Court Opinion

ID: 9927846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 15:06:13.190053+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:28:50.498409
License: Public Domain

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by
                        Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

                               STATE OF MINNESOTA
                               IN COURT OF APPEALS
                                     A23-0599

                                   In re the Marriage of:

                              Chriss O. Latterell, petitioner,
                                      Respondent,

                                            vs.

                                   Mary Jean Latterell,
                                       Appellant.

                                Filed January 29, 2024
                                Reversed and remanded
                                    Cochran, Judge

                              Ramsey County District Court
                               File No. 62-F2-92-003547

James D. Capra, James D. Capra, Inc., White Bear Lake, Minnesota (for respondent)

David K. Meier, Sjoberg & Tebelius, P.A., Woodbury, Minnesota (for appellant)

       Considered and decided by Slieter, Presiding Judge; Cochran, Judge; and

Larson, Judge.

                           NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

COCHRAN, Judge

       Appellant challenges the district court’s partial denial of her motion to amend the

parties’ dissolution judgment and decree (J&D), arguing that the district court erred by

denying her request for an amendment specifying that she is entitled to half of respondent’s

pension plan. Because the district court did not consider whether appellant may be entitled
to the requested relief based on the supreme court’s decision in Pooley v. Pooley,

979 N.W.2d 867 (Minn. 2022), we reverse and remand.

                                          FACTS

       Appellant Mary Jean Latterell (wife) and respondent Chriss O. Latterell (husband)

dissolved their marriage by a J&D, entered on November 3, 1993. Husband was the

petitioner in the dissolution proceeding. The J&D noted that husband earned pension

benefits through his employer, Northwest Airlines, Inc., and specified the value of those

benefits at the time of dissolution. The J&D also included the following provision

regarding the division of husband’s pension benefits:

                     Respondent is entitled to a marital interest share of
              petitioner’s Honeywell Retirement Benefit Plan to be computed
              pursuant to the formula set forth in the Qualified Domestic
              Relations Order (QDRO), which is a separate document and
              incorporated by reference. The respondent is awarded all
              interest in his NWA, Inc. pension plan except as set forth in the
              aforesaid QDRO.

(Emphasis added.) Despite the J&D’s reference to a QDRO, no QDRO was ever submitted

to the court for approval or filed in the dissolution proceeding. As a result, the dissolution

court never defined the “marital interest share” of husband’s pension benefits and did not

“compute[]” how those benefits were to be divided between the parties.

       In February 2022, husband reached age 65, and began receiving pension benefits.

At this time, wife became aware that a QDRO had never been filed. Wife then contacted

husband to “notify[] him of the error and ask[] for his cooperation.” Wife also contacted

Delta Airlines, the successor-in-interest to Northwest Airlines, “to prepare a QDRO for

[Delta’s] approval.”    When wife later submitted a proposed QDRO to Delta, Delta

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informed wife that it could not implement the QDRO until it received an “actual order.”

Husband refused to agree to the proposed QDRO.

       In October 2022, wife moved the district court to amend the relevant conclusion of

law in the J&D “to correctly identify [husband’s] retirement account” as associated with

Northwest Airlines, rather than Honeywell, and to “clarify” the extent of wife’s interest in

that account based on the court’s duty “to make a just and equitable division of the marital

property of the parties pursuant to” Minnesota Statutes section 518.58, subdivision 1

(2022). Wife asked the district court to correct the J&D’s reference to Honeywell, to

approve the proposed QDRO, and to clarify that she was entitled to half of husband’s

Northwest Airlines pension benefits pursuant to the QDRO. In an affidavit supporting her

motion, wife stated that she understood the “marital interest share” language in the J&D to

mean that she was entitled to “50% of the marital portion of the [Northwest Airlines

pension].” Wife also stated that it was her understanding that husband’s attorney was

responsible for preparing and submitting a QDRO for approval by the dissolution court in

1993 but never did so.

       Husband opposed the motion. Husband acknowledged that the J&D was “fraught

with errors and omissions,” including references to a “Honeywell Retirement Benefit Plan”

that did not exist and a QDRO that was never submitted to the dissolution court. But

husband argued the district court should deny wife’s motion because it was untimely.

       After a hearing, the district court granted wife’s motion to amend the J&D to

correctly identify husband’s pension as through Northwest Airlines rather than Honeywell,

but it denied wife’s motion to incorporate the proposed QDRO into the J&D or otherwise

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clarify wife’s interest in husband’s pension benefits. The district court determined that the

J&D’s reference to the incorrect pension plan was a clerical error that could be corrected

at any time under rule 60.01. But the district court ruled that the parties’ failure to clarify

how husband’s pension benefits should be divided between the parties was a “mistake”

under Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02 and that wife’s motion to correct the

mistake was time-barred by Minnesota Statutes section 518.145 (2022). Wife then filed a

request for reconsideration, which the district court denied.

