Court Opinion

ID: 9908603
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-11 14:07:41.752437+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:18.517073
License: Public Domain

In the
                  Court of Appeals
          Second Appellate District of Texas
                   at Fort Worth
               ___________________________
                    No. 02-23-00224-CV
               ___________________________

            JOHN ANTHONY CASTRO, Appellant

                              V.

AMERICAN EXPRESS NATIONAL BANK, SUCCESSOR BY MERGER TO
          AMERICAN EXPRESS BANK, FSB, Appellee

           On Appeal from County Court at Law No. 1
                    Tarrant County, Texas
                Trial Court No. 2022-005583-1

           Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Walker, JJ.
         Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
                              MEMORANDUM OPINION

      John Anthony Castro appeals from a summary judgment awarding American

Express National Bank (Amex) $53,923.74 in damages, plus costs, in this credit card

debt-collection suit. In two issues, Castro contends that his verified objections and

motion to strike were sufficient to controvert Amex’s summary-judgment evidence and

that Amex failed to prove that he owned the credit card account at issue. We affirm

the trial court’s judgment.

                                   I. Background

      Amex, the successor-by-merger to American Express Bank, FSB (Amex Bank),

sued Castro to recover an unpaid credit card debt. Amex alleged that it issued a credit

card to Castro, and once he received and used it, he became liable for the charges

incurred. The current balance Castro owes is $53,923.74. Amex canceled the card

when Castro failed to make monthly payments and sued him for breach of contract and

account stated. Amex later filed a business-records affidavit with a demand letter, a

cardmember agreement, and billing statements attached.

      Castro generally denied the allegations and filed a no-evidence motion for

summary judgment.       Castro attached Amex’s previously filed documents to his

summary-judgment motion and argued that Amex could not prove that it had standing

to sue or that the parties had a valid contract. Castro maintained that the credit card

was issued by Amex Bank and that he “never entered into a contract with [Amex].” He

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also argued that Amex had failed to produce “a signed contract between the parties”

and proof that he made or authorized the charges at issue.

       Amex responded and filed a traditional motion for summary judgment that

included a different business-records affidavit, the same cardmember agreement and

billing statements that were attached to Castro’s motion, and records from the United

States Office of the Comptroller of Currency (OCC). Amex argued that the OCC

documents proved its standing through its merger with Amex Bank. Relying on the

cardmember agreement and billing statements, Amex argued that the parties had a valid

contract, which Castro had breached by failing to pay for the charges incurred.

       Castro responded, arguing that Amex’s evidence failed to establish that he had

made or authorized the charges and payments appearing in the billing statements.

Although he did not contest Amex’s evidence reflecting that he owned the account, he

later filed a motion to strike and verified objections to Amex’s affidavits, asserting that

the affidavits contained hearsay and conclusory testimony and failed to prove that he

owned the account.

      The trial court ruled that Amex had standing to sue, granted Amex’s summary-

judgment motion, and denied Castro’s. The trial court did not rule on Castro’s motion

to strike or verified objections. This appeal followed.

                                II. Standard of Review

       We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. v. Joachim, 315 S.W.3d

860, 862 (Tex. 2010). We consider the evidence presented in the light most favorable

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to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if reasonable jurors

could and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant unless reasonable jurors

could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848

(Tex. 2009). We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the

nonmovant’s favor. 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008). A plaintiff

is entitled to summary judgment on a cause of action if it conclusively proves all

essential elements of the claim. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(a), (c); MMP, Ltd. v. Jones, 710

S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. 1986). Once the movant produces sufficient evidence to establish

the right to summary judgment, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to come forward

with competent controverting evidence that raises a fact issue. Van v. Peña, 990 S.W.2d

751, 753 (Tex. 1999). Uncontroverted evidence from an interested witness does

nothing more than raise a fact issue unless it is clear, positive, and direct; is otherwise

credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies; and could have been readily

controverted. Morrison v. Christie, 266 S.W.3d 89, 92 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no

pet.) (citing Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c)); Trico Techs. Corp. v. Montiel, 949 S.W.2d 308, 310

(Tex. 1997).

                                      III. Analysis

      In two issues, Castro contends that he sufficiently controverted Amex’s

summary-judgment evidence and that Amex failed to prove that he owned the credit

card account. Castro’s argument occupies less than two pages and cites only three cases.

Liberally construing Castro’s argument, as we must, see Tex. R. App. P. 38.9, we

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conclude that both issues rely on Castro’s contention that his verified objections raised

a fact issue regarding the credit card account’s ownership.

