Court Opinion

ID: 9880963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 23:27:13.683727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:58:04.163635
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30642      Document: 00516912407           Page: 1      Date Filed: 09/28/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                            United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                     Fifth Circuit

                                  ____________                                     FILED
                                                                           September 28, 2023
                                   No. 23-30642                               Lyle W. Cayce
                                  ____________                                     Clerk

   In re Jeff Landry, In his official capacity as the Louisiana Attorney
   General; Kyle R. Ardoin, in his official capacity as Louisiana Secretary of
   State,

                                                                         Petitioners.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Louisiana
                     USDC Nos. 3:22-CV-211, 3:22-CV-214
                   ______________________________

   Before Jones, Higginson, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   By Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge:
          Louisiana’s Attorney General has filed this request for mandamus
   relief seeking to vacate the district court’s hearing scheduled to begin on
   October 3 and require the district court to promptly convene trial on the
   merits in this congressional redistricting case. We GRANT IN PART,
   ORDERING the District Court to VACATE the October Hearing.
          The reasons for this grant of relief are as follows:
          Redistricting based on section 2 of the Voting Rights Act,
   52 U.S.C. § 10301, is complex, historically evolving, and sometimes
   undertaken with looming electoral deadlines. But it is not a game of ambush.
          Since 1966, the Supreme Court has repeatedly reminded lower federal
   courts that if legislative districts are found to be unconstitutional, the elected
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   body must usually be afforded an adequate opportunity to enact revised
   districts before the federal court steps in to assume that authority. In
   Reynolds v. Sims, the Court stated that “legislative reapportionment is
   primarily a matter for legislative consideration and determination.”1 In
   subsequent cases,
           [t]he Court has repeatedly held that redistricting and
           reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task which the
           courts should make every effort not to preempt. When a
           federal court declares an existing apportionment scheme
           unconstitutional, it is therefore, appropriate, whenever
           practicable, to afford a reasonable opportunity for the
           legislature to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a
           substitute measure rather than for the federal court to devise
           and order into effect its own plan.
   Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. 535, 540, 98 S. Ct. 2493, 2497 (1978) (citations
   omitted). This is the law today as it was forty-five years ago.2

           _____________________
           1
               377 U.S. 533, 586, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1394 (1964).
           2
               See North Carolina v. Covington, 138 S. Ct. 2548, 2554 (2018) (“[S]tate
   legislatures have primary jurisdiction over legislative reapportionment[.]”) (quotation
   marks and citation omitted); McDaniel v. Sanchez, 452 U.S. 130, 150 n.30, 101 S. Ct. 2224,
   2236 (1981) (“Moreover, even after a federal court has found a districting plan
   unconstitutional, redistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task
   which the federal courts should make every effort not to preempt.”) (quotation marks and
   citation omitted); Wise v. Lipscomb, 437 U.S. at 540; Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-15,
   97 S. Ct. 1828, 1833-34 (1977) (“[A] state legislature is the institution that is by far the best
   situated to identify and then reconcile traditional state policies within the constitutionally-
   mandated framework. . .. The federal courts by contrast possess no distinctive mandate to
   compromise sometimes conflicting state apportionment policies in the people’s name.”);
   Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27, 95 S. Ct. 751, 766 (1975) (“We say once again what has
   been said on many occasions: reapportionment is primarily the duty and responsibility of
   the State through hits legislature or other body, rather than of a federal court.”); Gaffney
   v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 749, 93 S. Ct. 2321, 2329 (1973) (“Nor is the goal of fair and
   effective representation furthered by making the standards of reapportionment so difficult
   to satisfy that the reapportionment task is recurringly removed from legislative hands and

