Court Opinion

ID: 9391941
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-03 18:08:54.897513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:43.651795
License: Public Domain

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :         PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    DASEAN DAMONT MORRIS                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :    No. 1060 MDA 2022

          Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 6, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Criminal Division at No(s):
                           CP-67-CR-0004509-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., OLSON, J., and DUBOW, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                       FILED: MAY 3, 2023

        Appellant, Desean Damont Morris, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of York County on June 6,

2022, as made final by the denial of his post-sentence motion on June 17,

2022.     On appeal, Appellant challenges the trial court’s order denying his

motion to suppress. We reverse the trial court’s suppression ruling, vacate

Appellant’s judgment of sentence, and remand for further proceedings.

        The following facts were revealed at the May 12, 2021 suppression

hearing. On August 18, 2020, Officer Chris Martin and his partner, Officer

Harris,1 were “assigned to roving patrol detail” in York City, Pennsylvania.

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/12/21, at 6. At approximately 4:00 p.m., the

two officers were traveling in a marked patrol vehicle “in the east end of the

____________________________________________

1   Officer Harris’s first name is not of record.
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[c]ity,” “heading northbound on Pattison Street.” Id. At that time, the officers

observed Appellant traveling southbound on Pattison Street in a blue Toyota

Corolla with a Florida license plate. Id. at 7.

       Upon observing Appellant and his Corolla, Officer Martin “made a

U-turn” and began to travel southbound on Pattison Street. Id. at 8. As

Officer Martin turned, Appellant “made a right-hand turn onto Prospect” Street

and then turned onto Courtland Street.           Id.   When Appellant turned onto

Courtland Street, Officer Martin noticed Appellant “gain[] speed” but,

eventually, lost sight of the Corolla. Id. at 9. Shortly thereafter, Officer Martin

located the Corolla, parked and empty “at the northwest corner” of the South

Street and Gerard Street intersection. Id. at 10. The officers also spotted

Appellant “walking westbound from the vehicle, maybe two or three-car

lengths” away from the Corolla. Id. The officers identified Appellant after he

“looked over his shoulder” at them. Id.

       The officers pulled up next to Appellant, exited their vehicle, and

commanded Appellant to stop.2 Id. at 56. Appellant complied. Id. Officer
____________________________________________

2 Appellant testified at the May 12, 2021 suppression hearing and explained
the circumstances of the initial stop. In particular, Appellant explained that
he was “walking up the street” and then heard Officer Harris say “hey, hey
hey, can you stop?” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/12/21, at 56. Per Appellant,
he stopped in response to the officer’s command. Id. Officer Martin was
specifically asked about the circumstances of this encounter with Appellant
but stated he did not recall “whether [he] or [Officer Harris] attempted to get
[Appellant’s] attention” prior to turning on his body camera. Id. at 52. Officer
Martin also testified that he did not turn on his body camera until after he
made contact with Appellant. Id. at 46-47. Our review of the body camera
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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Martin asked Appellant for his name. Id. Appellant responded that his name

was “Sean” but refused to provide his last name. N.T. Preliminary Hearing,

9/25/20, at 6.3 During the interaction, the officers noticed “a faint smell of

unburn[ed] marijuana.” Id. at 7. At that time, the officers placed Appellant

under arrest. Id. Appellant then informed the officers that he had a gun in

his right front pocket. Id. A subsequent search of Appellant’s person revealed

a firearm and a small amount of marijuana. Id. at 7-9.

       The Commonwealth charged Appellant with firearms not to be carried

without a license and possession of marijuana.      On November 19, 2020,

Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion seeking to suppress the evidence

obtained pursuant to the search of his person, arguing that the officers

detained him “illegally without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and

without probable cause.” Appellant’s Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion, 11/19/20, at

____________________________________________

footage supports Officer Martin’s testimony. Hence, Appellant’s testimony
regarding the circumstances of the encounter with police was uncontradicted
by the Commonwealth’s evidence and the testimony of the Commonwealth’s
witnesses. See Commonwealth v. Griffin, 116 A.3d 1139, 1142 (Pa. Super.
2015) (“When reviewing the rulings of a suppression court, [the appellate
court] considers only the evidence of the prosecution and so much of the
evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the context
of the record as a whole.”), quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 33 A.3d
122, 125-126 (Pa. Super. 2011).

