Court Opinion

ID: 9707821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:21:57.278784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:38.295847
License: Public Domain

BAKER, J.,
concurs in result with separate opinion.
BAKER, Judge,
concurring in result.
While I agree with the conclusion and rationale set forth in the majority opinion, it is my view that Grubb lacks standing to appeal the trial court’s grant of the Childers’ motion for summary judgment.
Our supreme court has determined that in order to establish standing, the complaining party must demonstrate a personal stake in the outcome of the lawsuit and must show that he has sustained, or is in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a result of the conduct at issue. Shourek v. Stirling, 621 N.E.2d 1107, 1109 (Ind.1993). Moreover, in Shand Mining, Inc. v. Clay County Bd. of Comm’rs, 671 N.E.2d 477, 479 (Ind.Ct.App.1996), this court held that one defendant does not have standing to appeal a judgment rendered in favor of a codefendant unless the defendant suffers some prejudice as a result of the entry of judgment in favor of the codefendant.
In the instant case, even if the Dillabaughs were charged with knowledge of the Child-ers’ potential interest in the property and were not bona fide purchasers for value, the record shows that Grubb conveyed any interest that he may have held in the real estate by quitclaim deed to the Dillabaughs on June 13, 1996. Moreover, the trial court determined that there was no valid mortgage hen held by the Dillabaughs on the real estate and that Genell Childers should receive the property free and clear of those claims. At that time, Grubb had no legal or equitable interest in the property. As a result, Grubb cannot now establish that he is either prejudiced or aggrieved by the outcome of the judgment. Therefore, Grubb does not satisfy the standing requirement of having an actual interest in the controversy.
Inasmuch as Grubb had been disenfranchised from his-interest by both a judgment through the divorce decree as well as his voluntary act of conveying the property by quitclaim deed to the Dillabaughs, he lacks standing to appeal the trial court’s judgment. As a result, I vote to dismiss the appeal.