Court Opinion

ID: 9516871
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 23:54:53.656998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:39:45.048023
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
As explained in part IF of my dissent today in Bryant v. State (1995), Ind., 660 N.E.2d 290 (Sullivan, J., dissenting), I believe the majority errs in holding that an administrative assessment of a tax can constitute a first punishment for double jeopardy purposes.6 As such, I believe that Keith Hall's criminal conviction is not contrary to the Double Jeopardy Clause. However, payment of the CSET assessed would constitute a second punishment of Keith Hall and would therefore be barred by Department of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, -- U.S. --, 114 S.Ct. 1937, 128 L.Ed.2d 767 (1994) (tax on the possession of illegal drugs assessed after the state has imposed a criminal penalty for the same conduct violated Double Jeopardy Clause).
I agree with the majority that no second jeopardy occurred in Mary Hall's case and that the CSET violates neither the Halls' privilege against self-incrimination nor their due process rights.

. If we were to proceed under the alternative approach I describe in part II of my Bryant dissent, I would remand to the Tax Court for determination of when jeopardy attached, i.e., when evidence was first presented to a trier of fact in the Halls' contest of the assessment. If that occurred prior to jeopardy attaching in Keith Hall's criminal prosecution, then the result would be the same as the majority reaches here.