Court Opinion

ID: 9939548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-10 17:09:38.202135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:41:24.480235
License: Public Domain

J-A18017-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 DIAMOND DESIGN, INC., T/D/B/A         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 DIAMOND DESIGN JEWELERS OF            :        PENNSYLVANIA
 WEXFORD                               :
                                       :
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 ALICIA BLAIR, SCOTT BLAIR AND         :   No. 997 WDA 2022
 JEWELRY BY ALICIA AND SCOTT           :
                                       :
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 DIAMOND DESIGN, INC., T/D/B/A         :
 DIAMOND DESIGN JEWELERS OF            :
 WEXFORD                               :
                                       :
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
 CHARLES DUFFY AND CHRISTYANN          :
 DUFFY                                 :
                                       :
                                       :
 APPEAL OF: DIAMOND DESIGN,            :
 INC., CHARLES DUFFY AND               :
 CHRISTYANN DUFFY                      :

           Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 19, 2022,
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
                          No(s): GD 18-10757

 DIAMOND DESIGN, INC. T/D/B/A          :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 DIAMOND DESIGN JEWELERS OF            :        PENNSYLVANIA
 WEXFORD                               :
                                       :
                                       :
              v.                       :
                                       :
                                       :
J-A18017-23

    ALICIA BLAIR, SCOTT BLAIR AND                :   No. 1066 WDA 2022
    JEWELRY BY SCOTT AND ALICIA                  :
                                                 :
                       Appellants                :
                                                 :
                                                 :
                                                 :
                                                 :
                v.                               :
                                                 :
                                                 :
    CHARLES DUFFY AND CHRISTYANN                 :
    DUFFY                                        :

              Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 19, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at
                            No(s): GD-18-010757

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                             FILED: February 9, 2024

       The parties, Alicia Blair, Scott Blair, and Jewelry by Scott and Alicia (the

Blairs/Defendants/Appellants/Cross-Appellees) and Charles Duffy, Christyann

Duffy, and Diamond Design, Inc., (the Duffys/DD/Plaintiffs/Appellees/Cross-

Appellants) appeal and cross-appeal, respectively, from the judgment entered

on a verdict, after the trial court granted, in part, and denied, in part,

Appellants’ post-trial motions.1

       Appellants Scott and Alicia Blair misappropriated a customer list from

Appellees’ 40-year-old jewelry business before opening their own jewelry
____________________________________________

1 On August 19, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a praecipe to enter judgment on the
verdict in the amount of $142,400.00; judgment was entered on the docket
the same day. See Pa.R.C.P. 227.4(2). See Stahl Oil Co. v. Helsel, 860
A.2d 508, 511 (Pa. Super. 2004) (appeal lies from judgments entered
subsequent to trial court’s disposition of post-verdict motions, not from order
disposing of post-trial motions).

                                           -2-
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business, located one-and-one-half miles from Appellees’ jewelry shop. Alicia

is Appellee Christyann Duffy’s daughter and Appellee Charles Duffy’s step-

daughter; Scott is Appellees’ son-in-law.2

        Following a three-day trial, a jury entered a $225,000.003 verdict, for

misappropriation of a trade secret, in favor of Appellees, and awarded

$5,000.00 to Appellant Scott Blair on his counterclaim for violation of

Pennsylvania’s Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL).4 Appellants filed

post-trial motions, which included a motion to add liquidated damages and a

petition for attorneys’ fees and costs under the WPCL. Following a hearing,

the court denied the motion in part and granted the motion in part. The court’s

post-trial order molded the verdict by reducing it by $82,600.00 (representing

damages for conversion and unfair competition claims), awarding $6,250.00
____________________________________________

2 This case brings to mind the often-quoted phrase from Shakespeare’s King

Lear:

        “How sharper than a serpent's tooth it is/To have a thankless
        child!”

Shakespeare, William, King Lear (Act 1, Scene 4).

3 The jury’s verdict breaks down as follows:

   •    Misappropriation of trade secrets - $142,400.00
   •    Common law unfair competition - $41,300.00
   •    Conversion - $41,300.00

See infra at 7. In addition, the jury found that Alicia Blair was not owed any
wages and the jury found in favor of the Duffys on Appellants’ defamation
claim.

4 43 P.S. §§ 260.1-260.45.

                                           -3-
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in liquidated damages5 to Scott Blair, and granting an additional $27,642.00

in attorneys’ fees and costs to Scott Blair.6 After careful consideration, we

vacate the portion of the judgment that molded the verdict and denied a

judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on Alicia’s WPCL claim,

reimpose the jury’s original verdict on the conversion and unfair competition

claims and remand for a new trial on Alicia’s WPCL claim. We affirm, on the

opinion authored by the Honorable Alan Hertzberg, in all other respects.

       Diamond Design, Inc. (DD), which closed its doors in June 2018, was

the Duffys’ family-owned jewelry business. DD opened in 1982 in downtown

Pittsburgh and operated for almost 40 years, with its final principal place of

business located at 140 Church Road, Wexford, PA. The Blairs 7 worked as

employees of DD until April 13, 2018, when they “left the employment of

Diamond Design without any notice.” Plaintiffs’ Complaint, at 8/20/18, ¶ 12.

____________________________________________

5 Liquidated damages are statutorily-imposed damages to compensate for
wages that remain unpaid for thirty days beyond the scheduled payday and
no good faith dispute over the wage claim exists. See 43 P.S. § 260.10.

6 Specifically, the court awarded attorneys’ fees in the amount of $26,100.00

and costs in the amount of $1,542.00. All remaining post-trial claims were
denied.

7 In their answer, the Blairs averred that Alicia worked at DD as a retail
salesperson from 2003 until April of 2018, and that Scott was employed as a
jeweler by DD from November 2017 through April 2018. Scott left his job as
a helicopter mechanic in late November 2017 to come to DD, where he was
trained by Mr. Duffy to do bench work. Defendants’ Answer, New Matter, and
Counterclaim, 9/28/18, at ¶¶ 5-7; see also Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/22, at
2.

