Court Opinion

ID: 9383667
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 21:04:34.840108+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:47.360266
License: Public Domain

NOTICE
This Order was filed under           2023 IL App (4th) 220414-U                         FILED
Supreme Court Rule 23 and is                                                         March 30, 2023
not precedent except in the                  NO. 4-22-0414                            Carla Bender
limited circumstances allowed                                                     4th District Appellate
under Rule 23(e)(1).                IN THE APPELLATE COURT                              Court, IL

                                             OF ILLINOIS

                                         FOURTH DISTRICT

  THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,                          )   Appeal from the
            Plaintiff-Appellee,                                 )   Circuit Court of
            v.                                                  )   Winnebago County
  LAMARCUS BASSETT,                                             )   No. 14CF1519
            Defendant-Appellant.                                )
                                                                )   Honorable
                                                                )   Brendan A. Maher,
                                                                )   Judge Presiding.

                  JUSTICE CAVANAGH delivered the judgment of the court.
                  Justices Zenoff and Lannerd concurred in the judgment.

                                                ORDER
 ¶1       Held: (1) The claim at issue in the amended petition for postconviction relief fails to make
                a substantial showing that defendant was deprived of a constitutional right.

                  (2) The record does not affirmatively refute the representation, in postconviction
                  counsel’s certificate pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 615 (eff. July 1, 2017),
                  that he made amendments to the petition filed pro se that were necessary for an
                  adequate presentation of defendant’s contentions.

 ¶2               Defendant, Lamarcus Bassett, is serving a sentence of imprisonment for armed

 robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2014)). He petitioned, pro se, for postconviction relief. The

 circuit court of Winnebago County appointed postconviction counsel, who amended the petition.

 The State moved for dismissal of the amended petition on the ground of legal insufficiency. The

 court granted the motion, concluding that the amended petition failed to make a substantial

 showing that defendant had been deprived of a constitutional right.
¶3             Defendant appeals, contesting the dismissal of ground three of his amended

petition, a claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to impeach the victim

regarding his bias against defendant. Because the record shows that trial counsel subjected the

State’s case to meaningful adversarial testing, we conclude that his decision not to attempt an

impeachment of the victim in this regard falls into the category of trial strategy and, hence, is

immune to a claim of ineffective assistance. Also, apart from such immunity, the decision was

objectively reasonable.

¶4             Alternatively, defendant claims that postconviction counsel failed to shape ground

three of his amended petition into proper legal form. Postconviction counsel filed a certificate

representing that he had “made any amendments to the petition filed pro se that [were] necessary

for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions.” Because the record does not affirmatively

refute that representation, we find that postconviction counsel provided reasonable assistance.

¶5             Therefore, we affirm the judgment.

¶6                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶7             An indictment charged defendant with two counts of armed robbery (id.

§ 18-2(a)(1), (2)) and one count of aggravated robbery (id. § 18-1(b)(1)). All three counts were

based on an incident in which, on June 17, 2014, defendant allegedly robbed Deonterryo

Thompson at gunpoint.

¶8             Before the trial, defense counsel filed 10 motions in limine, in which he sought to

bar the prosecution from mentioning a variety of prior bad acts by defendant, including “having

multiple warrants for his arrest and being a suspect in numerous shootings and robberies or other

potential offenses.” In one of the motions in limine, defense counsel sought to bar any mention of

the fact that, at the time of the alleged armed robbery, defendant was wearing an ankle bracelet

                                                -2-
because he was on mandatory supervised release for second degree murder. Another motion

in limine expected Thompson to testify “that the Defendant ‘kills people and robs them.’ ” This

motion sought to bar such testimony as irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial.

¶9             On January 12, 2015, the day of the jury trial, the circuit court granted a motion by

the State to dismiss count II, a count alleging armed robbery with a bludgeon (id. § 18-2(a)(1)).