       Wife appeals.

                                        DECISION

       Wife challenges the district court’s denial of her motion to modify the J&D to

incorporate the proposed QDRO into the J&D or otherwise clarify wife’s interest in the

pension plan. She argues that the failure of the parties and the dissolution court to

incorporate a QDRO into the J&D in 1993 was a clerical mistake that arose from an

oversight or omission which is redressable under rule 60.01. She also contends that the

district court’s denial of her motion as time-barred under section 518.145 was “contrary to

[the] fair and equitable division of the marital property as contemplated in the decree” and

required by Minnesota Statutes section 518.58 (2022). We first address the argument

pertaining to rule 60.01 and then turn to the argument relating to section 518.145.

       A.     Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.01

       Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.01 authorizes courts to correct at any time

clerical mistakes in final judgments. It states:

                                              4
                      Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of
              the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission
              may be corrected by the court at any time upon its own
              initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if
              any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an appeal,
              such mistakes may be so corrected with leave of the appellate
              court.

Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.01 (emphasis added). Generally, a clerical mistake “is apparent upon

the face of the record and capable of being corrected by reference to the record only.”

Medtronic, Inc. v. Advanced Bionics Corp., 630 N.W.2d 438, 447 (Minn. App. 2001)

(quoting Wilson v. City of Fergus Falls, 232 N.W. 322, 323 (Minn. 1930)). A clerical

mistake “is usually a mistake in the clerical work of transcribing the particular record” and

“may be made by a clerk, by counsel, or by the court.” Id. (quoting Wilson, 232 N.W. at

323). A motion to correct a clerical mistake “can only be used to make the judgment or

record speak the truth and cannot be used to make it say something other than what

originally was pronounced.” Gould v. Johnson, 379 N.W.2d 643, 647 (Minn. App. 1986)

(emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted), rev. denied (Minn. Mar. 14, 1986).

       Here, the terms of the J&D reflect an intent to award wife a share of the marital

portion of husband’s pension benefits, but the J&D does not specify the extent of wife’s

interest in these benefits or otherwise divide the pension benefits in the J&D. Instead, the

J&D referenced a QDRO, a document typically used to apportion pension benefits, but a

QDRO was never submitted by the parties or approved by the dissolution court. Absent

certainty about the extent of wife’s interest in the pension benefits, the lack of an award of

that interest is neither “capable of being corrected by reference to the record only” nor “a

mistake in the clerical work of transcribing the particular record.” Medtronic, 630 N.W.2d

                                              5
at 447 (quoting Wilson, 232 N.W. at 323). We therefore conclude that the district court

correctly determined that wife’s request to identify her interest in husband’s pension

benefits is not susceptible to correction under rule 60.01 as a “clerical mistake.” 1

         B.     Minnesota Statutes section 518.145

         A party seeking relief from an otherwise final dissolution judgment and decree can

do so under section 518.145 for various reasons, including “mistake, inadvertence, surprise

or excusable neglect.” Minn. Stat. § 518.145, subd. 2. The statute requires that a relevant

motion for relief be made within a reasonable time, and not more than one year after the

judgment was entered. Id. Here, the district court determined that wife’s motion to amend

the J&D was untimely because she filed it in 2022, more than one year after the J&D was

entered. This analysis assumes that the time limit in section 518.145 applies to wife’s

motion.

         In reaching its decision that wife’s motion was not timely, the district court did not

consider the supreme court’s recent decision in Pooley. 2 In Pooley, the supreme court

1
  To the extent that the district court also determined that wife’s motion to amend the J&D
was untimely under Minn. R. Civ. P. 60.02, we note that rule 60.02 does not apply to
dissolution judgments. Indeed, rule 60.02 specifically states that a district court may grant
relief from judgments “other than a marriage dissolution decree.” (Emphasis added.) And
the supreme court has stated that “motions to modify divorce decrees brought under [r]ule
60.02 should not be entertained by the district courts.” Lindsey v. Lindsey, 388 N.W.2d
713, 716 n.1 (Minn. 1986). But because the district court correctly declined to alter the
J&D under rule 60.02, we will not alter that determination even though it incorrectly
implies that rule 60.02 applies here. See Katz v. Katz, 408 N.W.2d 835, 839 (Minn. 1987)
(stating that appellate courts “will not reverse a correct decision simply because it is based
on incorrect reasons”).
2
    Pooley was released a few months prior to the district court’s decision in this case.

                                                6
clarified that the one-year time limit under section 518.145 does not apply to motions

addressing the division of a marital asset if the dissolution court did not divide the asset

during the dissolution proceedings. 979 N.W.2d at 875. Here, the district court applied

the time limit in section 518.145 without addressing whether this statutory provision

applies to wife’s motion in light of Pooley. As a result, the district court’s decision that

wife’s motion was untimely under section 518.145 was premature, at best.

