Court Opinion

ID: 9949079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 19:01:04.781014+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:36.508761
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60554        Document: 78-1     Page: 1    Date Filed: 03/08/2024

        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit                                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Fifth Circuit
                             ____________                                FILED
                                                                     March 8, 2024
                              No. 22-60554
                                                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                             ____________                                Clerk

Marta Alicia Mejia-Alvarenga,

                                                                  Petitioner,

                                   versus

Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                 Respondent.
                 ______________________________

                    Petition for Review of an Order of the
                        Board of Immigration Appeals
                          Agency No. A206 007 825
                 ______________________________

Before Higginbotham, Smith, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:
       The original opinion in this matter was issued by the panel on January
3, 2024. A petition for rehearing en banc is currently pending before the
court. The petition for en banc rehearing is DENIED, no judge in active
service having requested that the court be polled. Nevertheless, the panel
withdraws our previous opinion, reported at 90 F.4th 348, and substitutes
the following:
       Marta Alicia Mejia-Alvarenga petitions for review of the Board of
Immigration Appeals’ denial of her application for asylum. We DENY her
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                                     No. 22-60554

petition in part, and we DISMISS her petition in part because we lack
jurisdiction.
                                           I
       Marta Alicia Mejia-Alvarenga, a native and citizen of El Salvador, was
detained while attempting to cross the Rio Grande into the United States
near Laredo, Texas. She was then charged with removability under 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) because she did not possess valid documentation at the
time of her entry. She conceded removability as charged. Mejia-Alvarenga
then filed an application with the immigration court for statutory withholding
of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture.1 She later
amended her application to seek asylum.
       Mejia-Alvarenga based her claims for relief on threats that she
received from a man named Rigoberto Nelson and others associated with
him. In her application for asylum, Mejia-Alvarenga stated that Nelson raped
her while driving her home from a friend’s gathering. She further stated that,
immediately after raping her, Nelson threatened to kill Mejia-Alvarenga to
prevent her from reporting the rape to the police. Nevertheless, Mejia-
Alvarenga reported the rape to law enforcement. Shortly after, Nelson was
arrested and government officials began his prosecution.
       Thereafter, the police sent Mejia-Alvarenga multiple notices to attend
court hearings. After attending two hearings, Mejia-Alvarenga was visited by
a series of individuals connected with Nelson who pressured her to drop the
case. First, Nelson’s attorney offered Mejia-Alvarenga money to drop the
case. Mejia-Alvarenga reported this to the judge, who removed the attorney
from the case.      Then, Nelson’s second attorney engaged in the same
       _____________________
       1
         Mejia-Alvarenga has forfeited any challenge to the denial of CAT relief because
she did not raise that issue before the BIA.

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behavior. Once again, Mejia-Alvarenga reported the behavior to the judge,
and the judge removed Nelson’s attorney from the case.             Thereafter,
Nelson’s mother and sister began visiting Mejia-Alvarenga and offering her
money to drop the case.        Mejia-Alvarenga stated that they told her
“Rigoberto was going to [be] free[d]” regardless of whether she dropped the
case, which frightened her because she perceived it as a threat.
       Mejia-Alvarenga further alleged that Nelson sent other men to
threaten and intimidate her while he was in jail. For example, Mejia-
Alvarenga stated that her friend received a phone call telling the friend to
warn Mejia-Alvarenga that she needed to be careful because Nelson had been
set free and that “something was going to happen” to her. She also stated
that random men, whom she believed to be members of the MS-13 gang with
Nelson, began showing up to the stand where she sold fruit to threaten her
and to tell her to “be careful.” In addition, Mejia-Alvarenga stated that her
brother-in-law once found a note next to their home stating that Mejia-
Alvarenga should leave if she “owed something” and instructing her not to
say anything to the police. Nonetheless, Mejia-Alvarenga reported the note
to the police, who stated that they could not do anything because the note
was anonymous and did not contain “blood or anything else like that.”
       Mejia-Alvarenga testified that Nelson made his final threat to her
roughly seven years after the rape, when Nelson approached Mejia-
Alvarenga and said, “you’re going to pay for what you did to me.” Mejia-
Alvarenga contends that she did not report this threat to the police because
she feared for her safety. Instead, she traveled to the United States—first by
train and then by crossing the Rio Grande.
                                      II
       The immigration judge denied Mejia-Alvarenga’s application for
relief and ordered her to be removed to El Salvador. While the immigration

