Court Opinion

ID: 9796939
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 04:08:48.784122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:51:49.358578
License: Public Domain

Justice EID,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I agree with the majority that MAB may use an automated mailing service, see maj. op. at 777, I disagree with its holding that “MAB’s debt collection communication violated the notice provisions of section 12-14-109.” Id. at 771. The majority does not dispute that MAB’s disclosures to Flood contained all of the information required by section 12-14-109; instead, it finds that the *778disclosures contained “two apparent contradictions likely to confuse the consumer.” Maj. op. at 774. Unlike the majority, I would find MAB’s disclosures to be in compliance with section 12-14-109. In my view, the majority’s holding today — which penalizes MAB for permitting consumers to contact it by phone and for giving consumers additional time to consider a settlement offer after they dispute a debt — may well harm consumers in the long run. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding that MAB’s disclosures violated section 12-14-109.
I.
Section 12-14-109 requires a collection agency to send a consumer written notice containing the following five disclosures:
(a) The amount of the debt;
(b) The name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed;
(c) That, unless the consumer, within thirty days after receipt of the notice, disputes the validity of the debt, or any portion thereof, the debt will be assumed to be valid by the debt collector or collection agency;
(d) That, if the consumer notifies the debt collector or collection agency in writing within the thirty-day period that the debt, or any portion thereof, is disputed, the debt collector or collection agency will obtain verification of the debt or a copy of a judgment against the consumer and a copy of such verification or judgment will be mailed to the consumer by the debt collector or collection agency;
(e)That upon the consumer’s written request within the thirty-day period, the debt collector or collection agency will provide the consumer with the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.
§ 12-14-109(1)(a)-(e), C.R.S. (2007). The majority does not dispute that MAB’s disclosure complied with these requirements, as its letter to Flood contained the amount of the debt, MAB’s name, and an almost verbatim restatement of the language of subsections (c), (d), and (e) regarding Flood’s rights (1) to dispute the debt, (2) to request, in writing, a verification of the debt, and (3) to request, in writing, the name and address of the original creditor. See maj. op. appendix A. MAB had no additional duties under section 12-14-109 unless and until Flood disputed her debt. See § 12-14-109(2).1
Despite MAB’s compliance with section 12-14-109, the majority concludes that MAB’s letter to Flood contained “two apparent contradictions” that “couch, conceal, veil, contradict, or minimize the required disclosures so as to confuse or mislead [Flood] into foregoing her rights.” Maj. op. at 774, 776. In my view, however, these “apparent contradictions” are illusory.
A.
The first “apparent contradiction,” according to the majority, is that “the letter portion of the communication encourages Flood to contact MAB orally,” while the required disclosures are “buried in the fine print appended to the bottom of the communication.”2 Id. at 774. The majority posits that somehow the consumer will be confused and at*779tempt to invoke her section 12-14-109 rights orally, instead of in writing. Id. at 774-76. But importantly, only two rights must be invoked in writing: the right to obtain a verification of the debt, and the right to obtain the name and address of the original creditor. See § 12 — 14—109(d), (e). Those two rights are not discussed in the body of the letter, and only appear in the disclosures, which clearly state that the requests must be in writing. These express statements are not, in my view, contradicted in any way by the body of the letter, which urges that “[i]f you don’t agree with the balance it is important that you contact our office to discuss this matter,” and includes an address and phone number. Significantly, this statement is in full compliance with section 12-14-109(e), which — in contrast to subsections (d) and (e) — permits the consumer to dispute the debt orally. See § 12-14-109(e) (omitting any reference to “in writing” or “written request”). This statement is also entirely consistent with the letter’s disclosures, which, as noted above, contain an almost verbatim recitation of subsection (c).
The majority apparently believes that any mention of oral communication in connection with debt collection, whatever the context and for whatever purpose, will necessarily contradict an express statement requiring writing in certain instances. In other words, according to the majority, a consumer will assume that if she can contact the collection agency orally for some purposes, she can do so for all purposes. Maj. op. at 775. Yet this is how the statute is structured: Subsection (d) and (e) rights must be invoked in writing, but the right described in subsection (c) may be invoked through written or oral communication. This distinction is in the statute, and MAB should not be faulted for repheating it.
After today, to avoid any such “confusion” posited by the majority, collection agencies may simply prevent consumers from contacting them by phone. For many consumers, however, phoning is the easiest, most convenient, and most accessible means of communication. By equating any mention of oral communication with confusion, today’s decision, in my view, will ultimately harm the very people the majority seeks to help.
The majority also faults MAB for failing to mention Flood’s section 12-14-109 rights in the body of the letter, and accuses it of “bur[ying]” the disclosures “in the fine print” at the bottom of the letter. Maj. op. at 774. As for the “fine print,” the typeface used in the body of the letter is virtually the same size as the typeface used in the disclosures. More importantly, the majority’s complaint that “there is no prominently displayed message of [Flood’s] right,” id. at 776, is curious considering that its analysis is entirely dependent upon its belief that the consumer would perceive contradictions between the body of the letter and the disclosures. In other words, under the majority’s theory, the disclosures must have been “sufficiently prominent to be noticed.” Swanson v. S. Or. Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th Cir.1988) (applying this requirement to disclosures in debt collection letters). In fact, MAB could have placed the disclosures on the back of the letter to Flood, or it could have sent the letter alone and then waited up to five days before sending the disclosures. See § 12-14-109(1). It was certainly not required to place the disclosures in the body of the letter, as the majority seems to contemplate. See maj. op. at 775 (noting that the body of the letter “does not clearly state” recipient’s section 12-14-109 rights). In sum, MAB’s disclosures were far more prominent than what the statute requires.
