Court Opinion

ID: 9757181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:22:30.92319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:35.614829
License: Public Domain

Justice SAYLOR,
dissenting.
As I would not impose a duty to investigate upon Appellee, I respectfully dissent. Preliminarily, in the context of fraud or misrepresentation, the elements necessary to avoid a contract correspond with those required to establish tort liability. See generally Restatement (Second) of Contracts (Topic 1. Misrepresentation, Introductory Note) (1979) (explaining that the rules applicable in the contractual context conform to those provided for in tort, although because “tort law imposes liability in damages for misrepresentation, while contract law does not, the requirements imposed by contract law are in *76some instances less stringent”). In either context, a recipient’s reliance need only be justifiable. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 164(1); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 525; see also Gibbs v. Ernst, 538 Pa. 193, 207, 647 A.2d 882, 889 (1994). Justifiable reliance represents an intermediate level of dependence, falling between reasonable reliance and mere or bare reliance. See generally Field v. Mans, 516 U.S. 59, 72-75, 116 S.Ct. 437, 444, 446, 133 L.Ed.2d 351 (1995) (collecting cases discussing the required level of reliance for common law fraud). Although whether one’s reliance is justified depends upon the facts and circumstances surrounding the representation, see id. at 71,116 S.Ct. at 444,116 S.Ct. 437, as a general rule, there is no duty to investigate. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 172 (stating that “a recipient’s fault in not knowing or discovering the facts before making the contract does not make his reliance unjustified unless it amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance -with reasonable standards of fair dealing”).1
Here, taking into consideration that the parties did not deal at arm’s length, their age and experience disparity, the absence of any evidence indicating that Appellee failed to act in *77good faith, the fact that the financial disclosure listing the value of the engagement ring occurred immediately before Appellee was to sign the prenuptial agreement, and the fact that Appellant had given Appellee numerous items of genuine jewelry prior to the engagement ring, and, more important, in light of the trial court’s fact and credibility assessments, I would hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that Appellee’s reliance upon the intentional misrepresentation by Appellant was justified.
Justice NIGRO joins this dissenting opinion.

. Accord. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 540. The rationale for such rule stems, in part, from the fact that a recipient's comparative or contributory fault is less relevant where, as here, the fraudulent representation was intentional as opposed to negligent. See generally Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 474, at 1359-60 (2001). At the same time, however, an individual is not generally permitted to rely upon statements of opinion or expressions of intention. See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 169, 171. In this regard, certain statements between buyers and sellers of goods are treated as opinion, for example, general statements of quality and value, provided that such declarations are "not so far removed from the truth as to be incompatible with the facts known to the maker.” See id. at § 168 cmts. c, d. Here, the relationship between Appellant and Appellee was not that of buyer and seller and, for this reason, I would distinguish the case relied upon by the majority, namely, Moore v. Steinman Hardware Co., 319 Pa. 430, 179 A. 565 (1935), which is cited for the proposition that Appellee had a duty to investigate where there was ah equal opportunity to ascertain the facts affecting value. Moreover, Moore's holding drew from statutory authority, which provided that affirmations of value between buyers and sellers could not be construed as a warranty. See id. at 433 n. 1, 179 A. at 567 n. 1 (citing Section 12 of the Uniform Sales Act of May 19, 1915, P.L. 543).