Court Opinion

ID: 2642734
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-11-16 02:03:25.989339+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:37:11.284850
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
                                            DIVISION ONE

           WASHINGTON FEDERAL SAVINGS,
                                                              No. 68749-2-1
                                  Appellant,
                                                              ORDER GRANTING
                           v.                                 MOTIONS TO PUBLISH
                                                              OPINION
           MICHAEL P. KLEIN, Personal
           Representative of the Estate of
           ROBERT KLEIN, Deceased,

                                  Respondent.

                     Non-parties Dean V. Butler and Sandra L. Perkins, and Respondent Michael P.

           Klein have filed motions to publish the opinion filed August 12, 2013. Appellant

           Washington Federal Savings has filed responses to both motions to publish. The

           hearing panel has considered its prior determination and finds that the opinion will be of

           precedential value; Now, therefore, it is hereby

                     ORDERED that the written opinion shall be published and printed in the

           Washington Appellate Reports.

                     DONE this Vffe-- day of October, 2013.
                                                               FOR THE COURT:

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      •146 Wash. 2d 291, 300, 45 P.3d 1068 (2002). Summary judgment is

appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file

demonstrate the absence of any genuine issues of material fact and the moving

party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CR 56(c). A material fact is one

on which the outcome of the litigation depends. Zedrick v. Kosenski, 62 Wash. 2d

50, 54, 380 P.2d 870 (1963).

       The party opposing a motion for summary judgment may not rely on

speculation, argumentative assertions that unresolved factual issues remain, or

on having its affidavits considered at face value. Seven Gables Corp. v.

MGM/UAEntm'tCo.. 106Wn.2d 1, 13,721 P.2d 1 (1986). The party must set

forth specific facts rebutting the moving party's contentions and disclose that a

genuine issue as to a material fact exists. Seven Gables, 106 Wash. 2d at 13.

       Washington Federal rests its case on its claim that it never received the

documents mailed by the estate's legal team in January 2011. The evidence

Washington Federal submits are affidavits by two of its employees stating that

the documents were never received and detailing the careful procedures that

have been put in place to ensure that mail does not get lost.

       If Favretto's affidavit proves mailing of the notice—an issue we will

address below—these affidavits do not rebut it. A creditor's claimed nonreceipt
No. 68749-2-1/7

of a probate notice is not material to proving actual notice. Had proof of receipt

been of concern to the legislature, it could have so provided. Just such a

requirement exists in the mortgage foreclosure context, for example, where the

legislature requires creditors to transmit notices of foreclosure sale "by both first-

class and either certified or registered mail, return receipt requested." RCW

61.24.040(1 )(b) (emphasis added). Actual notice under RCW 11.40.020(c) is

accomplished by mailing, without regard to proof of receipt.

       And proof of receipt is not necessary to satisfy due process. Under most

circumstances, notice sent by ordinary mail satisfies due process because it is

deemed reasonably calculated to inform interested parties of an impending

action. Weianerv. New York. 852 F.2d 646, 650 (2d Cir. 1988). cert, denied. 488

U.S. 1005 (1989); Tulsa Prof I Collection Srvs. v. Pope. 485 U.S. 478, 490, 108

S. Ct. 1340, 99 L. Ed. 2d 565 (1988); Mennonite Bd. of Missions v. Adams. 462

U.S. 791, 800, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 77 L. Ed. 2d 180 (1983).

       The Mississippi and Kansas cases cited by Washington Federal do not

establish a rule that due process requires proof of receipt. One would have to lift

sentences out of context in order to give them that interpretation. In the Kansas

case, there was no issue as to whether an affidavit of mailing was adequate to

prove receipt; indeed, the record was "void of any evidence" that the creditor

"was ever notified" of the probate, by mailing or otherwise. In re Estate of

Reynolds. 266 Kan. 449. 970 P.2d 537, 545(1998). Nor was there a live dispute

as to mailing versus receipt in the Mississippi case. There, the court presumed
No. 68749-2-1/8

that a mailed notice was a received notice; it described the affidavit of mailing as

listing "creditors who received notice by mail." In re Estate of Petrick, 635 So. 2d

1389, 1390 (Miss. 1994) (emphasis added).

       Washington Federal's essential argument on appeal is that Favretto's

affidavit was inadequate to prove that the estate mailed notice. Washington

Federal argues Favretto's use of the wording "have given, or caused to have

given" creates ambiguity as to who actually placed the document into the mail,

and whether such a person ever did, in fact, mail the document.

       Klein contends that Washington Federal failed to preserve a challenge to

the adequacy of Favretto's affidavit. "On review of an order granting or denying a

motion for summary judgment the appellate court will consider only evidence and

issues called to the attention of the trial court." RAP 9.12. "The appellate court

may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court."

