Court Opinion

ID: 9494664
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:43:41.225113+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:32.784387
License: Public Domain

MURPHY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
A majority of this court concludes that Congress did not divest Native American Indian tribes of the power to enact right-to-work laws when it passed §§ 8(a)(3) and 14(b) of the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”). The majority supports this conclusion by invoking the general proposition that Congress cannot abrogate Indian self-governance by silence. It then goes on to conclude, however, that Congress, by its silence, implicitly granted Indian tribes the right to enact such laws when it passed § 14(b). Because I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that § 8(a)(3) did not divest Indian tribes of their power to enact right-to-work laws and with its subsequent conclusion that § 14(b) implicitly granted Indian tribes the same power to enact right-to-work laws granted to states and territories, I respectfully dissent.
It is beyond debate that Indian tribes do not “possess! ] • • • the full attributes of sovereignty.” United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381, 6 S.Ct. 1109, 30 L.Ed. 228 (1886); see also Mention v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 617 F.2d 537, 541 (10th Cir.1980), aff'd, 455 U.S. 130, 102 S.Ct. 894, 71 L.Ed.2d 21 (1982). Tribes, rather, are quasi-sovereign governments, possessing only “those powers of self-government not voluntarily relinquished by treaty, not divested by Congress in the exercise of its plenary authority over them, or not inconsistent with the superior interest of the United States as a sovereign nation.” Merrion, 617 F.2d at 541. The Union and *1202the NLRB do not argue that the Pueblo of San Juan (“Pueblo”) never possessed the power to enact a right-to-work law or that any such power has either been relinquished by treaty or is inconsistent with the superior status of the United States. Rather, both simply argue that the Pueblo’s power has been divested by the exercise of congressional plenary authority over Indian tribes.
The majority does not dispute that Congress retains plenary power over Indian tribes and may exercise that power to divest tribes of their sovereignty. See op. at 1191. Further, the majority correctly points out that the burden is on the NLRB and the Union to demonstrate that the Pueblo’s power to enact the ordinance at issue here has been “modified, conditioned or divested by Congressional action.” Southland Royalty Co. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 715 F.2d 486, 488 (10th Cir.1983). The majority then concludes that Appellants have not met their burden of showing that Congress intended to divest the Pueblo of the power to enact the ordinance. The NLRB and the Union, however, have met their burden by demonstrating that the NLRA constitutes comprehensive federal regulation of labor relations. The Pueblo then fails to offer any proof that Congress did not intend for § 8(a)(3) to apply to Indian tribes.
Congress’ clear intentioñ to apply a federal statute to Indian tribes can be demonstrated in one of two ways. Congress, of course, may expressly limit tribal sovereignty by including specific language to that effect in the federal statute. Alternatively, congressional intent to abrogate Indian sovereignty can be discerned from legislative history or from the “existence of a comprehensive statutory plan.” EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937, 939 (10th Cir.1989). The conclusion that Congress can abrogate Indian sovereignty by implication is firmly supported by statements made by the Supreme Court in Federal Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116, 80 S.Ct. 543, 4 L.Ed.2d 584 (1960). In Tuscarora, the Court declared that “it is now well settled by many decisions of this Court that a general [federal] statute in terms applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests.” Id. Though dicta, this language indicates the Court’s position that the case law supports a presumption that federal statutes of general applicability apply to Indian tribes. See Gaylor v. United States, 74 F.3d 214, 217 (10th Cir.1996) (“[T]his court considers itself bound by Supreme Court dicta almost as firmly as by the Court’s outright holdings .... ”).
The Ninth Circuit has expounded on the Court’s statement in Tuscarora, articulating three exceptions to the general presumption in favor of applicability.
A federal statute of general applicability that is silent on the issue of applicability to Indian tribes will not apply to them if: (1) the law touches exclusive rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties; or (3) there is proof by legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the law] not to apply to Indians on their reservations....
Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir.1985) (quotations omitted). These exceptions provide Indian tribes with the opportunity to rebut the presumption that they are included in federal statutes of general application.
