Court Opinion

ID: 9713162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:09:33.539097+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:17.148831
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE BUCKLEY, dissenting: I dissent because I believe the majority has misstated Illinois products liability law applicable to design defect cases and has confused the concept of crashworthiness with the consumer contemplation test. The majority incorrectly states that an “extensive” body of Illinois law addresses the issues in the case at bar and requires a finding that the challenged design defects here are not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. The majority fails to recognize that the crucial issues presented by this appeal are (1) whether Illinois has adopted the consumer contemplation test as the exclusive test in design defect cases to preclude a plaintiff’s recovery for personal injury resulting from any obvious design defect and (2) whether the adoption of the crashworthy doctrine by the Illinois Supreme Court in automobile collision cases extends to motorcycle collision cases. As demonstrated below, Illinois case law is anything but “established” as to the permissible proof to show an unreasonably dangerous product in design defect cases and Illinois courts have not addressed the applicability of the crashworthy doctrine to motorcycle collision cases. The “consumer contemplation test” has been subject to wide criticism by courts and commentators for its inadequacy as a test for evaluating whether a product is defective in design defect cases.2 One shortcoming of the test is that a victim could never recover for harm suffered as a result of a design hazard that was open or obvious, resulting in products not being found defective where they could easily have been designed safer without great expense or effect on the benefits or functions to be served by the product. (See W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts, §99 (5th ed. 1984).) This, as well as other deficiencies, prompted many jurisdictions to adopt in design defect cases an alternative approach to determining whether a product is unreasonably dangerous which allows a product to be found defective where the benefits of the challenged design do not outweigh the risk of danger inherent in the design. (See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. (1978), 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225; Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck (Alaska 1979), 593 P.2d 871; Chown v. USM Corp. (Iowa 1980), 297 N.W.2d 218; Knitz v. Minster Machine Co. (1982), 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814; Brady v. Melody Homes Manufacturer (Ariz. App. 1979), 121 Ariz. 253, 589 P.2d 896; Turner v. General Motors Corp. (Tex. 1979), 584 S.W.2d 844; Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Machine Co. (1979), 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140; Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp. (1978), 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322.) Under the various forms of balancing tests adopted by these jurisdictions, numerous factors are considered in determining whether a design renders the product unreasonably dangerous, such as the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would result from the alternative design. See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 431, 573 P.2d at 455. The Illinois Supreme Court first applied the consumer contemplation test to determine if a product contained an actionable defect in Hunt v. Blasius (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 203, 211-12, 384 N.E.2d 368, 372, where the court found that an exit sign post without a “break-away” design was not defective, as there were no allegations that the post subjected motorists to any unexpected risks. The supreme court, however, has not limited the method of proof to show an unreasonably dangerous product to the consumer contemplation test set forth in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A, comment i (1965)), but has recognized evidence of feasible alternative design, not in the context of consumer expectations, but as a separate method of showing the unreasonably dangerous nature of a design. In Palmer v. Avco Distributing Corp. (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 211, 216, 412 N.E.2d 959, 962, the supreme court did not limit the method of proof to consumers’ expectations when it found that the second way the unreasonable danger was proven was by “introducing evidence that the [product] could have been designed to prevent a foreseeable harm without hindering its function or increasing its price.” (Palmer, 82 Ill. 2d at 219-20, 412 N.E.2d at 963-64.) Similarly, other supreme court cases have permitted proof not relevant to consumers’ expectations to prove an unreasonably dangerous design, suggesting the adoption of an alternative method of proof. In Kerns v. Engelke (1979), 76 Ill. 2d 154, 164, 390 N.E.2d 859, 864, where plaintiff alleged a forage blower was unreasonably dangerous because it lacked a device to secure a power takeoff assembly, the supreme court found plaintiff could prove the unreasonably dangerous nature of a defect in the design by introducing evidence of feasible alternative design. In Rucker v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 434, 437-38, 396 N.E.2d 534, 536-37, where the plaintiff argued that a manufacturer’s compliance with Federal standards should be admissible as evidence under a risk-benefit balancing test in the determination of whether the absence of a protective shield device rendered a railroad tank car unreasonably dangerous, the court, without discussing the ordinary consumer’s expectations, found such evidence to be admissible as relevant to the issue of whether a product’s design is unreasonably dangerous. See also Anderson v. Hyster Co. (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 364, 385 N.E.2d 690; Moehle v. Chrysler Motors Corp. (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 299, 443 N.E.2d 575. Courts and commentators have interpreted this supreme court case law as implicitly adopting an alternative test to the consumer contemplation test which is similar