Court Opinion

ID: 9371168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-15 17:09:06.64547+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:25.703182
License: Public Domain

J-S42003-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    VICTORIA GREENE                            :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    SOMMER LAW GROUP, P.C.                     :   No. 807 WDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2022
       In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
                            No(s): AR-20-003082,
                                AR-20-003082

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., OLSON, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                           FILLED: FEBRUARY 15, 2023

        Victoria Greene (“Greene”) appeals pro se from the June 13, 2022 order

sustaining preliminary objections filed by Sommer Law Group, P.C. (“SLG”)

and dismissing Greene’s complaint with prejudice. We dismiss this appeal. 1

        From the certified record and trial court opinion, we glean that the

underlying matter stems from a landlord-tenant dispute and a related escrow

account. Briefly, Greene’s landlord, Crafton Holdings, initiated a suit against

Greene in 2011 for unpaid rent and to recover possession of the unit occupied
____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We note that SLG filed an application with this Court to dismiss Greene’s
appeal as frivolous because the description of the appeal and issues to be
raised in her docketing statement were “incomprehensible and frivolous.”
Application to Dismiss, 8/3/22. We denied the application without prejudice
for SLG to re-raise the issue before the merits panel. SLG has not renewed
its request for dismissal in its brief to this Court and our dismissal of the appeal
is not based on this request.
J-S42003-22

by Greene. At that time, Elan Sokol served as the general partner of Crafton

Holdings, which SLG represented in that particular case. A magisterial district

judge granted Crafton Holdings possession of the unit and entered judgment

in its favor for unpaid rent. Greene deposited a sum of money into an escrow

account as a supersedeas while she appealed the decision.        Since Greene

retained possession of the unit during the pendency of the appeal, the totality

of the funds in the escrow account, upon motion by SLG, were released to

Crafton Holdings. In February 2012, a non-jury verdict was entered in favor

of Crafton Holdings and against Greene.

      Later in 2012, Greene filed a complaint against Sokol for, inter alia,

fraud and conversion in relation to the funds that had been disbursed from

the escrow account.      After preliminary objections were sustained, that

complaint was dismissed. We note that SLG did not represent Sokol in that

proceeding.

      In September 2020, Greene initiated the instant action against SLG,

claiming that SLG had defrauded her and failed to return money from the

escrow account. Ultimately, on June 13, 2022, the trial court sustained two

of SLG’s preliminary objections and dismissed Greene’s complaint with

prejudice. Specifically, the court determined that her complaint was legally

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insufficient due to res judicata and that Greene, proceeding in forma pauperis,

was prohibited from pursuing a frivolous case. This timely appeal followed.2

       Preliminarily, we address Greene’s utter failure to comply with our Rules

of Appellate Procedure in drafting her brief. Upon review, her brief lacks any

relevant headings, a copy of her Rule 1925(b) statement, or certifications of

compliance.     See Pa.R.A.P. 2111 (requiring the brief of the appellant to

sequentially include the following relevant sections with accompanying titles:

a statement of jurisdiction, the order in question, statement of the scope and

standard of review, statement of the questions involved, statement of the

case, summary of the argument, argument, conclusion, the opinion below, a

copy of the Rule 1925(b) statement, and certificates of compliance). In fact,

this Court is unable to discern where, if anywhere, the sections required by

Rule 2111 are within her brief.          See Appellant’s brief at unnumbered 55

(handwritten reference to “question involved” but provided in the middle of

exhibits so it is unclear if it pertains to the instant appeal); 65 (handwritten

reference to “question involved” but appears to be related to the 2012 case

against Sokol); 77 (handwritten reference to “Statements of the Question
____________________________________________

2 The trial court ordered Greene to file a Rule 1925(b) statement. The certified
record does not contain such a statement. However, the trial court indicated
in its Rule 1925(a) opinion that Greene’s “‘concise’ statement of errors
complained of on appeal [went] beyond the scope of [the] order” and
therefore, in its opinion, the court “simply explain[ed its] rationale related to
the two preliminary objections [it] sustained.” Trial Court Opinion, 9/12/22,
at 2. Thus, we discern that it is likely Greene filed some manner of concise
statement in response to the trial court’s order. Nonetheless, in light of the
dispositive deficiencies in Greene’s brief, we did not inquire further as to the
nature of her purported Rule 1925(b) statement.

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Involved” but appears to pertain to the 2012 case against Sokol). See also

Pa.R.A.P. 2114 (relating to the requirements for the statement of jurisdiction);

Pa.R.A.P. 2115 (relating to the requirements for the order in question);

Pa.R.A.P. 2116 (relating to the requirements for the statement of questions

involved); Pa.R.A.P. 2117 (relating to the requirements for the statement of

the case); Pa.R.A.P. 2118 (relating to the requirements for the summary of

the argument); Pa.R.A.P. 2119 (relating to the requirements for the

argument). Moreover, the brief, which is over 150 pages, is unnumbered,

illegibly handwritten, and crammed full of exhibits that are annotated and

slotted between handwritten discussions and/or notes that may or may not

pertain to the surrounding exhibits. See Pa.R.A.P. 124 (setting forth the form

of the brief, including that “[l]ettering shall be clear and legible”); Pa.R.A.P.

2135 (mandating that, except as otherwise ordered by court, the brief shall

not exceed 14,000 words and requiring a party to file a certificate of

compliance with the word count limit if the brief is over thirty pages). What

portions are legible barely amount to full sentences and do not set forth the

issues Greene wishes to raise on appeal with particularity or develop any

meaningful legal argument.

      Rule 2101 mandates that all briefs conform with the requirements of the

Rules of Appellate Procedure discussed above.         Furthermore, where the

defects are in the appellant’s brief and are substantial, this Court has the

discretion to dismiss the appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101. We are cognizant that

some of Greene’s non-compliance may be due to her pro se status. However,

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this Court has consistently held that such status does not excuse an appellant

from compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure:

      Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed
      by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special
      benefit upon an appellant. A pro se litigant must comply with the
      procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court.
      Any layperson choosing to represent himself or herself in a legal
      proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that
      his or her lack of expertise and legal training will prove his or her
      undoing.

Smithson v. Columbia Gas of PA/NiSource, 264 A.3d 755, 760 (Pa.Super.

2021) (cleaned up). Moreover, this Court cannot act as Greene’s counsel. Id.

      In sum, Greene’s brief violates nearly every Rule of Appellate Procedure

concerning the formatting and content of briefs. More to the point, her failure

to comply with the rules has irreparably hampered our ability to conduct an

effective review as we are essentially left without any cognizant advocacy on

Greene’s behalf. Were we to proceed to the merits of this matter, we would

be forced to engage in guesswork and supposition, as the trial court

apparently did, regarding what issues Greene sought to raise on appeal.

Accordingly, we will exercise our discretion to dismiss the instant appeal due

to Greene’s wholly defective brief. See id. at 761 (dismissing appeal where

non-compliance with the Rules of Appellate Procedure deprived this Court of

the ability to conduct effective review); Pa.R.A.P. 2101.

      Appeal dismissed.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/15/2023

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