Court Opinion

ID: 9908058
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-07 17:14:01.021369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:37.847128
License: Public Domain

FILE                                                                     THIS OPINION WAS FILED
                                                                                    FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
                                                                                        DECEMBER 7, 2023
       IN CLERK’S OFFICE
SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
       DECEMBER 7, 2023
                                                                                        ERIN L. LENNON
                                                                                     SUPREME COURT CLERK

                 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                                 )
        STATE OF WASHINGTON,                     )     No. 101159-8
                                                 )
                              Respondent,        )
                                                 )     En Banc
               v.                                )
                                                 )
        MITCHELL HENG,                           )      Filed: December 7, 2023
                                                 )
                              Petitioner.        )
                                                 )

               GONZÁLEZ, C.J.— A person charged with a crime has a right to counsel

        under our constitutions and under our court rules. Violation of that right is, at least,

        constitutional error. A violation of that right at critical stages of criminal

        proceedings is structural error.

               Mitchell Heng was charged with murder, arson, and robbery and was

        brought before a judge for a preliminary hearing without counsel. At that

        preliminary hearing, the judge set bail, among other things. Heng argues that

        counsel should have been present. We agree. But Heng has not shown that the

        hearing was a critical stage of the prosecution. Because we are persuaded that the

        violation did not contribute to the verdict, we affirm the courts below.
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

                                       FACTS

      Amy Hooser was killed in an apparent robbery of her workplace, Sifton

Market. Surveillance footage captured images of Heng, in a blood-stained shirt, at

the scene with a lighter in his hands. Police arrested Heng shortly afterward.

      The next day, Heng was charged with first degree murder, first degree

robbery, and first degree arson. At his initial appearance, counsel was appointed

but was not yet present. The State successfully requested that bail be set at

$2 million based the nature of the offense, Heng’s criminal history, and a purported

lack of community ties. Heng’s counsel appeared at his next hearing but declined

to challenge bail.

      Heng spent the next 31 months in jail awaiting his trial. While in jail, he

made many phone calls. Heng was informed that jail phone calls are recorded.

During those recorded phone calls, Heng described the events of the night and said

someone else had killed Hooser. His descriptions of what happened that night in

Sifton Market were not consistent.

      Heng’s theory at trial was that a drug dealer, not visible in the surveillance

footage, had killed Hooser and had forced Heng to burn down the market. The

State impeached Heng using his jail calls and police interviews, highlighting

different versions of the story he had told over time. The State also introduced a

large amount of direct evidence against Heng, including the video evidence that

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State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

placed him at the market where the victim was killed, video evidence that

suggested he had set the fire that burned down the market, DNA evidence from the

victim in Heng’s car, and more. A jury convicted Heng of first degree murder and

first degree arson, and he was sentenced to 374 months in prison.

       Heng appealed arguing, among other things, that his right to counsel had

been violated at a critical stage of the prosecution. The Court of Appeals held that

the preliminary hearing was not a critical stage and that any violation of the right to

counsel was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Heng, 22 Wn. App. 2d

717, 742, 512 P.3d 942 (2022), review granted in part, 200 Wn.2d 1025 (2023).

       We granted review on issues related to the bail hearing 1 and set it as a

companion to State v. Charlton, which also involves deprivation of counsel at

preliminary hearings. 23 Wn. App. 2d 150, 159, 515 P.3d 537 (2022), review

granted, 200 Wn.2d 1025 (2023).

                                             ANALYSIS

                                     I. The Right to Counsel

       The Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution and article I, section 22 of

our state constitution both guarantee criminal defendants the right to counsel. State

v. Heddrick, 166 Wn.2d 898, 909-10, 215 P.3d 201 (2009) (citing U.S. CONST.

