Court Opinion

ID: 9583071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:34:37.36191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:50.772603
License: Public Domain

McMurray, Presiding Judge,
dissenting.
As I am unable to concur with the reasoning stated in Division 1 of the majority opinion, I respectfully dissent. In my view, the majority fails to recognize the significance of the factual distinctions between the present case and the authority cited in its opinion.
The cases cited by the majority involve peace officers who have acted in reliance on stale or incorrect information which has been accurately communicated to them. In contrast, the police records in the present case contained correct information which was not accurately conveyed to Officer Banks. The fact of the corruption of the information being shared does not alone remove the present case from the case law followed by the majority. The important distinction lies in the fact that Officer Banks was a party to the miscommunication which corrupted the license plate information.
As Officer Banks was a party to the faulty communications process with his dispatcher, I find it less than readily apparent that Officer Banks relied “upon information which he had no reason to think was incorrect.” Harvey v. State, 266 Ga. 671, 673 (469 SE2d 176). An officer in the field is not in a position to know that incorrect information has been entered in a computer at headquarters. But that same officer on patrol is well positioned and may reasonably be expected to know of problems with his communications with his dispatcher. Since it was the accuracy of the radio communications process between Officer Banks and his dispatcher which failed in this *424case, it is the integrity of that process which is at issue. “The material inquiry is whether the facts within the officer’s knowledge at the time of the arrest constituted reasonably trustworthy information which was sufficient to authorize a prudent person to believe that [a suspect] had committed an offense. [Cit.]” Id. The question then is whether the communications process between Officer Banks and the dispatcher was accurate enough to provide reasonably trustworthy information.
Decided March 20, 1998.
Cecilia M. Cooper, for appellant.
Howard S. McKelvey, Jr., Solicitor, for appellee.
While the accuracy of radio communications systems is not usually a disputed issue, it is under the facts and circumstances of the case sub judice. This leads us to the fact that the State apparently failed to recognize any burden to establish the accuracy of the radio communications system used by Officer Banks. For example, could any radio malfunction or interference have contributed to the miscommunication in this case? Officer Banks could reasonably be expected to know the answer to this question, but the trial court, as well as this Court, does not, because no evidence on this issue was introduced by the State.
More significant are the questions concerning whether an adequate protocol was used between Officer Banks and the dispatcher. Officer Banks testified that the dispatcher did not read back to him the tag number he or she was running. While there was considerable colloquy at the motion to suppress hearing acknowledging the prevalence of mental lapses, slips of the tongue, and other human failing which might impair communications, there was no attempt to establish that any sort of communications protocol had been adopted to lend accuracy to the process so that Officer Banks could reasonably rely upon the information he received from his dispatcher. Most importantly, there is no evidence that the protocol actually used by Officer Banks and the dispatcher is usually accurate.
The State having failed to prove the accuracy and reliability of the communications process between Officer Banks and the dispatcher, it follows that it has not been established that Officer Banks could reasonably rely upon information received through that process. Thus, the actions of Officer Banks must be viewed as lacking any proper articulable grounds for the stop of defendant’s car and defendant’s motion to suppress evidence should have been granted.
I am authorized to state that Judge Ruffin joins in this dissent.