Court Opinion

ID: 9455778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 19:33:07.290573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:34:43.876516
License: Public Domain

McCREE, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I do not disagree with the basic principles enunciated in the majority opinion. The majority recognizes that section 9(b), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 159(b), vests authority for determining appropriate bargaining units in the Board and that Board determinations should be disturbed only if they constitute an abuse of discretion. N.L.R.B. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., 341 F.2d 750, 755-756 (6th Cir. 1965). Also, the majority properly acknowledges that an employer’s form of organization cannot compel employees to organize along similar lines. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 411 F.2d 356 (7th Cir. 1969).
I disagree, however, with the majority’s application of these principles in reaching its decision in the present case. Despite its statement that a bargaining unit does not have to parallel an employer’s managerial arrangement in order to be appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, the majority concludes that the unit designated by the Board is inappropriate primarily because of respondent’s central determination of labor policy, the close supervision emanating from the Columbus office, and the uniformity of working conditions throughout the district. Yet, each of these factors reflects a decision of management about the most efficient form of organization for the company. To ascribe controlling importance to them is contrary to the proposition that the interests of employees, not the convenience of the employer, are paramount in deciding whether a proposed bargaining unit *487is appropriate. See N.L.R.B. v. Western and Southern Life Ins. Co., 391 F.2d 119, 123 (3rd Cir. 1968).
The Regional Director decided the proposed unit was appropriate because:
the employees working in the three-city Mansfield area comprise a cohesive grouping with interests separate and apart from employees in other areas * * *. [T]hey all reside in the Mansfield area, all are under the immediate supervision of field [supervisor] Dasher, are subject to assignment only to installations within the area, and do not interchange with employees from different areas.
Moreover, at the time the representation petition was filed, there were no other petitions requesting a larger bargaining unit before the Regional Director.
I would hold that the Regional Director’s factual conclusions are supported by the record and that they provide ample support for the Board’s approval of the proposed three-city unit. Although a larger bargaining unit may have been more suitable, a reviewing court is concerned only with whether the unit designated is an appropriate unit and not with whether it is the appropriate unit. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. N.L.R.B., supra, 411 F.2d at 358.
Since I would hold that the Board did not abuse its discretion by determining that the proposed unit was appropriate, I find it necessary also to comment on respondent’s contention that the first representation election, which the union lost by a vote of 16 to 11, was valid.
After the Regional Director’s Decision and Direction of Election in the proposed three-city unit, but prior to the election itself, respondent circulated three letters to the employees in the unit. In these letters respondent asserted, inter alia, that the union was interested only in the dues it could collect from the employees if they chose the union; that unionization would result in a loss of clients and consequent loss of jobs, particularly if the union ordered a strike; and that the benefits of unionization would be postponed for at least two years because respondent would initiate protracted litigation and would suspend all wage increases and changes in working conditions pending the outcome of the litigation. The union filed objections to the election pursuant to section 102.69(a) of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.69(a), charging that respondent’s letters had destroyed the “laboratory conditions” the Board seeks to maintain during representation elections. See N.L.R.B. v. Houston Chronicle Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 273, 278 (5th Cir. 1962). The Regional Director, after conducting an investigation, sustained the union’s objections and ordered a second election. The union won the second election by a vote of 13 to 11 and was certified as the employees’ exclusive bargaining representative.
I would hold that the Regional Director properly concluded that the requisite laboratory conditions were impaired by respondent’s correspondence and that he did not abuse his discretion in sustaining the union’s objections and ordering a new election. See Neuhoff Bros., Packers, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 362 F.2d 611, 614 (5th Cir. 1966). “It is not necessary that conduct -which interferes with the freedom of choice in an election actually constitute an unfair labor practice” in order to justify setting aside the election. N.L.R.B. v. Tennessee Packers, Inc., Frosty Morn Division, 379 F.2d 172, 181 (6th Cir. 1967). Moreover, section 8(c), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(c), does not afford protection to this kind of expression. N.L.R.B. v. Realist, Inc., 328 F.2d 840 (7th Cir. 1964).
Accordingly, I would hold that the three-city unit is appropriate and that the union’s election victory and certification are valid. I would enforce the Board’s order.