Court Opinion

ID: 9908409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 17:09:04.152178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:10.291241
License: Public Domain

J-S33029-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DAVID HARRIS                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 30 WDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 2, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                        CP-25-CR-0001490-2022

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  DAVID HARRIS                                 :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 31 WDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 2, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Criminal Division at No(s):
                        CP-25-CR-0002715-2021

BEFORE:       BENDER, P.J.E., McCAFFERY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY McCAFFERY, J.:                         FILED: DECEMBER 8, 2023

       David Harris (Appellant) appeals from the judgments of sentence

entered, across two dockets, in the Erie County Court of Common Pleas,

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S33029-23

following his jury convictions of assault by life prisoner1 and related offenses.2

Appellant avers the trial court erred in denying his Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 speedy-

trial motion.      First, he contends the delay in holding the preliminary

arraignment, due to technical issues with video-conferencing equipment,

should have been attributed to the Commonwealth.              Second, Appellant

maintains that after the initial charge of assault by life prisoner was dismissed

for lack of evidence, the Commonwealth failed to exercise due diligence when

it did not refile the charge for almost five months, and thus the run date should

be the date of the initial filing of the charge. We agree with the trial court

that even if it accepted both of Appellant’s arguments, trial commenced 13

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1 18 Pa.C.S. § 2704 (“Every person who has been sentenced to death or life

imprisonment . . . in this Commonwealth . . . who commits an aggravated
assault . . . by any means of force likely to produce serious bodily injury, is
guilty of a crime, the penalty for which shall be the same as the penalty for
murder of the second degree.”).

2 As we discuss infra, following the preliminary hearing, three charges were

initially held over for court and filed at trial docket CP-25-CR-0002715-2021
(the 2021 Docket), while one charge was dismissed, but later refiled at trial
docket 25-CR-0001490-2022 (the 2022 Docket).

      Furthermore, we note Appellant has properly filed separate notices of
appeal at docket. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 971 (Pa.
2018) (separate notices of appeal must be filed when a single order resolves
issues arising on more than one trial court docket), overruled in part,
Commonwealth v. Young, 265 A.3d 462, 477 (Pa. 2021) (reaffirming that
Pa.R.A.P. 341 requires separate notices of appeal when single order resolves
issues under more than one docket, but holding Pa.R.A.P. 902 permits
appellate court to consider appellant’s request to remediate error when notice
of appeal is timely filed). See also Pa.R.A.P. 902 (amended May 18, 2023).

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days after the adjusted run date, and the court showed it had scheduling

conflicts that prevented trial from commencing sooner. Thus, we affirm.

       On October 26, 2020, Appellant was serving a life sentence at SCI

Albion. He got into an argument with an inmate who was using the particular

telephone Appellant wished to use. N.T. Jury Trial Day 1 – Morning, 9/21/22,

at 28-29. A corrections officer heard a “loud click like someone got hit,” looked

over, and saw the inmate fall to the ground and Appellant “stomp on his head.”

Id. at 30. The victim suffered, inter alia, a concussion and multiple extensive

facial fractures, which required surgery. N.T. Jury Trial Day 1 – Afternoon

Session, 9/21/22, at 25-26.

       On July 21, 2021, a police criminal complaint was filed, charging

Appellant with assault by life prisoner — the most serious offense herein, as

a conviction carried a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment3 — as well as

assault by prisoner, aggravated assault, and simple assault.4

       A preliminary arraignment was initially scheduled for July 26, 2021, but

was not held until September 7th. See Magisterial District Judge 06-3-08,

Criminal Docket at 1. This delay, which we calculate to be 43 days,5 was due

____________________________________________

3 See 18 Pa.C.S. § 2704.

4 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 2703(a)(1)(i), 2702(a)(1), 2701(a)(1), respectively.

5 As we discuss infra, Appellant repeatedly refers to this period, between the

originally scheduled preliminary arraignment date (July 26, 2021,) and the
actual hearing date (September 7th,) to be 48 days long. See Appellant’s
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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to “issues with the Polycom equipment” that would enable Appellant to appear

by video for the proceeding. See Opinion & Order, 9/22/22, at 1.

       A preliminary hearing was held on October 21, 2021.6 Apparently, the

Commonwealth did not appear. See N.T., 9/20/22, at 3. A state trooper

affiant did appear, but “did not enter . . . information” that Appellant was

serving a life sentence. See id. at 9, 12. The magisterial district court thus

dismissed the assault by life prisoner charge, but held over the remaining

charges for court. These held over charges were filed at the 2021 Docket.

