Court Opinion

ID: 9961229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 14:08:14.113555+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:29.585738
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-3599-21

CHANDRA JATAMONI,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KAVITHA DANDU,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted April 9, 2024 – Decided April 18, 2024

                   Before Judges Mayer and Enright.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County,
                   Docket No. FM-12-1862-18.

                   Kavitha Dandu, appellant pro se.

                   Chandra Jatamoni, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM
      In this post-judgment matrimonial case, defendant Kavitha Dandu appeals

from orders entered on June 28, and July 21, 2022 by Judge Gerald J. Council.

Finding no merit in defendant's arguments, we affirm.

                                        I.

      Our prior unpublished opinion described in detail the parties' ongoing

disputes over custody, parenting time, and child support issues regarding their

now twelve-year-old daughter. Jatamoni v. Dandu, No. A-2707-20 (App. Div.

Nov. 29, 2022) (slip op. at 2-11). Therefore, we need only summarize the facts

relevant to this appeal.

      Defendant and plaintiff Chandra Jatamoni divorced in December 2018,

after entering into a property settlement agreement (PSA). Id. at 2. The PSA

incorporated into their judgment of divorce stated, in part:

            2.1 The parties shall have legal custody of the minor
            child born of the marriage. [Defendant] shall have
            primary residential custody of the child. . . . [Plaintiff]
            shall have parenting time every Friday at 6:00 p.m. to
            Sunday at 6:00 p.m. . . .

                   ....

            2.3 The parties shall communicate with each other on
            a regular basis concerning the child's health,
            education[,] and welfare, and will share and make
            accessible to each other all school records, report cards,
            medical reports and . . . other documentation of like . . .
            character that may come into their possession. . . .

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                    ....

             2.8 Each party shall be entitled to two . . . weeks with
             the child, each summer. If the parties are to take the
             child out of the country, they shall provide the other
             party with all travel and contact information. . . .
             [Plaintiff] shall retain the child's passport . . . and [visa],
             but shall provide the [visa] and passport to [defendant]
             upon her showing of all necessary travel
             information . . . . Upon [defendant's] return to the
             United States with the child from any trip, she shall
             immediately return the passport . . . and [visa] to
             [plaintiff,] who shall continue to be responsible for
             maintaining same by [o]rder of the [c]ourt.

             [Id. at 2-3.]

      Plaintiff became the child's parent of primary residence in January 2019.

Id. at 4. Although defendant moved to regain primary residential custody of the

child, Judge Council denied her request and ordered her to pay child support at

the rate of ninety-three-dollars per week. Id. at 4-5. Defendant subsequently

appealed from two post-judgment orders entered by Judge Council in April and

May 2021. The orders addressed various issues, including custody, parenting

time, and child support. We affirmed the orders in our November 2022 decision.

Id. at 22.

      On May 12, 2022, while defendant's prior appeal was pending, Judge

Council entered an order permitting plaintiff to take the parties' daughter out-

of-state for a vacation from June 30 to July 10, 2022. In June 2022, defendant

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filed a motion seeking twenty-six requests for relief, including: modification of

her child support obligation; permission to relocate with the parties' child to

New York; sole custody of the child; and Judge Council's recusal.

      On June 28, 2022, Judge Council entered an order denying defendant's

motion. In a thoughtful written opinion accompanying the order, the judge

explained defendant was not entitled to a reduction in her child support

obligation because she "did not provide valid proofs demonstrating she [wa]s

incapable of working[,] nor [did] she demonstrate[] an inability to pay" child

support. The judge also cited defendant's failure to "include[] a case information

statement [(CIS)]" with her application as another basis to deny her request to

reduce her child support obligation.

      Next, the judge explained why he denied defendant's request to modify

the existing custody and parenting time arrangements.            The judge found

"plaintiff ha[d] full custody of [the parties' child] since 2019," "[d]efendant only

recently began bi-weekly unsupervised [parenting time] with [the child] in May

2022," and the court could not conclude it was in the child's "best interest to

have a modification in custody" or for the child "to be relocated to New York"

where defendant lived.

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      On July 19, 2022, after plaintiff took the parties' child on the vacation as

permitted under the May 12 order, defendant filed an order to show cause,

alleging the child was "removed/abducted . . . from the State of New Jersey"

from June 25, 2022 to July 10, 2022 without her consent and "in violation of

[her] parental rights." Defendant also asked for Judge Council's recusal in the

case and reconsideration of the custody and child support provisions of the June

28 order.

      On July 21, 2022, Judge Council entered an order denying the order to

show cause, finding defendant failed to establish "any imminent risk of

irreparable harm to . . . her or the child." Judge Council also stated, "an [o]rder

to [s]how [c]ause . . . is not the proper way to either appeal previous decisions

or to seek the disqualification of the presiding judge."

                                        II.

