Court Opinion

ID: 9564068
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:53:54.69478+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:13.033527
License: Public Domain

STEWART, Justice
(dissenting):
In my view the majority’s opinion misapplies the doctrine of res judicata. Indeed, there is a complete absence of a sufficient foundation for application of the doctrine of res judicata. In short, the majority puts the plaintiffs out of court without their having had an opportunity to have had their claims adjudicated.
The plaintiffs, Lavern L. Mendenhall, Vonda Mendenhall, and Phyllis Maltby, had, prior to the initiation of this action sought to set aside a foreclosure judgment and subsequent sale of residential property to defendants pursuant to a motion made under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Proce*1290dure. That motion was denied, apparently on the ground that it was not timely filed.
The instant case is an independent equity action filed for the purpose of setting aside the judgment. Among other things, it alleges negligence and fraud on the part of the defendant — claims not made in the Rule 60(b) motion.
The difficulty is that it is not clear what the basis was for the trial court’s ruling denying the Rule 60(b) motion. The trial judge who granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment in the instant case did not indicate in his memorandum decision the basis for his ruling. The defendants argued that the claims alleged in this action were barred by the statute of limitations and that the prior ruling under Rule 60(b) was res judicata with respect to the issues raised in the instant case. There is evidence in the transcript that the lower court’s ruling was made on the basis of res judicata. In fact, in colloquy with counsel at a hearing subsequent to his order he so indicated several times.
If the trial judge in the preceding case, in ruling on the motions under Rule 60(b), denied the motions on procedural grounds, then it was clear error for the court below in this action to have dismissed the complaint on grounds of res judicata. Clearly, it would be patently erroneous for the trial judge to rule that causes of action which could not have been alleged in the Rule 60(b) motions were claims which should have been asserted in that proceeding and, because they were not, are barred in this action. That clearly is the antithesis of due process of law.
Barring the court door to a person who has not had a hearing on the merits of his claim is a denial of fundamental fairness and due process of law. I see no reason to assume that the trial judge who entered summary judgment in this case on grounds of res judicata had any valid grounds for knowing the basis of the ruling made by another trial judge on the Rule 60(b) motions. Certainly, there is no presumption that the trial court was correct since the issue is strictly a matter of law. In a sense the real problem lies in our rules of procedure which fail to require a trial judge to specify the ground or grounds upon which a Rule 60(b) motion or a motion for summary judgment is granted when several grounds are asserted. It is hardly appropriate to hold a litigant responsible for that lapse.
In my view, this case should be remanded for an evidentiary determination of the grounds upon which the Rule 60(b) motion was denied for the purpose of determining whether res judicata is applicable. And in all events, the case should be remanded for a consideration of the grounds alleged in this case which were not contained in the Rule 60(b) motion.
WILKINS, J., concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of STEWART, J.