Court Opinion

ID: 9383534
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-30 16:11:13.695241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:46.030625
License: Public Domain

J-A05036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 KALEVELYN CHAVERS                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellant        :
                                    :
                                    :
              v.                    :
                                    :
                                    :
 1605 VALLEY CENTER PKY, LP; PENN   :   No. 1045 EDA 2022
 CAP GROUP 3 GP, LLC; PENN CAP      :
 PROPERTIES PORTFOLIO, LP; AND      :
 GRUBB & ELLIS MANAGEMENT           :
 SERVICES, INC.                     :

           Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 12, 2022
         In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
              Civil Division at No(s): C-48-CV-02016-6041

 KALEVELYN CHAVERS                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                    :        PENNSYLVANIA
                   Appellant        :
                                    :
                                    :
              v.                    :
                                    :
                                    :
 1605 VALLEY CENTER PKY, LP; PENN   :   No. 1183 EDA 2022
 CAP GROUP 3 GP, LLC; PENN CAP      :
 PROPERTIES PORTFOLIO, LP; AND      :
 GRUBB & ELLIS MANAGEMENT           :
 SERVICES, INC.                     :
                                    :
                                    :
 APPEAL OF: PENN CAP PROPERTIES     :
 PORTFOLIO, LP                      :

           Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 12, 2022
         In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
              Civil Division at No(s): C-48-CV-02016-6041

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
J-A05036-23

MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.:                                  FILED MARCH 30, 2023

       Kalevelyn Chavers (Appellant) appeals from the $202,814.23 judgment

entered following a jury verdict in her favor, and against 1605 Valley Center

Pky, LP; Penn Cap Group 3 GP, LLC; and Penn Cap Properties Portfolio, LP

(PCPP).1 PCPP cross-appeals the judgment. Upon careful review, we affirm

in part, vacate in part, and remand with instructions.

       The trial court summarized:

       On July 8, 2016, [Appellant] … commenced this suit via complaint.
       In her complaint, [Appellant] alleged that on July 22, 2014, she
       tripped on exposed wires at her place of employment, Easton
       Hospital [(employer)], causing her to fall and sustain injuries.
       [Appellant] alleged that her injuries occurred due to the
       negligence of [PCPP], which owned and maintained the property….

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 2.            In a June 17, 2016, Compromise and

Release (C&R), Appellant settled her claim against employer and its workers’

compensation carrier for $100,000.00.             As a result of the settlement, the

employer/carrier assigned their subrogation rights to her. C&R, 6/17/16.

       On July 8, 2016, Appellant filed this action against PCPP. The trial court

explained:

       On November 8, 2021, a jury trial commenced in the instant
       matter. On November 12, 2021, the jury returned a verdict in
       favor of [Appellant], finding [PCPP] 100% negligent in causing the
       accident[,] and awarded [Appellant] one hundred sixty thousand
____________________________________________

1 The parties agreed 1605 Valley Center Pky, LP, and Penn Cap Group 3 GP,
LLC, “are part of and belong to” PCPP. N.T., 11/12/21, at 275. The parties
further agreed that Grubb & Ellis Management Services, Inc., “at all times as
property manager[,] acted on behalf [of] and at the direction of PCPP.” Id.
We collectively reference the defendants as PCPP.

                                           -2-
J-A05036-23

      dollars ($160,000.00) in damages.       The Civil Prothonotary
      docketed the verdict following the conclusion of the trial. On
      November 17, 2021, [Appellant] filed her motion for delay
      damages. [Appellant] and [PCPP] then filed their respective post-
      trial motions on November 22, 2021….

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 2.

      The trial court subsequently awarded delay damages and molded the

verdict. Order, 3/16/22, at 1. The court denied the parties’ remaining post-

trial motions. Id. On April 12, 2022, the trial court entered judgment against

PCPP for $202,814.23. Appellant timely appealed, and PCPP filed a cross-

appeal. The parties and the trial court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

      Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

      1. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error of law and/or abuse
      [its] discretion by denying the admission of past medical expenses
      and/or the lien for same, allowing the jury to be told that such an
      award would be a double recovery, and by refusing to mold the
      verdict to include past medical expenses of $228,347.10 (plus
      delay damages and post-judgment interest), and/or in failing to
      grant a new trial on damages for the valuation of [Appellant’s]
      past recoverable medical expenses?

      2. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error of law and/or abuse
      of discretion by permitting the jury to be advised that [Appellant]
      did not have to pay back the indemnity lien due to the assignment
      of the lien to her, depriving [Appellant] of an additional award of
      at least $154,711.66 (plus delay damages and post-judgment
      interest), such that the court should have either molded the
      verdict to include those damages, or grant a new trial concerning
      the valuation of those damages?

      3. Did the trial court commit prejudicial error of law and/or abuse
      its discretion by precluding Dr. [Christopher] Ferrante’s estimate
      as to the cost of future medical expenses, such that a new trial on
      future medical expenses should have been ordered?

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      4. Did the court commit prejudicial error of law and/or abuse of
      discretion by refusing to grant a new trial on the Disfigurement
      Claim since the verdict of $0 for disfigurement is clearly against
      the weight of the evidence?

      5. Did the court commit prejudicial error of law and/or abuse of
      discretion by refusing to grant a new trial on the claim for past,
      present, and future pain and suffering, embarrassment and
      humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life, since an award of only
      $25,000 is against the weight of the evidence, and probably the
      result of court error in admitting evidence of employer negligence?

      6. Did the court commit prejudicial error of law and/or abuse of
      discretion in refusing to grant a new trial on the issue of loss of
      past and future household services, for which the jury’s award of
      $0 was clearly against the weight of the evidence?

Appellant’s Brief at 4-6 (capitalization modified).

      On cross-appeal, PCPP presents the following issues:

   1. Did the trial court err by denying [PCPP’s] motion for judgment
      NOV or alternatively for new trial, and underlying motions for
      summary judgment, nonsuit and directed verdict, as the evidence
      was insufficient to support the verdict and establish that [PCPP]
      owed or breached a duty to [Appellant] given the clear terms of
      the Lease and as it bore no responsibility for installing and
      maintaining the wires [Appellant] tripped over, as the verdict was
      also against the weight of the evidence?

   2. Is a new trial required due to errors at trial which individually and
      cumulatively so prejudiced [PCPP] that the verdict was punitive
      and based on sympathy, speculation and confusion, which
      included:

      a. denying [PCPP’s] proposed verdict slip and accepting
         [Appellant’s] version, and submitting and erroneous verdict slip
         causing jury confusion; and

      b. failing to charge the jury on open and obvious conditions and
         rejecting [PCPP’s] proposed instruction?

   3. Is [PCPP] entitled to entry of judgment NOV in its favor or a new
      trial, as the jury’s finding that [Appellant’s] comparative

                                      -4-
J-A05036-23

      negligence was not a factual cause of harm was against the weight
      of the evidence, is not supported by the record evidence, and is
      contrary to law, as [Appellant] admitted she knew of the wires for
      at least 2 years before the incident but did not advise her
      employer or [PCPP], was looking ahead and not where she was
      walking, and, could have walked on the right side of her desk
      which was free of potential tripping hazards?

