Court Opinion

ID: 9947655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 15:10:48.099737+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:29.586836
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2938-21
                                                                   A-2939-21

THAT'S AMORE RESTAURANT,
JACK AND DINO, LLC, and
HADDON AND COLLINGS, LLC,

          Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

TRAVELERS CASUALTY
INSURANCE COMPANY OF
AMERICA,1

          Defendant,

and

AMGUARD INSURANCE
COMPANY2 and SERV PRO,

          Defendants-Respondents.

1
  Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America was improperly pled as
Travelers Insurance Company.
2
 AmGUARD Insurance Company was improperly pled as Berkshire Hathaway
Guard Insurance Companies.
           Submitted November 9, 2023 – Decided March 5, 2024

           Before Judges Currier and Firko.

           On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
           Division, Camden County, Docket No. L-1313-19.

           Buividas Law Group, attorneys for appellants (Stephen
           James Buividas, on the briefs).

           Zirulnik, Demille & Vilacha, attorneys for respondent
           Serv Pro (Stephen G. Sobocinski, on the brief).

           Finazzo Cossolini O'Leary Meola & Hager, LLC,
           attorneys for AmGUARD Insurance Company
           (Jeremiah Lynn O'Leary and Robert J. Pansulla, on the
           brief).

PER CURIAM

     In these back-to-back appeals, plaintiffs appeal from the orders granting

defendants SERVPRO and AmGUARD Insurance Company (AmGUARD)

summary judgment. We affirm.

                                     I.

     Plaintiff Jack and Dino, LLC operated a restaurant named That's Amore,

which rented space in a building owned by plaintiff Haddon and Collings, LLC.

The LLCs are owned by Alfredo Fischioni.

     Defendant Travelers Casualty Insurance Company of America (Travelers)

insured Haddon and Collings, LLC. AmGUARD insured Jack and Dino, LLC.

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Plaintiffs dismissed their claims against Travelers in April 2022. We glean from

the record that Travelers paid Haddon and Collings, LLC monies for its loss of

business income, repairs to the property, and for remediation work.

      In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged That's Amore was damaged in

December 2017 when a broken pipe blocked a vent in the restaurant's basement,

causing the plumbing system to surpass its capacity and spill out through a

"grease trap lid" and "air gap drains," "leaving raw sewage in duct work on

wiring, on plumbing, and on kitchen and basement floors along with the entire

joist system and interior of the restaurant, causing substantial damages."

      Christina Colangelo was the manager of That's Amore at the time and

testified during her deposition that she "basically [ran] the restaurant." Her

duties included scheduling, payroll, paying the bills and taxes, serving, hosting,

and catering events. She recalled the day of the incident being December 7, and

although she was not present that day, she received a video from one of the

employees showing the grease trap overflowing in the basement of the

restaurant.

      The next day, Colangelo went to work and called the municipality and "a

couple different plumbers" about the grease trap; the plumbers advised her they

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                                        3
did not work on grease traps. She also hired several HVAC companies to try

and resolve the issue.

      According to notes made by Fischioni, on December 8, a company

resealed the grease trap. However, within a short period of time there were

several inches of water in the basement. When the same company returned, its

representative advised Fischioni the problem was not "the [g]rease [t]rap but the

discharge pipe was backing up." According to Fischioni, when the municipality

official came to the restaurant, it "determined the water from the restaurant was

not flushing out to the street."

      On December 9, 2017, Colangelo contacted defendant SERVPRO of

Cherry Hill to mitigate and remediate the damage. She testified that a "team of

people" came to the restaurant to survey the area and damage. According to

Colangelo, a representative from SERVPRO sat down with her and went through

documents and discussed "everything" that "was going to take place." The

service included mold containment, where SERVPRO would return to check on

the mold levels. Colangelo could not recall whether Fischioni was present

during the conversation.

