Court Opinion

ID: 9479567
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:21:42.959817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:07.069524
License: Public Domain

EDWARDS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
This case involves a claim by the plaintiffs-appellants, five consumer organiza*432tions and one senior citizen research and advocacy organization (collectively, “Public Citizen”), that the lack of consumer representation on the National Advisory Committee on Microbiological Criteria for Foods (“the Committee”) violates section 5 of the Federal Advisory Committee Act (“FACA” or “the Act”), 5 U.S.C. App. 2 § 5(b)(2), (3) (1982). The District Court dismissed the case, finding that the plaintiffs had “offered no specific evidence that their viewpoints are not adequately represented by the Committee.” Public Citizen v. National Advisory Comm, on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 708 F.Supp. 359, 364 (D.D.C.1988).
Judge Friedman and Judge Silberman have voted separately to affirm. Judge Friedman agrees with the District Court that the plaintiffs have not made out their claim on the merits, and Judge Silberman has concluded that the plaintiffs lack standing and that their claim is not justiciable. Because I believe that the question presented is justiciable, that Public Citizen does have standing and that the absence of any consumer representative on the Committee violates FACA, I would reverse the judgment of the District Court and remand the case for further consideration.
I. Justioiability
Under section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), agency action is judicially reviewable
except to the extent that — (1) statutes preclude judicial review; or (2) agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.
5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (1982). Over the years, the Supreme Court and this court have emphasized that preclusion is a very narrow exception under the APA, not the norm. In other words, section 10 “creates a strong presumption of reviewability that can be rebutted only by a clear showing that judicial review would be inappropriate.” Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1043 (D.C.Cir.1979). As the Supreme Court explained in Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 106 S.Ct. 2133, 90 L.Ed.2d 623 (1986), the reason for this rule is that
[w]e ordinarily presume that Congress intends the executive to obey its statutory commands and, accordingly, that it expects the courts to grant relief when an executive violates such a command.
Id. at 681, 106 S.Ct. at 2141. See also Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560, 567, 95 S.Ct. 1851, 1857, 44 L.Ed.2d 377 (1975) (discussing the presumption of reviewability as it relates to APA section 701(a)(1)); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410, 91 S.Ct. 814, 820, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971) (discussing the presumption of reviewability as it relates to APA section 701(a)(2)); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140, 87 S.Ct. 1507, 1510, 18 L.Ed.2d 681 (1967) (noting that the APA “embodies the basic presumption of judicial review”).
There is no claim here, nor could there be, that Congress expressed an intention to preclude review of appointments made pursuant to section 5 of FACA. Therefore, the plaintiffs’ suit is not barred by section 10(a)(1) of the APA. So the only question at issue is whether, as Judge Silberman contends, this suit is barred by section 10(a)(2) of the APA because the agency action at issue “is committed to agency discretion by law.” Under this view, one must find that the “fairly balanced” requirement in section 5 of FACA “ ‘committed’ the decisionmaking to the agency’s judgment absolutely.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830, 105 S.Ct. 1649, 1655, 84 L.Ed.2d 714 (1985). On the record of this case, such an interpretation simply cannot be supported, either by reference to the terms of FACA or pursuant to the case law construing section 10(a)(2) of the APA.
In order for the “committed to agency discretion” exception to preclude judicial review altogether, the Government must establish that “the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency’s exercise of discretion.” Chaney, 470 at 830, 105 S.Ct. at 1655. See also Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 108 S.Ct. 2047, 2052, 100 L.Ed.2d 632 (1988) (same). This standard *433has been understood to mean that judicial review is precluded under section 10(a)(2) only “in those rare instances where ‘statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.’ ” Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 410, 91 S.Ct. at 821 (quoting S.Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26 (1945)). There is nothing in FACA or its legislative history to indicate that the “fairly balanced” requirement affords executive discretion sufficient for us to find that “there is no law to apply.” Indeed, just the opposite is true, because it is clear that Congress enacted the “fairly balanced” requirement to constrain executive discretion and to establish a measurable standard against which to judge executive action. In short, this is not a case like Webster v. Doe1 in which the applicable statutory standard “exudes deference” to the agency and thus “foreclose[s] the application of any meaningful judicial standard of review.” 108 S.Ct. at 2052.
