Court Opinion

ID: 9387409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-17 20:02:49.21054+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.880935
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/17/23 P. v. Radillo CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                       FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F083848
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. 15CR-06414)
                    v.

 OSCAR RADILLO,                                                                           OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Merced County. Paul C. Lo,
Judge.
         Lillian Hamrick, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Eric L. Christoffersen and Craig
S. Meyers, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                     INTRODUCTION
         In 2016, appellant Oscar Radillo was charged with arson of an inhabited structure
(Pen. Code,1 § 451, subd. (b), count 1); making criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a), count
2); and false imprisonment by violence (§ 236, count 3). Radillo entered a plea of no
contest to counts 1 and 3. The trial court subsequently found Radillo mentally
incompetent, accepted his alternative plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, and ordered
Radillo committed to the Department of State Hospitals “for a maximum period not to
exceed eight (8) years eight (8) months.”
         In 2021, Radillo filed a motion to withdraw his plea. The trial court granted
Radillo’s motion, finding that he was not advised that his term of commitment may
exceed the longest possible term of imprisonment for the underlying crimes. (See People
v. Lomboy (1981) 116 Cal.App.3rd 67.)
         The trial court indicated it would sentence Radillo to the upper term. Radillo
reentered his plea of no contest to arson (§ 451, subd. (b)) and false imprisonment by
violence (§ 236).
         On January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No.
567) and Assembly Bill No. 124 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill No. 124) went
into effect. Following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 567, a trial court may impose an
upper term sentence only if the aggravating circumstances justify its imposition, and the
facts underlying those circumstances have been proven consistent with the statute. In
turn, Assembly Bill No. 124 established a presumption that the trial court will impose the
low term if certain circumstances were contributing factors to the commission of the
crime.

1        All undefined statutory citations are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                              2.
       On January 27, 2022, following argument by the parties, Radillo was resentenced
to the upper term of eight years for arson, and a consecutive term of eight months for
false imprisonment by violence.
       On appeal, Radillo contends that the trial court failed to comply with Senate Bill
No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124, and that he is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
We affirm.
                               PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       On August 8, 2016, the Merced County District Attorney charged Radillo by
information with arson of an inhabited structure (§ 451, subd. (b), count 1); making
criminal threats (§ 422, subd. (a), count 2); and false imprisonment by violence (§ 236,
count 3).
       On November 29, 2016, Radillo entered a plea of no contest to arson and false
imprisonment by violence. Count 2 was dismissed in view of Radillo’s plea. Radillo
also plead not guilty by reason of insanity. Following a bench trial, the court found
Radillo was legally insane at the time of the offense and that he had not fully recovered.
       On February 9, 2017, the court committed Radillo to the State Department of State
Hospitals “for a maximum period not to exceed eight (8) years eight (8) months.”
       On November 18, 2021, the trial court granted Radillo’s motion to withdraw his
plea of insanity, finding that Radillo had not been advised pursuant to People v. Lomboy,
supra, 116 Cal.App.3rd 67. The court reinstated Radillo’s no contest plea and indicated
that it would impose the upper term in state prison.
       On January 27, 2022, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. Following
argument by the parties, including a discussion of mitigating and aggravating factors
relevant to Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124, the court sentenced Radillo to
the upper term of eight years for arson, and one-third the middle term of eight months for
false imprisonment by violence, to run consecutively.
       Radillo filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                             3.
                               STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Underlying Offense
       The following statement of facts is derived from the reporter’s transcript from
Radillo’s preliminary hearing, which occurred on July 25, 2016:
       On November 27, 2015, Radillo, schizophrenic and delusional, accused his father,
R.R., of poisoning his food. Radillo spilled food all over his bed. When his father
questioned him about it, Radillo began to get angry. R.R. tried to leave the room, which
further angered Radillo. Radillo told his father, “ ‘You going nowhere.’ ” As R.R. tried
to leave, Radillo punched him in the mouth. When R.R. moved to another door, R.R.
punched him in the ribs. R.R. eventually managed to get out of the house as Radillo said,
“ ‘[T]his is a warning. Next time I kill you.’ ”
       R.R. went into a nearby field and called the police. As he waited for the police to
arrive, he saw smoke coming from his home. R.R. tried to put the fire out, but he was
unsuccessful. The house burned down.
The Mental Health Report
       A report prepared pursuant to section 1026, subdivision (f) was made part of the
record.2 The report, dated December 6, 2021, states that since the last progress report,
there were minimal changes to Radillo’s status. According to the report, Radillo
“continues to lack insight into his mental illness and need for treatment.”
       Under “Psychiatric status,” the report states that Radillo “has remained
psychiatrically unstable,” and that he “has primarily been experiencing chronic delusional
beliefs about women and religion.”

