Court Opinion

ID: 9378421
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 15:04:41.320707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.051425
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: MARCH 3, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-0288-MR

DANILO FERNANDEZ DAVILA                                                APPELLANT

               APPEAL FROM MUHLENBERG CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE BRIAN WIGGINS, JUDGE
                        ACTION NO. 20-CR-00135

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                                  APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, DIXON, AND EASTON, JUDGES.

EASTON, JUDGE: A circuit court jury convicted Appellant Danilo Fernandez

Davila (“Davila”) of first-degree bail jumping. Because Davila was also

determined by the jury to be a persistent felony offender in the first degree, he

received a sentence of fifteen years. Davila’s sole claim of error is the refusal of

the circuit court to give a “choice of evils” jury instruction. Finding no error, we

affirm.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

             On January 30, 2020, Davila was required to appear before the

Muhlenberg Circuit Court for a jury trial on a charge of promoting contraband in

the first degree. Davila was ordered to appear at 8:45 a.m. for his trial. At 8:40

a.m., Davila called his trial attorney Steve Lamb (“Lamb”).

             Davila told Lamb that he was in Indiana but on his way to court, but

he was experiencing some concerning medical symptoms. Davila never appeared

in court that day, and he did not contact the Muhlenberg Circuit Clerk’s office

about missing the trial. Davila was eventually served with the bench warrant

issued after his failure to appear. He was found in Louisville on June 6, 2021,

almost a year and a half later.

             During Davila’s long absence, a Muhlenberg County Grand Jury

indicted Davila for first-degree bail jumping and being a persistent felony offender

in the first degree. The circuit court conducted a jury trial on those charges on

February 1, 2022.

             Davila testified in his own defense. Davila said that, on the morning

of his January 30, 2020, trial, he started the two-hour drive from his home in

Louisville to the Muhlenberg Circuit Court in Greenville. Davila’s mother

confirmed Davila had left her home that morning. When Davila was about thirty

minutes from the courthouse, Davila stopped his car because he was sweating,

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nauseated, and believed he was having a heart attack. Inexplicably, Davila then

drove an hour and a half back to Louisville for medical care.

             Davila says he went to the University of Louisville emergency room

for medical attention. He says he informed the hospital staff he was having a heart

attack. He had his blood pressure checked. Apparently not in danger, Davila was

informed by the hospital staff there was a four to six hour wait. He left. Davila

never provided any documentation of this contact with the hospital.

             Davila further testified he visited a friend, Carlos Vera (“Vera”), at a

dental lab just after he left the hospital. Vera had formerly been a physician in

Cuba, of which Davila is also a native. But now Vera was working as a dental

technician. Vera examined Davila. Vera testified Davila was pale and had chest

pains, high blood pressure, and a rapid pulse. Vera testified it appeared Davila was

not having a heart attack because the pains were not radiating down Davila’s back,

shoulder, or arm. Vera concluded Davila was experiencing symptoms of a panic

attack. They talked for a while. Davila calmed down and left.

             Lamb testified about his preparation for Davila’s trial for promoting

contraband. Lamb confirmed Davila called him about 8:40 a.m. the day of the

trial. Davila told Lamb he was headed to court but was having chest pains and

would be seeking medical attention. Lamb received no further evidence from

Davila. Lamb explained that, had he heard from Davila, he could have resolved

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the situation with the Commonwealth and possibly prevented the bail-jumping

indictment.

                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

           The decision to give an instruction on the justification of choice of evils

depends on the evidence presented and is measured by an abuse of discretion

standard. Hunt v. Commonwealth, 304 S.W.3d 15, 31 (Ky. 2009). “The test for

abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary,

unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v.

English, 993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999).

                                    ANALYSIS

              Davila argues the circuit court erred by not giving and thus allowing

him to argue a “choice of evils” instruction to the jury. The choice of evils

defense, which has its roots in the common law doctrine of necessity, has long

been recognized as a defense to a charge predicated upon an act which otherwise

would be criminal. Senay v. Commonwealth, 650 S.W.2d 259, 260 (Ky. 1983).

