Court Opinion

ID: 9380401
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-17 22:00:30.910668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:24.795107
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       MAR 17 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No. 21-35804

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. No. 2:18-cv-00712-RSM

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*

CAROL L. ENGEN,

                Defendant-Appellant.

 and

KING COUNTY; QUALSTAR CREDIT
UNION,

                Defendants,

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Western District of Washington
                   Ricardo S. Martinez, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted March 14, 2023**

Before:      SILVERMAN, SUNG, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

       *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
       **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      Carol L. Engen appeals pro se from the district court’s summary judgment

for the United States in its action to reduce to judgment frivolous filing penalties

for tax years 2004 through 2008 and unpaid taxes, penalties, and interest for tax

years 2005 and 2007, and to enforce liens against her property. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Hughes v. United

States, 953 F.2d 531, 541 (9th Cir. 1992). We affirm.

      The district court properly granted summary judgment because the

government submitted Forms 4340 for the relevant years, and Engen failed to raise

a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the tax and penalty assessments

were invalid. See 26 U.S.C. § 6702(a) (providing for a civil penalty of $5,000 for

filing a frivolous tax return); Fed. R. Civ. P. 36(a)(3) (providing that a matter is

deemed admitted unless party serves timely answer or objection to request for

admission); Palmer v. IRS, 116 F.3d 1309, 1312 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that

the IRS’s deficiency determinations are generally entitled to a presumption of

correctness unless the taxpayer submits competent evidence that the assessments

were “arbitrary, excessive, or without foundation”); Hughes, 953 F.2d at 535

(absent contrary evidence, official certificates, such as a Form 4340, constitute

proof of fact that assessments were actually and properly made). Engen does not

dispute the government’s contention that her arguments regarding the validity of

the liens are moot because Engen sold the property, and the liens were removed.

                                           2                                     21-35804
      We reject as without merit and unsupported by the record Engen’s

contentions regarding joinder of the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”); the district

and bankruptcy courts’ alleged operation in a “secret jurisdiction”; Engen’s alleged

tender of payment in the form of a letter of credit; the IRS’s alleged refusal to issue

refunds; Engen’s disputed status as a taxpayer; the district court’s denial of her

motions to recuse; and alleged judicial bias.

      We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued

in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on

appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).

      AFFIRMED.

                                          3                                       21-35804