Court Opinion

ID: 4065343
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-29 21:56:58.367154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:31:49.220966
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                   01-14-00862-CR
                                                        FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                                              7/31/2015 7:17:22 PM
                                                             CHRISTOPHER PRINE
                                                                            CLERK
             No. 01-14-00862-CR

                    In the
Court of Appeals for the First District of TexasFILED IN
                 At Houston                1st COURT OF APPEALS
                                               HOUSTON, TEXAS
                                7/31/2015 7:17:22 PM
                                          CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
                  No. 1364962                   Clerk
           In the 178th District Court
            Of Harris County, Texas
           

    ANDRE DEMONT THOMPSON
                   Appellant
                      V.
         THE STATE OF TEXAS
               Appellee
           

       STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF
           

                                DEVON ANDERSON
                                District Attorney
                                Harris County, Texas

                                DAVID ABRAMS
                                Assistant District Attorney

                                HEATHER A. HUDSON
                                Assistant District Attorney
                                Harris County, Texas
                                State Bar No. 24058991

                                1201 Franklin, Suite 600
                                Houston, Texas 77002
                                Tel.: 713/755-5826
                                Fax No.: 713/755-5809

                                Counsel for Appellee

      ORAL ARGUMENT NOT REQUESTED
                     IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES

      Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.2(a)(1)(A), a complete list

of the names of all interested parties is provided below.

COUNSEL FOR THE STATE:

   Ms. Devon Anderson ― District Attorney

   Mr. David Abrams ― Assistant District Attorney at trial

   Ms. Heather A. Hudson ― Assistant District Attorney on appeal

APPELLANT:

   Andre Demont Thompson

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

   Mr. Jules Johnson
   Mr. Eric Davis ― Assistant Public Defenders at trial

   Mr. Glenn J. Youngblood ― Appointed counsel on appeal
   Mr. Franklin Bynum ― Retained counsel on appeal

PRESIDING JUDGE:

   Hon. David L. Mendoza

                                              i
                    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT

           The State believes the briefs in this case adequately apprise this Court of the

issues and the law, and any marginal benefit from oral argument does not justify

the considerable amount of time that preparation for oral argument requires of the

parties and the Court. Therefore, the State does not request oral argument.

                                       TABLE OF CONTENTS

IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES .....................................................................i

STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................ ii

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... iii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE................................................................................... 1

STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................... 1

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ......................................................................... 3

REPLY TO APPELLANT’S FIRST POINT OF ERROR ......................................... 4

      I.      Defense counsel’s general objections to an “improper argument”
              are insufficient to preserve error for appellate review. ...............................6

      II.     The prosecutor’s jury argument was justified as a reasonable
              deduction from the evidence. .....................................................................8

      III. The prosecutor’s jury argument was not so extreme or manifestly
           improper as to constitute reversible error. ................................................13

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER .............................................................................. 15

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE........................................................................ 15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ................................................................................. 16

                                                            ii
                                      INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Allen v. State,
  No. 12-02-00138-CR, 2004 WL 187217 (Tex. App.--Tyler Jan. 30, 2004,
  no pet.) (not designated for publication) ..............................................................14
Belton v. State,
  900 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1995, pet. ref’d) ........................................ 11
Branch v. State,
  774 S.W.2d 781 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1989, pet. ref’d) ........................................ 11
Broussard v. State,
  910 S.W.2d 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ..............................................................12
Brown v. State,
  978 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1998, pet. ref’d) ........................................9
Buchanan v. State,
  207 S.W.3d 772 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ................................................................6
Burns v. State,
  556 S.W.2d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).............................................................. 11
Davis v. State,
 329 S.W.3d 798 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) ................................................................8
Everett v. State,
  707 S.W.2d 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) ................................................................8
Gaddis v. State,
 753 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988) ................................................................9
Garza v. State,
 783 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.--San Antonio 1990, no pet.) .................................... 11
Gonzalez v. State,
 115 S.W.3d 278 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2003,
 pet. ref’d) ............................................................................................... 8, 9, 13, 14
Hernandez v. State,
 791 S.W.2d 301 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref’d) .............................14

