Court Opinion

ID: 9751857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 17:10:31.956498+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:00.703001
License: Public Domain

YEGAN, J.
I respectfully dissent. The price of perfect justice is too high. (See Fleming, The Price of Perfect Justice (1974.) The majority reverse because the record reveals facts which, in the eyes of a hypothetical person, might create an impression of possible bias. (Betz v. Pankow (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1503, 1507-1508 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d 107].) The use of the words “might,” “impression,” “possible,” and “hypothetical person” make me uneasy. While the appearance of justice is an important ideal for which we should strive, we must not become slaves to the ideal at the expense of justice.
Here the motion to vacate was fueled by the size of the award, $278,168.52. There was no showing that AMCO, a sophisticated insurance carrier, would have objected to the arbitrator had it known of the simultaneous arbitrations. This is especially true because the other arbitration was not binding.
I agree that the arbitrator should have disclosed the simultaneous arbitrations. AMCO, however, was in no position to complain about the perception of possible bias after the arbitrator found for the insured. It refused to arbitrate and only did so after the insured petitioned to compel arbitration. The superior court sanctioned AMCO for its actions. The arbitrator was selected and made several disclosures, i.e., that she had arbitrated other cases for the attorney representing the uninsured motorist, that that attorney had referred cases to her, and that she had previously represented an affiliate carrier of AMCO. AMCO did not respond to the disclosures or make further inquiry.
I am of the view that AMCO was estopped from later challenging the award on the ground of possible bias. Of course, hindsight is 20-20. After the arbitrator reads the majority opinion, she will realize that she should have disclosed the hypothetical conflict. In a perfect world, she would have disclosed as soon as she realized that a hypothetical reasonable person might question her impartiality. She did not do so and the result is that the insured, who was without fault, suffers.
The majority’s opinion will not result in an armageddon. I do, however, predict a plethora of disclosure statements flying about before and during an arbitration. It is bound to have a chilling effect on the arbitration process.
*508Further comment on the nature of the simultaneous arbitrations seems appropriate. AMCO’s arbitration was “binding” but the other arbitration was not. While some consequences flow from “nonbinding” arbitration, they pale in comparison to “binding” arbitration. I doubt that the hypothetical reasonable person would believe the arbitrator was biased if he or she knew that the award rendered in a “nonbinding” arbitration would be automatically erased by a trial de novo request. Nor am I certain that the fully informed hypothetical reasonable person would credit the unspoken premise of AMCO’S appeal, i.e., that two attorneys would, in essence, sell their integrity for pecuniary gain.
For these reasons, I would affirm the order denying the motion to vacate the arbitration award.