Court Opinion

ID: 9694405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:40:39.492513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:00.951156
License: Public Domain

BERGER, Justice,
dissenting, with whom STEELE, Chief Justice, joins.
The majority holds that a .warrant to search for adult pornography on a computer was not stale, even though the affidavit of probable cause provided no information as to when the victim had seen the pornography, and, at the suppression hearing, the detective acknowledged that the offense occurred between five and seventeen months before the warrant was issued. The majority bases its decision on the nature of the evidence sought and the fact that computer flies can be recovered even after deletion.
Numerous courts in other jurisdictions have addressed staleness when considering the likelihood of finding child pornography on a computer.18 (In fact, the majority relies on two of those cases to support its decision.)19 Expert evidence presented to those other courts established that child pornography is difficult to obtain and that people who obtain child pornography tend to save it for many months, if not years. But there was no cause to believe that a search of Smith’s computer would reveal child pornography. The search warrant was issued on the basis that Smith had displayed adult pornography to his child.
No evidence has been presented to this Court, the trial court, or the magistrate, suggesting that adult pornography is difficult to obtain or that it is retained for long periods of time. To the contrary, it is a *476known fact that adult pornography is readily available on the internet.20 Thus, there would be no reason to expect that the pornography being sought here would have been saved on Smith’s computer for as much as a year or more.
The majority also bases its decision on the premise that computer files can be retrieved even after they have been erased. The only evidence on this point, however, was conflicting at best. In the affidavit of probable cause, the detective explained that there are “data protocols ... designed to protect the integrity of the evidence and to recover even ‘hidden’, erased, compressed password-protected, or encrypted files.” But he continued, “since computer evidence is extremely vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction (either from external sources or from destructive codes imbedded in the system as a ‘booby trap’), a controlled environment is essential to its complete and accurate analysis.” Thus, it appears that computer information can be recovered after being deleted, but it also can be destroyed. Moreover, if it is common knowledge that computer files can be retrieved after being erased, then computer users who wish to remove illegal materials from their computers also would know that they have to do more than just delete the file to protect themselves.
In U.S. v. Zimmerman,21 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held there was no probable cause to issue a search warrant under facts very similar to those presented here. The defendant, a high school teacher and athletic coach, had been under investigation for allegedly sexually accosting his male students. One student told the police that defendant showed him adult pornography on defendant’s computer. Three other students allegedly confirmed that they had seen the pornography at defendant’s home approximately six months before the warrant was issued. The appellate court distinguished between child pornography and adult pornography in concluding that the information in the affidavit of probable cause was stale:
In conducting our staleness analysis in [United States v. Harvey, 2 F.3d 1318 (3rd Cir.1993)], we also pointed to the fact that pedophiles rarely, if ever dispose of child pornography... .Presumably individuals will protect and retain child pornography for long periods of time because it is illegal and difficult to obtain.... There is no indication, however that [defendant] ever possessed child pornography, and [the expert affiant] did not address the issue of whether adult pornography typically is retained. Moreover, the only piece of pornography that [defendant] allegedly possessed was, in all likelihood, legal and quite easy to obtain. The affidavit states that the video clip of the woman and the horse was viewed via the Internet. This suggests that [defendant] could easily access it and had no reason to retain a copy and carefully guard it.22
The majority attempts to distinguish Zimmerman, saying that: 1) Zimmerman involved only a single incident, not a course of conduct; 2) there was no allegation that Zimmerman ever possessed child pornography; and 3) the police were improperly using an affidavit alleging possession of adult pornography to search for child pornography. It is difficult to follow the majority’s reasoning. First, the staleness analysis applies equally to single inci*477dents and courses of conduct.23 Second, as with Zimmerman, there was no allegation that Smith ever possessed child pornography. Third, although the Zimmerman court held that there was no probable cause to search for child pornography (because there was no evidence that Zimmerman ever possessed it), it also held that “there was no probable cause to search for adult pornography ... because the information supporting probable cause was stale.” 24
Applying the Zimmerman staleness analysis to the facts of this case would require a finding that there was no probable cause. Smith allegedly viewed adult pornography on his computer sometime between five and seventeen months before the warrant was issued. There was no indication that Smith ever possessed child pornography and no expert opined about whether adult pornography is typically retained. The pornography that Smith allegedly possessed apparently was legal and easily obtainable. In sum, there was no reason to believe that the adult pornography would still be on Smith’s computer many months after it was observed. Therefore, I dissent.

. See, e.g., United States v. Hay, 231 F.3d 630 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Lacy, 119 F.3d 742 (9th Cir.1997); United States v. Chrobak, 289 F.3d 1043 (8th Cir.2002); United States v. Cox, 190 F.Supp.2d 330 (N.D.N.Y.2002); Hause v. Commonwealth, 83 S.W.3d 1 (Ky.Ct.App.2001).

. United States v. Hay, Supra; United States v. Lacy, Supra.

. See U.S. v. American Library Assoc., Inc., 539 U.S. 194, 200, 123 S.Ct. 2297, 156 L.Ed.2d 221 (2003).

. 277 F.3d 426 (3rd Cir.2002).

. Id. at 434-35.

. In Zimmerman, the court distinguished its Harvey decision:
In Harvey, we held that information indicating that the defendant had ordered and received child pornography on thirteen occasions during the fifteen months preceding the issuance of the warrant was not stale. We emphasized, however, that the defendant had received three mailings only two months before the warrant was issued ... .We also emphasized the fact that there was a "continuing offense of receiving child pornography.” 277 F.3d at 434 (Emphasis added.)

. 277 F.3d at 433-34.