Court Opinion

ID: 9462541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:43:13.822128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:38.128248
License: Public Domain

HUFSTEDLER, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I agree with the majority opinion that the scienter element of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5861(d) and (e) excludes any knowledge on the part of Thomas that possession or transfer of the weapon was illegal and any knowledge of the registration provisions of the National Firearms Act. (United States v. Freed (1971) 401 U.S. 601, 91 S.Ct. 1112, 28 L.Ed.2d 356.) I disagree with the majority’s limitation of the requisite scienter to knowledge that he possessed a firearm.
Scienter is here composed of two elements: (1) Thomas’s knowledge that he possessed a weapon, and (2) his knowledge that the weapon was a short barrel rifle. Without the knowledge that the gun he possessed was a short barrel rifle, he did not have the necessary consciousness of the nature of the item he possessed to have scienter. (See United States v. Freed, supra, 401 U.S. at 612, 91 S.Ct. 1112 (Brennan, J., concurring).)
Perhaps the halcyon day may come when Americans accept the idea that all guns are “highly dangerous offensive weapons, no less dangerous than . . . narcotics,” (United States v. Freed, supra, 401 U.S. at 609, 91 S.Ct. at 1118) and when they “would hardly be surprised to learn that possession of [hand guns and rifles like possession of] *423hand grenades is not an innocent act.” (Id.) That day has not arrived. Millions of Americans possess different varieties of hand guns and rifles without any consciousness of wrongdoing, or any suspicion that these weapons are as potentially dangerous as narcotics. As desirable as may be the contrary view, our society does not put hand guns and rifles in the same category of suspected dangerousness as machine guns, hand grenades, sawed-off shotguns, and other lethal hardware.
To be sure, one who knows that the gun he possesses is a short barrel rifle may be presumed to know that his weapon is in a suspect category, along with hand grenades and sawed-off shotguns, but it should be obvious that the presumption cannot arise until he knows that the gun is a short barrel rifle. Knowledge that the weapon is a short barrel rifle does not entail knowledge of “every last characteristic which subjects it to regulation.” (United States v. DeBartolo (1st Cir. 1973), 482 F.2d 312, 316.) All it means is knowledge that the gun is a rifle with a short barrel.
None of the cases cited by the majority addresses the scienter question before us. United States v. International Minerals & Chemical Corp. (1971) 402 U.S. 558, 91 S.Ct. 1697, 29 L.Ed.2d 178 involved a prosecution for a failure to show on shipping papers that the substance shipped (sulphuric acid) was classified as “Corrosive Liquid.” The opinion is relevant only for its interpretation of Freed as not imposing strict liability, as requiring scienter, and as eliminating from scienter a requirement of knowledge of the content of the statute, the violation of which is charged. In each of the cited cases, including International Minerals & Chemical Corp., supra, the defendant knew the nature of the thing he possessed, but he claimed that he did not know that the thing he possessed was proscribed by statute and that such knowledge was an element of scienter. (United States v. DeBartolo, supra (sawed-off shotgun transferred by gun dealer); United States v. Cowper (6th Cir. 1974) 503 F.2d 130 (M-l carbine modified by defendant police officer); United States v. Vasquez (5th Cir. 1973) 476 F.2d 730 (M-14 automatic rifle used in shooting incident); United States v. Gardner (7th Cir. 1971) 448 F.2d 617 (modified shotgun possessed by gun collector).) Sipes v. United States (8th Cir. 1963) 321 F.2d 174 arose under a predecessor of the National Firearms Act. Sipes did not claim that he did not know that the weapon that he possessed, and which he himself had altered to make it fireable, was a short barrel rifle. His claim was “that he did not know that it was an ‘illegal weapon’ or that he was violating the law when he had it or that there was a tax or registration which was required or that the gun was made in violation of any statute.” (321 F.2d at 176.) Judge Blackmun (now Mr. Justice Blackmun) acknowledged some intercircuit disharmony over the question whether then 26 U.S.C. § 5851 required scienter and concluded that the question did not have to be reached in Sipes. (321 F.2d at 179). Sipes had knowing possession of a rifle he knew was shortened. The only question was whether he also had to know that the rifle was made in violation of the statute. Sipes also rejected the defendant's argument that knowledge of the terms of the statute was an element of scienter.
The scienter issue before us is entirely different. Thomas testified about the innocent circumstances of his finding the weapon, and his testimony was corroborated. The district court refused to permit him to testify to his belief that the weapon was an antique pistol and to describe how he had used it as a wall decoration until he pawned it when he needed money. The rejected testimony was directly relevant to the scienter issue, and its exclusion was erroneous.
Despite the refusal of the district court to admit Thomas’s testimony in this respect, the jury was aware of the dispositive issue. The jury, during deliberation, asked the court: “Does the defendant have to know that the firearm is a short barrel rifle?” The court’s negative response and its earlier instruction that “the only knowledge which the Government needs to prove is that the *424firearm was in his possession” were prejudicially erroneous.
Although the Devitt and Blackmar instruction quoted by the majority is not nearly as accurate, precise, or adapted to this case as the instruction that the jury framed for itself, it is an adequate statement of the applicable law. But that instruction was not given, and it cannot be squared with the instruction that told the jury that “[t]he only knowledge which the Government needs to prove is that the firearm was in his possession.”
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.