Court Opinion

ID: 9602283
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:52:45.431532+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:01.954623
License: Public Domain

*178Beasley, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
OCGA § 34-9-104 (a) defines the term “change in condition” as a “change in the wage-earning capacity, physical condition, or status of an employee . . . , which change must have occurred after the date on which the wage-earning capacity, physical condition, or status of the employee . . . was last established by award or otherwise.” In this case, the claimant is seeking the resumption of disability income benefits based on a change in his wage-earning capacity. He is receiving 10% permanent partial disability and has not attempted to change that.
After a period of disability, Mr. King returned to work at his same job as a carpenter for the same employer but was unable to carry some of the heavy items used in his work. He continued on, without any pay reduction, until he and 18 or 20 others were laid off on December 26. His curtailed activity was unrelated to his termination. He was unable to secure work because of lack of employment opportunities in the area, so the question of the effect of his disability on his employability as a carpenter at the same rate he had been earning from his previous employer never was reached in his job-seeking.
In order to establish entitlement to the disability benefits sought, “[h]e was required by Code Ann. § 114-709 [now OCGA § 34-9-104], as amended in 1968, to show that his inability to secure suitable employment elsewhere was proximately caused by his previous accidental injury.” Hartford Accident &c. Co. v. Bristol, 242 Ga. 287, 288 (248 SE2d 661) (1978). Although the law has again been amended since 1968, the burden of proof is still upon the claimant in this regard, to make a showing. Ga. Power Co. v. Brown, 169 Ga. App. 45, 48 (311 SE2d 236) (1983). “[T]he crucial issue was whether the employee’s inability to secure suitable employment elsewhere was proximately caused by his previous accidental injury ... he is entitled to benefits if because of his disability he is unable to find employment.” (Emphasis supplied.) Cornell-Young (Macon &c. Co.) v. Minter, 168 Ga. App. 325, 330 (2) (309 SE2d 159) (1983); Gilmer v. Atlanta Housing Auth., 170 Ga. App. 326 (316 SE2d 535) (1984); Augusta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Carter, 172 Ga. App. 195, 196 (322 SE2d 365) (1984). \
Unlike Gilmer, supra, there is no evidence that claimant “was unable to maintain a job due to his . . . condition . . .” Id. at 327. The “if’ contained in the previous quotation was not satisfied by any competent evidence. The statement of the former employer* recited by the majority is based on a hypothetical situation which is not supported by facts in the record. For one thing, there is no evidence that “the only thing he could do was to nail nails.” For another thing, that *179same employer had kept him on the payroll working until the job was completed and no more work remained to be done. The ALJ found that claimant “was able to do light work, that he was able to perform the basic carpentry duties, . . .” She also found that “he was able to do most of the duties of his job as a carpenter, with the exception that he was not able to lift and carry heavy items. He was not absent any of the work days.”
Decided December 4, 1985.
Lovick P. Anthony, Jr., for appellant.
Elton L. Wall, George Skene, for appellees.
I do not perceive a factual basis for the award and would affirm the trial court.
I am authorized to state that Judge Carley joins in this dissent.