       In his verified objections, Castro asserted that Amex’s affidavits were “entirely

inadmissible hearsay,” conclusory, and “factually unsupported.” He did not identify

the statements to which he objected but merely “object[ed] to the substance” of the

affidavits so that they would be “considered on appeal.” Castro also argued that the

affidavits proved only “the existence of an account [but] not ownership of the account”

and that he was not the account’s owner. Castro admits, and the record reflects, that

the trial court did not rule on his objections. Citing no authority, he nonetheless insists

that a pro se defendant’s verified objections are sufficient alone to controvert a

summary-judgment movant’s hearsay evidence.

      Generally, if a party does not obtain a written ruling on an objection to summary-

judgment evidence, the objection is not preserved. Seim v. Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 551

S.W.3d 161, 164–65 (Tex. 2018). Specifically, form defects “must be objected to and

ruled upon by the trial court for error to be preserved.” Id. at 166. Castro’s hearsay

objection is a form objection. See McFarland v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 293 S.W.3d 759,

762 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.). Because Castro failed to obtain a ruling on the

objection, he has failed to preserve it for appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(2).

Regardless, Castro’s hearsay objection—merely stating that the affidavits were “entirely

inadmissible hearsay”—is too vague to support a reversal. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(f)

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(“Defects in the form of affidavits . . . will not be grounds for reversal unless specifically

pointed out by objection . . . .”).

       Castro’s remaining objections go to the substance of the affidavits and can be

raised for the first time on appeal. See Seim, 551 S.W.3d at 166; Albright v. Good Samaritan

Soc’y–Denton Vill., No. 02-16-00090-CV, 2017 WL 1428724, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth Apr. 20, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that an “objection that an affidavit

is conclusory asserts a defect of substance and not form” that may be raised for the first

time on appeal). But Castro’s verified objections stated only that he “objects to the

substance of the conclusory [and] factually unsupported . . . affidavits . . . .”         He

reiterates this objection on appeal but fails to identify any objectionable statement in

the affidavits. Thus, neither his verified objections nor his appellate argument is

sufficiently specific for us to determine whether any of the affidavits’ statements were

inadmissible. See Morales v. Uptown Props., Inc., No. 05-05-00295-CV, 2005 WL 3418603,

at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 1, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Objections that statements

are ‘conclusory’ may not be ‘conclusory’ themselves.” (quoting Stewart v. Sanmina Tex.

L.P., 156 S.W.3d 198, 207 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2005, no pet.))); Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i)

(“The brief must contain a clear and concise argument for the contentions made, with

appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”).

       Regardless, Amex’s affidavits are not conclusory. “A conclusory statement is one

that does not provide the underlying facts to support the conclusion.” See Albright, 2017

WL 1428724, at *3. “Conclusory statements in an affidavit, whether legal or factual, are

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not credible or susceptible to being readily controverted, and thus conclusory

statements will not support a summary judgment.” See id.

      Both affidavits were made by a records custodian and contain statements

authenticating the attached records as business records. See Tex. R. Evid. 902(10)(B).

This alone is sufficient to show that they are not conclusory. See Core v. Citibank (S.D.),

N.A., No. 11-13-00040-CV, 2015 WL 1004344, at *5 (Tex. App.—Eastland Feb. 27,

2015, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Affidavits that substantially comply with the language of

Rule 902(10)(b) are not conclusory in nature.”).

       The records custodian stated that the additional factual allegations made in the

second affidavit were from personal knowledge based on a review of the attached

records. The records include a cardmember agreement identifying “John Castro” as

the cardmember and reflecting interest rates and payment terms. The agreement also

reflects that it included “any supplements or amendments” and that by “us[ing] the

Account (or . . . sign[ing] or keep[ing] the card), [Castro] agree[d] to the terms of the

Agreement.” The records also include multiple billing statements identifying “John

Anthony Castro” as the cardmember and reflecting charges, payments, and notices of

past-due amounts and account cancellation. All of the records reflect “1002” as the last

four digits of the account number. Although these allegations go beyond those required

under Rule 902, they are based on the affiant’s personal review of the records. See

Albright, 2017 WL 1428724, at *3. Thus, neither affidavit is conclusory.

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       Castro alternatively argues in his reply brief that his verified objections were

“akin to an affidavit” in which he “ma[de] it clear that he is not the owner of this account

[and] that the evidence submitted [did] not establish ownership . . . .” But pleadings,

even if sworn to, do not constitute summary-judgment proof. Laidlaw Waste Sys. (Dall.),

Inc. v. City of Wilmer, 904 S.W.2d 656, 660 (Tex. 1995).

       On the record before us, we conclude that Amex produced competent summary-

judgement evidence to establish that Castro owned the credit card account at issue, and

Castro failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact to preclude summary judgment.

We overrule Castro’s issues.

                                    IV. Conclusion

       Having overruled Castro’s issues, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                           /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

                                                        Bonnie Sudderth
                                                        Chief Justice

Delivered: December 7, 2023

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