Court Opinion

ID: 9615008
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:30:18.461544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:41.141370
License: Public Domain

Justice WHICHARD
dissenting.
I believe defendant, through counsel, admitted or implicitly stipulated to the existence of his prior criminal record as presented to the court by the prosecuting attorney and that this was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding of the “prior convictions” aggravating factor.
In this case the prosecuting attorney opened the sentencing phase by saying, “Your Honor, first of all, I would like to present to the Court facts of a prior criminal record of the Defendant.” He then told the court that the defendant had prior convictions of felonious possession of marijuana, felonious possession of LSD, discharging a firearm into an occupied motor vehicle, and escape *409from the Department of Corrections. At no point during the prosecuting attorney’s sentencing phase presentation of the prior criminal record did defendant object or protest. When defense counsel rose to make his argument, he stated that “[t]hese charges and convictions now against [defendant] are out of character and not consistent with what he’s been involved in in the past. . . . [YJes, he’s had problems with the drugs, but we don’t have anything other than that . . . .” (Emphasis added.) I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that defense counsel’s statement “is too equivocal to serve as an admission by the defendant to prior convictions.” State v. Canady, 330 N.C. 398, 399, 410 S.E.2d 875, 876-77 (1991).
The statement at issue here is less equivocal than statements in other cases in which we have upheld the trial court’s finding of an aggravating or mitigating factor. In State v. Albert, 312 N.C. 567, 324 S.E.2d 233 (1985), we held that the trial court erred in failing to find as a mitigating factor that the defendant had no record of criminal convictions. In Albert, the defendant’s attorney asserted that the defendant had “no record at all in her lifetime” and had “never been in court before” except as a juror. We noted that, standing alone, those statements would not have been sufficient to meet defendant’s burden of persuasion on the mitigating factor. Id. at 579, 324 S.E.2d at 241. However, we also noted that the trial court asked the prosecutor whether any of the three defendants in the case had a prior criminal record, to which the prosecutor replied, “only Mr. Dearen.” We concluded that the trial court erred in rejecting the mitigating factor because “the State appears to have stipulated that neither the defendant Mills nor the defendant Albert had a criminal record . . . .” Id. at 579-80, 324 S.E.2d at 241.
Similarly, in State v. Mullican, 329 N.C. 683, 406 S.E.2d 854 (1991), the prosecutor opened the sentencing proceeding by stating “[w]ith the permission of the Court and the Defense, I will summarize what the State’s evidence will show.” Without objection or complaint by the defendant, the prosecutor then described the evidence that ultimately supported the aggravating factor found by the court. In presenting the defendant’s evidence relating to sentencing, defense counsel described the circumstances of the crime and stated, “Of course that is not any excuse for his doing this. He told the Officer that he was sorry, sorry for committing the offense. . . .” Id. at 684, 406 S.E.2d at 855. Our Court of Appeals held in Mullican that “defense counsel admitted the correctness *410of [the prosecutor’s] summary in his own statement to the court.” State v. Mullican, 95 N.C. App. 27, 29, 381 S.E.2d 847, 848 (1989). On appeal, this Court stated, “We cannot say the Court of Appeals was wrong . . . .” Mullican, 329 N.C. at 685, 406 S.E.2d at 855. Thus, we left undisturbed the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that defense counsel’s statement constituted an admission that was sufficient to support the aggravating factor in question. We went on to say that, even if the statement was not an admission, the defendant “stipulated that the prosecuting attorney could state the evidence.” Id. .
Finally, in State v. Brewer, 89 N.C. App. 431, 366 S.E.2d 580, cert. denied, 322 N.C. 482, 370 S.E.2d 229 (1988), we find the following:
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated that in 1974 defendant was convicted of larceny and received a four year sentence as a committed youthful offender; that in 1977 defendant was convicted of felonious assault for which he received a ten year sentence as a regular youthful offender. In response to the prosecutor’s remarks, defense counsel stated:
Mr. PRICE: Your Honor, Mr. Brewer last worked in April or May of 1986 for a contractor in roofing work. He has a G.E.D. and is 28-years-old. He has been living with his father and step-mother. I would emphasis [sic], Your Honor, that his record indicates no convictions for almost 10 years. We would ask for leniency.
Considering the State’s remarks about defendant’s record of convictions and defense counsel’s immediate response that he would like to emphasize to the court that defendant’s record “indicates no convictions for almost 10 years,” we find and so hold that defense counsel was referring to the record of convictions the State had just referenced. From the full context of the remarks we find that no reasonable inferences to the contrary can be drawn. Defense counsel’s response is tantamount to an admission or a stipulated fact that defendant has the convictions so represented by the State.
Id. at 435-36, 366 S.E.2d at 583.
In this case, the prosecutor’s description of the prior convictions, combined with defense counsel’s express acknowledgement *411of the prior “problems,” are at least the equivalent of the exchanges held to be sufficient to prove the aggravating or mitigating factors in Albert, Mullican, and Brewer. Thus, I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
While I agree with the result he would reach, I decline to join Justice Meyer’s dissent because I discern no contradiction between N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446(d)(5) and North Carolina Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(1). As Justice Meyer notes, the applicable language of Rule 10(b)(1) states:
Any . . . question which was properly preserved for review by action of counsel taken during the course of proceedings in the trial tribunal by objection noted[,] or which by rule or law was deemed preserved or taken without any such action, may be . . . made the basis of an assignment of error
N.C.R. App. P. 10(b)(1) (1989) (emphasis added). The Meyer dissent focuses on the rule’s requirement of an objection or action by counsel during the proceedings and concludes that defendant has failed to show why this Court should review the error assigned. I believe, however, that had defendant not admitted or implicitly stipulated to his criminal record, this issue would have been preserved for appellate review. As the Meyer dissent notes, N.C.G.S. § 15A-1446(d)(5) provides that “insufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law ‘may be the subject of appellate review even though no objection, exception or motion has been made in the trial division.’ ” State v. Canady, 330 N.C. 398, 403, 410 S.E.2d 875, 879 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Clearly, this statutory provision is a “rule or law” permitted by Rule 10(b)(1) which deems defendant’s exception to the trial court’s ruling to be preserved within the meaning and intent of the rule.
For the foregoing reasons, I dissent and vote to affirm the Court of Appeals.
Justice MITCHELL joins in this dissenting opinion.