Court Opinion

ID: 9946957
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 20:02:51.587607+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:43.999695
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/1/24
               CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                           DIVISION FOUR

    RICHARD C. COLYEAR,                    B308382

         Petitioner and                    (Los Angeles County
         Respondent.                       Super. Ct. No. BS150539)

         v.

    ROLLING HILLS COMMUNITY
    ASSOCIATION OF RANCHO
    PALOS VERDES et al.,

         Plaintiffs and Appellants.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Christopher K. Lui, Judge. Affirmed in part and
reversed in part.

     Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(c) and
8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication with the exception of
parts B through E of the Discussion.
      Horvitz & Levy, David M. Axelrad, John A. Taylor, Jr.;
Kaufman, Dolowich & Voluck, Richard C. Greenberg, Samantha F.
Lamberg, and Michael J. Weinberger, for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
      Greenberg Glusker Fields Claman & Machtinger, Ricardo P.
Cestero; Chuck & Tsoong, Stephen C. Chuck; Greines, Martin,
Stein & Richland, Kent L. Richland, David E. Hackett, and Stefan
C. Love, for Petitioner and Respondent.

                  ____________________________

       The Rolling Hills Community Association of Rancho Palos
Verdes (the Association) appeals the judgment in favor of Richard
C. Colyear on his claim for declaratory relief, an injunction, and
damages for breach of fiduciary duty arising out of the
Association’s tree-trimming covenant. Colyear cross-appeals the
denial of his claim for quiet title. In the published portion of this
opinion, we affirm the judgment as to the claim for declaratory
relief. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, we affirm the
judgment as to Colyear’s claim of quiet title and reverse with
respect to the claims for injunctive relief, breach of fiduciary duty
against the Association, and the attorney fees award against the
Association’s individual directors.

                   FACTUAL BACKGROUND
       In the mid-1930s, the Palos Verdes Corporation (PVC)
acquired a large portion of the Palos Verdes Peninsula and began
subdividing Rolling Hills. The community was envisioned as a
place where residents could enjoy country living and was extolled
for its views. Beginning in 1936, PVC carved out its first tract and

                                  2
recorded a declaration of covenants and restrictions regarding that
section. Over the years, PVC annexed more tracts, each with its
own declaration. Although the original tract and many
subsequent tracts contained covenants permitting the Association
to trim trees on properties to preserve views, some did not.
       As the years passed, trees grew, and view preservation
became an issue in the community. Richard C. Colyear owned two
parcels outside the original tract with a large garden containing
many mature trees. Because the annexation declaration covering
his property contained no tree-trimming covenant, Colyear
preemptively initiated this action to obtain, among other things, a
declaration and injunction that the trees on his property could not
be cut.
       The trial court agreed with Colyear, relying on Citizens for
Covenant Compliance v. Anderson (1995) 12 Cal.4th 345 (Citizens).
In Citizens, our Supreme Court held a covenant in a declaration
establishing a general plan for a subdivision is binding on property
within the subdivision if it is recorded before the execution of the
contract of sale, describes the property, and states that it is to bind
purchasers, even if the covenant is not in the deed. Citizens
makes clear, however, that its ruling applies to properties
described in the declaration at the time of sale because the owners,
by their purchase, impliedly assent to the covenant’s terms.
Because the tree-trimming covenant was not recorded against
Colyear’s property when he purchased it, the court found he did
not impliedly agree to the covenant’s terms.

                                  3
A.     Background of Rolling Hills Development
       PVC acquired Lot “H,” part of the old Rancho Palos Verdes,
in 1926. Most of the Palos Verdes Peninsula was contained within
Lot “H,” including what is now the City of Rolling Hills.
       Rolling Hills is a planned community. At the time of its
inception, there were no trees in Rolling Hills, with every lot
enjoying a panoramic view of Santa Monica Bay and the local
mountains. Rolling Hills had large lots which offered the “ideal
outdoor life, seclusion, privacy, recreation, horseback riding,
cultivation of fruits and vegetables[,] and the enjoyment of a
country atmosphere, all protected by good restrictions.” (Hanson,
Rolling Hills, The Early Years (1978) p. 24.) As further described
by the Association’s attorney in the 1940s, “[PVC’s] project in
these hills contemplate[d] a community development of
refinement, contentment, rural composure, security, privacy and
isolation . . . .”
       In 1936, the Association was incorporated with five
volunteer directors.

B.     Recordation of Declaration 150
       The first phase of the development was initiated with the
recordation of Declaration 150 on May 14, 1936. Declaration 150
stated that PVC “certifies and declares that it has established and
does hereby establish the General Plan for the protection,
maintenance, improvement[,] and development” of the land
described in it. The General Plan set forth “the general basic and
local restrictions, conditions, covenants, reservations, liens and
charges upon and subject to which all lots, parcels and portions of
said property shall be held, leased or sold and/or conveyed.”

                                 4
Declaration 150 contained a metes and bounds description of its
boundaries, and it only covered a portion of Rolling Hills.
       Declaration 150 authorized the Association to interpret and
enforce its provisions and the provisions of “any subsequent
declaration.” (See Declaration 150 Art. I, § 4, Art. II, § 2, subd. (p),
Art. IV, § 11.) Any landowner likewise could enforce the General
Plan against other owners. Declaration 150 stated, “[A]ny lot
owner subject to the jurisdiction of the Association” may seek an
abatement of a violation of any other lot owner of any restrictions,
condition, or covenant in this declaration. (Art. IV, § 12.)
       Article IV, section 5 of Declaration 150 provided for the
annexation of future tracts. Such annexed tracts would be
“subject to restrictions, conditions, covenants, reservations, liens,
or charges set forth in a Declaration of Restrictions.” Upon the
recording of such declarations, “the Association shall then and
thereafter have power to do and perform any and all of the acts, to
fix, impose and collect charges, assessments and dues from the
owners of said property as therein provided[,] and to grant said
owners membership in the Association as therein agreed to and
provided.”
       Article II, section 2 of Declaration 150 provided that the
Association’s powers extended to any property and owner in its
jurisdiction and, according to appellants, reflects PVC’s intent to
extend the General Plan to the entire Rolling Hills community.
       The Tree-Cutting Covenant (Tree CC) is contained in Article
I, section 11 of Declaration 150, which provided in relevant part:
“The Association shall have the right at any time to enter on or
upon any part of said property for the purpose of cutting back
trees or other plantings which, in the opinion of the Association, is

                                   5
warranted to maintain and improve the view of, and protect,
adjoining property.”
      A.E. Hanson, the first general manager of PVC, recalled in
his memoir Rolling Hills, The Early Years, supra at page five, that
at the time of development, all of Rolling Hills was put “under
general basic restriction” when Declaration 150 was signed.

C.     Annexation of Additional Tracts Under Separate
       Declarations
       Over the years, additional tracts were annexed. Today,
Rolling Hills consists of 57 tracts, each added by its own numbered
declaration and agreement with PVC. In 1937, PVC annexed the
first additional tract with Declaration 150-A. Declaration 150-A
expressly stated it was subject to the same restrictions and
conditions as Declaration 150. Another area, referred to as the
“Flying Triangle,” was added in 1939 with Declaration 160. From
1941 to 1944, additional tracts were added, governed by
Declarations 150-B through 150-F. These declarations contained
the same Tree CC as Declaration 150.
       In January 1944, the Board of the Association adopted a
Resolution allowing it to record agreements for the declaration of
covenants in conformity with Declaration 150.1 The Resolution
provided that the Association could, “from time to time, [ ] execute
and deliver, and cause to be recorded in the office of the County
Recorder of the County of Los Angeles, an agreement between this
[A]ssociation and [PVC] for the declaration of establishment of
basic restrictions, conditions, covenants, reservations[,] liens,
charges and certain local restrictions in conformity with said
Declaration No. 150, . . . .”

1     A similar resolution was adopted in 1949.

                                  6
      Declaration 150-M, applicable to Colyear’s property, was
recorded on May 29, 1944, and does not contain the Tree CC. In
1967 and 1970, Colyear purchased his parcels at 35 and 37 Crest
Drive. This land is not within the boundaries described in
Declaration 150. Neither Colyer’s title insurance policies nor his
deeds contain a reference to Declaration 150; rather, the title
insurance reports reference Declaration 150-M. Currently,
Colyear’s property has many mature trees and a large garden.

D.     Inconsistencies Result in the 1947 Swaffield Study
       Roland Swaffield, an attorney and Rolling Hills resident,
prepared a study in 1947 regarding inconsistencies between
Declaration 150 and the annexation declarations. Swaffield
observed that there were questions concerning the scope and
applicability of the various declarations, and there was a “wide
divergence of these restrictions in many instances.”
       In conjunction with this report, Swaffield produced an
analysis of the differences in the restrictions, with particular
emphasis on Declaration 150-AF. Declaration 150-AF is identical
to Declaration 150-M in its preamble and in its omission of the
Tree CC. Swaffield’s analysis observed that in the tract governed
by Declaration 150-AF, “the Association would not have the same
power concerning these subjects” discussed in the omitted sections
“as it possesses in relation to the original Rolling Hills area under
Declaration 150.” In November 1947, Swaffield asked Kelvin
Vanderlip, PVC president, why the Tree CC (codified in section
11), among other sections, had been omitted from Declaration 150-
AF.
       Vanderlip responded that PVC intentionally removed those
provisions: “[P]ractically all of the provisions which were contained

                                 7
in Declaration No. 150, . . . were removed by our attorneys as far
back as the Flying Triangle Declaration [(Declaration 160)] for the
purpose of simplification.” Vanderlip stated that PVC would not
“object to the modification of [Declaration 150-AF]” to conform it to
Declaration 150.
      In 1948, after evaluating possible modifications to the
declarations, a draft modification was prepared, adding the Tree
CC to Declaration 150-AF. The parties intended to use this
modification as a model for other declarations in order to bring
various parcels into conformity with Declaration 150. A Master
Agreement was prepared in 1950 to update the annexation
template. However, the parties realized that modifying the
declarations would require 70 percent concurrence of Association
members. The modifications never took place, and no modified
declarations were ever recorded.
      Later declarations, those recorded from 1949 through 1969,
included the Tree CC.

E.    Russell v. Palos Verdes Properties (1963) 218
      Cal.App.2d 754 (Russell)
      There are a number of cases involving covenants, some
concerning covenants in Rolling Hills specifically. Russell, a case
predating Citizens, involved Rolling Hills subdivision restrictions
requiring neighborhood association permission before subdividing
any parcel. (Russell, supra, 218 Cal.App.2d. at p. 757.) Russell
held that personal covenants, which do not run with the land, may
be enforced against transferees acquiring the property with actual
or constructive notice2 of the restrictions when the property was

2     Proper recordation of a real property instrument is necessary to
impart constructive notice of its contents. (Civ. Code, §§ 1213, 1214.)

                                   8
conveyed to them, when failure to enforce the restrictions would
produce an inequitable result. (Id. at pp. 762–764.)
       Although its holding is not on point here, Russell made
various non-binding observations about the interplay between
Declaration 150 and the subsequent annexation declarations. At
issue in Russell was Declaration 150-W.3 (Russell, supra, 218
Cal.App.2d at p. 765.) Russell observed that Declaration 150
created “a general plan of restrictions.” When PVC sold
subsequent parcels, “before conveying the same and for the future
use of the land,” PVC “imposed on each the above restrictions in
the form of separate Agreements and Declarations between it and
[the] Association.” (Id. at p. 758.) Russell further observed that
the declarations applicable to the parcels that were sold
(Declarations 150-A through 150-V) were intended to establish a
general plan for the development, improvement, and protection of
the subdivision. (Id. at p. 759.) With Declaration 150-W’s
reference to the General Plan in Declaration 150, Russell indicated
the land it annexed into Rolling Hills became “subject to the same
restrictions.” (Id. at p. 765.)
       William Kinley, the Association’s counsel at the time of the
Russell decision, relied on the decision to assert that “all parcels in
Rolling Hills are subject to [Declaration] 150 because of the
reasoning in the Russell case” and “everybody was covered” by the

If an instrument cannot be located by searching the “grantor” and
“grantee” indices of the public records, the instrument does not
constitute constructive notice and later bona fide purchasers or
encumbrances are not charged with knowledge of its existence. (See
Stafford v. Ballinger (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 289, 297.)

3     Declaration 150-W’s simplified restrictions list also omits the
Tree CC.

                                   9
General Plan. Kinley believed Russell established that “all of the
Declarations of Restrictions were to be considered as a part of
Declaration [ ] 150” and “not as separate and independent
declarations of restrictions.” Nonetheless, Kinley informed his
successor, Sidney Croft, who became the Association’s attorney in
1988, that different restrictions had been placed on different
tracts.

F.     Citizens for Covenant Compliance v. Anderson (1995)
       12 Cal.4th 345 (Citizens)
       In Citizens, our Supreme Court held that a declaration of
restrictions for a subdivision need not be cited in a parcel’s deed to
be effective if certain conditions were met. (Citizens, supra, 12
Cal.4th at p. 349.) Citizens required that the declaration be
recorded before the execution of the contract of sale, describe the
property it is to govern, and state that it is to bind all purchasers
and their successors. (Ibid., italics added.) Citizens denounced the
“crazy-quilt pattern” of restrictions that resulted from a contrary
rule, which occurred when “the developer of a subdivision records
a uniform plan of restrictions intended to bind and benefit every
parcel alike,” but “implementation of the plan depends upon the
vagaries of the actual deeds, and whether they contain at least a
ritualistic reference to restrictions of record.” (Id. at pp. 360–363.)
Citizens reasoned that “if the restrictions are recorded before the
sale, the later purchaser is deemed to agree to them . . . even if
there is no additional reference to them in the deed.” (Id. at
p. 363.)

                                  10
G.    Nunn v. Rolling Hills Community Association of
      Rancho Palos Verdes (Super. Ct. Los Angeles, 2004,
      No. BC314522) (Nunn)
      In Nunn, the superior court rejected the contention that a
parcel subject to Declaration 150 could claim exemption from its
Tree CC provisions because the party seeking to enforce those
provisions against it was not so encumbered.
      Nunn involved two adjacent homeowners who disputed
whether the Tree CC applied to their property. The Lorigs, who
were uphill to the Nunns, sought to have the Association trim the
Nunns’ trees, but the Nunns sought an injunction to prevent the
trimming. The Nunns’ property was within the original
boundaries of Declaration 150, while the Lorigs’ property was
outside the boundaries of Declaration 150 but within Declaration
150-AE. Declaration 150-AE did not contain the Tree CC.
      The court observed that the General Plan provision
authorizing the Tree CC was contained in a declaration by PVC
(through Declaration 150) when it owned “what is now the Nunn
property and the Lorig property. Said provision is contained in
documents in the chain of title of the Nunn property but is not
contained in a conveyance or document in the chain of title of the
Lorig property.”
      The Nunns argued that while the Tree CC was in their
chain of title, the Tree CC was not in the Lorigs’ chain of title such
that the covenant lacked mutuality and could not be enforced
against them. The court disagreed and found the Nunns were
bound by the Tree CC because it was “contained in a declaration
that describes the Nunn property, was recorded before the Nunn
property was sold, states that it is to bind all purchasers and their
successors and was recorded to give subsequent purchasers

                                 11
constructive notice of it. . . . The Nunns . . . had constructive
notice that trees upon their property might be trimmed to
maintain the view of, and protect, adjoining property.” As a result,
the court denied the Nunns’ request for preliminary injunction.
The Nunns’ writ petition was summarily denied by this court.

