Court Opinion

ID: 9693492
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:44:52.094953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:47.509039
License: Public Domain

*133Sharpe, J.
{dissenting). A fair statement of the' facts in the instant case appears in Justice Btjtzel’s opinion. Admitting that the employee was injured “in the course of” his employment does not admit that the injury “arose out of” that employment. In Levchuk v. Krug Cement Products Company, 246 Mich 589, a divided court sustained the commission and the contention of defendants that the injury of plaintiff did not “arise out of” his employment even though it occurred “during the course of” that employment. In that case plaintiff reported for work at defendant’s manufacturing plant in Detroit where he was picked up to he taken to a gravel pit several miles outside of the city. His duties consisted of taking charge of the gravel pit and assisting in loading trucks. Before reaching the gravel pit, a fowl of some kind flew against the windshield and shattered the glass causing the loss of an eye. In that case the Court said:
“Unless the proof justifies us in concluding that this particular risk or danger which resulted in plaintiff’s injury was one which was peculiarly incident to his work as the caretaker and watchman of a gravel pit, it cannot be said that the accident arose out of his employment. Surely, it cannot be said that the risk or probability of the plaintiff’s being injured by a pheasant or other fowl flying into the windshield of a motor vehicle in which he was riding was any greater because of the fact of his particular employment as a watchman or caretaker than would have been the risk or probability of injury to any other traveler in an automobile in the same locality.”
Further, in that case the Court held that lightning cases presented substantially the same situation:
“In each of the cited cases this Court held that the accident resulting from the building or the person being struck by lightning did not arise out of the employment; and likewise it must be held in the *134instant case that the pheasant striking the windshield and thereby cansing plaintiff’s injury did not arise out of the employment.”
In the instant case Justice Butzel argues that the lightning cases are not controlling because the injury occurred through an “act of God.” See Klawinski v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. Co., 185 Mich 643 (LRA1916A, 342); Thier v. Widdifield, 210 Mich 355; and Nelson v. Country Club of Detroit, 329 Mich 479. It does not appear in the record that any human agency combined with the forces of nature to cause the limb to fall. There was a mild breeze blowing. There is hearsay evidence that the limb was a “little decayed.” Nothing more appears to show why that limb fell, it would seem to be one of those natural happenings which in its suddenness is wholly unexpected. Ordinarily prudent persons do not inspect the limbs of each tree along a street they are about to travel. In many cases careful inspection would not discover the unsound limb about to fall. In its suddenness the falling of a limb is similar to lightning. In 2 Words and Phrases, p 169 a number of definitions of an “act of God” may be found, including the following:
“The distinguishing characteristic of an ‘act of God’ is that it proceeds from the forces of nature alone, to the entire exclusion of human agency. Rice v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 33 Idaho 565 (198 P 161).”
“Natural causes which directly and exclusively, without human intervention, produce damages not preventable by any reasonable foresight and care, constitute ‘act of God’ for which no liability exists; rule being otherwise if defendant’s negligence cooperates. Perkins v. Vermont Hydro-Electric Corporation, 106 Vt 367 (177 A 631).”
*135However, it does not seem to me critical to the argument that the falling limb be held to be an “act of God.” The point is that the factual distinction between the lightning cases and the instant case made by Justice Butzel is not substantial. He does not attempt any distinction between the Levchuk Case, supra, and the instant case. Instead, he relies on Stockley v. School District No. 1 of Portage Township, 231 Mich 523 (24 NCCA 170); Morse v. Port Huron & Detroit R. Co., 251 Mich 309; Widman v. Murray Corporation of America, 245 Mich 332; Katz v. A. Kadans & Company, 232 NY 420 (134 NE 330, 23 ALR 401); Kunze v. Detroit Shade Tree Company, 192 Mich 435 (LRA1917A, 252); and Arnested v. McNicholas, 223 Mich 488. He also points to 80 ALR 126 for a collection of cases holding that street injuries are compensable as arising out of the employment “when it is the employment itself that places the employee on the street.”
The Stockley Case, supra, involves a teacher who was injured while en route to attend an institute which she was required to attend. The car in which she was riding was struck by an interurban railway car and she was killed. In that case the general rule is recognized that when an employee is injured away from his place of employment while going to and from his work the injury does not arise out of his employment. However, the Court holds that that case fell within an exception to the general rule where an employee is doing some special service or discharging some duty incidental to the nature of his employment in the interest of or under direction of his employer. However, it must be recognized that critical to the decision is the fact that in that case the employee was required to make a journey of 12 miles away from her home and regular place of employment and thereby subjected to greater hazards. *136of travel than she would ordinarily experience in traveling to and from work.
