual roles as fact and expert witnesses.

                                                      i.
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               Vladimirov argues that the district court erred in overruling his objections that

        Varela and Niehaus did not use, or adequately explain their use of, a reliable methodology

        that would qualify them to offer expert testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. We

        review this evidentiary ruling for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Chikvashvili,

        859 F.3d 285, 292 (4th Cir. 2017); United States v. Cloud, 680 F.3d 396, 401 (4th Cir.

        2012). “An abuse of discretion occurs [when] a decision ‘is guided by erroneous legal

        principles . . . or rests upon a clearly erroneous factual finding.’” Chikvashvili, 859 F.3d

        at 292 (quoting Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 261 (4th Cir. 1999)).

               Of course, expert testimony must be “the product of reliable principles or methods,”

        Fed. R. Evid. 702(c), and, as part of its gatekeeping function, a district court must ensure

        that expert testimony is both sufficiently relevant and reliable, see Sardis v. Overhead Door

        Corp., 10 F.4th 268, 281 (4th Cir. 2021). But the district court nonetheless retains “broad

        discretion ‘to determine reliability in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the

        particular case.’” Nease v. Ford Motor Co., 848 F.3d 219, 229 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting

        Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring)). And,

        as the record before us demonstrates, a witness who relies on his experience may be

        qualified to testify as an expert witness when the witness can explain how his experience

        leads to the conclusion reached, why his experience provides a sufficient basis for his

        opinion, and how his experience reliably is applied to the facts. See, e.g., United States v.

        Wilson, 484 F.3d 267, 274 (4th Cir. 2007); see also Fed. R. Evid. 702, advisory committee

        note (“[T]he text of Rule 702 expressly contemplates that an expert may be qualified on

        the basis of experience.”).
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               Both Varela and Niehaus had substantial experience in conducting retail crime

        investigations. Considering this extensive experience, each expert’s description detailing

        how he investigated a case, and each expert’s explanation describing how he identified a

        fencing operation, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in

        permitting this testimony. 2 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 752 F.3d 382, 391 (4th Cir.

        2014) (concluding that the expert’s accepted methodology, although “not as coherent as

        we might wish,” “passes muster” under the “deferential standard of review applicable” to

        the district court’s reliability determination).

                                                       ii.

               Vladimirov argues for the first time on appeal that the district court erred by failing

        to implement appropriate safeguards when Varela and Niehaus testified as dual fact and

        expert witnesses. We reject this argument under our plain error standard of review. See

        Olano, 507 U.S. at 732–34.

               Because dual-role testimony creates a risk of juror confusion, or a risk that a juror

        will give undue weight to lay testimony, we previously have outlined a non-exhaustive list

        of safeguards that a district court may employ when a witness testifies as both a fact and

        an expert witness. United States v. Smith, 919 F.3d 825, 837 (4th Cir. 2019); United States

        v. Baptiste, 596 F.3d 214, 224 (4th Cir. 2010). But we also have explained that none of

        these particular safeguards is “necessary” or “per se sufficient,” and that “[t]he ultimate

               2
                 Because Vladimirov failed to timely object to Niehaus’s expert testimony at trial,
        ordinarily we would review his challenge to the reliability of Niehaus’s testimony for plain
        error. We do not do so here, however, because we already reject Vladimirov’s challenge
        under the less deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.
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        question is whether, considering the safeguards used, the testimony’s ‘probative value is

        substantially outweighed’ by the risk of jury confusion or unfair prejudice.” Smith, 919

        F.3d at 837 (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 403).

               Here, both the district court and the government took steps to mitigate potential

        harm from Varela’s and Niehaus’s dual-role testimony. The government established a

        foundation for Varela’s and Niehaus’s expertise when it questioned each witness, and the

        district court gave Vladimirov an opportunity to cross-examine Varela and Niehaus

        regarding the witnesses’ qualifications.

               Vladimirov later declined the district court’s offer to have the jury instructed on the

        difference between expert and fact testimony after each dual witness testified. And, with

        Vladimirov’s agreement, the court instructed the jury at the end of the government’s case

        on the differences between expert and fact testimony. The government also grounded at

        least some of its questions on the witnesses’ expertise, requesting an opinion from each

        “based on [his] training and experience.” We have upheld the implementation of a similar

        degree of safeguards. United States v. Galloway, 749 F.3d 238, 245–46 (4th Cir. 2014).

        Accordingly, after balancing “the need for factual context for [the expert’s] opinions and

        the risk in blending expert and factual testimony,” we do not find plain error in the present

        case. Smith, 919 F.3d at 838.

                                                     D.

               Finally, Vladimirov appeals the district court’s denial of his motions for judgment

        of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29. We review the district court’s

        rulings de novo and will uphold the verdict if there is substantial evidence, when construed
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        in the light most favorable to the government, supporting the verdict. United States v.

        Zelaya, 908 F.3d 920, 925 (4th Cir. 2018). “[S]ubstantial evidence is evidence that a

        reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of

        a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Gillion, 704 F.3d 284,

        294 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting United States v. Palacios, 677 F.3d 234, 248 (4th Cir. 2012)).

                                                     i.

               We begin by addressing the three arguments Vladimirov raises regarding his

        conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering. First, he contends that there was

        no evidence that an agreement or understanding to commit money laundering was formed.

