Court Opinion

ID: 9964787
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 20:00:46.943833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:42.227736
License: Public Domain

In the

    United States Court of Appeals
                For the Seventh Circuit
                    ____________________
No. 22-2764
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                  Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                v.

THOMAS BROOKS, II,
                                              Defendant-Appellant.
                    ____________________

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the
          Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
         No. 3:22-CR-50001 — Philip G. Reinhard, Judge.
                    ____________________

       ARGUED JUNE 1, 2023 — DECIDED APRIL 30, 2024
                 ____________________

   Before EASTERBROOK, WOOD, and PRYOR, Circuit Judges.
    PRYOR, Circuit Judge. Thomas Brooks, II was charged with
and pleaded guilty to possessing a ﬁrearm as a convicted
felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Brooks received an
above-Guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment. On
appeal, Brooks challenges this sentence. Because the district
court’s sentence was well within its discretion, we aﬃrm.
2                                                             No. 22-2764

                            I. BACKGROUND

    Brooks was leaving an Illinois apartment complex during
the early afternoon of November 1, 2021, when he saw police
officers waiting outside. He began to run. Brooks had several
outstanding warrants, and the officers were there to arrest
him. Police yelled for him to stop, but he disregarded their
commands and continued running. Brooks reached into his
waistband and threw an object into the grass. The foot chase
continued to the front of the apartment complex, and Brooks
reached into his waistband again. An officer unholstered his
firearm, pointed it at Brooks, and ordered him to show his
hands. Brooks tossed two more objects he had grabbed from
his waistband and kept running. Soon thereafter, Brooks
tripped, the police apprehended him, and they took him into
custody.
    Within a minute, officers retrieved the objects that Brooks
had thrown during flight, which included a Glock 26 9mm
firearm, loaded with one round in the chamber. The firearm
was equipped with a “switch.” 1 Law enforcement also recov-
ered an extended magazine with thirty-one rounds of ammu-
nition.
   Brooks was indicted for possessing a firearm as a felon, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). He pled guilty. Before sentenc-
ing, the United States Probation Office prepared a Presen-
tence Investigation Report (“PSR”). The probation officer, us-
ing the United States Sentencing Guidelines, calculated an of-
fense level of 19, based on the illegal firearm possession

    1 A “switch” is a device that turns a semi-automatic firearm into a fully

automatic one. United States v. Díaz-Rivera, 957 F.3d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 2020);
United States v. Morgan, 216 F.3d 557, 567 (6th Cir. 2000).
No. 22-2764                                                     3

conviction, a two-level enhancement for recklessly creating a
substantial risk of death or seriously bodily injury to another
person in the course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer,
and a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
See U.S.S.G. §§ 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)(I), (i)(II), & (ii)(I); § 3C1.2;
§ 3E1.1(a), (b). Combined with 14 criminal history points es-
tablishing a criminal history category VI, Brooks’s offense
level yielded an advisory guidelines range of 63 to 78 months
in prison.
    Brooks argued, in his sentencing memorandum and at
sentencing, that the reckless endangerment enhancement
should not apply because the government could not demon-
strate that any of his actions “on the date of his arrest” created
a “substantial risk of serious bodily harm.”
    At sentencing, to support the two-level enhancement, the
government elicited testimony from Detective David Cerasa
with the Rockford Police Department, who had participated
in the arrest of Brooks on November 1, 2021. Detective Cerasa
testified that once Brooks exited the back of the apartment
complex, he immediately saw police approaching. In re-
sponse, Brooks ran in the opposite direction, toward Detec-
tive Cerasa, who was surveilling the area from the parking lot
of a neighboring apartment complex. After seeing Brooks
drop an object to the ground and continue running, Detective
Cerasa joined the pursuit. He saw Brooks reaching for his
waistband. Suspecting that Brooks could be concealing a fire-
arm, Detective Cerasa unholstered his firearm as he pursued
Brooks, giving verbal commands for Brooks to stop running
and to get on the ground. Brooks disregarded these com-
mands but was eventually secured and arrested in the street
directly in front of the apartment complex. On cross-
4                                                 No. 22-2764

