Court Opinion

ID: 9671126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:31:37.057172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:44.640388
License: Public Domain

Justice Greenhill,
joined, by Justices Griffin and Calvert, dissenting.
The majority correctly announces that this is a case of first impression in Texas. Under the particular facts of this case, and because of the announced policies of the several states, including Texas, in the recent enactment of Uniform Support Acts *205and the Probate Code of Texas, I believe this to be a case of first impression in the United States.
The majority opinion states that its decision is based on decisions which it cites from other jurisdictions. I do not believe that those opinions are controlling. They will be discussed herein.
It seems to me that the better rule is stated in 11 American Jurisprudence 810, Conflict of Laws Section 11:
“The fundamental question determinative of the enforcement of statutory rights arising in another state is whether there is a substantive right originating in one state and a corresponding liability which follows the person against whom it is sought to be enforced into another state. Such a right, arising under a local statute, will be enforced ex comitate in another state unless there is a good reason for refusing to enforce it. It will be enforced, not because of the existence of the statute, but because it is a right which the plaintiff has legitimately acquired and which still belongs to him.”
The majority opinion relies on what it says is the “universally recognized rule that no statutes of a state ex propria vigore [by their own force and vigor] have extraterritorial effect.” The cases generally cited for that proposition are founded on the premise that one nation or state will not enforce a statute of another nation or state which is penal in nature, or which, from a civil standpoint, is contrary to the public policy of the enforcing state or nation. The California statute, as involved here, is not penal, and the majority concedes that the statute is not against our public policy. The ex proprio vigore cases, therefore, are not controlling here.
This doctrine under which nations or state will not enforce “foreign” statutes is set out in 11 American Jurisprudence 310:
“There are several situations in which it is well established that the forum will not enforce a foreign statutory right. Thus, a right given by statute will not be enforced by the courts of another jurisdiction if the statute is against the policy of the law of the forum, if the enforcement of the right would work injustice to the citizens of the state where the action is brought, if the right, by the terms of the statute creating it, is to be enforced by prescribed proceedings within the state of its enact*206ment, or if it is of such a kind that, with a due regard for the interests of the parties, a proper remedy can be given only in the jurisdiction where it is created.”
The negative of the rule is that we will not enforce the California statute if it is against our public policy, if it would work an injustice, if it is penal in nature, if the right can be enforced only by proceedings of the enacting state, or if the proper remedy can only be given in the enacting state. The positive rule, above set out, is that the right “will be enforced ex comitate [out of comity] unless there is a good reason for not enforcing it.”
As will be set out hereinafter, there is no evidence in this record that the enforcement of the statute will not work an injustice. The remedy and procedure are available here, and the statute is not against our public policy. In short, I see no good reason for not enforcing California’s rights and those of the dependent mother.
The respondent here, Copus, and his mother had been residents of California for many years. While both were there, she became mentally ill. She was placed in a California hospital and is still there. The need for care which began when both were residents of California continues. Under the California law, Copus is required to contribute to his mother’s support. His moral duty1 became, under California law. his legal duty. The legal obligation attached to Copus while he was a California resident. Nothing has happened to relieve him of that obligation except that he crossed state lines and took up residence here.
The majority opinion recognizes Copus’ duty and the validity of California’s claim and enforces it in Texas with a Texas decree for that period of time when he was in California and until he came to Texas. As I view it, the bare legal point here is: does the fact that Copus moved to Texas, standing alone, relieve him of his legal obligation to contribute thereafter to his mentally-ill mother’s support? I think not. Texas should not *207become a haven for deserting providers who would ignore or repudiate their duty to support.
