Court Opinion

ID: 9583767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:41:51.836838+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:42.068576
License: Public Domain

MAUGHAN, Justice
(dissenting):
This appeal challenges a judgment awarding $2,700 child support to plaintiff; together with interest and costs. The award was made, for a daughter of the parties; for a period ensuing after the eighteenth birthday of the girl, and culminating at her twenty-first birthday. We should affirm. Statutory references are to U.C.A.1953.
In November of 1960, defendant, pursuant to a decree of divorce, was ordered to pay plaintiff $100 per month support payments for each of the minor children of the parties. There were two children, a daughter, who was born February 12, 1953; and a son, whose birth date was January 29, 1955. Upon the daughter attaining the age of 18 years, the father, defendant, ceased paying child support for her. Subsequently, the mother, plaintiff, filed a motion for entry of judgment against defendant for $2,700, the sum of which had accumulated since the eighteenth birthday of the daughter. The trial court denied the motion on the ground the obligation to support, under the decree, terminated at the time the daughter attained her majority, which status was set forth in 15-2-1, U.C.A.1953, as it then existed.
15-2-1 provided:
The period of minority extends in males to the age of twenty-one years and in females to that of eighteen years.1
Plaintiff appealed to this court on the ground the statute created an unconstitutional classification in violation of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. This court found the statutory classification reasonable and affirmed the trial court.2
Plaintiff appealed the decision to the United States Supreme Court, which ruled the classification set by 15-2-1 denied equal protection of the laws, as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.3 However, the court observed that its holding did not terminate the controversy as it was the prerogative of the state court to determine when defendant’s obligation for his children’s support pursuant to the divorce decree terminated under Utah law. The matter was remanded to this court, and in turn, the case was remitted to the trial court for further proceedings.
On appeal, defendant contends the trial court did not have authority to order payment of child support after the child had attained the age of 18. Defendant urges two alternatives. First, this court may de*117termine the constitutional infirmity does not invalidate the statute in its entirety; but rather, the statute may be construed to confer the benefit of emancipation, upon both classes male and female at the age of 18. Second, if this court determines there was no governing statute in effect, then the age of majority should be set at 18 years in conformity with the national trend.
Although the explicit reason for the action of the trial court is not set forth, its judgment can be sustained under two theories. It should be emphasized the invalidity of the statutory classification was strictly confined to its effect concerning child support, and the issue of the instant matter is so limited.
Under one theory, if the statute be deemed void, the common law “shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state.” (68-3-1) Under the common law both male and female attain their majority at the age of 21 years.4
Under the second theory, rather than invalidating the entire statutory scheme, where a classification has the effect of unreasonably granting a benefit to one class and denying it to another, the benefit may be extended to the excluded class. A reviewing court may correct a discriminatory classification by invalidating only the invidious exception or exemption and thus extend statutory benefits to those whom the legislature improperly excluded.5
To extend the benefit of support to females to the age of 21 years is not at odds with legislative expression, or our society as it is. The obligation to pay support under a decree of divorce would coincide with the legal duty of every man and woman to support their children under the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act.6 This act defines a child as a son or daughter under the age of 21 years.7
After the inception of the matter here for decision, the enactment of 15-2-1 (L. Utah 1975) continued the legislative expression of the Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, by providing that “courts in divorce actions may order support to age 21.” It does such, to the exclusion of the stated ages of majority, therein.
The trial court had the authority to order payment of support, by defendant, for his daughter, beyond her eighteenth birthday. Costs should be awarded to plaintiff.
TUCKETT, Justice, concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of MAUGHAN, J.

.This statute was amended in 1975, ch. 39, see. 1, and currently provides: “The period of minority extends in males and females to the age of eighteen years; but all minors obtain their majority by marriage. It is further provided that courts in divorce actions may order support to age 21.”

. Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d 1010 (1974).

. Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 95 S.Ct. 1373, 43 L.Ed.2d 688 (1975).

. 42 Am.Jur.2d, Infants, Sec. 3, p. 10.

. In re Kapperman, 11 Cal.3d 542, 114 Cal. Rptr. 97, 522 P.2d 657 (1974) ; IIarrigfeld v. District Court of Seventh Judicial District, 95 Idaho 540, 511 P.2d 822 (1973) ; Moritz v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (C.A. 10th 1972), 469 F.2d 466.

. L.Utah 1957 ; 78-45-3, 4.

. 78-45-2(4).