Court Opinion

ID: 9418661
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 22:34:38.843851+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:07.440895
License: Public Domain

Me. Justice Sutherland,
dissenting.
In collision cases between private parties, interest, as a general rule, is allowed upon the amount of the loss sustained. That the allowance may be to'somejextent in the discretion of the court does not affect the question presented here, since the court below denied interest not as *50a matter of discretion but upon the ground that it had no power to allow- it against the United States. Erom an examination of the record, it" fairly may be assumed that if the case had been one between private parties interest would have been allowed..
It is said that when interest is allowed it is no part the damages. But, very clearly, I think, the settled rule is to the contrary. When the obligation to pay interest arises upon contract, it is recoverable thereon as damages for failure-to perform; “and when recoverable in. tort it is chargeable on general principles as an additional element of damage for the purpose of full indemnity to the injured party.” 1 Sutherland on Damages (4th Ed.) § 300, p. 939. In Wilson v. City of Troy, 135 N. Y. 96, the New York Court of Appeals, holding that in certain actions sounding in tort interest is allowed “as a part of the damages ” as matter of law, said (pp. 104, 105): “ The reason given for the rule is. that interest is as nécessary a part of a complete indemnity to the owner of the property as the value itself) and in fixing the damages, is not any more ill the discretion of the jury than the value . . . In an early case in this state the principle was recognized that interest might be allowed, by way of damages, upon the sum lost by the plaintiff in consequence of defendant’s negligence. (Thomas v. Weed, 15 John. 255.)” These principles , find abundant Support in the decisions of this Court.
In The “ Atlas,” 93 U- S. 302, 310, the general rule is laid down that satisfaction for the injury sustained is the true rule of damages, and that by this is meant that the measure of compensation shall be. equal to the amount of injury received, ta.be calculated for the actual loss occasioned by the collision, upon the principle that the sufferer is. entitled to complete indemnification for his loss. Cómplete recompense-Tor- the injury is required. .
In The “ Wanata”.95 U. S. 600, 615, this Court, pointing out the essential difference between costs and interest, *51said: “Interest is not costs in any sense, and, when allowed, it should be decreed as damages,- and be added to the damages awarded in. the District Court.”
In United States v. North Carolina, 136 U. S. 211, 216, this Court said: “Interest, when not stipulated for by contract, or authorized by statute, is allowed by the courts as damages for the detention of money or of property, or of compensation, to which the plaintiff is entitled; . .
In The “ Santa Maria,” 10 Wheat. 431, 445, Mr. Justice Story, speaking for the Court, said: “ Damages are often given by way of interest for the illegal seizure and detention of property; and, indeed, in cases of tort, if given at all, interest partakes of the very nature of damages.”
In The “Umbria,” 166 U. S. 404, 421, this Court recognized that the general rule was that in cases of total loss by collision damages are limited to the value of the vessél, with interest thereon, etc.
See, also, Redfield v. Ystalyfera Iron Company, 110 U. S. 174, 176; The “ Scotland ” 105 U. S. 24, 35.
It. does not seem necessary to cite the numerous decisions of the lower federal and state courts to the same effect. A very good statement is to be found in Balano v. The Illinois, 84 Fed. 697, where it was held that the valúe of the injury done to the vessel is to-be ascertained, and then an amount equal to interest thereon to the time of the trial may be added, not strictly as interest, but as‘part of 'the damage compensation. The court said IP- 698]: '
“ The sum called interest added to the $5,000 was necessary to make full compensation at this time. It is not strictly interest — which is due only for, the withholding of a debt-, — but the' compensation for the permanent injury to the vessel was due as- of the time when it was inflicted, and the addition of what is called interest is justly added for withholding it ... it is quite well settled that in ascertaining the amount of compensation to be *52paid, it is justifiable to find the extent of the injury-valued in money, and add ,a sum equal to interest to make compensation at the time of such finding.”
This is in accordance with the general rule that for the wrongful sinking of a ship the owner is entitled to restitutio in integrum, that is, he is entitled “ to be put in as-good position pecuniarily as if his property had not been destroyed.” Standard Oil Co. v. So. Pacific Co., 268 U. S. 146, 155, 158.
In the light of the foregoing, I am unable to see any ground for differentiating the rule of damages applicable to the present case from that applicable to eminent.domain cases, that is to say, the owner is 'entitled to the amount that would be just compensation if the ship had been taken by the power of eminent domain. Just compensation means “ the full and perfect equivalent of the property taken . . . the owner shall be put in as good position pecuniarily as he would have been if his property had not been taken . . . the owner is not limited to the value of the property at the time of the taking; he is entitled to such addition as will produce the full equivalent of that- value paid contemporaneously with the taking. Interest at a proper rate is a good measure by which to ascertain the amount so to be added.” Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U. S. 299, 304, 306. See also, Liggett & Myers v. United States, 274 U. S. 215.
