Court Opinion

ID: 9891285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-18 00:00:37.398913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:36.611915
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-30030       Document: 00516934123       Page: 1     Date Filed: 10/17/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                                 ____________                                 FILED
                                                                        October 17, 2023
                                  No. 23-30030                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                 ____________                                 Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Bryant Lamont Harris,

                                             Defendant—Appellant.
                    ______________________________

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                              USDC No. 2:20-CR-71-1
                    ______________________________

   Before Elrod, Ho, and Oldham, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:
          Our previous opinion is WITHDRAWN. And the following is sub-
   stituted in its place.
                                  *      *      *
          Bryant Lamont Harris asserts that he is required by his religious faith
   to abstain from psychiatric medication. But because he is not competent to
   stand trial, the Government requested to involuntarily medicate him, and the
   district court granted the motion. We hold that Harris’s religious beliefs,
   combined with his lengthy detention and his potential civil confinement,
Case: 23-30030      Document: 00516934123             Page: 2   Date Filed: 10/17/2023

                                       No. 23-30030

   lessen the Government’s interests in forcible medication. We accordingly re-
   mand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
                                            I.
          Harris was charged for threatening to assault a federal judge in viola-
   tion of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B). In February 2020, the FBI received infor-
   mation from the United States Marshals regarding threats made against
   Judge Susie Morgan and her staff. In response, FBI agents were dispatched
   to conduct interviews with Judge Morgan and her staff.
          Based on the interviews, the agents determined that a male who iden-
   tified himself as Bryant Lamont Harris had contacted Judge Morgan’s cham-
   bers via telephone and complained about the New Orleans Police Depart-
   ment. Harris asserted that he was an Army veteran and had been expertly
   trained in marksmanship. He then asked how many security personnel were
   assigned to Judge Morgan. When asked why he needed that information, he
   replied, “I need to know how many people I need to take out to get to the
   Judge.” He then said, “I’m not hiding” and “I don’t give a f---,” and then
   hung up the phone. The FBI later learned that Harris had contacted Judge
   Morgan’s chambers several times before.
          Harris was subsequently arrested, detained, and indictment for threat-
   ening to assault a federal judge in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B).
   Shortly after his arrest, Harris underwent a behavioral health evaluation.
   Among other things, the evaluation noted Harris’s delusional belief that he
   was offered “multiple women and $500k a month contract to join the Illumi-
   nati” due to his “special gifts.”
          Given his delusions, the district court held a hearing to determine
   whether Harris was competent to stand trial. The court determined that Har-
   ris was incompetent and ordered that he be committed to the custody of the
   Attorney General. Specifically, the order stated that the Attorney General

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   “shall hospitalize Harris for treatment in a suitable facility for such a reason-
   able period of time, not to exceed four months, as is necessary to determine
   whether there is a substantial probability that in the foreseeable future he will
   attain the capacity to permit the proceedings to go forward.” The court also
   ordered the Attorney General to provide “reports on [Harris’s] mental com-
   petency” throughout the confinement period. Harris appealed the district
   court’s incompetency determination, and we affirmed. United States v. Har-
   ris, No. 21-30326, 2022 WL 1044915 (5th Cir. Apr. 7, 2022).
          Toward the end of the confinement period, the district court received
   a report from Forensic Psychologist Brianna Glover. The report noted that
   Harris remained incompetent to stand trial. Furthermore, because Harris
   had been refusing medication, the report also recommended that Harris be
   involuntary treated with psychotropic medication. In light of that recommen-
   dation, the district court held a status conference and ordered the parties to
   submit briefing on the first so-called “Sell factor” (i.e., whether the Govern-
   ment has an important interest to warrant involuntary medication). Sell v.
   United States, 539 U.S. 166, 180 (2003). The district court also issued an or-
   der directing the Bureau of Prisons to prepare an addendum outlining in de-
   tail the proposed treatment plan and other details pertinent to the Sell factors.
          The court then conducted another hearing once it received the adden-
   dum. During that hearing, Harris raised a religious objection to being invol-
   untarily medicated, without identifying a particular source of law. The dis-
   trict court denied the objection, concluding that: (1) the Government had a
   compelling interest in prosecuting Harris’s crime, which was not outweighed
   by Harris’s religious liberty interests; and (2) the Government satisfied the
   four Sell factors. Thus, the court ordered that Harris “shall be involuntarily
   medicated, in an attempt to render him competent to stand trial.”

