Court Opinion

ID: 9403413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 06:09:46.04583+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:06.799183
License: Public Domain

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed June 16, 2023

                                        In the
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-00156-CR

                     THOMAS LINZ JOHNSON, Appellant
                                  V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

               On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                     Trial Court Cause No. F15-58525-S

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION
                  Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Kennedy
                            Opinion by Justice Carlyle
      Thomas Linz Johnson claims the trial court erred in competency proceedings,

violating his due process rights, and that trial counsel was ineffective before, during,

and after trial. We affirm in this memorandum opinion. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.4.

      Article 46B Claims

      Johnson claims he was impermissibly committed for more than “one initial

period of restoration period and one extension” in violation of Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure article 46B.085(a). Johnson has not pointed us to any trial

objection raising this issue and therefore the issue presents nothing for our review.
See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a); see also Clark v. State, 592 S.W.3d 919, 924 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d). Even assuming preservation, there is no error.

Johnson ignores the effect of article 46B.084(e), allowing further commitment under

subchapter E, entitled “Civil Commitment: Charges Pending.”

        After an initial 120-day confinement,1 article 46B.073(b)(2), the court granted

a 60-day extension, albeit having done so December 21, 2016, which was prior to

the date the 120 days was to expire. Nevertheless, this extension did not run until the

initial 120 days expired on January 26, 2017, and thus the extension ran until March

26, 2017. Before the end of this confinement, the trial court bench-warranted him

back to Dallas County, doctors evaluated him, and the trial court found him

incompetent to stand trial by order dated June 2, 2017. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

arts. 46B.084(e), 46B.101. Based on that finding, the court ordered Johnson

committed to the North Texas State Hospital for a period not to exceed 12 months.

Id. Even had Johnson preserved error, because the trial court followed the applicable

law, we would conclude there was no improper extension or recommitment.

        Johnson next claims there was no notice from the “head of the facility,” as

required by article 46B.080(a), preceding an order extending the initial restoration

period. After the head of the facility notified the trial court pursuant to article

46B.079, the parties agreed to the 60-day commitment extension. Johnson does not

    1
     There is a delay between the trial court’s April 6, 2016 judgment of incompetency to stand trial and
Johnson’s September 27, 2016 commitment to the North Texas State Hospital due to bed space issues.
                                                  –2–
present this court a record of any objection to this procedure. See TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a). And, Johnson conflates his statutory violation claim with one of due process,

and in this situation, has presented no claim of constitutional error. See Williams v.

State, No. 02-19-00484-CR, 2020 WL 6066198, at *2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Oct.

15, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). In any event, the case later

proceeded to trial, where Johnson was found guilty, and he has made no argument

why this claimed error caused a violation of his substantial rights. See Newman v.

State, 331 S.W.3d 447, 450 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (appellant must bring forward a

record on appeal sufficient to show trial court error); TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).

      Johnson further claims his procedural due process right and right to counsel

were violated due to a claimed failure of statutorily required notification to counsel

that he had returned to Dallas County. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts. 46B.079(c),

.084(a)(1). Again, the record before this court contains no objection to not receiving

notice, nor does it contain a document notifying him. The record fails to establish

whether counsel received the document. Johnson provides no sufficient argument

why any claimed failure of notification requires reversal of the jury’s verdict and the

court’s sentence or how it led to an incorrect verdict. Like our disposition of the

previous issue, we are unable to find a violation of substantial rights due to a claimed

notification failure in the pre-trial competency proceedings. See Williams, 2020 WL

6066198, at *2; Newman, 331 S.W.3d at 450; TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a), 44.2(b).

                                          –3–
        Johnson claims there was no written jury waiver, in contravention of Texas

Health and Safety Code § 574.032(c), which statutory violation denied him

procedural and substantive due process, as well as the Sixth Amendment right to the

effective assistance of counsel. His argument fails at the first premise because it

ignores part of the statute, which provides an exception to a written jury waiver when

“the proposed patient or the attorney orally waives the right to a jury in the court’s

presence.” See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 574.032(c). The parties agree the

record indicates a jury waiver, and therefore, because we find no statutory violation,

we reject this issue.2

        Johnson also claims error in the trial court’s failure to conduct a rule 702

hearing regarding the qualifications of a State expert witness, as well as the

reliability of the testimony. At trial, “the proponent of scientific evidence is not

typically called upon to establish its empirical reliability as a predicate to admission

unless and until the opponent of that evidence raises an objection under Rule 702.”

State v. Esparza, 413 S.W.3d 81, 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Further, the opponent

of such evidence must object at trial to preserve an issue for appeal. TEX. R. APP. P.