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judge found Mejia-Alvarenga to be a credible witness and observed that she
had suffered past harm rising to the level of persecution, the immigration
judge determined that she had not been harmed on account of a political
opinion or her membership in a particular social group. The immigration
judge also concluded that Mejia-Alvarenga did not establish a well-founded
fear of future persecution because she did not show that the government
would be unable or unwilling to control a future persecutor.
         Mejia-Alvarenga appealed this decision to the BIA. In addition, she
filed a motion asking that the BIA refer her appeal to a three-member panel
and seeking summary reversal and remand. In a reasoned order, a single-
member panel of the BIA affirmed the immigration judge’s decision and
denied Mejia-Alvarenga’s motion. With respect to her application for
asylum and withholding of removal, the BIA determined that Mejia-
Alvarenga failed to show that Salvadoran authorities were unable or unwilling
to protect her. The BIA’s order also rejected Mejia-Alvarenga’s arguments
that her due process rights were violated; that her appeal should be granted
because the government did not file a brief; and that the immigration judge
was biased, applied the wrong burden of proof, and overlooked material
evidence. Finally, the BIA responded to Mejia-Alvarenga’s motion seeking
referral to a three-member panel. In doing so, the BIA ruled that it lacked
authority to review challenges to its regulatory referral procedures and that
the appeal otherwise did not require a three-member panel under 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(e)(6). Mejia-Alvarenga filed a timely petition for review in this
court.
                                     III
         We review the BIA’s factual findings under the substantial evidence
standard and its legal conclusions de novo. Bertrand v. Garland, 36 F.4th 627,
631 (5th Cir. 2022). Where the immigration judge’s decision impacted the

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BIA—as is the case here—we consider the immigration judge’s decision to
the extent it influenced the BIA. Hernandez-Castillo v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 199,
204 (5th Cir. 2017).
                                       IV
       Mejia-Alvarenga contends that the BIA erred in denying her relief
because: (1) her petition for asylum established that the Salvadoran
government was unable or unwilling to protect her from private persecutors;
(2) the BIA adjudicator failed to act as an impartial adjudicator in violation of
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1); (3) the BIA violated her constitutional rights when
it allowed a single BIA member to render its decision, without referral to a
three-member panel; and (4) the BIA committed an abuse of discretion by
not referring her case to a three-member panel pursuant to 8 C.F.R.
§ 1003.1(e)(6).
                                       A
       We begin by considering whether the BIA erred when it determined
that Mejia-Alvarenga failed to establish that the Salvadoran government was
unable or unwilling to protect her from private persecutors, as would be
required for her to obtain asylum. We hold that it did not.
       To be eligible for asylum, an applicant must establish that she is a
“refugee.”    8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i).       To qualify as a refugee, the
applicant must show that “race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion was or will be at least one central
reason for persecuting the applicant.” Id. “Persecution refers to harm
inflicted either by the government or by private actors whom the government
‘is unable or unwilling to control.’” Bertrand, 36 F.4th at 631 (quoting
Sanchez-Amador v. Garland, 30 F.4th 529, 533 (5th Cir. 2022)). To prove
that a government is unable or unwilling to protect against private
persecution, an applicant for asylum “must show that the government

