Court Opinion

ID: 9955666
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 21:04:05.074821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:14.489417
License: Public Domain

2024 IL App (1st) 230640-U
                                  Order filed: March 28, 2024

                                                                              FIRST DISTRICT
                                                                            FOURTH DIVISION

                                         No. 1-23-0640

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the
limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).
______________________________________________________________________________

                                    IN THE
                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                           FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

 FAHAD NAZIR,                                    )        Appeal from the
                                                 )        Circuit Court of
       Plaintiff-Appellant,                      )        Cook County.
                                                 )
 v.                                              )        No. 20 L 8025
                                                 )
 COOK COUNTY HEALTH AND                          )        Honorable
 HOSPITAL SYSTEMS,                               )        Cahterine A. Schneider,
                                                 )        Judge, presiding.
       Defendant-Appellee.                       )
______________________________________________________________________________

       PRESIDING JUSTICE ROCHFORD delivered the judgment of the court.
       Justices Hoffman and Ocasio concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1     Held: Order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant is affirmed in part and
             reversed in part, where the majority of plaintiff’s claims under the Illinois
             Whistleblower Act were either barred by the applicable statute of limitations or
             failed on the merits; however, one claim that plaintiff was improperly suspended
             without pay is remanded for further proceedings.

¶2     Plaintiff-appellant, Fahad Nazir, appeals from an order granting summary judgment in

favor of defendant-appellee, Cook County Health and Hospital Systems. For the following reasons,

we affirm in part and reverse in part and remand for further proceedings.

¶3     Plaintiff filed his complaint against defendant on July 29, 2020. Therein, plaintiff alleged

that while he was employed by defendant, he suffered retaliation and ultimately termination of his
No. 1-23-0640

employment, in violation of the Illinois Whistleblower Act (Act). 740 ILCS 174/1 et seq. (West

2020).

¶4       More specifically, plaintiff’s complaint alleged that he was a pharmacist, having obtained

his pharmacy license in Illinois in 2009 and in Florida in 2011. He was hired by defendant as a

Staff Pharmacist in 2011. Plaintiff was assigned to work at Cermak Health Services of Cook

County (Cermak), a division of defendant located within a Cook County Department of

Corrections (CCDOC) facility in Chicago, Illinois, which provided medical treatment exclusively

to patients at the facility. Plaintiff’s duties included dispensing medication orders, including

controlled substances, to patients in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. However,

after several years of working for defendant, plaintiff began to raise internal concerns with

defendant—including formal union grievances—regarding his duties and responsibilities and

other aspects of defendant’s employment practices.

¶5       Plaintiff’s complaint primarily contended that “per the Drug Enforcement Agency” (DEA),

defendant’s own “Interagency Directive on Medication Administration and Distribution,” and the

Illinois Pharmacy Practice Act (Pharmacy Act) (225 ILCS 85/3 (West 2020)), a distinction was

made between “dispensing” and “administrating” controlled substances. According to the

complaint, these sources generally provided that dispensing such controlled substances simply

involved preparing and delivering a prescription for later use, while administering them involved

physically providing medications to a patient for immediate use. Plaintiff asserted that from the

beginning of his employment he was required by defendant to “administer” methadone and

suboxone to patients. These two drugs were controlled substances and were being provided to

certain patients as part of an opioid treatment program. After several years of employment, plaintiff

began to make internal complaints to defendant that as a pharmacist he was not authorized by state

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No. 1-23-0640

law or defendant’s own policies to “administer,” as opposed to “dispense,” methadone and

suboxone to patients. Beginning in May of 2019, plaintiff began to refuse to “administer”

methadone and suboxone to patients.

¶6     Plaintiff also made internal complaints that: (1) the person serving as defendant’s

Pharmacy Supervisor at Cermak did not have the proper qualifications to hold that position, (2) he

was improperly being required to, and ultimately refused to, complete a “Schedule ‘L’ form”

regarding drug and alcohol abuse programs in order to comply with requirements of the Illinois

Department of Human Services, (3) he had improperly been converted from a Staff Pharmacist to

a Clinical Pharmacist by defendant without notification, training or an increase in pay, (4) a

continuing education requirement mandated by defendant was improper, and (5) the way in which

patients were being administered methadone and suboxone violated their rights under the Health

Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) (Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.

