Court Opinion

ID: 9725190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 11:34:12.951811+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:12.222466
License: Public Domain

WHITE, P. J.
I respectfully dissent. Unlike the majority, I conclude there is a triable issue of fact that Erma and Luis are members of the same household. In addition, although the majority have applied the correct *597definition of “household” in this case, they have done so for the wrong reason. I therefore write to explain my understanding of the correct analysis for arriving at this definition.
In my view, the term “household” is ambiguous and is subject to the normal rules of construction in insurance cases. Because we are construing a coverage clause, this means we must interpret “household” as broadly as is reasonably possible. (Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 808 [180 Cal.Rptr. 628, 640 P.2d 764].)
A policy provision is ambiguous if it may be interpreted in at least two ways, both of which are reasonable. Whether a policy provision is ambiguous is a question of law. (Producers Dairy Delivery Co. v. Sentry Ins. Co. (1986) 41 Cal.3d 903, 912 [226 Cal.Rptr. 558, 718 P.2d 920]; Safeco Ins. Co. v. Gibson (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 176, 181 [259 Cal.Rptr. 206].) Although the majority acknowledge cases which state that the term “household” has “no absolute meaning” and that its meaning may “vary according to the circumstances” (Cal-Farm Ins. Co. v. Boisseranc (1957) 151 Cal.App.2d 775, 781 [312 P.2d 401]; maj. opn., ante, at p. 590) they nevertheless choose to follow other cases which hold that the term is not ambiguous. These cases explain the apparent conflict in opinions interpreting “household” by pointing to the difficulty in applying varying sets of facts to a fixed definition. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 591.) Although I agree that some of the conflict in the cases can be explained by the difficulty of applying varying facts to a fixed definition, this does not answer the question of law before us: is the term “household” subject to two or more reasonable definitions? I conclude that it is. (See Safeco Ins. Co. v. Gibson, supra, 211 Cal.App.3d at p. 185, dis. opn. of Stone (W. A.), J.)
Ironically, the very case the majority cite to show that our Supreme Court has “adopted” a single definition of “household” in fact highlights the ambiguity of that term. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 591-592.) In Island v. Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Co. (1947) 30 Cal.2d 541 [184 P.2d 153, 173 A.L.R. 896] the Supreme Court interpreted the term “household” as used in an auto policy clause excluding coverage. The Island court set out several definitions of the term. (Id., at pp. 547-548.) These definitions—which the majority quote, ante, at page 592 of their opinion—show that there are at least two variables in defining “household.” First, some definitions limit a “household” to family members, while others include all persons who live together under one head, whether related or not. (Island, supra, at pp. 547-548 [Household “ ‘is variously used to designate people . . . who live together in the same house, including the family, servants, and boarders, or it may be used as including only members of the family relation.’ ”].) Second, some definitions require that the persons constituting a household live to*598gether “in the same house” or “under one roof” while others are arguably broader in that they require that the persons live together “within one curtilage.” (Ibid.) These varying definitions prove that the term “household” is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation, and is therefore ambiguous.
Moreover, the Island court itself concluded that the term is ambiguous. After quoting several definitions of “household,” the Island court resolved the issue before it by relying on the “cardinal rule of interpretation . . . that, where a provision of an insurance policy is susceptible of two constructions, it should be construed most strongly in favor of the policyholder. [Citations.] This rule requires the conclusion that Cave, Jr., was not a member of his father’s household . . . .” (Island v. Fireman’s Fund Indemnity Co., supra, 30 Cal.2d at p. 548, italics added.) If the Island court believed the term “household” was unambiguous—that is, subject to only one reasonable interpretation—why did it apply the rule requiring it to pick the construction most favorable to the policyholder? Thus, the majority are simply wrong when they claim the Island court adopted a single definition of household which we are bound to follow as a matter of stare decisis. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 591-592.) If anything, we are bound by stare decisis to find the term ambiguous.
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the term “household” as used here is “authorized by statute” and thus not subject to the usual rules of insurance policy interpretation. (Prudential-LMI Com. Insurance v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 674, 684 [274 Cal.Rptr. 387, 798 P.2d 1230]; maj. opn., ante, at pp. 595-596.) “When a clause in an insurance policy is authorized by statute, it is deemed consistent with public policy as established by the Legislature. [Citation.] In addition, the statute must be construed to implement the intent of the Legislature and should not be construed strictly against the insurer (unlike ambiguous or uncertain policy language). [Citations.]” (Prudential-LMI, supra, at p. 684, italics added.) This rule has been applied only where the clause has been directly authorized by statute; for example, where the clause is part of a statutory standard form insurance policy (id., at p. 680 [California Standard Form Fire Insurance Policy]; Ichthys, Inc. v. Guarantee Ins. Co. (1967) 249 Cal.App.2d 555, 558 [57 Cal.Rptr. 734] [same]) or is taken directly from statutory language addressing the precise issue addressed by the clause in the policy (Interinsurance Exchange v. Marquez (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 652, 655-656 [172 Cal.Rptr. 263] [construction of Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subd. (h)(1)]; Darrah v. California State Automobile Assn. (1968) 259 Cal.App.2d 243, 245, 247 [66 Cal.Rptr. 374] [construction of Ins. Code, § 11580.2, subd. (c)(2)]). In this context, the rule makes sense, since it is the Legislature—not the insur*599er—which has chosen the language placed in the policy. (See Interinsurance Exchange, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at p.656.)
The majority concede that the clause under consideration here1 is not part of a statutory homeowner’s liability insurance policy, and was not taken from a statute which is concerned with the subject matter addressed by the clause in the policy. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 595-596.) Instead, the majority point to unrelated sections of the Insurance Code where the Legislature has used similar clauses. The mere fact the Legislature has used the word “household” at various points in the Insurance Code does not shelter that word from the normal rules of interpretation. Here, the language is that of the insurer, not of the Legislature, and the normal rules of interpretation apply. (See Interinsurance Exchange v. Marquez, supra, 116 Cal.App.3d at p. 656.)
