Court Opinion

ID: 9737694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:32:24.046529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:00.772413
License: Public Domain

*32Holbrook, Jr., P.J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. This case centers on the parties’ minor child, Jayce Lyn Jordan, bom March 31, 1993.
The majority concludes that because the court originally erred in entering the July 28, 1997, order without first making an independent determination regarding the best interests of the child, it therefore did not err in subsequently setting aside that order. Ante, p 22-24. I disagree. In support of this conclusion, the majority cites my authored opinion in Lombardo v Lombardo, 202 Mich App 151; 507 NW2d 788 (1993). As its author, I believe that the majority has misread that opinion.
In Lombardo, the parents had come to an impasse concerning the proper educational setting for their minor son. The lower court determined that because the defendant father had sole physical custody of the boy, he alone had the authority to decide into what educational program the boy would be enrolled. Id. at 153. We disagreed, concluding that a “court should not relinquish its authority to determine the best interests of the child to the primary physical custodian.” Id. at 160. The case did not involve a stipulated order transferring custody of the boy, nor was there an issue about any stipulation reached between the parties that would limit the court’s ability to determine the best interests of the child. Further, Lombardo specifically “concluded] that a trial court must determine the best interests of the child in resolving disputes concerning ‘important decisions affecting the welfare of the child’ that arise between joint custodial parents.” Lombardo, supra at 160, quoting MCL 722.26a(7)(b); MSA 26.312(6a)(7)(b) (emphasis added).
*33The majority also relies on the majority opinion in Napora v Napora, 159 Mich App 241; 406 NW2d 197 (1986). To the extent that Napora indicates that where an established custodial environment exists, divorced parents cannot agree to change their custody arrangement without first having the court determine if such a change is within the best interests of the child, I must disagree with its analysis. Section 7 of the Child Custody Act1 states in pertinent part:
(1) If a child custody dispute has been submitted to the circuit court as an original action under this act or has arisen incidentally from another action in the circuit court or an order or judgment of the circuit court, for the best interests of the child the court may do 1 or more of the following:
* * *
(c) Modify or amend its previous judgments or orders for proper cause shown or because of change of circumstances until the child reaches 18 years of age and, subject to section 4a, until the child reaches 19 years and 6 months of age. The court shall not modify or amend its previous judgments or orders or issue a new order so as to change the established custodial environment of a child unless there is presented clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interest of the child. [Emphasis added.]
I believe, as did the dissenting judge in Napora, that the plain language of § 7 indicates that the revisiting of the best interest analysis is required only where a “child custody dispute” has arisen. See People v Nimeth, 236 Mich App 616, 620; 601 NW2d 393 (1999). When the parties are in agreement regarding a modification of the custodial arrangement, I believe the *34court has the authority, but is not bound, to accept the parties’ stipulation without first specifically reexamining the best interest factors. See Dick v Dick, 210 Mich App 576, 584-585; 534 NW2d 185 (1995).2
*35In the case at hand, plaintiff and defendant had reached an agreement regarding custody, the substance of which is embodied in the July 28, 1997 order.3 As another panel of this Court observed in Koron v Melendy, 207 Mich App 188, 191-192; 523 NW2d 870 (1994):
While it is true that a trial court is not bound by the parties’ stipulations or agreements regarding child custody, Napora v Napora, 159 Mich App 241, 245; 406 NW2d 197 (1986), the court is not precluded from accepting the parties’ agreement and including it in the orders of the court. Implicit in the trial court’s acceptance of the parties’ custody and visitation arrangement is the court’s determination that the arrangement struck by the parties is in the child’s best interest.
... Accordingly, we hold that in cases where the parties are in agreement regarding custody and visitation and present the court with such an agreement, the trial court need not expressly articulate each of the best interest factors.
