Court Opinion

ID: 9462861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:51:52.073482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:49.261709
License: Public Domain

EUGENE A. WRIGHT, Circuit Judge
(concurring and dissenting):
I concur in Parts I and II of the majority opinion and dissent from the third and sixth paragraphs of Part III. I would affirm the district court’s denial of the petition without hearing.
The law of this circuit on the issue presented in the majority’s Part III is far from clear. Yet I do not believe that Jones v. United States, 384 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1967), and its progeny compel the result reached by the majority here. The rule of law announced in Jones is a good one, but is simply inapplicable to the facts before us. If I misinterpret Jones and, if its rule does apply to these facts, then I agree with the majority that it is a “strange legal concept” in need of reevaluation.
Title 28 U.S.C. § 2255 states in relevant part:
Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice [of the petition] to be served upon the United States attorney, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto.
See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 1462, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973); Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1, 15-16, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963).
In remanding for an evidentiary hearing on the voluntariness of petitioner’s guilty plea, the Fontaine Court stated, 411 U.S. at 215, 93 S.Ct. at 1462:
We need not take issue with the Government’s generalization that when a defendant expressly represents in open court . . . that his plea is voluntary . he “may not ordinarily” repudiate his statements to the sentencing judge.
The Court was simply unable to conclude on the facts before it1 “that under no circum*1087stances could the petitioner establish facts warranting relief under § 2255. . . . ” Id.
I read Fontaine as instructing district judges to give full consideration, including an evidentiary hearing, to any petition which has any discernible merit.2 However, while district judges should be receptive to Section 2255 petitions, the plain language of that section admonishes them not to waste valuable time and energy holding meaningless hearings on meritless claims. See Austin v. United States, 408 F.2d 808, 812 (9th Cir. 1969).
The “conclusively shows” clause of Section 2255 cannot be reasonably interpreted in a vacuum, but must be interpreted in light of the requirements of Rule 11. In McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 472, 89 S.Ct. 1166, 1174, 22 L.Ed.2d 418 (1969), the Supreme Court required that “district judges take the few minutes necessary to inform [defendants] of their rights and to determine whether they understand the action they are taking.” By this procedure it sought, inter alia, to
reduce the great waste of judicial resources required to process the frivolous attacks on guilty plea convictions that are encouraged . . . when the original record is inadequate.
Id. The Court in other decisions mandated additional safeguards for similar reasons. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969). The requirements specified in those cases are now included in the present Rule 11.
In order to give some effect to the painstaking inquiry conducted under Rule 11, the record made of it should be presumed correct unless there are specific reasons for not doing so. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 767-74, 90 S.Ct. 1441, 25 L.Ed.2d 763 (1970); United States ex rel. Grays v. Rundle, 428 F.2d 1401, 1403 (3rd Cir. 1970).
If a petitioner’s allegations are completely outside the record,3 or are merely rebutted by recorded statements of the judge4 or counsel,5 the facts are in issue and a hearing is ordinarily required. This is so because, even though a petitioner’s allegations concerning “the voluntariness of his confession may be baseless ... we are obliged to treat them as true” if we are to dismiss the petition without calling for a return and without a hearing. Bell v. Alabama, 367 F.2d 243, 246 (5th Cir. 1966).
We need not always treat those allegations as true. There is a presumption that the petitioner personally spoke truthfully at the Rule 11 proceeding. Thus, no evidentiary hearing is required “when [petitioner’s] allegations merely [contradict] his earlier statements.” Hedman v. United States, 527 F.2d 20, 22 (10th Cir. 1975). See Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973) (implication); Jones v. United States, 423 F.2d 252, 255-56 (9th Cir. 1970) (dictum);6 Crawford v. United States, 519 F.2d 347, 350 (4th Cir. 1975); Bryan v. United States, 492 F.2d 775, 780 (5th Cir. 1974) (en banc); United States v. Huffman, 490 F.2d 412, 413 (8th *1088Cir. 1973). Cf. Cancino v. Craven, 467 F.2d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1972) (implication).7
There can, of course, be no mechanical application of these principles. “Each case must be determined upon its own facts.” Huffman, supra, 490 F.2d at 414, citing Fontaine and Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 494-95, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962). Comparing the facts of Jones and its progeny with the facts before us, I am convinced that Mayes’ petition does no more than contradict his solemn statements at the Rule 11 proceeding, and that an evidentiary hearing on the matters raised in his petition would be an exercise in futility. If ever there were a case to breathe life into the “conclusively shows” clause of Section 2255, this is it. If a hearing is required in this case, the “conclusively shows” language may just as well be ignored in this circuit.
