Court Opinion

ID: 9474296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:53:27.044587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:00.706550
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,
separately concurring.
I concur in Judge Arnold’s opinion. I write separately to indicate that I do not join the separate concurrences of Chief Judge Lay and Judge MeMillian, and to emphasize my view that liability in this case rests upon the district court’s finding of a causal relationship between race discrimination and the employment decision; that is, that race discrimination played a role, albeit a minor one, in selecting the person to be promoted.
In my opinion, the existence of some racial prejudice in the workplace that does not affect the employment decision will not support a determination of liability against an employer, where the discrimination and the decision are not shown to be causally connected.
Finally, I express disagreement with the suggestion in Chief Judge Lay’s opinion that the “same decision test” should be rejected in mixed motive cases — “same decision” meaning that the employer would have made the same employment decision regardless of racial factors which might have entered into the hiring or promotion decision.
A simple hypothetical will illustrate the logic of applying the same decision test. Assume a college seeks a new president. Five candidates, four Caucasians and one black constitute the finalists. All are quali*1329fied but one Caucasian possesses clearly superior talents. That person is selected, but during the selection process an individual on the committee states that he or she would not vote for a black person for president under any circumstances, and that bias is shown to have a minor impact on the decisionmaking process of the entire committee.1 The mixed motive analysis offered by Chief Judge Lay seems to suggest that the college would be forced to hire and give backpay to the black applicant who would not have been selected as college president under a completely racially neutral selection process.
Under Judge Arnold’s opinion, which I join, the college could limit the remedy, avoiding backpay and having to hire the rejected applicant, by showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the black applicant would not have received the appointment in any event.
In his dissent, Judge Ross construes the majority’s use of the term “discernible factor” as containing no causal requirement. I disagree. I believe that term denotes the existence of a causal relationship in some degree in the present case, as shown by the district court’s finding that “race played a minor role in the decision not to promote the plaintiff * * *.” (Dist.Ct. Order at p. 8).
Thus, with the above explanation of my views, I agree with Judge Arnold’s opinion for the court which imposes liability on the employer but permits the defendant to restrict the remedy by proving by a preponderance of the evidence that Bibbs would not have been promoted even if his race had not been considered in the employment decision.

. To make my position clear, I would add that the presence of racial bias by one member of the selection committee which does not on a causal basis enter into the employment decision of the committee will not impose liability on the employer.