Court Opinion

ID: 9956310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 19:08:00.48069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:50.037064
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re D.C.-F., 2024-Ohio-1237.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                          THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               ALLEN COUNTY

IN RE:                                                    CASE NO. 1-23-34

       D.C.-F.,

ADJUDGED DEPENDENT CHILD.
                                                          OPINION
[KERENZA C. - APPELLANT]

                   Appeal from Allen County Common Pleas Court
                                  Juvenile Division
                           Trial Court No. 2021 JG 37284

                                      Judgment Affirmed

                              Date of Decision: April 1, 2024

APPEARANCES:

        Linda Gabriele for Appellant

        Ashley R. Stansbery for Appellee
Case No. 1-23-34

ZIMMERMAN, J.

          {¶1} This is an appeal from the May 22, 2023 decision of the Allen County

Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, which terminated the parental rights of

appellant, Kerenza C., mother of D.C.-F. (“Kerenza”) and Michael F., father of

D.C.-F. (“Michael”) and granted permanent custody of their minor child to Allen

County Children Services Board (the “agency”). For the reasons that follow, we

affirm.

          {¶2} D.C.-F., was born in 2016, to Kerenza and Michael, both unmarried at

the time. On March 12, 2021, the agency filed a motion in the trial court for

emergency-temporary custody of D.C.-F., which the trial court granted. On March

16 2021, the agency filed a complaint alleging D.C.-F. to be a neglected child under

R.C. 2151.03(A)(1) and a dependent child under R.C. 2151.04(C).

          {¶3} After a shelter-care hearing on March 15, 2021, the trial court

concluded that probable cause existed to believe that D.C.-F. was a neglected and

dependent child; that it was in his best interest to be placed in the temporary custody

of the agency; and that

          reasonable efforts were made by the [agency] to prevent the
          placement and removal of [D.C.-F.] from the home prior to March 12,
          2021, and thereafter to eliminate the continued removal of [D.C.-F.]
          from the home, and to make it possible for [him] to return and/or
          remain in the home.

                                          -2-
Case No. 1-23-34

(Doc. No. 11). Then, on March 17, 2021, trial court appointed D.C.-F. a Court

Appointed Special Advocate/Guardian Ad Litem (“GAL”).

       {¶4} At the adjudicatory hearing on April 21, 2021, Kerenza admitted that

D.C.-F. was a dependent child. (Doc. No. 23). Thereafter, the trial court found

D.C.-F. to be a dependent child under R.C. 2151.04(C) and dismissed the neglect

allegation in the complaint. (Id.). The trial court further made a reasonable-efforts

finding in favor of the agency. (Id.).

       {¶5} The GAL filed a report with the trial court on May 28, 2021

recommending D.C.-F. remain in the temporary custody of the agency and that he

continue in his current foster placement.

       {¶6} At the dispositional hearing on June 7, 2021, the parties agreed and the

trial court ordered that D.C.-F. remain in the temporary custody of the agency and

again the trial court made a reasonable-efforts finding in favor of the agency. (Doc.

No. 30).

       {¶7} On September 8, 2021, the trial court held a review hearing and

continued D.C.-F.’s temporary-custody placement with the agency. Further, the

trial court made a reasonable-efforts finding in favor of the agency. (Doc. No. 41).

       {¶8} On April 27, 2022, the trial court granted the agency’s motion for a six-

month extension of temporary custody and determined that the agency had made

                                         -3-
Case No. 1-23-34

reasonable efforts to prevent the removal, eliminate the continued removal, and to

make it possible for D.C.-F. to return home safely. (Doc. No. 64).

       {¶9} Kerenza filed a motion seeking custody of D.C.-F. on July 25, 2022.

Then, on August 8, 2022, the agency filed a motion for permanent custody. (Doc.

No. 69). After conducting the permanent-custody hearing on May 15, 2023, the

trial court granted permanent custody of D.C.-F. to the agency on May 22,

2023. (Doc. No. 102).

       {¶10} Kerenza filed a notice of appeal and sets forth three assignments of

error. We will address Kerenza’s first and second assignments of error together

followed by her third assignment of error.

                            First Assignment of Error

       The Juvenile Court’s Decision Is Against The Manifest Weight Of
       The Evidence As The Appellee Did Not Prove By Clear And
       Convincing Evidence That The Agency Should Be Granted
       Permanent Custody Of The Minor Child.