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condoned the private violence ‘or at least demonstrated a complete
helplessness to protect the [applicant.]’” Id. at 631–32 (quoting Shehu v.
Gonzales, 443 F.3d 435, 437 (5th Cir. 2006)). The BIA appropriately applied
this standard when determining whether the Salvadoran government would
be unwilling or unable to control Mejia-Alvarenga’s persecutors.
       Although Mejia-Alvarenga argues that the “complete helplessness”
standard is inapposite because it was adopted in Matter of A-B-, 27 I&N Dec.
316, 337 (A.G. 2018) (A-B-I), which has since been vacated by Matter of
A-B-, 28 I&N Dec. 307 (A.G. 2021) (A-B-III), our precedent forecloses that
argument. Bertrand 36 F.4th at 632 n.5. Indeed, our court has held that the
“inability or unwillingness” standard is interchangeable with our “complete
helplessness standard,” and therefore does not conflict with the Attorney
General’s decision in A-B-III. Gonzales-Veliz v. Barr, 938 F.3d 219, 233 (5th
Cir. 2019).    Thus, because the complete helplessness standard was
unambiguously the correct standard prior to A-B-I, it continues to serve as
the law of this circuit even after the vacatur in A-B-III. Bertrand, 36 F.4th at
632–33; see also Nat’l Cable Telecomm. Assoc. v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545
U.S. 967, 982 (2005) (“A court’s prior judicial construction of a statute
trumps an agency construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only
if the prior decision holds that its construction follows from the unambiguous
terms of the statute.”). In addition, the standard that Mejia-Alvarenga
proposes—that she must prove that there is at least a ten percent chance that
the Salvadoran government is unable or unwilling to protect her from her
persecutors—is without support. Mejia-Alvarenga cites INS v. Cardoza-
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431 (1987), in support of her claim. However,
Cardoza-Fonseca is inapposite here because that case did not concern the
element of a government’s ability or willingness to protect against private
persecution. Instead, Cardoza-Fonseca evaluated what is required to establish
a “well-founded fear of persecution.” Id.

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       Mejia-Alvarenga further argues that the BIA failed to show
meaningful consideration of the relevant substantial evidence supporting her
claims because its decision focused on persecution by Nelson alone and did
not address the Salvadoran government’s ability and willingness to protect
her from the MS-13 gang. A decision by the BIA is deficient if it fails to reflect
“meaningful consideration of the relevant substantial evidence supporting
[an] alien’s claims.” Ndifon v. Garland, 49 F.4th 986, 988 (5th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Abdel-Masieh v. INS, 73 F.3d 579, 585 (5th Cir. 1996)). The BIA is
not required to “write an exegesis on every contention,” but it must consider
the issues raised before it and provide a decision “sufficient to enable a
reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and thought and not merely
reacted.” Ghotra v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 284, 290 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation
omitted).
       We hold that the BIA did not err in deciding that Mejia-Alvarenga
failed to show that the Salvadoran government would be unable or unwilling
to control Mejia-Alvarenga’s persecutors because the BIA adequately
considered evidence of gang involvement in Mejia-Alvarenga’s claims, and
substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination.            The evidence
presented to the BIA showed that the Salvadoran government arrested and
detained Nelson for the alleged rape; removed his first two attorneys after
Mejia-Alvarenga reported them to the court for offering her money to drop
the case; and pursued Nelson’s case even after Mejia-Alvarenga stopped
cooperating with the prosecution.         These actions support the BIA’s
determination that the Salvadoran government would not be unwilling or
unable to control Mejia-Alvarenga’s persecutors.
       Mejia-Alvarenga also presented evidence that the Salvadoran
government did not make an effort to address threats from random men at
Mejia-Alvarenga’s fruit stand, Nelson’s May 2013 in-person threat, or the
nonspecific threat made on a note left at Mejia-Alvarenga’s house in May

