Court Opinion

ID: 9840524
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-18 23:03:15.037473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:34:07.418583
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/18/23
                              CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                               THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                         (Sacramento)
                                               ----

 GEORGE BRINSMEAD et al.,                                             C096394

                  Plaintiffs and Appellants,                     (Super. Ct. No.
                                                           34202100292775CUPOGDS)
          v.

 ELK GROVE UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT et al.,

                  Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Richard
Sueyoshi, Judge. Reversed with directions.

       Niddrie Addams Fuller Singh LLP, John S. Addams, and David A. Niddrie; Frantz
Law Group, APLC, James P. Frantz, Stephanie M. Caloca, and Jade S. Koller for
Plaintiffs and Appellants.

      Horvitz & Levy LLP, Scott P. Dixler, and Cameron Fraser; Matheny Sears Linkert
& Jaime, LLP, Richard S. Linkert, and Madison M. Simmons for Defendants and
Respondents.

        This case arises from a car crash causing the death of a 16-year-old girl G. when
she was trying to get to high school. In January 2020, after waiting 40 minutes for a

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school bus that never came, G. got picked up from the bus stop by a friend whom she had
texted. During their ride to school, the friend’s car was hit head on by another driver,
causing G. to suffer fatal injuries. G.’s parents sued the school district, a board member
of the school district, and school district employees (collectively, the district) for
wrongful death. The parents alleged the district was liable because it breached its duty to
timely retrieve G. from the designated school bus stop, to provide notice of and
instructions regarding delayed buses, and to provide a reasonably safe and reliable bus
system. The district demurred asserting immunity under Education Code section 44808.
(All further undesignated section references are to the Education Code.) The trial court
sustained the demurrer to the parents’ first amended complaint without leave to amend
and entered a judgment of dismissal. We conclude the parents pleaded sufficient facts to
fall outside section 44808 immunity for purposes of demurrer and reverse.
                   FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       According to the operative complaint, the parents enrolled G. in the district’s
school bus program for the 2019-2020 school year. As of January 2020, G. rode a district
bus from a district-designated bus stop to her high school. The bus was scheduled to
arrive at the stop at approximately 6:40 a.m. On January 22, 2020, G. was present at the
bus stop at its scheduled arrival time, but the bus did not come. G. and the parents did
not receive notice of a delay, nor did they receive instruction that G. should wait for a bus
to arrive. At approximately 7:20 a.m., with no bus in sight, G. got a ride to school in a
friend’s car. During the ride, the friend’s car was hit head on by another driver. G.
sustained fatal injuries on impact.
       The parents sued the district and other parties. The first amended complaint
sought monetary damages for wrongful death and asserted a survivors’ action against all
defendants. The district demurred, arguing it owed no duty to G. under section 44808
because the district had not yet begun to undertake her transportation to school. The trial
court agreed and sustained the demurrer with leave to amend. The parents amended the

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complaint, and the district demurred once more. The district again argued section 44808
rendered it immune because the parents still did not allege that the district began
undertaking G.’s transport to school. The trial court (Judge Cadei) heard argument and
sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on the grounds that section 44808
immunity applied. The court (Judge Sueyoshi) entered a judgment of dismissal. The
parents timely appealed.
                                      DISCUSSION
                                              I
                              Standard and Scope of Review
       A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of factual allegations in a complaint. (Title
Ins. Co. v. Comerica Bank—California (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 800, 807.) We review de
novo the dismissal of a civil action after a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend.
(Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 879 (Cantu).) In doing so,
we exercise our independent judgment to “determine whether the complaint states facts
sufficient to constitute a cause of action.” (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311,
318.) “ ‘We treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded,’ ” and
we liberally construe the complaint’s allegations with a view to substantial justice
between the parties. (Ibid.; Code Civ. Proc., § 452.) The plaintiffs bear the burden of
proving the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrer. (Williams v. Sacramento River
Cats Baseball Club, LLC (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th.280, 286.)
       We affirm if any proper ground for sustaining the demurrer exists even if the trial
court did so on an improper ground. (Cantu, supra, 4 Cal.App.4th at p. 880, fn. 10.) But
a defendant “who has advanced multiple theories in support of a demurrer . . . may be
deemed to have abandoned those theories by failing to reassert them on appeal.”
(Tukes v. Richard (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1, 20 (Tukes).)
       Here, the district demurred to the parents’ amended complaint on multiple
grounds, including immunity under section 44808. The trial court sustained the demurrer