1
  Heng devotes a portion of his supplemental brief renewing his argument that trial counsel’s
failure to ask the court to reconsider its decision on bail. We decline to reach this issue as it is
outside of the scope of our order granting review. See RAP 13.7(b).
                                                  3
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 22; State v. Everybodytalksabout, 161 Wn.2d

702, 708, 166 P.3d 693 (2007)); see also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69, 53

S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158 (1932) (holding that a defendant has the right to counsel

because even if “not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does not

know how to establish his innocence”). The right to counsel attaches under the

Sixth Amendment at a defendant’s “first appearance before a judicial officer”

where “a defendant is told of the formal accusation against him and restrictions are

imposed on his liberty.” Rothgery v. Gillespie County, 554 U.S. 191, 194, 128 S.

Ct. 2578, 171 L. Ed. 2d 366 (2008) (citing Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 398-

99, 97 S. Ct. 1232, 51 L. Ed. 2d 424 (1977)).

      Our court rules also guarantee the right to counsel. CrR 3.1; State v.

Templeton, 148 Wn.2d 193, 212, 59 P.3d 632 (2002) (“Promulgation of state court

rules creates procedural rights.” (citing In re Welfare of Messmer, 52 Wn.2d 510,

512, 326 P.2d 1004 (1958))). Under CrR 3.1,“[t]he right to a lawyer shall accrue as

soon as feasible after the defendant is taken into custody, appears before a

committing magistrate, or is formally charged, whichever occurs earliest.” CrR

3.1(b)(1). This rule-based right extends to “all criminal proceedings” and requires

counsel at “every stage of the proceeding.” CrR 3.1(a), (b)(2)(A); accord State v.

Copeland, 130 Wn.2d 244, 282, 922 P.2d 1304 (1996); see also CrR 3.2.1(e)(1)

                                          4
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

(requiring courts to provide lawyers at preliminary appearances after a warrantless

arrest).

       Our rule also provides that counsel “shall” be provided “as soon as feasible

after the defendant has been arrested, appears before a committing magistrate, or is

formally charged,” providing broader protections than our constitutions. CrR

3.1(b)(1); cf. Templeton, 148 Wn.2d at 210-12 (quoting CrRLJ 3.1(b)(1)), 218-19

(citing Heinemann v. Whitman County, 105 Wn.2d 796, 802, 718 P.2d 789

(1986)).2

       Importantly, technological progress has made it increasingly feasible to have

counsel present at a defendant’s first judicial appearance, even in small counties.

See, e.g., Ord. Regarding Ct. Operations after Oct. 31, 2022, No. 25700-B-697, at

4 (Wash. Oct. 27, 2022) (“Courts should continue to allow telephonic or video

appearances for all scheduled criminal and juvenile offender hearings whenever

2
  While Templeton dealt with the criminal rules for courts of limited jurisdiction, not superior
court, we find it helpful. First, the rules mandating counsel are essentially identical. Compare
CrR3.1(a), (b)(1), with CrRLJ 3.1(a), (b)(1). The rules differ on when counsel should be
provided, but CrR 3.1’s language suggests broader applicability and expanded requirements.
Compare CrR 3.1(b)(2) (“A lawyer shall be provided at every stage of the proceedings.”
(emphasis added)), with CrRLJ 3.1(b)(2) (“A lawyer shall be provided at every critical stage of
the proceedings.”). Second, CrRLJ 3.1 “appears to have been written both to effectuate the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Miranda [v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16
L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966)] and to ensure that defendants will be afforded the right to counsel at all
critical stages of the proceedings.” Heinemann, 105 Wn.2d at 802. CrR 3.1 cannot provide less
than what our constitutions require, and the Court of Appeals has applied Templeton’s holding
equally to CrR 3.1. E.g., State v. Ackerman, No. 77807-2-I, slip op. (unpublished portion) at 13
(Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2019) (citing Templeton, 148 Wn.2d at 207),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/778072.pdf.

