Court Opinion

ID: 9352526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 20:08:18.973407+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:40.580343
License: Public Domain

J-S15033-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

YONINA JACOBSON AND ZEV                   :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
JACOBSON                                  :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
Appellants                                :
                                          :
             v.                           :
                                          :
                                          :
GEICO GENERAL INSURANCE                   :   No. 1038 EDA 2021
COMPANY                                   :

                 Appeal from the Order Entered April 21, 2021
             In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
                      Civil Division at No(s): 200203543

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                        FILED JANUARY 6, 2023

      Husband and wife Yonina and Zev Jacobson (collectively, Appellants)

appeal from the order granting summary judgment in favor of GEICO General

Insurance Company (GEICO). Appellants contend that the trial court erred in

granting summary judgment and cites a change in controlling caselaw. After

review, we vacate and remand for further proceedings.

      The record reflects that on February 29, 2016, Yonina Jacobson was

operating Zev Jacobson’s employer-leased vehicle when she was struck by

vehicle driven by Alifia Bucknor (Tortfeasor). Compl., 7/29/20, at ¶¶ 1-7.

Appellants alleged that at all relevant times, they were insured by GEICO. Id.

at ¶ 4. Tortfeasor’s insurance coverage was insufficient to compensate Ms.

Jacobson for her medical expenses and property damage. Id. at ¶¶ 8-16.
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Appellants    commenced the          underlying action   against   GEICO   seeking

underinsured motorist coverage. Id. at ¶¶ 1-16. GEICO moved for summary

judgment in March 2021 and asserted that Ms. Jacobson had regular use of

Mr. Jacobson’s employer-leased vehicle, and therefore GEICO’s “regular use”

policy exclusion applied. GEICO’s Mot. for Summ. Jud., 3/16/21. Appellants

filed a response asserting that there was a genuine issue of material fact

concerning whether there was regular use of the vehicle. Appellants’ Resp. to

Mot., 4/9/21. On April 21, 2021, the trial court granted summary judgment

in favor of GEICO. Appellants filed a timely motion for reconsideration that

the trial court denied. This timely appeal followed. Both the trial court and

Appellants complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.1

       On appeal, Appellants raise the following issues:

       1. Does Rush v. Erie Exchange[, 265 A.3d 794 (Pa. Super.
          2021), appeal granted, 281 A.3d 298 (Pa. 2022)] control this
          matter, and if so, should the [trial c]ourt be reversed on these
          grounds?

       2. In light of the pendency of the above case, and the timely filing
          of a post-trial motion by Appellants, were all issues properly
          preserved for this appeal?

____________________________________________

1  The trial court filed its initial opinion on September 27, 2021, in which it
opined that summary judgment was proper. Trial Ct. Op., 9/27/21. However,
after Rush was filed during the pendency of this appeal on October 22, 2021,
the trial court authored a supplemental opinion on November 3, 2021, in which
it stated that the Rush Court changed controlling case law, and the trial court
respectfully requested that this Court remand the matter to the trial court.
Supp. Trial Ct. Op., 11/3/21, at 1-2.

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Appellants’ Brief at 2 (formatting altered). Appellants’ issues are related, and

we will address them concurrently.

        Appellants argue that although they did not specifically allege that

GEICO’s regular use policy exclusion conflicted with the Motor Vehicle Financial

Responsibility Law (MVFRL)2 in the complaint or in the response to GEICO’s

motion for summary judgment, Rush had not yet been decided and was

pending before this Court. Id. at 3, 5. Appellants note that they subsequently

raised the regular use exclusion’s conflict with the MVFRL in their motion for

reconsideration, and they contend that Rush constituted a fundamental

change in controlling law which occurred during the pendency of this case and

they are entitled to its application. Id. at 5-7.

        GEICO asserts that Appellants waived any argument concerning Rush

due to their failure to raise it in their brief in opposition to GEICO’s motion for

summary judgment. GEICO’s Brief at 10. Further, GEICO alleges that in their

brief in opposition to GEICO’s motion for summary judgment, Appellants

argued only that there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether

the vehicle in question was regularly used. Id. at 14-15. Accordingly, GEICO

contends that the validity of the regular use exclusion and conflict with the

MVFRL is waived. Id. at 15.