   4. Did the trial court err by granting [Appellant’s] Motion for Delay
      Damages which should have been denied or significantly reduced
      based on delay beyond [PCPP’s control], including the Covid
      pandemic and judicial emergency?

   5. Did the trial court err by denying [PCPP’s] Motion for Remittitur,
      and reducing and remitting the damages award to [an] amount
      consistent with the weight of the evidence?

PCPP’s Brief at 6-8. We first address the issues raised by Appellant.

                  Appellant’s Appeal at 1045 EDA 2022

(1)   Whether the trial court committed [a] prejudicial error of law
      and/or abuse of discretion by denying admission of past medical
      expenses and/or the lien for the same, allowing the jury to be
      told that any award of the lien amount would be a double
      recovery, and by refusing to mold the verdict to include past
      medical expenses of $228,347.10 (plus delay damages and pos-
      judgment interest), and or failing in granting a new trial on
      damages for the valuation of [Appellant’s] past recoverable
      medical expenses.

      Appellant argues the trial court “erred by failing to admit the past

medical expenses and permit recovery of the same[.]” Appellant’s Brief at

17.   Appellant claims the trial court improperly deemed her past medical

expenses unrecoverable from PCPP. See id. at 18. According to Appellant,

                                    -5-
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       she gave up rights under the [Workers’ Compensation Act (WCA)2]
       to obtain that lien assignment. The [trial court] summarily
       deprived [her] of the benefit of her bargain in favor of pardoning
       the responsible tortfeasor.

Id. at 18 n.2 (footnote added).

       Appellant further argues the trial court impermissibly permitted PCPP to

present evidence of

       the [subrogation] lien, the fact that all of [Appellant’s] past
       medical bills were paid, as well as much of her wage loss as set
       forth in the C&R Agreement, that any award to [Appellant] on the
       items covered by the lien would be payable to [Appellant], and
       therefore are not recoverable ….

Id. at 20.      Appellant maintains the subrogation lien should have been

admissible at her option, as established in Nazarak v. Waite, 216 A.3d 1093

(Pa. Super. 2019).       Appellant’s Brief at 21.       Quoting Nazarak, Appellant

claims she can recover the expenses paid by the workers’ compensation

carrier. Id. at 22.

       Appellant explains the public policy of avoiding a windfall was not

implicated because she “paid for the assignment of the subrogation right.”

Id. (capitalization modified).        Id.      Appellant argues, “Because [she] was

assigned the lien for good and valuable consideration, [] the tortfeasor gets

away with paying none of the medical bills it negligently caused [Appellant] to

incur.” Id. at 24.

____________________________________________

2See Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended, 77 P.S. §§ 1-1041.4, 2501-
2710.

                                            -6-
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      Appellant also claims the preclusion of an award for her past medical

expenses deprived her “of property rights without due process.” Appellant’s

Brief at 26 (capitalization modified). Additionally, Appellant insists the trial

court’s ruling will discourage settlements of workers’ compensation cases and

other cases involving third-party carriers. Id. at 29. According to Appellant,

the trial court should have molded the verdict to include past medical

expenses or award a new trial on damages. Id. at 42, 48.       Appellant directs

our attention to the testimony of her expert, who opined her past medical

expenses were reasonable and necessary.         Id. at 34.   Further, Appellant

points to the amount of the subrogation lien evidences the reasonable value

of the medical expenses. Id. at 37. Because the jury found PCPP 100% liable

for her injuries, Appellant asks this Court to either mold the verdict or grant a

new trial limited to damages. Id. at 48.

      As this Court has explained:

      [W]hen analyzing a decision by a trial court to grant or deny a
      new trial, the proper standard of review, ultimately, is whether
      the trial court abused its discretion.

      ….

      Moreover, our review must be tailored to a well-settled, two-part
      analysis:

      We must review the court’s alleged mistake and determine
      whether the court erred and, if so, whether the error resulted in
      prejudice necessitating a new trial. If the alleged mistake
      concerned an error of law, we will scrutinize for legal error. Once
      we determine whether an error occurred, we must then determine
      whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the
      request for a new trial.

                                      -7-
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Marion v. Bryn Mawr Tr. Co., 253 A.3d 682, 694 (Pa. Super. 2021)

(citations omitted).

      Upon review, the trial court’s denial of Appellant’s claim for past medical

expenses implicates 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6141 and the collateral source doctrine.

Section 6141 provides, in part:

      (a) Personal injuries. — Settlement with or any payment made
      to an injured person or to others on behalf of such injured person
      with the permission of such injured person or to anyone entitled
      to recover damages on account of injury or death of such person
      shall not constitute an admission of liability by the person making
      the payment or on whose behalf the payment was made, unless
      the parties to such settlement or payment agree to the contrary.

      ….

      (c) Admissibility in evidence. — Except in an action in which
      final settlement and release has been pleaded as a complete
      defense, any settlement or payment referred to in
      subsections (a) and (b) shall not be admissible in evidence
      on the trial of any matter.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6141(a), (c) (emphasis added).

      “The collateral source rule, which is intended to protect tort victims,

“provides that payments from a collateral source shall not diminish the

damages otherwise recoverable from the wrongdoer.” Nazarak, 216

A.3d at 1101-02 (emphasis added, citation omitted). In Nazarak, this Court

concluded evidence of a workers’ compensation settlement was not admissible

in similar circumstances:

      [T]here is no dispute that the “settlement” at issue (the workers’
      compensation compromise and release) was not made by
      [a]ppellants, and [a]ppellants were not in any way a party to the

                                      -8-
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      settlement. Rather, the settlement was made between Nazarak
      and his employer/employer’s workers’ compensation carrier,
      Liberty Mutual. Thus, according to the plain language of [42
      Pa.C.S.A. §] 6141(a), while the settlement does not constitute an
      admission of liability by Nazarak’s employer or Liberty Mutual, it
      has no effect on the liability of [a]ppellants (the third party
      tortfeasors). 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903 (indicating words and phrases
      are given their common and approved usage); 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921
      (indicating when words are clear and free from ambiguity they
      may not be disregarded).

      … Subsection (c) indicates that a settlement referred to in
      Subsection (a) “shall not be admissible in evidence on the trial of
      any matter.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6141(c). Accordingly, when
      Subsections (a) and (c) are read together, arguably, the
      settlement at issue was not admissible in the instant trial.

Nazarak, 216 A.3d at 1103 (emphasis added).

