Court Opinion

ID: 9702436
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:11:14.139681+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:37.456151
License: Public Domain

Beasley, J.
(dissenting). I dissent.
The tort of inducing breach of contract, or inter*575fering with a contract, was never intended and does not apply to the relationship between employer and employee.
An employee has a veritable arsenal of remedies against his employer. Among other things, an employee has the benefit of the workmen’s compensation laws, fair employment practices legislation, unemployment compensation laws, collective bargaining agreements and the general law affording damages for breach of contract, all of which bear in various ways on hiring and firing.1 An employee does not have a right to sue his employer for damages under the doctrine that his employer interfered with his employment contract; that tort remedy is not available to an employee. The employer breaches the contract; he does not induce a breach or interfere with the contract. The employer is liable in damages for breach of contract, not the tort of inducing a breach of or interfering with the employment contract.
In this case, defendant was the president of the local union. In that capacity he was entrusted with responsibility for hiring and firing employees of the union. Under Michigan law this union is a voluntary, unincorporated association. In discharging plaintiff, defendant exercised the power of supervision entrusted to him by the union as an employer. Whether he discharged her for an improper reason, namely, denial of sexual relations, does not alter the fact that defendant was acting for the employer of both plaintiff and defendant. In so doing, he is not liable for damages for *576inducing a breach of contract or interference with an employment contract.
I believe it would be an unwise public policy to extend tort liability of the kind described here to employer-employee relations.
If plaintiif is entitled to claim in tort as she claims, her damages would appear to be limited to those she would be entitled for breach of contract. The nature of the tort asserted here is such that it cannot be greater than that out of which it arises, namely, discharge from employment.
Thus, here, defendant did not induce a breach of plaintiffs employment contract nor interfere with her employment contract in the sense that would entitle her to sue him for damages under the tort theory asserted.
This ruling does not condone or indicate approval of the gross impropriety of firing an employee for refusal of sexual relations, if it occurred, but plaintiff will have to pursue the usual remedies for unlawful discharge from employment.
Therefore, I would not permit an employee this cause of action under these circumstances. The trial court reached the correct result. I would affirm.

 For example, under the workmen’s compensation statute, plaintiff could only obtain psychic damages from her employer for work-related injury and only to the extent provided in the statute; furthermore, she would be precluded from obtaining psychic damages from a fellow employee, even if part of supervision, by the terms of the workmen’s compensation statute.