In Donovan v. Navajo Forest Products, this court opined that Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. at 152, 102 S.Ct. 894 (1982) “limits or, by implication, overrules Tuscarora.” 692 F.2d 709, 713 (10th Cir.1982). If Merrion did limit the *1203application of Tuscarora, those limits are entirely consistent with the exceptions articulated by the Ninth Circuit in Coeur d’Alene:. Reading Merrion as consistent with Tuscarora is supported by the opinions issued by this court after Merrion and Navajo Forest Products in which the court invokes the Tuscarora presumption and then considers the Coeur d’Alene exceptions. See Nero v. Cherokee Nation, 892 F.2d 1457, 1462-63 (10th Cir.1989); EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, 871 at 939; Phillips Petroleum Co. v. EPA 803 F.2d 545, 555-56 (10th Cir.1986). Thus, this court, together with several other circuits, has embraced the Tuscarora/Coeur d’Al-ene approach.
In EEOC v. Cherokee Nation, a divided panel of this court concluded that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) did not apply to Indian tribes. See 871 F.2d at 939. Both the majority and the dissenting judge, however, acknowledged that clear congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereignty could be manifested by the existence of a comprehensive statutory plan. See id.; id. at 940 n. 1, 941-42 (Tacha, J., dissenting) (examining legislative history and an analogous federal statute to support the conclusion that the tribe’s right to self-government was limited by the ADEA). It is unclear whether the majority based its holding on its view that the ADEA was not a comprehensive federal plan or its conclusion that a treaty between the Cherokee Nation and the United States overcame the Tuscarora presumption. See id. at 939, 938 n. 3.
This court has also invoked the Tuscarora presumption to conclude that Congress intended to include Indian tribes within the reach of the Safe Water Drinking Act of 1974 (“SWDA”) even though tribes were not expressly mentioned. See Phillips Petroleum, 803 F.2d at 556 (“The conclusion that the SWDA empowered the EPA to prescribe regulations for Indian lands is also consistent with the presumption that Congress intends a general statute applying to all persons to include Indians and their property interests.”); id. at 556 n. 14. The court’s holding was supported, in large part, by its conclusion that the SWDA “clearly established] national policy with respect to clean water.” Id. at 555. The court determined that this national policy would be thwarted if Indian tribes were not covered by the SWDA. It then noted that there was no showing that the SWDA conflicted with a specific right granted to the tribe either by statute or treaty. See id. at 556. The majority believes Phillips Petroleum differs from this case because, unlike the Pueblo, the Indian tribe in Phillips Petroleum did not oppose the application of the SWDA. Under the analysis employed by the Phillips Petroleum court, however, the outcome would be the same regardless of whether the issue of tribal sovereignty was raised by an Indian or by a non-Indian. Certainly the majority cannot be suggesting that the outcome in Phillips Petroleum would have been different had the theory of tribal sovereignty been raised by the affected tribe rather than Phillips Petroleum. The importance of Phillips Petroleum is that it squarely supports the proposition that cases involving comprehensive federal statutes of general applicability should be analyzed by applying Tuscarora/Coeur d’Al-ene.
Other circuit courts of appeal have also concluded that tribes’ sovereign powers can be divested by comprehensive federal regulatory schemes that are silent as to their application to Indians. See, e.g., Fla. Paraplegic Ass’n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 166 F.3d 1126, 1128-30 (11th Cir.1999) (concluding that the ADA applies to Indian tribes); Reich v. Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d 174, 177-82 (2d Cir.1996) (holding that OSHA applied to an Indian tribe); Smart v. State Farm *1204Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 932-36 (7th Cir.1989) (applying ERISA to an employee benefits plan established and operated by an Indian tribe); Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d at 1116 (holding that OSHA applied to a tribe’s commercial activities). These cases all discussed Tuscarora and the exceptions articulated by the Ninth Circuit.
The majority distinguishes Tuscarora and its progeny by concluding that the Pueblo’s sovereign power to govern by enacting legislation, as opposed to its power to protect any proprietary interests it holds, can never be divested by implication. See op. at 1192-93 (“[IJmplied preemption of such sovereign authority does not suffice.”). The majority’s position, however, is purely visceral; the majority offers no logical, precedential, or authoritative support for the proposition that a tribe’s sovereign power to enact general legislation is afforded more protection than any other aspect of its sovereignty. Further, the majority’s position conflicts with Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.
In Merrion, the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether Congress implicitly divested an Indian tribe of its power to impose a severance tax, a power of self-governance. See 455 U.S. at 150-52, 102 S.Ct. 894. Although the Court ultimately concluded that there was no indication the tribe’s power had been abrogated by Congress, it clearly engaged in the very analysis repudiated by the majority in this case. The Court first examined two federal statutes to determine whether they contained any references to Indian tribes. See id. at 149-50, 102 S.Ct. 894. It then examined whether any particular provision in the statutes “deprived the Tribe of its authority to impose the severance tax.” Id. at 149, 102 S.Ct. 894. The Court concluded that the first statute contained express language indicating congressional intent that it not apply to Indian tribes. See id. at 150, 102 S.Ct. 894. As to the second statute, the Court noted that although it authorized state taxation of royalties from mineral production on Indian lands, it did not mention tribal authority to tax. See id. at 151, 102 S.Ct. 894. In rejecting the claims that the statute transferred the Indian power to tax mineral production to the states, the Court stated as follows:
This claim not only lacks any supporting evidence in the legislative history, it also deviates from settled principles of taxation: different sovereigns can enjoy powers to tax the same transactions. Thus, the mere- existence of state authority to tax does not deprive the Indian tribe of its power to tax.

Id.

Although the Court concluded that Congress had not implicitly divested the tribe of its power to impose the severance tax at issue in that case, Merrion clearly stands for the proposition that Congress can divest an Indian tribe of a “power of self-government” by implication. 455 U.S. at 152, 102 S.Ct. 894 (“We find no ‘clear indications’ that Congress has implicitly deprived the Tribe of its power to impose the severance tax.” (emphasis added)). The Court did not conclude that Congress could never divest a tribe of such powers by implication.
Like the Supreme Court, this court has also recognized that Congress can divest Indian tribes of sovereign powers of self-government by implication. See Nero, 892 F.2d at 1462-63. In Nero, this court concluded that a federal statute of general applicability did not divest a tribe of its sovereign power to determine tribal membership and thus exclude plaintiffs from participating in tribal elections and Indian benefits programs. See id. at 1463. The court arrived at this conclusion by apply*1205ing the Tuscarora/Coeur d’Alene analysis. It apparently assumed that the federal statute was one of general applicability but then concluded that the statute could not be invoked against the tribe because it would impinge on the tribe’s right of self-governance over tribal membership, a purely intramural matter. See id. at 1462-63.
The Supreme Court has consistently and unequivocally stated that Congress has plenary authority to divest Indian tribes of any and all aspects of their sovereignty, whether those powers were retained by the tribes or established by treaty. “The sovereignty that the Indian tribes retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the sufferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.” United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323, 98 S.Ct. 1079, 55 L.Ed.2d 303 (1978) (emphasis added). “Congress has plenary authority to limit, modify or eliminate the powers of local self-government which the tribes otherwise possess.” Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58, 98 S.Ct. 1670, 56 L.Ed.2d 106 (1978); see also United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738, 106 S.Ct. 2216, 90 L.Ed.2d 767 (1986) (holding that rights granted to a tribe by treaty may be abrogated by Congress). Even powers over purely intramural tribal matters can be divested by treaty or statute. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322 n. 18, 98 S.Ct. 1079.
The Tuscarora/Coeur d’Alene test accommodates notions of both tribal and federal sovereignty. Pursuant to the exceptions first articulated by Coeur d’Alene, congressional power to implicitly divest an Indian tribe of sovereign powers is limited in only two circumstances: when the federal statute strips the tribe of its power to regulate purely intramural matters or when the statute divests the tribe of powers guaranteed by treaty. Only in those two situations must congressional divestiture be express. Congress can divest Indian tribes of any and all other aspects of their sovereignty by implication, including their power to regulate the activities of non-members, unless the tribe can demonstrate that Congress did not intend the federal statute to apply to them.
