Court Opinion

ID: 9931075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-08 15:06:59.432331+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:16:13.751280
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                                APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

                                                         SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                         APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                         DOCKET NO. A-0200-22

MICHAEL A. URSITTI and
LISA A. COSCIA,

          Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

JAMES H. WILSON, CHRISTINA
WILSON, EQUIHEART
VETERINARY SERVICES, LLC,
and EQUIHEART FARMS, LLC,
THE TOWNSHIP OF WASHINGTON,
a municipal corporation, THE
TOWNSHIP OF WASHINGTON
ZONING BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT,
a land use agency of the TOWNSHIP
OF WASHINGTON, and

          Defendants-Respondents,

and

THE TOWNSHIP
OF WASHINGTON BOARD
OF EDUCATION,

     Defendant.
_______________________________
            Argued January 9, 2024 – Decided February 8, 2024

            Before Judges Whipple, Enright and Paganelli.

            On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
            Chancery Division, General Equity, Hunterdon
            County, Docket No. C-014017-20.

            Erica Lynn Edwards argued the cause for appellants
            (Erica Edwards, Esq. Law Offices, LLC, attorney;
            Erica Lynn Edwards, on the brief).

            Gerald J. Kelly argued the cause for respondents
            James H. Wilson, Christina Wilson, Equiheart
            Veterinary Services, LLC, and Equiheart Farms, LLC.

PER CURIAM

      Michael A. Rusti and Lisa A Coscia (collectively, plaintiffs) and James

H. Wilson and Christina Wilson (collectively, defendants) have been neighbors

for over five years. During that time, defendants have had use of a driveway

on an access easement on plaintiffs' property, plaintiffs have objected to the

manner in which the driveway was used, and defendants have objected to

plaintiffs' increasingly intrusive and intimidating behavior. As a result, the

relationship between the neighbors has deteriorated over the years.

      On appeal, plaintiffs challenge the trial judge's determination that their

use of cameras and a radar speed detector to monitor the easement constitutes

a private nuisance. Judge Margaret Goodzeit, Chancery Division, oversaw this

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                                      2
case at the trial level, issued extensive findings of fact and legal conclusions

after a three-day bench trial, and fashioned an equitable remedy. Based upon

her findings and legal reasoning, we agree with her decision and affirm.

        Below, we briefly recount the essential facts, relevant to this issue.

Plaintiffs have lived at and owned the property at 14 Coddington Lane,

Tewksbury, since the residence was built in 1998. Defendants purchased and

moved into the property at 16 Coddington Lane, Washington Township, in

2017.    Defendants also have certain businesses associated with their farm

activities and veterinary practice, which operate out of the property under a

farmland assessment and an accessory use home occupation approval.

        Despite being in a different municipality and different county, 1

defendants' property is adjacent to, and behind, plaintiffs' property.

Defendants' property would be landlocked and inaccessible, but for an

easement that was memorialized in an agreement filed in 1998. By agreement,

plaintiffs' property is encumbered by an access easement, measuring

approximately 530' long by 30' wide, to the benefit of defendants' property.

The access easement agreement grants to defendants, as successors in the

estate from the original Grantees:

1
  14 Coddington Lane is in Tewksbury, Hunterdon County. 16 Coddington
Lane is in Washington Township, Morris County.
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                                      3
            1. [A]n exclusive access easement over that portion of
            the Property [at 14 Coddington Lane] . . . (the
            "Easement Area") . . . , which includes the Driveway,
            only for the purpose of providing ingress and egress
            from Coddington Lane to [16 Coddington Lane].

            2. The easement created hereby shall be subject to the
            following:

            (a) Existing rights and easements, including, but not
            limited to, those for access, drainage, utilities, water
            and sewer mains, pipelines and telephone lines located
            in the Easement Area.

      When they purchased their property, plaintiffs installed a home security

system that included panic alarm buttons registered with, and continually

monitored by, the Tewksbury Township Police. Their system also includes

heat detectors, water breach devices, and other security measures. In 2019,

plaintiffs became suspicious about damage to their rear fence and installed a

camera to surveil the fence. The camera was attached to a tree in the wooded

backyard, approximately sixty feet from defendants' residence and was housed

in a birdhouse casing.    Plaintiffs deny any intention to surveil defendants'

residence and assert the camera was placed in the birdhouse to protect it from

the elements, as it was designed for indoor use.

