Court Opinion

ID: 9660409
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:12:46.65484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:19.257174
License: Public Domain

MONTGOMERY, Judge
(dissenting).
I cannot agree to that part of the majority opinion holding that the evidence in this case is insufficient to justify an inference of intent to kill and to sustain the conviction of voluntary manslaughter. The holding in the majority opinion violates the fundamental principle of criminal law that one who does a willful act which causes another great bodily harm from which death follows is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of such act and must stand legally responsible for it.
To constitute what the law deems to be a crime, there must be a combination of an overt wrongful act and a wrongful intent. The guilty intent is not necessarily that of intending the very act or thing done and prohibited by common or statute law, but it must at least be the intention to do something wrong.
It is a fundamental rule of criminal law that every sane person, capable of committing crime, is presumed to contemplate and intend the necessary, natural, and probable consequences of his own voluntary acts, even if the harm is done to one other than the one intended. The presumption that the accused intends the natural and probable consequences of his own act is not one of law to be applied by the court but of fact to be weighed by the jury. The intent must be proved and this may be done either by direct or indirect evidence tending to establish the fact, or it may be inferred from the circumstances of the case and the conduct of the accused at the time of and subsequent to the commission of the act. Where an intent exists to do wrong and an illegal act is committed, the doer of the act may be criminally liable though the result is other than he anticipated or intended. Roberson’s New Kentucky Criminal Law and Procedure, 2nd Edition, Sections 17 and 18, and cases cited therein.
Thus, the striking of Graden Jett by appellant with his fist, once while standing and then two or three times while down, is an overt act which indicates an intention to do bodily harm. The circumstances of the drunken free-for-all fight are indicative of ill will. Certainly under this evidence the question of fact should have been submitted to the jury to determine whether or not there was a sufficient inference to justify the intent to kill, as well as the question of whether or not death under such circumstances was the natural and probable consequence of the act.
For these reasons, I feel that the evidence was sufficient to submit the case to the jury for its determination of whether the appellant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter.