Court Opinion

ID: 9464001
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:22:41.683706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:24.563396
License: Public Domain

TAMM, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I concur in the result reached by the court in this case but wish to elucidate the reasoning that leads me to do so. In my view, it is essential to appellants’ successful invocation of general federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1970), that they make out a nonfrivolous claim that Lea was acting under color of his authority as a “federal” police officer at the time of this incident.1 If the district court could have concluded from the pleadings and evidence properly before it that Lea was clearly not acting as a governmental agent, I could readily affirm its dismissal of this action for failure to satisfy either the “case arising” or amount in controversy requirements. After a thorough review of the record on appeal, however, I find that sufficient doubt remains as to the capacity in which Lea was acting to preclude a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.
I
Every case in .which the pleadings allege a claim under federal law does not automatically come within section 1331(a) jurisdiction, even though the amount in controversy requirement has been satisfied. In Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 939 (1946), the Supreme Court expressly stated that a suit may sometimes be dismissed for want of federal question jurisdiction
where the alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes clearly appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly insubstantial and frivolous.
Id. at 682-83, 66 S.Ct. at 776. The standard for want of “substantiality” is a stringent one, and “if there is any foundation of plausibility to the claim federal jurisdiction exists.” 13 C. Wright, A. Miller & E. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure § 3564, *824at 428 (1976) [hereinafter Wright]; see Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 539-41, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974); Montana Catholic Missions v. Missoula County, 200 U.S. 118, 130, 26 S.Ct. 197, 50 L.Ed. 398 (1906).
The constitutional claim raised by the appellants in this case certainly cannot be labelled “wholly insubstantial and frivolous”, since Bell v. Hood, supra, clearly held that a federal court can grant money damages to redress the violation by a federal officer of a person’s fifth amendment rights. 327 U.S. 683-84, 66 S.Ct. 773. However, the mere allegation by a plaintiff that a defendant was acting as a governmental agent should not suffice ipso facto to avoid the other exceptions delimited by Bell. This court has made it very clear that for federal jurisdiction to attach, “it is necessary to show that the Government exercises some form of control over the actions of [a] private party.” Spark v. Catholic University of America, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 56, 510 F.2d 1277, 1282 (1975). This requirement may pose a substantial hurdle for a plaintiff where the defendant is distinctly a private entity, such as a private university, hospital or restaurant. See, e.g., Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 92 S.Ct. 1965, 32 L.Ed.2d 627 (1972); Wahba v. New York University, 492 F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 874, 95 S.Ct. 135, 42 L.Ed.2d 113 (1974). Though the status of an off-duty policeman may be a somewhat easier case, I see no reason why a court should automatically hold that the requirement of governmental involvement is met simply because a defendant is employed by the government. The record in any given case may well disclose that a defendant clearly was not acting as a governmental agent, in which case a district court must conclude that the constitutional claim was “made solely for the purpose of obtaining jurisdiction” and must dismiss the action for lack of any plausible nexus between the constitutional right and its violation by the government. Otherwise a plaintiff could merely assert a “substantial” but factually baseless federal claim so as to seek adjudication of a related state law claim under a federal court’s pendent jurisdiction, even though the federal claim was dismissed on the merits. See ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction Between State and Federal Courts 177 (1969).
The court’s opinion refers throughout to Lea as “Officer Lea” or as the “police officer”, apparently assuming straightway that he was acting in his capacity as a police officer throughout the incident in question. Even though the record permits only a sketchy reconstruction of the factual background, it contains considerable evidence to indicate that Lea was, in fact, not acting in his official capacity. It is undisputed2 that at the time of the shooting Lea had been off duty for at least forty-five minutes,3 was driving his own car,4 was dressed in mufti,5 and was simply attempting to investigate the possible theft of certain items from his car.6 Appellants apparently never even realized that he was a police officer until sometime after they had reported the incident.7
Without more, I would have to conclude that there was no governmental involvement in this incident and that, therefore, *825appellants’ constitutional rights could not have been violated by Lea’s actions as a private individual except on thirteenth amendment grounds.8 If such were the case, appellants’ constitutional claim would clearly be implausible and subject to jurisdictional dismissal. There is more, however. The bullets were fired from a service revolver.9 What makes the real difference though, in my opinion, is the fact that the record contains no indication whatsoever that the District of Columbia ever denied, either specifically or indirectly, that Lea’s actions were related to his official duties.
