Court Opinion

ID: 9352942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-10 16:00:32.264072+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:06:06.553223
License: Public Domain

20-2689
     Kumar v. Garland
                                                                                   BIA
                                                                              Sponzo, IJ
                                                                           A208 200 200

                             UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                   SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 10th day of January, two thousand twenty-
 5   three.
 6
 7   PRESENT:
 8            WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
 9            BETH ROBINSON,
10            ALISON J. NATHAN,
11                 Circuit Judges.
12   _____________________________________
13
14   RAHUL KUMAR, AKA RAHUL,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                      v.                                       20-2689
18                                                               NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                    Jaspreet Singh, Esq., Jackson
25                                       Heights, NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                    Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
28                                      Attorney General; Matthew B.
 1                                    George, Senior Litigation Counsel;
 2                                    Patricia E. Bruckner, Trial
 3                                    Attorney, Office of Immigration
 4                                    Litigation, United States
 5                                    Department of Justice, Washington,
 6                                    DC.
 7
 8       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 9   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

10   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

11   is GRANTED.

12       Petitioner Rahul Kumar, a native and citizen of India,

13   seeks review of a July 21, 2020, decision of the BIA affirming

14   a September 7, 2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”)

15   denying    Kumar’s    application         for   asylum,   withholding      of

16   removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

17   (“CAT”).     In re Rahul Kumar, No. A208 200 200 (B.I.A. July

18   21, 2020), aff’g No. A208 200 200 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Sept.

19   7, 2018).         We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

20   underlying facts and procedural history.

21       We have reviewed both the BIA’s and IJ’s opinions.                    See

22   Yan Chen v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 268, 271 (2d Cir. 2005).                    We

23   review     factual    findings     for      substantial     evidence      and

24   questions    of    law,   including       whether   the   BIA   engaged   in

25   improper factfinding, de novo.              Paloka v. Holder, 762 F.3d

26   191, 195 (2d Cir. 2014); Padmore v. Holder, 609 F.3d 62, 67

                                           2
 1   (2d Cir. 2010).       “[T]he administrative findings of fact are

 2   conclusive     unless     any      reasonable     adjudicator       would   be

 3   compelled      to     conclude       to     the     contrary.”       8 U.S.C.

 4   § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 5     I.     BIA’s Factfinding

 6          Kumar testified that the police detained and beat him,

 7   and members of the Badal Party assaulted him because he

 8   supported    the    Congress     Party.      The    IJ    credited    Kumar’s

 9   testimony in its entirety, but found that Kumar’s beating and

10   detention    by     the   police    did    not    rise   to   the   level   of

11   persecution, his subsequent assault by Badal Party members

12   did not rise to the level of persecution, and he did not

13   demonstrate that his fear of future harm was objectively

14   reasonable.    The BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and relied on

15   additional grounds.        We decline to consider those additional

16   grounds because the BIA may not engage in factfinding on

17   appeal: “The Board will not engage in de novo review of

18   findings of fact determined by an immigration judge.                    Facts

19   determined by the immigration judge, including findings as to

20   the credibility of testimony, shall be reviewed only to

21   determine whether the findings of the immigration judge are

22   clearly       erroneous.”              8 C.F.R.          § 1003.1(d)(3)(i).

                                            3
 1   Accordingly, we address only the IJ’s conclusion that Kumar

 2   failed to show past harm rising to the level of persecution

 3   and do not consider the BIA’s findings that he did not

 4   establish a nexus to a protected ground, that the Badal Party

 5   members were not state actors, and that the government would

 6   not be unable or unwilling to control the Badal Party.           We

 7   note that the nexus determination—that Kumar was arrested

 8   because of suspected involvement with drugs—relies, in part,

 9   on a finding that before his arrest he visited a friend who

10   was using drugs; however, that visit appears to have occurred

11   after Kumar’s arrest.

12     II. Past Persecution

13       “The BIA has defined persecution as a threat to the life

14   or freedom of, or the infliction of suffering or harm upon,

15   those who differ in a way regarded as offensive.”         Baba v.

