Court Opinion

ID: 9586235
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:08:32.400657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:25:59.327325
License: Public Domain

Chief Justice TOAL
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent. I would adopt a bright-line rule that the statute of limitations does not begin to run in a legal malpractice action until an appellate court disposes of the action by sending a remittitur to the trial court.
I agree that under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations is tolled until the date the injured party either knows or should know, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, that a cause of action exists for the wrongful conduct. S.C.Code Ann. § 15-3-535 (Supp.2003); See also Dean v. Ruscon Corp., 321 S.C. 360, 363, 468 S.E.2d 645, 647 (1996) (explaining the discovery rule). In Dean, this Court explained the nature of “reasonable diligence”:
[w]e have interpreted the exercise of reasonable diligence to mean that the injured party must act with some promptness where the facts and circumstances of an injury place a *384reasonable person of common knowledge and experience on notice that a claim against another party might exist.
Id. (emphasis added).
I disagree with the majority’s decision holding that the appellants should have known of the existence of a cause of action arising from respondent’s alleged malpractice at the conclusion of the trial. In my opinion, there was no evidence that appellants were injured as a result of respondent’s alleged malpractice until the court of appeals disposed of the case by sending a remittitur to the trial court. Therefore, I would establish a bright-line rule that the statute of limitations does not begin to run in a legal malpractice action until a remittitur has been sent to the trial court. As a result, in my opinion, the statute of limitations does not bar Appellants’ claim.