Court Opinion

ID: 9400100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-07 15:04:49.247635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:42.193393
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                               FOURTH DISTRICT

    WATER’S EDGE DERMATOLOGY, LLC, and DWAYNE MONTIE, D.O.,
                         Appellants,

                                      v.

                  SARAH VICTORIA CHRISTOPHERSON,
                              Appellee.

                               No. 4D22-2209

                                [June 7, 2023]

  Appeal of nonfinal order from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth
Judicial Circuit, Broward County; Barbara McCarthy, Judge; L.T. Case No.
CACE21009857.

     Lissette Gonzalez of Cole, Scott & Kissane, P.A., Miami, for appellants.

   Bard D. Rockenbach of Burlington & Rockenbach, P.A., West Palm
Beach, and Jonathan R. Gdanski and David Silverman of Schlesinger Law
Offices, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee.

FORST, J.

   Appellants, Water’s Edge Dermatology, LLC (“Provider”), and Dwayne
Montie, D.O. (“Doctor”), 1 argue that the trial court abused its discretion in
denying their amended motion to transfer venue from Broward County to
Indian River County. We agree and reverse.

                                 Background

   Doctor and Provider treated Appellee Sarah Victoria Christopherson
(“Patient”) in Provider’s Vero Beach office located in Indian River County.
The following year, Patient discovered that she developed skin cancer. She
subsequently filed suit in Broward County against Provider and Doctor for
medical negligence, and against Provider for vicarious liability.

   Patient alleged in the complaint that she resided in Indian River County
at all material times and Broward County was a proper venue because at
the time Provider and Doctor treated Patient, “one or more of the

1Doctor passed away during the pendency of the proceedings. Doctor’s widow,
as personal representative of Doctor’s estate, is now a party to the action.
defendants resided in Broward County, Florida and the corporate
defendant has, or usually keeps an office for transaction of its customary
business that is located in Broward County, Florida.” While Provider
conducts business in Broward County, Provider’s principal place of
business and the office that treated Patient are located elsewhere. Doctor
resided in Martin County, which—like Indian River County—is served by
the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit. Broward County is the sole county served
by the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit. The principal judicial complex for the
Seventeenth Circuit lies about 120 miles south of Provider’s Vero Beach
office.

    Provider and Doctor moved to transfer venue to the Nineteenth Judicial
Circuit, arguing forum non conveniens as a basis for transfer, and
attaching Doctor’s affidavit in support. Doctor attested that Broward
County was an inconvenient venue, because neither Doctor nor any of
Provider’s staff involved in treating Patient resided in or practiced in
Broward County. Doctor elaborated that Patient received treatment in
Provider’s Vero Beach office, located in the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit,
and the material witnesses would be “substantially more convenien[ced]”
if venue was transferred.

   The defendants later amended their motion, specifying Indian River
County as the preferred transferee venue. In an affidavit filed following
Doctor’s death, his widow, a resident of Martin County, attested that the
case remaining in Broward County would pose a substantial hardship to
her as a single parent to a young child.

   Patient responded to the motion and amended motion to transfer
venue, attaching the affidavits of six individuals: Patient, Patient’s
boyfriend, Patient’s mother, Patient’s treating oncologist, Patient’s
boyfriend’s mother, and Patient’s boyfriend’s father. Aside from Patient’s
boyfriend’s parents, whose connection to the case is unknown, no
attesting individual resides in Broward County or identifies a connection
to Broward County related to Patient’s treatment. Each affidavit contains
the same declaration that testifying in Broward County would not be
inconvenient.

    After hearing arguments of the parties on the amended motion to
transfer venue, the trial court expressed that “there is insufficient evidence
to transfer venue.” This appeal followed.

                                  Analysis

   An order denying a motion to transfer venue is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. Eagle Transp. Corp. of N.C. v. Roch-Hernandez, 324 So. 3d
521, 522–23 (Fla. 4th DCA 2021).
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      A plaintiff may select the venue and that selection will not be
      disturbed as long as the selection is one of the alternatives in
      the venue statute. Florida Gamco, Inc. v. Fontaine, 68 So. 3d
      923, 928 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011). A defendant contesting a
      plaintiff’s facially proper venue selection has the burden of
      proving the selection is improper and must establish where
      venue actually lies. Id. Once a defendant has challenged
      venue with an affidavit controverting a plaintiff’s venue
      allegation, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove the venue
      selection is proper. Id.

