Court Opinion

ID: 9693270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:33:51.506805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:43.828869
License: Public Domain

Fairchild, J.
(dissenting). I would affirm the judgment. We have applied the emergency doctrine relied on here by the majority in such cases as Havens v. Havens (1954), 266 Wis. 282, 63 N. W. (2d) 86, and recently in Le May v. Marks (1957), 1 Wis. (2d) 487, 85 N. W. (2d) 360. Both were situations where the driver, found negligent by the jury as to management and control, was not negligent as to speed or lookout and was driving on his own side of the highway; was faced with a car approaching from the opposite direction on a straight road without notice of *180any loss of control and with a quandary as to whether the oncoming car would continue in a straight course or revert to its own side. The controlling element in these cases is the propriety of the assumption that the oncoming driver will return to his own side of the road. The instant situation is substantially different in my opinion. There was evidence which would support the following propositions: Papacosta realized that the Dabson car was approaching the curve at a speed and with a momentum which would probably compel Dabson to proceed forward into a side road or swing off the main road onto the shoulder or parking lot on his wrong side. Successful rounding of the curve plus return to his own side of the road against his momentum would require an unlikely degree of effort. A maximum application of the brakes by Papacosta could have brought him to a stop in about 65 feet, or less than 2 seconds, and greatly reduced the chances of collision. The evidence accordingly supports the finding of causal negligence as to management and control.
In my opinion the emergency doctrine always tends to put the court in the position of trying the facts, and the majority is putting the court in that position here.