Court Opinion

ID: 9409298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 18:00:52.066362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.796782
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-10595         Document: 00516822320                       Page: 1   Date Filed: 07/17/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                      ____________                                     FILED
                                                                                   July 17, 2023
                                        No. 22-10595
                                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                      ____________                                     Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                                versus

   Christain Cowan Felder,

                                                                         Defendant—Appellant.
                                       ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Northern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 3:15-CR-93-1
                      ______________________________

   Before King, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Christain Felder was sentenced to twenty-four months in prison fol-
   lowing the revocation of her term of supervised release (“SR”). She appeals
   the sentence, asserting that the district court reversibly erred by considering
   improper factors. We affirm.
          Felder pleaded guilty of conspiracy to commit mail and wire fraud and
   aiding and abetting aggravated identity theft in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1349

          _____________________
          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-10595        Document: 00516822320              Page: 2       Date Filed: 07/17/2023

                                          No. 22-10595

   and 1028A, respectively. She was sentenced to seventy-five months in
   prison, followed by three years of SR, and $227,240.01 in restitution. Three
   conditions of her SR are relevant: (i) that she not commit another federal,
   state, or local crime; (ii) that, if arrested, she notify her probation officer of
   the arrest within seventy-two hours; and (iii) that she make monthly pay-
   ments on any remaining restitution balance.
           Almost two years into SR, the government claimed that Felder had
   violated the three conditions above.1 It alleged that she violated the first
   condition by stealing at least $290,865.63 from Walmart, where she worked
   as a manager, and by fraudulently using or possessing identifying information
   (in this case, bank account information). Felder violated the second condi-
   tion by not notifying her probation officer of her ensuing arrest for theft of
   property.2 She violated the third condition by failing to make the required
   monthly payments toward restitution. The government concluded that the
   guideline imprisonment range was six to twelve months for the alleged
   violations.
           At her revocation hearing, Felder admitted to violating the second and
   third conditions, but she denied committing the new crimes, which were also
   the subject of pending state charges. The government therefore presented
   testimony and evidence regarding the alleged theft and fraudulent use or
   possession of identifying information.

           _____________________
           1
             The following facts reflect the government’s allegations after amendments to its
   petition for a person under supervision.
           2
              The original grounds for Felder’s arrest were outstanding traffic warrants, but
   the arrest occurred after she was caught on tape apparently stealing cash from self-checkout
   registers. Felder consented to a police search of her vehicle, in which officers found
   $24,582.01 that she could not adequately account for. She was then arrested for theft of
   property.

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                                            No. 22-10595

          The district court found that Felder had committed the two crimes
   and had to “face punishment for both of those crimes and the technical vio-
   lations.” It also characterized Felder as “kind of a lawless person” and her
   crimes as “aggravated” and “unforgivable.” The court revoked SR and
   imposed a sentence of twenty-four months’ imprisonment, the statutory
   maximum3 and in excess of the six-to-twelve-month guideline range.
          On appeal, Felder asserts that the district court reversibly erred by
   relying on an improper factor in imposing the revocation sentence—namely,
   the need to punish her for the crimes she had committed on SR. We review
   for plain error because Felder did not object on this ground in the district
   court. See United States v. Cano, 981 F.3d 422, 425 (5th Cir. 2020).
          To prevail on plain error review, Felder must show an error that was
   clear or obvious and that affected her substantial rights. See United States v.
   Stoglin, 34 F.4th 415, 417 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing Puckett v. United States,
   556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)). If she makes that showing, this court “has the
   discretion to correct the error but only if it ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness,
   integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (alteration in
   original) (quoting Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135).
          During a defendant’s initial sentencing, the district court must con-
   sider, among other factors, the need for the sentence “to reflect the serious-
   ness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just pun-
   ishment for the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Those factors, how-
   ever, may not be considered when fashioning a revocation sentence under
   18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). See United States v. Sanchez, 900 F.3d 678, 683–84 (5th
   Cir. 2018). A court therefore may not impose a revocation sentence based on
   a perceived need for the revocation sentence to reflect the seriousness of the
          _____________________
          3
              See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); see also id. §§ 1343, 1349.

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   SR violation, to promote respect for the law, or to provide just punishment
   for the SR violation. Id. Relying on an improper factor rises to the level of
   error when the “impermissible consideration is a dominant factor in the
   court’s revocation sentence, but not when it is merely a secondary concern
   or an additional justification for the sentence.” United States v. Rivera,
   784 F.3d 1012, 1017 (5th Cir.), reh’g denied, 797 F.3d 307 (5th Cir. 2015).
          Even assuming arguendo that the district court plainly erred by letting
   the § 3553(a)(2)(A) considerations predominate, and further assuming that
   the error affected Felder’s substantial rights, we must still decide whether to
   exercise our discretion to remedy the error. “[W]e look to ‘the degree of the
   error and the particular facts of the case’ to determine whether to exercise
   our discretion.” United States v. Prieto, 801 F.3d 547, 554 (5th Cir. 2015)
   (quoting United States v. Avalos-Martinez, 700 F.3d 148, 154 (5th Cir. 2012)).
          Here, the degree of error is small, given that there is a “fine line”
   between punishing the offense constituting the SR violation—which is
   impermissible—and sanctioning the violation of the release condition itself
   as a “breach of the court’s trust”—which is allowed. Rivera, 797 F.3d at 309.
   When imposing such a sanction, “the nature of the conduct leading to the
   revocation [may] be considered in measuring the extent of the breach of
   trust.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting U.S.S.G. ch. 7, pt. A(3)(b)
   (2014)). Deterrence and protecting the public against further crimes are
   permissible considerations in determining what sanction to impose after
   revocation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); see also id. § 3553(a)(2)(B)–(C).
          Because similar conduct—possession or use of identifying informa-
   tion, fraud, and theft—underpinned both Felder’s original offenses and her
   violations, and because her violations apparently resulted in even greater
   financial harm than did her original offenses, all of those permissible consid-
   erations are salient here and provide independent support for her revocation

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   sentence.
          Viewed in this context, the district court’s error, assuming there was
   one, did not seriously “impugn[] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
   of the court system.” Rivera, 784 F.3d at 1019. Accordingly, we decline to
   exercise our discretion to remedy any error.
          The judgment is AFFIRMED.

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