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           The district court did not follow the law of the Supreme Court or this
   court. Its action in rushing redistricting via a court-ordered map is a clear
   abuse of discretion for which there is no alternative means of appeal.3
   Issuance of the writ is justified “under the circumstances” in light of multiple
   precedents contradicting the district court’s procedure here.
           This case was remanded after the Supreme Court stayed lower court
   proceedings to decide Alabama v Milligan, 143 S. Ct. 1487 (2023). Ardoin v.
   Robinson, 142 S. Ct. 2892 (2022) (cert. dismissed as improvidently granted
   and stay vacated by 143 S. Ct. 2654 (2023)). The district court here had held,
   in June 2022, after an expedited preliminary injunction proceeding, that
   Louisiana’s congressional districts violate section 2, requiring an additional
   majority black congressional district. Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759,
   766 (M.D. La. 2022). The district court then ordered the state legislature to
   reconfigure such an additional district within five legislative days. Robinson
   v. Ardoin, 37 F.4th 208, 232 (5th Cir. 2022). Landry pursued an immediate
   appeal and a motion to stay in this court. This court denied a stay, id., but

           _____________________
   performed by federal courts which themselves must make the political decisions necessary
   to formulate a plan or accept those made by reapportionment plaintiffs who may have
   wholly different goals from those embodied in the official plan. From the very outset, we
   recognized that the apportionment task, dealing as it must with fundamental choices about
   the nature of representation. . . is primarily a political and legislative process.”) (citation
   omitted); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 85, 86 S. Ct. 1286,1293 (1966) (“[J]udicial relief
   becomes appropriate only when a legislature fails to reapportion according to federal
   constitutional requisites in a timely fashion after having an adequate opportunity to do
   so.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted).
           3
             The dissent contends that the ordinary appellate process suffices. But the dissent
   does not challenge the notion that if the remedial hearing goes forward, the merits of the
   preliminary injunction will be on a separate appellate track from the remedy order. Nor
   does the dissent explain how the panel that will hear the merits of the preliminary injunction
   would have jurisdiction to order relief to the state on the scheduling of the fifteen-month-
   later separately litigated remedy hearing, as no Rule 28(j) letter can manufacture appellate
   jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over the non-final trial setting order.

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   expedited the appeal—until the Supreme Court entered its stay. Ardoin v.
   Robinson, 142 S. Ct. at 2892.
          A year later, the Supreme Court’s stay was lifted, Ardoin v. Robinson,
   143 S. Ct. at 2654, and the parties completed briefing the merits of the
   preliminary injunction, which another panel of this court will hear in oral
   argument on October 6.
          Undeterred by the pendency of appeal on the merits, the district court
   opted to go ahead on October 3-5 with an expedited hearing to determine a
   court-ordered redistricting map. But the court provided merely five weeks
   for the state’s preparation.      No mention was made about the state
   legislature’s entitlement to attempt to conform the districts to the court’s
   preliminary injunction determinations.
          This post-merits activity prompted the state to seek a writ of
   mandamus from this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651.           In this court,
   “mandamus will be granted upon a determination that there has been a clear
   abuse of discretion.” In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545 F.3d 304, 309 (5th
   Cir. 2008) (en banc). As “one of the most potent weapons in the judicial
   arsenal, three conditions must be satisfied” before mandamus may be issued.
   In re Gee, 941 F.3d 153, 157 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court
   for D.C., 542 U.S. 367, 380, 124 S. Ct. 2576, 2587 (2004)). The Supreme
   Court has elaborated that:

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          First, the party seeking issuance of the writ [must] have no
          other adequate means to attain the relief he desires—a
          condition designed to ensure that the writ will not be used as a
          substitute for the regular appeals process. Second, the
          petitioner must satisfy the burden of showing that [his] right to
          issuance of the writ is clear and indisputable. Third, even if the
          first two prerequisites have been met, the issuing court, in the
          exercise of its discretion, must be satisfied that the writ is
          appropriate under the circumstances.
   Cheney, 542 U.S. at 380-81 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
          After reviewing the mandamus factors, we conclude that the state is
   entitled to partial mandamus relief.
          1. The state has no other means of relief and is not seeking to use mandamus
          as a substitute for appeal.
          The only issue before this panel is the scheduling of the remedial
   hearing and potential scheduling for trial on the merits. The events leading
   to this writ application post-date the merits-only preliminary injunction by
   fifteen months. In ruling on this application, we do not discuss the merits.
   Likewise, the decision on the merits of a Section 2 violation of the Voting
   Rights Act has no direct relationship with nor factual nor legal overlap with
   the scheduling issues this panel confronts.
          That this application presents an unusual posture for mandamus is not
   a contrivance of Landry or this panel but the result of the district court’s
   unique rush to remedy when circumstances did not require it. Moreover,
   because this application is wholly different from the merits of the appeal, the
   state has no adequate remedy by way of appeal.
          The plaintiffs respond that the state may adequately appeal following
   the decision formulating a court-ordered redistricting plan. That outcome
   would embarrass the federal judiciary and thwart rational procedures.
   Denying mandamus effectively means a two-track set of appeals on the merits

