Court Opinion

ID: 9375134
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 22:02:10.542204+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:56.247087
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/24/23 Tagg v. Capistrano Beach Care Center CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                        SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                     DIVISION SEVEN

ANITA TAGG, by and through her                                 B319670
successor in interest, BRIAN
TAGG,                                                          (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct.
         Plaintiff and Respondent,                             No. 21STCV35700)

         v.

CAPISTRANO BEACH CARE
CENTER, LLC et al.,

        Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Lawrence P. Riff, Judge. Affirmed.
      Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Tracy D. Forbath, Daniel
Velladao, Kathleen M. Walker, and Jeffrey S. Healey for
Defendants and Appellants.
      Arias Sanguinetti Wang & Torrijos, Mike Arias, and Robert
M. Partain for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   __________________________
      Capistrano Beach Care Center, LLC and Cambridge
Healthcare Services, Inc. (collectively, Capistrano defendants)
appeal from an order denying their petition to compel arbitration
of Anita Tagg’s cause of action for elder abuse. The Capistrano
defendants contend the trial court erred in finding Tagg only
agreed to arbitrate her medical malpractice claims. They argue
further that even if Tagg only agreed to arbitrate medical
malpractice disputes, her elder abuse claim sounds in medical
malpractice, and therefore, the court should have ordered
arbitration of her claim. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A.     The Arbitration Agreement
       On June 15, 2021 Tagg was admitted to a skilled nursing
facility (Facility) operated by the Capistrano defendants after she
fell and fractured her vertebrae. Tagg and the Capistrano
defendants’ representative, McKenna Hensley, signed portions of
a two-page stand-alone arbitration agreement (agreement).1 The
agreement made clear in article 3 that “execution of this
Arbitration Agreement is not a precondition to receiving medical
treatment, care, services and/or for admission to the Facility and
is not a requirement to continue receiving medical treatment,
care and services at the Facility.”
       Article 1 provides, “It is understood that any dispute as to
medical malpractice, that is as to whether any medical services

1     It is undisputed that Tagg signed the agreement during her
stay at the Facility, although she did not date the agreement.
Hensley wrote “9/13/20” next to her signature on the agreement,
which was nine months before Tagg’s admission date.

                                 2
rendered under this contract were unnecessary or unauthorized
or were improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will
be determined by submission to arbitration as provided by
California law, and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process
except as California law provides for judicial review of arbitration
proceedings. Both parties to this contract, by entering into it, are
giving up their constitutional right to have any such dispute
decided in a court of law before a jury, and instead are accepting
the use of arbitration.”
       Article 2 provides, “It is further understood that any
dispute between Resident and . . . [the Capistrano defendants],
including any action for injury or death arising from negligence,
intentional tort and/or statutory causes of action (including all
California Welfare and Institutions Code sections and Health and
Safety Code section 1430), will be determined by submission to
binding arbitration and not by lawsuit or resort to court process
except as California law provides for judicial review of arbitration
proceedings. The parties to this agreement are giving up their
Constitutional right to have all disputes decided in a court of law
before a jury, and instead are accepting the use of binding
arbitration.”
       Article 4 provides that the agreement “shall be binding for
any dispute, except for disputes pertaining to collections or
evictions.” Further, the agreement is binding on all parties and
the resident’s “representatives, executors, family members, and
heirs who bring any claims individually or in a representative
capacity.” The agreement also contains a certification provision
under which the resident or signatory on behalf of the resident
certifies he or she has read the agreement, has a copy of the
agreement, and is authorized to sign the agreement.

                                 3
       The agreement’s articles and certification provision are in
black ink. At the end of the agreement (following the
certification provision) are two notice provisions, each in all
capital letters in red ink. Each notice provision is followed by
lines for the Facility representative and resident to sign and date.
       The first notice provision states, “Notice: By signing this
contract you are agreeing to have any issue of medical
malpractice decided by neutral arbitration and you are giving up
your right to a jury or court trial. See article 1 of this contract.”
(Capitalization omitted.) Below this notice Hensley signed her
name as the Facility representative, wrote “9/13/20,” and stated
her title as “Admissions Assistant.” Tagg signed her name below
the line for “Resident’s Signature,” but she did not provide a date.
       The second notice provision states, “Notice: By signing this
contract you are agreeing to have all claims, including claims
other than a claim for medical malpractice, decided by arbitration
and you are giving up your right to a jury or court trial and you
agree that no party shall adjudicate any claim on a class action
basis.” (Capitalization omitted.) Below this notice Hensley again
signed her name as the Facility’s representative, wrote “9/13/20,”
and stated her title as “Admissions Assistant.” Tagg did not sign
this notice.

