Court Opinion

ID: 9742976
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:23:35.91988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:38.141178
License: Public Domain

N. PATRICK CROOKS, J.
¶ 66. (dissenting). Because I strongly disagree with the majority's reaffirmation of the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 941.23, despite the overwhelming passage of Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution, I respectfully dissent. Although this case presents an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of § 941.23,1 believe the statute is unconstitutional not only as applied here, but also on its face or per se, since it is contrary to Article I, Section 25. I write separately to reiterate the conclusions set *150forth in my concurrence/dissent in State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W2d 785, in which I took the same position in regard to the unconstitutionality of § 941.23.1 The broad language of Article I, Section 25 clearly overrides the very restrictive language of § 941.23.
¶ 67. A state, through its police power, may impose reasonable restrictions on the exercise of an individual's constitutional rights. It is undisputed that the constitutional amendment's broad declaration of the right to keep and bear arms may be reasonably limited by such police power. Yet, in light of our constitutional amendment which grants Wisconsin citizens the right to bear arms "for security, defense, hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose," a statutory prohibition on carrying concealed weapons at all times, *151under all circumstances, the sole exception being for peace officers, is not a reasonable exercise of the state's police powers. As I stated in my concurrence/dissent in Hamdan, "[t]he breadth of the statute is incompatible with the broad constitutional right to bear arms." Hamdan, 264 Wis. 2d 433, ¶ 103.
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¶ 68. The majority undertakes an analysis as to whether Wis. Stat. § 941.23 is unconstitutional as applied to Fisher, and in doing so, ignores a fundamental flaw in its own reasoning by failing to recognize that the amendment is too broad, and the statute is too restrictive to coexist.
¶ 69. Although the majority opinion refuses to give Fisher the benefit of the constitutional amendment, it again engages in interpreting the judicially created exceptions laid out in Hamdan. The majority cites Hamdan for the proposition that "[i]f the constitutional right to keep and bear arms for security is to mean anything, it must, as a general matter, permit a person to possess, carry, and sometimes conceal arms to maintain the security of his private residence or privately operated business . . . ." Id., ¶ 68 (emphasis added).
¶ 70. This court cannot create exceptions to Wis. Stat. § 941.23 to cure that statute's constitutional defects. That is the job of the Wisconsin Legislature.2 It is *152well-established in Wisconsin law that " '[w]here the language used in a statute is plain, the court cannot read words into it that are not found ... even to save its constitutionality, because this would be legislation and not construction.'" State v. Zarnke, 224 Wis. 2d 116, 139, 589 N.W.2d 370 (1999) (citing Mellen Lumber v. Indus. Comm., 154 Wis. 114, 120, 142 N.W. 187 (1913)). The legislature is the governmental body whose job it is to balance the competing interests between individuals and the public at large. This court must either uphold a statute as written, or strike it down as unconstitutional if it violates a constitutional provision. Judicially creating exceptions, on a case-by-case basis, is totally inappropriate.3 The majority's attempt to tie the Hamdan *153exceptions to self-defense and "extraordinary circumstances" (Majority op., ¶¶ 32-33) demonstrates an intent to continue the one-exception-at-a-time approach of Hamdan.
¶ 71. Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution reads, in its entirety, "The people have the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense, hunting, recreation or any other lawful purpose." Wis. Const, art. I, § 25. In this case, it is undisputed that Fisher was carrying a weapon for "security" purposes — a purpose that falls unambiguously within the amendment. Also, there is no dispute that he had only a lawful purpose. Yet, the majority concludes that he had no right to do so. While reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions may comport with the constitutional amendment,4 such public policy determinations are properly left to the legislature. The majority, instead of striking down the statute, attempts, yet again, to do the job of the legislature and to judicially rewrite Wis. Stat. § 941.23. The legitimate concerns of law enforcement are best addressed by the legislature, not by a piecemeal approach by this court.