      Here, the trial court precluded an award for Appellant’s past medical

expenses, stating “allowing [her] to collect trial damages and receive the

benefit of the workers’ compensation settlement would create a windfall for

[Appellant].” Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 11. This was error. See 42

Pa.C.S.A. § 6141(a); Nazarak, 216 A.3d at 1103. Concern over a windfall to

Appellant is overshadowed by the injustice of absolving PCPP of liability for its

negligence. See, e.g., Charles v. Giant Eagle, 522 A.2d 1, 3 (Pa. 1992) (in

a case involving a settling co-tortfeasor, “concern over the windfall to the

plaintiff, if appellee were to be required to pay its full pro rat[a] share, is far

overshadowed by the injustice of the result they urge.”).

      Because the jury found PCPP 100% negligent for Appellant’s fall, the

trial court erred in precluding Appellant’s claim for her past medical expenses:

                                       -9-
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$228,347.10.3 We therefore vacate the trial court’s judgment and remand for

the trial court to mold the verdict to include Appellant’s past medical expenses,

plus delay damages and interest. See Pa.R.C.P. 238(a)(1) (“in all civil cases

wherein the plaintiff seeks monetary relief for bodily injury, delay damages

shall be added to compensatory damages awarded to the plaintiff against each

defendant found to be liable by the jury.”).

(2)    Whether the trial court committed prejudicial error of law
       and/or abuse of discretion by permitting the jury to be advised
       that Appellant did not have to pay back the indemnity lien due
       to the assignment of the lien to her, depriving Appellant of an
       additional award of at least $154,711.66 (plus delay damages
       and post-judgment interest), such that the court should have
       either molded the verdict to include those damages, or grant a
       new trial concerning the valuation of those damages.

       Appellant challenges the jury’s award of $75,000 for her lost past and

future wages. Appellant’s Brief at 59. Appellant argues:

       It is clear that the jury subtracted the $154,711.66 [previously
       paid by the carrier] from past and future loss of earnings.
       [Appellant] was forced to argue that the workers’ compensation
       payments only compensated [two-thirds of her] the past wages.
       The jury award of the final 1/3rd, $75,000.00 (rounded off), the
       jury thought would make the [Appellant] whole on the past wage
       loss. The problem is that [Appellant] was entitled to collect the
       entire lien[,] plus [the portion of the] wage loss [] not paid by
       workers’ compensation, and instead she collected none of the lien.
       This must be corrected either by molding the verdict to include

____________________________________________

3 The subrogation lien identifies the past medical expenses paid by the carrier.
See Moorhead v. Crozer Chester Med. Ctr., 765 A.2d 786, 789 (Pa. 2001)
(“The expenses for which a plaintiff may recover must be such as have been
actually paid, or such as, in the judgment of the jury, are reasonably
necessary to be incurred.”), overruled in part by Northbrook Life Ins. v.
Commonwealth, 949 A.2d 333, 337 (Pa. 2008).

                                          - 10 -
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      the $154,71166, or by granting a new trial to value the past and
      future loss of earnings and earning capacity.

Id. Appellant provides no additional argument.

      Appellant challenges the jury’s verdict as against the weight of the

evidence.

      The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial based upon
      a claim that the verdict is against the weight of the evidence is
      within the sound discretion of the trial court. Thus, the function
      of an appellate court on appeal is to review the trial court’s
      exercise of discretion based upon a review of the record, rather
      than to consider de novo the underlying question of the weight of
      the evidence. An appellate court may not overturn the trial court’s
      decision unless the trial court palpably abused its discretion in
      ruling on the weight claim. Further, in reviewing a challenge to
      the weight of the evidence, a verdict will be overturned only if it
      is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

      ….

      A trial court’s determination that a verdict was not against the
      interest of justice is [o]ne of the least assailable reasons for
      denying a new trial. A verdict is against the weight of the evidence
      where certain facts are so clearly of greater weight that to ignore
      them or to give them equal weight with all the facts is to deny
      justice.

Tong-Summerford v. Abington Mem’l Hosp. & Radiology Grp. of

Abington, P.C., 190 A.3d 631, 659 (Pa. Super. 2018) (quotation marks and

citations omitted).

      Our Supreme Court explained:

      While a jury’s verdict and damages award are generally insulated
      from challenge, the grant of a new trial may be required to achieve
      justice in those instances where the original trial, because of taint,
      unfairness, or error, produces something other than a just and fair
      result, which is the principle goal of judicial proceedings. … [A]
      jury verdict may be set aside as inadequate when it appears to

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      have been the product of passion, prejudice, partiality, or
      corruption, or where it clearly appears from uncontradicted
      evidence that the amount of the verdict bears no reasonable
      relation to the loss suffered by the plaintiff. Where the jury’s
      verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of
      justice a new trial should be awarded. [The Court] cautioned that
      it was within the province of the jury to assess the worth of the
      testimony and to accept or reject the estimates given by the
      witnesses, and if the verdict bears a reasonable resemblance to
      the proven damages, it is not the function of the court to
      substitute its judgement for the jury’s….

Mader v. Duquesne Light Co., 241 A.3d 600, 612-13 (Pa. 2020) (citations

and quotation marks omitted).

      Our review shows the trial court properly instructed the jury it could

award Appellant her past lost earnings. N.T., 11/10/21, at 266-67. The trial

court did not instruct the jury to make any deductions from its award. “We

presume that juries follow the trial court’s instructions.” Renninger v. A&R

Mach. Shop, 163 A.3d 988, 1000 (Pa. Super. 2017).

      In denying Appellant relief, the trial court explained: “Considering the

evidence produced at trial and respecting the jury’s findings of fact, this court

does not deem it appropriate to disturb the jury’s verdict.” Trial Court Opinion,

3/16/22, at 14. Upon review, we discern no abuse of discretion; the jury’s

verdict bears a reasonable resemblance to the proven damages. See Mader,

241 A.3d at 613. Appellant’s issue merits no relief.

(3)   The Trial Court committed prejudicial error of law and/or abused
      its discretion by precluding Dr. Ferrante’s estimate as to the cost
      of future medical expenses, such that a new trial on future
      medical expenses should have been ordered.

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      Appellant argues the trial court disallowed Dr. Ferrante’s testimony

about “the reasonable value of [Appellant’s] future medical expenses[.]”

Appellant’s Brief at 60. Appellant claims the absence of this testimony caused

“the jury to speculate on the costs thereof, which resulted in a finding of $0[]

for future medical expenses.”     Id.   Appellant emphasizes Dr. Ferrante’s

testimony that Appellant’s prosthesis would wear out, and “given her age, she

had about a 50-50 chance of having to have another knee replacement in the

future.” Id. According to Appellant, PCPP objected to Dr. Ferrante’s estimated

future medical expenses of $70,000 - $100,000 as outside the scope of his

expert report. Id. Appellant asserts the trial court improperly sustained the

objection, because

      experts can expand on and amplify their pretrial reports, as long
      as they do not proffer a new theory or present trial testimony
      inconsistent with the fair scope of their report.

Id. (emphasis omitted).

      Appellant contends Dr. Ferrante, who testified as her treating physician,

“was never purely” an expert witness. Id. at 61. Appellant argues that, since

PCPP objected, PCPP had the burden of proving Dr. Ferrante “did not form

those opinions during the course of treatment.” Id. Appellant posits that Dr.

