Court Opinion

ID: 9386439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-12 15:05:21.710342+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:06.418077
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                 No. 22-1299
                             Filed April 12, 2023

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF AMANDA JANE BAINBRIDGE
AND TROY DOUGLAS BAINBRIDGE

Upon the Petition of
AMANDA JANE BAINBRIDGE,
      Petitioner-Appellee,

And Concerning
TROY DOUGLAS BAINBRIDGE,
     Respondent-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

     Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Plymouth County, Tod Deck, Judge.

     Troy Bainbridge appeals from the decree dissolving his marriage to Amanda

Bainbridge. AFFIRMED.

     William H. Larson of Klass Law Firm, L.L.P., Sioux City, for appellant.

     Michele Lewon of Michele Lewon, P.L.C., Sioux City, for appellee.

     Considered by Bower, C.J., and Badding and Buller, JJ.
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BULLER, Judge.

       This appeal arises from a 2021 dissolution of marriage between Amanda

Bainbridge and Troy Bainbridge, centering on three disputes from the district

court’s decree. Troy argues that the district court erred in its valuation of his

business, Bainbridge Capital, LLC (Bainbridge); the determination of his yearly

income; and the award of spousal support to Amanda. Amanda requests appellate

attorney fees. We find that equity was done, we affirm the dissolution decree, and

we deny Amanda’s request for appellate attorney fees.

       I.     Background Facts and Proceedings

       Amanda and Troy married in November 2000 and had four children

together. At the time of trial, the older two children were young adults and mostly

lived independently. The two younger children—both born in 2009—lived mostly

with Amanda.

       Amanda is a nurse anesthetist. She started working as a nurse in 2002 and

earned her doctorate in 2021. Before the dissolution, she worked part time,

earning about $171,000 per year, with the potential to earn $220,000 if she

switched to full time. Troy is a high school graduate and spent his entire career in

construction. He runs Bainbridge.

       Bainbridge is a construction company that does mostly governmental

contract work. Troy began Bainbridge in 2000—after the parties’ marriage. At the

time of trial, Troy owned 70% of Bainbridge and Amanda owned 30%.               The

business grew significantly during the marriage and, over the two years preceding

the divorce, Amanda and Troy began drawing large amounts from the company.
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By trial, the long-term debt of the business grew to more than $2 million and the

pair incurred significant personal debt.

       Amanda filed the petition for dissolution of marriage in December 2020. The

parties stipulated before trial to legal custody of the minor children, placing physical

care with Amanda and visitation with Troy.          The remaining issues included

Bainbridge’s valuation, Troy’s annual income, and whether Troy should pay

spousal support to Amanda.

       Trial was in December 2021, and the district court issued its dissolution

decree in April 2022. The court valued Bainbridge at $800,000 and awarded the

company to Troy. In addition, the court assigned Amanda an annual income of

$220,000 based on full-time employment and Troy an annual income of $300,000

based on his salary and recent history of draws from Bainbridge. Based on the

marital lifestyle and Troy’s significantly higher income, the court ordered Troy to

pay Amanda $1000 per month for the next ten years, until one of the parties dies

or until Amanda remarries. Troy appeals.

       II.    Standard of Review

       A dissolution-of-marriage proceeding is heard in equity, and we generally

review the resulting dissolution de novo. In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402,

406 (Iowa 2015). “We give weight to the factual determinations made by the district

court; however, their findings are not binding upon us.” Id. “We will disturb the

trial court’s order only when there has been a failure to do equity.” Id. (citation

and internal quotation marks omitted).
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       III.    Discussion

       On appeal, Troy disagrees with the district court’s valuation of Bainbridge,

the determination of his yearly income, and the award of spousal support to

Amanda.       Amanda requests appellate attorney fees.            We affirm and deny

Amanda’s request for appellate attorney fees.

       A. Valuation of Bainbridge Capital

       Troy first challenges the district court’s valuation of Bainbridge at $800,000

and contests the valuation’s effect on the division of marital property. He argues

the court should have not relied on Amanda’s expert and did not consider all of the

relevant evidence when valuing the company.

       In dissolution-of-marriage cases, courts divide martial property equitably,

considering the factors outlined in Iowa Code section 598.21 (2020).                 In re

Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 702 (Iowa 2007). What qualifies as an

equitable distribution depends on the circumstances of each case, as an equitable

division is not necessarily an equal division. Id.

