Court Opinion

ID: 9594604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:31:23.178889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:51.845198
License: Public Domain

BAKES, Justice,
concurring in the result:
I concur in the result reached by the majority based on that part of the majority opinion which concludes that the affidavits of Dr. Lindsay and Dr. Montgomery, filed on behalf of the defendants, were not adequate to support granting summary judgment for the defendants. However, I cannot concur in the majority’s statement that “the affidavit of Dr. Weeks was sufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact and to defeat the motion for summary judgment of Dr. Parsons and Dr. Thueson.” Ante at 338, 757 P.2d at 201.
Regarding the sufficiency of the affidavit of Dr. Weeks, I.R.C.P. 56(e) states, in pertinent part, that “[supporting and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall *340show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.” (Emphasis added.) Further, focusing to an even greater extent on the facts of this case, I.C. § 6-1013 states that expert opinion testimony regarding a defendant’s failure to meet the applicable standard of practice “may only be admitted in evidence if the foundation therefor is first laid, establishing ... (c) that such expert witness possesses professional knowledge and expertise coupled with actual knowledge of the applicable said community standard____” (Emphasis added.)
Both I.R.C.P. 56(e) and I.C. § 6-1013 require an adequate foundation regarding the expert’s qualifications to be laid before he is permitted to testify as an expert by way of affidavit or otherwise. An affirmative showing is necessary.1 An adequate foundation is not laid, however, by the mere inclusion of conclusory statements. Neither is an adequate foundation laid where an affidavit does not set out the requisite facts necessary to rule on an expert affiant’s qualifications. In Casey v. Highlands Ins. Co., 100 Idaho 505, 508, 600 P.2d 1387, 1390 (1979), this Court, in discussing a factually deficient and conclusory affidavit stated:
“Where an affidavit merely states conclusions and does not set out facts, such supporting affidavit is inadmissible to show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Matthews v. New York Life Insurance Co., 92 Idaho 372, 443 P.2d 456 (1968). Accord, Openshaw v. Allstate Insurance Co., 94 Idaho 192, 484 P.2d 1032 (1971).”
A supporting affidavit is inadmissible to show the presence of a genuine issue of material fact if it merely states conclusions and does not set out the underlying facts. See also Corbridge v. Clark Equip. Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986) (affidavit not establishing specific facts “is precisely the type of flawed affidavit contemplated by I.R.C.P. 56(e)”); Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil (Second) § 2738 (1983) (ultimate or conclusory facts cannot be utilized on a summary judgment motion).
On point is Nadler v. Baybank Merrimack Valley, N.A., 733 F.2d 182 (1st Cir. 1984), reh’g and reh’g en banc denied 1984. In Nadler, defendant moved for summary judgment and supported its motion with, inter alia, an expert’s deposition. Plaintiffs responded by offering the affidavit of Nadler, and her deposition. Summary judgment was granted, and the United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit, affirmed, stating that plaintiffs failed to adduce admissible evidence. It commented on Nadler’s affidavit as follows:
“Asked her own qualifications to express these opinions, Nadler’s sole answer was that she was ‘a furniture person,’ amplified in her affidavit to say she had ‘extensive experience.’
“Nadler did not lack for self-confidence. ... [However,] self-confidence is not *341enough. The liquidation business requires specialized knowledge as evidenced by ... the need for experts. She advanced, however, no single instance of any personal connection with liquidation sales, either directly or indirectly____
“... [T]here must be some burden on her, and we cannot think unidentified, even ‘extensive’ experience in the furniture business enough to qualify her as an expert on the conduct of liquidation sales....” 733 F.2d at 184-185.
The court in Nadler concluded that, “Plaintiffs having failed to adduce admissible evidence,” the judgment of the district court was affirmed. Id.
The affidavit of Dr. Weeks in the instant case closely parallels that proffered by Nadler; accordingly, we too should recognize the deficiencies in Dr. Weeks’ affidavit and hold it inadmissible to withstand the instant motion for summary judgment. Nadler’s sole recitation of qualifications identified her as “a furniture person” with “extensive experience.” Likewise, Dr. Weeks states his qualifications as “a practicing doctor” possessing “actual knowledge.” Further, Nadler advanced no single instance of any personal connection with the subject on which she rendered her alleged expert opinion. Neither did Dr. Weeks advance a single instance of any personal connection with the diagnosis and treatment of appendicitis under the Blackfoot standard of care. Instead, the affidavit of Dr. Weeks merely states conclusions as to his qualifications; it does not set out the underlying facts regarding his qualifications. The only clues given regarding his qualifications are the following:
“1. That I am a practicing doctor of medicine and practice in the City of Boise, State of Idaho and possess actual knowledge of the standards of practice for physicians and surgeons in the State of Idaho, particularly, with respect to the diagnosis and treatment of appendicitis.
“3. That I am also familiar with the standards of the community regarding the diagnosis and treatment of suspected and actual appendicitis.” Affidavit of Dr. David Weeks, pp. 1, 2.
These statements do not set out the background facts regarding Dr. Weeks’ qualifications. Rather, they merely allege that he is “familiar with the standards of the community regarding the diagnosis and treatment of suspected and actual appendicitis,” without stating whether the community is Boise or Blackfoot. Nowhere does Dr. Weeks support these conclusory statements with underlying facts regarding: (1) where and when he received his M.D. degree and when he was licensed to practice in the State of Idaho; (2) any other specialized training he may have had; (3) how he gained actual knowledge of the standards of practice for board certified pediatricians and surgeons in the State of Idaho (especially since he has not established his qualifications as either a board certified pediatrician or a surgeon); (4) how he attained familiarity with Blackfoot community standards, if indeed he had, particularly regarding the diagnosis and treatment of appendicitis by board certified pediatricians and surgeons; (5) such additional items as whether he has taught or published in the field, whether he has previously testified as an expert on this subject, the number of patients with this problem he has treated, and how much time he devotes to practicing in this field.
Some combination of underlying facts, such as those just delineated, would be necessary in order to qualify an expert under I.R.E. 702 at a full trial. An expert is not allowed to render an opinion as an expert until he demonstrates a sufficient foundation establishing his qualifications. Rule 56(e) requires the same standard in a summary judgment proceeding as is mandated at trial. Jameson v. Jameson, 176 F.2d 58 (D.C.Cir.1949). As Professors Wright, Miller and Kane have stated, “Affidavits filed by a party in support of or in opposition to a motion for summary judgment must present evidence. The affidavits should follow substantially the same form as though the affiant were giving testimony in court.” Wright, Miller and Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil *342(Second) § 2738 (1983), quoting Jameson v. Jameson, 176 F.2d 58, 60 (D.C.Cir.1949).
An expert’s affidavit should lay an adequate foundation for his qualifications to render an expert opinion. This is accomplished by reciting facts (e.g., those delineated above in numbers (1) through (5)) which support his “expert” designation. As at trial though, if an inadequate foundation is contained in the affidavit, the affiant is not allowed to render an expert opinion. Since Dr. Weeks’ affidavit did not lay the proper preliminary foundation regarding his expert qualifications, his affidavit was deficient and his opinion expressed therein was not admissible, and the trial court did not err in rejecting it.
The Court’s statement that “in a medical malpractice case against a board-certified specialist, plaintiff may offer the testimony of a physician who is not board-certified in the same specialty as the defendant physician, so long as the testimony complies with the requirements of I.C. §§ 6-1012 and 6-1013,” ante at 338, 757 P.2d at 201, appears to have effectively overruled most of what was left of our decision in Buck v. St. Clair, 108 Idaho 743, 702 P.2d 781 (1985), after our recent decision in Grimes v. Green, 113 Idaho 519, 746 P.2d 978 (1987).
However, the result reached by the majority today is probably correct because the affidavits of Dr. Lindsay and Dr. Montgomery were also deficient for much the same reasons as was the affidavit of Dr. Weeks. Accordingly, since all the affidavits were deficient, I would merely reverse and remand for further proceedings.2

. Accord Bieghler v. Kleppe, 633 F.2d 531, 533-534 (9th Cir.1980):
"Affidavits submitted in support of or in opposition to a summary judgment motion must ... 'show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)
"The expert’s affidavit here affirmatively showed his qualifications as an expert____ The affidavit was admissible to support plaintiffs opposition to the motion for summary judgment.” (Emphasis added.)
Walling v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 139 F.2d 318, 322 (8th Cir.1943) (“When affidavits are offered in support of a motion for summary judgment, they must present admissible evidence, and must not only be made on the personal knowledge of the affiant, but must show that the affiant possesses the knowledge asserted."); Carlson v. Tucson Racquet & Swim Club, Inc., 127 Ariz. 247, 619 P.2d 756, 758 (Ct.App.1980), reh’g denied and review denied 1980 (“Plaintiff's reliance on the affidavit of [the expert] as creating fact issues is misplaced. [The expert's] opinions ... do not meet the requirements of 17A A.R.S. Rules of Evidence, rule 702, in that they are unsupported by the necessary expert qualifications____” (Emphasis added)); Rothstein, Rules of Evidence for the United States Courts and Magistrates, p. 271 (2d ed. 1987) ("Civil Rule 56 on summary judgment must be construed in the light of the Federal Rules of Evidence; expert affidavits will not prevent summary judgment unless they show compliance with the requirements of Art. VII of the Federal Rules of Evidence [which includes Rule 702, requiring the expert’s qualifications to be established]....”).

. Accord Martin v. Allied International, Inc., 16 F.R.D. 385 (S.D.N.Y.1954) (where, on motion for summary judgment, affidavits submitted by both parties were vague, general and conclusory in nature, the motion for summary judgment was held in abeyance and both parties were granted permission to submit further affidavits).