Court Opinion

ID: 9905610
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 20:05:04.157431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:46.251525
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Nov 29 2023, 9:58 am

                                                                            CLERK
                                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                                             and Tax Court

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Amy E. Karozos                                            Theodore E. Rokita
Public Defender of Indiana                                Attorney General of Indiana
Deidre R. Eltzroth                                        Tyler Banks
Deputy Public Defender                                    Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Indianapolis, Indiana

                                           IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

A.W.,                                                     November 29, 2023
Appellant-Petitioner,                                     Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          23A-JV-1609
        v.                                                Appeal from the Elkhart Circuit
                                                          Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Michael A.
Appellee-Respondent.                                      Christofeno, Judge
                                                          The Honorable Elizabeth Bellin,
                                                          Magistrate
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          20C01-2004-JD-157

                                 Opinion by Judge Riley.
                             Judges Crone and Mathias concur.

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-1609 | November 29, 2023                           Page 1 of 13
      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellant-Petitioner, A.W., appeals the trial court’s denial of his motion for

      relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rules 60(B)(6) and (8) without

      conducting an evidentiary hearing.

[2]   We affirm.

      ISSUES
[3]   A.W. presents three issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:

          (1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for

              relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) when his

              admission to juvenile delinquency was motivated by a threat of criminal

              prosecution against his father;

          (2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by denying his motion for

              relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8) when his

              admission to juvenile delinquency was the result of ineffective assistance

              of trial counsel; and

          (3) Whether the trial court was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing

              on his Indiana Trial Rule 60(B) motions.

      FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
[4]   On April 16, 2020, the State filed a delinquency petition in Cause 20C01-2004-

      JD-000157 (Cause 157), alleging that thirteen-year-old A.W. had committed

      child molesting as a Level 3 felony, if committed by an adult. Later, the State

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-1609 | November 29, 2023    Page 2 of 13
      filed a second delinquency petition under a separate cause number 20C01-2004-

      JD-000158 (Cause 158), 1 alleging that A.W. had committed child molesting as

      a Level 4 felony, if committed by an adult. On October 23, 2020, the trial court

      conducted a consolidated fact-finding hearing.

[5]   At the commencement of the consolidated hearing, the State informed the trial

      court that the victim and the victim’s mother in Cause 157 were not present in

      court as the State “started having communication problems” with the victim’s

      mother, who had indicated “some concerns” about A.W.’s father. (Appellant’s

      App. Vol. III, p. 5). The State elaborated that “in one of my meetings with me,

      she did indicate she was a little fearful of retaliation. She lives close to [A.W.’s

      father], a couple doors down. I assured her I didn’t think [A.W.’s father] was

      gonna be causing any problems. I had no reason to believe so.” (Appellant’s

      App. Vol. III, p. 10). Being asked about the situation, A.W.’s counsel advised

      the trial court, “I was informed, just prior to court, by [A.W.’s father] that he

      has had encounters and had to call the police on [victim’s mother] twice in the

      past month because of threats she’s made toward A.W.” (Appellant’s App.

      Vol. III, p. 14).

[6]   The trial court proceeded to hear testimony in the consolidated hearing. The

      State called the investigator, who had tried to locate the victim’s mother and the

      victim in Cause 157, and a detective, who testified that the local sheriff’s office

      1
       The record does not include the chronological case summary for this Cause and the exact date of filing the
      delinquency petition cannot be determined.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-1609 | November 29, 2023                           Page 3 of 13
      had received three calls from A.W.’s father in the past month, filing complaints

      against the victim’s mother. After the trial court agreed to issue a writ of body

      attachment for the victim’s mother, the State mentioned that it would be

      “looking at a forfeiture by wrongdoing” “based upon the behavior of [A.W.’s

      father] that we’ve introduced here.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, pp. 88-89). The

      State then returned to presenting testimony of the victim in Cause 158.

[7]   After the trial court admitted the forensic interview of the victim in Cause 158,

      A.W.’s counsel requested a recess, which was granted. Upon reconvening,

      A.W.’s counsel indicated that she had conferred with A.W. and had learned

      that A.W. “may want to” admit to the allegations in both delinquency

      petitions. (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 108). The trial court placed A.W.

      under oath and specifically inquired if it was his intention to stop the trial and

      admit to the allegations claimed by the State. A.W. indicated that he had

      received enough time to speak with his counsel and his father about the

      decision to admit to the allegations. The trial court then proceeded to advise

      A.W. of his rights and informed him that with his admission, he would be

      waiving his right to a trial. A.W. confirmed that he understood. A.W.’s

      counsel informed the trial court that the decision to admit to the formal

      delinquency petitions was a free and voluntary decision made by A.W.:

              Trial court: And, A.W., nobody’s forcing you or threatening you
              to do this, is that right?