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2013. However, a reasonable factfinder could still conclude that substantial
evidence supported the determination that the Salvadoran government
would not be unwilling or unable to control Mejia-Alvarenga’s persecutors.
Indeed, Mejia-Alvarenga did not report the first two of these threats to
authorities, therefore depriving them of the opportunity to address those
threats. Thus, “one would be hard-pressed to find that the authorities were
unable or unwilling” to protect her from those threats. Sanchez-Amador, 30
F.4th at 534. Further, given the lack of specificity of the threat conveyed by
the note and the fact that there is no evidence as to who was responsible for
the note, it was reasonable for the BIA to conclude that Mejia-Alvarenga did
not present compelling evidence that the Salvadoran government was unable
or unwilling to protect Mejia-Alvarenga from gangs. “A government is not
‘unable or unwilling’ to protect against private violence merely because it has
difficulty solving crimes or anticipating future acts of violence.” Bertrand,
36 F.4th at 632.
                                           B
       We next consider whether the BIA violated its regulatory obligation
to be impartial under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1). Mejia-Alvarenga contends that
the BIA failed to act as an impartial appellate body when the BIA adjudicator
did not require DHS to file briefing and instead “sua sponte decide[d]” issues
“on DHS’s behalf.” However, there is no authority requiring either party to
file briefing before the BIA, and Mejia-Alvarenga’s argument is otherwise
legally insufficient to prove bias.
       Mejia-Alvarenga grounds her claim concerning the BIA’s failure to act
as an impartial appellate body in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(1), which requires the
BIA to function as such. However, this argument is unavailing. The decision
not to require the government to file briefing is consistent with the
regulations governing appeals before the BIA.            Under the regulations,

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“[b]riefs may be filed by both parties.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.38(f). Thus, the
regulations allow even the appealing party to forgo filing a brief in the BIA,
so long as the party identifies the reasons for the appeal when filing the notice
of appeal. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(b). It follows that the single BIA member’s
decision not to require the government to file a brief complies with the
regulations.
       Further, even if we were to construe Mejia-Alvarenga’s argument as
a due process concern—instead of one grounded in the Attorney General’s
regulations—Mejia-Alvarenga has still failed to present evidence in support
of her position that the BIA member demonstrated partiality by not requiring
the government to file a brief. See Wang v. Holder, 569 F.3d 531, 540 (5th Cir.
2009) (“[O]pinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or
events occurring in the course of the . . . proceedings, do not constitute a basis
for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or
antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.” (alterations in
original) (quoting Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994))).
                                        C
       Next, we consider Mejia-Alvarenga’s argument that the BIA violated
her due process rights when it allowed a single BIA member to render its
decision, without referral to a three-member panel. We reject this claim.
       Mejia-Alvarenga argues that the regulation governing decisions by a
single BIA member, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e), is unconstitutional because it
“virtually preclude[s] reversal of immigration judges’ removal orders even
when meritorious issues are raised.” While Mejia-Alvarenga correctly
asserts that single-member BIA panels do not have the authority to reverse
an immigration judge’s decision unless reversal is plainly consistent with and
required by an intervening change in law, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5),

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(e)(6)(vi), this feature of the BIA’s case management system does not violate
due process for two independent reasons.
        First, under the statutory scheme, referral to a three-member BIA
panel is discretionary. As our precedent clearly states, “the failure to receive
relief that is purely discretionary in nature does not amount to a deprivation
of a liberty interest.” Ramos-Portillo v. Barr, 919 F.3d 955, 963 (5th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Assaad v. Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2004)). “[T]he denial
of discretionary relief does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation
even if [the moving party] had been eligible for it.” Ramos-Portillo v. Barr,
919 F.3d at 963 (alterations in original) (quoting Altamirano-Lopez v.
Gonzales, 435 F.3d 547, 550 (5th Cir. 2006)). Because referral to a three-
member BIA panel is discretionary, Mejia-Alvarenga has no liberty interest
at stake.
        Alternatively, we hold that there is no due process violation because
the agency has discretion to fashion its own rules of procedure.2 As the
Supreme Court has stated, when Congress entrusts executive agencies with
the responsibility to conduct their own proceedings—as it has done in the
immigration context—it “intend[s] that the discretion of [these] agencies
and not that of the courts be exercised in determining” whether to provide
procedural rights beyond those that Congress expressly granted in the
authorizing statute. Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 546 (1978) (emphasis omitted). Thus, because Congress
has given the BIA the responsibility to conduct its own proceedings, the
agency “should be free to fashion [its] own rules of procedure and to pursue
methods of inquiry capable of permitting [it] to discharge [its] multitudinous
        _____________________
        2
          Alternative holdings are not dicta and are binding in this circuit. Texas v. United
States, 809 F.3d 134, 178 n.158 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 579 U.S.
547 (2016).

