Court Opinion

ID: 9688739
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:02:18.946328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:41.682086
License: Public Domain

OPINION
HANSON, Justice.
Respondent Kathryn L. Streiff (Streiff) was charged with two felonies, criminal vehicular operation resulting in substantial *833bodily harm under MinmStat. § 609.21, subd. 2a(4) (2002), and criminal vehicular operation leaving the scene of the crime under Minn.Stat. § 609.21, subd. 2a(7) (2002). Over the prosecutor’s objection, the district court granted Streiffs motion under Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.07 to plead guilty to two lesser-included gross misdemeanor offenses. The district court found that although the state had sufficient evidence to proceed to trial, it would be a manifest injustice to have Streiff prosecuted for a felony. The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the state had failed to show an abuse of the district court’s discretion. State v. Streiff, No. C8-02-1857, 2008 WL 1702255, at *1 (Minn.App. Apr.1, 2003). Because the collateral consequences of prosecuting Streiff on the felony charges do not constitute a manifest injustice under Rule 15.07, we reverse.
On January 5, 2002, Streiff and her husband James Streiff (James) were involved in a one-car rollover accident in Olmsted County. Witnesses reported that Streiff was on the driver’s side of the vehicle, or was getting out of the driver’s side, when they arrived at the scene. Witnesses found James injured and lying in a ditch near the vehicle. Witnesses reported that Streiff had wandered off from the accident scene and was found among the trees a short distance away. A preliminary breath test of Streiff taken at the scene registered a blood alcohol content of 0.162. Streiff then submitted to a blood test that indicated a blood alcohol content of 0.17.
A state trooper took a statement from James two days after the accident. James stated that he could not remember the accident, but remembered that he and his wife had been drinking prior to the accident. The trooper obtained a release for James’s medical records. Based on the release, James’s treating physician reported that James sustained substantial bodily harm as a result of the accident. When James discovered that his medical records had been released to the county attorney’s office and were being used to prosecute his wife, he sent letters to the Minnesota State Patrol revoking all releases of medical information; the hospital revoking the medical information release; and the Assistant Dakota County Attorney, stating his opposition to the prosecution of his wife and his concern that his wife would lose her job if convicted of a felony.
After being charged with the two felonies, Streiff filed a motion under Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.07 requesting that she be allowed to plead to a lesser offense. Under Rule 15.07, a district court may accept a plea of guilty to a lesser offense if (1) “the court is satisfied following [a] hearing that the prosecutor cannot introduce evidence sufficient to justify the submission of the offense charged to the jury” or (2) “it would be a manifest injustice not to accept the plea.” The district court granted the motion over the state’s objection and accepted a guilty plea from Streiff to two lesser-included, gross misdemeanor charges, violations of Minn.Stat. § 609.21 subd. 2b(4) and 2b(7) (2002). The district court noted that the state had sufficient evidence to proceed to trial on the felony charges, but found that to do so would effect a “manifest injustice.” The court relied on five factors: (1) James did not want Streiff to have a felony conviction; (2) Streiffs family would be harmed by the felony conviction by Streiffs possible loss of employment; (3) public policy concerns of deterrence and punishment would be met by the conviction of two gross misdemeanors; (4) the offense was an unintended consequence of an intentional act; and (5) Streiff had accepted responsibility for her actions.
A majority of the court of appeals affirmed the district court, holding that the *834state failed to show an abuse of discretion by the district court. State v. Streiff, 2003 WL 1702255, at *1. The court stated that while the prosecutor has the final decision on what to prosecute, the court retained the authority on sentencing. Id. at *2. The dissenting opinion argued that the circumstances were not sufficient to show a manifest injustice, noting that this court has set a higher standard for “manifest injustice” in the comparable context of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea under Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.05. Id. at *3. Additionally, the dissent observed that the factors relied upon by the district court to constitute manifest injustice are factors that commonly appear in criminal cases and could not be considered under the sentencing guidelines to support a downward sentencing departure. Id. at *4 n. 1.
Streiff does not argue that the prosecution abused its discretion in bringing the felony charges. Neither does Streiff argue that she was selectively prosecuted for some discriminatory reason. Instead, she essentially argues that the potential loss of her employment, coupled with the objection by the victim to the felony prosecution, amount to manifest injustice. The state argues that the factors do not rise to the level of manifest injustice and that the district court’s acceptance of a plea to lesser charges violates the separation of powers provision of the Minnesota Constitution.
A. Separation of Powers1
A review of the history of Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.07 demonstrates the state’s separation of powers concerns. Prior to 1980, Rule 15.07 did not place any conditions on the district court’s discretion to accept a guilty plea to a lesser charge over the objection of the prosecutor. It simply stated “the court may accept a plea of guilty to a lesser included offense or to an offense of a lesser degree.”
In 1980, we decided State v. Carriere, 290 N.W.2d 618, 619 (Minn.1980), which addressed the following certified question from the district court: “Under Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure 15.07, can the court accept a plea to an offense of lesser degree over the voiced opposition of the county attorney?” We said:
If the second sentence of Rule 15.07 were interpreted as leaving to the trial court’s complete discretion the decision whether to accept a guilty plea opposed by the prosecutor, the [separation of powers] constitutional argument the prosecutor makes in this case would have merit. We believe, however, that conditions can be placed on the trial court’s acceptance of such a plea which will eliminate the danger of judicial intrusion into an area reserved for prose-cutorial discretion.
Id. To satisfy separation of powers concerns, Carriere conditioned the district court’s acceptance of the defendant’s motion on whether the prosecutor can “demonstrate to the trial court that there is a reasonable likelihood the state can withstand a motion to dismiss the charge at the close of the state’s case in chief.” Id. We concluded that if the prosecutor can satisfy this condition, the district court “should refuse to accept the tendered guilty plea.” Id. at 621.
In 1983, Rule 15.07 was amended to reflect the condition suggested in Carriere, *835but the amendment added a second condition, that the district court could also grant the defendant’s motion over the prosecutor’s objection when “it would be [a] manifest injustice not to accept the plea.” Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.07. The phrase “manifest injustice” is not defined in Rule 15.07 and is not discussed in the comments to the rule.2

