Court Opinion

ID: 9352013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 16:03:35.814919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:43.603195
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

   CALVARY CHAPEL CHURCH, INC. d/b/a CALVARY CHRISTIAN
   ACADEMY, CALVARY CHAPEL OF FT. LAUDERDALE, INC., and
                    JOSEPH WILSON,
                       Appellants,

                                     v.

           COLLEEN HAPP, as Personal Representative of the
                ESTATE OF COLIN CHARLES HAPP,
                            Appellee.

                              No. 4D22-1887

                             [January 4, 2023]

  Appeal of a nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Sandra Perlman, Judge; L.T. Case No.
CACE22-003250.

  Mitchell L. Lundeen and Katherine M. Martinez of Chartwell Law,
Miami, for appellants.

  Thomas Scolaro and Adam T. Rose of Leesfield Scolaro, P.A., Miami,
and Elliot B. Kula and William D. Mueller of Kula & Associates, P.A.,
Miami, for appellee.

DAMOORGIAN, J.

    Appellants (collectively “the School”) appeal a nonfinal order denying
their motion to dismiss Appellee’s (“the plaintiff”) wrongful death complaint
or, in the alternative, to compel arbitration. We agree with the School that
the plaintiff’s claims are subject to the arbitration clauses at issue, and
reverse and remand.

    The plaintiff sued the School for wrongful death after her 13-year-old
son committed suicide following the School’s request that he withdraw
from the school for selling a vape pen to another student. The complaint
alleged the School violated its policies and procedures and a common law
duty to assess and provide suicide prevention and crisis support to a
disciplined student. Specifically, the complaint alleged:
      At all times material, Defendants and CCA [the School],
      consistent with their policies and procedures, owed a duty of
      reasonable care to assess disciplined students like COLIN to
      see if they were in crisis, and to determine specifically what
      care was needed to address that crisis and minimize the risk
      of self-harm or suicide.

      ....

      Notwithstanding Defendants and CCA’s policies and
      procedures, knowledge that COLIN’s withdrawal would be
      highly traumatic, and knowing that COLIN was in utter shock
      from that trauma, CCA failed to evaluate or take any steps to
      assess COLIN and determine appropriate behavioral, social,
      or crisis support treatment. . . . .

(emphasis added). The complaint further alleged the School was negligent
for “[f]ailing to conduct a full investigation” and “imposing a punishment
that had no basis in Defendants’ policies and procedures.” (emphasis
added). Notably, at least twenty of the complaint’s allegations implicated
the School’s investigation of the incident and the appropriateness of the
School’s disciplinary measures.

   The School moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, to
compel arbitration pursuant to the enrollment contract which the plaintiff
signed when the child was admitted to the school. The enrollment contract
provides:

      In the event of a disagreement with CCA, or if I have a legal
      claim against CCA, I agree to address any such disagreement
      or claim through the process of conflict resolution, including
      Christian mediation and binding arbitration as outlined in the
      Parent/Student Handbook.

The Parent/Student Handbook (“the handbook”), in turn, provides:

      [A]ny claim or dispute arising out of your student’s enrollment
      at CCA shall be settled by biblically-based mediation and, if
      mediation is not successful, legally binding arbitration in
      accordance with the Guidelines for Christian Conciliation (the
      “Rules”) of the Institute for Christian Conciliation (ICC). . . .

      ....

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      The parties to this Agreement agree that these methods shall
      be the sole remedy for any controversy or claim arising out of
      this Agreement and expressly waive their right to file a lawsuit
      against one another in any civil court for such disputes,
      including any class action proceeding, except to enforce a
      legally binding arbitration decision. The parties acknowledge
      that by waiving their legal rights to file a lawsuit to resolve any
      dispute between them, they are not waiving their right to
      employ legal counsel at their own expense to assist them in
      any phase of the decision.

(emphasis added).     Notably, the handbook also contains a section
prohibiting vape pens and providing that a student’s possession or use of
a vape pen “will result in immediate suspension and probation, and will
cause his or her enrollment to be subject to termination.”

   The trial court ultimately denied the School’s motion, concluding the
plaintiff’s claims did not arise out of the child’s enrollment at the school.
This timely appeal follows.

