Court Opinion

ID: 9542279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:32:38.352373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:27.389229
License: Public Domain

Judge TAUBMAN
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Because I believe that People v. Tippett, 733 P.2d 1183 (Colo.1987) is controlling on the issue of the motion to elect and also that the majority incorrectly interprets the term “seize” in § 18-3-302(1), C.R.S. (1995 Cum. Supp.), I respectfully dissent from the affir-mance of the kidnapping conviction.
I.
In People v. Tippett, supra, the supreme court concluded that the trial court’s failure to grant the defendant’s motion to elect, or in the alternative, to instruct the jury that it could find the defendant guilty of kidnapping or violation of custody, but not both, was an abuse of discretion because the two crimes were supported by “identical evidence.”
In my view, the facts of the present case are not significantly different from the facts in Tippett and therefore that ease should control. Both cases arose out of a family dispute. Neither Tippett nor the defendant here had legal custody of his stepchildren or child, respectively. However, both defendants expressed concern for the safety and welfare of their children and took the law into their own hands to remedy the perceived danger. In each case, the defendant removed the children from the state and failed to contact the legal guardian. Finally, both defendants were charged and convicted of *142both second degree kidnapping and violation of custody.
In addition, unlike the majority, I do not find the factual differences of the two cases to be so substantial or significant that the analysis in Tippett would be inapplicable. For example, I do not view as dispositive the fact that, in Tippett, the natural mother, who was not the legal guardian, accompanied defendant when he fled the state with the children. Moreover, I do not perceive Tip-pett’s filing of unfounded charges of child abuse against the custodial parents to be more probative of a genuine concern for the child than was defendant’s testimony on that same issue here.
Finally, I agree with defendant that there is no legal significance attached to the filing of second degree kidnapping charges under § 18-3-302(2), C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.) in Tippett’s case as opposed to similar charges under § 18-3-302(1) against defendant here.
Thus, in my view, because there is no material distinction between the facts or the law in the two cases, I would find, pursuant to the supreme court’s holding in Tippett, that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to grant defendant's motion to elect or to instruct the jury properly.
II.
Next, I agree with defendant’s alternative contention that the word “seize” in § 18-3-302(1), unlike the term “take” in § 18-3-302(2), is intended to encompass the use of force. In light of that difference, I find the evidence insufficient to prove an essential element of second degree kidnapping.
Although I recognize that the dictionary definitions of “seize” and “take” offer broad interpretations of both words, other tools of statutory construction persuade me that the General Assembly intended those words to have separate and distinct meaning. See Bailey v. United States, — U.S.-, 116 S.Ct. 501, 133 L.Ed.2d 472 (1995) (because of different meanings attributable to the word “use” in federal criminal statute, Supreme Court considers not only the bare meaning of the word but also its placement and purpose in the statutory scheme).
In construing words and phrases in a statute, a court should give some meaning and effect to every word used. Blue River Defense Committee v. Town of Silverthome, 33 Colo.App. 10, 516 P.2d 452 (1973). Moreover, it is presumed that the General Assembly has knowledge of the legal import of the words it uses. Longbottom v. State Board of Community Colleges, 872 P.2d 1253 (Colo. App.1993). Courts are therefore not to presume that the General Assembly used statutory language idly and with no intent that meaning should be given to its language. Blue River Defense Committee v. Town of Silverthome, supra. As the Supreme Court recently observed:
Judges should hesitate to treat [as surplus-age] statutory terms in any setting, and resistance should be heightened when the words describe an element of a criminal offense.
Bailey v. United States, supra — U.S. at -, 116 S.Ct. at 506-07,133 L.Ed.2d at 481.
Accordingly, because the two words appear in the same statute and the General Assembly could have chosen to use the same word if it intended that they have the same meaning, I would presume that it intentionally chose the word “seize” in § 18-3-302(1) and the word “take” in § 18-3-302(2) and was fully cognizant of their respective meanings. Cf. People v. Powell, 716 P.2d 1096 (Colo. 1986) (noting no evidence of legislative intent that “forcibly” in former second degree kidnapping statute was intended to be an element of second degree kidnapping).
In addition, to interpret the terms otherwise would render superfluous a related violation of custody statute, § 18-3-304(1), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B), which provides:
Any person, including a natural or foster parent, who, knowing that he has no privilege to do so or heedless in that regard, takes or entices any child under the age of eighteen years from the custody of his parents, guardian, or other lawful custodian commits a class 5 felony.
In enacting a statute, it is presumed that the entire statute is intended to be effective. People v. Phillips, 652 P.2d 575 (Colo.1982). Further, a court must adopt the statutory construction that best effectuates the pur*143poses of the entire statutory scheme. In re M.S. v. People, 812 P.2d 632 (Colo.1991). Thus, a statute is to be construed as a whole to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. People v. Phillips, supra (statutes addressing the same subject matter must, if possible, be construed together to give full effect to the legislative purpose of each).
Here, if the words “seize” and “take” are deemed synonymous, any person, including a parent, who takes a child could always be charged with second degree kidnapping, a class two felony, rather than with violation of custody, a class five felony. Hence, § 18-3-304(1) would effectively be rendered meaningless.
However, if “seize” and “take” are given different meanings, the entire statutory scheme that includes kidnapping and violation of custody would be given a sensible and harmonious effect. See Bailey v. United States, supra, — U.S. at-, 116 S.Ct. at 507, 133 L.Ed.2d at 481 (rejecting broad meaning of “use” that would render the statutory term “carry” superfluous on basis that Congress intended “each term to have a particular, nonsuperfluous meaning.”); People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo.1986).
Under this interpretation, convictions under statutes such as § 18-3-302(1), containing the word “seize,” would require proof of some use of force, whereas those statutes using the word “take” would not require proof of force. This interpretation is consistent with two of the more commonly understood definitions for these words: “seize,” meaning “to possess or take by force;” and “take,” meaning “to get into one’s hands or one’s hold or possession by a physical act of simple transference.” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 2057 & 2329-30 (1986).
Moreover, such an interpretation would also be consistent with the General Assembly’s intent to punish more severely actors with a higher level of culpability. For example, any person who takes a child with force would be charged with second degree kidnapping under § 18-3-302(1), and any non-parent who takes a child, but does not use force, would be charged with second degree kidnapping under § 18-3-302(2). However, a parent who takes a child illegally but without using force would only be charged with violation of custody under § 18-3-304(1), a less serious offense than second degree kidnapping, implying that a parent would be less culpable than a stranger. This interpretation effectuates the purpose of the entire statutory scheme and accords distinct meanings to the terms “seize” and “take.”
So interpreted, I would conclude that, under the evidence presented, the People failed to establish that defendant “seized” his child and would set aside his conviction under § 18-3-302(1) on this basis.
In sum, on either the basis of the trial court’s failure to require the prosecution to elect between the charged offenses or the failure of the prosecution to prove all elements of the offense, I would hold that defendant’s conviction for second degree kidnapping should be reversed. I concur in the affirmance of the conviction for violation of custody.