Court Opinion

ID: 9464834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:44:22.060856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:50.771622
License: Public Domain

THORNBERRY, Circuit Judge,
specially concurring:
I concur specially in the result reached by the panel. I agree with the majority’s well-*1248reasoned opinion that a prisoner retains some fourth amendment rights but that prison officials are not bound by warrant and probable cause requirements. I also agree that the issue in this case is the reasonableness of the two searches and that the government should bear the burden of showing that reasonableness. I believe, however, that in the case of appellant Gallegos, there is a far more compelling reason for holding the body cavity search to which she was subject unreasonable. Gallegos contended, and the government did not dispute, that she was held in administrative detention for several days prior to the body cavity search. She was placed in the solitary confinement cell after she initially refused to consent to the body cavity search. When she arrived at the cell she was required to do three “deep knee bends” and “spread”. During the time that she was confined she was allowed to wear only a T-shirt, the light remained constantly on in the cell, and she was guarded at all times. She was required to use the bathroom by squatting on a sheet and using a small pan. During her confinement she was visited by authorities who strenuously urged that she consent to the search. When the authorization for the body cavity search was received, five persons, including two males, came to take Gallegos to the clinic. She was told that the non-medical, male officers would have to be present in the room during the cavity search. At this point she “consented” to the removal of the contraband.
The government argued that Gallegos had consented to the search and, alternatively, that her consent was immaterial because prison officials did not need it to perform the body cavity search. The voluntariness of a consent to search is to be judged by the totality of the circumstances. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). A consent must be the product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice of an individual whose will has not been overborne and whose capacity for self-determination has not been critically impaired. 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2047. In determining voluntariness the court has looked to the age of the accused, Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 68 S.Ct. 302, 92 L.Ed. 224 (1948), the length of the detention, Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716 (1970), the repeated and prolonged nature of questioning, Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 64 S.Ct. 921, 88 L.Ed. 1192 (1944), and the use of physical punishment such as the deprivation of food or sleep. Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 81 S.Ct. 1541, 6 L.Ed.2d 948 (1961). Although no single aspect of Ms. Gallegos’ confinement, standing alone, would be sufficient to destroy her consent, taken together the circumstances present a very troublesome picture. I would hold that the consent was invalid and that the search was invalid because it took place under circumstances that were so coercive that they were patently unreasonable.