Court Opinion

ID: 9730424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:11:53.241341+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:06.359518
License: Public Domain

R. A. Benson, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In my opinion the ten-day county residence requirement of MCL 552.9; MSA 25.89 represents a jurisdictional limitation on the court’s power to enter a divorce judgment.
As the majority notes, in Lehman v Lehman, *437312 Mich 102; 19 NW2d 502 (1945), the Michigan Supreme Court construed a precursor to MCL 552.9; MSA 25.89 as being jurisdictional. With all due respect to the majority, I conclude that Lehman is controlling. It is of no import that the current statutory provisions on venue embodied in MCL 600.1601; MSA 27A.1601 through MCL 600.1659; MSA 27A.1659 were not codified as a group at the time Lehman was decided. Most, if not all, of the provisions set forth in Chapter 16 of the Revised Judicature Act (RJA) were embodied elsewhere in the compiled laws when Lehman was decided or represented the common law of this state at the time of Lehman. Moreover, the simple fact is that not one of the venue provisions in Chapter 16 of RJA specifically applies to divorce actions. I fail to see how the Legislature’s codification of pre-existing venue provisons in the RJA reflects a legislative intent to overrule Lehman.
It is presumed that when the Legislature amends a statute it has knowledge of the existing law. Skidmore v Czapiga, 82 Mich App 689, 691; 267 NW2d 150 (1978), lv den 403 Mich 810 (1978). Had the Legislature intended to abrogate the rule of Lehman by codifying venue provisions in the RJA, it would minimally have included a provision addressing venue in divorce cases. Not only did the Legislature fail to do this, but in 1974 it reenacted MCL 552.9; MSA 25.89 in positive language similar to that used in the provision in effect at the time of Lehman and kept this provision in the section of the compiled laws concerned with divorce.
The majority argues, however, that MCL 552.9; MSA 25.89 is no longer jurisdictional because it is different now than at the time Lehman was decided. I disagree. The former provision was no *438more positive in its command with respect to county residency than the current provision.1 Nothing in the current language of MCL 522.9; MSA 25.89 suggests that the Legislature intended to abrogate the Lehman Court’s holding that the county residency rule in a divorce action is jurisdictional. In the venue chapter of the RJA, the Legislature explicitly provided that the chapter’s provisions "are not jurisdictional”. MCL 600.1601; MSA 27A.1601. Accordingly, it is clear that the Legislature knows full well the distinctions between venue and jurisdictional provisions. Had it intended to legislatively overrule Lehman, I would have expected the Legislature to use language in MCL 552.9; MSA 25.89 similiar to that employed in MCL 600.1601; MSA 27A.1601. In contrast to the venue provisions of chapter 16 of the RJA, MCL 552.9; MSA 25.89 specifically commands that a circuit court "shall not” grant a judgment of divorce unless the ten-day county residency requirement has been satisfied. "Shall” is used to denote a mandatory duty, see Law Dep’t Employees Union v Flint, 64 Mich App 359, 368; 235 NW2d 783 (1975), and I am convinced that the use of the term "shall not” was intended as a jurisdictional limitation on the power of the circuit courts.
The majority, in reaching the opposite conclusion, relies on Abadi v Abadi, 78 Mich App 73, 76-77; 259 NW2d 244 (1977), lv den 402 Mich 870 (1978), in which this Court indicated that MCL 552.9; MSA 25.89 was a mere venue provision. This conclusion in Abadi was mere dictum since, as the Court noted, the trial judge had, following a *439hearing on the question of plaintiff’s residency, concluded that, in fact, she satisfied the ten-day residency requirement of MCL 552.9; MSA 25.89.
The dictum in Abadi also finds the Court construing the state residency requirement as jurisdictional. I see nothing in the wording of MCL 552.9; MSA 25.89 which would support the conclusion that the state and county residency requirements stand on anything other than equal footing. In contrast to Abadi is Beaudry v Beaudry, 20 Mich App 287; 174 NW2d 28 (1969), in which this Court held that the ten-day residency rule is jurisdictional in effect. Beaudry relies on a long line of decisions which hold that the jurisdiction of the circuit courts over divorce matters is entirely statutory and not within the general equity powers of the court. The Abadi decision ignores this line of cases, ignores Lehman, and, while citing Beaudry as support for another proposition, inexplicably fails to note that, on the jurisdictional question, Beaudry reached a contrary result. All of these shortcomings convince me that this dictum from Abadi should not be relied upon as controlling precedent.
Since I believe that the Livingston County Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction over this matter, it is my opinion that the only authority that the circuit court had was to enter an order dismissing the case. Fox v Bd of Regents of University of Michigan, 375 Mich 238, 242-243; 134 NW2d 146 (1965). The court’s order granting defendant attorney fees was void. See Saba v Gray, 111 Mich App 304; 314 NW2d 597 (1981) (the Wayne County Circuit Court lost jurisdiction after it executed an order transferring the case to Monroe County Circuit Court and, accordingly, its subsequent order granting plaintiff’s motion for rehearing and *440denying defendant’s motion for change of venue was void).
I would reverse on the basis that the Livingston County Circuit Court’s order granting attorney fees was void for lack of jurisdiction.

 In Lehman, supra, p 105, the Supreme Court set out the pertinent portion of the then-existing county residence requirement with which it was concerned. This provision said:
"A divorce from the bonds of matrimony may be decreed by the circuit court of the county where the parties or one of them, reside.”