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   and the court-ordered plan. No matter the outcome—or timing—of this
   court’s merits panel determination, one side will seek relief in the Supreme
   Court. Similarly, the anticipated court-ordered redistricting plan will be
   appealed to this court and likely to the Supreme Court. And all of this will
   persist well into the 2024 election year. The likelihood of conflicting courts’
   scheduling and determinations will create uncertainty for the state and, more
   important, the candidates and electorate who may be placed into new
   congressional districts. In sum, while there is on paper a right to appeal
   whatever decision the district court renders on drawing its own redistricting
   maps, the paper right is a precursor to legal chaos.
           2. Clear and Indisputable Right
           The state contends that it has a clear right to relief because the court’s
   remedial redistricting plan should not be ordered before it has a fulsome
   opportunity to defend itself on the merits of plaintiffs’ section 2 claim.4 That
   the state lacked a full opportunity to mount a defense on the merits is likely
   accurate. Plaintiffs’ testimony showed that they had been planning a lawsuit
   for months before the legislature effectuated its 2022 redistricting. But under
   the district court’s expedited scheduling, the state had less than four weeks
   to prepare for what became a five-day evidentiary hearing.5
           This court’s order denying a stay pending appeal repeatedly noted
   that the panel’s conclusions were only tentative and the plaintiffs’ case had
   clear weaknesses. The court referenced the importance of final adjudication.

           _____________________
           4
            The state also argues that the plaintiffs’ case became moot after the 2022 election
   cycle ended. This is incorrect, because the district court enjoined all future elections
   pursuant to the allegedly violative state plan, and this reflected the scope of the plaintiffs’
   demand for relief.
           5
            The state says it had only two weeks before the preliminary injunction hearing to
   prepare expert witness reports, which are critical in legislative redistricting cases.

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   Robinson, 37 F.4th at 222 (“[T]he plaintiffs have much to prove when the
   merits are ultimately decided.”).6 Of course, an order denying stay pending
   appeal cannot be a “merits” ruling and is subject to reconsideration by this
   court, either in the upcoming oral argument or on review of a final judgment.
   Id. at 232 (“Our ruling here concerns only the motion for stay pending
   appeal; our determinations are for that purpose only and do not bind the
   merits panel[.]”) (quotation marks and citations omitted). But the point is
   that this court recognized the hasty and tentative nature of the district court’s
   decision and, at least implicitly, the need for further development of factual
   and legal aspects. Id. (“[N]either the plaintiffs’ arguments nor the district
   court’s analysis is entirely watertight[.]”).
           The progress of the Alabama redistricting litigation in some ways
   parallels this case but is instructive as to full and fair procedures not accorded
   here. First, while that case progressed to a seven-day preliminary injunction
   hearing within about two months after the legislature finalized congressional
   districts, Alabama has never contended that its defense was unduly
   truncated. Allen v. Milligan, 143 S. Ct. 1487, 1502 (2023) (noting that the
   three-judge district court’s preliminary injunction hearing lasted seven days,
   during which it received live testimony from 17 witnesses, reviewed more
   than 1000 pages of briefing and upwards of 350 exhibits while considering
   arguments from 43 different lawyers); Singleton v. Allen, No. 2:21-CV-1291-
   AMM, 2023 WL 5691156, at *10 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 5, 2023) (noting that at the
   Alabama remedial hearing, the parties agreed that the Alabama three-judge

           _____________________
           6
             This court also said the state put all its eggs in one basket, litigating essentially
   that only with race-predominant considerations could the plaintiffs justify a second
   majority-black congressional district. Robinson, 37 F.4th at 217. No litigant, however, is
   bound at trial on the merits to a defense strategy that failed to succeed on a preliminary
   injunction.

