Court Opinion

ID: 9530942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:05:28.028073+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:17.875764
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE DOOLEY, specially concurring: Experience as a commissioner of this court hearing attorney disciplinary matters while a member of the Board of Managers of the Chicago Bar Association fostered an opinion that when the penalty warrants no more than censure, the interests of the profession and the public are not served by memorializing the reprimand in the reported decisions of this court. Censure should be accomplished by an order of the court. This case makes what was once,a mere opinion now a conviction. As the opinion points out, there is no evidence to suggest that the discrepancy between respondent’s reported taxable income and actual taxable income for the year in question was a result of any criminal or fraudulent intent. There are certain inconsistencies in the position of the government which caused respondent to be indicted. As Mr. Justice Ryan points out: “*** There is no evidence to suggest that this discrepancy, though not insignificant, was the product of any criminal or fraudulent intent. Attorneys from the office of the regional counsel of the Internal Revenue Service concluded that respondent’s actions ‘lack a criminal intent.’ ” This is actually a prosaic case of an error in the completion of income tax returns. When respondent discovered the error, he filed an amended return 14 months prior to his indictment. We venture to say that each working day in each Internal Revenue Service office in this country an amendment is filed because of error in the taxpayer’s original income tax return. Yet the taxpayer is not indicted. Are we, as judges, to be immune to the realities of life? But of even greater significance is that we are imposing the penalty not so much for conduct, but for the conviction. In In re Crane (1961), 23 Ill. 2d 398, 400-01, the court stated: “While the conviction is conclusive evidence of guilt, it does not preclude the consideration of other evidence for the purpose of determining the appropriate disciplinary action. After all, a respondent is being disciplined not because of his conviction but because of his conduct. The actual conduct itself is certainly relevant to a determination of the appropriate discipline to be accorded. Just as every conviction of a crime does not require the same punishment, so all convictions of crimes involving moral turpitude do not require the same discipline. Thus, a consideration of the actual conduct of the respondent is not only proper, but may be indispensable, to an informed appraisal of the appropriate disciplinary action. ” (Emphasis added.) This court has continuously referred to In re Crane in its subsequent disciplinary decisions. See In re Andros (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 419, 424; In re Fumo (1972), 52 Ill. 2d 307, 310; In re Hutul (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 209, 214; In re Grossgold (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 9, 10. The majority has manifested its deep sense of fairness in its description of this unhappy situation. But we do not agree that the duty of an attorney in keeping income records is any greater than that of any other citizen. There is nothing in any canon of ethics or in the fidelity to the principles of a lawyer that he has an obligation different from others in keeping records of his own income when the interests of clients are in nowise involved. Frank Walker did not bring the profession into disrepute. He injured no one except himself. This record indicates that this member of our bar, who has given so much to public service, now in his seventieth year, has until this unhappy event enjoyed an excellent reputation-something which cannot be bought or sold in any market place, but is acquired only by cultivation in all phases of human conduct. By memorializing his misfortune, we unduly infringe upon that which represents the efforts of a lifetime. Nor do we stand alone in this position. Many years ago, Mr. Justice Cardozo, while a member of the Court of Appeals of New York, in People ex rel. Karlin v. Culkin (1928), 248 N.Y. 465, 478, 162 N.E. 487, 492, 60 A.L.R. 851, 859, involving the investigation of a lawyer’s conduct, expressed these thoughts: “The argument is pressed that in conceding to the court a power of inquisition we put into its hands a weapon whereby the fair fame of a lawyer, however innocent of wrong, is at the mercy of the tongue of ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a calling is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored. The mere summons to appear at such a hearing and make report as to one’s conduct, may become a slur and a reproach.” It is our hope that we have pointed up the exemplary professional life of respondent with the same effect as the description of his misfortune entails. As we have noted, this censure could be accomplished by an order of court — a vehicle which would accomplish the same end as these opinions. Here the penalty is out of proportion to the charge. CLARK and MORAN, JJ., join in this special concurrence.