Court Opinion

ID: 9737977
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:38:58.609699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:02.958560
License: Public Domain

Spencer, J.,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion herein for the reason that the motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should have been sustained. At most, the plaintiff was a mere licensee, subject to the rights and obligations of a licensee so far as Hawkins *227Construction Company was concerned. A licensee, who comes upon premises by virtue of the possessor’s consent, either by invitation or permission, express or implied, takes the premises as he finds them and the duty of the possessor is not to willfully or wantonly injure the licensee, and in this connection the possessor has a duty to give warnings only of traps or concealed dangers. See Van Dollen v. Stulgies (1964), 177 Neb. 5, 128 N. W. 2d 115.
There was no opportunity for Hawkins’ employees to dó more than they did in the circumstances herein. They placed a warning sign on the doors and the doors were closed. If the door was open when the plaintiff entered about 9:45 a.m., it was opened by persons unknown to the defendant Hawkins. I cannot believe that Hawkins •was required to post a guard on the door to see that it was not opened to keep out curious trespassers.
The slippery floor was in plain sight. In fact, the plaintiff admitted that he saw the wet floor before he entered the' auditorium.' Under the circumstances I cannot understand why this would not be sufficient to alert plaintiff to the possibility he should not step on the floor. The fact that it was more slippery than he anticipated does not convert it into a trap or concealed danger known to the defendant and unknown to and unobservable by the plaintiff in the exercise of ordinary care. Yet, this is the holding in the majority opinion. In my judgment, the plaintiff failed to establish liability on the part of Hawkins Construction Company.
Boslaugh, J., joins in this dissent.