Court Opinion

ID: 9843770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:43:11.879648+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:55.178862
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 20] The majority misapplies the law by parsing the facts rather than taking them as a whole. The majority wrongly discards the individual facts merely because there are other conceivable explanations for them. The majority also fails to consider the seriousness of the offense in deciding whether law enforcement had a reasonable suspicion for the stop. I would affirm the decision of the district court, and I therefore respectfully dissent.
I
[¶ 21] As the majority notes, at ¶ 13, we are to “use an objective standard and view the totality of circumstances to determine whether an investigative stop is valid, and we consider whether a reasonable person in the officer’s position would be justified by some objective manifestation to suspect the defendant was, or was about to be, engaged in unlawful activity” (citing State v. Smith, 2005 ND 21, ¶ 15, 691 N.W.2d 203). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) (“in justifying the particular intrusion the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion”). In that context, the severity of the crime, in this case murder, is important to a Fourth Amendment analysis. State v. Anderson, 2006 ND 44, ¶ 24, 710 N.W.2d 392. As the United States Supreme Court has said:
Because “[t]he test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of precise definition or mechanical application,” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1884, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979), however, its proper application requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S., at 8-9, 105 S.Ct., at 1699-1700 (the question is “whether the totality of the circumstances justified] a particular sort of ... seizure”).
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865,104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989).
[¶ 22] Furthermore, law enforcement officers may rely on their common sense when conducting an investigation. Kappel v. Dir., N.D. Dep’t of Transp., 1999 ND 213, ¶ 10, 602 N.W.2d 718. “[T]he reasonable suspicion standard does not require an officer ... to rule out every potential innocent excuse for the behavior in question before stopping a vehicle for investigation.” Id. The majority, however, takes each individual fact out of this reasonableness analysis. It examines each fact individually and claims each fact is insufficient *29in itself to support a reasonable and articu-lable suspicion.
A
[f 23] The first suspicious fact relevant to this murder investigation was Torkel-sen’s presence at the site where the victim’s body was found.
[¶ 24] After Belzer had discovered the smoking body, Torkelsen pulled up in his pickup. They were the only two people at the scene at the time. The record reflects that when Torkelsen stopped, he did not acknowledge the presence of the smoldering body in any way. The majority discounts Torkelsen’s presence by arguing, at ¶ 15, “Just as mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to support a war-rantless search, see City of Fargo v. Wonder, 2002 ND 142, ¶23, 651 N.W.2d 665, ‘[i]t is axiomatic that presence at or near the scene of a crime, without more, does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.’ ” While “presence at or near the scene of a crime, without more, does not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity,” State v. Parker, 834 P.2d 592, 595 (Utah Ct.App.1992) (emphasis added), the officers in this case had more on which to rely. Furthermore, most of the cases the majority cites are factually distinct from the remote encounter on a gravel road in this case. Those eases involved crime scenes in populated areas, where the presence of other people would be far more likely. See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 49, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed.2d 357 (1979) (“The area of El Paso where appellant was stopped has a high incidence of drug traffic”); Batson v. State, 847 So,2d 1149, 1150 (Fla.App.2003) (“he responded to a call regarding a burglary at 5712 Guava Street.... The burglarized home is two blocks from the end of the street.”); People v. Young, 202 A.D.2d 957, 610 N.Y.S.2d 417, 418 (1994) (“The investigator testified that he requested that defendant be stopped and brought to headquarters based on a reliable informant’s statement that defendant and a number of other men had been sitting in a parked car outside a building where a homicide occurred.”); Parker, at 592 (“three garages in and around a West Jordan subdivision in Salt Lake County were burglarized”). This case involves a crime scene in a rural area where Torkel-sen’s almost immediate arrival after the body was discovered is far more suspicious than the presence of the defendants would have been in the cited cases.
B
[¶25] The second suspicious fact was Torkelsen’s lack of reaction upon seeing the burning body.
[¶ 26] The majority claims “this fact loses much of its significance when considered in conjunction with Belzer’s rather unusual directive that Torkelsen simply leave the area.” Supra at ¶ 16. The majority stops here, however, never explaining why Torkelsen’s reaction is insignificant or what Belzer’s directive has to do with the officers’ suspicion of Torkelsen. The majority also argues, at ¶ 16, that Torkelsen’s presence raised only the officers’ subjective suspicions, but Torkelsen’s presence and reaction were odd enough that Belzer reported them to law enforcement. Apparently, Torkelsen’s presence and reaction were suspicious not only to the officers but also to Belzer. The reasonable inference drawn from Torkelsen’s lack of reaction is that he was not surprised to see the body and possibly had information regarding why the body was there. In any event, Torkelsen did not act as a reasonable person likely would when coming upon a burnt body for the first time.
*30C
[¶ 27] The third suspicious fact was that on meeting emergency vehicles rushing to the scene, Torkelsen failed to pull over and yield the right of way.