16   Holder, 569 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2009) (quotation marks

17   omitted).   “Where an alien, because of [his] membership in a

18   statutorily   protected   class,   suffers   physical   abuse   and

19   violence at the hands of government agents, . . . such

20   evidence, if credible, may preclude a finding that the conduct

21   is mere harassment that does not as a matter of law rise to

22   the level of persecution, for violent conduct generally goes

                                    4
 1   beyond the mere annoyance and distress that characterize

 2   harassment.”       Id. (quotation marks and brackets omitted).

 3   Although we have “never held that a beating that occurs within

 4   the context of an arrest or detention constitutes persecution

 5   per se,” Jian Qiu Liu v. Holder, 632 F.3d 820, 822 (2d Cir.

 6   2011), the agency “must . . . be keenly sensitive to the fact

 7   that a ‘minor beating’ or, for that matter, any physical

 8   degradation designed to cause pain, humiliation, or other

 9   suffering, may rise to the level of persecution if it occurred

10   in the context of an arrest or detention on the basis of a

11   protected ground,” Beskovic v. Gonzales, 467 F.3d 223, 226

12   (2d Cir. 2006).         The agency also must consider the harm

13   suffered in the aggregate.         See Poradisova v. Gonzales, 420

14   F.3d 70, 79–80 (2d Cir. 2005).                  “[W]e require a certain

15   minimum level of analysis from the IJ and BIA opinions . . .

16   if judicial review is to be meaningful” and “require some

17   indication     that     the   IJ   considered         material       evidence

18   supporting a petitioner’s claim.”           Id. at 77.

19         We remand for the agency to more fully address whether

20   the   beatings   Kumar    suffered       rise    to   the    level   of    past

21   persecution.     The agency considered the severity of the harm

22   without   making      clear   findings     regarding        the   reason   for

                                          5
 1   Kumar’s arrest.     The record reflects that Kumar’s father

 2   received a call that Kumar would be “framed in a drug problem”

 3   if he did not leave the Congress Party and join the Badal

 4   Party.    The police subsequently arrested Kumar at his home,

 5   brought him to the police station, held him overnight, and

 6   punched, kicked, and beat him with belts on three occasions.

 7   During that time the police pressured him to join the Badal

 8   Party.    The IJ found that the beatings were not persecution

 9   because Kumar “did not require medical attention for the cuts

10   and bruises that he sustained.” This is a mischaracterization

11   of Kumar’s statement that he was afraid to seek medical help,

12   and the IJ did not make clear findings as to whether Kumar

13   was arrested because of his political affiliation.      If he

14   was, then even a minor beating may be enough to establish

15   past persecution.    See Baba, 569 F.3d at 85; Beskovic, 467

16   F.3d at 226.

17          Kumar further alleged that Badal Party members hit him

18   with their car, then kicked, punched, and threatened to kill

19   him.     The IJ found that this incident did not rise to the

20   level of persecution because Kumar stated that he did not

21   require professional medical attention, he suffered no broken

22   bones, and did not require stitches.    Again, the IJ relied

                                    6
 1   solely on the level of injury, without considering the context

 2   of the assault or addressing this assault in connection with

 3   the prior arrest.     See Beskovic, 467 F.3d at 226; Poradisova,

 4   420 F.3d at 79–80.

 5       In sum, we can reach no conclusion as to the ultimate

 6   success of Kumar’s claim and remand for the agency to further

 7   consider his claim and make all necessary findings.         Because

 8   the burden of proof as to future persecution turns on the

 9   agency’s conclusion regarding past persecution, we do not

10   reach the agency’s finding that Kumar failed to establish a

11   well-founded   fear    of   future   persecution.   See    8 C.F.R.

12   § 1208.13(b)(1).

13       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

14   GRANTED, the BIA’s decision is VACATED, and the case is

15   REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this order.

16   All pending motions and applications are DENIED and stays

17   VACATED.

18                                   FOR THE COURT:
19                                   Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
20                                   Clerk of Court

                                      7