Court Opinion

ID: 9840447
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-18 16:09:14.207087+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:27.902866
License: Public Domain

J-S12030-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DUNG VAN DANG                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1660 MDA 2022

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 2, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-36-CR-0004449-2020

BEFORE:      KUNSELMAN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                   FILED: SEPTEMBER 18, 2023

       Dung Van Dang (Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence

entered in the Lancaster County Court of Common Pleas after his jury

convictions of one count each of driving under the influence (DUI) — general

impairment (fourth offense), DUI — high rate of alcohol, driving an

unregistered vehicle, driving while license suspended — relating to DUI

offense, and careless driving.1 Contemporaneous with this appeal, Appellant’s

counsel, Diana C. Kelleher, Esquire, has filed a petition to withdraw from

representation and an Anders brief.2 The Anders brief presents the following

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S. 3802(a)(1), (b), 1301(a), 1543(b)(1)(i), 3714(a).

2See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, (1967); Commonwealth v.
Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009).
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purported claims: (1) trial counsel was ineffective; (2) Appellant’s sentence is

illegal; and (3) the trial court improperly denied Appellant’s motion for

mistrial. For the reasons below, we affirm the judgment of sentence and grant

Attorney Kelleher’s petition to withdraw.

       On the morning of September 30, 2020, Pennsylvania State Trooper Ian

Hutchinson witnessed the driver of a white BMW sedan, later identified as

Appellant, pass two vehicles using the center turn lane. N.T. Jury Trial Vol. I,

7/13/22, at 56-58.       When the trooper attempted to initiate a traffic stop,

Appellant pulled into an apartment complex, exited his vehicle, and entered

the apartment building. Id. at 58-60. Shortly thereafter, the trooper saw

Appellant walking down the road away from the apartment, called for

assistance, and stopped Appellant to speak about the traffic violation. Id. at

65-67. Assistance arrived and based on each of the troopers’ observations,

they suspected Appellant was impaired and unable to drive. See id. at 65-

66, 78-79, 95. Appellant then was placed under arrest. Id. at 95.

       Appellant subsequently was charged with one count each of DUI —

general impairment, and DUI — high rate of alcohol.3        Appellant was also

charged with the following summary offenses — driving an unregistered

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3 Initially, Appellant was only charged with DUI — general impairment under

Subsection 3802(a)(1), but the Commonwealth amended the information to
include the additional offense of DUI — high rate of alcohol under Subsection
3802(b) on July 11, 2022. See Amended Information, 7/11/22; Information,
11/16/20.

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vehicle, driving while license suspended — relating to DUI offense, and

careless driving.

       This matter proceeded to a two-day jury trial that began on July 13,

20224 where the Commonwealth presented the following evidence.

       Trooper Hutchinson testified that on September 30, 2020, he was the

vehicle maintenance officer at the Avondale Barracks in Chester County. See

N.T. Jury Trial Vol I at 56. As part of his duties, Trooper Hutchinson went to

the troop headquarters in Lancaster County to pick up supplies. Id. at 57.

Around 9:52 a.m. that morning, he was traveling westbound on Lincoln

Highway East near Macklevein Road in Lancaster County when he observed a

white BMW sedan traveling in the opposite direction pass two vehicles by using

the center turning lane.5 Id. at 57-58, 73. The trooper described this lane

as a designated turn-only lane, which was marked along the highway. Id. at

58. He then activated his emergency lights, turned his vehicle around, and

attempted to initiate a traffic stop based on this violation. Id. at 58-59. The

____________________________________________

4 It merits mention the criminal docket incorrectly states Appellant entered a

non-negotiated guilty plea on each of his charges. See Criminal Docket CP-
36-CR-0004449-2020 at 5. However, the record reflects Appellant had a two-
day jury trial on July 13 and 14, 2022. See N.T. Jury Trial Vol. I, 7/13/22;
N.T. Jury Trial Vol. II, 7/14/22; Verdict Sheet, 7/14/22.

      We also note that at the time of trial, Appellant had the assistance of an
interpreter.

5 Trooper Hutchinson initially stated he was traveling eastbound on Lincoln
Highway, but later testified he was traveling westbound. See N.T. Jury Trial
Vol. I at 58, 73.

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driver of the BMW pulled his car into a nearby parking lot for an apartment

building. Id. at 59. The trooper remained in his car and observed a man —

later identified as Appellant — exit the BMW and walk into the apartment

building. Id. at 59-60.

