Court Opinion

ID: 9772555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:22:04.045152+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:45.608640
License: Public Domain

RUDDY, Judge
(dissenting).
The opinion that failed of acceptance by the other members of the court, referred to in the majority opinion, was written by me. My colleagues agreed with my opinion in all respects except on the question of the adequacy of the protest petition. I agree with the majority opinion in all respects, except that part which holds that the protest petition was inadequate.
The defendants in support of their contention that the protest petition is insufficient state that in most cases the signers of the protest petition were not the sole owners of the property for which they signed. The record shows that in a majority of the cases title to the property was held by husband and wife as tenants by the entirety and only one of the spouses signed the protest petition. In other cases the title to the property was held by joint tenants and only one of the joint tenants signed the protest petition. It is the contention of the defendants, upheld by the majority opinion, that all of the owners of a particular lot must sign before a lot can be included in the area sought to be covered by the protest petition. They say both the husband and wife are “owners” and must sign a protest petition and in the case of a joint tenancy all the joint tenants must sign.
Defendants rely on the case of Blackwell v. City of Lee’s Summit, 326 Mo. 491, 32 S.W.2d 63, loe. cit. 67, where the court said:
“But in Kitchen v. City of Clinton, 320 Mo. 569, 8 S.W.(2d) 602, after fully considering the O’Connor Case, this Division held that, where the protest is to be measured on a per capita basis, both the husband and wife must be counted as owners in determining the number of eligible signers. If that is so, and one of them fails to sign, then undoubtedly, indeed, mathematically, one must be counted for and one against the improvement.”
Defendants in their brief state that the only logical conclusion which can be reached, from a study of the aforesaid decision and the decisions on which it is based, is that where a certain percentage of owners are required by the statute, both husband and wife must sign as “owners” when they own property as tenants by the entirety. To my mind, the significant thing about the cases of Blackwell v. City of Lee’s Summit, supra, and Kitchen v. City of Clinton, 320 Mo. 569, 8 S.W.2d 602, is that they hold that both the husband and wife are owners in determining the number of eligible signers. However, in the aforesaid cases the Missouri statute involved required (1) a majority of the number of resident owners and (2) a majority of the front feet of property owned by such resident owners and abutting upon a part of the street to be improved. Where, in addition to a majority of the front feet of property owned by the resident owners a majority of the number of resident owners must also'be obtained, the rule in Missouri is that if one co-tenant signs the protest petition and the other does not sign, in order to determine the statutory majority each co-tenant must be treated as an owner and the' one signing must be counted as the one . Opposing the *596improvement and the one not signing must be counted on the side favoring the improvement.
In the instant case we are not dealing with a statute where the protest is to be computed on a per capita basis. We are dealing with a statute that requires the signers to be the owners of ten per cent or more of an area "determined by lines drawn parallel to and one hundred and eighty-five feet distant from the boundaries of the district proposed to be changed * * *.” § 89.060 RSMo 1949, 7 V.A.M.S. All that is required under this statute is that the protest petition be signed by owners of ten per cent or more of the areas of the land in question and this statute does not require a majority in number of the resident owners of the area in question.
As pointed out in the majority opinion, the identical question facing us in this case confronted the Supreme Court in the case of Findley-Kehl Investment Co. v. O’Connor, Mo., 256 S.W. 798, loc. cit. 799. In that case the writer of the opinion construed the provision of the Charter of Kansas City, Missouri, which provided that in the case of improvement of a street, avenue, alley, or a part thereof, where “the resident owners of the city owning a majority of the front feet of all the lands belonging to such residents and fronting on the street * !|! * shall file with the said board * * a remonstrance against such * * * ” improvement, “the power of the board to make the improvement shall cease. * *
In the Findley-Kehl Investment Co. case the writer of the opinion held that the signature of the husband alone was sufficient to count the whole frontage in determining the sufficiency of the protest petition. The majority opinion in the instant case holds that because the opinion in the Findley-Kehl Investment Co. case failed to receive the concurrence, in all respects, of a majority of the membership of the Supreme Court En Banc that the statements of law made therein are not authority on any legal point. I do not intend to differ with this statement. I do differ with the majority opinion in its statement that the opinion of the Supreme Court in the case of Kitchen v. City of Clinton, supra, is not controlling in the instant case. It is true that in the Kitchen case the primary question before the court was whether a majority in number of the resident owners of land abutting upon that part of the street proposed to be improved had signed the remonstrance petition. However, in that case the court was concerned with who was an “owner” of property. It was contended by appellants in the Kitchen case that the pronouncements made in the Findley-Kehl Investment Co. case were at variance with the ruling of the Springfield Court of Appeals in the case of Rhodes et al. v. Koch et ah, 195 Mo. App. 182, 189 S.W. 641, whereas the respondents contended that the ruling in the Findley-Kehl Investment Co. case was in full accord with the ruling of the Springfield Court of Appeals in the Rhodes case. Because of these conflicting contentions the Supreme Court undertook to review the opinion written in the Findley-Kehl Investment Co. case and in its review of that opinion found that the case was not inconsistent or at variance with the ruling of the Springfield Court of Appeals in the Rhodes case, supra, and in so finding said: “We think that both of the cited decisions were rightly ruled upon correct and sound principles of law * * 8 S.W.2d loc. cit. 606.
