Court Opinion

ID: 9448386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:34:22.728849+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:24.716145
License: Public Domain

POPE, Circuit Judge
(concurring in the result).
While I think the court’s opinion reaches a correct result, I cannot agree with that part of the decision which relies upon the provisions of the Harter Act, 46 U.S.C. § 190, for the purpose of invalidating the first part of paragraph 15 of the applicable bill of lading.1
*50I am unable to discover that any court has ever given to the Harter Act the construction which the majority opinion now proposes to give it. Even if it were true, which I am inclined to doubt, that the maritime law, apart from statute, required delivery to be made upon a wharf, as stated in the “dictum in Tan Hi v. United States”, 94 F.Supp. 432, I can find nothing in the Harter Act or in the cases which construe it forbidding the parties to agree upon a place of delivery.2
I am convinced that the appellant is right in its contention that § 1 of the Harter Act does not deal with the scope of the carrier’s obligation as to place of delivery; that the Act does not determine how, when or where the carrier must deliver the cargo but only prevents the carrier from avoiding liability for loss arising from negligence in delivery to such place as the carrier has in fact undertaken to deliver the cargo.
The court’s opinion rejects the contention just mentioned on the ground that to accept that “weakens the Harter Act, and runs counter to its spirit and purpose.” It is my view that the Harter Act and its purposes must be judged by the language of the Act; I do not subscribe to the majority’s undertaking to extend the Act by reference to its “spirit and purpose”.
It seems to me that the Harter Act merely avoids agreements relieving the carrier from negligence and similar breaches of duty including improper loading, delivery, etc. To my mind, the idea of failure to make proper delivery connotes commissions or omissions in the general nature of the failure to use ordinary care. The majority opinion seems to say that “proper delivery” means delivery on a wharf.
I cannot find in the opinion any answer to the appellant’s position that there is no limitation in the Act upon the power of the parties to contract or to stipulate where delivery is to be made, providing there is no attempted stipulation that delivery may be made in a negligent or improper manner. Clearly enough the parties may agree whether delivery shall be made at Rotterdam, or Liverpool or Calais. They might stipulate that certain goods were to be delivered to another ship at sea. And no conceivable reason would prevent their agreeing that delivery might be made onto lighters.
*51I would regard it to be a mistake for us now to undertake to hold and thus set a precedent for the proposition that the so-called “lighterage clauses” here, including paragraph 15, are invalid. I am not prepared at this time to agree to a rejection of the appellant’s contention that the parties could agree to deliver at some point short of a wharf just so long as they do not attempt to stipulate that the carrier should not be liable for negligence for delivery at that point. In this particular ease an agreement to make delivery on a lighter and not upon a wharf would appear to be reasonable, and the master’s undertaking to make such delivery would not be an abuse of the discretion mentioned in clause 15, for this was a case where lighterage was absolutely necessary. I cannot find any court decision which has ever held what is proposed in the opinion with respect to the Harter Act invalidating a lighter-age clause such as this.
However, I am in accord with those portions of the opinion which note tha-t under the circumstances of the delivery made in this particular case, the appellant did not in truth and in fact undertake to exercise its privileges or its discretion purportedly reserved to it in the first paragraph of clause 15. As the opinion notes, no receipts were taken by the appellant from the lighterman when the shipments were discharged onto the lighters. The order bills of lading covering the shipment were not required to be surrendered to the appellant at that time.
It also appears from the record that the lighters at Alexandria were procured by and the lighterage services were performed in the following manner: American-Eastern Trading and Shipping Company, which represented the appellant at Alexandria, requested the Egyptian Stevedoring and Shipping Company, an independent contractor, to perform the stevedoring and lighterage services. It requested E. Barber & Sons, operators of the lighter, to furnish the lighter. The Egyptian Customs Regulations required the shipment to be landed on the quay of the Egyptian Petroleum Storage Company to be received there by that company as agent for the Customs Authorities and on April 2, 1952, that company for Egyptian Customs acknowledged receipt of the packages from the appellant’s agent, American-Eastern Trading and Shipping Company.
The opinion quotes from the letter written on behalf of appellant to the consignee suggesting that the latter could arrange to have its own lighter ready to receive delivery but stating that if that be not done appellant would be obliged to charge appellee with the hire of the lighters after 48 hours of the ship’s discharge.
All of these circumstances sufficiently demonstrate that, as suggested in the opinion, the carrier elected to lighter the goods “in or with lighters or craft operated or controlled by it”. This is further confirmed by the fact that it was the master of the appellant’s ship which undertook to inspect the lighters prior to and immediately following the loading of the lighter, and after the lighter had broken loose during the storm. Inspection was also made of the mooring lines after loading and mooring.
My own conclusion is that this case does not present any situation where we are obliged to pass upon the question of the validity of the first part of paragraph 15 for the reason that the appellant did not undertake to utilize any privileges, discretion or rights purportedly reserved to it in that paragraph. It follows that the appellant’s attempted defense under paragraph 15 must fail because of a failure to establish that the appellant undertake to do what this clause purportedly authorized. The result of all this was that those operating the lighter were agents of the appellant, and its responsibility follows from a loss under circumstances which speak for themselves. This ground for affirmance of the trial court’s judgment seems to be so plain I would prefer to leave such debatable question as the effect of the Harter Act on these clauses for decision at a time when it was necessary to reach it.

. Paragraph 15 in its entirety reads as follows : “15. The carrier or master, in the exercise of its or Ms discretion, may at any time, whether or not customary and *50without notice, lighter the goods or any part thereof, to or from the ship at the risk and expense of the goods. In making arrangements for lighterage or use of craft, the carrier or master shall he considered solely the agent of the shipper and consignee and without any responsibility whatsoever. The carrier shall not be responsible for any loss or damage to the goods while on such lighter or craft or in the custody of the lightermen who shall be considered independent contractors, including, but without limitation, responsibility for the choice of, condition, seaworthiness or manning of such lighter or craft.
If the carrier elects to lighter the goods in or with lighters or craft operated or controlled by it, the carrier shall have the benefit of all the terms of this bill of lading with respect to such lighterage and may collect the cost thereof from shipper or consignee.”

. I doubt whether the cases cited in support of this dictum really so hold. For instance, in The Eddy, 5 Wall. 481, 72 U.S. 481, 18 L.Ed. 486, the sole question was whether the shipowner had and retained a lien on goods shipped to secure payment of the freight. The master had unloaded the goods upon the wharf, notifying the consignees that the consignment was ready to be delivered on payment of freight, but if they refused to pay freight the goods would be stored at their expense and risk. “The appellants refused to pay the freight, and the master declined to part with the possession of the goods. He discharged the cargo upon the wharf, gave due notice to the consignees, and they refused to pay the freight, claiming that they had a right, by the usages of the port, to remove the goods to their store for inspection, without paying freight.” (p. 496) The court, sustaining the shipowner’s claim of lien, merely held that he was not required to deliver possession to the consignee, or at his warehouse. No question such as that presented in our case was there involved. Its reference to the wharf had to do solely with the question of the lien for freight.