                                                               iii
Lowe v. State,
  676 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1984) ........................................7
Martinez v. State,
 17 S.W.3d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ................................................................14
Miles v. State,
 312 S.W.3d 909 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d)........................6
Rocha v. State,
  16 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ......................................................................8
Thompson v. State,
  729 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 1987, pet. ref’d) ....................................10
Tompkins v. State,
  774 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) ....................................................... 12, 14
Wesbrook v. State,
 29 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ........................................................... 9, 14

RULES

TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) ................................................................................................6
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) ..............................................................................................13

                                                               iv
      TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:

                           STATEMENT OF THE CASE

      Appellant was indicted on a charge of murder.            (C.R. 15).   Appellant

proceeded to trial and was convicted by a jury of the charged offense. (C.R. 109-

10). The jury sentenced appellant to 30 years in the Institutional Division of the

Texas Department of Criminal Justice. (C.R. 109-10). Appellant filed a timely

written notice of appeal on October 8, 2014. (C.R. 113). On April 13, 2015,

appointed counsel for appellant filed an Anders brief asserting that the appeal was

wholly frivolous. On June 22, 2015, appellant’s newly-retained counsel filed a

brief on appellant’s behalf raising a single point of error.

                             STATEMENT OF FACTS

      On the evening of October 5, 2012, Jackie Bergeron and the complainant,

Thomas Williams, Jr., were at the Green Arbor apartment complex in Houston

waiting for a ride. (3 R.R. 164-66). While at the complex, Bergeron saw appellant

hanging out by the playground.         (3 R.R. 170).     Bergeron and appellant had

previously gotten into a fistfight. (3 R.R. 169). When appellant spotted Bergeron

and the complainant, he approached them with a gun visibly tucked in his pants. (3

R.R. 174). A verbal confrontation ensued.           (3 R.R. 175-76).   Williams told

appellant he was not worried about appellant’s gun because they also had guns. (3

R.R. 177). Williams lifted his shirt to display an unloaded pistol tucked in his
pants. (3 R.R. 177-78). At some point, appellant placed his hand on his gun, and

Bergeron and Williams turned to leave. (3 R.R. 181-83). Bergeron ran when he

heard gunshots behind him. (3 R.R. 182-83). He looked back and saw Williams

fall.     (3 R.R. 184).       Bergeron circled back around and found the deceased

complainant lying face-down on the ground. (3 R.R. 185-86).

         The offense was also witnessed by a resident of the apartment complex who

looked out the window when he heard several gunshots. (4 R.R. 94-95). He saw a

black man with a gun chasing a boy.1 (4 R.R. 96). The resident saw the boy fall

face down, and the man stood over the boy and shot him two more times before

fleeing the scene. (4 R.R. 97-98).

         An autopsy of the complainant revealed that he had been shot seven times.

(5 R.R. 26). His injuries were consistent with the witnesses’ testimony that he was

shot from behind as he attempted to flee from appellant. (5 R.R. 29-44).

1
    The complainant was only 15 or 16 years old. (3 R.R. 164; 4 R.R. 115).
                                                    2
                      SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

      Appellant has not preserved a claim that the trial court erred in overruling

defense counsel’s objections to the prosecutor’s improper jury argument.

Counsel’s general objections to “improper argument” were not sufficient to

preserve a complaint that the prosecutor was engaging in improper name-calling.

Moreover, it was not improper for the prosecutor to compare appellant to a lion and

a shark while making a plea for law enforcement because these comparisons were

reasonable deductions from the evidence. Even if the jury argument was improper,

it was not so extreme or manifestly improper as to require reversal.

                                             3
           REPLY TO APPELLANT’S FIRST POINT OF ERROR

      In a single point of error, appellant complains that the trial court erred by

overruling objections to the prosecutor’s jury argument at the punishment phase of

trial because the prosecutor improperly referred to appellant as a monster or a wild

animal. See (Appellant’s Brief p. 9). The prosecutor argued, in relevant part, as

follows:

      So, just focus on the amount of years.