      On appeal, defendant raises twelve arguments for our consideration,

which we recite verbatim: (1) "[a]buse of discretion by [t]rial [c]ourt"; (2) "[t]he

[c]ourt entertained unlawful act"; (3) "[Judge Council] is not enforcing the

previous order when . . . defendant raises this concern"; (4) "[Judge Council]

victimizes . . . defendant by granting contempt of the order"; (5) "[Judge

Council] acted bias"; (6) "[Judge Council] ignored the best interests of the child

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with . . . defendant"; (7) "[r]equest that [Judge] . . . Council be disqualified"; (8)

"[Judge Council] failed to abide by the principle of [n]atural [j]ustice[,

because] . . . . while allowing unsupervised visitation with conditions, [he]

failed to take note that . . . defendant was a responsible person who brought a

child from India to the U.S.A."; (9) "[Judge Council] used his discretionary

powers to favor [p]laintiff"; (10) "[Judge Council] made several observations

against . . . [defendant] without any [s]tatement of [r]eason[s]"; (11) "[Judge

Council] [n]eglect[ed] to perform [his] duties[,] amount[ing] to official

[m]isconduct"; and (12) "[Judge Council] alter[ed] the meaning of . . .

defendant's statement in court orders, further complicating the case. "

      These arguments lack merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Thus, we affirm the

challenged orders substantially for the reasons set forth by Judge Council in his

thoughtful written opinions. We add the following brief comments.

      Our review of a Family Part order is limited. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J.

394, 411 (1998).      "Because of the family courts' special jurisdiction and

expertise in family matters, appellate courts should accord deference to family

court factfinding." Id. at 413. Therefore, "[w]e will reverse only if we find the

trial [court] clearly abused [its] discretion." Clark v. Clark, 429 N.J. Super. 61,

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72 (App. Div. 2012). However, we review a Family Part judge's interpretation

of the law de novo. D.W. v. R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245-46 (2012).

      A custody or parenting time decision rests within the Family Part judge's

sound discretion. Pascale v. Pascale, 140 N.J. 583, 611 (1995). In any custody

or parenting time dispute, "it is well settled . . . the court's primary consideration

is the best interests of the child[]." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. Super. 102, 105

(App. Div. 2007) (citation omitted). "Where there is already a judgment or an

agreement affecting custody in place, it is presumed it 'embodies a best interests

determination' and should be modified only where there is a 'showing [of]

changed circumstances which would affect the welfare of the child[].'" A.J. v.

R.J., 461 N.J. Super. 173, 182 (App. Div. 2019) (first alteration in original)

(quoting Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J. Super. 387, 398 (App. Div. 1993)).

      Likewise, "[w]hether [a support] obligation should be modified . . . rests

within a Family Part judge's sound discretion." Larbig v. Larbig, 384 N.J. Super.

17, 21 (App. Div. 2006) (citations omitted). Thus, a Family Part judge's decision

regarding a support obligation should not be disturbed unless we "conclude that

the trial court clearly abused its discretion, failed to consider all of the

controlling legal principles, or . . . that the determination could not reasonably

have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record after

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considering the proofs as a whole." Heinl v. Heinl, 287 N.J. Super. 337, 345

(App. Div. 1996).

      Support orders are "subject to review and modification [up]on a showing

of 'changed circumstances.'" Lepis v. Lepis, 83 N.J. 139, 146 (1980) (quoting

Chalmers v. Chalmers, 65 N.J. 186, 192 (1974)). "When the movant is seeking

modification of child support, the guiding principle is the 'best interests of the

child[].'" Id. at 157 (quoting Hallberg v. Hallberg, 113 N.J. Super. 205, 209

(App. Div. 1971)).

      A movant seeking to modify a support obligation bears the burden of proof

that a modification is warranted. Ibid. Importantly, the moving party must

demonstrate a permanent change in circumstances from those existing when the

prior support award was fixed. Donnelly v. Donnelly, 405 N.J. Super. 117, 127-

28 (App. Div. 2009).        Accordingly, "[w]hen a motion . . . is filed for

modification or termination of . . . child support, . . . the movant shall append

copies of the movant's current [CIS] and the movant's [CIS] previously executed

or filed in connection with the order, judgment[,] or agreement sought to be

modified." R. 5:5-4(a)(4). "A prima facie showing of changed circumstances

must be made before a court will order discovery of an ex-spouse's financial

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status," Lepis, 83 N.J. at 157, including "a copy of a current [CIS]," R. 5:5-

4(a)(4).

      A mere showing of an obligor's reduction in income is not dispositive. In

fact, current earnings have never been viewed as "the sole criterion [upon which]

to establish a party's obligation for support." Weitzman v. Weitzman, 228 N.J.

Super. 346, 354 (App. Div. 1988) (quoting Lynn v. Lynn, 165 N.J. Super. 328,

341 (App. Div. 1979)). A party's "potential to generate income is a significant

factor to consider when determining [their] ability to pay [support]." Miller v.

Miller, 160 N.J. 408, 420 (1999).

      Guided by these standards, we are persuaded Judge Council correctly

determined defendant's proofs were insufficient to establish a basis for a change

in the parties' custodial and parenting time arrangement, or a modification in

child support. Our review of the record also convinces us defendant's proofs

were lacking regarding her contention that Judge Council should recuse himself

from the case based on his alleged bias against her. See Strahan v. Strahan, 402

N.J. Super. 298, 318 (App. Div. 2008) ("Bias cannot be inferred from adverse

rulings against a party."). Thus, we affirm the challenged orders, substantially

for the reasons expressed by Judge Council in his thoughtful written opinions.

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      Any remaining arguments raised by defendant are without sufficient merit

to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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