Court Opinion

ID: 9955896
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-29 18:02:23.40035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:38.149018
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/29/24 P. v. Yi CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C098349

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 20FE009058)

           v.

 JOSEPH YI,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         A jury found defendant Joseph Yi guilty of voluntary manslaughter and found true
a weapon allegation, as well as an aggravating circumstance allegation that defendant
used a weapon during the commission of his offense. The trial court further found true as
aggravating circumstances that defendant was on probation at the time of the offense and
had served a prior term in jail. The trial court weighed the aggravating circumstances
against the circumstances listed in defendant’s statement in mitigation and sentenced
defendant to the upper term of 11 years, plus one year for the weapon enhancement, for a

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total of 12 years in prison. Defendant appeals and argues the court abused its discretion
when weighing the circumstances. We disagree and affirm.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In June 2020, Yeng T. met defendant at defendant’s motel room. Although the
two were friends, defendant was afraid of Yeng because Yeng spent time in prison,
claimed to be affiliated with a gang, and had made threatening statements to others.
Defendant and Yeng left the motel room and went for a drive in search of heroin. Yeng
drove erratically, which caused defendant to think they were going to crash. Defendant
grabbed the steering wheel but overcorrected and crashed the car. Yeng then told
defendant, “[Y]ou’re a dead man,” which defendant understood to be a death threat.
Defendant and Yeng fought inside the car before defendant armed himself with a knife,
got out of the passenger side, ran around the vehicle, and smashed the driver’s side
window. Yeng moved over to the passenger side as defendant entered the driver’s side,
and defendant stabbed Yeng seven times. Yeng got out of the car and defendant chased
Yeng around the car before getting in the car and driving away. Yeng died from the
wounds defendant inflicted.
       At defendant’s sentencing hearing, the trial court acknowledged several
circumstances raised in defendant’s statement in mitigation: (1) Defendant’s prior felony
and misdemeanor convictions were not violent in nature; (2) defendant had substance
abuse problems; and (3) defendant suffered childhood trauma. The trial court
nonetheless imposed the upper term of 11 years for the voluntary manslaughter
conviction because defendant was on probation at the time of the offense and had served
two prior jail terms pursuant to Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (h).1 The trial court

1      While the trial court referred to the aggravating circumstances as defendant’s
criminal history of felony and misdemeanor convictions, the aggravating circumstances
found true were that defendant was on probation at the time he committed the offense and

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stated, “[B]ut probably one of the most significant factors in my assessment in terms of
the level of punishment to be imposed has to do with the level of violence in the killing
itself. This was not a one-off. Sometimes when we get these manslaughter verdicts and
it’s a -- one firing of a gun or two immediate firings of a gun in an isolated moment and
an exercise of insanity or crazy lack of judgment, that falls into one column. When there
are repeated stabbing[s], violent acts that resulted in a death as here, at least in my
thinking, that falls in a different column.” The trial court then imposed a year for the
weapon enhancement, for a total prison sentence of 12 years.
       Defendant appeals.
                                       DISCUSSION
       Defendant does not argue the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion.
Instead, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion by selecting the upper term
based on the facts before the court. As defendant puts it, his “criminal history, [when]
weighed against the numerous factors in mitigation, renders imposition of the upper term
an abuse of discretion.” We disagree.
       We review the trial court’s sentencing decision for abuse of discretion. (People v.
Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 847.) “ ‘In reviewing for abuse of discretion, we are
guided by two fundamental precepts. First, “ ‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the
sentence to clearly show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary.
[Citation.] In the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to
achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination to impose a
particular sentence will not be set aside on review.’ ” [Citations.] Second, a “ ‘decision

he had served two prior jail terms. Given the close relationship of defendant’s prior
convictions to his probationary status and prior jail terms, we presume the trial court was
referring to the aggravating circumstances found true when referencing defendant’s prior
convictions. (People v. Bradford (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1345, 1355 [“absent a showing
to the contrary, the trial court is presumed to have known and followed the applicable
law”].)

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will not be reversed merely because reasonable people might disagree. “An appellate
tribunal is neither authorized nor warranted in substituting its judgment for the judgment
of the trial judge.” ’ ” [Citation.] Taken together, these precepts establish that a trial
court does not abuse its discretion unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary that no
reasonable person could agree with it.’ ” (People v. Strother (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 563,
571, quoting People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 376-377.)
       Assuming the trial court based its imposition of the upper term on only the
aggravating circumstances that defendant was on probation at the time he committed the
crime and had served a prior term in jail, defendant has not satisfied his burden of
showing the trial court acted in an arbitrary or irrational manner. Indeed, the trial court
also considered the circumstances listed in defendant’s statement in mitigation. The trial
court weighed these circumstances and permissibly selected the upper term. (People v.
Willover (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 302, 323 [“When the sentencing decision involves an
assessment of various factors, the trial court has discretion to accord different weight to
each factor, and its decision need not be determined by the sheer number of factors on
one side or the other”].) We may not substitute our judgment of how the circumstances
should have been weighed for that of the trial court. (See People v. Strother, supra,
72 Cal.App.5th at p. 571.)
       Moreover, contrary to defendant’s contention, the trial court did cite to an offense
specific aggravating circumstance—namely that defendant acted with violence by
repeatedly stabbing Yeng with a weapon. While the jury did not find defendant acted
with great violence when committing the offense, it did find he used a weapon. Given
the trial court’s focus on the repeated nature of the use of the weapon, we presume the
trial court referred to the weapon-related aggravating circumstance—not the great
violence aggravating circumstance—when speaking to the aggravated manner of the
killing. (See People v. Bradford, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at p. 1355.) Accordingly, the

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trial court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the upper term for the voluntary
manslaughter conviction.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                 /s/
                                                 ROBIE, Acting P. J.

We concur:

/s/
KRAUSE, J.

/s/
MESIWALA, J.

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