Court Opinion

ID: 9776037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:16:58.727175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:33.110505
License: Public Domain

RAY, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The holding of the majority is incorrect in two respects: first, it upholds a declaratory judgment when the movant failed to meet its burden of proof and second, the majority’s holding implicitly overrules the test as set forth in Glover v. National Insurance Underwriters, 545 S.W.2d 755 (Tex.1977).

Declaratory Judgment

In actions for declaratory judgment, courts will ignore the formal position of the parties and place the burden of proof upon the party asserting the affirmative of the controlling issues. Ross v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 507 S.W.2d 806, 810 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1974, writ ref’d n.r.e.); 1 R. McDonald, Texas Civil Practice § 2.06 (rev. 1965). A review of the pleadings demonstrates that the plaintiff, United States Fire Insurance Company (“U.S.F.I.”), bore the burden of proving Ronald Eugene Marr (“Marr”) was not properly rated for the flight involved. If U.S.F.I. failed to meet its burden of proof on this issue, its motion for declaratory judgment must be denied.
The issue of whether Marr was properly rated for the flight involved was submitted *8to the jury in Special Issue No. 1, which stated:
Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that the weather conditions existing at the beginning of the flight in question when Ronald Eugene Marr and his passengers took off from Lakefront Airport on September 20, 1979, were IFR?
Answer “we do” or “we do not.”
Answer: “We do not.”
U.S.F.I. failed to obtain a favorable jury finding on its vital issue. The jury’s finding on Special Issue No. 1 established that the weather conditions were VFR when Marr took off from Lakefront Airport. Marr was licensed for VFR conditions, and therefore, it is without question that Marr possessed the proper qualifications for the flight involved.

