Court Opinion

ID: 9631442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:38:23.844278+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:54.292891
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
In response to a certified question of law from the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, see Alaska R.App. P. 407, the court holds that AS 18.80.220(a)(1), which prohibits discrimination based on, inter alia, marital status, “is limited to preventing employers from discriminating against an employee based on the status of being married, and does not prohibit an.employer from discriminating against an employee based on the identity of his or her spouse or future spouse.” Op. at 793. I think this conclusion runs counter to the letter and spirit of the statute.
I.
The court suggests that the plain meaning of the term “marital status” in AS 18.80.220 dictates the outcome, Op. at 788, and I agree, but the outcome I see the plain meaning producing is quite different from that the court reaches. Pursuant to company policy, any BP employee who supervises a spouse or is supervised by a spouse must be transferred or terminated. BP’s policy therefore discriminates based on marital status. When a BP employee is transferred or terminated under the policy, it is the employee’s marital status which is the cause of the transfer or termination. If the employee were to divorce or to remain single and cohabit with the supervising or supervised employee, the employee would not be subject to the policy. In other words, marital status is the predicate for the discrimination. The policy violates AS 18.80.220(a)(1).
Given this divergence of opinion, it must be conceded that the meaning of “marital status” is far from plain. The close split among jurisdictions considering the issue is proof enough of this. I am more persuaded by those decisions which hold that statutes banning discrimination based on “marital status” apply to anti-nepotism policies. See Thompson v. Bd. of Trustees, 192 Mont. 266, 627 P.2d 1229, 1231 (1981) (“But for the fact this plaintiff is married, he would still be working. The term ‘marital status’ as a protected classification in the statutes was included to cover this type of unjustified discrimination.”); Kraft, Inc. v. State, 284 N.W.2d 386, 387 (Minn.1979) (“[A]n antinepotism employment rule denying full time employment to individuals married to persons already employed full time by the employer constitutes a dis-eriminatory practice based on marital status within the meaning of the Minnesota Human Rights Act.”); Washington Water Power Co. v. Washington State Human Rights Comm’n, 91 Wash.2d 62, 586 P.2d 1149, 1153 (1978) (agreeing with the Washington Human Rights Commission’s conclusion that “whether or not it is intended as such, the discharge of an employee or the refusal to hire an applicant because his or her spouse works for the employer necessarily involves an examination of an employee’s marital status and therefore is discrimination based upon such status.”); River Bend Sch. Dish v. Human Rights Comm’n, 232 Ill.App.3d 838, 173 Ill. Dec. 868, 597 N.E.2d 842, 846 (1992) (School District’s anti-nepotism policy “is clearly triggered by a party’s marital status and imposes a direct burden upon marriage. A person who remains single would not be affected by the rule.”).
II.
In attempting to divine the legislature’s intent, the court places emphasis on the legislature’s failure to discuss the alleged conflict between the Human Rights Act and anti-nepotism laws governing employment in state government. I am hesitant to draw inferences from the legislature’s silence. See Public Defender Agency v. Superior Court, 534 P.2d 947, 952 (Alaska 1975) (“Legislative inaction may be evidence of intent, although it is not always a reliable guide.”); Brecht v.
*794Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 632, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719, 123 L.Ed.2d 353 (1993). “As a general matter, we are ‘reluctant to draw inferences from Congress’ failure to act.’” (quoting Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 306, 108 S.Ct. 1145, 1154, 99 L.Ed.2d 316 (1988)).1
In my opinion, construing AS 18.80.220(a)(1) to apply to anti-nepotism policies gives effect to the legislature’s intent. In enacting the Alaska Human Rights Act, the legislature found that discrimination based on marital status “is a matter of public concern and ... not only threatens the rights and privileges of the inhabitants of the state but also menaces the institutions of the state and threatens peace, order, health, safety, and general welfare of the state and its inhabitants.” AS 18.80.200(a). The purpose of the Act is to prevent such discrimination. Id. at .200(b). The narrow interpretation of marital status adopted by the court runs counter to this purpose by forcing those subject to anti-nepotism rules to choose between employment and marriage. See Kraft, Inc., 284 N.W.2d at 388. (“Endorsing a narrow definition of marital status and uncritically upholding an employment policy such as respondent’s could discourage similarly situated employees from marrying.... Such an employment policy would thus undermine the preferred status enjoyed by the institution of marriage.”) A broad construction of the term marital status avoids this “Hobson’s choice” and therefore furthers the purpose of the Act. See Alaska USA Fed. Credit Union v. Fridriksson, 642 P.2d 804, 806 (Alaska 1982) (quoting Wondzell v. Alaska Wood Products, Inc., 601 P.2d 584, 585 (Alaska 1979). “Alaska’s civil rights statute should be broadly construed ‘to further the goal of eradication of discrimination.’ ”).
III.
The Alaska Human Rights Commission is charged with adopting “procedural and substantive regulations necessary to implement” the Alaska Human Rights Act. AS 18.80.050(a). While the court exercises its independent judgment on issues of statutory construction, the Commission’s interpretation is entitled to “‘some weight.’” Peninsula Marketing Ass’n v. State, 817 P.2d 917, 922 (Alaska 1991) (quoting State, Dep’t of Revenue v. Alaska Pulp America, Inc., 674 P.2d 268, 274 (Alaska 1983)).2
The Commission has defined discrimination based on marital status to include “unjustified adverse action taken against a person because that person is single, married, widowed or divorced, or because of that person’s marriage or termination of marriage to another person.” 6 AAC 30.990(a)(8) (emphasis added). In construing statutes or regulations, it is presumed that “every word, sentence, or provision ... [has] some purpose, force, and effect, and that no words or provisions are superfluous.” Rydwell v. Anchorage Sch. Dist., 864 P.2d 526, 530-31 (Alaska 1993). The first portion of the Corn-*795mission’s definition (“adverse action taken against a person because that person is single, married, widowed or divorced”) covers what the court calls “the condition of being married or unmarried.” Op. at 788. For the second portion of the definition to be more than superfluous, it can only mean that marital status encompasses the identity of one’s spouse. BP’s policy violates 6 AAC 30.990(a)(8).
IV.
It is not the case, as the court asserts, that extending the protection of AS 18.80.220(a)(1) to cover the identity of one’s spouse will necessarily “invalidat[e] any relevant anti-nepotism policies.” Op. at 791. A distinction based on marital status, or on any other protected category, is allowed “when the reasonable demands of the position” require it. AS 18.80.220(a)(1). The Commission has established guidelines for enforcing this provision:
It is a defense to a complaint of unlawful discrimination to establish by clear and convincing evidence that a distinction in employment prohibited by AS 18.80.220(a)(1) is required by business necessity or the reasonable demands of the position. “Business necessity” or “reasonable demands of the position” means that the distinction is necessary to the safe and efficient operation of the business; the business purpose is sufficiently compelling to override any disproportionate impact on an individual protected by AS 18.80.220(a), and the challenged business practice efficiently carries out the business purpose it is alleged to serve, and there is no available or acceptable policy or practice which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced or accomplish it equally well with less discriminatory impact on the complainant.
6 AAC 30.910(e). This procedure for proving “business necessity” comports with practices in other jurisdictions. See, e.g., River Bend Sch. Dist., 173 Ul.Dec. 868, 597 N.E.2d at 846 (placing the burden on the employer to show that one spouse was unable to effectively supervise another, and noting that the business necessity exception “is a narrow one.”); Kraft, Inc., 284 N.W.2d at 388 (“[0]nly where a business necessity is compelling and overriding may an employer differentiate on the basis of marital status.... Mere business convenience is insufficient.”). While the standard is exacting, it nevertheless allows for some exception to the strict anti-discrimination rule in AS 18.80.220(a)(1).
V.
I would respond to the certified question as follows: AS 18.80.220(a)(1) prevents an employer from discriminating against an employee based on the identity of the employee’s spouse, unless the employer can prove that the reasonable demands of the position require a distinction based on marital status.

