Court Opinion

ID: 92985
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2010-04-28 16:06:41+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:39:36.595184
License: Public Domain

138 U.S. 623 (1891)
GORMLEY
v.
BUNYAN.
No. 574.
Supreme Court of United States.
Submitted January 9, 1891.
Decided March 2, 1891.
ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS.
*629 Mr. Morton Culver for plaintiffs in error.
Mr. Charles E. Pope, Mr. Alexander McCoy and Mr. Charles B. McCoy for defendants in error.
*630 MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.
The first three assignments of error cover the whole case, and are as follows:
The first is, that the court erred in refusing to allow the plaintiff in error to file the several pleas of non est factum, statutes of limitation, payment and set-off. The reply to this is, that as long ago as Mandeville v. Wilson, 5 Cranch, 15, 17, and as late as Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, it has been held that the granting or refusal of leave to file an additional *631 plea, or to amend one already filed, is discretionary with the court below, and not reviewable by this court, except in a case of gross abuse of discretion.
The second assignment of error is, that the court erred in admitting incompetent and irrelevant evidence in behalf of the defendants in error. Under this assignment various objections are specified.
(1) The first is, that there was a fatal variance between the indorsement on the $10,000 note and that declared upon in the special count, and that for the same reason it and the coupon notes were inadmissible under the common counts.
The only variance between the declaration and the proof (and this manifestly arose from the fact that the notes were lost at the time of the filing of the declaration) was, that the indorsement on the note was, "Pay to the order of Bunyan and Meeban, executors of Edward Clark," instead of "Pay to the order of Edward Clark," as stated in the declaration; and in the common counts the indebitatus was laid to Edward Clark instead of to Bunyan and Meehan, his executors.
The proof was clear that Edward Clark lent the money to the plaintiffs in error; that they executed the notes, and made them payable to their own order, and put on them their blank indorsement; that Clark owned and had in his possession the note at the time of his death; and that Bunyan and Meehan were appointed as his executors, in which capacity they brought the suit.
Such a technical variance may be cured by amendment without introducing any other cause of action or affecting the merits of the case between the parties, and it was proper for the court to allow it. It appears that on the trial the indorsement on the note was amended by the counsel for the defendants in error to correspond with the declaration, with the court's acquiescence, and pursuant to what they considered its order. In the bill of exceptions is this statement of the judge:
"The minutes of the court made at the trial and the shorthand reporter's notes do not show that the court formally granted leave to the plaintiffs to change the indorsement on *632 the note in suit so that it should read, `Pay to the order of Edward Clark;' but, from what was said by the court in its opinion on the subject, I am satisfied that the attorneys for the plaintiffs in good faith supposed or understood that they had leave to make such change, and that, accordingly, they had in fact changed the form of the indorsement on the note independently of the minutes of the trial. The court cannot say that leave was expressly granted, or that it said anything further on the subject than is expressed in the opinion hereunto annexed."
We think that all the notes offered, either with or without amendment, conformed in legal effect to the allegation of the common counts. This objection cannot therefore prevail.
(2) A second objection relied on under this assignment is, that the deposition of James Meehan was improperly admitted because not complying with the United States Revised Statutes (sec. 863) in that respect. The heading of the notice was not technically correct, perhaps, but it was substantially so. It was as follows: "United States of America, State of Illinois, County of Cook, ss.: In the Circuit Court of the United States." Then follows the title of this case, and everything else was regular. There could have been no mistake made by the defendants with reference to what case the notice applied. The proof showed that the notice was properly served, and that the deposition was taken at the place and time specified in the notice, but before a different notary public from the one specified in the notice. The notice read that the deposition would be taken "before William G. Peckham, Esq., notary public, or some other officer authorized by law to take depositions," etc. The deposition was actually taken before Nicoll F. Elmendorf, a notary public, and an officer authorized by law to take depositions in such cases. That was perfectly regular, and cannot be objected to. The notice conformed to section 863 of the Revised Statutes. There is no merit in this objection.
(3) It is also objected that "the will and probate proceedings of the estate of Edward Clark were improperly admitted." This objection, as stated in the record, is wanting in precision; *633 but taking it as stated in the brief of counsel for plaintiffs in error it is that "the certificates of authenticity are not in accordance with the laws of the United States. They are not under the seal of the court." In this statement counsel are in error. An inspection of the record shows that the only "certificates of authenticity" to which counsel refer, are the certificates of exemplification of the Surrogate's Court. These are in proper form, and are under the seal of the court. The letters "L.S." appear on the copy of the original letters testamentary. This objection is therefore without merit.
