Court Opinion

ID: 9404427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-23 00:00:41.553797+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:13.815482
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50164     Document: 00516796593        Page: 1    Date Filed: 06/22/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                            Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                               FILED
                                                                      June 22, 2023
                                 No. 22-50164                        Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                               Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                      versus

   Arturo Shows Urquidi; Mario Iglesias-Villegas

                                          Defendants—Appellants.
                  ______________________________

                 Appeals from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Texas
                          USDC No. 3:12-CR-849-14
                          USDC No. 3:12-CR-849-19
                 ______________________________

   Before King, Jones, and Duncan, Circuit Judges.
   King, Circuit Judge:
         Defendants were among 24 individuals indicted on various charges in
   connection with their involvement in the Sinaloa Cartel. Defendants were
   jointly tried during a 10-day jury trial. Arturo Shows Urquidi was convicted
   on five counts, while Mario Iglesias-Villegas was convicted on 12 counts.
   Each received concurrent life sentences for all counts on which they were
   convicted. Defendants raise various challenges to their respective
   convictions and sentences on appeal. We AFFIRM the convictions but
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                                          No. 22-50164

   VACATE those sentences that exceed their respective statutory maxima
   and REMAND the case for resentencing on those counts only.
                                               I.
           On April 11, 2012, Defendants-Appellants Arturo Shows Urquidi and
   Mario Iglesias-Villegas (together, the “Defendants”) were among 24
   individuals who were indicted in connection with their affiliation and dealings
   with the Sinaloa Cartel (alternatively, the “Cartel”). Defendants were tried
   together during a 10-day jury trial, which concluded on October 21, 2022.
           The Sinaloa Cartel is a criminal organization whose members and
   associates engage in the illegal trafficking of cocaine and marijuana from
   Mexico into the United States. Drug proceeds accrued in the United States
   are secretly transported back to Mexico and into the Cartel’s coffers. Cartel
   members frequently engage in violence—such as murder, torture, and
   kidnapping—against rivals, those they deem responsible for lost or stolen
   assets, and individuals cooperating with law enforcement, among others.
   These acts of violence, which also include the mutilation and
   dismemberment of victims’ bodies, are often publicized by the Cartel as a
   means of intimidation.
           The Sinaloa Cartel has a hierarchical structure and was led by Joaquin
   “El Chapo” Guzman Loera and Ismael “El Mayo” Zambada Garcia during
   the events that were recounted at trial. 1 Below Chapo and Mayo were “plaza
   bosses” who managed the Cartel’s daily operations in each major city within
   its network. These operations included moving and importing drugs,
           _____________________
           1
             After multiple escapes from Mexican authorities, Chapo was eventually
   extradited to the United States in 2017 and sentenced to five concurrent life sentences plus
   30 years in 2019; his conviction was later affirmed by the Second Circuit. See generally
   United States v. Guzman Loera, 24 F.4th 144 (2d Cir. 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Loera v.
   United States, 142 S. Ct. 2780 (2022).

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   accounting for the cash proceeds returned from drug sales in the United
   States, acquiring weapons, and managing “sicarios,” i.e., Cartel assassins.
   Under the plaza bosses were Cartel members in charge of individual
   “offices” (sometimes referred to as “houses,” “safe houses,” or “safety
   houses”), where meetings were held; drugs, cash, and firearms were stored;
   money was counted; and individuals were kidnapped, tortured, and
   murdered. Beneath the office heads were rank-and-file members of the Cartel
   who served as sicarios, provided security, paid bribes, packaged or
   transported drugs, and counted money, among other Cartel duties.
          On October 22, 2022, the jury found both Shows Urquidi and Iglesias-
   Villegas guilty of Racketeering Conspiracy, Conspiracy to Possess a
   Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, Conspiracy to Import a
   Controlled Substance, Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments, and
   Conspiracy to Possess Firearms in Furtherance of Drug Trafficking Crimes
   (Counts I through V). Iglesias-Villegas was also found guilty of five counts
   for Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering (Counts VI through X),
   Conspiracy to Kill in a Foreign Country (Count XIII), and Kidnapping and
   Aiding and Abetting Kidnapping (Count XIV). On March 3 and March 24,
   2022, Shows Urquidi and Iglesias-Villegas were sentenced to concurrent life
   sentences on each count of conviction. Iglesias-Villegas was also fined
   $100,000. Defendants raise various issues on appeal that span from pre-trial
   discovery through their sentencing. We address each issue in turn.
                                         II.
          Iglesias-Villegas argues that the district court erred in denying his pre-
   trial motion for the disclosure of evidence presented to the grand jury
   supporting the indictment as it related to him.

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          We review the denial of a motion for the disclosure of grand jury
   materials for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Miramontez, 995 F.2d 56,
   59 (5th Cir. 1993).
          “Federal courts long have recognized that secrecy is essential to
   maintaining the integrity of the grand jury system.” In re Grand Jury
   Testimony, 832 F.2d 60, 62 (5th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, a court may
   authorize the disclosure of grand jury materials “at the request of a defendant
   who shows that a ground may exist to dismiss the indictment because of a
   matter that occurred before the grand jury.” Fed. R. Crim. P.
   6(e)(3)(E)(ii). “The burden is on the party seeking disclosure to show that ‘a
   particularized need’ exists for the materials that outweighs the policy of
   secrecy.” Miramontez, 995 F.2d at 59 (quoting Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v.
   United States, 360 U.S. 395, 400 (1959)). To meet this burden, the seeking
   party must demonstrate that “(1) the material he seeks is needed to avoid a
   possible injustice . . . , (2) the need for disclosure is greater than the need for
   continued secrecy, and (3) his request is structured to cover only material so
   needed.” Id.; see also United States v. Madrid, 610 F. App’x 359, 373 (5th Cir.
   2015) (per curiam).
          Iglesias-Villegas asserts that the grand jury transcripts were necessary
   to prove that his case is one of mistaken identity. The indictment incorrectly
   names him as Mario Alberto Iglesias-Villegas. Throughout this case, Iglesias-
   Villegas has maintained that Mario Alberto Iglesias-Villegas refers to his
   now-deceased cousin Mario Alberto Iglesias-Chavaria and not himself. In his
   motion below, Iglesias-Villegas argued that he needed the grand jury
   materials so that he could “become aware whether he was indicted via
   allegations to the grand jury of conduct that was attributable to his cousin”
   and “determine whether a ground may exist to dismiss the indictment.” The
   district court rejected this argument, reasoning that Iglesias-Villegas failed to
   establish that there was any confusion between his identity and that of his

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   cousin at the time of the indictment or that the Government engaged in
   misconduct while presenting its case to the grand jury.
           This was not an abuse of discretion. “We have ‘refuse[d] to adopt the
   proposition that, absent perjury or government misconduct, an indictment is
   flawed simply because it is based on testimony that may later prove to be
   questionable.’” United States v. Cessa, 861 F.3d 121, 142 (5th Cir. 2017)
   (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Sullivan, 578 F.2d 121, 124
   (5th Cir. 1978)). “[W]hen a defendant claims that the prosecution put false
   information before the grand jury, we ask two questions (1) did the
   government ‘knowingly []sponsor[]’ false information before the grand jury
   and (2) was that information material, that is, was the information ‘capable’
   of influencing the grand jury’s decision.” Id. (quoting United States v.
   Strouse, 286 F.3d 767, 771–72 (5th Cir. 2002)). Iglesias-Villegas speculates
   that the Government did not present accurate evidence to the grand jury due
   to its purported confusion between his identity and that of his cousin. But he
   does not allege that the Government intended to deceive the grand jury to
   the extent that any confusion existed. Without more, confusion alone does
   not amount to the knowing sponsorship of false information. Furthermore,
   his argument that the district court should have granted him access to the
   grand jury materials so he could “determine what information the
   government had presented and . . . whether the indictment had been
   influenced by any misconduct” establishes that he cannot demonstrate that
   any false information was actually presented to the grand jury. Iglesias-
   Villegas thus cannot show that a possible injustice could have been avoided. 2

           _____________________
           2
             Although not dispositive to our analysis, the materiality of this purported false
   information is also suspect. The indictment is replete with allegations regarding Iglesias-
   Villegas’s culpability that were re-alleged at trial in greater detail and bolstered by
   additional evidence. Nevertheless, during his closing arguments, Iglesias-Villegas
   continued to assert that his was a case of mistaken identity despite multiple witnesses