                                               5
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

appropriate.”). Because it is increasingly feasible, courts are required to provide

counsel at earlier stages than was previously possible. See Khandelwal v. Seattle

Mun. Ct., 6 Wn. App. 2d 323, 338, 431 P.3d 506 (2018) (noting that the word

“shall” in our right to counsel rules mandates strict compliance with the rule). At

oral argument, counsel for the State acknowledged that providing counsel at

preliminary hearings would place no extra burden on the State because

       following COVID, we’ve utilized video proceedings to always have
       indigent defense counsel present via video so that if other attorneys
       who are actually appointed to the case are not available to be present
       to represent their client at these preliminary appearances, the . . . on
       duty indigent defense attorney who's appearing via video can step in
       just for that proceeding. So, that would have no impact on our county
       at least and would be . . . we would brook no issue with that . . .
       decision anyway.

Wash. Sup. Ct. oral argument, State v. Heng, No. 101159-8 (June 15, 2023), at 22

min., 12 sec., video recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs

Network, https://tvw.org/video/washington-state-supreme-court-2023061146/.

       Simply put, defendants must have counsel present, at least virtually, at their

first preliminary appearance before a judge unless it is simply not feasible for some

extraordinary reason.3 Administrative convenience, lack of funds, or shortage of

3
  We note that a defendant’s right to counsel may attach before their first appearance before a
judge. See Copeland, 130 Wn.2d at 282 (1996) (rejecting State’s argument that “criminal
proceedings” for CrR 3.1 purposes “have begun only if the defendant has been arrested, and it
intends to charge him with a crime”). While the right to counsel may be waived, any waiver must
meet constitutional standards. See State v. Tetzlaff, 75 Wn.2d 649, 651-52, 453 P.2d 638 (1969).
                                               6
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

defense counsel are not adequate reasons to deprive a person accused of a crime of

counsel. See Wilbur v. City of Mount Vernon, 989 F. Supp. 2d 1122, 1137 (W.D.

Wash. 2013) (“[S]tate courts must appoint counsel for indigent defendants who

cannot afford to retain their own lawyer.”); cf. In re Det. of D.W., 181 Wn.2d 201,

208, 332 P.3d 423 (2014) (holding that lack of funds cannot justify the State’s

failure to provide required services (quoting Or. Advoc. Ctr. v. Mink, 322 F.3d

1101, 1121 (9th Cir. 2003)).

      A person facing criminal charges needs counsel at their first preliminary

appearance to protect their constitutional rights while the court decides bail and

other important questions. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9, 90 S. Ct. 1999,

26 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1970) (plurality portion) (highlighting the importance of counsel

to argue for procedural safeguards like “early psychiatric examination or bail”).

Bail hearings “are frequently hotly contested and require a court’s careful

consideration of a host of facts about the defendant and the crimes charged.”

United States v. Abuhamra, 389 F.3d 309, 323 (2d Cir. 2004). Our own court rules

on pretrial release and bail require exactly that kind of fact-intensive inquiry before

the State can restrain an accused’s liberty. CrR 3.2 (requiring courts to presume

release on personal recognizance in noncapital cases and requiring fact-intensive

analysis before imposing bail or other release conditions); CrR 3.2.1 (explaining

similar procedures for preliminary hearing after warrantless arrest); CrRLJ 3.2.1

                                          7
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

(explaining similar procedures for preliminary hearing after warrantless arrest for

limited jurisdiction courts). A person the State accuses of a crime needs counsel to

navigate these rules. Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9.

      Accordingly, Heng was entitled to have his counsel present at his first

preliminary hearing. The failure to have his counsel present was error.

                                  II. Structural Error

      Next, we must decide whether the preliminary hearing here was a critical

stage of the prosecution. If so, the failure to have Heng’s counsel present was

structural error requiring automatic reversal. Heddrick, 166 Wn.2d at 910, 910 n.9

(citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-59, 659 n.25, 104 S. Ct. 2039,

80 L. Ed. 2d 657 (1984); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 696 n.3, 122 S. Ct. 1843, 152

L. Ed. 2d 914 (2002)). Generally, a critical stage is one where “‘a defendant’s

rights may be lost, defenses waived, privileges claimed or waived, or in which the

outcome of the case is otherwise substantially affected.’” Id. at 910 (quoting State

v. Agtuca, 12 Wn. App. 402, 404, 529 P.2d 1159 (1974)); see also White v.