              A.W.: (No audible response)

              Trial court: You have to answer out loud.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-1609 | November 29, 2023      Page 4 of 13
              A.W.: Nobody’s doing that to me.

              Trial court: It’s your own free and voluntary decision to - -

              A.W.: Yes.

              Trial court: - - to admit to what’s been charged. Right?

              A.W.: Yes.

      (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 114). Factual bases were then tendered to the trial

      court and the trial court entered an adjudication in both Causes.

[8]   On December 1, 2020, the trial court conducted a dispositional hearing.

      During the hearing, the trial court encouraged A.W.’s father to ask questions if

      he was confused about anything. Although A.W. and A.W.’s father had an

      opportunity to address the trial court and participate in the conversation as to

      the best rehabilitative plan for A.W., neither A.W. nor A.W.’s father raised any

      concern about A.W. having been coerced to admit to the allegations. At the

      close of the hearing, A.W. was placed under probation supervision. After his

      admission and dispositional hearing, A.W. appeared before the trial court six

      additional times and at no time did he indicate that his original admissions

      were not voluntary or that he had been coerced into making his admissions.

      On March 23, 2022, after numerous failed attempts at less restrictive

      rehabilitation services, A.W. was made a ward of the Indiana Department of

      Correction (DOC).

[9]   Approximately one year later, on March 21, 2023, A.W. filed a motion for

      relief from judgment pursuant to Indiana Trial Rules 60(B)(6) and (8),

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-1609 | November 29, 2023    Page 5 of 13
       requesting the trial court to vacate the delinquency adjudications because his

       admissions had been motivated by “the perceived threat of a criminal charge

       against his father,” and later added a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 195). On May 10, 2023, the trial court conducted

       a status hearing on the motion. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court

       took the “question of timeliness [of the motion] under advisement,” and offered

       the parties time to file a supplemental brief on “specifically the issue of

       timeliness of the [T.R.] 60(B) motion.” (Transcript p. 13).

[10]   On May 31, 2023, the trial court issued a detailed Order denying A.W.’s

       motion for relief from judgment under T.R. 60(B)(6) because A.W. “provide[d]

       no supporting information by way of affidavit or the like within the record that

       contradicts [AW.’s] sworn testimony that his admission was made without

       force, threat, or coercion.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 216). The trial court

       likewise denied A.W.’s motion under T.R. 60(B)(8) because the motion was

       untimely, and no meritorious claim or defense had been identified.

[11]   A.W. now appeals. Additional facts will be provided if necessary.

       DISCUSSION AND DECISION
       I. Standard of Review

[12]   Because A.W. seeks relief from judgment under Trial Rules 60(B)(6) and (8),

       this case implicates two standards of review. When a judgment is void under

       Rule 60(B)(6), the trial court has no discretion to enforce it, and thus, we review

       the court’s decision de novo. M.H. v. State, 207 N.E.3d 412, 416 (Ind. 2023).
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-1609 | November 29, 2023         Page 6 of 13
       But under Rule 60(B)(8)’s catchall provision, whether relief is warranted “is left

       to the equitable discretion of the trial court,” and thus, we review the court’s

       decision for an abuse of that discretion. T.D. v. State, 219 N.E.3d 719, 724 (Ind.

       2023). A trial court abuses its discretion if it misinterprets the law or if its

       decision clearly contravenes the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances

       before it. See, e.g., id.; Smith v. Franklin Twp. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 151 N.E.3d 271,

       273 (Ind. 2020).

       II. Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6) 2

[13]   Trial Rule 60(B)(6) allows a party to move for relief at any time if “the

       judgment is void.” T.R. 60(B)(6); see also Anderson v. Wayne Post 64, Am. Legion

       Corp., 4 N.E.3d 1200, 1205 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. Therefore, to be

       entitled to relief, the party must establish that the judgment is void, not

       voidable. Koonce v. Finney, 68 N.E.3d 1086, 1090 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans.

       denied. The distinction between these two terms is “no mere semantic quibble.”

       Stidham v. Whelchel, 698 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Ind. 1998). While a void judgment

       “is a complete nullity” without legal effect from its inception, a voidable

       judgment “is capable of confirmation or ratification,” making it subject to

       2
         The trial court denied A.W.’s motion pursuant to T.R. 60(B)(6) based on the established ground that
       T.R.60(B) cannot be used to present a claim that could have been, but was not presented, on direct appeal.
       See Perkins v. State, 718 N.E.2d 790, 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). The trial court noted that A.W. “is requesting
       that the [c]ourt hear new evidence related to the voluntariness of his plea, a fact that was known to [A.W.]
       when a direct appeal could have been perfected. [A.W.] did not file a direct appeal during his case, either
       after this [c]ourt entered the first dispositional decree on December 1, 2020, or when this [c]ourt modified the
       child’s dispositional decree for the last time on March 23, 2022.” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, 216). While we
       agree with the trial court, based on our de novo review, we reach the same result but on different grounds.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-1609 | November 29, 2023                              Page 7 of 13
       ordinary appellate or other direct procedures to correct it. Id. (quoting 46 Am.

