Court Opinion

ID: 9551689
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:57:29.065859+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:24:24.223024
License: Public Domain

Hill, J.
(concurring in the result) — I do not agree with the factual statement in the majority opinion. The jury could have found that instead of the collision occurring two or three car lengths beyond the intersection of Aurora Avenue and North 49th, it occurred in the north part of the intersection and that instead of the Harris (favored driver) car striking the left side of the Fiore (disfavored driver) car, the headlight of the latter car hit the right rear door of the Harris car.
I do not believe that the factual differences are particularly material, but do desire to make it clear that there is *362not just one version on the fact issues of who hit whom and where.
I agree with the majority that the contributory negligence of the favored driver (Mrs. Harris) was a proper issue for the jury to determine.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the instruction on deception should have been given.
It seems to me that to permit a deception instruction to be given under the circumstances of this case, takes away the positive statutory right of way given at that time to the traveler on an arterial (such as Aurora Avenue) over any driver entering upon that arterial from an intersection such as North 49th.
I would first make clear the character of the negligence for which the disfavored driver seeks exculpation, claiming he was deceived. He violated the right-of-way statute (RCW 46.60.170) then in effect (changed in some particulars subsequent to this collision) by failing to yield the right of way to the favored driver on an arterial. There was a collision in the intersection or just beyond it. That was negligence per se.
The necessity for obedience to such traffic safety statutes is well enunciated in Spalding v. Waxler, 2 Ohio St. 2d 1, 4, 205 N.E.2d 890, 893 (1965).
To constitute a legal excuse for failure to comply with a safety statute, it is not enough for defendant to show that he acted as a reasonably prudent person would have acted under the circumstances. The required standard of care has been specified by the General Assembly, and the specific requirements of the statute have replaced the rule of ordinary care. Kehrer v. McKittrick, 176 Ohio St. 192, 194; Prosser, Torts (3 Ed.) 191, Section 35.
“Some statutes, such as traffic laws, are enacted * * * to prescribe uniform and certain rules of conduct in the interest of safety. Such rules are authoritative declarations as to how persons shall act, and must be observed * * * . * * * In such a field, ‘when the 'Legislature has spoken, the standard of care required is no longer what the reasonably prudent man would do' under the circumstances, but what the Legislature has *363commanded.’ ” Traynor, J., concurring in Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal.2d 581, 596, 177 P.2d 279, 287.
In order to avoid liability for injuries resulting from a failure to comply with a safety statute regulating the operation of a motor vehicle upon the public highway, the test is not what a reasonably prudent person would have done, but whether the favored driver so wrongfully and negligently operated his car as to create a deception tantamount to an entrapment. Ward v. Zeugner, 64 Wn.2d 570, 392 P.2d 811 (1964); Mondor v. Rhoades, 63 Wn.2d 159, 385 P.2d 722 (1963).
We come now to the consideration of the evidence upon which a jury could make a finding of deception in the present case.
The disfavored driver had been at the intersection for from 5 to 7 minutes waiting (patiently we presume) for a break in the northbound traffic to enable him to make a right turn into the curb lane and proceed north. He knew that traffic could change from lane to lane at any time. His testimony was that there came a time when there was no traffic in the curb lane and he saw no car in the middle lane of the three northbound lanes signaling a right turn into the curb lane. He seized that moment to make his right turn into Aurora Avenue, and at approximately the same time the favored driver (traveling in the middle lane) commenced her right turn into the curb lane. Her testimony was that she had put on her right-turn indicator somewhere between North 48th and North 49th Streets. She was moving into the curb lane so that she could make a right turn off of Aurora Avenue at North 50th.
We have here no more than a conflict in testimony: She says she signaled her change of lane; he says he saw no such signal.
In view of the traffic situation at that time and place, it seems to me that any disfavored driver turning onto Aurora Avenue was taking a calculated risk. We have here no visible obstruction, no excessive speed, no sudden change of *364pace by the favored driver such as have distinguished our other deception cases. If we are to hold that what happened here could constitute proof of deception tantamount to entrapment, all that would ever be needed to excuse a failure to yield a statutory right of way would be the testimony of a disfavored driver that he didn’t see a signal.
Despite my feeling that we are making a mistake in labeling this a deception case, I am concurring in the result because whether or not the deception instruction should have been given, it was not prejudicial to the favored driver, the respondent here, if, as we agree, the contributory-negligence instruction was proper.
The reason for my concurrence is that if the disfavored driver, the appellant here, was deceived into believing it was safe for him to enter Aurora Avenue from North 49th it was because of the failure of the favored driver to signa* her intention to change lanes, which is exactly the same failure which we are agreed is sufficient to justify an instruction on contributory negligence. Under the deception instruction, her failure to signal a change of lanes could absolve the disfavored driver of his negligence in failing to yield the right of way, and under the contributory-negligence instruction, the same failure to signal a change of lanes could bar her recovery.
In other words, there is no contributory negligence and there is no deception, unless the favored driver failed to signal her intention to change lanes for the distance and time required by the statute quoted in the majority opinion.
In this particular situation, where the disfavored driver is claiming no damages but is merely defending against the claim of the favored driver, I see no prejudice to the favored driver in giving the deception instruction, for if the jury found that the favored driver failed to signal her intention to change lanes and that such negligent conduct was a proximate cause of the collision, the favored driver was barred from any recovery, and whether or not the *365appellant-disfavored driver was or was not deceived by that same failure becomes immaterial.
Rosellini, J., concurs with Hill, J.
May 3, 1967. Petition for rehearing denied.