H.     Subsequent Resolutions Attempt to Correct View
       Impairment Provisions
       Given the inconsistencies and uncertainties regarding the
enforceability of view restrictions, beginning in the 1990s, as trees
had matured, residents complained that Rolling Hill’s blank
canvas had become an area of “obscene landscaping.” Responding
to community support for view protection, the Association
attempted to create conformity among the divergent declarations.
       The Association adopted several resolutions as follows:
       Resolution 166. This resolution, adopted in 1997 and
drafted by Croft, permitted any Rolling Hills resident to apply for
the Association to exercise its tree-trimming authority to correct
view impairments. Resolution 166 does not distinguish between
parcels that have a Tree CC and those that do not.
       Resolution 181. In 2002, the Association limited view
impairment correction to cases involving mutuality of deed
restrictions. The resolution adopted a policy accepting
applications only when “the applicant and the affected parcel are
subject to the same Deed Restrictions.”
       The Association opted to require mutuality of deed
restrictions to reduce litigation with those who, like Colyear,
objected to having the Tree CC applied to their property. Colyear
wrote to the Association in July 2002, informing the Association
that his property was covered by Declaration 150-M. He asked

                                 12
whether the Association asserted the Tree CC was enforceable
against his property, and the Association responded, “No. You are
one of the few ‘miscellaneous’ parcels who are not protected.”
       Resolution 193. In response to the Nunn litigation, Croft
advised that the Tree CC need not be in the chain of title to be
binding. Croft asserted that Declaration 150’s Tree CC applied to
all properties in the Association’s boundaries.
       In 2006, Resolution 193 was issued. It stated that
Declaration 150 applied to “some, if not all” properties in Rolling
Hills. Resolution 193 required that the object of the view
complaint be subject to the Tree CC. But, as amended in 2009,
this resolution permitted any owner to file an application.
       Resolution 220. This June 2012 resolution replaced
Resolutions 166, 181, and 193. Recognizing the Tree CC applied to
“some, if not all, properties in the City of Rolling Hills,” it stated it
was the Association’s “policy to encourage resolution of view
impairment issues between the parties who are directly involved.”
The resolution permitted any property owner to file a view
application, regardless of the owner’s governing declaration.

                 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A.     Petition and Complaint
       This action originated in 2015, when a neighbor of Colyear
filed a view application under Resolution 220 against another
neighbor. However, two of Colyear’s trees appeared in a
photograph of the view application, so Colyear preemptively sued
the neighbor as well as the Association and several of its board
members to enjoin them from cutting his trees, for declaratory
relief that the Tree CC did not apply to his property, and for quiet
title and breach of fiduciary duty against the board and

                                   13
Association. The neighbor successfully challenged Colyear’s
lawsuit as a SLAPP action, but the action proceeded against the
remaining defendants. (Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community
Association of Rancho Palos Verdes (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 119, 123,
137.)
      After several intermediate proceedings, Colyear filed his
operative Third Amended Petition and Second Amended
Complaint in June 2018, stating claims for declaratory relief,
injunctive relief, quiet title, slander of title, and breach of fiduciary
duty against the Association and the director defendants.4
Colyear sought to enjoin the Association from relying on
Resolution 220 and Declaration 150 to trim trees on his property
and a declaration that Declaration 150 did not apply to his
property.

B.     Trial and Statement of Decision
       After the trial court granted defendants’ motion for
summary adjudication on the slander of title claim,5 the matter
proceeded to a 10-day bench trial held in September 2019.
       Colyear principally argued that restrictions can only burden
the property legally described in the restricting document, and
because Declaration 150 only described one tract, under Citizens,
it did not burden his property. The Association argued that

4     In addition to the Association, the operative petition named the
Board of Directors of the Association; Board members David McKinnie,
Joseph Heitzler, Gian Starinieri, Marcia Gold, Tom Heinsheimer, and
Fred Lorig; and non-board member Yu Ping Liu.

5     Before trial, on July 23, 2019, Colyear dismissed without
prejudice individual director defendants Gold and Heinsheimer, and on
August 15, 2019, dismissed Starinieri.

                                   14
Citizens supported its position because Declaration 150 was in
Colyear’s chain of title through Declaration 150-M, and reasonable
inquiry would have put Colyear on notice that Declaration 150’s
general restrictions, including the view covenant, applied to his
property. The Association also argued it had treated Declaration
150 as the General Plan from the beginning and its interpretation
of the General Plan was conclusive.
       The trial court issued its Corrected Statement of Decision
and entered judgment on September 4, 2020.
       In its statement of decision, the court identified the issue as
whether Declaration 150 was binding on properties other than
those identified therein. The court rejected the Association’s
contention that Russell established the governing effect of
Declaration 150 over the entire community. The court
distinguished Russell on the basis it did not address the Tree CC,
did not address inconsistent provisions among the various
recorded declarations, and assumed for purposes of the case before
it the declarations were the same. As a result, the court found
Russell provided no support for the Association’s argument that
Declaration 150 was binding across the entire community.
       The trial court also conducted a linguistic analysis of
Declaration 150-M. The court concluded Declaration 150-M did
not incorporate Declaration 150’s terms sufficiently to impart
notice that Declaration 150 applied to properties governed by
Declaration 150-M. Further, extrinsic evidence, including the
1944 resolution, the Swaffield study, as well as the Hanson book,
confirmed that Declaration 150 was not drafted to apply clearly
and unambiguously outside its boundaries. Further, the abortive
attempts of the Association over the years to modify or amend the

                                 15
annexation declarations showed that the Association was aware of
the inconsistencies.
       Lastly, the trial court concluded Citizens did not compel a
different result. Citizens held that where a common plan for a
subdivision is recorded before the properties in a subdivision are
sold, all properties in the subdivision are bound, even where the
deed or other documents pertaining to the sale do not mention the
restrictions. However, Declaration 150 was not a stand-alone plan
that expressly applied to all of Rolling Hills at the time Colyear
purchased his home. Additionally, the CC&Rs in Citizens were
recorded on the subject property, while Declaration 150 was not
recorded on Colyear’s property. Thus, no “uniform plan of CC&Rs
was ever imposed during the expansion of the community, as the
Swaffield analysis showed years before [Colyear] purchased [his
property].” The trial court observed, “To the extent a crazy quilt
exists, it is a byproduct of the method by which PVC and [the
Association] expanded the community.”
       The trial court granted Colyear’s request for declaratory
relief and an injunction, declaring that Declaration 150 was not
binding on Colyear’s property except to the extent any restrictions
were restated in Declaration 150-M. The court enjoined the
Association from enforcing or attempting to enforce the Tree CC
against Colyear’s property and from “publishing or disseminating
in any statements or documents, including internet website
content, indicating that the [Tree CC] applies to or may be
enforced against the [s]ubject [p]roperty.” The court found the
Association breached its fiduciary duty to Colyear, but denied
Colyear’s quiet title claim, finding it unwarranted and
“redundant” given the injunction and declaratory relief. The court

                                16
also entered judgment in favor of the individual defendants on the
fiduciary duty claim.6
      On February 25, 2021, the court awarded $1.328 million in
attorney fees to Colyear under Civil Code section 5975.

