Court Opinion

ID: 9555975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-15 18:11:59.402814+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:37:15.139101
License: Public Domain

J-S21016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

  IN RE: ADOPTION OF: P.B., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: J.H., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 322 MDA 2023

             Appeal from the Decree Entered February 8, 2023
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County Orphans’ Court at
                        No(s): 028-ADOPT-2022

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                     FILED: AUGUST 15, 2023

       Appellant J.H. (Mother) appeals1 from the order granting the petition

filed by the Cumberland County Children and Youth Services (CCCYS) to

involuntarily terminate Mother’s parental rights to P.B. (Child).       Mother’s

counsel, Joseph L. Hitchings, Esq. (Attorney Hitchings) has filed a petition to

withdraw and an Anders/Santiago2 brief.             We grant counsel’s motion to

withdraw and affirm the trial court’s order.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We note that although the order also terminated Father’s parental rights, he

is not a party to the instant appeal.

2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967); Commonwealth v. Santiago,

978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009); see also In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267, 1275 (Pa.
Super. 1992) (extending Anders to appeals involving the termination of
parental rights).
J-S21016-23

     The trial court summarized the facts underlying this case as follows:

     On October 25, 2021, [CCCYS] received a referral that the
     Newville Police Department received a tip regarding the Mother
     being in possession of an illegally obtained firearm. As a result,
     the Newville Police Department located Mother and identified the
     firearm, as well as methamphetamines, in the same bedroom that
     Mother was sharing with [Child], her one-month-old daughter.
     Mother admitted to using methamphetamines for the last three
     days along with [Child’s] father, [L.B. (Father)]. [] Father’s
     immediate whereabouts were unknown and Mother identified Jade
     Williams and Kaisha Lugo as a safety plan kinship resource for
     [Child]. On October 26, 2021, the [trial court] provided a verbal
     order for CCCYS to receive emergency protective custody of
     [Child] for placement into the emergency caregiver home of Jade
     Williams and Kaisha Lugo. Mother later tested positive for
     amphetamines and methamphetamines and admitted to CCCYS
     that she had been up for three days straight, using
     methamphetamines with the Father and her mother. They had
     been actively caring for [Child] while under the influence of
     methamphetamines.          Father had absconded from law
     enforcement on October 25, 2021, but came to CCCYS on October
     26, 2021. When asked to provide a urine sample he claimed he
     was unable to yield one, however, he admitted to using “Molly”
     [the crystal form of methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA)]
     three days prior while also caring for [Child]. While Father was at
     CCCYS, he was arrested on charges of second-degree felony
     possession of a firearm prohibited and second-degree felony
     receiving stolen property.

     On October 28, 2021, CCCYS filed a dependency petition alleging
     that [Child] was without proper parental care, control and
     supervision placing her health, safety and welfare at risk, as a
     result of her Mother admitting to using methamphetamines while
     actively caring for her, Mother testing positive for amphetamines
     and methamphetamines, Father admitting illegal drug use and his
     recent arrest.

     As a result of the verbal emergency protective custody order
     received on October 26, 2021, a shelter care hearing was held on
     October 28, 2021 before Hearing Officer Kate C. Lawrence, and it
     was ordered that [Child] remain in the legal and physical custody
     of CCCYS for continued placement with the emergency kinship
     caregivers (maternal great-aunt and her fiancé).           Mother

                                    -2-
J-S21016-23

     appeared for the shelter care hearing and did not oppose
     continued placement for shelter care purposes and Father was
     unable to appear because of his very recent arrest. The parties
     waived the 10-day requirement for the adjudicatory hearing to be
     held and that hearing did not occur until December 6, 2021 before
     Hearing Officer. Mother had since become incarcerated and did
     not participate in the hearing, while Father had been released, but
     was aware of a detainer that had been issued for his arrest out of
     Dauphin County so he only appeared remotely for the hearing.
     Following an adjudicatory hearing, it was determined that [Child]
     was a dependent child based upon clear and convincing evidence.
     Formal disposition was scheduled separately to allow CCCYS to
     further explore additional kinship care resources who had been
     identified while [Child] remained in the legal and physical custody
     of CCCYS for continued placement with the same emergency
     caregiver kinship home she was originally placed.