Ferrante’s testimony should have been admitted, “because the opinion was

not acquired or developed with an eye toward litigation.”       Id.   Appellant

asserts, “given that there was no objection to the testimony that a future

medical procedure may be needed, [] the defense would not have been

                                     - 13 -
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surprised that such procedures cost money.” Id. at 62. Finally, Appellant

maintains the cost of a medical procedure is more a question of fact, not

opinion. Id.

     A plaintiff must present expert testimony to establish a right to

compensation for future medical damages:

     It is well-settled that an item of damage claimed by a plaintiff can
     properly be submitted to the jury only where the burden of
     establishing damages by proper testimony has been met. In the
     context of a claim for future medical expenses, the movant must
     prove, by expert testimony, not only that future medical
     expenses will be incurred, but also the reasonable cost of such
     services….

Mendralla v. Weaver Corp., 703 A.2d 480, 485 (Pa. Super. 1997) (en

banc) (emphasis added; citations omitted).

     The trial court correctly and concisely disposed of this issue:

     A new trial is warranted if the trial court committed a clear abuse
     of discretion or an error of law controlling the outcome of the case.
     Angelo v. Diamontoni, 871 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. Ct.
     2003). “[T]he direct testimony of the expert at the trial may not
     be inconsistent with or go beyond the fair scope of his or her
     testimony in the discovery proceedings as set forth in the
     deposition, answer to an interrogatory, separate report, or
     supplement thereto.” Pa.R.C.P. 4003.5(c). Here, at trial, [PCPP]
     objected to Dr. Ferrante’s testimony estimating that a future knee
     surgery would cost [Appellant] $70,000.00 - $100,000.00
     because such testimony is beyond the scope of Dr. Ferrante’s
     report. Indeed, Dr. Ferrante’s report did not set forth an
     estimate regarding the cost of a potential future knee
     replacement.       Furthermore, Dr. Ferrante testified that
     [Appellant] had a fifty percent chance of requiring another
     knee replacement in the future. [Appellant’s] need for a future
     surgery is purely hypothetical, and the future damages are not
     actual. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
     limiting Dr. Ferrante’s testimony.

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Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 12-13 (emphasis added).       Whether the

Court committed prejudicial error of law and/or abuse of discretion

by refusing to grant a new trial on the disfigurement claim since the

verdict of $0 for disfigurement is clearly against the weight of the

evidence.

(4)   Whether the court committed prejudicial error of law and/or
      abuse of discretion by refusing to grant a new trial on the claim
      for past, present, and future pain and suffering, embarrassment
      and humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life, since an award of
      only $25,000 is against the weight of the evidence, and probably
      the result of Court error in admitting evidence of employer
      negligence.

(5)   Whether the court should have granted a new trial on assessing
      value of loss of past and future household services, for which the
      jury’s award of $0 is clearly against the weight of the evidence.

      In her fourth, fifth and sixth issues, Appellant claims the verdict is

contrary to the weight of the evidence.      In her fourth issue, Appellant

challenges the jury’s award of $0 for knee disfigurement. Appellant’s Brief at

63. Appellant states: “Scarring is a compensable type of disfigurement.” Id.

at 67. Appellant advises she displayed her surgical scar to the jury. Id. at

63. Although she includes photographs of her knee in her brief, Appellant

concedes that no photographs were presented or admitted into evidence at

trial. Id. at 64. Appellant directs our attention to her testimony about the

impact of the scar on her lifestyle and self-esteem. Id.

      Appellant claims: “The fact of scarring … from the tort is not debatable

given the award of past and future lost income.” Id. at 65. Appellant cites

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Kopytin v. Aschinger, 947 A.2d 739, 743-44 (Pa. Super. 2008), as holding

that

       [a j]ury verdict in [a] personal injury case which awarded
       damages only to compensate for unreimbursed medical expenses,
       contradicted [the] jury’s finding that [the] driver received injuries
       of a type that normally involved pain and suffering, and therefore,
       reversal of the award and [a] new trial on damages was required.

Appellant’s Brief at 66-67.

       Similarly, in her fifth issue, Appellant claims the jury awarded her a

“grossly    inadequate   sum”    of   $25,000.00     for   her   pain,   suffering,

embarrassment, humiliation, and her loss of enjoyment of life.           Id. at 73.

Appellant asserts that, because of the accident, she underwent a partial knee

replacement,

       extensive physical therapy, a total knee replacement, a Dural leak
       which involved excruciating pain and suffering due to spinal fluid
       around her brain and spinal cord being drained during her …
       procedure, a manipulation under anesthesia, and a surgical repair
       of her Dural leak, together with lifetime disability, impairment,
       and pain and suffering….

Id.      Appellant references evidence of her physical abilities prior to the

accident, and her pain following the accident and medical procedures. Id. at

74-77.

       In her sixth issue, Appellant argues the jury’s failure to award damages

for her inability to perform household services is against the weight of the

evidence. Id. at 81. Appellant asserts that her vocational expert placed a

value on these services. Id. According to Appellant, the jury was not free to

disregard this testimony and “simply pretend the damages did not exist.” Id.

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      We are cognizant of our standard and scope of review, stated above.

See Tong-Summerford, 190 A.3d at 659.

      Instantly, the trial court declined to award Appellant a new trial, stating:

      Considering the evidence produced at trial and respecting the
      jury’s findings of fact, this court does not deem it appropriate to
      disturb the jury’s reasonable verdict….

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 13-14. Upon review, we discern no abuse of

discretion.

      “[A] jury is always free to believe all, part, some, or none of the evidence

presented.”   Avery v. Cercone, 225 A.3d 873, 879 (Pa. Super. 2019).

“[G]enerally the determination of whether the pain is severe enough to be

compensable is left to the jury.” Van Kirk v. O’Toole, 857 A.2d 183, 186

(Pa. Super. 2004).

      [T]here are injuries to which human experience teaches there is
      accompanying pain. Those injuries are obvious in the most
      ordinary sense: the broken bone, the stretched muscle, twist of
      the skeletal system, injury to a nerve, organ or their function, and
      all the consequences of any injury traceable by medical science
      and common experience as sources of pain and suffering.

Boggavarapu v. Ponist, 542 A.2d 516, 518 (Pa. 1988). The jury, having

seen and heard Appellant’s testimony and that of her doctor and other

witnesses, “is not required to accept everything or anything [they] said, even

if their testimony was uncontradicted.” Bronchak v. Rebmann, 397 A.2d

438, 440 (Pa. Super. 1979). “The “determination of what is a compensable

injury is uniquely within the purview of the jury.” Majczyk v. Oesch, 789

                                     - 17 -
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A.2d 717, 725-26 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted); accord Avery, 255

A.3d at 879.

       At trial, Appellant testified about her scar from her knee replacement

surgery:

       [I]t just changed my whole lifestyle. I can’t wear dresses anymore
       above or below the knee. They have to be long. Because the
       scar, it stems from above my knee past my knee. It’s very thick
       and it’s just ugly.

