Court Opinion

ID: 9963466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 16:04:11.999565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:50.024507
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Jones, 2024-Ohio-1588.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                    :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,              :                No. 113082

                 v.                               :

DARRYL JONES,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellant.             :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 25, 2024

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                             Case No. CR-20-652722-A

                                            Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Shannon M. Musson, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Allison S. Breneman, for appellant.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, P.J.:

                Defendant-appellant, Darryl Jones, appeals his convictions for rape and

kidnapping following a jury trial. He contends that his convictions were not

supported by sufficient evidence and were against the manifest weight of the
evidence. He also contends that the trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case

due to preindictment delay. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

Factual Background and Procedural History

             On September 22, 2020, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Jones

on three counts: (1) one count of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), with

notices of prior conviction pursuant to R.C. 2929.13(F)(6) and repeat violent

offender specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.149(A); (2) one count of gross sexual

imposition in violation of R.C. 2907.05(A)(1) and (3) one count of kidnapping in

violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4), with notices of prior conviction pursuant to R.C.

2929.13(F)(6), repeat violent offender specifications pursuant to R.C. 2941.149(A)

and a sexual motivation specification pursuant to R.C. 2941.147(A). The charges

related to Jones’ alleged sexual assault of T.G. on October 25, 2004 in East

Cleveland.

      Pretrial Motion to Dismiss Due to Preindictment Delay

             On September 30, 2021, Jones filed a “motion to dismiss with prejudice

for unconstitutional pre-indictment delay.” Jones argued that the state’s delay of

nearly 16 years in prosecuting the case violated his rights under Article I, Section 16

of the Ohio Constitution and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution. He argued that his defense was “significantly impaired and

prejudiced” because “a great deal of evidence was either never investigated or is no

longer available for review and testing.”       Specifically, Jones claimed he was

prejudiced by (1) the loss of the recording of a 911 call and photographs of T.G.’s
alleged injuries; (2) the inability to identify and locate witnesses, including a man

who allegedly assisted T.G. following the incident, police officers and detectives in

the East Cleveland Police Department to whom T.G. reported the incident and

“hospital personnel that examined and interviewed” T.G.; (3) memory loss by other

witnesses, including memory loss by T.G.’s adoptive mother following a brain tumor

and “critical” “change[s]” in T.G’s “version” of events from 2004 to 2020; and (4)

the death of two witnesses, Harvey Randall and Dianne Wynn, who Jones claimed

could have corroborated his version of events, i.e., that he and T.G. had had

“consensual sex for money.” Jones submitted no affidavits or other evidence in

support of his motion.

             The state opposed the motion, arguing that Jones had failed to establish

that he had suffered “actual, substantial prejudice” as a result of the delay and that

the delay in prosecution was justified, i.e., the case involved an alleged rape by a

stranger who had not been identified and the investigation “came back to light once

there was DNA evidence matching the defendant.” The state did not submit any

evidence in support of its opposition.

            On April 12, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on the motion. At the

hearing on the motion, once again, the parties presented no witness testimony or

other evidence. Counsel merely argued for, and against, the motion to dismiss.

Jones’ counsel argued that Jones was prejudiced by the state’s almost 16-year delay

in prosecuting him for the reasons set forth in his motion, in particular because

T.G.’s adoptive mother, G.G., who had allegedly taken T.G. to the hospital, had
suffered memory loss following a brain tumor and “two independent witnesses, who

were there, at the scene, who would have been able to have said it was consensual

sex for money” were now deceased. Jones further argued that there was no

justifiable reason for the delay, noting that even after receiving a CODIS hit for Jones

in 2015, the state did nothing to prosecute Jones for several years.

              In response, the state argued that Jones had not met his burden of

establishing that he was actually prejudiced by the delay in prosecution and that,

because “no witnesses [had] been called” at the hearing, there was no evidence for

the trial court “to really consider at this point.” Addressing each of the items of

allegedly lost evidence identified by Jones, the state indicated that Harvey Randall

was not identified in the police report1 and that its investigator had located only one

Harvey Randall in the state of Ohio, i.e., a 60-year-old white male who lives in the

Akron area and “appears to be alive.” The state acknowledged that “the one woman

who is listed in the police report” was deceased but that she had only stated that “she

heard a noise, she didn’t observe anything” and that Jones’ claim that he had had

consensual sex with T.G. for money was inconsistent with what he told the

investigator initially, i.e., that he had never met T.G. before, that “his DNA would

never be in her kit” and that he had not been to East Cleveland since he had

graduated from high school. The state acknowledged that it had been unable to

locate the man who had allegedly picked up T.G. following the assault, but noted

      1 The police report was not submitted with the parties’ briefs on the motion to

dismiss and, based on the transcript of the hearing, it does not appear that it was
introduced into evidence at the hearing.
that he was not an eyewitness to the incident. The state also acknowledged that any

recordings of 911 calls would have been destroyed because they were retained for

only seven years and that the photographs taken of T.G. at the hospital had not been

located. The state indicated, however, that T.G.’s “medical records” and sexual-

assault kit notes were available and that these were “fairly descriptive of the injuries

that were in fact photographed.” The state further acknowledged that G.G. had

sustained memory loss due to a brain tumor but indicated that she did recall that

“something terrible” had happened to T.G. and that she had “assisted her in getting

to the hospital.”2 The state indicated that both the East Cleveland police officer who

took T.G.’s report and the sexual assault nurse examiner (“SANE nurse”) who

examined and interviewed T.G. had been located and were available for trial. The

state asserted that to the extent Jones claimed T.G. had “changed her story” from

2004 to 2022, Jones was free to cross-examine T.G. regarding what she had said

previously and what she recalled at the time of trial.

             The state also attempted to explain the delay in prosecution and

asserted that it did not delay the prosecution “deliberately for any kind of tactical

advantage.” The state noted that Jones was a stranger to T.G., that the state did not

know his identity in 2004 when the rape was initially reported and that it was not

until 2015, when the state received a CODIS hit on DNA samples in T.G.’s sexual-

assault evidence collection kit (“sexual-assault kit”), that Jones was identified. The

      2  The state’s assertion that G.G. assisted T.G. in getting to the hospital is
inconsistent with T.G. and G.G.’s trial testimony. As indicated below, T.G. testified that
an ambulance took her to the hospital and G.G. testified that she met T.G. at the hospital.
state indicated that T.G.’s sexual assault kit was one of 7,000 kits discovered when

the Cuyahoga County Sexual Assault Kit Task Force was started in 2011, that cases

were necessarily prioritized, that, in 2017, a new investigator began looking into the

case, that that investigator was reassigned and that Christy Kernik was thereafter

assigned to the case and contacted T.G. According to the state, investigators had

made efforts to locate Jones before his indictment but were unsuccessful and that it

was not until June 30, 2021, after Jones was indicted and brought into custody, that

Kernik first spoke with Jones. The state could provide little explanation for the five-

year delay between the identification of Jones in 2015 and his indictment in 2020,

other than to state that there was prioritization of cases within the department and

that “we were investigating the case, trying to put all the pieces together.”

             On April 20, 2022, the trial court summarily denied Jones’ motion to

dismiss.

