Court Opinion

ID: 9955662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 21:04:00.108735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:14.025734
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (2d) 230148-U
                                        No. 2-23-0148
                                  Order filed March 28, 2024

      NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23(b) and is not precedent
      except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                            IN THE

                             APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                              SECOND DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE                ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
OF ILLINOIS,                           ) of Lake County.
                                       )
      Plaintiff-Appellee,              )
                                       )
v.                                     ) No. 21-CF-612
                                       )
TERRANCE E. WILLIAMSON,                ) Honorable
                                       ) Daniel B. Shanes,
      Defendant-Appellant.             ) Judge, Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE HUTCHINSON delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Kennedy and Mullen concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1     Held: The trial court did not err in declining to appoint new counsel to assist defendant
             with his claim that defense counsel was ineffective for proceeding to trial on sexual
             abuse charges before receiving the victim’s medical records, which defendant
             asserts could have been used to impeach the victim’s testimony. The medical
             records are not in the record on appeal, so defendant can only speculate as to their
             contents. Moreover, even if the records said what defendant asserts, there is no
             reasonable probability that the result of the trial would have been different if
             defendant had used the records to impeach.

¶2     Following a jury trial in the circuit court of Lake County, defendant, Terrance E.

Williamson, was found guilty of four counts of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child (720

ILCS 5/11-1.40(a)(1) (2014)), one count of criminal sexual assault (720 ILCS 5/11-1.20(a)(3)
2022 IL App (2d) 230148-U

(West 2016)), and one count of aggravated criminal sexual abuse (720 ILCS 5/11-1.60(d) (West

2014)). The victims were defendant’s stepdaughters, J.L., J.B., and R.C. The trial court sentenced

defendant to life imprisonment for each conviction of predatory criminal sexual assault of a child,

a 15-year prison term for criminal sexual assault, and a 7-year prison term for aggravated criminal

sexual abuse. The court ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. Defendant argues on

appeal that the trial court erred by refusing to appoint new counsel to assist him with a posttrial

claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. We affirm.

¶3                                      I. BACKGROUND

¶4     Before trial, defendant subpoenaed certain medical records pertaining to J.B. At a pretrial

hearing, the prosecutor mentioned the subpoena, explaining that “the information in the records

may contain a denial of any sexual contact with anybody, which could be a defense; including the

contact with the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) At a subsequent hearing, the prosecutor told the

court that “what the defense is hoping to achieve from the records is the victim was asked about

sexual history during the meeting with the doctor and denied having any sexual contact, which

would be a germane topic of cross examination or impeachment.” On the date set for trial, the

records had not yet been received. Nonetheless, both parties answered ready for trial. Defense

counsel did not request that the trial be continued pending the availability of the subpoenaed

records.

¶5     At trial, J.L. testified that she was born on February 6, 1999. In 2015, she resided with her

father, and her siblings resided with her mother and defendant. In May or June 2015, J.L. spent the

night at the apartment her mother and defendant shared with J.L.’s siblings. After getting ready for

bed, she went to the kitchen to say goodnight to her mother. While walking to J.B.’s room, J.L.

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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-U

passed defendant, who was in her mother’s bedroom. Defendant asked her to sit on the bed. He

put his hand up her shirt and touched her breast. She was not wearing a bra.

¶6     J.B. testified that she was born on August 20, 2002. When she first met defendant, she was

living with her mother and her younger siblings, R.C., M.C., and B.K. When J.B. started sixth

grade, she was 11 years old. On one occasion while in sixth grade, J.B. watched movies with her

younger siblings and defendant in her mother’s bedroom. After her younger siblings fell asleep,

defendant put his hand in J.B.’s shorts and started touching her vagina. Eventually, he inserted his

finger into her vagina. Then he pulled off her shorts and put his penis in her vagina. J.B. also

recalled a subsequent incident while she was in sixth or seventh grade. On this occasion, which

occurred one morning while her mother took J.B.’s younger siblings to daycare, defendant put his

penis in her vagina. Usually, J.B.’s mother left the house at 5 a.m. and J.B. took the school bus at

7 a.m. J.B. also testified that defendant placed his penis in her vagina on several other occasions.

¶7     On July 3, 2015, J.B. was diagnosed with cancer. She testified to the circumstances

surrounding the diagnosis. The family had planned a trip to an amusement park. Before they left,

defendant commented that J.B. looked six months pregnant. J.B.’s mother agreed. She asked J.B.

whether she was sexually active. J.B. said that she was not, but defendant said that J.B. was lying.

