Court Opinion

ID: 9404353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-22 20:00:42.302738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:13.338732
License: Public Domain

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
                             Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
                                    File Name: 23a0129p.06

                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

                                                          ┐
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                          │
                                 Plaintiff-Appellee,      │
                                                           >        No. 22-1970
                                                          │
       v.                                                 │
                                                          │
 ANDREW DAMARR MORRIS,                                    │
                              Defendant-Appellant.        │
                                                          ┘

                        Appeal from the United States District Court
                   for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
                    No. 1:07-cr-00193-1—Janet T. Neff, District Judge.

                             Decided and Filed: June 22, 2023

               Before: MOORE, McKEAGUE, and MATHIS, Circuit Judges.
                               _________________

                                         COUNSEL

ON BRIEF: Lawrence J. Phelan, LAWRENCE J. PHELAN, Walker, Michigan, for Appellant.
Nils R. Kessler, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, Grand Rapids, Michigan, for
Appellee.

      MATHIS, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which MOORE, J., joined.
McKEAGUE, J. (pp. 12–14), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and in the
judgment.
                                   _________________

                                          OPINION
                                   _________________

      MATHIS, Circuit Judge. This is the second time this case comes before us. The district
court previously found Andrew Morris guilty of twelve supervised-release violations and
sentenced him to a below-Guidelines sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment. He appealed, and
 No. 22-1970                         United States v. Morris                             Page 2

we vacated the sentence and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing in light of
Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817 (2021). On remand, the district court sentenced Morris
to the same sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment, even though that sentence now exceeds the
high end of the advisory Guidelines range by 21 months. Morris appeals again, arguing that his
sentence is procedurally and substantively unreasonable. For the reasons that follow, we vacate
Morris’s sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing.

                                                I.

       In 2008, Morris was convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B) (“Count One”), and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (“Count Two”). He
was sentenced to 156 months’ imprisonment, followed by two concurrent five-year terms of
supervised release. Morris began his supervised-release term on June 2, 2016.

       In January 2021, the United States Probation Office charged him with seventeen
violations of supervised release after he threatened a victim with a pneumatic pistol and led
police on a high-speed chase through a residential neighborhood with methamphetamine in his
possession. At the time, the most serious violation conduct was resisting and obstructing police,
then classified as a Grade A violation. With a criminal history category of VI, Morris’s advisory
Guidelines range was 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment.

       At the revocation hearing, the government called three witnesses, Rayquan Reese-Hunter,
Officer Steve Dibble, and Probation Officer Terry Smith. Reese-Hunter testified that he flagged
down an officer after Morris threatened him with a black semiautomatic pistol. Officer Dibble
testified that following Reese-Hunter’s report, he stopped Morris’s vehicle, but Morris refused
commands to show his hands and then sped off through a residential neighborhood, driving
nearly 70 mph and disregarding traffic signals. Officer Dibble also testified that he saw Morris
throw an object wrapped in cellophane and a black pistol—later recovered by a Michigan State
Police dive team—into a river. As the chase continued, Officer Dibble saw Morris throw
additional cellophane packages out of the window. Once officers stopped Morris, they recovered
methamphetamine, marijuana, $420 in cash, and a drug ledger from Morris’s vehicle and person.
 No. 22-1970                           United States v. Morris                           Page 3

Officer Smith, Morris’s probation officer, testified that Morris tested positive for
methamphetamine and marijuana use in November 2020, was fired from his job for failing to
show up, failed to attend substance abuse counseling, and was generally uncooperative while on
supervision.

       The district court found Morris guilty of twelve violations, including possessing
methamphetamine, using methamphetamine, fleeing police, resisting and obstructing police,
possessing marijuana, using marijuana, failing to notify his probation officer of his arrest, and
failing to attend substance-abuse counseling. With an advisory Guidelines range of 51 to 63
months, the district court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 48 months’ imprisonment—
48 months on Count Two and time served on Count One.

