Court Opinion

ID: 9768506
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:06:44.13052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:41.507981
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Associate Justice, dissenting. As I read the majority opinion, this court recognizes the appellants’ (three surviving children of the decedent, R. A. Pickens) standing to question whether the executor, Freddie Black, had a conflict of interest that prohibited him from deciding whether a wrongful death action should be brought against himself, his wife and mother-in-law and Dr. Hoagland, Pickens’ attending physician at the time Pickens died. See Wright v. Wright, 248 Ark. 105, 449 S.W.2d 952 (1970). In his brief, Black relates that one of appellants’ claims filed in a chancery court proceeding alleged that Black and his other co-defendants willfully caused the death of Pickens.1 Assuming the validity of the appellants’ claim, they, rather than Pickens’ surviving spouse, would be heirs at law and share in any proceeds gained from a wrongful death suit. Having accepted the appellants’ standing in this cause — a point with which I agree — the majority opinion proceeds to dismiss the appellants’ claim on the basis that the probate court acted properly when appointing a special administrator and in accepting his report and recommendation that a special counsel should not be authorized to pursue a wrongful death action. Based upon the evidence, I believe the probate judge was clearly wrong in adopting the special administrator’s recommendation. In their briefs, appellants set forth considerable evidence from which one could reasonably conclude Pickens’ death at 12:20 a.m., April 10, 1991, resulted from an overdose of morphine prescribed by his treating physician, Dr. R. A. Hoagland. Pharmacists submitted affidavits reflecting their opinions that Pickens, considering his medical history, should not have been given morphine in any form. They also averred that morphine is a drug that should never be used without monitoring; nonetheless, Mr. Pickens was permitted to self-administer the morphine prescribed for him. Dr. Hoagland was shown previously to have had his license suspended by the Arkansas Medical Board, for-prescribing excessive amounts of controlled drugs. Hoagland also had had his license suspended previously in Nebraska, as well as having been fined and placed on probation in Louisiana. Dr. Hoagland’s file reflected he had spoken to Mrs. Pickens the morning of April 9, 1991, and Mrs. Pickens informed Hoagland that Mr. Pickens had taken four morphine pills within a one-to-two hour period. Nevertheless, Hoagland waited another nine and one-half hours to examine Mr. Pickens. Hoagland examined Mr. Pickens at his home at 12:00 a.m. on April 10, and Pick-ens died shortly thereafter (Hoagland said) from acute myocardial infarction. Mr. David Demarco, a licensed embalmer, was called to the Pickens home on April 10th and was met, Demarco said, by a man who appeared to be a doctor. Demarco removed Pickens’ body, took it to a Pine Bluff funeral home and embalmed it that day. Pickens’ funeral was conducted the day after his death. The coroner stated that, although not required, the Desha County physicians almost always notify him of an attended death, but Hoagland did not do so in this situation. Based upon the foregoing and other like statements, affidavits, testimony and records, four trial attorneys, Robert C. Compton, David A. Hodges, David N. Laser and Walter R. Niblock, opined that a wrongful death action may be sustained against Dr. Hoagland and those persons having the care, custody and control of Mr. Pickens prior to his death. Even the special administrator, who was appointed by the probate court to evaluate such a claim, believed a negligence suit against Hoagland would most likely survive any motion for summary judgment. The special administrator advised against the estate pursuing a wrongful death suit because Mrs. Pickens “is obviously not in favor of the suit and the material does not indicate that there is a loss of earnings for which compensatory damages would lie in favor of [Pickens’] surviving children.” In sum, the special administrator felt the expense to the estate could not be justified, and did not feel independent counsel would accept the case on a contingency basis. In rebuttal, appellants submitted Mr. David Hodges’ affidavit stating he would accept litigating the case on a graduated contingency fee basis and advance case expenses to be reimbursed upon any recovery. In my view of the foregoing evidence, I am unaware of any compelling reason why a special administrator should not file a wrongful death action. Everyone, including the special administrator, agrees a strong case of liability exists if a wrongful death suit is filed. The only reasons for rejecting the filing of suit given by the administrator was his suggesting that the prospective amount of damages would be small and to pursue the litigation would cost the estate. Of course, the amount of damages recoverable in most law suits is unpredictable, and considering the circumstances and evidence in this case, the estimated amount of damages, in my opinion, should not be the deciding factor. As to costs of litigation, the estate is in a position to contract with an attorney, who may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter. See Rule 1.8(e) of the Ark. Rules of Professional Conduct. But see also 1 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. & W. William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering, A Handbook on the Model Rules of Professional Conduct § 1.8:601, at 274 (2d ed. 1993). In sum, while certainly the probate judge acted prudently in appointing a special administrator to evaluate the merits of filing a wrongful death action, I believe he should not have felt bound by the administrator’s suggestion. To the contrary, the judge, considering the facts and evidence presented, was clearly erroneous to do so. Hays, J., joins this dissent.  At this point, I note that Black asserts in his brief that the chancery court has dismissed with prejudice this and other claims since the filing of this appeal. Nothing in the record supports this assertion, nor, if it were true, if those rulings have been appealed.