Court Opinion

ID: 9681546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:52:28.379295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:34.374711
License: Public Domain

DAVIS, Justice
(dissenting).
I find myself unable to agree with a part of the conclusions reached by a majority of the Court and hereby dissent.
In addition to the statement of the nature- and result of the suit as stated in the majority opinion, I add the following:
Appellee filed the will of his father for-probate on July 24, 1953 (just three days after his death). About a week after the-death of A. L. Vaughn, Mrs. Stella Vaughn, became ill and had to be carried to the; home of her son near Vernon, Texas.. She spent several days in a hospital; ran. up a bill of $211 and her medicines since; *439then have cost her about $25 per month. And regardless of the amount of money she and her husband had on hand 'at the timé of his death, it was frozen by the filing of the will for probate and she has been living off her children by her first marriage ever since the death o-f her husband.'
Mrs. Stella Vaughn filed her notice of intention to take under the law instead of the will before the will was admitted to probate.
I am unable to locate the authority of the majority for the underscored part of their statement pertaining to the land owned by A. L. Vaughn and his first wife: “At the time of and prior to said marriage, A. L. Vaughn and his children of a prior marriage owned six tracts of land in Fannin County, Texas, aggregating 238 acres, which they rented out and A. L. Vaughn did not have possession of any of it.” There is evidence of the ownership and that the children by the first marriage had sued their father for a partition of same about the time he married appellant, but I am unable to find anything in the record that any of it was rented out or that A. L. Vaughn did not have possession of any of it.
The record is confusing as to the tracts of land involved. It is true that two tracts of 64 and 48 acres as described in the partition judgment, both in Fannin County, were awarded to A. L. Vaughn. The 64-acre tract is described as being part of Section No. 5, University League No. 1, and 40 acres out of 80 acres patented to J. B. Russell. The 48-acre tract is described as being in the E. W. Pittman Survey.
Appellant alleges three tracts of land in her petition as being the land described in the partition judgment, but says the 40 and 36 acres are in the James Hubbard Survey and the 48 acres in the E. W. Pittman Survey. There is evidence that four acres were sold off one 40-acre tract. Another 12-acre tract was bought,by A. L. Vaughn on January 13, 1931, after his marriage to appellant, but I cannot agree that the récord shows it was -bought ■ by him out of his separate funds.
The trial court tendered judgment according to the following findings of fact and conclusions of law that were incorporated into the judgment:
-“(a) That the forty acre tract of land and the thirty-six acre tract of land, contiguous and adjoining, both out of the James Hubbard Survey in Fannin County, Texas, as described in plaintiff's original petition, and containing approximately seventy-six acres in all, were, and constituted at the time of his death, the homestead of the plaintiff and the said A. L. Vaughn, deceased; and the same should be set apart and aside to plaintiff as her homestead, forming no part of the estate of the said A. L. Vaughn, deceased, subject to administration, unless and until the homestead rights of plaintiff therein shall hereinafter cease and terminate ;
“(b) That, as shown by defendant’s first amended original answer, the defendant, claiming as independent executor, has received, and holds in his possession, since the death of his testator, the sum of $366.07 as rents and revenues from the forty acre tract of land and the sum of $725.35 as rents and revenues from the thirty-six acre tract of land, described in subdivision (a) above, in all $1,091.42, to which plaintiff is entitled, the same forming no part of the estate of A. L. Vaughn, deceased, subject to administration;
“(c) That the forty-eight acre tract of land out of the E. W. Pittman Survey in Fannin County, Texas, described in plaintiff’s original petition, was the separate property of A. L. Vaughn, deceased, and at the date of his death did' not constitute any part of the homestead of plaintiff and the said A. L. Vaughn, deceased.; and' the rents and.revenues therefrom collected after *440the death of the said A. L. Vaughn were not the community property of plaintiff and the said A. L. Vaughn, deceased. (Italics mine.)
