Court Opinion

ID: 9963808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-26 13:09:14.65875+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:00.787034
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Shinholster, 2024-Ohio-1606.]

                      IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO
                       HAMILTON COUNTY, OHIO

 STATE OF OHIO,                                   :   APPEAL NO. C-230457
                                                      TRIAL NO. B-2203537-A
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                      :

                                                  :
   VS.
                                                  :

 ANASIA SHINHOLSTER,                              :

       Defendant-Appellant.                       :

 STATE OF OHIO,                                   :   APPEAL NO. C-230436
                                                      TRIAL NO. B-2203537-B
         Plaintiff-Appellee,                      :

                                                  :
   vs.
                                                  :
                                                           O P I N I O N.
 SAKARIA WILLIAMS,                                :

       Defendant-Appellant.                       :

Criminal Appeals From: Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas

Judgments Appealed From Are: Affirmed in C-230457; Affirmed in Part, Sentences
Vacated, and Cause Remanded in C-230436

Date of Judgment Entry on Appeal: April 26, 2024
                  OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Melissa A. Powers, Hamilton County Prosecuting Attorney, and John D. Hill, Jr.,
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for Plaintiff-Appellee,

Law Office of Arica L. Underwood LLC and Arica L. Underwood, for Defendant-
Appellant Anasia Shinholster,

Timothy J. McKenna, for Defendant-Appellant Sakaria Williams.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

BERGERON, Judge.

       {¶1}    A takeout order placed by restaurant regulars that took too long sparked

a request for a refund that led to a physical altercation, culminating in three shots fired

and a gunshot wound.        Following the incident, codefendants-appellants Anasia

Shinholster and Sakaria Williams (together, “Defendants”) were tried jointly, and both

women were convicted of two counts of felonious assault and sentenced to five-to-six

years in prison.

       {¶2}    We sua sponte consolidate their two separate appeals into a single

opinion and judgment because Defendants raise overlapping self-defense arguments,

challenging their convictions for felonious assault on manifest weight grounds. Ms.

Shinholster separately raises concerns about a clerical error in the judicial entry

denying her Crim.R. 29 motion for a judgment of acquittal. And Ms. Williams argues

that the trial court failed to merge allied offenses of similar import and that the state

failed to establish the “aiding and abetting” element of felonious assault.          After

reviewing the record and the trial court’s decision, we vacate Ms. Williams’s sentences

and remand her case (C-230436) for resentencing. In all other respects, we affirm

both judgments of the trial court.

                                            I.

       {¶3}    In July 2022, Ms. Shinholster arrived at a restaurant that she regularly

frequented to pick up food that she and Ms. Williams had ordered. Because the order

was not yet ready, she had to wait for the food. Sometimes, when that happened, the

restaurant would offer a free soft drink for their troubles of having to wait longer than

expected. Accordingly, she requested a drink, but the restaurant was out of her

preferred beverage and one of the restaurant’s owners, Jason Williams, declined her

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

back-up request because the alternative drink she wanted was more expensive. Ms.

Shinholster was on the phone with Ms. Williams throughout this encounter, with her

annoyance growing by the minute.

       {¶4}    As Ms. Shinholster left with the order, she announced to Ms. Williams

that she would no longer support the restaurant.             Jason overheard this edict.1

Testimony and evidence presented at trial established that Ms. Williams and Jason

later exchanged phone calls, adding fuel to the simmering feud. The content of these

phone calls, however, is disputed. According to Jason, although the calls grew heated

at moments, no one said anything outrageous, and he eventually apologized. But Ms.

Shinholster testified that during the last call (the only call to which she was a party),

Jason was irate and disrespectful, hurling profanities at them.

       {¶5}    Following the phone calls, Defendants determined that they wanted a

refund for their order. Together, they decided that Ms. Williams would enter the

restaurant because the owners would be less familiar with her. Ms. Shinholster

remained in the car with Ms. Williams on speaker phone, so she could hear what

transpired inside the restaurant. Both women carried a gun, consistent with their

normal practice, although Ms. Shinholster testified that she did not know whether Ms.

