Court Opinion

ID: 9699401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:22:36.070019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:39.855886
License: Public Domain

Pashman, J.,
concurring. I concur in the result reached by the majority. The conclusion is sound that where a liability insurance policy facially provides coverage for an insured intentional wrongdoer, such coverage should extend to an injured third party, with the insurer subsequently being subrogated to the rights of the third party against the insured. As Justice Schreiber aptly points out, sound public *487policy is furthered where injured parties are reimbursed, so long as no benefit is received by the tortfeasor. My concurrence is based on uneasiness over whether the majority opinion demonstrates coverage under the policy, given the definition of "occurrence.” My conclusion is that there is coverage in spite of that definition.
By the terms of the policy, coverage exists if the insured is liable for damages arising out of an "occurrence,” defined as "an accident . . . which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.” I find coverage because Satkin did not intend to injure the decedent under a proper definition of that term.
The major problem with this ease is that the Appellate Division selected an improper standard of intent, and then erroneously applied that standard. The Appellate Division followed Hanover Insurance Group v. Cameron, 122 N. J. Super. 51, 61 (Ch. Div. 1973), in adopting the definition of intent as used in Restatement, Torts 2d, § 8A (1965). 147 N. J. Super. 286, 292 (App. Div. 1977).
§ 8A. Intent.
The word “intent” is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.
The Appellate Division also cited the following part of Restatement, Torts 2d, § 8A, comment b:
If the actor knows that the consequences are certain or substantially certain, to result from his act, and still goes ahead, he is treated by the law as if he had in fact desired to produce the result.
If I believed that this were indeed a proper definition of intent in the context of liability insurance, my conclusion would be that the injuries resulting from Satkin’s arson were intentional and not an occurrence under this policy. Surely, one who starts a fire in an old multi-storied wood *488frame building at 3 a.m., directly under the main stairwell, without warning any of the inhabitants, should be held to be substantially certain that some of these persons would be seriously injured or killed. The Appellate Division’s conclusion that Satkin’s act did not meet the objective standard of intent inherent in the Restatement strains credulity.
Moreover, the. trial court found as a matter of fact that Satkin could not have said in his mind, as he did this act, “[TJhey’ll all get out; there’s a fire escape.” The judge added that
It is not logical, nor can I' draw a reasonable inference that this is what he said or this is what he thought.
I am of the opinion that the natural and logical consequence of his act is what we have resulted and what was before us. I think this case, on its facts •— strictly on its facts — is different than the man who throws a firecracker in a room and intends merely to scare.
I think this case turns on these particular facts and to that extent, I find that he meets the test as set forth in Lyons [Lyons v. Hartford Insurance Group, 125 N. J. Super. 239 (App. Div. 1973)], that is, the intended result of an intended act and a judgment is to entered [sic] on behalf of the plaintiff.
The finding that Satkin knew with substantial certainty that his act of arson would injure his tenants is amply supported by the evidence, and is unassailable under State v. Johnson, 42 N. J. 146, 161-162 (1964). Under a principled application of the Restatement standard, the Appellate Division could do nothing but affirm the denial of coverage at trial.
However, I reject the Restatement standard as a definition of intent in the liability insurance field. It is really no different from the rule that a tortfeasor intends the natural and probable consequences of his acts, a standard which has been roundly rejected in liability insurance policy cases. See Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Toal, 244 N. W. 2d 121, 125 (Minn. 1976); Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co. v. Blackburn, 477 P. 2d 62, 66 (Okl. 1970); Grange *489Mutual Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 301 So. 2d 158, 159 (Fla. App. 1974); Cloud v. Shelby Mutual Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. App. 1971).
The proper standard of intent for liability insurance cases was announced in Lyons v. Hartford Insurance Group, 125 N. J. Super. 239, 247 (App. Div. 1973), certif. den. 64 N. J. 322 (1974), as whether the injury was the intended result of an intentional act. In Lyons, an off-duty police officer whose conduct after a long drinking bout caused him to be assaulted, shot and killed a man. He claimed that he merely wanted to fire a warning shot and that the revolver went off prematurely.
The policy had an exclusion clause which prevented coverage (for an injury expected or intended from the standpoint of the insured. The Appellate Division injected this clause into the case for the first time, and reversed the trial court’s dismissal of the insured’s declaratory judgment action concerning coverage. The Appellate Division used the following test to determine coverage:
Thus, the distinction between intended and unintended results of intentional acts is well recognized. The trial court did not apply this principle. The oral opinion below can be construed as holding that if Lyons intended to fire without any specific intent to cause death or bodily harm, coverage did not exist. Such a principle is at war with the authorities discussed here. The short of it is, if Lyons intended to maim or kill Berger he has no coverage. If his intent was, as he says, to fire a warning shot, but he unintentionally fired prematurely, coverage exists.