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                                                III.
           Iglesias-Villegas also challenges the district court’s denial of his
   motion to suppress statements that he made to DEA Special Agent Juan
   Briano while in Mexican custody.
           For a denial of a motion to suppress, we review factual findings for
   clear error and legal conclusions, including “whether Miranda’s guarantees
   have been impermissibly denied,” de novo. United States v. Nelson, 990 F.3d
   947, 952 (5th Cir. 2021). We evaluate evidence in a light most favorable to
   the party that prevailed below and will uphold the district court’s ruling “if
   there is any reasonable view of the evidence to support it.” United States v.
   Michalik, 5 F.4th 583, 588 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Michelletti,
   13 F.3d 838, 841 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc)). “Our review is ‘particularly
   deferential where denial of the suppression motion is based on live oral
   testimony because the judge had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of
   the witnesses.’” United States v. Lim, 897 F.3d 673, 685 (5th Cir. 2018)
   (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 781 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 2015)).
                                                 A.
           On April 19, 2012, shortly after the indictment in this case was filed, a
   group of agents from both the DEA and FBI interviewed Iglesias-Villegas,
   who was being held in Mexican custody after being arrested. Iglesias-Villegas
   was informed that he had been indicted and that the purpose of this meeting
   was to seek his cooperation for an interview. After some initial hesitation,
   Iglesias-Villegas began to cooperate, confirming his aliases; Delta, Delfin,
   and Dos; and admitting to working for Jose Antonio Torres Marrufo, a plaza

           _____________________
   testifying to the contrary. This theory was rejected by the petit jury, which found Iglesias-
   Villegas guilty on all counts. And Iglesias-Villegas does not challenge the petit jury’s verdict
   to the extent it rejected his mistaken identity theory.

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   boss for the Sinaloa Cartel in Juarez, Mexico. He admitted to being a sicario
   and operating a Cartel office in Juarez where there were between 30 and 35
   other sicarios under his command. He also admitted to being involved in
   three incidents that he recounted to Agent Briano and which became central
   components of the Government’s case against him at trial.
          The first incident concerned an operation ordered by Marrufo in
   which a bridegroom, his brother, and his uncle were all to be kidnapped from
   a church in Juarez during the bridegroom’s wedding and brought to another
   location where they would be interrogated and eventually killed (the
   “Wedding Murders”). Iglesias-Villegas told Agent Briano that Marrufo had
   instructed him to assist the principal coordinator of the operation, Rafael
   Figueroa-Merino. Figueroa-Merino initially wanted to kill the three men
   inside the church, but Iglesias-Villegas explained to Agent Briano that he
   disagreed with this approach due to his respect for the church and persuaded
   Figueroa-Merino to kidnap them instead.
          The second incident concerned the kidnapping of Sergio Saucedo in
   Horizon City, Texas (the “Horizon City Kidnapping”). After being
   kidnapped, Saucedo was secreted across the border to Juarez by associates of
   Gabino Salas, the plaza boss in El Valle de Juarez, Mexico. From there,
   Salas’s associates handed Saucedo over to individuals working for Marrufo
   via a roadside exchange. Iglesias-Villegas told Agent Briano that he picked up
   Marrufo and brought him to the office where Saucedo was being held so that
   Saucedo could be interviewed by Marrufo. After the interview, Saucedo was
   killed and several sicarios “dump[ed] the corpse in Ciudad Juarez.”
          The third incident involved the murder of two men, one of whom was
   an FBI informant, at an Xtreme Car Wash in Juarez (the “Xtreme Car Wash
   Murders”); Marrufo had instructed Iglesias-Villegas to arrange for the
   murders. The murders were reported by the Mexican news media and later

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   confirmed in greater detail at trial. Iglesias-Villegas provided Agent Briano
   with further details of Marrufo’s operations regarding smuggling drugs into
   the United States, smuggling cash from drug proceeds back into Mexico, and
   Marrufo’s source for assault weapons. And he described the relationships he
   had with contacts in Mexican law enforcement with whom he shared
   information about rival cartels. Specifically, Iglesias-Villegas recalled riding
   around Mexico with his contacts in their state-issued vehicles and
   coordinating with them to frame rival cartels.
           Before trial, Iglesias-Villegas moved to suppress the statements he
   made during his interview with Agent Briano. At the suppression hearing,
   Iglesias-Villegas testified 3 that on March 17, 2012, he was arrested by
   Mexican federal police, handcuffed, and moved into an unmarked car so that
   he could be transported to the prosecutor’s office. While in this car, he
   claimed that the police beat him on the side of his ribs with their rifles and
   smacked him with their open hands on his neck. Once they had arrived at the
   office, he was told that his mother and wife would be arrested if he did not
   sign documents that were presented to him. He testified that he signed the
   documents without having an opportunity to review them because he “felt
   cornered” and that his mother and wife would be “in the crosshairs” of
   Mexican authorities otherwise. Iglesias-Villegas was then taken to a hotel,
   where he was detained for over a month. While detained at the hotel, he
   shared a room with four other people who had been arrested and was only
   allowed to leave the room to eat. He was in line to receive a visit from his

           _____________________
           3
             Iglesias-Villegas only testified for the purpose of his motion to suppress. See
   Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (“[W]hen a defendant testifies in
   support of a motion to suppress evidence on Fourth Amendment grounds, his testimony
   may not thereafter be admitted against him at trial on the issue of guilt unless he makes no
   objection.”); United States v. Harrison, 461 F.2d 1127, 1131–32 (5th Cir. 1972) (applying
   Simmons’s reasoning to the Fifth Amendment).

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   mother and wife when he was notified by an agent that he was to go to the
   prosecutor’s office. Iglesias-Villegas was then taken out of line, handcuffed,
   and driven to the office; he was not told why he was being taken there.
          When Iglesias-Villegas arrived at the prosecutor’s office, the
   prosecutor informed him that U.S. agents wanted to speak with him. No one
   ever asked if he wanted to speak with the agents. He testified that he felt as if
   he had no choice and would be beaten again if he refused. He was eventually
   escorted into an office with glass walls and sat at the head of a long table alone
   with the U.S. agents. One of the U.S. agents then attempted to close the door
   but was stopped by a Mexican agent looking after Iglesias-Villegas. The door
   was kept open throughout the interview while the Mexican agent sat outside
   beside the door and within earshot. Iglesias-Villegas admitted that no threats
   or promises were ever made by any of the agents, and he agreed that he was
   “treated with respect.” Agent Briano testified that the agents attempted to
   read Iglesias-Villegas his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
   (1966), and “explain . . . what his U.S. Constitutional rights were in the
   United States” but that Iglesias-Villegas said he “didn’t want to hear it” and
   “scoffed and backed off the seat.” Iglesias-Villegas disputes that he was ever
   given Miranda warnings and testified that he was never provided with a form
   explaining his extraterritorial rights. The interview lasted no longer than an
   hour and a half and was terminated by Iglesias-Villegas, who said that he
   would continue to cooperate after speaking with his attorneys. Iglesias-
   Villegas was released from Mexican custody on May 6, 2012, about two-and-
   a-half weeks after the interview.
          Iglesias-Villegas argues that the statements he made during this
   interview should have been suppressed pursuant to the Fifth Amendment
   because they were given involuntarily and because he was not adequately
   advised of his Miranda rights.

