Court Opinion

ID: 9649355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 14:50:12.779619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:09.980021
License: Public Domain

KELLER, Judge,
dissenting.
A little history is in order. The State filed its petition for discretionary review in this case on February 5, 1996 — well over two years ago. The case was held here for over fifteen months, until nine days after art. 28.061 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was amended. If the delay was occasioned by the intent to prevent the granting of the petition, the strategy did not succeed at that time — the petition was granted — but persistence seems to pay off. Today, a majority of the Court decides to dismiss the petition as improvidently granted. It is not appropriate to do so.
Prior to the statutory amendment, the dismissal of an indictment pursuant to art. 32.01 was with prejudice pursuant to art. 28.061. As of May 26,1997, art. 28.061 is inapplicable to art. 32.01, so that the dismissal of an indictment under art. 32.01 is now without prejudice. Thus, it might seem that the Court would be wasting judicial resources by addressing a claim that will no longer arise. *4But prior art. 28.061 was in effect for ten years. A conviction obtained at any time during that ten years is, arguably, subject to challenge if the indictment was not timely presented under art. 32.01.
And, in fact, a number of eases with issues concerning the interplay of the two statutes are currently before the Court and continue to be presented in petitions. In State v. Condran, 951 S.W.2d 178 (Tex.App. — Dallas 1997, pet. granted), for instance, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that former art. 28.061 is unconstitutional, and further held that ap-pellee’s complaint was moot because he did not obtain a ruling on his 32.01 claim until after the grand jury returned a second indictment. One of the issues raised in Con-dran (the mootness issue) is the exact issue raised (and granted) in ground one of the State’s petition in this case. And while in Condran the constitutionality of a statute which is no longer in effect is challenged, in this ease the constitutionality of a current statute — art. 32.01 — is challenged. Yet Con-dran has not been improvidently granted.
Furthermore, less than one month ago, on April 15, 1998, we granted review in Barnes v. State, Nos. 400/401/402-98. The issues in Barnes are the same issues pending in Con-dran.
And finally, we have recently granted review in two other cases concerning art. 32.01, although the issues relate to aspects of the statute different from those in the cases discussed above. In Martin v. State, No. 73-98, granted on the eighth of last month, the issue is what is “good cause” under art. 32.01. In Dobbs v. State, Nos. 329/330-98, granted the twenty-second of last month, we granted review to decide in what court a ease is pending under art. 32.01 before indictment. So, the Court continues to grant review of various issues relating to art. 32.01.
Presumably, the Court grants review to examine the legal issue presented; thus, it is irrelevant whether it is an appellant’s or a State’s petition presenting the issue. Nevertheless, Condran and Barnes are appellants’ petitions, and Norton and Ybarra are State’s petitions. It makes no sense to improvidently grant cases when the identical issues have been granted review and are pending decision in this Court.