33.1(a)(1). Because there was no objection at trial, this issue presents nothing for

our review.

    2
      In any event, Johnson makes no argument why a statutorily compliant jury waiver would affect his
due process rights, instead attempting, in two sentences without citing a case or statute, an argument for
expanding appellate consideration of ineffective assistance from counsel-based error to trial-court-based
errors. We reject this argument.
                                                  –4–
      Ineffective Assistance Claims

      To establish the ineffective assistance of counsel, Johnson must establish by a

preponderance of the evidence that (1) his counsel committed errors so serious that

counsel was not functioning as counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, and

(2) there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficiency, the outcome

of the proceedings would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687, 694 (1984); Cox v. State, 389 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).

      We first address Johnson’s claim relying on an exception to these basic

constitutional requirements: when trial counsel “entirely fails to subject the

prosecution’s case to meaningful adversarial testing.” See United States v. Cronic,

466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984). On appeal, Johnson argues counsel failed to file pretrial

motions, failed to challenge claims regarding his mental status at multiple points,

failed to object to hearsay testimony, and failed to cross-examine witnesses from the

murder scene. Not only do these arguments fail to cover the broad territory required

to establish the total failure of adversarial testing, they also incompletely describe

the legal environment within which the trial occurred.

      Trial counsel filed an omnibus pretrial motion with multiple requests aimed

at guarding Johnson’s trial rights. There was a notice that he intended to offer

evidence of insanity. Counsel successfully argued the court should allow Johnson to

sit at counsel table without shackles. Counsel actively participated in voir dire.

Counsel engaged in cross-examination of multiple State witnesses that, though not

                                         –5–
ultimately successful, undercut their testimony or assisted his mental state

arguments. Counsel also succeeded in keeping certain evidence out of the trial, and

moved for an instructed verdict. Indeed, Johnson stated in a colloquy that he had

directed counsel not to call defense witnesses, and that there were no defense fact

witnesses. He all but admitted his guilt and expressed a preference for attempting to

minimize his punishment. On this record, we cannot conclude there was the

complete failure of meaningful adversarial testing. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659; see

also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 697 (2002); Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743,

752 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

      Johnson also makes a Cronic claim for counsel’s performance during the

incompetency phase of this case. His complaints center on the lack of record, and

after minimal appellate argument, Johnson recites the familiar statement that “It is a

violation of due process to put a mentally incompetent person on trial.” He claims

counsel should have requested a mistrial “under these circumstances,” but has failed

to adequately describe any deficient performance, and to any extent he has, the

record on direct appeal lacks support for this claim. See Goodspeed v. State, 187

S.W.3d 390, 392 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (the undeveloped record on direct appeal

is rarely sufficient to support an ineffective assistance of counsel finding).

      Next, to the extent Johnson complains counsel was ineffective for admitting

his guilt, we cannot find ineffectiveness on this record. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 138

S. Ct. 1500, 1510 (2018). As an initial matter, the record includes Johnson’s

                                          –6–
testimony, agreeing he had “always” told counsel he “understood and fully

expect[ed] that [he would] be found guilty. And that the only real issue before the

jury in this case is gonna be the issue of punishment.” He agreed that the strategy

was that they would not “necessarily [be] contesting the guilt in the case,” but would

be “forcing the State to at least meet their burden of proof.” Johnson agreed he was

satisfied with counsel and that counsel had “done everything” he had “requested

[him] to do.” Johnson never objected to this strategy. See Turner v. State, 570 S.W.3d

250, 276 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (defendant must express statements of his will to

maintain innocence, but is not required to “object with the precision of an attorney”).

We overrule this basis for finding the ineffective assistance of counsel.

      We continue, addressing Johnson’s laundry list of ineffective assistance

claims, with the following precepts of law in mind. We presume sound trial strategy

in the absence of evidence of counsel’s strategic motives, and may not reverse for

ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal when counsel’s actions or

omissions may have been based on tactical decisions for which the record contains

no specific explanation. See Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 813–14 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1999). We may find ineffective assistance of counsel as a matter of law when

no reasonable trial strategy could justify trial counsel’s conduct, regardless whether

the record adequately reflects the subjective reasons for the conduct in question.

Andrews v. State, 159 S.W.3d 98, 102 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). But when counsel has

not had an opportunity to explain his conduct, we should refrain from finding

                                         –7–
ineffective assistance of counsel unless the conduct was so outrageous that no

competent attorney would have engaged in it. See Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392

(cleaned up).

