Court Opinion

ID: 9532314
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:20:16.052574+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:43.958077
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Hershey, dissenting: The trial judge, sitting without a jury, found that the death here did not occur solely through “accidental means * * * independently of all other causes.” In my opinion, he was right. For while the Illinois courts have been “liberal” in construing this common insurance provision, this opinion marks an extension which is both unprecedented and unjustified. It is true that “accidental means” have been considered synonymous with “accidental result,” but it has always been recognized that an effect which is the natural and probable consequence of a deliberate act or course of action cannot be said to be produced by “accidental means.” (See, e.g., Cory v. Woodmen Accident Co. 333 Ill. 175.) This is, of course, based on the fundamental principle that one is presumed to intend all the natural and probable consequences flowing from his own deliberate act. The stipulation shows that the insured and his accomplices “entered the house for the purpose of carrying out their agreement.” A pilot light was burning in the gas furnace of the living room, and the parties spread ten gallons of gasoline “on the floor and furniture in the house.” Judicial notice can be taken of the highly inflammable and explosive qualities of gasoline, especially when spread in proximity to an open flame. (Gust v. Muskegon Co-op Oil Co. 226 Mich. 532; see also 24 Am. Jur., Gas and Oil, sec. 179.) Given these conditions, an explosion and fire should have been expected at any time. The conclusion is inescapable that the natural and probable consequence of the insured’s deliberate misconduct was the explosion and fire in which he died, and it cannot be held that his death was due solely to “accidental means,” even though he miscalculated the precise moment when the fire would start. While the stipulation neither affirms nor negates whether the conspirators knew of the pilot light, all reasonable inferences point to such knowledge. For example, one of them was the owner of the house and used it as his residence. And apart from the general rule that the knowledge of one conspirator is imputed to all, the others surely must have observed the gas furnace in the living room as they helped spread gasoline “on the floor and furniture in the house.” Engaged as they were in a highly dangerous and illegal venture, they were certainly put on notice of the possibility of there being an open flame in the gas furnace. But even if it be assumed that they did not know of the pilot light, still, there is a strong indication that before they left the premises the men had done all that they deemed essential to the starting of the fire. For, as noted, they entered the house “for the purpose of carrying out their agreement” (i.e., to set the fire) ; and after spreading the gasoline, the ignition of which caused the explosion and fire, stepped outside. There is nothing to suggest they thought anything further had to be done to accomplish their nefarious purpose. The reentry was not connected with the arson, and the fire did in fact occur. The trial court could reasonably conclude that the men believed a fire would commence, though they failed to appreciate how imminent it was, and that the plaintiff failed to sustain her burden of proving that the insured died from an injury caused solely by “accidental means.” Finally, even if we assume that fire at the time was “accidental,” still, this “accident” did not cause death “independently of all other causes.” If these words in the policy mean anything at all, they must mean if nonaccidental factors have some substantial proximate relationship to the ultimate death, as in this case, the death is not “accidental * * * independently of all other causes.” KlingbiEl, C.J., and House, J., concur in the foregoing dissenting opinion.