Court Opinion

ID: 9858642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 16:34:20.618875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:21.672020
License: Public Domain

HYDE, J.
(dissenting). — I respectfully dissent from the principal opinion and concur in the dissenting opinion of Ellison, C. J. It is my view that all bills passed at the same session of the Legislature have the same referendum deadline; and that petitions therefor may be filed at any time not more.than ninety days after final adjournment. Sec. 52(a), Art. Ill, specifically so provides without any exception and there is nothing in Sec. 29 to the contrary. I do not see how any other result can be reached without amending the Constitution. The idea is not new that a law may be effective prior to the filing of referendum petitions, in which “event its operation is suspended until its fate is determined in the referendum election. (See 28 Am. Jur. 178, Sec. 46, Annotation 7 A.L.R. 532; Lodge v. Ayers, Mont., 91 P. (2d) 691; Fitzpatrick v. State Board of Examiners, Mont., 70 P. (2d) 285.)
The proviso added to Sec. 29, Art. Ill of the 1945 Constitution (formerly Sec. 36, Art. IY, Const, of 1875) authorizes the General Assembly, if it recesses for thirty days or more, to “prescribe by joint resolution that laws previously passed and not effective shall take effect ninety days from the beginning of such recess.” It seems to me that this clearly applies only to acts of the Legislature that have the status of laws at the beginning of the recess and not to bills that have not yet become laws at that time. Art. Ill, 1945 Constitution, as was true of Art. IY, 1875- Constitution, makes a clear distinction between laws and bills, in prescribing essential legislative proceedings. Sec. 21, Art. Ill (see See. 25, Art. IY, 1875 Const.) provides: “no law shall be passed except by bill,” Sec. 27, Art. Ill (see Sec. 31, Art. IY, 1875 Const.) .says: “Nor shall a bill be finally passed unless a vote by yeas and nays be taken and a majority of the members elected to each house be recorded *262as voting favorably.” Sec. 30, Art. Ill, (see Sec’s. 37-38, Art. IY, 1875 Const.) says: “No bill shall become a law until'it is signed by the presiding officer of each house in open session”; and “When [709] a bill has been signed, the secretary * !S * shall present the bill in person to the Governor.” Sec. 31, Art. Ill (see Sec. 38, Art. IY, 1875 Const.) provides: “If the hill he approved hy the Governor it shall become a law.” Sec’s. 32 and 33 (see Sec’s. 39-40, Art. IY, 1875 Const.) provide how a bill may become a law if the Governor objects to it or fails to return it. These provisions, as to when a bill shall become a law, have been contained in all previous Constitutions. (See Sec. 10, Art. IY, Const, of 1820 and Sec. 9, Art. Y, Const, of 1865.) These provisions show that a specific distinction was plainly made between “a bill” and “a law”; and that wherever one designation was made the other was not intended.
Furthermore, the language of the proviso itself shows that it is intended to apply only to bills that have become laws. It specifies “laws previously passed and not effective.” Only laws are ever effective, bills never are effective. The laws to which the proviso does not apply are those which are effective without waiting ninety days; namely, appropriation laws, and laws in which an emergency is expressed and have received a two-thirds vote, that have been signed by the Governor. Therefore, both what- the proviso specifically excludes as well as what it includes are laws not bills. All other laws (which are not appropriation or emergency laws or laws put into effect on recess) do not take effect until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which enacted. This has been the constitutional provision as to the effective date of laws since 1875 (See. 36, Art. IY, Const. 1875) except for the period of 1943 to 1945, when by an amendment to Sec. 36 (See Laws 1943, p. 1085) it was provided that laws should take effect “ninety days after enactment and approval thereof as otherwise provided by this Article.” It seems to me that this language was also a recognition of the principle that both enactment by the Legislature and approval by the Governor was required, as provided in the other sections of Article IY of the 1875 Constitution, before a bill could become a law.
The only decision of this Court in which this matter has been considered is Nichols v. Bobinson, 277 Mo. 483, 211 S. W. 11. The Constitution of 1865 was in effect when the bill involved in that case was passed. Under that Constitution, the Legislature could provide when its acts become effective; but a statute provided for them to 1 ‘ take effect at the end of ninety days unless a different time is therein appointed.” (Sec. 4, p. 76, G. S. 1866.) The bill involved provided: ‘ ‘ This act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage.” It was contended that this clause in the act was unconstitutional because it was intended to make it an effective law *263without presentation to the Governor. The Court in overruling that contention and holding that the act “became an effective law” on the day the Governor signed it, said: “The legislative authority in Missouri is not wholly with the General Assembly. The Governor is a factor in legislation. When the General Assembly used the clause 'after its passage’ as it did in Section 3 of the act, it meant after the signature and approval of the Governor, or in the event he vetoed it, the final passage over his veto, as provided in the Constitution.” Thus, while bills are passed when “a majority of the members of each house be recorded as voting favorably” (Sec. 27, Art. Ill) but laws are not passed until signed by the Governor or finally passed without his approval.
Considering similar constitutional provisions, the Supreme Court of Montana said: “Clearly, the legislature cannot enact a law. It merely has the power to pass bills which may become laws when signed by the presiding officer of each house and are approved and signed by the Governor, or which he allows to become laws without his signature by lapse of time, in the manner prescribed by the Constitution.tJ The presiding officer of each house and the Governor have under the Constitution, an indispensable part of the making of every law. They are part of the machinery set up by the Constitution to make laws.” (Vaughn & Ragsdale Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 96 Pac. (2d) 420.) This is in accord with • authority in this country generally as stated in 59 C.J. 575, Sec. 101, as follows: “Under the system of government adopted in this country the chief executive, [710] either the president or a governor, is a part of the law-making power, and while engaged in considering bills which have been passed by the legislature and which are presented to him for approval or disapproval, the governor is acting in a legislative capacity, or is exercising a power which is essentially legislative in character, and is not acting in an executive capacity.” Thus the act of the Governor in approving a bill is the final act- of legislative power which makes a bill passed by the Legislature become a law. That to me is the plain meaning of our constitutional provisions.
Since Senate Bill No. 267 had not been signed by the Governor prior to the beginning of the recess of January 22, 1952, it is not now effective and will not take effect until ninety days after the adjournment of the session at which it was enacted. This is an additional reason why, in any event, the referendum petitions involved were timely filed.
Leedy, J., and Ellison, G. J., concur.