Court Opinion

ID: 9788335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:41:47.723291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:08.336529
License: Public Domain

WILKINS, Justice,
concurring in the result:
1 24 I concur in the result reached in the main opinion. I write separately to explain my concurrence.
{ 25 The court's decision today relies upon our decision in In re Marriage of Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28, 1 P.3d 1074, issued just over one year ago. Under the Gonzalez holding I see no other possible result. In both this case and Gonzales, the party seeking to establish the marriage was afforded an opportunity to do so that began when the relationship with their partner began, and ended one year after the termination of that relationship. In both cases, the limitation imposed under seetion 30-1-4.5 encompassed a period of years, not just the single year following the end of the relationship. It included all of the time the parties chose to live as "married" persons.
126 The statute interpreted in Gonzalez and again applied here, section 80-1-4.5 of the Utah Code, requires that the "determination or establishment of a marriage under this section must occur during the relationship ... or within one year following the termination of that relationship." Utah Code Ann. § 80-1-4.5(2) (1998). By its terms, it appears not only to require the filing of such an action, but also determination or establishment of the relationship within that time. Had I been part of the Gongales court, I would have concurred in the dissenting opinion of Justice Russon. See Gonzalez, 2000 UT 28 at M 51-61, 1 P.8d 1074. I would have agreed that the language of the statute was eminently clear: To receive the benefits of the law relating to married persons in this state, the legislature has required persons either to undertake the legal formalities of marriage required by statute, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-1-1 to -89 (1998), or to act with sufficient diligence and foresight to have the marriage determined, conclusively, by a court of competent jurisdiction during the period of the relationship plus one additional year. Neither Juanita Gonzalez nor Linda Clark did so. Both began so late that the process could not be completed within the statutory limitation.
127 However, in Gonzales we held that the requirements of section 30-1-4.5 are met by the filing of such an action within the term of the relationship plus one year. Gongalez, 2000 UT 28 at ¶ 25, 1 P.3d 1074. Until changed by this court or by action of the legislature, that is the law. And while a majority of the current members of this court may well agree that Gongales was incorrectly decided, there are higher values at *544stake than the correction of what might be seen as a single erroneous holding.
28 In a society controlled by the rule of law, citizens are entitled to a considerable measure of stability in that law. This is especially true when the law is made by judges as opposed to the legislature. It is the legislature to which our citizens have a general right of redress and petition when they feel the law has been incorrectly decided. -It is the legislature that is designed to seek public input on issues of public policy. Courts are ill-suited to evaluate and impose broad policy mandates on society. Notwithstanding the contrary belief of many, including many judges, I am of the opinion that it is not our role to correct perceived errors in legislative policy. Our task is to apply statutory enactments as best we are able to understand them, and precisely as written if possible. This is true even if literal application of the statutory language does not produce a result we admire, or would advocate if we were members of the legislature. If we find the result to be unsatisfying, our obligation ends in applying the language as written, and pointing out the possibility of modification to the legislature for its consideration. Unless statutory language violates the constitution, courts have no obligation to "fix" anything the legislature chooses to do. That is better left to the legislative process and its closer relationship with citizens.
129 However, the case before us is controlled by Gongales. The court has already spoken as to the interpretation of the limitation period contained in the statute. To me, the only thing worse than a court seeking to act as a legislative body in modifying the law is a court that cannot be counted on to maintain stability and consistency in application of the law. Onee this court has spoken on an issue, changing that pronouncement should occur only when faced with cireum-stances clearly establishing that the prior rule was erroneous, is not easily subject to legislative remedy, and has failed the test of time. The decision in Gongales is barely a year old, is easily subject to legislative correction if desired, and appears to have worked little harm to society generally to date. Although I think it was incorrect at the time, I see no compelling reason to change the prior rule announced in Gonzalez, and I therefore concur in the result reached in the main opinion. I do so purely on the basis of stare decisis, not on the basis of agreement with the logic or policy expressed.
1 30 Justice DURRANT concurs in Justice WILKINS concurring opinion.