      The Trial

             The case proceeded to trial on May 31, 2023. Jones waived a jury trial

on the notices of prior conviction and repeat violent offender specifications. The

remaining charges were tried to a jury.

              Eight witnesses testified on behalf of the state at trial, including T.G.,

G.G., the SANE nurse who conducted a sexual assault examination of T.G. following

the incident, the retired East Cleveland Police Officer to whom T.G. reported the

incident, investigators involved in the continued investigation of the incident in

2020 and the forensic scientist who performed DNA analysis of the samples
collected in T.G.’s sexual assault kit. No witnesses testified for the defense. A brief

summary of the relevant evidence presented at trial follows.

             T.G. testified that on the evening of October 24, 2004, when she was

22, she went to a bar in Cleveland Heights and drank tequila and beer until she was

“buzzed.” She stated that she “definitely smoked weed” that day and also likely used

cocaine. She testified that, at closing time, during the early morning hours of

October 25, 2004, the bouncer, whom she knew, offered her a ride home and T.G.

accepted. As they were driving in the car, the bouncer began “making passes” at T.G.

and “being very pushy.” T.G. stated that she became “uncomfortable” and asked

him to pull over. He did so, and T.G. got out of the car, intending to walk the rest of

the way home, approximately a mile or two.

              T.G. testified that she began walking home at approximately 3:00 a.m.

She stated that it was dark and that, at first, there was no one around. T.G. testified

that she had a cigarette, but no lighter, and really wanted to smoke. As she was

walking, she saw a man she did not know. She described him as “taller than [her],

stocky, kind of like beefy” and that he “[d]idn’t seem like a threat.” She asked him

if he had a lighter and he told her to follow him to his house. T.G. walked with the

man to get a lighter and the two then sat on his front steps, talking, “socializ[ing].”

She stated that, after a while, she began getting “negative, bad” vibes from the man

and “wasn’t liking what he was saying because it was angry and aggressive towards

wom[e]n,” so she attempted to leave.
              T.G. testified that when she attempted to leave, the man “grabbed

[her] up,” “yanked” her and “drug [her] down in between two houses” into a dark

alleyway. She stated that she was “scared” and was “resisting him,” “fighting him,”

trying to get away, but that she could not escape because he was “a lot bigger than

me.”

              T.G. stated that as the man pulled her “away from the street,” someone

turned a light on and then off in one of the nearby buildings, but that when they

reached the rear of the property, “[i]t was just me and him back there.”

              T.G. testified that the man “threw [her] down,” forcing her to the

ground, then took her head and “started slamming it against [the] ground” into the

concrete. T.G. stated that, as she was struggling, her glasses fell off and were scraped

on the lens. She said that she “tried her best” to resist but that the man was “so beefy

and thick,” “like a brick wall,” there was “nothing [she] could do” to get him off her,

“so [she] just stopped resisting and waited it out.”

              T.G. stated that the man took off her pants and raped her vaginally.

She testified that she did not consent to having sex with the man. She stated that

she did not approach the man to buy drugs from him and did not offer to exchange

sex for drugs. She testified that she told the man, “No,” “multiple times.” When

asked whether she wanted to have sex with her assailant, she replied, “Absolutely

not. I just wanted a lighter.”

              T.G. testified that, after the assault, her assailant pulled up her pants,

and she left. T.G. stated that the next thing she recalled, she was in “daylight,”
walking “aimlessly,” “in a haze” when a car pulled up alongside her, driven by a black

male. She testified that the man offered to assist her and “take [her] to get some

help.” T.G. indicated that after she saw his “credentials,” indicating that he was a

nurse, she got into his car and he drove her to a clinic. She stated that she was then

taken by ambulance to the hospital, where a sexual assault examination was

performed and a sexual assault kit was collected.

              T.G. stated that, at the hospital, she spoke with a SANE nurse and told

her what had happened. She stated that when she undressed for the sexual assault

examination, “there was like a ton of gravel that had fallen out of my clothes and off

of me from on the ground.” She described the collection of evidence by the SANE

nurse as “violating” and “[h]orrible” and that she “didn’t want any of that to

happen.” She stated that both her adoptive mother, G.G., and her biological mother

were at the hospital with her. After T.G. left the hospital, she and G.G. went to the

East Cleveland police station, where T.G. filed a report, answered questions and gave

a statement to one of the officers. The police then accompanied T.G. and G.G. back

to the scene of the incident. T.G. indicated that she told the officer that her assailant

was a man named “Ron,” who was in his thirties, 5′10″ and 180 pounds.

              T.G. testified that the police later had her “come in and look at some

lineups, photo items of people’s mug shots * * * to see if [she] could find [her

assailant],” but that there were “tons” of photos and she never found him. T.G.

stated that the East Cleveland police never contacted her again about the incident
and that she did not follow up with them herself because she “just wanted to forget

about it” and “just tried to block it out like it didn’t happen.”

               T.G. testified that, in 2020, an investigator reached out her and

informed her that they were continuing to investigate the incident. She then met

with the investigator, the assistant prosecutor, an advocate and “another lady.” T.G.

stated that she was asked to view a photo lineup of potential suspects. She indicated

that one of the men in the photo lineup “had the features [she] remembered” but

that she was not sure it was her assailant and ultimately decided not to make an

identification because she “didn’t want to do something [she] wasn’t [a] hundred

percent positive about.” Timothy Brown, an investigator in the Cuyahoga County

Prosecutor’s Office, testified that a photograph of Jones was included in the photo

lineup shown to T.G.

              T.G. admitted that she had been convicted of theft in 2010 and of

misuse of a credit card in 2011. She stated that both convictions related to offenses

involving her mother, i.e., theft of her mother’s cell phone and unauthorized use of

her mother’s debit card.

               G.G., T.G.’s adoptive mother, testified that she had had a brain tumor

in 2019 and that, as a result, she sometimes experiences memory loss. She stated

that she remembered receiving a call, at some point, that T.G. had been assaulted

and was in the hospital. She indicated that she went to see T.G. at the hospital and

that T.G. was “kind of beat up,” with bruises and scratches on her face. G.G. testified

that after she and T.G. left the hospital, they drove to East Cleveland and T.G.
showed her where she had been taken and dragged behind a house. G.G. stated that

she recalled little else regarding the incident.

              Jo Ann Podlogar, a nurse, examined T.G. on October 25, 2004,

following the incident, and collected information and evidence for T.G.’s sexual

assault kit. Based on her review of the sexual assault kit notes she had made during

her examination of T.G., Podlogar testified that T.G. had reported that she had been

assaulted by a male stranger who had vaginally penetrated her and licked her

breasts. Podlogar then read the narrative description — which Podlogar had

recorded verbatim — of what T.G. had said occurred, to the jury:

              After leaving a bar in Cleveland Heights near Cedar and Lee I
      walked towards Mayfield Road to catch a bus to my mother’s house.
      The bus was — the bars were closing, so it was after 2:30 in the
      morning. I walked down Superior and cut through an apartment
      building, and I remember * * * ending up by a bank in a Taco Bell type
      building. I was walking down the street, and I asked this dude to
      borrow his lighter. I walked with him and talked with him. We went
      to a light colored duplex and sat on the porch.

            The next thing I knew he was getting pushy and ignorant. He
      used sexual language. And was pushing me. Next thing I knew, he
      dragged me down the driveway. He threw me on the ground, ripped
      off my pants and shoved up my shirt.