Maryland, 373 U.S. 59, 60, 83 S. Ct. 1050, 10 L. Ed. 2d 193 (1963) (noting that a

preliminary hearing became a critical stage by virtue of the fact the defendant

pleaded guilty). If a trial court reasonably anticipates that a hearing is such a stage

of the prosecution, defense counsel should be present.

                                           8
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

      But not all pretrial hearings are critical stages. To determine whether a

given hearing was a critical stage on review, we must examine a hearing’s

“substance and not merely [its] form,” State v. Jackson, 66 Wn.2d 24, 28, 400 P.2d

774 (1965), and “[i]f there is no possibility that a defendant is or would be

prejudiced in the defense of [their] case, then this court will be reluctant to

overturn the result of a fair trial,” id. Even though witnesses were examined at the

hearing in Jackson, we concluded it was not a critical stage because the defendant

failed to show “that lack of counsel at the hearing resulted in an absence of fairness

at the trial.” Id. at 29; see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 124-26, 95 S. Ct.

854, 43 L. Ed. 2d 54 (1975) (holding that Fourth Amendment probable cause

hearing does not require adversary hearing and so is not a critical stage); United

States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 191, 104 S. Ct. 2292, 81 L. Ed. 2d 146 (1984)

(holding that preindictment investigative proceedings are not critical stages).

      We recognize that courts have not been entirely consistent in describing

when a hearing is a critical stage of the prosecution for purposes of structural error

analysis. E.g., Coleman, 399 U.S. at 10-11 (remanding erroneous deprivation of

counsel at critical stage “to determine whether such denial of counsel was harmless

error” (citing Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 87 S. Ct. 824, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705

(1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 242, 87 S. Ct. 1926, 18 L. Ed. 2d

1149 (1967))); Tully v. State, 4 Wn. App. 720, 726-28, 483 P.2d 1268 (1971)

                                           9
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

(holding that the failure to continue preliminary hearing was constitutional error

and remanding for determination of prejudice (citing Powell, 287 U.S. at 69)).

More recently, the Supreme Court has clarified that denial of counsel at a pretrial

hearing is structural error only if that error “affected—and contaminated—the

entire proceeding.” Satterwhite v. Texas, 486 U.S. 249, 257, 108 S. Ct. 1792, 100

L. Ed. 2d 284 (1988). That requires us to examine the effect of the error on the

defendant’s case.

      Heng argues that bail setting is always a critical stage of the proceedings

because the deprivation of liberty is enormous, the potential impact on the trial is

significant, and the facts underlying that decision are often disputed. In support,

amici call to our attention studies on the negative effects of pretrial detention on

the lives of detainees that show how pretrial detention and the bail system

negatively affect detainees’ personal lives, finances, employment, and housing. Br.

of Amici Curiae Wash. Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws., Am. Civ. Liberties Union of

Wash. Found., Wash. Def. Ass’n, and King County Dep’t of Pub. Def. (Amici Br.)

at 15-17. Heng cites several courts that have concluded, based in part on these

widely documented effects, that bail hearings are critical stages of criminal

prosecutions. Booth v. Galveston County, 352 F. Supp. 3d 718, 738-39 (S.D. Tex.

2019); Hurrell-Harring v. State, 15 N.Y.3d 8, 20, 930 N.E.2d 217, 904 N.Y.S.2d

                                          10
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

296 (2010); State v. Fann, 239 N.J. Super. 507, 519-20, 571 A.2d 1023 (Law Div.

1990).

