Court Opinion

ID: 9734589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:38:38.038377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:49.279777
License: Public Domain

Ryan, J.
(concurring in the result). I concur separately, basing my agreement in the result on different grounds. Unlike my colleague, I do not believe that the theory of White v Weinberger Builders, Inc, 397 Mich 23; 242 NW2d 427 (1976), which was upheld in Grice v General Motors Corp, 407 Mich 465; 286 NW2d 238 (1979), needs to be limited to that case only.
In White, we affirmed the lower court’s holding that the " 'liability of the Second Injury Fund is derivative from that of the employer, so that the fund cannot be subjected to a separate, independent hearing as to liability for differential payments once the employer’s alleged prospective liability has been redeemed via a negotiated settlement’ ”. White, supra, p 30, quoting 49 Mich App 430, 432; 212 NW2d 307 (1973). This "derivative liability” language of White does not mean that the Second Injury Fund is precluded from fully litigating the issue of the plaintiff’s eye injury in this case.
The operative proposition is simply this: if the Second Injury Fund is to be liable, then the employer must first be found liable. In White, the *96employer had not been found liable by adjudication or stipulation, thus the Second Injury Fund was not liable — an eminently logical conclusion given the proposition.
Logic teaches us that the converse of the proposition is not necessarily true, and the converse is what the plaintiff is trying to establish: if the employer is found liable, as he was, then the Second Injury Fund is liable. White does not stand for that, and the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board improperly cited it as authority.
Simple fairness also prompts our affirmance of the decision below. The factual scenario in this case reveals that the employer had no incentive to fully litigate the issue of whether the plaintiff had a preexisting disabling eye injury. As the Court of Appeals noted: "By admitting that plaintiff had a preexisting disabling eye injury, the employer did not render itself liable’ for any additional benefits”. Clark v Cadillac Gage, 101 Mich App 513, 516; 300 NW2d 622 (1980). Since the employer had no real interest at stake in stipulating that the plaintiff suffered a disabling eye injury, it would be unfair to hold the Second Injury Fund to the employer’s stipulation.
Coleman, J., concurred with Ryan, J.
Riley, J., took no part in the decision of this case.