                                           -4-
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Alicia was a salaried DD employee with an annual salary of over $68,000.00,8

while Scott worked as an apprentice, in which capacity was taught to do bench

work9 by Mr. Duffy.        Alicia testified that during the holiday season (mid-

November through December), she would often work an average of 50-70

hours a week. See N.T. Jury Trial, 10/28/21, at 259-61.

       In late 2017/early 2018, when the Duffys contemplated retirement, the

parties engaged in negotiations to sell DD to the Blairs. See N.T. Jury Trial,

10/27/21, at 94 (Mr. Duffy testifying intent was to “transfer the store to Alicia

and still maintain [a position] within the business when she needed help”).

On April 6, 2018, the parties drafted a proposed agreement of sale with the

purchase price of the business (exclusive of the building) established at

$350,000.00. Those negotiations, however, proved unsuccessful. On April

14, 2018, Alicia posted on her Facebook page that she decided to quit working

at DD, without giving the Duffys two-weeks’ notice.        Id. at 91-92.   Then,

“[w]hen word got out that the customer base had already been taken from

the store, it kind of stripped the sale for purposes of the business.” Id. at 95.

       Three months later, in July 2018, the Blairs started a new jewelry

business, “Jewelry by Alicia and Scott,” a limited liability corporation with its

principal place of business located at 306 Warrendale Road, Warrendale, PA,

____________________________________________

8 Alicia testified that she was paid bi-weekly.   See N.T. Jury Trial, 10/28/21,
at 258.

9 Bench work consisted of putting together new jewelry pieces and repairing

jewelry. Id. at 253.

                                           -5-
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one and one half miles from DD. Id., 10/28/21, at 309. DD alleges that the

Blairs misappropriated DD’s customer lists and files, stole DD’s tools and

equipment, and stole DD’s trade secrets, resulting in unfair competition, loss

of profits, loss of goodwill, and “[a]ncillary and related costs.”    Plaintiffs’

Complaint, at 9/28/18, ¶¶ 21-33. The Duffys alleged that the customer list

was “password protected” on their company computer. See N.T. Jury Trial,

10/27/21, at 213. Mr. Duffy testified that, over the years, he developed a

customer list for DD, adding new names, addresses, and phone numbers to

the list throughout their years in business. Id. at 75-76. The customer list,

which was never “put out for public usage[,] . . . was maintained on a

computer used by Alicia in her office.”10 Id. at 87, 89; id. at 87 (Mr. Duffy

testifying Alicia would take sales slips with customers’ names and addresses

on them and “transfer all of the information[,] including the sale[,] onto the

computer”).     The customer list contained approximately 5,000 names and

“was the basis of the income coming into the store.” Id. at 90. At trial, Mr.

Duffy testified that a “Grand Opening card” for Jewelry by Alicia and Scott was

sent to customers on DD’s customer list. Id. at 95.

____________________________________________

10 Mr. Duffy further testified that Alicia performed marketing and sales for DD,

handled the business’s social media accounts, and ran “the front of the store
so that [he] could focus on operations in the back of the store[,] which was
the manufacturing end of the business.” Id. at 78. The Blairs, on the other
hand, claimed that Alicia was employed as a retail salesperson at DD, that her
job encompassed sales, marketing, and customer service, and that she “was
never responsible for the management of [DD].”                    Defendants’
Answer/Counterclaim/New Matter, 9/28/18, at 23-25.

                                           -6-
J-A18017-23

       On August 20, 2018, DD filed a complaint against the Blairs alleging

misappropriation of trade secrets under the Pennsylvania Uniform Trade

Secrets Act (PUTSA),11 libel, unfair competition, breach of duty of loyalty,

tortious interference with contractual and business relationships, conversion,

computer fraud and abuse, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy.

Defendants filed an answer, new matter, and counterclaims that included

claims for overtime pay under the WPCL, defamation, and tortious interference

with business relations. In their answer to Defendants’ counterclaims, the

Duffys admitted that “Alicia Blair worked as a retail salesperson.”    Duffys’

Answer and New Matter to Complaint to Join Additional Defendants, 4/12/19,

at ¶ 12.

       On February 12, 2022, the Blairs moved for partial summary judgment,

arguing that Alicia’s WPCL counterclaim should be granted, as a matter of law,

where she was classified as a non-exempt employee at DD who was entitled

to overtime (1.5 times regular rate of pay for all hours worked in excess of 40

hours/week).      See 34 Pa. Code § 231.41.      The Blairs also argued that

judgment should be entered as a matter of law in favor of Scott on his WPCL

claim where he received no pay as an employee of DD for a period of months.

See 43 P.S. § 251. On April 19, 2021, the trial court denied the Blairs’ motion

for partial summary judgment.

____________________________________________

11 See 12 Pa.C.S. §§ 5301-5308.

                                           -7-
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       A jury trial was held from October 27-29, 2021. Following trial,12 the

jury returned the following verdict:

          •   Defendants violated the PUTSA;
          •   Damages in amount of $142,400.00 for PUTSA violation;
          •   Defendants engaged in unfair competition;
          •   Damages in the amount of $41,300.00 for unfair competition;
          •   Defendants engaged in conversion;
          •   Damages in the amount of $41,300.00 for conversion;
          •   No wages due to Alicia Blair for Plaintiffs’ WPCL violation;
          •   Wages, in the amount of $5,000.00[,] due to Scott Blair for
              Plaintiffs’ WPC[L] violation [back pay and overtime]; and
          •   The Duffys did not defame the Blairs.

Jury Verdict, 10/29/21 at 1-4. The Blairs filed post-trial motions, including

claims for $102,417.00 in attorneys’ fees and costs under the WPCL, see 43

P.S. § 260.9(f),13 liquidated damages, the entry of JNOV or a new trial, the

molding of Scott Blair’s damages award and DD’s verdict to avoid double

recovery.14

____________________________________________

12 The parties also stipulated that DD was worth $350,000.00 when the
agreement to sell was in the Duffys’ hands. See Order, 10/27/21.

13 To support his claim for attorneys’ fees and costs under the WPCL,   Scott
Blair attached the affidavit of John Berry, Esquire, who, after reviewing his
entire litigation file and fee records, concluded that “Mr. Blair [] incurred
$6,603[.00] in recoverable costs related to the prosecution of his wage
payment claim and . . . $102,417[.00] in recoverable fees and costs related
to the prosecution of his wage payment claim.” Affidavit of John J. Berry,
Esquire, 11/8/21, at ¶¶ 13-14.

14 In their motion for post-trial relief, the Blairs sought, in relevant part, the

molding of DD’s verdict to avoid double recovery. See Post-Trial Motion,
11/18/21, at 1-2. More specifically, the Blairs argued that the verdict should
be molded to prevent a double recovery, based on the “election of remedies
doctrine.” Specifically, they claimed “[t]he court committed an error of law
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -8-
J-A18017-23

____________________________________________

[with regard to] the three claims to a combined amount of $225,000.00 in
damages owed by the Blairs [where t]he damages awarded by the jury for all
three of the Plaintiffs[’] claims flowed from the one-time use of the customer
list at issue.” Post-Trial Motion, 11/8/21, at ¶¶ 28-29 (emphasis in original).
See also id. at ¶ 30 (“The [m]olded [v]erdict as it stands is inconsistent and
duplicative, and results in a significant windfall to the Plaintiff above and
beyond their claimed damages.”); id. at ¶ 32 (“[T]he Blairs respectfully ask
the [c]ourt to mold the verdict to remove any additional damages for the two
claims, [c]onversion and [u]nfair [c]ompetition, as failure to do so results in
an impermissible windfall for the Plaintiffs that is contrary to the damages
sustained due to the Blairs’ alleged misconduct.”). The Blairs relied upon
Gamesa Energy USA, LLC v. Ten Penn Ctr. Assocs., L.P., 217 A.3d 1227,
1234 (Pa. 2019), AAA Mid-Atlantic Ins. Co. v. Ryan, 84 A.3d 626 (Pa.
2014), and Schwartz v. Rockey, 932 A.2d 885 (Pa. 2007), to support their
claim that the Duffys “double recovered” when, in addition to the PUTSA
award, the jury awarded damages for conversion and unfair competition
claims. None of these cases controls the instant matter.

      Gamesa involved a breach of contract action where the Supreme Court
determined that appellants were improperly awarded damages for both breach
of contract and recission of a lease agreement based on the conclusion that
“a non-breaching party to a contract may, by its conduct following a breach,
conclusively elect its remedy and be bound by it to one theory for recovery of
damages.” 217 A.3d at 1243. The Supreme Court in AAA Mid-Atlantic held
that the amount of damages that may be offset against recovery under an
underinsured motorist’s policy includes damages recovered from all
tortfeasors. 84 A.3d at 628. There, the case involved the concept of
subrogation and preventing an injured party from profiting from a “double
recovery” at an indemnifying party’s expense. Finally, Schwartz involved the
sale of a residential home where the buyer filed a lawsuit alleging fraudulent
non-disclosure and/or concealment of water infiltration. On appeal, the Court
was faced with determining whether the buyers, who had made an election of
remedies, had foreclosed the remedy of rescission.         When the buyers
attempted to amend their complaint to substitute a demand for rescission,
more than two years after the sale, the court denied rescission due to the
buyers’ failure to pursue the remedy with “sufficient promptitude.” 932 A.2d
at 554. Our Court vacated the trial court’s decision to deny rescission. On
discretionary appeal, the Supreme Court reversed our Court’s decision and
remanded because “the court’s decision to permit the filing of an amended
complaint to assert the remedy of rescission was not dispositive concerning
the requirement of prompt action.” Id. at 553-54.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                           -9-
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       Following a hearing, the court entered an order denying in part and

granting in part Defendants’ post-trial motion. Specifically, the court molded

the verdict to $142,400.00 to remove any additional damages for Plaintiffs’

conversion and unfair competition claims, included an award of $6,250.00 in

liquidated damages to Scott Blair on his WPCL claim, and granted $27,642.00

in attorneys’ fees and costs to Scott Blair. See Order, 7/25/22, at 1-2. With

regard to the conversion and unjust enrichment claims, the court found that

there was no basis for damages in excess of the $142,000.00 verdict for

violating the PUTSA because section 5304 of the PUTSA states “damages can

include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the unjust

____________________________________________

It has been established that “[t]he primary substantive application of the
[election of remedies] doctrine has been to prevent double recovery for a
single injury . . . and thus, an election should be required among
inconsistent remedies at some point prior to the entry of a final judgment.”
Gamesa, supra at 1234 (emphasis added). Here, the common law claims of
unfair competition and conversion and violations of the PUTSA are distinct
causes of action that are hardly inconsistent remedies. See Hill v. Best
Medical International, Inc., 2011 WL 5082208 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (PUTSA not
intended to abrogate common law conversion claims based upon taking of
confidential business “information that . . . was . . . of value to the
claimant.”); see also Morgan’s Home Equipment Corp. v. Martucci, 136
A.2d 838, 848 (Pa. 1957) (trading on another’s business reputation by . . .
other means is enjoinable on grounds of unfair competition; if particular use
in question is reasonably likely to produce confusion in public mind, equity will
restrain unfair practice and compel accounting of profits gained thereby). In
fact, the PUTSA provides that, [t]his chapter does not affect . . . other civil
remedies that are not based upon misappropriation of a trade secret.” 12
Pa.C.S.A. § 5308(b)(2).

                                          - 10 -
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enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account in

computing actual loss.” 12 Pa.C.S.A. § 5304.

     The parties filed timely appeals and cross-appeals, as well as court-

ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statements of errors complained of on

appeal. On appeal, Appellants/Cross-Appellees raise the following issues for

our consideration:

     (1) Whether the trial court committed an error of law and abused
     its discretion in denying Appellants’ post-trial motion for [JNOV]
     as to Alicia Blair’s [WPCL] claim, as no reasonable juror could have
     concluded that Diamond Design carried its burden of proving that
     Ms. Blair’s primary job responsibilities were administrative in
     nature[.]

