Court Opinion

ID: 9722893
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:54:25.171638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:15.303159
License: Public Domain

NEWBLATT, District Judge,
dissenting.
While I disagree not only in the result, but in the reasoning of my brothers, I acknowledge that Judge Rosen has well stated the existing law.1 The law, however, is not settled in this jurisdiction.
*375It must be acknowledged that admitting a convicted felon to the Bar of this Court might be embarrassing in the event he thereafter engages in attorney misconduct. But the risk of embarrassment, even humiliation, is a risk borne by every judge in every ruling she or he might make. That risk ought not prevent one from doing that which the evidence commands one to do.
My colleagues take the position that Mr. Culpepper’s application for reinstatement “must be denied at this time,” finding that “his resumption of the practice of law before this Court before he has completed his term of parole on the sentence of incarceration on Counts 3 and 4 would be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Federal Bar.” They base their conclusion on the policy basis set forth by the Supreme Court of the State of Washington in In Matter of Reinstatement of Walgren, 104 Wash.2d 557, 708 P.2d 380 (1985):
Reinstatement prior to elapse of parole would not comport with the principle that a parolee is not to be accorded complete liberty and privilege prior to successful completion of parole.
While I have no disagreement with the principle that a parolee is not to be accorded complete liberty and privilege before successfully completing parole, neither the author of the quote nor my colleagues have set forth what liberties or privileges a parolee might have and which ones ought to be denied. That distinction is inherent in the quotation which says “complete liberty and privilege” are not accorded a parolee (underlining added). More importantly, they have failed to state the rationale for such distinction. The current intense public scrutiny of the ethics and practices of the legal profession, as urged by my colleagues, is not a justification for denying readmittance. The legal profession is always under scrutiny. It is the nature of the profession and the adversarial process which properly induces the scrutiny. But that is totally irrelevant to the issue—has Mr. Culpepper proven by a preponderance of the evidence that he should be readmitted?
Likewise, I find it irrelevant that while a person remains under sentence for a felony, she or he is precluded from serving as a juror. There is no relationship whatever in the functions of an attorney and a juror. My colleagues further state that they do “not believe that the ethical standards expected of attorneys representing clients before this court ... should in any way be compromised or reduced, which ... would be the effect of reinstating an attorney under the circumstances presented here.” Unfortunately, my colleagues fail to state how readmitting Mr. Culpepper under these circumstances would compromise or reduce the ethical standards of attorneys. Those standards remain the same whether Mr. Culpepper is readmitted or not.
And my colleagues weigh in their reasoning the fact that Mr. Culpepper will be supervised on his present probation and/or parole status by members of the Federal Probation Office of this district. Again, they expressly base their concerns on public perception as distinguished from reality. I do not understand where they obtain this public perception—how it was made known to them. They make some reference to the “adversary relationship” Mr. Culpepper might have in dealing with probation office staff on behalf of clients when Mr. Culpepper is himself supervised by staff members of the same office. I simply cannot agree. I think the reasoning is flawed and obscured by the use of the phrase “adversary relationship.” As a member of the Bar of this Court, Mr. Culpepper would have to deal with probation officers who are investigating convicted clients for purposes of writing reports for the judge. Part of the role of the probation officer is to make preliminary findings of fact in order to apply the sentencing guidelines. In that process an attorney presents facts to the probation officer and contests the facts submitted by others. If the probation offi*376cer makes a finding with which the attorney disagrees, the judge resolves the matter. How Mr. Culpepper’s being on probation/parole would be affected in this process is simply assumed by my colleagues. I submit one could just as easily, but not any more accurately, say Mr. Culpepper would be in an adversarial relationship with the judge to whom he brings his disagreement. To so state is to refute. The attorney is in an adversarial relationship to his legal opponent, who, in a criminal case, is the United States Attorney and his staff, not the Probation Department. In my view it is specious to justify denying readmission on the mere labelling of a relationship as adversarial.
I am mindful that Mr. Culpepper was sentenced by a judge of this Court who had a complete background investigation of Mr. Culpepper before him before sentence was imposed—a report which no member of this panel has sought to examine. Nor have we sought the view of the sentencing judge. Had the sentencing judge deemed Mr. Culpepper not qualified to be readmitted until after he completed his probationary sentence and/or parole term, he could have so stated. He could have made it a condition of the probationary sentence. If the probation department felt Mr. Culpepper should not be readmitted while he was on parole, they likewise could have communicated that view to the Court together with the reasons. If the United States Attorney felt that Mr. Culpepper should not be readmitted, he too could have expressed a view.
No one has opposed his readmission, and while there is a risk, just as there is a risk when admitting an attorney for the first time, that risk, standing alone, does not justify denying readmission until parole and/or probation have been completed. Such a blanket rule would prevent one from getting one’s life in order and returning to that for which one is trained if otherwise justified.
The final reason I reject my colleagues’ position is because a determination made by prison authorities as to parole is wholly unrelated to a determination that one has or has not been sufficiently rehabilitated to justify readmission to this Court’s Bar. Both the periods of probation and parole are determined without regard to eligibility or competency to practice law. Using that period to bar readmission is arbitrary when all the other facts, as my colleagues admit, would justify readmission.
I dissent and would determine Mr. Culpepper eligible to practice in this Court.

. I agree that reinstatement by the State Bar of Michigan does not entitle Mr. Culpepper to au*375tomatic readmittance to the Bar of this Court. The determination by the State Bar is entitled to respect and consideration here, but is not binding upon us. Our obligation cannot be fulfilled by the State Bar of Michigan. Moreover, we have a right to look into matters not considered by the State Bar.