Court Opinion

ID: 9831768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 21:20:47.801907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:37.818944
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
Defendant contends that, in reversing the judgment of the trial court arrd rendering judgment in favor of plaintiff for one-half of the properties acquired during the marriage of plaintiff and defendant, we deprived defendant of his property without due process of law, and denied to him a trial by jury, contrary to both State and Federal Constitutions (Const. Tex. art. 1, §§ 15, 19; Const. U. S. Amends. 7, 14).
We think it obvious that our decision was not predicated on any fact or group of facts taken from the jury and decided by us; but, on the contrary, was predicated on findings of the jury that, in our opinion, imperatively required the rendition of such judgment.
It is contended that we erred in considering plaintiff’s assignment of error No. 4, complaining of the action of the court in refusing to grant her motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, because the assignment was not briefed. We neither discussed nor considered this assignment; but in disposing of the various objections urged by defendant to the consideration of plaintiff’s assignments and propositions, we held that the questions discussed had been properly presented, and in this connection, among other things, said that “In truth, assignment No. 4, to the effect that the court erred in refusing plaintiff’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto and assignment No. 5, to the effect that the court erred in refusing plaintiff’s motion for judgment on the - verdict, present fundamental error.” We were partially in error in the above statement, as it is obvious that assignment No. 4 was not well taken and did not present fundamental error, or error at all, in that, under the statute (Vernon’s Ann. Civ. St. art. 2211), a judgment non obstante veredicto is not authorized unless a directed verdict would have been proper, and as the evidence was conflicting on the pivotal issue, the court did not err in refusing the plaintiff’s motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. However, this is a negligible matter, and the opinion will be corrected by deleting all references to assignment No. 4 as presenting fundamental error.
As shown in the original opinion, we construe special issues Nos. 2, 4, and 6 as referring to statements and representations by defendant to plaintiff made after the instrument of August 31, 1933, was prepared, and because the evidence failed to disclose that defendant made any representations in regard to the matter after the preparation of the instrument, we held that the findings, in answer to said issues, could not have been otherwise; and, further that said findings, in view of the undisputed evidence did not conflict with the findings to issues Nos. 3, 5, 7, and 8, that we held entitled plaintiff to judgment. In view of these holdings counsel for defendant have this to say: “We do not know where the court gets its authority to state that the meaning of the question is whether the defendant, 'after the preparation of the instrument, represented to the plaintiff, etc.’ ” We got our authority for the meaning attributed, from the pleadings that framed the issues, to which the charge was referable; from the unambiguous language in which these issues were phrased, and from the answers of the jury thereto. Issue No. 2 reads as follows: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant, on the occasion of writing the contract dated August 31, 1933, represented to the plaintiff that it was a joint will providing, etc.?” The word “it,” used in the charge, referred to the instrument, and, of course, there was no “it,” i. e., instrument, until written. This conclusion we think inescapable. • Issue No. 4 submitted the identical issue, and has the same meaning; and the answer of the jury to issue No. 6, that plaintiff, in signing the instrument, did not rely solely on representations of defendant, is a necessary corollary, for if, after the instrument was prepared, no representation was made by defendant to plaintiff, it cannot be said that, in signing the instrument, plaintiff relied either solely, or in any sense, upon representations, the evidence discloses and the jury found, were not made.
*914So much for the interpretation we gave to these issues. Counsel, however, made the following additional observation in regard to the matter: . They say, “This •court has interpreted the language to mean something, which neither the trial court nor the lawyers on either side nor any juryman misunderstood. The argument before the jury, the argument before the trial court and the argument in the Court of Civil Appeals did not anywhere suggest the finding by the Court of Civil Appeals that Special Issue No. 2 in any way, even remotely, referred to anything whatsoever that happened after the preparation of the contract.” In making this criticism, counsel for defendant evidently have forgotten the oral argument of counsel for plaintiff, when the cause was submitted, and also have overlooked pertinent language contained in plaintiff’s brief. On this point, the brief states that, “While plaintiff alleged that when defendant came he asked her to join with him in such joint will and told her he was going to write such will and that she believed it was a joint will she was signing, the petition also alleged that after it was written he reiterated such statements. In her testimony, however, she testified to all the facts preceding the writing of the instrument as alleged but said that she had faith in him and went ahead and signed it after it was.written, and that nothing was said after it was written. However, the court submitted both theories, though there was no evidence on the second. By Questions Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 7, he submitted the issues as to the statements made prior to the writing of the instrument, Question No. 1 being as to whether he requested her to join in such will; Question No. 3 being as to whether she agreed with him to execute a joint will; Question No. 5 being as to whether she believed it was a joint will when she signed it, and Question No. 7 being as to whether she would have signed it if she had known it was not .a joint will. Questions Nos. 2, 4 and 6 were with reference to the second theory alleged as to his statements after he had written the instrument.”