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                                          B.
          “Whether a confession is admissible or not turns on whether it was
   made voluntarily.” United States v. Cantu-Ramirez, 669 F.3d 619, 624 (5th
   Cir. 2012). An individual makes an involuntary statement if, due to state
   action, see Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986), “his will has been
   overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired,”
   Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 225 (1973). A court considers
   whether a confession was voluntary based on a totality of the circumstances,
   which include the length of detention, length of questioning and its location,
   the use of physical punishment, and whether the accused is informed of his
   constitutional rights. Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680, 693–94 (1993);
   Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 226.
          Here, Iglesias-Villegas contends that his confession was a product of
   coercion. He argues that he would not have submitted to the interview with
   U.S. agents if given a choice. Additionally, he asserts that he was fearful of an
   “impending threat of violence” by Mexican law enforcement if he did not
   engage with Agent Briano’s questions. But we fail to see such a threat.
   Iglesias-Villegas concedes that he had not been beaten by Mexican law
   enforcement since his arrest, which occurred over a month prior to the
   interview. By the time of his interview, too much time had elapsed from the
   initial beating for Iglesias-Villegas to credibly fear retaliation for failing to
   engage with the U.S. agents. He does not allege that he was beaten or
   threatened by Mexican authorities since his arrest. Without more, we cannot
   conclude that there was a looming threat of violence if Iglesias-Villegas chose
   not to cooperate with the U.S. agents. Other facts surrounding the interview
   support this conclusion. Iglesias-Villegas never evinced any fear of the U.S.
   agents conducting the interview; indeed, he acknowledged that they treated
   him with respect. We also credit the district court’s finding that Iglesias-
   Villegas was advised of his extraterritorial rights and that his testimony to the

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   contrary was not credible. Furthermore, he terminated the interview on his
   own volition by stating that he would like to speak with his attorneys before
   continuing, demonstrating both that he was cognizant of his rights and felt
   comfortable exercising them. And although a Mexican agent remained within
   earshot of the interview, Iglesias-Villegas cannot point to any evidence that
   this amounted to anything more than a standard security measure. Lastly,
   there is no indication that anything else concerning the environment in which
   the interview occurred, i.e., the location or duration of the interview, was
   inherently coercive. Accordingly, considering the totality of the
   circumstances, we hold that Iglesias-Villegas’s confession was voluntary.
                                         C.
          Miranda warnings are necessary during a custodial interrogation for a
   suspect’s statements to later be admissible in compliance with the Fifth
   Amendment. United States v. Coulter, 41 F.4th 451, 456 (5th Cir. 2022). “A
   suspect is . . . ‘in custody’ for Miranda purposes when placed under formal
   arrest or when a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have
   understood the situation to constitute a restraint on freedom of movement of
   the degree which the law associates with formal arrest.” United States v.
   Wright, 777 F.3d 769, 774 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting United States v. Bengivenga,
   845 F.2d 593, 596 (5th Cir. 1988)). Put more succinctly: “would a reasonable
   person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation
   and leave.” Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 112 (1995). “‘[W]hether a
   suspect is “in custody” is an objective inquiry’ that ‘depends on the “totality
   of the circumstances.”’” Wright, 777 F.3d at 774–75 (alteration in original)
   (citation omitted) (first quoting J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 270
   (2011); and then quoting United States v. Cavazos, 668 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir.
   2012)). Although “no one fact is determinative,” we have “repeatedly
   considered certain key details when analyzing whether an individual was or
   was not in custody,” including “the length of the questioning”; “the location

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   of the questioning”; “the accusatory, or non-accusatory, nature of the
   questioning”; “the amount of restraint on the individual’s physical
   movement”; and “statements made by officers regarding the individual’s
   freedom to move or leave.” Id. at 775.
          In Howes v. Fields, the Supreme Court ruled that “imprisonment alone
   is not enough to create a custodial situation within the meaning of Miranda.”
   565 U.S. 499, 510–11 (2012). Three reasons undergirded the Court’s holding
   in Howes: (1) “[i]n the paradigmatic Miranda situation . . . detention
   represents a sharp and ominous change, and the shock may give rise to
   coercive pressures,” whereas “a person who is already serving a term of
   imprisonment . . . usually [experiences] no such change” due to their already
   being acclimated to the “ordinary,” albeit “unpleasant,” restrictions of
   prison life at the time of the interrogation; (2) “a prisoner, unlike a person
   who has not been sentenced to a term of incarceration, is unlikely to be lured
   into speaking by a longing for prompt release”; and (3) “a prisoner, unlike a
   person who has not been convicted and sentenced, knows that the law
   enforcement officers who question him probably lack the authority to affect
   the duration of his sentence.” Id. at 511–12.
          Iglesias-Villegas argues that Howes is inapplicable to his case, making
   the conclusory assertion that he had good reason to think that speaking with
   U.S. agents would affect the conditions and length of his custody and
   pointing to his release 17 days later. But his invocation of subjective beliefs
   and post-hoc rationalizations are unavailing. Iglesias-Villegas’s detention was
   sufficiently analogous to the detention contemplated in Howes that it, without
   more, cannot be adjudged as per se custodial for the purpose of Miranda. A
   reasonable person would be aware that U.S. agents likely lack the authority
   to effect a release from detention from an independent sovereign.
   Consequently, despite not being sentenced to a term of years, there would be
   little incentive for a reasonable person in Iglesias-Villegas’s carceral state to

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   be lured into speaking in the hope of securing his prompt release. And an
   individual who is placed in detention for over a month (and given no
   indication as to when or whether he will be released) more closely resembles
   a prisoner serving a term of years that is already acclimated to prison life
   rather than the paradigmatic Miranda suspect who has yet to adjust to the
   sharp and ominous change of being newly detained.
          The remaining circumstances surrounding the interview support a
   determination that Iglesias-Villegas was not in custody. Despite originally not
   being given a choice to attend the interview, Iglesias-Villegas was informed
   of his extraterritorial rights, including that he did not have to speak with the
   U.S. agents, and that if he decided to answer their questions, he had the right
   to stop answering questions at any time. See Howes, 565 U.S. at 514–15
   (although “respondent did not invite the interview,” this was “[m]ost
   important[ly]” offset by him being told that “he could leave and go back to
   his cell whenever he wanted”); Coulter, 41 F.4th at 461 (“[A]ssurances that
   a suspect ‘[is] not under arrest and that he [is] free to leave’ weigh in favor
   of determining that a suspect is not in custody.” (second and third alterations
   in original) (quoting Wright, 777 F.3d at 777)). He later evinced an
   understanding of those rights when he terminated the interview on his own
   and stated that he would like to speak with his attorneys before continuing
   further. And the U.S. agents treated him with respect throughout the
   interview, which lasted no longer than 90 minutes and took place in a non-
   hostile office environment. See Howes, 565 U.S. at 515 (suspect-prisoner was
   not in custody where interview lasted between five and seven hours and
   occurred in a “well-lit, average-sized conference room”); see also United
   States v. Arellano-Banuelos, 927 F.3d 355, 361–63 (5th Cir. 2019) (inmate
   serving state prison sentence not in custody while being interviewed by ICE
   agents where he was not told before arriving that he could decline the
   interview or was otherwise free to leave, was not provided with full Miranda

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   warnings but was told that his statement had to be voluntary and that the
   interview would terminate if he chose not to speak with the ICE agents, was
   treated with respect by the ICE agents, and was told by those agents that the
   time he might spend in ICE detention might be reduced if he cooperated). 4
                                               IV.
           Shows Urquidi argues that numerous Government exhibits were
   either inadmissible due to their irrelevance or unduly prejudicial nature
   under Federal Rules of Evidence 402 and 403, respectively. He concedes,
   however, that he did not object to the admissibility of most of these exhibits
   during the trial.
           Evidentiary holdings subject to timely objections are reviewed for an
   abuse of discretion. United States v. Garcia, 530 F.3d 348, 351 (5th Cir. 2008).
   “However, the standard for assigning error under Rule 403 is ‘especially
   high’ and requires a showing of a ‘clear abuse of discretion.’” United States

           _____________________
           4
             The parties disagree as to whether Iglesias-Villegas was handcuffed during the
   interview, and the district court did not make a finding regarding this fact. But whether
   Iglesias-Villegas was restrained is not dispositive to our analysis, and we would come to the
   same conclusion regardless. See Howes, 565 U.S. at 509 (“Our cases make clear . . . that the
   freedom-of-movement test identifies only a necessary and not a sufficient condition for
   Miranda custody.” (quoting Maryland v. Shatzer, 559 U.S. 98, 112 (2010))); Dolph v. Davis,
   765 F. App’x 986, 991 (5th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (“[T]here is no clearly established law
   that Miranda warnings must be given whenever an individual is handcuffed.”).
            Iglesias-Villegas also contends that his statements must be excluded under United
   States v. Heller, which held that a statement made in foreign custody without Miranda
   warnings must be excluded if (1) “the conduct of the foreign officers shocks the conscience
   of the American court,” or (2) “American officials participated in the foreign search or
   interrogation, or if the foreign authorities were acting as agents for their American
   counterparts.” 625 F.2d 594, 599 (5th Cir. 1980). As we explained earlier in our
   voluntariness analysis, see supra Part III.B, the conduct of Mexican law enforcement with
   respect to the interview does not shock the conscience of this court; the totality of the
   circumstances renders Iglesias-Villegas’s confession voluntary. We have likewise just
   concluded that Iglesias-Villegas was not in custody for the purpose of Miranda.