B.     The Complaint
       On September 28, 2021 Tagg filed a complaint against the
Capistrano defendants2 alleging causes of action for elder abuse
in violation of the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil
Protection Act (Elder Abuse Act or Act) (Welf. & Inst. Code,

2     Tagg also named Doe 1 to 100 as defendants.

                                 4
§ 15600 et seq.) and negligent hiring and supervision. The
complaint alleged then-82-year-old Tagg was admitted to the
Facility on June 15, 2021. The elder abuse cause of action
alleged that during Tagg’s 10-day stay at the Facility, the
Capistrano defendants “ignored her needs” and “wrongfully
withheld necessary care and services” by failing “to properly and
competently evaluate [Tagg’s] clinical conditions and risk factors
for falling”; to implement, monitor, and revise interventions to
prevent Tagg from falling; “to ensure staff provided [Tagg] with
care and interventions as called for by care plans, physician
orders, and assessments”; and “to timely transfer [Tagg] to an
acute care facility when her emergent medical needs and
conditions required such elevated provision of care.”
(Capitalization omitted.) As a direct and proximate result of the
neglect, Tagg “suffered an avoidable fall and resulting hip
fracture which required surgery, which sequela accelerated the
deterioration of her health beyond that caused by the normal
aging process.”
       In addition, the Capistrano defendants did not provide
sufficient staffing and many of the staff members were not
properly trained or qualified to care for the elderly, including
Tagg. They “wrongfully withheld necessary care and services
from [Tagg] in violation of federal and state rules, laws, and
regulations governing the operations and standards of practice in
skilled nursing facilities,” including regulations addressing
pressure sores. (Capitalization omitted.) Tagg would not have
suffered injuries had there been sufficient staffing.
       The second cause of action for negligent hiring and
supervision alleged the Capistrano defendants negligently hired,
supervised and/or retained the Facility’s administrator, director

                                5
of nursing, certified nursing assistants, registered nurses, and
licensed vocational nurses. The Capistrano defendants “knew, or
should have known, that these individuals were unfit to perform
their job duties . . . and that this unfitness created a high risk
that serious injury would befall elderly and infirm residents”
such as Tagg.
       Tagg died on October 16, 2021. On December 8 the trial
court granted the ex parte application filed by Tagg’s attorney to
appoint Tagg’s son Brian Tagg to prosecute the lawsuit as Tagg’s
successor in interest.3

C.     The Capistrano Defendants’ Motion To Compel Arbitration
       On December 1, 2021 the Capistrano defendants filed a
petition to compel arbitration.4 They argued that Tagg executed
the agreement during her stay at the Facility and is presumed to

3    For ease of reference, we refer to the plaintiff and
respondent as Tagg.
4      The Capistrano defendants styled their motion as
a petition to compel arbitration. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2
[referring to a request to enforce an arbitration agreement as a
“petition of a party to an arbitration agreement”].) However,
because the pleading was filed in an existing lawsuit, we treat it
as a motion to compel arbitration. (See Villareal v. LAD-T,
LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 446, 453 [treating petition to compel
arbitration filed in existing action as motion to compel
arbitration]; Phillips v. Sprint PCS (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 758,
772 [“There is an ‘analytic distinction’ between
a motion (or petition) to compel arbitration filed within an
existing action, as here, and a petition to compel arbitration that
commences an independent action.”].).

