Court Opinion

ID: 9381931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 09:09:01.267755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:35.852800
License: Public Domain

IN THE
                         TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                No. 10-22-00142-CR

TAEKEON A. MODESTER,
                                                           Appellant
v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS,
                                                           Appellee

                          From the County Court at Law
                              Navarro County, Texas
                            Trial Court No. C40879-CR

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

      In two issues, appellant, Taekeon A. Modester, challenges his conviction for two

counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child.         See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §

22.021(a)(2)(B). Specifically, Modester complains that: (1) he was egregiously harmed by

the use of repealed language on good-conduct time in the punishment charge; and (2) the

trial court erred by admitting the entirety of the forensic interview of the child victim

over his hearsay objection. We affirm.
                                  The Trial Court’s Sealing Orders

        Before we can analyze Modester’s issues on appeal, we must address the appellate

record.1 On April 22, 2022, the trial court signed an order sealing “the entire Reporter’s

Record” in this matter. Thereafter, on May 18, 2022, upon its own motion and without

any further explanation or citation to authority, the trial court signed an order sealing

“the entire Clerk’s Record and Reporter’s record.”

        On August 25, 2022, we abated and remanded this matter to the trial court to make

findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning “1) under what statutory or case

authority the records are ordered to be sealed; and 2) whether the briefs in this cause

should be filed under seal; and/or 3) whether the clerk’s record and reporter’s record

should remain under seal.” On September 15, 2022, the trial court made several findings

of fact and the following conclusions of law, which are relevant to the analysis of this

case:

                                      CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

    1. Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 76a regarding sealing records and that
       statute governs criminal cases.

        1 We recognize that neither party has complained on appeal about the trial court’s sealing actions.
However, because the sealing of the entire Clerk’s and Reporter’s Records impacts this Court’s ability to
address the issues raised by the parties without violating the trial court’s sealing orders, we address the
propriety of the trial court’s sealing order. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1 (“The court of appeals must hand down
a written opinion that is as brief as practicable but that addresses every issue raised and necessary to final
disposition of the appeal.”), 47.3 (“All opinions of the courts of appeals are open to the public and must be
made available to public reporting services, print or electronic.”). Furthermore, the fact that this opinion
is designated as “do not publish” is of no consequence because this opinion will be made available to public
reporting services, print or electronic, pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.3. See id. at R. 47.3.
The “do not publish” designation mostly pertains to the precedential value, or lack thereof, of an opinion,
rather than the availability of the opinion and its contents to the public. See id. at R. 47.2(b), 47.7(a).

Modester v. State                                                                                       Page 2
   2. The Texas Constitution, Article 1, § 30(a)(1), states that a crime victim has
      the right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity
      and privacy throughout the criminal justice process.

   3. Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, 109.002(d), states on the motion of the
      parties or on the Court’s own motion, the Appellate Court, in its opinion,
      may identify the parties by fictitious names or by their initials only.

   4. Further, even the Federal rules find that the child’s rights to privacy and the
      protection of the child are very serious and should be taken very serious, so
      long as it does not keep such disclosure from the defendant or defendant’s
      counsel. (See 18 U.S. Code § 35.09).

   5. Each of the above rules identifies how seriously a victim’s rights to privacy
      and protection should be taken. This Court would assume that to be even
      more of a serious matter when the State had not used a fictitious name or
      initials in the original criminal case.

   6. In this case, the victim was related to the defendant by blood, through the
      victim’s father.

   7. Ordering the records to be sealed protects this child’s rights to privacy, as
      well as her rights to protection and does not keep disclosure from the
      defendant or defendant’s counsel. In this case, it also protects this child’s
      family, also.

   8. The Court could have ordered the District Clerk and/or the Official Court
      Reporter to go through their records and redact the name of the victim;
      however, that is a tedious task that is not theirs to take on, but is the
      attorneys and would further cause them possible harm if they failed to
      redact a name by accident.

   9. Based upon the foregoing, the Court has the authority to Order the records
      sealed. If this Honorable Court does not believe so, the Court will rescind
      the Order Sealing Records immediately once it is advised to do so by this
      Honorable Court.

   10. Based on the Court’s Order to Seal the Records in this case, the briefs in this
       case should be filed under seal, as well.
Modester v. State                                                                        Page 3
   11. Additionally, the Clerk’s record and Reporter’s record should both remain
       under seal.

