Court Opinion

ID: 9739395
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:14:22.996419+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:12.032706
License: Public Domain

O’Connell, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent because, first, the majority has erroneously concluded that MCR 6.419 authorizes a trial court to grant a motion for a directed verdict brought after declaration of a mistrial based on a hung jury, and, second, my review of the record indicates that the court’s order directing a verdict was not based upon a finding that the evidence was insufficient. In such a situation, retrial of the defendant is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions.
i
In contrast to 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), Standard 15-3.5(c), pp 15-93—15-9*3714,1 and FR Crim P 29(c),2 MCR 6.4193 does not *372grant a trial court the authority to grant a motion for a directed verdict brought after the declaration of a mistrial on the basis of a hung jury. The rules of statutory construction also apply to court rules. People v McCoy, 189 Mich App 201, 204; 471 NW2d 648 (1991). Where statutory language deviates from the language of a model act, such deviation is presumed to be deliberate. In re Childress Trust, 194 Mich App 319, 326; 486 NW2d 141 (1992); see also People v Pigula, 202 Mich App 87, 90; 507 NW2d 810 (1993). Similarly, the omission of a provision in one part of a statute that is included in another part is construed as intentional. Farrington v Total Petroleum, Inc, 442 Mich 201, 210; 501 NW2d 76 (1993). While the ABA Standard upon which MCR 6.419 is based is neither a model act, 1 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), Introduction, pp xix-xx, nor a statute, the general rule of construction, that where language deviates from or omits portions of its source such alterations are deemed to have been intentional, would appear to be applicable to situations such as the present one.
In the present case, the majority has concluded that, because the primary and secondary sources of MCR 6.419, that is, 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), Standard 15-3.5(c), and FR Crim P 29(c), contain provisions allowing trial courts to grant motions such as that in issue, MCR 6.419 must be construed similarly despite the fact that it contains no such provision. Such a holding is plainly contrary to the general rule set forth above that all deviations and omissions are *373deemed to be deliberate and intentional. Childress Trust, supra; Pigula, supra; Farrington, supra. The duty of this Court is to interpret the court rule as written. See Jennings v Southwood, 446 Mich 125, 142; 521 NW2d 230 (1994). Therefore, in accordance with commonly accepted principles of statutory construction, MCR 6.419 may not be construed to grant a trial court the authority , to grant a motion for a directed verdict brought after the declaration of a mistrial on the basis of a hung jury where inclusion of a provision to that effect was deliberately and intentionally rejected by the Supreme Court.4
ii
Both the United States and Michigan Constitutions prohibit placing a defendant twice in jeopardy for a single offense. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15; People v Wilcox, 183 Mich App 616, 620; 456 NW2d 421 (1990). Because the parallel Double Jeopardy Clauses are "substantially identical,” People v Bush, 187 Mich App 316, 322; 466 NW2d 736 (1991), rev’d in part on other grounds sub nom People v Harding, 443 Mich 693; 506 NW2d 482 (1993), the two are often analyzed simultaneously. See, e.g., People v Passeno, 195 Mich App 91, 95; 489 NW2d 152 (1992).
In the context of a jury trial, jeopardy generally attaches at the time the jury is impaneled and sworn. People v Little, 180 Mich App 19, 22; 446 NW2d 566 (1989). Once jeopardy attaches, the *374defendant has a constitutional right to have the prosecution completed by that tribunal. United States v Jorn, 400 US 470, 479; 91 S Ct 547; 27 L Ed 2d 543 (1971). Unless the defendant "consents to the trial’s interruption or ... a mistrial occurs because of manifest necessity, the state is precluded from bringing him to trial again.” Little, supra, p 22. Significantly, a hung jury has been held to constitute "manifest necessity,” and, accordingly, retrial of a defendant after a mistrial is declared on the basis of a hung jury does not implicate double jeopardy concerns. People v Daniels, 192 Mich App 658, 663; 482 NW2d 176 (1992).
In the present case, the trial court found that the jury was deadlocked, and declared a mistrial. Several weeks later, defendant brought a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, which the trial court granted.
Retrial after an acquittal based upon insufficient evidence is prohibited; our Supreme Court has stated that this prohibition is nothing short of "absolute.” People v Anderson, 409 Mich 474, 492; 295 NW2d 482 (1980), citing Fong Foo v United States, 369 US 141, 143; 82 S Ct 671; 7 L Ed 2d 629 (1962). However, also in the Anderson opinion, our Supreme Court emphasized that the denomination of a trial court’s decision, whether it is termed an acquittal or something other than an acquittal, is not significant. The significance lies in the substance of the trial court’s decision. Anderson, supra, pp 486-487, states the following:
The determination of what the judge did, however, does not turn on how the judge characterizes his actions. "[T]he trial judge’s characterization of his own actions cannot control the classification of the action.”24 What constitutes an "acquittal” is not controlled by the form of the judge’s action.25
To decide how a trial judge’s action should be *375characterized, the reviewing court "must determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged”.26 There is an acquittal and retrial is impermissible when the judge "evaluated the Government’s evidence and determined that it was legally insufficient to sustain a conviction.27
