Court Opinion

ID: 9852132
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:25:07.42743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:22.963431
License: Public Domain

Quillian, Judge,
dissenting. The following facts should be noted: National Union issued a comprehensive automobile liability policy to the Smiths which listed the policy period from April 26, 1964, to April 26, 1965. Since this policy was under the provisions of Code Ann. § 68-612, National Union filed a certificate with the Georgia Public Service Commission which listed that the policy (CA971388A) was effective from April 26, 1964 "until canceled.” The form further recited "if continuous — complete 'until canceled.’ ” The automobile collision which is the subject of the original suit occurred on November 12, 1965.. However, it was not until July 16, 1966, that the Georgia Public Service Commission received notice of cancellation from National Union. The cancellation was effective August 13, 1966. The policy issued to the Smiths contained the following endorsement: "Cancellation of the policy and this endorsement may be effected only after giving 30 days notice in writing to the public or Federal authority with which such certificate has been filed.”
National Union contends it is entitled to reimbursement from the Smiths because of provisions of the policy that "the insured agrees to reimburse the company for any payment made by the company which it would not have been obligated to make under the terms of this policy except by reason of the obligation assumed in making such certification.” In its argument to this court National Union cites *756the rules of the Georgia Public Service Commission and sets out that the policy was issued in compliance with the Georgia Public Service Commission’s rules and was controlled by such rules. In this connection, National Union states that the policy follows Rule 35 of the Georgia Public Service Commission; that although the certificate to the Georgia Public Service Commission recites that the policy was effective until canceled, this rule was subsequently changed after the issuance of the policy but before the collision in question. In support of this argument is the affidavit of National Union’s agent which recites that the notice given to the Georgia Public Service Commission indicated the policy was in effect "until canceled” which was in compliance with the Georgia Public Service Commission’s rules at that time, but that the rule was subsequently rescinded in July of 1964.
Although there is considerable foreign authority to the contrary (see e.g., Ohran v. National Automobile Ins. Co., 82 Cal. App.2d 636 (187 P2d 66)), the case of Garden City Cab Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 80 Ga. App. 850 (2) (57 SE2d 683), cited by the majority, is apparently controlling. However, it is applicable only if there was a cancellation or termination of the policy between National Union and its insureds, the Smiths. This then is the determinative issue in the case.
In ascertaining whether the contract could be terminated or could lapse, the Georgia Public Service Commission’s Rules are exceedingly vital. If the Rules allowed a policy to lapse after a definite time then National Union might rely on that fact plus the ruling in Garden City Cab Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 80 Ga. App. 850, supra, to sustain its contention. However, if the policy must continue until canceled then National Union must make a showing that it met any formal cancellation requirement which the Rules specified. Gilley v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 81 Ga. App. 71 (58 SE2d 218). For the policy provision can not prevail over the terms of the statute, and rules promulgated pursuant thereto, which must be strictly followed. See State Farm Mut. *757Auto. Ins. Co. v. Reese, 116 Ga. App. 59, 60 (156 SE2d 529); 45 CJS 83, Insurance, § 449.
Although in National Union’s cross claim a portion of Rule 35 of the Georgia Public Service Commission is set forth, there was no attempt made to introduce the rule on motion for summary judgment. Moreover, there is no showing as to when the particular rule was effective or what rules were effective for the time period involved in these cases. A statement by the Underwriting Manager of National Union is not sufficient to establish the rules of the Georgia Public Service Commission or their status at a particular time. Furthermore, this court cannot take judicial notice of the Georgia Public Service Commission Rules. Atlanta Gas Light Co. v. Newman, 88 Ga. App. 252, 254 (76 SE2d 536), and cits. Shurman v. City of Atlanta, 148 Ga. 1 (3) (95 SE 698).
Under the Georgia Public Service Commission’s Rules in effect at the inception of the contract the period of insurance coverage was "until canceled” and apparently notice of cancellation from National Union to the Smiths was necessary. If such rules were changed what did they provide? Did they apply to the instant contract, that is did they apply retroactively or retrospectively to a contract already entered into? Did they contain any reference to any notice which must be given the insured?
Here, absent the applicable rules and their effective date, we have no concrete showing as to whether the contract could terminate or lapse at the end of a one-year period. In such situation the granting of a summary judgment should not be approved.
I am authorized to state that Judges Pannell and Evans concur in this dissent.