Court Opinion

ID: 9386622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-13 14:00:41.967196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:07.833229
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11776    Document: 45-1      Date Filed: 04/13/2023    Page: 1 of 16

                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-11776
                           ____________________

        SHILOH CHRISTIAN CENTER,
                                                       Plaintiff-Appellant,
        versus
        ASPEN SPECIALTY INSURANCE COMPANY,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 6:20-cv-01774-CEM-LHP
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-11776

        Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
        NEWSOM, Circuit Judge:
                This is an insurance case. Fear not, keep reading. In deter-
        mining whether a pair of insurance policies cover losses resulting
        from “named windstorms,” we have to decide an important and
        (as it turns out) interesting question about the interpretation of
        written legal instruments: What is a court to do when all the surest
        proof of contracting parties’ subjective intentions and expectations
        flatly contradicts the surest indicators of an agreement’s objective
        legal meaning?
                At the risk of oversimplifying, Aspen Specialty Insurance
        Company, a billion-dollar insurance conglomerate, has essentially
        all of the subjective-intent evidence on its side: The records of the
        contracting parties’ course of dealing, contractual negotiations, and
        policy applications strongly suggest that the parties intended and
        expected that the policies would exclude damage caused by named
        windstorms. But Aspen’s policyholder—Shiloh Christian Center,
        a small Florida church—has the text: However clear the parties’
        subjective intentions or expectations, the policies do not, by their
        plain terms, exclude named-windstorm-related losses.
               What, then? The district court found the evidence of the
        parties’ subjective intent overwhelming and accordingly granted
        summary judgment to Aspen. We hold, to the contrary, that, un-
        der Florida law—as in the law more generally—in the event of a
        conflict between clear text, on the one hand, and even compelling
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        22-11776                  Opinion of the Court                              3

        evidence of extra-textual “intent,” on the other, the latter must give
        way to the former Cf. CRI-Leslie, LLC v. Comm’r of Internal Rev-
        enue, 882 F.3d 1026, 1033 (11th Cir. 2018). We therefore reverse
        the district court’s decision and remand for further proceedings.
                                              I
                                              A
              In 2016 and 2017, respectively, Hurricanes Matthew and
        Irma tore through Melbourne, Florida, pummeling Shiloh Chris-
        tian Center. On both occasions, the storms peeled back the
        church’s roof, allowing rain to soak the exposed structure. 1
               In 2015, the year before Matthew hit, Shiloh’s property-in-
        surance policy with Aspen Specialty Insurance Company covered
        losses resulting from so-called named windstorms—i.e., hurri-
        canes. In the middle of that year, though, Shiloh specifically asked
        Aspen to stop covering named-windstorm-related losses. Aspen
        agreed and issued an endorsement implementing the requested
        change: “THIS ENDORSEMENT CHANGES THE POLICY.
        PLEASE READ IT CAREFULLY. . . . It is understood and agreed
        effective 7/16/2015, the following change is made to this policy:
        Named Windstorm coverage is removed from this policy.” Doc.
        25-4 (emphasis in original). Reflecting the amendment, Aspen

        1 We   review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing
        all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
        Shiloh as the nonmoving party. See Hinkle v. Midland Credit Mgmt., Inc., 827
        F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2016).
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                 22-11776

        reduced Shiloh’s premium and even refunded its past payments for
        named-windstorm coverage.
               In early 2016, Shiloh began negotiations to renew its policy
        with Aspen. An insurance broker gave Shiloh a quote for “the same
        coverage provided after the Return Premium endorsement was is-
        sued last year”—that is, the post-amendment coverage that “ex-
        clude[d] Named Storms.” Doc. 25-3 at 15 (email from Shiloh). In
        its application for the policy, Shiloh scribbled “EX wind” in the sec-
        tion labeled “forms and conditions to apply” for several of the cov-
        ered premises. Doc. 25-7 at 4, 7. Aspen then issued a binder—
        which, for the uninitiated, is “a contract . . . for interim insurance”
        that is “effective at the date of the application and terminates at
        either the completion or rejection of the principal policy.” Medley
        Warehouses, LC v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 39 So. 3d 440, 444–45 (Fla.
        3rd Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (quotations and brackets omitted). The
        binder described the agreed-to scope of coverage this way: “All
        Risks of Direct Physical Loss or Damage excluding Flood, Earth-
        quake and Named Windstorm.” Doc. 25-9 at 2.
               Soon after, Aspen issued the 2016 policy. The cover page
        described the 2016 policy as a “renewal of” its 2015 predecessor.
        Doc. 25-10 at 1. But the two policies’ terms differed in material
        respects. For one thing, the 2016 policy was about $10,000 cheaper
        per year than the amended 2015 policy. Far more significantly
        here, the 2016 policy contained no exclusion for losses caused by
        named windstorms. It contained a detailed catalogue of other ex-
        clusions—for instance, for damage resulting from “Ordinance Or
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        22-11776               Opinion of the Court                       5

