Court Opinion

ID: 9856476
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:48:12.145996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:50.303263
License: Public Domain

KIKER, Justice (dissenting). The applicant after being notified, according to the record, that he might take the examination and after having appeared on the date the examination was to begin was interviewed by the members of the Board of Bar Examiners and then told he would not be allowed to take the examination. The reasons given by the Board for declining to allow the applicant to take the examination were contained in a motion which was unanimously carried: “ * * * for the reason that, taking into consideration the use of aliases by the applicant; his former connection with subversive organizations, and his record of arrests, he has failed to satisfy the Board as to the requisite moral character for admission to the Bar of New Mexico.” After applicant had been denied the privilege of taking the examination, he wrote a letter to the Board in which he said: “ * * * If after you have reconsidered the question and your answer is still the same, I would appreciate being given an opportunity to appear personally before the Supreme Court when you certify the question to them.” Later, in the month of July 1954, the applicant was given a hearing before the Board. At this hearing the applicant testified at length — this was at Albuquerque. In addition to the applicant the following witnesses testified briefly in his behalf: Mrs. Schware, applicant’s wife; Rabbi Moshay P. Mann of Albuquerque, who is the Rabbi-of the Congregation B’Nai Israel; Julia R. McCulloch, secretary to the dean of the law school at the University of New Mexico; and Monroe Fox, an attorney practicing at Chama. There were also seventeen letters which applicant got from students at the law school from professors present at the University when applicant was getting together testimony as to his character. At that hearing no witnesses appeared to show want of good character on the part of applicant. The result of the hearing was that the Board of Bar Examiners affirmed the position taken by it at the time applicant applied for the examination on February 26, 1954 and so the application stood denied by the Board of Bar Examiners until the opinion of the majority was filed. The majority, in the opinion, discusses the three reasons assigned by the Board of Examiners for refusing to allow applicant to take the examination February 26, 1954. The first of these is the use of aliases beginning more than twenty years before the date of the examination and continuing from time to time over a period of approximately eight years. When applicant was eighteen years of age, after graduating from high school, he worked for a time in a hotel at Monticello, New York. Leaving Monticello on his way into New York City, he came to a town called Gloversville where a large part of the population -was Italian and where the workers at the factory were practically all Italian. He applied for a job and adopted the name of Rudolph Di Caprio and used that name while working there. He gave two reasons for the use of this name at different times and the majority seems to think the reasons are wholly inconsistent and show a tendency to falsehood. He explained in his application that since practically all the workers were Italian he thought in order to organize a union he would be more effective using the Italian name. He was dark and could easily pass for Italian. He stated at the hearing that he used this alias at the factory for the purpose of getting a job and did get a job working with Italians at that factory. I do not see any great inconsistency between the two statements. Being a Jew, he must have felt as he said he did, that he probably could not get a job there and he would be unable to organize a union if he did. When the workers were organized into a local union, they affiliated with the A. F. of L. after which applicant left for his home in New York City and resumed use of his own name. There is no evidence to show that the A. F. of L. failed to investigate the union before taking it into its organization as an affiliate and I have never heard of the A. F. of L. being charged with being Communist or having engaged in any subversive activities. The statement made by applicant, as shown in the majority opinion, discloses the fact that he worked in Los Angeles, San Pedro, San Francisco and Berkeley, California from 1934 to 1937 and during that time he worked under the name of Rudolph Di Caprio. He explained this fact stating that at none of the places where he worked in shipyards, as longshoreman and warehouseman were any Jews employed. The employees were almost entirely Italian and so applicant used the name Di Caprio. There is no hint or suggestion in the record made at the hearing given applicant in Albuquerque that he at any time used the name for the purpose of defrauding any person. Applicant also used another Italian alias on the occasions of several arrests about which he told the Board of Bar Examiners. The name used was Joe Fliari or Joe Fliori. He told the Board that he made a special trip to California for the purpose of ascertaining the number of times he was arrested at San Pedro. He stated that he was arrested twice in the course of a strike and that approximately three thousand people were arrested during the period of sixty-six days of the strike and that of these, two hundred men, of whom he was one, were arrested on a charge of suspicion of criminal syndicalism. He had been working under the name of Rudolph Di Caprio before being arrested, but when arrested he gave the police the name