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   v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 716 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United States v. Setser,
   568 F.3d 482, 495 (5th Cir. 2009)). “Rare is the appellant who can make that
   showing.” Id. “Importantly, we have cautioned that ‘Rule 403 . . . is an
   extraordinary measure because it permits a trial court to exclude concededly
   probative evidence, and thus it should be used sparingly.’” United States v.
   Clark, 577 F.3d 273, 287 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Caldwell,
   820 F.2d 1395, 1404 (5th Cir. 1987)). “Accordingly, ‘[w]hen reviewing this
   exercise of discretion, we must look at the evidence in the light most favorable
   to the proponent, maximizing its probative value and minimizing its
   prejudicial effect.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Caldwell, 820 F.2d at
   1404).
            Unpreserved evidentiary challenges are reviewed for plain error.
   United States v. Richard, 775 F.3d 287, 295 (5th Cir. 2014). “This court finds
   plain error when: (1) there was an error; (2) the error was clear and obvious;
   and (3) the error affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” United States
   v. Jasso, 587 F.3d 706, 709 (5th Cir. 2009) (quoting United States v. Villegas,
   404 F.3d 355, 358–59 (5th Cir. 2005)). Even if these three prongs are
   satisfied, whether the error must be remedied is subject to our discretion—
   this discretion need only be exercised “if the error ‘seriously affect[s] the
   fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Puckett v.
   United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting
   United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)). It is Shows Urquidi’s
   burden to establish plain error. United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S.
   74, 82 (2004).
            Evidence is relevant if it (1) “has any tendency to make a fact more or
   less probable than it would be without the evidence” and (2) “the fact is of
   consequence in determining the action.” Fed. R. Evid. 401. Irrelevant
   evidence is inadmissible. Fed. R. Evid. 402. “The court may exclude
   relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a

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   danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues,
   misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting
   cumulative evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403.
          At trial, Shows Urquidi objected to the admissibility of three
   photographs pursuant to Rule 403. The first two photographs, Exhibits 33-a
   and 33-b, depict the corpse of a confidential source for the DEA, Edgar Ariel
   Avalos, who agreed to cooperate against Marrufo and was later killed during
   the Xtreme Car Wash Murders. Both photographs show Avalos’s bullet-
   riddled body contorted on the floor of a garage with a large amount of blood
   pooled around his head. Exhibit 33-b is a closeup photograph depicting the
   same image as Exhibit 33-a. The third photograph, Exhibit 24-o, depicts the
   dead body of Alonso Sotelo, a friend of the groom who was gunned down as
   he tried to escape during the Wedding Murders. In the photograph, Sotelo is
   lying face up on the ground with a bloodied face and arm.
          Shows Urquidi now contends that additional evidence should not
   have been admitted. For example, he cites photographs depicting the body of
   a dead waiter who had his finger severed and placed in his mouth after he was
   suspected of losing $250,000 of the Cartel’s cocaine. The man who killed the
   waiter testified that the finger was severed to signal that he was a thief, and it
   was placed in his mouth to show that he was cooperating with the U.S.
   government. Shows Urquidi also points to a photograph of Sergio Saucedo
   following the Horizon City Kidnapping. In that photograph, Saucedo is lying
   dead on the ground with his severed arms placed on top of his chest. The
   other photographs that Shows Urquidi now contests are similarly graphic. He
   also challenges multiple pieces of testimony, including that of the father of
   the groom who gave his account of the Wedding Murders. Shows Urquidi
   asserts that all of this evidence—both the evidence he originally objected to
   and that which he challenges for the first time on appeal—was not relevant

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   to the crimes for which he was on trial and was otherwise unnecessarily
   cumulative and unfairly prejudicial.
          We disagree. First, because Shows Urquidi challenges this evidence’s
   relevancy for the first time on appeal, he must establish that its admission on
   this basis was plainly erroneous, which he fails to do. He does not contend
   that this evidence was wholly irrelevant, but that it was merely irrelevant to
   the case as it pertained to him. Specifically, he does not assert that this
   evidence was irrelevant to the Government’s case against Iglesias-Villegas,
   who notably makes no such assertion on his own. Indeed, it appears that the
   crux of Shows Urquidi’s argument is that he was tried together with Iglesias-
   Villegas, i.e., that evidence relevant only to the case against Iglesias-Villegas
   could be presented in such close proximity to the case against Shows Urquidi,
   an issue he raises separately and which we address in Part VI infra.
          Second, it was not clearly—or plainly—erroneous for the district
   court to conclude that the probative value of this evidence was not
   substantially outweighed by it being overly cumulative or unfairly prejudicial.
   The photographic evidence was critical in proving many of the counts of the
   indictment. And it supported one of the principal theories of the
   Government’s case: that the Sinaloa Cartel utilized extreme forms of
   violence as a means of achieving its objectives via intimidation. Nor was it
   cumulative as it provided support to witness testimony. See United States v.
   Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 325 (5th Cir. 2022) (“gruesome” photographs were
   admissible where they had “nontrivial probative value” in that they helped
   prove overt acts committed in furtherance of a conspiracy, lent support to
   testimony, and established the violence of the crimes committed). The
   challenged testimony—which is all subject to plain error review—likewise
   provided the jury with a unique and important perspective as to the Cartel’s
   violence that would otherwise have been solely portrayed through the

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   testimony of the perpetrators. The value of this testimony thus outweighed
   any risk of unfair prejudice or having an overly cumulative effect.
                                         V.
          Defendants each challenge the sufficiency of the evidence: Shows
   Urquidi as to Count I, and Iglesias-Villegas as to Counts IV, VI, and VII.
          Properly preserved challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are
   reviewed de novo, but our review is “highly deferential to the verdict.” United
   States v. Beacham, 774 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v.
   Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 835 (5th Cir.2014)). The evidence will be deemed
   sufficient unless no “rational jury, viewing the evidence in the light most
   favorable to the prosecution, could have found the essential elements of the
   offense to be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt. In reviewing the evidence
   presented at trial, we draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the jury’s
   verdict.” Id. (quoting United States v. Miles, 360 F.3d 472, 476–77 (5th Cir.
   2004)). The jury, however, “retains the sole authority to weigh any
   conflicting evidence and to evaluate the credibility of witnesses.” United
   States v. Scott, 892 F.3d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting United States v.
   Grant, 683 F.3d 639, 642 (5th Cir. 2012)).
          If a defendant fails to renew a motion for acquittal after the jury’s
   verdict, then we will only reverse the verdict if there is a “‘manifest
   miscarriage of justice,’ which occurs only where ‘the record is devoid of
   evidence pointing to guilt’ or the evidence is so tenuous that a conviction is
   ‘shocking.’” United States v. Oti, 872 F.3d 678, 686 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting
   United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 331 (5th Cir. 2012) (en banc)).
          Both Defendants moved for a judgment of acquittal following the
   conclusion of the Government’s case-in-chief. Because Iglesias-Villegas
   failed to renew his motion after he presented evidence, his issues are
   reviewed for a manifest miscarriage of justice. Shows Urquidi did not present

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   evidence. Accordingly, we review Shows Urquidi’s challenge to the
   sufficiency of the evidence de novo. United States v. Daniels, 723 F.3d 562, 569
   (5th Cir. 2013) (Defendants “did not need to renew their Rule 29 motions in
   order to preserve their challenges because they did not present evidence.”).
                                         A.
          Shows Urquidi was convicted on Count I for Racketeering Conspiracy
   pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d), which criminalizes conspiring to violate any
   of the RICO Act’s substantive provisions, i.e., subsections (a) through (c) of
   § 1962. Under the RICO Act’s third substantive provision, it is “unlawful for
   any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the
   activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or
   participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise’s affairs
   through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.” 18
   U.S.C. § 1962(c). “Racketeering activity” includes state law offenses
   punishable by imprisonment for more than one year such as murder,
   kidnapping, and dealing in a controlled substance, and federal offenses
   involving money laundering and narcotics violations. Id. § 1961(1). An
   “enterprise”     “includes    any   individual,    partnership,   corporation,
   association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals
   associated in fact although not a legal entity.” Id. § 1961(4). A “pattern of
   racketeering activity” “requires at least two acts of racketeering
   activity . . . the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period
   of imprisonment) after the commission of a prior act of racketeering
   activity.” Id. § 1961(5).
          “To prove a RICO conspiracy the government must establish (1) that
   two or more people agreed to commit a substantive RICO offense and (2)
   that the defendant knew of and agreed to the overall objective of the RICO
   offense.” United States v. Posada-Rios, 158 F.3d 832, 857 (5th Cir. 1998).

