Court Opinion

ID: 9665811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:57:37.527026+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:18.846698
License: Public Domain

T. G. Kavanagh, J.
(dissenting). The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit judge’s refusal to permit the cross-examination of the defendant on his driving record to test his credibility after he denied he had ever been arrested or convicted of a crime.
On appeal to this Court that decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed1 by an evenly divided Court, the writer having disqualified himself on account of his participation in the Court of Appeals decision.
Because of the frequency with which the issue recurs, however, it was the judgment of this Court that the matter should be resubmitted for consideration by the full bench in the hope that authoritative, definitive resolution of the question involved would assist the bench and bar.
In his opinion for reversal, 384 Mich 114 at 117, Mr. Justice Black set forth that portion of the trial transcript containing the cross-examination, colloquy and ruling giving rise to the issue in this suit.
An examination of it shows that no offer of proof or separate record was made. In such circumstance this Court usually makes short shrift of an appellant’s assertion of error in the excluding of evidence, GrCB, 1963, 604.
Nonetheless we granted leave to rule on the question, so rule we shall.
Our late Brother Kelly’s opinion for affirmance2 meticulously and cogently treated of the issue and *602gave in detail the Michigan experience in dealing with the problem. No purpose is to be served by repeating the points he made.
The trial judge held that making a prohibited left turn is not a “crime”. As a general statement taken out of context this is clearly wrong, for “Whenever a person does an act which is prohibited by law, which act is punishable by fine, penalty, forefeiture or imprisonment, he commits a crime.” People v. Hanrahan (1889), 75 Mich 611, at 620. Thus, as a general proposition, any violation of the Michigan Vehicle Code is expressly made a misdemeanor or a felony with punishment by fine or imprisonment, and hence within the foregoing definition, a crime.
This is not to say that the trial judge erred in applying the law, or that in context his remark was wrong, however, for the “crime” of making a prohibited left turn is not necessarily a “crime” which touches on his credibility.
Thus, in context, his ruling was tantamount to saying that “Conviction of petty crimes or misdemeanors may be shown, in the discretion of the trial judge, for the purpose of testing credibility, but in my view it is too prejudicial to the defendant here to permit you to show his conviction of a prohibited turn.”
In Sting v. Davis (1971), 384 Mich 608, a majority of this Court subscribed to the dictum that under GCR. 1963, 607 “a trial judge has no discretion to exclude cross-examination with regard to the driving history of a plaintiff driver or a defendant driver, such cross-examination being proper to test the credibility of the witness’ testimony with regard to the central fact issue in the case.”
This clearly would be an extension of the court rule as written, for neither in the language of the rule itself nor the four cases cited therein, viz. Van *603Goosen v. Barlum (1921), 214 Mich 595; Zimmerman v. Goldberg (1936), 277 Mich 134; Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marvin (1946), 313 Mich 528; Cebulak v. Lewis (1948), 320 Mich 710 was the discretion of the trial judge so limited.
In Van Goosen, supra, the Court said (p 599):
“3. Defendant, while on the witness stand, was interrogated as to the number of times he had been arrested and convicted. This is complained of as error. Defendant was asking the jury to believe his version of the accident. In determining the weight to he given to his testimony they had a right to know what manner of man he had been in the past. These questions had a tendency to elicit the information and were proper. Leland v. Kauth [1882], 47 Mich 508; Pratt v. Wickham [1903], 133 Mich 356; Lunde v. Railway [1913], 177 Mich 374; People v. Cutler [1917], 197 Mich 6; People v. LaLonde [1917], 197 Mich 76.”
In Zimmerman, supra, the Court said (pp 136, 137):
“Notwithstanding the contention of plaintiff’s attorney that this testimony was material in that it had a hearing on defendant’s credibility, the trial court struck it from the record. Appellant asserts this ruling of the trial court constituted prejudicial error. It is a fair inference from the record that the trial judge was of the opinion that since defendant’s conviction was not of a crime, hut rather a misdemeanor, that therefore the testimony concerning such conviction did not hear materially upon his credibility. The statute which the trial judge had in mind provides in part that “conviction of crime may be shown for the purpose of drawing in question the credibility of such witness.” 3 Comp. Laws 1929, § 14217. Notwithstanding the statutory provision, it has long been established law in this State that it is within the discretion of a trial judge to permit a witness to be cross-examined as to his having been *604convicted of a misdemeanor. Van Goosen v. Barlum [1921], 214 Mich 595; Niedzinski v. Coryell [1921], 215 Mich 498.
“In the instant case it must be borne in mind that the cross-examination of defendant was not one pertaining to a collateral matter and bearing only upon his credibility. Instead it was cross-examination concerning defendant’s plea of guilty to a charge of reckless driving arising out of the very accident involved in the principal case. Excluding such cross-examination or striking the testimony from the record was error under the circumstances.” (Emphasis added.)
In Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marvin, supra, the Court commented on the Zimmerman case saying (p 537):
“Following comment on the general rule that a witness may be cross-examined as to prior convictions for the purpose of impeaching his credibility, it was said:
