Court Opinion

ID: 9892413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 18:11:31.353747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:05:20.619031
License: Public Domain

J-A18010-23

                               2023 PA Super 211

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                         :        PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellant             :
                                         :
                                         :
              v.                         :
                                         :
                                         :
 SHANNON MCKNIGHT                        :   No. 66 WDA 2023

              Appeal from the Order Entered January 12, 2023
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-63-CR-0001628-2022

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

OPINION BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                      FILED: OCTOBER 23, 2023

     The Commonwealth appeals from the trial court’s January 12, 2023

pretrial order directing that it shall provide information requested in

Appellee’s, Shannon McKnight, “Request for Bill of Particulars Pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 572(A)” (“Request”). After careful review, we affirm.

     We summarize the pertinent background of this case, as follows. On

December 20, 2022, the Commonwealth filed a Bill of Information

(“Information”) charging Appellee with, inter alia, two counts of first-degree

murder (18 Pa.C.S. § 2501(a)) and one count of attempted murder (18

Pa.C.S. § 901(a)). The Information alleges that Appellee caused the death of

a three-month-old infant, N.M., by poisoning the infant with fentanyl. The

Information also alleges that Appellee attempted to murder a 16-month-old
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toddler, K.M., also with fentanyl.1 On December 20, 2022, the Commonwealth

filed a “Notice of Aggravating Circumstances” for purposes of seeking the

death penalty.

       On December 22, 2022, Appellee submitted the Request to the District

Attorney’s Office, wherein the Commonwealth was asked to provide Appellee

with the following:

       1. In what manner was fentanyl and/or a combination of drugs
       and/or a chemical compound and/or an illegal substance
       introduced to N.M.?

       2. In what manner was cocaine and/or fentanyl and/or a
       combination of drugs and/or dangerous metabolites introduced to
       K.M.?

Request at 1 (unnumbered single page). Appellee also stated in the Request

that without those particulars, she does not know what is being alleged as the

actus reus in counts one through three, and that she cannot adequately

prepare for trial without the information. Id.

       On January 4, 2023, the Commonwealth filed a response to the Request

in which the Commonwealth refused to provide the requested particulars. The

Commonwealth argued that Appellee was using the requested particulars to

improperly seek the Commonwealth’s evidence. On January 9, 2023, Appellee

____________________________________________

1 The Information identifies the 16-month-old toddler as “B.M.”  In Appellee’s
Request, she identifies the toddler as “K.M.,” and notes that the Information
mistakenly refers to the 16-month-old as B.M. See Request, 12/22/22, at 1
n. 1 (unnumbered single page). We will herein refer to the 16-month-old as
K.M. for purposes of clarity.

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filed a motion asking the trial court to direct the Commonwealth to provide

the information sought in the Request. On January 12, 2023, the trial court

entered an order directing the Commonwealth to “provide the information

requested in Defendant’s Request for Bill of Particulars.” Order, 1/12/23, at

1 (unnumbered single page).           The order further provides that the

Commonwealth’s “[f]ailure to provide adequate responses to these inquiries

may result in a prohibition against alleging specific intent to kill and the death

penalty.” Id.

      The Commonwealth filed a timely Notice of Appeal from the trial court’s

order on the same date.         The Commonwealth certified that the order

terminates or substantially handicaps its prosecution of Appellee’s case

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d).        The trial court thereafter ordered the

Commonwealth to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal, and the Commonwealth timely complied. The court

filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 7, 2023. Herein, the Commonwealth

states four issues for our review:

      A. Did the [c]ourt err in requiring the Commonwealth to answer
      [Appellee’s] Request for Bill of Particulars?

      B. Did the [c]ourt err in requiring the Commonwealth to answer
      [Appellee’s] Request for Bill of Particulars where the [Appellee]
      was seeking the Commonwealth’s evidence and was not a proper
      request for a bill of particulars?

      C. Did the [c]ourt err by requiring the Commonwealth to respond
      to [Appellee’s] Request for Bill of Particulars by providing the
      Defense with its theory of the case?