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   “The government is not required to prove a conspiracy through direct
   evidence. Because conspirators normally attempt to conceal their conduct,
   the elements of a conspiracy offense may be established solely by
   circumstantial evidence.” Id. “The agreement, a defendant’s guilty
   knowledge and a defendant’s participation in the conspiracy all may be
   inferred from the ‘development and collocation of circumstances.’” Id.
   (quoting United States v. Maltos, 985 F.2d 743, 746 (5th Cir. 1992)).
          Although a defendant’s mere presence at the scene of a crime
          is not, by itself, sufficient to support a finding that the
          defendant is participating in a conspiracy, presence and
          association may be considered by the jury along with other
          evidence in finding that the defendant participated in a
          conspiracy.
   Id. at 857–58. “Moreover, a defendant may be convicted of a conspiracy if
   the evidence shows that he only participated at one level of the conspiracy
   charged in the indictment, and only played a minor role in the conspiracy.”
   Id. at 858.
          Shows Urquidi maintains that the Government failed to prove that he
   had knowledge of and agreed to the overall objective of the RICO offense. He
   contends that any illicit activities he committed were for his sole economic
   benefit and that the Government failed to connect him, either by his activities
   or affiliations, to the Sinaloa Cartel.
          The evidence adduced at trial, though, was more than sufficient to
   prove his knowledge of and agreement to the Cartel’s objectives. Multiple
   witnesses identified Shows Urquidi as a member of the Sinaloa Cartel.
   Further testimony described Shows Urquidi frequenting locations as well as
   parties and meetings where attendance was restricted to Cartel members.
   During these meetings, Cartel members discussed business strategy and the
   Cartel’s operations. Multiple witnesses also recounted that Shows Urquidi

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   would help guard tanker trucks full of drugs being transported for the Cartel;
   take shifts guarding, arranging, and packaging cocaine in Cartel offices; and
   would observe as cocaine, weapons, and money were loaded onto trucks at
   Cartel offices for transport. Other testimony established that Shows Urquidi
   would kidnap, murder, and dispose of bodies for the Cartel as well.
          Shows Urquidi’s membership and participation in meetings and
   parties for the Sinaloa Cartel demonstrates that he had knowledge of its
   objectives. And his support for the Cartel through, inter alia, acting as a
   guard, packaging cocaine, and committing violent acts is sufficient to affirm
   his § 1962(d) conviction. See United States v. Velasquez, 881 F.3d 314, 332
   (5th Cir. 2018) (per curiam) (defendants had knowledge of and agreed to the
   overall objectives of the RICO enterprise where they were members of the
   enterprise and participated in its meetings and decisions to murder
   individuals and distribute drugs); United States v. Nieto, 721 F.3d 357, 369
   (5th Cir. 2013) (membership in RICO enterprise and participation in
   predicate acts conforming to the enterprise’s known enforcement methods
   were sufficient); United States v. Delgado, 401 F.3d 290, 296 (5th Cir. 2005)
   (sufficient evidence where defendant was a member of the RICO enterprise,
   attended meetings where drug operations were discussed, and directed and
   participated in predicate acts). Shows Urquidi’s argument that he acted in
   his own self-interest is unavailing. Even if he acted partly in his own self-
   interest, there is no doubt that he also provided various forms of support to
   the Cartel while knowing that his support would further its objectives. See
   Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 64 (1997) (“If conspirators have a plan
   which calls for some conspirators to perpetrate the crime and others to
   provide support, the supporters are as guilty as the perpetrators.”). That he
   engaged in this support partly for personal gain is far from unique for a
   convicted § 1962(d) conspirator.

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                                          B.
                                          1.
          Iglesias-Villegas was convicted on Count IV for Conspiracy to
   Launder Monetary Instruments pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(A) and
   (h). Under § 1956(a)(2)(A), it is unlawful to
          transport[], transmit[], or transfer[], or attempt[] to transport,
          transmit, or transfer a monetary instrument or funds from a
          place in the United States to or through a place outside the
          United States or to a place in the United States from or through
          a place outside the United States . . . with the intent to promote
          the carrying on of specified unlawful activity.
   Section 1956(h) makes it unlawful to conspire to violate § 1956(a)(2)(A).
   Section 1956(h) consists of two elements: “(i) ‘that there was an agreement
   between two or more persons to commit money laundering’; and (ii) ‘that
   the defendant joined the agreement knowing its purpose and with the intent
   to further the illegal purpose.’” United States v. Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 601
   (5th Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Fuchs, 467 F.3d 889, 906 (5th Cir.
   2006)). “Direct evidence of a conspiracy is unnecessary; each element may
   be inferred from circumstantial evidence.” Fuchs, 467 F.3d at 906 (quoting
   United States v. Casilla, 20 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir. 1994)). “An agreement
   may be inferred from a ‘concert of action.’” Id. (quoting Casilla, 20 F.3d at
   603). “Once the government presents evidence of a conspiracy, it only needs
   to produce slight evidence to connect an individual to the conspiracy.”
   United States v. Virgen-Moreno, 265 F.3d 276, 285 (5th Cir. 2001).
          Here, the trial record is not devoid of evidence pointing to Iglesias-
   Villegas’s guilt, nor is his conviction shocking. Iglesias-Villegas was an active
   member of the Sinaloa Cartel. He was also familiar with its money-laundering
   operations as shown by his discussions with Agent Briano. Cartel offices were
   often used to store laundered money, and Iglesias-Villegas was in charge of

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   one of these offices. Furthermore, one witness placed him in a Cartel office
   being used for this purpose. Accordingly, his conviction on this count was not
   a manifest miscarriage of justice.
                                              2.
           Iglesias-Villegas was convicted on Counts VI and VII for violations of
   the Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering Activity (“VICAR”) statute, 18
   U.S.C. § 1959. He was convicted on Count VII pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2 for
   aiding and abetting as well. 5 Both convictions were for his role in the
   kidnapping and murder of Sergio Saucedo in the Horizon City Kidnapping.
           The VICAR statute states:
           Whoever, as consideration for the receipt of, or as
           consideration for a promise or agreement to pay, anything of
           pecuniary value from an enterprise engaged in racketeering
           activity, or for the purpose of gaining entrance to or
           maintaining or increasing position in an enterprise engaged in
           racketeering activity, murders, kidnaps, maims, assaults with a
           dangerous weapon, commits assault resulting in serious bodily
           injury upon, or threatens to commit a crime of violence against
           any individual in violation of the laws of any State or the United
           States, or attempts or conspires so to do, shall be punished . . . .
   18 U.S.C. § 1959(a). To secure a VICAR conviction, five elements must be
   proven:
           that (1) an enterprise existed; (2) the enterprise engaged in, or
           its activities affected, interstate commerce; (3) it was engaged
           in racketeering activity; (4) the defendant committed violent
           crimes; and (5) the defendant committed the violent crimes to

           _____________________
           5
               The convictions were also pursuant to various provisions of the Texas Penal
   Code.

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          gain entrance to, or maintain or increase his position in, the
          enterprise.
   United States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 320 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting United
   States v. Jones, 873 F.3d 482, 492 (5th Cir. 2017)). Section 2 states that
   whoever aids or abets an offense against the United States is punishable as a
   principal. 18 U.S.C. § 2(a). “[A] person is liable under § 2 for aiding and
   abetting a crime if (and only if) he (1) takes an affirmative act in furtherance
   of the offense, (2) with the intent of facilitating the offense’s commission.”
   United States v. Carbins, 882 F.3d 557, 563–64 (5th Cir. 2018) (alteration in
   original) (quoting Rosemond v. United States, 572 U.S. 65, 71 (2014)).
          For Count VI, Iglesias-Villegas contends that the Government failed
   to show that he entered into an agreement with the other Cartel members
   who conspired to murder Saucedo. For Count VII, he similarly asserts that
   there was no evidence that he either murdered or aided and abetted in the
   murder of Saucedo. We disagree; the record was not devoid of evidence to
   support either conviction, i.e., there was no manifest miscarriage of justice.
   Iglesias-Villegas provided Agent Briano with details concerning the Horizon
   City Kidnapping, including that he complied with instructions from
   Marrufo—who coordinated the Horizon City Kidnapping—to drive him to
   the office where Saucedo was being interrogated and admitted that he
   assisted in disposing Saucedo’s body. While he was being held by the Cartel,
   Saucedo was kept for multiple days at Iglesias-Villegas’s office, where he was
   interrogated by Marrufo. Further testimony showed that Iglesias-Villegas
   had arranged for his office to be used for similar interrogations on other
   occasions and that individuals who were interrogated in Cartel offices were
   often subsequently executed. Iglesias-Villegas’s agreement can be
   established through hosting Saucedo’s interrogation by keeping him at his
   office, bringing Marrufo to the interrogation, and his general knowledge
   regarding how the Cartel handled matters akin to the Horizon City

