Court Opinion

ID: 9574821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:08:43.996187+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:18.502018
License: Public Domain

Jansen, RJ.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. In very broad terms, the majority declares that a prosecutor’s entire work product is privileged from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (foia), MCL 15.231 et seq.; MSA 4.1801(1) et seq., without any supporting authority that the work-product doctrine applies to a closed governmental file. I do not *651believe that this case should be decided under a work-product exemption because the trial court did not decide the case on this basis and the issue requires further factual development. Rather, I would remand to the trial court to consider whether the prosecutor has shown that the public interest in encouraging frank communications between officials and employees of the public body clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure, as required under subsection 13(l)(n) of the FOIA.
After he was acquitted of manslaughter involving the death of his very prematurely bom son, plaintiff, Gregory G. Messenger, M. D., sought to obtain under the FOIA the prosecutor’s file concerning his case. Obviously, plaintiff was seeking a closed governmental file. The trial court ruled that the work-product privilege did not apply because there was no other litigation between these two parties, the investigation had been closed, and there was no contemplated prosecution. The trial court then ruled that the prosecutor was required to release all strictly factual materials, except those that were elicited from a person on an express prior promise of confidentiality, unless the person appeared on the witness list. The trial court also ruled that the deliberative materials, such as notes or drafts of pleadings or evaluations made by members of the prosecutor’s staff, were exempt from disclosure.
Thus, the trial court did not decide this case on the basis of any work-product exemption to disclosure under the FOIA. Specifically, with regard to defendant’s contention that the materials were exempted under the work-product doctrine, the trial court stated that the work-product exemption did not apply, “at least *652not to the factual materials,” because the criminal investigation was closed and there was no contemplated prosecution. Rather, the trial court found that the documents were exempt from disclosure under the “deliberative materials” exemption, or subsection 13(l)(n), of the FOIA. There is no factual finding by the trial court that the exempted materials were indeed work product, and this Court does not have the materials to review to determine whether they are work product. Moreover, the majority’s assertion in footnote eight that there is no dispute that the materials all constitute attorney work product is not accurate. I find no such concession in plaintiff’s brief. In fact, plaintiff rather forcefully argues that the work-product doctrine does not apply to this case1 and points out that many of the materials that were ultimately disclosed were initially claimed by the prosecutor to be work product when they clearly were not.
The majority’s attempt to get around the problem that there is no factual finding that the material at issue is indeed attorney work product is to declare that an attorney work-product exemption to disclosure wholly subsumes the deliberative-process exemption of subsection 13(l)(n). However, the court rule, MCR 2.302(B)(3)(a), is a rule of pretrial discovery in civil actions and its terms are not as broad as the majority applies them. MCR 2.302(B)(3)(a) per*653mits the discovery of documents and tangible things prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial or for another party or another party’s representative only on a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials and is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. The court rule requires a showing of substantial need and undue hardship on the party seeking discovery, but the majority ignores this dictate, instead concluding that the foia is not an appropriate mechanism for addressing the issue of personal need or hardship. Thus, the attorney work-product doctrine is given even broader application in the context of the foia under the majority’s opinion. This application is in direct conflict with the purpose of the foia, which is a prodisclosure statute whose exemptions are to be narrowly construed. See Swickard v Wayne Co Medical Examiner, 438 Mich 536, 543-544; 475 NW2d 304 (1991), and MCL 15.231(2); MSA 4.1801(1)(2) (“It is the public policy of this state that all persons . . . are entitled to full and complete information regarding the affairs of government and the official acts of those who represent them as public officials and public employees, consistent with this act. The people shall be informed so that they may fully participate in the democratic process.”). Moreover, if subsection 13(l)(i) exempts from disclosure a privilege recognized by a court rule, the exemption being set forth in this case is not the one recognized by MCR 2.302(B)(3)(a). Finally, it should be emphasized that the majority cites no authority for the application of the attorney work-product doctrine to a closed governmental file.
*654Because this Court does not have the materials to review and because there is otherwise no factual finding by the trial court that the materials are indeed work product, I do not believe that this case can be resolved on the basis of whether the documents are exempt from disclosure under the work-product doctrine. Rather, the trial court ruled that the documents now challenged by plaintiff were exempt from disclosure because they were “deliberative materials.”
The trial court did not cite which subsection of the FOIA it was relying on, but the parties indicate that the trial court relied on subsection 13(l)(n).2 Under this subsection, the following record is exempt from disclosure:
Communications and notes within a public body or between public bodies of an advisory nature to the extent that they cover other than purely factual materials and are preliminary to a final agency determination of policy or action. This exemption does not apply unless the public body shows that in the particular instance the public interest in encouraging frank communications between officials and employees of public bodies clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure. . . . [MCL 15.243(l)(n); MSA 4.1801(13)(l)(n).]
The trial court made no finding regarding whether, in this particular instance, the public interest in encouraging frank communications between officials and employees of public bodies clearly outweighs the *655public interest in disclosure. This was error. When the court chooses to conduct an in camera review of the documents, the court must still determine whether the government has met its burden of proving the claimed exemptions and must give particularized findings of fact indicating why the claimed exemptions are appropriate. Newark Morning Ledger Co v Saginaw Co Sheriff, 204 Mich App 215, 218; 514 NW2d 213 (1994). Further, the public body must show that the public interest in encouraging frank communication clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure and this cannot be done in conclusory, general terms. Nicita v Detroit (After Remand), 216 Mich App 746, 754-755; 550 NW2d 269 (1996); In re Subpoeana Duces Tecum to the Wayne Co Prosecutor (On Remand), 205 Mich App 700, 705-706; 518 NW2d 522 (1994).
I would vacate the trial court’s order and remand for it to determine whether the prosecution has met its burden of showing that the public interest in encouraging frank communication clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure in this case. For the reasons stated, I would not decide this case on the basis of any work-product exemption, and to that extent I disagree with the majority’s decision to hold that the prosecutor’s file is work product that is exempt from disclosure under subsection 13(l)(i). Such a finding requires additional factual information that is not now before this Court.
I would remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

 Plaintiff argues that the work-product doctrine does not apply for the following reasons: (1) there is no explicit provision in the foia exempting materials on the basis of the work-product doctrine as there is under the federal foia; (2) the work-product doctrine under MCR 2.302(B)(3)(a) provides only a limited and qualified protection against pretrial discovery of trial preparation materials by a party to the suit; (3) the work-product doctrine is limited with regard to a prosecutor because of other constitutional and ethical obligations of a prosecutor; and (4) the work-product doctrine may be waived like any other privilege.

 Generally, the foia requires the disclosure of all public records, except to the extent that they fall within a statutory exemption. MCL 15.233(1); MSA 4.1801(3)(1). See Swickard v Wayne Co Medical Examiner, supra at 544.1 emphasize this point because the trial court appeared to also apply a common-law deliberative-process exemption, relying on In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to the Wayne Co Prosecutor, 191 Mich App 90; 477 NW2d 412 (1991); however, that case did not involve a claim under the foia.