Court Opinion

ID: 9372767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:23.438869+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.245303
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                       MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                      2022 MSPB 32
                             Docket No. AT-0752-14-0475-I-1

                                Thomas Michael Dieter,
                                        Appellant,
                                             v.
                            Department of Veterans Affairs,
                                          Agency.
                                    September 14, 2022

           Ward A. Meythaler, Tampa, Florida, for the appellant.

           T. B. Burton, Esquire, Bay Pines, Florida, for the agency.

                                         BEFORE

                              Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                               Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                 OPINION AND ORDER

¶1        The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     affirmed his removal. For the reasons discussed below, we DENY the petition for
     review and AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                      BACKGROUND
¶2        The appellant is a Roman Catholic priest and was formerly employed as a
     Chaplain, GS-0060-12, at the Department of Veterans Affairs Medical Center
     (VAMC) in Bay Pines, Florida. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 12, Tab 46
     at 135. The agency has a qualification standard requiring all Chaplain s to have an
                                                                                         2

     “ecclesiastical endorsement, dated within the past 12 months, from the official
     national endorsing authority of their faith group or denomination.” IAF, Tab 5
     at 9.    The agency’s Veterans Health Administration Handbook defines an
     ecclesiastical endorsement as:
             [A] signed statement, by the official national endorsing agency of an
             ecclesiastical endorsing organization, certifying that an individual is
             in good standing with that religious faith group, and stating that the
             individual is, in the opinion of the endorsing agent, qualified to
             conduct all functions, sacraments, ordinances, ceremonies, rites,
             and/or observances required to meet the needs of patients.
     Id. at 17.    Thus, an ecclesiastical endorsement is provided by a Chaplain’s
     religious faith group, and not by the agency or the Government.         Id. at 9, 17.
     The Archdiocese for the Military Services, USA (AMS), a division of the Roman
     Catholic Church, provides ecclesiastical endorsements for Roman Catholic
     Chaplains with the agency, such as the appellant. IAF, Tab 4 at 34, Tab 5 at 28,
     35.
¶3           By letters dated October 17, 2013, the AMS, through the Vicar for Veterans
     Affairs, notified the appellant and the agency that it had withdrawn the
     appellant’s Ecclesiastical Endorsement and Faculties (eccle siastical endorsement)
     to serve as a Chaplain with the agency. IAF, Tab 4 at 42-43. Shortly thereafter,
     on October 31, 2013, the agency proposed to remove the appellant for failure to
     maintain a condition of employment—specifically, his ecclesiastical endorsement.
     Id. at 39-40.    The proposal notice explained that, as an agency Chaplain, the
     appellant was required to have an ecclesiastical endorsement from the official
     national endorsing authority of his faith group or denomination but that, by letter
     dated October 17, 2013, the AMS had withdrawn his endorsement.             Id. at 39.
     The proposal notice further stated that, as a result of the withdrawal, the appellant
     was no longer able to perform work as a Chaplain for the agency and therefore
     was charged with failure to maintain a condition of employment.                   Id.
     The proposal notice indicated that the appellant’s August 2013 reprimand for
                                                                                         3

     disrespectful conduct would be taken into consideration in determining the
     penalty. 1 Id.
¶4         The appellant, through counsel, provided an oral and a written response to
     the proposed removal, arguing, among other things, that he could not adequately
     defend himself without information regarding AMS’s decision to withdraw his
     ecclesiastical endorsement and urging the Director of the Bay Pines Department
     of Veterans Affairs Healthcare System (Director) to recuse herself as the deciding
     official because of her personal involvement in prior actions involving the
     appellant. Id. at 19-21; IAF, Tab 46 at 134‑35. The appellant acknowledged that
     he could not serve as a Chaplain without an ecclesiastical endorsement but
     requested reassignment to another position with the agency in lieu of removal.
     IAF, Tab 46 at 135. In a decision letter dated December 31, 2013, the Director
     sustained the single charge of failure to maintain a condition of employment and
     imposed the removal effective January 10, 2014. IAF, Tab 4 at 12-15.
¶5         The appellant appealed his removal to the Board and requested a hearing.
     IAF, Tab 1.      The administrative judge issued an order finding that the Board
     lacked the authority to review the substance of the AMS’s decision to withdraw
     the appellant’s ecclesiastical endorsement and that the Board’s review in this case
     was analogous to the Board’s review of adverse actions under 5 U.S.C. § 7513
     based on the denial, revocation, or suspension of a security clearance.
     IAF, Tab 27. In a prehearing order, the administrative judge advised the parties
     that the hearing would be limited to review of the appellant’s removal and his due
     process and harmful procedural error affirmative defenses and notified them of