3 The Commonwealth admitted the transcripts of the September 25, 2020
Preliminary Hearing as an exhibit during the May 12, 2021 suppression
hearing. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/12/21, at 16; see also In re. L.J.,
79 A.3d 1073, 1087 (Pa. 2013) (holding that the scope of review from a
suppression ruling is limited to the evidentiary record created at the
suppression hearing).

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2. A suppression hearing was held on May 12, 2021, during which Officer

Martin and Appellant testified. See N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/12/21, at

1-66. On June 4, 2021, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion. Trial Court

Order, 6/4/21, *1-*3 (unpaginated).

        On June 6, 2022, the Commonwealth withdrew the marijuana

possession charge and the case proceeded to a stipulated bench trial. That

same day, the court found Appellant guilty of firearms not to be carried

without a license4 and sentenced him to two to four years’ incarceration. On

June 16, 2022, Appellant filed a post-sentence motion. On June 17, 2022,

Appellant’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel. That same day, the

court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion and granted counsel leave to

withdraw. This appeal followed.5
____________________________________________

4   18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a).

5 The trial court denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion on June 17, 2022
and, as such, Appellant was required to file his notice of appeal on or before
July 18, 2022. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908; see also Pa.R.A.P. 903(a) (explaining
that an appellant has “30 days after the entry of the order from which the
appeal is taken” to file an appeal). Appellant’s notice of appeal is
time-stamped July 19, 2022. Appellant, however, is incarcerated and filed his
notice of appeal pro se. Under the prisoner mailbox rule, the filing date for a
submission by an incarcerated pro se party is measured from the date the
prisoner placed the filing in the institution’s mailbox. See Commonwealth
v. Patterson, 931 A.2d 710, 714 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“Pursuant to the prisoner
mailbox rule, we deem a document filed on the day it is placed in the hands
of prison authorities for mailing.”). Appellant’s certificate of service indicates
that he placed the pro se notice of appeal in the institution’s mailbox on July
14, 2022. The Commonwealth has not challenged the certification. We
therefore conclude that Appellant’s notice of appeal was timely filed on July
14, 2022. On July 25, 2022, the trial court ordered Appellant to file a concise
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:

        [Whether the trial court erred in denying Appellant’s omnibus
        pre-trial motion to suppress evidence?]

See generally Appellant’s Brief at 4.

       Herein, Appellant argues that the trial court erroneously denied his

suppression motion. In its order denying suppression, the trial court held that

Appellant’s initial seizure was constitutional because “the [o]fficers had

reasonable suspicion to [] stop [Appellant].” Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/21, at

*3 (unpaginated); Trial Court Opinion, 8/19/22, at 4.          In support of this

conclusion, the trial court cited the fact that “the [o]fficers observed

[Appellant’s] vehicle begin to lean while making a turn at an unsafe rate of

speed, in violation of the [Motor Vehicle Code (“MVC”)].”6 Id. The trial court

also concluded that, following Appellant’s initial seizure, the “[o]fficers had

probable cause to make an arrest” because Appellant “refused to provide his

full name” and because the “[o]fficers could smell unburn[ed] marijuana

coming from [Appellant].”         Id.   Based upon the foregoing, the trial court
____________________________________________

statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
Appellant timely complied. The trial court issued an opinion pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on August 19, 2022. All issues raised on appeal were
included in Appellant’s concise statement.

6 The trial court did not set forth the particular section of the MVC that
Appellant violated. The Commonwealth, however, both in its response to
Appellant’s omnibus pre-trial motion and on appeal, argued that Appellant
violated 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361, Driving Vehicle at Safe Speed.          See
Commonwealth’s Response to Omnibus Pre-Trial Motion to Suppress,
5/24/21, at *4 (unpaginated); see also Commonwealth Appellate Brief,
12/2/22, at 12, 14, 16 and 19-20.