examination, Detective Cerasa testified that law enforcement
was able to recover the firearm Brooks had thrown within 45
seconds to a minute. In addition to Detective Cerasa’s testi-
mony, the government introduced body camera footage
showing the chase, civilians walking in and out of the apart-
ment complex, and one individual on a porch.
    Having considered the evidence, the district judge applied
the two-level reckless endangerment enhancement. The court
found several relevant facts that supported the enhancement,
including (1) Brooks was actively fleeing from law enforce-
ment; (2) the police chase occurred in the middle of the day
through a public residential neighborhood with officers
drawing their weapons; (3) Brooks threw a loaded firearm—
made fully automatic by a switch—onto the grass near the
apartment complex sidewalk leading to an entry door of the
building; (4) the deadly weapon that Brooks tossed could
have discharged when it hit the ground or been recovered by
a child or adult in the area; (5) Brooks threw a loaded firearm
and an extended magazine in an area were persons are nor-
mally coming and going from the complex. The district court
found sufficient evidence that Brooks’s actions supported the
two-level enhancement.
   Apart from challenging the reckless endangerment en-
hancement, Brooks also argued that his criminal history cate-
gory overrepresented his criminal record. He maintained that
when properly reviewed, one would notice that a majority of
Brooks’s criminal history points derived from his juvenile rec-
ord, diminished culpability, and immaturity. For these rea-
sons, Brooks argued that the two-level enhancement should
not apply.
No. 22-2764                                                    5

    The district court disagreed. The district court concluded
that Brooks’s criminal history demonstrated a “steady pro-
gression” of the same criminal behavior all occurring rela-
tively “close in time,” negating Brooks’s argument that his
criminal history category of VI was overrepresented. Given
Brooks’s offense level and criminal history category, the court
determined that the advisory guidelines range was 63 to 78
months.
   After calculating the appropriate guidelines range, the
court heard argument from the parties regarding the appro-
priate sentence. The government requested a sentence within
the guidelines, and Brooks argued for a below-Guidelines
sentence of 34 months pursuant to Guideline § 4A1.3(b)(1).
    Considering the parties’ arguments, the PSR, Brooks’s al-
locution, and the written submissions, the court turned to the
§ 3553(a) factors to make its sentencing determination. In re-
gard to the nature and seriousness of the offense conduct, the
district court explained that Brooks had been convicted in this
case of possessing a dangerous firearm. Additionally, the
court found it troubling that Brooks’s firearm had been con-
verted to a “fully automatic” handgun increasing the
weapon’s “killing potential.” The district court also took issue
with Brooks’s decision to possess an extended magazine with
31 rounds of ammunition, which the court viewed as a “pro-
pensity for violence.” Thus, the court found Brooks’s offense
conduct of fleeing and discarding the firearm to be both seri-
ous and a substantial risk to the public. The district court also
concluded that Brooks’s possession of a loaded “fully auto-
matic” weapon and the extended magazine warranted a
higher sentence.
6                                                  No. 22-2764

    The district court found Brooks’s mitigation arguments in-
volving his personal history and characteristics of drug addic-
tion, serious mental health history, and exposure to gun vio-
lence at a young age failed “to justify” Brooks carrying a dan-
gerous automatic weapon in his neighborhood. While the
court acknowledged that Brooks had been raised in a violent
neighborhood and exposed to gun violence at an early age,
Brooks had been reared in a loving family. Relying on com-
munications from Brooks’s family, the court noted that the de-
fendant had been guided by both his mother and stepfather
in the home, but still chose to join a street gang.
    The court found Brooks’s mitigating factors, however, to
be outweighed significantly by numerous aggravating fac-
tors. It noted that, although Brooks was only twenty years old,
he had already developed an extensive criminal record that
started at the age of 14. The court observed that Brooks’s “per-
sistent criminal felony record” had amassed a substantial
criminal history, including an adult criminal conviction for
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The court found
Brooks to be a repeat offender. More troubling, the court ob-
served that Brooks had refused the reformative programming
and counseling offered to him over the years through the ju-
venile justice system. The court also noted that Brooks’s re-
cent illegal use of a weapon conviction and sentence had
failed to deter Brooks from engaging in further crime, given
that he was on probation for that charge at the time of the in-
stant offense. Another aggravating factor for the court was
that Brooks was in possession of an additional clip with 31
rounds of ammunition on the day of his arrest. The court
noted that, although Brooks was on pretrial release for vari-
ous pending state charges, nothing deterred him from pos-
sessing a fully automatic weapon.
No. 22-2764                                                   7

    The court also discussed Brooks’s “disrespect for the law,”
which was reflected in his failure to appear for court proceed-
ings, his criminal behavior while on bond for various state of-
fenses, and his disciplinary record in pretrial detention. The
district court believed Brooks’s steady delinquent criminal
behavior and his conduct while detained all demonstrated
that Brooks posed a “risk to the public” and that his “rehabil-
itative potential” was questionable.
    After evaluating the sentencing factors found at 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), the district court concluded that an above-Guide-
lines sentence of 96 months in prison was warranted in this
case. The court later supplemented its sentencing decision to
note that it would reach the same sentence even if Guideline
§ 3C1.2, the reckless endangerment enhancement, was inap-
plicable.