            It’s very thick and ugly to look at. So I have developed a
       complex of anybody looking at me, if I was to go to the doctor,
       anywhere, even if I’m at a family member’s house and I have to
       wear – I would undress, say, for my sisters or anyone, I just have
       a complex.

             I don’t want anybody to look at it. I will cover it up, you
       know. Or pajamas. I don’t wear the nightgown anymore if I am
       sleeping over. I just wear pajama pants.

Id. at 153. As stated above, Appellant showed her scar to the jury. Id. at

154.

       It is undisputed Appellant had knee replacement surgery following the

accident, which resulted in pain and suffering and a scar. However, the jury

also heard evidence that Appellant had significant knee issues predating her

July 22, 2014, workplace injury. Appellant acknowledged seeing her doctor

on January 12, 2009, for left knee pain. N.T., 11/9/21, at 121. At that time,

Appellant’s x-rays showed a significant lesion on her medial femoral condyle

in her left knee. Id. at 122. Appellant again complained of left leg and back

pain on May 14, 2009. Id. at 124. On September 23, 2012, Appellant visited

an emergency care center because she felt a “pop” in her left knee. Id.

                                     - 18 -
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      On May 28, 2013, Appellant had an arthroscopic surgery on her left

knee. Id. at 126. On August 2, 2013, Appellant informed her doctor she had

swelling in her left knee, but no pain. Id. at 127. Appellant received steroid

injections in her left knee on February 2, 2014, March 3, 2014, and March 10,

2014. Id. at 128-29.

      On May 9, 2014, Appellant visited her doctor for pain in both knees. Id.

at 132-33. Appellant told her doctor that she continued to have knee pain.

Id. at 133-34. Appellant’s x-rays at the time showed sclerosis and narrowing

of the left knee, with large spur formation.         Id. at 136.     Appellant

acknowledged the x-rays showed moderate to advanced arthritis in both

knees. Id. at 137.

      Appellant presented the deposition testimony of Dr. Ferrante, an

orthopedic surgeon with Lehigh Valley Health Network.        See N.T. (Trial),

11/10/21, at 168. Dr. Ferrante testified that, in preparing his expert report,

he reviewed Appellant’s prior medical records and her history of treatment for

left knee pain.   N.T., (Deposition), 11/3/21, at 28-30.      Regarding knee

swelling before and after her injury, Dr. Ferrante opined:

      The perfect situation would be to have an MRI before the trauma
      and an MRI after the trauma to see, which we don’t have. But
      [Appellant] seemed to be functioning very well from her report[]
      to me long after this [and] she was functioning pretty well, so she
      probably didn’t have the edema before the injury.

Id. at 54-55. Dr. Ferrante saw Appellant on January 6th and 28th, 2016, and

ultimately performed a total knee replacement. Id. at 61.

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      In sum, the jury heard extensive evidence concerning Appellant’s

disfigurement, the lost value of her household services, and her pain and

suffering. Ultimately, the jury chose to award nothing for disfigurement or

the lost value of Appellant’s household services, and awarded $25,000 for

Appellant’s pain and suffering. Regarding the first two types of damages, this

Court has recognized that not all injuries are “serious enough to warrant

compensation.” Gold v. Rosen, 135 A.3d 1039, 1044 (Pa. Super. 2016)

(citation   omitted).    The   jury   was   free   to   conclude   that   Appellant’s

disfigurement and lost household services were not caused by PCPP’s

negligence or “the sort of transient rub of life for which compensation is not

warranted.” Id.

      Regarding the alleged inadequacy of the pain and suffering award, our

Supreme Court has stated that a reversal of a jury verdict on the grounds of

inadequacy is appropriate “only where the injustice of the verdict stands forth

like a beacon.” Davis v. Mullen, 773 A.2d 764, 766 (Pa. 2001) (citation and

brackets omitted).      Here, the trial court, which oversaw the presentation of

evidence first-hand, concluded that the jury verdict with respect to these three

types of damages did not warrant relief.        See Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22,

at 14 (“Considering the evidence produced at trial and respecting the jury’s

findings of fact, this court does not deem it appropriate to disturb the jury’s,

reasonable verdict.”).     Appellant has not convinced us that the trial court

abused its discretion. As such, Appellant’s challenges do not merit relief.

                                       - 20 -
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                  Appeal of PCPP: No. 1183 EDA 2022

(1)   Whether the trial court erred by denying PCPP’s motion for
      Judgment notwithstanding the verdict or for a new trial, as the
      evidence was insufficient to support the verdict and establish
      that PCPP owed or breached a duty to Appellant, and the verdict
      was also against the weight of the evidence.

      PCPP first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the

verdict.   PCPP’s Brief at 44.    PCPP argues, “The evidence at trial was

insufficient to establish [PCPP] was negligent, i.e., owed or breached a duty

of care to [Appellant] ….” Id. at 45. PCPP asserts the trial court erred by not

granting a nonsuit, a directed verdict, or judgment notwithstanding the

verdict. Id. According to PCPP:

      [PCPP’s] duties with regard to the property are unambiguously set
      forth in the Lease and Property Management Agreement
      [(Lease)], and were solely to manage the property, maintain
      common areas, and to provide the IT network and infrastructure.
      [Employer] installed the equipment and wires, not [PCPP], and
      [PCPP] did not provide credit card machines or computers to its
      tenants.     There was no evidence that [PCPP] bore any
      responsibility for the condition of the wires or manner in which
      they were left on, or taped to the floor, or to install and maintain
      the wires. The Lease specifically excluded telecommunications
      wiring, outlets and equipment from [PCPP’s] duties….

Id. at 46 (emphasis in original). PCPP further asserts that Appellant’s own

expert     “admitted   and    acknowledged      that    under    the    lease[,]

telecommunications wires are excluded[.]” Id.

      PCPP points out that employer installed the equipment and wires, not

PCPP. Id. PCPP argues:

      The record is devoid of any evidence that [PCPP] was advised of,
      or had notice of a hazardous wire condition, and it had no duty of

                                     - 21 -
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      inspection here. The lease required [employer] to keep the
      premises in a neat and orderly condition and comply with all laws
      (including the [Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§
      12101 et seq.]), ordinances, notices, orders, rules, regulations
      and requirements regulating the subject property.

Id. (citations omitted).

      PCPP additionally challenges the jury’s finding it was 100% liable for

Appellant’s injury. PCPP’s Brief at 47. PCPP argues, “The evidence at trial

overwhelmingly established that [PCPP] did not owe or breach a duty of care

to [Appellant].” Id. at 48. PCPP cites for support the testimony of its expert

mechanical engineer, Dr. Jason Kiddy.        Id.   According to PCPP, Dr. Kiddy

opined that PCPP

      had no responsibility for, and did not contribute to [Appellant’s]
      trip and fall; that [PCPP] did not obstruct a means of egress from
      [Appellant’s] desk in regard to the wires; and [employer] bore the
      duty to maintain the space where the incident occurred, not
      [PCPP].