        Law,” “Earth Movement,” “Governmental Action,” “Nuclear Haz-
        ard,” “Utility Services,” “War And Military Action,” and “‘Fungus,’
        Wet Rot, Dry Rot And Bacteria”—but a “Named Windstorms” ex-
        clusion was conspicuously absent. Doc. 25-10 at 42–44 § B.
               You know what happened next. In October 2016, a named
        windstorm—Hurricane Matthew—blew through Melbourne, rip-
        ping the roof off Shiloh’s building. Rainwater poured in, aggravat-
        ing the damage. Shiloh filed a claim for, in its words, “Water Dam-
        age from Roof hurricane Matthew.” Doc. 25-15. Aspen denied the
        claim on several grounds, including, as relevant here, that Shiloh’s
        policy excluded coverage for losses caused by named windstorms.
        See Doc. 25-16 at 2.
                                         B
               The following year was basically a carbon copy. In early
        2017, Shiloh commenced efforts to renew its policy. As in 2016,
        Aspen provided a quote, reminding Shiloh that the policy would
        exclude coverage for damage resulting from “Named Wind-
        storms.” Doc. 25-13 at 2. As in 2016, Shiloh applied for the policy,
        scribbling “EX wind” into the application’s “forms and conditions
        to apply” sections for certain buildings, Doc. 25-11 at 3–4, 7, and
        Aspen issued a binder reflecting the named-windstorm exclusion,
        Doc. 25-12. As in 2016, Aspen then formally issued a policy that
        described itself as a “renewal” of the 2016 policy, Doc. 25-14 at 1,
        but, again, whose “Exclusions” provision, while expressly carving
        out losses resulting from all manner of contingencies, said nothing
        about named windstorms, id. at 43–44.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-11776

               Like clockwork, in September 2017, a named windstorm—
        Hurricane Irma—blew through town and, you guessed it, tore the
        roof off of Shiloh’s building. Just as it had in Hurricane Matthew,
        water poured in, exacerbating the damage. Shiloh filed another
        claim listing the “cause of loss”—again, in its words—as “Hurricane
        Irma.” Doc. 25-18 at 1. And just as it had done a year earlier, Aspen
        denied Shiloh’s claim on several grounds, among them that its pol-
        icy excluded losses caused by named windstorms.
                                         C
               Shiloh sued Aspen for breach of contract and sought a dec-
        laration that its 2016 and 2017 policies—which we’ll call the Mat-
        thew and Irma Policies—covered damages caused by named wind-
        storms. The parties cross-moved for summary judgment, teeing
        up a discrete and dispositive question of law: Do the policies cover
        named-windstorm-related losses?
               The district court granted summary judgment to Aspen. It
        held that “no reasonable jury” could find that the parties “intended
        the policies at issue to exclude named windstorm coverage.” Doc.
        41 at 13 (emphasis omitted). The court acknowledged that “[t]he
        two policies in effect when [Shiloh’s] building incurred damage do
        not, alone, say anything explicit concerning damage resulting from
        a named windstorm.” Id. at 9. But it found Aspen’s evidence re-
        garding the parties’ intent overwhelming: “[T]he explicit bargain-
        ing to remove named windstorm coverage, the reduced premiums
        that resulted from that bargaining, and the explicit language in the
        subsequent policy quotes” all proved to the district court’s
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        22-11776                   Opinion of the Court                                7