        When reviewing an order granting summary judgment, we are guided

by the following principles:

____________________________________________

2   75 Pa.C.S. §§ 1701-1799.7.

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      Our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
      plenary. Summary judgment is appropriate where there is no
      genuine issue of material fact as to a necessary element of a cause
      of action that can be established by discovery or expert report. In
      reviewing an order granting a motion for summary judgment, an
      appellate court must examine the entire record in the light most
      favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all doubts against
      the moving party.

Liberty Mutual Group, Inc. v. 700 Pharmacy, LLC, 270 A.3d 537, 547-48

(Pa. Super. 2022) (citations omitted and formatting altered).

      We note that the trial court filed its Rule 1925(a) opinion on September

27, 2021, in which it opined that summary judgment was proper. Trial Ct.

Op., 9/27/21. However, as noted, after Rush was filed on October 22, 2021,

the trial court authored a supplemental opinion on November 3, 2021, in which

it concluded that Rush changed controlling case law and requested that this

Court remand the matter to the trial court for further proceedings. Supp. Trial

Ct. Op., 11/3/21, at 1-2.

      In Rush, this Court held that a “regular use” exclusion in an automobile

insurance policy is unenforceable because it conflicts with the MVFRL:

      The regular use exclusion in the [policy] limits the scope of UIM
      coverage required by Section 1731 by precluding coverage if an
      insured is injured while using a motor vehicle that the insured
      regularly uses but does not own. This exclusion conflicts with the
      broad language of Section 1731(c), which requires UIM coverage
      in those situations where an insured is injured arising out of the
      use of a motor vehicle. In other words, the exclusion limits
      Section 1731(c)’s coverage mandate to situations where an
      insured is injured arising out of use of an owned or occasionally
      used motor vehicle. Since the regular use exclusion conflicts with
      the clear and unambiguous language of Section 1731 of the
      MVFRL, it is unenforceable.

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Rush, 265 A.3d at 797 (formatting altered).

      Although GEICO claims that Appellants waived application of Rush, we

note that “[t]he general rule followed in Pennsylvania is that we apply the law

in effect at the time of an appellate decision. Thus, a party whose case is

pending on direct appeal is entitled to the benefit of changes in law which

occur before the judgment becomes final.” Amato v. Bell & Gossett, 116

A.3d 607, 617 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations omitted and formatting altered);

see also Commonwealth v. Chesney, 196 A.3d 253, 257 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(same). This general rule assumes the issue was preserved at each stage of

the litigation including direct appeal. Amato, 116 A.3d at 617. “However,

where a fundamental change in the law occurs after the lower court enters its

order, but before the appellate court rules, the failure to raise the issue in the

lower court will not preclude appellate review of that issue.” Cleveland v.

Johns-Manville Corp., 690 A.2d 1146, 1151 (Pa. 1997) (citation omitted).

      Here, summary judgment centered on the application of the regular use

exclusion, and it is undisputed that while this matter was pending, the Rush

Court held that a regular use exclusion conflicted with the MVFRL. Rush, 265

A.3d at 797. After review, we agree with the trial court that remand is proper.

See Supp. Trial Ct. Op., 11/3/21, at 1-2.       Pursuant to the authority cited

above, we remand this matter for the trial court to consider, in the first

instance, whether Rush announced a fundamental change in the law pursuant

to Cleveland, excusing Appellants from the need to specifically raise the

issue, or whether Appellants were required to, and in fact did, preserve the

                                      -5-
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issue as contemplated in Amato. See Amato, 116 A.3d at 617; see also

Cleveland, 690 A.2d at 1151. Once the court determines if the issue was

preserved, it shall then determine if Rush applies. See, e.g., Jones v. Erie

Insurance Exchange, 282 A.3d 1139, 1141-45 (Pa. Super. 2022) (applying

Rush to an appeal from an order granting judgment on the pleadings that

was pending when Rush was decided).

     For the reasons set forth above, we vacate the order granting summary

judgment and remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings.

     Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this Memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

     Judge Murray joins the memorandum.

     Judge Sullivan concurs in the result.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 1/6/2023

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