Id. at 48-49 (citations omitted).    Upon review, we are not persuaded by

PCPP’s argument.

      We have explained:

      Our standard[s] of review when considering the motions for a
      directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict [JNOV]
      are identical. We will reverse a trial court’s grant or denial of a
      [directed verdict or JNOV] only when we find an abuse of
      discretion or an error of law that controlled the outcome of the
      case. Further, the standard of review for an appellate court is the
      same as that for a trial court.

      There are two bases upon which a [directed verdict or JNOV] can
      be entered; one, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter
      of law and/or two, the evidence is such that no two reasonable
      minds could disagree that the outcome should have been rendered

                                    - 22 -
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      in favor of the movant. With the first, the court reviews the record
      and concludes that, even with all factual inferences decided
      adverse to the movant, the law nonetheless requires a verdict in
      [its] favor. Whereas with the second, the court reviews the
      evidentiary record and concludes that the evidence was such that
      a verdict for the movant was beyond peradventure.

Hall v. Episcopal Long Term Care, 54 A.3d 381, 395 (Pa. Super. 2012)

(citations omitted).

      The trial court explained:

      [PCPP] argues [Appellant] was not owed a duty, and therefore,
      [PCPP] could not have breached a duty that resulted in
      [Appellant’s] injuries; [PCPP] contend[s] that all of [its] duties and
      obligations relating to the property are defined in the contract
      documents. [PCPP] state[s] that the duties discussed in the
      contract include managing the property, maintaining the common
      areas, and providing the IT network and infrastructure. The
      contract excludes from [PCPP’s] duties telecommunication wiring,
      outlets, equipment, and any associated wires connecting to those
      items. [PCPP] reason[s … it was] not responsible for maintaining
      the wires [Appellant] tripped over and [is] entitled to judgment as
      a matter of law.

      [Appellant], however, argued [PCPP] indeed owed her a duty.
      [Appellant] asserted [PCPP] retained sufficient control over the
      premises to impose a duty to protect [Appellant] from foreseeable
      harm. [PCPP’s] control over the property was evidenced by the
      lease agreement, building rules, [PCPP’s] exclusive right to service
      the property, [PCPP’s] maintenance and janitorial responsibilities,
      and inspections of the property. Certainly, genuine issues of
      material fact existed regarding the issue of duty. As such, the
      issue of duty was property submitted to the jury, and the trial
      court did not err in denying [PCPP’s] pre-trial motion[.]

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 16.

      The record supports the trial court’s findings, and we discern no error.

See, e.g., N.T., 11/8/21, at 167, 176-77 (PCPP’s president, Lisa Pektor,

testifying employer paid a maintenance fee), 177 (Pektor testifying employer

                                       - 23 -
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can put in a work order for, inter alia, exposed wires), 177-78 (Pektor

testifying PCPP personnel are instructed to notify PCPP of dangerous

conditions).    Because the testimony showed a question of fact existed

regarding PCPP’s responsibilities, relief is not warranted.

(2)   Whether a new trial is required due to the errors at trial which
      individually and cumulatively so prejudiced PCPP that the
      verdict was punitive and based on sympathy, speculation, and
      confusion.

   (a)   Whether the trial court erred by denying PCPP’s proposed
         verdict sheet and accepting Appellant’s verdict slip, and
         submitting an error-filled verdict slip, which caused jury
         confusion.

      PCPP argues the trial court erred in denying its proposed verdict slip and

accepting Appellant’s proposed slip. PCPP’s Brief at 50. PCPP asserts it asked

to list on the slip only the actual owner of the property – PCPP. Id. However,

the trial court accepted Appellant’s proposed slip listing each defendant

individually. Id. According to PCPP,

      [l]isting all four Defendants individually by name, instead of just
      Defendant property owner [PCPP], was clearly prejudicial, as the
      jury was unable to properly consider and contrast the alleged
      negligence of [PCPP] against [Appellant’s] contributory
      negligence, and fairly assess the percentage of negligence to
      each….

Id. (emphasis in original).

      PCPP further argues that the verdict slip erroneously listed damages

previously excluded by the trial court, including past medical expenses. Id.

at 52. Notwithstanding, PCPP acknowledges the line item for past medical

                                     - 24 -
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expenses was crossed off on the verdict slip. Id. PCPP asserts it “should have

been left off the verdict sheet altogether.” Id. (emphasis omitted).

      Our standard of review regarding a trial court’s denial of a motion for a

new trial is limited: “The power to grant a new trial lies inherently with the

trial court and we will not reverse its decision absent a clear abuse of discretion

or an error of law[,] which controls the outcome of the case.” Maya v.

Johnson & Johnson & McNeil-PPC, Inc. (In re McNeill-PPC, Inc.), 97

A.3d 1203, 1224 (Pa. Super. 2014). In conducting review, we employ a two-

part analysis: First, we determine if an error occurred. If so, we ascertain

“whether the error resulted in prejudice necessitating a new trial.” Czimmer

v. Janssen Pharms., Inc., 122 A.3d 1043, 1051 (Pa. Super. 2015). Under

the second aspect of this analysis, the “consideration of all new trial claims is

grounded firmly in the harmless error doctrine[.]” Knowles v. Levan, 15

A.3d 504, 507 (Pa. Super. 2011). The error in question must have affected

the verdict. Id.

      The trial court rejected PCPP’s claim regarding the verdict slip:

      [PCPP] argue[s] that the court instead accepted [Appellant’s]
      verdict sheet. However, this is not entirely accurate. The final
      verdict sheet that the court submitted to the jury was a
      compromise between [Appellant’s] and [PCPP’s] proposed verdict
      slips. At [PCPP’s] request and over [Appellant’s] objection, the
      court removed any reference to past medical expenses from
      [Appellant’s] proposed verdict slip.        The final verdict slip
      considered [Appellant’s] and [PCPP’s] respective positions, and
      the court edited the verdict slip accordingly.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/3/22, at 16.

                                      - 25 -
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      We discern no error or abuse of discretion by the trial court. The verdict

slip’s line item for past medical expenses was crossed out. See id. Further,

the trial court instructed the jury as to damages it could award:

      [Appellant] is claiming the following damages: She’s claiming
      future medical expenses. She’s claiming past and future loss of
      earnings and earning capacity. She’s claiming loss of household
      services and past and future services. She’s claiming past,
      present and future pain and suffering. And she’s also claiming
      embarrassment, humiliation, and loss of enjoyment of life.

      If you find in favor of [Appellant], you should consider these
      damages and then return a verdict in a single lump sum that will
      be added at the bottom.

      Future medical expenses are all medical expenses that you find
      [Appellant] will incur in the future for the diagnosis and treatment
      of her injuries if that was proven here in court. Future medical
      expenses include compensable medical expenses, example,
      physician services, hospital care, nursing care, drug costs and
      rehabilitation. To recover future medical expenses, she must
      prove that the medical care would be reasonably required and that
      the amount of expenses claimed reasonable.

