Court Opinion

ID: 9537516
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:19:26.413515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:56:44.492144
License: Public Domain

CROCKETT, Chief Justice
(concurring, but with separate comments).
I agree that the court’s disposition of this case is not without justification in law. But I cannot see the practicality nor the wisdom of failing to treat the issue presented. This is especially so because the issue upon which the main opinion is based was not raised in the district court, nor by either party in this Court,1 and both seem to desire to have an answer. I am impelled to point out that the problem will continue to exist until some answer is provided. For that reason, I think it not amiss to make some separate observations.
The purpose of the statute providing for declaratory judgments was to afford a means for obtaining an adjudication without the necessity of anyone having suffered damages or gotten into serious difficulties before he could have his rights determined.2 Accordingly, there is sound law, with which I am in accord, to the effect that, especially where there is a public interest to be served, the courts should be liberal in dealing with such matters.3
Even in a democracy, where great emphasis is properly placed on the right of each individual to do as he pleases, there must be some limitations upon the freedoms of individuals for the common good. In order to avoid confusion in elections, it is necessary that there be imposed some reasonable requirements as to qualifications and procedures.
The desired objective is to provide a method which will allow, and indeed encourage, well-qualified candidates to indicate their willingness to serve in public office, and at the same time, enable the voters to make the best choice between them. There are a number of public interests to be served in keeping the number of candidates within manageable proportions. This justifies the guarding against filings which may be for purposes other than good faith candidacies,4 such as filings by crusaders, fanatics, or eccentrics, who have no realistic prospect of public support, who may file merely for publicity, or for other unjustified or obstructive purposes.5
The requirement of a payment of a reasonable filing fee, in addition to having other specified qualifications for office, seems calculated to minimize the evils just mentioned and to serve the desired objective of limiting the candidates to persons of good qualifications and serious purpose who have at,least some reasonable prospect of public support. This aids in reducing vot.er confusion by allowing attention to be focused upon a reasonably small number of such candidates; and it avoids the encumbering of the handling of elections.
In a society where money is so essential as a means of living, the likelihood of a person entirely without money being otherwise qualified for public office would seem to be quite rare. Nevertheless, allowance should be made for that possibility. If such a person has the other qualifications to be *244regarded a bona fide candidate who will attract any substantial support, it is safe to assume that some of his supporters would provide his filing fee; or as a reasonable alternative thereto,6 he could be required to obtain a substantial number of signatures to support his filing.
With deference to the position expressed in the main opinion, it is my judgment that this Court would perform a useful and desirable public purpose by so confronting and dealing with the problem presented, and rejecting the attack upon the statute.
MAUGHAN, J., concurs in the result of Chief Justice CROCKETT’S concurring opinion.
WILKINS, J., having disqualified himself, does not participate herein.

. That we do not consider matters raised for the first time on appeal, see Hamilton v. Salt Lake County, 15 Utah 2d 216, 390 P.2d 235.

. See 1 C.J.S. Actions, § 18(3) and cases there cited; see also Parker v. Rampton, 28 Utah 2d 36, 497 P.2d 848, citing Terrace v. Thompson, Attorney General of Wash., 263 U.S. 197, 44 S.Ct. 15, 68 L.Ed. 255.

. Id. There are some situations where, due to unavoidable delays in our legal system, the problem will become moot before the case can be decided.

. See Anno. 89 A.L.R.2d 864.

. The public press (Salt Lake Tribune, December 30, 1979) reports that an opponent accuses one politician, Panjay Ghandi, of encouraging and causing such a chaotic condition in India where over 500 persons have filed to be candidates for one party’s seats in their congress.

. See Lubin v. Punish, 415 U.S. 709, 94 S.Ct, 1315, 39 L.Ed.2d 702; and this is said notwithstanding Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 92 S.Ct. 849, 31 L.Ed.2d 92, relating to specific conditions in Texas.