Court Opinion

ID: 9965680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 07:13:11.856449+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:32.775210
License: Public Domain

In The

                               Court of Appeals

                   Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
                          ________________

                             NO. 09-23-00184-CR
                             ________________

                   DOMINICK EARL PARKS, Appellant

                                       V.

                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
________________________________________________________________________

                    On Appeal from the 1A District Court
                           Tyler County, Texas
                          Trial Cause No. 13,985
________________________________________________________________________

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Appellant Dominick Earl Parks (“Parks”) pleaded guilty to the third-degree

felony offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. See Tex. Penal Code

Ann. § 46.04(a). He also pleaded true to two enhancements for prior felony

convictions, making him a habitual offender and increasing the punishment range

from twenty-five to ninety-nine years. See id. § 12.42(d) (providing punishment

range of twenty-five to ninety-nine years for habitual offenders). The trial court

placed him on deferred adjudication community supervision. The State moved to

                                        1
adjudicate after Parks violated multiple terms of his community supervision. After a

hearing, the trial court adjudicated him guilty and orally pronounced a sentence of

forty-five years of confinement. The trial court’s written judgment also included a

$2,500.00 fine, court costs of $290.00, and reimbursement fees of $515.00. We will

affirm the trial court’s judgment as modified for the reasons discussed below.

      Counsel filed a brief containing his professional evaluation that after careful

review of the record, he could find no arguable grounds on which to appeal and

moved to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967); High v.

State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). After Parks’s counsel filed his

brief, we granted an extension of time for Parks to file a pro se response. Parks has

not responded.

      The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that we need not address the merits

of issues raised in an Anders brief. Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826–27 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2005). Rather, an appellate court may determine: (1) “that the appeal is

wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it has reviewed the record and

finds no reversible error[;]” or (2) “that arguable grounds for appeal exist and remand

the cause to the trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief the

issues.” Id.

      Upon receiving an Anders brief, a court must conduct a full examination of

the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488

U.S. 75, 80 (1988) (citing Anders, 386 U.S. at 744). We have reviewed the entire
                                          2
record and counsel’s brief and have found no reversible error, and we conclude the

appeal is wholly frivolous. See Bledsoe, 178 S.W.3d at 827–28. Therefore, we find

it unnecessary to order appointment of new counsel to re-brief the

appeal. Cf. Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).

                            Modifying the Judgment

      We have the power to reform or modify a judgment in Anders cases to address

non-reversible error and to affirm the judgment as modified. See Tex. R. App. P.

43.2(b) (allowing appellate court to modify trial court’s judgment and affirm as

modified); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (noting a court

of appeals may modify the lower court’s judgment by correcting or reforming it);

Bray v. State, 179 S.W.3d 725, 729 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)

(exercising authority to reform judgment in Anders case and affirming trial court’s

judgment). Our review of the record reveals the trial court’s judgment must be

modified in several respects, as discussed below.

1. Fine Not Orally Pronounced

      While the order deferring adjudication and placing Parks on community

supervision included a fine, the trial court’s subsequent adjudication of guilt set

aside the order deferring adjudication, including any fines or restitution. See Taylor

v. State, 131 S.W.3d 497, 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). When the trial court

adjudicated Parks guilty, its oral pronouncement did not include the $2,500.00 fine,

but the written judgment did. A trial court must orally pronounce a defendant’s
                                          3
sentence in the defendant’s presence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.03, §

1(a); Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 500. Fines are punishment and generally must be orally

pronounced. See Armstrong v. State, 340 S.W.3d 759, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

The trial court’s oral pronouncement controls over its written judgment to the extent

they conflict. Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 502. We conclude that since the trial court did

not include a fine in its oral pronouncement of Parks’s sentence at the hearing on the

Motion to Adjudicate, it should not have included the $2,500.00 fine in the

judgment. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.03, § 1(a); Armstrong, 340

S.W.3d at 767; Taylor, 131 S.W.3d at 500, 502.

2. Court Costs and Reimbursement Fees

      Our review of the record also reveals that the written judgment included

$515.00 in reimbursement fees and $290.00 in court costs. The record shows the

trial court found Parks indigent and appointed counsel. Court costs are not punitive

and do not have to be included in the oral pronouncement as a precondition to their

inclusion in the written judgment. Weir v. State, 278 S.W.3d 364, 367 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009). The imposition of court costs does not alter the punishment range, is

authorized by statute, and is generally not conditioned on a defendant’s ability to

pay. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.16; Armstrong, 340 S.W.3d at 767.

“Only statutorily authorized court costs may be assessed against a criminal

defendant[.]” Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 389 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). Costs

cannot be imposed “for a service not performed or for a service for which a cost is
                                          4
not expressly provided by law.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 103.002. Court

costs are supported if there is a bill of costs denominating the amount assessed and

if those costs are authorized by statute. See id. arts. 103.001–.002. Even so, certain

reimbursement fees, including attorney’s fees, cannot be assessed against an indigent

defendant unless it is subsequently determined he has financial resources to pay. See

id. arts. 26.04(p) (a defendant determined to be indigent is presumed to remain

indigent), 26.05(g) (providing for reimbursement of fees if the judge determines

defendant has financial resources); Cates v. State, 402 S.W.3d 250, 252 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013) (concluding judgment should be reformed to remove assessment of

attorney’s fees because there was no finding in the record an indigent defendant

could repay costs of court-appointed counsel).

      Since the record here did not contain a bill of costs, we requested one. See

Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 103.006 (requiring a bill of costs); see also Tex. R.

App. P. 34.5(c)(1) (allowing for supplementation of clerk’s record if relevant item

was omitted). Yet a bill of costs was not provided showing the court costs or

reimbursement fees were statutorily authorized, so they are unsupported by the

record. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 103.001–.002; Johnson, 423 S.W.3d at

389. There is also nothing in the record showing Parks’s indigent status changed, so

to the extent the “reimbursement fees” depended upon his ability to pay, we conclude

these are likewise unsupported by the record for that reason. See Tex. Code Crim.

                                          5
Proc. Ann. arts. 26.04(p), 26.05(g); Cates, 402 S.W.3d at 252. Thus, we are

modifying the judgment to delete the court costs and reimbursement fees.

3. Statutory Section

      We note the written judgment recites the “Statute for Offense” as section

“46.04(c)” of the Texas Penal Code, which concerns illegal possession of a firearm

when a domestic violence protective order is in place. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §

46.04(c). Parks pleaded guilty to, and the trial court found him guilty of, the third-

degree felony offense of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon under section

46.04(a). See id. § 46.04(a). To correct this clerical error, we modify the trial court’s

judgment to reflect the correct statute of the offense as section “46.04(a)” of the

Texas Penal Code.

                                     Conclusion

      We modify the trial court’s judgment by deleting the $2,500.00 fine,

reimbursement fees of $515.00, and court costs of $290.00. We also modify the trial

court’s judgment to reflect the correct Penal Code section, 46.04(a). We affirm the

trial court’s judgment as modified. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(b); Bigley, 865 S.W.2d

at 27; Bray, 179 S.W.3d at 729.

      AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED.
                                                      W. SCOTT GOLEMON
                                                           Chief Justice
Submitted on April 17, 2024
Opinion Delivered May 1, 2024
Do Not Publish
Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.
                                           6