The majority’s attempt to distinguish the Tuscarora/Coeur d’Alene analysis on the basis that it only applies when a federal statute affects property interests and does not apply when a tribe merely invokes its general legislative powers is illogical. If the majority is correct, an Indian tribe, in almost every instance, could avoid the application of a comprehensive, generally applicable federal statute simply by exercising its general legislative powers and enacting an ordinance that either declares the tribe to be exempt from the federal statute or which directly conflicts with the federal statute. By holding that Congress can never implicitly divest tribes of their power to enact laws that conflict with generally applicable federal statutes, the majority effectively bestows upon Indian tribes sovereign powers far greater than those possessed even by the states. As a result of the majority opinion, tribes will now have unfettered power to enact ordinances that directly conflict with any federal statute of general application. For example, the Pueblo could enact an ordinance legalizing the closed shop, a form of compulsory unionization the majority acknowledges was “outlawed in 1947 by the Taft Hartley Act’s amendment of the NLRA.” See op. at 1190 n. 3. The Pueblo could also enact legislation declaring its members to be exempt from all federal tax laws. Such an ordinance would effectively preempt the application of all federal tax laws until Congress remedied the situation by expressly including Indian tribes within the reach of the federal tax laws. This certainly cannot be the rule.
*1206Both the Seventh and the Second Circuits have rejected the majority’s reasoning on this very basis. In Smart, a member of the Chippewa Tribe argued that ERISA did not apply to an employee benefit plan maintained by the tribe because it affected tribal sovereignty. See 868 F.2d at 935. The Seventh Circuit disagreed, stating:
A statute of general application will not be applied to an Indian Tribe when the statute threatens the Tribe’s ability to govern its intramural affairs, but not simply whenever it merely affects self-governance as broadly conceived. Any federal statute applied to an Indian on a ■reservation or to a Tribe has the arguable effect of eviscerating self-governance since it amounts to a subordination of the Indian government.
Id. Similarly, the Second Circuit addressed a nearly identical argument, concluding:
When taken to its logical limits, it would preclude the application of any federal legislation, silent as to Indians, that in some way affects the political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare of a tribe. Such a test greatly expands the niche the federal government has carved out for Indian tribes; that of a sovereign with limited powers, dependent on, and subordinate to the federal government.
Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d at 179 (quotation omitted).
Merrion and Nero stand for the proposition that the Tuscarora/Coeur d’Alene analysis should be applied to determine whether Congress has, by implication, divested an Indian tribe of any powers it retains. The approach adopted by the Ninth Circuit in Coeur d’Alene is consistent with both Tuscarora and Merrion and provides courts with an appropriate and workable framework within which to analyze the impact of all generally applicable federal statutes on all aspects of Indian sovereignty. The exceptions articulated in Coeur d’Alene appropriately limit the Tuscarora presumption by preserving tribal sovereignty over purely intramural matters even in the face of comprehensive federal regulation. A limited notion of tribal self-governance preserves federal supremacy over Indian tribes while providing heightened protection for tribal regulation of purely intramural matters. Any concerns about abrogating tribal powers of self-governance by implication are fully addressed by the Coeur d’Alene exceptions. The majority has offered no rationale for its position that tribes’ powers to enact general legislation occupy the same heights as their more vital powers to regulate purely intramural matters such as tribal membership and domestic affairs.
