Court Opinion

ID: 9457802
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:33:27.372947+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:30.863629
License: Public Domain

BROWNING, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
Appellant offered two defenses to the assault charge. The first was that appellant was under the influence of narcotics and unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct. The second was that appellant’s actions were calculated to stop the officer from taking pictures rather than to injure him.
Appellant’s opening witnesses were two staff attorneys of the American Civil Liberties Union who were present at the demonstration as observers. They were the only defense witnesses who saw the incident in question, except appellant himself. They testified in support of appellant’s second defense to the assault charge.
In substance, their testimony was that appellant twirled the chain over his head and advanced slowly toward the officer, and the officer retreated at the same pace. When the officer backed off, appellant stopped, turned around, and walked away. Both testified that appellant made no sudden move toward the officer.
If the jury had credited this testimony it might well have acquitted appellant on the ground that there was reasonable doubt that bodily harm was either threatened or feared. Appellant’s counsel so argued to the jury.
Thus the weight given the testimony of these two witnesses by the jury was critical to appellant’s second defense to the assault charge. It is simply not true that the testimony of these witnesses “was relatively unimportant”, or that the witnesses “did not know anything about the relevant facts”; or that they *1130“frankly admitted the insignificance of their testimony.” 1
The trial judge disparaged and belittled the two witnesses. The trial judge suggested that neither of the witnesses knew his proper professional title.2 He cast doubt upon their explanation of their presence at the riotous demonstration (“Were you there just as an observer?”); and hinted that there was some impropriety in their announced purpose to arrange bail for those arrested (“No matter what the offense . . . ?”). The trial judge required one of the attorneys to swing the chain as he had seen appellant swing it; and, appearing to detect some hesitancy, chided the witness, “Are you afraid you will hurt yourself?”
Perhaps these comments and questions might be passed off as “instances which were of little importance in their setting,” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 83, 62 S.Ct. 457, 471, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), and too easily magnified in the “ivory tower of appellate court chambers.” Kohatsu v. United States, 351 F.2d 898, 904 n. 11 (9th Cir. 1965), quoting Bush v. United States, 267 F.2d 483, 488 (9th Cir. 1959).
But a more serious incident followed.
The charges arose out of appellant’s participation in an anti-war demonstration at the United States Courthouse in Seattle, Washington, on February 17, 1970. Some 1500 to 2000 persons participated. Rocks were thrown, windows and doors broken, and other property damage inflicted. As the prosecuting attorney told the jury in the present case, the February 17 demonstration “developed into practically a riot at the doors of the courthouse building.”
The invasion of Cambodia was announced April 30, 1970. On May 4, four students were killed during an anti-war demonstration at Kent State University in Ohio.
The trial of this case began on May 5. It was held in the United States courthouse that had been the scene of the February 17 demonstration. On the second day of the trial another anti-war demonstration began outside the courthouse. The noise made by the demonstrators intruded into the courtroom. As the second of the two attorney-witnesses completed his testimony, the court said:
“I think I am not going to take a recess at this time. I hear the cheerleaders out in front. We will continue on a little while. At least, I assume that is what I hear but don’t let it bother you.
I don’t know whether it is the right thing to say but someone once said brave men die only once and a coward a thousand times, so that I guess we might as well be brave and I take it most of you have lived a good full life anyway so that what is the difference.”
The attorney-witness then asked, “May we be excused?”
*1131The court responded, “Yes, you may be excused. I think they are waiting for you.” 3
The inference was inescapable. The judge told the jury, in effect, that the two defense witnesses were associates of the persons who were then conducting a demonstration outside the courthouse involving a risk of harm to the jurors. The impact was heightened by the obvious parallel to the violent and destructive demonstration of February 17. The jury had just seen the earlier demonstration on videotape and had heard it described by witnesses.
No doubt the trial judge wished appellant to have a fair trial. The judge’s statement appears to have been thoughtless. When defense counsel moved for a new trial, the judge denied having made the statement, telling defense counsel, “This is a figment of your imagination.” But the statement was made; and it could only have had a devastating effect upon the credibility of the two defense witnesses in the eyes of the jurors.
“ ‘The influence of the trial judge on the jury is necessarily and properly of great weight,’ Starr v. United States, 153 U.S. 614, 626, 14 S.Ct. 919, 38 L.Ed. 841 and jurors are ever watchful of the words that fall from him. Particularly in a criminal trial, the judge’s last word is likely to be the decisive word.” Bollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612, 66 S.Ct. 402, 405, 90 L.Ed. 350 (1946). See also United States v. Tobin, 426 F.2d 1279, 1282 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Cassiagnol, 420 F.2d 868, 879 (4th Cir. 1970); United States v. Barbour, 137 U.S.App.D.C. 116, 420 F.2d 1319, 1322 (1969); Bursten v. United States, 395 F.2d 976, 983 (5th Cir. 1968); Moody v. United States, 377 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1967).
The trial was short, a day and a half. The defense offered only six witnesses, including appellant. The two ACLU attorneys were the defense’s opening witnesses. They were critical to the contention that no assault had occurred. It was for the jury to evaluate their reliability and to accord their testimony such weight as the jury saw fit. Appellant was entitled to have the jury act free of the influence of the judge’s dramatic pronouncement that effectively stripped the witnesses of any claim to credibility in the jury’s eyes. Quercia v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 470, 53 S.Ct. 698, 77 L.Ed. 1321 (1933); see also United States v. Chibbaro, 361 F.2d 365, 378-379 (3d Cir. 1966).
It is impossible to say, “with that degree of assurance required in a criminal case, that the activities of the trial judge may not have prejudiced the defendant, notwithstanding the strong evidence presented against him.” Jackson v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 325, 329 F.2d 893, 894 (1964). See also Moody v. United States, supra, 377 F.2d at 179-180.4
Appellant is therefore entitled to a new trial.
A word regarding appellant’s attack upon the sentence. The short and only answer is that the sentence is not subject to appellate review. The trial judge would be the first to reject the elaborate attempt to demonstrate some basis for the sentence in terms of appellant’s *1132rehabilitation.5 The trial judge made it completely clear that the sentence was based upon a single overriding consideration — deterrence. “You may think this is a cruel sentence,” the judge said, “but I am telling you that these people are going to have to come to task in this country and stop assaulting people.”