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      D. Did the [c]ourt err in ordering that failure to provide adequate
      responses may result in a prohibition against alleging specific
      intent to kill and the death penalty?

Commonwealth’s Brief at 7.

      Before addressing the Commonwealth’s claims, we must discuss the

appealability of the court’s January 12, 2023 order. On February 6, 2023,

counsel for Appellee filed a Motion to Quash (“Motion”) this appeal, arguing

that the “Commonwealth’s interlocutory appeal is premature, as the order to

furnish a bill of particulars in this matter does not terminate or substantially

handicap the prosecution in this case.” Motion to Quash, 2/6/23, at 3 ¶ 14

(unnumbered). Appellee also argued that there has been no suppression or

exclusion of Commonwealth evidence at this point because the trial court’s

order informs the Commonwealth that some of their claims “may be

suppressed” if the Commonwealth fails to comply with the order. Id. at ¶ 12

(emphasis in original).

      By   Order   dated   February   10,   2023,   this   Court   directed   the

Commonwealth to respond to Appellee’s Motion within seven days.               The

Commonwealth filed a timely “Answer to Motion to Quash” (“Answer”).

Therein, the Commonwealth stressed that the order at issue provides that the

failure or refusal to comply with the order would result in the Commonwealth’s

being precluded from seeking the death penalty or even seeking a first-degree

murder conviction. The Commonwealth also averred that it is being compelled

to give its theory of the case, and that compliance with the order would limit

its presentation of its case.   Further, the Commonwealth maintained that

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Appellee’s requests are not a proper subject for a bill of particulars and,

instead, are in the nature of a discovery request. Finally, the Commonwealth

argued   that   when    a   pretrial   motion   removes   evidence    from   the

Commonwealth’s case, only the prosecutor can judge whether that evidence

substantially handicaps the prosecutor’s ability to prove every essential

element of the case.

      On April 3, 2023, this Court issued a per curiam order denying Appellee’s

Motion without prejudice to her right to raise the issue before the present

merits panel. While Appellee does not reiterate her request that we quash

this appeal in her appellate brief, we “may raise jurisdictional issues sua

sponte.” A.A. v. Glicken, 237 A.3d 1165, 1168 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations

omitted); see also In re Estate of Cella, 12 A.3d 374, 377 (Pa. Super. 2010)

(“The appealability of an order directly implicates the jurisdiction of the court

asked to review the order. [T]his Court has the power to inquire at any time,

sua sponte, whether an order is appealable.”) (internal quotation marks and

citations omitted). Thus, we examine whether the trial court’s January 12,

2023 order is appealable.

      Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 311(d) provides that “[i]n a

criminal case, under the circumstances provided by law, the Commonwealth

may take an appeal as of right from an order that does not end the entire case

where the Commonwealth certifies in the notice of appeal that the order will

terminate or substantially handicap the prosecution.” Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). This

Court has stated that “[w]hile the Commonwealth’s good faith certification

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under Rule 311(d) is entitled to some deference, this Court need not accept

its good faith certification in every case.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 99

A.3d 565, 568 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2014); see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cosnek,

836 A.2d 871 (Pa. 2003) (finding that the Commonwealth’s appeal from a

pretrial ruling that denied its motion in limine to exclude certain defense

evidence was not appealable under Rule 311(d)); Commonwealth v.

Woodard, 136 A.3d 1003 (Pa. Super. 2016) (ruling that the Commonwealth’s

appeal from an order denying its motion to consolidate pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 582 was not appealable under Rule 311(d)); Commonwealth

v. Hamilton, 2021 WL 225635 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 22, 2021) (unpublished

memorandum) (concluding that a pretrial order denying the Commonwealth’s

Tender Years motion without prejudice to refile the motion prior to trial was

not appealable as of right under Pa.R.A.P. 311(d)).2

       On the other hand, when a pretrial order has the effect of excluding

Commonwealth evidence, this Court is “not permitted” to inquire into the

Commonwealth’s good-faith certification.          Commonwealth v. Moser, 999

A.2d 602, 605 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2010).             Indeed, “[t]he classic case of an

interlocutory order appealable by the Commonwealth as of right … is one

granting a defense motion to suppress evidence.”              Commonwealth v.

