Court Opinion

ID: 9955643
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-28 21:02:38.559397+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:14.519495
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/28/24 P. v. Ortega CA1/5

         NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for pur-
poses of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

    THE PEOPLE,                                                   A167133
          Plaintiff and Respondent,
    v.                                                            (San Francisco City and County
    REINIERY ORTEGA,                                              Super. Ct. Nos. SCN233174,
                                                                  CRI20009652)
           Defendant and Appellant.

      Defendant Reiniery Ortega pled guilty to sale of fentanyl
but contends the preliminary hearing magistrate erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence pursuant to Penal Code
section 1538.5.1 We affirm.

                                    BACKGROUND
       San Francisco Police Officer Cullen Roche was conducting
surveillance of a high narcotics area when he noticed Ortega
“loitering.” At one point, Officer Roche saw Ortega “pull out a
package and select items and begin kind of sifting through” them.
A few minutes later, Ortega approached a car and conversed with
the driver. No physical exchange took place. Some time
afterward, a pedestrian approached the same car and
“exchange[d] an object in exchange for U.S. currency.” Officer
Roche was not “100 percent certain[]” what the object was, but he

1        Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
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suspected it was a narcotics sale. He did not direct any officers to
stop or arrest those individuals.

      Soon after, Officer Roche observed another pedestrian,
Ricky Vedilago, approach Ortega. After appearing to engage in
conversation and walking together, Ortega handed over a “small
substance” to Vedilago in exchange for U.S. currency.

       Officer Roche relayed a description of Vedilago to other
officers, including Officer Wright. Vedilago was arrested, at
which point Officer Wright informed Officer Roche that a “white
crystalline substance” was found in Vedilago’s possession.

      With this information, Officer Roche ordered the arrest of
Ortega. A search incident to arrest uncovered several
denominations of “crumpled up” bills as well as a cigarette pack
that contained “a Ziploc bag of a white crystalline substance and
another bag with small black objects in individual bindles.”
These substances were determined to be methamphetamine and
heroin. In contrast, the white crystalline substance found on
Vedilago was determined to be fentanyl. No drug paraphernalia
or fentanyl was found on Ortega.

       At the preliminary hearing, Officer Roche was qualified as
an expert in narcotics sales. Officer Roche testified to his
observations as well as his extensive experience investigating
narcotics and his specialized knowledge in identifying drug
packaging and teams of drug dealers. The magistrate heard and
denied the defense motion to suppress evidence brought pursuant
to section 1538.5. Ortega subsequently filed a section 995 motion
to set aside the information on grounds including that there was
no probable cause to arrest him. The trial court denied the
motion.

      Following these unsuccessful motions, Ortega pled guilty to
felony violations of sale of fentanyl (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352,
subd. (a)) and accessory after the fact (Pen. Code, § 32). He was

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given two years of probation, and the court dismissed the
remaining two counts as well as charges in four related criminal
cases. Ortega now appeals the denial of the suppression motion.

                          DISCUSSION

      Ortega contends the People failed to establish probable
cause for his arrest and related search. Reviewing the
magistrate’s express and implied factual findings for substantial
evidence and exercising our independent judgment to determine
whether probable cause was supplied on those facts (People v.
Macabeo (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1206, 1212), we disagree.

       A warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause.
(People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 667, 673 (Celis).) While
probable cause “is incapable of precise definition,” it “exists when
the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade someone
of ‘reasonable caution’ that the person to be arrested has
committed a crime.” (Ibid.) And while “specialized knowledge
may render suspicious what would appear innocent to a layman,”
it remains an objective test based on whether an individual “who
possessed such knowledge” would reasonably believe action was
appropriate. (Cunha v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 352, 358
(Cunha).)

       In Cunha, supra, 2 Cal.3d 352 and Remers v. Superior
Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 659, 664, 665–666 (Remers), our Supreme
Court found that a hand-to-hand street sale of an unidentified
object may not constitute probable cause even if the transaction
takes place in an area known for frequent narcotics trafficking or
if the suspect exhibits concern for his or her surroundings.
(Cunha, supra, at p. 357; Remers, supra, at pp. 665–666.) The
court observed that such a sale may be as consistent with
innocence as it is with criminality. (Ibid.; Remers, at pp. 664-
666.)