      Defendants thought the camera was placed surreptitiously and made two

reports to the police about it. Plaintiffs removed this birdhouse camera a short

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                                      4
time later. In 2019, plaintiffs installed other cameras on their property to

monitor their backdoor, gate, mailbox, driveway, and an office area. One

camera looked in the direction of their car parking pad and viewed a portion of

the easement beyond the parking pad. Plaintiffs also installed two cameras on

a pole adjacent to the easement for presence detection for the length of the

easement and real-time video. One faces south toward the road, and one faces

north toward defendants' home.       Defendants' residence is not within the

sightline of the easement cameras.

      Plaintiffs later upgraded their outdoor cameras to consistently

transmitting infrared cameras with nighttime capability, installing five of them

in late November and December 2020. They did not install any cameras facing

defendants' property. The camera from the birdhouse was installed to monitor

the wires on the two infrared cameras near the easement. At trial, plaintiff-

husband explained that he monitored those wires because they could be cut by

a perpetrator or squirrels. He stated that this camera has audio capability but

denied that such monitoring was enabled. Plaintiffs testified at trial t hat they

were concerned about confrontations and potential incidents on the easement,

and they increased their security monitoring to protect themselves.

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      Plaintiffs asserted that, since defendants moved in and began operating

their businesses from 16 Coddington Lane, traffic volume on the easement

increased and the character of the vehicles using the easement changed to

include more commercial and delivery vehicles, as well as heavier vehicles

with trailers. They also claimed that it is common for vehicles to travel at

"excessive speeds" on the easement. Plaintiffs asserted these negative changes

in the traffic using the driveway impacted their use and enjoyment—as well as

the potential resale value—of their property.

      Plaintiff-husband testified he observed on the driveway vehicles

travelling at speeds plaintiffs "thought . . . were not appropriate." Plaintiffs

voiced their concerns to defendants in casual conversation and text messages,

but purportedly witnessed no change in the driving behavior. Begin ning in

late 2019, plaintiffs also began reaching out to the U.S. Postal Service, FedEx,

and UPS to complain about the speeds driven by their delivery drivers on the

easement, again with no appreciable change in behavior.          In June 2020,

plaintiff-husband   also   stopped   various    delivery   drivers—as   well    as

defendants—as they were on the driveway and asked them to drive more

slowly.

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      In August 2020, while defendants were away on vacation, plaintiffs

installed on the driveway four speed bumps and ten signs—stating, "Speed

Bumps"; the defendants discovered this installation upon their return home.

The number was later increased to six speed bumps. Earlier that summer, in

July 2020, plaintiffs had ordered the installation of "No dumping" signs by the

property line between plaintiffs' property and defendants' house and the

installation of "Private property/No trespassing" signs on plaintiffs' property at

the end of the easement, with all signs pointing toward defendants' property.

"No parking" signs were placed on the other side of the easement, facing the

driveway. These signs were installed by plaintiffs in response to a March 2020

letter from defendants' counsel that asserted plaintiffs would be considered

trespassing if they entered the easement.

      In November 2021, plaintiffs installed a radar device to monitor the

speed of vehicles travelling on the easement. Plaintiff-husband testified he

could then cross-reference "fast" radar readings with images from his video

feed from the easement to determine whether the reading was from a delivery

vehicle or a private car. Plaintiff-husband kept a log of such readings and

vehicles for about six weeks after installing the radar device to present

evidence to various delivery companies.

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                                       7
      At trial, plaintiff-wife testified that her home had been "a sanctuary"

before defendants moved in, but that it was "not a pleasant place to live

anymore." Plaintiff-wife stated that she was "angry" and "heartbroken" and

that she disapproved of defendants' running businesses on their propert y. She

complained of noisy animals and too much traffic on the easement.           She

recounted her numerous failed attempts through Washington Township to

obtain relief against the defendants' commercial activities, including opposing

permits sought by the defendants, although they were within the zoned use of

the property. Plaintiff-wife testified plaintiffs had asked other neighbors to

likewise oppose defendants' permit requests.     Plaintiffs had also sought to

relocate the school bus stop utilized by defendants' children away from the end

of their driveway to a location approximately half a mile away.

      At trial, defendants testified they felt their privacy had been invaded by

the cameras monitoring the easement area. Specifically, defendants related the

oppressive effect the surveillance had on family members and visitors. They

were uncomfortable with the constant monitoring of their comings and

goings—not only of visitors, but of defendants themselves and their children.

