Court Opinion

ID: 9469348
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:38:06.462764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:41:20.590956
License: Public Domain

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge, joined by CHARLES CLARK (first two paragraphs only) and RANDALL, Circuit Judges,
concurring in the result:
Because no attorney-client privilege between Mr. Pavlick and the anonymous fee-payer has been established, Mr. Pavlick must answer the questions put to him, and I see no reason to discuss whether or not he was employed to fulfill a promise made as part of a conspiracy. The party who invokes the attorney-client privilege-has the burden of establishing both the existence of an attorney-client relationship and the confidential nature of the communication.1 See United States v. Flores, 628 F.2d 521, 526 (9th Cir. 1980); United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d 928, 938 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829, 99 S.Ct. 105, 58 L.Ed.2d 123 (1978). Even if the anonymous fee-payer sought personal legal advice from Mr. Pavlick and became his client in regard to the matters about which he sought counsel, he was not Mr. Pavlick’s client in the matter for which the fee was paid and about which Mr. Pavlick was interrogated. In that matter, Mr. Pavlick’s clients were Willis, Love, and Pieser, each of whom waived the attorney-client privilege. There is neither any contention nor the slightest evidence that Mr. Pavlick was retained to represent Mr. Anonymous jointly with these three. There was, therefore, no attorney-client relationship between the fee-payer and the lawyer with regard to the matter about which Mr. Pavlick was questioned.
Not only did Mr. Pavlick fail to establish an attorney-client relationship with Mr. Anonymous in this matter, he also failed to present evidence that the communication between him and Mr. Anonymous concerning payment of a fee to represent Willis, Love, and Peiser was for the purpose of obtaining legal advice for Mr. Anonymous. As we have seen, the attorney-client privilege shields only those communications made for the purpose of securing such advice. See United States v. Kelly, 569 F.2d *1030at 938 (“the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney was informed by his client ... for the purpose of securing primarily either an opinion on law or legal advice or assistance in some legal proceeding”); 8 J. Wigmore, supra at § 2310 (“The test is, therefore, not whether the fact or the statement is actually necessary or material or relevant to the subject of the consultation, but whether the statement is made as a part of the purpose of the client to obtain advice on that subject.”).2
The majority opinion paints with a broad brush and its background suggests answers to questions we should not now decide. Although the government now seeks only to learn the identity of Mr. Anonymous, as I read the majority opinion, if the predicate facts are established, even Willis, Love and Peiser could not claim an attorney-client privilege. Thus, if Mr. Pavlick had been retained by Mr. Anonymous to represent Willis, Love, and Pieser jointly, none of them could claim the privilege either for the identity of Mr. Anonymous or for any other communications made in the conversation.3 Accepting its rationale as the basis for requiring disclosure of the identity of Mr. Anonymous, it is difficult to see why the same rationale would not require stripping any privilege from the entire relationship.
When confronted with a ease in which there might be an attorney-client privilege but for the taint of illegality, I would decide whether the rationale of United States v. Hodge and Zweig, 548 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1977), should be extended. That case involved “legal representation . .. secured in furtherance of intended, or present, continuing illegality.” It held that the “party seeking disclosure . .. must make out a prima facie case that the attorney was retained in order to promote intended or continuing criminal or fraudulent activity.” 548 F.2d at 1354 (emphasis added).4
In the instant case, however, there is no indication that the legal representation was secured in furtherance of “intended, or present, continuing illegality.” The illegal acts had already taken place, even if the eventual procurement of counsel is viewed as the final overt conspiratorial act. The importation of marijuana had been completed, and Mr. Pavlick was retained after the arrest of the three sailors.
Mr. Pavlick’s assertion of the shield of privilege for Mr. Anonymous does not require us to apply Hodge and Zweig to this case, let alone extend it to every case in which the retaining of a lawyer is promised to a criminal as one of the benefits offered to induce him to join in a crime.

. Professor Wigmore characterizes the rule as follows:
8 J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2292, at 554 (J. McNaughton rev. 1961) (footnote omitted).
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.
We have adopted this definition. In United States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1973), we said: “The privilege applies to communications between lawyer and client, and, to come within the scope of the privilege, an attorney must show that the communication was made to him confidentially, in his professional capacity, for the purpose of securing legal advice or assistance.” Accord, In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Jones), 517 F.2d 666, 670 (5th Cir. 1975).

. See Saltzburg, Communications Falling With-1 in the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 Iowa L.Rev. 811, 823 (1981), in which a distinction is drawn between retaining a lawyer to give legal advice and having him simply perform an act as an agent.

. Consider, as another example, a corporation whose president is named as a codefendant with the corporation in an indictment charging an antitrust conspiracy. The corporation retains counsel to represent both. The president later waives the attorney-client privilege, asserting that the corporation’s board of directors had agreed before the.alleged antitrust course was begun that, if the president were ever charged with an antitrust violation, the corporation would retain counsel for him. I would intimate no opinion concerning the effect of this agreement, which might be viewed as a fringe benefit for use in recruiting or continuing the services of a criminal conspirator.

. In Hodge and Zweig the information sought concerned transactions during 1970, 1971, and 1972, and the conspiracy began “at least as early as June 1971 and ended on November 21, 1974.” Id.