Court Opinion

ID: 9915569
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 19:00:44.100669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:16:12.760081
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50360      Document: 00517023247         Page: 1     Date Filed: 01/05/2024

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit
                                  No. 23-50360
                                Summary Calendar                              FILED
                                ____________                            January 5, 2024
                                                                         Lyle W. Cayce
   Anthony Norman,                                                            Clerk

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   U.S. Attorney General, for the Western District of Texas; Kim
   Ogg, District Attorney, Harris County; Glenn Hegar, Texas
   Comptroller of Public Accounts; Sharon Keller, Judge, Texas Court of
   Criminal Appeals; Mary Lou Keel, Judge, Texas Court of Criminal
   Appeals; Bert Richardson, Judge, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals;
   Kevin Yeary, Judge, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals; Scott
   Walker, Judge, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals; Jesse F. McClure,
   Judge, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals; Barbara Hervey, Judge, Texas
   Court of Criminal Appeals; Michelle Slaughter, Judge, Texas Court
   of Criminal Appeals; David Newell, Judge, Texas Court of Criminal
   Appeals; Deana Williamson, Clerk, Texas Court of Criminal Appeals;
   Nathan Hecht, Chief Justice, Supreme Court of Texas; James D.
   Blacklock, Justice, Supreme Court of Texas; Debra H. Lehrmann,
   Justice, Supreme Court of Texas; John P. Devine, Justice, Supreme Court
   of Texas; Rebeca A. Huddle, Justice, Supreme Court of Texas; Jane
   Nenninger Bland, Justice, Supreme Court of Texas; Jeffrey S.
   Boyd, Justice, Supreme Court of Texas; J. Brett Busby, Justice,
   Supreme Court of Texas; Evan A. Young, Justice, Supreme Court of
   Texas; Blake Hawthorne, Clerk, Supreme Court of Texas;
   Christopher A. Prine, Clerk, Texas Fourteenth Court of Appeals;
   Jeffery D. Kyle, Clerk, Texas Third Court of Appeals; John Does,
   All person(s) whom allegedly are or were employed in the Texas Court of Criminal
   Appeals under the guise of a “staff writ attorney” and not being officially
Case: 23-50360         Document: 00517023247             Page: 2      Date Filed: 01/05/2024

   appointed as a Court Commissioner of the court from September 2012 to current;
   Lori Chambers Gray, Judge, 262nd District Court, Harris County,
   Texas; Tammy Chapman, Supervisor, Texas Department of Criminal
   Justice; Margarita Thomas, Administrative Assistant, Texas
   Department of Criminal Justice; Maria S. Cervantes, Administrative
   Assistant, Texas Department of Criminal Justice; Matthew Bender
   and Company, Incorporated; and Thompson Prometric,
   also known as West Law,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:21-CV-1024
                      ______________________________

   Before Elrod, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Anthony Norman, Texas prisoner # 01718789, appeals the district
   court’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint against numerous defendants.
   In his complaint, Norman alleged that (1) the Texas Court of Criminal
   Appeals defendants and the Supreme Court of Texas defendants mishandled
   his various postconviction proceedings and other cases by failing to conduct
   those proceedings in accordance with the Texas Constitution and other
   Texas laws and rules such that his murder conviction has not been finalized
   under Texas law; (2) many of the defendants were engaged in a coordinated
   effort of racketeering activities to deny certain groups of citizens from
   accessing the courts; (3) the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ)
   defendants were interfering with voting materials requested by Norman;
   (4) District Attorney Kim Ogg refused to produce exculpatory evidence

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

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                                          No. 23-50360

   about Norman; (5) Texas Comptroller Glenn Hegar has been issuing
   paychecks to staff writ attorneys who were not lawful employees of the State
   of Texas; (6) Thompson Prometric and Matthew Bender and Company were
   disseminating Texas court decisions that were not official records; and
   (7) the United States Attorney for the Western District of Texas wrongfully
   failed to submit Norman’s complaints of the other defendants’ violations of
   federal law to a grand jury. The district court’s dismissals were based on
   various grounds including lack of standing, various types of immunity, and
   failure to state a claim for relief. On appeal, Norman has filed a motion to
   expedite the appeal and a motion to strike one of the briefs filed by a specific
   group of defendants as untimely. We DENY both motions.
           We conduct a de novo review of dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil
   Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and dismissals
   under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
   upon which relief can be granted. Smith v. Hood, 900 F.3d 180, 184 (5th Cir.
   2018). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) is proper when a claim is barred by a
   defendant’s immunity or by a plaintiff’s lack of standing. See id. at 184–85;
   Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244, 250–52 (5th Cir. 2015). Dismissal under Rule
   12(b)(6) is proper if a complaint fails to set forth “sufficient facts to state a
   plausible claim for relief.” Smith, 900 F.3d at 184.
           Norman argues that the district court erred by invoking the Rooker-
   Feldman doctrine 1 to dismiss his claims that were based on his assertions that
   the state courts did not comply with the state constitution or state rules.
   Though Norman contends that he was not challenging the propriety of the
   state court decisions, the basis for his assertion that the state courts did not

