Court Opinion

ID: 9526679
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:22:18.256069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:07.324521
License: Public Domain

Mr. PRESIDING JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: In People v. Canale, 52 Ill. 2d 107, 285 N.E.2d 133, the Supreme Court expressly rejected the contention that a conviction for aggravated kidnapping must be reversed because the confinement and asportation in kidnapping was incidental to the rape thereafter committed. The court held that the evidence of confinement and asportation supported the conviction for aggravated kidnapping, and a concurrent sentence for such offense was sustained. Canale has been followed in People v. Pardue, 6 Ill. App. 3d 430, 286 N.E.2d 29; People v. Whiteaker, 30 Ill. App. 3d 848, 334 N.E.2d 200; People v. Brown, 31 Ill. App. 3d 547,334 N.E.2d 323 and People v. Elliott, 32 Ill. App. 3d 654, 336 N.E.2d 146. In each case concurrent sentences were sustained. In its opinion in People v. Sims, 20 Ill. App. 3d 1068, 313 N.E.2d 663, this court did not refer to the holding in Canale. Sims relied upon People v. Whittington, 46 Ill. 2d 405, 265 N.E.2d 679, People v. Lerch, 52 Ill. 2d 78, 284 N.E.2d 293, and People v. Russo, 52 Ill. 2d 425, 288 N.E.2d 412. Those cases concerned convictions for escape which were incidental to the principal offense. Canale did not consider such opinions. The principal opinion relies upon language in People v. Williams, 60 Ill. 2d 1, 322 N.E.2d 819, to conclude that the holding in Canale should be modified. That opinion determined that burglary and armed robbery constituted the same conduct and for such reason the burglary should be reversed. The court distinguished offenses which include “very closely related acts” for which there may be separate convictions and sentences. Citing People v. Johnson, 44 Ill. 2d 463, 256 N.E.2d 343, and People v. Harper, 50 Ill. 2d 296, 278 N.E.2d 771, the court reiterated that the test of propriety in separate convictions and sentences was whether or not the offenses were clearly distinct and required separate elements of proof. In Williams, the court did find that the murder was a “change in the nature of the criminal objective” for purposes of considering the statutory provision which bars consecutive sentences for different offenses which are a part of a “single course of conduct”.1 The court continued, however, to state its conclusion that the murder was a “departure from a ‘single course of conduct’.” It therefore does not seem to be precise to conclude that the language with regard to a change in criminal objective modifies the rule of Canale with regard to closely related acts which include elements of separate offenses. In such context, it cannot be said that the rape involved the same conduct and elements as the aggravated kidnapping, and I do not believe that this court should depart from the rule of Canale to reverse the conviction and sentence for aggravated battery.   Ill. Rev. Stat. 1973, ch. 38, par. 1005 — 8—4(a).