Court Opinion

ID: 9684997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 14:20:42.149191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:01.625049
License: Public Domain

R. M. Maher, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent from the conclusion in Part I of the majority opinion that the following comments by defense counsel during closing argument were either made in response to plaintiff’s counsel’s closing argument or constituted harmless error:
*229"I can assure you that if there was a case here, and Mr. Dickinson [plaintiffs counsel] is a good lawyer, he wouldn’t have purposefully kept records and X-rays from his witness. He would have put it all on the table, but he didn’t.
"I can assure you, also, that in representing a physician if he needed an expert’s testimony to prove his case you wouldn’t have to go several hundred miles to Massachusetts to ñnd Dr. Brinkman. There are 200 orthopedic physicians in the State of Michigan.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In support of its conclusion that the above-quoted argument amounted to harmless error, the majority states that the inference was not merely to the deposition of December 15, 1979, "but to plaintiff’s failure to provide the X-rays to his expert during the entire course of the expert’s preparation for the case”. I believe that the majority opinion misapprehends the gravity of the inference which the jury could have drawn. By using the word "purposefully”, defense counsel impugned the integrity of plaintiffs counsel and, indeed, the trial itself. How often has this Court and the Supreme Court made it clear that certain remarks are "offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial system”? Comments which call the integrity of that system into question must be examined with the utmost scrutiny.
In this case, the record is devoid of any suggestion that plaintiffs counsel "purposefully” withheld evidence from his witness,1 and by extension from the jury. I believe that the potential impact *230on the jury of this attack on the integrity of plaintiff’s counsel compels the conclusion that these remarks constituted reversible error. As this Court stated in People v LaForte, 75 Mich App 582, 584; 256 NW2d 44 (1977):
"Whatever the metaphor, the damage was irreparable: the bell could not. have been unrung; the ink stain could not have been eradicated; the stench could not have been ignored.”
It is not enough to view this matter with judicial hindsight and impose a burden on plaintiff to, in effect, place himself in the minds of the jurors in order to demonstrate prejudice. If the jury viewed the remarks in the light ascribed to them by the majority opinion, then no prejudicial error occurred. 2 But I am not confident that not even one juror was improperly affected. I agree with the Supreme Court’s holding in Wayne County Board of Road Comm’rs v GLS LeasCo, 394 Mich 126, 139; 229 NW2d 797 (1975):
" 'A substantial doubt regarding the fairness of the trial has been raised * * *. To say, as did the Court of Appeals, that LeasCo must 'demonstrate affirmatively prejudice” is to misstate the test if not misplace the burden.
"It cannot be demonstrated what effect any particular statement has on a jury. Neither LeasCo nor any other *231litigant similarly situated can properly be expected to 'demonstrate affirmatively’ a prejudicial effect on the jury resulting from improper remarks of opposing counsel.” (Emphasis supplied.)
I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the remarks in question did not constitute error requiring reversal inasmuch as they were made "in response to arguments made by opposing counsel”. The sweep of the majority’s brush (and that of this Court in Haynes v Monroe Plumbing & Heating Co, 48 Mich App 707; 211 NW2d 88 [1973]) is too broad. The point is neatly summarized in this Court’s opinion in People v Newby, 82 Mich App 489, 493-494; 266 NW2d 492 (1978): 'Improper remarks by a prosecutor do not amount to reversible error where they are in such direct response to improper statements of defense counsel.” (Emphasis supplied.) See generally Kalamazoo v Standard Paper Co, 182 Mich 476; 148 NW 743 (1914), Sterling v Detroit, 134 Mich 22; 95 NW 986 (1903), Little v Williams, 107 Mich 652; 65 NW 568 (1895), Pabst Brewing Co v Lueders, 107 Mich 41; 64 NW 872 (1895).
In this case, the improper remarks of defense counsel were not preceded by similar improper remarks by plaintiffs counsel. The remarks referred to in the majority opinion as "’opening the door’ to comment on the subject by defense counsel in his closing argument”3 were proper comments on the evidence.
My review of the record indicates that, at least until commencement of the trial, the parties weré forced to rely on copies of the X-rays of plaintiffs shoulder. In his closing argument, plaintiffs coun*232sel contended that the missing originals indicated improper record-keeping by defendant Henry Ford Hospital:
"And where are the X-rays? Where are the original X-rays of the shoulder?
"Dr. Guise sat there on the stand and was trying to mark off that wax pen marker and said they’re copies. Well that wasn’t of particular significance at that time until Dr. Bakirci took the stand and said with copies you lose some of the detail.
"Is this the way to run a teaching hospital? Is this the way to teach young doctors when patients come in with conditions like this? I hope not.”
After an objection by defense counsel, plaintiff’s counsel concluded, "Where are the X-rays? Lost? I don’t know. It is for you to determine”. I find nothing in those remarks which suggests that defense counsel withheld the original X-rays from evidence or committed any other impropriety. Nothing in those remarks justifies defense counsel’s personal and untruthful attack on the integrity of plaintiff’s counsel: namely, defense counsel’s allegation that plaintiff’s counsel "purposefully” withheld the original X-rays or copies thereof from his expert witness. In fact, SJI2d 6.01 is designed precisely to handle such a situation. There is simply nothing in the closing argument of plaintiff’s counsel to warrant the improper remarks made by defense counsel. Pabst Brewing Co v Lueders, supra.
I. would reverse and remand for a new, and fair, trial.4 People v LaForte, supra.

 During oral argument,' it was conceded that plaintiffs expert witness had made plans with plaintiffs counsel to testify in person at the trial and to arrive before trial in time to examine the necessary medical records, including the copied X-rays. However, at the last minute, plaintiffs expert found himself unable to leave Boston. Plaintiffs counsel’s decision to defer the expert’s examination of the X-rays until his arrival in Detroit is of no moment; there was absolutely no *230purpose or intent to deprive the expert of the opportunity to view the records, (including the copies of the X-rays).

 It should be noted that defense counsel could properly have commented on plaintiffs counsel’s failure to ensure that unforeseen consequences would not prevent plaintiffs expert from viewing the copied X-rays. As always, there are permissible and impermissible ways to demonstrate a particular assertion. If defense counsel truly intended to comment on plaintiffs counsel’s lack of preparation or organization other less prejudicial means were available. See People v Ronald Green, 74 Mich App 601, 606; 254 NW2d 788 (1977). Permissible goals do not validate impermissible means.

 The majority opinion is correct insofar as it suggests that the door ‘ is open to permissible comment on the subject. My area of disagreement with the majority is over the propriety of those comments.

 On retrial, I would caution defense counsel to avoid the unnecessary reference to plaintiff’s need to travel out-of-state in order to obtain witnesses. Kern v St Luke’s Hospital Ass’n of Saginaw, 404 Mich 339, 352-354; 273 NW2d 75 (1978). But see Wilson v Stilwell, 411 Mich 587; 309 NW2d 898 (1981).