Court Opinion

ID: 9962189
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-22 21:19:13.34552+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:58.830426
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                           DIVISION ONE

 THE STATE OF WASHINGTON,                          No. 85379-1-I

                           Respondent,

                 v.                                UNPUBLISHED OPINION

 BENJAMIN VAZQUEZ LOPEZ,

                           Appellant.

       BOWMAN, J. — Benjamín Vázquez López1 pleaded guilty to

communicating with a minor for immoral purposes. Vázquez appeals two

community custody conditions and legal financial obligations (LFOs) imposed by

the court. The State concedes the errors. We remand for the court to consider

modification of one community custody condition, clarify the other, and strike the

victim penalty assessment (VPA) and community supervision fees.

                                        FACTS

       In May 2018, the State charged Vázquez with first degree child

molestation of his partner’s nine-year-old sister, S.F. In March 2023, the State

amended the information and charged Vázquez with one count of communicating

with a minor for immoral purposes. Vázquez pleaded guilty to the amended

information as charged.

       1
          We adopt the spelling and surname of Benjamín Vázquez López as used in his
briefing on appeal.
No. 85379-1-I/2

       In May 2023, the trial court sentenced Lopez to 3 months of partial

confinement and 12 months of community custody. It ordered him to pay a $500

VPA and community supervision fees as determined by the Department of

Corrections (DOC). The court waived all other LFOs “based on indigency.” And

as a crime-related community custody condition, the court ordered Vázquez to

“[a]void places where minors congregate including schools, playgrounds, child-

care centers, . . . parks and recreational programs, unless otherwise approved by

[DOC].” The court also ordered Vázquez to “[s]ubmit to a sexual history and

periodic polygraph assessment” at his own expense as directed by DOC.

       Vázquez objected to the community custody conditions. He asked the

court to modify the language of the “avoid places” condition so that it would not

infringe on his constitutional right to parent his minor children. He argued the

condition as written would prevent him from going to places where his children

wanted to go, like parks, and from picking up his children from day care and

school. And he argued the court could not impose the “costly” polygraph

condition because he is indigent.

       The court declined to modify the conditions. As to the “avoid places”

condition, it reasoned that Vázquez could “make that request to his community

corrections officer [(CCO)], and if his [CCO] disapproves of it then he can come

back to court and make a specific request of the court.” And the court ruled that

the polygraph condition is “an important aspect of the sexual deviancy

treatment.”

       Vázquez appeals.

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No. 85379-1-I/3

                                     ANALYSIS

       Vázquez argues that the trial court erred by refusing to modify the

community custody conditions because the “avoid places” condition violates his

right to parent and the polygraph condition is overly broad. He also argues that

the court must strike the VPA and community supervision fees. We address

each argument in turn.

I. Avoid Places Where Minors Congregate

       Vázquez argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it refused to

consider whether to tailor the community custody condition that he “[a]void

places where minors congregate . . . unless otherwise approved by [DOC]”

because the court based its decision on a misunderstanding of the law. The

State concedes the error. We agree.

       We review imposing community custody conditions for an abuse of

discretion and reverse only if the decision is manifestly unreasonable or based

on untenable grounds. State v. Williams, 157 Wn. App. 689, 691, 239 P.3d 600

(2010). A trial court’s decision is untenable if the court bases it on a

misunderstanding of the law. State v. Meza, 26 Wn. App. 2d 604, 609-10, 529

P.3d 398 (2023). And “we more carefully review conditions that interfere with a

fundamental constitutional right, such as the fundamental right to the care,

custody, and companionship of one’s children.” In re Pers. Restraint of Rainey,

168 Wn.2d 367, 374, 229 P.3d 686 (2010) (citing State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17,

32, 195 P.3d 940 (2008)).

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No. 85379-1-I/4

       When a court sentences a person to a term of community custody, it must

also impose conditions of community custody. RCW 9.94A.703. Along with

statutory mandatory conditions, the sentencing court may also order compliance

with any crime-related prohibitions. RCW 9.94A.703(3)(f). Conditions that

interfere with a fundamental constitutional right “must be ‘sensitively imposed’ ”

and narrowly drawn “so that they are ‘reasonably necessary to accomplish the

essential needs of the State and public order.’ ” Rainey, 168 Wn.2d at 374

(quoting Warren, 165 Wn.2d at 32).

       Here, Vázquez objected to the condition that he avoid places where

minors congregate unless approved by DOC. He asked the court to tailor the

condition so it would not burden his right to parent his minor children. The court

rejected the argument, telling Vázquez that he can later seek to modify the

condition with his CCO and then, if necessary, petition the court to modify. But a

trial court does not generally have authority to modify court-imposed community

custody conditions in a non-SSOSA2 sentence after sentencing. See State v.

Hubbard, 1 Wn.3d 439, 446, 527 P.3d 1152 (2023); see also State v. Harkness,

145 Wn. App. 678, 685, 186 P.3d 1182 (2008) (a trial court has only limited

statutory authority to modify a sentence postjudgment). So, the court based its

refusal to consider Vázquez’s request for modification of the condition on a

misunderstanding of the law. As a result, we accept the State’s concession and

remand to the trial court to consider modification of the “avoid places” community

       2
           Special sex-offender sentencing alternative.

                                              4
No. 85379-1-I/5

custody condition.3

II. LFOs

       Vázquez argues that we should remand to the trial court to strike the VPA

and community supervision fees from his judgment and sentence because he is

indigent, and the laws requiring imposition of those fees have changed. The

State concedes each issue. We accept the State’s concessions.

       First, regarding the VPA, when the trial court sentenced Vázquez in May

2023, former RCW 7.68.035(1)(a) (2018) required the court to impose a

mandatory $500 VPA on all convicted defendants. But while Vázquez’s appeal

was pending, the legislature amended the VPA statute to prohibit sentencing

courts from imposing the VPA on indigent defendants. RCW 7.68.035(4) (LAWS

OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1, effective July 1, 2023).   That prohibition applies

prospectively to cases pending on appeal when the legislature amended the

statute. State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023) (citing State

v. Ramirez, 191 Wn.2d 732, 748-49, 426 P.3d 714 (2018)).

       The parties do not dispute that Vázquez is indigent or that the legislature

amended the VPA statute while his appeal was pending. We accept the State’s

concession and remand to strike the $500 VPA from the judgment and sentence.

       Finally, Vázquez argues we should remand to strike the court-imposed

supervision fees because the LFO “derives from a defunct statute.” We agree.

       3
           Vázquez also argues that the condition requiring him to submit to a sexual
history and periodic polygraph assessment is overly broad because it does not explicitly
limit its use to monitoring compliance. See State v. Combs, 102 Wn. App. 949, 952-53,
10 P.3d 1101 (2000). The State concedes the issue. Because we remand for the court
to address the separate community custody condition, we need not accept the
concession, and the parties may seek clarification of this condition on remand.

                                           5
No. 85379-1-I/6

       Effective June 2022, RCW 9.94A.703(2) no longer authorizes imposing

community custody supervision fees. LAWS OF 2022, ch. 29, § 7; see also LAWS

OF 2022, ch. 29, § 8 (effective July 1, 2022). The court sentenced Vázquez on

May 3, 2023, almost a year after the legislature amended the statute. As a

result, the court had no authority to impose supervision fees, and we remand for

the court to strike them.

       We remand for the trial court to consider modification of the “avoid places”

community custody condition, clarify the polygraph condition, and strike the VPA

and community supervision fees from Vázquez’s judgment and sentence.

WE CONCUR:

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