Court Opinion

ID: 9728166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:00:38.070837+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:46.460553
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting: In my view, the two-year limitations period in section 13 — 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/13 — 202 (West 2004)) does not apply to actions based on municipal ordinances. I would, therefore, hold that plaintiffs’ claim is not barred by the limitations period in section 13 — 202. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent. Counts I and II of plaintiffs’ complaint alleged defendants failed to return their security deposit and failed to pay interest as required by section 5 — 12—080 of the Chicago Residential Landlord and Tenant Ordinance (RLTO). Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting it was untimely under section 13 — 202 of the Code. Section 13 — 202 provides a two-year limitations period for actions involving a “statutory penalty.” 735 ILCS 5/13 — 202 (West 2004). Initially, I believe the majority mistakenly frames the issue as “whether subsection (f) of section 5 — 12—080 of the RLTO imposes a ‘statutory penalty’ within the meaning of section 13 — 202 of the Code.” 235 Ill. 2d at 4. Rather, the issue is more properly framed as whether the legislature intended “[ajctions *** for a statutory penalty” (735 ILCS 5/13 — 202 (West 2004)) to encompass actions brought pursuant to municipal ordinances. I submit that the legislature did not intend to include municipal ordinances within the meaning of “statutory penalty.” Our fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Krautsack v. Anderson, 223 Ill. 2d 541, 552-53 (2006). The best indication of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Jamison, 229 Ill. 2d 184, 188 (2008). Undefined statutory terms must be given their ordinary and popularly understood meanings. People v. Ward, 215 Ill. 2d 317, 325 (2005). This court has held that the meaning of a statute “depends upon the intent of the drafters at the time of its adoption.” (Emphasis added.) Sayles v. Thompson, 99 Ill. 2d 122, 125 (1983). The term “statutory penalty” first appeared in the predecessor to section 13 — 202 in 1874 (see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1874, ch. 83, par. 14), and it has not been amended since that time. In determining the legislature’s intent, we must look to the popularly understood meaning of the term “statutory” in 1874. In 1874, the term “statute” was commonly understood to mean: “An act of the legislature of a state, [declaring] commanding or prohibiting something. *** An express act of the legislature of a country. *** A law made with all the formalities of legislation. Statute law is the express written will of the legislature, rendered authentic by certain prescribed forms and solemnities.” Burrill’s Law Dictionary 484 (2d ed. 1867). Another commonly used legal dictionary in 1874 defined “statutory” as “A law established by the act of the legislative power. An act of the legislature. The written will of the legislature, solemnly expressed according to the forms necessary to constitute it the law of the state.” 2 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 543 (14th ed. 1874). In contrast, “ordinance” was defined as “[a] law or regulation of a municipal corporation.” Burrill’s Law Dictionary 264 (2d ed. 1867). Bouvier’s Law Dictionary defined “ordinance” as: “A law; a statute; a decree. This word is more usually applied to the laws of a corporation than to the acts of the legislature: as, the ordinance of the city of Philadelphia.” 2 Bouvier’s Law Dictionary 263 (14th ed. 1874). These definitions unmistakably show that a “statute” was understood to mean a legislative act of a state or country, while an “ordinance” was understood as a law of a municipality. The majority fails to acknowledge that these legal dictionaries clearly differentiate between “statutes” and “ordinances,” and relies on modern dictionary definitions to conclude that the term “statutory” is ambiguous. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, in 1874 the definition of the term “statute” did not include acts of a municipality, nor did the definition of “ordinance” include acts of the state legislature. Acts of a municipal corporation were specifically included in the definition of an “ordinance.” Moreover, a “legislature” is not a “municipality” and, therefore, even applying the definition of “statutory” liberally, as the majority does, an act of a municipality is not an act of the legislature. Thus, a distinction between an ordinance and a statute was commonly recognized in 1874 when the phrase “statutory penalty” was added to the predecessor to section 13— 202. Importantly, this court also recognized a distinction between statutes and ordinances during the relevant time period. In Wood v. City of Chicago, 205 Ill. 70 (1903), the plaintiff filed a direct appeal challenging the validity of a city ordinance. This court noted it had jurisdiction over direct appeals involving the validity of a statute, but specifically held that “an ordinance is not a statute” within the meaning of the Constitution of 1870. Wood, 205 Ill. at 72. This court explained that an ordinance