Viewed the other way, if Copus and his mother had been Texas citizens and he were obligated in Texas to contribute to her support, should he be able to shirk that responsibility by just moving out of the State?
There is no evidence before us that Copus is unable to support his mother, that other relatives should bear or share in the burden, or that she has forfeited any right to support from her son. There is no evidence that the original $40 per month or the subsequent $90 per month of support is excessive, discriminatory, or inequitable. We do not have before us a situation in which liability to support arises after the obligor has left the state or a situation in which the obligor has never been in the state in which the person to be supported resides. The only defense offered is that Copus left California and came to Texas.
The majority opinion correctly states that it is not against the public policy of Texas to enforce such an obligation. Our policy in that regard has been fixed in comparatively recent times by the enactment of our Uniform Support Act2 and the Texas Probate Code.3
Section 423 of the Probate Code provides:
“Where an incompetent has no estate of his own, he shall be maintained (a) by the husband or wife . .-. if able to do so; or if not ((b) by the father or mother ... if able; or if not, (c) by the children and grand children of such person respectively if able to do so; or if not (d) by the county . . . .”
The Legislature has thus determined that it is the policy of Texas that under the circumstances above set out, an incompetent person (such as the mother here) shall be supported by her children, if able. The mother here was incompetent.
Section 8 of our Uniform Support Act provides that a State [California] shall have the same right to enforce support as the person to be supported [the mother] has; under Section 7, *208“the duties of support enforceable under this law are those imposed under the laws of any state [California] * * * where the obligee [the mother] was present when the failure to support commenced * * * * ” The mother was certainly present in California when this obligation arose.
Section 9 says that, “All duties of support are enforceable * * * irrespective of relationship between the obligor [Copus] and the obligee [his mother]. An exception not applicable here is made in Section 7 regarding alimony to a former wife.
It is true that California did not attempt to comply with the Uniform Support Act. This case would have been much easier if it had. Under that Act, a California Court would have certified to a Texas Court the identity of the parties, the duty to support, and law requiring the support requested. However, all that is required to have been done or which could have been done by the certifying court in California under the- Support Act has been directly accomplished and proved in the Texas district court. The facts and the California law are stipulated. So here, in my opinion, we have the substance of the Uniform Support Act but not the form.
Section 3 of the Act states that “The remedies herein provided are in addition to and not in substitution for any other remedies.” It is not intended to be the exclusive remedy. Ex Parte Helms, 152 Texas 480, 259 S.W. 2d 184 (1953). To say the least, it does not evidence an intention that the policy of the State of Texas is to deny enforcement of a duty fixed on Copus when he left California and came to Texas and which, but for his removal to Texas, still exists.
The majority opinion holds that to require Copus to contribute to the support of his mother would be to deny him the equal protection of the laws. I disagree. Both Texas and California have statutes authorizing the Court to require support of parents. Moreover, if the Uniform Support Act had been invoked and followed here, and a recovery allowed under it, that Constitutional point would be the same.
I do not believe that the equal protection clause was intended to relieve a person of his duties by crossing state lines. The reasonableness of the classification under California law did not become unreasonable or unconstitutional because Copus moved to Texas. The requirements of the equal protection clause are met if the laws of each state apply with equal force to persons *209similarly situated. A classification is repugnant to this provision when it is unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious. Such classifications are not unreasonable when based upon sound considerations of public policy. Carried to its logical extreme, the holding would render all reciprocal laws unconstitutional until they are enacted by all states.