J.B.’s mother asked her several more times if she was sexually active. J.B. persisted that she was

not. J.B. acknowledged that this conversation occurred after defendant had sexually penetrated

her. J.B. did not tell her mother what defendant had done, because she did not think her mother

would believe her. J.B.’s mother took her to a doctor, who initially said that J.B. had a full-term

baby. J.B. told the doctor that that was “impossible.” Ultimately, J.B. was found to have a 32-

centimeter abdominal tumor.

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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-U

¶8     R.C. testified that she was born on February 21, 2006. Beginning when she was in first

grade, she lived in an apartment in Waukegan with her mother, J.B., M.C., and B.K. Defendant

moved in sometime later. R.C. lived in the apartment until the beginning of sixth grade, when she

was about 11. R.C. described two incidents that occurred while she was living in the Waukegan

apartment. The first incident involved defendant touching her vagina with either his finger or his

penis. The second incident involved him placing his penis in her mouth. At some point, she told

J.L. about these incidents.

¶9     J.L. testified that, in September 2020, she, J.B., and R.C. made accusations against

defendant at a family meeting attended by J.L., J.B., R.C., their other siblings, several maternal

aunts, and defendant. One of their aunts contacted the police. J.B. also testified about the meeting,

but the only attendees she mentioned were her, her siblings, her mother, and defendant; she did

not mention her aunts. She denied that, at the meeting, she accused defendant of engaging in sexual

activity with her. R.C. testified that her aunts were at the family meeting along with her, her

siblings, and her mother. At that meeting, she “didn’t tell anybody the details” of the incidents she

described in her testimony.

¶ 10   Francisco Cancino, a sergeant with the Waukegan Police Department, testified that, on

September 16, 2020, he became involved in an investigation of defendant. Cancino arranged for

R.C., M.C., and B.K. to be interviewed at the Lake County Children’s Advocacy Center. Cancino

arranged the interviews because of allegations involving R.C. M.C. and B.K. were interviewed

because they might have seen or heard something relevant to the allegations involving R.C.

Cancino also noted that B.K. was interviewed for the additional reason that she “would have been

the age that the allegations would have started when [R.C.] was that age.”

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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-U

¶ 11   Anntoinette W., the mother of J.L., J.B., and R.C., testified for the defense that she married

defendant in August 2014. They lived in a three-bedroom apartment with J.B., R.C., M.C., and

B.K. Anntoinette testified that defendant routinely took the children to daycare. She further

testified that it was during an argument about a missed driver’s education class that J.B. first

alleged that defendant had abused her. On cross-examination, Anntoinette testified that, before

trial, she had reviewed the sign-in records for the daycare facility. She recalled seeing her signature

on the records. Asked if she recalled seeing defendant’s signature on the records, she replied that

she did not think the daycare facility permitted defendant to sign her children in.

¶ 12   After the trial court was informed that the jury had reached a verdict, the court advised the

parties that it had received J.B.’s subpoenaed medical records. The court indicated that it had

reviewed the records in camera and that they did not “add anything to the case.” The court tendered

copies of the records to the parties, but they do not appear in the record on appeal.

¶ 13   Defense counsel filed a posttrial motion, stating that defendant was claiming, among other

things, that counsel had failed to provide effective assistance. At the hearing on the motion, counsel

confirmed that defendant wanted to raise a claim that counsel was ineffective. Counsel noted that

he could not argue his own ineffectiveness. The trial court then asked defendant to explain his

concerns about counsel’s representation. Defendant noted, among other things, that counsel moved

forward with trial without J.B.’s medical records. He claimed the medical records would have

discredited her testimony. He explained that the records would have shown that

       “[J.B.], *** claimed to have been raped and molested *** in 2015. And at the same time,

       she was diagnosed with an illness. In which she spoke to, I believe my wife told me, two

       doctors; and told them that she had never had sex with anybody at this same time in 2015.”

       (Emphasis added.)

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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-U

During an exchange with defense counsel, the trial court stated, “[W]hen we finally got [the

medical records], the State may have actually stipulated to their content, had the parties wanted to

use them?” Defense counsel responded, “There was a stipulation. We did subpoena [the medical

records]. They got in late. *** But there was a stipulation.” Defense counsel explained that, before

J.B. was diagnosed with cancer, the doctor indicated that she was possibly pregnant and asked if

she was sexually active. Counsel added, “And I believe her mother was in the room with her at the

time, from my memory, if it serves me correctly. But she said, no, I haven’t had sexual intercourse.

I believe the State stipulated to that fact, that she said that to the doctor.”

