Court Opinion

ID: 9614776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:28:03.858185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:38.939258
License: Public Domain

HENRIOD, Justice
(dissenting):
Respectfully, I dissent.
It appears that the hallmark of the main opinion considerably is based on the gratui*145ty that if anybody, — just anybody, — pays a decreed amount for X, beneficiary of a judgment, — has some kind of an immutable right to collect from the judgment debtor. The main opinion says that if someone other than the judgment debtor takes care of the obligation, “That person then has the right to claim reimbursement, . the same as any other past debt.” It is impossible to determine who “that person” is here unless it be Baggs, her new husband, ■ — who has no contractual rights against the old husband.
Such a concept allows an interloper, not particeps to a debt, and not a litigant in a legal proceeding, to muscle in on a contract or debt or judgment and collect on a voluntary payment of someone else’s obligation, — when the latter may be subject to a legal defense on the part of the creditor, such as fraud upon the court, full payment made, bankruptcy and any of many other such defenses. If Karen is suing for what she has paid, is one thing, but if she is suing for what Baggs has furnished, is another, which seems to be the case here.
The statement of the main opinion, quoted above, completely departs from any known principles in the law of contracts.