Court Opinion

ID: 9587944
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:28:16.940303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:20.339871
License: Public Domain

Hall, Judge.
In 1957 the General Assembly imposed implied warranties by manufacturers of personal property sold in this State. Ga. L. 1957, p. 405; Code Ann. § 96-307: “The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property, either directly or through wholesale or retail dealers, or any other person, shall warrant the following to the ultimate consumer, who, however, must exercise caution when purchasing to detect defects, and, provided there is no express covenant of warranty and no agreement to the contrary: 1. The article sold is merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended. 2. The manufacturer knows of no latent defects undisclosed.” This law has now been repealed (Ga. L. 1962, pp. 156, 427), but was in effect at the time of the sale upon which these actions are founded. (Under § 109A-2—314 of the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code, effective January 1, 1964, “a warranty that the goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind.” Ga. L. 1962, p. 156.
The petition of Mr. Wood, who purchased the automobile, alleged: The automobile was not merchantable and reasonably suited for the uses intended in that, while it was being driven in a normal and careful way it suddenly, unexpectedly, and without warning became unmanageable and uncontrollable and veered into the wrong lane of traffic and collided with another vehicle, and both of them were demolished. Latent mechanical defects between the steering mechanism and the front wheels, which existed at the time of manufacture, caused the malfunc*104tion. At the time he purchased the automobile he exercised caution to detect defects, but discovered none, and neither he nor Mrs. Wood knew of the defects until the time of the collision. The automobile had been driven approximately 11,500 miles at the time of said collision; it was reasonably expected to provide safe and efficient transportation for at least two years or 25,000 miles, whichever came first. Between the time of the purchase of the automobile and the collision, the automobile was not involved in any other wreck, was driven with caution, and serviced in accordance with instructions furnished by defendants. At the time of the collision, the automobile was being operated in a normal and safe manner and no external cause of failure (other than the latent defects) made it veer into the wrong lane of traffic and collide with another vehicle. The innumerable parts of the steering mechanism were so badly damaged that it was impossible for the plaintiff to allege what particular part caused the automobile to become unmanageable and uncontrollable.
The trial court sustained the general demurrer as well as special demurrers attacking the above allegations, piecemeal and generally, as being conclusions unsupported by facts alleged, too indefinite and uncertain, and insufficient to put the defendant on notice as to the plaintiff’s contentions as to the nature and location of the alleged latent defects and enable the defendant to properly prepare its defense.
The statutory implied warranty is “an obligation that the law places on a party as a result of some transaction entered into”; it is not a contractual obligation. Bookholt v. General Motors Corp., 215 Ga. 391, 394 (110 SE2d 642). Accord: Bond & Maxwell v. Perrin, 145 Ga. 200, 209 (88 SE 954); Colt Co. v. Bridges, 162 Ga. 154, 158 (132 SE 889); A. D. L. Sales Co. v. Gailey, 48 Ga. App. 798 (173 SE 734); Smith v. Eastern Light Co., 49 Ga. App. 593 (176 SE 545). It remains effective for a reasonable time. 46 Cornell L. Q. 607, 612. Breach and consequent damages complete a cause of action on an implied warranty. A petition which makes both of these elements appear is not subject to demurrer. Welfare Finance Corp. v. Waters, 98 Ga. App. 20, 23 (104 SE2d 669). This petition shows a transaction cov*105ered by the statute. The plaintiff need only show that the automobile was not reasonably suited for the purposes for which it was commonly intended and that because of its unsuitability he was damaged.
Negligence is not an element of breach of warranty. If goods do not conform to the warranty, the warrantor’s utmost care will not relieve him of liability. We may assume that proof would show that the defect and failure of the machine to function properly was not due to any negligence of the manufacturer. This will not impair the plaintiff’s cause of action under the statute. Accord Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N. J. 358 (161 A2d 69); Greeman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57 (377 P2d 897); Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 NY2d 432 (191 NE2d 81). The purpose of the statute is . . that the enterprise which causes losses should lift them from the individual victims and distribute them widely among those who benefit from the activities of the enterprise. . . . This would include strict liability on the part of the manufacturer upon an implied warranty for unreasonable dangers lurking in any kind of product.” James, “General Products—Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without Negligence?”, 24 Tenn. L. Rev. 923, 924, 925; Noel, “Strict Liability of Manufacturers”, 50 American B. J. 446; 1 Williston On Sales 617, § 237.
We recognize that some negligence cases have held that facts which in evidence would give rise to an inference of negligence without proof of a specific negligent act are insufficient to pass the test of pleading wffien no specific act of negligence is alleged; “res ipsa loquitur” cannot aid pleadings. See Hudgins v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 122 Ga. 695 (50 SE 974). These precedents are not applicable, however, in this action upon statutory implied warranties. Certainly “res ipsa loquitur,” a rule of negligence law, has no application to a suit upon a statutory implied warranty.