     1
       In July 2013, the Chief of Chaplain Services proposed to reprimand the appellant for
     alleged disrespectful conduct based on his behavior towards the Director of the Bay
     Pines Department of Veterans Affairs Healthcare System (Director) on April 6, 2013,
     and for allegedly making inappropriate remarks regarding the Director on April 25,
     2013. IAF, Tab 4 at 45-46. In August 2013, the Associate Director for Patient and
     Nursing Services (Associate Director) imposed the reprimand. Id. at 44.
                                                                                             4

     their respective burdens of proof.      IAF, Tab 49.      After holding the requested
     hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision finding that the agency
     proved the charge, nexus, and the reasonableness of the penalty, and denying the
     appellant’s affirmative defenses. IAF, Tab 59, Initial Decision (ID). Thus, the
     administrative judge affirmed the appellant’s remo val. ID at 31.
¶6         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, arguing
     that the administrative judge erred in denying his affirmative defenses, failed to
     consider his argument that the agency committed a prohibited personnel practic e
     by defaming and stigmatizing him, erred in denying his motion to compel, and
     improperly denied his request to admit an exhibit. Petition for Review (PFR)
     File, Tab 1. 2,3 The agency has responded in opposition to the appellant’s petition
     for review. 4 PFR File, Tab 3.

     2
       On review, the appellant does not challenge the administrative judge’s findings that
     the agency proved the charge and nexus, PFR File, Tab 1, and we discern no reason to
     disturb these well-reasoned findings, see Crosby v. U.S. Postal Service, 74 M.S.P.R. 98,
     106 (1997) (finding no reason to disturb the administrative judge’s findings when she
     considered the evidence as a whole, drew appropriate inferences, and made reasoned
     conclusions on issues of credibility). Although, as discussed below, the appellant
     challenges the administrative judge’s determination that he failed to establish his
     affirmative defenses, he does not otherwise dispute the administrative judge’s finding
     that the penalty of removal is reasonable for the sustained charge o f failure to maintain
     a condition of employment. PFR File, Tab 1. We likewise discern no basis to disturb
     this finding and agree that removal is an appropriate penalty for failure to maintain a
     condition of employment. See Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 106; see also, e.g., Penland v.
     Department of the Interior, 115 M.S.P.R. 474, ¶ 11 (2010) (finding that a penalty of
     removal was reasonable when an appellant failed to maintain a pilot authorization
     required by his position).
     3
       By notice dated April 20, 2017, the Office of the Clerk of      the Board notified the
     appellant that his petition for review was missing page 5          and afforded him an
     opportunity to submit the missing page. PFR File, Tab 4.            The appellant timely
     submitted a copy of page 5, PFR File, Tab 5 at 6, and we have     accepted the page into
     the record on review.
     4
       In May 2021, while the appellant’s petition for review was pending, the appellant’s
     counsel notified the Board that the appellant died on April 28, 2021. PFR File, Tab 6.
     On May 25, 2021, the Office of the Clerk of the Board issued an order advising that the
                                                                                                5

                                            ANALYSIS
     The administrative judge properly found that the appellant failed to establish his
     constitutional due process affirmative defense.
¶7         The appellant argues on review, as he did below, that the agency violated
     his due process rights by providing false or misleading information to the AMS
     and by failing to give him proper notice and an opportunity to respond to that
     information and to the proposed removal.             PFR File, Tab 1 at 8 -12, 16-17.
     He also argues, as he did below, that his right to due process was violated because
     the deciding official was biased against him and considered ex parte information
     in deciding to impose the removal rather than reassigning him to a position that
     did not require an ecclesiastical endorsement. Id. at 17-23.
¶8         In the initial decision, the administrative judge thoroughly discussed the
     events leading up to the AMS’s decision to withdraw the appellant’s
     ecclesiastical endorsement and concluded that it was “entirely possible” that the
     AMS relied on information provided by the Chief of Chaplain Service to the

