Court Opinion

ID: 9545784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:19:31.420254+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:32.734789
License: Public Domain

GOLDEN, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority opinion in this case is separated into two sections, the first addressing the procedural aspects of the Zoning Board’s determination against Cook and the second addressing the substantive aspects. I have no argument with the majority’s analysis in the substantive section. In Wyoming an agency is required to set forth findings of fact and conclusions of law under W.S. 16-3-110; because the agency failed in this case to provide any findings or conclusions supporting its decision, it is clear that the Zoning Board’s decision should at least be reversed and remanded for written findings and conclusions. I do, however, disagree with the majority’s analysis of the procedural aspects of this case.
In response to the City’s argument that Cook’s Petition for Review of the Building Inspector’s decision was improperly served, the majority states:
Without attempting to unravel whether the layman in the volunteer office of chairman should have been served instead of the city clerk as the normal agent for the City, it will suffice to conclude that sufficient notice was given for the hearing to be scheduled and absent objection by the City, jurisdiction exists and the failure, if any, was waived.
Ante at 4.
Ch. II, § 3 of the Zoning Board’s Rules and Regulations requires that service be made upon the “Mayor of the City Council or the Chairman of the board or commission involved.” (This rule is identical in part to Laramie Municipal Code, § 1.20.050, which further requires that service under the code section comply with W.R.C.P. 4.). In 17 McQuillen, Municipal Corporations, § 49.32, p. 213 (3d. 1982), it is stated:
Service of process or the waiver of it by appearance is essential to the validity of a judgment against a city or its officers. Substitute service on a municipality is not a permissible method of service. The form of the process in actions against municipal corporations and the manner of service are usually controlled by local laws, and generally strict compliance with the procedure prescribed is exacted * * *.
In the absence of charter or statutory provisions to the contrary, when a municipal corporation is sued in that capacity, the summons must be served on its may- or or other chief executive officer * * *.
The local law in this case, Laramie Municipal Code, § 1.20.050, requires that service be completed upon the “Mayor of the City Council or the Chairman of the board or commission involved.” Here, service was completed on the city clerk in violation of that local law, and was, therefore, improper. However, any defect in service was waived when the City appeared at and proceeded with the hearing without objection. Matter of Parental Rights to ARW, 716 P.2d 353, 357 (Wyo.1986).
Since any defect in service was waived by the city’s appearance at the hearing, it is inconsistent for the majority to then posit that the City cannot be defaulted against despite its failure to timely answer Cook’s Petition. This position contravenes the clear language of Ch. II, § 6 of the Zoning Board’s Rules and Regulations, and the identical language of Laramie Municipal Code, § 1.20.080 (which also requires compliance with W.R.C.P. 5), which state:
In the event of failure of either the council, commission or board as the case may be, or any contestee to answer or otherwise appear within the time allowed by these rules; [twenty days] and provided that § 3 [Laramie Municipal Code, § 1.20.050] [service] hereof has been complied with, said agency or contestee so failing to answer or otherwise appear, shall not be allowed to answer or otherwise appear thereafter and after written *188notice to the petitioner, the proceedings will be brought before the agency to which it was presented for consideration and appropriate action.
There are no provisions in either the Board’s promulgated rules or the general provisions of the Laramie Municipal Code which exempt the City or its agencies from the language of these rules. Rules properly promulgated have the force and effect of law. Matter of GP, 679 P.2d 976, 996 (Wyo.1984); Yeik v. Department of Revenue and Taxation, 595 P.2d 965, 968 (Wyo.1979). One cannot ignore the language of the rules above; the City properly should have been defaulted against for its failure to answer Cook’s petition.
The question then raised is whether the Board can violate or ignore its own rules and permit the City to appear and defend despite its failure to answer Cook’s petition. It has been held that an agency can depart from its own rule if the rule was intended to govern a mere internal operating procedure rather than to protect some interest of the objecting party. Roberts v. Lincoln County School District No. One, 676 P.2d 577, 580 (Wyo.1984) (quoting Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 Harvard L.Rev. 629 (1973-74)). When the procedural rule bears on individual rights, however, the court may find that the rule is binding on the agency and may not be violated or ignored because the rule is not a mere internal housekeeping arrangement. Brookhaven Housing Coalition v. Kunzig, 341 F.Supp. 1026, 1027 (E.D.N.Y.1972) (executive order, having been issued and published by the President pursuant to statutory authority, is not á mere internal housekeeping arrangement; private citizens have a right to review compliance with both the statutes and the regulations relating to the provisions of publicly assisted housing). In Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 79 S.Ct. 968, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1959), the Court held that if a rule constitutes a procedural safeguard, a violation of that rule will not be permitted. It would appear that the procedural due process requirements in Ch. II, § 6, Laramie Municipal .Code, § 1.20.080 and W.R.C.P. 5, are just such procedural safeguards contemplated in the Vitarelli opinion and should not be lightly disregarded by agencies for the purposes of convenience.
I agree that this case should be reversed for the reasons stated in the majority’s substantive analysis. I disagree with, and, therefore, dissent from its inconsistent analysis in the procedural section. I believe the proper disposition of this case is a vacation of the Board’s holding on jurisdictional grounds and a remand for a new hearing where only Cook can present evidence upon which the Board can make its findings and conclusions.