Court Opinion

ID: 9752296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:55:59.931751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:13.359691
License: Public Domain

WAGNER, Chief Judge,
dissenting:
I am not persuaded that, viewed in the light most favorable to Walker, the evidence favors the District so overwhelmingly that the jury could not find reasonably that the gross negligence of its police officers was a proximate cause of the accident which resulted in Mrs. Walker’s death.1 See Kuzmics v. Santiago, 256 Pa.Super. 35, 389 A.2d 587, 589-91 (1978). There was evidence that the police engaged in an automobile chase of a juvenile, suspected of driving a stolen vehicle, for five miles, in the middle of a Saturday afternoon, in the District and onto Suitland Parkway in Maryland, at speeds of up to 90 miles per hour. The evidence also showed that the juvenile, who committed no traffic infractions before the pursuit commenced, evaded the officers’ efforts to block him in the District and that the officers observed the suspect, who appeared to be too young to drive, losing control of the car as the officers continued the chase onto the Suitland Parkway just prior to the fatal collision with the passing motorist, Mrs. Walker. One police officer admitted at trial that police pursuit should be terminated when a suspect drives so erratically. D.C. Municipal Regulations provide that police officers may exceed the speed limit when pursuing suspected law violaters only “so long as it does not endanger life or property.” 18 DCMR § 2002.3. Walker presented the testimony of two experts who testified to the standard of care for the initiation, conduct and termination of police pursuits. They testified that the standard of care required a weighing of the urgency of an immediate apprehension of the suspect against the foreseeable risk of death or injury to the people involved or the public. The experts also faulted the police officers for pushing the chase under the circumstances, given the time, location and traffic conditions, youthfulness of the suspect, his manner of driving, as well as the officers’ deviation from the requirements of the general orders of the police department. One expert testified that there were safer ways to stop a fleeing motorist under the circumstances. On these facts, a juror could conclude that the police officers’ conduct deviated so grossly from the standard of care as to support a finding of a failure to exercise slight care or a conscious indifference for the rights and safety of others.2 See Boyer v. State, 323 Md. 558, 594 A.2d 121, 132 (1991).
In determining whether the conduct which caused the accident amounts to gross negligence, courts which have reviewed the issue in the context of a high speed chase, consider a number of factors, among which are “the length, characteristics, and speed of the pursuit; the area of the pursuit; whether rural or urban; the highway characteristics such as curves of no passing zones; the presence of pedestrians and traffic; weather and visibility; and the seriousness of the law violation.” Peak v. Ratliff, 185 W.Va. 548, 408 S.E.2d 300, 308 (1991) (citations omitted); see also Boyer, supra, 594 A.2d at 137. Such fact-based considerations necessarily result in each case turning on its own peculiar circumstances. Generally, whether conduct constitutes gross negligence is a question of fact for the jury. See District of Columbia v. Banks, 646 A.2d 972, 983 (1994). In the case *52before the court, these factors, weighed in light of the evidence, favor sustaining the jury’s verdict. The lengthy chase and continued pursuit of an obvious juvenile, for offenses at the lower end of the seriousness level, at extremely high rates of speed, in the middle of a Saturday afternoon, on a major thoroughfare, in a large metropolitan area, where there was vehicular traffic, during which the immature suspect demonstrated an unwillingness to stop and was observed losing control of the vehicle before the fatal accident, reasonably could be found to render the risk of continued pursuit unreasonable and a fatal collision entirely foreseeable. A jury could reasonably conclude that such conduct reflects an indifference to the safety of others which amounts to gross negligence. See Boyer, 594 A.2d at 132. For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the court.3

. See Vassiliades v. Garfinckel’s, Brooks Bros., 492 A.2d 580, 586 (D.C.1985) (citations omitted) (A judgment notwithstanding the verdict is appropriate when'" ‘the facts, viewed most favor-

. I agree with the majority that liability cannot be imposed for acts of gross negligence which did not proximately cause the fatal accident. See Sanders v. Wright, 642 A.2d 847, 850 (D.C.1994). However, the majority does not reach the question of proximate cause here; therefore, I need not address it. See Majority Op. note 10.

. Both of Walker's experts expressed the opinion that D.C. police officers were grossly negligent in continuing the chase and that their gross negligence was a proximate cause of the accident and Mrs. Walker’s death.