“ ‘In the instant case it must be borne in mind that the cross-examination of defendant was not one pertaining to a collateral matter and bearing only upon his credibility. Instead it was cross-examination concerning defendant’s plea of guilty to a charge of reckless driving arising out of the very accident involved in the principal case. Excluding such cross-examination or striking the testimony from the record was error under the circumstances. Especially is this true since in this case the defendant had testified in his own behalf and his testimony in effect was a denial of reckless driving. As just above indicated, we think it was not within the discretion of the trial judge to limit defendant’s cross-examination by striking this testimony from the record ; but instead this ruling constituted error which, except for the reason hereinafter indicated, would have been prejudicial and necessitated reversal.’ ”
*605In Cebulak v. Lewis, supra, the Court said (p 728):
“4. The trial court permitted cross-examination of Betty Lewis as to whether she had been charged with failing to yield the right of way to a pedestrian, as a result of the accident. She admitted having received two traffic tickets, one for failing to yield the right of way and one for not having a driver’s license. She admitted over defendants’ objection that her father ‘took it (the ticket) down and paid the fine.’ Doubtless counsel for the defendants made too much showing of importance of this matter before the jury. However, it was not error to permit the cross-examination. Zimmerman v. Goldberg [1936], 277 Mich 134; Socony Vacuum Oil Co. v. Marvin [1946], 313 Mich 528.”
Thus in Van Goosen, Socony and Cebulak it was held no error to permit cross-examination regarding arrests and conviction of crime, and in Zimmerman while expressly affirming that it has “long been established law in this State that it is within the discretion of a trial judge to permit a witness to be cross-examined as to his having been convicted of a misdemeanor” the Court held it was error to exclude “cross-examination concerning defendant’s plea of guilty to a charge of reckless driving arising out of the very accident involved in the principal case.”
Since GCR 1963, 607 provides that the rules of evidence approved in those cases and “reenacted by PA 1961, No 236” it would appear that the present rule is that a witness may be cross-examined, to test his credibility, regarding prior arrests and convictions, within the trial judge’s discretion.
See 3A Wigmore, Evidence, § 987 (Chadbourn rev. 1970). In a footnote to this section the author has exhaustively catalogued the authorities of many jurisdictions including Michigan. It is apparent *606from the cases cited that the rule vesting discretion in the trial judge has almost invariably been followed in Michigan.
The ratiocination behind the rule was set forth in Wilbur v. Flood (1867), 16 Mich 40, wherein Justice Campbell wrote (pp 43, 44):
“Defendant was sworn as a witness in his own behalf, and controverted the plaintiff’s case. Upon cross-examination he was allowed, against objection, to be asked whether he was ever confined in the state prison, and an exception is taken to this ruling. It is claimed to have been erroneous, as an attempt to discredit the witness by improper means, and to prove by parol what rests in record evidence. We do not think the objection tenable. It has always been found necessary to allow witnesses to be cross-examined, not only upon the facts involved in the issue, but also upon such collateral matters as may enable the jury to appreciate their fairness and reliability. To this end a large latitude has been given, where circumstances seemed to justify it, in allowing a full inquiry into the history of witnesses, and into many other things tending to illustrate their true character. This may be useful in enabling the court or jury to comprehend just what sort of person they are called upon to believe, and such a knowledge is often very desirable. It may be quite as necessary, especially where strange or suspicious witnesses are brought forward, to enable counsel to extract from them the whole truth on the merits. It cannot be doubted that a previous criminal experience will depreciate the credit of a witness to a greater or less extent, in the judgment of all persons, and there must be some means of reaching this history. The rules of law do not allow specific acts of misconduct, or specific facts of a disgraceful character, to be proved against a witness by others. He may be proved by record evidence to have been convicted of infamous crimes, but not to have done other infamous deeds, nor to have undergone personal dis*607grace. And even as to previous conviction of infamous crimes, the rule is seldom of any great service, because no one can be expected to know in advance what witnesses may appear, nor what may have been their history. Unless the remedy is found in cross-examination, it is practically of no account.
“It has always been held, that within reasonable limits a witness may, on cross-examination, be very thoroughly sifted upon his character and antecedents. The court has a discretion as to how far propriety will allow this to be done in a given case, and will, or should, prevent any needless or wanton abuse of the power. But within this discretion we think a witness may be asked concerning all antecedents which are really significant, and which will explain his credibility, and it is certain that proof of punishment in a state prison may be an important fact for this purpose. And it is not very easy to conceive why this knowledge may not be as properly derived from the witness as from other sources. He must be better acquainted than others with his own history, and is under no temptation to make his own case worse than truth will warrant. There can with bim be no mistakes of identity. If there are extenuating circumstances, no one else can so readily recall them. We think the case comes within the well established rules of cross-examination, and that the few authorities which seem to doubt it have been misunderstood, or else have been based upon a fallacious course of reasoning, which would, in nine cases out of ten, prevent an honest witness from obtaining better credit than an abandoned ruffian.”
There are some of us who feel for varying reasons the rule should be re-examined.
Until we do so we owe it to the profession to state what the rule is and insist on its observance.
For this reason the decision of the trial judge here and the Court of Appeals should be affirmed and costs awarded to the appellee.

 (1970), 384 Mich 114.

 (1970), 384 Mich 114, beginning at 121.