Court Opinion

ID: 9899563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 21:04:42.522888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:37.667267
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/16/23 Kort v. Hectram CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION ONE

 NASSER KORT,                                                     B328391

          Plaintiff and Appellant,                                (Los Angeles County
                                                                  Super. Ct. No. 19STCV30116)
          v.

 HECTRAM, INC., et al.,

          Defendants and Respondents.

     APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, James A. Kaddo, Judge. Affirmed.
     Innabi Law Group, Amer Innabi, Abdalla J. Innabi; Davis
Law Office, D. Jason Davis for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Mark R. Weiner & Associates, Michael H. Park for
Defendants and Respondents Hector Erami, Hectram, Inc., and
Brenda Rodriguez-Murillo.
              ___________________________________
       Nasser Kort was attacked while dining at a restaurant. He
sued the restaurant owner and the owner’s landlord for
negligence and premises liability, alleging they owned or
controlled the premises and failed their duty to secure the
premises despite prior criminal incidents at the same location.
The restaurant owner answered the complaint but the landlord
defaulted. Kort moved for a default judgment against the
landlord but the trial court deferred entering a judgment until
the restaurant owner’s liability was established. (A jury
ultimately found the restaurant owner not liable.) In its minute
order, the court awarded Kort zero money damages and entered
judgment for the landlord.
       Kort appeals, contending the judgment should have been
entered before trial and in his favor. We hold that the court
properly waited until after trial before entering judgment, but
the judgment should have been in Kort’s favor because Lopez was
in default. However, the error is nonprejudicial because the court
awarded zero damages, and clearly would have done so even had
it entered judgment for Kort. Kort otherwise fails to show it
would have been “just” to award other than zero damages, which
Code of Civil Procedure section 585 requires. We therefore affirm
the judgment.
                         BACKGROUND
A.     The Incident
       We take the facts, which are largely undisputed, from a
defense expert’s recitation at trial, using them only to establish
context.
       On August 2, 2019, Kort was ordering food at “Tijuana’s
Tacos,” a restaurant in Pomona. While doing so, Christopher San
Luis got into Kort’s Toyota Prius in the parking lot, mistakenly

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thinking it was his Honda. Kort, who was much larger than San
Luis, pulled San Luis from the car and called him names. When
he released San Luis, the latter left and Kort went back to the
restaurant, neither calling the police nor asking anyone else to do
so. San Luis returned with a baseball bat and used it to attack
Kort, causing injuries to his arm and leg.
B.    Complaint
      Kort filed a form complaint against the owners and
operator of the restaurant, Hector Erami, Hectram, Inc., and
Brenda Rodriguez-Murillo (collectively Hectram), and their
landlord, Cruz Lopez, asserting causes of action for negligence
and premises liability. Kort alleged “the business and property is
owned, managed, and/or controlled by Defendants” and
“Defendants were under a duty and failed to properly secure the
premises despite prior criminal incidents at the same location
causing plaintiffs injuries.” He further alleged that the
Restaurant Defendants “knowingly failed to report
contemporaneous criminal conduct to the authorities on [their]
property on the day of the incident which led to those injuries.”
      Hectram answered the complaint but Lopez did not.
C.    Default Proceedings
      The court clerk entered Lopez’s default on January 13,
2020, with a statement of damages of $1 million.
      On April 21, August 22, and October 19, 2022, Kort filed
requests for a court judgment against Lopez, supporting the
requests with evidence that he suffered significant injuries
because of the San Luis attack.
      In response, Hectram filed an ex parte application to stay
the default judgment as to Lopez, which the trial court denied.

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       After denying Kort’s requests for default judgment without
prejudice, the court held an Order to Show Cause hearing on
whether a default judgment could be entered against Lopez prior
to proceeding to trial against Hectram. Kort filed a brief
regarding severability of claims against Lopez, and Hectram filed
its own brief.
       The court found that some of Hectram’s defenses, including
lack of duty, lack of foreseeability, superseding causation, and
apportionment of damages to San Luis, “would go to plaintiff’s
right to recover at all from anyone other than the non-party
Christopher San Luis, who is not affiliated with any defendant,
and who (allegedly) assaulted and battered plaintiff with a
baseball bat in response to a prior plaintiff-initiated altercation
having to do with plaintiff’s car.” The court found that these
defenses may inure to the benefit of Lopez, and a final judgment
must therefore be entered in favor of Hectram first.
       In its minute order the court evaluated Kort’s damages as
follows: special damages: $84,719.52; general damages:
$415,280.48; interest: $160,547.95; and costs: $16,579.37, for a
total of $677,127.32.
       The matter proceeded to trial as to Hectram.
       On March 9, 2023, after presentation of evidence but before
argument, the trial court stated, “I’ve heard all the evidence, I’m
ready to deal with the Cruz Lopez issue. And the court, having
heard the evidence, finds that the owner of the property, who
basically is an absentee owner, had no duty and had no liability
and judgment [should be entered] for defendant Cruz Lopez on
his—on the default.”
       The same day, the court entered a judgment “for Cruz
Lopez and against Nasser Kort” in the amount of “$0.00.”

