Court Opinion

ID: 9919480
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 16:06:30.326841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:22.622870
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JANUARY 18, 2024
                                                        TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2022-SC-0386-DG

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                            APPELLANT

                   ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V.                          NO. 2017-CA-1665
                          KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
                   NOS. 15-CR-00112 & 15-CR-00112-003

STEVEN D. ROARK                                                      APPELLEE

                OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE BISIG

                                 REVERSING

      Steven Roark was convicted of manufacturing methamphetamine,

possession of methamphetamine, and tampering with physical evidence. After

a jury trial, the Knox Circuit Court sentenced him to ten years in prison

consistent with the jury’s recommendation. In this appeal, we granted the

Commonwealth’s motion for discretionary review of the Court of Appeals’

holding that the jury instruction for manufacturing methamphetamine violated

Roark’s right to a unanimous verdict. After careful review, and finding no

error, we reverse the Court of Appeals as to the manufacturing conviction.

                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      On February 25, 2015, police arrived at a trailer owned by Tonia and

Alvin Couch to conduct a welfare check on a minor living in the home. Officers
heard a noise in the back of the trailer, Tonia Couch (Couch) consented to a

search and the officer proceeded to the back bedroom. Upon entering the back

bedroom, officers found Steven Roark, and others, lying on a mattress feigning

sleep. A small, plastic bag of meth and a syringe were discovered lying on the

floor next to the mattress. During the search of an attached bathroom, officers

found green tubing, a Mountain Dew bottle, coffee filter, and an HCI generator,

described as a one-step meth lab, stuffed inside the wall of a bathroom vent. 1

In addition, they found funnels, coffee filters, syringes, and salt on the

bathroom cabinet, counter, and shelf, along with a spoon on top of a coffee

filter and a clear plastic bag containing clear liquid. There is no dispute that

the materials discovered are commonly used in the manufacture of

methamphetamine. The officers also discovered a burn barrel outside the

trailer, which usually indicates meth-making activity. Roark and others were

arrested.

      Relevant to this appeal, Roark was charged with one count of

manufacturing methamphetamine. During the one-day jury trial, Couch

testified that Roark called her a few months after his arrest and apologized for

“bringing it in [her] house,” but Roark denied making this statement. He

testified in his own defense and admitted to being a drug addict and using

methamphetamine at the trailer on February 25 but denied residing at the

trailer or manufacturing methamphetamine. Roark also emphasized that there

      1 Expert testimony described the meth making process and explained how the

one-step meth lab the officers discovered “cooks” meth.
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was no link between the various indicia of methamphetamine production and

Roark other than his mere presence at the scene.

      Before closing arguments and before the trial court instructed the jury,

the parties and the trial court discussed jury instructions. The trial court read

the jury instructions aloud and the relevant jury instruction directed the jury

to find Roark guilty of manufacturing meth if it believed that Roark “knowingly

manufactured methamphetamine; OR . . . knowingly had in his possession

with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine” certain meth-making

materials. (Emphasis added). Roark objected to this instruction and argued

that the Commonwealth should proceed under one theory or the other to

prevent a unanimous verdict issue. The Commonwealth responded stating

that the evidence would support either theory and that a general unanimous

verdict instruction would cure the problem. The trial court agreed that a

unanimous verdict instruction would cure the problem and gave an instruction

that read, “[t]he verdict of the jury must be in writing, must be unanimous, and

must be signed by one of you as foreperson.”

      Roark tendered his own jury instruction that contained only the theory

that he “knowingly had in his possession with the intent to manufacture

methamphetamine two or more chemicals, or two or more of the items of

equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine.” 2 The jury found Roark

      2 The Court pauses to note that while Roark’s tendered instruction would cover

the facts supporting possession of two or more chemicals or two or more items of
equipment, there was also evidence of a bag of methamphetamine and a “one-step”
meth lab introduced in this case. Accepting Roark’s proposed instruction would not
reflect the full aggregate of evidence presented at trial.
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guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine, possession of methamphetamine,

and tampering with physical evidence. Consistent with the jury’s

recommendation, the trial court sentenced Roark to ten years for

manufacturing, one year for possession, and one year for tampering, to run

concurrently for a total sentence of ten years in prison.

