Court Opinion

ID: 9491976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:29:04.145872+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:02.525937
License: Public Domain

TROTT, Circuit Judge,
Concurring:
I agree with the panel’s conclusion that the “bright-line” rule drawn in New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460-61, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768 (1981), as interpreted in our precedent subsequent to that case, compels a conclusion that the search in this instance was a valid search incident to arrest. I am reminded, however, of then-Justice Rehnquist’s prediction that
any search for “bright lines” [in the Fourth Amendment context is] illusory. Our entire profession is trained to attack “bright lines” the way hounds attack foxes. Acceptance by the courts of arguments that one thing is the “functional equivalent” of the other, for example, soon breaks down what might have been a bright line into a blurry impressionistic pattern.
Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 443, 101 S.Ct. 2841, 69 L.Ed.2d 744 (1981) (Rehnquist, *894J., dissenting). Unfortunately, in our search for clarity, we have now abandoned our constitutional moorings and floated to a place where the law approves of purely exploratory searches of vehicles during which officers with no definite objective or reason for the search are allowed to rummage around in a car to see what they might find. This state of affairs should cause us to reexamine our thinking.
The “bright-line” rule of Belton was intended to give officers in the field a practical means of understanding the constitutional limitations on their authority. 453 U.S. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860. At its core, Belton further defined for law enforcement the “grab area” limitation on searches incident to arrest outlined in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). In Chimel, the arrest occurred in a home, whereas Belton involved the search of a vehicle. Interpreting Chimel, Belton proclaimed the “passenger compartment” of a vehicle as the “grab area per se” for Fourth Amendment purposes. In doing so, however, the Court clearly said:
Our holding today does no more than determine the meaning of Chimel’s principles in this particular and problematic content. It in no way alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 n. 3, 101 S.Ct. 2860.
One of the “fundamental principles” the Court referred to is that, in order for a search incident to arrest to be reasonable as opposed to merely exploratory, it must be grounded in at least one of the rationales for which the exception was created: officer safety or the preservation of evidence. Id. at 460, 101 S.Ct. 2860; Chimel, 395 U.S. at 768, 89 S.Ct. 2034.
The “search incident to arrest” is an exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement that a warrant must be issued prior to a search:
It is a first principle of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that the police may not conduct a search unless they first convince a neutral magistrate that there is probable cause to do so. This Court has recognized, however, that “the exigencies of the situation” may sometimes make exemption from the warrant requirement “imperative.”
Belton, 453 U.S. at 457, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (quoting McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948)). In the warrant context, the particularity requirement provides the safeguard against general, exploratory searches. Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79, 84, 107 S.Ct. 1013, 94 L.Ed.2d 72 (1987). “By limiting the authorization to search to the specific areas and things for which there is probable cause to search, the requirement ensures that the search will be carefully tailored to its justifications, and will not take on the character of the wide-ranging exploratory searches the Framers intended to prohibit.” Id. (footnote omitted). Just as the scope of the search in the warrant context is limited to those items for which there is probable cause, the searches conducted pursuant to an exception to the warrant requirement must be limited in scope to the purposes for which the exception was created.
In our application of Belton’s “bright-line,” however, the rationales behind the search incident to arrest exception have been abandoned, the purpose has been lost, and, as Chief Justice Rehnquist predicted, little certainty remains.
The “impressionistic blur” that has been the downfall of the well-meaning Belton rule in this court is our case law surrounding the requirement that, in order to qualify as a search incident to arrest, the search must be “roughly contemporaneous” with the arrest. In United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787 (9th Cir.1987), we held the search was not “roughly contemporaneous” and therefore not incident to arrest where the defendant was handcuffed, placed in a police car and held thirty to forty-five minutes before the search occurred. Then, in United States v. Moorehead, 57 F.3d 875, 878 (9th Cir.1995), we held that a search was a valid search incident to arrest where the defendant was similarly handcuffed and placed in the back of a vehicle, but where the search occurred soon after arrest. Next, in United States v. Ramos-Oseguera, 120 F.3d 1028, 1036 (9th *895Cir.1997), we found a search was not “roughly contemporaneous” because it occurred after the defendants were arrested and taken to the police station but before the police had the car towed away.
In the case before us, we face a situation where the defendant was arrested, taken from the scene, and was well on his way to the police station. Approximately five minutes after McLaughlin departed, the search took place. The search was conducted as an inventory search, but the state officers did not follow their own rules, and the case ended up in federal court on a different theory, a theory having nothing to do with what really happened. In any event, the panel concludes that this case looks more like Moorehead and less like Vasey and Ramos-Oseguera because of (1) the length of time that had passed (never mind the fact that we do not know how much time elapsed in Ramos-Oseguera) and (2) the fact that, in this case, the delay was caused by the police officer’s completion of paperwork, as compared to Vasey, where delay was due to conversations with the defendant or Ramos-Oseguera, where delay caused by moving the defendant. So the law regarding searches incident to arrest now reads something like, “well, thirty-minutes is too long, but five minutes is okay and you can delay if you are filling out paperwork but not if you are interrogating or transporting the defendant.” So much for bright lines.
The tragedy is not just that the rule is now so unclear that it provides little guidance to law enforcement. Of greater concern is the reality that the search incident to arrest exception has been completely severed from the historic rationales of officer safety and preservation of evidence. The questions now revolve around when and how, not why.
The case before us illustrates this perfectly. McLaughlin was pulled over for having an illegally tinted rear window. He was then arrested because the police discovered there was an outstanding warrant for failure to appear. The search in no way furthered officer safely: McLaughlin was handcuffed and taken away. There was no evidence to preserve. Analytically — given the evaporation of the inventory search basis — the search was a fishing expedition — a purely exploratory search — plain and simple.
Ironically, adherence to the rationales behind the exception would provide police officers with greater guidance than does the “bright-line” rule applied today. Officers would only have to ask themselves two questions: (1) is officer safety at risk and (2) is there evidence to preserve. If the answer to either of those questions is “yes,” the search may proceed. If not, there is no reason to set aside the warrant requirement.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Knowles v. Iowa, — U.S. -, 119 S.Ct. 484, 142 L.Ed.2d 492 (1998), provides reasoning that should be equally applicable here. Addressing the preservation of evidence rationale, the Court stated: “Once Knowles was stopped for speeding and issued a citation, all the evidence necessary to prosecute that offense had been obtained. No further evidence of excessive speed was going to be found either on the person of the offender or in the passenger compartment of the car.” Id. at 488. Officer safety was not implicated because Knowles was not arrested but instead issued a citation. Id. at 487.
While the panel correctly observes that Knowles, a “search incident to citation” case, is not controlling in the search incident to arrest context, the Court’s reasoning in that decision illuminates the absurdity associated with allowing purely exploratory searches incident to arrest. Cessante ratione legis ces-sat et ipsa lex.1

. "The reason for the law ceasing, the law also ceases.”