Court Opinion

ID: 9591744
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:07:15.360717+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:43.157405
License: Public Domain

WEDEMEYER, P.J.
(dissenting). I write separately because I respectfully disagree with the majority's conclusions. I would affirm both the trial court's decision that the notice of claim statute, § 893.80, Stats., was satisfied, as well as the trial court's discretionary decision to conditionally certify the class.
A. Section 893.80, Stats.
I agree that under Hicks and Carpenter, the class cannot demonstrate that it satisfied the express notice provisions of the class action statute.1 However, neither Hicks nor Carpenter addressed the actual *230notice provision of § 893.80, STATS., and the relationship to class action suits. I conclude, therefore, that neither case precludes such consideration.
As indicated in § 893.80, Stats., failure to comply with the express notice provisions of the statute will not bar the claim against the City if the City had actual notice of the claims and was not prejudiced by the claimants' failure to comply with the express notice provisions of the statute.
Based on a review of the record, I conclude that the City did have actual notice of the claims and was not prejudiced by the failure of the unnamed class members to file individual notices. The record establishes the following facts. As reported cases of illness spread throughout the metropolitan area, the City began to investigate the causes of the outbreak. In early April, after tests on several individuals struck with the digestive illness confirmed the presence of Cryptosporidium, City of Milwaukee Mayor John O. Norquist issued a boil advisory for any Milwaukee residents drinking or using Milwaukee municipal water in food preparation.
The investigation conducted by the City involved employees and agents of the City. The investigation revealed that there were increases in the turbidity of treated water at the City's southern water treatment plant from March 23, 1993, through April 9, 1993. Laboratory tests confirmed the presence of Cryptosporidium occysts in stool samples from several Milwaukee area residents. Findings pointed to the water supply as the likely source of the illnesses. The southern water treatment plant was temporarily closed. An article published in the New ENGLAND *231Journal of Medicine indicated that the contaminated water affected approximately 400,000 persons.
Based on the foregoing, I conclude that the City had actual notice that: Cryptosporidium had entered the water supply at the southern filtration plant; a definable percentage of the population had been exposed to the contaminated water; and approximately 400,000 persons became ill because of the contaminated water. This knowledge is reasonably sufficient to satisfy the dictates of the actual notice provision of § 893.80, STATS. I further conclude that the City was not prejudiced by the absence of individual notices of claims from each member of the class. The City does not dispute that it had actual notice or that it was not prejudiced. Instead, it argues that any information it obtained from conducting its own investigation does not operate to satisfy the notice requirements of the statute. The City cites Felder v. Casey, 139 Wis. 2d 614, 408 N.W.2d 19 (1987), cert. granted, 484 U.S. 942 (1987), reversed 487 U.S. 131 (1988), in support of this proposition. I am not persuaded. In Felder, our supreme court determined that the facts presented by Felder did not support a finding of actual notice. Id. at 630, 408 N.W.2d at 26.1 do not interpret Felder to be a blanket holding that whenever the City conducts its own investigation into an incident that the information it gleans from the investigation can never satisfy the actual notice provision of § 893.80. The facts presented in the instant case are very different from those presented in Felder. Felder never filed any notice of claim to put the City on notice that he intended to hold the City responsible for his injuries. Id. The class in the instant case did file notices with the City showing its intent to hold the City responsible. In addition, the facts in this case are *232unique: as a result of contaminated water supplied by the City, the Milwaukee area experienced a public health crisis. Based on these factors, I would reject the City's contention that any information it learned on its own cannot be used to show that it had actual notice.
The purpose of the notice requirement of § 893.80, Stats., to provide the City with an opportunity to properly investigate claims and budget accordingly for settlement or litigation, was satisfied. See State Dep't of Natural Resources v. City of Waukesha, 184 Wis. 2d 178, 195, 515 N.W.2d 888, 894-95 (1994). The City not only received notice of claims from thousands of individually named class members, which indicated the class's intent to include all persons affected, but it also conducted its own investigation, and determined the specific identity of affected persons. Therefore, the purpose of the notice provisions was fulfilled in this case. The City received notice of the size of the potential class as well as the substantive claims that the class may raise. Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the actual notice provision of the statute was satisfied.

B. Certification Criteria.

The second issue in this appeal is whether the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion in certifying the consolidated cases as a class. The City and General Chemical argue that the certification criteria were not satisfied and, therefore, the trial court erred in its decision. The class argues that certification was appropriate under the § 803.08, Stats., and class certification criteria.2 The trial court ruled:
*233Whether or not certification shall be granted rests in the sound discretion of the Court relying on Nolte and Schlosser. I have not put in the citations of the cases. We are all familiar with them.
This Court today, after rigorous analysis, decides that this unique lawsuit fits the concept and intent embodied in Section 803.08 of the Wisconsin Statutes though some tailoring is probable as the case progresses.
Having reviewed the briefs so competently provided, the arguments made and the pleadings on file, and acknowledging the appropriate concerns ably presented by the City defendants, this Court conditionally certifies as a class action against the City defendants the cases of Markweise and Gaines, in each of their substantive complaints, defining the class as all persons who suffered injury as a result of the contamination with Cryptosporidium of the water publicly supplied by the City of Milwaukee which contamination occurred in March and April of1993.
The Court appoints as class representatives the named plaintiffs in Markweise and Gaines and further appoints Lawrence Walner and Associates, Limited and Cascino Vaughn Law Offices, Limited to represent the class defined above naming Lawrence Walner as lead counsel for the class.
This Court is satisfied that the record before it is legally sufficient and more than adequate upon which to base today's decision.
In March and April of 1993, there was an outbreak of illness among the residents of the City of Milwaukee, often characterized by a watery *234diarrhea. Other physical complications occurred ranging from distress to death.
Some of the City's water supply is received through a water intake sited in Lake Michigan east of the pumping station at the east end of Texas Avenue in the Bay View section of Milwaukee's southside — And Bay View is part of Milwaukee and not a suburb, for counsel's consideration. The water is pumped by the Texas pumping station to the Howard Avenue purification plant. There the water is purified and distributed to consumers for consumption and other uses. The intake, pumping station, purification plant and the network of channeling and distribution pipes are owned, operated, and maintained by the City of Milwaukeé. The City of Milwaukee charged its customers a fee for the water so provided.
Increased turbidity of the water processed at the Howard Avenue plant was noted toward the end of March of 1993, and particularly from March 23rd through April 5th of 1993.
The outbreak of illness within that same time frame led to a belief that the water supply may have been the source of infection, a boil advisory was issued on April 7th by the City, and the Howard Avenue plant temporarily closed on April 9th of 1993.
Cryptosporidium, a water-borne parasite, was identified in the stool samples of some of the persons who became ill. A study reported in the New England Journal of Medicine concluded that the massive outbreak of watery diarrhea was caused by Cryptosporidium occysts which apparently passed through the filtration system of the Howard Avenue plant. That study estimated that more than 400,000 people were affected during the outbreak but by limiting the study's definition *235to watery diarrhea, the size of the affected population may be underestimated.
The City acknowledges that over 1500 persons have given notice of claim for damages attributed to the cryptosporidium-tainted water, and counsel for the plaintiffs in the cryptosporidium-related cases consolidated in this Court assert representation of over 1400 persons.
The complaints in the class action claim the injuries incurred by the representative plaintiffs and the members of the class were incurred as a result of the City's negligence, that the City failed to notify the plaintiffs and members of the class that the water was, or was likely to become, contaminated with Cryptosporidium resulting in injury, that the City is liable under the doctrine of strict liability, and that the City was liable to them for breach of contract and breach of implied warranty.
Section 803.08 of the Wisconsin Statutes provides: "When the question before the Court is one of a common or general interest of many persons, or when the parties are very numerous and it may be impractical to bring them all before the Court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole." That concept being denoted a class action.
Although the reported Wisconsin cases do not factually approach the circumstances presented in the present lawsuit, much guidance is provided. The prerequisites for class action [are] commonality, representation, and impracticability.
Commonality is tested by determining whether all members of the class desire the same outcome of the suit that the alleged representatives of the class desire. Mercury Records. All interests need not be shared but, rather, a common interest must exist. Both Harris and Jones discuss that. Cases decided *236understanding the Federal Rule which is not controlling, but instructive, discuss the concepts of predominance and superiority.
In the instant case, the claims of the representative plaintiffs and unnamed members of the class rests upon the same theories of law and the same set of facts as respects liability — was the City negligent in testing or treating the water, in failing to warn the possible contamination or in failing to inspect a drainage connection pipe at a certain facility? Did the City break its contractual obligations to consumers?
An affirmative response is the clear and only goal of the plaintiffs and the class. No animosity or cross purpose exists between or among them.
There are obstacles. Causation, individual damages, subrogation, possible contributory negligence are advanced by the City as mitigating against commonality, and these are not ignored by the Court. However, in my judgment, the alleged contamination of the water supply provided by the City is a predominant issue that supersedes any individual variance as to causality or damages.
