Court Opinion

ID: 9950589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 15:08:27.92195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:26.920154
License: Public Domain

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                                                RENDERED: MARCH 14, 2024
                                                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

              Supreme Court of Kentucky
                              2022-SC-0514-MR

CHRISTOPHER HUGHES                                                  APPELLANT

             ON APPEAL FROM MONTGOMERY CIRCUIT COURT
V.             HONORABLE WILLIAM EVANS LANE, JUDGE
                          NO. 21-CR-00125

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                             APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                 AFFIRMING

      Christopher Hughes was convicted of first-degree trafficking (more than

two grams of methamphetamine), possession of drug paraphernalia, first-

degree possession of a controlled substance, and being a first-degree persistent

felony offender. The trial court sentenced Hughes to an enhanced sentence of

twenty years in prison in accordance with a Montgomery Circuit Court jury’s

recommendation. Hughes now appeals as a matter of right. Finding no error,

we affirm the judgment of the Montgomery Circuit Court.

                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      On January 12, 2021, while patrolling what he described as a high

narcotics area, Detective Jarrod Nester of the Montgomery County Sheriff’s

Office observed a vehicle leaving a known narcotics house. Detective Nester

asked dispatch to run the license plate of the vehicle and dispatch advised him
to verify proof of insurance. Detective Nester effectuated a stop on the vehicle

which Christopher Hughes was driving. Hughes was unable to produce either

a driver’s license or proof of insurance, although he did produce an

identification card. Hughes agreed to a search of the vehicle.

      When Hughes stepped out of the vehicle, a crystal-like substance fell

from his hooded sweatshirt and onto his jeans. Hughes admitted the

substance was “ice,” which is a common street name for methamphetamine.

At that point, Detective Nester placed Hughes under arrest. Detective Nester

retrieved a golf ball-sized piece of methamphetamine from Hughes’s sweatshirt

pocket. When he checked Hughes’s waistband, he found a plastic bag full of

meth (that had burst) tucked into Hughes’s pants.

      Detective Nester waited for backup to arrive. A further search of Hughes

revealed approximately $6,500 in cash and six pills. The officers found more

methamphetamine around the driver’s seat of the vehicle and a scale tucked

between the seat and the console. The Kentucky State Police laboratory testing

revealed that the methamphetamine weighed approximately seventy-one

grams, and the six pills recovered were a mixture of hydrocodone and

acetaminophen.

      During trial, Hughes testified that he was a methamphetamine user and

that he used between seven and nine grams of meth every day. He also stated

that he would buy as much methamphetamine as he could with what money

he had so he did not have to continuously drive back and forth to obtain more.

Hughes estimated that seventy-one grams would last him about five to six days

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and explained that he received the seventy-one grams of methamphetamine as

a gift from a guy he met at Taco Bell. He also testified that he recently earned

$4,200 in cash by repairing a barn for Bobby Thornsburg.

        A jury convicted Hughes of first-degree trafficking (more than two grams

of methamphetamine), possession of drug paraphernalia, first-degree

possession of a controlled substance, and being a first-degree persistent felony

offender. The trial court sentenced Hughes to an enhanced sentence of twenty

years in prison in accordance with the jury’s recommendation. Hughes now

appeals as a matter of right.

                                     ANALYSIS

        On appeal, Hughes argues that (1) the trial court erred in allowing the

Commonwealth to cross-examine him regarding pending trafficking charges; (2)

the trial court erred in allowing the Commonwealth to cross-examine a witness

about his potential bias or motivation to testify; (3) the trial court erred in

allowing evidence to distinguish drug trafficking from mere possession; and (4)

this Court should reverse for cumulative error.

   I.      The Commonwealth’s cross-examination of Hughes was
           permissible.

        Prior to trial, Hughes filed a motion in limine to exclude reference to his

prior convictions and pending indictments during the guilt phase of trial. The

Commonwealth noted it had no intention of introducing that evidence unless

something happened to open the door. The trial court held that the evidence

would be excluded.