        satisfaction that “named windstorm coverage would not be in-
        cluded.” Id. at 13.
               This is Shiloh’s appeal. Shiloh contends, as it did below, that
        the Matthew and Irma Policies cover losses caused by named wind-
        storms, and it asks us to “reverse the district court’s order granting
        summary judgment” and to “remand[] with instructions that [the
        case] be submitted to a jury.” Br. of Appellant at 25.
                                               II
               We reverse. For reasons we will explain, we hold that both
        policies cover named windstorms. The Irma Policy unambigu-
        ously covers them, and the Matthew Policy, although ambiguous,
        covers them by dint of the traditional contra proferentem canon of
        insurance-contract interpretation.
                                               A
               The general rules governing the interpretation of insurance
        policies under Florida law are clear. 2 The cardinal principle is that
        a policy’s text is paramount: “Florida courts start with ‘the plain
        language of the policy, as bargained for by the parties.’” State Farm
        Fire & Cas. Co. v. Steinberg, 393 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th Cir. 2004)
        (citing Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 756 So. 2d 29, 34 (Fla.
        2000)). In particular, “[i]n insurance coverage cases under Florida

        2 Because federal jurisdiction over this matter is based on diversity of the par-
        ties’ citizenship, Florida law governs the determination of the issues on this
        appeal. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Steinberg, 393 F.3d 1226, 1230 (11th
        Cir. 2004).
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11776

        law, courts look at the insurance policy as a whole and give every
        provision its full meaning and operative effect.” Id. (quotations
        omitted). To be sure, Florida law permits reviewing courts to ven-
        ture outside the policy’s four corners in limited circumstances—to
        consider, for instance, whether an insured’s “application” should
        be understood to “amplif[y], extend[], or modif[y]” the policy. Fla.
        Stat. § 627.419(1). Florida law is clear, though, that in the event of
        a conflict between the policy and the underlying application, the
        policy controls. See Mathews v. Ranger Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 345,
        349 (Fla. 1973) (“[T]he general rule” is that “the provisions of the
        policy [] govern where conflict exists between the provisions of the
        application and the policy.”) (interpreting § 627.419(1)).
                Beyond those basics, Florida law prescribes more particular
        rules for the interpretation of ambiguous and unambiguous insur-
        ance policies. The rule applicable to unambiguous policies is ruth-
        lessly straightforward: If the policy’s “language is unambiguous, it
        governs”—end of story. State Farm Fire, 393 F.3d at 1230; accord
        Allstate Ins. Co. v. Orthopedic Specialists, 212 So. 3d 973, 975–76
        (Fla. 2017) (“Where the language in an insurance contract is plain
        and unambiguous, a court must interpret the policy in accordance
        with the plain meaning so as to give effect to the policy as writ-
        ten.”). Importantly, that is true even where extrinsic evidence con-
        tradicts the policy’s terms. See Vencor Hosps. v. Blue Cross Blue
        Shield of R.I., 284 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th Cir. 2002) (“It is well estab-
        lished under Florida law that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary
        or contradict the clear and unambiguous language of a contract.”).
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        22-11776               Opinion of the Court                        9

        And it is “especially true when the contract contains an integration
        clause indicating that the parties intended the written agreement
        to be the entire agreement.” In re Yates Dev., Inc., 256 F.3d 1285,
        1290 (11th Cir. 2001) (applying Florida law).
                When confronted with an insurance policy that is facially
        ambiguous, Florida courts apply the familiar contra proferentem
        canon. Pursuant to that interpretive rule, “any ambiguity which
        remains after reading each policy as a whole and endeavoring to
        give every provision its full meaning and operative effect must be
        liberally construed in favor of coverage and strictly against the in-
        surer.” Gov’t Emps. Ins. Co. v. Macedo, 228 So. 3d 1111, 1113 (Fla.
        2017) (quoting Wash. Nat’l Ins. Corp. v. Ruderman, 117 So. 3d 943,
        949–50 (Fla. 2013) (plurality opinion)).
               Importantly here, the Florida Supreme Court has clarified
        that facial ambiguities in insurance contracts should be resolved by
        reference to contra proferentem rather than extrinsic evidence of
        the parties’ supposed “intent.” And in fact, it did so in response to
        a question that we certified to it. In Ruderman ex rel. Schwartz v.
        Washington National Insurance Corp., 671 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir.
        2012), we confronted (1) a Florida insurance policy that was ambig-
        uous on its face and (2) an apparent split among Florida courts
        about how to resolve the ambiguity. One line of decisions indi-
        cated that “[a]mbiguous policy provisions are interpreted liberally
        in favor of the insured and strictly against the drafter who prepared
        the policy”; but another suggested that courts should “look[] to ex-
        trinsic evidence to resolve the ambiguity before construing any
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                 22-11776