Defendant-wife testified they told their children not to talk while walking on

the easement because of the camera with audio recording capability. She also

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                                      8
emphasized that it felt "creepy" being constantly surveilled, especially since

they had no knowledge how the captured images were being used. She further

objected that plaintiffs' surveillance permitted them to know "exactly when

[she] left in the mornings and exactly when [she] came home at night," as well

as when her children "c[a]me off the bus and . . . walk[ed] up the driveway by

themselves."

      Defendants asserted plaintiffs' surveillance inappropriately interfered

with their free use and enjoyment of the easement as guaranteed by the access

easement agreement.     Defendants testified they objected to the easement's

being monitored at all, but they specifically took issue with the constant

monitoring of vehicle speeds, as well as plaintiffs' stopping vehicles on the

driveway.      Defendants contended that the surveillance was intended to

intimidate and interfere with their use and enjoyment of the easement, as well

as the use by those visiting them.

      Plaintiff-husband stated at trial that he was willing to post a "twenty-

four-hour surveillance" sign to alert visitors that surveillance was running at

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                                      9
all times, and that he was willing to permit defendants to place a camera on the

northwest corner of the easement, looking south down the driveway. 2

      Before the current litigation began, defendants' attorney sent a "cease

and desist letter" to plaintiffs in March 2020, requesting plaintiffs refrain from

interfering with defendants' rights to use the easement, specifically by not

proceeding with their threat to install speed bumps across the driveway.

Undeterred, plaintiffs installed the speed bumps and signs on the easement

while defendants were away on vacation.        In November 2020, defendants'

attorney sent letters to plaintiffs' counsel demanding the immediate removal of

the speed bumps or defendants would remove them themselves.

      In response, plaintiffs filed an order to show cause for a preliminary

injunction with temporary restraints and a verified complaint to prevent

defendants from removing the speed bumps. Defendants countersued. The

preliminary injunction was denied; defendants removed the speed bumps from

the driveway and plaintiffs had the signs removed. Claims remained, however,

and the disharmony between the neighbors continued.

2
  Defendants had once placed a camera, unwittingly on a different neighbor's
property, near that area so they could monitor who was coming up the
driveway toward their house. Defendants' camera was, ultimately, removed
after the plaintiff admonished the neighbor by having his lawyer send a letter
threatening litigation if the camera was not removed.
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                                      10
      Defendants raised counterclaims sounding in nuisance and trespass.

Plaintiffs added claims against new defendants—the Township of Washington,

the Township of Washington Zoning Board of Adjustment, and the Township

of Washington Board of Education. The trial court judge dismissed all claims

against the public entity defendants on March 31, 2021. The remaining parties

stipulated to the dismissal of one count of plaintiffs' second amended

complaint. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the one remaining

count and on their counterclaims, and plaintiffs cross-moved.

      By order dated February 14, 2022, the trial judge granted summary

judgment to defendants, dismissing plaintiffs' remaining count. By this same

order, the trial judge granted, in part, summary judgment to plaintiffs,

dismissing defendants' counterclaims for trespass and interference with use by

circulating false information and filing incident reports.

      Judge Goodzeit presided over a three-day non-jury trial on defendants'

remaining nuisance claim and rendered a decision finding generally in

defendants' favor.    In the judgment, the trial court clarified maintenance

obligations for both parties; defined circumstances permitting plaintiffs'

presence in the easement area; addressed the removed speed bumps and

various protrusions of plaintiffs' improvements into the easement area; and

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                                      11
required the removal of most signs facing defendants' property and removal of

the speed detector and three cameras monitoring the easement area and each

other.

         This appeal followed in which plaintiffs appeal only the trial court's

order to remove the speed detector and infrared cameras that surveil the

driveway.

         "[A] judge sitting in a court of equity has a broad range of discretion to

fashion the appropriate remedy in order to vindicate a wrong consistent with

principles of fairness, justice, and the law." Graziano v. Grant, 326 N.J. Super.

328, 342 (App. Div. 1999). We review an equitable remedy for an abuse of

discretion, determining "whether the court properly exercised its discretion in

fashioning the appropriate equitable remedy." Todaro v. Cnty. of Union, 392

N.J. Super. 448, 456 (App. Div. 2007).

