Court Opinion

ID: 9898662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 21:07:39.755638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:55.476892
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                              No. 125,549

               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                       v.

                                        VICTOR R. CHAPPELL,
                                             Appellant.

                                    MEMORANDUM OPINION

        Appeal from Sedgwick District Court; BRUCE C. BROWN, judge. Submitted without oral
argument. Opinion filed November 9, 2023. Affirmed.

        Kristen B. Patty, of Wichita, for appellant.

        Lance J. Gillett, assistant district attorney, Marc Bennett, district attorney, and Kris W. Kobach,
attorney general, for appellee.

Before COBLE, P.J., MALONE and WARNER, JJ.

        PER CURIAM: Victor R. Chappell appeals his sentence after pleading guilty to one
count of aggravated battery. Chappell claims the district court erred in classifying two
2009 Oklahoma convictions for eluding a police officer as person crimes in determining
his criminal history score. The State argues that both out-of-state convictions were
properly classified as person crimes under the plain language of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-
6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d). We agree with the State and affirm the district court's judgment.

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                                          FACTS

       On July 7, 2021, the State charged Chappell with one count of aggravated robbery
committed in May 2021. Chappell later pleaded no contest to a reduced charge of
aggravated battery. The presentence investigation (PSI) report scored Chappell's criminal
history as A. The PSI report included 37 prior convictions. Chappell objected to entries
11, 23, and 29, all out-of-state convictions, which he argued were improperly scored as
person felonies under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6811(e).

       At the sentencing hearing on April 28, 2022, the parties agreed that entry 11, an
Oklahoma conviction for assault and battery against a detention officer, was a
misdemeanor and no longer in dispute for scoring purposes. The district court then heard
argument on whether entries 23 and 29, both for eluding a police officer in Oklahoma,
were person crimes. The State admitted into evidence certified journal entries of both
convictions. The State argued that the Oklahoma convictions should be scored as person
felonies under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d) because the crimes required the
presence of a person, other than the defendant, a charged accomplice, or another person
with whom the defendant is engaged in a drug transaction.

       The Oklahoma statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 540A, which has not been amended
since Chappell's convictions, defines the offense of eluding a police officer. The statute
includes three subsections. Subsection A defines a misdemeanor offense and subsections
B and C define felony offenses. Subsections B and C both require danger or risk of harm
to another person. Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 540A. Because Chappell did not dispute that he
was convicted of felony offenses, the State argued that either subsection under which
Chappell could have been convicted required the presence of another person. As a result,
both convictions had to be person felonies for criminal history purposes.

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       Chappell agreed that K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d) defined a person
crime as involving any other person besides "the defendant, a charged accomplice or
another person with whom the defendant is engaged in the sale, distribution or transfer of
a controlled substance or non-controlled substance." Chappell assumed the other person
involved in his offenses were the police officers being eluded, and he argued the presence
of a police officer does not satisfy the spirit of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d).
The district court agreed with the State and found that because subsections B and C of the
Oklahoma statute required the presence of another person and because Chappell had to
have been convicted under one of those subsections, the convictions must be scored as
person felonies under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d).

       After resolving Chappell's objections to the PSI report, the district court found that
Chappell had a criminal history score of B. The district court sentenced Chappell to a 31-
month term of imprisonment with 12-months' postrelease supervision. Chappell later
moved to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion after holding an
evidentiary hearing. Chappell timely appealed the district court's judgment.

                                         ANALYSIS

       Chappell's sole claim on appeal is that the district court erred in classifying his
2009 Oklahoma convictions for eluding a police officer as person felonies. Chappell
claims that categorizing the police officers in those offenses as the other person under
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d) violates "the spirit" of the law. We note that
under the statement of the case section of his brief, Chappell states that he is also
appealing "the denial of his motion to withdraw plea." But Chappell does not address—or
even mention—this claim in the rest of his brief. An issue not briefed is waived or
abandoned. State v. Davis, 313 Kan. 244, 248, 485 P.3d 174 (2021).

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       The State argues that both Oklahoma convictions of eluding a police officer were
properly scored as person felonies under the plain language of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-
6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d). As a result, the State contends that Chappell receive a legal sentence.

       "Classification of prior offenses for criminal history purposes involves
interpretation of the [Revised Kansas Sentencing Guidelines Act]; statutory interpretation
is a question of law subject to unlimited review." State v. Wetrich, 307 Kan. 552, 555,
412 P.3d 984 (2018). We review de novo whether a prior conviction was properly
classified as a person or nonperson crime for criminal history purposes. State v. Dickey,
301 Kan. 1018, 1034, 350 P.3d 1054 (2015).

