Court Opinion

ID: 9745008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:28:22.3775+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:12.386225
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE KLUCZYNSKI, dissenting: I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion. One of the issues presented in this appeal is whether the trial court was correct in finding a factual basis for the guilty plea. I agree with the majority’s principle that a reviewing court should defer to the trial court’s determination that a factual basis for a plea of guilty exists unless the facts of the case show otherwise. However, during the State’s recital at the change of plea hearing, the prosecutor stated that Dr. Kearns from the coroner’s office had testified. Ordinarily the purpose of having a pathologist testify at a criminal proceeding involving a criminal charge of murder or manslaughter is to show that the death of the victim was caused by a criminal agency. The record in the present case is devoid of any such testimony. The State did not relate what the doctor’s testimony would have been if he had been allowed to testify, but claimed that he had testified. Based on that alleged testimony, and other witnesses’ testimony, stipulations and facts, the State maintained that a factual basis existed. I cannot determine how heavily the trial judge relied on the doctor’s alleged testimony in his factual-basis analysis. If this were the only consideration, I would vacate the judgment and remand the cause to the trial court with instructions to reconsider whether a factual basis exists in light of the State’s misrepresentation. (See People v. Galloway, 59 Ill. 2d 158, 164.) However, the factual-basis determination was not the only contested issue before this court. Defendant maintains that the trial judge erred in that he did not personally inform her of and did not determine that she understood the nature of the charge. As stated by the majority, Rule 402(a)(1) requires that the court shall not accept a plea of guilty without first addressing the defendant personally in open court, informing her of and determining that she understands the nature of the charge. Paragraph (a)(1), coupled with paragraph (e) of the same rule, which applies to the present case, require that the common law record reflect that the trial court admonish the defendant. The majority, quoting the trial court’s colloquy at defendant’s change of plea hearing, claimed that this admonishment meets the first part of the two-pronged test expressed in People v. Robinson, 63 Ill. 2d 141, 145. I find that this merely informed defendant what sentence she could expect if she pleaded guilty to a lesser charge of voluntary manslaughter. This charge is not the one that was stated in the indictment, and this hearing is the first proceeding in which it is mentioned. It is an offense that deserves further explanation if a defendant is to be informed as to the nature of the charge. Also, the record fails to show that the judge adequately determined that the defendant understood the charge. In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 470, 22 L. Ed. 2d 418, 427, 89 S. Ct. 1166, which involved construction of Federal Rule 11, a rule comparable to Rule 402, the United States Supreme Court stated: “There is no adequate substitute for demonstrating in the record at the time the plea is entered the defendant’s understanding of the nature of the charge against him.” At the plea of guilty hearing, defendant’s attorney stated: “She [defendant] says she could not have murdered her child. She says the only way in which she could have possibly harmed her child would have been if her child had provoked her or did something to make her angry. ” This statement given in support of defendant’s plea of guilty was, at best, ambiguous. It was too contingent and indefinite for any determination that defendant understood the nature of the charge. Since the discrepancy between the possible meaning of defendant’s statement and her purported plea was significant, the court should have refused the plea. Considering the doubt as to the existence of a factual basis and the inadequacy of the admonishment of defendant, as shown by the inconsistency between defendant’s plea and her statement supporting her plea, I would hold that the trial court substantially failed to comply with Rule 402. In a recent United State Supreme Court case, Henderson v. Morgan, --- U.S. ---, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108, 96 S. Ct. 2253, defendant was indicted for first degree murder. Although defendant was substantially below average in intelligence, he was found to be competent to stand trial. The indictment was read in open court which charged that he wilfully stabbed his victim. The two able attorneys that represented him held a series of conferences with the prosecutors, the defendant and members of his family and sought to have the charge reduced to manslaughter, but the prosecutors would only agree to a second degree murder charge. At the plea of guilty hearing defendant stated that his plea was based on the advice of counsel, that he understood he was accused of killing the victim, that he was waiving his right to a jury trial, and that he would be sent to prison. The Supreme Court found that defendant’s plea of guilty to a charge of second degree murder was made without informing him of the elements of the offense to which he pleaded guilty and that there was no indication that the nature of the offense had ever been discussed with him. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that a plea cannot be voluntarily made, and fulfill the requirement of due process, unless defendant received “real notice of the true nature of the charge against him.” (--- U.S. ---, ---, 49 L. Ed. 2d 108, 114, 96 S. Ct. 2253, 2257.) An admission by defendant that he killed the victim does not necessarily admit that he was also guilty of second degree murder. The facts in Morgan are similar to the facts in the case before us. Nyberg was also of below average intelligence. Although she was found competent to stand trial, the court found it necessary to have the results of psychological testing of the defendant made part of the record. I believe this undermines the importance the majority opinion places on the fact that the defendant’s attorneys discussed the case at a meeting with defendant, her parents and clergy. The record does not demonstrate that defendant gained any insight or understanding, at the time of the plea of guilty hearing, as to the nature of the reduced charge of voluntary manslaughter, as a result of these meetings. The record does not show that the trial judge, in open court, explained the elements of voluntary manslaughter and inquired whether defendant knew the charge to which she was entering a plea of guilty. Although the majority states that the trial judge admonished defendant carefully and in simple terms, I find that the record reveals that the court was diligent only in informing defendant that she would waive a jury trial and that she could expect a sentence of 5 to 20 years when she entered her guilty plea. The court’s opinion refers to the fact that defendant’s attorneys discussed the plea of guilty with defendant, her family and clergy, but, for the above-stated reasons, I find that this does not meet the requirement of Rule 402(a) that defendant be admonished in open court as to the nature of the charge. Nor does it show that defendant received “real notice of the true nature of the charge” against her. I would affirm the appellate court judgment and allow defendant to plead anew.