Court Opinion

ID: 7824344
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 18:03:25.284879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:49.038413
License: Public Domain

Tom Glaze, Justice, dissenting. I disagree with the majority decision. In my view, the issue involved here concerns whether Ark. Code Ann. § 27-53-402 (Supp. 1989), as amended by Act 70 of 1987, can be retroactively applied to a tort action occurring on March 11,1987, and arising before Act 70’s enactment. If Act 70 had not been enacted, the appellants clearly would have been limited in the amount of the damages they sought. Under the original version of § 27-53-402, appellants could have recovered double damages based upon a property loss not to exceed a $300 amount. Act 70, on the other hand, authorized double damages to be based upon a loss not to exceed $1,000. Here, the Spires’s stipulated damages were $412.12; thus such damages under Act 70 permits the Spires damages they were unable to recover under prior law. Whether the $1,000 amount under Act 70 rather than the $300 amount under prior law applies to the present circumstances depends solely on whether Act 70 can be applied to an action for property loss which arose before Act 70’s enactment. As noted above, the prior language in § 27-53-402 is the same as now except Act 70 amended it to increase the amount of damages and costs a plaintiff can seek. Thus, Act 70 unquestionably is remedial legislation. The established rule of construction applicable to such legislation is as follows: The established rule is that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. * * * The strict rule of construction contended for does not apply to remedial statutes which do not disturb vested rights, or create no obligations, but only supply a new or more appropriate remedy to enforce an existing right or obligation. These should ... be given a retrospective effect whenever such seems to have been the intention of the Legislature. State ex rel Moose v. Kansas City & Memphis Ry. and Bridge Co., 117 Ark. 606, 174 S.W. 248 (1914). In construing remedial legislation, the courts do so with appropriate regard to the spirit which prompted its enactment, the mischief sought to be abolished and the remedy proposed. Skelton v. B. C. Land Company, 260 Ark. 122, 539 S.W.2d 411 (1976). It is also an established rule that remedial legislation shall be liberally construed. Chicago Mill & Lumber Company v. Smith, 228 Ark. 876, 310 S.W.2d 803 (1958), and Schultz v. Rector-Phillips-Morse, Inc., 261 Ark. 769, 552 S.W.2d 4 (1977). Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Neal, 4 Ark. App. 11, 626 S.W.2d 620 (1982). In passing Act 70, the General Assembly gave no hint that it intended the increased damages authorized by that Act to apply to vehicular-property losses that had already occurred before the Act’s enactment. As a result, I must conclude that, under the circumstances of this case, appellants are restricted to those damages authorized under § 27-53-402, as it read when appellants’ loss was sustained. Cf. Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Neal, 4 Ark. App. 11, 626 S.W.2d 620. Therefore, I would affirm the lower court’s ruling.