      Roark appealed to the Court of Appeals and argued three jury instruction

errors, including that he received a non-unanimous and unreliable verdict as

to the manufacturing charge because the jury could have convicted him on

manufacturing in two different ways—completed manufacture or knowing

possession of materials with the intent to manufacture. The Court of Appeals

agreed, and determined that the jury instructions created a unanimity error.

“Because the jury did not necessarily agree on which instance of

manufacturing methamphetamine it based its finding of guilt, its verdict

cannot stand and Roark is entitled to a new trial on the charge of

manufacturing methamphetamine.” The Court of Appeals also instructed the

trial court on remand to tailor the jury instructions “to reflect the evidence and

require a unanimous verdict regarding a specific factual scenario[.]” Martin v.

Commonwealth, 456 S.W.3d 1, 8 (Ky. 2015), overruled on other grounds by

Johnson v. Commonwealth, 676 S.W.3d 405 (Ky. 2023), and abrogated on other

grounds by Sexton v. Commonwealth, 647 S.W.3d 227 (Ky. 2022).

      This appeal followed. Having granted the Commonwealth’s motion for

discretionary review, heard oral arguments, and carefully considered the

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record, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ holding regarding the manufacturing

conviction.

                                   ANALYSIS

      The Kentucky Constitution requires a unanimous verdict in criminal

cases. KY. CONST. § 7. The sole issue on appeal is whether Roark’s right to a

unanimous verdict was violated by a jury instruction that allowed for a

conviction based upon either express statutory method of manufacturing

methamphetamine under Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 218A.1432.

      KRS 218A.1432 states

      (1) A person is guilty of manufacturing methamphetamine when he
      knowingly and unlawfully:

              (a) Manufactures methamphetamine; or

              (b) With intent to manufacture methamphetamine possesses
              two (2) or more chemicals or two (2) or more items of
              equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine.

The legislature has specifically prescribed, under the same criminal offense,

two methods by which a person can be found guilty of manufacturing

methamphetamine. There are various offenses in the Kentucky Penal Code

that give alternative ways in which crimes may be committed.

      Our standard of review of this alleged unanimity error first hinges on

whether Roark preserved this allegation of error. Kentucky Rule of Criminal

Procedure (RCr) 9.54(2) provides that

      No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an
      instruction unless the party's position has been fairly and
      adequately presented to the trial judge by an offered instruction or
      by motion, or unless the party makes objection before the court

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      instructs the jury, stating specifically the matter to which the party
      objects and the ground or grounds of the objection.

      This issue is properly preserved for our review. Roark objected to the

jury instruction allowing the jury to find him guilty under either subsection of

KRS 218A.1432—that he knowingly manufactured meth, or that he knowingly

possessed, with the intent to manufacture, two or more items of equipment for

the manufacture of methamphetamine. In addition, Roark tendered his own

proposed instruction that would have allowed the jury to convict him of

manufacturing methamphetamine if he “knowingly had in [his] possession with

the intent to manufacture methamphetamine two or more chemicals and/or

two or more items of equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine.” 3

Therefore, this issue is preserved. Despite proper preservation, we nevertheless

hold that the manufacturing methamphetamine jury instruction did not create

a unanimity error.

      In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 134 S.W.3d 563, 567-68 (Ky. 2004),

appellant Johnson argued that the Commonwealth failed to introduce evidence

      3 In its brief, the Commonwealth argues that the trial court directed the parties

to file their tendered jury instructions into the record, but that only the
Commonwealth did so. In his brief, Roark argues that he submitted his own jury
instructions as requested by the trial court. The record only contains one set of jury
instructions, and it is ambiguous at best as to which party tendered the instructions.
However, at oral argument, the Commonwealth conceded that this issue is likely
preserved but did point out that the tendered instructions included instructions for all
five co-defendants, not just Roark. We also note that the tendered instruction for
manufacturing methamphetamine located in the record would not have given the jury
the option to convict Roark under either statutory subsection (completed manufacture
or possession of equipment with intent to manufacture) but instead only would have
allowed a conviction if the jury believed Roark possessed equipment with the intent to
manufacture. We will resolve the ambiguity in the record in Roark’s favor and treat
the instructions as though they were tendered by him.
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sufficient for conviction under KRS 218A.1432(1)(b), possession of equipment

with intent to manufacture, and therefore he was denied his right to a

unanimous verdict. The Court equated the manufacturing methamphetamine

jury instruction used in Johnson’s case, which, as in Roark’s case, gave the

jury the option to convict for completed manufacture of methamphetamine or

possession of chemicals or equipment used for manufacture with the intent to

manufacture methamphetamine, to a combination jury instruction. Id. at 568.