      Colangelo     signed    certain   documents,   including    one    entitled

"Authorization to Perform Services and Direction of Payment" dated December

                                                                           A-2938-21
                                        4
9, 2017. She testified she reviewed the front and back of the document and the

signature on the document was hers. Above the signature line, the document

stated in bold capital letters: "I HAVE READ THIS AUTHORIZATION TO

PERFORM SERVICES AND DIRECTION OF PAYMENT, INCLUDING THE

TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF SERVICE ON THE NEXT PAGE HEREOF,

AND AGREE TO SAME. "

      The relevant terms and conditions on the next page stated:

                            READ CAREFULLY

                  Note: This Contract Includes a limitation
                   of liability and limitation of remedies.

                        ....

               4. Limitation of Liability: IN NO EVENT SHALL
                  PROVIDER . . . BE RESPONSIBLE FOR
                  INDIRECT,          SPECIAL,       NOMINAL,
                  INCIDENTAL,              PUNITIVE        OR
                  CONSEQUENTIAL LOSSES OR DAMAGES,
                  OR FOR ANY PENALTIES, REGARDLESS OF
                  THE LEGAL OR EQUITABLE THEORY
                  ASSERTED,        INCLUDING       CONTRACT,
                  NEGLIGENCE,          WARRANTY,       STRICT
                  LIABILITY, STATUTE OR OTHERWISE,
                  EVEN IF IT HAD BEEN AWARE OF THE
                  POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES OR
                  THEY ARE FORESEEABLE; OR FOR
                  CLAIMS BY A THIRD PARTY.                THE
                  MAXIMUM          AGGREGATE        LIABILITY
                  SHALL NOT EXCEED THREE TIMES THE
                  AMOUNT PAID BY CUSTOMER FOR THE

                                                                        A-2938-21
                                      5
                  SERVICES     OR    ACTUAL    PROVEN
                  DAMAGES, WHICHEVER IS LESS. IT IS
                  EXPRESSLY AGREED THAT CUSTOMER'S
                  REMEDY     EXPRESSED     HEREIN   IS
                  CUSTOMER'S EXCLUSIVE REMEDY. THE
                  LIMITATIONS SET FORTH HEREIN SHALL
                  APPLY EVEN IF ANY OTHER REMEDIES
                  FAIL OF THEIR ESSENTIAL PURPOSE.

                        ....

               7. Any claim by Client for faulty performance, for
                  nonperformance or breach under this Contract for
                  damages shall be made in writing to Provider
                  within sixty (60) days after completion of
                  services. Failure to make such a written claim for
                  any matter which could have been corrected by
                  Provider shall be deemed a waiver by Client. NO
                  ACTION,        REGARDLESS         OF       FORM,
                  RELATING TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF
                  THIS CONTRACT MAY BE BROUGHT MORE
                  THAN ONE (1) YEAR AFTER THE
                  CLAIMING PARTY KNEW OR SHOULD
                  HAVE KNOWN OF THE CAUSE OF ACTION.

                  [(emphasis omitted).]

Colangelo stated she had full authorization from Fischioni to sign the documents

and to issue a check for payment of the provided services. Colangelo also signed

documents entitled "Customer Information Form Water Damage" and

"Customer Disclosure and Consent."

      At some point after SERVPRO completed its work, the state Health

Department inspected the restaurant and cleared it to open for business.

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                                       6
However, Colangelo stated Fischioni closed the restaurant because of the

"offensive" smell that "progressively got worse . . . every day."            In his

deposition, Fischioni testified he was aware on Monday December 11 that "[he]

needed further help, because [he] d[id]n't believe that what [SERVPRO] did was

. . . sufficient. Or something was still wrong." 3

      Therefore, Fischioni hired a public adjuster to assist in settling plaintiffs'

claims. Fischioni met with the public adjuster and a SERVPRO representative

at the restaurant on December 13, 2017. According to Fischioni, the public

adjustor "confronted" the SERVPRO representative and "expressed substantial

dissatisfaction with the efforts and results achieved by th[e] company."

      On December 20, 2017, the public adjuster contacted Travelers indicating

he was handling the claim for plaintiffs. The adjuster advised Travelers that

SERVPRO's actions had worsened the extent of the loss and he asked Travelers

to withhold payment to SERVPRO. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs hired another

remediation company to clean the premises.