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   district court would consider all evidence admitted during the preliminary
   injunction hearing unless counsel raised a specific objection).
          Second, and also pertinent, in the Alabama case on remand from the
   Supreme Court, the three-judge panel afforded the state legislature six weeks
   to propose a new districting plan. See contra Singleton, 2023 WL 5691156 at
   *6-*7 (noting that the Alabama three-judge district court delayed remedial
   proceedings for six weeks after remand from the Supreme Court to allow the
   legislature to pass a new congressional redistricting plan). Last year, with the
   2022 elections fast approaching, the district court prescribed an impossibly
   short timetable for state legislative action amounting to only five legislative
   days. Whatever the propriety of that timetable (about which we express no
   opinion) at that time, there is no warrant for the court’s rushed remedial
   hearing by the first week of October 2023, months in advance of deadlines for
   districting, candidate filing, and all the minutiae of the 2024 elections. Even
   more significant, the Alabama court on remand from the Supreme Court
   afforded the state an adequate opportunity to accomplish a redistricting
   compliant with final judgment. Here, of course, there is no final judgment on
   the merits. But the district court acted ultra vires in rushing to prescribe its
   own maps.
          As demonstrated above, a court must afford the legislative body that
   becomes liable for a Section 2 violation the first opportunity to accomplish
   the difficult and politically fraught task of redistricting. That is required for
   redistricting litigation to proceed according to its “ordinary course and in
   advance of the 2024 congressional elections in Louisiana”—as the Supreme
   Court’s remand in this case mandated. Ardoin v. Robinson, 143 S. Ct. at 2654.
   Not only has the Supreme Court serially reinforced this duty of lower courts,
   but this court has carefully adhered to these rulings. Nearly forty years ago,
   this court criticized a district court’s rushed, court-ordered redistricting plan
   less than a month and a half following final judgment. Jones v. City of Lubbock,

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   727 F.2d 364, 387 (5th Cir. 1984).                We admonished that the court’s
   procedures
           if challenged, would have required that we vacate this order. For
           the sake of future parties, we reiterate briefly some of the
           principles that the district court should bear in mind.
           Apportionment is principally a legislative responsibility. . .. A
           district court should, accordingly, afford to the government
           body a reasonable opportunity to produce a constitutionally
           permissible plan. . ..
   Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).7 The district court here
   had no warrant to undertake redistricting (A) through a court-ordered plan
   (B) with no elections impending, (C) on a severely limited pretrial schedule,
   and (D) without having afforded the Louisiana legislature the first
   opportunity to comply with its ruling.
           “A district court abuses its discretion if it: (1) relies on clearly
   erroneous factual findings; (2) relies on erroneous conclusions of law; or
   (3) misapplies the law to the facts. On mandamus review, we review for these

           _____________________
           7
              See also United States v. Brown, 561 F.3d 420. 435 (5th Cir. 2009) (“[A]t least in
   redistricting cases, district courts must offer governing bodies the first pass at devising a
   remedy[.]”); Rodriguez v. Bexar County, 385 F.3d 853, 869-70 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[D]istrict
   courts should use a great deal of caution in invalidating the results of a duly held election
   and ordering the implementation of its own alternative districting plan. The primary
   responsibility for correcting Voting Rights Act deficiencies rests with the relevant
   legislative body. . .. Both the Supreme Court and this court have admonished district
   courts to afford local governments a reasonable opportunity to propose a constitutionally
   permissible plan and not haphazardly to order injunctive relief.”) (citations and footnote
   omitted); Chisom v. Roemer, 853 F.2d 1186, 1192 (5th Cir. 1988) (“[R]esponsible state or
   local authorities must be first given an opportunity to correct any constitutional or statutory
   defect before the court attempts to draft a remedial plan. In the case at bar, that means that
   should the court rule on the merits that a statutory or constitutional violation exists the
   Louisiana Legislature should be allowed a reasonable opportunity to address the problem.
   We have no reason whatsoever to doubt that the governor and legislature will respond
   promptly.”).

