Court Opinion

ID: 9914041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 15:00:43.843292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:09:55.350648
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11282    Document: 19-1     Date Filed: 12/29/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11282
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       DE ANNA MARIE STINSON,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                  D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cr-00343-SDM-AAS-1
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11282         Document: 19-1         Date Filed: 12/29/2023          Page: 2 of 5

       2                          Opinion of the Court                        23-11282

       Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               De Anna Marie Stinson, proceeding pro se, appeals the dis-
       trict court’s denial of her motion for compassionate release. She
       argues that the district court erred in denying her motion because
       she presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for compas-
       sionate release based on her asthma and poor living conditions and
       that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the
       18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors did not favor her release. 1
              Before the First Step Act of 2018 (“First Step Act”), 18 U.S.C.
       § 3582(c)(1)(A) allowed the district court to reduce a prisoner’s
       term of imprisonment upon motion of the Director of the BOP,
       after considering the factors set forth in § 3553(a), if it found that ex-
       traordinary and compelling reasons warranted such a reduction.
       18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) (effective November 2, 2002, to Decem-
       ber 20, 2018). The First Step Act amended § 3582(c)(1)(A) to allow
       the court to reduce a defendant’s term of imprisonment also upon
       motion of the defendant, after the defendant has fully exhausted all

       1 We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for a sentence reduction

       under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1345 (11th
       Cir. 2021). After eligibility is established, we will review the district court’s
       denial of a prisoner’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for an abuse of discretion. Id. Pro
       se pleadings are liberally construed. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d
       1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
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       23-11282                  Opinion of the Court                               3

       administrative rights to appeal a failure of the BOP to bring a mo-
       tion on the defendant’s behalf, or the lapse of 30 days from the re-
       ceipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility,
       whichever is earlier. 2 See First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 603,
       132 Stat. 5194, 5239; 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
               A district court may grant compassionate release if: (1) an
       extraordinary and compelling reason exists; (2) a sentencing reduc-
       tion would be consistent with U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13; and (3) the
       § 3553(a) factors weigh in favor of compassionate release. United
       States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237–38 (11th Cir. 2021). When the
       district court finds that one of these three prongs is not met, it need
       not examine the other prongs. Giron, 15 F.4th at 1348.
              Factors under § 3553(a) that the district court may consider
       include the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history and
       characteristics of the defendant, the seriousness of the crime, the
       promotion of respect for the law, just punishment, protecting the
       public from the defendant’s crimes, and adequate deterrence. 18
       U.S.C. § 3553(a). The district court need not address each of the

       2 We have held that § 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdic-

       tional but rather is a claim-processing rule. United States v. Harris, 989 F.3d
       908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021). But we left open the question of whether the ex-
       haustion requirement is mandatory in the sense that the court must enforce
       the requirement if the government raises it. See id. We decline to address that
       open question here because Stinson and the state dispute whether she ex-
       hausted her administrative remedies, and there is no need to resolve that dis-
       pute because we may affirm a district court “on any ground supported by the
       record.” PDVSA US Litig. Trust v. LukOil Pan Americas LLC, 65 F.4th 556, 562
       (11th Cir. 2023).
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11282

       § 3553(a) factors or all the mitigating evidence. Tinker, 14 F.4th at
       1241. An acknowledgment that the court considered all applicable
       § 3553(a) factors and the parties’ arguments, along with “enough
       analysis that meaningful appellate review of the factors’ application
       can take place,” is sufficient. Id. at 1240–41 (quotation marks omit-
       ted). The weight given to any § 3553(a) factor is committed to the
       sound discretion of the district court. Id. at 1241. The “district
       court abuses its discretion when it (1) fails to afford consideration
       to relevant factors that were due significant weight, (2) gives signif-
       icant weight to an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a
       clear error of judgment in considering the proper factors.” Id. (quo-
       tation marks omitted).
              In its order denying Stinson’s motion for compassionate re-
       lease, the district court held that “the Section 3553(a) sentencing
       factors weigh against her release.” It then went on to discuss how
       18 months of imprisonment for “a crime fundamentally incompat-
       ible with civilized society” would not properly address the various
       factors. It acknowledged Stinson’s contrition but still held that the
       factors “weigh[ed] decisively against her release.”
               The court did not abuse its discretion in finding that an
       18-month sentence for Stinson’s murder-for-hire offense did not re-
       flect the seriousness of the offense, promote respect for the law,
       provide just punishment, and protect the public from further
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       23-11282                  Opinion of the Court                               5

       crimes despite her personal history and rehabilitation. Accord-
       ingly, we affirm.3
              AFFIRMED.

       3 We need not address Stinson’s argument that the district court erred in find-

       ing her medical conditions and living conditions constituted extraordinary and
       compelling reasons for release under U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 because we may affirm
       on the independent ground that the district court did not abuse its discretion
       in finding that the § 3553(a) factors weighed against her release.