Court Opinion

ID: 9540144
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:13:04.271693+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:56.442039
License: Public Domain

J-A13033-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  LEE EDWARD KEKOA FUCHIGAMI                   :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1124 MDA 2022

         Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 14, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-01-CR-0000603-2021

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                 FILED: AUGUST 7, 2023

       Lee Edward Kekoa Fuchigami appeals from the July 14, 2022 aggregate

judgment of sentence of 24 to 84 months’ imprisonment imposed after a jury

found him guilty of driving under the influence of alcohol – highest rate of

alcohol (“DUI”) and driving while operating privilege is suspended or revoked.1

After careful review, we affirm the judgment of sentence.

       The suppression court summarized the relevant facts of this case as

follows:

              1.     Trooper Logan Howell is employed with the
                     Pennsylvania State Police. Trooper Howell has
                     been employed with the State Police for two
                     years.
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3802(c), 1543(a), and (b)(1.1)(i), respectively.
J-A13033-23

           2.     Trooper Howell has undergone Driving Under
                  the Influence (DUI) training at the Pennsylvania
                  State Police Academy. Trooper Howell has been
                  involved in approximately 50 DUI motor vehicle
                  stops.

           3.     On December 5, 2020, at approximately 1:28
                  AM, Trooper Howell came upon a vehicle
                  traveling directly in front of him on Centennial
                  Road, Conewago Township, Adams County.

           4.     As the vehicle came upon a slight bend to the
                  left in the roadway, Trooper Howell observed it
                  drift toward the outside of the lane of travel,
                  then drift back to the inside of the lane, crossing
                  onto the yellow middle line. The vehicle then
                  immediately drifted back to the outside of the
                  lane, with the passenger-side tires of the vehicle
                  crossing completely over the white fog line.

           5.     Trooper Howell initiated a traffic stop and
                  identified [Appellant] as the driver of the
                  vehicle.

           6.     Trooper Howell’s testimony of the above-
                  described driving behavior and subsequent
                  traffic stop were recorded and corroborated by
                  [Motor Vehicle Recording “(MVR”)] dash-cam
                  video.

Suppression court opinion, 8/31/21 at 1-2.

     Upon stopping the vehicle, Trooper Howell indicated that he observed

Appellant demonstrate multiple signs of intoxication, including blood shot and

glassy eyes and the strong odor of alcohol emanating from the vehicle and his

person.   Following the administration of field sobriety tests, Appellant

underwent a BAC test which revealed that his blood alcohol content was .19%

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at 2:23 am. See Criminal Complaint – Affidavit of Probable Cause, 1/5/21 at

1. Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with DUI and related

offenses.

        On June 23, 2021, Appellant filed an omnibus pretrial suppression

motion challenging, inter alia, the legality of the traffic stop. See “Omnibus

Pre-Trial Motion,” 6/23/21 at ¶¶ 13-33. On August 19, 2021, the suppression

court conducted a hearing on Appellant’s suppression motion, at which time

Trooper Howell testified. Notes of testimony, 8/19/21 at 4-10. Following the

hearing, the suppression court denied Appellant’s suppression motion on

August 31, 2021. Thereafter, Appellant proceeded to a jury trial on February

3, 2022 and was found guilty of the aforementioned offenses. As noted, trial

court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 24 to 84 months’

imprisonment on July 14, 2022.       This timely appeal followed on August 3,

2022.

        On August 5, 2022, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise

statement     of   errors   complained   of    on   appeal,   in   accordance   with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed a timely Rule 1925(b) statement on August

17, 2022. On August 22, 2022, the trial court filed a statement in lieu of a

Rule 1925(a) opinion, indicating that it was relying on the reasoning set forth

in its prior August 31, 2021 opinion.

        Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

              1.    Whether the [suppression] court judge applied
                    the wrong quantum of cause requiring the

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                  officer to have only reasonable suspicion,
                  instead of probable cause, that [Appellant] was
                  violating the Motor Vehicle Code?

            2.    Whether the Trooper lacked probable cause to
                  stop Appellant’s vehicle?

            3.    In the alternative, whether the Honorable
                  [suppression] court lacked reasonable suspicion
                  to stop [Appellant’s] vehicle[?]

Appellant’s brief at 5 (extraneous capitalization and headings omitted).

      Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a denial of a

suppression motion is well settled.

            [Our] standard of review in addressing a challenge to
            the denial of a suppression motion is limited to
            determining whether the suppression court’s factual
            findings are supported by the record and whether the
            legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.
            Because the Commonwealth prevailed before the
            suppression court, we may consider only the evidence
            of the Commonwealth and so much of the evidence
            for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read
            in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
            suppression court’s factual findings are supported by
            the record, [the appellate court is] bound by [those]
            findings and may reverse only if the court’s legal
            conclusions are erroneous.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 121 A.3d 524, 526 (Pa.Super. 2015) (citation

omitted; brackets in original), appeal denied, 135 A.3d 584 (Pa. 2016).

      “Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and

Article 1, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution guarantee an individual’s

freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures.”         Commonwealth v.

Bostick, 958 A.2d 543, 550 (Pa.Super. 2008) (citation and internal quotation

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marks omitted), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 158 (Pa. 2009). “To secure the

right of citizens to be free from such intrusions, courts in Pennsylvania require

law enforcement officers to demonstrate ascending levels of suspicion to

justify their interactions with citizens to the extent those interactions

compromise individual liberty.” Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196,

1201 (Pa.Super. 2002) (citation omitted).

