Court Opinion

ID: 9836967
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:15:45.834511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:19.609126
License: Public Domain

GIERKE, Judge
(concurring in part and in the result):
There are three aspects to the granted issue: (1) the military judge’s questioning of the witnesses; (2) the military judge’s chiding of defense counsel for objecting to his questioning; and (3) the military judge’s comments on the defense evidence.
For reasons not apparent on the record, assistant defense counsel did not object in open court but instead voiced his objection during a recess. The military judge described this off-the-record objection as follows: “Members of the court, during that last recess, Captain [D], the assistant defense counsel, made a remark to me, thanking me for helping perfect the Government’s case, presumably, through the questions I asked.” In my view, this informal, out-of-court objection was the functional equivalent of an RCM 802 conference. Once assistant defense counsel voiced his objection to the military judge’s questions, the military judge had two options:
(1) Treat it as a defense objection and make it a matter of record in accordance with RCM 802(b); or
(2) Inform counsel that he would not entertain such an objection off the record and require that the objection be made on the record in open court.
If the military judge had exercised the second option and defense counsel did not make his objection on the record, I would agree with the majority that it was waived. Since, however, the military judge exercised the first option, I believe that'the first two aspects of the granted issue were preserved for appellate review. Because defense coun*253sel did not object to the military judge’s comments on the evidence, I join the majority in holding that there was no plain error as to the third aspect.
I concur in the result, for the reasons set out below.
Questioning the Witnesses. A military judge must scrupulously avoid “even the slightest appearance of partiality.” United States v. Ramos, 42 MJ 392, 396 (1995). A military judge’s “influence ... is necessarily and properly of great weight,” and his “last word is apt to be the decisive word.” United States v. Glower, 23 USCMA 15, 18, 48 CMR 307, 310 (1974) (internal quotation marks omitted). On the other hand, because military judges are more than “mere referees,” it is appropriate for them to take an active part in the trial. Thus, while military judges may not become partisan advocates, they may and “sometimes must ask questions ... to clear up uncertainties in the evidence or to develop the facts further.” Ramos, supra at 396. “The legal test ... is whether, taken as a whole in the context of this trial,” the trial’s “legality, fairness, and impartiality were put into doubt by the military judge’s questions.” United States v. Acosta, 49 MJ 14, 18 (1998) (internal quotation marks omitted). The test is applied through the eyes of a reasonable person. Ramos, supra at 396. I conclude that a reasonable person, viewing the questions of the military judge in a proper context, would not doubt the impartiality of the military judge in this case. See United States v. Acosta, supra.
Chiding Defense Counsel. I agree with the majority that it was inappropriate for the military judge to chide the defense counsel for objecting to his questions. The military judge “must be circumspect in what he says to the parties.” United States v. Loving, 41 MJ 213, 253 (1994), aff'd on other grounds, 517 U.S. 748, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 135 L.Ed.2d 36 (1996). Nevertheless, the context of the military judge’s remarks, including his detailed cautionary instruction, satisfy me that a reasonable person would not doubt his impartiality. 41 MJ at 253, citing Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555, 114 S.Ct. 1147, 1157, 127 L.Ed.2d 474 (1994); United States v. Ramos, supra.
Comments Regarding Evidence. “Generally, a judge’s comment on the evidence is a matter within the judge’s sound discretion.” He abuses his discretion only if he takes “a partisan view of the evidence.” United States v. Damatta-Olivera, 37 MJ 474, 479 (CMA 1993). In this case, the military judge expressed impatience with the poor technical quality of videotape, but not its relevance or probative value. He criticized the quality of the tape, not the party presenting it. Because it is clear from the record that the military judge did not blame appellant for the poor quality of the videotape, a reasonable person would not have doubts about the military judge’s impartiality. United States v. Ramos, supra. In my view, there was no error at all, much less plain error.