Court Opinion

ID: 9912578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 19:02:47.436675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:24.341253
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION IN WEST'S HAWAI‘I REPORTS AND PACIFIC REPORTER

                                                 Electronically Filed
                                                 Intermediate Court of Appeals
                                                 CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                 22-DEC-2023
                                                 08:20 AM
                                                 Dkt. 92 SO

                           NO. CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX

                 IN THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS

                         OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

                 STATE OF HAWAI‘I, Plaintiff-Appellee,
                                   v.
                  KEKOA FIGUEROA, Defendant-Appellant

         APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                     (CASE NO. 1CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

                        SUMMARY DISPOSITION ORDER
         (By:   Ginoza, Chief Judge, Nakasone and Guidry, JJ.)

            Defendant-Appellant Kekoa Figueroa (Figueroa) appeals

from the Judgment of Conviction and Probation Sentence

(Judgment), filed on February 1, 2022, and amended on

December 27, 2022 by the Circuit Court of the First Circuit

(circuit court).1     For the reasons set forth below, we vacate the

circuit court's Judgment, and this case is remanded for a new

trial.

     1      The Honorable Trish K. Morikawa presided.
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           In January 2020, Figueroa was charged via Felony

Information, with Unauthorized Control of Propelled Vehicle

(UCPV), in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 708-836

(2014).2   The Felony Information alleged that,

           On or about January 8, 2020, in the City and County of
           Honolulu, State of Hawai[‘]i, Kekoa Figueroa did
           intentionally or knowingly exert unauthorized control over
           a propelled vehicle, by operating the vehicle without the
           consent of German Dalo, owner of said vehicle, thereby
           committing the offense of Unauthorized Control of Propelled
           Vehicle, in violation of Section 708-836 of the Hawaii
           Revised Statutes.

           Prior to trial, Figueroa filed Defendant's Motion to

Suppress Evidence (Motion to Suppress), dated June 12, 2020,

requesting that the circuit court suppress and preclude from use

at trial the evidence obtained by the Honolulu Police Department

(HPD) during Figueroa's brief investigative detention on

January 8, 2020.    Figueroa contended that Officers Lyle Maiava

(Officer Maiava) and Christopher Chu's (Officer Chu) "prolonged

detention of Defendant for purposes other than to address a

traffic infraction, to wit, failure to use turn signal, was an

     2     HRS § 708-836 (2014) states, in pertinent part,

                 Unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle in the
           first degree. (1) A person commits the offense of
           unauthorized control of a propelled vehicle in the first
           degree if the person intentionally or knowingly exerts
           unauthorized control over another's propelled vehicle by
           operating the propelled vehicle without the owner's consent
           or by changing the identity of the propelled vehicle
           without the owner's consent.

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illegal seizure," and that the introduction of evidence obtained

during the detention thus violated his rights under Article I,

Sections 5 and 7 of the Hawaiʻi State Constitution, and the

Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States

Constitution.

          The circuit court denied Figueroa's Motion to

Suppress, after hearing the motion on January 7, 2021, and

entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions Of Law, and Order

Denying Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence (Order) on

February 19, 2021.    In its Order, the circuit court made the

following unchallenged findings of facts:

             1. The Court finds that State's Witnesses, Officers
          Christopher Chu ("Officer Chu") and Lyle Maiava ("Officer
          Maiava") were credible.

             2. On January 8th, 2020, at about 5:30 pm, HPD Officer
          Chu and HPD Officer Maiava were on duty in the City and
          County of Honolulu in a high crime area.

             3. While operating an unmarked vehicle on a Honolulu
          roadway and making checks, Officer Chu and Officer Maiava
          observed a male later identified as Kekoa Figueroa
          ("Defendant") operating a moped bearing Hawai[‘]i Decal
          "Z18009."

