Court Opinion

ID: 9766718
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:57:10.553627+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:25.177066
License: Public Domain

Justice LaVECCHIA,
dissenting.
Defendant asserts the novel argument that votes taken in separate proceedings to review his capital conviction and sentence must be aggregated retrospectively. He contends that we should combine all negative votes cast on the issue of his capital sentence, whether a justice’s vote was cast in the direct appeal of his capital sentence or, later, in a separate proceeding to review the proportionality of that already validated sentence. So viewed, defendant maintains that his sentence is “freakish”1 because a combination of four justices of differently constituted membership of this Court have voted, over time and in different proceedings, not to uphold his death sentence. I find defendant’s argument unpersuasive. Moreover, a majority of this Court can embrace it only by 1) pronouncing for the first time today that votes on penalty phase issues are to be combined with proportionality review votes because they are related, thereby altering the Court’s prior approach and recordation of its voting in respect of capital sentences, and by 2) not respecting the finality of the Court’s prior judgments. Accordingly, I respectfully must dissent.
I.
Our system for capital conviction and sentence review involves several phases of proceedings: guilt-phase review, penalty-phase review, proportionality review, and thereafter a post-conviction relief proceeding or proceedings. Each helps to insure that a *181defendant’s capital conviction and sentence is not arbitrary or capricious.
Although direct appeals in capital matters are heard now by this Court in the same appellate proceeding in which we review a defendant’s claim of sentence disproportionality, the two determinations are distinct. See N.J.S.A. 2C:ll-3e (juxtapositioning mandatory nature of direct appeal for every judgment of conviction that results in death sentence against distinct proportionality review to be provided, on request, to defendant facing imposition of capital sentence). The majority recognizes, as it must, that the Court first considers defendant’s claims of error in the guilt and in the penalty phases of defendant’s trial proceedings. If we conclude that 1) there was no reversible error in the guilt-phase of the trial and that the verdict of guilt stands, and 2) the jury determination imposing the penalty of death is valid, then we address defendant’s claim that his death sentence is disproportionate. See In re Proportionality Review Project, 161 N.J. 71, 96, 735 A.2d 528 (1999) (noting that “proportionality review [does] not occur if the defendant’s direct appeal [is] successful.” (quoting State v. Loftin, 157 N.J. 253, 316, 724 A.2d 129 (1999))).
Thus, proportionality review has as its logical predicate a judgment by this Court that there is an otherwise enforceable death sentence that requires review to assuage any proportionality concern. Indeed, we have stated plainly that the proportionality review of a death sentence is not the same as
the review of any legal error in the imposition of the sentence but, rather, the review of the sentence itself. We seek to determine [w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.
[In re Proportionality Review Project, supra, 161 N.J. at 75-76, 735 A.2d 528.]
The Court’s determination on proportionality review is separate from the Court’s determination on the necessary predicate to that review—a capital sentence that otherwise would be implemented. It is as analytically distinct in the present combined appellate proceedings as it was when the two proceedings were conducted separately. Administrative convenience alone compelled the join*182ing of proportionality review with our consideration of the direct appeal. No constitutional consideration motivated the Court to alter its prior practice. That we now conduct proportionality review and hear direct appeal issues at the same time does not render the two determinations related. In my view, they are no more related than when the Court determines that defendant’s guilt-phase proceeding was not flawed by an error found to exist in the jury’s imposition of a capital sentence during the penalty proceeding. Consolidation cannot provide the reason for changing the Court’s treatment of these two different determinations.
And, there certainly is no basis for aggregating votes of the formerly separate proceedings that resulted in final judgments, each of which had an affirmative vote of the then sitting justices upholding defendant’s capital sentence. If the logic of the conclusion reached by the majority today were so self-evident, the original justices who participated in the two judgments surely would have realized it at the time of' voting on defendant’s proportionality review. They could have applied to the number of negative votes on proportionality review the number of negative votes cast earlier when the Court considered the alleged errors in defendant’s penalty phase trial. The Court, at the time, apparently did not view the votes as related either. That the Court affirmed defendant’s capital sentence reinforces the separateness of the records, the proceedings, and the judgments reached in each.