B. Case Laio Under Rule 15.07

In State v. Stafford, 340 N.W.2d 669, 670 (Minn.1983), we held that it was error for the district court to accept a plea to a lesser offense where the prosecutor’s offer of proof demonstrated a reasonable likelihood that the state could withstand a motion to dismiss on the charged offense. We noted that the amended rule also allowed the acceptance of a plea based on a finding of “manifest injustice,” but, without further discussion, we simply concluded that it was not a manifest injustice to charge a defendant with felony assault in the third degree for striking the victim, knocking her unconscious, and breaking her nose. 340 N.W.2d at 671 n. 2. This has been our only decision under the amended version of Rule 15.07.
In the absence of any decisions by this court on the meaning of “manifest injustice” under Rule 15.07, the court of appeals has developed a hybrid test with two parts, stating “[t]he ‘manifest injustice’ provision [of Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.07] more properly applies to situations like a dishonored plea bargain, or to prosecutorial decisions based on ‘an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification.’ ” State v. Favre, 428 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Minn.App.1988).3
The court of appeals has applied this interpretation of manifest injustice in eight cases. In all cases except Neddermeyer, where there was evidence sufficient to enforce a plea agreement, the court has held that the circumstances were insufficient to constitute a “manifest injustice.” These circumstances included: (1) the charged crime was defendant’s first offense and defendant had made numerous trips from Chicago to the Twin Cities to resolve the charges, State v. Gilmartin, 550 N.W.2d 294, 297 (Minn.App.1996); (2) the state withdrew its plea offer on the first day of trial, after the court ruled certain evidence admissible, State v. Hoffa, 511 N.W.2d 462, 463 (Minn.App.1994); (3) the state required the defendant to stand trial on the offense charged even though the plea would have resulted in the same punishment as a lesser offense, Favre, 428 N.W.2d at 830 (Minn.App.1988); (4) the district court believed that the statute was unconstitutionally vague and discriminato-rily applied, State v. McAllister, 399 N.W.2d 685, 688-690 (Minn.App.1987); (5) the district court accepted the defendant’s statement that he had paid the fine for which his license had been suspended before being stopped for a driving after sus*836pension violation and the delay in processing his payment was the cause of his not having a license, State v. Whitley, No. C4-99-726, 1999 WL 809776 at *1 (Minn.App. Oct.12, 1999) (unpublished opinion); and (6) the defendant would suffer the same consequences under the lesser offense, he was using a legally obtained drug that impaired his driving, and the defendant had displayed good behavior for two years, State v. Heibel, No. C6-94-2295, 1995 WL 81395 at *2 (Minn.App. Feb.28, 1995) (unpublished opinion).

C. Case Law in Related Areas

The parties support their respective interpretations of Rule 15.07 by referring to our decisions concerning the division of power between the prosecutor and the court at other stages in the prosecution of a crime. The prosecution of a criminal defendant may move through several potential stages, from a complaint issued by the prosecutor or an indictment returned by a grand jury; to plea negotiations; to the entry of a plea; to the ordering of a stay of adjudication or a stay of imposition or of execution of a sentence; to the execution of a sentence. At one end of this spectrum, bringing charges and plea bargaining, the discretion rests almost entirely with the prosecutor. At the other end of the spectrum, the imposition of the sentence or staying the imposition or execution of a sentence, the discretion rests almost entirely with the court. But the separation of powers is perhaps not as clear for the stages that lie in between.

