Court Opinion

ID: 9394696
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-16 13:03:20.809178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:02.016829
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
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 official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: May 16, 2023

               S23A0224. SMITH, WARDEN v. CHANDLER.

       BOGGS, Chief Justice.

       At a jury trial in 2017, Erasmus Chandler was found guilty of

aggravated child molestation and two counts of child molestation. In

2019, the Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions in an

unpublished opinion. Chandler later filed a pro se petition for

habeas corpus, which the habeas court granted in 2022 on the

ground that Chandler’s appellate counsel provided ineffective

assistance at the motion for new trial stage and on appeal, including

by failing to raise and prove claims of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel. Warden Aimee Smith appeals, arguing that the habeas

court erred in admitting an exhibit at the habeas hearing and in
determining that Chandler’s appellate counsel provided ineffective

assistance.1

      At the habeas hearing, the warden did not object to the

admission of the challenged exhibit for the limited purpose for which

it was admitted, and now on appeal the warden has not shown plain

error in its admission. Moreover, the habeas court properly

determined that Chandler’s appellate counsel provided ineffective

assistance at the motion for new trial stage and on appeal by failing

to raise and prove a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel

for failing to impeach the alleged victim’s testimony at trial with

evidence that she had made prior inconsistent statements about the

alleged abuse. We affirm the habeas court’s grant of relief on this

basis.

      1.    The record shows as follows. In September 2014,

Chandler and his live-in girlfriend, Christina Williams, moved with

      1 The warden also argues that the habeas court erred in granting relief
on three claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel that she contends were
not properly raised in the habeas proceeding and were procedurally defaulted.
In light of our conclusion that the habeas court properly granted relief on
another basis, we need not address the warden’s argument in this regard.
                                       2
Williams’ three daughters and Chandler and Williams’ two younger

children from Montgomery, Alabama, to Augusta, Georgia, where

Williams worked at a cell phone store and Chandler cared for the

children. In February 2015, Chandler and Williams drove with the

children to Montgomery to visit family and to celebrate the

fourteenth birthday of Williams’ oldest daughter, N.C. During the

trip, when Williams was telling N.C. and another daughter that they

needed to do a better job with their chores, N.C. told Williams that

Chandler had been “touching on” N.C. for years and that N.C.

thought that she might be pregnant by Chandler. After Williams

confronted Chandler, Williams, Chandler, and N.C. got into the

family van, where Williams had N.C. repeat the allegations to

Chandler. Chandler angrily denied the accusations and demanded

that they take N.C. to a hospital immediately.

     The next morning, Williams drove back to Augusta with the

children and took N.C. to Doctors Hospital of Augusta, where the

medical staff contacted law enforcement and determined that N.C.

was not pregnant. Several days later, Denise Field conducted a

                                 3
forensic interview of N.C., which was played for the jury at

Chandler’s trial. During the interview, N.C. told Field that she was

in special education classes and that Chandler had licked her vagina

and breasts and put something inside of her vagina while he was on

top of her.

     On August 4, 2015, a Richmond County grand jury indicted

Chandler for aggravated child molestation by placing his mouth on

N.C.’s vagina and two counts of child molestation by placing an

unknown object in N.C.’s vagina and by placing his mouth on N.C.’s

breast. Chandler was subsequently arrested.

     At Chandler’s trial in 2017, Williams testified that N.C. had a

learning disability, was in special needs classes, read below her

grade level, and developed behavioral issues, including extreme

anger and suicidal thoughts, around the age of nine or ten, the

timeframe when N.C. said that Chandler began abusing her.

Williams acknowledged that N.C. sometimes lied about “petty

things” and that N.C. wrote in her diary about how much she hated

Chandler, did not want Williams to marry him, and wanted a new

                                 4
family but did not write anything about the alleged inappropriate

behavior by Chandler aside from an entry that N.C. “scribbled real

quick” after the allegations arose but dated to a time before the

birthday trip to Montgomery. Williams also acknowledged that she

at one point had doubts about N.C.’s allegations due to the hastily

scribbled diary entry but later came to believe the allegations

because N.C.’s statements had been “very consistent” over time.

