Court Opinion

ID: 9747888
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:41:10.633993+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:28.254107
License: Public Domain

Reiber, C.J.,
¶ 13. dissenting. Because the ALJ was well within his discretion to limit the evidence to the events of January 19 and 20,2008, under our deferential standard of review I would affirm the holding of the Employment Security Board.
¶ 14. The majority’s holding ignores the limited role assigned to this Court in this appeal. We have previously noted that we will affirm the findings of the Employment Security Board if they are “supported by any credible evidence in the record.” Whitcomb v. Dep’t of Employment & Training, 147 Vt. 525, 528, 520 A.2d 602, 604 (1986) (emphasis added). Indeed, findings will not be disturbed even where there is substantial evidence to the contrary. Littlefield v. Dep’t of Employment & Training, 145 Vt. 247, 251, 487 A.2d 507, 509 (1984). We also defer to the Board’s construction of statutes it is charged with administering. Agency of Natural Res. v. Upper Valley Reg’l Landfill Corp., 167 Vt. 228, 238, 705 A.2d 1001, 1007 (1997). We construe the record in the manner most favorable to the Board’s conclusions. Harrington v. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 142 Vt. 340, 344, 455 A.2d 333, 336 (1982). In evaluating claims of error relating to the admission or exclusion of evidence, we will reverse only where the tribunal below has abused its discretion resulting in prejudice. Keus v. Brooks Drug, Inc., 163 Vt. 1, 4, 652 A.2d 475, 478 (1994).
¶ 15. Applying this deferential standard of review to the Board’s decision to affirm the conclusion of the ALJ, I do not find grounds for reversal. Claimant raises only one argument on appeal: that the Board erred by adopting the findings of the ALJ, who, according to claimant, relied on the human resources director’s testimony concerning earlier incidents of tampering with, and theft of, Adderall. Claimant contends that he was unable to defend himself against the charges below as a result of the ALJ’s refusal to issue a subpoena for work records that he says would have shown that he was not on duty during the relevant times of the November and December discoveries of Adderall theft and tampering. No claim is made on appeal that any of the ALJ’s findings of fact are not supported by credible evidence. Nor is it claimed that the ALJ abused his discretion in limiting the evidence at the hearing to the events of January 19 and 20, 2008.
¶ 16. Although the majority’s opinion focuses exclusively on one decision by the ALJ regarding a subpoena request, it is important to put that decision into context. At the beginning of the hearing, the ALJ stated that he would “postpone addressing [the subpoena question]... until I’ve heard the evidence in the hearing this morning. I will [then] decide whether ... the information requested is necessary.” The ALJ also stated that if the Retreat later refused to produce records after the ALJ decided they were necessary, he would issue a subpoena and reschedule the hearing for a future date to permit service. The ALJ then proceeded to take evidence.
¶ 17. At the hearing, Kathleen Brooks, Brattleboro Retreat’s human resources director, testified without objection as follows:
On January 20th at 8 [a.m.] . . . [the] first shift nurse discovered that six of the Adderall tablets had been tampered with. [Claimant] happened to have worked the night before on January 19th .... So at 8 o’clock the following morning it appeared as though . . . pills had been tampered with____[A]ll of the second *637shift nurses on January 20th came in ... and were instructed not to go into the medication room except for [claimant]____At change of shift around midnight on January 20th or right before midnight, it appeared that eight more capsules had been tampered with when they did the change of shift count. [Claimant] was the only nurse who had access to the med room and . . . could have had the opportunity to tamper with the capsules, that’s why we terminated [him]. . . . [W]e met with him to confront him on January 23rd after the investigation. . . . [H]e was represented by [the] Union .... He ... had no ability to account for the problems in the medication room .... And the Union did not grieve his discharge.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 18. Given that this undisputed evidence was limited to the January dates only, and that claimant was therefore “the only nurse who had access” and “opportunity” to tamper with the Adderall on January 19 and 20, the question before this Court is whether — after hearing this evidence — it was then an abuse of discretion for the ALJ to deny claimant’s request to subpoena documents relevant to incidents that occurred in November and December. When the ALJ asked claimant at the hearing why the materials would be relevant, claimant stated that he “just wanted to address whether [he] was ... a suspect until I was the medication nurse at the time it happened.” The ALJ concluded that neither the work schedule nor the personnel file was relevant, noting that the human resources director “has testified to your schedule for the relevant days” — a statement to which claimant agreed. The ALJ concluded that because claimant’s discharge was based solely on charges relating to events that occurred on January 19 and 20, the question of when he became a suspect was not relevant to determining whether he had been discharged for gross misconduct connected with his work on those dates. Neither this conclusion nor the refusal to issue a subpoena was an abuse of discretion.
