Court Opinion

ID: 9899453
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 19:03:45.360297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:28.139223
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/16/23 P. v. Martinez CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                  2d Crim. No. B322582
                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 2020027482)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 (Ventura County)

v.

TIBURCIO EMETERIO
MARTINEZ,

     Defendant and Appellant.

      Tiburcio Emeterio Martinez appeals from the judgment
after a jury convicted him of two counts of lewd acts on a child
under age 14 (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (a); counts 1 and 2), one
count of continuous sexual abuse of a child (§ 288.5, subd. (a);
count 3), one count of incest (§ 285; count 4), two counts of
unlawful sexual intercourse with a child (§ 261.5, subd. (d);
counts 5 and 9), two counts of sexual penetration of a child with a
foreign object (§ 289, subd. (i); counts 6 and 10), one count of oral

         1 Unlabeled statutory references are to the Penal Code.
copulation of a child (§ 287, subd. (b)(2); count 7), and two counts
of lewd acts on a child under 16 (§ 288, subd. (c)(1); counts 8 and
12). The trial court sentenced him to 26 years in state prison: 12
years on count 3; six years on count 1; two years on count 2; one
year each on counts 5 and 9; and eight months each on counts 4,
6, 7, 8, 10, and 12.
       Martinez contends the judgment should be reversed
because: (1) the court admitted into evidence statements obtained
in violation of the privilege against self-incrimination, and (2) the
court admitted evidence of child sexual abuse accommodation
syndrome (CSAAS) that was unreliable and unduly prejudicial.
He also contends: (3) his sentence on count 4 should be stayed
pursuant to section 654. We affirm.
             FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       D.M. lived with Martinez, his father, when he was between
10 and 14 years old.2 D.M.’s sister, A.M., lived with them for part
of that time.
      Shortly before D.M. turned 13, Martinez began to “graze”
him with his penis while the two played or lay in bed. He did this
at least three times. After D.M.’s 13th birthday, Martinez
touched D.M.’s vagina with his fingers and asked him “if it felt
good.” D.M. said nothing. Martinez later told him that he
“couldn’t stop” and asked D.M. for forgiveness.
      On another occasion when he was 13, D.M. was watching a
movie with his father and sister. After A.M. fell asleep, Martinez
took D.M.’s hand and put it on his erect penis. Martinez then
inserted his penis into D.M.’s vagina. Martinez repeated this
abuse multiple times, increasing in frequency from about once

      2 D.M. was assigned female at birth.   He identifies as male
and uses masculine pronouns.

                                 2
every three days to almost daily. He also put his fingers in
D.M.’s vagina and touched D.M.’s breasts.
       Martinez continued to put his penis in D.M.’s vagina after
D.M. turned 14. The frequency of Martinez’s abuse varied from
daily to “just on the weekends” to “three times a week” to “often.”
Martinez also continued to put his fingers in D.M.’s vagina and
touch D.M.’s breasts. He began to orally copulate D.M.’s vagina
and forced D.M. to orally copulate him.
       Martinez apologized for his abuse, telling D.M. “that it
wasn’t right, that he would have to pay, [and] that it would have
to stop, but that he couldn’t, that it felt good.” He said that if
D.M. spoke to anyone about what was going on that he would be
arrested and get deported. D.M. and A.M. could also be sent to a
foster home.
       The last time Martinez put his penis in D.M.’s vagina was
on or around September 20, 2020. On September 23, Detectives
Jesus Nunez and Alyse Quiroz went to Martinez’s house and
asked to speak to D.M. after a friend of his told police of
Martinez’s abuse. Martinez said the detectives could take D.M.
to the station and that he would pick him up later.
       Detective Quiroz interviewed D.M. at the police station.
Initially, D.M. told her that everything was fine because he was
afraid of being separated from A.M. He then told the detective
about Martinez’s abuse.
                           DISCUSSION
         Martinez’s statements to Detective Nunez and D.M.
       Martinez first contends the judgment should be reversed
because admitting his statements to Detective Nunez and D.M.
into evidence violated his privilege against self-incrimination.
We disagree.

