Court Opinion

ID: 9948946
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 15:15:11.077756+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:25.100142
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 1, 2024; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2023-CA-0225-MR

JANICE HAMILTON                                                      APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.               HONORABLE ANNIE O’CONNELL, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CI-006304

LOUISVILLE & JEFFERSON
COUNTY METROPOLITAN SEWER
DISTRICT                                                               APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, GOODWINE, AND JONES, JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Janice Hamilton (“Hamilton”) appeals from the October

6, 2022 and January 30, 2023 judgments of the Jefferson Circuit Court. After

careful review and consideration of the parties’ oral arguments, we affirm.

                                BACKGROUND

            Hamilton began employment with the Louisville and Jefferson County

Metropolitan Sewer District (“MSD”) in 2011. She worked as a member of a field
crew doing maintenance, repairs, and construction. She began as a Utility Trainee

before advancing to the position of Utility Worker I and then to Utility Worker II.

             On February 10, 2012, Hamilton injured her ankle on the job and

subsequently filed a workers’ compensation claim. After being temporarily

restricted from working, she returned to her position. She was injured on the job

for a second time on August 1, 2014. She again filed a workers’ compensation

claim and she was again able to return to her position on the field crew.

             In 2015, Hamilton applied for a position in the MSD dispatch

department. After failing the requisite typing test once, she passed it and was

transferred on February 6, 2016. She was supervised by Yvonne Austin

(“Austin”). Hamilton admits she struggled with the duties of her new position,

especially because the work required use of computers. She acknowledges she did

not meet the expectations of the position. Her performance reviews showed that

she needed additional attention and training, and her inability to perform her duties

created additional work for other staff. Her evaluations also show she reacted

poorly to feedback and her behavior negatively impacted her peers.

             Austin and Hamilton had a contentious working relationship.

Hamilton alleges various acts of harassment, including micromanagement and rude

remarks from Austin. In 2016, a few months after she began working for dispatch,

Hamilton filed a human resources (“HR”) complaint alleging Austin provided her

                                         -2-
insufficient training and claimed Austin created a stressful work environment by

criticizing her performance in front of other staff. Hamilton did not claim she was

disabled or that the alleged harassment was based on a disability. HR investigated

the allegations, and they were unsubstantiated.

             In February 2018, Austin placed Hamilton on a 90-day performance

improvement plan (“PIP”). The PIP detailed the skills and duties in which

Hamilton needed to improve to meet the expectations for her position. Hamilton

failed to complete the PIP. Her evaluations continued to show she had not

improved and was rude to other staff. According to an evaluation completed after

the PIP, she did not “possess the capabilities to function in her current position.”

Record (“R.”) at 308.

             On June 6, 2018, Austin instructed Hamilton to take her scheduled

lunch break. Hamilton repeatedly refused to do so. According to witnesses and

Hamilton’s admission, in response to Austin’s instruction, she yelled, “I’m sick of

you.” Id. at 319. The next day, Angela Basil (“Basil”), an MSD Employee

Relations Administrator, met with Hamilton and gave her a one-day suspension

without pay because her behavior violated MSD’s rules of conduct. Hamilton

alleged Austin’s instruction for her to take her lunch break was harassment. HR

determined Austin’s instruction was reasonable and Hamilton should have

                                          -3-
communicated with her supervisor in a respectful manner. Austin was not

disciplined for the incident.

             In September 2018, Hamilton informed HR that she would need to

move around during her shifts because she was at risk of developing cramps or

blood clots. Hamilton is diabetic though she did not mention her diagnosis on her

request form. On that form, her medical provider stated Hamilton experienced

neuropathy which can be aggravated by “prolonged periods of sitting.” Id. at 327.

Her provider recommended she be allowed to walk around for five minutes every

one to two hours. Id. at 328. Hamilton was permitted to take additional breaks as

needed.

             In October 2018, Hamilton filed a second HR complaint against

Austin. She alleged Austin followed her to the restroom and harassed her about

taking too long. She admits she was making a personal phone call from the

restroom. She again makes no mention of any alleged disability in her complaint.

HR investigated the incident and found it unsubstantiated.

