Court Opinion

ID: 9945330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 18:10:49.633111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:26.501972
License: Public Domain

J-A29026-23

                                   2024 PA Super 33

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    MOISES GARCIA                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 648 WDA 2023

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered May 24, 2023
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Mercer County Criminal Division at
                        No(s): CP-43-CR-0000515-2022

BEFORE: BOWES, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.

OPINION BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                          FILED: February 27, 2024

       Moises Garcia appeals from his judgment of sentence after he was

convicted of drug trafficking crimes.1 He challenges the partial denial of his

motion to suppress evidence and the denial of his motion for bond pending

appeal. We affirm.

       On May 2, 2022, Corporal Reed Grenci of the Pennsylvania State Police

stopped Garcia on Interstate 80 in Mercer County, Pennsylvania. A search of

the car Garcia was driving revealed suspected drugs; Corporal Grenci charged

Garcia with the above offenses. The charges were held for court.

       On August 11, 2022, Garcia filed an omnibus pre-trial motion, in which

he moved to suppress all evidence against him. The suppression court heard

____________________________________________

1 35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(30) (possession with intent to deliver a controlled
substance); id. § 780-113(a)(16) (possession of a controlled substance), and
id. § 780-113(a)(32) (possession of drug paraphernalia).
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the matter on December 6, 2022. The court recounted the facts adduced at

the hearing:

     On May 2, 2022, [Garcia] was stopped by Corporal Reed Grenci
     (“Grenci”) for violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3314[, which prohibits
     the use of headphones or earphones while driving]. Grenci
     witnessed [Garcia] driving slowly compared to other traffic and
     began to pursue [Garcia], noticed [Garcia] was operating a vehicle
     while wearing an earbud, ran his license plate, discovered the car
     being driven by [Garcia] was a rental, and conducted a traffic stop.
     After stopping [Garcia] and obtaining his license and rental
     agreement, Grenci inquired about the rental being in another
     name, [Garcia] not being listed as an authorized driver, and
     [Garcia’s] destination; thereby learning [Garcia] was heading
     from Connecticut to Youngstown, Ohio for approximately five days
     and [Garcia’s] brother had allegedly rented the vehicle. During
     this discussion Grenci discovered [Garcia] possessed no luggage,
     Grenci returned to his cruiser to enter [Garcia] into his computer
     at which time he discovered a prior case with a $750,000.00 bond.
     Grenci then returned to [Garcia’s] car, ordered [Garcia] to exit the
     vehicle, and began a line of questioning without issuing a citation
     or returning [Garcia’s] documents.          When asked on cross
     examination whether [Garcia] was free to leave at this point,
     Grenci stated [Garcia] was not and he did not return the
     documents because he had not fulfilled the purpose of the traffic
     stop. Grenci asked [Garcia] if he may search the car, [Garcia]
     denied, and Grenci informed [Garcia] if he refused Grenci would
     call in the K-9 unit to sniff the car and search the car thereafter if
     the dog signaled. [Garcia] again denied and the K-9 unit was
     called, leading to a signal from the dog. Grenci again asked for
     permission to search to avoid lengthening the process; [Garcia]
     denied and was taken into custody. Upon the subsequent search
     of the vehicle, Grenci located a backpack in the back seat which
     contained allegedly packages of fluorofentanyl (a fentanyl
     derivative) and heroin.

Suppression Court Opinion, 1/31/23, at 1–2.

     On January 31, 2023, the suppression court partially denied Garcia’s

motion to suppress evidence.      Specifically, the court suppressed certain

statements made by Garcia but denied suppression as to all other evidence.

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      Garcia proceeded to a non-jury trial based on stipulated facts. The trial

court found Garcia guilty. After conviction and before sentencing, the court

denied the Commonwealth’s motion to revoke Garcia’s bond.

      On May 24, 2023, the trial court sentenced Garcia to consecutive terms

of 72 to 144 months of incarceration, 24 months of probation, and 12 months

of re-entry supervision.   Defense counsel requested that Garcia remain on

bond pending appeal, which the trial court denied.

      Garcia timely appealed.      Garcia and the trial court complied with

Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.

      On September 27, 2023, Garcia filed an application for relief with this

Court, seeking bond pending appeal. This Court directed the trial court to

issue a statement of reasons for its bond order. The trial court complied on

October 6, 2023. The Commonwealth filed an answer on October 11, 2023,

opposing Garcia’s motion. On October 20, 2023, this Court denied Garcia’s

application for relief by per curiam order.

