Court Opinion

ID: 9679215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:44:41.291125+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:11.487836
License: Public Domain

LEE ANN DAUPHINOT, Justice,
dissenting.
The trial court granted Appellant’s motion to quash the information, and the majority reverses that decision. Because *672the majority confuses the standard for a fundamentally deficient charging instrument with the standard for a legally sufficient charging instrument that is nevertheless subject to a motion to quash, I must respectfully dissent.
It is well established in Texas law that the two functions of the State’s accusatory pleading are to give adequate notice to the defendant of the charges against which he must defend and to invoke the jurisdiction of the trial court.7
These two functions of the [Sjtate’s accusatory pleading are distinct, and complaints regarding the sufficiency of that pleading to fulfill one or the other of those functions are subject to different rules for presentation, and different measures for validity.
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... [T]he sufficiency of the State’s pleading to allege an offense against the law is not the test for the adequacy of notice in the face of the presumption of innocence and a motion to quash for insufficient notice.8
As the Drumrn court reminds us, sufficiency of notice to the defendant is an issue of constitutional magnitude:
Because of the fundamental notions of fairness that require adequate notice of the nature of the charges against the accused in our system of justice, a timely claim of inadequate notice requires careful ... examination of the criminal accusation from the perspective of the accused, as contrasted to the measurement of its allegations against the statute that is the test for a claim that no offense is alleged.9
In State v. Moff, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals summarized the rules regarding the notice that indictments must provide:
The right to notice is set forth in both the United States and Texas Constitutions. See U.S. Const, amend. VI; Tex. Const, art. I, § 10. Thus, the charging instrument must be specific enough to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so that he may prepare a defense. In addition, the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides guidelines relating to the sufficiency of an indictment. See, e.g., Article 21.03 (“Everything should be stated in an indictment which is necessary to be proved.”); Article 21.04 (“The certainty required in an indictment is such as will enable the accused to plead the judgment that may be given upon it in bar of any prosecution for the same offense.”); Article 21.11 (“An indictment shall be deemed sufficient which charges the commission of the offense in ordinary and concise language in such a manner as to enable a person of common understanding to know what is meant, and with that degree of certainty that will give the defendant notice of the particular offense with which he is charged, and enable the court, on conviction, to pronounce the proper judgment... .”).10
Moff specifically addressed whether a trial court errs in granting a motion to quash an indictment that tracks the language of the statute, correctly delineating the penal statute in question, that is, an indictment *673that is legally sufficient.11 The Moff court held that a legally sufficient indictment may nonetheless be subject to a motion to quash when additional notice is necessary to allow the defendant adequately to prepare a defense or to prevent subsequent prosecution for the same act.12 Examples of such indictments include (1) an indictment alleging government record tampering that failed to identify the specific monthly staffing report on which the State would rely,13 (2) an indictment alleging welfare fraud that failed to allege which of the defendant’s statements was false,14 and (3) in Moff, an indictment alleging misapplication of fiduciary duty that failed to inform the defendant of the specific transactions that allegedly violated the statute.15
The Moff court summarized, “[T]he State may not conduct ‘trial by ambush,’ in which the information necessary to provide notice is buried somewhere in a mass of documents turned over to the defendant.” 16
In the case now before this court, the information provides,
[Appellant], on or about the 24th day of October, A.D., 2004, and before the making and filing of this information, in the County of Denton of the State of Texas, did then and there unlawfully, intentionally or knowingly cause, allow or permit outdoor burning, to wit: [Appellant] burned domestic and non-domestic waste including an appliance and electrical wire when collection of domestic waste is provided or authorized by the local governmental entity having jurisdiction, within the State of Texas in violation of an order, permit, or exemption issued or a rule adopted under Chapter 382, Health and Safety Code, to wit: Title 30, Texas Administrative Code Rule Section 111.201, and the outdoor burning was not authorized by the Executive Director of the Texas Commission of Environmental Quality, nor was the outdoor burning authorized by an exception contained in Title 30, Texas Administrative Code Rule Sections 11.205, 11.207,111.209,111.211,111.213.
The majority notes that the information contains typographical errors in listing code sections 11.205 and 11.207. The information also fails to specify whether Appellant acted in violation of an order, of a permit, or of an exemption issued, or instead acted in violation of “a rule adopted under Chapter 382, Health and Safety Code, to wit: Title 30, Texas Administrative Code Rule Section 111.201.” The information does not set out the provisions of “Title 30, Texas Administrative Code Rule Section 111.201.” The information also fails to specify whether Appellant caused, allowed, or permitted outdoor burning. It fails to specify whether “collection of domestic waste is provided or [merely] authorized by the local government entity having jurisdiction,” and it fails to name this government entity or describe what it had jurisdiction over. How does a defendant defend against an allegation that he committed an act that was illegal only within a certain political or geographical entity when the information does not state what that entity is? The information also does not state whether the alleged burning occurred on a property used as a private residence, at a garbage *674dump, at an Aggie bonfire, or for warmth on an overnight camp out on a hunting trip.
From reading the information, it is impossible to tell whether Appellant was accused of burning an electrical appliance, a gas appliance, a medical appliance, or another kind of appliance. The State argues that if it had alleged an automobile, it would not have been required to name the make and color. I agree. However, Appellant does not argue that the State should have been required to plead the make of appliance or color of appliance, merely the nature of the appliance.
Appellant argues that the specific appliance should be named and that the phrase “in violation of an order, permit, or exemption” is too vague to provide notice. He additionally argues that the references to the Texas Administrative Code Rule provisions merely compound the difficulty in understanding what he is accused of. The trial court agreed with Appellant, and so should we.
The majority opinion directly conflicts with this court’s holding in State v. Goodman, 17 dealing with the same issue out of the same trial court. In Goodman, we sustained the trial court’s granting Goodman’s motion to quash based on defective notice because the “information merely states that the illegal burning materials [that Goodman was accused of burning did] not fall within an exception provided in the administrative code and lists several statutory provisions of the code. The amended information d[id] not tell Goodman what item the State allege[d] he illegally burned.”18
In Drumm, the defendant was charged with driving while his license was suspended. The Drumm court stated,
In the face of the constitutional presumption of innocence to which every accused is entitled, it cannot be claimed by the [S]tate, when there is a motion to quash on these grounds, that appellant knew the grounds for the suspension of his license. There may exist several such grounds for suspension, and there may exist various defenses to some or all of those grounds. It is not for us to speculate on possible defenses; those are for the accused and counsel to investigate, prepare, and establish if they can. In order to perform that duty, however, the accused is entitled to notice of the particular cause for suspension upon which the [S]tate will rely. The accused is not required to anticipate any and all variant facts the [S]tate might hypothetically seek to establish. When the defendant petitions for sufficient notice of the [S]tate’s charge by motion to quash adequately setting out the manner in which notice is deficient, the presumption of innocence coupled with his right to notice requires that he be given such notice.19
Similarly, in the case now pending before this court, the information does not tell Appellant how he offended the law with sufficient specificity to allow him to prepare a defense or to prevent being again placed in jeopardy for the same act. Merely referring to a list of Administrative Code provisions does not satisfy the need for specificity of notice.
The Court of Criminal Appeals has repeatedly stated,
*675As a general rule, any element that must be proved should be stated in an indictment [or information].... Whether an element of an offense may be inferred from the language employed is not the question. In the face of a proper motion to quash, the information must state the elements of the offense, leaving nothing to inference or intendment.20
Although the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has modified the rule somewhat, now permitting essentially a bill of particulars,21 it is still true that
Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution mandates that the notice petitioned for — information on which to prepare a defense — must come from the face of the charging instrument. It is improper to look to the record of the case in order to determine whether the allegation in the charging instrument constitutes adequate notice; the adequacy of the allegation must be tested by its own terms, “in a vacuum, so to speak.”22
Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the hypothetically correct jury charge as measured against the hypothetically correct charging instrument.23 When the information charges globally every alternative method of committing the offense, and simply lists code provisions, we cannot say the trial court erred in requiring the State to plead with more specificity. As a defendant in a civil case would be entitled to have the trial court grant his special exceptions to the plaintiffs petition, so the trial court found and held that the defendant in this criminal case was entitled to have his special exceptions or motion to quash granted. The trial court merely held that Appellant was entitled to more specific notice of what the State intended to prove Appellant did in violation of the law.
Our sister court in San Antonio remind us,
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in part that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be informed of the nature and course of the accusation....” This Sixth Amendment right is applicable to state prosecutions. Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution provides in part: “[in] all criminal prosecutions the accused ... shall have the right to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him and to have a copy thereof.” These constitutional guarantees require that notice [of the nature and cause of the accusation] be given with sufficient clarity and detail to enable the defendant to anticipate the [S]tate’s evidence and prepare a proper defense to it. This was recently explained in State v. Moff. Under Article I, Section 10 of the Texas Constitution, the requisite notice must come from the face of the indictment.24
An information must allege in plain and intelligible language all the facts and circumstances necessary to establish all the *676material elements of the offense charged.25 Merely listing every possible alternative pleading permitted by the code provision and referring generally to other code provisions by number does not satisfy this requirement. Because the majority opinion conflicts with this court’s decision in Goodman, with decisions of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and with constitutional and statutory mandates, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the conscientious and well-reasoned decision of the trial court.

