Court Opinion

ID: 9811804
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:29:03.310568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:29.869791
License: Public Domain

RICK STRANGE,
Justice, dissenting.
I agree with the majority on all issues save them finding that plaintiffs voluntarily paid the fire safety registration fee. I would find that the fee was paid involuntarily and that plaintiffs are entitled to reimbursement. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
The supreme court’s recent decision in Dallas County Community College District v. Bolton1 supports reimbursement here because plaintiffs had to pay the fee to avoid financial penalties. Justice Wain-wi’ight, writing for a 6-8 majority in Bolton, found the Community College District had improperly charged two student fees but held that the students were barred from seeking reimbursement because the fees had been voluntarily paid. The three dissenters agreed the fees were improper but believed they had been involuntarily paid.
Justice Wainwright’s analysis indicates that the differences between the student fees and the City’s fire registration fee should lead to a different result in this case. First, the student fees were not mandatory. The City’s fee was. A student could avoid the fees by going to a different school, restructuring their class load, or by applying for a waiver. Dallas businessmen had no such options. All owners and operators of commercial property were required to pay the fee.
Second, the ordinance included a potential $2,000 penalty if the fee was not timely paid. The Bolton majority acknowledged that a person is entitled to reimbursement when a public entity compels compliance with a void law and subjects them to punishment for noncompliance.2 They recognized three instances where the supreme court had found “implied duress.”3 Of these, the most applicable is Highland Church,4 There, a church disputed its liability for an ad valorem tax, A judgment was rendered against it, and it appealed. The church paid the tax during the appeal to avoid further penalties and interest. The supreme court held that the church’s payment was not voluntary and, thus, that its appeal was not moot. The other two cases can be distinguished factually. National Biscuit5 involved a much more severe penalty: forfeiture of the right to do business in the State. Miga6 concerned the payment of a judgment during an appeal to avoid postjudgment interest. But in both instances, a party made a payment it did not believe it owed to avoid further financial consequence; and, in each case, *784the Supreme Court held the payment was not voluntary.
The financial impact the void fee had on plaintiffs is a relevant inquiry. Draconian consequences support a finding of duress but are not required. The Bolton majority noted: “We have repeatedly held that duress is established where the unauthorized tax or fee is ‘required,’ ‘necessary,’ or ‘shall’ be paid to avoid the government’s ability to charge penalties or halt a person from earning a livelihood or operating a business.”7 (emphasis added) Thus, being forced out of business would support a finding of duress but so too would a mandatory payment made to avoid financial penalties. Plaintiffs had the option of contesting the ordinance in municipal court or filing a pre-emptive lawsuit in district court. Due process, therefore, was satisfied. But paying the fire registration fee was not only mandatory, it was the only way to avoid the potential $2,000 penalty. Some plaintiffs received citations to appear in municipal court. If they had challenged the ordinance in municipal court and lost, they owed the fee and any assessed penalty. If they had challenged the ordinance in district court, a judge might or might not have enjoined collection of the fee or penalty. Consequently, a plaintiff wishing to avoid a potential $2,000 fine had one choice free from uncertainty: pay the fee.
The financial impact reimbursement of the invalid fee would have on the City is also a relevant inquiry. The Bolton majority recognized the necessity for a governmental authority to be able to rely on a predictable income stream.8 Forcing the City to reimburse fees we find it should never have collected thrusts financial unpredictability and unexpected expenditure upon the City. While relevant, the supreme court has never characterized this as determinative. To hold otherwise would have the perverse effect of encouraging public entities to provide lesser rather than greater protection to their citizens.
The City provided no mechanism for contesting the fee or paying it under protest. Instead, it adopted a penalty that was sufficiently high to encourage compliance but at the same time was less than one would incur in litigation contesting the ordinance. Plaintiff Lowenberg, for example, was assessed an $80 fee. The City cited him for failing to pay it. If he had contested his liability in municipal court and lost, he could have been required to pay $2,080. He understandably paid the $80 fee to avoid a fine.
Because the ordinance operated exactly as intended, money which should never have been collected was. That money was presumably placed immediately in the City’s coffers. Requiring the City to reimburse plaintiffs will impose a hardship on the City, but the City should not be in a better legal position today because it immediately spent the void fee than it would be had the ordinance provided citizens with a mechanism to pay under protest, or otherwise challenge the fee without incurring a financial penalty.
For these reasons, I would find the plaintiffs’ payments were involuntary and I, therefore, respectfully dissent.

. Bolton, No. 02-1110, 185 S.W.3d 868 (Tex.2005).

. See In re FirstMerit Bank, N.A., 52 S.W.3d 749, 758 (Tex.2001), and State v. Akin Prods. Co., 155 Tex. 348, 286 S.W.2d 110, 111-12 (1956).

. Miga v. Jensen, 96 S.W.3d 207, 211, 224-25 (Tex.2002); Highland Church of Christ v. Powell, 640 S.W.2d 235, 237 (Tex.1982); and Nat’l Biscuit Co. v. State, 134 Tex. 293, 135 S.W.2d 687 (1940).

. 640 S.W.2d at 235.

. 135 S.W.2d at 687.

. 96 S.W.3d at 207.

. Bolton, at 879-80.

. Bolton, at 881-82.