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based on that immunity and did not address the district’s other grounds. On appeal, the
parents argue the demurrer cannot be sustained on any ground the district argued in the
trial court. Because the district reasserts only immunity as a ground for demurrer in its
responding brief, we deem the district to have abandoned any alternative grounds for
demurrer. (Tukes, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 20-21.) Thus, our analysis is limited to
whether the trial court erred in finding immunity under section 44808.
                                               II
                                        Section 44808
       A school district “owes a duty of care to its students because a special relationship
exists between the students and the district.” (Guerrero v. South Bay Union School Dist.
(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 264, 268.) But that special relationship does not create liability
on its own. (Ibid.) “ ‘The liability of public entities is entirely statutory.’ ” (Bassett v.
Lakeside Inn, Inc. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 863, 869 (Bassett); Gov. Code, § 815.) A
school district’s liability is limited by section 44808. (Bassett, at p. 870.) Under
section 44808, a district is immune from liability “for the conduct or safety of any pupil
of the public schools at any time when [the] pupil is not on school property.” (§ 44808.)
       But an exception to that immunity applies and “a duty of care exists” where the
district “has undertaken to provide transportation for such pupil to and from the school
premises.” (§ 44808; Patterson v. Sacramento City Unified School Dist. (2007)
155 Cal.App.4th 821, 830 (Patterson).) In the event of such undertaking, the district is
liable for the safety of a pupil “while such pupil is or should be under the immediate and
direct supervision of an employee of such district.” (§ 44808.) Here, the dispute centers
on the meaning and application of these two phrases: (1) “has undertaken to provide
transportation” and (2) “is or should be under the immediate and direct supervision of an
employee of such district.” We separately analyze each of these phrases as applied to the
facts alleged in the parents’ amended complaint and then turn to the district’s other
contentions concerning section 44808.

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A.     Has Undertaken to Provide Transportation
       A school district is not immune, and a duty exists under section 44808 when the
district “has undertaken to provide transportation” to students. (§ 44808; Patterson,
supra, 155 Cal.App.4th at p. 830.) Here, the trial court agreed with the district that this
phrase did not cover the facts alleged because the district “had not yet begun to undertake
the transportation of [G.] to school on the day of the accident.” The trial court found no
authority to expand liability “for any busing actions . . . even before a student actually
boards a school bus in the morning.” The district argues that the court’s interpretation of
the undertaking language is consistent with its plain meaning. We disagree.
       According to its plain meaning, the phrase “undertakes to provide transportation”
connotes both the physical transportation from point A to point B and also the promise or
engagement to provide that transportation. (See Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1993)
p. 2491 [defining undertake to mean “to take in hand: enter upon; set about; attempt”; “to
take upon oneself solemnly or expressly; put oneself under obligation to perform”;
“guarantee, promise”; “to accept as a charge: engage to look after or attend to; accept the
responsibility for the care of”]; People v. Costella (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1, 6 [plain
meaning of statutory language controls and is determined from dictionary].) Thus, the
parents’ allegation that the district accepted the responsibility of providing G. stable and
reliable transportation to school when the district enrolled her in the district’s school bus
program falls within this plain meaning.
       The district admits this meaning but argues we should construe the phrase
narrowly in the context of student pick-up to cover only the point at which the bus
arrives. In support of that argument, the district relies on the use of the term “specific” in
section 44808. For example, section 44808 describes the activities excluded from
immunity as “specific undertaking[s].” (§ 44808.) The district contends this description
“supports reading ‘undertake to provide transportation’ to mean transporting specific
students, on a specific bus, on a specific day, and not the mere promise of providing bus