In Jones v. United States (Jones I), 384 F.2d 916, 917 (9th Cir. 1967), petitioner
alleged that his guilty plea was induced by coercive in-custody interrogation without counsel, threats to himself and his family, and a promise of leniency.
The district court in Jones I “conducted the inquiry contemplated by [then] Rule 11 . .” Id. This court ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held since the petition “contained factual matters outside the record . . . which cannot be conclusively resolved by reference to that record.” Id. The Rule 11 record was only “ ‘evidential on the issue of voluntariness . not conclusive.’ ” Id., quoting United States ex rel. McGrath v. LaVallee, 319 F.2d 308, 314 (2nd Cir. 1963).
The court in Jones I did not indicate what matters were discussed at the Rule 11 proceeding. The law of the case then is simply that a hearing must be held if the petition sets forth factual matters outside the record. Jones I does not help us decide when factual allegations should be regarded as “outside the record,” and when not.
Upon remand of Jones I, the district court held a hearing and denied relief. We affirmed. Jones v. United States (Jones II), 423 F.2d 252 (9th Cir. 1970). In Jones II we quoted relevant portions of the record of the Rule 11 proceeding, 423 F.2d at 254. From that it appeared that Jones raised at least two factual matters not specifically covered during the Rule 11 proceeding. First, he alleged that threats were made against his family. The record shows his denial that “any force or threats of any sort” had induced his guilty plea, but there is no specific reference in the record to threats made against his family.
Second, Jones alleged the nondisclosure of a plea agreement. The record shows that both Jones and his counsel denied the existence of any “deal” with the United States Attorney. However, the Jones II court correctly characterized the Rule 11 proceeding as “ritualistic.” While the stock questions were asked, the district court made no significant attempt to inquire into the defendant’s state of mind. The court did not inform the defendant that a disclosed or undisclosed plea agreement was not binding upon the court. There is no indication that Jones was independently aware of its nonbinding nature.
While the Jones I court did not make it clear why an evidentiary hearing would be required, it is apparent from Jones II that the record failed to demonstrate conclusively the lack of merit of either of the two allegations mentioned above.
In Castro v. United States, 396 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1968) (en banc), petitioner alleged that: (1) the court failed to inform him of the allowable range of punishment, and (2) he believed he could not be imprisoned for more than six years. Attached to his petition was an affidavit from trial counsel stating he had erroneously advised Castro *1089that he would be sentenced for no more than six years. (He received an eight year sentence.)
At the Rule 11 proceeding, the district court merely determined from defense counsel that he had “fully explained to his client all the consequences of pleading guilty.” Id. at 347. We properly concluded that counsel’s general assurance did not even “touch upon the question of whether counsel misadvised his client, much less ‘conclusively resolve’ that issue.” Id. at 348. Therefore, a hearing was required under Jones.
The petitioner in Diamond v. United States, 432 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1970), described in great detail how he had been starved, beaten and abused while in the custody of the County Sheriff and alleged that, for “fear of his life,” he was thereby coerced into pleading guilty. No consideration was given to these allegations at the Rule 11 hearing. In denying the petition without hearing, the district court simply relied on its “observation” of Diamond at arraignment. This court properly remanded for evidentiary hearing. The court’s general observations in Diamond, like defense counsel’s general assurances in Castro, did not “touch upon the question” specifically raised by petitioner, “much less ‘conclusively resolve’ that issue.” 396 F.2d at 348.
In Lopez v. United States, 439 F.2d 997 (9th Cir. 1971), petitioner alleged that defense counsel promised him a 5-10 year sentence (he received 20 years), and admonished him not to disclose any “deal” to the court at the Rule 11 hearing. Lopez also alleged that shortly before pleading guilty he had been mistreated in the “Psycho Ward” of the county jail, and had been given certain drugs.
While certain evidence introduced at the Rule 11 proceeding contradicted his assertions, the record contained nothing which specifically contradicted petitioner’s allegation of an undisclosed promise by the defense attorney. For this reason alone the remand was appropriate. Further, petitioner’s allegation that his counsel had prompted him to lie about the existence of a plea agreement was not contradicted by the record.
The petitioner in Reed v. United States, 441 F.2d 569. (9th Cir. 1971), alleged that defense counsel promised him a lenient sentence under the Youth Corrections Act. The district court, relying on an affidavit from defense counsel denying the communication of any promise to Reed prior to the entry of his plea, denied the petition without a hearing. We reversed. While it is unclear from the opinion, there was apparently no admission by Reed at the Rule 11 proceeding of the absence of a promise by defense counsel.
