Court Opinion

ID: 9867895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 17:11:24.479751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:21.065993
License: Public Domain

J-A03040-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  MONICA JUNE CHACLAS                          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  ANGELO NICHOLAS CHACLAS                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :      No. 1296 EDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Decree Entered April 19, 2022
                In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County
                     Civil Division at No(s): 2016-04482-DI

BEFORE:      KING, J., SULLIVAN, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                            FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2023

       Appellant, Angelo Nicholas Chaclas, appeals from the decree entered in

the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, which granted the petition of

Appellee, Monica June Chaclas, to enforce a property settlement agreement

(“Agreement”) between the parties, and which awarded her attorneys’ fees.

We affirm in part and vacate and remand in part.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

Appellant and Appellee married in November 1994 and have five children. The

parties separated in 2014. On July 1, 2015, they entered into the Agreement,

which was incorporated into the final divorce decree on October 3, 2016. The

relevant alimony portion of the Agreement provides:

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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          In addition, [Appellant] agrees to pay [Appellee] the sum of
          Six Thousand Dollars ($6,000) per month from July 2022
          through June 2023.         This payment to [Appellee] will
          terminate upon [Appellee’s] death, [Appellant’s] death, or
          [Appellee’s] cohabitation or remarriage. In addition, so long
          as [Appellee] is not cohabitating or remarried and so long
          as [Appellant] is employed full time at the compensation
          comparable to his 2015 compensation, [Appellant] agrees
          to pay [Appellee] ten percent (10%) of his gross annual
          cash bonus (this does not include discretionary or retention
          bonus or awards or long term incentive awards or
          compensation) for two additional years in April 2020 and in
          April 2021. All payments of alimony/alimony pendente lite
          as set forth herein shall be tax deductible to [Appellant] and
          included in [Appellee’s] income.

(Agreement at 9 ¶11). The relevant legal fees provision of the Agreement

provides:

          If either party breaches any provision of this Agreement, the
          other party shall have the right, at his or her election, to sue
          for damages for such breach, and the party breaching this
          contract shall be responsible for payment of legal fees and
          costs incurred by the other in enforcing his or her rights
          under this Agreement, or seek such other remedies or relief
          as may be available to him or her.

(Id. at 23 ¶31(a)).

       On September 10, 2021, Appellee filed a petition to enforce the

Agreement, alleging that Appellant failed to pay her ten percent of his cash

bonus, as required under the Agreement, for either 2020 or 2021. The court

held a hearing on March 24, 2022. 1 At the hearing, Appellant acknowledged

____________________________________________

1 The parties agree that the issue with respect to the 2020 bonus is moot
because Appellant paid ten percent of that bonus to Appellee prior to filing his
answer.

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that he received a cash bonus in 2021 of $313,712.00, and that he did not

pay Appellee ten percent of that cash bonus as required under the terms of

the Agreement. (See N.T. Hearing, 3/24/22, at 5-6). Appellant testified that

he did not pay the bonus because he believed Appellee was cohabitating with

an individual named Kevin Blake, and therefore, he was not required to pay

her the portion of his bonus per the terms of the Agreement.

        On April 19, 2022, the trial court granted Appellee’s petition to enforce

the Agreement. In doing so, the court found that although Appellant met his

burden of proving that Appellee and Mr. Blake were engaged in a social and

sexual interdependent relationship, the record did not establish that they were

financially interdependent. Therefore, the court found that Appellee and Mr.

Blake’s relationship did not constitute cohabitation and granted Appellee’s

petition.    In addition, based on paragraph 31 of the Agreement, the court

directed Appellant to pay Appellee’s legal fees because he had failed to comply

with the Agreement.       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on May 13,

2022.     On May 16, 2022, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P.

1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal, and Appellant

subsequently complied.