Our courts have always held that the facts of a cause of action must be so plainly and fully and distinctly set forth as to inform the opposite party of the grounds of the plaintiff’s action, and enable him to prepare his defense; to enable the jury to *106find an intelligible and complete verdict; and to enable the court to declare distinctly the law of the case. Murphy v. Lawrence, 2 Ga. 257, 258; Southern R. Co. v. Lunsford, 50 Ga. App. 829, 834 (179 SE 571), reversed on other grounds, 297 U. S. 398 (56 SC 504, 80 LE 740); Georgia-Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. White, 55 Ga. App. 706, 713 (191 SE 265).
“While a plaintiff is required to set out his cause of action in a full, complete, and definite manner, in order that the defendant may, without difficulty, understand the nature of the plaintiff’s charge or demand, and make preparation to meet it (Civil Code § 5538), this requirement is to be liberally construed [Kemp v. Central &c. R. Co., 122 Ga. 559, 50 SE 465), and a plaintiff is not required to allege impossible particulars or unnecessary details (Bittick v. Georgia &c. R. Co., 136 Ga. 138, 70 SE 106), nor is a plaintiff required to set forth in his petition the evidence relied on to make out his cause of action, it being sufficient if he alleges enough to inform the opposite party of the grounds of his action, and to enable the jury to find an intelligible and complete verdict, and enable the court to declare distinctly the law of the case. Cedartown Cotton &c. Co. v. Miles, 2 Ga. App. 79 (58 SE 289); Wrightsville &c. R. Co. v. Vaughn, 9 Ga. App. 371 (2), 377 (71 SE 691).” Watts v. Rich, 49 Ga. App. 334, 335 (175 SE 417).
“Ultimate facts are conclusions drawn from intermediate and evidentiary facts, or allegations of mixed law and fact; they are conclusions from reflection and natural reasoning on evidentiary facts. The ultimate facts which are to be pleaded are the issuable, constitutive, or traversable facts essential to the statement of the cause of action; the facts which the evidence on the trial will prove, and not the evidence which will be required to prove the existence of those facts.” 71 CJS 33-34, § 12. Ultimate facts “. . . are necessarily conclusions and inference from other proved facts as distinguished from conclusions of law. Allegations of conclusions of law must be supported by facts justifying them, but allegations of ultimate facts need not be supported by the allegation of evidentiary facts by which the ultimate facts are to be proved.” Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. McMichael, 74 Ga. App. 53, 55 (38 SE2d 689).
*107“Good pleading requires only that the plaintiff plainly and concisely state the material ultimate facts upon which she depends for recovery.” Lefkoff v. Sicro, 189 Ga. 554 (10) (6 SE2d 687, 133 ALR 738); Baker v. Goddard, 205 Ga. 477, 479 (53 SE2d 754). If the pleader goes further and pleads evidentiary facts, he thereby renders his pleading subject to special' demurrer. Oxford v. Shuman, 106 Ga. App. 73, 84 (126 SE2d 522); Martin v. Greer, 31 Ga. App. 625 (2) (121 SE 688); Phipps Lumber Co. v. Albany Hdw. &c. Co., 42 Ga. App. 820 (157 SE 702); Maynard v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 138 Ga. 549 (75 SE 582); Alabama Const. Co. v. Continental Car &c. Co., 131 Ga. 365, 367 (62 SE 160); Tanner v. National Cas. Co., 214 Ga. 705, 707 (107 SE2d 182). The principles enunciated above are also applicable under the ancient rules of common law pleading. Cases on Common-Law Pleading by Keigwin, 329; Shipman on Common-Law Pleading, 492.
The defendant contends that in the present case it was necessary for the plaintiff to plead what part of the steering system was defective. On this question our courts have held “. . . structural descriptions of defects alleged in machinery are not required in order to give the necessary certainty. To state specific concrete improper results which a machine in question produced is often sufficient to describe a defect definitely” Atlantic C. L. R. Co. v. Davis & Brandon, 5 Ga. App. 214, 217 (62 SE 1022) (defective locomotive smokestack); Hubbard v. Macon R. &c. Co., 5 Ga. App. 223, 226 (62 SE 1018) (defective valve); King Hardware Co. v. Ennis, 39 Ga. App. 355, 364 (147 SE 119) (defective cooking stove—plaintiff “unable to set out specially and in detail the particulars in which said stove was defectively constructed”); Bittick & Mays v. Georgia, Fla. &c. R. Co., 136 Ga. 138, 140 (70SE1106) (defective engine throwing out sparks). “A defect in a machine may be described by showing that the machine was in such condition that it produced certain definitely described results which a "machine not defective would not and should not produce. It is not necessary to describe minutely or particularly the physical appearance of the parts alleged to be defective.” Charleston & W. C. R. Co. *108v. Attaway, 7 Ga. App. 231 (2a) (66 SE 548); King Hardware Co. v. Ennis, supra.