Paragraph six of the Complaint, for instance, expressly alleges that Lea was a “duly appointed and qualified police officer of the Metropolitan Police Department . and acting in the course of his employment and engaged in the course of his duties as a police officer.”10 Record, Document No. 1, at 2. The District of Columbia’s Answer, however, fails to deny that Lea was acting under color of his official authority. It merely comments that the allegation was a “conclusio[n] of the pleader requiring no answer.” Record, Document No. 3, at 2. In the same vein, Interrogatory Eight directed to the District of Columbia requested that the government “[sjtate with particularity that [sic] facts you intend to rely upon to support your allegation that all actions taken by the District of Columbia or its agents with regard to the Plaintiffs were proper, legally sanctioned and justified.” Record, Document No. 20, at 2 (emphasis added). The government only answered that Lea “discharged his service revolver to defend himself from harm. . . Record, Document No. 25, at 2. This reply makes no attempt to deny that Lea was acting as an agent of the District of Columbia and might even be read as pregnant with an admission that he was. Finally, the record also contains four unsigned “Statements” of the several appellants prepared by the police, all of which are replete with dubious “admissions” to the effect that Lea unmistakenly was wearing his uniform, showed his badge and otherwise identified himself as a police officer prior to the shooting. Record, Document No. 25, at 1^4. In "view of these rather vague indications that Lea may have been acting as a governmental agent and mindful that jurisdictional dismissals are not favored, I cannot agree with the district court that the appellants “have failed to allege or indicate any circumstances which raise their claim to a constitutional dimension sufficient to confer jurisdiction on [it].” J.A. 40.
II
Even though these claims of constitutional tort survive the exceptions set forth in Bell v. Hood, supra, appellants can still not invoke general federal question jurisdiction unless they also satisfy the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement of section *8261331(a).11 Each of the four appellants demands $15,000 in compensatory and $15,000 in punitive damages. Appellants may not aggregate their claims to make up the jurisdictional amount; it must appear that each and every one of them satisfies the requirement. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291, 294-95, 94 S.Ct. 505, 38 L.Ed.2d 511 (1973). The allegations of the complaint are not conclusive on the question of whether the requisite amount has been met, but, in finding that it has not been, a court must conclude “to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount.” St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 289, 58 S.Ct. 586, 590, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938), quoted in Apton v. Wilson, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 506 F.2d 83, 95 (1974).
The valuation problem in this case is more difficult than Judge Robinson’s opinion seems to intimate. There were only $24 in special damages arising from the shooting: an emergency room charge for treating one of the appellants for superficial facial lacerations from flying glass.12 Only one of the appellants sustained any physical injury, and none of them appears to have suffered any significant emotional injury, though each alleges “mental anguish”. From my reading of the depositions, the physical injury appears relatively minor, notwithstanding the injured appellant’s testimony that it caused his vision to become impaired occasionally. Record, Document No. 32, at 14-15. The emotional injuries alleged do not seem very convincing, though surely some degree of “mental anguish” must be accepted as only natural under the circumstances.13
While I believe that the district court would not have abused its discretion in holding that the physical and emotional injuries to appellants clearly did not satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement, the question still remains whether their punitive damage claims and the alleged violation of their constitutional interests are sufficient to carry the matter in controversy across the $10,000 threshold. Both compensatory and punitive damage claims are generally to be considered in this determination, Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Co., *827320 U.S. 238, 240, 64 S.Ct. 5, 88 L.Ed. 15 (1943), and the amount of the latter need not have any necessary relation to the former. Wardman-Justice Motors v. Petrie, 59 App.D.C. 262, 39 F.2d 512, 515-16 (1930); see Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 125 U.S.App.D.C. 70, 366 F.2d 649, 662 (1966) (en banc).
These punitive damage claims of the appellants though do not have any talismanic effect. The law does not favor punitive damages but will award them to punish and deter intentional and aggravated wrongdoing that evidences a conscious disregard for another’s rights. E. g., Brown v. Coates, 102 U.S.App.D.C. 300, 253 F.2d 36, 39-40 (1958); Mills v. Levine, 98 U.S.App.D.C. 137, 233 F.2d 16, cert. denied, 352 U.S. 858, 77 S.Ct. 86, 1 L.Ed.2d 67 (1956). Assuming the worst, as we must on this appeal, the actions of Lea were outrageous and life-endangering, though their consequences were fortunately slight. In the usual case, which the one now before us clearly is not, I might readily agree with Judge Robinson’s conclusion here that appellants’ allegations make out at least a colorable claim for some punitive damages, and that must be considered as another input into the valuation calculus. Bell, supra.
It is not clear to me, however, that punitive damages are available where, in the absence of statutory authorization of traditionally available remedies, the remedies sought for alleged constitutional violations must be implied directly from the terms of the Constitution. In the germinal case, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), the Supreme Court held that money damages may be recovered for any injury suffered as a result of a violation of the fourth amendment. Id. at 397, 91 S.Ct. 1999. There was no mention whatsoever in Bivens of the possible availability of punitive damages by way of such a federal cause of action.