Indeed, the two judgments reflect different and serial determinations based on different records. A death sentence is “ ‘disproportionate if other defendants with characteristics similar to those of the defendant under review generally receive sentences other than death for committing factually-similar crimes in the same jurisdiction.’ ” State v. Papasavvas, 170 N.J. 462, 473, 790 A.2d 798 (2002) (quoting State v. Martini, 139 N.J. 3, 20, 651 A.2d 949 (1994)). To that end, “[t]he first step in proportionality review is to determine the universe of cases against which the defendant’s case will be compared.” Ibid. Using that universe of cases, the *183Court conducts a “frequency analysis” to determine “ ‘whether there is a societal consensus that the defendant in the case before us is sufficiently culpable such that his sentence may be deemed not aberrational.’ ” Id. at 474, 790 A.2d 798 (quoting State v. Chew, 159 N.J. 183, 201, 731 A.2d 1070 (1999)). That frequency analysis entails assigning the defendant’s case to a category, ie. F-l murder committed during a residential- robbery, and then determining the percentage of F-l defendants in the universe of cases who have received the death penalty. Id. at 474-76, 790 A.2d 798. That analysis is used to assess whether there is societal consensus for or against the use of the death penalty in F-l cases. Id. at 476, 790 A.2d 798. Following frequency analysis the Court conducts “precedent-seeking review,” wherein the Court “examinéis] death-eligible cases similar to defendant’s case to determine whether his death sentence is aberrant when compared to the sentences received by defendants in those other cases,” in order “to ensure that the defendant has not been singled out unfairly for capital punishment.” Id. at 477, 790 A.2d 798 (internal quotations omitted). In undertaking a precedent-seeking review, we evaluate defendant’s criminal culpability as compared to that of other similar defendants. Chew, supra, 159 N.J. at 210, 731 A.2d 1070. The Court considers the defendant’s moral blameworthiness, the degree of victimization, and the defendant’s character. Papasavvas, supra, 170 N.J. at 480, 790 A.2d 798. To aid in the comparison with other similar cases, those categories are refined further: a defendant’s moral blameworthiness takes into consideration defendant’s motive, premeditation, and justification or excuse. Ibid.
As is evident from the foregoing, the record used in frequency analysis and precedent-seeking review is comprised of data concerning other cases involving different defendants and that data constitutes information not contained in the record on direct appeal. The fact that each review results in a judgment as to the validity of defendant’s death sentence does not make them part of the same proceeding, or render the determinations related so as to justify vote aggregation. Here the Court had two judgments *184based on different records answering questions that are different from one another. The existence of a valid jury determination imposing a death sentence was a predicate to conducting proportionality review. And, the latter review analyzed a record containing material never presented to the guilt- or penalty-phase jury, including statistical analyses and comparisons of defendant’s person and crime with case studies of other similar defendants and crimes, all gathered and prepared for the Court’s review by a Special Master.
Plainly, I view the issues addressed on direct appeal and during proportionality review as unrelated. One justice’s vote on the issues before the Court on direct appeal—in respect of both guilt and the validity of the capital sentence imposed as a result of the penalty phase of the trial—has no bearing on his or her vote cast in the determination of the unique questions posed by proportionality review. It is entirely possible for members of this Court to vote differently in the two phases and, in fact, they did. However, it is the majority vote as to each proceeding that must control in these serial reviews, not the identity of the voting members. If it were otherwise, the Court should have long ago started to aggregate the voting records of justices on issues concerning the guilt phase, or the penalty phase of a defendant’s trial, with the votes east on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel performed after post-conviction review.2 The result would be the same in that *185perhaps a new majority of voting justices might find reason to fault the conduct of the guilt or penalty trial and either reverse a sentence, or a conviction. That is not justice. That is disruption of the finality of judgments.
H.
Because I cannot justify the reversal of validly entered judgments of this Court, I respectfully dissent.
Justice WALLACE and Justice RIVERA-SOTO, join in this opinion.

 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2935, 49 L.Ed.2d 859, 887 (1976) (expressing concern that "death sentences ... not [be] imposed capriciously or in a freakish manner.").

 The following hypothetical reveals the flaw in the majority’s analysis. Assume that this Court consists of Justices A, B, C, D, E, F, and G. On direct appeal, a defendant argues that his conviction should be overturned because critical evidence should have been excluded. In a four-to-three vote, this Court rejects the defendant's argument. Justices A, B, C, and D vote to affirm the defendant’s conviction. Justices E, F, and G dissent. The Court’s judgment affirms the defendant’s conviction. On post-conviction review, the defendant argues that his conviction should be overturned because he received ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of trial. In a four-to-three vote, this Court rejects the defendant’s argument and the Court’s judgment affirms the defendant's conviction. Justices A, B, C, and G vote to affirm defendant’s conviction. Justices D, E, and F dissent. Under the majority's approach, the defendant’s conviction must now be overturned because four justices (D, E, F, *185and G) voted to overturn the defendant's conviction. The fact that the defendant's conviction was reviewed in two separate proceedings would be of no consequence to the majority.