of Joe Fliori. He state that it had been a long time since the arrest occurred and that he supposed that the reasons for using that alias was fear that the company for which he had been working might not allow him to return to work. Nobody was or could have been defrauded by the use of that name. It is not shown that applicant intended to defraud anybody by its use. In 1940 applicant was arrested in Detroit on a charge of violation of the Neutrality Act which became Federal Law in 1818 and which was revised in 1909 and now appears as Sec. 959, Title 18 U.S.C.1952 Ed.; since 1909 the law has not changed and was in effect in 1940 and is as follows: “(a) Whoever, within the United States, enlists or enters himself, or hires or retains another to enlist or enter himself, or to go beyond the jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or entered in the service of any foreign prince, state, colony, district, or people as a soldier or as a marine or seaman on board any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.” The majority opinion quotes briefly a portion .of the testimony given by applicant at the close of his examination with reference to the Detroit arrest. I quote that which precedes that quoted by the majority. “Q. You have spoken about arrests, you testified to the arrest for criminal syndicalism twice in San Pedro, California, were you ever arrested on any other occasion? A. Yes, I was arrested in 1940. Q. “Where? A. In Detroit, Michigan. “Q. And what was the charge ? A. Well, I have attempted to obtain a copy of the indictment and the order of release and I corresponded with an attorney in Detroit, who defended me at that particular time and so far he has not sent down the copy of the indictment or the order of release although I believe he has kept my check which I tendered to him. “Mr. White: Did you plead guilty to the indictment or not guilty? A. I pleaded not guilty. I believe the charge was— “Mr. White: It was read to you, wasn’t it? A. I believe it was a violation of the neutrality act, it was the statute, I believe, of June 2, 1818, violation of the neutrality act. “Mr. Dunleavy: Was that as a result of attempts that you had made, and you describe in one of your letters, of obtaining recruits for the fight against Franco in Spain? A. Yes. “Q. Were you ever brought to trial? A. No, we were not brought to trial. Ten days after our arrest, my arrest the indictment was nol prossed. I believe the Attorney General of the United States said that inasmuch as the case had not been brought to trial when it was fresh and inasmuch as the Spanish government had granted amnesty to quite a number of people who had participated, in the country itself, that there was no reason for pressing charges and I was released. “Q. Were you ever arrested again or at any other time? A. I was arrested on one other occasion.” Though the applicant used the words “I, myself, had volunteered to go to Spain” in that quotation it cannot be said he had enlisted or entered himself, or hired or retained any other to enlist or enter himself or that he at any time went beyond the jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted or enter service of any foreign people as a soldier or other warrior. From that which is contained in the record he could not have been convicted if he had been tried on this charge as plainly appears from the wording of the statute and from the only testimony offered on this sub j ect. Applicant was again arrested at some town in Texas the name of which town he does not remember, while driving a car for .a friend to California. According to the sole testimony on the subject he had all the papers authorizing him to take the car from Detroit to California for a friend. He had taken the sohthern route through Texas because it was wintertime. The police held him, though he had all papers authorizing him to have the car in possession, for two or three days then released him and returned all his possessions taken from him. No charges were ever preferred against him on that charge. The record does not show which name he used in this arrest. It does show in other testimony that applicant, after he left the Communist party in 1940, used the name which he acquired at birth, at all times; but even if he had made use of the name Joe Fliori which he did when arrested on other occasions, I think it would have made no difference, as there is positively nothing in the record to show anybody was defrauded or that it was intended by applicant by the use of an alias at any time that anybody should be defrauded or wrongfully deceived. The exact date when the Texas arrest occurred doesn’t show in the Transcript of the hearing held at Albuquerque but after leaving the Communist party in 1940 applicant got work and being in Detroit a friend arranged with him to drive his car out to California, so that the incident must have occurred in 1940. The record does show that during at least eleven years before applying to take the examination, applicant used his own name on all occasions. The use of an alias when it is not intended to and does not deceive another, or others, to their injury and when it does not defraud another, or others, is not unlawful. 