                          Second Assignment of Error

       The Juvenile Court Abused Its Discretion In Finding That The
       Permanent Custody To The Agency Was In The Minor Child’s
       Best Interest.

       {¶11} In her first and second assignments of error, Kerenza argues that the

trial court erred in granting permanent custody of D.C.-F. to the agency since it was

against the manifest weight of the evidence and because the trial court failed to

consider D.C.-F.’s wishes under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b).

                                         -4-
Case No. 1-23-34

                                Standard of Review

       {¶12} The right to raise one’s child is a basic and essential right. In re

Murray, 52 Ohio St.3d 155, 157 (1990), citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651,

92 S.Ct. 1208, 1212 (1972) and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399, 43 S.Ct.

625, 626 (1923). “Parents have a ‘fundamental liberty interest’ in the care, custody,

and management of the child.” Id., quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753,

102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394 (1982). However, the rights and interests of a natural parent

are not absolute. In re Thomas, 3d Dist. Hancock No. 5-03-08, 2003-Ohio-5885, ¶

7. These rights may be terminated under appropriate circumstances and when the

trial court has met all due process requirements. In re Leveck, 3d Dist. Hancock

Nos. 5-02-52, 5-02-53, and 5-02-54, 2003-Ohio-1269, ¶ 6, citing In re Palmer, 12

Ohio St.3d 194, 196 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1162, 105 S.Ct. 918 (1985).

       {¶13} When considering a motion for permanent custody of a child, the trial

court must comply with the statutory requirements set forth in R.C. 2151.414. See

In re C.E., 3d Dist. Hancock Nos. 5-09-02 and 5-09-03, 2009-Ohio-6027, ¶ 14. R.C.

2151.414(B)(1) establishes a two-part test for courts to apply when determining

whether to grant a motion for permanent custody. In re S.G., 9th Dist. Wayne No.

15AP0005, 2015-Ohio-2306, ¶ 10. The trial court must find, by clear and

convincing evidence that: (1) one of the circumstances in R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a)-

                                         -5-
Case No. 1-23-34

(e) applies, and (2) that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child. Id.

See also In re Brown, 98 Ohio App.3d 337, 342-343 (3d Dist.1994).

                                       Analysis

       R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) provides, in its pertinent parts, that

       * * * the [trial] court may grant permanent custody of a child to a
       movant if the court determines at the hearing held pursuant to division
       (A) of this section, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is in the
       best interest of the child to grant permanent custody of the child to the
       agency that filed the motion for permanent custody and that any of the
       following apply:

       ***

       (d) The child has been in the temporary custody of one or more
       public children services agencies or private child placing agencies for
       twelve or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or
       the child has been in the temporary custody of one or more public
       children services agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve
       or more months of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as
       described in division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code,
       the child was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent
       agency in another state.

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d).

       {¶14} If the trial court makes this statutorily required determination, a

reviewing court will not reverse a trial court’s decision unless it is not supported by

clear and convincing evidence. In re H.M.K., 3d Dist. Wyandot Nos. 16-12-15 and

16-12-16, 2013-Ohio-4317, ¶ 43, citing In re Meyer, 98 Ohio App.3d 189, 195 (3d

Dist.1994), In re Adoption of Holcomb, 18 Ohio St.3d 361, 368 (1985), and In re

Adoption of Lay, 25 Ohio St.3d 41, 42 (1986). “Clear and convincing evidence is

                                          -6-
Case No. 1-23-34

that which is sufficient to produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or

conviction as to the facts sought to be established.” In re S.G., 2015-Ohio-2306, at

¶ 10, citing Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the

syllabus. “Where the degree of proof required to sustain an issue must be clear and

convincing, a reviewing court will examine the record to determine whether the trier

of facts had sufficient evidence before it to satisfy the requisite degree of

proof.” Ledford at 477, citing Ford v. Osborn, 45 Ohio St. 1 (1887), Cole v.

McClure, 88 Ohio St. 1 (1913), and Frate v. Rimenik, 155 Ohio St. 11 (1926). If

some competent, credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case

supports the trial court’s judgment, an appellate court must affirm the judgment and

not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley

Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 280-281 (1978).

       {¶15} Moreover, issues relating to the credibility of witnesses and the weight

to be given to the evidence are primarily for the trier-of-fact. Seasons Coal v.

Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 80 (1984). Deferring to the trial court on matters of

credibility is “crucial in a child custody case, where there may be much evidence in

the parties’ demeanor and attitude that does not translate to the record well.”