             4. Defendant was observed by the officers turning onto
          Ke[‘]eaumoku Street without using a turn signal.

             5. Officer Chu, who was seated in the passenger seat of
          the unmarked vehicle, observed that the moped was being
          operated without any keys in the ignition. Officer Maiava
          independently observed the same.

             6. Officer Chu and Officer Maiava continued to follow
          the Moped, which turned into the Walmart parking lot
          located on Ke[‘]eaumoku Street. Without being pulled over
          by the HPD officers, the Defendant proceeded towards the
          entrance of Walmart and parked the moped near some soda
          machines.
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             7. Suspecting Defendant was operating the moped without
          authorization, Officer Chu and Officer Maiava parked their
          vehicle and approached Defendant on foot.

             8. While Officer Chu approached and spoke to the
          Defendant, Officer Maiava immediately conducted checks upon
          the moped and verified that the moped bearing Hawai[‘]i
          Decal "Z18009" is registered to a German Dalo ("Dalo").

             9. Officer Maiava contacted Dalo's phone number; Dalo
          related that he is still the current owner of the moped,
          that he does not know a Kekoa Figueroa and that he did not
          give Kekoa Figueroa permission to use, operate, or possess
          his moped.

             10. Based on the phone records of Officer Chu's cell
          phone (that were entered into evidence as State's exhibit
          #4), the phone call from Officer Maiava to Dalo's phone
          number was initiated at 5:33 pm and lasted 6 minutes.

          Based on the above-factual findings, the circuit court

made the following conclusions of law:

              1. The Perez test is controlling for investigative
          stops such as in the instant case in determining whether
          the stop/detention was justified. State v. Perez,
          111 Hawaiʻi 392 (2006).

              2. The suspicion of HPD Officer Chu and HPD Officer
          Maiava (before approaching Defendant) that Defendant was
          operating the moped without authorization was reasonable.

              3. The investigative actions by the HPD officers were
          reasonable at their inception.

              4. The time period from when HPD Officers Chu and
          Maiava first saw Defendant until the end of the phone call
          to Dalo did not last longer than was necessary to
          effectuate the purpose of the detention (the investigation
          of the possible stolen moped), and was limited in scope to
          that which justified the initial stop.[3]

     3    With respect to the timing, the circuit court further explained,

          At 5:30 the officers see the defendant operating the moped.
          The defendant had to drive to Walmart, park the moped. The
          officers had to park their car, walk to the defendant, get
          the VIN, run the VIN, and call the registered owner.

                                                              (continued...)

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               5. The investigation for unauthorized control of a
           propelled vehicle and any seizure of Defendant pursuant
           thereto, was reasonably related in scope to the
           circumstances, which justified the interference in the
           first place.

(Footnote added.)

           The matter proceeded to a jury trial.         At trial,

Figueroa raised, inter alia, a mistake-of-fact defense.              Counsel

for the State and Figueroa both agreed to the mistake-of-fact

jury instruction set forth in the Court's Special Instruction

No. 3, as modified by agreement, and the circuit court so

instructed the jury.     The jury reached its verdict on May 3,

2021, finding Figueroa guilty as charged of UCPV.           The circuit

court entered its Judgment sentencing Figueroa to four years of

probation with special conditions.

           Figueroa raises two points of error on appeal.            He

contends: (1) "[t]he trial court erroneously concluded that the

police had reasonable suspicion from the inception to detain

Figueroa for purposes of investigating whether the moped was

     3(...continued)

                 All of that occurred -- if the call was made at 5:33,
           all of that occurred in three minutes. Therefore, a good
           chunk of that three minutes was following the defendant,
           parking and approaching the defendant. Thereafter, Officer
           Maiava talked to the registered owner for six minutes.

                 Based on that information, the detention of the
           Defendant did not last longer than was necessary to
           effectuate the investigation of the possible stolen moped.

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stolen"; and (2) "[t]he [deputy prosecuting attorney]'s improper

remarks during his rebuttal closing argument substantially

prejudiced Figueroa's right to a fair trial."