1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of Titles 18, 26, 29, and 42 of the United

States Code (2016))). None of plaintiff’s internal complaints or union grievances with respect to

these issues were addressed or resolved to plaintiff’s satisfaction.

¶7     Thereafter, plaintiff began to raise these concerns externally. This included defendant’s

formal complaints to the Cook County Inspector General (CCIG), the Illinois Department of

Financial and Professional Regulation (IDFPR), the United States Department of Health and

Human Services, and the “Shakman Compliance Office.” Plaintiff also filed a complaint with the

Illinois Department of Human Rights (IDHR), asserting a claim of discrimination based upon his

sex and national origin. While an IDFPR investigator conducted an onsite investigation on or about

October 17, 2018, plaintiff’s complaint alleged that all his external complaints ultimately “met to

no avail.”

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No. 1-23-0640

¶8     However, plaintiff alleged that after “making internal and external complaints starting from

August 2018, Management’s treatment towards Plaintiff only worsened.” Plaintiff alleged that

after making his complaints, he suffered: (1) his first negative performance evaluation, (2)

schedule changes, and (3) his first suspension, followed by two more suspensions for not

completing continuing education requirements and for “refusing to administer methadone and

suboxone.”

¶9     Thereafter, on or around August 16, 2019, “Plaintiff provided counseling and printed

material to Opioid Treatment Program patients. Plaintiff provided information that informed

patients their health was at risk because pharmacists cannot administer methadone and suboxone.”

Three days later, “Plaintiff was escorted out of Defendant’s premises for informing patients their

rights were being violated having Pharmacists administer suboxone and methadone.” Plaintiff was

suspended for 29 days on or about August 19, 2019, although the complaint does not identify the

exact reason for the suspension. On or about September 12, 2019, plaintiff’s employment with

defendant was terminated. According to the complaint, the “reason given for his termination was

that Plaintiff had not followed management’s orders to dispense methadone and suboxone in

August of 2019, and that Plaintiff had distributed literature to inmates that their rights were being

violated.” Plaintiff’s appeal of his termination was denied.

¶ 10   Plaintiff’s complaint cited to the Act, which in relevant part prohibits an employer from

retaliating against an employee for: (1) “disclosing information to a government or law

enforcement agency, where the employee has reasonable cause to believe that the information

discloses a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation” (740 ILCS 174/15(b) (West

2020)), or (2) “refusing to participate in an activity that would result in a violation of a State or

federal law, rule, or regulation” (740 ILCS 174/20 (West 2020)). Contending that his first negative

                                                -4-
No. 1-23-0640

performance evaluation and his first suspension came within months of his complaints about the

administration of methadone and suboxone, all his suspensions were without pay, and despite his

best efforts he had yet to “find gainful employment since his time with Defendant” ended in his

termination, plaintiff’s complaint sought to recover damages under the Act. See 740 ILCS 174/30

(West 2020) (“If an employer takes any action against an employee in violation of Section 15 or

20, the employee may bring a civil action against the employer for all relief necessary to make the

employee whole.”).

¶ 11   Defendant filed an answer denying the material allegations of the complaint, as well as

three affirmative defenses. Those affirmative defenses included assertions that: (1) plaintiff’s

claims were barred by the applicable statute of limitations, including the one-year limitation

contained in the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (Tort

Immunity Act). 745 ILCS 10/8-101(a) (West 2020), (2) plaintiff failed to fully mitigate his

damages, and (3) to the extent plaintiff’s claims were premised upon the discrimination complaint

he filed with the IDHR, such claims were preempted by the Illinois Human Rights Act. See 775

ILCS 5/1-101 et seq. (West 2020). The record on appeal contains no indication that plaintiff ever

filed a response to these affirmative defenses.