While the Koron case involved the entry of an original custody agreement and not a modification, I believe the reasons articulated by the Koron Court also support the acceptance of the stipulation in the *36case at hand. Id. at 191-193. Indeed, the Koron Court cited as support for its reasoning the Napora dissent. Id. at 192.4 I also do not find support in the record that the stipulation was obtained by fraud, mistake, or unconscionable advantage.
Therefore, I believe the court erred in not enforcing the provision in the July 28 order modifying the custody arrangement. I do not, however, believe the court erred in disregarding the provision regarding a change in custody if plaintiff were to “change residence from the Owosso School District . . . .” This provision did have the effect of usurping the court’s authority to consider the best interests of Jayce when the court was presented with the current custody dispute. See Lombardo, supra at 160.
Accordingly, because the trial court did not begin its analysis of the change of domicile and change of custody petitions with the understanding that the parties had joint legal and physical custody of Jayce, I would remand for reconsideration in light of this custodial arrangement.
As for the issue of the change in domicile, I believe that the court did abuse its discretion in granting plaintiff’s petition. Overall v Overall, 203 Mich App 450, 458-459; 512 NW2d 851 (1994). As the majority observes, the paternal grandmother’s involvement in taking care of Jayce during defendant’s parenting time *37was substantial. Ante, p 25-26. However, the majority fails to note that the record also indicates that the grandmother had considerable involvement with Jayce during plaintiff’s parenting time. The evidence is that plaintiff would often rely on her ex-mother-in-law to care for Jayce, often without advance notice. The strength of Jayce’s relationship with her grandmother is typified by an incident that occurred in Dr. Zak’s office. Dr. Zak testified that, at one point, Jayce picked up a toy telephone, dialed the grandmother’s telephone number, and then began to pretend that she was talking to her grandmother. When asked whether she knew any other telephone numbers, including her parents’, Jayce responded that she did not. As Dr. Zak noted in response to a question posed by the court, the paternal grandmother’s home “has been [Jayce’s] home consistently for her life. I don’t think dad’s house has been her home, nor do I think mother’s house” has been her home.5
The majority correctly notes that under the first prong of the D’Onofrio test,6 the role of the Jordan “family cannot be the determining factor in denying a change of domicile.” Ante, at 31. However, it is a factor in determining “whether the prospective move has the capacity to improve the quality of life” of Jayce. Anderson v Anderson, 170 Mich App 305, 309; 427 NW2d 627 (1988). See also Scott v Scott, 124 Mich App 448, 452; 335 NW2d 68 (1983) (“The D’Onofrio test . . . focuses on the best interest of the custodial parent and child.”).
*38After reviewing the record, I conclude that the purported potential advantages of the move to California for Jayce do not outweigh the existing advantages of remaining in Michigan. It is true that the economic condition of plaintiff’s new husband would significantly alter Jayce’s fife style. I do not believe, however, that this justifies taking Jayce away from both the nurturing and stable atmosphere offered by the Jordan family and the school system in which she has thrived. As for plaintiff’s desire to pursue a career in real estate, I am not convinced by the evidence of the plausibility of this opportunity. Plaintiff’s testimony regarding her desire to pursue such a career indicates that it was more of a daydream than an actual goal.7
I am not unsympathetic to plaintiff’s position. She is married to a man who lives in California, and she *39understandably wants to move so that they can live together. However, plaintiff’s situation did not just drop out of the sky and fall onto her shoulders. It was her decision to marry without either first applying to the court for a change in Jayce’s domicile or securing defendant’s agreement to the move. See Zwernemann v Kenny, 236 NJ Super 37, 48; 563 A2d 1158 (1988). Indeed, plaintiff’s own testimony indicates that this course of action was a calculated risk on her part.
Accordingly, I would reverse the grant of the petition for change in domicile. I would also reverse the denial of defendant’s petition for a change in custody and remand for a reexamination of that issue in light of the existence of a joint physical and legal custodial relationship.

 MCL 722.27; MSA 25.312(7).

 As the United States Supreme Court observed in United States v Turkette, 452 US 576, 580; 101 S Ct 2524; 69 L Ed 2d 246 (1981): “Of course, there is no errorless test for identifying or recognizing ‘plain’ or ‘unambiguous’ language.” It is not all that unusual — indeed, it is quite common — for members of a court to disagree on “plain meaning” of the words in a given statute. Lasky, Perplexing problems with plain meaning, 27 Hofstra L R 891, 910 (1999) (and cases cited therein); Taylor, Structural textualism, 75 BU L R 321, 356 (1995) (and cases cited therein). This is another example of such a disagreement.
The majority notes that my conclusion that a court has the authority, but is not bound, to accept a parental stipulation regarding modification of a custodial arrangement is at odds with the plain meaning of § 7. Ante, n 1, pp 22-23. In support of this assertion, the majority quotes from subsection 7(l)(c). Id. It is a fundamental tenent of statutory construction that every word and every clause of a statute must be read in the context of the entire statute so as to produce an harmonious whole. Weems v Chrysler Corp, 448 Mich 679, 699-700; 533 NW2d 287 (1995); Gumma v D & T Constr Co, 235 Mich App 210, 218; 597 NW2d 207 (1999). Section 7 is divided into six subsections. Each of these six subsections is tied together by § 7’s introductory clause, which I have already quoted. As this clause indicates, the six judicial responses authorized in subsections 7(l)(a)-(f) arise in the context of a “child custody dispute” that has been submitted to the circuit court. Accordingly, the mandatory limitations placed on the circuit court in subsection 7(1) (c) apply only in the context of a custody dispute. Certainly, if the Legislature had wanted to so circumscribe the circuit court’s authority to modify a custody arrangement in the absence of parental agreement, it would not have included subsection 7(l)(c) in this list. It is not for the courts to determine that an honorable and broader social purpose could be served if the statute had been designed differently. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1997), p 23. Rather, it is the role of the judiciary to reasonably construe the text of a statute and apply it accordingly. Id.
Additionally, I believe that recognition of a court’s authority to accept a modification offered by a child’s parents furthers the laudable goals of minimizing the state’s role in decisions involving family life and promoting cooperation between divorced parents in matters involving their children.
Let me also make clear that I do not believe a court should blindly accept a parental agreement modifying custodial arrangements. I would not bind the court’s hands in such a fashion. In the same vein, I do not believe § 7 binds the court’s hands with respect to a parental agreement to change a custodial arrangement in the absence of a dispute between *35the parents. As with judicial acceptance of an original custody arrangement, implicit in a court’s acceptance of a modification agreement is an acknowledgment that the agreement is in the child’s best interest.

 While I agree with the reasoning set forth by the dissenting judge in Napora, I do not agree with his result. The facts of that case indicate that a dispute did indeed arise between the parties before the stipulation was incorporated in an order of the court. Thus, while a stipulation existed regarding a change in custody, the court was not bound to follow it, and indeed was required by § 7 to review the issue of the best interests of the child, because of the existence of that dispute. Again, this is not the situation in the case at hand, where the dispute arose after the July 28, 1997, order was entered.

 I note that the Koron Court remarked that cases cited by the defendant in support of the argument that a trial court is always required to place findings on the record regarding the statutory best interest factors were distinguishable because they involved “modification of the terms of a custody arrangement. . . .” Koron, supra at 192.1 also note that in the cases cited there was a dispute between the parties regarding the potential modification. Hoffman v Hoffman, 119 Mich App 79, 81; 326 NW2d 136 (1982); Dowd v Dowd, 97 Mich App 276, 278; 293 NW2d 797 (1980).

 This conclusion is supported by testimony by Jayce’s first grade teacher that Jayce could not identify where she lived.

 D’Onofrio v D’Onofrio, 144 NJ Super 200; 365 A2d 27 (1976).

 I believe the following trial excerpt is illustrative:
Court: And as far as your proposed employment in the event you move to California, you want to get into real estate?
Plaintiff: Yes.
Court: And is that something you’ve tried here?
Plaintiff: No.
Court: You’ve not gone to school here?
Plaintiff. No.
Court: You’ve not gone after any certification or licensure to become a realtor?
Plaintiff: No.
Court: So you don’t know if you could fare better in Michigan or California selling real estate?
Plaintiff. If I could what?
Court: Fare better in Michigan than in California if you were to sell real estate?
Plaintiff: I guess I don’t understand what you’re saying.
Court: Do you know if you could earn more money selling real estate in Michigan than in California?
Plaintiff: I would assume I would earn more in California just because the market is more expensive.