Court Opinion

ID: 9547388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:46:45.407883+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:41.312629
License: Public Domain

KAUS, J., Concurring.
I have for some time felt that the absolutist formulation of Prudhomme v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 320, 326 [85 Cal.Rptr. 129, 466 P.2d 673]—that the privilege against self-incrimination *559forbids any compelled disclosure which might conceivably lighten the prosecution’s burden of proving its case—leads, when rigidly applied, to very strange results. Just for example, when a defendant invokes the trial court’s discretion to prohibit felony-impeachment and threatens not to testify if his request is denied, why should the privilege prohibit the court from asking for an offer of proof, so that it will know what it would be missing? (See People v. Fries (1979) 24 Cal.3d 222, 233 [155 Cal.Rptr. 194, 594 P.2d 19]; cf. Luce v. United States (1984) — U.S. — [83 L.Ed.2d 443, 105 S.Ct. 460]; People v. Kyllingstad (1978) 85 Cal.App.3d 562, 570-571 [149 Cal.Rptr. 637].)
The answer to my problem may lie in a reappraisement of just what it is that makes a communication “compelled” in the self-incrimination sense. Were it necessary, I would have no problem drawing a line between the offer of proof in support of a motion for a discretionary ruling and the compelled disclosures demanded by Penal Code section 1102.5 as the price for calling a witness.
With this reservation, I agree with the majority that section 1102.5 cannot be sustained.