Court Opinion

ID: 9544791
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:01:47.926043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:40.327884
License: Public Domain

RICHARDSON, J.
I respectfully dissent, and regret today’s majority opinion. It may well serve to deprive the office of the Attorney General of its traditional authority to initiate judicial proceedings which challenge the constitutional basis for procedures which are undertaken or threatened to be undertaken by public officials, including the Governor, when the Attorney General reasonably and in good faith believes such procedures to be defective. The Attorney General’s traditional watch-dog function and his power to challenge questionable official conduct are important and necessary tools to assure the continued integrity of our system of government. Their loss would deprive the people of a first line of protection against improper executive conduct in appropriate cases. I trust that courts, including ours, will in the future narrowly limit the applicability of today’s decision.
In the consolidated proceedings presently before us, petitioners have challenged the constitutional basis for the State Employer-Employee Relations Act (SEERA). (Gov. Code, § 3513.) In the instant cause— one of the consolidated proceedings—the Attorney General appears as petitioner on behalf of the People of the State of California. The majority does not reach in its opinion the substantive merits of the Attorney General’s petition, but examines only a motion by respondent Governor to dismiss the petition on the ground the Attorney General is disqualified from filing it. Only that same limited issue is addressed in this dissenting opinion. After the relief sought by petitioners in the consolidated cases was ordered by the Court of Appeal, the Governor petitioned this court for hearing and simultaneously moved “to have the Court . .. dismiss the Attorney General’s petition and to disqualify the Attorney General from any further participation in those proceedings.” This issue was argued before the court in conjunction with argument on the substantive merits.
SEERA purports to provide for collective bargaining for state civil service employees as to wages, hours and other terms and conditions of state employment. However, it is also provided in California Constitution, article VII (formerly art. XXIV) that the State Personnel Board *161(SPB) shall administer a civil service system of appointments and promotions, the fixing of probationary periods and classifications, the adoption of rules authorized by statute, and the review of disciplinary actions affecting employees of the state. The substantive question thus at issue but not here examined is whether the constitutional role of the SPB preempts the setting of salaries of civil service employees and, if so, whether SEERA infringes on such constitutionally vested authority. It is the Attorney General’s position that the jurisdiction of the SPB to prescribe classifications for civil service positions is so integrally bound up with the setting of salaries that the legislative attempt through SEERA to subject the salary-setting function to the bargaining process conflicts with article VII.
We have said recently that, “The Attorney General ... is the chief law officer of the State (Cal. Const., art. V, § 13). As such he possesses not only extensive statutory powers but also broad powers derived from the common law relative to the protection of the public interest. [Citations omitted.] ‘[H]e represents the interest of the people in a matter of public concern.’ [Citation omitted.] Thus, ‘in the absence of any legislative restriction, [he] has the power to file any civil action or proceeding directly involving the rights and interests of the state, or which he deems necessary for the enforcement of the laws of the state, the preservation of order, and the protection of public rights and interest.’ [Citation omitted.] Conversely, he has the duty to defend all cases in which the state or one of its officers is a party. (Gov. Code, § 12512.) In the course of discharging this duty he is often called upon to make legal determinations both in his capacity as a representative of the public interest and as statutory counsel for the state or one of its agencies or officers.” (D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 14-15 [112 Cal.Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10].)
In view of our foregoing description of the Attorney General’s unique representative capacities which clearly distinguishes him from attorneys generally, no claim is now made by anyone that the Attorney General cannot seek a judicial declaration of the invalidity of SEERA on constitutional or other grounds. In fact, the Attorney General not only has the right but an obligation to present what he deems to be in the public interest in the face of potential conflicts with state agencies which he nominally represents. “In the exceptional case the Attorney General, recognizing that his paramount duty to represent the public interest cannot be discharged without conflict may consent to the employment *162of special counsel by a state agency or officer. (See Gov. Code, § 11040.)” (D'Amico, supra, at p. 15, italics added.) Nor can there be any question but that the Governor is the chief executive officer of the state and that in the performance of the Governor’s executive function the Attorney General is his subordinate.