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   types of errors, but we only will grant mandamus relief when such errors
   produce a patently erroneous result.” In re Volkswagen of Am., 545 F.3d at
   310 (citing McClure v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 404, 408 (5th Cir.2003)). Here, we
   find that the district court’s errors produced a patently erroneous result.
            3. Appropriate under the circumstances
            If this were ordinary litigation, this court would be most unlikely to
   intervene in a remedial proceeding for a preliminary injunction. Redistricting
   litigation, however, is not ordinary litigation. Of course, the law as set forth
   by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Constitution and section 2 must
   be vindicated. But the remedy necessarily involves the exercise of discretion
   by federal courts whose judgments will interfere with a primary
   constitutional structural device of self-government: making decennial
   districting choices about representation in legislative bodies. Ever since its
   initial forays into legislative districting, the Supreme Court has explained the
   proper     procedure    to   implement      federal   court    judgments   while
   accommodating to the greatest extent the legislatures’ ability to confect their
   own remedial plans. The district court here forsook its duty and placed the
   state at an intolerable disadvantage legally and tactically.
            Accordingly, we VACATE the remedial order hearing. Further
   scheduling in the case must be done by the district court pursuant to the
   principles enunciated herein.

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   James C. Ho, Circuit Judge, concurring:
          I concur. I write to respond to my distinguished dissenting colleague.
          I agree that mandamus is not ordinarily a substitute for appeal. I also
   agree that whatever the district court might have done pursuant to its
   October 3 hearing would eventually be subject to appeal.
          But that does not end the analysis. “[E]xceptional circumstances,
   amounting to a judicial usurpation of power, will justify the invocation of this
   extraordinary remedy.” Allied Chem. Corp. v. Daiflon, Inc., 449 U.S. 33, 35
   (1980) (per curiam). So it doesn’t matter that “uncorrectable damage may
   not result if petitioners are forced to wait for a remedy on direct appeal”—
   “the clearly erroneous nature of the district court’s order [may] call[] for a
   more immediate remedy.” In re Impact Absorbent Techs., Inc., 106 F.3d 400,
   1996 WL 765327, *3 (6th Cir. 1996) (unpublished table decision) (granting
   mandamus relief to compel dismissal of case). See also, e.g., Holub Indus., Inc.
   v. Wyche, 290 F.2d 852, 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
          Moreover, mandamus relief may be especially warranted where the
   stakes of the litigation are unusually significant. See, e.g., Abelesz v. OTP
   Bank, 692 F.3d 638, 651 (7th Cir. 2012) (granting mandamus relief to compel
   dismissal of case involving “appreciable foreign policy consequences” and
   “astronomical” “financial stakes”).
          Consider, for example, In re Trinity Industries, Inc., No. 14-41067 (5th
   Cir. Oct. 10, 2014). It was asserted there (as here) that the district court had
   no legal basis to hold a particular proceeding (there, it was a trial under the
   False Claims Act). It was further argued that “the litigation stakes . . . are
   unusually high”—namely, the risk of a $1 billion adverse judgment. Id.
          Notably, the mandamus panel did not deem the matter beyond the
   scope of the writ—even though any damages award can obviously be

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   reversed later on appeal (as indeed later occurred in that case). To the
   contrary, the mandamus panel acknowledged that “this is a close case.” Id.
   It ultimately denied relief. But the panel went out of its way to caution the
   district court not to proceed. It said that “[t]his court is concerned” about
   the impending proceedings, and warned that the petitioner had presented a
   “strong argument” that the case should not go to trial. Id. The district court
   nevertheless proceeded to trial. So this court subsequently reversed. In
   doing so, this court specifically noted that the district court went to trial
   “despite . . . a caution from this court that the case ought not proceed.”
   United States ex rel. Harman v. Trinity Indus., Inc., 872 F.3d 645, 647 (5th Cir.
   2017).1
             As with Trinity Industries, this case presents “unusually high” stakes.
   It doesn’t just delineate how Louisiana voters may exercise their right to vote
   for their elected representatives in the House. It could also impact the course
   of national policy decisions made by Congress—after all, every member of
   Congress has a voice, and a vote, in those deliberations. Whatever the final
   outcome of Louisiana’s redistricting process may be, the people of Louisiana,
   and the country, are entitled to an orderly process that they can trust.
             As the majority explains, it would fly in the face of decades of Supreme
   Court precedent for a district court to usurp the prerogative of the state
   Legislature to take the first crack at drawing a remedial map. Yet that appears

             _____________________
             1
             I suppose that this mandamus panel could have followed the example in Trinity
   Industries by sounding a similar firm note of warning to the district court here, while
   ultimately denying rather than granting mandamus relief. See, e.g., In re Depuy
   Orthopaedics, Inc., 870 F.3d 345, 347 n.4 (5th Cir. 2017) (noting that “this court has
   routinely held, sometimes in published opinions, that a district court erred, despite
   stopping short of issuing a writ of mandamus”) (collecting cases). But that’s a matter of
   discretion, not restriction. Moreover, if our court’s experience in Trinity Industries teaches
   us anything, it’s that sometimes you need a writ, not a warning.

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   to be what is being contemplated here. As the majority notes, the district
   court gave the State only five legislative days to produce a remedial map.
           The dissent responds that that was a year ago, and suggests that “this
   yearlong process” should have given the State ample time to work. But that
   doesn’t strike me as a realistic understanding of the legislative process. This
   matter has been pending on appeal throughout this period of time—not to
   mention subject to an extended stay by the Supreme Court. And naturally,
   the whole point of any appeal is that the district court ruling could be set
   aside—thereby obviating the need for any remedial effort by the Legislature.
           It seems impractical, to say the least, to expect busy elected officials
   and their staffs to set aside all of the other responsibilities of public office, just
   to focus all of their attention on negotiating a hypothetical remedial plan that
   the courts have not yet even resolved is necessary. And not only impractical,
   but unfair to the citizens of Louisiana, who no doubt seek the attention of
   their elected representatives on countless other pressing matters of
   importance to their communities.
                                               ***
           I concur in the grant of mandamus relief.2

           _____________________
           2
             The dissent observes in passing that this mandamus proceeding could have been
   assigned to the pending appeal panel in No. 22-30333. I certainly agree that judges should
   work collaboratively and in a spirit of comity when it comes to the assignment and transfer
   of cases. I’m reminded of our court’s experience in Defense Distributed v. Platkin, 55 F.4th
   486 (5th Cir. 2022), and Defense Distributed v. Platkin, 48 F.4th 607 (5th Cir. 2022),
   involving the unfortunate refusal of a federal district court in New Jersey to heed a request
   to transfer a Texas case back to the relevant district court within our circuit. Had the panel
   in No. 22-30333 requested transfer of this mandamus proceeding to its current docket, I
   imagine I would’ve agreed. But no such request was made.

