Court Opinion

ID: 9482216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:43:43.011529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:50.560593
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
The majority has concluded that Golston has failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural bar. I believe the majority has misread the law of this Circuit. I therefore dissent.
Golston has never received an evidentia-ry hearing. We have held that when there is a factual dispute about the existence of cause and prejudice, an evidentiary hearing is warranted. See Amadeo v. Kemp, 773 F.2d 1141 (11th Cir.1985) (per curiam). Before awarding a petitioner an evidentiary hearing, we are obligated to “accept all of the petitioner’s alleged facts as true and determine whether the petitioner has set forth a valid claim.” Agan v. Dugger, 835 F.2d 1337 (11th Cir.1987). If Golston’s allegations could constitute valid cause, we are obligated to remand the ease to the district court for an evidentiary hearing.
Golston makes several relevant allegations. Golston alleges that he failed to receive adequate legal assistance at his trial. He further alleges that the same lawyer who represented him at trial continued to represent and advise him during the period when he could have filed his application for state collateral review. Golston claims that this attorney advised him that he lacked any claims that could be brought in a state collateral review. Golston claims that he relied on this advice and therefore he failed to file a timely petition for state collateral review.
Golston claims that, based on these facts, we should excuse his procedural bar. Gol-ston argues that his attorney should not be expected to recognize during state collateral review his ineffectiveness at trial. Assuming that Golston’s allegations are true, he has demonstrated cause under our holding in Stephens v. Kemp, 846 F.2d 642 (11th Cir.1988). In Stephens, we found “ ‘cause’ for petitioner’s failure to raise the ineffective assistance issue in his first state habeas petition in the fact that petitioner’s trial counsel, whose effectiveness [at trial was then being] challenged, also represented him in the first state habeas proceeding.” Id. at 651.
The majority, however, chose to ignore the narrower question raised and answered by Stephens in order to reach the broader issue of whether ineffective assistance during collateral review could ever constitute cause to excuse a procedural default. This same question, complete with virtually the same set of case citations, was addressed by a panel of our Court in Toles v. Jones, 888 F.2d 95 (11th Cir.1989). The Toles opinion, however, was vacated and heard en banc last fall. See Toles v. Jones, 905 F.2d 346 (11th Cir.1990). The en banc Court has not yet issued an opinion and I question the wisdom of reaching this broader issue and stepping into the vacuum that currently exists.