65 C.J.S., Names, § 9 a, states: “ * * * in the absence of statutory prohibition, a person, without abandoning his real name, may adopt or assume any name, wholly or partly different from his name, by which he may become known, and by which he may transact business, execute contracts, and carry on his affairs, unless he does so in order to defraud others, * * * 99 See the multitude of cases cited therein in this regard. Some years ago, to illustrate, I was asked by a worthy New Mexico citizen who had been long in business in New Mexico and who was a well established and highly respected citizen in his community, to institute the necessary proceeding to change his name. I inquired as to what name he desired to take and he said, “the name by which you have known me for a good many years”. It developed that he was of Polish extraction and the name of his father was so lengthy that when he went to work for another in the business for which his training qualified him he shortened his name and had been known by the assumed name for many years. I explained to him that he might go on permanently using the name he adopted without resort to any court, but his desire to have a judgment of a court in the matter was founded on the thought that he might sometime want to make a trip to the country his parents came from and that he might have difficulty obtaining a passport under the name of his birth since he had been known so long under another name. A judgment of court was obtained according to his desire; but the statute under which the proceeding was instituted was permissive only and did not require my client so to proceed. To further illustrate, some of the greatest people in history have been better known by an alias than by the name of their birth. Mark Twain is better known than is Samuel L. Clemens; Mr. Dooley is far better known to people of my generation than is F. Peter Dunne; O. Henry is probably better known than is William Sydney Porter; Abraham is far better known than is Abram, the original name of the same man; Paul the Apostle is far better known, I think, than Saul of Tarsus, his former name. Many of the most prominent actors and actresses who have worked in Hollywood since the establishment of the motion picture enterprise in that city have been known by names other than the names to which they were born. No law at any time ever prevented or does now prevent a change of name without fraudulent intent, as is shown by the authorities above cited. The second reason assigned by the Board of Bar Examiners for declining to permit applicant to take the bar examination was his former connection with subversive organizations. As pointed out in the majority opinion, applicant, according to his own declaration, joined the Young Communist League in his senior year at high school. Whether that connection ended upon his graduation at the end of the school year does not appear. He joined the Communist party in 1934 and continued to be a member of that party as it then existed in this country until 1937 when he left the party. After 1937, at some date not stated, applicant joined and remained a.member until 1940, when, according to. his own declaration, he found the protestations of the leaders of the party as to their interest in man as an individual were false. He decided, so he declared, that the interest of the leaders was in their own welfare and so he left. This is his declaration. There is no other evidence in the record except that supplied, as to membership in the Communist party, by applicant. The opinion of the majority points out that the Communist party was regarded in a far different manner during the time applicant was a member of it than at the present time. Applicant called the attention of the Board of Bar Examiners to the fact that in the year 1948, and years prior thereto, there was a national Communist ticket. Evidence of membership in the Communist party at a time fourteen years and more before the application to take the bar examination and with additional evidence that within that fourteen year period applicant took a solemn oath in the armed service of the United States of America to uphold and defend the Constitution and laws of this country and spent more than three years of such service as entitled him to an honorable discharge from the armed ranks, is not sufficient, in my opinion, to show want of good moral character of the applicant; and this is particularly true when it is shown that during the five years immediately preceding the date of application the applicant was of good moral character, at two educational institutions he attended during that time, and in the communities where he lived, three years having been spent at the law school at the University of this state. If the evidence in this case leaves any lingering suspicion that applicant may still in his beliefs cling to Communist theories, I think that the least that could be done about the matter of his eligibility to take the bar examination would be to bring him, with his legal representative and members of the Board of Bar Examiners, before the court for such representations as might be made as to the present activities of the applicant as to subversive matters. The majority makes much of the writing of a letter by applicant to his wife in 1944 after applicant had been in the armed services of this country for approximately a year and while he was on his way to the South Seas to fight and die, if necessary, for his country and for those of us who were unable to fight for ourselves. In that letter written to his wife applicant spoke with high praise of the Fair Employment Practices Commission and charged that white supremacy is a tool of southern Bourbonism to continue in power at the expense of the south itself and the nation as a whole and said: “Jim-Crow is on a par with AntiSemitism, anti-Catholicism, anti-Communism. In a democracy one cannot discriminate against a minority.” Later in the same letter applicant wrote that all the above “anti’s” are: “ * * * most dangerous and stupid mistakes for Americans to make. They violate Christian ethics as well as all other ethical principles that recognize