Court Opinion

ID: 9425803
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:15:52.547673+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:57.669697
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Stewart,
concurring.
I agree with the Court that the respondents lack standing to sue either as citizens or taxpayers in this case. Here, unlike United States v. Richardson, ante, p. 166, the respondents do not allege that the petitioners have refused to perform an affirmative duty imposed upon *229them by the Constitution. Nor can there be taxpayer standing under Flast v. Cohen, 392 U. S. 83, since there is simply no challenge to an exercise of the taxing and spending power.
The Court’s judgment in this case is wholly consistent with United States v. SCRAP, 412 U. S. 669. Standing is not today found wanting because an injury has been suffered by many, but rather because none of the respondents has alleged the sort of direct, palpable injury required for standing under Art. III. Like the plaintiff in Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 447, the respondents seek only to air what we described in Flast as “generalized grievances about the conduct of government.” 392 U. S., at 106. Our prior cases make clear that such abstract' allegations cannot suffice to confer Art. Ill standing, and I therefore join the opinion and judgment of the Court.