Court Opinion

ID: 9690526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 19:21:03.708129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:58.064873
License: Public Domain

DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
I write in dissent because I believe the majority applies the wrong standard for determining Appellant’s thirteenth point on appeal, in which Appellant argues that the trial court erred in failing to require production of DWI task force information for an in camera inspection.
While the majority correctly states that “there is no constitutional obligation on the part of the trial court to peruse the prosecutor’s file for exculpatory evidence that does not exist,” this proposition is not *213found in Ransonette v. State,1 the case cited by the majority. The Ransonette court actually held that
[tjhere is no constitutional requirement that the prosecutor must make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on a case. The prosecutor has not violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is sufficiently significant to result in the denial of the defendant’s right to a fair trial. Likewise, we know of no constitutional obligation of the trial court to peruse the prosecutor’s file for exculpatory evidence in the absence of a specific request supported by some showing that such evidence exists.2
In this case, there is “some showing” that the task force documents exist.
The majority concludes that the testimony of the arresting officer, Paul Nathan (Officer Nathan), that he was not a member of any DWI task force and did not have a quota is uncontroverted and thus “conclusively established that the requested documents relating to Officer Nathan are nonexistent.” The majority reaches this conclusion despite Officer Nathan’s evasive answers, his admission that he is not sure of the exact dates the City of Lewisville (Lewisville) participated in the DWI task force, and the testimony of Kimberly Cawley (Cawley), the assistant city attorney for Lewisville, that directly contradicts Officer Nathan’s testimony.
Officer Nathan’s testimony is puzzling. When asked if he was aware that there was a DWI task force at the time of Appellant’s arrest, his response was to ask if Appellant’s attorney meant a county task force. When the definition of DWI task force was limited to county task force, Officer Nathan denied that he was a part of it. When asked if he had a “goal stated or unstated ... as part of any DWI task force,” he did not reply with an unequivocal denial, but rather he responded, “Not as a DWI task force member, no.” When asked if there was federal funding contingent on any number of arrests, again instead of an unequivocal denial, Officer Nathan replied,
A: Not for me, no.
Q: Or any part of the Lewisville Police Department?
A: I don’t think we were participating in a DWI task force at the time.
The trial judge was obligated to determine whether Officer Nathan’s supposition that he did not think Lewisville was participating in a task force at that time was substantiated by the documents in the State’s control.
Furthermore, Cawley directly contradicted Officer Nathan’s guess that Lewis-ville was not participating in the DWI task force on the date of Appellant’s arrest. Cawley actually asked the chief of police or one of the arresting officers about the DWI task force. Although she did not recall the exact words, she testified:
Q. Okay. But, in any event, based on your conversation with the chief of police of the City of Lewisville or the officer who arrested Mr. Page, did they tell you — did one of them tell you or lead you to believe that there was in effect a DWI task force at the time that they arrested him?
A I believe so, yes.
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Q. But the gist of it was that there was a task force that existed at the time of the arrest?
A I believe it was a county task force that existed, not a city task force.
Q. And they were part of the task force, the City of Lewisville?
A. I believe that was the substance of our conversation.
Although Cawley was evasive and admitted she neither asked about grants, goals, or stated objectives, nor looked at any *214documents, she finally admitted there may have been goals of the task force. But she also took it upon herself to determine what information was and was not relevant to the case before us. She stated in response to whether she had even asked whether there was a quota for arrests, “No, sir, because I believed that what you requested was not relevant to this particular case, and my inquiry ended there.”
The majority would allow lawyers and witnesses to assume the duties of the trial judge. I would hold that a defendant should not be required to rely on the State’s determination of what constitutes Brady3 material. That determination is the obligation of the trial judge. The majority holds that Appellant must rely on the representations of Officer Nathan that he was not a member of the task force and did not have a quota and that, therefore, the requested documents would not contain evidence that was either impeaching, exculpatory, or mitigating, nor would they contain information that would lead to the discovery of impeaching, exculpatory, or mitigating evidence.4 In this case, the trial court, without first performing an in camera inspection, granted Lewisville’s motion for protective order, thus prohibiting Appellant’s access to documents he believed contained information that could be used to impeach Officer Nathan. Furthermore, the trial court refused to require the State to produce the documents even for the limited purpose of the appellate record.
The United States Supreme Court addressed a defendant’s right to an in camera inspection in Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, stating,
It is well settled that the government has the obligation to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment.... “[E]vidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A ‘reasonable probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.”5
The Court noted that it was impossible to say whether any of the information Ritchie requested was relevant to his claim of innocence because neither the prosecution nor the defense had seen and the trial judge had not reviewed the requested file.6
The Commonwealth argued that Ritchie was not entitled to disclosure because he did not make a particularized showing of what information he was seeking or how it would be material.7 In response the Court held that Ritchie could not require the trial court to search through the file without first establishing a basis for his claim that it contains material evidence: “ ‘He must at least make some plausible showing of how their testimony would have been both material and favorable to his defense.’ ”8 The Court also held that Rit-chie was entitled to know whether the file contained information that may have changed the outcome of his trial had it been disclosed and that an in camera review by the trial court would serve Rit-*215chie’s interest without destroying the Commonwealth’s need to protect confidentiality.9
A defendant is not necessarily entitled to direct access to the requested information, but, “[njevertheless, a defendant seeking merely an in camera inspection to determine whether certain files contain Brady material need only make a ‘plausible showing’ that the file will produce ‘material’ evidence.”10
When, as in Ritchie and in the instant case, an accused cannot possibly know, but may only suspect, that particular information exists which meets these requirements [both favorable to the accused and material to guilt or punishment], he is not required, in order to invoke the right, to make a particular showing of the exact information sought and how it is material and favorable. Instead, he need only at that stage “at least make some plausible showing” that it does exist and how it would be “both material and favorable to his defense.” Upon making such a showing, the accused does not become entitled to direct access to the information to determine for himself its materiality and favorability. Rather, he does become entitled, in order to secure the basic right, to have the information he has sufficiently identified submitted to the trial court for in camera inspection and a properly reviewable judicial determination made whether any portions meet the “material” and “favorable” requirements for compulsory disclosure.11
