Court Opinion

ID: 9765761
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:18:34.76732+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:22.838977
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTIN
concurring.
I concur in the majority opinion, but write separately to express my concerns regarding the manner in which plaintiff’s real property interest was alienated in the instant case.
To illuminate my concerns, it is necessary to consider a slightly longer excerpt from the colloquy between the trial court and plaintiff, a seventy-three-year-old man who was hard of hearing and did not use a hearing aid during this exchange. At this point in the underlying trial, the jury had been excused from the courtroom. After a short recess, the parties reconvened at 11:35 a.m. outside the presence of the jury. Next, counsel for the municipal defendant announced the proposed settlement to the trial court. A brief discussion ensued, mainly regarding the scheduling of closing for the land transfer. Then the following exchange occurred:
[PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY]: We’ll do it by the 12th or on the 12th.
THE COURT: That’s your agreement, Mr. Powell?
[PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY]: Stand up, James.
THE COURT: Is that your agreement, sir?
[PLAINTIFF]: I don’t have any choice.
THE COURT: Well — .
[PLAINTIFF’S ATTORNEY]: You do have a choice.
THE COURT: I understand your sentiment, sir. But is that your agreement?
[PLAINTIFF]: Yes, that’s my agreement.
[CITY’S ATTORNEY]: Thank you, Your Honor.
(These proceedings were concluded at 11:40 a.m.)
*572Collectively, the announcement of the proposed settlement, a brief discussion of its terms, negotiations about scheduling the closing date, and confirmation of plaintiffs assent took five minutes. At the end of this brief exchange, the trial court and all the participating attorneys had confirmed plaintiff’s reluctant transfer of land.
Even if, speaking hypothetically, plaintiff later signed a deed transferring the land, this exchange would indeed remain troubling. While trial courts undoubtedly face large caseloads, the importance and sanctity of land ownership should always be respected. Trial courts faced with such a situation should exercise patience and deliberation. When a party who is presumably assenting to a settlement agreement involving the transfer of his real property states before the court, “I don’t have any choice” or an equivalent phrase, the trial court should order a recess ex mero mo tu and request counsel to fully discuss the matter with the client. Even though the application of judicial estoppel is appropriate in the present case, in general, land should not be alienated in this manner.
Land-is an extremely important and long-valued asset in this state and throughout this country. The singular nature of land’s immense value was perhaps best expressed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in 1852:
Land is the most important and valuable kind of property. Or if it be not, there is no other stake for which men will play so desperately. In men and nations there is an insatiable appetite for lands, for the defence or acquisition of which money and even blood sometimes are poured out like water. The evidence of land-title ought to be as sure as human ingenuity can make it. But if left in parol, nothing is more uncertain, whilst the temptations to perjury are proportioned to the magnitude of the interest.
The infirmities of memory, the death of witnesses, the corruptibility of witnesses, the honest mistakes of witnesses, and the misunderstandings of parties, these are all elements of confusion and discord which ought to be excluded from titles to the most coveted, if not most valuable of terrestrial objects. And it is the purpose of the statute of frauds and perjuries to exclude these elements, and to compel men.to create testimonials of their intentions which are certain and enduring.
Moore v. Small, 19 Pa. 461, 465 (1852), quoted in part in 1 James A. Webster, Jr., Patrick K. Hetrick & James B. McLaughlin, Jr., Webster’s *573Real Estate Law in North Carolina § 9-6, at 284 (5th ed. 1999) .[hereinafter Webster’s]. As the Pennsylvania court summarized, the unparalleled value of land provides the basis and the inspiration for the writing requirement embodied in the statute of frauds.
The statute of frauds in North Carolina is a statutory enactment from 1819; it is not directly a part of the common or statutory law imported from England. See Herring v. Volume Merch., Inc., 249 N.C. 221, 224, 106 S.E.2d 197, 200 (1958) (citing Foy v. Foy, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 131, 132 (1801)). Nonetheless, the statute is derived from the original English statute of 1677 and, like the original, was enacted to prevent fraud and perjury in conveyances of land. Webster’s § 9-6, at 284. A signed writing provides needed formality and solemnity to the divestment of a fee simple interest and signifies to even the most unaware layperson that a transaction of legal importance is occurring.
In the present case the lack of a signed writing results from plaintiff’s desire to challenge the settlement agreement that he assented to, however reluctantly, before the trial court. The doctrine of judicial estoppel operates to prevent plaintiff’s failure to sign from defeating the conveyance. Nevertheless, the facts of this case provide a cautionary tale for judges to consider as they work through their crowded dockets.
Ultimately, the trial court is in the best institutional position to slow court proceedings and protect the interests of a party reluctant to transfer his real property. Accordingly, to the extent that a party exhibits such reluctance, a trial judge should be prepared to order a recess ex mero mo tu to ensure that alienation of the fee occurs with the deliberation appropriate to the seriousness and significance of a real property transfer.
Justice BRADY joins in this concurring opinion.