Court Opinion

ID: 9377069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-06 20:00:41.42116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:11.827577
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                     For the First Circuit

No. 21-1839

   NATHALIE NICOLE RIVERA-APONTE and DENISE M. APONTE-TORRES,

                     Plaintiffs, Appellants,

                               v.

    GOMEZ BUS LINE, INC. and PONCE PARAMEDICAL COLLEGE, INC.,

                     Defendants, Appellees,

                    JOSE MIGUEL PEREZ-TORRES,

                           Defendant.

          APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

        [Hon. Jay A. García-Gregory, U.S. District Judge]
       [Hon. Camille L. Vélez-Rivé, U.S. Magistrate Judge]

                             Before

                       Barron, Chief Judge,
              Selya and Montecalvo, Circuit Judges.

     David Efron and Law Offices of David Efron, P.C. on brief for
appellants.
     Giselle Colon-de-Ferenczi and Nachman & Guillemard, PSC on
brief for appellees.

                          March 6, 2023
           SELYA, Circuit Judge.       To ensure the fair and prompt

adjudication of cases, a district court must be able to manage its

docket effectively and efficiently.           To this end, we      afford

district courts a wide margin of discretion in the performance of

their   case-management   functions.     In   the   present   proceeding,

appellants Nathalie Nicole Rivera-Aponte (Rivera) and her mother,

Denise Aponte-Torres (Aponte), challenge a case-management order

that resulted in the striking of their opposition to pending

motions for summary judgment.      After careful consideration, we

uphold the challenged order, reject the plaintiffs' claims of

error, and affirm the judgment below.

                                   I

           We first rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the

case.   Because our review follows the entry of summary judgment,

"we take the facts and the reasonable inferences therefrom in the

light most" favorable to the non-moving parties (here, Rivera and

Aponte).   Pleasantdale Condos., LLC v. Wakefield, 37 F.4th 728,

730 (1st Cir. 2022).

           In October of 2015, Rivera was a student at Ponce

Paramedical College (the College) in Ponce, Puerto Rico.          On the

morning of October 22, Rivera boarded a bus operated by Gomez Bus

Line, Inc. (GBL), a company under contract with the College to

provide transportation services to students.         The bus was driven

by Jose Miguel Perez-Torres (Perez), a GBL employee, and Perez

                                - 2 -
convinced Rivera to accompany him on a trip to a nearby sports

complex.   Upon their arrival, Perez parked the bus in a secluded

spot, assaulted Rivera, and raped her.

           A civil action in the United States District Court for

the   District   of   Puerto     Rico       ensued,     based     on    diversity

jurisdiction.    See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).               As this appeal turns

entirely on the travel of that case, we set out a chronology of

the relevant events, listing them in line with the dates that

appear on the district court's docket.

             •   On   December      22,       2016,     Rivera        and       Aponte

                 (collectively, the plaintiffs) sued GBL and the

                 College     (collectively,       the    defendants)        in     the

                 district court.1           The plaintiffs alleged that —

                 through   fault      or    negligence     —    the    defendants

                 "breached    their      duty   to    exercise    due       care   in

                 selecting    their        personnel,    maintaining        a    safe

                 environment,      and      safeguarding        and    protecting

                 [Rivera] while she was [o]n the bus."

             •   On May 11, 2017, the district court issued its

                 initial scheduling order.              See Fed. R. Civ. P.

                 16(b).    The order set March 30, 2018, as the date

      1The plaintiffs' complaint also named Perez as a defendant.
Perez did not seasonably answer the complaint, and a default was
entered against him.   See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). That default
later ripened into a default judgment in the amount of $450,000.

                                   - 3 -
    for the close of discovery.            Dispositive motions

    were to be filed no later than May 31, 2018.

•   On April 2, 2018, the district court granted the

    College's    motion      to   extend   the    deadlines    for

    completing discovery and for filing dispositive

    motions.     The court set June 29, 2018, as the

    deadline    for   both    and   further      specified    that

    oppositions to the dispositive motions were to be

    filed by July 16.         The court warned that absent

    "grave cause," those dates were "final."

•   On June 18, 2018, the district court granted the

    College's second motion for an extension of time to

    file dispositive motions.         The court extended the

    deadline to July 16, 2018, and the deadline for

    oppositions to July 23, 2018.          The court admonished

    that "[n]o extensions w[ould] be allowed."

•   On July 16, 2018, the defendants filed motions for

    summary judgment, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, and

    statements of material facts not in dispute, see

    D.P.R. Civ. R. 56(b).

•   July 23, 2018 — the due date for the plaintiffs'

    opposition to the summary judgment motions — came

    and went without any opposition papers being filed.

    Instead, the plaintiffs filed an "urgent motion" to

                      - 4 -
    reopen discovery so that they could "depose two key

    witnesses."    The plaintiffs did not specify any

    timeline for this additional discovery.    They did

    request, though, that the court grant them ten days

    following the conclusion of the depositions in

    which to file an opposition to the summary judgment

    motions.

•   On August 31, 2018, the district court granted the

    plaintiffs' motion to reopen discovery.    The order

    did not    set a deadline for the taking of      the

    additional depositions.     At the same time, the

    district court referred the pending motions for

    summary judgment to a magistrate judge for a report

    and recommendation.    See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B);

    Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(1).

•   On September 24, 2018, the plaintiffs took the

    depositions of the witnesses identified in their

    July 23 motion.

•   On October 5, 2018, the College moved for an order

    "affirming that all dispositive motions have been

    submitted for resolution and no further associated

    filings will be allowed."   It pointed out that more

    than ten days had passed since the depositions were

    taken and that, therefore, "the period for [the]

                   - 5 -
    [p]laintiffs       to    file        oppositions         to    [the]

    [d]efendants' dispositive motions [had] expired."

    GBL subsequently joined the College's motion.

•   On October 9, 2018, the plaintiffs moved for a ten-

    day extension of time to file an opposition to the

    defendants'      motions       for   summary      judgment.       In

    support, the plaintiffs explained that they had

    just received the transcripts of the September 24

    depositions.      They added that, although their July

    23 motion was not explicit on the subject, "it

    should    have    been     apparent"         that       the    motion

    contemplated that the ten-day extension requested

    "would necessarily run from the receipt of the"

    deposition transcripts.          The plaintiffs assured the

    court    that    their   request       for    a    "brief     10-day

    extension" was the "final" extension they would

    need.     Later the same day, the magistrate judge

    granted    the    plaintiffs'        motion       for    a    ten-day

    extension and set a deadline of October 19, 2018,

    for the filing of the plaintiffs' opposition to the

    pending    motions       for     summary      judgment.           The

    magistrate also denied the defendants' October 5

    motion as moot.

                      - 6 -
•   The plaintiffs did not file an opposition to the

    pending motions for summary judgment before the

    deadline expired.       And it was not until October 29,

    2018, that the plaintiffs filed a "motion for leave

    to     file   late,"    seeking    leave     to    file   their

    opposition papers "instanter."             At the same time,

    they    tendered their proposed opposition to the

    defendants' motions for summary judgment and their

    counter-statements of material facts.               See D.P.R.

    Civ. R. 56(c).         To excuse their dilatory filing,

    the plaintiffs asserted that — in the interval

    between their counsel's receipt of the deposition

    transcripts and the filing of their opposition —

    their counsel "had a number of legal urgent matters

    which accumulated, including preparation for an

    upcoming trial and pre-trial," which prevented him

    from "working on the deposition testimony earlier."

•   On the same day, the defendants moved to strike the

    plaintiffs' untimely opposition papers and to treat

    the     pending   motions    for    summary       judgment   as

    unopposed.

•   On October 30, 2018, the magistrate judge denied

    the plaintiffs' motion for leave to file out of

    time, pointedly noting that "[t]he fact that an

                      - 7 -
    attorney has other fish to fry is not an acceptable

    reason for disregarding a court order" (quoting

    Chamorro v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 304 F.3d 1, 5

    (1st Cir. 2002)).           And in a separate order, the

    magistrate judge granted the defendants' motion to

    strike the plaintiffs' untimely filings.

•   Hours      later,      the      plaintiffs        moved    for

    reconsideration.

•   On November 1, 2018, the magistrate judge denied

    the motion for reconsideration.

•   On January 31, 2019, the magistrate judge issued a

    report and recommendation (the R&R) recommending

    that    the   district      court   grant   the   defendants'

    motions for summary judgment (which the magistrate

    judge treated as unopposed).

