Court Opinion

ID: 9684543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:00:36.087356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:01:11.294929
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10095    Document: 25-1     Date Filed: 08/24/2023   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10095
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       ERIC PAUL JONES,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Florida
                 D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00162-VMC-TGW-1
                          ____________________
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       2                     Opinion of the Court                23-10095

       Before BRANCH, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges:
       PER CURIAM:
             Eric Jones, after pleading guilty to production and
       possession of child pornography, was sentenced to 365 months’
       imprisonment, followed by a lifetime of supervised release. He
       now appeals his sentence, despite having signed a plea agreement
       that contained an appeal waiver. The government moved to
       dismiss the appeal based upon the appeal waiver and—because the
       appeal waiver is enforceable, and Jones’s claims are not the types
       that we have previously allowed to proceed despite an appeal
       waiver—we grant the government’s motion to dismiss Jones’s
       appeal.
                                I.     Background
               In May 2021, a federal grand jury returned an indictment
       charging Jones with one count of production of child pornography,
       in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a) and (e) (Count One), one count
       of distribution of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
       § 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1) (Count Two), and one count of possession
       of child pornography, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and
       (b)(2) (Count Three). Jones entered into a plea agreement with the
       government, under which Jones would plead guilty to Counts One
       and Three of the indictment and the government would move to
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       23-10095                  Opinion of the Court                                3

       dismiss Count Two. 1 The agreement contained the following
       waiver:
              The defendant . . . expressly waives the right to appeal
              defendant’s sentence on any ground, including the
              ground that the [sentencing c]ourt erred in
              determining the applicable guidelines range pursuant
              to the United States Sentencing Guidelines, except (a)
              the ground that the sentence exceeds the defendant’s
              applicable guidelines range as determined by the
              [sentencing c]ourt pursuant to the United States
              Sentencing Guidelines; (b) the ground that the
              sentence exceeds the statutory maximum penalty; or
              (c) the ground that the sentence violates the Eighth
              Amendment to the Constitution; provided, however,
              that if the government exercises its right to appeal the
              sentence imposed, as authorized by 18 U.S.C.
              § 3742(b), then the defendant is released from his
              waiver and may appeal the sentence as authorized by
              18 U.S.C. § 3742(a).
       Both Jones and the government signed the agreement and, by
       signing, Jones certiﬁed that he and his counsel had read the
       agreement in its entirety (or that it had been read to Jones) and that
       Jones fully understood the terms of the agreement. Jones also

       1 According to the agreement, Count One carried a mandatory minimum term

       of imprisonment of 15 years up to 30 years, a maximum fine of $250,000, at
       least a 5-year term of supervised release, and a special assessment of $100; and
       Count Three carried a maximum sentence of 20 years’ imprisonment, a
       $250,000 fine, at least 5 years of supervised release, and a $100 special
       assessment.
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       4                        Opinion of the Court                    23-10095

       initialed each page of the agreement to indicate that he understood
       its operative terms.
               At the change of plea hearing, Jones conﬁrmed to the
       magistrate judge that he had signed, initialed, and understood the
       plea agreement, denied that he had any questions about the
       agreement, and conﬁrmed that the factual basis underlying his
       oﬀenses as set forth in the plea agreement was correct. The
       magistrate judge then explained the plea agreement’s appeal
       waiver, as well as exceptions to the waiver, and Jones conﬁrmed
       that he understood the waiver and that he had freely and
       voluntarily agreed to it. After ﬁnding that Jones was competent
       and capable of entering an informed plea, the magistrate judge
       adjudicated Jones guilty and entered a report and recommendation
       recommending that the district court accept Jones’s plea. The
       district court later did so.
              Prior to sentencing, the government moved for a three-level
       reduction in Jones’s total oﬀense level for substantial assistance to
       law enforcement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5K1.1. Before hearing
       argument on the motion at the sentencing hearing, the district
       court stated that Jones’s oﬀenses were “some of the most serious”
       it had overseen and took the oﬀenses “very seriously.” The district
       court ultimately granted the government’s motion and decreased
       Jones’s oﬀense level by three. 2

       2 The district court determined that, based on an offense level of 43 and a

       criminal history category of I, Jones’s advisory guideline range was 600
       months’ imprisonment. After the district court granted the government’s
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       23-10095                 Opinion of the Court                              5

               The district court then stated that it believed cases such as
       Jones’s were “horriﬁc,” and doubted whether “certain people
       [could] change when it comes to these oﬀenses.” The district court
       went on, stating that it had “imposed very signiﬁcant sentences in
       these crimes” in the past, being concerned “not just [about]
       punishment,” but having the “prevailing concern [about]
       protecting the public.” “What it [came] down to” for the district
       court is that “they don’t change.” Finally, the district court
       announced Jones’s sentence and informed Jones that his
       cooperation with the government had spared him from a life
       sentence, emphasizing that it had imposed a life sentence on
       “virtually everybody” who had previously appeared before the
       district court after committing similar crimes.
              Jones now appeals the judgment and sentence, and the
       government moves to dismiss the appeal pursuant to the appeal
       waiver in the plea agreement. Jones argues that the appeal waiver
       should not be enforced because, while he waived his right to appeal
       his sentence on legal grounds, he did not knowingly and voluntarily
       waive his right to appeal where the district court utilized
       unconstitutional and biased reasoning. Speciﬁcally, Jones points to
       the district court’s statements that “they,” i.e., individuals who
       produce and possess child pornography, “don’t change,” and argues
       that the district court improperly imputed its own biases onto him.
       Jones also argues that the district court committed a substantive