                            DISCUSSION
A.     Applicability of the Tree CC to Colyear’s Property
       1.     Standard of Review
       We analyze deeds under the same rules applicable to
contracts. (Canyon Vineyard Estates I, LLC v. DeJoria (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 995, 1003.) “Contract interpretation is a question of
law.” (Ibid.) “‘The fundamental goal of contract interpretation is
to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties.’” (Ibid; see
Civ. Code, § 1636; Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2
Cal.4th 1254, 1264.) When a contract is reduced to writing, the
parties’ intention is determined from the writing alone, if possible.
(Civ. Code, § 1639.) “The words of a contract are to be understood
in their ordinary and popular sense.” (Civ. Code, § 1644; see
Lloyd’s Underwriters v. Craig & Rush, Inc. (1994) 26 Cal.App.4th
1194, 1197–1198 [“We interpret the intent and scope of the
agreement by focusing on the usual and ordinary meaning of the
language used and the circumstances under which the agreement
was made”].) The whole of the contract is “‘to be taken together, so
as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable,’” and to
avoid a construction “that would render other provisions
surplusage.” (Boghos v. Certain Underwriters of Lloyd’s of London

6       In so ruling, the trial court found the petition for writ of
mandate superfluous. The court reasoned that, although there was no
basis for the Association to enforce the Tree CC, issuance of writ relief
was unnecessary because the claims for declaratory and injunctive
relief accomplished this purpose.

                                   17
(2005) 36 Cal.4th 495, 503 (Boghos); see R.W.L. Enterprises v.
Oldcastle, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 1019, 1026 (R.W.L.
Enterprises) [an interpretation giving “‘effect to all provisions of
the contract is preferred to one which renders part of the writing
superfluous, useless or inexplicable’”].)
       Extrinsic evidence is admissible to prove a meaning to which
the contract is reasonably susceptible. (Powers v. Dickson, Carlson
& Campillo (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1111.) If the trial court
decides, after receiving the extrinsic evidence, the language of the
contract is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation urged, the
evidence is admitted to aid the interpretation. (Ibid.) Thus, “[t]he
test of admissibility of extrinsic evidence to explain the meaning of
a written instrument is not whether it appears to the court to be
plain and unambiguous on its face, but whether the offered
evidence is relevant to prove a meaning to which the language of
the instrument is reasonably susceptible.” (Pacific Gas & E. Co. v.
G.W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 37.)
       The threshold issue of whether to admit the extrinsic
evidence—that is, whether the contract is reasonably susceptible
to the interpretation urged—is a question of law subject to de novo
review. (Appleton v. Waessil (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 551, 554–555.)
Here, because the material facts are undisputed, the legal
significance of those facts presents a question of law which we
review de novo. (Hill v. San Jose Family Housing Partners, LLC
(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 764, 774.)

                                 18
      2.      Declaration 150 Does Not Apply to Colyear’s Property
              a.     Under Citizens, Declaration 150 Does Not
                     Burden Colyear’s Property Because His Property
                     is Not Described in It
       “A covenant running with the land is created by language in
a deed or other document showing an agreement to do or refrain
from doing something with respect to use of the land.” (Committee
to Save The Beverly Highlands Homes Assn. v. Beverly Highlands
Homes Assn. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1247, 1269.) The only
covenants that run with the land are those specified by statute
“and those which are incidental thereto.” (Civ. Code, § 1461.) The
primary characteristic of a covenant running with the land is that
its benefits and burdens pass with the transfer of the estate. (Self
v. Sharafi (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 483, 488.)
       Citizens described the requirements for the formation of
covenants and held that where CC&Rs are recorded before the
sale of any property in a subdivision, describing the property they
govern, subsequent purchasers who have constructive notice of the
recorded CC&Rs are deemed to have agreed to be bound by such
restrictions, even where such restrictions are not mentioned in any
deed or other document. (Citizens, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 349,
italics added.) Citizens found it was not merely the intent of the
original grantor that established the covenant; there must be
sufficient intent on the part of the purchaser to enter the
covenants. “Although notice is relevant to our resolution of the
issue, it is not the issue itself.” (Id. at p. 356.) Rather, there must
be sufficient evidence of the grantee’s intent to accept the
covenant. (Id. at pp. 356, 365–366.)
       As Citizens made clear, the covenant comes into existence
upon sale or transfer of the property. “In essence, if the

                                  19
restrictions are recorded before the sale, the later purchaser is
deemed to agree to them. The purchase of property [with]
know[ledge] of the restrictions evinces the buyer’s intent to accept
their burdens and benefits. Thus, the mutual servitudes are
created at the time of the conveyance even if there is no additional
reference to them in the deed.” (Citizens, supra, 12 Cal.4th at
p. 363.) Citizens concluded, “[T]he rule is consistent with the
rationale that a covenant requires an agreement between buyer
and seller, and not a unilateral action by the developer.” (Id. at
p. 367.) In other words, the parties’ intent is inferred from the
recorded uniform plan: “It is express on the part of the seller,
implied on the part of the purchaser. . . .” (Id. at p. 366.)
       Citizens examined two cases for guidance: Werner v.
Graham (1919) 181 Cal. 174 (Werner) and Riley v. Bear Creek
Planning Committee (1976) 17 Cal.3d 500 (Riley). In both cases,
covenants were recorded by developers seeking to impose a
general plan, but the developers failed in their efforts for different
reasons. In Werner, the developer subdivided a parcel and
recorded a map but did not record any other documents indicating
any restrictions. (Werner, supra, at p. 177.) The developer in
Riley sold the property in dispute by deed that contained no
restrictions, but nine months after the conveyance, the developer
recorded a document purporting to impose uniform restrictions on
a number of lots, including the one in dispute. (Riley, supra, at
p. 504.) In both Werner and Riley, the Supreme Court held the
properties were not bound by the restrictions. In Werner, there
was no recorded document imposing uniform restrictions on the
entire subdivision, only individual deeds imposing restrictions on
specific parcels. In Riley, the restrictions were recorded after the
conveyance at issue.

                                  20
      Here, applying the rule recognized in Citizens and its
rationale, we conclude the Tree CC of Declaration 150 does not
apply to Colyear’s property. First, it is undisputed that
Declaration 150 does not describe Colyear’s property, as required
by Citizens. This requirement defines the scope of the buyer’s
implied agreement to any covenant binding the described
property. As originally set forth, Declaration 150 covered the
narrow strip down the middle of Rolling Hills. In later years, as
PVC expanded the Rolling Hills development, additional
declarations were made, including Declaration 150-M governing
Colyear’s property. Neither Colyear’s deeds nor his title reports
reference Declaration 150, but they reference Declaration 150-M.
As a result, under Citizens, Colyear did not impliedly agree to be
bound by a covenant set forth in Declaration 150.

             b.    The Association’s Arguments
      Acknowledging that Declaration 150 does not expressly
apply to Colyear’s property, the Association advances several
theories to extend the Tree CC to Colyear’s property:
(1) Declaration 150-M’s references to Declaration 150 and the
General Plan incorporate the basic restrictions of Declaration
150; (2) these references provide constructive or inquiry notice
that the Tree CC in Declaration 150 applies to lands annexed
under Declaration 150-M; (3) the extrinsic evidence at trial
established that PVC intended to incorporate Declaration 150’s
terms into Declaration 150-M; (4) under the Nunn and Russell
cases, the Tree CC should apply; (5) Resolution 220 makes the
Tree CC applicable; and (6) because Colyear benefits from using
Association property, he bears the corresponding burden of

