Court Opinion

ID: 9627929
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:59:40.398332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:04.103593
License: Public Domain

LANE, Judge,
concurring in result.
I concur in results and write to express my views on 22 O.S.Supp.1995 § 1089. The majority states on page 231 of the opinion:
In Walker, we said an ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim could not have been raised on direct appeal if it requires “factfinding outside the direct appeal record.” (Cite omitted) Stated in prohibitive terms, this Court may not review (Petitioner’s) post-conviction claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel if the facts generating those claims were available to (Petitioner’s) direct appeal counsel and thus either were or could have been used in his direct appeal.
To this point, I agree with the majority. However, the majority then goes on to state that if the error is based on facts that were available to direct appeal counsel they could have been argued on direct appeal and are waived if not so argued.1 This statement does not take into consideration whether or not the necessary facts to sustain the allegation of error are contained in the direct appeal record or whether the facts must come from some source outside the record.
*235If the facts to support the alleged error are contained in the trial record, there is not a doubt that the allegation is waived. However, I believe that for the purpose of determining the applicability of the waiver doctrine, I would not consider any facts that were not before the trial court but which could have been available to trial counsel from some other source as dicta from Walker would suggest. I think to hold otherwise would defeat the language and intent of § 1089. It provides in (D)(4)(b):
For the purposes of this subsection, a ground could not have been previously raised if:
(1) it is a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel which requires fact-finding outside the direct appeal record.... (Emphasis supplied)
Without saying so, the majority seems to be imposing our Rule 3.11(B)(3) which permits the supplementation of the record when claims of ineffective assistance of counsel is raised. I believe that this rule is only applicable to non-death penalty cases as it seems to be in direct conflict with § 1089. I would hold that when there is such a conflict, the statute takes precedence over the rule.
If I applied this thinking to the current ease, I would be forced to concur in result. In his application for post-conviction relief, the petitioner asserts six allegations of ineffective assistance of trial counsel:
1. Petitioner’s trial attorney failed to test the State’s evidence.
2. Petitioner’s trial attorney failed to investigate and prepare for both stages of the trial.
3. Petitioner’s trial attorney failed to present mitigation evidence.
4. Petitioner’s trial attorney failed to request a voluntary intoxication instruction.
5. Petitioner’s trial attorney failed to present evidence of Mr. Conover’s mental state and intoxication to support his request for the lesser included instruction of manslaughter.
6. Petitioner’s attorney failed to present evidence to rebut the continuing threat aggravator.
One and four are not the subject of a post conviction relief action because their factual basis is in the trial record and they have been waived for failure to raise on direct appeal. Three and six are moot since they refer to the sentencing stage of the trial and we are reversing the death penalty. Two and five fail because the supporting affidavits are insufficient to show that even if we consider the facts contained in them as true they fail to establish that post-conviction relief is warranted.

. Opinion, page 232.