Court Opinion

ID: 9492793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:50:40.078491+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:29.834257
License: Public Domain

EMILIO M. GARZA, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with those portions of the majority opinion which find that Hinds County Sheriff Malcolm McMillan and Deputy Sheriff Les Tannehill are entitled to qualified immunity on most of Joseph Jones’s federal law claims against them. I also agree that McMillan and Tannehill are entitled to sovereign immunity for Jones’s state law claims. Accordingly, I concur with the opinion’s partial reversal of the lower court’s denial of summary judgment. However, the opinion affirms the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on Jones’s Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. I dissent from this portion of the opinion because Jones has not shown that either McMillan or Tannehill violated his clearly established rights.
Public officials acting within the scope of their official duties are shielded from liability by qualified immunity. See Kipps v. Caillier, 197 F.3d 765, 767-68 (5th Cir.1999). Qualified immunity applies unless: (1) the plaintiff alleges the violation of a clearly established constitutional right, and (2) the defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable. See Palmer v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 346, 351 (5th Cir.1999). Additionally, the record must at least “give[] rise to a genuine issue of material faet as to whether the defendant actually engaged in the conduct that violated the clearly-established right.” Kipps, 197 F.3d at 768 (quoting Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 666 (5th Cir.1999)). Once the defendant invokes qualified immunity by pleading good faith and shows that he was acting within the scope of his discretionary duty, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant violated clearly established law. See Salas v. Carpenter, 980 F.2d 299, 306 (5th Cir.1992).
The evidence before the district court on summary judgment consisted of affidavits from McMillan and Tannehill, which they submitted in support of their motion.1 *882McMillan’s affidavit states that he had no knowledge of Jones’s case until Jones served him with the complaint. Tanne-hill’s affidavit states that he sent a written detainer request to the Jackson City Jail after noticing that Judge Hilburn had an outstanding bench warrant for Jones, and that he then informed Judge Hilburn’s court administrator about the detainer.2
The evidence does not show that an act of either McMillan or Tannehill harmed Jones; he has not identified a policy of McMillan’s which harmed him3 and he has not shown that Tannehill’s placement of the detainer on him was improper. Instead, he attempts to show that, by virtue of their positions and because Tannehill placed the detainer on him, they owed him duties which they did not perform, thereby violating his rights.
Jones has not identified a legal duty McMillan owed him which he did not carry out. He argues that McMillan was deliberately indifferent to his rights, see, e.g., Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 992-93 (7th Cir.1988) (“[Supervisors who are merely negligent in failing to detect and prevent subordinates’ misconduct are not liable.... The supervisors must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye for fear of what they might see.”), but he makes no showing that McMillan knew about his situation, knew similar events had occurred, or failed to take reasonable steps to prevent Jones’s lengthy detention from occurring.
Jones also suggests that McMillan violated duties he owed Jones by virtue of the “special relationship” between the state and a prisoner. See generally DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, 199-200, 109 S.Ct. 998, 1005, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989) (“[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty to assume some responsibility for his safety and general well-being.”). He fails to show, as a legal or factual matter, that this “special relationship” existed here. Significantly, he does not rely on Mississippi law vesting sheriffs with certain responsibilities over, county jails to argue that McMillan was responsible for his custody, see Miss.Code Ann. § 47-1-49 (“The sheriff shall have charge of the ... jail of his county ... and of the prisoners in said jail”), presumably because Jones was in a city rather than a county jail, see id. § 47-1-49 (“In the case of a jail owned jointly by a county and municipality, ... the governing authorities of the county and municipality are hereby vested with full and complete authority, jurisdiction and control over such jointly owned jail facility and the governing authority of the municipality may appoint a jailer who shall be responsible for all municipal prisoners lodged in said jail in the same manner in which the sheriff is responsible for state prisoners.... ”). The state law he does rely on, Miss.Code Ann. § 47-3-1, applies when a prisoner is placed in a jail outside the arresting jurisdiction. It directs “the *883sheriff of the county to which the prisoner is so removed ... to have the body of the accused, without further order, before the proper court of the proper county, at its next term thereafter, on the first day of the term.” Id. (emphasis added). Because McMillan was not the sheriff in the county to which Jones was removed, § 47-3-1 imposed no duty on him.' Similarly, § 99-3-17, which directs “[e]very person making an arrest [to] take the offender before the proper officer without unnecessary delay for examination of his case,” id. §. 99-3-17, does not apply because McMillan and Tannehill did not arrest Jones. Cf. United States v. Hausman, 894 F.2d 686, 688-89 (5th Cir.1990) (concluding that a federal detainer was not equivalent to an arrest for purposes of the Speedy Trial Act).
Jones’s allegations against .Tannehill also fail. Tannehill had no greater duty as Deputy Sheriff than McMillan had as Sheriff, and thus his position alone does not render him responsible for Jones. Additionally, Jones has not shown that Tan-nehill had a general legal duty to follow up on the detainer he lodged, and Jones does not allege facts which might establish a specific duty to do so here.4
Qualified immunity is a shield from civil liability for “all but the plainly incompetent or those "who knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 1096, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 (1986). Accordingly, we “resolv[e] immunity questions at the earliest possible stage in litigation,” Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227, 112 S.Ct. 534, 536, 116 L.Ed.2d 589 (1991) to ensure that the immunity properly shields those it is meant to protect. Because the majority opinion undermines this protection by allowing claims against McMillan and Tannehill to proceed even though there is no evidence in the record which suggests' that they .violated Jones’s clearly established rights, I dissent from this portion of the majority’s opinion.

. Jones apparently responded to their motion, but he did not file his response and thus it is not before us. Cf. United States v. Coveney, 995 F.2d 578, 587-88 (5th Cir.1993) (discussing the appellee’s responsibility to ensure that the record is complete).

. On appeal, Jones disputes whether Tanne-hill actually notified Judge Hilburn’s adminr istrator that he had placed the detainer. He also alleges that "[t]his type of act occurred on numerous occasions prior to Joseph Jones [sic] dilemma” and that ''[a]ll of the aforementioned actors were aware of the prior occurrences, remedial measures were not taken, or if they were taken, they were wholly inadequate.” Because he does not support these allegations with evidence, they do not raise genuine issues of material fact. See Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (stating that the non-movant’s burden of responding to the mov-ant's showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact “is .not satisfied with some metaphysical .doubt as to the material facts, by conclusory allegations, by unsubstantiated assertions, or by only a scintilla of evidence.”) (citations and quotations omitted).

. McMillan's only "policy” which Jones specifically identifies is the space-sharing agreement with Madison County under which Jones was transferred to the Madison County Jail. Jones fails to show that this policy was facially improper or that it was applied to him improperly.

. For example, Jones does not allege that Tannehill was notified that the other charges against Jones were dropped, and that Jones was therefore only being held because of Tan-nehill’s detainer. Nor does he allege that Tannehill improperly documented the detain-er such that Jones’s case was "lost in the shuffle.” To the contrary, Tannehill’s affidavit states that he promptly notified the court administrator upon placing the detainer. (As noted, Jones disputes this, but he does so without citing evidence on which we could rely:)