Court Opinion

ID: 9750743
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:28:24.588819+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:20.419264
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
Appellant should be granted a new trial because the lower court erred in refusing to order the Commonwealth to disclose the identity of the informer.1
*305The case arises from a robbery committed on November 5, 1975. The trial was before a jury. The Commonwealth proved its case by calling two of the victims, Frank Couch and Rose Bologes. Their testimony, and the testimony for the defense, may be summarized as follows.2
At about 5:30 p. m. Mr. Couch parked his car in the Banko Beverage Service store parking lot. He noticed another car parked in the lot with some men by it. Entering the store, he ordered a case of beer from Mrs. Bologes, the proprietor. Two other men were already in the store. They had ordered some beer, and Mrs. Bologes had told her retarded son Paul to get it. When Mr. Couch placed his order, Mrs. Bologes told Paul to get that too. She then went into her office. The two other customers followed her. One customer (later identified by Mrs. Bologes and Mr. Couch as Roberto Pagan) produced a gun and said, “This is it. Keep cool and you won’t be hurt.” The other customer (later identified by Mrs. Bologes as appellant) went behind the counter and took money from the cash register. A third man (never identified) entered and ransacked the drawers, and a fourth man (also never identified), carrying a shotgun, brought Paul into the office. Mrs. Bologes, Paul, and Mr. Couch were made to get down on the floor, their mouths were sealed with tape, and they were handcuffed together.
The robbery took ten to twelve minutes. Mrs. Bologes and Mr. Couch were both positive in their identifications. They both said that the office was well-lighted, that the robbers wore no masks, and that they had an ample opportunity to see the robber or robbers they respectively identified.
Pagan and appellant denied any participation in the robbery, and appellant offered evidence of his good reputation.
The jury found Pagan and appellant guilty of robbery and conspiracy. After motions in arrest of judgment and for a *306new trial were filed and denied, sentence was imposed. This appeal followed.
Before the trial, counsel for appellant had filed various motions, among them a Motion for Disclosure of Informant’s Name. It appeared at the hearing on the motion for disclosure that on November 4, 1975 — the day before the robbery — an informer told Officer Regino Cora, a patrolman of the Bethlehem police force, that he had overheard five men planning a robbery in Bethlehem. It further appeared that on November 5 at about 11:00 p. m. — some five and a half hours after the robbery — the informer told the officer that he had overheard the same men discussing having committed the robbery at the Banko Beverage store; the informer told the officer details of the robbery, and gave him descriptions of the men. The officer passed this information on to the detective on duty. N.T. 2/4/76, 17-18, 63-64, 68-69.
In support of the motion for disclosure, counsel for appellant called Rosa Sanabria. She testified that she was appellant’s sister, that she lived in New York City, and that on November 4, 1975, appellant went shopping with her there from about 10:30 a. m. to 1:30 p. m. and stayed overnight. N.T. 2/4/76, 5-6. She testified that she remembered the date “[b]ecause he [appellant] was trying to make me a surprise party for my birthday.” Id. at 8. Counsel then made the following argument to the hearing judge:
Now, Your Honor, my defense is, first of all, Norberto Garcia was not even in Bethlehem or was not in the area of where the informer apparently was on November 4. As my witness indicated, Mr. Garcia was in New York on November 4. Therefore, the information that the informer gave to the police on November 4 has to be wrong with reference to my defendant. The only way I can test that is to interview the informer prior to trial and to subpoena that informer into trial and to prove to the satisfaction of everyone involved that he made a mistake in identity when he said my man was, apparently, one of these five that was planning the robbery.
*307In addition, if the informer, if the informer heard these same five men discussing the armed robbery after it occurred he should be able to describe these five men who actually were the robbers. My man says he did not do this crime; therefore, if I could bring the informer in to say what he knows of the five men whom he heard discussing the crime I could show that my man was not one of those. It would exculpate Norberto Garcia to bring the informer in and have him say who the five men were that discussed the occurrence of the robbery. Therefore, in order to exculpate Norberto Garcia I need to interview and subpoena and bring in the informer because his information, his information I have shown, excuse me, I have showed by bringing in my witness that Norberto Garcia was not in Bethlehem on November 4.
THE COURT: So you are going to have alibi evidence. The defense side of the case will involve the production of alibi evidence for the jury to — (Interposed.)
MRS. POSWISTILO: No, Your Honor. The crime was November 5, on November 4 the informer overheard certain people planning a robbery. My man is charged with conspiracy; therefore, my man is, apparently, charged as one of those five that were discussing it.
THE COURT: All right, it does not necessarily follow but go ahead.
MRS. POSWISTILO: In any case, if an informer heard five people discussing a robbery and then calls up the next day and says these same five people have now admitted they did the robbery, and my man is charged with the robbery; necessarily, my man has to have been one of the original five and one of the five that discussed it afterward.
THE COURT: So it attempts to put at issue any identification testimony that the Commonwealth would produce during the course of the trial from any source?
MRS. POSWISTILO: That’s right. It’s absolutely essential to a defense of my case and I have, Your Honor, several, I have one important recent case which I would like to call to your attention, if I may get it.
*308N.T. 2/4/76, 18-19-20.
After further argument, by defense counsel and the district attorney, the judge reserved his decision, but in the end he denied the motion for disclosure. I believe this was error.
-1-
On a motion for disclosure the defendant has the burden of producing evidence to show that disclosure would be “relevant and helpful to the defense . . ., or . essential to a fair determination of a cause.” Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 60-61, 77 S.Ct. 623, 628, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957); Commonwealth v. Carter, 427 Pa. 53, 59, 233 A.2d 284, 287 (1973); Commonwealth v. Pritchett, 225 Pa.Super. 401, 407, 312 A.2d 434, 438 (1973).
