Court Opinion

ID: 9572432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:41:37.349749+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:56.097384
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, J.,
dissenting.
I cannot accept the reasoning of the majority as to the applicability of governmental immunity to this case. The majority opinion relies upon cases such as Barr v. Matteo, 360 US 564, 79 S Ct 1335, 3 L Ed 2d 1434 (1959), to suggest that the culpability of the governmental agent is not relevant. The cases cited deal with actions for defamation and the government agent’s privilege. Privilege to commit defamation is a doctrine separate from governmental immunity and based on different policy reasons. The cases cited by the majority are not on point.
More importantly, the majority opinion misconstrues plaintiff’s cause of action. The majority states:
"* * * In effect, then, plaintiff’s position is that welding courses without the practical usage and training could not achieve the promised level of proficiency.
"The method of instruction and course content obviously involve complex judgmental decisions by college officials. A jury verdict here is tantamount to a direction to the college to provide practical use training as part of the curriculum for the courses offered in the catalog. The legislature intended that such decisions be made by college officials, not by judges and juries in tort actions. * * *” 33 Or App at 566.
While I agree that an action based on the failure of the college to include certain courses in the curriculum or teach certain techniques in the courses would be barred by governmental immunity, I see no relevance to that position in this case. The plaintiff sued on account of statements made to him in order to induce his enrollment. The statements were specific and factual and concerned not the level of proficiency *571plaintiff would reach, but rather what machines were to be available for training plaintiff.
After restructuring plaintiff’s cause of action, the majority finds that it is barred by immunity. To reach this conclusion the majority opinion still finds it necessary to imply some different standard of pleading or proof in actions in which governmental immunity is an issue. This higher standard is not explained nor is any statutory or case authority cited to support the imposition of this standard. 33 Or App at 568. The majority opinion concludes by commenting that the evidence of fraud is slight. While this may be true, its relevance to the question of immunity escapes me.
My analysis of the immunity problem starts at the same point as the majority: ORS 30.260 to 30.300. I agree that in this case the issue turns on whether the acts alleged by the plaintiff are "discretionary” or "ministerial” as those terms have been defined by the courts. Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or 485, 475 P2d 78 (1970) is generally considered the leading Oregon case on the subject. In Smith the court discussed several possible rules to help determine if an activity was discretionary or ministerial. The court stated:
"The most decisive factor but one most difficult to articulate is that it is essential for efficient government that certain decisions of the executive or legislative branches of the government should not be reviewed by a court or jury. The reason behind such factor is that the bases for the legislative or executive decision can cover the whole spectrum of the ingredients for governmental decisions such as the availability of funds, public acceptance, order of priority, etc.” Smith v. Cooper, supra, 256 Or at 506.
Although the Smith case does not lend itself easily to analysis, it would appear that the factor explained above was relied upon by the court in reaching its conclusion:
"These allegations charge conduct by the executive branch of the government which should not be reviewed *572by the judicial branch. The decisions that were made to do or not to do these things appear to have been dependent upon considerations that a court or jury should not consider, particularly by hindsight, such as the funds available for the project, the amount of additional land necessary to make a more gradual curve, the cost of the land, the loss of the land for recreational or agricultural purposes, the amount and kind of traffic contemplated, the evaluation of traffic and safety technical data, etc.” Smith v. Cooper, supra, 256 Or at 511.
I would therefore hold that the applicability of governmental immunity depends upon the most decisive factor discussed in Smith. I would suggest that an appropriate formulation of that factor would be to construe ORS 30.265(3)(c) to preclude any suit in which determination of liability would necessarily involve judicial review of a policy-based political decision, affecting or concerning the people as a whole, which is expressly or peculiarly within the purview of another branch of government.
Under this formulation, a suit based on the college’s failure to offer certain courses or offer a certain type of instruction in the courses would be barred by immunity. Curriculum planning is an activity peculiarly within the purview of another branch of government and should not be made the basis of liability. The suit before us seeks damages for fraud committed by college officials in soliciting plaintiff’s enrollment in the college. Such solicitation does not involve policy-based political decisions affecting or concerning the people as a whole. It is my opinion that there is no governmental immunity for the acts involved in this case.
I would remand this case for a new trial on account of two errors below. First, the complaint which went to the jury allowed it to find fraud on the basis of statements made in defendant’s catalog. I would hold that in this case fraud could not be predicated on statements made in the college catalog since there are no specific factual representations contained in that *573catalog. 33 Or App at 565. Statements in the catalog can properly be classified as "puffing” and thus not actionable as fraud, and arguably, fall in the category of a policy-based political decision.
The second reason I would remand this case is the trial judge’s failure to instruct the jury on "recklessness.” No definition was given to the jury, although it was a central issue in the case. Although I would not agree that defendant’s requested instruction on recklessness correctly states the law I would hold that the trial judge has the obligation to instruct the jury on all relevant matters.
I respectfully dissent.