Moreover, even if the term “household” is “authorized” by statute, the court must still construe the statute—not the policy language itself—to implement the intent of the Legislature. (Prudential-LMI Com. Insurance v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 684.) The majority have not attempted to construe the statutory meaning of the term “household.” How could they? There is no statute which authorizes the term in the context in which it is used in the policy. Thus, the majority would have to pick and choose among the various statutes where the term is used, and then transfer the legislative intent expressed in that statute to a different context not considered by the Legislature.
Finally, the majority’s reliance on this rule is inconsistent with their finding that the term “household” is unambiguous. If this is true, the word can have only one meaning and resort to legislative intent is superfluous.
Despite all my differences with the majority’s analysis, I nevertheless believe the majority have adopted the proper definition of “household” in this case because it is the broadest definition of the term which is consistent with the reasonable expectations of the insured. This definition is appropriate in cases interpreting clauses providing coverage. (Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta, supra, 30 Cal.3d at pp. 807-808; maj. opn., ante, at p. 589.) However, the definition adopted here would not necessarily be proper in a case construing an exclusionary clause. (Ibid.)
Thus, I agree that in this case a “household” may be broadly defined as a collection of persons, whether related or not, who live together as a group *600or unit of permanent or domestic character, with one head, under one roof or within a common curtilage, who direct their attention toward a common goal consisting of their mutual interests.2
However, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that, under this definition, there is no triable issue of fact Erma and Luis are members of the same household. Summary judgment “is drastic and should be used with caution so that it does not become a substitute for the open trial method of determining facts.” (Stationers Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. (1965) 62 Cal.2d 412, 417 [42 Cal.Rptr. 449, 398 P.2d 785]; see also Spradlin v. Cox (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 799, 805-806 799 [247 Cal.Rptr. 347].) “The aim of the summary judgment procedure is to discover, . . . whether the parties possess evidence requiring the weighing procedure of a trial; the motion may be granted only if no triable issue of fact appears; the court may not pass upon the issue itself.” (G & D Holland Construction Co. v. City of Marysville (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 989, 993 [91 Cal.Rptr. 227].)
.The evidence presented in the case at bench requires “the weighing procedure of a trial.” (G & D Holland Construction Co. v. City of Marysville, supra, 12 Cal.App.3d at p. 993.) Unlike similar cases cited by the majority—Watt by Watt v. Mittelstadt (Mo.Ct.App. 1985) 690 S.W.2d 807 (where the plaintiff in any event survived a motion for summary judgment) and Hernandez v. Comeo Ins. Co. (La.Ct.App. 1978) 357 So.2d 1368—there is evidence in this case from which a trier of fact could conclude that both Erma and Luis belonged to the same household, namely, the household headed by Connie.
To survive summary judgment, appellant was not required to show that Luis was a member of a household headed by Erma. Instead, it is enough if Luis and Erma were residents of the same household. Even when the courts have construed language similar to that under consideration here (i.e., “resident of your household”) in an exclusionary clause, they have broadly interpreted the language to mean a resident of the same household as the insured, not a resident of a household headed by the named insured. (California State Auto. Assn. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Hoffman (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 768, 772-775 [143 Cal.Rptr. 835], and cases there cited.) Consequently, appellant can prevail at trial if he proves Erma and Luis are members of one household headed by Connie.3
*601Here, there is a triable issue of fact whether Erma and Luis are members of the household headed by Connie. There is no question that Luis belonged to the household headed by Connie. The more difficult question is whether Erma belonged to that household, or maintained her own separate household which she headed. In my view, appellant presented sufficient evidence on this issue to survive summary judgment.
Appellant presented evidence that Connie had daily contact with her grandmother, prepared her daily medications, took her to appointments, paid all her bills and generally took care of “all” her business. In addition, Connie has always had a key to her grandmother’s unit and subjectively thinks of herself as her grandmother’s caretaker. Indeed, Connie moved into the duplex to care for her ailing grandmother. Given Erma’s extreme dependence on Connie, I believe a reasonable trier of fact could conclude that Erma is, in fact, a member of the household headed by Connie. This is true, even though they do not live “technically” under one roof (Hernandez v. Comco Ins. Co., supra, 357 So.2d at p. 1370), although they arguably live within one curtilage. Since I believe there is a triable issue of fact on this issue, I would reverse the summary judgment.4

 “Insured means you and the following persons if permanent residents of your household; [f|] a. your relatives. [[[] b. anyone under the age of 21.”

 I also agree with the qualifications of this definition in footnotes 5 and 6 of the majority opinion.

 Appellant’s counsel raised a very similar theory at the hearing where the court changed its decision and granted the motion for summary judgment. However, the court refused to entertain this theory because, in its view, it had not been raised in the moving papers. I cannot agree with the trial court. It is absolutely clear from the evidence presented by appellant *601that he was relying on Connie’s relationship to Erma to establish that Erma and Luis were members of the same household.

The majority point to only two specific facts to support their conclusion to the contrary: Erma did not share meals with Connie’s family and Erma subjectively did not consider Luis to be part of her household. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 596.) Although these facts would be relevant to the issue at trial, they do not conclusively establish that Erma and Luis are members of different households.