Court Opinion

ID: 9880690
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 15:00:29.821618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:57:10.450458
License: Public Domain

22-1517-cr (L)
United States v. Thornton

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                         SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A
SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED
BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1.
WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY
MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE
NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

       At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held
at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New
York, on the 28th day of September, two thousand twenty-three.

PRESENT: JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
           DENNY CHIN,
           ALISON J. NATHAN,
                 Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                 Appellee,

        v.                                             22-1517-cr (L),
                                                       22-1518-cr (CON)

BRIANA GARLAND,
                            Defendant,

REGINALD THORNTON,
                 Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________________
FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT:                   MOLLY K. CORBETT, Assistant Federal
                                           Public Defender, for Lisa A. Peebles,
                                           Federal Public Defender for the
                                           Northern District of New York,
                                           Albany, NY.

FOR APPELLEE:                              CARINA H. SCHOENBERGER (Joshua R.
                                           Rosenthal, on the brief), Assistant
                                           United States Attorneys, for Carla B.
                                           Freedman, United States Attorney for
                                           the Northern District of New York,
                                           Syracuse, NY.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Northern

District of New York (Suddaby, J.).

      UPON     DUE     CONSIDERATION,         IT   IS   HEREBY      ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

      While serving a state prison sentence, Reginald Thornton conspired with

two others to defraud the State of New York of $31,276 in unemployment and

pandemic relief funds. Thornton pled guilty to two counts of mail fraud and one

count of aggravated identity theft and was sentenced to 51 months’ federal

imprisonment consecutive to any state sentence (Suddaby, J.).        On appeal,

Thornton asserts that the district court’s sentence was procedurally and

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substantively unreasonable.       We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and the record of prior proceedings, to which we refer only as

necessary to explain our decision.

   I.      Background

        Thornton is currently serving a nine-year prison sentence in the New York

State correctional system for drug-related offenses. In 2020, while serving that

sentence at Bare Hill Correctional Facility, Thornton participated in two mail fraud

conspiracies that involved falsely claiming eligibility for state and federal

pandemic-related unemployment funds. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he pled

guilty to two counts of conspiracy to commit mail fraud and one count of

aggravated identity theft.

        At sentencing, the district court adopted the presentence report’s Guidelines

calculations, to which neither party objected. The Guidelines range for each of

the two conspiracy counts was 21 to 27 months. The Guidelines sentence for the

identity theft count was the statutory minimum of 24 months consecutive to any

other sentence.    See 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), (b)(2). After considering the plea

agreement, the parties’ submissions, the Guidelines, and the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)

sentencing factors, the district court sentenced Thornton to 27 months’

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imprisonment for each of the two mail fraud counts, to be served concurrently,

and the mandatory minimum of 24 months’ imprisonment for the aggravated

identity theft count, to be served consecutively. The total prison term thus came

to 51 months, which the district court concluded should be served consecutively

to Thornton’s state sentence. The district court reasoned that the sentence was

necessary upon its review of the record and consideration of the § 3553(a) factors,

especially because the instant offenses “represent[ed] the defendant’s eighth and

ninth and tenth felony conviction[s]” and because of “[t]he audacity, the

outrageousness, quite frankly, of serving a sentence in a state facility and still

committing crimes. . . .” App’x 108–09.

         Thornton timely appealed, challenging the procedural and substantive

reasonableness of his sentence.

   II.     Discussion

         “We review the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a sentence

under a deferential abuse-of-discretion standard,” which “incorporates de

novo review of questions of law, including our interpretation of the Guidelines,

and clear error review of questions of fact.” United States v. Yilmaz, 910 F.3d 686,

688 (2d Cir. 2018).