       Morris appealed, and the parties filed a joint motion to remand to the district court for
resentencing. We granted the motion, noting that pursuant to Borden, Morris’s resisting-and-
obstructing-police offense no longer qualified as a Grade A violation. United States v. Morris,
No. 21-1315 (6th Cir. July 15, 2022). As such, we vacated the sentence and remanded the case
to the district court for resentencing. Id.

       Because Morris no longer had a Grade A violation, his new advisory Guidelines range
was 21 to 27 months’ imprisonment. The USPO did not identify “any aggravating or mitigating
factors that may warrant a sentence outside the applicable range of imprisonment[.]” R. 96,
PageID 406. The USPO indicated that “[t]he violation conduct may suggest Mr. Morris is either
unwilling or unable to change his ways,” and recommended consecutive sentences of 24 months
for both counts, stating that “[a] consecutive custodial sentence is recommended to conform with
the [c]ourt’s original sentence where he was sentenced to consecutive sentences on March 20,
2008.” Id. at 407.

       In October 2022, the district court conducted the resentencing hearing. Morris sought a
sentence at the low end of the recalculated Guidelines range. At sentencing, he recognized that
his past was “really really bad,” but asked the court to consider that he had not engaged in
misconduct while in prison, had attempted to enroll in several classes that were shut down due to
COVID-19, was transferred to the honor camp, and had a very supportive family. R. 110,
 No. 22-1970                          United States v. Morris                                Page 4

PageID 451–52. Morris apologized to the court and indicated that he wanted to stay out of
trouble so that he could complete his supervised-release term. He was “focused on staying away
from all negative and criminal activity and doing what is right going forward.” Id. at 454. The
government, on the other hand, asked the district court to impose the same sentence it had
previously imposed (48 months’ imprisonment), which the court could accomplish by imposing
consecutive sentences on Counts One and Two. At the time of resentencing, Morris had served
22 months in custody.

       In sentencing Morris, the district court focused on Morris’s prior criminal history, which
included convictions for controlled substance offenses, domestic violence, child abuse as a
habitual offender, and unlawful firearm possession. The court observed that “Mr. Morris is not a
kid. He is in his early 40s. He has been at this for a long time, and the declaration that all of this
. . . behavior is now behind him I have to say really does ring hollow.” Id. at 454. The court also
discussed Morris’s violations, noting that “the most serious ones” involved methamphetamine,
“a very dangerous, insidious drug,” and Morris’s efforts to flee a police officer “in a very
dangerous vehicle chase[.]” Id. at 455. The court stated that it “ha[d] a hard time rationalizing
all of [Morris’s] prior behavior in the face of what [his counsel said] is and what Mr. Morris
[said] as well is . . . a new leaf.” Id. The court did not accept the statements of Morris and his
counsel “as an accurate statement of reality.” Id.

       The court reviewed the new advisory Guidelines range, and in determining Morris’s new
sentence, the district court stated, “you can pretty much reach the same result as the earlier
sentencing because of the discretion to treat the sentencing of the two offenses as consecutive,
which I plan to do.” Id. The court then resentenced Morris to two consecutive 24-month terms
of imprisonment, with no additional supervised release on Count One and 12 months of
additional supervised release on Count Two. After the district court pronounced the sentence
and asked if Morris had anything further, Morris’s counsel “object[ed] to the reasonableness of
the sentence, both substantive reasonableness and procedural reasonableness[.]” Id. at 457. This
appeal followed.
 No. 22-1970                          United States v. Morris                               Page 5

                                                 II.

       We review a sentence imposed by a district court after revocation of supervised release
for reasonableness under an abuse-of-discretion standard. United States v. Bolds, 511 F.3d 568,
578 (6th Cir. 2007). We will grant relief if there was a legal error, a clearly erroneous finding of
fact, or where we are “otherwise left with the definite and firm conviction that the district court
committed a clear error of judgment.” United States v. Hymes, 19 F.4th 928, 933 (6th Cir. 2021)
(citations omitted). Reasonableness review has both procedural and substantive components.
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).

