Court Opinion

ID: 9868479
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 18:37:14.911998+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:50.816482
License: Public Domain

On Petition to Rehear.
A petition to rehear is filed by the complainants in which counsel insist that we misapplied the law as to the defense of impossibility of performance of a contract. We think not. We have merely adopted the view now more generally accepted by modern authorities. Mr. Williston very interestingly traces the evolution of this defense in his work on Contracts (Revised Ed., Yol. 6, p. 5406 et seq.).
The old rule, approved as an abstract principle, but not there applied, is stated in Trigg v. Hally, 23 Tenn. (4 Humph.), 493, and is: “Where a party by his own contract engages to do an act, it is deemed to be his own *559fault and folly that he did not thereby expressly provide against contingencies and exempt himself from responsibility in certain events, and in snch case, therefore, that is, in the instance of an absolute and general contract, the performance is not excused by an inevitable accident, or other contingency, although not foreseen by or within the control of the party. ’ ’
The new rule, as stated in the opinion herein, is: “The essence of the modern defense of impossibility is that the promised performance was at the making of the contract, or thereafter became, impracticable owing to some extreme or unreasonable difficulty, expense, injury, or loss involved, rather than that it is scientifically or actually impossible.” Williston on Contracts (Revised Ed.), Vol. 6, p. 5410.
This defense of impossibility of performance is considered at length in the Restatement of Contracts, section 454 et seq. Many illustrations of the application of the rule and comments are contained in this chapter of the Restatement.
The quotation from Mr. Williston just above is said by him to be the essence of the matter as laid down in the Restatement. Since he was the Reporter of the Restatement of Contracts and, as we understand, largely the author, we take this observation of his to be correct.
Counsel refer to earlier decisions of this court approving the old rule. We were not unmindful of these cases in disposing of the case before us. Doubtless they should have been noticed in the opinion but reference to them was omitted for the sake .of brevity.
The last of the cases referred to was Wiggins v. Gill, 62 Tenn. (3 Baxt.), 140. This case was decided in 1873. We mentioned it in the opinion noting that it had approved the case of Taylor v. Caldwell, 3 B. & S., 326, 122 *560Eng. Reprint 309, which was one of the authorities upon which our opinion herein rested. Taylor v. Caldwell seems to have marked a sort of turning point in judicial thought.
Another decision of this court is Trigg v. Hally, supra. In so far as' the case is here in point it involved what is called subjective impossibility as distinguished from objective impossibility — the difference between “the thing cannot be done” and “I cannot do it.” In the latter class of cases impossibility of performance is not a defense. Restatement of Contracts, section 455.
In Bryan v. Spurgeon, 37 Tenn. (5 Sneed), 681, the court thought that the contingency should have been foreseen. Officer v. Sims, 49 Tenn. (2 Heisk.), 501, is irrelevant. An executed contract was involved. In Thompsons v. Warren, 45 Tenn. (5 Cold.), 644, and Mississippi & T. Railroad Co. v. Green, 56 Tenn. (9 Heisk.), 588, a relaxation of the old rule was made, and performance was excused when the thing to be done became impossible by reason of law.
The complainants ask that we clarify our opinion in certain aspects. We have heretofore expressed our conclusions about as clearly as we are able to do.
In so far as the complainants sought a recovery for the balance due for the first fifty-year term, we awarded judgment. Defendants indeed conceded liability for the rent for that term and the only question was as to the amount due.
 As to the right of the complainants to enforce a renewal of the lease for another fifty-year term, the court simply refused to make any declaration. This course was followed upon authority of Newsum v. Interstate Realty Co., 152 Tenn., 302, 278 S. W., 56, wherein it was said: “A declaratory judgment is essentially' one *561of construction. It is apparent from the history of the legislation providing for this procedure, ns well as from the recitals of the Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act itself, that its primal purpose is the construction of definitely stated rights, status, and other legal relations, commonly expressed in written instruments, although not confined thereto, and, while determination of an issue of fact is authorized by section 9 of the act, the settlement of disputed facts at issue between the parties will ordinarily be relegated to the proper jurisdictional forums otherwise provided. Recognizing that the courts have a very wide discretion under these acts, which should be exercised with the utmost caution, it has been said by good authority that ‘a declaration may properly be refused if it can be made only after a judicial investigation of disputed facts.’ Freeman on Judgments, Yol. 3 (5th Ed.), section 1356, and see [Annotation], 12 A. L. B., 72.”
The foregoing was approved in Harrell v. American Home Mortgage Co., 162 Tenn., 371, 36 S. W. (2d), 888.
We are unable to see that any grave injustice will be done to complainants if they fail to obtain a renewal of this lease. As we figure it, they have been paid upward of $270,000 for the property they parted with, which is no trifling consideration.
The petition to rehear is denied.