Court Opinion

ID: 9405477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-28 17:04:47.813733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:22.323493
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/28/23 Louderback v. Walking U Ranch CA2/6
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                         DIVISION SIX

JOHN R. LOUDERBACK et al.,                                     2d Civ. No. B318275
                                                           (Super. Ct. No. 17CV05630)
  Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants                               (Santa Barbara County)
and Appellants,

v.

WALKING U RANCH, LLC, et
al.,

  Defendants, Cross-
complainants and Respondents.

      Plaintiffs’ complaint sought to enforce a right of way
easement across defendants’ land. Defendants cross-complained
to quiet title against the claim of easement. The trial court
awarded judgment to defendants and against plaintiffs. Why?
Because the easement was terminated by merger. We affirm.
                               FACTS
      This appeal concerns two large parcels of real property in
rural Santa Barbara County. In 1972, Roger and Willa Morehart
(the Moreharts) owned the Walking U Ranch (the Ranch). The
Morehart’s children and a daughter-in-law (collectively the
Morehart Children) owned an undivided 25 percent interest in a
neighboring property known as the “793 Acres.”
       In 1972, the Moreharts granted a right of way easement
(the easement) across the Ranch to the Morehart Children for
access to the 793 acres. The Morehart Children were the sole
grantees of the easement, and no other owners of the 793 Acres
were included in the grant.
       In 1972, the Moreharts sold the Ranch to Theodore and
Katherine Okie (the Okies). In 1973, the Morehart Children sold
their 25 percent interest in the 793 Acres to the Okies. Theodore
Okie testified that he and his wife purchased the Morehart
Children’s 25 percent interest to prevent anyone from claiming a
right to cross the Ranch.
       In 2006, Glen Goldin purchased the Okie’s 25 percent
interest in the 793 Acres. No easement was included in the
transfer.
       In 2010, Goldin sold the 25 percent interest in the 793
Acres to John Louderback. Louderback acquired the remaining
75 percent interest in the 793 Acres in 2013. He subsequently
transferred co-ownership to his wife, Jacqueline Louderback.
       Kathleen March and Patrick Bright acquired the Ranch in
2010. John Louderback was the managing agent for the entity
that sold the Ranch to March and Bright. Louderback signed a
disclosure statement that did not mention the easement. March
and Bright transferred their interest in the Ranch to Walking U
Ranch, LLC.1

     1 Hereafter “the Ranch” includes March, Bright, and
Walking U Ranch, LLC, collectively.

                                2
        In March 2016, March challenged the Louderbacks’ use of
the easement. In March 2017, a lock was placed on the northern
entrance gate to the Ranch, preventing the Louderbacks from
using the easement.
                               Lawsuit
        After negotiations proved unsuccessful, the Louderbacks
filed suit against the Ranch. The Louderbacks’ second amended
complaint includes causes of action for: 1) quiet title to the right
of way by express easement or in the alternative easement by
implication, prescription, equity, or necessity; 2) declaratory
relief; 3) interference with easement; 4) nuisance; 5) slander of
title; 6) unfair competition and unfair business practices; and 7)
interference with prospective economic relations.
        The Ranch filed a cross-complaint. The second amended
complaint alleges causes of action for 1) quiet title; 2) declaratory
relief; 3) fraudulent concealment in violation of Civil Code2
section 1102; 4) violation of common law duty to disclose; 5)
negligent concealment; and 6) financial elder abuse of Bright.
The matter proceeded to a court trial, at which time the Ranch
was named the prevailing party.
                        Statement of Decision
        At the Louderbacks’ request, the trial court issued a
statement of decision.
        At trial the Ranch argued that the easement was only a
personal right in the Morehart Children that did not transfer to
their successors. The court did not reach that issue. Instead, the
court assumed it was a valid easement. The court found,
however, that the easement had been terminated by merger

      2All further references are to the Civil Code unless
otherwise indicated.