     (2) Whether the trial court committed an error of law in denying
     Appellants’ post-trial motion for [JNOV] as to Diamond Design’s
     trade secret claim, as both the specific provisions of the [PUTSA]
     and binding precedent establish that the specific customer list at
     issue is not a trade secret as a matter of law[.]

     (3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
     Appellants’ post-trial motion for JNOV as to Diamond Design’s
     unfair competition claim, as no reasonable juror could have
     concluded that the parties were competitors based on the facts
     and evidence adduced at trial[.]

     (4) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying
     Appellants’ post-trial motion for JNOV as to Diamond Design’s
     conversion claim, as the undisputed facts of record established
     that Diamond Design was not deprived of its use, possession, or
     property rights in the customer list at issue[.]

     (5) Whether a new trial on damages was warranted when the
     amounts awarded by the jury to Appellee[s] were unjust and bore
     no reasonable relationship to the damages actually suffered by
     Appellee[s]?

     (6) Whether the jury award to Appellant, Scott Blair, was so
     arbitrary and inconsistent with the undisputed evidence adduced
     at trial that the verdict should have been molded?

                                    - 11 -
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        (7) Whether the trial court erred in its award of fees and costs in
        less than the amount requested because [] Scott Blair was
        successful in prosecuting his [WPCL] claim?[15]

Appellants’ Brief, at 13-14 (renumbered for ease of disposition) (unnecessary

capitalization omitted).      On cross-appeal, Cross-Appellants/Appellees raise

the following claim: “Whether the [t]rial [c]ourt’s [o]rder granting Appellants’

[p]ost-trial [m]otion by molding the amount awarded by the jury for damages

to Appellees[,] by reducing it from $225,000.00 to $142,400.00[,] constituted

an error of law or an abuse of discretion.”16 Appellees/Cross-Appellant’s Brief,

at 8.

____________________________________________

15 Notably, on appeal, the Duffys maintain that the court’s award of attorneys’

fee/costs to Scott on his WPCL claim was reasonable. See Appellees’ Brief, at
49.

16Appellees raised the following issue, among others, in their Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of:

        The [h]onorable [t]rial [c]ourt improperly granted attorneys[’]
        fees in the amount of $26,100.00[.00] in favor of Scott Blair and
        costs in the amount of $1,542.00[.00], when there was only a
        [v]erdict of $5,000.00 entered by the [j]ury[.]

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 9/14/22, at 2. However, in their brief they
concede that the trial court did not err or abuse its discretion by denying
Appellants’ post-trial motion and awarding $27,642.00 in attorneys’ fees and
costs. See Appellees’ Brief, at 8. In fact, the Blairs sought attorneys’ fees
and costs in the amount of $102,417.00, in their post-trial motions.

Moreover, Appellees’ issue regarding “[w]hether the trial court’s order denying
Appellant’s Post-trial motion requesting a new trial and/or JNOV constituted
an error of law or an abuse of discretion[,]” Appellees’ Brief, at 8, is merely a
counterstatement to Appellants’ fifth and seventh issues raised on appeal.
See Appellants’ Brief, at 13-14.

                                          - 12 -
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      Because Appellees’/Cross-Appellants’ issue is dispositive of their cross-

appeal, we will address it first. Appellees argue that the jury’s $225,000.00

verdict is fully supported in the record and, thus, the court’s molding of the

verdict to $142,400.00 was in error. Specifically, Appellees claim that DD’s

claims for conversion and unfair competition are distinct torts and causes of

action from their claims under PUTSA and that evidence supports the award

of damages for all three claims.

      In reviewing a challenge to the trial court's decision concerning a

request to mold a jury verdict, we are mindful of the following:

         The power of a trial judge to exercise his discretion in
         molding a verdict to fit the expressed desires of the jury is
         a cornerstone of the jury system.

      Verdicts which are not technically correct in form but which
      manifest a clear intent on the part of the jury may be corrected
      without resort to further jury deliberations or the grant of a new
      trial.

      At the same time, we are reminded that the power of a trial court
      to mold a verdict is not unlimited, and a verdict may not be molded
      where the intention of the jury is not obvious, or where the
      intention of the jury has not been expressed at all as when the
      jury has failed to return a verdict, or to satisfy the supposed
      equities of the case. Nor may a verdict be molded to express an
      intention on the part of a jury when the question was never
      submitted to the jury.

House of Pasta, Inc. v. Mayo, 449 A.2d 697, 701-02 (Pa. Super. 1982)

(citations omitted).

      Following agreement by counsel, the trial court instructed the jury on

the claims of conversion and unfair competition, as follows:

                                    - 13 -
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       To succeed on [a conversion] claim, Diamond Design must prove
       all the following: [(1)] Diamond Design’s ownership or right of
       possession of customer list; [(2)] the Blairs’ conversion by
       wrongful act inconsistent with the property rights of Diamond
       Design; [(3)] Diamond Design was deprived of its right and
       customer list; and [(4)] Diamond Design suffered damages.[17]

       To succeed on [an unfair competition] claim, Diamond Design
       must prove the following: [(1)] the Blairs entered a field already
       occupied by a rival of established reputation; [(2)] the Blairs’
       business and that of Diamond Design’s w[ere] competitors; [and
       (3)] the Blairs engaged in misappropriation of Diamond Design’s
       trade secrets.

N.T. Jury Trial, 10/28/21, at 486-87. Moreover, the court gave the following

instruction on damages:

       The fact that I am now going to instruct you about damages does
       not imply any opinion on my part as to whether damages should
       be awarded. If you find that any of the parties suffered damages,
       then you must determine an amount of damages that you find
       adequately compensate[s] them for such financial harm as they
       have sustained.

       If you find in favor of Diamond Design on its [PUTSA] claim,
       Diamond Design is entitled to damages. You may award
       Diamond Design damages that include the actual loss caused
       by the defendant’s misappropriation as well as the unjust
       enrichment of the defendants caused by misappropriation.

       If you find in favor of Diamond Design on its conversion
       claim against the defendants, you must award Diamond
       Design an appropriate amount of damages. The measure
       of damages for a conversion is the market value of the
       converted property at the time and place of the conversion.

