Court Opinion

ID: 9538806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:42:01.686418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:10.418735
License: Public Domain

MARTONE, Justice,
concurring in the judgment.
I would hold that the 1984 contract and the 1988 contract are unconscionable as a matter of law. As the majority acknowledges, a declaration of unconscionability under A.R.S. § 47-2302(A) is a legal conclusion to be made by the court. And the evidence referred to in § 47-2302(B) “is for the court’s consideration, and not the jury’s.” U.C.C. § 2-302, Comment 3 (1962). The facts as outlined by the majority lead to one inescapable conclusion: one of unconscionability. If these contracts are not unconscionable as a matter of law, what contract would be?
The majority refuses to hold these contracts unconscionable as a matter of law because it says Fidelity did not have an op*94portunity to present evidence “on the commercial setting, purpose, and effect of the 1984 contract.” Ante, at 93, 907 P.2d at 62. The majority argues that “neither Fidelity’s motion for summary judgment [nor] Maxwell’s response ... addressed the merits of the unconscionability claim.” Ante, at 87, 907 P.2d at 56.
But they did. Fidelity moved for summaiy judgment on the unconscionability claim, with references to the record. Fidelity’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 15. Maxwell resisted summary judgment on the unconscionability claim with references to the record. Plaintiff’s Response in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment at 5-7. Both sides argued the evidence as it related to commercial setting, purpose and effect. Id. Fidelity's entire 11 page Reply to the Plaintiff’s Response related to unconscionability. Indeed, Fidelity said:
Although A.R.S. § 47-2302(B) states that when it is claimed or appears that a contract may be unconscionable, the parties shall be afforded a “reasonable opportunity to present evidence,” such does not bar summary judgment here because Plaintiff has had such an opportunity to present evidence by way of Affidavit. This court then determines whether there is a fact issue.
Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment at 7-8 (emphasis added). It is thus clear that Fidelity itself admits it had its opportunity to present evidence on the claim of unconscionability.
The majority acknowledges that § 47-2302(B) “only requires a reasonable opportunity to present evidence” and that “such opportunity may be equally well afforded at the hearing on a motion for summary judgment,” ante, at 87, 907 P.2d at 56, but then suggests that some sort of evidentiary hearing or trial is required. Ante, at 93, 907 P.2d at 62. The contradiction inherent in this approach is obvious. The majority is simply unwilling to accept the fact that unconscionability was the subject of the motion for summary judgment. We do not have the “supreme power” to ignore the record. Espinoza v. Martin, 182 Ariz. 145, 894 P.2d 688, 696 (1995) (Feldman, C.J., concurring).
On the undisputed facts, the commercial setting, purpose and effect of the contracts are tragically plain. The commercial setting: a “now defunct” entity, ante, at 84, 907 P.2d at 53, took advantage of a limited person living on the margin of human existence. The purpose: to extract “$17,000” from a “hotel maid” who earned “$400 per month.” Id. at 84-85, 907 P.2d at 53-54. The effect: to subject a marginal person to the risk of loss of her home, all for a hot water heater that “was never installed properly, [and] never functioned properly.” Id. at 84, 907 P.2d at 53.
I would remand this case to the trial court for entry of judgment in favor of Maxwell. On a record like this, the court has the power to grant an unasserted cross-motion for summary judgment. Trimmer v. Ludtke, 105 Ariz. 260, 263, 462 P.2d 809, 812 (1969) (“[A] judgment on a motion for summary judgment may be either for or against the moving party, even though the opposing party has not filed such a motion.”); Celotex Corporation v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 326, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2554, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (“[C]ourts are widely acknowledged to possess the power to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long as the losing party was on notice that she had to come forward with all of her evidence.”).