“(d) That the exempt personal property, consisting of household and kitchen furniture and one 1937 Chevrolet 4-door automobile, as shown by the inventory, appraisement and list of claims of such estate, exclusive of any -sepa;rate . personal property of either, the plaintiff or the said .A. L. Vaughn, deceased, should be set apart and aside to the plaintiff, forming no part of the estate of the defendant’s testator subject-to administration. >
“(e) That an allowance in the sum of $750.00 should be made and set apart to plaintiff for her support for a period of one yearj to be charged against the community property administered by the defendant as independent executor;
“(f) That an allowance in -the sum of $100.00 should be made and set-apart to plaintiff in lieu of exempt personal property not on hand at the time of the "death of defendant’s testator, the same to be charged against the community property administered by the defendant as such executor;
“(g) That the 1937 Chevrolet automobile, the Series E bonds, the coA and hay on hand, as shown by the inventory, appraisement and list of claims in such estate, are the community property of the plaintiff and A. L. Vaughn,- deceased, and the plaintiff’s community interest in the Series E bonds should be paid to her;
“(h) That the fractional share of the stock in The Continental National Bank of Fort Worth, as shown in the inventory, appraisement and . list of claims of such estate, were, and are the separate property of the said A. L. Vaughn, deceased;
“(i) That the defendant as . independent executor is- entitled-to recover of the plaintiff the sum of $92.42 advanced by defendant’s testator for payment on a -Federal Land Bank note owed. by. plaintiff, at the time of her marriage to decedent, the sum of $42.-48 and $38.56, respectively, advanced by ■ such decedent for the payment of taxes on her land, which were paid by decedent out of his separate funds for the use and benefit of plaintiff’s separate estate; '
“(j) That the advancements to Sam Vaughn, William Vaughn, Dessie Page and Robert B. Vaughn were made by the said A. L. Vaughn, deceased, prior to his marriage to plaintiff, and consequently no provision should be made-for their collection in this judgment
“(k)-That a part of the advancements made to Archie Vaughn were .made prior, and a part subsequent to the marriage of plaintiff and .A. L. Vaughn, deceased, but the court is, unable to determine what amount was. advanced by such decedent after said marriage;-
“(l) That the loan to Sudie Page-in the sum of $600.00, as shown by-the inventory, appraisements and list: of claims of such estate, and the loan of $1,200.00 to -Rosie Shockley, as. shown by the will of the decedent, were made subsequent to the marriage of the plaintiff-and such decedent, are not in-, fact advancement, but. loans made by' such decedent out of community funds,, and that-the judgment shall provide that the executor shall exert every-effort to collect the same;
“(m) That a rental contract for. the-year 1954 -upon the thirty-six acre tract and the tillable portion of the forty-acre tract.above mentioned, the same-being the Homestead tracts as heretofore found, has been made between, defendant’s testator and the said Zac-Vaughn, prior to the death, of the; former;
*441“(n) That, after payment of the above allowances of $750.00 and $100.00, as set out in subdivision (e) and (f) above, the payment of the funeral bills of the said A. L. Vaughn, ■deceased, to J. R: Wilson &•'Company in the sum of $904J98, the medical bills of such decedent in the sum of $8.00 to Dr. Joe Stephens incurred during his last illness, the attorney’s fee of the defendant as executor to Messrs. Cunningham, Colé and Southerland in the sum of $500.00, the defendant’s commission as independent executor in the sum of $122.50, and the sum of $13.45 as probate court costs, one-half of'all community funds on hand should be paid to the plaintiff; to which findings and conclusions, and each and every one of them, the plaintiff and defendant each then and there in open court duly excepted.”
The challenges, or “counter-assignments” by appellee to all of appellant’s points of error as' set out in the majority opinion, in the opinion of this writer,-are without merit. Under Rule, 418(b)r T.R.C.P., the appellant need only complain of the action of the trial court on specific Matters in order to 'raise his point. It is not necessary to give any reason-therefor. Wagley v. Fambrough, Tex.Civ.App., 163 S.W.2d 1072, no writ history; Insurance Inv. Corp. v. Hargrove, Tex.Civ.App., 179 S.W.2d 383; Vela v. Southland Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 212 S.W.2d 210, reversed on other grounds, 147 Tex. 478, 217 S.W.2d 660; Foster v. Buchele, Tex.Civ.App., 213 S.W.2d 738, ref., n. r. e. And the majority, though critical of the points, were able to tell what errors the appellant was complaining about.