2       Section 1026, subdivision (f) provides: “If the defendant is confined in a state
hospital or other treatment facility as an inpatient, the medical director of the facility
shall, at six-month intervals, submit a report in writing to the court and the community
program director of the county of commitment, or a designee, setting forth the status and
progress of the defendant.”

                                             4.
       Radillo stated that he wanted “ ‘to sleep with 1000 women and save them from
going to hell’ ” and he had been exercising daily for this purpose. Radillo commented
that women “ ‘are she-devils who will make [him] sacrifice animals, but [he] will have to
do it because they will make [him]. It says so in the Bible.’ ” He also stated that these
women would make him “ ‘burn incense to summon demons.’ ”
       The report notes that Radillo has not engaged in any assaultive behaviors and that
he has generally been pleasant and followed directions. However, while he has been
willingly taking his medication, he was refusing to participate in any program that he
perceived to be treatment. The report states that Radillo “does not believe he has a
mental illness … and he has not been motivated to attend groups.”
       Under “VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT,” the forensic evaluator concluded that
“[i]f Mr. Radillo were to be moved to a different setting (e.g., prison, CONREP, straight
release, etc.), the severity of his symptoms and his limited coping abilities would increase
his risk for being a danger to others, and it would also increase his risk for victimization
(e.g., sexual exploitation).”
The Sentencing Hearing
       On January 27, 2022, the trial court held Radillo’s sentencing hearing. The
hearing occurred after Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124 went into effect,
and therefore, applied prospectively to Radillo’s sentence.
       At the hearing, Radillo’s family addressed his history of mental health issues, and
claimed that he had suffered mental and physical abuse as a child. Radillo’s brother told
the court that he would assume responsibility for Radillo’s care if Radillo were to be
released, with support from other family members.
       Trial counsel discussed Senate Bill No. 567 and Assembly Bill No. 124, and the
application of these newly enacted laws to Radillo’s sentence. She explained that Senate
Bill No. 567 “require[s] the Court to impose a term of imprisonment not exceeding the
middle term unless there are circumstances in aggravation that have been either stipulated

                                              5.
to by the Defendant or found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by a jury or a judge
in a court trial.” Trial counsel added that the trial court would presumably be able to base
factors in aggravation and mitigation of Radillo’s sentence upon the preliminary hearing
transcript, and reports and statements submitted by the defense or the victim (R.R.) and
the victim’s family. Trial counsel stated, “[n]othing at this point has been stipulated to by
the Defendant as to specific aggravating factors, but I believe the Court has reviewed the
preliminary hearing transcript. That included the testimony of his father, who is
essentially the victim or complaining witness in this case.”
       Trial counsel observed that two factors in aggravation arguably applied, including:
Radillo’s threat to his father, which may constitute a “threat of great bodily harm” (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)3), and the destruction of R.R.’s home, which would
likely qualify as damage of “great monetary value” (rule 4.421(a)(9)). However, she
emphasized that there were multiple mitigating factors applicable, including: the fact that
Radillo had no prior criminal record (rule 4.423(b)(1)); he was suffering from
schizophrenia, which was documented by family members and mental health reports (rule
4.423(b)(2) & (4)); he voluntarily acknowledged wrongdoing at an early stage (rule
4.423(b)(8)); and that he is ineligible for probation, and but for his ineligibility, probation
would likely have been granted (rule 4.423(b)(9)).
       Trial counsel further observed that section 1170, subdivision (b)(6), added by the
enactment of Assembly Bill No. 124, required the court to impose the low term of
incarceration if Radillo’s youth was a contributing factor to the offense. Under the
statute, “youth” is defined as being under the age of 26 at the time of the offense. (See
§ 1016.7.) Radillo was 20 years old when the crime occurred.
       With respect to Radillo’s mental health issue, trial counsel stated that the court
was permitted to consider the mental health report from the Department of State