to the “risk-benefit” test or as expressly pretermitting the issue of feasible alternative design in design defect cases. See Seward v. Griffin (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 749, 766, 452 N.E.2d 558, 571 (“Clearly, evidence of alternative design feasibility is relevant to the issue [of the unreasonably dangerous nature of the defect in design.] In light of the Kerns decision, and until the Illinois Supreme Court determines otherwise, we believe the rule of law in Illinois is that evidence of alternative design feasibility is relevant and admissible in a design defect case ***.’’); J- Mirza, Illinois Personal Injury §700:56 — 57 (1989); Huntley, The Concept of Defect in Illinois Products Liability Litigation, 71 Ill. B.J. 22, 28-34 (1982). The above supreme court case law illustrates that, in reaching its conclusion that plaintiff may not recover as a matter of law here, the majority has relied on two incorrect principles as “established” Illinois law in design defect cases: first, that injuries are not compensa-ble if they are caused by obvious propensities in a product and, second, that available safety devices are irrelevant to the “unreasonably dangerous” determination. Not only is this “established” law contrary to the above-cited supreme court case law, the supreme court cases cited in the case relied upon by the majority, Miller v. Dvornik (1986), 149 III. App. 3d 883, 501 N.E.2d 160, do not lend support for the majority’s conclusion. Hunt v. Blasius (1978), 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368, and Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell Manufacturing Co. (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401, cited in Miller, predate the court’s recognition of the alternative method of proving a defective product in design defect cases through feasible alternative design proof. Moreover, outside their application of the consumer contemplation test, these cases did not establish any general products liability principles relating to obvious dangers3 or alternative design proof.4  Recognizing that Illinois permits an alternative method of proving an “unreasonably dangerous” design and that the open and obvious nature of a design does not preclude recovery in a design defect case, it is evident that the majority has relied on a faulty basis for finding the challenged designs not to be unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law. The question of whether the challenged designs of the motorcycle were unreasonably dangerous through consideration of feasible alternative design was a question properly to be decided by the trier of fact. Nonetheless, apart from the question of whether the product was unreasonably dangerous — which involves the breach of duty element in product liability actions (Phillips v. United States Waco Corp. (1987), 163 Ill. App. 3d 410, 417, 516 N.E.2d 670)-plaintiff’s complaint raises an issue of first impression for Illinois involving a motorcycle manufacturer’s legal duty in products liability law. Because the gravamen of plaintiff’s action is that defects in the design of the motorcycle, though not the cause of the accident, caused or enhanced his injuries, a question of law is raised as to whether Illinois will extend a manufacturer’s duty to produce reasonably safe products to situations where the product did not cause the accident, but enhanced the injuries after a collision. This inquiry involves the concept of “crashworthiness.” The majority, in stating that Illinois does not adhere to the crashworthy doctrine but instead follows the consumer contemplation test, fails to recognize that (1) the crashworthy doctrine involves the legal duty element in strict liability actions, whereas the consumer contemplation test relates to the breach of duty element through the evaluation of a product’s defectiveness, and (2) Illinois has not rejected the crashworthy doctrine.5  “Crashworthiness” has been defined as the “protection that a passenger motor vehicle offers its passengers against personal injury or death as a result of a motor vehicle accident.” (Jackson v. Volkswagen of America (E.D.N.C. June 4, 1986), No. 84—857—Civ—5 (unpublished memorandum opinion and order).) Under the “crashworthy doctrine,” which has been adopted in various contexts by most jurisdictions,6 the manufacturer’s products liability may extend in motor vehicle cases to situations in which the defect did not cause the accident or initial impact, but rather increased the severity of the injury over that which would have occurred absent the defective design. (E.g., Tafoya v. Sears Roebuck & Co. (10th Cir. 1989), 884 F.2d 1330; Jackson, No. 84 —857—Civ—5; Robbins v. Yamaha Motor Corp. (1983), 98 F.R.D. 36; Buehler v. Whalen (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 460; Larsen v. General Motors Corp. (8th Cir.1968), 391 F.2d 495.) The doctrine recognizes that the foreseeable and intended use of a motor vehicle encompasses the inevitability of collisions and requires the manufacturer to design a vehicle reasonably safe for those foreseeable risks. (Miller v. Todd (Ind. 1988), 518 N.E.2d 1124.) It does not, however, place the manufacturer in the position of insurer, but merely extends a manufacturer’s duties while invoking the same requirements of liability as in other products liability actions. (See Miller, 518 N.E.2d at 1125-26; Jackson, No. 84—857—CIV—5; Larsen, 391 F.2d 495.) Thus, application of the doctrine in Illinois would still require plaintiff to prove that his injury resulted from a condition of the product, that the condition was an unreasonably dangerous one, and that the condition existed at the time the product left the defendant’s control. See Surada v. White Motor Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 612, 623, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188. The Illinois Supreme Court adopted the crashworthy doctrine in Buehler v. Whalen (1977), 70 Ill. 2d 51, 61-62, 374 N.E.2d 460, 464-65, when it defined a manufacturer’s duty in automobile cases “to use reasonable care in the design and manufacture of its product, bearing in mind that the intended and actual use of automobiles results in collisions.” (See also Seward v. Griffin (1983), 116 