Court Opinion

ID: 9773269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:40:52.868241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:51.370828
License: Public Domain

OPINION
DORSEY, Justice.
Appellant, Marco A. Rubio-Ardila, brought suit against appellee, Antonio Saavedra, Jr., for damages arising from an automobile accident. Summary judgment was granted to appellee because the statute of limitations barred the appellant’s claim. By three points of error, appellant argues that summary judgment was improper because an issue of material fact exists whether limitations was tolled by appellee’s absence from the State. Appel-lee did not file a brief. We reverse the trial court’s judgment.
In support of his motion for summary judgment appellee relied upon admissions of appellant, his own affidavit, and his deposition testimony. Appellant admitted and it is undisputed that the automobile wreck giving rise to this action occurred on May 20, 1987, and he filed suit on June 27, 1987, two years and thirty-six days later. There is no reliance on or mention of the date of service of citation. The applicable statute of limitations is two years. In response to appellee’s motion for summary judgment, appellant argued that appellee was absent from the state and limitations was thus tolled during the period of his absences under Tex.Civ.PRAc. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.063 (Vernon 1986), which provides:
The absence from this state of a person against whom a cause of action may be maintained suspends the running of the applicable statute of limitations for the time period of the persons absence.
Attached to the motion for summary judgment were the deposition of appellee, admissions of appellant, and an affidavit of appellee that states in relevant part:
My only absences from Cameron County have been temporary visits into Matamo-ros to do errands, shopping, etc. I estimate that on the average I go no more than the (10) times per year, if that much, to Matamoros to shop or for entertainment and such visits are only going into Matamoros and coming directly back to Brownsville, they do not entail my staying in Matamoros overnight or for more than a couple of hours.
In his response to the motion for summary judgment, appellant cited and attached portions of the movant-appellee’s deposition in which the following exchange occurred:
Q Would it be fair to say, Mr. Saave-dra — this is the last question I will ask you — that over the last three years you have been to Mexico more than 10 times?
A More than 10 times?
Q Yes, each year.
A Each year?
Q Yes, over 365 days of the year.
A I wouldn’t know for sure.
Q Is there a possibility that you—
A It’s possible, yes. It’s possible.
Q Is it possible — I know I have asked you this. Is it possible you went— over the last three years you have been to Mexico more than 15 times?
A 15?
Q Yes, over a period of 365 days.
A It’s possible, yes.
Q Is it also possible that over the last three years you have gone across the border to eat or to shop or whatever more than 20 times over a one-year period?
A I seriously doubt it.
The purpose of a summary judgment is to eliminate patently unmeritorious claims or untenable defenses. Swilley v. Hughes, 488 S.W.2d 64, 68 (Tex.1972); Barrow v. Jack’s Catfish Inn, 641 S.W.2d 624, 625 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1982, writ ref’d n.r.e.). A summary judgment should be granted only if evidence establishes that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that the movant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Barrow, 641 S.W.2d at 625; Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c).
The party seeking summary judgment has the burden of proof, and all doubts regarding the existence of a genuine issue of fact are to be resolved against the movant. All evidence favorable to the *647non-movant is taken as true, and every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts be resolved in the non-movant’s favor. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex.1985). When summary judgment is sought on the grounds that limitations have expired it is the mov-ant’s burden to conclusively establish the limitations bar. Zale Corp. v. Rosenbaum, 520 S.W.2d 889, 891 (Tex.1975). When the non-movant raises a suspension statute in response, the movant must also conclusively negate the applicability of these issues. Id. The application of the summary judgment rules reverses the burdens that would apply at trial, where the party relying on the tolling or suspension of limitations would have the burden of proving it at the peril of having limitations bar his action. See id.
Here the non-movant, appellant, raised the suspension statute in his responsive pleading citing deposition excerpts where the movant-appellee testified that it was “possible” that he was in Matamoros, Mexico, more than fifteen times a year but that he seriously doubted going across more than twenty times per year. Reading the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, one could construe the deposition testimony to entail between thirty and forty trips out of state over a two year period. In order to prevent summary judgment based on limitations, appellant would need to be out of state for 36 days, a period within the parameters of his evidence.
We find the Supreme Court’s opinion in Zale Corp. v. Rosenbaum controlling. There, suit was filed on June 28, 1973, four days before the running of limitations. Service of citation, however, was not requested until August 3, 1973, after limitations had expired. Rosenbaum, 520 S.W.2d at 891. In responding to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff raised two issues: 1) that it had been diligent in procuring issuance of citation and 2) that the defendant’s absence from the state tolled limitations under the statute. Id. The court of civil appeals held that the non-movant failed to meet its burden of raising a fact issue on either point because the evidence only established that the defendant’s absences from the state were partial as opposed to “full” days. Zale Corp. v. Rosenbaum, 517 S.W.2d 440, 442-44 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1974), reversed, 520 S.W.2d 889. The Supreme Court reversed in a Per Curiam opinion holding that the court of civil appeals had misconstrued the burden in a summary judgment case. Rosenbaum, 520 S.W.2d at 891. “Where the non-movant interposes a suspension statute, such as Article 5537 1, or pleads diligence in requesting issuance of citation, the limitation defense is not conclusively established until the movant meets his burden of negating the applicability of these issues.” Id. at 891, (citing Oram v. General Am. Oil Co., 513 S.W.2d 533 (Tex.1974)).
A summary judgment may be based on an interested party’s testimony if the evidence is “clear, positive and direct, otherwise credible and free from contradictions and inconsistencies, and could have been readily controverted.” Rule 166a(c). Here, all of the evidence concerning the tolling of limitations is from the defendant-movant. In support of his motion for summary judgment the movant submitted his affidavit in which he estimates that on the average he goes to Matamoros no more than ten times per year, if that much. The burden was his to conclusively negate that he was out of state thirty-six days during the two year limitation period. This he failed to do as the affidavit is not sufficiently clear, positive and direct to conclusively establish the inapplicability of the tolling statute.
We find that appellee has failed to conclusively establish the affirmative defense of limitations as a matter of law. Appel-lee’s affidavit regarding his absences from the State fails to negate the applicability of the suspension statute. We sustain appellant’s points of error one, two, and three. The judgment of the trial court is REVERSED and REMANDED.

. Now Tex.Civ.Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 16.063 (Vernon 1986).