       The Commonwealth refiled the assault by life prisoner charge on March

17, 2022 — 147 days, or almost five months, after the dismissal of the initial

charge. This charge was filed at the 2022 Docket.

       Eventually, a joint trial for the two dockets was scheduled for the

September 2022 term.           Order, 8/4/22.    On September 8 and 9, 2022,

Appellant filed separate Pa.R.Crim.P. 600 motions, at each docket, to dismiss

the charges.

____________________________________________

Brief at 13; N.T. Motion to Dismiss, 9/20/22, at 3; Appellant’s Motion to
Dismiss, 2021 Docket, 9/8/22, at 4 (unpaginated); Appellant’s Motion to
Dismiss, 2022 Docket, 9/9/22, at 2 (unpaginated). We instead calculate it to
be 43 days. In any event, we note there are 48 days from the filing of the
complaint to the preliminary arraignment.

6 The certified record does not include a transcript for the preliminary hearing,

and there is no indication in the trial docket that the transcript was requested.
Nevertheless, we glean the above undisputed statements about the
preliminary hearing from the notes of testimony of the Rule 600 motion
hearing. See N.T., 9/20/22, at 3, 9, 12.

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      On the day scheduled for trial, September 20, 2022, the trial court

conducted a hearing on the Rule 600 motions.         Appellant first argued the

Commonwealth failed to act with due diligence when: it could have “handled”

the preliminary hearing itself in a diligent manner; and it did not refile the

assault by life prisoner charge for four months, despite the lack of “essentially

[any] change in the circumstances.” N.T., 9/20/22, at 9-10. We note that in

his written motion, Appellant also averred the run date for this charge should

be the date of the initial complaint filing — July 21, 2021. Appellant’s Motion

to Dismiss, 2022 Docket, at 2. Furthermore, Appellant alleged the “48 day[

]” delay, between the originally scheduled date of the preliminary arraignment

and the actual date of that proceeding, should be attributed to the

Commonwealth, “as the use of the PolyCom equipment [was] solely for [its

benefit] in alleviating it of the burden of transporting a defendant in person to

court hearings.” Appellant’s Motion to Dismiss, 2021 Docket, at 4.

      The Commonwealth responded that: it did not learn of the dismissed

charge until December of 2021; in January of 2022, it communicated with

defense counsel, who did not agree to the Commonwealth’s “add[ing] the

charge back;” and thus the Commonwealth contacted the officer.             N.T.,

9/20/22, at 3-4. The officer then refiled the assault by life prisoner charge on

March 17, 2022. See id. at 4. Meanwhile, the Commonwealth explained, it

held the advancement of the 2021 Docket case, so that the new charge could

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“catch up.”     Id.   Appellant responded it was “not fair to say that the

Commonwealth was unaware” of the dismissal of the charge. Id. at 9.

     After hearing the parties’ arguments, the trial court denied Appellant’s

motions to dismiss. First, it reasoned the technical issues with the Polycom

equipment were not due to any fault on the Commonwealth’s part, and thus

that delay was not chargeable against the Commonwealth. Opinion & Order

at 1-2.       Second, the trial court found there was no evidence the

Commonwealth did not exercise due diligence in prosecuting the first

complaint, and thus the run date for the refiled charge was the date of the

second filing (March 17, 2022). Id. at 2, citing Commonwealth v. Peterson,

19 A.3d 1131, 1141 (Pa. Super. 2011) (en banc) (“Where the Commonwealth

exercises due diligence in prosecuting the original criminal complaint, the

time period between the dismissal of the first complaint and the re-filing of

the second complaint is irrelevant for purposes of Rule 600 and the

Commonwealth is only required to re-file within the applicable statute of

limitations.”) (emphasis added).    Finally, the court found there was no

prejudice to Appellant, who was already serving a life sentence. Opinion &

Order at 3.

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       A jury trial commenced that same day, September 20, 2022.7 Appellant

was found guilty of all charges: assault by life prisoner, assault by prisoner,

aggravated assault, and simple assault.

       On December 2, 2022, the trial court imposed the statutorily mandated

sentence of life imprisonment for assault by life prisoner, and found the

remaining offenses merged with this charge for sentencing purposes. See

Sentencing Order, 2021 Docket, 12/2/22. However, on January 3, 2023, the

court issued a modified sentencing order, removing the finding of merger for

the remaining offenses and simply imposing no further penalty.          Modified

Sentencing Order, 2021 Docket, 1/3/23.

       Appellant filed timely, separate notices of appeal at each docket, and

complied with the trial court’s orders to file Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statements of

errors complained of on appeal.

       Appellant presents one issue for our review:

       Whether the trial court erred in denying . . . Appellant’s motion to
       dismiss pursuant to Rule 600?