         Our review of a trial judge's findings is limited. See Fagliarone v. Twp.

of N. Bergen, 78 N.J. Super. 154, 155 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 40 N.J. 221

(1963). We defer to the trial judge's factual findings that are well-supported

by competent evidence in the record. See Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit

Union, 199 N.J. 381, 397 (2009). However, we accord no deference to the

trial judge's conclusions on issues of law and review such issues of law de

                                                                            A-0200-22
                                        12
novo. State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 387 (2012); Manalapan Realty, L.P. v.

Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378, (1995); Pressler & Verniero,

Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3.1 on R. 2:10-2 (2024). We review mixed

issues of law and fact de novo. In re Malone, 381 N.J. Super. 344, 349 (App.

Div. 2005).

                                        I.

      Plaintiffs' chief argument is that the trial judge abused her discretion

when she found plaintiffs' monitoring of the easement with cameras and a

speed detector constitutes a private nuisance. Based upon the well-developed

record, we disagree.

      "A cause of action for private nuisance derives from [one party's]

'unreasonable interference with the use and enjoyment' of the [the other

party's] property." Ross v. Lowitz, 222 N.J. 494, 505 (2015) (quoting Sans v.

Ramsey Golf & Country Club, Inc. (Sans II), 29 N.J. 438, 448 (1959)). For a

party to be liable for a private nuisance, that party's conduct must be the "legal

cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of

land, and the invasion is either (a) intentional and unreasonable, or (b)

unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling liability for

negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions o r

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                                      13
activities." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822 (Am. L. Inst. 1979); see also

Ross, 222 N.J. at 505-06 (citing Burke v. Briggs, 239 N.J. Super 269, 272-73

(App. Div. 1990)) ("Our courts have adopted the standard of Restatement

section 822 to assess liability for private nuisance.").

      Our Supreme Court has acknowledged that the specific causes and

symptoms of a private nuisance claim defy enumeration, Sans II, 29 N.J. at

448, and that the claim requires an individualized analysis, considering "the

facts . . . in their totality," and a balancing of equities, id. at 450.

             The essence of a private nuisance is an unreasonable
             interference with the use and enjoyment of land. The
             elements are myriad. The law has never undertaken to
             define all of the possible sources of annoyance and
             discomfort which would justify such a finding.
             Litigation of this type usually deals with the
             conflicting interests of property owners and the
             question of the reasonableness of [one party's] mode
             of use of his land. The process of adjudication
             requires recognition of the reciprocal right of each
             owner to reasonable use, and a balancing of the
             conflicting interests. The utility of [one party's]
             conduct must be weighed against the quantum of harm
             to the [other]. The question is not simply whether a
             person is annoyed or disturbed, but whether the
             annoyance or disturbance arises from an unreasonable
             use of the neighbor's land or operation of his business.

             [Id. at 448–49 (internal citations omitted).]

      Though it is not controlling, we appreciate the guidance offered by the

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                                         14
Supreme Court of Vermont in Jones v. Hart "that a sustained and intentional

campaign to annoy a neighbor can amount to a private nuisance." 261 A.3d

1126, 1140 (Vt. 2021).       "Although such campaigns primarily involve only

discomfort and annoyance—and therefore cause relatively little harm, as

compared to other categories of interferences—they qualify as a private nuisance

because the harassment and annoyance is repeated over a prolonged period and

the activity causing the interference has no utility." Ibid.

      Here, the trial judge began with a painstaking recitation of the facts,

detailing the lengthy, contentious relationship between the parties. She found,

not only that the actions plaintiffs took were an intentional and unreasonable

invasion of defendants' private use and enjoyment of the driveway on the

easement, but also that plaintiffs "have done everything in their power to make

life difficult for . . . defendants." In particular, the judge found plaintiffs

installed the cameras to monitor the easement because,

             as [plaintiff-husband] himself indicated, he wanted to
             know who was coming and going so he could report
             excessive speeds. He wanted to call the United States
             Post Office, UPS, FedEx, and perhaps anybody else to
             complain[]. He actually, indeed, started making a log
             of when they were there, and how fast he believed
             they were going.

                                                                         A-0200-22
                                        15
The judge mentioned "how [defendants] felt and feel about being subjected to

the surveillance" and the fact that defendants have "stopped talking, and told

their children not to talk[,] while walking up and back the driveway." Judge

Goodzeit said it was "very telling" and "unfathomable" that defendants felt

such discomfort traversing the one means of reaching their home. Moreover,

the trial judge stated, it was "inappropriate" that defendants' "invitees, delivery

people, have been stopped" and that "one of the [delivery] services won't come

down the driveway." Finally, the trial judge found that the speed detector had

been recently installed "for the same exact reasons."

