Court Opinion

ID: 9709408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:46:55.514422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:48.557533
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARTMAN, dissenting: Contrary to the legislative directive that the "Act *** be liberally construed, to the end that controversies may be speedily and finally determined according to the substantive rights of the parties” (735 ILCS 5/1 — 106 (West 1992)), the majority has construed section 2 — 1203 (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1203 (West 1992)) of the Act hypertechnically and punitively by ignoring the plain language of the post-judgment motion filed by J.D. Marshall International, Inc. (Marshall), and dismissing the appeal for want of jurisdiction. For this reason I am compelled to dissent. Although citing and quoting language, in part, from Marshall’s motion at pages 888-890 of the opinion, the majority has chosen to emphasize only one aspect thereof and to ignore what is plainly in compliance with both statute and case authority. Under section 2 — 1203, a post-judgment motion in nonjury cases relates to motions for rehearing, retrial, modification or vacature of the judgment, or for other relief. In order to constitute a post-judgment motion acceptable for purposes of Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1), the putative section 2 — 1203 motion "must include a request for at least one of the forms of relief specified” therein and must "allege grounds that would warrant the granting of the relief requested.” (Beck v. Stepp (1991), 144 Ill. 2d 232, 240, 579 N.E.2d 824; Andersen v. Resource Economics Corp. (1990), 133 Ill. 2d 342, 347, 549 N.E.2d 1262.) The subject motion clearly moves the court "to vacate the judgment *** entered in this cause on July 17, 1992 *** for a [new] trial and for reconsideration of the court’s order denying leave to file a second amended complaint.” (Emphasis added.) In its prayer for relief, Marshall iterates its request that the "judgment of dismissal *** be vacated, that the plaintiff [Marshall] be granted leave to file a second amended complaint, or, in the alternative, a new trial.” (Emphasis added.) Isolating the request for reconsideration of the court’s denial of leave to file a second amended complaint as the sole remedy sought, and ignoring that part of the motion seeking vacature of the judgment and a new trial (on the merits), the majority unjustifiably has transformed the motion into one seeking only leave to file an amended complaint. The second requirement set forth in Beck and Andersen, that the post-judgment motion allege grounds that would warrant the relief requested, is also fulfilled. Marshall’s motion specified that the circuit court erroneously ruled adversely to Marshall on each of seven motions in limine to its prejudice and, absent such erroneous rulings, "would have drawn different inferences or different conclusions which would have set forth [Marshall’s] *** right to recover as is more specifically set forth in the proposed second amended complaint, as is incorporated herewith.” A motion is a pleading (Chimerofsky v. School District No. 63 (1970), 121 Ill. App. 2d 371, 374, 254 N.E.2d 480; Russell v. Hertz Corp. (1985), 139 Ill. App. 3d 11, 15, 487 N.E.2d 630; Pence v. Village of Rantoul (1973), 12 Ill. App. 3d 446, 449, 298 N.E.2d 775), which may incorporate by reference any other pleading. (134 Ill. 2d R. 134.) The incorporated allegations set forth in the referenced five-count amended complaint more than adequately recount the history of dealings, customs and usages between all those concerned and makes extensive assertions of fact, contrary to the findings of the circuit court, which would entitle Marshall to judgment. Leaping to the alternative relief requested, leave to file an amended complaint, the majority has completely discounted and ignored these other parts of Marshall’s post-judgment motion, for vacatur or a new trial, and the grounds for doing so. To hold, as the majority does, that Supreme Court Rule 303(a)(1) has not been satisfied under these circumstances is without precedent in any authority cited. The appellate court ineluctably has jurisdiction of this case and I would decide the appeal on its merits. Accordingly, I dissent.