                         II. ANALYSIS
    On appeal, Brooks challenges his sentence on three
grounds. First, Brooks argues that the district court erred in
its application of a two-level enhancement under Guideline
§ 3C1.2 for reckless endangerment while fleeing from police.
Second, Brooks argues that the district court failed to address
one of his key mitigation arguments. Third, Brooks contends
the district court erred in sentencing him above the Guide-
lines range, to 96 months’ imprisonment, for the firearm vio-
lation. We address his procedural arguments first, then turn
to the reasonableness of his sentence.
   A. Reckless Endangerment Sentencing Enhancement
    We review de novo—take a fresh look at—whether a dis-
trict court’s factual findings support the imposition of the en-
hancement. United States v. Hibbett, 97 F.4th 477, 480 (7th Cir.
8                                                      No. 22-2764

2024). We review the court’s underlying factual determina-
tions for clear error. Id. (quoting United States v. Prieto, 85 F.4th
445, 448 (7th Cir. 2023)). The district court’s determination
that Brooks recklessly endangered the life of another person
is a finding of fact. United States v. Chandler, 12 F.3d 1427, 1433
(7th Cir. 1994). The clearly erroneous standard is deferential,
and we will not disturb the district court’s findings unless, af-
ter examining the evidence and the reasonable inferences
therefrom, “we are left with the definite and firm conviction
that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Ford, 22 F.4th
687, 691 (7th Cir. 2022) (internal citations and quotations omit-
ted); United States v. Melendez, 819 F.3d 1006, 1011 (7th Cir.
2016).
    A district court may find facts sufficient to support an en-
hancement if they are established by a preponderance of the
evidence. Prieto, 85 F.4th at 448. “The task on appeal is not to
see whether there is any view of the evidence that might un-
dercut the district court's finding; it is to see whether there is
any evidence in the record to support the finding.” United
States v. Wade, 114 F.3d 103, 105 (7th Cir. 1997).
    Under Guideline § 3C1.2, a defendant’s offense level is in-
creased by two if he “recklessly created a substantial risk of
death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course
of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” A defendant acts
recklessly when he is aware of the risk created by his conduct
and the risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard
it constituted a “gross deviation from the standard of care that
a reasonable person would exercise in such a situation.”
U.S.S.G. § 2A1.4 cmt. n.1, U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 cmt. n.2. The gov-
ernment bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of
the evidence, facts justifying an upward adjustment of a
No. 22-2764                                                   9

defendant’s base offense level. United States v. Smith, 210 F.3d
760, 762 (7th Cir. 2000).
    On appeal, Brooks argues that the district court not only
erroneously determined that § 3C1.2 applied to him, but also
improperly based its § 3C1.2 determination on insufficient ev-
idence. To support the two-level enhancement here, the gov-
ernment offered the testimony of Detective Cerasa, who testi-
fied that Brooks threw the loaded firearm and extended mag-
azine near the apartment complex; body camera footage de-
picting Brooks fleeing from police in a residential neighbor-
hood; and still images from the body camera that depicted ci-
vilians entering and exiting the apartment building and an-
other individual on a porch. After reviewing the evidence, the
court made several factual findings: (1) Brooks’ weapon was
a loaded firearm with a bullet in the chamber, a clip that had
excess capacity, and an attached switch that made the gun
fully automatic; (2) the police chase took place during the
middle of the day in a residential, public neighborhood that
appeared to be occupied by many people; (3) Brooks’s actions
caused Detective Cerasa to draw his weapon; (4) Brooks
threw the firearm fairly close to the edge of one of the complex
buildings near a sidewalk that led to one of the building’s en-
try doors; and (5) Brooks later reached into his waistband and
threw an extended magazine containing over 30 rounds of
ammunition.
    Based on these findings, the district court determined that
Brooks was aware that he had created a substantial risk of
death or serious bodily harm in three ways: by discarding the
fully automatic weapon in a public area where it could have
been recovered by a child or an adult; by throwing the dan-
gerous weapon in such a careless manner that it could have
10                                                  No. 22-2764

