Court Opinion

ID: 9650150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:25:53.039136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:05.184662
License: Public Domain

EAGEN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Prior to today’s decision, official immunity in Pennsylvania could be divided into two types, namely, absolute immunity and limited or conditional immunity. Absolute immunity could be invoked by “high ranking officials” acting within the scope of their authority and within the course of their duties or powers. Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188, 88 A.2d 892 (1952); Montgomery v. Philadelphia, 392 Pa. 178, 140 A.2d 100 (1958); Jonnet v. Bodick, 431 Pa. 59, 244 A.2d 751 (1968). Limited immunity could be invoked by other officials acting within the scope of their authority and within the course of their duties or powers. Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. 151 (1865); Yealy v. Fink, 43 Pa. 212 (1862). See Montgomery v. Philadelphia, supra.
Absolute immunity “foreclose^] the possibility of suit,” Montgomery v. Philadelphia, supra, 392 Pa. at 183, 140 A.2d at 103, so that the fullest “protection of society’s interest in the unfettered discharge of public business,” id., might be afforded “high ranking officials.” Limited immunity did not foreclose the possibility of suit against other officials because it could be overcome by an allegation in the plaintiff’s complaint that the conduct complained of was malicious, wanton, or reckless, Burton v. Fulton, 49 Pa. 151 (1865); but, absent such an allegation and proof, the official was immune from suit.
While absolute and limited immunity reflect differing degrees of protection against suit, both reflect a determination and policy indicating a need for such protection for public officials in order to protect “society’s interest in the unfettered discharge of public business.” Montgomery v. Philadelphia, supra, 392 Pa. at 183, 140 A.2d at 103. This need has not dissipated with the passage of time. Indeed, *549Mr. Justice Roberts reiterated a recognition of this need in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Freach v. Commonwealth, 471 Pa. 558, 575, 370 A.2d 1163, 1171 (1977), when he stated that:
“Commentators differ widely on how broad the immunity extended to public officials should be . but agree that some form of immunity is necessary.”
Further, the Superior Court has, of late, recognized the importance of this need when it stated:
“If we were to agree with appellants and abolish conditional immunity for public officials, we fear progress would be placed in a permanent holding pattern wherein no advance would be made, but rather officials would be concerned solely with constantly re-checking what has already been done. Many of the benefits government now confers on the populace would stagnate.”
Lehnig v. Fulton, 235 Pa.Super. 100, 105, 340 A.2d 564, 566 (1975). Thus, there can be little doubt that a need to protect public officials continues to exist. Indeed, the majority opinion recognizes this fact since it refrains from completely abolishing official immunity and disallows the application of vicarious liability for those in the “chain of command.” Still, I am compelled to dissent from the action of the majority because it apparently adds a condition precedent, in addition to those previous set forth, to an effective assertion of immunity by officials, and the additional condition is undefined and vague. This, in itself, will impede officials and thereby foster precisely the evil official immunity attempts to avoid.
First, the majority seems to be saying that official immunity can still be invoked where the standard of care is “unpredictable,” but may not be invoked where a standard of care can be “defined and applied with relative ease.” This is so, reasons the majority, because, where the standard of care is “predictable,” liability will not be “unpredictable.” Can it be that the majority is suggesting the courts of this Commonwealth in applying the law of torts have been imposing an unpredictable standard of care on our citizens *550and thereby subjecting them to unpredictable liability? Such a suggestion will certainly come as a shock to the insurance industry which has been setting rates based on predictable liability for the private sector.
Furthermore, I fail to understand how a public servant’s performance will not be impaired in circumstances where “the standard of care may be defined and applied with relative ease,” when the majority gives no indication whatsoever what type of conduct can or cannot be measured against a standard of care which can be defined and applied with ease.*
Second, the majority apparently leaves to a case-by-case determination those situations which do or do not evidence conduct which can be measured against an easily defined standard of care. This process in and of itself leaves the liability of officials unpredictable not only presently, but also for an indeterminable length of time.
Furthermore, by here remanding to the Commonwealth Court, the majority evidences its own inability to determine whether the conduct involved herein, when considered with the status of the officials, does or does not constitute conduct which can be measured against an easily defined standard of care.
Finally, since the majority now predicates immunity, at least in part, on the nature of the conduct in which an official is involved at a particular time, each and every official, whose duties and thus conduct varies, will by today’s decision be left in a quandary as to what particular conduct he engages in at any particular time will allow him to assert immunity and what particular conduct will not. This set of circumstances will certainly enhance the unpredictability of *551liability, and thereby advance precisely the evil immunity seeks to avoid.
I dissent.

 If the majority is adopting the discretionary-ministerial distinction to determine what conduct warrants granting official immunity, it is an action which will only add to the unpredictability of liability because only inconsistency can be expected from a distinction which has been characterized as difficult, Ham v. Los Angeles County, 46 Cal.App. 148, 162, 189 P. 462, 468 (1920), if not impossible, Prosser, Torts 132, p. 990 (4th ed. 1971), to draw and because the distinction states a result rather than a method of analysis. L. Jaffe, Judicial Control of Administrative Action, p. 240 (1965).