     On December 30, 2021, following the dispositional hearing,
     Hearing Officer Lawrence found [Child], who was only three
     months old, continued to be dependent while remaining in the
     legal and physical custody of CCCYS for placement in the same
     formally approved kinship home she had been residing. At the
     time of this hearing, Mother was no longer incarcerated, but did
     not appear for the hearing and had recently failed to report to a
     treatment-based setting so that she could participate in Overdose
     Intervention Court [(OIC)]. She had provided a positive drug
     screen for methamphetamines since her release. Her adult
     probation officer would have detained her if her whereabouts were
     known. Father was unable to be located, although mail sent to
     his last known address had not been returned.

     A permanency plan was developed for Mother on November 16,
     2021, and subsequently revised on January 7, 2022, June 3, 2022,
     September 19, 2022, and December 8, 2022. Mother was ordered
     to cooperate with Cumberland County Probation, maintain
     consistent visitation with [Child], obtain and maintain stable and
     appropriate housing, maintain frequent communication with
     CCCYS and provide any and all updates regarding goals to CCCYS,
     complete a parenting evaluation through ABC, complete a drug
     and alcohol evaluation and follow all recommendations from the
     evaluation, and participate in random drug screening through
     Restorative Sanctions.

     On May 13, 2022, CCCYS petitioned for the involuntary
     termination of Mother’s parental rights (henceforth first

                                    -3-
J-S21016-23

       involuntary termination petition).      A hearing on the first
       involuntary termination petition was scheduled for June 14, 2022.
       At the time the first involuntary termination petition was filed,
       Mother had had very minimal contact with CCCYS and other than
       some virtual visitation on or around December 2021 while she was
       incarcerated, no contact with [Child]. Mother’s whereabouts had
       been unknown following her release from Cumberland County
       Prison on December 21, 2021 until she was picked up and
       reincarcerated there on April 5, 2022. She had not completed any
       of her permanency plan goals and had not obtained a drug and
       alcohol evaluation, submitted to random drug screens or
       completed a parenting evaluation with ABC. On the date of the
       scheduled termination of parental rights hearing, it was
       determined that Mother was at Pyramid, an inpatient drug and
       alcohol facility. Based on this update, CCCYS requested that the
       first involuntary termination petition be withdrawn without
       prejudice. There were no objections to this request by any party
       or the [guardian ad litem (GAL)] and the petition was dismissed
       without prejudice by order dated June 14, 2022.

       On December 5, 2022, CCCYS again petitioned for the involuntary
       termination of Mother’s parental rights (henceforth second
       involuntary termination petition).   A hearing on the second
       involuntary termination petition was scheduled for January 24,
       2023. As a result of being unable to complete the hearing on
       January 24, 2023, the hearing was reconvened on February 8,
       2023 for the purposes of having the remaining witnesses testify
       and presentation of remaining evidence.[3]

Trial Ct. Op., 3/7/23, at 1-5 (unpaginated).

       Ultimately, the trial court granted CCCYS’s petition terminate Mother’s

parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a) (2), (5), (8), and (b) and

to change Child’s permanency goal to adoption. Mother filed a timely notice

____________________________________________

3 We note that the prior to the termination hearings, the trial court appointed

separate counsel to represent Child’s best interests and legal interests. See
Trial Ct. Order, 4/20/22. At the termination hearings, Tami B. Blackburn,
Esq., served as Child’s GAL and Cindy Martin, Esq., appeared as Child’s legal
counsel.

                                           -4-
J-S21016-23

of appeal and complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court issued a

Rule 1925(a) opinion explaining its reasons for terminating Mother’s parental

rights.

      On appeal, Attorney Hitchings has filed a petition to withdraw and an

Anders/Santiago brief that identifies the following issues:

      1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an
         error of law when it found, despite a lack of clear and
         convincing evidence, that sufficient grounds existed for a
         termination of [Mother’s] parental rights to her child under
         Section 2511(a) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a).

      2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an
         error of law in terminating [Mother’s] parental rights when the
         conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
         children no longer existed or were substantially eliminated,
         thus contravening sections 2511(a) and (b) of the Adoption
         Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a), (b).

      3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and committed an
         error of law in determining it would be in [C]hild’s best interest
         to have parental rights terminated, when [Mother], if given
         sufficient time, would be ready, willing and able to parent
         [C]hild and provide for her needs, thus contravening Section
         2511(b) of the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).