The Glover Test v. the New Test

The test adopted by the majority overrules the Glover test, 545 S.W.2d 755. The holding in Glover clearly requires that a flight designation of VFR or IFR be determined by the weather conditions at the departure site. Our opinion in Glover specifically rejects pilot knowledge as the test. In direct contrast, the present test set forth in the majority opinion requires that a pilot’s knowledge of the existence of IFR weather in the flight path determines the designation of a flight as IFR or VFR for purposes of insurance coverage.
In Glover, this court construed a pilot clause very similar to the one presently at issue. The pilot requested weather briefings at 7:55 a.m. for an anticipated departure time three to four hours later. The briefings recited the existence of IFR conditions at the departure site and along the flight path. When the conditions improved to VFR at the airport of departure, the pilot, who was rated only for VFR flight, took off. He then crashed in IFR conditions en route to his original destination.
After holding that the pilot clause was ambiguous, the Glover court addressed the problem of how to characterize a flight as an IFR or VFR flight. It is useful to note the methods of characterizing a flight which were mentioned in the Glover opinion but which that court chose not to employ. The court chose not to use a method of characterization which turned upon whether or not the pilot actually used his instruments, rather than his vision, to maintain the aircraft in its proper position during flight. Id. at 761-62. The court also chose not to characterize a flight as IFR or VFR by reference to the Federal Aviation Regulations. Id. at 762. Most importantly, the Glover court explicitly rejected the characterization of a flight as IFR or VFR, depending on the pilot’s knowledge of weather conditions along his flight path or at his destination. Id. at 763.
After considering various methods of characterizing a flight as IFR or VFR, the Glover court held that a flight is to be characterized as a whole according to whether IFR or VFR weather conditions existed at the time and place of the flight’s inception.1 Id. at 762. In other words, if it is found that IFR weather conditions existed at the time and place of the flight’s inception, then the entire flight is to be characterized as an IFR flight, and if it is determined that VFR conditions existed at the time and place of the flight’s inception, then the entire flight is to be characterized as a VFR flight. Accord, Northwestern Flyers, Inc. v. Olson Bros. Mfg. Co., Inc., 679 F.2d 1264 (8th Cir.1982); see also, National Insurance Underwriters v. King Craft Custom Products, Inc., 368 F.Supp. *9476 (N.D.Ala.1973), aff'd per curiam, 488 F.2d 1393 (5th Cir.1974).
The following examples illustrate the problems which will result from applying the test delineated by the majority. Before takeoff, Pilot A, a non-instrument rated pilot, receives a weather forecast predicting that IFR weather conditions will exist when he arrives at his 'destination 500 miles away, but that weather conditions will be VFR between his point of departure and his destination. This is evidence to support a jury finding that Pilot A knew at takeoff that he would be flying in IFR weather conditions. Suppose the pilot takes off in VFR conditions, flies ten miles in VFR conditions, then crashes in VFR conditions. Under the present test implemented by the majority opinion, the flight would be characterized as an IFR flight for which the pilot was not properly rated since Pilot A knew at takeoff that he would be flying in IFR conditions. Thus, the insurance policy involved in this case would not cover the flight.
Pilot B, a non-instrument rated pilot, takes off in VFR weather conditions, encounters IFR weather conditions after flying twenty miles, then crashes in IFR conditions. It is conclusively established that all available weather forecasts predicted that IFR weather conditions would exist along Pilot B’s flight path. Furthermore, it is conclusively established that Pilot B consulted no weather forecast before, during, or after takeoff. Thus, Pilot B, because he was so grossly careless, had no knowledge that he would be flying in IFR weather conditions. Under the test implemented by the majority opinion, Pilot B’s flight would be a VFR flight for which he was properly rated, and the policy of U.S. F.I. would cover the crash.
In example # 1, Pilot A was not covered by insurance because he consulted weather forecasts. In example # 2, Pilot B was covered because he failed to consult weather forecasts. The new rule places a premium upon a pilot’s voluntary ignorance of weather conditions along his flight path.
The Glover court rejected the pilot knowledge test because “very few pilots actually know when they take off what weather conditions they will encounter over two hours later.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 763. Instead, the Glover court recognized the pilot only possesses an expectation, based on the available weather information, of conditions he will encounter. The court stated that a pilot knowledge test would necessitate inquiry into the reasonableness of the pilot’s expectations based on the weather forecasts he received.
Inquiries into the reasonableness of a person’s actions might best be ignored in determining the coverage of an insurance policy designed to protect one from the consequences of one’s own negligence, especially where the language of the policy does not clearly dictate such an inquiry.
Id. at 763.
In light of this language in Glover, the court of appeals in the present case correctly concluded that the jury finding on the second special issue was irrelevant for determining whether the flight was IFR or VFR. Special Issue No. 2 inquired whether Marr knew when he took off from Lakefront Airport that he would be flying in IFR weather conditions. The jury answered Marr did know he would be flying in IFR conditions.
Applying the majority’s test to the present fact situation, the evidence would not support a finding of pilot knowledge. The majority seems to base its finding of knowledge by Marr that he would be flying into IFR conditions on the fact that Marr filed an IFR flight plan before departing the airport. However, expert testimony presented at trial established that filing an IFR flight plan does not signify the pilot knows he will be flying into IFR conditions. IFR flight plans often are filed when present and anticipated weather conditions are VFR to insure the pilot will be maintained bn radar coverage throughout the flight.
