Court Opinion

ID: 9368180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 01:00:25.631297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:06.105777
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30269         Document: 00516632965             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/02/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                February 2, 2023
                                        No. 22-30269                              Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   Marquel Devon Robinson,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellant.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                         for the Western District of Louisiana
                               USDC No. 2:19-CR-363-1

   Before Elrod, Haynes, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Marquel Devon Robinson pleaded guilty (pursuant to a plea
   agreement) to possessing heroin with intent to distribute. Before entering
   that plea, Robinson filed a motion to suppress certain evidence that he alleged
   was the product of an unconstitutional search warrant. The district court
   denied that motion, adopting the magistrate judge’s report and
   recommendation. On appeal, Robinson argues that the good-faith exception

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30269      Document: 00516632965            Page: 2   Date Filed: 02/02/2023

                                      No. 22-30269

   to the exclusionary rule is inapplicable because the affidavit supporting the
   search warrant altogether lacked the factual indicia required to justify an
   officer’s reasonable belief in the existence of probable cause for a search. He
   also argues that probable cause was absent. Because we reject Robinson’s
   first argument, we need not reach his second, and we therefore AFFIRM.
                                  *        *         *
          Robinson asked the district court to suppress evidence that officers
   discovered while executing a warrant to search a residence. The affidavit
   supporting the warrant relayed the following information:

          • Robinson is a “well known drug dealer,” and his sister has
            “a previous drug arrest.”

          • Robinson and his sister were “in” the residence, which
            their mother owned and which saw “a high traffic volume”
            involving stays of “less than five minutes per visit.”

          • Because of this pattern, Officer Guidry (the affiant)
            believed that the residence’s “occupants [we]re involved in
            narcotic[s] distribution.”

          • Further, during “surveillance,” officers observed a Honda
            Accord parked in front of the residence.

          • When the Honda departed, the driver (not a party here)
            committed a traffic infraction that led to a stop, and during
            that stop officers discovered in the vehicle what they
            believed to be heroin and related paraphernalia.

          • A search of the driver’s person also revealed a “large
            amount of cash” and plastic bags containing what the driver
            described as “Crack.”

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Case: 22-30269       Document: 00516632965           Page: 3      Date Filed: 02/02/2023

                                      No. 22-30269

          Citing United States v. Leon, Robinson argues that the affidavit is “so
   lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
   entirely unreasonable.” 468 U.S. 897, 899 (1984). In particular, he argues
   that “no evidence linked the occupant or drugs in the Honda Accord to [the
   residence].” As a result, he argues, the “affidavit provides no basis
   whatsoever to believe anyone at [the residence] was involved in criminal
   activity.” We disagree.
          An affidavit lacks indicia of probable cause, and thereby defeats the
   good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, when it is “wholly conclusory”
   and “do[es] not detail any facts” but instead “allege[s] only conclusions.”
   United States v. Morton, 46 F.4th 331, 337 (5th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (emphasis
   added), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Jan. 9, 2023) (No. 22-6489). If the affidavit
   contains enough factual information to allow the judge to “ma[k]e a
   judgment call,” then it is “reasonable” for an officer to “rely on the
   warrant[].” Id. at 338. The affidavit here was far from the “bare bones”
   recitations that fail constitutional muster. See id. It alleged specific facts
   regarding the residence and its occupants, and about their connection to drug
   trafficking. Those indicia are plenty to give an officer “reasonable grounds
   for believing that the warrant was properly issued.” Leon, 468 U.S. at 923.
          Robinson’s contrary arguments are unpersuasive. He argues that
   “[s]anctioning the instant search warrant would mean that any car containing
   contraband parked on the street outside a house would provide sufficient
   probable cause to search that house.” But the question under the good-faith
   exception is not whether probable cause exists, but instead whether the
   affidavit is so factually defective as to render “entirely unreasonable” an
   officer’s reliance on the warrant. Leon, 468 U.S. at 923 (citation omitted).
   Robinson’s argument also ignores the specific facts that here linked the
   residence to drug trafficking (for example, several vehicles making short
   stops, and the fact that a “well known drug dealer” was “in” the residence).

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Case: 22-30269      Document: 00516632965          Page: 4   Date Filed: 02/02/2023

                                    No. 22-30269

          If the affidavit mentioned only the Honda Accord’s one-time location
   in front of the residence, then this case would be closer to United States v.
   Brown, 567 F. App’x 272 (5th Cir. 2014). There, “the affidavit provided no
   information . . . [or] any evidence, either direct or inferential, linking the
   investigation to Brown’s home.” Id. at 282. Instead, the affidavit recited only
   the mere “belie[f] that additional narcotics and paraphernalia are located at
   Brown’s residence.” Id. at 283. Given that “bare-bones statement[],” the
   officers in Brown “could not have acted in objectively-reasonable good-faith
   reliance upon the search warrant.” Id.
          Here, by contrast, the affidavit contained specific factual information
   far beyond mere “belief” regarding the residence. See id (citation omitted).
   It provided information regarding the residence’s unusual traffic pattern, and
   it also linked Robinson and his sister to the residence and to “drug deal[ing]”
   and to a “previous drug arrest.” The affidavit is neither “wholly conclusory”
   nor devoid of “any facts,” and it does not allege “only conclusions.” See
   Morton, 46 F.4th at 337. Accordingly, the affidavit did not foreclose
   reasonable reliance on the warrant. Leon’s good-faith exception to the
   exclusionary rule thus applies, and that brings our inquiry to an end.
          We do not decide whether “the state judge should have” issued the
   warrant, but rather “only that the officers acted in good faith when relying
   on the judge’s decision to issue the warrant[].” Id. at 339. We AFFIRM.

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