I disagree with the holding of the majority opinion for the errors complained of by appellant in her points one and two wherein 'she complains of the action of the trial court in finding and holding that the 48-acre tract of land,’.involved in this suit was no part of their homestead at the time of the death of A. L. Vaughn, and denying-to her the rents and revenues from the'crops raised1 thereon in the year 1953 and so long thereafter as the same should remain her homestead.
The evidence shows that Mr. and Mrs. Vaughn moved upon .the land in December, 1932, and resided - there continuously until Mr. Vaughnls death. Mr. Vaughn did not-farm any of the land after his marriage to Mrs. Vaughn, except for one year. His health did not permit him to farm the land after that, and all three of the tracts were rented out to his children, and occasionally to others, from about 1934 until his death. The evidence shows that Mr. and Mrs. Vaughn used1 ’the ’ rents and revenues from all ‘three tracts of’ land for their support and maintenance during all of that time. The evidence does not specifically ’ show that any of the feed gathered from the 48-acre tract of land in controversy which was, always rented on a rental basis of one-third of the feed and one-foiirth of the cotton, was ever delivered into the barn of Mr, and Mrs. Vaughn, or' that any of such feed cro^s were actually consumed by appellant and fte,r husband or was actually fed to any of their stock'. The evidence does show that there was corn' and hay in the barn at the time of Mr. Vaughn’s death. The use of such feed can'most reasonably be implied in view of the evidence in the case .without dispute, that the rents and revenues from the 48 acres was used for the support and maintenance of appellant and her 'deceased husband, in the same manner as that from the' other two tracts that'joined.
Appellee takes the position that in view of the fact that appellant failed to show any actual labor upon the land or actual consumption of any of the rents by her and her husband during his lifetime or to show that any of the feed was fed to any livestock, or that they did not cut any wood or posts,off the land, is sufficient to defeat any claim 'of right of homestead in the 48 acres. Appellee further contends that A. L. Vaughn designated - their homestead in his will as being, the 40-acre tract of land *442upon which they resided and that appellant cannot change- that designation. ■ The provision in the will pertaining to the 40 acres is as follows: “I also will and bequeath to my said wife, Stella Vaughn, for and during her natural life only, the home place' consisting of about 40 acres, being the place where I now live, and the household and kitchen furniture located therein.” (Underscoring mine). The word “homestead” was twice subsequently used in the will, but when one considers the will from its four comers, it seems that the other two tracts were included in the “homestead.”
Appellant claims a life estate in and to the entire three tracts of land by virtue of our Revised Civil Statutes, and Section 51 of Article 16 of our Constitution which reads as follows:
“Sec. 51. The homestead', not in a town or city, shall consist of not more than two hundred acres of land, which may be in one or more parcels, with the improvements thereon; the homestead in a city, town or village, shall consist of lot, or lots, not to exceed in value five thousand dollars, at the time of their designation as the'homestead, without reference to the value of any improvements' thereon; provided, that the same, shall be used for the purposes of a home, or as a place to exercise the calling or business of the head of a family; provided also, that any temporary renting of the homestead shall not change the character of the same, when no other homestead has been acquired.”
It is conceded by appellee that appellant is entitled to such life estate, but he contends that the “homestead” is limited to the 40 acres upon which the residence was situated in which Mr. and Mrs. Vaughn resided.
There has been much said by our courts about the showing of the “use” of rural property in order to be entitled to have a homestead character impressed" upon it, especially where a part of the 200 acres granted by the Constitution is separate and apart from a tract upon which the residence is situated. A careful study and reading of the Constitution does not justify such construction. By carefully analyzing the provisions of the Constitution, it will be noted that the two “provisos” contained therein pertain only to a homestead- in a city, town or village. The writer is highly in accord with the holding of the U. S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in the case of Woodward v. Sanger Bros., 246 F. 782-783, in which Mr. Justice Batts in speaking of a detached rural tract of land said:
“If a person should use his land in the way indicated, if he should thereby get his living, thereby provide himself in kind with corn and wheat needed for his own consumption, thereby provide the oats and fodder needed for the horse which he rides; by what provision of the law is he placed, with reference to the tract or tracts constituting the 200 acres which might have become his homestead, in any different .position than he would be in if he had done a little work on each of the tracts with his own .hand or by hired labor? The law could make such a difference, and, if made, whether reasonable or not, it would have to be observed. But why should an absurdity be imputed to', the law when there .is nothing in its terms that would justify or excuse such imputation? * .