       The parties dispute the applicable standard of review for Morris’s procedural-
reasonableness argument. Generally, “a procedural claim that was not raised as an objection
before the district court is subject only to plain error review.” United States v. Sears, 32 F.4th
569, 573 (6th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v. West, 962 F.3d 183, 191 (6th Cir. 2020)). Our
determination of the applicable standard turns on whether the district court “ask[ed] the parties
whether they have any objections to the sentence just pronounced that have not previously been
raised” as required under United States v. Bostic, 371 F.3d 865, 872 (6th Cir. 2004).

       The government argues that we should review Morris’s procedural challenges for plain
error because “he failed to articulate any defect in the court’s reasoning[,]” instead making a
“formulaic objection[.]” The government relies on our decision in United States v. Simmons,
587 F.3d 348, 355 (6th Cir. 2009), for the proposition that Morris’s objection “to the
reasonableness of the sentence, both substantive reasonableness and procedural reasonableness,”
R. 110, PageID 457, is not specific enough to escape plain-error review. While true that a vague
objection does not warrant more than plain-error review on appeal, Simmons is distinguishable
because there, the district court asked the Bostic question. See Simmons, 587 F.3d at 355–56.

       Here, the district court did not ask the Bostic question. Following its pronouncement of
Morris’s sentence, the district court asked if there was “anything further” the parties wanted the
court to address. R. 110, PageID 457. But is that enough to satisfy Bostic? The answer is no.
We have previously held that a district court broadly asking the parties if there is anything else to
address does not comport with the procedural rule announced in Bostic. See, e.g., United States
 No. 22-1970                                United States v. Morris                                         Page 6

v. Batti, 631 F.3d 371, 379 n.2 (6th Cir. 2011) (holding that the district court asking “[a]nything
else concerning sentence?” did not meet the Bostic requirement); United States v. Camacho-
Arellano, 614 F.3d 244, 246–47 (6th Cir. 2010) (applying abuse-of-discretion standard to
procedural-reasonableness challenge where the district court asked defense counsel “is there
anything else that you need me to address?”); United States v. Gapinski, 561 F.3d 467, 473–74
(6th Cir. 2009) (holding that the defendant’s failure to object on reasonableness grounds in
response to the district court’s asking “Anything else for the record, Ms. Lasker?” did “not
trigger plain-error review”); United States v. Thomas, 498 F.3d 336, 340 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding
that asking “Do you have anything further for the record, Mr. Canady?” did not satisfy the Bostic
requirement). We therefore review Morris’s procedural challenges for abuse of discretion. See
Batti, 631 F.3d at 379 n.2.

                                                        III.

    A. Procedural Reasonableness

         Procedural reasonableness requires the district court to “properly calculate the
[G]uidelines range, treat that range as advisory, consider the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a),1 refrain from considering impermissible factors, select the sentence based on facts that
are not clearly erroneous, and adequately explain why it chose the sentence.” United States v.
Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 440 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing Gall, 552 U.S. at 51). Morris argues that the
district court considered impermissible factors and failed to adequately explain his sentence.
We address each argument in turn.

         1Under  18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), only certain § 3553(a) factors are relevant following revocation of supervised
release. Those factors are: (a)(1) “the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of
the defendant”; (a)(2) “the need for the sentence imposed . . . (B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal
conduct[,] (C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant[,] and (D) to provide the defendant with
needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective
manner”; (a)(4) “the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established”; (a)(5) “any pertinent policy statement
issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . that . . . is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced”; (a)(6) “the
need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty
of similar conduct”; and (a)(7) “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
 No. 22-1970                               United States v. Morris                                       Page 7