It is hazardous to attempt to distill from these cases a controlling rule or rules but there does seem to be at least one common thread: In each of the cases discussed the motions, files and records failed to show that petitioner’s allegations were specific ally contradicted by statements or admissions made by the defendant personally during or after the Rule 11 proceeding. Since such specific contradiction is present in this case, a remand for hearing is unnecessary.
A review of the Rule 11 record, detailed in the majority’s note 1, shows that the district court anticipated and complied with the requirements of Rule 11 as amended in 1975, even though this proceeding occurred in 1969. Since, as the majority and I agree, Mayes was competent to plead at that proceeding, we must assume that the specific statements, representations and admissions made by him at that hearing were correct.
Mayes’ petition includes the following relevant allegations:
Petitioner further alleges that his plea of guilty was unconstitutionally induced by threats and promises. Petitioner was coerced into entering a plea of guilty as a result of threats of and by the Los Angeles city police and the F.B.I. agents who interrogated him ... by stating that if he did not sign a confession and plead guilty, his wife would be arrested and would have her baby in the penitentiary. .
*1090In addition to the threats, counsel had stated, that if Petitioner would plead guilty, two counts of the three count indictment would be dropped, and he would receive a small sentence to Fort Worth, Texas, drug center where he could be cured.
These allegations can be characterized as follows: (1) Defense counsel’s promise that upon a plea of guilty two of the three counts would be dismissed; (2) Threats by law enforcement officers against his pregnant wife; and (3) Defense counsel’s promise that upon a guilty plea petitioner would receive a “small sentence to Fort Worth, Texas, drug center where he could be cured.”
The first factual allegation constitutes no ground for an evidentiary hearing. The agreement was specifically disclosed at the Rule 11 hearing.8 Moreover, as Mayes concedes in his appellate brief, the agreement as made was honored. It is difficult to imagine how the existence of a plea agreement, fully disclosed to the court and honored by the government, can raise the issue of voluntariness. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971); Benn v. Eyman, 436 F.2d 1074, 1075 (9th Cir. 1971), and cases cited; Buckles v. United States District Court, 488 F.2d 85, 86 (5th Cir. 1973).
Petitioner’s second factual allegation, regarding threats against his wife, is specifically contradicted by this portion of the Rule 11 record:
THE COURT: Have there been any threats made against you or any member of your family now that compel you to offer your plea of guilty at this time?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
(Emphasis added.) I do not see how Mayes’ allegation can be deemed outside this record when it is simply a contradiction of the representation made at the Rule 11 proceeding. As such, it does not constitute a springboard for hearing.
The third allegation, the promise of lenient sentence and treatment,9 flies in the face of the following portion of Rule 11 record:
THE COURT: Has anyone made any promises of leniency, any particular sentence, probation or other inducement of any kind for you to plead guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
THE COURT: Has your lawyer told you what sentence the Court would impose upon a plea of guilty to this charge?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
MR. SIROTA [Defense counsel]: . I should inform the Court that Mr. Mayes is an addict of heroin, and I did inform him of the fact that there is a possibility of hospitalization for his cure of narcotic addiction.
THE COURT: ... Mr. Mayes, you understand the statement of your *1091counsel that that is not any promise made to you for pleading guilty, that it is no promise of any kind by your counsel? Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: The determination of what the sentence may be or what the disposition of the case might be in terms of any possible addiction that you might have is up to the Court after a probation report.
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And there is no promise made to you by anyone, and if there has been any promise made to you, I am telling you now that there can be no promise made to you concerning a plea of guilty. Do you understand that?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir, I understand.
THE COURT: Mr. Sirota, have you made any indication to the defendant what sentence the Court might impose?
MR. SIROTA: No, sir. I said that the maximum sentence was twenty years, and I informed him of the possibility of hospitalization and informed him of the possibility of the various sections of Section 4208 all the way down the line.
The district court, to the point of redundancy, made the defendant aware that sentencing, including the option of curative treatment, was solely a matter for the court. Mayes twice represented that he understood this. He now claims that he did not understand, an obvious example of self-contradiction.
I conclude that “under no circumstances could the petitioner establish facts warranting relief under § 2255. . . . " Fontaine v. United States, 411 U.S. 213, 215, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d 169 (1973). All of Mayes’ allegations are “conclusively resolved” against him by reference to the Rule 11 record. Jones I, 384 F.2d at 317. Therefore, I would affirm.