Williams testified that Chandler admitted that he helped N.C. apply

cream to a bump on N.C.’s vagina when N.C. was 13 and Williams

was at work. Williams further testified that N.C. had complained in

the past about Chandler coming into her bedroom and looking at her

when she was seven or eight years old. N.C. testified that Chandler

had licked her vagina and breasts and put something inside her

vagina when he was on top of her, and Field testified about N.C.’s

forensic interview and the disclosure process for children who have

been sexually abused.

     Chandler testified at trial and adamantly denied all the

allegations against him, including Williams’ claim that he admitted

                                5
touching N.C.’s vagina to apply cream to a bump. Chandler also

called Officer Jacob Green of the Richmond County Sheriff’s Office,

who spoke to Williams and N.C. at the hospital. However, Officer

Green was not allowed to testify about what N.C. said, because the

trial court sustained the State’s hearsay objection on the ground

that Chandler’s counsel did not file a notice of intent to introduce

child hearsay. The jury found Chandler guilty of all charges, and he

was sentenced to serve a total of 50 years in prison followed by life

on probation.

     Chandler filed a motion for new trial, which he amended with

new appellate counsel, claiming that the evidence was insufficient

to support his convictions and that the trial court erred in allowing

Williams to testify that, although she at one point had doubts about

N.C.’s allegations due to the diary entry that N.C. “scribbled real

quick” after the allegations arose, she later came to believe them

because N.C.’s statements had been “very consistent” over time.

After a hearing at which Chandler did not produce any evidence and

instead presented only argument, the trial court denied the motion.

                                 6
Chandler, represented by the same counsel, appealed, again raising

the two claims that he raised in his amended motion for new trial.

On May 21, 2019, the Court of Appeals issued an unpublished

opinion rejecting Chandler’s sufficiency claim, finding no plain error

from improper bolstering, and affirming the trial court’s judgment.

     On November 8, 2019, Chandler filed a pro se petition for

habeas corpus, which he later amended, raising several claims of

ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The habeas court held an

evidentiary hearing over two days in early 2021 at which Chandler’s

appellate counsel, James Rogers, and his trial counsel, Sean

Gamble, both testified. Chandler introduced into evidence Habeas

Exhibit 10, a page from N.C.’s medical records that included a note

from Nurse Angela A. Haustad that said: “Pt. told officer that she

has only touched [sic] by step father no sexual penetration occurred,

told officer that they fight often.” Chandler also introduced Habeas

Exhibit 14, another page from N.C.’s medical records, which

included a note from Dr. Thomas L. Zickgraf that said that N.C. was

                                  7
“unsure if she has been sexually penetrated by [Chandler’s] penis in

the past vaginally” and that she “denies any oral contact.”2

     On July 28, 2022, the habeas court entered a lengthy Final

Order Granting Habeas Corpus Relief. The habeas court found that

both Gamble and Rogers failed to grasp the importance of these

notes in N.C.’s medical records. The habeas court determined that

Gamble was professionally deficient for, among other things, failing

to impeach N.C. by cross-examining her about her prior inconsistent

statements contained in Habeas Exhibit 10 and Habeas Exhibit 14

and, if she denied or claimed not to remember making them, failing

to introduce the exhibits. The habeas court also determined that this

deficient performance prejudiced Chandler, because “[t]he jury was

completely unaware of the alleged victim ever being inconsistent or

     2 Dr. Zickgraf’s note said in full:
     Pt. reports that since the age of 10 beginning in Alabama she has
     been repeatedly sexually assaulted by her mother’s husband. She
     reports last time was about the first week of February. She reports
     that he looks at her private parts and touches her. She is unsure if
     she has been sexually penetrated by his penis in the past vaginally
     and denies any oral contact. She reports vaginal spotting over the
     last week and nausea. She denies any physical trauma as a result
     of her interactions with her mother’s husband.

                                      8
denying the allegations that she made against” Chandler, and the

outcome of the case hinged on N.C.’s credibility. 3 The habeas court

further determined that Rogers was professionally deficient at the

motion for new trial stage and on appeal for, among other things,

failing to raise and prove this claim of ineffective assistance of trial

counsel in addition to the two weaker issues that Rogers decided to

raise. The habeas court also determined that, but for Rogers’

deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that the

outcome of his appeal would have been different. The warden filed a

timely notice of appeal.

      2.    The warden contends that the habeas court erred when it

admitted Habeas Exhibit 10 over her hearsay objection, because

N.C.’s statements within the document were inadmissible hearsay.

However, at the habeas hearing, although the warden objected to

the admission of Habeas Exhibit 10 to prove the truth of the

statements therein, she said that she had “no objection” to the

      3 As discussed below, the jury was aware of minor inconsistencies in the
details of N.C.’s allegations of abuse.
                                      9
admission of the exhibit for “the limited purpose” of showing

whether Gamble was aware of the document and how he used it in

his representation of Chandler. The habeas court then admitted

Habeas Exhibit 10 “for that purpose.” The warden now argues that

the exhibit should not have been admitted at all. The warden did not

make this argument in the habeas court, so we review the habeas

court’s ruling only for plain error. Cf. Crayton v. State, 298 Ga. 792,

799 (784 SE2d 343) (2016) (reviewing only for plain error where

counsel stated that he had no objection to the admission of

documentary evidence).

     To show plain error, the warden must point to a legal error that

was not affirmatively waived, was obvious beyond reasonable

dispute, likely affected the outcome of the proceedings, and seriously

affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings. See Lupoe v. State, 300 Ga. 233, 243 (794 SE2d 67)

(2016). The failure to establish any one of these elements is fatal to

the warden’s plain error claim. See Wright v. State, 315 Ga. 459, 462

(883 SE2d 294) (2023).

                                  10
     We conclude that the warden has failed to point to a clear legal

error by the habeas court. OCGA § 24-8-801 (c) defines “hearsay” as

an out-of-court statement “offered in evidence to prove the truth of

the matter asserted” in the statement. The habeas court admitted

Habeas Exhibit 10 for the limited purpose of showing whether

Gamble was aware of it and how he used it in his representation of

Chandler, not to prove the truth of the statements that N.C. had

“only [been] touched” by Chandler or that “no sexual penetration

occurred.” Accordingly, the warden has failed to show error, much

less plain error, in the habeas court’s admission of the exhibit over

her hearsay objection.

     3.   The warden also contends that the habeas court erred in

determining that Chandler’s appellate counsel was ineffective. “In

reviewing the grant or denial of a petition for habeas corpus, this

Court accepts the habeas court’s factual findings and credibility

determinations unless they are clearly erroneous, but we

independently apply the law to the facts.” Luckie v. Berry, 305 Ga.

684, 691 (827 SE2d 644) (2019) (cleaned up).

                                 11
     (a)   To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of appellate

counsel, a habeas petitioner must show that his appellate counsel’s

performance was deficient and that the deficiency prejudiced the

outcome of his appeal. See Cartwright v. Caldwell, 305 Ga. 371, 378

(825 SE2d 168) (2019). See also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.

668, 687 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To establish deficient

performance, the petitioner must show that his appellate counsel

performed his duties in an objectively unreasonable way,

considering all the circumstances at the time and in the light of

prevailing professional norms. See Cartwright, 305 Ga. at 378. To

establish the required prejudice, the petitioner must show that, but

for his appellate counsel’s unprofessional errors, there is a

reasonable probability that the result of his appeal would have been

more favorable. See id. “A reasonable probability is a probability

sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466

U.S. at 694.

     When the petitioner contends that his appellate counsel

performed deficiently by failing to properly raise or prove a claim of

                                  12
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, in order to establish the

required prejudice, “the petitioner must demonstrate that the

underlying ineffectiveness-of-trial-counsel claim would have had a

reasonable probability of success.” Cartwright, 305 Ga. at 378. In

other words, to establish the prejudice required to prevail on this

type of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim, a habeas

petitioner must show that his trial counsel’s performance was

professionally deficient and that, but for the deficiency, there is a

reasonable probability that the outcome of his trial would have been

more favorable. See Gramiak v. Beasley, 304 Ga. 512, 513 (820 SE2d

50) (2018). Accordingly, we turn first to whether Chandler was

denied the effective assistance of counsel at trial.

     (b)   At Chandler’s trial, N.C. testified that Chandler had

licked her vagina and breasts and put something inside her vagina

when he was on top of her, and these alleged acts were the basis for

the charges of child molestation and aggravated child molestation

against Chandler. But according to N.C.’s medical records, she made

statements at the hospital that she had “only [been] touched” by

                                  13
Chandler, that “no sexual penetration occurred,” and “den[ying] any

oral contact.” Gamble briefly cross-examined N.C. at trial but did

not ask her a single question about her statements at the hospital

as reflected in the medical records, even though those statements

likely would have been admissible as prior inconsistent statements.

See Nicholson v. State, 307 Ga. 466, 472 (837 SE2d 362) (2019) (“A

prior inconsistent statement of a witness who takes the stand and is

subject to cross-examination is admissible as substantive evidence.”

(cleaned up)). Moreover, if, on being confronted with the statements

by Gamble, N.C. had denied or claimed not to remember making

them, then Habeas Exhibit 10 and Habeas Exhibit 14 would have

been admissible as extrinsic evidence of the prior inconsistent

statements. See OCGA § 24-6-613 (b) (providing for the admission of

extrinsic evidence of a prior inconsistent statement if “the witness is

first afforded an opportunity to explain or deny the prior

inconsistent statement and the opposite party is afforded an

opportunity to interrogate the witness on the prior inconsistent

statement”). See also OCGA § 24-8-801 (d) (1) (A) (excluding such

                                  14
statements from the definition of hearsay if the declarant testifies

at trial and is subject to cross-examination concerning the

statement).

     At the habeas hearing, Gamble testified that his defense

strategy was to show the jury that N.C. “was lying, and she wasn’t

trustworthy, and she didn’t like [Chandler], and she was making

this up because she didn’t like [Chandler].” Impeaching N.C. with

her own prior statements and denials as reflected in the medical

records would have strongly supported the defense strategy by

putting evidence before the jury that she had been significantly

inconsistent in her allegations of abuse, information that the jury

did not otherwise have. Although the scope of cross-examination will

rarely support a claim of deficient performance, under these

circumstances, no reasonably competent defense attorney would

have decided against presenting this impeachment evidence to cast

doubt on the credibility of the State’s key witness. See Cartwright,

305 Ga. at 379.

                                15
     In order to show prejudice, Chandler was not required to show

that Gamble’s failure to use the impeachment evidence “more likely

than not altered the outcome of the case,” only that “the likelihood

of a result more favorable” to him is great enough “to undermine

confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-695.

Chandler made that showing here.

     The entire case against Chandler was one built on N.C.’s

statements about her alleged abuse, and on N.C.’s credibility. No

physical evidence supported N.C.’s allegations. All the State’s

evidence that the charged crimes had occurred traced back to

statements made by N.C. The testimony of N.C., and of Williams

and Field about what N.C. told them, was certainly sufficient to

support Chandler’s convictions, see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.

307, 319 (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560) (1979); OCGA § 24-14-8 (“The

testimony of a single witness is generally sufficient to establish a

fact.”). But the evidence of Chandler’s guilt was not overwhelming,

particularly in light of his adamant denials of N.C.’s accusations;

Williams’ testimony that N.C. sometimes lied and hated Chandler;

                                16
and N.C.’s creation, after she made the accusations, of a backdated

entry in her diary that for the first time talked about the things that

she claimed that Chandler did to her. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at

696 (“[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by the record

is more likely to have been affected by errors than one with

overwhelming record support.”).

     Had the jury been presented with N.C.’s prior inconsistent

statements and denials of the alleged abuse, there is a reasonable

probability that the outcome of the trial would have been different.