       As stated above, the primary authority relied upon by the trial court to seal the

entire Clerk’s and Reporter’s Records is Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a. The Texas

Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure do not

apply in criminal cases, except for a few carved-out exceptions that do not apply here.

See Ex parte Donaldson, 86 S.W.3d 231, 233 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); see also $100,210.00 in

U.S. Currency v. State, No. 02-22-00016-CV, 2022 Tex. App. LEXIS 9378, at *21 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Dec. 22, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re Garcia, No. 02-20-00161-CV, 2020 Tex.

App. LEXIS 6723, at *6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 20, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). In fact,

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 2, entitled “Scope of Rules,” specifically provides that:

“These rules shall govern the procedure in justice, county, and district courts of the State

of Texas in all actions of a civil nature, with such exceptions as may be hereinafter stated.”

TEX. R. CIV. P. 2 (emphasis added). Furthermore, nothing in Rule 76a states that the rule

applies to criminal proceedings, and we have not found any cases where Rule 76a was

applied to criminal proceedings, such as this.

       Additionally, none of the other bases articulated by the trial court provide

sufficient support for sealing the entire Clerk’s and Reporter’s Record. Neither article 1,

section 30 of the Texas Constitution, the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, nor the

portion of the United States Code cited by the trial court authorizes the trial court to seal

Modester v. State                                                                       Page 4
the entire Clerk’s and Reporter’s Record on its own motion. While we share the trial

court’s concern for protecting the privacy rights of crime victims, the trial court has not

provided any relevant legal support for the sealing actions in this case. As such, we

conclude that the trial court’s sealing order is void. Cf. Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 667-68

(Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (“The void judgment exception recognizes that there are some

rare situations in which a trial court’s judgment is accorded no respect due to a complete

lack of power to render the judgment in question. A void judgment is a ‘nullity’ and can

be attacked at any time.” (internal footnotes omitted)); see Masa Custom Homes, LLC v.

Shahin, 547 S.W.3d 332, 338 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, no pet.) (concluding that when a

judge has no authority to render an order or judgment, that order or judgment is void).

And as such, we dissolve the trial court’s sealing orders signed on April 22, 2022 and May

18, 2022.

                                     The Jury Charge

       In his first issue, Modester contends that he was egregiously harmed by the trial

court’s use of repealed language on good-conduct time in the punishment charge.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

       In reviewing a jury-charge issue, an appellate court’s first duty is to determine

whether the charge contains error. Hutch v. State, 922 S.W.2d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App.

1996). If the jury charge contains error, the appellate court must analyze that error for

harm. Middleton v. State, 125 S.W.3d 450, 453-54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The court will

Modester v. State                                                                       Page 5
reverse if an error is properly preserved by objection and is not harmless. Almanza v.

State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Conversely, where a party does not

properly preserve error by proper objection, the court will only reverse for egregious

harm, meaning Modester did not receive a fair and impartial trial. Id. To obtain a reversal

for jury-charge error, Modester must have suffered actual harm and not just merely

theoretical harm. Sanchez v. State, 376 S.W.3d 767, 775 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012); Arline v.

State, 721 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).

         Modester did not object in the trial court to the punishment charge; thus, he must

show egregious harm. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. In examining the record for

egregious harm, we consider the jury charge, the state of the evidence, the arguments of

the parties, and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a

whole. Olivas v. State, 202 S.W.3d 137, 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Jury-charge error is

egregiously harmful if it affects the very basis of the case, deprives the defendant of a

valuable right, or vitally affects a defensive theory. Stuhler v. State, 218 S.W.3d 706, 719

(Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Sanchez v. State, 209 S.W.3d 117, 121 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

APPLICABLE LAW & DISCUSSION

         A jury charge contains error when it does not follow the applicable law. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14; Taylor v. State, 332 S.W.3d 483, 488-89 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011).    As relevant here, the Texas Legislature changed the parole instructions on

September 1, 2019. See Act of May 16, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S., ch. 260, §§ 2-3, 2019 Tex. Sess.