       Trooper Hutchinson testified that instead of engaging with Appellant, he

decided to “run the registration” plate of the car.6 N.T. Jury Trial Vol I. at 60-

62. This search revealed the car was registered to Appellant at a Philadelphia

address “not anywhere near the apartment complex or in Lancaster.” See id.

at 62, 64. The trooper also noted the registration was expired. Id. at 62.

Based on the Philadelphia address, the trooper became “suspicious that

[Appellant] was trying to get away” from him instead of driving home. Id. at

62-63. Trooper Hutchinson pulled out of the parking lot so he did not block

the exit and then soon after noticed Appellant walking on the road and away

from the apartment complex. Id. at 61, 65.

       Trooper Hutchinson then stopped Appellant, and while speaking with

him about the traffic violation and expired registration, the trooper “smell[ed]

the odor of an alcoholic beverage [on Appellant’s] breath.” N.T. Jury trial Vol.

I at 65-66. Trooper Hutchinson asked if he had any alcohol, to which Appellant

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6  Trooper Hutchinson stated to “run a registration[ plate,]” he uses “a
computer [in his patrol vehicle that is] hooked up to a system” that allows him
to type in the license plate number and state. N.T. Jury Trial Vol I. at 62. The
computer will then produce information about whether the car is stolen, who
it is registered to, and in some instances the driver’s license information of
the owner. Id.

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responded “approximately three hours prior[,] he drank two beers[.]” See

id. at 66. During his investigation, the trooper requested assistance from

another nearby trooper via radio, and Pennsylvania State Troopers Daniel

Castellano and Steven Kase responded.7           Id. at 66-67.   After Troopers

Castellano and Kase arrived, Trooper Hutchinson turned over the investigation

to them.8 Id. at 68.

       The Commonwealth then presented Trooper Kase, who testified that on

the day in question at approximately 10:06 a.m., he heard a request for

assistance over radio from Trooper Hutchinson. See N.T. Jury trial Vol. I. at

75-76. Trooper Kase responded to the call and drove “[a]pproximately a half

mile” down the road where he saw Troopers Castellano and Hutchinson, as

well as Appellant. Id. at 76-77. Trooper Kase stated Trooper Hutchinson

explained Appellant “consumed alcohol during the day” and committed

“multiple” traffic violations. Id. at 78. Trooper Kase then escorted Appellant

back to his car in the apartment complex parking lot. Id. While walking, the

trooper “detected a strong odor of alcohol emanating from [Appellant’s]

person” and noticed his eyes were “glassy and bloodshot[.]” Id. at 78-79.

       Trooper Kase testified that based on his observations, he suspected

Appellant was under the influence of alcohol and attempted to administer

____________________________________________

7 Both state troopers’ primary patrol area was Lancaster County.

8 The Commonwealth also admitted video footage of Trooper Hutchinson’s
interaction with Appellant into evidence. See N.T. Jury Trial Vol. I at 69, 103.

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three field sobriety tests — horizontal gaze nystagmus (HGN),9 “[w]alk-and-

[t]urn[,]” and “[o]ne-[l]eg [s]tand” tests. N.T. Jury Trial Vol. I. at 79, 82.

Trooper Kase stated Appellant did “not [perform] well” on the HGN and walk-

and-turns tests, and “refused to perform” the one-leg stand test due to an

ankle injury. Id. at 82, 88, 91, 93. After Appellant completed two of the

three sobriety tests, Trooper Kase concluded Appellant was “impaired to the

point of unsafe driving[,]” placed him under arrest, and transported him to

the hospital for a blood alcohol content (BAC) test. See id. at 95, 101. The

results of the test indicated Appellant had a BAC of .152 percent. Id. at 101.

       Relevant to one of Appellant’s claims on appeal, during Trooper Kase’s

testimony, the Commonwealth presented video footage of the trooper

conducting the sobriety tests on Appellant to the jury.10 See N.T. Jury trial

Vol. I. at 84. At the start of the video, Trooper Kase stated Appellant’s license

“was DUI suspended.” Id. at 86. Counsel objected and requested a mistrial.

Id. The trial court denied the motion, and instead provided the jury with a

curative instruction. Id. at 87.

