Court Opinion

ID: 9893395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-26 20:04:19.916359+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:03:00.991697
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/26/23 Munoz v. Ojogho CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION THREE

JOSE MUNOZ,                                                       B312317

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                                 Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. 20STCP03450
         v.

ENYINNAYA CHRISTIAN
OJOGHO,

         Defendant;

GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY,

         Respondent.
JOSE MUNOZ et al.,                      B316065

     Plaintiffs and Appellants,         Los Angeles County
                                        Super. Ct. No. BS172763
     v.

A-1 SOCCER WAREHOUSE, INC.,

     Defendant;

GREAT AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY,

     Respondent.

      APPEALS from postjudgment orders of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, David Sotelo and Stuart M. Rice, Judges.
Affirmed.

     Law Office of Eugene Lee and Eugene D. Lee for Plaintiffs
and Appellants.

     Lanak & Hanna and Mac W. Cabal for Respondent.
                _________________________

                         INTRODUCTION
       This is the second time this matter has come before us.
In the first appeal, we affirmed the superior court’s dismissal
of defendant A-1 Soccer Warehouse, Inc.’s (A-1) de novo appeals
from separate Labor Commissioner awards totaling more than
$500,000 in favor of 13 of its employees, including current
appellants and plaintiffs Jose Munoz and Jackelinne Chonay.

                                  2
        The superior court had dismissed A-1’s appeals after
finding it failed to post with the court the undertaking required
by Labor Code1 section 98.2, subdivision (b) (section 98.2(b)).
Relevant here, as to its de novo appeals of the awards in favor
of plaintiffs Munoz and Chonay, A-1 had filed notices of appeal
with the superior court, attaching uncertified copies of corporate
surety appeals bonds issued by current nonparty respondent
Great American Insurance Company (Great American).
A-1 asserted it had posted the original bonds with the Labor
Commissioner. Section 98.2(b) required A-1—as a condition
to filing the appeals—to “first post an undertaking with the
reviewing court in the amount of the . . . award.” (Italics added.)
        Plaintiffs Munoz and Chonay now appeal from orders—
entered by two different superior court judges—denying motions
to enforce judgments (1) jointly and severally against defendant
Enyinnaya Christian Ojogho, as bond principal, and against
Great American, as surety on the bond (Judge Sotelo’s order);
and (2) jointly and severally against defendant A-1, as bond
principal, and against Great American, as surety on the bond
(Judge Rice’s order). Plaintiffs also appeal from Judge Rice’s
order denying their request for attorney fees. Defendants A-1
and Ojogho are not parties to this appeal.
        We affirm the orders.

1    All undesignated statutory references are to the Labor
Code unless noted otherwise.

                                 3
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
       On May 18, 2018, the Labor Commissioner issued separate
monetary awards to 13 of A-1’s employees, finding A-1 and
Ojogho each separately liable—for the full amount of each
employee’s award—for various Labor Code violations, including
unpaid overtime, denied meal and rest breaks, and penalties.
Munoz and Chonay were awarded $29,988.44 and $85,658.78,
respectively. In its decision accompanying the awards, the Labor
Commissioner found Ojogho—the CEO of A-1—was individually
liable for plaintiffs’ wages both as the alter ego of A-1 and under
section 558.1, which provides owners, directors, officers, and
managing agents of an employer may be held responsible for
wage and hour violations.
       A-1 timely filed notices of appeal in the superior court.3
(Ojogho did not file any notices of appeal with the superior court.)
The 13 de novo appeals were consolidated.
       As a condition to filing its appeals under section 98.2,
A-1 first had to post undertakings with the superior court in the
amount of each award. (§ 98.2(b).) As we noted, for its appeals
from the awards to employees Munoz and Chonay, A-1 attached

2    We draw the facts underlying the judgments against A-1
and Ojogho from our prior opinion. (See Munoz v. A-1 Soccer
Warehouse, Inc. (Mar. 19, 2020, B295516) [nonpub. opn.]
(Munoz I).)
3      Under section 98.2, subdivision (a), a party may seek
de novo review of a Labor Commissioner’s order, decision, or
award by filing an appeal to the superior court within 10 days
after its service, or within 15 days if served by mail, as occurred
here. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1013, subd. (a).)

                                 4
to its notices of appeal copies of corporate surety bonds issued
by Great American in the respective award amounts. The bonds
bear the caption and case numbers from Munoz’s and Chonay’s
underlying cases filed with the Labor Commissioner. They each
state:
             “Whereas, Enyinnaya Christian Ojogho, as
             Principal, desire [sic] to give an undertaking
             for an Appeal as provided by Labor Code
             Section 98.2. [¶] Now, Therefore, Great
             American Insurance Company, a corporation
             authorized to transact the business of Surety
             in the State of California, does hereby obligate
             itself, its successors and assigns to the plaintiff
             as shown above under said statutory
             obligations in the sum of [the Labor
             Commissioner’s award].”4
The bonds are “[s]igned, sealed and dated” as of June 7, 2018,
by Great American’s authorized attorney-in-fact.
       On November 26, 2018, the superior court held a hearing
on whether the appeals should be dismissed for A-1’s failure
to post undertakings with the court. As part of its opposition,
A-1’s attorney declared that for each appeal from the Labor
Commissioner’s awards, “bond/undertaking[s] were filed.”
       The court took the matter under submission and issued
its ruling later that day. There is no reporter’s transcript

4     Because Ojogho was not a party to the appeal, in Munoz I,
we described the bond as stating, “A[-]1’s principal ‘desire[s] to
give an undertaking for an Appeal as provided by Labor Code
Section 98.2.’ ” (Munoz I.)

                                 5
of the hearing. The court found that it lacked jurisdiction
“because no undertaking was posted with the court in any
of the consolidated cases” and dismissed the appeals.
       On December 4, 2018, new counsel for A-1 substituted into
the case and moved the court to reconsider its order dismissing
the consolidated cases. The motion asked the court to reconsider
its ruling as to the appeals involving Munoz and Chonay because
A-1 posted surety bonds in those two cases. A-1’s counsel argued
that its former attorney may not have made the court aware that
on June 7, 2018, A-1 had posted undertakings of corporate surety
bonds through a licensed surety under section 98.2 obligating
the surety to pay the stated amounts to those two employees.
A-1’s counsel attached to his declaration copies of the surety
bonds and copies of the notices of appeal A-1 had filed in those
two cases that included the copies of the surety bonds.
       On December 31, 2018, the court heard and denied the
motion for reconsideration. There is no reporter’s transcript
of the hearing. The court then signed the order dismissing the
consolidated actions with prejudice. As discussed, we affirmed
that order on March 19, 2020. In so doing, we noted A-1
had presented no declaration to the trial court stating it
had posted the original bonds with the Labor Commissioner,
and the uncertified copies attached to its notices of appeal bore
no indication—such as a dated file stamp—that they had been
posted or filed with the Labor Commissioner. Nor did the
appellate record include a reporter’s transcript or settled
statement of the hearing on the court’s dismissal of A-1’s
de novo appeals. We thus only could infer the trial court
found the uncertified copies of the corporate surety bonds

