Court Opinion

ID: 9726772
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:07:38.097106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:30.646019
License: Public Domain

Peterson, J.
I respectfully dissent. The majority decides two issues in reversing. 1. In this action in equity plaintiffs are granted a right to appeal from the action of defendant in denying damages, in spite of plaintiffs’ failure to appeal within 20 days, as provided in section 306.38, 1950 Iowa Code. 2. That the defect in plaintiffs’ case is not jurisdictional, but involves the merits, and cannot be reached by special appearance.
Presumably it is the contention of the majority that defendant 'should have filed a motion to dismiss. I agree it would have been better; and a more direct approach, but I contend the procedure followed sustains defendant’s position in the case.
I. It is a dangerous doctrine to overrule a specific statutory provision. While there apparently was some delinquency on the part of some county office employees I do not feel it was of such a serious nature that a specific statutory provision should be abrogated. Defendant’s records were ’ open to the [public, and plaintiffs’ attorney had some obligation to check them.
*1269Specific statutory procedure as to appeal under chapter 306, takes precedence over general equitable actions.
We have often held special statutes take precedence over general ones. Warren v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 473, 93 N.W.2d 60 ; Crawford v. State Highway Commission, 247 Iowa 736, 76 N.W.2d 187; Iowa Mutual Tornado Insurance Assn. v. Fischer, 245 Iowa 951, 955, 65 N.W.2d 162, 165.
The situation in the case at bar is analogous to this situation.
Plaintiffs’ relief is restricted to statutory procedure, when the matter is controlled by statute. Hampton v. Des Moines & Central Iowa R. Co., 217 Iowa 108, 250 N.W. 881; In re Proposed Assessment by County Treasurer of Woodbury County v. Lytle Investment Co., 219 Iowa 1099, 260 N.W. 538; In re Assessment of Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 129 Iowa 588, 105 N.W. 1023; Woodbury County v. Talley, 153 Iowa 28, 129 N.W. 967.
In Hampton v. Des Moines & Central Iowa R. Co., supra, the court said (page 111 of 217 Iowa) : “No appeal from the finding and decision of an inferior tribunal will lie unless authorized by statute, and, when allowed, the procedure prescribed must be strictly followed.”
In In re etc. Treasurer of Woodbury County v. Lytle Inv. Co., supra, the court stated (page 1102 of 219 Iowa): “The right of appeal is purely statutory and unless conferred does not exist.”
II. I contend the last clause of rule 104(a), R. C. P., as to special appearance sustains the ruling of the trial court. The clause provides: “and want of jurisdiction of the subject matter may be so raised.”
What is the subject matter in the ease at bar? It is the claim for damages by appellants for closing a road which intersects Interstate Highway No. 29.
We have clearly decided the issue involved in the recent case of Warren v. Iowa State Highway Commission, 250 Iowa 473, 93 N.W.2d 60.
On the basis of that decision appellants have no cause of *1270action. If appellants had followed the statute and appealed within 20 days, they still would not have a cause of action.
The majority contend that “subject matter” pertains to a class of cases, of which the case under consideration must be one, in order to qualify under the special appearance rule. They say no such condition pertains here, and cite State ex rel. Cairy v. Iowa Co-Op. Assn., 248 Iowa 167, 79 N.W.2d 775, in support of this position.
The difficulty with this position, as I view it, is that the case at bar is a class unto itself. The petition is denominated “Petition for Declaratory Judgment; Appeal from Highway Closure.” A petition for declaratory judgment is ordinary and well known. However, I fail to find either in statutory procedure or in judicial pronouncement a cause of action in equity permitting “appeal from highway closure.” Since this case is therefore a class unto itself, in view of the Warren decision we have no jurisdiction of the subject matter involved. We can therefore reach the defect by special appearance.
I contend we could properly justify affirmance on the basis I have outlined. Under such circumstances it seems such a futile gesture to reverse and then have the ease promptly dismissed in view of our decision in Warren v. Iowa State Highway Commission, supra.
It is an unfortunate situation for plaintiffs, but as we stated in the Warren ease at page 486 of 250 Iowa: “The greatest good of the greatest number is the criterion which the authorities having charge of the building, alteration, and maintenance of the highway systems in the State must follow.”
I would affirm.