A combination instruction permits a jury to convict “of the same offense under

either of multiple alternative theories . . . .” Brown v. Commonwealth, 553

S.W.3d 826, 839 (Ky. 2018) (citation omitted).

      “A ‘combination’ instruction permitting a conviction of the same
      offense under either of multiple alternative theories does not
      deprive a defendant of his right to a unanimous verdict, so long as
      there is evidence to support a conviction under either theory.” “It is
      not necessary that a jury, in order to find a verdict should concur
      in a single view of the transaction disclosed by the evidence. If the
      conclusion may be justified upon either of two interpretations of
      the evidence, the verdict cannot be impeached by showing that a
      part of the jury proceeded upon one interpretation and part upon
      the other . . . .”

Cox v. Commonwealth, 553 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Ky. 2018) (citations omitted).

      In Johnson, the Court explained that KRS 218A.1432 (a) and (b) are

intertwined:

      A necessary inference from proof of actual manufacture is that, at
      some point in time, he must have had possession of both all the
      equipment and all the ingredients necessary to manufacture
      methamphetamine. In other words, just as you can't make an
      omelet without breaking some eggs, you can't make
      methamphetamine without having possession of the necessary
      chemicals and equipment. Nor, as demonstrated in the next
      section, is it likely that someone would inadvertently combine the
      chemicals and use the equipment to manufacture
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      methamphetamine by accident. Thus, intent to manufacture can
      be inferred from the act of manufacturing as well.

134 S.W.3d at 568. The Court concluded that because there was sufficient

evidence to convict Johnson under both versions of the manufacturing

instruction, no error occurred. Id. Just as the statutory methods of

manufacturing methamphetamine are intertwined, the evidence of Roark’s

commission of both crimes was intertwined. A reasonable juror would not have

believed that Roark manufactured methamphetamine but did not knowingly

possess two or more meth-making materials with the intent to manufacture

methamphetamine and vice versa.

      In Wells v. Commonwealth, 561 S.W.2d 85, 86 (Ky. 1978), Wells was

charged with several crimes, including first-degree assault. The jury

instructions allowed the jury to convict Wells of first-degree assault if he acted

intentionally or if he acted wantonly. Id. at 87. The Court reasoned that the

first-degree assault statute “brings together two distinct culpable mental

states” and “punishes them equally under specified circumstances.” Id. at 88.

Either mental state supported a conviction, and “[t]he legal effect of the

alternative conclusions is identical.” Id. The Court concluded that “a verdict

can not be successfully attacked upon the ground that the jurors could have

believed either of two theories of the case where both interpretations are

supported by the evidence and the proof of either beyond a reasonable doubt

constitutes the same offense.” Id.

      The jury instruction in Wells allowed the jury to convict under either of

two theories of first-degree assault. Similarly, the jury instruction in Roark’s
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case allowed the jury to convict under either of two theories of manufacturing

methamphetamine. The manufacturing methamphetamine statute brings

together two distinct methods to commit the manufacturing offense and each

way is punished equally if the requisite criteria is met. As in Wells, either

method supported a conviction with an identical “legal effect of the alternative

conclusions[.]” Id.

      In a case directly on point, Robinson v. Commonwealth, 181 S.W.3d 30,

37 (Ky. 2005), this Court also characterized a jury instruction that allowed a

conviction for either completed manufacture or possession of materials with

intent to manufacture as an instruction containing “alternate theories of guilt

for the same offense.” Upon executing a search warrant police discovered

packets of methamphetamine, coffee filters, salt, and a plastic bottle modified

for use as an HCI generator, which is an item of equipment used in the final

step of methamphetamine manufacture. Id. at 33. Robinson was convicted of

manufacturing methamphetamine, among other crimes, and argued on appeal

that he was denied a unanimous verdict because the instruction contained two

theories of guilt. 4 Id. at 36.

