Court Opinion

ID: 9549351
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:16:41.863097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:11.380585
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.—I respectfully dissent.
The statute at issue herein (Stats. 1981, ch. 959), enacted in September 1981, was to become effective on January 1, 1982. Although chapter 959 purported to *253establish 18 new appellate judgeships on that date, no valid prior appropriation of funds had been made to pay for them. Accordingly, chapter 959 itself constituted, in legal effect, an attempted implied appropriation measure which was rendered absolutely void for failure to obtain the requisite two-thirds vote needed to adopt such a measure (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 12, subd. (d)). Being void in its entirety on January 1, 1982, chapter 959 could not be revived by a belated appropriation contained in the 1982-1983 Budget Act (Stats. 1982, ch. 326).
1. No Valid Prior Appropriation in the 1981-1982 Budget Act.
Initially, it is clear that there existed no prior appropriation of funds legally available to pay the costs of chapter 959’s ambitious programs. The 1981-1982 Budget Act (Stats. 1981, ch. 99) contained a lump sum appropriation of $19,321,447 for the Court of Appeal, and there is some indication that this figure was intended to include some provision for 15 new judgeships which were proposed under an earlier, vastly different, version of the bill which ultimately became chapter 959. (See 1981-1982 Governor’s Budget, at p. LJE 10.) Yet, as I explain, we could not properly hold that the 1981-1982 Budget Act lawfully appropriated funds for the 18 judgeships created by chapter 959. Indeed, the majority herein does not contend otherwise.
There are several reasons for the foregoing conclusion. First, as the budget act itself acknowledged, the act’s various appropriations were limited to “the usual current expenses” of the state. (Stats. 1981, ch. 99, § 35.00; see Cal. Const., art. IV, § 8, subd. (c)(2).) Although such expenses could legitimately include anticipated expenditures for previously authorized projects, or programs not requiring legislative approval, nevertheless, as the state Legislative Analyst pointedly observed, it was improper to provide an appropriation in the budget act for future judicial positions which had not yet been legislatively approved. Instead, the funding of such new positions should have been considered “in connection with the authorizing legislation,” i.e., chapter 959. (Legis. Analyst Rep. to Joint Legislative Budget Com., Analysis of 1981-1982 Budget Bill, at p. 8.)
The practical reason for excluding from a budget act any appropriations for items which are not as yet legislatively authorized is obvious: An annual budget act is intended to itemize the probable recommended state expenditures for the forthcoming fiscal year. (Cal. Const., art. IV, § 12, subds. (a), (c).) Until formal enabling legislation is enacted, following the usual procedures of hearings and debates, the necessity for an appropriation for such an item is entirely speculative and premature.
In the present case, therefore, the lump sum appropriation for the Court of Appeal in the 1981-1982 Budget Act was not lawfully available to fund the 18 *254added judgeships subsequently created by chapter 959. Any different conclusion could readily endanger the financial security of the state by permitting the use of general fimds to defray the cost of projects which were neither anticipated nor authorized at the time when the state’s forthcoming budget needs were calculated. As we recently held, appropriated funds may be spent only for the particular purpose for which they were legislatively designated. (Stanson v. Mott (1976) 17 Cal.3d 206, 213 [130 Cal.Rptr. 697, 55, P.2d 1].)
2. No Valid Appropriation in Chapter 959.
I do not suggest, of course, that the Legislature is powerless to approve and fund new projects not properly included in the current budget bill. However, the proper procedure, as carefully explained in the report of the Legislative Analyst, previously quoted, is to appropriate specially those funds for such projects as part of the legislation which establishes the projects. (See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 12, subd. (d).) No such special appropriation was contained in chapter 959, of course. If an implied appropriation was intended, the measure necessarily failed because, as the majority concedes, chapter. 959 did not gain the constitutionally mandated two-thirds legislative approval.