First Church of Nazarene of Gainesville, Fla., Inc. v. Site Concepts, Inc., 265
So. 3d 641, 643 (Fla. 4th DCA 2019).

   “[T]here are three statutory factors a court considers in determining
whether to grant a motion [to transfer venue] pursuant to section 47.122[,
Fla. Stat.]: (1) the convenience of the parties; (2) the convenience of the
witnesses; and (3) the interest of justice.” Pep Boys v. Montilla, 62 So. 3d
1162, 1165 (Fla. 4th DCA 2011) (first alteration in original) (quoting Ford
Motor Co. v. James, 33 So. 3d 91, 92–93 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)).

   While the trial court should consider all three of these factors, the
convenience of the witnesses is “probably the single most important
consideration of the three statutory factors.” Ford Motor Co., 33 So. 3d at
93 (quoting Hu v. Crockett, 426 So. 2d 1275, 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)).
“The plaintiff’s forum selection is no longer the factor of over-riding
importance.” Botta v. Ciklin, Lubitz & O’Connell, 222 So. 3d 605, 608 (Fla.
4th DCA 2017) (quoting Pep Boys, 62 So. 3d at 1165).

    A trial court abuses its discretion when it denies a motion to transfer
based on forum non conveniens where there is only an attenuated
connection to a venue that bears no relation to the lawsuit’s critical events.
See, e.g., SMA Behav. Health Servs., Inc. v. Loewinger, 355 So. 3d 988,
989–90 (Fla. 3d DCA 2023) (transferring from county where corporate
headquarters were located to county where most of the critical events
occurred and fact witnesses resided); Braun v. Stafford, 529 So. 2d 735,
736 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (transferring from county where only connection
was a corporate office to county where cause of action occurred and
medical treatment was administered); Botta, 222 So. 3d at 609–10
(transferring from county where party’s law firm was located to county
where decedent lived and received treatment).

   Here, the factors favor Indian River County as a more appropriate and
convenient venue over Broward County. Patient, Provider, Doctor, and

                                      3
Provider’s staff members involved in treating Patient are/were located in
or near Indian River County, where Patient’s cause of action accrued. See
McDaniel Rsrv. Realty Holdings, LLC v. B.S.E. Consultants, Inc., 39 So. 3d
504, 509 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (“[A] tort accrues in the county where the
plaintiff first suffers injury.”). Additionally, neither Patient nor any
attesting individual has established a connection to Broward County
specifically related to Patient’s treatment. Indeed, the only attenuated
connection to Broward County is the fact that Provider transacts business
there, but its business in Broward County bears no relation to Patient’s
treatment by Provider or Doctor. See Loewinger, 355 So. 3d at 989–90.

   The law firm representing Patient in this civil action is located in
Broward County. However, the convenience of the attorneys “is usually
accorded very little, if any, weight.” Pep Boys, 62 So. 3d at 1165 (quoting
Hu, 426 So. 2d at 1280).

    As noted in Hu and Pep Boys, “[o]ther [interests of justice]
considerations include but are not limited to the avoidance of a crowded
court docket and the imposition of jury duty on an uninvolved
community.” Pep Boys, 62 So. 3d at 1165 (quoting Hu, 426 So. 2d at
1280). In Pep Boys, we found the trial court abused its discretion in
denying the defendant’s motion to transfer venue from Broward County.
Id. at 1167. Here, we can parrot Pep Boys’ observation that “Broward
County is a larger, more populous county, has crowded dockets, and the
community has virtually no connection to the case.” Id. at 1166. Thus,
the interests of justice strongly favor change of venue to Indian River
County.

                                Conclusion

   Patient, a resident of Indian River County, alleges damages resulting
from medical treatment at co-defendant Provider’s facility located in Indian
River County. Doctor’s widow, the representative of Doctor’s estate,
resides in the Nineteenth Circuit, as did the decedent Doctor. The latter
practiced in Indian River County. Applying the three-factor test, we
conclude the defendants met their burden to establish the most
convenient forum is Indian River County. Patient did not meet her burden
to show that Broward County was the proper venue.

   Accordingly, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the
defendants’ amended motion to transfer venue. Thus, we reverse and
remand the case to the trial court for transfer of Patient’s lawsuit to Indian
River County.

   Reversed and remanded.

                                      4
CIKLIN and KUNTZ, JJ., concur.

                           *      *        *

   Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

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