Williams was armed that night.

       {¶6}    As Jason and his co-owner and wife, Peta Duffus, began to prepare to

close their restaurant for the evening, Ms. Williams entered the restaurant, demanding

a refund for her order. She claimed that she did not know what was in the order

because her mother had placed it. There is conflicting testimony regarding where

Jason was when the encounter began. Ms. Shinholster testified that she first heard

1 Because Sakaria Williams and Jason Williams share a last name, we refer to Jason Williams as

“Jason” throughout the opinion to avoid any confusion.
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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Ms. Williams having a cordial conversation with Jason. But Jason testified that he was

in the back cleaning when Ms. Williams entered the restaurant and did not come to

the front of the restaurant until he heard loud talking and the mention of a gun. And

Ms. Duffus similarly testified that she was the first one to interact with Ms. Williams

while Jason worked in the back.

       {¶7}   Regardless, it is undisputed that some time at or near the beginning of

the encounter, Ms. Duffus began arguing with Ms. Williams, prompting Ms.

Shinholster to enter the restaurant and Jason to call 911 as he advanced towards the

front of the restaurant. According to Ms. Duffus, when Ms. Williams entered the

restaurant, she flashed her gun. As evidenced by video footage, Ms. Williams walked

behind the counter into the employees-only kitchen area. And Ms. Shinholster stood

in the doorway to the employees-only area to prevent the door from closing. The

owners did not invite Defendants into this area, and Ms. Duffus instructed them to

leave the business multiple times during this portion of the encounter.              Ms.

Shinholster testified that they refused to leave because they were waiting for the police

to show up to enable them to procure their refund.

       {¶8}   At some point during this time, Ms. Duffus picked up a knife, but she

quickly put it down, and never came within an arm’s length of the women while

holding the knife. Nor did anyone touch the knife again during the encounter.

Throughout this portion of video evidence admitted at trial, Ms. Duffus indicates that

the women have a gun. And Ms. Shinholster informs the 911 operator that she had her

concealed carry permit.

       {¶9}   Conflicting testimony exists as to how the physical altercation between

Ms. Williams and Ms. Duffus began. Ms. Duffus testified that she tried to grab the

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

food bag from Ms. Williams to see what was in it, and Ms. Williams punched her, spit

in her face, and turned around, and in response, Ms. Duffus grabbed her. Jason

explained that he saw Ms. Duffus chase the women into the lobby and a physical

altercation ensued. And Ms. Shinholster asserted that Ms. Duffus started pushing and

shoving Ms. Williams out of the employees-only area with a dustpan, and Ms. Williams

went to leave, but then Ms. Duffus “attacked” her, punching her and pulling her hair.

Ms. Shinholster insisted that Ms. Williams did not spit at anyone or touch anyone until

she needed to defend herself. Once the physical altercation began, it is undisputed

that Ms. Duffus held Ms. Williams pinned on the ground, as the two women continued

to tussle. Ms. Duffus testified that, at some point during this altercation, she removed

Ms. Williams’s gun from her bag and slid it under the bulletproof glass at the counter,

into the cash register area (presumably to ensure that no one would use it).

       {¶10} Ms. Shinholster intervened to assist Ms. Williams, prompting Jason to

attempt to remove her from the restaurant. He and Ms. Shinholster engaged in a

physical altercation at the door of the restaurant as he sought to shove her out of the

restaurant, while she fought to remain inside (and later regain entry). During this

time, Ms. Duffus still had Ms. Williams pinned on the ground. Ms. Williams continued

to call for help, eventually encouraging her companion to “shoot the bitch.”

       {¶11} Believing that he locked Ms. Shinholster out of the restaurant, Jason

turned to address the encounter between the two women rolling around on the floor.