As Judge Friedman’s opinion notes, this court already has found that FACA’s legislative history makes clear that
the “fairly balanced” requirement was designed to ensure that persons or groups directly affected by the work of a particular advisory committee would have some representation on the committee. See S.Rep. No. 1098, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972); H.R.Rep. No. 1017, [92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972)]. When the requirement is ignored, therefore, persons having a direct interest in the committee’s purpose suffer injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing to sue.
National Anti-Hunger Coalition v. Executive Committee of the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, 711 F.2d 1071, 1074 n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1983).2 The question of justiciability of claims under section 5 of FACA is thus not an open issue in this circuit.3
Furthermore, just this past Term, the Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history of FACA and concluded that the Act’s “principal purpose was to enhance the public accountability of advisory committees established by the Executive Branch and to reduce wasteful expenditures on them.” Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 2568, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989). In analyzing a claim arising under the section of FACA that provides for access to meetings and records, the Court in Public Citizen never expresses even the slightest doubt over the justiciability of the plaintiffs' suit. Nor can any be expressed here. If, as the Supreme Court has told us, FACA is designed to ensure “public accountability” on the part of the Executive Branch, it is reasonable to assume that Congress “ex*434pects the courts to grant relief when an executive agency violates [the statutory] command.” Bowen, 476 U.S. at 681, 106 S.Ct. at 2141.
It does not matter that the “fairly balanced” requirement falls short of mathematical precision in application, or that it may involve some balancing of interests by the agency. The presumption in favor of judicial review is not altered in the face of a diffuse statutory directive. Indeed, this one of the principal points of the Supreme Court’s decision in Overton Park. In that case, the Court allowed a suit under a statute that prohibited the Secretary of Transportation from authorizing the use of federal funds to finance the construction of highways through public parks if a “feasible and prudent” alternative route exists and allowed construction through parks only if there has been “all possible planning to minimize harm” to the park. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 411, 91 S.Ct. at 821. The “feasible and prudent” and “minimize harm” standards involved a significant and ill-defined weighing of interests by the agency, just as does the “fairly balanced” standard in this case. However, as the Court made clear, this did not mean that there was “no law to apply.” Id. at 410-13, 91 S.Ct. at 820-22. While the difficulty of determining what precisely constitutes a “fair balance” may incline courts to be deferential in reviewing the composition of advisory committees and may defeat a plaintiffs claims in a given case, this cannot be grounds for refusing to enforce the provision altogether. “When the [fair balance] requirement is ignored, persons having a direct interest in the committee’s purpose suffer injury-in-fact sufficient to confer standing to sue.” National Anti-Hunger Coalition, 711 F.2d at 1074 n. 2. The courts therefore have a duty to hear and decide such cases. Judicial responsibility cannot be abdicated merely because a case poses a difficult question for resolution.
II. Standing
It has been suggested that even if the plaintiffs’ claim is justiciable, they have no standing to sue in this case. The doctrine of standing encompasses three separate requirements: a distinct and palpable injury, an injury “fairly traceable” to the challenged action and an injury likely to be redressed by the requested relief. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3324, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984). The concurring opinion questions the plaintiffs’ standing on the third ground — re-dressability — arguing that there should be no standing because a court would be forced to make arbitrary policy judgments in assessing the balance of the Committee. It is clear, however, that there is no basis to deny standing in this case. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, — U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989), makes this point quite clear.
First, it is important to note that, for purposes of standing, we need not determine whether the membership of the Committee is or is not fairly balanced. As this court noted in Metcalf v. National Petroleum Council, in assessing standing, “we are required to ‘accept as true all material allegations of the complaint....’” 553 F.2d 176, 180 (1977) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2206, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975)).
Second, there are no problems here with redressability. The plaintiffs contend simply that the Committee must have some consumer representation in order to meet the “fairly balanced” requirement. The alleged injury from the lack of any consumer representative is easily remedied by the relief requested by Public Citizen — an injunction suspending operation of the Committee until consumers are represented on it.