. That the legislature has enacted anti-nepotism statutes governing employment in state government sheds no light on the legislature's intent vis-a-vis the Human Rights Act. Different considerations apply when considering whether anti-nepotism rules are proper in the public sector. See Washington Water Power Co., 586 P.2d at 1154 ("The [legislature] is in a different position from the private employer, in that its employees are paid out of public funds over which the legislature exercises control, and it is quite likely that nepotism in the hiring of employees is not looked upon with favor by the public. The need for the 'appearance of fairness’ in this situation may well outweigh the spouses’ interest in obtaining employment unburdened by marital status discrimination.”).

. The court cites Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights v. State, 796 P.2d 458, 460 (Alaska 1990), for the proposition that the court should exercise its independent judgment in determining the meaning of “marital status.” Op. at 788 n. 3. The question presented in Alaska State Comm'n for Human Rights was whether the court should review appeals from the Human Rights Commission involving questions of law under the independent judgment standard of review. Id. (“We must review appeals involving questions of law from the superior court and the HRC under the same de novo standard of review, in order to insure uniformity of decision.”). Alaska State Comm’n for Human Rights does not undermine the general principle that the court may look to an agency’s interpretation to help resolve ambiguous statutory language. See, e.g., Union Oil Co. of California v. State, Dep't of Revenue, 560 P.2d 21, 25 (Alaska 1977) ("|TIhe statute is ambiguous, and we may therefore give some weight to the administrative decision even when exercising our independent review.”).