N.T., 11/12/22, at 266. The trial court additionally explained the verdict slip

allowed the jury to award damages for

      Future medical expenses, past loss earnings, future loss earning
      capacity, loss of household services, past and future -- past,
      present and future pain and suffering, embarrassment,
      humiliation and loss of enjoyment of life. That’s all one category
      in the paragraph []. And [the next item] is disfigurement. If you
      find those damages, itemize it and add up the total.

Id. at 281.      Again, “we presume that juries follow the trial court’s

instructions.” Renninger, 163 A.3d at 1000.

      Finally, our review discloses PCPP cites no authority for its position that

listing all defendants on a verdict slip constitutes error. As such, PCPP’s claim

                                     - 26 -
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merits no relief. See Coulter v. Ramsden, 94 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa. Super.

2014)     (“We    need     not    reach    the     merits   of   this   issue   because

the argument section of [the a]ppellant’s brief merely consists of general

statements unsupported by any discussion and analysis of relevant legal

authority.”); In re R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 674 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“[I]t is an

appellant’s duty to present arguments that are sufficiently developed for our

review.    The brief must support the claims with pertinent discussion, with

references to the record and with citations to legal authorities.”) (citation

omitted, emphasis added).4

    (b)   Whether the trial court erred by failing to charge the jury on
          open and obvious conditions and rejecting PCPP’s proposed
          instruction and instead charging the jury under Pennsylvania
          Suggested Standard Jury Instruction § 13.180 (Civil)
          Plaintiff’s Comparative Negligence.

       PCPP argues the trial court improperly used Suggested Standard Jury

Instruction § 13.180 (Plaintiff’s Comparative Negligence), instead of its

proposed instruction on open and obvious conditions. PCPP’s Brief at 54. PCPP

asserts the evidence supported its theory/defense that

       the wire condition was “open and obvious” and that [Appellant]
       was comparatively negligent, and a charge on this principle was
       critical to its case….

____________________________________________

4 Nevertheless, our review discloses the trial court correctly instructed the
jury, “1605 Valley Center Parkway, LP, and Penn Cap Group 3GP, LLC, are
part [of] and belong to Penn Cap Properties Portfolio, LP.” N.T., 11/12/21, at
276.

                                          - 27 -
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Id. PCPP maintains Appellant knew of and walked over the wires for at least

two years and did not advise anyone of the condition. Id. Further, PCPP

claims Appellant was looking ahead, and not where she was walking, when

she tripped. Id. According to PCPP, Appellant also “could have walked on the

right side of her desk which was free of the potential tripping hazards posed

by the wires.” Id. PCPP insists that because Appellant’s negligence was not

in dispute, the trial court was required to address “any theory or defense that

has support in the evidence.” Id. at 54-55 (quoting McLintock v. Works,

716 A.2d 1262, 1265 (Pa. Super. 1998)). PCPP challenges the trial court’s

conclusion that the standard jury instruction covered this area of law. Id. at

55.

      We recognize:

      Our standard of review regarding jury instructions is limited to
      determining whether the trial court committed a clear abuse of
      discretion or error of law which controlled the outcome of the case.
      Error in a charge occurs when the charge as a whole is inadequate
      or not clear or has a tendency to mislead or confuse rather than
      clarify a material issue. Conversely, “[a] jury instruction will be
      upheld if it accurately reflects the law and is sufficient to guide the
      jury in its deliberations.”

      The proper test is not whether certain portions or isolated excerpts
      taken out of context appear erroneous. We look to the charge in
      its entirety, against the background of the evidence in the
      particular case, to determine whether or not error was committed
      and whether that error was prejudicial to the complaining party.
      In other words, there is no right to have any particular form of
      instruction given; it is enough that the charge clearly and
      accurately explains the relevant law.

                                      - 28 -
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Krepps v. Snyder, 112 A.3d 1246, 1256 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations and

some quotation marks omitted). Further, “[w]hile … [Pennsylvania Standard

Jury Instructions] are not binding on trial courts, [they] are nonetheless

instructive.” Gorman v. Costello, 929 A.2d 1208, 1213 (Pa. Super. 2007).

     In rejecting this claim, the trial court stated:

            This court did not err in not instructing the jury on “open
     and obvious conditions.” Similar to the compromises made in
     arriving at a final verdict slip, the court held a conference with
     counsel to determine the charges that the court should read to the
     jury. See Transcript Vol. III pp. 193-96. [PCPP] argue[s] that
     excluding a charge relating to “open and obvious” conditions is
     reversible error. This court maintains that it is not. The requested
     instruction read as follows:

        The law of Pennsylvania does not impose liability upon the
        Defendant if it was reasonable for the Defendant to believe
        that a dangerous condition would be obvious and discovered
        by Plaintiff. A danger is deemed to be “obvious” when the
        condition creating the alleged danger is apparent and would
        be recognized by reasonable persons in the position of the
        invitee exercising normal perception, intelligence and
        judgment.

     Skalos v. Higgins, 449 A.2d 601 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982);
     Carrender v. Fitterer, 469 A.2d 120 ([Pa.] 1983). [PCPP’s]
     requested charge is essentially an in depth comparative
     negligence charge derived from case law. This court deemed it
     more appropriate to use Pennsylvania Suggested Standard Jury
     Instruction § 13.180 (Civ) Plaintiff’s Comparative Negligence. The
     court read the following instruction to the jury at trial:

        As a defense, [PCPP] claim[s] that [Appellant’s] own
        negligence was a factual cause of her injury. [PCPP] ha[s]
        the burden to prove both of the following: that [Appellant]
        was negligent; and that [Appellant’s] negligence was a
        factual cause of her injury. If you find [Appellant’s]
        percentage of negligence is greater than fifty percent,
        [Appellant] cannot recover her damages.

                                     - 29 -
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      Transcript Vol. III pp. 265-66. This instruction explained the
      relevant law to the jury in an adequate manner….

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 17-18.

      Viewing the charge in its entirety, against the background of the

evidence presented, we discern no error or abuse of discretion by the trial

court. See id.; see also Krepps, 112 A.3d at 1256. This issue does not

warrant relief.

(3)   PCPP is entitled to judgment in its favor or a new trial as the
      jury’s finding that Appellant’s comparative negligence was not a
      factual cause of harm was against the weight of the evidence,
      and is contrary to law, as Appellant admitted she knew of the
      wires for at least 2 years before the incident.

      PCPP challenges the jury’s finding that Appellant’s comparative

negligence was not a factual cause of her harm. PCPP’s Brief at 57. PCPP

cites Appellant’s testimony that the condition of the wires had existed “[a]s

long as I worked out there,” which “was a [c]ouple of years.” Id. (citation

omitted). PCPP further points to Appellant’s admission that she was looking

forward, and not at the ground, when she tripped. Id. PCPP additionally cites

evidence that Appellant failed to notify anyone about the wires. Id. at 58.

