Court Opinion

ID: 9734185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:27:21.800802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:46.527507
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Hoffman, J. :
The sole meritorious issue in this appeal is whether the trial judge committed reversible error by instructing the jury that it could find appellant criminally liable for the acts of his co-conspirators, but failing to charge either as to the elements of conspiracy or as to the effect of the termination of the conspiracy.
At 12:45 a.m. on August 21, 1972, Ronald Williams, while lying in bed in a friend’s apartment in North Philadelphia where he was staying, heard the door being broken down. Appellant, Richard Kelsey, Leon Kelsey, and David Warren then entered the apartment. The four searched for a stereo set which they claimed that Williams had stolen, but found nothing. One or more of the four men ordered Williams to leave his apartment and come with them. The four men and Williams went to the house near Thirteenth and Erie where Williams claimed that he had been during the day. One or more of the four questioned the woman who lived there about the time of Williams’ arrival and departure. The four men and Williams then left and went onto the street. Williams was shot in the back while appellant, Warren, and Leon Kelsey were facing him. Immediately before Williams was shot, Warren and appellant had leaned back on the ground, as if *437anticipating the shot. Spun around by the force of the bullet, Williams saw Richard Kelsey cross the street with-the gun in his hand. All four men ran towards Broad Street. Williams later named appellant as the owner of the gun.1
Appellant’s jury trial, before the Honorable John A. Geisz, of the Philadelphia Common Pleas Court, was severed from the trial of his three companions.2 On October 3, 1973, appellant was found guilty of forcible entry, aggravated assault and battery, and assault with intent to kill, Judge Geisz denied appellant’s post-trial motions. This appeal followed.
As it appeared that it was not appellant, but one of his companions, who shot Williams, the Commonwealth based its case on the charges of aggravated assault and battery and assault and battery with intent to kill on a conspiracy theory.3 Nevertheless, the trial judge devoted only two sentences of a more than twenty-page charge to the vicarious liability of a co-conspirator.4 Although *438the judge charged as to the legal consequences of a finding of conspiracy, he nowhere defined the elements of conspiracy, thus leaving the jury to guess at what the instruction might have meant.5
“[I]n charging a jury, it is the primary duty of the trial judge to clarify the issues so that the jury may understand the questions to be resolved.” Commonwealth v. Beach, 438 Pa. 37, 40, 264 A.2d 712, 714 (1970), citing Commonwealth v. Meas, 415 Pa. 41, 202 A.2d 74 (1964). “ ‘As to serious crimes, it is a fundamental duty of the trial judge to give full and explicit instructions as to the nature of the charges. . . . [W] e cannot assume that the jury understood clearly the exact issues involved or because of exposure are learned in the law.’ ” Commonwealth v. McMillion, 215 Pa. Superior Ct. 306, 309, 265 A.2d 375, 376 (1969), quoting Commonwealth v. Weatherwax, 166 Pa. Superior Ct. 586, 589, 73 A.2d 427 (1950). Aggravated assault and battery, of which appellant was convicted, has been held to be a serious crime, requiring the trial judge to instruct specifically on the nature of the charge against the appellant. Commonwealth v. Franklin, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 484, 52 A.2d 230 (1947). Failure to give such full and explicit instructions is reversible error. Commonwealth v. McMillion, supra.
The Commonwealth contends that appellant has waived any objection to this omission from the charge by failing to comply with Rule 1119(b), Pa. R.Crim.P. This Rule states that “[n]o portions of the charge nor omissions therefrom may be assigned as error, unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury retires to deliberate.” The record indicates that, before beginning his charge to the jury, the trial judge conferred with counsel in chambers. Appellant’s attorney first asked the trial judge to delete all references to conspiracy in the *439charge. The judge admitted that he “was hoping [he] could get away from using the word conspiracy. Because there is no conspiracy indictment here. And conspiracy is confusing to most people.” When it appeared that the trial judge would charge on conspiracy, counsel for appellant requested that “Your Honor then go into an explanation of conspiracy. Because otherwise I feel that it would not have been properly explained to the jury.” This was an objection, timely made, specifically directed to the omission of a definition of conspiracy from the charge. This objection was sufficient to preserve this point for appeal.
The trial judge also erred in refusing appellant’s proposed point for charge dealing with the termination of a conspiracy: “If a common enterprise is at an end the acts and declarations of one of the alleged conspirators are not competent to establish the guilt of any of the other alleged participants.” This charge follows language in Commonwealth v. Holloway, 429 Pa. 344, 240 A.2d 532 (1968). The Commonwealth claims that the judge properly refused to give this charge because there was no evidence that the conspiracy had terminated at any time relevant to the testimony at trial. A properly instructed jury, however, might reasonably have concluded that the conspiracy which appellant joined had been limited to, and had terminated after, the search of Williams’ apartment, relying, for example, on testimony elicited from Williams on cross-examination to the effect that “[on] 13th Street [appellant] didn’t get involved in the situation.”
Nor is the trial judge’s error in failing adequately to charge the jury on the liability of a co-conspirator rendered harmless by the possibility that the jury might have found appellant guilty as a principal in the second degree, rather than as a co-conspirator. “The inquiry cannot be merely whether there was enough to support the result, apart from the phase affected by the error. *440It is rather, even so, whether the error itself had substantial influence. If so, or if one is left in grave doubt, the conviction cannot stand.” Commonwealth v. Anskate, 221 Pa. Superior Ct. 122, 125, 289 A.2d 156, 158 (1972), quoting Commonwealth v. Savor, 180 Pa. Superior Ct. 469, 119 A.2d 849 (1956), quoting Commonwealth v. Blose, 160 Pa. Superior Ct. 165, 50 A.2d 742 (1947), quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946). (Emphasis supplied.) See also Commonwealth v. Rose, 457 Pa. 880, 821 A.2d 880 (1974), (JONES, C.J., concurring).
The record before this court creates grave doubt as to whether the jury convicted appellant as a principal in the second degree, or as a co-conspirator. Although the court referred only briefly to the liability of a co-conspirator, the prosecutor, in his closing argument immediately preceding the judge’s charge, had devoted three pages to telling the jury, in rather conclusive terms, that appellant was liable for the shooting under a conspiracy theory, ending with the statement that “[a] 11 these men are liable for shooting Ronald Williams.” “[W]e should not affirm a conviction on the basis of an assumption that the jury applied the correct standard when it is plain that it might not have.” Commonwealth v. McFarland, 226 Pa. Superior Ct. 138, 142, 308 A.2d 126 (1973). As it is not clear that the jury, in convicting appellant on the various charged offenses, did not rely on the defective conspiracy charge, appellant must be granted a new trial.6
*441The judgment of the court below should be reversed, and a new trial granted.
Jacobs, J., joins in this dissenting opinion. '

