Court Opinion

ID: 9948157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-06 16:06:37.147369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:17.200511
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                              FOURTH DISTRICT

                            PETER HERMAN,
                               Appellant,

                                     v.

             SCOTT DALE SMILEY and LORI LEIGH SMILEY,
                            Appellees.

                             No. 4D2023-1073

                              [March 6, 2024]

   Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,
Broward County; Francis Viamontes, Judge; L.T. Case No. FMCE 17-
013464.

  Robert C. Buschel of Buschel Gibbons, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for
appellant.

   Donna Greenspan Solomon of Solomon Appeals, Mediation &
Arbitration, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee Scott Dale Smiley.

GERBER, J.

   We affirm without discussion the circuit court’s final order denying the
appellant’s motion to intervene in the appellees’ dissolution action. We
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction the appellant’s appeal from the circuit
court’s nonfinal order denying the appellant’s motion to review and deny
appellee Scott Smiley’s confidentiality designations under Florida Rule of
General Practice and Judicial Administration 2.420 in the dissolution
action.

   The review of orders regarding access to judicial records under rule
2.420 is by way of a petition under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure
9.100(d)(1). See Fla. R. App. P. 9.100(d)(1) (“A petition to review an order
excluding the … public from … any records of the judicial branch, must
be filed in the court as soon as practicable following rendition of the order
to be reviewed … no later than 30 days after rendition of the order.”). Even
if we were to redesignate the appellant’s notice of appeal as a rule
9.100(d)(1) petition, such a petition would have been untimely, because
the appellant’s motion for rehearing directed to the circuit court did not
toll the time by which to file the petition. Cf. McGee v. McGee, 487 So. 2d
412, 413 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986) (motion for rehearing is not authorized to be
taken from interlocutory or nonfinal order, and therefore does not delay
the time of filing for a petition for writ of certiorari).

   Affirmed in part, dismissed in part.

DAMOORGIAN and CIKLIN, JJ., concur.

                            *         *       *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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