Court Opinion

ID: 9906270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 16:01:34.825923+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:12.812259
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-4114     Document: 010110961687       Date Filed: 12/01/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         December 1, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                          Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                              Clerk of Court
  DOUGLAS BRUCE, an individual,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                           No. 22-4114
                                                     (D.C. No. 1:20-CV-00034-DBB)
  OGDEN CITY CORPORATION, an                                    (D. Utah)
  incorporated city in the State of Utah;
  MICHAEL P. CALDWELL, in his official
  capacity as the Mayor of Ogden City
  Corporation,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before BACHARACH, BRISCOE, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Plaintiff Douglas Bruce is a Colorado resident who owns a tract of land within

 the city limits of Ogden, Utah (the City), that contains two duplexes and one cottage.

 In early 2020, the City’s building official directed Bruce to rehabilitate or demolish

 one of the buildings on the property that had been damaged by a fire in 2018. Bruce

 failed to respond to that directive. The building official then petitioned the City’s

       *
          This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for
 its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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 mayor to issue a demolition order. Following a hearing, the mayor ordered the

 building to be demolished at Bruce’s expense.

        Bruce responded to the demolition order by filing this action against the City

 and its mayor. Bruce’s complaint included a Fifth Amendment takings claim, a

 procedural due process claim, and a substantive due process claim, all asserted

 pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as a state law tort claim. The district court

 granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all of the claims. Bruce now

 appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the City.

 Exercising jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm the judgment of the

 district court.

                                            I

                                  Factual background

        a) Bruce’s Property in Ogden

        Bruce, a Colorado resident, has owned a tract of land (the Property) in the City

 since 1983. The Property contains three residential buildings—two duplexes and one

 cottage—which together contain a total of five residential living spaces. The

 Property also has two street addresses: 3166 Grant Avenue and 3172 Grant Avenue.

 The building assigned the address of 3166 Grant Avenue is a side-by-side duplex

 with two residential living spaces. The buildings assigned the address of 3172 Grant

 Avenue include a side-by-side duplex with two residential living spaces, and a two-

 bedroom cottage that is located in the rear of the property. The five residential

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 spaces on the Property have a combined total of five kitchens, five bathrooms, five

 gas meters, five electric meters, and three water meters.

       The Property is treated as one tax parcel.

       b) Zoning history of the Property

       The three buildings on the Property were built in approximately 1907, prior to

 any zoning by the City.

       The City first implemented zoning regulations in 1951. At that time, the

 Property was zoned as “R-5,” which permitted the number and types of structures

 that exist on the Property. Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 14–15.

       In 1984, the area in which the Property is located was rezoned as “R-2A.” Id.

 at 15. R-2A zones generally “allow[ed] single family and duplex-type development,”

 as well as “subdivisions for senior housing and . . . other typical accessory residential

 uses such as churches, schools, [and] public facilities.” Id. at 96. City officials

 deemed Bruce’s property nonconforming because the number of structures on the

 property exceeded the density limits of the new zone. Id. at 105. The City, however,

 undertook no enforcement measures against the Property during the time that the

 Property was zoned as R-2A. Id.

       According to City records, R-2 zoning areas “[t]raditionally . . . had more

 single family homes than duplexes.” Id., Vol. 1 at 65. “This allowed [for] the

 creation of neighborhoods with a good mixture of housing styles and market ranges.”

 Id. Over time, however, new development in R-2 zoning areas came to be dominated

 by “duplex only style neighborhoods.” Id. Further, owners of new duplexes

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 typically occupied only a small percentage of those duplexes. Id. at 75. City

 officials considered “[t]his type of land use [a]s eliminating” the City’s “ability to

 provide different market levels of housing” and instead “create[ed] a starter home

 only type of community.” Id. at 65. City officials also considered “[t]his [to be]

 detrimental to neighborhood stability because” such neighborhoods were “always in

 transition,” which in turn impacted local schools. Id. at 155. In addition, city

 officials expressed concern that “[t]his . . . threaten[ed] to create areas of future slum

 and blight.” Id. at 88.

        These trends in the R-2 zoning areas led the City, on July 18, 2000, to adopt

 Ordinance No. 2000-44. That ordinance prohibited the development of two-family

 dwellings, i.e., duplexes, within all existing two-family zones, including zone R-2A,

 from July 18, 2000, to January 18, 2001, so that the City could review and consider

 the downzoning of all or a portion of the R-2 zones to single-family zone

 classification.

        On January 16, 2001, after lengthy consideration, public notice, 1 and public

 input, the City adopted Ordinance No. 2000-73 (the Ordinance). The Ordinance

 amended the City’s zoning map and, in relevant part, reclassified the R-2A two-

        1
         The public notice took two forms. First, the city “mail[ed] a letter or
 postcard to each individual property owner, to each tenant of property within [the]
 area being considered for a zone change, notifying them of the meeting[s], notifying
 them of staff to contact if they have questions about it, and also notifying them that
 they c[ould] either attend the meeting[s] or send . . . letter[s] regarding their
 concerns.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 92, 171. Second, the City placed a notice in the
 local newspaper informing the public of any upcoming meetings at which the issue
 would be discussed. Id. at 92.
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 family residential zones as “R-1-5,” meaning single-family residential. Id. at 49.

 The Ordinance stated, however, that “legally established duplexes, currently located

 in the areas subject to rezoning, should not be treated as non-conforming uses and

 that such uses, if allowed to continue as legal confirming uses, will not have a

 significant impact on the goals for rezoning.” Id. Consistent with this statement, the

 Ordinance resulted in the following provision being added to the City’s code: “Any

 two-family dwelling or duplex that was in legal existence prior to January 16, 2001,

 shall be considered legal conforming.” 2 Id., Vol. 2 at 5, 28.

       It is undisputed that Bruce did not judicially challenge the Ordinance at the

 time of its adoption. It is also undisputed that the City complied with all applicable

 state laws and local regulations in adopting the Ordinance.

       c) The Property’s history of noncompliance with City codes

       On or about March 7, 2005, Greg Montgomery, the City’s Manager of Current

 Planning, issued a certificate of noncompliance regarding the Property. The

 certificate stated that the Property was inspected on February 15, 2005, and that

 “[t]he following conditions and/or use of the building and/or premises render[ed] the

 property in violation of Ogden City Ordinances”: “Having a group dwelling (three

 buildings with dwelling units) on a lot that allows only one dwelling unit. Approval

 must be obtained to continue a use as a group dwelling.” Id., Vol. 1 at 238.

