Court Opinion

ID: 9673192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:08:00.050216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:20.578754
License: Public Domain

S. S. Hughes, J.
(dissenting). I dissent from the majority’s opinion in this case. I feel that there is merit in at least four of plaintiff’s allegations of error on appeal.
First, I must disagree with the conclusion that this blatant and negligent breach of the hospital’s duty of care to plaintiff is somehow not actionable because of the formalistic requirements of a narrow conception of proximate cause. The trial judge should have instructed the jury that the hospital was negligent as a matter of law, and left to the jury the matter of proximate cause and damages.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion as *128to the admissibility of the release. Plaintiff argues that the release was intended to apply only to the owner and operator of the vehicle that struck him; plaintiff and his lawyer so testified. Neither the release nor any witness put forth any evidence that some or all of the defendants were to be released from liability for any injuries to plaintiff caused by the negligence of defendants. Further, no defendant gave any consideration to plaintiff to secure a release from liability. I conclude that the release should not have been admitted.
Similar problems derive from the trial judge’s instruction to the jury concerning the release. One difficulty with holding that the "plaintiff/driver” settlement money should be deducted from any judgment is the implicit assumption that the jury will be able to determine and apportion the respective damage done to the plaintiff by the accident and by the resultant treatment. Another difficulty involves the overriding policy of encouraging settlement. There are many inducements to make settlements and there are many variables in assessing the dollar value of injuries. The plaintiff had many more injuries than just the hip injury about which the malpractice is claimed. If the defendants in this case are liable for negligence, they are liable only for the injuries caused by their own negligence and not those caused by the driver in the accident. The settlement covered these injuries, and it is irrelevant to any determination of the liability of defendants.
The law favors settlements. The trial judge’s ruling in this case will discourage settlements. To the extent that Sobotta v Vogel, 37 Mich App 59; 194 NW2d 564 (1971), may be construed as contrary to this reasoning, I would decline to follow that ruling.
*129I further believe that the court erred in directing a verdict of no cause of action in favor of Dr. DeWitt. The record dictates that the question of his potential liability be determined by the jury. Dr. DeWitt ordered X-rays, including one of the actually injured left hip, and assisted Dr. Mahaney in tractioning the wrong leg in spite of the apparent indication of the left hip X-ray (exhibit 10).
It is almost unbelievable that with such a severely injured patient that Dr. Gesink would not immediately call or contact Drs. Mahaney and DeWitt upon discovery of the mislabeling, as opposed to merely correcting the X-rays and writing a report. It is also strange that these doctors, Mahaney and DeWitt, did not see the report in plaintiff’s file and that they took so long to discover the left hip injury. The plaintiff was apparently suffering almost unbearable pain, and having great difficulty with his left leg.
I concur with the majority as to the error in the trial judge’s permission of cross-examination as to plaintiff’s "experimental” use of marijuana. In the context of the other errors committed at trial I do not believe that this questioning can be dismissed as harmless error under the court rule.
I find the conclusion to be inescapable that this plaintiff had too many elements militating against him to allow a fair trial. He was a motorcycle rider, a marijuana experimenter, and a settler of an accident case. The judgment should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.