Anders/Santiago Brief at 3-4 (some formatting altered).

      When faced with an Anders/Santiago brief, this Court may not review

the merits of any possible underlying issues without first examining counsel’s

request to withdraw. See In re X.J., 105 A.3d 1, 3 (Pa. Super. 2014). As

this Court has stated:

      To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must:

          1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that, after
          making a conscientious examination of the record, counsel

                                       -5-
J-S21016-23

        has determined that the appeal would be frivolous; 2)
        furnish a copy of the [Anders] brief to the [appellant]; and
        3) advise the [appellant] that he or she has the right to
        retain private counsel or raise additional arguments that the
        [appellant] deems worthy of the court’s attention.

     With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel
     inform the appellant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s
     withdrawal, this Court has held that counsel must “attach to their
     petition to withdraw a copy of the letter sent to their client
     advising him or her of their rights.”

In re J.D.H., 171 A.3d 903, 907 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted).

     Additionally, counsel must file a brief that meets the following

requirements established by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Santiago:

     (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
     citations to the record;

     (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
     supports the appeal;

     (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and

     (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
     frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
     controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the
     conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

In re Adoption of M.C.F., 230 A.3d 1217, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citation

omitted).

     “After an appellate court receives an Anders brief and is satisfied that

counsel has complied with the aforementioned requirements, the Court then

must undertake an independent examination of the record to determine

whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.” In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237

(Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Our independent review is not limited

                                    -6-
J-S21016-23

to the issues discussed by counsel, but extends to “additional, non-frivolous

issues” that may have been overlooked by counsel. J.D.H., 171 A.3d at 908

(citation omitted). An appeal is frivolous when it lacks any basis in law or

fact. See M.C.F., 230 A.3d at 1220; accord Santiago, 978 A.2d at 356.

       Instantly, Attorney Hitchings has filed a petition to withdraw that states

that he conscientiously reviewed the record and determined that the appeal

is frivolous.   He has also provided this Court with a certificate of service

demonstrating that he served Mother with a copy of the motion to withdraw

and a letter advising Mother of her right to proceed pro se or raise any

additional points that Mother deemed worthy of consideration. Additionally,

Attorney Hitchings’ Anders/Santiago brief provides a summary of the

essential facts and procedural history of the case. Counsel also sets forth his

reasons for concluding that Mother’s appeal is frivolous. For these reasons,

we conclude that Mother’s counsel has substantially complied with the

technical requirements set forth above, and we proceed to an independent

review of counsel’s assessment that the appeals are frivolous because there

was sufficient evidence to terminate Mother’s parental rights.4 See S.M.B.,

856 A.2d at 1237-38.

                         Termination of Parental Rights

       The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
       requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
       credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
____________________________________________

4 Mother has not filed a brief in response to her counsel’s petition to withdraw

and Anders/Santiago brief.

                                           -7-
J-S21016-23

      by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
      courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
      or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
      of   discretion    only   upon     demonstration      of    manifest
      unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
      court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
      the record would support a different result. We have previously
      emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
      observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks

omitted). “[T]he trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and

resolve conflicts in the evidence.”    In re Q.R.D., 214 A.3d 233, 239 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

      Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated analysis.

      Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
      seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
      that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
      termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
      determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
      or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
      the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
      needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
      of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
      concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
      parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
      of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We note

that we need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section

2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), to affirm an order terminating parental

rights. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).

                                      -8-
J-S21016-23

                           Section 2511(a)(2)

     We first address the involuntary termination of Mother’s parental rights

under Section 2511(a)(2) because it is dispositive.       See id.       Section

2511(a)(2) provides as follows:

     § 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

     (a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
     be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
     grounds:

                                  *    *    *

        (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
        or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
        essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
        his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
        causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
        will not be remedied by the parent.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).

     To satisfy the requirements of [Section] 2511(a)(2), the moving
     party must prove (1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
     neglect or refusal; (2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or
     refusal caused the child to be without essential parental care,
     control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes of the incapacity,
     abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied. The
     grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct,
     but concern parental incapacity that cannot be remedied.

In re C.M.K., 203 A.3d 258, 262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations and quotation

marks omitted).

     Further, this Court has explained:

     The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section
     2511(a)(2), due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied,
     are “not limited to affirmative misconduct.” In re A.L.D., 797
     A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002).

