Court Opinion

ID: 9692269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:49:18.264831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:33.323942
License: Public Domain

DUANE BENTON, Judge.
Because the principal opinion does not follow the binding precedent, Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985), I dissent.
Elstad holds that “a suspect who has once responded to unwarned yet uncoer-cive questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving [her] rights and confessing after [she] has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1298, 84 L.Ed.2d at 238. Patrice Seibert’s unwarned responses to Officer Hanrahan’s questioning did not prevent her from waiving her rights and confessing.
“In these circumstances [where the preceding admission is unwarned but voluntary], a careful and thorough administration of Miranda warnings serves to cure the condition that rendered the unwarned statement inadmissible.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 310-311, 105 S.Ct. at 1294, 84 L.Ed.2d at 233. In this case, the administration of Miranda warnings was careful and thorough, as demonstrated by the tape recording of the administration, and by the form that Seibert initialed, dated and signed. As in Elstad, the reading of Seibert’s rights was undeniably complete and recorded. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314-315, 105 S.Ct. at 1296, 84 L.Ed.2d at 236. Moreover, Seibert was 39 years old when she confessed. Appendix A to this opinion is the “Warning & Waiver Form.” Appendix B is the testimony discussing it.
“A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. at 1296, 84 L.Ed.2d at 235. The Miranda warnings given Seibert “ordinarily” should make her later confession admissible.
“Though Miranda requires that the unwarned admission must be suppressed, the admissibility of any subsequent statement should turn in these circumstances solely on whether it is knowingly and voluntarily made.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. at 1293, 84 L.Ed.2d at 232. In this case, Seibert’s unwarned admissions were suppressed. The circuit court found that the warned statement was knowingly and voluntarily made. “In reviewing preserved error relating to a trial court’s order on a motion to suppress evidence, the facts and reasonable inferences from such facts are considered favorably to the trial court’s ruling, and contrary evidence and inferences are disregarded.” State v. Galazin, 58 S.W.3d 500, 507 (Mo. banc 2001).
“It is an unwarranted extension of Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect’s ability to exercise [her] free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 309, 105 S.Ct. at 1293, 84 L.Ed.2d at 232. In this case, there was no “actual coercion” of Seibert, or “other circumstances” that undermined her free will. Elstad holds flatly that the “psychological impact of voluntary disclosure of a guilty secret” is not coercion, nor does it compromise the voluntariness of a subsequent informed waiver. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312, 105 S.Ct. at 1294, 84 L.Ed.2d at 234. The Elstad opinion disapproves such *709“cat out of the bag” logic as “expansive.” Id.
“[A]bsent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 314, 105 S.Ct. at 1296, 84 L.Ed.2d at 235. In Seibert’s case, there were no deliberately coercive tactics. No firearms were produced, or shown to Seibert during her interrogation. There were no threats in any way, nor physical or verbal abuse. The conversation was in “very low conversational tones.” No inducements or promises were made. There is no evidence of deliberately coercive tactics.
The principal opinion distinguishes El-stad, noting that in that case there were no “improper tactics.” In Seibert’s case, the principal opinion finds improper tactics, when it presumes that the officer intended to deprive her “of the opportunity knowingly and intelligently to waive her Miranda rights.”
If there were substantial evidence that the officer did the following — “inherently coercive police tactics or methods offensive to due process that render the initial admission involuntary and undermine the suspect’s will to invoke [her] rights once they are read to [her]” — then the warned confession should be suppressed. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317, 105 S.Ct. at 1297, 84 L.Ed.2d at 237.
At this critical point, the majority presumes that the officer’s strategy had the purpose “to weaken Seibert’s ability to knowingly and voluntarily exercise her constitutional rights.” No evidence supports this assumption. Seibert did not testify at any hearing or at trial. Officer Hanrahan testified at the hearing that his “hope” and “intent” were to gain some sort of confession or admission of guilt. The officer did not mention “breakthrough” or “beachhead” interrogation. In addition to the “rolling the dice” paragraph quoted in the principal opinion, Officer Hanrahan testified that withholding Miranda rights at the outset means:
A. You may not get any information at all.
Q. In which part of the interrogation?
A. In either part. You may never even get to the second stage.
Officer Hanrahan testified that based on two prior conversations with Seibert, he believed she expected to be arrested and would have a story rehearsed. Although defense counsel asked Officer Hanrahan about interrogation techniques at both the suppression hearing and the trial, the Officer — the only witness to testify about the confession — stated that his hope and intent was to gain a confession or admission.