. The Commonwealth relied on the possibly coordinated movement of Warren and appellant before the shot was fired, the fact that all four fled in the same direction, and appellant’s apparent ownership of the weapon used in the shooting as circumstantial evidence of conspiracy.

. At a separate trial, completed before the trial of appellant, his three co-defendants were acquitted of assault with intent to kill, and convicted of lesser charges.

. Appellant was not charged with conspiracy as a separate substantive crime.

. “Where the existence of a conspiracy is established, the law imposes upon a conspirator full responsibility for the natural and probable consequences of acts committed by his fellow conspirator or conspirators if such acts are done in pursuance of the common design or purpose of the conspiracy. Such responsibility ... extends even to a homicide which is a contingency of the natural and probable execution of the conspiracy, even though such homicide is not specifically contemplated by the parties.” Cf. Commonwealth v. Thomas, 410 Pa. 160, 165, 189 A.2d 255, 258 (1963); cert. denied, 375 U.S. 856 (1963).

. Nor did the instructions concerning the liability of a principal in the second degree or criminal liability in general fill this void.

. Appellant’s other contentions lack merit. Appellant contends that there was insufficient evidence to convict him of aggravated assault and battery and assault and battery with intent to kill, by means of a conspiracy theory. “However, it is established law in this Commonwealth that a conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence as well as by direct evidence.” Commonwealth v. Eiland, 450 Pa. 566, 570, 301 A.2d 651, 652 (1973). In Eiland, such circumstantial evidence of conspiracy was held sufficient to sustain the conviction of a gang member for second de*441gree murder, although there was no evidence to show that he had personally participated in the shooting.
Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in admitting an exculpatory statement made by appellant shortly after the shooting in which appellant stated that he, David Warren, and Leon Kelsey had been standing on the corner of 13th and Erie drinking wine when the shooting occurred. This statement, an admission and attempted exculpation by appellant, was clearly material. Moreover, the passing reference to wine in no way implied that appellant was an alcoholic, or guilty of “moral turpitude,” as appellant suggests.