       Jur. 2d Judgments §§ 30, 31 (1994)).

[14]   In its very recent opinion in T.D., our supreme court clarified the concept of a

       void judgment within the confines of Indiana Trial Rule 60(B). Specifically,

       our supreme court pronounced that

               a trial court’s judgment is void if the court lacks personal
               jurisdiction, subject matter jurisdiction, or the authority to render
               the judgment. That said, we construe “authority” narrowly to
               distinguish void errors from voidable legal or procedural errors.
               There is a distinct difference between a judgment that the law
               does not authorize under any circumstances (a void judgment),
               and a judgment authorized by law but derived in violation of law
               (a voidable judgment). In the latter scenario, the trial court still
               has the requisite authority to act, and thus, the error is a
               procedural irregularity that can be cured.

       T.D., 219 N.E.3d at 726-27 (internal references omitted). In T.D., our supreme

       court was faced with the issue whether a trial court’s failure to comply with the

       Juvenile Waiver Statute rendered an agreed delinquency adjudication void or

       voidable for purposes of a motion made pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule

       60(B)(6). Id. at 727. Despite warning that “given the special caution afforded

       to juvenile admissions, a trial court’s failure to comply with the Juvenile

       Waiver Statute is particularly alarming,” the court noted that this “failure does

       not mean the court lacks the legal authority under any set of circumstances to

       adjudicate a juvenile as a delinquent.” Id. “Indeed, nothing in the juvenile

       code prohibits a court from entering judgment on an agreed delinquency

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-1609 | November 29, 2023       Page 8 of 13
       adjudication despite an invalid waiver of rights.” Id. As such, the supreme

       court concluded that “violations of the Juvenile Waiver Statute do not render a

       subsequent delinquency adjudication void; they render it voidable because the

       error can be cured if challenged.” Id. Applying our supreme court’s holding in

       T.D. to the situation before us, we reach a similar result. A.W.’s allegations of

       purported deficiencies in admission proceedings and claims of involuntary

       admissions do not render a delinquency adjudication void, but merely voidable

       as the error can be cured when challenged. Accordingly, as A.W.’s

       adjudication cannot be held void, A.W. is foreclosed from proceeding under

       Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(6).

       III. Indiana Trial Rule 60(B)(8)

[15]   Trial Rule 60(B)(8) permits a party to obtain relief from judgment for “any

       reason” other than those set forth in other subsections of the rule that are not

       relevant here. T.R. 60(B)(8). To be entitled to relief under this rule, the movant

       must file their motion “within a reasonable time” and “allege a meritorious

       claim or defense.” T.R. 60(B)(8). Additionally, our precedent requires the

       moving party to “demonstrate some extraordinary or exceptional circumstances

       justifying equitable relief.” State v. Collier, 61 N.E.3d 265, 268 (Ind. 2016).

[16]   Focusing on the reasonable time requirement of T.R. 60(B)(8), the trial court

       concluded that

               In this instance, an adjudication was entered on September 18,
               2020. Counsel for [A.W.] did not enter her appearance until July
               2022, and transcripts were requested in August 2022, almost two
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-1609 | November 29, 2023      Page 9 of 13
               (2) years after the adjudication. Almost seven (7) months after
               counsel received the transcripts was a Motion for Relief filed.
               Counsel does not provide specific reasons for the delay, only that
               counsel sought relevant documentation and conducted necessary
               investigation during those seven (7) months. It cannot be said
               that such a delay is timely, particularly in juvenile delinquency
               cases that have strict statutory timelines. Furthermore, time was
               and is of the essence in this instance, as counsel concedes that
               [A.W.] has already completed the sex offender treatment
               program within the [DOC], and alleges that such completion is
               akin to having already “served his sentence.”

       (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 217). In support of his contention that the trial

       court abused its equitable discretion by declaring his T.R. 60(B)(8) motion to be

       filed outside the reasonable time parameters, A.W. requests this court to

       artificially limit the relevant timeframe in which to consider the reasonableness

       requirement as starting after the final modification of his disposition and

       wardship to the DOC, rather than when the adjudication was officially

       admitted and entered.