However, a state Attorney General is more than a mere appendage to a Governor’s office. As our description in D’Amico makes abundantly clear, the Attorney General is an independent constitutional officer vested with very broad powers derived from both common law and statutory origins. He is far more than a tail on the Governor’s kite. It would be a serious breach on the part of an Attorney General if he or she failed to challenge a legislative enactment which he or she believed with good cause to lack constitutional basis, even though the enactment was then actively supported by a Governor. Such a challenge is not an act of insubordination proscribed by the language of article V, section 13 of the Constitution providing that as “chief law officer of the State” the Attorney General is “[s]ubject to the powers and duties of the Governor.” All powers and duties, including those of the executive, are limited by the lawful exercise thereof, and the Attorney General cannot be constrained in seeking a judicial pronouncement of the lawfulness of legislation which the Governor would implement. If the Governor could impose such limitations on the Attorney General—as in this case by precluding a constitutional challenge to SEERA—then the Attorney General would not be able to test or challenge any enactment without executive approval, and the system of checks and balances envisioned by the Constitution would fail. Such a conceptual paralysis is unthinkable, of course, and the majority, fortunately, does not urge this position.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the majority concludes that in the particular circumstances of this case the Attorney General has conducted his office in a manner which disqualifies him, thus leaving the public interest without any representation in these proceedings. The disqualifying conduct is said to deny respondents a fair opportunity to litigate issues on the merits because of advantages gained by the Attorney General through his relationships to some or all of respondents. The challenged conduct consists of (1) a letter sent by the Attorney General on September 20, 1977, to the Governor urging him to sign the legislation (Sen. Bill No. 839) enacting SEERA into law, (2) a conference between deputy attorneys general and representatives of the SPB on January 30, 1979, at which the deputies urged the invalidity of SEERA *163and sought SPB support in seeking a judicial declaration thereof, and (3) utilization of those same deputies who had previously represented SPB to prosecute the instant proceedings.
The letter is of little significance. Although former Attorney General Younger urged the Governor to sign Senate Bill No. 839, it is clear that because the Governor had been active in procuring the legislation he would sign it independently of the Attorney General’s recommendation. The content of the letter deals with continuing efforts by public employees to gain some participation in the determination of their working conditions and compensation, noting that “some public employees tend to believe their only effective tool to get proper attention is to strike.” While the letter does not address constitutional or other legal issues, it concludes that the “bill will assist greatly in resolving [existing] grievances.”
The letter may well be viewed as an effort finally to confront issues which must be resolved in the event that collective bargaining by state employees is implemented. These proceedings are a step in such resolution. The Attorney General’s letter seeks to move these long-standing issues toward a final resolution without addressing the issue of constitutional infirmities, if any, in the legislation.
The Attorney General-SPB conference of January 30, 1979, was called by the Attorney General’s office following commencement by Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF) of the proceedings now consolidated with the instant cause. Present at the meeting were members of SPB and its executive officers. The Attorney General was represented by Deputies Talmadge Jones and Stephen Porter. Mr. Jones noted the PLF action in which SPB was named a respondent, and stated SPB had four options in response thereto: (1) to join PLF in urging the unconstitutionality of SEERA, (2) to remain a respondent but to agree nonetheless that SEERA is unconstitutional, (3) to remain a respondent but to take a “noncommittal” position as to the constitutionality of SEERA, or (4) to defend the constitutionality of SEERA. The deputies recommended the first option. They asserted this was the unanimous view of those in the Attorney General’s office who had considered the matter, and that SPB’s concurrence would add weight to that view in court proceedings because of SPB’s administrative expertise in concerned areas.
