Court Opinion

ID: 9771015
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:29:01.484566+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:23.745060
License: Public Domain

Newbern, J., not participating. Brown, J., concurring in part; dissenting in part. Robert L. Brown, Justice. I would affirm the chancellor’s decision across the board. The majority second guesses the chancellor’s finding óf fact that a separate agreement to apply farm income to note payments was entered into between W.T. Karnes and his son, appellant Robert Karnes, and that payments were made under that agreement. According to the chancellor, the separate agreement and the rent payments tolled the statute of limitations for the years 1983, 1984, and 1985. The specific language in his letter opinion is this: Although the decedent’s tax returns indicate he received gross rents, it must be remembered that he owned other lands on which rents were received. If the Court were to attempt to account for the rents and profits, it would be engaging in speculation and that is something this Court cannot do. The Defendants have the burden of proof on this issue and the documentary proof does not satisfy that burden. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS: As stated, the Court is unable to resolve the issue of the amount of the rents and profits. It finds, however, that there is proof that some payments were made and that this action is not barred by limitation. The counterclaim is dismissed. This case has been presented as well as it could have been presented. What the Court is trying to say is that some type of an agreement was reached between the decedent and his son Robert Karnes. Whatever that agreement was, it was sufficient to toll the statute of limitations. If the Court were to try to reduce the agreement to a dollar amount or assign an obligation to account on a fair rental value, it would be engaging in sheer speculation. The chancellor found that there was a second agreement between father and son relating to the application of farm income to the debt. He found that payments were actually made pursuant to that agreement. However, the amount of those payments, he concluded, was impossible to quantify, and the appellants did not satisfy their burden of proof in this regard. Nevertheless, the fact of the agreement and the payments of an undetermined amount tolled the statute of limitations in his judgment. The chancellor’s findings appear entirely reasonable to me. We should be reluctant in this case to substitute our factual findings for those of the chancellor who had the benefit of hearing the testimony and argument on a difficult issue. I would not reverse on this point.