                                      -9-
J-S21016-23

        Unlike subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not
        emphasize a parent’s refusal or failure to perform parental
        duties, but instead emphasizes the child’s present and
        future need for essential parental care, control or
        subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being.
        Therefore, the language in subsection (a)(2) should not be
        read to compel courts to ignore a child’s need for a stable
        home and strong, continuous parental ties, which the policy
        of restraint in state intervention is intended to protect. This
        is particularly so where disruption of the family has already
        occurred and there is no reasonable prospect for reuniting
        it.

     In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2008) (internal citations
     and quotation marks omitted).

     Thus, while “sincere efforts to perform parental duties,” can
     preserve parental rights under subsection (a)(1), those same
     efforts may be insufficient to remedy parental incapacity under
     subsection (a)(2). “Parents are required to make diligent efforts
     toward the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental
     responsibilities.” [A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340]. A “parent’s vow to
     cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the
     necessity or availability of services, may properly be rejected as
     untimely or disingenuous.” Id.

In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1117-18 (Pa. Super. 2010) (some citations

omitted and formatting altered).

     Here, the trial court noted that although Mother was given an additional

six months to remedy the issues that led to Child’s removal after CCCYS

initially filed a termination petition in May of 2022, Mother failed to

demonstrate that she had “taken the necessary steps to be able to provide

[Child] with a safe, permanent, and stable home.” N.T. Hr’g, 2/8/23, at 44.

     In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained:

     At the time of the January 24, 2023 and February 8, 2023
     termination of parental rights hearing, [Child] was sixteen months

                                    - 10 -
J-S21016-23

     old and had been out of parental care for almost fifteen of those
     sixteen months.

     At the time of the filing of the second involuntary termination
     petition, [filed on December 6, 2022,] Mother was again
     incarcerated and had not completed any of the following court
     ordered goals, as follows:

       a. Cooperate with Cumberland County Probation: Mother
          had multiple periods of incarceration as a result of her
          failure to abide by probationary requirements;

       b. Maintain consistent visitation with [Child]: Mother’s
          visitation was extremely inconsistent as she had no
          visitation from December 21, 2021 to April 5, 2022 and
          guided weekly visitation through ABC from July 7, 2022
          through October 8, 2022 with that weekly visitation being
          disrupted due to her incarceration on or around October
          16, 2022;

       c. Obtain and maintain stable and appropriate housing:
          Mother has never demonstrated an ability to maintain
          stable and appropriate housing for [Child];

       d. Maintain frequent communication with CCCYS and
          provide any and all updates regarding goals to CCCYS:
          Mother’s communication with CCCYS was never frequent
          as she had no contact with CCCYS between January
          2022-April 2022 and her communication with CCCYS
          beginning in April 2022 was often disrupted due to her
          frequent    probation   violations  and   periods   of
          incarceration;

       e. Complete a parenting evaluation through ABC: Mother
          completed the parenting evaluation through ABC, but
          was never able to successfully complete all the
          recommendations from that evaluation to include TIPS
          parenting education, supervised visitation, mental health
          counseling, intensive    outpatient counseling and
          attending AA/NA meetings;

       f. Complete a drug and alcohol evaluation and follow all
          recommendations     from    the    evaluation:    Mother
          completed a drug and alcohol evaluation while at Pyramid
          but  has    not   successfully    completed     all  the
          recommendations from that evaluation as a result of her

                                  - 11 -
J-S21016-23

           non-compliance with the rules at her recovery/sober
           houses revocation from Overdose Intervention Court and
           resultant incarceration;

        g. Participate in random drug screening through Restorative
           Sanctions: Mother only minimally participated in drug
           screening through Restorative Sanctions as a result of
           frequent incarcerations and although she had negative
           screens between June 2022 — August 2022, she tested
           positive for methamphetamines on August 9, 2022 and
           missed a drug screen on October 15, 2022.

     The kinship parents are an adoptive resource and have cared for
     [Child] all but thirty-three days of her life and since she was first
     placed on October 26, 2021.

