Court Opinion

ID: 9758526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:34:26.888133+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:52.577073
License: Public Domain

Bogdanski, J.
(concurring). I agree that the present statutory scheme concerning the commitment and release of persons committed by civil process to an institution for the mentally ill is violative of the due process clause of our state constitution.
The questions presented in these proceedings are novel and unprecedented in this state. In the interests of justice they should be determined now as finally as it is possible. Brownell v. Union & New Haven Trust Co., 143 Conn. 662, 672, 124 A.2d 901. I am compelled, therefore, to discuss the merits of the equal protection challenge as well and conclude that the present statutory scheme is violative of that constitutional clause also.
New acts of the state impinge more directly and with greater finality on an individual’s liberty than the act of the state in committing a person to involuntary confinement in a hospital for the mentally ill. Whether such commitment is made pursuant to civil or criminal proceedings, the ultimate effect is the same: the person loses not only his freedom, but also suffers the indignity of being treated while in confinement as something less than a normal reasoning human being.
The point sought to be stressed is twofold: first, that any involuntary commitment is a serious infringement on a person’s right to liberty which should be tolerated only so long as is necessary, and second, that when any statutory scheme which significantly affects such a commitment is challenged as *485violative of either the due process or equal protection clauses it ought to be subjected to “strict judicial scrutiny.”
The plaintiffs, civilly committed pursuant to § 17-178 of the General Statutes, claim that they are deprived of equal protection of the law because of the denial to them of legal rights which are afforded to persons committed under § 53a-47 after having been found not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity. They assert that while the state has provided for a comprehensive follow-up procedure, including state-initiated automatic judicial reviews, with respect to the confinement and release of persons committed pursuant to § 53a-47, it has failed to provide for any similar procedure for the release of persons, such as themselves, committed pursuant to § 17-178.1 They contend that, once the state has initiated action as parens patriae to commit involuntarily persons “for the period of the duration of such mental illness,” it is incumbent on the state to provide for periodic judicial review on the factual and legal question as to whether that mental illness continues; that, in essence, the state has provided for such a review procedure for persons committed pursuant to § 53a-47, but not for them and for other persons similarly committed under § 17-178.
An examination of §§ 17-178 and 53a-47 reveals that they have the same intent and purpose: (a) both provide for restraint and custody while the *486proceedings are pending if the court is satisfied the individual is a dangerous person;2 (b) both require medical examinations prior to the commitment hearing; (c) both provide for a hearing at which the court determines whether or not the person is mentally ill; (d) both authorize continued commitment of the individual only as long as he or she is mentally ill; (e) both statutes provide for the right of the mentally ill person to be represented by counsel at the commitment hearing.
There are, however, important differences in the rights accorded by the statutes concerning judicial review and release from confinement. Section 53a-47, which concerns commitment after a finding of not guilty because of insanity, requires the submission to the court of a written report every six months regarding that person’s mental condition, and for a copy of that report to be sent to his lawyer. It further provides that the court, either upon its own motion or at the request of the parties, shall hold a hearing to determine whether such person should be released, and that such a court hearing must be initiated by the state at least once every five years. Most importantly, § 53a-47 requires that the state shall assume the burden of proof to show that such person’s continued confinement is necessary.
By contrast a person civilly committed, pursuant to § 17-178, has no automatic access to the courts. Neither he nor his attorney is entitled to periodic *487psychiatric reports, nor is he entitled to any state-initiated judicial review. Indeed, unless he or another interested party affirmatively seeks release from custody, he will never get one. In further contrast, if he should go to court and seek release from custody, he would have to establish before such court “satisfactory proof that . . . [he has] been restored to reason.” See § 17-192 of the General Statutes. In point of fact, these plaintiffs have been confined for thirteen years and twenty-six years respectively, and neither has yet received any judicial review of her mental illness.
The equal protection clause of the Connecticut constitution requires that any classification affecting a fundamental right be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 640, 376 A.2d 359. That constitutional provision provides in article first, § 20, that “[n]o person shall be denied the equal protection of the law . . . .” Article first, § 1, provides that “[a] 11 men when they form a social compact, are equal in rights; and no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive public emoluments or privileges from the community.” The equal protection provisions of the state and federal constitutions have the same meaning and impose similar constitutional limitations. Horton v. Meskill, supra, 639.
