Court Opinion

ID: 9885106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 03:30:06.559635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:43.942721
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE RYAN, dissenting: I cannot agree with the conclusion of this court that the counterclaim in this case raises the question of whether any rent is in fact due to the plaintiff. In determining the nature of the counterclaim in the present case, it is helpful to look at the defendant’s pleadings before she withdrew the answer and the affirmative defense. At that time the defendant’s pleadings consisted of an answer, an affirmative defense and a counterclaim. The answer was a general denial. The affirmative defense alleged that the defendant had a decrease in income and that the plaintiff’s manager had agreed to accept the rent payments in two installments and not to impose the contract penalty for late payment of rent. The counterclaim sought to have the rent-adjustment policy of the plaintiff declared unconstitutional, requested the court to order plaintiff to fix her rent based either on her present income or the provision for welfare rents and prayed money damages against the plaintiff for any overcharge of rent from January 1, 1970, to date. As the defendant’s pleadings then stood, the answer and the affirmative defense were pleaded in defense of the forcible entry and detainer action and the counterclaim was a separate cause of action seeking affirmative relief unrelated to the complaint. When the answer and the affirmative defense were withdrawn, there were no pleadings in opposition to the complaint but only the counterclaim seeking the affirmative relief. This is a different situation than was presented in Rosewood Corporation v. Fisher, 46 Ill. 2d 249, and Jack Spring, Inc. v. Little, 50 Ill.2d 351. In those cases the affirmative allegations were pleaded in the answers and affirmative defenses in opposition and as a defense to the forcible detainer actions. A counterclaim differs from an answer and an affirmative defense in that it must be a cause of action and seeks affirmative relief, while an answer or an affirmative defense merely seeks to defeat the plaintiff’s cause of action. Wilson v. Tromly, 404 Ill. 307, 309; People v. American National Bank and Trust Co., 32 Ill.2d 115; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 110, par. 38. This is not to say that a counterclaim cannot be pleaded in a forcible detainer action. Section 5 of the Act, providing that “no matters not germane to the distinctive purpose of the proceeding shall be introduced by joinder, counterclaim or otherwise,” by implication authorizes germane matters to be introduced by way of counterclaim. As an example, see Allensworth v. First Galesburg National Bank and Trust Co., 7 Ill. App. 2d 1, where the court approved a counterclaim for injunction and for a decree to quiet title in a forcible entry and detainer action when this relief was sought to defeat and in' opposition to the cause of action stated in the complaint. An examination of the counterclaim as it stands alone after the withdrawal of the answer and affirmative defense reveals no denial of a default in the payment of the June, 1970, rent. It contains no allegation that the defendant is entitled to a recomputation of rents since January, 1970, or if a recomputation were ordered that the claimed refund would offset the unpaid rent. The demand for rent reveals that the defendant is in default in the payment of the June, 1970, rent in the amount of $50. The claimed reduction in monthly rent as stated in oral argument is $9. Although the $9 reduction in rent for June, 1970, could properly be claimed as an offset if this case included an action for rent due, it is not a defense to an action for possession when the default in rent payments is $50. The counterclaim does not allege that the rent for the previous months has been paid. Likewise, the counterclaim contains no allegation which would support the defendant’s right to recover payment of rent for past months voluntarily made. (See Groves v. Farmers State Bank of Woodlawn, 368 Ill. 35; Illinois Glass Co. v. Chicago Telephone Co., 234 Ill. 535.) Likewise, there is no reference in the prayer for relief to the forcible detainer action and there is no prayer that the action be enjoined, dismissed or that in the action for possession, judgment be entered for the defendant. In summary, neither the allegations of the counterclaim nor the relief prayed seeks any relief against the action for possession of the property. From the manner of pleading and the relief sought in the counterclaim, I must conclude that the issues therein pleaded are not germane to the distinctive purpose of the forcible entry and detainer action. It is obvious that the answer and the affirmative defense which the defendant filed and then withdrew were the defensive pleadings to the complaint and the counterclaim was intended to be and, in fact, is a different cause of action seeking relief unrelated to the complaint. The basic thrust of the counterclaim is to seek a declaration of the invalidity of the plaintiff’s rent-adjustment policy and money damages. I conclude that the trial court properly dismissed the counterclaim. Why the defendant withdrew her answer and affirmative defenses to the complaint is unknown. It is obvious that after they were withdrawn the allegations of the complaint for forcible detainer stood undenied and the relief prayed stood unchallenged. I am in full accord with the principle that pleadings should be liberally construed. However, I do not feel that this principle would be violated or that an unbearable burden would be cast upon attorneys if we were to require sufficient specificity in the pleadings to enable a trial judge to determine whether he is trying a forcible entry and detainer case, or a declaratory judgment action coupled with a prayer for money damages. Since, in my opinion, the allegations of the counterclaim and the prayer for relief which it contains are in no way related to the allegations of the complaint and its prayer for relief, I cannot agree that the counterclaim is germane to the issue of whether or not any rent is in fact due. I therefore cannot agree with the opinion of my colleagues.