           _____________________
           1
            See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263
   U.S. 413 (1923).

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                                     No. 23-50360

   issue any official decisions in his cases requires a review of the propriety of
   those decisions. Because he has not shown that the state decisions were void,
   the district court correctly determined that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine
   barred review of his claims directed at those state decisions. See United States
   v. Shepherd, 23 F.3d 923, 925 & n.5 (5th Cir. 1994).
          As to the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Texas, the district
   court denied Norman’s request for mandamus relief because 18 U.S.C.
   § 3332—under which Norman alleged the U.S. Attorney should have
   presented his complaints to a grand jury—does not provide for a private right
   of action, such that Norman lacked standing to bring such a claim. Section
   3332 states that an attorney for the United States who receives information
   concerning an alleged federal “offense from any other person shall, if
   requested by such other person, inform the grand jury of such alleged offense,
   the identity of such other person, and such attorney’s action or
   recommendation.” § 3332(a). However, “a private citizen lacks a judicially
   cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.” Linda
   R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973). Norman has not shown that he
   has a clear and indisputable right to mandamus relief regarding his § 3332
   claim. See In re Willy, 831 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1987).
          Contrary to Norman’s arguments on appeal, the district court
   appropriately construed his requests—to stop the defendants from violating
   federal criminal laws and to compel them to perform certain non-
   discretionary acts—as seeking mandamus relief. Because the district court
   lacked mandamus authority over state entities, the court properly dismissed
   those requests. See Moye v. Clerk, DeKalb Cnty. Super. Ct., 474 F.2d 1275,
   1276 (5th Cir. 1973) (holding that federal courts lack “the general power to
   issue writs of mandamus to direct state courts and their judicial officers in the
   performance of their duties where mandamus is the only relief sought”).

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                                    No. 23-50360

          The district court dismissed Norman’s RICO claims because he failed
   to establish standing and did not set forth any valid claim. Norman’s initial
   brief does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of his RICO claims
   based on lack of standing, thereby abandoning that issue. See Yohey v. Collins,
   985 F.2d 222, 224–25 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting that, though pro se briefs are
   afforded liberal construction, even pro se litigants must adequately brief
   arguments to preserve them). Though he attempts to salvage this omission
   by arguing in his reply brief that he alleged the denial of a property right for
   purposes of RICO standing, we generally disregard arguments raised for the
   first time in a reply brief. See Sahara Health Care, Inc. v. Azar, 975 F.3d 523,
   528 n.5 (5th Cir. 2020).
          Although Norman seeks to challenge the district court’s dismissal of
   his claims against Presiding Judge Sharon Keller and Chief Justice Nathan
   Hecht based on absolute judicial immunity, he has not adequately briefed this
   issue either. See Yohey, 985 F.2d at 225. The district court correctly
   dismissed Norman’s claims of interference with his right to vote against
   TDCJ personnel Maria Cervantez, Tammy Chapman, and Margarita
   Thomas because, as a convicted felon, Norman is ineligible to vote. Contrary
   to his assertions on appeal that his conviction is not yet final, Norman’s
   murder conviction was affirmed on direct appeal.
          Norman’s challenges to the district court’s dismissal of his claims
   against District Attorney Ogg and the defendants who were employed as
   clerks in various Texas courts and as staff writ attorneys are inadequately
   briefed because they are conclusory, and he does not provide any legal
   citations supporting his assertions. See Coleman v. Lincoln Par. Det. Ctr., 858
   F.3d 307, 309 (5th Cir. 2017); Yohey, 985 F.2d at 224–25. Similarly, his
   arguments that the defendants relied on state court decisions that were
   invalid are conclusory and frivolous.
                                                                   AFFIRMED.

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