Court Opinion

ID: 9790387
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:52:25.820209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:29.303890
License: Public Domain

Judge DUBOFSKY
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In my view, the trial court committed reversible error in permitting cross-examination of defendant about his failure to file a Colorado income tax return for 1983 and his failure to indicate on his letterhead that he was admitted to practice law only in New Mexico. CRE 608(b) provided the legal basis for the People’s cross-examination and on appeal the People assert the same rule to justify the cross-examination. The use of cross-examination to demonstrate specific instances of truthfulness which are unrelated to the specific charges in the case on trial is inherently problematic.
Researchers who have analyzed the phenomenon of lack of truthfulness, including lying, within American culture have determined that it is of significant proportions. S. Bok, Lying-Moral Choice in Public and Private Life, (1978). Therefore, a high percentage of defendants and witnesses could be cross-examined about untruthful acts or statements made during the course of their lifetime. These episodes not only divert the jury from the real issues of a defendant’s guilt or innocence in the pending case, but create an atmosphere in which the “side show,” takes over the trial.
Furthermore, the subject matters about which the prosecutor cross-examined here (e.g., failure to file a Colorado income tax return for 1983 and not indicating defendant’s practice of law was limited to New *1378Mexico) are neither instances of criminal conduct nor necessarily indicative of deceit. In my opinion the admission that defendant had not filed a Colorado income tax return for 1983 and the admission of his letterhead showing it was not properly titled to reflect the fact that he was not admitted to practice law in Colorado were prejudicial and had limited probative value.
I agree with the majority’s implicit conclusion that the fact a person turns out to have either understated the amount of income tax he owes or fails to file a state return in a given year is not of sufficiently high correlation to a lack of truthfulness to warrant the use of that fact under CRE 608(b). Thus, there is insufficient evidence of intent to deceive to justify the questioning about the state income tax return.
The government recognizes that failure to pay income taxes or even to file a return in a given year occurs for a myriad of reasons, and only a small percentage are ever prosecuted criminally. See United States v. Byrne, 422 F.Supp. 147 (E.D.Pa.1976) modfd on other grounds, 560 F.2d 601 (3rd Cir.) cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1045, 98 S.Ct. 890, 54 L.Ed.2d 796 (1978).
Here, although the majority agrees the income tax information was inadmissible it concludes its admission was harmless error. I disagree with this conclusion. First, my review of the record indicates that although the evidence supports the verdict, defendant’s guilt was not overwhelmingly demonstrated. The mentioning of failure to pay income taxes may well have tipped the balance.
A person other than defendant was the creator and principal mover behind the “Ponzi” scheme involved here. There was unrefuted expert testimony that Ponsi schemes are very sophisticated and often employees of the creator of the scheme are deliberately kept unaware of its many aspects. Typically, and as occurred here, the principal person provides only selected bits of information about the scheme to his employees.
Several former employees of the investment companies involved in this scheme testified for the People and stated that they were unaware of the scope and illegality of the investment scheme and in their opinion, for the same reasons, Kraemer did not act criminally. Furthermore, investigators for the People and other legal experts rendered opinions that the evidence did not support a conclusion that Kraemer had engaged in criminal activity.
Defendant had no prior arrests or convictions. He worked on this matter for only a few months. The evidence showed that the principal in the scheme made several hundred thousand dollars from it; whereas defendant was paid $3,000 a month plus expenses. Thus, I found the evidence sufficient for conviction but not overwhelming.
I disagree with the majority’s characterization that defendant “volunteered” this tax information. Defendant responded to an explicit question by the prosecution as to whether he had paid his Colorado taxes. Moreover, in my opinion a defendant’s admission of not filing a return and paying income taxes can so inflame and affect a juror that it is per se prejudicial.
I agree that the failure of defendant to indicate on his letterhead that he was admitted only to practice law in New Mexico was improper and apparently a violative of disciplinary rules. Moreover, I agree in certain circumstances that the failure to indicate the limitation on a person’s practice can be fraudulent and deceitful and therefore arguably admissible under CRE 608. I also agree that defendant may have engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
I strongly resist, however, the supposed violation of disciplinary rules as a springboard to convict attorneys in criminal cases. I believe the trial court erred in not requiring, at an in limine hearing, more of an evidentiary showing that the purpose and intent of the use of this letterhead was to deceive people.
Apparently, under Code of Professional Responsibility DR2-102(D) the firm name need not reflect any limitations on practice. Thus, it is the failure of an individual to place an asterisk next to his name with a *1379statement indicating the person’s practice is limited to another state. Here, defendant’s practice in Colorado was limited to assisting a firm’s New Mexico client. There is no evidence that either defendant or his law firm represented other clients from Colorado in regard to Colorado business. Much of the work done for the client involved New Mexico property and laws. Defendant never directly stated orally or in writing that he was admitted to practice law in Colorado. Not one witness testified he had relied on any representations as to defendant’s bar admission, including the letterhead, in their dealings with defendant.
