Court Opinion

ID: 9571788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:35:11.841827+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:56.567012
License: Public Domain

WAHL, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. Normally, when eligibility for unemployment compensation benefits is disputed, the employer has the burden of proving the requisite facts to bring the employee within the statutory deprivation of benefits. Brown v. Port of Sunnyside Club, Inc., 304 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn.1981); Lumpkin v. North Central Airlines, Inc., 296 Minn. 456, 459, 209 N.W.2d 397, 400 (1973). In my view, where the City of Circle Pines apparently elected not to participate in this unemployment benefits matter,1 and where the evidence pertaining to the City’s decision to discharge Markel from employment was far from clear, the requisite factual predicate for disqualification of an otherwise eligible employee was not developed.
The record reflects Markel’s job required that he transport himself from site to site in his employer’s vehicles to accomplish whatever utility work was necessary. The record further reflects that following the revocation of Markel’s drivers’ license, the city did not discharge Markel from employment. To the contrary, the city prepared the letter upon which the Department of Public Safety “evaluator” relied in issuing a “Sullivan limited” license, allowing him to drive “Class B” vehicles owned and operated by the City. Markel also indicated the Department of Public Safety evaluator retained the employer’s letter. When the hearing officer questioned Markel about the restrictions attached to the “Sullivan limited” license, Markel indicated the Department of Public Safety had given him several different opinions as to what his driving restrictions were, including that the license allowed him to drive only the city’s dump truck. The record further reflects the city did not discharge Markel until nearly 4 months after the license revocation when Markel was unable to obtain a license that would have allowed him to drive employer owned and operated vehicles, other than the dump truck, for work-related purposes. Finally, the record reflects Markel had no idea as to why the Department of Public Safety had not issued the needed license; and no explanation was provided by either the employer or the Department of Public Safety. In affirming Markel’s disqualification from receipt of unemployment benefits, the majority of this court, as well as the majority of the court of appeals, focused on the event leading to the revocation of the drivers’ license; but generally, we look to all of the events leading to a termination from employment. See E.g., Brown, supra.
In addition, if we are to walk backwards through the events which set in motion the ultimate discharge from employment, then I believe we cannot ignore the factual determination that Markel is an alcoholic. A claimant who is discharged for misconduct due to chemical dependency may not be disqualified unless the claimant has not made consistent efforts to control the illness. The standard requires an evaluation of the claimant’s efforts, not the results. Leslin v. County of Hennepin, 347 N.W.2d 277, 279 (Minn.1984); Moeller v. Minnesota Department of Transportation, 281 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn.1979); Minn.Stat. § 268.09, subd. 1(c)(2). To me, the record in this case reflects that the conduct leading to the license revocation was due to chemical dependency, that Markel was very concerned about retaining his job with the city, and that he made *387reasonable attempts to retain his job and control his addiction. See Moeller, supra.
For these reasons, I would have reversed Markel’s disqualification from receipt of unemployment benefits.

. The City of Circle Pines did not even respond to the Department of Jobs and Training request for information on employee separation. Minn. Rule 3310.2800, subp. 1.