Court Opinion

ID: 9892891
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 14:07:06.1712+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:48:55.231053
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 475
                   ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                       DIVISION II
                                       No. CV-22-646

 ANDREW HAMERLINCK                              Opinion Delivered October 25, 2023

                               APPELLANT
                                                APPEAL FROM THE GARLAND
                                                COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
                                                [NO. 26DR-18-908]
 V.
                                                HONORABLE CECILIA DYER, JUDGE

 DANIELLE HAMERLINCK                      AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED AND
                                 APPELLEE REMANDED IN PART

                             CINDY GRACE THYER, Judge

       This is the second appeal involving appellant Andrew Hamerlinck and appellee

Danielle Hamerlinck. In Hamerlinck v. Hamerlinck, 2022 Ark. App. 89, 641 S.W.3d 659

(Hamerlinck I), this court affirmed the decision of the Garland County Circuit Court

awarding the Hamerlincks joint legal and physical custody of their two children. We

dismissed the remaining issues on appeal, however, because we lacked a final order.

Hamerlinck I, 2022 Ark. App. 89, at 12, 641 S.W.3d at 665. Following the issuance of this

court’s mandate, the circuit court entered an amended decree in which it restated its initial

decree and denied and dismissed all other pending motions. Andrew timely appealed from

the amended decree, and he now argues that the circuit court erred in its division and

distribution of the couple’s property. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.
       In Hamerlinck I, we set forth the underlying facts of the parties’ “contentious and

aggressive litigation” that resulted in the decree at issue on appeal. Id. at 2, 641 S.W.3d at

660. Those facts dealt almost entirely with the Hamerlincks’ custody dispute and are largely

irrelevant to this appeal. Briefly, however, Andrew and Danielle married on September 4,

2010, and separated in 2018 when Danielle filed a complaint for separate maintenance.

Andrew answered and filed a counterclaim for divorce. Over the course of the next two years,

the circuit court held multiple hearings and issued multiple temporary custody orders. Over

two days in December 2019 and July 2020, the circuit court held a final divorce hearing at

which it heard considerable testimony that focused on each party’s desire for custody. A

portion of the hearings, however, also addressed three of the couple’s financial accounts, the

marital home, and certain business assets. These topics form the crux of the arguments

presented in this appeal. We therefore turn to the substance of the testimony presented at

trial and the circuit court’s findings regarding these matters.

       The financial accounts that are the subject of Andrew’s first argument on appeal are

a Fidelity Roth Individual Retirement Account (the “Roth IRA”), a Fidelity rollover IRA (the

“rollover IRA”), and an Arvest money market account (the “money market account”).1

Andrew testified that he established the Roth IRA in 2004 but had not made contributions

       1
       The court also heard evidence regarding a fourth account––Andrew’s Fidelity
brokerage account––but Andrew does not dispute that this account was a marital asset
because it was created after the couple’s marriage with marital funds. In addition, Andrew
had a Wells Fargo retirement account through his current job at Cardinal Health, which he
agreed had been “acquired and accumulated during the course of [the] marriage.” This
retirement account is likewise not an issue in this appeal.

                                               2
to that account in “eight plus years, probably” because he and Danielle made too much to

contribute to a Roth IRA. Andrew’s exhibit 1 included a Roth IRA investment report for

the period ending September 30, 2010, showing a balance of $19,484.59. Exhibit 1 also

reflected that Andrew made postmarital contributions to the account of $5000 in April

2011, $5000 in March 2012, and $5135.37 in February 2013. The latest account summary

that was part of exhibit 1 indicated that the account’s value was $97,854.53 as of September

30, 2019.

       The rollover IRA was funded with $70,689.69 in February 2013. Andrew testified

that the funds for the rollover IRA came from retirement benefits that he accrued during his

time working for both Sanofi Pasteur, which was between 2008 and 2011, and Eli Lilly,

where he began working “in 2011 [or] 2012.” It was unclear from Andrew’s testimony

whether contributions associated with his Eli Lilly retirement were still being made.

Nonetheless, Andrew’s exhibit 2, a collection of investment reports for the rollover IRA,

indicated that the rollover IRA was valued at $115,164.50 as of June 2019.

