Court Opinion

ID: 9587925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:28:05.526376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:00:56.472478
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
The State Highway Department contends there is no issue of fact regarding “extra work” since the work involved did not fall within the ambit of “extra work” which is defined as that which was unforeseen when the plans and specifications were prepared and for which no unit price was provided in the proposal. It is true that the plaintiff used the terminology “extra work.” However, the thrust of plaintiff’s complaint is that the Highway Department paid it $353,894.18 for certain described work which cost $392,500.78 and thus still owed it $38,606.60. This is further evidenced by the recurring thread running throughout letters contained in the record which showed the contractor disagreed with the engineer’s estimate and claimed additional compensation for the work performed.
Of course, substance controls over mere nomenclature in pleadings. Waller v. Morris, 78 Ga. App. 821, 822 (52 SE2d 583), and Chance v. Planters &c. Co-op., 219 Ga. 1, 5 (131 SE2d 541). Hence, however styled, what the plaintiff sought was the recovery of additional compensation for work actually performed but not allowed. We point out that Section 5.15 of the Standard Specifications does not relate to contractual “extra work” but provides “in any case where the contractor believes that extra compensation is due him for work or material not clearly covered in the contract or not ordered by the engineer as extra work” the contractor should make claim for this extra compensation.
With this in mind, we consider the principal contention made by the Highway Department in which it argues that the project engineer’s opinion as to what was “proper facilities for keeping strict account of actual cost,” was final and thus not subject to the rule in Harrison v. Tuggle, 225 Ga. 211, supra, and Ginn v. Morgan, 225 Ga. 192, supra. Under Section 5.01 of the Standard Specifications, the decision of the engineer *879“shall be final on all questions related to the interpretation of the specifications and the plans and as to the acceptable fulfillment of the contract by the contractor.” Since under Section 5.07 of the same Standard Specifications the engineer may delegate authority to certain subordinates, such as project engineers, it is urged that the project engineer had the same authority as the engineer and his decision as to what were “proper facilities” was final. See State Hwy. Dept. v. Hewitt Contr. Co., 113 Ga. App. 685, 695 (149 SE2d 499).
Nevertheless, the question still remains as to whether the present issue is one susceptible to final adjudication by the engineer. Construing the contract most strongly against the scrivener, we hold it is not. It should first be pointed out that Section 5.01 of the Standard Specifications itself provides “that any decision of the engineer regarding contractual questions as distinguished from technical questions may be appealed to the Board by the contractor.” Since under Section 5.15 of the Standard Specifications, the contractor agrees to waive his claim for extra compensation if the proper notification is not given and the engineer is not furnished with proper facilities, this language must be “contractual” rather than “technical.” For, if the engineer’s decision was final in such instance, the above provision would be meaningless.
Furthermore, Section 7.18 of the Standard Specifications regarding arbitration further delineates those areas in which the engineer’s decision is final. The section in describing what the Arbitration Board might pass upon excludes various matters upon which the engineer’s decision is final and then states it “shall have authority only to pass upon questions involving compensation to the contractor for work actually performed but not allowed by the engineer.” Thus, it is apparent that questions as to compensation for work actually performed but not allowed are not finally determined by the engineer but instead are subject to arbitration and subsequent legal action. Here, there was proof offered that the plaintiff sought a sum which was not allowed and that the Highway Department refused to arbitrate. Hence, the plaintiff was entitled to “appeal to the courts” under Section 7.18 regarding the question at issue.

Motion denied.