Court Opinion

ID: 9890016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 21:03:46.096612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:57.837381
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/11/23 Boehmer v. Hodge CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 NORINE BOEHMER, as Trustee,                                   B315711

           Plaintiff and Respondent.                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct.
           v.                                                  No. 17STPB08490)

 CHALA REKAY HODGE,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ana Maria Luna, Judge. Dismissed.
     Chala Rekay Hodge, in pro. per.
     Tamila C. Jensen for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                        _________________________________
                        INTRODUCTION

      Chala Rekay Hodge appeals from an order approving a
trust accounting and a request for trustee and attorney’s fees.
Because the order did not aggrieve Hodge, she lacks standing to
appeal, and we dismiss.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      A.     The Chala Renay Hodge Special Needs Trust
      Chala Rekay Hodge (Rekay) is the mother of Chala Renay
Hodge (Renay), who is a disabled adult.1 Rekay is the
conservator of the person for her daughter, but not the
conservator of her daughter’s estate. After Renay’s father Bobby
Hodge died, his mother (Renay’s grandmother) Betty Hanson
created the irrevocable Chala Renay Hodge Special Needs Trust
for Renay’s sole benefit and to settle a dispute with Rekay.
(Boehmer v. Hodge (Dec. 11, 2020, No. B299529) [nonpub. opn.]
(Boehmer I).)2 The trust’s assets included real property that
Hanson and Bobby Hodge had owned as joint tenants and that
Hanson conveyed to the trust after her son died. (Id.)

1     As in a previous appeal concerning Chala Rekay Hodge and
the trust created to benefit her daughter, we distinguish between
mother and daughter by using their middle names. (See Boehmer
v. Hodge (Dec. 11, 2020, No. B299529) [nonpub. opn.].)

2      We rely on Boehmer I for relevant background information
not otherwise included in the record on appeal. We also grant
Boehmer’s motion to augment the record to include documents
filed in this proceeding in the probate court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.155(a)(1)(A).)

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       Among other provisions, the trust states: “In no event shall
the Beneficiary [Renay] nor the Beneficiary’s mother [Rekay]
qualify as nor be appointed as Successor Trustee hereunder.”
The trust also states the “Trustee shall provide the Beneficiary’s
legal guardian or conservator with an annual accounting per the
requirements of Probate Code §§ 16060 et seq., which shall be
sent by first class mail . . . to the Beneficiary’s legal guardian or
conservator, who shall thereafter have sixty (60) days within
which to review such accounting and to file objections, to said
accounting with the Trustee.”
       Pamela Muir was named trustee and served in that
capacity from the trust’s formation in November 2004 until
August 2013, when Norine Boehmer and Dawn Mills became the
successor trustees. In December 2018 the probate court
authorized Boehmer and Mills to sell the real property in the
trust and brought the trust under court supervision.

      B.     Boehmer and Mills Petition the Probate Court for
             Approval and Settlement of the Trust Accounts and
             for Trustees’ and Attorney’s Fees
       Effective March 27, 2019, Mills resigned as co-trustee, and
on November 14, 2019 Boehmer and Mills filed a petition to settle
and approve the accounts of the trust and for trustees’ and
attorney’s fees. The petition included an accounting for the
period from January 1, 2018 through September 30, 2019. Rekay
filed two sets of objections to the petition. Among many other
objections, Rekay argued the petition did not include an
accounting for the years 2014 through 2017. In response,
Boehmer and Mills filed a supplement to the accounting that
included four additional time periods from September 10, 2013

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(shortly after their appointment) to January 1, 2018. The record
does not indicate Rekay objected to the supplemental accounting.
      Rekay’s other objections to the accounting for 2018 and
part of 2019 included, as best as we can tell, assertions the
trustees did not properly obtain a loan for the benefit of the trust;
the combined accounting for the years 2018 and 2019 was
confusing; the trustees sold the property in the trust merely to
pay their fees; the requested attorney’s fees were excessive;
Boehmer’s declaration and supporting documents were
“contrive[d]” to support “deceptive” legal fees; repairs to the real
property listed as expenses were not completed; and the petition
named the wrong trust.3 Rekay also objected to Mills’s
resignation without stating a reason for her objection, though
Rekay claimed she “fired” Boehmer in 2016.
      In response to Rekay’s objections, Boehmer and Mills
argued that Rekay failed to show “she is an aggrieved party
legally able to file objections” and that Renay was represented by
counsel who did not object to the petition. Boehmer and Mills
also argued many of Rekay’s objections concerned matters beyond
the scope of the petition and were not before the court.