      Now, on appeal, Garcia presents the following issues for this Court’s

review:

      1. Did the [trial court] err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
         discretion when it denied in part, [Garcia’s] Motion to Suppress
         on January 30, 2023[?]

            a. Did the [trial court] err as a matter of law and/or abuse
               its discretion when it concluded that the police officer had
               reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop[?]

            b. Did the [trial court] err as a matter of law and/or abuse
               its discretion when it concluded that the police officer had
               “reasonable suspicion to extend the detention” of

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               [Garcia] and extend the investigation of the vehicle
               [Garcia] was driving[?]

            c. Did the [trial court] err as a matter of law and/or abuse
               its discretion when it upheld the search warrant used to
               search the vehicle [Garcia] was driving[?]

      2. Did the [trial court] err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
         discretion by denying [Garcia’s] Motion for Bond Pending
         Appeal in its order dated May 24, 2023[?]

See Garcia’s Brief, at 5–6.

      Garcia’s first issues concern the denial of his suppression motion. As

such, we review whether the suppression court’s findings of fact are supported

by the record and whether the court’s conclusions of law are correct.

Commonwealth v. Arias, 286 A.3d 341, 346–47 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

omitted). If the record supports the factual findings, those facts bind us, and

we will not reverse unless the suppression court erred in applying the law. Id.

at 347. The scope of our review is the evidentiary record from the suppression

hearing. Id.

       Reasonable Suspicion to Stop Under 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3314

      Garcia argues, foremost, that Corporal Grenci lacked reasonable

suspicion to initiate a traffic stop because the officer could not conclude that

Garcia was violating Section 3314 of the Vehicle Code. The statute at issue,

titled “Prohibiting use of hearing impairment devices,” provides:

      (a) General rule.--No driver shall operate a vehicle while
      wearing or using one or more headphones or earphones.

      (b) Exception.--This section does not prohibit the use of hearing
      aids or other devices for improving the hearing of the driver, nor
      does it prohibit the use of a headset in conjunction with a

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      cellular telephone that only provides sound through one
      ear and allows surrounding sounds to be heard with the
      other ear, nor does it prohibit the use of communication
      equipment by the driver of an emergency vehicle or by motorcycle
      operators complying with [75 Pa.C.S.A. §] 3525 (relating to
      protective equipment for motorcycle riders).

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3314 (emphasis added).

      Garcia contends that Corporal Grenci only observed a single earbud and

ignored the statutory exception that, according to Grenci, “allows for an

earbud in one ear.” Grenci’s Brief at 17–19.

      The Commonwealth responds that Corporal Grenci had reasonable

suspicion to stop Garcia to determine whether Garcia had an earbud in his

other ear. The Commonwealth notes that the statutory exception uses the

word “headset,” which would not include an earbud. And the Commonwealth

argues that Corporal Grenci was not required to rule out the possibility that

Garcia’s apparent violation of the law could have an innocent explanation.

      Under Pennsylvania law, the level of cause required for a police officer

to stop a vehicle for an apparent violation of the Vehicle Code varies based on

the officer’s observations and the provision at issue.    Commonwealth v.

Salter, 121 A.3d 987, 993 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citing Commonwealth v.

Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1290–91 (Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc)). An officer

may always stop a vehicle if the officer has probable cause to believe that

the vehicle or its driver was violating the Vehicle Code. Id. at 992. However,

an officer may only stop a vehicle based on reasonable suspicion of a

Vehicle Code violation if the stop would “serve a stated investigatory purpose,”

i.e., to determine whether a violation occurred.      Id. at 992–93; see 75

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Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b) (authorizing traffic stops for reasonable suspicion of

Vehicle Code violations). Here, because Garcia limits his argument to whether

Corporal Grenci had the lesser level of cause to suspect a Section 3314

violation, we will accept that the reasonable suspicion standard applies.2

       Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of

the circumstances:

       The officer must articulate specific observations which, in
       conjunction with reasonable inferences derived from these
       observations, led him reasonably to conclude, in light of his
       experience, that criminal activity was afoot. In order to determine
       whether the police officer had reasonable suspicion, the totality of
       the circumstances must be considered.                In making this
       determination, we must give due weight to the specific reasonable
       inferences the police officer is entitled to draw from the facts in
       light of his experience. Also, the totality of the circumstances test
       does not limit our inquiry to an examination of only those facts
       that clearly indicate criminal conduct. Rather, even a combination
       of innocent facts, when taken together, may warrant further
       investigation by the police officer.

Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1021 (Pa. Super. 2017) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Smith, 917 A.2d 848, 852 (Pa. Super. 2007)) (brackets

and ellipses omitted). Notably, a determination of reasonable suspicion “need

not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct.” United States v. Arvizu,

534 U.S. 266, 277 (2002) (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125

(2000)). Indeed, allowing a reasonable-suspicion stop only after all possibility

of innocence is eliminated would be incongruous with the notion that such a

____________________________________________

2 One can readily imagine a scenario where further investigation is not needed

to establish a violation of Section 3314 of the Vehicle Code. In such a case,
an officer would need probable cause to initiate a stop.

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stop “must serve a stated investigatory purpose.” Salter, 121 A.3d at 992.

Without any possibility of innocence, there would be nothing for the officer to

investigate. Nonetheless, reasonable suspicion of criminal activity requires

something more than an observation that an individual is engaging in behavior

that many people can do legally. See Commonwealth v. Hicks, 208 A.3d

916, 945–46 (Pa. 2019).

       As applied to Section 3314, an officer may stop a driver if the officer

reasonably suspects that the driver is “using one or more headphones or

earphones” and that no statutory exception applies. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3314(a),

(b).   The officer need not conclusively rule out every exception.        Arvizu,

supra; cf. United States v. Powell, 774 F. App’x 728, 731 & n.11 (3d Cir.

2019) (not requiring an officer to determine whether a Section 3314(b)

exception applied before initiating a traffic stop). It is enough that the totality

of the officer’s observations and inferences therefrom support the reasonable

conclusion that the driver’s conduct does not fall within an exception. Harris,

supra. This is a lesser burden than proof at trial. See Commonwealth v.

Fretts, 271 A.3d 383, 391 n.7 (Pa. Super. 2021) (noting in dicta that because

Section 3314 “does not prohibit all single-ear earbuds,” proof of a violation

would require something more).

       Here, Corporal Grenci’s observation of Garcia driving with an earbud in

one ear, without the other ear visible, was enough to support a stop for further

investigation.   The use of one earbud violates Section 3314(a) unless an

exception applies. Three exceptions clearly do not apply, as an earbud is not

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used “for improving the hearing of the driver,” and Garcia was not driving an

emergency vehicle or a motorcycle. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3314(b). Likewise, it was

reasonable for Corporal Grenci to infer that Garcia was not using “a headset

in conjunction with a cellular telephone that only provides sound through one

ear and allows surrounding sound to be heard with the other ear.” Id. It is

not clear that an earbud is a “headset.” There was no indication that Garcia

was using it “in conjunction with a cellular telephone.” And Corporal Grenci

could not determine, before stopping Garcia, whether Garcia also had an

earbud in his other ear.       Under the totality of the circumstances, Corporal

Grenci had reasonable suspicion to stop Garcia to investigate further whether

Garcia was violating Section 3314.3 This issue fails.

                  Reasonable Suspicion to Prolong the Stop

       Garcia argues that Corporal Grenci lacked reasonable suspicion to

extend the traffic stop by directing Garcia out of the vehicle, questioning him,

and securing a canine sniff. Garcia disputes that the information available to

the officer allowed him to go past the primary mission of the stop. He stresses

that none of what Corporal Grenci saw and learned about him was illegal.

       The permissible duration of a traffic stop, “is determined by the seizure’s

‘mission’—to address the traffic violation that warranted the stop . . . and
____________________________________________

3 Corporal Grenci’s observations provided reasonable suspicion to stop Garcia

to further investigate whether Garcia violated Section 3314. We do not opine
what additional evidence, if any, would be required to prove the ultimate
question of guilt. See Commonwealth v. Fretts, 271 A.3d 383, 391 n.7
(Pa. Super. 2021).

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attend to related safety concerns.” Commonwealth v. Ross, 297 A.3d 787,

792 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348,

354 (2015)). This “‘includes ordinary inquiries incident to the traffic stop’ such

as ‘checking the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding

warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and

proof of insurance.’” Id. (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355). While the

officer is completing the mission of the stop, he may direct the driver to exit

the vehicle and ask “a moderate number of questions” about the driver’s

identity and the officer’s suspicions. Id. at 793 (citations omitted).

      An officer may prolong a traffic stop if, before completing the purpose

of the stop, the officer develops additional suspicion.     Commonwealth v.