                                 3
                          1. Background
      When Martinez arrived at the police station, Detective
Nunez took him to an interview room. He closed the door for
privacy, and told Martinez that he was not obligated to answer
any of his questions, was not under arrest, was not being
detained, and could end the conversation at any time. Martinez
said he understood. Detective Nunez nevertheless read Martinez
his Miranda3 rights in Spanish:

     “[Detective Nunez]:     [Y]ou have the right not to
                             say   anything,   you    do
                             understand?

     “[Martinez]:            Okay, uh-huh.

     “[Detective Nunez]:     Do you understand?

     “[Martinez]:            Yes.

     “[Detective Nunez]:     Okay. Anything you say can
                             be used in a court of law, do
                             you understand?

     “[Martinez]:            Yes.

     “[Detective Nunez]:     Eh, you have the right to
                             have an attorney present
                             before and during any
                             interrogation.  Do    you
                             understand?

     “[Martinez]:            Uh-hum.

     3 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda).

                                  4
      “[Detective Nunez]:      If you cannot pay an
                               attorney,    one    will  be
                               appointed to you for free to
                               represent you before and
                               during the interrogation.

      “[Martinez]:             Okay.

      “[Detective Nunez]:      Do you understand? You do
                               understand what I told you?

      “[Martinez]:             Yes, yes.”

      A few minutes later, Detective Quiroz interrupted the
interview and told Detective Nunez that D.M. wanted to speak to
Martinez privately. Martinez agreed to do so. Detective Nunez
told Martinez that the two of them could continue talking after
Martinez spoke with D.M.
      Martinez and D.M. spoke in a conference room at the police
station. Martinez said there was a microphone recording them.
D.M. said that the police “already knew everything” about the
two of them. A report had been filed. Martinez asked about the
report and said, “They know everything then, what is gonna
happen is gonna happen and that’s it. . . . [I]f they already have
evidence[,] they are going to arrest me right now and that’s it.”
      Martinez then returned to the interview with Detective
Nunez. About a half-hour had passed. Detective Nunez asked
Martinez if he had had sex with D.M. Martinez said that nothing
had happened, “[b]ut . . . if you have the evidence, please.”
Detective Nunez said that they had the evidence and had heard
Martinez’s conversation with D.M. Martinez then said, “[I]t’s
something that . . . I . . . can’t explain. . . . I don’t know what to

                                  5
do. . . . All by myself I think that this is not . . . right[, but]
nonetheless I ended up falling into . . . the same thing.”
        Martinez said that “nothing ever happened” at the first
house he shared with D.M., when D.M. was 10 and 11 years old.
Detective Nunez asked when their sexual relationship began.
Martinez replied, “I don’t have a date,” but it was when D.M. was
about to turn 13, “[a]round May.” “We began like playing
around” and “one day it . . . got out of control.” D.M. grabbed
Martinez’s penis and Martinez started touching D.M.’s vagina.
Penetrative sex began later.
        Martinez confirmed that he and D.M. had sex multiple
times: “Yes, yes, yes there were more times . . . .” “I . . . can’t give
you an exact number,” but “[l]et’s say about ten times.” Martinez
said that D.M. never said “no” and never resisted him. The last
time the two had had sex was the Sunday before the interview.
        Detective Nunez asked Martinez whether he digitally
penetrated D.M.’s vagina. Martinez said that he initially put his
finger only by D.M.’s clitoris. Later, however, “once everything
got out of [control],” Martinez put his finger between the lips of
D.M.’s vagina. He did so about five times, including the previous
Sunday.
        Detective Nunez also asked about oral sex. Martinez said
D.M. performed oral sex on him when D.M. was about 14 years
old and as recently as three weeks before the interview.
Martinez also performed oral sex on D.M. about four times when
D.M. was 14 years old.
                                2. Analysis
               a. The first interview with Detective Nunez
        Martinez claims the trial court erroneously admitted his
first interview with Detective Nunez because: (1) he was in