                                          3
      During re-direct examination of Hughes, the following exchange

occurred:

      Defense counsel: Chris, have you ever been convicted of
      trafficking in drugs?
      Hughes: Never.
      Defense counsel: You ever been charged with it, other than here
      recently?
Before Hughes answered the question, the prosecutor asked to approach the

bench. The trial court conducted a bench conference.

      Prosecutor: Yeah, so he just opened the door to the motion in
      limine that we said we weren’t – that he has four other pending
      trafficking charges in our circuit. He asked if he has been charged
      with any other besides this. So I just want to make sure the court’s
      aware because the Commonwealth will requestion regarding this.
      Trial court: Alright.
      Prosecutor: Thank you.
      Defense counsel: I’ll withdraw that.
      Trial court: I think we’re clear cut there.
When re-direct examination continued, Hughes confirmed he had no prior

convictions for selling drugs.

      The Commonwealth again cross-examined Hughes and the following

exchange occurred:

      Prosecutor: Mr. Hughes, how many felonies do you currently have
      pending for you . . . for trafficking?
      Hughes: I have no idea.
      Prosecutor: Do you not remember the other four trafficking
      charges?
      Hughes: Four, I guess, yeah, besides this one, maybe.

                                        4
        Prosecutor: Okay. One of those is for forty some grams of meth in
        Bath County, is that accurate?
        Hughes: Did you find meth on me in Bath County?
        Prosecutor: Mr. Hughes, do you currently have that indictment
        pending?
        Hughes: Did you find methamphetamine on me in Bath County?
        Prosecutor: Mr. Hughes, do you currently have that indictment
        pending?
        Hughes: Does that make me guilty?
        Prosecutor: Can you answer my question, yes or no?
        Hughes: Does that make me guilty?
        Prosecutor: Yes or no, Mr. Hughes.
        Hughes: Do what, do I have an indictment in Bath County? I’ve got
        indictment in Bath County in two or three years.
        Prosecutor: Okay, so you have three other charges, actually four
        for trafficking in narcotics, correct?
        Hughes: I guess it’s indictment, yeah.
        Prosecutor: Thank you.
Defense counsel did not object to the Commonwealth’s questions.

        Defense counsel again questioned Hughes and began to ask about the

pending charges, referencing “every one of those for similar conduct, where

they’re claiming you possessed . . . .” At that point, Hughes cut him off and

interjected that every indictment he has is for possession, “except they’ve

indicted me for trafficking.” He stated he has never sold or traded

methamphetamine, and that he got pulled over “with drugs on me and they’ve

indicted me for trafficking.” Defense counsel referenced Detective Nester’s prior

testimony about confidential informants and Hughes stated he has never sold

dope.

                                         5
      The parties dispute whether this issue is preserved. The Commonwealth

argues that defense counsel’s failure to object to the Commonwealth’s question

paired with defense counsel’s follow-up question regarding the pending charges

amounts to waiver. Further, since Hughes did not specifically request palpable

error review, this Court should decline to consider his argument. Hughes

argues this issue is preserved by the Commonwealth arguing that defense

counsel opened the door to introduce evidence of the pending trafficking

charges.

      By a narrow margin, we conclude this issue is preserved for review.

Although the Commonwealth initiated the bench conference where the parties

and the trial court discussed defense counsel questioning Hughes about

pending indictments, defense counsel stated he withdrew the question. In

addition, the trial court stated, “I think we’re clear cut there,” which seemingly

cut off further discussion about opening the door and the proper line of

questioning. Although Hughes did not object to the Commonwealth’s

questions regarding the pending trafficking charges, in Norris v.

Commonwealth, 89 S.W.3d 411, 415 (Ky. 2002), this Court held that an

objection to the inadmissible evidence is not necessary in order to rely on the

“opening the door” doctrine. Therefore, we review this evidentiary issue for an

abuse of discretion. Ward v. Commonwealth, 587 S.W.3d 312, 332 (Ky. 2019).

We must determine whether the trial court’s decision was “arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.”

