Court Opinion

ID: 9558682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:15:22.349519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:30.822812
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
specially concurring and dissenting, with whom GOLDEN, Justice, joins.
I also agree that Ryan’s conviction should be affirmed, and I join in the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Golden. In addition to the discerning analysis presented by Justice Golden, I believe that we have cases in Wyoming that justify the exercise of discretion by the trial court in admitting the Bratton testimony. The jury was confronted by events that seemed difficult to reconcile. *66In my judgment, the Bratton testimony was useful to the jury in its duty to determine the facts in this case.
I have analyzed the matter from a different perspective than Justice Golden. I agree that we should not treat Bratton’s testimony as character evidence under W.R.E. 404. For me, the W.R.E. 404 issue would relate only to the evidence of spousal abuse that was presented by other witnesses. Ryan did not contest the admissibility of that evidence. The admissibility of Bratton’s testimony then should be evaluated under W.R.E. 702 and W.R.E. 703.
These rules obviously raise far different questions than the question of character evidence. The primary concern in the exercise of the trial court’s discretion is whether the expert will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue. This determination presupposes the determination of relevance under W.R.E. 401, and then invokes the weighing requirements of W.R.E. 403. In this case, the issue at the trial, as I understand the case, was who shot whom. This evidence was definitely useful to the jury in deciding whether Ryan had shot the victim and then shot himself, or, alternatively, whether the victim first wounded Ryan who then killed her in protecting himself.
While factually distinguishable, language that we invoked in Coleman v. State, 741 P.2d 99, 105 (Wyo.1987), may well have been prophetic:
It was offered for a permissible purpose to show motive, the state of mind of Coleman, intent, purpose, and a continuing course of conduct. It was material because evidence of motive can lead to an inference of identity which is an element of this crime. That concept is appropriately stated in J. Wein-stein and M. Berger, 2 Weinstein’s Evidence, supra, § 404[14] at 404-108:
“Motive has been defined as ‘supply[ing] the reason that nudges the will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal intent.’ Two evidentiary steps are involved. Evidence of other crimes is admitted to show that defendant has a reason for having the requisite state of mind to do the act charged, and from this mental state it is inferred that he did commit the act.” (Footnotes omitted.)
In Marker v. State, 748 P.2d 295, 297 (Wyo.1988), after quoting the above language from Coleman, we went on to adopt the following language:
Wright and Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5239, pp. 465-466 (1978) states:
“The exception [for proof of identity] is usually thought of as involving evidence of a method of committing crimes that is so distinctive as to constitute a ‘signature’ of the culprit. But this is only one way in which evidence of other crimes may serve to identify the actor. Identity may also be shown when the other crime establishes that the defendant is one of a limited class of persons with the capacity to commit the crime :Ji ⅝ ⅛ »
(Emphasis added.) In Kolb v. State, 930 P.2d 1238, 1242 (Wyo.1996), we said:
The admissibility of such testimony is a function of helping the jury understand how particular conduct by the accused or an alleged victim can be viewed as part of a greater pattern of behavior, rather than as an isolated event.
I am convinced that is exactly why the trial court committed no error in admitting the Bratton testimony. Viewed as an isolated event, the circumstances could be perceived as nothing more than a tragic accident. When Ryan’s conduct and that of the victim are viewed in the “greater pattern of behavior,” however, it is much easier to understand what was going on that resulted in the death of the victim and the wounding of Ryan.
I would hold that there was no error, not that error occurred but was harmless.