Court Opinion

ID: 9955442
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 17:01:16.46813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:42.214325
License: Public Domain

FILED
                             NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                            MAR 28 2024
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                          U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                             FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

FIDELINA FARIAS LOPEZ; ANTHONY                   No. 23-2
VILLA FARIAS,
                                                 Agency Nos.
              Petitioners,                       A208-308-001
                                                 A208-308-002
 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney                     MEMORANDUM*
General,

              Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                          Board of Immigration Appeals

                             Submitted March 25, 2024**
                                Seattle, Washington

Before: W. FLETCHER, WARDLAW, and MILLER, Circuit Judges.

      Fidelina Farias Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for review of

a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal from

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
the Immigration Judge’s (IJ) denial of her application for asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Farias

Lopez’s minor son, Anthony Villas Farias, was a derivative beneficiary of her

asylum application. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We deny the

petition.

       Where, as here, the BIA conducts its own review of the record and

incorporates some findings of the IJ, we review both decisions to the extent the

BIA’s opinion expressly adopted the IJ’s opinion. Flores Molina v. Garland, 37

F.4th 626, 632 (9th Cir. 2022). We review legal conclusions de novo and factual

findings for substantial evidence. Plancarte Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824,

831 (9th Cir. 2022). “To prevail under the substantial evidence standard, the

petitioner ‘must show that the evidence not only supports, but compels the

conclusion that these findings and decisions are erroneous.’” Id. (quoting Davila v.

Barr, 968 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2020)). We review due process claims de

novo. Ibarra-Flores v. Gonzales, 439 F.3d 614, 620 (9th Cir. 2006).

       Substantial evidence supports the agency’s finding that Farias Lopez did not

establish persecution that would make her eligible for asylum or withholding of

removal. We have repeatedly found no persecution where, as here, the petitioner

did not experience physical harm or face direct threats. See Sharma v. Garland, 9

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F.4th 1052, 1061 (9th Cir. 2021). Nor does the evidence compel a finding that the

attacks and threats against Farias Lopez’s husband and father by members of the

Knights Templar cartel were “part of a pattern of persecution closely tied to” her.

See id. at 1062 (internal quotation omitted).

      Although Farias Lopez fears the Knights Templar cartel member who

harassed her when she was 17, she has not spoken to him since 2009. That 15

years have passed sine she last spoke to him undermines the likelihood of future

harassment. See Lanza v. Ashcroft, 389 F.3d 917, 934–35 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding

no clear probability of future persecution where the “alleged persecution occurred

more than ten years ago”). That Farias Lopez’s relatives continue to live and work

in Mexico without harm further undermines the reasonableness of her fear. See

Sharma, 9 F.4th at 1066 (“The ongoing safety of family members in the

petitioner’s native country undermines a reasonable fear of future persecution.”).

      The agency did not err by failing to address the young age of Farias Lopez’s

son when assessing persecution. Her son did not present an independent claim for

asylum or withholding of removal, and Farias Lopez did not present any evidence

that the harms she and her family experienced had cognizable effects on her son.

      We deny the petition as to Farias Lopez’s CAT claim for similar reasons.

Torture is “more severe than persecution,” Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1217

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(9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207, 1224 (9th Cir. 2005)),

and Farias Lopez did not show that she suffered any harm that amounted to

persecution. Further, generalized evidence of corruption and violence in Mexico is

not specific enough to show government acquiescence. Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder,

600 F.3d 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).

      The IJ’s mistaken reference to an application for “deferral of removal” rather

than “withholding of removal” under CAT was harmless and does not warrant

remand. Farias Lopez did not meet her burden to establish eligibility for CAT

protection, and she has not identified any prejudice from the IJ’s error. Moreover,

the IJ’s order clearly and correctly stated that Farias Lopez applied for “protection

in the form of withholding of removal” under CAT.

      PETITION DENIED.

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