The presumption of Marr’s knowledge of IFR conditions also is based on the is*10suance of a convective SIGMET warning just before Marr took off from Lakefront Airport. A SIGMET is generally issued for a large area, for a long period of time. It is a forecast of possible or impending weather conditions in the area. A convective SIGMET is generally more specific and informative about phenomena such as turbulence and thunderstorms and, consequently, a more urgent warning of severe weather conditions. There is no evidence in the record to substantiate that Marr received the SIGMET warning. U.S.F.I.’s expert testified he believed there was some type of problem with Marr’s plane radio. The control tower unsuccessfully attempted several times to contact Marr for verification that he had received his clearance. The tower personnel finally succeeded on the fourth attempt.
The only weather information received by Marr, as proved by the evidence presented at trial, consisted of the flight service briefings which showed IFR conditions on a direct flight path from New Orleans to Fort Worth, but VFR conditions along the alternate path (Lafayette, Lake Charles, Beaumont, Navasota, Waco). There is direct testimony in the record that Flight Service informed Marr of clearing at Lake Charles with some light rain showers, some IFR conditions “every now and then” and “maybe a cell or two” between Lake Charles and Lafayette.
The majority presumes the airplane crash resulted from Marr’s contact with thunderstorm turbulence. The presumption is based on testimony by the air traffic controller monitoring the flight, that Marr stated, “we got it turned back around, we got off our course.” Evidence presented at trial verified the presence of fifteen other planes in the same area, under control of the same controller and within the same time period as Marr. There was no report of turbulence by any of those pilots. Accurate reports of turbulence are obtainable only from pilots in the area because radar cannot detect air turbulence. The majority totally disregards the absence of any proof as to what actually caused the crash. Marr raised this point in his motion for rehearing and supplied evidence of possible mechanical problems with the airplane itself instead of the pilot disorientation presumed by the majority. A conclusion by this court that the crash was caused by weather conditions is based on speculation, not the evidence presented at trial.
Marr has preserved the issue of causation for our review. In the trial court he objected to the submission of Special Issue No. 2 on the grounds that knowledge of the existence of IFR conditions was not an ultimate issue, would not support a judgment and should have inquired where Marr encountered the IFR conditions. Special Issue No. 2 merely presupposed that if Marr knew of IFR conditions, he operated his aircraft in them. U.S.F.I. obtained no fact finding on this issue. Without a fact finding that Marr operated his aircraft in IFR conditions, and that such conditions were causally related to the crash, U.S.F.I. has failed to establish any causal connection between the IFR conditions and the crash.
There simply is no evidence to establish that Marr encountered any weather conditions that caused him to lose control of his aircraft. Since Marr objected to Special Issue No. 2, the burden was on U.S.F.I. to obtain favorable fact findings that Marr encountered IFR conditions above the crash site and that such weather caused the crash. Insurance coverage should not be denied Marr unless U.S.F.I. proves that Marr encountered IFR weather and that his failure to have an instrument rating was causally related to the crash. Failure to have such • a rating could not be the cause of the crash unless Marr actually encountered IFR weather. There can be no presumed fact finding that Marr actually encountered IFR weather in the face of Marr’s objection to Special Issue No. 2. The fact that Marr’s plane crashed is no evidence that Marr violated his VFR rating or encountered IFR weather. Tison v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 181 So.2d 835, 839 (La.Ct.App.1965).
*11If this court is going to characterize flights in the way set forth in the majority opinion, then it would seem reasonable to require a finding of a causal relationship between the IFR conditions and the crash. We recently have held in Puckett v. United States Fire Insurance Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 937 (1984), that a causal nexus must exist between the breach of an insurance policy and an airplane crash. The majority does not require the same finding be made in this case.
The majority has chosen to employ the pilot knowledge test when determining flight classification for purposes of insurance coverage. Furthermore, the majority has decided upon this test without any showing of causation between the pilot’s knowledge or lack of knowledge and the crash. In so doing, the court has adopted precepts of negligence law for a cause of action arising out of contract construction.
I am opposed to the present test set forth in the majority opinion. This court, in Glover, has already spoken to the issues presented in this case. The majority opinion overrules our prior test. Nonetheless, even in light of this new test, I would remand the case to the trial court for the determination of whether a causal connection existed between the pilot’s knowledge or lack thereof and the fatal crash.

. In response to the contention of United States Fire Insurance that this was not the holding in Glover, I note that my interpretation not only is supported by the majority opinion in that case, it is identical to the interpretation of the majority opinion by the dissenting justices. The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Sam D. Johnson and joined by Justice Pope, states:
It is important to follow the reasoning of the majority: first, in determining the character of the flight as VFR or IFR, it will be looked to as a whole; and second, that determination (of the whole) will be based on the conditions (VFR or IFR) at the inception of the flight only.
545 S.W.2d at 764.