. Drumm v. State, 560 S.W.2d 944, 946 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).

. Id. at 946-47 (citations omitted).

. Id.

. 154 S.W.3d 599, 601 (Tex.Crim.App.2004) (case citations omitted); see also Studer v. State, 799 S.W.2d 263, 268 (Tex.Crim.App.1990) (providing that rules regarding specificity of notice in indictments also apply to informations).

. Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 601-02.

. Id.

. Swabado v. State, 597 S.W.2d 361, 364 (Tex.Crim.App.1980).

. Amaya v. State, 551 S.W.2d 385, 387 (Tex.Crim.App.1977).

. Moff, 154 S.W.3d at 603.

. Id.

. No. 02-05-00374-CR, — S.W.3d —, 2006 WL 1843485 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth July 6, 2006, no pet.).

. Id. at-, 2006 WL 1843485 at *4.

. Drumm, 560 S.W.2d at 947.

. Green v. State, 951 S.W.2d 3, 4 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).

. Kellar v. State, 108 S.W.3d 311, 313-14 (Tex.Crim.App.2003).

. Adams v. State, 707 S.W.2d 900, 901 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) (citations omitted).

. See Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 253 (Tex.Crim.App.2001); see also Bledsue v. Johnson, 188 F.3d 250, 260 (5th Cir.1999); Rosales v. State, 4 S.W.3d 228, 240 n. 3 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (Meyers, J., concurring), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1016, 121 S.Ct. 576, 148 L.Ed.2d 493 (2000).

. Sanchez v. State, 182 S.W.3d 34, 44-45 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2005, pet. granted) (citations omitted).

. Reeves v. State, 144 Tex.Crim. 270, 162 S.W.2d 705, 705 (Tex.Crim.App.1942); see also Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 21.02(7) (Vernon 1989).