Chase, 960 A.2d 108, 115 n.5 (Pa. 2008). Further reasonable suspicion can

support continued investigation, including a canine sniff of the exterior of the

vehicle. Harris, 176 A.3d at 1021 (citing Commonwealth v. Rogers, 849

A.2d 1185, 1191 (Pa. 2004)).

      Here, the suppression court reasoned that Corporal Grenci had

reasonable suspicion to continue his investigation and dispel his suspicions

that Garcia was carrying illegal drugs:

      During the moment at which Grenci ordered [Garcia] to exit the
      vehicle, Grenci was aware of [Garcia’s] origin and destination, the
      alleged duration of his stay (approximately five days), the fact
      that he was driving a long-term rental car as an unauthorized
      driver, he takes said trip quarterly, he was traveling without
      luggage, and he had a sizable bail amount for a prior crime. Based
      on his knowledge and experience, Grenci articulated the reason
      the totality of these circumstances piqued his suspicions was due
      to his knowledge regarding drug traffickers routinely moving

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       between source cities to transport drugs, using long-term rental
       cars which are not in their names, performing short turnaround
       trips (thereby negating the need for luggage), and maintaining
       higher rates of recidivism. Grenci’s knowledge and experience
       would lead a reasonable officer with his experience and knowledge
       under the totality of the circumstances to believe criminal
       wrongdoing was afoot and further investigation was warranted.
       Grenci was required to establish choate particularity of his
       suspicions to manifest the reasonable suspicion which is requisite
       for an investigative detention. Grenci’s experience led him to
       believe the facts known warranted suspicion. Thus, Grenci did
       establish reasonable suspicion to justify detention.

Suppression Court Opinion, 1/31/23, at 8.

       We reach the same conclusion as the suppression court—Corporal

Grenci’s observations while he was checking Garcia’s documents led him to

reasonably suspect that Garcia might be transporting drugs. Although each

factor alone might not support a continued detention, the totality of what

Corporal Grenci saw added up to allow for further investigation. Harris, 176

A.3d at 1021 (“[E]ven a combination of innocent facts, when taken together,

may warrant further investigation by the police officer.”).      This included

conducting a canine sniff of the exterior of the rental vehicle. Id. Because

reasonable suspicion supported Corporal Grenci’s prolonged investigation into

Garcia’s possible drug activity, this issue fails.4

____________________________________________

4 The Commonwealth notes that the officer “even attempted to minimize the

length of the stop by asking [Garcia] for consent to search.” Commonwealth’s
Brief at 30–31. We reject the implication that the police can cure an unlawfully
continued detention by inviting a suspect to relinquish his privacy rights. As
described in this section, however, Corporal Grenci had reasonable suspicion
to continue to investigate Garcia.

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                 Probable Cause to Obtain a Search Warrant

       Garcia argues that after his arrest, Corporal Grenci failed to establish

probable cause for a warrant to search the vehicle.      Although the affidavit

stated that a drug detection dog alerted twice to the exterior of the vehicle,

Garcia emphasizes that the affidavit did not describe the search in detail, such

as what parts of the vehicle the dog sniffed, the duration of the stop, the dog’s

qualifications,5 or whether the officer saw items in the vehicle that could

contain drugs.

       The Constitutions of the United States and of Pennsylvania require

search warrants to be issued only “upon probable cause,” i.e., “where the facts

and circumstances within the affiant’s knowledge and of which he has

reasonably trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a

man of reasonable caution in the belief that a search should be conducted.”

Commonwealth v. Pacheco, 263 A.3d 626, 645 (Pa. 2021). On review, we

determine “only whether a substantial basis exists for the issuing authority’s

finding of probable cause” and will not invalidate a warrant through a hyper-

technical reading. Id. (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 236 (1983),

and Commonwealth v. Johnson, 42 A.3d 1017, 1031 (Pa. 2012)).

       Notably, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has instructed that when

the police already have reasonable suspicion that a vehicle contains drugs, a

canine alerting to the outside of the vehicle provides probable cause. Rogers,
____________________________________________

5 The Commonwealth provided a “drug detector dog certification” at the
suppression hearing. Suppression, Commonwealth Exhibit 4.