Finally, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, — U.S.-, 109 S.Ct. 2558, 105. L.Ed.2d 377 (1989), confirms that the plaintiffs do have standing. Analyzing a section of FACA that provides for access to meetings and records, the Supreme Court concluded that even though many of these meetings might be legitimately closed to the public and many documents might be *435shielded from public view, a ruling in the appellants’ favor would allow some increased notice and access to information. Id. 109 S.Ct. at 2564. The Court held that, with regard to redressability, these “potential gains are undoubtedly sufficient to give them standing.” Id. (footnote omitted). Similarly, in this ease, it does not matter that every one of the plaintiffs’ preferred viewpoints might not be represented on the Committee or that they might not be afforded the precise extent of representation sought on the Committee. Their “potential gains” of some representation are sufficient to give them standing. Id.4
III. Mootness
I agree with Judge Friedman that the Department of Agriculture’s recent appointment to the Committee of one of Public Citizen’s nominees, Dr. Frank Calia, does not render this case moot. As Judge Friedman correctly notes, there is still an “actual controversy” between the parties over the legality of the Committee’s composition, despite the addition of Dr. Calia to the Committee.
In my view, however, this court is in no position to consider the appointment of Dr. Calia in weighing the merits of this case. An appellate court ordinarily has no fact-finding function, as this circuit has noted repeatedly. See, e.g., National Anti-Hunger Coalition, 711 F.2d at 1075; Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 371 (D.C.Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927, 100 S.Ct. 1312, 63 L.Ed.2d 759 (1980).
It cannot receive new evidence from the parties, determine where the truth actually lies, and base its decision on that determination. Factfinding and the creation of a record are the functions of the district court; therefore, the consideration of newly-discovered evidence is a matter for the district court.
Goland, 607 F.2d at 371.
Judge Friedman may be right that Dr. Calia’s recent appointment to the Committee shows that the Committee is “fairly balanced.” But we are in no position to decide this question, especially in the face of the strongly competing claims of the parties concerning the effect of Dr. Calia’s appointment. I would refer this matter to the District Court for consideration on remand.
IV. The Merits
As Judge Friedman’s opinion sets forth, the appropriate inquiry in determining whether the Committee’s membership satisfies the “fairly balanced” standard in section 5(b)(2) is “whether the Committee’s members ‘represent a fair balance of viewpoints given the functions to be performed’ ” (quoting National Anti-Hunger Coalition, 711 F.2d at 1074). The function of the Committee has played a critical role in the outcome of previous decisions, and is the basis for my divergence from the panel opinion over whether the Committee is “fairly balanced” absent any representative of consumer interests on the record before us.
In applying section 5, courts have paid special attention to the mandate of the advisory committee. Thus, in National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, *436Civ. Action No. 88-186, slip op. at 9-10, 1988 WL 21700 at 8-9 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1988), the District Court determined that the Commission need not include a critic of privatization where the function of the Commission was primarily to study and report on which activities of the federal government are more appropriately part of the private sector, rather than to determine whether privatization is a good policy. Similarly, in National Anti-Hunger Coalition, this court held that a commission composed entirely of leaders of private industry was not unbalanced when the purpose of the commission was to apply private sector expertise to the task of improving the cost-effectiveness of the federal government. See 711 F.2d at 1074. On remand, however, the District Court determined that the commission had strayed from its narrow area of cost and management control into more substantive legislative policy issues affecting the rights of recipients of federal food benefits, who were not represented on the commission. In this respect, the court found the commission unbalanced, in violation of FACA. See National Anti-Hunger Coalition, 566 F.Supp. 1515, 1517 (D.D.C.1983).
In the instant case, the Committee is charged with recommending “microbiological criteria by which the safety and wholesomeness of food can be assessed, including criteria for microorganisms that indicate whether foods have been processed using good manufacturing practices.” 52 Fed.Reg. 43,216 (1987). This is precisely the type of committee on which Congress believed that consumer representation was important. Congress saw a specific need for public interest representation on committees involved in issues of public concern.
The report accompanying the House version of FACA identified as an example of a committee that would not meet the “fairly balanced” requirement one established to propose a national industrial wastes inventory questionnaire but which contained predominantly “representatives of industry” and excluded persons representing “conservation, environment, clean water, consumer, or other public interest groups.” H.R. Rep. No. 1017, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1972), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, p. 3491 [hereinafter House Report]. Food contamination affects consumers at least as directly as a national industrial wastes inventory and, although scientific and technical expertise is essential in both instances, the need for technical expertise does not negate the requirement of fairly balancing points of view. Cf. National Academy of SCIENCES, Meat and Poultry Inspection, The Scientific Basis of the Nation’s Program 160 (1985) (concluding that in some cases the “low level of communication with communities outside industry can lead to inappropriate decisions that may affect public health”).