                                 6
have read and understood its terms, which required arbitration of
her claims (as stated in article 2 of the agreement).
       In her opposition, Tagg argued that by signing the notice
provision for medical malpractice disputes under article 1, and
not signing the notice provision applicable to “claims other than a
claim for medical malpractice” (capitalization omitted), she only
agreed to arbitrate her medical malpractice claims. Tagg
asserted that “[i]f only one signature were required to assent to
both portions of the agreement, the agreement would so indicate.”
Tagg also argued her elder abuse cause of action was not for
medical malpractice, and therefore, it was not covered by article 1
of the arbitration agreement. Tagg asserted her negligent hiring
and supervision cause of action likewise did not involve medical
malpractice.5
       In their reply brief, the Capistrano defendants argued Tagg
“did not cross out or strike out any portion of the two arbitration
agreements and it is clear from the plain language of the
Agreements that the intent was for all claims to be subject to
arbitration.” Further, articles 2 and 4 of the agreement made
clear that all disputes were subject to arbitration. The

5      Tagg also argued that if the court were to compel
arbitration, it should require the Capistrano defendants to pay
all arbitration costs. In a supporting declaration, Brian Tagg
stated his mother “died penniless and her estate has no money to
pay for an arbitration.” The Capistrano defendants responded in
their reply that Tagg had a contractual obligation under the
agreement to share the arbitration costs. Further, because
Tagg’s attorney was paying her litigation costs, the attorney
would also pay her arbitration costs. Payment of arbitration
costs is not at issue on appeal.

                                7
Capistrano defendants added that at a minimum Tagg’s
negligent hiring and supervision claim was subject to arbitration.

D.    The Trial Court’s Ruling
      On March 21, 2022 the trial court held a hearing on the
Capistrano defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. The court’s
written tentative ruling was to deny the motion as to the elder
abuse cause of action but to grant it as to the negligent hiring
and supervision cause of action, with the arbitrator to decide
what portion of the negligent hiring and supervision cause of
action was for medical malpractice. At the hearing, the
Capistrano defendants’ attorney argued that article 4 of the
agreement made clear the agreement applied to all disputes
except those pertaining to collections and evictions. Therefore,
unless the court were to strike article 4, there was enough in the
agreement to “bootstrap [any] claims other than just medical
malpractice.” In response, Tagg’s attorney argued the agreement
was “pretty clear and unambiguous” that Tagg agreed only to
arbitrate her medical malpractice claims (and not her elder abuse
cause of action).
      The trial court adopted its tentative ruling and denied the
Capistrano defendants’ motion to compel arbitration of Tagg’s
elder abuse cause of action. Pursuant to Tagg’s request, the court
dismissed the cause of action for negligent hiring and supervision
without prejudice. The court did not explain its reasoning in its
tentative ruling or minute order.
      The Capistrano defendants timely appealed.

                                8
                          DISCUSSION

A.     Governing Law and Standard of Review
       Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.26 requires the trial
court to order arbitration of a controversy “[o]n petition of a party
to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written
agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to the
agreement refuses to arbitrate such controversy . . . if it
determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy
exists.” Accordingly, the threshold question is whether there is
an agreement to arbitrate. (American Express Co. v. Italian
Colors Restaurant (2013) 570 U.S. 228, 233 [“arbitration is a
matter of contract”]; Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle
Market Development (U.S.), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236
(Pinnacle) [“‘“A party cannot be required to submit to arbitration
any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”’”]; Trinity v.
Life Ins. Co. of North America (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1111, 1120
(Trinity) [“As the language of this section makes plain, the
threshold question presented by every petition to compel
arbitration is whether an agreement to arbitrate exists.”].)7
       The party seeking to compel arbitration bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence an agreement to
arbitrate a dispute exists, and the party opposing arbitration
bears the burden of proving unconscionability or other defenses.
(Pinnacle, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 236; Rosenthal v. Great Western

6       Further undesignated statutory references are to the Code
of Civil Procedure.
7     The agreement states it is governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.).