      Based on these findings, the trial court then held that plaintiffs "have

gone beyond their rights with respect to the ground of the easement."

"[P]utting surveillance cameras for [their] own gratification, and whatever

underlying complaints they intend to file, is inappropriate, and the [c]ourt

finds[,] rises to the level of nuisance."

      In so finding, Judge Goodzeit emphasized the fact that plaintiffs' issue

with allegedly excessive speeds on the easement is based on "their personal

belief[, and] . . . it is not supported by any law." Plaintiffs have not

             established that anybody has driven in excessive speed
             according to any standard. [They have] had no expert
             provide a standard. [They have] provided no laws or
             ordinances that apply to this driveway. It is just their

                                                                            A-0200-22
                                       16
            subjective desire to keep people at under [ten] miles
            an hour, and [that is] not enough.

Plaintiffs' actions to enforce a subjective speed limit were legally

unreasonable, as there is no legal support for their opinion that "driving on the

easement access driveway should be limited to a speed of [ten] miles per

hour."   As a result, the judge found "that the surveillance and the speed

detectors are intimidating to [defendants] and their guests and invitees, and

[plaintiffs] have no legal justification for same."

      The determination that plaintiffs' cameras and speed detector constitute a

private nuisance to defendants, infringing on defendants' reasonable use and

enjoyment of the driveway on the easement, is well within the judge's

discretion. Her decision did not "rest[] on an impermissible basis, consider[]

irrelevant or inappropriate factors, fail[] to consider controlling legal

principles or ma[k]e findings inconsistent with or unsupported by competent

evidence." See Elrom v. Elrom, 439 N.J. Super. 424, 434 (App. Div. 2015).

The trial court judge's decision rested on the totality of the circumstances, as is

appropriate for considering a private nuisance claim. See Sans II, 29 N.J. at

450. The trial judge considered only appropriate factors and controlling legal

principles, ignoring extraneous interactions between the parties that were not

relevant to the use of the easement and referring to controlling case law,

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                                       17
including Ross v. Lowitz, 222 N.J. 494 (2015), and Sans II, 29 N.J. 438

(1959). Finally, every factual finding the judge made was derived directly

from party testimony offered during the three-day bench trial.

      Plaintiffs argue the cameras and speed detector at issue should be

permitted to remain in place, because they "do not interfere with [d]efendants'

exercise of their exclusive rights and responsibilities under the [a]ccess

[e]asement [a]greement, namely, the right to travel the easement for the

purpose of ingress to and egress from their property to the public street . . . ."

Plaintiffs derive this non-interference argument from the laws that govern

easements, under which the "owner of the burdened property retains the right

to make all uses of the land that do not unreasonably interfere with the

easement holder's exercise of the rights granted by the easement," citing

Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 1.2 cmt. d and § 4.9 (Am. L.

Inst. 2000). Plaintiffs also emphasize that "the [a]greement does not prohibit

any form of monitoring of the easement by the fee simple owner of the lands."

      The judge found that, by purchasing land encumbered by an easement,

plaintiffs gave up the right to have absolute control over activities on the

property included in the easement, "absent some proof of inappropriate

behavior, which they have not provided."         The judge held that, because

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                                      18
plaintiffs had not "established that the vehicles are in any way driving . . . at

excessive speeds, or in other dangerous ways," taking steps to monitor or

modulate the travel speed on the easement "is not within the rights that are

granted by the express easement." Therefore, because the surveillance of the

easement "is not within the rights that are granted by the express easement,"

plaintiffs "have no legal justification" for monitoring the driveway with

cameras and a speed detector.

      "An easement is an interest in land owned by another." Tewksbury Twp.

v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 159 N.J. Super 44, 49 (App. Div. 1978),

aff'd, 79 N.J. 398 (1979). An owner of the underlying land may not, "without

the consent of the easement holder, unreasonably interfere with the latter's

rights or change the character of the easement so as to make the use thereof

significantly more difficult or burdensome."     Tide-Water Pipe Co. v. Blair

Holding Co., 42 N.J. 591, 604 (1964). On the other hand, with regard to the

easement holder, "there is, arising out of every easement, an implied right to

do what is reasonably necessary for its complete enjoyment, that right to be

exercised, however, in such reasonable manner as to avoid unnecessary

increases in the burden upon the landowner." Ibid.