discharged and injured someone; and by reaching into his
waistband, prompting officers to draw their weapons. Brooks
raises three arguments for why these determinations are not
supported by the evidence. We address each finding in turn.
       1. Leaving the Gun in a Public Area
   Based on the evidence, the district court found that Brooks
discarded his gun in a public area, creating a substantial risk
that himself or someone else could be harmed. The court also
noted that if the police had not timely recovered the weapon,
Brooks’s loaded Glock could have been picked up by another
adult or by a child. Brooks contends that the court’s findings
are unsupported by the record because the weapon was
dropped in front of the police, recovered within 45 seconds of
being discarded, and not dropped in a crowded area.
    Brooks argues that the short time span the gun remained
on the grass negates the probability of an adult or child being
able to retrieve it. Brooks maintains that our decision in United
States v. Lard supports his argument that the short time frame
for when the police recovered the gun suspends the notion
that someone other than the police could have found the dis-
carded firearm. 327 F.3d 551 (7th Cir. 2003). Brooks’s reliance
on Lard is misplaced because there we recognized simply
leaving a loaded weapon in a public place may warrant the
district court imposing the § 3C1.2 enhancement especially
where there is evidence that the public is able to easily access
the gun’s location. Id. at 553 (referencing United States v.
Brown, 314 F.3d 1216, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003)). Here, Brooks dis-
carded a loaded gun outside of an apartment complex in the
middle of the day, while civilians were nearby. This created a
substantial risk that someone could find it.
No. 22-2764                                                    11

    Brooks also argues that unlike the defendant in Lard, who
discarded his gun in a “heavily weeded” area when police
were not around, Brooks dropped his gun “in the grass in
front of the police, who were in close proximity to him.”
Brooks’ position, however, overlooks the fact that he tossed a
loaded fully automatic firearm in the back yard of an apart-
ment complex with people coming and going. Recognizing
the police did not need to do much to recover the gun after
securing Brooks—they only needed to trace his short flight
path—Brooks’s action still created a substantial risk that the
firearm lying in plain view would be recovered by an unsus-
pecting child or adult. Brooks seems to miss that whether it
was 45 seconds or a full minute, there was a substantial risk,
given the firearm’s proximity to the apartment complex, that
it could have been recovered by someone else.
    Given the circumstances surrounding Brooks’s decision to
flee from police and throw a loaded firearm and an extended
magazine in a public area, we are not left with a definite and
firm conviction that the district court made a mistake in ap-
plying the enhancement. Lard, 327 F.3d at 553; see also United
States v. Kelley, 40 F.4th 276, 285 (5th Cir. 2022) (the court
found a “reckless endangerment” enhancement was more
than plausible where the defendant discarded a pistol with
twenty-one rounds in the magazine in a public area when
running from police); United States v. Gray, 942 F.3d 627, 632
(3d Cir. 2019) (court determined there was a substantial risk
of death or serious bodily injury where the defendant threw a
loaded firearm down a street in a residential neighborhood in
the vicinity of a police officer and at least one civilian and the
firearm was recovered after a brief search of the area); United
States v. Vega-Rivera, 866 F.3d 14, 19 (1st Cir. 2017) (“[W]hile
the record does not indicate whether there were individuals
12                                                    No. 22-2764

located in the parking lot at the exact time when he discarded
the gun, it is reasonable to infer that the gun, so casually
tossed into a public arena, could have been found and re-
sulted in injury to others.”); United States v. Slaughter, 386 F.3d
401, 404 (2d Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (determining that the en-
hancement was warranted after the defendant threw a loaded
handgun in an area where children were playing); Brown, 314
F.3d at 1221 (concluding that the defendant’s disposal of a
gun in the presence of children “undoubtedly created a sub-
stantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to [the] children
and to the other bystanders around the complex”).
     Brooks attempts to analogize his case to a more recent
Sixth Circuit case coming out the other way, United States v.
Mukes, 980 F.3d 526, 539 (6th Cir. 2020), but his arguments fail.
The facts of Mukes are easily distinguishable from the evi-
dence in this case. In Mukes, unlike here, there was “no evi-
dence in the record about any potential risk that a bystander
might have come across the weapon” during the defendant’s
brief encounter with the police. Id. The facts surrounding
Brooks’s arrest, supported by both body camera footage and
still images, demonstrate that there were civilians outside the
apartment complex during Brooks’s attempt to flee. From
this, the district court could reasonably infer that Brooks’s
conduct created a substantial risk that civilians in the vicinity
of the chase could come across Brooks’s discarded firearm.
Also, the district court found Brooks tossed his gun and am-
munition in a public area, in the middle of the day. This evi-
dence supported the district court’s decision to apply the
reckless endangerment enhancement.
No. 22-2764                                                  13

