Court Opinion

ID: 9394483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-15 16:08:21.050436+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:00.387420
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Chester v. Davis, 2023-Ohio-1629.]

                 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                           ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                TRUMBULL COUNTY

ISAAC CHESTER,                                    CASE NO. 2023-T-0013

                 Petitioner,
                                                  Original Action for Writ of Habeas Corpus
        - vs -

MR. DAVIS, WARDEN,

                 Respondent.

                                          PER CURIAM
                                           OPINION

                                      Decided: May 15, 2023
                                    Judgment: Petition dismissed

Isaac Chester, pro se, PID# A791-522, Trumbull Correctional Institution, 5701 Burnett
Road, P.O. Box 901, Leavittsburg, OH 44430 (Petitioner).

Dave Yost, Ohio Attorney General, State Office Tower, 30 East Broad Street, 16th Floor,
Columbus, OH 43215, and Jerri L. Fosnaught, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal
Justice Section, 30 East Broad Street, 23rd Floor, Columbus, OH 43215 (For
Respondent).

PER CURIAM.

        {¶1}     This matter is before the court on the petition for a writ of habeas corpus

filed by petitioner, Isaac Chester, against respondent, Mr. Davis, Warden, filed on

February 13, 2023, and respondent’s motion to dismiss filed on March 14, 2023.

        {¶2}     This court issued an alternative writ on March 6, 2023, requiring respondent

to answer or otherwise plead. Thereafter, respondent filed a motion to dismiss under

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Subsequently,
Chester moved to “dismiss respondent’s motion to dismiss” arguing that respondent

provided inaccurate dates pertaining to the plea and sentencing hearings in respondent’s

motion to dismiss and opposing the merits of respondent’s motion to dismiss.

Accordingly, Chester’s “motion to dismiss” is, in substance, a response to respondent’s

motion to dismiss.

       {¶3}   “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

granted tests the sufficiency of the complaint.” Volbers-Klarich v. Middletown Mgt., Inc.,

125 Ohio St.3d 494, 2010-Ohio-2057, 929 N.E.2d 434, ¶ 11. When considering a Civ.R.

12(B)(6) motion, we accept all factual allegations in the complaint as true and draw all

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. State ex rel. Talwar v. State Med.

Bd. of Ohio, 104 Ohio St.3d 290, 2004-Ohio-6410, 819 N.E.2d 654, ¶ 5.           To grant a

motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), “it must appear beyond doubt that the [petitioner]

can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the [petitioner] to the

relief sought.” (Citations omitted.) Ohio Bur. of Workers’ Comp. v. McKinley, 130 Ohio

St.3d 156, 2011-Ohio-4432, 956 N.E.2d 814, ¶ 12.

       {¶4}   Here, in his petition, Chester seeks a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he

is being unlawfully confined as a result of a sentence improperly imposed in an underlying

criminal case in the Portage County Court of Common Pleas (“the sentencing court”). In

that case, Chester pleaded guilty to one count of failure to comply with an order or signal

of a police officer, a third-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2921.331. On August 11,

2022, the sentencing court issued an entry sentencing Chester to 24 months of

imprisonment, to be served consecutively to a sentence Chester was serving at that time.

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Case No. 2023-T-0013
       {¶5}   In his petition, Chester raises arguments pertaining to the proceedings in

the sentencing court as follow: Chester’s right to a speedy trial was denied when he was

not brought to trial within 90 days of his arrest, his plea was not voluntary, and sentencing

was unnecessarily delayed.

       {¶6}   Respondent argues that Chester’s petition should be dismissed because:

(1) Chester failed to attach copies of all of his pertinent commitment papers as required

under R.C. 2725.04(D) because, although he attached the sentencing entry for the

underlying criminal matter, he did not attach commitment papers for robbery and felonious

assault convictions originating from a separate case in Cuyahoga County; (2) Chester

had an adequate alternative legal remedy to raise his claims; (3) Chester has not yet

served the maximum sentence imposed; and (4) Chester failed to fully comply with R.C.

2969.25(C).

       {¶7}   We agree that Chester had/has adequate alternative remedies at law, and

therefore we do not reach the other bases for dismissal advanced by respondent.

“[H]abeas corpus will lie only if the petitioner is entitled to immediate release from

confinement.” State ex rel. Justice v. State, Ohio Supreme Court Slip Opinion No. 2023-

Ohio-760, ¶ 7 (Mar. 15, 2023), citing Scarberry v. Turner, 139 Ohio St.3d 111, 2014-Ohio-

1587, 9 N.E.3d 1022, ¶ 14; see also State ex rel. Norman v. Collins, Ohio Supreme Court

Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-975, ¶ 9 (Mar. 29, 2023), citing R.C. 2725.01; and State ex

rel. Cannon v. Mohr, 155 Ohio St.3d 213, 2018-Ohio-4184, 120 N.E.3d 776, ¶ 10.

“‘Generally, a writ of habeas corpus is available only when the petitioner’s maximum

sentence has expired and he is being held unlawfully * * * or when the sentencing court

patently and unambiguously lacked subject-matter jurisdiction.’” Norman at ¶ 9, quoting

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Case No. 2023-T-0013
Stevens v. Hill, 168 Ohio St.3d 427, 2022-Ohio-2479, 199 N.E.3d 529, ¶ 6. “Unless the

trial court's judgment is void for want of jurisdiction, a writ of habeas corpus will not issue

when the petitioner has or had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law.”

Norman at ¶ 9, citing Stevens at ¶ 6.

       {¶8}   “Subject-matter jurisdiction of a court connotes the power to hear and

decide a case upon its merits * * *.” Morrison v. Steiner, 32 Ohio St.2d 86, 87, 290 N.E.2d

841 (1972). Here, the sentencing court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the felony

with which Chester was charged. See R.C. 2931.03 (“The court of common pleas has

original jurisdiction of all crimes and offenses, except in cases of minor offenses the

exclusive jurisdiction of which is vested in courts inferior to the court of common pleas.”).

Chester’s arguments advanced in his petition do not relate to the subject matter

jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and he had other adequate remedies at law. See

Dunkle v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 148 Ohio St.3d 621, 2017-Ohio-551, 71 N.E.3d 1098,

¶ 8 (“Habeas corpus will lie only to challenge the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.”);

State ex rel. Hart v. Turner, 132 Ohio St.3d 479, 2012-Ohio-3305, 974 N.E.2d 87, ¶ 1

(speedy-trial claims are not cognizable in habeas corpus); and Bell v. McConahay, Ohio

Supreme Court Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-693, ¶ 11 (Mar. 9, 2023), quoting Douglas v.

Money, 85 Ohio St.3d 348, 349, 708 N.E.2d 697 (1999) (“‘the issue of whether [a

petitioner] made an intelligent, knowing, and voluntary guilty plea is a matter to be

resolved by motion to withdraw the guilty plea, direct appeal, or postconviction

proceedings, rather than in habeas corpus.’”). In fact, Chester currently has a delayed

appeal pending in this court from the August 11, 2022 sentencing entry, and Chester

states that he has a petition for postconviction relief pending in the trial court.

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Case No. 2023-T-0013
      {¶9}   Based on the foregoing, we grant respondent’s motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim and overrule Chester’s “motion to dismiss[.]”

      {¶10} The petition is dismissed.

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J., MATT LYNCH, J., EUGENE A. LUCCI, J., concur.

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Case No. 2023-T-0013