Court Opinion

ID: 9955841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 16:08:13.058652+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:26.632724
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Wilson, 2024-Ohio-1193.]

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                             SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                  MONROE COUNTY

                                             STATE OF OHIO,

                                             Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                                     v.

                                        JACOB A. WILSON,

                                        Defendant-Appellant.

                        OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                         Case No. 23 MO 0012

                                    Criminal Appeal from the
                         Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Ohio
                                      Case No. 2021-378

                                            BEFORE:
                           Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Judges,
            William A. Klatt, Retired Judge of the Tenth District Court of Appeals,
                                     Sitting by Assignment.

                                                JUDGMENT:
                                                  Affirmed.

Atty. James L. Peters, Monroe County Prosecutor, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

Atty. James R. Wise, for Defendant-Appellant.

                                         Dated: March 28, 2024
                                                                                       –2–

HANNI, J.

       {¶1}    Defendant-Appellant, Jacob A. Wilson, appeals from a Monroe County
Common Pleas Court judgment convicting him of two counts of murder, following his
guilty plea.
       {¶2}    On October 30, 2021, the bodies of Malakai Curry and Daniel Franzoi were
found with gunshot wounds in Woodsfield, Ohio. Appellant was arrested.
       {¶3}    On November 18, 2021, a Monroe County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on
two counts of aggravated murder, unclassified felonies in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A);
two counts of tampering with evidence, third-degree felonies in violation of R.C.
2921.12(A)(1); and two counts of abuse of a corpse, fifth-degree felonies in violation of
R.C. 2927.01(B). Firearm specifications accompanied both aggravated murder counts.
Appellant initially pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity.
       {¶4}    On May 15, 2023, the trial court held a change of plea hearing. Pursuant
to plea negotiations with Plaintiff-Appellee, the State of Ohio, in exchange for Appellant’s
guilty plea the State would amend the two counts of aggravated murder to murder,
dismiss the firearm specifications, and dismiss the tampering with evidence and abuse of
a corpse charges.      The trial court conducted a plea colloquy with Appellant and
determined that he was entering his guilty plea knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.
Thus, the court accepted Appellant’s plea and scheduled the matter for sentencing.
       {¶5}    The trial court subsequently held a sentencing hearing on May 22, 2023. It
sentenced Appellant to mandatory sentences of 15 years to life on each of the two murder
counts.   The court ordered Appellant to serve his sentences consecutively for an
aggregate sentence of 30 years to life.
       {¶6}    Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on June 16, 2023. He now raises
a single assignment of error.
       {¶7}    Appellant’s sole assignment of error states:

       THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO PROPERLY COMPLY WITH CRIMINAL
       RULE 11 BEFORE ACCEPTING DEFENDANT’S PLEAS OF GUILTY.

       {¶8}    Appellant argues that while the trial court properly advised him of the
constitutional rights he was waiving by pleading guilty, it did not properly advise him of

Case No. 23 MO 0012
                                                                                            –3–

his non-constitutional rights. Specifically, Appellant contends the court failed to advise
him that he was not eligible for community control. Therefore, Appellant asserts, the court
failed to substantially comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) in ensuring that he understood the
effect of his plea.
       {¶9}    Pursuant to Crim.R. 11(C)(2), the trial court must follow a certain procedure
for accepting guilty pleas in felony cases. Before the court can accept a guilty plea to a
felony charge, it must conduct a colloquy with the defendant to determine that he
understands the plea he is entering and the rights he is voluntarily waiving. Crim.R.
11(C)(2). If the plea is not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, it has been obtained in
violation of due process and is void. State v. Martinez, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 03-MA-
196, 2004-Ohio-6806, ¶ 11, citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243, 89 S.Ct. 1709,
23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969).
       {¶10} A trial court must strictly comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) pertaining to the
waiver of five federal constitutional rights. Martinez, at ¶ 12. These rights include the
right against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, the right to confront one's accusers,
the right to compel witnesses to testify by compulsory process, and the right to proof of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c). A trial court need only substantially
comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) pertaining to non-constitutional rights such as: informing
the defendant of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved and, if
applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or community control sanctions
at the sentencing hearing; informing the defendant of and determining that the defendant
understands the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest; and informing the defendant that
the court, upon acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence. Id.,
citing Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)(b).
       {¶11} In this case, the trial court properly advised Appellant of each of the
constitutional rights he was waiving by entering a guilty plea. (Tr. 44-45). The court
advised him that he was waiving the right to a jury trial, the right to confront witnesses
against him, the right to compel witnesses on his behalf, the right to require the State to
prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and the right against self-incrimination. (Tr.
44-45). Appellant admits this in his brief. Thus, the trial court strictly complied with
Crim.R. 11(C)(2) pertaining to the waiver of Appellant’s federal constitutional rights.

