Court Opinion

ID: 9366227
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-26 15:03:38.631366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:50.900009
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20001     Document: 00516420076         Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/04/2022

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                       United States Court of Appeals
                                                                        Fifth Circuit

                                                                      FILED
                                                                 August 4, 2022
                                  No. 22-20001                   Lyle W. Cayce
                                Summary Calendar                      Clerk

   Markethia Mull,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Houston Independent School District; Sonia
   Quintanilla, Houston Independent School District Police Officer;
   Marguerite Gardea; Shavonne Sheltton,

                                                         Defendants—Appellees.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Texas
                           USDC No. 4:20-CV-2638

   Before Southwick, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Markethia Mull, a former kindergarten teacher at B.C. Elmore
   Elementary School, sued Houston Independent School District, District
   police officer Sonia Quintanilla, Principal Maguerite Gardea, and Shavonne

          *
            Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
   opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
   circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 22-20001        Document: 00516420076              Page: 2      Date Filed: 08/04/2022

                                         No. 22-20001

   Sheltton1 under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of her rights under the
   First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments as well as claims under Texas
   law. Mull sued after the District decided not to renew her teaching contract
   in the wake of a physical altercation with a young student. The Defendants
   moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failing
   to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and the district court
   granted their motion. We affirm.
                                               I.
           Mull worked as a kindergarten teacher at B.C. Elmore Elementary
   School for three years, from 2013 until 2016. She was employed under a term
   contract. In November 2016, Mull was involved in a physical altercation with
   a young female student. Mull maintains that she applied reasonable force to
   the student’s hands to keep her from hitting other students, but the District’s
   investigation found that Mull intentionally and knowingly caused injury to
   the child by restraining the student’s arm behind her, slamming her to the
   floor and causing the student to bleed from her mouth. While the facts of the
   altercation are disputed, it is undisputed that Mull was suspended from her
   teaching duties as a result and reassigned to work at a football stadium
   fieldhouse.
           In January 2017, the District’s Board of Trustees proposed a mid-year
   termination of Mull’s teaching contract.                      Mull appealed their
   recommendation to the Commissioner of Education, but then she dismissed
   her appeal. On April 21, 2017, the Board ultimately decided not to renew her
   contract. Rather than appeal that decision, Mull filed this lawsuit on July 28,

           1
             Mull alleged in her complaint that Sheltton was the mother of the child involved
   in the altercation giving rise to this action. But Sheltton apparently was never served and
   did not answer Mull’s complaint.

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                                        No. 22-20001

   2020. She alleged that the defendants conspired to violate Section 1983 and
   violated her rights, privileges, and immunities under the First, 2 Fourth, and
   Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. She additionally
   alleged that the District violated the Texas Constitution and several state
   statutes by failing to renew her contract.
          Defendants responded with a motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal
   Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). They contended that Mull’s claims were
   time-barred, unexhausted, and baseless. The district court granted the
   defendants’ motion. Mull now appeals.
                                            II.
          “We ‘review a grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss de novo,
   accepting all well-pled facts as true and viewing those facts in the light most
   favorable to the plaintiff[].’” See Olivarez v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 997 F.3d
   595, 599 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Meador v. Apple, Inc., 911 F.3d 260, 264 (5th
   Cir. 2018)). Rule 12(b)(6) governs dismissal for “failure to state a claim upon
   which relief can be granted.” “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint
   must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
   relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
   (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
          On appeal, Mull contends that the district court erred: (1) in
   dismissing her Section 1983 claims when it failed to consider that Texas
   Education Code section 22.0512 immunized her against disciplinary
   procedures; (2) in failing to consider the District’s noncompliance with
   Texas Education Code sections 21.0203 and 22.0512 and Texas Penal Code
   section 9.62, and how this violated her due process rights; (3) by applying a

          2
              Mull abandoned her First Amendment claim on appeal.

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   two-year statute of limitations to bar Mull’s claims under the Texas
   Constitution; and (4) in dismissing Mull’s claims based on alleged violations
   of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
   Constitution. We address each of these arguments in turn.
                                          A.
          Under Texas Education Code section 22.0512, “[a] professional
   employee of a school district may not be subject to disciplinary proceedings
   for the employee’s use of physical force against a student to the extent
   justified under Section 9.62, Penal Code.” Tex. Educ. Code § 22.0512.
   Texas Penal Code section 9.62 provides that:
          The use of force, but not deadly force, against a person is
          justified: (1) if the actor is entrusted with the care, supervision,
          or administration of the person for a special purpose; and
          (2) when and to the degree the actor reasonably believes the
          force is necessary to further the special purpose or to maintain
          discipline in a group.
   Mull contends that these provisions granted her immunity from disciplinary
   proceedings regarding her physical altercation with a student.
          But section 22.0512 was not an impediment to dismissal of Mull’s
   Section 1983 claims because, as a threshold matter, Mull failed to exhaust her
   administrative remedies as to this issue. In Texas, “[i]f the Legislature
   expressly or impliedly grants an agency sole authority to make an initial
   determination in such disputes, the agency has exclusive jurisdiction, and a
   party ‘must exhaust [her] administrative remedies before seeking recourse
   through judicial review.’” Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538,
   544 (Tex. 2016) (quoting City of Houston v. Rhule, 417 S.W.3d 440, 442 (Tex.
   2013)). Here, Mull was required first to appeal the District’s nonrenewal of
   her contract to the Commissioner of Education. See Tex. Educ. Code
   §§ 21.251-60, 21.301-07. Mull has not pled, nor argued here, that she did so.