           Upon careful review of the record and the briefs

submitted by the parties, and having given due consideration to

the arguments advanced and the issues raised by the parties, we

resolve Figueroa's contentions of error as follows:

          (1) We review the circuit court's denial of Figueroa's

Motion to Suppress de novo to determine whether that ruling was

"right" or "wrong."     State v. Spillner, 116 Hawaiʻi 351, 357,

173 P.3d 498, 504 (2007) (citation omitted).

          The proponent of the motion to suppress has the burden of
          establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
          statements or items sought to be excluded were unlawfully
          secured and that his or her right to be free from
          unreasonable searches or seizures was violated under the
          fourth amendment to the United States Constitution and
          article I, section 7 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution.

Id. (citation omitted).

          An investigative search is supported by the law

enforcement officer's reasonable suspicion for conducting the

investigative search.     State v. Perez, 111 Hawaiʻi 392, 398, 141

P.3d 1039, 1045 (2006).     "[T]he subject matter and intensity of

the investigative detention must be limited to that which is

justified by the initial stop."         State v. Iona, 144 Hawaiʻi 412,

417, 443 P.3d 104, 109 (2019) (cleaned up).

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          Reasonable suspicion exists where the officer can

"point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together

with rational inferences from those facts," demonstrate that

"measured by an objective standard, a man of reasonable caution

would be warranted in believing that criminal activity was afoot

and that the action taken was appropriate."      Perez, 111 Hawaiʻi

at 398, 141 P.3d at 1045 (cleaned up).     A court determines

whether reasonable suspicion exists based on consideration of

the "totality of the circumstances."     Spillner, 116 Hawaiʻi at

357, 173 P.3d at 504 (citations omitted).

          The record reflects that Officers Maiava and Chu had

reasonable suspicion to carry out their brief investigative

detention of Figueroa.    Officers Maiava and Chu testified to

observing that there was no key in the ignition of the moped

that Figueroa was riding.    Officer Chu testified that a moped

being operated without a key was "very unusual," and that "from

past experiences [the lack of a key] usually is a key indicator

that the vehicle might possibly be stolen."      The officers

approached Figueroa after he had pulled into the Walmart parking

lot and parked the moped.    They introduced themselves as police

officers, obtained Figueroa's name, and then visually observed

and ran checks on the moped's vehicle identification number

(VIN).   Figueroa explains in his opening brief that "the VIN []
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was openly indicated on the frame of the moped and the decal

affixed to the rear of the moped."     Officer Chu testified that

the VIN could be observed just by looking at the moped.       Officer

Maiava testified that the VIN is readily observable because it

is "visible to anybody that looks for it."

          The officers learned, based on their check of the

moped's VIN that, while not reported stolen, the moped was not

registered to Figueroa.    Officer Maiava contacted the registered

owner of the moped, German Dalo, by telephone.      Dalo informed

Officer Maiava, during a six-minute phone call at 5:33 p.m.,

that Figueroa did not have permission to operate the moped.

Officers Maiava and Chu testified that they arrested Figueroa

once they had verified that Figueroa did not have permission to

operate the moped, and that Dalo wanted to prosecute.

          Based on the totality of the circumstances, we

conclude that the brief detention of Figueroa was reasonable,

did not last longer than necessary to investigate whether the

moped was stolen, and was limited to effectuating the purpose of

the detention to investigate whether the moped was stolen.

Iona, 144 Hawaiʻi at 417, 443 P.3d at 109; Spillner, 116 Hawaiʻi

at 357, 173 P.3d at 504.    The circuit court did not, on this

record, err in denying Figueroa's Motion to Suppress.

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            (2) We review Figueroa's contention of prosecutorial

misconduct under the harmless beyond a reasonable doubt

standard.    State v. Mainaaupo, 117 Hawaiʻi 235, 247, 178 P.3d 1,

13 (2008).    This court must first determine,

            (1) whether the conduct was improper; (2) if the conduct
            was improper, whether the misconduct was harmless beyond a
            reasonable doubt; and (3) if the misconduct was not
            harmless, whether the misconduct was so egregious as to bar
            reprosecution.