¶ 12   Defendant thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment. Therein, defendant first

asserted that because plaintiff filed his complaint on July 29, 2020, any acts of retaliation alleged

to have occurred prior to July 29, 2019—which included all the allegations in the complaint other

than plaintiff’s August 19, 2019, suspension and his September 12, 2019, termination—were

untimely under the one-year limitation contained in the Tort Immunity Act. Defendant also

asserted that defendant could not meet his burden of proof under the Act where the undisputed

facts showed that: (1) plaintiff could not have had a reasonable belief that defendant’s procedures

                                                  -5-
No. 1-23-0640

regarding methadone and suboxone were improper after the October 17, 2018, inspection by the

IDFPR investigator, (2) there was no evidence that plaintiff refused to participate in an activity

that actually violated any state or federal law, rule, or regulation, (3) plaintiff was actually

terminated due to his unauthorized communications with patients, which caused his access to the

facility to be revoked, and (4) plaintiff’s discrimination claim was preempted by the Illinois Human

Rights Act. Supporting exhibits attached to defendant’s motion included: (1) the signed declaration

of Mary Ann Wrobel, the Director of Pharmacy for defendant’s Cermak facility, (2) the transcript

of plaintiff’s deposition testimony, and (3) nine exhibits identified at and discussed during

plaintiff’s deposition.

¶ 13    Plaintiff filed a written response to defendant’s motion for summary judgment, to which

he attached 17 exhibits as supporting evidence. These exhibits purported to be copies of: (1) the

internal and external written complaints plaintiff filed, (2) plaintiff’s internal and external

correspondence related to his complaints, (3) the results and findings of the IDFPR onsite

investigation, (4) two excerpts of what appears to be Wrobel’s deposition testimony, (5) a Cook

County Interagency Directive on Medication Administration and Distribution, and (6) several of

defendant’s other internal policies and procedures. However, the record includes no indication that

any of these documents were authenticated in any way.

¶ 14    After defendant’s motion was fully briefed by the parties, the circuit court entered an order

granting summary judgment in defendant’s favor on March 9, 2023. In its order, the circuit rejected

defendant’s assertion of preemption under the Illinois Human Rights Act. However, the circuit

agreed that all the allegations of retaliation alleged in the complaint other than plaintiff’s August

19, 2019, suspension and his September 12, 2019, termination were barred by the one-year statute

of limitations. With respect to those two remaining claims, the circuit court concluded that

                                                -6-
No. 1-23-0640

plaintiff’s “allegations are conclusory statements unsupported by fact, and in the absence of further

evidence, Plaintiff has not established a genuine issue of material fact that supports a reasonable

belief or actual violation of a law, rule, or regulation” to support his claims under the Act. For

those reasons, the circuit granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on the entirety of

plaintiff’s complaint. Plaintiff filed a timely notice of appeal on April 7, 2023.

¶ 15   Summary judgment is properly granted where the pleadings, depositions, and admissions

on file, together with any affidavits, indicate there is no genuine issue of material fact and the

moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 735 ILCS 5/2–1005(c) (West 2022). The

court must examine the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Pavlik v.

Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 323 Ill. App. 3d 1060, 1063 (2001)), and must construe the material strictly

against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmovant (Espinoza v. Elgin, Joliet and Eastern

Railway Company, 165 Ill. 2d 107, 113 (1995)). Although a drastic means of disposing of

litigation, summary judgment is nonetheless an appropriate measure to expeditiously dispose of a

suit when the moving party’s right to the judgment is clear and free from doubt. Gaston v. City of

Danville, 393 Ill. App. 3d 591, 601 (2009).

¶ 16   A “defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of production.”

Nedzvekas v. Fung, 374 Ill. App. 3d 618, 624 (2007). The defendant may satisfy this “burden of

production in two ways: (1) by affirmatively showing that some element of the case must be

resolved in his favor, [citation omitted]; or (2) by establishing ‘that there is an absence of evidence

to support the nonmoving party’s case.’ “ Id. When the defendant has met this initial burden, the

burden shifts to “the plaintiff to present a factual basis which would arguably entitle her to a

favorable judgment.” Id. A plaintiff is not required to prove her case in response to the motion for

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No. 1-23-0640

summary judgment, but must present evidentiary facts to support the elements of the cause of

action. Richardson v. Bond Drug Company of Illinois, 387 Ill. App. 3d 881, 885 (2009).

¶ 17   An order granting a motion for summary judgment is subject to a de novo standard of

review. Millennium Park Joint Venture, LLC v. Houlihan, 241 Ill. 2d 281, 309 (2010). As such,

we perform the same analysis that a circuit court would and give no deference to the circuit court’s

conclusions or specific rationale. Milevski v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital, 2018 IL App (1st)

172898, ¶ 26. This court may, therefore, affirm the judgment of the circuit court on any basis that

appears in the record, regardless of whether the circuit court relied upon that basis or whether the

circuit court’s reasoning was correct. Retirement Plan for Chicago Transit Authority Employees v.

