Court Opinion

ID: 9789202
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:30:26.819122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:20.561464
License: Public Domain

Justice MARTINEZ
dissenting:
In this case, the majority concludes that "the record demonstrates that Defendant's statements were not the result of any force, threats, promises, or other forms of undue influence exerted by the police," maj. op. at 659, and thus reverses the trial court's suppression order. I disagree. My review of the record leads me to conclude that the trial court's findings of fact are inadequate to *664reach any conclusion of law regarding the nature of Officer Schrimpf's remarks concerning the Defendant's girlfriend or the vol-untariness of the Defendant's statements after his exchange with Officer Schrimpf. As explained below, the inadequacy of the trial court's factual findings resulted from the tentative and ambiguous nature of Officer Schrimpf's testimony. - Because the trial court's findings are not likely to become more detailed, remand in this case would not be helpful. Thus, I would accept the record and the trial court's findings of fact as they currently stand and turn to the burden of proof in suppression cases to decide the case.
The People have the burden of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, to demonstrate that the defendant's statements were voluntary. Because I find the record inadequate to reach any conclusion of law, I would thus affirm the trial court's suppression order on the ground that the People failed to meet its burden.
Although I agree with the majority that the trial court's holding is not supported by the record, I disagree with the majority's subsequent assertion that the record supports reversal of the trial court's suppression order because "the record demonstrates that, given the totality of the cireumstances, Officer Schrimpf's statement was not coercive." Maj. op. at 662. Instead, my review of the record reveals that the testimony of Officer Schrimpf, which was the basis of the trial court's suppression order, alone is inadequate to support any decision on the issue of whether his statements to the Defendant were coercive or threatening.
Officer Schrimpf's testimony about his statements to the Defendant regarding the Defendant's girlfriend was general at best. He testified in a manner sufficiently vague as to raise a question about the specific content, tone, and nature of his conversation with the Defendant regarding the Defendant's girlfriend. For example, Officer Schrimpf testified: "At one point I confronted him, told him what Claudia told me. I told him it was important to be honest." R. vol. II at 24. At another point, Officer Schrimpf explained: "I don't believe I made him any promises. I believe I made a statement to the effect ... I didn't want to see Claudia get drug into this thing if not actively involved. I made a statement to that effect, but no way made any promises." R. vol. II at 27. Finally, the following exchange occurred between Officer Schrimpf and Defense counsel:
Defense Counsel: Now in your discussions with him, you obviously stressed it would be helpful if he would try to clear Claudia of any involvement; isn't that correct?
Officer Schrimpf: I believe what I said to him is, if Claudia didn't have any involvement as she was saying, then it was important that he be honest and talk about what their actual involvement was, yes.
R. vol. II at 37. Based on these statements, the trial court suppressed all of the statements made by the Defendant after he had the foregoing conversation with Officer Scehrimpf. The trial court did not make extensive findings of fact, but instead simply stated that "Officer Schrimpf made this tantamount to a valid threat to arrest a woman who he had no reason to believe was involved in any of these transactions." R. vol. II at 47.
The majority relies on these same general, paraphrased - statements - from - Officer Schrimpf to reach its conclusion of law that the Defendant was not coerced or threatened into giving inculpatory statements. Maj. op. at 662-663. The majority reasons that Officer Schrimpf had reason to believe that the Defendant was lying, so, given the context in which Officer Sehrimpf's statements regarding the Defendant's girlfriend were made "it was not coercive for him to encourage Defendant to tell the truth." Id. at 662.
The majority, in essence, determines that the statements made by Office Schrimpf regarding the Defendant's girlfriend amount to nothing more than "encouraging Defendant to tell the truth." The trial court considered those same statements and determined that the statements amounted to a coercive threat. In my view, both the trial court and the majority reach a conclusion of law prematurely because of inadequate factual investigation and determination.
The majority correctly states that when the controlling facts are undisputed, the legal effect of those facts constitutes a question of law. Maj. op. at 661 (citing People v. D.F., 933 P.2d 9, 15 (Colo.1997)). However, in my *665view, the majority's assertion that "the controlling facts are undisputed," maj. op. at 661, does nothing to address the threshold issue of the adequacy of those allegedly undisputed facts. Whether the record below reveals no conflicting evidence regarding the details of the encounter between the Defendant and Officer Sehrimpf is not the controlling issue in my mind. Rather, the determinative issue is the inadequacy of the factual record, which I consider sufficiently inadequate so as to render any conclusion of law improper.