¶ 72. Wisconsin Stat. § 941.23 could pass constitutional muster if it contained reasonable exceptions to the present far-reaching prohibition on carrying a concealed weapon. Wisconsin and Illinois are the only *154states, except Alaska and Vermont,5 without a law allowing residents to obtain permits to carry concealed weapons.6 Even though Illinois has adopted a constitutional provision guaranteeing the right to bear arms, and a law prohibiting the carrying of concealed weapons, it has also adopted statutory exceptions to its concealed-carry law.7 Except as noted, Wisconsin is the only state without such statutory exceptions and/or a permit system. Such exceptions, and/or a permit system, are necessary in light of the constitutional guarantees of Article I, Section 25. To relieve § 941.23 of its constitutional infirmity, the Wisconsin Legislature must either create a permit system so that qualified individuals may legally carry concealed weapons, and/or *155create exceptions to § 941.23 consistent with the use of the state's police power and the Wisconsin Constitution.
¶ 73. Despite the majority's contention to the contrary, the Wisconsin Legislature's attempts to modify Wis. Stat. § 941.238 are evidence of its belief that the present ban on carrying a concealed weapon is unconstitutional.9 Majority op., ¶ 51. The majority dismisses the argument of legislative intent on the grounds that the failure of the legislation to become law indicates that § 941.23 is still intact, albeit with the majority's judicially created exceptions. The majority then proceeds to determine that even if such failed legislation was indicative of legislative intent, it would still fail to support Fisher's claim of a constitutional right to carry a concealed weapon in his vehicle for business security purposes. This reasoning is flawed. The fact that the bill did not become law is certainly not indicative of a legislative intent to maintain the concealed weapon statute as it currently exists. The bill twice passed in both the Assembly and the State Senate, only to be vetoed by the Governor. See Ban on Concealed Weapons Stands, Milwaukee J. Sentinel, Feb. 3, 2004, http://www2.jsonline.com:80/news/state/feb04/204715.asp; http://www.legis.state.wi.us/2005/data/SB403hst.html. Moreover, in both the 2003-04 and 2005-06 sessions, the Senate successfully overrode the veto, while the Assembly only failed to do so by one vote in 2003-04, *156and by two votes in 2005-06. The majority, therefore, seems to confuse legislative intent with gubernatorial intent, despite the fact that the legislative intent could not be much clearer.
¶ 74. As it did in Hamdan, the majority once again improperly holds that the determination of the facts is to be done as a matter of law, rather than decided by the trier of fact — usually a jury. Having judicially carved out an exception to Wis. Stat. § 941.23 for a privately owned business in Hamdan, the majority decides here, as a matter of law, that Fisher's car, which is used to transport his tavern's money to the bank, cannot be considered an extension of his place of business. Majority op., ¶ 56. Such weighing of the evidence and finding of facts relating to Fisher's constitutional defense is appropriate only for the trier of fact. The majority also fails to give any deference, whatsoever, to the facts found by the circuit court, the trier of fact in this case. The statute is clearly unconstitutional as applied to Fisher.
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¶ 75. The majority in this case once again ignores the clear and explicit language of Article I, Section 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution, fails to strike down Wisconsin's overbroad and very restrictive concealed weapon statute, and instead continues to judicially re-write it, in order to attempt to cure its constitutional defects. I would hold that Wis. Stat. § 941.23 is unconstitutional in light of the constitutional amendment adopted overwhelmingly by Wisconsin citizens, both as applied here, and on its face given the broad language of Article I, Section 25.10 Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
*157¶ 76. I am authorized to state that Justices JON E WILCOX and PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK join that portion of this dissent that concludes that Wis. Stat. § 941.23 is unconstitutional as applied.

 I acknowledge that the majority opinion's affirmation of the facial constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 941.23 adheres to this court's own precedent as expressed in State v. Hamdan, 2003 WI 113, 264 Wis. 2d 433, 665 N.W.2d 785, and State v. Cole, 2003 WI 112, 264 Wis. 2d 520, 665 N.W2d 328. I have both a great appreciation of and high regard for the importance of stare decisis in our legal system. However, adherence to precedent that is obviously flawed is far more harmful to the integrity of and confidence in our legal system than abandoning such precedent in favor of a proper determination of law. As United States Supreme Court Justice Benjamin Cardozo wrote:
I am ready to concede that the rule of adherence to precedent, though it ought not to be abandoned, ought to be in some degree relaxed. I think that when a rule, after it has been duly tested by experience, has been found to be inconsistent with the sense of justice or with the social welfare, there should be less hesitation in frank avowal and full abandonment. We have had to do this sometimes in the field of constitutional law.
Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, Yale University Press, 150 (1960 ed.)(footnote omitted).

 This court plainly set forth the position that it is the role of the legislature, not the judiciary, to act in the area of laws concerning carrying concealed weapons. As we stated in State v. Dundon:
Forty-three states have legislative enactments permitting citizens to carry concealed weapons under a variety of conditions *152and circumstances. The existence of these many statutes underscores the impropriety of the judiciary attempting to act in this controversial policy area which is so clearly the province of other branches.
State v. Dundon, 226 Wis. 2d 654, 673, 594 N.W2d 780 (1999). It should be noted that now only Wisconsin remains without such legislative enactments. See infra notes 3, 4 and 5.

 See, e.g., Lang v. Lang, 161 Wis. 2d 210, 224, 467 N.W2d 772 (1991)(We cannot, under the guise of liberal construction, supply something that is not provided in a statute. . ..) (citing Application of Duveneck, 13 Wis. 2d 88, 92, 108 N.W2d 113 (1961)); State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 907, 470 N.W2d 900 (1991) (Our task is to construe the statute, not to rewrite it by judicial fiat.) (citing State v. Richards, 123 Wis. 2d 1, 12, 365 N.W2d 7 (1985)); State ex rel. Badtke v. Sch. Bd., 1 Wis. 2d 208, 213, 83 N.W.2d 724 (1957)(Modifications of the statute if it works badly or in unexpected and undesirable ways must be obtained through legislative, not judicial action.); Columbus Park Hous. v. Kenosha, 2003 WI 143, 34, 267 Wis. 2d 59, 671 N.W.2d 633 (citation omitted) ([I]t is the duty of this court to apply the policy the legislature has codified in the statutes, not impose our own policy choicesto do otherwise would render this court little more than a super-legislature. Thus, we must apply *153the statute as written, not interpret it as we think it should have been written.).

 As I noted in Hamdan, other Wisconsin laws restricting weapons are narrowly tailored and therefore do not create the same constitutional problems as the statute at issue. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. §§ 941.26 (ban on machine guns), 941.28 (ban on short-barreled shotguns and rifles), 941.29 (possession of a firearm by a felon), 948.60 (possession by a minor), and 948.605 (possession in a school). Hamdan, 264 Wis. 2d 433, ¶ 104 n.6.

 Alaska and Vermont allow the unpermitted carrying of concealed weapons.

 On March 23, 2006, the Kansas Legislature overrode Governor Kathleen Sebelius veto of SB 418, a concealed weapons bill. The new law will go into effect on July 1, 2006. Also, Nebraska Governor Dave Heineman signed LB 454, allowing the carrying of concealed weapons, into law on April 5, 2006.
See also David B. Kopel, The Licensing of Concealed Handguns for Lawful Protection: Support From Five State Supreme Courts, 68 Alb. L. Rev. 305 n.3 (2005).

 See 720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-l(a) (2005), which provides in relevant part:
A person commits the offense of unlawful use of weapons when he knowingly:
(4) Marries or possesses in any vehicle or concealed on or about his person except when on his land or in his own abode or fixed place of business any pistol, revolver, stun gun or taser or other firearm. . .."
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/24-l(a) (2005).

 In S.B. 214 (2003-04) and S.B. 403 (2005-06) the Wisconsin Legislature attempted to enact a permit system for carrying a concealed weapon and to create a home and business exception to Wis. Stat. § 941.23.

 While there is no Wisconsin case law that allows intent to be inferred from failed legislation, the legislative history in this case departs from the typical failed legislation and is therefore significant to the discussion of the constitutionality of Wis. Stat. § 941.23.

 As stated in my Hamdan concurrence/dissent, I would delay the holding for a reasonable period of time to allow time *157for the Wisconsin Legislature and the Governor to act. See DOC v. Kliesmet, 211 Wis. 2d 254, 267, 564 N.W.2d 742 (1997) (delaying, for one year, the effective date of this court's decision limiting the authority of the Wisconsin Department of Corrections to house inmates in county jails over sheriffs' objections).
See also Holytz v. Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W2d 618 (1962)(delaying for 40 days the effective date of this court's decision abrogating the doctrine of governmental tort immunity, while carefully analyzing the rights of the state in light of the Wisconsin Constitution); Pascucci v. Vagott, 362 A.2d 566 (NJ 1976)(delaying for 60 days the effective date of its decision invalidating a general assistance benefit schedule); Hellerstein v. Assessor of Town of Islip, 332 N.E.2d 279, 287 (NY 1975)(de-laying for 18 months the effective date of its decision invalidating real estate assessment technique); Bond v. Burrows, 690 P.2d 1168 (Wash. 1984) (delaying for 15 days the effective date of its decision invalidating a sales tax differential between counties).