Court Opinion

ID: 9466279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:10:36.327618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:38.552189
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
It is my belief that certain events which took place during the trial were so egregious and so prejudicial to plaintiff as to deny him a fair trial:
(1) On cross-examination defendant’s counsel asked Saladino if he was aware that it was illegal to drive with a license that had been revoked. Objection was registered on the ground of relevancy. Defense counsel argued that under the circumstances a person being apprehended by an officer and knowing of such a violation might act in an irrational manner. The following colloquy then occurred:
THE COURT: Would this be the extent of your bringing in matters which skirt on relevancy? Is there anything more?
[Defense counsel]: I propose to show that he did not have a driver’s license because I have to tie it up that he did not have it. I won’t even do that if there is objection, but I have to show and can show that he did know that his license was revoked, and I propose to show that his blood sugar was .126.
THE COURT: You are going to have to show it, or this case is going to be a mistrial.
[Defense counsel]: I will show both of those.
The objection was overruled, and the witness answered: “I wasn’t even aware that my license was revoked at the time.” The transcript then reflects the following:
[Defense counsel]: Had it been?
A. The last revocation I had was in October of 1968, ten years prior, or eight years prior to that time. There was no revocation at that time.
Q. Did you have a license at that time?
A. I had moved to Miami. My license had been revoked at that time, and I had gotten a Miami license. I had been driv*1216ing on that up until that time. And I moved to New York, and then I came here, and I was going to transfer that over, and I was not aware that there was any revocation.
[Plaintiff counsel]: Object to the entire line of questioning, your Honor, and move to strike it, and move for a mistrial.
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. Motion denied.
Thereafter, despite his representation, defense counsel never attempted to prove that the plaintiff was driving an automobile without a driver’s license.* At the close of all the evidence, plaintiff asked that certain evidence, including that relating to his driver’s license revocation, be struck and for a mistrial. Defense counsel responded:
Your Honor, the plaintiff admitted that his license was revoked, so that has been established.
In view of the Court’s feelings about this matter that it should not become prejudicial, I did not go into the matters exhaustively or elaborate upon them. It has been established by competent evidence that there was opened liquor in the car, and of course, the Court will take judicial notice of the violation.
It has been established that he was driving without a license, and that the plaintiff has admitted it. I didn’t go back on it and highlight it because the Court didn’t feel we should do these things. It was admitted for that sole purpose, for a limited purpose.
The defense counsel misstated the record when he told the judge that it had been “established that the plaintiff was driving without a license.” Plaintiff stated that his Illinois license had been revoked more than six years earlier, and that he subsequently moved to Miami and obtained a Florida driver’s license which he was driving with at the time. Plaintiff testified that he did not believe he was driving on a revoked license.
There are two other aspects of this situation just detailed which bear discussion. First, despite the defendant’s argument that a revocation would be relevant, it is absurd to infer that Saladino was aiming his shotgun at defendant because he feared being arrested for driving without a license. Moreover, a revocation of plaintiff’s driver’s license in 1968 — more than six years before the shooting incident — was so remote in time that its irrelevance is obvious. The objection to the initial question should have been sustained.
Second, it is reversible error for an attorney, after laying a foundation for an impeaching answer to a question and after promising the court that he will produce the impeaching evidence, to fail to make good on his promise. United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir. 1971).
(2) The record must be quoted at some length in order to place in context another prejudicial error requiring reversal. On cross-examination of Kubacha the following occurred:
THE WITNESS: I have come to know him well, yes.
[Defense counsel]: Did you at that time?
A. No, not really.
Q. Didn’t you spend as much as maybe 20 hours a week with him?
A. In the week that the shooting happened, yes. In the weeks before that, no, I’d see him occasionally.
Q. Where would you spend this time?
[Plaintiff counsel]: Objection. Move to strike.
THE COURT: Sustained.
[Defense counsel]: After this occurrence, did the police officers interrogate you?
A. Yes, they did.
Q. They asked questions about what you saw and what happened?
A. Yes, they did.
Q. You gave them a statement?
*1217A. I was talking, I didn’t know — I couldn’t even recall the road it happened on. It was right after that they took me to the police station. I was brought into a room, and there was a bunch of people there, and I just answered questions. I don’t know it was a statement. I didn’t know it was anything, that it was any kind of a, you know, that it would be recorded or anything. I just told them to the best of my knowledge what happened, but I was trying to protect some people, and they just wrote down whatever I said. I don’t even recall what I said.
