Court Opinion

ID: 9778657
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:15:06.903571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:12.397007
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION
OSBORNE, Judge.
I see no fraud here. Appellant and ap-pellee were having sexual intercourse on a regular and frequent basis. Appellee thought she was pregnant and went to a doctor who confirmed her fears. She then confronted appellant with this fact and he agreed to marry her. After the parties were married they lived together for some time as man and wife in another state prior to appellant leaving and returning to his home in Kentucky. It was while they were living together as man and wife that it was discovered that appellee was not pregnant.
The only question before this court is: Is a false claim of pregnancy sufficient grounds for the annulment of a marriage? The majority rule is that it is not. See Nelson, Divorce and Annulment, 31.40, wherein the rule is stated to be:
“Misrepresentations with respect to the existing pregnancy of a woman who has had premarital intercourse with her husband fall into two categories: (1) That she was pregnant as a result of such intercourse though in fact she was not pregnant, and (2) that she was pregnant as the result of intercourse with her husband though in fact she was pregnant by another man.
“Generally, where the parties have had illicit intercourse, their marriage will not be annulled because the woman falsely represented that she was pregnant, and thereby induced or persuaded the man to marry her. Clearly, ground for annulment is not established where she falsely claimed to be pregnant three or four days after their first act of intercourse and threatened to commit suicide unless he married her. Nor will the marriage be annulled where he continued to cohabit with her after discovering that she was not pregnant.”
Madden states the rule as follows:
“If the man is induced to marry the woman by her false representation that she is pregnant by him, when in fact she is not pregnant at all, the fraud is not ground for annulment.” Madden, Persons and Domestic Relations, page 15.
Most states refuse annulment even where the wife is pregnant by another man if the husband has had premarital relations with her. See 4 Am.Jur.2d 467, § 39.
“A man cannot have a marriage annulled because his wife is pregnant by him at the time of the marriage, and an annulment will be denied to the husband where he marries without knowledge of his wife’s pregnancy if prior to the marriage he had sexual relations with her. But where the wife is pregnant at the time of the marriage by one other than the husband, some courts hold this to constitute matrimonial incapacity so as to justify the annulment of the marriage but others have taken a contrary position. *729Some statutes expressly make prenuptial pregnancy by a third person a ground for divorce or annulment of a marriage, but if the husband knew of the prenuptial pregnancy it is no ground for annulment.”
This rule is also stated in Corpus Juris Secundum:
“Where a man marries in reliance on the false representation of the woman that she is pregnant by him, he may not have the marriage set aside. A fraudulent concealment of pregnancy by another man may invalidate the marriage, although in a number of jurisdictions this relief will not be granted where complainant had previously had illicit relations with the woman.” 55 C.J.S. Marriage § 34, p. 873.
It is regretable that this court should see fit to further weaken the institution of marriage in a time when it needs all the support and strength that can be mustered upon its behalf. The majority opinion purports to follow an established rule of law when there is no rule. The Wisconsin case, Masters v. Masters, 13 Wis.2d 332, 108 N.W.2d 676, constitutes a departure from the rule. The Di Lorenzo case cited in the majority opinion from New York was not in point. There the girl represented a child as being the plaintiff’s. After the marriage she admitted it was the offspring of another couple. This is not a case of a false pregnancy. The New York rule may be found in Donovan v. Donovan, 147 Misc. 134, 263 N.Y.S. 336, and Garfinkel v. Garfinkel, 9 A.D.2d 98, 191 N.Y.S.2d 574. The court in the Donovan case in commenting upon the Di Lorenzo case had this to say:
“When the plaintiff was accused, as he alleges, of being the father of an unborn child, if he was innocent he was called upon by every dictate of self-respect to deny the charge, and, if guilty, he should not be relieved from the subsequent solemn contract of marriage because the prospective mother did not give birth to a child.
“The foregoing is written with the case of Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N.Y. 467, 67 N.E. 63, 63 L.R.A. 92, 95 Am.St. Rep. 609 before me. The facts in the Di Lorenzo Case are so different from the facts in the case before me as to have no application to the instant case. In the Di Lorenzo Case the defendant fraudulently, during the plaintiff’s absence from the state, procured a child, representing to the plaintiff that the child was his, while in fact she had not given birth to any child.
“To allow an annulment upon the facts in the instant case would open up a new field for people inclined to throw off the relation and responsibility of a sacred contract upon which the basis of our society rests.”
The rule is well settled and for all practical purposes unanimous that a false claim of pregnancy will not support an action for annulment if the parties have in fact been engaging in premarital sexual intercourse. It is clearly stated in 15 A.L.R.2d 726, § 12 as follows:
“The courts are in general agreement that there may be no annulment where the parties have had sexual intercourse and the man marries the woman upon her representation that she is pregnant, even though it later appears that the representation was false, the general feeling being that the plaintiff has created his own dilemma and has no right to expect the courts to extricate him from it. Alabama, Mobley v. Mobley (1943) 245 Ala. 90, 16 So.2d 5. California, Gondouin v. Gondouin (1910) 14 Cal.App. 285, 111 P. 756. Florida, Brandt v. Brandt (1936) 123 Fla. 680, 167 So. 524. Massachusetts, Levy v. Levy (1941) 309 Mass. 230, 34 N.E.2d 650. New Jersey, Rhoades v. Rhoades (1950) 7 N.J.Super. 595, 72 A.2d 412. New York, Tait v. Tait (1893) 3 *730Misc. 218, 23 N.Y.S. 597; Donovan v. Donovan, supra, and Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, supra.”
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.