Court Opinion

ID: 9930780
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-07 17:10:47.593189+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:25:22.408377
License: Public Domain

578                  February 7, 2024                 No. 74

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
            GLENN LAVAUGHN THOMPSON,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
              Lincoln County Circuit Court
                  20CR28294; A175836

   Amanda R. Benjamin, Judge pro tempore.
   Argued and submitted November 6, 2023.
   Frances J. Gray argued the cause and filed the briefs for
appellant. Glenn Lavaughn Thompson filed the supplemen-
tal brief pro se.
   Timothy A. Sylwester, Assistant Attorney General,
argued the cause for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen
F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General.
  Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, and Egan, Judge, and
Kamins, Judge.
   KAMINS, J.
    Convictions on Counts 16 (attempted second-degree
assault with a firearm) and 20 (attempted third-degree
assault) reversed and remanded for entry of a single con-
viction on Count 13 (attempted first-degree assault with a
firearm); conviction on Count 6 (second-degree robbery with
a firearm) reversed and remanded for entry of a single con-
viction on Count 2 (first-degree robbery with a firearm);
remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.
Cite as 330 Or App 578 (2024)   579
580                                      State v. Thompson

        KAMINS, J.
         Defendant appeals a judgment of multiple convic-
tions for robbery, attempted assault, and firearm offenses
stemming from a criminal episode in which defendant and
his codefendant Jackson robbed the victim, O. Defendant
assigns five errors. First, he argues that the trial court
erred by failing to merge the guilty verdicts for attempted
assault into a single conviction. Second, defendant argues
that the trial court erred by failing to merge the guilty
verdicts for second-degree and first-degree robbery into
a single conviction. In defendant’s third, fourth, and fifth
assignments of error, he argues that the trial court erred by
accepting the guilty verdicts relating to the charged firearm
offenses, because he did not possess the firearm during the
robbery. Defendant also raises three pro se supplemental
assignments of error, which we briefly address and reject for
the reasons later discussed. We reverse in part, concluding
that the trial court plainly erred by not merging all of the
attempted assault guilty verdicts and by not merging the
guilty verdicts for second-degree robbery and first-degree
robbery, we remand for resentencing, and we otherwise
affirm.
          We address first defendant’s arguments relating to
merger. We summarize the facts in light most favorable to
the trial court’s conclusion that merger was not required.
See, e.g., State v. Oldham, 301 Or App 82, 83, 455 P3d 975
(2019). Defendant and Jackson learned that O had about
$30,000 in cash and, knowing O would be at a specific
trailer, defendant and Jackson hatched a plan to rob him.
Right before entering the trailer, defendant handed his gun
to Jackson and grabbed a shovel to use as a weapon. They
both entered the trailer and encountered O in the living
room area. Defendant swung the shovel at O, demanding
that he surrender his money. O resisted, grabbed a knife,
and swung it towards Jackson. Jackson fell over a table and
dropped the gun, at which point O ran off. Defendant picked
up the gun and pursued O, firing two shots as O “descended
down the driveway” on foot. The first shot missed; the sec-
ond shot grazed O’s thigh. O sustained no serious injuries.
Cite as 330 Or App 578 (2024)                                             581

         Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty
of 20 offenses. After the sentencing court conducted a
merger analysis, defendant’s convictions were entered as fol-
lows: Count 2 (first-degree robbery with a firearm); Count 6
(second-degree robbery with a firearm); Count 12 (unlawful
use of a weapon); Count 13 (attempted first-degree assault);
Count 16 (attempted second-degree assault with a firearm);
Count 20 (attempted third-degree assault); and Count 21
(menacing).1
         In his first assignment of error, defendant contends
that the trial court erred by not merging the attempted
assault verdicts into a single conviction, an argument the
state contends is unpreserved. Defendant concedes that,
although he “did not argue * * * or object to the trial court’s
error in failing to” merge the attempted assault verdicts,
the argument was preserved, because the trial court was
apprised of the relevant statute—ORS 161.485(2), which
bars multiple convictions for certain inchoate offenses—in
the state’s sentencing memorandum’s discussion of the con-
spiracy to commit robbery offenses. Alternatively, defendant
requests that we review for plain error.
         In order to preserve an argument, a party must
articulate enough information to an opposing party or the
trial court “to be able to understand [a party’s] contention
and to fairly respond to it.” State v. Walker, 350 Or 540, 552,
258 P3d 1128 (2011). Here, defendant never even posited
that the relevant counts should merge, nor did he mention
    1
      The following counts merged with Count 2 (first-degree robbery a firearm):
Counts 3 (first-degree robbery with a firearm); 4 (first-degree robbery with a
firearm); 5 (criminal conspiracy with a firearm); 9 (third-degree robbery with a
firearm); and 10 (criminal conspiracy with a firearm).
    The following counts merged with Count 6 (second-degree robbery with a
firearm): Counts 7 (second-degree robbery with a firearm) and 8 (criminal con-
spiracy with a firearm).
    Count 11 (felon in possession of a firearm) merged with Count 12 (unlawful
use of a weapon).
    The following counts merged with Counts 13 (attempted first-degree assault
with a firearm): Counts 14 (attempted second-degree assault with a firearm);
15 (attempted second-degree assault with a firearm); and 17 (attempted third-
degree assault).
    The following counts merged with Count 16 (attempted second-degree assault
with a firearm): Counts 18 (attempted third-degree assault) and 19 (attempted
third-degree assault).
582                                       State v. Thompson