             In January 2019, Hamilton acknowledged she “dropped the ball” by

failing to properly follow up on a request that led to significant sewage backup in a

customer’s yard. Id. at 333. She met with HR and was given a five-day

suspension without pay for the error. A week later, she applied for and received a

leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) for an

                                         -4-
“unspecified anxiety disorder.” Id. at 341. She sought treatment at The Brook.

Her provider recommended an “intensive outpatient treatment program.” Id. In a

letter, her provider recommended she transfer back to a job in the field. Hamilton

was discharged from The Brook and cleared to return to work in June 2019.

Neither Austin nor Basil were informed of the reason for Hamilton’s leave of

absence.

              Thereafter, Hamilton requested an accommodation based on her

provider’s recommendation to “return to work out in the field.” Id. at 343. Based

on documentation from The Brook, MSD allowed Hamilton to transfer back to a

field position. She began work as a Utility Trainee on July 13, 2019.1 Hamilton

continued to work in field positions with MSD until early 2021. In February 2021,

she was injured again and filed a third workers’ compensation claim. She did not

return to work at MSD after this injury.

              On October 30, 2020, while she was still employed by MSD,

Hamilton filed a complaint in Jefferson Circuit Court alleging disability

discrimination, hostile work environment, workers’ compensation retaliation, and

1
  In this position, Hamilton was a member of the Laborers International Union of North America
(“LIUNA”). Under the union’s collective bargaining agreement’s seniority rules, she was
required to transfer back to a trainee position. After the 30-day probationary period, she
progressed back to the position of Utility Worker II. The agreement also governed the way
LIUNA members were able to change shifts based on seniority. R. at 346.

                                             -5-
negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”). Thereafter, MSD moved for

summary judgment on Hamilton’s claims.

            In its October 6, 2022 judgment, the trial court granted summary

judgment on all claims except the NIED claim. The court determined there

remained genuine issues of material fact as to Hamilton’s NIED claim. Thereafter,

MSD again moved for summary judgment on Hamilton’s remaining claim. On

January 30, 2023, the court granted summary judgment. Relying on Johnson v.

Pennyrile Allied Community Services, No. 5:20-CV-071-TBR, 2022 WL 1004873

(W.D. Ky. Apr. 4, 2022), the trial court held Hamilton’s NIED claim was

preempted by the Kentucky Civil Rights Act (“KCRA”) because the claims were

based on the same underlying facts.

            This appeal followed.

                          STANDARD OF REVIEW

            The proper standard of review on appeal when a trial
            judge has granted a motion for summary judgment is
            whether the record, when examined in its entirety, shows
            there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the
            moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
            The trial judge must view the evidence in a light most
            favorable to the nonmoving party, resolving all doubts in
            its favor. Because summary judgment does not require
            findings of fact but only an examination of the record to
            determine whether material issues of fact exist, we
            generally review the grant of summary judgment without
            deference to either the trial court’s assessment of the
            record or its legal conclusions.

                                       -6-
Phoenix American Administrators, LLC v. Lee, 670 S.W.3d 832, 838 (Ky. 2023)

(citation omitted).

                                       ANALYSIS

                On appeal, Hamilton argues summary judgment should not have been

granted on her claims because (1) she provided adequate evidence of workers’

compensation retaliation; (2) she provided adequate evidence of disability

discrimination; (3) she showed a pattern of severe and pervasive conduct to

support her hostile work environment claim; and (4) NIED is a “stand alone

claim.”

                First, Hamilton failed to establish a prima facie case of workers’

compensation retaliation. “No employee shall be harassed, coerced, discharged, or

discriminated against in any manner whatsoever for filing and pursuing” a

workers’ compensation claim. KRS2 342.197(1). In a claim for workers’

compensation retaliation, a plaintiff must prove:

                (1) he engaged in a protected activity; (2) the defendant
                knew that the plaintiff had done so; (3) adverse
                employment action was taken; and (4) that there was a
                causal connection between the protected activity and the
                adverse employment action.

Dollar General Partners v. Upchurch, 214 S.W.3d 910, 915 (Ky. App. 2006)

(citing Brooks v. Lexington-Fayette Urban County Housing Authority, 132 S.W.3d

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                            -7-
790, 803 (Ky. 2004)). It is uncontested that Hamilton engaged in protected activity

by filing two workers’ compensation claims in 2012 and 2014.3

               As to the second element, Hamilton argues all employees of MSD had

constructive knowledge of her workers’ compensation claims. However, she did

not first raise this argument before the trial court.4 “An issue cannot be raised for

the first time on appeal; the trial court must be given an opportunity to rule on a

claim before it can be addressed by an appellate court.” Brooks v. Byrd, 487

S.W.3d 913, 919 (Ky. App. 2016). On this basis, we will not consider the merits

of Hamilton’s constructive knowledge argument.

