Court Opinion

ID: 9539645
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:07:44.392602+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:06.032552
License: Public Domain

FELDMAN,
Justice, dissenting.
I do not agree with either of the majority’s conclusions. First, I believe that the legislative classification which gives property owners the exclusive voice in the initiation of annexation is one which infringes upon the fundamental rights of residents who are not property owners. The effect of annexation on residents as well as property owners is substantial. See Note, The Right to Vote in Municipal Annexations, 88 HARVARD L.REV. 1571, 1594. It is true that the state does not have to deal with popular opinion at all in the annexation process. City of Tucson v. Garrett, 77 Ariz. 73, 267 P.2d 717 (1954). Nevertheless, when the state chooses to do so and makes petition to a city council the only method to initiate annexation of an unincorporated area, the state deals with the political rights of those who live within the unincorporated area and must deal with all the people equally. See Adams v. City of Colorado Springs, 308 F.Supp. 1397 (1970), aff'd. 399 U.S. 901, 90 S.Ct. 2197, 26 L.Ed.2d 555 (1970).
The majority quotes extensively from Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178-79, 28 S.Ct. 40, 46, 52 L.Ed. 151 (1907). I believe that in the context of this present case Hunter does not stand for the proposition of absolute power for which it is cited. First, in Hunter, the dispute was over dilution of the voting rights of the smaller city’s voters because a majority of the combined votes of both cities was necessary to annex. The issue was not whether some residents were excluded from the process. Second, the case arose under the contract clause, U.S. Const, art. 1, § 10 cl. 1, with petitioner arguing that there was an impairment of the contract between the citizens and the city. The Supreme Court never addressed the questions of violations of due process or equal protection. Third, Hunter only applies to municipal property used for governmental purposes, Id. at 179, 28 S.Ct. at 47. It does not apply to municipal property used for private purposes, as to which “the legislature is not omnipotent.”
Not only have concepts of due process and equal protection evolved in the past 80 years, but in Hunter, all voters in both cities were allowed to vote on the proposition. The premise of Hunter is that cities are creatures of the state, which I do not dispute. However, the issue in the present case is whether the legislature can deprive the class of resident non-landowners of a voice in the initial decision to become part of a city while granting it to non-resident landowners. Hunter is inapposite to this issue.
The ability to participate in the determination of the nature of the governmental entity that is to exercise power over one’s person and one’s family is a right of a fundamental nature. It is a right that is shared by residents and property owners in the area. Curtis v. Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles County, 7 Cal.3d 942, 960, 104 Cal.Rptr. 297, 309, 501 P.2d 537, 549 (1972). In my view, therefore, although the right denied non-property owners in the present case is not an electoral right, it is one of fundamental importance in its impact upon residents and property owners alike.
*224The majority reasons that Curtis, supra, is inapplicable because the California court found “that barring an election touched upon and burdened the right to vote and [therefore] applied the compelling state interest test.” (At 390). A.R.S. § 9-471 has the same effect because, although it does not touch upon the right to vote, it does bar access to the annexation process. The California statute in Curtis allowed landowners to control the culmination of the annexation process—an election—while the Arizona statute allows landowners to control the initiation of an annexation which culminates in a vote by the city council. Both statutes interfere with the citizen’s right of participation in the political process. The Arizona statute, like that held unconstitutional by the California court, touches upon fundamental political interests. It can be found valid only by applying strict scrutiny—the compelling state interest test. The majority errs in adopting and applying the rational basis test.
The majority also errs in holding that the statute passes even the rational basis test. The annexation statute makes two unconstitutional classifications. First it distinguishes between those who own taxable property and those who do not, excluding those who do not. The majority has identified no state interest to justify this exclusion. While the initial burdens of increased property taxation are placed on landowners, they are immediately passed on to consumers through increased rents and via increased prices. Further, landowners share equally with non-landowners the need for and benefits from all public services. Curtis, 7 Cal.3d at 961, 104 Cal.Rptr. at 310, 501 P.2d at 550.
The second major defective classification is that § 9-471 distinguishes by wealth even among the eligible landowners themselves by providing that owners of at least “one-half in value” of the property sign the petition. The greater the assessed value of a parcel land, the greater the weight of that owner’s signature. This classification cannot withstand any scrutiny. One landowner with substantial holdings could effectively block all action by a much greater number of people. This is fundamentally at odds with all notions of fairness and participation in the political process. It is patently exclusionary. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134, 142-44, 92 S.Ct. 849, 855-56, 31 L.Ed.2d 92 (1972); Note, supra at note 129. This statute discriminates against all residents and small property owners who have the same interests in government services as wealthier owners. The state has no interest which can justify this exclusion.
Thus, even if we were to forego the strict scrutiny test and apply a rational basis analysis, this statute cannot survive. The majority argues (at 392-93) that there is a rational basis for the property— non-property classification because property owners pay taxes, must bear the financial burdens of annexation, and, therefore, have a real interest in whether their property is annexed or not. I concur in these sentiments, but find in them only a rational basis for inclusion of property owners in the process of determining whether a property should be annexed.
The question before us, however, is whether there is a rational basis for exclusion of residents in the areas who happen not to own property. While the majority argues (at 392-93) that non-property owners have some voice in the annexation process because they can argue to the city council or mount a court contest to the validity or legality of the annexation, I find the reasoning unpersuasive. It fails to explain why a non-resident owner who has never set foot in Arizona, and who may never intend to do so, may have the sole voice in determining whether the property is to be annexed; it fails to explain why those who reside on the property and whose vital interests will be affected by the question of annexation have no voice whatsoever and no method by which to even attempt to determine who will provide them with necessary governmental services.
The majority gives good reasons for giving property owners a voice in annexation. *225It gives no reasons, good or bad, rational or irrational, for excluding non-property owning residents from the annexation process. The majority has the issue backwards. In an equal protection analysis, the statute should not be sustained merely because there is a basis for the favorable treatment given to one class. There should also be some basis, either rational or compelling, for the discrimination against the other class. See Harper v. Virginia State Board, of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-67, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1081, 16 L.Ed.2d 169 (1966); Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627-28, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 1890, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969). No such basis is provided here. I submit that none exists. I agree with the opinion of the court of appeals and would hold the statute unconstitutional.