The decisions of this circuit on this particular question appear to be in conflict. For instance, in Hartigh v. Latin, 158 U.S.App. D.C. 289, 485 F.2d 1068 (1973), cert. denied, Columbia v. Marsh, 415 U.S. 948, 94 S.Ct. 1470, 39 L.Ed.2d 564 (1974), where recovery was sought under a Bivens theory, a panel of this court held that punitive damages are to be included in determining the jurisdictional amount under section 1331(a).14 Id. at 1072. In another decision, however, this court appears to have expressly limited the remedies available under the Bivens decision to compensatory damages. Zweibon v. Mitchell, 170 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 516 F.2d 594, 659 (1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944, 96 S.Ct. 1685, 48 L.Ed.2d 187 (1976), and this position is not inconsistent with the rationale advanced for the Court’s holding in Bivens. See Bivens, supra, 403 U.S. at 395—97, 91 S.Ct. 1999. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion, for instance, fairly characterized the essential question facing the Court concerning damages as “whether compensatory relief is ‘necessary’ or ‘appropriate’ to the vindication of the interest asserted.” Bivens, supra, at 407, 91 S.Ct. at 2010 (Harlan, J., concurring). Whether or not “vindication” is limited to compensation must remain for now an open question. It could well be argued though that punitive damages are unnecessary to the vindication of constitutional interests because their justificatory functions of deterrence and punishment might just as well be served by according the victims of constitutional violations compensatory damages,15 see id. at *828407-08, 91 S.Ct. 1999, especially where the lack of clear standards in setting compensation in any given case may permit amplification of an award on exemplary grounds anyway.16 At least in such a case as this one, too, illegal actions may subject the governmental agent to the possibility of criminal prosecution,17 which should serve similar if not, perhaps, as effective a deterrent purpose.
While it may someday be settled that punitive damages are an additional type of permissible relief afforded by Bivens and its descendants — perhaps even as an appropriate substitute deterrent for the exclusionary rule — I do not believe that such is necessarily the better rule; nor does the question warrant further examination in light of the procedural posture of this case and the ultimate conclusion I reach on the jurisdictional amount issue.
In my view, appellants’ case must thus survive or perish on the valuation to be accorded the alleged violation of their constitutional interests. Some courts have flatly decreed that constitutional rights are worth more than $10,000,18 though Professor Wright notes approvingly that “the great majority of courts have resisted this temptation and have declined the invitation to invent jurisdiction for themselves that Congress has not yet seen fit to grant.” Wright, supra, § 3561, at 395; see, e.g. Nguyen Da Yen v. Kissinger, 528 F.2d 1194, 1201 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975).
This is not to say, however, that the valuation of constitutional rights in dollars and cents should be ignored simply because it may be difficult. In fact, decisions of this circuit have been more generous than stingy in valuing basic civil rights. In Gomez v. Wilson, 155 U.S.App.D.C. 242, 477 F.2d 411, 420 n.51 (1973), quoted in Committee For GI Rights v. Callaway, 171 U.S.App.D.C. 73, 518 F.2d 466, 472 (1975), for example, this court articulated the applicable principle as follows:
Although the value of certain rights may be difficult of precise measurement, that difficulty does not make the claim nonjusticiable under Section 1331(a). . Absolute certainty as to the amount is not essential; it suffices that there is a present probability that the damages or the right sought to be protected meet the statutory requirement.
Thus, for jurisdictional purposes, this court has found that some twelve hours of alleged false imprisonment sufficed by itself to satisfy the $10,000 amount requirement. Sullivan v. Murphy, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 478 F.2d 938, 960-61 n.34, cert. denied, 414 *829U.S. 880, 94 S.Ct. 162, 38 L.Ed.2d 125 (1973). Similar valuations were reached in Apton v. Wilson, 165 U.S.App.D.C. at 34, 506 F.2d supra at 95 (fourth and fifth amendment violations) and Hartigh v. Latin, supra, 158 U.S.App.D.C. at 293, 485 F.2d at 1072 (fifth and eighth amendment violations).
There may well be a “national trend toward increasing awards in cases alleging . . . police misconduct,” see James v. Lusby, 162 U.S.App.D.C. 352, 499 F.2d 488, 493 (1974), which would lend support to these decisions. The determination of the jurisdictional amount must nevertheless be judged predominately on the facts of a particular case as they appear in the record. The essential probative facts in this case are not uncontested, as they were in James v. Lusby, supra, where this court held that the jurisdictional amount had not been satisfied despite allegations to the contrary. Indeed, the single most important ultimate fact in this case — whether or not Lea’s shots were in self-defense — is vigorously disputed. Against this background, the amount in controversy valuation poses a close question, as the Corporation Counsel for the District of Columbia admitted at oral argument, yet as a jurisdictional matter it must, in my judgment, be resolved here in favor of the appellants. In sum, it is not apparent to me that the appellants cannot to a legal certainty recover the amount claimed. See St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co., supra; Gomez v. Wilson, supra.
Ill
Not every violation of local law may be transformed into a constitutional tort at the whim of a plaintiff simply because it was committed by a governmental agent under color of official authority. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 699-701, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (1976); cf. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 61, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967). I am not insensitive in this regard to the growing burden of unsound constitutional claims upon our
district courts. The proper means of disposing of baseless claims, however, should usually be by summary judgment for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and not by dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. See Lewis v. D. C. Department of Corrections, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 483, 533 F.2d 710, 712 (1976). Where a federal constitutional claim brought under section 1331(a) rests upon an allegation of governmental involvement that is clearly baseless, however, the suit may and should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. While the action presently before this court may pose a close question in this respect, I believe that the more cautious alternative adopted today is the preferable one.
For the foregoing reasons, and without expressing any views as to the merits of this case, I concur in the decision of the court reversing the district court’s dismissal of this action for lack of jurisdiction.