     appeal may be dismissed if there is not a proper substitute for the appellant and
     providing instructions on how to file a motion for substitution. PFR File, Tab 7.
     Thereafter, the appellant’s counsel moved that Francis H. Dionne be substituted as th e
     party in this appeal, and he submitted evidence showing that Mr. Dionne was appointed
     as the personal representative of the appellant’s estate in the Probate Division of the
     Circuit Court for Pinellas County, Florida. PFR File, Tabs 8 -9. The agency did not file
     a response or opposition to the motion for substitution.
     Pursuant to the Board’s regulations, if an appellant dies during the pendency of his
     appeal, the processing of the appeal will only be completed upon the substitution of a
     proper party. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.35(a). Substitution is not permitted when the appellant’s
     interests terminate due to his death. Id. The Board has permitted substitutions
     following an appellant’s death in appeals involving adverse actions because, in such
     cases, monetary relief would have been recovered if the appeal was successful on the
     merits and the appellant’s representative of his estate stood in line to receive that relief.
     See Carpio v. Office of Personnel Management, 94 M.S.P.R. 506, ¶ 5 (2003). Here, we
     find that the appellant’s interests did not terminate upon his death because i f the
     appellant’s estate prevails, it will be entitled to monetary relief, such as back pay. We
     further find that the appellant’s personal representative, Mr. Dionne, is responsible for
     managing any relief for the benefit of the appellant’s estate. There fore, we grant the
     appellant’s motion for substitution.
                                                                                              6

     agency’s Liaison to the AMS in deciding to withdraw the appellant’s
     ecclesiastical endorsement. 5 ID at 9-14. Nonetheless, the administrative judge
     concluded that the AMS, not the agency, made the decision to withdraw the
     appellant’s ecclesiastical endorsement and that, once the AMS made such a
     decision, the agency could properly rely on the appellant’s loss of his
     ecclesiastical endorsement as the basis for its action. ID at 15 -16. Although the
     appellant does not appear to challenge the administrative judge’s finding that the
     Board lacks the authority to review the AMS’s decision, he argues that the agency
     violated his due process rights by providing “stigmatizing” information to the
     AMS without giving him notice and an opportunity to respond to that information
     and by failing to disclose the contents of all communications between the AMS
     and the agency that pertained to him. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8 -11.
¶9         We agree with the administrative judge’s determination that the Board lacks
     the authority to review the AMS’s decision to withdraw the appellant’s

     5
       The following events preceding the AMS’s decision to withdraw the appellant’s
     ecclesiastical endorsement are undisputed but, as discussed below, are irrelevant to the
     dispositive issues in this appeal. During a mass on September 15, 2013, the appellant
     gave a homily to the congregation in which he stated that, while wearing the “Roman
     Collar” earlier that morning, he “hit” and “knocked out,” or words to that effect, two
     teenage boys who were attempting to burglarize a veteran. IAF, Tab 47 at 12, Tab 48
     at 12. The Chief of Chaplain Service reviewed a video of the homily and emailed the
     agency’s Liaison to the AMS regarding the homily and other issues concerning the
     appellant. IAF, Tab 46 at 45-48, Tab 47 at 11-13. Several days later, the Liaison, the
     Chief of Chaplain Service, the Director, the Associate Director, and the Chief of Human
     Resources participated in a teleconference to discuss the appellant’s situation.
     IAF, Tab 47 at 31. The Liaison stated during a deposition that he forwarded the email
     regarding the appellant and the video of his homily to someone within the Roman
     Catholic Church. IAF, Tab 46 at 216. Thereafter, the AMS withdrew the appellant’s
     ecclesiastical endorsement. IAF, Tab 4 at 42-43. The AMS did not provide a reason
     for its decision and declined the appellant’s request for a statement of reasons, asserting
     that it was “not required to disclose conditions or circumstances surrounding the
     removal of endorsements and/or faculties.” Id. at 34. The appellant subsequently
     stated that he made up the story about going to the veteran’s house during a burglary
     and, consequently, did not actually engage in the physical violence toward minors as
     suggested in his homily. IAF, Tab 48 at 12.
                                                                                           7