             He hit my head on the ground repeatedly. He banged my head
      against the ground. He had his hand over my mouth and throat, and I
      bit him on the hand.

            I broke my nails on his skin. He finished what he wanted to do.
      He got up off of me and helped me put my pants back on. I was crying.

            I dressed and walked down the driveway. He was yelling vulgar
      obscenities to me.
           I ran down the street and got away. I was hysterical. A man saw
      me and drove slowly in his car and asked if I was okay.

            I was afraid. He reassured me because he worked for a clinic. He
      drove me to the clinic and back to where the assault happened.

            Then I went back to the clinic, and I told one of the nurses I was
      raped, and the clinic staff called EMS.

               Podlogar testified that, based on a visual examination, she observed

that T.G. had abrasions to her right cheek and above her left eye, abrasions on both

breasts, scratches linearly across her upper right thigh, bruises on her hands and her

left posterior arm and abrasions to the sacrococcyx area. Podlogar stated that she

took Polaroid photos of T.G.’s injuries, then proceeded to the “intimate exam,”

where swabs of samples were collected for the sexual assault kit. She indicated that

T.G.’s clothing and a hospital towel and bedding used during the examination were

also collected and placed in bags. Podlogar stated that a physician had ordered an

X-ray of T.G.’s tailbone and a CT scan of her brain but that the tests revealed nothing

significant.

               Podlogar testified that, as of the date of trial, T.G.’s clothing (which

had been taken by East Cleveland police) and T.G.’s hospital medical records,

including the photographs she had taken of T.G.’s injuries, had not been located. As

such, she could not state whether a toxicology screen had been performed on T.G.’s

blood following the incident. The hospital towel, blanket and a sheet containing

“sandy dirt, debris” that had been in use during the exam were identified by

Podlogar and admitted into evidence.
              Ralph Woods, a retired East Cleveland police officer, was the officer

who received T.G.’s report that she had been raped on October 25, 2004. Based on

his review of the police report he had prepared, Woods testified that T.G. had, at that

time, identified her assailant as a man named “Ron” and had described him as a

black male, dark complexion, in his late thirties, medium build, 5′10″ tall, 180

pounds, with black eyes, a round face, short, black, greasy hair, a full beard and

glasses.     Woods     stated   that   T.G.   reported    that   her    assailant   had

“[c]hoked/strangled” her and then raped her. He stated that after T.G. reported the

incident, she and G.G. took him to the location where the alleged assault occurred,

i.e., behind a house on Emily Street in East Cleveland.

              Woods testified that he canvassed the area to see if he could find any

neighbors or others who had witnessed the incident and spoke with Jacqueline

Jones,3 who lived near the scene of the alleged assault. He indicated that he “wrote

down what she stated” in his police report. Woods testified that after he retrieved

the sexual assault kit and a bag containing T.G.’s clothing from the hospital and

placed them in the East Cleveland Police Department’s evidence locker, he had no

further involvement in the case.

              In 2020, Christy Kernik, an investigator in the Cuyahoga County

Prosecutor’s Office Cold Case Sexual Assault Unit, was assigned to investigate the

incident. After reviewing the police report and case documents, she attempted to

      3 It is unclear from the record whether Jacqueline Jones was related to appellant.
locate and contact T.G. On July 27, 2020, Kernik interviewed T.G. and took a

statement from her. Kernik testified that, as part of her continuing investigation,

she interviewed G.G., retrieved evidence from the East Cleveland Police

Department, attempted to track down the individual who had picked up T.G. and

driven her to the clinic following the alleged assault and attempted to obtain a

complete copy of T.G.’s hospital medical records, including photographs, relating to

the incident. Kernik stated that she determined that Jacqueline Jones (who had

been identified in the initial police report) was deceased. She indicated that her

efforts to locate the individual who took T.G. to the clinic were unsuccessful and that,

aside from an x-ray and CT scan (and the sexual assault kit notes, which had been

kept in the sexual assault kit), the hospital had been unable to locate T.G.’s hospital

medical records relating to the incident. On July 1, 2021, Kernik obtained and

executed a search warrant to obtain a DNA sample from Jones.

              Andrew Sawin, a forensic scientist with the Ohio Bureau of Criminal

Investigation (“BCI”), testified regarding the DNA evidence in the case. He stated

that BCI received T.G.’s sexual assault kit and a DNA sample for T.G. in September

2013 and that initial DNA testing was completed in July 2015. He indicated that

further DNA analysis, comparing Jones’ DNA profile to “unknown” DNA profiles in

the samples from T.G.’s sexual assault kit, was completed in July 2021 after BCI

received a DNA sample for Jones.

              Sawin testified that, based on the testing performed, Jones’ DNA

profile was consistent with DNA found in multiple samples collected as part of T.G.’s
sexual assault kit, including DNA in the sperm fraction of vaginal swabs (with an

estimated frequency of occurrence rarer than 1 in 1 trillion unrelated individuals),

DNA in the sperm fraction of pubic hair combings and thigh/eternal genitalia swabs

(with an estimated frequency of occurrence rarer than 1 in 1 trillion unrelated

individuals), DNA in fingernail scrapings (with an estimated frequency of

occurrence of 1 in 50,000,000 unrelated individuals), and DNA in breast swabs

(with an estimated frequency of occurrence of 1 in 1,000,000 unrelated individuals).

             In addition to witness testimony, the state introduced into evidence

various exhibits, including T.G.’s sexual assault kit, the sexual assault kit notes,

photographs of T.G. taken in or around 2004, documents relating to the photo

lineup T.G. reviewed in 2020, evidence submission sheets and envelopes, BCI lab

reports dated July 13, 2015 and July 22, 2021, a death certificate for Jacqueline

Jones and the hospital towel and bedding from T.G.’s sexual assault examination.

              After the state rested, Jones moved for a judgment of acquittal

pursuant to Crim.R. 29. The trial court denied the motion. Jones also orally

renewed his motion to dismiss due to preindictment delay, arguing that prejudice to

Jones’ defense had been established based on evidence presented at trial that (1)

emergency room records, including photographs of T.G. and a toxicology report,

were missing or lost, (2) “critical clothing” T.G. had been wearing was lost, (3)

Jacqueline Jones, “a potential eyewitness,” was deceased and (4) the man who had

picked up T.G. and transported her to the clinic was “missing.” The state responded

that all of the arguments Jones had then raised had been previously raised or could
have been raised during the pretrial hearing on his motion to dismiss and that any

claim that evidence favorable to the defense had been lost due to preindictment

delay was purely speculative. The trial court denied the renewed motion to dismiss.

                The defense rested without presenting any witness testimony, and

Jones renewed his motion for a judgment of acquittal. Once again, the trial court

denied the motion.

                On June 6, 2023, the jury found Jones guilty of rape in violation of

R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4) with a sexual

motivation, as charged. The jury found Jones not guilty of gross sexual imposition.

                The trial court then addressed the issues as to which Jones had waived

his right to a jury trial. The state introduced certified copies of journal entries

reflecting that Jones had been previously convicted of robbery in violation of R.C.

