Court Opinion

ID: 9583990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:43:35.940034+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:06:21.797098
License: Public Domain

Ruffin, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment for the reasons set forth in Presiding Judge Andrews’ special concurrence, with which I fully agree. I write separately only to address the majority’s attempt to distinguish the *76Supreme Court’s recent decision in Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland,52
As the majority notes, the narrow issue to be decided in Albany Urology Clinic was whether a physician could be sued for failing to disclose his cocaine use to his patient before performing a surgical procedure. In analyzing this issue, however, the Court extensively discussed the state of the law governing the doctrine of informed consent. The Court expressly stated that
[p]rior to 1988, Georgia physicians were not required to disclose to their patients any of the risks associated with a particular medical treatment or procedure. ... As established by pre-1988 precedent, under the common law, evidence of a failure to reveal the risks associated with medical treatment is not even admissible in support of a claim for professional negligence. As recognized by Georgia’s appellate courts, this common law rule could be changed only by legislative act.53
The Court then noted that the legislature modified the common law rule in 1998 by passing an informed consent statute, OCGA § 31-9-6.1. As the Court stated,
[t]he Georgia informed consent statute does not impose a general requirement of disclosure upon physicians', rather, it requires physicians to disclose only those factors listed in OCGA § 31-9-6.1 (a). . . . [I]n situations not covered by the statute’s language, the common law rule must still govern, as courts are without authority to impose disclosure requirements upon physicians in addition to those requirements already set forth by the General Assembly.54
It is abundantly clear that the majority’s holding in this case — i.e., that physicians have a common law duty to inform their patients of the material risks of a proposed treatment or procedure — is directly contrary to the Supreme Court’s statement in Albany Urology Clinic that there is no such common law duty. Indeed, the majority makes no attempt to reconcile its decision with the plain language of the Supreme Court’s decision. Instead, the majority simply ignores such language, apparently on the grounds that it is dicta.
In my opinion, when the Supreme Court has clearly and unambiguously spoken on an issue, this Court should be extremely reluc*77tant to dismiss such pronouncements as mere dicta. Even if I were inclined to treat Supreme Court statements as dicta, however, I would not do so in this case, as it is apparent that the Court’s discussion of informed consent in Albany Urology Clinic was central to its analysis. Indeed, immediately after the extensive discussion quoted above, the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t follows that” the physician in question had no statutory or common law duty to disclose his drug use to his patient.55 Although the majority treats the Court’s analysis as mere dicta, it is apparent that the Supreme Court considered such analysis to be central to its decision. Under these circumstances, I do not believe it is appropriate for this Court to excise portions of the Supreme Court’s opinion because we do not think they were technically necessary to decide the question presented.
Decided November 29, 2000
Jones, Osteen, Jones & Arnold, Linnie L. Darden III, for appellant.
Brannen, Searcy & Smith, David R. Smith, for appellee.
Were I not constrained by Supreme Court precedent, I would be very sympathetic to the majority’s argument that the informed consent doctrine should apply in Georgia. However, “the Court of Appeals is bound by decisions of the Supreme Court.”56 Because the Supreme Court has clearly spoken on this issue, I cannot agree with the majority’s prospective recognition of the common law doctrine of informed consent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews, Presiding Judge Blackburn and Judge Miller join in this special concurrence.

 272 Ga. 296 (528 SE2d 777) (2000).

 (Footnote omitted; emphasis supplied.) Id. at 298 (1).

 (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 298-299 (1).

 Id. at 299 (1).

 Hogan v. State, 118 Ga. App. 398, 400 (163 SE2d 889) (1968).