Court Opinion

ID: 9747346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:12:13.868163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:32.054093
License: Public Domain

POPOVICH, Judge:
This is a consolidation of two appeals filed by appellant, Catherine Mandia, one from an order which bifurcated from the parties’ economic claims appellant’s divorce from appellee, Dominic Mandia, and one which dismissed the exceptions of appellant to a Master’s report concerning, inter alia, equitable distribution, alimony, approving the Master’s report and recommendations, and entering a final order.
On January 18, 1988, an order was entered bifurcating the parties’ divorce from the outstanding economic claims. Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal from the bifurcation *118order at No. 427 Philadelphia 1983 on February 4, 1983. We hold that an order granting a petition for bifurcation is not final and appealable.
Whether an order is final and appealable cannot necessarily be ascertained from the face of the decree alone, nor simply from the technical effect of the adjudication. The finality of an order is a judicial conclusion which can be reached only after an examination of its ramifications.
Bell v. Beneficial Consumer Discount Company, 465 Pa. 225, 228, 348 A.2d 734, 735 (1975). An order which grants a bifurcation has no bearing on the parties’ status nor does it realistically affect them in any way. It is only upon entry of the actual decree of divorce when the ramifications of the order become apparent and tangible. A party who opposes the grant of a petition for bifurcation is not necessarily acting in opposition to the divorce per se but is opposing the timing of the divorce vis a vis the parties’ economic claims. Indeed, in this case, appellant initially filed for divorce. For reasons carefully explored in Wolk v. Wolk, 318 Pa.Super. 311, 464 A.2d 1359 (1983), a party who opposes the petition does so on the grounds that it would be error to grant a divorce at this time and under these circumstances.
In the instant case, six days after the entry of the bifurcation order, a divorce decree was entered. Although the initial appeal is lodged from the bifurcation order, such an order would not be entered without intention of thereafter entering a decree of divorce. Indeed, often the two orders are combined. As expressed above, the bifurcation order did not aggrieve appellant; the order entering the divorce represents the substance of her appeal. In this case, the divorce decree states that it is “by virtue of the authority vested in this Court under ... the Order entered by this court on January 18, 1983, decreeing bifurcation of this case to effectuate economic justice.” The appeal from the order which was entered as a final decree of divorce “is sufficient to raise the bifurcation issue.” Thill v. Larner, 321 Pa.Super. 62 n. 1, 467 A.2d 894 n. 1 (1983). We believe that a notice of appeal from an order granting bifurcation, *119premised as it is on the eventual granting of a divorce is, conversely, sufficient to raise the issue of the propriety of the grant of the divorce. An order entering a bifurcated divorce is final and appealable. See Wolk v. Wolk, supra. Appellant’s attorney, in an attempt to assert appellant’s rights to appeal the bifurcation, described the appeal as one from the order granting bifurcation. Under these circumstances, we find counsel’s action an uninformed procedural misstep and will preserve appellant’s right to appeal the order granting the divorce, premised as it is on the bifurcation order.
Since the decision to bifurcate is discretionary, we will review lower court decisions pertaining to bifurcation by using an abuse of discretion standard. So long as the trial judge assembles adequate information, thoughtfully studies this information, and then explains his decision regarding bifurcation, we defer to his discretion. In other words, this determination should be the result of a reflective examination of the individual facts of each case.
Hall v. Hall, 333 Pa.Super. 483, 482 A.2d 974 (1984).
The hearing on the petition to bifurcate was held on January 18, 1983. The standard by which we must evaluate the record is enunciated in Wolk v. Wolk. An independent examination of the January 18, 1983, hearing transcript on the bifurcation petition indicates little consideration of the ramifications of bifurcation on the parties involved. The facts of the instant case mirror those in Hall v. Hall in which this court reversed the order which granted the bifurcation. There is simply no evidence on record that the court gathered adequate information, thoughtfully studied that information and then explained its decision. At the hearing, the court briefly entertained arguments by counsel and then stated:
Mr. Hurowitz, do you mean to tell me that here where she’s agreeable that they have been separated three years, and its the whole purpose of the new divorce code to speed up divorces so you wouldn’t have all these battles, and this one, if Mr. Littleton is correct, that this *120one has been going on for four years that the court should not bifurcate?
These are precisely the reasons expressed by the Judge in Hall v. Hall and are, as such, little more than “conclusions”.
We, therefore, reverse the order of the lower court and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
After Notice of Appeal was filed by appellant on February 4, 1983, the trial court entered an order on October 28, 1983, which dismissed exceptions to a master’s report on issues concerning the parties’ financial status. Appellant filed a notice of appeal at No. 3190 Philadelphia 1983. After appellant lodged her appeal at No. 427 Philadelphia 1983, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to act further and to dismiss appellant’s exceptions on the economic claims under Pa. Rule of Appellate Procedure 1701. Prozzoly v. Prozzoly, 327 Pa.Super. 326, 475 A.2d 820 (1984). Therefore, the appeal of the order of the Honorable Robert W. Tredinnick which concerned the economic claims is quashed.
Order entered at No. 427 Philadelphia 1983 reversed and appeal at No. 3190 Philadelphia 1983 quashed. We remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
DEL SOLE, J., files a dissenting opinion.