Case No. 23 MO 0012
                                                                                          –4–

       {¶12} Therefore, we must move on to consider whether the trial court substantially
complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) pertaining to Appellant’s non-constitutional rights.
       {¶13} The trial court informed Appellant of the nature of the charges by informing
him that the charges he now faced were two counts of murder, which are first-degree
felonies in violation of R.C. 2903.02(A). (Tr. 41). Appellant stated that he understood the
charges. (Tr. 41). The court next informed Appellant of the maximum penalty he faced,
which was a mandatory 15-years to life sentence on each charge in addition to post-
release control. (Tr. 41). Appellant indicated that he understood this. (Tr. 41). The court
informed Appellant that it intended to impose his sentence on May 22, 2023, which it did,
and Appellant indicated he understood this. (Tr. 43). Appellant’s counsel informed the
court that Appellant understood and appreciated what his guilty plea would result in. (Tr.
40). And in the written plea of guilty, signed by Appellant, he stated that he understood
he was admitting that he committed the offenses. Thus, the trial court substantially
complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) pertaining to these non-constitutional rights.
       {¶14} The only non-constitutional right Appellant argues the court failed to
explicitly inform him of was that he was not eligible for community control sanctions.
       {¶15} While Appellant is correct that the trial court did not specifically tell him that
he was not eligible for probation or community control sanctions, the court still met the
substantial compliance standard here.
       {¶16} At the beginning of the plea colloquy, the court informed Appellant that each
of his two murder charges “carry a mandatory 15-year to life sentence, as well as Post
Release Control should you ever be released.” (Tr. 41). Appellant told the court that he
understood this. (Tr. 41).
       {¶17} Later, after going over his constitutional rights with him, the court again told
Appellant: “You do need to understand as I told you that these two charges have a
sentence – a mandatory sentence. It’s a 15-year to life sentence. Once you have served
the definite portion of your sentence, you are eligible for parole at some point basically.”
(Tr. 45). And again, Appellant indicated to the court that he understood this. (Tr. 45).
       {¶18} Thus, while the trial court did not explicitly state to Appellant that he was not
eligible for probation or community control sanctions, it made clear to him twice that he
faced a mandatory prison sentence. It is well established that a trial court substantially

Case No. 23 MO 0012
                                                                                           –5–

complies with Crim.R. 11(C)(2) when it informs the defendant that a mandatory prison
sentence will be imposed and the defendant acknowledges this. See State v. Nero, 56
Ohio St.3d 106, 564 N.E.2d 474 (1990), at the syllabus (“Where the circumstances
indicate that the defendant knew he was ineligible for probation and was not prejudiced
by the trial court's failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), the trial court's acceptance
of the defendant's guilty plea to the nonprobationable crime of rape without personally
advising the defendant that he was not eligible for probation constitutes substantial
compliance with Crim.R. 11.”); State v. Stewart, 51 Ohio St.2d 86, 364 N.E.2d 1163
(1977), at the syllabus (“Where an individual is indicted on a charge of aggravated murder,
with specifications thereto, and the trial court accepts a plea of guilty to the lesser included
offense of murder [R.C. 2903.02] without personally advising the defendant that he is
ineligible for probation, such omission does not constitute prejudicial error, and there is
substantial compliance with the provisions of Crim.R. 11.”); State v. Beamon, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 73813, 1999 WL 165925, *4 (Mar. 25, 1999) (“Here, the facts showed the
trial court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11 when Beamon entered his guilty plea.
The trial court then enumerated the potential terms of incarceration. When a trial court
refers to actual incarceration, it substantially complies with Crim.R. 11.”)
       {¶19} Based on the above, the trial court substantially complied with Crim.R.
11(C)(2) in informing Appellant of his nonconstitutional rights.
       {¶20} Accordingly, Appellant’s sole assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
       {¶21} For the reason stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed.

Waite, J., concurs.

Klatt, J., concurs.

Case No. 23 MO 0012
[Cite as State v. Wilson, 2024-Ohio-1193.]

        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignment of error is
overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the Court
of Common Pleas of Monroe County, Ohio, is affirmed. Costs to be waived.
        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

                                        NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.