       The property’s value is generally determined as of the date of trial. See In

re Marriage of Driscoll, 563 N.W.2d 640, 642 (Iowa Ct. App. 1997). Even so,

“[t]here may be occasions when the trial date is not appropriate to determine

values. Equitable distributions require flexibility and concrete rules of distribution

may frustrate the court’s goal of obtaining equitable results.” Id. In reviewing the

trial court’s determination, we will not disturb the valuation of an asset if “it is within

the range of permissible evidence.” In re Marriage of McDermott, 827 N.W.2d 671,

679 (Iowa 2013).
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       When determining the value of a closely held business like Bainbridge,

courts look to the intrinsic value of the business, as the market value of the stock

can rarely be ascertained. In re Marriage of Moffatt, 279 N.W.2d 15, 19 (Iowa

1979). A wide range of evidence can show intrinsic value, such as the book value

of the stock or the earnings capacity of the company. Id.; In re Marriage of Dieger,

584 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Iowa Ct. App. 1998). A court need not arrive at an exact

value, only an overall equitable result. Dieger, 584 N.W.2d at 569. Because

valuation is difficult, the trial court is given significant flexibility, such as the ability

to devise its own scheme for valuation. In re Marriage of Hitchcock, 309 N.W.2d

432, 435 (Iowa 1981).

       Amanda’s expert on Bainbridge’s value was a certified public accountant

and valuation analyst. He provided a written report opining that the value of

Bainbridge was $1,020,597 and testified to his findings at trial. Amanda’s expert

valued Bainbridge as of December 31, 2020, because that was the last date that

complete information was available. Troy did not rebut Amanda’s expert with his

own expert, but instead summed the values of company assets, subtracted the

liabilities, and arrived at a value of $480,187 for Bainbridge as of trial.

       The district court found Amanda’s expert persuasive and reasoned it was

appropriate to value Bainbridge as of December 31, 2020, due to incomplete

information after that date. In contrast, the court found Troy’s valuation too volatile

and unreliable, as his valuations fluctuated wildly depending on when he valued

the company.       Troy also failed to provide a compelling explanation for why

Bainbridge’s value would drop by more than half in the year between the expert’s

valuation and the time of trial. To some degree, the court split the difference and
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adjusted Amanda’s expert valuation down to $800,000 based on outstanding

receivables and Bainbridge’s uneven history of success. We agree with the district

court’s observations about the competing valuation evidence and find its ultimate

conclusion about valuation was fair. See In re Marriage of McKamey, 522 N.W.2d

95, 97 (Iowa Ct. App. 1994) (taking the past several years of business activity into

account when valuing a business). Because the $800,000 valuation is well within

the “range of permissible evidence,” McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at 679, we find no

failure to do equity in the $800,000 valuation assigned to Bainbridge and reject

Troy’s challenge.

       B. Troy’s Yearly Income

       Troy next contends the district court erred in finding he earned $300,000

per year, based on his $80,000 annual salary and expected annual draws of

$220,000 from Bainbridge. In considering a party’s income, a court must consider

all circumstances relating to that party’s income. In re Marriage of Powell, 474

N.W.2d 531, 534 (Iowa 1991). For instance, if a party’s income is subject to

substantial fluctuations, an average of that income over several years may be

appropriate. Id. As a whole, however, the parties’ income must be determined

from the most reliable evidence presented. Id.

       Troy makes two arguments surrounding this claim.           First, while Troy

acknowledges his salary is $80,000, he argues his expected draws are only

$63,245 based on an exhibit he submitted showing draws for 2021. Yet Troy

admitted at trial that he made substantial draws not shown in the exhibit, and the

district court identified about $200,000 in draws Troy made in the first seven

months of 2021. Amanda also submitted an exhibit showing the parties made
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more than $1.2 million in draws from 2016 through 2020, an average of nearly

$250,000 annually.     Considering the parties’ recent draws from Bainbridge,

Bainbridge’s potential future earnings, and Troy’s ownership of the company, we

agree with the district court that Troy can be expected to draw $220,000 annually

from Bainbridge.

      Second, Troy argues the court should have subtracted the sum of the three-

year cash-equalization payment amount—$120,818—from his annual income.

