Court Opinion

ID: 9533959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:35:54.259942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:14.819256
License: Public Domain

McQUADE, Justice
(dissenting).
I am unable to agree with the majority’s position that the arrest of Pontier complied with the Fourth Amendment. I fear that the majority’s position will erode the Fourth Amendment’s protection of the public from unreasonable governmental interference.
The record discloses that after observing two marijuana plants in the backyard of Pontier’s residence, the police went to the house to arrest Pontier and all persons residing therein without making any effort to obtain an arrest warrant for Pontier or a search warrant for the house. This Court has held that “A police officer may make an arrest without a warrant when a felony has been committed and he has rea*716sonable cause to believe that the person or persons arrested have committed it.”1 The police did not possess sufficient information to meet the reasonable cause test and thus the arrest of Pontier and the search of his house was in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Pontier was arrested and charged with violation of I.C. § 37-3202 2 which makes it unlawful for any person to be in possession of marijuana. To determine if the police had reasonable cause to arrest Pontier, the facts and circumstances known to the police prior to entry into his residence must be measured against the elements of the offense to determine if there was reasonable cause to believe that Pontier was in violation of I.C. § 37-3202.
The elements of the offense of possession of marijuana are possession of the narcotic, intent to possess it and knowledge that it is marijuana. The record reveals that no physical possession of the plants was established because neither Pontier nor anyone else was ever observed near the plants. The only other means of establishing possession is through the doctrine of constructive possession which was recently applied by this Court in the case of State v. Segovia.3 In that case a reliable informant was sent to purchase marijuana from Segovia. The transfer was not observed by the police, but the informant later rendezvoused with the officers with the amount of marijuana he had agreed to purchase and stated it had come from Segovia. The police arrested Segovia and in his appeal to this Court, he argued that the State had not proven possession of the marijuana, but this Court held to the contrary stating,
“Here the state established that some marijuana was found in appellant’s house, and a coffee can of it was found in a bush in his backyard. The evidence established one set of footprints in the snow near the bush, and the officers testified to seeing him go back to the trash can near the bush. A defendant need not have actual physical possession of marijuana to sustain a conviction for possession of it, but the state need only prove that he has such dominion and control over it as to establish constructive possession.”4
The question of reasonable cause for the element of possession in this action is whether the observation of two marijuana plants would give rise to reasonable cause for the police to believe that the residents of the house were exercising dominion and control over the plants. Unlike the Segovia case, and the cases relied on in that case to define the doctrine of constructive possession, 5 there was no physical connection of any kind established between the marijuana plants in this action and any resident of the house. Clearly the facts fall far short of demonstrating any dominion or control by the residents of the house and thus do not give rise to reasonable cause to believe that Pontier had possession of the marijuana plants.
The other two elements of the offense of possession of marijuana are knowledge that the substance is marijuana and intent to possess it. The statutory definition of the offense does not specifically require knowledge and intent, but I.C. § 18-114 provides, “In every crime or public offense there must exist a union, or joint operation, of act and intent, or criminal negli*717gence.” The question of reasonable cause for the elements of knowledge and intent is whether observation of the two plants would give rise to reasonable cause for the police to believe that Pontier had knowledge of the presence of marijuana plants on his rented property and that he intended to possess them. Without some showing of a connection between the plants and Pontier other than their presence on his property, it cannot be concluded that he had knowledge of them and intended to possess them.
In comparing the facts of this case to other decisions of this Court involving reasonable cause for arrest, it is clear that much less was shown in this case to connect Pontier with a criminal offense than was shown in the others. In State v. Segovia, the defendant also challenged the probable cause that led to his arrest. This Court recited the facts giving rise to reasonable cause as,
“In the present case the officers observed much of the initial transaction between their informer and appellant, and although they did not see the actual transfer of marijuana from appellant to the informer, they had the statement of the informer, whom they knew from past occasions to be reliable, that he had purchased the marijuana from appellant. This marijuana was delivered to the officers shortly after its purchase, and the can was in a brown paper sack similar to the one the officers had observed appellant carrying during their surveillance.” 6
In this case there was never any physical connection between Pontier and the marijuana plants either observed or reported by a reliable informer.
In State v. Loyd,7 the appellant in a burglary conviction claimed that there was no probable cause for his arrest, but this Court held to the contrary and recited the following facts,
“[T]he police officers observed a car with out-of-state license plates driving slowly during the early morning, in the vicinity where a burglary had occurred minutes before. The area was predominately residential. One officer noticed an occupant throw something in a furtive manner from the car.”8
In this case there were no suspicious activities that would connect Pontier and the marijuana plants.
A search for analogous factual situations in other jurisdictions in which probable cause for an arrest is based solely on the observation of contraband in the vicinity of the suspect resulted in the discovery of very few cases which indicates that more information is usually required before probable cause is determined to exist. In the case of People v. Olson 9 the police arrested Olson’s girlfriend and two others in the car for possession .of marijuana and found marijuana in the car. The police then arrested Olson at his residence for possession of marijuana. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the police did not have probable cause to arrest Olson and stated,
“The only circumstance to tie Olson to the unlawful conduct of the three occupants of Olson’s car was his ownership of the vehicle. He was not a participant in the alleged unlawful conduct which gave rise to the initial arrests, which in turn justified the search of the vehicle. None of the three occupants gave any statements implicating Olson * * *. The officers must have had not only probable cause to believe an offense had been committed, but also that the person to be arrested had committed it.” 10
*718Similarly in this action, the only circumstance to tie Pontier to the marijuana plants was their presence on his rented property. The police had reason to believe that the narcotic laws were being violated upon observation of the plants, but they had no indication as to who was exercising dominion and control over the plants. Another similar factual situation is found in the case of United States v. Myers.11 In that case the appellant Myers was arrested while sitting in the woods when a package of marijuana was found a few feet from him. On appeal it was held there was no probable cause to believe that Myers was in possession of the marijuana. Although the marijuana plants in this action were located on Pontier’s rental property, there are no factual circumstances, to demonstrate his possession or control of marijuana similar to the Myers case.
By measuring the information the police possessed against the elements of the offense, it can only be concluded that there was no reasonable cause to believe Pontier was in violation of I.C. § 37-3202 and thus there was no reasonable cause to justify his arrest and the accompanying search of his house. The majority’s position of upholding the arrest and search appears to lessen the standard of reasonable cause that has been applied in the past by this Court and other courts to the detriment of the public’s right to be free from unreasonable governmental interference. By holding that there was no reasonable cause to arrest Pontier does not mean that the police are powerless to act when they observe marijuana or any other type of contraband located on a person’s property. Upon observation of the contraband, the police have the right to seize it and investigate to determine if the owner or tenant has any connection with the contraband, but they have no authority to arrest without further evidence the occupier of the property and other persons found thereon.
The policy behind the reasonable cause requirement for a warrantless arrest grows out of the Fourth Amendment’s limitation on governmental action:
“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”12
Without a warrant an arrest without reasonable or probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person and thus violative of the Fourth Amendment. The purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to protect the citizen’s right to be free from unreasonable governmental interference and his right to be unmolested.
An arrest is governmental interference with an individual’s freedom. Although a conviction may never be obtained, an arrest has serious effects on a person’s employment, social life, and general well being.13 In this action in addition to the arrest, the police invaded and searched Pontier’s home. In order to minimize the above adverse consequences of an arrest, the Fourth Amendment requires that the police possess reasonable or probable cause to believe that the suspect has committed a crime before a warrant can issue and the arrest take place. The probable cause requirement is a limitation on governmental action for the protection of the American people and can only be modified by the electorate, not by this Court. The majority has abdicated this Court’s duty to protect the public’s constitutional guarantees from governmental encroachment.
It is unfortunate that Pontier’s conviction should be reversed because during the search of the house to arrest Pontier, evidence was discovered that indicated he was *719involved in narcotics. This Court, however, must look beyond the effect of its ruling in this one case, and must consider the effect of its ruling on the public generally in connection with the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable governmental interference. Today’s majority decision will allow the police to arrest persons and conduct searches of their homes any time contraband of any type is observed on the property they occupy. If a thief fleeing from a crime discards stolen property on any portion of a person’s property, then under the majority’s reasoning upon police observation of the contraband the land occupier and his family would be subject to arrest and their home searched. Surely the Fourth Amendment never contemplated such a result.
Because probable cause was not established in this case, we need not reach the issue of whether arrest warrants are required by the Fourth Amendment when there are no exigent circumstances.14 Although not ruling on the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirements for an arrest, it should be pointed out that:
“An arrest without a warrant bypasses the safeguards provided by an objective predetermination of probable cause, and substitutes instead the far less reliable procedure of an after-the-event justification for the arrest or search, too likely to be subtly influenced by the familiar shortcomings of hindsight judgment.”15
This action is a perfect example of the efficacy of the warrant procedure. Had the police gone to a magistrate to obtain an arrest warrant, the lack of probable cause would have been discovered. Through more investigation a good case could have been built against Pontier and this appeal with its accompanying cost to the taxpayer could have been avoided. Additionally, the majority would not be forced to diminish constitutional standards that are for the protection of the public in order to affirm a conviction.
Because of the adverse consequences of the majority’s decision upon the public’s right of privacy and freedom from governmental interference, Pontier’s conviction must be reversed.