However, Ms. Shinholster regained entry and fired three shots at him.            In her

recounting of the story, she asserts that he reached into Ms. William’s purse and pulled

out “what looked like to me resembled like a hammer like object” and moved towards

her when she decided to fire three shots in self-defense.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶12} After the shots were fired, Ms. Shinholster grabbed Ms. Williams, exited

from the restaurant, called the police, and waited by their car for police to arrive. A

detective arrived and interviewed, and then arrested, both women. Upon their arrival

at the Justice Center, officers denied them entry because of their injuries, so they first

went for treatment at a hospital before landing in jail. Ms. Shinholster testified that

she is recovering from a concussion that occurred during the melee, and that she also

suffered a scraped knee and bruised arms. And she testified that the photo evidence

of Ms. Williams (which showed a large bump on her head) accurately portrayed how

she looked following the incident. Jason required surgery for his injury and suffers

ongoing pain from his gunshot wound.

       {¶13} Both Defendants were charged with two counts of felonious assault,

felonies of the second degree, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(1) and (2), with firearm

specifications. Both women waived their rights to a jury trial. At trial, Ms. Duffus,

Jason, Detective Carl Blackwell, and Ms. Shinholster testified (notably, Ms. Williams

did not testify). The defense and prosecution also tendered exhibits, including 911

calls, cellphone footage, and various photographs. Ultimately, the trial court found

Defendants each guilty of both counts and sentenced them to the mandatory minimum

of two-to-three years on count 1, plus three years on the firearm specification, and

count 2 running concurrently to count 1, for five-to-six-year indeterminate sentences.

                                           II.

       {¶14} On appeal, Ms. Shinholster and Ms. Williams each raise three

assignments of error, with overlapping self-defense arguments. We first address their

self-defense arguments. We then proceed to analyze each defendant’s remaining

assignments of error.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

                                           A.

       {¶15} In Ms. Shinholster’s first and second assignments of error and Ms.

Williams’s third assignment of error, Defendants challenge their convictions for

felonious assault as against the manifest weight of the evidence, maintaining that the

state failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they were not acting in self-

defense. Ms. Williams also raises a sufficiency challenge to the self-defense claim.

But, based on the recent change in the law regarding self-defense claims, the

sufficiency of the evidence standard applies to the defendant’s burden of production,

whereas a manifest weight of the evidence standard applies to the state’s burden of

persuasion. See State v. Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-4562, 216 N.E.3d

653, ¶ 26. Thus, “[t]he Ohio Supreme Court has held that a self-defense claim is not

an element of the offense that must be proven by the state and, therefore, it is not

subject to review for sufficiency of the evidence.” State v. Warth, 1st Dist. Hamilton

No. C-220477, 2023-Ohio-3641, ¶ 37, citing Messenger at ¶ 24-27. Consequently, we

only evaluate Defendants’ convictions through a manifest weight lens.

       {¶16} When a defendant raises a self-defense claim, once evidence is

presented that tends to support that their use of force was in self-defense or in defense

of another, “ ‘ “the burden of persuasion requires the state to disprove at least one of

the elements of self-defense * * * beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (Emphasis added.)

State v. Mitchell, 2023-Ohio-2604, 222 N.E.3d 156, ¶ 16 (1st Dist.), quoting State v.

Gibson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220283, 2023-Ohio-1640, ¶ 10, quoting State v.

Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190507, 2020-Ohio-4976, ¶ 49. “Unlike the burden

of production, which concerns a party’s duty to introduce enough evidence on an issue,

the burden of persuasion represents a party’s duty to convince the factfinder to view

                                           8
                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

the facts in a favorable manner to them.” (Emphasis sic.) Mitchell at ¶ 15, citing

Messenger at ¶ 17.