While, factually the court was concerned with the sufficiency of the “per capita count of the owners,” the legal question was whether a husband and wife holding an estate by the entirety is each an owner of property. 8 S.W.2d loc. cit. 604. The Supreme Court in quoting from the Findley-Kehl Investment Co. case pointed to the language in the opinion wherein it was said that each was an owner of the whole and if only one spouse signed the remonstrance the whole frontage of the tract must be counted in determining the sufficiency of the remonstrance since the signer was an owner of the entire frontage and estate. In other words, whether the measure of effectiveness *597of the remonstrance was a “per capita count of owners” or the “owners of an area or frontage of land,” the legal question decided in the Kitchen case, supra, which determined the validity or invalidity of the remonstrance, depended upon and was one of ownership. The Supreme Court in the Kitchen case clearly and unequivocally ruled that the principles of law as announced in the Findley-Kehl Investment Co. case were correct and sound. It is my opinion that in so holding the Supreme Court has established as the law of this state that each spouse is an owner of the whole and where the area of land in the lots are signed for by one of the spouses alone, the whole of such area should be counted in determining the sufficiency of the protest or remonstrance petition.
My brother judges hold that it “is completely repugnant to the character” of property held by the entirety to permit the signature of one to affect the property. This statement is correct if it is applied to a situation where one of the owners attempts to burden the property with the cost of an improvement which will result in a tax lien against the property or in any similar situation where the nature of the petition signed imposes a burden on the property. As said in the case of Los Angeles Lighting Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 106 Cal. 156, 39 P. 535:
“It is undoubtedly true that it is not within the power of a cotenant to create an incumbrance upon the entire estate, or to impose any burden upon the interests of his cotenants therein, nor can he by any act of his confer jurisdiction upon any other body or tribunal to impose such burden, as was held in Mulligan v. Smith, 59 Cal. 206.”
However, the court, in holding the entire frontage of the lot should be counted when only one tenant signed the protest petition, distinguished between a situation where one cotenant attempted to impose a burden on the interests of the other cotenant and one where the cotenant through his act or signature was protecting the entire estate from injury or loss. In this connection it was further said in the Los Angeles Lighting Co. case, at loc. cit. 535, that:
“This rule of inability is, however, entirely inapplicable to the acts of the cotenant in a case like the present. One cotenant can at any time protect the entire estate from injury or loss without calling to his aid the assistance of the other cotenants, and his act will inure to their benefit. He can resist an intruder, or evict a trespasser, remove an incumbrance, or redeem from a burden, and, since his acts in this behalf are in the interest of and for the benefit of his cotenants, their authority therefore, if necessary, will be presumed. We hold, therefore, that a coten-ant is authorized to sign a protest against the improvement of a street by the city council under the aforesaid act.”
To the same effect see Mosher v. City of Phoenix, 33 Ariz. 182, 263 P. 5.
In the case of Chan v. City of South Omaha, 85 Neb. 434, 123 N.W. 464, loc. cit. 466, the court said:
“While it may be necessary for the representatives to act jointly to convey the real estate, a remonstrance signed by either representative for the purpose of protecting the estate is valid.
“ * * * It may be that, if the heir, devisee, or other person entitled to the fee of the lots had denied the right of the remonstrant to represent the estate, the city council would have been justified in rejecting the signatures. The record affirmatively discloses that the authority of the remonstrants was not questioned by any other owner of the property represented by the signers.”
The Chan case, supra, was followed by the court in Bonner v. City of Imperial, 149 Neb. 721, 32 N.W.2d 267, 3 A.L.R.2d 120. In the Bonner case the court held that a presumption arises that the tenant ob*598jecting did so as the representative of the j’oint tenancy, which presumption shall prevail and obtain until and unless the contrary is made to appear.