Another objection urged under this assignment is, that the charges for taxes and redemption of tax certificates by Loeb, after the sale of the property under the trust deed, were improperly allowed. With reference to these charges the court said:
"Here was a covenant in this trust deed on the part of the makers of the deed to pay all taxes and assessments on the property. They had up to the last moment before the sale in which to do that. It was not done. In fact those taxes were not paid until after the sale by this trustee  that is, he took up these certificates, procured them to be cancelled, so that they were no longer a lien on the property. It is true that in this deed the language used is, that out of the proceeds of sale he may pay all moneys advanced  advanced for insurance, taxes and other liens or assessments; but it has seemed to me that the act of paying the taxes or taking up the certificates after the sale related back, in legal effect, to a period antedating the sale, and that it was equivalent to an advancement of money before the sale for the payment of the taxes and the clearing off of these tax liens and assessments. I understand from Judge Blodgett and am authorized to say that he has had this very question up in connection with trust deeds like this, and that he has taken the same view of the question, and has held that, although the amount necessary to pay off the taxes was not advanced before the sale, but was paid after the sale, it was an item which could be properly taken out of the proceeds of the sale of the property."
We see no objection to anything in that part of the court's *634 opinion or in that ruling. Hall v. Gould, 79 Illinois, 16; Parsons v. Gas Light & Coke Co., 108 Illinois, 380.
Another objection is that the checks upon which the original loans were made were irrelevant and not counted on in the declaration, nor proof made of signatures. These were, in the view we take of the case, admissible as showing that the amount of money due on these notes was actually received from Edward Clark, as constituting part of the res gest.
One more objection remains under this second assignment, which is, that the statement of the account by McCoy should not have been received and adopted by the court as the basis of its judgment. It is not shown to our satisfaction that the account is wrong in any particular item or items. The objection is to the account as a whole. There is no ground for such an objection, if the principles upon which the account is stated are correct; and they are so in this case.
Under the third assignment of error, viz. that the court erred in excluding proper and competent testimony on behalf of the plaintiffs in error, the points relied on are that the court ruled out (1) proof of the moneys paid by plaintiffs in error to said Edward Clark; (2) the statutes of Illinois and New York concerning limitations, mortgages and estates; (3) evidence of the value of land sold by Loeb under the trust deed to and for Clark; (4) the evidence to show that the notes in suit were never scheduled in the Surrogate's Court of New York.
With reference to the moneys claimed to be paid by plaintiffs in error to Edward Clark, or his agents, and to the value of the land sold by Loeb at the foreclosure sale, the reply is, that there was no evidence going to show, nor do the defendants claim, that they ever paid money to any one but Loeb. Loeb was not the agent of Clark any more than of the defendants. He was a trustee for both parties to the contract. The moneys paid to Loeb by the defendants at the time they secured the loans were paid to him as their own agent. Bolton was Clark's agent in those transactions. We agree with the court below in holding those transactions to have been purely personal between Loeb and the defendants. So also with *635 regard to the sale of the property under the trust deed. If the defendants were wronged by that sale their remedy is against Loeb; and any loss they may have suffered cannot be pleaded to defeat the claim of the plaintiffs on the note.
There was no error in not allowing the statutes of limitation of New York and Illinois to be admitted in evidence, after the court had overruled the motion of the defendants to be allowed to plead them as a defence. The only way in which such statutes are available as a defence is when they are, at the proper time, specially pleaded. 1 Chitty on Pleading, 514, 515; Stephen on Pleading, 76, note; Wilson v. King, 83 Illinois, 232.
With respect to the refusal of the court to allow certain other public statutes to be introduced in evidence, it need only be said that the courts of the United States take judicial notice of all the public statutes of the several States.
Neither was there any error in excluding evidence offered to show that the notes sued on had never been inventoried as a part of the estate of Edward Clark, deceased. It was shown that the notes were his property at the time of his death, and by operation of law, in pursuance of his will, they passed to his executors, who possessed the right to sue for the amount due on them.
We see no error in the proceedings of the court below, and its judgment is
Affirmed.