Court Opinion

ID: 9775048
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:42:08.091328+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:19.293032
License: Public Domain

COMBS, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent. Firstly, a good deal of the police testimony complained of was inadmissible hearsay. The officer testified that certain numbered dollar bills were (reportedly) stolen during a robbery; and that some of these bills were (reportedly) passed to a bank (reportedly) by the defendant’s sister, who also (reportedly) surrendered another of the bills to the police chief. According to the majority, this testimony was admissible because it “did not indicate innocence or guilt” (ante, p. 485). But in another breath the majority defends the prosecutor’s claim in closing *488argument,1 that the sister had acquired the money from the defendant, as a “reasonable inference[] from the testimony that had been presented regarding the recovery of the stolen money” (ante, p. 6).
If the testimony was indeed not probative of innocence or guilt, it was not only hearsay but was irrelevant and immaterial as well; and allowing the prosecution to introduce new damning evidence by way of closing argument was patently prejudicial error. If on the other hand the testimony did permit reasonable inferences that the defendant had possessed the bills and that these were in fact the stolen bills, it was highly prejudicial, clearly inadmissible hearsay. The evidence was offered, not to prove any police action which was in issue, but to prove the defendant guilty of robbery. See Sanborn v. Commonwealth, Ky., 754 S.W.2d 534 (1988). Here, the prosecution and the trial court ignored the law of the case established upon a previous (unpublished) review of this very matter, that such evidence should be introduced through witnesses having firsthand knowledge of the facts.
Secondly, I believe that the deposition of the absent witness was erroneously admitted. KRS 422.150 provides:
The testimony of any witness taken by a stenographic reporter may, in the discretion of the court in which it is taken, be used as evidence in any subsequent trial of the same issue between the same parties, where the testimony of such witness cannot be procured, but no testimony so taken shall be used in any criminal case without the consent of the defendant.
In my view, this statute prohibits in a criminal case the reading in of prior testimony, including a deposition, without the consent of the accused, and, as a substantive legislative prohibition, transcends RCr 7.22, RCr 7.20, and judicial precedent.
STEPHENS, C.J., and LEIBSON, J., join in this dissenting opinion, solely with respect to the issue of investigative hearsay.

. During closing, the prosecutor argued to the jury; "And Io and behold who cashes them but this guy’s sister.... [T]his is the one that she gave to the Bellvue Police when they called her in. Where did you get the money? Do you remember that testimony? Where did you get the money? Well, Keith paid me twenty dollars he owed me_” The defense objected, pointing out that the defendant’s sister had not testified at all. The prosecutor insisted that the police officer had testified as to her remarks. In fact, the record contains no testimony, competent or hearsay, as to how or from whom Ms. Ruppee acquired the bills.