Court Opinion

ID: 9374706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-23 19:02:15.577988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:52.551552
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/23/23 Hacker v. Levy CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 RON HACKER,                                                          B317325

           Plaintiff and Appellant,                                   (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. 19STCV12728)
           v.

 HENRI LEVY et al.,

           Defendants and Respondents.

      APPEAL from judgments of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Theresa M. Traber, Judge. Affirmed.
      Law Offices of Vincent Quigg and Vincent Quigg for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
      Krishel Law Firm and Daniel L. Krishel for Defendants
and Respondents Henri Levy, Gabriel Perez and 4865 Bakman,
LLC.
      Hall Griffin, Howard D. Hall and Taylor R. Dalton for
Defendants and Respondents Finance of America Commercial
LLC and Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, as Trustee of
Antler Mortgage Trust 2019-RTL1.
                 ____________________________

       Plaintiff and appellant Ron Hacker appeals from two
judgments, one in favor of defendants and respondents
Henri Levy, Gabriel Perez, and 4865 Bakman LLC (collectively,
the Levy defendants), and one in favor of defendants and
respondents Finance of America Commercial LLC (FOAC) and
Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB (Wilmington). Hacker
contends the trial court erroneously granted summary judgment
in favor of respondents, and also erred in granting an earlier
motion for judgment on the pleadings in favor of FOAC.
       Hacker’s appellate briefing suffers from numerous serious
deficiencies. First, Hacker filed two opening briefs, one for each
challenged judgment. This court rejected the brief concerning the
Levy defendants, advising Hacker of its policy that multiple
notices of appeal from the same trial court case filed within
30 days of each other are combined into a single appeal, and
therefore the appellant may file only one opening brief. Hacker
took no action to combine the substance of the two briefs into a
single brief, or otherwise address the deficiency in the briefing,
even after respondents’ briefing argued the absence of a filed
brief concerning the judgment in favor of the Levy defendants
constituted forfeiture of Hacker’s challenges to that judgment.
Thus, the only properly filed brief we have before us is the brief
challenging the judgment as to FOAC and Wilmington. Any
challenge to the judgment in favor of the Levy defendants is
forfeited.

                                   2
       Second, Hacker’s arguments challenging the grant of
summary judgment in favor of FOAC and Wilmington lack any
citations to the record, and thus are forfeited as well.
       Third, Hacker’s arguments concerning the judgment on the
pleadings are entirely conclusory, with no discussion of the
operative pleading, and are insufficient to demonstrate error.
       Accordingly, we affirm the judgments.

                         BACKGROUND
      Because we resolve this appeal based on deficiencies in
Hacker’s briefing, we provide only a brief summary of the case
background.
      On April 12, 2019, Hacker filed a lawsuit against Levy,
4865 Bakman LLC, and others arising from an alleged real
property transaction. As summarized by the trial court, Hacker
alleged he and Levy entered into a joint venture to purchase real
property with the intent to resell it for a profit. Hacker alleged
after he and Levy purchased the property, Levy and others
clouded title to the property, impeding Hacker’s ability to sell it.
      Perez and FOAC were listed as defendants in the second
amended complaint, and Wilmington later was added via a Doe
amendment. The third amended complaint is the operative
pleading for purposes of this appeal.
      The trial court granted FOAC’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings, dismissing all causes of action against FOAC without
leave to amend except the cause of action for judicial foreclosure.
      FOAC and Wilmington later filed a motion for summary
judgment on the remaining causes of action against them. The
Levy defendants filed a separate motion for summary judgment
on the causes of action against them.

                                    3
The trial court granted both motions and entered two judgments,
one in favor of FOAC and Wilmington, and one in favor of the
Levy defendants.

                          DISCUSSION

A.    Appealability
      Hacker filed notices of appeal after the trial court issued its
order granting the summary judgment motions, but before the
judgments were entered. We exercise our discretion to “treat a
notice of appeal filed after the superior court has announced its
intended ruling, but before it has rendered judgment, as filed
immediately after entry of judgment.” (Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.104(d)(2); see Thompson v. Ioane (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th
1180, 1189.) Hacker’s notices of appeal therefore are timely.

