Court Opinion

ID: 9498224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:11:31.781221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:58:41.828049
License: Public Domain

BATCHELDER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
While I agree with the conclusions of the majority in Parts II-A-1 and II-B, I respectfully dissent from Part II-A-2 because I believe that even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, the facts do not establish that Wesley committed overt acts that constituted a substantial step towards the commission of a bank robbery.
The majority correctly points out that in order to convict a defendant of an attempt crime the government must prove both that the defendant had the intent to engage in the proscribed criminal activity, and that he committed an overt act that constitutes a substantial step towards the commission of the crime. Bilderbeck, 163 F.3d at 975. For that overt act to constitute a substantial step, the “defendant’s objective conduct, taken as a whole, must unequivocally corroborate the required subjective intent” to engage in criminal activity. Id. As we have explained, “[a] substantial step must be something more than mere preparation.” United States v. Bailey, 228 F.3d 637, 640 (6th Cir.2000). “Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction for criminal attempt, if it shows that the defendant’s conduct goes beyond ‘preliminary activities,’ and ‘a fragment of the crime [was] essentially ... in progress.’ ” United States v. Price, 134 F.3d 340, 350 (6th Cir.1998) (quoting United States v. Dolt, 27 F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir.1994)).
The majority concludes that Wesley took a substantial step towards the commission of bank robbery by engaging in several overt acts, including questioning Reid con*623cerning the Stockbridge State Bank and recruiting Reid to act as a getaway driver; attempting to recruit Carr, a convicted armed robber, to participate in the robbery; and casing the bank on September 3, 2004. In my opinion, this is not a ease in which the defendant “went beyond mere preparation,” Bailey, 228 F.3d at 640, or “a fragment of the crime [was] essentially ... in progress.” Dolt, 27 F.3d at 239.
In my view, we must look as well at what Wesley failed to do to carry out his plan and recognize just how far he was from actually carrying out the plan. Wesley was arrested at his home, over one hour away from the Stockbridge State Bank, but only about one hour before the bank was set to close that Friday. In his discussions with Reid, Wesley talked about robbing the bank during business hours, wearing dark clothes, using masks, and carrying firearms during the robbery. At the time of Wesley’s arrest, the police found no disguises or masks, no weapons, and no other robbery paraphernalia. Wesley also suggested that he would have to steal two switch cars before the robbery could take place, but the government presented no evidence that he had tried to accomplish this task in preparation for the robbery. And while Wesley told Reid that he would need to recruit others to help carry out the robbery, he had not done so. I do not dispute that Wesley may have had the subjective intent to commit bank robbery, however, I do not believe that, when viewed objectively, the facts in this record establish that a he had taken a substantial step towards the commission of the robbery or that any reasonable juror could conclude otherwise.
Because in my mind the evidence adduced at trial, whether erroneously or not, was insufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted bank robbery, I respectfully dissent. I would therefore hold that retrial is precluded. See Lockhart, 488 U.S. at 34; see also Quinn, 901 F.2d at 529 n. 5.