Court Opinion

ID: 9675980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:11:29.486448+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:42.140371
License: Public Domain

O’Connell, P.J.
(dissenting). I disagree with the lead opinion’s conclusion that this case does not present “an important constitutional issue that is decisive of the outcome” of this case. Ante at 685. In People v Carr, 149 Mich App 653, 659; 386 NW2d 631 (1986), this Court held that “any evidence derived from testimony at a disciplinary hearing is inadmissible at subsequent criminal proceedings on the underlying charge, save for impeachment or rebuttal . . . .” This rule in Carr is outcome determinative of the present case and defendant’s convictions should be reversed. 1
*696While in prison for an unrelated conviction, defendant was found to be in possession of a small amount of marijuana. Corrections officers, acting on a tip, searched defendant immediately after he was observed being handed a small box. The box was found to contain 4.8 grams of marijuana. Defendant later asserted that he had not known what was in the box when it was handed to him.
Evidence concerning the circumstances surrounding the search of defendant could have supported the conclusion that defendant had been caught red-handed as a result of deft work by corrections officers. However, other evidence suggested that defendant had been framed — corrections officers consistently refused to disclose the identity of the informant, defendant was apprehended before he had had the opportunity to discover what the box he had been handed contained, and another inmate testified that he had handed defendant the box and that defendant would have had no way to know what was in it. Further, this other inmate was apparently never disciplined or prosecuted in any way.
An administrative disciplinary hearing was held before a hearing officer of the Michigan Department of Corrections. At the hearing, defendant admitted that he had knowingly possessed the marijuana and he was punished in accordance with Department of Corrections guidelines. He later stated that he pleaded guilty to avoid being considered a “snitch” by other inmates. Significantly, all parties concede that defendant was at no point told that his testimony *697could later be used against him in a criminal proceeding.
Soon after, criminal proceedings were initiated against defendant. Defendant testified at trial that he had not known that the box that he was handed contained marijuana. After considering the evidence set forth above, the jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict.2 Another trial was held. At the second trial, a new witness was produced, the hearing officer who had overseen the administrative disciplinary hearing. He testified that defendant had admitted at the disciplinary hearing that he had knowingly been in possession of marijuana. This testimony was not introduced for impeachment purposes but as substantive evidence. In light of the fact that defendant was then standing accused of having been a prisoner in possession of contraband, MCL 800.281(4); MSA 28.1621(4), this second jury, unsurprisingly, found defendant guilty. This appeal followed.
Defendant argues that the evidence of his earlier confession at the disciplinary hearing was not admissible in the subsequent trial because he was not read his Miranda3 warnings. In his brief on appeal, defendant concedes that this issue was not raised by his trial attorney — the attorney lodged no objection to the admission of the hearing officer’s testimony, nor did the attorney raise the issue at the postjudgment *698motion for a new trial. Generally, we will not review an issue raised for the first time on appeal. People v Davis, 122 Mich App 597, 609; 333 NW2d 99 (1983); People v Newcomb, 190 Mich App 424, 431; 476 NW2d 749 (1991). However, if an important constitutional question is presented regarding the admissibility of evidence and is decisive of the outcome of the case, appellate review is appropriate. People v Catey, 135 Mich App 714, 722; 356 NW2d 241 (1984).
In the present case, defendant’s first trial resulted in a mistrial because the jury was unable to reach a verdict. The only significant difference between the first trial and the second trial, at least in terms of the evidence presented, was the introduction of the hearing officer’s testimony at the second trial. Thus, there could hardly be a clearer indication that the introduction into evidence of the testimony “is decisive of the outcome . . . .’’Id. Therefore, I believe we are required to review this issue despite the fact that it was not properly preserved below.
To reiterate defendant’s position, he contends that the admission into evidence of his prior confession of guilt violated his Fifth Amendment rights.4 This Court reached this precise issue in Carr, supra at 659, relying on People v Rocha, 86 Mich App 497, 512; *699272 NW2d 699 (1978), in which we stated the following:
[A]ny evidence derived from testimony at a disciplinary hearing is inadmissible at subsequent criminal proceedings . on the underlying charge, save for impeachment or rebuttal, and the accused must be advised before testifying at the disciplinary hearing that his testimony will not be admissible against him at a subsequent criminal trial on the underlying offense.
It is not contended in the present case that the hearing officer’s testimony was offered for impeachment* ***5 or rebuttal, and the prosecution concedes that the introduction into evidence of this testimony violates Carr.6 While the prosecution submits that this error may be considered to have been harmless, for the reasons set forth above, I cannot so conclude. Therefore, because defendant’s prior statements were improperly introduced into evidence in this criminal trial, and because the introduction of these statements almost certainly resulted in the verdict of *700guilty, defendant’s conviction should be reversed. Carr, supra; Grant, supra.
I would reverse.

 Separation of powers concerns and a closer analysis of the constitutional question presented in Carr compel me to the conclusion that the Carr resolution is a public policy decision and is not warranted by the *696Fifth Amendment. However, until we can reach a workable resolution to the dilemma presented in this case, I am reluctant to advocate substantial changes to the current system.

 The record contains a transcript of the testimony presented at the first trial, but the transcript does not reflect the jury’s verdict or, rather, an indication that the jury was unable to reach a verdict. I infer that the first trial resulted in a mistrial from defense counsel’s representation at the sentencing hearing (after the second trial) that the first trial resulted in a hung jury. This representation is corroborated, obviously, by the fact that a second trial was conducted.

 Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966).

 To my knowledge, every court that has addressed the issue, i.e., whether Miranda rights must be read at a prison disciplinary hearing, has concluded that the statements at a prison disciplinary hearing of an inmate who has not been advised of his Miranda rights may not be used against him at a subsequent criminal trial. Avant v Clifford, 67 NJ 496, 538-540; 341 A2d 629 (1975); Carter v McGinnis, 351 F Supp 787, 794 (WD NY, 1972); People v Stamus, 902 P2d 936, 938 (Colo App, 1995); Grant v State, 154 Ga App 758; 270 SE2d 42 (1980); Pruitt v State, 176 Ga App 317, 319; 335 SE2d 724 (1985); United States v Redfield, 402 F2d 454, 455 (CA 4, 1968); State v Harris, 176 Mont 70, 72-73; 576 P2d 257 (1978).

 Though the hearing officer’s account of defendant’s prior confession could have been used to impeach defendant’s credibility, it was not so used in the present case. The hearing officer testified as part of the prosecution’s case in chief, that is, before defendant testified, and the officer’s testimony was utilized as substantive evidence of defendant’s guilt.

 For the reasons stated in Carr, I agree that Miranda warnings are not required at prison disciplinary hearings. However, if the state intends to use the accused’s testimony at a subsequent criminal proceeding, a different issue is presented. If I were writing on a clean slate, the focal point of this issue would be whether prison disciplinary hearings involve custodial interrogation. If there is no custodial interrogation at prison disciplinary hearings, then the Miranda warnings are not required. However, if custodial interrogation does/did occur, then the state, if it intends to use the accused’s statements in a subsequent criminal proceeding, must give the accused his Miranda rights. People v Hill, 429 Mich 382; 415 NW2d 193 (1987).