Commonwealth v. English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

                                        6
      “Generally stated, ‘opening the door’ to otherwise inadmissible evidence

is a form of waiver that happens when one party’s use of inadmissible evidence

justifies the opposing party’s rebuttal of that evidence with equally

inadmissible proof.” Commonwealth v. Stone, 291 S.W.3d 696, 701-02 (Ky.

2009). Prior to trial, the trial court ruled that evidence of the pending

indictments was inadmissible. However, defense counsel specifically asked

Hughes whether he had any pending trafficking charges other than the

pending charges in the present case, which directly introduced a topic that the

trial court deemed inadmissible. The Commonwealth countered by eliciting

from Hughes more information about those other pending trafficking charges.

      Hughes notes that he did not answer defense counsel’s question about

other pending trafficking charges, and that defense counsel withdrew the

question during the bench conference. But in any event, defense counsel

interjected the issue of Hughes’s other pending trafficking charges despite the

earlier ruling that such evidence was inadmissible. Although Hughes did not

answer defense counsel’s question, the harm was already done. A reasonable

juror may have inferred that Hughes’s answer would have been no because his

own lawyer was raising the issue. It thus became necessary for the

Commonwealth to rebut that untrue suggestion to the jury.

      Hughes argues that the evidence of other pending trafficking charges was

not relevant to whether Hughes trafficked in the present case, and that the trial

court neglected to conduct a proper balancing of the probative value against

the prejudicial effect of the evidence pursuant to Kentucky Rule of Evidence

                                         7
(KRE) 403. Defense counsel interjected the topic of any pending trafficking

charges, an inadmissible topic. The Commonwealth therefore merely elicited

that Hughes has four pending trafficking charges, and that one of those

charges involved forty grams of methamphetamine. The information elicited by

the Commonwealth was minimal, at best, and hardly constitutes a “storm of

evidence” or qualifies as “unnecessarily detailed and improperly inflammatory”

as Hughes describes in his brief.

      In addition, we further highlight defense counsel’s line of questioning.

Prior to asking about other pending trafficking charges, defense counsel asked

whether Hughes had any trafficking convictions, which thereby allowed Hughes

to establish that he had no prior trafficking convictions. After the

Commonwealth established that Hughes had four other pending trafficking

charges, defense counsel again established that Hughes had no convictions for

selling drugs whatsoever. Thus, because the jury learned only that Hughes

had pending charges, and Hughes clarified he had no convictions, the resulting

prejudice to Hughes was significantly lessened.

      Because defense counsel opened the door to Hughes’s other pending

trafficking charges, the trial court properly allowed the Commonwealth to

establish that Hughes had four other pending trafficking charges. This

minimal testimony does not constitute an abuse of discretion and therefore

there was no error.

                                        8
   II.      The trial court properly permitted the Commonwealth to
            impeach a witness’s testimony.

   Hughes argues that the trial court erred in permitting the Commonwealth to

question Bobby Thornsburg about Thornsburg’s sisters’ pending trafficking

charges. To explain why the officers found Hughes in possession of so much

cash, Hughes testified that Bobby Thornsburg recently paid him $4,200 in

cash to work on a barn. Hughes also testified that he dated one of

Thornsburg’s sisters and that was how he secured the barn job.

         Thornsburg testified at trial and on cross-examination the prosecutor

asked Thornsburg about who his sisters were. Thornsburg responded “you

know who they are.” The prosecutor asked whether they had pending

trafficking charges. Defense counsel objected, arguing this was improper

impeachment, but the prosecutor claimed that defense counsel brought up

Thornsburg’s relationship with Hughes. Hughes’s relationship with one of

Thornsburg’s sisters, and that the evidence of the sisters’ pending trafficking

charges was evidence of Thornsburg’s potential bias – that he was motivated to

testify against the Commonwealth. The trial court allowed the testimony,

stating that Thornsburg opened the door by answering that the prosecutor

knew who his sisters were in response to the prosecutor’s question. The

prosecutor continued cross-examining Thornsburg, eliciting testimony that he

was a surety for one of his sister’s bond on her drug trafficking charges in Bath

County.

                                         9
      A trial court’s evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion.

King v. Commonwealth, 554 S.W.3d 343, 358 (Ky. 2018), overruled on other

grounds by Johnson v. Commonwealth, 676 S.W.3d 405 (Ky. 2023). A trial

court abuses its discretion when its decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable,

unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” English, 993 S.W.2d at 945.

      Pursuant to KRE 611(b), “[a] witness may be cross-examined on any

matter relevant to any issue in the case, including credibility.” One method by

which an impeaching party may discredit a witness’s testimony on cross-

examination is by “revealing possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives of

the witness as they may relate directly to issues . . . in the case at hand.”

Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974). “Exposing a witness’s bias or

motivation to testify is ‘a proper and important function of the constitutionally

protected right of cross-examination.’” Commonwealth v. Armstrong, 556

S.W.3d 595, 600 (Ky. 2018) (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 316). In fact, it is “one

of the most crucial goals of cross-examination.” Baker v. Kammerer, 187

S.W.3d 292, 295 (Ky. 2006).

      Here, the prosecutor asked Thornsburg about his sister’s pending

trafficking charge to illustrate that he had a reason to be biased or prejudiced

against the Commonwealth. Hughes argues that an impeaching crime must be

a felony conviction, and not a pending charge, citing Iles v. Commonwealth, 476

S.W.2d 170 (Ky. 1972). But the purpose of establishing that Thornsburg’s

sisters had pending trafficking charges was not to impeach Hughes or

                                        10
prejudice him, but rather to establish a possible motivation for Thornsburg’s

testimony against the Commonwealth.

      Hughes called Thornsburg as a witness to provide testimony to explain

why officers found Hughes in possession of such a large sum of cash, i.e., that

Thornsburg had recently paid him $4,200 to repair a barn. As Detective Nester

testified, the large amount of cash suggested trafficking rather than mere

possession. The Commonwealth merely revealed Thornsburg’s possible bias or

an ulterior motive in testifying as to an issue in the case at hand. Davis, 415

U.S. at 316. Further, Thornsburg’s response that the prosecutor knew who his

sisters were certainly created an inference that they were involved in criminal

acts in some way – this would explain Thornsburg’s allegation that the

prosecutor was familiar with his sisters. This is permissible impeachment, and

the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the testimony.

   III.   The trial court properly admitted Detective Nester’s testimony
          based on his knowledge and experience of narcotics users and
          dealers.

      Next, Hughes argues the trial court erred by admitting Detective Nester’s

testimony based on his knowledge of and experience with narcotics users and

dealers. He asserts that this testimony amounted to Detective Nester testifying

to the ultimate issue of fact in the case – whether Hughes was trafficking or

simply in possession of methamphetamine. Hughes admits this claim is

unpreserved and requests palpable error review pursuant to Rule of Criminal

Procedure (RCr) 10.26.

                                       11
       Palpable error review allows reversal when “manifest injustice has

resulted from the error.” Elery v. Commonwealth, 368 S.W.3d 78, 98 (Ky. 2012)

(quoting RCr 10.26). Such an injustice occurs when there is a “probability of a

different result or error so fundamental as to threaten a defendant's

entitlement to due process of law.” Martin v. Commonwealth, 207 S.W.3d 1, 3

(Ky. 2006). “When an appellate court engages in a palpable error review, its

focus is on what happened and whether the defect is so manifest, fundamental

and unambiguous that it threatens the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. at

5.

       During direct examination, the Commonwealth asked Detective Nester

why he charged Hughes with trafficking instead of possession. Detective

Nester explained the substantial amount of methamphetamine combined with

the scale, which is often used by dealers, and the large amount of unexplained

cash indicated trafficking rather than mere possession. He explained that, in

comparison, he only charged Hughes with possession of hydrocodone rather

than trafficking because possessing six pills was more indicative of personal

use.

