Court Opinion

ID: 9753712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:24:10.203264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:40.866225
License: Public Domain

OPINION BY
President Judge COLINS.
Mary Price1 and JUL Realty Corporation (Taxpayers) appeal the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County denying their exceptions to confirmation of the tax upset sale of the real property located at 394 Old Gulph Road and 145 Narberth Avenue in Lower Mer-ion Township for delinquent taxes.
Mary Price, owner of a home at the Old Gulph Road address, is the sole shareholder and owner of JUL Realty Corporation, which owned an office building at the Nar-berth Avenue address. The exceptions filed for both parcels averred that the tax sale was conducted on September 13, 1999, that notices to the Taxpayer indicated that the sale was scheduled for September 15, 1999, that the Montgomery County Tax Claim Bureau failed to properly post the property, and that the Taxpayer appeared on September 15, 1999 to pay the delinquent taxes and was told that the parcel was sold on September 13, 1999. Michael Singer, Michael Candido, and Homeowner’s Concepts, Inc., and Irvin Povlow, purchasers of the properties, intervened and filed answers.
The parties presented evidence with respect to both properties at a January 23, 2001 hearing before the trial court. Tax Claim Bureau Supervisor Sharon Hetrick testified from her records that the tax upset sale of the properties in question was advertised, the proper notices sent by certified and first-class mail, that the properties were posted, and that the owner occupant of the properties was personally served with notice of the sale. With respect to posting and personal service, the Tax Claim Bureau introduced into evidence the sheriffs affidavits of service.
With respect to the residential property on Old Gulph Road, Sheriffs Deputy James Conway testified from his daily log that he posted the front door of the property at 7:45 a.m. on July 27, 1999 using scotch tape. He testified that he attempted to personally serve Ms. Price and on the affidavit of service he wrote, “Would not come to door. Left as a refusal.” On direct examination, Conway testified that he knocked on the front door and then went to the side-door through which he observed Mary Price in the kitchen, but that she did not answer the door. On cross-examination, Conway acknowledged that in a June 8, 2000 deposition, he testified 1) that he knocked on the front door, through which he observed Ms. Price in her kitchen and 2) that he observed Ms. Price’s yellow Cadillac in her driveway. *1040He acknowledged on cross-examination he did not believe that Ms. Price saw or heard him knocking because if she had she would have answered the door. (Transcript, p. 93.)
With respect to the commercial property on Narberth Avenue, Deputy Conway testified from his daily log that he arrived at the property at 8:30 a.m. on July 27, 1999 and posted notice of the tax sale on the front door. He stated that as he was about to enter the premises he saw Ms. Price pull up behind his vehicle and that he then personally served her with notice of the tax sale. On cross-examination, Conway acknowledged that during June 8, 2000 deposition he stated at one point that he posted the notice and then immediately removed it and handed it to Ms. Price when he effected personal service of the tax sale notice and at another point he stated that when Ms. Price pulled up behind his vehicle he served her with both the posted notice and the personal service notice. Conway acknowledged that at the time in question his practice was to hand both notices to the property owner if the owner answered his knock or was otherwise present at the premises. (Transcript, p. 110-111.)
Mary Price testified on her own behalf as follows. She has lived at the Old Gulph Road property for 38 years, and that there is no mortgage on the home. A woman of 75 years, she generally pays her bills by check, in person. She acknowledged receiving notice of the tax sale by mail and had the money to pay the delinquent taxes, as it was her habit to pay the taxes every other year. From her copies of the notices, which were faintly printed, she believed the sale date to be September 15, 1999, and she went to Norristown, to the Tax Claim Bureau, on that date to pay the taxes in full. Had she known that the sale was September 13, 1999, she would have gone to Norristown to pay the taxes on that date.
As for July 27, 1999, the day Deputy Conway allegedly posted notice and personally served her with notice of the tax sale, Ms. Price testified that she was not home at 7:30 a.m. on that day because she attends mass at 7:30 a.m. every day and misses mass only rarely, as on days when snow storms prevent her from exiting her driveway. She testified that from her front door, one cannot see into her kitchen. She testified that she remembered meeting Conway in front of the Narberth Avenue property and that he handed her one or more documents, but he did not go up to the front door, and neither she nor her tenants saw anything posted on the front door of the property. She acknowledged that she drives a white Lincoln and never owned a yellow Cadillac. She testified that when she returned home at the end of the day, she did not see anything posted on the front door.
Based on the evidence presented, the trial court found that the sale date on the required notices was legible to a person with normal or normally corrected vision. It found that Deputy Conway filled out affidavits of personal service and posting for both properties. The court concluded on the basis of Hollinger v. Hollinger, 416 Pa. 473, 206 A.2d 1 (1965), that the sheriffs affidavit is conclusive and immune from attack from extrinsic evidence. Having concluded that the statutory requirements were met in this case, the trial court denied the Taxpayers’ exceptions and confirmed the sale of the properties.
On appeal, the Taxpayers raise the following issues: 1) whether the trial court abused its discretion and erred when it concluded that notices of the sale were properly posted on the properties and personally. served on Ms. Price and bore a legible sale date, and 2) whether the tax *1041sale should be set aside because the successful bidders did not provide certification that they were not delinquent in real estate taxes or municipal utility bills. Our review is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion, clearly erred as a matter of law, or rendered a decision unsupported by the evidence. Hunter v. Washington County Tax Bureau, 729 A.2d 142 (Pa.Cmwlth.1999).
