Court Opinion

ID: 9387138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-14 21:01:14.031293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:11.438868
License: Public Domain

USCA4 Appeal: 22-1091      Doc: 24         Filed: 04/13/2023    Pg: 1 of 4

                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                              No. 22-1091

        DENISE M. BARNETTE,

                            Plaintiff - Appellant,

                     v.

        WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A.,

                            Defendant - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at
        Richmond. David J. Novak, District Judge. (3:20-cv-00988)

        Submitted: January 13, 2023                                       Decided: April 13, 2023

        Before DIAZ, THACKER, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.

        Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Henry W. McLaughlin, III, LAW OFFICE OF HENRY MCLAUGHLIN,
        P.C., Richmond, Virginia, for Appellant. Allison A. Melton, Jason E. Manning,
        TROUTMAN PEPPER HAMILTON SANDERS LLP, Virginia Beach, Virginia, for
        Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1091       Doc: 24         Filed: 04/13/2023      Pg: 2 of 4

        PER CURIAM:

               Denise Barnette appeals the district court’s order denying her motion for

        reconsideration of the court’s order granting in part her motion for leave to refile her case

        in state court.

               After filing multiple lawsuits against Wells Fargo and other defendants arising from

        the foreclosure of her house, Barnette moved to voluntarily dismiss her case pursuant to

        Rule 41(a)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court granted her

        motion, but “due to the history of the case,” the court ordered her to seek the court’s leave

        before refiling the action. J.A. 292. Subsequently, through counsel, Barnette moved to

        reopen the case in state court, or alternatively in federal court, and file what would be her

        fifth complaint in these proceedings. J.A. 293. The district court denied the motion to refile

        in federal court but granted the motion to file in state court on the condition that Barnette’s

        new complaint would assert only claims that were not “previously adjudicated [in federal

        court] or any state court and not precluded by the statute of limitations.” J.A. 535. Barnette

        moved for reconsideration requesting the district court to remove this condition. After the

        court denied that motion, she timely appealed.

               On appeal, Barnette raised the following issues: (1) Whether the District Court erred

        in conditioning the District Court’s grant of leave for Denise Barnette to file a new state

        court complaint on the condition that any such complaint not being barred by the statute of

        limitations, inasmuch as the District Court’s order stated that the court would not decide

        whether or not such new complaint would be time-barred; and (2) Whether the District

        Court erred in limiting leave for Denise Barnette to re-file a complaint on any such

                                                      2
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1091       Doc: 24         Filed: 04/13/2023      Pg: 3 of 4

        complaint not alleging “a basis for relief not previously adjudicated by this Court or any

        state court” inasmuch as such part of such order might preclude Denise Barnette from

        preserving a right of appeal of appellate review of final adjudication with prejudice against

        her. Op. Br. 3. But for relief, Barnette asks us to hold that “her counsel would not be in

        danger of being found in breach of [a] federal court order if the state court” determines that

        “her claim . . . has already been ruled on by either the state court [or] the District Court by

        any decision in favor of one or more defenses of Wells Fargo.” Op. Br. 18–19.

               Ordinarily, we review a district court’s denial of a motion for reconsideration for

        abuse of discretion. United States v. Holland, 214 F.3d 523, 527 (4th Cir. 2000). However,

        because of the relief sought in this appeal, we must first consider whether we have

        jurisdiction.

               Based on Article III’s case and controversy language, we only have jurisdiction of

        matters that are “justiciable.” Scoggins v. Lee’s Crossing Homeowners Ass’n, 718 F.3d

        262, 269 (4th Cir. 2013). A claim is unripe “‘if it rests upon contingent future events that

        may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all.’” Id. at 270 (quoting Texas v.

        United States, 523 U.S. 296, 300 (1998)).

               Here, even accepting that the district court erred in purporting to place conditions

        on Barnette’s ability to file in state court, Barnette asks us to rule on whether a state court

        decision—dismissing her proposed complaint on grounds that her claims are barred by

        principles of res judicata or the applicable statute of limitations would subject her to

        sanctions for violating the district court’s order. That dismissal has not occured and may

        not occur. And whether the yet to occur state court decision dismissing her proposed

                                                      3
USCA4 Appeal: 22-1091         Doc: 24      Filed: 04/13/2023     Pg: 4 of 4

        complaint on either of those grounds would subject her to sanctions matters only if Wells

        Fargo or the district court sua sponte seeks to enforce the order and Barnette is ultimately

        sanctioned. Those events likewise have not occurred and may never occur. As such,

        Barnette asks us to grant relief on issues that are not ripe. We have no jurisdiction to do

        that. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

               We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

        adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the

        decisional process.

                                                                                       DISMISSED

                                                     4