      C.    The Probate Court Approves the Petition
      At an evidentiary hearing on the petition held July 27,
2021, the probate court struck Rekay’s objections because the
court found she did not have standing as an “interested person”

3      The first page of the petition mistakenly referred to the
Maudie H. Davis Separate Property Trust U/T/D instead of the
Chala Renay Hodge Special Needs Trust. Counsel for Boehmer
and Mills stated in a subsequent declaration this was a clerical
error.

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under Probate Code section 48.4 The court’s order also stated
that Rekay “withdrew her objections” and that “[a]ll objections
[were] withdrawn.” The court approved the accounting, granted
the requested fees, accepted Mills’s resignation, and authorized
Boehmer to act as sole trustee.
      Rekay timely appealed and designated the reporter’s
transcript of the July 27, 2021 hearing (where a court reporter
was present).5 Rekay indicated on the form for designating the
record on appeal that she was electing to provide a certified
transcript under California Rules of Court, rule 8.130(b)(3)(C),6

4     Statutory references are to the Probate Code. Although the
court used the term “interested party,” section 48 refers to
“interested person[s].”

5      Rekay appealed from the July 27, 2021 minute order, which
directed counsel for the trustees to prepare a formal order. The
court entered that order on September 20, 2021. We liberally
construe Rekay’s notice of appeal to be from the subsequently
signed order entered on the trustees’ petition. (See In re
Marriage of Grimes & Mou (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 406, 420; Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(2); see, e.g., Rozanova v. Uribe
(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 392, 398, fn. 3 [court treated a notice of
appeal from a minute order after a hearing on a motion to tax
costs as an appeal from a subsequently filed order on the motion
to strike or tax costs]; In re Marriage of Zimmerman (2010)
183 Cal.App.4th 900, 906 [court treated a notice of appeal from a
minute order as filed after the subsequent entry of a formal
signed order incorporating the rulings in the minute order].)

6     Rule 8.130(b)(3)(C) provides that, instead of providing a
deposit for the approximate cost of transcribing the proceedings,
the appellant may “substitute . . . [a] certified transcript of all of
the proceedings designated by the party.”

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which the form instructs the appellant to lodge directly with the
Court of Appeal. The record on appeal, however, does not include
a reporter’s transcript for the July 27, 2021 hearing because
Rekay never lodged it with this court.
      During the pendency of this appeal, the probate court
accepted Boehmer’s resignation as trustee and appointed the
Los Angeles County Public Guardian as the successor trustee.
The court discharged Boehmer as trustee on January 27, 2023.

                          DISCUSSION

       A.    Rekay Lacks Standing To Appeal
       Standing to appeal is a jurisdictional requirement. (K.J. v.
Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2020) 8 Cal.5th 875, 888, fn. 7;
Doe v. Regents of University of California (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
282, 293.) “To have appellate standing, one must (1) be a party
and (2) be aggrieved.” (In re Marriage of Burwell (2013)
221 Cal.App.4th 1, 13; see Code Civ. Proc., § 902; Doe, at p. 293.)
       Boehmer argues Rekay lacks standing to appeal because
Rekay was not a party in the underlying proceeding. Indeed, the
probate court found Rekay lacked standing to participate in the
probate proceeding as an “interested person” under section 48.
That statute defines “interested person” to include “[a]n heir,
devisee, child, spouse, creditor, beneficiary, and any other person
having a property right in or claim against a trust estate or the
estate of a decedent which may be affected by the proceeding.”
(§ 48, subd. (a)(1).) Rekay is not any of those things. Section 48
also provides, however, “[t]he meaning of ‘interested person’ as it
relates to particular persons may vary from time to time and
shall be determined according to the particular purposes of, and