                                   6
custody, and (2) the Miranda warnings were defective. We
disagree.
       “An interrogation is custodial when ‘a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of [their] freedom of
action in any significant way.’ ” (People v. Leonard (2007) 40
Cal.4th 1370, 1400.) “Whether a person is in custody is an
objective test; the pertinent inquiry is whether there was ‘ “ ‘a
“formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement” of the degree
associated with a formal arrest.’ ” ’ ” (Ibid.) This presents “a
mixed question of law and fact,” requiring us to “ ‘apply a
deferential substantial evidence standard’ [citation] to the trial
court’s factual findings regarding the circumstances surrounding
the interrogation, and . . . independently decide whether, given
those circumstances, ‘a reasonable person in [the] defendant’s
position would have felt free to end the questioning and leave’
[citation].” (Ibid.)
       Circumstances to consider when determining whether a
person was in custody during an interrogation include whether
they were under arrest, the length of the detention, the location
of the detention, “ ‘the ratio of officers to suspects,’ ” and “ ‘the
demeanor of the officer, including the nature of the questioning.’ ”
(People v. Davidson (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 966, 972.) Other
circumstances to consider include whether police told the person
they were “considered a witness or suspect,” “whether there were
restrictions on the [person’s] freedom of movement,” whether the
police officer’s tone was aggressive or accusatory, and whether
police otherwise pressured the person. (Ibid.)
       We conclude Martinez was not in custody during his first
interview with Detective Nunez based on the totality of the
circumstances. Martinez voluntarily went to the police station.

                                 7
He was not under arrest during that interview, had not been told
that he was a suspect, and was not handcuffed or restrained in
any way. The interview lasted just 10 or 15 minutes. It occurred
in an unlocked room and Detective Nunez was the only police
officer present. The detective was friendly and told Martinez
that he did not need to answer any questions and could end the
interview at any time. Because a reasonable person in his
position would have felt free to do so, Martinez was not in
custody. (See, e.g., People v. Potter (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 528,
541-542 [person not in custody where he voluntarily went to
police station, was told he did not have to talk to police and could
end interview at any time, and was not restrained, and interview
lasted under two hours].)
       We also reject Martinez’s claim that his Miranda waiver
was invalid because Detective Nunez’s warnings were defective.
“ ‘To establish a valid Miranda waiver, the prosecution bears the
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that
the waiver was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under the
totality of the circumstances of the interrogation.’ ” (People v.
Suarez (2020) 10 Cal.5th 116, 160 (Suarez).) A waiver is knowing
and intelligent if it is “made with a full awareness of both the
nature of the right being abandoned and the consequences of the
decision to abandon it.” (Moran v. Burbine (1986) 475 U.S. 412,
421.) Factors to consider include “ ‘the defendant’s mental
capacity,’ ” whether they signed a written waiver, whether they
were advised in their native language, whether they appeared to
understand their rights, whether their rights were explained
individually, and whether they had “ ‘prior experience with the
criminal justice system.’ ” (Suarez, at p. 160.)
       Here, there is no indication that Martinez’s mental capacity

                                 8
was impaired when he spoke with Detective Nunez. The
detective advised him of each Miranda right individually, in his
native Spanish. And though he did not sign a written waiver and
had no prior experience with the criminal justice system,
Martinez repeatedly said he understood his rights. That weighs
in favor of a knowing and intelligent waiver.
       Martinez counters that Detective Nunez told him that
“anything you say can be used in a court of law” instead of
“anything you say can be used against you in a court of law,”
which negates any finding of a knowing and intelligent waiver.
(Italics added.) But the Supreme Court “has ‘never insisted that
Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described in that
decision.’ ” (Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 159.) “Rather, ‘the
inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably “convey to a
suspect [their] rights as required by Miranda.” ’ ” (Ibid.,
alterations omitted.) Detective Nunez’s warnings did just that.
The trial court properly admitted into evidence Martinez’s
statements to Detective Nunez during the first interview.
                        b. Statements to D.M.
       Martinez next asserts he should have received a Miranda
warning before speaking with D.M. We again disagree.
       “Miranda protects the Fifth Amendment rights of a suspect
faced with the coercive combination of custodial status and an
interrogation the suspect understands as official.” (People v. Tate
(2010) 49 Cal.4th 635, 685, italics omitted.) “Implicit in the
definition of ‘interrogation’ is that (1) the suspect is talking to the
police or an agent of the police, and (2) the suspect is aware that
[they are] talking to the police or one of their agents.” (People v.
Orozco (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 802, 813.) “Conversely, there is no
‘interrogation’ when a suspect speaks with someone [they do] not

