Court Opinion

ID: 9846659
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:44:58.884149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:42.361309
License: Public Domain

CURETON, AJ
(Concurring and dissenting in part):
I disagree with the majority on the issues of the amount of alimony and the award to Wife of exclusive ownership of the marital home. I treat these issues together because they are so closely intertwined.
The apportionment of marital property is within the family court judge’s sound discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. Bowers v. Bowers, 349 S.C. 85, 97, 561 S.E.2d 610, 616 (Ct.App.2002). S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-472 (Supp.2002) lists fifteen factors for the family court to consider when making an equitable apportionment of the marital estate and vests the family court with the discretion to determine what weight should be assigned to each *561factor. On review, this court looks to the overall fairness of the apportionment, and if the result is equitable, taken as a whole, that this court might have weighed specific factors differently than the family court is irrelevant. Johnson v. Johnson, 296 S.C. 289, 300-01, 372 S.E.2d 107, 113 (Ct.App.1988).
The right of spouses to realize the benefits of equity in a marital home has always been guarded in this state. As the majority correctly points out, the family court is to “carefully consider the claim of a party that the interests of that party or the children are so predominant, when balanced against the interests of the other, that an award of exclusive possession of the marital home is compelled.” Johnson v. Johnson, 285 S.C. 308, 311, 329 S.E.2d 443, 445 (Ct.App.1985). The rationale for scrutinizing such requests lies in the substantial burden upon the party who must defer realization of the value of his or her share of the marital home. Morris v. Morris, 335 S.C. 525, 534, 517 S.E.2d 720, 725 (Ct.App.1999).
Some, but not all, of the compelling interests the court may consider are: (1) adequate shelter for minors; (2) the inability of the occupying spouse to otherwise obtain adequate housing; (3) the size of the non-occupying spouse’s equity in the home relative to his other assets or income; (4) the size of the home relative to the expected use and the cost of maintaining the home in comparison to the benefits received; and (5) the potential duration of the exclusive possession. See Morris, 335 S.C. at 534, 517 S.E.2d at 725.
The threshold issue in this case is whether the award of the house to Wife is required to maintain her standard of living or whether the award of the exclusive ownership of the house places too great of a burden on Husband. The trial judge concluded it was not essential to her standard of living to remain in the house, and I agree.
Factually, the house was acquired when the household consisted of five persons, the parties and their three children.1 *562The children are now emancipated and are not a factor in considering Wife’s needs. The trial court properly allowed Wife the continued use of the marital residence while the youngest child was still in high school.
The house has five bedrooms, three and a half baths and over 5000 square feet. The trial court found that Wife had not demonstrated she had any practical need for a home the size of the marital home now that two children are completely emancipated.2 The costs of ownership of a house that size for one person greatly outweigh any need or benefit obtained from allowing Wife to retain the property.
There is no indication Wife cannot find a suitable home in the same or similar neighborhood, while greatly reducing her monthly housing expenses. She testified that she enjoyed the safety offered by the neighborhood and the ability to walk the neighborhood pathways. However, she also admitted that other neighborhoods could offer just as much and be just as secure.
The trial court reasoned that the parties could sell the marital home and realize over $250,000 from its sale. Expert testimony provided that the parties could then split the equity and each could purchase another home for approximately $250,000 paying $125,000 down, and thereafter have housing expenses of approxiznately $1664.00 per month instead of the $4,441.00 per month expense on the marital home. The court further concluded that unitizing Wife’s claimed expenses and adding to them the $1664.00 projected housing expense, her total expenses would be approximately $4,700.00 per month. Finally, the trial court concluded that by awarding Wife $875.00 per month in permanent alimony, she would still have approximately $600 per month left after paying her expenses. Wife’s share of the equity in the home, coupled with her income, alimony, and the other assets she receives in the *563distribution will allow her to obtain more than sufficient housing and maintain her standard of living.
Questions concerning alimony rest within the sound discretion of the trial court, whose conclusions will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion. Dearybury v. Dearybury, 351 S.C. 278, 282, 569 S.E.2d 367, 369 (2002). An abuse of discretion occurs when the court is controlled by some error of law or where the order, based upon findings of fact, is without evidentiary support. McKnight v. McKnighi, 283 S.C. 540, 543, 324 S.E.2d 91, 93 (Ct.App.1984). In appeals from family court, the appellate court has authority to find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the evidence. However, when an appellate court chooses to find facts in accordance with its own view of the evidence, the court must state distinctly its findings of fact and the reason for its decision. Dearybury, 351 S.C. at 283, 569 S.E.2d at 369.
Alimony is a substitute for the support that is normally incident to the marital relationship. Ordinarily, the purpose of alimony is to place the supported spouse, as nearly as practical, in the position of support he or she enjoyed during the marriage. Alimony should not dissuade a spouse, to the extent possible, from becoming self-supporting. McElveen v. McElveen, 332 S.C. 583, 599, 506 S.E.2d 1, 9 (Ct.App.1998). “Where, as here, a wife has been awarded a fair percentage of the marital estate, it is error to award her permanent alimony substantially in excess of her needs.” Woodward v. Woodward, 294 S.C. 210, 217, 363 S.E.2d 413, 417 (Ct.App.1987). Such an award “is in the nature of a division of the husband’s future excess income.” Id.
The reason expressed by the majority for increasing Wife’s alimony was to maintain her standard of living. It became clear during oral argument that but for the excessive mortgage payment Wife would be burdened with if she remains in the marital home, there would be no practical need for alimony in excess of the amount awarded by the trial court. Thus, the result of the majority’s decision to award Wife the marital home is to artificially create a need for additional alimony to pay the expenses on the marital residence.
*564Clearly, Husband was at fault in the breakup of this marriage and should incur some penalty for his marital fault. The trial court provided significant marital assets to Wife and allowed her to maintain her standard of living without the extravagance of a home that is too costly for her needs. The award by the majority is excessive and unnecessary given her lifestyle and actual needs. As the trial court’s order is structured, I fail to see an abuse of discretion in its award of alimony and the required sale of the marital home. I would affirm those awards.

. At time of trial, the court found that Wife, the parties' oldest child Zackery age 27, and a minor child lived in the home. The court further found that all of the children had the benefit of educational trusts, from inheritances. Additionally, while Zackery suffered a head injury as a child in an accident, he “is capable of sole support and has other *562resources to rely upon for his support.” At oral argument, Wife's counsel informed the court that only Zackery continued to remain in the marital home. In any event there is no contention that Wife should be awarded the marital home to accommodate the parties’ children.

. The trial court concluded "[t] his ruling does not prevent [Wife) front buying [Husband's] interest in the house (using the agreed valuation) or on other terms mutually agreeable to them.”