Court Opinion

ID: 9575098
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:11:35.795716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:47:58.351069
License: Public Domain

Carley, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
The majority, finding no reversible error, affirms the judgment in this condemnation action. In my opinion, numerous errors mandating a new trial were committed by the trial court. Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.
1. In Division 1, the majority finds no reversible error in the refusal to grant a mistrial when counsel for appellee-condemnee revealed to the jury the amount which appellant-condemnor had paid into the registry of court at the time of the taking. The record shows that, at trial, condemnor’s expert testified that, in his opinion, the value of the property was $114,500. If condemnor’s expert had previously reached an opinion as to value which was higher than $114,500, then his previous opinion would clearly be admissible to impeach his trial testimony that the value of the property was only $114,500. See State Hwy. Dept. v. J. A. Worley & Co., 103 Ga. App. 25, 28 (4) (118 SE2d 298) (1961); Georgia Power Co. v. Hudson, 46 Ga. App. 206 (3) (167 SE 206) (1932). However, that is not what occurred in the in*274stant case. Condemnee revealed to the jury that the amount of estimated just and adequate compensation that condemnor had previously paid into the registry of court was less than the opinion as to value expressed by condemnor’s expert at trial. That the original amount of estimated just and adequate compensation was $103,000 is certainly not relevant as impeaching of the trial testimony of condemnor’s expert that the property had a higher value of $114,500. Its only effect would be to prejudice condemnor, tending to intimate an attempt to have secured condemnee’s property for less than its true value. Under these circumstances, it is my opinion that the prejudicial reference to the amount of estimated just and adequate compensation warranted the grant of a mistrial: “ ‘ “An appeal (in a condemnation by declaration of taking) is a trial de novo on the question of compensation, and it is the function and duty of the jury to pass upon the issues independently of the (estimate of just and adequate compensation). [Cit.]” [Cit.]’ [Cit.]” Department of Transp. v. Gunnels, 175 Ga. App. 632, 636 (4) (334 SE2d 197) (1985), rev’d on other grounds, 255 Ga. 495 (340 SE2d 12) (1986). “There was no reason why the [amount of estimated just and adequate compensation] should have been before the jury. The question submitted to them for solution was to be determined by them independently of the antecedent action of the [condemnor]. The jury had to ascertain, under the evidence submitted to them, the value of the land and the amount of damages. The [amount of estimated just and adequate compensation] could not have been evidence for their consideration.” Atlanta, Birmingham &c. R. Co. v. Smith, 132 Ga. 725, 727 (1) (64 SE 1073) (1909). “Placing the [amount of estimated just and adequate compensation] in evidence on a trial before the jury is impermissible. [Cits.] This [comment by condemnee’s counsel], not warranted by the evidence, constitutes an impairment of the right to a fair trial, nothing else appearing. [Cits.]” State Hwy. Dept. v. Cantrell, 119 Ga. App. 241, 242-243 (lb) (166 SE2d 604) (1969). “Nothing else appearing” in the instant case, such as curative instructions, it follows that condemnor was denied a fair trial and that the judgment must be reversed. Compare Gate City Terminal Co. v. Thrower, 136 Ga. 456, 470 (71 SE 903) (1911); State Hwy. Dept. v. Cantrell, supra at 243 (1b).
2. In Division 2, the majority finds no error in the denial of condemnor’s motion to strike certain testimony concerning business losses which condemnee had sustained during the period of construction. As the majority notes, it is a correct principle of law that “evidence of temporary loss of business is admissible not for the purpose of recovering for the temporary loss of business but for the limited purpose of demonstrating fair market value of the land not taken immediately after the taking.” (Emphasis supplied.) Buck’s Svc. Sta*275tion v. Dept. of Transp., 259 Ga. 825, 827 (2) (387 SE2d 877) (1990). In the instant case, one of condemnee’s other witnesses did give an ultimate opinion of the fair market value of the remainder of condemnee’s property after the partial taking. Accordingly, I agree that the testimony as to temporary business losses was admissible for the “limited purpose” of demonstrating the fair market value of the remainder immediately after the taking.
In Division 3, however, the majority finds that a charge on the recovery of business losses as a separate element of compensation was also authorized. “When the business belongs to the landowner, total destruction of the business at the location must be proven before business losses may be recovered as a separate element of compensation. [Cit.]” (Emphasis supplied.) Department of Transp. v. Dixie Hwy. Bottle Shop, 245 Ga. 314, 315 (265 SE2d 10) (1980). The undisputed evidence of record shows that condemnee’s business was not totally destroyed. Department of Transp. v. Kendricks, 148 Ga. App. 242, 244 (1) (250 SE2d 854) (1978); Department of Transp. v. Dent, 142 Ga. App. 94, 95 (3) (235 SE2d 610) (1977). Accordingly, business losses were clearly not recoverable as a separate element of compensation and a charge on that issue should not have been given. Since condemnee’s business was damaged but not destroyed, she was limited to recovering for the diminution in the fair market value of the remainder. Buck’s Svc. Stat. v. Dept. of Transp., supra at 827 (2). “[T]he charge was not supported by evidence since the business continued to operate at the same location. . . . Because it was not adjusted to the evidence, the jury instruction was erroneous. [Cit.]” Department of Transp. v. Dent, supra at 95 (3).
3. In Division 4, the majority holds that, if improper, cross-examination of condemnor’s witness regarding a driveway on neighboring condemned property was harmless. Since, in my opinion, the instant case must be reversed, I would hold that the questioning was improper and if, upon retrial, condemnee again attempts to pursue that irrelevant topic, an objection to the relevancy thereof should be sustained.
4. In Division 6, the majority finds no error in admitting into evidence the tape measure that condemnee’s expert had used to illustrate certain points during his testimony. However, the tape measure itself was not relevant to any issue at trial and, insofar as condemnor did not seek to admit any irrelevant measuring devices, the jury may have been given the erroneous impression that the testimony of condemnee’s expert was more credible simpiy because it had been “corroborated” by tangible evidence in the form of the tape measure. The erroneous admission of this irrelevant evidence may not be an independent ground for reversal. However, since, in my opinion, the instant case must be reversed, I would hold that if, upon retrial, an *276objection to the admission of the irrelevant tape measure is raised, that objection should be sustained.
Decided December 4, 1991
Reconsideration denied December 19, 1991
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Bolton & Park, Jack L. Park, Jr., for appellant.
Smith, Welch & Studdard, A. J. Welch, Jr., J. Mark Brittain, for appellees.