       And finally, as it is pertinent to the financial-account issues raised on appeal, Andrew

presented testimony about the money market account. Andrew opened the account before

he and Danielle married, but he put her name on the account after they wed. He

acknowledged that Danielle withdrew money from that account and repaid it during the

course of the marriage, although he denied she deposited money into the account on a

regular basis. In the weeks before the parties filed for divorce, Andrew closed the money

market account and opened a new one in order to prevent Danielle from withdrawing any

                                              3
more money from it. Andrew estimated that the balance in that account when they got

married was around $130,000, and his exhibit 4 reflected that the final balance when he

closed the account in October 2018 was $91,502.78. Danielle disputed the value of the

account at the time of the marriage and testified that she made multiple deposits into and

withdrawals from the account during the marriage, treating it as her own.

       In addition to the financial accounts, Andrew and Danielle both testified about their

home on Vector Lane in Hot Springs. The house was built in 2015. Andrew testified that

he was the general contractor on the job and that he made all the mortgage payments from

his income. Although he admitted that the house was built during the marriage, Andrew

asserted that Danielle had nothing to do with the construction of the house and claimed

that she should receive no more than 25 percent of its value. Danielle testified that the

mortgage was placed in both their names from the beginning and that it remained in both

names at the time of the divorce hearing.

       Danielle offered testimony about her business, Dignified Dietitians. She explained

that she started the LLC after she and Andrew had married. She estimated the value of the

company to be between $50,000 and $80,000, although she did not present any

documentation in support of that figure.

       At the conclusion of the final hearing, the court granted the divorce and asked both

parties to prepare proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues, including

their finances and the allocation of property. The court subsequently issued a decree of

divorce that made the following pertinent findings:

                                             4
             4.     108 Vector Lane, Hot Springs, AR 71913 is marital property within the
      scope of Arkansas Code Annotated § 9-12-315(b). The property was acquired during
      the marriage of the parties, each participated in the construction and design of the
      home and it is mortgaged in the names of Plaintiff and Defendant.

             5. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the equitable presumption of
      one-half (1/2) to each party with regard to the marital home and all other marital
      property.

              6. Taking into consideration the eight year length of the marriage up to
      separation; that the parties are both educated, professional people well able to be
      employed in their chosen fields; both are in good health with equivalent earning
      capacity and have a similar need for capital acquisition; the contribution of each party
      in acquisition, preservation, or appreciation of marital property, including Plaintiffs
      services as a homemaker––these factors all weigh in favor of an equitable distribution
      of one-half to each.

      ....

              8.     The marital home shall be sold in accordance with Arkansas Code
      Annotated § 9-12-315(a)(3)(B) . . . [and the] proceeds shall be evenly divided between
      Plaintiff and Defendant.

      ....

              20.    The financial accounts shown in Plaintiff’s Record Exhibits 1, 2, 3 and
      4 are marital property and they shall be immediately liquidated or divided with the
      proceeds evenly divided between the parties based on their values as of November 25,
      2020. Upon review of the evidence and testimony presented, the Court finds that
      Plaintiff’s argument that the financial accounts––Arvest Money Market Account
      ending in 8682, Fidelity IRA accounts ending in 8266 and 9220, and the Fidelity
      Brokerage Account ending in 3029,[2] are marital property and that each party
      contributed to the growth of same during the marriage.

      2
         These accounts ending in 8266 and 9220 are, respectively, the Roth IRA and the
rollover IRA. As noted above, Andrew does not challenge the circuit court’s division of the
Fidelity Brokerage Account on appeal.

                                             5
       Andrew timely appealed, and he now challenges the circuit court’s findings regarding

the nature and division of the Roth IRA, the rollover IRA, and the money market account.

In addition, Andrew argues that the court erred in awarding Danielle 50 percent of the

marital home, and he challenges the court’s failure to award him any of the value of

Danielle’s business.

       This court reviews cases involving the division of marital property de novo. Philmon v.

Philmon, 2023 Ark. App. 150, at 5, 662 S.W.3d 728, 732. We review the circuit court’s

findings of fact and affirm them unless they are clearly erroneous or against the

preponderance of the evidence. Id. A circuit court’s finding is clearly erroneous when,

although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left

with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made. Id. We give deference to

the circuit court’s superior position to determine matters of witness credibility and the

weight to be given to their testimony. Scherling v. Scherling, 2023 Ark. App. 402.

       Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315 (Repl. 2020) governs the distribution of

marital property. As a general rule, the court should distribute all marital property one-half

to each party unless the court finds such a division to be inequitable. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-

12-315(a)(1)(A). In that case, the court must make some other division that the court deems

equitable, taking into consideration a list of nine factors, including the length of the

marriage, the occupation of the parties, the amount and sources of income, and

employability. Id.

                                              6
       Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315(b) provides that “marital property means

all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage.” All earnings or other

property acquired by each spouse after marriage must be treated as marital property unless it

falls into one of the statutory exemptions contained in Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b). Wilson

v. Wilson, 2023 Ark. App. 155, 662 S.W.3d 273.

       One of these statutory exemptions encompasses “[p]roperty acquired prior to

marriage . . . including . . . an individual retirement account” and the “increase in value of

property acquired prior to marriage . . . including . . . an individual retirement account.”

Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(b)(1), (5). Stated another way, an individual retirement account

acquired prior to marriage and any increase in value thereof constitutes nonmarital property.

All nonmarital property must be returned to the party who owned it prior to the marriage

unless the court makes some other division that the court deems equitable, taking into

consideration those factors enumerated in § 9-12-315(a)(1)—in which case the court must

state in writing its basis and reasons for not returning the property to the party who owned

it at the time of the marriage. Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a)(2).

       A circuit court has broad powers to distribute property in order to achieve an

equitable distribution. Richards v. Richards, 2022 Ark. App. 309, 651 S.W.3d 190. The

overriding purpose of the property-division statute is to enable the court to make a division

of property that is fair and equitable under the circumstances. Id. The statute does not

compel mathematical precision in the distribution of property; it simply requires that marital

property be distributed equitably. Id.

                                              7
       With these standards in mind, we turn to Andrew’s arguments on appeal. His first

argument concerns the Roth IRA, the rollover IRA, and the money market account. Andrew

challenges the circuit court’s findings that these accounts are marital property that should

be divided equally between him and Danielle. He asserts that individual retirement accounts

are excluded from the statutory definition of marital property, and the court therefore erred

in awarding Danielle half of those accounts. He also argues that the court erred in awarding

Danielle half of the money market account that he owned before marriage.

       Regarding the Roth IRA and the rollover IRA, Andrew argues that both were “well

established before the marriage,” they were therefore nonmarital property, and it was clearly

erroneous for the court to award Danielle any portion of either account. The undisputed

testimony and documentary evidence before the circuit court showed the Roth IRA was

established in 2004, six years before the parties married in 2010. On the other hand,

evidence before the circuit court also revealed that Andrew made at least three contributions

to the Roth IRA during the marriage.3 The circuit court nonetheless concluded that the

entirety of the Roth IRA was purely marital property to be divided equally between Andrew

and Danielle. This was erroneous.

       The evidence regarding the rollover IRA was somewhat murky. Although Andrew

testified that he funded that account with retirement pay earned while he was working at

       3
       As noted above, there were deposits to Andrew’s Roth IRA of $5000 in April 2011,
$5000 in March 2012, and $5135.37 in February 2013. Each of these deposits occurred after
Andrew and Danielle married in September 2010.

                                             8
Sanofi Pasteur––a job he started before the marriage but continued “through 2011”––he

also testified that he funded the account with retirement benefits he earned from Eli Lilly—

a job he held from “2011 to 2012,” which was after the marriage. Thus, with evidence before

the court that this account comprised both marital and nonmarital funds, the court erred in

finding that the entirety of the rollover IRA was marital property.

       As noted above, Arkansas Code Annotated section 9-12-315(a)(2) provides that all

nonmarital property shall be returned to the party who owned it prior to the marriage unless

the court makes some other division that the court deems equitable taking into consideration

those factors enumerated in § 9-12-315(a)(1), in which event the court must state in writing

its basis and reasons for not returning the property to the party who owned it at the time of

the marriage. Therefore, with respect to the Roth IRA and the rollover IRA, we reverse and

remand for the circuit court to either redistribute these two accounts in a manner consistent

with this opinion and the statutes governing the distribution of marital and nonmarital

assets, or should it opt to make an equitable distribution of nonmarital property, explain its

reasoning for doing so. See Richards v. Richards, 2022 Ark. App. 309, at 9, 651 S.W.3d 190,

196–97 (reversing circuit court’s equitable division of property consisting of both pre- and

postmarital contributions to husband’s 401(k) account because the court did not explain the

basis for its reasoning).

       Although the court erred in its conclusion that both IRAs were solely marital

property, we have no such concerns about its decision that the money market account was

marital property. Andrew testified that he put Danielle’s name on this account after they

                                              9
were married, and the exhibit showing the account’s final balance before Andrew closed it

clearly shows that both parties’ names remained on it. In addition, there was testimony

before the circuit court that Danielle had treated the account as her own by making multiple

deposits into the account and withdrawals from it over the years. Once property, whether

real or personal, is placed in the names of persons who are husband and wife without

specifying the manner in which they take, there is a presumption that they own the property

as tenants by the entirety, and clear and convincing evidence is required to overcome that

presumption. Cole v. Cole, 53 Ark. App. 140, 144, 920 S.W.2d 32, 35 (1996). Andrew failed

to present such “clear and convincing” evidence below and fails to make a cogent argument

on appeal that he rebutted the above presumption. We therefore affirm that portion of the

circuit court’s decree finding that the money market account was marital property.

       In his second point on appeal, Andrew argues that the circuit court erred in awarding

Danielle half the value of the marital home. He concedes that the house was marital property,

and he acknowledges that a circuit court must distribute marital property one-half to each

party unless such a division would be inequitable. He nevertheless argues that the circuit

court erred in awarding Danielle half the value of the home because he put more work into

its construction and more money into the mortgage. In essence, he argues that the circuit

court should have made an unequal distribution of the proceeds of the sale of the home.

       There is a presumption that property placed in both spouses’ names is held in tenancy

by the entirety and is marital property. McKinnis v. McKinnis, 2020 Ark. App. 479, 612

S.W.3d 730. Moreover, there is a presumption that an equal division of marital property is

                                             10
fair and equitable. See Ellis v. Ellis, 2017 Ark. App. 661, at 8, 536 S.W.3d 166, 172; Davis v.

Davis, 2016 Ark. App. 210, 489 S.W.3d 195. Clear and convincing evidence is required to

overcome this presumption. Powell v. Powell, 72 Ark. App. 17, 110 S.W.3d 290 (2003).

Unless that presumption is overcome, the property shall be distributed one-half to each

party. McKinnis, supra (citing Ark. Code Ann. § 9-12-315(a)).

       Andrew points to nothing in the record other than his self-serving testimony that he

put more effort into the house than Danielle did. Moreover, he fails to acknowledge the

presumption in favor of an equal division of marital property and cites no authority in

support of his bare claim that he deserved a greater share of the value of the home. It is

axiomatic that we will not consider an argument that is not supported by citation to authority

or convincing argument. Grimsley v. Drewyor, 2019 Ark. App. 218, 575 S.W.3d 636; Foster v.

Foster, 2010 Ark. App. 594, 377 S.W.3d 497.

       Finally, Andrew argues that the court erred in not awarding him any of the value of

Danielle’s business. He argues it was undisputed that Danielle started her LLC, Dignified

Dietitians, after they were married and that Danielle estimated the value of the company to

be between $50,000 and $80,000. Andrew contends that because this was a marital asset, it

should have been subject to division by the court. His argument is not preserved for this

court’s review.

       In his complaint for divorce, Andrew generally sought an equitable division of the

parties’ property. There was some testimony presented at the multiday trial about the value

of Danielle’s business. However, as Andrew acknowledges in his brief, the circuit court did

                                              11
not address “this asset” in the divorce decree. In Myrick v. Myrick, 339 Ark. 1, 2 S.W.3d 60

(1999), the appellant requested a division of the appellee’s pension plan in her complaint

for divorce and presented evidence about the value of the pension at trial, but the circuit

court made no ruling on the subject. Accordingly, the supreme court in Myrick concluded

that appellant’s failure to obtain a ruling on the issue precluded it from addressing the

argument on appeal. 339 Ark. at 6, 2 S.W.3d at 63 (noting it is “well settled that this court

will not address an argument where the [record] does not show that it was made in the trial

court[,] . . . [and] issues upon which the trial court failed to make a ruling [are] not preserved

for appellate review”). As in Myrick, we simply have nothing to review. As such, we do not

address Andrew’s argument regarding the value of Danielle’s business.

       In sum, we must reverse in part because of the court’s error in finding that the entirety

of the Roth IRA and the rollover IRA were marital property. In doing so, however, we take

note of Danielle’s suggestion that the circuit court’s division of the remainder of the couple’s

assets was predicated on the amount of retirement income she was awarded. We recognize

that circuit courts have broad powers in distributing marital property in order to effect a

division that is fair and equitable under the specific circumstances of the case. See Wadley v.

Wadley, 2012 Ark. App. 208, 395 S.W.3d 411. Accordingly, on remand, we advise the circuit

court that it is not precluded from reconsidering its overall allocation of marital and

nonmarital property in order to effect a fair and equitable disposition of this matter, so long

as it comports with the requirements of section 9-12-315(a)(1)(B) & (a)(2) to explain its

reasons for making an equitable division of the property.

                                               12
Affirmed in part; reversed and remanded in part.

ABRAMSON and KLAPPENBACH, JJ., agree.

Green & Gillispie, by: Chad M. Green, for appellant.

Dusti Standridge, for appellee.

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