Court Opinion

ID: 9677963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:07:12.409816+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:00.664628
License: Public Domain

Ray THORNTON, Justice. This case involves a dispute ice. neighbors regarding the establishment of the boundary line between them. They each claim an interest in a strip of land fifteen-feet wide east and west, and one-hundred fifty feet north and south (hereinafter “the strip”) that separates their residential properties. The record owner of the strip has not been made a party to this litigation, and none of the parties to this litigation have any record title to the strip. The trial court attempted to resolve the dispute without joining the record owner of the strip. We reverse and dismiss the case. The litigation commenced when the plaintiffs, William and Delores Mitchell, brought an action against the defendant, Mary Ellen Koonce, seeking to quiet title by asserting ownership of the east half of the strip by adverse possession and seeking an injunction requiring Ms. Koonce to remove a fence on the eastern boundary of the strip. There is no showing that the record owner of the strip was given notice of the litigation. Ms. Koonce responded by asserting her own claim of title to the entire strip both by adverse possession and by acquiescence of the plaintiff to the eastern boundary of the strip as the property line. She did not join the record owner of the strip in her answer. The intervenor, Norris Surratt, joined in the litigation, seeking to protect his record title to property separate from the disputed strip from any claim of adverse possession. Because we conclude that the case must be dismissed, we do not reach the merits of the intervenor’s claims. This is a bizarre case in which we have two parties battling over the strip of land, but the record owner of the strip was not in court. The trial court acknowledged in its amended order that an unknown record owner still retains the eastern seven and one-half feet of the strip. Moreover, we note that Mr. Mitchell’s claim to the eastern half of the strip was contradicted by his own testimony that “[w]e do not own it and the Koonces do not own it. Neither party has paid taxes on it.” No boundary line was established between the Mitchells and Ms. Koonce, but the width of the strip belonging to the unknown holders of record title was reduced from fifteen feet to seven and one-half feet. We observe that, in the absence of the record owner, the trial court could not resolve all issues before it. The ownership of the strip remains subject to further dispute between the Mitchells, Ms. Koonce, and the unknown holder of record title. In order to establish a boundary between the Mitchells and Ms. Koonce, it is necessary to adjudicate the interest of the record owner. Therefore, the controversy over who eventually will own the strip between the Mitchells and Ms. Koonce remains unresolved, and will require further litigation to settle title.  An order is not final when it adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties. Stockton v. Sentry Ins., 332 Ark. 417, 965 S.W.2d 762 (1998). See also Ark. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The underlying policy of this rule is to avoid piecemeal appeals. Id. Even though an issue on which a court renders a decision might be an important one, an appeal will be premature if the decision does not, from a practical standpoint, conclude the merits of the case. Doe v. Union Pac. R.R., 323 Ark. 237, 914 S.W.2d 312 (1996).  The proceedings in the case before us were flawed because the record owner was not given notice of the petition to quiet title, and was not made a party. Therefore, we must resolve the question whether the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the interest of that record owner in the strip. We must raise issues of subject-matter jurisdiction even when such questions are not raised below. Vanderpool v. Fidelity & Casualty Ins. Co., 327 Ark. 407, 939 S.W.2d 280 (1997). In determining subject-matter jurisdiction, we note that a prima facie case to quiet title requires a showing that the plaintiff has legal tide to the property and is in possession. Gingles v. Rogers, 206 Ark. 915, 175 S.W.2d 192 (1943). In an action to quiet title, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing his or her title to the land. Bullock v. Duerson, 95 Ark. 445, 129 S.W. 1083 (1910). Arkansas Code Annotated sections 18-60-501 — 505 (1987) provide the statutory framework for actions to quiet title. Specifically, Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-503 (1987) provides the procedure by which notification must be given to all persons who claim an interest in the disputed land. The statute reads in pertinent part: (a) Upon the filing of the petition [to quiet title], the clerk of the court shall publish a notice of the filing of the petition on the same day of each week, for four (4) weeks in some newspaper published in the county . . . The petition shall describe the land and call upon all persons who claim any interest in the land or Hen thereon to appear in the court and show cause why the title of the petitioner should not be confirmed. Id.  It is well established that, in order to constitute adverse possession, the possession must be actual, open, continuous, hostile, exclusive, and be accompanied by an intent to hold adversely and in derogation of, and not in conformity with, the right of the true owner. Staggs v. Story, 220 Ark. 823, 250 S.W.2d 125 (1952). Implicit in this rule is that the record owner must be a party to the proceedings, or be given notice of the petition to quiet tide as provided by Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-503.  Here, nothing in the record reflects compliance with Ark. Code Ann. § 18-60-503, and because of the failure to give notice to the record owner, neither appellant nor appellee were able to make a prima fade case to quiet tide. Therefore, we hold that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights to the land. When the trial court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the appellate court also lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. Priest v. Polk, 322 Ark. 673, 912 S.W.2d 902 (1995).  In actions where the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction, we have reversed and dismissed without prejudice. Weiss v. Johnson, 331 Ark. 409, 961 S.W.2d 28 (1998). Accordingly, we reverse and dismiss without prejudice in this case. Reversed and dismissed without prejudice. Glaze and Brown, JJ., concur. Imber and Smith, JJ., dissent.