3. No Valid Appropriation in the 1982-1983 Budget Act.
The majority insists that any defect in appropriating fimds for the judgeships created by chapter 959 was cured by a subsequent appropriation contained in the 1982-1983 Budget Act (Stats. 1982, ch. 326), which was adopted by the Legislature on June 30, 1982. Because chapter 959 was absolutely void as of January 1, 1982, however, no such revival or cure could have occurred. Sound public policy compels that conclusion.
As previously indicated, by its terms chapter 959 supposedly became effective on January 1, 1982, despite the lack of any funds legally available to pay the salaries and expenses of the 18 new judgeships created by that chapter. If we assume that chapter 959 was nonetheless a valid and effective measure on January 1, 1982, the Governor thereupon became authorized and, indeed, was constitutionally mandated (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 16, subd. (d)) to appoint 18 new judges to fill those positions. Any such appointments automatically, and without the necessity of any further proceedings, would have imposed upon the state a corresponding liability to pay the salaries statutorily prescribed for the new offices. (See Gov. Code, §§ 68201, subd. (b); 68203.) As the Constitution provides, “Laws that set these salaries [of elected state officers such as judges] are appropriations.” (Cal. Const., art. III, § 4, subd. (a); see Olson v. Cory (1980) 27 Cal.3d 532, 543-544 [178 Cal.Rptr. 568, 636 P.2d 532].)
*255Thus, assuming that chapter 959 became effective on January 1, it thereupon had the immediate potential of imposing upon the General Fund a substantial liability not secured by any valid preexisting appropriation. Attempting to salvage chapter 959, the majority in hindsight observes, however, that “no chapter 959 judges have been appointed” (ante, p. 249), evidently acknowledging that had such appointments been made prior to the passage of the 1982-1983 Budget Act, a different result might obtain. Yet it should be wholly irrelevant from a constitutional standpoint that in this case no appointments were made. In every case it is the potential liability of the General Fund which requires a two-thirds approval of the Legislature before special appropriation measures such as chapter 959 may be adopted. To assure that no such future liability is incurred or attempted, this court should recognize a prophylactic rule that all similar measures are absolutely void unless adopted by the requisite two-thirds vote. Such proposals may not be somehow frozen in a legislative refrigerator and later thawed by a belated appropriation in some subsequent budget act.
While ineffective for funding the new judgeships, the 1982-1983 Budget Act is revealing in one important respect: In attempting to provide a belated appropriation for “all of the judgeships and places of sitting created by Chapter 959 of the Statutes of 1981” (Stats. 1982, ch. 326, item 0250-001-001), the Legislature thereby impliedly acknowledged that no prior valid appropriation had theretofore been made for this item. Yet being absolutely void, chapter 959 and the 18 judgeships could not be so readily created by only the briefest reference in a single item in the budget act. Under our system of government, revival of a void act can only occur by a reenactment of the legislation following the usual legislative process and its accompanying safeguards against precipitous action. That essential procedure was not followed here.
The majority seeks help from a principle that a partially invalid statute may be validated by later legislation. (Ante, p. 251.) Yet as I have explained, chapter 959 was entirely void, not partially so, having failed to gain the necessary two-thirds legislative approval of the attempted appropriation implicit within chapter 959’s provisions.
Nor is County of Los Angeles v. Jones (1936) 6 Cal.2d 695, 708 [59 P.2d 489], in point. There we held that the Legislature could amend an unconstitutional law by a subsequent duly enacted amendment. As noted, chapter 959 was not reenacted in the manner required by law; moreover, Jones did not purport to allow revival of the entire void act by a simple amendment thereto.
Finally, the majority points to the fact that, on a prior occasion, the Legislature purported to create new appellate judgeships for the Third Appellate District without expressly appropriating funds for their support. (Ante, pp. 250-251.) Yet, as the majority must concede, the legislation there at issue *256“in fact passed both houses with more than a two-thirds vote . . . .” (Id., at p. 251.) Thus, although the Legislature did not label it as such, the Third District legislation clearly constituted an implied appropriation which was duly approved by the requisite vote.