. In effect at the time of the arrest.

. State v. Segovia, supra, note 1.

. State v. Segovia, supra, note 1, 93 Idaho at 598, 468 P.2d at 664.

.State v. Segovia, supra, note 1, at 598, 468 P.2d 660; White v. United States, 315 F.2d 113 (9th Cir. 1963) — per curiam; United States v. Hernandez, 290 F.2d 86 (2nd Cir. 1961) — remanded to trial court for failure to explain possession in charge; People v. White, 50 Cal.2d 428, 325 P.2d 985 (1958)— possession by agent under explicit instruction of defendant; People v. Magdaleno, 158 Cal.App.2d 48, 322 P.2d 89 (1958) — narcotics found in room rented by defendant.

. State v. Segovia, supra, note 1, 93 Idaho at 597, 468 P.2d at 663.

. State v. Loyd, supra, note 1.

. State v. Loyd, supra, note 1, 92 Idaho at 23, 435 P.2d at 800.

. 175 Colo. 140, 485 P.2d 891 (1971).

. People v. Olson, supra, note 9, 485 P.2d at 894.

. 20 U.S.C.M.A. 269, 43 C.M.R. 109 (1971).

. United States Const., amend. IV. See Idaho Const., art. I, § 17.

.Leedom, Removing the Stigma of Arrest: The Courts, The Legislatures and Unconvicted Arrestees, 47 Wash.L.Rev. 659 (1972).

. See The Neglected Fourth Amendment Problem in Arrest Entries, 23 Stan.L.Rev. 995 (1971).

. Beck v. State of Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 96, 85 S.Ct. 223, 228, 13 L.Ed.2d 142 (1964).