Court Opinion

ID: 9624721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 07:15:01.816633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:53.548181
License: Public Domain

Evans, Judge,
dissenting. The majority opinion reverses the trial court, but in order to reach that decision it was first confronted with the appellee’s motion to dismiss the appeal. The motion to dismiss is upon two grounds, to wit: "1. Appellant’s enumeration of errors does not contain any showing that the Court of Appeals of Georgia has jurisdiction of the above captioned case. 2. Neither the enumeration of errors nor appellant’s statement of the case contains any citation to any part of the record in the above captioned case.”
Reference to the record shows that appellant is correct in his assertion respecting the enumeration of errors. There is no statement whatever as to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals. The Rule of this court (Code Ann. §24-3613 (c)) provides: "Statement of jurisdiction. — At the conclusion of the enumeration of errors and immediately preceding the signature of counsel for appellant or cross appellant, there must be a statement of the reasons why the Court of Appeals and not the Supreme Court has jurisdiction of the appeal, with citation of the part or parts of the record or transcript, and if possible the particular paragraphs thereof, showing jurisdiction.” (Emphasis supplied). Note the language, "there must be a statement,” etc. How can this court ignore its own rule and its own positive mandate respecting the enumeration of errors?
*203The Rules of this Court further provide in Code Ann. §24-3617 (c-3): "References to record or transcript — A. Specific reference to support enumerated errors. — Each enumerated error shall be supported in the brief by specific reference to the record or transcript or both.” (Emphasis supplied). Appellant’s brief completely fails to comply with this rule.
The majority opinion correctly states that "under the many decisions of this court interpreting these rules we have not construed them to be of such a mandatory nature as will support a motion to dismiss.” The writer of this dissent, along with the other members of this court, has written or concurred in opinions which incorrectly construed our rules. I wish to acknowledge that error here and now and do my best to rectify it. How did we come up with an interpretation of "must” and "shall” as not being mandatory? What does the word "must” mean? What does the word "shall” mean? What right had this court (including the writer) to interpret these words as not being mandatory in nature? We had no such right! We were wrong! We all, each member of the court, ought to be willing now to admit that we were wrong and henceforth interpret the rules correctly. We should call a spade a spade, call the truth the truth and interpret "must” and "shall” as being terms of the highest mandate.
What difference that we have written decisions in the past that were wrong? Are we to be bound by ohr errors and continue to incorrectly interpret our rules? In the case of Humthlett v. Reeves, 211 Ga. 210 (1 b) (85 SE2d 25), it is held: "While, under the rule of stare decisis, a principle of law which has become settled by a series of decisions generally is binding on the courts and should be followed in similar cases, that doctrine should not be followed to the extent that error may be perpetuated.” (Emphasis supplied).
The lawyers of this State are entitled to have it made clear as to the effect of violating the rules of this court. Our rules are given much prominence by their emplacement in Georgia Code Annotated, beginning with Code *204Ann. § 24-3601 et seq. The most recent revision of the rules, effective July 1, 1971, has not yet been published in the Annotated Code, though published in Georgia Appeals Reports, 122 Ga. App 885, 904. Many of the hard-working lawyers of Georgia patiently and meticulously abide by these rules, going to extra trouble in order to comply. What is to be their reward? Shall the lawyers who are not willing to abide by the rules be treated exactly like those lawyers who do comply? This seems manifestly unfair. There is a very meaningful rule in equity that "Equity aids the vigilant, .not the slothful.” Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Vaughn, 103 Ga. App. 660 (120 SE2d 190). And this court has applied that rule heretofore. Why not now? Here we are reversing this principle by aiding those who neglect to comply with our rules. If all of our rules are merely suggestions, I favor so labeling them. If some of them are mandatory, and some are suggestions, I favor dividing them and properly labeling the divisions. But until some definite pronouncement is made by this court, I have to vote to sustain those rules that use the words "must” and "shall”; which means that in the case sub judice, I have to vote to sustain the motion to dismiss the appeal.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion which overrules said motion to dismiss.