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denied suppression, holding that the firearm and marijuana were obtained via

a constitutional search “incident to [a] lawful arrest.” Id.

      On appeal, Appellant points out that, in reviewing the constitutionality

of a traffic stop, the trial court wrongly applied a reasonable suspicion

standard, as opposed to a probable cause standard, which is required to

conduct a lawful vehicular detention for suspected violations of the MVC.

Appellant’s Brief at 24. In addition, Appellant maintains that, when viewed

under a probable cause standard, his seizure for an alleged MVC infraction

was not justified. Id. at 26-31. Appellant thus concludes that the trial court

erred in failing to suppress evidence, including a firearm and marijuana, which

was seized after a subsequent, and constitutionally unsupported, police

interaction. Id. at 31-32. We agree.

      Our standard of review for an order denying a motion to suppress is well

established.

       [We are] limited to determining whether the suppression court's
       factual findings are supported by the record and whether the
       legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct. Because
       the Commonwealth prevailed before the suppression court, we
       may consider only the evidence of the Commonwealth and so
       much of the evidence for the defense as remains uncontradicted
       when read in the context of the record as a whole. Where the
       suppression court's factual findings are supported by the
       record, we are bound by these findings and may reverse only if
       the court's legal conclusions are erroneous. Where, as here,
       the appeal of the determination of the suppression court turns
       on allegations of legal error, the suppression court's legal
       conclusions are not binding on an appellate court, “whose duty
       it is to determine if the suppression court properly applied the
       law to the facts.” Thus, the conclusions of law of the courts
       below are subject to our plenary review.

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Commonwealth v. Mbewe, 203 A.3d 983, 986 (Pa. Super. 2019), quoting

Commonwealth v. Kemp, 195 A.3d 269, 275 (Pa. Super. 2018).

      Initially, we consider Appellant’s claim that the trial court applied the

wrong constitutional standard in assessing the validity of the traffic-related

stop in this case. With respect to vehicle stops based on suspected violations

of the MVC, Section 6308(b) of the MVC provides:

       (b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police officer is
       engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers
       or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is
       occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request
       or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle's registration,
       proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or
       engine number or the driver's license, or to secure such other
       information as the officer may reasonably believe to be
       necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.

75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b).

      In Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285 (Pa. Super. 2010), this

Court explained the state of the law with respect to vehicle stops:

       Traffic stops based on a reasonable suspicion[,] either of
       criminal activity or a violation of the [MVC] under the authority
       of Section 6308(b)[,] must serve a stated investigatory
       purpose. [Commonwealth v.] Chase, 960 A.2d [108,] 116 [
       (Pa. 2008)].

       Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop when
       the driver's detention cannot serve an investigatory purpose
       relevant to the suspected violation. In such an instance, “it is
       encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate specific facts
       possessed by him, at the time of the questioned stop, which
       would provide probable cause to believe that the vehicle or the
       driver was in violation of some provision of the Code.”
       [Commonwealth v. Gleason, 785 A.2d [983,] 989 [(Pa.
       2001)].

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Id. at 1291. “Accordingly, when considering whether reasonable suspicion or

probable cause is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the nature

of the violation has to be considered.” Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d

987, 993 (Pa. Super. 2015).

         If it is not necessary to stop the vehicle to establish that a
         violation of the [MVC] has occurred, an officer must possess
         probable cause to stop the vehicle. Where a violation is
         suspected, but a stop is necessary to further investigate
         whether a violation has occurred, an officer need only possess
         reasonable suspicion to make the stop.

Id.

        Here, Appellant was alleged to have violated 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3361,7

which states:

         § 3361. Driving vehicle at safe speed

         No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is
         reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having regard
         to the actual and potential hazards then existing, nor at a speed
         greater than will permit the driver to bring his vehicle to a stop
         within the assured clear distance ahead. Consistent with the
         foregoing, every person shall drive at a safe and appropriate
         speed when approaching and crossing an intersection or
         railroad grade crossing, when approaching and going around
         curve, when approaching a hill crest, when traveling upon any
         narrow or winding roadway and when special hazards exist with
         respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason of weather
         or highway conditions.

Id.

        Importantly, Pennsylvania case law holds that an officer must possess

probable cause, not simply reasonable suspicion, prior to conducting a stop
____________________________________________

7   See Footnote 6, supra.

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for a violation of Section 3361 of the MVC. See Commonwealth v. Smith,

237 A.3d 580, 583 (Pa. Super. 2020) (noting that the “parties agree[d] that

[the police officer] was required to have probable cause before stopping [the

appellant] for violation of Section 3361 of the [MVC], Driving Vehicle at Safe

Speed, because the stop would not enable the trooper to learn anything more

about whether [the appellant] was driving at an unsafe speed”); see also

Commonwealth v. Nell, 245 A.3d 1067 (Pa. Super. 2020) (unpublished

memorandum) (applying a probable cause standard to determine whether the

appellant violated Section 3361 of the MVC); Commonwealth v. Hissim,

2017 WL 765935, *1, *3 (Pa. Super. Feb. 27, 2017) (unpublished

memorandum); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 2016 WL 941979, at *4 (Pa.

Super. Mar. 11, 2016) (unpublished memorandum) (accord). Based upon the

foregoing, we conclude that Appellant is correct that the trial court erroneously

examined the validity of the traffic-related stop under the reasonable suspicion

standard since probable cause was required.8 Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/21, at

*3 (unpaginated); Trial Court Opinion, 8/19/22, at 4.

       Next,    Appellant     argues    that   his   traffic-related   detention   was

unconstitutional because the officers did not have probable cause to believe
____________________________________________

8 The Commonwealth argues that the trial court “correctly applied the
standard of reasonable suspicion” to the traffic stop. Commonwealth’s Brief
at 12. The Commonwealth, however, relies heavily upon this Court’s recent
decision in Smith, 237 A.3d at 583, which clearly states that officers are
“required to have probable cause before stopping [a] vehicle for violation of
Section 3361 of the [MVC], Driving Vehicle at Safe Speed.” (emphasis added);
see also Commonwealth’s Brief at 17-18. As such, the Commonwealth’s
argument lacks merit.

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that he violated Section 3361 of the MVC. Appellant’s Brief at 26-31. Upon

careful review, we agree.

         Our Supreme Court has defined probable cause as follows:

          Probable cause is made out when the facts and circumstances
          which are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the
          [stop], and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information,
          are sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the
          belief that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.
          The question we ask is not whether the officer's belief was
          correct or more likely true than false. Rather, we require only a
          probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity.
          In determining whether probable cause exists, we apply a
          totality of the circumstances test.

Commonwealth v. Martin, 101 A.3d 706, 721 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).

         In Commonwealth v. Heberling, 678 A.2d 794 (Pa. Super. 1996), this

Court set forth the criteria for evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence to

support a conviction under Section 3361 of the MVC. Notably, the Heberling

Court explained that “speeding alone does not constitute a violation.” Id. at

795. Instead, “a violation depends on the speed in relation to the ‘conditions’

and ‘actual and potential hazards’ of the roadway.” Smith, 237 3d at 583,

citing Heberling, 678 A.2d at 795. Said conditions and hazards included, but

are not limited to, “the amount of traffic, travel and weather conditions, [and]

also the nature of the roadway itself (e.g., whether four-lane, interstate, or

rural;    flat   and   wide,   or   narrow   and   winding   over   hilly   terrain;

smooth-surfaced, or full of potholes; clear, or under construction with abrupt

lane shifts).” Heberling, 678 A.2d at 795-796.

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      This Court has used the criteria set forth in Heberling to evaluate

whether an officer possesses probable cause to effectuate a stop for violation

of Section 3361.    See Smith, 237 A.3d at 584 (explaining the officer’s

testimony demonstrating that the appellant was “driving upwards of 70 miles

per hour in an area where the limit was 45 or 50 miles per hour” and that such

a speed “was unreasonable given the specific conditions of the road” i.e.,

“’windy, curvy, hilly’ with ‘lots of intersections’ and with houses alongside of

it” supported “the conclusion that [the officer] had probable cause to stop [the

appellant] for violating Section 3361”); Commonwealth v. Minnich, 874

A.2d 1234, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2005) (holding that the traffic stop was

supported by probable cause based upon the officer’s testimony that, “in a

highly trafficked area,” the appellant traveled “around a sharp bend” at a “high

rate of speed” causing the vehicle to drift “outside its normal lane” which

“create[ed] a likelihood of a collision with oncoming traffic around a blind

curve”).