2911.02 in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-86-213309-ZA and of attempted kidnapping in

violation of R.C. 2923.02/2905.01 in Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-93-298565-ZA, and the

parties stipulated that Jones was, in fact, the person convicted in those journal

entries.    On June 9, 2023, the trial court found Jones guilty of the notices of prior

conviction and repeat violent offender specifications associated with the rape and

kidnapping charges.

                On July 31, 2023, the trial court sentenced Jones to nine years in

prison on each count, to be served concurrently. The trial court also imposed five

years of mandatory postrelease control and classified Jones as a sexually oriented

offender.
               Jones appealed, raising the following three assignments of error for

review:

      Assignment of Error No. 1: The jury found, against the manifest weight
      of the evidence, that the appellant committed the acts alleged in the
      indictment.

      Assignment of Error No. 2: The evidence was not legally sufficient to
      sustain a guilty verdict.

      Assignment of Error No. 3: The trial court erred upon failing to dismiss
      the case due to prosecutorial delay.

               For ease of discussion, we address Jones’ assignments of error out of

order and together where appropriate.

Law and Analysis

      Preindictment Delay

               We first address Jones’ third assignment of error.          In his third

assignment of error, Jones contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion

to dismiss due to preindictment delay because (1) the state “neglected” to prosecute

the case for nearly 16 years, (2) the length of the delay was presumptively prejudicial,

(3) there was no justification for the delay in prosecution, (4) Jones did nothing to

cause or contribute to the delay and (5) Jones demonstrated actual prejudice as a

result of the delay, i.e., that “critical witnesses are dead or no longer able to testify

about the gist of the incident, i.e., consent or force.”

               The state responds that the trial court properly denied the motion to

dismiss because Jones failed to establish “actual and substantial prejudice” as a

result of the preindictment delay and because “the reasons for the delay are
justifiable” given that “new evidence ha[d] become available in the form of DNA

evidence and participation by T.G.”

              “[W]hen unjustifiable preindictment delay causes actual prejudice to

a defendant’s right to a fair trial despite the state’s initiation of prosecution within

the statutorily defined limitations period, the Due Process Clause affords the

defendant * * * protection.” State v. Jones, 148 Ohio St.3d 167, 2016-Ohio-5105, 69

N.E.3d 688, ¶ 11. “‘An unjustifiable delay between the commission of an offense and

a defendant’s indictment therefor, which results in actual prejudice to the

defendant, is a violation of the right to due process of law’” under the Ohio and

United States Constitutions. Id. at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Luck, 15 Ohio St.3d 150,

472 N.E.2d 1097 (1984), paragraph two of the syllabus.

              The Ohio Supreme Court has “firmly established” a “burden-shifting

framework” for determining whether preindictment delay amounts to a violation of

due process. Jones at ¶ 13. “Once a defendant presents evidence of actual prejudice

[to his or her defense], the burden shifts to the state to produce evidence of a

justifiable reason for the delay.” Id. A delay in commencing prosecution will not be

justified if the state uses the delay to gain a tactical advantage or through negligence

or error in judgment ceases its investigation and then later, without new evidence,

decides to prosecute. State v. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45

N.E.3d 127, ¶ 98, citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324, 92 S.Ct. 455, 30

L.Ed.2d 468 (1971), and Luck at 158. “The length of delay will normally be the key

factor in determining whether a delay caused by negligence or error in judgment is
justifiable.” Luck at 158. If, however, a defendant fails to establish prejudice, it is

unnecessary to consider the reasons for the delay. See Jones at ¶ 16; Adams at

¶ 107.4

               Determining whether actual prejudice exists “involves ‘“a delicate

judgment’” and case-by-case consideration” based on the particular facts and

circumstances of the case. Jones at ¶ 20, quoting State v. Walls, 96 Ohio St.3d 437,

2002-Ohio-5059, 775 N.E.2d 829, ¶ 52, quoting Marion at 325. The court considers

the evidence as it exists when the indictment is filed and the prejudice the defendant

will suffer at trial due to the delay. Jones at ¶ 20, citing Walls at ¶ 52. A claim of

actual prejudice must be “scrutinized * * * vis-à-vis the particular evidence that was

lost or unavailable as a result of the delay,” specifically, “the relevance of the lost

evidence and its purported effect on the defense.” Jones at ¶ 23.

               Speculative claims of prejudice or vague assertions of prejudice are

insufficient to meet a defendant’s burden. Jones at ¶ 27 (A defendant cannot rely on

“mere speculation to support a claim of prejudice.”); see also State v. Meeks, 5th

Dist. Delaware No. 21 CAA 20 0010, 2022-Ohio-6, ¶ 53 (“Proof of actual prejudice

must be specific, particularized, and non-speculative.”).        “The ‘possibility that

memories will fade, witnesses will become inaccessible, or evidence will be lost is

not sufficient to establish actual prejudice.’” (Emphasis deleted.) Jones at ¶ 21,

      4 In State v. Bourn, 172 Ohio St.3d 343, 2022-Ohio-4321, 224 N.E.3d 1, the Ohio

Supreme Court again considered what a defendant must show to demonstrate actual
prejudice when claiming unconstitutional preindictment delay in a rape case. There was
no majority opinion in the case. Accordingly, we continue to apply the analysis set forth
in Jones, 148 Ohio St.3d 167, 2016-Ohio-5105, 69 N.E.3d 688.
quoting Adams at ¶ 105. However, “[t]hat does not mean * * * that demonstrably

faded memories and actually unavailable witnesses or lost evidence cannot satisfy

the actual-prejudice requirement.” Jones at ¶ 21. The “proven unavailability of

specific evidence or testimony that would attack the credibility or weight of the

state’s evidence against a defendant and thereby aid in establishing a defense may

satisfy the due-process requirement of actual prejudice.” Id. at ¶ 25. “Actual

prejudice exists when missing evidence or unavailable testimony, identified by the

defendant and relevant to the defense, would minimize or eliminate the impact of

the state’s evidence and bolster the defense.” Id. at ¶ 28, citing Luck at 157-158.

              In reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for

preindictment delay, we apply a de novo standard of review to issues of law but

afford great deference to the trial court’s findings of fact. See, e.g., State v. Jabbar,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109642, 2021-Ohio-1191, ¶ 19-20; State v. Kocevar, 2023-

Ohio-1513, 213 N.E.3d 1240, ¶ 60 (2d Dist.).

               In his motion to dismiss, Jones claimed that he had been prejudiced

by the loss of the following evidence as a result of the state’s preindictment delay:

      1. The believed male nurse named “Terry” who picked [T.G.] up[,]
      convinced her to go to his employment and who called 911 for her.
      2. 911 calls.
      3. Photographs of any alleged injuries and/or other records related
      thereto.
      4. All of the members of the East Cleveland Police Department that took
      a report; the detectives and officers have presumably retired long ago.
      5. All of the hospital personnel that examined and interviewed the
      alleged victim.
      6. An accurate recollection of the alleged incident by all individuals and
      witnesses involved; {victim changed her version from [sic] in critical
      fashion f[rom] 2004 to 2020}
      7. The victim’s mother who allegedly took her to the hospital. Her
      testimony regarding what her daughter told her is critical. However
      when interviewed in 2020 she reported a brain tumor and loss of
      memory.
      8. Harvey Randall who is deceased. He lived at 126th and St. Clai[r]
      who spoke with the defendant in the morning who would have been
      able to corroborate there was consensual sex for money.
      9. Dianne Wynn who is deceased. She would have been able to
      corroborate the incident was consensual and an exchange of sex for
      money.