The above, we think, is sufficient to acquit this court of the imputation of having invented an interpretation or given a meaning to the issues not insisted upon or presented by counsel for plaintiff.
Counsel insist that we erred in holding that plaintiff was entitled to judgment on the answers to issues Nos. 3, S, 7, and 8, and in this connection say, “In the first place, the Court of Civil Appeals misquotes the finding of the jury in answer to Special Issue No. 3. The court says, ‘As to issue No. 3, the jury found that, on the occasion in question, plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement to execute a joint will, containing the provisions substantially as set out in Special Issue No. 2, etc.’ The exact language of Special Issue No. 3 is, ‘Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that on August 31, 1933, plaintiff, Mrs. L. A. Joiner, agreed with the defendant, C. M. Joiner, to join with him in the execution of a joint will containing the provisions substantially as set out -in Special Issue No. 2?’ ”
We did not pretend to quote the matter mentioned, hence did not misquote anything, but simply interpreted the special issue as answered by the jury, and the meaning thus stated by us is precisely the same as if the matter had been stated as counsel insists it should have been, and counsel do not contend to the contrary, hence this criticism is pointless.
It is further said that, “The Court of Civil Appeals erred in its finding that the ‘jury did convict defendant of want of candor and bad faith, in securing the signature of his wife to the instrument, the effect of which was to find him guilty of fraud.’ ” With reference to this, counsel say: “Where is there any justification for this statement? The word ‘candor’ does not appear anywhere in the case, except in the opinion, nor is the word ‘bad faith’ in this case other than in the opinion of the court, and in addition to this, it is the first time that we have seen in an opinion of any court that a want of can.dor had anything whatsoever to do with the finding of fraud. Many people are lacking in candor, who are not guilty of fraud. As far as bad faith .is concerned, there is no finding of the jury that convicts the defendant of bad faith. Bad faith is another word for fraud. Bad faith was not submitted to the jury. Bad faith does not appear either - in the pleadings, the evidence or the findings of the jury. Bad faith is merely a conclusion that the court puts upon the findings of the jury in answer to questions 3, 5, and 7.”
As stated in the original opinion, the material question involved was, whether or not the action of defendant in obtaining *915the signature of plaintiff to the instrument of August 31, 1933, was fraudulent. We think the conclusion inescapable that the findings of the jury, considered in connection with the evidence upon which they were predicated, show that defendant was lacking in candor and guilty of bad faith, tantamount to a finding that defendant was guilty of fraud in obtaining the signature of his wife to the instrument in 'question. “Candor” means to treat a subject with fairness, impartiality, and to be outspoken, frank, veracious, and is synonymous with other terms describing morality. The terms “bad faith” and “fraud” are synonymous, and also synonyms of dishonesty, infidelity, faithlessness, perfidy, unfairness, etc. The jury found that, on the occasion in question plaintiff and defendant entered into an agreement to execute a joint will. Admittedly, the instrument prepared by defendant, to which he secured his wife’s signature, bore absolutely no resemblance to a will. The jury also found that when plaintiff signed the instrument she believed it to be the joint will of herself and defendant, and would have refused to sign had she known it was not their joint will. Her testimony was to the effect that she trusted defendant, and without any questioning signed the instrument after he finished its preparation, believing it to be their joint will, and that, after its preparation, defendant neither read or explained it to her. In this situation, the implication is irresistible that the jury findings convicted defendant of want of candor and of bad faith in securing? the signature of his wife to the instrument, in effect finding him guilty of fraud.
In addition, we think defendant was uncandid in concealing from plaintiff a matter of considerable materiality to her. Defendant testified that he and Miss England had been engaged to marry for at least a year prior to August 31, 1933, their marriage to be consummated when plaintiff obtained a property settlement with and a divorce from his wife. He went to Ardmore on this occasion for no purpose other than to obtain this property settlement, and after securing his wife’s signature to the instrument, bade her goodbye, intending that that should be'the last time he and she would meet as man and wife, but defendant failed utterly to disclose to his wife anything in regard to his intention to divorce her and marry Miss England. The jury found, in answer to issue No. 8, that plaintiff would have refused to sign the instrument if defendant had told her of his intention to marry Miss England. It is evident that Mrs. Joiner was chiefly interested in the future welfare of her children; therefore her willingness to agree to a joint will in their interest is perfectly reasonable, but we think it unreasonable to assume that she would have executed any instrument in furtherance of the designs of Mr. Joiner to obtain a divorce and marry the young woman, thus introducing a stranger to assert the rights of a wife in his share of the property. Fraud may be committed negatively as well as positively, for whether committed one way or the other, the same result may be produced.