The jury heard evidence that N.C. was sometimes untruthful, but it

did not hear that, according to her medical records, she had been

significantly inconsistent in the very allegations of abuse that

formed the basis for the charges against Chandler. To be sure,

despite the habeas court’s statement that the jury was “completely

unaware of the alleged victim ever being inconsistent” in her

allegations against Chandler, there was some evidence of minor

inconsistencies about the details of the abuse, but those

inconsistencies were not material to the habeas court’s conclusion

                                  17
that Gamble’s deficient performance prejudiced the defense.4

Presented with N.C.’s prior denials, jurors may well have concluded

that N.C.’s trial testimony against Chandler, like the hastily

scribbled entry in her diary, was a deliberate fabrication designed to

harm Chandler. Moreover, without the impeachment evidence, it

was just Chandler’s testimony against that of N.C., Williams, and

Field. We are not confident that the jury would have reached the

same result if presented with this impeachment evidence. See id. at

694 (“A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome.”). Thus, Chandler has shown

Strickland prejudice from Gamble’s deficient performance at trial.

     The warden resists this conclusion, arguing that in order to

show prejudice from Gamble’s deficient performance, Chandler was

required to call N.C. to testify at the habeas hearing or to present

an appropriate substitute for her sworn testimony such as an

affidavit to show how she would have responded when confronted

     4  N.C.’s allegations about when the abuse started were somewhat
unclear, and she was inconsistent about whether an object was put in her
vagina once or more than once.
                                  18
with her prior inconsistent statements. The important point for

purposes of assessing prejudice here is that Gamble’s failure to

introduce the prior inconsistent statements deprived Chandler of

the only evidence of N.C. denying the allegations at issue, which

would have been support different in kind from any other evidence

that he had to show that she was lying and untrustworthy.

Whatever N.C. might have testified on cross-examination could not

have had the effect of erasing that evidence entirely: even if she

could have cast doubt on or contested the accuracy of the statements,

they remained the only evidence of her denying the allegations at

issue and thus were still of substantial importance to a defense

grounded in trying to discredit N.C. Under these circumstances,

calling N.C. to testify at the habeas hearing was not necessary to

establish prejudice. See Cartwright, 305 Ga. at 379-381 (reversing

denial of habeas relief based on counsel’s failure to impeach a key

State witness with evidence of a prior inconsistent statement,

despite the lack of testimony or an affidavit from the witness

showing how he would have responded to the impeachment

                                 19
evidence, given the less than overwhelming evidence of guilt,

counsel’s chosen theory of defense, and the importance of the

witness’ testimony to the State’s case).

     (c)   Because Chandler has shown that his trial counsel

provided ineffective assistance, any deficiency in his appellate

counsel’s failure to raise and prove that ineffectiveness-of-trial-

counsel claim prejudiced his appeal. See id. at 381; Gramiak, 304

Ga. at 513. Thus, the only remaining question is whether Rogers

was professionally deficient in failing to raise and prove a claim that

Gamble provided ineffective assistance by failing to impeach N.C.’s

testimony at trial with her prior inconsistent statements contained

in Habeas Exhibit 10 and Habeas Exhibit 14.

     We fail to see why a competent appellate attorney would have

failed to raise and support such a claim under these circumstances.

As the habeas court recognized, this claim was clearly stronger than

the claims of insufficient evidence and improper bolstering that

Rogers chose to raise at the motion for new trial stage and on appeal,

which were easily rejected. No reasonable attorney would have

                                  20
failed to raise an ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim based

on Gamble’s failure to impeach N.C. with her prior inconsistent

statements and denials as reflected in the medical records and to

support that claim by presenting Habeas Exhibit 10 and Habeas

Exhibit 14 at the motion for new trial hearing, which were essential

to proving Gamble’s ineffectiveness. We therefore conclude that

Rogers provided ineffective assistance of appellate counsel in this

regard, and we affirm the habeas court’s grant of relief on this basis.

      Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur, except McMillian,
J., disqualified.

                                  21