                                21
complying the Tree CC in Declaration 150. These arguments are
unpersuasive.
                    (1)   Declaration 150-M Does Not Incorporate
                          Declaration 150’s Terms
       The Association argues that references to Declaration 150
in Declaration 150-M are sufficient to incorporate the Tree CC
into Declaration 150-M. We disagree.
       We turn to contract principles for guidance. A contract
may incorporate the terms of another contract. (Shaw v. Regents
of the University of California (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 44, 54.)
However, the reference to the other contract or its terms must be
clear and unequivocal. “‘“[T]he reference must be called to the
attention of the other party and he must consent thereto, and the
terms of the incorporated document must be known or easily
available to the contracting parties.” [Citation.]’” (Ibid.)
Further, the terms of the contract must be sufficiently certain in
order to provide a basis for determining the existence of a breach
and for giving an appropriate remedy. (Weddington Productions,
Inc. v. Flick (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 793, 811.) As a corollary, we
will not write the parties’ contract for them. (Industrial
Indemnity v. Superior Court (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 828, 832.)
       In this case, Declaration 150-M does not sufficiently
incorporate the Tree CC found in Declaration 150. First, unlike
other declarations such as Declaration 150-A, Declaration 150-M
does not expressly incorporate the restrictions found in
Declaration 150; to the contrary, the General Basic Descriptions
in Declaration 150-M duplicate some of Declaration 150’s General
Basic Restrictions and omit others. Second, while Declaration
150-M acknowledges that Declaration 150 exists, nowhere is
there clear and unequivocal incorporation of Declaration 150 or

                               22
its Tree CC. For example, the first reference to Declaration 150
is to its separate location by Map and Book number. Declaration
150-M also refers to PVC’s “General Plan” and the Association’s
power to interpret and enforce covenants imposed on tracts
covered by Declaration 150, but this simply recites the
Association’s powers as to tracts covered by Declaration 150. It
does not state that Declaration 150’s covenants apply to tracts
covered by Declaration 150-M. Finally, Declaration 150-M
provides that under Article IV, section 5 of Declaration 150, PVC
can annex more tracts to be governed by Declarations that are to
be later recorded. That is what occurred here: Colyear’s property
was annexed, and Declaration 150-M was recorded to govern it.
These references are not sufficiently clear, unequivocal, or certain
to incorporate Declaration 150’s Tree CC into Declaration 150-M.

                  (2)     Declaration 150-M’s References to
                          Declaration 150 Did Not Otherwise Make
                          the Tree CC Applicable to Colyear’s
                          Property
       The terms of Declaration 150, including the Tree CC, were
not recorded against Colyear’s property. Nevertheless, the
Association asserts that the references to Declaration 150 in
Declaration 150-M were sufficient to put Colyear on constructive
or inquiry notice that the Tree CC applied to his property.
According to the Association, Colyear should have inquired as to
what Declaration 150 said, analyzed the competing declarations,
and reached the conclusion that the Tree CC applied to his
property. The Association asserts, under Citizens, this is
sufficient to enforce the Tree CC against his property, even
though the covenant is not in the chain of title. We disagree.

                                23
      As a preliminary matter, the references to Declaration 150
in 150-M did not put Colyear sufficiently on constructive or
inquiry notice of the applicability of the Tree CC. Constructive
notice of a lien, covenant, or other interest in property arises from
the proper recording of that interest. (Civ. Code, § 1213; Vasquez
v. LBS Financial Credit Union (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 97, 108.)
Civil Code section 1213 provides that “every conveyance of real
property . . . recorded as prescribed by law [provides] constructive
notice of its contents [ ] to subsequent purchasers.” (See Civ. Code,
§ 1215.) A purchaser has inquiry notice where the purchaser “‘has
knowledge of circumstances which, upon reasonable inquiry,
would lead to that particular fact.’” (In re Marriage of Cloney
(2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 429, 437; see Civ. Code, § 19.) As we have
discussed, Declaration 150-M did not incorporate Declaration 150
by reference and Declaration 150 was not otherwise recorded
against Colyear’s property. Even if Colyear had reviewed
Declaration 150, given the property description therein, he could
have concluded it applied to a different section of Rolling Hills.
This conclusion would have been confirmed by the Association in
2002 when it stated the Tree CC was not enforceable against his
property.
      Moreover, Citizens does not stand for the proposition that a
purported covenant outside the chain of title can be enforced
whenever there is a development with a common grantor.
Although PVC is the common grantor of the Rolling Hills parcels,
it conveyed different parcels under different declarations. As
Citizens makes clear, a covenant is created by implied agreement,
which occurs with the recordation of the original declaration on
property and its acceptance through conveyance to a subsequent
purchaser. “‘The burden should be upon the developer to insert

                                 24
the covenant into the record in a way that it can be easily found’
and ‘[a]ll buyers could easily know exactly what they were
purchasing.’” (Citizens, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 365.) The
recordation should be such that a title search reflects the
operative declaration. (Ibid.) Then, when a conveyance is made
subject to that declaration, the buyer can be deemed to have
consented to it. Here, it is undisputed that the original
declaration recorded on Colyear’s property, 150-M, did not
contain the Tree CC. Thus, under Citizens, Colyear cannot be
deemed to have accepted the Tree CC.

                  (3)   Extrinsic Evidence of PVC’s Intent

       The Association argues the trial court erred in ignoring its
extrinsic evidence of PVC’s intent to have a uniform General Plan
that would include tree-trimming covenants for every property in
the development. We disagree that such evidence must be
considered in defining the scope of the covenant. Citizens
demonstrates the intent that matters is what is expressed in
writing in the recorded predecessor documents describing the
property to be bound. (Citizens, supra, 12 Cal.4th at p. 366.) PVC
did not bring its intended General Plan to fruition by recording the
necessary documents in conformity with Citizens on Colyear’s
property. As explained in Werner and Citizens, the sole intent of
the common grantor, the original owner, is insufficient. There
must be joint intent between the grantor and the grantees.
Further, Riley rejected parol evidence to show that the parties in
fact intended the property to be subject to restrictions like those
later recorded, finding that the covenants must be in writing to be
effective. (Riley, supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 509.) A contrary rule
“would make important questions of the title to real estate largely

                                25
dependent upon the uncertain recollection and testimony of
interested witnesses.” (Id. at p. 510.)

                   (4)    Nunn and Russell
       To the extent the Association attempts to rely on Nunn and
Russell to contend the Tree CC applies to Colyear’s property, both
cases are distinguishable. Nunn addressed two properties, one
with the Tree CC and the other without it, and did not decide the
issue whether the Tree CC applied to the entire community
regardless of the language in the individual declarations. Russell
did not decide the applicability of the Tree CC. As our analysis
based on Citizens makes clear, Russell’s commentary on the scope
of the General Plan and Declaration 150 is only dicta. (Sonic-
Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1158 [an
appellate decision is not authority for everything said in the
court’s opinion but only for the points involved and actually
decided].)

                   (5)    Resolution 220
       The Association argues Resolution 220 provides an
independent basis to enforce the Tree CC. Resolution 220
permitted any property owner to file a view application, regardless
of the owner’s governing declaration. Resolution 220 only provides
a mechanism for filing a view application to resolve tree-trimming
disputes. It is not a covenant.

                                26
                  (6)     Colyear’s Use of Association Common
                          Areas is Not Inconsistent with Our
                          Conclusion
      Finally, the Association asserts that because Colyear enjoys
the benefits of Rolling Hills’ roads, gates, and other facilities, he
should be subject to all intended restrictions, including the Tree
CC. The Association generally argues that it would be unfair to
allow him to enjoy the benefits of common areas without
subjecting him to the burden of the Tree CC. To the extent this
argument posits that only properties subject to the original
Declaration 150 may use the common areas, it is mistaken. The
Association’s Articles of Incorporation establish that the common
areas are governed by the Association “for the benefit of residents
of any tract” and as may be set forth in any subsequent
declaration for such tract. As we have discussed, there is no
declaration applicable to Colyear’s property that includes the Tree
CC.

            c.      Declaration 150-M’s Tree-Trimming Provisions
                    Do Not Provide an Independent Basis to Trim
                    Colyear’s Trees
      The Association asserts certain provisions of Declaration
150-M (Art. II, § 2, subds. (u), (j), and (v))—independent of
Declaration 150’s General Plan—provide the authority for it to
enter Colyear’s property and trim trees for any purpose, including
view protection. Colyear asserts the Association did not raise the
issue at trial, and in any event, the Association’s tree-trimming
power is limited to streets, parks, playgrounds, school grounds,
and adjacent land.