Pownall, 278 A.3d 885, 889 (Pa. 2022) (citation omitted). “This category

covers all types of orders resulting in the suppression or exclusion of
____________________________________________

2Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), non-precedential decisions of the Superior
Court filed after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value.

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Commonwealth evidence[,]” and also “includes orders that have ‘the practical

effect’ of suppressing or excluding evidence.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v.

Matis, 710 A.2d 12, 18-19 (Pa. 1998) (finding that a pretrial order denying

the Commonwealth’s motion for a continuance to secure the presence of a

necessary witness was “sufficiently similar to a suppression order to justify an

appeal”)).   Additionally, Rule 311(d) is not limited to suppression-related

orders, but may also include “other types of orders….” Id. (citation omitted).

For instance, in Commonwealth v. Karetny, 880 A.2d 505, 513 (Pa. 2005),

our Supreme Court found appealable an order quashing some, though not all,

offenses charged against Karetny, reasoning that the order “quite definitively

terminates the prosecution as to the quashed charge” and “imposes a

handicap that the prosecution cannot overcome without a pretrial appeal.” We

also note that in Woodard, this Court recognized that the Commonwealth has

the right to appeal an order precluding it from seeking the death penalty.

Woodard, 136 A.3d at 1005 (citing Commonwealth v. Buonopane, 599

A.2d 681 (Pa. Super. 1991)).

      In Pownall, our Supreme Court addressed the appealability of “a new

type of order” that did “not concern the suppression of evidence or fit neatly

within any of the other discrete categories that we have held are appealable

as of right by the Commonwealth….” Pownall, 278 A.3d at 900. The order

at issue there was “one denying a pretrial Commonwealth motion in limine

seeking to preclude the trial court’s use of a suggested standard jury

instruction” based on a “facial attack to the statute upon which that instruction

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is based[].”   Id.   Relying on Rule 311(d)’s “plain language[,]” the Court

ultimately determined that the order did not terminate or substantially

handicap the Commonwealth’s prosecution and, thus, the interlocutory appeal

was not permitted. Id. In so ruling, the Court relied on its earlier decision in

Commonwealth v. Shearer, 882 A.2d 462 (Pa. 2005). There,

      the Commonwealth took an interlocutory appeal from “a pretrial
      order granting [the defendant’s] request to compel the minor
      complainant to submit to a psychological exam for the purpose of
      aiding the trial court in determining whether [he] was competent
      to testify.” [Shearer,] 882 A.2d at 464. The Commonwealth
      argued its appeal was proper under Rule 311(d) on the ground its
      case would be “over if the trauma inflicted on the child results in
      his being unwilling or unable to cooperate or testify, or otherwise
      results in or contributes to a defense verdict.” Id. at 468 (internal
      quotations, brackets, and citation omitted).          We disagreed.
      Notably, we flatly rejected the Commonwealth’s “assertion that it
      should always be permitted to appeal any pretrial order that has
      the potential to affect its ability to meet its burden of proof.” Id.
      at 467. In our view, the claimed handicap was founded on nothing
      more than the Commonwealth’s “speculation regarding the
      potential effects of the order[.]” Id. at 468. That, we held,
      “simply does not suffice to establish” an order’s appealability
      under Rule 311(d). Id.

Pownall, 278 A.3d at 901.

