Court Opinion

ID: 9849974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:50:21.366236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:29.901580
License: Public Domain

Berry, Justice,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion with regard to the holding that the petitioners’ constitutional rights were violated because the petitioners were not advised that an attorney would be provided by the Parole Board to represent them at the parole violation hearings.
The Supreme Court of the United States recently decided that it is constitutionally necessary to provide counsel to an indigent in probation revocation proceedings when the facts are such that only an attorney could present them meaningfully. The status of an individual on probation and on parole is similar as far as deprivation of personal liberty and the degree of freedom involved. *417This case, therefore, should come within the rule announced in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra.
The parolees in this case both had violated the condition of their parole. In fact, the violations were not denied. No complicated or peculiar facts were advanced as requiring a professional presentation by an attorney in order to protect their rights. It is clear that an attorney was not necessary under the Gagnon rule.
A parole hearing is before an administrative board and not a court and is not a trial of a crime. It, therefore, does not come within the provision of Article III, Section 14 of the West Virginia Constitution providing for the assistance of counsel because that section of the Constitution specifically pertains to “Trial of Crimes and Misdemeanors”.
The applicable statute, Code 62-12-19, as amended, merely provides that: “ * * * the parolee and his counsel shall be given an opportunity to attend [the hearing].” There is nothing in the statute that requires a parolee to have an attorney either employed by the parolee or provided by the Board at every parole violation hearing.
I am authorized to state that Justice Sprouse joins in this dissent.