(Emphasis sic.) Davis v. Flickinger, 77 Ohio St.3d 415, 419 (1997).

                                         -7-
Case No. 1-23-34

       Furthermore,

       ‘[w]eight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of the greater
       amount of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of
       the issue rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the [trier-of-fact]
       that the party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their
       verdict, if, on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the
       greater amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be
       established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics, but
       depends on its effect in inducing belief.”’

(Emphasis sic.) Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 12,

quoting State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387 (1997), superseded by statute

on other grounds, State v. Smith, 80 Ohio St.3d 80 (1997), quoting Black’s Law

Dictionary 1594 (6th ed. 1990).

                                Manifest Weight Analysis

       {¶16} When an appellate court reviews whether a trial court’s permanent

custody decision is against the manifest weight of the evidence, the court

       ‘“weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the
       credibility of witnesses and determines whether in resolving conflicts
       in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost its way and created
       such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be
       reversed and a new trial ordered.”’

Eastley at ¶ 20, quoting Tewarson v. Simon, 141 Ohio App.3d 103, 115 (9th

Dist.2001), quoting Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, quoting State v. Martin, 20

Ohio App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist.1983); accord In re Pittman, 9th Dist. Summit No.

20894, 2002-Ohio-2208, ¶ 23-24.

                                           -8-
Case No. 1-23-34

                                  R.C. 2151.414

       {¶17} Now, we turn to address Kerenza’s first and second assignments of

error. In this case, the trial court concluded that R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) was

applicable. (Doc. No. 102). The finding under R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d) is an

alternative finding, and is “independently sufficient to use as a basis to grant the

Agency’s motion for permanent custody.” In re M.R., 3d Dist. Defiance No. 4-12-

18, 2013-Ohio-1302, ¶ 80, citing In re Langford Children, 5th Dist. Stark No.

2004CA00349, 2005-Ohio-2304, ¶ 17.            Under the plain language of R.C.

2151.414(B)(1)(d), when a child has been in an agency’s temporary custody for 12

or more months of a consecutive 22-month period, a trial court need not find that

the child cannot be placed with either parent within a reasonable time or should not

be placed with the parents. In re I.G., 3d Dist. Marion Nos. 9-13-43, 9-13-44, and

9-13-45, 2014-Ohio-1136, ¶ 30, citing R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d); In re A.M., 3d Dist.

Marion No. 9-14-46, 2015-Ohio-2740, ¶ 14.

       {¶18} The record supports that D.C.-F. had been in the temporary custody of

the agency continuously since his removal in 2021. The agency filed its permanent-

custody motion on March 12, 2021 with the final hearing being heard on May 15,

2023. Hence, the record is clear that D.C.-F. was in the temporary custody of the

agency from 2021 until 2023 in excess of 12 months in a consecutive 22-month

period.

                                        -9-
Case No. 1-23-34

       {¶19} Accordingly, based on the evidence presented and because it is

dispositive, we conclude that the trial court’s determination under R.C.

2151.141(B)(1)(d) is sufficient to satisfy the first prong of the permanent-custody

test and is not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

                                    Best Interests

       {¶20} Thus, having satisfied the first prong of the permanent-custody test, we

proceed to the second prong of the test–the trial court’s consideration of the best-

interest factors. R.C. 2151.414(D) contains the factors for a trial court to consider

when determining whether granting permanent custody to an agency is in the best

interests of a child. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) reads as follows:

       [i]n determining the best interest of a child at a hearing held pursuant
       to division (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) or
       (5) of section 2151.353 or division (C) of section 2151.415 of the
       Revised Code, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including,
       but not limited to, the following:

       (a) The interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child’s
       parents, siblings, relatives, foster caregivers and out-of-home
       providers, and any other person who may significantly affect the
       child;

       (b) The wishes of the child, as expressed directly by the child or
       through the child’s guardian ad litem, with due regard for the maturity
       of the child;

       (c) The custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
       been in the temporary custody of one or more public children services
       agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months
       of a consecutive twenty-two-month period, or the child has been in

                                         -10-
Case No. 1-23-34

       the temporary custody of one or more public children services
       agencies or private child placing agencies for twelve or more months
       of a consecutive twenty-two-month period and, as described in
       division (D)(1) of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child
       was previously in the temporary custody of an equivalent agency in
       another state;

       (d) The child’s need for a legally secure permanent placement and
       whether that type of placement can be achieved without a grant of
       permanent custody to the agency;

       (e) Whether any of the factors in divisions (E)(7) to (11) of this section
       apply in relation to the parents and child.