____________________________________________

17 The Blairs’ proposed jury instruction on conversion is identical to the one

given by the trial court to the jury as cited above. Notably, that instruction
includes the element that DD suffered damages. See Defendants’ Proposed
Jury Instructions, at No. 12 (Conversion).

                                          - 14 -
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       Thus, you may award Diamond Design damages in an amount
       equal to any and all property converted by the defendants.[18]

N.T. Jury Trial (Jury Charge), 10/29/21, at 493-95 (emphasis added).19

       In B.G. Balmer & Co. v. Frank Crystal & Co., 148 A.3d 454 (Pa.

Super. 2016), the appellants asserted, among other things, a claim for unfair

competition.     After the jury returned awards for both compensatory and

punitive damages, the appellants argued on appeal that “the trial court erred

in awarding as compensatory damages $2,191,569.00 for lost profits and

$200,000.00 in the diminution in value of [appellee’s] business because

Pennsylvania law precludes an award of both[.]” Id. at 471.     Acknowledging

that “an injured party cannot recover twice for the same injury,” id. at 473,

our Court concluded “where a plaintiff is able to demonstrate damages for loss

of profits and loss of equity value that are not duplicative of each other due

to the tortious conduct of another party, both types of damages may be

recovered as compensatory damages.” Id.

       Here, the Duffys established that the value of the business, at the time

they were negotiating to sell it to the Blairs, was $350,000.00, and that once

$170,000.00 of the business’s hard assets (business materials and equipment

the Duffys sold) and $37,600.00 of unsold business assets were subtracted
____________________________________________

18 See PTSI, Inc. v. Haley, 71 A.3d 304 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“In conversion[,]

the measure of damages is the full value of the chattel, at the time and place
of the tort.”).

19 The trial court, however, did not instruct the jury on damages with regard

to unfair competition.

                                          - 15 -
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from that value, they incurred $142,400.00 in damages from the stolen

customer list. See N.T. Jury Trial, 10/27/21, at 116. The Duffys argued that

once the Blairs took DD’s customer list and sent out the mailers, the list no

longer had any value for them. See id. at 249. Moreover, the Duffys testified

that after the Blairs used DD’s customer list to open their own shop, the Blairs’

new jewelry company made $390,000.00, $450,000.00, and $650,000.00 in

2018, 2019, and 2020, respectively. See id. at 236-37.

      The trial court states that it “agree[s] with the jury’s determination that

there was liability for the two claims [of conversion and unfair competition,

however, the trial judge] molded the verdict because no additional damages

could be awarded where the measure of damages for [those claims] was

already included in the Trade Secrets Act damages award.”            Trial Court

Opinion, 11/10/22, at 5.    Moreover, in supporting its decision to mold the

verdict post-trial, the court concluded that “there is no authority for allowing

damages in excess of [DD]’s actual loss [under the PUTSA] under the common

law unfair competition or conversion claims, and [DD] proposed no contrary

instruction to the jury.”   Trial Court Opinion, 11/10/22, at 4.      Ironically,

however, the jury verdict form specifically provides that if the jury finds that

the Blairs violated the PUTSA and awards them damages for that violation, it

is “to Proceed to Question No. 3,” for the claim of unfair competition.” Jury

Verdict Sheet, 11/1/21 at 2.        Questions 3 (unfair competition) and 5

(conversion) then state that if the jury finds the Blairs committed those

common law causes of action, that they are to proceed to Questions 4 and 6,

                                     - 16 -
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respectively, and “[s]tate the amount of damages, if any, sustained by Plaintiff

as a result of the” unfair competition and conversion.20 Id. at 2-3.

       In Tincher v. Omega Flex, 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014), our Supreme

Court explained the role of the trial court instructing a jury as follows:

       [W]hen a court instructs the jury, the objective is to explain to the
       jury how it should approach its task and the factors it should
       consider in reaching its verdict. On appeal, the reviewing court
       examines jury instructions to determine whether the trial court
       abused its discretion or offered an inaccurate statement of law
       controlling the outcome of the case. A jury charge is adequate
       unless the issues are not made clear, the jury was misled by the
       instructions, or there was an omission from the charge amounting
       to a fundamental error. The appellate court will afford a new trial
       if an erroneous jury instruction amounted to a fundamental error
       or the record is insufficient to determine whether the error
       affected the verdict.

Id. at 351.

       Instantly, the trial court found that there was no basis for damages in

excess of the $142,000.00 PUTSA verdict because section 5304 states that

“damages can include both the actual loss caused by misappropriation and the

unjust enrichment caused by misappropriation that is not taken into account

____________________________________________

20 Conversion is defined as:

       [T]he deprivation of another’s right of property in, or use or
       possession of, a chattel, or other interference therewith, without
       the owner’s consent and without lawful justification. When such
       an act occurs, the plaintiff may bring suit if he had an immediate
       right to possession of the chattel at the time it was converted.

Bank of Landisburg v. Burruss, 524 A.2d 896, 898 (Pa. Super. 1987).

                                          - 17 -
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in computing actual loss.” 12 Pa.C.S.A. § 5304. This conclusion, however, is

inconsistent with the court’s instruction that if the jury finds that the Blairs

committed conversion, then they must award damages. Simply stated, the

court’s molded verdict does not reflect the intent of the jury, as memorialized

in the answers provided on the jury verdict form.

      In fact, the jury’s verdict conformed with the trial court’s explicit

instructions on the causes of action (PUTSA, unfair competition, and

conversion) and damages. See N.T. Jury Trial (Jury Charge), 10/28/21, at

495 (trial court instruction stating if jury finds Duffys proved conversion claim,

then it must award damages). Moreover, the court found that the evidence

at trial proved that the Blairs interfered with DD’s use of its customer list

(conversion) and that there was sufficient evidence to prove an unfair

competition claim where Mr. Duffy was still doing business after the Blairs

opened their jewelry store, the Blairs took the Duffys’ customer list and later

registered Jewelry by Alicia and Scott, and individuals interested in the Duffys’

business lost interest in buying DD when they found out Alicia possessed the

list. See Williams v. Dulaney, 480 A.2d 1080, 1082 (Pa. Super. 1984) (“It

is the duty of the trial judge to determine, prior to sending the case to the

jury, whether or not the plaintiff has introduced sufficient evidence to establish

the elements necessary to maintain an action.”); see also Gordon v.

