Court Opinion

ID: 9855989
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:35:51.479735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:24.034544
License: Public Domain

LoviNS, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I have grave doubts whether a certified question propounded by the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board is cognizable in this Court. It is true that the following statutory authority is found for the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board to certify to this Court questions of law. “* * * The board may certify to the court (Supreme Court of Appeals) and request its decision of any question of law arising upon the record, and withhold its further proceeding in the case, pending the decision of court on the certified question, or until notice that the court has declined to docket the same. * * Chapter 131, Article 5, Section 4, Acts of the Legislature, 1945, Regular Session.
A cursory examination of the above quoted statute discloses that the language authorizing certification of a question pending by the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board is so broad that given full effect would obviate any necessity for the statutory appeal provided for in the same statute and heretofore generally utilized.
The question relative to the chargeability of compensation benefits to the account of an employer is, in my opinion, an administrative question and does not contemplate the decision of a question of law.
I foresee a possibility and perhaps a probability that this opinion establishes a precedent in taking cognizance of *386this certified question, and thus paves the way for advisory opinions by this Court to be furnished administrative agencies and departments of the State Government.
I do not think that this Court should interfere with the functions of other constitutional departments except when a judicial question requires determination. Article V of our constitution reads as follows: “The Legislative, Executive and Judicial Departments shall be separate and distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either of the other; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them at the same time, except that justices of the peace shall be eligible to the Legislature.”
The statutory appeal to this Court from an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board authorized by Chapter 131, Article 5, Section 4, Acts of the Legislature, 1945, Regular Session, and prior statutes has been entertained by this Court under the original jurisdiction conferred by Article VIII, Section 3, Constitution of West Virginia. In discussing that question, this Court has stated: “* * * This proceeding is authorized by a statute different from the one under which United Fuel Gas Company v. Public Service Commission, 73 W. Va. 571, 80 S. E. 531, was instituted, but the constitutional provisions referred to in the opinion in that case, render it impossible to treat this one as an ordinary appeal or bring it within the appellate jurisdiction of this court. What the statute, sec. 43 of Chap. 10 of the Acts of 1913, denominates an appeal must, if possible, be regarded as a right given to a claimant to participation in the fund in question, to apply to this court for the exercise of its original jurisdiction. Any other construction would render the provision unconstitutional. The Commission itself is not a court. It is only an administrative board, possessing quasi-judicial and legislative powers. United Fuel Gas Company v. Public Service Commission, cited. Its powers, in the administration of the Workmen’s Compensation Fund, are not sub*387stantially different from its powers over other matters within its control; and the principles upon which the jurisdiction of this court over its acts, by original process, was sustained in the case just cited, determine the jurisdictional question now presented.” DeConstantin v. Pub. Serv. Commission, 75 W. Va. 32, 83 S. E. 88. It is to be noted that the Public Service Commission, in the De-Constantin case was performing the duty of administering the Workmen’s Compensation Fund.
In the case of Lively v. Commissioner, 113 W. Va. 242, 167 S. E. 583, the first point of the syllabus reads as follows: “The jurisdiction conferred upon the supreme court of appeals by Code 1931, 23-5-1, to review acts of the commissioner, respecting the administration of the compensation fund, is original, not appellate; and, hence, is not controlled by the provision of sec. 3, Art. VIII, Const. W. Va., which confers appellate jurisdiction on this court in civil cases where the matter in controversy, exclusive of costs, is of greater value or amount than one hundred dollars.” In Caldwell v. Commissioner, 107 W. Va. 272, 274, 148 S. E. 75, this Court uses the following language: “It is true that the remedy by appeal is in the nature of an exercise or original jurisdiction as by mandamus or prohibition (United Fuel Co. v. Pub. Ser. Com., 73 W. Va. 571, 580) and is governed largely by the same legal principles and procedure, * * *”. Further, this Court states in the case of Saunders v. Comp. Comm’r., 112 W. Va. 212, 214, 164 S. E. 39: “The ‘appeal’ to this court provided for in the compensation statute is always regarded as an application to this court to exercise its original jurisdiction as by mandamus or prohibition and is governed largely by the same legal principles and procedure.”
The statutory appeal from an order of the Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board rests solely upon the original jurisdiction of this Court, conferred by the first part of Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution, and does not rest upon this Court’s appellate jurisdiction, conferred by the latter part of Section 3, Article VIII of the Constitution.
*388This note raises the question of jurisdiction. Though such question is neither raised nor argued in brief and oral argument, nevertheless, a question of jurisdiction may be raised at any time prior to the final decision, and by the Court of its own motion. Morehead et al. v. De Ford et al., 6 W. Va. 316; Cresap v. Kemble, 26 W. Va. 603; Buskirk v. Ragland, 65 W. Va. 749, 65 S. E. 101; Charlotten v. Gordon, 120 W. Va. 615, 618, 200 S. E. 740; McKinley v. Queen, 125 W. Va. 619, 625, 25 S. E. 2d 763; Staats v. McCarty, 130 W. Va. 240, 243, 43 S. E. 2d 826. In Blosser v. Comp. Comm., 132 W. Va. 112, 116, 51 S. E. 2d 71, Judge Haymond, speaking for the Court, says: “The question was raised in conference by some members of the Court. As the question is jurisdictional in character, it will be considered and resolved by this Court on its own motion on this appeal. Whited v. State Compensation Commissioner, 131 W. Va. 646, 49 S. E. 2d 838; Gapp v. Gapp, 126 W. Va. 847, 30 S. E. 2d 530; Morris v. Gates, 124 W. Va. 275, 20 S. E. 2d 118; Dawson v. Dawson, 123 W. Va. 380, 15 S. E. 2d 156; Charleston Apartments Corporation v. Appalachian Electric Power Company, 118 W. Va. 694, 192 S. E. 294; Arnold v. Mylius, 87 W. Va. 727, 105 S. E. 920; Buskirk v. Ragland, 65 W. Va. 749, 65 S. E. 101; Thompson v. Adams, 60 W. Va. 463, 55 S. E. 668; Cresap v. Kemble, 26 W. Va. 603; Kemble v. Cresap, 26 W. Va. 603.” To the same effect is the opinion of this Court in Grottendick v. Webber, 134 W. Va. 798, 803, 81 S. E. 2d 854.
Again adverting to the question of advisory opinions. I know of no constitutional or statutory provision authorizing such opinions by this Court.
I am fortified in this view by the fact that under our Code and the long established and continued practice, the Attorney General of this State is the legal advisor of the Executive Department of this State. See Chapter 2, Section 1, Acts of the Legislature, 1932, Extraordinary Session.
For the foregoing reasons, I do not think the statute, with reference to certified questions from the Workmen’s *389Compensation Appeal Board is constitutional and would therefore refuse to take cognizance of such question.
If the certified question is cognizable by this Court, I agree with the result reached, but I dissent from the action of the Court in assuming jurisdiction of the question here certified.