      Here, Officer Martin testified that he and Officer Harris observed

Appellant driving southbound on Pattison Street in York City at approximately

4:00 p.m. on a sunny, summer afternoon.            N.T. Suppression Hearing,

5/12/21, at 6-8.     This area, per Officer Martin, is mixed commercial and

residential and the speed limit is generally 25 miles per hour. Id. at 7 and 9.

Officer Martin also testified that, at the time they encountered Appellant, there

was light traffic. Id. at 6. Upon seeing Appellant, Officer Martin explained

that he “made a U-turn in the middle of Pattison Street” and, “as [he] did that,

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Appellant’s Corolla made a right-hand turn onto Prospect” Street. Id. at 8.

After Appellant turned onto Prospect Street, Officer Martin testified Appellant

“accelerate[d]” and took a “high speed turn” onto Courtland Street. Id. 8 and

38. Officer Martin characterized this turn as “erratic[]” and “careless[.]” Id.

at 9. Officer Martin, however, could not say whether Appellant was speeding.

Id. at 9 and 40.     In addition, Officer Martin testified that he did not see

Appellant “cross any of the white lines dividing the street” or “interfere with

any other traffic.” Id. at 40-41.

      Hence, the only reason proffered by Officer Martin as possible

justification to initially stop Appellant for violating Section 3361 was the

alleged “high speed turn” in which Appellant did not interfere with traffic, run

the risk of causing an accident, or otherwise pose a risk to any other person

on or around the street. Id. at 38. Based upon our review of relevant case

law, a single turn at an elevated, but not necessarily unlawful, speed, without

more, is insufficient to establish probable cause to support a traffic stop for

violation of Section 3361 of the MVC.          See Minnich, 874 A.2d at 1239

(explaining that the appellant’s “single act of ‘hugging the east part of the

shoulder’” of the road did not provide sufficient basis for the officers to conduct

a traffic stop but, when combined with the officer’s testimony regarding other

actual and potential hazards, there was sufficient evidence that the appellant

was “operating his vehicle at an unsafe speed”). We therefore conclude that

the officers did not have probable cause to carry out a lawful traffic stop and,

as such, did not have probable cause to detain Appellant.

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      We have concluded that, in issuing its suppression ruling, the trial court

erred in applying a reasonable suspicion standard when assessing the

constitutionality of Appellant’s traffic-related detention because a Section

3361 stop requires probable cause. Upon a review of the record, the facts do

not demonstrate probable cause to support a Section 3361 violation. As such,

we   must     now    review   the    record     to   determine   whether   any   other

constitutionally valid police-citizen encounter supported the trial court’s

decision to deny suppression.

      Here,    the    evidence      presented     during   the   suppression   hearing

demonstrated that, as Officer Martin and his partner were driving northbound

on Pattison Street, they saw Appellant driving in the opposite direction in a

blue Toyota Corolla. N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/12/21, at 6-7. Upon seeing

Appellant, Officer Martin made a U-turn in the middle of Pattison Street and,

as he did so, Appellant turned off Pattison Street, and then turned onto

Courtland Street. Id. at 8. Officer Martin attempted to follow Appellant but

lost sight of the Corolla. Id. at 9. Shortly thereafter, the officers located

Appellant’s Corolla parked legally at the intersection of Girard Street and

South Street. N.T. Preliminary Hearing, 9/25/20, at 5 and 12. After spotting

the Corolla, the officers also located Appellant “two or three-car lengths from

[his] vehicle.”     N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/12/21, at 10.           Officer Martin

indicated that, at the time they spotted Appellant, he “turned around [and]

looked over his shoulder at [them].” Id. The officers then pulled their marked

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police car “up . . . to where [Appellant] was walking,” exited the vehicle, and

requested him to stop. Id. at 42-43 and 56.