The concept of de minimis is wrongfully argued by the City since one value to be accomplished by class certification is to provide access to the courts for those due to the size of their claim are unable practically or financially to advance their cause in any other manner. Pre-existing conditions do not intervene to prevent recovery since by definition they pre-exist the alleged wrong. They would be viable in damage determinations.
Looking at the case before us, it is clear that the liability issue predominates and that the class approved provides a superior method of resolution.
Consider, for example, the expense to litigants, the expenditure of court time, and the delay forced upon other litigants if 1500 cases at a minimum and *237an indefinable at present but potentially large number of others were to be tried separately.
The retrial over and over of the same factual issues, the repeated testimony of expert witnesses, and the possibility of inconsistent verdicts make individual resolution of claims an administrative and judicial logjam with delay and uncertainty overwhelming the process.
As to representation, two considerations are paramount — whether the representative plaintiffs clearly share a consistent and non-antagonistic interest with the unnamed class members, and whether counsel for the representative plaintiffs and class are competent and will fairly represent the interest of all plaintiffs.
A reading of the complaints demonstrates unequivocally that the representative plaintiffs seek to hold the City liable for the damages each sustained by use or consumption of the crypto-bearing water, exactly the interest of the unnamed class members.
There is and can be no animosity between or among those representative plaintiffs and the class.
[T]he choice of counsel by a host of claimants convinces me of the ability of selected counsel to fairly and competently represent the claim as well as the representative — as the claim — of the class as well as the representative plaintiffs.
Impracticability is essentially an issue of numerosity. Suffice it to say whether we consider 1500, 15,000 or 150,000, the number of claimants clearly exceeds any number ever found by any Court to be insufficient for class action.
Class certification is not a panacea operating to necessarily resolve all issues for all time in a single proceeding. It is, however, highly praised by some *238as said by the respected Professor Arthur Miller of Harvard back in 1987.
"Class actions have proven to be the most effective legal technique for avoiding piecemeal litigation and preserving legal resources."
It is understood that there will be manageability problems with a case of this magnitude proceeding in the class mode, but the alternative would be particularly oppressive and destructive of the goals of our system of justice.
In addition to being a more inexpensive, efficient, and inclusive method of claims adjudication, there is the additional benefit to defendant that a finality of litigation will be accomplished, even perhaps through exoneration allowing that though opt outs would be separately resolved, they would be known.
The class certification also lends itself as a tool toward settlement, a valid and desirable result in all litigation.. ..
It must be remembered that the Court retains the authority through the length of this litigation to amend the parties, to redefine the class, to establish subclasses, to join or bifurcate issues or causes, and to ultimately control disposition.
Innovative and imaginative techniques for resolution will not be avoided by this court simply because they are innovative or imaginative. This Court will throughout this matter maintain a focus on due process and fairness to all.
It is the Court's decision, for all thé reasons set forth, that certification of the class defined above be granted....
*239This court's review of a trial court's decision that a class action is appropriate is limited to determining whether the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion. See Mercury Records Productions, Inc. v. Economic Consultants, Inc., 91 Wis. 2d 482, 491, 283 N.W.2d 613, 618 (Ct. App. 1979). The trial court did not erroneously exercise its discretion if it addressed the pertinent facts, applied the proper law, and reached a rational conclusion, see Hartung v. Hartung, 102 Wis. 2d 58, 66, 306 N.W.2d 16, 20 (1981), even if this court might reach a different conclusion. I emphasize that this standard restricts this court's review to determining only whether the trial court erroneously exercised its discretion, and this court cannot decide the substantive merits of the trial court's decision.
In order to maintain a class action, three criteria must be satisfied. Nolte v. Michels Pipeline Constr. Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 171, 176, 265 N.W.2d 482, 485 (1978). The criteria are: (1) the named parties must have a common interest with the persons represented; (2) the named parties must be able to fairly represent the common interest so that the issue may be fairly and honestly tried; and (3) it is impracticable to bring all the interested persons before the court. Id. If these three criteria are met, the trial court must also balance the benefits to be gained by class certification against the burdens inherent in a class action. Schlosser v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 86 Wis. 2d 226, 233-34, 271 N.W.2d 879, 883 (1978).
As is evident by the excerpt quoted above from the trial court's decision, the trial court addressed each of these factors at length, and employed a balancing of benefits versus burdens. The trial court found that all of the members of the proposed class satisfied the common interest criteria because each desired the *240same outcome — that the defendants be found liable for the damages caused by the contamination of the water supply. Finding that the common interest factor was satisfied did not constitute an erroneous exercise of discretion.