•   On February 14, 2019, the plaintiffs objected to

    the R&R.      See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2).               Their

    objection focused exclusively on the magistrate

    judge's       order      striking      their      opposition,

    characterized that order as "too severe a sanction"

    for their untimely filing, and submitted that the

    defendants were not prejudiced by the delay.

                        - 8 -
•    On March 6, 2019, the district court adopted

the R&R and granted the defendants' motions for

summary    judgment.          The     court    stated     that   the

plaintiffs'        objections          "misconstrue[d]"          the

magistrate judge's order striking their untimely

opposition papers and her subsequent recommendation

that summary judgment be entered in the defendants'

favor.     Rivera-Aponte v. Gomez Bus Line, Inc., No.

16-3181,    slip      op.    at   1   (D.P.R.    Mar.     6,   2019)

(unpublished).          The       court     explained     that   the

plaintiffs' "claims against [the defendants] are

being dismissed with prejudice based on the record

and the applicable law, not as a Fed[eral] R[ule]

[of] Civ[il] P[rocedure] 16(f) sanction for their

failure to timely oppose the Motions for Summary

Judgment and comply with the [magistrate judge's]

related orders."        Id. (emphasis in original).              The

district     court          further       explained     that     one

consequence      of    the     magistrate       judge's    earlier

orders     was   that       the     court     could   accept     the

defendants' allegedly uncontested facts as true.

The court made clear that it was granting summary

judgment based on the way in which the law applied

to those uncontested facts.

                   - 9 -
              The   district    court    proceeded    to   enter    a    partial

judgment, dismissing the claims against the defendants.                  A final

judgment was entered on September 27, 2021.2               This timely appeal

followed.

                                        II

              In this venue, the plaintiffs reassert their claim that

the magistrate judge erred by denying their motion for a further

extension of time and striking the materials that they belatedly

filed    in   opposition   to    the    defendants'   motions      for   summary

judgment.     They also argue for the first time that — even if there

was no error in these rulings — summary judgment was not warranted.

We address these arguments in turn.3

     2 The delay in entering a final judgment related to Perez's
default. See supra note 1. It was not until September 27, 2021,
that the district court entered its final judgment against Perez.

     3 It is at least arguable that the plaintiffs forfeited the
first of these claims by failing to object to the magistrate
judge's order within fourteen days of the date of service of that
order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) (explaining that when magistrate
judge enters order resolving nondispositive matter, aggrieved
"party may serve and file objections to the order within [fourteen]
days after being served with a copy" of that order); see also ML-
CFC 2007-6 P.R. Props., LLC v. BPP Retail Props., LLC, 951 F.3d
41, 46-49 (1st Cir. 2020) (describing analysis used to determine
whether matter is dispositive or nondispositive). The defendants,
however, have not advanced any such argument, and both the
magistrate judge and the district court denied the plaintiffs'
claims for relief on the merits. In these circumstances, we deem
the fourteen-day argument waived.

                                   - 10 -
                                       A

           We start by addressing the plaintiffs' contention that

the magistrate judge abused her discretion by denying their motion

for a further extension of time and striking their opposition

papers.4   The plaintiffs concede that they ignored the deadline

for filing their opposition papers.            But they contend that — to

the extent that their tardiness             should have resulted in any

detrimental action at all — the magistrate judge should have

resorted to less draconian measures.

           In weighing these contentions, we do not write on a

pristine page.    We have made it pellucid that district courts are

endowed with sweeping case-management authority.             See Rosario-Diaz

v. Gonzalez, 140 F.3d 312, 315 (1st Cir. 1998).               This authority

includes   the   power   to   "set[]       deadlines   for   the   filing   of"

dispositive motions and responses thereto.             Id.    As a necessary

corollary, this authority also includes the power to insist upon

compliance with those deadlines.            See Pérez-Cordero v. Wal-Mart

P.R., 440 F.3d 531, 533 (1st Cir. 2006).

           Over the years, we have recognized that district courts

have broad discretion in determining how best to deter parties

     4 As a technical matter, we review the final judgment of the
district court, not the magistrate judge's order itself. See 28
U.S.C. § 1291. But because the parties have briefed and argued
the issue in terms of the magistrate judge's exercise of her
discretion in matters of case management, we address the question
on that basis.