      ecclesiastical endorsement and is, in fact, precluded from doing so by the First
      Amendment. See, e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & School v.
      Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 565 U.S. 171, 187-89 (2012)
      (finding that the state is precluded from interfering in a religious group’s right to
      select and remove ministers under both the Establishment Clause and Free
      Exercise Clause of the First Amendment); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of
      Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (holding
      that the freedom of a religion to select its clergy has constitutional protection
      against state interference as a part of the free exercise of religion). We further
      agree with the administrative judge’s determination that, because an ecclesiastical
      endorsement is essentially a determination by a religious authority regarding who
      is qualified to perform religious activities on behalf of that religion in the role of
      a Chaplain, the appellant did not have a constitutionally protected property
      interest in his ecclesiastical endorsement, and the withdrawal of his endorsement
      does not implicate his due process rights. ID at 14-16; see, e.g., Serbian Eastern
      Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of America & Canada v. Milivojech, 426 U.S. 696, 715
      (1976) (holding that “[c]onstitutional concepts of due process, involving secular
      notions of ‘fundamental fairness’ or impermissible objectives, are . . . hardly
      relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance”).
¶10         In sum, the appellant had no property or liberty interest in his ecclesiastical
      endorsement, no due process rights concerning the procedures used by the AMS
      in deciding to withdraw his endorsement, and no constitutional right to receive
      the documentary or testimonial evidence underlying the AMS’s d ecision to
      withdraw his ecclesiastical endorsement.        Thus, as the administrative judge
      correctly found, the agency did not violate the appellant’s d ue process rights by
      providing information to the AMS without affording him notice and an
                                                                                               8

      opportunity to respond or by providing allegedly stigmatizing information to the
      AMS. 6 ID at 22-23.
¶11         The appellant did, however, have a property interest in his continued
      Federal employment. Stone v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d
      1368, 1374-76 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 7 Due process requires, at a minimum, that an
      employee being deprived of his property interest be given the opportunity to be
      heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Palafox v. Department
      of the Navy, 124 M.S.P.R. 54, ¶ 9 (2016). In the context of an adverse action
      based on the suspension of access to classified information, the Board has held
      that the agency provided the appellant minimal due process by informing him of
      the basis for the action, i.e., that his position required access to classified
      information and that his access had been suspended.               Id., ¶ 10.    Here, the
      appellant received written notice clearly stating that the agency proposed his
      removal on the basis of one charge of failure to maintain a condition of
      employment following the withdrawal of his ecclesiastical endorsement by the
      AMS. IAF, Tab 4 at 39. The proposal notice explained that an ecclesiastical
      endorsement was a requirement of his position and that, as a result of the

      6
        In the initial decision, the administrative judge found that, even if the appellant had a
      liberty interest in his reputation with the AMS, the information provided by the agency
      to the AMS was not demonstrably false. ID at 23 n.13. Furthermore , contrary to the
      appellant’s argument on review, the administrative judge did consider his argument that
      the agency committed a prohibited personnel practice by providing false or defamatory
      information to the AMS, but concluded that the appellant had not shown by
      preponderant evidence that the agency stigmatized him by providing false information
      to the AMS. Id.; PFR File, Tab 1 at 11. We discern no basis to disturb these findings.
      7
        The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s reasoning rests on the decision of
      the U.S. Supreme Court in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,
      538-39, 546-48 (1985), which held that a tenured public employee has a constitutionally
      protected property interest in ongoing public employment and that an agency may not
      deprive such an employee of his property interest without providing him with due
      process of law, including the right to advance notice of the charges against him, an
      explanation of the agency’s evidence, and an opportunity to respond.
                                                                                       9

      withdrawal, he was no longer able to perform work as a Chaplain for the agency.
      Id. The appellant had an opportunity to make both a written and an oral response
      to the deciding official, and the deciding official considered those responses .
      Id. at 13, 19-21; IAF, Tab 46 at 134-35.         Therefore, we agree with the
      administrative judge’s determination that the appellant received a meaningful
      opportunity to respond to the proposal notice, ID at 9-17, and find no merit to his
      assertion on review that the agency did not give him adequate notice of the charge
      against him, PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-17.
¶12        As noted above, the appellant also contends that his due process rights were
      violated because the Director, in her role as the deciding official, was biased
      against him.   Id. at 17-20.    An employee has a due process right to have an
      unbiased decision maker adjudicate his case.     Lange v. Department of Justice,
      119 M.S.P.R. 625, ¶ 9 (2013). To establish a due process violation based on the
      identity of the deciding official, an employee must assert specific allegations
      indicating that the agency’s choice of the deciding official made the risk of
      unfairness to the appellant intolerably high. Id. However, a deciding official’s
      awareness of background information concerning the appellant, her concurrence
      in the desirability to take an adverse action, or her predisposition to impose a
      severe penalty does not disqualify her from serving as a deciding official on due
      process grounds.     Id.   Moreover, a deciding official’s mere knowledge of an
      employee’s background does not rise to the level of a due process violation unless
      “that knowledge is a basis for the deciding official’s determination on either the
      merits of the underlying charge or the penalty to be imposed.”                  Id.
      (quoting Norris v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 675 F.3d 1349, 1354
      (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
¶13        Here, the appellant alleged below that the deciding official was biased
      against him, as evidenced by the following: she refused to meet with him on one
      occasion; she refused to allow him to be on stage with her at a Memorial Day
      service; she banned him from entering the executive suite; she had two armed
                                                                                         10