The court also granted some of the motions in limine filed by the defense, including the motions

to bar evidence that defendant was on mandatory supervised release for second degree murder and

to bar character testimony from Thompson “that the Defendant ‘kills people and robs them.’ ”

¶ 10           In the jury trial, Thompson testified substantially as follows. On June 17, 2014, he

was in front of the apartment building in which he resided, in Rockford, Illinois, barbecuing on a

grill. Seven or eight people were outside with him. Delano Foreman, accompanied by two other

men, came up to Thompson. At the time of the incident, Thompson knew one of Foreman’s two

companions only by his nickname of Koolaid. Thompson identified Koolaid, in court, as

defendant. Thompson did not know the name of the other man who was with Foreman. “[T]hey,”

the three men, asked Thompson where his friend Tuvia (last name unspecified) was. Thompson

answered that Tuvia had left. Defendant and the man whom Thompson did not know then went

into the apartment building. “[A]fraid that Koolaid was going to do something to [him],”

Thompson went into the apartment building a couple of minutes later, intending to take refuge in

his apartment. While climbing the stairs to his apartment, Thompson heard footsteps behind him.

He turned, and defendant and the man whose name Thompson did not know were on the staircase.

These two men pulled out pistols. Pointing a pistol in Thompson’s face, defendant commanded

him to empty his pockets. After failing to persuade defendant that he had no money, Thompson

handed him $150 in cash. Defendant and the other man then ran down the stairs and out of the

                                               -3-
apartment building, got into a black Nissan vehicle, and drove away. Thompson did not

immediately telephone the police. Instead, he contemplated retaliation. His mother persuaded him,

however, that reporting the robbery to the police would be the better course of action. He did so

the day after the robbery. In the police station, he was shown a photographic array, in which he

identified defendant as one of the robbers. He identified the second robber, Dezha Manning, in

another photographic array.

¶ 11           In his cross-examination of Thompson, defense counsel raised seven points that

were calculated to impeach Thompson or to reduce confidence in his testimony. First, Thompson

could not remember whether he was robbed on June 17, 2014, or the day before, although, as

Thompson admitted, most people would have found being robbed at gunpoint to be “somewhat

traumatic.” Second, Thompson admitted entering the apartment building right after defendant,

although, according to Thompson’s testimony on direct examination, he had been afraid that

defendant would do something to him. Third, Thompson testified that defendant’s accomplice was

armed with a black 9-millimeter pistol. On June 18, 2014, however, in his written statement to the

police, Thompson represented that this man was armed with a .40- or .45-caliber pistol. Thompson

explained on cross-examination, “They all look alike to me, 45, 49.” Fourth, Thompson testified

he handed $150 to defendant. In his statement to the police, however, Thompson represented that

the amount he handed to defendant was only $50. Fifth, as far as Thompson could remember, he

gave the police no physical description of defendant other than that he had braided hair and a logo

on his shirt or jacket. By contrast, Thompson gave the police a detailed physical description of the

other robber. Sixth, Thompson’s friend Nuky (last name unspecified) was in the hallway of the

apartment building during the armed robbery, and he saw the armed robbery take place.

(Nevertheless, Nuky was not called to testify.) Seventh, in addition to being previously adjudicated

                                               -4-
to be a delinquent minor, Thompson had a criminal case pending against him in Winnebago

County. He faced a potential punishment of up to one year in the county jail, a fine of as much as

$2500, and two years of probation. Nevertheless, Thompson denied hoping for leniency as a result

of his testimony in the present case.

¶ 12           In addition to calling Thompson, the State called Rockford Detective Dwayne

Beets, who testified substantially as follows. When he interviewed Thompson on June 18, 2014,

about the robbery that happened the day before, Thompson did not provide much of a physical

description of defendant—only a reference to braids or locs and an article of clothing. The reason

for this paucity of information, Beets explained, was that Thompson knew defendant and referred

to him by name as Koolaid. After interviewing Thompson, Beets assembled a photographic lineup

of six photographs. Then he gave Thompson a photographic lineup spread notice, which informed

Thompson that (1) the suspect might or might not be in the lineup, (2) Thompson did not have to

make an identification, and (3) the person administering the lineup did not necessarily know which

person was the suspect. Beets watched Thompson as he read and signed the notice. Then Beets

gave Thompson the photographic lineup (People’s exhibit No. 2). Without hesitation, Thompson

selected defendant’s photograph, circling and initialing it. Beets assembled a second photographic

lineup (People’s exhibit No. 4), using Thompson’s more detailed physical description of the

second robber, whose face Thompson knew but whose name Thompson did not know. On June

25, 2014, after having been given the same notice as before, Thompson selected Manning’s

photograph in the second lineup.