                                 9
Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.) “To carry this
burden of persuasion the moving party must first produce ‘prima
facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the
controversy.’ [Citations.] ‘If the moving party meets its initial
prima facie burden and the opposing party disputes the
agreement, then . . . the opposing party bears the burden of
producing evidence to challenge the authenticity of the
agreement.’ [Citations.] If the opposing party produces such
evidence, then ‘the moving party must establish with admissible
evidence a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.’
[Citation.] Despite the shifting burden of production, ‘[t]he
burden of proving the agreement by a preponderance of the
evidence remains with the moving party.’” (Trinity, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1120; accord, Gamboa v. Northeast
Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165 (Gamboa).)
       “Absent conflicting evidence, we review de novo the trial
court’s interpretation of an arbitration agreement, including the
determination whether it is enforceable on unconscionability
grounds.” (Trinity, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 1120; accord,
Villareal v. LAD-T, LLC (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 446, 456 [“[W]e
independently review the order if the trial court’s denial rests
solely on a question of law.”].) “Where the trial court’s ruling is
based on a finding of fact, we review the decision for substantial
evidence.” (Trinity, at p. 1121; accord, Villareal, at p. 456.)
       However, where “‘the court’s order denying a motion to
compel arbitration is based on the court’s finding that petitioner
failed to carry its burden of proof, the question for the reviewing
court is whether that finding was erroneous as a matter of law.’
[Citations.] ‘“Specifically, the question becomes whether the
appellant’s evidence was (1) ‘uncontradicted and unimpeached’

                                10
and (2) ‘of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a
judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a
finding.’”’” (Trinity, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p.1121; accord,
Evenskaas v. California Transit, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 285,
292; Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 166.) “‘“‘[U]nless the
trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing
[party], we presume the trial court found the [party’s] evidence
lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of
proof.’”’” (Gamboa, at p. 166; accord, Fabian v. Renovate
America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1067; Juen v. Alain
Pinel Realtors, Inc. (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 972, 978-979.)

B.    The Evidence Does Not Compel a Finding That Tagg Agreed
      To Arbitrate Her Elder Abuse Cause of Action
      Although it is undisputed that Tagg signed the arbitration
agreement (unlike the factual dispute in Trinity, supra,
78 Cal.App.5th at pages 1115 to 1116 over whether the employee
electronically signed the arbitration agreement), there is a
factual dispute as to whether Tagg agreed to arbitrate her elder
abuse cause of action. Because the trial court impliedly found the
Capistrano defendants did not meet their burden to prove the
existence of an agreement to arbitrate the elder abuse cause of
action, we consider whether the Capistrano defendants’ evidence
was uncontradicted and unimpeached and of such a character
that there was “no room for a judicial determination that it was
insufficient to support a finding.” (Trinity, at p. 1121.) It was
not.
      The Capistrano defendants contend Tagg’s single signature
constituted an agreement to arbitrate all her claims arising from
her stay at the Facility. They point out that Tagg did not cross

                                11
out article 2 or article 4, which required her to arbitrate “any
dispute,” nor did the agreement specify that a party would only
be bound by an agreement to arbitrate all claims if the party
signed both notice provisions. In making this argument, the
Capistrano defendants rely on Martinez v. BaronHR, Inc. (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 962, in which the employer and employee signed
below the final paragraph of a stand-alone arbitration agreement
certifying that they understood and agreed to be legally bound by
“all of the terms of this agreement,” and the employee certified he
agreed only to pursue claims against the company through the
arbitration process. (Id. at p. 965, capitalization and boldface
omitted.) However, the parties did not initial the sentence in the
third paragraph of the agreement that stated, “‘In agreeing to
arbitration, both Employer and Employee explicitly waive their
respective rights to trial by jury.’” (Ibid., boldface omitted.) The
Court of Appeal concluded the employee had assented to
arbitration of his claims despite his failure to initial the jury
waiver provision because he signed the certification paragraph at
the end of the arbitration agreement stating he agreed to all
terms of the agreement, which included the jury waiver provision
he had not initialed. (Id. at pp. 967-968.)
       In contrast to Martinez, the two notice provisions at the
end of the agreement make clear the signatory is agreeing to
arbitration in lieu of a jury or court trial, with the first explicitly
referencing medical malpractice claims and the second
referencing all other claims. Tagg made her intent known by
signing only the provision that applied to medical malpractice
claims as set forth in article 1. The Capistrano defendants did
not present any evidence that compels a contrary finding.