                                6
insufficient proof that A-1 indeed had posted the required bonds.
Our opinion became final on May 27, 2020.5
        Following remittitur, on September 18, 2020, the trial court
entered judgment in favor of each of the 13 plaintiff-employees,
including Munoz and Chonay, and against A-1. For each
plaintiff-employee, the judgment ordered the section 98.2
“undertaking[s]/bond[s] posted by Defendants with [the] Court
. . . be released and delivered” to plaintiffs’ counsel’s trust
account. That same day, plaintiffs’ counsel asked Great
American to release the two bonds. Great American denied
plaintiffs’ claims on October 7, 2020, having concluded the
bonded principal—Ojogho—was not named in the awards
included in A-1’s de novo appeal packages filed with the
superior court and not liable on the judgment entered
against A-1.
        Because Ojogho never filed a notice of appeal—nor paid
the Labor Commissioner awards—on October 16, 2020, the Labor
Commissioner filed 13 separate actions with the superior court
asking the clerk to enter judgment against Ojogho in the amount

5     Meanwhile—apparently unbeknownst to plaintiffs—on
May 17, 2019, Ojogho’s and A-1’s original attorney Wilfred Aka
sent a letter on their behalf to Great American’s agent stating
he was returning the original bond on Chonay’s award for
$85,658.78 and asking for the return of the cash collateral
held by Great American. Around June 19, 2019, on Ojogho’s
instructions, Great American wired the $85,658.78 to an account
held by Ojogho American Enterprises. The original bond for
Chonay then was destroyed. (The $29,988.44 bond issued on
Munoz’s award was not returned or destroyed at this point;
Aka purportedly had the original and was out of the country.)

                                 7
of the Labor Commissioner awards plus interest and filing fees.
The clerk entered judgment that same day. Munoz’s and
Chonay’s actions against Ojogho were assigned to different
judicial officers.
       On December 14, 2020, in the Munoz-Ojogho action,
Munoz moved to enforce judgment on the bond jointly and
severally against Ojogho, as bond principal, and Great American,
as surety, and for attorney fees.6 On January 25, 2021, Judge
Sotelo heard Munoz’s motion and denied it without prejudice as
to Great American. Judge Sotelo agreed with Great American
that, because Ojogho neither filed an appeal nor posted a bond
with the court, the bond was not effective and thus the provision
for bond forfeiture under section 98.2(b) did not apply.
       Munoz filed a motion for reconsideration on February 4,
2021, which Judge Sotelo denied on April 5, 2021, after a hearing.
The order states,
              “A-1 filed notices of appeal, thirteen in total,
              while Ojogho did not. [¶] Additionally, A-1 filed
              undertakings for thirteen appeals. Defendant
              Ojogho filed these undertakings on A-1’s behalf
              and one of these undertakings was an appeal
              bond of [Munoz’s] award. [¶] The issue is
              whether Defendant Ojogho filed this bond
              on his own behalf. Surety [Great American]
              argues that [Ojogho] filed the bond on behalf of

6     Chonay filed a nearly identical motion in the Chonay-
Ojogho action but was ordered to file a notice of related case.
In April 2021, Judge Rice ordered the Ojogho actions related
to the consolidated A-1 action and reassigned to him.

                                 8
             A-1 but not himself. [¶] . . . [¶] Again, the court
             finds that Ojogho did not post the bond on his
             own behalf. The language of the bond controls
             over its caption: it states that Ojogho, as A-1’s
             principal, desires to file an undertaking. It
             does not say that [Ojogho] is posting the bond
             in his individual capacity. Thus, [Ojogho]
             filed the bond on behalf of A-1 and not in his
             individual capacity.”
Munoz appealed the January 25, 2021 order on March 25, 2021.
       In May 2021, in the A-1 action, plaintiffs moved to enforce
the A-1 judgment jointly and severally against A-1 and Ojogho,
as bond principals, and Great American, as surety, and for
attorney fees. The trial court, Judge Rice, denied the motion—
on the ground Ojogho was not a party to the A-1 action and
had not filed an appeal—without prejudice to plaintiffs filing
a motion for judgment as to A-1 and Great American, as surety.
The court ordered plaintiffs and Great American to meet and
confer to see if they could reach a stipulation as to “A-1’s appeal
bonds pertaining to Plaintiffs.” They did not reach a stipulation.
       Accordingly, plaintiffs filed a second motion in July 2021
—this time for judgment jointly and severally against A-1, as
bond principal, and Great American, as surety, plus attorney
fees. Great American again opposed the motion, arguing A-1
was not the bond principal—thus, Great American was not
liable to pay A-1’s judgment debt—and the bonds were not posted
with the superior court and, therefore, not subject to forfeiture.
With its opposition, Great American filed the June 6, 2018
supersedeas bond applications Ojogho submitted through Great
American’s agent. Ojogho is named as the applicant, and the

                                 9
box “Individual” is checked.7 Ojogho also signed indemnity
agreements on behalf of the surety in his individual capacity.8
(The bond applications ask the applicant to attach a copy of
the judgment being appealed. The copies of the applications
filed with Great American’s opposition do not include any
attachments.)
       Judge Rice heard plaintiffs’ motion on July 29, 2021.
Plaintiffs’ counsel argued this court had “found that the bonds
were posted and issued by A-1’s principal Ojogho . . . on behalf
of A-1.” He thus argued that interpretation of the bonds was
controlling under the principle of the law of the case. Counsel
also noted Judge Sotelo, in the minute order denying Munoz’s
motion for reconsideration, also had found Ojogho filed the bond
on behalf of A-1, not in his individual capacity, and had noted
Great American argued Ojogho filed the bond on behalf of A-1.
Thus, counsel invoked the doctrine of judicial estoppel, arguing
Great American had taken contradictory positions. The court
permitted the parties to submit supplemental briefs on those
two issues and took the matter under submission.
       On August 19, 2021, the court issued its ruling denying
plaintiffs’ motion. Judge Rice reasoned that, because A-1—

7    The other boxes available to be checked are “Partnership,”
“LLC,” “Corporation,” and “Sub-S Corporation.”
8     Ojogho signed in the space under the statement, “If
applicant is an individual, sign here.” The next section states,
“If applicant is a corporation, limited liability company
or a partnership, sign here.” That signature line is blank.
(Capitalization and boldface type omitted.)