        1. Consideration of impermissible factors

        We interpret Morris’s argument that the district court erred in considering his past
criminal history and violation conduct at sentencing as an allegation that the court considered
impermissible factors.2 We disagree with Morris’s argument. First, the district court could
consider Morris’s prior criminal history when sentencing him, even if the criminal history was
already factored into his sentencing range under the Guidelines. See United States v. Lanning,
633 F.3d 469, 474–75 (6th Cir. 2011); United States v. Herrera-Zuniga, 571 F.3d 568, 590 (6th
Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Warren, 771 F. App’x 637, 642–43 (6th Cir. 2019) (“[W]e
have declined to impose a ‘bright-line rule’ that district courts cannot rely on factors accounted
for by the Guidelines in imposing a variance[.]” (citing United States v. Tristan-Madrigal, 601
F.3d 629, 636 n.1 (6th Cir. 2010))).

        Second, regarding Morris’s violation conduct, although the district court may not impose
a punishment for the violation conduct itself, it may sanction the “breach of trust” associated
with a violation. See United States v. Johnson, 640 F.3d 195, 204 (6th Cir. 2011). As such, we
have held that district courts may consider the seriousness of the violation conduct when
determining the sanction for the breach of trust associated with a supervised-release violation.
Id. at 203–04; see Bolds, 511 F.3d at 582. Thus, it was appropriate for the district court to
consider Morris’s violation conduct.

        2. Adequate explanation

        The district court failed to adequately explain its decision to impose consecutive
sentences. The sentencing court has an obligation to “adequately explain the chosen sentence to
allow for meaningful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sentencing.” Gall,
552 U.S. at 50 (citing Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 351 (2007)).

        2Both     parties framed the consideration of impermissible factors as a substantive reasonableness issue
pursuant to United States v. Conatser, 514 F.3d 508, 520 (6th Cir. 2008). As we have previously explained,
“members of our Court disagree over whether challenging the district court’s consideration of an improper factor is
a substantive or a procedural challenge.” United States v. Fowler, 956 F.3d 431, 440 n.1 (6th Cir. 2020). Because
we believe that this issue is properly considered a challenge to the procedural reasonableness of the sentence, we
consider Morris’s argument as a challenge to the procedural reasonableness of his sentence. See Rayyan, 885 F.3d
at 442 (“The point [of substantive reasonableness] is not that the district court . . . considered an inappropriate
factor; that’s the job of procedural unreasonableness.”).
 No. 22-1970                           United States v. Morris                             Page 8

        “A challenge to a court’s decision to impose a consecutive or a concurrent sentence is
not easily classified as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural.’ This is so because an evaluation of the
substantive reasonableness of a decision to impose a consecutive sentence depends heavily upon
an evaluation of the procedural reasonableness.” United States v. Berry, 565 F.3d 332, 342 (6th
Cir. 2009). But “[n]o matter how the challenge is characterized, a consecutive sentence is
unreasonable if the district court fails to adequately explain why the sentence is consecutive.”
United States v. Perez-Rios, 846 F. App’x 371, 372 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing United States v.
Cochrane, 702 F.3d 334, 344 (6th Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015)).

       Congress has given district courts discretion to decide whether to impose consecutive or
concurrent sentences. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). In making the determination, courts must consider
the § 3553(a) factors, see 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b), and must “make[] generally clear the rationale
under which it has imposed the consecutive sentence.” Johnson, 640 F.3d at 209 (emphasis
removed) (quoting United States v. Owens, 159 F.3d 221, 230 (6th Cir. 1998)). But a district
court does not have to conduct a separate § 3553(a) analysis to explain its reasons for imposing
consecutive sentences; it may rely on its earlier discussion of the § 3553(a) factors. See Berry,
565 F.3d at 343. “[A] district court must indicate on the record its rationale, either expressly or
by reference to a discussion of relevant considerations contained elsewhere.            Otherwise,
meaningful appellate review becomes impossible.”           Cochrane, 702 F.3d at 346 (citation
omitted).

