Court Opinion

ID: 9681527
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:52:06.162497+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:21.002580
License: Public Domain

J. Seaborn Holt, J., (dissenting). June 30, 1953, Alice B. Askew, sister of appellant, Jess Askew, executed a note in favor of appellee, Murdock Acceptance Corporation, for $1,561.68, in monthly payments, and as security, executed a chattel mortgage on a 1951 Buick automobile, which Alice had purchased about a year earlier, from Little Bock Motor Company. It appears that this original purchase of the car by Alice had been financed by Associated Discount Corporation, and the proceeds from the loan from appellee, Murdock, above, were used to pay off this earlier debt of Alice Askew, and title to the Buick was in her at all times. Jess Askew, as indicated, was not a party to the above note and mortgage. On November 15, 1954 Jess Askew brought suit against Murdock (Appellee) and his sister, Alice Askew, alleging in effect that the above note and mortgage should be cancelled on the grounds of usury, and title to the Buick car should be vested in him. December 6, 1954 appellant (Askew) filed a motion asking for “an order permitting him to make the payment on the car involved in this action to the Clerk of this Court and that the Clerk of the Court hold same iu the registry of the court during the pendency of this action and that the defendant be restrained from molesting or harassing plaintiff and his sister Alice E. Askew during the pendency of this action (Tr. 14).” The court denied this motion, on the day filed, and also on this same day, Murdock (Appellee) filed in the Pulaski Circuit Court an action in replevin against Jess Askew to gain summary possession of the Buick auto. Alice Askew was not made a party in this suit but she was a party to the usury suit filed by Jess Askew. Appellee, Murdock, in his complaint alleged: “On or about June 30, 1953, Alice E. Askew executed a note in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of One Thousand Five Hundred Sixty-one and 68/100 Dollars ($1,561.68), payable in twenty-four (24) monthly installments of Sixty-five and 07/100 Dollars ($65.07) each. Said note was secured by a chattel mortgage of the same date conveying to plaintiff a 1951 Buick, two door sedan, motor number 63655635, a certified copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof. The said Alice E. Askew was, at the time of execution of the aforesaid mortgage, the registered owner of said automobile, same having-been purchased by her from Little Eock Motor Company in March, 1952. The proceeds of the aforesaid loan were used, exclusively, to pay off an indebtedness of the said Alice E. Askew to Associated Discounts Corporation of Little Eock, which said indebtedness was incurred as a result of the purchase of the aforesaid automobile by the said Alice E. Askew. “The said Alice E. Askew is indebted to plaintiff on said note and chattel mortgage in the sum of Five Hundred Eighty-five and 63/100 Dollars ($585.63), which is now due and unpaid, and, although demand has been made therefor, payment has been refused. “The property is of the value of Five Hundred Eighty-five and 63-100 Dollars ($585.63). “The plaintiff is entitled to the immediate possession of said automobile by reason of the aforesaid default, said automobile is now in the possession of defendant, the brother of Alice E. Askew, and is unlawfully detained by him under a false claim of ownership. Said Alice E. Askew has consented that the plaintiff may have possession of said automobile but the defendant refuses to surrender same ...” Murdock posted the statutory bond, the replevin writ was issued, and the car delivered to Murdock. Thereafter, Jess Askew filed a demurrer alleging that: “DEMUEEEE “Comes the defendant, Jess Askew, and for his demurrer to the complaint of the plaintiff herein, states: “That this court does not have jurisdiction of this cause of action for the reason that there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause and same subject matter, said action is pending in the Chancery Court of Pulaski County by the style of JESS ASKEW vs. MUEDOCK ACCEPTANCE COEPOEATION, NO. 101309, said suit being filed and summons issued on November 15, 1954, that in said suit the title to the car involved in this action and the right of possession to same is involved and can be fully determined in the Chancery Court in the suit pending therein. “That this court should dismiss the complaint of the plaintiff and should order plaintiff to immediately restore said car to the possession of defendant. . .” The court overruled the demurrer, whereupon appellant (Askew) refused to plead further and the court then entered judgment for Murdock for possession of the car and Murdock together with its surety were discharged from liability under the replevin bond. This appeal followed. For reversal appellant stoutly contends that: “The Circuit Court erred in overruling the demurrer of the defendant and in rendering judgment against the defendant because the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction of this cause of action for the reason that there was and is another action pending in the Chancery Court of Pulaski County between the same parties for the same cause and involving the same subject matter, prior to and still pending at the time this action was filed in the Circuit Court of Pulaski County.” I think this contention is untenable in the circumstances. Our rule is that a complaint is subject to demurrer only for defects apparent on its face. § 27-1115, Ark. Stats. 1947, provides: “Demurrer to complaint — Grounds.—The defendant may demur to the complaint where it appears on its face, either: “First. That the court has no jurisdiction of the person of the defendant, or the subject of the action; of, Second. That the plaintiff has not legal capacity to sue; or, Third. That there is another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; or, Fourth. That there is a defect of parties, plaintiff or defendant; or, Fifth. That the complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Civil Code, § 111; C. & M. Dig., § 1189; Pope’s Dig., § 1411.)” Ordinarily jurisdiction in the statutory action of replevin is in the circuit court, (§ 34-2101, et seq., Ark. Stats.). Here on the face of appellee’s complaint I find none of the above grounds that would support a demurrer. The parties in 1he usury suit (equity) and those in the replevin suit (law) are not the same. Alice Askew was a party to the former suit but was not a party in the latter. In the replevin suit default in monthly payments by Alice Askew under the terms of the note and mortgage which she alone signed was alleged, and this default, if true, gave appellee the right to summary possession of the Buick car in a court of law. What we said in the recent case of Wilson v. Sanders, 217 Ark. 326, 230 S. W. 2d 19, relating to the above statute (§ 27-1115, Ark. Stats. 1947), applies with equal force here. “It is also urged by the appellee that the issues in the two cases are not the same. This contention is well taken. What the statute requires is that the two suits be ‘for the same cause,’ and our decisions have enforced this requirement. In Garabaldi v. Wright, 52 Ark. 416, 12 S. W. 875 one partner sued the other for a dissolution of the partnership and a settlement of their affairs. The defendant later sued the plaintiff in a different court for conversion of part of the property involved in the first case. In stressing the need for an identity of issues we said: ‘If the objects of two suits are different, they may progress at the same time, although the thing about, or in reference to which, they are brought, is the same in each case.’ ” The general rule is stated in 1 Am. Jur., § 30, Page 37: “It does not necessarily follow from the mere fact that the same property is in controversy in both actions or that the same right or title is involved, that the prior action can be pleaded in abatement of the second one; it is necessary that the cause of action be the same in both suits.” Appellant refused to plead further and elected to stand on his demurrer, which was in effect a speaking demurrer. Dodson v. Abercrombie, 218 Ark. 50, 234 S. W. 2d 30. He made no motion to transfer to equity. “Under the code of practice, if a party commit an error in the kind of proceedings adopted, he may change and have the same transferred to the proper docket, either before answer filed, without motion, or after, on motion; but the court is not bound to make the transfer unless asked to do so by the party desiring it.” Berry, Adm’x, et al. v. Hardin, et al., 28 Ark. 458, Headnote 2. I would affirm the judgment.