      Upon review, we conclude that, at the time the officers exited the vehicle

and requested Appellant to stop, a relevant encounter occurred. Hence, to

determine the requisite level of suspicion required, we must first determine

the nature of this interaction.    Under Pennsylvania law, there are three

categories of police-citizen interactions. As our Supreme Court has clearly

articulated:

       The first of these is a “mere encounter” (or request for
       information) which need not be supported by any level of
       suspicion, but carries no official compulsion to stop or to
       respond. The second, an “investigative detention” must be
       supported by a reasonable suspicion; it subjects a suspect to a
       stop and a period of detention, but does not involve such
       coercive conditions as to constitute the functional equivalent of
       an arrest. Finally, an arrest or “custodial detention” must be
       supported by probable cause.

Commonwealth v. Gutierrez, 36 A.3d 1104, 1107 (Pa. Super. 2012),

appeal denied, 48 A.3d 1247 (Pa. 2012), quoting Commonwealth v. Ellis,

662 A.2d 1043, 1047 (Pa. 1995) (citations omitted). Further, this Court

previously explained:

       [t]o determine whether a mere encounter rises to the level of
       an investigatory detention, we must discern whether, as a
       matter of law, the police conducted a seizure of the person
       involved. To decide whether a seizure has occurred, a court
       must consider all the circumstances surrounding the encounter
       to determine whether the demeanor and conduct of the police
       would have communicated to a reasonable person that he or
       she was not free to decline the officer's request or otherwise
       terminate the encounter. Thus, the focal point of our inquiry
       must be whether, considering the circumstances surrounding

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       the incident, a reasonable person innocent of any crime, would
       have thought he was being restrained had he been in the
       defendant's shoes.

Id., quoting Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1201-1202 (Pa.

Super. 2002).

      The testimony elicited at the suppression hearing revealed that, after

the officers spotted Appellant outside the Corolla, they pulled up next to him

in a marked vehicle, exited the car, and requested Appellant to stop. See

N.T. Suppression Hearing, 5/12/21, at 56.       A review of the body camera

footage demonstrates that, upon asking Appellant to stop, the officers

immediately directed Appellant to a porch, commanded him to sit down and

stood around him, thereby prohibiting him from leaving. See id. at Exhibit 2.

Based upon the foregoing, we find that Appellant was subjected to an

investigative detention at that time.    See Commonwealth v. Cauley, 10

A.3d 321, 325 (Pa. Super. 2010) (explaining that “’[a]n investigative

detention occurs when a police officer temporarily detains an individual by

means of physical force or a show of authority for investigative purposes.’ In

other words, in view of all the circumstances, if a reasonable person would

have believed that he was not free to leave, then the interaction constitutes

an   investigatory    detention.”)      (quotations   omitted);   see    also

Commonwealth v. Adams, 205 A.3d 1195, 1201 (2019) (explaining that

the appellant was subjected to an investigatory detention after the officer

“restrained his freedom to walk away”). Thus, the issue is whether, prior to

commanding Appellant to sit down and restraining his ability to leave, the

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officers possessed reasonable suspicion that Appellant was engaged in

criminal conduct. See Reppert, 814 A.2d at 1203 (“Our Supreme Court has

mandated that law enforcement officers, prior to subjecting a citizen to an

investigatory detention, must harbor at least a reasonable suspicion that the

person seized is then engaged in unlawful activity.”)

      “Instantly, [we conclude that] there is not one fact which would give

rise to the reasonable belief [Appellant] was involved in illegal activity.”

Commonwealth v. Jeffries, 311 A.2d 914, 917 (Pa. 1973). Indeed, Officer

Martin testified that Appellant made a quick turn, and then subsequently

parked his car and exited his vehicle. It is apparent from the body camera

footage that the officer’s considered this activity evasive.         See N.T.

Suppression Hearing, 5/12/21, at Exhibit 2 (revealing the officer’s statement

to Appellant that they “knew [Appellant] was in that car” and they “knew

[Appellant] took off from [them]”). Even if Appellant engaged in unprovoked

flight, no facts connected him to criminal activity.      Further, there is no

indication that Appellant’s vehicle was parked in a suspicion manner. To the

contrary, Officer Martin specifically stated the vehicle was parked “legally.”