"The test for common interest is whether all members of the purported class desire the same outcome of the suit that the alleged representatives of the class desire." Mercury Records, 91 Wis. 2d at 490, 283 N.W.2d at 617. The trial court's finding satisfied this test. I am not persuaded by the defendants' arguments that the differences in causality and damage issues preclude a finding of commonality. Although the variances of cause and damage issues in this case may eventually pose some difficulties in its ultimate resolution, these issues do not alter the finding of the common interest criteria. The trial court indicated a willingness to employ innovative and imaginative techniques to address potential hurdles and I would not prematurely usurp the trial court's attempt to do so. The fact that such hurdles may occur somewhere during the litigation does not make the trial court's finding that all purported class members share a common interest erroneous. Further, the trial court determined that the issue of common interest was predominant over the other concerns.
The trial court also addressed the second criteria — whether the named class members fairly and adequately represent the interest of the unnamed class members. In addressing this factor, the trial court again found that this criteria was satisfied because the named members and the unnamed members are aligned in interest and no animosity exists between the two groups. The trial court also found the attorneys representing the class to be competent and capable of *241providing proper representation. This is a proper analysis. See Goldwater v. Alston & Bird, 116 F.R.D. 342, 353 (S.D. Ill. 1987) (adequate representation factor is satisfied if the named plaintiffs' interests are not antagonistic to the class). There is sufficient evidence in the record to uphold the trial court's determination and the defendants have failed to present this court with any evidence to show that the named members cannot adequately represent the unnamed members. Lewis v. Curtis, 671 F.2d 779, 788 (3d Cir.) (it is the defendant's burden to establish that representation is inadequate), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982). Further, the trial court conditionally certified this class, acknowledged that potential problems may arise during the course of the litigation, and recognized its authority to take any action necessary to address and resolve problems that arise.
The record also demonstrates that the trial court aptly addressed the third criteria — impracticability. The trial court addressed the significant burdens and problems that would occur if the thousands of cases at issue were allowed to proceed independently. Specifically, the trial court ruled: "Suffice it to say whether we consider 1500, 15,000 or 150,000, the number of claimants clearly exceeds any number ever found by any Court to be insufficient for class action." After addressing these considerations, the trial court determined that the class action would be the most effective legal technique for the Cryptosporidium claims. The defendants' concerns regarding this factor again focus on the potential problems regarding the variances among causality and damages. My response here is the same as indicated above: I would not prematurely usurp from the trial court the chance to successfully resolve these issues within the context of *242the class action and, therefore, these potential problems do not lead me to conclude that the trial court's determination of this factor was erroneous.
Finally, the trial court engaged in a balancing of the benefits versus the burdens. It noted that there may be some manageability problems, but reasoned that these problems may be resolved utilizing imaginative and innovative techniques and that the alternative "would be particularly oppressive and destructive of the goals of our justice system." I agree.
In reviewing the trial court's discretionary determination to conditionally certify the class, I cannot conclude at this point that the trial court's discretionary determination was erroneous. The trial court's certification was conditional, and it committed itself to attempting to make the class action work. Although it is conceivable that the trial court may not be able to fashion a workable method to address the issues raised by the defendants, that potential hurdle should not prevent the trial court from making an effort to do so. Moreover, the trial court's commitment to make such an attempt furthers the purposes of a class action to simplify the lawsuit, avoid multiplicity of litigation, provide access to efficient justice to class members with nominal claims, and to avoid unnecessary prophylactic filing. General Chemical's concerns about its right to a jury trial can be addressed by the trial court's due diligence as the case proceeds to resolution. By allowing the trial court to exercise its powers of discretion as delineated in its motion decision, Wisconsin's rich tradition of allowing its citizens reasonable access to judicial process would neither be jeopardized nor abused. Thus, it is not necessary to reverse the trial court's certification decision on that basis.
*243I would affirm the trial court's order and, therefore, respectfully dissent.

Both cases involved an individual who filed a notice of claim on his behalf and on behalf of all members of the class. Hicks v. Milwaukee County, 71 Wis. 2d 401, 407, 238 N.W.2d 509, 513 (1976); Carpenter v. Racine Comm'n of Public Works, 115 Wis. 2d 211, 214, 339 N.W.2d 608, 609 (Ct. App. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984). Both cases concluded that the class could not be maintained because the notices of claim, purportedly filed on behalf of the entire class failed to meet the minimum requirements: (1) identify the claimants; and (2) show that the named individual is authorized to act on behalf of all *230the claimants. Hicks, 71 Wis. 2d at 407, 238 N.W.2d at 514; Carpenter, 115 Wis. 2d at 216-17, 339 N.W.2d at 610.

 Wisconsin's class action statute, § 803.08, Stats., provides:
*233When the question before the court is one of a common or general interest of many persons or when the parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole.