Court Opinion

ID: 9795917
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:42:02.274065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:40:33.614439
License: Public Domain

Justice KOURLIS
dissenting:
While I sympathize with Mullens’s position that he earned and should be permitted to keep payment for the services rendered to Hansel for the Bad Faith claim, it is my view that Mullens is not entitled to that payment because he failed to follow the requirements of chapter 23.3 and because Hansel had no notice of the possibility of a quantum meruit claim. The underlying purpose of our Rules governing contingency fees remains unchanged whether the attorney has secured a recovery for the client or not. That purpose is that a client entering into a contingency fee agreement must understand all conditions that will trigger attorney fees, and the amount of those fees. Absent such notice to the client, the attorney is not entitled to recover.
I. Facts
As the facts were thoroughly outlined in the majority opinion, I review them here only briefly. Petitioner Mullens began his representation of Respondent in connection with a Workers’ Compensation claim Hansel had against her employer, Public Service Company, involving a head injury. To initiate his services, Mullens and Hansel entered into a written contingency fee agreement, dated September 6, 1990, which provided that Mul-lens would receive twenty percent of any recovery obtained, whether through award, compromise, or otherwise. The agreement made no mention of any fees that might be recoverable if their relationship terminated or if Mullens failed to obtain a recovery — the condition precedent to payment. In the course of Mullens’s representation in the Workers’ Compensation claim, he discovered actions taken by an employee of Public Service to influence medical diagnosis, thus implicating the possibility of a claim of Bad Faith against the employer. While there was conflicting testimony at trial, the trial court found that Mullens discussed the claim with Hansel and that she agreed to Mullens’s representation in both the Workers’ Compensation and Bad Faith claims. The trial court determined that an oral agreement existed between Mullens and Hansel pursuant to which Mullens would receive forty percent of any settlement of the Bad Faith claim. Mul-lens failed to reduce the oral agreement to writing.
Mullens eventually settled both claims on behalf of Hansel. He retained thirty-three percent of the total recovered amount, rather than the twenty percent agreed to in the contingency fee agreement for the Workers’ Compensation claim, or the forty percent for the Bad Faith claim. The Workers’ Compensation claim settled for $37,500, of which Mullens retained $12,500.1 The Bad Faith claim settled for $262,440, of which Mullens retained $87,440. Two years after the settlement, Hansel brought this claim to recover the attorney fees paid to Mullens for settlement of the Bad Faith claim.
II. Analysis
As noted by the majority, this court faces the question of whether quantum meruit recovery is available for unenforceable contingent fee agreements where the contingency has been satisfied. Maj. op. at 994-995. While I agree that attorneys can recover under the theory of quantum meruit in certain circumstances, I believe our precedent and the spirit of the Colorado Rules Governing Contingent Fees, chapter 23.3, require us to limit those circumstances to situations where the client has adequate notification of the attorney’s option to seek such equitable recovery.
Reviewing chapter 23.3 and this court’s precedent, I do not read the law pertaining to contingent fee arrangements and quantum meruit so narrowly as to say that quantum meruit recovery is limited only to instances where the contingency fails. Chapter 23.3, in *1001pertinent part, requires that an attorney disclose to a prospective client in writing the statement of the contingency upon which the client is to be hable for services and the exact percentage of the contingency. C.R.C.P. Ch. 23.3, Rules 4-5. Both the attorney and client must sign the written document. Id. No contingent fee agreement shall be enforceable unless there has been substantial compliance with the rules. C.R.C.P. Ch. 23.3, Rule 6. Mullens does not debate that the contingent fee agreement between himself and Hansel failed to meet the requirements of the Rules, and that he is thus not entitled to the contingency fee. However, he seeks to retain the sums paid him on a theory of quantum meruit.
The fundamental purpose underlying our Rules concerning fee agreements is tó ensure that clients understand the terms and conditions of payment when contracting for attorney services. See Budding v. Norton Frickey & Assoc., 11 P.3d 441, 446 (Colo.2000); see also Fasing v. LaFond, 944 P.2d 608, 612 (Colo.App.1997) (noting that the plain language of chapter 23.3 imposes an absolute burden on an attorney to ensure that a valid contingency fee agreement is in place). The strict requirements found in chapter 23.3 for contingency fee agreements, and the unen-forceability of agreements that fail to meet those standards, exemplify the importance of requiring attorneys to disclose the nature of the parties’ financial relationship. Clients often lack the knowledge to make informed financial decisions pertaining to legal services so the law has stepped in to protect clients and to require attorneys to make full disclosure as to the nature of their relationship. Even in non-contingent attorney-client arrangements, the attorney has a duty to communicate the fee to the client in writing before or early in the representation. Colo. RPC 1.5(b).
