Court Opinion

ID: 9740181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:29:27.858759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:16.651426
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE GOLDENHERSH, dissenting: I dissent. In its well-reasoned opinion the appellate court has shown beyond question that the delay in this case resulted solely from the failure to timely indict the defendant and not from the continuance of the preliminary hearing. The majority purports to find support for its position in People v. Benjamin, 34 Ill.2d 183, People v. Petropoulos, 34 Ill.2d 179, and People v. Bagato, 27 Ill.2d 165. The holding in those cases is based on the assumption that delay in the preliminary hearings in some manner delayed the trials, a conclusion unsupported by any semblance of reasoning and which will not withstand scrutiny. Although constitutionally mandated (Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 7), we have held that prompt indictment obviated the need for a preliminary hearing (People v. Hendrix, 54 Ill.2d 165), that a conviction should be affirmed despite a patent violation of the constitutional provision, and that the remedy for the violation must be provided by the General Assembly. (People v. Howell, 60 Ill.2d 117.) In those cases and in People v. Kent, 54 Ill.2d 161, we recognized that although the existence of probable cause could be determined either by preliminary hearing or indictment, the prosecution could proceed only by indictment. It is obvious, therefore, that the failure to timely indict, not in any manner affected by the request for continuance of the preliminary hearing, caused the delay in this case.