Court Opinion

ID: 9717027
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:56:20.08889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:50.737034
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE STEIGMANN, dissenting: The majority appropriately sets forth the context of this case, and I agree with much of its analysis. However, because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion, I respectfully dissent. The majority opinion focuses on whether the officer had “probable cause to search the baggie, or *** probable cause to search the purse.” (Emphasis in original.) 315 Ill. App. 3d at 777. The totality of the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge, in particular (1) the presence of a container often used to hold controlled substances (that is, the knotted plastic bag containing unidentified white pills), (2) defendant’s pushing the bag toward the bottom of her purse each time she opened the pocket of her purse where the plastic bag was located, and (3) defendant’s demeanor during the stop, was sufficient to warrant “a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the police officer[ ] to conclude that a crime ha[d] been committed and the defendant was the person who committed the crime.” People v. Robinson, 167 Ill. 2d 367, 405, 657 N.E.2d 1020, 1025 (1995). Once the officer had probable cause to believe that defendant’s purse contained drugs, that probable cause allowed him to conduct a warrantless search of her purse to determine if it contained drugs or drug paraphernalia. The officer chose to search first the most obvious object within defendant’s purse — namely, the knotted plastic bag. Probable cause to search the entirety of the purse was not extinguished upon the officer’s determining that the plastic bag did not contain contraband. See Smith, 95 Ill. 2d at 420, 447 N.E.2d at 812 (once police officer had probable cause to believe vehicle contained drugs, the officer could search the vehicle and any containers that might hold drugs or drug paraphernalia, and the fact that he searched first in the most obvious location within the vehicle did not invalidate the search). The majority has taken an unduly restrictive position regarding the scope of the officer’s search, perhaps in part because of its belief that “a woman’s purse occupies a peculiar status and is a possession in which a woman expects supreme privacy” (315 Ill. App. 3d at 777). However, the recent United States Supreme Court decision of Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 143 L. Ed. 2d 408, 119 S. Ct. 1297, although not directly on point, suggests that purses do not constitute special containers for purposes of warrantless searches. In that case, the Court held that police officers with probable cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings — including purses — found in the car if they are capable of concealing the object of the search. Houghton, 526 U.S. at 302-03, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 416, 119 S. Ct. at 1301-02. In so holding, the Court reasoned, in pertinent part, as follows: “[The cases upon which the respondent relies] turned on the unique, significantly heightened protection afforded against searches of one’s person. ‘Even a limited search of the outer clothing ... constitutes a severe, though brief, intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience.’ [Citation.] Such traumatic consequences are not to be expected when the police examine an item of personal property found in a car.” Houghton, 526 U.S. at 303, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 417, 119 S. Ct. at 1302. See also Houghton, 526 U.S. at 308, 143 L. Ed. 2d at 420, 119 S. Ct. at 1304 (Breyer, J., specially concurring) (“given this Court’s prior cases, I cannot argue that the fact that the container was a purse automatically makes a legal difference, for the Court has warned against trying to make that kind of distinction. [Citation.] But I can say that it would matter if a woman’s purse, like a man’s billfold, were attached to her person. It might then amount to a kind of ‘outer clothing,’ [citation], which under the Court’s cases would properly receive increased protection” (emphasis in original)). Thus, it seems that a purse — at least one that is not “attached” to the person, as is the case here — does not constitute a special container that would receive increased protection. Significantly, defendant here did not claim that her purse was entitled to increased protection.