Court Opinion

ID: 9611941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:01:36.670036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:18.018809
License: Public Domain

TOM GLAZE, Justice, dissenting. The majority opinion is seriously tice, holding that Ark. Code Ann. § 11 — 9— 102(5) (F) (iii) (Supp. 1999) merely codifies preexisting case law found in Guidry v. J. & R. Eads Constr. Co., 11 Ark. App. 219, 669 S.W.2d 483 (1984). That statutory provision clearly changed the law announced in Guidry. In Guidry, the court adhered to the following principles: When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of and in the course of employment, every natural consequence that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the employment, unless it is the result of an independent intervening cause attributable to claimant’s own negligence or misconduct. (Emphasis added.) [T]he question is whether there is a causal connection between the primary injury and the subsequent disability and if there is such a connection, there is no independent intervening cause unless the subsequent disability is triggered by activity on the part of the claimant which is unreasonable under the circumstances. (Emphasis added.) The above principles clearly provide that an independent intervening cause or connection is shown when the claimant’s own negligence, misconduct, or unreasonable activity results in a subsequent or second injury. Section 11 -9-102(5) (F) (iii), on the other hand, provides the claimant’s negligence or recklessness is unnecessary to show a nonwork-related independent intervening cause. Section 11 -9-102 (5) (F) (iii), adopted by Act 796 of 1993 after the Guidry decision, further states that workers’ compensation benefits shall not be payable for a condition which results from a nonwork-related independent intervening cause following a compensable injury which causes or prolongs disability or a need for treatment. Here, claimant’s Randy Davis’s second injury to his ankle was clearly nonwork-related, since it occurred at his sister’s house. Randy’s own conduct caused his second injury when, to avoid contact, he stepped over his two-year-old niece and came down awkwardly on the right ankle he had previously injured at work. There is no substantial evidence to show Davis’s second injury was due to his own nonwork-related independent activity. Because the plain language in § 11 — 9—102(5)(F)(iii) clearly excludes benefits ion these circumstances, I must respectfully dissent. Smith, J., joins this dissent.