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   As she failed to exhaust her administrative remedies as to this issue, the
   district court’s dismissal was proper.
                                         B.
          Similarly, Mull contends that the district court failed to consider the
   District’s noncompliance with its own policies and state law—specifically
   Texas Education Code section 21.203 and section 22.0512, and section
   9.62—when it decided not to renew her employment contract.                 Mull
   contends that the District’s noncompliance violated her due process rights.
          Under section 21.203, “[t]he [District] must consider the most recent
   evaluations before making a decision not to renew a teacher’s contract if the
   evaluations are relevant to the reason for the [District’s] action.” Mull
   contends that the District did not consider the high marks that she received
   on previous evaluations before it decided not to renew her contract, and that
   she had a due process right that the District do so. By extension, Mull
   reasons that the district court failed to consider the due process violation in
   dismissing her claims.
          Contrary to Mull’s assertions, the district court properly dismissed
   Mull’s procedural due process claim. As with her first issue, Mull failed to
   exhaust her administrative remedies. See In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 235 S.W.3d
   at 624–25; see also Tex. Educ. Code § 21.301. Mull’s claim regarding the
   District’s noncompliance with its policies and state law is plainly ancillary to
   the District’s decision not to renew her contract, and
          if the constitutional claim is “ancillary to and supportive of a
          complaint about the [District’s] handling of an employment
          contract or application of school law,” such that the true nature
          of the claim, although asserted as a constitutional violation,
          necessarily results from a violation of school laws or an
          employment contract, then [Texas Education Code Section
          7.057(a)] authorizes and requires the Commissioner to hear the

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          appeal first, unless another exception to the exhaustion
          requirement applies.
   Clint Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Marquez, 487 S.W.3d 538, 553 (Tex. 2016) (quoting
   Jones v. Clarksville Indep. Sch. Dist., 46 S.W.3d 467, 474 (Tex. App. 2001));
   see Tex. Educ. Code § 7.057(a). Thus, the district court properly
   dismissed Mull’s claim regarding the District’s alleged procedural due
   process noncompliance because Mull failed to exhaust her administrative
   remedies before filing suit in the district court.
                                           C.
          Mull next takes issue with the district court’s dismissal of her claims
   alleged under the Texas Constitution. These claims essentially duplicate her
   statutory arguments but additionally assert a property interest in her
   employment contract. The district court found these claims to be time
   barred. “The statute of limitations for a substantive due process claim
   brought under the Texas Constitution is two years.” Jackson v. Hous. Indep.
   Sch. Dist., 994 S.W.2d 396, 402 (Tex. App. 1999); see Tex. Civ. Pract.
   and Rem. Code § 16.003(a) (providing that “a person must bring suit
   for . . . taking or detaining the personal property of another . . . not later than
   two years after the day the cause of action accrues”). Mull received notice
   on April 21, 2017, that the District was not renewing her contract. She filed
   this action on July 28, 2020, well more than two years later. Thus, the district
   court properly dismissed Mull’s claims under the Texas Constitution as
   barred by the statute of limitations.
                                           D.
          Finally, Mull contends that the district court erred in dismissing her
   claims based on alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment and her
   substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mull
   contends that the District violated her Fourth Amendment rights in

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Case: 22-20001      Document: 00516420076          Page: 7   Date Filed: 08/04/2022

                                    No. 22-20001

   maliciously prosecuting her without probable cause. Specifically, Mull
   contends that she was wrongly subjected to criminal prosecution because she
   had a reasonable belief that the physical force she used was necessary and
   allowed under section 22.0512 and section 9.62.            But there is “no
   . . . freestanding constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution.”
   Castellano v. Fragozo, 352 F.3d 939, 945, 953 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc).
   Further, the lack of probable cause to prosecute is an essential element of a
   malicious prosecution claim. See Rife v. City of Dallas, 91 F.3d 139 (5th Cir.
   1996). Here, the Harris County District Attorney’s office had probable cause
   based on the District’s findings that Mull restrained the child’s hand behind
   her back and slammed her to the floor. Thus, the district court properly
   dismissed Mull’s Fourth Amendment claim.
          Mull also contends that her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due
   process rights were violated because of the District’s failure to comply with
   provisions of the Texas Education Code and Texas Penal Code. “To
   succeed with a claim based on substantive due process in the public
   employment context, the plaintiff must show . . . that [she] had a property
   interest/right in [her] employment . . . .” Lewis v. Univ. of Tex. Med. Branch
   at Galveston, 665 F.3d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 2011) (quotation omitted). “[P]ublic
   school teachers under fixed term contracts do not have property interests in
   their teaching positions extending beyond the term of the contracts.” Frazier
   v. Garrison Indep. Sch. Dist., 980 F.2d 1514, 1530 (5th Cir. 1993). Thus, the
   district court properly dismissed Mull’s substantive due process claim.
                                                                  AFFIRMED.

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