Thus, federal case law is clear that once a defendant makes a plausible showing that the evidence exists and that it is both material and favorable, he is entitled to an in camera inspection to determine whether the information must be disclosed under Brady.
Turning to Texas case law, this situation is similar to the State’s refusal to produce Crime Stoppers information. The court of criminal appeals held that a defendant seeking production of information protected by confidentiality provisions of the Crime Stoppers statute was entitled to production of the information for an in camera inspection by the trial court, to determine whether the information contains Brady material, in which case the evidence must be released to the defendant.12
Contrary to the statements of the majority, Officer Nathan’s testimony was not uncontradicted. And, contrary to the position of the majority, a defendant in a criminal trial is not required to accept the State’s determination of what evidence may be material and favorable.13 The State does not bear the burden of guaranteeing a fair trial. That obligation rests squarely on the shoulders of the trial judge. It is a simple matter to abate the appeal and to order the trial court to conduct an in camera inspection of the documents in question and to seal the documents and make them part of the appellate record. In this case, the requested documents are not included in the appellate record because the trial judge refused to order their production. Not only do we have a duty to make sure material and favorable information is turned over to the defendant, we have a duty to allow the defendant to perfect the appellate record by providing the documents to a judge for *216review, even when the trial judge refuses to inspect the documents.
The majority’s conclusion directly contradicts our prior opinions,14 and it is in direct conflict with federal and state law that requires in camera examination of documents in the State’s control to determine whether Brady material exists. When balancing a defendant’s due process rights against the slight inconvenience, to the trial judge of a few minutes’ examination of documents, the scales must weigh heavily in favor of one of the most basic of our constitutional guarantees.
A trial judge has an affirmative duty to do his best to provide both sides a fair trial. He upholds this duty to both the State and the defense by examining potential Brady material in camera with no one else present. In that way he protects the privacy interests of the State and safeguards the due process protections guaranteed to the defendant. Because the trial judge failed to perform this duty, I respectfully dissent to the majority’s placing on Appellant the burden of proving to the trial court the existence of Brady evidence and its contents before triggering his right to an in camera inspection. I further dissent to the majority’s determination of Officer Nathan’s credibility and its misstatement in saying that his testimony was uncontroverted.
In summary, the test for triggering the requirement of an in camera inspection is a plausible showing that (1) the evidence exists and (2) how this evidence would be both' material and favorable to the defense.15 The defendant is entitled to direct access to the information only after the trial court makes a “properly renewable judicial determination [as to] whether any portions meet the ‘material’ and ‘favorable’ requirements for compulsory disclosure.”16
The majority incorrectly applies the test for sufficiency of the evidence rather than the Pennsylvania v. Ritchie “plausible showing” standard for triggering an in camera inspection for Brady material. Although Cawley could be said to have contradicted Officer Nathan’s testimony, the majority states that it will not second guess the trial court’s implied finding that Officer Nathan’s testimony was credible and upholds the trial court’s decision as a determination based on credibility.
At this point, we do not determine whether the State withheld Brady material requiring reversal and remand for a new trial. We are only determining whether Appellant was entitled to an in camera inspection and whether the documents he believes were material and favorable to his defense should be made a part of the appellate record. We cannot determine whether Appellant was denied Brady material unless the documents at issue are part of the appellate record. The majority is not correct in requiring Appellant to make the more stringent showing of entitlement to a new trial because of Brady violations. The sole test for triggering the requirement of an in camera inspection is some plausible showing that (1) the evidence exists and (2) how this evidence would be both material and favorable to the defense.
Appellant made a plausible showing that documents regarding the DWI task force do exist. The State has never claimed that the requested documents do not exist. Rather, Lewisville, not the State, filed motions for protective order. At the hearing on these motions, Cawley argued that Lewisville should not be forced to turn *217over records concerning a DWI task force or quotas. Cawley testified that there was a DWI task force and that she believed Lewisville was participating in the task force at the time of Appellant’s arrest. Cawley further stated,
If the' Court is asking me to relay whether or not my officers or my chief has led me to believe there was such a force in existence, then I would submit to the Court that it is my belief, based on conversation, that there may be information responsive to the request. [Emphasis added.]
Cawley, however, stated that she just did not believe these documents were relevant. Appellant clearly met the first prong of the test.
Appellant also made a plausible showing of how the requested documents would have been both material and favorable to his defense. All of the evidence of Appellant’s intoxication regarding his driving and his admissions and conduct at the scene came exclusively from Officer Nathan. Officer Nathan denied he was a part of a county task force. He stated that he had no personal arrest quota and that he did not think Lewisville was participating in the task force at the time of Appellant’s arrest. Task force documents that contradicted Officer Nathan’s testimony would have constituted impeachment evidence and would have been crucial to a defense consisting of Officer Nathan’s lack of credibility. There is a reasonable probability that, had evidence of a DWI task force been disclosed to the defense, Appellant could have impeached Officer Nathan and the result of the trial would have been different. The requested evidence therefore was both material and favorable to Appellant’s defense. Appellant clearly met the second prong of the test.
Having made a plausible showing that the evidence existed and that it was both material and favorable to his defense, Appellant was absolutely entitled to an in camera inspection of the requested documents. We should sustain Appellant’s thirteenth point on appeal, abate the remainder of the appeal, and remand the case to the trial court for the trial court to conduct an in camera inspection of the DWI task force documents, to make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and to supplement the record with the task force documents, which should be sealed and not provided to Appellant except by agreement of the State.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. Majority op. at 207 (citing Ransonette v. State, 550 S.W.2d 36 (Tex.Crim.App.1976)).