The Committee at issue in this case is charged with recommending regulations for a broad range of food products. These decisions have health and safety implications that directly affect consumers. Recommendations regarding these regulations involve complex policy choices, not merely — or even primarily — technical determinations. For these reasons, especially in light of the legislative history of section 5, I disagree with Judge Friedman’s opinion that the Committee’s mandate in this instance was “primarily technical and scientific,” and I conclude that a fair balance of viewpoints cannot be achieved without representation of consumer interests.5
This leads to a second point: whether consumer interests are represented on the Committee as composed on the record before us. The District Court made no finding whether consumers are represented on *437the Committee; it simply found that the plaintiffs had presented no evidence that their viewpoints were not represented. See Public Citizen v. National Advisory Comm, on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 708 F.Supp. at 363-64. This is the wrong standard. Congress clearly did not intend courts to inquire into the specific opinions of every committee member in order to determine if a committee is unbalanced. Rather, it accepted that a person’s viewpoints could be inferred from his or her background and employment status. Thus, the House Report described the commission on national industrial wastes inventory as defective merely because its members were representatives of industry, not because the opinions held by its individual members were unrepresentative. Cf. House RepoRt at 6. Similarly, Senator Monagan, in introducing Senate debate on the bill, explained:
[T]he most important provision here is the one which requires fair representation of different points of view upon any advisory commission, so that they will not all be educators on committees in the Department of Education and will not be all scientists, physicians, or medical men on commissions relating to the Institutes of Health.
118 Cong.Rec. 16,296 (1972).
As the legislative history indicates, Congress intended “balance” to be judged by the members’ employment status and background, not their professed personal opinions. Nothing in the Act or its legislative history even slightly indicates that Congress intended the presence or absence of balance to turn on an inquiry into the opinions of individual members. Indeed, the Government has itself acknowledged that one can presume that industry representatives will tend to represent industry interests. See Tr. of Preliminary Injunction (Sept. 22,1988) at 27-31, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 43-47. The converse also holds; if none of the Committee members has a background in consumer issues, then the Committee is unbalanced within the meaning of FACA, without regard to the specific views of the members.
The Government argues that consumers are represented by Dr. Martha Rhodes, the Assistant Commissioner of Agriculture for the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Affairs, and by Dr. Mitchell Cohen of the Centers for Disease Control. Both of these persons, however, are government employees with a variety of regulatory responsibilities. One of the dangers that Congress specifically identified in adopting FACA was the risk that governmental officials would be unduly influenced by industry leaders. See, e.g., House Report at 6; 118 Cong.Rec. 30,280 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Roth); Report by E. Winslow Turner, Special Counsel to the Intergovernmental Relations Subcommittee, reprinted in 118 Cong.Rec. 30,276 (1972). That is, it is precisely the lack of representatives of the public interest independent of both government and industry that prompted Congress to enact the “fairly balanced” provision. The fact that Dr. Rhodes and Dr. Cohen are state rather than federal government officials does not demonstrate that they will be less amenable to influence by industry representatives. This is not to impugn the integrity of either individual. Rather, it is to say that it is unnecessary for the court to assess the individual viewpoints of Dr. Rhodes and Dr. Cohen in order to find that their presence does not mitigate the lack of consumer representation. I, thus, conclude that, on the record before us, the Committee does not include any representative of consumer interests and, consequently, that it is not “fairly balanced” as required by section 5 of FACA.
Y. CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs have alleged that the Government has denied them their statutory right to representation on the Committee. This injury is redressable and is sufficient under both the constitutional and prudential limitations on standing. The alleged violation of section 5 of FACA is also judicially cognizable, because the statute and legislative history together provide courts with standards to apply in interpreting the provision.