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      Looking to the easement agreement itself, it grants to defendants, as

successors in the estate from the original Grantees:

            1. [A]n exclusive access easement over that portion of
            the Property [at 14 Coddington Lane] . . . (the
            "Easement Area") . . . , which includes the Driveway,
            only for the purpose of providing ingress and egress
            from Coddington Lane to [16 Coddington Lane].

            2. The easement created hereby shall be subject to the
            following:

            (a) Existing rights and easements, including, but not
            limited to, those for access, drainage, utilities, water
            and sewer mains, pipelines and telephone lines located
            in the Easement Area.

Importantly, under Tide-Water Pipe Co., the scope of rights held by the

servient estate is not only defined by those reserved in the easement

agreement, but the scope is also limited by the extent of rights held by the

dominant estate.    See 42 N.J. at 604.     Under the terms of the easement

agreement, any actions by plaintiffs that unreasonably interfere with

defendants' use of the driveway for "ingress and egress from Coddington Lane

to [16 Coddington Lane]" exceed plaintiffs' rights. The law of easemen ts and

the terms of the easement agreement do not extend the rights of plaintiffs to

include perpetual monitoring of the easement when such monitoring interferes

with defendants' use of the driveway, as the trial judge found here.

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      We stress that the trial court judge did not hold—nor do we—that

plaintiffs have been divested of all rights to address activity that takes place on

the easement. Instead, the trial court judge undertook a delicate and nuanced

balance and carefully outlined that plaintiffs' ability to interfere with

defendants' exclusive use of the easement—as provided for in the access

easement agreement—is limited to only instances of activity that are legally

established as inappropriate.    Plaintiffs may not impose their opinions of

propriety on others, even if they retain rights to the land included in the

easement. Our ruling does not infringe on plaintiffs' rights to the easement;

instead, it addresses the "reciprocal right of each owner to reasonable use, and

a balancing of the conflicting interests," as is required under the laws

controlling easements. See Sans II, 29 N.J. at 449.

      We are not persuaded by plaintiffs' argument that, because the cameras

and speed detector are not physically located on the easement and do not have

a view of defendants' residence and "none of the cameras emit noise, exhibit

flashing light, or move in such a way as would distract motorists traveling on

the easement," then "the cameras do not interfere with [defendants'] exercise of

their exclusive rights and responsibilities under the [a]ccess [e]asement

[a]greement."

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                                      21
      The trial court judge found measurable impacts on defendants from

plaintiffs' monitoring of the easement with cameras and a speed detector. The

trial judge also found plaintiffs' surveillance of the easement inappropriate in

that it interfered with the willingness of delivery service drivers to travel up

defendants' driveway to make deliveries. Because plaintiffs' surveillance made

defendants and their invitees reluctant to fully utilize the driveway as they

would if the surveillance was not occurring, the trial court judge found that

plaintiffs' surveillance of the easement "unreasonably interferes with the use

and enjoyment [by] the [defendants]."

      When we determine whether a nuisance exists, "[t]he pertinent inquiry is

whether [a] defendant's activities materially and unreasonably interfere with

[a] plaintiff['s] comforts or existence, 'not according to exceptionally refined,

uncommon, or luxurious habits of living, but according to the simple tastes and

unaffected notions generally prevailing among plain people.'" Sans v. Ramsey

Golf & Country Club, Inc. (Sans I), 50 N.J. Super. 127, 134–35 (App. Div.

1958), aff'd, 29 N.J. 438 (1959) (quoting Stevens v. Rockport Granite Co., 104

N.E. 371, 373 (Mass. 1914)).        A judge will find that a party's activity

unreasonably interferes with another party's use and enjoyment of their

property when the "utility of the [offending party's] conduct" is outweighed by

                                                                          A-0200-22
                                     22
the "quantum of harm to the [other party]." See Rose v. Chaikin, 187 N.J.

Super. 210, 216 (Ch. Div. 1982) (citing Sans II, 29 N.J. at 449). Specifically,

in Rose v. Chaikin, a Chancery Division judge emphasized that one's "ability

to look to one's home as a refuge from the noise and stress associated with the

outside world is a right to be jealously guarded." 187 N.J. Super. at 219. The

Rose court found that, where "the benefits are relatively small and the

irritation is substantial," a private nuisance exists. Ibid.