                                  3
when the Okies acquired both the Ranch and the Morehart
Children’s 25 percent interest in the 793 Acres.
       The trial court also found that the Louderbacks did not
carry their burden to prove an easement by necessity, an implied
easement, prescriptive easement, or equitable easement. The
court found for the Ranch on its causes of action for negligent
concealment and breach of the common law duty to disclose. But
the court found that the Ranch suffered no damages. Finally, the
court found that Bright had not proven his cause of action for
elder abuse.
                              Judgment
       On the Louderbacks’ second amended complaint, the trial
court gave judgment in favor of the Ranch and decreed that the
Louderbacks take nothing on any of their causes of action.
       On the Ranch’s cross-complaint, the trial court quieted title
in favor of the Ranch and declared that the Louderbacks and all
persons unknown have no easement to cross the Ranch and no
right to enter the Ranch. The court found for the Louderbacks on
the Ranch’s causes of action for intentional concealment and
elder abuse. The court awarded costs to the Ranch as the
prevailing party.
                            DISCUSSION
                               I. Merger
       The Louderbacks contend the trial court erred in
concluding that the easement was terminated by merger.
       An easement is an interest in the land of another that
allows the easement owner a limited use of the other’s land.
(Zissler v. Saville (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 630, 638; see 12 Witkin,
Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2017) Real Property, § 396,
p. 454.) The land benefited by an easement is called the

                                 4
dominant tenement; the land burdened by the easement is called
the servient tenement. (§ 803.) It follows from the definition of
an easement as an interest in the land of another that a property
owner cannot have an easement in his own land. (§ 805 [“A
servitude thereon cannot be held by the owner of the servient
tenement”].) Thus when the same person or persons obtains both
the dominant and servient parcels, the easement is terminated
by merger. (§ 811 [“A servitude is extinguished: 1) [b]y vesting of
the right to the servitude and the right to the servient tenement
in the same person”]; see 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th
ed., p. 502.) An easement once terminated by merger does not
come into existence again merely by severing the united estates.
(Zanelli v. McGrath (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 615, 634.)
       Here in 1973, the Okies owned both the Ranch (servient
tenement), and the Morehart Children’s 25 percent interest in
the 793 Acres, (dominant tenement). The trial court correctly
concluded that the easement was extinguished by merger.
       The Louderbacks argue that the Morehart Children were
not the sole owners of the easement. They rely on language in
the easement language in the easement deed allowing use of the
right of way by “tenants and occupants of the premises now held
by Grantee.” In context the language applies only to tenants and
occupants under the Morehart Children’s title. The Morehart
Children are the only parties listed under “Grantee” in the
easement deed. The Louderbacks point to no evidence the
Moreharts intended to benefit anyone other than their children in
creating the easement. The easement created no rights
independent of the Morehart Children’s title. All right, title, and
interest in the Morehart Children’s 25 percent interest was
transferred to the Okies.

                                5
       The Louderbacks argue that merger does not apply where
either the dominant or servient tenements are held in
fractionalized ownership. The argument is supported by neither
logic nor the law.
       As to logic, the Morehart Children were the sole grantees of
the easement. It was not appurtenant to any other interest in
the 793 Acres. The Okies acquired full fee simple title to the
Morehart Children’s 25 percent interest in the 793 Acres. Thus,
the Okies held full fee simple title to the entire dominant and
servient tenements. There was no longer any land of another to
which the easement could remain appurtenant. The easement
was terminated by merger.
       As to law, the authorities on which the Louderbacks rely do
not support their argument.
       In Beyer v. Tahoe Sands Resort (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th
1458, 1473-1478, the Court of Appeal held that merger did not
apply where the plaintiffs held full title to the dominant
tenement and only a beneficial interest in an adjoining servient
tenement with legal title held by a trustee. That is not remotely
similar to this case. In this case, the Okies acquired full fee
simple title to both the dominant and servient tenements.
       In Zanelli v. McGrath, supra, 166 Cal.App.4th 615, the
Court of Appeal concluded that an easement was terminated by
merger. In so concluding the court stated in dicta: “[E]ven when
common ownership of a fee simple absolute estate exists in both
the dominant and servient tenements, that ownership must be of
the entire dominant and servient tenements and not merely a
fractional share.” (Id. at p. 629.) The court gave as examples
cases where an easement served more than one parcel. The
acquisition of less than all of the parcels by the servient owner