       When resentencing Morris, the district court identified the new advisory Guidelines range
(21 to 27 months) and stated that it could “pretty much reach the same result as the earlier
sentencing because of the discretion to treat the sentencing of the two offenses as consecutive[.]”
R. 110, PageID 455. The court then sentenced Morris to two consecutive 24-month sentences on
Counts One and Two. The only explanation clear from the record is that the district court
wanted to impose the same sentence it had previously imposed, despite the significant reduction
in the advisory Guidelines range. Such an explanation does not promote the perception of fair
sentencing. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 50. The district court did not consider many of the relevant
 No. 22-1970                          United States v. Morris                               Page 9

sentencing factors, including but not limited to “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence
disparities.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6).

       The district court did not tie its decision to impose the same sentence back to its analysis
of the § 3553(a) factors or any sentencing document like the Amended Violation Worksheet.
Although we have held that a district court does not abuse its discretion where it imposes a
consecutive sentence “in conjunction with or immediately following the court’s invocation of the
§ 3553(a) factors,” United States v. Kitchen, 428 F. App’x 593, 597 (6th Cir. 2011) (citing Berry,
565 F.3d at 343), here, the district court failed to consider most of the relevant § 3553(a) factors.
Therefore, we cannot say that the district court satisfied its statutory obligation to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors when imposing consecutive sentences. See, e.g., United States v. Ross, 375 F.
App’x 502, 507 (6th Cir. 2010).

       Also problematic is the court’s failure to explain its decision to increase Morris’s
sentence on Count One from “time served” to 24 months’ imprisonment post-remand. Although
the district court was not constrained by its prior decision, the absence of any explanation leaves
us to speculate as to the court’s reasoning. This is reversible error. See United States v.
McBride, 434 F.3d 470, 475 n.3 (6th Cir. 2006) (“To the extent that the court hides its reasoning
or requires us to ponder and speculate, the more likely we are to find procedural
unreasonableness in the court’s sentencing determination.”).

   B. Substantive Reasonableness

       Even if Morris’s sentence were procedurally reasonable, it is not substantively
reasonable.    Substantive reasonableness focuses on whether a “sentence is too long (if a
defendant appeals) or too short (if the government appeals)” and whether “the court placed too
much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too little on others in sentencing the
individual.” Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442. Weighing the factors “is a matter of reasoned discretion,
not math.” Id.

       Under § 3553(a), the court “shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than
necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth” in § 3553(a)(2). A sentence within the
Guidelines range is presumed substantively reasonable, but a sentence outside the Guidelines
 No. 22-1970                              United States v. Morris                                     Page 10

range is not. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51. In assessing substantive reasonableness, we “consider[] the
totality of the circumstances, including ‘the extent of any variance from the guidelines range.’”
United States v. Johnson, 26 F.4th 726, 736 (6th Cir. 2022) (quoting Bolds, 511 F.3d at 581).
The degree to which the sentence deviates from the Guidelines range is important, and there
must be a “justification [that] is sufficiently compelling to support the degree of variance.”
United States v. Perez-Rodriguez, 960 F.3d 748, 754 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Gall, 552 U.S. at
50). “The greater the variance, the more compelling the justification must be.” Id. When
varying outside of the Guidelines range, the district court should explain “how the present case is
different from the typical or mine-run case that occupies the heartland to which the Commission
intends individual Guidelines to apply.” Id. (citations and quotations omitted). “The fact that
[we] might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is insufficient to
justify reversal of the district court.” Gall, 552 U.S. at 51; see also Bolds, 511 F.3d at 581.

        Morris argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the district court
provided “insufficient grounds” for imposing a sentence nearly double the high end of the
Guidelines range—a significant upward variance. The government argues that the district court
“considered all the variables, and reasonably determined that a 48-month sentence remained the
appropriate sanction for the same conduct it had considered at the original sentencing.”3

        Morris has the better argument.            In fashioning Morris’s sentence, the district court
considered Morris’s prior criminal history and the seriousness of his violation conduct but
seemingly ignored the other § 3553(a) factors and imposed a sentence to “reach the same result
as the earlier sentencing.” While the court was entitled to consider Morris’s criminal history, the
Guidelines already take account of that factor, so “imposing an extreme variance based on that
same criminal history” would be inconsistent with the sentencing goals of § 3553(a). Warren,
771 F. App’x at 642 (citing United States v. Bistline, 665 F.3d 758, 767 (6th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Borho, 485 F.3d 904, 912–13 (6th Cir. 2007)).

