Court Opinion

ID: 9787426
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 00:16:25.109071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:36:55.806729
License: Public Domain

DEITS, C. J.,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that, under Article VII (Amended) of the Oregon Constitution, there are limits on *562the authority of the legislature to regulate access to the courts. However, for the reasons that I will discuss, I do not agree with the majority that the legislature’s grant of “standing” to seek judicial review of land use decisions in ORS 197.830 and ORS 197.850 exceeds constitutional limits. In my view, this case presents a justiciable controversy because the statutory standing requirements are satisfied as well as all of the elements necessary to establish justiciability. Therefore, the case should not be dismissed.
The majority is correct that the existence of a justiciable controversy is a prerequisite to a court’s consideration of a matter. There are four categories of issues that are pertinent in assessing whether a justiciable controversy exists: standing, ripeness, adversity, and mootness. Each of those categories concerns whether there is a genuine controversy before the court. Standing involves whether the party in question has a legally recognized interest in the case; ripeness involves whether the case is at a stage where it is possible for a court to make a meaningful decision; adversity involves whether the parties are actually taking different positions so that there is a real dispute; and mootness involves whether a decision would have any real or practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties. If a case fails to satisfy any one of those categories, there is nothing for a court to decide.
My disagreement with the majority relates to what is necessary to establish standing for purposes of justiciability. The majority concludes that standing for purposes of justiciability involves more than the question of whether the party seeking judicial review has a legally recognized interest as defined by the applicable standing statute. The majority holds that there is a constitutional component to standing. In this case, according to the majority, the fact that petitioner satisfies the standing requirements for review of a land use decision set forth in ORS 197.830(2) and (7) is not enough to provide standing for purposes of the justiciability inquiry. It is the majority’s view that, in addition to meeting the requirements of ORS 197.830, petitioner must also show, as part of its demonstration of standing, that a decision by the court would have a “practical effect” on its rights. The majority concludes that that showing, as a part of the standing inquiry, is a prerequisite to the constitutional exercise of the *563judicial power and that the legislature lacks the authority to abrogate this power by attempting to grant standing in circumstances in which that showing cannot be made. I disagree.
The majority believes that its conclusion is driven by federal, as well as Oregon, case law. The federal cases concerning the case or controversy clause of Article III of the United States Constitution address issues common to the Oregon courts’ consideration of the scope of the “judicial power” under Article VII (Amended) of the Oregon Constitution. Not surprisingly, our courts have at times referred to and relied on language from federal cases. The Oregon courts, however, have never adopted the federal approach. Our Supreme Court, in fact, has cautioned against placing too much emphasis on federal law relating to standing. In Strawberry Hill 4 Wheelers v. Benton Co. Bd. of Comm., 287 Or 591, 609 n 8, 601 P2d 769 (1979), the court noted:
“References to ‘standing,’ without more, risk treating this term as a generic concept whose contours may be drawn indiscriminately from decisions interpreting diverse statutes or U S Const art III, § 2, or from the academic literature. But statutes often provide differentiated requirements for ‘standing’ before an agency or to obtain different judicial remedies. See, e.g., Gruber v. Lincoln Hosp. Dist. [,] 285 Or 3, 588 P2d 1281 (1979) (declaratory judgment); Marbet v. PGE[,] 277 Or 447, 561 P2d 154 (1977) (administrative procedure act).”
(Emphasis added.) Although the majority is right that there is some “murkiness” in our case law regarding standing as it relates to justiciability, I do not agree with its understanding of that law: namely, that above and beyond any statutory requirements for standing, Article VII (Amended) imposes a general requirement that a certain type and magnitude of interest must always be demonstrated to establish standing for purposes of justiciability.