In sum, where it is contended that a prior decision of a trial court constituted the acquittal of a defendant, thereby barring his' retrial, the reviewing court is burdened with looking beyond mere nomenclature. Id. An order that is termed other than an acquittal may, in fact, have been based upon a finding of the insufficiency of the evidence and thereby constitute an acquittal. See United States v Hill, supra; Anderson, supra, pp 487-494. In such a situation, the defendant may not be retried without placing him twice in jeopardy. Conversely, an order that is termed an "acquittal” may, in fact, have been based on grounds other than the insufficiency of the evidence. See United States v Appawoo, supra; United States v *376Mackins, 32 F3d 134, 137-139 (CA 4, 1994); United States v Council, 973 F2d 251, 253-254 (CA 4, 1992). In such a situation, to retry the defendant does not constitute double jeopardy because the defendant’s initial jeopardy has not been terminated.
m
Turning then to the case presently before this Court, the trial court was without authority to grant defendant’s motion for a directed verdict of acquittal pursuant to MCR 6.419 where the motion was brought after the declaration of a mistrial on the basis of a hung jury. Had defendant been prosecuted in federal court, such a motion would have been proper pursuant to FR Crim P 29(c). Had our Supreme Court adopted 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), Standard 15-3.5 in its entirety, such a motion would have been proper. However, in promulgating MCR 6.419, our Supreme Court first reviewed the ABA Standards, staff comment to MCR 6.419, and then deliberately and intentionally, In re Childress Trust, supra; Farrington, supra, chose to exclude the provision contained in those standards that expressly allowed motions for a directed verdict brought after the declaration of a mistrial based on a hung jury. 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), Standard 15-3.5(c). Given this, one may not reasonably impute an intent on the part of the Supreme Court to include that which they intentionally excluded.
Defendant contends that, regardless of the propriety of the trial court’s action in granting the tardy motion for a directed verdict of acquittal, he has been acquitted, and that to retry him would violate his constitutional right to be free from *377being prosecuted twice for the same actions. US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 15. However, "the trial judge’s characterization of his actions cannot control the classification of his action.” Anderson, supra, p 486 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). We must look beyond the title of the order and "determine whether the ruling of the judge, whatever its label, actually represents a resolution, correct or not, of some or all of the factual elements of the offense charged.” Id. (Internal citation omitted.) After meticulous review of the statements of the trial court and the transcript of the trial, I conclude that the trial court’s nominal order of acquittal was not based on the sufficiency of the evidence, and is not, therefore, an acquittal.
Defendant was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(l) (f); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(f). The statute provides:
(1) A person is guilty of criminal sexual conduct in the first degree if he or she engages in sexual penetration with another person and if . . .
(f) The actor causes personal injury to the victim and force or coercion is used to accomplish sexual penetration.
"Sexual penetration” is defined in MCL 750.520a(l); MSA 28.788(1)(1), in relevant part, to mean "sexual intercourse ... or any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a person’s body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person’s body.” "Force or coercion” is defined in MCL 750.520bl(f)(i); MSA 28.788(2)(l)(f) (i) to include the situation where "the actor overcomes the victim through the actual application of physical force or physical violence.”
*378A directed verdict of acquittal is appropriate where, considering all the evidence presented at the time of the motion in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime or crimes charged were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. People v Wolfe, 440 Mich 508, 515; 489 NW2d 748 (1992). "Circumstantial evidence and reasonable inferences drawn therefrom may be sufficient to prove the elements of a crime.” People v Jolly, 442 Mich 458, 466; 502 NW2d 177 (1993).
Therefore, a directed verdict of acquittal would have been appropriate with respect to the first count of the criminal complaint if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found that defendant physically overcame the complainant, causing her physical injury, in a successful attempt to insert his penis into her vagina. With respect to the second count, a directed verdict would have been appropriate if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, no rational trier of fact could have found that defendant physically overcame the complainant, causing her physical injury, in a successful attempt to insert an object into her vagina.
Upon defendant’s motion, the trial court directed a verdict of acquittal. However, as summarized by the majority, the trial court based the order upon an improper consideration, namely, the credibility of the complainant. See People v Herbert, 444 Mich 466, 473-474; 511 NW2d 654 (1993). Although a review of the record indicates the complainant’s testimony was, in fact, marred by vagueness and inconsistency, the assessment of the complainant’s veracity was the province of the jury, not the court.