                                  12
       Moreover, the arbitration agreement complies with the
mandates of section 1295 applicable to contracts for medical
services that contain arbitration agreements. Section 1295,
subdivision (a), provides that the first article of any contract
requiring arbitration of medical malpractice disputes “shall have”
the following language: “‘It is understood that any dispute as to
medical malpractice, that is as to whether any medical services
rendered under this contract were unnecessary or unauthorized
or were improperly, negligently or incompetently rendered, will
be determined by submission to arbitration as provided by
California law, and not by a lawsuit or resort to court process
except as California law provides for judicial review of arbitration
proceedings. Both parties to this contract, by entering into it, are
giving up their constitutional right to have any such dispute
decided in a court of law before a jury, and instead are accepting
the use of arbitration.’” Section 1295, subdivision (b), likewise
requires that the contract contain a disclosure for arbitration of
medical malpractice disputes above the signature line in boldface
red capitalized print that reads, “NOTICE: BY SIGNING THIS
CONTRACT YOU ARE AGREEING TO HAVE ANY ISSUE OF
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DECIDED BY NEUTRAL
ARBITRATION AND YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO
A JURY OR COURT TRIAL. SEE ARTICLE 1 OF THIS
CONTRACT”].)
       The arbitration agreement complies with section 1295,
subdivision (a), by including the mandated language in article 1
of the agreement (applicable only to medical malpractice
disputes), and providing a separate provision (article 2) that
addresses arbitration of other claims, including for general
negligence, intentional tort, and statutory causes of action. ~(AA

                                13
37)~ And consistent with section 1295, subdivision (b), there are
separate notice provisions and signature lines for arbitration of
medical malpractice claims and for claims other than medical
malpractice, with the medical malpractice notice using the
required language in section 1295, subdivision (b), and the notice
provision for other claims using different language. For example,
the medical malpractice notice refers to “neutral arbitration,” but
the notice provision for other claims refers only to “arbitration”
and contains a class action waiver. ~(AA 38)~
      The arbitration agreement’s inclusion of separate
disclosure and notice provisions for medical malpractice claims
makes clear that the Capistrano defendants, in drafting the
agreement, intended to have residents separately agree to
arbitration of medical malpractice disputes (using the statutory
language) and arbitration of other disputes (using other
language). It is disingenuous for the Capistrano defendants now
to argue that Tagg’s signature below the notice of arbitration of
medical malpractice claims constitutes an agreement to arbitrate
her other claims. Moreover, as the Capistrano defendants
acknowledged at oral argument, their position logically would
mean that had Tagg signed under only the second notice (for
arbitration for all claims other than medical malpractice), Tagg’s
signature would constitute her agreement to arbitrate all claims,
including for medical malpractice. But such a result would
violate section 1295, subdivision (b).
      The two unpublished federal cases relied on by the
Capistrano defendants are likewise distinguishable because in
each case the plaintiff signed an agreement containing an
arbitration provision but failed to initial the specific arbitration

                                14
clause within the agreement.8 In Burgoon v. Narconon of
Northern California (N.D.Cal., Jan. 15, 2016, No. 15-cv-011381-
EMC) 2016 U.S.Dist. Lexis 5489, a drug treatment patient signed
an admission agreement, but he did not initial the arbitration
provision within the agreement. (Id. at p. *5.) The court granted
the defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, finding the
patient’s failure to initial the arbitration provision was
insufficient to show he “did not enter into a contract given his
signature at the end of the document.” (Id. at p. *24.) Similarly,
in Hartung v. J.D. Byrider, Inc. (E.D.Cal., Oct. 16, 2008, No. 1:08-
cv-00960-AWI-GSA) 2008 U.S.Dist. Lexis 86972, a car buyer
signed a retail installment contract but did not initial the
arbitration provision within the contract. (Id. at p. *4.) The
court found the buyer assented to the arbitration provision
because the contract “included a notice just above [p]laintiff’s
signature in bold-faced, capitalized typeface alerting her that the
[c]ontract contained an arbitration provision” and she initialed a
portion of the agreement “indicating her understanding that the
[c]ontract contained an arbitration provision.” (Id. at p. *18.)9