Congress divested the Pueblo of the power to enact the ordinance at issue here. The Pueblo does not dispute that the NLRA establishes a national labor policy. See Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U-.S. 728, 735, 101 S.Ct. 1437, 67 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981) (“The national policy favoring collective bargaining and industrial self-government was first expressed in the National Labor Relations Act of 1935. It received further expression and definition in the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947.” (citation omitted)); Phillips Petroleum, 803 F.2d at 555 (using the NLRA as an example of a statute that established a national policy); Navajo Tribe v. NLRB, 288 F.2d 162, 164 (D.C.Cir.1961) (“Congress has adopted a national labor policy, superseding the local policies of the States and the Indian tribes, in all cases to which the National Labor Relations Act applies.”). Relying on Algo-ma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, however, the majority concludes that § 8(a)(3) does not prohibit right-to-work laws like the one at issue here. See 336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584, 93 L.Ed. 691 (1949).
*1207Algoma cannot be read for the proposition that § 8(a)(3) had no effect on an Indian tribe’s power to enact a right-to-work ordinance. In Algoma, the Court interpreted § 8(3) of the Wagner Act, which permitted the closed shop before it was amended by the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947.1 See id. at 307-09, 69 S.Ct. 584. Addressing the concern that § 8(3) could be interpreted as outlawing the closed shop, the Court stated, “§ 8(3) merely disclaims a national policy hostile to the closed shop or other forms of union-security agreement.” Id. at 307, 69 S.Ct. 584. The Court, in part, relied on language from a Senate Report indicating that § 8(3) “deals with the question of the closed shop.” Id. The Court then quoted a statement made by Senator Wagner that § 8(3) “will not change the status quo.... [W]herever it is the law today that a closed-shop agreement can be made, it will continue to be the law. By this bill we do not change that situation.” Id. at 310, 69 S.Ct. 584. Thus, the language in Algoma relied upon by the majority stands only for the proposition that § 8(3) of the Wagner Act did not prohibit states from outlawing closed shops. The “status quo” referred to by the Court was the states’ powers to regulate closed shops.
Even assuming that § 8(3) of the Wagner Act had no effect on the rights of all sovereigns to fully regulate union security agreements, the majority fails to acknowledge that § 8(3) was amended by the Taft>-Hartley Act of 1947. See ch. 120, § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 136, 140-41 (1947) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3)). As amended, the statute regulates more than the closed shop. Section 8(a)(3)
add[ed] new conditions, which, as presently provided in § 8(a)(3), require that there be a 30 day waiting period before any employee is forced into a union, that the union in question is the appropriate representative of the employees, and that an employer not discriminate against an employee if he has reasonable grounds for believing that membership in the union was not available to the employee on a nondiscriminatory basis or that the employee’s membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than failure to meet union-shop requirements as to dues and fees.
Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, Local 1625 v. Schermerhorn, 375 U.S. 96, 100, 84 S.Ct. 219, 11 L.Ed.2d 179 (1963). Because Algo-ma did not resolve the question of whether § 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act, the statute at issue here, preempted state right-to-work laws, the Court took the question up in Schermerhom. Acknowledging that § 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act imposed additional federal restrictions on union security agreements not found in § 8(3) of the Wagner Act, the Court, referring to § 8(a)(3), stated, “In other words, Congress undertook pervasive regulation of union-security agreements, raising in the minds of many whether it thereby preempted the field ... and put such agreements beyond state control.” Id. at *1208100-01, 84 S.Ct. 219 (emphases added and citation omitted). Although the Court ultimately concluded that the state law at issue in Schermerhom was not preempted by § 8(a)(3), its holding was premised on § 14(b) of the Taft Hartley Act, which restored to the states and territories a power otherwise preempted by § 8(a)(3). See id. at 102, 84 S.Ct. 219. The exception carved out by § 14(b), however, is extremely narrow; it only permits states and territories to enact legislation prohibiting union security agreements otherwise allowed under § 8(a)(3). Section 14(b) does not permit even states and territories to enact legislation allowing what § 8(a)(3) prohibits, e.g., the closed shop.
In 1976, the Court unambiguously reiterated its belief, that § 8(a)(3) constitutes pervasive federal regulation of union security agreements, stating:
Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations Act permits employees as a matter of federal law to enter into agreements with unions to establish union or agency shops. Section 14(b) of the Act, however, allows individual States and Territories to exempt themselves from § 8(a)(3) and to enact so-called “right-to-work” laws prohibiting union or agency shops.
Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, Int’l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 409, 96 S.Ct. 2140, 48 L.Ed.2d 736 (1976) (citations and footnote omitted). The Court went on to state, “§ 8(a)(3) articulates a national policy that certain union-security agreements are valid as a matter of federal law.” Id. at 416, 96 S.Ct. 2140. This most recent pronouncement by the Court supports the proposition that Congress intended to regulate union security agreements when it enacted § 8(a)(3) of the Tafi>-Hartley Act, restoring a small portion of that regulatory power only to states and territories when it enacted § 14(b). Thus § 8(a)(3), the statute at issue here, did alter the status quo as it existed before the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act and does constitute pervasive federal regulation of union security agreements.
The ordinance in this case clearly conflicts with the NLRA. Section 8(a)(3) states that employers and unions are not precluded by the NLRA from entering into an agreement requiring employees to become union members within thirty days after beginning employment. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). The ordinance enacted by the Pueblo specifically prohibits what § 8(a)(3) otherwise allows, i.e., the right of “employers as a matter of federal law to enter into agreement with unions to establish union or agency shops.” Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers, Int’l Union, 426 U.S. at 409, 96 S.Ct. 2140. Thus, the ordinance is clearly contrary to federal law. Congressional intent to divest the Pueblo of its power to enact the ordinance is thus presumed under Tuscarora.
None of the exceptions first articulated in Coeur d’Alene apply in this case to overcome the Tuscarora presumption. The Pueblo has not identified any treaty with the United States that permits it to enact the ordinance. Additionally, § 8(a)(3) does not touch on the Pueblo’s “exclusive 'rights of self-governance in purely intramural matters.” Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116 (quotation omitted). Section 8(a)(3) regulates the relationship between employers and their employees. In no sense does § 8(a)(3) impact purely intramural tribal matters which “generally consist of conduct the immediate ramifications of which are felt primarily within the reservation by members of the tribe.” Mashantucket Sand & Gravel, 95 F.3d at 181. Section 8(a)(3) does not regulate tribal membership, domestic relations, or tribal rules of inheritance, those areas recognized by the Supreme Court as constituting rights of internal self-governance. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 322 n. 18, 98 S.Ct. *12091079 (acknowledging that even the power to regulate tribal membership, domestic relations, or rules of inheritance can be divested by treaty or statute). In this case, § 8(a)(3) merely curtails the Pueblo’s power to regulate the relationship between a non-tribal employer and its employees, both Indian and non-Indian. Although § 8(a)(3) does implicate the Pueblo’s power to regulate economic activity on its land, as discussed above, this power, like almost all other powers retained by Indian tribes, can be divested by implication. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 152, 102 S.Ct. 894 (examining whether a tribe’s power to impose a tax had been divested by implication). Because § 8(a)(3) does not affect the Pueblo’s power to regulate purely intramural matters, the second Coeur d’Al-ene exception does not apply.
Finally, the Pueblo has failed to show that “Congress intended [§ 8(a)(3)] not to apply to Indians on their reservations.” Coeur d’Alene, 751 F.2d at 1116 (quotation omitted). The majority believes that congressional intent is embodied in § 14(b), which specifically exempts only states and territories from the application of § 8(a)(3). To support this conclusion, the majority relies on the rule of construction that statutes are to be interpreted in favor of Indian sovereignty. Rules of statutory construction, however, can be invoked only when the statute at issue is ambiguous. See Chickasaw Nation v. United States, 208 F.3d 871, 880 (10th Cir.2000), aff'd, 534 U.S. 84, 122 S.Ct. 528, 151 L.Ed.2d 474 (2001). Section 14(b) is not ambiguous; it expressly provides that only states and territories may enact legislation prohibiting what § 8(a)(3) otherwise allows. Further, § 14(b)’s silence as to Indian tribes does not render it ambiguous. To conclude otherwise would eviscerate the Tuscarora presumption whenever a federal statute of general application contains a limited exception. Under the majority’s reasoning, no federal statute containing even the most narrow exception would apply to Indian tribes; congressional failure to specifically include Indian tribes in the exception would, standing alone, constitute proof that Congress intended by that failure to include them. If this were the rule, the general Tuscarora presumption that federal statutes of general application apply to Indian tribes would be swallowed by the narrow and specific Coeur d’Alene exception in almost every case. For this reason, the majority’s approach goes too far. The existence of a statutory exception, standing alone, is insufficient to render a federal statute ambiguous or trigger the application of canons of construction favoring Indian tribes.