       2
          This provision did not operate to render Bruce’s Property as a whole legal
 conforming because the number of structures on the Property exceeded the density
 limits that existed both before and after passage of the 2001 Ordinance.
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       Beginning in late January of 2009, the City increased its efforts to enforce

 ordinance violations at the Property. On January 27, 2009, a City code enforcement

 officer visited the Property and notified Bruce that the Property was in violation of

 Ordinance 12-4-2 due to the presence of waste materials or junk on the Property. On

 February 10, 2009, a City code enforcement officer again visited the Property and

 advised Bruce that the Property was in violation of Ordinance 12-4-2 due to the

 presence of waste materials or junk on the Property. The City also advised Bruce on

 that date that “[d]ocuments still ha[d] not been provided” by him “for a legal

 Nonconforming use” of the Property “with the down zone from R-2 to R-1-5.” Id. at

 242. On March 4, 2009, a City code enforcement officer visited the Property and

 again advised Bruce of the waste and nonconforming use issues. The City noted that

 because notice of nonconformance “was given in 2004,” some of “the rights were

 lost,” but that it was aware “that the south duplex has been occupied and may have

 some rights.” Id. at 243. The City advised Bruce that it was up to him “to go

 through the approval process” for a nonconforming use, and it advised him of who to

 contact in the City’s planning department. Id.

       According to Bruce, at some point in 2009, the city mailed him a notice

 notifying him that the Property had been downzoned to single-family residential (the

 2009 Notice). Bruce alleges that, after receiving this 2009 Notice, he attempted to

 file an administrative appeal. Bruce alleges that the City ignored his appeal and

 ordered that the two units in the duplex at 3166 Grant Avenue and the unit in the rear

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 of 3172 Grant Avenue (the cottage) remain unoccupied indefinitely. Bruce also

 alleges that the City instructed him to board up those units.

       City code enforcement officers conducted seventeen additional inspections of

 the Property between April 13, 2009, and May 7, 2010. Following each of those

 visits, the City sent notices to Bruce advising him of the Property’s nonconformance

 with zone R-1-5, encouraging him to utilize the City’s approval process for

 nonconforming uses, and asking him to advise the City of his plans for the Property.

 The City also issued six citations to Bruce in 2009 due to ordinance violations at the

 Property.

       Bruce met with Greg Montgomery, the City’s Planning Manager, in early May

 2010. Following the meeting, Montgomery sent a letter to Bruce noting, in relevant

 part, (a) that the City mailed notices to property owners prior to the enactment of the

 Ordinance, (b) how the process of applying for a nonconforming use certificate

 works, and (c) emphasizing that a nonconforming certificate can be lost or revoked.

       On eleven occasions between July 1, 2015, and November 14, 2019, the City’s

 Code Services Department “sent abatement crews to secure the [P]roperty, remove

 discarded junk and debris from the yard, and/or cut the weeds.” Id. at 268.

       Beginning on June 2, 2015, the City sent sixteen Notices of Violation, fourteen

 Citations, and eleven Abatement Citations to Bruce regarding the Property.

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       d) Bruce’s failure to establish the legal existence of a noncomplying
         structure and/or a nonconforming use

       Utah law provides that “a nonconforming use or noncomplying structure may

 be continued by the present or future property owner.” Utah Code Ann.

 § 10-9a-511(1)(a). Utah law also, however, affords municipalities with substantial

 regulatory authority over nonconforming uses. More specifically, Utah law provides

 that municipalities “may provide for”:

       (a)    the establishment, restoration, reconstruction, extension, alteration,
              expansion, or substitution of nonconforming uses upon the terms and
              conditions set forth in the land use ordinance;
       (b)    the termination of all nonconforming uses, except billboards, by
              providing a formula establishing a reasonable time period during
              which the owner can recover or amortize the amount of his
              investment in the nonconforming use, if any; and
       (c)    the termination of a nonconforming use due to its abandonment.

 Id. § 10-9a-511(2). In addition, Utah law provides that “[u]nless [a] municipality

 establishes, by ordinance, a uniform presumption of legal existence for

 nonconforming uses, the property owner shall have the burden of establishing the

 legal existence of a noncomplying structure or nonconforming use through

 substantial evidence.” Id. § 10-9a-511(4)(a).

       Consistent with Utah law, the City’s Municipal Code “allows for the

 preservation of nonconforming uses of land, provided that the use legally existed

 before its current land use designation and has been continuously maintained since

 the time of the adoption of the land use ordinance changing the permitted use.” Aplt.

 App., Vol. 1 at 27 (citing City Municipal Code § 15-6-3). The City issues

 nonconforming certificates and in turn records those in the county records.

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        It is undisputed that the Property was noncompliant with City ordinances

 because multiple dwelling units were located on the Property, which was zoned for

 only one dwelling unit. Id. at 26, 238. As noted, the City repeatedly urged Bruce to

 seek a certificate for a nonconforming use for the Property. 3 Bruce, however, neither

 sought nor received a certificate for any nonconforming use for the Property.

        e) The demolition order

        On June 25, 2018, there was a fire in the building on the north side of the

 Property, i.e., the side-by-side duplex located at 3166 Grant Avenue. This building

 “ha[d] been vacant for an extended period of time,” “lack[ed] sanitation facilities,”

 and had been the subject of “38 calls” to the police. Id. at 267. “The fire damaged

 the exterior south wall window header and framing, and the fascia on the south side.”

 Id. at 266. “The interior structure was [also] damaged from the fire, including

 damage to the door framing and headers as well as wall framing . . . and coverings,”

 which “compromised the structural integrity of the building.” Id. “The interior

 ceiling . . . partially collapsed from fire damage and firefighting efforts.” Id. at 266–

 267.

        On January 8, 2020, Steve Patrick, the City’s Building Official, “declared the

 structure on the north side of the [Property] . . . to be a dangerous building and a

        3
          According to the record, “a nonconformance certificate is to help people
 understand what their rights are, that the nonconformity exists, and that it can be lost
 through certain neglect items.” Aplt. App., Vol. 2 at 129. In addition, “the
 certificate allows them to make sure that if they’re selling the property, the new
 buyer can know that it does have those rights,” i.e., “that the city actually recognizes
 those rights and it specifies what those rights are.” Id.
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  public nuisance” under the City’s ordinances. Id. at 265–266. On or about January

  9, 2020, Patrick sent a letter to Bruce that was titled “NOTICE OF DANGEROUS

  BUILDING AND ORDER TO ABATE.” Id. at 222. The letter listed the “Property

  Address” as “3166 Grant Avenue.” Id. The letter stated, under the title

  “DESCRIPTION”:

        That certain parcel with three separate structures. The structures are
        non-complying group dwellings, and have not been permitted by the
        city. The structure subject to this notice and order, henceforth referred
        to as “the structure” is located on the north side of the parcel with
        address number 3166. The structure being a wood framed two story
        structure facing west to the street, with wood siding, and two entrances
        on the west side, and an attached wood framed covered porch, and an
        entrance on the east and north side of the house, with a cement
        foundation, and cement cellar. The second structure, which is not
        subject to this notice and order, being a wood framed two story structure
        with address number 3172 located on the south side of the lot, with
        wood siding, and two entrances on the west side, and an attached wood
        framed covered porch, and an entrance on the east and north side of the
        house, with a cement foundation, and cement cellar. The third structure,
        which is not subject to this notice and order, located on the east side of
        the lot, being one level, with no visible house number, with an entrance
        on the south side of the building, with an attached lean to shed on the
        east side of the property, the parcel is located at 3166 Grant Ave.,
        Ogden City, Weber County, Utah[.]