The majority states that, by the beginning of the last decade, Oregon courts had settled on a justiciability analysis that has been consistently applied and that that analysis has included consideration of the “practical effect on the rights of the parties.” Contrary to the majority’s assertions, I do agree *564that the practical effects on the rights of the parties is a pertinent consideration in determining the justiciability of a matter. However, the consideration of practical effects has always been in the context of satisfying the specific requirements of a statutory standing requirement, commonly the statutory requirements for bringing a declaratory judgment action, or it has been related to mootness, not standing. We have consistently equated the practical effects aspect of justiciability with mootness. For example, in our decision in State v. Lavitsky, 158 Or App 660, 663, 976 P2d 82 (1999), we stated:
“Determining whether a case is moot is part of a larger two-part inquiry into whether a case is justiciable. Brumnett v. PSRB, 315 Or 402, 405, 848 P2d 1194 (1993). The first part of that inquiry is whether a case presents a controversy between parties with adverse interests. Id. The second element is whether the court’s decision will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties. Id. at 405-06. See also Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 321 Or 174, 182, 895 P2d 765 (1995)[.]"
(Emphasis added.) In Joint Council of Teamsters #37 v. BOLI, 168 Or App 398, 407, 11 P3d 247, rev den 331 Or 429 (2000), we said:
“Brumnett * * * prescribes a two-part inquiry into whether a case is justiciable. The first question is whether a case presents an actual and substantial controversy between parties having adverse legal interests. Id. The second question is whether the court’s decision will have a practical effect on the rights of the parties, i.e., whether the case is moot. Id.”
(Emphasis added.)
Contrary to the majority’s assertions, Oregon courts have consistently considered whether a party has standing in terms of the specific statute defining who may seek judicial review of a particular matter. The Oregon courts have not held that there is a generic standing requirement imposed by constitutional considerations that exists independent of the statutory standing requirement and that requires that a certain magnitude of interest be satisfied before the other *565aspects of justiciability — adversity, ripeness and lack of mootness — are even considered.
In our recent decision in Poddar v. Clatsop County, 167 Or App 162, 169, 2 P3d 929, adhered to on recons 168 Or App 556, 7 P3d 677, rev den 331 Or 193 (2000), for example, we began our discussion of standing by noting that we should not lose sight of the fact that standing is not a generic concept: what constitutes standing depends on the specific statutory standard in the particular case. We quoted from the Supreme Court’s decision in Eckles v. State of Oregon, 306 Or 380, 384, 760 P2d 846 (1988), appeal dismissed 490 US 1032, 109 S Ct 1928, 104 L Ed 2d 400 (1989):
“One other source of confusion is the habit of treating standing as if it were a generic concept unrelated to the specific legal relief requested by a party. This court has noted on more than one occasion that whether a person is entitled to seek judicial relief depends upon the type of relief sought and commonly is governed by a specific statutory standard. A person with standing to seek one type of relief will not necessarily have standing to seek any other type of relief. Because plaintiff sought declaratory and injunctive relief, we must decide the issue of his standing by looking to the specific statutes and cases governing his right to seek these types of relief.”
(Emphasis added; citations and footnotes omitted.) We went on in Poddar to conclude that, in light of the statutory standing requirements applicable to the plaintiffs claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, the plaintiff did not adequately demonstrate a sufficient interest to establish standing. 167 Or App at 170.
The Supreme Court has never suggested that there is any constitutional infirmity with legislatively created standing or the legislatively created rights that necessarily provide the foundation for it.1 To the contrary, the court has *566repeatedly stated that questions of standing are to be resolved by referring to statutes. As the Supreme Court stated in Local No. 290 v. Dept. of Environ. Quality, 323 Or 559, 566, 919 P2d 1168 (1996):
“When it is ruling on a standing issue, a reviewing court must focus on the wording of the particular statute at issue, because standing is not a matter of common law but is, instead, conferred by the legislature.”