       motion for a reduction of the base offense level, Jones’s guideline range was
       reduced to 292 to 365 months’ imprisonment.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10095

       error by giving signiﬁcant weight to an improper factor in
       imposing his sentence, namely its generalized assumption that
       criminals like Jones “don’t change.”
              The government has moved to dismiss Jones’s appeal on the
       grounds that the district court did not violate Jones’s due process
       rights, that Jones knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
       appeal, and that the exceptions to the appeal waiver do not apply
       to Jones’s case.
                                  II.    Discussion
              “We review the validity of a sentence appeal waiver de
       novo.” United States v. Johnson, 541 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 2008).
       A sentence appeal waiver will be enforced if it was made knowingly
       and voluntarily. United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343, 1351 (11th
       Cir. 1993). To establish that the waiver was made knowingly and
       voluntarily, the government must show either that: (1) the district
       court speciﬁcally questioned the defendant about the waiver during
       the plea colloquy; or (2) the record makes clear that the defendant
       otherwise understood the full signiﬁcance of the waiver. Id.
              Our “touchstone for assessing” whether a defendant entered
       a waiver knowingly and voluntarily is whether the district court
       “clearly convey[ed] to [the defendant] that he was giving up his
       right to appeal under most circumstances.” United States v. Boyd, 975
       F.3d 1185, 1192 (11th Cir. 2020) (alterations and emphasis in
       original); see also United States v. Weaver, 275 F.3d 1320, 1323–24,
       1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (holding that an appeal waiver was valid
       where it was “referenced” at the plea hearing and where the district
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       23-10095               Opinion of the Court                         7

       court established that the defendant had read and understood
       “every page and every word” of the plea agreement).
              An appeal waiver may waive “the right to appeal diﬃcult or
       debatable legal issues or even blatant error.” Boyd, 975 F.3d at 1191
       n.5 (quoting United States v. Grinard-Henry, 399 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th
       Cir. 2005)). Consequently, a defendant may waive his right to
       appeal constitutional and non-constitutional issues by executing a
       valid sentence appeal waiver. See United States v. Bascomb, 451 F.3d
       1292, 1297 (11th Cir. 2006). However, a sentence appeal waiver “is
       not an absolute bar to appellate review;” despite a valid appeal
       waiver, review may be available when the defendant was
       “sentenced entirely at the whim of the district court,” above the
       statutory maximum, or based on a constitutionally impermissible
       factor, such as race. Johnson, 541 F.3d at 1068 (quotation omitted).
       We have also noted that extreme circumstances, “for instance, if
       the district court had sentenced [the defendant] to a public
       ﬂogging,” may implicate due process and require that the
       defendant be allowed to appeal despite agreeing to a valid appeal
       waiver. United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1169 n.5 (11th Cir.
       1999).
              Here, the government’s motion to dismiss Jones’s appeal is
       due to be granted. Jones initialed each page of the plea agreement
       and signed it at the end, certifying that he had read every page of
       the agreement and understood the terms contained therein.
       During the plea colloquy, the magistrate judge clearly explained
       the appeal waiver and conﬁrmed that Jones understood it, had
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       8                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10095

       signed and initialed it, and did not have any questions about it. The
       magistrate judge then found that Jones fully understood the appeal
       waiver and thus knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to
       appeal as provided in the plea agreement. The appeal waiver is
       therefore valid and enforceable against Jones. Bushert, 997 F.2d at
       1351.
               Jones’s appeal does not fall within any of the exceptions
       contained in the waiver: (1) his sentence was within his guideline
       range, as the district court calculated at sentencing; (2) his sentence
       did not exceed the statutory maximum; and (3) the government did
       not appeal. As for Jones’s argument that the district court relied on
       unconstitutional reasoning in imposing his sentence, there is no
       indication that Jones was “subjected to the unfettered whim of the
       district court, or punished on the basis of a constitutionally
       impermissible factor such as race.” Johnson, 541 F.3d at 1068–69.
       The sort of constitutional error Jones challenges here falls within
       the sorts of claims defendants may negotiate away during the
       course of plea negotiations and, accordingly, an appeal waiver to
       which the parties agreed can bar such an appeal. See Bascomb, 451
       F.3d at 1297. Jones’s second argument fails for the same reason—
       his claim that the district court gave an improper factor signiﬁcant
       weight in imposing his sentence falls outside the scope of the
       waiver’s exceptions and does not amount an extreme circumstance
       implicating due process. Johnson, 541 F.3d at 1068; Howle, 166 F.3d
       at 1169 n.5.
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       23-10095              Opinion of the Court                       9

                                III.   Conclusion
              The appeal waiver contained in Jones’s plea agreement is
       valid and enforceable and Jones’s claims do not fall within the
       waiver’s exceptions, nor do they constitute the type of issues that
       we have permitted to proceed despite the presence of a valid appeal
       waiver. We therefore grant the government’s motion to dismiss.
            THE GOVERNMENT’S MOTION IS GRANTED AND
       THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.