¶ 13           In his closing argument to the jury, defense counsel reasoned that if, as Thompson

testified, all pistols looked alike to him, it was unproven that the robbers even used firearms. If, as

Thompson testified, all pistols looked the same to him, then (defense counsel argued) Thompson

                                                 -5-
was unable to tell the difference between a BB pistol and a pistol that was a firearm. See 720 ILCS

5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2014) (providing that a person commits armed robbery when he or she commits

robbery and is armed with a “firearm”); id. § 2-7.5 (providing that “firearm” has the meaning

ascribed to it in section 1.1 of the Firearm Owners Identification Card Act (430 ILCS 65/1.1 (West

2014)); 430 ILCS 65/1.1 (West 2014) (excluding a BB gun or pneumatic gun from the definition

of a “firearm”). Also, defense counsel maintained that, for seven reasons, Thompson was an

unreliable witness. First, not only had he been adjudicated a delinquent minor, but—implausibly—

he denied having any hope that his testimony would bring him leniency in the criminal case

pending against him. Second, Thompson could not even figure out what day it was when he was

robbed. Third, Thompson had tripled the amount stolen from him, telling the police it was only

$50 but testifying it was $150. Fourth, Thompson’s story made no sense. He followed two men

into the apartment building even though he supposedly feared that the two men were going to do

something to him. Fifth, Thompson waited 18 hours to report the incident to the police. Sixth,

Thompson gave the police hardly any description of what defendant looked like. He told the police

that defendant had braids. In the photograph in the lineup, however, defendant had no braids.

Thompson never mentioned to the police the tattoo under defendant’s left eye, which could be

plainly seen by the jury. Seventh, defense counsel noted the State’s failure to call Nuky or any of

the six or seven other people who were at the barbecue.

¶ 14           After deliberating for three hours, the jury sent out a note that it was hung. The

circuit court responded with a note to continue deliberating. Ultimately, the jury found defendant

guilty of armed robbery and aggravated robbery.

                                               -6-
¶ 15            On February 19, 2015, the circuit court imposed a sentence of 32 years’

imprisonment on count I, armed robbery (720 ILCS 5/18-2(a)(2) (West 2014)). The court found

that count III, aggravated robbery, merged into count I.

¶ 16            Defendant took a direct appeal, in which he raised a single issue. He argued the

circuit court had committed plain error by failing to ensure that one of the seated jurors, Michael

Messink, understood and accepted the State’s obligation to prove defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt (see Ill. S. Ct. R. 431(b) (eff. July 1, 2012)). People v. Bassett, 2016 IL App (2d)

150213-U, ¶ 14. In his direct appeal, defendant invoked both of the alternative theories of the plain

error doctrine: he argued that (1) the violation of Rule 431(b) was inherently serious and (2) the

evidence in the trial was closely balanced. Id. Disagreeing with both theories (id. ¶¶ 26-27), the

appellate court affirmed the judgment (id. ¶ 30). The appellate court “conclude[d] that, even if a

technical violation of Rule 431(b) occurred, the conviction should be affirmed because the

plain-error doctrine [did] not excuse defendant’s procedural default in failing to object at trial or

raise the issue in his posttrial motion.” Id. ¶ 2.

¶ 17            On April 4, 2018, defendant filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. In his

petition, defendant made four claims, which he labeled as arguments A, B, C, and D.

¶ 18            Argument A was that “trial counsel was ineffective for not investigating and

presenting [an] alibi witness.” In exhibits to his petition, defendant presented affidavits by two

alibi witnesses: his sister, Malikah Muhammed, who averred that defendant was home at the time

of the armed robbery, and the codefendant, Dezha Manning, who averred that defendant “did not

have anything to do with this armed robbery.” According to argument A, Thompson’s testimony

already was weak and inconsistent for three reasons. First, Thompson had “failed to identify

[defendant] as one of the perpetrators but instead [had] described an individual” with “braids” who

                                                     -7-
was “wearing a black shirt with a red logo on it.” Second, defendant and Thompson had gotten

into “an earlier altercation where [Thompson] had an unfounded grudge against defendant for the

death of one of [Thompson’s] friend[s].” Third, “suggestive police tactics” had caused Thompson

to “inculpate” defendant. In sum, defendant claimed that trial counsel’s “failure to investigate[,]

subpoena[,] and call [defendant’s] alibi witness[es] amounted to ineffective assistance” for the

following reasons:

                “[Defendant’s] alibi witness would have testified that [defendant] was with her at

                home when [the] offense occurred [and] this testimony not only could have

                established and corroborated [defendant’s] whereabouts at the time of the offense

                but also been used to impeach [***] already weak [and] inconsi[s]tent testimony

                from the victim.”