        remaining ambiguity against the drafter of the policy.” Id. at 1211
        (quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). Uncertain how to pro-
        ceed, we certified several questions to the Florida Supreme Court,
        one of which was whether, “[i]f an ambiguity exists in this insur-
        ance policy,” a court should “first attempt to resolve the ambiguity
        by examining available extrinsic evidence.” Id. at 1212. In what we
        called a “definite response[],” the Florida Supreme Court “advised
        us that the answer” is “no”—contra proferentem controls. Ruder-
        man ex rel. Schwartz v. Wash. Nat’l Ins. Corp., 731 F.3d 1188, 1189
        (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Ruderman, 117 So. 3d at 949–50).
               To the extent that the Florida Supreme Court’s Ruderman
        decision left any doubt, its follow-on decision in Macedo resolved
        it. The question there was whether an insurance policy provision
        covering “legal expenses and court costs” included attorneys’ fees.
        The court concluded that the policy’s language “create[d] an ambi-
        guity”—in particular, it said, because “[r]eferring to ‘legal expenses’
        in conjunction with ‘court costs’ signifies that there are ‘legal ex-
        penses’ aside from costs” that might (or might not) include attor-
        neys’ fees. Macedo, 228 So. 3d at 1114. As already noted, for the
        governing interpretive principle the court quoted its earlier deci-
        sion in Ruderman: “[A]ny ambiguity which remains after reading
        each policy as a whole and endeavoring to give every provision its
        full meaning and operative effect must be liberally construed in fa-
        vor of coverage and against the insurer.” Id. at 1113 (quotations
        omitted). The court then applied that rule matter-of-factly and
        without further elaboration or investigation, let alone
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        22-11776                   Opinion of the Court                               11

        consideration of any extrinsic evidence: “[B]ecause there are mul-
        tiple reasonable interpretations regarding whether attorneys’ fees
        are included by the terms ‘expenses’ and ‘costs,’” the policy “is am-
        biguous and must be construed in favor of coverage.” Id. at 1114
        (citation omitted).
               Together, Ruderman and Macedo make clear that when
        confronted with a facially ambiguous insurance policy, a reviewing
        court should simply apply the well-worn contra proferentem rule
        and resolve the ambiguities in favor of coverage and against the
        insurer. It shouldn’t plumb the depths for evidence of the parties’
        supposed intent. 3
                                               B
              We now apply these principles to the two policies. First, the
        Irma Policy. Whatever the extrinsic evidence may suggest about
        the parties’ intentions or expectations, the Irma Policy

        3 We should briefly tie up one loose end. In some contexts, Florida courts
        have distinguished between contracts that exhibit “patent” ambiguities—i.e.,
        those that appear on the face of the instrument—and those that contain only
        “latent” ambiguities—i.e., those that surface only after considering extrinsic
        circumstances. In those contexts, courts have permitted the consideration of
        parol evidence to clarify latent ambiguities but not patent ones. See, e.g., Mac-
        Gray Servs., Inc. v. Savannah Assocs. of Sarasota, LLC, 915 So. 2d 657, 659
        (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005). For two reasons, though, those decisions don’t
        affect our analysis here. First, the sole ambiguity that we find here—as we’ll
        explain, in the Matthew Policy—is patent, not latent. Second, it may well be
        that the patent-latent distinction matters only for “contracts other than con-
        tracts of insurance.” Ruderman, 117 So. 3d at 950 n.3.
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        12                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11776

