Court Opinion

ID: 9486043
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:36:37.80146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:30.311782
License: Public Domain

CUDAHY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I think the learned trial judge correctly granted the writ here. The case, of course, is extremely close, but an even-handed application of the Vogel factors seems to me to point toward an affirmance.
The issue in this habeas corpus action is not whether “Johnson was more credible at the hospital than she was at trial.” Ante at 503. The issue is whether a rational trier of fact could find Ticey guilty beyond a reasonable doubt based simply on Johnson’s un-transcribed, uncorroborated and unsworn prior inconsistent statements. In Vogel v. Percy, 691 F.2d 843, 846-47 (7th Cir.1982), we adopted five guidelines for determining whether the use of a prior inconsistent statement comports with due process. As the majority correctly indicates, “[w]e considered whether: 1) the declarant was available for cross-examination; 2) the statement was made shortly after the events related and was transcribed promptly; 3) the declarant knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to remain silent; 4) the declarant admitted making the statement; and 5) there was some corroboration of the statement’s reliability.” Ante at 501-502.
We intended the application of these guidelines to “safeguard due process by ‘prevent[ing] convictions where a reliable eviden-tiary basis is totally lacking.’ ” Vogel, 691 F.2d at 847 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 163 n. 15, 90 S.Ct. 1930, 1938 n. 15, 26 L.Ed.2d 489 (1970)). Despite the importance of this purpose, however, the majority dilutes the corroboration prong of the guidelines. For one thing, the hypothesis of family pressure on Johnson sufficient to make her change her story is just that — a hypothesis. Evidence to support it was (in Judge Duffs words) “scanty” and in my view suggestive only. (There was some sort of “confrontation” and emotional outburst at one of Johnson’s interviews and he had telephone contact with her brother while he was in jail.) Perhaps this explains why the trial judge “made no specific finding about whether Johnson had been pressured to recant her story.” People v. Ticey, 214 Ill.App.3d 1043, 158 Ill.Dec. 697, 700, 574 N.E.2d 810, 813 (1991). More importantly, the majority has not pointed to any corroboration of Johnson’s earlier identification. The majority relies for “corroboration” on another statement by Johnson. This statement may in a minor way add something to the credibility of the first one, but it essentially piles one uncorroborated (unsworn and unrecorded) statement on another. This is not “corroboration” as the word is commonly understood. Cf. Reynolds v. Indiana, 573 N.E.2d 430, 432 (Ind.Ct.App.1991) (listing types of independent evidence sufficient to corroborate repudiated prior statement); People v. Winfield, 160 Ill.App.3d 983, 112 Ill.Dec. 423, 425, 513 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (1987) (affirming trial court’s specific finding that alleged sexual abuse victim had been pressured into recanting accusation of father based on the court’s observation of the father in court and on the *505fact that the recanted statement was transcribed, given under oath, and similar to statements victim made to nurse treating her).
When this Court adopted the Vogel guidelines, we sought to determine whether a court violated due process by admitting prior inconsistent statements which were not the only basis for the conviction:
Additional witnesses for the state positively identified petitioner Vogel as having purchased a pair of nylon pantyhose the evening of the robbery; as having been in the vicinity of the robbery under suspicious circumstances at the time the market alarm was sounded; and as having asked a friend to dispose of certain clothing approximately two hours after the robbery.
Vogel then testified in his own behalf. He admitted the substance of the statements against him, but offered exculpatory explanations for each of his acts on the night of the robbery.
Vogel, 691 F.2d at 845. If anything, the guidelines should be applied more stringently in a ease like Ticey’s where the inconsistent statements are the sole foundation for the conviction. Given the absence of truly corroborative evidence supporting Johnson’s initial identification, the circumstances in this ease do not foreclose a reasonable doubt. I therefore respectfully dissent.