Court Opinion

ID: 9656980
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:09:56.168353+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:39.364456
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
(concurring). For the reason stated below, I concur with the majority only with respect to the result it reached._
*290The majority in this case seems to hold, as a rule, that if persons are discharged from their employment by their employer, then they did not "voluntarily” leave their job under MCL 421.29(l)(a); MSA 17.531(l)(a). "We hold that they did not leave work 'voluntarily’ when they were discharged after they failed the examinations and are entitled to benefits.” Ante, p 282. "Clarke and Dawson did not voluntarily leave employment. All agree that they were discharged when they failed the licensing examination.” Ante, p 287. This Court "quoted with approval a Pennsylvania court’s definition of 'voluntary’ as ' "[w]hen we say, 'he left work voluntarily,’ we commonly mean, 'he left of his own motion; he was not discharged.’ ” ’ ” Ante, p 285. The majority states that the threshold question in cases analyzing § 29(l)(a) is "whether the claimant voluntarily quit the job, or was discharged . . . .” Ante, p 284.
In Parks v Employment Security Comm, 427 Mich 224, 264-265; 398 NW2d 275 (1986), I stated:
I would acknowledge that § 29(l)(a) may be applicable, under some circumstances, in cases in which an employee is discharged; the applicability of § 29(l)(a) should not be limited to cases in which the employee says "I quit.” When an employee voluntarily fails to comply with a condition of employment with knowledge that such failure requires resignation or will result in termination, and without good cause attributable to the employer, that disqualifying provision may, under the particular circumstances, be applicable. Issues concerning "volition” and "good cause” must be determined case by case. Whether an employee was formally discharged as opposed to voluntarily resigning should not, in all cases, be dispositive. When a claimant asserts a justifiable excuse for his actions, that justification must be carefully *291considered. [Riley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part. Emphasis added.]
I believe this rationale in Parks would provide a better rule from which to analyze these types of cases dealing with the interpretation of § 29(l)(a).
Section 29(l)(a) focuses on whether an employee "left work voluntarily.” The language of the statute does not mention or focus on whether an employer discharged the employee. Therefore, a rule which focuses on "[i]ssues concerning 'volition’ and 'good cause’ ” on a case-by-case basis would seem a better approach.
Focusing on the employee’s volition and reasons for "leaving work” would also provide a rule in this case which would be more consistent with this Court’s opinion in Echols v Employment Security Comm, 380 Mich 87; 155 NW2d 824 (1968). (See ante, p 288.)
The majority states that "[i]n the instant case, there are no allegations of misconduct, negligence, or illegal acts” and that there is "no evidence in the record that either Clarke or Dawson were negligent in preparing for or taking the examination.” Ante, p 288. Furthermore, the final sentence of the opinion states that "we would not ascribe fault to Clarke or Dawson simply because they failed the examination.” Ante, p 289.
I agree with these statements and would suggest that they are based more on a rule which focuses on "issues of volition” and on whether the employees "left work voluntarily” than on simply whether the employer discharged the employees.
I believe that by failing an examination, Clarke and Dawson should not be disqualified from employment compensation under § 29(l)(a). However, the reason I believe this, and the reason I believe the Court should give for such a holding, is that *292failing an examination is not a volitional act, and, therefore, since the act which caused the employees to leave work was not volitional or voluntary, the employees cannot be disqualified under the language of § 29(l)(a). Clarke and Dawson did not "leave work voluntarily” regardless of whether they were discharged or had to resign.
Griffin, J., concurred with Riley, J.
Mallett, J., took no part in the decision of these cases.