Elstad expressly commends confessions: “Voluntary statements ‘remain a proper element in law enforcement.’” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305, 105 S.Ct. at 1291, 84 L.Ed.2d at 229, quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 478, 86 S.Ct. at 1630. “Indeed, far from being prohibited by the Constitution, admissions of guilt by wrongdoers, if not coerced, are inherently desirable .... Absent some officially coerced self-accusation, the Fifth Amendment is not violated by even the most damning admissions.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305, 105 S.Ct. at 1291, 84 L.Ed.2d at 229. “When neither the initial nor the subsequent admission is coerced, little justification exists for permitting the highly probative evidence of a voluntary confession to be irretrievably lost to the factfinder.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 312, 105 S.Ct. at 1294-95, 84 L.Ed.2d at 234
Elstad invokes cases holding confessions voluntary, even though police falsely stated that a codefendant turned State’s evi*710dence, or although the defendant did not know that a prior coerced confession could not be admitted. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 317, 105 S.Ct. at 1297, 84 L.Ed.2d at 237. See also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986) (police failed to tell suspect of attorney’s efforts to reach him; confession admitted, after voluntary waiver); Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495-96, 97 S.Ct. 711, 714, 50 L.Ed.2d 714, 719 (1977) (police falsely told suspect his fingerprints found at scene, not Miranda violation). “Miranda forbids coercion, not mere strategic deception.... Ploys to mislead a suspect or lull [her] into a false sense of security that do not rise to the level of compulsion or coercion to speak are not within Miranda’s concerns.” Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 297, 110 S.Ct. 2394, 2397, 110 L.Ed.2d 243, 251 (1990). Placing an undercover agent near the suspect in order to gather incriminating information is permissible under the Fifth Amendment. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 304, 87 S.Ct. 408, 414, 17 L.Ed.2d 374, 383 (1966).
The principal opinion, in emphasizing the factors of lapse-of-time, change-of-place, change-of-interrogators, and need-to-dissipate-taint, echoes the Oregon court reversed in Elstad, and the other courts criticized in Elstad. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303, 310, 317-18, 105 S.Ct. at 1290, 1293, 1297, 84 L.Ed.2d at 228, 233, 237. Elstad makes clear that these factors are considered only if the first confession is coerced. Id.
Elstad is still binding precedent. Elstad was approved in Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 441, 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2335, 147 L.Ed.2d 405, 418 (2000). The United States Supreme Court re-affirmed that the traditional “fruits” doctrine developed in Fourth Amendment cases does not apply to unwarned interrogation under the Fifth Amendment. Id. The holding of Dickerson is: “Miranda and its progeny in this Court govern the admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation in both state and federal courts.” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 432, 120 S.Ct. at 2329-30, 147 L.Ed.2d at 412. This “progeny” includes the Elstad case, as demonstrated by Dickerson’s express discussion of Elstad (summarized above), and by Dickerson’s implicit approval: “If anything, our subsequent cases have reduced the impact of the Miranda rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling that unwarned statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution’s case in chief.” Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 443-44, 120 S.Ct. at 2336, 147 L.Ed.2d at 420.
The principal opinion asserts that Elstad does not apply where police intentionally withhold Miranda warnings before the initial unwarned statement. True, Elstad, at one point, describes the initial unwarned statement as “technically in violation of Miranda.” Elstad, 470 U.S. at 318, 105 S.Ct. at 1297-98, 84 L.Ed.2d at 238. This passing comment in Elstad does not support the principal opinion, as demonstrated in recent opinions by the Courts of Appeals.
On facts nearly identical to this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, en banc, held that Elstad applies so long as the initial unwarned statement is not actually coerced. United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. en banc), Jull en banc hearing denied, 275 F.3d 1190 (2001). The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari on the Orso case, while this case was pending. - U.S. -, 123 S.Ct. 125, 154 L.Ed.2d 42 (2002).
It is also true that the Eighth Circuit has made statements to the contrary. United States v. Carter, 884 F.2d 368, 372-74 (8th Cir.1989). However, yet another *711Circuit, the First, called Carter’s statements “dicta” and “facially inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in El-stad.” United States v. Esquilin, 208 F.3d 315, 320 (1st Cir.2000). The First Circuit then holds that deliberate withholding of Miranda rights before the unwarned admission does not make a later warned statement inadmissible. Id. at 320-21. Directly refuting the principal opinion’s re-banee on “deterrence” against “improper tactics,” the First Circuit holds:
Although Elstad does not permit suppression of Esquilin’s voluntary statement made after he was informed of his Miranda rights and voluntarily waived them, the basic Miranda rule still operates here to render Esquilin’s initial unwarned (but voluntary) statement inadmissible. The Supreme Court has ruled that Miranda’s deterrence rationale requires no more than that, see Elstad, 470 U.S. at 308, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, and we are not free to ignore that judgement.
Id. at 321. The Esquilin case also specifically holds that Elstad rejects the “nearly continuous” and “time lapse” arguments, both invoked by the principal opinion. Id. at 319.
As for the other authority the principal opinion discusses, Elstad renders obsolete the contrary approach in this Court’s decision eleven years earlier in State v. Wright, 515 S.W.2d 421, 426-27 (Mo. banc 1974), and in the Court of Appeal’s decision last year in State v. Fakes, 51 S.W.3d 24, 30 (Mo.App.2001).
Once the questions of law are resolved, it is clear that the trial judge should be affirmed. “When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, the inquiry is limited to whether the court’s decision is supported by substantial evidence, and deference is given to the trial court’s superior opportunity to determine credibility of witnesses.” State v. Feltrop, 803 S.W.2d 1, 12 (Mo. banc), cert. denied, 501 U.S. 1262, 111 S.Ct. 2918, 115 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1991). On this record, there is substantial evidence that both the unwarned and warned statements were voluntary. Thus, under Elstad, the warned statement is admissible, as the trial judge ruled.
*712APPENDIX A
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*713APPENDIX B
Trial Testimony of Officer Richard E. Hanrahan (Excerpt of Transcript March 28, 2000, Pages 917, line 18— 920, line 15)
Q. When you arrived at the station, you had an initial conversation with her— is that correct?
A. That’s correct.
Q. After that initial conversation did you inform the Defendant of her rights under the Miranda decision?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. I’d like to hand you what’s been marked as State’s Exhibit 37 and ask you if you can tell me what this is please?
A. Yes, sir — this is a rights advisement provided by the detective with St. Louis County that night.
Q. And was that, in fact, read to the Defendant?
A. Yes, sir, it was.
Q. And did you ask. her if she understood each of those rights as you read them to her?
A. As I read them to her, I simply check-marked them when I was finished. I asked her if she understood each right.
Q. Did she indicate to you in some fashion whether she did or not?
A. Yes, she did.
Q. And what was her response in each case?
A. She indicated that she understood and she signed next to each of the rights to state that she understood.
Q. And sir, did you then read the waiver portion of the form?
A. I believe I let her read the waiver. I’d have to check my report to be sure. I usually allow the suspect to read the waiver.
Q. How does that waiver read?
A. It says — “I have read the above statement of my rights and I understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.”
Q. In fact, did you threaten the Defendant in any fashion?
A. I did not.
Q. Did you display a weapon or threaten a weapon — I mean, you can do things that are non-verbal. Did you do anything that would be taken as threatening by the average person?
A. I don’t believe so — no, sir.
Q. Did you promise the Defendant any benefit of any kind in order to induce her to speak with you?
A. The truth would make her feel much better.
Q. Was that all you said?
A. I believe so. I told her I believed that she was lying and the lie was hurting her.
Q. Sir, did you, in fact, ask her to sign that form if she understood her rights and agreed to speak with you?
A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. And did the Defendant do so in your presence?
A. Yes, sir, she did.
Q. Would you point out her signature to the Court please?
A. (Complies)
Q. And sir, did you sign that form yourself as a witness?
*714A. Yes, sir, I did.
Q. And was anyone with you who also signed that form?
A. Fire Marshal Rodger Windle was also there.
Q. And are both your signatures then present on that form as witnesses to her signature and waiver of having been informed and waiving her rights?
A. Yes, sir, they are.
Q. Would you point out your signature and Officer Windle’s signature please?
A. (Complies)