Court Opinion

ID: 9472483
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:01:40.797563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:56.887153
License: Public Domain

WIDENER, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
Although I concur in Judge Sprouse’s opinion on the question of the validity of the search and in the result reached in that opinion on the admissibility of Officer Neal’s statement and Officer Hernandez’ testimony with respect to it, I think it unnecessary to the decision and so do not reach the question of admissibility under the confrontation clause. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347, 56 S.Ct. 466, 483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (Justice Brandéis concurring). Of course, I do not disagree in the abstract with the result Judge Sprouse would obtain under the confrontation clause. See United States v. Payne, 492 F.2d 449, 455 (4th Cir.1974) (dissenting opinion). I note that this concurring opinion is the opinion of the court on the question of the admissibility of the statements.
I am of opinion that neither the affidavit of Neal nor Hernandez’ testimony with respect to it is admissible. ■ The need for their introduction was due to the untimely death, and thus unavailability, of Neal.1 Mere unavailability, however, is an insufficient reason to justify the admissibility of those statements, and the use of Neal’s statement in the trial amounted to no more than the trial by affidavit the hearsay rule prevents. See 5 Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn Ed.) § 1364 (1974). Hernandez’ explanation of Neal’s statement stands on even weaker ground than Neal’s statement as it attempts to explain away those parts of Neal’s statement favorable to the defendant.
Hearsay testimony is no less inadmissible now under FRE 802 than it was under Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 290, 3 L.Ed. 348 (1813). The reasons for its exclusion are as true today as they were *1343when Queen was decided, the human condition having changed little, if at all, with the passing years. The quotation from Queen, “[i]ts intrinsic weakness, its incompeteney to satisfy the mind of the existence of the fact, and the frauds which might be practiced under its cover ...,” Queen, 11 U.S. (7 Craneh.) at 295, well states the case.
Just as Queen, p. 295, set out certain exceptions to the hearsay rule, Congress in enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence also adopted certain exceptions. Unless hearsay evidence is admissible under one of the exceptions enumerated in the Rules, a rule of the Supreme Court or Act of Congress, it is nevertheless inadmissible under FRE 802 subject only to the exception that the requirements of FRE 803(24) or 804(b)(5) are met. FRE 802; Saltzburg and Redden, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual (3rd Ed.1982), p. 566. The government does not claim the evidence in question is admissible under an explicit exception to the hearsay rule, under rule of the Supreme Court, or under Act of Congress; it maintains that Neal’s statement and Hernandez’ testimony with respect to that statement are exceptions to the hearsay rule under Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5).
The pertinent text of Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) is phrased in exactly the same language, the first although the declarant may be available as a witness and the latter if unavailable. The text is:
“A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.”
There is no doubt the statements were offered as evidence of material facts. While there may be some argument that the statements were more probative than any other evidence which could be procured through reasonable efforts, for the purpose of this opinion I will consider that such is the case. Whether the general purpose of the rules and justice would best be served by admitting the statement is a matter which need not be considered here. This leaves the question on which the case turns as whether or not Neal’s statement and Hernandez’ explanation of Neal’s statement have such equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness to make the statements admissible despite their hearsay character.
Affidavits are within the prohibition of the hearsay rule. 5 Wigmore on Evidence (Chadbourn Ed.) § 1362 (1974). Thus, the mere fact that a statement which is sought to be introduced is in the form of a written affidavit is not a sufficient guarantee of trustworthiness, and additional guarantees must be shown to permit the introduction of the statement.
Neal’s written statement to Hernandez, to repeat, contained in part the following:
“To be honest, I think I have seen that guy somewhere before. I don’t know if it was an FPO or someone who worked at the motor pool, but if I saw him again I may recognize him. I think it was one of the motor pool employees, I think____ The guy who I think robbed me that I said I think work at the motor pool drives a Cadillac and is brown skinned. I am not sure but it seems to fit that guy.”
The court admitted Neal’s written statement. It is at once apparent that the statement did not implicate McCall for McCall was an FPO, did not work at the motor pool, and drove a Camaro rather than a Cadillac, as Neal knew at the time he made the statement.
The court, in addition, allowed Hernandez to testify as to other statements Neal had made to him at the time which Hernandez did not include in Neal’s written statement. Among them were:
*1344“... he was very adamant in stating to me that he knew the person, somehow he knowed who the person was.”
“He said, but I am pretty sure that my feeling is that it is another FPO.”
“... but, he said, Hernandez I have got a feeling it is an FPO.”
“I asked him to call a name. He said, I don’t want to get anybody in trouble. I don’t want to call a name, but I am pretty sure it was a FPO.”
“... but he specifically informed me that he thought it was another FPO and he didn’t want to call the person’s name.” 2
Hernandez testified that he did not include in Neal’s affidavit the above quoted statements he attributed to Neal because Neal asked him not to. Of equal significance, Hernandez did not even tell his supervisor or the United States Attorney’s office about the statements until the case was reopened some two years later. Apparently the matters included in the quotations were included in no report of Hernandez.
The testimony of Hernandez with respect to Neal’s statements to him which were not included in Neal’s affidavit are the purest hearsay. They are statements “... other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” FRE 801(c). They have no circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness and are inadmissible under any standard. If such statements were admitted in criminal prosecutions, it would amount to opening the door to admitting into evidence the file of the investigating officers in criminal prosecutions without the production of the witnesses.
Neal’s written statement also has insufficient, if any, circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness. The written statement of Neal is contradicted by the oral statements Neal made to Hernandez, and far from corroborating Neal’s written statement, the oral statements Neal made to Hernandez are indications that his written statement is unreliable at best, and perhaps simply not true, when it is remembered that Neal and McCall were fellow FPO officers, had known each other since their training days some years before, McCall supposedly talked to Neal during the robbery and Neal had failed to recognize McCall as the robber, although working with him for more than two years after the robbery.
I am thus of opinion that the written statement of Neal and the oral testimony of Hernandez with respect to Neal’s statements to him were both inadmissible as hearsay under FRE 802, and that neither is admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under FRE 803(24) or 804(b)(5). 1 would grant a new trial, for the error is not harmless.
I am authorized to state that Judge MURNAGHAN concurs in this opinion.

. The robbery took place on July 6, 1980. Neal died on December 27, 1982.

. These quotations obviously are not all in cornpíete context.