Court Opinion

ID: 4136284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2017-02-18 02:11:53.27982+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:06.507276
License: Public Domain

THEA~ORNEY                GENERAL
                            OFTEXAS

                                September 2, 1959

Honorable Coke R. Stevenson
                   --    .       Opinion No. ww- 6%
Texas Liquor Control Ljoara
P. 0. Box 56                     Re:   Whether subsection 2 of
Austin 61, Texas                       H. B. 11, 56th Leg., 3rd
                                       C.S., directs the Liquor
                                       Control Board to collect
                                       a floor tax from all se-
                                       tailers of distilled
Dear Mr. Stevenson:                    spirits in Texas.
         You have requested an opinion concerning whether
or not Subsection 2 of Section 2 of House Bill 11, passed
at the 3rd Called Session of the 56th Legislature, directs
your Department to collect a "floor tax" from all retailers
of distilled spirits in Texas. You have also directed
attention to the fact that an objection to the Constitu-
tionality of the Act has been made on the ground that if
it does direct that the tax be collected/it is in conflict
with Article III, Section 35 of the Texas Constitution.
           The constitutional section referred to is as
follows:
         "No bill, (except general appropriation bills,
which may embrace the various subjects and accounts for and
on account of which monies are appropriated) shall contain
more than one subject, which shall be expressed in its title
But if any subject shall be embraced in an act,which shall
not be expressed in its title, such act shall be void only
as to so much thereof, as shall not be so expressed."
           The pertinent portions of the title to House Bill
11 are:
         "An Act. . .amending Section 21 of Article 1.
Chapter 467, Acts of the 44th Legislature, Second
Called Session 1935> as amended (compiled as Article 666.~21
of Ibid. P. 80. Particularly is this true in
regard to revenue measures. City of Beaumont v. Gulf States
Utilities Co., 163 S.W.2d 426 (Tex.Civ.App. 1942, erro-
refused).
         Giving the caption to H. B. 11 literal interpretation,
its purpose (in so far as relevant) is to amend Art. 666-21,
,Tex.Pen.Code,by increasing the tax on distilled spirits and
wine. It should be noted that the .captiondoes not specify
Honorable Coke R. Stevenson, Page 4    (Opinion No. WW- 695)

the .~--
    amount, or the nature of, or who is to pay the tax increase.
The tax levied by A.P=~-21,    Tex. Pen.Code is imposed on
distilled spirits and wine on -.-.-
                              which the -tax has not previously
                                                          -,.-
been paid. (See quotation o??Sec. 2.T   H, By-il,upsa).
ConseEtiy,    it is clear that any interested person(harticu-
a retailer) would reasonably be put on notice that the amend-
ment to said Article might make provision for the collection
of the tax increase on all liquor held for sale as of the
effective date of the increase.
         It is well settled that the caption of a bill need
not state every detail designed to effectuate, accomplish, or
enforce the main object of the act, but is sufficient if such
main purpose is stated. Continental Bus System v. Carney,
310 S.W.2d 676 (Tex.Civ.App.1958, error refused), City 07
Beaumont v. Gulf State Utilities Co., supra. And see 39 Tex.
jur. 90.7s stated in Wilkinson v. Lyen,,2U'(S.W. 638,640
(Tex. Civ.App. 1918):
         "It is also well settled that an act of the Legis-
lature is unobjectionable on the ground that it contains more
than one subject, if those subjects are germane or subsidiary
to the main sub,iect;that the requirement of the consti-
tutional provision is addressed to the subject, and not to
the details of the act, -+-
                        to accom lish the main object of -
                                                         the
act,and such details may be mu tifarious. miffS=te,
TTex.   Cr. R. 63, 109 S.W. 176; Singleton v. State, 53 Tex.
cr. R. 626, 111 S.W. 736, and authorities there cited."
(Emphasis added.)
Section 2 of H. B. 11, in effect, does three things:
         1.   Specifies the new rate applicable to distilled
              spirits and wine.
         2.   Clearly expresses the intent that for the pus-
              pose of the rate boost, "first possession"
              shall include possession of stock held for sale
              on September 1, 1959.

         3.   Directs that the tax increase be collected on
              all such stock.
         It is clesr that Nos. 2 and 3 above are designed
solely for the purpose of effectuating the tax increase, and
are germane to the main object of the Bill as stated in the
caption.
         For the reasons above stated, you are advised that
the provisions of subs. 2 of Sec. 2 of H. B. 11 are consti-
Honorable Coke R. Ste.venson,Page 5       (Opinion No. WW695)

tuitional. Accordingly, you are directed .tocollect the tax
increase from all retailers on all stock held fo;,sale as of
Septemoer 1, 1959.
                              SUMMARY
                     Subsection 2 of Section 2 of House
              Bill 11, 3rd C.S., 56th Leg., directs the
              Liquor Control Board to collect a "floor
              tax" on all stock held for sale as of
              September 1, 1959, from all retailers of
              distilled spirits and wine in Texas. Such
              provision does not contravene Art. III,
              Sec. 35, of the Texas Constitution.
                               Very truly yours,
                               WILL WILSON
                               Attorney General

                               By:             t+
                                        k N. Price '
JNP:lp
APPROVED:
OPINION COMMITTEE:
Geo P. Blackburn, Chairman

J. C. Davis
James R. Irion
Marvin H. Brown, Jr.
REVIEWED FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
By:
      W. V. Geppert