Court Opinion

ID: 9728600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:12:25.973434+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:45.527109
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
concurring in part, and in part dissenting.
While I generally concur with the result reached by the majority in the instant case, I must dissent from that portion of the opinion which holds that a court may not properly deprive a parent of the custody of a minor child “unless it is affirmatively shown that such parent is unfit to perform the duties imposed by the relationship, or has forfeited that right,” ante p. 149, _ N.W.2d _(emphasis added), and from that portion of the opinion which recites that “the right of a parent to the custody of his minor child is not lightly to be set aside in favor of more distant relatives or unrelated parties, and the courts may not deprive a parent of such custody unless he is shown to be unfit or to have forfeited his superior right to such custody,” Id. at 149,_N.W.2d at_(emphasis added). I do wholeheartedly concur with the majority in that portion of the opinion which recites that “[wjhere the custody of a minor child is involved in a habeas corpus action, the custody of the child is to be determined by the best interests of the child, with due regard for the superior rights of a fit, proper, and suitable parent,” Id. at 149, N.W.2d at I believe that that the last-cited principle is, indeed, the law in Nebraska and that the requirement that, before custody may be changed, the court must make an affirmative finding that a parent is unfit to perform the duties imposed by the relationship or has forfeited that right is neither a correct rule of law nor a sound rule of law.
I believe that we do a grave injustice to a parent when we require a court to make an affirmative finding of “unfitness” before custody may be changed because of the best interests of the child. While it is true that in a very technical sense the word “unfit” *151may be broad enough to encompass both personal and situational deficiencies, the overwhelming impression left by the cases is that a finding of “unfitness” implies that the parent is morally corrupt or emotionally unstable.
While one may find early decisions of this court in which there is a requirement that an affirmative finding of unfitness be made (see, for example, Clarke v. Lyon, 82 Neb. 625, 118 N.W. 472 (1908)), we had and, I think, properly so, abandoned that strict requirement and, instead, spoke about the “best interests of the child” as the paramount consideration. In Bigley v. Tibbs, 193 Neb. 4, 8, 225 N.W.2d 27, 29 (1975), which the majority now disapproves, in part, we properly said “to the extent that Raymond v. Cotner, supra, [175 Neb. 158, 120 N.W.2d 892 (1963)] does not hold that the first and primary consideration in any case involving the custody of a child is the best interests of the child, it is overruled.” (Emphasis supplied.)
To be sure, a parent may be afflicted with a terminal disease which prevents the parent from providing the child with the child’s best interests. Shall we, therefore, require the court to make an affirmative finding that a terminally ill parent is “unfit” when, in fact, all we really mean to say is that it is in the best interests of the child that the custody be changed? In my view, we have imposed an unnecessary affirmative finding in these cases.
A review of the many cases decided by this court makes it quite clear that there is no clear and concise definition of “best interests of the child” and that each of the cases must depend upon its own particular facts at a particular time. To now, in effect, disregard that view and require an affirmative finding of unfitness is neither necessary nor proper. To be sure, superior rights of a fit, proper, and suitable parent should receive great consideration. Yet, there may be instances where permitting a child to remain with a fit, proper, and suitable parent may not be in the child’s best interests *152and we should not so tie the hands of the courts who must hear the evidence and decide each individual case, one by one. I, therefore, respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion which now requires that a court must make an affirmative finding of unfitness before it may deprive a parent of the custody of a minor child, regardless of the child’s best interests. I would continue to follow the rules which we have established in the Bigley v. Tibbs case and those which we have decided since that time. See, State v. Loomis, 195 Neb. 552, 239 N.W.2d 266 (1976); Contreras v. Alsidez, 200 Neb. 773, 265 N.W.2d 452 (1978); Haynes v. Haynes, 205 Neb. 35, 286 N.W.2d 108 (1979).