Court Opinion

ID: 9687813
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:49:53.336731+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:32.079580
License: Public Domain

DYKMAN, J.
¶ 35. (dissenting). The problem requiring a remand for re-sentencing arose at Matson's sentencing hearing. The trial judge used a format for the hearing in which it outlined the plea agreement, the maximum sentences for the crimes to which Matson pled guilty, and inquired into inaccuracies in the presentence report. After correcting inaccuracies, the court asked the State and Matson: "Is that all a correct summary?" Matson's attorney replied, "That's all correct, your honor . . . ." The court then asked: "Are you asking for any other remedies?" Matson's attorney said, "There are a couple other matters that need to be considered as incorrect." The court heard those matters and disposed of them, noting: "I will consider the corrections that have now been made."
¶ 36. The court next heard from victims, and a witness supporting Matson. Matson's attorney was then given an opportunity to speak. He began by noting that the letter from the Janesville Police Department was, in *744his view, an attempt to usurp the job of the district attorney. He was aware that at a previous hearing, the trial judge had concluded that he would use a presentence report which included references to the letter. But he wanted the trial judge to reconsider.
¶ 37. The trial judge asked the dispositive question directly: "[M]y question is, do you believe that your remedies are sufficiently served by permitting you to furnish the Court with the Sentencing Memorandum you have given me, and then to argue from that?"
¶ 38. Matson's attorney had a decision to make. He could answer "no," and reiterate his argument that the only remedy for a breach of the plea agreement was a sentencing before a different judge, using a presentence report which did not mention the offending letter. The parties had previously discussed this letter as an appellate issue, and the trial court might have concluded that the best solution was to do as Matson's attorney requested.
¶ 39. But Matson's attorney answered:
Your Honor, I do, because I have also submitted material in support of the Memorandum, including a police report from the Janesville Police Department from 1991, which I will address when the opportunity is afforded me, and about what type of sentence it should be, and why the Department's Presentence is of no value to the Court in rendering a decision today.
¶ 40. The choice was clear. Should Matson stand on his belief that the letter was a breach of the plea agreement or should he use the other material he had obtained to show that the letter should be ignored? Matson's attorney made the latter choice.
¶ 41. Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. State v. Huebner, 2000 WI 59, n.2, 235 *745Wis. 2d 486, 611 N.W.2d 727. The trial court knew this, and at a postconviction motion hearing explained to Matson:
And at the time of sentencing, I asked Counsel for the defendant, clearly, if there were any remedies that Counsel for the defendant wanted to use with respect to the differences of opinion with the Sentencing Memorandum, and I was told by Counsel that — first, I did hear from both Mr. O'Leary [the district attorney] and from Mr. Hoag [defense counsel], and I obtained the Sentencing Memorandum of Defense Counsel, and I adjusted and made the corrections that were agreed to. Mr. O'Leary had some comments as well that did not adhere to the Sentencing Memorandum of the Defense. Counsel for the Defense told me that those remedies were sufficient. And I find that when you tell a sentencing judge that the remedies are sufficient, that effectively, that is a waiver from at a later date raising the issue that you are raising now.
¶ 42. The practice of agreeing to something in the trial court and then arguing on appeal that a judge's reliance on that agreement was error is called "sandbagging." The problem with sandbagging is that if trial judges are given a choice between decisions, they can consider the law and the facts, and come up with a decision that is often correct, precluding an appeal on that issue. But when a litigant agrees that a trial judge's solution to a problem is acceptable, and then claims error in that solution on appeal, the opportunity for a correct solution to the problem is lost. Appellate courts usually disapprove of that procedure. State v. Mikkelson, 2002 WI App 152, ¶ 14, 256 Wis. 2d 132, 647 N.W.2d 421.
*746¶ 43. I conclude that Matson waived the right to assert now that the trial court erred by refusing to transfer this case to another judge for sentencing with a new presentence report. Therefore, I would not reach that issue. I would affirm. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.