Court Opinion

ID: 9918834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 18:01:38.739795+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:10.593883
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-13044   Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 01/16/2024    Page: 1 of 5

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-13044
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       SHAQUILLE KIERAN ALLEN,
                                                               Petitioner,
       versus
       U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

                                                              Respondent.

                          ____________________

                   Petition for Review of a Decision of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals
                          Agency No. A063-101-734
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-13044     Document: 17-1      Date Filed: 01/16/2024    Page: 2 of 5

       2                      Opinion of the Court                23-13044

       Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and NEWSOM, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Shaquille Allen petitions for review of the Board of Immi-
       gration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s
       (“IJ”) denial of his application for asylum pursuant to the Immigra-
       tion and Nationality Act (“INA”) § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), with-
       holding of removal under INA § 241(b)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3),
       and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture
       and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
       ment (“CAT”), 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c). He admits that his petition
       was untimely filed but argues that we should review the petition
       anyway because he failed to receive a copy of the BIA’s decision
       and a hurricane prevented him from timely filing. He also moves
       to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). The government moves for
       summary disposition, arguing that this Court should dismiss Al-
       len’s petition as untimely under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). It also moves
       to stay the briefing schedule.
               We determine de novo whether we have subject matter ju-
       risdiction. Guzman-Munoz v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 733 F.3d 1311, 1313
       (11th Cir. 2013). “Federal courts are obligated to inquire into sub-
       ject-matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it may be lacking.”
       Bing Quan Lin v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 881 F.3d 860, 866 (11th Cir. 2018)
       (quotation marks omitted).
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       23-13044               Opinion of the Court                        3

              A petition for review of an order of removal must be filed
       no later than “30 days after the date of the final order of removal.”
       INA § 242(b)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1). An order of removal is final
       when the BIA affirms the order or when the time to appeal the or-
       der to the BIA expires, whichever is earlier. INA § 101(a)(47)(B), 8
       U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B).
              Prior to 1996, § 1105a(a)(1) governed the time to file a peti-
       tion for review, providing that a petition “may be filed not later
       than 90 days after the date of the issuance of the final deportation
       order, or, in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated fel-
       ony . . . , not later than 30 days after the issuance of such order.”
       INA § 106(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1) (1995). The statute also re-
       quired that review of an order regarding a motion to reconsider or
       reopen be consolidated with the review of the underlying agency
       order. Id. § 1105a(a)(6).
              In Stone v. INS, the Supreme Court declined to infer from
       § 1105a(a)(6)’s consolidation requirement that a motion for recon-
       sideration of a deportation order suspended the order’s finality.
       514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995). It reasoned that “[j]udicial review provi-
       sions” like § 1105a(a) “are jurisdictional in nature and must be con-
       strued with strict fidelity to their terms.” Id. The Court explained
       that “[t]his is all the more true of statutory provisions specifying
       the timing of review, for those time limits are, as we have often
       stated, mandatory and jurisdictional, and are not subject to equita-
       ble tolling.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted) (citing
       Cheng Fan Kwok v. I.N.S., 392 U.S. 206, 212 (1968) (“Section 106(a)
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                   23-13044

       is intended exclusively to prescribe and regulate a portion of the
       jurisdiction of the federal courts. As a jurisdictional statute, it must
       be construed both with precision and with fidelity to the terms by
       which Congress has expressed its wishes.”). We have relied on
       Stone in stating that the deadline in § 1252(b)(1) is also jurisdictional
       and not subject to equitable tolling. Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 371
       F.3d 771, 773 n.3 (11th Cir. 2004).
              In 2006, the Supreme Court adopted the clear-statement
       rule, holding that a statute is jurisdictional only if clearly indicated.
       Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 502 (2006). The Supreme
       Court applied the clear-statement rule, in Santos-Zacaria v. Gar-
       land, in determining whether the exhaustion requirement in
       § 1252(d)(1) is jurisdictional. 598 U.S. 411, 415-17 (2023). It con-
       cluded that, because exhaustion requirements are usually claims
       processing rules and the statute did not specify any jurisdictional
       bar, § 1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional. Id. at 417-19. It held that
       Stone could not be read to establish that the exhaustion require-
       ment is jurisdictional because it predated Arbaugh and did not ad-
       dress the exhaustion requirement. Id. at 421-22.
              Under the prior panel precedent rule, we must follow a prior
       binding precedent “unless and until it is overruled by this [C]ourt
       en banc or by the Supreme Court.” United States v. Martinez, 606
       F.3d 1303, 1305 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks omitted). As to
       subsequent Supreme Court decisions, a later panel may depart
       from an earlier decision based on an intervening Supreme Court
       decision only if the intervening decision is “clearly on point.”
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       23-13044               Opinion of the Court                          5

       Atlantic Sounding Co. v. Townsend, 496 F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir.
       2007) (quotation omitted). Therefore, “that the reasoning of an in-
       tervening high court decision is at odds with that of our prior deci-
       sion is no basis for a panel to depart from our prior decision.” Id.
               We lack jurisdiction to consider Allen’s petition because it is
       untimely, as he filed the petition more than 30 days after the time
       to appeal the BIA’s August 1 ruling expired. INA § 242(b)(1), 8
       U.S.C. 1252(b)(1); Dakane, 399 F.3d at 1272 n.3. Under the prior
       panel precedent rule, we are obligated to follow Dakane because
       Santos-Zacaria is not clearly on point, as it examined § 1252(d)(1).
       Townsend, 496 F.3d at 1284; Dakane, 399 F.3d at 1272 n.3; San-
       tos-Zacaria, 598 U.S. at 417-19, 421-22. That the Supreme Court’s
       reasoning in Santos-Zacaria may be at odds with our reasoning in
       Dakane due to its reliance on Stone is no basis to depart from Da-
       kane. Townsend, 496 F.3d at 1284. Notably, the Supreme Court
       has not overruled either Dakane or Stone. See Stone, 514 U.S. at
       405; Dakane, 371 F.3d at 773 n.3. While Allen states that he did not
       receive a copy of the BIA’s decision and a hurricane prevented him
       from timely filing his petition, § 1252(b)(1) is not subject to equita-
       ble tolling. Dakane, 399 F.3d at 1272 n.3.
              Accordingly, we DISMISS the petition as untimely. Because
       we lack jurisdiction, we DENY as moot the government’s motions
       for summary disposition and to stay the briefing schedule and Al-
       len’s motion to proceed IFP.
              DISMISSED.