There is one Ohio case, not cited in the majority opinion, which reaches the same result as the majority opinion here on the equal protection clause, but is distinguishable. In Pennsylvania v. Mong, 117 N.E. 2d 32 (1954), the defendant’s indigent father lived in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania brought suit in Ohio, under the Uniform Support Act, against an Ohio son. Ohio, however, had a statute which denied support from a child to a parent who had abandoned such child before the child became 16 years of age. The Ohio law in this regard was substantially different from the Pennsylvania law. The parent there had so abandoned the child. Recovery was denied in Ohio by a divided court on the ground of equal protection; i.e., that Ohio children who had been abandoned may not be required to contribute to the support of the parent in Ohio. So it would be discriminatory to make an Ohio son support his parent (who had abandoned him) in another state. The Ohio statutory exception is not unreasonable, and it fixed the policy of Ohio as being affirmatively opposed to the support of the parent under the circumstances. The case, therefore, to me, reaches the correct result on the wrong- ground.4
De Brimont v. Penniman, 7 Fed. Cases 309 (No. 3715), although not cited by the majority opinion, might also support the majority view; but it also is distinguishable. There an American girl in France married a Frenchman. Her parents went to France after the marriage. When they returned to New York, the French son-in-law sued the American parents on a French judgment for support under a French statute which authorized son-in-law and father-in-law support. The Federal Court correctly denied liability. The Court found that the French statute was “hostile to the policy of this country.” The Court recognized, however, that in many of our states, “The duty of parents and grandparents, and reciprocally, of children and grandchildren when of sufficient ability, to provide for the necessary support * * * is declared and enforced.”
*210The majority opinion cites and relies on Section 457 of the Restatement of Conflict of Laws. The Restatement was prepared in 1934 before the preparation and adoption of the Uniform Support Act. That Act was designed in part to combat an alleged “indifference of many states which would refuse or neglect to enforce support in favor of out-of-state dependents on the theory, often tacitly admitted, that one state has no interest in helping another state rid itself of the burdens of supporting destitute families.”5
Thus if this section of the Restatement ever expressed the policy of the State of Texas, it was superseded by our adoption of the Uniform Support Act in 1951.
The majority opinion cites Berkley v. Berkley, 246 S.W. 2d 804 (Mo. Sup. 1952). There a California wife brought suit in Missouri against her husband, a resident of Missouri, for reimbursement for funds expended by her for the support of their minor child who lived with the mother in California. She had worked to support the child, but the father refused to contribute to the child’s support. The father attempted to set up in Missouri a technhical defense, that, under California law, a father is not liable for reimbursement to the mother for the support of a minor child unless he expressly agrees to do so. The Missouri Court held that the father was a citizen of Missouri, and the law [public policy] of Misosuri required him to support his minor children whether they were in Missouri or not.
To the Berkley case could be added Commonwealth v. Acker, 197 Mass. 91, 83 N.E. 312 1908, (noted in “Simplifying the Conflict of Laws,” by Dean E. S. Stinson, 36 Am. Bar Assn. Journal 1003). There Acker, his wife and child lived in Nova Scotia. He abandoned them and got a job in Massachusetts. His wife went also to Massachusetts, although separated from her husband. The child was left in Nova Scotia. Acker was prosecuted in Massachusetts for failure to support the child in Nova Scotia. (No evidence was introduced as to the law of Nova Scotia.) In sustaining Acker’s conviction the Court held:
“The offender is here within our jurisdiction. While residing here, he ought to make provision for the support of his wife and *211minor child, whether they are here or elsewhere. If he fails to do so, his neglect of duty occurs here without reference to the place where proper performance of his duty will confer benefits.”
Both cases are properly decided. Where the policy of the forum is to require support, or where its policy is at least not to the contrary and the duty arises out of a valid statute of a sister state, the duty to support should be at least recognized. Here, without regard to equitable considerations, we simply refuse to recognize the mother’s and California’s rights and Copus’s duties under the California statute after he moved to Texas.
The Berkley case is annotated in 34 A.L.R. 2d 1460 (1954). The annotator states the rule to be:
“A state may be limited in the conflict of laws rules by provisions of the Federal Constitution, and in particular by the full faith and credit clause, the equal privileges and immunities clause, and the due process clause * * * *

