Court Opinion

ID: 9693621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:53:01.725299+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:49.000273
License: Public Domain

C. J. Byrns, J.
(dissenting). I must respectfully dissent from the decision of the majority because I believe, that in protecting the best interests of the children, the trial judge should have the same options open when the noncustodial parent is complaining of denial of visitation rights in a URESA action as he or she would have in proceedings based on a Michigan divorce order or judgment.
This is a real problem frequently faced by circuit judges of this state especially considering the *171frequency of divorce in a nation whose people are becoming more migratory. Children of broken homes have a natural right and need — sometimes more than those in homes with both parents — for the love, affection and companionship of both separated parents. Visitation is often more important to such a child than it may be to the noncustodial parent. In some cases visitation may be more important to a child’s welfare than monetary support from the absent parent.
Each divorce case involving children, each child involved in a divorce case, is different and matters affecting them must be decided individually where their best interests may be at issue.
It is not wise or equitable to absolutely deny the trial judge in URESA cases the right, when he or she finds a need for child visitation, to fashion a suitable remedy (e.g., deny, suspend or reduce support, or hold the same in escrow with the clerk or friend of the court) in order to win for the child visitation with a parent.
Presumably a trial judge, who each year has hundreds of divorce cases involving children on the docket, is skilled and experienced enough, where lack or loss of visitation is claimed in defense of a support obligation, to recognize the difference between a parent who is merely trying to avoid paying support and one who is sincerely concerned for the children.
While it is important to protect the pecuniary rights of taxpayers, who my experience would indicate are more often than not supporting URESA children, it is also essential to protect the child’s, as well as the parent’s rights of visitation, and, in the appropriate case, to use a support order to encourage the absent custodial parent or the authorities in the petitioning state to give *172visitation rights to the respondent parent or at least give serious consideration to the matter. I cannot make the differentiation between who the real complainant is in a URESA action a basis for decision as Robinson v Harris, 87 Mich App 69; 273 NW2d 108 (1978), appears to do.
It does not seem to me that we should read into URESA a mandatory rule that it is the noncustodial but supporting parent who must always go to the other state to obtain enforcement of visitation rights which have been denied by the custodial parent. There are cases where the custodial parent is much more able to travel than the other parent.
The judge in Michigan, if permitted to hear the facts of a denial of visitation claim, may determine that a denial, suspension, reduction or escrow of support money will best persuade the custodial parent to cooperate in respecting visitation for the other parent. If the real motivation to collect or enforce support in the demanding state is a social or public agency rather than the custodial parent, then it may be the one to either encourage the custodial parent to cooperate in visitation, or else to take action in a court having jurisdiction over such parent to compel visitation rights.
Michigan recognizes in the enforcement of visitation rights granted in a Michigan judgment that as long as the child is not adversely affected, trial judges have the authority to suspend or modify child support obligations to enforce visitation rights. McLauchlin v McLauchlin, 372 Mich 275; 125 NW2d 867 (1964), Pronesti v Pronesti, 368 Mich 453; 118 NW2d 254 (1962), Myers v Myers, 143 Mich 32; 106 NW 402 (1906).
To deny a Michigan-resident obligor-parent the same right to have a court enforce visitation rights by such use of support orders, just because the *173matter before the court is a URESA petition rather than a Michigan judgment, creates two classes of citizens and is a denial of equal protection of the law. Such result also is contrary to MCL 780.158; MSA 25.225(8), which I interpret as requiring the duty of support to be decided in accordance with Michigan law.
Where this issue of the authority of the responding court to consider visitation in URESA proceedings has arisen, some states have taken what to me is the better position, which is that a court can consider the issue and condition payment of support on observation of visitation rights. New Jersey v Morales, 35 Ohio App 2d 56; 299 NE2d 920 (1973), Porter v Porter, 25 Ohio St 2d 123; 267 NE2d 299 (1971), Chandler v Chandler, 109 NH 477; 256 A2d 157 (1969), Curry v Felix, 276 Minn 125; 149 NW2d 92 (1967), Daly v Daly, 39 NJ Super 117; 120 A2d 510 (1956), aff’d 21 NJ 599; 123 A2d 3 (1956).
In leaving to the judge in a URESA proceeding the right to consider and in the appropriate case protect visitation rights by an appropriate support order, it is axiomatic that the best interest of the child is paramount. First among the questions to be asked is how the child’s interest will be affected by the support order. Is the custodial parent unable to adequately provide for the child’s needs absent support from the other parent? Is a public agency supporting the child, and, if so, can it be enlisted to help persuade the custodial parent to make visitation available?
It is assumed that the judge, before using support as a vehicle for enforcement of visitation, has first been satisfied that the noncustodial parent is sincere; that he or she is a proper person with the necessary facilities for visitation; and that the *174custodial parent is denying or abridging visitation without good cause. The judge should not hesitate to use the local friend of the court and prosecutor as well as any appropriate agency in the locale of the custodial parent to secure such information. If reasonable, the custodial parent should be asked to appear to give evidence, or, if possible, evidence can be supplied by deposition or interrogatories. It is also within the realm of possibility to request the petitioning court to hold a hearing on visitation and make its findings or recommendations.
I recognize that what I recommend would mean more work for the trial courts than obtains if they are in the position to say that visitation complaints cannot be heard in URESA cases, but I believe our courts have a duty to the children involved, even though those children are located in another state. We also have a duty to the Michigan-resident parent who is being denied rights available to other residents not involved in a URESA action.
I submit that, rather than to read the act as automatically denying the hearing and decision of any claim of abuse or denial of visitation rights in URESA cases, this Court in this case of first impression in Michigan should interpret the act as I do to permit the trial judge to consider such a claim and act in accordance with the best interests of the child as the judge would in any other case.
In Chandler v Chandler, supra, the New Hampshire Supreme Court specifically found (as hopefully the appellate authority of this state will) that the provision of the act reading: "Participation in any proceeding under this chapter shall not confer upon any court jurisdiction of any of the parties thereto in any other proceeding” did not "preclude a court from reducing a support order until such *175time as agreement may be reached by the parties as to reasonable rights of visitation”. 109 NH at 479, 480.
It seems to me that limiting URESA actions to consideration of support only, on grounds of ability to pay, can work harm to those most vitally involved, the children.
I would affirm the trial court.