       2. Firearm Discharging upon Hitting the Ground.
    Next, Brooks contends that the district court erred in con-
cluding that his dropping the gun created a strong probability
of the firearm discharging and hurting someone else. Again
pointing to Mukes, Brooks argues that the government was re-
quired to prove that the gun was “operable, cocked, and
ready to fire,” for a substantial risk of harm to exist. See 980
F.3d at 538. We disagree.
    While the Sixth Circuit in Mukes imposed such require-
ments, we have thus far declined to adopt bright-line rules for
§ 3C1.2, noting that district judges are better positioned to
hear the evidence and decide what counts as a “substantial
risk.” United States v. Baker, 56 F.4th 1128, 1131 n.2 (7th Cir.
2023). Instead, we have affirmed application of the enhance-
ment where the district court could reasonably have inferred
that the way the firearm was discarded could have caused the
gun to go off upon hitting the ground. Lard, 327 F.3d at 554.
    To find the enhancement warranted, “[t]he district court
needs to adopt only a permissible view of the evidence.” Id.
at 554 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 238 F.3d 822, 825 (7th
Cir. 2001)). Here, Brooks tossed a fully loaded firearm with an
attached switch outside the doors of an apartment complex.
Brooks makes no argument that these findings were clearly
erroneous. As the district court explained, the “switch” made
the modified Glock both highly inaccurate and even more
dangerous because it was “fully automatic.” In assessing the
risk caused by throwing the loaded gun in a residential neigh-
borhood with people nearby, the court determined that
Brooks’s action could have “caused injury or death to a police
officer” or “a bullet could have gone into one of the windows
in the complex and [] injured somebody inside.” The risk was
14                                                  No. 22-2764

especially dire, given the fact that the switch made the pistol
an automatic weapon—it could have discharged through just
hitting the ground. Based on the evidence before the district
court, it was reasonable for the court to infer that the gun’s
characteristics rendered it capable of firing upon impact with
the ground. See id. at 554; United States v. Brown, 31 F.4th 39,
49 (1st Cir. 2022) (concluding that it was reasonable for the
district court to infer that the defendant’s gun posed a risk of
drop fire where there were rounds in four of the gun’s five
chambers); Gray, 942 F.3d at 632 (affirming a district court’s
application of § 3C1.2 enhancement where defendant threw a
loaded firearm); Johnson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 797 F.2d
1530, 1532 (10th Cir. 1986) (discussing “drop-fire,” in which a
“gun is carried with a bullet in the chamber over which the
hammer rests,” and “a sharp blow to the hammer, such as
when the gun is dropped and lands hammer first, will cause
the gun to discharge”).
    Brooks also argues that for the reckless endangerment en-
hancement to apply, the government was required or should
have been required to test the firearm and to have an expert
testify that the trigger of the gun was more susceptible to be-
ing fired. We have never imposed such a requirement. We
also are unaware of any court that imposes such a require-
ment; it appears even the Mukes court would have been satis-
fied if there was testimony that the firearm was cocked when
the defendant tossed it, without requiring testing of the
weapon. 980 F.3d at 538.
    The district court did not err in inferring that by throwing
the loaded firearm, Brooks created a substantial risk of serious
injury or death to pursuing officers or those individuals in the
area.
No. 22-2764                                                     15

       3. Danger from Police Drawing Weapons
    Brooks also challenges the district court’s conclusion that
by causing the officers to draw their weapons, Brooks created
a substantial risk of death or bodily injury to another. Accord-
ing to Brooks, for this to satisfy Guideline § 3C1.2, the facts
needed to show that the officer drew his weapon because the
officer knew Brooks had a gun; the officer was preparing to
shoot Brooks because the officer observed Brooks reaching for
his waistband; or that the officer knew that Brooks was pos-
sessing a firearm while fleeing. We disagree.
    In United States v. Easter, we concluded that reaching for a
gun while running from police is enough to warrant the
§ 3C1.2 enhancement. 553 F.3d 519, 524 (7th Cir. 2009). This
conduct, as we explained in Easter, creates a substantial risk
that an officer might inadvertently shoot another officer or a
bystander. Id.; see also, United States v. Dennings, 922 F.3d 232,
238 (4th Cir. 2019) (“Regardless of whether [the defendant]
was carrying the firearm, putting it back in his pocket, reach-
ing to retrieve it from his pocket, or trying to keep it inside his
pocket as he ran, his movements ‘created a substantial risk of
death or a serious bodily injury to another person’… [because
the defendant’s] behavior could have led the pursuing officer
to draw his own firearm in self-defense.”); United States v.
Bates, 561 F.3d 754, 757–58 (8th Cir. 2009) (defendant continu-
ally reaching toward his waistband during altercation with
police sufficient to support enhancement under Guideline
§ 3C1.2).
     Regardless of whether officers knew if Brooks possessed
an operable firearm or whether he was reaching for another
gun when reaching into his waistband, Detective Cerasa tes-
tified that individuals commonly conceal firearms or
16                                                 No. 22-2764

