Court Opinion

ID: 9905378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 15:03:55.337105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:13.974927
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 551
                     ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                          DIVISION I
                                         No. CV-22-150

                                Opinion Delivered November 29, 2023
LEANNE CARPENTER AND SHELLEY
BENTON
                     APPELLANTS APPEAL FROM THE PRAIRIE
                                COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT,
V.                              NORTHERN DISTRICT
                                [NO. 59NPR-13-22]
COREY PATTERSON
                                    APPELLEE HONORABLE CRAIG HANNAH,
                                             JUDGE

                                                   AFFIRMED

                                    MIKE MURPHY, Judge

        Appellants Leanne Carpenter and Shelley Benton contest the validity of the second

 codicil to the will of their grandmother, Anna Belle Patterson. They appeal from the Prairie

 County Circuit Court’s order dismissing their claims. On appeal, Leanne and Shelley

 contend that the trial court erred in finding that (1) they failed to prove their brother, Corey

 Patterson, exhibited undue influence over Anna Belle; (2) Corey overcame his burden of

 proof that Anna Belle had testamentary capacity at the second codicil signing; and (3) Corey

 overcame his burden of proof that Anna Belle was not unduly influenced. We affirm.

        On October 20, 2013, Anna Belle died, leaving as her heirs Leanne, Shelley, and

 Corey, her three grandchildren. On October 30, 2013, Anna Belle’s will and first and second

 codicils were admitted to probate, and Corey was appointed executor. The will, signed in
1996, and the first codicil, signed in 2003, provided for the residue of her estate to pass in

trust to her husband, Willie B. Patterson, who died December 26, 2006. It was to pass then

in trust for her only child, Willie Joe Patterson, who died December 3, 2011. After those

two had died, the residue was to be divided equally among Leanne, Shelley, and Corey. Anna

Belle’s husband, Willie B., signed a will and first codicil at the same time, mirroring Anna

Belle’s. Anna Belle’s second codicil, signed in 2009, left the trust assets at her and Willie

Joe’s deaths solely to Corey. The second codicil stated that Anna Belle made the codicil

partially due to efforts by Willie Joe, Leanne, and Shelley to remove Corey as the

administrator in the proceedings of Willie B.’s estate.

       Leanne and Shelley petitioned to contest the second codicil to Anna Belle’s will, and

a hearing on the petition was held July 1, 2021.1 Prior to the hearing, the court found that a

“confidential relationship” existed between Corey and Anna Belle, which created a

rebuttable presumption of undue influence.2

       At the hearing on the petition, the deposition testimony of Linville Jones, Anna

Belle’s brother-in-law, was admitted into evidence. Leanne and Shelley deposed him on July

16, 2015, in connection with their contest. Linville, now deceased, testified that he made

the appointment with Anna Belle’s attorney to change her will because she asked him to. He

       1
       There is no dispute that the last will and testament and the first codicil were executed
while Anna Belle had testamentary capacity and without undue influence.
       2
         Corey had power of attorney to assist Anna Belle with the family farm and pay her
bills since around 2004.

                                              2
testified that “she wanted to make sure the girls didn’t get anything” and that “she knew

exactly what she was doing” the day she signed the codicil. Additionally, a letter dated August

14, 2009, from Dr. Ramirez, Anna Belle’s treating physician, was entered into evidence. The

letter provided that he evaluated her on July 17, 2009. It stated in part:

       I have found her diagnosis to be Alzheimer’s Dementia, Mild. I did a full mental
       status examination and can state that she has a good attention span and good
       recollection, especially given her age and her diagnosis. I have found she is rational
       and relevant and goal directed in her thinking and does not suffer from any
       delusional ideations and knows exactly what she is saying. Her biggest problem is
       communication due to her extreme hearing loss. It is my professional opinion that
       she is in possession of the capacity to make informed consent in regards to her
       personal and financial affairs. . . .

       Dr. Jeffrey Rains testified first at the hearing that he has been performing mental

evaluations for twenty-eight years and that he evaluated Anna Belle on July 20, 2009. During

that hour-long appointment, he conducted a mini mental-status exam and evaluated her for

capacity to offer informed consent. He stated that she gave him no reason to think that she

did not understand the questions. Dr. Rains testified that memory loss was normal for her

age but that she logically answered questions about her personal finances and evaluated the

risks and benefits of the scenarios discussed in the exam, exhibiting that she had the capacity

to offer informed consent concerning her money. He testified that her responses led him to

believe that she was “rational, relevant, and goal-directed.” Dr. Rains stated, “[S]he convinced

me very clearly that she knew what she had and what she wanted to do with it.”

       Dr. Rains was unconcerned that Anna Belle did not know exactly how much land or

money she had. He explained that just because someone does not know how much money

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they have does not mean they are incompetent and do not know what they want to do with

the money. He testified that if the standard was recalling every detail about how much

money or property you have, then most people over the age of fifty lack capacity.

       Additionally, Dr. Rains was unconcerned that Anna Belle was unduly influenced. He

further testified that he knew of no intervening events that would have changed his

evaluation of her and that she would have been competent within sixty days of the

evaluation, which was when the second codicil was signed.