R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e).

       {¶21} After reviewing the evidence in the record and determining the

applicability of R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d), the trial court addressed the best-interest

factors under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e), ultimately, concluding by clear and

convincing evidence that it was in the best interest of D.C.-F. that the agency be

awarded permanent custody.

       {¶22} Here, Kerenza argues that the trial court failed to consider R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(b), since the GAL never asked D.C.-F. regarding his wishes. To

address this assertion, we start our review of the record regarding the trial court’s

consideration of the R.C. 2151.414(D) factors.

       {¶23} In its judgment entry, the trial court made findings relevant to the best-

interest factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D). Addressing the factors in R.C.

2151.414(D)(1)(a), concerning the relationships of D.C.-F., the record suggests

                                         -11-
Case No. 1-23-34

evidence that D.C.-F. “has adjusted to his placement and appear[ed to be] happy and

comfortable.” (Doc. No. 102). This finding is supported by the testimony of the

agency’s caseworker and the GAL’s written report and recommendation.

         {¶24} Regarding R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(b), concerning the wishes of the child

as expressed directly or through the recommendation of the GAL considering D.C.-

F.’s maturity, the GAL filed several reports with the trial court prior to the

permanent-custody hearing noting that D.C.-F. was too young to express his wishes.

Because of his young age and lack of maturity and considering her investigation,

the GAL recommended that it was in D.C.-F.’s best interest for the trial court to

grant permanent custody of him to the agency. See In re L.T., 10th Dist. Franklin

Nos. 23AP-26, 23AP-28, 23AP-67, and 23AP-68, 2023-Ohio-4329, ¶ 20; In re

M.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112411, 2023-Ohio-3251, ¶ 53.

         {¶25} Next, the trial court discussed the factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(c)

and R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d), which concerns D.C.-F.’s custodial history and his

need for permanency. Specifically, the trial court found that D.C.-F. had been in

the temporary custody of the agency for 25 consecutive months. This finding is

reinforced by the same evidence supporting the trial court’s R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d)

determination noted in our disposition of the first assignment of error discussed

above.

                                         -12-
Case No. 1-23-34

       {¶26} Lastly, concerning factor R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(e), the trial court found

none of the factors under R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) applicable to Kerenza.

       {¶27} Based on our review of the record, we find competent, credible

evidence supports the trial court’s determination that granting permanent custody to

the agency was in D.C.-F.’s best interest. Accordingly, because the trial court’s

decision to grant permanent custody of D.C.-F. to the agency is not against the

manifest weight of the evidence, we overrule Kerenza’s first and second

assignments of error.

                           Third Assignment of Error

       The Juvenile Court Committed Prejudicial Error In Findings
       That The Allen County Children Services Board Made
       Reasonable Efforts For The Children To Return To The Custody
       Of Appellant-Mother.

       {¶28} In her third assignment of error, Kerenza argues that the trial court

erred by granting permanent custody of D.C.-F. to the agency because the agency

failed to make reasonable efforts toward reunification.      Specifically, Kerenza

contends that she was never permitted to graduate to unsupervised visitations

despite achieving goals in the case plan.

                                Standard of Review

       {¶29} The question of whether an Agency has made reasonable efforts

towards reunification is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. In re A.M.,

2015-Ohio-2740, at ¶ 24. An abuse of discretion suggests the trial court’s decision

                                        -13-
Case No. 1-23-34

is unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio

St.3d 217, 219 (1983).

                                       Analysis

       {¶30} “‘Reasonable efforts’ has been defined as the state’s efforts, after

intervening to protect a child’s health or safety, to resolve the threat to the child

before removing the child from the home or to return the child to the home after the

threat is removed.” In re I.H., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-20-1062, 2020-Ohio-4853, ¶

23, citing In re Mar.H., 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-17-1171, 2018-Ohio-883, ¶ 51, citing

In re C.F., 113 Ohio St.3d 73, 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 28. Case plans are the tools that

child protective service agencies use to facilitate the reunification of families who *

* * have been temporarily separated.” In re Evans, 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-01-75,

2001-Ohio-2302, *3. “Agencies have an affirmative duty to diligently pursue

efforts to achieve the goals in the case plan.” In re A.M.A., 3d Dist. Crawford No.