        3The  government also argues that the imposition of consecutive sentences was substantively reasonable.
Because we find that the imposition of consecutive sentences was not procedurally reasonable, we need not address
the government’s argument.
 No. 22-1970                         United States v. Morris                              Page 11

       In analyzing the nature and circumstances of the offense, the district court should have
considered only Morris’s conduct for his original offenses, not the violation conduct. See United
States v. Byrd, 843 F. App’x 751, 759 (6th Cir. 2021) (“When § 3553(a) speaks of ‘the nature
and circumstances of the offense,’ it refers to the offense of conviction, rather than the violation
conduct.” (quoting Johnson, 640 F.3d at 203)); see also Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694,
701 (2000) (holding that “postrevocation penalties relate to the original offense”). But “[e]ven
assuming the district court was sanctioning the breach of trust rather than the violation conduct
[with its sentence], the question of whether it improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors
remains.” Byrd, 843 F. App’x at 760. The district court did not consider, or otherwise weigh,
many of the other pertinent § 3553(a) factors. Moreover, the district court failed to explain how
or why this case differs from the typical supervised-release violation case. See Perez-Rodriguez,
960 F.3d at 754. The district court’s consideration of just a few of the pertinent sentencing
factors and its desire to impose the same sentence it had previously imposed was not sufficiently
compelling to justify a 21-month upward variance. See id.

       Despite our “highly deferential review,” Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442, we conclude that the
district court improperly weighed the § 3553(a) factors by placing considerable weight on a
couple of factors and no weight on several other factors. This renders the sentence in this case
substantively unreasonable. See United States v. Robinson, 669 F.3d 767, 775 (6th Cir. 2012).
Contrary to the government’s argument, the record simply does not show that the district court
“considered all of the variables.”

                                                IV.

       For these reasons, we VACATE Morris’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
 No. 22-1970                          United States v. Morris                                  Page 12

                 ___________________________________________________

                    CONCURRING IN PART AND IN THE JUDGMENT
                 ___________________________________________________

       McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment. I agree
with my colleagues that the district court failed to adequately explain its chosen sentence.
Although a district court need not “recite and analyze each § 3553(a) factor,” United States v.
Robinson, 503 F.3d 522, 530 (6th Cir. 2007), the sentencing judge must still “set forth enough
[explanation] to satisfy the appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has
a reasoned basis for exercising his own legal decisionmaking,” United States v. Jeross, 521 F.3d
562, 583 (6th Cir. 2021) (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007)). Indeed,
“meaningful appellate review [is] the touchstone of procedural reasonableness.” United States v.
Zobel, 696 F.3d 558, 569 (6th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Here,
however, the district court failed to offer sufficient explanation to facilitate our review.

       Beyond acknowledging Morris’s prior criminal history, listing some of Morris’s
supervised-release violations, and identifying the advisory Guidelines range applicable on
remand, the district court provided no further explanation—and no analysis of the remaining
§ 3553(a) factors—to support its chosen sentence. And more specifically, the district court
offered no rationale for its decision to impose consecutive sentences. Instead, the court simply
stated it that it could “pretty much reach the same result as the earlier sentencing because of the
discretion to treat the sentencing of the two offenses as consecutive.” R. 110, PID 455. We have
held that a district court abuses its discretion when, as here, its decision to impose consecutive
sentences “does not include a separate discussion of the § 3553(a) factors and the decision
appears to be ‘divorced’ from the analysis of the § 3553(a) factors that is required before
imposing a general sentence.” United States v. Kitchen, 428 F. App’x 593, 597 (6th Cir. 2011)
(emphasis in original).