              In his renewed motion to dismiss, after the state concluded its case,

Jones argued that prejudice to his defense had been shown based on evidence at

trial that (1) the emergency room records, including photographs of T.G. and a

toxicology report, were missing or lost, (2) “critical clothing” T.G. had been wearing

was lost, (3) Jacqueline Jones, “a potential eyewitness,” was deceased and (4) the

man who had allegedly picked T.G. up and transported to the clinic following the

incident was “missing.” The trial court summarily denied both Jones’ pretrial

motion to dismiss and his renewed motion to dismiss. The trial court did not make

any explicit findings of fact and did not explain the basis for its rulings.

               Following a thorough review of the record, we cannot say that the trial

court erred in denying Jones’ motion to dismiss due to preindictment delay. Jones

has not met his burden of showing that he sustained actual prejudice as a result of

the state’s preindictment delay.

               First, contrary to Jones’ assertion, prejudice is not presumed, for

purposes of a motion to dismiss based on preindictment delay, solely due to a
lengthy delay in prosecution. Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45

N.E.3d 127, at ¶ 98; State v. Herns, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 23 MA 0055, 2024-

Ohio-1099, ¶ 51. As stated above, it was Jones’ burden to show actual prejudice to

his defense resulting from the preindictment delay. He needed to show (1) that

specific evidence was lost or unavailable due to the preindictment delay and (2) the

exculpatory value of that evidence, i.e., how that lost or unavailable evidence would

have minimized or eliminated the impact of the state’s evidence or otherwise

bolstered his defense.

              Jones, however, submitted no affidavits or other evidence with his

motion and offered no witness testimony or other evidence at the hearing on his

motion pointing to missing evidence or unavailable testimony that would have

minimized or eliminated the impact of the state’s evidence or bolstered his defense.

His motion to dismiss was supported by nothing more than speculative, conclusory

assertions and the arguments of counsel. For that reason alone, the trial court could

have properly denied his motion to dismiss. Cf. State v. McClellan, 9th Dist. Summit

No. 30304, 2023-Ohio-2152, ¶ 17 (where defendant submitted no affidavits or other

evidence pointing to missing evidence or unavailable testimony that would have

minimized or eliminated the impact of the state’s evidence or bolstered his defense,

defendant did not “adequately demonstrate[] that, if he had filed a timely motion to

dismiss, it would have been granted”).

             Second, considering each of the items of allegedly “lost” or

“unavailable” evidence in light of (1) other evidence available at the time of the
indictment and (2) the relevance of the allegedly unavailable evidence to the

defense, Jones has not shown how any of these items, if they had been available,

would have meaningfully impacted his case. See, e.g., State v. Craig, 10th Dist.

Franklin No. 22AP-215, 2023-Ohio-1003, ¶ 20 (“‘“Without proof of prejudice,

meaning something which adversely affects [a defendant’s] ability to defend himself

at trial, there is no due process violation for preindictment delay in prosecution.”’”),

quoting Meeks, 2022-Ohio-6, at ¶ 53, quoting State v. Davis, 7th Dist. Mahoning

No. 05 MA 235, 2007-Ohio-7216, ¶ 17.

              The missing recording of the 911 call: It is unknown, from the limited

information available, who made the alleged 911 call, but there has been no claim

that it was made by T.G. Given that the 911 call allegedly occurred after T.G. was

picked up and transported to the clinic, there is no reason to believe that the loss of

the recording resulted in the loss of evidence favorable to Jones. Jones has not

shown that the missing recording would minimize or eliminate the state’s evidence

or bolster his defense.

              Missing photographs taken by the nurse, missing emergency room

records and missing clothing: The evidentiary significance of the lost or missing

emergency room records, photographs, toxicological report and clothing is purely

speculative. There is no evidence as to whether a toxicological analysis was even

performed on T.G.’s blood following the incident.          Nevertheless, T.G. readily

admitted that she had been drinking that evening, that she had likely used both

marijuana and cocaine and that she was “buzzed” at the time of the incident. She
was subject to cross-examination regarding the extent to which her alcohol and drug

use may have altered her perception or memory.           Although the photographs

Podlogar took of T.G.’s injuries following the incident are now missing, she also

documented T.G.’s injuries in the sexual assault kit notes, including both a detailed

description of the injuries she observed and photographed and a diagram showing

the precise location of those injuries. Podlogar testified at trial and was subject

cross-examination. There is no reason to believe that the photographs would have

shown materially different injuries from those documented in the sexual assault kit

notes or that other emergency room records would have contained materially

different, relevant information from what was included in the sexual assault kit

notes.

              Likewise, Jones has not identified any specific, relevant evidence that

examination or testing of T.G.’s clothing would have revealed that was not available

elsewhere. Based on the samples collected as part of the sexual assault kit, there was

ample DNA evidence establishing that Jones engaged in sexual conduct with T.G.

Examination or testing of T.G.’s clothing would have had no bearing on whether that

conduct was the product of force or a consensual encounter. Jones has not shown

that this missing evidence would minimize or eliminate the state’s evidence or

bolster his defense.

              G.G.’s memory loss: G.G. testified at trial and was subject to cross-

examination. G.G. testified that she met T.G. at the hospital following the incident

and testified both as to her observation of T.G. at the hospital and what happened
after they left the hospital. She did not witness the incident. There is nothing in the

record to suggest that G.G.’s memory loss following her 2019 brain tumor resulted

in the loss of any evidence favorable to Jones’ defense.

              Unidentified, missing or deceased witnesses: Jones also asserts that

he was prejudiced due to the loss of testimony from “crucial” unidentified, lost,

missing and/or deceased witnesses, including (1) “[a]dditional members of the East

Cleveland Police Department,” (2) “[h]ospital personnel that examined and

interviewed the alleged victim, other than the SANE nurse,” (3) the unidentified

man who picked up T.G. following the incident and took her to a clinic and (4)

Harvey Randall, Dianne Wynn and Jacqueline Jones.

              In order to establish actual prejudice caused by the unavailability of

witnesses, the defendant must first prove that the witnesses are in fact unavailable.

State v. Walker, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106414, 2018-Ohio-3669, ¶ 20.                “A

defendant’s bald assertion that witnesses are unavailable because they cannot be

found is not sufficient to establish the unavailability of the witnesses.” Id. “Evidence

that a witness is deceased is obviously sufficient to establish the witness’s

unavailability. However, the death of a witness, by itself, is not enough to establish

actual prejudice.” Id. ¶ 22, citing Jones, 148 Ohio St.3d 167, 2016-Ohio-5105, 69

N.E.3d 688, at ¶ 26.

              “The death of a potential witness during the preindictment period can

constitute prejudice, * * * if the defendant can identify exculpatory evidence that was

lost and show that the exculpatory evidence could not be obtained by other means.”
Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, at ¶ 103. For example,

a defendant may establish actual prejudice where he or she is unable to seek

verification of his or her story from a deceased witness. See, e.g., Jones at ¶ 28;

Luck, 15 Ohio St.3d at 157-158, 472 N.E.2d 1097.