       {¶17} We will not reverse a conviction unless “the evidence weighs heavily

against [it].” Id. And we will not “second-guess the factfinder’s adjudication of

conflicting evidence” except under “the most exceptional circumstances.” Id. Thus,

when reviewing a manifest weight challenge involving self-defense, we must

determine if “the factfinder disregarded or overlooked compelling evidence that

weighed against conviction.” Gibson at ¶ 8, citing State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d

380, 387-388, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997).

       {¶18} Defendants insist that the state failed to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that they did not act in defense of themselves or of another. Self-defense and

defense of another are affirmative defenses that legally excuse otherwise unlawful

conduct. See Messenger, 171 Ohio St.3d 227, 2022-Ohio-4562, 216 N.E.3d 653, at ¶

21 (“The plain language of R.C. 2901.05(A) reflects that self-defense is still an

affirmative defense.”).

       {¶19} Here, the facts that both Defendants were injured during the

altercation and that they claimed that the restaurant owners started the brawl tend to

support the conclusion that they acted in self-defense. Therefore, the burden shifted

to the state to disprove one or more of the elements of self-defense in the use of deadly

force: “(1) the defendant[s] [were] not at fault in creating the situation giving rise to

the affray; (2) the defendant[s] had a bona fide belief that [they were] in imminent

danger of death or great bodily harm and that [their] only means of escape from such

a danger was in the use of such force; [or] (3) the defendant[s] did not violate any duty

to retreat or avoid the danger.” Smith, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-190507, 2020-Ohio-

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

4976, at ¶ 48, citing State v. Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 24, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002).

The state must only disprove one element beyond a reasonable doubt to defeat the

self-defense claim. See State v. Terry, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220379, 2023-Ohio-

2074, ¶ 9, citing Gibson, 1st Dist. Hamilton No. C-220283, 2023-Ohio-1640, at ¶ 10.

       {¶20} Under the first element of a self-defense claim, the state presented

evidence establishing that Defendants were at fault in creating the situation giving rise

to the affray. For the purposes of self-defense, “the first aggressor in an incident is ‘at

fault.’ ” State v. Santana, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 29348, 2022-Ohio-4118, ¶ 30,

quoting State v. Williams, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29444, 2020-Ohio-3269, ¶ 9, citing

State v. Turner, 171 Ohio App.3d 82, 2007-Ohio-1346, 869 N.E.2d 708, ¶ 23 (2d Dist.).

Defendants argue (and Ms. Shinholster testified) that they were not at fault in creating

the situation leading to the shooting because Jason attacked Ms. Shinholster, and Ms.

Duffus attacked Ms. Williams. But Ms. Duffus testified that Ms. Williams spit on her

and threw the first punch. Similarly, Jason testified that he did not get physically

involved with Ms. Shinholster until she engaged in the altercation between the other

two women. Ms. Williams also claims that she was not at fault in creating the situation

because at one point she put up her hood and turned to leave before Ms. Duffus

launched an attack at her. She did not testify at trial, so the only evidence supporting

this claim comes from the testimony of Ms. Shinholster indicating that they were going

to leave at this point.      But elsewhere during her testimony, Ms. Shinholster

acknowledged that they refused to leave and were waiting for the police to show up.

       {¶21} Moreover, the state demonstrated under the second element that

Defendants were not in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm at the time Ms.

Shinholster fired shots at Jason. Both Ms. Shinholster and Ms. Williams arrived for a

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

refund with guns. At trial, Ms. Shinholster testified that she “fear[ed] for her life” and

that “[i]f [she] didn’t fire that either Ms. Williams and I would have died that night.”

She also maintained that she “knew Ms. Williams could not breathe because of the

position she was in.” Yet testimony and evidence presented at trial demonstrate that

Ms. Williams was loudly and continuously yelling for help throughout the encounter

(not to mention exhorting her companion to shoot), demonstrating her ability to

breathe. And while Ms. Shinholster testified that Jason was coming at her when she

fired her gun, he testified that he thought he locked her out and had turned back to

address the altercation between Ms. Duffus and Ms. Williams at the time the shots

were fired.