        ***

        You, and each of you, are hereby notified that pursuant to the provisions
        of Section 16-8A-7[] of the Code for the Abatement of Dangerous
        Buildings, the undersigned, as the officer charged with the
        administration and enforcement of said Ordinance, has caused to be
        inspected the buildings herein above described and has determined that
        said buildings are a Dangerous Buildings within terms of Ordinance
        16-8A-6 A & B and particularly by reason of the following, to wit:

        16-8A-6: B4. Whenever any portion thereof has been damaged by fire,
        earthquake, wind, flood, or by any other cause, to such an extent that the
        natural strength or stability thereof is materially less than it was before

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        such catastrophe and is less than the minimum requirements of the
        Building Code for new buildings or similar structure, purpose or
        location.

        On June 25, 2018, there was a fire in the structure. The fire
        damaged the exterior south wall window header and framing, and
        the fascia on the south side “Figure 1”. The interior structure was
        damaged from the fire. The fire damage to the door framing and
        headers as well as wall framing and coverings have compromised
        the structural integrity of the building “Figure 2”. The interior
        ceiling has collapsed from fire damage and firefighting efforts
        “Figure 3”.

        16-8A-6: B12. Whenever the building or structure has been so damaged
        by fire, wind, earthquake or flood, or has become so dilapidated or
        deteriorated it has become: a) an attractive nuisance to children; b) a
        harbor for vagrants, criminals or immoral persons; or as to c) enable
        persons to resort thereto for the purpose of committing unlawful or
        immoral acts.

        The structure has been vacant for some time and lacks sanitation
        facilities. The water service has been off since May 21, 2003.
        Individuals have entered and illegally resided in the structure on
        numerous occasions. Since March, 2017, Ogden City Police
        Department has responded to 38 calls to the property “Figure 4”.

        16-8A-6: B19. Whenever any building or structure, or portion thereof,
        is vacant or open and:
        a. One or more of the doors, windows, or other openings are missing or
            broken;
        b. One or more of the doors, windows, or other openings are boarded up or
            secured by any means other than conventional methods used in the
            design of the building or permitted for new type, unless boarded in
            accordance with an approved vacant building plan pursuant to article B
            of this chapter; or
        c. In such condition that it constitutes an attractive nuisance or hazard to
            the public.

        The doors and windows of the structure have been broken down
        numerous times. The owner does not respond to requests from
        Ogden City Code Enforcement to close and secure the structure,
        remove junk from the yard, and remove people living in the

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        structure. These actions constitute an attractive nuisance and
        hazard to the public.

        On the following dates Ogden City Code Services sent abatement
        crews to secure the property, remove discarded junk and debris
        from the yard, and/or cut the weeds:
              1. July 1, 2015
              2. September 14, 2015
              3. August 19, 2016
              4. June 16, 2017
              5. July 28, 2017
              6. October 20, 2017
              7. October 31, 2017
              8. November 22, 2017
              9. January 25, 2018
              10. June 12, 2018
              11. November 14, 2019

        YOU ARE HEREBY ORDERED to immediately vacate the premises, if
        the premises are not already vacant. YOU ARE FURTHER ORDERED
        to obtain the proper permits as required and secure the building and to
        cause the building to be secured immediately. YOU ARE FURTHER
        ORDERED not to lease or rent any of the buildings, and to maintain the
        buildings at the above address VACANT and SECURE against entry
        until it has been determined that said buildings are no longer dangerous
        by the Ogden City Building Department.

        YOU ARE HEREBY ORDERED to obtain the proper demolition
        permits and commence to completion with reasonable diligence,
        demolition of said building not later than FIFTEEN (15) DAYS FROM
        THE DATE OF SERVICE OF THIS NOTICE, and to have said work of
        abatement completed within the limits of required permits. If you fail to
        do so, your non-compliance will result in the buildings being abated at
        the direction of Ogden City, and the total cost of said abatement shall be
        levied as a special assessment against said property.

        YOU ARE HEREBY ADVISED that all other persons having an
        interest in said building or land are hereby notified that they may, at
        their own risk and expense, so abate said buildings not later than the
        date herein above provided, so as to prevent the levy by Ogden City of
        the aforesaid special assessment on said property.

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        YOU ARE HEREBY FURTHER ADVISED that failure to abate
        (correct) the nuisance within the time specified is a misdemeanor.

        YOU ARE HEREBY FURTHER ADVISED that the building or
        structure identified in this Notice and Order has deteriorated to a
        condition that has rendered it uninhabitable. Any nonconforming use
        pertaining to the building or structure will be lost if the building or
        structure is not repaired or restored within six (6) months after the date
        this notice is mailed to you.

        YOU ARE HEREBY FURTHER ADVISED that any person having any
        record title or legal interest in the building may appeal the Notice and
        Order to the Ogden City Board of Building and Fire Code Appeals,
        provided the appeal is made in writing, within 10 days from the DATE
        OF SERVICE of such notice and order. Failure to do so constitutes a
        waiver of all rights to an administrative hearing and determination of
        the matter. SERVICE by mail in the manner herein provided shall be
        effective five (5) days after the date of mailing of this notice and order.

        YOU ARE HEREBY FURTHER ADVISED that non-compliance of this
        notice and order of the appeal process, within the time specified, will
        result in the recordation of this order with the County Recorders Office
        for permanent record on the property abstract.

  Id. at 222–26 (emphasis in original).

        A notice of the declaration was sent to Bruce on January 9, 2020, ordering him

  to “commence with the demolition/rehabilitation of the building not later than fifteen

  (15) days from the date of the Notice.” Id. at 266. Bruce failed to respond to the

  notice. More specifically, Bruce failed to commence demolition or rehabilitation

  work on the Property, did not seek to “obtain permits for either the repair or

  demolition of the building within the required period,” and did not appeal the

  declaration and notice. Id. at 266.

        On February 4, 2020, Patrick petitioned Michael Caldwell, the Mayor of the

  City, “to hold a hearing and order” Bruce “to show cause why [the City] should not

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  abate the dangerous building.” Id. at 265. A hearing was scheduled for March 6,

  2020, and Bruce was notified of the hearing. “Bruce appeared at the hearing via

  telephone and was also represented in person through his attorney, Aaron C. Garrett.”

  Id. On April 8, 2020, Caldwell determined that “the building [wa]s in fact dangerous

  as defined in the Ogden Municipal Code and [was] a public nuisance.” Id. at 268.

  Caldwell also found that Bruce “ha[d] not shown valid reasons why the city should

  not proceed with the demolition of the building.” Id. Caldwell therefore ordered the

  building to be demolished and “the cost of such demolition” to “be recovered by a tax

  lien on the property.” Id. at 269.