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       More recent case law has refined the application of Cunha
and Remers. Probable cause is an objective yet fluid inquiry into
the “totality of the circumstances.” (Cleaver v. Superior Court
(1979) 24 Cal.3d 297, 307.) The totality of the circumstances test
“ ‘allows officers to draw on their own experience and specialized
training to make inferences from and deductions about the
cumulative information available.’ ” (People v. Barnes (2013) 216
Cal.App.4th 1508, 1514.) Courts may consider the officer’s
experience, the officer’s awareness that the area is known for
narcotics trafficking, suspicious conduct by the defendant and
others, and distinctive packaging typically used for drugs. (See
People v. Guajardo (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1738, 1742 [listing
cases]; People v. Mims (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1244, 1247-1250.)
Probable cause may be found when an experienced police officer
“observed all the elements of a completed [drug] sale.” (People v.
Garrett (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 535, 539 (Garrett).)

       Applying these factors to the instant facts, we are not
persuaded that Cunha and Remers control. Officer Roche—an
officer with extensive experience investigating narcotics—had
observed Ortega for roughly half an hour. During that
surveillance, Officer Roche developed an informed suspicion that
Ortega was involved in narcotics trafficking. (Cunha, supra, 2
Cal.3d at p. 358.) This suspicion was based in part on the fact
that Ortega had loitered in a high narcotics trafficking area,
manipulated a small package that he stored in his pocket, and
engaged with a car involved in hand-to-hand transactions that
are consistent with narcotics trafficking methods in that area.
Then Officer Roche witnessed Ortega’s transaction with
Vedilago—a brief conversation, followed by an exchange of cash
for a small package that Officer Roche, based on his training and
experience, believed was narcotics. Officer Roche was then told,
by another police officer, that the buyer, Vedilago, was arrested,
searched, and found to possess suspected narcotics. On these
facts, “[i]t is difficult to imagine what further visual evidence of a

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street sale of narcotics could be required to establish reasonable
cause for an arrest.” (Garrett, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 539; see
also People v. Stanfill (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 420, 426.)

       Ortega focuses on a factual finding that the magistrate
deemed important. The magistrate found the evidence of Officer
Wright’s search of Vedilago, “which revealed a white crystalline
substance in a small amount,” was “consistent with the package”
that Officer Roche witnessed Ortega hand to Vedilago. Ortega
argues the evidence does not support this finding. Even if it did,
Ortega maintains any such similarity is irrelevant because
Officer Roche did not see the package seized from Vedilago until
after directing the arrest of Ortega.

      Ortega has a point. Officer Roche was at least 90 feet
away, without binoculars, and was only able to see Ortega hand
Vedilago a “small substance” or “small object.” He did not see the
“white crystalline substance” until sometime after Ortega’s
arrest, and there is no evidence that Officer Wright described to
Officer Roche the amount of substance (small or large) or its
packaging.

      Nevertheless, the information Officer Roche received about
the search of Vedilago still supports the magistrate’s ruling.
Officer Roche strongly suspected that he saw a drug deal.
Shortly thereafter, he was told that other officers arrested the
buyer and found a white crystalline substance. A reasonable
person could draw the connection between the sale and the
suspected drugs. (See Garrett, supra, 29 Cal.App.3d at p. 539
[probable cause requires reasonable probability, not certainty,
that package contained drugs].)

      We reject Ortega’s remaining arguments. There is no
serious question here that the information related to Officer
Roche about the white crystalline substance was manufactured or
otherwise unreliable under People v. Harvey (1958) 156
Cal.App.2d 516, 523–524 and People v. Madden (1970) 2 Cal.3d
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1017, 1021. (See In re Richard G. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1252,
1260 [“When the judiciary can reasonably determine that no
evidence has been manufactured, there is no reason for strict
compliance with the letter of the ‘Harvey–Madden’ rule.”].)
Ortega’s attacks on Officer Roche’s credibility are likewise
unpersuasive; the magistrate heard the same evidence and found
him credible. We have no basis to overturn that finding. (People
v. Pantoja (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 483, 489.)

      In sum, although one of the magistrate’s findings (on the
consistency between the white substance and the package) is
unsupported, it does not change the outcome. We may affirm the
magistrate’s ruling if it is correct, despite flaws in the reasoning.
(People v. Hall (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 946, 951.) The evidence
supports a probable cause finding.

                             DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                          BURNS, J.
WE CONCUR:

JACKSON, P. J.
CHOU, J.

People v. Ortega (A167133)

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