Court Opinion

ID: 9807078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 19:46:46.594711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:22:10.684861
License: Public Domain

KAPSNER, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶24] I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.
[¶ 25] To deprive a person of his liberty for an indefinite period of time in the civil commitment of a sexually dangerous *508individual, the State must show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the individual to be committed has a disorder that makes the individual likely to engage in further acts of sexually predatory conduct and, because of the disorder, is likely to engage in those acts. See N.D.C.C. § 25-08.3-01(8). In addition, substantive due process rights require that the individual facing civil commitment must also be shown to have serious difficulty controlling his behavior. Matter of E.W.F., 2008 ND 130, ¶ 10, 751 N.W.2d 686.
[¶ 26] I noted in my dissent in Interest of Maedche that although this Court has held the commitment laws of our state are civil in nature, our sexual predator commitment laws have to be regarded as punitive, and we must provide the usual protections that are afforded to a criminal defendant. Maedche, 2010 ND 171, ¶¶ 29-30, 788 N.W.2d 331. Although the commitment of a sexually dangerous individual is a civil proceeding, the deprivation of liberty resulting from commitment is in many ways worse than the deprivation of liberty following a conviction in a criminal proceeding because the period of commitment is indefinite. Interest of Hoff, 2013 ND 68, ¶ 10, 830 N.W.2d 608. “[T]he fervor of a rightfully outraged public” to prevent sexually predatory crimes “cannot be allowed to overcome the necessary safeguards to individual liberty the law has established.” Interest of J.M., 2006 ND 96, ¶ 18, 713 N.W.2d 518.
[¶27] Due process requires the confinement’s duration and conditions bear some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual has been committed. Matter of G.R.H., 2006 ND 56, ¶24, 711 N.W.2d 587. “Procedural due process requires fundamental fairness, which, at a minimum, necessitates notice and a meaningful opportunity for a hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Id. “A person committed as a sexually dangerous individual is entitled to certain post-commitment procedures in N.D.C.C. §§ 25-03.3-17 and 25-03.3-18, including the least restrictive treatment and an annual examination and report to the committing court.” Id. at ¶ 25. At the time of the annual examination, the committed individual has the right to have an expert examination, and, if the individual is indigent, the court shall appoint a qualified expert to examine the committed individual and report to the court. NiD.C.C. § 25-03.3-17(2).
[¶ 28] In Dr. Volk’s initial evaluation of Loy, Dr. Volk concluded Loy had a moderate to high level of risk to reoffend, but if appropriate levels of supervision could be maintained, it was likely Loy could make an adequate adjustment in the community. Dr. Volk’s initial evaluation did not indicate any reference to Ley’s inability to pay for the evaluation as a raised risk factor. However, Dr. Volk testified at the hearing that Loy’s inability to pay for the independent evaluation indicated a raised risk assessment due to his failure to follow a court order:
Q. [Atty. Wamstad]: Any new information you obtained since you completed that report?
A. [Dr. Volk]: The new information I would have is just — since it’s been sort of a course of time here since I completed the evaluation last spring, the one thing that I would add is that there are factors that would plainly contribute to an overall increase in the risk rating. And I believe — my understanding is that behavior wise, things have — there have been just some minor incidents. However, and I sort of don’t necessarily like to bring this up, necessarily, because it is probably a difficult subject in some ways, but there is the matter of financial obligations. And so Mr. Loy has an *509outstanding bill to our office for $2,700. And it’s not about the finances of that, but part of the risk assessment process, looking at financial responsibility as well as (indiscernible) responsibility and he has chosen not to pay that at this point in time, which, again, is less of the issue and in terms of the overall picture of the fact that it does show that there’s a lack of responsibility to follow through with obligations. The other piece, I think, is maybe even more concerning for me is that was a court-ordered obligation. So I think that that increases the level of risk because it shows that he is not in compliance with a directive through the Court, which increases risk because it would suggest that he may not be in compliance with any kind of recommendations or anything that would be occurring through the court system if he were released into the community.
Loy moved to exclude Dr. Volk’s testimony as an expert witness due to alleged bias, and the district court denied his motion. In its order, the district court specifically noted that Dr. Volk’s testimony regarding Loy’s failure to partially pay for the evaluation was “not pivotal” in its determination of whether Loy should be released.
[¶ 29] I agree with the majority’s finding in ¶ 15 that “[t]he district court’s order requiring partial payment by Loy for his independent evaluation was based on an erroneous view of the law.” However, I disagree with the majority that the district court’s prior order requiring payment was harmless error under the circumstances. Dr. Volk testified Loy’s risk level was raised because of an alleged failure to partially pay for the evaluation; this was due, in part, to the district court’s erroneous prior order requiring Loy to partially pay for Dr. Volk’s independent evaluation. In ¶ 18, the majority acknowledges, “[t]he district court found Dr. Volk’s testimony at the hearing was apparently shaped in part by an outstanding debt allegedly owed by Loy to Dr. Volk.” However, the majority ultimately found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing Dr. Volk to testify because the court’s order clearly indicated the alleged conflict was not “pivotal” to the court’s final decision. The process of civilly committing sexually dangerous individuals involves a serious deprivation of liberty, and that process should not be tainted. Here, the district court found Dr. Volk’s testimony was apparently shaped, in part, by an outstanding debt allegedly owed by Loy to Dr. Volk. Loy, an indigent person who qualified for a court-appointed expert witness, was assessed as having an increased risk of reof-fending by virtue of his “lack of responsibility to follow through with obligations.” This was an obligation that was improper to impose on him in the first place — compounded by the fact that his inability to pay was treated by that expert as related to his sexual dangerousness. While the court stated the alleged conflict was “not pivotal” to its decision, I conclude the cumulative effect of the admittance of Dr. Volk’s biased testimony, along with the court’s erroneous view of the law regarding Loy’s partial payment for the evaluation, so tainted the process as to require reversal and a remand for a new hearing.
[¶ 30] As an appellate court, we disregard errors which do not affect substantial rights (harmless errors), while we must consider errors objected to at trial that were prejudicial (reversible errors) and errors “so fundamental that a new trial or other relief must be granted even though the action was not objected to at the time” (obvious errors). See Commentary, N.D.R.Crim.P. 52. “The mere quantity of alleged errors is not in itself the measure for reversal.” State v. Ebach, 1999 ND 5, ¶ 16, 589 N.W.2d 566. While the errors in this case, standing alone, arguably may *510have been harmless, the errors are so intertwined and interrelated that I would conclude the cumulative effect of the errors requires reversal and a remand for a new hearing. See State v. Parisien, 2005 ND 152, ¶ 22, 703 N.W.2d 306.
[¶ 31] CAROL RONNING KAPSNER