Court Opinion

ID: 9754495
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 20:02:39.209887+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:54.150687
License: Public Domain

*515ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. While my review of the record before us indicates that counsel’s ineffectiveness 1 permeates the entire proceeding, for the purposes of this Opinion I find it necessary to address only those instances upon which the majority relies in finding no ineffectiveness, in order to support my contention that a new trial should be granted in the instant case.
The majority addresses Appellant’s claim that counsel were ineffective for allowing evidence of Appellant’s prior incarcerations to be heard by the jury. Slip opinion at 11. Following that quoted exchange the majority notes that at the hearing on post trial motions, “the defense attorney explained that he wanted to show that the witness had been in jail in order to attack his credibility,” 2 then concludes “[ajlthough the attorney should have been able to accomplish this without revealing that Appellant had also been in jail, we find no prejudice to the defense in this instance.” Maj. opinion at 502 (Emphasis added). If it is the majority’s conclusion that the attorney should have been able to accomplish this without revealing that Appellant had also been in jail, a fact prejudicial to Appellant’s case, see, Commonwealth v. Bricker, 506 Pa. 571, 487 A.2d 346 (1985); Commonwealth v. Clark, 453 Pa. 449, 309 A.2d 589 (1973), then it cannot be said that counsel’s tactic had a *516reasonable basis designed to effectuate his client’s interest for it is obvious that the alternative not chosen, bringing out the witness’ incarceration without calling attention to that of Appellant, certainly offered a potential for success substantially greater than the tactics actually utilized. At this point the proper application of Washington requires a finding of ineffectiveness.
The majority next addresses the Appellant’s contention that it was ineffective for trial counsel to allow the Commonwealth to bring out several other periods of incarceration during the introduction into evidence of Appellant’s long history of placement in mental institutions. Because it was admittedly trial counsel’s strategy to advance a diminished capacity defense, it was imperative that they lay a foundation for this defense by showing Appellant’s significant history of confinement in these various mental institutions, as well as a suicide attempt. Knowing that the basis for Appellant’s stay in these institutions and the suicide attempt was his prior criminal incarcerations, the only reasonable strategy would have been to attempt to introduce this evidence with all references to the criminal acts or incarcerations eliminated. This could have been accomplished through a pre-trial motion or a motion in limine outside the hearing of the jury, where counsel could have advanced the argument that the need for this evidence was so necessary to promote Appellant’s defense, that the Commonwealth should be precluded from any cross-examination which touched on any reference to past bad acts. Cf., Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973). This was neither contemplated nor done. This alternative had a substantial likelihood for success since the Commonwealth’s need for this evidence in challenging the validity of Appellant’s stays in these institutions could have been met through other means — most directly by testimony of the treating physicians relative to whether Appellant manipulated his way into these institutions or not. It cannot be realistically said that the failure to attempt such *517a strategy had any reasonable basis designed to effectuate their client’s interest.
Putting this failure of representation to one side and examining the situation which actually occurred at trial, (as if, for example, such a motion had been made and denied, requiring counsel to put the Appellant on the stand at the risk of having his prior incarceration revealed on cross-examination) I discern no basis for counsel’s failure to object to the manner in which this information was elicited.
Q. (District Attorney Kiniry) Now, Larry, you told us about all the times that you were in these mental hospitals and drug rehabilitation clinics yesterday, right?
A. (Appellant) Yes.
Q. So, you have been in Farview, May view, Norristown, Johnstown, Hollidaysburg; is that right?
A. That is right.
Q. Isn’t it true that every time you went in one of those hospitals or clinics you were put in there from either a local jail or a State Prison?
A. That is true.
Q. So, you have never been taken off the street and put into one of these facilities, have you?
A. I can’t remember if the Hollidaysburg one was.
Q. Well, let’s look when you went to Farview. You were in where? What prison were you in then?
A. The first time I was at Huntingdon.
Q. It is not too nice at Huntingdon, is it?
A. It is not too nice in any prison.
Q. That is a good point, because every time you go to prison, you do something which gets you put into one of these mental hospitals or drug rehabilitation clinics; isn’t that true?
And when you spend your time in jail, you’re in some kind of a hospital, it is a little nicer in the hospital than it is in the prison, isn’t it, Larry?
A. A couple of them, yes.