Although a presumption of regularity attaches to tax sales, a property owner overcomes the presumption whenever he or she states a prima facie challenge to the sale based on the agency’s compliance with statutory tax sale requirements. Michener v. Montgomery County Tax Claim Bureau, 671 A.2d 286 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1996). Because of the fundamental importance of the due process considerations that arise when the government subjects a citizen’s property to forfeiture for nonpayment of taxes, the agency that has sold the property bears the burden of proving that it complied with statutory notice requirements when property owner mounts such a prima facie challenge. Id.
Section 602 of the Real Estate Tax Sale Law (Tax Sale Law),2 72 P.S. § 5860.602, imposes a series of notification requirements — by publication, certified mail, posting, and in some cases personal service — before a county tax claim bureau can sell real property for delinquent taxes. The Law’s notice provisions are to be strictly construed, and the tax sale is void if any of the required types of notice is defective. Ban v. Tax Claim Bureau of Washington County, 698 A.2d 1386 (Pa. Cmwlth.1997). Actual notice of a pending tax sale waives strict compliance with the notice requirements. Stanford-Gale v. Tax Claim Bureau of Susquehanna County, 816 A.2d 1214 (Pa.Cmwlth.2003). At issue in this case are the personal service and posting requirements.
Section 601(a)(3) of the Tax Sale Law provides in unequivocal terms that no owner-occupied property may be sold unless the owner has been personally served with notice of the sale. 72 P.S. § 5860.601(a)(3). As relied upon by the trial court, Hollinger states, “in the absence of fraud, the return of service of a sheriff, which is full and complete on its face, is conclusive and immune from attack by extrinsic evidence.” 416 Pa. at 476, 206 A.2d at 3. The conclusive nature of the sheriffs return of service is limited to the facts stated in the return of which the sheriff has personal knowledge. Id. The rule of conclusiveness is based on the presumption that the sheriff acted with propriety in the conduct of his official duties. Id. “The presumption is rebuttable and must yield if the evidence indicates the contrary.” In re Upset Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Montgomery County, 68 Pa. Cmwlth. 180, 448 A.2d 696, 699 (1982).
In the instant case, the trial court found only that Deputy Conway filled out the affidavits of service on July 27,1999; it made no findings as to whether service was actually effected. In our estimation (without making credibility determination), Deputy Conway’s testimony constitutes evidence that contradicts the affidavits.
The affidavit of personal service for the residential property states, “Would not come to door, left as refused.” On its face, the affidavit does not demonstrate that the deputy sheriff effected personal service, and when considered in its entirety, Deputy Conway’s testimony does not support a finding that personal service was made or that Ms. Price refused service. Conway changed his testimony that he saw Ms. *1042Price in her kitchen when he peered through the front door when he was confronted with the fact that the kitchen was not visible from the front door, and on cross-examination he stated his belief that if Ms. Price had heard him knocking she would have answered the door. The evidence does not support a conclusion that Ms. Price was personally served with notice of the tax sale at the Old Gulph Road residence.
Similarly, the affidavits of service state that notice was posted and served at the Narberth Avenue property, but Deputy Conway’s testimony indicates otherwise. He acknowledged that if the property owner was present at the premises, his practice was to hand both the posting notice and personal service notice to the property owner, and stated that when he saw Ms. Price pull up behind him, he handed her both of the notices. Because a property is not properly posted within the meaning of the Tax Sale Law unless it is sufficient to notify both the owner and the public at large of the pending sale, posting does not satisfy the statutory requirement when the notice is not conspicuous such that it will be seen by the public. Ban; In re Upset Tax Sale of September 10, 1990, 147 Pa.Cmwlth. 52, 606 A.2d 1255 (1992). The evidence does not support a finding that the Narberth Avenue property was properly posted within the meaning of the Law.
Although the trial court found that the sale date on the notices was legible to a person with normal or normally corrected vision, it also found that Ms. Price wore reading glasses and that the date on the notices was faint. Given the noncompliance with the posting and personal service notice requirements, the unclear sale date on the notices, and the fact that Ms. Price appeared in person to pay the overdue taxes in full on September 15, 1999, the date she thought the notices bore, we must conclude that the Tax Claim Bureau failed to meet the statutory notice requirements and failed to provide Ms. Price with adequate notice of the sale date.
The purpose of the tax sale law is to collect overdue taxes, not to punish taxpayers who omit through oversight or error to pay their taxes, Tracy v. County of Chester, Tax Claim Bureau, 507 Pa. 288, 297, 489 A.2d 1334, 1339 (1985) (quoting Ross Appeal, 366 Pa. 100, 107, 76 A.2d 749, 753 (1950)), and not to permit real estate speculators to obtain the property of taxpayers who are willing and able to pay their taxes. The taxpayer in this case, Ms. Price, has not proven herself to be a willful, persistent, and long-standing tax delinquent. Given the facts of this case, the properties in question should never have been exposed for tax sale.
The Taxpayers’ claim that the buyers did not certify that they were not delinquent in payment of real estate taxes or municipal utility bills was not raised before the trial court, and therefore, it was waived.
Accordingly, the order of the trial court is reversed.

ORDER

AND NOW, this 3rd day of November 2003, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County in the above-captioned matter is reversed.

. During the pendency of this case, Mary Price died, and by order dated August 13, 2003, this court granted an application to substitute executor John A. Price for Mary Price as a party pursuant to R.A.P. 502(a).

. Act of July 7, 1947, P.L. 1368, as amended.