Court Opinion

ID: 9544835
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:02:19.77857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:42.279102
License: Public Domain

ROVIRA, Justice,
specially concurring:
I concur in the result reached in the majority opinion, but disagree in the analysis and conclusion reached in Part I B.
*1073The appellant’s second law suit, initiated by filing a complaint attacking as facially unconstitutional the habitual traffic offender statute, was filed almost two years after the hearing officer’s license revocation order.
The appellee contends, and I agree, that section 24-4-106(4), C.R.S.1973 (1981 Supp.), which requires that “any person adversely affected or aggrieved by any agency action may commence an action for judicial review in the district court within thirty days after such action becomes effective; ... . ” mandates dismissal because the second law suit was not filed within the required time.
Quite recently in Clasby v. Klapper, 636 P.2d 682 (Colo.1981), we stated as a general rule that a person seeking to exercise a statutorily provided right of review must comply with the time limitations imposed by that statute; failure to bring a proceeding within the applicable time limit is a jurisdictional defect; and a party cannot circumvent these limitations on his right of review by attempting to obtain declaratory or injunctive relief where the prescribed avenue of review is adequate. Id. 684.
In Clasby the person aggrieved by the agency action argued that since an administrative body could not decide the constitutionality of its enabling legislation he was not limited to the statutory review provided by section 12-23-120, C.R.S.1973 (Repl.Vol. 5). In denying the validity of that argument, we stated that three questions must be answered. First, whether the statute prescribing the method of appeal from an agency decision contemplates that facial constitutional challenges to the statute under which the agency acts may be asserted on appeal. Second, whether the statutory appeal procedure is intended to provide the exclusive means of asserting such challenges. Third, whether the appeal procedure is adequate.
Answering all three questions in the affirmative, we concluded that the statutory review procedure in section 12-23-120, C.R. S.1973 (Repl.Vol. 5), was the appropriate and exclusive means of challenging the facial constitutionality of the licensing statute involved in that case.
A comparison of section 12-23-120 1 and section 24-4-106 leads me to believe that the same conclusion is applicable in this case.
Section 24 — 4-106 contemplates that a facial constitutional challenge may be made to the statute which authorized the revocation of appellant’s license. Section 106(7) states in part that if the reviewing court finds “that the agency action is arbitrary or capricious, a denial of statutory right, contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity . . . then the court shall hold unlawful and set aside the agency action . . . . ” This statutory provision provides appellant ample opportunity to test the constitutionality of section 42-2-202, C.R.S.1973 (1981 Supp), in a judicial review proceeding pursuant to section 24-4-106(4).
Section 24 — 4-106(4) provides for expeditious review of administrative action by requiring that a judicial proceeding be filed within thirty days of the decision. Further, the review procedures of section 24-4— 106(4) must be considered exclusive for the same reasons as so cogently stated in Clasby v. Klapper, supra.
Finally, I am convinced that the review procedure set out in section 24^4-106(4) provides, as we said in Clasby, “an avenue for the plain, speedy and adequate vindication of [appellant’s] rights.” See People v. District Court, Colo., 612 P.2d 87 (1980).
I believe that Part I B of the majority opinion makes more confusing an already confusing area of the law. I am of the opinion that since the appellant failed to comply with the applicable statutory review *1074procedure he is precluded from obtaining review and would remand to the district court for entry of a judgment of dismissal.
I am authorized to say that Chief Justice HODGES joins in this special concurrence.

. Section 12-23-120, C.R.S.1973 (Repl.Vol. 5), states in pertinent part:
“Appeals. Any person aggrieved by a decision of the board and affected thereby shall be entitled to judicial review by filing in the district court .. . within ninety days after the decision of the board, an action requesting such review.” Review shall be by the court without a jury, and a decision of the board shall be reversed or set aside only if it is contrary to constitutional rights or privileges.... ”