       {¶22} Furthermore, the state established that Defendants had a duty to

retreat before using force in self-defense. Under the most recent amendments to R.C.

2901.09(B), a person does not have a duty to retreat before using force in self-defense

if that person is in a place where they lawfully have a right to be. Mitchell, 2023-Ohio-

2604, 222 N.E.3d 156, at ¶ 17. While Ms. Shinholster and Ms. Williams were lawfully

able to enter the restaurant, by the time of the shooting, they were trespassers (and

thus, were not in a place where they lawfully had a right to be). Testimony, video

evidence, and the 911 call recordings establish that Ms. Williams entered the

employees-only area of the restaurant without permission. And the restaurant owners

repeatedly instructed Defendants to leave the restaurant before the physical

altercation began. During the recording of her 911 call, Ms. Shinholster responded to

Ms. Duffus’s instruction to leave: “No, we ain’t going nowhere.”

       {¶23} Self-defense claims are often rife with issues of credibility. And here,

the state and Defendants largely presented two different versions of the events leading

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

up to the shooting. But when there is conflicting evidence presented at trial, we will

not find that a conviction is against the manifest weight of the evidence where a trier

of fact reasonably weighed the conflicting evidence. See, e.g., State v. Vandergriff, 1st

Dist. Hamilton No. C-200282, 2021-Ohio-3230, ¶ 9. On this record, we cannot

conclude that the trial court clearly lost its way or created a manifest miscarriage of

justice in determining that the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that

Defendants did not act in self-defense. Although some evidence weighs in favor of the

self-defense claims, the weight of the evidence points in the other direction. Therefore,

we overrule Ms. Shinholster’s first and second assignments of error and Ms. Williams’s

third assignment of error.

                                            B.

       {¶24} Turning to Ms. Shinholster’s remaining assignment of error, she

maintains the trial court erred by denying her Crim.R. 29 motion for a judgment of

acquittal as to “counts 1 and 2” when she was the named defendant in the third and

fourth counts of the indictment. Specifically, in light of this error, she claims that this

court should vacate her conviction.

       {¶25} Defendants were convicted of parallel counts of felonious assault:

counts 1 and 2 against Ms. Williams and counts 3 and 4 against Ms. Shinholster. At

the conclusion of the presentation of evidence at trial, both defendants moved for a

judgment of acquittal pursuant to Crim.R. 29, which the trial court immediately

denied. Two days later, the trial court journalized its denial of the Crim.R. 29 motion

in two entries, one for each defendant. The entries for both defendants listed counts 1

and 2. But the entry regarding Ms. Shinholster should have listed counts 3 and 4 as

those were the charges against her.        Of note, however, the entry reflected the

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                     OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

appropriate offenses (both felonious assault). The court never corrected its error, but

it later docketed an entry finding Ms. Shinholster guilty of the correct counts.

         {¶26} A clerical error is “ ‘a mistake or omission, mechanical in nature and

apparent on the record, which does not involve a legal decision or judgment.’ ” State

ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 19,

quoting State v. Brown, 136 Ohio App.3d 816, 819-820, 737 N.E.2d 1057 (3d Dist.

2000).

         {¶27} Ms. Shinholster acknowledges that the error was clerical. And the court

orally denied her Crim.R. 29 motion during trial. Further, the court later docketed an

entry finding her guilty of the correct counts. While Ms. Shinholster argues her

conviction should be vacated, we see no basis for vacating the conviction for what

appears to be a scrivener’s error that did not affect her substantial rights. Nor does

she explain how she suffered any prejudice from this clerical error. Without any such

argument, we see no utility in a remand to correct the error given that the ultimate

judgment was correct.

         {¶28} In light of the foregoing analysis, we overrule Ms. Shinholster’s second

assignment of error.

                                           C.