        Johnson complains counsel was ineffective for not filing a “motion to

suppress or set aside the affidavit along with a Franks Hearing.”3 Though he

creatively attacks nearly every sentence in the affidavit in isolation, Johnson

completely fails to address his statements in the affidavit such as the unprompted, “I

just committed capital murder,” as well as a later, post-Miranda admission of killing

the victim. The failure to wrestle with these admissions, which dovetail with the

entire rest of the affidavit and undercut any argument that he made the required

“substantial preliminary showing that a false statement was made in the affidavit,”

see Harris, 227 S.W.3d at 85, is fatal to this ineffectiveness claim on the record

before this court. See Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392.

        Johnson quibbles with counsel’s voir dire performance in two sentences of

case-citation-less argument, followed by two pages of quotes from voir dire itself.

Because the skeletal argument—that counsel should have moved for a change of

venue or request a mistrial—fails without further briefing, TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i),

    3
       When a defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that an affiant—knowingly and
intentionally or with reckless disregard for the truth—made a false statement in a warrant affidavit, he may
be entitled to a hearing. See Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155–56 (1978); Harris v. State, 227 S.W.3d
83, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
                                                   –8–
and fails for an insufficient record of counsel’s potential strategy, see Thompson, 9

S.W.3d at 813–14, we reject it.

      Johnson next complains of counsel’s “Trial Performance” for failure to

request mistrial due to multiple “violations” of “The Rule,” which he defines as

meaning that witnesses cannot discuss case facts “with anyone other than the Court

and the attorneys.” He proceeds to complain about in-court, mid-trial, before-the-

jury questioning as a violation because he claims certain questions previewed facts

previously unknown to those witnesses. Questioning by an attorney of a witness on

the witness stand in front of the jury is explicitly allowed under any interpretation of

trial rules in our system of jurisprudence. Without a more detailed record, we are

unable to identify any deficient performance in counsel’s failure to object or request

a mistrial. See Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392; Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14.

      Johnson complains counsel erred by stipulating to a serology report because

nothing in the record suggests “counsel is a scientist,” because the State had not yet

established chain of custody on the record, and perhaps because of unmentioned yet

vaguely referenced Confrontation Clause claims. Johnson fails to actually argue on

appeal about the effect not stipulating to the report would have had on the outcome.

The ineffectiveness argument fails to identify how there was a “reasonable

probability of a different outcome” in a trial without the claimed errors. See Cox,

389 S.W.3d at 819. And in any event, an attorney may have any number of strategic

reasons for deciding to stipulate to an expert report, so without record development

                                          –9–
of those reasons, we are unable to effectively evaluate this claim. See Goodspeed,

187 S.W.3d at 392.

      Johnson complains of counsel’s post-trial performance, referencing counsel’s

motion for new trial and a failure to obtain a ruling on it. Johnson recites affidavit

testimony from prior habeas proceedings seeking permission for an out-of-time

appeal, which the Court of Criminal Appeals allowed. See Ex parte Johnson, No.

WR-91,959-01, 2022 WL 301840 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 2, 2022). The Court of

Criminal Appeals has resolved the issue of counsel’s performance regarding the

appeal, over which this court has no jurisdiction. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. arts.

11.05; 11.07, § 5; TEX. GOV’T CODE § 22.221(d). Johnson appears to make the failure

to file a notice of appeal part of a broader claim of cumulative ineffectiveness

throughout the proceedings, which we reject due to our lack of jurisdiction and due

to the finality of the habeas proceedings, where he received relief.

      Johnson next argues counsel was ineffective for failing to call experts on his

mental illness and his failure to cross-examine witnesses who “tersely and

inappropriately commented” on his mental status. He quotes reports, and claims the

record reveals that at trial, he was delusional in believing he was a prophet.

Johnson’s arguments ignore that trial counsel could have made strategic decisions

for his actions and omissions in this regard and without testimony, discovery, and

other record development, we cannot adequately evaluate this issue on direct appeal.

See Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392.

                                        –10–
      Johnson continues, arguing counsel provided “no meaningful adversary

testing,” and quoting voir dire statements, opening statement, as well as counsel’s

Omnibus Pretrial Motion. But Johnson makes no attempt to argue how the quoted

portions of the record were deficient performance or the reasonable probability of a

different outcome based on them. For failure both of briefing, TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i),

and for an insufficient direct appeal record of counsel’s potential strategy for these

actions, see Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14, we reject this claim.