                                               II

                                       Procedural history

        On March 16, 2020, Bruce initiated these proceedings by filing a complaint in

  federal district court against the City and Caldwell in his official capacity as Mayor

  of the City. Bruce alleged in his complaint that he first received notice from the City

  in 2009 “that it had changed the zoning of the Property to a single family residential

  zone.” Id. at 11. Bruce further alleged that “[b]efore 2009 [he] had spent tens of

  thousands of dollars on renovations and upgrades to the residential units located on

  the Property.” Id. Bruce alleged that he “received no hearing or other proper due

  process before the Property was down-zoned.” Id. Bruce alleged that “[h]e

  attempted an administrative appeal” of the down-zoning, but the “City ignored his

  appeal,” “ordered that the two units at 3166 Grant Avenue and the unit in the rear of

  3172 Grant Avenue must remain unoccupied and empty forever,” and “instructed

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  [him] to board up the units and otherwise close them from residential use.” Id. at 11–

  12. Bruce alleged that, “[a]gainst his will, [he] complied with this order even though

  it meant he had lost the substantial income he could generate from these three units.”

  Id. at 12. Bruce also alleged that he “had two tenants in the side-by-side duplex

  located at 3172 Grant Avenue, who [the] City agreed could remain in the homes until

  they moved.” Id. “After that, however, [the] City [allegedly] mandated that [Bruce]

  could only lease one of the two units at 3172, and only one of his five units on the

  Property, at any given time.” Id.

         The first three causes of action alleged in the complaint sought relief under 42

  U.S.C. § 1983 for various constitutional violations allegedly committed by the City

  and/or Caldwell. The first of those three causes of action, titled “DEPRIVATION

  OF PROPERTY UNDER FIFTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS,” alleged that

  “Defendants maintain[ed] a policy, practice, custom, or procedure through which

  [they] downzone[d] multi-unit parcels to single-family dwellings without providing

  owners proper notice, reasonable ability to contest the zoning change before a neutral

  party, and the right to appeal.” Id. at 15. It further alleged that “[a]s a result of this

  policy, practice, custom, or procedure, Defendants ha[d] unlawfully deprived [Bruce]

  of his private property.” Id.

         The second cause of action, titled “VIOLATION OF PROCEDURAL DUE

  PROCESS—FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT,” alleged that Bruce’s “legitimate

  property interest . . . in the Property was abridged, under color of state law, without

  appropriate due process.” Id. at 16. More specifically, the cause of action alleged

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  that Defendants “ha[d] unlawfully deprived [Bruce] of his private property” “[a]s a

  result of [their] policy, practice, custom, or procedure” by which they “downzone[d]

  multi-unit parcels to single-family dwellings without providing owners proper notice,

  reasonable ability to contest the zoning change before a neutral party, and the right to

  appeal.” Id.

        The third cause of action, titled “VIOLATION OF SUBSTANTIVE DUE

  PROCESS,” alleged that due to defendants’ “policy, practice, custom, or procedure

  which prefer[red] single family units to the multi-family unit property maintained by

  [Bruce],” defendants “ha[d] unlawfully deprived [Bruce] of his private property” and

  “violated [his] substantive due process rights under the United States Constitution.”

  Id. at 16–17.

        The fourth cause of action alleged in the complaint was titled

  “INTENTIONAL INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS RELATIONS UNDER

  UTAH STATE LAW.” Id. at 18. This cause of action alleged that “Defendants

  intentionally interfered with [Bruce’s] existing or potential economic relations with

  respect to the Property” and “did so with the improper and predominant purpose of

  injuring [him] and his financial interest in the Property.” Id.

        On February 15, 2022, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment with

  respect to all of the claims asserted in Bruce’s complaint. Defendants argued that

  Bruce’s Fifth Amendment takings claim failed as a matter of law because the subject

  ordinance did not deprive Bruce of all economically viable uses of the Property, there

  was no evidence of diminution in value, and any alleged diminution in value did not

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  amount to a taking. Defendants in turn argued that Bruce’s “claim of a procedural

  due process violation should be dismissed as a matter of law because the challenged

  Ordinance was the result of legislative action.” Id., Vol. 2 at 160. As for Bruce’s

  substantive due process claims, defendants argued those should be dismissed because

  the challenged government action was not arbitrary and capricious, or capable of

  shocking the judicial conscience. Finally, defendants argued that Bruce’s tortious

  interference claim was fatally flawed because he “failed and refused to provide any

  evidence concerning the damages sustained by him as a result of [the] City’s

  actions.” Id., Vol. 1 at 46.

         Bruce opposed the motion, in part. Specifically, Bruce argued that genuine

  issues of material fact precluded summary judgment on his constitutional claims

  against the City, but he “d[id] not dispute dismissal of . . . Caldwell in his official

  capacity [as Mayor] or the dismissal of the interference with business relations

  claim.” Id., Vol. 2 at 23 n.4.

         Defendants filed a reply brief in support of their motion for summary

  judgment. In it, defendants argued, in relevant part, that some of the statements and

  admissions contained in Bruce’s response to the motion for summary judgment

  established that his claims arose long before his complaint was filed and that, as a

  result, his constitutional claims were untimely. Bruce filed a surreply arguing, in

  relevant part, that his claims were not time-barred.

         On November 8, 2022, the district court issued a written order granting

  defendants’ motion for summary judgment. The district court concluded, as an initial

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  matter, that to the extent Bruce was alleging the existence of any constitutional

  violations stemming from the enactment of the Ordinance and the issuance of the

  2009 Notice, those claims were time-barred. The district court next considered

  “whether a reasonable jury could find that the 2020 Demolition Order and its related

  proceedings were a Fifth Amendment taking without just compensation, a denial of

  procedural due process, or a violation of substantive due process.” Id., Vol. 4 at 25.

  The district court concluded that “[b]ecause [Bruce] d[id] not allege a permanent

  physical invasion of the Property,” it only needed to consider “whether [he] ha[d]

  sufficient evidence to show that either . . . the City completely deprived [him] of ‘all

  economically beneficial use’ of his property under Lucas[ v. South Carolina Coastal

  Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)] or” that “the evidence [wa]s sufficient to satisfy the

  Penn Central[ Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)] analysis.” Id. at

  26. The district court concluded that Bruce’s evidence was insufficient to show a

  taking under Lucas because it did not show that defendants denied him all

  economically beneficial use of the Property. Id. at 27–29. The district court also

  concluded that Bruce’s evidence was insufficient to show a taking under Penn

  Central because he provided no evidence of economic impact or a distinct,

  investment-backed expectation to maintain a nuisance; lastly, the district court

  concluded that regulating a nuisance is quintessential government action.

        As for Bruce’s procedural due process claim, the district court concluded that

  “[i]t [wa]s undisputed that [Bruce] ha[d] a property interest in the Property.” Id. at

  32. The district court in turn concluded that the record evidence established that

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  Bruce received notice from the City that it was considering demolishing one of the

  buildings on the Property, that Bruce was afforded a hearing, that Bruce appeared

  remotely at the hearing and was represented in-person through his attorney, and that

  the mayor rendered a decision after hearing the evidence and the arguments from

  both sides. Id. at 33. Although the district court noted that Bruce’s position was that

  “the mayor’s role as arbiter violated procedural due process,” it rejected that view,

  noting that Bruce “fail[ed] to offer any evidence that the City’s mayor faced any

  circumstances that would lead him not to be impartial and fair.” Id. at 33, 34.