weapons in their waistband, and it was these actions of
Brooks that led the officer to draw his weapon. Brooks has not
presented any evidence contesting this testimony. The court
did not clearly err in relying on the officer’s testimony when
determining that Brooks’s actions created a substantial risk of
death or serious bodily injury to others.
   Based on the foregoing, we are convinced that the district
court did not err in finding that Brooks’s conduct warranted
the § 3C1.2 reckless endangerment enhancement.
     B. Mitigation Arguments
    Brooks also claims that the district court committed proce-
dural error by failing to address one of his key mitigation ar-
guments. Specifically, Brooks argued that his juvenile convic-
tions caused his Criminal History Category VI to overrepre-
sent the seriousness of his criminal history. In his sentencing
memorandum and before the district court, Brooks’s counsel
argued that as a juvenile, the defendant’s brain was less de-
veloped and that he was more immature and thus less culpa-
ble than an adult committing those same violations. Brooks
also pointed to cases from other circuits and district courts
that factored in the defendant’s age at the time of a prior con-
viction when determining whether the offender’s criminal
history points overstated the seriousness of the defendant’s
criminal record.
    To bolster this argument, Brooks cites to § 4A1.3(b)(1) of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which allows a court
to grant a below-Guidelines sentence when the “criminal his-
tory category substantially over-represents the seriousness of
the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood that the de-
fendant will commit other crimes.” U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b)(1).
No. 22-2764                                                       17

According to Brooks, the district court failed to consider this
factor at sentencing.
    “The Federal Sentencing Guidelines help guide district
judges to select penologically appropriate sentences for crim-
inal offenders. The operative term here is ‘guide.’” United
States v. Gonzalez, 3 F.4th 963, 964 (7th Cir. 2021). “But it is well
established that after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259
(2005), which rendered the Sentencing Guidelines advisory,
downward departures, per se, have become obsolete.” United
States v. Turner, 569 F.3d 637, 640 (7th Cir. 2009). “Though a
district court must always consult the guidelines and take
them into account, the ultimate length of a sentence (within
statutory maxima and minima) is committed to the discretion
of the district judge, who is constrained by the statutory fac-
tors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Gonzalez, 3 F.4th at 965 (citing
Brooks, 543 U.S. at 264).
    We acknowledge that the Guidelines’ recommendations
are a helpful tool for judges, but we also recognize that they
might not account for the particular nuances of an individual
case. Id. For that reason, “we have held that a district court is
free to deviate from the guidelines, so long as it offers an ad-
equate statement of its reasons.” Id. (citing Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 49–50 (2007)). “A district court commits
procedural error when it fails to address a defendant’s miti-
gating arguments that are not so weak as not to merit discus-
sion.” United States v. Hendrix, 74 F.4th 859, 868 (7th Cir. 2023)
(internal citations omitted). “In determining whether a court
addressed an argument, we consider the totality of the rec-
ord.” United States v. Wilcher, 91 F.4th 864, 874 (7th Cir. 2024).
    Brooks points to several mitigating circumstances that, he
believes, the district court failed to consider, including “his
18                                                            No. 22-2764

youth, immaturity, susceptibility, and diminished culpabil-
ity.” Specifically, he argues that the district court failed to con-
sider how his “juvenile characteristics” and “diminished cul-
pability” warranted a lower category determination.
    Turning first to the cases that Brooks relied on to demon-
strate that his juvenile characteristics supported a lower crim-
inal history to effectuate a lower sentence, 2 the district court
explained that the cases identified by Brooks were distin-
guishable from the facts of the present case. In the cases pre-
sented by Brooks, the juvenile convictions were years, if not
decades, prior to the offense of conviction, the maturity and
age of the defendants were different, and the nature of the
crimes was different. In the court’s view, neither Brooks’s
young age, his loss of family and friends to gun violence, nor
his previous arrests and convictions had deterred his criminal
activity. Instead, his criminal activity had escalated with “no
gap in time” between his offenses.
    Brooks also argues that the court did not give meaningful
consideration to his “immaturity” and “age.” We disagree.
The court observed that since the age of fourteen, Brooks had
continued to engage in a “steady progression” of criminal be-
havior. The court noted that Brooks’s most recent conviction,
which was close in time to the instant offense, involved the
aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The court concluded
that Brooks’s criminal history category “fairly represent[ed]
his history” and determined that Guideline § 4A1.3(b)(1) was
inapplicable. The district court did not overlook Brooks’s

