Court Opinion

ID: 9626880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:26:33.889257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:35.705536
License: Public Domain

BROWN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Under the circumstances of this case I do not strongly disagree that appellant should be discharged from probation. The attempted revocation of probation left a great deal to be desired. My disagreement with the majority is the consequences that may flow from the rule of this case.
Appellant was incarcerated in a Texas prison for more than a year while he was on probation from Wyoming. The purposes of probation are defeated if a probationer is deemed to be serving a term of probation while in prison. A convict in prison should not be considered to have been living a law-abiding life during the period of his imprisonment. Hill v. State, 37 Tex.Crim. 415, 35 S.W.Rep. 660 (1896).
It seems that the better rule of law would be that a prison sentence interrupts probation and tolls the probationary period. United States v. Gelb, 175 F.Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y.1959), aff’d 269 F.2d 675 (2d Cir.1959), cert. denied 361 U.S. 822, 80 S.Ct. 66, 4 L.Ed.2d 66 (1959). See also, Nicholas v. United States, 527 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir.1976). This standard has been adopted by several states. See People v. Peretsky, 44 Colo. App. 270, 616 P.2d 170 (1980); and Gillespie v. State, 17 Wash.App. 363, 563 P.2d 1272 (1977).
In the case here, if appellant’s probationary period was tolled by the length of time he spent in the Texas jail, the petition for revocation would be in time.
Furthermore, I think our rule should be that revocation proceedings can commence after the stated probationary period ends, provided the violation of probation occurred during the probationary period, and provided further that revocation proceedings be commenced within a reasonable time. There is considerable support for the rule I have suggested. State v. Miller, 289 Md. 443, 424 A.2d 1109 (1981); and Commonwealth v. Sawicki, 369 Mass. 377, 339 N.E.2d 740 (1975).
Under the majority rule in this case, a probationer could neglect to make restitution or pay a fine until the end of his stated probationary period. He would then be absolved from his obligation if the probation department did not have time to file a petition for revocation before the stated time expired. The rule in this case grants a probationer a license to run amok during the waning days of his probation.
I would affirm the district court and hold that appellant’s probationary period was tolled for the period of time he was in the Texas lockup.
THOMAS, Justice,
dissenting.
What have we here? The statement of facts in the majority opinion does not disclose the entire story. Lackey is not a poor soul who has somehow been victimized by the system. Instead we have a miscreant, a convicted burglar, who was given the benefit of grace, in the form of probation by the trial court, and was permitted to return to the state of Texas. Instead of taking advantage of that opportunity to reform and become a constructive citizen, Lackey, while in Texas, and within a relatively short period of time, committed another burglary. He then was incarcerated by Texas authorities. We now find that the majority of this court is willing to consider the time that he served in the Texas penitentiary as satisfactory time to be counted toward his probationary term imposed because of the Wyoming conviction. This court should not do that, and I strongly disagree with the result.
In addition to the authorities which Chief Justice Brown has cited in his dissenting opinion, other cases make clear that the general federal rule is that imprisonment in a state institution outside the jurisdiction of a federal court tolls any probation period which may have been imposed by a federal court when the state sentence is for a crime which constitutes a violation of the federal probation agreement. United States v. Martin, 786 F.2d 974 (10th Cir. *5701986); Allen v. United States, 209 F.2d 353 (6th Cir.1953), cert. denied 347 U.S. 970, 74 S.Ct. 782, 98 L.Ed. 1111 (1954); United States, ex rel. Demarois v. Farrell, 87 F.2d 957 (8th Cir.1937), reh. denied 302 U.S. 775, 58 S.Ct. 135, 82 L.Ed. 600 (1937; United States v. Pisano, 266 F.Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa.1967); United States v. Gerson, 192 F.Supp. 864 (E.D.Tenn.1961), aff'd 302 F.2d 430 (6th Cir.1962); McGuire v. Warden, United States Penitentiary, 122 F.Supp. 699 (W.D.Pa.1954). A period of probation is also subject to tolling if the convicted person, because of his own wrongdoing, is beyond the supervision and jurisdiction of probation authorities. United States v. Workman, 617 F.2d 48 (4th Cir.1980); United States v. Gerson, supra. As Chief Justice Brown’s dissenting opinion demonstrates, this standard has been adopted in state courts either by statute or decision. O’Shea v. State, Alaska, 683 P.2d 286 (1984); Wellons v. State, 164 Ga.App. 100, 296 S.E.2d 397 (1982); State v. Frazier, 20 Wash.App. 332, 579 P.2d 1357 (1978).
Whether we accept the testimony of Lackey that he was incarcerated in Texas for one year and eight months, or whether we count the one year and three months between August 3, 1984, when he was convicted in Texas of burglary and his Texas parole on November 5, 1985, the period of time is ample, if it is discerned as properly tolling the period of probation in Wyoming and is not credited toward the three-year period of Wyoming probation, to sustain a conclusion that Lackey’s probation was properly revoked. The last petition for revocation of probation was filed prior to April 25, 1986, the date on which the district court issued its order revoking Lackey’s probation and sentencing him to the Wyoming State Penitentiary. Under the tolling rule Lackey’s probation would not have ended prior to February 5, 1987, and the petition for revocation surely was timely. Under the circumstances there would be no need to consider the question of whether a petition for revocation and probation must be filed within the probationary term. This petition was filed within the probationary term.
In the district court Lackey also urged that the district court had violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial. That contention is not made in this court, probably in light of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 105 S.Ct. 3401, 87 L.Ed.2d 516 (1985); and Moody v. Daggett, 429 U.S. 78, 97 S.Ct. 274, 50 L.Ed.2d 236 (1976). Those decisions demonstrate that not only was it the right of the authorities in Wyoming to delay their determination concerning revocation of Lackey’s probation while he was incarcerated in Texas, but according to the Supreme Court that well may have been the proper choice.
Not even the crowded conditions at the Wyoming State Penitentiary justify excusing Lackey from his violation of the Wyoming probation. By his conduct in committing a subsequent burglary in Texas, he simply was thumbing his nose at the Wyoming court and spurning the probationary grace he had received. The action of the district court in revoking Lackey’s probation and sentencing him to the penitentiary not only was lawful, but it was appropriate. I dissent from the majority opinion which apparently agrees with Lackey’s position. The district court is entitled to be affirmed.