                                   9
know is an agent of the police.” (Id. at p. 814.) In such a
situation, no Miranda warnings are required. (Ibid.)
      Here, nothing in the record indicates that Martinez knew
D.M. was working with police when the two spoke alone at the
police station. The only evidence Martinez relies on is that he
told D.M. police were recording their conversation. But that
Martinez believed he was being recorded does not show that he
believed D.M. was working as a police agent. (See, e.g., People v.
Wojtkowski (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 1077, 1079-1081 [despite
believing phone calls were being recorded, defendant’s
statements admissible because he did not know wife was working
with police].) The trial court properly admitted the statements
Martinez made to D.M.
           c. The second interview with Detective Nunez
      Finally, Martinez claims the trial court erroneously
admitted the statements he made to Detective Nunez during the
second interview because he did not receive another Miranda
warning.4 We disagree once more.
       “ ‘Where a subsequent interrogation is “ ‘reasonably
contemporaneous’ ” with the prior waiver, and the prior waiver
was “knowing and intelligent,” police need not undertake a
Miranda readvisement.’ ” (Suarez, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 161.)
“ ‘In determining whether a subsequent interrogation [was]
reasonably contemporaneous, we consider the totality of the
circumstances.’ ” (Ibid.) Circumstances to consider include
“ ‘ “the amount of time that has passed since the initial

      4 Martinez also claims he was in custody during this
interview. Given our conclusion that Martinez received the
proper Miranda warnings (see pp. 8-9, ante, & p. 11, post), we
need not resolve this claim.

                               10
waiver,” ’ ” whether the identity of the interrogator or location of
the interrogation changed, whether the suspect was reminded of
their previous advisement, and whether they have prior
experience with law enforcement. (Ibid.) Other “ ‘ “indicia that
the [suspect] subjectively understands and waives [their]
rights” ’ ” should also be considered. (Ibid.)
      Based on the totality of the circumstances here, we
conclude Martinez’s two interviews with Detective Nunez were
reasonably contemporaneous such that a second Miranda
advisement was not required. Only about 30 minutes passed
between the two interviews. The interviews were with the same
police officer and in the same location. And during the first
interview Martinez indicated that he understood and waived his
Miranda rights. In our view, readvisement was unnecessary
under these circumstances. (See, e.g., People v. Miranda-
Guerrero (2022) 14 Cal.5th 1, 19 [interrogation taking place up to
40 hours after Miranda warning does not require readvisement
when conducted by same officers in same location]; People v.
Spencer (2018) 5 Cal.5th 642, 668-669.) Martinez’s statements to
Detective Nunez during the second interview were properly
admitted into evidence.
                           CSAAS evidence
      Martinez next contends the judgment should be reversed
because the testimony on CSAAS was irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial. We reject these contentions.
                             1. Background
      At trial, Martinez moved to exclude evidence on CSAAS.
He argued CSAAS evidence was unnecessary, unreliable, and
unduly prejudicial. The trial court disagreed and admitted the
evidence.

                                 11
       Prosecutors’ CSAAS expert, Dr. Anthony Urquiza, testified
that the behaviors and symptoms of child abuse victims can be
counterintuitive, and that such victims share common
characteristics. First, most child victims delay disclosing abuse,
even if asked. Such delay may be due to threats or coercion, fear
of negative consequences, or the victim’s feelings of shame.
Second, many abuse victims do not hate their abuser, are not
angry with them, and do not avoid them. Third, victims do not
often take actions that would lead others to see that they were
abused. Instead, they often suppress their feelings so they can
cope. Finally, victims often do not clearly and articulately
disclose their abuse. If a child has been sexually abused many
times, for example, it may be difficult for them to describe every
instance of abuse or provide specific details such as dates and the
total number of instances of abuse.
       Dr. Urquiza said that since most perpetrators of child
sexual abuse are older and bigger than their victims, are in
positions of authority, or have ongoing contact with their victims,
child victims usually submit instead of resisting their abusers.
They also often keep the sexual abuse a secret.
       Dr. Urquiza also said CSAAS evidence cannot show
whether someone is telling the truth or whether they have been
abused. He did not review any documents related to Martinez’s
case and was not provided with any police reports or transcripts
of the detectives’ interviews with Martinez or D.M. Dr. Urquiza
did not even know D.M.’s name.
       After Dr. Urquiza’s testimony, Martinez requested the trial
court instruct jurors pursuant to CALCRIM No. 1193. The court
did so: “You have heard testimony from Dr. Anthony Urquiza. [¶]
[Dr. Urquiza’s] testimony is not evidence that [Martinez]