3      All further rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

                                              6.
Hospitals in its sentencing decision and she referred to findings within the report
throughout her argument. Trial counsel acknowledged that Radillo had made statements
that were “delusional and concerning,” and admitted that “he’s not in remission at this
time.” However, she opined that he did “not appear to be acting on these [delusions] in
any way that creates a risk to himself or others.” Trial counsel remarked, “[Radillo] is
medication compliant and these delusions don’t seem to have led to any actual issues.”
       According to trial counsel, “[t]he big concern here really is, if he gets upper term,
he will still have time left in prison and he will go to [the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation].” Trial counsel added that the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) lacks significant mental health treatment.
Alternatively, if Radillo were to be released, she asserted that Radillo could participate in
an outpatient treatment program, which his family was committed to.
       The prosecutor agreed that the trial court could take the mental health report into
consideration in its sentencing decision. He explained the report could be considered
under factors that reasonably relate to the defendant. (See rule 4.421(c) [the court can
consider “[a]ny other factors statutorily declared to be circumstances in aggravation or
which reasonably relate to the defendant or the circumstances under which the crime was
committed”].)
       The prosecutor characterized the hospital report as “concerning.” The hospital
report stated that if Radillo were moved into a different setting, “ ‘the severity of his
symptoms and his limited coping skills would increase his risk for being a danger to
others, and it would also increase his risk for possible victimization.’ ” According to the
prosecutor, the hospital report demonstrated that if Radillo were to be released, he would
be a danger to his family and to the community.
       Following the parties’ arguments, the trial court concluded that imposition of the
upper term of eight years was warranted, finding the factors in aggravation outweighed
the factors in mitigation. The trial court found that the threat of harm to R.R. had been

                                              7.
significant, and the court expressed concern about releasing Radillo to his family and into
the community. The trial court explained, “the Defendant does not have any insight and
appreciation that he has a mental health issue and he does not acknowledge that.”
Further, “although he does take medication, he does not participate in any therapy.” The
trial court stated that Radillo’s expressed desire to be released so that he could “sleep
with a thousand women” was “very concerning.” The court observed that Radillo had
been taking active steps to carry out that delusion, including working out every day.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     Radillo is Not Entitled to Resentencing Pursuant to Senate Bill No. 567
       Radillo contends that neither of the aggravating factors upon which the trial court
relied in imposing the upper term were stipulated to or found true beyond a reasonable
doubt, which is required following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 567. The Attorney
General contends that the trial court substantially complied with amended section 1170,
subdivision (b) because Radillo stipulated to certain facts, but that the court’s findings of
fact, which did not comply with the statute, constitutes harmless error.4
       We conclude that the trial court failed to fully comply with amended section 1170,
subdivision (b). Radillo did not stipulate to all relevant facts supporting the aggravating
factors relied upon by the trial court, nor were these facts found true beyond a reasonable
doubt by a jury or by the judge. However, in light of the strong evidence presented at the
sentencing hearing supporting the aggravating factors relied upon by the trial court in
imposing the upper term, we further conclude that the error is harmless.
       A.     Relevant Legal Principles
       On October 8, 2021, Senate Bill No. 567 was signed into law. The new law
amended the determinate sentencing law, section 1170, subdivision (b), which delineates

4     The parties do not argue that an implied waiver of the right to a jury trial on the
circumstances in aggravation is sufficient under the statute. We therefore presume that
an express waiver is required.

                                              8.
the trial court’s authority to impose one of three statutory terms of imprisonment, by
making the middle term the presumptive sentence for a term of imprisonment, unless
certain circumstances apply. (See Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3, adding § 1170, subd. (b)(1),
(2).)
        Effective January 1, 2022, the trial court may impose an upper term sentence only
where there are circumstances in aggravation that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying all of the
aggravating circumstances have been stipulated to by the defendant or found true beyond
a reasonable doubt by a jury or a trial court if the defendant has consented to a court trial.
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
        Either party, including the victim or the victim’s family, “may submit a statement
in aggravation or mitigation to dispute facts in the record or the probation officer’s report,
or to present additional facts.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(4).) The trial court may consider “the
record in the case, the probation officer’s report, other reports, including reports received
pursuant to Section 1203.03, and statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by the
prosecution, the defendant, or the victim, or the family of the victim if the victim is
deceased, and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing hearing.” (Ibid.) The
trial court must “set forth on the record the facts and reasons for choosing
the sentence imposed.” (Id., subd. (b)(5).)
        B.     Analysis
        1.     The Aggravating Factors Found True by the Trial Court

               a. The Crime Involved a Threat of Great Bodily Harm (Rule 4.421(a)(1))
        At the sentencing hearing, trial counsel stated that the court could consider the
reporter’s transcript from the preliminary hearing for purposes of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(2). Radillo contends that this was not a stipulation to the truth of all facts
therein. (See People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36 [when entering a plea, “[a]

                                              9.
defendant is not required to personally admit the truth of the factual basis of the plea”];
People v. Rivera (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 217, 235, quoting People v. French, at pp. 51-52
[“absent an indication that a defendant admitted the truth of particular facts, the
stipulation to a factual basis for the plea does not ‘constitute[ ] a binding admission for all
purposes’ ”].) The Attorney General does not suggest as much.
       Moreover, while trial counsel suggested that this aggravating circumstance may
apply, her assertion fell short of a clear concession. Trial counsel argued, “while there
maybe were threats made ahead of time, this is not a situation where [Radillo] attempted
to burn the building down with his father inside of it. [¶ ] So, arguably, factor (a)(1)
applies, but I do think there’s caveats to that as well.” Trial counsel’s statement falls
short of a clear admission that the threat to which she was referring involved a threat of
great bodily harm (see rule 4.421(a)(1)). Based upon the foregoing, we conclude that the
trial court erred by finding this factor true without complying with amended section 1170,
subdivision (b).

              b. The Risk of Harm Radillo’s Release Would Pose to the Community
                 and to His Family (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421, subd. (c))
       As to the second aggravating factor, pertaining to Radillo’s threat of harm to the
community and his family, trial counsel did not stipulate that this factor applied.
However, throughout her argument, trial counsel referred to facts relevant to this
aggravating circumstance.
       She acknowledged that Radillo had suffered from delusions and that he was “not
engaging in treatment.” She emphasized that if Radillo were to receive the upper term
sentence of eight years, he would have to serve his remaining time at CDCR. Trial
counsel claimed that CDCR lacks significant mental health treatment programs.
Alternatively, if Radillo were to be released by imposition of the middle or lower term,
she suggested that he could participate in an outpatient treatment program.