      The Robinson Court explained that “[w]hen a jury is presented, in a

single instruction, alternate theories of guilt for the same offense, ‘each juror’s

      4 The version of the manufacturing methamphetamine statute in effect at the

time of the Robinson decision was virtually identical to the current version, except that
in Robinson, the second method of manufacturing methamphetamine simply required
possession of “chemicals or equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine”
with intent to manufacture, rather than requiring possession of “two (2) or more
chemicals or two (2) or more items of equipment” with the intent to manufacture.
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verdict [must] be based on a theory of guilt in which the Commonwealth has

proven each and every element beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Id. at 37 (quoting

Burnett v. Commonwealth, 31 S.W.3d 878 (Ky. 2000), overruled on other

grounds by Travis v. Commonwealth, 327 S.W.3d 456, 463 (Ky. 2010)).

Because the Commonwealth met its burden of proof on each prong of KRS

218A.1432, the Court concluded that the trial court did not err “by instructing

the jury as to both prongs, or theories of guilt in this case.” Id.

      Albeit in an unpublished Opinion, this Court also determined that no

unanimity violation occurred when the jury was instructed on multiple theories

of the manufacturing methamphetamine offense because “the evidence was

sufficient to support a conviction based on either the theory that Appellant

manufactured methamphetamine, or that he possessed all the necessary

methamphetamine manufacturing equipment or ingredients with intent to

manufacture.” Willis v. Commonwealth, No. 2004-SC-0032-MR, 2005 WL

1412482, at *2 (Ky. June 16, 2005) (citing Wells, 561 S.W.2d at 97).

      Combination instructions, like the one given in Roark’s case, reflect

“distinct theories of culpability which bear equal punishment . . . .” Benjamin

v. Commonwealth, 266 S.W.3d 775, 785 (Ky. 2008). This Court has upheld

other combination instructions for different offenses, such as murder, see

Hudson v. Commonwealth, 979 S.W.2d 106, 109 (Ky. 1998), in which a jury

instruction allowed a conviction for either intentional or wanton conduct;

driving under the influence, see Evans v. Commonwealth, 45 S.W.3d 445, 447

(Ky. 2001), in which the jury instruction allowed conviction for having a blood

                                         10
alcohol level above a certain amount or being under the influence of a

substance that impairs driving ability, and the Court held that “[w]hile the

alternative means do indeed require different acts, the effect is the same and

there is no prejudice so long as evidence is presented from which the jury could

reasonably believe both of the subsections had been violated.”; and fleeing and

evading, see Carroll v. Commonwealth, No. 2007-SC-0613-TG, 2009 WL

160450, at *1 (Ky. Jan. 22, 2009), in which a jury instruction allowed

conviction if the jury found appellant was under the influence or that he

created a substantial risk of injury or death by fleeing.

      In this case, there was evidence of both theories presented in the jury

instruction—completed manufacturing of methamphetamine and possession of

two or more pieces of equipment or chemicals with the intent to manufacture

methamphetamine. First, completed manufacture was supported by the fact

that Roark was found in a trailer with an active methamphetamine lab and a

bottle connected to the lab that contained methamphetamine. During the

search, police officers discovered the presence of large amounts of salt, coffee

filters, a funnel with white residue, a bottle that tested positive for ammonia

nitrate, green tubing with a knot tied in it, an HCI generator, suspected lithium

strips, spoons, needles, an operational meth lab, and the finished product–

methamphetamine. All of these items were found near where Roark was

located (and where Tonya testified he had been living) when police arrived.

This constituted strong evidence of completed manufacture under KRS

218A.1432(1)(a).

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      The evidence also supported a conviction for manufacturing

methamphetamine under the second method, possessing two items of

equipment or chemicals with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine.

The same items discovered by police as listed above were equipment or

chemicals used in the manufacture of methamphetamine. This, paired with

the evidence supporting completed manufacture of methamphetamine,

constituted sufficient evidence for conviction under KRS 218A.1432(1)(b). See

Johnson, 134 S.W.3d at 568 (holding that “intent to manufacture

methamphetamine can be inferred from the act of manufacturing”).

