Court Opinion

ID: 9706645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:48:31.570049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:24.147582
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
(concurring). For the reasons set forth in Chief Justice Cavanagh’s dissent, I would unequivocally decline to recognize a direct cause of action by the insurer for legal malpractice. I would go beyond the majority’s observation that "something less than a plenary attorney-client relationship exists between a defense counsel and an insurer,” and clearly state that no attorney-client relationship exists between a defense counsel and an insurer. The attorney-client relationship is with the insured only.
I concur in Justice Brickley’s reasoning and conclusion that the doctrine of equitable subrogation is appropriately applied to the circumstances of this case. On this record, I perceive no divergence between the interests of the insurer and those of the insured. Nor is there any evident threat to the interests protected by the attorney-client relationship. However, because the trial court record indicates that the parties did not focus on equitable subrogation, we can only speculate regarding the effect of the privilege and the extent to which a court, in recognition of the *525privilege, may sustain an objection to testimony or evidence, that would effectively preclude the case from going forward. MCR 2.116(C)(8), (10), 2.504(B)(2), 2.515.
Thus, while I agree on this record with the abstract proposition that the action in equitable subrogation may go forward, this conclusion is subject to reexamination when the record in this case or another more fully presents the basis for a claim that public policy in support of the interests protected by the attorney-client relationship requires barring such a cause of action.