Court Opinion

ID: 9671219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:33:04.555335+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:08.809650
License: Public Domain

Bronson, J.
(dissenting). Defendant, Irving King, was convicted by a jury of breaking and entering with intent to commit larceny. MCLA § 750.110 (Stat Ann 1971 Cum Supp § 28.305). He appeals as of right.
Defendant was arrested at 2 a.m. on September 17,1969 inside a supermarket in Coleman, Michigan. The police officer who made the arrest advised defendant at that time of his constitutional rights pursuant to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 US 436 (86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974). Defendant indicated he wished to remain silent. Forty-five minutes later he was put into a police car, advised of his rights again, and on the way to the police station told the arresting officer his name and a few of the details of the crime. Upon arrival at the police station, defendant was *283further interrogated by the arresting officer, whereupon defendant signed a waiver of his “Miranda rights” and confessed to the crime by supplying statements of his specific intent to commit larceny. Defendant was allowed to go to his cell at 6:30 a.m.
Before trial, defense counsel moved to suppress the confession, alleging that it was the product of police coercion. At the “Walker hearing”1 held to determine the issue of the voluntariness of the confession, only the defendant testified. Since it was upon the basis of defendant’s testimony that the trial judge denied the motion to suppress, I quote extensively from the record:
(Direct) :
“Q. Now, you have indicated you were arrested around two o’clock in the morning?
“A. Around that time, yes.
“Q. What happened when you were arrested?
“A. He told me I was charged with a B & E; that I had the right to remain silent; that anything I did say would he held against me; and then, he asked me if I had anything to say.
“Q. And, what did you reply?

“A. I told him I had nothing to say, at that time.

“Q. Then, what happened after that, do you recall?
“A. After sometime, I was put into the police car; and, they started to proceed to the Midland County Jail.

* * *

(Cross):

“Q. You were further advised similarly of these rights after you were in the patrol car headed for Midland, were you not?
*284“A. I believe it; I believe I was, yes.
“Q. And, in tbe patrol car * * * you told the officers something about the matter. What did you tell them about the matter on the way to Midland, before you got to jail?
“A. I told him my name, which I hadn’t given him before; because he radioed ahead to the Mount Pleasant Post to check on my registration. I told him I might as well tell him my name because he was going to find it out anyway. I do remember this; but, I don’t remember the questions I answered. I think I did answer a couple of more.
“Q. Did you tell them, at that time, about picking up a stone or breaking the window?
“A. I might have; I don’t remember that.
* # #
(Direct):
“Q. Now, * # * after you had arrived here in Midland * * * you did talk to the officers. Now, why, after you had indicated previously you didn’t want to say anything, did you agree to talk to the officers ?
“A. Well, after I was brought into the county jail, and they took my personal property, and they were making out a form, I put my cigarettes in my pocket; and, Trooper Lick asked where there was an office he could use; and, he said he wanted to talk to me before I was put in a cell. And, the jailer or the turnkey told him he could use one of the offices down the hall; and, he said, ‘King, I want to talk to you before you go anywhere. We got paper work to fix up.’
“Q. What did he say to you after he got inside the room and you were in there with him?
“A. He advised me of my rights again; and showed me the printed form.
# * #
“A. He told me to read it; and, if there was any questions, I was to ask them; and, I read it and I *285said, no, first lie said, ‘Do you understand it?’ And, I said, ‘Yes, I guess so.’ And, lie says, ‘Okay, now, we are going to ask you some questions and we would like to get a statement.’ He said; because, as I understood it, this is what they had to have before I would be put in a cell. He said that that was proper procedure; I mean, that they had to have this statement; so, we went over the things, the same things that I had been discussing. I — at first, 1 didn’t want to answer any questions; but, after a while, I started answering because I didn’t see what difference it made; I just wanted to get to bed.” (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court has interpreted the Miranda decision to mean that, although the accused need not be specifically advised that interrogation will cease at his request, once the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. People v. Tubbs (1970), 22 Mich App 549. As stated by the Court in Miranda (p 474):
“At this point he has shown that he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.”
Such an interpretation does not necessarily bar the use of statements volunteered by a defendant who previously invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. Nevertheless, the prosecution has a heavy burden of showing that a defendant, who previously invoked the right to remain silent, has voluntarily decided to waive his Fifth Amendment right. Miranda v. Arizona, supra, at p 478; People v. Hill (1968), 39 Ill 2d 125 (233 NE2d 367); cf. Tucker v. United States (CA 8, 1967), 375 F2d 363.
*286However,, it is clear from a careful reading of the record in the instant case that all interrogation of defendant should have ceased when he was arrested and first invoked his Fifth Amendment rights. Repeated attempts to question the accused initiated by those aware of the previous exercise of the right to remain silent, even if preceded by new recitation of the Miranda warnings, can only convey to the accused the impression that the police will not take “no” for an answer. The trial judge denied the motion to suppress on the ground that defendant did not repeat his desire to remain silent in the face of police interrogation in the police car or at the jail, instead of upon the basis of whether defendant himself initiated conversation and volunteered the statements. Since the defendant’s statements to the police established his specific intent to commit larceny, whereas defendant’s theory of innocence at trial was that he was unable to form the requisite specific intent due to a state of intoxication, I cannot say that the admission of the confession, if involuntary, was harmless error.
I am constrained to vote for reversing the conviction and remanding this case for new trial.

 People v. Walker (On Rehearing, 1965), 374 Mich 331, requires a hearing out of the presence of the jury before any confession is determined voluntary. See, also, Sims v. Georgia (1967), 385 US 538 (87 S Ot 639, 17 L Ed 2d 593); Jackson v. Denno (1964), 378 US 368 (84 S Ct 1774, 12 L Ed 2d 908, 1 ALR3d 1205).