Court Opinion

ID: 9643968
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:45:10.944781+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:06.499238
License: Public Domain

STEVENS, J.,
concurring and dissenting:
¶ 1 I concur with the Majority’s conclusions that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence and that the evidence was sufficient to convict Aguado of possession with the intent to deliver. However, I dissent from the Majority’s conclusion that the trial court erred in failing to grant Aguado’s motion in limine, in which Aguado sought to exclude evidence of his prior conviction for possession with the intent to deliver, and, therefore, I would affirm.
¶ 2 The law applicable to the trial court’s ruling on Aguado’s motion in limine was set forth by this Court in Commonwealth v. Camperson, 417 Pa.Super. 280, 612 A.2d 482, (1992), as follows:
Evidence of a defendant’s distinct crimes are not generally admissible against a defendant solely to show his bad character or his propensity for committing criminal acts, as proof of the commission of one offense is not gener*1188ally proof of the commission of another. However, this general proscription against admission of a defendant’s distinct criminal acts is subject to numerous exceptions where special circumstances exist which render such evidence relevant for some legitimate evidentiary reason and not merely to prejudice the defendant by showing him to be a person of bad character. Some of the exceptions that this Court has recognized in the past as legitimate bases for admitting evidence of a defendant’s distinct crimes include (but are not limited to): (1) motive; (2) intent; (3) absence of mistake or accident; (4) a common scheme, plan or design embracing commission of two or more crimes so related to each other that proof of one naturally tends to prove the others; (5) to establish the identity of the person charged with the commission of the crime on trial where there is such a logical connection between the crimes that proof of one will naturally tend to show that the accused is the person who committed the other; (6) to impeach the credibility of a defendant who testifies in his trial; (7) situations where defendant’s prior criminal history had been used by him to threaten or intimidate the victim; (8) situations where the distinct crimes were part of a chain or sequence of events which formed the history of the case and were part of its natural development (sometimes called “res gestae” exception).
To be admissible to show intent or motive, the evidence must give sufficient ground to believe that the crime currently being considered grew out of or was in any way caused by the prior set of facts and circumstances. There must be a logical connection between the prior incident and the crime for which the accused is being tried. Important factors to be considered in making this determination include the proximity in time between the incidents; the similarity in the circumstances surrounding the incidents; and whether evidence of the prior crime is necessary to rebut the accused’s evidence or contention of accident, mistake or lack of required intent. However, even where evidence of prior criminal conduct is within one of the above exceptions, the trial court must balance the need for the evidence against its potential prejudice in order to determine its admissibility.
Camperson, 612 A.2d at 483-484 (citations, quotations, and quotation marks omitted).
¶ 3 Presently, as the Majority indicated, the parties discussed Aguado’s motion in limine prior to the start of the second day of Aguado’s trial. N.T. 7/31/97 at 2-8. Aguado argued: (1) his prior conviction could not be admitted in the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief to show his bad character or his propensity to commit criminal acts; (2) the prior conviction for drug trafficking could not be admitted to impeach his credibility should he take the stand; and (3) his prior conviction could not be admitted to show his intent to sell drugs.
¶ 4 The trial court agreed that the conviction could not be used simply to demonstrate Aguado’s bad character or his propensity to commit crimes and that the conviction, since it was not a c/dmen falsi, could not be used to impeach Aguado’s credibility. N.T. 7/31/97 at 4. The Commonwealth also indicated that it would not offer evidence of Aguado’s prior conviction in its case-in-chief. N.T. 7/31/97 at 3. However, the court indicated that it would not rule on Aguado’s claim that the prior conviction was not admissible to rebut Aguado’s testimony, until such time as Aguado’s defense was clear. N.T. 7/31/97 at 3-8. In other words, the trial court believed that the admissibility of Aguado’s prior conviction was dependent upon the similarity of Aguado’s prior conviction to the facts of this case.
¶ 5 The parties again discussed the motion in limine immediately befoi'e Aguado was to testify. N.T. 7/31/97 at 131-139. *1189Once more, the trial court ruled that it would not absolutely forbid the Commonwealth from offering evidence of Aguado’s prior conviction; but rather, would rule on its admissibility based upon Aguado’s testimony. N.T. 7/31/97 at 132-136. Despite apparently reserving its ruling for a later time during the trial, the trial court indicated that it believed that the prior conviction could be used to show Aguado’s intent. N.T. 7/31/97 at 133. I would find that the trial court did not err in so ruling.
¶ 6 The circumstances of the current crime and the prior crime for which Agua-do was convicted are virtually identical. For instance, both crimes involved a similar location (Hart Lane), similar type of narcotic (crack cocaine), and similar style of transaction (street-corner sale). As such, I conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the prior conviction could be used to rebut Aguado’s testimony, in the event he testified, on the issue of intent. See Commonwealth v. Saxton, 516 Pa. 196, 532 A.2d 352 (1987) (Nix, J., plurality opinion) (holding that evidence of a prior firearms conviction was admissible to rebut the defendant’s statement that he never owned a gun); Commonwealth v. Gelber, 406 Pa.Super. 382, 594 A.2d 672 (1991), appeal denied, 529 Pa. 667, 605 A.2d 332 (1992) (holding that evidence of drug use and drug dealing were admissible to rebut defendant’s claim of self-defense and to show motive); Commonwealth v. Barba, 314 Pa.Super. 210, 460 A.2d 1103 (1983) (finding that evidence that the defendant participated in other transactions involving stolen property admissible to demonstrate his knowledge that items in his possession were stolen).
¶ 7 Moreover, while I acknowledge that a nine-month gap between the two offenses existed, the gap does not preclude the use of the conviction for the limited purpose of proving Aguado’s intent since the probative value of such evidence outweighs any prejudice resulting from its admission. See Camperson, supra. As such, I would hold that the trial court did not err, and, therefore, I respectfully dissent as to this issue.6

. I note that I reviewed Aguado’s remaining claims and have found them to be meritless.