People for Ethical Treatment v. Inst. Animal Care, 312 Or 95, 99, 817 P2d 1299 (1991) (“Standing * * * is conferred by the Legislative Assembly.”); Eckles, 306 Or at 383-84 (“To say that a plaintiff has ‘no standing’ is to say that the plaintiff has no right to have a tribunal decide a claim under the law defining the requested relief [.]” “[W]hether a person is entitled to seek judicial relief * * * commonly is governed by a specific statutory standard.”); Benton County v. Friends of Benton County, 294 Or 79, 82, 653 P2d 1249 (1982) (“ ‘Standing’ is not common law. Some statutes expressly provide who may seek review of specific governmental actions.”); Associated Builders and Contractors v. Tri-Met, 170 Or App 271, 12 P3d 62 (2000).2
In the decisions relied on by the majority for the proposition that there is a generic constitutional requirement for purposes of proving standing, the court does not discuss any such generic requirement. Rather, the court’s focus is on the specific requirements of the statute defining standing for the particular kind of case involved. In Gruber, for example, the court discussed whether the plaintiff had a sufficient interest to bring the case and, consequently, whether the plaintiffs interest met the statutory standing requirement. The applicable statutory standing requirement was the Declaratory Judgment Act, which provided:
*567“Any person interested under a deed, will, written contract or other writing constituting a contract, or whose rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or franchise may have determined any question of construction or validity arising under any such instrument, constitution, statute, municipal charter, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a declaration of rights, status or other legal relations thereunder.”
Gruber, 285 Or at 6.
Similarly, in Eckles, the court focused on the statutory standing requirement, again the Declaratory Judgment Act. The court concluded:
“The statute’s reference to an effect on ‘rights, status or other legal relations’ requires a plaintiff seeking declaratory relief to allege ‘some injury or other impact on a legally recognized interest beyond an abstract interest in the correct application or the validity of a law.’ Budget Rent-A-Car v. Multnomah Co., 287 Or 93, 95, 597 P2d 1232 (1979). The interest perhaps most often recognized as sufficient for standing under ORS 28.020 is a present or foreseeable financial interest, such as that of a taxpayer, e.g., Lipscomb v. State Bd. of Higher Ed., [305 Or 472, 753 P2d 939 (1988)], but many other interests have been recognized as well, including the interests of voters, e.g., Webb v. Clatsop Co. School Dist. 3, 188 Or 324, 331, 215 P2d 368 (1950), and of users of a road, e.g., Rendler v. Lincoln Co., 302 Or 177, 182, 728 P2d 21 (1986). On the other hand, a taxpayer who alleged only an interest in the proper expenditure of public funds without alleging that the challenged government action would have an effect on his taxes was held to have no standing, Gruber[, 285 Or at 8], and parents whose son had been murdered had no standing to obtain a declaration setting forth limits on the Governor’s power to commute the death sentence of their child’s murderer, Eacret et ux v. Holmes, 215 Or 121, 124-25, 333 P2d 741 (1958).”
Eckles, 306 Or at 385 (emphasis added). See Gortmaker v. Seaton, 252 Or 440, 450 P2d 547 (1969); Oregon Cry. Mfgs. Ass’n v. White, 159 Or 99, 78 P2d 572 (1938); Erwin v. Oregon State Bar, 149 Or App 99, 941 P2d 1094 (1997); deParrie v. State of Oregon, 133 Or App 613, 893 P2d 541, rev den 321 Or 560 (1995).
*568The majority concludes that the legislature may not deem a matter to be justiciable; in other words, that the legislature is without authority to alter the requirements of justiciability. I agree. The legislature may not deem a matter to be justiciable. Clearly, the legislature may not alter the requirements necessary to establish the constitutional aspects of justiciability — adversity, ripeness, and a lack of mootness. Failure to establish the constitutional aspects of any of those elements of justiciability will compel the dismissal of a case. With respect to standing, however, the Oregon courts have not held that the legislature is without authority to define the interests of the parties necessary to establish standing; in other words, to define who has a legally protected interest in a matter.
Significantly, the majority does not cite any case in which statutory standing requirements were met where the case was dismissed for lack of justiciability other than on grounds of lack of adversity, ripeness, or mootness.3 E.g., Oregon Cry. Mfgs. Ass’n, 159 Or at 110-11 (“plaintiffs’ case is not ripe for judicial determination” where the defendant “might promulgate and enforce some regulation or rule which might affect their business”; does not use “practical effects in rights of the parties” phrase) (emphasis in original); Eacret, 215 Or at 124-25 (plaintiffs lacked particularized interest apart from public at large — i.e., no statute created standing— and, accordingly, did not have standing).
