Court Opinion

ID: 9960376
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 00:00:42.34857+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:24.884179
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-20627       Document: 59-1      Page: 1    Date Filed: 04/15/2024

        United States Court of Appeals
             for the Fifth Circuit
                             ____________                United States Court of Appeals
                                                                  Fifth Circuit

                                                                FILED
                              No. 22-20627                  April 15, 2024
                             ____________
                                                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                Clerk
Marcus Anderson; Reed Clark,

                                                      Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                   versus

Harris County,

                                         Defendant—Appellee.
               ______________________________

               Appeal from the United States District Court
                   for the Southern District of Texas
                        USDC No. 4:19-CV-4920
               ______________________________

Before Wiener, Haynes, and Higginson, Circuit Judges.
Haynes, Circuit Judge:
      Plaintiffs Marcus Anderson and Reed Clark appeal the district court’s
dismissal of their § 1983 claims against Harris County. For the reasons set
forth below, we AFFIRM.
                              I.   Background
      This case involves allegations from current and former Harris County
employees that Constable Christopher Diaz violated their First Amendment
rights. Plaintiffs allege that, after Diaz was elected as constable of Harris
County Precinct Two, he “instituted reforms . . . to ensure that he would
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                                 No. 22-20627

continue to be elected.” These reforms included requiring employees to
work on the Diaz campaign by (1) securing capital and (2) performing
administrative functions such as notifying employees of campaign events.
The employees further allege that Diaz retaliated against any employee who
impeded campaign functions. For example, Diaz allegedly disciplined every
employee “who participated in the Texas Rangers investigation into
misappropriated [Hurricane] Harvey donations by the Diaz campaign.”
Diaz also allegedly “conditioned advancement within Precinct Two upon a
quantitative evaluation of that employee’s contribution to the Diaz
campaign, such that, coveted positions would go to [the] employee who had
contributed the most.” Plaintiffs assert that Diaz’s employees suffered
various adverse employment actions ranging from transfer to termination.
       As relevant here, Plaintiffs allege Diaz had final authority over
employment decisions. A former constable for Precinct Three submitted an
affidavit stating that he was a policymaker regarding employment decisions
and that neither the Harris County Sherriff’s Office nor the Commissioners
Court oversaw the creation of those policies.
       In December 2019, Plaintiffs initiated this suit against Diaz and Harris
County under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming Diaz violated their First
Amendment rights. Harris County subsequently filed a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Finding that Diaz was
not a policymaker for Harris County, the district court granted the motion
and dismissed with prejudice all claims against the county. At that time, the
district court declined to enter a final judgment as to Harris County.
However, two years later, when Plaintiffs moved for a final judgment as to
Harris County due to Diaz’s interlocutory appeal based upon his claim of
qualified immunity, the district court issued a final judgment regarding the

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claims against Harris County, allowing the Plaintiffs to appeal. 1 Plaintiffs
timely appealed.
                    II.     Jurisdiction & Standard of Review
        The district court properly exercised jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
§ 1983 claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction to review
the district court’s partial final judgment entered pursuant to Rule 54(b). 28
U.S.C. § 1291.
        We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim, “applying the same standard applied by the district
court.” Masel v. Villarreal, 924 F.3d 734, 742–43 (5th Cir. 2019), as revised
(June 6, 2019). In conducting this review, we “accept as true any well-
pleaded factual allegations” but do not “accept as true legal conclusions.”
Id. at 743. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter . . . to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
                                  III.     Discussion
        Plaintiffs raise two issues on appeal: (1) whether Diaz is a policymaker
regarding     employment-related          decisions     for    Harris     County      and,
alternatively, (2) whether Harris County, through its Commissioners Court,
delegated policymaking authority or rubber stamped Diaz’s employment
decisions.
    A. Policymaker

        _____________________
        1
          The two appeals were not consolidated. The district court had denied Diaz’s
claim of qualified immunity, and he lost his interlocutory appeal. Anderson v. Diaz, No. 22-
20525, 2023 WL 8521395, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 8, 2023) (per curiam). Thus, this appeal
addresses only the claims against Harris County.

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                                  No. 22-20627

       Plaintiffs may bring § 1983 claims against municipalities for violations
of their constitutional rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694
(1978). However, “[i]t is well established that a [municipality] is not liable
under § 1983 on the theory of respondeat superior.” Valle v. City of Houston,
613 F.3d 536, 541 (5th Cir. 2010). Thus, to establish municipal liability, a
plaintiff must identify “a policymaker; an official policy; and a violation of
constitutional rights whose ‘moving force’ is the policy or custom.”
Piotrowski v. City of Houston, 237 F.3d 567, 578 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Monell, 436 U.S. at 694). Here, the district court found that Diaz is not a
policymaker because a constable serving a single precinct does not make
employment policy for all of Harris County. We agree.
       Our precedent makes clear that a constable’s employment decisions
within his own precinct do not constitute county-wide policy. In Rhode v.
Denson we were “unpersuaded that a constable of a Texas county precinct
occupies a relationship to the County such that his edicts or acts may fairly
be said to represent official county policy.” 776 F.2d 107, 108 (5th Cir. 1985).
Plaintiffs argue that Rhode is limited to a constable’s role when making
arrests. But our subsequent cases apply Rhode to constables’ employment
decisions. See, e.g., Tonkin v. Harris County, 257 F. App’x 762, 763 (5th Cir.
2007) (per curiam) (holding that a constable did not act as a policymaker
when he allegedly violated the plaintiffs’ First Amendment rights by
retaliating against them for refusing to support his election campaign);
Bowden v. Jefferson County, 676 F. App’x 251, 256 (5th Cir. 2017) (“As the
constable of one out of eight precincts in Jefferson County, [the constable]
may have been a decision maker for a single precinct, but he was not a
policymaker for all of Jefferson County when he constructively terminated
[the plaintiff].”); Frank v. Harris County, 118 F. App’x 799, 802 (5th Cir.
2004) (holding that a constable was not acting as a policymaker for the county
when he discharged a deputy).