         {¶29} Finally, we consider Ms. Williams’s remaining arguments. In her first

assignment of error, she asserts that the trial court failed to merge the felonious

assaults in counts 1 and 2 when they were the same offenses against the same victim

and were part of the same immediate and continuing course of conduct. Rather than

ordering Ms. Williams to serve count 2 concurrently, she argues that the court should

have merged the two counts. This court reviews R.C. 2941.25 merger determinations

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

de novo. State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482, 2012-Ohio-5699, 983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶

28.

       {¶30} The Ohio Supreme Court has repeatedly found convictions under these

sections of R.C. 2903.11 “are allied offenses of similar import * * * when both are

committed with the same animus against the same victim.” State v. Harris, 122 Ohio

St.3d 373, 2009-Ohio-3323, 911 N.E.2d 882, ¶ 1; see State v. Cotton, 120 Ohio St.3d

321, 2008-Ohio-6249, 898 N.E.2d 959, ¶ 1. While a defendant who commits allied

offenses of similar import may be tried for both offenses, they may “only be sentenced

for one offense.” State v. Bohannon, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-070859 and C-070860,

2010-Ohio-4596, ¶ 5.

       {¶31} Here, Ms. Williams was charged with and convicted of felonious assault

under both R.C. 2903.11 (A)(1) and (A)(2), which respectively address the infliction of

serious physical harm and the use of a deadly weapon to cause or attempt to cause

physical harm. Both charges result from her encouraging Ms. Shinholster to shoot and

the resulting injury caused to Jason. The trial court sentenced her on both counts

concurrently. But because the offenses were allied offenses of similar import, the court

should have merged the counts at sentencing. Underscoring the point, the state

concedes this error. Therefore, we sustain Ms. Williams’s first assignment of error.

       {¶32} In her second assignment of error, Ms. Williams claims that her

conviction for felonious assault was against the manifest weight of the evidence and

was not supported by sufficient evidence because the state failed to establish the

required elements of the offense. Specifically, she contests the “aiding and abetting”

element of R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), arguing that she did not act in concert with Ms.

Shinholster (who indisputably fired the shots) to commit felonious assault.

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

       {¶33} When reviewing a sufficiency challenge, this court asks “ ‘ “whether,

after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a

reasonable doubt.” ’ ” State v. Robinson, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-230394 and C-

230395, 2024-Ohio-847, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Walker, 150 Ohio St.3d 409, 2016-

Ohio-8295, 82 N.E.3d 1124, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259, 574 N.E.2d

492 (1991), paragraph two of the syllabus. “ ‘ “[W]here reasonable minds can reach

different conclusions upon conflicting evidence, determination as to what occurred is

a question for the trier of fact.’ ” ” (Emphasis deleted.) Id., quoting State v. Shabazz,

146 Ohio St.3d 404, 2016-Ohio-1055, 57 N.E.3d 1119, ¶ 20, quoting Jenks at 279.

       {¶34} This court sits as the “thirteenth juror” when reviewing whether a

conviction runs counter to the manifest weight of the evidence. Thompkins, 78 Ohio

St.3d at 388, 678 N.E.2d 541. “[W]e review the evidence, the credibility of witnesses,

and the entire record.” State v. Bryant, 2022-Ohio-4108, 201 N.E.3d 482, ¶ 10 (1st

Dist.), citing Thompkins at 388. But we will not reverse the conviction unless “the trial

court ‘ “clearly lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the

conviction must be reversed and a new trial ordered.” ’ ” Id., quoting Thompkins at

387, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1st Dist.1983).

       {¶35} It is undisputed that Ms. Shinholster shot Jason, so Ms. Williams’s

guilt is premised on aiding or abetting. And to support a conviction for aiding or

abetting under R.C. 2923.03(A)(2), “ ‘the evidence must show that the defendant

supported, assisted, encouraged, cooperated with, advised, or incited the principal in

the commission of the crime, and that the defendant shared the criminal intent of the

principal. Such intent may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the crime.’

