Court Opinion

ID: 9756592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 21:39:11.923085+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:26.409488
License: Public Domain

*723HARRELL, Judge, dissenting, joined by RAKER and GREENE, JJ.
I dissent. It is my view that, on the facts of this case, the Majority opinion improperly resolves the tension existing between a nonconforming use as a disfavored aspect of land use regulation, yet one that enjoys protection as a vested right. The Majority, in what I consider to be an opportunistic rush to declare extinguished the nonconforming use in the present case, imagines an intent to abandon the safe harbor of the nonconforming automobile filling and service station use simply because a prior tenant applied for and received paper approval of a special exception for a proposed conforming automobile filling station operation on the property in question. The Majority then misapprehends the significance of the utter failure of the tenant or property owner to take any affirmative act, subsequent to and in reliance on that paper special exception approval, to change or modify the nonconforming use into one conforming to the special exception and applicable zoning regulations.
There was neither abandonment nor termination of the nonconforming use here. The record is devoid of any evidence (substantial or otherwise) that the nonconforming automobile filling and service station use changed even by one whit since its establishment in the early 1960’s and running through the closure of the evidentiary record in this case. Viewed in criminal law vernacular and even in a light most favorable to the Majority’s view, the record at best reveals an intent to change (i.e., the obtention of the paper special exception approval) that might supply, had the Board of Appeals chosen to interpret it so, the mens rea of abandonment or termination, but which does not come close to satisfying the actus reus required before a declaration may be made of abandonment or termination of the constitutionally protected vested right to maintain and continue the nonconforming use.
A lawful nonconforming use includes generally a vested right to its continuance. Trip Assoc. v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 392 Md. 563, 574, 898 A.2d 449, 456 (2006); *724County Comm’rs of Carroll County v. Uhler, 78 Md.App. 140, 148, 552 A.2d 942, 945-46 (1989). As part of that vested right, the property owner is entitled to maintain that use, subject only to local ordinance limitations on expansion, abandonment, amortization, and the like. County Council of Prince George’s County v. E.L. Gardner, Inc., 293 Md. 259, 268, 443 A.2d 114, 119 (1982). Local ordinances regulating nonconforming uses generally seek to achieve the desired goal of the elimination of nonconforming uses through economic attrition and physical obsolescence. Id.
Abandonment or termination of a nonconforming use in modern land use regulation usually does not turn on the showing of mere intent to abandon the use. Compare Trip Assoc., 392 Md. at 577, 898 A.2d at 457-58, and Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dembo, 123 Md.App. 527, 539, 719 A.2d 1007, 1013-14 (1998) (citing Catonsville Nursing Home, Inc. v. Loveman, 349 Md. 560, 581-82, 709 A.2d 749, 759 (1998)), with Landay v. Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 173 Md. 460, 469, 196 A. 293, 297 (1938). Usually, it is the actual conduct of the user in ceasing the use for some statutory period that is determinative. Trip Assoc., id.; Canada’s Tavern, Inc. v. Town of Glen Echo, 260 Md. 206, 210-11, 271 A.2d 664, 666 (1970). As this Court said in Trip Associates, a sufficient predicate to conclude “abandonment or discontinuance must be active and actual.” Id. Indeed, the Montgomery County Zoning Ordinance governing abandonment of a nonconforming use places no premium on proof of intent to abandon, but instead focuses on actual stoppage or discontinuance of the use. See Mont. Cty. Code, § 59-G-4.14 (“A nonconforming use is abandoned if the nonconforming use stops for at least 6 months.”). I submit that the mere paper shuffling of the prior tenant in this case did not evince an intent to abandon the nonconforming use sufficient to proclaim abandonment or termination on the part of the property owner who continued the nonconforming use through a subsequent tenant. See Kastendike v. Baltimore Ass’n for Retarded Children, 267 Md. 389, 297 A.2d 745 (1972) (mere change of ownership does not destroy a nonconforming use; a use transferred to a successor *725in interest will continue to be legal so long as the nature and character of that use is unchanged and substantially the same facilities are used).
The major deviation between the Majority opinion and my view regards whether the automobile filling and service station use operated after the approval of the special exception was carried out solely under the legal authority of the special exception or was a continuation of the nonconforming use. The Majority’s facile conclusion that it was the former (see, e.g., Maj. op. at 696-97, 912 A.2d at 600 — “The automobile filling station was operated under the auspices of the special exception [until revoked on 11 July 2003, at the new tenant’s request] — even though it appears that none of the improvements attached as conditions to the special exception ... were made.”), is insupportable. It is undisputed that neither the tenant-applicant for the special exception nor the property owner implemented or established any of the improvements or changes in the operation of the use required by the special exception approval. This leads to the inescapable conclusion that the special exception never was established or relied on.
The Montgomery County Board of Appeals’s 1997 approval of the special exception in this case included 15 express conditions:
Accordingly, the Board grants the requested exception and variances subject to the following conditions. The variances[1] are granted subject to condition numbers 1 and 2.
*7261. As required by Section 59-A-1.27, the holder of the special exception is bound by all of its exhibits of record, the testimony of its witnesses and representations of its attorneys, to the extent that such evidence and representations are identified in this Opinion and except as altered by compliance with the following conditions.
2. Construction must conform to Exhibit No. 32(b) [a revised site plan].
3. The holder of the special exception must obtain approval of a stormwater management concept plan or waiver by the Montgomery County Department of Permitting Services prior to issuance of building permits. Particular attention needs to be paid to stormwater collecting on the adjacent properties. Any drainage problem which exists on the rear of the property must be corrected at the time the station renovation takes place.
4. The holder of the special exception must demonstrate compliance with Chapter 31B of the Montgomery County Code (on-site noise).