       The supreme court’s decision in Pooley was not explicitly cited by the parties before

the district court or this court. Thus, Pooley’s applicability to this case is arguably beyond

our scope of review. See, e.g., Thiele v. Stich, 425 N.W.2d 580, 582 (Minn. 1988) (stating

that appellate courts address only those questions previously presented to and considered

by the district court); State, Dep’t of Lab. & Indus. v. Wintz Parcel Drivers, Inc.,

558 N.W.2d 480, 480 (Minn. 1997) (declining to address an inadequately briefed issue);

Brodsky v. Brodsky, 733 N.W.2d 471, 479 (Minn. App. 2007) (applying Wintz in a

family-law appeal). For three reasons, however, we conclude that we may consider Pooley

in addressing the district court’s denial of wife’s motion based on the one-year time limit

set forth in section 518.145.

       First, regarding the “applicability of [a] law” that “[n]either party discussed . . . in

either briefs or at oral argument,” the supreme court stated: “[I]t is the responsibility of

appellate courts to decide cases in accordance with law, and that responsibility is not to be

diluted by counsel’s oversights, lack of research, failure to specify issues or to cite relevant

authorities.” State v. Hannuksela, 452 N.W.2d 668, 673 n.7 (Minn. 1990) (quotation

omitted).   The supreme court then noted that the doctrine in question was “not of

                                               7
questionable validity,” and “proceed[ed] to consider its application . . . notwithstanding

that the parties failed to raise or discuss the issue in their briefs or at oral argument.” Id.;

see also Moorhead Econ. Dev. Auth. v. Anda, 789 N.W.2d 860, 875 (Minn. 2010) (applying

Hannuksela in a civil case). Here, the Pooley opinion is not of questionable validity—it is

the supreme court’s most recent statement on when a motion to amend a dissolution

judgment and decree is barred by the time limit in section 518.145.

       Second, the supreme court in Pooley held that the time limit in section 518.145 did

not bar the attempt to amend the judgment in that case, in part because district courts have

a duty “to divide parties’ marital property justly and equitably” when dissolving marriages.

979 N.W.2d at 875 (citing Minn. Stat. § 518.58, subd. 1). Here, wife did not cite Pooley,

but she did explicitly seek relief in district court and before this court based on the court’s

duty “to make a just and equitable division of the marital property of the parties pursuant

to [section 518.58, subdivision 1].” Thus, part of the argument wife made to the district

court and makes to this court is the same argument the supreme court found persuasive in

Pooley. In these circumstances, the basis for this court to address Pooley is strong.

       Third, as explained below, this court is not resolving the parties’ dispute based on

an application of Pooley. This court is merely directing the district court to consider the

Pooley analysis for the purpose of determining whether the time limit in section 518.145

applies to a particular motion to modify a dissolution J&D as a logical prerequisite to its

determination that the motion here was untimely under that time limit. As a result, neither

party will be prejudiced by this court addressing Pooley for this limited purpose.

                                               8
       In sum, we conclude that this court may consider the Pooley opinion in analyzing

wife’s argument regarding the division of husband’s pension benefits. We further conclude

remand is necessary because the district court did not address whether, under Pooley, the

time limit in section 518.145 applies to wife’s motion regarding the division of the pension

benefits. We therefore reverse and remand. On remand, the district court shall determine

whether, under Pooley, the dissolution court was able to make a fair and equitable division

of husband’s Northwest Airlines pension benefits as required under section 518.58 without

a QDRO and whether wife’s motion is time-barred by section 518.145.               See, e.g.,

Monson v. Suck, 855 N.W.2d 323, 329-30 (Minn. App. 2014) (explaining that appellate

courts “refrain from addressing the alternative arguments so that the district court may

address them in the first instance in further proceedings”), rev. denied (Minn. Dec. 30,

2014); Slindee v. Fritch Inv., LLC, 760 N.W.2d 903, 911 (Minn. App. 2009) (providing

that appellate courts “generally do not address issues presented in but not decided by the

district court” and remanding to give the district court the opportunity to address an issue

in the first instance).

       We recognize that additional evidence regarding the parties’ 1993 dissolution

proceedings may be necessary to determine whether, under Pooley, wife’s motion to amend

falls under section 518.58 or section 518.145. Such evidence might include testimony from

the parties or their attorneys as to whether the terms of a QDRO were known to the

dissolution court at the time of dissolution even though a QDRO was not submitted by the

parties to the dissolution court. Accordingly, on remand, the district court has discretion

to conduct an evidentiary hearing to elicit whatever evidence it may need to resolve any

                                             9
outstanding questions raised by Pooley or any other question it may need to address. If the

district court determines that section 518.145 does not preclude wife’s motion because the

J&D was entered in 1993 without a determination by the dissolution court as to the fair and

equitable division of the marital share of husband’s pension benefits, the district court shall

divide the marital share of husband’s pension benefits on remand.

       Reversed and remanded.

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