Court Opinion

ID: 9640592
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:09:08.89289+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:07.009655
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON MOTION FOR REHEARING
In a motion for rehearing, Appellee re-urges his point that the revocation of the Appellee’s dental license because of substandard anesthesiological practices must illustrate an arbitrary and capricious act. In reviewing Texas Health Facilities Commission v. Charter Medical-Dallas, Inc., 665 S.W.2d 446 (Tex.1984), the Supreme Court recognized that while all decisions made under the Texas Administrative Procedure and Texas Register Act that are unsupported by substantial evidence are arbitrary ones, there are arbitrary decisions that can be made even if substantial evidence is present to support the decision. Again, a narrow interpretation is required. In Lewis v. Metropolitan Savings and Loan Association, 550 S.W.2d 11 (Tex.1977), the refusal by the agency to consider clearly competent, material and properly tendered evidence was a denial of due process and therefore arbitrary. In Railroad Commission v. Alamo Express, 158 Tex. 68, 308 S.W.2d 843 (1958), an agency was found to have acted in an arbitrary manner when it totally failed to make findings of fact and instead based its decision on findings in another case. Arbitrary and capricious action was also found when an agency based its decision on non-statutory criteria. Public Utility Commission Of Texas v. South Plains Electric Cooperative, Inc., 635 S.W.2d 954 (Tex.App.—Austin 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.). These cases were all offensive to due process in that the opportunity to be heard was unduly restricted and the orderly procedures were violated. Masonic Grand Chapter Of Order Of Eastern Star v. Sweatt, 329 S.W.2d 334, 337 (Tex.Civ.App.—Fort Worth 1959, writ ref’d n.r.e.). In this case, the permit to administer anesthesia was subordinate to the dental license. It was a medical specialty for which the dentist had qualified to practice. It is no more a violation of fair play to revoke the dental license in this instance than it would be to revoke a medical doctor’s license for improper practice of medicine within or without his specialty, or to revoke a lawyer’s license for improper practice within or without his board certified area. In narrowly construing the case of Texas Health Facilities Commission v. Charter Medical-Dallas, Inc., we believe the finding of an act, which is supported by substantial evidence, to be arbitrary and capricious must be based on a violation of due process or some other unfair or unreasonable conduct that shocks the conscience. *286To allow any less of a standard would merely allow the reviewing court to imper-missibly substitute its judgment for the expertise of the administrative officers in the exercise of their statutory discretion. Gerst v. Goldsbury, 434 S.W.2d 665 (Tex.1968).
Furthermore, Appellee failed to assert this particular contention in his motion for rehearing before the Board and it was therefore waived. Sears v. Texas State Board Of Dental Examiners, 759 S.W.2d 748 (Tex.App.—Austin 1988). It was also not one of the considerations taken by the reviewing court in its assessment of arbitrary action by the Board.
Appellee’s motion for rehearing is overruled.