Ill. App. 3d 749, 766, 452 N.E.2d 558, 568.) While the doctrine was originally applied to an automobile collision case (Larsen, 391 F.2d 495), many jurisdictions have extended its application to other motor vehicles, including motorcycles. (Jackson, No. 84—857—CIV—5; Tafoya, 884 F.2d 1330; Camacho v. Honda Motor Co. (Colo. 1987), 741 P.2d 1240, 1243; Frazier v. Harley Davidson Motor Co. (W.D. Pa. 1985), 109 F.R.D. 293; McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc. (1st Cir. 1985), 765 F.2d 240; O’Donnell v. City of Casper (Wyo. 1985), 696 P.2d 1278; Robbins v. Yamaha Motor Corp. (M.D. Pa. 1983), 98 F.R.D. 36; Stueve v. American Honda Motors Co. (D. Kan. 1978), 457 F. Supp. 740; Nicolodi v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co. (Fla. App. 1979), 370 So. 2d 68.) Illinois has not had occasion to address whether the doctrine extends to motorcycle collision cases. As the resolution of this first-impression question is necessary to the determination of whether plaintiff has stated a cause of action here, I would hold that the crashworthy doctrine adopted in Illinois to automobile collision cases extends to motorcycle collision cases. After reviewing cases from other jurisdictions which have addressed the issue, I find persuasive the reasoning articulated by the Colorado Supreme Court in Camacho v. Honda Motor Co. (Colo. 1987), 741 P.2d 1240: “Honda argues *** that motorcycles are inherently dangerous motor vehicles that cannot be made perfectly crashworthy and, therefore, that motorcycle manufacturers should be free of liability for injuries not actually caused by a defect in the design or manufacture of the motorcycle. We find no principled basis to conclude that liability for failure to provide reasonable, cost-acceptable safety features to reduce the severity of injuries suffered in inevitable accidents should be imposed upon automobile manufacturers but not upon motorcycle manufacturers. The use of motorcycles for transportation over roadways is just as foreseeable as the use of automobiles for such purpose. The crashworthiness doctrine does not require a manufacturer to provide absolute safety, but merely to provide some measure of reasonable, cost-effective safety in the foreseeable use of the product. *** In view of the important goal of encouraging maximum development of reasonable, cost-efficient safety features in the manufacture of all products, the argument that motorcycle manufacturers should be exempt from liability under the crashworthiness doctrine because serious injury to users of that product is foreseeable must be rejected.” Camacho, 741 P.2d at 1243-44. To summarize, I would reverse the circuit court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s action because the question of whether the challenged designs rendered the product unreasonably dangerous, in light of a motorcycle manufacturer’s duty to design a motorcycle free from unreasonable risks of enhanced injuries in the event of collisions, should have been a question for the trier of fact here. Consistent with Illinois case law, plaintiff should have been given the opportunity to prove that the product was unreasonably dangerous through evidence of the availability of a feasible alternative design which would not hinder the motorcycle’s function or utility. In making the “unreasonably dangerous” determination, the trier of fact should have been permitted to consider such factors as the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design, the mechanical and economical feasibility of a safer alternative design, and the adverse consequences of the alternative design to the motorcycle’s inherent and open nature.  The consumer contemplation test, with its origins in warranty law, is rooted in contract law, which explains its emphasis on consumers’ expectations. See W. Keeton, Prosser & Keeton on Torts, §99 (5th ed. 1984).   Hunt’s discussion as to product liability principles regarding the obvious inherent properties of a product refers to the principle in duty to warn cases that a manufacturer does not have a duty to warn of obvious dangers of nondefective products. (Hunt, 74 Ill. 2d at 211, 384 N.E.2d at 372 citing Genaust v. Illinois Power Co. (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 456, 467, 343 N.E.2d 465, 471 (duty to warn is not required where the product is not defectively designed and where the possibility of injury results from a common propensity of the product which is open and obvious); see also Martin v. Harrington & Richardson, Inc. (1984), 743 F.2d 1200 (applying Illinois law); Huff v. Elmhurst-Chicago Stone Co. (1981), 94 Ill. App. 3d 1091, 419 N.E.2d 561.) The reasoning of the general rule regarding the obviousness of the risk in duty to warn cases is that the purpose of warning is to apprise persons of a danger of which he has no knowledge so that he may take protective measures.   The majority cites Miller, which in turn cites Hunt and Dunham as establishing that the focus in the unreasonably dangerous determination “is on the product itself, not on available safety devices.” Hunt and Dunham, however, do not establish any general product liability principle excluding consideration of available safety devices. Hunt merely stated that the availability of an alternative design alone does not translate into a legally cognizable defect. While it is true that the focus in strict products liability law is on the product, consideration of available safety devices does not deviate from that focus. Where alternative feasible design is in issue, the question is whether the absence of safety devices makes the product unreasonably dangerous. See J. Mirza, Illinois Personal Injury §700:56 — 57 (1989).   As noted in Jackson v. Volkswagen of America (E.D.N.C. June 4, 1986), No. SI-SÓ? — CIV—5 (unpublished memorandum opinion and order), as of 1986, 38 of the 39 jurisdictions that have considered the question have adopted the doctrine of crashworthiness.   It should be noted that although the majority mentions the crashworthy doctrine, the majority’s finding that the motorcycle was not unreasonably dangerous as a matter of law because of the open and obvious nature of the challenged designs rendered it unnecessary to address the crashworthy issue.