Court Opinion

ID: 9851349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:11:02.859782+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:54.101634
License: Public Domain

YANDE WALLE, Chief Justice,
concurring specially.
No issue has been raised as to Erickson’s standing to challenge the validity of the search. As the majority opinion observes, “the room was not a common area, nor under the exclusive control and domain of Erickson; there is no evidence that Erickson had permission to enter the room....”
In State v. Lind, 322 N.W.2d 826, 833 (N.D.1982), we determined it was “no longer desirable to continue the automatic-standing rule” announced by the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), which gave a defendant charged with crimes of possession of seized goods automatic standing to challenge the legality of a search which produced the evidence against him whether or not the defendant had an expectation of privacy in the premises. We did so on the basis of United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 65 L.Ed.2d 619 (1980), which held defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact been violated. Most states have not retained the automatic standing rule. See 4 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 11.3, at 70 n. 314 (2d ed. Supp.1993), citing State v. Cortis, 237 Neb. 97, 465 N.W.2d 132 (1991).
If Erickson had no permission to enter the room he would not appear to have standing to raise a Fourth Amendment violation. Salvucci, supra; United States v. Pitt, 717 F.2d 1334 (11th Cir.1983), cert, denied 465 U.S. 1068, 104 S.Ct. 1421, 79 L.Ed.2d 746 (1984) [no expectation of privacy in room where tenant had no possessory interest]. If, on the other hand, he did have permission to enter the room, it is open to question whether or not the police exceeded the scope of the warrant. The very evidence Erickson marshals to attack the search as exceeding the scope of the search warrant suggests he has no standing to attack the search because he had no expectation of privacy in the premises. Cf. State v. Crane, 296 S.C. 336, 372 S.E.2d 587 (1988) [defendants objection to excess in execution resulting in search of lands owned by another likely to be rejected on grounds of lack of standing].
Nevertheless, if the issue of standing had been raised it may be that Erickson could have shown that he had permission to use the premises at least sufficient to create a legitimate expectation of privacy, i.e., one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91, 110 S.Ct. 1684, 109 L.Ed.2d 85 (1990), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507, 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967), and Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978).
Although the standing issue was not raised, I believe this court could raise the issue sua sponte, see, State v. Cortis, supra. But, as indicated above, this record does not definitively indicate that Erickson did not have standing. Therefore, I believe the majority opinion properly focuses on the scope of the search warrant.
Nevertheless, it appears the scope of the warrant is integrally intertwined with whether or not the place to be searched was particularly described within the mean*562ing of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, § 8 of the North Dakota Constitution. Although it would have been preferable had the affidavit and warrant indicated that this was a multiple dwelling building, and that only-one apartment was to be searched, thus precluding a search of the other unit indiscriminately, I agree that the fact the two units had separate addresses, and the warrant listed only one address, meets the constitutional standard. However, as La-Fave observes in his treatise:
“Assuming a designated subunit, the warrant may be executed only there and may not extend to another subunit, and this is so ‘without regard to whether the officers could have anticipated ahead of time that they would encounter separate premises.’ ”
2 Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure § 4.5, at 51 (2d ed. Supp.1993), quoting State v. Devine, 307 Or. 341, 768 P.2d 913 (1989) [warrant specifying address permits search of house so numbered, but not apartment having separate entrance and separate number over door].
At the preliminary hearing, in response to the question of whether the room in which the drugs were found was beneath “the other apartment,” the executing officer replied “I believe it was” and that it “was correct” that the room was under the main floor of 501. Had it not appeared that the room searched was part of another dwelling unit not described" in the warrant, I would vote to affirm for I do not believe the fact the door was closed and unlocked is necessarily significant. Surely in a search of premises described in a warrant, the executing officers may open doors in the premises which are closed, notwithstanding a “closed door does not invite unauthorized entry.” See, e.g., United States v. Elliott, 893 F.2d 220, 222, 225 (9th Cir.1990) [search warrant for certain apartment allowed search of store room behind that apartment where that room was “accessible through a hole in the bathroom wall concealed by a burlap sack,” as this “unconventional manner of access ... made the room part of the apartment.”]
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion.
RALPH J. ERICKSTAD, Surrogate Judge, concurs.