Court Opinion

ID: 9538914
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:43:54.918852+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:15.105349
License: Public Domain

Lee, J.
(dissenting).
I am mindful that a statute should be construed so as to render it valid and in harmony with the Constitution, if reasonably possible; and that its unconstitutionality ought to appear beyond reasonable doubt before it should be held invalid. Quinn v. City of McComb, Miss., 55 So. (2d) 479.
Section 156, Constitution of 1890, is as follows -.“The circuit court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters civil and criminal in this state not vested by this Constitution in some other court, and such appellate jurisdiction as shall be prescribed by law.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The above section is an exact rescript of Section 4, Article 5 of the Constitution of 1817; Section 14, Article IV of the Constitution of 1832; and Section 14, Article VI of the Constitution of Í869, except that in the Constitution of 1817, the Court was designated as the superior rather than the circuit court, and the phrase ‘ ‘ not vested by this Constitution in some other court” did not appear in those Constitutions.
Thus,'since 1817 for a period of one hundred and thirty-five years, by the Constitutions of our State, the circuit court has been given original jurisdiction of all criminal matters. Doubtless one of the reasons for vesting such original jurisdiction was that the circuit court is looked upon by many as the people’s court. The accusing branch thereof, the grand jury, is drawn from the body of the people of the county. Selected from, and representative of, the people, it may be said to be the people; and if the people desire to prefer charges against a citizen, they *417should have an unfettered forum. Manifestly, Section 156 did not purpose that the people’s forum should he subordinate to any other court.
The only vesting' of jurisdiction in criminal matters in any other court is by Section 171 thereof, which provides that justices of the peace “shall have jurisdiction concurrent with the circuit court over all crimes whereof the punishment prescribed does not extend beyond a fine and imprisonment in the county jail; * * (Emphasis supplied.) The effect of these two sections is that both the circuit and the justice of the peace courts, alike, have jurisdiction to try misdemeanors, and the one first taking jurisdiction has full jurisdiction; but as to felonies, that is, crimes punishable by death or imprisonment in the penitentiary, the circuit court, in which indictment by a grand jury is requisite, alone has jurisdiction. Section 27, Constitution 1890.
The Constitution of 1890' provided for only four state courts: The Supreme, Circuit, Chancery, and Justice of the Peace courts. The Supreme Court has only appellate jurisdiction in criminal matters, and the chancery court is vested with no jurisdiction whatever in such matters.
The language of Section 156 is so simple that any effort to define may render it complex. But if original jurisdiction may need some light in order to interpret, attention is called to 67 C. J. S-, page 526, where it is said: “Employed as an adjective, the word ‘original’ is defined to mean first in order; initial; preceding all others; pertaining to the origin or beginning.” See also Webster’s New International Dictionary, 2nd Edition. In 50 C. J. S., page 1090 it is said: “The word ‘jurisdiction’ implies a court or tribunal with judicial power to hear and determine a cause, * * * ’ ’.
Manifestly then, the circuit court is both the first and the only court vested with judicial .power to hear and determine felony charges.
Evidently because the language of the section is so plain and unambiguous, the Legislature, until the Youth *418Court Act was passed, during the whole one hundred and thirty-five years of our statehood, has undertaken but one time to deprive the circuit court of any of its jurisdiction. That instance is reported in Montross v. State, 61 Miss. 429, decided in 1883. On October 23, 1866, the Legislature approved an act, incorporating the Town of Shieldsborough, and declared the mayor, two aldermen, the clerk and marshal of the town to constitute an inferior court, with jurisdiction as follows: ‘ ‘ The said court thus constituted shall have full, complete, and exclusive jurisdiction of all the police matters prescribed by the ordinances and by-laws of said city, of all breaches of the peace, assaults, assaults and batteries, violations of the Sabbath of every kind against the laws of the State, etc. ” By amendment on March 8,1882, which also extended to the Town of Biloxi, it was provided “ ‘that for all violations of the laws of the State of Mississippi, ’ as enumerated in the preceding portions of said section, the board of mayor and aldermen shall have the power, and are hereby authorized and empowered, to regulate all fines imposed for said violation of the State laws, at not less than one dollar or more than twenty-five dollars, as in their opinion, will best insure the enforcement of the laws of the State of Mississippi, and the welfare and order of the community.” Laws 1882, c. 282.