Chicago Transit Authority, 2020 IL App (1st) 182510, ¶ 34.

¶ 18   We begin by making several preliminary observations and conclusions. First, we note that

“[e]vidence that would be inadmissible at trial is not admissible in support of or in opposition to a

motion for summary judgment.” Complete Conference Coordinators, Inc. v. Kumon North

America, Inc., 394 Ill. App. 3d 105, 108 (2009). “In civil cases in Illinois, the basic rules of

evidence require a proponent of documentary evidence to lay a foundation for the introduction of

that document into evidence.” Anderson v. Human Rights Comm’n, 314 Ill. App. 3d 35, 42 (2000).

“Evidence must be presented to demonstrate that the document is what its proponent claims it to

be.” Id. at 42. “Without proper authentication and identification of the document, the proponent of

the evidence has not provided a proper foundation and the document cannot be admitted into

evidence.” Id. This requirement may be met by providing an affidavit or by presenting testimony.

Cordeck Sales, Inc. v. Construction Systems, Inc., 382 Ill. App. 3d 334, 384 (2008).

¶ 19   Defendant met these requirements here, where the exhibits it attached to its motion for

summary judgment consisted of: (1) the signed affidavit—identified as a “declaration”—of

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No. 1-23-0640

Wrobel, (2) the transcript of plaintiff’s sworn deposition testimony, and (3) nine exhibits used at

plaintiff’s deposition, authenticated by plaintiff’s own deposition testimony. In contrast, the

documents attached to plaintiff’s response to the motion for summary judgment were not

authenticated in any way. Plaintiff presented no affidavit or testimony laying a proper foundation

for these documents or to demonstrate that the documents actually are what he claimed them to

be. Therefore, we conclude that plaintiff may not rely upon these documents to oppose summary

judgment in favor of defendant.

¶ 20    Second, we note that the relevant portions of the Act upon which plaintiff relies only protect

an employee from retaliation related to actual violations, or the reporting of alleged violations, of

a “State or federal law, rule, or regulation” (740 ILCS 174/15(b), 174/20 (West 2020)). (Emphasis

added.) Nevertheless, both below and on appeal, plaintiff relies in part upon purported actual

violations—and his reporting of alleged violations—of defendant’s own internal policies, Cook

County rules and regulations, and a Shakman consent decree involving Cook County hiring

practices. However, none of these are state or federal laws, rules, or regulations, and therefore

plaintiff cannot rely upon them to support his claims under the Act. Id.; Cwik v. Manteno

Community Fire Protection District, 2024 IL App (3d) 230036-U, ¶ 36 (“To allege a violation of

the Whistleblower Act, plaintiff had to allege *** a violation of a State or federal law, State or

federal rule, or State or federal regulation.”). 1

¶ 21    In addition, while both below and on appeal defendant relies upon vague allusions to

defendant’s purported violation of HIPPA and the federal “DEA manual,” or plaintiff’s disclosure

        1
          This case is cited as persuasive authority pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(e) (eff. Feb.
1, 2023), which provides that “a nonprecedential order entered under subpart (b) of this rule on or after
January 1, 2021, may be cited for persuasive purposes.”

                                                     -9-
No. 1-23-0640

of information he had reasonable cause to believe amounted to a violation of HIPPA and the DEA

manual, plaintiff has never identified or provided any specific provisions of HIPPA or the DEA

manual that were purportedly violated. However, summary judgment “ ‘is the put up or shut up

moment in a lawsuit.’ “ North Community Bank v. 17011 South Park Avenue, LLC, 2015 IL App

(1st) 133672, ¶ 15 (quoting Parkway Bank & Trust Co. v. Korzen, 2013 IL App (1st) 130380, ¶

14). The party opposing summary judgment must therefore produce actual evidentiary facts that

would enable a jury to return a favorable verdict—and “ ‘mere speculation, conjecture, or guess’

“ is insufficient. Barrett v. FA Group, LLC, 2017 IL App (1st) 170168, ¶ 26, (quoting Sorce v.