Additionally, this case is distinguishable from D.F., which the majority relies on to support its assessment of the factual findings in this case. In DF., we reversed the trial court's suppression order, concluding that the police officers had reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. D.F., 933 P.2d at 10. In DF., we accepted the findings of fact made by the trial court, but also determined that the trial court had inexplicably failed to incorporate one key, uncontradicted fact, which was present in the record, into its findings of fact. We thus included that fact in our consideration of the record and our decision to reverse the trial court's suppression order. That key fact was that the defendant was walking stiff-legged, indicating that he was carrying a concealed weapon, which was important support for the police officers' reasonable suspicion. Id. at 14. We found that it was proper for us as a reviewing court to consider that key fact, which went unconsidered by the trial court, in our review of the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Id. at 14-15. We thus concluded that when controlling facts are undisputed, including those controlling facts unconsidered by the trial court, the legal effect of those facts constitutes a question of law. Id. at 15 (citing Lakeview Assoc., Ltd. v. Maes, 907 P.2d 580 (Colo.1995)).
The present case presents a much different situation than the one in D.F. In this case, the trial court did not fail to consider a "key, uncontradicted fact" that was disposi-tive to the conclusion of law. On the contrary, the trial court in this case considered all of the relevant facts as presented in Officer Schrimpf's testimony. Thus, this case does not present an opportunity to employ the reasoning of D.F. because there is no key, uncontested fact that the trial court failed to consider. The majority correctly states that where the trial court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous or not supported by the record, this court may set those factual findings aside. See People v. Mendoza-Balderama, 981 P.2d 150, 158 (Colo.1999). However, I am troubled by the majority's willingness to substitute its own fact finding for the trial court's fact finding in the face of such an inadequate record and in the absence of a D.F.-type situation in which the trial court merely neglects to consider a disposi-tive fact. In essence, the majority takes general and paraphrased statements by Officer Schrimpf, elevates these vague statements to hard, historical facts, and then proceeds to reframe the trial court's conclusion that the statements were a "threat" to its own conclusion that the statements were merely "encouragement" to tell the truth.
In addition, I disagree with the majority's expansion of the reasoning in D.F. to this case, which is importantly different from D.F. The majority's extension of D.F. to situations such as this, in which no key, uncontested fact was left unconsidered by the trial court, creates a problematic precedent permitting this court to substitute its own fact finding for that of the trial court.
Previously, we have held that when the trial court's findings of fact are inadequate to make any conclusions of law regarding suppression, remand is the appropriate course of action. See, e.g., People v. Pitts, 18 P.3d 1218, 1221 (Colo.2000); People v. A.W., 982 P.2d 842, 852 (Colo.1999); People v. Curtis, 959 P.2d 434, 438 (Colo.1998); People v. Trujillo, 938 P.2d 117, 124-25 (Colo.1997).
Just as this case is distinguishable from D.F., it is also distinguishable from the cases in which we remanded for further findings. As previously discussed, the testimony of Officer Schrimpf was vague and ambiguous. Thus, although we could remand for further findings, such a remand would be unlikely to result in more detailed findings because of the vague nature of Officer Schrimpf's testimony. Accordingly, I believe that remand here would more than likely be futile.
Because I believe that remand is inappropriate given the nature of this record, I view this case as a stalemate between the majority *666and the trial court: Both consider the same inadequate facts and make differing findings of fact. The findings of the majority differ with those of the trial court because each make different inferences from the same vague testimony. Thus, the majority finds encouragement to tell the truth where the trial court finds implied coercive threats. Faced with this stalemate and the futility of remand, I would turn to the burden of proof to resolve this case.
The People bear the burden of demonstrating that the defendant's statements were voluntary by a preponderance of the evidence. See People v. Valdez, 969 P.2d 208, 210 (Colo.1998). The majority correctly explains this burden, but then fails to apply it to the inadequate record here. Because the record is inadequate upon which to base any conclusion of law, I would hold that the People failed to meet their burden of proof, and thus would affirm the trial court's suppression order.
Justice BENDER joins in the dissent.