¶ 14    In rejecting defendant’s ineffective assistance claim, the trial court remarked, “Turning to

the subpoena for the medical records. Counsel did pursue that, and did get them. And convinced

the State to stipulate to the important part, for the defense at least, regarding that. So the jury did

hear what the defense wanted in that regard.” The trial court then heard arguments on the other

issues raised in the posttrial motion. The trial court denied the posttrial motion and imposed

sentence. This appeal followed.

¶ 15                                        II. ANALYSIS

¶ 16    Defendant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to appoint new counsel to assist him

with his posttrial claim that, by allowing the trial to proceed before receiving J.B.’s medical

records, defense counsel failed to provide him with effective assistance of counsel. We evaluate

ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims under the two-prong Strickland test. Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688, 694 (1984). Strickland requires a showing that counsel’s

performance “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness” and that the deficient

performance was prejudicial in that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Id.

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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-U

¶ 17   Pro se claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are evaluated under the common-law

procedure developed in People v. Krankel, 102 Ill. 2d 181 (1984), and its progeny. As our supreme

court explained in People v. Roddis, 2020 IL 124352, ¶¶ 35-36:

               “Under the common-law procedure, a pro se defendant is not required to file a

       written motion but need only bring his or her claim to the trial court’s attention. [Citation.]

       New counsel is not automatically appointed in every case when a defendant presents a

       pro se posttrial motion alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. [Citation.] Rather, when

       a defendant makes such a claim, the court should first examine the factual basis of the

       defendant’s claim. [Citation.] If the court determines that the claim lacks merit or pertains

       only to matters of trial strategy, then the court need not appoint new counsel and may deny

       the pro se motion. [Citation.] However, if the allegations show possible neglect of the case,

       new counsel should be appointed. [Citation.]

               New counsel would then represent the defendant at the hearing on the pro se

       ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Appointed counsel can independently evaluate the

       claim and avoid the conflict of interest that trial counsel would have in trying to justify his

       or her own actions contrary to the defendant’s position. [Citation.]” (Emphasis added.)

We note that, although defense counsel himself raised defendant’s ineffectiveness claim, there is

no dispute that the claim is subject to the Krankel procedure.

¶ 18   In determining whether to appoint counsel, the trial court considers the merits of the

ineffective assistance claim in their entirety. Id. ¶ 61. “[I]f the trial court has properly conducted a

Krankel inquiry and has reached a determination on the merits of the defendant’s Krankel motion,

we will reverse only if the trial court’s action was manifestly erroneous.” People v. Jackson, 2020

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IL 124112, ¶ 98. A decision is manifestly erroneous when arbitrary, unreasonable, and not based

on the evidence. People v. Ceja, 204 Ill. 2d 332, 347 (2003).

¶ 19   Defendant argues that the trial court’s decision was manifestly erroneous because it was

not based on the evidence. The trial court was under the misimpression that the jury was made

aware of the germane aspects of the medical records through a stipulation. In fact, no such

stipulation was ever presented to the jury.

¶ 20   Although it is true that the trial court’s decision was based on reasoning that was not

supported by the evidence, “[w]e review the trial court’s judgment, not its reasoning, and we may

affirm on any basis called for by the record.” People v. Mueller, 2018 IL App (2d) 170863, ¶ 16.

Leaving aside the trial court’s mistaken belief that the jurors heard a stipulation equivalent to the

evidence that defendant argues should have been presented through J.B.’s medical records, it is

abundantly clear from the record on appeal that defendant failed to show possible neglect of the

case. To the contrary, defendant’s ineffectiveness claim was entirely speculative. Accordingly, the

trial court was not obligated to appoint new counsel to assist defendant with that claim.

¶ 21   As noted, to satisfy the prejudice prong of the Strickland standard, a defendant must show

a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding

would have been different. Although defendant contended that the medical records would have

shown that J.B. denied ever having had sexual intercourse, the record on appeal provides no

support for that contention. Defendant did not suggest that he had ever actually seen the medical

records. He merely stated that his wife had told him that J.B. had told her doctors that she had

“never had sex with anybody at this same time in 2015.” Defendant’s claim implicitly assumes

that, if J.B. had made such a statement, it would appear in the medical records. We cannot join in

that assumption. J.B.’s alleged statement was in response to concerns that her enlarged abdomen

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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-U

was the result of pregnancy. However, her physician(s) diagnosed her with a tumor that apparently

mimicked the appearance of pregnancy. It is by no means clear that her sexual history was germane

to that diagnosis, and we cannot simply assume that her physician(s) would have included any

statements pertaining to her sexual history in her medical records.

