Court Opinion

ID: 9688318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 17:43:23.067783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:37.379382
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(concurring in part, specially concurring in part).
I.
I concur on the academic discussion on Issue One.
II.
Although I concur that the trial court properly refused to dismiss Brown’s indictment for prosecutorial misconduct,. Ven-tling would not be the primary authority to uphold the trial court. In Ventling, the prosecutor’s ethics were not in question at all. Essentially, it is my position that Ven-tling is somewhat inapposite. Rather, I would focus on the thesis that this prosecutor, as any prosecutor in this state, has statutory authority to plea bargain cases with defense counsel and his client. SDCL 23A-7-8. We have recognized this in previous cases. State v. Grosh, 387 N.W.2d 503, 504 (S.D.1986); State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 390, 392 (S.D.1981).
Brown’s brief characterized the prosecutor’s offer as “a proposed plea bargain;” how, then, can Brown contend that such legitimate force in law, recognized by our State Legislature and this Court, is prose-cutorial misconduct? Brown’s position is ridiculous. Would he have every prosecutor in this state prosecuted for a felony for trying to implement a plea bargain? Under his theory, a prosecutor would be prosecuted for a felony, i.e. compounding, because the prosecutor in this case offered to permit Brown to plead guilty to a misdemeanor, providing Brown would reimburse creditors of CMC. This was an attempt to seek restitution for victims, a salutary, not reprehensible, legal effort.