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849 A.2d at 1192. A dog’s “indication alone” is sufficient to escalate to this

heightened quantum of cause. Commonwealth v. Green, 168 A.3d 180,

187 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      Here, the affidavit attached to the search warrant describes Corporal

Grenci’s experience and knowledge about drug traffickers. It recounts the

stop and observations that led Corporal Grenci to suspect that Garcia was

carrying drugs. The affidavit continues to describe the canine sniff:

      Based upon my observations, taken within the totality of my
      training and experience and the circumstances of this stop, I
      believed that criminal activity was afoot. I asked GARCIA for
      consent to search the vehicle, which he denied. I contacted Tpr.
      Jonathan CASEY, PSP K9 Unit, and requested his response to the
      stop.

      Tpr. CASEY arrived on scene at approximately 1315 Hrs. He
      deployed drug detection canine Senna on a search of the exterior
      of the vehicle. While searching, Canine Senna displayed alert/
      indication behavior to the driver’s side door seam and alert
      behavior to the open passenger side front window.

Suppression, Commonwealth Exhibit 3, at 36.

      We conclude that the affidavit provided a substantial basis for the

issuing authority to find probable cause. After establishing facts that gave

rise to Corporal Grenci’s reasonable suspicion, the warrant notes that a “drug

detection canine” alerted twice to the exterior of the vehicle that Garcia was

driving. To require anything more than the same sequence of events from

Rogers and Green would be a hyper-technical reading of the warrant, which

is inappropriate on review. Pacheco, 263 A.3d at 645. This issue fails.

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                               Bond Pending Appeal

       In Garcia’s final issue, he challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion

for bond while this appeal remains pending. Garcia notes that the purpose of

proceeding to a stipulated non-jury trial was to allow for this appeal of the

court’s suppression ruling. He emphasizes his consistent appearance at all

scheduled court proceedings as well as his strong community ties and family

support in Connecticut.

       When a criminal defendant has been convicted and sentenced to two

years or more of imprisonment (but not life imprisonment or death), “the

defendant shall not have the same right to bail as before verdict, but bail may

be allowed in the discretion of the judge.”        Pa.R.Crim.P. 521(B)(2). 6    We

therefore review for an abuse of discretion. See Commonwealth v. Keller,

248 A.2d 855, 857 (Pa. 1969). “An abuse of discretion may not be found

merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion,

but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice,

bias, or ill-will, or such a lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.”

Commonwealth v. Raboin, 258 A.3d 412, 422 (Pa. 2021) (citation omitted).

____________________________________________

6 Prior to a finding of guilt, an accused person enjoys a constitutional right to

bail, reflecting (1) the presumption of innocence, (2) a distaste for sanctions
prior to trial and conviction, and (3) the maximum opportunity to prepare a
defense. Commonwealth v. Talley, 265 A.3d 485, 499 (Pa. 2021) (citing
Commonwealth v. Truesdale, 296 A.2d 829, 834–35 (Pa. 1972)). These
considerations do not apply after conviction and sentencing, when a defendant
no longer has a right to bail. See Commonwealth v. McDermott, 547 A.2d
1236, 1242 n.5 (Pa. Super. 1988).

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A judge who refuses or revokes bail under Rule 521 “shall state on the record

the reasons for this decision.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 521(C).

      Here, the trial court explained on the record its reasons for denying

Garcia’s oral request to remain on bond pending his appeal:

      THE COURT: And while certainly the nature of the charges as well
      as the quantity of controlled substances weighs very heavily in my
      denial of bond, more significant is my realization recently that this
      offense occurred while [Garcia] was on bond for two other
      offenses out of a separate jurisdiction, and a different state
      entirely, which is not insignificant to the Court.

             As such, I’ll be denying bond at this time, and the Defendant
      shall be committed to begin serving his sentence.

N.T., Sentencing, 5/24/23, at 31.

      The trial court further detailed its considerations in a statement of

reasons for denying bond. Trial Court Statement of Reasons, 10/6/23, at 4–

7 (including Garcia’s prior record, the nature of Garcia’s crimes, danger to

society, and a lack of mitigating factors such as efforts toward rehabilitation).

      We discern no abuse of discretion.       The trial court recognized that

Garcia, who had just been sentenced to more than a decade of imprisonment

in Pennsylvania, had committed serious drug offenses while other cases were

pending in Connecticut. This suggested that bail would no longer be effective.

See Keller, 248 A.2d at 857 & n.4 (considering the public interest in

preventing crimes by denying bail pending appeal). We cannot say that the

trial court’s decision was manifestly unreasonable, was the product of

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or overrode or misapplied the law.

Therefore, this issue fails, and we affirm Garcia’s judgment of sentence.

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     Judgment of sentence affirmed.

 2/27/2024

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