. They observed the event from across the street, and therefore could not see the facial expressions of the participants or hear what was said. But they had an unobstructed view of the entire incident. Their testimony as to the facts was unequivocal, and was not shaken by the prosecutor’s cross-examination.

. The relevant part of the reporter’s transcript reads :
“Q. What is your occupation, Mr. Rosen?
A. Attorney.
THE OOTJRT: What?
THE WITNESS: Attorney.
THE COURT: Attorney.
By Mr. Meltzer:
Q. Mr. Rosen, were you present—
THE COURT: (Interposing) Attorney at Law, you mean?
THE WITNESS: Yes, your Honor. (Tr. 150)
THE CLERK: State your full name, please.
THE WITNESS : Jan Eric Peterson.
By Mr. Meltzer:
Q. What is your occupation?
A. Attorney.
THE COURT: Attorney at what?
THE WITNESS:- Attorney at Law, your Honor.” (Tr. 162)

. In moving for a new trial, defense counsel stated for the record that the judge’s remark “was made in a sarcastic manner and cast aspersions.”

. In his instructions the judge said he had asked questions “for the sole purpose of bringing out, facts which I thought might be of assistance to the jury,” and admonished the jury “not to draw any inference from any questions or to assume that I hold any opinion on the matter to which my questions related.” However, by its terms, this general instruction relating to questions the judge may have asked was not relevant to the judge’s comment regarding the two defense witnesses.

. Appellant was 22 years old. lie had no prior felony conviction. The property destroyed was valued at $49.90. No one was injured in the assault. There was no presentence investigation. Appellant was given the maximum term under each statute, one year and five years, the sentences to run consecutively.