The court in Senay noted “the danger presented to the defendant must be

compelling and imminent, constituting a set of circumstances which afford[] him

little or no alternative other than the commission of the act which otherwise would

be unlawful.” Id.

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                The choice of evils defense has been codified as KRS1 503.030, which

provides, in part:

                Unless inconsistent with the ensuing sections of this code
                defining justifiable use of physical force or with some
                other provisions of law, conduct which would otherwise
                constitute an offense is justifiable when the defendant
                believes it to be necessary to avoid an imminent public or
                private injury greater than the injury which is sought to
                be prevented by the statute defining the offense charged,
                except that no justification can exist under this section for
                an intentional homicide.

                It is the defendant’s initial burden to produce evidence to support a

choice of evils defense. LaPradd v. Commonwealth, 334 S.W.3d 88, 91 (Ky.

2011). “Once such evidence is proffered, the burden of proof is then on the

Commonwealth to disprove the defense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. If no

such evidence is proffered, the trial court is not required to instruct the jury on the

choice of evils defense. Senay, supra, at 260-61.

                A choice of evils instruction is only proper if the

following requirements are met:

                       (1) that the person believes the necessity of his
                           action is mandated by his subjective value
                           judgment (this must be weighed by the
                           reasonableness standard);

                       (2) that such action must be contemporaneous with
                           the danger of injury sought to be avoided;

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                             -5-
                   (3) that the injury is imminent, requiring an
                       immediate choice if to be avoided; and

                   (4) that the danger or injury sought to be avoided
                       must be greater than the penalty or offending
                       charge occasioned by the action chosen by the
                       party.

Beasley v. Commonwealth, 618 S.W.2d 179, 180 (Ky. App. 1981), overruled on

other grounds by LaPradd, supra (citation omitted).

             In the current case, Davila’s subjective belief in the necessity of his

actions to skip the trial was not reasonable when the evidence is fully considered.

Davila testified he was about 30 minutes away from the Muhlenberg Circuit

courthouse when his symptoms started. Davila pulled off the side of the road for

twenty minutes. Instead of calling 911 or using his GPS (which he had with him

and had used) to research where to find a local hospital, Davila drove an hour and a

half back to Louisville for medical attention. Davila says he checked into an

emergency room and told the hospital staff he was having a heart attack. Despite

this, Davila was not immediately admitted. Further, Vera opined to Davila that he

had simply had a panic attack.

             Davila’s actions after that day were not reasonable either and

seriously weaken any legitimate claim of actual immediacy of Davila’s claim of a

threat of death as compared with the consequences of missing the trial and thus

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committing bail jumping. Davila never provided medical proof to his attorney or

the circuit court. Further, Davila absconded for over a year before being arrested.

                We have found no Kentucky case like this one. But our courts have

held no choice of evils instruction should be given in an escape case when the

defendant claimed chest pains and other medical concerns supporting his claim of

a fear of death as the reason for his escape. See Damron v. Commonwealth, 687

S.W.2d 138 (Ky. 1985). Given the evidence before the circuit court, we do not

believe the circuit court abused its discretion in refusing a choice of evils

instruction.

                Even if the refusal to give the requested instruction had been error, the

error would have been harmless. RCr2 9.24. Bail jumping contains its own

defense, which was in the instructions given in this case. Davila would not be

guilty if the jury believed his failure to appear was “unavoidable and due to

circumstances beyond his control.” KRS 520.070(2). All the evidence Davila

offered for his choice of evils argument was presented to the jury in the context of

this bail jumping defense. The jury did not agree with that defense. The choice of

evils defense would not have made a difference with this evidence.

2
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.

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                               CONCLUSION

            The circuit court did not err when denying Davila’s request for a

choice of evils instruction. Therefore, the judgment of the Muhlenberg Circuit

Court is AFFIRMED.

            ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                    BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Sarah D. Dailey                          Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                      Attorney General of Kentucky

                                         Melissa A. Pile
                                         Assistant Attorney General
                                         Frankfort, Kentucky

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