RAP 2.5(a). As a general matter, an argument neither pleaded nor argued to the

trial court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Sourakli v. Kvriakos, Inc..

144 Wash. App. 501, 509, 182 P.3d 985 (2008). review denied. 165 Wash. 2d 1017

(2009).

       Klein is correct that Washington Federal's position on appeal has evolved

from its position in the trial court. Washington Federal's summary judgment

opposition brief did not mention Favretto's name, and it made only an oblique

reference to her affidavit.
No. 68749-2-1/9

       [E]videntiary issues exist with respect to the P.R.'s ostensible proof
       of his attorney's assistant's actions. Indeed, Mr. Klein's Declaration
       is internally inconsistent, indicating that both his lawyer, and his
       lawyer's assistant "gave . .. direct notice," and/or "given, or caused
       to have given," such notice to WaFed.
             It is not up to the Court or WaFed to read between the lines
       and attempt to ascertain which of the multiple possibilities actually
       occurred - if any; rather it is the Estate's burden to prove the
       material facts. Even were the Estate to belatedly attempt
       establishing a foundation for its P.R.'s knowledge of WaFed's
       ostensible service, given the existing contradictions in his testimony
       that evidence should be accorded very little weight.

Clerk's Papers at 170 (some emphasis added) (alteration in original) (footnotes

omitted). Washington Federal's motion for reconsideration similarly failed to

confront Favretto's affidavit directly.

       For the sake of argument, we will assume the challenge to Favretto's

affidavit was not waived. The question, then, becomes whether her affidavit

established prima facie proof of "mailing the notice" to Washington Federal as

required by RCW 11.40.020(c). Favretto declared, "I have given, or caused to

have given, the creditors listed on said Exhibit A, actual notice by mailing to the

creditor's last known address, by regular first class mail, postage prepaid, a true

and correct copy of the notice to creditors filed herein."

       Zeroing in on the phrase, "or caused to have given," Washington Federal

argues it means that Favretto is unable to claim personal knowledge that the

document was mailed:

       Even accepting the affidavit at face value, the letter and notice may
       well have been given to someone else to mail or handle—but there
       is no declaration from any such person as to their actions or
       confirming mailing. That alone establishes the existence of a
No. 68749-2-1/10

       genuine issue of material fact as to whether "actual notice" was
       given.

Brief of Appellant at 27 (emphasis omitted). According to Washington Federal,

Favretto's affidavit raises a reasonable inference that no one accomplished the

mailing.

       We reject this argument. It is not uncommon for declarations of mailing to

use phrases signifying that the declarant has "caused" an important document to

be mailed. Use of this passive voice construction abounds in statutes that

describe a party's obligation to give notice. See, e.g., RCW 61.24.040(1 )(b) ("At

least ninety days before the sale, ... the trustee shall. .. cause a copy of the

notice of sale . . . to be transmitted') (emphasis added); RCW 23B.15.100(3)

("the secretary of state shall immediately cause a copy thereof to be forwarded

by certified mail") (emphasis added).

       What these usages recognize is that "mailing" a notice is not a single,

complete act. Mailing a notice refers to a series of linked actions, any one of

which, hypothetically, is fallible. To prove mailing in accordance with RCW

11.40.020(c), if it is not enough for a legal assistant to say that she "caused"

actual notice to be given by mailing, then what is enough? Must she say that she

personally took the document to the mail room? Or that she personally put it on

the mail truck or in an official postbox? No. The familiar standard of "reasonably

calculated to apprise" encompasses the remote possibility that any one of these

links may break down in a given case. The office messenger may drop the

envelope into the dustbin on the way to the mail room; the wind may blow it off

                                            10
No. 68749-2-1/11

the truck into the street; or a careless postal employee may direct it to the dead

letter office. The fact that mailed notice satisfies due process reflects a judgment

that such mistakes are very rare.

       So, when a legal assistant declares that she has "given, or caused to have

given" a creditor actual notice by mailing, it is reasonable to accept her statement

as prima facie proof of mailing. To refute such a declaration, a creditor must do

more than swear that the mail never arrived.

       We conclude Washington Federal has not raised a genuine issue of

material fact as to the mailing of the notice to creditors on January 28, 2011. The

trial court did not err in concluding that the creditor claim is time barred.

       The promissory note contains an attorney fee provision. The trial court

awarded the estate attorney fees and costs under this provision totaling $12,045.

The estate is similarly entitled to an award of attorney fees as the prevailing party

on appeal, subject to compliance with RAP 18.1.

       Affirmed.

WE CONCUR:

                                                           6a&x J.

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