Court Opinion

ID: 9679844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:10:58.772168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:22.165335
License: Public Domain

BRIAN HOYLE, Justice.
Because the summary judgment proof raises a fact issue as to whether the exception to the limitation on liability contained in section 87.004(2) applies, I agree that the trial court’s summary judgment in favor of Loftin should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. Because the summary judgment proof fails to raise a fact issue as to whether the limitation on liability contained in section 87.003 applies, I concur in the court’s judgment by separate opinion.

Limitation on Liability

In construing a statute, our primary objective is to determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent in enacting it. McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex.2003). In determining legislative intent, we examine the entire act, not just isolated portions. City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex.2003). We start with the plain and common meaning of the statute’s words. McIntyre, 109 S.W.3d at 745. Unless the statute is ambiguous, we determine the legislature’s intent from the language of the statute itself. Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Downs, 81 S.W.3d 803, 805 (Tex.2002). We must presume that every word of the statute has been used for a purpose and that every word excluded from the statute has been excluded for a purpose. Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dallas), Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex.1995). We should not insert words into the statute except to give effect to clear legislative intent. Id. We presume that the legislature enacted the statute with complete knowledge of existing law and with reference to it. Acker v. Tex. Water Comm’n, 790 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.1990).
Here, Loftin asserts that section 87.003 limits her liability for inherent risks of equine activity and therefore she is not liable for the Lees’ injuries. Thus, the initial step in determining whether the trial court’s summary judgment was proper is to decide whether the activity that is the subject of the Lees’ claims involves an inherent risk of equine activity. Specifically, we must determine whether a horse’s bolting when a vine touches the horse while it is in wet, boggy soil is an inherent risk of equine activity. The statute itself points us to the correct answer.
Section 87.003 provides the following nonexclusive list of inherent risks of equine activity:
(1) the propensity of an equine or livestock animal to behave in ways that may result in personal injury or death to a person on or around it;
(2) the unpredictability of an equine or livestock animal’s reaction to sound, a sudden movement, or an unfamiliar object, person, or other animal;
(3) with respect to equine activities, certain land conditions and hazards, including surface and subsurface conditions;
*534(4) a collision with another animal or an object; or
(5) the potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or another, including failing to maintain control over the equine or livestock animal or not acting within the participant’s ability.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.003 (Vernon 2005). Because section 87.003 controls here and contains a nonexclusive list of inherent risks, we may compare the facts of this case to the listed risks to decide whether, as a matter of law, the Lees’ injuries resulted from an inherent risk. See Little v. Needham, 236 S.W.3d 328, 332 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
Summary judgment is proper when an activity falls within only one of the statutorily defined inherent risks, or within an inherent risk of equine activity not listed in the statute. See Tex. Civ. PRAC. & Rem. Code Ann. § 87.003. But in this case, the activity in question falls within all five of the listed inherent risks of equine activity. Id.; see also Little, 236 S.W.3d at 332 (When a jumpy and free spirited horse that was not fully trained veered off the track causing the plaintiff to collide with a tree, the facts fell “squarely within the statutorily defined dangers or conditions that are an inherent risk of equine activity” because the facts involved both the propensity of an equine to behave in ways that may result in injury or death and a collision with an object.). Therefore, I would hold that Loftin established she was entitled to the limitation on liability provided by section 87.003, and the trial court did not err by so finding. See Little, 236 S.W.3d at 332 (quoting Jorst v. D’Ambrosio Bros. Invest. Co., No. C 00-03646 CRB, 2001 WL 969039, at *8 (N.D.Cal. Aug.13, 2001)(not designated for publication)) (Where the object with which a rider collides is a foreseeable part of riding, such as a tree branch when riding outside, the risk that a rider would brush against the object and fall is an inherent risk.).

Exceptions to Limitations on Liability

Determining the applicability of section 87.003 is only the first step, however. Section 87.004 creates exceptions to the limitations on liability, one of which applies when
(2) the person provided the equine or livestock animal and the person did not make a reasonable and prudent effort to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity or livestock show and determine the ability of the participant to safely manage the equine or livestock animal, taking into account the participant’s representations of ability[.]
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 87.004 (Vernon 2005).12
Viewed in the light most favorable to the Lees, the evidence establishes that Loftin never inquired of Janice Lee’s riding ability. While Lee was a horse breeder, she *535was not actually a horse rider. Although she previously had ridden horses on a few occasions, she presented evidence that she was a novice rider and that she told Loftin she wanted to “start” riding. I understand the trial court’s reluctance to find that the Lees raised a fact issue on this exception based on their theory that a horse breeder lacked the ability to negotiate a trail ride. And the Lees’ proof was certainly not overwhelming. Nevertheless, I agree that the Lees’ summary judgment evidence was sufficient to create a fact issue. Therefore, the summary judgment in favor of Loftin should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.

. The Lees claimed that their injuries were caused by a dangerous latent condition of land, thereby invoking another exception to the limitation on liability. However, summary judgment was proper on this claim for several reasons, probably the most indisputable of which was that the vines and bog were not a latent condition of the property because Janice Lee saw the vines and the bog before entering the area. See Little, 236 S.W.3d at 333; see also Gamble v. Peyton, 182 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2005, no pet.) (Generally, landowners have no duty to disclose risks caused by plants because such a duty would be an enormous burden bordering on absolute liability.). The Lees make no argument that the vines or wet, boggy soil were concealed. Therefore, I examine only the Lees’ contention that they raised a fact issue concerning whether Loftin failed to make a reasonable and prudent effort to determine Janice Lee's riding ability.