. Police officers of the District of Columbia are not considered employees of the United States, at least for certain purposes. See Bradshaw v. United States, 143 U.S.App.D.C. 344, 443 F.2d 759, 766 (1971). Actions may nevertheless be brought under § 1331(a) against District of Columbia officials, even though they are acting in a purely local capacity. Apton v. Wilson, 165 U.S.App.D.C. 22, 506 F.2d 83, 96 (1974); Sullivan v. Murphy, 156 U.S.App.D.C. 28, 478 F.2d 938, 960, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 880 (1973); see District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432-33, 93 S.Ct. 602, 34 L.Ed.2d 613 (1973). Whether or not the District of Columbia, itself, can be sued for the tortious acts of its employees where the remedy is implied directly from the Constitution is an issue which has not been decided by this court, although it has been raised. Apton, supra, 165 U.S.App.D.C. at 36, 506 F.2d at 96. See also Shifrin v. Wilson, 412 F.Supp. 1282, 1305-06 (D.D.C.1976). In any case, that issue addresses the merits and not the scope of the jurisdiction conferred on the district court by § 1331(a). Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682, 66 S.Ct. 773, 90 L.Ed. 839 (1946); Lewis v. D.C. Department of Corrections, 174 U.S.App.D.C. 483, 533 F.2d 710, 711-12 (1976).