        Finally, as for Bruce’s substantive due process claim, the district court noted

  that the “City Code authorizes the City to abate dangerous buildings that ‘endanger

  the life, limb, health, morals, property, safety or welfare of the general public or their

  occupants,’” and the “[r]ecord evidence show[ed] that the . . . City Building Official

  reviewed the condition and history of the structure at 3166 Grant Avenue,”

  “observ[ed] that the structure had been vacant for years, had experienced a fire in

  2018, and was the location of 38 calls to the police over the last three years,” and

  “concluded that the property was dangerous.” Id. at 36. The district court further

  noted that “[a]fter hearing from the building official and from [Bruce], the mayor

  also concluded that the building was dangerous and should be demolished.” Id. The

  district court concluded that “[n]o reasonable jury could find that this constitutes

  ‘outrageous’ conduct.” Id.

        Final judgment was entered in the case on November 8, 2022. Bruce filed a

  timely notice of appeal on November 22, 2022.

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                                             III

        In his appeal, Bruce challenges the entirety of the district court’s decision

  granting summary judgment in favor of the City. Specifically, Bruce argues that the

  district court erred in concluding that (1) many of his claims were time-barred, (2) he

  could not establish a Fifth Amendment takings claim, (3) the mayor was a neutral

  decision-maker, and (4) the City’s actions did not shock the conscience so as to give

  rise to a substantive due process claim.

        “We review the district court’s rulings on summary judgment de novo.” Deer

  Creek Water Corp. v. City of Okla. City, 82 F.4th 972, 979 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting

  Hamric v. Wilderness Expeditions, Inc., 6 F.4th 1108, 1121 (10th Cir. 2021) (internal

  quotation marks omitted)). “Summary judgment is appropriate if there is no genuine

  dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of

  law.” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

        1) Statute of limitations

        In his first issue on appeal, Bruce argues that the district court erred in

  concluding that the statute of limitations had run on his § 1983 claims to the extent

  they related to downzoning. “We review whether a district court properly applied a

  statute of limitations de novo.” Allen v. Envtl. Restoration, LLC, 32 F.4th 1239, 1243

  (10th Cir. 2022).

        Because § 1983 itself contains no statute of limitations, § 1983 claims are

  governed by the statute of limitations generally applicable to personal injury actions

  in the state where the claims arose. Thus, in this case, Utah’s four-year residual

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  statute of limitations governs Bruce’s § 1983 claims. See Fratus v. DeLand, 49 F.3d

  673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995).

        The district court concluded, in addressing the timeliness of Bruce’s § 1983

  claims, that to the extent Bruce was alleging the existence of any constitutional

  violations stemming from the enactment of the Ordinance or the issuance of the 2009

  Notice, those claims were time-barred, but to the extent Bruce’s alleged

  constitutional violations stemmed from the 2020 Demolition Order and the related

  proceedings, those claims were not time-barred. More specifically, the district court

  noted that “by 2009, [Bruce] had notice of the . . . Ordinance . . . and was injured by

  it.” Aplt. App., Vol. 4 at 24. Because he “did not file this complaint until 2020, the

  four-year statute of limitations had long since run.” Id. As for the 2009 Notice, the

  district court noted that Bruce “knew about the [notice],” “attempted to appeal it,”

  “and then complied with it” all in 2009, “which [allegedly] caused him injury in the

  form of lost rental income.” Id. “By 2013,” the district court concluded, “the

  applicable four-year statute of limitations had expired.” Id. Finally, the district court

  concluded that, to the extent Bruce’s alleged constitutional violations stemmed from

  the 2020 Demolition Order and the related proceedings, those claims were not

  time-barred because Bruce “filed his complaint in March 2020, well within the

  four-year statute of limitations.” Id. at 25.

         Bruce argues in his appeal that “the touchstone for [his] takings and due

  process claims was the demolition order issued by” the Mayor “on March 6, 2020.”

  Aplt. Br. at 11. He argues that “[i]t was through this order that [the] City ordered his

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  building demolished, which constitutes a taking under the 5th Amendment.” Id.

  More specifically, Bruce argues that “[t]he regulations” he now “challenge[s] . . .

  with his lawsuit did not rise to the level of a total taking until Appellees ordered the

  demolition of the building at 3166 Grant Avenue on the Property.” Id. at 8 (emphasis

  in original). “Prior to that point,” Bruce asserts, “there was some theoretical residual

  value for use of the Building.” Id. Consequently, he argues, “no statute of

  limitations began to run on any of [his] claims until that order for demolition was

  issued, in January 2020.” Id. at 8–9.

        We begin with Bruce’s assertion that the demolition order resulted in a “total

  taking” of the Property. For the reasons we shall discuss below in our analysis of

  Bruce’s Fifth Amendment takings claim, Bruce has failed to demonstrate that the

  demolition order resulted in a “total taking” of the Property. We therefore reject his

  statute-of-limitations arguments to the extent that they rest on this “total takings”

  theory.

        Notably, Bruce does not otherwise challenge any of the conclusions that

  underpin the district court’s statute of limitations rulings. Specifically, he has not

  challenged the district court’s determinations that he “received notice of the

  [Challenged Ordinance] no later than 2009, when Defendants mailed him [the 2009

  Notice],” or that “Defendants began enforcing the ordinance on the Property” in

  2009. Aplt. App., Vol. 4 at 24. Nor does Bruce challenge, at least directly, the

  district court’s conclusion that because he “did not file this complaint until 2020, the

  four-year statute of limitations had long since run,” meaning that “[a]ny

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  constitutional violations resulting from the . . . Ordinance are time-barred.” Id.

  Lastly, Bruce does not challenge the district court’s conclusion that “[b]y 2013, . . .

  the applicable four-year statute of limitations had expired” on any claim arising out

  of the 2009 Notice. Id.

        We therefore affirm the district court’s statute-of-limitations rulings.

        2) The Fifth Amendment Takings claim

        Bruce argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in

  favor of the City on his Fifth Amendment takings claim. Bruce argues in support that

  “all economically beneficial use of” the Property “has been eliminated by the

  municipal demolition order.” Aplt. Br. at 13. According to Bruce, “[n]o additional

  or replacement building will be permitted to be built” on the Property at 3166 Grant

  Avenue, “as it is considered [by the City to be] one in the same with the buildings

  located at 3172 Grant Avenue,” “and the revised local ordinances do not allow

  multiple units on one parcel.” Id. at 14. “As such,” Bruce argues, “by ordering the

  demolition of the Building at 3166 Grant Avenue, [defendants] have forced [him] to

  hold the ground fallow and unused, and have erased any economic use of that

  property.” Id.

