Court Opinion

ID: 9487878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:28:52.64743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:32.182211
License: Public Domain

NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority finds that Thomas was brought to trial in a timely manner that was not in violation of the Speedy Trial Act. I dissent.
I agree with the majority that Thomas was not brought to trial within seventy days as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3161, and thus to show that there has been no violation of the Speedy Trial Act the government must establish that the ninety-day clock of section 3164 applies. Unlike, the majority, however, *262I do not find that the government has met this burden. The plain language of sections 3161 and 3164 convinces me that section 3164 does not apply to this case. Consequently, I would find that the more than seventy-day delay in bringing Thomas -to trial was a violation of the Speedy Trial Act. I would thus remand the case , to the district court with instructions to dismiss the indictment.
Section 3161 instructs that “[i ~\n any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial of a defendant ... shall commence within seventy days from the filing date.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c) (1988) (emphasis added). Any case means any case. Thomas entered a plea of not guilty, thus the language of section 3161 clearly applies to him. “The task of resolving the dispute over the meaning of [a statute] begins where all such inquiries must begin: with the language of the statute itself. In this case it is also where the inquiry should end, for where, as here, the statute’s language is plain, ‘the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms.’ ” United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241, 109 S.Ct. 1026, 1030, 103 L.Ed.2d 290 (1989) (quoting Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485, 37 S.Ct. 192, 194, 61 L.Ed. 442 (1917)) (citations omitted). The plain language of section 3161 creates the definite presumption that a seventy-day clock should be applied to Defendant Thomas; this court’s task is simply to enforce that language.
The majority found that the ninety-day clock of section 3164 applied to this ease. Because I find that application of section 3164 creates an absurd result, I would decline to apply it in this case. Section 3164 instructs that the trials of defendants who fall within its scope are to be “accorded priority.” Nevertheless, application of section 3164’s ninety-day time limit, in juxtaposition with section 3161’s seventy-day time limit, encourages that defendants who section 3164 instructs are to be “accorded priority” actually be brought to trial later than other defendants. To require defendants who were originally the focus of congressional concern to be treated more harshly than others who were previously afforded no such special protection is nonsensical and thus cannot be a right result. “Courts are bound to construe a statute to avoid absurd results. ...” Bailey v. City of Lawrence, Ind., 972 F.2d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir.1992). See also Public Citizen v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 454-55, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 2567, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989) (“Where the literal reading of a statutory term would ‘compel an odd result,’ Green v. Bock Laundry Machine Co., 490 U.S. 504, 509, 109 S.Ct. 1981, 1984, 104 L.Ed.2d 557 (1989), we must search for other evidence of congressional intent to lend the term its proper scope.”); Grand ex rel. United States v. Northrop Corp., 811 F.Supp. 333, 335 (S.D.Ohio 1992) (“a court should not enforce the plain meaning of a statute if it would lead to an absurd or odd result”). In the absence of a legislative explanation for this odd effect, I believe that the only fair result is to reject the application of the ninety-day clock of section 3164 in this case.
Moreover, I am also troubled by the majority’s application of the plain language of section 3164 to the facts of this case. Even if one reads section 3164 as creating a legitimate exception to the plain language of section 3161, the facts of this case strongly suggest that Thomas does not fit within that exception. The provisions of section 3164 apply when a defendant is “being held in detention solely because he is awaiting trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3164(a)(1) (emphasis added). The majority found that “for all intents and purposes” Thomas was in custody solely awaiting trial. I believe that the facts show otherwise.'
On February 3, 1993, Thomas was taken into federal custody on the narcotics charges involved in the instant case. See J.A. at 77. Previously, on January 20, 1993, the day before the federal grand jury returned an indictment against Thomas, the California Interstate Parole Unit lodged a detainer for Thomas’ confinement. J.A. at 84. In 1985, Thomas had been convicted in California for voluntary manslaughter and possession of a deadly weapon. He was sentenced to 13 years and paroled on September 26, 1991. Presumably, the January 20th detainer was premised upon the fact that Thomas’ instant misconduct was a violation of his parole.- Re*263gardless of the purpose of the detainer, section 3164 applies only where a defendant is being held solely because he is awaiting trial. The lodging of the detainer suggests that Thomas was not being held solely for the purpose of awaiting trial. Consequently, he does not fall within the scope of section 3164, and the section’s provisions do not apply.
The majority’s decision in this ease is another of those recurring instances of recent time, where courts are all too-ready to relax the requirements imposed on the government, while shifting the goal posts for individual defendants. I continue to hold to the view, some may consider outdated, that such a double standard is antithetical to the values we hold dear in our constitutional jurisprudence.
Both the plain language and the spirit of section 3164 prohibit its application in the instant case. It is thus inappropriate for this court to use that section to justify the clear violation of section 3161 that has occurred. Thomas was tried more than seventy days after he was arraigned; thus, the Speedy Trial Act was violated. Accordingly, I dissent.