3-13-02, 2013-Ohio-3779, ¶ 29. Importantly, the Agency’s case plan and efforts

need only be reasonable and diligent under the circumstances of the case before the

Agency. Id.

       Indeed,

       [n]o one section of the Revised Code addresses the concept of
       reasonable efforts. Overall, Ohio’s child-welfare laws are designed
       to care for and protect children, “whenever possible, in a family
       environment, separating the child from the child’s parents only when
       necessary for the child’s welfare or in the interests of public safety.”
       R.C. 2151.01(A). To that end, various sections of the Revised Code

                                         -14-
Case No. 1-23-34

       refer to the agency’s duty to make reasonable efforts to preserve or
       reunify the family unit.

In re C.F at ¶ 29. In particular, under R.C. 2151.419, when a trial court

       removes a child from the child’s home or continues the removal of a
       child from the child’s home, the court shall determine whether the
       public children services agency * * * has made reasonable efforts to
       prevent the removal of the child from the child’s home, to eliminate
       the continued removal of the child from the child’s home, or to make
       it possible for the child to return safely home.

R.C. 2151.419(A)(1). The Supreme Court of Ohio has

       determined that the trial court is not obligated, under R.C. 2151.419,
       to make a determination that the agency used reasonable efforts to
       reunify the family at the time of the permanent custody hearing unless
       the agency has not established that reasonable efforts have been made
       prior to the hearing.

(Emphasis sic.) In re N.R.S., 3d Dist. Crawford Nos. 3-17-07, 3-17-08, and 3-17-

09, 2018-Ohio-125, ¶ 25, citing In re C.F. at ¶ 41, 43 (concluding that the

reasonable-efforts determination under R.C. 2151.419 does not apply to permanent-

custody motions under R.C. 2151.413 or to hearings on such motions under R.C.

2151.414).

       {¶31} The Supreme Court of Ohio held that

       the trial court is only obligated to make a determination that the
       agency has made reasonable efforts to reunify the family at
       “adjudicatory, emergency, detention, and temporary-disposition
       hearings, and dispositional hearings for abused, neglected, or
       dependent children, all of which occur prior to a decision transferring
       permanent custody to the state.”

                                        -15-
Case No. 1-23-34

In re B.S., 3d Dist. Allen No. 1-15-44, 2015-Ohio-4805, ¶ 36, quoting In re C.F.,

2007-Ohio-1104, at ¶ 41, 43.

       {¶32} Accordingly, since the trial court made its reasonable-efforts finding

when it granted emergency custody to the agency by ex parte order at the time of

the shelter-care, at adjudication, and ordered that D.C.-F. remain in the temporary

custody of the agency at the dispositional hearings, the trial court was not required

to make any further reasonable-efforts findings. (See Doc. Nos. 1, 11, 22, 30, 41,

64); In re S.D., 9th Dist. Lorain Nos. 15CA010864 and 15CA010867, 2016-Ohio-

1493, ¶ 25. Stated another way, because the trial court previously made the requisite

R.C. 2151.419 “reasonable efforts” findings, it was not required to again make those

findings at the hearing on the agency’s motion for permanent custody filed under

R.C. 2151.413. See In re C.F. at ¶ 43. Nevertheless, the trial court specifically

determined in its permanent-custody entry that the agency “has made, and continues

to make, reasonable efforts to finalize the permanency goal for [D.C.-F.].” (Doc.

No. 102).

       {¶33} Moreover, even though she argues that the agency never allowed her

to graduate to unsupervised visitations, the testimony of the caseworker supports

the trial court’s finding that it was Kerenza who failed to maintain regular visits with

D.C.-F. Specifically, she missed 78 out of 110 supervised visitations with D.C.-F.

at the agency in the preceding 25 months asserting a variety of excuses. Ultimately,

                                         -16-
Case No. 1-23-34

the trial court found that Kerenza had not made D.C.-F. her top priority nor had she

made efforts towards reunification.

       {¶34} Accordingly, we conclude that Kerenza has not demonstrated that the

trial court abused its discretion by determining that the agency made reasonable

efforts toward reunification under the circumstances presented in this appeal.

Therefore, her third assignment of error is overruled.

       {¶35} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellants herein in the

particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                Judgment Affirmed

MILLER and ZMUDA, J.J., concur.

** Judge Gene A. Zmuda of the Sixth District Court of Appeals, sitting by
Assignment of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Ohio.

                                        -17-