Court Opinion

ID: 9606606
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:51:17.527325+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:15.237107
License: Public Domain

*160LAVENDER, Vice Chief Justice,
dissenting:
I dissent from the majority opinion. I fear the bright line rule posited therein that under 85 O.S.1991, § 171 where a claimant has not suffered an enumerated loss, his disability must always be adjudicated prior to the subsequent injury for Fund liability to attach does not appear to comport with legislative intent and will surely lead to absurd results. A simple example is illustrative.
Jim and Ray work for Acme Tool Company. They have been life-long friends. As both are repairing a machine at work an explosion occurs which results in hip injuries to both men. Workers’ compensation claims are filed by Jim and Ray. Although both hip injuries are substantially similar in severity Jim heals faster than Ray and he is able to obtain a quick adjudication and determination by the workers’ compensation court of permanent partial disability. Ray, a slow healer, takes a longer period of time to adjudicate his case as to permanent partial disability because no adjudication can take place until the healing period has come to an end.1
Prior to Ray being able to obtain an adjudication from the workers’ compensation court for permanent partial disability Jim and Ray leave Acme Tool Company and both go to work for A-l Machine Company. As both are being trained on a new machine a malfunction occurs causing severe neck injuries to both. Ray’s hip has now healed and he is awarded compensation against Acme for the permanent partial disability to his hip. Both men then obtain adjudications for permanent partial disability as a result of the neck injuries against A-l. They both then file claims against the Special Indemnity Fund based on allegations combination of the hip and neck disabilities renders each permanently totally disabled. As to both men the evidence shows the material increase in disability resulting from combination of the two injuries does result in total disability.
Neither can recover from either employer for this increase in disability because the two employers are only responsible for the separate disability caused while Jim and Ray were working for them. If recovery can be obtained it must come from the Fund. Under the bright line rule espoused by the majority Jim can recover the increase in disability from the Fund; Ray cannot because his hip injury claim stood unadjudicated prior to the accident at A-l. Jim and his family are able to live off his workers’ compensation benefits from the Fund. In that Ray has been awarded no benefits from the Fund he and his family are forced to go on welfare to survive. I find such a result absurd and inconsistent with the general purpose of our workers’ compensation laws.
The pertinent phrase at issue here is, “[f]or purposes of Sections 171-176 of this title, the term ‘physically impaired person’ is hereby defined to be a person who ... has suffered ... any disability which previously has been adjudged and determined by the Workers’ Compensation Court ...”. Section 171 does not itself indicate a time frame as to when any previous impairment must be adjudicated, but when read in conjunction with the language of 85 O.S.1991, § 172 [now Supp.1992], which speaks in terms of a subsequent injury occurring to a physically impaired person, at least, facially it looks like the majority view has some support. I do not believe such a view, however, holds water when it is exposed to critical analysis.
The primary goal of statutory construction is to determine legislative intent and such intent is to be ascertained from the statute at issue in light of its general purpose. TXO Production v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 829 P.2d 964, 968-969 (Okla.1992). Further, a statutory construction that would lead to an absurdity will be avoided if this can be done without violating legislative intent. Id. at 969. A reasonable and rational construction is preferred. Id.; Ledbetter v. Oklahoma Alco*161holic Beverage Laws Enforcement Commission, 764 P.2d 172, 179 (Okla.1988). An inept or incorrect choice of words by the Legislature will not be construed to defeat the real or obvious purpose of a legislative enactment. TRW/Reda Pump v. Brewington, 829 P.2d 15, 20 (Okla.1992). Finally, the legislative intent behind a statute is to be ascertained from the whole act in light of its general purpose and if a statute is ambiguous or uncertain the reasonable construction that will avoid absurd consequences should be given if this can be done without thwarting legislative intent. Id. at 20.
The general purpose of our workers’ compensation laws is to compensate workers for work-related injuries and was intended to prevent the workers and their families from becoming public charges. Crocker v. Crocker, 824 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Okla.1991). As is obvious the majority’s opinion thwarts this general purpose in the above scenario. Both Jim and Ray pursued their respective claims diligently. Both suffered substantially the same work-related injuries at the same time, yet the majority’s bright line rule says one can recover while the other cannot. In my view this result is absurd, it obviously does not comport with the central purpose behind our workers’ compensation laws and, I believe, it does not comport with the true intent of the Legislature espoused in § 171. I believe the real and obvious purpose of the Legislature in regard to Fund liability was to include a situation like that detailed above, but I am afraid the majority opinion will thwart that purpose by denying recovery. For this reason, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Justice ALMA WILSON and Justice KAUGER join in the views herein expressed.

. A permanent disability award is a solemn adjudication the worker’s healing period has come to an end and his condition or state of health bas reached the very optimum that is then medically attainable. Bill Hodges Truck Co. v. Gillum, 774 P.2d 1063, 1065 (Okla.1989).