                                 - 11 -
from flouting filing deadlines.   A district court, for example,

may respond to a missed deadline by imposing monetary sanctions,

see McKeague v. One World Techs., Inc., 858 F.3d 703, 706 (1st

Cir. 2017); by excluding evidence, see Martínez-Serrano v. Quality

Health Servs. of P.R., Inc., 568 F.3d 278, 283 (1st Cir. 2009); or

by striking untimely submissions, see Shell Co. (P.R.) v. Los

Frailes Serv. Station, Inc., 605 F.3d 10, 24-25 (1st Cir. 2010).

When circumstances warrant, a court    may even dismiss a case

outright. See, e.g., McKeague, 858 F.3d at 706-08; Tower Ventures,

Inc. v. City of Westfield, 296 F.3d 43, 45-46 (1st Cir. 2002).

Given the amply stocked armamentarium that is available to a

district court to combat the flouting of court-ordered deadlines,

"a litigant who ignores a case-management deadline does so at his

peril."   Rosario-Diaz, 140 F.3d at 315; see Torres-Vargas v.

Pereira, 431 F.3d 389, 393 (1st Cir. 2005).

          The choice as to how to respond to a flouted deadline in

any particular case is largely for the district court.    This is

merely a subset of the principle that district courts possess wide

latitude in the exercise of their case-management authority.   See

Jones v. Winnepesaukee Realty, 990 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1993).

Given that "case management is a fact-specific matter [uniquely]

within the ken of the district court," appellate review of case-

management decisions is highly deferential — and we review such

decisions only for "clear abuse of discretion."    Tubens v. Doe,

                             - 12 -
976 F.3d 101, 107 (1st Cir. 2020) (quoting Robson v. Hallenbeck,

81   F.3d   1,   2-3   (1st   Cir.   1996)).   Under   this   standard,   "a

disgruntled litigant 'bears a formidable burden in attempting to

convince the court of appeals that the lower court erred.'"

Rosario-Diaz, 140 F.3d at 315 (quoting United States v. One 1987

BMW 325, 985 F.2d 655, 657 (1st Cir. 1993)).

            A careful review of the record in this case indicates

that the magistrate judge acted within the ambit of her discretion

in denying the plaintiffs' motion for a further extension of time

and striking their untimely opposition papers.                Of decretory

significance here, the deadline that the plaintiffs disregarded

was one that they themselves had requested.         As we previously have

said, "when a litigant seeks an extension of time and proposes a

compliance date, the court is entitled to expect that the litigant

will   meet      its   self-imposed    deadline."      Cintrón-Lorenzo    v.

Departamento de Asuntos del Consumidor, 312 F.3d 522, 526 (1st

Cir. 2002) (internal alteration omitted) (quoting Tower Ventures,

296 F.3d at 47).        Thus, a party's noncompliance with a deadline

that she herself suggested creates a particularly inhospitable

landscape for a claim that a court abused its discretion in holding

her to that deadline.         See Fernández-Salicrup v. Figueroa-Sancha,

790 F.3d 312, 321 (1st Cir. 2015).

            That is precisely the situation here.             On October 9,

2018, the plaintiffs sought a ten-day extension of time in which

                                     - 13 -
to submit their opposition papers, assuring the court that such an

extension was the "final" one they would need.              The magistrate

judge    obliged   and   granted    the   ten-day   extension.     Yet   the

plaintiffs let this deadline pass without so much as a by-your-

leave:   they neither made the anticipated submission nor asked the

court for additional time.         Cf. Shell Co., 605 F.3d at 25 (noting

appellant's failure "to request a filing extension" as one factor

supporting affirmance of order striking untimely summary judgment

motion); Rosario-Diaz, 140 F.3d at 315 (similar).             Having taken

the plaintiffs at their word that ten days would be sufficient for

them to prepare and file their opposition, the magistrate judge

was under no obligation to allow the plaintiffs to disregard the

filing date that they themselves had selected and to allow them to

make a belated submission.          Court-imposed deadlines ought to be

taken seriously, and litigants flout them at their own risk.

            To cinch the matter, the plaintiffs failed to advance a

"convincing reason"      that might       justify their procrastination.