is “purely local, for the regulation of affairs within [a] municipality, and is distinguished from general laws and statutes.” Wood, 205 Ill. at 72. The appeal was, therefore, dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Wood, 205 Ill. at 72. This court subsequently reaffirmed the clear distinction between statutes and ordinances, holding that a municipal ordinance is not a statute. See Masonic Fraternity Temple Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 217 Ill. 58, 60 (1905) (“an ordinance is not a statute”); People ex rel. Goldman v. Harrison, 223 Ill. 540, 544 (1906) (“an ordinance is not a statute”); Village of Lake Zurich v. Deschauer, 310 Ill. 209, 211 (1923) (“an ordinance is not a statute”). This court’s precedent could not be more clear. The majority, while briefly acknowledging that this court held in Wood that “an ordinance is not a statute,” ultimately determines that the term “statutory” is ambiguous in order to reach its conclusion that “the legislature intended the broader meaning — that ‘statutory’ encompasses municipal ordinances as well as state statutes.” 235 Ill. 2d at 12. The majority does not, however, overrule Wood, nor does it distinguish that opinion. Rather, the majority chooses to consider the consequences that would result from a plain reading of the statute and determines it is “more reasonable to apply the two-year limitations period uniformly.” 235 Ill. 2d at 12. As a result of today’s holding, municipalities seeking to enforce a penalty created by ordinance may well be limited by section 13 — 202’s two-year statute of limitations. This result is contrary to this court’s holding in Clare v. Bell, 378 Ill. 128 (1941). In that case, this court rejected application of this same two-year statute of limitations to a cause of action by a county for collection of penalties on delinquent real estate taxes. The majority attempts to distinguish Clare and does not overrule it. Further, the majority fails to explain why section 13 — 202 is applied differently depending on whether an individual or a unit of local government is bringing the action. Thus, we are left with inconsistent applications of section 13 — 202 by this court. In sum, the term “statutory penalty” must be construed according to its meaning in 1874, when the term was added to the predecessor to section 13 — 202. In 1874, the term “ordinance” was not interchangeable or synonymous with the term “statute.” “Statute” referred specifically and exclusively to an act of the legislature of a state or country and did not encompass municipal laws. Municipal laws were considered to be “ordinances.” Based on the plain meaning of the terms “statute” and “ordinance” at the relevant time, I would hold that the two-year limitations period in section 13 — 202 does not apply to bar plaintiffs’ action for damages under section 5 — 12—080(f) of the municipal ordinance. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the appellate court. I therefore respectfully dissent. JUSTICE KARMEIER joins in this dissent. Dissent Upon Denial of Rehearing JUSTICE KILBRIDE, dissenting: In their petition for rehearing, plaintiffs, Ken and Anna Landis, argue that in light of this court’s ruling that the term “statutory” is ambiguous and in need of statutory interpretation, the legislature’s prior use of that term should have been considered. I agree with plaintiffs that section 1 of the Statute on Statutes supports plaintiffs’ argument that “the legislature linked the term ‘statute’ solely to Acts of the legislature.” The Statute on Statutes, originally adopted in 1874, was entitled “AN ACT to revise the law in relation to the construction of the statutes.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1874, ch. 131, par. 1 et seq. Section 1 of the Statute on Statutes provided, in relevant part: “Be it enacted by the People of the State of Illinois, represented in the General Assembly, That in the construction of all statutes now in force, or which may hereafter be enacted, the following rules shall be observed, unless such construction would be inconsistent with the manifest intent of the legislature or repugnant to the context of the same statute ***[.]” (Emphases added.) Ill. Rev. Stat. 1874, ch. 131, par. 1. The Statute on Statutes exists expressly for the purpose of aiding in the interpretation of statutes. The Statute on Statutes refers to statutes only in the context of the “General Assembly” and the “legislature.” Statutes are passed by the General Assembly. Ordinances are not. Section 1 therefore makes it clear that at the time section 13 — 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure was passed, the legislature did not intend the terms “statute” and “statutory” to refer to ordinances as well as to statutes. I continue to believe that the majority has erroneously failed to consider the meaning of the term “statutory penalty” at the time of the adoption of section 13 — 202 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Since I believe the legislature did not intend to include municipal ordinances within the meaning of “statutory penalty,” I respectfully dissent upon denial of the plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing. JUSTICE KARMEIER joins in this dissent.