Modester v. State                                                                      Page 6
Law Serv. 446, 448. This change removed references to “good conduct time,” which the

Legislature believed would confuse jurors. Id. In the instant case, the trial court’s charge

included language that has been repealed by the Legislature. Thus, the inclusion is

erroneous. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.14; see also Jones v. State, No. 10-19-

00350-CR, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 7622, at **8-9 (Tex. App.—Waco Sept. 15, 2021, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that the trial court erred in

submitting instructions considering good-conduct time after the Legislature removed

this from the jury charge, but ultimately concluding that the error was harmless because

the charge included language to disregard parole law and good-conduct time). The State

concedes that the instruction given by the trial court regarding parole was erroneous.

       Despite the erroneous instructions regarding good-conduct time, we cannot say

that Modester was egregiously harmed. The trial court included the following instruction

after the erroneous instruction:

       You may consider the existence of parole law and good conduct time.
       However, you are not to consider the extent to which good conduct time may be
       awarded to or forfeited by this particular defendant. You are not to consider the
       manner in which the parole law may be applied to this particular defendant.

(Emphasis added).       We presume that the jury followed the trial court’s charge

instructions. Luquis v. State, 72 S.W.3d 355, 366 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). The instruction

given by the trial court prevents harm to Modester by directing the jury not to consider

parole and good-conduct time in their punishment assessment. See Alaniz v. State, 648

S.W.3d 657, 659 n.2, 661-64 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.); Igo v. State, 210 S.W.3d
Modester v. State                                                                          Page 7
645, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Newman v. State, 49 S.W.3d 577, 581 (Tex. App.—

Beaumont 2001, pet. ref’d); see also West v. State, No. 10-20-00087-CR, 2022 Tex. App.

LEXIS 2424, at *8 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 13, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication); Jones, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 7622, at *10. Further, there is nothing in the

record to indicate that the jury was confused by the trial court’s charge.

       In addition to the foregoing, neither party presented any evidence about good-

conduct time. Moreover, neither party mentioned good-conduct time in their closing

argument. The focus of the State’s closing argument was on the nature and circumstances

of the offense and the punishment-phase evidence. And while the jury did transmit two

notes to the trial court, both notes asked whether the two counts would be served

concurrently or consecutively. Neither note asked the trial court about parole or good-

conduct time. But see Hooper v. State, 255 S.W.3d 262, 272 (Tex. App.—Waco 2008, pet.

ref’d) (“When there is a note from the jury regarding parole or good-conduct time, courts

are more prone to find egregious harm.” (internal citations omitted)).

       Considering all the relevant Almanza factors, we cannot say that Modester was

egregiously harmed by the erroneous jury instruction on good-conduct time.

Accordingly, we overrule Modester’s first issue.

Modester v. State                                                                  Page 8
                                 The Forensic Interview

       In his second issue, Modester complains that the trial court abused its discretion

by admitting the entirety of the forensic interview of the child victim over his hearsay

objection.

STANDARD OF REVIEW & APPLICABLE LAW

       We review the trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion. McDonald v. State, 179 S.W.3d 571, 576 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). “Under an

abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court should not disturb the trial court’s

decision if the ruling was within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” Bigon v. State,

252 S.W.3d 360, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

       Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at

the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” TEX. R.

EVID. 801(d). Hearsay statements are generally not admissible unless the statement falls

within a recognized exception to the hearsay rule. Id. at R. 802; see Taylor v. State, 268

S.W.3d 571, 578 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). The rule of optional completeness, as outlined

in Texas Rule of Evidence 107, is one such rule. Walters v. State, 247 S.W.3d 204, 217 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007) (internal citation omitted).

       The rule of optional completeness “is one of admissibility and permits the

introduction of otherwise inadmissible evidence when that evidence is necessary to fully

and fairly explain a matter ‘opened up’ by the adverse party. Id. at 218 (internal citation

Modester v. State                                                                      Page 9
omitted). “It is designed to reduce the possibility of the jury receiving a false impression

from hearing only part of some act, conversation, or writing.” Id. (internal citations

omitted). “Rule 107 does not permit the introduction of other similar, but inadmissible,

evidence unless it is necessary to explain properly admitted evidence.” Id. (internal

citations omitted). “Further, the rule is not invoked by the mere reference to a document,

statement, or act.” Id. (internal citations omitted). “And it is limited by Rule 403, which

permits a trial judge to exclude otherwise relevant evidence if its unfair prejudicial effect

or its likelihood of confusing the issues substantially outweighs its probative value.” Id.