       Donald Raney, the attorney who drafted the second codicil, testified he had known

Anna Belle for thirteen years. He explained that in July 2009, Linville contacted him because

Anna Belle wanted to change her will. Linville made an appointment and Raney met with

him, Anna Belle, and her sister. Raney testified that he anticipated the codicil would be the

subject of litigation, so he made an unannounced visit to her at the nursing home sometime

later. She recognized him, and without prompting. inquired about the codicil, so he felt

comfortable moving forward. The second codicil was executed a couple of days later. He

testified that he read it to her, stopped occasionally, and asked, “Is that what you want to say

in your second codicil?” and she responded yes. He testified that he would not have prepared

the second codicil if he had any concern about her competency or if someone was

influencing her. He said Corey never contacted him about the codicil, and he never told

Corey about it.

       April Branham worked as a nurse at the nursing home where Anna Belle stayed. She

testified that Corey and his wife were very helpful in the care of Anna Belle and that she only

                                               4
saw Leanne and Shelley visit one time. Nurse Branham testified that she never talked to

Anna Belle about her estate planning. She said Anna Belle only appeared confused just

before her death in 2013.

       Corey testified he lived next door to his grandparents and visited with them daily for

fifteen to twenty years, even when they went into the nursing home. He was not made aware

of the second codicil until after Anna Belle’s death. He testified that he never restricted who

could visit and never tried to prevent his sisters from visiting Anna Belle. Corey testified that

Anna Belle’s main health issue was her hearing and that as long as she had her hearing aid

in and you talked slow and plain to her, she did not have an issue with her dementia

diagnosis.

       Unlike Corey, Leanne testified that she and Shelley have families and did not live

conveniently close to Anna Belle. She testified that when she would call the nursing home

to inquire about Anna Belle’s care, she was told that she could not be informed.

Additionally, Corey would not talk to her. She testified that she and Shelley contacted Raney

about probating Willie B.’s will because Corey had not done so. She said they did not intend

to remove Corey as administrator so they could take Anna Belle’s land or money.

       Shelley’s testimony mirrored Leanne’s testimony. She testified that intimidation was

used to keep her and her sister away from Anna Belle; for example, she said that if she were

by herself visiting, someone stood outside the door while she visited. She also testified that

she and Leanne were told they could not take Anna Belle out for a drive without first asking

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Corey and his wife. She said Anna Belle talked about wanting to go home but that Corey

would not let her.

       Dr. Garrett Andrews, a neuropsychologist, testified on behalf of Shelley and Leanne

as an expert witness. He reviewed Dr. Ramirez’s and Dr. Rains’s medical reports, the will,

the medical records, the nursing notes, and Anna Belle’s deposition from May 2009 that was

taken in the matter of Willie B.’s estate. Dr. Andrews drafted a letter opinion based on this

information. He specifically opined,

       It is my opinion, within a degree of neurocognitive certainty, [Anna Belle’s] ability to
       appreciate, understanding, and conduct her wishes freely was compromised at the
       time of her signing the Second Codicil to her Will on 10/7/2009. She demonstrated
       significant deficits in her thinking abilities including memory and comprehension
       well before 2009 as the medical records indicate and several providers commented
       on.

       Following the hearing, the court entered an extensive order in favor of Corey, finding

that Anna Belle had the capacity to execute the second codicil and that she was not unduly

influenced into doing so.

       We review probate proceedings de novo, and we will not reverse the decision of the

trial court unless it is clearly erroneous. In re Est. of Haverstick, 2021 Ark. 233, at 5, 635

S.W.3d 482, 485.

       Leanne and Shelley first argue that the court erred in finding that they failed to

present any evidence to prove undue influence because it was Corey’s burden to prove.

       As the court’s order states, it previously ruled that due to the confidential relationship

between Anna Belle and Corey, Corey had the burden of proving by a preponderance of the

                                               6
evidence that the second codicil was not the product of undue influence. The order detailed

evidence that supported this finding. It then found, “[T]here was no evidence presented by

the contesting parties to prove that [Corey] exhibited undue influence over Anna Belle.”

Immediately following this finding, the court specifically found that Corey had met his

burden to rebut the presumption that Anna Belle was unduly influenced. Having given this

matter our de novo review, it is apparent that the court did not erroneously shift the burden

of proof; rather, the court weighed the evidence and found that Corey had met his burden,

and Leanne and Shelley had presented nothing to counteract it.

       Leanne and Shelley’s final two points on appeal challenge the court’s finding that

Anna Belle had testamentary capacity at the signing of the second codicil and that she was

not unduly influenced.

       In a typical will contest, the burden of proving the invalidity of a will due to lack of

testamentary capacity, undue influence, or fraud is on the contestant. See Wiseman v. Keeter,

2018 Ark. App. 302, at 19, 550 S.W.3d 883, 893–94. If the proponent of a will, however,

procures the making of the will, then a presumption of undue influence arises, and the

burden shifts to the proponent to prove that the testator had testamentary capacity and was

free from undue influence in executing the will. Id. If there exists a confidential relationship

between the testator and the primary beneficiary, then a rebuttable presumption of undue

influence arises. Id. The ultimate burden of proof remains on the contestant.