Since CRE 608 prevents the parties from putting on extrinsic evidence to the fact asserted in cross-examination, I believe that the person cross-examining should have made an evidentiary showing to the trial court, at an in limine hearing, that the act of failing to place an asterisk with accompanying information on a letterhead was done with intent to deceive and that in fact people were deceived. Here, there was no such preliminary evidentiary requirement.
Other courts which have addressed the question of the admissibility of other instances of lack of truthfulness under rules identical to CRE 608 have concluded that in circumstances significantly more probative of truthfulness than these that such evidence was inadmissible. United States v. Bentley, 706 F.2d 1498 (8th Cir.1983) (involvement in drug operation, without resulting criminal conviction, is not indicative of truthfulness); United States v. Hastings, 577 F.2d 38 (8th Cir.1978) (involvement in armed robbery is not indicative of truthfulness).
Historically, the impeachment of criminal defendants by acts not relevant to the charges has been severely restricted. Tarling v. People, 69 Colo. 477, 194 P. 939 (1921). In disregarding this restriction, here, the majority, under the guise of impeaching credibility, has opened the door to convict people for being immoral or “bad men.”
In explaining why collateral bad acts of a witness should not be admitted into evidence J. Wigmore; Evidence § 57 at 456 (3d ed. 1940) states:
“The deep tendency of human nature to punish, not because our victim is guilty, this time, but because he is a bad man and may as well be condemned now that he is caught is a tendency which cannot fail to operate with any jury, in and out of court.”
I also dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the trial court did not err when it refused to exclude testimony from a prosecution witness.
After opening statements, the prosecution learned for the first time that defendant had been personally involved in the loan/sales transactions with this witness. The trial court had ordered the prosecution to inform defendant of all alleged statements made by defendant upon which the prosecution would rely on trial. The prosecutor informed defendant and the court there were no statements indicating he was personally and directly involved with investors in these loans/sales transactions.
This case was extensively investigated by the State of Colorado. A special prosecutor from the Attorney General’s Office handled the case. Although only a few testified, there were over 100 investors listed as potential investors by the prosecution as potential witnesses. Apparently the investor who testified that defendant had dealt directly with him was not questioned in this regard until after the trial started.
If, as here, the prosecutor represents to defendant and the court that none of the witnesses he will call will testify regarding a certain matter, then it is incumbent upon the prosecutor to have first interviewed his witnesses on that point. If, after being questioned by the prosecution and giving a negative response on this point, the witness then later “remembers” there were different facts, the court may, within its discretion, permit such testimony. Here, however, there is no suggestion that the prosecution or its investigators had ever asked the witness about defendant’s involvement with them. Therefore, the prosecutor’s *1380representations to defendant and the court were not based on a previous interview of the witnesses.
When defendant’s attorney was informed of the new testimony, he moved to exclude it and in so doing stated:
“We are severely prejudiced in this case because we told the jurors one particular thing and now there is going to be evidence of another state of facts. Our credibility is severely diminished in this case, perhaps more importantly, we did specifically request this kind of information and the court order that particular information be provided. It was not.” (emphasis added)
Moreover, defense counsel pointed out to the trial court that the episode involving the witness had happened three years before and, for defendant to establish an alibi or another defense for that time, he would need more time than a brief continuance during trial.
It is important for both defense counsel and defendant to establish their credibility with the jury in order to present effectively their defense. If, as here, defendant takes a position in opening statement because of reliance on information provided by the prosecution and that information turns out to be false, defendant has suffered a significant loss of credibility with the jury and his defense has been damaged.
Defendant is insured a right to marshal and present an effective defense. People v. McGrath, 793 P.2d 664 (Colo.App.1989). Effective defenses to a criminal case cannot be made without long hard pretrial work and analysis. Although the response of an attorney to new developments within a trial is important to the success of the case, the work that predates the trial is of at least comparable, if not greater, importance.
Here, the late presentation of this evidence to defendant and his attorney precluded this pretrial analysis and defense. Moreover, if, as here, defendant and his attorney are presented after opening statement with critically different information than was represented to them pursuant to court order by the prosecution before trial, and such testimony not only undermines defendant’s stated theory of the case but also presents a new and difficult factual setting, defendant is entitled either to have the evidence excluded or to be granted a mistrial so that he can effectively present his case. This is particularly true where, as here, the prosecutor made such representations to defendant and the court without having interviewed his witnesses.
For both the impermissible cross-examination of defendant about his failure to file a tax return and the omission on his letterhead and for the admission of the newly discovered testimony of the prosecution witness, I would reverse the judgment of conviction and remand for new trial.