Court Opinion

ID: 9745210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:41:31.670513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:57.605272
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: Judges in civil cases should be reluctant to give a missing witness instruction (Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 5.01 (3d ed. 1995) (hereinafter IPI Civil 3d No. 5.01)) unless the witness is truly accessible only to one party. Cases should be decided on the basis of the evidence presented, not by bickering over who is to blame for supposed evidence not presented. If a party is compelled to call all possible witnesses in order to avoid the missing witness instruction, cumulative testimony and unduly lengthy trials will be the result. In criminal cases judges must be even more careful than in civil cases. There is no missing witness instruction in criminal cases, and comment on missing witnesses may violate (1) the defendant’s right to remain silent and (2) the defendant’s presumption of innocence, as it is impermissible for the prosecution to attempt to shift the burden of proof to the defendant. The State has the burden of proving defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt as to an alibi defense together with all the other elements of the offense. 720 ILCS 5/3 — 20b) (West 1994). Apart from alibi cases, it is generally improper for the prosecution to comment on an accused’s failure to call a witness. People v. Adams, 109 Ill. 2d 102, 120, 485 N.E.2d 339, 345 (1985). It is impermissible for the prosecution to attempt to shift the burden of proof to the defense. The defense is under no obligation to present any evidence. People v. Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d 499, 527, 538 N.E.2d 500, 511 (1989). However, the prosecution may comment on the fact that pieces of evidence stand undenied or unexplained. Fly, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 736-37, 619 N.E.2d at 825; People v. Brown, 222 Ill. App. 3d 703, 718, 584 N.E.2d 355, 365-66 (1991). Where the prosecution has presented evidence tending to show guilt and defendant "fails to bring in evidence within his control in explanation or refutation, his omission to do so is a circumstance entitled to some weight in the minds of the jury, and, as such, is a legitimate subject of comment by the prosecution.” Williams, 40 Ill. 2d at 529, 240 N.E.2d at 649 (ballistics expert testified regarding gun similar to defendant’s; defendant failed to produce his gun for tests); Brown, 222 Ill. App. 3d at 718, 584 N.E.2d at 365-66; People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 147, 588 N.E.2d 1044, 1062 (1991). It is more likely that evidence will be under defendant’s control than it is that witnesses will be under defendant’s control. Where the comment is not directed to particular evidence or a particular theory, but to defendant’s general failure to produce evidence, there is error. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d at 451-52, 553 N.E.2d at 379 (remarks focused "on the absence of witnesses to show where the defendant was at that time”); Phillips, 127 Ill. 2d at 527, 538 N.E.2d at 511 (once a defendant has presented evidence, that evidence is -within the reach of appropriate comment). There are suggestions in some of the older cases that comment is always appropriate when the defendant fails to call an alibi witness, whether or not that witness is equally accessible to the prosecution, that the only question is whether the "defendant injects into the case the name of an alibi witness.” Kubat, 94 Ill. 2d at 498, 447 N.E.2d at 275; Mays, 3 Ill. App. 3d at 514, 277 N.E.2d at 548 (potential alibi witnesses are "deemed unavailable” to the prosecution). If that is correct, then a defendant in a civil case has more protection than a defendant in a criminal case. Comment is improper in a civil case where the witness is equally available to the adverse party. See IPI Civil 3d No. 5.01. If the witness’ testimony would be favorable, the party should call that witness, not complain that the other party has not done so. There was a time when the prosecution in a criminal case was unfairly disadvantaged with regard to alibi defenses. As the court said in People v. Sanford, 100 Ill. App. 2d 101, 105, 241 N.E.2d 485, 487 (1968): "There is nothing in the record to indicate that the State knew prior to defendant’s testimony that he would claim an alibi or whom he would name as witnesses to support his story that he was in another place at the time of the crime. The defendant knew who they were and could have had them on hand, the State could not. After the witnesses were named, the trial would have had to be recessed, perhaps to some other day, for the State to have subpoenaed them.” Those problems were eliminated, however, once Supreme Court Rule 413 (134 Ill. 2d R. 413) was interpreted to require advance disclosure of alibi defenses. See People ex rel. Carey v. Strayhorn, 