Court Opinion

ID: 9762905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:33:42.319524+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:38.406813
License: Public Domain

WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because the facts in this case do not permit a decision of this court to be based on the case of Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2130,124 L.Ed.2d 334 (1993).
In Dickerson, the police officer never believed the lump in Dickerson’s jacket was a weapon and did not immediately recognize it as cocaine. The officer determined that it was cocaine only after he squeezed and otherwise manipulated the contents of the pocket. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the search in Dickerson, supra, went far beyond a mere extension of the pat-down search as authorized by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
*654In this case, the police officer immediately recognized the bindle of drugs during the pat-down search for weapons. This fact is a clearly distinguishing aspect of the case and consequently Dickerson cannot be used as a foundation for a reversal of this case.
The Federal courts have long recognized that probable cause for a warrantless search can be based on senses other than sight. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730,103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983); Johnson v. U.S., 333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478, 105 S.Ct. 881, 83 L.Ed.2d 890 (1985).
Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution are very similar in both language and purpose. In Crayton v. Commonwealth, Ky., 846 S.W.2d 684 (1992), this Court refused to apply a more rigorous standard than the United States Supreme Court, finding little textual difference between Section 10 of the Kentucky Constitution and the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. A similar philosophy should be applied in this instance. The Kentucky Constitution does not require the suppression of the evidence in this case. .
A trained and experienced police officer can observe through his sense of touch what others can observe only through sight. The “plain touch” doctrine should be recognized in Kentucky.
Eight other states have held that an object is subject to search and seizure, if as a result of lawful touching, a police officer develops probable cause to determine that the object is contraband. See Jackson v. State, 34 Ark. App. 4, 804 S.W.2d 735 (1991); People v. Chavers, 33 Cal.3d 462, 189 Cal.Rptr. 169, 658 P.2d 96 (1983); People v. Hughes, 767 P.2d 1201 (Colo.1989); State v. Vanacker, 759 S.W.2d 391 (Mo.App.1988); State v. Vasquez, 112 N.M. 363, 815 P.2d 659 (App.1991); Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 13 Va.App. 206, 409 S.E.2d 177 (1991); State v. Richardson, 156 Wis.2d 128, 456 N.W.2d 830 (1990); State v. Bearden, 449 So.2d 1109 (La.Ct.App.1984).
I must join with Justice Lambert in his suggestion that a rational rule would be to permit seizure of any item of contraband discovered in the course of a valid Terry search.
Under the facts of this case, I believe the decision of the Court of Appeals should be reversed and the judgment of conviction reinstated.
SPAIN, J., joins in this dissent.