. Ransonette, 550 S.W.2d at 40 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).

. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

. For example, the State must inform a defendant of the existence of a witness who would provide testimony favorable to the defense. See Flores v. State, 940 S.W.2d 189, 191-92 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1996, no pet.) (finding reversible error where accused did not know of existence of witness who provided exculpatory evidence to the State and where prosecution suppressed information it learned from this witness on day before trial).

. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 57, 107 S.Ct. 989, 1001, 94 L.Ed.2d 40 (1987) (quoting United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 3383, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985)).

. See id.

. See id. at 58 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. at 1002 n. 15.

. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982)).

. See id. at 61, 107 S.Ct. at 1003.

. United States v. Lowder, 148 F.3d 548, 551 (5 ⅛ Cir.1998).

. Love v. Johnson, 57 F.3d 1305, 1313 (4⅛ Cir.1995) (citations omitted).

. See Thomas v. State, 837 S.W.2d 106, 113— 14 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

.See United States v. Kiszewski, 877 F.2d 210, 215-16 (2d Cir.1989) (holding that it was error for district court to refuse to compel production of government agent’s personnel file for in camera inspection based solely on representations of government that file contained no Brady material).

. See, e.g., Dixon v. State, 923 S.W.2d 161, 167 (Tex.App. — Fort Worth) (holding that to balance competing interests of State and defendant, trial court must conduct in camera review of requested information to determine whether it contains any Brady material), vacated on other grounds, 928 S.W.2d 564 (Tex.Crim.App.1996).

. See Love, 57 F.3d at 1313 (relying on Ritchie, 480 U.S. at 58 n. 15, 107 S.Ct. at 1002 n. 15).

. Id.