Court Opinion

ID: 9705233
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:00:27.251152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:09.127227
License: Public Domain

Arthur H. Healey, J.
(dissenting). I dissent because I believe that the defendants were denied their constitutional right of trial by jury.
The majority states that the legal title is not in issue and, in doing so, points to the admission of paragraph 1 of the complaint as being conclusive upon them. They “show” this admission up by pointing out that the “essence of the dispute” is in the defendants’ special defense which “spells out the quality of that ownership” they allege in paragraph 1 of that defense.1 They again characterize for their purposes certain portions of the counterclaim without setting out that there again the defendants allege that “[a]t all times pertinent, defendants owned, still own and are in possession of *218premises described in plaintiffs’ complaint ...” which the plaintiffs deny. (Emphasis added.) The defendants could hardly have denied the existence of the warranty deed alleged in paragraph 1. In their counterclaim,2 however, a separate cause of action, they allege ownership and possession. If these were said to be inconsistent pleadings, it would be the first time this claim is made. There is not even a clue of the weakest sort of any such claim by the parties in the trial court, in the briefs, or in the argument before us as to that effect. All the pleadings should be read in the light of the claims of the parties; Pawlinski v. Allstate Ins. Co., 165 Conn. 1, 4-5, 327 A.2d 583 (1973); not just some of them.
The trial court’s memorandum of decision begins by stating clearly that “the case has resolved itself to the issue of ownership of the premises and which party should be made to vacate the premises,” and it ends by stating that “[¡'Judgment will enter for the plaintiff with the right of exclusive ownership and possession of the premises as against the defendants . . . .’’The judgment file demonstrates exactly the same. In addition, the plaintiffs’ brief states that “[bjoth parties, by subsequent pleadings, claimed title to and exclusive possession of the property and each sought an order directing their opponents to vacate the premises.” Significantly, and it cannot be oversight, the plaintiffs never suggested in their brief nor in argument that the defendants’ answer to paragraph 1 put the issue of title to rest at all. We are not, under such circumstances, *219“locked in” as the majority concludes on the defendants’ admission of paragraph 1 of the complaint. Yet, despite all this, the majority goes on to characterize the pleadings in a manner not even suggested by the trial court or the parties, either below or before us, and goes on to decide and dispose of the case on a theory not even suggested by the trial court or the parties, either below or before us, all without even suggesting that the trial court got to the right result but by the wrong route. The trial court apparently construed the pleadings in the light of the claim of the parties insofar as title necessary to entitle them to ownership and possession was concerned. We should dispose of this case on the theory upon which it was tried and on which the trial court decided it. Machiz v. Homer Harmon, Inc., 146 Conn. 523, 525, 152 A.2d 629 (1959); Treat v. Town Plan & Zoning Commission, 145 Conn. 406, 409, 143 A.2d 448 (1958); Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 42. We have done this, and not interfered, where the parties at trial adopted a certain construction of the pleadings. See, e.g., Milardo v. Branciforte, 109 Conn. 693, 695, 145 A. 573 (1929); First National Bank v. Broder, 107 Conn. 574, 580, 141 A. 861 (1928); Ohlin v. Kowner, 96 Conn. 394, 401, 114 A. 117 (1921); Maltbie, Conn. App. Proc. § 42.
In fairness to the litigants, it can be said that the determination of whether a claim is legal or equitable is an “elusive question,” and it requires an appraisal of the basic nature of the issues presented, including the relief sought. Flanigan v. Foley, 20 Conn. Sup. 12, 119 A.2d 741 (1955); Cyr v. Cote, 396 A.2d 1013 (Me. 1979); Portland Pipe Line Corporation v. Environmental Improvement Commission, 307 A.2d 1 (Me.), appeal dismissed, 414 U.S. 1035, 94 S. Ct. 532, 38 L. Ed. 2d 326 (1973). It is crucial, however, to remember, as the majority have not, that “the constitu*220tional right to trial by jury cannot be made to depend upon the choice of words used in the pleadings.” Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469, 477-78, 82 S. Ct. 894, 8 L. Ed. 2d 44 (1962). One court referring to Dairy Queen said that “the labels chosen by pleader do not control [the determination of whether a party is entitled to a jury trial].” Prudential Oil Corporation v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 392 F. Sup. 1018,1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The elemental issues in this case are, according to everyone but the majority, ownership and possession. We have said that “[w]hen the title is in dispute, or doubtful, or has not been long enjoyed, or the possession is not in the complainant, equity will leave the parties to settle the title and possession at law . . . .” Roy v. Moore, 85 Conn. 159, 163, 82 A. 233 (1912).
In this case, in the trial court and in this court basically, without labels, “[t]he question involved was one of title, which ordinarily equity will not try; nor will it take property out of the possession of one and put it in the possession of another, but will leave the parties to settle their doubtful right first at law.” Welbrot v. Levenberg, 98 Conn. 217, 222, 118 A. 911 (1922); see Lacassagne v. Chapuis, 144 U.S. 119, 124, 12 S. Ct. 659, 36 L. Ed. 368 (1892); National Bank of Commerce of New London v. Howland, 128 Conn. 307, 310, 22 A.2d 773 (1941); Roy v. Moore, supra, 162; Robinson v. Robinson, 73 Me. 170,176 (1882); Glickmah v. Kastel, 323 Mass. 148, 149-50, 80 N.E.2d 469 (1948); 1 High, Injunctions (2d Ed.) § 355. No one claims that the judgment, as well as the trial court’s memorandum of decision, was not responsive to the relief sought, ownership and possession. See Linahan v. Linahan, 131 Conn. 307, 330, 39 A.2d 895 (1944). Would the majority, therefore, deny that had the trial court decided for the defendants and not the plaintiffs it would have found ownership and possession in the defendants? The *221alacrity with which we properly protect the right to a jury trial on the criminal side should be no less zealously protected on the civil side.
The constitutional right to trial by jury cannot be abridged in those cases where the right existed when the 1818 constitution was adopted. Gentile v. Altermatt, 169 Conn. 267, 298-99, 363 A.2d 1 (1975), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1041, 96 S. Ct. 763, 46 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1976); Swanson v. Boschen, 143 Conn. 159, 162, 120 A.2d 546 (1956); La Croix v. County Commissioners, 50 Conn. 321, 327 (1882). “The right to a jury trial of the issues of title and possession existed prior to the adoption of our Constitution, and hence exists now. La Croix v. County Commissioners, 50 Conn. 321, 327 [1882].” Roy v. Moore, supra, 167. The majority not only abridges this right but endorses its violation.
I dissent, and I would find error and remand for a new trial before a jury.

 Paragraph 1, in fu]l, alleges: “At all times pertinent, defendants were and still are the owners of and in possession of all the premises described in the complaint.”

 “ ‘A counterclaim is a cause of action existing in favor of a defendant and against a plaintiff which a defendant pleads to diminish, defeat or otherwise affect a plaintiffs claim and also allows a recovery by the defendant.’ ” Nickerson v. Martin, 34 Conn. Sup. 22, 28, 374 A.2d 258 (1976); see Williams v. Dumais, 34 Conn. Sup. 247, 250, 385 A.2d 686 (1977); Seligson v. Chase Manhattan Bank, National Assn., 50 App. Div. 2d 206, 376 N.Y.S.2d 899 (1975).