Court Opinion

ID: 9731079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:32:32.007416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:12.899661
License: Public Domain

LAMBERT, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
The opinion of the majority improperly circumscribes the jurisdiction of Kentucky courts and undermines important state and federal policy. It is truly extraordinary for a Kentucky court to hold that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction of a claim for Kentucky Civil Rights Act violations committed against its employees by a Kentucky corporation.1
Circuit courts “have original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not vested in some other court.”2 “The circuit court is a court of general jurisdiction; it has original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not *194exclusively vested in some other court.”3 Under these provisions, Kentucky circuit courts, unlike their federal counterparts that require an express grant of jurisdiction, are granted subject matter jurisdiction in all cases except where it is expressly denied. As such, the focus of the majority opinion on whether the trial court was granted jurisdiction is misplaced; the inquiry should be whether jurisdiction has been denied. Nothing in the Act remotely constitutes an express denial of subject matter jurisdiction.4
The fundamental basis for the majority opinion is found in language from the general purposes provision of the Act which refers to protection of “individuals within this state.”5 To reach its conclusion, however, there has been a tortured reading of the entire general purposes section and disregard of the first sentence, “to provide for execution within the state of the policies embodied in the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964 ...” (emphasis added). Other provisions of the Act remove any doubt as to legislative intent that all persons employed by an employer subject to the Act are covered. KRS 344.030(5) defines “employee” as “an individual employed by an employer,” and KRS 344.450 states, “any person injured by any act in violation of this chapter shall have a civil cause of action in circuit court .... ” Moreover, application of the Act by the majority leads straightaway to inconsistent treatment of corporate employees working in Kentucky and those who work in another state. The majority should have been guided by KRS 446.080 which requires that statutes “be liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the intention of the legislature, and the rule that statues in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed shall not apply to the statutes of this state.”
The most pernicious effect of the majority opinion is that it undermines compelling state and federal policy. The Act (KRS 344, et. seq.) Is intended to encompass and guarantee under state law the provisions of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VIII of the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1968, the Fair Housing Act as amended (42 USC 360), the Federal Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 as amended.6 With the majority opinion here, these paramount rights have been thwarted. Rights available to an employee within Kentucky are wholly denied to an employee of the same corporation who is directed by the employer to work outside this state, despite the fact that all relevant decisions were made in Kentucky.
As the majority opinion is predicated entirely upon lack of subject matter jurisdiction, it found no need to address numerous other significant issues presented in this case. This record should reflect, however, that the case was tried before a jury that found Fruit of the Loom had discharged Barnhart “because of his age” and returned a verdict in excess of one million dollars. Judgment for that sum plus attorneys’ fees was entered by the trial court. It should also be said that the Court of Appeals panel hearing the case was unanimous and rendered a scholarly *195opinion of forty-seven pages affirming the final judgment.
KELLER and STUMBO, JJ., join this dissenting opinion.

. While Fruit of the Loom is incorporated in New York, its principal place of business is in Bowling Green. Barnhart reported directly to the company headquarters in Bowling Green and the decision to demote Barnhart because of his age was made and approved at corporate headquarters in Bowling Green. In sum, every decision that gives rise to Barn-hart’s claim occurred at corporate headquarters in Bowling Green.

. KY. CONST. § 112(5).

. KRS 23A.010 (emphasis added).

. Compare KRS 24A. 110 and KRS 24A. 120, whereby the criminal and civil jurisdiction of district courts is articulated, thereby depriving circuit courts of jurisdiction in such circumstances.

. KRS 344.020(1).

. Meyers v. Chapman Printing Co., Ky., 840 S.W.2d 814 (1992).