PCPP argues:

      Under Pennsylvania law, [Appellant] had a duty to look where she
      was going and a duty to avoid a condition that was open and
      obvious, but failed to do so by her own testimony.

Id. PCPP further emphasizes Dr. Kiddy’s opinion that a reasonable person

would identify loose wires on the floor as a potentially hazardous condition.

Id. at 59. PCPP contends:

                                   - 30 -
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      [A] jury is entitled to reject any and all evidence up until the point
      at which the verdict is so disproportionate to the uncontested
      evidence as to defy common sense and logic….

Id.

      Again, the trial court explained its rejection of PCPP’s claim:

             The jury’s finding that [Appellant] was not comparatively
      negligent is not against the weight of the evidence. … The issue
      of comparative negligence was an issue for the jury to decide as
      the finder of fact. Based on the consideration of the evidence
      produced during trial, the jury found [Appellant] was not
      comparatively negligent. Such a finding does not shock one’s
      sense of justice, and the court will not disturb the jury’s findings
      of fact….

Trial Court Opinion, 3/16/22, at 18. Mindful of our standard of review, we

discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in rejecting this issue

challenging the jury’s verdict. See Womack, 877 A.2d at 1283.

(4)   Whether the trial court erred by granting Appellant’s motion for
      delay damages, which should have been denied or significantly
      reduced based on delay beyond PCPP’s control.

      PCPP argues the trial court should have denied or reduced the award of

delay damages. PCPP’s Brief at 60. PCPP claims “the mere length of time

between the starting date and the verdict is not the sole criterion” for

calculating delay damages.     Id. at 61.     PCPP points out the continuance

requested by Appellant because of the COVID epidemic, and the Supreme

Court’s declaration of a judicial emergency. Id. at 63-64.

      Pa.R.C.P. 238 provides, in relevant part:

      (1) At the request of the plaintiff in a civil action seeking monetary
      relief for bodily injury, … damages for delay shall be added to the
      amount of compensatory damages awarded against each

                                     - 31 -
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     defendant or additional defendant found to be liable to the plaintiff
     in the verdict of a jury ….

     (2) Damages for delay shall be awarded for the period of time
     from a date one year after the date original process was first
     served in the action up to the date of the award, verdict or
     decision.

Pa.R.C.P. 238(a)(1)-(2).

     This Court addressed the impact of the COVID judicial emergency on

delay damages in Getting v. Mark Sales & Leasing, Inc., 274 A.3d 1251

(Pa. Super. 2022):

     This issue requires us to interpret and apply the Supreme Court’s
     Order and [Pa.R.C.P.] 238. Thus, it presents us with a pure
     question of law. ”As with all questions of law, the appellate
     standard of review is de novo, and the appellate scope of review
     is plenary.” In re Wilson, 879 A.2d 199, 218 (Pa. Super. 2005).

     Sitting en banc, this Court explained the drafters of Rule 238
     “specified two, and only two, periods of time to be excluded from
     the calculation of delay damages ….” King v. SEPTA, 383 Pa.
     Super. 420, 557 A.2d 11, 12-13 (Pa. Super. 1989) (en banc).
     Those two excluded periods are “(1) any periods of time after
     which the defendant has made a written offer of settlement, the
     offer is continued in effect for at least ninety days or until the
     commencement of trial, whichever first occurs, the offer is
     rejected by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff does not recover more
     than 125 percent of the offer; and (2) any periods of time during
     which the plaintiff caused delay of the trial.” Id. (quoting Miller
     v. Wise Bus. Forms, Inc., 381 Pa. Super. 236, 553 A.2d 443,
     446 (Pa. Super. 1989)). Thus, we concluded that Rule 238 has
     “not allowed for the exclusion of periods of delay not caused by
     either party.” Id. at 13 (emphasis in original).

     ….

     COVID-19 and the judicial emergency it created did not diminish
     the rights of plaintiffs to be made whole, nor did they prohibit
     defendants from engaging in settlement negotiations or making
     reasonable offers to help alleviate court dockets. … [S]imply

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     because the flow of cases had temporary stopped, it does not
     follow that all legal practice had also ceased. [The defendant] was
     free at all times during the judicial emergency to increase its offer
     to induce the [plaintiffs] to settle and thereby to avoid delay
     damages.

     … We do not read the March 18, 2020 Order of the Supreme
     Court as permitting tortfeasors to reap unjust windfalls from a
     five[-]month delay that was clearly beyond the control of their
     victims. … [T]he [defendant] must compensate the [plaintiffs] for
     using their money during the judicial emergency to the fullest
     extent of Pa.R.C.P. 238.

Getting, 274 A.3d at 1261-62 (emphasis omitted). Consequently, we are

unpersuaded by PCPP’s claim that the trial court erred in granting delay

damages encompassing the COVID judicial emergency. See id.

     To the extent PCPP challenges the award of delay damages during

discovery delays, we reference the comment to Rule 238:

     With respect to delay of the trial, not every procedural delay is
     relevant to the issue of delay damages, but only such
     occurrences as actually cause delay of the trial.              For
     example, failure by the plaintiff to answer interrogatories within
     thirty days should not affect the award of damages for delay
     unless the trial was delayed as a result.         Otherwise, the
     introduction of the fault concept and its attendant hearing would
     create a large new field of court hearings revolving around
     evidence of dilatory compliance with discovery procedures, the
     evidence of which would consist almost entirely of the attorneys
     testifying against each other and could be years old before the
     hearing. It is felt that present Rule 4019 provides a vehicle,
     although little used at present, which can timely dispose of delay
     due to discovery noncompliance regardless of whether or not it
     delays the trial. The note under proposed Rule 238(b)(2) is a
     reminder of this alternative remedy to halt delay damages and to
     expedite preparation of the case for trial.

Pa.R.C.P. 238, comment (emphasis added). Our review discloses no error by

the trial court in declining to exclude discovery delays in calculating delay

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damages. See id. PCPP’s challenge to the award of delay damages warrants

no relief.

(5)   Whether the trial court erred in denying PCPP’s motion for
      remittitur.

      Finally, PCPP argues the trial court erred in denying a remittitur. PCPP’s

Brief at 65. PCPP argues the jury’s award of $160,000 is against the weight

of the evidence “regarding [Appellant’s] contributory negligence.” Id. Again,

PCPP challenges the jury’s failure to find Appellant negligent. Id.

      Our review discloses PCPP failed to preserve this issue in its Pa.R.C.P.

227.1 post-trial motion. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/28/22, at 2. Accordingly,

it is waived. See id.; see also Chaulkey v. Roush, 805 A.2d 491, 494 (Pa.

2002) (recognizing the purpose of Rule 227.1 “is to provide the trial court with

an opportunity to correct errors in its ruling and avert the need for appellate

review.”).

      For the foregoing reasons, we affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand

for molding of the verdict consistent with this memorandum.

      Judgment affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded with

instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/30/2023

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