      The Pownall Court found that the Commonwealth’s appeal “faces the

same problem” addressed in Shearer. Id. Namely, while the Commonwealth

contended that the court’s order would force it “to disprove multiple

justification defenses,” the Court concluded that it was “impossible to know in

this pretrial posture whether the [Commonwealth would] actually be forced to

disprove anything.”    Id.   “That could only theoretically occur if, at trial,”

certain evidence was produced that would support the at-issue jury

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instruction, and the court then exercised its discretion to issue that charge

“exactly    as   written.”   Id.      The   Pownall    Court   characterized   the

Commonwealth’s “asserted substantial handicap” as being “constructed on

layer after layer of speculation and ‘what ifs.’” Id. It held that “Rule 311(d)

requires more[,]” namely, that “the order appealed from [has] a tangible or

practical effect on the Commonwealth’s actual ability to prosecute its case.”

Id. at 901-02.

       Here, we conclude that the order from which the Commonwealth

appeals has a practical and tangible impact on its ability to prosecute

Appellee’s case.     Namely, the order requires the Commonwealth to either

provide information that it believes will improperly “reveal [its] theory of the

case” and have “the effect of constraining the Commonwealth’s evidence[,]”

or refuse to comply with the order and risk that the court will preclude it from

prosecuting Appellee for first-degree murder, or seeking the death penalty

against her, by prohibiting evidence that Appellee acted with the specific intent

to kill.   Commonwealth’s Brief at 15.        Unlike the speculative argument in

Pownall, here, the Commonwealth has offered concrete reasons that it

believes its prosecution will be hampered whether it complies with the court’s

order or refuses to do so.         Accordingly, we accept the Commonwealth’s

certification under Rule 311(d) and proceed to the merits of the issues it raises

herein.

       The Commonwealth’s first three issues are interrelated and, thus, we

will address them together. The Commonwealth contends that the court erred

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by requiring it to answer Appellee’s Request, as it “is putting the

Commonwealth in the precarious position of trying to figure out what is an

appropriate response” to the Request, while at the same time knowing “that

if the Commonwealth does not meet this undefinable standard that it will be

precluded    from   seeking    first-degree     murder   or   the   death   penalty.”

Commonwealth’s Brief at 16. Additionally, the Commonwealth insists that, “if

it does in some way file an acceptable response with the trial court, then it

would be limited in the presentation of its case.” Id. at 17. Specifically, the

Commonwealth contends that “being required to present [its] theory of the

case in an answer to a bill of particulars will constrain the Commonwealth in

its presentation of evidence.” Id. at 18. It elaborates that,

      [t]his case is largely based on circumstantial evidence and there
      are many ways in which the child could have been poisoned by
      her parents with fentanyl (i.e., inhalation, ingestion, etc.). The
      case law is very clear that the Commonwealth is restricted to
      proving what it has set forth in the bill of particulars.
      Com[monwealth] v. Simione, 291 A.2d 764 … [(Pa.] 1972[)].
      The [Commonwealth] should not be limited at this point to
      choosing only one possible way in which the child was poisoned
      with fentanyl.

Id.

      The Commonwealth further avers that Appellee “is requesting things

within the bill of particulars that are not a proper subject for a bill of particulars

and are in the nature of a discovery request.” Id. at 17. The Commonwealth

stresses that “[a] bill of particulars is not a place where the Commonwealth

clarifies [its] evidence.” Id. Instead, “[t]he function of [a] bill of particulars

is to give notice to the accused of the offense charged in order to permit him

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to prepare a defense, avoid surprise, and be placed on notice as to any

restrictions in the Commonwealth’s proof.” Id. at 16 (citing Commonwealth

v. Delbridge, 771 A.2d 1, 4 (Pa. Super. 2001)).                 Instantly, the

Commonwealth contends that,

      [t]he facts are clear that … Appellee and her co-defendant were in
      a small room with over … 100 stamp bags of fentanyl mixed with
      horse tranquilizer and drug paraphernalia everywhere. In that
      small room were the now deceased infant, and a 16-month-old
      sibling who both tested positive for fentanyl and horse
      tranquilizer. There is no surprise here or need for clarification of
      evidence.

Id. at 18-19.

