Court Opinion

ID: 9838442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-06 15:00:54.218196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:29.883174
License: Public Domain

21-6082
     Lin v. Garland
                                                                                     BIA
                                                                             Schoppert, IJ
                                                                             A208 163 563

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 6th day of September, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7                    JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
 8                    WILLIAM J. NARDINI,
 9                    BETH ROBINSON,
10                    Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   YING LIN,
14                    Petitioner,
15
16                    v.                                           21-6082
17                                                                 NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20              Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                     Gerald Karikari, Esq., New York, NY.
 1   FOR RESPONDENT:                       Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney
 2                                         General; Melissa Neiman-Kelting, Assistant
 3                                         Director; Allison Frayer, Trial Attorney,
 4                                         Office of Immigration Litigation, United
 5                                         States Department of Justice, Washington,
 6                                         DC.

 7            UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

 8   Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

 9   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

10            Petitioner Ying Lin, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of China,

11   seeks review of a January 21, 2021, decision of the BIA affirming an August 21,

12   2018, decision of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying her application for asylum,

13   withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

14   (“CAT”). In re Ying Lin, No. A 208 163 563 (B.I.A. Jan. 21, 2021), aff’g No. A 208

15   163 563 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Aug. 21, 2018). We assume the parties’ familiarity

16   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

17            We have reviewed both the IJ’s and the BIA’s opinions “for the sake of

18   completeness.” Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir.

19   2006).     We review the agency’s adverse credibility determination “under the

20   substantial evidence standard.” Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir.

21   2018). “[T]he administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable
                                                2
 1   adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”                  8 U.S.C.

 2   § 1252(b)(4)(B).

 3         Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors,
 4         a trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the demeanor,
 5         candor, or responsiveness of the applicant . . . , the inherent
 6         plausibility of the applicant’s . . . account, the consistency between the
 7         applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements (whenever made
 8         and whether or not under oath, and considering the circumstances
 9         under which the statements were made), the internal consistency of
10         each such statement, the consistency of such statements with other
11         evidence of record . . . , and any inaccuracies or falsehoods in such
12         statements, without regard to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy,
13         or falsehood goes to the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other
14         relevant factor.
15
16   8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination

17   unless, from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-

18   finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey,

19   534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. We conclude

20   that substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Lin was not

21   credible as to her alleged past harm—the village chief’s attempt to force her to

22   marry his son—or as to her fear of religious persecution based on her practice of

23   Christianity in the United States.

24         We give “particular deference” to the IJ’s demeanor finding because the IJ

25   is “in the best position to evaluate whether apparent problems in the . . . testimony
                                               3
 1   suggest a lack of credibility or, rather, can be attributed to an innocent cause such

 2   as difficulty understanding the question.” Li Hua Lin v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 453 F.3d

 3   99, 109 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks omitted). Such deference finds

 4   further support here where the “observations about an applicant’s demeanor . . .

 5   are supported by specific examples of inconsistent testimony.” Id. For example,

 6   the demeanor finding is linked to Lin’s fluctuating statements about whether she

 7   was a member of a church in Flushing, her lack of responsiveness and inconsistent

 8   statements about when she joined the church, the lack of clarity in her explanations

 9   about spreading the Gospel and why she would spread the Gospel to people in

10   China who were already Christian, and her lack of responsiveness when asked to

11   explain her statement that the police gave her father warnings.

12         The agency also reasonably relied on inconsistencies among Lin’s written

13   and oral statements and documentary evidence, and the implausibility in her

14   testimony about the village chief.      See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).   She was

15   inconsistent about when she became a Christian, testifying that she was

16   introduced to Jesus in detention after she arrived in the United States, but stating

17   in her earlier credible fear interview that she believed in Christianity and that her

18   family in China was Christian. The agency did not err in relying on the record of

                                               4
 1   the credible fear interview because it was conducted through a Mandarin

 2   interpreter, Lin did not allege difficulty understanding the questions, she told the

 3   interviewing officer why she left China and why she was afraid to return, she said

 4   she wanted to continue the interview without an attorney, and the interview was

 5   memorialized in a typewritten document of questions asked and her responses.

 6   See Ming Zhang v. Holder, 585 F.3d 715, 725 (2d Cir. 2009) (discussing “indicia of

 7   reliability”). The IJ also reasonably deemed it implausible that Lin did not know

 8   the name of the village chief and his son given that she knew the individual was

 9   the village chief, she testified that he came to her family’s home to discuss the

10   marriage, and the alleged attempted forced marriage was why she fled China.

11   See Siewe v. Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that an IJ’s

12   inferences concerning credibility merit deference “so long as” they are “ tethered

13   to the evidentiary record”).

14         Taken together, the IJ’s demeanor findings, the inconsistencies, and the

15   implausible testimony provide substantial evidence for the agency’s adverse

16   credibility determination. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Likai Gao v. Barr, 968

17   F.3d 137, 145 n.8 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[E]ven a single inconsistency might preclude an

18   alien from showing that an IJ was compelled to find him credible.”); Xiu Xia Lin,

                                              5
 1   534 F.3d at 167.

 2         The adverse credibility determination is dispositive of asylum, withholding

 3   of removal, and CAT relief because all three claims are based on the same factual

 4   predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006). Because Lin

 5   was not credible about her Christian practice, we do not reach her claim that there

 6   is a pattern or practice of persecution of Christians. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429

 7   U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to make

 8   findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

 9         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

10   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

11                                          FOR THE COURT:
12                                          Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
13                                          Clerk of Court

                                              6