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9 Trooper Kase described that while conducting an HGN test, the officer looks

for “a series of [standardized] clues” to indicate intoxication, such as the
inability for the subject’s eyes to “follow the stimulus” — in the present case,
a pen — as the officer “move[s] it back and forth.” See N.T. Jury Trial Vol. I.
at 87-88.

10 The video footage was not included in the certified record, but this does not

impede our review.

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       Appellant then testified on his own behalf. Appellant stated that on the

morning of the incident, he was at the “Vintage Commons Apartments”

because he shared an apartment there with his friend and co-worker, “Lew.”

N.T. Jury Trial Vol. I. at 108, 110-11. Appellant detailed that his name was

not on the lease for this apartment, he only goes to the apartment “every two

weeks[,]” and he did not know the address of the apartment. Id. at 113. He

stated that because his license is suspended, Lew would drive Appellant’s car

to work, and Lew parked the car at the apartment that morning. See id. at

111, 115. Appellant explained his car was registered in Philadelphia because

he did not “want to live in Lancaster anymore.” Id. at 112.

       Appellant stated “[a]t some point during that morning[,]” he “walked

out [of the apartment] to get a beer[,]” but before he was able to purchase

any, he was stopped by Trooper Hutchinson. N.T. Jury Trial Vol. I. at 108-09.

By the time the trooper stopped him, Appellant stated his vehicle was parked

at the apartment for “three to four hours[.]” Id. at 109. He then testified

that because of his “limited English,” he did not understand much of what

Trooper Hutchinson said to him. Id. at 110. Regarding their conversation,

Appellant stated: “[Trooper Hutchinson] mentioned beer, so I . . . told him,

yeah, I wanted to get beer.     [Trooper Hutchinson] mentioned [a] driver’s

license. I know my driver’s license is suspended[.] I just catch the words and

I just give him what I know.” Id.

       During cross-examination, Appellant testified that he did not drive that

day.   See N.T. Jury Trial Vol. I. at 115.      However, the Commonwealth

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highlighted that during the video footage, Trooper Hutchinson asked Appellant

“if [he] parked to avoid him[,]” to which Appellant responded, “no, [he] was

dropping the car off for [his] friend[.]” Id. Further, in the video, Appellant

admitted he saw the trooper when he “passed the truck[.]” Id. Appellant

explained that he did not “understand [the trooper’s] question[s]” and

attempted to clarify his statements in the video footage regarding “pass[ing]

the truck[.]” Id. He stated the following:

      What I’m trying to explain to [Trooper Hutchinson] is if I were
      passing someone is only when they — you know, like, if I were to
      be behind a truck that was slow, that is when I would pass it, not
      that I was doing it. I wasn’t driving.

Id. at 116.

      The next day, the Commonwealth recalled Trooper Kase to present

rebuttal evidence.   See N.T. Jury Trial Vol. II. at 126-128.     Trooper Kase

stated: (1) he patrolled the area where Appellant was arrested “almost

daily[;]” (2) the closest bar to the apartment complex was “approximately”

two and one half miles away and was not open at 10:00 a.m.; and (3) the

closest “beer store” to the apartments was “about six miles” away and he did

not believe it was open at 10:00 a.m. See id.

      At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Appellant guilty at both counts

of DUI. The trial court then found Appellant guilty of the remaining summary

offenses, driving an unregistered vehicle, driving while license suspended —

related to DUI offense, and careless driving.

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      On November 2, 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. At the

proceeding, the Commonwealth pointed out this was Appellant’s fourth DUI

offense within the past 10 years. See N.T. Sentencing, 11/2/22, at 3. The

Commonwealth noted there was a one-year mandatory minimum sentence,

and the Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines provided a standard sentencing

range of 15 to 21 months’ incarceration. Id. Appellant responded that the

sentencing guidelines called for a nine-to-16-month sentence because the

three prior DUI’s “should not count against [Appellant’s] prior record score

since they are what enhances” the conviction’s grading. Id. at 4. The trial

court determined it would use Appellant’s suggested guideline range. Id. The

court then imposed a 16 month to seven-year sentence for the DUI — high

rate of alcohol — conviction. Id. at 6. Appellant’s sentence for DUI — general

impairment merged for sentencing purposes, and he received no further

penalty on the remaining summary offenses. Id.