“None of these clauses prevents a state from choosing the law of the father’s or the child’s domicile as governing the existence and extent of the father’s duty to support the child.”

The remaining case cited by the majority is the Yarbrough case, 1933, 290 U.S. 202, 54 Sup. Ct. 181, 78 L. Ed. 269. There a husband and wife were divorced in Georgia. By agreement between the spouses, a lump sum was awarded and paid by the husband for the support of their minor child. When money had been exhausted, and the child was living in South Carolina with her grandfather, a suit was brought in South Carolina to require the father, a resident of Georgia, to make further provision for the child’s support. An award for the child’s support, based upon her need, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed the South Carolina judgment and held that the Georgia judgment precluded any further claim for support of the child.
Justices Stone and Cardozo, with whom I agree, dissented upon the ground that Georgia had full authority to adjudge the rights of the parties as of the time of the adjudication, but that South Carolina had jurisdiction to require further support on changed conditions. “The measure of the duty is the need of the child and the' ability of the parent to meet those needs at *212the very time when the performance of the duty is envoked. Hence, it is no answer * * * that at some earlier time provision was made for the child, which is no longer available * * *
The majority opinion in the Yarborough case is criticized by an eminent authority on Conflicts:
“The decision seems unsound, in that the Georgia judgment was based upon conditions at the time of the original decree. Need of additional support in South Carolina upon change of domicile to that state was not before the Georgia court and for that reason was not adjudicated in the proceedings in the latter state. Actually, the [Yarborough] case only decides, however, that a judgment for a lump sum relieving a father from any further duty precludes a further claim.” Strumberg, Conflicts of Laws (2nd Ed. 1951), p. 345.
The Yarborough case is also discussed in “Interstate Recognition of Support Duties” by Albert A. Ehrenzweig of the California Law faculty, 42 Calif. L. Rev. at 385 (1954). It is there said that the statement in the Yarborough case that “the character and extent of the father’s obligation, and the status of the minor, are determined ordinarily not by the place of the minor’s residence but by the law of the father’s domicile,” is “mere dictum, lacks support in precedent, and is open to serious objections on ground of policy.” In the words of Justice Stone, such a rule would enable a deserting provider “by the expedient of choosing a domicile other than the state where [his dependent] is rightfully domiciled, to avoid the duty which that state may impose * * * 290 U.S. at 225, 54 Sup. Ct. at page 190.
It should, of course, be the policy of the State to protect its citizens and its state’s rights. But states’ rights carry states’ responsibilities. This being a case of first impression, it would be better to set a precedent of co-operation and enforcement of the duty which is not contrary to our own public policy. The better policy would be to minimize the loopholes which allow evasion of support responsibilities and duties. Such a policy is preferable to one which allows a person under a duty to support in his own state to cross a state line and figuratively thumb his nose at his home state and those to whom he owes the duty to support.
This Copus case was the subject of a leading article on “Policy Problems in Conflicts Cases” by Professor Joseph Dainow in 35 Texas Law Review 759 (June 1957). Concerning the problem the author says:
*213“Of course, it is a matter of permanent policy for a state to protect its own people, and if this policy were carried to its logical ultimate, it would greatly simplify the complications and confusion in conflicts cases. In fact, it could almost eliminate the whole subject of conflict of laws by favoring the local boy in all contests with a foreigner * * * *
“By its nature, a rule of conflict of laws generally contemplates the possibility of the decision being made in accordance with a foreign law. In a sense, this may be viewed as the relinquishment of a measure of sovereignty; more properly, it is the exercise of an attribute of sovereignty. In the process, it is possible that the application of a foreign law in accordance with the local conflicts rule would produce a result that is too undesirable to be permitted. To prevent something so utterly repugnant — a result that would run too much against the grain of a local society and its mores — there has been reserved an exceptional corrective under the name of ‘public policy.’ When no other regular legal technique will do the job, public policy is called upon to prevent the violation of ‘some fundamental principle of justice, some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of common weal.’ ”
As conceded by the majority here, and as set forth in our Probate Code and our Uniform Support Law, the enforcement of the California statute is not contrary to our public policy. So far as I can ascertain, no provision of the constitution or laws of this State or the United States would prevent our honoring and enforcing the California statute. The authority first cited herein correctly states that such will be enforced unless there is good reason for refusing to enforce it. There being no good reason shown in this record, it should be enforced.
The Texas trial court found that “the liability of * * * Copus is a continuing one; and that the removal of the defendant [Copus] to Texas * * * does not discharge him from such continuing liability.”
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Opinion delivered January 15, 1958.
Rehearing overruled February 19, 1958.

. — The Fifth Commandment is “Honor thy father and thy mother . . . ,” Exodus 20.12. “Like others in this code of laws, it is directed to the adult citizen who is burdened with the care of an aged parent, and is a warning against the heathen habit of abandoning the aged when they can no longer support themselves.” “This commandment most especially refers to the treatment of helpless aged dependents.” Medical science has progressed so efficiently that modrn nations are comprised more and more of old people. 1 Interpreter’s Bible 985, Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1952.

. —Acts 1951, 52nd Leg., ch. 377, p. 643, as amended by Acts 1953, 53rd Leg., ch, 374, p. 907, being Article 2328b, Vernon’s Texas Civ. Stat.

. —Acts 1955, 54th Leg., p. 88, ch. 55.

. — The case is noted and criticized in 67 Harvard Law Review 1435; 102 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 938; and 40 Virginia Law Review 489.

. — Commissioners’ Prefactory Note in Handbook, National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 291, 292 (1952), cited in “Interstate Recognition of Support Duties” by Albert A. Ehrenzweig, 42 California Law Review 382, at 383 (1954).