      In regard to Appellee’s claim that she “cannot prepare a proper defense

because [she] does not know the actus reus[,]” the Commonwealth points out

that “[t]he wrongful deed that composes the crime is the poisoning of the

infant child and their 16-month-old sibling with fentanyl and horse

tranquilizer.”   Id. at 20-21.   The Commonwealth insists that this fact is

“contained within the discovery that has been provided” to Appellee, and that

the trial court’s order improperly requires the Commonwealth to divulge its

theory of the case, despite that “no rule of criminal procedure … requires the

Commonwealth to put forth [its] trial strategy and/or theory.” Id. at 21, 22.

      In assessing the Commonwealth’s arguments, we are mindful that “[w]e

review a trial court’s [Pa.R.Crim.P.] 572 decision for an abuse of discretion.”

Commonwealth v. Libengood, 152 A.3d 1057, 1059 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citation omitted). Rule 572 states:

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      (A) A request for a bill of particulars shall be served in writing by
      the defendant upon the attorney for the Commonwealth within 7
      days following arraignment. The request shall promptly be filed
      and served as provided in Rule 576.

      (B) The request shall set forth the specific particulars sought by
      the defendant, and the reasons why the particulars are requested.

      (C) Upon failure or refusal of the attorney for the Commonwealth
      to furnish a bill of particulars after service of a request, the
      defendant may make written motion for relief to the court within
      7 days after such failure or refusal. If further particulars are
      desired after an original bill of particulars has been furnished, a
      motion therefor may be made to the court within 5 days after the
      original bill is furnished.

      (D) When a motion for relief is made, the court may make such
      order as it deems necessary in the interests of justice.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 572.

      Here, in explaining its decision to order the Commonwealth to respond

to Appellee’s Request, the trial court states:

      As previously noted by the [c]ourt, a bill of particulars functions
      to provide a defendant with notice of the charges contained within
      the bill of information so as to allow her to prepare for trial,
      prepare a defense, and to prevent surprise during the
      proceedings. Additionally, the comment to Pa.R.Crim.P 572
      (governing bill of particulars) states that “[t]he traditional function
      of a bill of particulars is to clarify the pleadings and to limit the
      evidence which can be offered to support the information.”
      Pa.R.Crim.P. 572 (Comment) (emphasis added). … Moreover,
      “when a motion for relief is made, the [c]ourt may make such
      order as it deems necessary in the interests of justice.”
      Pa.R.Crim.P. 572(D) (emphasis added).

      Turning to the matter sub judice, the [c]ourt’s decision to grant
      Appellee’s motion for a bill of particulars does not amount to an
      abuse of its discretion and is necessary to ensure that the interest
      of justice are protected. As the [c]ourt has discussed throughout
      its opinion, Appellee, in her request for a bill of particulars,
      requested information regarding the manner in which the victims
      in this matter were allegedly poisoned. While a bill of particulars
      is not to be directed at the Commonwealth’s evidence and utilized

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     as a substitute for discovery, Appellee’s request did no such thing.
     Commonwealth v. Mercado, 649 A.2d 946, 959 (Pa. Super.
     1994). Rather, Appellee’s request for a bill of particulars merely
     sought clarification as to information that had already been
     supplied by [the Commonwealth], that is, that the victims in this
     matter had allegedly been poisoned.             Such a request for
     clarification evidently fits directly within the purposes for which a
     bill of particulars is sought. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 572 (Comment).

