Court Opinion

ID: 9476167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:49:04.550327+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:09.731754
License: Public Domain

K.K. HALL, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the district court committed no error in refusing to grant judgment notwithstanding the jury verdict. A reasonable jury, weighing the credibility of the witnesses, could have concluded that Great Southwestern failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that arson was committed.
However, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that other aspects of the trial proceedings resulted in reversible error. Key to the majority’s reversal is the admission of evidence which mentioned the criminal arson case against Rabón. Although I do not applaud the references by Rabon’s counsel to the arson case in his closing argument, I am convinced that the comments did not result in error because Great Southwestern’s counsel had already “opened the door” to that otherwise improper topic during his earlier cross-examination of Rabon’s accountant.
The arson case was first mentioned by accident. While being examined on direct by Rabon’s counsel, Rabon’s accountant was asked why certain tax returns had not been filed. He stated that necessary forms had been unavailable and, “I did not get those records back until the arson case was dismissed, was thrown out.”
The majority suggests that Great Southwestern immediately objected to this accidental disclosure. However, the record demonstrates otherwise. True, counsel for the insurance company did suggest at that time that there was “a matter to take up,” but instead of raising the issue then, he delayed his objection until after he had extensively cross-examined the witness regarding his participation in the arson case. The cross-examination included the following colloquy:
Q: Have you testified on the subject of these income tax returns before any investigative body?
A: I did in association with the arson charge that was dropped.
Q: Was that a federal grand jury?
A: No, sir. It was for — in connection with it in my office____ I think the court recorder was there and I answered questions for Mr. Ken Young. (Rabon’s counsel)
Q: Have you talked to Mr. Don Andrews?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: He’s a federal treasury agent?
A: Yes, sir. He served me with a subpoena for those records.
Q: He served you with a subpoena for the federal grand jury?
A: Yes, sir.
It was only after this exchange that Great Southwestern’s counsel objected to the mention of the arson case by Rabon’s accountant. This objection, delayed until he had the opportunity to cross-examine on the issue, was thus not properly made and borders on being disingenuous. In my view, the insurance company clearly opened the door to the subject of the arson case and I am, therefore, unpersuaded that the later comments by Rabon’s counsel regarding the subject resulted in reversible error.1
Nor can I agree that any reversible error resulted from the district court’s jury instructions regarding Great Southwestern’s burden of proof. The curative instruction, *312which correctly stated the applicable preponderance of evidence standard, erased any mistaken perception the jury may have held that Great Southwestern must prove arson beyond a reasonable doubt. The majority fails to note that no objection was made to the curative instruction. If indeed the curative instruction was at all confusing to the jury, any resulting error was waived by Great Southwestern’s failure to object.
I am unconvinced that either of these alleged errors, singularly, or in combination, misled the jury or warrant a new trial in the case. Defendants are not entitled to a perfect trial. They are, however, entitled to a fair one, and in my view, the district court’s trial was. fair. I would, therefore, affirm the judgment below.2

. As a general rule, "one who induces a trial court to let down bars to a field of inquiry that is not competent or relevant to the issues cannot complain if his adversary is also allowed to avail himself of the opening." E. Cleary, McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence, § 357 at 132 (2d ed. 1972).

. I have not addressed Rabon’s contention in his cross-appeal that the district court erred by not awarding prejudgment interest. That claim is not properly before this Court, because Rabón has filed a motion in the district court to amend the verdict to allow prejudgment interest. The district court has ordered that the motion be decided after the disposition of this appeal.