B.    Hacker Has Failed Properly To Brief Any Argument
      Concerning the Levy Defendants
       Respondents argue, and we agree, that Hacker has
forfeited any argument concerning the Levy defendants by failing
properly to brief his appellate challenges to the trial court’s
disposition of his claims against the Levy defendants.
       Hacker submitted two opening briefs to this court, one
challenging the judgment in favor of FOAC and Wilmington, and
one challenging the judgment in favor of the Levy defendants.
The clerk’s office accepted the brief concerning FOAC and
Wilmington, but rejected the brief concerning the Levy
defendants, informing Hacker that he was entitled to file only
one opening brief. Rejection of the second brief was consistent
with California Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(1), which provides,

                                     4
“Each appellant must serve and file an appellant’s opening brief.”
(Italics added.)1
       Hacker’s counsel then sent the clerk’s office an e-mail
noting Hacker had filed separate notices of appeal from the two
judgments, and asked if the matter could be treated as two
appeals. Hacker’s counsel claimed because the two sets of
respondents (the Levy defendants and FOAC/Wilmington) would
each be entitled to file a respondent’s brief, limiting Hacker to
only one brief would prejudice him. A clerk responded by e-mail
that because Hacker’s two notices of appeal were filed within
30 days of one another, the practice of the court was to file them
under a single case number with a single opening brief.
       Hacker took no further action in response to this
information from the clerk’s office, such as filing an amended
opening brief that combined the substance of his two original
opening briefs. Even when respondents in their own briefing
noted the absence of a properly filed brief regarding Hacker’s
claims against the Levy defendants, Hacker did nothing, and
did not file a reply brief to address respondents’ forfeiture claim.2

      1  When an appeal involves multiple appellants or multiple
respondents, “[p]arties allied in interest . . . have the option of
filing individual briefs or joint briefs.” (Eisenberg et al., Cal.
Prac. Guide: Civil Appeals and Writs (The Rutter Group 2022)
Ch. 9-B, ¶ 9:79, p. 9-28; see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.200(a)(5).)
It thus was permissible for the two sets of defendants in this
appeal, the Levy defendants and FOAC/Wilmington, each to file
its own respondent’s brief. No rule, however, permits a single
appellant to file multiple opening briefs on the basis that there
are multiple respondents.
      2 Indeed, we granted Hacker an extension of time within
which to file a reply, but none was forthcoming.

                                     5
Accordingly, the only properly filed opening brief before us solely
concerns the judgment in favor of FOAC and Wilmington, with no
argument addressing the judgment in favor of the Levy
defendants.
        It is well established that failure to raise an issue in an
opening brief forfeits the issue. (Golden Door Properties, LLC v.
Superior Court (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 733, 786 [“issues not
addressed as error in a party’s opening brief with legal analysis
and citation to authority are forfeited”].) Because Hacker has
failed to file a proper brief challenging the judgment in favor of
the Levy defendants, any such challenge is forfeited. As noted
above, Hacker has not filed a reply brief, and therefore offers no
argument to the contrary.
        There is sound policy behind the rule of accepting only one
opening brief from a party. Even when a party appeals from
multiple judgments in favor of multiple parties to a lawsuit, often
the underlying facts and the applicable law overlap, and the
requirement of a single brief prevents unnecessary duplication.
To the extent the combined appeals present too many issues to
address within the mandated word limits, a party may seek leave
to file a longer brief. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(c)(6).)
Hacker therefore had options to comply with the court’s single-
brief requirement without suffering any prejudice. His failure to
avail himself of any of those options forfeits his arguments
concerning the Levy defendants.

C.    Hacker Forfeits His Challenge to the
      FOAC/Wilmington Summary Judgment Motion By
      Failing To Provide Record Citations
      In an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, we review
de novo whether the record presents a triable issue. (See Wall

