Court Opinion

ID: 9471332
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:29:26.871657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:21.496068
License: Public Domain

ALVIN B. RUBIN, Circuit Judge,
with whom REAVLEY, Circuit Judge, joins, dissenting.
The words of the 4-R statute are refreshingly simple and direct: market dominance exists when there is “an absence of effective competition from other carriers or modes of transportation for the traffic or movement to which a rate applies ” (emphasis added). 49 U.S.C. § 10709(a) (Supp. IV 1980).1 Congress gave the Commission no *781power to reinterpret these plain words but only the authority for 240 days to adopt “standards and procedures” for determining “whether and when a carrier possesses market dominance over a service rendered or to be rendered at a particular rate or rates.” 49 U.S.C. § l(5)(d) (1976).
Competition for a movement of coal by rail from a coal mine in Kentucky to a public utility in the City of Austin, Texas, exists only if some other carrier is willing to move that coal from Kentucky to Austin. That is competition for the “service rendered or to be rendered.” That another railroad is able to move coal from a strip mine in Wyoming to Austin creates competition with the Kentucky-Texas movement but not competition for that movement. The Wyoming-Texas carrier is not offering the same service. Even more obviously, the offer by a pipeline to supply an alternate energy source, natural gas, provides economic competition with the Kentucky-Texas movement but it is not competition for that movement. Such products have different physical properties and must be transported in a different manner. The Wyoming-Texas natural gas carrier is, therefore, not offering the same service. It is not competing for the transportation to which the market-dominant rate applies.
In neither case is there competition from other carriers or modes of transportation for the traffic or movement to which the challenged rate applies. That is the type of competition that the statute specifies, not competition from other products or from other geographic areas.
The majority opinion states that the panel opinion relied “heavily on a vague congressional use of prepositions.” Ante, p. 778 at n. 10. The use of the preposition in the statute is not vague, but, in any event, it is not the sole basis for reading the statute as being limited to direct carrier competition.
“The 4R act speaks of ‘the traffic or movement to which the rate applies’ ” an authority eminent in defining terms used in interstate commerce has said. “When used in this context in the transportation industry, the word ‘movement’ refers to transportation from a single origin point to a single destination point, while the word ‘traffic’ commonly denotes transportation services from a named set of points to another point or set of points; from specific areas to rate groups or in blanket areas; or between stated mileage brackets on particular commodities in a given territory. There is no language in the legislation which would warrant the extension of the phrase the traffic or movement to which the rate applies, beyond transportation services which are comparable to that described in the issue tarriff.”2
The definition of the meaning the industry attributes to the words in the statute was not by some professed pundit but by the Commission itself, which surely should, after a century of experience, be conversant with the industrial lexicon. The definition of these terms in the industry has not, I take it, changed since 1976. It was this clarity of language that led the Commission to say in 1976 that the market definition in the statute was “explicit.”3
Four years later the definition that was once “explicit” is no longer exact. It has instead acquired “a range of possible interpretations which Congress left to the Commission to fix exactly.”4 Even if it were permissible to adjust the interpretation somewhat, the same statute cannot either in good conscience or good English be read to say that what is black one day is white the next, that what is day one day is night the next, that what must be excluded one *782day must be permitted the next — or even five years later.
The congressional history does not indicate that the Commission was meant to consider geographic and product competition in determining whether a carrier has market dominance. The Senate Conference Report on the 4R Act merely states:
The Department of Justice had, however, suggested only the consideration of such evidence in rebuttal. Id., at 633.
While the absence of effective competition test is not intended to strictly conform with the standards of the antitrust laws, it is intended that when the Commission administers the test it will recognize the absence of forces which normally govern competitive markets.” (Emphasis added.)
1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 148, 163. Far from requiring the Commission to recognize the presence of product-geographic competition, this language mandates only that the Commission recognize the absence of competitive forces in the railroad industry.
The Staggers Act demonstrates that Congress knew the economic significance of product-geographic competition and referred specifically to those factors when it thought them appropriate. Section 205(a)(1) of the act requires the Commission to initiate a proceeding to determine whether, and to what extent, “product competition” (defined by the statute to include both what we have called product and geographic competition) should be considered in determining the reasonableness of rates. The instruction is not set forth in the U.S.Code but is contained in the historical note following 49 U.S.C.A. § 10701a (West Special Pamphlet 1983). Section 205(a) expressly recites that this directive shall not be construed as altering the “meaning, use, or interpretation by the Commission, the courts, or any party of the term ‘market dominance’ .... The enactment of [Section 205] shall not be considered by the Commission in any proceeding, or by any court on an appeal from that or any other proceeding, to determine the proper scope of the term ‘market dominance ....’” Pub.L. No. 96 — 448, § 205(a)(3)(B), 94 Stat. 1906 (1980).5
The Commission’s interpretation of the statute would read “effective competition ... for the transportation to which a rate applies” to mean “effective competition with the transportation.” This disregards the words requiring competition “from other carriers or modes of transportation.”6 Indeed, it gives the statute only the meaning carried by the phrase “absence of effective competition” without any limitation whatever. There may be sound economic or administrative arguments for giving the Commission such free rein, but Congress simply did not do so. The Commission’s studies showing that direct competition for a particular movement is not a sufficient economic test may indicate how much wiser Congress would have been had it allowed the Commission more latitude. Those studies and the Commission’s recommendations may, indeed, persuade Congress to alter the statute. But the post-enactment economic studies tell us nothing about what the statute means.
In this part of the 4R Act, Congress did what courts have repeatedly criticized it for failing to do.7 It wrote clearly and suc*783cmctly. Indeed, the entire definition of market dominance is set forth in twenty words. Its brevity implies no ambiguity. When a statute is clear, it must be read to mean what it says. American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 67, 102 S.Ct. 1534, 1537, 71 L.Ed.2d 748, 755 (1982); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580, 101 S.Ct. 2524, 2527, 69 L.Ed.2d 246, 252 (1981); Howe v. Smith, 452 U.S. 473, 483, 101 S.Ct. 2468, 2475, 69 L.Ed.2d 171, 180 (1981).
Administrative agencies are given latitude in interpreting statutes they execute.8 When the statute requires interpretation, we defer to their expertise and responsibility.9 But when statutory words are plain, there is no reason to defer, for our competence and experience in statutory interpretation are surely greater. “[T]he courts are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction. They must reject administrative constructions of the statute ... that are inconsistent with the statutory mandate ...” FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 37, 102 S.Ct. 38, 42, 70 L.Ed.2d 23, 33 (1981).
Our colleagues in the majority straddle the issue of interpretation. They do not read the statute either to require or to forbid the consideration of geographic competition. They simply defer to the Commission’s decision. This might be appropriate were the statute unclear. But deference has already been paid to the Commission’s 1976 reading of the statute to mean that the statute forbids such consideration. No court, including the majority, has found this interpretation to be in error. It is, I submit, not only permitted but compelled.
What the Interstate Commerce Commission has done is to perform a sleight-of-hand interpretation. It decided in 1981 that a statute permits it to consider evidence that, in a careful 1976 decision, it had read the self-same statute to preclude. The statute has not been amended. Nothing new has been discovered in its legislative history, and, despite the majority’s effort to find some hint of later congressional sanction in the Staggers Act, the Commission itself has, after relying on that history, said that the Staggers Act contains nothing that directly supports the change. What the Commission has said is simply that it has changed its mind: its earlier “interpretation was unnecessarily restrictive.”10 “[T]he thoroughness, validity, and consistency of an agency’s reasoning are factors that bear on the amount of deference to be given the agency’s ruling.” Federal Election Commission v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee, 454 U.S. 27, 37, 102 S.Ct. 38, 44, 70 L.Ed.2d 23, 33 (1981). The Commission has been neither thorough nor consistent here. See General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141, 97 S.Ct. 401, 411, 50 L.Ed.2d 343, 357 (1976) (“We have declined to follow administrative guidelines in the past where they conflicted with earlier pronouncements of the agency”); United Housing Foundation, Inc. v. Foreman, 421 U.S. 837, 857-859, 95 S.Ct. 2051, 2063-64, 44 L.Ed.2d 621, 635-36 (1975); Fort Worth & Denver Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 693 F.2d 432 (5th Cir.1982) (adhering to agency’s “original and contemporaneous construction” of the Act in question). Only a few weeks ago, we denied deference to an agency decision because the agency had, “in the guise of interpretation,” effected “a change in statutory intent.” Quarles v. St. Clair, 711 F.2d 691 (5th Cir.1983).
After adopting a practice and using it in actual operation, an administrative agency may properly change its course and decide that the practice is not feasible. Experience, the old saw correctly runs, is the best teacher. For this reason, we defer to agency judgments based on experience. In this case, I would defer to a decision that the *784consideration of indirect competitive factors would not, as earlier thought by the Commission, unduly protract proceedings.11 This is something that can be learned by experience. But the Commission has no greater experience in interpreting the statute now than it had in 1976. Indeed, it has had no experience with considering geographic or product competition as a factor in determining market dominance.
There is a “judicial — indeed, universally human — temptation to pass responsibility on to others by saying one is describing their will when one is, in truth, prescribing what is to be.”12 The Commission has attributed what it wills to a Congress that never intended this result. The hand is masked as the hand of Congress but the voice that speaks is in truth the voice of the Commission.
Congress knows exactly how to deregulate an industry when it chooses to do so. It has effectively deregulated rate control of air transportation.13 In adopting the 4R Act, it did not intend to eliminate the regulation of maximum railroad rates but only to lessen regulation when “competition is actually sufficient to insure that rates will not exceed a reasonable level.” Its aim was, as the majority agrees, to deregulate rates only in the areas in which effective competition exists. But Congress defined what it meant by effective competition: it is competition from other carriers for the traffic or movement to which a rate applies. Our guide most unerring is neither legislative history, a history that is uncertain, nor the definition of effective competition revised by a Commission bent now on its own goal, heedless both of congressional intent and of cost to shipper or consumer, but what Congress itself said.14
An agency that changes its course by rescinding a rule and adopting a contrary one “is obligated to supply a reasoned analysis for the change beyond that which may be required when an agency does not act in the first instance.” Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., - U.S. -, -, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866, 77 L.Ed.2d 443, 457 (1983). “[T]he forces of change do not always or necessarily point in the direction of deregulation.” Id. The Commission has not explained or even attempted to explain why what was “explicit” in 1976 is no longer so, why what was an industry meaning five years before has suddenly changed, or why it has learned better how to read a statute in the interim. Even if it had discretion initially to interpret the statute, it has not “cogently explained] why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner.” (citations omitted). Id. at-, 103 U.S. at 2869, 77 L.Ed.2d at 461. This failure ought to suffice for rejection of its change of heart. 4958.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from our abdication of our duty to interpret the laws of the United States and from the majority’s acceptance of a meaning that the statute cannot bear.

