Court Opinion

ID: 9683072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:21:50.271443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:44.365204
License: Public Domain

On the Merits
RENFRO, Justice.
This is a third party action brought by plaintiff Warren Donaldson against defendants Exchange Estates, Inc., S. Mort Zimmerman, Frank C. Anderson, William C. Huls, Philip Leserman III, Albín P. Scott and William M. Sickler. Suit was brought upon an agreement by defendants to jointly and severally indemnify and hold plaintiff harmless against any and all actions, claims and demands whatsoever that might result or arise out of the ownership by plaintiff of *782certain motor hotel stock sold by plaintiff to the defendants.
Originally suit was brought by Republic National Bank of Dallas against Donaldson and others. The third party action was severed from said suit.
Trial by the court without a jury in the third party action resulted in a judgment for plaintiff against the defendants in the sum of $263,703.18, being the amount, after certain credits, the court found was due under their indemnity agreement. The Bank had previously taken judgment against plaintiff.
Appellants briefed four points of error, namely, the trial court erred (1) in overruling defendants’ plea in abatement; (2) in holding that the mailing of a promissory note constituted payment of the judgment held by the Bank against plaintiff; (3) in finding that prior to judgment in the instant suit plaintiff paid to the Bank the sum of $258,865.78, and had been released from liability because there was no evidence to support the finding; (4) in overruling defendants’ motion for continuance.
Defendants’ motion for extension of time for filing statement of facts was by this Court denied because of failure to show good cause.
The appeal, therefore, is before us without a statement of facts. There are no bills of exception in the record.
The points present matters which, from their very nature, cannot be determined by us without a statement of facts or bills of exception. In addition to findings incorporated in the judgment, the court filed twenty-three separate findings, taking up five full pages in the transcript, and, in addition, six separate conclusions of law.
Some of the findings were: (1-2-3) that each defendant, for a valuable consideration, had executed the indemnity agreement; (8) on August 19, 1965, the Bank obtained judgment against plaintiff and others in the amount of $689,641.00 and a foreclosure of lien against the Admiral Motor Hotel of Texas, Inc.; (9) pursuant to an order of sale the Bank bought the property for $325,000.00; (10) execution was issued against plaintiff; (14) prior to entry of judgment in the instant case plaintiff Donaldson “paid to the Republic National Bank of Dallas the total sum of $258,-865.78 on the judgment (in favor of Bank against plaintiff and others), and has been released from further liability on said judgment”; (18) that all conditions precedent to the obligation of defendants to hold plaintiff harmless and indemnify him against liability on the obligation asserted against plaintiff have been performed or have occurred.
The court concluded that defendants were liable to plaintiff in the amount of $253,-703.18, plus $10,000.00 attorneys’ fees.
The facts found by the court are amply sufficient to support the judgment entered.
It was held by the Supreme Court in Mays v. Pierce, 154 Tex. 487, 281 S.W.2d 79 (1955) : “There being no statement of facts in the record, we must presume there was evidence to support the findings of fact and the court’s judgment.” Cited as authority were: Kirkman v. Snively, 2 Tex. 447 (1847); Orrill v. Talbott, 44 Tex. 192 (1875); Gentry v. Schneider, 77 Tex. 2, 13 S.W. 614 (1890) ; Paden v. Briscoe, 81 Tex. 563, 17 S.W. 42 (1891); Lemp v. Armengol, 86 Tex. 690, 26 S.W. 941 (1894); Parker v. El Paso County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 116 Tex. 631, 297 S.W. 737 (1927); Anchor v. Wichita County Water Imp. Dist. No. 2, 129 Tex. 385, 103 S.W.2d 135, 112 A.L.R. 70 (1937); Uvalde Const. Co. v. Joiner, 132 Tex. 593, 126 S.W.2d 22 (1939) ; Hursey v. Thompson & Hursey, 141 Tex. 519, 174 S.W.2d 317 (1943); City of Galveston v. Hill, 151 Tex. 139, 246 S.W.2d 860(1) (1952); 3B Tex.Jur. 377, §§ 913-17. See also Thompson v. Republic Acceptance Corporation, 388 S.W.2d 404 (Tex.Sup., 1965).
*783In McDonald, Texas Civil Practice, Vol. 4, p. 1302, § 16.10(c), the author states: “Where specific findings of fact and conclusions of law are filed, and no statement of facts is brought forward, the findings of fact are binding on the parties and are accepted as justified by the evidence.”
In addition, unless the record shows to the contrary, every reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of the findings and judgment of the trial court and no presumptions will be indulged against the validity of the judgment. Collins v. Tucker, 333 S.W.2d 218 (Tex.Civ.App., 1960, no writ hist.); 4 Tex.Jur.2d 329, § 806; Shroff v. Deaton, 220 S.W.2d 489 (Tex.Civ.App., 1949, no writ hist.); Schweizer v. Adcock, 145 Tex. 64, 194 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Sup., 1946); Commercial Credit Corp. v. Smith, 143 Tex. 612, 187 S.W.2d 363 (Tex.Sup., 1945).
In view of the record before us, we must presume the judgment rendered by the court was proper.
Affirmed.