*164SPB deliberated the matter in executive session. It unanimously concluded to remain a respondent and to continue to assert the constitutionality of SEERA. When so advised, the deputies suggested the Attorney General might initiate an independent action challenging the constitutionality of SEERA. While representatives of the Attorney General’s office did not meet with other respondents, within a few days of the meeting with SPB the Attorney General informed by letters to the Governor, the Controller and the SPB that in the Attorney General’s view SEERA was unconstitutional and that he would commence an independent action for a judicial declaration. The Attorney General consented in the letters to the use of other counsel by the addressees. (Gov. Code, § 11040.)
There was no impropriety in the conduct of representatives of the Attorney General in meeting with SPB. The representatives did no more than inform SPB of the Attorney General’s opinion concerning the constitutional invalidity of SEERA, seek the support of SPB and advise of the possibility of an independent action by the Attorney General. Indeed, the Attorney General acted well within his duties and responsibilities in asserting an opinion that SEERA was unconstitutional. His nonjudicial opinions are “accorded great respect by the courts.” (Wenke v. Hitchcock (1972) 6 Cal.3d 746, 752 [100 Cal.Rptr. 290, 493 P.2d 1154].) The most relevant court decision then appeared to support his conclusion. (See Fair Political Practices Com. v. State Personnel Bd. (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 52, 56 [143 Cal.Rptr. 393].) The merits of the constitutional issue were neither stated nor discussed. The Attorney General sought no information from, and none was given by, SPB other than its status as a party in the action or actions. The Attorney General forthrightly stated his position and reasons for approaching SPB. He gained no advantage and SPB suffered no disadvantage or prejudice. This has been conceded by all parties to the action.
The final claim of misconduct is likewise wholly without significance. The fact that deputies who had earlier represented SPB are active in prosecuting the Attorney General’s action against SPB and others raises no issue of a breach of confidence. The Attorney General’s position on the merits in these proceedings was made clear at the outset and we are referred to neither specific advantage gained nor confidence breached. Again, this has been conceded by the parties.
In asserting disqualification the Governor relies on rules 4-101 and 5-102(B), Rules of Professional Conduct. Rule 4-101 provides: “A *165member of the State Bar shall not accept employment adverse to a client or former client, without the informed and written consent of the client or former client, relating to a matter in reference to which he has obtained confidential information by reason of or in the course of his employment by such client or former client.” Certainly no one can claim in good faith that the Attorney General obtained confidential information by directing his September 20, 1977, letter to the Governor. In requesting and attending the January 30, 1979, conference with SPB, and in utilizing the deputies who had participated in that conference to conduct these proceedings, the Attorney General neither sought to gain nor gained, directly or indirectly, any confidential information.
The reason for the foregoing meeting becomes clear from a communication to the Court of Appeal by the Attorney General four days before the meeting with SPB. In seeking an extension of time to respond to the PLF petition, the Attorney General stated that the petition raised potential conflicts of interest among the various respondents, and that neither these conflicts nor representations by the Attorney General of the various respondents, had been resolved. The SPB meeting was essential to the Attorney General’s determination of which, if any, agencies and offices he could represent. The office of the Attorney General approached SPB first as most likely to agree with PLF because SPB had only one year earlier forcefully argued its exclusive constitutional right to deal with the fixing of salaries for state employees. (See Fair Political Practices Com. v. State Personnel Bd., supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at p. 56.) The Attorney General thus had sound reason to believe SPB would join him in rejecting SEERA.
I find it significant that SPB itself raises no claim that—because of the conference or the prior representation by certain deputies—a confidence has been breached or that there is any impropriety in the Attorney General’s conduct and participation in these proceedings. The Governor’s reliance on cases dealing with disqualification of private attorneys pursuant to rule 4-101, is misplaced. When a public attorney is required by law to fulfill his legal duty of representing public officials or agencies in exercising exclusive control of civil litigation, the usual attorney-client relationship does not prevail within the reasonable meaning of rule 4-101. (Ward v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 23, 34 [138 Cal.Rptr. 532].) In similar fashion it has been held that county counsel was not disqualified from representing in their official capacities county officials sued by the county assessor—whom the *166county counsel had previously represented—for defamation and violation of civil rights. (Ward v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 34.)