      In a certification presented in opposition to AmGUARD's motion for

summary judgment, the public adjuster stated, "the cause of [plaintiffs'] loss was

3
  Plaintiffs only provided a portion of Fischioni's deposition transcript in their
appendix.
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                                         7
. . . an escape of sewer water" from "at least two locations within the sanitary

plumbing system." He said,

             A blockage formed near the vent location as a result of
             pipe joint breakage . . . where roots gained access . . . .

                 . . . Consequently, the plumbing system was filled to
             its capacity to where any new water added would
             escape from the grease trap lid and from the air gap
             drains, soaking everything in that vicinity.

He further certified that SERVPRO's work "was not conducted properly" and

raw sewage was left "in duct work, on wiring, on plumbing, and on the kitchen

and basement floor along with a substantial amount of the joist system to include

the interior basement walls." In addition, "gallons of sewage [had] entered the

duct work system" causing damage to the "two . . . hot water heaters, a boiler,

and a furnace."

       At the time of these events, plaintiffs were insured under a

Businessowner's Policy of Insurance with AmGUARD. Although plaintiffs

initially submitted a claim under the policy, they later withdrew it on December

14, 2017. After a second claim was submitted,4 AmGUARD advised plaintiffs

on September 8, 2018 that the claim resulted from "a back-up of water."

4
    The second claim was made in March 2018.

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                                         8
AmGUARD informed plaintiffs the loss was covered under the "Water Back-

Up and Sump Overflow Endorsement" (the Endorsement) in the policy. The

endorsement had a $5,000 limit of insurance for property damage. AmGUARD

subsequently paid plaintiffs $5,000 under the Endorsement. 5

      AmGUARD's "Businessowner’s Coverage Form" stated in pertinent part:

            SECTION I—PROPERTY

            A. Coverage

               We will pay for direct physical loss of or damage to
               Covered Property at the premises described in the
               Declarations caused by or resulting from any
               Covered Cause of Loss.

                  ....

               3. Covered Causes of Loss

                  Risks of direct physical loss unless the loss is:

                  a. Excluded in Paragraph B. Exclusions in
                     Section I; or

                  b. Limited in Paragraph 4. Limitations in Section
                     I.

                  ....

            B. Exclusions

5
  AmGUARD also informed plaintiffs the Endorsement included a $5,000 limit
for business income loss. Plaintiffs did not supply the required documentation
to support its claim for business income loss.
                                                                        A-2938-21
                                        9
  1. We will not pay for loss or damage caused
     directly or indirectly by any of the following.
     Such loss or damage is excluded regardless of
     any other cause or event that contributes
     concurrently or in any sequence to the loss.
     These exclusions apply whether or not the loss
     event results in widespread damage or affects a
     substantial area.

            ....

     g. Water

            ....

         (3) Water that backs up or overflows or is
             otherwise discharged from a sewer, drain,
             sump, sump pump or related equipment;

            ....

         This exclusion applies regardless of whether
         any of the above, in Paragraphs (1) through
         (5), is caused by an act of nature or is
         otherwise caused. An example of a situation
         to which this exclusion applies is the situation
         where a dam, levee, seawall or other boundary
         or containment system fails in whole or in
         part, for any reason, to contain the water. . . .

            ....

H. Property Definitions

  ....

                                                             A-2938-21
                          10
        12. "Specified causes of loss" means the following:
           Fire; lightning; explosion; windstorm or hail;
           smoke; aircraft or vehicles; riot or civil
           commotion; vandalism; leakage from fire
           extinguishing equipment; sinkhole collapse;
           volcanic action; falling objects; weight of snow,
           ice or sleet; water damage.

                  ....

           c. Water damage means accidental discharge or
              leakage of water or steam as the direct result
              of the breaking apart or cracking of any part
              of a system or appliance (other than a sump
              system including its related equipment and
              parts) containing water or steam.

     [(boldface omitted).]

The relevant provisions in AmGUARD's Endorsement state:

     A. We will pay for direct physical loss or damage to
        Covered Property, covered under Section I—
        Property, caused by or resulting from:

        1. Water or waterborne material which backs up
           through or overflows or is otherwise discharged
           from a sewer or drain; or

        2. Water or waterborne material which overflows or
           is otherwise discharged from a sump, sump pump
           or related equipment, even if the overflow or
           discharge results from mechanical breakdown of
           a sump pump or its related equipment.