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        However, we review procedural sentencing challenges not raised in the

district court for plain error. United States v. Verkhoglyad, 516 F.3d 122, 128 (2d

Cir. 2008). To demonstrate plain error, an appellant must show that “(1) there is

an error; (2) the error is clear or obvious, rather than subject to reasonable dispute;

(3) the error affected the appellant’s substantial rights . . . ; and (4) the error

seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.” United States v. Marcus, 560 U.S. 258, 262 (2010) (cleaned up).

   a.    Procedural Reasonableness

        A sentence is procedurally unreasonable if the district court “fails to

calculate (or improperly calculates) the Sentencing Guidelines range, treats the

Sentencing Guidelines as mandatory, fails to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selects

a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or fails adequately to explain the

chosen sentence.” United States v. Chu, 714 F.3d 742, 746 (2d Cir. 2013) (citation

omitted).    Thornton argues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable

because the district court both failed to consider Thornton’s history and

characteristics as required by § 3553(a)(1), and also treated the Guidelines as

mandatory in its decision to run Thornton’s federal and state sentences

consecutively.   Because Thornton did not raise these arguments in the district

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court, plain error review applies.        We conclude that neither of Thornton’s

arguments demonstrates plain error.

      First, we are unpersuaded by Thornton’s claim that the district court failed

to properly consider the § 3553(a) factors. At sentencing, the district court stated

that it had considered the factors, and it demonstrated a deep knowledge of

Thornton’s history and characteristics.

      Second, the district court’s decision to impose a sentence consecutive to

Thornton’s state sentence did not involve plain error. By statute, “if a term of

imprisonment is imposed on a defendant who is already subject to an

undischarged term of imprisonment, the terms may run concurrently or

consecutively. . . .” 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). However, the Guidelines recommend

that an offense committed while imprisoned should be sentenced consecutively to

the undischarged term of imprisonment. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.3(a). Thornton argues

that because the district court did not mention 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) during

sentencing, it must not have recognized that it had discretion to depart from the

Guidelines’ recommendation of a consecutive sentence and treated that

recommendation as mandatory. Appellant’s Br. at 26-27. This argument lacks

merit. In determining whether to impose a consecutive or concurrent sentence,

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trial judges can and should consider the Sentencing Guidelines, among other

factors. 18 U.SC. §§ 3584(b); 3553(a)(4). It was proper for the district court to

consult the Guidelines, and there is no record evidence that the district court

believed them to be mandatory.           Rather, the district court agreed with the

reasoning of the Guidelines, explaining that the sentence would be consecutive

because Thornton committed his offense while already imprisoned. App’x 109-

10.       We   therefore   have    no    reason   to   depart   from    our   ordinary

“presum[ption] . . . that [the] sentencing judge has faithfully discharged her duty

to consider the statutory factors.”     United States v. Fernandez, 443 F.3d 19, 30 (2d

Cir. 2006), abrogated on other grounds by Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007).

      b. Substantive Reasonableness

        Sentences are substantively unreasonable only if they are “so shockingly

high, shockingly low, or otherwise unsupportable as a matter of law that allowing

them to stand would damage the administration of justice.”             United States v.

Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265, 289 (2d Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Thornton argues that the

district court relied too heavily on his criminal history and the fact that he

committed the offense while incarcerated, and that it should have put more weight

on his youth and lack of support systems. This argument is unavailing.

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         In reviewing a sentence for substantive reasonableness, “we do not consider

what weight we would ourselves have given a particular factor,” but rather

“consider whether the factor, as explained by the district court, can bear the weight

assigned it under the totality of circumstances in the case.” United States v. Cavera,

550 F.3d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (en banc).            Notwithstanding Thornton’s

arguments, we see no reason why the factors the district court considered cannot

“bear the weight” assigned to them here. It was reasonable for the district court

to balance the aggravating and mitigating factors as it did. Further, Thornton’s

sentence falls within the Guidelines range.    Although a Guidelines sentence is not

presumptively reasonable, see id. at 190, it is reasonable in the “overwhelming

majority of cases,” United States v. Watkins, 667 F.3d 254, 261 (2d Cir. 2012) (citation

omitted). This case is no exception.

                                        * * *

         We have considered Thornton’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district

court.

                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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