[17]   However, contrary to A.W.’s request, in making its determination of the

       reasonable time requirement, “the court must consider the length of time that

       elapsed from the date of the judgment to the date of the filing of the Trial Rule

       60 motion, the circumstances of the delay, the diligence exercised by the

       movant, and the possibility of prejudice to the opposing party.” Jordan v. State,

       549 N.E.2d 382, 384 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), trans. denied. In D.D.J. v. State, 640

       N.E.2d 768, 769-70 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), trans. denied, we calculated the

       relevant time period under T.R. 60(B)(8) in collateral attacks on delinquency

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-1609 | November 29, 2023    Page 10 of 13
       adjudications as running from the time of the adjudication to the time of the

       filing of the motion.

[18]   A.W.’s dispositional hearing was conducted on December 1, 2020, and he filed

       his T.R. 60(B)(8) motion based on ineffective assistance of counsel almost two-

       and-a-half years later, on March 21, 2023. The ineffective assistance of counsel

       claim, which is grounded in A.W.’s perceived coerced admission, was available

       to him since his adjudication. He appeared in court many times after his

       disposition for rehabilitative placement modifications and never lodged a

       complaint about the circumstances of his admissions. Furthermore, the State

       would be prejudiced if a new fact-finding hearing would be required: one

       witness was impaired in her memory due to her young age at the time of the

       first factfinding hearing, and the record is silent about the testimonial capacity

       of the second victim. See Stewart v. State, 548 N.E.2d 1171, 1176 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1990) (“If reasonable likelihood of successful prosecution is materially

       diminished by the passage of time attributable to the defendant’s neglect, such

       may be deemed a sufficient demonstration of prejudice.”), trans. denied.

       Accordingly, based on the lapse of time, the prejudice to the State, and the trial

       court’s equitable discretion, we affirm the trial court’s conclusion that A.W.’s

       T.R. 60(B)(8) motion was filed untimely. See also D.D.J, 640 N.E.2d at 769-70

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-1609 | November 29, 2023      Page 11 of 13
       (holding that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by denying the

       juvenile’s T.R. 60(B)(8) motion after a two-year delay). 3

       III. Evidentiary Hearing

[19]   Lastly, A.W. contends that the trial court erred by not conducting an

       evidentiary hearing on his T.R. 60(B) motions, as an evidentiary hearing was

       mandatory to show that neither A.W.’s counsel nor A.W. realized at the time

       of his admissions that the admissions were improperly motivated or coerced.

[20]   Indiana Trial Rule 60(D) dictates that the trial court “shall hear any pertinent

       evidence” in resolving a motion for relief from judgment. However, when there

       is no pertinent evidence to be heard, a hearing is unnecessary. Thompson v.

       Thompson, 811 N.E.2d 888, 904 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Pub. Serv.

       Comm’n v. Schaller, 299 N.E.2d 625, 628 (1973) (noting that the language of

       Rule 60(D) is mandatory but only for the presentation of “pertinent evidence”)),

       reh’g denied, trans. denied. “The catalyst needed to obtain the proper relief is

       some admissible evidence, which may be in the form of an affidavit, testimony

       of witnesses, or other evidence obtained through discovery[.]” State Farm Fire &

       Cas. Co. v. Radcliff, 18 N.E.3d 1006, 1016-17 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014).

       3
        Because we affirm the trial court’s ruling based on the timeliness requirement of T.R. 60(B)(8), we do not
       analyze A.W.’s argument concerning the existence of a meritorious claim or defense and his demonstration
       of some extraordinary or exceptional circumstances justifying equitable relief.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-1609 | November 29, 2023                          Page 12 of 13
[21]   In the preamble of its decision, the trial court advised that it had considered “all

       of the filings in the above cause, and ha[d] reviewed the entire transcript

       submitted by [A.W.] marked as ‘Exhibit A.’” (Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p.

       214). A.W. did not file any affidavits or other admissible evidence to support

       his contention that he had been coerced into his admissions, nor did he specify

       in his filings to the court what other pertinent evidence would be needed to

       adjudicate his claim. See, e.g., Williams v. Tharp, 934 N.E.2d 1203, 1214-15

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“Appellants have failed to direct us to any pertinent

       evidence that was not before the trial court when it ruled on their motion.”).

       Therefore, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred when it did not conduct

       an evidentiary hearing on A.W.’s T.R. 60(B) motions.

       CONCLUSION
[22]   Based on the foregoing, we hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion

       by denying A.W.’s motions for relief from judgment pursuant to T.R. 60(B)(6)

       and (8) and the trial court was not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing.

       Affirmed.

       Crone, J. and Mathias, J. concur

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-JV-1609 | November 29, 2023     Page 13 of 13