¶ 22   Defendant also argues that his description of the subpoenaed medical records matched both

defense counsel’s description of the records during the Krankel hearing and the prosecutor’s

description during pretrial proceedings. The flaw in the argument is that, as seen, defendant did

not describe the medical records themselves, but merely described statements J.B. allegedly made

during her medical appointment. The same is true of defense counsel’s remarks during the Krankel

hearing. Defense counsel advised the trial court, incorrectly, that the parties stipulated that, during

her medical appointment, J.B. told her physician(s) that she had not had intercourse. Defense

counsel did not suggest that there was any stipulation as to the content of the medical records, and

we cannot conceive of how there could have been such a stipulation, given that the parties had not

seen the medical records until after the jury began its deliberations.

¶ 23   Finally, defendant’s contention that his description of the subpoenaed records matches the

prosecutor’s description at a pretrial hearing is ludicrous. The prosecutor merely indicated what

the medical records “may” have said and what defense hoped to establish with the records. The

prosecutor never suggested he was confident as to what the records said or that the defense would

be successful. Indeed, the prosecutor made these remarks before even receiving the records. The

prosecutor had no way of knowing whether they would have any impeachment value.

¶ 24   As discussed, the medical records themselves, although received and reviewed by the trial

court, are absent from the record on appeal. Under Foutch v. O’Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92

(1984), doubts arising from the incompleteness of the record should be resolved against the

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defendant (the appellant) and in favor of the judgment. Having reviewed the medical records, the

trial court stated that the records added nothing to the case. Because the records are not part of the

record on appeal, we must assume the trial court’s assessment was correct. We note that, although

the absence of the medical records from the record on appeal is a serious impediment to appellate

relief, defendant might still be able to obtain relief through a proceeding under the Post-Conviction

Hearing Act (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2022)). However, we express no opinion on the

likelihood of success in that endeavor.

¶ 25   In an effort to circumvent Foutch, defendant contends, in essence, that because defense

counsel did not obtain the medical records before trial, the trial court record is incomplete, not the

record on appeal. Citing People v. Carter, 2021 IL 125954, ¶ 39, defendant argues that Foutch

does not apply under these circumstances. We disagree. As noted, the trial court reviewed medical

records in camera. “Even where a party is not privy to materials reviewed in camera *** that party

can request the circuit court to submit those materials under seal for appellate review.” Cascade

Builders Corp. v. Rugar, 2021 IL App (1st) 192410, ¶ 28. In Robinson v. Township High School

District 113, 2022 IL App (2d) 210107 ¶¶ 2,17, which we cite as persuasive authority under Illinois

Supreme Court Rule 23(e)(1) (eff. Feb. 1, 2023), we held that Foutch required affirmance of the

trial court’s in camera determination that certain emails were exempt from disclosure under the

Freedom of Information Act (5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (West 2018)), where the e-mails were not

included in the record on appeal.

¶ 26   Moreover, even assuming, arguendo, that the contents of the medical records included

J.B.’s supposed denial that she had intercourse, there was no reasonable probability that using that

statement to impeach J.B. would have resulted in an acquittal on any of the charges. Defendant

advised the trial court that the medical records would reveal that J.B. told her doctors, not merely

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2022 IL App (2d) 230148-U

that it was “impossible” that she was pregnant, but that “she had never had sex with anybody at

this same time in 2015.” Notably, however, J.B. testified that, before her medical examination, she

told her mother and defendant that she was not sexually active. Defendant suggests that J.B.’s

supposed statement to her doctors that she “never had sex with anyone” would have more

definitively impeached her testimony that defendant sexually assaulted her. J.B. made clear that

she did not want to reveal to her mother that defendant had sexually assaulted her, and J.B.’s

mother was supposedly present when J.B. spoke to the doctors. Thus, J.B. was far less likely to

speak candidly on that topic with her mother present. Under these circumstances, there is no

reasonable probability that the jury would have given any significant weight to J.B.’s alleged

statements during the medical examination.

¶ 27   We stress that, notwithstanding our conclusion that defendant was not entitled to new

counsel to pursue defendant’s ineffectiveness claim, we are deeply troubled by defense counsel’s

false statements during the Krankel hearing regarding an imaginary trial stipulation. We have no

reason to believe counsel deliberately misled the court. However, we caution counsel to exercise

greater care when making such representations. Nonetheless, although the trial court’s decision

was based on a false premise (as a result of counsel’s false statements), the record simply provides

no support for defendant’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, defendant was

not entitled to new counsel to assist him in pursuing that claim.

¶ 28                                   III. CONCLUSION

¶ 29   For the reasons stated, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County.

¶ 30   Affirmed.

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