Court Opinion

ID: 9644050
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:47:33.622404+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:08.090695
License: Public Domain

VAN der VOORT, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the Majority that the case should be remanded to the lower court for consideration of that part of appellant’s petition requesting that the judgment be opened. However, I respectfully dissent from that part of the Majority’s holding that would include consideration by the lower court of the part of appellant’s petition requesting the court to strike off the judgment.
Although appellant entitled his motion, “Petition to strike off judgment or in the alternative to open judgment”, the two are not one and the same and should be considered separately. The Majority points out this distinction, but nonetheless, relying on the case of Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Haupt, 359 Pa. 338, 59 A.2d 73 (1948), where the plaintiff issued a sci. fa. to revive a judgment entered after default and the defendant did not appear nor answer, and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the judgment should have been opened, the Majority infers that the Supreme Court would have permitted the judgment to be stricken. I agree, based on the authority of Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Haupt, supra, that this case should be remanded for consideration of that part of appellant’s petition requesting that the judgment be opened, however, I do not agree that Schuylkill Trust permits the inference that the part of *244appellant’s petition requesting the judgment be stricken should likewise be entertained.
I am of the opinion that the case of Mayer Furniture Company v. Putt, 3 D. & C. 542 (1923) states the proper position in situations where a motion to strike has been filed subsequent to a validly conducted and duly entered revived judgment. Mayer represents that line of cases that hold a revived judgment, if entered properly, insulates the original judgment, though it be void or voidable, from attack by a motion to strike it off. After careful analysis of the cases that support the different sides of the issue, the court stated:
We think the greater weight of authorities in our jurisdiction is that where judgment is taken in default on a scire facias to revive a judgment that is void or voidable, the court, upon motion, should not strike it off. There is nothing irregular on the face of the judgment taken on scire facias. In the case of Breden v. Gilliland, 67 Pa. 34, Sharswood, J., said: “Opening a judgment and striking it off are two entirely different things. No court has power to strike off a judgment regular on its face.” See, also, Johnson v. Royal Ins. Co., 218 Pa. 423, 67 A. 749, and Long v. Lemoyne Borough, 222 Pa. 311, 71 A. 211. Mayer Furniture Company v. Putt, 3 D. & C. 542, 546 (1923).
In the Majority’s analysis of the different sides of the issue, it cites the case of Duff v. Wynkoop, 74 Pa. 300 (1873) as being representative of that line of cases supporting the position that a properly revived judgment protects the original invalid judgment from attack. The Majority then goes on to limit Duff on the basis that the case concerned the Act of 1705, Sect. 9, 1 Sm.L. 57, 61 (1810), and the sale of land pursuant to an execution on the revived judgment. This analysis was undertaken in an attempt to reconcile Duff with Eldred v. Hazlett’s Administrator, 38 Pa. 16 (1860) which held that a revival of an original judgment does not protect that judgment from subsequent attack. However, I do not interpret Duff to be as narrow as the Majority would have it be. That case, along with others, was cited as *245precedent for the Mayer decision. Although the court in Mayer was confronted only with a motion that the judgment be stricken, it was cognizant of the distinction between a motion to strike off a judgment and a motion to open a judgment. Early in its opinion the Mayer court called attention to this difference when it stated:
In the case of Hamborsky v. Magyar Presbyterian Church, 78 Pa.Super. 519, the rule of this and other jurisdictions is laid down as follows: “A rule to strike off a judgment is a common law proceeding; the procedure to open is equitable. The function of each is clearly stated in many decisions, although the two are not only frequently confused in practice, but occasionally one is permitted to perform the function of the other.” Mayer Furniture Company v. Putt, 3 D. & C. 542, 543 (1923).
Although appellant’s motion contained both requests pleaded in the alternative, each one must be considered separately and in light of proper procedure. Therefore, I would concur with the Majority that based on Schuylkill Trust Co., supra, the part of the petition requesting the judgment be opened should be remanded to the lower court; but since the revived judgment is correct on its face it should stand and not be subject to attack by a petition to strike.