Court Opinion

ID: 9744483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:04:28.072256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:49.606358
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: During the pendency of Simpson’s appeal, our court adopted a comprehensive set of new rules governing the conduct of cases in which the State is seeking the death penalty. One of the most significant features of the new rules is their inclusion of rigorous standards governing the qualifications of individuals eligible to try capital cases. Recognizing the indispensable role of competent trial counsel where the State is seeking the death penalty, our court has determined that such cases may only be handled by those attorneys who possess extensive experience and specialized training in the field. With limited exceptions, only attorneys who have become members of the Capital Litigation Trial Bar may appear as lead or co-counsel in capital cases. That restriction applies to both counsel for the State and counsel for the defense. 188 Ill. 2d Rs. 416(d), 701(b). The eligibility standards for membership in the Capital Litigation Trial Bar are substantial. Lead counsel, for example, must have at leave five years of criminal litigation experience; have prior experience as lead or co-counsel in no fewer than eight felony jury trials which were tried to completion, at least two of which were murder prosecutions; and have complete certain specified training requirements. The qualifications for co-counsel are comparable. 188 Ill. 2d R 714(b). Attorneys who fail to meet the specified requirements may not appear in capital cases without receiving a waiver directly from our court (188 Ill. 2d R 714(d)), and indigent defendants are entitled to representation by not one but two attorneys with the requisite qualifications (188 Ill. 2d R 416(d). Now that our court has adopted these stringent new rules, I fail to see how it can continue to sanction proceedings such as the one before us today. This defendant certainly did not have two competent lawyers to represent him. He did not have even one competent attorney to represent him. The trial court permitted him to proceeded pro se, despite serious questions as to the soundness of his judgment and his ability to reason. Promulgation of the new rules is equivalent to a determination by this court that even a lawyer is not competent to handle a death case unless he has special training and experience. To be consistent with that determination, the court must reject the fiction that this defendant was competent to represent himself. He was not. Under the standards we have now imposed, he never will be. No legitimate purpose will be served by pretending otherwise. If our experience with capital cases over the past few years has taught us anything, it is that we must view everything that occurs at capital trials with heightened skepticism. When we surrender that skepticism, disaster follows. Just ask Ronald Jones, Joseph Burrows or Anthony Porter. We found ways to uphold each of their convictions and sentences when their cases first came before us, only to discover later that they were actually innocent. The procedures contained in the new rules we have adopted may not be perfect. They may not eliminate all of the constitutional defects in the present death penalty law. Without those rules, however, no capital conviction or sentence can be deemed reliable. People v. Hickey, 204 Ill. 2d 585, 634 (2001) (Harrison, C.J., dissenting). Because Simpson was tried, convicted and sentenced without the benefit of the new rules, his conviction and sentence should therefore be vacated, and the cause should be remanded to the circuit court for a new trial. Even if Simpson were not entitled to avail himself of the new rules, his sentence of death could not stand. For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. Bull, 185 Ill. 2d 179 (1998), the Illinois death penalty law is void and unenforceable because it violates the eighth and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., amends. VIII, XIV) and article I, section 2, of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 2). Absent the new rules, there is no basis for altering that conclusion. At a minimum, Simpson’s sentence of death should therefore be vacated, and the cause should be remanded to the circuit court for imposition of a sentence of imprisonment. 720 ILCS 5/9 — l(j) (West 1992).