Court Opinion

ID: 9901416
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 19:01:59.699611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:32.554397
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                       STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,

                                        v.

                    BOBBY LANIR HUDSON, Appellant.

                             No. 1 CA-CR 22-0316
                               FILED 11-21-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
                        No. S8015CR202000515
          The Honorable Douglas Camacho, Judge Pro Tempore

                                  AFFIRMED

                                   COUNSEL

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
By Alice Jones
Counsel for Appellee

Janelle A. McEachern Attorney at Law, Chandler
By Janelle A. McEachern
Counsel for Appellant
                             STATE v. HUDSON
                             Decision of the Court

                       MEMORANDUM DECISION

Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Michael S. Catlett joined.

B R O W N, Judge:

¶1            This appeal is presented to us pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Leon, 104 Ariz. 297 (1969). Defense counsel
has searched the record on appeal and advised us there are no meritorious
grounds for reversal. Hudson was given the opportunity to file a
supplemental brief but did not do so. Our obligation is to review the entire
record for reversible error, State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 537, ¶ 30 (App. 1999),
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the
conviction and resolving all reasonable inferences against Hudson, State v.
Guerra, 161 Ariz. 289, 293 (1989).

¶2            On the afternoon of April 29, 2020, an Arizona Department of
Public Safety (“DPS”) trooper was “working Interstate 40” while using a
fully-marked law enforcement vehicle. The trooper noticed a blue sports
car traveling approximately 90 miles per hour (15 miles per hour above the
posted speed limit) and initiated a traffic stop. After the car pulled over,
the trooper noted there were two occupants. Hudson, who was sitting in
the front passenger seat, gave the trooper a driver’s license, a temporary
Arizona registration, and insurance information, all of which were issued
to “Robert Harrington.” When asked about a driver’s license, the driver
replied that he “didn’t have it with him.”

¶3           The trooper had the driver exit the car, and after several
minutes the trooper returned to speak with Hudson. Because the driver
had no license, the trooper allowed Hudson to move into the driver’s seat
but instructed him not to “leave yet,” and it “would just be a minute.”
Returning to his patrol car, the trooper could not find any records for a
“Robert Harrington,” even under a national search. When the trooper
confronted Hudson and told him multiple times to step out of the car,
Hudson slammed the door shut, immediately locked the door, and sped
away. Shortly thereafter, Hudson rear-ended another vehicle with several
occupants, including the driver (“A.L.”), who felt pain in her hands and her
back immediately after the collision and was taken to a hospital.

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                            STATE v. HUDSON
                            Decision of the Court

¶4            When the trooper reached the scene of the accident, he saw
the blue sports car lying upside down in the median. After briefly hiding
under a nearby truck that had pulled on to the shoulder, Hudson was
apprehended.

¶5             Based on the distance between the collision and the initial
traffic stop, and the time from when Hudson fled and when officers found
his vehicle, Hudson was estimated to have been traveling at an average of
120 miles per hour before the accident. After he was taken into custody,
Hudson confirmed his actual identity to officers. Hudson’s release order,
which he signed the day following his arrest, advised him of his right to be
present at trial and all other proceedings and warned him that “[i]f you fail
to appear the court may issue a warrant for your arrest and/or hold the trial
or proceeding in your absence.”

¶6             As pertinent here, the State indicted Hudson for (1)
aggravated assault, a class three felony, for the injury caused to victim A.L.;
(2) taking the identity of another, a class four felony; and (3) unlawful flight
from a pursuing law enforcement vehicle, a class five felony. A change of
plea hearing was scheduled, but Hudson failed to appear. Relying on a
letter purportedly written by a behavioral health agency, defense counsel
advised the court that Hudson was absent because he was in a mental
health facility; however, several days later the State requested a status
hearing, asserting it had just been advised that Hudson was in prison in
Illinois. Hudson’s counsel moved to withdraw, and the court granted the
request. At a subsequent hearing, Hudson was present and informed the
court he had obtained private counsel. This second attorney was allowed
to withdraw a few months later, asserting Hudson was “no longer able or
willing to pay.” After Hudson failed to hire new counsel for several
months, the court appointed the public defender’s office to represent him.
When Hudson did not appear at the final management conference, the
court issued a warrant for his arrest.

¶7             Hudson also failed to appear on the morning scheduled for
his trial. Defense counsel informed the court that she had not been able to
contact him throughout her representation, and the trial proceeded in his
absence. After hearing testimony from DPS officers, the occupants of the
car Hudson rear-ended, and reviewing photo and video evidence, the jury
found Hudson guilty on all three counts. Soon after the trial, Hudson was
arrested for an unrelated incident involving the fraudulent purchase of a
car.

                                       3
                            STATE v. HUDSON
                            Decision of the Court

¶8           At sentencing, Hudson was given the opportunity to speak,
and the court considered the information contained in the presentence
report. The court imposed mitigated, consecutive sentences of 6.5 years’
imprisonment for aggravated assault and one year imprisonment for
unlawful flight. As to Hudson’s conviction for taking the identity of
another, the court placed him on probation for four years, to begin
following completion of incarceration. The court also credited Hudson
with 133 days of presentence incarceration credit. Hudson timely appealed,
and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and
13-4033(A)(1).

¶9             After a thorough review of the record, we find no reversible
error. Clark, 196 Ariz. at 541, ¶ 50. Concerning the superior court’s decision
to try Hudson in absentia, Hudson was not present for the final
management conference or either day of trial. A criminal defendant who is
voluntarily absent can waive the right to be present at trial. State v. Bolding,
227 Ariz. 82, 88, ¶ 19 (App. 2011). A court may infer voluntary absence if
the defendant had notice of the date and time of the proceeding, his right
to be present, and that the proceeding would go forward in his absence.
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.1. On appeal, we review a court’s finding of voluntary
absence for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bishop, 139 Ariz. 567, 569 (1984).

¶10            The record shows that Hudson received sufficient notice for
the court to infer his absence was voluntary. In the release order Hudson
signed the day following his arrest, he was advised he had the right to be
present at trial, and if he failed to appear the court could conduct the trial
in his absence. And though Hudson was not at the final management
conference, he was present at the previous hearing during which the date
and time for the final management conference and trial were set. Hudson
likewise had the responsibility to remain in contact with his attorney, an
obligation confirmed in his release paperwork. State v. Love, 147 Ariz. 567,
570 (App. 1985). Hudson voluntarily waived his presence at trial, and the
court acted within its discretion in proceeding in his absence. See Bishop,
139 Ariz. at 569.

¶11           The remainder of the record reflects Hudson was present or
represented by counsel at all other critical stages of the proceedings against
him. The evidence presented supports the convictions, and the sentences
imposed fall within the ranges permitted by law. As far as the record
reveals, these proceedings were conducted in compliance with the Arizona
Rules of Criminal Procedure and Hudson’s constitutional and statutory
rights. Accordingly, Hudson’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.

                                       4
                          STATE v. HUDSON
                          Decision of the Court

¶12           Unless defense counsel finds an issue that may be
appropriately submitted to the Arizona Supreme Court, her obligations are
fulfilled once she informs Hudson of the outcome of this appeal and his
future options. State v. Shattuck, 140 Ariz. 582, 584–85 (1984). Hudson has
30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he wishes, with a pro
per motion for reconsideration or petition for review.

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED: AA

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