the brotherhood of man. To top it all off, consider them immoral.” This letter speaks only of mental attitudes and beliefs. It is not difficult for me to understand how a young man, recently married, might display an ambitious desire to appear as a great philosopher to his recently wedded sweetheart from whom he must now be separated for a time. Though I cannot subscribe to the philosophy expounded by the writer as to some of his declarations, I think he might have been speaking of matters as he understood them to be at the time. Both Republicans and Democrats at that time were naturally opposed to the Communist party, but all recognized that it was the legally qualified exponent of its beliefs to the electorate of the United States. I do not think this letter was inadvertently offered in evidence by applicant’s attorney. It is unfortunate that death has removed the attorney for applicant and he cannot now tell us why the letter was offered in evidence; but I think it was offered for the same reason applicant so freely told the members of the Board of Bar Examiners of his life’s activities from the time he began working at nine years of age until he completed his educative efforts which brought him to the point of readiness to take the bar examination. I think applicant was denied the privilege of taking the bar examination on the suspicion that he still has beliefs of Commuunism as it is now known to exist rather than as known to exist at the time applicant was a member of the Communist party. When applicant left the Communist party he used language quite like that used by Mr. Justice Jackson at one place in his opinion in American Communications Association v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 70 S.Ct. 674, 702, 94 L.Ed. 925. The opinion just referred to concurs in part with the majority opinion and dissents in part. The majority opinion points out certain declarations of Mr. Justice Jackson with all of which I fully agree; but in that opinion the writer was speaking as of May 8, 1950, the date of the decision, and not as of 1944. The opinion of the majority quotes from the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in American Communications Association v. Douds, supra, a declaration made by Mr. Justice Jackson as to what the Communist party actually is and the principles for which it stands. The case before the court and on which Mr. Justice Jackson wrote was one brought to test the constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act as amended in 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq. The act provided that the board would not investigate any question affecting commerce concerning representations of employees raised by a labor organization and that no such petition would be entertained unless there be on file with the board an affidavit executed in the time stated, by the officers of such an organization that the officer is not a member of the Communist party or affiliated with such party and, “ * * *, that he does not believe in, and is not a member of or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods.” Having considered the Communist party and the propriety of the requirement as to membership in the Communist party, Mr. Justice Jackson wrote: “I conclude that we cannot deny Congress power to take these measures under the Commerce Clause to require labor union officers to disclose their membership in or affiliation with the Communist Party.” Turning to the requirement of the oath as to a belief of the officers of the union Mr. Justice Jackson wrote boldly of his belief in fundamental constitutional principles. Among other things: “Progress generally begins in skepticism about accepted truths. Intellectual freedom means the right to re-examine much that has been long taken for granted. A free man must be a reasoning man, and he must dare to doubt what a legislative or electoral majority may most passionately assert. The danger that citizens will think wrongly is serious, but less dangerous than atrophy from not thinking at all. Our Constitution relies on our electorate’s complete ideological freedom to nourish independent and responsible intelligence and preserve our democracy from that submissiveness, timidity and herd-mindedness of the masses which would foster a tyranny of mediocrity. • The priceless heri- • tage of our society is the unrestricted constitutional right of each member to think as he will. Thought control is a copyright of totalitarianism, and we have no claim to it. It is not the function of our Government to keep the citizen from falling into error; it is the function of the citizen to keep the Government from falling into error. We could justify any censorship only when the censors are better shielded against error than the censored.” The next quotation we take from this opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson upon which the majority placed considerable reliance expresses in very splendid language, very clearly, the idea of which applicant in this case had formed as he stated it and which he said was his reason for leaving the Communist party. The applicant said he came to the realization that the beautiful words declared by the leaders of the Communist party showed a lack of interest in the individual and a desire for power on the part of the leaders and the leadership did not care what happened to the other people. Having so concluded he said that he finally and definitely left the Communist party. Mr. Justice Jackson states:' “The idea that a Constitution should protect individual nonconformity is essentially American and is the last thing in the world that Communists will tolerate. Nothing exceeds the