The equal protection clause does not prohibit a state from granting privileges to specified classes of persons where sufficient reasons exist; but where advantages are conferred upon some, the state must justify its denial to others by reference to a constitutionally recognized reason. Thompson v. Shapiro, 270 F. Sup. 331, 338 (D. Conn.), affirmed, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322, 22 L. Ed. 2d 600; Sanger v. Bridgeport, 124 Conn. 183, 189, 198 *488A. 746. All such classifications “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.” F. S. Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S. Ct. 560, 64 L. Ed. 989.
To determine whether a statutory scheme violates the equal protection clause, a court must consider three factors: “the character of the classification in question; the individual interests affected by the classification; and the governmental interests asserted in support of the classification.” Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274. Where the “fundamental right” to education was involved, this court in Horton v. Meskill, supra, 649, declared that the interference with such a fundamental right requires “strict judicial scrutiny,” which means that the state’s action is not entitled to the usual presumption of validity. The state rather than the complainants must carry the “heavy burden of justification.” Dunn v. Blumstein, supra, 343. It is insufficient to show that the classification is merely “reasonably related to a permissible state interest” or merely rational. Ibid.
The trial court’s rationale for justifying the differences was the state’s concern for public safety and the unique role of the insanity defense which requires criminal courts to remain apprised of the mental condition of the person committed after a finding of not guilty because of insanity. That rationale, however, cannot justify the disparate treatment.
In Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S. Ct. 760, 15 L. Ed. 2d 620, the United States Supreme *489Court invalidated commitment procedures for a mentally ill prisoner because those procedures were not the same as those accorded to all others. The court there (p. Ill) said: “It follows that the State, having made this substantial review proceeding generally available on this [the commitment] issue, may not, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arbitrarily withhold it from . . . [others].” The court further stated: “Classification of mentally ill persons as either insane or dangerously insane of course may be a reasonable distinction for purposes of determining the type of custodial or medical care to be given, but it has no relevance whatever in the context of the opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at alU (Emphasis in original.)
Another recent United States Supreme Court case, Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S. Ct. 1845, 32 L. Ed. 2d 435, is relevant. There, the court reviewed the procedure by which a mentally defective deaf-mute was committed after having been found incompetent to stand trial for robbery. In concluding that the procedures used violated the equal protection of the law under the fourteenth amendment, the court (p. 729) made the following observation: “Baxstrom did not deal with the standard for release, but its rationale is applicable here. The harm to the individual is just as great if the State, without reasonable justification, can apply standards making his commitment a permanent one when standards generally applicable to all others afford him a substantial opportunity for early release.”
Other courts have struck down on equal protection grounds commitment and release procedures which denied prisoners or persons acquitted by rea*490son of insanity the same rights as accorded to others. See Chesney v. Adams, 377 F. Sup. 887 (D. Conn.) (prisoner); Cameron v. Mullen, 387 F.2d 193 (D.C. Cir.) (acquittal by reason of insanity); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.) (acquittal by reason of insanity); United States ex rel. Schuster v. Herold, 410 F.2d 1071 (2d Cir.) (prisoner).
Where the state is prohibited from denying equal rights with respect to commitment and release procedures to prisoners and persons acquitted by reason of insanity, it follows that it ought also to be prohibited from denying those same rights to persons who have committed no crimes. The burden of proof of the necessity for confinement of persons who have not been convicted of a crime should remain with the state at all times.
The state has utterly failed to show any justification for its disparate classification.

 There are currently several different statutes which authorize a civilly committed person to initiate court proceedings to obtain his liberty. See General Statutes §§ 17-192, 17-200, 17-201, and 17-229a. These statutes, however, in general, place the burden on the committed person and do not provide for any periodic review as to the duration of the mental illness.

 The standard of “dangerousness” is relevant in civil commitment procedures only insofar as temporary confinement pending a full hearing is concerned. The standard applied by the court for purposes of final commitment determination is whether “the person complained of is mentally ill and a fit subject for treatment in a hospital for mental illness or that he ought to be confined . . . .” General Statutes § 17-178.