The allegation of an ultimate fact is not demurrable as a conclusion unless the petition affirmatively contradicts it. Etheridge Motors, Inc. v. Haynie, 103 Ga. App. 676, 679 (120 SE2d 317). “A conclusion in a pleading is not subject to special demurrer if the inference stated therein may be legitimately drawn from the special facts pleaded. . .” Saliba v. Saliba, 202 Ga. 279 (9) (42 SE2d 748); McWhorter v. Settle, 202 Ga. 334, 335 (4) (43 SE2d 247); Morgan v. Crowley, 91 Ga. App. 58, 69 (85 SE2d 40); Midland Properties Co. v. Farmer, 100 Ga. App. 8, 25 (110 SE2d 100); Allen v. Arthurs, 106 Ga. App. 682 (127 SE2d 819). It is not an unreasonable and unwarranted conclusion to say that when an automobile while in normal use suddenly becomes uncontrollable because of a defect and failure of the parts by which it is steered and controlled, it is not suitable for the use for which it is commonly intended—driving on the streets and highways. Whether or not the conclusions alleged in a particular case are warranted by the specific allegations upon which they are based will ultimately become a question for the jury, based on all the evidence. Hawley &c. Furnace Co. v. Van Winkle Gin Works, 4 Ga. App. 85, 89 (60 SE 1008); Macon Telegraph Pub. Co. v. Graden, 79 Ga. App. 230, 236 (53 SE2d 371). We can test the substance of a petition by asking, can the defendant admit all that is alleged (well-pleaded) and escape liability? Lam Amusement Co. v. Waddell, 105 Ga. App. 1, 4 (123 SE2d 310); Belk-Gallant Co. v. Cordell, 107 Ga. App. 785, 787 (131 SE2d 575).
Admittedly the petition may present a formidable problem of proof on the part of the plaintiff, a problem which we do not reach. See Ashe, “So You’re Going to Try A Products Liability Case,” 13 Hasting L. J. 66; Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N. J. 358, supra; 46 Cornell L. Q. 607; 40 Oregon L. R. 364; 78 ALR2d 460-588; 50 American B. J. 446. The plaintiff has alleged facts which, if he can prove them by direct or circumstantial evidence, will entitle him to recover. Accord: Raines v. Jones, 96 Ga. App. 412, 415 (100 SE2d 157).
The petition of Mr. Wood, the purchaser, shows that Ford *109Motor Company placed a new automobile in the stream of trade, that the plaintiff purchased the automobile from a retail dealer, that a latent defect (between the steering mechanism and the front wheels) in the automobile existing at the time it left the manufacturer caused it to be unmerchantable and not reasonably suited for the use intended in that it became unmanageable and uncontrollable while being operated upon the highway, and that the plaintiff was damaged as a consequence of the defective mechanism. It meets the test prescribed by our courts for adequate pleading of a cause of action on statutory implied warranty, and states a cause of action against the manufacturer under the 1957 Act (former Code Ann. § 96-307).
The petition of Mrs. Wood, who at the time of the collision was the fiancee of the owner of the automobile, shows that she was not a purchaser of the automobile and not covered by the provisions of the 1957 Act, supra, and therefore not entitled to sue the manufacturer on the implied warranty imposed by the statute. Revlon, Inc. v. Murdock, 103 Ga. App. 842 (120 SE2d 912). Cf. Georgia Uniform Commercial Code (Code Ann. § 109A-2—318).
Until 1964 Georgia had a statute, an early codification of the general law, providing that the seller of personal property “(unless expressly or from the nature of the transaction excepted) warrants that. . . The article sold is merchantable, and reasonably suited to the use intended.” Code of 1863, § 2607; (1933) Code § 96-301; Roebling’s Sons Co. v. Southern Power Co., 142 Ga. 464, 478 (83 SE 138, LRA 1915B 900). This statute has been repealed. Ga. L. 1962, pp. 156, 427. (Effective January 1, 1964). While the statute existed, however, this court held that the sale of articles procured from reputable manufacturers, which in practical use in retail trade [the seller] cannot feasibly examine for imperfections, is not subject to the implied warranty. Maroney v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 72 Ga. App. 485 (34 SE2d 302). Cf. Sections 109A-2—312 et seq. of the Georgia Uniform Commercial Code, supra.
The trial court erred in sustaining the general demurrer of Ford Motor Company and dismissing Mr. Wood’s petition, and erred in sustaining the special demurrers of Ford Motor Company except special demurrer number 5 to paragraph 11 of Mr. *110Wood’s petition as amended. The trial court did not err in sustaining said demurrer number 5. The trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrers of Hub Motor Company to Mr. Wood’s petition and in dismissing Mrs. Wood’s petition against both defendants.
Judgment in Case No. 40568 sustaining general and special demurrers of Ford Motor Company reversed except as to the sustaining of demurrer number 5 to paragraph 11 of the petition, the sustaining of that demurrer being affirmed.

Judgment in Case No. 40568 sustaining demurrers of Hub Motor Company affirmed. Judgments in Case No. 40569 sustaining demurrers of Ford Motor Company and Hub Motor Company affirmed.

Felton, C. J., Bell, P. J., Jordan, Eberhardt and Bussell, JJ., concur. Nichols, P. J., Frankum and Pannell, JJ., dissent.