Court Opinion

ID: 9635016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:32:32.122007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:49:46.142929
License: Public Domain

POMEROY, Justice,
dissenting.
The Court today seems to be saying that because a person’s due process rights were infringed in a commitment proceeding, all record of that commitment must be erased, and that the courts of this state have the power to accomplish this notwithstanding legislative enactments stating that records must be maintained in all cases, while at the same time providing for protection of the confidentiality of such records. The broad sweep of the majority opinion would extend to the consequences of any due process violation, not merely commitment cases. I must respectfully dissent.
That appellant was improperly committed to Danville State Hospital by the court of common pleas is uncontested,1 and indeed has been acknowledged by that court, which *482directed that its own order of commitment be expunged.2 But no court can cause the fact of that commitment to vanish into thin air; the injury to Ms. Wolfe, while regrettable, is an historical fact. Eradication of the episode itself is impossible.
Addressing the appellant's complaint which is before us, it is important to note that no present damage to appellant or particularized future harm to her good name is alleged.3 I cannot say with any confidence that a negative public perception of those who have been in institutions such as Danville State Hospital is so deep and pervasive that we are obliged to take judicial notice of it. And it is impossible to conclude that the records pertaining to Debra Wolfe, whatever they may contain,4 constitute a threat of irreparable harm to appellant’s reputation. Indeed, appellant has not alleged that her reputation has been or may be injured in any way.
The General Assembly has explicitly directed that complete records be kept pertaining to each patient in state institutions.5 To protect patients from any harm that could result from careless dissemination of these records, however, the legislature has coupled the directive that records be maintained with strict requirements to ensure their confidentiality. Section 111 of the Mental Health Procedure Act of 19766 provides in pertinent part:
*483“All documents concerning persons in treatment shall be kept confidential and, without the person’s written consent, may not be released or their contents disclosed to anyone except:
(1) those engaged in providing treatment for the person;
(2) the county administrator . . . ;
(3) a court in the course of legal proceedings authorized by this act; and
(4) pursuant to Federal rules, statutes and regulations governing disclosure of patient information where treatment is undertaken in a Federal agency.
In no event, however, shall privileged communications, whether written or oral, be disclosed to anyone without such written consent. This shall not restrict the collection and analysis of clinical or statistical data by the department, the county administrator or the facility so long as the use and dissemination of such data does not identify individual patients.” (Emphasis added.)
This is not a case where governmental action has been utterly arbitrary and the maintenance of records would serve no useful purpose. Compare Bilick v. Dudley, 356 F.Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y.1973); Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F.Supp. 881 (E.D.Pa.1968). Nor is this a case where potentially damaging information in government files is freely available, and a court of equity, in considering the equitable remedy of expungement, is called upon to act “with close attention to the peculiar facts of each case” and to “effect a proper reconciliation of the competing interests of the Government in retaining information . . . and of the individual in having it forgotten.” Chastain v. Kelley, 167 U.S.App.D.C. 11, 510 F.2d 1232, 1236 (1975) (McGowan, J.). In the case before us the legislature has struck a balance and it is presumptuous for us to say that the protection it has afforded is inadequate on its face, and that additional action by the courts is necessary and proper. The statutory safeguards confirm my view that the Commonwealth *484Court’s order7 represents the appropriate action by the judiciary in this case.
I would affirm.
EAGEN, C. J., and O’BRIEN, J., join in this dissenting opinion.

. The “Petition for Expungement of Confinement Records” filed in the Commonwealth Court (and which, although improper in form, was accepted by the Commonwealth Court as the equivalent of a complaint in equity or mandamus) alleges that appellant was committed after hearings of which she was not apprised and at which she neither appeared nor had representation. Since this appeal is from an order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, we must accept these factual averments as true. E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Fioravanti, 451 Pa. 108, 111, 299 A.2d 585 (1973).

. Order of Kivko, J., August 7, 1974, attached to appellant’s petition as Exhibit A.

. The only allegation of the petition relative to harm to appellant is that continued maintenance of the records after her commitment was declared illegal “constitutes an invasion of plaintiffs right of privacy”. Petition, par. 23.

. The contents of these records are unknown to us; the record in this appeal consists only of appellant’s petition, the preliminary objections thereto, and the opinions and order of the Commonwealth Court.

. Act of October 20, 1966, Spec.Sess., P.L. 96, No. 3, art. IV, § 602, 50 P.S. § 4602 (1969).

. Act of July 9, 1976, P.L. 817, No. 143, § 111, 50 P.S. § 7111 (Supp. 1977-78).

. The Commonwealth Court’s order provided:
[T]he prayer of the above petition is denied. Further, the Chief Clerk is directed, in addition to the usual distribution, to send a certified copy of this opinion and order to the respondent, the Superintendent of the Danville State Hospital. Said respondent is directed to place such copy . . with the medical file of the petitioner to that end that those limited persons, if any, ever specifically authorized by respondents to examine such medical file, shall know that the original commitment was improper and has been expunged from the court records of the Court of Common Pleas of Northumberland County which ordered the commitment.”