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   Kidnapping. Iglesias-Villegas knew that it was likely that Saucedo would be
   murdered after such an interrogation. Iglesias-Villegas’s actions here—
   hosting the interrogation, transporting Marrufo, and burying Saucedo—
   satisfy aiding and abetting as well.
                                          VI.
          Shows Urquidi contends that the district court erred by failing to sua
   sponte sever his trial from that of Iglesias-Villegas. Because Shows Urquidi
   raises this issue for the first time on appeal, we review the ruling below for
   plain error. See United States v. Vasquez, 899 F.3d 363, 371–73 (5th Cir. 2018).
          “If the joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment . . . or a
   consolidation for trial appears to prejudice a defendant . . . , the court may
   order separate trials of counts, sever the defendants’ trials, or provide any
   other relief that justice requires.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). Typically,
   outside of plain error review, “we review the decision not to sever ‘under the
   exceedingly deferential abuse of discretion standard’”; “as a substantive
   matter, our caselaw does not reflect a ‘liberal attitude toward severance.’”
   United States v. Ledezma-Cepeda, 894 F.3d 686, 690 (5th Cir. 2018) (first
   quoting United States v. Chapman, 851 F.3d 363, 379 (5th Cir. 2017); and then
   quoting United States v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806, 822 (5th Cir. 2012)). There is
   a presumption favoring joint trials “stem[ming] from the belief that
   ‘[d]efendants who are indicted together should generally be tried together,
   particularly in conspiracy cases,’ because joint trials ‘promote efficiency’ and
   protect against the ‘inequity of inconsistent verdicts.’” Id. (second alteration
   in original) (footnote omitted) (first quoting United States v. Musquiz, 45 F.3d
   927, 931 (5th Cir. 1995); and then quoting Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S.
   534, 537 (1993)). “To surmount this heavy presumption, a defendant must
   show that ‘(1) the joint trial prejudiced him to such an extent that the district
   court could not provide adequate protection; and (2) the prejudice

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   outweighed       the   government’s    interest     in   economy    of   judicial
   administration.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Owens, 683 F.3d 93, 98 (5th
   Cir. 2012)).
          “To warrant vacatur, the defendant must show ‘specific and
   compelling prejudice’ resulting from the joint trial.” Chapman, 851 F.3d at
   379 (quoting Owens, 683 F.3d at 100). “[C]ompelling prejudice is not shown
   if it appears that, through use of cautionary instructions, the jury could
   reasonably separate the evidence and render impartial verdicts as to each
   defendant.” United States v. Erwin, 793 F.2d 656, 665 (5th Cir. 1986).
   “Merely alleging a ‘spillover effect’—whereby the jury imputes the
   defendant’s guilt based on evidence presented against his co-defendants—
   ‘is an insufficient predicate for a motion to sever.’” Chapman, 851 F.3d at
   379 (quoting United States v. Snarr, 704 F.3d 368, 397 (5th Cir. 2013)); see
   also United States v. Williams, 809 F.2d 1072, 1085 (5th Cir. 1987) (“The
   additional evidence adduced at joint trials does not constitute compelling
   prejudice by itself.”). “Nor is it sufficient for a defendant to allege they were
   less involved than other defendants.” United States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 343
   (5th Cir. 2022). “[I]n conspiracy cases we generally favor specific
   instructions over severance.” Ledezma-Cepeda, 894 F.3d at 690; see also id.
   (“[d]efendants who are indicted together should generally be tried together,
   particularly in conspiracy cases” (alteration in original) (quoting Musquiz, 45
   F.3d at 931)).
          Here, Shows Urquidi argues that most of the evidence adduced at trial
   was exclusively targeted at the counts that were only faced by Iglesias-
   Villegas and that this evidence was particularly “graphic, emotional,
   gruesome, and gut-wrenching.” For example, Shows Urquidi points to
   testimony describing Iglesias-Villegas’s work as a sicario and his
   management of an office of 30 to 35 other sicarios that assisted the Artistas
   Asesinos, a gang-affiliated group supporting the Sinaloa Cartel, as they

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   carried out kidnappings and murders. He also cites testimony describing the
   contents of a videotape depicting men being tortured and murdered that was
   used by the Sinaloa Cartel to intimidate a rival cartel. And there was
   testimony concerning the waiter who was tortured and murdered after he was
   suspected of being responsible for the seizure of about $250,000 of cocaine
   by U.S. authorities that had belonged to the Cartel. Accompanying this
   testimony were photographs admitted into evidence showing the head of this
   man’s corpse with a bloody nose and one of his severed fingers placed in his
   mouth. See Part IV supra. These are just a few of many examples cited by
   Shows Urquidi in support of his argument that his joint trial with Iglesias-
   Villegas was compellingly prejudicial. He asserts that he was not linked to any
   of the killings or violence recounted in this evidence.
            But this is not enough to demonstrate plain error. Here, the purported
   error is a spillover effect—an insufficient basis for reversal, even if our review
   was not limited to plain error. Chapman, 851 F.3d at 379. The jury
   instructions also sufficiently cured any spillover risk. As relevant here, the
   jury instructions read:
            The case of each defendant should be considered separately
            and individually. The fact that you may find one or both of the
            accused guilty or not guilty of any of the crimes charged should
            not control your verdict as to any other crime charged. You
            must give separate consideration to the evidence as to each
            defendant.
   Furthermore, there is no authority requiring sua sponte severance on similar
   facts.
            Shows Urquidi also contends that his case is similar to two of our prior
   decisions where we reversed defendants’ convictions because their trials had
   not been severed from those of their co-defendants. But both of those cases
   are inapposite. In United States v. Erwin, we reversed a defendant’s perjury

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   convictions when the district court denied her motion for severance from a
   trial where most of the evidence concerned two kidnappings, two beatings, a
   killing, counterfeiting, and conspiracy and drug charges relating to her co-
   defendants. 793 F.2d at 656, 665–66. There, we reasoned that the charges
   brought against the defendant were only “peripherally related” to those that
   were brought against her co-defendants, and relatedly, “very little of the
   mountainous evidence was usable against her.” Id. at 666. Here, though,
   Defendants were convicted on the same five conspiracy charges, see Ledezma-
   Cepeda, 894 F.3d at 690, requiring many of the same witnesses and evidence.
   Additionally, the difference between the severity of the crimes under which
   Defendants were indicted is not as great as it was in Erwin.
          Nor is our case akin to United States v. McRae, 702 F.3d 806 (5th Cir.
   2012). In that case, David Warren was tried before a jury for killing Henry
   Glover while Warren was a rookie officer in the New Orleans Police
   Department in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Id. at 811–17. Warren was
   convicted of depriving Glover of his right to be free from the use of
   unreasonable force by a law enforcement officer and carrying, using, and
   discharging a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence resulting in an
   individual’s death; the jury also found that the second offense constituted
   voluntary manslaughter. Id. at 817. Warren had been tried alongside four
   other officers for their roles in covering up Glover’s killing; only two of the
   four officers were convicted. One of the convicted officers, Gregory McRae,
   was convicted, inter alia, of depriving Glover’s descendants and survivors of
   the right to access courts to seek legal redress for a harm, obstruction of a
   federal investigation, and use of fire to commit a felony in connection with
   his driving Glover’s body into a secluded area, burning Glover’s body, and
   leaving his charred remains to be discovered two weeks later. Id. at 817–18.
   The other officer, Travis McCabe, was convicted of obstruction of a federal
   investigation by falsifying a police report, making false statements to the FBI