[¶ 28] The record reflects that emergency vehicles were responding with their signal lights activated as Torkelsen was leaving the area. Agent Zachmeier testified he was told that when Torkelsen met the vehicles, “he did not yield to the emergency vehicles.” The majority, at ¶ 16, excuses Torkelsen’s conduct when first meeting the emergency vehicles on the gravel road as “understandable” and treats this fact alone as irrelevant in light of the narrow gravel road on which they traveled. The statute requiring a driver to yield when meeting an emergency vehicle, however, does not provide for an “understandable circumstances” exception or a “narrow gravel road” exception:
Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency vehicle displaying a visible flashing, revolving, or rotating blue, white, or red light, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the right of way and shall immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of the roadway clear of any intersection and shall stop and remain in that position until the authorized emergency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a police officer.
N.D.C.C. § 39-10-26(1).
[¶ 29] Torkelsen was required by law to pull as far as he safely could to the side of the road and stop to allow emergency vehicles to pass. In the context of a murder investigation in which Torkelsen was wanted for questioning, the investigating officers could reasonable interpret Torkelsen’s conduct as obstructive and aggressive, especially in light of his presence at the scene, lack of reaction to the body, location when law enforcement stopped him, and known history with law enforcement. Torkelsen’s failure to yield is relevant in the context of developing a reasonable and articulable suspicion while investigating a murder. The majority erroneously isolates this fact and ignores its relevancy.
D
[¶ 30] The fourth suspicious circumstance was Torkelsen’s leaving the area, with the addition of a reliable citizen report that he was driving wildly.
[¶ 31] Law enforcement officers ultimately located Torkelsen not at his home or near Cando, the community near where the murder occurred, but driving west on North Dakota Highway 17. He was located by law enforcement after a known informant reported erratic driving, and he was finally stopped, after backup had arrived, approximately twenty-eight miles west of Cando. The majority apologetically states, “when officers finally pulled him over several hours after Torkelsen left the scene, he was only 28 miles from Cando. This scenario hardly suggests that Torkel-sen was fleeing the area.” The majority takes this fact, again, individually out of the context of the investigation. Torkel-sen was wanted for questioning, either as a suspect or a witness. He was located twenty-eight miles away, and a known informant reported Torkelsen had been driving erratically. While he may not have been attempting to rapidly flee the area, the circumstances of this murder investigation do not suggest that he was out for a Sunday drive. A reasonable person with the same training and experience as these law enforcement officers would act as the officers in this case did and would stop Torkelsen before he was allowed to travel any further to prevent him from potentially compromising this investigation or from *31actually fleeing. While Torkelsen’s location alone does not suggest rapid flight from the scene of a crime, it does add another relevant fact the officers could rely on.
E
[¶32] The fifth suspicious fact was Torkelsen’s criminal history of domestic violence and history threatening violence against others.
[¶ 33] The record reflects that Torkel-sen had a criminal history of violating a protection order. Torkelsen had also threatened law enforcement, saying “he wouldn’t go peacefully.” The majority discounts Torkelsen’s criminal history and “warnings” to law enforcement as “insufficient, in itself, to support a reasonable and articulable suspicion.... ” Supra at ¶ 16 (emphasis added). By examining this fact by itself, the majority again takes a fact out of the context of a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis. His criminal history and threats towards law enforcement were two more facts the officers could consider. In the context of this murder investigation, the officers were allowed to consider Tor-kelsen’s criminal history, threat, location when stopped, failure to yield to emergency vehicles, presence at the crime scene, and utter lack of reaction upon seeing the burnt body.
F
[¶ 34] The sixth factor is the seriousness of the crime in evaluating the reasonableness of the officer’s action.
[¶ 35] The severity of this crime cannot be disputed. As the United States Supreme Court has said, the test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment includes consideration of the severity of the crime at issue, and flight to evade arrest. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396, 109 S.Ct. 1865; Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8-9, 105 S.Ct. 1694, 85 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985).
[¶36] Torkelsen was not immediately arrested but was wanted for questioning. Although the officers had not observed Torkelsen committing any illegal acts, all facts known to the officers led them to believe that Torkelsen could have information relevant to the homicide investigation. The officers acted as any reasonable person in the officers’ position would, and therefore they had a reasonable and artic-ulable suspicion to stop Torkelsen’s vehicle.
II
[¶ 37] Torkelsen was seen at the crime scene shortly after an apparent homicide. He did not seem surprised by the sight of a burning body. He had a known history of violence and threatened violence. He failed to yield to approaching emergency vehicles. He was leaving the community where the crime had apparently been committed under circumstances that suggested flight. These factors taken together provided the officers with a reasonable suspicion to stop Torkelsen for questioning about an apparent homicide. I would affirm.
[¶ 38] Dale V. Sandstrom