. In Fontaine, 411 U.S. at 214-15, 93 S.Ct. 1461, petitioner described alleged physical abuse and illness caused by a recent gunshot *1087wound. The record tended to support, rather than contradict, his allegations.

. “[T]here must be a hearing whenever] the allegations of the petition make out a possibly fatal infection of the plea . . .” Smith v. Wainwright, 373 F.2d 506, 507 (5th Cir. 1967), quoting Carpenter v. Wainwright, 372 F.2d 940, 942 (5th Cir. 1967).

. Jones v. United States, 384 F.2d 916 (9th Cir. 1967).

. Diamond v. United States, 432 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1970).

. Reed v. United States, 441 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1971).

. In Jones II, 423 F.2d at 255-56, we said:
“Full disclosure makes direct appellate review meaningful. It also reduces the number and difficulty of subsequent collateral attacks. A full record of the [plea] agreement, and of the defendant’s understanding of it, limits the matters subject to challenge.”
(Footnote omitted.)

. In Cancino, involving a petition by a state prisoner, we remanded for an evidentiary hearing because
“[t]he record consisted of the brief exchange between the prosecutor and the defense attomey, and Cancino’s ten words. It did not contradict Cancino’s averments.”
467 F.2d at 1246.

. “THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty to Count Three because you have been promised disposition of the other counts?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Is that why you are pleading guilty?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: Why are you pleading guilty to Count Three?
THE DEFENDANT: I am guilty of it.”

. Contrary to the majority’s statement, nowhere in the petition under review has Mayes alleged either (1) that his defense counsel told him “he would also receive a sentence of seven years,” or (2) that “he [the defense attorney] told him [Mayes] that he was very close to the judge and could fix things up for him.” (Majority op. 1082.)
According to representations in appellant’s brief, these allegations were made in earlier petitions but those are not in the record before us, and should therefore not be considered by us.
Even if they were considered, I do not see how Mayes could benefit. The “seven year” allegation is not substantially different from the third allegation made in the petition which we find in the record. Either version is specifically contradicted by the record of the Rule 11 hearing.
The allegation that defense counsel promised to “fix things up for him” is the sort of bare allegation which is insufficient to compel an evidentiary hearing. Diamond v. United States, 432 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1970); Meeks v. United States, 427 F.2d 881 (9th Cir. 1970).