                                 6
matter involved in, any proceeding.” (§ 48, subd. (b).) Courts
have discretion under that provision to allow others to participate
as interested persons in a particular proceeding. (Estate of Sobol
(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 771, 782; see Estate of Prindle (2009)
173 Cal.App.4th 119, 126 [“‘a party may qualify as an interested
person entitled to participate for purposes of one proceeding but
not for another’”]; Arman v. Bank of America, N.T. & S.A. (1999)
74 Cal.App.4th 697, 702-703 [“standing for purposes of the
Probate Code is a fluid concept dependent on the nature of the
proceeding before the trial court and the parties’ relationship to
the proceeding, as well as to the trust (or estate)”].) Rekay is
Renay’s conservator, which gave her rights under the trust
document to receive and object to annual accountings. Thus,
Rekay arguably is an “interested person” within the meaning of
section 48 who may have had standing to object to the petition.
      We need not decide this issue, however, because Rekay was
not “aggrieved” by the probate court’s order. (See Estate of
Bartsch (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 885, 890 [the rule that only an
aggrieved person may appeal applies to appeals from probate
court orders].) As stated, Rekay withdrew her objections to the
trustees’ petition at the July 27, 2021 hearing. Rekay does not
contend otherwise, despite three statements in Boehmer’s
respondent’s brief that Rekay withdrew her objections at the
hearing on the petition. Moreover, because Rekay did not provide
a reporter’s transcript, she cannot dispute she withdrew her
objections. When an appellant proceeds without a reporter’s
transcript of the proceedings, “we presume the trial court’s
findings of fact . . . are supported by substantial evidence,” and
“[t]hey are binding on us, unless reversible error appears in the
record.” (People v. Roscoe (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 829, 839;

                                7
accord, Bond v. Pulsar Video Productions (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th
918, 924; see Shenefield v. Shenefield (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 619,
633, fn. 12 [“[w]hen there is no reporter’s transcript and no error
is evident from the face of the appellate record, we presume that
the unreported trial testimony would demonstrate absence of
error”]; Wagner v. Wagner (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 259 [“The
absence of a record concerning what actually occurred at the
hearing precludes a determination that the court abused its
discretion.”].) Thus, we presume a transcript of the unreported
hearing would confirm Rekay withdrew her objections, as the
trial court’s order stated she did. (See In re Marriage of Obrecht
(2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1, 8-9 [appellate court presumed the
appellant made a general appearance in the trial court, where
the order appealed from did not indicate otherwise, and the
appellant, who argued on appeal he made only a special
appearance, did not provide a reporter’s transcript or a settled
statement].)7
       Because Rekay withdrew her objections, she is not
aggrieved by the order approving the petition. An aggrieved
person is “one whose rights or interests are injuriously affected
by the decision in an immediate and substantial way, and not as

7     Rekay argues in her opening brief the “Probate court tried
everything in its power to prevent [her] from object[ing] to
accounting years, 2004 to 2013” and cites a clerk’s transcript
dated April 12, 2021. The record does not include a transcript of
a hearing on that date, and Rekay did not designate any
proceedings on that date to be included in the reporter’s
transcript; the hearing on the petition involved in this appeal
occurred on July 27, 2021. And the trustees did not provide an
accounting for the years 2004 to September 2013, when Muir was
the trustee.

                                 8
a nominal or remote consequence of the decision.” (In re K.C.
(2011) 52 Cal.4th 231, 236; accord, Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Co.
(2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 482, 488; Six4Three, LLC v. Facebook, Inc.
(2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 109, 115.) To the extent Rekay had the
right to object to the accounting, she waived that right by
withdrawing her objections at the evidentiary hearing. (See
Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008) 170 Cal.App.4th 229, 286
[waiver “may result by action or inaction, though falling short of
express waiver that demonstrates acquiescence in the error”].)
Thus, Rekay lacks standing to appeal from the order granting the
trustees’ petition. (See Estate of Kempton (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
189, 201-202 [creditor of an estate lacked standing to appeal from
aspects of a court order that did not injure him]; Conservatorship
of Gregory D. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 62, 69 [even if the mother of
a conservatee was an “interested party” entitled to participate in
conservatorship proceedings, she lacked standing to appeal the
court’s order instructing conservators because the order did not
injuriously affect her].)8

      B.    Even if Rekay Had Standing, Her Arguments Are
            Forfeited or Meritless
      Rekay makes a number of arguments the probate court
erred in approving the trustees’ petition. Many of them she
makes for the first time in her reply brief; the others do not show

8      Rekay also forfeited the arguments she makes on appeal
concerning the objections she withdrew in the probate court.
Generally, failure to make a timely objection in the trial court
forfeits the argument on appeal. (Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v.
Allied World National Assurance Co. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 881,
885, fn. 2.)

