Court Opinion

ID: 9544871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:02:43.585047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:43.631448
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Justice.
Appellant was found guilty in municipal court of violating Rock Springs City Ordinance No. 5-157, driving while under the influence of alcohol. He appealed to the District Court for the Third Judicial District, Sweetwater County, Wyoming, which affirmed the municipal court. He argues on appeal that he was not properly advised of his rights, and that the City failed to prove the elements of the offense with which he was charged.
Appellant had been given a blood alcohol test, but the municipal court found that the results were inadmissible. It ruled that sufficient evidence had been presented without the admission of the blood test results to find appellant guilty. We reverse because we agree with appellant’s contention that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction.
Rock Springs City Ordinance No. 5-157(a), in effect at the time of appellant’s arrest and trial, provided:
“It is unlawful * * * for any person who is under the influence of intoxicating liquor to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle, to drive or have actual physical control of any vehicle within the City of Rock Springs.”
The elements of the offense are (1) that the person charged (2) be under the influence of intoxicating liquor (3) to a degree which renders him incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle; (4) that the accused be driving or in actual physical control of a vehicle (5) within the city of Rock Springs on or about a certain date. Each of the elements must be proved to establish a prima facie case. There was no question concerning the identity of the appellant. The testimony that he had been driving an automobile within the city of Rock Springs on or about November 7, 1981, was also uncontroverted. There was testimony that appellant twice drove through intersections with red lights, so that the trier of fact could have inferred that appellant was incapable of safely driving a motor vehicle. There was, however, a failure of proof of the element that the appellant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Evidence of a blood test is not required to prove that a person was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Hammer v. Town of Jackson, Wyo., 524 P.2d 884 (1974). Here, the arresting officer presented the only testimony concerning appellant’s appearance and behavior. The officer testified that appellant’s face was flushed, that his speech was slurred, that he was having some trouble maintaining his balance without leaning up against his car, and that he could not perform the field sobriety tests “too well.”
“I asked him to stand with his right leg out in front of him and (transcriber cannot understand). And he couldn’t do this without putting his foot down several times. I asked him to take five steps forward, heel to toe, and then turn around and take five steps back towards the heel to toe. He couldn’t do this without catching his balance several times. I asked him to stand at modified attention with his head back and his eyes closed, and he swayed very badly in this position.”
The testimony by the policeman that the appellant did not do “too well” on the sobriety test is not enough by itself to allow a trier of fact to draw a reasonable inference of intoxication. We would be adopting a rule permitting an inference of intoxication to be drawn from a decision to test for intoxication. A person could fail to do “too well” on a sobriety test for a number of reasons having nothing to do with intoxicating liquor:
“ ‘ * * * There are approximately 60 pathological conditions that have symptoms similar to those of alcoholism. An apparent alcoholic condition might not be *29due to alcohol at all. It may be merely the result of injury or sickness. People taking medicines often act as if they had been imbibing too freely. The diabetic in need of, or with an overdose of, insulin may act as if he were intoxicated. Injuries to the nervous system or a concussion of the brain may create alcoholic symptoms. * * * People v. Butts, 201 N.Y.S.2d 926, 932, 21 Misc.2d 799 (1960), citing from New York Leg.Doc., 1953, No. 25, pp. 11-12.
The above-cited case went on to hold that a chemical test was required to obtain a conviction, something which we have already ruled is not necessary. Hammer v. Town of Jackson, supra. We have indicated, however, that there must be some evidence of ingestion of alcohol. Goich v. State, 80 Wyo. 179, 339 P.2d 119 (1959), concerned a statute with essentially the same wording as the Rock Springs ordinance. We said the trial court had properly instructed that the phrase “under the influence of intoxicating liquor” meant that a person had taken into his stomach a sufficient quantity of intoxicating liquor so as to deprive him of the normal control of his bodily or mental faculties. Without appellant’s admission that he had been drinking, or without someone else’s testimony that they had seen appellant drinking, or without an observation of the odor of alcohol, or the presence of alcohol in appellant’s car, or without some evidence linking appellant to alcohol, the inference is just as reasonable that defendant had not been drinking. We hold that there must be some evidence linking an accused with intoxicating liquor before the prosecution can meet the burden of proving that an accused is under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
“This court will ‘view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine questions of law as to whether there is substantial evidence, direct or circumstantial, or both, which, with the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, will sustain the verdict.’ ” Blakely v. State, Wyo., 542 P.2d 857, 863 (1975).
Here, without any evidence tending to establish that intoxicating liquor was responsible for appellant’s behavior and appearance, the evidence was not sufficient “to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Harvey v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1386, 1387 (1979).
Appellant was under no duty to explain his actions; the prosecution had the burden of proof. If the prosecution had presented any evidence linking the appellant with alcohol, then appellant would have been well advised to provide some explanation if he wanted to rebut the prosecution’s proof of the element of being under the influence of intoxicating liquor. Here, there was no proof to rebut.
In Norwood v. City of Sheridan, Wyo., 593 P.2d 184 (1979), the appellant had been involved in an altercation with another driver, and used his car to batter the other car. He was arrested about an hour later. The appellant had presented evidence that he had been drinking after the incident, not before, and presented another explanation for the incident. One police officer had testified that appellant’s face was “flared,” his eyes were bloodshot, and he smelled of alcohol. The appellant’s breathalizer test had shown a blood alcohol content of .168, which raised a statutory presumption of intoxication. We upheld the conviction in the Norwood case, but said that the evidence was lean. Other courts have ruled similarly, but all of them which upheld convictions showed that there had been some evidence concerning alcohol.
Other than the suppressed evidence that appellant’s blood alcohol level was .13, there is no evidence concerning alcohol. Without it, appellant’s conviction cannot be upheld.
“ * * * [T]he belief in the guilt of the accused sufficient to convict must be based upon the evidence in the case. A lack of evidence to prove such guilt cannot be supplied by what a juror knows or believes. * * * Under our procedure he is required to base his verdict solely upon the evidence and law as given him by the *30court. * * *” Robinson v. State, 18 Wyo. 216, 106 P. 24, 27 (1910).
The doctrine of the Robinson case is applicable here. The municipal judge was aware of the results of the blood test, but had ruled that this test was not admissible. He could not, therefore, use that knowledge to convict the appellant.
Reversed.