Court Opinion

ID: 9448986
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:51:26.109427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:38.059392
License: Public Domain

CAMERON, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I agree with the contention of the United States here that the evidence does not tend to establish entrapment as that term has been usually accepted by this Court. Cf. Accardi v. United States, 1958, 5 Cir., 257 F.2d 168, 172; Vamvas v. United States, 1926, 5 Cir., 13 F.2d 347, 348; and Park v. United States, 1960, 5 Cir., 283 F.2d 253, 254. What we said in the last mentioned case sums up the rule recognized by this Court: “Nothing here established that the agents lured and induced the commission of the offense rather than affording an opportunity to persons of ready willingness and complaisance to enter into the unlawful transaction.”
The majority, in reality, reverses this case because of the ignoble part assigned by the Government to the informer Moye. The sole basis of the reversal is that Moye was working on a contingent fee *446basis.1 He was paid a nominal salary and furnished gasoline and was to receive $200.00 if he made a purchase from one of these defendants leading to his conviction and $100.00 if he made a like purchase from the other.
In the majority’s view, the very fact of hiring an informer on a contingency is ignoble. Such a holding would rob the Government of one of its most effective weapons in detecting crime and bringing to the bar of justice those who commit it.
For decades the use of informers has been accepted as a proper means of enforcement of the criminal law. It is recognized by all as one of the most important means. And, in practically all instances, the informer is in reality on a contingent basis.
The method chiefly used in apprehending sellers of narcotics, for instance, is the employment of addicts to make the purchases from suspects in the presence of federal officers who are secreted or in disguise. Every such informer knows that his day to day arrangement with the Government will continue only if he delivers the goods. The addict is given barely enough money to live on and supply his need for narcotics for a few days. In most cases, the Government agents are after one or more individuals to whom the informer is sent. If the addict succeeds in landing some of the criminals the Government is after, he is well paid and his services will continue. If he does not, he is dropped. As far as I know, the courts have accepted such practices as permissible. The same attitude has prevailed in connection with informers in the apprehension of liquor law violators.
Those who represent persons charged with crime have for ages made impassioned pleas — mostly to juries — that the hiring of informers, in many cases friends of the victims being sought, is dirty business. Crime itself is dirty business, and the universal experience of law enforcement officers is that the use of informers is necessary to the enforcement of law.
Not only the court but the Congress has put its stamp of approval, under conditions like those present here, on the employment of informers in the enforcement of the Internal Revenue Laws. Cf. Internal Revenue Code, 1954, § 7623. It is common knowledge that, based upon that statute, those charged with the responsibility of collecting the government revenues make it a practice of rewarding, contingently, individuals who “squeal” on those from whom sums are collected through information furnished by the “squealer.” It is commonly accepted that the one who informs is given ten percent of the take. By § 7214(a) of the Code, the discretion is given to a court imposing sentence on a revenue agent or employee convicted as the result of'information furnished by an informer, to award the informer a portion of the fine imposed not in excess of one-half thereof.
At a time when crime of all sorts is so definitely on the increase, I am not willing to weaken the hand of the law by interfering with a practice as well established as the one here under examination. Juries generally take into account the interest of every witness who testifies before them. What we are really dealing with here is the weight of the testimony of an interested witness employed as an informer. The juries can be counted upon to make proper discount in crediting the testimony of an informer employed on a contingent basis. It is their function to determine the extent of the discount. I do not think we ought to take such a witness off of the stand entirely. I respectfully dissent.
Rehearing denied; CAMERON, Circuit Judge, dissenting.

. The basis for the reversal which the majority apparently accept is thus stated in the appellants’ brief:
“We respectfully urge that all entrapments accomplished by an reformer woraing for a contingent financial fee should be outlawed as being incurably afoul of public policy and not to be permitted under our form of government.”