Trovato, 338 A.3d 653 (Pa. 1975) (“There must be evidence upon which a

jury’s conclusion may be based.”).

                                     - 18 -
J-A18017-23

       Therefore, we conclude that the court improperly molded the verdict

with regard to the damages awarded on the conversion and unfair competition

claims.     By reducing the verdict, where the law provides for independent

causes of action (conversion and unfair competition) in addition to those under

the PUTSA, the court invaded the province of the jury and negated its findings

as expressed on the jury verdict sheet, which was the product of a joint effort

by Plaintiffs’ and Defendants’ counsel.            See N.T. Jury Trial (Charging

Conference), 10/28/21, at 397-99. See Mendralla v. Weaver Corp., 703

A.2d 480, 486 (Pa. Super. 1997) (en banc) (“While a trial court has discretion

in deciding whether to mold a verdict, it must nonetheless adhere to the

principle that a verdict may only be molded where the intention of the jury is

clear.”).    Because the court erroneously molded the jury’s awards as to

conversion and unfair competition, we must reverse and remand for the

reinstatement of the jury’s original awards on those claims.21

       We now turn to the Blairs’ claims. In their first issue on appeal, the

Blairs contend that the jury improperly concluded that DD met its burden of

proving Ms. Blair’s primary job responsibilities were administrative in nature

and, thus, she was an “exempt” employee who was not entitled to overtime

pay. We are constrained to agree.

____________________________________________

21 Moreover, by agreeing to the various instructions for damages given to the

jury, the Blairs waived any issue regarding the jury’s award.

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J-A18017-23

     The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) requires certain employers to pay

their employees at least “one and one-half times the regular rate,” i.e.,

overtime pay, for any hours worked in excess of a forty-hour workweek. 29

U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). However, “any employee employed in a bonafide . . .

administrative . . . capacity,” id. at § 213(a)(1), is exempt from this

overtime requirement.     Id. (emphasis added).    An employer seeking to

establish that an employee is exempt under this “administrative” exemption

must show that: (1) the employee’s salary is at least $684.00 per week; (2)

the employee’s “primary duty is the performance of office or non-manual work

directly related to the management or general business operations of the

employer or the employer's customers;” and (3) the employee’s “primary duty

includes the exercise of discretion and independent judgment with respect to

matters of significance.” 29 C.F.R. § 541.200(a). See generally id. at §

541.700 (Primary duty).

     The existence of an FLSA overtime exemption for professional

employees is an affirmative defense for which the employer bears the burden

of proof. Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997). See 29 CFR § 541.203

(Administrative exemption examples); see also id. at § 541.700(a)

(“Determination of an employee’s primary duty must be based on all the facts

in a particular case, with the major emphasis on the character of the

                                   - 20 -
J-A18017-23

employee’s job as a whole.”); id. at § 541.200(1)(2)-(3).22 In order to show

that the employee’s work is “directly related to the management or general

business operations of the employer or the employer’s customers . . . an

employee must perform work directly related to assisting with the running or

servicing of the business.” Id. at § 541.201(a).

       In their answer and new matter to the Blairs’ counterclaims, the Duffys

denied that Alicia was “a non-exempt employee who was entitled to overtime

pay for any time worked in excess of forty (40) hours in a workweek.” Duffys’

Answer and New Matter to Counterclaim, 4/12/19, at ¶ 17. In their brief in

____________________________________________

22 The court gave the following, relevant instruction to the jury, as proposed

by the Blairs, regarding the FLSA’s Administrative Employee Exemption:

       In order for Diamond Design to establish that Alicia Blair was an
       exempt administrative employee, Diamond Design must prove
       each of the following by a preponderance of the evidence:

          1. Alicia Blair was compensated on a salary basis;

          2. Alicia Blair’s primary duty was the performance of
          office or non-manual work directly related to the
          management or general business operations of
          Diamond Design or Diamond Design's customers; and

          3. Plaintiff’s primary duty included the exercise of
          discretion and independent judgment with respect to
          matters of significance.

“Primary duty” means the principal, main, major[,] or most important duty
that the employee performs.

N.T. Jury Trial, 10/28/21, at 491 (emphasis added). In addition, the court
instructed the jury that, “[i]f you find in favor of the Blairs under their wage
claims, you must award the Blairs damages in the amount that they should
have been paid less what [DD] actually paid them.” Id. at 495.

                                          - 21 -
J-A18017-23

opposition to the Blairs’ motion for partial summary judgment, the Duffys

averred that Alicia was an exempt DD employee under Pennsylvania’s

“administrative” exemption, see 34 Pa. Code § 231.83, claiming, among other

things, that “Alicia’s primary duties include[d], but were not limited to,

management, design of jewelry, and independent sales.” Brief in Opposition

to Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, at 8; see also id. at §

541.100(a)(2)-(4).

       Therefore, as Alicia’s employers, the Duffys had the burden to prove

that Alicia was an exempt employee under the administrative exemption23

of the FLSA, Robbins, supra, not the creative professional or learned

professional exemptions. See 29 CFR § 541.300(a)(2). Thus, even if Alicia

performed any “invention, imagination, originality[,] or talent in a recognized

field of artistic or creative endeavor,” like designing jewelry for DD’s

customers, it is irrelevant for purposes of determining whether, in the instant

matter, she is an exempt administrative employee under the FLSA. See id.

at § 541.300(a)(2) (creative professional exemption applies to employee

“[w]hose primary duty is the performance of work . . . [] requiring invention,

____________________________________________

23In fact, during the charging conference, the Duffys’ attorney specifically
noted that his clients were claiming Alicia was exempt under the
administrative and not the executive exception. See N.T. Jury Trial (Charging
Conference), 10/28/21, at 435.