Shell Co., 605 F.3d at 25.         The plaintiffs suggest that they had

"good cause" for delay because their counsel encountered "a number

of [urgent legal] matters which accumulated" during the period

immediately   following    their     extension   request.    The   "[urgent

legal] matters" included two looming trials and the need to perform

ancillary work.

                                    - 14 -
          This explanation is old hat:      it is emblematic of an

excuse that we have rejected time and again.      See Chamorro, 304

F.3d at 5 (collecting cases).    As we pointed out over forty years

ago, "[m]ost attorneys are busy most of the time and they must

organize their work so as to be able to meet the time requirements

of matters they are handling or suffer the consequences."    Pinero

Schroeder v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, 574 F.2d 1117, 1118 (1st

Cir. 1978) (per curiam).   To put it bluntly, "the fact that [one's]

counsel may have bitten off more than he could chew does not exempt

[a litigant] from meeting court-appointed deadlines."      Vélez v.

Awning Windows, Inc., 375 F.3d 35, 40 (1st Cir. 2004); see Mulero-

Abreu v. P.R. Police Dep't, 675 F.3d 88, 91, 94-95 (1st Cir. 2012)

(affirming dismissal of case with prejudice as a consequence of

late filing).

          In an effort to locate an off-ramp, the plaintiffs try

to change the subject.     They argue that the magistrate judge's

decision to strike their untimely filings was — in essence — a

decision to dismiss their case on the merits.       Proceeding from

this premise, they argue that the magistrate judge imposed "the

harshest of sanctions" without either providing adequate warning

or determining whether their conduct was so "extreme" as to warrant

so harsh a remedy.    And they add that this harsh sanction was

imposed even though the record does not suggest that their delay

prejudiced the defendants.

                                - 15 -
           The premise on which the plaintiffs rely is faulty.   The

magistrate judge's decision to strike their opposition was not

"tantamount" to dismissing their case on the merits.   See Torres-

Rosado v. Rotger-Sabat, 335 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2003) (explaining

that failure timely to oppose summary judgment "does not mean the

unopposed party [automatically] wins").   Of course, the magistrate

judge's decision to strike the plaintiffs' opposition papers had

serious consequences:   it entitled both the magistrate judge and

the district court to treat the defendants' motions as unopposed.

See Pérez-Cordero, 440 F.3d at 533-34; Cordero-Soto v. Island Fin.,

Inc., 418 F.3d 114, 118 (1st Cir. 2005); Vélez, 375 F.3d at 41.

So, too, it allowed them to "accept as true all material facts set

forth" in the defendants' statements of uncontested material facts

to the extent those facts were "adequately supported by the

record."   De La Vega v. San Juan Star, Inc., 377 F.3d 111, 116

(1st Cir. 2004) (quoting Jaroma v. Massey, 873 F.2d 17, 21 (1st

Cir. 1989)).

           Even so, a court confronted with an unopposed summary

judgment motion is still required "to test the undisputed facts in

the crucible of the applicable law in order to ascertain whether

[summary] judgment is warranted."   Vélez, 375 F.3d at 42; see Fed.

R. Civ. P. 56(a).     The magistrate judge was cognizant of that

obligation.    She canvassed the uncontested facts, measured them

against the law applicable to the plaintiffs' claims, and wrote a

                              - 16 -
well-reasoned      twenty-seven-page           R&R,    culminating     in     a

recommendation that the district court grant summary judgment.

The district court adopted the R&R and — based on its de novo

review of the record — entered summary judgment in favor of the

defendants.     Seen in this light, the plaintiffs' claim that the

magistrate judge's striking of their opposition papers was itself

a death sentence for their case, without any regard to the merits

of the defendants' summary judgment filings, simply will not wash.5

           In   addition,       the    plaintiffs'     complaint     that   the

magistrate judge struck their opposition without providing them

"prior" or "suitabl[e]" warning is unavailing.            As authority, the

plaintiffs invoke our decision in Velázquez Linares v. United

States, 546 F.3d 710, 711-12 (1st Cir. 2008).                 But Velázquez

Linares   stands   only   for    the    unremarkable    proposition    that   a

district court should generally provide warning before dismissing

a case as a sanction for a litigant's noncompliance with an

     5 We note that — at this juncture — the deposition transcripts
had not been made part of the record.      It was only with their
untimely opposition papers that the plaintiffs filed Spanish-
language transcripts of the depositions together with a "Motion
for Leave to File Spanish Language Document and Request for
Extension of Time to File Translation." The plaintiffs requested
an additional twenty days in which to file certified English
translations.    Treating the defendants' motions for summary
judgment as unopposed, therefore, did not entail ignoring facts
that the plaintiffs had since properly introduced into the record.
See D.P.R. Civ. R. 5(c) ("All documents not in the English language
which are presented or filed, whether as evidence or otherwise,
must be accompanied by a certified translation into English
. . . .").