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       The jury thereafter entered a verdict finding Hectram not
liable for Kort’s injuries.
       Kort appeals.
                            DISCUSSION
       Kort contends the trial court erred by entering judgment in
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favor of Lopez because Code of Civil Procedure section 585
requires judgment be rendered in Kort’s favor, as Lopez was in
default. We agree that judgment should have been entered for
Kort but the error is nonprejudicial because the court properly
found Lopez owed Kort nothing in damages.
A.     Legal Principles
       After a defendant fails to respond to a complaint, the court
clerk, “upon written application of the plaintiff, shall enter the
default of the defendant.” (§ 585, subd. (b).)
       The default of the defendant admits the well-pleaded
factual allegations of the complaint giving rise to liability.
(Steven M. Garber & Assocs. v. Eskandarian (2007) 150
Cal.App.4th 813, 823-824.)
       “The plaintiff thereafter may apply to the court for the
relief demanded in the complaint. The court shall hear the
evidence offered by the plaintiff, and shall render judgment in
the plaintiff’s favor for that relief, not exceeding the amount
stated in the complaint, . . . as appears by the evidence to be
just.” (§ 585, subd. (b); Carlsen v. Koivumaki (2014) 227
Cal.App.4th 879, 898.)
       We review a trial court’s interpretation and application of a
statute de novo. (Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 527.)

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        Undesignated statutory references will be to the Code of
Civil Procedure.

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We review an award of damages after a default judgment for
substantial evidence, and will reverse “only where the sum
awarded is so disproportionate to the evidence as to suggest that
the verdict was the result of passion, prejudice or corruption
[citations] or where the award is so out of proportion to the
evidence that it shocks the conscience of the appellate court.”
(Johnson v. Stanhiser (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 357, 361; see also
Uva v. Evans (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 356, 363-364.)
        Even where error is shown, we may not reverse a judgment
unless the error resulted in a miscarriage of justice. (Cal. Const.,
art. VI, § 13 [“No judgment shall be set aside . . . on the ground of
. . . the improper admission or rejection of evidence, . . . or for any
error as to any matter of procedure, unless, after an examination
of the entire cause, including the evidence, the court shall be of
the opinion that the error complained of has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice”].)
B.      Application
        1.    Judgment Should Have Been Entered for Kort
        Here, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Lopez,
the defaulting defendant, and against Kort, the plaintiff.
Subdivision (b) of section 585 clearly states that a default
judgment must be entered in favor of the plaintiff. Therefore, the
court erred in entering judgment in favor of Lopez.
        2.    The Error was Nonprejudicial
        However, the error was nonprejudicial because even had
the trial court entered judgment for Kort, its rationale would
have resulted in an award of zero damages. A judgment for
Lopez and a judgment in favor of Kort but awarding zero
damages are equivalent. (See § 1032, subd. (a)(4) [a defendant

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where neither the plaintiff nor defendant obtained any relief is
the prevailing party].)
       Kort argues the court was precluded from evaluating
Lopez’s liability.
       We disagree. Section 595 requires the court to render
judgment for plaintiff in an amount that “appears by the evidence
to be just.” (§ 585, subd. (b).) To determine what is just, the
court must consider all the circumstances of the case, including, if
appropriate, the defaulting plaintiff’s comparative liability. To do
otherwise runs the risk of working an injustice.
       In this vein, the trial court based its procedure and
findings, and the phrasing of its judgment, on Mirabile v. Smith
(1953) 119 Cal.App.2d 685. There, a plaintiff sued two partners
on a contract. One partner answered but the other defaulted.
The answering defendant contended that no contract existed.
The court held that the default should be held in abeyance until
the case was “finally determined upon” by the answering
defendant where the answering defendant’s position is “equally
applicable against both of these defendants.” (Id. at p. 688.) The
court stated that were the law otherwise, “a grave injustice would
result.” (Id. at p. 689; see also Freeman v. Churchill (1947) 30
Cal.2d 453, 461 [where a defense presented by a non-defaulting
defendant is not personal to him but goes to the merits of the
case, the defense pleaded by the non-defaulting defendant inures
to the benefit of the defaulting defendant as well].)
       Kort ignores Mirabile and fails to explain how it would be
just to award damages against an absentee landlord for
negligence and premises liability where the occupying tenant,
against whom the same allegations were raised, owes no
damages.

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       The trial court also relied on Adams Mfg. & Engineering
Co. v. Coast Centerless Grinding Co. (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 649,
which held that “ ‘[when] the defenses interposed by the
answering defendant [go] to the whole right of the plaintiff to
recover at all’ ”—“ ‘as distinguished from his right to recover as
against any particular defendant’ ” —and “ ‘when such defenses
prove successful[,] they enure to the benefit of the defaulting
defendant, and final judgment must therefore be entered not only
in favor of the answering defendant, but in favor of the defaulting
defendant as well.’ ” (Id. at p. 656.) Kort ignores this case as
well.
       The trial court clearly found it would not be just for Kort to
recover from Lopez simply because he defaulted, because Kort
had no right to recover at all, from any defendant. Even were we
to assume for the sake of argument that it was improper for the
court to phrase its finding in terms of Lopez’s liability rather
than damages, the result would be the same: The court found
Lopez owed Kort nothing.
       In sum, Kort failed to show that an award of damages
would have been just, as section 585 requires. He does not argue
that the judgment in Lopez’s favor prejudiced him in any way or
resulted in a miscarriage of justice. For example, he does not
argue that a judgment for zero damages in his favor would be
materially different than a judgment for zero damages in Lopez’s
favor. Were we to set aside the judgment and order the trial
court to render another judgment in Kort’s favor, the new
judgment would simply result in a rephrased award of zero
damages. (See Bristol Convalescent Hospital v. Stone (1968) 258
Cal.App.2d 848, 859 [“The setting aside of a judgment obtained
on an unvacated default properly entered results merely in the

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rendition of such another judgment as the plaintiff’s pleadings
and evidence might support”].) Therefore, any error in phrasing
the judgment in Lopez’s favor was immaterial.
                         DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed. Each side is to bear its own
costs on appeal.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                               CHANEY, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             WEINGART, J.

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