Our precedent does not support this argument. See Hansen, 733 N.W.2d at 704

(calculating a party’s income without subtracting a cash-equalization payment from

it). This argument also ignores Troy’s yearly fluctuations in income. Even if we

were inclined toward this claim, Troy’s math does not account for the drastic

increase in his income after the three-year period ends. Like the district court, we

decline to subtract the equalization payment from Troy’s income.

      C. Spousal Support to Amanda

      Troy also argues neither party should receive spousal support. An award

of spousal support is not an absolute right, and any award depends on the

particular circumstances of a case, dependent on the factors listed in Iowa Code

section 598.21A. In re Marriage of Olson, 705 N.W.2d 312, 315 (Iowa 2005). A

determining court must balance the ability of a spouse to pay support with the

needs of the requesting spouse, while also considering the standard of living the

parties enjoyed during the marriage. In re Marriage of Stark, 542 N.W.2d 260, 262

(Iowa Ct. App. 1995). We will not disturb an award of spousal support unless the

district court failed to do equity. In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 541

(Iowa 2022).
                                         8

       The district court ordered Troy to pay Amanda spousal support in the

amount of $1000 per month for ten years. The court did not specify which type of

support it was awarding, and neither party claims error related to the type of

support or its duration once ordered. See id. at 543–45 (discussing the types of

spousal support, noting varying lengths for different types of support).

       The parties were married for twenty-one years, a duration that favors

spousal support. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(a); Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d at 542

(finding a seventeen-year marriage “weighs in favor of a substantial [spousal

support] award”). Neither party identified significant health concerns for their age.

See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(b). The parties received a near-equal distribution of

marital property that the district court valued at more than $2.5 million, though the

court noted the value of Troy’s distribution is more open to interpretation and

fluctuation. See id. § 598.21A(1)(c). Neither party showed a need or desire for

additional education or training. See id. § 598.21A(1)(d).

       Amanda is expected to earn an annual income of $220,000, and Troy is

expected to earn an annual income of $300,000. While Amanda’s income is

substantial, she only worked part time while caring for the children, and she

sacrificed at least some career success to benefit the marriage.            See id.

§ 598.21A(1)(e). The parties lived a marital lifestyle commensurate with their high

income, amassing a significant marital estate with multiple homes and enjoying

regular vacations such as wine-tasting in California and skiing in Colorado. See

id. § 598.21A(1)(f). Finally, we note the recent changes in tax law that make

spousal support more burdensome for the payor and more favorable for the payee.

See id. § 598.21A(1)(g); In re Marriage of Mann, 943 N.W.2d 15, 21 (Iowa 2020).
                                            9

         Considering all relevant factors, we agree Amanda should receive a spousal

support award. In particular, Amanda’s income alone will not allow her to maintain

a lifestyle reasonably comparable to the standard during marriage. Troy earns a

greater income and has the means to pay support. We find no lack of equity in

ordering Troy to pay support to Amanda in the amount of $1000 per month for ten

years.

         D. Appellate Attorney Fees

         Finally, Amanda requests appellate attorney fees. An award of appellate

attorney fees is within the appellate court’s discretion. McDermott, 827 N.W.2d at

687. In making this determination, we consider the needs of the requesting party

for an award of fees, the ability of the other party to pay attorney fees, and whether

the requesting party was obligated to defend the trial court’s decision on appeal.

In re Marriage of Moore, 526 N.W.2d 335, 338 (Iowa 1994).

         Amanda argues she should receive appellate attorney fees because Troy

has significantly greater income and she was obligated to defend the district court’s

decision, which we affirm in its entirety. Even so, Amanda has sufficient means to

pay her attorney fees, especially after receiving a sizable award of marital property.

We decline to order Troy to pay Amanda’s appellate attorney fees.

         IV.    Disposition

         We affirm the district court’s valuation of Bainbridge, determination of Troy’s

monthly income, and spousal support award.            We also decline to order any

appellate attorney fees. Costs are assessed to Troy.

         AFFIRMED.

Bower, C.J., concurs; Badding, J., concurs specially.
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BADDING, Judge (concurring specially).

       I concur in the result reached, though with some hesitation as it relates to

the spousal support awarded to Amanda. This case typifies the difficulty with the

multifactored statutory approach used in our state to determine spousal support.