8       Unpublished federal cases may be cited as persuasive
authority. (Martinez, supra, 51 Cal.App.4th 962, 968, fn. 1;
Haligwoski v. Superior Court (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 983, 990,
fn. 4.)
9      The Capistrano defendants also rely on Anderson v. Pitney
Bowes, Inc. (N.D.Cal., May 4, 2005, No. C 04-4808 SBA) 2005
U.S.Dist. LEXIS 37662, in which the employee signed on the
signature line at the end of the arbitration agreement but did not
initial the paragraph acknowledging he was giving up his right to
a jury trial. (Id. at pp. *3-*4.) However, the court granted the
employer’s motion to compel arbitration based only on a

                                15
       The Capistrano defendants’ reliance on Basura v. U.S.
Home Corp. (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 1205 is similarly misplaced.
In Basura, a home builder and 48 buyers signed form sales
agreements, each of which included an arbitration clause. Each
buyer initialed the arbitration clause, but the builder failed to
initial the arbitration clause in 28 of the contracts. (Id. at
pp. 1208-1209.) The Court of Appeal reversed the denial of the
petition to compel arbitration and directed the trial court to
conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether the builder intended
to agree to arbitration as to all 48 buyers notwithstanding its
failure to initial the arbitration provisions in 28 of the contracts.
(Id. at p. 1216.) Unlike Basura, where the builder’s agreement to
the arbitration clauses in 20 of the identical form agreements
suggested “its failure to initial the arbitration clauses in each and
every contract was simply due to clerical error” (ibid.), the
Capistrano defendants presented no evidence of Tagg’s intent to
arbitrate claims other than for medical malpractice.10

delegation clause in the arbitration agreement that “evidences a
clear intent that an arbitrator would decide the significance, if
any, of Plaintiff’s failure to initial one of the Agreement's
paragraphs.” (Id. at p. *3.)
10     Grubb & Ellis Co. v. Bello (1993) 19 Cal.App.4th 231 is
likewise inapposite. The court in Grubb considered whether a
real estate broker could compel a seller to arbitrate the broker’s
fees claim where only the seller initialed the arbitration
provisions in the listing agreement. (Id. at pp. 235-236.) The
court concluded that section 1298, governing arbitration
provisions in real estate contracts, did not require a mutual
obligation to arbitrate, and thus the broker’s lack of assent did
not bar enforcement of the arbitration agreement. (Id. at p. 239.)
This case does not involve section 1298 or the legal question

                                 16
      Finally, the Capistrano defendants contend Tagg’s elder
abuse cause of action sounds in medical malpractice, and thus is
subject to arbitration. But they did not make this argument in
their briefs or at the hearing in the trial court. Because the
Capistrano defendants did not raise this issue in the trial court,
they have forfeited the argument. (Lopez v. Ledesma (2022)
12 Cal.5th 848, 866 [“‘[A] reviewing court ordinarily will not
consider a challenge to a ruling if an objection could have been
but was not made in the trial court.’”]; Gamboa, supra,
72 Cal.App.5th at p. 170 [argument for enforcement of arbitration
agreement forfeited because not raised in trial court].)

whether mutual assent is required. Further, Grubb has been
consistently criticized by later courts. (See Marcus & Millichap
Real Estate Investment Brokerage Co. v. Hock Investment Co.
(1998) 68 Cal. App. 4th 83, 90-91 [disagreeing with Grubb’s
holding that mutuality of arbitration was not required]; Stirlen v.
Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1539 [“To the extent
Grubb & Ellis suggests mutuality of arbitral obligation is not
required, we question the court’s analysis of this issue, which has
never been relied upon by other courts and is hard to reconcile
with other pertinent cases requiring mutuality of the arbitral
obligation.”].)

                                17
                         DISPOSITION

      The order denying the Capistrano defendants’ motion to
compel arbitration is affirmed. Anita Tagg, through her
successor-in-interest Brian Tagg, is entitled to recover costs on
appeal.

                                                 FEUER, J.

      We concur:

                   PERLUSS, P. J.

                   HOWARD, J.*

*     Judge of the Marin County Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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