Court Opinion

ID: 9834250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:26:50.362141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:13.264721
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
[9] On consideration of appellees’ motion for rehearing, we conclude that we erred in holding that the refusal of the trial court to grant appellant’s request for a postponement in order that a trial before jury might be had was reversible error. In reaching the conclusion that we did, we were not unmindful that the trial court had1 stated in his qualification to the bill of exception that to grant a postponement would on account of the condition of the docket necessarily result in a continuance of the case for the term. We thought the record indicated otherwise and stated the reasons for this belief in our opinion. Upon further consideration, we now think that such belief was not justified by the record, and that the court in refusing to postpone did not abuse the discretion so wisely vested in it by law in such matters. We at first thought that, inasmuch as the trial on the merits carried the case over into the next week, and that' it was not concluded until Wednesday, a postponement of the case for the few hours remaining in Saturday, after the issues of law arising on the pleadings were determined, would have resulted in the ease going over until Monday, at which time, a jury being present, a trial by jury could have been had. There was however nothing in the record to indicate (and this we overlooked) that there were not other cases already set for Monday having precedence, nor does it appear from the record that there were not a sufficient number of cases on the docket which would have had precedence of this case, had it been postponed, to consume the entire time of the court for the term in their trial.
[10] The trial judge must be presumed to have known the condition of the docket, and, in the absence of a clear showing of an abuse of discretion vested in the trial judge, his ruling should be upheld. Besides this, we are doubtful if we correctly held under the facts relied upon by appellant that the demand for a jury was made at such a time and with such diligence as entitled it to a postponement or continuance in order to obtain a trial by jury. We went further in so holding than the Supreme Court did in Allen v. Plummer, 71 Tex. 546, 9 S. W. 672, of which it is said by the Supreme Court in Petri v. Bank, 84 Tex. 155, 19 S. W. 380: “That case pushes the doctrine to the extreme verge of propriety, and we are averse to proceeding further on that line.”
We adhere, however, to our conclusion that the court committed reversible error in its rulings in other matters pointed out in our opinion. The motion is overruled.
Overruled.