As mentioned above, I do agree with the majority that there is some murkiness in our case law relating to the relationship between standing and justiciability. I would acknowledge that the court’s discussion in Mclntire v. Forbes, *569322 Or 426, 909 P2d 846 (1996), includes language which could be read to import a generic constitutional practical effects requirement into the consideration of standing. The majority relies on the court’s statement that “[t]here are two aspects to the analysis of justiciability in this case. The first relates to the standing inquiry: will a decision have a practical effect on the rights of the parties?” Id. at 433. This statement is admittedly somewhat confusing. Reading the statement in the context of the entire opinion, however, shows that the discussion of standing focuses on the statutory standing requirement and that the discussion of practical effects in Mclntire is about mootness and only about mootness. The Mclntire decision, in fact, illustrates that, contrary to the majority’s assertion, standing and mootness involve different questions.
The court in Mclntire begins its discussion of standing by noting that the intervenor “questions petitioners’ standing to bring this action and the justiciability of this case.” Id. at 431. It then discusses standing under a separate section labeled “A. Statutory Standing.” Id. (emphasis in original). That entire discussion concerns the statutory requirement that a petitioner must be an “interested person” under the statute. Id. at 431-32. In section B of its discussion, the court concluded that the petitioners in the case were interested persons with standing under the statute. Id. at 433. The court then moves to the section entitled “C. Justiciability.” Id. (emphasis in original). It is at the beginning of this discussion that the court makes the statement cited above and relied on by the majority. Immediately after making that statement, however, the court goes on to quote from Barcik, a mootness case, which itself quoted Brumnett, another mootness case, to explain the standards for a justiciable controversy under Oregon law.
The issue in Brumnett was whether a challenge to a decision in which PSRB refused to release the petitioner from its jurisdiction became moot when PSRB subsequently released him. In discussing that issue, the court stated that there must be a justiciable controversy, because a court will not decide an abstract, hypothetical, or contingent question. After noting that a preliminary question is whether the interests of the parties are adverse, it turned to whether
*570“the court’s decision in the matter will have some practical effect on the rights of the parties to the controversy. See Warren v. Lane County, 297 Or 290, 686 P2d 316 (1984) (to determine whether judicial review from land use decision is moot, one must determine whether a decision will have practical effect; if there still is a practical effect, the controversy is not moot).
“Cases that are otherwise justiciable, but in which a court’s decision no longer will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties, will be dismissed as moot.”
Brumnett, 315 Or at 405-06 (emphasis added). The court then held that the most that the petitioner could show was the possibility that the state might, some time in the future, seek to recover money for the cost of his care. That mere possibility was insufficient to avoid mootness. Id. at 406-07.
When the court in Brumnett considered whether its decision would have a practical effect on the rights of the parties, it was examining whether the case was not justiciable because it was moot. Both we and the Supreme Court have treated Brumnett as a mootness case ever since. See, e.g., Shasta View Irrigation Dist. v. Amoco Chemicals, 329 Or 151, 166, 986 P2d 536 (1999); State v. Dick, 169 Or App 649, 650, 10 P3d 315 (2000); Joint Council of Teamsters #37, 168 Or App at 407. That is, the reference to whether a decision would have a practical effect on the rights of the parties has not been considered as an aspect of standing except as it pertains to the applicable statutory standing requirement. The rights of the parties to which the court referred were the rights that the parties had standing to assert- — -in Brumnett, the validity of PSRB’s order. The question of justiciability that the court decided in Brumnett was mootness — whether a decision at a particular time would have a practical effect on those rights.4
*571In light of the cases on which it relied and the fact that the court’s only discussion of standing concerns the application of the statutory standard, in my view, the only thing that the court in Mclntire decided in its discussion of practical effects was that the controversy was not moot. Its reference to the preceding discussion concerning standing simply indicated that, as in Brumnett, the nature of the plaintiffs’ standing defined the rights that the court examined to decide whether the case was moot: that is, whether a decision of the case would have a practical effect on the statutory rights that gave the plaintiffs standing.
