Court Opinion

ID: 9726522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:55:02.000118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:28.010927
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE SIMKINS dissenting: I dissent. It seems anamolous to hold that Rule 402 provides a vehicle for the taking of a perfectly valid plea upon which judgment and sentence may not be imposed. No factual basis for the plea was established as required by Rule 402(c), and the trial judge was consequently without authority to enter the judgment of conviction and impose sentence. I see no basis for distinguishing failure to comply with the provisions of Rule 402(a) and (b) from noncompliance with (c) of the Rule. While recognizing the difference in the initial sentence of (a) and (b) to the effect that “The Court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first * * *” as contrasted to the opening sentence of (c) “The Court shall not enter final judgment * * *” it seems clear that the requirement of a factual basis for a plea is a central and indispensible part of the foundation. The above quoted language contained in Rule 402 is patterned after the language in Federal Rule 11. The procedural safeguards contained in Rule 402 are constitutionally mandated. I read McCarthy v. United States. 394 U.S. 458, 22 L.Ed.2d 418, 89 S.Ct. 1166, to hold that the factual basis for the plea is intertwined with the concept of voluntariness. The McCarthy court said, “Moreover because a guilty plea is an admission of all die elements of a formal criminal charge, it cannot be truly voluntary unless the defendant possesses an understanding of the law in relation to the facts. Thus, in addition to directing the judge to inquire into the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of his plea, Rule 11 also requires the judge to satisfy himself that there is a factual basis for the plea.” (394 U.S. at 466-7). While McCarthy dealt primarily with the fact that the trial judge had failed to address the defendant personally and thus determine that the plea was made voluntarily with an understanding of the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea, the language of McCarthy seems clearly to hold that noncompliance with any of the provisions of Federal Rule 11 requires reversal and that the defendant under those circumstances is entitled to plead anew. The court said, “[I]n reversing the. Court of Appeals, we hold that a defendant is entitled to plead anew if a United States district court accepts his guilty plea without fully adhering to the procedure provided for in Rule 11.” (394 U.S. at 463-64.) The court further said, [0]ur holding that a defendant whose plea has been accepted in violation of Rule 11 should be afforded the opportunity to plead anew not only will insure that every accused is afforded those procedural safeguards, but will also help reduce the great waste of judicial resources required to process the frivolous attacks on guilty plea convictions that are encouraged, and are more difficult to dispose of, when the original record is inadequate.” (394 U.S. at 472.) I understand Manley v. United States, 432 F.2d 1241 (1970) to stand for the proposition (particularly the concurring opinion of Judge Friendly) that failure to establish a factual basis for a plea yields the same result as failure to comply with any other provision of Federal Rule 11. On remand for the purpose of establishing the existence or nonexistence of a factual basis it is entirely possible that the trial judge will be confronted with a contested evidentiary hearing. This raises questions concerning burden of proof, degree of proof and others which are avoidable by the simple device of compliance with the provisions of Rule 402. I would reverse and remand with directions to permit the defendant to plead anew.