Court Opinion

ID: 9454033
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 18:33:27.186581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:56.232162
License: Public Domain

COLLINS, Judge
(dissenting):
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority in this case.
Prior to the termination of his tour of duty, plaintiff, a commissioned officer in the Naval Reserve with more than 5 years’ continuous service on active duty, made two requests to the Chief of Naval Personnel for additional periods of active duty. The first request was for an active duty agreement for a 1-year period in Hawaii. In his second request plaintiff sought “an active duty agreement for a full regular tour,” without specification of the length of the re*243quested tour, the type of duty, or the place in which he wished to serve. Both requests were denied on the ground that plaintiff was in a “failed of selection status.” Plaintiff does not assert that the Navy was not within its rights in failing to extend or renew his tour of active duty because of his .status.
Thereafter, plaintiff made a claim for lump-sum readjustment pay, but this was denied. That denial gave rise to the current dispute.
The applicable statute1 provides in clear and unequivocal language that, after 5 years’ continuous service on active duty, a member of a reserve component involuntarily released from active duty or who is not accepted for an additional tour for which he volunteered is entitled to a readjustment payment. A section of the predecessor of the current statute2 provided that the term “involuntary release” would include release of a member of a reserve component who had completed a tour of active duty and who volunteered for an “additional tour of duty,” but whose request was not accepted. The regulation3 (apparently still in effect) promulgated under the earlier statute states, however, that requests contingent upon type of duty, location, or upon being offered a “specific type of contract (e. g., Active Duty Agreement)” are conditional and restricted, and as such they are incompatible with a voluntary request for an additional “regular” tour of duty. Since plaintiff had requested an active duty agreement, the Chief of Naval Personnel found that plaintiff had conditioned his requests for additional active duty and that his release was consequently not “involuntary.”
In the first place, it is noted that the new version of the statute, though not intended to effect a change in the prior substantive law,4 apparently authorizes readjustment pay for either an involuntary release or the denial of an additional tour of duty for which the individual volunteers. Though the reason for this dichotomy is not explained in the legislative history, it would appear that plaintiff was qualified for a readjustment payment under the instant facts irrespective of whether he was “involuntarily released.” Plaintiff clearly volunteered (in the ordinary sense of the word) for an additional tour, but his requests were denied. It can be assumed that Congress was aware in 1962 of the narrow definition of the term “involuntary release” used in the regulation. Therefore, Congress could well have intended, as it had originally, to provide for those who might not otherwise qualify under the regulation.
*244Secondly, in my opinion, even if the regulation’s “involuntary release” standards apply in all cases, the defendant still cannot prevail. I am not persuaded, though, that the refusal of the Navy to authorize a readjustment payment on the basis of plaintiff’s first request was unreasonable. But the Navy’s refusal, under its regulations, to award plaintiff a readjustment payment after denial of his second request was, in my opinion, an action inconsistent with the purpose and intent of the controlling statute. To the extent the pertinent regulation conflicts with the purpose of the statute, the regulation is unreasonable and invalid.5 .
It is noted at the outset that while 10 U.S.C. § 687(a) speaks in terms of an additional “tour of duty,” the regulation specifies “regular tour of duty.” Defendant argues that a “regular tour of duty” is distinct from a tour of duty under an active duty agreement. The former, it is asserted, is of indefinite duration, and continued service thereunder is at the discretion of the Navy. An active duty agreement, on the other hand, establishes a contractual relationship between the serviceman and the Navy for a definite period of time. Although this interpretation of the regulation is not the only one possible, the court has accepted defendant’s distinction. Because it accepts this broad ground for its decision, the majority therefore necessarily holds that a request for anything other than an indefinite extension of active duty at the Navy’s discretion is not a “volunteering” within the meaning and purpose of section 687(a). It also impliedly holds that the restriction placed by the Navy upon requests by servicemen for additional tours of duty is reasonably consistent with the language and purpose of the statute.
The court correctly states the general rule that regulations designed to effectuate the purposes of the statutes under which they are promulgated have the force and effect of law, so long as they are reasonably consistent with the statutes. E. g., Moran Bros., Inc. v. United States, 346 F.2d 590, 593, 171 Ct.Cl. 245, 249, (1965); Ludzinski v. United States, 154 Ct.Cl. 215, 230 (1961). However, as we have recognized, a regulation is invalid when it clearly contradicts the terms or purpose of the statute. Fix v. United States, 368 F.2d 609, 614, 177 Ct.Cl. 369, 377, (1966); see Tasker v. United States, 178 Ct.Cl. 56 (1967); Estate of Bahen v. United States, 305 F.2d 827, 829, 158 Ct.Cl. 141, 145 (1962). The standard used to measure the consistency between the statute and the regulations thereunder i« one of reasonableness. See, e. g., Cohen v. United States, 381 F.2d 383, 388, 180 Ct.Cl. 647, 658 (1967); Indiviglio v. United States, 299 F.2d 266, 156 Ct.Cl. 241, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 913, 83 S.Ct. 260, 9 L.Ed. 2d 173 (1962); cf. DeLano v. United States, 393 F.2d 517, 183 Ct.Cl. 379 (1968); Schellfeffer v. United States, 343 F.2d 936, 170 Ct.Cl. 178 (1965). And in determining whether a regulation reasonably effectuates the purposes of the controlling statute, the legislative history of the statute is pertinent, and may be controlling. Howard Indus., Inc. v. United States, 83 F.Supp. 337, 113 Ct.Cl. 231 (1949); see Lionberger v. United States, 371 F.2d 831, 178 Ct.Cl. 151, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844, 88 5. Ct. 91, 19 L.Ed.2d 110 (1967).