ORS 161.485(2). The state’s citation to that statute in its
sentencing memorandum when discussing other offenses
was not sufficient to preserve defendant’s argument that
ORS 161.485(2) required merger of the attempted assault
verdicts. See State v. Ortega-Gonsalez, 287 Or App 526, 539,
404 P3d 1081 (2017) (explaining that the defendant’s argu-
ment was unpreserved because he “did not specifically object
to the trial court’s failure to make factual findings when it
imposed the sentence,” despite the defendant’s own sentenc-
ing memorandum and objection “alert[ing] the trial court,
and the state” that his guilty verdicts could not be sentenced
consecutively). Because the argument is unpreserved, we
move on to defendant’s request for plain error review.
         Defendant was found guilty of multiple attempted
assault offenses, Counts 13 to 20. The court merged guilty
verdicts on Counts 11, 14, 15, 17, 18, and 19 into the ver-
dicts on Counts 13 (attempted first-degree assault with a
firearm), 16 (attempted second-degree assault with a fire-
arm), and 20 (attempted third-degree assault). Defendant
argues that because all the attempted assault counts arose
out of a single, continuous incident against a single victim
that would have culminated in a single assault, the trial
court plainly erred by not merging all the attempted assault
verdicts pursuant to ORS 161.485(2)—which provides that,
“[a] person shall not be convicted of more than one [attempt]
offense * * * for conduct designed to commit or to culminate
in the commission of the same crime.” The state responds
that each attempted assault count required a different
material element and thus precluded merger of the guilty
verdicts.
         We review the decision of whether to merge verdicts
for legal error. State v. Burris, 270 Or App 512, 519, 348 P3d
338 (2015). For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that
the trial court plainly erred by not applying ORS 161.485(2)
to merge Counts 20 and 16 with Count 13. The application
of ORS 161.485 is “akin to merger,” because a defendant can
be guilty of “multiple inchoate crimes pertaining to a single
substantive offense but cannot have more than one such con-
viction entered.” State v. Kimbrough, 364 Or 66, 73, 431 P3d
76 (2018). Inchoate offenses merge under ORS 161.485(2)
Cite as 330 Or App 578 (2024)                             583

when the defendant’s actions “constitute a single course of
conduct aimed at the commission of the same crime.” State
v. Huddleston, 278 Or App 803, 808, 375 P3d 583, rev den,
360 Or 604 (2016). The “commission of the same crime” ele-
ment “refers to a single act by an individual actor.” State v.
Badillo, 260 Or App 218, 225, 317 P3d 315 (2013). Whether
“defendant engaged in a single course of conduct is a close
factual analysis,” which includes an “exist[ence] of unity of
time, location, and intent.” Huddleston, 278 Or App at 808.
         In this case, it is undisputed that defendant’s
attempted assault offenses constituted a unity of time, loca-
tion, and intent in a single course of conduct; he fired two
gunshots in quick succession at a single victim, O. There
was no pause or separate assault attempt; only a single act
against a single victim, by a single actor. Cf Huddleston,
278 Or App at 810 (concluding that two counts of attempted
aggravated murder did not merge under ORS 161.485(2),
because the “defendant’s separate solicitations of two dif-
ferent individuals [were] weeks apart” leading to “two acts
of attempted aggravated murder”). Thus, ORS 161.485(2)
plainly requires merger.
          The state’s arguments to the contrary are unper-
suasive. First, the state argues that the trial court correctly
applied ORS 161.067(1), the antimerger statute, to Counts,
13, 16, and 20, because each completed assault requires a
“material element that each of the other two counts does
not[.]” It cites State v. Tyler, 239 Or App 401, 245 P3d 168
(2010), and State v. O’Hara, 152 Or App 765, 955 P2d 313
(1998), rev den, 327 Or 305 (1998), for that proposition.
However, Tyler and O’Hara did not involve multiple incho-
ate offenses; each involved guilty verdicts that included
not only attempted assault but also completed assaults. In
Tyler, we did not merge the defendant’s completed fourth-
degree assault conviction with the attempted second-degree
assault conviction. 239 Or App at 405. Similarly, in O’Hara,
we did not merge the defendant’s completed second-degree
assault with his attempted first-degree assault. 152 Or App
at 768-69.
       Additionally, the state cites State v. Habibullah,
278 Or App 239, 373 P3d 1259 (2016), and Badillo to argue
584                                        State v. Thompson

