Court Opinion

ID: 9540841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:20:15.968253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:11.312351
License: Public Domain

Banke, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
It is self-evident, to me at least, that the trial court could not have had a meritorious reason for setting aside the default judgment in the absence of a valid basis upon which to open the underlying default. To hold otherwise is to create a less stringent standard for setting aside a default judgment than for opening a default in a case where judgment has not yet been entered.
The trial court’s discretion to open a default is limited by OCGA § 9-11-55 (b), which requires, among other things, that the defendant assert a meritorious defense to the claim “under oath.” See Global Assoc. v. Pan Am. Communications, 163 Ga. App. 274, 275 (1) (b) (293 SE2d 481) (1982). The only defense to the appellant’s breach of contract claim which was asserted under oath by the appellee in this case was that he (the appellee) had “never met Mr. Lord, who purportedly owns the [appellant] corporation, nor . . . talked with Mr. Lord in person or by telephone or through any agent whatever.” Obviously, this does not foreclose the possibility that the parties entered into a valid contract, absent evidence that Mr. Lord was the only person authorized to enter into contracts on behalf of the appellant corporation. Contrary to the majority opinion, the appellee’s motion to set aside alleged the pendency of only one other action against him to recover on the contract; and the record affirmatively establishes that this prior action was dismissed as to the appellee prior to the initiation of the present lawsuit. For these reasons, I would hold that the trial court erred in setting aside the default judgment and opening the default.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray joins in this dissent.
*331Larry H. Evans, Larry K. Evans, for appellee.