       Hughes argues that while a police officer is permitted to testify about

drug transactions, law enforcement tactics, and terminology, they may not

testify as to determinations of fact. Sargent v. Commonwealth, 813 S.W.2d

801, 802 (Ky. 1991). Further, Hughes asserts that Detective Nester’s testimony

amounted to an opinion on the ultimate issue of whether he was guilty of

                                        12
trafficking. As such, he asserts that he was denied a fair trial, fundamental

fairness, and due process. We disagree.

      In McGuire v. Commonwealth, 595 S.W.3d 90, 93 (Ky. 2019), an officer

testified that, based on his experience, the quantity of methamphetamine

recovered from the defendant was inconsistent with personal use, the small

plastic bags found on the defendant’s person were commonly used to carry

drugs, and that persons in possession of methamphetamine for personal use

usually only possess a small bag of methamphetamine and are found with

some means of administering the drug. The defendant argued the officer

impermissibly expressed his opinion on the ultimate issue of whether the

defendant was guilty of trafficking. Id. The Court found no palpable error in

the officer’s testimony.

      In holding that there was no palpable error, the Court relied on Stringer

v. Commonwealth, 956 S.W.2d 883, 885 (Ky. 1997), in which the defendant was

convicted of first-degree sodomy and first-degree sexual abuse. An expert

testified at trial that his examination of the victim revealed some vaginal

tearing and partial destruction of the hymen and that those findings were

compatible with the victim’s self-reported history and “something being

inserted in there, and, trying to stretch it.” Id. at 889. The Court held that the

testimony was admissible and explained that it was not an opinion as to the

ultimate issue of whether the defendant was guilty but rather a relevant

evidentiary fact tending to make the ultimate fact of guilt more or less

probable. Id. at 891-92.

                                        13
      In analyzing and applying Stringer, the McGuire Court reasoned that “an

opinion that a result is consistent with a factual scenario is not an opinion that

the scenario occurred.” McGuire, 595 S.W.3d at 94. Likewise, this Court has

reached similar conclusions in Kroth v. Commonwealth, 737 S.W.2d 680 (Ky.

1987) (holding that the trial court did not err in allowing an officer to testify as

to his opinion that the defendant possessed pills for sale, not for personal use),

and Sargent, 813 S.W.2d 801 (permitting police officers’ testimony, acting as

experts, to express their opinion that a large quantity of marijuana paired with

unique packaging led to their conclusions that the defendant possessed for

sale, not personal use).

      Likewise, in this case Detective Nester offered his opinion that, based on

his experience, the evidence discovered was consistent with trafficking and not

personal use. He never stated whether he believed Hughes was guilty of

trafficking. Detective Nester testified that he was familiar with the major drugs

in the area (methamphetamine and heroin), typical user amounts (0.1 to 0.2

grams), the costs of the drugs ($20-$30 depending on type), and various street

names for the drugs. He also explained his familiarity with typical items users

have, such as pen shafts, glass pipes, or needles to ingest the drugs. “This

type of expert opinion has been almost routinely admitted in drug cases.”

Ordway v. Commonwealth, 391 S.W.3d 762, 777 n.6 (Ky. 2013). Additionally,

this testimony regarding knowledge and experience is necessary to discuss

trafficking versus personal use. The caselaw is clear. As such, this testimony

was permissible and there was no error.

                                         14
   IV.      The cumulative error doctrine is inapplicable.

         Finally, Hughes argues cumulative error, “the doctrine under which

multiple errors, although harmless individually, may be deemed reversible if

their cumulative effect is to render the trial fundamentally unfair.” Brown v.

Commonwealth, 313 S.W.3d 577, 631 (Ky. 2010). Because we conclude that no

errors occurred, the cumulative error doctrine does not apply.

                                    CONCLUSION

         For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of Montgomery Circuit Court is

affirmed.

         All sitting. VanMeter, C.J.; Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, and Nickell,

JJ., concur. Thompson, J., concurs in result only.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Robert C. Yang
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Russell M. Coleman
Attorney General of Kentucky

Kristin L. Conder
Assistant Attorney General

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