Moreover, for evidence to be admissible under this rule, “the omitted portion of the

statement must be ‘on the same subject’ and must be ‘necessary to make it fully

understood.’” Pena v. State, 353 S.W.3d 797, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (quoting Sauceda

v. State, 129 S.W.3d 116, 123 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)); see Walters, 247 S.W.3d at 218.

DISCUSSION

       During cross-examination, defense counsel asked the child victim several, specific

questions about statements she made during the forensic interview at the Child

Advocacy Center. These questions were designed to challenge the credibility of the child

victim regarding the circumstances and timing of the offenses. In response to the cross-

examination of the child victim regarding purportedly inconsistent statements made

during the forensic interview, the State offered, and the trial court admitted into evidence

Modester v. State                                                                     Page 10
under the rule of optional completeness, the entire video recording of the child victim’s

forensic interview.

       When defense counsel pursues a subject or line of questioning that would

ordinarily be outside of the realm of proper comment for the State, the defense “opens

the door” and creates a right of reply for the State. Tovar v. State, 221 S.W.3d 185, 190

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.). “A party who opens a door to an issue

‘cannot complain when the opposing party desires to go into details of that subject.’” Id.

(quoting Sherman v. State, 20 S.W.3d 96, 101 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, no pet.)). In a

case involving whether a video recording of a child victim’s forensic interview was

admissible under the rule of optional completeness, the First Court of Appeals held that

the State is entitled to the admission of such a video recording when: (1) defense counsel

asks questions concerning some of the complainant’s statements on the recording; (2)

defense counsel’s questions leave the possibility of the jury receiving a false impression

from hearing only part of the conversation, with statements taken out of context; and (3)

the recording is necessary for the conversation to be fully understood. Id. at 190-91.

However, even when defense counsel’s questions relate to the complainant’s statements

on the recording, the rule of optional completeness does not permit the State to introduce

the record when: (1) the recording is unnecessary to show the context of the statement,

such as showing the absence of a statement by the complainant rather than the existence

of a directly contradictory statement; and (3) admission of the recording would likely

Modester v. State                                                                  Page 11
create confusion, such as when the recording references extraneous offenses. Id. at 191

(citing Sauceda, 129 S.W.3d at 121-24).

       Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred by admitting the entire

recording of the child victim’s forensic interview under the rule of optional completeness,

we must determine whether the purported error requires reversal of the trial court’s

judgment of conviction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2. Because the erroneous admission of

hearsay evidence is not constitutional error, we apply the standard set out in Texas Rule

of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b) and disregard the error if it did not affect the defendant’s

substantial rights. See id. at R. 44.2(b); Campos v. State, 317 S.W.3d 768, 779 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d) (noting that the erroneous admission of a hearsay

statement constitutes non-constitutional error subject to a harm analysis). A defendant’s

substantial rights are affected when the error had a substantial and injurious effect in

determining the verdict. Campos, 317 S.W.3d at 779 (citing Johnson v. State, 43 S.W.3d 1, 4

(Tex. Crim. App. 2001)). We should not overturn a conviction for such error if, after

examining the record as a whole, we have fair assurance that the error did not influence

the jury or had but a slight effect. Id.; see Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355-56 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2002).

       In conducting the harm analysis, we consider everything in the record, including

any testimony or physical evidence admitted for the jury’s consideration, the nature of

the evidence supporting the verdict, the character of the alleged error and how it might

Modester v. State                                                                        Page 12
be considered in connection with other evidence in the case, the jury instructions, the

State’s theory and any defensive theories, closing arguments, voir dire, and whether the

State emphasized the error. Rich v. State, 160 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); see

Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355-56.

