Court Opinion

ID: 9912507
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-22 17:07:51.549612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:59:46.526269
License: Public Domain

[Cite as M.G. v. S.M., 2023-Ohio-4678.]

                             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                                  TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

[M.G.],                                         :

                Petitioner-Appellee,            :
                                                                  No. 23AP-113
v.                                              :             (C.P.C. No. 22DV-2373)

[S.M.],                                         :           (REGULAR CALENDAR)

                Respondent-Appellant.           :

                                          D E C I S I O N

                                  Rendered on December 21, 2023

                On brief: Vassy Law Office, and Nicholas E. Vassy, for
                appellee. Argued: Nicholas E. Vassy.

                On brief: Einstein Law, LLC, and Dianne D. Einstein, for
                appellant. Argued: Taylor Jones.

                 APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas,
                             Division of Domestic Relations

BOGGS, J.

        {¶ 1} Respondent-appellant, S.M., appeals a judgment from the Franklin County
Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, granting the petition for a
domestic violence civil protection order (“DVCPO”) filed by petitioner-appellee, M.G., on
behalf of herself. For the following reasons we dismiss this appeal as moot.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
        {¶ 2} On December 19, 2022, M.G. filed a petition for a DVCPO from S.M. for
herself and her minor children. On January 27, 2023, the Franklin County Court of
Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, held a full hearing. The court found that
M.G. had proven that S.M. committed domestic violence against her and placed her in fear
of imminent physical harm and that a DVCPO was necessary to protect her from further
No. 23AP-113                                                                                   2

domestic violence. (Feb. 17, 2023 Order at 2.) The DVCPO was for eight months and was
set to expire on September 30, 2023.
       {¶ 3} S.M. now appeals and asserts the following assignments of error:

               (1) The trial court erred in its finding that M.G. was in
                   immediate and present danger of domestic violence and
                   temporary civil protection orders were necessary to protect
                   [her] from domestic violence.

               (2) The trial court erred when it based its decision on S.M.’s
                   past acts.

               (3) The trial court erred as the granting of a civil protection
                   order was not supported by the manifest weight of evidence.

II. LEGAL ANALYSIS
       {¶ 4} Before we turn to S.M.’s assignments of error, we sua sponte consider
whether the appeal is moot, given that the DVCPO expired on September 30, 2023.
       {¶ 5} Pursuant to the mootness doctrine, a court will not decide a case in which
there is no longer any actual controversy. In re A.G., 139 Ohio St.3d 572, 2014-Ohio-2597,
¶ 37. This court has stated the general rule that “ ‘the expiration of a [civil protection order]
renders an appeal from that order moot.’ ” A.F. v. R.A.T., 10th Dist. No. 20AP-23, 2021-
Ohio-2568, ¶ 5, quoting Foster v. Foster, 10th Dist. No. 11AP-371, 2011-Ohio-6460, ¶ 4.
The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that “in the absence of demonstrated legal collateral
consequences, the collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine does not
apply to an expired domestic-violence civil protection order.” Cyran v. Cyran, 152 Ohio
St.3d 484, 486 (2018). The collateral-consequences exception to mootness “applies [only]
in cases in which the collateral consequences is imposed as a matter of law” and causes an
appellant to suffer a collateral disability. Id. at 487. The Supreme Court included an
example of the collateral consequences exception as “the statutory imposition of points on
a person’s driver’s license constitutes a collateral disability” in an appeal of a conviction for
a traffic offense after fines and costs have been paid. Id. at 490, citing In re S.J.K., 114 Ohio
St.3d 23, 2007-Ohio-2621, ¶ 14, 18. The court also noted that “[s]peculation is insufficient
to establish a legally cognizable interest for which a court can order relief using the
collateral-consequences exception to the mootness doctrine.” Id. at 490.
No. 23AP-113                                                                            3

       {¶ 6} There is no dispute here that the DVCPO had expired prior to the oral
argument in this appeal.      Here, S.M. does not demonstrate any legal collateral
consequences from the DVCPO. In oral argument, S.M.’s counsel argued that while the
DVCOP has expired, its existence is still on his record and that he is concerned about the
effect it may have on work opportunities and his career. As we have noted, however,
speculative effects are insufficient for this court to find applicable the collateral-
consequences exception to mootness. As the DVCPO at issue expired by its own terms and
neither the collateral-consequences exception nor any other exception to the mootness
doctrine applies to this case, we conclude that the questions presented by the appeal are
moot. A.F. at ¶ 7-8.
III. CONCLUSION
       {¶ 7} Based on the reasons stated above, the issues raised in this appeal are moot.
Therefore, we dismiss this appeal.
                                                                       Appeal dismissed.
                        MENTEL and EDELSTEIN, JJ., concur.