                                    6
Street Network, Ltd. v. New York Times Co. (2008)
164 Cal.App.4th 1171, 1176.) Hacker argues he presented
sufficient evidence to raise a triable issue as to whether FOAC
and Wilmington were on actual or constructive notice of Hacker’s
claim to the property in dispute, such that FOAC and Wilmington
could not be deemed “a bona fide encumbrancer for value.” To
demonstrate this evidence, Hacker lists a number of “key facts”
he contends show FOAC and Wilmington had actual or
constructive notice of his claim on the property.
       As FOAC and Wilmington note in their respondents’ brief,
Hacker fails to provide any record citations for his “key facts.”
Such citations either are absent entirely, or state only “AE” (for,
we presume, “appellant’s exhibits”), without any page or exhibit
numbers. The record here is substantial, consisting of over a
dozen volumes of appendices. The court “ ‘ “cannot be expected to
search through a voluminous record to discover evidence on a
point raised by [a party] when his brief makes no reference to the
pages where the evidence on the point can be found in the
record.” ’ [Citation.] ” (Myers v. Trendwest Resorts, Inc. (2009)
178 Cal.App.4th 735, 745.) “Rather than scour the record
unguided, we may decide that the appellant has forfeited a point
urged on appeal when it is not supported by accurate citations to
the record.” (WFG National Title Ins. Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 881, 894–895.) We choose that course
here, and deem Hacker’s arguments forfeited.3

      3  Given our conclusion that Hacker’s lack of record
citations forfeits his challenge to the grant of summary judgment,
we express no opinion as to respondents’ argument that Hacker
failed to provide an adequate record on appeal to support that
challenge.

                                   7
D.    Hacker’s Conclusory Arguments Are Insufficient To
      Demonstrate That the Trial Court Erred In Granting
      Judgment on the Pleadings
       Hacker contends the trial court erred in granting FOAC’s
earlier motion for judgment on the pleadings, which dismissed all
but one cause of action against FOAC. Alternatively, Hacker
argues the trial court should have granted leave to amend to
address any deficiencies in the complaint. We review a judgment
on the pleadings de novo to determine whether the complaint
states a cause of action. (Foundation for Taxpayer & Consumer
Rights v. Nextel Communications, Inc. (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th
131, 135.) “ ‘Denial of leave to amend after granting a motion for
judgment on the pleadings is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
[Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.)
       Hacker does not explain how, contrary to the trial court’s
conclusion, he sufficiently stated causes of action against FOAC.
He merely states that his “operative complaint clearly set forth
sufficient facts to state viable claims against [FOAC].” Hacker
does not discuss any specific allegations in the complaint to
explain how they were sufficient or, if they were insufficient,
amenable to amendment. Such conclusory argument is
inadequate to demonstrate error. (City of Santa Maria v. Adam
(2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 287 [appellate court “may disregard
conclusory arguments that . . . fail to disclose the reasoning by
which the appellant reached the conclusions he wants us to
adopt”].)
       Hacker notes that the trial court’s tentative ruling on the
motion for judgment on the pleadings was more favorable to
Hacker than the court’s final ruling, in that the tentative ruling
denied the motion as to several additional causes of action. “[A]

                                   8
trial court retains inherent authority to change its decision, its
findings of fact, or its conclusions of law at any time before
entry of judgment and then, the judgment supersedes
any memorandum or tentative decision or any oral comments
from the bench.” (Shaw v. County of Santa Cruz (2008)
170 Cal.App.4th 229, 268.) The mere fact that the trial court’s
ultimate ruling differed from its tentative ruling does not
demonstrate error.
        To the extent Hacker seeks to incorporate by reference the
reasoning in the trial court’s tentative ruling, he cannot do so.
(Serri v. Santa Clara University (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 830, 854
[“It is inappropriate for an appellate brief to incorporate by
reference arguments contained in a document filed in the trial
court.”].)
        Hacker contends the trial court’s tentative ruling
“acknowledged” that his causes of action were amenable to
amendment to address any deficiencies. Again, the fact that the
trial court’s final ruling reached a different conclusion than the
court’s tentative ruling does not, in itself, demonstrate error.
Hacker, moreover, misreads the tentative ruling, which stated
the trial court would grant leave to amend only if plaintiff
“demonstrate[d]” at the hearing on the motion for judgment on
the pleadings there was “a reasonable possibility of successful
amendment.” In other words, the trial court did not issue a
tentative ruling on leave to amend, but left the issue for the
hearing, ultimately deciding in its final ruling not to grant leave
to amend.

                                    9
                          DISPOSITION
       The judgments are affirmed. All respondents are awarded
their costs on appeal.
       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                        BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

             CHANEY, J.

             WEINGART, J.

                                 10