      Appellant did not file a post-sentence motion, but instead filed this

timely appeal. On December 5, 2022, the trial court ordered Appellant to file

a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b).   Order, 12/5/22.   In lieu of a Rule 1925(b) statement, Attorney

Kelleher filed a statement of intent to file an Anders brief pursuant to

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) (“If counsel intends to seek

to withdraw in a criminal case[,] counsel shall file of record and serve on the

judge a statement of intent to withdraw in lieu of filing a [Rule 1925(b)]

Statement.”). In light of Attorney Kelleher’s statement of intent to file an

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Anders brief, the trial court did not file a Rule 1925(a) opinion.         See

Statement in Lieu of Memorandum Opinion, 12/28/22.

     When, as here, counsel files a petition to withdraw and accompanying

Anders brief, we must first examine the request to withdraw before

addressing any of the substantive issues raised on appeal. Commonwealth

v. Bennett, 124 A.3d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 2015). An attorney seeking to

withdraw from representation on appeal must:

     1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
     making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel has
     determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2) furnish a copy
     of the brief to the defendant; and 3) advise the defendant that he
     or she has the right to retain private counsel or raise additional
     arguments that the defendant deems worthy of the court’s
     attention.

Commonwealth v. Cartrette, 83 A.3d 1030, 1032 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en

banc). Pursuant to Santiago, counsel must also:

     (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
     citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
     counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
     counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state
     counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous.
     Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling
     case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the conclusion
     that the appeal is frivolous.

Id., quoting Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.

     In the present case, the brief and application to withdraw submitted by

Attorney Kelleher comply with the requirements of Anders and Santiago.

See Cartrette, 83 A.3d at 1032. Moreover, Counsel has provided this Court

with a copy of the letter she sent to Appellant, advising him of his right to

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proceed pro se or retain private counsel, and to raise any additional claims.

See Attorney Kelleher’s Application for Leave to Withdraw as Counsel, 2/7/23,

Appendix A.      Appellant did not file a response.       Therefore, we proceed to

examine the issues identified in the Anders brief, and then conduct “a full

examination of all the proceedings, to decide whether the case is wholly

frivolous.” Commonwealth v. Yorgey, 188 A.3d 1190, 1196 (Pa. Super.

2018) (en banc) (citation omitted).            If we agree with Attorney Kelleher’s

assessment, “[we] may grant [her] request to withdraw and dismiss the

appeal[.]” Id. (citation omitted).

       The Anders brief identifies the following for our review: (1) Appellant’s

trial counsel was ineffective when he did not “adequately present his case at

trial[;]” (2) Appellant’s sentence is illegal; and (3) the trial court erred when

it denied Appellant’s motion for mistrial.11 Anders Brief at 9-13.12

       In his first claim, Appellant alleges trial counsel was ineffective and did

not “adequately present his case[.]” Anders Brief at 9.

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11 Attorney Kelleher does not present Appellant’s potential claims in a
“Question’s Presented” section of the Anders brief, nor does she set forth
each argument in question form. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“The statement of
the questions involved must state concisely the issues to be resolved . . .).
However, Counsel does raise the following issue in the “statement of question
presented[:]” “Should appellate counsel be granted leave to withdraw as
counsel because any appellate issues in the instant case are frivolous?”
Anders Brief at 5 (some capitalization omitted).

12 The Commonwealth did not file a responsive brief with this Court.

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       “[A]s a general rule, a petitioner should wait to raise claims of ineffective

assistance of trial counsel until collateral review.” Commonwealth v. Grant,

813 A.2d 726, 738 (Pa. 2002). Our Supreme Court has recognized two very

limited exceptions to the general rule: (1) in extraordinary circumstances

where claims of trial counsel’s ineffectiveness are apparent from the record

and immediate consideration best serves the interests of justice and/or; (2)

where there is good cause shown and unitary review of the claim is preceded

by a waiver of the right to seek review under the Post-Conviction Relief Act

(PCRA).13    Commonwealth v. Holmes, 79 A.3d 562, 563-64 (Pa. 2013).

Our Supreme Court also adopted a third exception, which requires “trial courts

to address claims challenging trial counsel’s performance where the defendant

is   statutorily   precluded      from    obtaining   subsequent   PCRA    review.”

Commonwealth v. Delgros, 183 A.3d 352, 361 (Pa. 2018).

       Attorney Kelleher states in the Anders brief that Appellant inquired

about filing a PCRA petition, and she “instructed him that his appeal would

either need to be completed . . . or withdrawn before he could move forward”

with collateral review. Anders Brief at 10. Appellant did not direct Attorney

Kelleher to withdraw his appeal. Id.

       None of the above-mentioned exceptions apply to the facts before us.

Appellant’s claim that trial counsel did not present “adequate[ ]” evidence is

(1) not apparent from the record or so extraordinary that the interests of
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13 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9545.

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justice require immediate review, and (2) Appellant has not shown good cause

to require review or waived his right to file a petition under the PCRA. See

Holmes, 79 A.3d at 563-64; Anders Brief at 9.           Additionally, Appellant

received a sentence of incarceration, which he is presently serving, and as

such, is not statutorily prohibited from seeking collateral relief.    See 42

Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(1)(i) (to be eligible for PCRA relief, the petitioner must

“plead and prove by a preponderance of the evidence [they have] been

convicted of a crime under the laws of this Commonwealth and is at the time

relief is granted . . . currently serving a sentence of imprisonment, probation

or parole for the crime”); see also Delgros, 183 A.3d at 361. Accordingly,

we decline to entertain Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim on direct appeal and

dismiss the issue without prejudice for him to raise on collateral review.

      In his second claim, Appellant purportedly raises a challenge to the

legality of his sentence. See Anders Brief at 10-11. Attorney Kelleher states

there was a “dispute” as to the applicable guideline range for Appellant’s

sentence — with the Commonwealth suggesting the guidelines provide a

range of 15-to-21-months and Appellant arguing the guidelines require a nine-

to-16-month range. Id. at 10.

      First, we note that “any misapplication of the Sentencing Guidelines

constitutes a challenge to the discretionary aspects of [a] sentence.”

Commonwealth v. Sunealitis, 153 A.3d 414, 421 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citation omitted). Thus, Appellant’s argument does not qualify as a claim

regarding the legality of his sentence. Instead, it amounts to a challenge to

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the discretionary aspects of his sentence as his claim concerns the

misapplication of the sentencing guidelines.     Appellant did not preserve a

discretionary   aspects   of   sentencing   argument   during   his   sentencing

proceedings or in a post-sentence motion.      See id. at 420 (to preserve a

challenge to the discretionary aspects of a sentence, petitioner must, inter

alia, preserve the claim at sentencing or “in a motion to reconsider and modify

sentence”). As such, this claim is waived, and no relief is due.

      Moreover, if Appellant did properly preserve this claim, he would not be

entitled to any relief. This Court has previously stated:

      Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
      sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
      absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
      of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
      the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
      sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
      judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
      arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Clemat, 218 A.3d 944, 959 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation

omitted). Further, “when imposing sentence, the trial court is granted broad

discretion, as it is in the best position to determine the proper penalty for a

particular offense based upon an evaluation of the individual circumstances

before it.” Commonwealth v. Mulkin, 228 A.3d 913, 917 (Pa. Super. 2020).

We also note, this Court will vacate a sentence imposed within the sentencing

guidelines but the trial court “applied the guidelines erroneously” or where

“the case involves circumstances where the application of the guidelines would

be clearly unreasonable.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(c)(1)-(2).

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      Turning to the instant matter, Appellant received a standard range

sentence of 16 months to seven years’ incarceration for DUI — high rate of

alcohol under Subsection 3802(b).     His remaining DUI charge merged for

sentencing purposes, and he received no further penalty for his summary

convictions. The Commonwealth stated at the sentencing hearing that the

standard guidelines provided a range of 15 to 21 months’ incarceration and

there was a mandatory one-year sentence due to his prior DUI convictions.

See N.T. Sentencing at 3. Appellant argued the standard guideline range was

nine to 16 months, and the trial court agreed with him, resolving the dispute

in his favor. Id. at 3-4.

      The Commonwealth was correct that the trial court was required to

impose a mandatory minimum sentence of one year incarceration. See 75

Pa.C.S. 3804(b)(4)(i) (a defendant who has four or more DUI convictions

under Section 3802(b) shall be sentenced to “undergo imprisonment of not

less than one year”). Further, Appellant’s minimum sentence was within the

standard guideline range that he requested during sentencing proceedings —

as opposed to the Commonwealth’s suggested guideline range — and it did

not exceed the statutory maximum. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3803(a)(3) (when an

individual commits a violation of Section 3802 and has three or more prior

offenses, they commit a felony of the third degree); 18 Pa.C.S. § 1103(3) (a

third-degree felony carries a maximum sentence of not more than seven

years); see N.T. Sentencing at 3-4. Thus, Appellant’s sentence imposed the

mandatory minimum, and was within the standard guideline range and the

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statutory maximum. As such, Appellant has not demonstrated that the trial

court abused its discretion, and no relief is due. See Clemat, 218 A.3d at

959.