Appellant’s Brief at 4.

       At this juncture, we consider the applicable standard of review:

____________________________________________

7 Appellant contends his trial commenced on September 21, 2022.  Appellant’s
Brief at 13. However, the comment to Rule 600 provides that a trial
commences when, inter alia, “the trial judge determines that the parties are
present and directs them to proceed to voir dire or to opening argument.”
Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, comment. As jury selection began September 20th, that
is the date trial commenced for Rule 600 purposes.

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      In evaluating Rule [600] issues, our standard of review of a trial
      court’s decision is whether the trial court abused its discretion.
      Judicial discretion requires action in conformity with law, upon
      facts and circumstances judicially before the court, after hearing
      and due consideration. An abuse of discretion is not merely an
      error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion the law is
      overridden or misapplied or the judgment exercised is manifestly
      unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will,
      as shown by the evidence or the record, discretion is abused.

Commonwealth v. Carl, 276 A.3d 743, 748 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation

omitted), appeal denied, 292 A.3d 839 (Pa. 2023).

      This Court has explained:

      [Rule] 600 provides that “[t]rial in a court case in which a written
      complaint is filed against the defendant shall commence within
      365 days from the date on which the complaint is filed.”
      Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(A)(2)(a). [However,] “periods of delay at any
      stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the
      Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be
      included in the computation of the time within which trial must
      commence. Any other periods of delay shall be excluded from the
      computation.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).

Carl, 276 A.3d at 749.

      First, a trial court shall determine the mechanical run date, which “is

calculated by adding 365 days to the date the criminal complaint is filed.” See

Peterson, 19 A.3d at 1137 n.6; Carl, 276 A.3d at 749.

      “Second, we determine whether any excludable time exists pursuant to

Rule 600(C). We add the amount of excludable time, if any, to the mechanical

run date to arrive at an adjusted run date.” Carl, 276 A.3d at 749 (citation

omitted).

      “Excludable time” is defined . . . as . . . any period of time for
      which the defendant expressly waives Rule 600; and/or such

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     period of delay at any stage of the proceedings as results from:
     (a) the unavailability of the defendant or the defendant’s attorney;
     (b) any continuance granted at the request of the defendant or
     the defendant’s attorney.” . . .

Peterson, 19 A.3d at 1137 (citation omitted). Additionally, “periods of delay

at any stage of the proceedings caused by the Commonwealth when the

Commonwealth has failed to exercise due diligence shall be included in the

computation of the time within which trial must commence.” Carl, 276 A.3d

at 749, citing Pa.R.Crim.P. 600(C)(1).

     Finally,

          [i]f the trial takes place after the adjusted run date, we
          apply the due diligence analysis set forth in Rule
          600([D]). . . . Rule 600[ ] encompasses a wide variety
          of circumstances under which a period of delay was
          outside the control of the Commonwealth and not the
          result of the Commonwealth’s lack of diligence. Any such
          period of delay results in an extension of the run date.
          Addition of any Rule 600[ ] extensions to the adjusted
          run date produces the final Rule 600 run date. If the
          Commonwealth does not bring the defendant to trial on
          or before the final run date, the trial court must dismiss
          the charges.

Carl, 276 A.3d at 749 (some citations omitted). “The Commonwealth bears

the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that it acted with due

diligence throughout the proceedings.” Id. at 748 (citation omitted).

     We also consider the dual public policy concerns behind Rule 600:

     (1) the protection of the accused’s speedy trial rights, and (2) the
     protection of society. . . .

     So long as there has been no misconduct on the part of the
     Commonwealth in an effort to evade the fundamental speedy trial
     rights of an accused, Rule [600] must be construed in a manner

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      consistent with society’s right to punish and deter crime. In
      considering [these] matters . . . , courts must carefully factor into
      the ultimate equation not only the prerogatives of the individual
      accused, but the collective right of the community to vigorous law
      enforcement as well.

Carl, 276 A.3d at 748 (citation omitted).

      Initially, we calculate that at the 2021 Docket, the Commonwealth filed

a complaint on July 21, 2021, and trial commenced 426 days later, on

September 20, 2022. On appeal, Appellant challenges only two periods of

delay: (1) the 43-day delay in the preliminary arraignment, caused by issues

with the Polycom equipment; and (2) the almost five month lapse between

the dismissal of the assault by life prisoner charge and the refiling of it. We

address these claims seriatim.