                                *     *      *

     Mother has not shown she has the ability to provide safe and
     stable care for [Child]. All of [Child’s] day to day needs and care
     have been provided by her kinship care parents, but for one month
     of her life. During that one month while she was living with her
     parents, both Mother and Father admitted to using illegal
     substances while actively trying to care for [Child]. Since [Child’s]
     placement into CCCYS legal and physical custody, Mother has not
     completed a single permanency plan goal. Bearing in mind the
     utmost importance for [Child] to have permanency, CCCYS filed
     the first involuntary termination petition back in May of 2022.
     Mother appeared and made a compelling argument for additional
     time to work on her reunification goals as she had finally initiated
     drug and alcohol treatment and was residing at an inpatient
     facility. Mother was given yet another opportunity to demonstrate
     her ability to provide [Child] the safe, stable and permanent home
     she so deserves. Fast forward an additional six months from the
     June 2022 hearing scheduled on the first involuntary termination
     petition, and Mother was nowhere closer to completing any of her
     reunification goals and/or demonstrating that she can provide
     [Child] with a safe, stable and permanent home.

     [Child] remains in the same safe, stable environment with all her
     needs being met by the kinship caregivers who are dependable
     and dedicated to the promotion of her healthy development. She
     remains in that loving environment where she has lived for all but
     thirty-three days of her life.

                                    - 12 -
J-S21016-23

      Father and Mother have been unable to remedy the deficiencies
      resulting in the need for ongoing placement and will not be able
      to remedy the deficiencies in a reasonable amount of time. [Child]
      has been in the custody of CCCYS for more than fifteen months
      with the conditions which led to her removal continuing to exist.
      The record is replete with other equally clear and convincing
      evidence of Mother’s incapacity to meet [C]hild’s needs and
      promote her welfare. Previous additional time and opportunities
      provided to Mother to remedy the reasons for placement were not
      seized upon and proven futile.

Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8; 10-11 (unpaginated) (formatting altered).

      Following our review, we find no abuse of discretion or error of law in

the trial court’s conclusion that CCCYS presented clear and convincing

evidence to support termination of Mother’s parental rights under Section

2511(a)(2). See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27; see also In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d

273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).

      Second, the record supports the trial court’s findings of fact and its

conclusion that the conditions leading to Child’s placement continued to exist.

See T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267; In re I.J., 972 A.2d 5, 11 (Pa. Super. 2009).

The trial court credited caseworker Ashley Vilka’s testimony that Mother

minimally complied with her objectives and ultimately failed to complete them.

Specifically, Ms. Vilkas testified that Mother had made only “minimal progress”

with addressing her drug and alcohol issues. See N.T. Hr’g, 1/24/23, at 35.

Although Ms. Vilkas acknowledged that Mother only had one positive drug

screen since she started testing in June of 2022, she noted that Mother had

only participated in testing during the five-month period before she was

revoked from OIC, which did not include the periods of time when Mother was

                                    - 13 -
J-S21016-23

incarcerated.   Id. at 58-59.   Parent educator Carrie Shanahan stated that

although Mother completed four of ten TIPS sessions, Mother ultimately

stopped attending those sessions after she was incarcerated for the second

time. Id. at 13-15. Ms. Vilkas rated Mother’s compliance with the parenting

goal as “minimal compliance, minimal progress” and stated that Mother’s

inconsistency with visitation “made it difficult to maintain her progress.” Id.

at 29. Finally, Ms. Vilkas stated that Mother had made “no progress” with

procuring appropriate housing. Id. at 27.

      Under these circumstances, the record supports the trial court’s

conclusion that Mother’s continued incapacity has caused Child to be without

essential parental care and that the causes of that incapacity cannot or will

not be remedied. See C.M.K., 203 A.3d at 262; Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1117-18.

Although we recognize that Mother attempted to complete at least some of

her objectives, her efforts were insufficient to preserve her parental rights

under Section 2511(a)(2). See id. at 1117 (stating that a parent’s “efforts

may   be   insufficient   to   remedy   parental   incapacity   under   [Section

2511(a)(2)]”); see also E.A.P., 944 A.2d at 82 (explaining that “the language

in subsection (a)(2) should not be read to compel courts to ignore a child’s

need for a stable home and strong, continuous parental ties,” particularly

when “disruption of the family has already occurred and there is no reasonable

prospect for reuniting it” (formatting altered) (citations omitted)).

      Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion by the trial court in

determining that Mother’s conduct warrants termination under Section

                                     - 14 -
J-S21016-23

2511(a)(2). See S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27; see also R.N.J., 985 A.2d at 276.