We think .it was the duty of defendant to have made a full disclosure to this trustful wife of fifty-two years’ standing of his intention to divorce her and marry the other woman. The relationship of husband and wife is not an ordinary relationship, but is one of greatest confidence and intimacy. The lawbooks characterize a concealment of this kind as tantamount to active fraud. 12 R.C.L. p. 305, § 66, announces the following doctrine: “Fraud may be committed by the suppression of the truth as well as by the suggestion of falsehood, and it is equally competent for the court to relieve against it whether it is committed in one way or the other. The one acts negatively, the other positively; both are calculated, in different ways, to produce the same result. The former as well as the latter is a violation of the principles of good faith. It proceeds from the same motives and is attended with the same consequences; and the deception and injury may be as great in the one case as in the other. * * * ”
Counsel say, “The Court of Civil Appeals erred in holding that the East Texas oil leases were purchased with funds jointly acquired in Oklahoma during the marriage of the parties,” and then make the charge, “that there is absolutely not one word of testimony in the entire record that justified this finding of fact. * * * ” This criticism is made in the face of undisputed evidence, none to the contrary, that the consideration paid by Mr. Joiner for the oil leases in East Texas were from funds acquired in Oklahoma during the marriage of the parties, hence under the statute of that state, as said by the Supreme *916Court of that state, were held by “⅜ species of joint ownership,” and this, we think, would he true whether the funds were acquired as the result of the labor and efforts of one or the other. We do not think the laws either of Oklahoma or Texas would require a wife to hew wood, draw water, grub, plow, sow, reap, tend herds, trade, buy, sell, sink oil wells, etc., to be entitled to share in the accumulation from these sources. Her marital duties are discharged in other and different spheres, appropriate to wifehood and motherhood, as recognized the country over.
Again counsel say, “The court is not justified in stating that ‘while it is true that defendant did not thereafter regularly reside with the family or live with plaintiff in the intimacy of married life, yet they maintained an irregular correspondence, association and a cordial relationship.’ ” With reference to this, counsel say: “What the record actually showed * * * was that after the wife had abandoned her husband there had never been any relationship between them, not even in the form of a correspondence.”
The undisputed evidence, we think, forbids the conclusion that Mrs. Joiner had “abandoned her husband,” as repeatedly stated by counsel in the argument. Mr. Joiner did not so regard the matter, for after dismissing the suit filed by him in Oklahoma City many years before, he continued as before to make Ardmore his home, and continued the recognition of his marital relationship down to August 31, 1933. In parting with Mrs. Joiner and his daughter on that occasion, Mr. Joiner testified that they kissed each other and shed tears, but stated in this connection that it was his intention, not disclosed to his wife, that he and she would never meet again as husband and wife. In urging the criticism last quoted, counsel for defendant either ignored or overlooked their own allegations and proof. In order to combat the contention of plaintiff, that their domicile had been changed from Oklahoma to Texas, and to invoke the laws of Oklahoma, defendant, in his second^ original answer, alleged: “That the said defendant and the plaintiff were married, as alleged by the plaintiff, on January 16, 1880, and lived together as husband and wife in the State of Oklahoma until August 31, 1933. * * * Defendant represents that plaintiff and this defendant never at any time lived in the State of Texas, or had their home or domicile in the State of Texas. * * * Defendant represents to the court that while he was still living in the State of Oklahoma, and before coming to the State of Texas he purchased several thousand acres of leases on what is now known as the East Texas oil field, etc.; * * * that he never at any time designated a place of residence and domicile for plaintiff and defendant at Dallas, Texas, or any other place in Texas, and never attempted to make any such designation after the plaintiff failed and refused to change her place of residence from Ardmore, Oklahoma to Oklahoma City, as above alleged, and that knowing plaintiff’s set determination not to move from Ardmore, Oklahoma, the defendant never at any time suggested to the plaintiff that she remove her residence and domicile from Ardmore to Dallas, or any other town or city of Texas, and that in truth and fact the domicile of plaintiff and defendant during all of the time from 1923 to 1933, up to the date of the settlement above mentioned, the residence home and domicile of plaintiff and defendant continued to be and was in Ardmore, Carter County, Oklahoma, and remained the same up to and including the 31st day of August, A. D. 1933.”