Court Opinion

ID: 9714995
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:51:12.333373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:30.388720
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WOLFSON, specially concurring: I agree the trial court erred when it gave the jury IPI Criminal 4th No. 26.011 instead of No. 26.01Q. Supreme Court Rule 451(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 451(a)) directs trial judges to use the appropriate pattern instruction unless “it does not accurately state the law.” Here, IPI Criminal 4th No. 26.01Q accurately states the law. It should have been given. I also agree the issue has been forfeited by defense counsel’s lack of objection. It then became the defendant’s obligation to demonstrate how he was prejudiced by the giving of IPI Criminal 4th No. 26.01I. We have been offered speculation about the jury’s reasoning process, but little else. Two Illinois Supreme Court decisions support the conclusion there was no plain error here. In People v. Pastorino, 91 Ill. 2d 178 (1982), the court saw no plain error where the trial court told the jury not to consider the voluntary manslaughter charge unless it first found the defendant guilty of murder. In People v. Towns, 157 Ill. 2d 90 (1993), the trial court gave the jury IPI Criminal 3d No. 26.01Q, but incorrectly included the paragraph authorizing the jury to find the defendant guilty of first degree murder and involuntary manslaughter, despite the different mental states required. Lack of objection led the court to conclude the defendant was not prejudiced. Towns, 157 Ill. 2d at 108. Pastorino and Towns make two points that are of importance to us. First, the failure to object deprives the trial court of the opportunity to correct any mistake it might be about to make. Pastorino, 91 Ill. 2d at 188. Second, where the record as a whole demonstrates the evidence of murder is substantial, the lack of a close balance supports the conclusion that the defendant was not deprived of a fair trial. Towns, 157 Ill. 2d at 108-09; Pastorino, 91 Ill. 2d at 188-89. Here, the evidence of defendant’s guilt on the murder charge was substantial. See People v. Bartall, 98 Ill. 2d 294 (1983) (discharge of a weapon into the air over a group of people in a parking lot supports the jury’s guilty verdict.) I do not share the majority’s concern about the jury’s possible inability to reach a unanimous verdict on the murder charge. That possibility is present in any jury trial. We do not instruct about it. Involuntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of first degree murder. People v. Robinson, 232 Ill. 2d 98, 104 (2009). When the offenses to be considered are first degree murder, second degree murder, and involuntary manslaughter, IPI Criminal 4th No. 26.01I tells the jury not to consider the involuntary manslaughter charge unless it finds the defendant not guilty of the two murder offenses. The jury also is told that if any proposition regarding first degree murder has not been proved, it then should decide the involuntary manslaughter charge. That is the instruction given in this case. I do not see how the defendant is harmed by it. That is, I do not see why the presence of a second degree murder charge radically changes the instructional landscape. Whatever reason the criminal pattern instructions committee had for making the distinctions in IPI Criminal 4th Nos. 26.01I and 26.01Q is not shared with us in any Committee Note.