      Additional surrounding circumstances also indicated the necessary

intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Police discovered

methamphetamine in its finished form, and, according to Couch, Roark told

her not to let the police in when they knocked on the trailer door. The one-step

meth lab was also hidden. Roark also admitted to being a daily

methamphetamine user, and he was familiar with methamphetamine and the

components used to make it.

      If, and only if, both theories are supported by the evidence can a

conviction be upheld based on a combination instruction. In prior instances,

this Court has reversed convictions when the evidence only supported one

theory of a crime and the Court was unable to ascertain whether all jurors

based their decision on the sole theory supported by the evidence. See Boulder

v. Commonwealth, 610 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Ky. 1980) (jury instructions provided

alternative grounds for conviction—either the defendant intended to cause

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serious physical injury or wantonly engaged in conduct that created a risk of

death—but the Court held that “it would be clearly unreasonable for a juror to

believe that John’s conduct was other than intentional”), overruled on other

grounds by Dale v. Commonwealth, 715 S.W.2d 227 (Ky. 1986); Hayes v.

Commonwealth, 625 S.W.2d 583 (Ky. 1981) (murder conviction reversed

because the jury instructions included alternative theories, intentional or

wanton conduct, and there was no evidence of wanton conduct).

      The requirement that the Commonwealth must prove beyond a

reasonable doubt every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which a

defendant is charged is a basic and fundamental protection of the Due Process

Clause of the United States Constitution. Burnett, 31 S.W.3d at 883 (citing In

re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970)). Here there was ample evidence to

support Roark’s conviction under either KRS 218A.1432(1)(a) or (b). Because

the Commonwealth proved both theories of the offense beyond a reasonable

doubt, there was no error.

      Roark argues that the jury instruction created a multiple

acts/duplicitous instruction unanimity error. The Commonwealth argued to

the Court of Appeals that no unanimity violation occurred, and now, before this

Court, asserts that Roark’s argument involves an alleged multiple

acts/duplicitous instruction error.

      This type of unanimous-verdict violation occurs when a jury
      instruction may be satisfied by multiple criminal acts by the
      defendant. When that is the case, and the instruction does not
      specify which specific act it is meant to cover, we cannot be sure

                                       13
       that the jurors were unanimous in concluding the defendant
       committed a single act satisfying the instruction.

Martin, 456 S.W.3d at 7. We disagree, as Robinson, 181 S.W.3d at 37, is

directly on point and held that the trial court did not err in giving a

combination jury instruction providing two theories of guilt, i.e., completed

manufacture and possession of chemicals/equipment with intent to

manufacture.

       In any event, even if the instruction here created a multiple-acts

unanimity error, the error would be harmless. A properly preserved

constitutional error requires reversal unless it was “harmless beyond a

reasonable doubt.” Staples v. Commonwealth, 454 S.W.3d 803, 827 (Ky. 2014).

In again considering the evidence presented at trial, had there been an error, it

would have been harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt. 5 But in any

event, because the evidence supported a conviction under either theory, there

was no error.

                                       CONCLUSION

       Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, we reverse the Court of

Appeals and affirm the judgment and sentence of the trial court as to Roark’s

manufacturing conviction. Given this result, and that no party has challenged

       5 We take this opportunity to note that, as with crafting any jury instruction,

the best practice is to tailor each instruction to the specific evidence presented. If the
Commonwealth lacks the evidence to distinguish or specifically describe the crime the
jury is to consider, it is likely that its evidence is insufficient to convict. “[I]t is better
practice in these instances to either set forth the separate theories on separate verdict
forms or when a combination instruction is given, require the jury to specify on the
verdict upon which theory they find.” Benjamin, 266 S.W.3d at 786.
                                              14
the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that double jeopardy principles bar Roark’s

simultaneous convictions for manufacturing and possession, we remand this

matter to the circuit court to vacate the possession conviction and dismiss that

charge with prejudice.

      VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Nickell, JJ., sitting.

All concur. Thompson, J., not sitting.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Joseph Beckett
Assistant Attorney General

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Shannon Dupree
Assistant Public Advocate

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