Accordingly, we agree with Attorney Hitchings’ assessment that a challenge

to the trial court’s ruling under Section 2511(a)(2)5 lacks any basis in the facts

or law and would be frivolous.

                                   Section 2511(b)

       We next review the trial court’s conclusion that involuntarily terminating

Mother’s parental rights best serves Child’s developmental, emotional, and

physical needs and welfare pursuant to Section 2511(b), which states:

       (b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights
       of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
       physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
       of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
       environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
       income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
       control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
       to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
       efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
       which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
       filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). We have explained:

       While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
       aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
       nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
       court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.

       [I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally
       emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider
       the intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability
       the child might have with the foster parent. Additionally, ... the

____________________________________________

5 We reiterate that we need only agree with the trial court as to one subsection

of Section 2511(a). B.L.W., 843 A.2d at 384.

                                          - 15 -
J-S21016-23

     trial court should consider the importance of continuity of
     relationships . . .

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting

In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011)).

     Our Supreme Court has stated that “if the child has any bond with the

biological parent, the court must conduct an analysis of that bond, which ‘is

not always an easy task.’” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. In K.T., our Supreme

Court explained that “a court conducting the Section 2511(b) needs and

welfare analysis must consider more than proof of an adverse or detrimental

impact from severance of the parental bond.” Interest of K.T., --- A.3d ---,

2023 WL 4092986 at *18 (Pa. filed June 21, 2023). Indeed, the parent-child

bond analysis must include “a determination of whether the bond is necessary

and beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the

child's developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” Id.

     “Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also

consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they

have a bond with their foster parents.”      T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268 (citation

omitted).   More specifically, courts must consider “the child’s need for

permanency and length of time in foster care[;] whether the child is in a

preadoptive home and bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster

home meets the child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs,

including intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and stability.”

K.T., 2023 WL 4092986 at *18.

                                    - 16 -
J-S21016-23

         In weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b),

“courts must keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” T.S.M., 71

A.3d at 269. “Children are young for a scant number of years, and we have

an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When courts fail .

. . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted children.” Id.

         Here, the trial court explained that Child is “sit[ting] and wait[ing] for a

permanent and safe and stable home and continues to live with her kinship

parents, the only parents that she truly has ever known” and that “[t]o deprive

her of making that her permanent home and to give her biological parents yet

another chance and more time is not in her best interest. . . . it is in [her]

best interest for her goal to be changed to adoption[.]” See N.T. Hr’g, 2/8/23,

at 45.

         Based on our review of the record, we discern no basis to disturb the

trial court’s finding that termination of Mother’s parental rights would best

serve Child’s needs and welfare. See K.T., 2023 WL 4092986 at *13; T.S.M.,

71 A.3d at 267. Ms. Vilkas testified that although Mother had participated in

some visits with Child, Child does not share a parental bond with Mother and

there would be no negative impact on Child if Mother’s rights were terminated.

N.T. Hr’g, 1/24/23, at 44-45. Ms. Vilkas also explained that Child is bonded

with her foster parents, who have cared for Child since she was only one

month old, and that Child was “happy,” “well adjusted,” and “comfortable” in

their care. Id. at 69-70. Ms. Vilkas testified that she has seen interactions

between Child and her foster parents and those interactions have been “very

                                        - 17 -
J-S21016-23

positive.” Id. at 44. Likewise, foster care specialist Christine Harris stated:

“[Child is] very bonded to the resource family, and she interacts appropriately

with them. They are very loving and nurturing towards her. It’s a typical

parent/child relationship.” Id. at 72. For these reasons, we agree with the

assessment of Mother’s counsel that a challenge to the trial court’s ruling

pursuant to Section 2511(b) was frivolous.

      In sum, we conclude that Mother’s counsel properly determined that the

appeals from the trial court’s orders terminating Mother’s parental rights to

the children were frivolous.   Further, our independent review reveals no

additional, non-frivolous issues in these appeals. See J.D.H., 171 A.3d at

908. Therefore, we grant Attorney Hitchings’ petition to withdraw and affirm

the order terminating Mother’s parental rights.

      Order affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/15/2023

                                    - 18 -
J-S21016-23

              - 19 -