Consistent with the above case law, our consideration of whether petitioner here has standing must begin with “looking to the specific statutes and cases governing” this type of relief. Eckles, 306 Or at 384. In ORS 197.830(2) and (7), the legislature created an unusually broad definition of standing for land use decisions. The legislature apparently decided that any person or entity that plays a serious role at the appropriate stages of the decision-making process should have standing to seek review of a decision that is contrary to the position that it took. The legislature gave such persons and entities a legally recognized right to continue to participate in the process. That action may well reflect its recognition that without citizen involvement — which, under Goal 1, is an essential part of the land use decision-making process— it would be impossible to ensure that local decisions comply with the law’s requirements. In any case, in Jefferson Landfill Comm. v. Marion Co., 297 Or 280, 686 P2d 310 (1984), the Supreme Court made it clear that the statute means exactly what it says.
Petitioner here met the statutory standing requirement. As discussed above, however, once that hurdle is crossed, the justiciability of the controversy must still be established. The justiciability of the controversy was established here. This case is at a stage where the court can make *572a meaningful decision — it is ripe. There is a real dispute— this would not be an advisory opinion — there is adversity. The decision will have a practical effect on or concerning the rights of the parties — respondents’ right to use specific property and petitioner’s legally recognized right as an interested participant in this land use decision. This is not an abstract, hypothetical, or contingent question — it is not moot.
In summary, we should determine that the case is justiciable and proceed to decide it on the merits. The first issue on the merits concerns the parties’ contentions as to the operation of the motocross race track on exclusive farm use (EFU) land. Petitioner, the League of Women Voters of Coos County (League), and the Department of Land Conservation and Development (DLCD) argue that LUBA erred in concluding that a motocross racetrack is permissible on EFU land. According to the League and DLCD, LUBA’s analysis was flawed in resting on the simple dictionary definition of the term “park.”
I agree with the League and DLCD that LUBA’s analysis was not correct. It is not sufficient to rely on the dictionary definition of the term “park” in determining the scope of permitted uses under ORS 215.283(2). Such reasoning would permit, among other things, the replication of Yankee Stadium or Disneyland on land zoned EFU, a construction of the statute that we take is self-evidently unlikely. As we noted in Steele v. Employment Department, 143 Or App 105, 113-14, 923 P2d 1252 (1996), aff'd 328 Or 292, 974 P2d 207 (1999), the dictionary is only the beginning of the process of statutory construction:
“[M]any of the words in our language have several meanings or shades of meaning. However, it does not follow from the fact that there are several variations of how a word is defined in the dictionary that all of the variations are pertinent whenever the word is used, or that each variation is an arguably plausible description of what the word means as it is used in a particular statute. The subject and purpose of the statute, together with the statutory language that surrounds the word in question, narrow the array of definitional choices that dictionaries alone afford and go far in identifying the intended meaning of the word as used in the statute.”
*573I agree with LUBA that the term “park,” at least conceptually, may encompass land devoted to a number of different recreational activities. My problem is with LUBA’s conclusion that all recreational uses are therefore permissible under ORS 215.283(2)(c) in any private park in an agricultural zone.
It is true that, as LUBA noted, neither Goal 3 — pertaining to agricultural lands — nor the agricultural lands statutes contain an express limitation on recreational uses to those that are “appropriate” to the surrounding land. Nevertheless, the pervasive theme in both Goal 3 and the statutes is the preservation of agricultural land for farm use. See, e.g., ORS 215.243. Accordingly, this court has consistently interpreted ORS 215.213 and ORS 215.283 restrictively. See, e.g., McCaw Communications, Inc. v. Marion County, 96 Or App 552, 773 P2d 779 (1989). Perhaps more significantly, implementation guideline B.l of Goal 3 provides:
“Non-farm uses permitted within farm use zones under ORS 215.213(2) and (3) and 215.283(2) and (3) should be minimized to allow for maximum agricultural productivity.”
In light of the foregoing contextual authorities, I do not agree that ORS 215.283(2)(c) allows recreational uses without limitation in private parks in EFU zones. Those authorities demonstrate instead a legislative intent to limit the nature and intensity of recreational uses on farmland to at least the same extent that Goal 4 limits recreational activities on forest land. Given that, I would conclude that, for the same reasons that LUBA determined that the motocross racetrack component is impermissible on forest land, it also is impermissible on land zoned EFU, as a matter of law.