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duties.” Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830, 832 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Albathani v. INS, 318 F.3d 365, 376 (1st Cir. 2003)).
        In addition, we also reject Mejia-Alvarenga’s argument on the merits.3
Mejia-Alvarenga argues that New Orleans’s 10% asylum grant rate, when
compared with New York and Honolulu’s grant rates of 43% and 60%
respectively, establishes bias.         However, we have already rejected this
argument. See Singh v. Garland, 20 F.4th 1049, 1054–55 (5th Cir. 2021)
(addressing a challenge to an immigration judge’s impartiality). The rate at
which immigration judges in a particular location grant asylum at most
provides a “crude summation” of aggregated decisions in prior cases. Id. at
1055. The “raw statistic” does not support finding a denial of due process as
to the § 1003.1(e) standards. Id.
                                             D
        Finally, we consider Mejia-Alvarenga’s argument that the BIA
committed an abuse of discretion by not referring her case to a three-member
BIA panel pursuant to § 1003.1(e)(6). We hold that we lack jurisdiction over
this claim. Judicial review under the APA is not available for agency actions
that are “committed to agency discretion by law.” 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2); see
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985). This means that the court shall
not review an agency action if the law governing the action “is drawn so that
a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the
agency’s exercise of discretion.” Chaney, 470 U.S. at 830; see Qorane v. Barr,
919 F.3d 904, 911–12 (5th Cir. 2019) (applying § 701(a)(2) to conclude that
jurisdiction does not exist to review the BIA’s denial of a sua sponte regulatory
reopening under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a)); cf. Hernandez-Castillo, 875 F.3d at

        _____________________
        3
          Alternative holdings are not dicta and are binding in this circuit. Texas v. United
States, 809 F.3d at 178 n.158, aff’d by an equally divided Court, 579 U.S. 547 (2016).

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207–08 (holding that the BIA’s discretionary denial of a motion to
administratively close proceedings is subject to judicial review because there
are meaningful standards for evaluating when administrative closure is
appropriate). Because the BIA has not articulated standards for evaluating
when and how single-member BIA panels should exercise their discretion to
refer a case to a three-member panel under § 1003.1(e)(6), we lack
jurisdiction over Mejia-Alvarenga’s claim.4 See Qorane, 919 F.3d at 912.
                                             V
        We DENY Mejia-Alvarenga’s petition as to the first three issues and
DISMISS her petition on the abuse of discretion issue for lack of
jurisdiction.

        _____________________
        4
           The government also argues that our reasoning from two earlier decisions
provides support for our decision today. In Tibakweitira v. Wilkinson, we stated that
“[b]ecause the decision to designate the case to be heard by a three-member panel is
discretionary, this court lacks jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision.” 986 F.3d 905, 914
(5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Cantu-Delgadillo v. Holder, 584 F.3d 682, 690–91 (5th Cir. 2009)).
While Tibakweitira and Cantu-Delgadillo could provide support for our holding here, the
government correctly points out that those cases also involved the application of 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252’s jurisdictional bar, which is not at issue in this case. Here, by contrast, we lack
jurisdiction to review the BIA’s decision not to refer a case to a three-member panel under
§ 1003.1(e)(6) without reliance on § 1252’s jurisdictional bar.

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