                                10
the only judgment debtor who attempted to appeal from the
Labor Commissioner’s award—was not the principal on the
bonds, there was no basis to forfeit them to plaintiffs. Judge Rice
also found this court had not determined the issue before him—
“whether the [b]onds procured by Ojogho identifying Ojogho as
bond principal are subject to forfeiture due to A-1’s failed appeal.”
The court also found Great American did not take an inconsistent
position with Judge Sotelo, where the issue was whether Ojogho
had posted the bonds triggering their forfeiture, not whether A-1
was the bond principal.
       Munoz and Chonay appealed Judge Rice’s order. On the
parties’ motion, we consolidated the appeal from Judge Sotelo’s
order (B312317) and the joint appeal from Judge Rice’s order
(B316065) for all purposes under case number B312317.
                            DISCUSSION
1.     Standards of review
       Plaintiffs contend our standard of review is de novo because
their appeals raise issues of statutory construction—whether
the appeal bonds were effective on execution under the Bond
and Undertaking Law (Code Civ. Proc., § 995.010 et seq.)—and
contractual interpretation—whether the bonds were issued to
Ojogho only or to A-1. Great American contends the substantial
evidence standard of review applies because “this matter also
turns on factual matters, including the contents of the Bonds.”
       To the extent resolution of an issue on appeal turns on
the trial court’s factual findings, we review those findings for
substantial evidence. (Southern California Edison Co. v. Severns
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 815, 822.) The trial court’s construction
and application of a statute, however, concern legal questions
that we review de novo. (Dowling v. Farmers Ins. Exchange

                                 11
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 685, 694.) We also “independently
review the trial court’s interpretation of a contract, including
the resolution of any ambiguity, unless the interpretation
depends on the trial court’s resolution of factual questions
concerning the credibility of extrinsic evidence.” (Ibid.; Filtzer
v. Ernst (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 579, 583 (Filtzer) [de novo review
“applies even where conflicting inferences may be drawn from
undisputed extrinsic evidence, ‘unless the interpretation turns
upon the credibility of extrinsic evidence’ ”].)
       As to the other issues raised on appeal, the determination
of whether the elements necessary to apply the doctrine of
judicial estoppel are satisfied also is a question of law that we
review de novo. (Blix Street Records, Inc. v. Cassidy (2010)
191 Cal.App.4th 39, 46; see also Filtzer, supra, 79 Cal.App.5th
at p. 583.) Whether to apply the doctrine if the elements are
present is within the discretion of the trial court. (Blix, at p. 46;
Filtzer, at p. 583.) “ ‘[T]he propriety or amount of statutory
attorney fees to be awarded’ ” also is reviewed for abuse of
discretion, “ ‘but a determination of the legal basis for an
attorney fee award is a question of law to be reviewed de novo.’ ”
(Mountain Air Enterprises, LLC v. Sundowner Towers, LLC
(2017) 3 Cal.5th 744, 751.)
2.     Section 98.2
       Under section 98.2, a party may appeal an award of the
Labor Commissioner to the superior court, “where the appeal
shall be heard de novo.” (§ 98.2, subd. (a).) “[T]he filing of the
notice of appeal vests jurisdiction in the superior court to conduct
the trial de novo.” (Palagin v. Paniagua Construction, Inc. (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 124, 132 (Palagin).)

                                 12
       As a condition to an employer filing such an appeal, the
employer “shall first post an undertaking with the reviewing
court in the amount of the . . . award.” (§ 98.2(b).) “If the
employer fails to pay the amount owed within 10 days of entry
of the judgment, dismissal, or withdrawal of the appeal, or the
execution of a settlement agreement, a portion of the undertaking
equal to the amount owed, or the entire undertaking if the
amount owed exceeds the undertaking, is forfeited to the
employee.” (Ibid.; Adanna Car Wash Corp. v. Gomez (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 642, 650 [“The appeal bond is forfeited to the
employee where the employer’s appeal fails or is withdrawn, and
the employer does not timely pay the award.”].) If no notice of
appeal is filed within the statutory deadline, the commissioner’s
award is deemed the final order. (§ 98.2, subd. (d).)
       The “immediate purpose” of this undertaking requirement
“is to provide assurance that a judgment in favor of the employee
will be satisfied.” (Palagin, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 130.)
The “broader purpose of this provision . . . is to ‘discourage
employers from filing frivolous appeals and from hiding assets
in order to avoid enforcement of the judgment.’ ” (Ibid.)
       Generally, the posting or filing of statutorily required
bonds and undertakings is governed by the Bond and
Undertaking Law, codified at Code of Civil Procedure section
995.010 et seq. (Lewin v. Anselmo (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 694,
698 (Lewin).) “[T]he statutory scheme applies to any ‘bond or
undertaking executed, filed, posted, furnished, or otherwise given
as security pursuant to any statute of this state, except to the
extent the statute prescribes a different rule or is inconsistent.’ ”
(Ibid., quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 995.020, subd. (a).)

                                 13
3.     The law of the case doctrine does not apply
       We first address plaintiffs’ contention this court’s
description of the bonds as stating—“A-1’s principal ‘desire[s]
to give an undertaking for an Appeal as provided by Labor Code
Section 98.2’ ”—reflected our finding in Munoz I that the bonds
were issued on A-1’s behalf and that purported finding now is
the law of the case. “Under the law of the case doctrine, when
an appellate court ‘ “states in its opinion a principle or rule of law
necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes
the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout [the
case’s] subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon
subsequent appeal . . . .” ’ [Citation.] Absent an applicable
exception, the doctrine ‘requir[es] both trial and appellate courts
to follow the rules laid down upon a former appeal whether
such rules are right or wrong.’ [Citation.] As its name suggests,
the doctrine applies only to an appellate court’s decision on a
question of law; it does not apply to questions of fact. [Citation.]”
(People v. Barragan (2004) 32 Cal.4th 236, 246.) “The doctrine
of law of the case . . . governs later proceedings in the same case
[citation] with regard to the rights of the same parties who were
before the court in the prior appeal. [Citations.]” (In re
Rosenkrantz (2002) 29 Cal.4th 616, 668.)
       First, Great American was not a party to Munoz I, and
neither plaintiffs nor A-1 represented Great American’s rights
or interests in that appeal. That ground alone renders the law
of the case doctrine inapplicable here.
       More importantly, we did not make a finding in Munoz I
that A-1 was the bond principal. Because Ojogho was not a party
to the Munoz I appeal, we referred to Ojogho by his title rather
than by his name. Hence, we substituted “A-1’s principal” for