Preliminary Hearing, 9/25/20, at 5 and 12. Accordingly, even if we were to

construe Appellant’s actions as evasive or akin to unprovoked flight, such

conduct, in and of itself, is insufficient to give rise to suspicion of criminal

conduct.   See Commonwealth v. Washington, 51 A.3d 895 (Pa. Super.

2012) (holding the appellant’s unprovoked flight, without more, was

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insufficient to give rise to reasonable suspicion justifying an investigatory

stop).

         We find the Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. DeWitt,

608 A.2d 1030, 1033 (Pa. 1992), to be instructive to our present analysis. In

DeWitt, at approximately 11:50 p.m. two Pennsylvania State Troopers

observed a vehicle parked in a parking lot of a church with the interior lights

on, but the exterior lights off. Id. at 1031. Based on concerns that the vehicle

was disabled and due to the church’s previous request to check for suspicious

vehicles on the property, the troopers pulled up next to the parked vehicle.

Id. at 1031-1032.        Upon doing so, the vehicle’s “interior lights were

extinguished and the four occupants made ‘furtive [] and suspicious

movements as if they were trying to hide something.’” Id. at 1032. The

vehicle also began to pull away. Id. The troopers then initiated a traffic stop,

approached the vehicle, and discovered alcohol and drugs in plain view. Id.

The appellant was later charged with various drug violations. Id.

         “Following a hearing on [the] appellant’ omnibus pre-trial motion, the

[trial] court suppressed the evidence of illegal drugs and paraphernalia.” Id.

In so doing, the court concluded that “the [troopers] were not authorized to

make the stop of the vehicle either as an investigative or traffic stop because

they did not have probable cause to believe a traffic violation occurred . . .

and there was insufficient evidence to reasonably warrant suspicion of criminal

conduct.”     Id.   The Commonwealth appealed and this Court reversed the

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suppression court’s decision.     Id. at 1032, 1034.      Our Supreme Court,

however, reversed and reinstated the order suppressing the evidence.

      In so doing, the Supreme Court initially noted that the stop was not a

valid traffic stop because, inter alia, the troopers did not have probable cause

to stop the vehicle for violating the MVC. Id. at 1033. Then, the Court went

on to determine whether the stop was otherwise justified, i.e., whether the

officers “had sufficient information to reasonably suspect that criminal activity

may have been afoot.” Id. at 1034. Ultimately, the Court concluded that

there was “absolutely no evidence” that the vehicle in question was engaged

in the type of behavior similar to that previously reported by the church. Id.

Moreover, the DeWitt Court specifically noted the alleged “flight” of the

vehicle after the police arrived, “in and of itself,” did not give rise to

“reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Our Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Jeffries, supra, the

facts of which are as follows. On an afternoon in November, four police officers

traveling in an unmarked police vehicle “observed Jeffries walking along a

public street in Pittsburgh, [Pennsylvania].” Id. at 916. When “Jeffries saw

the officers, he ‘quickened his pace.’” Id. The officers “left the police vehicle

and started to pursue Jeffries, who then began to run.” Id. During his flight,

Jeffries discarded a cigarette package.         Id.    Jeffries was eventually

apprehended and, when the officers retrieved the discarded cigarette

package, they discovered it contained several small packages of heroin. Id.

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      Jeffries eventually moved to suppress the evidence of the cigarette

package, arguing that the police engaged in an unconstitutional search and

seizure. Id. The trial court held that Jeffries’ flight supplied probable cause

to arrest Jeffries. Id. Our Supreme Court disagreed and ultimately reversed

the trial court’s denial of suppression. In so doing, the Court explained that

“flight, standing alone . . . is not sufficient to establish probable cause for an

arrest.” Id. at 917. Further, the Court concluded that “there [was] not one

fact which would give rise to the reasonable belief that Jeffries was involved

in criminal activity” sufficient to support an investigatory detention. Id. In

particular, the Court found that “Jeffries was simply walking along a public

street in Pittsburgh in broad daylight” and, even though he “’quickened his

pace’ and started to run when the officer[s] began to chase him,” such action

was “not enough to justify a seizure . . . absent some other factor which would

give rise to suspicion of criminal conduct.” Id.