that ORS 161.485(2) is inapplicable. However, those cases
are factually distinguishable. In Habibullah, we concluded
that the trial court did not plainly err by not merging the
verdicts for several inchoate offenses that occurred approx-
imately a month apart such that the “lapse of time between
defendant’s acts” could indicate the commission of separate
crimes. 278 Or App at 244. Similarly, in Badillo, we held
that verdicts should not merge where the defendant solicited
two people to kidnap a neighbor’s baby, because the solicita-
tion of two different people at different times amounted to
the commission of two different crimes rather than a sin-
gle course of conduct and, therefore, ORS 161.485(2) did not
apply. 260 Or App at 228.
         Our instant case deals with only attempted assault
convictions, involving a single course of conduct, which dis-
tinguishes it from all of the cases that the state cites and
brings it within the purview of ORS 161.485(2). For the
reasons discussed above, Counts 20 (attempted assault in
the third degree) and 16 (attempted assault in the second
degree with a firearm) should have merged with Count 13
(attempted assault in the first degree with a firearm).
          We may correct an unpreserved error as plain error
if “(1) the error is one of law; (2) the error is apparent, that
is * * * obvious, not reasonably in dispute; and (3) the error
appears on the face of the record,” and we need “not go out-
side the record to select among competing inferences to find
it.” State v. Loving, 290 Or App 805, 809, 417 P3d 470 (2018)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Here, all conditions
are satisfied. First, whether guilty verdicts merge is a legal
question. Id. Second, the error is obvious and not reason-
ably in dispute, because ORS 161.485(2) bars multiple con-
victions if a defendant’s attempt offenses stem from conduct
designed to culminate in the same crime; here, all of defen-
dant’s attempted assault offenses are from defendant’s act
of firing his weapon at one victim, designed to culminate in
a single assault. See State v. Ferguson, 276 Or App 267, 274,
367 P3d 551 (2016) (correcting the trial court’s error in fail-
ing to merge guilty verdicts in a plain error posture). Third,
the error is apparent on the face of the record, and we need
Cite as 330 Or App 578 (2024)                            585

not select competing inferences to identify the error. Loving,
290 Or App at 809.
         Having concluded that the trial court plainly erred,
we must determine whether we should exercise our discre-
tion to correct the error. The factors that we consider in
exercising our discretion include “the competing interests
of the parties; * * * the gravity of the error; [and] the ends
of justice in the particular case.” Ailes v. Portland Meadows,
Inc., 312 Or 376, 382 n 6, 823 P2d 956 (1992). Those con-
siderations weigh in favor of exercising our discretion. The
error is grave because, as we explained in similar cases,
“the presence of an additional * * * conviction on defendant’s
criminal record misstates the nature and extent of defen-
dant’s conduct and could have significant implications with
regard to any future calculation of” defendant’s criminal
history. State v. Valladares-Juarez, 219 Or App 561, 564,
184 P3d 1131 (2008) (so stating with regard to a kidnapping
conviction). Additionally, “although the state may have an
interest in avoiding unnecessary proceedings on remand, it
has no interest in convicting a defendant twice for the same
crime.” State v. Steltz, 259 Or App 212, 221, 313 P3d 312
(2013), rev den, 354 Or 840 (2014). Lastly, “the ends of jus-
tice would be served by ensuring that defendant’s criminal
record is an accurate reflection of the crimes for which he
was convicted.” State v. Newmann, 278 Or App 675, 682, 375
P3d 551 (2016). Accordingly, Counts 16 (attempted second-
degree assault with a firearm) and 20 (attempted third
degree assault) should merge with Count 13 (attempted first
degree assault with a firearm).
        In defendant’s second assignment of error, he con-
tends that the trial court erroneously relied on our decision
in Burris in declining to merge Count 6 (second-degree rob-
bery with a firearm) with Count 2 (first-degree robbery with
a firearm), ORS 164.405(1)(a), (b).
         As noted above, we review the decision of whether
to merge verdicts for legal error. Burris, 270 Or App at 519.
ORS 161.067(1), the antimerger statute, provides that guilty
verdicts may not merge if “the same conduct or criminal epi-
sode violates two or more statutory provisions and each pro-
vision requires proof of an element that the others do not.”
586                                        State v. Thompson