1. Stay of Adjudication

Streiff relies on two cases involving stays of adjudication to support her view that the district court had the authority to accept her plea to the lesser charges, State v. Krotzer, 548 N.W.2d 252 (Minn.1996) and State v. Olson, 325 N.W.2d 13 (Minn.1982). Preliminarily, we note that because the act of the court in accepting a plea over the objection of the prosecutor is more intrusive of the prosecutor’s charging function than ordering a stay of adjudication, the restriction on the court’s authority to accept a plea to a lesser charge would logically be greater than that on the court’s authority to order a stay of adjudication.
In Krotzer, this court held that the district court had the inherent power to stay adjudication where special circumstances so indicate. 548 N.W.2d at 255. Krotzer was a 19-year-old boy who was charged with statutory rape for having consensual sex with his 14-year-old girlfriend. Id. at 253. Krotzer entered a guilty plea to the prosecutor’s charge but requested the court to stay adjudication of his crime. The Department of Corrections, remarking on the lack of aggression in Krotzer’s history and the inappropriateness of requiring him to register as a sex offender, recommended that he be placed on probation under a stay of adjudication. The victim’s mother agreed. The district court postponed acceptance of the guilty plea and, over the objection of the prosecutor, stayed adjudication and placed Krotzer on probation for 60 months. This court held that the district court had inherent power to stay the adjudication in the “furtherance of justice.” Id. at 254-55.
In Olson, after the defendant had pleaded guilty to assaulting his wife with a dangerous weapon, the district court stayed the 54-month prison sentence for 10 years. 325 N.W.2d at 16. The district court described “strong mitigating factors,” including the wife’s belief that the defendant was a “good man” and no danger to her, the wife was not seriously hurt (although struck on the arm by a bullet), and the probable loss of the family home and the inability of the children to continue *837to attend “educational programs beyond high school” if the defendant was incarcerated. Id. This court held that the district court had the authority to stay the prison term over the prosecutor’s objection. Id.
But Krotzer and Olson are not particularly helpful to Streiff because in each case, the district court’s action took place during the sentencing stage and did not involve a direct intrusion on the charging or plea-bargaining functions of the prosecution. In fact, Krotzer recognized that the court’s authority to interfere with the charging function of a prosecutor is much less than its authority in sentencing, stating:
Under established separation of power rules, absent evidence of selective or discriminatory prosecutorial intent, or an abuse of prosecutorial discretion, the judiciary is powerless to interfere with the prosecutor’s charging authority.
548 N.W.2d at 254 (citations omitted). Moreover, Streiff fails to recognize that this court restricted the holding in Krotzer when it later confirmed that the district court may stay adjudication only where “special circumstances” are present. State v. Foss, 556 N.W.2d 540 (Minn.1996). This court emphasized in Foss that a stay of adjudication should only be used “sparingly ” and only for “the purpose of avoiding an injustice resulting from the prosecutor’s clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of the charging function.” Id. at 541 (emphasis in original). Thus, Foss is even less favorable for Streiff because it recognizes that separation of powers affects not only the authority of the court to directly interfere with the charging function, but also limits the court’s authority to indirectly interfere through sentencing.
Even more damaging to Streiffs argument is the decision of this court that followed Foss. In State v. Twiss, 570 N.W.2d 487 (Minn.1997), this court reversed the district court’s stay of adjudication of the defendant’s guilty plea, which had been granted over the objection of the prosecutor based on the possibility that the defendant might lose her job if convicted of a gross misdemeanor. We said that the possible loss of a job is not a “special circumstance” under Foss. “Rather, it is the sort of consequence that commonly attends a conviction of a serious offense, such as the offense in this case.” Id.4
Thus, Streiffs reliance on the stay of adjudication analogy does not support her argument. If the factors relied upon to grant Streiffs Rule 15.07 motion are not special circumstances that would support a court’s indirect interference with the charging function through a stay of adjudication, they provide even less support for the court’s more direct interference by accepting a plea to a lesser charge.