                                           15
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

” State v. Woodard, 1st Dist. Hamilton Nos. C-220364 and C-220365, 2023-Ohio-

1989, ¶ 15, quoting State v. Johnson, 93 Ohio St.3d 240, 754 N.E.2d 796 (2001),

syllabus. “ ‘ “[I]n order to aid or abet, whether by words, acts, encouragement,

support, or presence, there must be something more than a failure to object.” ’ ” State

v. Crosby, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 106504, 2018-Ohio-3793, ¶ 12, quoting State v.

Mendoza, 137 Ohio App.3d 336, 342, 738 N.E.2d 822 (3d Dist.2000), quoting State v.

Stepp, 117 Ohio App.3d 561, 568-569, 690 N.E.2d 1342 (4th Dist.1997).

       {¶36} Ms. Williams maintains that no evidence existed of a common plan or

scheme to fight or shoot anyone. But the state counters that Defendants acted in

concert to cause harm to Jason with a deadly weapon. Defendants planned to get a

refund from the store. They decided that Ms. Williams should enter the store because

the owners were less likely to recognize her. And Ms. Shinholster would wait in the

car on speaker phone, so she could hear everything that transpired inside (and come

to her aid if necessary). Ms. Williams set the plan into motion by entering the store.

And although Ms. Shinholster testified that she did not know Ms. Williams entered

the store with her firearm, she also stated it was their general practice to carry their

firearms, and both women were armed at the time of the affray.

       {¶37} Ms. Duffus had Ms. Williams pinned to the ground throughout most of

the physical encounter, so Ms. Williams was unable to access her firearm. However,

there is undisputed evidence that at least once during the encounter, Ms. Williams

instructed Ms. Shinholster to shoot.      Ms. Shinholster testified that she did not

remember Ms. Williams saying “shoot” or anything like that, but the prosecutor played

Jason’s 911 call and asked her if she could identify who yelled, “Shoot the bitch.” Ms.

Shinholster identified Ms. Williams as the speaker. And Ms. Duffus testified that Ms.

                                          16
                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

Williams instructed Ms. Shinholster to “shoot them.” While on the phone with 911

following the event, Ms. Duffus also stated: “The other one was saying shoot them,

shoot them.”

         {¶38} In In re T.K., 109 Ohio St.3d 512, 2006-Ohio-3056, 849 N.E.2d 286, ¶

1, the defendant and members of his gang arrived at a party in search of an individual

who was involved in a previous altercation with a member of their gang. Witnesses

testified that the defendant yelled “Shoot” and “Shoot the [expletive].” Id. Shots were

fired, and three individuals were injured. Id. Although the identity and the specific

target of the shooter were uncertain, the Ohio Supreme Court upheld the juvenile

court’s finding of delinquency under the principle of complicity by aiding and abetting

because “the juvenile court evaluated the evidence, determined that the [defendant]

had actively encouraged a member of his gang to shoot at someone at the [victim’s]

home with the specific intent to cause harm, and found that the state had sufficiently

shown transferred intent.” Id. at ¶ 17.

         {¶39} Like the defendant in In re T.K., Ms. Williams encouraged someone

she knew to be armed to shoot. Accordingly, based on these facts, Ms. Williams’s

conviction for felonious assault was supported by sufficient evidence and was not

against the manifest weight of the evidence. We overrule her second assignment of

error.

                                    *     *       *

         {¶40} In the appeal numbered C-230457, we overrule Ms. Shinholster’s

assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

         {¶41} And in the appeal numbered C-230436, we sustain Ms. Williams’s first

assignment of error and overrule her second and third assignments of error. We

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                    OHIO FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS

vacate her sentences and remand the case for resentencing at which the state must

elect which of the allied offenses it will pursue against her. In all other respects, we

affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                   Judgment affirmed in C-230457;
    Judgment affirmed in part, sentences vacated, and cause remanded in C-230436.

BOCK, P.J., and WINKLER, J., concur.

Please note:

       The court has recorded its entry on the date of the release of this opinion.

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