Court Opinion

ID: 9697647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:24:16.86521+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:34:50.010933
License: Public Domain

Justice WALLACE, JR.,
concurring.
I concur. It is my view that Mrs. Buechel has a cause of action for legal malpractice against Puder, but that her complaint was properly dismissed because she essentially satisfied the damages portion of her cause of action when she accepted the second settlement as a fair and equitable distribution of the marital assets.
In Ziegelheim, the plaintiff ultimately filed her malpractice action against the defendant, her previous attorney, after her *446motion to reopen the divorce decree and set aside the settlement agreement was denied. Supra, 128 N.J. at 257-58, 607 A.2d 1298. The defendant moved for summary judgment. Id. at 258, 607 A.2d 1298. The plaintiff testified at deposition that the defendant had told her that if the case were tried she would not receive more than twenty percent of the marital assets causing her to agree to the settlement. Id. at 258-59, 607 A.2d 1298. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion, concluding that the plaintiff understood the terms of settlement, believed they were fair, and freely entered into the agreement. Id. at 259, 607 A.2d 1298. The Appellate Division reversed in part and ordered a trial on whether defendant was negligent “because he convinced [plaintiff] to accept an agreement that a reasonably prudent attorney would have advised against accepting.” Id. at 260, 607 A.2d 1298. We agreed, but also permitted plaintiff to proceed on other counts of her complaint including the failure to make proper investigation, the negligent failure to discover concealed assets, id. at 265, 607 A.2d 1298, the negligent delay in finalizing the settlement and the failure to correctly memorialize the settlement, id. at 266, 607 A.2d 1298, and the negligent failure to present the offer in writing so plaintiff could review the terms and assess the fairness of the agreement. Id. at 266-67, 607 A.2d 1298.
We explained that in reaching our decision,
we do not open the door to malpractice suits by any and every dissatisfied party to a settlement. Many such claims could be averted if settlements were explained as a matter of record in open court in proceedings reflecting the understanding and assent of the parties. Further, plaintiffs must allege particular facts in support of their claims of attorney incompetence and may not litigate complaints containing mere generalized assertions of malpractice. We are mindful that attorneys cannot be held liable simply because they are not successful in persuading an opposing party to accept certain terms. Similarly, we acknowledge that attorneys who pursue reasonable strategies in handling their cases and who render reasonable advice to their clients cannot be held liable for the failure of their strategies or for any unprofitable outcomes that result because their clients took their advice. The law demands that attorneys handle their cases with knowledge, skill, and diligence, but it does not demand that they be perfect or infallible, and it does not demand that they always secure optimum outcomes for their clients.
[Id at 267, 607 A.2d 1298.]
*447The dissent also accepted the right of a settling party to sue his or her lawyer, but concluded that because the plaintiff failed to submit an expert’s report on the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the trial court correctly granted judgment in favor of the defendant. Id. at 268-69, 607 A.2d 1298.
There are clear differences between Ziegelheim and the present case. The plaintiff in Ziegelheim was unsuccessful in her effort to open the judgment and the settlement agreement. Thus, the plaintiffs only remedy to obtain what she believed was a fair share of the marital assets was to institute a malpractice claim and prove the negligence of her attorney. If plaintiff were ultimately successful in that action, she would have recovered at least the difference between the settlement share defendant obtained and the fair share a competent attorney would have recovered.
In the present case, like the plaintiff in Ziegelheim, Mrs. Buechel believed that plaintiff, her first attorney, was negligent in representing her in the initial settlement. However, unlike the plaintiff in Ziegelheim, before the trial court ruled on her motion to vacate the settlement, Mrs. Buechel agreed to a second settlement that she believed was fair and equitable. On the occasion of the second settlement, the terms were clearly explained to Mrs. Buechel. Thus, unlike the plaintiff in Ziegelheim, Mrs. Buechel was able to recover the difference between the amount she would have received in the settlement Puder obtained for her and the settlement terms her second attorney negotiated for her. Consequently, Mrs. Buechel received all that she was due. Any asserted negligence by Puder did not result in any damages to Mrs. Buechel.
In short, Mrs. Buechel failed to demonstrate that she suffered a loss as a result of Puder’s asserted negligence. The determining factor here is not her ultimate attainment of a fair and equitable settlement, but the fact that in reaching the second settlement, Mrs. Buechel recovered all of her damages allegedly suffered from Puder’s alleged deficient representation of her in the first settlement.
*448The result here mirrors the outcome that one would anticipate if the trial court had granted Mrs. Buechel’s motion to open the judgment, and thereafter, settlement ensued or a trial concluded on more favorable terms than the original settlement to Mrs. Bueehel. In that event, Puder’s alleged deficiencies would have run their course because Mrs. Bueehel would have received a full recovery.
I recognize that in some other case not before us a person in Mrs. Bueehel’s shoes may be able to prove damages beyond what he or she might receive in a settlement. For example, if such a hypothetical person were to incur substantial fees and costs that would otherwise not have been incurred and were not recovered as part of the settlement, then that would constitute damages recoverable against the deficient attorney. That is not the case here because Mrs. Bueehel recovered her attorney’s fees as part of the second settlement.
I concur in the result.