Court Opinion

ID: 9445269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:24:23.058261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:11.646058
License: Public Domain

FRANK, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I think Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co. v. Gill, 4 Cir., 227 F.2d 64, 67 is directly in point. There a truck, driven by William Oliver Long, collided with the defendant’s railroad train. The truck driver, his wife, Jessie Long, and her child, William Thomas Long, were killed. Gill, as administrator of the three, brought separate suits against the defendant; the suits were consolidated for trial. The defendant pleaded releases as a complete defense in each suit. At a first trial, the cases were submitted to the jury upon issues (1) as to the negligence of the Railroad Company, (2) the contributory negligence of the driver of the truck, (3) the understanding of Gill as to the nature and effect of the releases, and (4) the amount, if any, which the administrator was entitled to recover in each case. There was proof that the releases had been obtained by fraud or undue influence, and plaintiff asked the judge to instruct the jury accordingly, but the judge refused to do so. Instead, he told the jury that the question was whether plaintiff had executed the releases without understanding their effect. The jury found that the deceased persons were killed by negligence of the Railroad Company, that the driver of the truck was guilty of contributory negligence and his administrator was not entitled to recover anything, and that the administrator was entitled to recover $1,500 on account of the death of Mrs. Long and $2,500 on account of the death of her son. The judge set aside the verdicts, on the ground that the jury may have thought the releases were signed through a unilateral mistake of plaintiff and that, in such circumstances, the releases were valid under North Carolina “law.” The judge entered judgment for the defendant. On appeal, the Fourth Circuit held that the judge had erred in refusing to give plaintiff’s requested instruction concerning the releases. The court remanded for a new trial, as to the Jessie Long and William Thomas Long cases,, on the sole issue of the validity of the releases. It said that if the jury, on that issue, should find in plaintiff's favor, judgments should be entered for him in these cases for the amounts specified in the previous verdicts. See Gill v. Seaboard Air Line Railroad Co., 4 Cir., 208 F.2d 7, 12. On the new trial, the jury found for the plaintiff, and the judge entered judgments of $1,500 in the one case and $2,-500 in the other. But the judge made an order that the defendant be allowed a credit on the judgments for the amounts paid for the releases. The defendant appealed and the plaintiff cross-appealed. The Fourth Circuit, in Seaboard Air Line Co. v. Gill, 4 Cir., 227 F.2d 64, 67, affirmed on the defendant’s appeal, and said: “A cross appeal was filed by the administrator complaining of an order of the District Judge that the de*476fendant be allowed a credit on the judgments for the sums paid when the releases were signed, that is to say, a credit of $300 on the judgment for $1500 in favor of the administrator in the case of Jessie Thomas Long, and a like credit on the judgment of $2500 for the death of her son William Thomas Long. These credits represented the monies paid to the administrator when the releases were executed. We think that these deductions should not have been made. The jury at the first trial, having heard all the evidence in regard to the sums paid to the administrator, found by their verdict that he was entitled to the sums of $1500 and $2500 respectively, in answer to the question in each case as to what amount the plaintiff was entitled to recover of the defendant on account of the death of the deceased. Since all of the matters concerning these payments were brought to the jury’s attention, it is reasonable to assume that the jury took into account the monies which the administrator had already received in determining the amounts which he should recover from the Railroad Company. In Hayes v. Atlanta & C. Air Line R. Co., 143 N.C. 125, 55 S.E. 437, and King v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 157 N.C. 44, 66, 72 S.E. 801, 48 L.R.A..N.S., 450, the general rule is stated to be that when money is paid for releases subsequently set aside for fraud, it should be deducted —if the releasor afterward recovers damages; but in these cases, unlike the case at bar, the jury had not passed on the amount due to the plaintiff with the opportunity to take into account the money he had already received. We find nothing in these cases at variance with the conclusion which we have reached. The judgment of the District Court will be sustained insofar as it supports the findings of the jury as to the invalidity of the releases; but the judgment will be reversed insofar as it allows a credit to the defendant for the sums paid to the administrator at the time the releases were executed, and the case will be remanded with instructions to enter judgments in favor of the administrator for the sums determined by the jury’s verdicts.”
It will be noted that the court distinguished two North Carolina decisions. In each of them, the trial judge, on account of a release, had taken the case away from the jury and directed a verdict for the defendant, and the upper court had reversed for a new trial. Obviously, in neither case had the jury considered the release. This explains what the Fourth Circuit meant in the Gill case when it said that “in these cases, unlike the case at bar, the jury had not passed on the amount due to the plaintiff with the opportunity to take into account the amount he had already received”, whereas in the Gill case it was “reasonable to assume that the jury took into account the monies which the administrator had already received in determining the amounts which he should recover from the Railroad Company."
I think the Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of the verdict was correct and should be followed here. No more than here, did the trial judge in the Gill case submit to the jury a specific question as to whether the amount of each verdict was to be computed before or after deducting the amount paid for the release. See the pertinent portions of the judge’s charge in the instant case, quoted in the Appendix to this opinion; and note that here the jury’s verdict, as entered by the Clerk, read: “In this case the jury finds the issues in favor of the plaintiff, and therefore finds for the plaintiff to recover of the defendant the sum of $5,000.”