          We begin by discussing our holding in Burris upon
which the trial court relied. There, the defendant “drew a
gun * * * and pointed it at [the victim] without saying any-
thing,” while his partner told the victim “to empty his pock-
ets.” Id. at 514. For that conduct, the defendant was convicted
of first-degree robbery with a firearm, ORS 164.415. Id. He
was also convicted of two counts of second-degree robbery,
ORS 164.405(1)(a), (b). Id. ORS 164.405(1)(a) defines the
offense of second-degree robbery when a defendant is “armed
with what purported to be a deadly and dangerous weapon,”
and ORS 164.405(1)(b) defines the offense of second-degree
robbery when a defendant is “aided by another person actu-
ally present.” Id. at 515. Both crimes were charged with
an aggravating firearm enhancement under ORS 161.610,
meaning that the state had to prove that the defendant used
or threatened to use a firearm in the commission of a felony.
Id. at 518. On appeal, the defendant argued that the fire-
arm enhancement should cause the first- and second-degree
robbery verdicts that involved a firearm to merge “down”
into the second-degree guilty verdict for robbery that did not
involve a firearm (the verdict for being aided by another per-
son present). According to the defendant, the addition of the
firearm enhancement meant that “the weapon-related ele-
ments of the two offenses become equivalent” such that only
the “aided by another person present” element of second-
degree robbery was “unique.” Id. at 518-19.
        We rejected that argument, concluding that all
elements of the weapons-related robbery verdicts were
not equivalent. Specifically, first-degree robbery’s element
of being “armed with a deadly weapon” requires that the
weapon be “presently capable” of firing whereas second-
degree robbery’s element of representing that one is armed
with “what purports to be a dangerous or deadly weapon”
does not. Id. at 520. Because first-degree robbery contains
the “presently capable” element and second-degree robbery
does not, we concluded that a guilty verdict for first-degree
robbery cannot merge “down” into the guilty verdict for
second-degree robbery. In so holding, we acknowledged that
the reverse—that the guilty verdicts would be barred from
merging “up” into first-degree robbery—might not be true:
“Although an argument might be made that second-degree
Cite as 330 Or App 578 (2024)                            587

robbery with an apparent weapon should merge with first-
degree robbery, that is not our question here.” Id.
         This case presents the question left unresolved in
Burris. Defendant contends that the elements in second
degree robbery with a firearm (Count 6) are subsumed in
the first-degree robbery with a firearm (Count 2), such that
those counts should merge “up” into first-degree robbery. We
agree.
         The parties do not dispute that the only difference
between first-degree robbery in Count 2 and second-degree
robbery in Count 6 is that first-degree robbery requires that
the defendant be “armed with a deadly weapon” whereas
second degree robbery requires that defendant represents
that he is armed with what “purports to be a dangerous or
deadly weapon.” ORS 164.405(1)(a); ORS 164.415(1)(a). As
Burris explains, the difference between those two counts for
merger analysis is that first-degree robbery requires more
than second-degree robbery, preventing a downward merger
into second-degree robbery. Here, defendant was convicted
in Count 2 of committing first-degree robbery while armed
with a deadly weapon (a firearm presently capable of firing),
subsuming the “purporting to be armed with a dangerous
or deadly weapon” element of second-degree robbery alleged
in Count 6. Put differently, the elements of second-degree
robbery in Count 6 lack any distinctive element from the ele-
ments of first-degree robbery in Count 2, requiring a merger
of the guilty verdicts. See ORS 161.067(1) (merger of guilty
verdicts are precluded only if “the same conduct or criminal
episode violates two or more statutory provisions and each
provision requires proof of an element that others do not”).
         The state argues that the offenses cannot merge,
because a different count of second-degree robbery, Count
7, contains the unique element of committing robbery while
“aided by another.” However, the trial court merged the
second-degree robbery verdict contained in Count 7 into
Count 6 creating a single conviction for second-degree rob-
bery. See State v. White, 346 Or 275, 288-91, 211 P3d 248
(2009) (concluding that the trial court erred in failing to
merge the guilty verdicts for two counts of second-degree
robbery, ORS 164.405(1)(a) (robbery while purporting to be
588                                        State v. Thompson