      As in DeWitt, the officers in this matter lacked probable cause to believe

that a traffic violation occurred. In addition, as demonstrated in DeWitt and

Jeffries, even if we view Appellant’s actions (making a quick turn after he

saw police, parking the Corolla and exiting the vehicle), as evasive conduct or

unprovoked flight, such action, in and of itself, does not give rise to reasonable

suspicion of criminal conduct to justify Appellant’s non-traffic investigatory

detention, rendering Appellant’s detention unlawful.

      We have reviewed the opinions offered by the trial court in support of

its order denying suppression. As discussed above, the trial court examined

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and justified Appellant’s traffic-related detention under a reasonable suspicion

standard. See Trial Court Opinion, 6/2/21, at *3 (unpaginated); Trial Court

Opinion, 8/19/22, at 4. Building upon this error, the trial court went on to

hold that Appellant’s arrest was supported by probable cause and the officer’s

subsequent search of Appellant’s person was incident to a lawful arrest. Id.

The court based its finding of probable cause on Appellant’s refusal to provide

his full name in response to police questioning in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 6308, as well as the fact that the officers smelled unburned marijuana on

Appellant’s person.    Id.   On appeal, the Commonwealth argues that the

officers had probable cause to arrest Appellant because his failure to provide

his full name violated 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5101, Obstructing Administration of Law

or Other Government Function. See Commonwealth Brief at 20-31. Upon

review, it appears that the “theories advanced by [the trial court] and the

Commonwealth are after the fact justifications,” and do not alter our analysis

of the constitutionality of Appellant’s detention, his arrest, or the search

conducted incident to his arrest. Dewitt, 608 A.2d at 1033.

      As   discussed   above,   Appellant     was   subjected   to   an   unlawful

investigatory detention unsupported by reasonable suspicion when the officers

stopped him without first pointing to articulable facts that linked Appellant to

criminal activity. Importantly, we note that Appellant’s failure to provide his

last name, as well as the smell of unburned marijuana, occurred after the

officers detained him.       Therefore, neither circumstance demonstrates

reasonable suspicion that Appellant engaged in criminal activity prior to his

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detention. See Reppert, 814 A.2d at 1203 (explaining that police officers

must have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity prior to subjecting a citizen

to an investigatory detention).

      Second, even if we were to assume Appellant’s detention was lawful–

which it was not–the evidence presented at the suppression hearing did not

support a finding of probable cause to arrest Appellant. Indeed, contrary to

the Commonwealth’s contentions and the trial court’s conclusion, Appellant’s

failure to provide his full name in response to police questioning is not a

violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308 or 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 5101.                     See

Commonwealth v. Shelly, 703 A.2d 499, 504 (Pa. 1997) (holding that the

appellant did not violate the statute prohibiting obstruction of administration

of law by giving a false name to police).              Furthermore, pursuant to

Commonwealth v. Barr, 266 A.3d 25 (Pa. 2021), “the smell of marijuana

alone cannot create probable cause to justify a search under the state and

federal constitutions.” Id. at 41. The Commonwealth concedes this very point

on appeal. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 28-31.

      Herein, the traffic-related stop was invalid, the non-traffic investigatory

detention was unsupported by reasonable suspicion, and the discovery of

contraband and other grounds cited by the Commonwealth and trial court

supporting   Appellant’s   arrest   occurred   after    his   unlawful   detention

commenced.      The firearm and marijuana, found as a result of the

unconstitutional search and seizure, “was a direct product, and hence, an

exploitation of the initial illegality,” warranting suppression. Commonwealth

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v. Shabezz, 166 A.3d 278, 291 (Pa. 2017), citing Wong Sun v. United

States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). We therefore conclude that the trial court erred

in denying suppression.

      Judgment of sentence vacated.         Case remanded.       Jurisdiction

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/3/2023

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