        Second, he contends that the government did not show that the transactions involved

        proceeds from an unlawful activity, namely, wire fraud, mail fraud, or transporting stolen

        property. Third, Vladimirov argues that the government did not show that Vladimirov

        knew that the property involved in the transactions represented proceeds from felonious

        activities. We disagree with these arguments.

               To obtain a conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering under 18 U.S.C.

        § 1956(h), the government must prove:

               (1) the existence of an agreement between two or more persons to commit
               one or more of the substantive money laundering offenses . . . ; (2) that the
               defendant knew that the money laundering proceeds had been derived from
               an illegal activity; and (3) the defendant knowingly and voluntarily became
               part of the conspiracy.

        United States v. Green, 599 F.3d 360, 371 (4th Cir. 2010). For the first requirement, a

        “tacit or mutual understanding” will suffice. United States v. Ellis, 121 F.3d 908, 922 (4th

        Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). An individual who does not have full knowledge of all the
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        details of a conspiracy nevertheless may be convicted of conspiracy if he understands the

        conspiracy’s unlawful nature and “willfully joins in the plan on one occasion.” United

        States v. Seigler, 990 F.3d 331, 337 (4th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).

               Here, the evidence showed that, for years, Vladimirov purchased numerous goods

        from boosters for well-below market value, sold the goods to unsuspecting purchasers on

        eBay, shipped the purchased items to those buyers, transferred the proceeds from the sales

        to his bank account, and, to complete and continue the cycle, withdrew cash from his

        account to purchase more goods from the boosters.            Considering the “continuing

        relationships and repeated transactions” between Vladimirov and the boosters, the

        boosters’ testimony regarding their sales to and interactions with Vladimirov, and Varela’s

        and Niehaus’s testimony regarding both fencing operations and their fact-based

        investigations of Vladimirov’s conduct, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the

        jury’s finding of a tacit agreement. See United States v. Hackley, 662 F.3d 671, 679–81

        (4th Cir. 2011), as corrected (Dec. 20, 2011) (citation omitted).

               Vladimirov’s second and third arguments also fail because they are premised on a

        requirement that does not exist, namely, that the government prove the elements of the

        crime underlying the conspiracy. Although Vladimirov charges that the government failed

        to show that the bank transfers involved “proceeds of a specified unlawful activity” or that

        Vladimirov knew that the property involved represented proceeds from an activity that

        constituted a felony under the promotion money laundering statute, 18 U.S.C.

        §§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(c)(1), (7), “the prosecution was not required to prove that

        [Vladimirov] had committed promotion money laundering in order to convict [him] of
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        conspiring to do so.” United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 694 (4th Cir. 2005). Thus, on

        the extensive record before us, we hold that substantial evidence supports Vladimirov’s

        conviction for conspiracy to commit money laundering.

                                                     ii.

               With regard to his three money laundering convictions, Vladimirov argues that the

        government has failed to show that any of the $150,000 bank transfers included at least

        $10,000 in criminally derived funds. 18 U.S.C. § 1957(a) (prohibiting an individual from

        knowingly engaging “in a monetary transaction in criminally derived property of a value

        greater than $10,000 and is derived from specified unlawful activity” (emphasis added)).

        We disagree with Vladimirov’s contention.

               To satisfy the $10,000 threshold under § 1957(a), the government is not required to

        show “that no ‘untainted’ funds were involved, [n]or that the funds used in the transaction

        were exclusively derived from the specified unlawful activity.” United States v. Moore,

        27 F.3d 969, 976 (4th Cir. 1994). Because legitimate and illegitimate funds “cannot be

        traced to a particular source” once they have been commingled, in such a situation we may

        presume that “transacted funds, at least up to the full amount originally derived from crime,

        were the proceeds of the criminal activity.” Id. at 977.

               Our review of the record does not reveal how much money, if any, Vladimirov

        earned from legitimate sales. However, the record affirmatively shows that in the years

        leading up to the bank transfers, Vladimirov did not make any lawful purchases from

        boosters of items that he later sold on eBay, that he relied on eBay as his sole source of

        income, that he transferred $300,000 in eBay proceeds into his City National Bank account,
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        and that he regularly withdrew cash from his City National Bank account to purchase more

        stolen goods from the boosters. Between June 7, 2019 and July 15, 2019 alone, a period

        of about five weeks, Vladimirov deposited from his PayPal account into his City National

        Bank account $24,969.40 and withdrew from his City National Bank account $7,000 in

        cash. Vladimirov repeated this pattern of deposits and withdrawals from late 2017 until

        mid-2019, while buying hundreds of new-in-box goods from the boosters for prices far

        below their value on eBay. Construing this evidence in the light most favorable to the

        government, we have no difficulty concluding that substantial evidence supports the jury’s

        finding that at least $10,000 of each bank transfer constituted criminally derived property. 3

                                                     III.

               For these reasons, we reject Vladimirov’s constitutional and evidentiary challenges,

        and we affirm the district court’s denial of his Rule 29 motions. Accordingly, we affirm

        the district court’s judgment.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

               3
                We have reviewed Vladimirov’s remaining arguments on appeal and conclude that
        they have no merit.

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