Court Opinion

ID: 9659175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:34:12.220189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:04.706114
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice,
concurring in result.
Tracing the history of the adoption of the comparative negligence doctrine by the first state, Florida, to the thirty-eighth state, the Supreme Court of Iowa in the case of Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa 1982), adopted the pure form of comparative negligence in the State of Iowa. This decision was filed on December 22, 1982, and held, inter alia:
We hold that in all cases in which contributory negligence has previously been a complete defense, it is supplanted by the doctrine of comparative negligence. In such cases contributory negligence will not bar recovery but shall reduce it in the proportion that the contributory negligence bears to the total negligence that proximately caused the damages.
Goetzman, 327 N.W.2d at 754. Said Iowa decision particularly set forth a provision with respect to “retroactivity.” I quote therefrom:
The other courts that have adopted comparative negligence have all made the doctrine effective to pending cases to some extent. Considerations affecting that determination are discussed in them. See, e.g., Placek v. City of Sterling Heights, 405 Mich. [638] at 662-68, 275 N.W.2d [511] at 520-22; see also Keeton, Creative Continuity in the Law of Torts, 75 Harv.L.Rev. 463, 506-09 (1962). We conclude that the doctrine shall apply to (1) the present case, (2) all cases tried or retried after the date of filing of this opinion, and (3) all pending cases, including appeals, in which the issue has been preserved. (Emphasis supplied.)
Goetzman, 327 N.W.2d at 754.
I agree with the majority that this case must be retried but it must be retried in accordance with Goetzman, 327 N.W.2d 742. I base this statement not only upon this recent Iowa decision but upon Heidemann v. Rohl, 86 S.D. 250, 194 N.W.2d 164 (1972), which requires this Court to apply the law of the place of the wrong in a tort action. Here, the collision occurred in Iowa. Therefore, Iowa’s law applies.
Conceding that the violation of safety statutes regulating the operation of motor vehicles is negligence as a matter of law in Iowa, it appears that Mosher, the truck driver, rear-ended the van in which the appellant was sound asleep on the floor. Mosher admitted exceeding the speed limit in Iowa. By his own testimony, he admitted that he was driving on low beams at 3:40 a.m. and that he failed to see the van until he was approximately 100 feet away and could not avoid crashing into the van. Thus, by being on low beams and speeding, the trucker had insufficient lighting to reveal “persons and vehicles at a safe distance in advance of the vehicle.” This latter language is taken from the Iowa statutes, *82§ 321.415. There was an absence of any contributory negligence on the part of the sleeping passenger, appellant herein. Facts developed at trial reflect that for this long distance move, both plaintiffs had bolted certain dressers to the floor of the van which contained drawers with clothes and personal belongings; also, the back end of the van contained pots, pans, and dishes. Upon impact, testimony revealed that this “all flew apart” and that the injured woman had to be “dug out of the rubble.”
It is totally incredible that this sleeping passenger in a van, who had no control over the vehicle, could have been found by the jury to be the sole proximate cause of her injuries. Obviously, if the truck had not plowed into the rear of the van in the black of the night, she would have had no injuries. Thus, even under the doctrine of comparative negligence, she was entitled to a directed verdict on liability. To compare negligence on the liability question, there would have to be some negligence on the side of both parties. Appellant sleeping on the floor of the van was faultless in causing the collision. The jury should not have been permitted, under the state of the evidence in the record, to speculate on the truck driver’s liability, for, indeed, he violated Iowa state statutes and was negligent as a matter of law. Berhow v. Kroack, 195 N.W.2d 379 (Iowa 1972).
I agree to the necessity of a retrial of this case but on the sole issue of damages and not a complete retrial as envisioned by the majority. The fact that there were drawers and personal paraphernalia that toppled on top of appellant creates a question of the extent of her injuries attributable to the collision as created by the immediate impact and force of the truck hitting the rear end of the van. As to whether or not she contributed in some way to her own injuries caused by the van being packed with personal property, is an issue properly subject to determination in a retrial of this action. To put it another way, under no circumstance would I permit a jury to deliberate on liability, but would so permit it to deliberate on the extent and proximate cause of her injuries to determine the proper amount of damages. Again, Goetzman would aid the trial court on an instruction pertaining to the recovery of damages.
Under a system of comparative negligence, the keystone to fairness is proportionate responsibility for fault, not the relative severity of injuries. Each party’s recovery of damages is reduced in proportion to that party’s responsibility for them. As a result, no one is unjustly enriched.
Goetzman, 327 N.W.2d at 754. I further respectfully suggest inasmuch as this case must be tried under Iowa law, that the causation requirements of § 619.17 of the Iowa statutes applies.