      policemen present during his oral response; she placed him on authorized absence
      and restricted his access to the VAMC; she refused to consider his re quest to
      recuse herself as the deciding official; she was aware that he had called her
      “ugly” and a “hypocrite”; she was involved in the investigation leading to the
      agency’s communication with the AMS; and she was a witness in the case.
      IAF, Tab 57 at 34-38.       The administrative judge carefully considered these
      allegations but found that the appellant failed to establish that the Director, in her
      role as the deciding official, was actually biased against him or that the agency
      structured the situation in a manner that rendered the risk of unfairness
      intolerably high. ID at 24-26. In so finding, the administrative judge explained
      that the Director was at least three supervisory levels above the appellant and that
      her actions did not evidence bias, but rather were reasonable management
      practices. ID at 25. The administrative judge further found that the appellant’s
      insults toward the Director were not so demeaning that the risk of her treating
      him unfairly as a result of his comments was intolerably high. Id. at 26.
¶14         On review, the appellant restates his arguments from below on this issue but
      does not identify any particular error in the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 17-23.   Because these arguments were raised below and constitute mere
      disagreement with the administrative judge’s well-reasoned findings and implicit
      credibility determinations, they provide no basis to disturb the initial decision.
      See Davison v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 115 M.S.P.R. 640, ¶ 9 (2011)
      (finding that mere disagreement with an administrative judge’s explained findings
      is not a basis to grant a petition for review); Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 106.
      Moreover, we have reviewed the record and agree with the administrative judge’s
      determination that the appellant failed to show that the Director was biased
      against him or that the risk of bias was intolerably high. See Norris, 675 F.3d
      at 1354; Lange, 119 M.S.P.R. 625, ¶ 9.
¶15         The appellant further argued below that the Director, in her capacity as the
      deciding official, violated his due process rights by considering certain allegedly
                                                                                               11

      disruptive acts that he had committed without notifying him in the proposal notice
      that these acts would be considered as part of the penalty analysis. IAF, Tab 57
      at 38-39. The administrative judge found that the Director did not violate the
      appellant’s due process rights by considering ex parte information, ID at 22, and
      the appellant challenges this finding on review, PFR File, Tab 1 at 20 -23.
¶16         A deciding official violates an employee’s due process rights when she
      relies on new and material ex parte information as a basis for her decisions on the
      merits of a proposed charge or the penalty to be imposed. Mathis v. Department
      of State, 122 M.S.P.R. 507, ¶ 6 (2015).          An employee’s due process right to
      notice extends to ex parte information provided to a deciding official and to
      information known personally to her if the information was considered in
      reaching the decision and was not previously disclosed to the appellant. Id.
¶17         Here, as noted above, the proposed removal notice specifically stated that
      the appellant’s August 2013 reprimand for disrespectful conduct would be taken
      into consideration in determining the appropriate penalty. IAF, Tab 4 at 39. In
      the initial decision, the administrative judge noted the Director’s hearing
      testimony that she considered reassigning the appellant to another position but
      that, in light of his prior discipline, she did not feel that reassignment was in the
      best interest of the service and her deposition testimony that she considered
      reassigning the appellant but decided against it because “[i]t was not a
      requirement and he had been disruptive.” ID at 19-21; see IAF, Tab 45 at 40,
      Tab 52, Hearing Compact Disc (HCD) (testimony of the Director).                        The
      administrative judge further noted that the Director testified that she made her
      decision by considering the evidence file, the appellant’s oral and written
      responses, and the Douglas factors, 8 and denied considering anything outside of