   “Generally, the three fundamental elements that must be considered
when determining whether a dispute is required to proceed to arbitration
are: (1) whether a valid written agreement to arbitrate exists; (2) whether
an arbitrable issue exists; and (3) whether the right to arbitration was
waived.” Jackson v. Shakespeare Found., Inc., 108 So. 3d 587, 593
(Fla. 2013). As the parties agree that a valid written agreement to arbitrate
exists and no waiver occurred, the only issue before this Court is whether
the plaintiff’s wrongful death claim creates an “arbitrable issue” under the
enrollment contract and handbook’s arbitration clauses.

   Our answer to that question depends upon a determination of whether
the arbitration clauses are narrow in scope or broad in scope. See id.
(“Two basic types of arbitration provisions have emerged: (1) provisions
with language and application narrow in scope, and (2) provisions with
language and application broad in scope.”). As the Florida Supreme Court
held in Jackson:

      An arbitration provision that is considered to be narrow in
      scope typically requires arbitration for claims or controversies
      “arising out of” the subject contract. This type of provision
      limits arbitration to those claims that have a direct
      relationship to a contract’s terms and provisions. In contrast,
      an arbitration provision that is considered to be broad in
      scope typically requires arbitration for claims or controversies

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      “arising out of or relating to” the subject contract. The addition
      of the words “relating to” broadens the scope of an arbitration
      provision to include those claims that are described as having
      a “significant relationship” to the contract—regardless of
      whether the claim is founded in tort or contract law.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Seifert v. U.S. Home Corp., 750 So.
2d 633, 636–37 (Fla. 1999) (recognizing that “clauses including all claims
or controversies ‘arising out of’ the subject contract have been considered
by some courts to be narrow in scope,” whereas clauses including all
claims and controversies “‘arising out of or relating to’ the contract has
been interpreted broadly to encompass virtually all disputes between the
contracting parties, including related tort claims”).
    Applying the above principles, we hold the arbitration clauses in this
case are narrow in scope. Although the enrollment contract’s arbitration
clause refers generally to “a legal claim against” the School, the clause
then states that such claims must be resolved through binding arbitration
as outlined in the handbook. The handbook’s arbitration clause, in turn,
specifies that “any claim or dispute arising out of your student’s enrollment
at CCA shall” be resolved by binding arbitration and “[t]he parties to this
Agreement agree that these methods shall be the sole remedy for any
controversy or claim arising out of this Agreement.” (emphasis added).
The lack of the words “or relating to” restricts arbitration to claims arising
out of the enrollment contract and handbook. See BREA 3-2 LLC v.
Hagshama Fla. 8 Sarasota, LLC, 327 So. 3d 926, 933–34 (Fla. 3d DCA
2021) (holding that an arbitration provision providing that “[a]ny dispute
under this Agreement or any Exhibit attached hereto shall be submitted
to arbitration” was undoubtedly narrow in scope, and therefore the stricter
“direct relationship” test applied).
   Concluding that the arbitration clauses are narrow in scope, we must
next determine whether the plaintiff’s wrongful death action “arises out of”
the enrollment contract and handbook and have a “direct relationship” to
the narrow arbitration clauses. We answer yes to these questions.

    Although the plaintiff’s action sounds entirely in tort and does not
specifically include a breach of contract claim, the claims have a direct
relationship to the enrollment contract and handbook’s terms and
provisions. For example, the complaint repeatedly references the School’s
“policies and procedures” when discussing the duty owed to the student.
Moreover, the complaint references the School’s “policies and procedures”
when discussing the School’s alleged failure to properly investigate the
incident, take appropriate disciplinary measures, and evaluate the student
to determine the appropriate post-disciplinary support treatment. In other

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words, the complaint expressly relies on the enrollment contract and
handbook to establish the School’s duty to the student, the alleged breach
of which formed the basis of the wrongful death action. Cf. id. at 934
(holding that a narrow arbitration clause contained in a real estate
development agreement did not apply to the plaintiff’s usury claim because
the claim did not arise under the agreement but rather under Florida’s
usury statute; “[t]hat is, the duty and obligation not to commit usury, and
the resulting illegality of the Agreement, arise under state statutory law”).

   Accordingly, the order denying the School’s motion to dismiss or compel
arbitration is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.

   Reversed and remanded.

FORST and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

                            *        *         *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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