Court Opinion

ID: 6553560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-19 22:32:07.726881+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:56:10.286208
License: Public Domain

Layton Roaf, Judge, dissenting. I would affirm both the trial court’s decision to grant equitable relief in this case and the relief that he fashioned. In fact, the appellant’s attorney moved at the end of the trial testimony to conform the pleadings to the proof and asked the trial court to impose a constructive trust on the property; the chancellor did just that. The chancellor found that the appellant had failed to prove fraud, misrepresentation, or an agreement with Johnson, but that appellant’s deed to Johnson had not been a gift, and that Johnson had been unjustly enriched in his dealings with appellant. The chancellor awarded appellant $15,000, the value of her original one-tenth interest in the 179 acres, and imposed a constructive trust on the property in the form of an equitable lien. Although not in the appellant’s abstract, the chancellor carefully stated the reasons for his decision at the conclusion of the trial. The chancellor also stated that he could fashion any equitable remedy he deemed appropriate. I cannot say that the court clearly erred in any of his findings, including that appellant failed to prove fraud, that she also failed to prove that appellee specifically agreed to deed to his sisters two-thirds or any amount of the property after the partition suit was resolved, and that appellant had risked nothing but her original one-tenth interest in transferring title to Johnson so that he could attempt to stave off the partition and sale of the property. Significantly, the other sister involved in this alleged agreement neither participated in the suit, nor testified at trial to corroborate appellant’s version of events. Moreover, appellant did not claim a half-interest in the property as asserted in the majority opinion, she claimed two-thirds. And, it is clear from reviewing the transcript that appellant made a number of questionable and contradictory statements during her testimony and was evasive in answering some of the questions posed to her. Of course, the trial court ultimately must judge the credibility of the witnesses. Word v. Remick, 75 Ark. App. 390, 58 S.W.3d 422 (2001). I find the relief granted by the trial court appropriate and fair when the entire record is considered. Moreover, while appellant initially held only a one-tenth undivided interest in the 179 acres before the partition action was filed, it is unclear from the majority opinion just what her interest in the 79 acres now held by appellee should be on remand, one-third, one-half, 17.9 acres, or some other amount. Apparently, this decision is to be left to the trial court, conditioned upon appellant “joining” appellee on his mortgage, a feat that may be easier said than done. We ought to leave well enough alone, and affirm this case. Stroud, C.J., joins.