armed with a dangerous weapon) and ORS 164.405(1)(b)
(robbery when aided by the actual presence of another per-
son), because the legislature intended subsections (a) and (b)
to “create[ ] a single crime of second-degree robbery”). The
state cites no authority for the proposition that the elements
of Count 7 remain in Count 6, the single conviction of rob-
bery, for the purposes of a merger analysis, therefore, we do
not resolve that question. On these facts, nothing precludes
merger of Count 6 into Count 2 because Count 6 lacks any
distinctive element not contained in Count 2 and vice versa.
Accordingly, the trial court erred by not merging Count 6
(robbery in the second-degree with a firearm) with Count 2
(robbery in the first-degree with a firearm).
         In his third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error,
defendant argues that the trial court plainly erred by accept-
ing the jury’s verdict on his robbery and unlawful use of a
weapon convictions, because the evidence was insufficient
to prove that defendant committed those offenses using a
firearm. Defendant contends that because he used a shovel
rather than the firearm while inside the trailer, “the jury
could not * * * extend the duration of the robbery” to when
defendant left the trailer and fired two shots at O. Defendant
acknowledges that the argument is not preserved, and he
requests that we review for plain error. As noted, an error
is plain when, among other things, it is “obvious and not
reasonably in dispute, and apparent on the record without
requiring the court to choose among competing inferences.”
State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d 889 (2013).
         In this case, any error is not obvious on this record.
Nothing in the jury instructions or the state’s arguments
restricted the jury to solely determining whether defen-
dant’s wielding of the shovel inside the trailer—as opposed
to defendant firing two gunshots at O while outside the
trailer—constituted the robbery counts and the unlawful
use of a weapon counts. Indeed, as the trial court observed,
the jury could have interpreted the evidence to “believe
[defendant’s] act of picking up the gun, going after [O],
shooting at [O], was” first-degree robbery. Accordingly, any
error is not plain.
Cite as 330 Or App 578 (2024)                              589

         Defendant submits three additional pro se assign-
ments of error. In his first assignment of error, as we under-
stand it, defendant contends that the trial was mired with
prosecutorial misconduct. Defendant contends that, absent
“unlawful tactics or evidence” from the prosecution, he could
not have been convicted beyond a reasonable doubt, because
“[t]here was no physical evidence * * * [or] direct evidence
linking” him to the offenses, and the state relied only on
“testimonial” evidence. He argues that the prosecution’s
“unlawful tactics or evidence” included a letter from a state’s
witness expressing reluctance to testify, the grant of immu-
nity to the codefendant in exchange for his testimony and
the use of “hours of irrelevant videos that contained hours of
inadmissible testimony.” As defendant acknowledges, those
arguments are not preserved, but he asks us to review for
plain error. Reviewing for plain error, we conclude that any
errors are not obvious or appearing on the face of the record.
A witness’s reluctance to testify or a grant of immunity in
exchange for testimony does not render that testimony inad-
missible, and defense counsel did impeach both witnesses on
those bases. Lastly, the record does not indicate any error
involving the admission of video evidence, much of which
was edited consistently with the defense’s request.
         In his second pro se assignment of error, defendant
argues that the trial court erred by providing an inadmis-
sible video to the jury during its deliberations. However,
defendant did not raise that objection below and, there is
nothing in the record to suggest that the jury was provided
that the unredacted video. Consequently, his purported
claim is unsupported on this record and not subject to plain
error.
          In his last pro se assignment of error, defendant
argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion for
judgment of acquittal (MJOA). At trial, the court denied
defendant’s MJOA on all counts. On appeal, defendant con-
tends that (1) “no direct evidence” linked him to the offenses;
(2) the state presented “insufficient evidence to establish that
his conduct caused physical injury to the victim” because his
actions did not cause any physical injury; and (3) he did not
possess the firearm during the commission of first-degree
590                                     State v. Thompson

robbery—reciting a similar argument that was addressed
in assignments of error three, four, and five above. After
reviewing the record, we find no error.
         Convictions on Counts 16 (attempted second-degree
assault with a firearm) and 20 (attempted third-degree
assault) reversed and remanded for entry of a single con-
viction on Count 13 (attempted first-degree assault with a
firearm); conviction on Count 6 (second-degree robbery with
a firearm) reversed and remanded for entry of a single con-
viction on Count 2 (first-degree robbery with a firearm);
remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.