                                 14
“Ojogho.” The above description of the bonds does not rewrite
them to state A-1 was the bond principal, however. As Great
American notes, we were not asked to determine whether A-1
was the “bond principal” in Munoz I. The question before us was
whether the trial court erred in dismissing A-1’s de novo appeals
for not properly posting undertakings as required by section 98.2.
A-1 represented to the trial court, and this court, that by
providing copies of the bonds it had posted with the Labor
Commissioner, it had complied with the undertaking
requirement of section 98.2 by “provid[ing] instruments that
obligated it to pay the amount of the awards if its appeals
were unsuccessful.” Plaintiffs never argued the bonds failed
to comply with section 98.2 because Ojogho, not A-1, was named
“as Principal.” Accordingly, contrary to plaintiffs’ contention,
this court had no need to make any findings with respect to the
nature of the bonds themselves to determine whether the court
had erred in finding A-1 had not posted them in accordance
with the requirements of section 98.2.
4.     We cannot interpret the bonds as having been issued
       on behalf of A-1
       Plaintiffs contend Ojogho obtained the bonds as A-1’s
principal and thus the judgments against A-1 may be enforced
against Great American as the surety under the bonds. Great
American contends that, as the bond contracts identify Ojogho
as the only bond principal, it did not agree to answer for A-1’s
obligations and cannot be compelled to do so.
       “A surety or guarantor is one who promises to answer
for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another.” (Civ. Code,
§ 2787.) A “ ‘surety cannot be held beyond the express terms
of [its] contract.’ ” (G & W Warren’s, Inc. v. Dabney (2017) 11

                                15
Cal.App.5th 565, 574 (G & W).) “In interpreting the terms of a
contract of suretyship, the same rules are to be observed as in the
case of other contracts.” (Civ. Code, § 2837.) “The interpretation
of a contract is a judicial function. [Citation.] In engaging in
this function, the trial court ‘give[s] effect to the mutual intention
of the parties as it existed’ at the time the contract was executed.
[Citation.] Ordinarily, the objective intent of the contracting
parties is a legal question determined solely by reference to the
contract’s terms.” (Wolf v. Walt Disney Pictures & Television
(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1107, 1125–1126 (Walt Disney); Filtzer,
supra, 79 Cal.App.5th at p. 584 [“If a contract's language is clear
and unambiguous, intent is determined solely by the language
within the four corners of the contract.”].)
       Although extrinsic evidence is inadmissible to “add to,
detract from, or vary the terms of a written contract” (Pacific Gas
& Elec. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage & R. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d
33, 39), it is admissible “to interpret an agreement when a
material term is ambiguous” (Walt Disney, supra, 162
Cal.App.4th at p. 1126). “ ‘Even if a contract appears
unambiguous on its face, a latent ambiguity may be exposed
by extrinsic evidence which reveals more than one possible
meaning to which the language of the contract is yet reasonably
susceptible.’ ” (Wolf v. Superior Court (2004) 114 Cal.App.4th
1343, 1351.) Thus, extrinsic evidence may be used to determine
the parties’ objective intent where it “reveals that apparently
clear language in the contract is, in fact, susceptible to more than
one reasonable interpretation.” (Walt Disney, at p. 1126, citing
Pacific Gas, at p. 37.)
       The bonds—prepared by Great American—do not define
the term “Principal.” In this context—where Ojogho and A-1

                                 16
both were named defendants in the Labor Commissioner cases
and identified as defendants in the bond captions, Ojogho
indisputably was the principal of A-1 and was found to be its
alter ego, and Ojogho and A-1 each was liable for the full amount
of the awards—the term “as Principal” is susceptible to more
than one meaning. Arguably, because A-1, not Ojogho, was
the defendant who appealed from the awards—and attached
copies of the bonds as proof of its section 98.2 undertakings—
Ojogho intended to provide the bonds “as Principal” to A-1.
Moreover, at the time it issued the bonds, Great American
knew A-1 was a co-defendant with Ojogho—by the fact the case
caption on the face of the bonds includes A-1 as a defendant.
Presumably, Great American also would have read the Labor
Commissioner awards before issuing the bonds. The Labor
Commissioner’s written findings of fact, legal analysis, and
conclusions were attached to the awards entered against Ojogho,
as an individual (and against A-1). Great American thus would
have known Ojogho was A-1’s CEO and, therefore, its principal,
and that the Labor Commissioner had found Ojogho to be A-1’s
alter ego.
       Based on these circumstances surrounding Ojogho’s
procurement of the bonds—although A-1 is identified only in the
bonds’ captions—one reasonably could interpret the statement,
“Ojogho, as Principal, desire [sic] to give an undertaking for
an Appeal as provided by Labor Code section 98.2,” as referring
to Ojogho in his capacity of principal to A-1. Certainly, A-1 (and,
thus, Ojogho) interpreted the bonds this way. A-1 represented
to the trial court, and to this court, that it had provided the bonds
in the amounts of Munoz’s and Chonay’s awards as security
under section 98.2 for its appeals from those awards. On appeal,

                                 17
A-1 also represented the surety bonds it provided ensured
plaintiffs would be paid if it did not prevail on its appeals,
and “[t]he obligation to pay any amount owed was not altered
because the originals were filed with the Labor Commissioner.”
      Nevertheless, Great American presented evidence—on
which the trial court relied—demonstrating Ojogho did not apply
for the bonds as A-1’s principal; thus, Great American did not
agree to answer for A-1’s obligations. The bond application states
Ojogho is an individual, and he signed the corresponding
indemnity agreements in his individual capacity. A-1 is neither
identified in the bond applications or indemnity agreements,
nor, as we said, in the bonds themselves, except in the captions.
Nothing in the record suggests Ojogho otherwise made clear
to Great American his intent to use the bonds as security
for the judgments entered against A-1. (See G & W, supra,
11 Cal.App.5th at p. 575 [“ ‘ “Contract formation is governed
by objective manifestations, not the subjective intent of any
individual involved. [Citations.] The test is ‘what the outward
manifestations of consent would lead a reasonable person to
believe.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Thus, ‘[t]he parties’
undisclosed intent or understanding is irrelevant to contract
interpretation.’ ”].)
      Accordingly, when reading the bond contracts in connection
with the uncontradicted evidence of the bond applications and
indemnity agreements, we cannot infer Great American agreed,
or should have known it was agreeing, to provide the bonds to
secure the awards entered against A-1 instead of—or in addition
to—those entered against Ojogho individually. We thus conclude
the evidence demonstrates the parties’ objective mutual intent
was to name only Ojogho as the bond principal.

