Court Opinion

ID: 9684815
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:14:44.992356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:59.860902
License: Public Domain

DAUPHINOT, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial judge properly denied Appellant’s motion to suppress. However, I would find that we have jurisdiction to consider Appellant’s complaint of errors occurring at the adjudication hearing. Although this court has held that the prohibition of appeal from an adjudication hearing is nearly absolute,1 we were in error to do so.
The court of criminal appeals has stated, in unequivocal terms, that an appellate court may consider certain issues arising from the adjudication hearing: “[A]n appellate court must sort out various rulings a trial court may make in the course of a deferred adjudication proceeding to determine those which the Legislature provided the right to appeal.”2 Thus, we have been in error to summarily dismiss a claim simply because it arises from the deferred adjudication proceeding. Our high court has mandated that we sift through claims to locate those grounded on an appealable right.3 Deprivation of due process is such a right. Code of criminal procedure 42.12, section 5(b) provides:
On violation of a condition of community supervision imposed under Subsection (a) of this section, the defendant may be arrested and detained as provided in Section 21 of this article. The defendant is entitled to a hearing limited to the determination by the court of whether it proceeds with an adjudication of guilt on the original *776charge. No appeal may be taken from this determination.4
Read in conjunction with section 21, which mandates a hearing on the allegations in the petition to revoke community supervision, it is clear that a defendant is entitled to require the State to prove the alleged violations. The second sentence of section 5(b) guarantees the defendant the right to a hearing to determine whether the court will adjudicate guilt. My reading of Olowosuko v. State and sections 5(b) and 21 leads me to conclude that there is a right to appeal a deprivation of due process at this adjudication hearing.
In reading a statute, “[wjords and phrases shall be read in context and construed according to the rules of grammar and common usage.”5 In common usage, a healing is a “proceeding of relative formality ... in which witnesses are heard and evidence presented _in much the same manner as a trial.” 6 As a reviewing court, we have “jurisdiction to determine if a ‘hearing’ was held that satisfied the requirements of substantive and procedural due process.”7 A proceeding in which due process is disregarded, or where there is incompetent evidence to support adjudication, is not a “hearing” within the meaning of section 5(b).
It follows that an appeal alleging due process deprivation or insufficient evidence is not prohibited by the terms of section 5(b) because these claims, in effect, allege that no “hearing” was held. Because no “hearing” has been held under these circumstances, the section 5(b) prohibition does not apply. An appeal on those grounds is not statutorily barred by section 5(b) or any other section. Therefore, it is controlled by the general provisions of article 44.02.8 Thus, the legislature has not denied the right to appeal due process deprivation.
Although the third sentence of section 5(b) prohibits the defendant’s questioning the decision to adjudicate, it does not prohibit his challenging the procedure of adjudication. The right to appeal is generally grounded in the federal and state constitutions. The constitutions, not the legislatures, established the United State Supreme Court, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, and the Texas Supreme Court.
State court judges are bound by the federal constitution and all federal laws.9' Should the highest court of any state uphold a violation of the federal constitution, it would be the duty of the United States Supreme Court to reverse that ruling.10 The United States Supreme Court “has never held that the States are required to establish avenues of appellate review, but it is now fundamental that, once established, these avenues must be kept free of unreasoned distinctions that can only impede open and equal access to the’ courts.”11
The cornerstone of the restricted appeal from an adjudication hearing is not that the right to appeal is a legislatively created right, as this court has erroneously stated in the past. Rather, it is that the constitutionally-grounded right to appeal may be regulated by the legislature.12 Specifically, “in this state, the right of appeal is conferred only by the Constitution, with such exceptions or limitations as the legislature directs by statute.”13 Constitutional guarantees of due process and equal protection require that once the right to appeal a criminal conviction exists, it must be fairly applied.
*777The legislature has prohibited the defendant’s questioning the decision to adjudicate.14 The legislature has not prohibited his challenging the procedure, that is the propriety of the conduct, of the adjudication hearing. Were we to continue blindly to adhere to the notion that there are no constitutional limits to the legislature’s authority to regulate appeals, we would be forced to find that the legislature could write into every statute it passes that there could be “no appeal challenging the constitutionality of this statute.”
To hold that the legislature may suspend all constitutional guarantees to persons on deferred adjudication community supervision invites capricious and arbitrary decisions to adjudicate.15 The law is well established that defendants are entitled to due process in community supervision16 and parole17 revocation hearings. Similarly, section 5(b) “does not deprive this Court of jurisdiction to determine if a ‘hearing’ was held that satisfied the requirements of substantive and procedural due process.”18 As an appellate court, we must ensure that constitutional protections are honored. In doing so, we are obligated to entertain claims regarding the constitutionality of a statute or constitutional violations in the statute’s application.
I would hold that Appellant may challenge the admissibility of evidence at the adjudication hearing as well as the legal sufficiency of evidence to prove a violation. He may challenge the impartiality of the judge and the fairness of the proceeding. But once it is clear that his due process interests were adequately protected, the decision to adjudicate, lying within the sound discretion of the judge, may not be appealed.

. See Tillman v. State, 919 S.W.2d 836, 837 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref’d).

. Olowosuko v. State, 826 S.W.2d 940, 941 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

. See id.

. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (Vernon Supp.1998) (emphasis added).

. Tfex. Gov't Code Ann. § 311.011(a) (Vernon 1988).

. Black’s Law Dictionary 721 (6 th ed.1990).

. Eldridge v. State, 731 S.W.2d 618, 619 (Tex.App.—Houston [1st Dist] 1987, no pet.)

. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.02 (Vernon 1979).

. U.S. Const, art. VI.

. See U.S. Const, art. Ill, § 2, art. VI; Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 25 n. 4, 94 S.Ct. 2098, 2101 n. 4, 40 L.Ed.2d 628, 633 n. 4 (1974).

. Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310, 86 S.Ct. 1497, 1500, 16 L.Ed.2d 577, 581 (1966).

. See id.; Phynes v. State, 828 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).

. Millican v. State, 145 Tex.Crim. 195, 167 S.W.2d 188, 191 (1942).

. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 5(b) (Vernon Supp.1998).

. Of course, an 11.07 writ is always available, but it seems an unnecessary burden to place on the court of criminal appeals.

. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 1759-60, 36 L.Ed.2d 656, 662 (1973); Ruedas v. State, 586 S.W.2d 520, 523 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1979).

. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92 S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484, 494 (1972).

. Eldridge, 731 S.W.2d at 619; see Gilbert v. State, 852 S.W.2d 623, 625-26 (Tex.App.—Amarillo 1993, no pet.) ("[A]rt42.12, § 5(b) .... is not intended to preclude challenges to all of the rulings a trial court may potentially make in the course of a deferred adjudication proceeding.... The adjudication hearing must provide a defendant with minimum substantive and procedural due process protection.”); Goins v. State, 826 S.W.2d 733, 735 (Tex.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no pet.); see also Homan v. Hughes, 708 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) ("Nothing in Art. 42.12, supra, prohibits appeal of matters unrelated to the determination of guilt after a deferred adjudication. In fact, a plain reading of the germane section indicates just the opposite.”); Wright v. State, 592 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980); Earley v. State, 855 S.W.2d 260, 261-63 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1993), pet. dism’d, improvidently granted, 872 S.W.2d 758 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); De Leon v. State, 797 S.W.2d 186, 187-88 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1990, no pet.) ("[A] body of decisional law has developed to allow a defendant to raise limited challenges to the trial court’s decision to adjudicate.”); Fuller v. State, 653 S.W.2d 65, 65-67 (Tex.App.—Tyler 1983, no pet.)