        unambiguously covers named windstorms. The policy opens with
        a provision that broadly “cover[s]” “risks of direct physical loss.”
        Doc. 25-14 at 43 § A. There follows a long and extremely detailed
        list of exclusions—set out beneath a bolded “Exclusions” header.
        Id. at 43 § B. That list includes exclusions for losses caused by “Or-
        dinance Or Law,” “Earth Movement,” “Governmental Action,”
        “Nuclear Hazard,” “Utility Services,” “War And Military Action,”
        “Water” (which, to be clear, refers to floods, mudslides, etc.), and
        “‘Fungus,’ Wet Rot, Dry Rot And Bacteria.” The list conspicuously
        does not include “Named Windstorms,” either as a defined cate-
        gory of claim or in any other way, shape, form, or fashion.
                Two interpretive principles confirm that the Irma Policy
        doesn’t exclude, and therefore covers, damage caused by named
        windstorms. The first is the usual rule that “insurance coverage
        must be interpreted broadly and its exclusions narrowly.”
        Westchester Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Evanston Ins. Co., 48 F.4th 1298,
        1302 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotations and brackets omitted). And the
        second is the rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius—i.e., that
        “[t]he expression of one thing implies the exclusion of others.” An-
        tonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation
        of Legal Texts 107 (2012); see also Young v. Progressive Se. Ins.
        Co., 753 So. 2d 80, 85 (Fla. 2000) (using this “principle of statutory
        construction” to show that “[b]y failing to permit self-insured mo-
        torist policy exclusions in the list of authorized exclusions, the Leg-
        islature has . . . indicated its intent . . . not to permit self-insured
        motorist policy exclusions”). Here, the expressio unius canon
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        22-11776                   Opinion of the Court                               13

        applies with particular force because the Irma Policy’s catalogue of
        exclusions is so detailed. See Scalia & Garner, supra, at 108 (“The
        more specific the enumeration, the greater the force of the
        canon.”).
               On its face, then, the Irma Policy clearly doesn’t exclude—
        and thus covers—losses resulting from named windstorms. We
        can envision only two possible responses to the policy’s plain lan-
        guage. First, the district court pointed to both policies’ “renewal
        of” provisions, saying that they formed a “continuous chain”
        stretching back to the pre-Matthew policy, which, as amended in
        mid-2015, expressly excluded damages caused by named wind-
        storms. But policies in this kind of “chain” don’t invariably dupli-
        cate one other’s terms. And in fact, the chained-up policies here
        diverge from the pre-Matthew policy in at least one material way,
        in that they impose different premiums. Moreover, and in any
        event, “[t]he general rule” in Florida is that “each renewal of an
        insurance policy” creates “an entirely new and independent con-
        tract of insurance.” Marchesano v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins.
        Co., 506 So. 2d 410, 413 (Fla. 1987) (emphasis added). 4

        4 Before us, Aspen cites another passage of Marchesano for the proposition
        that “the parties to the renewal of an insurance contract are ‘entitled to assume
        that the terms of the renewed policy are the same as those of the original con-
        tract.’” Br. of Appellee at 20 (quoting Marchesano, 506 So. 2d at 413) (empha-
        sis added). But that is not what Marchesano says; rather, it says that “the in-
        sured is entitled to assume that the terms of the renewed policy are the same
        as those of the original contract.” 506 So. 2d at 413 (emphasis added). The
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        14                        Opinion of the Court                    22-11776