In our case defendants introduced no evidence to show that the spouse not signing the protest petition was in favor of the rezoning ordinance and was opposed to the stand taken by the opposite spouse. I am certain that if the spouse who did not sign was given an opportunity to testify he or she would approve of the signing of the protest petition by the other spouse. This is in harmony with the presumed close and harmonious relationship that exists between man and wife.
In the Annotation to the case of Bonner v. City of Imperial, supra, appearing in 3 A.L.R.2d p. 129, it is pointed out that the presumption followed in the Bonner case represents the conclusion reached in the majority of the cases. While the Kitchen case, supra, does not rest on such a presumption, I think it is an additional reason that can be given to support the holding that the entire area of the lot should be counted under the protest petition when signed by one of the owners. This should be true where the nature of the protest is to protect the property from an act of the Board of Aldermen which may prove injurious to owners of the property adjacent to the area proposed to be rezoned. I do not think it can be denied that the residential property owned by the protestants and immediately adjacent to the area proposed to be used for commercial development will suffer injury to value if the commercial development is consummated. In addition, the commercial development will seriously interfere with the peace, quiet and privacy of the residential owners.
It is my opinion that in the instant case one of the spouses is authorized to sign the protest petition, and, when so signed, the whole of the area of the lot signed for should be counted in determining the sufficiency of the protest petition. ,
In the cases of lots owned by joint tenants, I think the rule applicable to tenancies by the entirety is applicable in the case of a joint tenancy. All hold the property by one joint title and in one right, each being seized of a whole with the right of survivor to take the whole. 48 C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 1, p. 910. The essential elements of a joint tenancy are four: unity of interest, unity of title, unity of time, and unity of possession. Each of the owners must have one and the same interest, conveyed by the same act or instrument, to vest at one and the same time and each must have the entire possession of the property held in joint tenancy. Feltz v. Pavlick, Mo.App., 257 S.W.2d 214, and 48 C.J.S. Joint Tenancy § 3c., p. 916. I see no reason why the rule as stated in the Kitchen case and the reasoning advanced by the other cases cited should not be applied to a joint tenancy. I think that the areas of land signed for by one of the joint tenants should be counted.
The majority opinion finds the acknowledgment to the protest petition adequate and I concur in this finding. Defendants advance many complaints in their opposition to the sufficiency of the acknowledgment which I shall discuss.
I admit the form of the acknowledgment is no model to be followed by others. However, a substantial compliance with the requirements of the statute covering acknowledgments is all that is required. Alexander v. Merry, 9 Mo. 514; Hughes v. McDivitt, 102 Mo. 77, 14 S.W. 660, 15 S.W. 756; Hughes v. Morris, 110 Mo. 306, 19 S.W. 481; Mathews v. O’Donnell, 289 Mo. 235, 233 S.W. 451; Hatcher v. Hall, Mo.App, 292 S.W.2d 619.
It is the policy of the law to construe acknowledgments liberally, and, where a substantial compliance appears clearly and affirmatively, the certificate will be held sufficient, no matter what language is employed. Mathews v. O’Donnell, supra.
This policy is founded on the knowledge that the convenience of people requires that the taking of acknowledgments on instruments many times is entrusted to those who are ignorant of the forms of the law, who *599will take a proper acknowledgment, and blunder in certifying it. Alexander v. Merry, supra; Wilson v. Quigley, 107 Mo. 98, 17 S.W. 891; Mathews v. O’Donnell, supra.
The first complaint asserted by defendants in their contention that the acknowledgment is insufficient is that the Notary’s seal does not appear on the protest petition. A photostatic copy of the original petition filed with the Board of Aldermen was introduced and admitted in evidence. There is no contention on the part of defendants that the copy is not a true reproduction of the original, except for the missing seal. The photostatic copy admitted in evidence does not show a Notary seal affixed to the acknowledgment on the protest petition. I think a sufficient answer to the complaint of defendants is found in the testimony of Joseph F. Becker, the Notary, who unequivocally stated that he placed a seal on the original instrument and that the impression of the seal failed to show on the photostatic copy. I think his testimony, uncontroverted by defendants, is sufficient to establish that the original protest petition contained the Notary seal.
The acknowledgment declared by defendants to be insufficient is as follows:
“City of St. Louis) 1 “State of Missouri) J
“The individuals whose signatures have been affixed to this instrument, consisting of four (4) pages, did with full knowledge of the contents hereinbefore set forth, and of their own free will, sign their names before me, Joseph F. Becker, a Notary Public of the City of St. Louis, Missouri.
“Acknowledged before me in the city of St. Louis and the State of Missouri, this 26th day of November, 1956.
