Court Opinion

ID: 9774088
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:08:29.596047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:01.859477
License: Public Domain

BAIRD, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the Court of Appeals erred in holding the State’s notice of appeal was untimely. However, I would so hold for different, and hopefully more straightforward, reasons than those expressed by the majority. Accordingly, I concur only in the judgment of the Court.
Under Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 44.-01(d), the State may not make an appeal “later than the 15th day after the date on which the order, ruling, or sentence to be appealed is entered by the court.”1 The Legislature has limited appellate jurisdiction for the State’s appeal by imposing the fifteen day deadline.
On the other hand, Tex.R.App.Pro. Rule 41(b)(1) generally defines when appeal is perfected; specifically, the State’s appeal is perfected when notice of appeal is filed within fifteen days after “an appealable order is signed by the trial judge.” Thus, if “entered by the court” means something different than “signed by the trial judge,” the two provisions are inconsistent. For the following reasons, I believe those two terms are substantively different because the term “entered” is not synonymous with the term “signed,” but rather “has a definite fixed legal meaning and refers to the ministerial act of the clerk.” Wilson v. State, 677 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Tex.Cr.App.1984).
The majority’s interpretation that “entered” means when the judge signs an order is inconsistent with long-standing precedent. Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 199, 201 (Tex.Cr.App.1990); Wilson v. State, 677 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Tex.Cr.App.1984); Villarreal v. State, 166 Tex.Crim. 610, 317 S.W.2d 207 (App.1958); Hopkins v. State, 151 Tex.Crim. 304, 207 S.W.2d 626 (App.1948); Ex parte Logan, 151 Tex.Crim. 129, 205 S.W.2d 994, 995 (App.1947); State v. Macias, 791 S.W.2d 325, 328 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1990, pet. ref’d); Flores v. Onion, 693 S.W.2d 756, 758 (Tex.App.—*404San Antonio 1985, no pet.); Eastin v. Eas-tin, 588 S.W.2d 812, 814 (Tex.Civ.App—San Antonio 1979, pet. dism’d); Ex parte Gnesoulis, 525 S.W.2d 205, 209 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th] 1975, no pet.).
The language used by the Legislature in art. 44.01(d), “entered,” is a legal term of art which is well defined in our jurisprudence, and should control in the instant case. Texas appellate courts, in various contexts, have repeatedly defined the term “entered” to mean the clerical act of entry into the record. Three areas are illustrative. First, in the context of a judgment in a criminal case, “entered” of record means entered in the minutes of the court. Wilson, 677 S.W.2d at 522 (Tex.Cr.App.1984). See also Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 199 (“rendition” of judgment is an event which “entry” of judgment records); Macias, 791 S.W.2d 325 (“rendition” of judgment is distinguishable from “entry” of judgment, which is “the ministerial act which furnishes enduring evidence of the judicial act of rendition.”); Ex parte Gnesoulis, 525 S.W.2d 205, 209.
Second, in the context of notice of appeal under a predecessor statute, this Court has defined the term “entered” to mean “entered in the minutes of the court.” Hopkins, 207 S.W.2d 626. Thus, “entry” of record means “the recording of the notice of appeal in the minutes of the court.” Ex parte Logan, 205 S.W.2d at 995. Where a docket entry of notice of an appeal was entered into minutes of the court, notice of appeal was “entered” of record. Villarreal, 317 S.W.2d 207.
Third, in the civil context, signing an order is the rendition of the order, whereas the “entry” of the judgment is the “ministerial act which furnishes enduring evidence of the judicial act of rendition.” Flores, 693 S.W.2d at 758, citing Eastin v. Eastin, 588 S.W.2d at 814. Clearly, the term “entered” has historically meant something different from signing an order or judgment. Thus, the date an order is “signed” may not necessarily be the same date the order is “entered” because the term “entered” is not synonymous with the term “signed,” but rather “has a fixed legal meaning and refers to the ministerial act of the clerk." Wilson, 677 S.W.2d at 522.
Instead of attempting to make “entered by the court,” pursuant to art. 44.01(d), consistent with Rule 41(b)(l)’s “signed by the trial judge,” I believe that the better approach would be to conclude that the specific provisions of art. 44.01(d) control.2
First, art. 44.01(d), which speaks in terms of “entered,” is a statute binding on this Court. Laws passed by the Legislature are binding on this Court, and this Court is not empowered to enact rules which are inconsistent with the laws passed by the Legislature.3 Second, art. 44.01(d) takes precedence over Rule 41. Article 44.01(d) is a specific statute dealing with the State’s right to appeal and the appellate jurisdiction deriving therefrom. However, Rule 41, entitled “Ordinary Appeal — When Perfected,” includes references to civil appeals, criminal appeals, extensions of time, and includes a subsection entitled “Prematurely Filed Documents.” Therefore, Article 44.01(d) is a specific statute which takes precedence over the more general provisions contained in Rule 41. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 311.026.
Last, there is a disturbing outcome from the majority’s misconstruction of the term “entered by the court.” That is, the majority’s misinterpretation grants trial judges the “admittedly slippery” “inherent power” of extending appellate jurisdiction. Majority op. at 403. The majority initially interprets “entered by the court” to be the day the judge signs the order. However, the *405majority retreats from that newfound interpretation and concludes that although the appellate timetable began the date of signing, June 28, 1990, the judge could extend the fifteen day time limitation simply by noting in the order that the State could appeal from the order within fifteen days after the clerk entered the order into the record. This result allows the trial judge to extend appellate jurisdiction beyond the fifteen days mandated by the Legislature.
The majority cites no authority for this proposition because there is none. This “inherent power” concept is in contravention of Tex.R.App.Pro. 2(a), which states the Rules of Appellate Procedure “shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the courts of appeals, the Court of Criminal Appeals or the Supreme Court as established by law." The majority's “admittedly slippery” concept could be avoided by simply interpreting “entered by the court” consistent with our past opinions.
In short, I find it far wiser to hold that the State is entitled to appeal from an order fifteen days after the “order is entered by the court,” Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Ann. art. 44.01(d); that is, fifteen days after the date the signed order is file marked by the clerk. Because the order in the case at bar was not entered into the record until July 2,1990, and the State filed its notice of appeal within fifteen days “after the date on which the order” was entered, the State timely filed its notice of appeal, and the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the State’s appeal.
With these comments, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
McCORMICK, P.J., joins this opinion.

. All emphasis, unless otherwise indicated, is supplied by the author.

. Perhaps the gist of the problem is the language chosen by this Court in promulgating Rule 41, as it was facially inconsistent with Tex.Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 44.01(d).

. The Texas Constitution provides that the legislature may delegate to the Supreme Court with the power to promulgate "rules of administration not inconsistent with the laws of the state." Tex.Const. Art. V §§ 31(a). The Legislature has empowered the Supreme Court to do so in Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.024. Before the Supreme Court adopts rules affecting the administration of criminal justice, the Supreme Court shall request the advice of the Court of Criminal Appeals. Tex.Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.024(b).