                                 27
        Declaration 150-M, Article II, section 2, subdivision (u)
permits the Association to trim trees under certain circumstances:
The Association has the power “[t]o care for, trim, protect, plant
and replant trees, shrubs, or other planting on streets, parks,
playgrounds, school grounds, or upon any property over which it
may have and/or assume control or jurisdiction and/or on any
property adjoining the same.” Article II, section 2, subdivision (j)
grants the Association the authority to “provide for light [and]
air . . . for the occupants of existing and/or hereafter erected
buildings by establishing such regulations as are usually included
in city housing codes or zoning regulations.” Finally, Article II,
section 2, subdivision (v) authorizes the Association to “care for,
trim, protect and plant or replant any vacant or private property it
may assume charge of and to make a reasonable charge therefor.”
        We need not determine whether the Association sufficiently
raised the issue at trial because these provisions do not give the
Association power to trim trees on any and all private property
within the Association’s boundaries. By its plain language,
subdivision (u) governs plants in public places: streets, parks,
playgrounds, and school grounds. To the extent subdivision (u)
also refers to “any property over which [the Association] may have
and/or assume control and jurisdiction and/or on any property
adjoining the same,” this language must be read in context. It
refers to the Association’s ability to attend to plantings found on
the types of property the Association may control that are similar
to the public property specifically identified. In some instances,
the Association’s plantings could naturally encroach on adjoining
properties, in which case, subdivision (u) would arguably allow the
Association to cut them back. But subdivision (u) cannot be
construed beyond the terms it encompasses. (See Eisen v.

                                28
Tavangarian (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 626, 644 [ejusdem generis
limits general word following specific word to those of like kind].)
       To interpret subdivision (u) as the Association proposes
would render the Tree CC mere surplusage, as the Association
could use subdivision (u) to trim trees found anywhere on any
private property. PVC would not have relied upon vague language
at the end of a provision governing public spaces to establish a
significant right to enter an individual homeowner’s property and
cut their trees. (See Boghos, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 503; R.W.L.
Enterprises, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 1026.)
       The Association’s arguments regarding subdivisions (j) and
(v) are also unavailing. The language in these provisions is also
too general to encompass the Association’s specific right to enter
private property and trim trees. Subdivision (j) deals with the
Association’s ability to make light and air regulations “as are
usually included in city housing codes or zoning regulations” and
contemplates view preservation regulations regarding future
construction. This language cannot reasonably be construed to
give the Association the authority to enforce the Tree CC on
property not otherwise encumbered by it. (Epic Communications,
Inc. v. Richwave Technology, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1342,
1348–1349 [language must be reasonably susceptible to
interpretation “urged by the party”].) For the same reason,
subdivision (v) cannot be extended in the manner the Association
argues. Subdivision (v) concerns the care of vacant or private
property of which the Association takes charge, not private
property generally, including property actively managed by its
owner. Finally, as with subdivision (u), if subdivisions (j) and (v)
are interpreted as the Association proposes, they render the Tree

                                29
CC mere surplusage. (See Boghos, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 503;
R.W.L. Enterprises, supra, 17 Cal.App.5th at p. 1026.)

B.     Scope of Injunctive Relief
       The Association contends the injunctive relief granted by the
trial court is overbroad, constitutes a prior restraint on speech,
and should not include the individual director defendants.
Colyear counters that the Association, as well as the individual
board members, have asserted the Tree CC applies throughout the
area governed by the Association, and thus, prior restraint is
appropriate.
       The judgment contains two injunctions. The judgment on
the declaratory relief claim enjoins “all Defendants” and anyone
“acting in concert with them . . . from enforcing, or attempting to
enforce, the [Tree CC] against [Colyear’s property].” The
judgment on the injunctive relief claim enjoins all defendants from
“publishing or disseminating in any statements or documents,
including internet website content, indicating that the [Tree CC]
applies to or may be enforced against the [s]ubject [p]roperty.”

      1.     Governing Law
      A permanent injunction is a determination on the merits
that a plaintiff has prevailed on a cause of action and that
equitable relief is appropriate. (Art Movers, Inc. v. Ni West, Inc.
(1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 640, 646.) The grant or denial of a
permanent injunction rests within the trial court’s sound
discretion and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a showing of
a clear abuse of discretion. (Mendez v. Rancho Valencia Resort
Partners, LLC (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 248, 260.) A permanent

     See footnote, ante, page 1.

                                    30
injunction, notwithstanding its discretionary component, must be
sufficiently supported by the evidence of record. (DVD Copy
Control Assn., Inc. v. Kaleidescape, Inc. (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th
697, 721.) If the evidence is insufficient to justify issuance of a
permanent injunction, the trial court had no discretion to issue the
injunction. (Ibid.)
       “‘[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights.’ [Citation.]” (DVD Copy Control Assn., Inc. v. Bunner
(2003) 31 Cal.4th 864, 886.) A prior restraint describes judicial
orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance
of the time that such communications are to occur, and permanent
injunctions “are classic examples of prior restraints.” (Ibid.)
However, “[a]lthough stated in broad terms, the right to free
speech is not absolute.” (Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car System, Inc.
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 121, 133–134.) Indeed, “‘there are categories of
communication and certain special utterances to which the
majestic protection of the First Amendment does not extend
because they “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and
are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social
interest in order and morality.”’” (Balboa Island Village Inn, Inc.
v. Lemen (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1141, 1147 (Lemen).)
       Injunctive relief may be applied to repetition of expression
that has judicially been determined to be unlawful. (Lemen,
supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 1153.) However, an injunction’s scope is
overbroad where the conduct enjoined is not likely to recur in the
future. (Scripps Health v. Marin (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 324, 332–
333.)

                                31
       2.     The Order Enjoining Future Speech
       Here, substantial evidence does not support a finding the
Association (or its board members) have expressed outside of
litigation that the Tree CC applies to Colyear’s property. As
reflected in its response to Colyear’s July 2002 letter, the
Association has at times asserted the Tree CC did not apply to his
property. While this confusion led Colyear to institute this action
preemptively after joining third-party litigation between
neighboring homeowners, it does not show the Association (or its
board members) repeatedly asserted Declaration 150 and the Tree
CC applied to Colyear’s property. Moreover, the trial court’s
ruling the Tree CC does not apply to Colyear’s property makes it
unlikely the Association will publicly state otherwise in the future.
As such, the injunction is not supported by sufficient evidence and
therefore constitutes an abuse of discretion.

        3.    The Order Enjoining Future Attempts of Enforcement
        The order enjoining “all Defendants” and those acting in
concert with them from enforcing, or attempting to enforce, the
Tree CC against Colyear’s property does not enjoin speech. Thus,
it is subject to a different analysis. Appellants do not contest entry
of the injunction prohibiting the enforcement of the Tree CC
against Colyear’s property as a general proposition but argue
instead that the declaratory relief injunction is overbroad because
only the Association itself need be enjoined.
        Appellants cite no applicable authority to show it is an
abuse of discretion to enjoin all defendants and those working in
concert with them. It is well settled that an entity, as well as
those through which it acts, may be subject to an injunction.
(Berger v. Superior Court (1917) 175 Cal. 719, 721 [injunction

                                 32
applies to the classes of persons through whom the enjoined
person may act, such as agents, servants, employees, aiders,
abettors, etc., though not parties to the action]; accord, Signal Oil
& Gas Co. v. Ashland Oil & Refining Co. (1958) 49 Cal.2d 764,
779 [injunction against the corporation is injunction against the
directors, acting in their capacity as directors].)7 As there is no
showing the trial court abused its discretion by enjoining the
Association, the individual directors, and those acting in concert
with them, the declaratory relief injunction is affirmed.

C.    Breach of Fiduciary Duty Claim
      The Association contends the breach of fiduciary duty claim
must be reversed because Colyear suffered no damages, as
attorney fees do not constitute proper damages for breach of
fiduciary duty. The Association also contends the directors acted
in good faith in enforcing the CC&Rs, and because they cannot be
individually liable, the Association itself cannot be liable. Colyear
responds that the trial court’s findings necessarily establish harm
because the court enjoined the Association from further breaches
and good faith does not excuse the Association’s breach. We
conclude the claim fails due to a lack of damages.

     1.     Relevant Background
     At trial, the Association asserted it acted in good faith
pursuant to the business judgment rule (Corp. Code, § 7231) and

7      Although the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are not applicable
in this case, we note the court used language similar to that found in
rule 65. Rule 65 states that an injunction can include the parties, “the
parties’ officers, agents, servants, employees, and attorneys,” and “other
persons who are in active concert or participation” with the parties.
(Fed. Rules Civ. Proc., rule 65.)

                                    33
on reliance of counsel. The trial court agreed as to the actions of
the individual board members, citing Biren v. Equality Emergency
Medical Group, Inc. (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 125, 137 (Biren)
[business judgment rule protects even misinformed, misguided
and mistaken directors who were well-meaning].
       However, the court found the Association could be found
liable apart from its individual board members on the rationale
that even where the board members are protected by the good
faith exception, a homeowner should not be without a remedy
against the board. (See Ritter & Ritter, Inc. Pension & Profit Plan
v. The Churchill Condominium Assn. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 103,
125 (Ritter).) The court found the Association liable because it
adopted a community-wide view policy (Resolution 220) without a
valid basis in the applicable declarations.
       With respect to damages, the trial court found that while
Colyear’s property would suffer a loss in value if the trees were
cut, he had neither attempted to sell his property nor was he
dissuaded from doing so because of the Tree CC. Thus, there was
no indication of past damages for diminution in value. Due to the
injunctive and declaratory relief, there was no evidence supporting
present or future damages. Although the court believed attorney
fees could be recovered as damages at the time it entered its
corrected statement of decision, there was no evidence presented
at trial of such fees. Nonetheless, the court upheld the
Association’s liability for breach of fiduciary duty on the apparent
basis Colyear might be awarded attorney fees.
       On September 21, 2020, Colyear filed a separate, noticed
motion for attorney fees pursuant to Civil Code section 5975. The
trial court granted the fees in an order entered February 25, 2021.

                                34
       2.     Colyear Has Failed to Establish Damages
       The three elements of the cause of action for breach of
fiduciary duty are: existence of a fiduciary relationship, breach of
fiduciary duty, and damages. (Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman
(2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) The directors of the Association are
fiduciaries who must act for the benefit of the corporation and its
members. (Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1986) 42
Cal.3d 490, 513 [directors of nonprofit corporations are fiduciaries
who are required to exercise their powers in accordance with the
duties imposed by the Corporations Code].)
       A homeowner’s association and its board members may also
be protected from liability under two theories: (1) a rule of judicial
deference to their decision-making and (2) the business judgment
rule. We need not consider these theories or whether the
Association can be liable without underlying liability of its
individual directors, as Colyear has failed to establish damages.
       The trial court found no diminution in value of Colyear’s
property. Absent evidence Colyear attempted to sell his property
or was dissuaded from doing so because of the Tree CC, we discern
no evidence of past damages for diminution in value. As a result
of the declaratory relief action, there was also no evidence
supporting present or future damages through enforcement of the
Tree CC. The trial court posited, “[T]he only other form of
recoverable damages on this claim would be a recovery of
attorney’s fees” but found “no sufficient evidence of expenditures
[for legal fees] or their reasonableness was presented at trial.”
       The Association points out attorney fees are not awardable
as damages in tort actions, including claims for breach of fiduciary
duty. The Association challenges the trial court’s finding that
such fees can be recovered as damages for Colyear’s breach of

                                 35
fiduciary duty claim. (Gray v. Don Miller & Associates, Inc. (1984)
35 Cal.3d 498, 507.) We agree with the Association that attorney
fees do not constitute damages for purposes of Colyear’s breach of
fiduciary duty claim. (See Garcia v. Santana (2009) 174
Cal.App.4th 464, 473.) The availability of such fees under Civil
Code section 5975 (the Davis-Stirling Common Interest
Development Act) for an action between a homeowner association
and an owner does not convert attorney fees into damages for
purposes of establishing tort liability. Rather, such fees are
available to ensure access to the courts. (See Garcia v. Santana,
supra, at p. 473.) We note that the trial court did not find
sufficient evidence of the total attorney fees claimed at trial in any
event.
       Colyear contends entry of equitable relief establishes the
requisite harm in his breach of fiduciary duty claim, which
“logically” flows from the Association’s breach given the years he
spent opposing any application of the Tree CC to his property. We
disagree.
       Colyear sought declaratory relief, which is available to any
party “who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with
respect to another . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.) “‘Declaratory
relief operates prospectively, serving to set controversies at rest
before obligations are repudiated, rights are invaded or wrongs are
committed. Thus[,] the remedy is to be used to advance
preventative justice, to declare rather than execute rights.
[Citations.]’ In essence, declaratory relief operates to declare
future rights, not to address past wrongs.” (Monterey Coastkeeper
v. California Regional Water Quality Control Bd., etc. (2022) 76
Cal.App.5th 1, 13.) As Colyear’s declaratory relief action did not
“‘address past wrongs,’” it did not establish the requisite proof of

                                 36
actual damages or harm for purposes of his breach of fiduciary
duty claim.
       In addition, the issuance of the injunction to prevent future
damage from occurring did not constitute “damages” for purposes
of a breach of fiduciary duty claim. An injunction is designed to
maintain the status quo. (Daly v. San Bernardino County Bd. of
Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030, 1040–1041.) Here, none of
Colyear’s trees had been trimmed by or because of the Association.
While any injunction would prevent future harm, it did not prove
there were damages to support the breach of fiduciary duty claim.

D.    We Reverse the Attorney Fees Award Against the
      Individual Directors
      The Association asserts the attorney fees award against its
individual directors should be reversed because Civil Code section
5975’s fee-shifting provision does not apply to individual directors
shielded by the business judgment rule. Colyear urges us to
affirm the award because the statute authorizes awards against
individual defendants generally, if not individual directors. He
argues that because he is seeking to hold the individual
defendants liable as property owners and not directors, the
business judgment rule does not protect them. We agree with the
Association’s argument.8
      The trial court awarded the reduced amount of
$1,328,391.04 in attorney fees against all defendants pursuant to
Civil Code section 5975. Section 5975 provides in relevant part
that covenants and restrictions “may be enforced by any owner of

8     In light of our conclusion, we do not address the Association’s
alternative argument that Colyear was not the prevailing party
against its individual directors.

                                   37
a separate interest or by the association, or by both” (Civ. Code,
§ 5975, subd. (a)), and in an action “to enforce the governing
documents [of a common interest development], the prevailing
party shall be awarded reasonable attorney[ ] fees and costs” (Civ.
Code, § 5975, subd. (c)). Civil Code section 5980 provides that an
association entity, not its individual directors, has standing to
prosecute such enforcement actions on its behalf. (Civ. Code,
§ 5980.)
       We construe sections 5975 and 5980 together as authorizing
an award of attorney fees against the Association and not its
individual directors. (See Poole v. Orange County Fire Authority
(2015) 61 Cal.4th 1378, 1385 [statutory provisions must be read
together].) Subdivision (a) of section 5975 applies only to an
“association” or to “owners,” and does not specifically apply to
individual board members. Reading sections 5975 and 5980
together, they indicate that if an owner, such as Colyear, brings
an enforcement action against an association, the association
may be liable for attorney fees; they do not indicate that
individual directors of the Association should also be liable for
them.9
       Colyear argues he is not seeking to hold the individuals
liable for attorney fees as directors, as he recognizes they might

9      Cases cited by Colyear do not indicate otherwise. Each illustrates
that when an association brings an enforcement action against a
property owner for improper improvements or leasing, the prevailing
party may seek attorney fees. (See, e.g., Rancho Mirage Country Club
Homeowners Ass’n v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 260;
Almanor Lakeside Villas Owners Assn. v. Carson (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th
761, 765.) They do not hold individual directors of an association liable
for attorney fees.

                                   38
be shielded from liability under the business judgment rule.10
Instead, Colyear contends he is seeking to hold each director
defendant liable as a property owner. In this regard, Colyear
asserts the individual owners should be held liable for attorney
fees because they have “expressed the view” the Tree CC applies
to his property. This is not enough. Section 5975 contemplates
awarding attorney fees to enforce a covenant by a landowner or an
association. Colyear has made no allegation the individual board
members acted in their capacity as landowners seeking to enforce
the Tree CC, and the trial court made no such finding. As such,
they are not liable for attorney fees under section 5975.

E.     Colyear’s Cross-Appeal
       In his cross-appeal, Colyear contends the trial court abused
its discretion in denying his quiet title claim because he
established each element of the claim as a matter of law.
Moreover, Colyear contends the trial court could not decline to
issue a quiet title judgment on the basis it was redundant in light
of the declaratory relief judgment. The Association responds that
the trial court properly exercised its discretion to fashion

10     As Colyear acknowledges, section 7231 of the Corporations Code
provides that individual directors are generally shielded from liability
for performing their duties in good faith under the business judgment
rule. The rule sets up a presumption that directors’ decisions are
based on sound business judgment and can be rebutted only by a
factual showing of fraud, bad faith, or gross overreaching. (Eldridge v.
Tymshare, Inc. (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 767, 776.) Implicit in this rule is
that directors of non-profit boards would have little incentive to
volunteer for service if they faced great risk of liability for doing so.
(See Ritter, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th at p. 121.) Here, the trial court
found that the individual defendants were shielded from liability for
breach of fiduciary duty under the business judgment rule.

                                   39
appropriate relief, no prejudice was shown by the failure to enter a
quiet title judgment, and Colyear provides no record citation to
show an adverse claim. We conclude an adverse claim to title was
not sufficiently shown and find no abuse of discretion.11

        1.       Relevant Background
        The trial court found Colyear failed to meet his burden to
prove an adverse claim against the property sufficient to warrant
a judgment quieting title. The court observed, “[Colyear] presents
a novel issue in that he seeks to quiet title . . . against adverse
claims that do not arise from any document recorded in his chain
of title . . . .” The court indicated the Association’s failure to
properly record such a claim was the very basis for finding the
Tree CC inapplicable to Colyear’s property. As a result, the court
found a quiet title judgment would “unnecessarily complicate the
chain of title.” In light of the declaratory judgment and
permanent injunction, the court also found a quiet title judgment
would be “redundant and confusing.” The court declined to
exercise its discretion to issue a quiet title judgment.

      2.    Discussion
      A quiet title action is generally equitable in nature and
seeks to declare the rights of the parties in realty. (Civ. Proc.,

11     We deny appellants’ motion to strike portions of Colyear’s cross-
appellant’s reply brief and their accompanying request for sanctions.
To the extent Colyear’s combined brief raises arguments or issues for
the first time in his combined brief, we shall ignore those arguments as
beyond the scope of his cross-appeal. (See Doe v. University of
Southern California (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 221, 252, fn. 16; Hawran
v. Hixson (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 256, 268.)

                                  40
§ 760.010 et seq.; Strauss v. Summerhays (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d
806, 812.) To establish a claim to quiet title, the plaintiff must
establish an “adverse claim” to the property. (Civ. Proc.,
§ 760.020, subd. (a).) Such claim must also affect title to the
property. (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214
Cal.App.4th 780, 802–803.) The object of the action is to finally
settle and determine all conflicting claims to the property in
controversy, and to decree to each such interest or estate therein
as each may be entitled. (Robin v. Crowell (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th
727, 740.) Quiet title judgments operate in rem and are therefore
binding not only against the parties to the quiet title proceeding,
but also “‘against all the world.’” (Nickell v. Matlock (2012) 206
Cal.App.4th 934, 944.)
       We review the trial court’s decision for abuse of discretion.
The court’s discretion to issue a quiet title judgment must be
exercised within the bounds of governing statutes and must be
guided by applicable legal principles. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v.
Superior Court (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 96, 106.) The question of
whether a trial court applied the correct legal standard to an
issue in exercising its discretion is a question of law. (Gonzalez v.
Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 413, 420–421.) We review any
disputed facts for substantial evidence. (Ridec LLC v. Hinkle
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 1182, 1195.)
       Colyear asserts a judgment quieting title is required as a
matter of law, and the trial court abused its discretion in declining
to quiet title because the Association asserted an “‘interest in
property’ adverse to Mr. Colyear’s title.” We disagree. Colyear
has cited no case establishing entitlement to quiet title where the
purported adverse claim is a covenant that is both inapplicable to
the plaintiff’s property and does not put plaintiff’s title at stake.

                                 41
(See West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 802–803 [quiet title failed where defendant had no “adverse
claims to title”].) Neither Colyear’s deeds nor his title reports
reference Declaration 150. Rather, they reference Declaration
150-M. In other words, Colyear does not demonstrate how arguing
that a covenant applies to a property affects title where review of
the chain of title itself proves the covenant does not apply. As this
was the basis on which the trial court declined to exercise its
equitable discretion to issue a quiet title judgment, Colyear has
not demonstrated error.
        Nevertheless, Colyear asserts that where a plaintiff shows
any adverse claim, the plaintiff is entitled to have the validity of
that interest declared by the court through quiet title. The cases
upon which he relies are inapposite, as they involved claims that,
unlike the inapplicable Tree CC, affected the plaintiff’s title. In
Peterson v. Gibbs (1905) 147 Cal. 1, the plaintiff claimed to be the
fee simple owner of property. (Id. at pp. 2–3.) The defendants
“denied that [the] plaintiff was the owner in fee or in possession of
any part of said land,” based upon a duly recorded instrument that
the court found valid. In Barker v. Barker (1956) 139 Cal.App.2d
206, the parties disputed whether property was separate or
community property and asked the court to determine who had
title to it in their dissolution proceeding. (Id. at pp. 210–211.)12
Here, there is no dispute Colyear has title to his property and no

12     Colyear also relies on Water for Citizens of Weed California v.
Churchwell White (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 270, in support of his position.
In that case, the court addressed a quiet title claim regarding water
rights in the context of a malicious prosecution action and concluded
the plaintiff had probable cause for bringing such a claim. (Id. at
p. 284.) This case does not establish that a non-existent covenant
created a cloud on title sufficient to constitute an “adverse claim.”

                                  42
document is recorded in the chain of title applying the Tree CC to
Colyear’s property. As Colyear has not shown how the trial court
abused its discretion by failing to act within the bounds of the law,
we affirm its decision on the quiet title cause of action.

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                           DISPOSITION
       The judgment of the superior court is affirmed with respect
to declaratory relief and quiet title claims. The judgment is
reversed with respect to the injunctive relief and breach of
fiduciary duty claims. The attorney fees award is vacated, and the
court is directed to enter a new order awarding attorney fees to
Colyear against the Association. The parties are to bear their own
costs on appeal.

                                          MORI, J.

      We concur:

            COLLINS, Acting P.J.

            ZUKIN, J.

                               44