                                12
committed any of the crimes charged against him. [¶] You may
consider this evidence only in deciding whether or not [D.M.’s]
conduct was not inconsistent with the conduct of someone who
has been molested, and in evaluating the believability of his
testimony.”
                             2. Analysis
      Expert testimony on CSAAS is inadmissible to prove that a
child has been sexually abused. (People v. McAlpin (1991) 53
Cal.3d 1289, 1300 (McAlpin).) But it is admissible to rehabilitate
the child’s credibility where the defendant suggests that their
conduct is inconsistent with their claims of abuse. (Ibid.) “ ‘Such
expert testimony is needed to disabuse jurors of commonly held
misconceptions about child sexual abuse, and to explain the
emotional antecedents of abused children’s seemingly self-
impeaching behavior.’ ” (Id. at p. 1301.) We review the
admission of CSAAS testimony for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Brown (2014) 59 Cal.4th 86, 101.)
      Martinez first claims Dr. Urquiza’s CSAAS testimony was
irrelevant. But during trial Martinez attacked D.M.’s credibility,
suggesting that someone should have been able to corroborate his
accusations and that he could have been having sex with people
other than Martinez. Martinez also argued that D.M.’s testimony
was “all over the map,” that D.M. did not have a consistent
narrative or timeline of the alleged abuse, and that D.M. had “a
very strong motivation to lie.” Such credibility attacks render
CSAAS evidence relevant. (McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p.
1300.)
      Next, Martinez claims Dr. Urquiza’s CSAAS testimony
should not have been admitted because it was used to show that
D.M. was telling the truth about his abuse allegations, something

                                13
CALCRIM No. 1193 reinforced. But Dr. Uquiza said that CSAAS
evidence could not be used to tell whether a person had been
sexually abused or whether they were telling the truth about
their abuse allegations. He instead explained why a victim’s
allegations are not incredible simply because they were kept
secret for some time. Because Martinez attacked D.M.’s
credibility, Dr. Urquiza’s testimony was properly admitted.
(McAlpin, supra, 53 Cal.3d at p. 1301; see also People v. Patino
(1994) 26 Cal.App.4th 1737, 1744-1745 [CSAAS evidence
admissible if “the victim’s credibility is placed in issue due to the
paradoxical behavior, including a delay in reporting a
molestation”].) There was no abuse of discretion here.
      We also reject Martinez’s claim that CALCRIM No. 1193
created a “a reasonable likelihood that . . . jurors would use
CSAAS evidence to determine if [D.M.’s] allegations were true.”
The instruction was given at Martinez’s behest. The doctrine of
invited error thus bars his challenge. (People v. Lucero (2000) 23
Cal.4th 692, 723-724.)
      Our division has previously rejected similar arguments
against CALCRIM No. 1193. (People v. Munch (2020) 52
Cal.App.5th 464, 473-474 (Munch) [rejecting similar argument].)
And its use here was proper. It told jurors that Dr. Urquiza’s
testimony was “not evidence that [Martinez] committed any of
the crimes charged against him” and could instead be considered
only in evaluating D.M.’s credibility. Moreover, the trial court
instructed jurors that they “alone must judge the credibility or
believability of the witnesses” and that they could “disregard any
[expert] opinion that [they found] unbelievable, unreasonable, or
unsupported by the evidence.” (See CALCRIM Nos. 105, 332.)
We presume the jury understood and followed these instructions.