        “The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause provides that ‘private property [shall

  not] be taken for public use, without just compensation.’” N. Mill St., LLC v. City of

  Aspen, 6 F.4th 1216, 1224 (10th Cir. 2021) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). “The

  Supreme Court has recognized that government regulation of private property may, in

  some instances, be so onerous that its effect is tantamount to a direct appropriation or

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  ouster—and that such regulatory takings may be compensable under the Fifth

  Amendment.” Id. (quoting Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537 (2005)

  (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The Court has identified two categories of

  regulatory action that are per se takings: (1) where government requires an owner to

  suffer a permanent physical invasion of her property—however minor, and (2)

  regulations that completely deprive an owner of all economically beneficial use of

  her property.” Id. (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 538) (internal quotation marks

  omitted).

        In addition to these two categories of per se takings, “a taking still may be

  found” “when a regulation impedes the use of property without depriving the owner

  of all economically beneficial use.” Murr v. Wisconsin, 582 U.S. 383, 393 (2017).

  In such situations, “a taking . . . may be found based on a complex of factors,

  including (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to

  which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and

  (3) the character of the governmental action.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

        “A central dynamic of the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence . . . is its

  flexibility,” by which courts “reconcile two competing objectives central to

  regulatory takings doctrine.” Id. at 394. “One is the individual’s right to retain the

  interests and exercise the freedoms at the core of private property ownership.” Id.

  Second “is the government’s well-established power to ‘adjus[t] rights for the public

  good.’” Id. (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979)). In balancing these

  two competing objectives, “the analysis must be driven by the purpose of the Takings

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  Clause, which is to prevent the government from forcing some people alone to bear

  public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a

  whole.” Id. (quoting Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617–18 (2001))

  (internal quotation marks omitted).

         In determining whether a regulatory taking has occurred, a reviewing court

  must determine “the proper unit of property against which to assess the effect of the

  challenged governmental action.” Id. at 395. That is “[b]ecause [the] test for

  regulatory taking requires” a reviewing court “to compare the value that has been

  taken from the property with the value that remains in the property.” Id. (quoting

  Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497 (1987)) (internal

  quotation marks omitted). “To the extent that any portion of property is taken, that

  portion is always taken in its entirety; the relevant question, however, is whether the

  property taken is all, or only a portion of, the parcel in question.” Id. (quoting

  Concrete Pipe & Products of Cal., Inc v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust for

  Southern Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 644 (1993)).

         In this case, Bruce effectively argues that the proper unit of property against

  which to assess the effect of the challenged governmental action is the “building and

  property located at 3166 Grant Avenue,” i.e., the specific building that is the subject

  of the demolition order. Aplt. Br. at 12 (capitalization omitted). The City argues, in

  contrast, that the proper unit of property for purposes of analysis is “the entire subject

  parcel,” i.e., the Property. Aple. Br. at 17.

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         We conclude that the City has the better of the argument. In Murr, the

  Supreme Court noted that it “has declined to limit the parcel in an artificial manner to

  the portion of property targeted by the challenged regulation.” 582 U.S. at 396. The

  Court also held that “courts should give substantial weight to the treatment of the

  land, in particular how it is bounded or divided, under state and local law.” Id. at

  397. In this case, it is undisputed that, although the Property encompasses two street

  addresses, it is a single parcel of real estate that the state and the City have long

  treated as one tax parcel, and that the City has treated as a single unit for purposes of

  zoning. Thus, in assessing whether the demolition order resulted in a taking for

  purposes of the Fifth Amendment, we conclude we must treat the Property as a whole

  as the “proper unit of property against which to assess the effect of the challenged

  governmental action,” rather than simply the building that is the subject of the

  demolition order. Id. at 395.

         As the Supreme Court has noted, defining the proper unit of property is often

  “outcome determinative.” Id. That is because “the relevant question . . . is whether

  the property taken is all, or only a portion of, the parcel in question.” Id. (quoting

  Concrete Pipe, 508 U.S. at 644). And that is true here, at least in part. Even

  assuming that the demolition order resulted in a taking by the City of the portion of

  the Property associated with 3166 Grant Avenue, that portion represents only part of

  the Property. More specifically, there is no evidence that the demolition order

  required Bruce “to suffer a permanent physical invasion” of the Property or

  “completely deprive[d]” him “of all economically beneficial use of” the Property.

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  N. Mill St., 6 F.4th at 1224 (quoting Lingle, 544 U.S. at 537). Indeed, as the district

  court correctly noted, Bruce may still rent, occupy, or sell the Property after the

  offending duplex is demolished. Thus, the Property in its entirety was not taken by

  the demolition order. Consequently, that eliminates the possibility that the

  demolition order resulted in a per se taking of the Property.

        That leaves only the possibility of a taking “based on a complex of factors,

  including (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent to

  which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations; and

  (3) the character of the governmental action.” Murr, 582 U.S. at 393. With respect

  to the first of these factors, the district court concluded that Bruce “provided no

  evidence of the value that remains in the Property or of the value that has been taken

  by the demolition order.” Aplt. App., Vol. 4 at 30. With respect to the second factor,

  the district court concluded that when Bruce purchased the Property in 1983, he had

  no distinct, investment-backed expectation in maintaining a nuisance. Id.

  (capitalization omitted). Consequently, the district court concluded that “the 2020

  Demolition Order did not interfere with [Bruce]’s distinct investment-backed

  expectations.” Id. at 31. Lastly, with respect to the third factor, the district court

  concluded that “[r]egulating a nuisance is quintessential government action.” Id.

  The district court further noted that Bruce “offer[ed] no evidence that the duplex at

  3166 Grant Avenue is not a nuisance,” and that, “[i]nstead, the unrebutted evidence

  show[ed] that the building is dangerous because it is structurally deficient and left

  unsecured.” Id. Notably, Bruce does not discuss these three factors at all in his

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  opening appellate brief, let alone make any attempt to rebut the district court’s

  conclusions regarding these factors.

        We therefore conclude that the district court correctly granted summary

  judgment in favor of the City on Bruce’s Fifth Amendment Takings claim.

        3) The procedural due process claim

        Bruce next argues that the district court erred in granting summary judgment

  in favor of the City on his procedural due process claim. Bruce asserts that he “was

  not provided notice of the zoning changes as they were being considered and enacted

  in the 2000–2001 time period, and in the summary judgment briefing, Appellees

  presented no admissible evidence to contradict his sworn statement.” Aplt. Br. at 16.

  Bruce also challenges the hearing that preceded the demolition order, arguing that

  “[d]ue process requires a neutral and detached decision maker; and in these

  circumstances using the executive officer of the municipal body bringing the claim

  against [him] as the presiding judge does not meet this basic due process

  requirement.” Id. at 17.

        Bruce’s argument that he failed to receive notice of the zoning changes to the

  Property fails for at least three reasons. First, the district court found that Bruce

  “admit[ted] that he received notice of the [2001] ordinance by no later than 2009,

  when Defendants mailed him a notice.” Aplt. App., Vol. 4 at 24. Bruce does not

  dispute this finding in his opening appellate brief. Second, and relatedly, the district

  court concluded that “by 2009, [Bruce] had notice of the . . . Ordinance . . . and was

  injured by it,” but “did not file this complaint until 2020.” Id. As a result, the

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  district court concluded that “the four-year statute of limitations had long since run”

  when Bruce filed his complaint in 2020, and “[a]ny constitutional violations resulting

  from the 2001 Ordinance [we]re time-barred.” Id. Again, Bruce does not dispute

  this conclusion in his opening appellate brief, and therefore, to the extent his

  procedural due process claim is based upon failure to receive notice of the Ordinance,

  it is time-barred. Third, even if the claim was not time-barred, it clearly lacks merit.

