Court Opinion

ID: 9735589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:25:04.837102+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:00.208078
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, concurring in part and dissenting in part: Although most of the majority’s analysis is correct, I disagree with its conclusion that plaintiffs did not adequately plead that the various Suzuki dealers were Suzuki’s agents. The complaint specifically alleged that the vehicles were purchased from "authorized Suzuki dealers” who were "the actual and apparent agents of [Suzuki].” At this point I do not know what else needed to be said. Under the Code of Civil Procedure, "[n]o pleading is bad in substance which contains such information as reasonably informs the opposite party of the nature of the claim or defense which he or she is called upon to meet.” 735 ILCS 5/2 — 612(b) (West 1992). The allegations here accomplished that purpose. Additional details, even if plaintiffs had them, would have contributed little. The complaint, as it stood, supplied ample information for defendants to prepare their answer. I fail to see, moreover, how the court could reasonably expect plaintiffs to be any more specific at this stage of the proceedings. The situation here is analogous to the one present in Gilbert v. Frank, 233 Ill. App. 3d 372 (1992), a medical malpractice action against a hospital and one of its emergency room physicians. Rejecting the hospital’s argument that the complaint did not adequately allege that the physician was its apparent agent, the appellate court held that "precision pleading should not be required if knowledge of the pertinent facts is within the control of the defendant rather than the plaintiff. (Holton v. Resurrection Hospital (1980), 88 Ill. App. 3d 655, 658.) In the case at bar, the hospital would have had knowledge about the nature of its relationship with [the physician], but it is highly unlikely that plaintiff would have had access to this information when she filed her complaint. Therefore we do not believe it is unfair to the hospital to construe the allegation that [the physician] was its agent to be an allegation that he was either an actual or apparent agent. We conclude that plaintiff adequately alleged in count II that [the physician] was an apparent agent of the hospital and reject the hospital’s contrary contention.” Gilbert v. Frank, 233 Ill. App. 3d at 377. Our court subsequently granted a petition for leave to appeal in the case and expressly agreed with the appellate court’s reasoning and result on this issue. Gilbert v. Sycamore Municipal Hospital, 156 Ill. 2d 511, 527 (1993). This result is consistent with the principle that the existence of an agency relationship is a question of fact for the trier of fact and that "[t]o require plaintiffs, without benefit of discovery, to include in their complaint sufficient factual detail to permit a determination of these questions from the face of the complaint is both unrealistic and unnecessary.” Sherman v. Field Clinic, 74 Ill. App. 3d 21, 25 (1979). Even if I could put these considerations aside and accept that the allegations in the body of the complaint were too conclusory, by themselves, to comply with our pleading requirements, the majority’s analysis would still be unpersuasive. In declaring the agency allegations deficient, the majority overlooks the exhibits that were attached to the plaintiffs’ complaint. Where, as here, exhibits are incorporated into a pleading, the facts set forth in those exhibits have the same effect as if they had been alleged in the body of the pleading itself. See E.A. Cox Co. v. Road Savers International Corp., 271 Ill. App. 3d 144, 149 (1995). Accordingly, the facts contained in the exhibits must be considered alongside the allegations of the complaint in determining whether the pleading adequately states a cause of action. See Payne v. Mill Race Inn, 152 Ill. App. 3d 269, 275 (1987). The exhibits to plaintiffs’ third-amended complaint indicate that Suzuki dealerships are not simply independent merchants who buy a product from a manufacturer and resell it to third parties. The dealerships sell the vehicles on Suzuki’s behalf, and the corporation receives no payment for its vehicles until the dealerships have managed to sell them. Suzuki has also made the dealerships responsible for handling the warranties extended by the corporation to its customers. The owner’s manual furnished to consumers by Suzuki for the vehicle at issue here provides that any questions are to be referred to the dealer, not Suzuki, and that if warranty service is required, the vehicle should be taken to the dealer. These facts clearly suggest that the dealers do act, in every meaningful sense, as the agents of Suzuki for the purpose of selling and servicing Suzuki vehicles. If, despite all this, the court still believes that plaintiffs’ complaint is deficient, it is time for it to reassess its pleading requirements. The General Assembly has declared that pleadings must be construed liberally with the ultimate goal of doing substantial justice between the parties (735 ILCS 5/2 — 603(c) (West 1992)), and we are bound to adhere to this principle. Instead, the majority persists in refusing to even acknowledge that the principle exists. See Anderson v. Vanden Dorpel, 172 Ill. 2d 399, 417-20 (1996) (Harrison, J., dissenting). Although my colleagues purport to rely on the old doctrine of "fact pleading” to justify their position, I am afraid that what is really at work here is a fundamental opposition to plaintiffs’ claims. This is unfair and contrary to the law. The court should not subvert procedural requirements in order to effectuate its own private version of tort reform. I would reinstate the Illinois consumer fraud count based on representations by local Suzuki dealers as well as on the concealment of material facts by Suzuki itself. I would likewise reinstate plaintiffs’ common law fraud count to the extent it is based on representations by local Suzuki dealers.