Court Opinion

ID: 9572692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:43:45.893074+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:49.237907
License: Public Domain

SINGLETON, Judge,
dissenting.
I believe Simpson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 635 P.2d 1197 (Alaska App.1981), was incorrectly decided for the reasons set out in Judge Coats’ dissenting opinion. I am also of the view that statutes, such as AS 28.01.010(a) which was interpreted in Simpson, and AS 28.35.230(c) which is interpreted in this case, must be read in the light of article X, sections I and II, of the Alaska Constitution, requiring a liberal interpretation of municipal powers, and I suggest, by necessary implication, a strict construction *214of any statute purporting to “prohibit” the exercise of municipal power.1 These constitutional provisions have been thoroughly reviewed in V. Fischer, Alaska’s Constitutional Convention 116-27 (1975), and Sharp, Home Rule in Alaska: A Clash Between the Constitution and the Court, 3 UCLA-Alaska Law Review 1 (1973). I will not repeat that review here, let it suffice to say that I agree with Sharp that,
If the grant of ‘all legislative power’ is to be given the meaning of its Texas predecessor, namely, legislative power as broad as that possessed by the state legislature, and if that grant is to be construed in the light of the interpretative mandate of Article X, section 1 requiring a liberal construction be given to municipal powers, one is compelled to the initial conclusion that legislative acts of a home rule municipality rise in dignity to a level close to those of the state legislature. Municipal home rule acts are inferior only in that they are subject to being prohibited by the municipality’s charter and by an act of the state legislature. Accepting this near equality of the two acts, the resolution of a conflict between the two (when the home rule municipality’s act has not been clearly prohibited) is apparent: the court should resolve the conflict in the same manner it resolves a conflict • between two acts of the legislature. When it is asserted that two acts of the legislature are in conflict, the question is whether there is such a conflict as will compel the court to find an implied intent on the part of the legislature to repeal the prior conflicting act. It is the duty of the court to construe statutes in a manner which will produce harmony. As repeal by implication is disfavored by the courts, only when no reasonable construction can be found which will permit both acts to stand should the court resort to implied repeal by the dominant statute. If the court were to adopt this approach, the question of the level of friction which will cause the court to invalidate a home rule enactment would be clearly established as that which exists when there is an irreconcilable conflict.
Sharp, supra, at 30-31 (footnotes omitted).
Thus to the extent that a municipal penalty provision must be attached to an ordinance which corresponds to a state statute to survive AS 28.35.230(c), I would define “correspond” as “be similar to” and conclude that former AMO 9.28.030 is sufficiently similar to former AS 28.35.030 to pass muster.2
I am particularly concerned that the members of the State Constitutional Convention may have foreseen today’s holding and sought (ineffectually as it turns out) to prevent it.
The provision of the Alaska Constitution establishing home rule powers is based upon a comparable provision in the Texas State Constitution. Sharp, supra, at 24-27. There are some differences between the two sections, however. As Sharp points out:
[A] deviation from the Texas and AMA model is the character of the legislative act which invalidates a home rule exercise of power. Under the Alaska Constitution the home rule legislative power must be prohibited. Under the AMA model the power must be denied. The' comment explaining that provision of the AMA model states that the power exists for the home rule city ‘so long as the legislature does not expressly deny it.’ Under the Texas grant, home rule char*215ters and ordinances may not contain any provision which is inconsistent with the constitution or general laws enacted by the legislature. The result of judicial application of this standard in Texas was discussed supra. The Keith book3 which was before the committee made specific reference to what its author believed was a strict interpretation given the ‘no inconsistency’ phrase pointing to a decision in which the Texas court had found inconsistency where the municipality had set a heavier penalty than the state for a penal code violation.
With the foregoing interpretation of the Texas experience before it, it is significant to note that not only did the committee not propose an ‘inconsistency’ or ‘conflict’ standard but that it never used such a term in its discussion of the mechanics for limiting municipal home rule legislative powers. The idea of a specific withdrawal or prohibition indicates that the committee .intended some sort of direct action which clearly recognized the home rule power being limited.
Id. at 26-27 (footnotes omitted; emphasis added). In his analysis, Sharp is referring to the following statement by Keith:
Conflict with a general law. We find that where a charter provision or ordinance conflicts with the general law the general law is supreme even though the charter provision or ordinance deals entirely with municipal affairs. A city may act for itself within the scope of its functions in any field not covered by general law, but enactment of a general law applicable to all cities of a certain class precludes any city of that class from enacting contrary legislation. In addition, a general statute expressly applicable to general law cities does not apply to home rule cities and conversely. The courts are very strict as to what constitutes a conflict between a state law and a charter provision or ordinance. For example, a municipal ordinance which for an offense contains penal provisions different from those of the state penal code is held by the courts to constitute a conflict with the state law even though the municipal penal provision imposes a stiffer penalty.
J. Keith, supra, at 90-91 (footnotes omitted).
Keith cites City of Wink v. Griffith Amusement Co., 129 Tex. 40, 100 S.W.2d 695, 698 (1936), and El Paso Electric Co. v. Collins, 23 S.W.2d 295, 296 (Tex.Civ.App.1930), for the proposition that divergence of penalty renders an ordinance “inconsistent” and thus invalid. It is ironic that our court today adopts sub silentio the rule of these cases — a rule which, as Sharp persuasively argues, the constitutional convention expressly rejected.4

. A state statute which purported to “prohibit” any municipal ordinance which was not identical to a state statute would track the language of article X, section 11, but would, if given effect, amend the constitution, drastically altering the local government provisions of article X. I do not believe that the constitutional convention intended that the legislature could “prohibit” municipal action by general enactment and yet the interpretation placed upon AS 28.01.010(a) in Simpson and AS 28.35.230(c) here has that effect.

. Correspond ... v. 1. to be in harmony or agreement, this corresponds with what I’ve heard. 2. to be similar or equivalent, a parliament that corresponds to our congress
[[Image here]]
Oxford American Dictionary 143 (1980) (emphasis in original).

. The “Keith” book referred to is J. Keith, City and County Home Rule In Texas (1951).

. The state and local laws governing driving while intoxicated under discussion here have been substantially amended and are now virtually identical, nevertheless Simpson and this case speak generally to the relationship between state and local laws regulating motor vehicles. They therefore have significance far beyond drunk driving.