               Hamilton further alleges Austin knew about her workers’

compensation claims. A plaintiff must show the decision-makers who control

decisions regarding the plaintiff’s employment knew about the protected activity.

See Asbury University v. Powell, 486 S.W.3d 246, 258 (Ky. 2016) (citation

omitted). Hamilton alleges Austin knew of her workers’ compensation claims

because she knew Hamilton was injured and “reviewed daily reports indicating

3
  During oral arguments, the parties both stated Hamilton’s workers’ compensation claims were
filed in 2014 and 2016. The record on appeal indicates Hamilton’s injuries occurred in 2012 and
2014 but is less clear as to the precise dates on which her claims were filed. Our analysis is the
same regardless of whether her last claim was filed in 2014 or 2016.
4
 In her brief, Hamilton does not state where and in what manner this, or any other argument, is
preserved. Rules of Appellate Procedure (“RAP”) 32(A)(4). Our review of the record indicates
she did not raise this argument in her response to MSD’s motion for summary judgment. R. at
473-97.

                                               -8-
who was off work[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 10.5 Being aware of Hamilton’s injury

does not prove Austin knew about her workers’ compensation claims. Similarly,

Austin’s review of absence reports does not prove she knew of the reason for each

absence. Moreover, Hamilton alleges only that Austin generally reviewed these

reports, not that she specifically reviewed reports that included Hamilton’s

absences or that she had any knowledge of Hamilton’s attendance records in the

time preceding her transfer to the dispatch department. Hamilton cites to nothing

in the record showing any other decision-makers, including Basil, knew about her

workers’ compensation claims.6

               Assuming, in arguendo, Hamilton sufficiently proved Austin’s

knowledge, she failed to prove a causal connection between that knowledge and

the alleged employment actions. Hamilton claims she was subject to employment

actions including two suspensions, poor performance evaluations, her PIP, and

“severe emotional distress and abuse.” Id. at 11. Within her argument, she does

not specify what constituted the alleged severe emotional distress and abuse.

Without sufficient development of her argument, we cannot find this constitutes an

5
  Hamilton asserts this is direct evidence of Austin’s knowledge. However, MSD correctly
characterizes this as circumstantial evidence. See Charalambakis v. Asbury University, 488
S.W.3d 568, 577 (Ky. 2016) (citation omitted) (“direct evidence . . . does not require a factfinder
to draw any inferences”).
6
  Basil began working for MSD in 2015. She was not employed by MSD at the time Hamilton
filed her workers’ compensation claims.

                                                -9-
employment action under Upchurch, 214 S.W.3d at 915 (citation omitted).

Additionally, neither poor performance evaluations nor a PIP amount to adverse

employment actions without proof that they adversely impacted the employee’s

wages or salary. See Tuttle v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville, 474 F.3d

307, 322 (6th Cir. 2007) (citation omitted); see also Agnew v. BASF Corp., 286

F.3d 307 (6th Cir. 2002). Therefore, only Hamilton’s two suspensions qualify as

adverse employment actions.

             As is the case with most cases of alleged retaliation, there is no

“smoking gun” showing Austin reported Hamilton’s conduct to HR or that Basil

suspended her because of her workers’ compensation claims. See Powell, 486

S.W.3d at 258. This means Hamilton must establish causation by circumstantial

evidence. Id. (citation omitted). She must prove: “(1) the decision-maker

responsible for making the adverse decision was aware of the protected activity at

the time that the adverse decision was made, and (2) there is a close temporal

relationship between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Id. (citation

omitted).

             Hamilton’s claim fails on both elements. As explained above, Basil is

the decision-maker who suspended Hamilton. Hamilton cites to nothing in the

record from which this Court could reasonably infer Basil had any knowledge of

Hamilton’s workers’ compensation claims. Furthermore, while she attempts to

                                         -10-
show Austin, as the person who reported her to HR before both suspensions, knew

of her claims, the evidence shows only that Austin likely knew Hamilton had been

injured before transferring to the dispatch department. Additionally, there was no

close temporal proximity between Hamilton’s workers’ compensation claims and

her suspensions. She filed her claims in 2012 and 2014 and was not suspended

until 2018 and 2019. This is insufficient to prove causation.