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   concerning the report, and making false statements to the grand jury
   concerning the report, after the government asserted at trial that he had
   replaced a police report that was less favorable to Warren with one that
   justified his shooting Glover. Id. at 819.
          Warren argued that the district court erred in denying his motions to
   sever. Id. at 822. We agreed, highlighting three forms of prejudice that
   limiting instructions could not cure:
          (1) the marginal relationship between the charge and the
          evidence against Warren and that against his co-defendants;
          (2) the significant difference between the simpleness of the
          underlying charges—essentially use of excessive force—
          against Warren, in the performance of his duty as a police
          officer, and the crimes alleged against his co-defendants
          involving dishonesty, corruption, obstruction and cover-up;
          (3) the highly inflammatory and prejudicial nature of the
          charges and evidence against the co-defendants, from which
          Warren was disassociated, involving the burning Glover’s
          body . . . , [a] racially motivated beating . . . ; and the alleged
          alteration and distortion of a police investigative report
          convince us that the district court abused its discretion.
   Id. at 828. We also noted that both the nature of the evidence and the
   government’s presentation made it appear as if Warren was part of a
   conspiracy with his co-defendants to minimize the wrongfulness of his
   conduct, even though the government did not connect him to the coverup or
   charge any of the defendants with conspiracy. Id. at 826. Here, though,
   Defendants were indicted and convicted on five overlapping conspiracy
   counts. And relatedly, the differences between the charges and underlying
   facts faced by Defendants are not as stark as they were in McRae.
          In our case, the prejudice was not so compelling to overcome the
   presumption favoring a joint trial as in Erwin or McRae. In neither case was

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   reversal solely based on a spillover effect; the charges against the defendants
   in both cases were markedly dissimilar from those of their respective co-
   defendants. And notably, the defendants in both cases moved for a severance
   below. In neither case did we rule that the district court erred in failing to
   sever the defendant’s trial sua sponte.
            Therefore, the failure to sever sua sponte here did not amount to plain
   error.
                                           VII.
            Shows Urquidi argues that his conviction on Count I, Racketeering
   Conspiracy, was subject to a fatal variance because his conviction was based
   on evidence of multiple conspiracies despite the indictment alleging only one
   underlying conspiracy.
            “Fatal variance claims . . . are the right ‘not to be tried en masse for the
   conglomeration of distinct and separate offenses committed by others.’”
   United States v. Gallardo-Trapero, 185 F.3d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 1999) (quoting
   Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 775 (1946)). For this reason, a
   material variance occurs when evidence presented at trial proved multiple
   conspiracies, while the indictment alleged only a single conspiracy. United
   States v. Morris, 46 F.3d 410, 414 (5th Cir. 1995). “The question of whether
   the evidence establishes the existence of a single conspiracy or multiple
   conspiracies is a question of fact for the jury.” United States v. Beacham, 774
   F.3d 267, 273 (5th Cir. 2014). “We will affirm the jury’s finding that the
   government proved a single conspiracy ‘unless the evidence and all
   reasonable inferences, examined in the light most favorable to the
   government, would preclude reasonable jurors from finding a single
   conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Simpson, 741 F.3d
   539, 548 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Mitchell, 484 F.3d 762, 769
   (5th Cir. 2007)). Such a variance only constitutes reversible error if it

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   prejudices a defendant’s substantial rights. United States v. Richerson, 833
   F.2d 1147, 1154–55 (5th Cir. 1987). Because Shows Urquidi raises this issue
   for the first time on appeal, he must also satisfy the plain error standard. See
   United States v. McCullough, 631 F.3d 783, 793 (5th Cir. 2011).
          “The principal considerations in counting the number of conspiracies
   are (1) the existence of a common goal; (2) the nature of the scheme; and (3)
   the overlapping of the participants in the various dealings.” Simpson, 741
   F.3d at 548.
          First, the Government proved that there was a common goal. “This
   court has broadly defined the criterion of a common goal in counting
   conspiracies.” Mitchell, 484 F.3d at 770. Here, there was ample evidence of
   Cartel members, including Shows Urquidi, carrying out the Cartel’s affairs
   through a pattern of racketeering activity. That Cartel members also sought
   personal gain while engaging in Cartel business does not split the conspiracy
   as Shows Urquidi contends. See Beacham, 774 F.3d at 273 (“[I]n [Richerson,
   833 F.2d at 1153], we concluded that a common goal was shown when alleged
   co-conspirators all sought ‘personal gains’ through some participation in a
   broad conspiracy scheme.”); United States v. Gaytan, 74 F.3d 545, 552 (5th
   Cir. 1996) (“The common goal of the conspiracy was financial gain through
   the importation and distribution of cocaine from El Paso to California.”);
   Morris, 46 F.3d at 415 (“The common goal . . . was to derive personal gain
   from the illicit business of buying and selling cocaine.”).
          Second, the evidence at trial demonstrated that the nature of the
   Cartel’s business supported the existence of a single conspiracy. “[I]n
   considering the nature of the scheme, a single conspiracy ‘will be inferred
   where the activities of one aspect of the scheme are necessary or
   advantageous to the success of another aspect or to the overall success of the
   venture.’” Beacham, 774 F.3d at 274 (quoting Mitchell, 484 F.3d at 770).

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   Here, the evidence established that different individuals managed the
   Cartel’s day-to-day operations in Juarez and carried out the orders of higher
   ups; served as the Cartel’s enforcement arm and ran its local offices; loaded,
   unloaded, guarded, and packaged the Cartel’s drugs; smuggled the Cartel’s
   drugs into the United States for sale; acquired guns for the Cartel’s use;
   smuggled drug proceeds to Mexico; and stored and counted those drug
   proceeds. All of the activities listed above were done for the benefit of the
   Cartel and interdependent. And each of these activities was essential for the
   Cartel to successfully carry out its operations. See United States v. Rojas, 812
   F.3d 382, 407 (5th Cir. 2016) (“Here, the plan and the path of travel for all
   of these deals—transporting cocaine from Colombia to Central America by
   plane and then to Mexico and ultimately the United States—demonstrate
   that there was a common scheme.”).
          Third, there was an adequate overlapping of participants throughout
   the Cartel’s operations. “[T]here is no requirement that every member must
   participate in every transaction to find a single conspiracy.” Beacham, 774
   F.3d at 274 (quoting Mitchell, 484 F.3d at 770). “The more interconnected
   the various relationships are, the more likely there is a single conspiracy.” Id.
   (quoting Mitchell, 484 F.3d at 770). “A single conspiracy exists where a ‘key
   man’ is involved in and directs illegal activities, while various combinations
   of other participants exert individual efforts toward a common goal.”
   Richerson, 833 F.2d at 1154 (quoting United States v. Elam, 678 F.2d 1234,
   1246 (5th Cir. 1982)). In this case, there were two “key men” running the
   Sinaloa Cartel: El Chapo and El Mayo. They gave their orders to regional
   bosses, such as German “Paisa” Olivares-Magana and Sergio “El Coma”
   Garduno-Escobedo in Juarez. The regional bosses then disseminated the
   orders they received from the Cartel’s leaders to lower-ranking Cartel
   members, including Shows Urquidi. The trial evidence established that the

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   Cartel’s hierarchy and membership was consistent enough to satisfy this
   prong of the analysis.
           Shows Urquidi cannot overcome our review for plain error; it is clear
   to us that his conviction on Count I was based on a single conspiracy. 6
                                               VIII.
           Shows Urquidi challenges the jury instructions concerning how an
   “enterprise” was defined for Count I, Racketeering Conspiracy.
           Normally we review a challenge to jury instructions for an abuse of
   discretion. United States v. Gaspar-Felipe, 4 F.4th 330, 339 (5th Cir. 2021).
   But because Shows Urquidi did not raise an objection regarding this
   instruction below, our review is for plain error. United States v. Harris, 104
   F.3d 1465, 1471–72 (5th Cir. 1997). “Error in a charge is plain only when,
   considering the entire charge and evidence presented against the defendant,
   there is a likelihood of a grave miscarriage of justice.” United States v.
   McClatchy, 249 F.3d 348, 357 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Sellers,
   926 F.2d 410, 417 (5th Cir. 1991)). An inaccurate instruction “does not
   amount to plain error ‘unless it could have meant the difference between

           _____________________
           6
             Shows Urquidi also asserts that the district court erred in failing to instruct the
   jury on multiple conspiracies. This issue is also reviewed for plain error because Shows
   Urquidi did not raise it below. See McCullough, 631 F.3d at 793. “[A] multiple conspiracy
   instruction ‘is generally required where the indictment charges several defendants with one
   overall conspiracy, but the proof at trial indicates that a jury could reasonably conclude that
   some of the defendants were only involved in separate conspiracies unrelated to the overall
   conspiracy charge in the indictment.’” United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir.
   1991) (quoting United States v. Anguiano, 873 F.2d 1314, 1317 (9th Cir. 1989)), abrogated in
   part on other grounds, 968 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1992). Here, we have determined that a jury
   could not reasonably conclude that Shows Urquidi was involved in a separate conspiracy,
   making such an instruction unnecessary. See United States v. Devine, 934 F.2d 1325, 1342
   (5th Cir. 1991) (“[W]e have already held that a failure to instruct on multiple conspiracies
   generally does not constitute plain error.”).