     Furthermore, the [c]ourt fails to see how Appellee would
     adequately be able to prepare a defense for trial and be fully
     apprised of the charges against her without the requested
     clarification. More specifically, given the nature of the charges
     and the fact that [the Commonwealth] is pursuing the death
     penalty in this matter, clarification as to the manner in which the
     victims were allegedly poisoned is imperative to Appellee’s ability
     to obtain the necessary and proper expert witnesses, prepare a
     comprehensive defensive strategy, and avoid surprise during the
     trial. Absent said clarification, Appellee would be placed in a
     position in which she would have to obtain various experts to
     account for the multitude of ways in which the victims could have
     been allegedly poisoned. Moreover, Appellee would also be
     required to craft multiple defensive strategies as to the numerous
     ways in which the victims could have been allegedly poisoned, all
     while preparing for the varying evidence that could be introduced.2
     To expect Appellee to be able to meet such a lofty burden is
     unrealistic, contrary to the interests of justice, and precisely what
     a bill of particulars seeks to avoid. See [Commonwealth v.]
     Bartman, 367 A.2d [1121,] 1127 [(Pa. Super. 1976)]; See also
     Pa.R.Crim.P. 572(D); Pa.R.Crim.P. 572 (Comment). Accordingly,
     for the aforementioned reasons, this [c]ourt did not abuse its
     discretion when it granted Appellee’s “Motion for Bill of Particulars
     to Compel District Attorney to Respond.”
        2 Without the requested bill of particulars, Appellee would
        be required to engage in endless guesswork regarding the
        actus reus elements of the charged offenses and the
        accompanying evidence, inevitably resulting in surprise
        during the trial. Given that [the Commonwealth] is pursuing
        the death penalty in this matter, requiring Appellee to
        endure such surprise and preventing her from being unable
        to formulate and mount the proper defensive strategy
        blatantly runs afoul of the interests of justice.

TCO at 8-9.

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      Given the court’s discussion, we discern no abuse of discretion in its

decision to grant Appellee’s Request.          Appellee seeks clarification of the

pleadings in this case, which is not improper. Moreover, we disagree with the

Commonwealth’s assertion that Appellee is attempting to constrain it in its

presentation of evidence by forcing it to choose one theory of how the children

were poisoned. Indeed, in response to the Commonwealth’s argument that

“[t]his case is largely based on circumstantial evidence and there are many

ways in which the child could have been poisoned by her parents with fentanyl

(i.e.[,] inhalation, ingestion, etc.)[,]” Appellee states: “If that is the extent of

the allegations from the Commonwealth, then that should be the answer to

the request for a bill of particulars.”         Appellee’s Brief at 13 (quoting

Commonwealth’s Brief at 18). She continues:

      At least then, [Appellee] would know that the prosecutor does not
      know exactly how the fentanyl got into the children’s systems and
      could prepare a defense based on that premise. One of the
      functions of the bill of particulars is for the defense to be placed
      on notice of any restrictions upon the Commonwealth’s proof. If
      there is something more particular that the Commonwealth
      intends to allege, however, then that should be shared with
      [Appellee] in the bill of particulars because it is an essential
      element of the offenses in question. It certainly should not be
      shared for the first time at trial. Appellee genuinely wishes to
      avoid surprise and prepare a defense against the allegations that
      will be made against her.

Id. at 13-14.

      We agree with Appellee. She is seeking clarification of the pleadings, in

which the Commonwealth alleged that she poisoned the victims by

‘introducing’ illegal drugs into their systems. Appellee’s request for further

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explanation of how she purportedly introduced such substances is not

improper. Appellee’s preparation of her defense will differ significantly if the

Commonwealth is alleging a specific method of poisoning, or contending that

she poisoned the children in some manner that is unable to be determined.

We reiterate that the trial court has “broad discretion to ‘make such order as

it deems necessary in the interests of justice’ when a defendant files a motion

to compel the Commonwealth to file a bill of particulars.” Commonwealth

v. Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 412 (Pa. 2003). Thus, we conclude that the

court did not abuse its discretion in granting Appellee’s Request seeking

clarification of the Commonwealth’s pleadings.

      In the Commonwealth’s fourth and final issue, it contends that the trial

court erred in ordering that its failure to provide an adequate response to

Appellee’s Request “may result in a prohibition against alleging specific intent

to kill and the death penalty.” Order, 1/12/23, at 1 (single page). According

to the Commonwealth, the “court’s rulings are based on the idea that this is

a death penalty case and therefore the Commonwealth has a heightened duty

or burden of proof.” Commonwealth’s Brief at 23. The Commonwealth insists

that “[t]he Rules of Criminal Procedure do not change evidentiary rules such

as this just because the Commonwealth has sought the [d]eath [p]enalty.”

