Court Opinion

ID: 9735830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:32:08.376715+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:01.838156
License: Public Domain

DRAPER, J.
I agree that the error in trial of the
issues raised by the plea of not guilty was not prejudicial, and concur in the affirmance of the judgment as to that phase of the ease.
I disagree, however, as to the effect of the misconduct of the deputy district attorney in his argument to the jury *372on the issue joined upon defendant’s plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.
Closely comparable argument has been held to constitute prejudicial misconduct. (People v. Mallette, 39 Cal.App.2d 294 [102 P.2d 1084].) I cannot escape the reasoning of that court that a jury which has just convicted a defendant of murder will be strongly inclined against loosing upon the community one whom they themselves have thus stamped a menace to society. Of course, the argument misstated the law. A defendant found not guilty by reason of insanity is to be confined in a state hospital for the criminally insane unless and until he is determined to have fully recovered his sanity. (Pen. Code, § 1026.)
Under these circumstances, the admonition of the trial court was inadequate to remove the prejudice. The jury was told that “what would happen under the condition” outlined by the prosecutor “is no concern of yours,” and that the jurors “must absolutely erase any reference to any disposition from your minds.” The inaccuracy of the prosecutor’s statement of the legal consequences of a verdict for defendant lends weight to the statement in Mallette that an effective cure could be given only by an instruction upon the true effect of such a verdict. No such instruction was given here.
I cannot accept the argument of the prosecution that because the evidence on the not guilty plea is strongly against defendant, misconduct in the insanity phase of the trial is not prejudicial. This amounts to arguing that all guilty defendants are sane, a non sequitur which would effectively eliminate the clear legislative mandate for trial on the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity.  Similarly unimpressive is the contention that the issue of sanity had been disposed of in the first phase of the trial, when the jury impliedly found against defendant’s claim that his mental condition was such as to render him incapable of premeditation. This defense has been held to be distinct from the issue raised by the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity. (People v. Wells, 33 Cal.2d 330 [202 P.2d 53].) To accept the prosecution’s argument would be to negate this distinction and to deny effective trial of the insanity issue when the claim of inability to premeditate had been asserted in the first phase of the trial.
In view of the highly conflicting evidence as to defendant’s sanity, the prosecutor’s misconduct appears to me to be prejudicial, and thus beyond the healing powers of section 4% of article VI of the Constitution.
*373The judgment on the plea of not guilty is affirmed. As to the plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for new trial of the issues raised by that plea.
DOOLING, J.
I concur in the opinion of Mr. Justice Draper.