        Appellant raises the following issues for our review:

            1. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
            discretion by granting [Appellee’s] petition for enforcement
            even though it concluded that [Appellee] and [Mr.] Blake
            cohabitated through social and sexual interdependence but
            later discounted their cohabitation because of an alleged
            lack of financial interdependence, despite evidence that

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         [Mr.] Blake supported [Appellee] and that the couple shared
         living expenses?

         2. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
         discretion by not finding “financial interdependence”
         between [Appellee] and [Mr.] Blake and by necessitating
         that [Appellee] and [Mr.] Blake “share the needed financial
         interdependence” by proof of “joint bank statements,
         investment accounts or combined funds?”

         3. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
         discretion by awarding attorney’s fees in the amount of
         $16,805.00 without engaging in an analysis as to the
         reasonableness of said fees, thereby allowing [Appellee] to
         recoup “carte blanche” fees comprised of a non-market
         hourly rate.

         4. Did the trial court err as a matter of law and/or abuse its
         discretion by awarding attorney’s fees in the amount of
         $16,805.00 as said sum is comprised of fees for services
         rendered, such as the preparation of pleadings, argument,
         and fulfillment of discovery, wherein [Appellant] was
         ultimately victorious and as said sum would have been
         substantially lower if [Appellee] cooperated with the
         discovery process.

(Appellant’s Brief at 4) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

      Our standard of review of an order enforcing a property settlement

agreement is as follows:

         When interpreting a marital settlement agreement, the trial
         court is the sole determiner of facts and absent an abuse of
         discretion, we will not usurp the trial court’s fact-finding
         function. On appeal from an order interpreting a marital
         settlement agreement, we must decide whether the trial
         court committed an error of law or abused its discretion.

         Because contract interpretation is a question of law, this
         Court is not bound by the trial court’s interpretation. Our
         standard of review over questions of law is de novo and to
         the extent necessary, the scope of our review is plenary as
         the appellate court may review the entire record in making

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          its decision. However, we are bound by the trial court’s
          credibility determinations.

Rosiecki v. Rosiecki, 231 A.3d 928, 932-33 (Pa.Super. 2020), appeal

denied, 663 Pa. 51, 240 A.3d 1217 (2020) (citations omitted). “An abuse of

discretion is not lightly found, as it requires clear and convincing evidence that

the trial court misapplied the law or failed to follow proper legal procedures.”

Paroly v. Paroly, 876 A.2d 1061, 1063 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted).

        We address Appellant’s first two claims together. Appellant argues that

the trial court erred by deciding that the relationship between Appellee and

Mr. Blake did not constitute cohabitation. Specifically, Appellant claims the

court erred in not concluding that there was financial interdependence

between Appellee and Mr. Blake. In support of this, Appellant asserts that

Appellee was not paying rent or utilities to live with Mr. Blake, and she

contributed to Mr. Blake’s household expenses. Appellant avers that Appellee

also purchased a vehicle from Mr. Blake at less than fair market value.

Further, Appellant insists that Mr. Blake created an employment opportunity

for Appellee, for which she was overly compensated, and in doing so provided

her financial support.       Appellant contends that the court should have

considered the social and sexual interdependence between Appellee and Mr.

Blake    in   its   consideration   as   to   whether   there   was   also   financial

interdependence between them.            Appellant submits the trial court erred in

considering the lack of joint banking, investments, or combined funds, and

the court should have instead found financial interdependence based on the

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joint assumption of day-to-day costs. Appellant concludes the trial court erred

in finding insufficient evidence of cohabitation for purposes of the Agreement,

and this Court must grant relief. We disagree.

      Under Pennsylvania law, cohabitation is a term of art that has been

defined by this Court as existing when two people reside together “in the

manner of” spouses, “mutually assuming those rights and duties usually

attendant upon the marriage relationship.” Miller v. Miller, 508 A.2d 550,

554 (Pa.Super. 1986).