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   STEPHEN A. HIGGINSON, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
           The Supreme Court has been clear, cautioning long ago that
   mandamus is a “drastic and extraordinary remed[y] . . . reserved for really
   extraordinary causes.” Ex parte Fahey, 332 U.S. 258, 259-60 (1947). Thus,
   settled caselaw confirms that mandamus is not a tool to manage a district
   court’s docket; nor can mandamus substitute for appeal. Yet review of this
   matter’s procedural history shows that mandamus here improperly does
   both.
                                    I. Procedural History
           This petition, filed by Louisiana Attorney General Jeff Landry and
   Louisiana Secretary of State Kyle Ardoin (“the State”), concerns ongoing
   litigation over Louisiana’s congressional maps. On June 6, 2022, the district
   court preliminarily enjoined the State from conducting any congressional
   elections under the map enacted by the Legislature and ordered the
   Legislature to enact a remedial plan on or by June 20, 2022, at which point
   the district court would otherwise issue additional orders to enact a remedial
   plan. Robinson v. Ardoin, 605 F. Supp. 3d 759, 766-67 (M.D. La. 2022). The
   district court even invited the State to seek more time should it need it,
   explaining that “[i]f Defendants need more time to accomplish a remedy for
   the Voting Rights Act violation, the Court will favorably consider a [m]otion
   to extend the time to allow the Legislature to complete its work.” Robinson
   v. Ardoin, No. 22-00211, ECF No. 182 (M.D. La. June 9, 2022).
           The preliminary injunction was appealed to this court, which
   administratively stayed the injunction, then vacated that stay and denied a
   stay pending appeal, while expediting No. 22-30333. Robinson v. Ardoin, 37
   F.4th 208, 215 (5th Cir. 2022).1 On the eve of the district court’s remedial
           _____________________
           1
               Briefing now is complete and our court will hear argument next week.

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                                    No. 23-30642

   plan hearing, however, the Supreme Court stayed the injunction and held the
   case in abeyance pending resolution of (the then-styled) Merrill v. Milligan
   (No. 21-1086 and No. 21-1087). Ardoin v. Robinson, 142 S. Ct. 2892 (2022).
          When Milligan issued one year later, the Supreme Court instructed in
   the instant matter as follows: The “[s]tay heretofore entered by the Court on
   June 28, 2022 [is] vacated. This will allow the matter to proceed before the
   Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit for review in the ordinary course and
   in advance of the 2024 congressional elections in Louisiana.” Ardoin v.
   Robinson, 143 S. Ct. 2654 (2023).
          Correspondingly, this court in No. 22-30333, promptly ordered
   briefing “addressing [Milligan] and any other developments or caselaw that
   would have been appropriate for Rule 28(j) letters over the past year had the
   case not been in abeyance.” Mem. to Counsel at 1, Robinson v. Ardoin, No.
   22-30333, ECF No. 242 (5th Cir. June 28, 2023). In response, the State urged
   this court to vacate the injunction, remand, and “direct the district court to
   conduct a trial on the merits and reach a final judgment in advance of the
   2024 congressional elections in Louisiana.” Letter at 2, Robinson v. Ardoin,
   No. 22-30333, ECF No. 246 (5th Cir. July 6, 2023). On July 17, 2023, the
   district court rescheduled the remedial plan hearing that was supposed to
   have taken place the previous year—and for which the State had presumably
   fully prepared for given the original hearing was only cancelled the day before
   it was supposed to occur—for approximately eleven weeks later on October
   3-5, 2023, consistent with the Supreme Court’s vacatur of its stay of the
   district court’s injunction. Robinson v. Ardoin, Nos. 22-cv-211 and 22-cv-214,
   ECF No. 250 (M.D. La. July 17, 2023).
          The State then, on July 21, submitted more letter argument, still in No.
   22-30333, reiterating its arguments as to both the hearing and also the
   unscheduled trial, to “request[] the remedies outlined in [its] July 6, 2023
   Letter Brief.” Letter at 1, Robinson v. Ardoin, No. 22-30333 (5th Cir. July 21,

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                                      No. 23-30642

   2023). The State argued on August 19, in its reply brief to this court in No.
   22-30333, that the hearing and lack of trial date “make[] little sense when the
   district court could bring the case to final judgment in time for the 2024
   election cycle,” Reply Br. at 2-3 n.2, and sought dismissal of the appeal and
   vacatur of the preliminary injunction, id. at 2.
          Next, the State moved in the district court to cancel the remedial plan
   hearing. Mot., Robinson v. Ardoin, Nos. 22-cv-211 and 22-cv-214, ECF No.
   260 (M.D. La. Aug. 25, 2023). That motion was denied, Order, Robinson v.
   Ardoin, Nos. 22-cv-211 and 22-cv-214, ECF No. 267 (M.D. La. Aug. 29,
   2023), and the State neither appealed the denial nor moved to expedite its
   appeal of the preliminary injunction in pursuance of which the hearing is
   scheduled.
          Despite this procedural history, the State instead separately filed a
   mandamus petition seeking to vacate the scheduled district court hearing and
   to set a district court trial date. Pet. at 4, In re Landry, No. 23-30642 (5th Cir.
   Sept. 15, 2023). On receipt of the petition, I would have consolidated with
   No. 22-30333 and reassigned for consideration by that panel, respectful of the
   long-pending appeal as well as that panel’s explicit invitation to the parties to
   submit argument—which, months before this petition, they did, presenting
   the same issues and requesting the same relief. In re Landry, No. 23-30642
   (5th Cir. Sept. 17, 2023) (Higginson, J. dissenting from order requesting
   responsive briefing).
                                     II. Analysis
          Until today, mandamus has been ordered only when a petitioner has
   “no other adequate means to attain the relief [it] desires”—thus,
   specifically, mandamus “is not a substitute for appeal.”             In re Depuy
   Orthopaedics, Inc., 870 F.3d 345, 350 (5th Cir. 2017) (citations and internal

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                                            No. 23-30642

   quotation marks omitted) (alteration in original).2 While the majority
   acknowledges this principle, it factually errs in describing this matter as
   “wholly different from the merits appeal.”                    There could be no more
   conclusive proof of the availability of appellate relief than this circumstance,
   where the petitioner is already an appellant pressing the same issues and
   seeking the same relief, challenging the same injunction in pursuance of which
   this hearing was scheduled. There is no support for the assertion that the
   hearing, lasting for three days at the beginning of October, is mutually
   exclusive with progression to a full merits trial. The State can also, of course,
   appeal any remedial plan that the hearing produces. The panel asserts a
   prerogative to ignore this as only a “paper right” based on its prediction that
   this litigation will “turn into legal chaos” and eventually reach the Supreme
   Court. Needless to say, our court has yet to adopt a rule that mandamus lies
   where a matter may reach the Supreme Court.
           Furthermore, “we limit mandamus to only ‘clear abuses of discretion
   that produce patently erroneous results.’” In re Lloyd’s Register N. Am., Inc.,
   780 F.3d 283, 290 (5th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 545
   F.3d 304, 310 (5th Cir. 2008)). Oddly, the majority points to this court’s
   order denying the State’s motion for a stay pending appeal as evidence that
   the State has made the higher showing that it is entitled to mandamus. No
   patent error exists here. Quite the opposite. Until today, we have explicitly
   assured district judges that they enjoy “broad discretion and inherent
   authority to manage [their] docket.” June Med. Servs., L.L.C. v. Phillips,
   2022 WL 4360593 at *2 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting In re Deepwater Horizon, 988
           _____________________
           2
              Contrary to the assertion that “[d]enying mandamus effectively means a two-
   track set of appeals,” it is the majority that now invites parties to slice and dice in the hopes
   of eleventh-hour success in front of a mandamus panel when an earlier-in-time merits panel
   has so far declined to act on the same issues, presumably intending to question counsel
   about those issues in oral argument.

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                                    No. 23-30642

   F.3d 192, 197 (5th Cir. 2021) (per curiam)). The district court exercised that
   discretion when the Supreme Court lifted its stay after a year. The district
   court could, with approximately eleven weeks of notice to parties, reschedule
   the hearing that had originally been scheduled for well over a year earlier, a
   hearing that parties had prepared for because it was not cancelled until the
   day before it was supposed to begin. It is this yearlong process that the
   majority inexplicably calls a “game of ambush.”
          For these reasons, I dissent and would deny the petition.

                        A True Copy
                        Certified order issued Sep 28, 2023

                        Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit

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