                                      - 17 -
unambiguous court order.      See id. at 712; see also Pomales v.

Celulares Telefonica, Inc., 342 F.3d 44, 49-50 (1st Cir. 2003)

(collecting cases).     Here, however, the magistrate judge's order

striking the plaintiffs' opposition papers was not a dismissal of

the plaintiffs' case.

          In the posture of this case, we do not think that the

magistrate judge was obligated to spell out for the plaintiffs the

potential consequences of failing to abide by the October 19

deadline that they themselves had requested.     Where, as here, a

court has "set[] a reasonable due date," the parties are expected

to act by that date or risk "the foreseeable consequences of

noncompliance."    Mendez v. Banco Popular de P.R., 900 F.2d 4, 7

(1st Cir. 1990).   A foreseeable consequence of noncompliance with

the deadline set by the magistrate judge — a deadline that the

plaintiffs asked for and represented would be "final" — was a

decision striking the plaintiffs' untimely submission.    See, e.g.,

Lac Du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Stop

Treaty Abuse-Wis., Inc., 991 F.2d 1249, 1257 (7th Cir. 1993).

          Nor does the plaintiffs' argument that their conduct was

not so "extreme" as to warrant the striking of their opposition

gain them any traction.     We have held that "disobedience of [a]

court['s] [case-management] orders, in and of itself, constitutes

extreme misconduct."    Tower Ventures, 296 F.3d at 46.

                               - 18 -
               And,    finally,     the     plaintiffs'      assertion       that    the

defendants were not prejudiced by their delay in filing misses the

point.    Even when there is no prejudice to a party, disregarding

court-imposed deadlines works "prejudice to the court itself,

which    has    a     'strong    institutional       interest   in    ensuring      that

litigants honor court orders' so that it may efficiently administer

its docket."        United States v. 2008 33' Contender Model Tournament

Vessel, 990 F.3d 725, 727 (1st Cir. 2021) (quoting Tower Ventures,

296 F.3d at 47).          If parties were free to treat court orders as

optional, the administration of justice would become as chancy as

the menu at a potluck supper.

               To   say   more    would    be   to   paint   the     lily.     In    the

circumstances at hand, we conclude, without serious question, that

the plaintiffs have not shown that the magistrate judge abused her

discretion by denying them a further extension of time and striking

their late-filed submission.

                                            B

               The plaintiffs have one last shot in their sling.                    They

claim that — even without consideration of their opposition papers

— the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor

of the defendants.              Their intimation, of course, is that the

stripped down record reveals genuine issues of material fact.

               This claim is doubly waived.            First, the plaintiffs do

not point to any specific evidence or develop any particularized

                                          - 19 -
arguments identifying discrete factual issues that are in dispute.

And it is "the settled appellate rule that issues adverted to in

a perfunctory manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed

argumentation, are deemed waived."      United States v. Zannino, 895

F.2d 1, 17 (1st Cir. 1990).        Second, the plaintiffs did not

challenge the R&R on this basis when they filed their objections

in the district court.    And it is equally well-settled that "only

those issues fairly raised by the objections to the magistrate's

report are subject to review in the district court and those not

preserved by such objection are precluded on appeal." School Union

No. 37 v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., 617 F.3d 554, 564 (1st Cir. 2010)

(quoting Keating v. Sec'y of Health & Hum. Servs., 848 F.2d 271,

275 (1st Cir. 1988)); see D.P.R. Civ. R. 72(d) (requiring "written

objections . . . specifically identify[ing] the portions of the

proposed findings and recommendations to which objection is made

and the basis for the objection").

                                 III

            We need go no further. For the reasons elucidated above,

we uphold the challenged order, reject the plaintiffs' claims of

error, and affirm the judgment below.

Affirmed.

                               - 20 -