                                          - 22 -
J-A18017-23

imagination, originality or talent in a recognized field of artistic or creative

endeavor”).24

         Regarding the second prong25 of the administrative exception test, to

qualify as engaging in work “directly related to the management or general

business operations[,] an employee must perform work directly related to

assisting with the running or servicing of the business, as distinguished, for

example, from working on a manufacturing production line or selling a

product in a retail or service establishment.”                29 C.F.R. § 541.201(a)

(emphasis added). See N.T. Jury Trial, 10/28/21, at 253-59 (Alicia testifying

she did “mostly sales,” meeting with customers, greeting them, taking their

repair jobs when they came in, assisting customers with designing something

or making a purchase, and often times opening and closing the store on a

workday, she never ran the business side); id. (Alicia also testifying she “did

social    media   accounts     (1-2    hours/week),   .   .    .   would   occasionally

[approximately 5% the time] write an appraisal, . . . would enter customers’

names in the data list [monthly or quarterly]”); id. at 254, 280 (Alicia

testifying approximately 70-75% of her work week was spent “dealing with

customers on sales and design”); id. at 320 (Alicia testifying about 75% of

____________________________________________

24 Although vendors would send Alicia “stones on memo,” the customer would

then pick out the one they wanted for a particular design piece, Alicia would
purchase the one(s) they wanted, and then send back the ones the customer
did not want. See Alicia Blair Deposition, 1/4/21, at 33-34. However, Alicia
would “never just purchase[] items without authorization.” Id. at 56.
25 The parties do not dispute that Alicia was paid on a salary basis.

                                          - 23 -
J-A18017-23

her time was spent “[p]rimarily selling and designing [jewelry]”) but see id.

at 322 (Alicia testifying she “misspoke” when she stated at deposition that

75% of her work was strictly design and she exercised her independent

judgment “as to what [she] think[s] is a good idea, what might be plausible,

[and] what is the best deal”). Id. at 326 (Alicia testifying she modified social

media pages for DD on Facebook and Instagram).           See also Alicia Blair

Deposition, 1/4/21, at 14-19 (Alicia stating her first position at DD was as a

“salesclerk,” that she worked on designs for jewelry about 75% of the time);

id. at 22-24 (Alicia stating she worked on some mailer flyers and structured

some print advertisements that were all approved by Mr. Duffy before they

would get mailed or sent); id. at 25-28 (Alicia testifying she created and

worked on store’s social media account); id. at 94 (Alicia testifying roughly

70% of her time at DD consisted of selling retail jewelry).

      A primary duty “directly related to the management or general business

operations” includes work in a functional area of the business, such as

accounting, budgeting, auditing, quality control, purchasing, procurement,

marketing, safety and health, personnel management, and similar activities.

29 C.F.R. § 541.201(b). See also id. at § 541.201 (Notes) (“directly related

to the management or general business operations” prong under section

541.200(a) met if employee engages in running business itself or determining

overall course or policies, not just in day-to-day carrying out of business’

affairs).

                                     - 24 -
J-A18017-23

       Despite Alicia’s testimony to the contrary, Mrs. Duffy testified that Alicia

“stepp[ed]    into   [Mrs.   Duffy’s]   shoes,”   taking   over   her   managerial

responsibilities at DD after Mrs. Duffy had brain surgery and “was out of

commission for five months.” N.T. Jury Trial, 10/27/21, at 210, 214-15. In

particular, Mrs. Duffy testified Alicia’s duties included: taking over “the tax

and financial aspects of the business . . . [which] involved purchasing,

procuring items, inventory[, p]ersonnel management, human resources[,]

hir[ing] two people, [and] had the ability to hire and fire employees.” Id. at

216.    Therefore, even though the Duffys admitted Alicia was a retail

salesperson at DD and Alicia testified that roughly 70-75% of her time spent

at DD was performing retail jewelry sales, the jury, as fact finder, may have

chosen to believe Mrs. Duffy’s testimony that Alicia performed management

or general business operations, and to discredit Alicia’s testimony that she

performed non-managerial tasks for DD.

       However, even assuming the jury believed Mrs. Duffy’s testimony that

Alicia performed some duties directly related to the running of DD’s business,

in order to prove that Alicia was not entitled to overtime as an exempt

employee, the Duffys had to show that these tasks were Alicia’s “primary

duties” at DD. See 29 C.F.R. §541.201(a). Instantly, the Duffys failed to

present evidence on the relative importance of Alicia’s administrative tasks as

compared with her retail sales duties and the amount of time she spent

performing those tasks.      Accordingly, we conclude that the jury’s verdict

denying Alicia’s counterclaim under the WPCL is not supported by record

                                        - 25 -
J-A18017-23

evidence.   See id. at § 541.700(a) (among factors to consider in defining

“primary duty” of employee are: “(1) the relative importance of the exempt

duties as compared with other types of duties; (2) the amount of time spent

performing exempt work; (3) the employee's relative freedom from direct

supervision; and (4) the relationship between employee’s salary and the

wages paid to other employees for the kind of nonexempt work performed by

the employee”).

      It is well-established that the status of an employee under the FLSA is

“extremely individual and fact-intensive, requiring a detailed analysis of the

time spent performing the administrative duties and a careful factual analysis

of the full range of the employee’s job duties and responsibilities.” Id. at §

541.201, Overview. See also id. at § 541.103 (“Applying the regulations

interpreting the FLSA, an employee may be exempt if he or she spends more

than 50 percent of his or her time performing executive, administrative, or

professional work, or if he or she spends less than 50 percent of his or her

time on these tasks, but these tasks nevertheless predominate or define his

or her job.”). But see N.T. Jury Trial, 10/28/21, at 262 (Alicia testifying she

would “enter sales tax at the end of the month . . . [but] was never shown

exactly what sales were [hers]”); id. at 261-62 (Alicia testifying she did not

have understanding of DD’s books and finances, and did not know what her

sales numbers were in a given month); id. at 336 (Alicia testifying she did

marketing/print advertising for DD approximately 1-3 times/year for a total of

a couple hours; it was not one of her primary duties).       See also Duffys’

                                    - 26 -
J-A18017-23

Answer and New Matter to Complaint to Join Additional Defendants, 4/12/19,

at ¶ 12 (Duffys admitting in answer to Blairs’ counterclaims that “Alicia Blair

worked as a retail salesperson”); N.T. Jury Trial, 10/28/21, at 444-46 (DD’s

bookkeeper’s deposition testimony, read into record at trial, “99% of time”

when she came into DD, she “would see [Alicia] with customers . . . engaged

in jewelry sales”); id. at 349-351 (family friend, who helped as “back-up”

employee at DD, testified Alicia was “the base of the business” who “did sales,

marketing, designs, prioritized some of the bench work, tidied up,” but that

“good portion of her time” consisted of “working directly with customers” when

she was there).