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        Although Plaintiffs have alleged that Diaz had complete control over
employment decisions for Precinct Two, 2 they have not alleged or argued
that he made employment decisions for the entire county, nor could they.
Accordingly, Diaz, as a constable of a single precinct, is not a final
policymaker for Harris County. 3
    B. Delegation or Rubber Stamp
        Plaintiffs alternatively argue that Harris County is liable for Diaz’s
employment decisions under a delegation or rubber-stamp theory. Both
theories fail in this case.
        First, Plaintiffs improperly rely on Harris County v. Nagel for its
delegation theory. 349 S.W.3d 769 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011,
pet. denied). In Nagel, the court held that a constable was a policymaker for
the county because the Commissioners Court delegated authority to him. Id.
at 794. But there, the Commissioners Court delegated authority over mental-
health warrants in the entire county to the constable of a single precinct. Id.
Plaintiffs here have neither alleged nor argued that Diaz received authority
over more than his own precinct. We have previously rejected the extension
of Nagel to employment decisions for individual precincts, and we do so here.
Bowden, 676 F. App’x at 256 (“[T]he Texas court’s finding that the Harris

        _____________________
        2
         This ability to make final employment decisions does not equate to the ability to
make final policy. See Bolton v. City of Dallas, 541 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2008) (per curiam)
(“[D]iscretion to exercise a particular function does not necessarily entail final
policymaking authority over that function.”); Zarnow v. City of Wichita Falls, 614 F.3d 161,
167 (5th Cir. 2010) (“The fact that an official’s decisions are final is insufficient to
demonstrate policymaker status.”).
        3
         Plaintiffs also argue that, because sheriffs are policymakers, so are constables. But
we have repeatedly distinguished sheriffs and constables because a sheriff’s authority is
county-wide, while a constable has authority over only a single precinct. See, e.g., Rhode,
776 F.2d at 109; Bolton, 541 F.3d at 550 n.4.

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County Precinct 1 Constable was a policymaker is limited to that County’s
constable for the specific purpose covered by the broad delegation of serving
mental-health warrants. The limited holding in Nagel is inapplicable here.”
(footnote omitted)). Because Harris County did not delegate authority to
hire and fire to Diaz over the entire county, Plaintiffs’ delegation theory fails.
        Second, Plaintiffs assert that Harris County is liable because the
Commissioners Court rubber stamped Diaz’s decisions by accepting them
without question. We have not applied a theory that merely failing to
disagree with something a constable did (without any allegation that the
Commissioners Court knew the details) allows for a rubber-stamp theory of
municipal liability. Rather, we have held a plaintiff may establish municipal
liability through a ratification theory. See Young v. Bd. of Supervisors, 927 F.3d
898, 903 (5th Cir. 2019) (“If the authorized policymakers approve a
subordinate’s decision and the basis for it, their ratification would be
chargeable to the municipality because their decision is final.” (emphasis
added) (quotation omitted)).            There are certainly no pleadings of such
action. Thus, we need not even address the rubber-stamp theory here. 4
         More importantly, Plaintiffs have not alleged that the county
maintained a policy authorizing constables to condition employment on
campaign contributions. Nor have Plaintiffs alleged that the Commissioners

        _____________________
        4
          Even if we adopted a rubber-stamp theory of liability, Plaintiffs would fail to meet
their burden of establishing it. According to their allegations and affidavit, the
Commissioners Court had no control over Diaz’s employment decisions and no
involvement in the employment process. Texas courts have also held that “[o]nly the
constable has supervisory authority over the deputy constables; the commissioners court’s
only authority over the deputies is budgetary.” Nagel, 349 S.W.3d at 793; see also Renken
v. Harris County, 808 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ)
(“The Commissioners Court does exercise budgetary powers over the positions in the
Constable’s office. However, it has no authority by virtue of that budgetary power, to
appoint or terminate a deputy constable.”).

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Court had any knowledge of Diaz’s employment decisions on that basis, let
alone alleged that the Commissioners Court approved Diaz’s decisions and
his unconstitutional basis for them. Under Plaintiffs’ alleged facts, Diaz’s
actions were based on his own policy (that he likely hid from the
Commissioners Court)—not the policy of Harris County. Plaintiffs’ claims
are thus more appropriately directed at Diaz alone. See Anderson v. Diaz, No.
22-20525, 2023 WL 8521395, at *1 (5th Cir. Dec. 8, 2023) (per curiam)
(affirming district court’s denial of qualified immunity to Diaz).
       In sum, Plaintiffs have not alleged sufficient facts to plausibly show
Harris County adopted a policy that violated their First Amendment rights.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ assertion of municipal liability fails.
                              IV.      Conclusion
       Because Plaintiffs have failed to show that the alleged First
Amendment violations were the result of an official county policy, we
AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of their claims against Harris
County.

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