         Cohabitation may be shown by evidence of financial, social,
         and sexual interdependence, by a sharing of the same
         residence, and by other means. Where, upon proof by a
         preponderance of the evidence, the trier of fact concludes
         that the dependent former spouse has entered into a
         relationship with “a [person] who is not a member of the
         [alimony recipient’s] immediate family within the degrees of
         consanguinity” and the two have assumed the rights, duties,
         and obligations attendant to the marital relationship, the
         dependent former spouse is no longer entitled to receive
         alimony from the other former spouse. An occasional sexual
         liaison, however, does not constitute cohabitation.

Id. (citation omitted).

      In Miller, supra, this Court affirmed the decision of the trial court which

found that the wife and her paramour were not cohabitating within the

meaning of the Divorce Code.        In that case, the couple had a sexual

relationship together on the weekends, but they did not share a common

home on a permanent basis and did not share incomes and expenses.

      This Court again considered whether a couple’s relationship constituted

cohabitation in Moran v. Moran, 839 A.2d 1091 (Pa.Super. 2003). In that

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case, the trial court found that the wife spent most of her time over a two-

year span with her boyfriend, whom she accompanied almost everywhere,

including on business trips, weekend outings and vacations. While there was

no comingling of funds, there was financial interdependence between wife and

her boyfriend. The wife resided with her boyfriend, yet was not paying rent

or utilities, and she testified that she occasionally paid for food and shared

expenses if they went out to eat. Under those circumstances, the trial court

found that the wife cohabited with her boyfriend and, as a result, she was not

entitled to alimony. This Court affirmed the trial court’s decision. See id.

See also Lobaugh v. Lobaugh, 753 A.2d 834, 837 (Pa.Super. 2000)

(concluding that trial court did not abuse its discretion when it found that

appellant had cohabitated with her paramour where paramour lived in her

home, did not have any income, and those funds that he did have were used

to pay for meals and household goods).

      Instantly, the trial court found that Appellant met his burden to prove

that Appellee and Mr. Blake were engaged in a socially and sexually

interdependent relationship. Nevertheless, the court found that Appellee and

Mr. Blake’s relationship did not meet the definition of cohabitation based on

their lack of financial interdependence. In doing so, the court reasoned:

         To bar alimony due to cohabitation, the caselaw is very
         clear, there must be a showing of financial interdependence
         in addition to social and sexual interdependence. [Appellee]
         acknowledges being well-paid by Mr. Blake for work in his
         business for approximately 6 weeks at the start of the
         pandemic. She acknowledged purchasing a Jaguar vehicle

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         for $6,200, per her bank accounts. She acknowledged
         paying Mr. Blake ($1,000) One Thousand dollars to
         compensate for her extended stay in CT.

         There is no evidence of any joint bank or investment
         accounts or combined funds. It is clear from [Appellee’s]
         bank statements (Exhibit W-9) that she is paying her own
         mortgage and other expenses for her home and her living
         expenses. There is no indication that the parties are
         providing any continued financial support of one another.
         Lastly, there is no evidence that the parties are sharing their
         incomes.

         [Appellant] has failed to prove [Appellee] and Mr. Blake
         have mutually assumed the duties attendant to the
         husband/wife relationship or that they share the needed
         financial interdependence. Therefore, his obligation to pay
         10% of his bonus has not been defeated by her cohabitation.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 4/19/22, at 7).

      The record supports the trial court’s finding that Appellee and Mr. Blake

did not co-mingle funds. Additionally, Mr. Blake paid Appellee for work she

performed at his company, and the record fails to support Appellant’s

suggestion that she was overpaid. Further, during the period when Appellee

resided with Mr. Blake in Connecticut, she maintained her own residence in

Pennsylvania, which was not used by Mr. Blake. Under these circumstances

and in light of our deferential standard of review, we see no abuse of discretion

in the trial court’s finding of no financial interdependence between Appellee

and Mr. Blake. See Rosiecki, supra. Therefore, Appellant’s first two issues

merit no relief.

      In his third issue, Appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion

when it awarded attorneys’ fees to Appellee. Specifically, Appellant claims

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that the trial court failed to consider the reasonableness of the fees requested.

Appellant insists the court was required to assess the professional skill and

standing of Appellee’s attorney and to consider the market rate for legal

services for that time and place. Appellant concludes the court’s award of

attorney’s fees was improper, and this Court must grant relief. We agree.

         Our standard of review of the award of counsel fees
         pursuant to the Domestic Relations Code is for an abuse of
         discretion. See Bowser v. Blom, 569 Pa. 609, 807 A.2d
         830, 834 (Pa. 2002). An abuse of discretion is “[n]ot merely
         an error of judgment, but if in reaching a conclusion[,] the
         law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment exercised
         is manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality,
         prejudice, bias or ill-will, as shown by the evidence of
         record.” Id. (citations omitted). “[R]eview of the grant of
         counsel fees is limited...and we will reverse only upon a
         showing of plain error.” Isralsky v. Isralsky, 824 A.2d
         1178, 1192 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

Habjan v. Habjan, 73 A.3d 630, 642 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Kraisinger

v. Kraisinger, 34 A.3d 168, 175 (Pa.Super. 2011)).

      In McMullen v. Kutz, 925 A.2d 832 (Pa.Super. 2007), aff’d, 603 Pa.

602, 985 A.2d 769 (2009), this Court discussed whether legal fees must be

reasonable even though the contract awarding such fees does not specify

reasonableness. This Court explained that a reasonableness requirement is

implied in an agreement that provides for an award of attorney fees.

Specifically, this Court held that “when a contract provides for the award of

counsel fees, but does not specify that they must be reasonable, the trial court

must nonetheless examine the fees for reasonableness.” Id. at 835.

      In In re Estate of LaRocca, 431 Pa. 542, 246 A.2d 337 (1968), our

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Supreme Court established the following factors that a court must use to

evaluate the reasonableness of attorney fees and costs:

         the amount of work performed; the character of the services
         rendered; the difficulty of the problems involved; the
         importance of the litigation; the amount of money or value
         of the property in question; the degree of responsibility
         incurred; whether the fund involved was ‘created’ by the
         attorney; the professional skill and standing of the attorney
         in his profession; the results he was able to obtain; the
         ability of the client to pay a reasonable fee for the services
         rendered; and, very importantly, the amount of money or
         the value of the property in question.

Id. at 546, 246 A.2d at 339 (citations omitted).

      Here, the trial court found that Appellee was entitled to legal fees

pursuant to paragraph 31 of the Agreement. The court explained that “the

resulting award of legal fees can be attributed to one decision made by

[Appellant] and that was to exercise self-help rather than to seek [c]ourt

approval in the termination of alimony.” (Trial Court Opinion at 8). The court

further noted that:

         the underlying [Agreement] does not require that the legal
         fees incurred and awarded be reasonable. [Appellant]
         argues in his post-trial letter, as permitted by the [c]ourt,
         that the fees are not reasonable based on his and his firms
         fees, however, that does not persuade the [c]ourt that
         [Appellee’s] counsel’s fees are not reasonable. Each party
         is entitled to be represented by their counsel of choice.

Id.

      Although the trial court was correct in observing that the Agreement did

not expressly contain a requirement for reasonableness, Pennsylvania law

provides that a term of reasonableness is implied in a contract awarding

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attorney’s fees. See McMullen, supra. As the trial court declined to analyze

the reasonableness of Appellee’s counsel’s fees, we remand for further

proceedings such that the trial court can assess the reasonableness of the

attorneys’ fees requested by Appellee.2

       Order affirmed in part and vacated in part. Case remanded for further

proceedings. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 9/26/2023

____________________________________________

2 Based on our disposition, we need not address Appellant’s fourth issue on

appeal.

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