See In re Marriage of Gust, 858 N.W.2d 402, 408, 410 (Iowa 2015) (noting the “law

of spousal support under the multifactored statutory approach has been criticized

for its arbitrary nature and lack of predictability,” but stating “we are compelled to

follow the traditional multifactor statutory framework”). While the multifactored

approach allows for flexibility, that flexibility can lead to indiscriminate results,

making it difficult for practitioners to advise their clients and judges to decide their

cases. See id. at 408 (noting the “multifactored legal test in which all factors are

relevant and none are dispositive can be extraordinarily difficult to consistently

apply”).

       Here, for instance, there are just as many factors against making a spousal

support award to Amanda as there are in favor of such an award, chief among

them Amanda’s ability to support herself at a standard of living reasonably

comparable to that enjoyed during the marriage. See Iowa Code § 598.21A(1)(f)

(2020); In re Marriage of Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d 530, 543 (Iowa 2022) (“The award

and duration of a traditional alimony award ‘is primarily predicated on need and

ability.’” (quoting Gust, 858 N.W.2d at 411). In past cases, this court has observed

“[t]he fact one party may generate more income than the other is not the controlling

factor in the alimony award where both parties have the education and potential to

supply for themselves a very adequate living.” In re Marriage of Snyder, No. 21-

0438, 2022 WL 610322, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2022) (affirming rehabilitative
                                         11

spousal support award of $2000 per month for thirty months in a sixteen-year

marriage and denying recipient spouse’s request for an award of traditional

support); accord In re Marriage of Borden, No. 09-1148, 2010 WL 1050012, at *4

(Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 24, 2010) (modifying an award of $575 per month in traditional

spousal support, payable until either party’s death or the recipient’s remarriage, to

an award of $300 per month for forty-eight months where the recipient spouse left

a twenty-three-year marriage “with an education and skills enabling her to support

herself and accumulate additional funds to support her in retirement”); In re

Marriage of Grunder, No. 03-1871, 2004 WL 1843316, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. July

28, 2004) (affirming denial of spousal support in a fourteen-year marriage where

the recipient spouse had an agricultural business degree, worked full-time during

the marriage, and was capable of self-support).

       It is also unclear what type—or types—of spousal support was or were

awarded here. See In re Marriage of Sokol, 985 N.W.2d 177, 186 (Iowa 2023)

(noting while courts “may issue hybrid awards,” that “does not mean . . . that courts

are free to award spousal support not corresponding to any recognized category

of support”). The district court discussed the law on traditional, rehabilitative, and

reimbursement spousal support but did not specify which applied to the award that

was made.     In defending that award on appeal, Amanda characterizes it as

transitional—even though that was not a category discussed by the court, and it

had only been formally adopted by the supreme court about a month before the

district court issued its decree. See Pazhoor, 971 N.W.2d at 534. And since her

brief was filed in this appeal, our supreme court has clarified that because
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“transitional spousal support is focused on solving a short-term liquidity issue,” it

“generally should not exceed one year in duration.” Sokol, 985 N.W.2d at 187.

       Despite these issues, our case law has consistently emphasized the

deference that is to be afforded to the district court in making spousal support

awards. See id. at 182 (“Although our review is de novo, we afford deference to

the district court for institutional and pragmatic reasons.” (citation omitted)). As the

supreme court explained in Sokol:

       The institutional deference afforded the district court in determining
       spousal support counsels against undue tinkering with spousal
       support awards. An appellate court should disturb the district court’s
       determination of spousal support only when there has been a failure
       to do equity. Otherwise, when appellate courts unduly refine these
       important, but often conjectural, judgment calls, they thereby foster
       appeals in hosts of cases, at staggering expense to the parties wholly
       disproportionate to any benefit they might hope to realize.

Id. at 182–83 (cleaned up).

       In order to avoid this undue tinkering, and in consideration of the deference

to be afforded to the district court, I join in the majority’s well-written opinion

affirming the award of spousal support to Amanda—even though I would have

reached a different result under the same factors considered by the district court

and this court. See id. at 188 (Mansfield, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part) (“Unless and until our state adopts formal alimony guidelines, appellate courts

should not be second-guessing lower courts’ judgment calls.”).