Court Opinion

ID: 9370903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-14 23:02:22.087168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:24.599057
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/14/23 P. v. Silva CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                       (Nevada)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                            C093875, C095978

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Super. Ct. No. F18000078)

           v.

 ALBERT JORGE SILVA,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         In March 2018, the People charged defendant Albert Jorge Silva with murder. On
January 28, 2021, a jury found defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced
him to an indeterminate term of 15 years to life in state prison. Defendant appealed from
that conviction on March 19, 2021. He contends the trial court erred by instructing the
jury with CALCRIM No. 362. We find no error. Defendant also notes errors in the
abstract of judgment, which the People agree should be corrected. We will remand the
matter for the limited purpose of allowing the trial court to correct the errors in the
abstract of judgment and otherwise affirm the judgment.

                                                             1
        On February 24, 2022, while the direct appeal was pending, defendant filed a
petition for resentencing in the trial court, pursuant to Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The
court denied the petition without appointing counsel. Defendant appealed the trial court’s
denial of his petition, and the appeal was consolidated with his direct appeal. His
appointed counsel asked this court for an independent review of the record to determine
whether there are any arguable issues on appeal. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436
(Wende).) Defendant was informed of his right to file a supplemental brief but did not
file one. Exercising our discretion to independently review the record under People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo), we affirm.
                                   I. BACKGROUND
        Between May 2006 and May 2014, defendant was convicted three times for
driving under the influence. Each time he was convicted, defendant signed a “Watson”
advisement: “[B]eing under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, impairs my ability
to safely operate a motor vehicle. Therefore, it is extremely dangerous to human life to
drive while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both. If I continue to drive while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, and as a result of my driving, someone is
killed, I can be charged with murder.” (See People v. Watson (1981) 30 Cal.3d 290,
296.)
        In May 2014, at his sentencing hearing, the trial court spoke directly to defendant:
“ ‘[Y]ou also have probably been advised of this in the past. You understand that if you
drive under the influence of alcohol and somebody’s killed, you can and probably will be
charged with murder. Do you understand that?

1 Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Effective June 30,
2022, former section 1170.95 was recodified without substantive change to section
1172.6. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) We will refer to section 1172.6 throughout this
opinion.

                                              2
       “ ‘The Defendant: Yes, sir.’ ”
       Counsel acknowledged she read the Watson advisement “out loud” to defendant.
The court then continued to address defendant: “ ‘[Y]ou understand that three times
around, if you do this again, judges are likely to be looking at some much more serious
consequences?
       “ ‘The Defendant: Yes, sir.’ ”
       In February 2015, defendant enrolled in a program designed to educate him on the
dangers of driving under the influence. While in the program, defendant learned more
about the Watson advisements he signed, in particular that if he were to “drink and drive
and cause a fatality, [he] could be charged with second degree murder.”
       Then, in March 2018, defendant drove his car after drinking alcohol and smoking
marijuana. Defendant’s two-year-old son was also in the car. While driving, defendant
lost control of the car; his son was thrown from the car and died as a result of his injuries.
Defendant was subsequently charged with murder. Defendant pled not guilty; a jury
found defendant guilty as charged. Defendant appealed from his conviction.
       While his direct appeal was pending, defendant petitioned the trial court for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The court denied his petition without appointing
counsel, finding defendant was ineligible for relief because a jury found him guilty of
murder as a result of defendant “driving under the influence [and] causing the death of
his minor child (commonly referred to as Watson Murder).”
       The trial court further explained that even after the changes in the law, defendant
“can presently be convicted of a Watson Murder because changes made to . . . Sections
188 and 189 effective January 1, 2019[,] do not apply to Watson Murders . . . as a matter
of law.” Defendant appeals from this post judgment order as well.

