Court Opinion

ID: 9485817
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:30:42.874434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:22.564681
License: Public Domain

MeMILLIAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
For the reasons discussed below, I cannot agree with the majority opinion’s holding that federal courts can vacate arbitration awards under the Railway Labor Act on public policy grounds. Accordingly, I would reverse the decision of the district court and enforce the decision of the Board reinstating the employee, subject to the usual back-to-work examination, and awarding him back pay less 90 days for mishandling the switch.
Whether there is a public policy exception under the Railway Labor Act is a difficult question. On the one hand, as noted by the majority opinion, the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards under the Railway Labor Act is “among the narrowest known to the law.” International Ass’n of Machinists v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 858 F.2d 427, 429 (8th Cir.1988). The Railway Labor Act limits judicial review of arbitration awards to three specific grounds: (1) failure of the board to comply with the requirements of the Railway Labor Act, (2) failure of the board to conform or confine itself to matters within the scope of its jurisdiction, and (3) fraud or corruption. 45 U.S.C. § 153 First (q). The Supreme Court has emphasized that arbitration awards under the Railway Labor Act “may be set aside only for the three reasons specified therein” and that “this statutory language means just what it says.” Union Pacific R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 93, 99 S.Ct. 399, 402, 58 L.Ed.2d 354 (1978) (per curiam) (citations omitted).
On the other hand, as also noted by the majority opinion, courts must refuse to enforce private contracts, including collective bargaining agreements and arbitration awards, where enforcement would violate the law or would be contrary to public policy. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 34-35, 68 S.Ct. 847, 852-53, 92 L.Ed. 1187 (1948). The Supreme Court discussed the public policy exception at some length in W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, International Union of United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum, & Plastic Workers, 461 U.S. 757, 103 S.Ct. 2177, 76 L.Ed.2d 298 (1983) (W.R. Grace), and United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S.Ct. 364, 98 L.Ed.2d 286 (1987) {Misco). Whether an arbitration award violates public policy is a legal question. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 103 S.Ct. at 2183-84. The public policy in question must be explicit, well-defined and dominant, and ascertained “by reference to the laws and legal precedents and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.” Misco, 484 U.S. at 43, 108 S.Ct. at 373, citing W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 103 S.Ct. at 2183. “Precisely because [the public *265policy exception] allows courts to by-pass the normal heavy deference accorded to arbitration awards and potentially to ‘judieialize’ the arbitration process, the judiciary must be cautious about overruling an arbitration award on the ground that it conflicts with public policy.” E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Grasselli Employees Independent Ass’n of East Chicago, Inc., 790 F.2d 611, 615 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 853, 107 S.Ct. 186, 93 L.Ed.2d 120 (1986).
The problem is that W.R. Grace and Misco were not decided under the Railway Labor Act but under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). Neither W.R. Grace nor Misco refers to the Railway Labor Act or Union Pacific R.R. v. Sheehan. Most of the cases that have applied the public policy exception do not involve the Railway Labor Act. See, e.g., Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d 1200 (9th Cir.1989) (banc), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 946, 110 S.Ct. 2205, 109 L.Ed.2d 531 (1990); Iowa Electric Light & Power Co. v. Local Union 204, IBEW, 834 F.2d 1424 (8th Cir.1987). As noted by the majority opinion, the handful of cases that involved the Railway Labor Act assumed without much analysis that the public policy exception applied. See op. at 260 n. 4 (citing cases). I have found only one case that expressly refused to recognize a public policy exception under the Railway Labor Act. Union Pacific R.R. v. United Transportation Union, 820 F.Supp. 1198 (D.Neb.1993), appeal docketed, No. 93-2119 (8th Cir. May 4, 1993).1
Absent some affirmative indication from the Supreme Court or Congress, I am unwilling to add the public policy exception to the narrow scope of judicial review of arbitration awards under the Railway Labor Act. The limited grounds for review are specified in the Railway Labor Act and the Supreme Court has stated that the statutory language means what it says. I am also reluctant to draw an analogy between the NLRA and the Railway Labor Act in order to transplant the public policy exception from one statute to the other. Although the Supreme Court has referred to the NLRA and other federal labor laws for assistance in construing the Railway Labor Act, the two statutory schemes are not the same, and cases decided under the NLRA are not necessarily controlling under the Railway Labor Act. See, e.g., Air Line Pilots Ass’n v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 80-81, 111 S.Ct. 1127, 1137, 113 L.Ed.2d 51 (1991); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 383, 392, 89 S.Ct. 1109, 1117-18, 1123 (1969).
Because Union Pacific’s public policy objection to the board’s decision does not fall within any of the three limited categories of judicial review specified by the Railway Labor Act, I would reverse the decision of the district court and enforce the decision of the board reinstating the employee, subject to the usual back-to-work examination, and awarding him back pay less 90 days for mishandling the switch. There has been no alleged fraud or corruption on the part of the board, and the board did not fail to comply with the Railway Labor Act or exceed its jurisdiction. The board did not reach the merits of the Rule G violation, that is, whether the employee had used alcohol or controlled substances, because it found that the hearing officer had abandoned his role as factfinder and, as a result, the employee had been denied the fair hearing prior to administering discipline to which he was entitled under the rules set forth in the collective bargaining agreement.
*266Finally, even assuming that there is a public policy exception under the Railway Labor Act, I would argue that the focus should be on whether the award, not the underlying misconduct, violates an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy ascertained by reference to laws and legal precedent. See Stead Motors v. Automotive Machinists Lodge No. 1173, 886 F.2d at 1215-17 (plurality) (Reinhardt, J.) (“the critical inquiry is not whether the underlying act for which the employee was disciplined violates public policy, but whether there is a public policy barring reinstatement of an individual who has committed a wrongful act”). Accepting for purposes of analysis that there is an explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy which is sufficiently based in laws and legal precedents against alcohol or drug use by employees on the job, I do not agree that that public policy would necessarily bar reinstatement of an employee who engaged in that sort of conduct in the past but who has since been rehabilitated. See Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 861 F.2d 665, 674 (11th Cir.1988) (“There is no public policy against rehiring former alcoholics, post-rehabilitation.”), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 871, 110 S.Ct. 201, 107 L.Ed.2d 154 (1989); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Air Lines Pilots Ass’n, 808 F.2d 76, 83-84 (D.C.Cir.1987) (enforcing award reinstating former alcoholic pilot who had been recertified by FAA for flight duty), cert, denied, 486 U.S. 1014, 108 S.Ct. 1751, 100 L.Ed.2d 213 (1988). Here, the board conditioned reinstatement of the employee upon the employee’s successfully passing the “usual back-to-work examination” which includes drug screening.

. The facts in that case are similar to those in the present case. A railroad employee tested positive for cocaine. A hearing was conducted and he was found to have violated Industry Rule G and was discharged. Certain procedural irregularities occurred at the hearing. The union appealed on procedural grounds and the matter was submitted for arbitration to a public law board. The board found that one of the procedural irregularities had fatally tainted the proceedings and required reversal. The board noted that it could not reinstate the employee to train service without safeguards in light of his cocaine use. The board awarded the employee backpay and conditioned his reinstatement upon participation in the railroad's substance abuse rehabilitation program. The railroad objected and sought to vacate the award on public policy grounds. The union argued that the scope of judicial review of arbitration awards under the Railway Labor Act did not include the public policy exception.