Court Opinion

ID: 9852030
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:23:20.975757+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:21.348130
License: Public Domain

HARRIS, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority accurately states the facts and governing principles but I believe it reaches the wrong conclusion. I am convinced plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law.
By whatever route he chose or felt compelled to follow as he approached the crossing, plaintiff’s final approach was at an angle. He was aware of the crossing and knew his own truck box, because of the angle, obstructed his view toward the approaching train. In spite of the obstruction of his truck box plaintiff drove onto the crossing and the accident resulted. I am convinced this was negligence as a matter of law.
I am also convinced plaintiff’s negligence as a matter of law contributed to the accident in question. Clearly the accident would not have occurred but for plaintiff’s negligence. In addition one must conclude plaintiff’s conduct was a substantial factor in bringing about the harm. Hence plaintiff’s negligence contributed to the accident. Pedersen v. Kuhr, 201 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Iowa 1972); Restatement (Second) of Torts, §§ 431 and 433.
I freely subscribe to the expression in the majority opinion which describes the two difficulties faced by anyone seeking a finding of contributory negligence as a matter of law. Such a finding should not avail as a basis for substitution by a trial or appellate court of its factual findings for those of a jury. Too often cases in former times revealed just such a misapplication of the doctrine. I am glad to join in renouncing such misapplications. Yet if the doctrine of contributory negligence as a matter of law remains in any way viable I believe the facts in the instant case demand its application. If the doctrine is no longer alive the majority should say so and lay it to rest.
I would affirm.
UHLENHOPP, J., joins this dissent.