      But Booth, Hurrell-Harring, and Fann were not analyzing the nature of a

bail hearing in the context of a criminal appeal. Both Booth, 352 F. Supp. 3d at

724, and Hurrell-Harring, 15 N.Y. 3d at 15-16, were civil cases challenging bail

procedures. Fann was a pretrial challenge to bail procedures. 239 N.J. Super. at

509-10. These external consequences may well merit attention if a defendant can

show they substantively affected their specific case. Cf. D.W., 181 Wn.2d at 208

(holding that lack of funds cannot justify the State’s failure to provide required

services). They are not helpful in deciding whether a bail hearing was a critical

stage in a particular case.

      We hold that a critical stage is one where a defendant’s rights were lost,

defenses were waived, privileges were claimed or waived, or where the outcome of

the case was otherwise substantially affected. Heddrick, 166 Wn.2d at 910.

Counsel should always be present at all preliminary hearings because that is what

the federal and state constitutions and our rules require. On review, however, in

deciding whether to impose automatic reversal we consider if rights were lost in a

                                          11
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

way that demonstrably affected the outcome of the case. See Coleman, 399 U.S. at

9; Jackson, 66 Wn.2d at 28. 4

       Here, none of the situations we identified in Heddrick apply, and Heng’s

case was not demonstrably affected by his counsel’s absence. Heng lost no rights,

waived no defenses, and neither claimed nor waived privileges. The judge

appointed counsel, set bail, and then entered a not guilty plea on Heng’s behalf.

Heng did not lose his ability to challenge bail. His counsel decided not to challenge

bail when counsel actually appeared at the next hearing.

       We hold that Heng’s first preliminary hearing was not a critical stage under

Heddrick, and the absence of counsel at that hearing was not structural error.

Accordingly, constitutional harmless error analysis applies.

                              III. Constitutional Harmless Error

       Under constitutional harmless error analysis, the court will reverse unless it

is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the

verdict. State v. Orn, 197 Wn.2d 343, 359, 482 P.3d 913 (2021) (quoting State v.

Romero-Ochoa, 193 Wn.2d 341, 347, 440 P.3d 994 (2019)). We place such a

heavy burden on the State to “deter . . . conduct” that “undermines the principle of

4
  We note in passing that not all errors that are structural on direct review are structural on
collateral review. Compare State v. Wise, 176 Wn.2d 1, 6, 288 P.3d 1113 (2012) (holding a
violation of the right to a public trial is structural and requires automatic reversal), with In re
Pers. Restraint of Coggin, 182 Wn.2d 115, 116, 340 P.3d 810 (2014) (plurality opinion)
(requiring showing of prejudice to reverse). Whether denial of counsel at a critical stage would
be structural error on collateral review is not before us.
                                                 12
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

equal justice and is so repugnant to the concept of an impartial trial that its very

existence demands that appellate courts set appropriate standards to deter such

conduct.” State v. Monday, 171 Wn.2d 667, 680, 257 P.3d 551 (2011); see also

State v. Jackson, 195 Wn.2d 841, 856, 467 P.3d 97 (2020).

      Denial of bail comes with heavy consequences for the accused. As amici

note, “[A]n individual detained pretrial is more likely to be convicted and more

likely to plead guilty in light of the pressures of incarceration.” Amici Br. at 15-16

(citing LÉON DIGARD & ELIZABETH SWAVOLA, VERA INST. OF JUST., JUSTICE

DENIED: THE HARMFUL AND LASTING EFFECTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 3-5 (Apr.

2019), www.vera.org/downloads/publications/Justice-Denied-Evidence-Brief.pdf

[https://perma.cc/525P-ZQ5C]). One study found that longer pretrial detentions

can increase the likelihood of defendants failing to appear at trial, being arrested on

a new charge pending trial, and reoffending posttrial. Id. at 16-17 (citing

CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP ET AL., LAURA & JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., THE

HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 4 (Nov. 2013),

https://craftmediabucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploads/PDFs/LJAF_Report_hidden-

costs_FNL.pdf [https://perma.cc/G2C2-VXJ6]). That same study also found that

“delaying pretrial release for 8-14 days results in the defendant being 41% more

likely to commit a new criminal offense compared with an individual who obtained

prompt pretrial release.” Id. at 17. Amici also present evidence that “‘[B]lack

                                          13
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

people are subject to pretrial detention more frequently, and have bail set at higher

amounts, than white people who have similar criminal histories and are facing

similar charges.’” Id. at 20 (alteration in original) (quoting ELIZABETH HINTON ET

AL., VERA INST. OF JUST., AN UNJUST BURDEN: THE DISPARATE TREATMENT OF

BLACK AMERICANS IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 8 (May 2018),

https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/for-the-record-unjust-burden-racial-

disparities.pdf [https://perma.cc/AZM6-6K98]). The continued failure to ensure

that counsel is present at bail hearings may warrant some form of relief. See, e.g.,

Wilbur, 989 F. Supp. 2d at 1134 (providing injunctive relief for mass deprivations

of counsel because the government is “obligated to comply with the dictates of the

Sixth Amendment, and the Court will ‘not shrink from [its] obligation to enforce

the constitutional rights of all persons’” (alteration in original) (quoting Brown v.

Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 179 L. Ed. 2d 969 (2011))).

      But in this case the State presented overwhelming evidence of Heng’s guilt,

including video evidence placing him at the market where the victim was killed,

video evidence suggesting he set the fire that burned down the market where the

victim was killed, DNA evidence from the victim in Heng’s car, and more.

      Heng essentially argues that had he not been in jail, his trial theory that

someone else had committed the murder would not have been impeached by the

recorded jail phone calls. But those impeaching phone calls happened after counsel

                                          14
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

decided not to challenge bail and were only a small part of the evidence against

him. Heng has also given us no reason to believe that had counsel been present at

his preliminary hearing, he might have been released.

      While denying Heng counsel at his first preliminary appearance was error,

we conclude that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

                                      CONCLUSION

      The failure to have counsel present at Heng’s first preliminary hearing was

constitutional error. While we by no means countenance counsel’s absence, under

these facts we are persuaded that the error was harmless. Accordingly, we affirm

the courts below and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                        15
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8

                                   ____________________________

WE CONCUR:

_____________________________     ____________________________

_____________________________     ____________________________
       Madsen, J. - RESULT ONLY

_____________________________     ____________________________

_____________________________     ____________________________
                                        Lawrence-Berrey, J.P.T.

                                  16
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8
(Yu, J., concurring)

                                    No. 101159-8

       YU, J. (concurring) — I agree with the majority that criminal defendants

“must have counsel present . . . at their first preliminary appearance before a

judge,” at the latest. Majority at 6, 7 n.3. I also agree that Mitchell Heng “was

entitled to have his counsel present at his first preliminary hearing” and that “[t]he

failure to have his counsel present was error.” Id. at 8. Finally, I agree with the

majority that current law does not provide a remedy for this error under the

circumstances that occurred. Id. at 15. Therefore, I respectfully, though

reluctantly, concur.

       However, I write separately because this case illustrates the need for us to

develop a more robust protection of the right to counsel for the accused. The

record shows that Heng explicitly asserted his right to appointed counsel at his

preliminary hearing. The trial court formally appointed counsel for Heng but

stated there was “just not enough time” to wait for defense counsel to arrive. 1 Tr.

                                           1
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8
(Yu, J., concurring)

of Proc. (Jan. 20, 2017) at 6-7. Instead, the court immediately moved on to

determine “bail and release,” with only counsel for the State present. Id. at 7.

Neither the trial court nor the prosecutor expressed surprise or concern that Heng

was unrepresented at his preliminary appearance, suggesting this was not an

unusual occurrence.

