Court Opinion

ID: 9548815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:09:11.878285+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:27.064459
License: Public Domain

Robb, J.
(concurring specially): I concur in the opinion of the majority but would add that under the undisputed testimony defendant gave plaintiff an opportunity for rescission of the contract in January, 1955, when he offered his new Cadillac to plaintiff in an even trade for the leases then held by plaintiff, but plaintiff failed and refused to accept this offer. He retained the leases, continued to send checks for completion costs on commercial producing wells, and accepted income from the production of such wells until the leases became valueless — by their own terms, by sales as a result of a judgment in a lien foreclosure, and by a partition suit. His assignments of leases purporting to be the same leases he had acquired could not constitute a good and sufficient tender (G. S. 1949, 17-1240) and he was estopped from relying upon violation of the Kansas Securities Act as a cause of action to recover back the amount of money he had originally paid for such securities, or assignments. (Wichita Duntile Co. v. Wright, 130 Kan. 139, 141, 285 Pac. 635.)
I further believe that the result of the offer by defendant to trade his Cadillac for the leases, which plaintiff turned down, was ratifi*65cation in view of the following statement made in Weber v. Home Royalty Ass'n, 149 Kan. 678, 88 P. 2d 1053:
“We have repeatedly said the sale of speculative securities without a permit or license was not malum in se, but only malum prohibitum, and hence capable of being ratified.” (pp. 682-683.)
In' my opinion the Kansas Securities Act was never intended to permit a person to proceed in the way plaintiff proceeded in this case, to ratify the transactions, and then to say, “King’s X, I want out!”
Wertz, J., joins in the foregoing specially concurring opinion.