2. Dismissal under Minn.Stat. § 631.21

Streiff argues that because the court had the power to dismiss the charges on its own motion under Minn.Stat. § 631.21 (2002), it had the implied authority to take the less severe measure of accepting a plea to a lesser charge. Section 631.21 provides: “The court may order a criminal action, whether prosecuted upon indictment or complaint, to be dismissed. The *838court may order dismissal of an action either on its own motion or upon motion of the prosecuting attorney and in furtherance of justice.”
But this argument merely begs the question of what the scope of the authority of the court really is under section 631.21. First, such a dismissal ordinarily would not have the effect of precluding the prosecutor from recharging the accused. In Krotzer, we said: “While dismissing the complaint under section 631.21 might have avoided the need for a stay of adjudication, the prosecutor would have been free to reinstate identical criminal charges against Krotzer.” 548 N.W.2d at 255. See also City of St. Paul v. Halvorson, 301 Minn. 48, 52, 221 N.W.2d 535, 537-38 (1974) (stating that dismissal under section 631.21 is not appealable, but it is not “with prejudice,” leaving the prosecutor free to file a new complaint); 8 Henry W. McCarr & Jack S. Nordby, Minnesota Practice-Criminal Law and Procedure § 11.19 (3d ed.2001). Thus, dismissal of a charge under the statute would actually be less intrusive of the prosecutor’s charging function because it would be without prejudice to the reinstatement of charges.
Second, to the extent that it was argued that such a dismissal might preclude further charges, the statute would raise the same separation of powers issues that were present in Carriere and led the court to imply restrictions on the authority of the court to interfere with the prosecutor’s charging function.

S. Withdrawal of a Guilty Plea

The state relies in part on the analogy to the high standard for “manifest injustice” established by this court, under Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.05, to allow the withdrawal of a guilty plea. We have applied an “abuse of prosecutorial discretion” standard to define “manifest injustice” under Rule 15.05 and have confirmed that collateral consequences of a plea, including loss of employment, do not support a finding of abuse of prosecutorial discretion. See Kaiser v. State, 641 N.W.2d 900 (Minn.2002) (requirement to register as a predatory offender); Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573 (Minn.1998) (deportation); Barragan v. State, 583 N.W.2d 571 (Minn.1998) (deportation); Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263 (Minn.1989) (loss of employment). Because allowing the withdrawal of a plea is less intrusive of the prosecutor’s discretion than accepting a lesser plea (after withdrawal, the original charge still stands), the restriction on the authority of the court to accept a plea to a lesser offense should be at least as great as that on the court’s authority to allow a defendant to withdraw a guilty plea. Thus, “manifest injustice” under Rule 15.07 should not be interpreted any more broadly than manifest injustice under Rule 15.05 — as the abuse of prosecutorial discretion.

L Sentencing Departures

The state relies in part on the analogy to the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines to argue that factors that do not justify a downward departure under the guidelines should not be considered sufficient to supply manifest injustice under Rule 15.07. Circumstances involving employment or family status are specifically excluded from consideration in making a downward departure in sentencing. Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines II.D.l. If such factors do not support a sentencing departure, which only indirectly interferes with the prosecutor’s charging function, they should likewise provide no support for the acceptance of a plea to a lesser charge, which directly interferes with the charging function.
*839We conclude that the standard of proof required to establish a “manifest injustice” under Rule 15.07 is at least as high as that required under Rule 15.05, which necessitates a showing of abuse of prosecutorial discretion. We hold that the factors relied upon by the district court here do not establish an abuse of prosecu-torial discretion.
Reversed and remanded.

. Article 3, § 1 of the Minnesota Constitution provides: "The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments: legislative, executive and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly belonging to either of the others except in the instances expressly provided in this Constitution.”

. The files of the court's criminal rules committee do not reflect any discussion of why the “manifest injustice” language was included. The files do contain comments submitted by the state attorney general and several county attorneys, objecting to the manifest injustice language and noting the possible separation of powers issues that could arise under it.

. The first part of the test was apparently based on State v. Neddermeyer, No. C0-87-1415, 1987 WL 26901, at *2 (Minn.App. Dec.15, 1987) (unpublished opinion), where the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the defendant to plead to a lesser offense when the court found that a plea bargain had been offered and accepted prior to the hearing. The second part of the test was drawn from Wayte v. U.S., 470 U.S. 598, 608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985), where the Court addresses issues of selective prosecution.

. In State v. Leming, 617 N.W.2d 587 (Minn.App.2000), the court of appeals addressed several other factors relied upon by the district court in ordering a stay of adjudication and found them all to fall short of the “special circumstances” test. Similar to the factors relied upon by the district court here, these included (1) the possibility of the loss of employment; (2) the inability of the defendant to pay restitution if she lost her job; (3) the victim’s agreement to the stay; (4) the defendant’s lack of a criminal record; and (5) the defendant’s remorse. Id. at 589-90.