Court Opinion

ID: 9856337
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:45:14.619836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:36.959433
License: Public Domain

McQUADE, Justice
(dissenting).
As the majority opinion notes, some corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix in rape and lewd and lascivious conduct prosecutions long has been required in Idaho.1 The majority declines to require some corroboration in prosecutions for procurement under I.C. § 18-5602. The majority applies the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius to hold that I.C. § 19-2115, which requires corroboration in prosecutions for procurement of females under the age of eighteen, excludes any requirement of corroboration when the prosecutrix is over the age of eighteen, as apparently she is in the present case.
However, on the basis of the relevant policy considerations, it would appear that the better course would be to apply by analogy the rationale of the latter criminal procedure statute to require corroboration in the case at bar.2 The two statutes dealing with offenses against females under eighteen were enacted in 1887. I.C. § 18-5609 set out the substance of the offense and I.C. § 19-2115 set out the corroboration requirement as part of the procedure of prosecuting that offense. I.C. §§ 18-5601 through 18-5608 were enacted in 1911 by S.L. 1911, ch. 205, §§ 1-10, but a parallel corroboration provision was not added to Chapter 21 of Title 19 of the Idaho Code governing criminal procedure. Although legislative acts must be presumed to be reasonably undertaken, yet no compelling reason appears why the failure of the legislature to enact a corroboration requirement for the testimony of a prosecutrix over the age of eighteen in procurement prosecutions should be viewed as more than an inadvertent omission. Such an omission should be corrected interstitially by this Court, especially when statutes relating to criminal procedure generally are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused.3
The requirement of corroboration is a safeguard for the accused in relation to charges against which it is difficult to defend. The Idaho precedents indicate that this safeguard should be applicable in all sex crimes. After a review of cases dealing with lewd and lascivious conduct, statutory rape, sex perversion, sodomy and incest, the Court in the Madrid case stated:
“  In harmony with the declared public policy of this state with reference to the necessity of corroboration of testimony of the complaining witness in such sex crimes, we hold that the testimony of the prosecuting witness in the prosecution for lewd and lascivious acts must be corroborated either by direct evidence or evidence of surrounding circumstances which clearly corroborate the statements of the complaining witness under the rule as laid down in the case of State v. Elsen, supra, in order that a conviction under the act may be sustained.” 4
Thus, both the decisional and the statutory analogies available with respect to the *738case at bar would require that some corroboration be required. The majority apply the general common law rule that “corroboration of a prosecutrix’s testimony to sustain a conviction for a sex offense” is not necessary. This alters the established rule in Idaho that corroboration is necessary in the generality of sex crimes.
The majority argue that, though the corroboration requirement will seldom prevent valid prosecutions for rape because physical evidence is often available, yet such a requirement could make attempted procurement convictions harder to acquire because mere verbal communications constitute the offense. Of course, that is the purpose of the corroboration requirement. It is precisely because criminal liability is attached to what may be minimal or ambiguous verbal conduct that some form of corroboration should be required. In the present case, appellant’s putting his arm around the prosecutrix and his use of the word “kidnap” tends to give his statement a facetious quality.
The majority further argue that the criminal communications of attempted procurement “will invariably occur in private surroundings, there being no evidence of their occurrence, save for the testimony of the prosecuting witness.” However, in this very case the statement was made in a public tavern with at least four other girls nearby. Moreover, the precedents hold that only where the testimony of the prosecutrix is wholly without corroboration will the conviction fail. “No hard and fast rule can be laid down on the subject of corroboration. Each case must depend upon its own merits and * * * circumstances.” 5 In this case, the prosecutrix repeated appellant’s statement to the manager of the tavern where she was employed and to a detective soon after it was made and under conditions of apparent sincerity. This may have been sufficient corroboration of the testimony of the prosecutrix, but I cannot concur in the affirmance of the conviction without the application of the rule requiring some corroboration.

. See State v. Tope, 86 Idaho 462, 387 P.2d 888 (1963); State v. Madrid, 74 Idaho 200, 259 P.2d 1044 (1953); and State v. Elsen, 68 Idaho 50, 187 P.2d 976 (1947), as well as numerous other cases cited in each of the foregoing.

. Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 4917 (Horack ed. 1943) (Limitations [of expressio unius est exclusio alterius]) : “ * * * where an expanded interpretation of a statute will accomplish beneficial results, serve the purpose for which the statute was enacted * * * or is the established custom, usage or practice, the maxim will be refuted and an expanded meaning given;” see also Gellhorn, “Contracts and Public Policy,” 35 Col.L.Rev. at 690-692 (1935), quoted in Hart & Sacks, “The Legal Process: Problems in the Making and Application of Law” 490-491 (tent. ed. 1958).

. Sutherland, op. cit. n. 2, supra, § 5601.

. Madrid, note 1 supra 74 Idaho at p. 208, 259 P.2d at p. 1049.

. Elsen, note 1 supra, 68 Idaho at p. 55, 187 P.2d at p. 978.