           ....

                                                               A-2938-21
                              11
            E. With respect to the coverage provided under this
               endorsement, the Water Exclusion in Section I—
               Property is replaced by the following exclusion:

               Water

                  ....

               3. Water under the ground surface pressing on, or
                  flowing or seeping through:

                  a. Foundations, walls, floors or paved surfaces;

                  b. Basements, whether paved or not; or

                  c. Doors, windows or other openings; or

               4. Waterborne material carried or otherwise moved
                  by any of the water referred to in Paragraph 1. or
                  3., or material carried or otherwise moved by
                  mudslide or mudflow.

            [(boldface omitted).]

      In March 2019, plaintiffs filed a complaint against defendants alleging

negligence, breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and

fair dealing, promissory and equitable estoppel, unjust enrichment, common law

legal and equitable fraud, and bad faith. Plaintiffs alleged SERVPRO did not

properly perform the emergency mitigation service and remediation it was hired

to do, "causing substantial damage[]." Plaintiffs alleged AmGUARD refused to

pay for their lost revenue and profits, as well as other damages they incurred.

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                                      12
      After the court dismissed multiple counts of the complaint, plaintiffs filed

an amended complaint. In SERVPRO's answer to the amended complaint, it

asserted numerous affirmative defenses, including that the action was barred by

the statute of limitations. SERVPRO subsequently filed a motion for summary

judgment. The court denied the motion, finding a genuine issue of material fact

existed as to whether there was a valid contract between plaintiffs and

SERVPRO.

      In November 2020, SERVPRO filed a second motion for summary

judgment. After oral argument, the motion judge granted SERVPRO's motion,

finding the contract terms were set forth in bold print and in all capital letters,

and there was no evidence that the terms could not be negotiated. The judge

further found the contract contained a one-year limitation period within which

to bring a claim.

      The judge found the limitation clause was not unconscionable or invalid

because it accorded plaintiffs a year to bring their claims, and plaintiffs were

aware of deficiencies with SERVPRO's work within a year after the work was

performed. The judge was satisfied that a contract existed because the evidence

demonstrated Colangelo had the authority to sign the documents. Lastly, the

court found that the contract was not one of adhesion because plaintiffs could

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                                       13
have hired another company to perform the work. The court memorialized its

oral decision in a December 18, 2020 order.

      In August 2021, AmGUARD moved for summary judgment. In an oral

decision, the court found the following undisputed facts: "the loss occurred due

to a back-up of water into the basement"; a terra cotta sewer pipe was cracked

and obstructed with roots; the pipe was located underground encased by earth ;

and, although there may have been some permeation of sewage at the area of the

crack, the bulk of the sewer water reversed and went back into the building.

      The court found that under the AmGUARD policy, there was no coverage

for damage caused by the "back-up of a sewer or a drain" other than under the

Endorsement for water back-up and AmGUARD had already paid the $5,000

property damage coverage limits. The court found the failure of the terra cotta

pipe caused the sewer back-up, which was only covered under the Endorsement.

The court memorialized its decision in a November 5, 2021 order.

                                      II.

      On appeal, plaintiffs assert the court erred in granting summary judgment

to SERVPRO because plaintiffs never agreed to be bound by the contract and

its terms are unconscionable. In addition, plaintiffs contend the limitation and

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                                      14
liability clauses in the SERVPRO contract are unenforceable and not applicable

to these circumstances.

      As to their appellate arguments regarding AmGUARD, plaintiffs contend

the court erred in its determination that the damages were caused by a water

backup, and the claim was only covered under the Endorsement and not the

policy's water exclusion. Plaintiffs also assert AmGUARD committed bad faith

during the claim process.

      Our review of the trial court's grant or denial "of a motion for summary

judgment [is] de novo, applying the same standard used by the trial court."

Samolyk v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022). We consider "whether the competent

evidential materials presented, when viewed in the light most favorable to the

non-moving party, are sufficient to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the

alleged disputed issue in favor of the non-moving party." Brill v. Guardian Life

Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).