5. The holder of the special exception must contact the Department of Fire and Rescue Services to ensure compliance with the ordinance regarding the storage and disposal of hazardous materials. There must be no storage of hazardous waste or materials on-site, and no storage of derelict automobiles on-site as specified by the ordinance.
6. The holder of the special exception must request the State Highway Administration to relocate the sidewalk in the right-of-way to improve the pedestrian environment.
*7277. Pick-up of the trash dumpster must not take place before 7:00 AM.
8. Tanker truck deliveries of fuel must not take place between the hours of 11:00 PM and 7:00 AM.
9. Hours of operation of service bays are limited to 6:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. with gasoline sales available 24 hours daily.
10. Existing outdoor lifts must be enclosed. Access to these lifts must be provided by two overhead doors, which must be noise-insulating in nature. The new building musts be climate controlled. HVAC unit should not become a nuisance. Sound buffering of unit is required.
11. A 10' high wood wall will be installed along the majority of the rear property boundary and a portion of each side boundary as shown on the revised site plan, Exhibit No. 32(b).
12. The holder of the special exception must submit a landscape and lighting plan, in accord with agreed upon provisions as stated in this Opinion and Exhibit No. 32(b), to Technical Staff for review and approval. In addition, white pines should be of substantial size at planting — approximately 8'-12'. Lighting must be designed so as not to glare into the adjoining residential area. One copy of the approved plan must be submitted to the Zoning Supervisor at the Department of Permitting Services. One copy must be submitted to the Board for its records. All material must be installed according to plan and maintained and replaced as necessary.
13. During hours that the building is closed, convenience items may be sold only through the cash drawer. The building cannot be opened for sale of convenience items only.
14. A 26-fooi>-high sign is approved subject to approval by Montgomery County Sign Review Board.
*72815. If the property is sold or the filling station operation conveyed to another company, the new holder of the special exception must notify the Board in writing.
Zoning Ordinance § 59-A-4.53 (b)(2) of the Montgomery County Code provides that “[a] special exception is not valid after 24 months if the use is not established or a building permit is not obtained and construction started within the period.” The use in the present case, an automobile filling and service station, was established as a nonconforming use in the 1960’s and continued without change or modification after the paper special exception was approved. The use was not established, for purposes of the viability of the special exception, at any time at or after the approval of the special exception. The alternative scenario envisioned by the Zoning Ordinance, the issuance of a building permit where improvements are needed to implement the approved special exception (as was the case for most of the 15 conditions attached to the approval of the special exception), was not fulfilled. Thus, it was entirely correct for the Montgomery County Board of Appeals to declare the special exception (and variances) void because no affirmative actions were taken by the tenants or property owner to effectuate the approval within the time provided by the Zoning Ordinance. See generally Pemberton v. Montgomery County, 275 Md. 363, 340 A.2d 240 (1975) (administrative agency’s determination of whether a special exception was implemented or abandoned is a mixed question of fact and law and, thus, is entitled to deferential review on judicial review).
Were there evidence in this record that a tenant or the property owner had implemented, or even attempted to implement, any of the conditions of the special exception, or perhaps changed in some meaningful way the use as it operated before the special exception was approved (from which an inference might be drawn that the entity took advantage of the special exception), my view might be different. As noted supra, the proper legislative inducements for the elimination of nonconforming uses are economic attrition and physical obsolescence. In a sense, those very factors may have been *729on the prior tenant’s mind when it applied for the special exception and on the Board of Appeals’s mind when it approved the special exception. For example, Shell Oil’s purpose in seeking the special exception was described by the Board of Appeals’s in its approval as “to upgrade the existing gasoline filling station by installing new pump islands; ... construction of a new canopy; addition of landscaping in the front of the station ...; installation of a new freestanding sign ...; renovation of the exterior of the service station and service bay areas; ... installation of a trash enclosure; installation of new lighting ...” and other site improvements and upgrades. The Board’s approval was expressed in terms of permitting a “modernization” and “upgrade” of the existing filling station. Regretfully, not one thing proposed by Shell and approved by the Board ever came to fruition. Accordingly, there is no affirmative evidence that the nonconforming use was abandoned or terminated. At best, despite good intentions, no change in the status quo of the ongoing nonconforming use ever occurred. There is no basis in law or fact for the Majority opinion’s contrarian result. The Board of Appeals and the Circuit Court got it right.
I would affirm the judgment of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County.
Judges RAKER and GREENE authorized me to state that they join the views expressed in this dissent.

. The Majority opinion claims that "[o]nce the special exception was granted ..., the use of the Property came into conformance with the zoning law; hence, the nonconforming use ceased.” Maj. op. at 698, 912 A.2d at 611. This statement is a mere ipse dixit and erroneous. Not only would the use not conform with the Zoning Ordinance unless and until all of the conditions of the special exception approval were implemented, the existence of the variances, approved at the same time as the special exception, epitomize why the use as it continued could not be said to be in "conformance with the zoning law” or that the nonconforming use had ceased. The variances, mostly to set-back, landscaping, or screening requirements of the Zoning Ordinance prevailing at the time of approval of the special exception, were acknowl*726edged by the Board of Appeals as necessary because of existing conditions as the nonconforming use was being operated, as well as for the proposed improvements under the proposed special exception. Because no improvements were ever implemented, the continued use of the property as it was established in the 1960's continued to represent contravention of a host of Zoning Ordinance requirements.