It is next necessary to address the OHV trail system component of the proposed development. The League again charges that LUBA’s analysis was improperly based on simple reliance on the dictionary and that, taking into account the relevant statutory and regulatory context, it is clear that an OHV trail system, like a motocross racetrack, is impermissible on EFU or forest land. As explained above, I agree that LUBA erred in its analysis. I would not hold, however, that, as a matter of law, an OHV trail system is categorically *574impermissible. I would note, in particular, that LCDC’s rules apparently expressly permit off-road vehicle trails in public parks. That indicates that LCDC considered that uses of that kind at least could be an appropriate use on EFU and forest lands and that there should be a case-by-case analysis to determine whether a proposed OHV trail is appropriate under ORS 215.283(2)(c). That inquiry must take into account the intensity of the particular proposed use and other factual variables considered in the context of Goal 3. Accordingly, I believe the appropriate remedy would be to remand for LUBA to reconsider the OHV trail issue, either independently or by a remand to the county, as LUBA sees fit.
The League advances two other assignments, only one of which merits discussion. The League contends that LUBA erred by not expressly requiring that, on remand, the county must apply ORS 215.296 to the “special events” aspect of the Lillies’ proposal. The Lillies nominally oppose the assignment of error, but they acknowledge that the remand that LUBA ordered implicitly requires the county to apply ORS 215.296 to the issue. I agree and would make the requirement explicit. For all of the above reasons, I respectfully dissent.
Armstrong, J., joins in this opinion.

 The majority’s discussion of standing may also implicate separation of powers considerations. The power to define “rights” — which parties may seek to protect through the judicial process — is properly part of the “legislative power;” which is vested in the Legislative Assembly. Or Const, Art IV, § 1(1); see Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or 83, 112, 23 P3d 333 (2001) (suggesting that, apart from “ ‘absolute’ common-law rights,” definition of legally protectable rights is province of legislature); Swett v. Keisling, 171 Or App 119, 125, 15 P3d 50 (2000), rev allowed 332 Or 250 (2001) (legislature has plenary power to legislate on any matter not limited by federal or state constitution).

 1 acknowledge that there are also comments from the Supreme Court that can be read as leaving open the question of whether standing has a constitutional component in Oregon. People for Ethical Treatment, 312 Or at 99 (“[A]side from certain constitutional considerations not presented by this case, a reviewing court’s inquiry into the standing of an entity seeking judicial review is confined to an interpretation of legislative intent.”); Market, 277 Or at 457 n 4 (“It is not contended here that the standing conferred by ORS 183.480 exceeds ‘the judicial power of the state[.]’ ”). In my opinion, however, the court has made direct and frequent statements that standing is a matter for the legislature to determine by statute. Those statements control.

 The majority states that I am wrong in stating that the Oregon courts have never dismissed a case because of a failure to meet the practical effects requirement and cites a number of cases which were dismissed for failure to meet the practical effects requirement. 176 Or App at 553. However, the majority misreads my statement. I state that the Oregon courts have not dismissed a case, for lack of a justiciable controversy, in which statutory standing requirements have been met, other than on grounds of mootness, lack of adversity or ripeness. 176 Or App at 568. The cases that the majority cites, Eacret, Poddar, Erwin, and deParrie, as examples of cases that involved dismissals because the plaintiffs’ interests were insufficient to satisfy the “constitutional practical effects requirement,” were dismissed because the plaintiffs did not have a sufficient interest to satisfy the applicable statutory standing requirement.

 The majority relies on language from Brumnett to support its point that the practical effects requirement relates to establishing standing. As noted above, it points to the court’s statement that “ ‘[a] second requirement for a justiciable controversy is that the court’s decision * * * will have some practical effect on the rights of the parties to the controversy.’ ” 176 Or App at 540 (quoting Brumnett, 315 Or at 405). The majority, however, does not include the citation that follows this language which supports my view that practical effects relates to mootness. That additional language from Brumnett states:
*571“See Warren v. Lane County, 297 Or 290, 686 P2d 316 (1984) (to determine whether judicial review from land use decision is moot, one must determine whether a decision will have practical effect; if there still is a practical effect, the controversy is not moot).”
315 Or at 405-06.