                                 14
(People v. Coffman and Marlow (2004) 34 Cal.4th 1, 73, 107.)
       Martinez next challenges CSAAS evidence as unreliable.
To support his challenge, Martinez relies on out-of-state cases
that have criticized CSAAS evidence (see, e.g., Gersten v.
Senkowski (2d Cir. 2005) 426 F.3d 588; State v. Stribley (Iowa
1995) 532 N.W.2d 170), severely restricted its use (see, e.g., State
v. J.L.G. (N.J. 2018) 190 A.3d 442; Hadden v. State (Fla. 1997)
690 So.2d 573; Commonwealth v. Dunkle (Pa. 1992) 602 A.2d
830), or banned it altogether (see, e.g., Sanderson v.
Commonwealth (Ky. 2009) 291 S.W.3d 610; State v. Foret (La.
1993) 628 So.2d 1116; State v. Ballard (Tenn. 1993) 855 S.W.2d
557; State v. Davis (Ohio Ct.App. 1989) 581 N.E.2d 604).
“Obviously, we are not bound by these sister-state cases.” (People
v. Ross (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1184, 1190.) And we will not
follow them if doing so is “ ‘contrary to good policy.’ ” (Ibid.)
       Like other California courts, we believe CSAAS evidence is
important to disabuse jurors of misconceptions they may hold
about a victim’s reactions to sexual abuse. (See, e.g., People v.
Brown (2004) 33 Cal.4th 892, 906; People v. Gonzales (2017) 16
Cal.App.5th 494, 503; People v. Mateo (2016) 243 Cal.App.4th
1063, 1069; People v. Perez (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 231, 244-245.)
And we are not alone: The courts of at least 40 other states admit
such evidence for similar or even broader purposes. (See King v.
Commonwealth (Ky. 2015) 472 S.W.3d 523, 534-535 (dis. opn. of
Abramson, J.) [compiling cases].) It would be contrary to good
policy to adopt the views on CSAAS evidence expressed in the
cases Martinez cites. We therefore decline to do so.
       Finally, Martinez claims the trial court should not have
admitted CSAAS evidence because it does not meet the

                                15
Kelly/Frye5 standards of reliability. We previously rejected such
a claim (Munch, supra, 52 Cal.App.5th at pp. 472-473), and do so
again here.
                       The sentence on count 4
       Count 4 of the information charged Martinez with
committing incest between January 3 and September 24, 2020.
Count 5 charged him with having unlawful sexual intercourse
with D.M. between January 3 and September 19, 2020, while
count 9 charged him with committing that crime between
September 20 and 24, 2020. After the jury convicted him of all
three counts, the trial court imposed consecutive sentences,
finding that “the crimes and their objectives were predominantly
independent of each other.” Martinez now challenges the
imposition of consecutive sentences, contending the sentence on
count 4 should be stayed pursuant to section 654 because the
conduct underlying his conviction on that count has been
punished by the sentences on counts 5 and 9.
       Section 654, subdivision (a), provides that “[a]n act or
omission that is punishable in different ways by different
provisions of law may be punished under either of such
provisions, but in no case shall the act or omission be punished
under more than one provision.” Pursuant to this provision, a
“course of conduct that constitutes an indivisible transaction
violating more than a single statute cannot be subjected to
multiple punishment.” (People v. Martin (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th
776, 781, italics added.) But “ ‘a course of conduct divisible in
time’ ”—e.g., a course of conduct that includes sexual offenses
committed on separate occasions—“ ‘may give rise to multiple

     5 People v. Kelly (1976) 17 Cal.3d 24; Frye v. United States
(D.C. Cir 1923) 293 F. 1013.

                               16
violations and punishment.’ ” (People v. Jacobo (2019) 37
Cal.App.5th 32, 53, italics added.) We review the applicability of
section 654 for substantial evidence. (Jacobo, at p. 53.)
       Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
Martinez committed incest on a separate occasion from when he
had unlawful sexual intercourse with D.M. D.M. testified that
Martinez had put his penis in D.M.’s vagina three days before
Martinez was interviewed by police. That act was the basis for
the unlawful sexual intercourse charged in count 9. D.M. also
said that Martinez put his penis in D.M.’s vagina multiple times
in the 10 months leading up to his police interview. Martinez
confirmed this in his interview with Detective Nunez. This
provides substantial evidence to support the trial court’s
determination that the incest charged in count 4 and the
unlawful sexual intercourse charged in count 5 occurred on
separate occasions. The court thus correctly concluded that
section 654 is inapplicable. (See, e.g., People v. Andrade (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1309 [consecutive sentences permitted
when sex offenses committed on different occasions].)
                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                     BALTODANO, J.

We concur:

             GILBERT, P. J.          YEGAN, J.

                                17
                    Anthony J. Sabo, Judge

               Superior Court County of Ventura

                ______________________________

      Arielle Bases, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Susan S. Kim, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.