Court Opinion

ID: 9828830
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 18:46:30.015084+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:42:53.589191
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellee, while still contending for an af-firmance, earnestly insists that, if the judgment be reversed, this court should not render judgment, but should remand the case. The contention is again made that the suit was not upon a warranty, but for a deficiency in acreage, and it is sought to combine the ideas of deficiency an.d fraud or misrepresentation, and thus evolve a defense supporting the judgment of the court. This theory is advanced in an effort to meet our holding that no cause of action for a deficiency in acreage was alleged or established, and no cause of action for fraud was alleged. We are fully convinced that there is no cause of action for a deficiency in acreage, and that appellee’s remedy, if he has been wronged, is by an action for misrepresentation amounting to fraud, and in such case his damages would be measured by the amount that the value of the land purchased by him was diminished by reason of the existence of the road, if it be a public road. Appellee cites the case of Kevil Sons v. Wilford, Stunston & Co. (Ky.) 104 S. W. 348, as holding that the measure of damages in such a ease would be the value of the land over which a highway lies. In that ease the petition sought to recover on account of fraudulent representations to the effect that there were no streets over the land, the sum in which the value of the property was diminished by reason of certain streets across it, and a demurrer was sustained. This was held to constitute error, and, in discussing the matter, the court states that it is difficult to see why the appel-lee should have been allowed to retain that part of the purchase money representing the. value of the land occupied by the highways. We do not understand that the court, by such expression, sought to establish a rule respecting the measure of damages, especially as it cited with approval the ease of Butt v. Riffe, 78 Ky. 352, as holding that, where an adverse easement existed (being a private right of way), the vendor could recover the vaiue that the property was diminished by reason of such incumbrance.
Had appellee alleged even defectively a cause of action upon the theory of misrepresentation amounting to fraud, we would, of course, reverse the judgment, as the law fixes the measure of damages, but the petition alleges an express contract and agreement that the road had been discontinued, and there is no evidence to that effect, nor any pretense that the same can be obtained, and there is no allegation that any representation to that effect was made, that it was relied upon by plaintiff and deceived him, or that he would not have bought had the same not been made.
Appellee is not entitled to have this case remanded in order that by amendment he may change the same to a suit based upon a different cause of action. In our opinion, this suit should end here, and, if appellee is entitled to recover on the theory of fraud, he should bring a suit upon that theory.
The motion is overruled.