Q. And then you went back several days later?
A. Yes, I did.
Q. And then you gave them a different statement?
[Plaintiff counsel]: Objection and move to strike it for the reasons stated in my motions in chambers.
[Defense counsel]: This goes to credibility, your Honor.
THE COURT: Overruled. She may answer.
[Defense counsel]: Did you not? ******
THE WITNESS: Okay, yes; well, it wasn’t a different statement. It was just that there were a few discrepancies about where I was the day that it happened during the day, and I just told them that I was at Kevin’s, and Debbie was there, and that’s about it.
And then I knew what road it happened on because when it happened, I wasn’t even sure what road it was. I told them Schaftner, or something, which is the other side of Mack Road.
It is apparent from the foregoing that when she was first questioned by the police officer, Kubacha attempted to hide her relationship with plaintiff prior to the shooting. Defendant argues that he did not seek to show by extrinsic evidence an inconsistent statement, but that the discrepancies even if not introduced to show whether defendant acted reasonably on the day in question, are relevant to her credibility. It is obvious that the inconsistencies did not relate to any material point in issue. They dealt with an entirely collateral matter. Under such circumstances, impeachment is not permitted. United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304, 315 (7th Cir. 1968); Head v. Halliburton Oilwell Cementing Co., 370 F.2d 545, 546 (5th Cir. 1966); contra United States v. Barash, 365 F.2d 395, 401 (2d Cir. 1966). Credibility per se is one thing; improper impeachment to affect credibility is quite another.
To the prejudice caused by the foregoing reversible errors was added the undue prejudice suffered by plaintiff because of the improper conduct of defense counsel.
(1) In his opening statement counsel was permitted over objection to tell the jury that plaintiff was married and had a child and that during the day of the occurrence he was with Joyce Kubacha; counsel stated that when plaintiff went to a friend’s home, “there were two girls there; Mr. Kennedy’s girl and another, Joyce Kubacha. They stayed there, they had lunch, they drank beer, and they left about 6:00 or 6:30 P.M., he and Joyce Kubacha.”
(2) During the cross-examination of Mrs. Beverly Black, defense counsel asked whether she feared retaliation for testifying. The record shows the following:
Q. This other conversation that Mr. Kincaid was referring to was sometime after when Deputy Israel called you back?
A. That’s right.
Q. You were a little afraid, frankly, at that time when Israel called back about testifying for fear of retaliation by the kids, weren’t you?
A. I was concerned about testifying, yes.
Q. And it was retaliation from others?
[Plaintiff counsel]: Objection, your
Honor. I move that be stricken.
THE COURT: Yes, sustained.
[Plaintiff counsel]: I move for a mistrial.
THE COURT: And the jury is instructed to disregard it.
*1218The question to which an objection was sustained could only have been asked in order to prejudice the jury.
(3) The record shows the following occurrence during the closing argument of defense counsel:
Now, I don’t think Larry Saladino set out to do this intentionally. I think it was a combination of all of these things, knowing all of these things, not wanting these things to come to light, plus, unfortunately at the time, a little too much beer. That changed his personality.
If I were to make a confession, I would tell you now, and openly, and candidly, that if I have too much to drink, it changes my personality.
[Plaintiff counsel]: I object to what happens to counsel, your Honor.
[Defense counsel]: Well, your Honor, I would like to strike it myself. I join in the motion.
THE COURT: Yes, the objection is sustained, and the jury is instructed to disregard that remark.
[Defense counsel]: If anyone does, if a reasonable person does, this occurs.
It is axiomatic that it is improper for counsel to talk about personal experiences in summation. He is not a witness and cannot assume that role. The fact that the statement was struck even at the instance of the offending counsel is of little or no consequence.
The foregoing prejudicial events which occurred during the trial together with the improper conduct of counsel, deprived plaintiff of the fair trial to which he was entitled. I would reverse and remand.

 At oral argument and in his brief, defense counsel admitted that he was in possession of plaintiffs driving record.