                                 18
       Plaintiffs argue the trial court relied on inapposite,
nonbinding cases applying out of state law in reaching this
same conclusion. The two cases, Contractors Equip. Maintenance
v. Bechtel Hanford (9th Cir. 2008) 514 F.3d 899 (applying
Washington law), and Goldberg, Marchesano v. Old Republic
(D.C. App. 1999) 727 A.2d 858 (applying law applicable to the
District of Columbia), applied universal contract interpretation
principles to surety contracts. The courts in both cases found
the sureties could be liable only for the principal named in
the bonds. (Contractors, at pp. 904–905; Goldberg, at p. 861.)
In Contractors, a bond posted in connection with an appeal by
a contractor and an insurance company named the insurance
company alone as principal. (Contractors, at p. 904.) In
Goldberg, the supersedeas bond the plaintiff sought to enforce
with respect to a judgment against a corporation and the
corporation’s president, named the president, but not the
corporation, as the bond principal. (Goldberg, at p. 860.)
Plaintiffs argue the bonds here are distinguishable because
they named A-1 in the Labor Commissioner case caption.
As we discussed, that A-1 is named in the case caption does
not demonstrate Great American contracted to issue the bonds
on behalf of A-1.
       Plaintiffs also argue California policy requires any
ambiguity in a surety bond to be construed “in favor of protecting
the beneficiaries so as to ensure collection of their judgments.”
(Citing the following statement in Lewin, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th
at p. 700: “The procedural requirements applicable to all bonds
set forth in the Bond and Undertaking Law serve to protect
the rights of the beneficiary and to protect the integrity of the
bonding procedures.”) Here, however, we have found Great

                               19
American did not agree to bond A-1’s obligations; thus, plaintiffs
were not beneficiaries of any bond securing payment of the
awards against A-1.
5.     The bonds were not subject to forfeiture because
       Ojogho did not attempt to file any notices of appeal,
       and A-1 was not the bond principal
       a.    Great American’s appeal bond was not subject to
             forfeiture to satisfy Munoz’s judgment against Ojogho
       Plaintiffs note the court’s order denying Munoz’s motion
for reconsideration described the language of the bonds as stating
“Ojogho, as A-1’s principal, desires to file an undertaking” and
reasoned “the bond does not say that it was on Ojogho’s behalf.”
Our construction of the bonds as naming only Ojogho as the
bond principal does not lead us to conclude Judge Sotelo erred
in denying Munoz’s motion to forfeit the bond to satisfy his
judgment against Ojogho, however. The court found Munoz
could not enforce the appeal bond on the Ojogho judgment
based on the undisputed fact Ojogho never filed notices of appeal
from the Labor Commissioner awards entered against him
individually, and also never filed or posted the bond on his
own behalf.9 (Rodas v. Spiegel (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 513, 517
[“On appeal, we do not review the validity of the trial court’s
reasoning but only the propriety of the ruling itself.”].) Although

9     In its order denying the motion for reconsideration, Judge
Sotelo also found Ojogho filed the bond on A-1’s behalf, noting
it was A-1 that attempted to post the bond. We agree Ojogho
used the bonds Great American issued to him in an attempt
to secure A-1’s notices of appeal under section 98.2. That does
not change the fact Great American did not agree to do so.

                                20
Ojogho obtained the bonds and—acting for A-1, as its principal—
provided copies of those bonds as proof of the purported
undertakings supporting A-1’s notices of appeal under
section 98.2, Ojogho never submitted, or attempted to submit,
those bonds to the court in connection with any appeal from
the awards entered against him individually.
         As Munoz did below, plaintiffs contend that, under the
Bond and Undertaking Law, specifically Code of Civil Procedure
section 995.420, the bonds at issue here were “given”—and thus
effective—on their execution date. Relying again on Lewin,
which we discuss below, plaintiffs argue that, because the bonds
were effective, there was no need for Ojogho to have filed them
with the court for Munoz to be able to enforce the bond against
Great American under section 98.2(b). We cannot read the
applicable statutes to mean an appeal bond is “given” on
its execution, so that it is forfeitable to a prevailing employee
even where the employer has not asked the court to review
the Labor Commissioner’s award.
         “When we interpret a statute, ‘[o]ur fundamental task
. . . is to determine the Legislature’s intent so as to effectuate
the law’s purpose. We first examine the statutory language,
giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine
that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory
framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and
purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment.
If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain
meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd
consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory
language permits more than one reasonable interpretation,
courts may consider other aids, such as the statute’s purpose,

                                21
legislative history, and public policy.’ ” (Sierra Club v. Superior
Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 157, 165–166.)
        Code of Civil Procedure section 995.420 states, in part,
“Unless the statute providing for a bond provides that the
bond becomes effective at a different time, a bond is effective
at the time it is given or, if the statute requires that the bond be
approved, at the time it is approved.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 995.420,
subd. (a).) Section 489.060 of the Code of Civil Procedure
in turn provides, “(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), all
undertakings given pursuant to this title shall be presented to
a proper court for approval and upon approval shall be filed with
the court in which the action is pending. [¶] (b) If the surety on
the undertaking is an admitted surety insurer, the undertaking
is not required to be approved by the court.”
        As Great American is an admitted surety insurer—
rendering court approval of the appeal bonds it issued
unnecessary—plaintiffs essentially argue the bonds were given
and became effective on the date Great American executed,
i.e., signed, them. As plaintiffs state, a surety contract is
“a third[-]party beneficiary undertaking to indemnify a person
against losses resulting from the acts of the principal.”
(Conservatorship of O’Connor (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099.)
        As with any other contract that does not specify an effective
date, we agree the bonds were capable of enforcement on the date
Great American signed them, June 7, 2018. But as plaintiffs
note, the bonds at issue here were contracts for Great American
to indemnify plaintiffs against collection of the Labor

                                 22
Commissioner’s award pending a de novo appeal by Ojogho.10
(Italics added.) In other words, as of June 7, 2018, Ojogho could
have posted the bonds with the court to secure de novo appeals
under section 98.2 of the awards entered against him. Under
section 98.2(b), Great American then would have been obligated
to pay plaintiffs the amounts designated on the bonds if Ojogho
failed to pay them. Thus, had Ojogho submitted the appeal bonds
to the court to secure his appeals, they would have been effective
without need for any preauthorization by the court.
       Plaintiffs, however, read the Bond and Undertaking Law
to mean that, because the bonds were “effective” as of the date
Great American signed them, the bonds were subject to forfeiture
to plaintiffs under section 98.2 without Ojogho having had to
at least attempt to present—whether by posting, filing, or in
some other manner—the bonds to the court in connection with
de novo appeals from the awards entered against him. The plain
language of the bonds and section 98.2 belies this interpretation.
       First, the bonds themselves each are for “an Appeal as
provided by Labor Code Section 98.2.” Great American thus
agreed to obligate itself to plaintiffs only for the purpose of
securing their awards against Ojogho in connection with a
section 98.2 appeal. Second, the bond states Ojogho “desire[s]
to give an undertaking for an Appeal as provided by Labor Code
Section 98.2.” (Italics added.) Section 98.2, of course, requires

10    Plaintiffs actually assert Great American was indemnifying
them against collection of their “judgments pending the de novo
appeals by defendants,” meaning both Ojogho and A-1. As we
discussed, Great American agreed to indemnify Munoz and
Chonay against only Ojogho’s obligations.

