Court Opinion

ID: 9774144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:09:52.767138+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:02.805451
License: Public Domain

• On Motion for Rehearing
Appellant contends that our original opinion demonstrates that we failed to accurately and fairly reflect the -true- scope; character, and extent of appellant’s objections to respondents’ argument, and responses made thereto by the trial judge. During •opening argument counsel stated: “The whole thing was intended to be a smear and bring about a situation so no St. Louis •lawyer would ever again accept a case .against the Southern Railroad. That’s the reason they are having this case, to make it difficult for them to .collect this fee .against the railroad .company, because they knew Satterfield had been represented by these people.” Objection was made that the argument was beyond the purview of the pleadings and the evidence. The court acted on the objection by stating: “Argument of counsel is in no way to be taken as evidence.” Thereafter counsel for respondents argued: “And that they wanted to forestall. And that’s why they entered into that rigmarole of the judgment, so as to do everything in their -power to • keep Satterfield from getting everything he is entitled to.” Again there was an -objection that the argument was outside the. record and issues, and again the - court stated: “The jury heard the evidence.”
During the closing argument respondents’ counsel was commenting on the conduct of one of the claim agents of appellant and this occurred:
“Mr." Schwarz: The only issue in this casé, Your Honor, is solely on the idea that this settlement was made without notifying these lawyers. They made no charge of misrepresentation or shoddy dealing, or inadequacy, or anything else.
“Mr. Schneider: ■ That’s no objection to the argument at all.
“The Court: Proceed, gentlemen.
“Mr. Schwarz: Did they give no- ; tice to these attorneys or didn’t they? They never came in here and said any- ■ thing about fraud or inadequacy.”
No further objection or comment Was. made by appellant’s counsel during the remainder of the closing argument.
Appellant now contends that our holding with respect to the action of the trial court to objections during the opening argument is contrary to the ruling- of the Supreme Court in Reese v. Illinois Terminal Railroad Co., Mo.Sup., 273 S.W.2d 217, loc. cit. 224, 225. In the Reese case the court held that the ruling of the trial judge on the Objection to argument was insufficient in view, of the prejudicial nature of the argument. The court said that the character of the *400argument called for a prompt and unequivocal sustention of the objection instead of the qualifying direction given by the court to the.jury. If we were dealing with a case wherein the nature and character of the argument was prejudicially erroneous, we would have .no hesitancy in saying, as the court did in the Reese case, that the trial judge should have sustained the objection made by appellant’s counsel in unequivocal terms and directed the jury to disregard the argument. But careful consideration of the argument in light of the pleadings and evidence convinces us that the trial court should not be convicted of error with respect to the argument complained of.
 Even though it may be considered that the effect of the court’s ruling on the objections made by appellant’s counsel during opening argument pointed out, supra, was to overrule such objections, and should we consider further that proper .objection was made during the closing argument, we are not willing to hold the trial judge guilty of prejudicial, error. This is so because of the firmly established rule that counsel is allowed not only to comment upon the evidence, but to draw all reasonable inferences therefrom most strongly for his client, and an objection cannot be sustained because he is doing so. Wide range should be allowed counsel in presenting the facts and deducing legitimate inferences therefrom. Goyette v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., Mo.Sup., 37 S.W.2d 552, loc. cit. 556, and cases cited. The trial judge should be allowed large discretion in permitting or restraining the argument, and his rulings will generally be deferred to on appeal. Goyette v. St. Louis-San Francisco R. Co., supra; Venditti v. St, Louis Public Service Co., 362 Mo. 339, 240 S.W.2d 921, loc. cit. 929, 930; Shelley v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo.App., 279 S.W.2d 182, loc. cit. 187.
We are- unwilling to hold that the action of the trial judge with respect to the argument, viewed in light of the entire record-and measured-by the applicable principles, constituted an abuse of his discretion.
The motion for rehearing, or in the alternative to transfer to the Supreme Court, should be overruled. It is so ordered,
ANDERSON, P. J., and SAM C. BLAIR, Special Judge, concur.- .