“The criterion is not necessarily that others are exposed to the same dangers of travel, but whether with reference to the nature of his employment the performance of a special service within the scope of such employment, in the interest of or by direction of his employer, particularly subjects an employee to the added danger out of which the accident arises.” (Emphasis supplied.)
It is questionable in the instant case whether the employee was subjected to any “added danger.” It seems to me that in traveling to Central High School he was not subjected to any greater danger from the hazards of travel than if he was on his way to his regular place of employment.
In the Morse Case, supra, the defendant’s employee after ordinary working hours had the duty of making bank deposits, and while on his way to make such a deposit he was struck by a car which resulted in his death. In that case the comment of Chief Justice Wiest concurring in affirmance is illuminating :•
“I concur in the result. The employee was in the-street, about the business of his employer, therefore-the accident, incident to a hazard in using the street,, arose out of and in the course of his employment.
“Beyond deciding the case before us, I do not care-to be committed.”
That case is different than the instant case in that in that ease the carrying of the deposit to the bank was the service to be performed by the employee. Not so, in the instant case. In the instant case the-employee was on the way to perform the service.
The Widman Case, supra, offers nothing new. In that case the employee was sent from Chicago to the west coast on business .of the employer. While riding in the observation car of a train he was struck *137in the eye by a cinder. The Court disposed of that .case with the familiar language:
“We think it must be said that the very nature of the occupation of the deceased itself exposed him to the unusual risk and danger of an accident of this nature.” Quoted with approval from Kunze v. Detroit Shade Tree Co., 192 Mich 435(LRA1917A, 252).
Applied to the instant case it cannot be said that the very nature of the duties of an electrician on his way to hook up several electric ranges involved any unusual risk of being struck by a falling limb.
The Kats Case, supra, involves a dairyman’s chauffeur who was on the streets in performance of his duties when stabbed by a madman. Again a factual distinction appears when compared with the instant case in that in that case the service performed by the employee was performed on the streets. However, there is language in that case peculiarly applicable to the case at bar:
“Cases may arise where one is hurt in the street, but where the risk is of a general nature, not peculiar to the street. Lightning strikes fortuitously in the street; bombs dropped by enemy aircraft do not expose to special danger persons in a street as distinguished from those in houses. Allcock v. Rogers, [1918] House of Lords, 11 BWCC 149 (87 LJKB 693, 118 LT 386, 34 TLR 324, 62 SJ 421). The danger must result from the place to make it a street risk7 but that is enough if the workman is in the place by reason of his employment, and in the discharge of his duty to his employer.”
As applied to the instant case the risk of being struck by a falling limb is not a risk peculiar to the street any more than is the risk of being struck by lightning.
*138The Kunze Case, supra, involves an employee engaged in trimming and planting trees. He was injured while proceeding from one job to another. The Court said:
“We think it must be said that the very nature of the occupation of the deceased itself exposed him to the unusual risk and danger of an accident of this nature.”
The decision of Justice Butzel may be justified on the ground that it is within a group of cases representing an established exception to the general rule that ordinarily injuries to an employee while going to and from work are not regarded as arising out of and in the scope of his employment when the employee is on his way to perform some special service or to discharge some duty incidental to the nature of his employment or in the interest of or under the direction of his employer or where the employee is on his way home from such a mission. Cajes of this character are collected in 142 ALR 885. However, that exception recently has been repudiated in Michigan. In Phillips v. Fitzhugh Motor Company, 330 Mich 183, the injured employee was returning home after having rendered a service to his employer, while in the case at bar the employee was-going to a place where he could render a service to his employer. The writer of this opinion wrote the dissenting opinion in the Phillips Case. I now feel bound by the majority opinion in that case. The-majority opinion in the Phillips Case relies on Daniel v. Murray Corporation of America, 326 Mich 1:
“In order that compensation may be due the injury must both arise out of and also be received in the course of the employment. Neither alone is enough.” Quoted with approval from the McNicol's Case, 215 Mass 497 (102 NE 697, LRA1916A, 306).
*139The opinion of Mr. Justice Butzel eliminates the element of injuries that arise out of employment. Some causal connection between the risk that resulted in the injury and the duties of employment should he required. In the case at bar the risk of being struck by a falling limb while traveling on a public highway had no connection with the employee’s duties of hooking up electric ranges at the high school. For the reasons above stated I concur in reversal, with costs to defendants.
Boyles, J., did not sit.