                               23
the posting of an undertaking as a condition to the employer
filing an appeal. Ojogho never filed an appeal and copies of the
bonds were provided to the superior court only with A-1’s notices
of appeal. Thus, although Ojogho desired to give an undertaking
under section 98.2, he did not.
       Next, we must read Code of Civil Procedure section 995.420
with section 98.2. We read section 995.420 as simply stating
a corporate surety bond needs no prior court approval to be
effective for the purposes for which it is given as security.
Logically, the fact a bond is capable of being enforced does
not equate to the court’s ability to order it forfeited if the party
never took the action that required the bond to be given as
security in the first place.
       By filing an appeal of a Labor Commissioner’s award
with the superior court, the employer submits to the court’s
jurisdiction and accepts the conditions imposed by section 98.2:
(1) the employer must post with the reviewing court an
undertaking from a corporate surety, or a cashier’s check,
in the amount of the award; and (2) if the employer fails to pay
the resulting judgment—or fails to pay the award in the event
its appeal is withdrawn or dismissed without entry of judgment—
the undertaking must be forfeited to the employee. (§ 98.2(b).)
Those conditions, of course, are not imposed on the employer if
the employer has not at least attempted to file an appeal under
section 98.2. There would be no mechanism for the court to
forfeit a section 98.2 appeal bond to the employee if no section
98.2 appeal has been filed.
       Here, it is undisputed (1) Ojogho never filed any section
98.2 notices of appeal from the awards entered against him
individually, and (2) the copies of the bonds filed with the court

                                24
were done so in connection with A-1’s notices of appeal. As
Ojogho never even attempted to file an appeal on his own behalf,
the bonds are not subject to forfeiture under section 98.2(b).
This result comports with the policy underlying section 98.2.
       An employer’s filing of a section 98.2 notice of appeal delays
finalization of the Labor Commissioner’s award and, in turn, the
employer’s payment of the award to the employee. As we noted,
the employer’s posting of an appeal bond with the court is
designed to ensure there will be funds available to satisfy
a judgment, and to discourage the employer from hiding its
assets to avoid paying a future judgment. (Palagin, supra, 222
Cal.App.4th at p. 130; see also Lewin, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th
at p. 700 [statute providing for an appeal bond “is designed
to protect the judgment won in the trial court from becoming
an uncollectible while the judgment is subjected to appellate
review”].) Thus, a bond given to secure an appeal under section
98.2 is forfeitable to the employee even where the employer’s
attempted appeal fails. (See, e.g., Chavez v. Sarumi (2018) 36
Cal.App.5th Supp. 34, 39 (Sarumi) [appellate division of superior
court held employer’s late-filed appeal bond (naming it as bond
principal) must be forfeited to employee under section 98.2(b)
after trial court dismissed employer’s appeal from Labor
Commissioner’s award for failure to file a timely bond];
Patel v. Chavez (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 712, 718 (Patel) [holding
bond posted in an attempted section 98.2 appeal that failed
due to lack of proper notice was subject to forfeiture under
section 98.2(b)].)
       But, if an employer never files nor attempts to file
an appeal within the statutory period, there is no delay
in the finalization of the award. At that point, the Labor

                                 25
Commissioner’s order is “deemed the final order.” (§ 98.2,
subd. (d).) And, within 10 days of the order becoming final, the
Labor Commissioner “shall file . . . a certified copy of the final
order with the clerk of the superior court . . . . Judgment shall
be entered immediately by the court clerk.” (§ 98.2, subd. (e).)
Once judgment is entered, the employee can enforce it like any
other judgment. (Ibid.) And, “to ensure judgments are satisfied,”
the statute authorizes the Labor Commissioner to require the
employer, as the judgment debtor, to identify its assets. (§ 98.2,
subd. (f)(1).) Moreover, if the employer fails to appeal, upon the
order becoming final, the Labor Commissioner may create and
record a lien on the employer’s real property. (§ 98.2, subd. (g).)
       Finally, the statute requires the Labor Commissioner
to “make every reasonable effort to ensure that judgments are
satisfied, including . . . requiring the employer to deposit a bond
as provided in Section 240.” (§ 98.2, subd. (j).) Section 240,
subdivision (a) provides:
              “if any judgment against an employer for
              nonpayment of wages remains unsatisfied for
              a period of 10 days after the time to appeal
              therefrom has expired, and no appeal
              therefrom is then pending, the Labor
              Commissioner may require the employer
              to deposit a bond in such sum as the Labor
              Commissioner may deem sufficient and
              adequate in the circumstances, to be approved
              by the Labor Commissioner. The bond shall be
              payable to the Labor Commissioner and shall
              be conditioned that the employer shall, for a
              definite future period, not exceeding two years,

                                26
             pay the employees in accordance with the
             provisions of this article, and shall be further
             conditioned upon the payment by the employer
             of any judgment which may be recovered
             against the employer pursuant to the
             provisions of this article.”
Accordingly, where an employer does not appeal—and thus does
not post an appeal bond—the employee still has recourse through
the Labor Commissioner, who is authorized to take steps to
secure the employer’s payment of awards for unpaid wages
owed to the employee.11
      Lewin does not compel us to reach a different result.
There, the court “considered whether sureties had a unilateral
right” to cancel a statutory appeal bond12 based on a handwritten
notation purporting to give them 15 days to cancel the bond after

11    The timing of the entry of the clerk’s judgments against
Ojogho here is perplexing. As he did not appeal, the Labor
Commissioner’s awards against him became final around June 8,
2018—15 days after Ojogho was served with the awards by mail.
(§ 98.2, subd. (d).) And, as Ojogho did not pay the awards, the
Labor Commissioner should have presented them to the superior
court for entry of judgment 10 days after the awards were final.
(§ 98.2, subd. (e).) More than two years passed before it did so.
When asked about this delay at oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel
represented he had asked the Labor Commissioner to enter
judgment earlier. According to counsel, staffing issues at
the Labor Commissioner’s office are causing lengthy delays
in the presentation of final awards for entry of judgment.
12    The statute at issue provided, “Unless an undertaking is
given, the perfecting of an appeal shall not stay enforcement of”
a money judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 917.1, subd. (a)(1).)