. At another place in his answer, after alleging plaintiff’s refusal to move from Ardmore to Oklahoma City, defendant alleged that “from said time up to the time of the execution of the contract hereinabove set out (contract of August 31, 1933), plaintiff and defendant never at any time lived together or co-habited as man and wife, but defendant in order to try to- keep peace in the family continued to support the plaintiff in her residence a-t Ardmore, Oklahoma, and for all practical purposes continued to maintain his residence and domicile of their marriage in the State of Oklahoma, and in the city of Ardmore; and that on the 27th day of December, 1930, defendant purchased the home place known as number 601 North Washington Street, in the City of Ard-more, Carter County, Oklahoma, and furnished the same, and plaintiff never at any time after the purchase of said home desired to be elsewhere except in said home, and defendant never at any time desired the plaintiff thereafter to be at any other place except in said home, and said home place was considered by both the plaintiff and defendant, and by all members of the family, as the residence, home, domicile and place where the plaintiff and defend*917ant had their residence and home, and neither plaintiff nor defendant ever at any time thereafter up to the date of the making of said contract, ever discussed or intended any other house, place, residence or room to be their home. * * *”
The testimony of the defendant is equally, if not more, explicit; he testified, ‘in effect, that he considered Ardmore his home from 1897 to the date of the contract, August 31, 1933; that he. had the same telephone number for thirty years and was listed in the city directory of Ard-more. As touching his intimate family relationship, writing to Mrs. Joiner in' 1932, addressed her “Dear Lydia,” and in the discussion of business matters said: Neither you nor I ever let money disturb our love, and I am not going to let you worry if I can help it. I am going to see you real soon, and any demands or suggestions to lift you out of work, will do it.” Further, he stated, “I hope you will no longer worry, but rest assured, you will be taken care of if anything is saved.” He testified that Mrs. Joiner rarely ever wrote 'to him, except when some of the children were sick, but that she was not given to much writing; referred to the home at Ardmore as “our home in Ardmore”; on an occasion when Mrs. Joiner was sick defendant wrote that he would call up every night; that during a spell of sickness at home, his wife was very kind, waited upon him attentively; that he had a room in the house that he occupied when in Ardmore; that Mrs. Joiner was very much beloved in Ardmore; that during their, long married life, so far as he could remember, neither ever said an unkind word to the other, and paid her this extraordinary tribute, “There never was and never will be a better woman,” and that under no circumstances would he say a harsh word against her. It furthermore appears that in 1932, she gave him a power of attorney to act for her in making a separate community income tax report. This relationship continued down to the moment they parted at Ardmore on August 31, 1933.
So, we conclude that defendant’s admissions in pleadings and testimony fully justified the statement, in the opinion of this court, to the effect that, while defendant did not thereafter (after the refusal of Mrs. Joiner to move to Oklahoma City) regularly reside with the family, or live with the plaintiff in the intimacy of married life, yet they maintained an irregular correspondence, association, and a cordial relationship.
In the course of the discussion, in the original and in this opinion, we deemed it our duty to write plainly as to the legal effect of the conduct of Mr. Joiner, in concealing from Mrs. Joiner his intention to divorce her and marry again, and, as found by the jury, after agreeing to the execution of a joint will, in preparing and having her execute the instrument in evidence. However, we wish to say in behalf of Mr. Joiner that the facts showed that pri- or to August 31, 1933, lie was kind, considerate, and solicitous for his wife and children, and that, after bringing in the oil field and becoming wealthy, he purchased for his wife a splendid home in Ardmore, and furnished it expensively, was liberal with all the children, giving to each a •monthly allowance from oil runs, and provided handsomely for the support of Mrs. Joiner and their unmarried daughter, Fannie. But Mr. Joiner and his stenographer, being engaged to marry, the marriage to be consummated when he obtained a property settlement with and divorce from his wife, his only mission to Ardmore on the occasion was, to remove the first impediment, i. e., to secure such property settlement. He evidently knew that if Mrs. Joiner was informed of his intention to divorce her and marry again, she would refuse to sign any document, whether the one he said was executed or the one she testified that she thought she was signing. So he concealed from Mrs. Joiner his plans, which, in our opinion, furnished sufficient grounds for the cancellation of any document obtained under the circumstances, whether the one defendant said was executed, or the one plaintiff said she thought she was signing, for, in either case, good faith required a full disclosure.
We have written at unusual length, but feel justified in so doing, in view of the criticisms in the motion for rehearing that go deeper than the mere questioning of the correctness of our conclusions. Whether or not intended, as the strong language imports, the court is charged with misquoting the record and announcing conclusions without one word of testimony in the entire record justifying such conclusion. In our opinion, it would be absolutely indefensible for an appellate court, in order to bolster a position taken, to misquote the record, or announce conclusions *918without supporting evidence. We are not open, to these criticisms, hence in order to bare our reasons for the position taken, we have gone into the record rather extensively.
All grounds urged for a rehearing have been duly considered, and finding no reason to change our original decision, the motion is overruled.
Overruled.