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          Harris timely appealed. “In reviewing a district court’s order to med-
   icate a defendant involuntarily, we review findings of fact for clear error and
   conclusions of law de novo.” United States v. Gutierrez, 704 F.3d 442, 448 (5th
   Cir. 2013). “A factual finding is not clearly erroneous as long as it is plausible
   in light of the record read as a whole.” United States v. Dinh, 920 F.3d 307,
   310 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
                                          II.
          To forcibly medicate a criminal defendant for the purpose of restoring
   his competency to stand trial, the Government must establish that:
   (A) “important governmental interests are at stake,” taking into account that
   “[s]pecial circumstances may lessen the importance of that interest”;
   (B) “involuntary medication will significantly further those . . . interests”;
   (C) “involuntary medication is necessary to further those interests”; and
   (D) “administration of the drugs is medically appropriate.” Sell, 539 U.S. at
   180–81 (2003). Each factor must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.
   United States v. James, 938 F.3d 719, 723 (5th Cir. 2019).
          Here, we need only consider the first Sell factor. There are two
   “[s]pecial circumstances” that lessen the Government’s interests and
   necessitate reversal of the district court’s forcible-medication order. Sell, 539
   U.S. at 180.
          First, Harris has served significant time as a pre-trial detainee. He has
   been detained since his arrest on February 14, 2020. As of October 2023, he
   has been detained for almost 44 months. If the Government was allowed to
   forcibly medicate Harris, the psychiatrist indicated that it would take four-to-
   eight months before Harris could stand trial. So by the time of his
   hypothetical trial, Harris would have been incarcerated for 48 to 52 months.
   And that substantially exceeds the applicable Guidelines range for his
   offense, which is only 37 to 46 months.

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          True, the Government has an important interest in “bringing to trial
   an individual accused of a serious crime.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. And even if
   Harris was eventually sentenced to time served, that would not extinguish
   the Government’s interest in securing his conviction. James, 959 F.3d at 664;
   see also id. (“The government bears an interest not in punishing her per se
   but in trying her and vindicating the law publicly.”). But “not extinguished”
   is not the same as “not lessened.” And on this point, Sell is clear: “[T]he
   possibility that [Harris] has already been confined for a significant amount of
   time” serves as a “[s]pecial circumstance[]” that “lessens[s]” the
   Government’s interest in bringing him to trial. 539 U.S. at 180.
          Second, religious faith constitutes a “[s]pecial circumstance” that
   lessens the Government’s interest in forcible medication. In Sell, the Court
   listed a series of non-exhaustive and case-specific special circumstances that
   courts should consider in making forcible-medication decisions. The Court
   explained that, while the Government has an interest in bringing defendants
   to trial, it “has a concomitant, constitutionally essential interest in assuring
   that the defendant’s trial is a fair one.” Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. And the
   defendant’s special circumstances can lessen the Government’s trial
   interests. Id. True, the special circumstances listed by the Sell Court were
   purely secular—things like the potential for future civil confinement of the
   defendant and the time already served by the defendant. Id. If such secular
   circumstances are important enough to lessen the Government’s interest in
   prosecution, however, we believe religious liberty must be at least as
   important. Cf. Tandon v. Newsom, 141 S. Ct. 1294, 1296 (2021) (per curiam).
          Here, Harris faces a pending civil-confinement hearing in North
   Carolina. Moreover, he asserts that his religious belief as a Jehovah’s Witness
   prevents him from taking medication. He further asserts that forcible
   medication would violate his “constitutionally protected liberty.” The
   Government does not dispute that Harris’s religious faith can qualify as a

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   “special factor” under Sell. See Red Br. at 13–15; cf. Ramirez v. Collier, 595
   U.S. 411, 426 (2022). Harris’s religious beliefs, combined with his lengthy
   detention and his potential civil confinement, thus lessen the Government’s
   interests under the first Sell factor.
          We hasten to emphasize the limits in today’s holding. We do not hold
   that religious faith constitutes a get-out-of-jail-free card. We also do not hold
   that all religious objections eliminate the Government’s interests under the
   first Sell factor. We hold only that religious liberty can constitute a “special
   circumstance” under Sell, and that Harris properly raised a religious
   objection to forcible medication here. That well-taken special circumstance,
   combined with other factors identified above, necessitates the district court’s
   reevaluation of the Government’s efforts to forcibly medicate him.
          The district court’s order is VACATED, and the case is
   REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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