“Joseph F. Becker “Notary Public
“My commission expires March 29, 1957.”
In their next complaint concerning the sufficiency of the acknowledgment defendants assert that the acknowledgment did not state that the signers were known to the Notary. They say that the law requires a Notary to either certify that he knows the party or adopt the statutory mode of identification, citing Riehl v. Noel & Tittsworth, 89 Mo.App. 178; Hatcher v. Hall, supra; 1 Gill, Treatise on Real Property Law in Missouri, p. 68. I have examined the cases cited by defendants and many others. No tangible benefit would result from an attempt to analyze and reconcile the holdings in the numerous cases construing the sufficiency of acknowledgments. The result in each case, of course, depends upon the language contained in the acknowledgment under review.
I think the case of Warder v. Henry, 117 Mo. 530, loc. cit. 539, 23 S.W. 776, loc. cit. 778, controls our decision on the complaint raised by defendants. One of the questions in that case was whether a deed of trust given to secure an indebtedness of $85,000 “was well acknowledged.” The acknowledgment omitted the words “to me personally known” and contained no words to show that affiant was known to the Notary. The certificate did state “before me personally appeared George W. Warder.” In holding the acknowledgment sufficient, the court said:
“The officer in making this statement that George W. Warder personally appeared before him, includes therein the proposition that Warder was to him personally known; for, unless personally known, how could he say Warder personally appeared? The meaning and sense of the certificate of acknowledgment is the same as the statute. The transposition of words does not affect the validity of the certificate. There is certainly here a substantial compliance with the statute, and that is all the law demands, as has been time and again held by this court.”
In the case of Hatcher v. Hall, supra, cited and relied on by defendants, the court in a footnote (292 S.W.2d loc. cit. 622) *600said: “Thus, a certificate showing that the acknowledger ‘personally appeared’ constitutes substantial compliance with the statutory provision [Section 442.210] that the certificate ‘shall state’ that the acknowledger was 'personally known.’ ”
While the certificate under review does not say that the individuals “personally appeared” before the Notary, it does say that they signed their names “before me, Joseph F. Becker, a Notary Public * * Obviously, in order to sign before the Notary they had to “personally appear” before him. Becker, in his testimony, said that at the time of taking the acknowledgments he “knew them, slight as it might be.” I hold that the ruling in Warder v. Henry, supra, controls and that there is no validity to the complaint lodged by defendants.
The final complaint of defendants directed at the sufficiency of the acknowledgment is that it did not certify that the signers were the persons named therein and that they executed the same. I think the acknowledgment is sufficient in this respect. It stated that “The individuals whose signatures have been affixed to this instrument * *• * did * * * sign their names before me, Joseph F. Becker, a Notary Public, * * Those words are sufficient to show that the persons who signed are the persons named therein.
In State to the Use of Alexander v. Plass, 58 Mo.App. 148, loe. cit. 151, the court said: “that plaintiff had a right to assume that the Notary’s certificate was true and that the veritable persons therein mentioned appeared before him and acknowledged the instruments as therein recited.” (Emphasis supplied.) The acknowledgment is prima facie evidence of the facts recited therein. O’Bannon v. McArron, Mo., 236 S.W. 48. No evidence was adduced by defendants to show that the individuals who signed the protest petition and acknowledged it were not the “veritable persons” they claimed to be, namely, the owners of the property described opposite their names.
The acknowledgment substantially complies with the requirements of the statute in all respects. I find the protest petition complies with § 89.060, supra. Thus, if the ordinance failed to receive the favorable vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Board of Aldermen, it is ineffective and invalid. The record herein fails to show how many members constitute the Board of Aldermen of the City of St. Louis. However, we are authorized to take judicial notice of the provisions of the Charter of the City of St. Louis, Constitution of Missouri, 1945, Article VI, § 19, 2 V.A.M.S. Article I, § 3 of the Charter of the City of St. Louis divides the city into twenty-eight wards. Article II, § 3, provides for the election of one Alderman from each ward and a President of the Board of Aldermen. The Stipulation of Facts shows that Ordinance No. 48159 (the rezoning ordinance) upon a vote by the Board of Aldermen received fifteen ayes and, therefore, failed to receive the favorable vote of three-fourths of all the members of the Board of Aldermen. Because of this failure said Ordinance is invalid and has no legal effect.
Upon a careful examination of the entire record and the legal questions presented, I would reverse that part of the trial court’s judgment and decree wherein the court adjudged and decreed that Ordinance No. 48159 is a valid, lawful and subsisting ordinance of the City of St. Louis, and in all other respects I would affirm said judgment and decree.