       The most fundamental rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the
Legislature governs if that intent can be determined. State v. LaPointe, 309 Kan. 299,
314, 434 P.3d 850 (2019). An appellate court must first try to ascertain legislative intent
through the statutory language enacted, giving common words their ordinary meanings.
State v. Ayers, 309 Kan. 162, 163-64, 432 P.3d 663 (2019). When a statute is plain and
unambiguous, an appellate court should not speculate about the legislative intent behind
that clear language, and it should avoid reading something into the statute that is not
readily found in its words. 309 Kan. at 164. Where there is no ambiguity, the court need
not resort to statutory construction. Only if the statute's language of text is unclear or
ambiguous does the court use canons of construction or legislative history to construe the
Legislature's intent. State v. Pulliam, 308 Kan. 1354, 1364, 430 P.3d 39 (2018).

       K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d) proscribes that an out-of-state felony
conviction shall be classified as a person felony if it involves "the presence of a person,
other than the defendant, a charged accomplice or another person with whom the
defendant is engaged in the sale, distribution or transfer of a controlled substance or non-
controlled substance." The parties do not dispute that both of Chappell's Oklahoma

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offenses for eluding a police officer were felonies. Instead, they dispute whether the
offenses are person or nonperson felonies.

       Chappell was convicted of two felonies for eluding a police officer in accordance
with Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 540A. The statute provides:

               "A. Any operator of a motor vehicle who has received a visual and audible
       signal, a red light and a siren from a peace officer driving a motor vehicle showing the
       same to be an official police, sheriff, highway patrol or state game ranger vehicle
       directing the operator to bring the vehicle to a stop and who willfully increases the speed
       or extinguishes the lights of the vehicle in an attempt to elude such peace officer, or
       willfully attempts in any other manner to elude the peace officer, or who does elude such
       peace officer, is guilty of a misdemeanor. . . .
               "B. Any person who violates the provisions of subsection A of this section in
       such manner as to endanger any other person shall be deemed guilty of a felony
       punishable by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for a term of not less than one (1)
       year nor more than Oklahoma Statutes - Title 21. Crimes and Punishments Page 138 five
       (5) years, or by a fine of not less than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00) nor more than
       Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or by both such fine and imprisonment.
               "C. 1. Any person who causes an accident, while eluding or attempting to elude
       an officer, resulting in great bodily injury to any other person while driving or operating a
       motor vehicle within this state and who is in violation of the provisions of subsection A
       of this section may be charged with a violation of the provisions of this subsection. Any
       person who is convicted of a violation of the provisions of this subsection shall be
       deemed guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in a state correctional institution
       for not less than one (1) year and not more than five (5) years, and a fine of not more than
       Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00)." Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 540A.

       The State argues that there was necessarily a police officer involved in both of
Chappell's convictions under the Oklahoma statute and a police officer falls within the
definition provided in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d). Therefore, the State
argues that Chappell's convictions must be scored as person felonies.

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       Chappell renews the argument he made in district court. He acknowledges the
language of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d) and concedes that his Oklahoma
convictions of eluding a police officer required the presence of the police officers being
eluded. But Chappell argues that the presence of a police officer does not satisfy "the
spirit" of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d). Thus, he claims that his Oklahoma
convictions of eluding a police officer should be classified as nonperson felonies.

       Chappell's argument is contrary to the text of the statute. K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-
6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d) says that an out-of-state conviction will be classified as a person
crime if the elements of the offense establish that the crime involves the presence of a
person other than (1) the defendant, (2) a charged accomplice, or (3) another person with
whom the defendant is engaged in the sale, distribution, or transfer of a controlled
substance or a noncontrolled substance. A police officer does not fall into one of these
categories, so a police officer qualifies as "the presence of a person" making the out-of-
state conviction a person crime under K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d).

       This court addressed a similar issue in State v. Baker, 58 Kan App. 2d 735, 742-
46, 475 P.3d 24 (2020). Baker was convicted of resisting arrest in Missouri. In a later
criminal proceeding in Kansas, Baker objected to the PSI report calculating the Missouri
conviction as a person felony. The State argued, as it does in Chappell's case, that the
police officer involved in the resisting arrest offense satisfied the definition in K.S.A.
2020 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d). The Baker court agreed with the State and found:

       "Baker fled from one or more police officers. The police officers were present during
       commission of the crime because they were trying to arrest Baker, and Baker fled from
       them. The police officers are not Baker, they were not charged accomplices of Baker's,
       and they were not assisting Baker in certain drug dealings. So Baker's prior conviction
       was properly calculated as a person offense under subsection (d)." 58 Kan. App. 2d at
       746.

                                                   6
       Chappell concedes that the holding in Baker is contrary to his position and
supports the State's argument that Chappell's Oklahoma convictions of eluding a police
officer should be scored as person crimes. Alternatively, the State argues that the
convictions of eluding a police officer can be classified as person crimes under other
subsections of K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6811(e). We decline to address those arguments.

       In sum, Chappell does not contest that a police officer was present during the
commission of the Oklahoma crimes of eluding a police officer. Chappell does not show
us why we should depart from the holding in Baker or ignore the plain language of
K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-6811(e)(3)(B)(i)(d). He also does not explain why our decision
violates the spirit of the law. As a result, we find no error in the district court's judgment.

       Affirmed.

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