             Because Hamilton failed to prove a prima facie claim of workers’

compensation retaliation, summary judgment was appropriate.

             Second, Hamilton’s claim of disability discrimination fails as a matter

of law. It is unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against an individual with

respect to compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment . . .

because the person is a qualified individual with a disability[.]” KRS

344.040(1)(a). To establish a prima facie claim of disability discrimination, a

plaintiff must prove:

             (1) that she had a disability within the meaning of KRS
             344.010(4); (2) that, despite the disability, she was
             otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of
             the job in question, either with or without reasonable
             accommodation; (3) that she suffered an adverse
             employment action because of her disability; and (4) that
             she was replaced by a non-disabled person or that
             similarly situated non-disabled employees were treated
             more favorably.

                                        -11-
Larison v. Home of the Innocents, 551 S.W.3d 36, 41 (Ky. App. 2018) (citation

omitted).

             Under the KCRA, “disability” is defined as

             (a) A physical or mental impairment that substantially
                 limits one (1) or more of the major life activities of
                 the individual;

             (b) A record of such an impairment; or

             (c) Being regarded as having such an impairment.

KRS 344.010(4). Major life activities include, but are not limited to, “walking,

seeing, hearing, performing manual tasks, caring for oneself, speaking, breathing,

learning, and working.” Turner v. Norton Healthcare, Inc., 681 S.W.3d 26, 33

(Ky. 2023) (citation omitted). “Whether the plaintiff has an impairment and

whether the conduct affected by the impairment is a major life activity under the

statute are legal questions.” Hallahan v. The Courier-Journal, 138 S.W.3d 699,

707 (Ky. App. 2004).

             Here, Hamilton alleges her disabilities include diabetes, generalized

anxiety, and the leg and ankle injuries she sustained on the job. First, she claims

she is disabled because her injuries required surgery. However, an injury

necessitating surgery is not determinative of disability. In fact, generally, where

treatment has remedied an impairment, it is not substantially limiting. Turner, 681

S.W.3d at 33 (citation omitted). Hamilton cites to nothing which proves her prior

                                         -12-
injuries had anything more than short-term, temporary effects. See Larison, 551

S.W.3d at 43 (citation omitted). Without proof that her injuries substantially limit

any major life activity, they do not qualify as a disability under KRS

344.010(4)(a).

                 Hamilton also has not shown that her diabetes substantially limits a

major life activity. It is difficult to establish a claim for disability discrimination

based on a diabetes diagnosis. Bragdon v. Faneuil, Inc., 2022 WL 507430, at *3

(E.D. Ky. Feb. 18, 2022).7 Although an individual’s diabetes can be so severe that

it substantially limits their major life activities, “[n]umerous federal courts have

held that diabetes, even when accompanied by the use of medication and dietary

restrictions, is not necessarily a disability[.]” Sanders v. Bemis Company, Inc., No.

CV 5:21-323-DCR, 2017 WL 405920, *4 (E.D. Ky. Jan. 20, 2017) (quoting

Montalvo v. Lamy, 139 F.Supp.3d 597, 611 (W.D. N.Y. 2015)).8 Hamilton alleges

her condition prevents her from sitting for long periods of time and requires

additional breaks during the workday.9 Her medical provider indicated her

diabetes would not prevent her from performing any of her job duties. R. at 327.

7
    We cite to this unpublished opinion as persuasive, not binding, authority. See RAP 41(B).
8
    See supra note 7.
9
 Hamilton also claims her diabetes requires her to take additional restroom breaks. However,
neither she nor her medical provider mentioned this in her request for accommodation. R. at
325-28.

                                                -13-
Therefore, Hamilton’s diabetes did not substantially limit Hamilton’s ability to

work and, therefore, is not a disability under KRS 344.010(4)(a).10

               Finally, Hamilton has not shown her diagnosis of generalized anxiety

substantially limits any major life activity. During her FMLA leave, she sought

treatment and, based on the recommendation of her mental health provider, was

able to return to work and was transferred from the dispatch department back into

the field. After her release from treatment, she has continued with regular visits

with her provider. She vaguely alleges her anxiety is “debilitating,” but does not

specify what life activities it substantially limits. Without specific proof of

substantial limitation, we cannot find Hamilton has proven her anxiety is a

disability under KRS 344.010(4)(a).