“The decision of the District Court■ in the present case is predicated upon an opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas in Autry v. Reas or, 102 Tex. 123, 108 S.W. 1162, 113 S.W. 748. Both cases present, as strongly as may be, the absurd results of insisting upon a distinction which the lawmakers have not felt proper to make. The homestead claimant in this case is 72 years of age. She is living on one tract, and she owns another tract so situate that it could be a part of her homestead. If she had, at any time while she was *443the head of a family, labored'with her own hands on this second tract in the making of a crop, it would admittedly have become a part of her homestead. Doubtless, the same consequences ’ would have followed if- she had worked it with hired hands,' or if .the labor had been done by any member of her family. But she did not 'work it with her own hands; she was doubtless entirely unable to so utilize the land. She did not work it with hired hands. There was probably' an ample reason for this. The individual labors of the members of the family could be more efficaciously used in cultivating the tract upon which the residence was located. She probably used the detached land in the only way in which she was in position to use it. From this use she got the support the law contemplated she should get. In addition, she secured in kind what was ■ needed to feed the one horse she used. She got what the Constitution intended she should have, without doing anything which the Constitution prohibited. She is under the terms of the law — under the reason of the law. Why should she not get the benefit of the law? If the rule insisted upon obtains, protection is withdrawn from a class for whose' benefit it was peculiarly proper that the homestead law should have been framed. A robust man might work the land himself and extend to the detached tracts the homestead character. A woman with funds might, with hired labor, accomplish the same result; a woman with boys upon whom she could- depend for support might utilize them in extending the homestead right for which she-, had only a limited need; but the infirm, penniless, childless old lady, who most needs, is denied.
“In the case of Autry v. Reasor, supra, Mr. Justice Williams, concurring in the original opinion which' maintained'the homestead right, said:
“ T qm not prepared, however, to agree that the single circumstance of the use of the rents, even in kind, for the support of the family, was sufficient to impress the rented land with the homestead character.’
“In the original opinion by Chief Justice Gaines were detailed the following facts: One Forner, a witness for defendants, testified with reference to the 39 acres in controversy:
“ ‘That the 29-acre tract was only partly in cultivation when it was originally purchased by Reasor, and that he or his employe' prepared the whole of it for use; that he thought Reasor worked there. The ten acres adjoin the other. He did not know that he ever saw Reasor work on that tract, but that he, together with Reasor, gathered corn on the land.’
“Upon a rehearing the conclusion primarily reached was reversed, upon the( ground that,, notwithstanding the evidence \vhich had been recited by the, court, the trial court had found .that:.,
“ ‘Reasor never cultivated the 39 acres of land, or any part of it, by himself or through any one else; he rented the same from the time of the purchase to the time of his death to yearly tenants; who paid for the use of the same.’
“The court held that this finding of the trial court was-conclusive upon it, the appellate court, and concluded that the, facts ; established (excluding the facts recited) were not sufficient to show the 39 acres to be a part of the homestead.- It will be noted that, while the coup acquiesces m the proposition that .the detached land must, to be homestead, be used for some of the purposes of a horne 'either by cultivating it, using it directly for the purpose of raising family supplies, or for cut-ing firewood and such like,’ the distinct holding is that, if the trifling additional facts which have heretofore been detailed had existed, the homestead character would have been.impressed upon the land.”
*444The record in this, case- shows that Mr. and Mrs. Vaughn utilized this land in the only way possible in- view of their physical conditions and declining years. They comingled the rents from all three tracts of land to such an extent that, the proceeds from one tract could not possibly be distinguished from the proceeds of another. From these rents, they provided th'einselves with the sustenance of life and accumulated a little bank account which- prevented them.from becoming public charges of the state. Mrs. Vaughn, during those last 18 or 19 years of Mr. Vaughn’s life, when he was unable to work, was a good and devoted wife and provided for him every comfort within her power. She nursed him almost continually from sometime in 1950 when he fell and broke his hip until his death. Surely, it was not the intention of the framers of our Constitution to penalize the aged and physically handicapped in such cases by placing an imaginary drawstring around the 200 acres of land set aside -for a country homestead and provide that as people grow old and unable to labor that'this drawstring would gradually creep -to "the little plot of land-upon which the residence sits, remove the homestead character therefrom, and subject the excess of the 200 acres to forced sale, or exclude it from exemption as a homestead for tax purposes. Such construction is nothing .less .than inhuman. It places an impossible burden upon such people. What is the difference between taking a dollar from-the sale of a little bag of rent corn or wheat to a mill (which mills no longer exist in- rural communities), having the same 'ground into meal or flour and actually consuming the same? I am-constrained to believe that if a “use” is mandatory for rural' property, the time has come when the requirements of “use” must, of necessity, be’ construed differently. In our advanced age of modern conveniences, we no longer have a rural grist mill to which to carry corn, nor a flour mill for wheat. Machinery and trucks have taken the place of work stock and the wagon. The automobile has taken'-the place of th'e horse and buggy, and no posts are needed to fence' in the’ machinery, 'trucks and automobiles-while they are not in use. I doubt if there is one rural homeowner out of a hundred in Texas who uses wood to cook with and,to warm by (butane gas and electricity have taken the place of this). Advanced science: has convinced us that the use of homogenized, and pasteurized milk is more sanitary and healthful than milk produced from, an untested cow from an open corral or an unsanitary barn, and many rural people can purchase the more healthful product cheaper than they can actually produce their own milk and butter. Further, aged people, such as Mr. and Mrs. Vaughn in their last years could well afford the purchase of such items rather than drive themselves into all kinds of. weather and try to live by the moré ancient method,
The record further' shows that Mr. Vaughn rendered all three tracts-of land for taxes as his homestead from and including 1948,,the year of-his will, until his death, and claimed all the value of , the 48-acre tract and claimed only part of the value of the two adjoining tracts under the statute that exempts, homesteads from state ad valorem taxes up to $3,000, and appellee rendered them the same way for 1953. This may not be conclusive proof that the 48 acres is a part of the homestead, but it is awfully strong evidence of the intention of Mr. Vaughn during his lifetime, and ratified by appellee. And it is certainly contrary to the position appellee takes in this case. If the 48 acres was no part of-the homestead at the time of the death* of Mr. Vaughn,--then it-was never any part of-the same, and the estate Owes state ad valorem taxes, penalty and interest upon said' 48 acres, if not all three tracts, at least from the date Mr. Vaughn became unable to work to date; ■ . ■ .
The récord'further-shows that-appellee farmed the 36- and 40-acre .tracts of land in 1953 on a rental of-⅛ feed and ¾ cotton. He made 30 bales of cotton and some feed, and paid $366.07 rent on the 40 acres supposedly going .to Mrs. Vaughn under the will, and paid $725.35 on the 36 acres which hé contends she is not entitled to because *445of the will. The tenants on the 48-acre-tract made only 23 hales of cotton and paid $923.-36 rent. The discrepancies do not favorably impress this writer.
For the reasons hereinabove stated, I do not believe the ancient rule of law stated in Autry v. Reasor, 113 S.W. 748 (dated December 2, 1908), and followed by the majority opinion here is applicable to this case. If it is the law, from the standpoint of justice it should be changed by our presént Supreme Court. If such is the law,-its ultimate effect will be to compel our aged, and other rural residents who are unable to perform manual labor, to bbcome' public charges, and finally create for them a Welfare State. The rule being so--unjustly wrong, I feel that it is my duty not only to dissent, but also to criticise the same. I would sustain points 1 and 2 and would reverse and render'that part of the judgment.
I am, also unable to -agree with the holding of the trial court and of the majority of this Court on the question of taxing one-half of the cost of the trial court against appellant. Not only was she deprived of her part .of the community property by the action of the appellee, but also she has been denied' any of the rights to which she was entitle.d-as a matter of law. If she had not brought this suit, she would have been cut off with only $250 and a life estate in only 40 acres of land. Unquestionably, she has been compelled to endure untold embarrassment and suffering by being denied that to which she was rightfully entitled and should not be punished by adding any part of the court costs to her burden which appellee compelled her to incur. The reason stated by the trial court for taxing half the costs in the trial court against appellant is in direct conflict with his previous findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment. I think the reasons given show a clear abuse of discretion and violates Rule 131, T.R.C.P. I would reverse and render that part of-the judgment.
I concur with the other conclusions .reached by the trial court and the majority .here.