The questions concerning quantum meruit recovery arise when the attorney seeks a contingency fee but fails to obtain a complying fee agreement under the Rules. In the absence of such an agreement, the attorney turns to quantum meruit and asks the court to do equity.
As we have previously stated, we are obliged to examine such requests for quantum meruit recovery in light of the unique nature of the contractual relationship between attorneys and their clients, based on trust and confidence. Budding, 11 P.3d at 445. In a traditional contract context, the failure of a written agreement poses precisely the situation in which quantum meruit is most reasonable. However, here, we cannot rely on traditional contract principles, because the whole thrust of the Rules is to assure that clients understand both the circumstances in which they would be liable for fees, and the amount of those fees. An attorney is likely to have a greater understanding of such principles and has the corresponding duty to inform his or her clients. Id. at 448.
In both Budding and Elliott v. Joyce, 889 P.2d 43 (Colo.1994), this court determined that the Rules did not preclude an attorney from seeking recovery in quantum meruit if the attorney notified the client that circumstances may exist where he or she would seek quantum meruit recovery. See Budding, 11 P.3d at 447; Elliott, 889 P.2d at 46. Both of these cases arose in circumstances where the specified contingency failed because the attorney-client relationship was prematurely terminated; however, in my view, the outcomes in those cases hinged on notice and not on the fact that the contingency failed. Budding, 11 P.3d at 448 (“The case law and Rules in Colorado require clear written statements of the fee arrangements between the attorney and the client early in the relationship. Even in the area of quantum meruit recovery, which has arisen precisely to address the absence of a written agreement, we feel compelled to honor that precedent by requiring the attorney to provide some notice to the client of the possibility that he or she may seek quantum meruit recovery if the contract fails.”); Elliott, 889 P.2d at 46 (“[W]e do not disapprove of contingent fee arrangements permitting recovery by attorneys from clients in quantum meruit. However, in order to enforce such agreements, a client’s liability must be expressly provided within the written contingent fee agreement, as required by our rules.”).
The policies behind requiring client notification of fee arrangements are not altered *1002when the contingency has been satisfied. The notification requirements regarding fee arrangements are not, in any scenario, conditioned on whether the contingency is met. By allowing quantum meruit where there has been no notification of the possibility of such recovery, we essentially allow Mullens to recover despite the prohibitions set forth in chapter 23.3. Presumably, under the majority opinion, if the attorney receives a benefit for the client, then he or she can always recover in quantum meruit despite fading to meet the requirements of chapter 23.3. I believe that this outcome undermines the import of the Rules.
Even though the trial court found that an oral agreement existed for the Bad Faith claim, that agreement was a contingency fee agreement and is, of course, unenforceable, as it did not comply with the Rules. There is no evidence to suggest that Hansel was ever notified of the possibility that she might be responsible for paying Mullens in quantum meruit because he failed to secure a written agreement outlining the contingent agreement. If we look to the written contingency fee agreement for the Workers’ Compensation claim, for the purpose of determining what Hansel may have been aware of, we find that the only written agreement failed to mention the possibility of recovery in quantum meruit, whether the contingency was met or not.
III. Conclusion
Quantum meruit recovery where a contingency fee agreement is unenforceable for failing to meet the requirements of chapter 23.3 requires that an attorney notify the client of the possibility of such equitable recovery. This is true irrespective of whether a defined contingency has been met or not. In my view, to hold otherwise vitiates the intent of the Rules. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would affirm the holding of the court of appeals.
I am authorized to state that Justice RICE joins in this dissent.

. The tried court required that Mullens pay back the difference between the thirty-three percent retained and the twenty percent agreed to for the Workers’ Compensation claim. This decision surrounding the Workers’ Compensation claim is not at issue.