Court Opinion

ID: 9819298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:21:57.071354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:29.818597
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HUTCHINSON, specially concurring: While I agree with the majority’s conclusion in this case, I have serious reservations about using a broad-brush categorization to justify the resolution. A careful review of the record clearly indicates that when the defendant and the State discussed this plea arrangement, defendant was cognizant of and concerned about mandatory consecutive sentences. Therefore, when the State dismissed certain charges and defendant entered guilty pleas to the charges as indicated, the trial court was not required to impose mandatory consecutive sentences. Rather, the trial court sentenced defendant without any indicia of sentence caps or other agreement between the State and defendant. By pleading guilty as indicated in this case, defendant not only received a concession from the State but also acknowledged that concession in open court as part of the plea discussions. The trial court’s ultimate decision to impose consecutive sentences did not change the bargain between the State and defendant. However, I do not agree with the majority that this case represents a plea “negotiated as to charge and sentence” as described by Chief Justice Freeman in his specially concurring opinion in Linder. See People v. Linder, 186 Ill. 2d 67, 77-78 (1999) (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). Rather, I recently joined the majority in People v. Mast, 305 Ill. App. 3d 727 (1999), wherein this court said “[w]e do not believe that the decision in Evans or Linder contemplated that an agreement by the State to reduce or dismiss charges against a defendant in exchange for the defendant’s plea to the reduced or remaining charges, which has the effect of reducing the sentencing range or the number of sentences a defendant could face, constituted an implicit agreement as to sentence.” Mast, 305 Ill. App. 3d at 732. I acknowledge that our supreme court has spoken concerning the implications of a “sentence cap” negotiated plea and a “fully” negotiated plea. See Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 76; People v. Evans, 174 Ill. 2d 320 (1996). However, our supreme court has not yet formally resolved the type of plea scenario at issue in Mast. I believe the law has outgrown the rigid rule enunciated in Evans and has begun the maturization process by recognizing that different types of negotiated pleas exist. See Linder, 186 Ill. 2d at 75-80 (Freeman, C.J., specially concurring). Until such time as our supreme court does consider the Masi-type plea scenario and then revisits the other types of negotiated plea cases, I believe that the facts contained within the record should dictate the type of bargained-for plea, and trial judges should be allowed to impose and reconsider sentences by exercising sound discretion. Accordingly, I agree with the majority in this case only because the charges and the sentence considerations were clearly part of the negotiation between the State and defendant, and those facts were identified by the record.