                Nor, anticipating a second response, are we persuaded that
        Shiloh “amplified” or “modified” the Irma Policy within the mean-
        ing of Fla. Stat. § 627.419(1) by scribbling “EX wind” on its applica-
        tion. Two reasons: As an initial matter, it’s not self-evident that
        “EX wind” meant “exclusion for named windstorms”—maybe, but
        not necessarily. Moreover, even if it did, it wouldn’t matter be-
        cause, as already explained, Florida law provides that “the policy
        . . . govern[s] where conflict exists between the provisions of the
        application and the policy.” Mathews, 281 So. 2d at 349 (interpret-
        ing § 627.419(1)). And again, that rule applies with even greater
        force where, as here, the policy “contains an integration clause in-
        dicating that the parties intended the written agreement to be the
        entire agreement.” In re Yates Dev., Inc., 256 F.3d at 1290.
                                             C
               Shiloh concedes that, unlike the Irma Policy, the Matthew
        Policy is ambiguous on its face. See Oral Arg. at 5:20–5:35. We’re
        not so sure about that, but we’ll accept Shiloh’s concession. The
        supposed ambiguity results from tension between two of the pol-
        icy’s provisions. On the one hand, like the Irma Policy, the Mat-
        thew Policy contains a broad coverage clause, and a detailed “Ex-
        clusion” provision that includes all manner of specific exclusions
        but, conspicuously, does not mention “Named Windstorms.”
        Doc. 25-10 at 42 §§ A–B. That juxtaposition, for reasons we have

        insurer, it seems to us, isn’t entitled to make the same (if any) assumptions
        about the terms of a policy that it wrote.
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        22-11776               Opinion of the Court                        15

        explained, strongly indicates that the Matthew Policy covers dam-
        age caused by named windstorms. See supra at 12–13. On the
        other hand, unlike the Irma Policy, the Matthew Policy’s deducti-
        ble provision specifically mentions “Named Windstorm[s]”:
        “DEDUCTIBLE: $5,000 Per Occurrence, except; $25,000 Per Oc-
        currence as respects Wind and/or Hail (excluding Named Wind-
        storm).” Doc. 25-10 at 9. On one reading, that provision’s closing
        parenthetical could be understood to “exclud[e]” coverage for
        “Named Windstorm[s].” Of course, the deductible provision could
        also be read, in context, simply to create a “Named Windstorm”
        “exclu[sion]” to the $25,000 “except[ion]”—meaning only that
        named windstorms are subject to the usual $5,000 deductible. But
        again, we’ll accept Shiloh’s concession that the Matthew Policy’s
        deductible provision creates a facial ambiguity.
                As already explained in detail, Florida law is clear that when
        an insurance policy is facially ambiguous, the ambiguity is resolved
        in favor of coverage and against the insurer, without regard to ex-
        trinsic evidence of the parties’ supposed intentions or expectations.
        That’s the rule of Ruderman and Macedo: “[A]ny ambiguity which
        remains after reading each policy as a whole and endeavoring to
        give every provision its full meaning and operative effect must be
        liberally construed in favor of coverage and strictly against the in-
        surer.” Macedo, 228 So. 3d at 1113 (quoting Ruderman, 117 So. 3d
        at 949–50). Because (pursuant to Shiloh’s concession) “there are
        multiple reasonable interpretations” regarding whether the Mat-
        thew Policy covers named windstorms, the policy “is ambiguous
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        16                          Opinion of the Court                        22-11776

        and must be construed in favor of coverage.” Id. at 1114. Accord-
        ingly, the Matthew Policy, like the Irma Policy, covers damage that
        results from named windstorms.
                                                III
                For all these reasons, we hold as follows:
               1. Whatever the evidence of the contracting parties’ subjec-
        tive intentions and expectations, the Irma Policy’s plain language
        unambiguously covers losses caused by named windstorms.
               2. Although potentially ambiguous, the Matthew Policy
        likewise—and, again, whatever the evidence of the parties’ subjec-
        tive intentions and expectations—covers losses caused by named
        windstorms pursuant to the contra proferentem canon, according
        to which ambiguous insurance contracts are construed in favor of
        coverage and against the insurer.
                REVERSED and REMANDED. 5

        5 In light of our analysis of the policies, Shiloh may well be entitled to summary

        judgment. For whatever reason, Shiloh hasn’t asked us to reverse the district
        court’s decision and render judgment in its favor; rather, it has asked us only
        to reverse and remand the case “with instructions that it be submitted to a
        jury.” Br. of Appellant at 25. We will remand the case, but not specifically
        with instructions that it be submitted to a jury. We leave it to the district court
        to decide how best to proceed.