Court Opinion

ID: 9697475
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:17:43.500197+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:32.877962
License: Public Domain

NEBEKER, Associate Judge,
dissenting:
Prior to the Rental Housing Conversion and Sale Act of 1980, D.C.Code 1981, § 45-1611 et seq., the District of Columbia Council passed the Condominium and Cooperative Conversion Stabilization Act of 1979, D.C.Law 3-143, 27 D.C.Reg. 958 (1981), which placed a moratorium on the conversion to condominium of any housing accommodation under the Condominium Act of 1976, D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 5-1201 et seq. However, § 4(a)(4) of the Stabilization Act authorized the mayor to exempt “any housing accommodation with respect to which there was a substantial financial investment on or before May 22,1979, in its conversion.” Although the record before this court is incomplete, it appears that petitioners met the substantial financial investment requirement.
Petitioners testified at their hearing that they purchased a single family dwelling in 1977 which they later rented to their son. In early 1978, petitioners decided to convert the structure into six condominiums under the Condominium Act of 1976. By November of 1978, they had secured all the necessary plans and building permits. Construction began in April of 1979, and soon the building was completely gutted. It was vacant on January 1, 1980, however, the costs of construction forced petitioners to later rent some of the units. In order to finance the construction, petitioners secured $100,000 in loans. Their stated purpose when they applied for the loans was to convert the building to condominiums. The moratorium on condominium conversion went into effect in February 1980, with its exemption for housing accommodations to which there had been a substantial financial investment on or before May 22,1979, in its conversion. At their hearing, petitioners testified only that they began renovation in April of 1979 and secured $100,000 in loans for the construction. It is not clear from the record whether they actually had a substantial financial investment on or before May 22, 1979.
If petitioners did qualify for the exemption, the Council cannot now impose a retrospective requirement that they must have also kept their building vacant from January 1, 1980. “[A] property owner has no vested right in the continuance of any particular regulation. However, once regulations have been established, and so long as such regulations are in force, the state and its subdivisions are as much bound as the people to abide by such regulations.” Gibson v. City of Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. 1, 167 N.E.2d 651, 653-54 (1960). See also Smith v. Winhall Planning Commission, 140 Vt. 178, 436 A.2d 760 (1981); Union Oil Company of California v. City of Worthington, 62 Ohio St.2d 263, 405 N.E.2d 277 (1980); Board of Zoning App., City of Ft. Wayne v. *971Shell Oil Co., 164 Ind.App. 497, 329 N.E.2d 636 (1975); 16 C.J.S. Laws Regulating Property and Business § 239 (1956).
If petitioners could convert, with or without tenants, under the Stabilization Act of 1979, then they must be exempt from the January vacancy requirement. I would remand this case for further proceedings to determine whether the right to proceed with conversion had vested in petitioners.