Court Opinion

ID: 9829497
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:21:32.741707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:01.855740
License: Public Domain

On Appellees’ Motion for Rehearing.
Appellees suggest, in the oral argument of counsel, that plaintiff did not plead below, nor was there any evidence to sustain the contention, that plaintiff elected to apply the payments made by Mrs. Hamilton on the part of the account for groceries not used by Mrs. Hamilton and her minor children, and that such an election must be made by the creditor at a reasonable time after the receipt of the payments, and certainly before suit is filed. He cites Taylor v. Coleman, 20 Tex. 778. .
Plaintiff, in his amended original petition, and the only one in the record, pleaded:
“That the balance due on this account is for goods, wares, and merchandise which plaintiffs sold defendants, being groceries, and same were necessaries which plaintiffs furnished defendants for food for Mrs. John A. Hamilton and children, with permission and knowledge of John A. Hamilton. That none of the credits on this account were applied by plaintiffs in payment for the groceries furnished Mrs. John A. Hamilton and children, but said credits were appfied to that part of the account for which the defendant John A. Hamilton alone is liable. That the price charged is the reasonable market value of the said groceries at the time the same were sold by plaintiffs to defendants and delivered by plaintiffs to defendants.”
Mr. Snyder, for the plaintiff, testified:
“We have sold Mrs. Hamilton some groceries. Those that were sold to her, I feel safe in saying were deUvered to her. I personally sent her statements from time to time. She never questioned the accuracy of the statements. I have sent statements to her husband, John A. Hamilton. With reference to how the account was charged and whether it was charged to both, I would say it was a natural understanding that both were responsible. Both of them did not promise to pay for them; my dealings were with Mrs. Hamilton. However, I have at regular intervals mailed Mr. Hamilton statements to his place of business, showing that the account was charge'd to him. He never did object to that. This Exhibit A attached to the plaintiff’s petition is a correct statement of the amount due. At the end of the different months the bills were sent out. It is supposed to be correct. I sent out bills the 1st of each month and on some occasions, on the 15th of each month.
“With reference to -knowing who these groceries were to be consumed by, I will say it was generally understood it was the Hamilton family, and I also knew she had at different times a few boarders. With reference to what *756constituted her family, I will say that I had" met Mrs. Hamilton and one of her married daughters, and two children, and I knew of her having a married son. She told me they were living there with her. We sent these groceries to the house where they were all living.
“This money that was sent in, there was nothing said about how it was to be credited at the time it was paid in. On receipt of the money I just generally credited the account the total sum of the payment, and it has been called to my attention, or rather X have been informed, that I had the privilege of crediting the account to Mr. Hamilton or Mrs. John Hamilton, and I exercised my privilege of crediting the account of John Hamilton. That is groceries that are necessaries, that is what I mean. I did not malee any credit on the account of groceries that were' necessary for Mrs. Hamilton and the children.”
There was no plea of payment by Mrs. Hamilton for any groceries used by her or her minor children and ordered by her. Therefore, in the absence of any such defensive plea, and in the absence of any objection to the testimony of Snyder to the effect that he had credited payments made to that part of the account which was for groceries eaten by Mi-. Hamilton, the adult children, and the boarders, no question may now be made that the election came too late. Where the debtor makes no request to the creditor for the application of payments, the creditor may make the application as he may see fit. Nor are the dates of the obligations material, and he may appropriate the money to the earliest or latest one at his option. While a creditor may apply a general payment on a just and valid demand, whether the correctness thereof be assented to by the debtor or not, the debt must be an actual and existing one. 21 R. C. D. pp. 90, 91. In general, the creditor may apply a payment to suit his own interests, if by such application he does not injure the debtor or perpetrate a fraud on him. The early English decisions are conflicting as to the time when the creditor must-appropriate or apply the payment. Ann. Cas. 1913E, 895. But to the extent that the later English eases have established the rule that the appropriation need not be made by the creditor at the time of payment, they are in harmony with nearly all of the American decisions. See 21 R. C. L. p. 92, § 96; Alexandria v. Patten, 4 Cranch, 317, 2 L. Ed. 633.
30 Cyc. p. 1238, § 4, says:
“By the rule of the civil law, the creditor was bound to make his appropriation at the time of the payment, but at common law the creditor is not compelled to exercise his right of application at the time the payment is made. There is much conflict among the authorities, however, as to how long the right exists. Some decisions lay down the broad rule that the creditor’s right of application is not limited in time. By other decisions the application must be before a controversy has arisen, while another line of cases holds that it may be before suit brought, and still others that it may be applied before verdict or judgment. It has also been held that the appropriation must be made within a reasonable time.”
See Thatcher v. Tillory, 30 Tex. Civ. App. 327, 70 S. W. 782, and various other cases cited under note 22, p. 1239, 30 Cyc.
Under the circumstances shown, and under the pleadings, and the state of the record, we do not believe that plaintiff should be denied a recovery against Mrs. Hamilton, by reason of having made the application too late.
It is urged that there is no testimony to sustain the contention that Mrs. Hamilton personally contracted to pay for any part of the groceries she purchased, nor is there any allegation that Mr. Hamilton was insolvent at any time during which th© goods were furnished. We do not think that it was necessary to allege the insolvency of Mr. Hamilton, in order to bind his wife for groceries eaten by her and her minor children. The petition does allege that Mrs. Hamilton ordered the goods, and they were furnished to her. We think such allegations are all that is necessary, in the absence of any exception directed thereto, to bind the wife. In Hawkes et ux. v. Robertson (Tex. Civ. App.) 40 S. W. 548, writ of error denied, the court said:
“It is alleged that .the note was executed by her for necessaries and expenses that the statute makes her liable for. The note evidenced the debt, and there is nothing in the petition that indicates that the note was given for a pre-existing debt that.might have been incurred by some person other than herself. The petition was suflicient to warrant the judgment and execution against her separate estate for such balance as might be due on the judgment after the application of the proceeds of the mortgaged property. This suit is brought under the statute, and not to charge her separate estate in equity for necessaries for the family, including her husband; and hence it was not necessary to allege that the husband was insolvent, and that there was no community' estate liable for the debt.”
See McFaddin v. Crumpler, 20 Tex. 375; Emerson v. Kneezell (Tex. Civ. App.) 62 S. W. 551; Von Carlowitz v. Bernstein, 28 Tex. Civ. App. 8, 66 S. W. 464, by this court.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.
DUNKLIN, J., not sitting.