      "If there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then 'decide whether

the trial court correctly interpreted the law.'" DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig.

Support Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting

Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007), certif.

denied, 195 N.J. 419 (2008), overruled in part by Wilson by Manzano v. Jersey

                                                                            A-2938-21
                                      15
City, 209 N.J. 558, 563 (2012)). We review issues of law de novo and accord

no deference to the trial judge's conclusions on issues of law. Nicholas v.

Mynster, 213 N.J. 463, 478 (2013).

                                  SERVPRO

      Plaintiffs assert that the SERVPRO contract is unconscionable because it

precluded "liability for most types of damage[s]," imposed a one-year limitation

on the filing of a lawsuit, and stated these important terms on the back side of

the document that did not require a signature. Plaintiffs contend they were "at

the mercy of SERVPRO" because they were facing an emergency with unequal

bargaining power and no ability to negotiate, which is the classic situation of a

contract of adhesion.

            [U]ndoubtedly, courts may refuse to enforce contracts,
            or discrete contract provisions, that are unconscionable.
            The     unconscionability     determination      requires
            evaluation of both procedure and substance. Procedural
            unconscionability "'can include a variety of
            inadequacies, such as age, literacy, lack of
            sophistication, hidden or unduly complex contract
            terms, bargaining tactics, and the particular setting
            existing during the contract formation process.'"

            [Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 225 N.J. 343,
            366 (2016) (citation omitted) (quoting Muhammad v.
            Cnty. Bank of Rehoboth Beach, 189 N.J. 1, 15 (2006)
            (quoting Sitogum Holdings, Inc. v. Ropes, 352 N.J.
            Super. 555, 564 (Ch. Div. 2002))).]

                                                                           A-2938-21
                                      16
      Further, "[w]hen a contract is one of adhesion, the inquiry requires further

analysis of unconscionability." Id. at 367. The four factors for evaluating the

unconscionability of contracts of adhesion are: "[1] the subject matter of the

contract, [2] the parties' relative bargaining positions, [3] the degree of economic

compulsion motivating the 'adhering' party, and [4] the public interests affected

by the contract." Rudbart v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n, 127 N.J.

344, 356 (1992). "Those factors focus on procedural and substantive aspects of

the contract 'to determine whether the contract is so oppressive, or inconsistent

with the vindication of public policy, that it would be unconscionable to permit

its enforcement.'" Rodriguez, 225 N.J. at 367 (quoting Delta Funding Corp. v.

Harris, 189 N.J. 28, 40 (2006) (citations omitted)).

      Plaintiffs have not established the contract was unconscionable.

According to Colangelo and the documents in the record, the water backup had

begun at least a week before she hired SERVPRO to remediate the damages.

She had contacted several plumbers and HVAC companies attempting to resolve

the issue. When SERVPRO came to the restaurant, the representative sat with

Colangelo and outlined the proposed service and explained the documents to

her. Colangelo also recalled reviewing both sides of the contract before signing

it.

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                                        17
      In evaluating the Rodriguez factors, plaintiffs were not per se

unsophisticated customers. Colangelo had experience running the restaurant,

which entailed reviewing and signing binding contracts. The terms at issue were

not hidden in the contract nor are they overly complex or confusing. Although

Colangelo described the situation as stressful, plaintiffs were under no

compulsion to hire SERVPRO and sign the contract. They had contacted other

service companies and could have continued to do so.

      We also reject plaintiffs' contention that the one-year limitation for filing

a lawsuit against SERVPRO was unconscionable. As our Supreme Court found

in Eagle Fire Protection Corp. v. First Indemnity of America Insurance Co., 145

N.J. 345, 354 (1996), "[c]ontract provisions limiting the time parties may bring

suit have been held to be enforceable, if reasonable." The Court declared it had

"routinely upheld contract provisions that create a one-year time limitation in

which claimants may bring suit." Id. at 355.

      We discern no reason to conclude the one-year limitation was

unreasonable. Furthermore, plaintiffs believed, as testified to by Fischioni, and

were informed by the public adjuster, that SERVPRO's work was unsatisfactory

within days after the work was completed in December 2017. But the lawsuit

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                                       18
was not filed until March 2019. We are satisfied the trial court did not err in

granting SERVPRO summary judgment.