       Similarly, in Sans II, our Supreme Court determined that the third tee of

a golf course created a nuisance for a family living nearby, relying in part on

the effect on that family of the almost constant presence of golfers outside

their backyard. 29 N.J. at 445-50. To be sure, the Court also considered the

physical threat that flying golf balls posed to the children of the family, but a

large portion of the Court's opinion addressed the effects of the near-constant

presence of golfers on the family's expectations of a "comfortable life in [their]

home and the normal use of their property." Id. at 449. The Court noted that

members of the family "have a consciousness that everything they say in or

around the house can be heard out on the path and so they are 'under a constant

strain and constant tension.' They 'never feel relaxed or free at home.'" Id. at

445.   The Court further determined that "an even more serious objection

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                                       23
involves plaintiffs' children," in that they were forced to be quiet in their own

backyard and their friends would not come over to play, due to their backyard's

proximity to an active golf tee and the golfers' requirement for absolute quiet

and stillness as they addressed the ball. Id. at 446-47. After balancing the

reasonable preference of the golf course owner to maintain the tee placement

to offer a desirable par 4 water-hole against the reasonable expectation of the

family to enjoy their home as a restful haven, the Court then found that the

family's "interests are paramount and demand reasonable protection." Id. at

450.

       For a party to be liable for a private nuisance, that party's conduct must

be the "legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the private use and

enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either (a) intentional and unreasonabl e,

or (b) unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules controlling

liability for negligent or reckless conduct, or for abnormally dangerous

conditions or activities." Restatement (Second) of Torts § 822; see also Ross,

222 N.J. at 505-06. Under this framework, the "number of ways in which the

manner of use of one's property can become so offensive to others as to

warrant judicial relief, although not unlawful [p]er se, is manifold." Sans I, 50

N.J. Super. at 133. A party's activity unreasonably interferes with another

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party's use and enjoyment of their property when the "utility of the [offending

party's] conduct" is outweighed by the "quantum of harm to the [other party]."

See Rose, 187 N.J. Super. at 216 (citing Sans II, 29 N.J. at 449).

      Under the facts of this case, surveilling the easement with infrared

cameras and a speed detector twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week,

serves no utility. The trial judge found the surveillance was for plaintiffs'

"own gratification" and was not based on any legally cognizable complaint, as

"plaintiffs have not established their right to monitor the speed" on the

easement. When weighed against its tangible effects on defendants—that is,

reluctance on the part of themselves and their invitees to fully utilize their

driveway due to intimidation—the balance of the equities clearly favors

defendants, such that plaintiffs' conduct can be deemed unreasonable as a

matter of law.

      Plaintiffs argue defendants have no right to expect privacy in the

easement and, therefore, "could not establish a prima facie case for invasion of

privacy." Not only is a prima facie case for invasion of privacy not necessary

to sustain a nuisance claim, but also defendants never relied on a claim of a

right to privacy in advancing their nuisance claim.

      We also note the court's imposition of a remedy was nuanced, measured,

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and not overbroad. We review an equitable remedy for an abuse of discretion,

determining "whether the court properly exercised its discretion in fashioning

the appropriate equitable remedy."      Todaro, 392 N.J. Super. at 456.       In a

nuisance claim, "any relief granted must result from a reasonable

accommodation of [the conflicting] equities to each other in the light of" the

totality of the circumstances. Sans II, 29 N.J. at 450. The relief granted here

did just that.

      Finally, "[t]he law does not concern itself with trifles, or seek to remedy

all the petty annoyances of everyday life in a civilized community . . . ." W.

Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 88 (5th ed.

1984). As explained in the Restatement (Second) of Torts,

             Life in organized society and especially in populous
             communities involves an unavoidable clash of
             individual interests. Practically all human activities[,]
             unless carried on in a wilderness[,] interfere to some
             extent with others or involve some risk of
             interference, and these interferences range from mere
             trifling annoyances to serious harms. It is an obvious
             truth that each individual in a community must put up
             with a certain amount of annoyance, inconvenience[,]
             and interference and must take a certain amount of
             risk in order that all may get on together. The very
             existence of organized society depends upon the
             principle of "give and take, live and let live," and
             therefore the law of torts does not attempt to impose
             liability or shift the loss in every case in which one
             person's conduct has some detrimental effect on

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            another. Liability for damages is imposed in those
            cases in which the harm or risk to one is greater than
            [they] ought to be required to bear under the
            circumstances.

            [§ 822 cmt. g (Am. L. Inst. 1979).]

Any remaining arguments raised by plaintiffs are without sufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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