Court Opinion

ID: 9883478
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 01:43:24.750671+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:23.664158
License: Public Domain

Barrow, J.,
dissenting.
We should do more than simply discourage instructions which attempt to define reasonable doubt. This practice has not worked in the past. Our Supreme Court not only attempted this in the Strawderman opinion, it also tried to convey a similar message in Smith v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1111, 1120, 156 S.E. 577, 580 (1931) and before that in McCoy v. Commonwealth, 133 Va. 731, 735, 112 S.E. 704, 705-06 (1922). Yet, after more than sixty years of discouragement we encounter still another case where a court granted an instruction purporting to define reasonable doubt.
Since the Strawderman decision a major reform in the drafting of jury instructions has occurred. In the late 1930’s the model jury instruction movement began in this country. By the time the Virginia Model Jury Instructions were published in 1979, over forty states had approved model jury instructions. I Virginia Model Jury Instructions—Criminal 9 (1979). Research demonstrated that jurors did not sufficiently understand instructions. Strawn & Buchanan, Jury Confusion: A Threat to Justice, 59 Judicature 478, 480 (1978). This reform sought to assure that jury instructions would be written “in a simple style, readily understandable by a jury.” Hames, Pattern Jury Instructions, 27 Mercer L. Rev. *502291, 293 (1975).
The instruction given in this case ignores the accomplishments of that reformation. It was neither simple nor readily understandable. Its sentences were long and structurally complex. It contained conflicting, and therefore argumentative, definitions. It defined reasonable doubt variously as “a convinced belief of the guilt of the accused,” “an abiding conviction of the truth of the charge,” “a doubt which is founded on reason,” and “a doubt as may be honestly and reasonably entertained.” If these phrases convey different meanings, they are conflicting; if they convey the same meaning, they are repetitive. Either fault undermines the instruction’s clarity. The instruction also was unnecessary. An instruction describing reasonable doubt from the Virginia Model Jury Instructions was given.1 This was sufficient to properly advise the jury on the concept of reasonable doubt. The additional instruction only served as a platform for counsel’s closing argument.
A clear understanding of reasonable doubt was important to the jury in this case. The jury had to decide whether the defendant knew the carpet was stolen or not. He said he did not know, and the evidence to the contrary was circumstantial. If the jury were confused about the meaning of reasonable doubt, it may have affected their verdict.
For these reasons I would reverse the judgment of conviction and remand this proceeding for a new trial.

 [The Commonwealth is required to prove] . . . each and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. This does not require proof beyond all possible doubt, nor is the Commonwealth required to disprove every conceivable circumstance of innocence. However, suspicion or probability of guilt is not enough for a conviction.
* ** *
A reasonable doubt is a doubt based on your sound judgment after a full and impartial consideration of all of the evidence in the case.