                                27
its execution. (Lewin, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at pp. 689, 697.)
The court “look[ed] to the Bond and Undertaking Law to
determine when a statutory bond becomes effective and, once
in effect, how it may be withdrawn.” (Id. at p. 699.) Plaintiffs
first cite the court’s quotation of the Bond and Undertaking Law’s
application on its terms “to any ‘bond or undertaking executed,
filed, posted, furnished, or otherwise given as security pursuant
to any statute of this state,’ ” unless the statute provides
otherwise. (Id., at p. 698, quoting Code. Civ. Proc., § 995.020,
subd. (a).) Plaintiffs then contend the court treated the giving
of a bond and filing of it as “separate and distinct events,” citing
the court’s statement that, under the Bond and Undertaking law,
“Once a bond is given in an action or proceeding, it must be
filed with the court.” (Lewin, at p. 700, citing Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 995.340, subd. (a).)
       Plaintiffs miss the point. If a statutory appeal bond is not
submitted to the court (or to someone else designated under the
bond) to secure an appeal, it logically cannot have been given in
the action or proceeding. Code of Civil Procedure section 995.340
specifically states that, “If a bond is given in an action or
proceeding,” then it “shall be filed with the court unless the
statute providing for the bond requires that the bond be given
to another person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 995.340, subd. (a),
italics added.) Moreover, the facts in Lewin are inapposite.
The defendant in fact had appealed from a judgment—which
judgment was affirmed—and the appeal bond had been filed.
Neither event occurred here.
       Plaintiffs also ignore the fact the Lewin court specifically
found the appeal bond at issue “was effective no later than
January 25, 1994, by which time it had been given and filed with

                                28
the trial court.” (Lewin, supra, 56 Cal.App.4th at p. 700, italics
added.) The sureties had executed the bond on January 24,
the bond was filed on January 25, and the sureties had filed
the document purporting to withdraw the bond on January 28.
(Id. at p. 697.) Had the sureties’ execution of the bond been all
that was necessary for the plaintiff to be able to enforce it, the
court would have held the bond was effective as of January 24
—the date the sureties signed it. (Id. at pp. 700–701.) As the
bond had been filed, the sureties could not unilaterally attempt
to withdraw it without an order of the court. (Ibid.; See Code
Civ. Proc., § 996.110 [a surety “on a bond given in an action or
proceeding” must apply to the court for release from liability
on the bond].)
       b.     Judge Rice did not err in finding Great American’s
              appeal bonds were not subject to forfeiture under
              section 98.2(b) based on A-1’s attempted appeals
       As we discussed, Great American did not agree to be liable
for plaintiffs’ awards against A-1—only for those against Ojogho.
Indeed, the bond securing Chonay’s award no longer exists.
Great American returned to Ojogho (through another one of
his companies) the collateral it held for executing the bond and
destroyed the bond. Who has the original bond securing Munoz’s
award, and whether Ojogho continues to pay the premiums on it,
is unknown.
       The trouble here, of course, is that A-1—acting through
Ojogho or their joint counsel Aka—filed copies of the bonds with
the court as exhibits to its notices of appeal. The bonds thus were
before the court. Unfortunately, A-1 and Ojogho—erroneously
or intentionally—represented those bonds provided security for
A-1’s obligations to plaintiffs under the appealed awards. As we

                                29
discussed, Great American did not agree to do so. Accordingly,
Judge Rice, as a matter of law, neither could enforce the A-1
judgments against Great American—a nonparty—as A-1 was
not the bond principal, nor forfeit the bonds to plaintiffs based
on the dismissal of A-1’s appeals under section 98.2(b).
       Sarumi and Patel, mentioned above, do not help plaintiffs.
In Sarumi, the appeal bond was ordered forfeited because
the appealing employer was the bond principal and had filed,
although late, the appeal bond. (Sarumi, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th
Supp. at pp. 36–37, 38, 41 [noting “the appeal and bond were
actually filed”].)
       In Patel, instead of filing a valid notice of appeal, the
employers essentially sought de novo review of the Labor
Commissioner awards against them by filing suit against
the employee. (Patel, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at pp. 716–717
[complaint included writ of mandate cause of action demanding
“ ‘a de novo hearing’ ”].) With their complaint, employers filed
a notice of intent to post a bond under section 98.2, and their
surety posted appeal bonds on their behalf, “indicat[ing] that they
were ‘give[n] [as] an undertaking for appeal in accordance [with
the bond requirements of] . . . [s]ection 98.2.’ ” (Patel, at pp. 717–
718.) The court held that, although the employers had not filed
a proper notice of appeal under section 98.2 in challenging the
Labor Commissioner awards, the appeal bonds they had posted
under section 98.2 were subject to forfeiture. (Patel, at pp. 717–
718.) The court noted the employers had “had the opportunity
to challenge the [awards], and their efforts failed.” (Id. at p. 722.)
Accordingly, as the employers had not paid the judgments
resulting from the awards, the section 98.2 appeal bonds they
had posted—and which were “currently under the court’s

                                 30
control”—were forfeited to the employee under section 98.2(b).
(Patel, at p. 722.)
       Here, in contrast, the employer who sought to challenge
the Labor Commissioner’s awards was not the bond principal,
and the employer to whom the surety issued the appeal bond
never challenged the Labor Commissioner awards. Thus, we
agree with Judge Rice that “[g]iven . . . A-1, the only judgment
debtor who attempted an appeal, is not the principal on the
Bonds, there is no ground for forfeiting those bonds to Plaintiffs.”
And, as Judge Rice said, plaintiffs “provid[ed] no authority
holding that the Court may effectively re-write the Bonds to
render [Great American] liable for a judgment against a party
(A-1) with which it did not contract.” In short, in the words of
Judge Rice, “While there may be a policy in favor of expedient
collection of wages due, this does not overcome the fact that A-1
is not the bond principal, and [Great American] did not agree
to answer for its debts.”
6.     Estoppel does not apply
       a.     Great American cannot be estopped based on
              A-1’s representations
       Plaintiffs first argue that, because A-1 would be estopped
from claiming the appeal bonds were not issued to it—having
caused plaintiffs to rely on its representations that the bonds
were issued on its behalf—Great American is estopped from
denying its liability on the bonds. We disagree. As Great
American notes, in the case on which plaintiffs rely—First v.
Armes (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 633—the surety was estopped from
arguing plaintiff was authorized only to recover an amount less
than the amount explicitly stated on the face of an undertaking
where the defendant, who was the bond principal, erroneously