On the merits, I believe that the plaintiffs have made out their claim that the complete absence of consumer representa*438tion violates the “fairly balanced provision of section 5. Of course, FACA does not require a consumer representative on every federal advisory committee. As prior cases have shown, at times it may be perfectly appropriate to have an advisory committee composed largely or exclusively of representatives of private industry or some other private interest. See, e.g., National Anti-Hunger Coalition, 711 F.2d at 1074; National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, Civ. Action No. 88-186, slip op. at 9-10, 1988 WL 21700 at 8-9 (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 1988). The present case, however, involves a Committee that has been charged with recommending appropriate regulation of an industry for the benefit of the public health. This is precisely the type of situation with respect to which Congress feared industry domination and saw a need for independent consumer or other public interest representation.
I would remand the case to the District Court for further review on the merits, using the proper legal standard to assess whether the Committee is “fairly balanced.” On remand, the trial court could consider whether the recent appointment of Dr. Calia moots the plaintiffs’ suit.

. In Webster v. Doe, the Court concluded that the statutory standard — which allowed termination of an Agency employee whenever the Director "shall deem such termination necessary or advisable” — “fairly exudes deference” to the administrative official, and that both the language and the legislative history exhibit "extraordinary deference” to the Director in his decision to terminate individual employees. 108 S.Ct. at 2052-53 (quoting section 102(c) of the National Security Act). Neither the language nor the legislative history of the "fairly balanced” requirement of FACA section 5 exhibit this kind of deference in selection of Advisory Committee members.

. The Senate report accompanying the legislation subsequently enacted as the Federal Advisory Committee Act notes that federal advisory committees often "do not adequately and fairly represent the public interest, [and] that they may be biased toward one point of view or interest.” S.Rep. No. 92-1098, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1972). The report goes on to characterize the fair balance provision as "requir[ing] that membership of the advisory committee shall be representative of those who have a direct interest in the purpose of such committee.” Id. at 9. There is no mention of any broad executive discretion in the selection of persons to serve on advisory committees.

.A number of claims under section 5 of FACA have been pursued in the District Court. See, e.g., National Anti-Hunger Coalition, 557 F.Supp. 524 (D.D.C.1983) (Executive Committee of the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control), aff'd, 711 F.2d 1071 (D.C.Cir.1983); National Anti-Hunger Coalition, 566 F.Supp. 1515 (D.D.C.1983) (Executive Committee of the President’s Private Sector Survey on Cost Control); National Treasury Employees Union v. Reagan, Civ. Action No. 88-186, 1988 WL 21700 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1988) (President's Commission on Privatization); National Ass’n of People with AIDS v. Reagan, Civ. Action No. 87-2777-OG, 1988 WL 36143 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 1987) (Commission on Human Immunodeficiency Virus Epidemic).

. The Government also claims that the appellants run afoul of the prudential rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed to the representative branches. The appellants in this case, however, are not claiming such a generalized grievance. The appellants claim that they have been denied their right to representation. This is not an abstract psychological or ideological injury of the kind that defeats standing on prudential grounds. See, e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 102 S.Ct. 752, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). Standing is not found wanting because an injury has been suffered by many.
The Supreme Court rejected a similar argument in Public Citizen v. Department of Justice: "The fact that other citizens or groups of citizens might make the same complaint after unsuccessfully demanding disclosure under FACA does not lessen appellants’ asserted injury_” 109 S.Ct. at 2564. The Court applies the reasoning of its decisions interpreting the Freedom of Information Act ("FOIA”) noting that these decisions “have never suggested that those requesting information under [FOIA] need show more than that they sought and were denied specific agency records.” Id. The plaintiffs in this case have alleged that they sought and were denied their right to representation.

. Judge Silberman’s opinion is concerned about the difficulty of defining "consumer” or "public interest” in light of the divergence in viewpoints held by persons or individuals that claim to represent such interests. Similarly, the District Court observed that FACA cannot be read to require every type of consumer group that may be affected by the Committee’s work be included among its members. See Public Citizen v. National Advisory Comm, on Microbiological Criteria for Foods, 708 F.Supp. 359, 363 & n. 7 (D.D.C.1988). As noted above, however, the plaintiffs are not seeking to have every consumer viewpoint represented but simply to have some consumer representation on the Committee,. The plaintiffs acknowledged at oral argument that they have no right to insist that the Government appoint consumer representatives who share their own precise viewpoints.