¶ 19            Argument B of the pro se petition was twofold: (1) trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to object when the circuit court neglected to ask Juror Messink if

he understood and accepted the State’s burden to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt, and (2) appellate counsel on direct appeal rendered ineffective assistance by failing to raise

this issue.

¶ 20            Argument C was that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by “failing to put

the plea agreement in writing and [failing to] give defendant good legal advice to accept [the] plea

the day it was offer[ed] and inform [defendant] of the possible sentence if he did not accept the

plea offer and go to trial.”

¶ 21            Argument D was a claim of actual innocence premised on the affidavits of the alibi

witnesses, Muhammed and Manning.

                                                -8-
¶ 22           On July 9, 2018, the circuit court entered an order stating that the court had lacked

“sufficient time to review all of [defendant’s] claims or to adequately ‘*** examine the court file

of the proceedings in which [defendant] was convicted, any action taken by an appellate court in

such proceeding[,] and any transcripts of such proceeding’ within the ninety (90) day time limit

imposed by” section 122-2.1(a) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a) (West

2018)). Therefore, for that reason alone (the court emphasized), the court appointed postconviction

counsel and ordered that the pro se petition be “ ‘docketed for further consideration and hearing’

pursuant to” section 122-2.1(b) (id. § 122-2.1(b)). The court said that it thereby made no finding

as to whether the petition stated the gist of a constitutional claim.

¶ 23           On August 17, 2020, postconviction counsel filed an amended petition for

postconviction relief. The amended petition sought relief on four grounds, which were labeled as

grounds one, two, three, and four.

¶ 24           Ground one was that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to

object when Messink gave no response to the circuit court’s question of whether he understood

and accepted the State’s obligation to prove defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.

¶ 25           Ground two was that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by (1) “fail[ing]

to properly advise the Defendant of a 12 year plea offer,” (2) “fail[ing] to advise the Defendant of

his possible sentencing exposure if found guilty of armed robbery,” and (3) “allow[ing] the offer

to be revoked before the Defendant could accept it.”

¶ 26           Ground three was that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by “fail[ing] to

meet with the Defendant sufficiently in order to adequately prepare a defense for trial.” The

amended petition continued:

                                                 -9-
                     “30. Prior to trial, the Defendant made his attorney aware that the victim,

              Thompson, knew him well and that Thompson had a grudge against him. He also

              told his attorney that he did not rob Thompson and that Thompson had fabricated

              the story to get even with him.

                     31. Trial counsel did not put on any evidence, choosing to rely solely on

              cross examination of Thompson as to some inconsistencies in his testimony and

              prior police statements. Counsel essentially conceded the Defendant’s guilt as to

              one or both charges.

                     32. Trial counsel’s failure to review evidence and strategy with the

              Defendant arises to a level of ineffective assistance. *** [T]here appears to be no

              strategy whatsoever. Given that counsel failed to meet with the Defendant

              sufficiently to develop a defense strategy and then failed to give competent advise

              [sic] on the issue of possible sentencing exposure as discussed in Ground Two, the

              cumulative effect arises to the level of ineffective assistance.”

In an accompanying affidavit, defendant averred:

                     “6. Prior to our meeting on [January 8, 2015], my attorney spent little time

              with me to review the evidence or what our trial strategy would be.

                     7. I told my attorney that Deonterryo Thompson had a grudge against me

              and fabricated the story about being robbed. My attorney led me to believe that I

              could not be found guilty based on the testimony of Thompson. My attorney never

              made it clear to me or sought my input into what our trial strategy would be. I

              wanted to testify but my attorney convinced me otherwise.”

                                                - 10 -
¶ 27           Ground four was that appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance on direct

appeal by failing to argue the preceding three grounds.

¶ 28           On October 20, 2020, postconviction counsel filed an amended certificate pursuant

to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). One of his representations in the

certificate was that he had “made any amendments to the petition filed pro se that [were] necessary

for an adequate presentation of petitioner’s contentions.”

¶ 29           On May 3, 2022, the circuit court granted a motion by the State to dismiss the

amended postconviction petition.

¶ 30           On May 16, 2022, defendant filed his notice of appeal, designating the order of

May 3, 2022, as the judgment from which he appealed.

¶ 31                                       II. ANALYSIS

¶ 32                        A. The Legal Sufficiency of Ground Three

¶ 33           1. Failing to Impeach Thompson Regarding His Grudge Against Defendant

¶ 34           Defendant contends the circuit court erred by dismissing, as legally insufficient,

ground three of the amended petition, the claim that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance

by failing to impeach Thompson with evidence of his bias, his grudge, against defendant. To

survive the State’s motion for dismissal, the amended petition had to “make a substantial showing

of a deprivation of rights under either the United States or Illinois Constitution[ ] or both.” People

v. Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 28. We decide de novo whether ground three makes such a showing.

See People v. Young, 2022 IL App (1st) 210534, ¶ 41.

¶ 35           In ground three of his amended petition, defendant invokes a well-recognized

constitutional guarantee. Under the United States and Illinois Constitutions, a defendant has the

right to effective assistance from trial counsel. People v. Peterson, 2017 IL 120331, ¶ 79 (citing

                                                - 11 -
U.S. Const., amends. VI, XIV; Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 8). To establish that trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance, the defendant must show that both of the following propositions hold true:

(1) counsel’s performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,” and (2) there is a

“reasonable probability *** that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding would have

been different” (which is to say, more favorable to the defendant). Id. In short, the defendant must

show deficiency of performance and resulting prejudice. Id.

¶ 36           Establishing deficiency of performance in the impeachment of a witness tends to

be a daunting task. What makes this type of claim so troublesome is that (1) impeachment is a

matter of trial strategy (People v. Pecoraro, 175 Ill. 2d 294, 326 (1997); People v. Phillips, 2017

IL App (4th) 160557, ¶ 58) and (2) the supreme court has said this about trial strategy:

               “[M]atters of trial strategy [citation] *** are generally immune from claims of

               ineffective assistance of counsel. [Citation.] *** The only exception to this rule is

               when counsel’s chosen trial strategy is so unsound that counsel entirely fails to

               conduct any meaningful adversarial testing. [Citation.]” (Emphases added and

               internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. West, 187 Ill. 2d 418, 432-33 (1999).

Recently, the supreme court reiterated this rule from West, holding again that “[e]rrors in trial

strategy do not constitute ineffective assistance unless counsel entirely fails to conduct any

meaningful adversarial testing.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) People v. Custer, 2019 IL

123339, ¶ 39; see also Phillips, 2017 IL App (4th) 160557, ¶ 58; People v. Leslie, 2022 IL App

(4th) 200528-U, ¶ 19. Thus, even if the defendant can identify an additional subject on which trial

counsel might have impeached a witness, the defendant has no valid claim of ineffective assistance

if trial counsel subjected the State’s case to some significant adversarial testing.

                                                - 12 -
¶ 37           Phillips illustrates this principle. In Phillips, the postconviction petition faulted trial

counsel for failing to prove that the victim had been promised something in return for testifying

against the defendant. Phillips, 2017 IL App (4th) 160557, ¶ 1. The prosecutor had told the victim

that, in return for his testimony, the state’s attorney’s office would not refer him for federal

prosecution for drug offenses. Id. ¶ 42. On cross-examination, the victim denied that any such

promise had been made to him. Id. ¶ 14. In his postconviction petition, the defendant criticized

trial counsel for not proving this promise by other means. Id. ¶ 34. Because the defendant,

however, had “failed to show his counsel’s trial strategy amounted to a complete failure to conduct

any meaningful adversarial testing,” the appellate court affirmed the decision against the defendant

on this claim of ineffective assistance. Id. ¶ 59. The appellate court noted, “[C]ounsel attacked [the

victim’s] credibility with his prior felony conviction as well as his possible felony drug conviction

and the fact he did not know if he had any other felony convictions.” Id. In other words, even

though trial counsel did not succeed in impeaching the victim on one ground, he impeached the

witness on other grounds, and thus, some meaningful adversarial testing had taken place.

Therefore, the defendant had no legitimate claim of ineffective assistance.

¶ 38           Similarly, in the present case, even though trial counsel did not impeach Thompson

on his supposed grudge against defendant, he impeached Thompson in other ways. It could not be

reasonably contended that trial counsel completely failed to conduct any meaningful adversarial

testing. He filed 10 motions in limine, and they were largely successful. In his cross-examination

of Thompson and in his closing argument, he exposed serious vulnerabilities in the State’s case.

The record leads us to disagree with postconviction counsel’s assertion that “[c]ounsel essentially

conceded the Defendant’s guilt as to one or both charges.” On the contrary, there was meaningful

adversarial testing. Defense counsel’s cross-examination of Thompson and his closing argument

                                                 - 13 -
were hard-hitting. Therefore, trial counsel’s decision not to try to impeach Thompson regarding

his grudge against defendant is “immune from [a] claim[ ] of ineffective assistance of counsel.”

West, 187 Ill. 2d at 432.

¶ 39           To be clear, the rule in West, in and of itself, makes ground three of defendant’s

amended petition legally insufficient. Apart from that fatal flaw, we would point out that defense

counsel’s decision not to question Thompson about his alleged bias against defendant was

objectively reasonable. See People v. Mays, 2023 IL App (4th) 210612, ¶ 117. If, on cross-

examination, defense counsel had elicited an admission from Thompson that he had an earlier

altercation with defendant, defense counsel might have thereby opened the door to what the

altercation possibly was about: defendant’s allegedly having caused the death of one of

Thompson’s friends. Defense counsel might have ended up sabotaging his wise strategy of

excluding defendant’s prior bad acts.

¶ 40                  2. “Fail[ing] to Meet with the Defendant Sufficiently”

¶ 41           In ground three of the amended petition, defendant claimed that “[t]rial counsel

failed to meet with the Defendant sufficiently in order to adequately prepare a defense for trial.”

This claim is conclusory and, therefore, is not taken as true. See People v. Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d 403,

412 (2003). In deciding whether a petition makes a substantial showing of a deprivation of

constitutional rights, we assume the truth of “all well-pleaded facts in the petition and affidavits”

(id.) to the extent that those well-pleaded factual allegations are not “affirmatively refuted by the

record” (People v. Domagala, 2013 IL 113688, ¶ 35). By contrast, we do not assume the truth of

“nonfactual and nonspecific assertions [that] merely amount to conclusions.” Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d

at 412. Whether a meeting is “sufficient[ ]” and whether preparation is “adequate[ ]” are matters

of evaluative judgment—they are conclusions instead of well-pleaded facts. The conclusory

                                                - 14 -
assertion that “[t]rial counsel failed to meet with the Defendant sufficiently in order to adequately

prepare a defense for trial” did not merit an evidentiary hearing. See id.

¶ 42           In sum, in our de novo review (see Young, 2022 IL App (1st) 210534, ¶ 41), we

find ground three of the amended petition, the claim at issue in this appeal, to be legally

insufficient. Taking the well-pleaded facts in the claim to be true and disregarding its bare

conclusions (see Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d at 412), we find that the claim fails to “make a substantial

showing of a deprivation of rights under either the United States or Illinois Constitution[ ].”

Dupree, 2018 IL 122307, ¶ 28.

¶ 43           B. The Alternative Claim That Postconviction Counsel Failed to Provide

               Reasonable Assistance in Shaping Defendant’s Claims Into Proper Legal Form

¶ 44           Alternatively, defendant argues that postconviction counsel failed to fulfill his duty

of “investigat[ing] the defendant’s claims and mak[ing] any amendments necessary for an

adequate presentation of the defendant’s contentions.” People v. Austin, 2022 IL App (4th)

200630-U, ¶ 36 (citing Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. Feb. 6, 2013)). Defendant complains that, in the

amended petition, “[t]here was no discussion of what counsel should have done differently (e.g.,

investigate Thompson’s bias and present evidence on it).” Because the amended petition contained

no mention or proof of the earlier altercation between Thompson and defendant, the allegation, in

ground three of the amended petition, that “Thompson had a grudge against [defendant]” was a

bare conclusion. Second, defendant criticizes the amended petition for failing to “specify what

‘evidence’ and ‘strategy’ trial counsel failed to review.” We agree with these criticisms. Defendant

has identified some pleading deficiencies and evidentiary omissions in ground three.