                                 31
had substituted the undertaking in the full sum stated in
plaintiffs’ writ of attachment in exchange for release of attached
property that was worth less than that sum. (Id. at pp. 635–636.)
The court found the defendant’s errors led the plaintiffs
reasonably to believe they were secured for the full writ of
attachment amount under the undertaking. (Id. at p. 637.)
Accordingly, as the defendant would be estopped to claim
the amount stated in the undertaking was not the value of
the property released upon his furnishing of the undertaking,
the court held “[h]is surety . . . [was] likewise estopped.”
(Id. at p. 638.)
       Critically, the surety in First v. Armes was estopped to the
same extent as its bond principal from denying the undertaking
secured the amount stated on its face. Here, as we established,
A-1 is not Great American’s bond principal. Thus, Great
American cannot be bound by what A-1 represented about
the bonds. Moreover, in First v. Armes, the surety was
attempting to deny its liability for the amount specifically
stated on the face of the bond it had issued. Here, it was A-1
that caused the confusion about the bonds by representing
they secured the Labor Commissioner awards in favor of
plaintiffs from which A-1 was appealing.
       b.     Judge Rice correctly found judicial estoppel
              does not apply
       Nor do we agree Great American is judicially estopped
from denying it issued the bonds to A-1. Plaintiffs contend
Great American took contradictory positions with respect
to whom the bonds were issued in opposing the motions for
judgment, on which it prevailed. Plaintiffs assert, according
to Judge Sotelo’s minute order denying Munoz’s motion for

                                32
reconsideration, “Surety argue[d] that [Ojogho] filed the bond
on behalf of A-1 but not himself.” They then argue Great
American “reversed course” before Judge Rice and argued the
bonds were “issued on Ojogho’s behalf only.”
        Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine that “prohibits
a party from asserting a position in a legal proceeding that is
contrary to a position he or she successfully asserted in the same
or some earlier proceeding.” (Owens v. County of Los Angeles
(2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 107, 121.) The elements are: “ ‘(1) the
same party has taken two positions; (2) the positions were
taken in judicial or quasi-judicial administrative proceedings;
(3) the party was successful in asserting the first position
(i.e., the tribunal adopted the position or accepted it as true);
(4) the two positions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the
first position was not taken as a result of ignorance, fraud,
or mistake.’ ” (Ibid.)
        The appellate record does not support plaintiffs’ contention
that Great American took a contrary position before Judge Sotelo.
First, an argument that Ojogho “filed the bond on behalf of
A-1 but not himself” is not inconsistent with Great American’s
position that it issued the bonds to Ojogho but not to A-1.
(Italics added.) As we said, A-1 only could act through Ojogho.
As there is no reporter’s transcript of the hearing before
Judge Sotelo, we do not know the exact context in which
Great American made this argument. (In re Marriage of Obrecht
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1, 8–9 [in absence of reporter’s transcript
appellate court “ ‘must . . . presume that what occurred at that
hearing supports the judgment’ ”].) Great American could have
argued Ojogho (or defendants’ counsel at Ojogho’s direction)
only could have filed the copies of the bonds with A-1’s appeals

                                33
on A-1’s behalf, rather than on Ojogho’s own behalf, as Ojogho
did not file any notices of appeal.
       True, in his order denying Munoz’s motion for
reconsideration, Judge Sotelo mistakenly described the bond
Munoz sought to enforce as stating, “Ojogho, as A-1’s principal,
desires to file an undertaking.” But the issue before Judge Sotelo
at that point was whether his order denying the motion for
judgment jointly and severally against Ojogho and Great
American was subject to reconsideration. Thus, as Judge Rice
noted, the issue of “whether A-1 had posted bonds or whether any
bonds had been posted as to A-1 which were subject to forfeiture
due to the judgment against A-1,” was not before Judge Sotelo.
       Moreover, Great American’s purported argument, and
Judge Sotelo’s description of the bonds, were not necessary
to his decision denying Munoz’s motion for judgment against
Great American, as Ojogho’s surety. Rather, as we discussed,
Judge Sotelo agreed with Great American that Ojogho “needed
to both file the appeal and file the bond for it to be effective.”
Finding Ojogho “neither filed an appeal nor posted/filed the
bond,” the court concluded the bond forfeiture provision under
section 98.2 did not apply.
       Finally, Judge Rice “carefully reviewed [Great American’s]
papers on the motion for reconsideration to determine whether
[Great American] took” the position ascribed to it. The court
found the argument “that Ojogho posted the bond on behalf
of A-1 [was] Plaintiffs’ argument, not [Great American’s].
[Great American] was simply pointing out that Plaintiffs’ claim
about Ojogho posting the bond was not a ‘new fact’ justifying
reconsideration of the order denying the motion for judgment.”
We too have reviewed Great American’s opposition to the motion

                               34
for reconsideration and agree with Judge Rice. Great American
stated Munoz’s asserted new fact was that “Ojogho . . . personally
posted the Labor Code appeal bond on behalf of non-party A-1.”
(Italics omitted.) Great American argued that fact was neither
new, nor relevant. It continued, “Even if [Ojogho] ‘personally
posted’ the bond with the reviewing court, Plaintiff’s admission
that he did so ‘on behalf of A-1 Soccer,’ and not himself (as an
appellant), renders the appeal bond, which expressly named
[Ojogho] (and not A-1 Soccer) as bond principal, not liable.”
       Accordingly, we conclude plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate the doctrine of judicial estoppel applies here.
7.     Plaintiffs are not entitled to fees as against
       Great American
       Plaintiffs contend Judge Rice erred in denying their
request for attorney fees. They did not prevail in their motions
to enforce their judgments against Great American. Plaintiffs
thus are not entitled to an award of attorney fees as against
Great American under any of the statutes they cite.
       We express no opinion as to whether plaintiffs may recover
from Ojogho and A-1—who are not parties to this appeal—the
fees and costs plaintiffs have incurred in attempting to enforce
the bonds, which defendants had represented were appropriate
undertakings to secure payment of the awards against A-1
under section 98.2.
                           CONCLUSION
       This is a troubling case. Defendants Ojogho and A-1
have managed both to evade the undertaking requirements
of section 98.2 and delay satisfaction of judgments owed
plaintiffs for unpaid wages. Whether they did so intentionally
or negligently is not before us. We cannot hold Great American

                                35
liable to plaintiffs, however, for defendants’ representations that
the appeal bonds Great American issued secured payment to
plaintiffs on the awards entered against A-1 when they did not.
                           DISPOSITION
       We affirm the January 25, 2021 and August 19, 2021
orders. In the interests of justice, the parties are to bear their
own costs on appeal.

      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                     EGERTON, J.

We concur:

             EDMON, P.J.

             LAVIN, J.

                                36