Court Opinion

ID: 9894931
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 17:00:54.511484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:11:04.510110
License: Public Domain

FILED
                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                               NOV 3 2023
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                            U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

                            FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RRAFMAN KOCI,                                    No.     19-72547

              Petitioner,                        Agency No. A075-682-288

 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

              Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                             Submitted July 25, 2022**
                               Pasadena, California

Before:      TASHIMA, WARDLAW***, and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges.

      In 2008, we denied Rrafman Koci’s petition for review of a Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
            The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision without
oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2)(C).

      ***    Judge Wardlaw was drawn to replace Judge Watford, who resigned
his judgeship shortly after this case was submitted for decision.
judge’s denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief

under the Convention Against Torture. Koci v. Mukasey, 270 F. App’x 644 (9th

Cir. 2008). In 2017, we denied Petitioner’s third motion to reopen on the grounds

that it was untimely and successive and that Petitioner failed to demonstrate a

material change of conditions in Albania. Koci v. Sessions, 708 F. App’x 323, 324

(9th Cir. 2017); see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2), (c)(3)(ii) (allowing a party to file only

one motion to reopen and requiring the motion to be filed “no later than 90 days

after the date on which the final administrative decision was rendered,” unless the

motion is “based on changed circumstances arising in the country of nationality . . .

, if such evidence is material and was not available and could not have been

discovered or presented at the previous hearing”).

      Petitioner has now filed a motion to terminate removal proceedings or,

alternatively, to reopen those proceedings, relying on new precedent, Pereira v.

Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018). The BIA, construing the motion as an untimely

motion to reopen, found Pereira inapplicable and declined to exercise its discretion

to sua sponte reopen proceedings.

      We review the BIA’s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion.

See Dominguez v. Barr, 975 F.3d 725, 734 (9th Cir. 2020) (denial of motion to

terminate); Aguilar Fermin v. Barr, 958 F.3d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 2020) (denial of

                                           2
motion to reopen). Petitioner has failed to establish that the BIA abused its

discretion.

      We have limited jurisdiction to review the BIA’s denial of a motion to

reopen sua sponte, reviewing only to determine whether the BIA based its decision

on legal or constitutional error. See Lona v. Barr, 958 F.3d 1225, 1227 (9th Cir.

2020) (“BIA denials of sua sponte relief premised on legal or constitutional error

remain the ‘one narrow exception’ to our rule that the agency’s sua sponte

authority is not subject to judicial review.” (quoting Menendez-Gonzalez v. Barr,

929 F.3d 1113, 1116 (9th Cir. 2019))). Petitioner has failed to raise any colorable

legal or constitutional errors in the BIA’s denial of sua sponte reopening. We

therefore lack jurisdiction to review that denial of relief. See id. at 1235 (where the

BIA’s denial of sua sponte relief “was untainted by legal or constitutional error . . .

there is nothing left for us to review”).

      1.      Petitioner contends that his motion to reopen should be considered

timely because equitable tolling applies to the 90-day deadline in 8 C.F.R. §

1003.2(c)(2). See Iturribarria v. INS, 321 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (“This

court . . . recognizes equitable tolling of deadlines and numerical limits on motions

to reopen or reconsider during periods when a petitioner is prevented from filing

because of deception, fraud, or error . . . .”). Petitioner argues that the notice to

                                            3
appear (“NTA”) was defective under 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a)(1)(G)(i) because it failed

to specify adequately the place of his removal hearing, as required by Pereira, thus

making him eligible for new, previously unavailable relief.1 See Lona, 958 F.3d at

1230-31 (“Although claims for equitable tolling typically arise in conjunction with

claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, claims based on changes in the law are

not unheard of, nor are they prohibited.” (citation omitted)).

      Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the NTA did contain the correct address

of the immigration court where the hearing was to be held – 606 S. Olive Street,

15th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90014-0000,which the government points out is

“identical to the address provided on the Department of Justice website for the Los

Angeles Immigration Court.” Although the specific courtroom on the 16th Floor

was not included in the NTA, this does not render the NTA defective within the

meaning of Pereira or Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474 (2021), which both

discussed NTAs that failed to specify either a time or place of the proceedings.

Instead, the address might be characterized as somewhat incomplete. Nonetheless,

      1
             The NTA notified Petitioner that his hearing would be held at “606 S.
Olive Street, 15th Floor, Los Angeles, CA 90014-0000.” This is the address of the
immigration court; however, Petitioner pointed out in his brief to the BIA that
“there are no immigration judges on the 15th Floor.” Subsequent hearing notices
used the same address, including the 15th Floor designation, but added another
line, which states “16th Floor, Courtroom ‘O.’”
                                          4
it did direct Petitioner to the official address of the immigration court. Petitioner

accordingly is not entitled to relief under Pereira and has not established that he is

entitled to equitable tolling. We therefore deny the petition as to this argument.

      2.     In support of his request for sua sponte reopening, Petitioner contends

that jurisdiction never vested in the immigration court because the NTA was

defective for failure to comply with the requirement in 8 C.F.R. § 1003.15(b)(6)

that the NTA include “[t]he address of the Immigration Court where the Service

will file the . . . [NTA].” See Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2110 (holding that an NTA

“that does not inform a noncitizen when and where to appear for removal

proceedings is not a ‘notice to appear under section 1229(a)’ and therefore does not

trigger the stop-time rule” for purposes of accrual of continuous physical presence

to be eligible for cancellation of removal). Thus, the argument goes, the IJ lacked

jurisdiction, and the BIA should have terminated removal proceedings and abused

its discretion in failing to do so. However, “Pereira articulated the requirements

for an NTA in regards to the stop-time rule under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)(A)” and

“did not address the requirements for an NTA to vest an immigration court with

jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.14.” Aguilar Fermin, 958 F.3d at 893. The

alleged defect in the NTA accordingly did not deprive the immigration court of

jurisdiction. Id. at 895. The BIA’s denial of discretionary relief as to his claim is

                                           5
accordingly free from legal or constitutional error, and we therefore lack

jurisdiction to review it. Lona, 958 F.3d at 1235.

      3.     Petitioner contends that he has established eligibility for cancellation

of removal because the defective NTA did not trigger the stop-time rule. He

argues that, in denying sua sponte reopening, the BIA committed legal error in

finding that the NTA “contained a typographical error rather than a defect.”

      Contrary to the government’s contention, the subsequent notices of hearing

cannot correct a deficient NTA, if the NTA is indeed defective. See Niz-Chavez,

141 S. Ct. at 1479–86 (holding that all the requisite information regarding the

hearing must be contained in a single NTA). Nonetheless, as discussed above, we

conclude that the NTA is not defective under Pereira. The BIA’s denial of

discretionary relief as to this claim is accordingly free from legal or constitutional

error, and we therefore lack jurisdiction to review it. Lona, 958 F.3d at 1235.

                                      •    !    •

      For the reasons stated above, the petition for review is DENIED IN PART

AND DISMISSED IN PART.

                                           6