       In his third and final argument, Appellant avers he was deprived of a

fair trial when the Commonwealth played a video that revealed his license was

suspended due to a previous DUI. See Anders Brief at 13. He points out that

when the Commonwealth played video evidence for the jury, “an officer can

be heard saying [Appellant’s] license was DUI suspended.” Id. at 11. As a

result, trial counsel moved for a mistrial, but the court denied it and instead

instructed the jury to disregard the officer’s statement in the video. See N.T.

Jury Trial Vol. I at 86-87. Appellant avers the trial court erred when it denied

his motion for mistrial. See Anders Brief at 11-13.

       We review a challenge to the denial of a motion for mistrial by the

following standard:

       A motion for mistrial is within the discretion of the trial court. A
       mistrial upon motion of one of the parties is required only when
       an incident is of such a nature that its unavoidable effect is to
       deprive the appellant of a fair and impartial trial. It is within the
       trial court’s discretion to determine whether a defendant was
       prejudiced by the incident that is the basis of the motion for a
       mistrial. On appeal, our standard of review is whether the trial
       court abused that discretion.

Commonwealth v. Cox, 231 A.3d 1011, 1018 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted). Further, it is well established that juries are assumed to follow the

trial court’s instructions, which “is presumed to be sufficient to cure any

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prejudice.” Commonwealth v. Thornton, 791 A.2d 1190, 1193 (Pa. Super.

2002) (citations omitted).

      At trial, Appellant moved for mistrial after the Commonwealth presented

a video to the jury depicting his interaction with Trooper Kase. In the video,

trial counsel argued “that video just said the licen[s]e was DUI suspended.”

N.T. Jury Trial Vol. I at 86. The trial court denied the motion and gave the

following curative instruction to the jury:

      Ladies and gentlemen of the jury, you may have heard the trooper
      explain that [Appellant’s] license was suspended, perhaps, for
      some other reason. I believe he said a DUI-related charge.

             I’m directing you to disregard that. So as I indicated to you
      in my original comments, anything that you heard that I am
      directing you to disregard, you may not take that into
      consideration in your deliberations in this case. So whatever that
      comment was that the trooper made on the tape, I’m directing
      you to disregard it.

Id. at 87.

      We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied

Appellant’s motion for mistrial. The trooper made a single statement in the

video that Appellant’s license was suspended related to a DUI. See N.T. Jury

Trial Vol. I at 86. The trial court gave an instruction whereby it directed the

jury to disregard the statement twice. See id. at 87. The jury was presumed

to have followed this instruction. See Thornton, 791 A.2d at 1193. Further,

this statement does not rise to such a level that this Court must conclude the

“unavoidable effect [of the evidence] deprive[d Appellant] of a fair and

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impartial trial.”14      See Cox, 231 A.3d 1011, 1018.              Moreover, the

Commonwealth presented other independent evidence that Appellant was

driving while impaired in the form of Appellant’s BAC test result and Troopers

Hutchinson and Kase’s testimony. See N.T. Jury Trial Vol. I. at 57-58 (Trooper

Hutchinson witnessing Appellant commit traffic violations), 65-66 (Trooper

Hutchinson smelling alcohol on Appellant’s breath), 78-79 (Trooper Kase

smelled alcohol emanating from Appellant and noted his eyes were glassy and

bloodshot), 88, 91 (Trooper Kase testifying that, on the two sobriety tests he

administered, Appellant did not perform well), 95 (Trooper Kase concluded

Appellant “was impaired to the point of unsafe driving”), 101 (Appellant’s

blood test indicated he had a BAC of .152, well above the legal limit). As such,

no relief is due.

       Additionally, as required by Anders, this Court has independently

reviewed the record and concluded there are no non-frivolous issues to be

raised on appeal. See Yorgey, 188 A.3d at 1196. We affirm the judgment

of sentence and grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.              Petition to withdraw as counsel

granted.

____________________________________________

14  Notably, during his testimony, Appellant admitted: “I know my driver’s
license is suspended[.]” N.T. Jury trial Vol. I at 110.

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J-S12030-23

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 09/18/2023

                          - 19 -