Court Opinion

ID: 9409387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 22:01:02.277241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:50.139657
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUL 17 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JASON T. BROOKS,                                No.    21-56125

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                                3:18-cv-02290-GPC-KSC
 v.

TARSADIA HOTELS, a California                   MEMORANDUM*
corporation; et al.,

                Defendants-Appellees.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of California
                   Gonzalo P. Curiel, District Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted June 30, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: D.W. NELSON, SILVERMAN, and JOHNSTONE, Circuit Judges.

      Jason T. Brooks, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s orders

concerning the settlement of Brooks’s action against Tarsadia Hotels and other

defendants. Brooks alleged violations of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(2)(A), (B), and (C), and California law arising from his

purchase of a residential condominium unit in San Diego. Brooks challenges the

district court’s orders enforcing the oral settlement agreement and directing the

settlement funds be deposited into Brooks’s inmate trust fund account. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion the

district court’s enforcement of a settlement agreement. Doi v. Halekulani Corp.,

276 F.3d 1131, 1136 (9th Cir. 2002). We review de novo its interpretations of a

settlement agreement, ASARCO, LLC v. Celanese Chem. Co., 792 F.3d 1203, 1208

(9th Cir. 2015), and of state law, Flores v. City of Westminster, 873 F.3d 739, 748

(9th Cir. 2017). “[W]e defer to any factual findings made by the district court in

interpreting the settlement agreement unless they are clearly erroneous.” ASARCO,

LLC, 792 F.3d at 1208 (quoting City of Emeryville v. Robinson, 621 F.3d 1251,

1261 (9th Cir. 2010)). We affirm.

      The district court did not abuse its discretion by granting defendants’ motion

to enforce the settlement agreement. The district court properly found that the

parties entered into an enforceable oral agreement in an early neutral evaluation

before a magistrate judge, with the terms as the magistrate judge memorialized

them. See Doi, 276 F.3d at 1137–38 (district court’s enforcement power extends to

oral agreements, “particularly when the terms are memorialized into the record,”

even if “a party has a change of heart [after agreeing] to [the settlement] terms but

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before the terms are reduced to writing” (citations and internal quotation marks

omitted)). The district court did not clearly err in finding that Brooks assented to

the agreement and intended to be bound by it. See Ahern v. Cent. Pac. Freight

Lines, 846 F.2d 47, 48 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The district court’s finding that [a party]

assented to the settlement and intended to be bound by it must be affirmed unless it

is clearly erroneous.”).

      The district court’s order that the settlement funds be paid to Brooks for

deposit into his inmate trust fund account, permitting the Colorado Department of

Corrections to determine what percentage should go toward his criminal restitution

order under state law, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-18.5-106(2), is consistent with the

terms of the parties’ settlement agreement and Colorado law. See Colo. Rev. Stat.

§ 18-1.3-603(4)(a)(I), (4)(c) (Restitution Act, providing that an order of restitution

is a “final civil judgment in favor of the state and any victim,” which “remains in

force until the restitution is paid in full” and “creates a lien by operation of law

against the defendant’s personal property and any interest that the defendant may

have in any personal property”); People v. Stone, 471 P.3d 1159, 1162 (Colo. App.

2020) (provisions of the Restitution Act should be liberally construed). Moreover,

the district court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to consider

constitutional and other legal arguments that Brooks failed to raise in a timely

manner. See Kona Enters., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890–91 (9th Cir.

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2000) (no abuse of discretion in denying plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration

where plaintiffs failed to raise legal issues previously).

      The record does not support Brooks’s contentions that the district court was

biased against him, that it published settlement terms in violation of his privacy,

resulting in harm to Brooks, or that Tarsadia Hotels failed to perform under the

settlement agreement.

      AFFIRMED.

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