      8
        In Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305-06 (1981), the Board
      articulated a nonexhaustive list of 12 factors that are relevant in assessing the penalty to
      be imposed for an act of misconduct.
                                                                                          12

      these sources. ID at 21; HCD (testimony of the Director). The administrative
      judge concluded that, although the Director believed that the appellant h ad been
      disruptive in the past, she did not testify that she considered any “disruptions”
      that were not referenced in the proposal notice.          ID at 21-22.      Thus, the
      administrative judge found that the Director did not violate the appellant’s due
      process rights by considering ex parte information. ID at 22. On review, the
      appellant argues that the administrative judge mischaracterized the Director’s
      testimony and that her testimony was, in fact, that she had considered other
      alleged “disruptive” behavior, in addition to the disrespectful conduct at issue in
      his prior reprimand, in deciding not to reassign him. PFR File, Tab 1 at 22-23.
¶18         Although, as noted above, the Director referenced the appellant’s prior
      disruptive behavior as part of the reason she dec ided not to reassign him to
      another position, we agree with the administrative judge’s determination that this
      testimony was in reference to the disruptive behavior at issue in the appellant’s
      prior reprimand, which was specifically identified in the propo sal notice, and not
      to other behavior that may have been disruptive but was not identified in the
      proposal notice. 9 HCD (testimony of the Director); IAF, Tab 4 at 39, 44 -45,
      Tab 45 at 40. The appellant has not provided any basis on review to disturb the
      administrative judge’s implicit credibility determinations or his well -reasoned
      findings. Accordingly, we do not disturb them. See Crosby, 74 M.S.P.R. at 106.
      The administrative judge properly denied the appellant’s harmful error
      affirmative defense.
¶19         The appellant also argued below that the agency failed to conduct an
      adequate investigation, as required by the Master Agreement, an internal agency
      policy, and the Privacy Act, prior to providing information about him to the

      9
        In further support of this conclusion, the Director indicated in th e Douglas factor
      worksheet that the appellant previously had “displayed disruptive behavior as evidenced
      by the proposed reprimand and reprimand.” IAF, Tab 4 at 17.
                                                                                       13

      AMS.     IAF, Tab 57 at 20-24.     He further argued that the agency’s failure to
      conduct an adequate investigation under these authorities was harmful because, if
      the agency had interviewed him before it provided information to the AMS, he
      would have “had the opportunity to set the record straight that the homily was
      fictional and he had not assaulted a minor[.]” Id. at 24. Such an opportunity, he
      alleged, “may well have” stopped the agency’s Liaison to the AMS from sending
      the information to the AMS or may have been sufficient to convince the AMS not
      to withdraw his endorsement. Id.
¶20          Under the harmful error doctrine, an agency’s action is reversible only if
      the employee proves that the procedural error substantially prejudiced his rights
      by possibly affecting the agency’s decision. Tom v. Department of the Interior,
      97 M.S.P.R. 395, ¶ 43 (2004). Harmful error cannot be presumed; the employee
      must show that the error was likely to have caused the agency to reach a
      conclusion different from the one it would have reached in the absence or cure of
      the error. Id.; 5 C.F.R. § 1201.4(r). Here, the administrative judge found that,
      even if the agency committed procedural error as to its obligations to conduct a
      certain type of investigation, the appellant failed to establish that any such error
      was harmful. ID at 29. In particular, the administrative judge noted that the
      agency’s Liaison to the AMS testified that the appellant’s homily was “totally
      inappropriate regardless of whether the appellant had actually engaged in the
      activities he described.” ID at 28; HCD (testimony of the Liaison).
¶21          On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred because
      the lack of a proper investigation was a constitutional due process issue and not
      subject to the harmful error test and because, as he asserted below, an opportunity
      to explain his side of the story “may well have” changed the Liaison’s decision to
      notify the AMS of the appellant’s conduct or may have been sufficient to
      convince the AMS not to withdraw his ecclesiastical endorsement.         PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 15-16. We find these contentions unavailing. As discussed above, the
      appellant had no property or liberty interest in his ecclesiastical endorsement ,
                                                                                          14