       The erroneous admission of evidence is harmless if other evidence proving the

same fact is properly admitted elsewhere, or the evidence comes in elsewhere without

objection. Land v. State, 291 S.W.3d 23, 28 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. ref’d); see

Brooks v. State, 990 S.W.2d 278, 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (“[A]ny error in admitting the

[hearsay] evidence was harmless in light of other properly admitted evidence proving

the same fact.”); Matz v. State, 21 S.W.3d 911, 912 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref’d)

(“It is well-established that the improper admission of evidence does not constitute

reversible error if the same facts are proved by other properly admitted evidence.”). “In

situations where a video recording is improperly admitted, yet the recording is

cumulative of the victim’s properly admitted live testimony on the same issue, courts

often disregard the error, reasoning that it could not have affected the appellant’s

substantial rights.” Land, 291 S.W.3d at 29; see Mick v. State, 256 S.W.3d 828, 832 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2008, no pet.) (holding that because a video recording of the interview

of a child complainant was cumulative of the child’s properly admitted trial testimony

and discussed the same subject, any error in admission of the video recording did not

Modester v. State                                                                   Page 13
affect the defendant’s substantial rights and was harmless); Matz, 21 S.W.3d at 912-13

(same).

       During her trial testimony, the child victim described the instances of sexual abuse

perpetrated by Modester. Specifically, the child victim, who was eleven years old at the

time of trial, recounted that Modester had “intercourse” with her on multiple occasions

while she and Modester were hiding in her father’s closet and her brother’s closet during

games of hide and seek. The child victim described how and when the sexual abuse

occurred. The State also asked the child victim if she remembered speaking to a forensic

interviewer at the Children’s Advocacy Center. The child victim did not remember the

interview or watching any video recording of the interview.

       On cross-examination, defense counsel challenged the credibility of the child

victim by asking the child victim if she remembered telling the forensic interviewer that

she said, “Oh, yeah, me too,” after her father’s girlfriend told her about “being raped”

herself. Defense counsel also asked if the child victim remembered telling the forensic

interviewer that the sexual abuse first occurred when she was in Ms. Dagg’s third-grade

class. The child victim denied that that was not when it first happened, to which defense

counsel responded, “So you don’t remember telling that to the interviewer?” The child

victim responded, “Yes, ma’am.” Defense counsel later inquired if the child victim

remembered: (1) “telling the interviewer that [Modester] would give a game to distract

you do you could play while this was happening”; (2) “telling the forensic interviewer

Modester v. State                                                                   Page 14
you were nonbinary”; and (3) “talking to the forensic interviewer about being placed in

different poses.” The child victim answered these questions in the negative.

        Defense counsel’s cross-examination of the child victim created a false impression

that the child victim gave an inconsistent version of the events. But the State did not limit

the portion of the video recording of the forensic interview played to those apparent

inconsistencies; rather, the State played the entire recording.

        That recording, however, was mostly cumulative of properly admitted trial

testimony, especially the testimony of the child victim, and discusses the same subject.2

It also provided context for the impressions of inconsistency developed during cross-

examination. We further note that the State did not emphasize the video recording of the

forensic interview during voir dire or closing argument.                        Rather, defense counsel

emphasized the inconsistencies in the child victim’s statements at trial and in the forensic

interview during closing argument, and the State merely responded to that argument by

referring the jury to what they observed in the video recording of the forensic interview.

        When we consider the entire record, as we must when conducting a harm analysis

under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b), we have fair assurance that any error

in admitting the entire video recording of the child victim’s forensic interview did not

        2 We also note that there is ample evidence to support Modester’s convictions, including testimony
from the child victim and other witnesses. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07(a) (providing that the
testimony of a child victim alone is sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated sexual assault); see also
Bautista v. State, 605 S.W.3d 520, 525 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (stating that the
uncorroborated testimony of a victim if sufficient to support a conviction for aggravated sexual assault of
a child).

Modester v. State                                                                                      Page 15
influence the jury or had but a slight effect. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); Campos, 317 S.W.3d

at 779; Mick, 256 S.W.3d at 832; Matz, 21 S.W.3d at 912-13. Therefore, we conclude that

any error in the admission of the forensic interview did not affect Modester’s substantial

rights and, therefore, must be disregarded. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). Accordingly, we

overrule Modester’s second issue.

                                        Conclusion

       Having overruled both of Modester’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgments

of the trial court.

                                                  STEVE SMITH
                                                  Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,
       Justice Johnson,
       and Justice Smith
       (Chief Justice Gray concurring with a note)*
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed March 22, 2023
Do not publish
[CRPM]

* (Chief Justice Gray concurs in the Court’s judgment as it relates to the trial court’s April
22, 2022 judgment. A separate opinion will not issue.)

Modester v. State                                                                      Page 16