bitterness of their demands for freedom . for themselves in this country except the bitterness of their intolerance of freedom for others where they are in power. An exaction of some profession of belief or nonbelief is precisely what the Communists would, enact — ■ each individual must adopt the ideas that are common to the ruling group. Their whole philosophy is to minimize man as an individual and to increase the power of man acting in .the mass. If any single characteristic distinguishes our democracy from Communism it is our recognition of the individual as a personality rather than as a soulless part in the jigsaw puzzle that is the collectivist state.” It strikes me that applicant in this case at the time he left the Communist party was thinking along the same straight lines, and that his rebirth to the principles of democracy is no more strange than his passing from disbelief in God to faithful adherence io the religion of his birth. In the opinion of the majority in American Communications Association v. Douds, supra, Mr. Chief Justice Vinson wrote: “ * * * In this legislation, Congress did not restrain the activities of the Communist Party as a political organization ; nor did it attempt to stifle beliefs. Compare West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 1943, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87- L.Ed. 1628. Section 9(h) touches only a relative handful of persons, leaving the great majority of persons of the identified affiliations and beliefs completely free from restraint. And it leaves those few who are affected free to maintain their affiliations and beliefs subject only to possible loss of positions which Congress has concluded are being abused to the injury of the public by members of the described groups.” The few of whom the court there spoke were officials of labor unions and they were the only members of labor unions as to whom an oath as to affiliations or beliefs was required. The full opinion as written by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson was concurred in by three members of the court. Mr. Justice Frankfurter concurred in all portions of the opinion except that numbered 7 to which he dissented. This is not important to consider in our case. Mr. Justice Black begins his dissenting opinion in American Communications Association v. Douds: “We have said that 'Freedom to think is absolute of its own nature; the most tyrannical government is powerless to control the inward workings of the mind.’ ” Again Mr. Justi.ce Black said: . “Since § 9(h) was passed to exclude certain beliefs from one arena of the national economy, it was quite natural to utilize the test oath as a weapon. History attests the efficacy of that instrument for inflicting penalties and disabilities on obnoxious minorities. It was one of the major devices used against the Huguenots in France, and against ‘heretics’ during the Spanish Inquisition. It helped English rulers identify and outlaw Catholics, Quakers, Baptists, and Congregationalists— groups considered dangerous for political. .as well as religious reasons. And • wherever the test oath was in vogue, spies and informers found rewards far more tempting than truth. Painful awareness of the evils of thought espionage made such oaths ‘an abomination to the founders of this nation,’ In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561, 576, 65 S.Ct. 1307, 1315, 89 L.Ed. 1795, dissenting opinion. Whether religious, political, or both, test oaths are implacable foes of free thought. By approving their imposition, this Court has injected compromise into a field where the First Amendment forbids compromise. “The Court assures us that today’s encroachment on liberty is just a small one, that this particular statutory provision ‘touches only a relative, a handful of persons, leaving the great majority. of .persons of the identified affiliations and.beliefs completely free from restraint.’ But not the least of the virtues of the First Amendment is its protection of each member of the smallest and most unorthodox minority. Centuries of experience testify that laws aimed at one political or religious group, however rational these .laws may be in their beginnings, generate hatreds and prejudices which rapidly spread beyond control. Too often it is fear which inspires such passions, and nothing is more reckless or contagious. In the resulting hysteria, popular indignation tars with the same brush all those who have ever been associated with any member of the group under attack or who hold a view which, though supported by revered Americans as essential to democracy, has been adopted by that group for its own purposes.” The quotations are taken-from both Mr. Justice Jackson and Mr. Justice Black because I understand the majority of this court to rely solely on the proposition that at one time in his life, at least fourteen years before applying for admission to the bar, applicant was a member of the Communist party. No evidence appears in the record that in the year 1954 applicant was or had been for a period of fourteen years a member of the Communist party. In the record of the hearing held at Albuquerque this question was asked of applicant with the answer that follows: “Q. Regardless of whether it is Malencojf or Stalin or the Twelve Apostles in charge of the Communist party, if you took that oath you cannot be a Communist, is that right? “A. I am not a Communist.” The oath referred to in the question is the oath required of an attorney being admitted to the bar. We quote from that record again: “Q. Now then, that leads me down to this question concerning yourself, you stated that you left the Communist party because of your