Court Opinion

ID: 9364224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-18 19:02:00.268786+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:36.693159
License: Public Domain

Filed 1/18/23 P. v. Taylor CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,                                                          2d Crim. Nos. B305964, B308322
                                                                        (Super. Ct. No. NA074807)
     Plaintiff and Respondent,                                             (Los Angeles County)

v.

DERRICK TAYLOR,

     Defendant and Appellant.

      Derrick Taylor appeals an order denying his petition for
resentencing pursuant to former Penal Code section 1170.95
(renumbered section 1172.6 without substantive change).1 We
reverse the order and remand for an evidentiary hearing
pursuant to section 1172.6. (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th

         1   All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
698, 717-718 [true finding on a felony-murder special-
circumstance allegation rendered prior to People v. Clark (2016)
63 Cal.4th 522 and People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th 788 does
not preclude petitioner from showing eligibility for section 1172.6
relief].)
            FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       Taylor’s resentencing petition concerned his 2011
conviction of first degree murder (count 1) and burglary (count 2),
with findings of: 1) special-circumstance murder committed
during a burglary; 2) participation in a crime to benefit a
criminal street gang; and 3) discharge of a firearm by a principal
during commission of the crimes causing death. (§§ 187, subd.
(a), 189, 459, 190.2, subd. (a)(17), 186.22, subd. (b)(4), 12022.53,
subds. (b)-(e).) The trial court sentenced Taylor for the murder
conviction to life without the possibility of parole, plus a
consecutive term of 35 years to life in part for the principal
firearm use enhancement. Sentences on a remaining count and
enhancements were imposed but stayed pursuant to section 654.
Taylor appealed. We modified the judgment to award additional
presentence custody credit, but otherwise affirmed. (People v.
Taylor (Nov. 29, 2012, B233797) [nonpub. opn.].)
       On January 30, 2020, Taylor filed a section 1172.6 petition
for resentencing alleging that his murder conviction rested upon
the felony murder or the natural and probable consequences
doctrines and that he was not the actual killer. The trial court
denied the petition without appointing counsel or requesting
briefing based upon a belief that Taylor was the actual killer.
Taylor filed this appeal and challenges the decision.
       While Taylor’s appeal was pending, the trial court issued a
revised memorandum of decision. This decision concluded that

                                 2
although Taylor was not “the direct shooter,” judicial precedent
permitted the court to summarily deny a resentencing motion if a
jury found the defendant guilty of a special circumstance.2
                     Summary of Trial Evidence
       In the late evening of October 26, 2006, Derrick Taylor,
Jarrett Myers, and Vincent Smith, entrenched gang members of
the “Santana Blocc Crips” criminal street gang, went to the
residence of drug dealer John Ibrahim to obtain marijuana and
cash. The gang members believed that Ibrahim was then
vacationing in Hawaii. When they arrived at the residence,
however, they saw that Ibrahim was present.
       Smith then retrieved a firearm to carry out their plan. The
gang members developed a ruse to lure Ibrahim outside. When
Ibrahim was outside, Taylor and Smith went inside to search for
drugs. Ibrahim returned to his residence unexpectedly, however,
and a gun battle ensued. Ibrahim shot Smith in the neck but
Smith shot Ibrahim three times, twice in the back. Ibrahim died
in the bushes outside his residence. Neither Taylor nor his
codefendants sought help for Ibrahim.
       Taylor gave statements to police officers stating that he
was unaware that Smith was armed and that the group went to
Ibrahim’s home believing that he was absent. The gang members
devised a plan to lure Ibrahim outside, but when he returned
quickly and found the men inside his home, a gun battle ensued.

      2 Although the trial court lacked jurisdiction to issue a
revised decision because Taylor had already filed a notice of
appeal, we discuss Taylor’s special circumstance argument post
for the benefit of the court and the parties on remand.

                                3
       Codefendants Smith and Taylor received separate trials.
Each defendant claimed that the other was armed and shot
Ibrahim.
       Taylor appeals the denial of his petition for resentencing.
                             DISCUSSION
       Taylor argues that the trial court erred by denying
resentencing because his felony-murder special-circumstance
conviction does not necessarily render him ineligible for section
1172.6 relief. He adds that the court erred by fact-finding that he
was the actual killer. The Attorney General concedes this point.
       Section 1172.6 authorizes a defendant “convicted of felony
murder or murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine” (id., subd. (a)) to challenge his murder conviction if, as a
threshold matter, he makes a “prima facie showing” of
entitlement to relief. (Id., subd. (c).) This, in turn, requires a
showing that, among other things, he “could not presently be
convicted of murder” under the amendments to the murder
statutes that became effective on January 1, 2019. (Id., subd.
(a)(3).) These statutes, even as amended, still authorize a
murder conviction, however, based on murder committed by
someone else in the course of a jointly committed felony as long
as the defendant “was a major participant in the underlying
felony and acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (§ 189,
subd. (e)(3).)
       Recently, our Supreme Court held that a special-
circumstance finding made prior to People v. Banks, supra, 61
Cal.4th 788, and People v. Clark, supra, 63 Cal.4th 522, does not
warrant summary denial of a section 1172.6 petition. (People v.
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698, 720.) Instead, the matter must
proceed to an evidentiary hearing. (Ibid.) Strong concluded that

                                  4
“[f]indings issued by a jury before Banks and Clark” are not
preclusive and “do not preclude a defendant from making out a
prima facie case for relief.” (Id. at p. 710; id. at pp. 716-717.)
Strong reasoned that Banks and Clark “substantially clarified”
and narrowed the terms “major participant” and “reckless
indifference.” (Id. at p. 721.) Moreover, Strong held that it is
inappropriate for any court to evaluate whether substantial
evidence supports the jury’s pre-Banks and pre-Clark finding if
the evidence is viewed through the narrowed Banks and Clark
prisms. (Id. at pp. 719-720.)
       Here, Taylor’s special-circumstance finding was made prior
to the decisions in Banks and Clark. Taylor is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6. (People v.
Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th 698, 720.)
                           DISPOSITION
             The order denying the petition for resentencing is
reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court to appoint
counsel, issue an order to show cause, and conduct an evidentiary
hearing pursuant to section 1172.6.
             NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                    GILBERT, P. J.
We concur:

             YEGAN, J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                                5
                    Judith L. Meyer, Judge

             Superior Court County of Los Angeles

                ______________________________

      Spolin Law, Aaron Spolin for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Amanda V. Lopez and David W. Williams,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent