Court Opinion

ID: 9902986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:27:23.99166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:08.113941
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                      FIFTH DISTRICT

                                    NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                    FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                    DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

ADAM LEE TUCKER,

             Appellant,

v.                                         Case No. 5D23-208
                                           LT Case No. 2019-DR-7736

LAUREN KA-WEI NG TUCKER,

          Appellee.
________________________________/

Opinion filed July 7, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court
for Duval County,
Suzanne Bass, Judge.

William S. Graessle, of William S. Graessle, P.A.,
Jacksonville, for Appellant.

Michael J. Korn, of Korn & Zehmer, P.A.,
Jacksonville, and Denise Watson, of Watson
Henderlite, Jacksonville, for Appellee.

HARRIS, J.

      Appellant, Adam Lee Tucker (“Former Husband”), appeals the trial

court’s Consent Second Partial Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage,

arguing that the trial court erred in determining timesharing and parental

responsibility. Former Husband further challenges the trial court’s order

relative to his future consumption of alcohol, and the requirement that he
participate in substance abuse counseling. We affirm in part and reverse in

part. 1

          The parties married on May 13, 2017, and separated on September

25, 2019. Former Husband is a transactional attorney and Appellee, Lauren

Ka-Wei Ng Tucker (“Former Wife”), is a physician. They share one minor

child, T.K.S.T., born January 21, 2019. On October 18, 2019, Former Wife

filed a petition for dissolution of marriage initially requesting shared parental

responsibility and majority timesharing. She filed an amended petition on

November 15, 2019, in which she requested sole parental responsibility,

alleging that Former Husband suffers from significant anger and alcohol

issues and has made disturbing statements pertaining to the child.

          The evidence adduced over the two-day trial revealed that Former

Husband does in fact have significant and long-standing anger issues. There

was testimony establishing numerous instances of physical and severe verbal

abuse directed at Former Wife, the parties’ child, and even their nanny.

Former Husband has a documented history of severely abusing alcohol,

which exacerbates his anger and bouts of extreme rage. He has an

established history of threatening Former Wife, threatening to slit the throat

of the family dog, and threatening to throw the child against the wall because

he could not get the child to stop crying. It is under the backdrop of these

       We note that the trial judge in this case was the Honorable Karen
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Cole, who has since retired.
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clearly established repeated incidents of egregious and disturbing conduct

that Former Wife requested sole parental responsibility of the parties’ minor

child and asked that Former Husband be given only supervised visitation.

      Based on the evidence presented, the trial court agreed with Former

Wife’s position and in its final judgment, awarded Former Wife sole parental

responsibility for making all decisions of consequence regarding the child,

including education and healthcare. The court also made a specific finding

that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the child,

explaining that Former Husband repeatedly failed to demonstrate control over

his alcohol use disorder, and that without meaningful change in his use of

alcohol, there remained a significant risk to the parties’ child that may

increase.

      Former Husband’s timesharing was limited to supervised visits at the

Family Nurturing Center at least once per week. He was also entitled to daily

contact with the child by telephone or one of several internet-based websites.

The court further ordered Former Husband to participate in counseling with a

psychiatrist or psychologist familiar with intermittent explosive disorder to

eliminate or reduce the number and intensity of his episodes of anger.

Notably, even though Former Husband was not given any unsupervised

contact with the child, nor any clear path toward earning unsupervised contact

with his child, the court also ordered him to not consume alcohol and to attend

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Alcoholics Anonymous (“AA”) meetings at least once per week and to

participate in counseling with a certified addictions professional.

       A trial court has broad discretion in timesharing matters and its

decision is reviewed for an abuse of that discretion. Schwieterman v.

Schwieterman, 114 So. 3d 984, 987 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012). The timesharing

plan will be affirmed if there is competent, substantial evidence to support the

decision and reasonable people could differ with respect to the trial court’s

decision. Id.

       Here, after explaining that it considered the best interest of the child

factors listed in section 61.13(3)(a)-(t), Florida Statutes, the trial court

determined that supervised timesharing would in fact be in the best interest

of the minor child. Based on the evidence and testimony presented, including

countless incidents of extreme verbal abuse fueled by Former Husband’s

alcohol abuse and uncontrollable anger, we cannot conclude that the trial

court abused its discretion in awarding Former Husband only supervised

visitation.

       Former Husband next argues that he should have been given a path

forward as to how to obtain unsupervised timesharing. However, as our

Supreme Court noted in C.N. v. I.G.C., 316 So. 3d 287 (Fla. 2021), there is

no such requirement that the trial court must give a parent “concrete steps”

to restore lost time-sharing. We find unpersuasive Former Husband’s

argument that “obtaining” and “regaining” timesharing are different and that
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C.N. therefore does not apply. Our court in Piccinini v. Waxer, 321 So. 3d

943, 944 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021), rejected a similar argument, finding no

requirement that the court set forth specific steps to obtain unsupervised

timesharing.

       We next consider the trial court’s award of sole parental responsibility

to Former Wife. “The standard of review for the trial court’s findings and

determination regarding primary parental responsibility is abuse of

discretion.” Hudson-McCann v. McCann, 8 So. 3d 1228, 1229 (Fla. 5th DCA

2009). A trial court cannot grant one parent sole parental responsibility

without making the specific finding that shared parental responsibility would

be detrimental to the child. See § 61.13(2)(c)2., Fla. Stat. (2021); see also

Maslow v. Edwards, 886 So. 2d 1027, 1028 (Fla. 5th DCA 2004) (“[U]tilizing

the best interest of the child standard does not obviate the necessity of a

specific finding that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the

child before awarding sole parental responsibility to a parent.”). A trial court’s

determination that shared parental responsibility would be detrimental to the

child will be upheld if there is substantial, competent evidence that conforms

to the relevant factors. See Musgrave v. Musgrave, 290 So. 3d 536, 542 (Fla.

2d DCA 2019). There is a rebuttable presumption of detriment to the child

where there is evidence of domestic violence. See § 61.13(2)(c)2., Fla. Stat.

(2021). “Whether or not there is a conviction of any offense of domestic

violence or child abuse or the existence of an injunction for protection against
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domestic violence, the court shall consider evidence of domestic violence or

child abuse as evidence of detriment to the child.” Id.

      Here, the trial court awarded Former Wife sole parental responsibility

for “making all decisions of consequence regarding the parties’ son” which

“include, but are not limited to, decisions regarding education, health care,

and any religious training.” As required, after considering the relevant factors

in section 61.13(3), the court specifically found that shared parental

responsibility would be detrimental to the child. Competent, substantial

evidence supports the court’s finding. Former Husband was diagnosed with

alcohol use disorder and intermittent explosive disorder. There was evidence

that his alcohol use often fueled or triggered his aggression. Although the

court did not address the alleged instances of domestic violence in its order

and it did not provide in writing that such evidence was considered in

evaluating the best interests of the child per section 61.13(3)(m), there was

evidence of domestic violence committed by Former Husband. These

instances of domestic violence create a rebuttable presumption of detriment

to the child. See § 61.13(2)(c)2., Fla. Stat. (2021).

      Former Wife also testified that on numerous occasions, Former

Husband was verbally abusive towards her, oftentimes in the presence of

and regarding the minor child. According to Former Wife, Former Husband

yelled at the child when he cried, said he wanted to throw the child at a wall,

threatened to throw away all of the child’s milk, and left the infant child alone
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in the house to walk around the block. Former Wife’s expert testified that

Former Husband’s aggression could have a “devastating” psychological

effect on the child. Accordingly, because the trial court made the requisite

finding of detriment to the child, and there is competent, substantial evidence

that conforms to the relevant factors and supports that finding, we affirm this

portion of the judgment as well.

      Finally, we consider Former Husband’s argument that the court

exceeded its authority in crafting a plan to control his future alcohol

consumption. In its final judgment, the court prohibited Former Husband from

consuming alcohol and required him to attend weekly AA meetings. The

court further ordered him to participate in counseling with a mental health

professional who has significant experience in the field of substance abuse.

The court’s stated goal in this plan was to support Former Husband in his

efforts to refrain from alcohol consumption. While it would certainly appear

that Former Husband’s alcohol consumption is something that should be

addressed if he is to ever gain unsupervised visitation with his son, the

court’s stated goal for imposing these requirements as the “best interests of

the father” is not the appropriate standard. Here, Former Husband has been

given no unsupervised contact with his child and Former Wife has been given

sole parental responsibility for all decisions involving the child. The alcohol-

related prohibitions and mandates imposed by the trial court, being

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completely untethered to the best interests of the child, were an abuse of the

court’s discretion.

      Accordingly, we affirm the award of sole parental responsibility to

Former Wife and the award of supervised visitation to Former Husband.

However, we reverse that portion of the final judgment regarding Former

Husband’s future alcohol consumption and treatment.

      AFFIRMED in part, REVERSED in part.

WALLIS and JAY, JJ., concur.

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