Court Opinion

ID: 9568981
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:09:14.263574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:17:44.085817
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment, but write separately because I disagree with the Court of Appeals cases that exempt the photographic line-up forms from the continuing witness objection.2 In my opinion, the photographic identification forms should not be delivered to the jury for it to consider in reaching a verdict, unlike the actual photographic line-up, which may be delivered if properly admitted into evidence.
Georgia courts allow litigants to object to a written statement as a “continuing witness” to avoid placing undue emphasis on written testimony.3 This objection prevents the writing from going out with the jury to be read and reread during its deliberations.4 Instead, the written testimony is treated like oral testimony that the jury hears only once from a witness.5 Applying this rule, we have held that trial courts should not provide to the jury any answers to interrogatories,6 written dying declarations,7 signed statements of guilt, “ ‘or other instruments of evidence depending for their value on the credibility of the maker.’ ”8
Like the written testimony we have previously found subject to the continuing witness objection, the photographic identification forms introduced in this case are documentary evidence that rely on the maker’s credibility for their value. The witnesses signed a statement that “positively identified photo #5 as being the person who *620committed the offense of murder.” A handwritten note, “90% as shooter,” was added at the bottom of each form. These statements, if read and reread in the jury room, would speak more than once on the disputed issue of the shooter’s identity and unfairly elevate written testimony over similar oral testimony. Therefore, I believe that they should not go out with the jury during its deliberations when the defendant makes a proper objection.
Decided April 29, 1996.
Stacy S. Levy, Nancy K. Peterson, for appellant.
J. Tom Morgan, District Attorney, Barbara B. Conroy, Tamar P. Stern, District Attorneys, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Christopher S. Brasher, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Sears joins in this concurrence.

 See Samples v. State, 217 Ga. App. 509, 510 (460 SE2d 795) (1995); Parks v. State, 199 Ga. App. 736, 738-739 (406 SE2d 229) (1991); Kenney v. State, 196 Ga. App. 776, 777 (397 SE2d 131) (1990).

 Tibbs v. Tibbs, 257 Ga. 370, 370-371 (359 SE2d 674) (1987).

 Shedden v. Stiles, 121 Ga. 637, 640 (49 SE 719) (1905).

 Thomason v. Genuine Parts Co., 156 Ga. App. 599, 601 (275 SE2d 159) (1980).

 Shedden, 121 Ga. at 639-640.

 Strickland v. State, 167 Ga. 452, 460-462 (145 SE 879) (1928).

 Royals v. State, 208 Ga. 78, 81 (65 SE2d 158) (1951) (quoting People v. Spranger, 145 NE 706, 710 (Ill. 1924)).