In Miller v. Robertson, 266 U. S. 243, 258, the rule is stated: “Generally, interest is not allowed upon unliquidated damages. Mowry v. Whitney, 14 Wall, 620, 653. But when necessary in order to arrive at fair compensation, the court in the exercise of a sound discretion may include interest or its equivalent as an element of damages.”
It follows indubitably from these premises that interest is allowable against the United States by the words “ legal damages ” ex vi termini. If additional reason for this *53conclusion be needed, it will be found in the definite determination of this Court that the obligation of the United States to pay interest may be imposed by the name of damages as well as by‘the name óf interest. Angarica v. Bayard, 127 U. S. 251, 266, where it is said that one of the recognized exceptions to the rule that the United States is not liable to pay interest is “ where interest is given expressly by an act of Congress, either by the name of interest or by that of damages.”
For this conclusion, the Court cites a number of opinions of the Attorneys General of the United States, among them that of Attorney General Cushing reported in- 7 Op. A. G. 523, from the head-note to which the language above quoted was taken.- In the course of that opinion the Attorney General said (p. 531):
“ There is another possible case of apparent, but not real, exception, if the case exists, and that is, of ‘damages ’ provided by statute to be assessed against the Government. In one of the general acts above cited, a statute-interest on the detention of money is the established rendering- of the term ‘damages.’ (1 Stat. at Large, p. 85.) If, therefore, any such case of claim on the Government can be-shown, with color of demand for interest as ‘ damages,’ it will be no departure from the rule •never to allow interest except on express requirement of statute.”
By the statute under consideration the United States is made liable for “ legal damages ” upon the same principle and measure of liability as- in like cases between private parties. The authorities above reviewed put the meaning of these words beyond all reasonable doubt; and it is not permissible to attempt to vary that meaning by construction. The rule announced by Chief Justice Marshall in United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76, 95-96— “ Where there is no ambiguity in .the words, there is no room for construction, The case must be a strong one *54indeed, which would .justify a court in departing from the plain meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in search of an intention which the words themselves did not suggest.” — has, ever since, been followed by this Court.
In Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U. S. 414, 419, it is said: “The general rule is perfectly well settled that, where a statute is of doubtful meaning and susceptible upon its face of two constructions, the court may look into prior and contemporaneous acts, the reasons which induced the act in question, the mischiefs intended to be remedied, the extraneous circumstances, and the purpose • intended to be accomplished by it, to determine its proper construction. But where the act is clear upon its face,. and when standing alone it is fairly susceptible of but one construction, that construction must be given to it.” (Citing eases.)
And the Court added (p. 421): “ Indeed, the cases are so numerous in this court to the effect that the province of construction lies wholly within the domain of ambiguity, that an extended review.of them is quite unnecessary. The whole doctrine applicable to the subject may be summed up in the single observation that prior acts may be resorted to, to solve, but not to create an ambiguity.”
It was further said that if the section of law there under consideration were an original act there would be no room for construction, and that only by calling in the aid of a' prior act was it possible to throw a doubt upon its proper .interpretation.
The rule was tersely stated in United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385, 396: “If the language be clear it is conclusive. There can be no construction where there is nothing to construe.”
This is also the recognized rule of the English courts. In one of the English decisions Lord Denman said the *55court was bound to look to the. language employed and construe it in its natural and obvious sense, even though that was.to give the words of the act an effect probably never contemplated by those who obtained the act and very probably not intended by the legislature which enacted it. The King v. The Commissioners, 5 A. & E. 804, 816. See also, United States v. Lexington Mill Co., 232 U. S. 399; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470, 485; Russell Co. v. United States, 261 U. S. 514, 519.
The enforcement of the statute according to its plain terms résults' in no absurdity-' or injustice,- for, as this Court recently said, in’holding the United States liable for damages including interest in a collision case where the Government had come into ’court to assert a claim on its own behalf: “The absence of legal liability.in a case where but for its sovereignty it would be liable does.-not destroy the justice of the claim against it.” United States v. The Thekla, 266 U. S. 328, 340.
To refuse interest in this case, in my opinion, is completely to change the clear meaning of the words employed by Congress by invoking the aid of extrinsic circumstances to import into the statute an' ambiguity which otherwise does not exist and thereby tó set at naught the prior decisions of this Court and long established canons of statutory construction. ' .
Me. Justice Butler, Me. Justice Sanford and Me. Justice Stone concur in this opinion.