Court Opinion

ID: 9717605
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:06:55.656438+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:54.231043
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE MORAN, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I dissent from the portion of the majority opinion holding that the appellate court could have properly remanded the cause for sentencing on the two convictions for which no sentence had been imposed. The armed-violence and aggravated-battery convictions were properly before the appellate court. However, the mob-violence and disorderly-conduct convictions were not appealed by defendant. The opinion’s rationale for permitting these two convictions to be remanded for sentencing is that they were “intimately related to and ‘dependent upon’ the appealed convictions within the meaning of Rule 615(b)(2)” (73 Ill. 2d R. 615(b(2)). (91 Ill. 2d at 353-54.) I disagree. Our Rule 606(a) (73 Ill. 2d R. 606(a)) provides in pertinent part: “No step in the perfection of the appeal other than the filing of the notice of appeal is jurisdictional.” Here, the appellate court never obtained jurisdiction over the unappealed mob-violence and disorderly-conduct convictions. In this regard, I find People v. Lilly (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 493, and People v. Scott (1977), 69 Ill. 2d 85, inapposite. Those cases did not involve a situation like the instant case, where an appellate court attempted to assume jurisdiction over unappealed convictions. Although the opinion concedes that these cases do not resolve the issue of the State’s right to seek a remand here, nevertheless the majority finds that the cases do indicate the absence of sentence on one of two or more defendant-appealed sentences is not a jurisdictional defect. (91 Ill. 2d at 353.) Lilly involved two convictions based on a single act where the judgment of conviction for which no sentence was imposed was appealed. Similarly, in Scott, the issue before this court was “whether, having before it the defendant’s appeal seeking reversal of the conviction for aggravated kidnapping, the appellate court was empowered to remand the cause for imposition of sentence.” (69 Ill. 2d 85, 87.) This court specifically stated, “We need not and do not decide the question whether absent an appeal by defendant the People could have sought review of the order ‘merging’ the aggravated kidnapping conviction and the failure to impose sentence on that count.” (69 Ill. 2d 85, 87.) I believe the more accurate conclusion to be derived from these cases is that the absence of a sentence imposed on a conviction is not a jurisdictional bar to review so long as defendant has appealed that conviction. A broader reading of Rule 615(bX2) that confers jurisdiction on an unappealed conviction is not implied by the above cases. Rule 615(b)(2) provides: “(b) Powers of the Reviewing Court. On appeal the reviewing court may: (2) set aside, affirm, or modify any or all of the proceedings subsequent to or dependent upon the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken.” (73 Ill. 2d R. 615(b)(2).) The fallacy in the majority’s interpretation of the rule is its degradation of the plain language pertaining to setting aside, affirming or modifying the judgment or order from which the appeal is taken. The opinion emphasizes the portion of the rule relating to dependent proceedings in arriving at its conclusion. However, it is the appealed judgment from which the court derives its reviewing powers. By holding that failure to impose sentence upon an unappealed conviction, arising out of different acts, is “dependent upon the appealed conviction,” the majority effectively eviscerates the focal point of the rule. Further, interpreting Rule 615(b)(2) as the majority does results in a conflict with our Rule 604(aXl) (73 Ill. 2d R. 604(a)(1)), which provides: “(a) Appeals by the State. (1) When State May Appeal. In criminal cases the State may appeal only from an order or judgment the substantive effect of which results in dismissing a charge ***; arresting judgment because of a defective indictment, information or complaint; quashing an arrest or search warrant; or suppressing evidence.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, under the clear language of Rule 604(aXl), the State cannot appeal a conviction to seek an order for imposition of a sentence. (Accord, People v. Gum (1980), 85 Ill. App. 3d 298, 302.) Interpreting Rule 615(bX2) to allow an unappealed conviction to act as a “proceeding dependent upon the appealed conviction” would, in effect, expand the State’s right of appeal beyond that contemplated by Rule 604(aXl). Finally, the majority reasons that any interpretation of Rule 615(b)(2) other than the one it advances could have “mischievous consequences” in that if the convictions for which sentences were imposed were reversed, defendant could go unpunished. In short, the court, to avoid the potentiality of that occurrence (a situation not before the court in this case), has “forced” an interpretation never contemplated by its rule in order to reach a desired result. I suggest the proper approach is for this court, under its authority derived from article VI, section 16, of the Illinois Constitution, to clearly enhance the powers of the reviewing court, rather than fashioning an interpretation that I see as inconsistent with the plain language of the existing rule. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH joins in this partial concurrence and partial dissent.