      And in determining that, you heard the expression, “Motivation
      determines behavior.” What that means is that who you are as a
      person, decides how you act. I don’t know if any of you saw that it
      was in a video back on CNN, maybe six months, a year ago,
      something like that, where it was a mother, who had her little baby,
      and she was holding - - she was at the zoo - - and she holding this
      baby near the lion cage.

      And there was a clear plastic barrier between this baby and the lion,
      and the baby is sitting there dancing, moving around, and the lion
      comes out. It’s gnawing right there. Everybody thinks, oh, it’s
      hilarious. It’s cute. It’s so great mom’s filming it, sends it to CNN,
      everybody watches it. But was that really cute? What would have
      happened if that glass barrier was not there? That baby is a goner.
      Because the motivation of a lion, a lion is a killer. A lion is a predator.
      That lion would have eaten that baby and nothing would have
      changed.

      The defendant is a killer. He is a predator. We know he carries guns.
      We know that he will use a gun if you provoke him verbally. And we
      know that he will chase you down, firing round after round into your
      back and sides and then stand over you and execute you.

      ..........

                                               4
Giving someone time for what they did, giving them less time, and
then them getting out and victimizing someone else again, that is the
scariest thing. That is the real fear that we have, right, that it happens
again.

Have you guys seen the movie, Jaws?

MR. JOHNSON:        Objection; improper argument.

THE COURT:          Overruled.

MR. ABRAMS:         Have you seen the movie, Jaws? I mean, for those
                    who haven’t seen it, it’s a [sic] about a man-eating
                    shark, right? And there is a scene in which there
                    [sic] on a dock, all right.

And Chief Brody, he’s one of the main characters in the movie. And
they’re on this dock, and he had this gigantic shark hanging right there
and he’s standing there. He’s feeling good. He’s pumping his chest. I
did a great job. I caught this shark, and there’s a group of people
around him. They’re pumping their chests. Great job, Chief.

And then there’s a woman that comes up to him. She’s dressed in
black. She’s obviously mourning, slaps him across the face and says.
“Why did you let people go in the water if you knew there was a
shark?” And she walks away.

Now, everyone else gets around and says, “Don’t worry, you did a
good job. You caught that shark. Don’t worry. Don’t listen to her.
It’s not your fault.”

And he says, “No, it is.”

This man is a shark. We have to decide if we want to let him back in
the waters in our community.

MR. JOHNSON:        Objection, Your Honor; improper argument.

THE COURT:          It’s overruled.

                                       5
      MR. ABRAMS:          Do we want to remove that clear plastic barrier
                           between the lion and the baby? Do we want to do
                           that?

      MR. JOHNSON:         Objection, Your honor; improper, calls for law
                           enforcement.

      THE COURT:           It’s overruled.

      MR. ABRAMS:          That’s your decision. You get to decide because
                           he’ll get out eventually. He will. You get to
                           decide when you feel comfortable having this
                           predator, this killer back with our families on our
                           streets. (6 R.R. 32-36).

 I.   Defense counsel’s general objections to an “improper argument” were
      insufficient to preserve error for appellate review.

      To preserve a claim for appellate review, a timely objection must be raised

stating the grounds for the ruling sought with sufficient specificity to make the trial

court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent from the

context. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a). “A general or imprecise objection may be

sufficient to preserve error for appeal, but only if the legal basis for the objection is

obvious to the court and to opposing counsel.” Buchanan v. State, 207 S.W.3d 772,

775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (emphasis in original). A general objection to an

“improper argument” is typically insufficient to preserve error. See Miles v. State,

312 S.W.3d 909, 911 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (holding that

defense counsel’s objection to an “improper argument” was not sufficient to

preserve error because the objection was too general and the trial court made no

                                               6
statements indicating that it understood the nature of the objection); Lowe v. State,

676 S.W.2d 658, 662 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1984) (general objection to

“this type of argument” did not preserve error).

      Here, defense counsel raised two general objections to “improper argument,”

and a third objection to the prosecutor’s plea for law enforcement. During closing

argument the prosecutor repeatedly referred to the appellant, without objection, as

a “killer” and a “predator.” No objection was raised until the prosecutor asked

whether the jury had seen the movie “Jaws,” at which point defense counsel

generally objected that this constituted “improper argument.” Defense counsel did

not elaborate further, and the objection was overruled.