As an alternative ground for the holding in Ward that “no attorney-client relationship existed between the county counsel and [the county assessor] within the meaning of rule 4-101,” the court further observed: “The purpose of rule 4-101 forbidding an attorney from accepting employment adverse to a former client is to protect the former confidential relationship. Thus the rule does not apply where an attorney accepts employment adverse to a former client if the matter bears no relationship to confidential information acquired by the attorney as a result of the former attorney-client relationship.” (Id., at p. 34.) Accordingly, the Governor’s complete failure to establish that any confidences obtained by the Attorney General in his former attorney-client relationships bear on the merits in these proceedings is thus fatal to the motion for disqualification pursuant to rule 4-101. In fact, the issues raised on the merits of these proceedings are pure issues of law, the only question being whether a legislative enactment infringes on a constitutional proscription. There is no “confidential information” in the possession of respondents which—whether or not conveyed to the Attorney General—might have any bearing on resolution of these constitutional issues.
For reasons similar to those which render inapplicable rule 4-101 in the circumstances of these proceedings, rule 5-102(B) is also not controlling. This latter rule provides that a “member of the State Bar shall not represent conflicting interests, except with the written consent of all parties concerned.” The Attorney General is not, of course, representing conflicting interests in these proceedings. While it is true that he has represented or now represents clients whose interests are in conflict with those of the Attorney General as representative of the public interest, such conflicts are inherent in the applicable law pursuant to which the Attorney General must conduct himself. In his “dual role as representative of the state agency and guardian of the public interest” (D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, 11 Cal.3d 1, at p. 15), he may be called upon to make determinations and decisions which, while consistent with the interests of one “client,” are in conflict with those of another. In such a case he must serve “his paramount duty to represent the public interest,” withdraw from his other representations and consent to their employment of special counsel. (Ibid.) The Attorney General has conducted himself accordingly. Indeed, it is diffi*167cult to chart a course of conduct more consistent with legal requirements than that engaged in by the Attorney General whom the Governor seeks to disqualify.
The Governor’s assertion that rule 5-102(B) is applicable to the Attorney General in these circumstances, if correct, would result in the disqualification of the Attorney General in every instance where he had—prior to taking action against a public official or agency guilty of some mal- or misfeasance—represented or counseled that official or agency on an independent matter. It is manifest that rule 5-102(B) is not intended to so handcuff the official who is constitutionally described as the “chief law enforcement officer of the state” and who frequently is the sole representative of the public interest. The Attorney General’s role, being grounded in the common law (D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners, supra, 11 Cal.3d, at p. 14), is thus similar to that role fully recognized in sister states. Thus, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts has held that the Attorney General, in exercising his “‘common law duty to represent the public interest’” in a manner contrary to dictates of a public agency he normally represents, is not to be “constrained by the parameters of the traditional attorney-client relationship.” (Feeney v. Com. (1977) 373 Mass. 359 [366 N.E.2d 1262, 1266]; see also Conn. Com'n v. Conn. Freedom of Information (1978) 174 Conn. 308 [387 A.2d 533, 537] [“This special status of the attorney general—where the people of the state are his clients—cannot be disregarded in considering the application of the provisions of the code of professional responsibility to the conduct of his office.”]; E. P. A. v. Pollution Control Bd. (1977) 69 Ill.2d 394 [14 Ill. Dec. 245, 372 N.E.2d 50]; Commonwealth ex rel. Hancock v. Paxton (Ky.App. 1974) 516 S.W.2d 865.)
The record establishes that the Attorney General has conducted himself with the professionalism required of his office, particularly in view of the usual difficulties attending a transition which occurred in that elective office in January 1979. No cause appears for his disqualification, which would thereby deprive the people of any legal representation in these important proceedings.
The Governor’s motion should be denied.
Petitioner’s application for a rehearing was denied April 22, 1981. Richardson, J., was of the opinion that the application should be granted.