State v. Udo, 145 Hawaiʻi 519, 534-35, 454 P.3d 460, 475-76

(2019) (citation omitted).       In addressing whether improper

conduct is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, this court will

consider "the nature of the alleged misconduct, the promptness

or lack of a curative instruction, and the strength or weakness

of the evidence against the defendant."           Id. at 535, 454 P.3d at

476 (citation omitted).       "Prosecutorial misconduct is not

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt if there is a reasonable

possibility that the misconduct complained of might have

contributed to the conviction."           Id. (cleaned up).

            Figueroa specifically contends that the following

misstatement of law, made by the deputy prosecuting attorney

during rebuttal closing argument, was substantially prejudicial,

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                BY [Deputy prosecuting attorney]:

                Defense counsel argues that Mr. Figueroa thought that
          this moped was, quote, "trash." Well, it's not hard to
          figure out if that moped belongs to somebody. He
          understands, he testified that he understands the concept
          of registration and title. He made no attempt to find out
          if it was trash or abandoned in any way.

                Now, defense counsel, he harps on mistake of fact.
          So looking at page 20, he's saying that he thought that the
          moped was abandoned, but when we look at the elements of
          the offense, he needs to have permission from the owner.
          This isn't a case where he's saying that, you know, Jojo
          sold me the moped or some other person gave me permission,
          I'm mistaken, I thought –- I thought that the other person
          had authorization. This isn't that kind of situation.
          This is a situation where he found the moped, he didn't get
          permission from anybody. So the mistake of fact
          instruction doesn't apply because he's doing it without the
          owner's permission. He didn't seek permission from
          anybody. He didn't seek permission from not a single
          person. So for mistake of a fact –- fact to apply, he
          would have to say I got permission from Bobby down the
          street to drive this moped, and you would have to believe
          that testimony. That isn't the case here. He sought
          permission from literally no one, and the law requires him
          to seek permission.

                [Defense counsel]:   Objection, misstates the law.

                THE COURT:   Sustained.

                [Deputy prosecuting attorney]: The bottom line is
          that is not the situation in this case. He's not mistaken
          of fact. He knew that he –- he knew that he was operating
          that moped without permission.

                Defense counsel says he didn't have a chance to,
          like, try to get legal ownership by registering. The
          defendant himself testified that he had it for multiple
          weeks prior to driving it. He had every chance and all the
          time –- and he –- he had plenty of time to seek permission
          or seek –- figure out who the owner was.

                So in light of all that, the State would ask the
          ladies and gentlemen of the jury to reach the only verdict
          that is appropriate, that is guilty as charged. Thank you.

(Emphasis added.)

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            On appeal, Figueroa contends that the circuit court

erred because, although it sustained Figueroa's objection to the

above remarks, it did not sua sponte strike those remarks and/or

issue a curative instruction.        Figueroa's contention has merit.4

      4     The circuit court correctly instructed the jury on mistake-of-
fact, prior to the prosecutor's rebuttal closing argument, as follows,

                  In any prosecution for an offense, it is a defense
            that the defendant engaged in that –- in the prohibited
            conduct under ignorance or mistake of fact if the ignorance
            or mistake of fact –- sorry –- if the ignorance or mistake
            negates the state of mind required to establish an element
            of the offense.

                  Thus, for example, a person is provided a defense to
            a charge based on an intentional or knowing state of mind
            if the person is mistaken (either reasonably, negligently,
            or recklessly) as to a fact that negates the person's state
            of mind required to establish an element of the offense;
            however, a reckless mistake would not afford a defense to a
            charge based on a reckless state of mind.

                  The burden is upon the prosecution to prove beyond a
            reasonable doubt that the defendant was not ignorant or
            mistaken as to a fact that negates the state of mind
            required to establish an element of the offense. If the
            prosecution fails to meet its burden, then you must find
            the defendant not guilty.

(Emphasis added.) This instruction, along with the circuit court's general
instruction that the jury must disregard any argument that "misstate[d] these
instructions," did not cure the prosecutor's subsequent misstatement of the
law.

            The prosecutor did not make a curative statement
            specifically directed at correcting the improper
            definitions that had been provided. Additionally, no
            curative instruction was given by the circuit court.
            Although the court generally instructed the jury prior to
            closing arguments that "[s]tatements or remarks made by
            counsel are not evidence," this instruction did not
            neutralize the prosecutor's oral amendment to the
            accomplice instruction, which misstated the requirements of
            the law.

State v. Basham, 132 Hawaiʻi 97, 111, 319 P.3d 1105, 1119 (2014).
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The circuit court's failure to cure this misstatement was not

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

            Mainaaupo explained that the elements of UCPV under

HRS § 708-836 are: "(1) the person's conduct of exerting control

over a thing by operating it, (2) the attendant circumstance of

the thing being 'another's' (i.e., the registered owner's)

propelled vehicle, and (3) the attendant circumstance of the

person's control/operation being without the registered owner's

consent."    117 Hawaiʻi at 249, 178 P.3d at 15 (emphasis and

bracketed text omitted).       Thus, one of the elements of UCPV is

the attendant circumstance of the vehicle being "another's."

            Here, Figueroa's defense was based on an alleged

mistake-of-fact as to the attendant circumstance of the moped

being "another's"; Figueroa testified at trial that he found the

moped in the "Ala Wai river" and that he mistakenly believed it

to have been "trash."      The deputy prosecuting attorney, in

rebuttal closing argument, misstated to the jury that "the

mistake of fact instruction doesn't apply" because, even if

Figueroa "found the moped," he did not have "permission from

anybody" to take the moped:

            This is a situation where he found the moped, he didn't get
            permission from anybody. So the mistake of fact
            instruction doesn't apply because he's doing it without the
            owner's permission. He didn't seek permission from
            anybody.

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This was an incorrect characterization of Figueroa's mistake-of-

fact defense, which did not claim a factual mistake about the

consent-from-registered-owner element, but asserted Figueroa's

belief that the moped no longer belonged to another, and thus,

consent could not or need not be obtained.5          And because these

misstatements about the mistake-of-fact defense were made during

rebuttal closing argument, they were effectively the final words

to the jury regarding that defense.         "If there is a reasonable

possibility that error might have contributed to a conviction in

a criminal case, then the error cannot be harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt, and the conviction must be set aside."

State v. Klinge, 92 Hawaiʻi 577, 583, 994 P.2d 509, 515 (2000)

(citation omitted).      We conclude, on this record, that the

prosecutor's misstatement of law was not harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.

           For the foregoing reasons, the Circuit Court of the

First Circuit's Judgment of Conviction and Probation Sentence,

      5     The prosecutor misstated to the jury that Figueroa could not,
based on the evidence, have acted under a mistake-of-fact. If the jury
believed Figueroa's testimonial account -- i.e., that he took what he
believed to be "trash" from the "Ala Wai river" -- it could have also found
that Figueroa was acting under a mistake-of-fact, as properly defined.
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filed on February 1, 2022, and amended on December 27, 2022, is

vacated, and this case is remanded for a new trial.

          DATED:   Honolulu, Hawaiʻi, December 22, 2023.

On the briefs:
                                       /s/ Lisa M. Ginoza
William H. Jameson, Jr.,               Chief Judge
Deputy Public Defender
For Defendant-Appellant.               /s/ Karen T. Nakasone
                                       Associate Judge
Brian R. Vincent,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,           /s/ Kimberly T. Guidry
City and County of Honolulu,           Associate Judge
for Plaintiff-Appellee.

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