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transportation generally.” This argument is not compelling. When a district accepts a
student’s enrollment in a district’s school bus program to provide stable and reliable
transportation to school, that acceptance constitutes a “specific undertaking” by the
district.
        The district also argues the trial court’s ruling is consistent with published
authorities interpreting section 44808. But those authorities “do not address when the
duty to transport begins” nor do they address any temporal limits on the broader
undertaking to provide transportation. (Eric M. v. Cajon Valley Union School Dist.
(2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 285, 296 (Eric M.).) The published authorities interpreting
section 44808 do indicate that the duty to transport includes “gaining access to the
transportation vehicle.” (Ibid.) They also indicate that when a district chooses to provide
bus transportation to students, that choice constitutes “an affirmative undertaking . . . to
provide bus transportation, and [a] resulting duty of providing it with reasonable care.”
(Id. at p. 297) But the authorities do not establish a bright line rule that the undertaking
to provide transportation begins only when the bus arrives.
        In Eric M., a student boarded a bus after school but then left the bus after believing
he saw his father’s car parked nearby. (Eric M., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 290.) The
student was later hit by a car as he crossed the street. (Ibid.) The appellate court
reviewed a ruling on a motion for summary judgment and held that the trial court
incorrectly determined the school district did not owe the plaintiff a duty of reasonable
care at the relevant times. (Id. at pp. 288, 289.) According to the Eric M. court, once a
child routinely boards the school bus, the school becomes a “full participant in the
process of getting the child to and from school.” The district cites Eric M. for the
statement that this process “has a beginning, a middle and an end.” (Id. at p. 297.) The
district argues we should construe this statement to mean there is no transportation
process, and thus no undertaking to provide transportation, until the bus arrives. But the
district takes this statement out of context, extracting a rule that Eric M. did not adopt.

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(See People v. Letner and Tobin (2010) 50 Cal.4th 99, 194.) The Eric M. court made this
statement in response to the school district’s threshold argument that it had no duty
because the law did not compel it to provide bus transportation. (Eric M., supra, at
p. 297.) Eric M. did not hold that an undertaking to provide transportation under
section 44808 begins only when the school bus arrives.
       The district also relies on Raymond v. Paradise Unified School Dist. (1963)
218 Cal.App.2d 1, which was decided before section 44808 (and its predecessor) was
enacted. (Stats. 1976, ch. 1010; former § 13557.5.) The district argues this case reflects
the common law rule, codified in section 44808, that a district owes “a duty of care in the
actual movement of school buses” and “responsibility for the supervision of pupils in the
course of actual transportation.” (See Raymond, at p. 9, italics added.) But the district
again takes these statements out of context. In Raymond, we considered an appeal
following a jury verdict. (Id. at p. 5.) The jury found that the school district was
negligent in failing to provide supervision of a bus loading zone at a high school used by
six buses that would arrive and depart in close proximity. (Ibid.) We stated that
considerations engendering “a duty of care in the actual movement of schools buses, or
[creating] responsibility for the supervision of pupils in the course of actual
transportation, do not necessarily govern conduct of the bus stop areas.” (Id at p. 9.)
Given the practical problems involved, we declined to provide a general formulation of
duty with respect to transportation of students to and from school, opting instead to “deal
only with the accident scene before us, not with school bus stops in general.” (Id. at
p. 10.) In light of the facts the jury considered, we held that the school district “had a
duty to provide adequate supervisory measures to protect children using the bus loading
zone on the grounds of the high school.” (Id. at p. 11.) Thus, Raymond’s limited holding
does not assist the district here.
       In the trial court, the district suggested Bassett, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th 863
supported its interpretation of “undertaken to provide transportation.” There, the

                                              7
plaintiffs sued their daughter’s school district after she was killed by a drunk driver while
crossing the street to a designated school bus stop. (Id. at p. 866.) The plaintiffs argued
the school district “undertook to provide transportation to the school and ‘failed to
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances’ ” by designating a dangerous location
for the bus stop. (Id. at p. 871.) Contrary to the district’s interpretation of Bassett, we
did not reject the argument that the phrase “undertaken to provide transportation” may
have a broader meaning than the physical transportation of the student. But we held that
immunity under section 44808 is withdrawn “only when the student is or should be under
the school’s direct supervision.” (Id. at p. 872.) Because the student was not injured
“while she was or should have been under the direct supervision of the school,
section 44808 [immunity] applie[d].” (Ibid.) The decision in Bassett therefore hinged on
the second phrase at issue here, whether the student was or should have been under
district employee supervision at the time of the accident. Thus, Bassett does not provide
support for the district’s interpretation of the phrase “has undertaken to provide
transportation.”
       More useful guidance regarding the meaning of this phrase is found in Hanson v.
Reedley etc. School Dist. (1941) 43 Cal.App.2d 643. There, a teacher arranged for
another student to regularly take two students home following tennis practice, providing
the driving student with gas and reimbursement in accordance with district policy. (Id. at
p. 646.) According to the court, the teacher “undertook” to provide transportation to the
students and was required to “use such ordinary care in connection therewith as would
have been exercised by a reasonably prudent person under the circumstances.” (Id. at
p. 649.) This case indicates that arranging the provision of transportation of students
constitutes an undertaking to provide transportation. While this case predated the
enactment of section 44808 and its predecessor (former § 13557.5), section 44808 “is
simply a recognition by the Legislature of the law existing prior to its enactment that
once a school district undertakes to provide transportation for its pupils it has a duty to

                                              8
exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” (Farley v. El Tejon Unified School
Dist. (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 371, 376 (Farley).) We can also glean that in borrowing the
language “undertaken to provide transportation” from Hanson, the Legislature intended
that a similar meaning would apply under section 44808. (See Hoyem v. Manhattan
Beach City Sch. Dist. (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508, 518 (Hoyem) [in borrowing language from a
case predating section 44808, the court reasoned that the Legislature intended to limit a
district’s liability under similar circumstances].)
       In sum, the plain language of section 44808 establishes that a school district
undertakes to provide transportation both when the school bus arrives and transports
students and also when the district accepts the responsibility of providing that
transportation. The parents’ allegations are sufficient to allege an undertaking under
section 44808 for purposes of demurrer.
B.     Is or Should Be Under the Immediate and Direct Supervision of a District
Employee
       Section 44808 provides an additional limitation to the undertaking exception from
immunity. A district is liable during the undertaking “only while [the student] is or
should be under the immediate and direct supervision of an employee” of the district.
(§ 44808.) The parents alleged that when the accident occurred, G. should have been on
the bus that was at least 40 minutes late; thus, according to the parents, G. “should have
been under the care, custody and supervision of [the district] and/or its bus driver” at the
time the accident occurred.
       In analyzing the sufficiency of this allegation, the trial court considered two cases,
Farley, supra, 225 Cal.App.3d 371 and Eric M, supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 285. In Farley, a
student got off a school bus at the designated stop and was hit by a car while crossing the
street. (225 Cal.App.3d at p. 374.) The school bus had driven away and was out of sight
at the time of the accident. (Ibid.) On appeal following a motion for summary judgment,
the appellate court held it was a triable issue of fact whether the school district was liable

                                               9
for failing to supervise the student. (Id. at p. 380.) In Eric M., a student boarded a bus
after school but then got off the bus after believing he saw his father’s car parked nearby.
(174 Cal.App.4th at p. 290.) When the student realized he was mistaken, he started
walking back to school and was hit by a car as he crossed a busy street. (Ibid.) The
appellate court reversed summary judgment for the district, concluding there was a
“triable issue of fact whether the duty of immediate and direct supervision of pupils was
invoked and breached [in the] circumstances.” (Id. at p. 299.)
       The trial court found these cases factually distinguishable from the parents’
alleged facts because the physical transportation process of the students in Farley and
Eric M. had been recently completed. Thus, the trial court construed the phrase “ ‘should
have been’ under . . . supervision” as applying only if the parents had alleged that G. was
recently under supervision. Such a construction of the statutory language is overly
narrow. We construe the phrase “ ‘should have been’ under . . . supervision” to cover the
time during which the school bus should have arrived and provided transportation to a
student.
       The trial court’s analysis of these cases also misapplied the standards for
demurrer. “A general demurrer will lie where the complaint ‘has included allegations
that clearly disclose some defense or bar to recovery.’ ” (Casterson v. Superior Court
(2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 177, 183.) The demurrer must admit the truth of all material
facts properly pleaded no matter how unlikely or improbable. (Hacker v. Homeward
Residential, Inc. (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 270, 280.) The question of plaintiffs’ ability to
prove their allegations, or possible difficulties in making such proof, is of no concern.
(Alcorn v. Anbro Engineering, Inc. (1970) 2 Cal.3d 493, 496.) Both Farley, supra,
225 Cal.App.3d 371 and Eric M., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th 285 indicate that whether a
particular student was or should have been under a district employee’s direct supervision
is a question of fact.