       Here, the circuit court fluctuated on whether a confidential relationship shifts the

burden on undue influence and testamentary capacity or just undue influence. The court

                                               7
verbally said that if Corey showed no undue influence, then Leanne and Shelley had to prove

Anna Belle lacked testamentary capacity. However, the order put the burden of both on

Corey, which was erroneous.

       Despite the court’s order misstating the law, we may disregard the error because our

de novo review allows us to reach a different result required by the law. See In re Est. of

Haverstick, 2021 Ark. 233, at 5, 635 S.W.3d at 485. In Haverstick, the circuit court erred by

not finding a confidential relationship between spouses and by not requiring the wife to

rebut the presumption of undue influence; however, the supreme court applied the correct

burden-shifting analysis and affirmed. Again, we reiterate that the existence of a confidential

relationship between a primary beneficiary and a testator gives rise to a rebuttable

presumption of undue influence. Union Nat’l Bank v. Leigh, 256 Ark. 531, 532, 509 S.W.2d

539, 540 (1974).

       Turning to testamentary capacity, if a testator has sufficient mental capacity to retain

in his memory, without prompting, the extent and condition of his property and to

comprehend how he is disposing of it and to whom and upon what consideration at the

time the will is executed, then he possesses sufficient mental capacity to execute a will. Hodges

v. Cannon, 68 Ark. App. 170, 179, 5 S.W.3d 89, 96–97 (1999). Evidence of the testator’s

mental condition, both before and after execution of the will at issue, is relevant to show his

mental condition at the time he executed the will. Id. A testator’s old age, physical incapacity,

and partial eclipse of mind will not invalidate a will if he has the requisite testamentary

                                               8
capacity when the will is executed. Id. A testator does not lack testamentary capacity merely

because old age has impaired his mental faculties. Id.

       The evidence established that Anna Belle had the requisite testamentary capacity to

execute the second codicil. The attorney, Raney, ensured Anna Belle had testamentary

capacity because, as he testified, he knew a legal battle would ensue upon her death, so he

recommended evaluations by Drs. Rains and Ramirez. He also visited with her multiple times

to ensure she wanted to change her will, including one unannounced visit at the nursing

home where Anna Belle recognized him without prompting. Linville Jones’s deposition

testimony that Anna Belle wanted to change her will also supports the court’s finding as well

as Nurse Branham’s testimony. Additionally, Dr. Rains gave a favorable opinion supporting

capacity. Last, Dr. Ramirez’s note that “she is competent to make decisions [about] her

estate” supports the court’s finding.

       Leanne and Shelley’s argument is a request to reweigh the evidence. They contend

that no one testified nor did any exhibits detail that Anna Belle knew the nature and extent

of her property when she executed the second codicil. They take issue with the fact that

testimony did not establish that Anna Belle knew exactly how much money she had or the

exact acreage of her property. However, Arkansas law does not define “nature and extent of

property” with such precision. Rather, our supreme court has held, “With respect to the

ability to know the extent and condition of the property to be disposed of . . . it is unnecessary

that he actually has this knowledge. It is sufficient if he has the mental capacity to understand

                                                9
the effect of his will as executed.” Puryear v. Puryear, 192 Ark. 692, 94 S.W.2d 695, 697

(1936). Accordingly, we find no error.

       Turning to undue influence, we have held that it is not the influence that springs

from natural affection; rather, it results from fear, coercion, or any other cause that deprives

the testator of his free agency in the disposition of his property, and it must be specially

directed toward the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties. Robinson v. Est. of

Robinson, 2016 Ark. App. 130, at 6, 485 S.W.3d 261, 265. Undue influence may be inferred

from the facts and circumstances of a case, and cases involving questions of undue influence

will frequently depend on a determination of witness credibility. Id.

       Here, there is no evidence of coercion that would indicate that the will was not a

reflection of Anna Belle’s intent at the time the will was drafted. Changing her will was

something that she wanted to do on her own, and Corey was not aware of the second codicil

until after Anna Belle’s death. Leanne and Shelley’s argument is again a request to reweigh

the evidence. In light of the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, which has been

extensively discussed above, we cannot say that the trial court erred in finding that Corey

rebutted the presumption of undue influence. See Pyle v. Sayers, 72 Ark. App. 207, 211, 34

S.W.3d 786, 788 (2000) (holding that questions of testamentary capacity and undue

influence are so interwoven in any case where these questions are raised that the court

necessarily considers them together). Accordingly, we affirm.

       Affirmed.

       GLADWIN and THYER, JJ., agree.

                                               10
       Richard F. Hatfield, P.A., by: Richard F. Hatfield; and Taylor & Taylor Law Firm, P.A., by:

Andrew M. Taylor, for appellants.

       Brett D. Watson, Attorney at Law, PLLC, by: Brett D. Watson, for appellee.

                                               11