¶ 19. Despite claimant’s arguments to the contrary, the ALJ’s determination did not depend upon events that occurred before January 19 and 20. Regarding these January dates only, the ALJ concluded that “the weight of the evidence is that it was the claimant who removed the drug from the capsules” and then stated three reasons for that conclusion: (1) claimant “was on shift each time that the drug was tampered with”; (2) claimant “was the assigned medication nurse in the final incident”; and (3) claimant’s “employer . . . testified that other nurses going into the medication room on January 20 did so in pairs or were under observation while inside.” Although the ALJ’s first reason can plausibly be read as referring to the November or December incidents, it is much more likely (given his ruling on the request for a subpoena) that the ALJ meant to refer only to the two separate January incidents.
¶ 20. Under our deferential standard of review, the ALJ’s finding that a preponderance of the evidence supported the conclusion that claimant tampered with the Adderall in January should be affirmed, even if there is substantial evidence to the contrary. Littlefield, 145 Vt. at 251, 487 A.2d at 509; see also Whitcomb, 147 Vt. at 528, 520 A.2d at 604; Schaffner v. Dep’t of Employment Sec., 140 Vt. 89, 92, 436 A.2d 743, 745 (1981). The record amply supports the ALJ’s conclusion, with testimony from the Retreat’s human resources director and the statements from the other nurses from the Retreat.
*638¶21. It is true that the documents sought by claimant might have shown that it was possible that another employee had the opportunity to divert or tamper with drugs in November and December 2007. What the documents could not do, however, is materially alter the conclusion that it was claimant who tampered with the medication on January 19 and 20, 2008. Even if the majority is correct that “the fact-finder could find it likely that the same person was responsible” for each instance of tampering, ante, ¶ 9, the majority does not put forth any theory as to how the responsible person on the target dates of January 19 and 20 could be anyone other than claimant. Nor could such a theory be proffered given the uncontroverted testimony that claimant “was the only nurse who had access” and “opportunity” to tamper with the tablets on January 19 and 20.
¶22. The majority’s conclusion that claimant was deprived of a fair hearing, see ante, ¶ 11, does a disservice to the ALJ’s efforts in the hearing below. After careful consideration and after hearing all of the evidence, the ALJ properly exercised his discretion in declining to issue the subpoena. 21 V.S.A. § 1352; Langlois v. Dep’t of Employment & Training, 149 Vt. 498, 500, 546 A.2d 1365, 1366-67 (1988) (holding that § 1352 vests the finder of fact with discretion to issue subpoenas in unemployment-compensation matters). We have previously held that the presiding judicial officer at the administrative proceeding has “broad discretion” to determine relevance. Haynes v. Golub Corp., 166 Vt. 228, 236, 692 A.2d 377, 381 (1997). At issue here were the events of January 19 and 20. The evidence of work attendance in previous months was not going to refute the evidence of claimant’s exclusive and solitary access to the medication room on January 19 and 20, 2008. The ALJ was well within his “broad discretion” to refuse the subpoena for evidence that could not even marginally shed light on the events of January 19 and 20. Id.; accord Fid. & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Wu, 150 Vt. 225, 232, 552 A.2d 1196, 1200 (1988); cf. V.R.E. 401 (evidence is relevant if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable”). The ALJ did not abuse his discretion in determining that the evidence sought was not material. For these reasons, I dissent.
¶23. I am authorized to state that Justice Burgess joins this dissent.