¶ 45           The trouble is, even if ground three had suggested (and substantiated) a reason why

a grudge or bias of Thompson against defendant might have been inferred—namely, because of

                                               - 15 -
their earlier altercation over the death of Thompson’s friend—its claim of ineffective assistance

would remain frivolous. As we have explained, it is not arguable that trial counsel completely

failed to subject the State’s case to any meaningful adversarial testing. Therefore, under binding

precedent, the strategic decision not to try to impeach Thompson regarding his alleged grudge

against defendant is immune to a claim of ineffective assistance. See West, 187 Ill. 2d at 432.

¶ 46           Defendant maintains, however, that the potential merit of the claim of ineffective

assistance in ground three is irrelevant to the question of compliance with Rule 651(c). Quoting

from People v. Suarez, 224 Ill. 2d 37, 47 (2007), he argues, “[i]f it is shown that counsel failed to

fulfill any one of [the requirements in Rule 651(c)], ‘remand is required *** regardless of whether

the claims raised in the petition her merit.’ ” The facts in Suarez, however, are significantly

different from those in the present case. In Suarez, the postconviction counsel never filed a

certificate pursuant to Rule 651(c). Id. at 40. In such a certificate, the postconviction counsel would

have certified that he had “ ‘consulted with petitioner *** to ascertain his contentions of

deprivation of constitutional right.’ ” Id. at 42 (quoting Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. Dec. 1, 1984).

Absent a certificate pursuant to Rule 651(c), the record in Suarez failed to show that such a

consultation had taken place. See id. at 44. The supreme court was unwilling to excuse as harmless

error the lack of such a showing by the record. Id. at 52. In the present case, by contrast,

postconviction counsel filed a certificate pursuant to Rule 651(c). Consequently, the analysis in

this case is different from that in Suarez.

¶ 47           “The filing of a Rule 651(c) certificate by postconviction counsel averring that

counsel has complied with the three requirements of Rule 651(c) creates a presumption of

compliance with the rule.” People v. Gallano, 2019 IL App (1st) 160570, ¶ 26. We will credit the

representations in the certificate unless we find, in our de novo review (see id.), that “the record

                                                - 16 -
positively rebuts” the representations. People v. Wallace, 2016 IL App (1st) 142758, ¶ 28; see also

People v. Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d 34, 52 (2007); People v. Morgan, 2015 IL App (1st) 131938, ¶ 100.

¶ 48           According to defendant, the record contradicts postconviction counsel’s

representation, in his amended certificate, that he “made any amendments to the petition filed

pro se that [were] necessary for an adequate presentation of [defendant’s] contentions.” Ground

three of the amended petition, defendant argues (alternatively), was conclusory and, therefore, was

legally insufficient on its face. If a contention is presented in a conclusory way, the contention is

not adequately presented. See Rissley, 206 Ill. 2d at 412. Defendant contends that, by recasting a

pro se claim as a naked conclusion, a postconviction counsel fails to “shape” the pro se claim “into

proper legal form.” See Perkins, 229 Ill. 2d at 43-44. Defendant complains that his postconviction

counsel at least could have included, in the amended petition, an explanation of why defendant

thought that Thompson had a grudge against him: they had gotten into an altercation earlier.

¶ 49           Rule 651(c) required postconviction counsel to “ma[k]e any amendments to the

petitions filed pro se that [were] necessary for an adequate presentation of [defendant’s]

contentions.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 651(c) (eff. July 1, 2017). The supreme court has held, “If amendments

to a pro se postconviction petition would only further a frivolous or patently unmeritorious claim,

they are not ‘necessary’ within the meaning of [Rule 651(c)].” People v. Greer, 212 Ill. 2d 192,

205 (2004). By that standard, ground three of the amended petition—though pleaded by

postconviction counsel—was unnecessary. It follows that any further amendment of the pro se

petition by further elaboration of ground three was unnecessary. Defendant cites People v. Dixon,

2018 IL App (3d) 150630, ¶ 22, in which the appellate court remarked, “Here, postconviction

counsel chose to file an amended petition, so we assume that counsel found that the allegations in

the pro se petition were not frivolous.” Dixon is distinguishable, however, because (regardless of

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what the postconviction counsel in this case might have thought) the trial transcript shows ground

three of the amended petition to be frivolous. Reasonable assistance did not require the elaboration

of a claim of ineffective assistance that was, under West, obviously and incurably unmeritorious.

See Greer, 212 Ill. 2d at 205.

¶ 50                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 51           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

¶ 52           Affirmed.

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