Court Opinion

ID: 9627528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:47:10.442139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:33:39.422262
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. The majority’s result hinges on the assumption that the trial court did not have sufficient evidence to find that defendant was motivated to flee. In my view, the record proves otherwise. Moreover, defendant did not challenge any of the trial court’s findings. We should not conduct a treasure hunt for a reason to reverse his conviction.
Officer Mudrick decided to arrest defendant immediately, because he feared that defendant would flee or destroy drug evidence before a warrant could be obtained. Given the circumstances, those fears were patently reasonable. At the time of the arrest, Mudrick knew or had probable cause to believe that (1) defendant had just kidnapped Ritter, then passed out, allowing her to escape; (2) the dispatcher had just broadcast the report of the kidnapping on the radio, naming defendant as a suspect; (3) defendant and his father listened to police monitors so that they would know if they were mentioned in any dispatches; (4) defendant kept methamphetamine next to his bed; (5) defendant previously had assaulted police officers and shot someone with a firearm; and (6) defendant was in the process of moving. Given those facts, there was a strong possibility that, once awake, defendant would discover that Riddick had escaped, turn on his police scanner, and discover that he was a suspect. It stretches credulity to believe that an. individual who previously had attacked police officers and was in the process of moving would simply *6remain in his house until the police arrived to arrest him, leaving the methamphetamine next to his bed for them to discover.
The majority addresses that problem by deciding that “[t]he trial court’s finding that defendant probably had heard the dispatch is not supported by the record,” because “[t]here is no indication that defendant was listening to a scanner or had a scanner nearby.” 102 Or App 1, 4-5. The evidence is to the contrary. Mudrick testified:
“[Defendant] on occasion has mentioned to one other Cottage Grove police officer that both he and his father monitor the police scanner constantly, noting down the names and vehicles when they are ran [sic] in an attempt to put a harassment suit against the city.” (Emphasis supplied.)
Obviously, if defendant monitored his scanner constantly, he kept it near him. Even if defendant happened to remain passed out long enough to miss the police report, his father was likely to tell him about it. The majority is simply wrong in concluding that Mudrick’s testimony does not support a finding that defendant probably had heard or at any minute might hear the dispatch.
Finally, the majority reasons that “[i]f the officers were concerned that defendant would be gone before they could get a warrant, they could have watched the house for the time it would have taken to get a warrant.” 102 Or App 1, 4. There are two difficulties with that analysis. First, as the Supreme Court noted in State v. Girard, 276 Or 511, 515, 555 P2d 445 (1976), such a conclusion
“involves a large measure of speculation, depending upon a variety of factors relating to the feasibility of ‘surrounding’ the house or otherwise preventing escape * * *. In the exigencies of the moment, the officers could not reasonably be expected to put fine weights in the scale in weighing the chances of securing the house or of losing their quarry.”
Second, even if the officers had watched the house, that would not have prevented defendant or the others who were inside it from destroying evidence of drug-related crimes. The officers clearly were justified in proceeding with the arrest as soon as they could plan it.
In sum, the existence of exigent circumstances is a *7question of “practical necessity.” State v. Peller, 287 Or 255, 262, 598 P2d 684 (1979). I believe that the majority has ignored the practical necessities faced by the officers in this case. In the process, it also has disregarded valid findings made by the trial court. Accordingly, I dissent.