      Defense counsel again raised a general “improper argument” objection when

the prosecutor described the appellant as a “shark” and argued “[w]e have to

decide if we want to let him back in the waters in our community.” It is unclear

whether defense counsel was complaining that it was improper for the prosecutor

to refer to the appellant as a “shark.” The objection was overruled without further

comment from defense counsel. Finally, the prosecutor compared appellant to a

caged lion, and defense counsel objected that the argument was improper because

it “calls for law enforcement.”

      There is nothing in the record reflecting that defense counsel’s general

objections to “improper argument” were directed specifically at the prosecutor’s

                                             7
comparison of the appellant to a shark and a lion. Moreover, there is no indication

that the trial court was aware that counsel was objecting on the basis of improper

name-calling. Finally, defense counsel’s objection that the prosecutor’s argument

called for law enforcement, although more specific, does not preserve the claim

presented on appeal.2 Accordingly, nothing has been preserved for review and

appellant’s point of error should be overruled.

II.   The prosecutor’s jury argument was justified as a reasonable deduction from
      the evidence.

       Moreover, appellant has not shown that the prosecutor’s jury argument was

improper.     There are four generally accepted areas of jury argument: (1)

summations of the evidence; (2) reasonable deductions from the evidence; (3)

responses to the arguments of opposing counsel; and (4) pleas for law enforcement.

Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798, 821 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Closing argument

may not be used to insert matters before the jury that are outside the record and

prejudicial to the accused. Everett v. State, 707 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. Crim. App.

1986); Gonzalez v. State, 115 S.W.3d 278, 284 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi-

Edinburg 2003, pet. ref’d).

2
   This objection also seems to        suggest that defense counsel was laboring under the
misapprehension that a plea for law    enforcement is not a valid jury argument. It is well-settled
that a plea for law enforcement is a   permissible area of jury argument. See Davis v. State, 329
S.W.3d 798, 821 (Tex. Crim. App.       2010); Rocha v. State, 16 S.W.3d 1, 21 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000).
                                                     8
      An improper jury argument does not constitute reversible error unless, “in

light of the record as a whole, the argument is extreme or manifestly improper,

violative of a mandatory statute, or injects new facts harmful to the accused into

the trial proceeding.” Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 115 (Tex. Crim. App.

2000); Gonzalez, 115 S.W.3d at 284. In reviewing a claim that that the prosecution

engaged in improper argument, the appellate court considers the remark in the

context in which it appears. Gaddis v. State, 753 S.W.2d 396, 398 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1988). The remark must be a willful and calculated effort by the State to

deny the appellant a fair and impartial trial.       Wesbrook, 29 S.W.3d at 115.

“Counsel is allowed wide latitude without limitation in drawing inferences from

the evidence so long as the inferences drawn are reasonable, fair, legitimate, and

offered in good faith.” Gaddis, 753 S.W.2d at 398.

      Appellant contends that the prosecutor’s jury argument was improper

because comparisons between the accused and a notorious criminal have

traditionally been considered “an improper and erroneous injection of facts not in

the record that is harmful to the accused.”     Gonzalez, 115 S.W.3d at 284-85

(holding that the defendant was harmed by the prosecutor’s closing argument

which compared the defendant to Osama Bin Laden at a time when the events of

September 11th were fresh in the collective minds of the jurors); see also Brown v.

State, 978 S.W.2d 708, 714 (Tex. App.--Amarillo 1998, pet. ref’d) (holding that it

                                            9
was improper for the prosecutor to compare the accused to Jeffrey Dahmer, John

Wayne Gacy, and Ted Bundy).

      In this case, the prosecutor compared appellant to animals, rather than to

infamous criminals. Appellant argues, however, that the prosecutor’s analogies are

indistinguishable from references to terrorists: “Villains and terrifying creatures

take on many forms; the inflammatory caricature of a terrorist is just the same as

the inflammatory caricature of the homicidal shark or the tiger at the zoo.”

(Appellant’s Brief pp. 11-12).

