Court Opinion

ID: 9606342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:49:15.846006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:34.286943
License: Public Domain

Beasley, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
While I fully agree with the rest of the opinion, I cannot concur in Division 2 and would remand for a hearing pursuant to Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. __ (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986), were not a new trial necessary.
The court in Division 2 concludes that the white defendant has no standing to test, on equal protection grounds, the exclusion of blacks from the jury by way of the state’s exercise of the peremptory challenge.
Defendant’s grounds at trial were not only federal constitutional equal protection, but also federal constitutional due process and rights “under Georgia laws to a fair cross section from which to select a jury.” In support of standing, which the court ruled he did not have, he cited Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 493 (92 SC 2163, 33 LE2d 83) (1972). In that case, a white man claimed that there was a systematic exclusion of Negroes from grand jury and petit jury service.
On appeal, McGuire rests on federal due process as well as equal protection, and to his right to a fair and impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section, under the sixth and fourteenth amendments and under Georgia law. With respect to the latter, he cites Devier v. State, 250 Ga. 652 (1) (300 SE2d 490) (1983), and West v. State, 252 Ga. 156 (313 SE2d 67) (1984).
The decision in Devier was based on the statutory requirement of a fairly representative cross section of the intelligent and upright citizens of the county, OCGA § 15-12-40 (a) (1), to serve as traverse jurors, which it was concluded applied also to grand jurors, citing Sanders v. State, 237 Ga. 858 (1) (230 SE2d 291) (1976). Sanders, too, was at bottom a statutory inquiry, being based on Gould v. State, 131 Ga. App. 811 (207 SE2d 519) (1974), affirmed in part and reversed in part, 232 Ga. 844 (209 SE2d 312) (1974). West followed Devier in finding that the grand juries indicting each of these male defendants were statutorily infirm in their underrepresentation of women.
The trial court’s as well as the majority’s rejection of McGuire’s challenge was based on Pope v. State, 256 Ga. 195, 202 (7) (f) (345 SE2d 831) (1986), but that case dealt only with an equal protection ground. So did Heaton v. State, 180 Ga. App. 718, 719 (2) (350 SE2d 480) (1986), which also underlies the majority’s opinion here. The decision in Batson, upon which Pope turned, was also founded on the requirements of equal protection. That is why the claim, to be reached on its merits, had to be that of a black defendant, which Batson was.
*240Neither the United States Supreme Court in the Batson decision, nor the Georgia Supreme Court in the Pope decision, ruled that only a black defendant had standing to challenge the racially neutral exercise of the peremptory challenge. Here we have in addition other laws called to support the request for a showing of racially neutral peremptory challenge exercise by the state, and none of them were ruled on in Batson or Pope. The majority recognizes that there is a difference, by citing Ingram v. State, 253 Ga. 622, 627 (fn. 4) (323 SE2d 801) (1984), which mentions the different standing issues when due process rather than equal protection are raised.
In fact, Batson, expressly points out: “Racial discrimination in selection of jurors harms not only the accused whose life or liberty they are summoned to try ... As long ago as Strauder [v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (25 LE 664) (1880)] . . . the Court recognized that by denying a person participation in jury service on account of his race, the State unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror . . . The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence in the fairness of our system of justice . . . the [peremptory] challenge may be, and unfortunately at times has been, used to discriminate against black jurors. By requiring trial courts to be sensitive to the racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, our decision enforces the mandate of equal protection and furthers the ends of justice. In view of the heterogeneous population of our nation, public respect for our criminal justice system and the rule of law will be strengthened if we ensure that no citizen is disqualified from jury service because of his race.” Batson v. Kentucky, supra, 90 LE2d at 81, 89. (Emphasis supplied.) See Strauder v. West Virginia, supra, 100 U. S. at 308, 309, where it is recognized that exclusion of blacks as jurors denies them equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The harm to both prospective grand jury foremen from purposeful discrimination and to “the fundamental values of our judicial system and our society as a whole” were also deemed routable by a criminal defendant in Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U. S. 545, 556 (99 SC 2993, 61 LE2d 739) (1979). Standing to raise even an equal protection claim was granted to a white defendant in United States v. Sneed, 729 F2d 1333 (11th Cir. 1984).
Thus I would not hold that defendant lacked standing to raise the due process and statutory bases and thereby attack the peremptory challenge exercise. If either of these bases apply to the peremptory challenge question, then obviously a white person can raise them, *241as he would be harmed by their violation.1 In addition, how else could the integrity of the system be protected if the question cannot be raised in trials of white defendants as well as in trials of black defendants? A black jury venireman could not do it. Yet his or her right to serve is not limited to the trials of black defendants.
Decided December 4, 1987.
W. Benjamin Ballenger, for appellant.
David L. Lomenick, Jr., District Attorney, David J. Dunn, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, for appellee.
It would be arrogant of our law if it prevented one accused of a crime from calling attention to the possibility that the trial procedure was being used by the state’s representative to discriminate against a class of citizens by their exclusion from participation in the process of judging the accused. It would be blind legalism to ask, “What is it to you, who are white?” when even the state statute requires a representative cross-section. The process by which we adjudge guilt should not itself be immune from examination because of the race of the challenger.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Deen and Judge Benham join in this opinion.

 Harm to the defendant was expressly ruled not to be a prerequisite for a challenge of purposeful discrimination in the selection of the grand jury foreman, in Rose v. Mitchell, supra at 550 (II A), which dealt with an equal protection claim.