       As the majority correctly recognizes, this was a clear violation of Heng’s

right to counsel. Beyond basic constitutional requirements, our court rules

“provid[e] broader protections than our constitutions” by “requir[ing] counsel at

‘every stage of the proceeding’” in a criminal case. Majority at 5 (emphasis added)

(quoting CrR 3.1(b)(2)(A)). Moreover, the State has acknowledged that complying

with court rules and “providing counsel at preliminary hearings would place no

extra burden on [it].” Id. at 6. Thus, the violation of Heng’s right to counsel was

both clear and apparently unnecessary. Yet, Heng has no recourse on appeal.

While I recognize that our current state constitutional framework supports the

majority’s decision to affirm, I am troubled by the hand-wringing fear of

retroactive reversal of cases and the subsequent lack of accountability that will

follow in the actual implantation of the right to counsel at every level of court in

every legal proceeding. Will the result in this case serve to increase the likelihood

of similar violations in future cases?

                                           2
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8
(Yu, J., concurring)

       I firmly believe that this court should make a commitment going forward to

ensure that defense counsel is present at every defendant’s first appearance before

a judicial officer and at every subsequent appearance thereafter. Any preliminary

proceeding can ultimately change the outcome of a case, sometimes in “way[s] that

demonstrably affect[ ] the outcome” and sometimes in ways that are less obvious

but equally significant. Id. at 12. As the majority correctly acknowledges, defense

counsel’s presence is vital to protect the defendant’s rights “while the court decides

bail and other important questions.” Id. at 7 (citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S.

1, 9, 90 S. Ct. 1999, 26 L. Ed. 2d 387 (1970) (plurality portion)). Empirical studies

have also shown that a court’s decisions on bail and pretrial release conditions can

have devastating effects for the defendant, “both in their court cases and in their

lives.” LÉON DIGARD & ELIZABETH SWAVOLA, VERA INST. OF JUST., JUSTICE

DENIED: THE HARMFUL AND LASTING EFFECTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION, 2 (Apr.

2019), https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/Justice-Denied-Evidence-

Brief.pdf [https://perma.cc/525P-ZQ5C]. As amici explain, the lack of counsel at

the first appearance “exacerbate[s] racial disparities in the criminal legal system”

as pretrial detention “disproportionately impact[s]” communities of color. Br. of

Amici Curiae Wash. Ass’n of Crim. Def. Laws., Am. Civ. Liberties Union of

Wash. Found., Wash. Def. Ass’n, & King County Dep’t of Pub. Def. at 14-15.

Further, the lack of counsel “undermine[s] the integrity of criminal investigations”

                                          3
State v. Heng, No. 101159-8
(Yu, J., concurring)

because “[e]ven a brief private conversation” between a defendant and their

counsel “can be crucial” to their defense. Id. at 14, 22. Yet, “[d]isentangling the

possible effects of pretrial detention from the many other conditions that could

influence outcomes is difficult.” DIGARD & SWAVOLA, supra, at 4. As a result, it

is nearly impossible for a defendant to show that the absence of counsel at a

preliminary appearance in their “particular case . . . demonstrably affected the

outcome.” Majority at 11-12.

       Therefore, while I acknowledge that the majority in this case correctly

applies existing law, I write separately to highlight the need for stricter and more

precise obligations protecting the right to counsel in our court rules. Our rules

should explicitly and affirmatively provide that the right to counsel attaches at the

moment of the first appearance before a judicial officer and at every appearance

thereafter unless validly waived. No hearing before a judicial officer in a criminal

prosecution should occur without the presence of defense counsel, and if defense

counsel cannot be present, the proceedings must be halted until counsel returns.

And most importantly, we should enact an enforcement mechanism that has

significant consequences. Adopting such proactive protections in our court rules

would allow us to move past the backward-looking analysis employed by today’s

majority, and toward fully recognizing that every deprivation of counsel matters.

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State v. Heng, No. 101159-8
(Yu, J., concurring)

       All criminal defendants have the right to counsel at the first appearance

before a judicial officer and all hearings thereafter. This court owes it to

defendants and to the cause of justice to protect that right.

       For these reasons, I respectfully concur.

                                               ______________________________

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