*518Q. A little maybe cleaner sheets and nicer beds and better food?
A. No, not—
Q. Not the food, huh?
A. Not the food, no, especially Farview.
Q. Well, let’s look at Farview. If you hadn’t been in Farview those years you would have been sitting in Huntingdon, right?
A. Huntingdon or—
Q. Or some other State Prison. But you get to stay in Farview and when your sentence was up they let you out, right?
A. When my sentence was up they moved me out of the hospital, yes.
Q. You got out?
A. After several different channels.
Q. And so how many times have you been through these drug rehabilitation programs now, Larry?
A. I have been only through one drug rehabilitation center. I was told to go to other ones, but I didn’t go because of the times that I was in prison, when I did get out, I was only out 30 days, I went out high, stayed high until they caught me again.
Q. So that is the story of Larry Christy’s life. You get in trouble. You go to jail. You don’t like to be in jail, so, you do something to get you into the hospital. You serve your time. You get back out on the street. You do something bad. You go back into jail. You go back into the hospital. We can’t rehabilitate you, can we, Larry?
Trial Transcript of December 8, 1983, at pp. 26-28.
Using the Appellant as a foil, the district attorney was able to argue to the jury from “facts” not in the record that the Appellant’s history of treatment for mental disturbance was a sham. Such it may have been, but the Commonwealth should have been required to introduce its own evidence, e.g., psychiatric reports indicating no validity to the claims of mental illness, to make this case. Counsel’s *519failure to object to this highly prejudicial exchange is inconceivable. This is certainly ineffectiveness of the most prejudicial kind; yet the majority chooses to forego any detailed analysis and concludes:
We find that any error that existed by this course of action did not prejudice Appellant and had no effect on the judgment in this case or on the balance of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Here, Appellant testified at trial that his victim was on his knees, choking on his own blood. ... Thus, Appellant admitted that the act of killing his victim was deliberate and premeditated. The defense attempted to establish that due to Appellant’s diminished mental capacity at the time of the killing, he did not act willfully. The jury was justified in disbelieving this defense and finding that he did act willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt.
Maj. opinion at p. 502-503 (Emphasis added). Even conceding the overwhelming evidence of guilt, it cannot be objectively determined how this unnecessary evidence affected the minds of the jury at the penalty phase of the trial, a time when, at the very least, the evidence of mental capacity, while not negating the specific intent of the crime, could indeed have had some effect on the mitigation and penalty assessed. As Mr. Chief Justice Nix correctly points out in his dissent, Maj. opinion at p. 514, Nix, C.J., dissenting), this exchange was used as the basis of the Commonwealth’s argument for the death penalty during the penalty phase of the trial. Additionally, since the majority has found error in two of the three aggravating circumstances presented to the jury, a finding of the mitigating circumstance that “the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance,” 42 Pa.C.S. 9711(e)(2), could well have negated the imposition of the death penalty. The majority, however, in its “rush to justice” fails to give this possibility even cursory analysis. In view of the consequences, I find this unacceptable.
*520That a defendant should suffer the statutory punishment for the heinous crime he commits will never be disputed. However, where a defendant is sentenced to suffer the ultimate penalty of death, I will never support a rule of law which allows that defendant to face his death without being provided the fairest trial, though it need not be perfect, that he may be entitled to as guaranteed by both the State and Federal Constitutions. Anything less is unacceptable. I must therefore dissent from what I perceive this Court’s direction to be-a shortcut, result-oriented practice of jurisprudence.

. I question the validity of the majority’s assertion that Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052 (1984) "establish[es] the same standard” for reviewing ineffectiveness claims as Commonwealth ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 427 Pa. 599, 235 A.2d 349 (1967). Compare Commonwealth v. Badger, 482 Pa. 240, 393 A.2d 642 (1978), where both majority and dissent recognized that under Washington "no inquiry is necessary as to whether or not ineffectiveness, if found, resulted in prejudice.” Badger, 482 Pa. at 249, 393 A.2d at 647 (Pomeroy, J., dissenting). On the understanding that it is Strickland which is being interpreted to conform to Washington and not vice versa, I take the majority at its word that Appellant’s ineffectiveness claims are to be analyzed with the standard of Washington and its progeny in mind, maj. opinion at 835, and dispute here only the manner in which that standard is applied.

. This exchange involved the cross-examination of Commonwealth witness Dennis by Attorney Rulis relative to Dennis’ relationship to Christy.