To summarize, the constitutional invalidity of chapter 959 is founded upon more than mere empty technicalities which govern the adoption or amendment of legislation. Legislation which potentially creates a new and unappropriated state liability constitutes an implied appropriation. Every such appropriation must be approved by a two-thirds vote of the Legislature. This principle rests upon the sound financial policy which underlies article IV, section 12, subdivision (d), of the California Constitution. As California’s highest court it is our clear duty to remain ever diligent to protect the state treasury against unauthorized invasions from any source. It is our function, particularly, to insist upon that full and strict compliance with those constitutional safeguards which the people themselves have imposed upon the appropriation process. In my view, chapter 959 is invalid because of its noncompliance with article IV, section 12, subdivision (d) of the California Constitution. It follows from this that no new appellate judgeships were created.
I would deny the peremptory writ.
Caldecott, J.,* and Franson, J.,* concurred.
On November 18, 1982, the petition of real party in interest Tweedy for rehearing was denied, at which time the following order of court and dissenting opinion on denial of rehearing were filed. Richardson, J., Caldecott, J.,* and Franson, J.,* were of the opinion that the petition should be granted. A response of Justice Reynoso to that dissenting opinion was filed on January 12, 1983, and is reproduced below.
Order of Court
SUPREME COURT FILED Nov 18 1982 LAURENCE P. GILL, Clerk Deputy
S.F. No. 24403,24405
In the Supreme Court of the State of California In Bank
*257Brown, Jr., etc., et al., Petitioners, v.
The Superior Court of Sacramento County, Respondent; Martin, et al. , Real Parties in Interest.
Gampell, etc., Petitioner, v.
The Superior Court of Sacramento County, Respondent; Martin, et al. , Real Parties in Interest.
Since the decision in these cases was filed on November 1, 1982, the Court has received and considered the following papers:
1. Stipulation re Finality of Decision, signed November 2, 1982, by attorneys of record for the petitioners and for both real parties in interest, and filed November 3, 1982, stipulating that the decision may become final forthwith.
2. Letter from amici curiae dated November 8, 1982, urging that finality of the decision not be accelerated.
3. Substitution of Attorneys for real party in interest Thomas A. Tweedy, filed November 15, 1982.
4. Motion by real party in interest Tweedy to (1) Strike Stipulation; (2) Extend Time to File Petition for Rehearing; (3) Stay Issuance of Remittitur and Peremptory Writ and (4) Modify Judgment, filed November 15, 1982.
5. Letter from the Attorney General, as counsel for petitioner Edmund G. Brown, Jr., dated November 15, 1982, urging that the decision be made final forthwith notwithstanding the letter from amici curiae and the disavowal by real party in interest Tweedy of the stipulation filed November 3rd.
6. Petition for Rehearing and Motion Pursuant to Rule 45(e) (relief from default) filed by real party in interest Tweedy on November 16, 1982.
7. Opposition of Petitioner Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Governor, to Motion of Thomas A. Tweedy, filed by the Attorney General as counsel for the Governor on November 17, 1982.
In light of the declaration and affidavit attached to the motion of real party in interest Tweedy, the stipulation is stricken as to him. In all other respects, his *258motion filed November 15, 1982, is denied. The motion for relief from default, filed November 16, 1982, has been rendered moot by acceptance of the petition for rehearing.
After due consideration, the petition for rehearing is denied. The court deems that this lawsuit has long enough delayed the implementation of responsibilities that our Constitution entrusts to the Legislature. Accordingly, for good cause, the decision herein is made final forthwith.
See dissenting opinion.
Richardson, J., Caldecott, J., and Franson, J., are of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
Reynoso Acting Chief Justice

Assigned by the Acting Chairperson of the Judicial Council.