Court Opinion

ID: 9526150
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:13:11.782313+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:18:39.604599
License: Public Domain

Supplemental Opinion on Denial oe Petition eor Rehearing Plaintiffs filed a petition for rehearing herein asking that the decree pro confesso of the trial court be affirmed in that the order entered by the County Court, by Judge Fred J. Kullberg, on December 4, 1962, in cause No. 32,280, authorizing the issuance of tax deed, did not describe therein the premises in question, but rather referred to other premises. A certified copy of this order was attached as an exhibit to defendants’ motion to strike and dismiss the complaint. Such order, in fact, did not pertain to the real estate in question. Deféndants’ verified motion to strike and dismiss was predicated on said order pertaining to the premises in question. No counter affidavits were filed by plaintiffs denying the pertinency of said order and they offered no evidence in support of said decree pro confesso. The decree itself contained no finding that said County Court order did not pertain to the premises in question. The record reflects no word or act by plaintiffs in the trial court, objecting to, or attacking said order by virtue of the erroneous description. After plaintiffs’ petition for rehearing was filed raising only this point, defendants filed a motion to strike the petition for rehearing, which we denied. Defendants also filed a motion, pursuant to section 92 of the Civil Practice Act (Ill Rev Stats 1963, c 110, sec 92) asking leave to amend the record by adding thereto, a certified copy of the order entered in the County Court, by Judge Fred J. Kullberg, on December 4, 1962, in cause No. 32,280, authorizing the issuance of tax deed to the premises in question. They alleged that this order, due to inadvertence, was not incorporated in the transcript of record on appeal. We allowed this motion and amended the record herein, accordingly. The certified copy of the order which we allowed defendants to file, was identical in all respects to the order attached to the motion to strike, except for the description of the premises. It was a form, order wherein the person drafting it could insert the description of the pertinent premises. It is evident that several orders were entered on the same day, before the same judge, in the same cause, varying only in the description of the respective premises involved. Through inadvertence, a certified copy of a nonpertinent order was attached to defendants’ motion to strike the amended complaint.  Defendants’ verified motion to amend asserts that “no issue was raised in the trial court concerning any discrepancy between the property described in plaintiff’s complaint and the property described in said order directing the issuance of a tax deed.” This is not denied by plaintiffs. Rather, they assert that they raised this point in both their brief and argument, and that “In the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, neither the Supreme Court nor the Appellate Court can permit either party to introduce evidence or proof which was not made part of the record while the case was in the trial court, and a statutory provision, former paragraph (1)(d) of section 92 of the Civil Practice Act, purporting to authorize the introduction of such evidence in a court of review was held unconstitutional as an attempt to confer original jurisdiction. ILP Appeal and Error, sec 702 (Atkins v. Atkins, 393 Ill 202).” Section 92(1)(a) and (c), provide: “(1) In all appeals the reviewing conrt may, in its discretion, and on such terms as it deems just, (a) Exercise all or any of the powers of amendment of the trial court; . . . (c) Order or permit the record to he amended by correcting errors or by adding matters which should have been included;” We believe that we properly permitted the defendants to amend the record in question.  