      and, therefore, the agency’s failure to conduct an investigation prior to
      communicating with the AMS did not implicate any due process concerns.
      The appellant’s argument on review that the agency’s failure to conduct an
      investigation was harmful, contrary to the administrative judge’s finding,
      represents mere disagreement with the administrative judge’s well -reasoned
      conclusion and provides no basis to disturb the initial decision.       See Crosby,
      74 M.S.P.R. at 106.     In any event, we agree with the administrative judge’s
      determination that, even if the agency did commit a procedural error, the
      appellant has failed to show that such error was harmful.
      The appellant failed to show that the administrative judge abused his discretion in
      denying the appellant’s request to admit Exhibit Z.
¶22         During the hearing, the administrative judge denied the appellant’s request
      to admit Exhibit Z, which he had not included in his prehearing submissions and
      had provided to the agency only several days before the hearing after finding it in
      a stack of papers in his possession.     HCD (testimony of the appellant).          On
      review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in denying his
      request to submit this exhibit because “the handwriting is not easy to read at first
      glance and [the appellant] did not know what it was until he happened to study it
      in preparing for trial,” and because the agency should have produced it during
      discovery but failed to do so. PFR File, Tab 1 at 23 -24. He also avers that
      Exhibit Z is “highly relevant” and reflects that the Dir ector felt “let down by [the
      Chief of Chaplain Services] in losing the opportunity to dismiss [the appellant] by
      previously failing to build a case of poor behavior against [the appellant].” Id.
¶23         An administrative judge has wide discretion to control the proceedings
      before him, including the authority to exclude evidence that he believes would be
      irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.     See Sanders v. Social Security
      Administration, 114 M.S.P.R. 487, ¶ 10 (2010); 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(8).            To
      obtain reversal of an initial decision on the ground that the administrative judge
      abused his discretion in excluding evidence, the petitioning party must show that
                                                                                         15

      the administrative judge disallowed relevant evidence that could have affected the
      outcome of the appeal.     Sanders, 114 M.S.P.R. 487, ¶ 10; Jezouit v. Office of
      Personnel Management, 97 M.S.P.R. 48, ¶ 12 (2004), aff’d, 121 F. App’x 865
      (Fed. Cir. 2005). Here, the appellant has not shown that Exhibit Z is relevant to
      the dispositive issues in this appeal or that the inclusion of Exhibit Z in the record
      would have affected the outcome in any way. Therefore, the appellant has not
      shown that the administrative judge abused his considerable discretion in
      excluding Exhibit Z or that any such error denigrated his substantive rights.
      See Panter v. Department of the Air Force, 22 M.S.P.R. 281, 282 (1984) (holding
      that an adjudicatory error that is not prejudicial to a party’s substantive rights
      provides no basis for reversal of an initial decision).

      The appellant has not shown that the administrative judge abused his discretion in
      denying the appellant’s motion to compel testimony.
¶24         Finally, the appellant argues that the administrative judge abused his
      discretion in denying his motion to compel deposition testimony from the
      agency’s Liaison to the AMS concerning his communications with the AMS and
      with other agency employees about contacting the AMS regarding the appellant.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 24; IAF, Tab 31. The administrative judge denied the motion,
      finding that the information apparently sought by the appellant —namely,
      information to support his claim that the agency employees conspired to convince
      the AMS to revoke his ecclesiastical endorsement—was beyond the scope of the
      Board’s review in this case. IAF, Tab 32. On review, the appellant avers that
      “there is absolutely no rule or principle precluding the Agency from disclosing
      contacts between it and the [AMS]. Moreover, such information would have been
      obviously material to most of the issues in this case.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 24.
¶25         An administrative judge has broad discretion in ruling on discovery matters,
      and the Board will not find reversible error in such rulings absent an abuse
      of discretion. Kingsley v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 16 (2016).
      Here, for the reasons discussed above, we agree with the administrative judge’s
                                                                                           16

      finding that the appellant’s requested testimony—information pertaining to the
      reasons   underlying    the   AMS’s    decision    to   withdraw    his   ecclesiastical
      endorsement—is beyond the scope of the Board’s review. See Kedroff, 344 U.S.
      at 116; Gargiulo, 727 F.3d at 1185. Accordingly, the appellant has not shown
      that the administrative judge abused his discretion in denying the appellant’s
      motion to compel such testimony.

                                             ORDER
¶26         This is the final decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board in this
      appeal. Title 5 of the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.113 (5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.113).

                                NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 10
            You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
      statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
      review and the appropriate forum with which to file.               5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
      Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
      Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
      appropriate for your situation and the rights described bel ow do not represent a
      statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
      jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
      immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
      filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
      limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
            Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
      below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions

      10
        Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
      the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
      Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        17

about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit ou r website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
                                                                                18

judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court ‑appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other secur ity. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013
                                                                                     19

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circu it or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 11 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:

11
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                              20

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.