              Although a defendant need not identify “what the exact substance of

an unavailable witness’s testimony would have been,” there must be some indication

in the record of what testimony the unavailable witness might have offered to show

that the unavailable testimony “would minimize or eliminate the impact of the

state’s evidence and bolster the defense.” Jones at ¶ 27-28; see also Craig, 2023-

Ohio-1003, at ¶ 23 (“[W]hile precision is not required, a defendant must explain

what testimony the unavailable witness might have offered.”); Walker at ¶ 23. “‘[A]

defendant cannot rely upon broad assertions of missing evidence or an unavailable

witness to establish prejudice.’” Walker at ¶ 22, quoting State v. Richardson, 2016-

Ohio-5843, 70 N.E.3d 1175, ¶ 13 (8th Dist.). A defendant must demonstrate “a

viable, tangible connection” between the missing testimony from the unavailable

witness and the defense of the case. Herns, 2024-Ohio-1099, at ¶ 49; Walker at

¶ 22.

              Although Jones claimed, in his motion to dismiss, that Woods, the

retired East Cleveland police officer who took T.G.’s report in 2004, was unavailable,

in fact, he testified and was subject to cross-examination at trial. Woods testified

regarding his investigation as documented in the police report he had prepared

around the time of the incident, i.e., that he spoke with T.G., that T.G. and G.G. took
him to the scene of the assault and the results of his attempt to locate witnesses.

There is no evidence in the record that any additional East Cleveland police officers

other than Woods took any statements from T.G. or performed any investigation of

the incident.

                Likewise, Podlogar, the nurse, testified at length at trial and was

subject to cross-examination regarding her examination of T.G. and T.G.’s

statements to her regarding what occurred. Although other “hospital personnel”

may have examined or spoken with T.G. following the incident, none of them

witnessed the incident. There is nothing in the record to suggest that any of these

witnesses would have had materially different, relevant information from what was

testified to by Podlogar or contained in the sexual assault kit notes. Jones failed to

show that any testimony from other hospital personnel would minimize or eliminate

the state’s evidence or bolster his defense.

                Similarly, Jones has not shown that he was prejudiced by the

unavailability of the man who allegedly picked up T.G. and brought her to the clinic

following the incident. There is no claim that this man witnessed the alleged assault.

Although he may have been able to offer evidence regarding where he picked up T.G.

and her appearance immediately following the incident, there is nothing in the

record to suggest that he could have offered any evidence favorable to the defense

that was not available elsewhere.
              With respect to the “deceased” witnesses5 — Jacqueline Jones, Harvey

Randall, Dianne Wynn — although Jones describes some or all of these witnesses as

“eyewitnesses” in his appellate brief, there is nothing in the record (1) to indicate

that any of these individuals (or any other third party) witnessed the incident or (2)

to otherwise explain how their testimony would have assisted his defense. As stated

above, Jones did not submit any affidavits or other evidence in support of his motion

to dismiss and did not testify at the hearing on his motion or at trial.

              In his motion, Jones asserted that Harvey Randall and Dianne Wynn

“would have been able to corroborate the incident was consensual and an exchange

of sex for money” but he did not explain what their connection was to the case or

how or why they would have allegedly “been able to corroborate the incident was

consensual and an exchange of sex for money.” See State v. Figueroa, 11th Dist.

Trumbull No. 2018-T-0071, 2019-Ohio-3151, ¶ 21, 23 (death of defendant’s neighbor

during preindictment period who defendant claimed could have “tied” him to

informant did not constitute prejudice where defendant provided no explanation as

to how witness would have aided defendant’s defense or undermined the state’s

case); State v. McCoy, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 107029, 2019-Ohio-868, ¶ 12-15

(where defendant “offered nothing to show that any of the three [allegedly

unavailable witnesses] were actually present when the criminal acts occurred,”

      5 Although the state admitted Jacqueline Jones’ death certificate into evidence at

trial, Jones presented no evidence to support his claim that Harvey Randall or Dianne
Wynn were deceased.
“fail[ing] to demonstrate ‘a viable, tangible connection between the missing

evidence or the unavailable witness to the defense of the case,’” defendant did not

establish actual prejudice), quoting Walker, 2018-Ohio-3669, at ¶ 22. Based on

T.G.’s testimony — the only evidence in the record regarding the issue — she and her

assailant were the only persons present during the alleged assault.

               In arguing his renewed motion to dismiss at trial, Jones shifted his

focus away from Randall and Wynn and argued that he was prejudiced by the loss

of testimony from Jacqueline Jones, the neighbor with whom Woods spoke when

canvassing the neighborhood following the incident. But no witness statements

were offered into evidence6 and there is nothing in the record beyond mere

speculation that Jacqueline Jones witnessed anything relevant to the charges here.

Jones has not offered any explanation of what, if any, facts or information

Jacqueline Jones would have been able to provide, that would have aided his defense

or undermined the state’s case, had he been prosecuted before she died in

September 2014.       Speculation that she or any other witness could have had

information favorable to his defense does not meet Jones’ burden of showing actual

prejudice.

               Jones asserts that the facts in this case are similar to those in State v.

Mack, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 100965, 2014-Ohio-4817, and State v. Crymes, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 104705, 2017-Ohio-2655 — in which we held that the trial court

       6 Although Woods testified at trial that he “wrote down what [Jacqueline Jones]

stated” in his police report, the police report, which Woods reviewed prior to his
testimony, was not admitted as an exhibit at trial or submitted with his motion to dismiss.
had properly granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss due to preindictment

delay.7 We disagree.

               In Mack, multiple witnesses, including the responding officers and

two of the three detectives who investigated the case, were unavailable; the

recording of 911 call allegedly made by the victim was unavailable; the defendant

claimed that the alleged victim had admitted that she and the defendant had had

consensual sexual relations on multiple occasions prior to the time he had allegedly

raped her and the defendant was being prosecuted for a crime he allegedly

committed as a juvenile despite his identity always being known. Id. at ¶ 2-3, 10.

Based on the particular facts in that case, this court held that the defendant had

established actual prejudice and that the state’s reason for the delay — the lack of

       7 In support of his third assignment of error, Jones also cites numerous cases

addressing postindictment delay and the standard applicable when determining whether a
defendant’s constitutional right to a speedy trial has been violated. (See Appellant’s Br. at
16, 18-21, 24-25.) For example, Jones cites State v. Burden, 5th Dist. Stark No. 2012-CA-
00074, 2013-Ohio-1628, for the proposition that “[e]ven in the event that a defendant
cannot point to actual prejudice caused by a delay in prosecuting alleged criminal conduct
the length of the delay, standing alone, may also support a dismissal.” However, as stated
in Burden:

       The notion that prejudice may be presumed from a lengthy delay arises in the
       context of the four-part balancing test used in determining whether a post-
       indictment or post-accusation delay has deprived a defendant of his Sixth
       Amendment right to a speedy trial. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct.
       2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). The Barker four-part test, and the concept of
       presumptive prejudice, applies only to post-indictment or post-accusation
       delays that implicate the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, and has no
       application to pre-indictment delays. * * *

Burden at ¶ 33. Jones’ motion to dismiss was based on preindictment delay, not an alleged
violation of Jones’ right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, those cases have no application here.
cooperation by the alleged victim — did not outweigh the prejudice to the defendant.

Id. at ¶ 10-11.

                  In Crymes, 2017-Ohio-2655, the defendant claimed that he was

prejudiced by the unavailability of phone records that could have negatively

impacted the alleged victim’s credibility. The alleged victim had told the police that

she did not know why the defendant had come over to her house the morning of the

alleged rape. Crymes at ¶ 4. The defendant, however, had given a statement to police

in which he claimed that the alleged victim had been his girlfriend, that they had

previously engaged in consensual sex and that the alleged victim had called him

twice in the early morning on the date of the alleged rape, asking if he was coming

over to her house. Id. at ¶ 3. This court held that the defendant showed actual

prejudice from the loss of the phone records because evidence of the specific phone

calls from the alleged victim’s house to the defendant before the incident, “although

not direct proof of consent, would help [the defendant] verify his account of the

event, thereby bolstering the defense” and “could well contradict the victim’s

account of the event,” minimizing the impact of her testimony. Id. at ¶ 19-21. This

court further held that the state had failed to meet its burden of showing that the

delay in prosecution was justified because it had provided no reason or justification

for the delay. Id. at ¶ 22.

                  As detailed above, the facts here are very different from those in Mack

and Crymes. Unlike in those cases, where the alleged perpetrator was known to

authorities from the outset of the case, T.G.’s alleged assailant was a stranger whose
identity was not known until DNA testing linked him to the alleged assault. The

alleged missing witnesses here were not the original investigating police officers; the

missing recording of the 911 call here was not a 911 call made by the alleged victim

and other alleged missing evidence here did not involve alleged direct, pre-incident

communications between the alleged victim and the defendant.

              We are mindful more than ten years passed between the time of

alleged rape and the testing of T.G.’s sexual assault kit — when Jones was potentially

linked to the DNA found in the sexual assault kit — and that another five years

passed before the state indicted Jones. As this court previously acknowledged, when

considering a similar timeline, “[t]his timeline does not put the state’s preindictment

delay in a good light.” State v. Miller, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109543, 2021-Ohio-

1878, ¶ 35. “However, the burden-shifting analysis set forth by the Ohio Supreme

Court in Jones made clear that, before courts review whether the state’s delay was

unjustifiable, the defendant must present evidence of actual prejudice.” Id.

              Jones did not establish the existence of any missing or unavailable

evidence that would “cut into the state’s case” or “bolster his own.” Id. Having

concluded that Jones failed to meet his burden of showing actual prejudice, we need

not consider the reasons for the preindictment delay and whether those reasons

justified the delay. Jones, 148 Ohio St.3d 167, 2016-Ohio-5105, 69 N.E.3d 688, at

¶ 16, 18; Adams, 144 Ohio St.3d 429, 2015-Ohio-3954, 45 N.E.3d 127, at ¶ 107.

              Jones’ third assignment of error is overruled.
      Sufficiency of the Evidence and Manifest Weight of the Evidence

              In his first and second assignments of error, Jones contends that his

convictions for rape and kidnapping were not supported by sufficient evidence and

were against the manifest weight of the evidence. In his second assignment of error,

Jones contends that his convictions for rape and kidnapping should be vacated

because “T.G.’s testimony alone” that Jones’ sexual contact with her “was not

consensual” was insufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In his

first assignment of error, Jones contends that his convictions were against the

manifest weight of the evidence due to the state’s “failure to provide crucial

evidence.”

              Although sufficiency and manifest weight challenges involve different

standards of review, because, here, they are based on virtually the same arguments

and evidence (or the alleged lack thereof), we address them together.

              A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction

requires a determination of whether the state has met its burden of production at

trial. State v. Hunter, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 86048, 2006-Ohio-20, ¶ 41. The

relevant inquiry in a sufficiency challenge is “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in

a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found

the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.’” State v.

Leonard, 104 Ohio St.3d 54, 2004-Ohio-6235, 818 N.E.2d 229, ¶ 77, quoting State

v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d 492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus.

The court examines all the evidence admitted at trial to determine whether such
evidence, if believed, would convince a reasonable juror of the defendant’s guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111922, 2023-

Ohio-2296, ¶ 81, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 390, 678 N.E.2d 541

(1997) (Cook, J., concurring); see also State v. Bankston, 10th Dist. Franklin No.

08AP-668, 2009-Ohio-754, ¶ 4 (noting that “in a sufficiency of the evidence review,

an appellate court does not engage in a determination of witness credibility; rather,

it essentially assumes the state’s witnesses testified truthfully and determines if that

testimony satisfies each element of the crime”). Whether the evidence is legally

sufficient to support a verdict is a question of law. Thompkins at 386.

              In contrast to a challenge based on sufficiency of the evidence, a

manifest weight challenge attacks the credibility of the evidence presented.

“‘“[W]eight of the evidence involves the inclination of the greater amount of credible

evidence.”’” State v. Harris, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 109060, 2021-Ohio-856, ¶ 32,

quoting Thompkins at 387, quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1594 (6th Ed.1990).

When considering an appellant’s claim that a conviction is against the manifest

weight of the evidence, the appellate court functions as a “‘thirteenth juror’” and may

disagree “with the factfinder’s resolution of * * * conflicting testimony.” Thompkins

at 387, quoting Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 42, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652

(1982). The appellate court examines the entire record, weighs the evidence and all

reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, considers the witnesses’

credibility and determines whether, in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier

of fact “‘clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that
the conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at 387,

quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

Reversal on manifest weight grounds is reserved for the “‘exceptional case in which

the evidence weighs heavily against the conviction.’” Thompkins at 387, quoting

Martin at 175.

              Jones was convicted of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and

kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4). R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) states: “No

person shall engage in sexual conduct with another when the offender purposely

compels the other person to submit by force or threat of force.”                  R.C.

2905.01(A)(4) states, in relevant part: “No person, by force, threat, or deception, * *

* shall remove another from the place where the other person is found or restrain

the liberty of the other person, for any of the following purposes: * * * [t]o engage

in sexual activity, as defined in section 2907.01 of the Revised Code, with the victim

against the victim’s will.”

               Jones contends that “the only evidence” the state presented to prove

that Jones’ sexual conduct with T.G. “was not consensual” was “T.G.’s testimony

nearly 19 years later” and that “[h]er testimony alone” was insufficient to prove his

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because (1) “back in 2004, she was under the

influence of alcohol, marijuana and probably cocaine” and (2) in 2010 and 2011, she

was “convicted * * * of crimes that stemmed from untruthfulness.” Jones further

contends that because “key evidence” was “missing” from the state’s case —

including (1) testimony from “crucial” witnesses such as the individual who allegedly
drove T.G. to the clinic, G.G. (who had suffered memory loss) and the two deceased

individuals with whom Jones “had spoken to the morning of the incident, who would

have corroborated his version of events” and (2) T.G.’s clothing, complete hospital

medical records and photographs of her injuries — the state’s evidence was

“unreliable,” incomplete and “uncertain and fragmentary,” such that these

convictions were against the manifest of the evidence. We disagree.

              As detailed above, the state presented ample, credible evidence upon

which a reasonable jury could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Jones

raped and kidnapped T.G. as charged.