                                             10.
       The trial court took these facts into consideration in concluding that the upper term
was warranted. Under the circumstances, we see no reason why trial counsel’s
acknowledgment of the delusions experienced by Radillo, in addition to the fact that he
was not treatment compliant, should not be treated as an admission to these facts. (See
People v. Jackson (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 129, 161 [“[o]ral statements of counsel may
be treated as judicial admissions if they were intended to be such or reasonably construed
by the court or the other party as such”].) Although trial counsel’s statements lack the
formality of an oral stipulation, they were neither improvidently made nor inconsistent
with her argument that the court should impose a mitigated sentence. Additionally, it
strains credulity to accept trial counsel’s statement of the facts pertaining to Radillo’s
mental health issues on one hand, but to simultaneously conclude that this should not be
deemed an admission to these same facts on the other.
       We acknowledge that in explaining its sentencing decision, the trial court referred
to facts within the mental health report that were not explicitly admitted by trial counsel
at the sentencing hearing. Specifically, the fact that Radillo lacks insight into both his
commitment offense and his mental illness, as well as his delusions pertaining to women,
specifically, his expressed desire to be released so that he could “sleep with 1,000
women.” However, the parties below agreed that the trial court could rely upon findings
within the mental health report in making its sentencing decision, and the parties do not
contest this on appeal. The mental health report and the facts admitted by trial counsel
provide strong evidence that Radillo poses a threat of harm to the community if he were
to be released. As discussed further below, we conclude that any error by the trial court
in relying upon facts not admitted by trial counsel is therefore harmless.
       2.     Harmless Error
       There is a split of authority concerning what prejudice standard applies when a
trial court relies upon facts not stipulated to or found true beyond a reasonable doubt by
either a jury or the court. In People v. Flores (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 495, our colleagues

                                             11.
in the First District Court of Appeal, Division Three, held that resentencing following
Senate Bill No. 567 is not required if the reviewing court can determine beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury would have found true at least one aggravating
circumstance. (People v. Flores, supra, at p. 501.)
       In People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 459 (Lopez), the Fourth District Court
of Appeal, Division One, concluded that harmless error may be found where the
reviewing court can either (1) determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would
have found true all the aggravating factors the trial court cited, or if not, (2) conclude, “to
the degree required by People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836,” that the trial court
would have reached the same decision even if it knew it could not properly rely on all the
factors it did. (Id. at p. 467, fn. 11; but see, People v. Wandrey (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
962, 982, review granted Sept. 28, 2022, S275942 [applying the first prong of People v.
Lopez but stating, as to the second prong, “whether the trial court would have exercised
its discretion in the same way if it had been aware of the statutory presumption in favor
of the middle term”].)
       In People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, the Third District Court of
Appeal set forth the following test for harmless error: the reviewing court must (1)
identify one aggravating factor relied upon by the trial court that would have been found
true by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) for the remaining factors, determine
whether it is reasonably probable that a jury would have found the remaining aggravating
factors true. (Id. at pp. 1110-1113.) With the aggravating factors that survive, the
reviewing court must determine “whether it is reasonably probable that the trial court
would have chosen a lesser sentence had it considered only these aggravating facts.” (Id.
at p. 1112.)
       Finally, in People v. Dunn (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 394 (review granted Oct. 12,
2022, S275655 (Dunn)), this court described a two-step process: “The reviewing court
determines (1)(a) beyond a reasonable doubt whether the jury would have found one

                                              12.
aggravating circumstance true beyond a reasonable doubt and (1)(b) whether there is a
reasonable probability that the jury would have found any remaining aggravating
circumstance(s) true beyond a reasonable doubt. If all aggravating circumstances relied
upon by the trial court would have been proved to the respective standards, any error was
harmless. If not, the reviewing court moves to the second step of Lopez, (2) whether
there is a reasonable probability that the trial court would have imposed a sentence other
than the upper term in light of the aggravating circumstances provable from the record as
determined in the prior steps. If the answer is no, the error was harmless. If the answer is
yes, the reviewing court vacates the sentence and remands for resentencing consistent
with section 1170, subdivision (b).” (Id. at pp. 409-410, fn. omitted.)
       The question of what prejudice standard applies when a trial court fails to comply
with Senate Bill No. 567 is currently pending before our Supreme Court. (See People v.
Lynch (May 27, 2022, C094174) [nonpub. opn.], review granted Aug. 10, 2022,
S274942.) Notwithstanding, we are persuaded that under any standard, the trial court’s
error is harmless.
       First, with respect to the trial court’s finding that Radillo poses a risk of harm to
the community and to his family, the record amply supports this conclusion. The mental
health report was made part of the record on appeal. The parties’ comments summarizing
the report and the trial court’s statements concerning findings within the report accurately
reflect its contents. Indeed, even trial counsel acknowledged the truth of some of the
findings in the report, including, the fact that Radillo was experiencing significant
delusions, he was not engaging in treatment, and he was not in remission from his mental
health issue despite being medication compliant. Significantly, the mental health report
indicates that if Radillo “were to be moved to a different setting (e.g., prison, CONREP,
straight release, etc.), the severity of his symptoms and his limited coping abilities would
increase his risk for being a danger to others.”

                                             13.
       Whether a defendant poses a significant danger to the community is generally a
subjective assessment. “[T]o the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a
particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a
reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the
jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the trial court.”
(People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 840.) Here however, given the strength of
the evidence in the record, which was undisputed by the parties, we are confident that a
jury would have found this factor true beyond a reasonable doubt.
       As to the second aggravating circumstance, we need only conclude that there is a
reasonable probability that either the jury would have found this factor true beyond a
reasonable doubt (see Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 409-410), or alternatively, that
the trial court would have made the same sentencing decision if it knew it could not rely
upon this factor (see Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467). We are convinced that this
factor has been established under either standard.
       During a physical confrontation provoked by a paranoid delusion, Radillo beat and
then threatened to kill his father. After his father fled the home, Radillo burned his house
down. These facts were uncontested by trial counsel at the sentencing hearing.5
Although R.R. did not actually sustain great bodily injury during the incident, that does
not foreclose application of this aggravating factor. (See, e.g. People v. Edwards (1981)
117 Cal.App.3d 436, 445-446 [a direct verbal threat to kill the victim could be used as a
factor in aggravation of the defendant’s sentence].) From the record, we conclude there

5      Dunn makes clear that step (1)(a) is satisfied if the trial court “relied upon an
aggravating circumstance that relied only upon the fact of defendant’s prior convictions
and a certified record of defendant’s convictions was admitted, or defendant admitted the
facts underlying an aggravating circumstance.” (Dunn, supra, at 81 Cal.App.5th at p.
410, fn. 13, italics added.)

                                            14.
is a reasonable probability that a jury would have found this factor true beyond a
reasonable doubt. (See Dunn, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at pp. 409-410.)
       However, even assuming the trial court could not rely upon this factor, the record
supports that conclusion that the trial court would not have imposed a sentence other than
the upper term based upon its finding that Radillo’s release would pose a risk of harm to
the community and to his family. (See Lopez, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467.) The
record shows the trial court placed great weight upon this factor. The balance of the trial
court’s statements explaining its sentencing decision pertained to Radillo’s mental health,
his apparent need for continued treatment in a structured environment, and the threat his
release would pose to the public safety and Radillo’s family. Moreover, the court
explicitly stated, “the issue really is for the Court, … what would be the risk to the
community and to the family if [Radillo] is to remain outpatient, out of custody.”
       All things considered, even if the trial court did not consider the fact that the
underlying crime involved a significant threat of harm to Radillo’s father, we conclude
there is a reasonable probability that it would have imposed the upper term based upon its
finding that Radillo’s release would pose a threat of harm to the community. (See Lopez,
supra, 78 Cal.App.5th at p. 467.) We therefore conclude that the trial court’s failure to
fully comply with Senate Bill No. 567’s requirements is harmless error.
       Radillo claims it is not possible for this court to conclude that a trier of fact would
have found either of the aggravating factors to be true beyond a reasonable doubt. He
contends the aggravating factors relied upon by the trial court “concern matters about
which [he] did not have the chance to offer evidence.”
       A reviewing court cannot ordinarily assume that the existing record reflects all of
the evidence that would have been presented had the aggravating circumstances been
submitted to the jury. (See, e.g., People v. Sandoval, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 840
[“[c]ounsel’s strategy might have been different had the aggravating circumstances been
tried under a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard of proof to a trier of fact that was