      This court has recognized three types of interactions between members

of the public and the police:

            The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request
            for information) which need not be supported by any
            level of suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to
            stop or to respond. The second, an “investigative
            detention” must be supported by a reasonable
            suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a stop and a period
            of detention, but does not involve such coercive
            conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of
            an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention”
            must be supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Way, 238 A.3d 515, 518 (Pa.Super. 2020) (citation

omitted). Thus, pursuant to the Fourth Amendment, a person may not be

lawfully seized, either by means of an investigative detention or a custodial

detention, unless the police possess the requisite level of suspicion.

      The level of suspicion that a police officer must possess before initiating

a traffic stop is codified in 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b), which provides as follows:

            (b)   Authority of police officer.--Whenever a
                  police officer is engaged in a systematic
                  program of checking vehicles or drivers or has
                  reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title
                  is occurring or has occurred, he may stop a

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                  vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose
                  of checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of
                  financial responsibility, vehicle identification
                  number or engine number or the driver’s
                  license, or to secure such other information as
                  the officer may reasonably believe to be
                  necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b).

      This Court has recognized that,

            when considering whether reasonable suspicion or
            probable cause is required constitutionally to make a
            vehicle stop, the nature of the violation has to be
            considered. If it is not necessary to stop the vehicle
            to establish that a violation of the Vehicle Code has
            occurred, an officer must possess probable cause to
            stop the vehicle. Where a violation is suspected, but a
            stop is necessary to further investigate whether a
            violation has occurred, an officer need only possess
            reasonable suspicion to make the stop.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 177 A.3d 915, 919 (Pa.Super. 2017) (citation

omitted).

      Thus, “mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when the

driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose relevant to the

suspected violation.”    Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291

(Pa.Super. 2010) (en banc) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 327

(Pa. 2011). Rather, police officers are required to possess probable cause to

stop a vehicle based on observed violation of the Motor Vehicle Code (“MVC”)

or otherwise non-investigable offense. Id.

      “Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police officer has probable cause

to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a traffic code violation, even if

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it is a minor offense.”    Commonwealth v. Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019

(Pa.Super. 2017) (citation omitted).

            Probable cause is made out when the facts and
            circumstances which are within the knowledge of the
            officer at the time of the arrest, and of which he has
            reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient to
            warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
            the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.
            The question we ask is not whether the officer’s belief
            was correct or more likely true than false. Rather, we
            require only a probability, and not a prima facie
            showing, of criminal activity. In determining whether
            probable cause exists, we apply a totality of the
            circumstances test.

Commonwealth v. Thompson, 985 A.2d 928, 931 (Pa. 2009) (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

      Instantly, our review of the record in this matter establishes that

Trooper Howell possessed the requisite probable cause to stop Appellant’s

vehicle for violations of the MVC, namely 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3301(a) and

3309(1).

      Section 3301, Driving on right side of roadway, provides, in relevant

part, as follows:

            (a) General rule. -- Upon all roadways of sufficient
            width, a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of
            the roadway except as follows:

            (1)     When overtaking and passing another vehicle
                    proceeding in the same direction where
                    permitted by the rules governing such
                    movement.

            (2)     When an obstruction exists making it necessary
                    to drive to the left of the center of the roadway,

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                  provided the driver yields the right-of-way to all
                  vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon
                  the unobstructed portion of the roadway within
                  such distance as to constitute a hazard.

            (3)   When and where official traffic-control devices
                  are in place designating a lane or lanes to the
                  left side of the center of the roadway for the
                  movement indicated by the devices.

            (4)   Upon a roadway restricted to one-way traffic.

            (5)   When making a left turn as provided in sections
                  3322 (relating to vehicle turning left) and 3331
                  (relating to required position and method of
                  turning).

            (6)   In accordance with section 3303(a)(3) (relating
                  to overtaking vehicle on the left).

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3301(a).

      Section 3309, Driving on roadways laned for traffic, provides, in

relevant part, as follows:

            Whenever any roadway has been divided into two or
            more clearly marked lanes for traffic the following
            rules in addition to all others not inconsistent
            therewith shall apply:

            (1)   Driving within single lane. -- A vehicle shall
                  be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within
                  a single lane and shall not be moved from the
                  lane until the driver has first ascertained that
                  the movement can be made with safety.

75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3309(1).

      Instantly, Trooper Howell testified that in the early morning hours of

December 5, 2020, he was on patrol on Centennial Road in Conewago

Township, Adams County, Pennsylvania when he observed “[t]he poor driving

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of [Appellant’s] vehicle on the roadway.” Notes of testimony, 8/19/21 at 5.

Specifically, Trooper Howell testified that he was following Appellant’s vehicle

from behind when observed it drift to the outside of his lane toward the white

fog line as he entered a slight left bend in the roadway. Id. at 7. Trooper

Howell then observed Appellant’s vehicle drift back toward the center of the

roadway and onto the double-yellow line, before drifting back to the shoulder

of the road, with the passenger-side tires of the vehicle completely crossing

over the white fog line. Id. at 7-8. At this point, Trooper Howell activated

his lights and sirens to conduct a traffic stop based upon these traffic

violations. Id. at 9-10.

      Trooper Howell further testified that he has undergone DUI training

during his two-year employment with the Pennsylvania State Police and has

participated in approximately 50 DUI-related traffic stops. Id. at 4-5. The

suppression court found that the MVR footage from Trooper Howell’s patrol

vehicle that was submitted into evidence corroborates his testimony. Id. at

6; see also suppression court opinion, 8/31/21 at 4.

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      Based on the foregoing, we conclude that Trooper Howell possessed the

requisite probable cause to stop Appellant’s vehicle for a violation of Sections

3301(a) and 3309(1). Accordingly, we discern no error on the part of the

suppression court in denying Appellant’s suppression motion and affirm his

July 14, 2022 judgment of sentence.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/7/2023

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