              A conviction may rest solely on the testimony of a single witness,

including the alleged victim, if believed, and there is no requirement that a witness’

testimony be corroborated to be believed. See, e.g., State v. Washington, 2023-

Ohio-1667, 214 N.E.3d 1188, ¶ 119 (8th Dist.); State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga

No. 111922, 2023-Ohio-2296, ¶ 87; State v. Nicholson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

110595, 2022-Ohio-2037, ¶ 180; State v. Jones, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108371,

2020-Ohio-3367, ¶ 71; State v. Flores-Santiago, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 108458,

2020-Ohio-1274, ¶ 38. This includes cases that involve allegations of rape or other

forms of sexual assault. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-1748, 215 N.E.3d

629, ¶ 35-36 (8th Dist.); State v. Black, 2019-Ohio-4977, 149 N.E.3d 1132, ¶ 43 (8th

Dist.); State v. Schroeder, 2019-Ohio-4136, 147 N.E.3d 1, ¶ 84 (4th Dist.).

              Here, T.G. testified her assailant, a stranger, “grabbed” her, “yanked”

her and “dragged” down a dark alleyway and behind a house as she attempted to
fight him off. She testified that her assailant “threw [her] down,” forced her to the

ground and slammed her head against the ground while he was on top of her, before

taking off her pants and raping her. The state presented DNA evidence from T.G.’s

sexual assault examination kits that linked Jones to the rape.

               When viewed in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence

presented at trial was sufficient for a rational jury to find, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that Jones “engage[d] in sexual conduct” with T.G., “purposely compel[ing]

[her] to submit by force or threat of force,” and forcibly removed T.G. or

“restrain[ed]” her “liberty” in order to engage in sexual activity with her “against

[her] will” to support Jones’ convictions for rape and kidnapping under R.C.

2907.02(A)(2) and 2905.01(A)(4).

              At trial, Jones did not dispute that he had had sexual intercourse with

T.G. Instead, defense counsel argued that T.G.’s decisionmaking may have been

impaired by her drug and alcohol use, that “[m]aybe she decided to go out there and

meet a guy, have some indiscriminate sexual liaison,” that “[m]aybe,” after the fact,

she was “embarrassed” and “had buyer’s remorse” and that she was “a liar,” as

evidenced by her prior “adjudicat[ion] by the criminal justice system as being

dishonest,” alleged inconsistencies in her prior statements and testimony and the

alleged implausibility of her version of events.

              Simply because T.G. (1) has a criminal record and (2) admitted to

using drugs and alcohol and being “buzzed” at the time of the incident does not mean

that her testimony could not be relied upon to convict Jones. See, e.g., State v.
Robertson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106279, 2018-Ohio-2934, ¶ 29; State v. Nitsche,

2016-Ohio-3170, 66 N.E.3d 135, ¶ 44 (8th Dist.); see also State v. Wells, 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 98388, 2013-Ohio-3722, ¶ 130 (credibility of witnesses in murder

case was left to the jury where witnesses admitted they were high on crack cocaine

the day of the murder and had “extensive criminal histories”); State v. Medezma-

Palomo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 88711, 2007-Ohio-5723, ¶ 36-37 (fact that

witnesses “were all consuming crack cocaine and heroin on a daily basis” and that

several of the state’s witnesses had criminal records did not preclude the jury from

finding their testimony to be credible); State v. Petty, 10th Dist. Franklin Nos. 11AP-

716 and 11AP-766, 2012-Ohio-2989, ¶ 41 (fact that witnesses had criminal records

and struggled with substance abuse did not render their testimony unreliable; jury

could properly weigh information regarding witnesses’ criminal histories and drug

use in determining how much credibility to give their testimony).

              Likewise, a defendant is not entitled to reversal on manifest weight

grounds merely because certain aspects of a witness’ testimony are not credible or

were inconsistent or contradictory. State v. Williams, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No.

112800, 2024-Ohio-838, ¶ 54; Flores-Santiago, 2020-Ohio-1274, at ¶ 40; Nitsche

at ¶ 45; State v. Wade, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 90029, 2008-Ohio-4574, ¶ 38. “The

jury may detect any number of inconsistencies and resolve them accordingly.”

Williams at ¶ 54.

              T.G. answered questions regarding her criminal history and her

alcohol and drug use during her direct and cross-examinations. The jury heard T.G.
admit that she had been drinking, was “buzzed,” had smoked marijuana and had

likely used cocaine prior to the incident. The jury also heard T.G. admit that, in 2010

and 2011, she had been convicted of theft and misuse of a credit card. Through his

cross-examination, defense counsel identified certain inconsistencies in T.G.’s trial

testimony and her prior statements to police and Podlogar and brought them to the

attention of the jury. The jury, having heard T.G.’s testimony and the other evidence

presented at trial, was able to judge the credibility of T.G. for itself and was “‘“free to

believe all, some, or none of [her] testimony”’” (as well as that of the other witnesses

appearing before it). See, e.g., Jones, 2020-Ohio-3367, at ¶ 85, quoting State v.

Sheline, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106649, 2019-Ohio-528, ¶ 100, quoting State v.

Colvin, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 04AP-421, 2005-Ohio-1448, ¶ 34. Jones has not

shown that T.G.’s testimony was so inherently incredible or unreliable as to preclude

a reasonable factfinder from believing her.

               Further, contrary to Jones’ assertion, T.G.’s testimony was not the

only evidence presented at trial that supported his convictions. The state presented

evidence that, shortly after the incident, T.G. went to the hospital, where she agreed

to submit to an invasive sexual assault examination. Podlogar testified regarding

the significant bruising she observed on T.G. during the examination, including

abrasions to her right cheek and above her left eye, abrasions on both breasts,

scratches linearly across her upper right thigh, bruises on her hands and her left

posterior arm and abrasions to the sacrococcyx area — bruising that was arguably

inconsistent with an ordinary consensual sexual encounter and arguably consistent
with efforts to fight off an attacker. Although the photographs Podlogar took of

those injuries have been lost, she clearly documented T.G.’s injuries in the sexual-

assault kit notes, including in a detailed diagram. See State v. Dudley, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 28364, 2017-Ohio-7044, ¶ 10 (holding the state was not required to

present photographs or medical records to corroborate witness’ testimony regarding

injuries). The state also presented evidence that Jones’ DNA matched DNA found

in samples taken from T.G.’s breasts, vagina, pubic hair, thigh/eternal genitalia and

fingernail scrapings.

              Following a thorough review of the record, weighing the strength and

credibility of the evidence presented at trial and the reasonable inferences to be

drawn therefrom, we cannot say that the jury clearly lost its way and created such a

manifest miscarriage of justice that Jones’ convictions must be reversed. This is not

the “‘exceptional case’” in which the evidence weighs heavily against Jones’

convictions. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d at 387, 678 N.E.2d 541, quoting Martin, 20

Ohio App.3d at 175, 485 N.E.2d 717.

              We overrule Jones’ first and second assignments of error.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant the costs herein taxed.

      The court finds that there were reasonable grounds for these appeals.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas to carry this judgment into execution.

The defendant’s conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending is terminated.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

EILEEN A. GALLAGHER, PRESIDING JUDGE

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., and
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., CONCUR