Court Opinion

ID: 9765510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:04:26.696822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:09.352142
License: Public Domain

Allen, C.J.,
dissenting. I cannot agree that the outcome of this case is governed by our holding in Dalury v. S-K-I, Ltd., 164 Vt. 329, 670 A.2d 795 (1995). There we stated that the major public policy implications were those underlying the law of premises liability and held that the defendants, owners of a ski area, and not recreational skiers, have the expertise to foresee and control hazards and eliminate risks of harm. Id. at 335, 670 A.2d at 799. We reaffirmed that the operator of a ski area is obligated to prepare and maintain its slopes *144in a reasonably safe condition for skiing by members of the general public engaged in recreational skiing. The controlling factual distinction between this case and Dalury is that participants in a “ski bum” race or any other race know that they will be skiing challenging courses artificially created to make the descent difficult. The object is to get from the start to the finish in the shortest possible time and to go “flat out” in order to do so. Danger of injury is inherent in the activity. Racers, whether amateur or professional, want the challenge that implicitly requires the creation, not the elimination, of hazards. For some, the descent may be too steep, the gates too closely spaced, the course too icy or too rutted, but to require the promoter to eliminate such hazards is to eliminate the challenges the racers seek. There is a significant difference between the expectations of the general public, which has a right to assume reasonable care on the part of the ski area operator, and a ski racer who consciously undertakes risks that he or she knows may strain or exceed the tolerance of any safety system.
We stated in Dalury that the social interest inherent in operating a business that courts the public, like a ski area; outweighs the interest of the business in shielding itself from liability for ordinary negligence. The reason given for replacing the “essential nature of the service” criterion, see Tunkl v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441, 445-46 (Cal. 1963), with the “legitimate public interest” test was that
thousands of people buy lift tickets every day throughout the season. Thousands of people ride lifts, buy services, and ski the trails. Each ticket sale may be, for some purposes, a purely private transaction. But when a substantial number of such sales take[s] place as a result of the seller’s general invitation to the public to utilize the facilities and services in question, a legitimate public interest arises.
Dalury, 164 Vt. at 334, 670 A.2d at 799. Nowhere in Dalury did we suggest that those who choose to undertake particularly risky activities may not validly waive their rights to sue the sponsor for ordinary negligence. We went to the outer limit to hold that skiing implicates a legitimate public interest. But see Szczotka v. Snowridge, Inc., 869 F. Supp. 247, 251 (D. Vt. 1994) (exculpatory agreements for ski resorts do not affect the public interest); Bauer v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 788 F. Supp. 472, 474 (D. Colo. 1992) (skiing by definition is neither matter of great public importance nor matter *145of practical necessity). The majority holding now goes beyond a reasonable limit.
There is a segment of the population that engages in activities which by nature are hazardous or ultra-hazardous. The danger produces the thrill and is the motivation for the undertaking. Bungee jumping, parachuting, river rafting, scuba diving, ski racing, hang gliding are all activities involving varying degrees of risk. The owners of the lands or chattels that are used to facilitate these activities should be permitted to allocate the risk of harm. In short, a ski bum race is not an activity thought to be suitable for public regulation, a service of great importance to the public, or a matter of practical necessity for any member of the public. I would affirm the grant of summary judgment on the negligence claims. I am authorized to state that Justice Dooley joins in this dissent.