A mere allegation that the informant’s testimony might be helpful will not suffice . . . [citations omitted]. However, the defendant cannot be expected to predict exactly what the informant would say on the stand. Rather, in keeping with Roviaro and Carter, “all the defendant must show is a reasonable possibility that the anonymous informer could give evidence that would exonerate him.” Price v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.3d 836, 463 P.2d 721, 83 Cal.Rptr. 369 (1970).
Commonwealth v. Pritchett, supra, 225 Pa.Super. at 407-08, 312 A.2d at 438.
Here, appellant has met these requirements. As the lower court recognized, “the primary question in the case was one of identification.” Lower Court Slip Opinion at 2. If accepted, the testimony of appellant’s sister, while not showing that appellant could not have been one of the robbers on November 5, was relevant to show that he could not have been one of the conspirators on November 4. If the informer had testified at the trial that appellant was not one of the conspirators he overheard on November 4, planning the robbery, and later overheard on November 5, discussing the accomplishment of the robbery, the jury might have had a reasonable doubt regarding Mrs. Bologes’s identification of appellant, despite the fact that the identification was posi*309tive (indeed, it is not unheard of for a witness initially positive to acknowledge some uncertainty after hearing another witness).
-2-
The Commonwealth argues, and the lower court based its decision on the proposition, that the informer would not have testified that appellant was not one of the men he overheard on November 4 and 5. Thus the Commonwealth says that the informer would have testified that appellant “was present when the Robbery was planned, and was present after the Robbery when the other participants were talking about the Robbery.....” Commonwealth’s Brief at 6; and the lower court held that “[t]he proferred testimony would not exonerate but convict,” Lower Court Slip Opinion at 5. These statements, however, cannot support the refusal to order disclosure.
Never having heard the informer say anything, the lower court could not know what the informer’s testimony would have been; it therefore was in no position to say whether the testimony would or would not exonerate appellant. The Commonwealth knows what the police officer says the informer said, but that does not mean that the Commonwealth knows how the informer would testify. What the Commonwealth’s argument comes down to is the assertion that on a motion for disclosure the hearing judge is bound to accept the Commonwealth’s statement of what the informer’s testimony would be. If one were to accept this argument the result would be that no informer’s identity would ever be disclosed. It is settled, however, that it is not for the Commonwealth to say what the informer’s testimony would be. Thus in Roviaro v. United States, supra 353 U.S. at 64, 77 S.Ct. at 629, the Supreme Court of the United States said:
The desirability of calling John Doe [the informer] as a witness, or at least interviewing him in preparation for trial, was a matter for the accused rather than the Government to decide.
And in Commonwealth v. Carter, supra 427 Pa. at 64, 233 A.2d at 289-90, our Supreme Court said:
*310Finally, it is urged that disclosure should not be required because it will in no event aid the defendant. This is true, contends the Commonwealth, because informers themselves are invariably addicts or persons with provable criminal backgrounds, and thus their testimony can be completely discredited before the trier of fact. We do not believe, however, that our notions of jurisprudence permit the prosecution to be the arbiter of the value to the defense of the testimony of a prospective witness. Under an adversary system of justice, each side is deemed uniquely suited to determine whether the testimony of a particular witness will advance its cause.
-3-
The Commonwealth also argues that it should not have been ordered to disclose the informer’s identity because the informer was not an eye-witness to the robbery.
In fact, the informer was an eye-witness to the conspiracy, which was one of the offenses with which appellant was charged, and of which he was convicted. This fact is in no way affected by the principle of law, cited by the Commonwealth, that a conspiracy need not be proved by eye-witness testimony but may be proved circumstantially. In addition, the informer was an eye-witness to the robbers’ discussion of the robbery shortly after the robbery.
In any event, the law is not, as the Commonwealth suggests, that an informer’s identity need be disclosed only if the informer was an eye-witness. To the contrary, as the Supreme Court stated in Roviaro v. United States, supra at 353 U.S. 62, 77 S.Ct. at 628-29:
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifiable. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest in protecting the flow of information against the individual’s right to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondisclosure erroneous must depend on the particular circumstances of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the possible defenses, the possible significance of the informer’s testimony, and other relevant factors.
*311This balancing test was expressly adopted by our Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Carter, supra 427 Pa. at 58-59, 233 A.2d at 286-287 and applied by this court in Commonwealth v. Pritchett, supra 225 Pa.Super. at 406-07, 312 A.2d at 437-438. In Pritchett the Commonwealth also argued, as it does here, that disclosure should be required only where the informer was an eye-witness. The lower court had found that the informer had been an eye-witness, but the Commonwealth urged that the record did not support the finding. We agreed with the Commonwealth that the record was ambiguous, id., 225 Pa.Super. at 408, 312 A.2d at 438, but held that even on the assumption that the informer had not been an eye-witness, his participation had been such that the Roviaro — Carter balancing test required disclosure, id., 225 Pa.Super. at 409, 312 A.2d at 439.
When the Roviaro — Carter balancing test is applied here, it is evident that disclosure should have been ordered, for as discussed above, the informer’s participation was such that his testimony would have borne immediately upon the only substantial issue, which was the identification of the robbers.
The judgment of sentence should be vacated and a new trial granted.

. Having reached this conclusion, I find it unnecessary to consider appellant’s several other arguments.

. The record does not include a transcript of the trial. This absence, however, does not preclude our deciding the case, for as will appear, the critical event occurred pre-trial. The statement of facts that follows is taken from the opinion of the lower court and the Commonwealth’s brief.