      Thus, we reverse the trial court’s order denying the Blairs’ motion for

JNOV where no reasonable juror could conclude, based on the evidence

presented at trial, that Alicia’s primary duty was the performance of office or

nonmanual work directly related to the management or general business

operations of the employer or the employer’s customers.        See Martin v.

Cooper Elec. Supply Co., 940 F.3d 896, 900 (3d Cir. 1991) (“It is the

employer’s burden to affirmatively prove that its employees come within the

scope of the overtime exemption, and any exemption from the Act must be

proven plainly and unmistakably.”); see also Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky,

Inc., 361 U.S 388 (1960) (because FLSA is remedial statute, exemptions are

typically narrowly construed). Upon remand, the court shall determine the

amount of damages due Alicia and any costs for reasonable attorneys’ fees,

                                    - 27 -
J-A18017-23

see 43 Pa.C.S.A. § 260.91(f) and, if appropriate, liquidated damages. See

id. at § 260.10.26

       After reviewing the parties’ brief, relevant case law and statutes, and

the certified record on appeal, we rely on Judge Hertzberg’s opinion to affirm

the   judgment      as   it   relates   to     the    remaining   claims   advanced   by

Appellants/Cross-Appellees on appeal: (1) JNOV properly denied on unfair

competition claim where Mr. Duffy still doing business when Blairs opened

their jewelry store; (2) no new trial on damages warranted where jury’s award

reasonably related to damages suffered by Duffys;27 (3) jury properly awarded

____________________________________________

26 The trial court’s jury verdict sheet included the following relevant questions

with regard to Alicia’s WPCL claim:

       Question No. 7

          Are wages due to Alicia Blair for Plaintiff[]s’ violation of the
          Pennsylvania Wage Payment Collection Act?

       If you answered “Yes” proceed to Question No. 8. If you answered
       “No,” proceed to Question 9.

       Question No. 8

          State the amount of damages, if any, sustained by Alicia
          Blair as a result of the Pennsylvania Wage Payment
          Collection Act violation.

Jury Verdict, 10/29/21, at 3.
27 The parties agreed to the damage provisions on the verdict slip as follows:

       THE COURT: So[,] it is going to read [“]state the amount of
       damages sustained by plaintiff as a result of the Pennsylvania
       Uniform Trade Secrets Act violation.[”] All right moving on to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

                                             - 28 -
J-A18017-23

Scott $5,000.00 in overtime pay where: there was a good faith dispute as to

the payments made to Scott; Scott understood he would be paid upon

completion of contract for sale of business as he came on board to DD as

apprentice to learn business from Mr. Duffy; once Duffys did not sell the

business to the Blairs, Duffys issued Scott check for wages earned in March

____________________________________________

       three: Did defendants engage in unfair competition? You got
       these answers yes or no.

       MR. CORCORAN: Yeah.

       THE COURT: All right, this is what we usually use.

       MR. CORCORAN: It is no big deal. You know what, I don’t care.
       You can change it to that, Your Honor, I don’t care.

       MR. BERRY: Yeah

                                               *   *   *

       THE COURT: Everybody takes advocate positions in that and it is
       not the time for it, in my view, but that is what happens. If you
       answer yes, proceed to number four. Question number four is
       going to be [“]state the amount of damages, if any, sustained by
       the plaintiff.[”] Okay, state the amount of damages, if any,
       sustained by plaintiff as a result of the unfair competition. If they
       answer no, they are not doing that. Okay, number five: Did
       defendants engage in conversion, yes or no? If yes, proceed to
       six. If no, number seven. Same exercise here. State the amount
       of damages sustained, if any, by plaintiffs as a result of the
       conversion. . . . Does that sound okay to both of you?

       MR. BERRY: Uh-huh.

       MR. CORCORAN: Yes.

N.T. Jury Trial, 10/28/21, at 397-99 (emphasis added).

                                          - 29 -
J-A18017-23

and April 2018; there was no evidence adduced at trial regarding Scott’s

wages; and, as fact finder, jury had duty to determine a fair and reasonable

rate to calculate WPCL damages; (4) trial court struck proper balance and

awarded reasonably-related attorney fee award of $27,642.00 based on

Scott’s WPCL claim where Blairs’ counterclaims were neither “inextricably

intertwined”    with    Duffys’    successful      PUTSA,   unfair   competition,   and

conversion claims, nor did they flow from same set of operative facts.              Cf.

Ambrose v. Citizens Nat. Bank of Evans City, 5 A.3d 413 (Pa. Super.

2010) (where WPCL claim initiated litigation and defendant’s meritless

counterclaims were “inextricably intertwined” with plaintiff’s meritorious WPCL

claim where the defensive counterclaims flowed from same set of operative

facts).28

       Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.               Molded verdict of

$142,200.00 is reversed. Original jury verdict of $225,000.00 is reinstated in

accordance with dictates of this decision. Order denying JNOV as to Alicia’s

WPCL claim is reversed.           Case remanded for new trial as to damages

concerning Alicia’s WPCL claim, including any statutory attorneys’ fees or

____________________________________________

28 Having determined the court abused   its discretion in molding the verdict
and zeroing out the damages for the Duffys’ conversion and unfair competition
claims, we find this claim moot.

                                          - 30 -
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liquidated damages, if applicable.             Remainder of judgment affirmed.

Jurisdiction relinquished.29

DATE: 02/09/2024

____________________________________________

29 We instruct the parties to attach a copy of Judge Hertzberg’s decision in the

event of further proceedings in the matter.

                                          - 31 -