having reached the conclusion that the aims of those in charge of the policies of the Communist party were personal advancement and what not, rather than a belief in the principles, basic principles of the Communist party. That to me still leaves a doubt in my mind as to whether or not you still believe in the basic principles of the Communist party so that if at some time, let me ask you this question, suppose that the ruler of Russia today were to be overthrown and to the eyes of the Communist, the control of the Communist party was restored to sincere Communists, those that believe in principles of Communism, that condition existed, do you still believe in those principles to the extent that you would again join the Communist party? “A. Never, never! “Q. And then you say that you are not only, while you may have left the party originally because you didn’t believe that the leaders were sincere, you now say that you do not believe in the principles of Communism? “A. I am saying, Judge, that for myself I would never join the Communist party. I would never join the Communist party.” In Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 71 S.Ct. 857, 863, 95 L.Ed. 1137, the United States Supreme Court in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson, discussing the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385, said: “The very language of the Smith Act negates the interpretation which petitioners would have us impose on that Act. It is directed at advocacy, not discussion. Thus, the trial judge properly charged the jury that they could not convict if they found that petitioners did ‘no more than pursue peaceful studies and discussions or teaching, and advocacy in the realm of ideas.’ He further charged that it was not unlawful ‘to conduct in an American college or university a course explaining the philosophical theories set forth in the books which have been placed in evidence.’ Such a charge is in strict accord with the statutory language, and illustrates the meaning to be placed on those words. Congress did not intend to eradicate the free discussion of political theories, to destroy the traditional rights of Americans to discuss and evaluate ideas without fear of governmental sanction. Rather Congress was concerned with the very kind of activity in which the evidence showed these petitioners engaged.” Mr. Justice Frankfurter in the Dennis case, supra, in a concurring opinion, wrote: “No matter how clear we may be that the defendants now before us are preparing to overthrow our Government at the propitious moment, it is self-delusion to think that we can punish them for their advocacy without adding to the risks run by loyal citizens who honestly believe in some of the reforms these defendants advance. It is a sobering fact that in sustaining the convictions before us we can hardly escape restriction on the interchange of ideas. “We must not overlook the value of that interchange. Freedom of expression is the well-spring of our civilization — the civilization we seek to maintain and further by recognizing the right of Congress to put some limitation upon expression. Such are the paradoxes of life. For social development of trial and error, the fullest possible opportunity for the free play of the human mind is an indispensable prerequisite. The history of civilization is in considerable measure the displacement of error which once held sway as official truth by beliefs which in turn have yielded to other truths. Therefore the liberty of man to search for truth ought not to be fettered, no matter what orthodoxies he may challenge. Liberty of thought soon shrivels without freedom of expression. Nor can truth be pursued in an atmosphere hostile to the endeavor or under dangers which are hazarded only by heroes.” There is an appendix to the opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter pointing to opinions holding that speech cannot be restricted constitutionally unless there would result from it an imminent — close at hand — ' substantive evil. The cases cited and quoted from illustrate the view taken by the highest court of' the land as to any effort to control the thought processes of any individual. A mere belief in some proposition which is not orthodox when viewed from the standpoint of most people is not sufficient to condemn one as of bad moral character. The quotation taken from the majority opinion in American Communications Association v. Douds, supra, shows clearly that it is not membership alone in a party which was condemned. The oath required by the statute was of only a few individuals in that party who were in a position of leadership and whose authority and position might enable them to lead the masses of adherents to the beliefs and doctrines of that party to forcible action against the government. In the recent case entitled “In the Matter of Application of Ben G. Levy for Admission to Practice In the United States District Court, Southern District of Texas” the application was first considered by three District Judges. The matter involved the good moral character of applicant and nothing else. Applicant was a member of the bar of the State of Texas. The charge upon his character was based on the fact that he had been associated with an attorney practicing in the courts of Texas who was generally reputed to be a member of the Communist party. Applicant was denied admission to the District Court and thereupon took an appeal to the Court of Appeals where the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. 