[Lyons v. Hartford Insurance Group, supra at 247]
Under Lyons, Satlcm should be charged with intent to injure his tenants only if that was his subjective desire. This is the correct standard for liability insurance cases. Since one purpose of such insurance is to protect injured third parties, as between the liability insurer of a culpable actor and an innocent third party it is the better policy to place the risk of loss with the insurer where intent to injure is unclear.
*490Moreover, the standard which I advocate is the prevailing one.
The courts have generally held that injury or damage is “caused intentionally” within the meaning of an “intentional injury exclusion clause” if the insured has acted with the specific intent to cause harm to a third party, with the result that the insurer will not be relieved of its obligations under a liability policy containing such an exclusion unless the insured has acted with such specific intent. Under this view, it is not sufficient that the insured’s intentional, albeit wrongful, act has resulted in unintended harm to a third person ; it is the harm itself that must be intended before the exclusion will apply. There is, however, some authority for the proposition that such a clause will operate to relieve a liability insurer of its duty to indemnify an insured whose intentional act has caused harm to a third person where the nature or character of the act is such that an intent to cause harm is thereby inferred as a matter of law.
[Annotation, “Liability Insurance: Specific Exclusion of Liability for Injury Intentionally Caused by Insured,” 2 A. L. R. 3d 1238, § 2 at 1241 (1965), see also 44 Am. Jur. 2d Insurance § 1411 n. 5 at 259, 45 C. J. S. Insurance § 772 n. 53-55 at 801-802; footnote omitted]
The leading decision for the majority view is Lumbermens Mutual Insurance Co. v. Blackburn, supra, where the Court held that the intentional throwing of a hard object by insured’s son, which injured plaintiff, was not within a policy exclusion where the trial court found that no injury was actually intended. In Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 213 N. W. 2d 327 (1973), the court also held that an injury was not caused intentionally within the meaning of an intentional injury exclusion clause. The insured had deliberately pushed aside plaintiff in entering a coat checkroom but did not desire or intend her resulting fall and back injury. To the same effect is Hawkeye Sec. Insurance Co. v. Shields, 31 Mich. App. 649, 187 N. W. 2d 894, 901 (1971), which held that the insurer will only avoid liability if the insured not only intended the act which led to the injury, but also intended to cause bodily injury to the injured party. See also Putnam v. Zeluff, 372 Mich. 553, 127 N. W. 2d 374 *491(1964); Smith v. Moran, 61 Ill. App. 2d 157, 209 N. E. 2d 18 (1965) (insurer is liable for the unintended result of an intentional act). The holding in Lyons, supra, can be most readily interpreted as following these cases.
Although a few cases permit intent to harm to be found as a matter of law, see Continental Western Insurance Co. v. Toal, supra, 244 N. W. 2d at 125-126, nearly all such cases have involved an assault or some analogous act. See 2 A. L. R. 3d 1238, supra, § 4b at 1245 and supplement. An example of this view is found in Oakes v. State Farm, 137 N. J. Super. 365 (App. Div. 1975).
In the liability trial the jury expressly found that Oakes was guilty of assault and battery which, under the court’s instruction here, amounted to a determination that Oakes intended to injure Appleton. It follows that coverage is excluded. Indeed to permit coverage of an assault and battery would be against public policy. See Malanga v. Manufacturers Cas. Ins. Co., 28 N. J. 220, 225 (1958).
Satkin’s act was not in the nature of an assault, and is thus not controlled by these cases.
Eor a tortfeasor to be charged with intent to injure for purposes of a liability insurance policy, the majority rule requires that he have an actual subjective desire to injure a party. It is apparent that this rule cannot be harmonized with the Restatement test. I fully agree with the prevailing view that negligence standards of foreseeability do not govern the law of liability insurance exclusions. If subjective intent to injure is necessary, then Satkin lacked intent. The Appellate Division reached a result in keeping with the majority rule, but also endorsed a definition of intent which would probably negate that rule. If normal tort/negligence standards of foreseeability are inappropriate in the context of liability insurance coverage, then the Restatement, Torts 2d definition of intent is similarly unsuited for this area.
The whole purpose behind Satkin’s act of arson was to defraud the insurance company and obtain payment for the value of his property. He never desired that his tenants *492suffer injury or death. While he certainly displayed a callous disregard for their safety, he did not want to see them harmed by his act. Thus, Satkin did not “expect or intend” the deaths of his tenants in the subjective sense that is required for his act to be excluded from the definition of “occurrence.” He was covered for the injuries caused by his despicable act, but is also liable to the insurer as the subrogee of an injured third party.
While the issue need not be reached here, it is my opinion that the so-called public policy against covering an insured for his intentional torts should be reexamined. This is particularly so where, as here, a subrogation theory exists so that the tortfeasor can in no way profit from his intentional wrongful act. With the prospect of criminal sanction and the spectre of civil liability despite coverage facing any wrongdoer, there is little reason to deny coverage which would protect the innocent injured party.
Justice Handler joins in this opinion.