Court Opinion

ID: 9899711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 16:07:10.7733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:48.017995
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                            Nos. 124,845
                                                 124,846
                                                 124,847
                                                 124,848

             IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                         STATE OF KANSAS,
                                             Appellee,

                                                   v.

                                            BILLY HOYT,
                                             Appellant.

                                  MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Harvey District Court; TIMOTHY J. CHAMBERS, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed November 17, 2023. Appeal dismissed.

       Christopher S. O'Hara, of O'Hara & O'Hara LLC, of Wichita, for appellant.

       Natalie Chalmers, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before ATCHESON, P.J., MALONE and PICKERING, JJ.

       PER CURIAM: Billy Hoyt appeals his sentences in four cases consolidated on
appeal. Hoyt claims the district court abused its discretion by not following the plea
agreement that called for him to receive a durational departure in each case. He also
claims his due process rights were violated because there is no transcript of the joint
sentencing hearing. But because Hoyt received a presumptive sentence within the
applicable grid box in each case, we lack jurisdiction to review his sentences on appeal.

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                                           FACTS

       Between October 2019 and December 2020, the State charged Hoyt with crimes in
four cases. In 19CR711, the State charged Hoyt with two counts of aggravated sexual
battery. In 20CR38, the State charged Hoyt with stalking and two counts of violation of a
stalking order. In 20CR189, the State charged Hoyt with aggravated intimidation of a
witness, two counts of aggravated domestic battery, aggravated assault, aggravated
endangering of a child, and violation of a stalking order. In 20CR551, the State charged
Hoyt with one count of distribution of methamphetamine. Because Hoyt was serving a
term of probation in four prior cases when these crimes were committed, the State sought
to revoke his probation in those cases as well.

       The parties eventually entered into a global plea agreement to settle all the
pending cases. Hoyt agreed to plead no contest to one count of aggravated sexual battery
in 19CR711; one count of stalking in 20CR38; one count of aggravated intimidation of a
witness in 20CR189; and one count of distribution of methamphetamine in 20CR551. He
also agreed to violating the terms of his probation in the four prior cases. In exchange, the
State would dismiss all remaining charges and agree not to file two additional cases. The
parties agreed to recommend that Hoyt would serve 60 months' imprisonment in the four
probation violation cases and 90 months' imprisonment in the four new cases—for a total
sentence of 150 months' imprisonment.

       At the plea hearing before Judge Joe Dickinson, the district court accepted Hoyt's
no-contest pleas in the four new cases. The district court then addressed Hoyt's probation
violation cases and, under the plea agreement, Hoyt admitted to the violations in the
cases. The district court asked Hoyt if he wanted to wait until the sentencing for his four
new cases or proceed directly to disposition on the probation violations. Hoyt responded
that he wanted to go ahead and "dispose of them today." The district court followed the

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plea agreement, revoked Hoyt's probation in the four prior cases, and ordered Hoyt to
serve a modified sentence of 60 months' imprisonment in the four prior cases.

       Before the sentencing hearing in the new cases, Hoyt moved for a durational
departure in each new case, urging the district court to follow the recommendation in the
plea agreement for a total sentence of 90 months' imprisonment in the new cases,
consecutive to the 60-month sentence for the probation violations. Hoyt's motions did not
give any substantial and compelling reasons for the district court to depart from the
sentencing guidelines.

       By the sentencing hearing on November 8, 2021, Judge Dickinson had retired and
Senior Judge Timothy J. Chambers presided over the hearing. At the hearing, the State
joined in Hoyt's requests for a durational departure, but the district court declined to
follow the parties' sentencing recommendations in the four new cases. Instead, the district
court sentenced Hoyt to concurrently serve 120 months' imprisonment for aggravated
sexual battery in 19CR711; 14 months' imprisonment for stalking in 20CR38; 39 months'
imprisonment for aggravated intimidation of a witness in 20CR189; and 130 months'
imprisonment for distribution of methamphetamine in 20CR551. These were all
presumptive sentences under the Kansas sentencing guidelines based on the severity level
of the crimes and Hoyt's criminal history score. The district court ordered Hoyt to serve
the controlling 130-month prison sentence in the new cases consecutive to his 60-month
sentence in the probation violation cases. So, in the end, Hoyt received a total sentence of
190 months' imprisonment in all the cases instead of the 150-month sentence
recommended in the global plea agreement. Hoyt timely appealed his sentences in the
four new cases, and this court consolidated the cases on appeal.

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                                          ANALYSIS

       On appeal, Hoyt claims the district court abused its discretion in denying his
motions for durational departure. He also claims that Senior Judge Chambers, who Hoyt
refers to as a pro tem judge, abused his discretion when he failed to follow the "law of the
case" established by Judge Dickinson who previously agreed to sentence Hoyt according
to the global plea agreement in the probation violation cases. The State does not try to
address these arguments but asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to review Hoyt's
presumptive sentences. In a reply brief, Hoyt asserts that this court has jurisdiction to
review his sentences "because [his sentence] was not entirely presumptive. The probation
violation portion of the sentence was modified[.]"

       We must first address the State's contention that this court lacks jurisdiction to
review Hoyt's presumptive sentences. Kansas courts only have the judicial power to
decide matters over which they have jurisdiction. See State v. Huerta, 291 Kan. 831, 840-
41, 247 P.3d 1043 (2011) ("If subject matter jurisdiction is in question, that issue needs to
be resolved first. The merits come second."). The existence of jurisdiction is a question of
law subject to unlimited appellate review. State v. Looney, 299 Kan. 903, 906, 327 P.3d
425 (2014). "'Appellate jurisdiction is defined by statute; the right to appeal is neither a
vested nor a constitutional right.'" State v. Young, 313 Kan. 724, 728, 490 P.3d 1183
(2021). To the extent this jurisdiction-based question requires statutory interpretation, a
question of law, an appellate court exercises unlimited review. 313 Kan. at 728.

       Under K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 21-6820(c)(1), an appellate court has no jurisdiction to
review "[a]ny sentence that is within the presumptive sentence for the crime." A
"'presumptive sentence' means the sentence provided in a grid block for an offender
classified in that grid block by the combined effect of the crime severity ranking of the
offender's current crime of conviction and the offender's criminal history." K.S.A. 2022
Supp. 21-6803(q). Hoyt is trying to appeal the presumptive sentences the district court

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imposed in four cases when the court denied Hoyt's motions for a durational departure.
But the Kansas Supreme Court has expressly held that appellate courts lack jurisdiction
to consider challenges to the denial of motions for departure sentences because courts
lack jurisdiction to consider appeals from presumptive sentences. State v. Farmer, 312
Kan. 761, 764, 480 P.3d 155 (2021).

       Here, the record shows that the district court sentenced Hoyt within the
corresponding presumptive gridbox in all four cases. In 19CR711, the aggravated sexual
battery case, the district court denied Hoyt's departure motion and sentenced him to the
standard number in the presumptive prison gridbox—120 months. Similarly, in 20CR38,
the stalking case, the district court imposed 14 months' imprisonment—the mitigated
sentence in the applicable gridbox. In 20CR189, the aggravated intimidation of a witness
case, the district court also imposed a presumptive sentence of 39 months' imprisonment,
the standard number in the gridbox. Finally, in 20CR551, the distribution of
methamphetamine case, the district court imposed a presumptive prison sentence of 130
months' imprisonment, the mitigated number in the applicable gridbox.

       Hoyt's contention that his sentences were not presumptive because the probation
portion of the sentences were modified is unavailing. Hoyt is not appealing the sentences
the district court imposed because of the probation violations. In the four cases that are
the subject of this appeal, Hoyt received a presumptive sentence in each case. As a result,
we agree with the State's contention that this court lacks jurisdiction under K.S.A. 2022
Supp. 21-6820(c)(1) to review Hoyt's sentences on appeal. This includes Hoyt's claims
that the district court abused its discretion by denying the departure motions and failed to
follow the "law of the case" when it refused to follow the plea agreement.

       As a separate issue, Hoyt claims that his due process rights were violated because
there is no transcript of the joint sentencing hearing. When Hoyt's counsel requested a
transcript of the joint sentencing hearing held on November 8, 2021, the court reporter

                                             5
responded that there was no record for this hearing because the "record button was not
activated and no recording was made." As a result, this court granted Hoyt's request to
stay the appeal and remanded the case to the district court for recreation of the record
under Supreme Court Rule 3.04(a) (2023 Kan. S. Ct. R. at 24). On remand, the parties
prepared a written "Statement of Proceedings" signed by counsel for each party and
approved by the district court. The Statement of Proceedings states that Hoyt's attorney at
the sentencing hearing, who is also Hoyt's attorney in this appeal, "was not able to recall
the specifics of the sentencing hearing" and "was not able to add anything regarding the
sentencing hearing other than what is reflected in the court file and the journal entry."

       Now, on appeal, Hoyt argues that "[t]he lack of an accurate and complete record of
the sentencing hearing is a violation of [his] due process rights. The case should be
remanded for new sentencing." The State responds that Hoyt cannot establish a due
process violation because he "cannot make any showing that the lack of a transcript
would have changed the appeal." We agree with the State.

       The Kansas Supreme Court has recently noted that a defendant has "a due process
right to reasonably accurate trial transcripts, and a defendant may be entitled to a new
trial if manifestly incomplete or inaccurate transcripts preclude meaningful appellate
review." State v. Frantz, 316 Kan. 708, 743-44, 521 P.3d 1113 (2022). That said, where a
defendant's claim is based on "inaccurate or incomplete transcripts," the defendant "'must
make the best feasible showing possible that a complete and accurate transcript might
have changed the outcome of the appeal.'" 316 Kan. at 744. "A defendant does not have a
constitutionally protected right to a totally accurate transcript of the criminal
proceedings." State v. Holt, 298 Kan. 531, 538, 314 P.3d 870 (2013).

       Here, when Hoyt discovered that a transcript of the sentencing hearing was
inadvertently never created, the parties followed the procedure set forth in Rule 3.04(a) to
recreate the record. That is the purpose of the rule. Hoyt cannot show that a sentencing

                                              6
transcript would have affected the outcome of this appeal. Even if the sentencing
transcript—rather than the agreed Statement of Proceedings—were available, Hoyt's
appeal would still be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. This is because Hoyt is appealing
from presumptive sentences over which this court has no jurisdiction to review. Hoyt
complains that the Statement of Proceedings gives no reasons why the district court
denied the motions for durational departure. But under Kansas law, a sentencing court is
not required to state the reasons a departure motion is denied; the law only requires the
court to state substantial and compelling reasons for granting a departure. State v.
Florentin, 297 Kan. 594, 601-02, 303 P.3d 263 (2013).

       Hoyt is trying to appeal from his presumptive sentences under the sentencing
guidelines. We have no jurisdiction to review these sentences under K.S.A. 2022 Supp.
21-6820(c)(1). Having a transcript of the sentencing hearing instead of the Statement of
Proceedings agreed upon by the parties and approved by the district court would not
change the result of this appeal. We must dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction and
Hoyt's due process claim does not provide him with any independent basis for relief.

       Appeal dismissed.

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