      First, Appellant reiterates his argument that the “48 day[ ]” delay in the

preliminary arraignment, caused by “technical difficulties” with the video

conferencing equipment, should be attributed to the Commonwealth because

the use of the equipment is solely for the Commonwealth’s benefit “in not

having to transport [him] to in-person hearings.”       Appellant’s Brief at 13.

Appellant further reasons the Commonwealth could have exercised due

diligence by transporting him “at any point between July 28[ ] and September

7.” Id. We conclude no relief is due.

      As stated above, the trial court found the technical issues with the

Polycom equipment were not caused by any “fault of the Commonwealth.”

Opinion & Order at 1. Appellant does not dispute this finding. Instead, he

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argues the delay should nevertheless be attributed to the Commonwealth

because it solely benefitted from the equipment. However, Appellant cites no

legal authority, and we have discovered none, for his proposition — that when

videoconferencing equipment or other technology, which belongs to and is

maintained and controlled by the trial court, benefits one party over the other,

any delays caused by malfunctioning of the equipment is attributable to that

party for Rule 600 purposes. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) (argument shall include

“such discussion and citation of authorities as are deemed pertinent”).

Appellant likewise presents no authority to support his underlying premise —

that not having to transport a defendant from prison to the court is a “benefit”

conferred upon the Commonwealth. Accordingly, no relief is due on these

grounds.

      Furthermore, Appellant provides no support for his bald contention that

the Commonwealth could have simply transported him to the trial court “at

any point.” See Appellant’s Brief at 13. He cites no evidence the court and

the parties considered any feasible earlier preliminary arraignment date, that

was amenable to the trial court and both parties.        For all the foregoing

reasons, we do not disturb the trial court’s finding that the 43 day-delay,

caused by PolyCom equipment issues, was not attributable to either party.

See Carl, 276 A.3d at 748.

      Next, Appellant reiterates his claim that the refiled charge of assault by

life prisoner should have the same mechanical run date as that for the

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originally filed complaint, July 21, 2022.         See Appellant’s Brief at 13.   In

support, Appellant again avers the Commonwealth failed to exercise due

diligence after the October 21, 2021, dismissal of the charge, when it did not

refile the charge until five months later, on March 17, 2022. See id. at 13-

15. Appellant claims there were no circumstances preventing the refiling of

the charge, and “the Commonwealth acted with evasive intent in attempting

to circumvent the [Rule 600] time constraints.” See id. at 15-16. Appellant

thus claims this passage of time is attributable to the Commonwealth. Id. at

14. Additionally, Appellant cites the Commonwealth’s prior motion to continue

trial for the first docket “so that the [second docket] could ‘catch up’ with” it.

Id. at 13-14. We do not reach the merits of this claim, as we may affirm the

court’s order on the basis of Appellant’s next argument.8

       In his third argument, Appellant contends that even if the trial court

were to exclude the “48 day[ ]” delay caused by the Polycom equipment

issues, and the Rule 600 calculations began on the date the first complaint

was filed, the adjusted run date would be September 7th, but he was not

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8 “We can affirm the trial court’s decision if there is any basis to support it.”

Commonwealth v. Sunealitis, 153 A.3d 414, 423 (Pa. Super. 2016).

                                          - 12 -
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brought to trial until September 20th.9 Appellant’s Brief at 13. This delay is

13 days long.

       The trial court addressed Appellant’s claim, explaining the trial term in

Erie County commenced on September 12, 2020; and the court was not

available from September 13th to Friday, September 16th, as it was presiding

over a homicide trial. Opinion & Order at 2. Trial commenced on Tuesday,

September 20th. The trial court concluded this administrative delay, caused

by   the   court’s    own    scheduling,       should   not   be   attributable   to   the

Commonwealth.

       On appeal, Appellant does not dispute, let alone address, this discussion

of the 13 day period; he makes no claim the 13-day delay was attributable to

the Commonwealth’s actions. As stated above, if trial commences after the

adjusted run date, we apply the due diligence analysis set forth in Rule

600(D). See Carl, 276 A.3d at 749. Any delays “outside the control of the

Commonwealth and not the result of the Commonwealth’s lack of diligence”

extend the adjusted run date.                  Id.   We conclude that under these

circumstances, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying

Appellant’s motion to dismiss. See Carl, 276 A.3d at 748, 749 (any period of

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9 As noted above, while Appellant contends trial commenced on September

21, 2022, we conclude it commenced on September 20th, when jury selection
began. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 600, comment.

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delay, which was outside the Commonwealth’s control and not the result of

the Commonwealth’s lack of diligence, results in an extension of the run date).

      For the foregoing reasons, we conclude Appellant’s Rule 600 motion

claims do not merit relief, and we affirm the judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

DATE: 12/8/2023

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