      Appellant fails to provide legal precedent supporting this melodramatic

assertion. The only case cited by appellant involving a comparison between the

accused and an animal during jury argument is Thompson v. State, 729 S.W.2d 132

(Tex. App.--Beaumont 1987, pet. ref’d). Appellant mischaracterizes the nature of

the holding in that case, claiming that “a comparison of the defendant to a

venomous spider, along with a reference to a spider tattoo on the defendant’s neck,

was reversible.”    (Appellant’s Brief p. 11).     In Thompson, the prosecutor

commented during jury argument about a spider tattoo on the defendant’s neck.

Defense counsel objected that there was no evidence in the record of a spider

tattoo. The prosecutor also compared the defendant to a spider; however, no

objection was raised to that remark and the reviewing court does not explicitly

address whether it was improper. Instead, the court’s rationale focuses on the

                                           10
impropriety of the “tattoo” comment because it inserted prejudicial facts in the

record when there was no evidence of a spider tattoo on the defendant’s neck. See

id. at 132-33. Thus, Thompson does not support the proposition that a comparison

between an accused and an animal necessarily constitutes an improper jury

argument.

      Furthermore, Texas courts have upheld references to a defendant as an

animal during jury argument when the reference was justified as a reasonable

deduction from the evidence or a summation of the evidence. See Burns v. State,

556 S.W.2d 270, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (holding that the prosecutor’s

reference to the defendant as an “animal” was not an improper deduction from the

evidence because the defendant had brutally tortured and murdered a 58-year-old

man); Belton v. State, 900 S.W.2d 886, 898 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1995, pet. ref’d)

(concluding that the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant as an “animal” was a

reasonable deduction from the evidence because the facts at trial showed that the

defendant forced his way into a family’s home, beat and terrorized the victims, and

shot three of the family members); Garza v. State, 783 S.W.2d 796, 799 (Tex.

App.--San Antonio 1990, no pet.) (holding that it was not reversible error for the

prosecutor to refer to the defendant as an “animal” and a “wild dog” during jury

argument because these were summations of the witnesses’ testimony); Branch v.

State, 774 S.W.2d 781, 786 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1989, pet. ref’d) (it was not

                                           11
improper for the prosecutor to describe the defendant as an “animal who pounces

without warning” in light of evidence that he brutally attacked a 76-year-old man);

but see Tompkins v. State, 774 S.W.2d 195, 217-18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)

(holding that it was improper for the prosecutor to refer to the defendant as an

“animal” when the argument served no legitimate purpose).

      In this case, the prosecutor used an analogy during closing argument of a

barrier between a lion at the zoo and a small child to illustrate the danger appellant

posed to society if released from the confinement of prison.           Similarly, the

prosecutor compared appellant to a shark swimming “in the waters in our

community.” (6 R.R. 35). It is not improper for a prosecutor to use an analogy to

emphasize and explain evidence if the argument is supported by a reasonable

deduction from the evidence. See Broussard v. State, 910 S.W.2d 952, 959 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1995) (holding that it was not improper for the prosecutor to compare

the defendant to a volcano where the evidence supported a conclusion that the

defendant behaved peaceably at times, but had a great propensity for violence).

      The facts adduced at trial show that the prosecutor’s arguments were

justified as reasonable deductions from the evidence.            Appellant left the

playground when he saw Bergeron and walked down an alleyway. (3 R.R. 172).

When appellant returned, a gun was visibly displayed in his waistband. (3 R.R.

174). Appellant approached Bergeron and the complainant. (3 R.R. 175-76). At

                                             12
the time of the offense, the complainant was only 15 or 16 years old. (3 R.R. 164;

4 R.R. 115). Despite the fact that Bergeron and the complainant attempted to

leave, appellant chased after the complainant and ruthlessly shot him seven times.

(3 R.R. 179-84). The complainant’s injuries indicate that he was not facing his

assailant when he was shot. (5 R.R. 29, 31, 33, 34, 39, 42-43). When the

complainant fell to the ground, appellant picked him up and rolled him over. (4

R.R. 103). Then appellant stood over the complainant and shot him two more

times, execution style. (4 R.R. 103). Appellant’s actions were cold-blooded and

predatory. Accordingly, it was not error for the prosecutor to make comparisons

between the appellant and a dangerous animal during his plea for law enforcement.

III.   The prosecutor’s jury argument was not so extreme or manifestly improper as
       to constitute reversible error.

       Even assuming the prosecutor engaged in improper argument, the argument

was not so extreme or manifestly improper as to require reversal. To determine

whether harm resulted from an improper jury argument, the reviewing court

employs the harm analysis for non-constitutional error set forth in Rule 44.2(b).

See Gonzalez, 115 S.W.3d at 285.          Under Rule 44.2(b), any “error, defect,

irregularity, or variance that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”

TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). The harmfulness of an improper argument is measured by

several factors, including: (1) the severity of the misconduct; (2) curative

measures; and (3) the certainty of the punishment assessed absent the misconduct.

                                             13
Martinez v. State, 17 S.W.3d 677, 692-93 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Gonzalez, 115
S.W.3d at 285.

      Although the trial court did not take any curative measures, the prejudicial

impact of the prosecutor’s argument was nominal.         Viewing the prosecutor’s

remarks in the context of the argument, it is apparent that the purpose of the

prosecutor’s argument was to make a plea for law enforcement, rather than to

deride the appellant or subject him to abuse. See Tompkins, 774 S.W.2d at 218

(noting that abuse is not argument). The prosecutor’s argument was clearly not a

calculated attempt to deprive appellant of a fair and impartial trial. See Wesbrook,
29 S.W.3d at 115. Even if the argument was improper, it is less inflammatory than

other remarks which have been deemed harmless. See Hernandez v. State, 791
S.W.2d 301, 307 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1990, pet. ref’d) (observing that it was

improper for the prosecutor to imply that the defendant was a “scum and goat,” but

not reversible error); Allen v. State, No. 12-02-00138-CR, 2004 WL 187217, *5

(Tex. App.--Tyler Jan. 30, 2004, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (holding

that the prosecutor’s reference to the defendant as a “monster” was no worse than

other improper arguments that have been held to be harmless). Moreover, the

prosecutor’s remarks were made at the punishment phase of trial, after the jury had

already determined that appellant was guilty of murdering the complainant.

Considering that the jury could have imposed a sentence of life imprisonment, the

                                           14
prosecutor’s remarks did not significantly impact the jury’s assessment of a 30-

year sentence. As such, the jury argument was harmless and appellant’s sole point

of error should be overruled.

                         CONCLUSION AND PRAYER

      It is respectfully submitted that all things are regular and the judgment of

conviction should be affirmed.

                                               DEVON ANDERSON
                                               District Attorney
                                               Harris County, Texas

                                               /s/ Heather A. Hudson
                                               HEATHER A. HUDSON
                                               Assistant District Attorney
                                               Harris County, Texas
                                               1201 Franklin, Suite 600
                                               Houston, Texas 77002
                                               (713) 755-5826
                                               State Bar No. 24058991
                                               hudson_heather@dao.hctx.net
                                               curry_alan@dao.hctx.net

                      CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

      The undersigned attorney certifies that this computer-generated document

has a word count of 3,329 words, based upon the representation provided by the

word processing program that was used to create the document.

                                               /s/ Heather A. Hudson
                                               HEATHER A. HUDSON
                                          15
                                                 Assistant District Attorney
                                                 Harris County, Texas
                                                 1201 Franklin, Suite 600
                                                 Houston, Texas 77002
                                                 (713) 755-5826
                                                 State Bar No. 24058991

                          CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

             This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing instrument has been

submitted for service by e-filing to the following address:

             Franklin Bynum
             Bynum Law Office PLLC
             2814 Hamilton Street
             Houston, Texas 77002
             Tel: (713) 343-8844
             fgb@lawfgb.com

                                                 /s/ Heather A. Hudson
                                                 HEATHER A. HUDSON
                                                 Assistant District Attorney
                                                 Harris County, Texas
                                                 1201 Franklin, Suite 600
                                                 Houston, Texas 77002
                                                 (713) 755-5826
                                                 State Bar No. 24058991
Date: 7/31/2015

                                            16