Courts will take judicial notice of their own records. In City of East St. Louis v. Touchette, 14 Ill 2d 243, 247, 249, 150 NE2d 178 (1958), a County Court took judicial notice of its exhibits; in Fox v. Fox, 9 Ill2d 509, 518, 138 NE2d 547 (1956), the Supreme Court took judicial notice of testimony of the worth of a litigant as related in a prior case before it, which involved the party in question; in McKinney v. City of East St. Louis, 39 Ill App2d 137, 139, 188 NE2d 341 (4th Dist 1963), the Appellate Court held that the Circuit Court could take judicial notice of its own prior judgment; and in Petrando v. Barry, 4 Ill App2d 319, 321, 124 NE2d 85 (1st Dist 1955), the Appellate Court took judicial notice of its own records. In the case at bar, the Circuit Court had jurisdiction over the tax proceeding in question and would take judicial notice of its own records, which included the pertinent order of the County Court authorizing the issuance of the tax deed attacked by plaintiffs. The granting of defendants’ motion to amend the record, amounted to nothing more than an amendment of a pleading, which is permissible under section 92(1)(a). The allowance of the amendment also falls within the provisions of section 92(1)(c) in that it corrects an error in the record and adds matters which should have been included. The matters added, however, were limited to matters over which the trial court had judicial notice. The circumstances in the case at bar are readily distinguishable from those in Atkins v. Atkins, 393 Ill 202, 65 NE2d 801 (1946), which was cited by plaintiffs. In Atkins, the Supreme Court held that it could not admit evidence in proceedings in which it did not have original jurisdiction in the matter. In the case at bar, we permitted the amendment of a pleading and record by adding thereto a matter over which the trial court had judicial notice, and, by so doing, corrected an error in the record. Such amendment did not permit the defendants to offer evidence in a court of review, which was not a part of the record of the trial court.  In addition, the case was not tried or decided in the trial court on the issue of any discrepancy between the property described in the order of the County Court and that described in plaintiffs’ amended complaint. The theory, upon which a case is tried in a lower court, cannot be changed on appeal; and an issue not presented to, or considered by the trial court, cannot be raised for the first time on review. Woman’s Athletic Club of Chicago v. Hulman, 31 Ill2d 449, 454, 202 NE2d 528 (1964); Benson v. Isaacs, 22 Ill2d 606, 610, 177 NE2d 209 (1961); In re Estate of Leichtenberg, 7 Ill2d 545, 548, 131 NE2d 487 (1956); McCook Window Co. v. Hardwood Door Corp., 52 Ill App2d 278, 285, 202 NE2d 36 (1st Dist 1964); People ex rel. Bourne v. Johnson, 48 Ill App2d 307, 309, 199 NE2d 68 (1st Dist 1964).  Plaintiffs’ Brief, under “Points and Authorities” VII, states: “The county court order appearing in the record on appeal is not pertinent to this matter as it does not pertain to the real estate in question.” However, Point VII is not included in plaintiffs’ Argument and it is the only point under “Points and Authorities” which is omitted from the Argument. There is no reference to this point under the headings, “Nature of the Case”; “Plaintiffs’ Theory of the Case”; or “Statement of Facts.” In fact, there is no other reference in the Brief to this point. Under Appellate Court Rule 7, (Ill Rev Stats 1963, c 110, par 201.7), we are not required to review an alleged error which is not argued. A point made but not argued may be considered waived. Green v. Waller, 17 Ill2d 392, 402, 161 NE2d 858; Pipitone v. Mandala, 33 Ill App2d 461, 467, 180 NE2d 33; River v. Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 31 Ill App2d 232, 239, 175 NE2d 593 (4th Dist 1961).  There is, however, a more compelling reason for our decision. It lies in the basic purpose of the Civil Practice Act: the removal of barriers which prevent the trial of a case on its merits and the facilitation of procedures to accomplish this end. In adopting the Civil Practice Act, the General Assembly “acted in response to prevailing dissatisfaction with procedural doctrines which had exalted the role of a trial as a battle of wits and subordinated its function as a means of ascertaining the truth.” Krupp v. Chicago Transit Authority, 8 Ill2d 37, 41, 132 NE2d 532 (1956). The overall philosophy of liberal construction of the Practice Act precludes the determination of rights of litigants upon the technicalities of pleading and procedure when such rights may, within the spirit and letter of the Act, be adjudicated on their merits. Fleshner v. Copeland, 13 Ill2d 72, 77, 147 NE2d 329 (1958); People ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 12 Ill2d 231, 145 NE2d 588 (1957); Hruby v. Chicago Transit Authority, 11 Ill2d 255, 142 NE2d 81 (1957); People ex rel. Noren v. Dempsey, 10 Ill2d 288, 139 NE2d 780 (1957); Ill Rev Stats 1963, c 110, par 4. For the foregoing reasons, we adhere to the opinion as originally adopted and the petition for rehearing is denied. ABRAHAMSON, P. J. and MORAN, J., concur.