. The Staggers Act, passed in 1980, changed the wording of this definition, but, as the ma*781jority opinion concedes, effected no substantive change in it. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10709(a) (West Special Pamphlet 1983) (“an absence of effective competition from other carriers or modes of transportation for the transportation to which a rate applies”). See ante, at 777.

. Ex Parte No. 320 (Sub-No. 1), 353 ICC at 904-905 (emphasis added).

. Id. at 905.

. Ex Parte No. 320 (Sub-No. 2), 365 ICC at 129.

. On May 14, 1981, the Commission issued a decision concluding that such competition would not be considered as a reasonableness issue. Ex Parte No. 320 (Sub-No. 2), Market Dominance Determinations, 365 I.C.C. 1 (1981), petition for review filed sub nom. Association of American Railroads v. United States, No. 81-2249 (D.C.Cir., filed Nov. 30, 1981), transferred, No. 82-4082 (5th Cir. Feb. 26, 1982), consolidated with No. 81-4257, motion to sever granted, June 17, 1982.

. 49 U.S.C.A. § 10709(a) (West Special Pamphlet 1983). The Commission’s interpretation would also ignore the clear implication of § 10709(b), directing the commission to determining whether the carrier proposing a challenged rate has market dominance “over the transportation to which the rate applies.”

. See, e.g., Regional Rail Reorg. Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 133, 95 S.Ct. 335, 353, 42 L.Ed.2d 320, 347 (1974); Pillsbury v. United Engineering Co., 342 U.S. 197, 200, 72 S.Ct. 223, 225, 96 L.Ed. 225, 229 (1952); United States v. Evans, *783333 U.S. 483, 484-85, 68 S.Ct. 634, 635, 92 L.Ed. 823, 825 (1952); United States v. Mason, 611 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir.1979); Zeigler Coal Co. v. Kleppe, 536 F.2d 398, 406 (D.C.Cir.1976).

. Batterton v. Francis, 432 U.S. 416, 425, 97 S.Ct. 2399, 2405, 53 L.Ed.2d 448, 456 (1977); Williams v. St. Clair, 610 F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir.1980).

. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616, 625 (1965).

. Ex Parte 320 (Sub-No. 2), 365 ICC 128.

. Ex Parte 320 (Sub-No. 1), 353 ICC at 905.

. Tribe, Toward a Syntax of the Unsaid: Construing the Sounds of Congressional and Constitutional Silence, 57 Indiana L.J. 515, 523 (1982) (emphasis in original).

. The Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub.L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978), Pub.L. No. 96-192, § 28, 94 Stat. 48 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).

. See Rubin v. United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430, 101 S.Ct. 698, 701, 66 L.Ed.2d 633, 638 (1981); Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187, 98 S.Ct. 2279, 2298, 57 L.Ed.2d 117, 141 (1978).