                               AmGUARD

      Plaintiffs contend the court erred in finding its damages were not covered

under the AmGUARD policy because the damages were caused by a break in a

pipe and that is a covered loss.     Plaintiffs further assert the Endorsement

provided coverage for the direct physical loss and damage they incurred.

AmGUARD contends the court correctly found plaintiffs' damages were caused

by a sewer-backup due to a break in the sewer pipe and the Endorsement applied

to limit the coverage to $5,000 which AmGUARD paid.

      "In a dispute over the interpretation of an insurance contract, it is the

insured's burden 'to bring the claim within the basic terms of the policy.'"

Rosario by Rosario v. Haywood, 351 N.J. Super. 521, 529-30 (App. Div. 2002)

(quoting Reliance Ins. Co. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 292 N.J. Super. 365,

377 (App. Div. 1996)). But "where the insurance carrier claims the matter in

dispute falls within exclusionary provisions of the policy, it bears the burden of

establishing that claim." Id. at 530. Insurance policy exclusions require strict

construction and "a broad search 'for the probable common intent of the parties

in an effort to find a reasonable meaning in keeping with the express general

                                                                            A-2938-21
                                       19
purposes of the policies.'" Ibid. (quoting Royal Ins. Co. v. Rutgers Cas. Ins. Co.,

271 N.J. Super. 409, 416 (App. Div. 1994)).

      "Where the express language of the policy is clear and unambiguous, '"the

court is bound to enforce the policy as it is written."'" Ibid. (quoting Royal Ins.

Co., 271 N.J. Super. at 416). When a court is interpreting insurance policies,

"the court should give the words of the insurance policy 'their plain, ordinary

meaning.'" Sahli v. Woodbine Bd. of Educ., 193 N.J. 309, 321 (2008) (quoting

Zacarias v. Allstate Ins. Co., 168 N.J. 590, 595 (2001)). When no ambiguity is

present, "courts '"should not write for the insured a better policy of insurance

than the one purchased."'" Gibson v. Callaghan, 158 N.J. 662, 670 (1999)

(quoting Longbordi v. Chubb Ins. Co. of N.J., 121 N.J. 530, 537 (1990)).

      As the court found, the Endorsement is applicable to these circumstances.

The Endorsement stated:

            A. We will pay for direct physical loss or damage to
               Covered Property, covered under Section I—
               Property, caused by or resulting from:

               1. Water or waterborne material which backs up
                  through or overflows or is otherwise discharged
                  from a sewer or drain . . . .

      According to the public adjuster's certification, the restaurant had a built-

in, standalone sanitary sewer/plumbing system, which was separate from its

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                                       20
storm drainage system. He stated that a pipe within the sanitary system broke

and roots gained access, causing a blockage. As a result of the blockage, the

sanitary system filled and escaped through the grease trap lid and air gap drains

in the restaurant, "gallons of sewage . . . entered the duct work system[s]," and

"[t]he furnace fan circulated [that] . . . sewage into the . . . building." In short,

the sewer line which went into the restaurant's basement was impacted by tree

roots that disrupted the flow of water in the pipe.

      The damage to the restaurant was caused by a sewer back-up.               The

Endorsement applied to the loss. AmGUARD paid the coverage limits specified

under the Endorsement. The trial court did not err in granting AMGUARD

summary judgment.

      In light of our determination that the order granting summary judgment

was supported by the evidence in the record and the applicable principles of law,

we need not address plaintiffs' contention that AmGUARD acted in bad faith.

As our Supreme Court stated in Wadeer v. New Jersey Manufacturers Insurance

Co., 220 N.J. 591, 604 (2015), "'[u]nder the "fairly debatable" standard, a

claimant who could not have established as a matter of law a right to summary

judgment on the substantive claim would not be entitled to assert a claim for an

                                                                              A-2938-21
                                        21
insurer's bad faith refusal to pay the claim.'" (quoting Pickett v. Lloyd's, 131

N.J. 457, 473 (1993)).

      Affirmed.

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                                      22