Had the defendant here so desired, it could have requested the trial judge specifically to charge the jury — see Union Pacific Railway v. Harris, 1895, 158 U.S. 326, 333, 15 S.Ct. 843, 845, 39 L.Ed. 1003 —“that, if they made an allowance to the plaintiff, they should deduct from it what [the plaintiff] had received” as consideration for the release. The problem confronting the defendant at the trial was not novel. Defendant’s counsel, who is no novice, was of course well aware of Union Pacific Railway v. Harris and other cases where such a charge was re*477quested and given.1 Since he failed to act in accord with those precedents, the defendant should not now be allowed to have the amount of the verdict reduced as if its counsel had requested and obtained such a charge.2
My colleagues cite but one case supporting their position, Mandeville v. Jacobson, 122 Conn. 429, 189 A. 596, 598. There the court reached its conclusion without any discussion or reasoning whatever; in doing so, surprisingly, it cited Union Pacific Railway v. Harris, supra. I think the Mandeville case is wrong.
Appendix
Pertinent parts of the judge’s charge.
“If you find that the purported release signed by Mrs. O’Tell was obtained by duress, or coercion, or over-reaching, or by the taking of unfair or unconscionable advantage, or by fraud practiced upon her, or by misrepresentations of material facts, or by express representation of material facts in reckless disregard of their truth or falsity, or by statements of facts which were known to be untrue, or which were made without belief in their truth or recklessly, or that such false representations were made for the purpose of inducing Mrs. O’Tell to act on them, and that Mrs. O’Tell has been induced to act on such representations to her detriment, which she would not otherwise have done, then you must find that the purported release in this case is invalid and of no force or effect, and you will disregard the purported release in your consideration of this case.
“And in considering whether the plaintiff has sustained the burden of establishing the invalidity of the release, if you find that she has introduced sufficient evidence to make out a prima facie case regarding the invalidity of the release in question, the failure of the employer, Railroad, to call the employers’ adjustor, namely Shippee, as a witness who was available in Court and was the one whom the defendant Railroad would naturally produce, then you may draw an inference as to the testimony of the employee adjustor, Shippee, that it would have been unfavorable to the defendant Railroad.
“To recapitulate, then: The burden of proof lies on the plaintiff, Mrs. O’Tell, to prove, by a fair preponderance of the evidence that the decedent, John O’Tell, was injured, that such injury was caused by the negligence of the defendant, and that the release was obtained by mutual mistake of facts, by misrepresentation of fact, or by threats or duress.
“If you find that the plaintiff has proved that the defendant was negligent, and that such negligence was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injury, and that the release was not freely and understandingly given, then you will find for the plaintiff against the Railroad.
“The measure of damages in this case for the death of the decedent under the terms of the Act is the monetary loss suffered by the mother, Mrs. O’Tell, by being deprived of the support which she might reasonably have been expected to receive from the decedent had he lived. In arriving at this amount, if you find that the plaintiff is entitled to recover, you should consider the evidence as to the son’s employment and rate of pay, the length of time you would reasonably expect the mother to live, having in mind her age, her condition of health in November, 1952, and the evidence that the life expectancy of a normal woman of her age at the time of the accident was eight years.
“You may also award the plaintiff, if you find her entitled to recover, such a sum of money as you find to be fair compensation to the injured man prior to his death for the conscious pain and *478suffering which you find that he did suffer as a result of the defendant’s negligence.
“Damages in this case for the death should be equivalent to compensation for the deprivation of the reasonable expectation by the mother of pecuniary benefits that would have resulted from the •continued life of the decedent, if you find she is entitled to recover of the defendant.
“When future payments or other pecuniary benefits are to be anticipated, of course the verdict should be made upon the basis of their present value only. The life expectancy of the plaintiff is to be considered in arriving at the valuation. Mortality tables are merely guides in arriving at this evaluation.” * * *
“So you will determine from the evidence which you have heard here in Court what the facts were in this case and arrive at your verdict. You might first take up the question of the release, because of course if the release is valid the other questions will not be reached by you.
“The plaintiff, as I have said, has the burden of establishing that there was some mistake, or over-reaching, or some mental or emotional condition such as to make the signing of the release not her •own free and voluntary act, in order to avoid the release. On the issue of negligence, of course, the plaintiff may not recover unless she has established that the defendant’s employee was guilty of negligence, in the failure to use reasonable care either in a failure to instruct the plaintiff’s decedent or in the actual instruction or warning given under the circumstances at the time of the injury. * * *
“On the question of damages, as I have said,, it is the measure of loss to the mother of her expectation of pecuniary support from the son during her remaining life, measured from the date of the accident, plus any amount you find a reasonable compensation for any conscious pain you find that the decedent did suffer between the injuries and the death, and caused by the negligence of the defendant.
“In arriving at the loss to the mother, if you reach that point, you might consider the testimony as to the amount which the son was earning, which as I recall it, was something like $1.64 an hour, which would work out if my calculations are correct, to something like $3,300.00 a year, and determine what proportion of that you would have expected from the evidence to be used for the support of the mother. Of course, those are just evidence from which you should determine what might fairly be expected to be received by her over the length of time you find she would be reasonably expected to survive."

. See, e. g., O’Brien v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., 1894, 89 Iowa 644, 57 N.W. 425; Carroll v. Petty, 1939, 121 W.Va. 215, 2 S.E.2d 521; Paul v. Flannery, 1942, 128 N.J.L. 438, 26 A.2d 553.

. It may be that the trial judge here violated the Sixth Amendment’s prohibition against a re-examination of facts tried by a jury. Cf. Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U. S. 22, 27-30, 9 S.Ct. 696, 33 L.Ed. 110.