                                 6
did not extinguish the easement as to the parcels not acquired.
(Id. at p. 629-630, citing Leggio v. Haggerty (1965) 231
Cal.App.2d 873, 881-884; Cheda v. Bodkin (1916) 173 Cal.7 16-17;
Crease v. Jarrell (1924) 65 Cal.App. 554, 560.) That is not the
case here. The Okies acquired fee simple title to all of the
interest to which the easement was appurtenant.
       The Louderbacks claim the trial court failed to address the
inequitable result that would prevail if the merger doctrine is
applied. They cite Hamilton Court, LLC v. East Olympic, L.P.
(2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 501, 505 (Hamilton Court), for the
proposition that the doctrine of merger will not be applied where
it will be inequitable to do so.
       In Hamilton Court, a loan was secured by an easement
giving the owner of the dominant tenement the exclusive right to
occupy a portion of the servient tenement. The deed of trust
securing the loan contained a provision stating that a transfer of
the easement will not affect the priority of the deed of trust.
Parties who acquired both dominant and servient tenements,
sued the lender to quiet title to the easement. The Court of
Appeal held that the doctrine of merger did not apply because it
was contrary to the agreement that a transfer would not affect
the priority of the deed of trust. A merger would result in the
lender having no security. (Hamilton Court, supra, 215
Cal.App.4th 501, 506.)
       Here there was no agreement to preserve the easement.
The Morehart Children agreed to sell and the Okies agreed to
buy, the 25 percent interest in the 793 Acres. Neither party
claimed that the transaction was in any way inequitable.
       The Louderbacks claim that the transaction was financed
by the Morehart Children who took back a security interest on

                                7
the parcel they sold. The Louderbacks argue that the
termination of the easement impaired the Morehart Children’s
security interest.
       But the Morehart Children are not complaining, and the
Louderbacks are not successors to their security interest. The
Louderbacks cite no authority giving them standing to complain
about the impairment of the Morehart Children’s security
interest, if indeed it still exists.
       Moreover, the transaction that terminated the easement
occurred in 1973. We are not inclined to undo the result of a
transaction that occurred a half-century ago and has remained
unchallenged until now.
                               II. Necessity
       The Louderbacks contend that the trial court refused to
fully adjudicate their alternative claim of easement by necessity.
       An easement by necessity arises when a grantor conveys a
portion of his land in such a way that either the retained or
conveyed parcel would be landlocked in the absence of a right of
way. (See Murphy v. Burch (2009) 46 Cal.4th 157, 162-163.)
When no such right of way is conveyed or reserved, an easement
by necessity arises. (Ibid.) An easement by necessity requires:
1) “strict necessity,” that is, the parcel would be landlocked
without a right of way; and 2) common ownership at the time of
the conveyance giving rise to the necessity. (Id. at p. 163.) In the
absence of common ownership an easement will not be based on
necessity alone. (Id. at p. 164.) The failure of the original
grantee to assert an easement by necessity does not preclude a
subsequent grantee from asserting it. (Lichty v. Sickels (1983)
149 Cal.App.3d 696, 700.)