  That is because the Supreme Court long ago “held that constitutional procedural due

  process does not govern the enactment of legislation,” and we in turn have held that

  “the adoption of a general zoning law is a legislative action.” 4 Onyx Props. LLC v.

  Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Elbert Cnty., 838 F.3d 1039, 1045–46 (10th Cir. 2016).

        As for Bruce’s arguments regarding the propriety of the Mayor presiding over

  the demolition hearing, it is well established that due process requires an “impartial

  and disinterested” adjudicator, Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242 (1980),

  and prohibits procedures that “might lead” “the average [person] as a judge . . . not to

  hold the balance nice, clear, and true between” the opposing parties, Tumey v. State

  of Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927). That said, we have held that “a substantial

  showing of personal bias is required to disqualify a hearing officer or tribunal.”

        4
           In Onyx, this court “recognize[d] that not all actions by municipal boards are
  legislative,” and that “[w]hen the action has a limited focus (only a few people or
  properties are affected) and is based on grounds that are individually assessed, it may
  be more adjudicative than legislative and therefore subject to traditional procedural
  requirements of notice and hearing.” 838 F.3d at 1046. That exception clearly does
  not apply to the 2001 Ordinance in this case, because it applied generally to all R-2
  zoning areas in the City.
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  Corstvet v. Boger, 757 F.2d 223, 229 (10th Cir. 1985). Further, a person claiming

  bias on the part of a hearing officer or tribunal “must overcome a presumption of

  honesty and integrity in those serving as adjudicators.” Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S.

  35, 47 (1975). In applying this presumption, we have held that “[d]ue process is

  violated only when ‘the risk of unfairness is intolerably high’ under the

  circumstances of a particular case.” Mangels v. Pena, 789 F.2d 836, 838 (10th Cir.

  1986) (quoting Withrow, 421 U.S. at 58). We have also held that “[b]ecause honesty

  and integrity are presumed on the part of a tribunal, there must be some substantial

  countervailing reason to conclude that a decisionmaker is actually biased with respect

  to factual issues being adjudicated.” Id. (citations omitted).

        The Supreme Court has, over the past century, applied these same procedural

  due process principles to three cases, two of which Bruce cites in his opening brief,

  involving mayor’s courts, i.e., where the mayor of a town served both in an executive

  capacity and a judicial capacity overseeing certain crimes and alleged ordinance

  violations. In Tumey, the mayor was authorized to try certain crimes and fine those

  persons whom he found guilty. 273 U.S. at 516–17. Notably, any fines that were

  paid partly supplemented the mayor’s salary, and the remainder was deposited into

  the village’s general fund, which the mayor had substantial control over. Id. at 517–

  19. The Supreme Court held in Tumey that the mayor was not an impartial

  adjudicator because of his personal and official interests in securing convictions and

  in turn imposing fines. Id. at 523.

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        A year later, in Dugan v. Ohio, the Court heard an appeal from a conviction

  “before the mayor’s court of the city of Xenia, Greene county, Ohio.” 277 U.S. 61,

  62 (1928). The defendant was convicted by the mayor of possessing intoxicating

  liquor and fined $1,000. Id. at 63. “The defendant . . . raised the question of the

  constitutional impartiality of the mayor to try the case.” Id. at 62. In addressing this

  question, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]he mayor ha[d] no executive, and

  exercise[d] only judicial, functions,” and his “salary [wa]s fixed by the votes of the

  members of the [city] commission other than the mayor, he having no vote therein.”

  Id. at 63. The Court also noted that the mayor “receive[d] no fees” from fines

  imposed on criminal defendants. Id. In addition, the Court distinguished the case

  from Tumey because “[t]he mayor of Xenia receive[d] a salary which [wa]s not

  dependent on whether he convict[ed] in any case or not,” and even though “his salary

  [wa]s paid out of a fund to which fines accumulated from his court,” that was “a

  general fund, and he receive[d] a salary in any event, whether he convict[ed] or

  acquit[ted].” Id. at 65. The Court therefore rejected the defendant’s procedural due

  process argument.

        The third and most recent case involving a mayor’s court was Ward v. Village

  of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972). Although the mayor’s salary in that case did not

  depend on fines from convictions, the mayor did perform executive functions in

  addition to his judicial functions, and the revenue from fines constituted a

  “substantial portion of [the] municipality’s funds.” Id. at 59. The Supreme Court

  held that, because the mayor exercised “executive responsibilit[i]es for village

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  finances,” this created an impermissible incentive for him “to maintain the high level

  of contribution from [his] court” to the village’s general fund. Id. at 60. The Court

  therefore reversed the defendant’s conviction on procedural due process grounds.

        The case at hand differs substantially from all three of these Supreme Court

  cases involving mayor’s courts. To begin with, the case at hand does not involve the

  Mayor acting in a judicial capacity in criminal proceedings, but rather involves the

  Mayor acting in an adjudicatory capacity in a demolition proceeding. Further, unlike

  all three of the Supreme Court cases, the Mayor in this case did not impose any fines

  on Bruce. Thus, there was no possibility in the instant case that ruling against Bruce

  in the demolition proceeding would have financially benefited the City’s Mayor,

  either personally or professionally. To be sure, the Mayor in this case did order that

  the city’s cost to conduct the demolition be recovered by a tax lien on the Property.

  But, again, there is no evidence that such a tax lien would benefit the Mayor either

  personally or professionally.

        Although Bruce cites to Tumey and Ward in his opening appellate brief, he

  makes no attempt to explain how they support his procedural due process claim. Nor

  does he offer any explanation as to why the Mayor in this case was biased, other than

  to generally state that the Mayor was “the executive officer of the municipal body

  bringing the claim against” Bruce. Aplt. Br. at 17. That general assertion, standing

  alone, is insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that the Mayor was biased

  against Bruce or to otherwise find that there was a substantial risk of unfairness in

  the demolition proceedings due to the Mayor’s role as adjudicator.

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         For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in

  favor of the City on Bruce’s procedural due process claim.

         4) The substantive due process claim

         Finally, Bruce argues that the district court erred in granting summary

  judgment in favor of the City on his substantive due process claim. To understand

  this claim and Bruce’s appellate arguments regarding it, it is useful to turn first to the

  allegations in Bruce’s complaint. Bruce alleged in his complaint, in support of his

  substantive due process claim, that “Defendants . . . acted in an arbitrary and

  capricious manner with respect to [his] rights in the Property, including but not

  limited to their improper downzoning of the Property inconsistent with the historical

  use of the Property and factual reality on the ground, as well as . . . its inconsistent

  treatment of nearby properties that should have been similarly downzoned, but were

  not.” Aplt. App., Vol. 1 at 17. Bruce further alleged that “Defendants maintain[ed] a

  policy, practice, custom, or procedure which prefer[red] single family units to the

  multi-family property maintained by [him], particularly where the owners are not

  local residents.” Id. Bruce alleged that he had been “unlawfully deprived . . . of his

  private property” as a result of these actions, and that “[t]hese actions [we]re

  outrageous and of such a magnitude . . . that it truly shock[ed] the conscience.” Id.

