Court Opinion

ID: 9657448
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:26:38.555564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:45.329604
License: Public Domain

MacKenzie, P.J.
(concurring). I concur in the majority opinion except as to the analysis relating to the sentencing guidelines. I write separately to register my concern that, by undertaking an extended analysis of defendant’s claim that the sentencing guidelines’ offense variables were improperly applied, the majority is potentially usurping the discretionary role of the trial court in imposing sentence. I do not believe that this Court should engage in attempts to either mandate or second-guess the manner in which the trial court applies the sentencing guideline variables unless the record discloses that the judge based his or her assessment of those variables on clearly erroneous facts.
In People v Benson, 142 Mich App 720, 722-723; 370 NW2d 16 (1985), a panel of this Court observed:
"The trial court based its assessment [of the disputed offense variable] upon admissions of the defendant contained in the presentence report. At sentencing the trial court allowed both defendant and his attorney the opportunity to dispute, explain and clarify the facts underlying this point allocation. The facts upon which the judge based his decision were not challenged so much as were the conclusions he drew from those basically undisputed facts. Under such circumstances, we find no basis for this Court to interfere with the *149trial court’s discretionary assessment. Thus, four points were properly awarded under [the disputed offense variable].”
In People v Thomason, 141 Mich App 578, 580; 367 NW2d 364 (1985), the majority of another panel of this Court stated:
"Defendant now contends that the trial court abused its discretion by assigning the wrong number of points for Offense Variable 2 under the robbery heading. While we can see from the record that there was a difference of opinion between defense counsel and the court about the proper number of points to be assigned, we decline to pass on that question. The only issue before us is the question of whether the trial court abused its discretion in fashioning defendant’s sentence”.
In People v Clark, 147 Mich App 237, 243; 382 NW2d 759 (1985), yet another panel held:
"[T]his Court will not get bogged down in second-guessing the detailed calculations under the sentencing guidelines. In the overwhelming majority of cases, review of the sentencing guideline calculation should be perfunctory. Only in the very extreme case should there be any appellate review. Since here the trial judge had adequate evidence to score defendant as he did under the sentencing guidelines, resentencing of defendant is unnecessary.”
In the instant case, each of defendant’s claims regarding the court’s scoring of the offense variables challenges the conclusions the judge drew in applying the facts of the case to the sentencing guidelines. The scoring of the offense variables is not alleged to have been based on factual inaccuracies, but rather on a disagreement with the conclusions reached from essentially undisputed facts. *150Under these circumstances, we ought not interfere with the court’s discretionary assessment.
The sentencing guidelines are meant to serve as a tool to aid trial judges in the exercise of discretion in sentencing convicted felons. This Court is not in the business of imposing sentences; this Court should not be in the business of modifying sentencing information reports. In my opinion, we should not substitute our opinion for that of the sentencing court where the facts support the judge’s assessment of the guidelines variables.