The relevant legislative history (relied upon in part in Fox v. United States, 283 F.2d 951, 953-954, 151 Ct.Cl. 611, 615-616 (1960)) clearly sets forth the purposes of former section 1016:6
The bill has a dual purpose: * * * (2) to induce Reserve officers, by pro*245viding some measure of economic security, to remain voluntarily in the active service and thereby to reduce expensive personnel turnover and to increase the effectiveness of the armed services through the retention of competent and experienced officers.
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Today and for the foreseeable future, the Armed Forces require large numbers of reservists on extended active duty to meet the personnel needs of national security. To attract and retain the required number of capable reservists on active duty, a reasonable degree of security must be provided to them. There is now no satisfactory method for providing readjustment pay or other monetary cushion to soften the transition to civilian life for those reservists who are involuntarily released. The absence of such an authority deters continued active duty beyond obligated periods and creates hardships for those persons who are actually released.
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* * * So long as our national policy requires reservists on active duty to augment the regular forces, some compensation to these reservists in readjusting to civilian life seems a justifiable element of the cost of national defense. A part of the justification for the bill flows from the obligation to treat these reservists fairly ; at the same time, significant benefits may accrue to the Government. This measure could enhance stability in the officer structure of the Armed Forces. Capable Reserve officers, in the knowledge that they will be eligible for readjustment pay if involuntarily released, should have an increased feeling of security and should be more likely to remain on active duty for extended periods.7
It is clear from the above language that the statute was intended to be remedial in nature, and, consequently, it is entitled to a liberal interpretation to effectuate its purposes. Oleson v. United States, 172 Ct.Cl. 9 (1965). Defendant does not contend (as indeed it could not) that plaintiff was not one of the class intended to be benefited by the act. It therefore becomes readily apparent that the Navy’s constricted reading of the statute violates its express purposes in at least two obvious ways.
In the first place, the Navy itself has recognized the need, consistent with the statutory intent, to encourage members of the Reserve to remain on active duty. Pursuant at least in part to the policy set forth in the above-quoted legislative history, regulations8 were promulgated to specifically set forth the right of all Reserve officers on active duty to apply for active duty agreements prior to the termination of their tours. A reservist entering upon his first tour of active duty is led to believe, by the plain words of the statute and by the regulations encouraging requests for agreements, that, should he be refused additional duty, he would at least have the security of a cushioning readjustment payment. Without the assurance of a readjustment payment, as Congress has noted, many Reserve officers might never be persuaded to request additional active duty. Thus, by penalizing plaintiff for requesting an active duty agreement, the Navy not only acts in a manner directly opposed to the policy implicit in one of its own regulations, but it directly defeats one of the basic purposes of the act.
Secondly, plaintiff was one of those officers Congress intended to benefit through a monetary easing of the transition from military to civilian life. Apparently, Congress thought of the readjustment payment somewhat as a reward for the tendering of additional service. Since plaintiff offered his services in compliance with the language and intent of the statute, it follows that the *246Navy’s interpretation of its own regulation thwarts this benevolent congressional aim.
If service under an active duty agreement were an unusual or unique manner in which to tender active duty, the court’s holding here might be more understandable. However, not only are such agreements specifically authorized by Congress,9 but the above-mentioned Navy regulations10 indicate that these agreements are tendered to Reserve officers almost as a matter of course. It is therefore difficult to see how the Navy can consider plaintiff’s second request to be an unreasonably conditioned and restricted tender.
The Navy’s position, moreover, unreasonably discriminates against the plaintiff and others similarly situated who, in response to the open encouragement of the Navy, apply for active duty agreements. Anomalously, those who ignore the Navy’s invitation and request only an indefinite retention on active duty fare better than those who conform to the Navy’s regulations. The Government should not be permitted to so entrap the unwary.
Equally disturbing, however, is the apparent lack of justification for the difference in treatment between the two types of requests. Surely, it is convenient for the Navy to be readily able to dispose of unsatisfactory officers. Yet I fail to see by what authority a department of the Government can ignore the express dictates of Congress merely for its own convenience or because it believes it is more economical to do so.
Of course, the Navy must have the authority to ignore requests unreasonably conditioned. Were it otherwise, a serviceman with no intent to remain on active duty could submit a request so restricted that the Navy would clearly never consent to it. By so doing, the serviceman could become entitled to a windfall never intended by Congress. This is not the case here. Plaintiff made an unconditioned offer for the renewal of his agreement upon, apparently, the same terms as before.
Whatever restrictions the Navy might place upon conditional requests must be reasonable and consistent with the congressional purpose. In the instant case, the regulation is not only unreasonable, but it directly thwarts the congressional purposes without any meaningful justification. I would therefore hold invalid so much of paragraph 044189-1 as deprives Reserve officers of their entitlement to readjustment payments upon the sole basis that they have requested active duty agreements. Accordingly, I would find that plaintiff was involuntarily released and is entitled to a readjustment payment.
NICHOLS, Judge, concurs in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

