Court Opinion

ID: 9442635
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:54:27.240037+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:29:10.147196
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent. The automobiles were purchased by a local retail dealer from a California company which had theretofore purchased them from the out-of-state manufacturer. That is the essential fact from which the majority arrive at the conclusion that the retail dealer was in “commerce” or that any interruption in his business would “affect commerce.” For all we know the automobiles purchased from the California wholesale dealer had “come to rest” in the wholesaler’s California warehouse as his own automobiles long before they were sold and shipped to the retailer. Of course, the interruption of one automobile sale by reason of the retailer’s labor troubles in the long reach of time might have some effect on commerce. But in reason can a mere indefinite, remote, possible effect be held to come within the spirit of the Wagner Act? If so, interstate commerce is not a distinct thing — it is what Congress from time to time says it is. What good is there in saying “We recognize that the commerce clause cannot be pushed so far as to destroy the distinction between what is solely within the *384domain of the states and what is subject to federal control.” It reminds me of Daniel Boone’s boast that he had never been lost but he had been bewildered for a week or two.