         In his brief in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, Bruce

  argued, in discussing his substantive due process claim, that he “was stripped of the

  right to rent three of the five units on his Property immediately, and it w[ould]

  ultimately become four of the five units once one of the tenants vacate[d].” Id., Vol.

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  2 at 20. Bruce further argued that “[h]e was not provided notice of the zoning

  changes as they were being considered and enacted in the 2000–2001 time period,

  and Defendants . . . presented no admissible evidence to contradict his sworn

  statement.” Id. Bruce also argued that “Defendants . . . used their administrative

  authority to order him to keep the units unoccupied while at the same time requiring

  him to maintain and upkeep the Property.” Id. Lastly, Bruce alleged that

  “Defendants appointed themselves judge, jury, and executioner in the form of an

  administrative hearing in which [the] City’s mayor decided whether or not [the] City

  had presented sufficient evidence to permit [the] City to order the demolition of [his]

  buildings, thereby furthering the city’s policy and custom against multifamily

  housing and entitling it to a tax lien.” Id. at 20–21.

        The district court did not address most of the arguments on the merits because

  it concluded that any claims arising out of the enactment of the 2001 Ordinance and

  the 2009 Notice were time-barred. Thus, it only ruled on the merits of Bruce’s

  arguments pertaining to the Mayor’s demolition order. As to those arguments, the

  district court noted that (a) the City Code authorizes the City to abate dangerous

  buildings, (b) the City’s Building Official concluded that the structure at 3166 Grant

  Avenue was dangerous (based on its long-term vacancy, a fire, and numerous police

  calls to the building over a multi-year period), and (c) after hearing from the Building

  Official, the Mayor “also concluded that the building was dangerous and should be

  demolished.” Aplt. App., Vol. 4 at 36. The district court concluded that “[n]o

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  reasonable jury could find that this constitutes ‘outrageous’ conduct” sufficient to

  give rise to a substantive due process violation. Id.

         In his opening appellate brief, Bruce repeats the same arguments he made in

  his brief in opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Aplt. Br. at 16.

  In other words, he does not discuss, let alone challenge, the district court’s rationale

  for rejecting his substantive due process challenge to the demolition order. Thus, for

  that reason alone, we could summarily reject Bruce’s appellate arguments and affirm

  the district court’s decision regarding his substantive due process claim. See Nixon v.

  City and Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1369 (10th Cir. 2015) (affirming district

  court’s dismissal of due process claim because appellant’s “opening brief contains

  nary a word to challenge the basis of the dismissal”).

         Out of an abundance of caution, however, we will proceed to address Bruce’s

  challenge to the demolition order on the merits. To state a valid Fourteenth

  Amendment substantive due process claim challenging executive action such as the

  Mayor’s demolition order, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that “the government

  action deprive[d] [the plaintiff] of life, liberty, or property in a manner so arbitrary it

  shocks the judicial conscience.” Halley v. Huckaby, 902 F.3d 1136, 1153 (10th Cir.

  2018). To be conscience shocking, a defendant’s behavior must lack “any reasonable

  justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective.” Cnty. of

  Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (1998). Further, “[f]or executive action to

  shock the conscience requires much more than mere negligence.” Halley, 902 F.3d at

  1155. “Conduct that shocks the judicial conscience is deliberate government action

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  that is arbitrary and unrestrained by the established principles of private right and

  distributive justice.” Id. (quoting Hernandez v. Ridley, 734 F.3d 1254, 1261 (10th

  Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “To show a defendant’s conduct is

  conscience shocking, a plaintiff must prove a government actor arbitrarily abused his

  authority or employed it as an instrument of oppression.” Id. (quoting Hernandez,

  734 F.3d at 1261) (internal quotation marks omitted). “The behavior complained of

  must be egregious and outrageous.” Id. (quoting Hernandez, 734 F.3d at 1261)

  (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Nothing in the record in this case comes close to establishing that the City or

  Mayor acted egregiously or outrageously in seeking or issuing the demolition order.

  As the district court noted, municipalities have an important interest in controlling

  blight by demolishing buildings that are deemed a nuisance or threat to public health

  or safety. See Harris v. City of Akron, 20 F.3d 1396, 1405 (6th Cir. 1994) (“So far as

  we know, or have been informed, no court has held that it shocks the conscience for

  municipal authorities, acting pursuant to an unchallenged ordinance, to order the

  destruction of a building found by responsible officers to be a nuisance or threat to

  public health or safety.”). In this case, the City’s code recognizes as much because it

  contains an entire chapter dedicated to the abatement of dangerous buildings and

  structures, i.e., “buildings or structures which from any cause endanger the life, limb,

  health, morals, property, safety or welfare of the general public or their occupants.”

  Ogden City Code § 16-8A-2. That chapter provides, in relevant part, that “[a]ll

  buildings or portions thereof which are determined after inspection by the building

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  official to be ‘dangerous’, as defined in Subsection B of this section, are hereby

  declared to be public nuisances and shall be abated by repair, rehabilitation,

  demolition or removal in accordance with the procedures specified herein.” Id.

  § 16-8A-6(A).

        It is undisputed that City officials acted pursuant to the City code when, on

  February 21, 2020, the City’s Building Official, Steve Patrick, sent a letter to Bruce

  notifying him that Patrick had, for a number of stated reasons, deemed the structure

  located on the north side of the parcel with street address 3166 Grant a dangerous

  building under the City’s code. In that same letter, Patrick ordered Bruce to

  rehabilitate or demolish the building within fifteen days. Bruce failed to do so,

  prompting Patrick on February 4, 2020, to petition the Mayor of the City to hold a

  hearing and order Bruce to show cause why the City should not abate the building.

  Bruce received notice of, appeared, and was represented by counsel, at the hearing

  before the Mayor. After the hearing, the Mayor determined that the building was in

  fact dangerous, as defined by the City’s code, and was a public nuisance.

  Consequently, the Mayor ordered the building to be demolished and that a tax lien for

  the cost of the demolition be imposed on the Property.

        Notably, Bruce does not dispute that the City code authorized these activities,

  and he does not dispute any of those code provisions. Nor does Bruce seriously

  challenge the determinations of both the City’s Building Official and the Mayor that

  the structure at 3166 Grant was dangerous, as defined under the City’s code.

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        In sum, Bruce offers nothing, either evidence or argument, that remotely

  establishes that the City’s actions could be deemed to shock the conscience. We

  therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants

  on Bruce’s substantive due process claim.

                                           IV

        The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.

                                              Entered for the Court

                                              Mary Beck Briscoe
                                              Circuit Judge

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