Court Opinion

ID: 9649760
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 15:08:46.302304+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:14.818652
License: Public Domain

NICHOLS and SCOLNIK, Justices,
dissenting.
Because we are persuaded that 29 M.R. S.A. § 2241-G is unconstitutional in that it authorizes a search that violates the fourth *1169amendment of the United States Constitution, we respectfully dissent.
Although a search authorized by 29 M.R. S.A. § 2241-G (Supp.1983-1984), repealed and replaced by P.L. 1983, ch. 850, § 4 (effective May 2, 1984), may have a valid administrative purpose, that fact alone does not compel a conclusion that such a search is reasonable under the fourth amendment. Other factors associated with the search demonstrate that despite its administrative purpose, it involves much more than the relatively limited invasion of one’s privacy interest that traditionally serves as a justification for allowing administrative searches to be undertaken on a less than probable cause standard. Since the search authorized by section 2241-G constitutes practically the same invasion of a person’s privacy interest as that found in a search for evidence of criminal conduct, it follows that under the fourth amendment, the search is to be governed by the same rigorous standards that are applied to searches for evidence of a crime. Thus, because the statute challenged in this appeal purports to authorize a search that is ‘not based on probable cause to believe a crime has been committed, the search in this case was unreasonable and the fruits obtained therefrom must be suppressed. Further, since section 2241 purports to authorize what the Constitution prohibits, the statute itself must be declared unconstitutional.1
It is not disputed that the police officer’s conduct in obtaining a sample of blood constituted a search and seizure of the juvenile’s person. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). We have repeatedly stated that searches or seizures conducted without a warrant are per se unreasonable, except for a few carefully drawn and most guarded exceptions. State v. Rand, 430 A.2d 808, 817 (Me.1981); State v. Johnson, 413 A.2d 931, 933 (Me.1980). If, for example, law enforcement officers have knowledge of facts supporting a proper determination of probable cause, the warrant requirement may be waived if there are exigent circumstances that require a prompt search. State v. Baker, 502 A.2d 489, 493 (Me.1985); State v. Libby, 453 A.2d 481, 484 (Me.1982).
In this case, the police officer’s search of the juvenile was neither executed pursuant to a warrant nor was it based on probable cause to believe that a crime had been committed and that evidence of the crime would be found in the place to be searched. The purpose of the search was to determine the juvenile’s blood-alcohol level. Pursuant to section 2241-G, operating a motor vehicle when one’s blood alcohol level is 0.02% or greater by one under the age of twenty subjects the operator to an administrative sanction of a license suspension for one year. It is not a crime. Under 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312 (Supp.1983-1984), however, the same test, if 0.10% or greater, exposes the- driver to criminal penalties, namely, a maximum fine of not less than $300 and a license suspension for ninety days. Any suspension imposed under section 2241-G runs concurrently with any court ordered suspension for violation of section 1312. Before administering a blood test pursuant to section 2241-G, the investigating officer need not have probable cause to believe a crime has been committed; rather, the statute requires that he need only have probable cause to believe that the individual was operating with greater than a .02% blood-alcohol level. The critical issue is whether the search authorized by section 2241-G on a less than probable cause standard, as that term is used in the criminal sense, is reasonable and thus consistent with the fourth amendment. Cf. State v. Freeman, 487 A.2d 1175, 1177 (Me.1985) (labeling as “civil” an offense that is criminal in nature ineffectual to achieve legislative purpose of creating civil infraction).
*1170Recognizing the important distinction between criminal and administrative searches, the United States Supreme Court has observed that searches carried out for administrative purposes without probable cause in the criminal sense can nevertheless be reasonable. For instance, in Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 537, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1735, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967), the Court declared that probable cause is not required in order for routine searches of private dwellings by housing inspectors for possible violations of a housing code to be reasonable under the fourth amendment. In adopting a “reasonable legislative or administrative standard” for-inspection warrants, the Court reasoned that “because the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of [a] citizen’s privacy.” Id. (emphasis added). Subsequent cases similarly recognize that the rationale for allowing administrative searches on a less than probable cause standard is that such searches intrude into areas where individuals have a significantly decreased expectation of privacy and are carried out by non-polic3 personnel who have been delegated little criminal law enforcement authority. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 105 S.Ct. 733, 743-45, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985) (search of student by a teacher and other school officials); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13, 98 S.Ct. 1816, 1820-21, 56 L.Ed.2d 305 (1978) (search of commercial property by OSHA inspectors); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1948, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) (search of privately owned premises by fireman to battle a fire); see also Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598-99, 101 S.Ct. 2534, 2537-38, 69 L.Ed.2d 262 (1981) (“The greater latitude to conduct warrantless inspections of commercial property reflects the. fact that the expectation of privacy that the owner of commercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from the sanctity accorded an individual’s house, and that this privacy interest may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by regulatory schemes authorizing warrant-less inspections.”). Thus, a statute that authorizes a search not based on probable cause is reasonable if the search is for a valid administrative purpose, is neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of a crime, and involves a minimal invasion of a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy.
Applying these principles to the present case, it is clear that the search of the juvenile authorized by section 2241-G is unreasonable. Unlike cases involving administrative searches, the present case involves the search of a person, not of property; it is carried out by a police officer, not an administrative official; the search is not pursuant to a warrant; the evidence to be obtained can expose the person searched to a criminal prosecution; and it involves a significant intrusion into a person’s reasonable expectation of privacy. In fact, the intrusion of the juvenile’s privacy interest is similar to that found in a search pursuant to section 2241-G’s criminal counterpart, section 1312. This is plainly demonstrated by the facts of the case before us. The investigating police officer transported the juvenile to a police station. There he read to the juvenile his “Miranda” rights as well as the implied consent form applicable to section 1312. These characteristics of the search authorized by section 2241-G clearly reveal that such a search is not a limited invasion of a person’s privacy. It cannot be argued that there is any diminution of the juvenile’s reasonable expectation of privacy merely because the search was ostensibly made pursuant to the .02 law, section 2241-G, rather than section 1312, the operating under the influence (OUI) law. In Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. at 312-13, 98 S.Ct. at 1820-21, the Supreme Court recognized that a person’s privacy interest suffers the same intrusion whether the government’s motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards. Moreover, depending on the *1171test result, the evidence the police officer sought to obtain pursuant to section 2241-G could serve as a basis for a criminal prosecution under section 1312. In these circumstances, it matters little that the police officer may not expect evidence of a criminal OUI to be generated by the taking of the test because the constitutional safeguard against an unreasonable search and seizure does not depend on the fortuity of that test result. Taken together, when weighed against the valid administrative purpose of the statute, these factors compel the conclusion that the search authorized by section 2241-G is unreasonable under the fourth amendment. See Parrish v. Civil Service Comm’n, 66 Cal.2d 260, 267, 425 P.2d 223, 228, 57 Cal.Rptr. 623, 628, (1967) (though searches by county welfare officials intended to secure proof of welfare ineligibility, fact that sought-after evidence could have afforded basis for criminal prosecution imposed requirement for compliance with standards for searches for evidence of crime).
In sum, section 2241-G is unconstitutional because it purports to authorize what the fourth amendment prohibits. To satisfy constitutional requirements, a search in these circumstances must comply with the probable cause standard applicable to searches for evidence of criminal activity. Since the police officer’s search in this case was not based on probable cause to believe a crime had been committed, the relevant evidence was illegally obtained. As a result, the illegally obtained evidence must be suppressed in this criminal proceeding.
We reject the majority’s overly technical view that since the juvenile did not in so many words challenge the constitutionality of the statute, it is immune from scrutiny. Such a narrow approach ignores the fact that a challenge to the constitutionality of the search itself, carried out pursuant to section 2241-G, constitutes an attack on the validity of the statute. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 89-97, 100 S.Ct. 338, 341-45, 62 L.Ed.2d 238 (1979); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 471, 99 S.Ct. 2425, 2429-30, 61 L.Ed.2d 1 (1979); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 267-73, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 2536-40, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62-65, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 1902-04, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968). Since section 2241-G purports to authorize a search that is impermissible under the fourth amendment, we submit that the statute must be declared unconstitutional.
Accordingly, we would vacate the judgment of the Superior Court and remand with instructions to vacate the adjudications and remand to the juvenile court for a new trial.

. We note that section 2241-G is not here challenged as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. We therefore restrict our treatment of the issue to the context of the fourth amendment.