. 10 U.S.C. § 687 (a) (1964). This provision reads, in pertinent part, as follows: “ * * * a member of a reserve component or a member of the Army or the Air Force without component who is released from active duty involuntarily, or because he was not accepted for an additional tour of active duty for which he volunteered after he had completed a tour of active duty, and who has completed, immediately before his release, at least five years of continuous active duty as a commissioned officer, warrant officer, or enlisted member, is entitled to a readjustment payment * *
The predecessor of section 687 was section 265 of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, ch. 608, pt. II, 66 Stat. 481, as added by Act of July 9, 1956, ch. 534, 70 Stat. 517. Section 265 was subsequently codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1016,
which was repealed by the legislation enacting section 687. Act of Sept. 7, 1962, Pub.L. No. 87-651, §§ 102 and 307A, 76 Stat. 506, 526.

. Act of July 9, 1956, ch. 534, § 265(h), 70 Stat. 517 (formerly codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1016(h)). The Senate Report accompanying the bill wh'ch eventually became, in part, 10 U.S.C. § 687 indicated that it was “not intended to make any substantive change in existing law.” 2 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News p. 2456 (1962) (S.Rep. No. 1876, 87th Cong., 2d Sess.) Moreover, that report indicated that former section 1016(h) was being incorporated in new section 687(a), the provision involved here. Id. at 2457.

. Paragraph 044189-1, Navy Dept. Comp. Manual.

. See note 2 supra.

. See, e. g., Fix v. United States, 368 F.2d 609, 614, 177 Ct.Cl. 369, 377 (1966). Plaintiff does not assert that the Navy was without authority to prescribe regulations under the pertinent statutes.

. What was originally section 265 of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 was added by amendment in 1956. See note 1 supra. No meaningful changes in the substance of this statute have been effected since that time. See note 2 supra.

. 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News, p. 3062 (1956) (S.Rep.No. 2288, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.).

. Bupers Instruction 1120.22C, Dept. of the Navy, Apr. 21, 1961.

. 10 U.S.C. § 679 (1964).

. See note 8 supra.