               Furthermore, Hamilton has not proven she was regarded as disabled

under KRS 344.010(4)(c). It is “extraordinarily difficult” to prove a disability

discrimination claim under this subsection because it depends almost exclusively

on the employer’s subjective state of mind. Ross v. Campbell Soup Co., 237 F.3d

701, 709 (6th Cir. 2001). It is not enough for a plaintiff to prove only that her

employer was aware of her symptoms or condition. Baum v. Metro Restoration

Services, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 3d 684, 693 (W.D. Ky. 2017) (citation omitted).

10
   See DePrisco v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 90 F.App’x 790, 794-95 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding a
plaintiff’s need to briefly walk around every hour is not a substantial limitation on her ability to
work).

                                                -14-
Instead, she must show her employer thought she was disabled and “that [her]

disability would prevent [her] from performing a broad class of jobs.” Howard

Baer, Inc. v. Schave, 127 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Ky. 2003) (citation omitted). Herein,

at most, Hamilton showed Austin may have been aware of the injury that led to her

transfer to the dispatch department, knew of her diabetes diagnosis, and knew

Hamilton took a leave of absence but did not know she sought treatment for

anxiety. Even if Austin had this knowledge, Hamilton cites to no evidence proving

she regarded her as unable to perform her job responsibilities because of an

impairment.

              Because Hamilton failed to establish herself as disabled under the

KCRA, her claim for disability discrimination fails.

              Next, Hamilton’s hostile work environment claim fails on the same

grounds. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), to establish a claim

for hostile work environment, a plaintiff must prove “(1) she was disabled; (2) she

was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on her

disability; (4) the harassment unreasonably interfered with her work performance;

and (5) the defendant either knew or should have known about the harassment and

failed to take corrective measures.” Trepka v. Board of Education, 28 F. App’x

                                        -15-
455, 461 (6th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted).11 Hamilton’s failure to prove she is

disabled under KRS 344.010(4) is fatal to her hostile work environment claim.

              Finally, Hamilton’s NIED claim is preempted by the KCRA. This

Court has previously held claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress

(“IIED”) are subsumed by KCRA claims based on the same facts. Wilson v.

Lowe’s Home Center, 75 S.W.3d 229, 239 (Ky. App. 2001), superseded on other

grounds by Owen v. University of Kentucky, 486 S.W.3d 266 (Ky. 2016). The

purpose of the KCRA is “[t]o safeguard all individuals within the state from

discrimination . . . because of the person’s status as a qualified individual with a

disability . . . thereby to protect their interest in personal dignity and freedom from

humiliation[.]” KRS 344.020(1)(b). This Court has interpreted the statute to allow

plaintiffs to seek damages for “humiliation and personal indignity.” Wilson, 75

S.W.3d at 239 (citation omitted). Claims of IIED similarly allow plaintiffs to seek

damages for intentional emotional distress. Id. (citation omitted). “Where the

statute both declares the unlawful act and specifies the civil remedy available to the

aggrieved party, the aggrieved party is limited to the remedy provided by the

statute.” Id. (citation omitted). Because the same facts form the basis for both

Hamilton’s NIED and KCRA claims, the former is subsumed by the latter. See

11
  We rely on the ADA standard because, in relevant part, the purpose of the KCRA is “[t]o
provide for execution within the state of the policies embodied” in the ADA. KRS
344.020(1)(a).

                                             -16-
Johnson, 2022 WL 1004873, at *17. Therefore, summary judgment was

appropriate.

                                  CONCLUSION

               Based on the foregoing, the October 6, 2022 and January 30, 2023

judgments of the Jefferson Circuit Court are affirmed.

               ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF AND ORAL ARGUMENT                    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:
FOR APPELLANT:
                                           Alina Klimkina
Marilyn Shrewsbury                         Donald C. Morgan
Eddyville, Kentucky                        Louisville, Kentucky

                                           ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
                                           APPELLEE:

                                           Alina Klimkina
                                           Louisville, Kentucky

                                        -17-