     2 See United States v. Shoupe, 988 F.2d 440, 447 (3d Cir. 1993); United

States v. Brown, 985 F.2d 478, 482 (9th Cir. 1993); United States v. Hammond,
240 F. Supp. 2d 872, 878 (E.D. Wis. 2003).
No. 22-2764                                                                 19

“juvenile characteristics” and diminished capacity argu-
ments. Rather, the district court considered and adequately
explained its reasons for rejecting the arguments. United States
v. Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005). 3
    C. Above-Guidelines Sentence
    Finally, Brooks argues that the district court failed to ade-
quately justify his 96-month above-Guidelines sentence. Such
allegations are procedural challenges that we review de novo.
United States v. Annoreno, 713 F.3d 352, 356–57 (7th Cir. 2013).
“In doing so, we assess whether the district court committed
any significant error, such as by failing to adequately explain
a sentence. United States v. Wilcher, 91 F.4th 864, 869 (7th Cir.
2024) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51).
    As we have explained, the district court’s explanation
need not be exhaustive or reference each 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)
factor, but it must still show that the court thoroughly consid-
ered them. United States v. Orozco-Sanchez, 814 F.3d 844, 848
(7th Cir. 2016). The reason is twofold: to allow for “meaning-
ful appellate review” and to “promote the perception of fair
sentencing.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. In other words, we will up-
hold an above-Guidelines sentence “so long as the district
court offered an adequate statement of its reasons, consistent

    3 Brooks also analogizes his case to United States v. Ballard, 12 F.4th 734

(7th Cir. 2021), in which a defendant whose criminal history spanned over
thirty years was placed in criminal history category VI and sentenced to
92 months, also for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Aside from the fact that
there are pertinent distinctions between the two cases, we agree with the
government that to the extent Brooks was attempting to argue unwar-
ranted sentencing disparity, he failed to develop this argument and has
thus waived it. Ripberger v. Corizon, Inc., 773 F.3d 871, 879 (7th Cir. 2014).
20                                                 No. 22-2764

with 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” United States v. McIntyre, 531 F.3d
481, 483 (7th Cir. 2008).
    Here, the district court adequately explained why the “ag-
gravating circumstances” in this case warranted an upward
variance from the recommended range of the Guidelines. In
considering the § 3553(a) factors, the court noted that Brooks’s
offense was “very serious”: not only had Brooks modified the
weapon to make it automatic, but he also had a clip with over
fifteen rounds and another clip with thirty-one rounds. The
court also found that the “switch” was “not covered in the
guidelines.” Brooks argues this finding was error. We agree,
but the error was harmless. See United States v. Wood, 31 F.4th
593, 599 (7th Cir. 2022) (“A procedural sentencing error is
harmless if the sentence would have been the same without
the error.”).
    As explained in the PSR, Brooks’s base offense level was
calculated at twenty pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B).
Under the Sentencing Guidelines, § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) applies if
“the (i) offense involved a (I) semiautomatic firearm that is
capable of accepting a large capacity magazine; or (II) firearm
that is described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a); and (ii) defendant (I)
was a prohibited person at the time the defendant committed
the instant offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B) (emphasis
added). Section 5845(a) includes a machine gun within the
definition of a firearm. It defines a “machine gun” as:
       any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot,
       or can be readily restored to shoot, automati-
       cally more than one shot, without manual re-
       loading, by a single function of the trigger. The
       term [includes] any part designed and intended
       solely and exclusively, or combination of parts
No. 22-2764                                                    21

       designed and intended, for use in converting a
       weapon into a machinegun[.]
26 U.S.C. § 5845(b) (emphasis added). Because Brooks’s
switch allowed his “conventional semi-automatic Glock pis-
tol to function as a fully automatic firearm,” the district court
should have determined that the modified Glock was repre-
sented under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)(II) as a qualifying machine
gun. Id.; United States v. Camp, 343 F.3d 743. 745 (5th Cir. 2003)
(holding that modifying a rifle with a switch, which allowed
the weapon to fire until either the shooter released the switch
or the loaded ammunition was expended, converted the
weapon into a machine gun).
    The error was harmless, however, because the district
court went on to find that the switch and the clip with over
thirty rounds of ammunition could also call for an enhance-
ment of the sentence. The commentary to Guideline § 2K2.1
indicates that an upward departure may be warranted if “the
offense posed a substantial risk of death or bodily injury to
multiple individuals.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.11. Here, the
court explained that the gun’s modification created “an ex-
tremely dangerous weapon” that enhanced its “killing poten-
tial.” With the switch, the Glock was not only “more difficult
to control,” but now able to fire “multiple bullets instantane-
ously,” making it more likely that innocent bystanders could
be killed.
     Next, the court considered Brooks’s personal history and
characteristics, including his childhood upbringing, gang af-
filiation, mental health issues, and prior social services. The
court noted that despite having a loving family and many op-
portunities for progress, Brooks persisted with his criminal
activity. The court explained that Brooks was a repeat
22                                                   No. 22-2764

