Court Opinion

ID: 9543686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:48:05.389978+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:55.075822
License: Public Domain

NIX, Justice,
concurring and dissenting opinion.
I join the majority in its findings that appellant has not met the “actual malice” standard of New York Times Co. v. *186Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964) in the first action.
I further believe appellant has not met the “actual malice” standard of New York Times in the second case. When a libel suit is brought for publication of information regarding a public official’s conduct in office, the plaintiff has the burden of showing “that the publisher was aware of the likelihood that he was circulating false information.” St. Amant v. Thompson 390 U.S. 727, 731, 88 S.Ct. 1323, 1325, 20 L.Ed.2d 262 (1968).
The majority suggests that 1) the conceded fact that remarks attributed to David Marston, Esquire at a press conference on September 26, 1976 were not made by Marston, 2) appellee’s reporter Schaffer was present at the press conference and 3) appellant’s affiant, William Manning deposed: “.. . it was made clear at the conference that the investigation which culminated in the indictment . . . had begun in December of 1975” constitute that quality of proof required of the plaintiff to support a finding that the false publication “was made with a ‘high degree of awareness of ... probable falsity.’ ” as required by Time v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 91 S.Ct. 633, 28 L.Ed.2d 45 (1971); St. Amant v. Thompson, supra; and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 85 S.Ct. 209, 13 L.Ed.2d 125 (1964). I do not agree that this is sufficient to establish that appellee consciously ignored the probable falsity of the publication. I believe, as did the Superior Court, that appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence to support the vital “actual malice” ingredient of his case.
In the words of Mr. Justice Brennan in New York Times v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at 273, 84 S.Ct. at 722 “. . . neither factual error nor defamatory content suffices to remove the constitutional shield from criticism of official conduct.”
I would have affirmed the order entered in the second action.