Id.   It then stresses that the trial court has “no authority to examine the

methods employed by the prosecutor in making the determination of whether

to proceed with a murder prosecution as a capital case,” and claims that here,

“[t]he trial court’s prohibition of the death penalty (actual or proposed) for

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failure to respond appropriately” to Appellee’s Request “is a clear violation of

the separation of powers.” Id. at 25. The Commonwealth further contends

that the court’s granting Appellee’s Request “is motivated whole or in part

based on the [c]ourt’s personal bias against the Commonwealth in seeking

the [d]eath [p]enalty.” Id. As evidence of the court’s purported bias, the

Commonwealth cites questions asked by the court during a hearing in

Appellee’s co-defendant’s case on January 12, 2023. See id. at 25-26.

       Initially, the Commonwealth does not point to where in the record it

raised its claim of bias before the trial court, and it did not specifically assert

that issue in its Rule 1925(b) statement. Thus, the trial court did not address

this allegation of bias in its opinion, and we will not review it for the first time

on appeal, as it is waived.3 See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the

lower court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”);

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not

raised in accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are

waived.”); Pa.R.A.P 1925(b) Order, 1/17/23, at 1 (warning that “[a]ny issue

not properly included in the statement timely filed and served on the trial

judge shall be deemed waived”) (unnumbered page); see also Greater Erie

____________________________________________

3 We also point out that the January 12, 2023 transcript of the hearing in
Appellee’s co-defendant’s case is not included the certified record before this
Court. Thus, we would not be permitted to consider it in assessing the
Commonwealth’s allegations of trial court bias, even had that claim been
properly preserved. See Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa.
Super. 2006) (“Simply put, if a document is not in the certified record, the
Superior Court may not consider it.”) (citation omitted).

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Indus. Dev. Corp. v. Presque Isle Downs, Inc., 88 A.3d 222, 225 (Pa.

Super. 2014) (en banc) (“[I]n determining whether an appellant has waived

his issues on appeal based on non-compliance with [Rule] 1925, it is the trial

court’s order that triggers an appellant’s obligation[. T]herefore, we look first

to the language of that order.”) (citations omitted; some brackets added).

      We are also unconvinced by the Commonwealth’s argument that the

court abused its discretion by ordering that it may be prohibited from alleging

specific intent to kill and pursuing the death penalty if it fails to adequately

respond to Appellee’s Request.       In rejecting this claim, the trial court

explained:

      Allowing [the Commonwealth] to continue to pursue the ultimate
      punishment in a case where the defendant has not been fully
      apprised of the charges against her, will be unable to adequately
      prepare for trial, and ultimately would not be able to mount an
      effective and comprehensive defense offends even the most basic
      interests of justice. Thus, to ensure that the interests of justice
      are protected to the greatest degree possible in this matter, the
      [c]ourt, as empowered by Rule 572(D), deemed it necessary to
      order that [the Commonwealth] may be prohibited from
      continuing to pursue the death penalty in this matter if it fails to
      provide Appellee with the requested bill of particulars. See
      Pa.R.Crim.P. 572(D). As such, the [c]ourt did not err nor abuse
      its discretion when it ordered that [the Commonwealth] may be
      prohibited from alleging a specific intent to kill and from pursuing
      the death penalty in this matter if it failed to furnish Appellee’s
      requested bill of particulars.

TCO at 10.

      Again, the trial court possessed broad discretion to fashion its order

granting Appellee’s Request as it believed necessary to serve the interests of

justice.   For the reasons set forth supra, we agree with the court that

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J-A18010-23

Appellee’s seeking clarification of the Commonwealth’s allegation of poisoning

is permissible, in the interests of justice, so that she may effectively prepare

her defense and avoid surprise at trial.       Thus, there is no basis for the

Commonwealth to refuse to comply with the court’s order to provide the bill

of particulars and, at this juncture, the court is not precluding it from pursuing

the death penalty. Thus, the Commonwealth has failed to convince us that

the court abused its discretion in fashioning its order.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 10/23/2023

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