                                             10
       On demurrer, this phrase hinges on whether the plaintiffs allege a viable claim that
a school district owed a duty to provide direct supervision during the alleged undertaking.
Here, the parents alleged that the district undertook to provide G.’s transportation to
school when they accepted her enrollment in the school bus program. Under that
program, the bus had a duty to arrive at the designated stop around 6:40 a.m. and take G.
to school. The parents alleged the bus did not arrive for at least 40 minutes after its
scheduled arrival time. Accepting these allegations as true and liberally construing them
as we must on demurrer, we conclude the parents adequately alleged G. should have been
under district supervision by the time she decided to find other transportation and at the
time she was fatally injured.
C.     The District’s Other Contentions
       The district raises five other contentions in support of the trial court’s ruling.
None have merit.
       First, the district contends that allowing the parents’ amended complaint to fall
outside section 44808 immunity fails to give meaning to all the words in section 44808.
According to the district, three requirements must be met before a district can be held
liable for the safety of students while off campus: (1) the district must engage in a
specified undertaking; (2) the district must fail to exercise reasonable care during the
undertaking; and (3) the plaintiff must show that the student was or should have been
under the immediate and direct supervision of a district employee. The district contends
that “under [the parents’] rule, a single act – a bus being late – automatically satisfies all
three statutory requirements.” We are not persuaded. The district’s argument truncates
the parents’ allegations into one overly simplified allegation.
       Second, the district contends that the parents’ interpretation of section 44808
“clashes with the . . . purpose of section 44808.” Specifically, the district contends
section 44808 was intended to limit the circumstances under which a school district is
responsible for supervising students. We agree this was the general intent of

                                              11
section 44808. (See Srouy v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 548,
568.) But this does not reflect the qualification to that limitation provided by the clause
“unless such district . . . has undertaken to provide transportation.” While we narrowly
construe an exception to a general provision, such narrow construction covers
circumstances that are within the words and reason of the exception. (Azusa Land
Partners v. Department of Industrial Relations (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 1, 31.) As noted
above in part IIA, the undertaking to provide transportation exception of section 44808
recognizes that “once a school district undertakes to provide transportation for its pupils,
it has a duty to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.” (Farley, supra,
225 Cal.App.3d at p. 376.) The parents’ allegations fall within even a narrow
construction of this exception.
       Third, the district contends that allowing the parents’ interpretation “would make
school districts liable for off-campus student injuries even when the districts have no
ability to control student conduct.” Not so. The district confuses the lack of immunity
with liability. That a school district is subject to a lawsuit does not mean it will be held
liable. To establish liability for negligence, a plaintiff must prove duty, breach of duty,
causation, and injury. (LeRoy v. Yarboi (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 737, 742.) Whether G.
should have been under a district employee’s supervision at the time of the accident,
whether the district acted reasonably in performing the undertaking alleged, and whether
the district’s breach of duty, if any, was the proximate cause of injury are not before us
on appeal following demurrer. (See, e.g., Hoyem, supra, 22 Cal.3d 508, 519 [a district is
legally responsible for those injuries that are only a proximate result from the district’s
failure to exercise that degree of care that a person of ordinary prudence, charged with
comparable duties, would exercise under the same circumstances]; Angelis v. Foster
(1938) 24 Cal.App.2d 541, 543 [a school’s failure to provide transportation was not the
proximate cause of plaintiff’s injury].) Thus, the district overstates the meaning and
effect of our holding.

                                              12
       Fourth, the district contends that a school district cannot fail to exercise reasonable
care during a bus ride that never occurs. But the undertaking the parents allege is not the
bus ride alone but rather the promise to provide that ride. For purposes of demurrer, the
parents sufficiently alleged that the district owed a duty to provide transportation to G.
and failed to exercise reasonable care in performing that duty by not timely picking her
up and not notifying her or them of school bus delays or how to react during those delays.
Whether the parents can prove that the district failed to exercise reasonable care under the
circumstances is not properly before us on demurrer.
       And fifth, the district contends that after applying the common law duty factors in
Rowland v. Christian (1968) 69 Cal.2d 108 (Rowland), 1 we may affirm “on the
alternative ground that the district is not liable because neither the district nor any of its
officers or employees had a duty to protect [G.] from the harm she suffered.” This
contention fails given our conclusion that the parents sufficiently alleged a duty under
section 44808. And the Rowland factors do not provide a “freestanding means of
establishing duty.” (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 217.)

1       “[T]he foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of certainty that the
plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct
and the injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, the policy of
preventing future harm, the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach, and
the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.” (Rowland,
supra, 69 Cal.2d at p. 113.)

                                               13
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court
with instructions to vacate its order sustaining the district’s demurrer to the first amended
complaint and to enter a new order overruling the demurrer. The parents shall recover
their costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)

                                                   /s/
                                                  MESIWALA, J.

We concur:

 /s/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.

 /s/
DUARTE, J.

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