Court Opinion

ID: 9881915
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-04 17:01:16.49354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:23:12.766542
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        OCT 4 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DAVID ZOE-NAVARRO,                              No.    21-70244

                Petitioner,                     Agency No. A209-171-636

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                              Submitted October 2, 2023**
                                 Pasadena, California

Before: GRABER, BYBEE, and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.

      Petitioner David Zoe-Navarro, a native and citizen of Mexico, timely

petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order

dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of his applications

for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Torture (“CAT”). We review de novo legal conclusions and review for substantial

evidence factual findings. Bringas-Rodriguez v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1051, 1059

(9th Cir. 2017) (en banc). We deny the petition.

      1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Petitioner

failed to establish a nexus between the fear or harm he experienced and a political

opinion he held.

      Petitioner asserts that his opposition to the recruitment efforts of the

Guerreros Unidos, a gang operating in Mexico, constituted a political opinion. But

“resistance to a gang’s recruitment efforts alone does not constitute political

opinion.” Ramos-Lopez v. Holder, 563 F.3d 855, 862 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting

Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 747 (9th Cir. 2008)) (internal quotation

marks and brackets omitted), abrogated on other grounds by Henriquez-Rivas v.

Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1093 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc). Petitioner testified that he

tried “not to get involved with” the groups fighting for territory in the region in

Mexico where he lived “[b]ecause the people that are involved in that, they’re

either dead or in prison.” Thus, Petitioner’s resistance to joining the Guerreros

Unidos was motivated by self-preservation, not politics. See Barrios v. Holder,

581 F.3d 849, 856 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the petitioner was not persecuted

on account of an anti-gang political opinion, because he “failed to present evidence

that he was politically or ideologically opposed to the ideals espoused by the gang

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that recruited him (or to gangs in general)”), abrogated in part on other grounds by

Henriquez-Rivas, 707 F.3d at 1093; see also INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478,

483 (1992) (distinguishing “indifference, indecisiveness, and risk averseness” from

an affirmative political opinion).

      2. Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s finding that the gang’s

members did not target Petitioner on account of his actual or perceived political

beliefs. The IJ asked Petitioner’s attorney to point to any evidence in the record

showing that the gang would attribute a political opinion to Petitioner if he did not

join the gang. The attorney responded that “[t]here is no evidence in the record.”

In addition, Petitioner testified that he believed that the men had followed him for a

reason, but he did not know what that reason was.

      3. On appeal to the BIA, Petitioner argued for the first time that he belonged

to a particular social group: “Mexican youth who reject recruitment in and oppose

violence associated with Mexican gangs.” The BIA properly ruled that Petitioner

waived that argument because he had not identified a particular social group before

the IJ. See Honcharov v. Barr, 924 F.3d 1293, 1297 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam)

(“[T]he Board did not err when it declined to consider Honcharov’s proposed

particular social groups that were raised for the first time on appeal.”).

      4. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s denial of Petitioner’s CAT

claim. The record does not compel the conclusion that Petitioner’s past harm

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constituted torture, and Petitioner failed to show that it is more likely than not that

he will be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if

returned to Mexico. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2), 1208.18(a).

      5. Petitioner claims a due process violation for the first time in his reply

brief. Accordingly, Petitioner waived that issue. Nguyen v. Barr, 983 F.3d 1099,

1102 (9th Cir. 2020).

      Petition DENIED.

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