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   acquittal and conviction.’” Id. (quoting United States v. Anderson, 987 F.2d
   251, 256 (5th Cir. 1993)). In reviewing jury instructions, “we examine
   ‘whether the charge, as a whole, was a correct statement of the law and
   whether it clearly instructed the jurors as to the principles of the law
   applicable to the factual issues confronting them.’” Gaspar-Felipe, 4 F.4th at
   339 (quoting United States v. Daniel, 933 F.3d 370, 379 (5th Cir. 2019)).
          A conviction for racketeering conspiracy under the RICO Act requires
   the existence of an “enterprise,” which it defines as “a group of individuals
   associated in fact.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4); id. § 1962(c). “[A]n association-in-
   fact enterprise must have at least three structural features: a purpose,
   relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity
   sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.”
   Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009). A RICO “enterprise” is
   distinct from a “pattern of racketeering activity” (another element of
   racketeering conspiracy), which is defined under the RICO Act to include at
   least two acts of “racketeering activity” (a series of criminal acts also defined
   under RICO). 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961(5), (1); id. § 1962(c); United States v.
   Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). Each is a necessary element to establish a
   racketeering conspiracy. Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged
   that “the evidence used to prove the pattern of racketeering activity and the
   evidence establishing an enterprise ‘may in particular cases coalesce,’” it has
   stressed that “proof of one does not necessarily establish the other.” Boyle,
   556 U.S. at 947 (quoting Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583).
          Here, the relevant jury instructions read:
          Although whether an enterprise existed is a distinct element
          that must be proved by the government, it is not necessary to
          find that the enterprise had some function wholly unrelated to
          the racketeering activity. Common sense dictates that the
          existence of an enterprise is oftentimes more readily proven by

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          what it does rather than by an abstract analysis of its structure.
          Thus, the evidence used to prove the pattern of racketeering
          and the enterprise may overlap. Therefore, you may consider
          proof of the racketeering acts to determine whether the
          evidence establishes the existence of an enterprise, and further,
          you may infer the existence of an enterprise from evidence of
          the pattern of racketeering activity. 7
   Shows Urquidi argues that these instructions were erroneous because they
   did not require the Government to prove that an enterprise existed separately
   from racketeering activity and conflated the proof required to prove each
   element. He also contends that the jury was improperly instructed that it
   could infer the existence of an enterprise from evidence of a pattern of
   racketeering activity.
          Shows Urquidi’s arguments are unavailing. The instructions make
   clear that “whether an enterprise existed is a distinct element that must be
   proved by the government.” The disputed language also aligns with the
   Supreme Court’s reasoning in Turkette and Boyle: it is possible for the same
   or similar pieces of evidence to be used to prove both elements. Turkette, 452
   U.S. at 583; Boyle, 556 U.S. at 947. The instructions explain that “the
   evidence used to prove the pattern of racketeering and the enterprise may
   overlap”—coalescence is thus described as a possibility, not an inevitability.
   Consequently, the instructions do not run afoul of the Supreme Court’s
   guidance as they do not suggest that proof of an enterprise necessarily
   establishes proof of a pattern of racketeering activity or vice-versa. Accord
   United States v. Perholtz, 842 F.2d 343, 362–64 (D.C. Cir. 1988); United
   States v. Pelullo, 964 F.2d 193, 211–12 (3d Cir. 1992); Ouwinga v. Benistar 419

          _____________________
          7
             These instructions largely track the sample instructions used in Kevin F.
   O’Malley et al., Fed. Jury. Prac. & Instr. Crim. Comp. Handbook
   § 32:5 (June 2022 update).

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   Plan Servs., Inc., 694 F.3d 783, 793–95 (6th Cir. 2012). These instructions
   were thus not plainly erroneous.
                                          IX.
          Iglesias-Villegas argues that the $100,000 fine he received was
   unreasonable.
          We review the reasonableness of a fine for an abuse of discretion.
   United States v. Pacheco-Alvarado, 782 F.3d 213, 220 (5th Cir. 2015). Under
   this standard, “a district court’s interpretation or application of
   the . . . Guidelines is reviewed de novo, and its factual findings . . . are
   reviewed for clear error.” Id. (quoting United States v. Cisneros–Gutierrez, 517
   F.3d 751, 764 (5th Cir. 2008)). “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous as
   long as it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” Id. (quoting United
   States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 363 (5th Cir. 2005)).
          Here, the PSR calculated a fine range of $25,000 to $10,000,000 as
   per the Sentencing Guidelines. While the PSR acknowledged Iglesias-
   Villegas’s “indigent status” and that it “appears he may not have the ability
   to pay a fine” within the Guidelines range, it suggested that the district court
   “may consider imposing a minimal fine” because he “will have ample
   opportunity to participate in the Bureau of Prison’s Inmate Financial
   Responsibility Program, which will allow him the opportunity to make
   monthly payments toward a minimal fine or any other court cost, based on
   his institutional earnings.” The district court adopted the PSR’s findings and
   imposed a $100,000 fine.
          Iglesias-Villegas contends that the court abused its discretion because
   it disregarded the PSR’s determination that he was unable to pay a fine and
   imposed a fine regardless. He asserts that his case is like United States v. Fair,
   979 F.2d 1037, 1040–42 (5th Cir. 1992), where we reversed the district
   court’s imposition of a fine. There, the district court adopted the PSR’s

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   findings and recommendations; specifically, the PSR recommended against
   imposing a fine because the defendant had no assets that could be liquidated,
   and it did not appear that he would “have the means to pay a fine on an
   installment basis after a lengthy period of incarceration.” Id. at 1040. The
   Fair Court rejected the fine imposed by the district court because “specific
   findings are necessary if the court adopts a PSR’s findings, but then decides
   to depart from the PSR’s recommendation on fines or cost of incarceration.”
   Id. at 1041. In Fair, the district court failed to provide its own findings—
   separate from those of the PSR—when it chose to depart from the PSR’s
   recommendation. See id. at 1042. In our case, though, the PSR found that
   Iglesias-Villegas could contribute to a court-imposed fine through his prison
   earnings. The record thus supports the district court’s finding that Iglesias-
   Villegas can pay a fine. This finding was therefore not clearly erroneous, and
   the district court did not abuse its discretion.
                                          X.
          The parties agree that the sentences imposed for both Defendants’
   convictions on Counts IV and V and for Iglesias-Villegas’s convictions on
   Counts VI, VIII, and X exceed their respective statutory maxima and should
   be corrected.
          “[W]e review de novo a sentence that allegedly exceeds the statutory
   maximum term.” United States v. Ferguson, 369 F.3d 847, 849 (5th Cir. 2004)
   (per curiam).
          The maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for either
   Count IV—Conspiracy to Launder Monetary Instruments or Count V—
   Conspiracy to Possess Firearms in Furtherance of any Crime of Violence or
   Drug Trafficking Crime is 20 years. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(2), 924o. The
   maximum term of imprisonment that may be imposed for Counts VI, VIII, or
   X—all VICAR convictions—is 10 years. Id. § 1959(a)(5). Nevertheless, both

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   Defendants were sentenced to concurrent life terms of imprisonment on
   Counts IV and V, and Iglesias-Villegas also received concurrent life
   sentences for Counts VI, VIII, and X. These sentences all exceed their
   respective statutory maxima. Therefore, the life sentences imposed for
   Counts IV, V, VI, VIII, and X are vacated, and the case is remanded for
   resentencing on those counts only. 8
                                               XI.
           Defendants’ convictions are AFFIRMED. We VACATE the
   sentences of Shows Urquidi for Counts IV and V and Iglesias-Villegas for
   Counts IV, V, VI, VIII, and X and REMAND to the district court for
   resentencing that is consistent with the reasoning in Part X of this opinion.

           _____________________
           8
            The Government argues that we need not remand these counts for resentencing,
   and we may instead reform the sentence on each count according to its respective statutory
   maximum. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106. We decline to do so because “[t]he imposition of life
   sentences for [these counts] comports with the district court’s oral pronouncement of the
   sentences and are not mere ‘clerical errors’ subject to reformation . . . .” United States v.
   Velasquez, 710 F. App’x 189, 192 (5th Cir. 2017) (per curiam).

                                                38