Court Opinion

ID: 9639167
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:06:47.862356+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:13.493735
License: Public Domain

BROSKY, Judge,
dissenting:
I dissent. I would affirm the order of June 4, 1981, Appeal No. 707 Pittsburgh, 1981 and reverse the order of February 23, 1982, Appeal No. 1 Pittsburgh, 1983.
The majority’s disposition of this case is, indeed, consistent with Schmitz v. Schmitz, 305 Pa.Super. 328, 451 A.2d 555 (1982). However, for the following reasons I would overrule Schmitz.
The Superior Court case of Commonwealth ex rel. Mag-rini v. Magrini, 263 Pa.Super. 366, 398 A.2d 179 (1979), interpreted virtually identical statutory language to that analyzed in Schmitz.1
Clearly, these types of statutes were specifically drawn to protect the beneficiary’s family so he (or she) could not voluntarily or by means of creditor judgments, dissipate the assets and leave his family without a means of *314support. In view of this, we decline to interpret the Act of 1917, supra, to protect a delinquent husband’s pension funds from attachment for support.3
Commonwealth ex rel. Magrini v. Magrini, supra, 263 Pa.Superior Ct. at 370-1, 398 A.2d at 181.
Thus, it would appear that, the exemption not being applicable, an attachment would be valid in these circumstances. However, there is a complicating factor.
Note 3, above, states that a wife enforcing a support order is not a creditor. This is where the opinion in Schmitz — on which the en banc court below relied — comes into play.
Schmitz involved the attempted garnishment of the cash surrender value of life insurance policies to satisfy arrear-ages in payments owed under a support agreement. In an alternative holding, the opinion parallels the first two steps of our analysis: noting a similar statutory exemption and the exception to the exemption for support payments. Schmitz then went on to state that since the parties were divorced, she was a creditor and the exception to the exemption did not apply.
In the instant case we do not believe the [Commonwealth v.] Berfield [160 Pa.Super. 438, 51 A.2d 523 (1947) ] language is controlling. It must be emphasized that the parties were divorced. There is no longer a legal unity of husband and wife. The obligation here is imposed more so in contract than as an incident arising from the marital status. An absolute decree of divorce terminates the duty of a spouse to support his or her former spouse. Although a separation agreement providing support for a spouse will continue subsequent to a divorce, the obligation is based on a contract. The legal relationship of marriage has been severed.
Therefore, we find that the Schmitz’ divorce precludes us from applying policy relevant to the marital status. *315Appellee must be considered a judgment creditor and thus, under Pennsylvania law, her garnishment of the cash surrender value of the two life insurance policies cannot be allowed.
Schmitz, supra, 305 Pa.Super. at 332, 451 A.2d at 557 (citations omitted).
The holding of Schmitz is clear. Once a couple is divorced, the exception for support to the statutory exemption from attachment no longer applies. The facts in Schmitz vary from those before us in only one particular. Schmitz involved 42 Pa.C.S. § 8124(c) — the insurance exemption— and not, as here, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8124(b)(1)(vii) — the pension exemption. This sole difference in no way renders the holding of Schmitz inapplicable to the case before us. In fact, unless rejected, Schmitz would govern our resolution of the issue in question.
From Schmitz it would follow, therefore, that since Wade and Mary were divorced at all times during which support payments were not made, the exemption from attachment in 42 Pa.C.S. § 8124(b)(1)(vii) is in force here.
However, in good conscience I do not conclude that this Court should follow the law as it presently stands. The rule in Schmitz creates an unjustified exception to the rule in Magrini. Further, this exception applies to the vast majority of support cases — those in which the parties are divorced.
The exception created by Schmitz ignores the rationale, quoted above, of the Magrini case. The exemption from attachment statutes were designed to protect the interests of the family. It is perverse, to say the least, that those statutes should be used to deprive the family of support. That statutory purpose does not become inapplicable once the parties are divorced.2
*316Nor is the statutory purpose, as interpreted in Magrini, inapplicable by virtue of the fact that the instant default judgment arose out of a support agreement instead of a support order.3 While there may be a superficial appearance that Mary is a creditor because she was seeking to enforce a contract, it is readily apparent that a support agreement is not a standard type of contract but is, for our purposes, sui generis. In terms of the statutory purposes, Mary has not become a creditor — totally indistinguishable from Wade’s grocer or tailor — simply because she did not go to court and have the support agreement entered as an order. Her rights are still those which Magrini seeks to give special protection.
A contrary conclusion would put us in the position of compelling individuals, who are otherwise capable of amicably working out a support agreement between them, to each hire counsel and to go to court to seek a support order. The added expense and the injection of the adversarial process and the public exposure of private matters and the formality inherent in those procedures would, be the inevitable, undesirable and unnecessary consequences of such requirements. This would also run counter to the laudable *317trend in family law of reducing litigiousness and encouraging informal resolution.4
Schmitz is unwise even when, as here, no children are involved and the support order is only for the benefit of the divorced spouse. The former spouse’s duty to support the other spouse is an on going one. It is similarly undesirable even if the support order is apportioned between the children and the former spouse. The children are, after all, living with that former spouse and must share in her destitution if the support order cannot be enforced as to her. The rationale of the exemption statutes applies under these circumstances. I conclude that Schmitz should be expressly overruled.

. Schmitz analyzed 42 Pa.C.S. § 8124(b)(1)(vii). The statute interpreted in Magrini is 40 P.S. § 515.

 Additionally, we note that a wife enforcing a support order is not a "creditor." Commonwealth ex rel. Peterson v. Peterson, 100 Pa.Super. 600 (1930).

. This would be especially true with regard to the children of a terminated marriage. I fail to comprehend why the divorce of the childrens' parents should deprive the children of the very means to obtain support. Divorce does not alter the parent-child relationship. *316When a husband divorces a wife he does not divorce their children. Specifically, the duty of the parents to provide for their children continues after the divorce. Even when there are no children involved, as here, the support of the former spouse comes within the statutory purpose. Thus, I would find no rational basis for the effect of the Schmitz opinion on the case before us. Where the support order is not apportioned between the wife and children, it would be counterproductive to the childrens’ interests to prevent the assets being attached.

. In this connection I would note with approval the opinion of the hearing court which granted the attachment. "Under the divorce laws that existed at the time of this divorce, no alimony could be paid to a former spouse after a divorce from the bonds of matrimony. That being the case, it was not at all uncommon to induce spouses to forego divorce contests by entering into support agreements. ... This court will not draw a distinction between a support order entered by a court of competent jurisdiction and a support agreement entered into voluntarily by the parties in order to facilitate the obtaining of the divorce. The agreement was one for support and as such is favored by the public policy of the Commonwealth.” Hollman v. Hollman, 130 Pgh. L.J. 63 at 64 (1981) (Wekselman, J.).

. Through, for example, mediation.