                                 8
       The Louderbacks argue that the statement of decision is
inadequate. At trial there was a question -- whether the
Louderbacks would be required to add neighboring property
owners as parties to establish an easement by necessity. The
Louderbacks did not do so. In its statement of decision, the trial
court wrote: “This issue having been fully tried the court finds
that the plaintiff has failed to prove that facts necessary to
prevail on this cause of action and has perhaps also not satisfied
procedural pre-requisites to state a prima facie cause of action for
said relief. To the greatest extent possible the court incorporates
into reference herein the factual findings relevant to this cause of
action contained in the defendants’ post-trial papers which the
defense argued and makes all such said findings.”
       Code of Civil Procedure section 632 requires the trial court
to issue a statement of decision upon a party’s timely request.
Here the Louderbacks made a timely request. A statement of
decision is adequate if it fairly discloses the court’s determination
of the ultimate facts and material issues in the case. (Golden
Eagle Ins. Co. v. Foremost Ins. Co. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1372,
1380.)
       The Louderbacks complain that the trial court simply
stated that they had failed to prove their cause of action for an
easement by necessity, without providing any analysis or
discussion of the ultimate facts.
       First, the statement of decision requires only a fair
disclosure of the trial court’s determination of the ultimate facts.
The Louderbacks cite no authority requiring an analysis or
discussion of the ultimate facts.
       Second, if such analysis or discussion is required, the trial
court incorporated by reference the Ranch’s post-trial brief. (See

                                  9
Swars v. Council of City of Vallegio (1949) 33 Cal.2d 867, 872 [“A
Court in making findings may, and commonly does incorporate by
reference”].) That brief contains an extensive analysis of and
discussion on why the Louderbacks cannot prevail, including a
showing that there is no necessity.
       Third, defects in the statement of decision are reviewed for
harmless error. (See F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108.)
The appellant has the burden not only to show error, but injury
from the error. (Robbins v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist.
(1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 313, 318.) To obtain reversal the appellant
must show a reasonable probability that in the absence of the
error, a result more favorable to the appellant would have been
obtained. (Soule v. General Motors Corp. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 548,
574.) The Louderbacks do not attempt to show prejudice.
                   III. Remaining Easement Claims
       The Louderbacks contend that the statement of decision
was inadequate on their other easement claims.
       The statement of decision was limited to the statement that
the Louderbacks failed to carry their burden of proof on an
easement by implication, prescription, or by equity. Assuming
that is not sufficient, the Louderbacks failed to show prejudice.
They make no attempt to show that but for the alleged error, it is
reasonably probable that they would have achieved a more
favorable result. (Soule v. General Motors Corp., supra, 8 Cal.4th
at p. 574.)
                        IV. Statute of Limitations
       The Louderbacks contend that the Ranch’s cause of action
for quiet title is barred by the statute of limitations.
       The Louderbacks cite Muktarian v. Barmby (1965) 63
Cal.2d 558, 560 (Muktarian), for the proposition that because the

                                10
Legislature has established no statute of limitations for quiet
title actions, it is ordinarily necessary to refer to the underlying
theory of relief to determine which statute applies. The
Louderbacks suggest that in this case a five-year limitation of
action applies.
       What the Louderbacks fail to disclose is that in the very
next sentence to the sentence on which they rely, our Supreme
Court in Muktarian stated, “In the present case, however, it is
unnecessary to determine which statute would otherwise apply,
for no statute of limitations runs against a plaintiff seeking to
quiet title while he is in possession of the property.” (Muktarian,
supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 560.) See Levine v. Berschneider (2020) 56
Cal.App.5th 916, 921. Here cross-complainants have been in
possession of the Ranch since 2010. No statute of limitations
applies.
                          V. No Harm Suffered
       The Louderbacks contend that the Ranch’s cause of action
for failure to disclose and negligent concealment are time barred
and lack the essential element of damages. But the trial court’s
finding that those causes of action result in no damages makes
the issue moot. The Louderbacks do not demonstrate that they
suffered any harm. We do not decide hypothetical issues.
(Consolidated Vultee Corp. v. United Automobile, etc. (1946) 27
Cal.2d 859, 862-863.)

                                 11
                        DISPOSITION
     The judgment is affirmed. Costs are awarded to the
respondents.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                   GILBERT, P. J.

We concur:

             YEGAN, J.

             BALTODANO, J.

                              12
                    James F. Rigali, Judge

            Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

                ______________________________

     Williams Iagmin and Jon R. Williams for Plaintiffs and
Appellants.
     The Bankrupcy Firm, Kathleen P. March; Wagner,
Anderson & Bright and Patrick F. Bright for Defendants and
Respondents.