                                     II. DISCUSSION
A.     Appeal from Denial of Resentencing – Appeal No. C095978

                                              3
       Because this appeal is from an order denying postconviction relief rather than a
first appeal of right from a criminal conviction, defendant is not entitled to independent
review pursuant to Wende or its federal counterpart, Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
738. (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at pp. 221-22, 224, 231.) We have, nevertheless,
exercised our discretion to independently review the record under Delgadillo, supra, at
p. 233. Based on our review of the record, the trial court was correct and defendant is not
entitled to relief under section 1172.6 because he was convicted of Watson murder. A
defendant convicted of Watson murder is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6. (See
People v. Roldan (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 997, 1004 [defendant convicted of Watson
murder ineligible for relief under former § 1170.95].)
       As described by our Supreme Court in Watson “[m]alice may be implied when a
person willfully drives under the influence of alcohol.” (People v. Roldan, supra, 56
Cal.App.5th at p. 1004.) Thus, a defendant convicted of Watson murder is “convicted
under a theory of actual implied malice, not malice imputed under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.” (Ibid.) Although “the doctrine of implied malice has a
‘natural and probable consequences’ element,” the defendant must “actually appreciate
that death is the natural and probable consequence of his or her actions, and further
requires that the [defendant] consciously disregard that danger.” (Id. at pp. 1004, 1005.)
Thus, unlike the natural and probable consequences doctrine eliminated by Senate Bill
No. 1437, implied malice rests on the killer’s own mens rea. (See Roldan, supra, at pp.
1004-1005.) Accordingly, defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
B.     Direct Appeal – Appeal No. C093875
       1.     CALCRIM No. 362
       Defendant argues CALCRIM No. 362 creates an irrational permissive
presumption of guilt and violates his constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial.
The instruction as given, states: “If the defendant made a false or misleading statement
before this trial relating to the charged crime, knowing the statement was false or

                                              4
intending to mislead, that conduct may show he was aware of his guilt of the crime and
you may consider it in determining his guilt. If you conclude that the defendant made the
statement, it is up to you to decide its meaning and importance. However, evidence that
the defendant made such a statement cannot prove guilt by itself.”
       Defendant argues the predecessor to CALCRIM No. 362, CALJIC No. 2.03,
withstood constitutional challenge because it limited the permissive inference that might
be drawn from the evidence to the defendant’s consciousness of guilt of some
wrongdoing, not consciousness of guilt of the specific crimes charged. CALJIC No. 2.03
stated: “If you find that before this trial the defendant made a willfully false or
deliberately misleading statement concerning the crime for which he is now being tried,
you may consider that statement as a circumstance tending to prove a consciousness of
guilt. However, that conduct is not sufficient by itself to prove guilt, and its weight and
significance, if any, are for you to decide.” Defendant argues the new jury instruction
fails to reflect the distinction between consciousness of guilt of some wrongdoing as
opposed to consciousness of guilt of the charged crime. This, he argues, renders the
instruction unconstitutional. We disagree.
       The defendant’s “consciousness of guilt” language used in CALJIC No. 2.03,
approved in People v. Crandell (1988) 46 Cal.3d 833, is not materially different from the
defendant’s being “aware of his guilt of the crime” pursuant to CALCRIM No. 362.
Both instructions describe a defendant’s consciousness of guilt arising from a false or
misleading statement relating to the charged crime rather than a confession of guilt. The
Supreme Court apparently agrees. In People v. Howard (2008) 42 Cal.4th 1000, 1021,
the court stated, “defendant contends that consciousness of guilt instructions like CALJIC
No. 2.52 (and see [CALCRIM No. 362]) invite the jury to draw irrational and
impermissible inferences with regard to a defendant’s state of mind at the time the
offense was committed. We have repeatedly rejected this argument (see, e.g., [People v.]
Jackson [(1996)] 13 Cal.4th [1164,] 1222-1224), and do so here.”

                                              5
        Additionally, like CALJIC No. 2.03, CALCRIM No. 362 warns that any
“evidence that the defendant made such a statement cannot prove guilt by itself.” This
ensures the jury does not treat the defendant’s false or misleading statement as a
confession of the crime. (See People v. Crandell, supra, 46 Cal.3d at p. 870.)
Accordingly, CALCRIM No. 362 did not violate defendant’s rights to due process or a
fair trial.
        2.     Abstract of Judgment
        Defendant contends the abstract of judgment must be amended to reflect his
murder conviction to be one of second degree murder. The People agree. At trial, the
court instructed the jury only on second degree murder. As a result, defendant could only
have been convicted of second degree murder. The abstract of judgment, however, does
not identify the degree of murder. Such a mistake is clerical; it can and should be
corrected on remand. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th 181, 186.)
        In addition, the trial court failed to specify the fines and fees imposed on
defendant. This was error. (People v. Johnson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1432, 1459; see
also People v. High (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1192, 1201.) On remand, the trial court shall
identify the individual amounts and statutory bases for the fines, fees, and penalties
imposed, and amend the abstract of judgment accordingly.
                                     II. DISPOSITION
        The post judgment order denying defendant’s resentencing petition in appeal No.
C095978 is affirmed.
        In appeal No. C093875 the judgment is affirmed. The trial court, however, is
directed to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect defendant’s conviction as one for
second degree murder, and amend the abstract of judgment in order to identify the
individual amounts and statutory bases for the fines, fees, and penalties imposed. The
trial court is directed to deliver a copy of the amended and corrected abstract of judgment
to the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation.

                                               6
                                   /S/

                           RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

DUARTE, Acting P. J.

/S/

BOULWARE EURIE, J.

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