offender who continued to engage in criminal behavior with
no gap in time. The court also noted that at the time of the
instant offense, Brooks was on probation for an aggravated
unlawful use of a weapon conviction. This did not deter
Brooks, however, from possessing a “fully automatic”
weapon capable of killing multiple people. The court found
Brooks to be a “a serious safety risk to the public.”
    The court emphasized that it was Brooks’s “steady pro-
gression” in delinquent behavior that caused the court to
question the viability of Brooks’s rehabilitative potential. The
district court highlighted Brooks’ numerous outstanding war-
rants for failing to appear in state court and his various disci-
plinary problems and sanctions while detained awaiting the
resolution of the present case. All of this, for the court, demon-
strated Brooks’s disrespect for the law.
    For all of these reasons, the court permissibly found that
aggravating circumstances called for a sentence above the
Guidelines range. First, the district court correctly calculated
the Guidelines range. Next, the court considered the danger-
ous nature and circumstances of Brooks’s offense and con-
cluded that it was more serious than simple possession of a
firearm. The court considered Brooks’s extensive criminal
conduct with no gaps in time. It carefully explained why a
sentence within the range would not reflect the seriousness of
Brooks’s crime, adequately deter him in the future, or ade-
quately protect the public. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)–(2). The
court fulfilled its obligation to give an adequate explanation
of its sentence.
   As we have recognized, “firearm possession by a felon
who exhibits particularly lawless behavior generally warrants
a lengthier sentence than a ‘run-of-the-mill’ § 922(g)(1)
No. 22-2764                                                     23

offender.” United States v. Ingram, 40 F.4th 791, 796 (7th Cir.
2022). This, coupled with the district court’s consideration of
the import of deterring such conduct and protecting the pub-
lic, satisfies us that the sentence was reasonable. See United
States v. Abbas, 560 F.3d 660, 668 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Where, as
here, the judge has made a searching evaluation of a defend-
ant’s case, applied the statutorily mandated factors to the sen-
tence and clearly articulated why the given defendant war-
rants a sentence that would be a departure from the correct
range, the sentence is reasonable.”).
    Brooks responds that the sentence—eight years for mere
possession of a firearm—will lead to sentencing disparities.
While Brooks is correct that § 3553(a)(6) requires district
courts to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing
disparities, “the disparity provision leaves plenty of room for
differences in sentences when warranted under the circum-
stances.” United States v. Bridgewater, 950 F.3d 928, 936 (7th
Cir. 2020). “[S]entencing is never abstract: the district court is
required by § 3553 to tailor its sentence to the particular de-
fendant before it.” Id. (quoting United States v. Solomon, 892
F.3d 273, 279 (7th Cir. 2018)); see also United States v. Lockwood,
840 F.3d 896, 904 (7th Cir. 2016) (“In our legal tradition, each
defendant is treated as a unique individual and ‘every case as
a unique study in the human failings that sometimes mitigate,
sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue.’”
(citation omitted)).
   Here, the district court concluded that Brooks’s actions,
which included the possession of a fully loaded semiauto-
matic gun with a switch able to kill multiple people, war-
ranted a more severe sentence. The district court found that
Brooks posed a serious risk to the public. The court also noted
24                                                 No. 22-2764

Brooks’s disrespect for the law, evident by him continuing to
engage in criminal activity while on bond for various state of-
fenses and his numerous outstanding warrants for failing to
appear in pending state cases. The court explained that
Brooks’ behavior both while on probation on the state charge
and while in pretrial detention on the present federal case
caused it to question Brooks’s rehabilitative potential upon
release. For these reasons, the district court concluded that an
above-Guidelines sentence of 96 months was warranted. Be-
cause the district court’s sentencing explanation, when read
as a whole, demonstrates that the court primarily relied on
permissible factors and adequately reasoned through
§ 3553(a), we do not find that the district court erred.

                       III. CONCLUSION

   Brooks’s challenges to his sentence are unavailing. For the
reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.