However, defendant may not avoid being retried *379merely because he has a document signed by the trial court purporting to be a finding that the evidence was insufficient to convict, that is, an order nominally directing a verdict of acquittal. This Court must review the record and independently determine whether the trial court, in fact, found the evidence to be insufficient. Anderson, supra, pp 486-487. If a trial court "issues without precision what it labels as a judgment of acquittal, but the record . . . shows that the judgment is based on other than the issue of insufficiency of the evidence,” United States v Mackins, supra, p 138, the order may not be considered an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes. While, at first blush, it may appear counterintuitive, the trial court’s finding in the instant case that the complainant was incredible was not a finding that the evidence was insufficient.
It is commonplace that, when determining whether sufficient evidence exists to support a conviction, both the trial court and the reviewing court must consider all the evidence. Wolfe, supra; Lockhart v Nelson, 488 US 33, 40; 109 S Ct 285; 102 L Ed 2d 265 (1988). Here, the complainant was not the only source of evidence. The prosecution presented seven witnesses other than the complainant, as well as fifteen exhibits. The trial court found that the complainant was not credible. However, even disregarding the complainant’s testimony entirely, the remaining evidence, and the reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, Jolly, supra, when viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, Wolfe, supra, was sufficient to allow a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that all the elements of the crimes charged had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
The complainant’s ten-year-old son, who was in *380complainant’s domicile at the time of the events in question, testified that defendant was present at that time. He further testified that he heard the complainant’s sobs and cries for help, as well as defendant’s angry shouts. A police officer testified that he found fluid stains on the sofa where the alleged assault took place, as well as in the crotch of the pants the complainant put on after the alleged assault. The officer also found a plastic sexual aid, photographs of which were admitted into evidence. A forensic serologist testified that the fluid was semen and that approximately one-third of the Caucasian, male population could have produced the semen. Defendant was among that one-third. A registered nurse testified that the complainant had a welt on her head and complained of pain in her forehead and her shoulder, among other places. A photograph of the complainant’s bruised neck and elbow was admitted into evidence. Finally, no fewer than four witnesses testified that the complainant stated that she had been forcibly raped by defendant, and two witnesses testified that the complainant stated that defendant had forced the sexual aid into her vagina.
Viewing the above circumstantial evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and drawing only reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational finder of fact could conclude that the elements of the crimes charged were proved beyond a reasonable doubt. With respect to the first count of the complaint, the one alleging penile-vaginal penetration, from the semen stain in the crotch of the complainant’s pants, one could infer that she had been sexually penetrated; from defendant’s location on the scene and the testimony of the forensic serologist, one could infer that defendant had contributed the semen; from the complainant’s cries and the defendant’s shouts, as well as from complainant’s injuries, one could infer *381that the sexual penetration had been forced; finally, from the photograph of the complainant’s injuries, one could infer that she suffered personal injury as a result of defendant’s actions.
While the evidence with respect to the second count of the complaint, the one alleging penetration with an object, is weaker than that adduced for the first count where the testimony of the complainant is disregarded, it is, nonetheless, sufficient to withstand a motion for a directed verdict. The evidence set forth in the preceding paragraph would be sufficient to establish all the elements except that of penetration with an object. However, considering the proximity of the sexual aid to the scene of the alleged offense, coupled with the testimony of the two witnesses who related that the complainant claimed the defendant forcibly penetrated her with it, a reasonable finder of fact could conclude that the essential elements had been proved.
The evidence set forth above would not be overwhelming. However, evidence need not be overwhelming to withstand a motion for a directed verdict. Wolfe, supra. Further, given that prosecutions for sexual misconduct in domestic situations are frequently successful where the complaining witness refuses to testify or even recants her initial account of the events and testifies for the defense, it would be difficult to conclude that the evidence in the present case, discounting the complainant’s testimony, was insufficient without concluding that virtually all prosecutions for sexual misconduct where the complainant refuses to testify suffer from legally insufficient evidence.
Therefore, the trial court’s ruling that the complaining witness in the present case was incredible may not be taken to be a finding that the evidence was insufficient where sufficient evidence to support convictions would have existed had the com*382plainant’s testimony been disregarded entirely.5 Rather, the trial court’s ruling was relevant to the weight of the evidence, not to its sufficiency. Therefore, pursuant to Anderson, an independent review of the record discloses that the trial court’s acquittal was not, in fact, an acquittal because it was not based upon a finding that the evidence was insufficient. Because of this, retrial of defendant is not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the federal and state constitutions.
I would find merit to the prosecutor’s appeal, vacate the order directing a verdict of acquittal, and remand.