       Although we generally defer to a district court’s sentencing determinations, the uniquely
sparse sentencing transcript at issue in this case has left us little to review. I therefore agree that
Morris’s sentence must be vacated and remanded to the district court on procedural grounds.
 No. 22-1970                          United States v. Morris                              Page 13

       I disagree, however, with my colleagues’ conclusion that Morris’s sentence is
substantively unreasonable. “A claim that a sentence is substantively unreasonable is a claim that
a sentence is too long.” United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018). “The point
[of substantive unreasonableness] is not that the district court failed to consider a factor or
considered an inappropriate factor; that’s the job of procedural unreasonableness.” Id. Rather,
substantive unreasonableness is a concern “that the court placed too much weight on some of the
§ 3553(a) factors and too little on others.” Id. But because the district court’s weighing of the
§ 3553(a) factors “is a matter of reasoned discretion, not math,” our review is highly deferential.
Id. And that is particularly the case in the “discretion-filled context of supervised release.”
United States v. Kontrol, 554 F.3d 1089, 1093 (6th Cir. 2009).

       Morris was initially convicted of possession with intent to distribute cocaine base and
possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. His prior criminal history
included, among other things, controlled substance offenses, domestic violence, and child abuse
as a habitual offender. Following his term of imprisonment, Morris was found guilty of twelve
supervised-release violations, which included possession of methamphetamine and resisting and
obstructing police. At one point, Morris even pointed a pneumatic pistol at a victim before
leading police on a high-speed chase through a residential area, with methamphetamine in his
possession. Given this background, the sentencing judge determined that, “[Morris] has been at
this for a long time, and the declaration that all of this . . . behavior is now behind him I have to
say really does ring hollow.” R. 110, PID 454. Thus, measuring the “totality of the
circumstances,” as we must, Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007), I simply cannot agree
that Morris’s 48-month sentence is too long. Instead, I agree with the government: the district
court “reasonably determined that a 48-month sentence remained the appropriate sanction for the
same conduct it had considered at the original sentencing.” Appellee Br. at 16.

       The lead opinion argues that the district court failed to “consider, or otherwise weigh,
many of the . . . pertinent § 3553(a) factors.” Maj. Opn. at 11. But as stated above, which
sentencing factors the district court considers goes to form (i.e., procedure) rather than
substance. See Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442. And the lead opinion’s concern with the district court’s
justification for its 21-month upward variance is equally unpersuasive. We have routinely upheld
 No. 22-1970                          United States v. Morris                                Page 14

above-Guidelines sentences in the context of multiple and repeated supervised-release violations.
See, e.g., United States v. Glass, 749 F. App’x 434, 441–42 (6th Cir. 2018) (upholding a fifteen-
month upward variance, even where the district court failed to articulate its reasoning, because
the defendant seriously and repeatedly violated her supervised-release terms); United States v.
Kirby, 418 F.3d 621, 628 (6th Cir. 2005) (upholding the imposition of the statutory maximum
term of imprisonment given the defendant’s repeated supervised-release violations and continued
criminality).

       Morris’s substantive-reasonableness argument “boils down to an assertion that the district
court should have balanced the § 3553(a) factors differently.” United States v. Goode, 834 F.
App’x 218, 221 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. West, 962 F.3d 183, 191 (6th Cir.
2020)). “But our job is not to rebalance the factors; it is to ensure that the district court’s balance
was reasonable.” Id. And here, the district court’s weighing of Morris’s criminal history and
violation conduct did not amount to an abuse of discretion. I therefore part ways with my
colleagues and would find that Morris’s 48-month sentence was substantively reasonable.

       Ultimately, however, because the district court procedurally erred by failing to consider
pertinent § 3553(a) factors and by neglecting to articulate its reasoning, I respectfully concur in
the majority opinion in part and concur in the judgment.