                                             15.
responsible only for determining whether such circumstances were proved (and not for
making the ultimate sentencing decision)”].) However, Senate Bill No. 567 was already
part of the legal landscape at the time of Radillo’s sentencing hearing.
       At the hearing, trial counsel explained to the court that the facts underlying the
aggravating circumstances had to be stipulated to or proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
Because the sentencing hearing occurred after the enactment of Senate Bill No. 567, trial
counsel had the incentive and opportunity to challenge the forensic evaluator’s findings
in the mental health report, as well as the evidence showing that Radillo had beaten and
threatened to kill his father. We therefore presume the evidence presented by trial
counsel at the sentencing hearing was the sum total of the evidence available. Radillo’s
assertion to the contrary is too speculative to support his claim of reversible error.
II.    The Trial Court Complied with Assembly Bill No. 124
       Radillo further contends that the trial court failed to consider that certain factors
contributed to the commission of the offense (see § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B)), including the
fact that he was 20 years old when the crime occurred, that he has a mental illness, and
that he suffered physical and emotional abuse throughout his childhood. We conclude
the record shows that the trial court considered these factors, but found “the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances [such] that imposition of the lower
term would be contrary to the interests of justice.” (Ibid.)
       A.     Relevant Legal Principles
       Effective January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 124 amended section 1170 by
adding paragraph (6) to subdivision (b), which provides: “Notwithstanding paragraph
(1), and unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating
circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be contrary to the interests of
justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if any of the following was a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense: [¶] (A) The person has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse,

                                             16.
neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence. [¶] (B) The person is a youth, or was a youth as
defined under subdivision (b) of Section 1016.7 at the time of the commission of the
offense. [¶] (C) Prior to the instant offense, or at the time of the commission of the
offense, the person is or was a victim of intimate partner violence or human trafficking.”
(§ 1170, subd. (b)(6).) Section 1016.7, subdivision (b), defines a “ ‘youth’ ” as “any
person under 26 years of age on the date the offense was committed.”6
       B.     Analysis
       At the sentencing hearing, Radillo’s family stated that he had been physically and
psychologically abused as a child and they offered testimony describing his history of
mental health issues. Further, trial counsel explained how Radillo’s schizophrenia-
related delusions contributed to his commitment offense. She also advised the trial court
that under amended section 1170, it was required to impose the low term of incarceration
if certain circumstances were contributing factors to the commission of the offense,
including the fact that Radillo was under the age of 26 at the time of the offense. The
amendments to which trial counsel was referring were subdivision (b)(6) of section 1170
and section 1016.7, which were added by the enactment of Assembly Bill No. 124.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 5.1, adding § 1170, subd. (b)(6)(B); Stats. 2021, ch. 695, § 4,
adding § 1016.7.)
       The trial court acknowledged that Radillo’s mental health issue had precipitated
the crime and found that it was “a significant factor in mitigation.” Nonetheless, the trial
court imposed the upper term sentence. The fact that the trial court did not expressly
state all of the factors it had considered in concluding “the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(6)) does not mean that it failed to

6      The Attorney General observes that the amendments to section 1170 making the
lower term the presumptive sentence were initially made by Assembly Bill No. 124, but
were incorporated into Senate Bill No. 567, which was later enacted.

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consider Radillo’s age at the time of the offense and the fact that he suffered abuse as a
child.
         We do not presume error upon a silent record. To the contrary, “ ‘[a] judgment or
order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments and presumptions are
indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent, and error must be
affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an
ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Denham v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) To prevail, appellants must overcome this presumption
by affirmatively establishing prejudicial error. We conclude that upon this record,
Radillo has failed to meet his burden.
                                      DISPOSITION
         The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

                                                                                  SMITH, J.
WE CONCUR:

FRANSON, Acting P. J.

PEÑA, J.

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