Naperville Jeep Eagle, Inc., 309 Ill. App. 3d 313, 328 (1999)). In the absence of any evidence as

to what specific provisions of HIPPA or the DEA manual were purportedly violated, we conclude

that plaintiff may not rely upon any actual or purported violation of HIPPA or the DEA manual to

oppose summary judgment in favor of defendant.

¶ 22   Next, plaintiff for the first time on appeal contends that the Pharmacy Act expands the

protections of the Act, where it provides that any person who reports, among other things, a

violation of the Pharmacy Act to the IDFPR “is protected under subsection (b) of Section 15 of

the Whistleblower Act.” 225 ILCS 85/30(h) (West 2020). Even if we were to consider the merits

of this argument, raised for the first time on appeal, we note that this provision was not added to

the statute and was not effective until after defendant was terminated. See Pub. Act 101-621 (eff.

Dec. 20, 2019) (amending 225 ILCS 85/30(h)).

¶ 23   Our final preliminary observation is that, on appeal, plaintiff explicitly declines to

challenge the circuit court’s conclusion that all the allegations of retaliation alleged in the

complaint—other than his August 19, 2019, suspension and his September 12, 2019, termination—

                                              - 10 -
No. 1-23-0640

were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Therefore, only these two allegations of alleged

retaliation remain at issue on appeal.

¶ 24    Turning to plaintiff’s August 19, 2019, suspension, we first reject plaintiff’s claim that

summary judgment was improperly granted to defendant with respect to any assertion that this

suspension constituted improper retaliation under section 174/15(b) of the Act. There is simply no

admissible evidence in the record to support a contention that this suspension resulted from

plaintiff’s disclosure of information to a government or law enforcement agency that plaintiff had

reasonable cause to believe disclosed a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation. 740

ILCS 174/15(b) (West 2020). Thus, we are left with nothing but plaintiff’s unsubstantiated

assertions to support this claim, and again “[m]ere speculation, conjecture, or guess is insufficient

to withstand summary judgment.” Sorce, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 328.

¶ 25    Rather, the admissible and undisputed evidence contained in the record—which includes

defendant’s own deposition testimony and a “Disciplinary Action Form” documenting this

suspension—clearly indicate that this suspension was based on plaintiff’s refusal to “provide

services to patients.” Plaintiff’s challenge to his August 19, 2019, suspension must therefore rise

or fall on his contention that he was improperly suspended under section 174/20 of the Act for

“refusing to participate in an activity that would result in a violation of a State or federal law, rule,

or regulation.” (740 ILCS 174/20 (West 2020).

¶ 26    As narrowed by our above discussion, plaintiff’s sole remaining contention in this regard

is that he was improperly suspended because he properly refused to “administer,” as opposed to

“dispense,” methadone and suboxone to patients, where “administering” such controlled

substances would be in violation of the Pharmacy Act. In support of this argument, plaintiff cites

to section 85/3 of the Pharmacy Act, which defines the “Practice of pharmacy” and further provides

                                                 - 11 -
No. 1-23-0640

that a “pharmacist who performs any of the acts defined as the practice of pharmacy in this State

must be actively licensed as a pharmacist under this Act.” 225 ILCS 85/3(d) (West 2020). Among

the acts included in the definition of the practice of pharmacy is “the dispensing of prescription

drug orders.” 225 ILCS 85/3(d)(2) (West 2020). The Pharmacy Act goes on to state that:

                “ ‘Dispense’ or ‘dispensing’ means the interpretation, evaluation, and

       implementation of a prescription drug order, including the preparation and delivery of a

       drug or device to a patient or patient’s agent in a suitable container appropriately labeled

       for subsequent administration to or use by a patient in accordance with applicable State

       and federal laws and regulations. ‘Dispense’ or ‘dispensing’ does not mean the physical

       delivery to a patient or a patient’s representative in a home or institution by a designee of

       a pharmacist or by common carrier. ‘Dispense’ or ‘dispensing’ also does not mean the

       physical delivery of a drug or medical device to a patient or patient’s representative by a

       pharmacist’s designee within a pharmacy or drugstore while the pharmacist is on duty and

       the pharmacy is open. 225 ILCS 85/3(m) (West 2020).

¶ 27   Also included in the practice of pharmacy is “drug administration.” 225 ILCS 85/3(d)(4)

(West 2020). Such administration is, however:

       “limited to the administration of oral, topical, injectable, and inhalation as follows:

                (A) in the context of patient education on the proper use or delivery of medications;

                (B) vaccination of patients 14 years of age and older pursuant to a valid prescription

       or standing order, by a physician licensed to practice medicine in all its branches, upon

       completion of appropriate training, including how to address contraindications and adverse

       reactions set forth by rule, with notification to the patient’s physician and appropriate

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No. 1-23-0640

        record retention, or pursuant to hospital pharmacy and therapeutics committee policies and

        procedures; and

                (C) administration of injections of alpha-hydroxyprogesterone caproate, pursuant

        to a valid prescription, by a physician licensed to practice medicine in all its branches, upon

        completion of appropriate training, including how to address contraindications and adverse

        reactions set forth by rule, with notification to the patient’s physician and appropriate

        record retention, or pursuant to hospital pharmacy and therapeutics committee policies and

        procedures.” 225 ILCS 85/3(d)(4) (West 2020). 2

¶ 28    With these definitions in mind, we turn to plaintiff’s deposition testimony in which he

provides a description of how he was required to “administer” methadone and suboxone to patients

while working for defendant. Notably, this description is unrebutted by any other evidence in the

record. With respect to methadone, plaintiff described the process as follows:

        “I took the person’s ID. I made sure that it was the correct patient, matching the SAMS

        computer terminal along with the Cerner software that matches a patient’s information.

        Then what I did was, can you please verify your name and date of birth to the patient, and

        he said blah, blah, blah, whatever that person’s name was and date of birth. So it was the

        correct person.

                What I did was I proceeded to pressing the dispense button, whatever that dispense

        2
           On appeal, plaintiff cites to and relies in part upon additional language defining “drug
administration” to include the “administration of injections of long-acting or extended-release form opioid
antagonists for the treatment of substance use disorder.” 225 ILCS 85/3(d)(4)(B-5) (West 2020). Plaintiff
asserts that this language did not give him authority to “administer” methadone and suboxone to patients
while working for defendant, because those medications—while they are opioid antagonists—were
provided by plaintiff to patients orally and not by injection. The language in subsection (B-5) is simply not
relevant here, however, because it was not added to the statute and did not become effective until after
plaintiff was terminated. See Pub. Act 101-349 (eff. January 1, 2020) (amending 225 ILCS 85/3).

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No. 1-23-0640

       button stated the amount of milligrams that that person was getting. So then the medication

       poured into the vial. I put a white cap on top of the vial and then I matched the label of the

       patient receiving the dose and I manually put in the amount of milligrams that the person

       was getting per methadone. Then she said—and then I proceeded over and I proceeded to

       the five rights of administration. I verified the right dose, the right drug, the right time, the

       right strength, the right patient, and then I said that I’m Fahad Nazir. I will be administering

       methadone to you. Then I initiated BCMA, which is bar code med administration, and I

       showed the patient that you’re getting this amount, and he said okay. I also added water or

       juice to the methadone vial and shook it up to make sure that it’s not too concentrated.

                When I initiated BCMA, I scanned the ID, patient’s ID, and then the methadone

       bottle, and that automatically charted methadone administration to the electronic

       medication administration record. I have to insure [sic] that I was putting it in the right time

       slot, whatever that time was that the patient came at, and then I said okay, sir, and then I

       opened the bottle for him. Then I said, please make sure you drink the entire thing

       completely. So he drank it completely, and then after he drank it completely, he swallowed

       it. *** I asked him to open the mouth and then I made sure that there was no liquid left and

       that he swallowed it completely. Then I took the bottle away from him, the vial.”

¶ 29   With respect to suboxone, plaintiff described the process as follows:

       “So then I grabbed the suboxone from the Pyxis cabinet where the strip is inside a little

       Ziploc bag. So then I took out the Ziploc bag which contains the suboxone strip with the

       patient’s label affixed on the Ziploc bag. I closed the Pyxis cabinet and then I went over

       near the methadone terminal. I made sure that it was the right drug with the right patient’s

       name and the right patient and the date of birth. I asked the patient what is your name and

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No. 1-23-0640

       date of birth, and they stated their name and date of birth. I then initiated the five rights of

       med administration. Then I also started BCMA which is bar code med administration. I

       scanned the patient’s ID with the suboxone strips cover which has a bar code on it, and I

       scanned it and then when I scanned both those things, it automatically documented on the

       patient’s electronic medication administration record. Then I insured [sic] that the

       administration was at the right time for whatever time that the patient came in.