      Johnson further claims of counsel’s trial performance, repeating his arguments

about counsel’s strategy to put the State to its burden but not to contest guilt. In

support, Johnson’s appellate brief again quotes lengthy portions of the trial but

makes minimal meaningful appellate argument. Johnson makes a vague article 38.22

claim and cites scholarship regarding false confessions. In any event, the direct

appeal record is insufficiently developed for us to consider this claim, to the extent

it is different from Johnson’s other claims. See Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392;

Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813–14.

      Johnson next argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to properly

investigate the case. To the extent this claim relies on matters not in the appellate

record attached to his brief, we are not empowered to review it. See Estrada v. State,

No. 14-17-00410-CR, 2018 WL 5914504, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

Nov. 13, 2018, pet. ref’d) (mem. op.) (citing cases). In any event, much of Johnson’s

argument in this claim attempts to retry the case and challenge evidentiary

                                        –11–
sufficiency instead of claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. We reject those

arguments because the evidence supporting Johnson’s guilt is plainly sufficient, see

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979), and because the record at this

point is too undeveloped on certain potentially strategic matters. See Goodspeed,

187 S.W.3d at 392.

      Johnson also complains counsel should have objected to Crime Scene

Detective Seth Rosenberg’s testimony about pictures and DNA swabs he took for

“possible blood” and that he photographed a cut on Johnson’s knuckle because it

was possibly due to a defense wound or was self-inflicted from hitting something.

Johnson claims these were scientific matters and Detective Rosenberg hadn’t been

qualified as an expert so counsel should have objected and the court should have,

apparently sua sponte, granted a mistrial. On this record, we cannot conclude that

the failure to object to testimony from a crime scene photographer about why he

took certain photos and DNA swabs was deficient performance or that there was a

reasonable probability the trial’s outcome would have been different had it been

deficient not to object. See Cox, 389 S.W.3d at 819; Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392.

      Johnson next makes a medley of ineffectiveness complaints based on the

status of the various counsel at trial. He first complains that his initial trial counsel

withdrew in an “undated” motion such that “the transaction evade[s] review,” in

some way due to counsel accepting a position in the prosecuting District Attorney’s

office. Johnson makes no further argument regarding the initial trial counsel and we

                                         –12–
find no ineffectiveness in the failure to object to a conflicted lawyer’s motion to

withdraw.

      Johnson also complains of various claimed procedural issues with the

appointment of the attorney pro tem selected to prosecute the case instead of the

elected District Attorney. He further complains that a second attorney appointed as

an attorney pro tem to assist in the trial was a former prosecutor who “represented

the ‘Lion’s Share’ of the State’s interest at trial.” Other than attempt to recite the

litany of what happened in conspiratorial tones, Johnson makes no argument how it

was deficient performance for counsel not to object and fails to describe any

reasonable probability of a different outcome based on a successful objection. On

this record, we overrule the issue. See Cox, 389 S.W.3d at 819; Goodspeed, 187

S.W.3d at 392.

      Johnson’s final assignment of error is entitled “Closing,” and consists of three

sentences presenting three different arguments. The first is about how the court’s “60

days extension in December 2016” deprived him of an opportunity to meet with trial

counsel when he was determined competent to stand trial. The second says Drs.

Proctor and Compton evaluated him without a court order, was “misconduct by the

State,” and deprived him of equal protection of federal and state laws. Lastly, he

complains that Dr. Roger’s report was based on insufficient evidence. None of these

complaints presents an argument for the ineffective assistance of counsel, and if they

did, the record is undeveloped such that we may not grant relief on that basis. See

                                        –13–
Goodspeed, 187 S.W.3d at 392. To the extent Johnson assigns some talismanic error

in these disjointed statements, and to the extent we have not already addressed these

complaints within our Chapter 46B discussion above, they present nothing for our

review.

       Finally, to the extent Johnson argues ineffective assistance of counsel from

the cumulative effect of counsel’s representation, we have identified no error on the

record before us and therefore have no basis on which to agree. See Chamberlain v.

State, 998 S.W.2d 230, 238 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (non-errors may not cumulate to

cause error).

       Having overruled Johnson’s varied complaints, we affirm the judgment of the

trial court.

                                           /Cory L. Carlyle//
220156f.u05                                CORY L. CARLYLE
Do Not Publish                             JUSTICE
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

                                       –14–
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                 JUDGMENT

THOMAS LINZ JOHNSON,                          On Appeal from the 282nd Judicial
Appellant                                     District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                              Trial Court Cause No. F15-58525-S.
No. 05-22-00156-CR          V.                Opinion delivered by Justice Carlyle.
                                              Justices Goldstein and Kennedy
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                  participating.

    Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 16th day of June, 2023.

                                       –15–