. But cf. Record, Document No. 25, at 1-4.

. Answers 3 and 7 to Interrogatories of the Chief of Investigations, Office of the Corporation Counsel, District of Columbia; Record, Document No. 25, at 1-2. Cf. Payne Deposition 17-18.

. Answers 32, 34, and 49 to Interrogatories of Plaintiffs; Record, Document No. 35, at 5. Unsigned Statements of Plaintiffs taken on Dec. 16, 1972, by the Metropolitan Police Department (Fourth District); Record, Document No. 25, at 1-4. Payne Deposition 24-25.

. Answer 33 to Interrogatories of Plaintiffs; Record, Document No. 35, at 5. Jenkins Deposition 23; Martin Deposition 15, 28; Jones Deposition 25-26, 46; Payne Deposition 23-24.

. Supplementary Statement taken from Officer Lea on Dec. 20, 1972; Record, Document No. 25, at 2.

. Jenkins Deposition 17, 21-22, 25-27, 35; Martin Deposition 32; Jones Deposition 54; Payne Deposition 24-26, 38. Cf. Martin Deposition 26; Jones Deposition 27-30.

. This case is decidedly not a Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 91 S.Ct. 1999, 29 L.Ed.2d 619 (1971), or a Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492 (1961) type situation where the nexus between the constitutional interest and its violation under color of governmental authority is clear. In Bivens agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics manacled petitioner in front of his family and, after searching the apartment, took him to a federal courthouse where he was interrogated and subjected to a visual strip search. 403 U.S. at 389, 91 S.Ct. 1999. In Monroe 13 Chicago police officers broke into a home in the early morning, drove the occupants from bed and forced them to stand naked while every room was ransacked, after which petitioner was interrogated incommunicado at the police station.

. I am disinclined to impart much constitutional relevance to this fact alone. Members of the Metropolitan Police Department must carry their service revolvers whether on duty or off. D.C. Govt., Metropolitan Police Dept. Manual § 2.3:1, at 10 (1972). The circumstances surrounding the use of a service revolver, rather than the mere fact of its use, have constitutional relevance. See Stengel v. Belcher, 522 F.2d 438, 441 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. dismissed, 429 U.S. 118, 97 S.Ct. 514, 50 L.Ed.2d 269 (1976). Surely one could not reasonably maintain that an off-duty police officer whose revolver accidentally discharged and hurt someone was acting under color of governmental authority.

. This allegation, moreover, was repeated by appellants in their answers to interrogatories. Answer 43 to Interrogatories of Plaintiffs; Record, Document No. 35, at 7.

. The jurisdictional amount requirement of § 1331(a) was recently eliminated by Congress where the “action [is] brought against the United States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official capacity.” Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721. The applicability of this revision to the pending litigation need not be addressed in view of our holding that, in any case, appellants have met the jurisdictional amount requirement.

