Court Opinion

ID: 9631519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:41:01.919379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:55.751120
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, J.,
concurring.
I join in the court’s conclusion regarding the accused’s violation of disciplinary rules and the sanction imposed on the accused. I write separately to question the court’s analysis of the requirement of prejudice in DR 1-102(A)(4).
DR 1-102(A)(4) forbids “conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.” On its face, that rule authorizes discipline if the Bar can prove, by clear and convincing evidence, BR 5.2, that the accused lawyer’s conduct is “prejudicial,” that is, harmful or injurious, to the administration of justice. Only conduct that causes genuine prejudice will suffice to establish a violation. The rule does not prohibit conduct that threatens only a potential or hypothetical injury to the administration of justice.
In In re Haws, 310 Or 741, 745, 801 P2d 818 (1990), this court stated that the text of DR 1-102(A)(4) is “simple and straightforward.” I agree. The rule is uncomplicated by difficult phraseology, structure, or problems of internal inconsistency. However, in Haws, this court said that “[t]he problem arises in fairly determining the amount of harm or injury that triggers application of the rule.” 310 Or at 747 (emphasis added). In attempting to address that perceived problem, the court chose
“to interpret the word ‘prejudice’ in the context of this rule . to require either:
“1. Repeated conduct causing some harm to the administration of justice; or
“2. A single act causing substantial harm to the administration of justice.”
310 Or at 748 (emphasis in original). As a result of Haws, litigants in cases arising under DR 1-102(A)(4) typically wage costly battles over the questions whether the accused lawyer *657engaged in a single act or repeated conduct that harmed the administration of justice and whether the Bar proved that “some” harm or “substantial” harm resulted.
With all due respect, I believe that Haws adopted a strained and incorrect reading of the rule. Nothing in the rule’s text suggests that the lawyer’s ethical responsibility under the rule should turn on whether the accused lawyer engaged in one or more than one culpable act. The rule’s text also furnishes no support for the “some” harm versus “substantial” harm dichotomy that Haws created. The question that the prejudice element presents does not concern the amount of prejudice shown, as Haws states, but whether the Bar proved that the accused lawyer’s conduct genuinely prejudiced the administration of justice.
Haws purported to justify the creation of those proof requirements by suggesting that they would reduce uncertainty in the rule’s application. 310 Or at 748.1 do not agree that the construction of DR 1-102(A)(4) adopted in Haws alleviates uncertainty. Although litigants readily may discern the line between a single act and repeated conduct by a lawyer in most cases, it oftentimes is difficult to establish which of several acts may have caused prejudice to the administration of justice. Moreover, the question whether a lawyer’s conduct caused “some” harm or “substantial” harm to the administration of justice invites a purely subjective response. That test affords no assistance to lawyers who seek to conform their professional behavior to the rule’s command and to Bar counsel who must investigate and prosecute rule violations. In my view, the rule interpretation adopted in Haws needlessly complicates the administration of DR 1-102(A)(4).
Haws also creates a gap in the rule’s coverage. If the record of a disciplinary proceeding establishes that the accused lawyer engaged in a single act that was prejudicial to the administration of justice, but that the act caused only “some” harm (as opposed to “substantial” harm), the accused lawyer is entitled not to a reduced penalty but to exoneration. I cannot square that result with the unambiguous terms of DR 1-102(A)(4).
In a technical sense, the majority commits no error in declining to reexamine the tests for prejudice that Haws announced. No party before the court in this case argues for a *658reevaluation of Haws. I, for one, am willing to entertain that argument in a future proceeding that raises the question of prejudice under DR 1-102(A)(4).
I concur.