The majority’s conclusion is fatally undercut by a recent Supreme Court decision. In Chickasaw Nation v. United States, two Indian tribes argued that they were exempted from paying federal taxes related to their gaming activities. See 534 U.S. at-, 122 S.Ct. at 531-32. The tribes asserted that they were entitled to the same exemption from taxation expressly granted to the states. See id. The Court disagreed, basing its conclusion on the plain, unambiguous language of the federal statute which did not expressly grant Indian tribes an exemption from the federal taxes granted to the states. See id. at 532-33. In light of its conclusion that the statute was unambiguous, the Court refused to apply the canon of statutory construction favoring Indian tribes stating, “to accept as conclusive the canons on which the Tribes rely would produce an interpretation that we conclude would conflict with the intent embodied in the statute Congress wrote.” Id. at 535.
The majority attempts to distinguish Chickasaw Nation on the basis that it did not involve a tribe’s power to enact and enforce laws. The broad concepts of statutory interpretation articulated in Chicka*1210saw Nation, however, are not confined to the narrow issue before the Court. Chickasaw Nation must be read for the broad proposition that courts may not engage in judicial lawmaking by invoking general rules of statutory construction to rewrite otherwise clear and unambiguous statutes. Further, as already explained, a tribe’s power to enact legislation that does not impact purely intramural matters is entitled to no more protection than any other tribal power. Accordingly, the Court’s analysis in Chickasaw Nation applies with equal force to this case. The majority has circumvented congressional intent embodied in the clear and unambiguous language of § 14(b) by invoking a canon of statutory construction. The majority’s statement that “in the context of Indian law, appeals to ‘plain language’ or ‘plain meaning’ must give way to canons of statutory construction peculiar to Indian law,” directly conflicts with the Court’s holding in Chickasaw Nation. See op. at 1196.
The majority also relies on El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 119 S.Ct. 1430, 143 L.Ed.2d 635 (1999), to support its conclusion that congressional silence implicitly grants Indian tribes the same exemptions and exceptions from federal law afforded states. See op. at 1196. In El Paso, however, the Court concluded that Congress had implicitly divested Indian tribal courts of their power to adjudicate tort claims arising from nuclear accidents, an aspect of their self-governance. See El Paso, 526 U.S. at 485-87, 119 S.Ct. 1430. The Court’s holding in El Paso is completely consistent with the Tuscarora presumption. Read together, El Paso and Chickasaw Nation clearly stand for the proposition that while Indian tribes can be divested of powers of self-governance by implication, those powers cannot be restored by congressional silence. The majority reaches the opposite conclusion, thereby turning the law on its head.
There is no evidence in this record of congressional intent to include or exclude tribes from the exemption recognized in § 14(b). The majority necessarily equates this lack of evidence with freedom to legislate by invocation of a canon of construction favoring Indian tribes. The proper conclusion from this lack of evidence of legislative intent, however, is that application of the third Coeur d’Alene exception is precluded. Because Indian tribes are not specifically named in § 14(b) and because the Pueblo has not offered any other proof that Congress intended § 8(a)(3) should not apply to Indian tribes, none of the exceptions articulated in Coeur d’Alene are present in this case. Thus, Congress implicitly divested the Pueblo of the power to enact the ordinance and I would, accordingly, reverse the order of the district court.

. Section 8(3) of the Wagner Act read as follows:
8. It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer—
(3) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in the Nation Industrial Recovery Act ... or in any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization ... to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9(a), in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when made,
ch. 372, § 8(3), 49 Stat. 449, 452 (1935).