. In another case of analogous procedural posture where an appellant prayed for $100,000 in compensatory damages for alleged violation of his constitutional rights, but coincidentally had sustained only $24 of medical bills, this court understatedly remarked that “[i]n view of these very limited medical injuries, there may arise some question of the amount in controversy.” Hartigh v. Latin, 158 U.S.App.D.C. 289, 485 F.2d 1068, 1072 (1973), cert. denied, Columbia v. Marsh, 415 U.S. 948, 94 S.Ct. 1470, 39 L.Ed.2d 564 (1974).

. The following deposition testimony of one of the appellant’s is typical of that of the other three:
Q. What complaints did you have, physical and mental, five minutes after this took place?
A. All kinds.
Q. Like what?
A. I was sitting in the police precinct and I found—
Q. Five minutes right after.
A. Oh, what complaints?
Q. Yes.
A. All kinds of complaints because . . . a lot of stuff ran across my mind because I wasn’t doing a thing but sitting.
Q. Did you feel any pain, physical pain?
A. I don’t know ... I can’t remember.
Q. How about ten minutes after?
A. I don’t know. I still can’t remember. Yes, I felt a little pain because I was sitting on some glass. Yes, I felt something.
Q. Twenty minutes later?
A. I don’t remember.
Jenkins Deposition 54-55. Despite the improbability of evaluating credibility from a printed record, I nevertheless have the distinct impression from portions of this same deposition that appellant’s testimony as to his “mental anguish” may have involved considerable exaggeration. See id. at 43-51. The same may not unfairly be said of much of the other testimony. See, e.g., Martin Deposition 30-32; Payne Deposition 46-52; Jones Deposition 39-40.

. See also Hanna v. Drobnick, 514 F.2d 393, 398 (6th Cir. 1975).

. Punitive damages may serve an especially salutory end in deterring the unconstitutional actions of government officials. In fact, in England where the exemplary principle in civil suits was first recognized, this remains one of the few instances in which punitive damages are still awarded. See Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, 1226, where Lord Devlin remarks:
[T]here are certain categories of cases in which an award of exemplary damages can serve a useful purpose in vindicating the strength of the law and thus affording a practical justification for admitting into the civil law a principle which ought logically to belong to the criminal. . . . The first category is oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitu*828tional action by the servants of the government. . . . [T]he servants of the government are also the servants of the people and the use of their power must always be subordinate to their duty of service.
In this country, nevertheless, punitive damages have traditionally been considered foreign to equitable relief, see D. Dobbs, Remedies 211-12 (1973), and Justice Harlan makes clear that the scope of the Court’s “equitable remedial discretion” in fashioning the Bivens remedy was “determined according to the distinctive historical traditions of equity as an institution. . . . ” Bivens, 403 U.S. supra at 404, 91 S.Ct. at 2009 (Harlan, J., concurring). Furthermore, the punitive liability of governmental entities, such as the District of Columbia, has often been very limited, even where sovereign immunity has been abolished or does not otherwise apply. See Dobbs, supra at 217-18.

. Cf. Wm. Shakespeare, Romeo and Juliet, Act ii, sc. 2,1.42:
What’s in a name? that which we call a [thorn]
By any other name would [hurt] as [much],

. Section 4-176 of the District of Columbia Code provides that “[a]ny officer who uses unnecessary and wanton severity in arresting . . any person shall be deemed guilty of assault and battery, and, upon conviction, punished therefor.” D.C.Code § 4-176 (1973).

. E.g., Cortright v. Resor, 325 F.Supp. 797, 810 (E.D.N.Y.) rev’d on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965, 92 S.Ct. 1172, 31 L.Ed.2d 240 (1972), where the district court stated:
A monetary price can hardly be placed on the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment. To say that these priceless rights so many have fought and died to protect are worth nothing is to insult the basic principles upon which this nation was founded. Free speech is almost by definition, worth more than $10,000, so that the allegation of jurisdiction based upon 1331 ought not to be subject to denial.