 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), Standard 15-3.5(c), upon which MCR 6.419 is based, provides as follows:
(c) If the jury returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict, the defendant’s motic ~ [for judgment of acquittal] may be made or renewed within a certain time, set by statute or rule, after discharge of the jury or within such further time as the court may fix. Such a motion is not barred by defendant’s failure to make a similar motion prior to the submission of the case to the. jury. [Emphasis added.]

FR Crim P 29(c) (emphasis added), upon which 3 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice (2d ed), Standard 15-3.5(c) is "patterned,” provides as follows:
(c) Motion After Discharge of Jury. If the jury returns a verdict of guilty or is discharged without having returned a verdict, a motion for judgment of acquittal may be made or renewed within 7 days after the jury is discharged or within such further time as the court may fix during the 7-day period. If a verdict of guilty is returned the court may on such motion set aside the verdict and enter judgment of acquittal. If no verdict is returned the court may enter judgment of acquittal. It shall not be necessary to the making of such a motion that a similar motion has been made prior to the submission of the case to the jury.

 MCR 6.419 provides as follows:
(A) Before Submission to Jury. After the prosecutor has rested the prosecution’s case in chief and before the defendant presents proofs, the court on its own initiative may, or on the defendant’s motion must, direct a verdict of acquittal on any charged offense as to which the evidence is insufficient to support conviction. The court may not reserve decision on the defendant’s motion. If the defendant’s motion is made after the defendant presents proofs, the court may reserve decision on the motion, submit the case to the jury, and decide the motion before or after the jury has completed its deliberations.
(B) After Jury Verdict. After a jury verdict, the defendant may file an original or renewed motion for directed verdict of acquittal in the same manner as provided by MCR 6.431(A) for filing a motion for a new trial.
(C) Conditional New Trial Ruling. If the court grants a directed verdict of acquittal after the jury has returned a guilty verdict, it must also conditionally rule on any motion for a new trial by determining whether it would grant the motion if the directed verdict of acquittal is vacated or reversed.
*372(D) Explanation of Rulings on Record. The court must state orally on the record or in a written ruling made a part of the record its reasons for granting or denying a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal and for conditionally granting or denying a motion for a new trial.

 The majority’s exaltation of one adverbial phrase contained in MCR 6.419(A)—the "before or after the jury has completed its deliberations” language—as justification for its conclusion is equally indefensible. Considering the entire sentence, it is clear that the subrule encompasses only motions brought before the case is submitted to the jury. Further, the majority, in a footnote, waives the predicate requirement that the trial court reserve decision on the motion. Such construction is patently untenable.

 United States v Scott [437 US 82, 96; 98 S Ct 2187; 57 L Ed 2d 65 (1978)], quoting United States v Jorn [400 US 470, 478, n 7; 91 S Ct 547; 27 L Ed 2d 543 (1971) (plurality opinion)]. See United States v Martin Linen Supply Co [430 US 564, 571; 97 S Ct 1349; 51 L Ed 2d 642 (1977)].
In the following cases the trial judge’s characterization was held not to be controlling in determining whether there had been an acquittal: United States v Appawoo, 553 F2d 1242 (CA 10, 1977) (trial judge’s "acquittal” held not an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes); United States v Hill, 473 F2d 759 (CA 9, 1973) (dismissal of indictment held to be an acquittal for double jeopardy purposes). See, also, United States v Sisson, 399 US 267; 90 S Ct 2117; 26 L Ed 2d 608 (1970) (post-trial order in arrest of judgment held to be an acquittal, based on now repudiated definition of double jeopardy "acquittal”).

 United States v Martin Linen Supply Co, supra, p 571.

 Id.

 Id., p 572. See People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354, 385-386; 285 NW2d 284 (1979) (Ryan, J.).

 The case of Fong Foo v United States, 369 US 141, 143; 82 S Ct 671; 7 L Ed 2d 629 (1962), which the majority cites for the proposition that a "judge’s entry of judgments of acquittal after determining, among other things, that government’s witnesses were not credible, although erroneous, barred a retrial,” does not control the present case. In Fong Foo, supra, pp 144-145 (Clark, J., dissenting), a federal district court granted a directed verdict of acquittal after finding that all the prosecution’s material witnesses that had then been presented were not credible. The United States Supreme Court held this to be a finding, though erroneous, that the evidence was insufficient to convict, and ruled that retrial was barred. In the case at bar, the trial court found only one witness to be incredible, and, as set forth above and in contrast to Fong Foo, sufficient evidence existed even were that particular witness’ testimony to be discounted entirely.