61 Ill. 2d 85, 329 N.E.2d 194 (1975). In the days when a party could not impeach his own witness, there was an additional danger in calling a witness with ties to the adverse party. Even if that witness could be located and brought into court, there was always the possibility that the witness would commit perjury, and the party calling the witness would be stuck with the testimony. Under Rule 238 (134 Ill. 2d R. 238), however, effective April 1, 1982, the credibility of a witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling him. The rule allows the party calling such a witness to impeach him by proof of prior inconsistent statements. The same rule applies in criminal cases. See 134 Ill. 2d R. 433. The mere fact that potential alibi witnesses are listed in defendant’s discovery answers does not establish that they are more accessible to the defense than to the prosecution. Lawrence, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 626-27, 631 N.E.2d at 859; cf. People v. Navarrete, 258 Ill. App. 3d 39, 46, 629 N.E.2d 742, 747 (1994) (witness not equally available if witness would likely be biased against the State). If a defense alibi witness refuses to speak to the prosecution, however, the witness should be considered inaccessible to the prosecution. The more recent cases make it clear that alibi witnesses must in fact be unavailable to the prosecution before the prosecution may comment on their absence. People v. Bramlett, 276 Ill. App. 3d 201, 205-06, 658 N.E.2d 510, 514 (1995); People v. Alexander, 184 Ill. App. 3d 855, 863-64, 540 N.E.2d 949, 954 (1989); Eddington, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 777, 473 N.E.2d at 125. Both in alibi cases and in nonalibi cases it must be shown that the witness is more accessible to the defendant or under the defendant’s control before the prosecutor may comment on defendant’s failure to call him. Witnesses are accessible only to the defendant where the defendant refers to them by their first names only and discloses neither an address nor a telephone number. Bramlett, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 206, 658 N.E.2d at 514; Adams, 109 Ill. 2d at 112-13, 485 N.E.2d at 341 (defendant said he was with Shirley McClaine, but police found no evidence of a person by that name, and defendant refused to take them to her home). When the disclosure is not made until trial, comment is appropriate. Anderson, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 453, 620 N.E.2d at 1291 (no mention of Bobby Green until the prosecutor asked defendant at trial "who were you with?”); Talley, 152 Ill. App. 3d at 984, 504 N.E.2d at 1326 ("alibi witnesses first asserted by the defendant in response to cross-examination by the State”). Both aspects of accessibility, lack of identification and late disclosure, were present in Blakes (63 Ill. 2d 354, 348 N.E.2d 170). In Blakes, defendant during discovery named four persons who could establish his whereabouts at the time of the robbery, including the manager of the Inman Hotel. At trial, however, defendant testified he was at Neal’s Lounge at the time of the robbery. On cross-examination defendant named several people who were there, whom he had not named before, and "a lot of others, but I can’t remember everybody’s name.” Blakes, 63 Ill. 2d at 357, 348 N.E.2d at 172. The prosecution was accordingly allowed to comment on defendant’s failure to call alibi witnesses. Even where the issue of alibi is injected by the defense, and even where the witness is inaccessible to the prosecution, there are situations where comment is improper. Comment is not allowed where the witness is inaccessible both to the prosecution and to the defense. Bramlett, 276 Ill. App. 3d at 206, 658 N.E.2d at 514; Lawrence, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 627, 631 N.E.2d at 859 (defendant attempted to subpoena witness, but address was incorrect). Comment is not appropriate where there is a reason for defendant’s failure to call the witness, such as where the witness could be impeached with a felony conviction. Lawrence, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 627, 631 N.E.2d at 859. Comment is not appropriate where the unproduced witness’ testimony would be merely cumulative. Chuhak v. Chicago Transit Authority, 152 Ill. App. 3d 480, 489, 504 N.E.2d 875, 881 (1987). In contrast to prosecutors, defendants are allowed to comment on the prosecution’s failure to call a witness only where the uncalled witness has testimony unique to the case. Fly, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 738, 619 N.E.2d at 826. Nothing suggests Bolden was inaccessible to the prosecution in this case. Defendant had listed Bolden’s name and address in his response to discovery. Bolden was both identified and timely disclosed. If the prosecution truly believed that Bolden would have refuted defendant’s alibi, the prosecution would have called her to do so and not relied on a negative inference. The majority opinion limits its discussion to whether the alibi defense here was injected into the case by defendant or the prosecution. A defendant considering an alibi defense must weigh the possibility that the jury will convict him, not because it believes the prosecution case, but because it disbelieves his evidence of alibi. United States v. Robinson, 602 F.2d 760, 762 (6th Cir. 1979) (instruction should explain that is improper); see also 2 C. Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure § 491 (2d ed. 1982). It is wrong for the prosecution to inject into the trial a defense that the defendant chooses not to make, just so the prosecution may comment on the defendant’s failure to produce witnesses. The majority offers some advice to prosecutors that they should avoid presenting alibi evidence. My guess is that prosecutors know better than we do what works with a jury and that the frequent mention of alibis by prosecution witnesses is no accident. Giving notice of a potential alibi defense does not obligate defendant to present that defense. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d at 450, 553 N.E.2d at 378-79 (error to comment; defendant’s only reference to alibi contained in a pretrial pleading not in evidence). That is not to say that the prosecution must ignore a defendant’s pretrial statement that he was with X at the time the offense was committed. The prosecutor certainly may call X as a witness to deny that defendant was with him and the prosecutor no doubt would do that if that is what X would say. The cases that have sought to prevent the prosecution from injecting the alibi defense (or prevent the defense from injecting it while avoiding comment on it) have attempted to lay down some rules that have not worked well. A defendant in fact may interject the defense without taking the stand, by simply calling the alibi witness. A defendant who does take the stand should not be allowed to avoid cross-examination on his statement that he was not at the crime scene. Talley, 152 Ill. App. 3d 971, 504 N.E.2d 1318; Anderson, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 453, 620 N.E.2d at 1291 ("[w]ho were you with?” (emphasis added)). In these cases, I would allow the prosecution to comment on defendant’s failure to call alibi witnesses, if they were not equally accessible to the prosecution. Cf. Kubat, 94 Ill. 2d at 498, 447 N.E.2d at 275 (only question is whether "defendant injects into the case the name of an alibi witness” (emphasis added)); compare Anderson, 250 Ill. App. 3d at 454, 620 N.E.2d at 1291. The majority suggests it does not matter that a State witness initially suggests potential alibi witnesses to the trier of fact and that defendant calls an alibi witness in response; that the prosecutor should be allowed to comment in that situation. The cases have consistently used the word "inject” or "interject” in addressing this issue, which indicates they are concerned with who first brings the issue into the case. In the present case, the prosecutor certainly injected the alibi defense and the names of the alibi witnesses. If defendant had not then called his mother, the prosecutor would have commented, not just that defendant did not produce Bolden but that defendant did not produce either witness. Perhaps the trial court would have sustained an objection at that point, but the message would have been received by the jury. Comments that improperly suggest to the jury that defendant has a burden to prove his innocence are a serious matter and amount to constitutional error. In some cases, the appellate court has reversed for a new trial even though the trial court sustained an objection to the comment. Lawrence, 259 Ill. App. 3d at 628, 631 N.E.2d at 860; see Eddington, 129 Ill. App. 3d at 777, 473 N.E.2d at 125 (error not cured by general instructions on purposes of argument and burden of proof). In Nevitt, the supreme court stated that the comment could not have been a material factor in defendant’s conviction where the court had the victim’s statement and defendant had signed several confessions. Nevitt, 135 Ill. 2d at 453, 553 N.E.2d at 380. In Fly, where the trial court eventually gave a curative instruction and an undercover police officer testified that defendant had purchased cocaine from him, the appellate court held that defendant had suffered no prejudice. Fly, 249 Ill. App. 3d at 737, 619 N.E.2d at 825-26. In the present case, the prosecution’s action was intentional, there was no curative instruction, and the court’s overruling of the defense objection reinforced the jury’s impression that it could properly consider defendant’s failure to call Bolden. There was testimony from Jason Smith and Shain Ford that defendant was the one who killed the victim, but Smith and Ford were accomplices with a motive to exonerate themselves. I cannot say the error here was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. I would reverse and remand for a new trial.