Montross was indicted in the circuit court of Harrison County for keeping his barroom open on Sunday. He plead, in bar of the prosecution, a former conviction for the same offense by the mayor’s court of the Town of Biloxi, for which he had paid the fine of $1.25 and costs. The State’s demurrer to the plea was sustained, Montross was convicted and he appealed to this Court. The action of the trial court, in sustaining the demurrer, was affirmed, and the Court there said: “The legislature has by the constitution power to establish inferior courts and to confer upon such courts jurisdiction over crimes and misdemeanors, but it cannot confer upon such courts jurisdiction exclusive' of that which by the constitution *419is given to the courts established by the constitution itself. By section fourteen of article six of the constitution, original jurisdiction is conferred upon the circuit courts of the State in all criminal matters, and such jurisdiction cannot be withdrawn by the legislative department of the government. The legislative, the executive, and the judicial departments are each protected by the constitution against encroachments by the others, and the power conferred upon either cannot be withdrawn or abridged by either or both of the coordinate branches. If the legislature may withdraw from the constitutional court jurisdiction conferred by the constitution over one class of cases, it may withdraw it over another and another, until finally there would be no subject over which it might be entertained. * * * Looking to these acts of incorporation and the amendment thereof, it is apparent that the fundamental idea of the legislature was the exclusion of the jurisdiction of the circuit courts over the offenses• named. It cannot fairly be said the intention was to commit to the local authorities a concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit court, for the whole tenor of the legislation is to the end of withdrawing, not of conferring, power. We are therefore constrained to declare the scheme to be violative of the constitution and void. From these views it follows that the Mayor’s Court of the Town of Biloxi was without jurisdiction of the offense, and its judgment was a nullity.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Now, in spite of the fact that Section 156 vests original jurisdiction of criminal matters in the circuit court, and in spite of the fact that this Court, in the Montross case, supra, held that the Legislature can not confer upon an inferior court jurisdiction exclusive of the circuit court, Section 3, Chapter 207, Laws of 1916, the Youth Court Act provides as follows: “Except as otherwise provided herein, the court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction in all proceedings concerning any delinquent or neglected child residing or being in the county.” (Emphasis supplied.) And, by Par. (c), Section 2 thereof, “child” *420means a person who is less than eighteen years of age. The above mentioned exception is contained in Section 15 of the Act. If the child is thirteen years of age or older, “the circuit court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of such child if he be charged with any crime which, upon conviction, is punishable by life imprisonment or death.”
Thus, the only criminal cases where the circuit court will continue to have original jurisdiction, when the accused is under eighteen years of age, are murder and rape.
Grand larceny, under our law, is a felony punishable by a maximum sentence of five years in the penitentiary. Section 2340, Code of 1942. Although Section 156, supra, vests in the circuit court original jurisdiction of all crimes, including grand larceny — cattle stealing in this case- — this Act takes away such jurisdiction completely. Stealing by one under eighteen years of age can not be treated as a crime by the circuit court, unless the Youth Court gives its permission. The Legislature, by the euphemism of denoting as a civil matter what, since Mount Sinai, has been regarded as a crime, has taken away the jurisdiction vested in the -circuit court by the Constitution itself, and has rendered that court powerless to do anything .about prosecutions of such persons.
Besides, Section 17 of said Act provides: “No child under thirteen years of age shall be prosecuted criminally for a misdemeanor or a felony, but such ease must be handled by the youth court. ’ ’
The above classifications are contrary to the landmarks of human responsibility. From time immemorial, a person under seven years of age has been conclusively presumed to be incapable of committing crime. Between the ages of seven and fourteen, he is presumed to be incapable, but such presumption is rebuttable, and the ■State is privileged to show that he has such capacity. After fourteen years of age, he is presumed to have capacity. Joslin v. State, 75 Miss. 838, 23 So. 515; Beason v. State, 96 Miss, 105, 50 So. 488; Miles v. State, *42199 Miss. 165, 54 So. 946; Holmes v. State, 133 Miss. 610, 98 So. 104; Triplett v. State, 169 Miss. 306, 152 So. 881; Cochran v. Peeler, 209 Miss. 394, 47 So. (2d) 806.
The Youth Court Act, insofar as criminal responsibility is concerned, abolishes the wisdom of the ages, which rests on the laws of nature itself. If the Legislature shall be permitted to say that a seventeen year old is without capacity to steal, by the same token, it can arbitrarily increase the age of responsibility to twenty-one, or to any other age.
In the case of Bryant v. Brown, 151 Miss. 398, 118 So. 184, 187, 60 A. L. R. 1325, it was recognized that there are two schemes, under our law, for dealing with delinquent or incorrigible children and those who have violated the law. The child could be indicted in the circuit court for either a misdemeanor or a felony, and in a trial there, he would have all the rights accorded to any other person violating the law, including a jury trial and other incidents of the criminal law. But, if the circuit court was of the opinion that the chancery court could deal better with the child, it could transfer the case to that court. On such transfer, the case was then to be tried in accordance with procedure in the chancery court, as such proceedings would not then involve a prosecution for crime as such. The cause was thereby changed to a civil proceeding, and was governed by the rules of procedure as in other civil cases. The Court there said: “It will be seen from an examination of the above-cited sections that there are two schemes provided in the law for dealing with immoral, delinquent, or incorrigible children, or those who violate the law, either state or municipal, where such law involves moral turpitude, and instead of inflicting the punishment ordinarily inflicted for a violation of these statutes in proceeding under this statute, if the court proceeds to try the child in the circuit court under indictment for either misdemeanor or felony, the child has all the rights accorded to any other person violating the law, includ*422ing jury trial and other incidents of criminal law. But if the court having jurisdiction of the misdemeanor or felony is of the opinion that the chancery court can better deal with the child, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, than the circuit court, the case may be transferred to the chancery court for proceedings under section 10 of the act. If the cause is so transferred to the chancery court for hearing, it proceeds according to the procedure of the chancery court, and does not involve a prosecution for crime as such. In a case so transferred, the proceeding is changed from a criminal to a civil proceeding, and is governed by the rules of procedure in other civil cases.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In that case, there was no clash in jurisdiction. There was no denial whatever of jurisdiction of the circuit court in criminal matters. On the contrary, its jurisdiction was recognized; but it was empowered to transfer such causes to the chancery court when it deemed it to be proper. In such event, the causes became civil proceedings, and the incidents of the criminal law were not available.
But the Act here under review does not leave to the circuit court the power to transfer a case to the chancery court in order that it may then be treated as a civil proceeding. On the contrary, it denies to the circuit court jurisdiction of such case altogether. Such a situation is contrary to 31 0. J. 989, which says that: “Within constitutional limitations the legislature has power to create or establish such courts, and to confer upon them jurisdiction, powers, and duties which do not conflict with organic provisions-, * * (Emphasis supplied.) See, also 43 0. J. S., Infants, § 6 and cited in Bryant v. Brown, supra.
The reference in the majority opinion to the history of the inception and development of the Juvenile Court idea is concrete proof of the far-reaching effect of gradual encroachment: Let the camel get his head under the tent and he will take over completely.
*423Why should we be concerned with the citation of authorities from other jurisdictions when it is not even contended that the constitutional provisions are the same? But, even if they are alike, we turn to other jurisdictions only when our own Court has not decided the particular question. We are bound by the provisions of our own. Constitution and decisions; and Section 3 of the Youth Court Act is directly in the teeth of the plain and unambiguous language of Section 156 of our Constitution, and directly in the teeth of the opinion of this Court in the Montross case, supra.
There is no authority from this Court which would entitle the chancery court under the jurisdiction vested in it by Paragraph (d), Section 159, Article 6 of the Constitution to deprive the circuit court of its jurisdiction in criminal cases. As a matter of fact, the common acceptation of the meaning of that jurisdiction is the power to look after the property rights of minors, and appoint guardians of their persons and property.
The Constitution is the supreme law of our State. It is the anchor to the rights and liberties of the people. All officers, before their induction, must solemnly swear to uphold it. Peculiarly is that obligation binding on this Court, because its decision is the final authority in the construction and interpretation thereof. It is upheld and maintained in its pristine glory, or it becomes a mere meaningless scrap of paper, as this Court may decide.
In my opinion, there is no reasonable basis on which to construe Section 3, Chapter 207, supra, as valid or in harmony with Section 156 of our Constitution. I think that its unconstitutionality appears beyond reasonable doubt, and that this Court should so declare. For that reason, I most earnestly dissent against the conclusion of the majority opinion.
Roberds, Hall and Kyle, JJ., concur in this dissent.