                                 9
the probate court abused its discretion in approving the petition.
(See § 17206 [probate “court in its discretion may make any
orders and take any other action necessary or proper to dispose of
the matters presented by [a] petition” filed by a trustee under
section 17200]; Manson v. Shepherd (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1244,
1258 [abuse of discretion standard applies to petitions under
section 17200].)9
      Rekay argues for the first time in her reply brief the
probate court erred in denying her request for a continuance,
allowing Boehmer to testify “after the judge disclosed that she
had a personal conflict with [Rekay],” excluding evidence of
“defects” in the accounting, and approving the accounting without
substantial evidence. Rekay also asserts for the first time in her
reply brief new theories of liability, including that Boehmer
breached her fiduciary duty by engaging in unspecified litigation
against Mills and that Boehmer was personally liable for
damages because she acted “unreasonably” as a trustee. We
acknowledge that Rekay is self-represented and that her
understanding of the rules on appeal is likely more limited than
an experienced appellate attorney’s,10 but to be fair to both sides

9     Section 17200 et seq. governs petitions by trustees
“concerning the internal affairs of the trust . . . .” (§ 17200,
subd. (a).)

10     Whenever possible, we will not strictly apply technical
rules of procedure in a manner that deprives a self-represented
litigant of a hearing. Nevertheless, we must apply the procedural
and substantive principles and rules of appellate review to a self-
represented litigant’s arguments on appeal, just as we would to
arguments by litigants represented by attorneys. (See In re

                                  10
we cannot consider arguments first made in a reply brief. (See
Bitner v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1065, fn. 3; State Water Resources Control
Bd. Cases (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 674, 836.) Most of Rekay’s
arguments also lack sufficient discussion and citations to the
record and authority to be cognizable on appeal. (See Vines v.
O’Reilly Auto Enterprises, LLC (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 174, 190.)
        In her opening brief Rekay argues the probate court abused
its discretion in approving the petition because the accounting
did not include the years 2004 to 2013, when Muir was the
trustee. Rekay, however, did not object on this basis in her
written objections, and nothing in the record shows she objected
on this basis at the hearing. Thus, she forfeited this argument on
appeal as well. (See Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v. Allied World
National Assurance Co. (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 881, 885, fn. 2
[“[f]ailure to raise a timely objection forfeits the argument”];
Araiza v. Younkin (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1127 [beneficiary
forfeited the argument on appeal that a transfer of property from
the trust to a successor trustee was improper because the
beneficiary failed to object to the petition for approval on that
basis].) Moreover, nothing in the record indicates Rekay (or
Renay) ever petitioned the court to compel an accounting for 2004
to 2013 (see § 17200, subd. (a)), and that issue was not before the
probate court at the evidentiary hearing on the petition.
        Rekay also argues the probate court abused its discretion
because Mills (and presumably Boehmer) failed to provide an
accounting for the years 2013 to 2021. But, after submitting the

Marriage of Furie (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 816, 824; Hopkins &
Carley v. Gens (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 1401, 1413-1414.)

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first accounting for January 2018 through September 2019, the
trustees submitted a supplemental accounting covering the
period from September 2013 to January 2018. Mills and
Boehmer did not become the trustees until August 2013, and the
petition did not cover any time periods after September 2019.
       Rekay also asserts without explanation that the accounting
for 2018 and 2019 was “confusing and deceptive in the accounting
for one year as the beginning of the court supervision.” The
documents accompanying the accounting included statements
showing the property in the trust at the beginning of the
accounting period and the property in the trust at the end of the
accounting period, with itemized, dated, and categorized
statements of income and disbursements for the periods in
between. While the accounting for 2018 and 2019 was not
“annual,” as required by the trust document, Rekay has not
shown that the accounting was “confusing and deceptive” or that
the probate court abused its discretion in approving it.
       Finally, Rekay suggests the probate court erred in
approving the accounting for 2018 and 2019 because it referred to
a trust with a different name. Counsel for Boehmer and Mills,
however, clarified this was a clerical mistake, which had no
impact on the substance of the petition or its supporting
documentation. And even if the court erred in approving an
accounting that referred to the wrong trust in name, Rekay has
not explained how that error prejudiced her. (See Guardianship
of C.E. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1038, 1054 [“an appellant must
show [an] error was prejudicial to compel reversal”].)

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                         DISPOSITION

     The appeal is dismissed. The parties are to bear their costs
on appeal.

                                         SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

             FEUER, J.

             MARTINEZ, J.

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