5 Cir., 214 F.2d 331. Next the matter was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States where the following opinion was rendered: “Per Curiam. The record in this case discloses no' sufficient grounds for the failure and refusal of the District Court to grant petitioner’s application for admission to the bar of that Court. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is accordingly reversed with direction to remand the cause to the District Court for appropriate action in accordance with this order.” 348 U.S. 978, 75 S.Ct. 569, 99 L.Ed. —. A very recent case involving moral character of an applicant for admission to the bar of the state of' Florida is, Coleman v. Watts, filed May 11, 1955, rehearing denied June 3, 1955, 81 So.2d 650, 651. In that case it is shown that applicant is an attorney duly admitted to practice in the courts of Ohio. In October 1953 applicant filed an application for permission to take the bar examination. In further stating the facts the Supreme Court of Florida said: “* * * the Board presumably developed certain information concerning petitioner’s moral fitness, which was derogatory in nature, and Coleman was requested to appear before the Board on March 12, 1954, for interrogation. At that time, and upon a later occasion, questions were propounded to Coleman by Board members on a wide variety of subjects, including the amounts and sources of his income for past years, and taxes paid thereon; his net worth; his past employments; his business transactions and his associates during his residence in Naples, Florida, since 1946; his personal relationship with his employer’s wife at that time, and the purported receipt of a gift of a house by deed executed by the wife containing restrictions on disposition at her option. Inquiries were also made as to whether or not the petitioner had ever engaged in ‘kick-back’ business transactions in connection with his work in real estate development at Naples, and whether or not he had served illegitimately as a ‘tax front’ for certain business associates.” The petitioner was the only witness; all derogatory allusions or derogatory accusations were flatly denied by him. Again we quote from the opinion: “* * * the Board members did not at any time specify, either generally or specifically, what acts of malfeasance, if any, had been reported to it of which the petitioner might be guilty. Thereafter, the petitioner was informed by the Board that his application to take the examination had been denied because ‘he did not meet the requirements for admission to the Florida Bar,’ but that he might avail himself of the privilege of a rehearing by producing before the Board, within a sixty-day period, ‘new and additional matter which had not previously been considered.’ ” After being so advised by the Board the petitioner took the matter to the Supreme Court by certiorari to secure review of the ruling of the Board. Again we quote from the opinion: “Upon the allegations of the petition, which have been set forth here only in substance, the petitioner charged that the Board, in denying him the right to take the examination without at least informing him of the ■ general nature of the complaints and charges and allowing him an opportunity to refute them, ‘did not proceed according to the essential requirements of the law, exceeded and acted without jurisdiction or authority in the premises, illegally and unlawfully took away (from) and denied to * * * petitioner a right granted to other members of the class of which petitioner is a member and denied petitioner the due process of law.’ ” The court considered the cases found in the annotations to 28 A.L.R. 1140 and 72 A.L.R. 929 and discussed cases from Oregon, California, Wisconsin, Montana, Georgia, West Virginia, New York, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, Indiana, and North Carolina. We now quote the principles relied on in that case for quashing the ruling of the Board of Bar Examiners and directing that a hearing be afforded applicant in conformity with the principles stated in the opinion. “It would seem, then, either by virtue of specific holdings, or by necessary implication, in the many cases dealing with the point, that where a court is asked to review the merits of a board’s rejection of an application for admission to the bar, annotations 28 A.L.R. 1140, 72 A.L.R. 929, it is incumbent upon the board to sustain its ruling by record evidence and not by mere assertions that it is possessed of confidential information which shows the applicant to be unfit; and if the record consists only of evidence supplied by the applicant, then such evidence must demonstrate that the board’s dissatisfaction with his application rests on valid grounds and not upon mere suspicion. Although the burden is always upon the applicant to ‘satisfy the Board of his or her moral standing,’ we have the view that when he has made the prima facie showing required by the statutes and rules governing admission to practice, ‘it is incumbent upon those making objections to offer evidence to support the same and to overcome the prima facie showing made by the applicant. It is not for the applicant to prove the falsity of the charges made against him.’ While the burden of proof never shifts, the burden of proceeding does.” I feel confident that the record before us does not • show conclusively or even per-. suasively that the proceedings of the Board-of Bar Examiners met' the tests, stated in •. the- quotation, and which are approved by the cases cited in the opinion. Applicant in our case was denied the privilege of taking the bar examination at the time of his appearance before the Board sitting for that purpose, as he had been advised previously that he might take the examination at that time. The board had before it certain information undisclosed to applicant which led the Board to hold an interview with him and to make certain inquiries of him of which no record was made except a record of a motion carried unanimously by the Board to the effect that applicant be denied the privilege of taking the bar examination because of subversive activities, aliases and arrests. He was not then advised, as I understand, of any reason for the questions which were asked him and he was not told the substance, even, of anything contained in the “Confidential File”. At the hearing held in Albuquerque the applicant by his attorney asked for information as to the contents of the “Confidential File” held by the Board. He was informed that he could not have that and the hearing proceeded so far as anything against the applicant is concerned upon his statements only. There is a statement made by the Bar Examiners which is before the court that the Board did not rely upon the confidential information in reaching its decision but based the decision upon the statements by the applicant. As said above the applicant was denied the privilege of taking the examination when he appeared for that purpose. The result of the hearing at Albuquerque was the affirmation of its previous action in refusing to permit the applicant to take the examination. In this court applicant has complained of the failure to allow him to know about the reports in the “Confidential File”. There is one other reliance for its action by the Board in its denial to the applicant of the privilege of taking the bar examination and that is the arrests of the applicant. It is true applicant was arrested several times, but he was never tried or convicted for anything. He has no criminal record and it has been many years since he was last arrested. If one were on trial for a criminal action mere arrests without convictions would not be shown for any purpose. For impeachment a defendant may be asked if he ever has been convicted of a misdemeanor or a felony. The details of the proceedings leading to a conviction are not admissible as evidence. It seems to be a fact that applicant disclosed the fact of his arrests in explaining the use of an alias at different times. Since the record does not show any evidence of a fraudulent purpose in the use of an alias, bad moral character can not be established thereby. Just as a consideration of aliases is wrong in the absence of a showing of fraudulent intent, so is the consideration of arrests many years ago when there were no charges filed in some instances and no convictions ever. The good moral character of an individual may be attacked if put in issue by proof of his general reputation in the community for any damaging trait. It is not to be established by specific instances of what may be, or may be thought to be, wrongful acts. Proof of a general reputation of bad character at a remote time is not admissible. There is nothing in the record to show want of good moral character since January 1943. There is little if anything in the record other than applicant’s beliefs, to show bad moral character at any time. There is only one act of applicant’s life which suggests criminal conduct and that was when he was soliciting others to go to Spain with him and to there enter the Loyalist Army of that country. Applicant said he did not know the statute was in existence at the time he was asking others to go with him to Spain to enlist. It is not surprising that he did not know of the statute. There are many of us all over this country to whose attention that statute had not been called until necessity for its consideration arose. I have referred above to the “Confidential File”. It is pointed out in the majority opinion in this case that I am the only member of the court who has read the “Confidential File”. In this connection I feel justified in saying that by assignment this case first came to me for writing an opinion. On beginning to study the case I undertook to read and did read every paper in the files, including the “Confidential File”. I not only read the instruments once, I have read all of them, including the “Confidential File”, several times. The result of my studies at that time led me to prepare a memorandum suggesting that this court call before it the applicant with his attorney and the members of the Board of Bar Examiners for further consideration of the matter. The other members of this court did not agree with me but concurred in the opinion to which I now dissent. I think applicant was entitled to know at least the substance of any derogatory information given to the Board of Bar Examiners in the “Confidential File”. I think every member of this court owes it to the applicant, on review here of the action of the Board of Bar Examiners, to know the contents of the “Confidential File”. I do not believe that the applicant has been accorded the rights of freedom guaranteed him by the Federal Constitution or by the State Constitution or that he has had due process, by the proceedings had. That which I have said in this opinion is in no way a criticism of any member of the Board of Bar Examiners or of that Board. All men make mistakes. I know the members of this Board individually and am sure that no member of the Board would consciously or intentionally do any applicant a wrong. I appreciate also the sacrifices of time and effort which the examiners must make in order to hold the examinations and pass upon the eligibility of applicants for admission. In this case, however, I think an error has been made and that it should be corrected by an order of this court directing the Board of Bar Examiners to permit applicant to take the bar examination. For the reasons above stated, I dissent.