                I cut open the strip and said to please take the—I took the strip out and I perforated

       the line where you, you know, you cut it a little bit, and I said please take the strip out and

       put it underneath the tongue. Then I made sure that the person put it underneath [their]

       tongue. Then the patient was leaning against the wall and they waited the full 20 minutes

       for it to be dissolved, and then after it was fully dissolved 12 minutes, sorry, 20 minutes

       later, I asked the patient to do a mouth check and I asked them to open the mouth. I made

       sure that there was no strip remaining in the mouth, that there was no residual amount left,

       and there was no residual amount left. Then I said okay you’re good to go.”

¶ 30   We note again that on a motion for summary judgment we must examine the evidence in

the light most favorable to the nonmoving party (Pavlik, 323 Ill. App. 3d at 1063), and must

construe the material strictly against the movant and liberally in favor of the nonmovant (Espinoza,

165 Ill. 2d at 113). Furthermore, the “purpose of summary judgment is not to try a question of fact,

but to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Northern Illinois Emergency

Physicians v. Landau, Omahana & Kopka, Ltd., 216 Ill. 2d 294, 305 (2005). “A triable issue

precluding summary judgment exists where the material facts are disputed, or where, the material

facts being undisputed, reasonable persons might draw different inferences from the undisputed

facts.” Adams v. Northern Illinois Gas Co., 211 Ill. 2d 32, 43 (2004).

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No. 1-23-0640

¶ 31   Based upon plaintiff’s unrebutted description of how he was required to provide methadone

and suboxone to patients, we find that reasonable people could draw different conclusions as to

whether those activities constituted “dispensing” or “administrating” medication as defined by the

Pharmacy Act, or whether under these circumstances plaintiff’s activities in this regard were or

were not authorized by the Pharmacy Act. As such, on these facts we cannot say as a matter of law

that plaintiff was not suspended for “refusing to participate in an activity that would result in a

violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation.” (740 ILCS 174/20 (West 2020). We

therefore conclude that summary judgment was improperly granted to defendant on plaintiff’s

claim that his August 19, 2019, suspension violated section 174/20 of the Act, because plaintiff

was retaliated against for refusing to participate in an activity that would violate the Pharmacy Act.

We therefore reverse that portion of the circuit court’s order and remand for further proceedings

on this claim.

¶ 32   We now turn to plaintiff’s contention that his September 12, 2019, termination resulted

from improper retaliation under the Act. We find it unnecessary to undergo an analysis similar to

that above with respect to plaintiff’s suspension, as we find alternative and independent reasons to

affirm summary judgment in favor of defendant on this claim.

¶ 33   In seeking summary judgement on this claim, defendant asserted in part that plaintiff could

not establish causation under the Act because he was actually terminated due to his unauthorized

communications with patients, which caused his access to the facility to be revoked. While the

circuit court did not rely upon this as a basis for its grant of summary judgment in favor of

defendant, we reiterate that we may affirm the judgment of the circuit court on any basis that

appears in the record, regardless of whether the circuit court relied upon that basis. Chicago Transit

Authority, 2020 IL App (1st) 182510, ¶ 34.

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¶ 34    Under both sections 174/15(b) and 174/20 of the Act, a plaintiff must establish that an

employer’s retaliation—in this case, termination of plaintiff’s employment—resulted from

protected conduct. 740 ILCS 174/15(b), 174/20 (West 2020). “The requirement that the discharge

be in retaliation for an employee’s activities requires that a plaintiff establish a causal relationship

between the employee’s activities and the discharge.” Brummel v. Grossman, 2018 IL App (1st)

170516, ¶ 49. “ ‘The element of causation is not met if the employer has a valid basis, which is not

pretextual, for discharging the employee.’ “ Id. (quoting Hartlein v. Illinois Power Co., 151 Ill. 2d

142, 160 (1992).

¶ 35    Here, plaintiff’s complaint itself alleges that: (1) on or around August 16, 2019, he

“provided counseling and printed material to Opioid Treatment Program patients. Plaintiff

provided information that informed patients their health was at risk because pharmacists cannot

administer methadone and suboxone,” (2) three days later, plaintiff “was escorted out of

Defendant’s premises for informing patients their rights were being violated by having

Pharmacists administer suboxone and methadone,” and (3) the reasons given by defendant for

plaintiff’s termination included that plaintiff “had distributed literature to inmates that their rights

were being violated by defendant.” In its answer to these allegations in plaintiff’s complaint,

defendant admitted that : (1) “Plaintiff provided unauthorized printed materials to opioid treatment

patients,” (2) “Plaintiff was escorted out of the Cook County Department of Corrections on August

19, 2019, after engaging in unauthorized and inappropriate communication with patients in

violation of multiple County rules, policies, and procedures,” and (3) “Plaintiff’s employment was

terminated for engaging in improper, unauthorized, and unsanctioned, written and verbal

communications with patients enrolled in the opioid treatment program in violation of Defendant’s

personnel rules and policies, the Cook County Department of Corrections Code of Conduct, as

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well as management directives.”

¶ 36      Thus, the complaint itself alleged that plaintiff engaged in these activities and that

defendant provided a justification for its decision to terminate plaintiff that does not on its face

violate the Act, and defendant’s answer to the complaint does not indicate otherwise. In addition,

the exhibits provided by defendant in its briefing on the motion for summary judgment—

specifically plaintiff’s deposition testimony and the disciplinary records related to plaintiff’s

termination—show that it is in fact undisputed that plaintiff communicated with patients regarding

his concerns with respect to the administration of methadone and suboxone and that this activity

was specifically referenced by defendant as justification for plaintiff’s termination. Again, the

element of causation in a claim under the Act is not met if the employer has a valid basis for

discharging an employee. Brummel, 2018 IL App (1st) 170516, ¶ 49.

¶ 37      Nor did plaintiff’s complaint contain any allegation that any such proffered reason was

merely a pretext for defendant’s actual intent to retaliate against plaintiff for conduct protected

under the Act. It was not until he responded to defendant’s motion for summary judgment that

plaintiff raised the argument that: (1) this justification was “merely a pretext for Defendant’s true

motivation,” (2) “the stated reason for his termination is pretext because the [activity] Plaintiff was

engaging in (alerting inmates of their rights) was the exact behavior Plaintiff contends was his

whistleblowing activity,” and (3) a “legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for termination cannot be

based on retaliation for engaging in protected activity.” Plaintiff makes similar arguments on

appeal.

¶ 38      However, “a response to a motion for summary judgment is not the proper vehicle to assert

new factual allegations that should have been included in the underlying complaint. ‘When ruling

on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court looks to the pleadings to determine the issues

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in controversy. [Citation.] If a plaintiff desires to place issues in controversy that were not named

in the complaint, the proper course of action is to move to amend the complaint.’ “ Abramson v.

Marderosian, 2018 IL App (1st) 180081, ¶ 55 (quoting Filliung v. Adams, 387 Ill. App. 3d 40, 51

(2008). There are simply no allegations of fact contained in the complaint regarding any alleged

pretext. Thus, it is improper for plaintiff to rely upon any assertion of pretext in opposition to the

grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant as to plaintiff’s challenge to his termination.

¶ 39   Even if we were to further consider plaintiff’s assertion of pretext, we note that plaintiff

again offers only speculation and cites to no admissible evidence in support of his contention that

the otherwise valid, proffered reason for his termination was in fact merely a pretext under the Act.

Again, “[m]ere speculation, conjecture, or guess is insufficient to withstand summary judgment.”

Sorce, 309 Ill. App. 3d at 328. Moreover, we reject plaintiff’s contention that his communication

with patients was somehow also protected activity under the Act. As discussed above and as

relevant here, the Act specifically protects an employee from being retaliated against for certain

disclosures to a government or law enforcement agency or for “for refusing to participate in an

activity that would result in a violation of a State or federal law, rule, or regulation.” 740 ILCS

174/15(b), 174/20 (West 2020). Plaintiff’s communication with patients regarding his concerns is

not activity protected under the plain language of the Act.

¶ 40   For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed

in part and this matter is remanded for further proceedings.

¶ 41   Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

¶ 42   Cause remanded.

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