It is true that a consumer who reads only the body of the letter will not be informed of her legal rights. See maj. op. at 775. However, a consumer who reads the entire letter — i.e., all the language plainly visible on the front page — will be informed both that she may contact MAB, either in writing or orally, to dispute her debt and that she may request, in writing, verification of the debt and the name and address of the original creditor. Neither section 12-14-109 nor the least sophisticated consumer standard requires anything more. See Durkin v. Equifax Check Servs., Inc., 406 F.3d 410, 418 (7th Cir.2005) (stating that the least sophisticated consumer is deemed to possess “rudimentary knowledge” and to be “capable of making *780basic logical deductions and inferences”); Clomon v. Jackson, 988 F.2d 1314, 1319 (2d Cir.1993) (“[E]ven the ‘least sophisticated consumer’ can be presumed to possess a rudimentary amount of information about the world and a willingness to read a collection notice with some care.”) (citation omitted).
B.
The majority’s second “apparent contradiction” is “the conflicting deadlines contained in the communication” — thirty-nine days to take advantage of MAB’s settlement offer and thirty days to dispute the validity of the debt. Maj. op. at 774. It offers no analysis of why the two dates are contradictory, except for the fact that they are different. Again, as with the written and oral communication issue discussed above, difference is not necessarily confusion. We must examine the reason for the difference. With regard to the dates included in the letter, common sense and caselaw require that the settlement date be later than the thirty day dispute date.
A consumer in Flood’s position has two payment options: She can pay the debt, or pay the settlement amount (which is less than half that amount). But before making any payment, she would want to know first if the debt was valid. Thus, a consumer in Flood’s position should dispute the debt first, and then, if the debt ends up being valid, pay the lesser settlement amount. If the statute entitles her to thirty days to dispute the debt amount, see section 12-14-109(2), then the settlement deadline should be set beyond the thirty days. Thus, the fact that MAB’s settlement deadline is later than the dispute deadline is not confusing to the consumer, as the majority believes, it is helpful to the consumer.
To put it somewhat differently, if the settlement deadline were the same as the dispute deadline — as the majority seems to require — Flood would have been forced to choose either to settle the debt or to take advantage of the full thirty days to which she was legally entitled for the purpose of disputing the debt. See § 12-14-109(2). According to the federal courts’ interpretation of the least sophisticated consumer standard, this type of choice is impermissibly contradictory and coercive. See, e.g., Peter v. GC Servs. L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 349 (5th Cir.2002) (“Courts have generally found contradiction or apparent contradiction of the printed ... notice where payment is demanded in a concrete period shorter than the thirty day statutory contest period.”); Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 111 (3d Cir.1991) (“There is a reasonable probability that the least sophisticated debtor, faced with a demand for payment within ten days and a threat of immediate legal action if payment is not made in that time, would be induced to overlook his statutory right to dispute the debt within thirty days.”); Swanson, 869 F.2d at 1225-26 (same). If the federal standard does indeed apply in Colorado, see maj. op. at 773, then MAB was required to set the settlement deadline later than the dispute deadline.
Today’s opinion, combined with federal caselaw, effectively prohibits collection agencies from setting any deadline for acceptance of settlement offers. A thirty day deadline (or less) will be deemed coercive by federal caselaw, but a deadline of more than thirty days will be deemed confusing under the majority’s decision. The combined effect of the federal caselaw and the majority’s opinion will be to discourage, and perhaps bar, settlement offers in Colorado. Yet for many consumers, accepting the settlement amount — which is less, and in many cases far less, than the debt amount — will be the best option. Again, as with the issue of oral communications, I fear that the majority’s approach will ultimately harm consumers.
II.
MAB’s disclosures comply with the requirements of section 12-14-109, and contain no contradictory information. I therefore respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion holding that MAB’s disclosures violated section 12-14H09.
I am authorized to state that Justice RICE and Justice COATS join in this concurrence and dissent.
*781Appendix A (Debt Communication Letter, consumer’s personal information redacted)
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. Section 12-14-109(2) requires that if the consumer provides a written dispute or request for the original creditor’s name and address, then the collection agency must cease its debt collection activities until it mails a verification or the requested name and address to the consumer. However, the fact that a written dispute will stop collection activities is not one of the disclosures required by section 12-14-109. See § 12-14-109(d), (e) (requiring disclosure only of the consumer's ability to request debt verification as well as the original creditor's name and address). The majority opinion might be read to suggest that the collection agency must provide the consumer with some notice of her right to stop collection activities while the requested information is obtained. See maj. op. at 776 (stating that the consumer must have adequate notice before choosing not to invoke her right to cessation of debt-collection activities). But the statute contains no such requirement.

. The majority goes so far as to state that “MAB prominently and expressly encouraged Flood to contact it by phone." Maj. op. at 776 (emphasis added). This is obviously not the case, as the actual language of the letter to Flood does not use the words “call" or "phone,” and in fact, it provides MAB’s mailing address before MAB’s phone number.