Court Opinion

ID: 9699521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:30:27.170447+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:51.936161
License: Public Domain

Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
I join in the Court’s Senate districting plan reluctantly, despite my strong disagreement with the majority’s decision to limit the term of office of Senators to be elected from odd numbered districts1 in the forthcoming election to two years. However, in view of the imminence of the 1966 elections, the importance of a prompt decision persuades me to support the majority’s Senate plan notwithstanding my disagreement with the two year term limitation. I do so in order to ensure *367that a constitutionally valid districting plan be made available to the voters of the Commonwealth for the 1966 elections.
I regret, however, that this Court failed to produce an apportionment plan for the House which was at least as acceptable as that achieved for the Senate. This failure is all the more disappointing in view of the fact that the task confronting this Court in reapportioning the House was no more difficult, if not considerably easier, than that involved in districting the Senate. The unsatisfactory result achieved compels me to dissent from the majority’s apportionment plan for the House of Representatives.
I
In joining in the Senate plan, I am acquiescing in certain provisions (other than the two year term limitation) which are not entirely to my satisfaction. My decision to do so, and to concede my differences, is based primarily on my belief that the plan adopted is both in conformity with constitutional imperatives, and, on balance, a fair and sound accommodation of the varying and divergent solutions constitutionally and realistically available to this Court. Moreover, the difficulties and complexities involved in the implementation of our adjudication of September 29, 1964,2 the magnitude of the task, and its essentially legislative rather than judicial nature creates a situation not conducive to unanimity of agreement. Under such circumstances, satisfied that the plan is constitutional, and on the whole sound, I do not feel it appropriate that I condition my joinder on complete agreement with all aspects of the plan.
The primary objective of this Court in the task of implementing our previous decision in this case was *368the establishment of legislative districts -substantially, equal in population3 in conformity with the requirements of both the Federal Constitution and the Constitution-of this-.Commonwealth.4 In my view, an examination of the plan here adopted discloses that our objective has been.realized.
Analysis of the plan reveals that deviation from the apportionment norm has been restricted to a minimum, level. 66 per cent of the senatorial districts created deviate from the norm by less than 5 per cent; 78 per cent of -the districts deviate by less than 6 per cent; 84 per cent deviate by less than 7 per cent; 88 per.cent deviate by less than 8 per cent; and no district deviates beyond 9.8 per cent from the ideal.5 As a result, one of the *369more obvious and desirable features of today’s adjudication is that the election of a majority' of the Senate may not be accomplished by districts containing' less than 50.1 per cent of' the population of the Commonwealth.6
Thus, these figures reveal that the invidious discrimination which existed under the senatorial districting act7 invalidated in our earlier adjudication has been eliminated. Moreover, this has been accomplished under today’s plan' without the enforcement of such mathematical exactness as would unnecessarily invade-the integrity of governmental subdivisions and county lines while adding little to the quality of representative-processes.8
*370. Equal attention, and consideration has been given to the need for the plan adopted to yield compact districts of contiguous territory. An examination of the Court’s plan reveals that these constitutional objectives have been realized and harmonized with the equality of population principle and other guidelines set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States and this Court in our previous opinion in this case. On the whole, the accommodation which both the Federal and State Constitutions compel, and which this Court has sought, has been satisfactorily achieved. Thus, although the' plan is not perfect or ideal, it is constitutional and possesses sufficient merit to persuade me to join in its adoption.
However, as I have previously noted, I am disturbed by the unnecessary and unwise provision in the Court’s plan limiting Senators to be elected from odd numbered senatorial districts to less than a full four year constitutional term. In my view, such restriction is not mandated by the Federal Constitution and is inconsistent with Article II, §3 of the Constitution of this Commonwealth which provides, “Senators shall be elected for the term of four years . . . .” I entertain grave difficulties, with a construction of that provision which limits its reach to one half of the Senate while denying, its effect to the remaining membership.
Once this Court concluded that all 50 Senators were constitutionally required to stand for election in the 1966 general election, that determination, in my view, *371should have been controlling and required that all senatorial seats be filled for a four year constitutional term. I believe that the Supreme Court of Illinois,9 with the approval of the Federal District Court for Northern Illinois,10 correctly decided the issue when it recently held that the entire membership of the Senate of that State would stand for election in 1966 for full four year terms notwithstanding a state constitutional provision providing for staggered senatorial terms. However, because I am unable to persuade a majority of this Court to require all Senators to run for a four year term, and having made clear my views on this aspect of the Senate plan and my disapproval of the two year limitation, I most reluctantly concur in the Senate plan adopted by the majority.
Some comment on the plan embodied in Senate Bill No. 116211 would seem appropriate at this juncture.' That plan did not commend itself to a majority of this Court because certain of its provisions appeared both inequitable and unconstitutional.
The most fundamental failing of that proposal was the fact that it was obviously structured and designed to insulate 25 senatorial incumbents, elected in 1964, from standing for election in 1966. The undesirability, if not unconstitutionality, of such an approach is indicated by the fact that many of the districts represented by these incumbents would undergo, under the Bill, an infusion of voters from areas previously embraced by other senatorial districts. As a result of this transition, voters would be represented by a Senator in whose *372selection they were not afforded an opportunity to participate.12 Thus, by permitting 25 incumbents to complete a full four year term, Senate Bill 1162 would disenfranchise significant numbers of voters by depriving them of a choice as to their Senator until 1968, an additional two years. It is clear that any plan which practically and effectively delays reapportionmerit for such substantial numbers of voters for an additional two year period is both ’ undesirable and unacceptablé.
Another aspect of the plan proposed in Senate Bill 1162 which militated strongly against its acceptability is the unnecessarily large deviation of the districts there created from the apportionment norm. At least 1 out of every 5 districts set up under’ Senate Bill 1162 deviates from the apportionment ratio by 10 per cent or greater. Three districts deviate by 13 per cent or more and one reaches to a variance of greater than 14 per cent beyond the ideal.13 One result of these dis*373parities and the extent of. deviation permitted under Bill 1162 is that districts containing 49.1 per cent of the population of the Commonwealth would be able to elect a majority of the membership, and thus achieve control,'of the Senate.14
"Thus, although exact mathematical equality among, legislative districts is not required by the Federal or State Constitution, a greater regard for the “one man, one vote” principle than is apparent in Bill 1162 is clearly desirable.' That such a regard is practical and attainable is '. convincingly indicated by the result achieved under the plan adopted today.15
*374II
My disagreement with and dissent to the majority’s House plan is based primarily on its failure to observe the equal population principle and other guidelines mandated by the controlling decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and set forth in our earlier opinion in this case. Unfortunately, the plan adopted by the majority permits representative districts embracing 47.03 per cent of the population of the Commonwealth to elect a majority of the 203 members of the House.16
Moreover, as undesirable, unnecessary, and unfair as that overall apportionment is, its imperfection is compounded by the serious and glaring population disparities between individual representative districts.
In my view, the majority, in formulating its House plan, unwisely proceeded on the unsupported assumption that the House apportionment norm of 56,597 might be exceeded by as much as 15 per cent or reduced by a like percentage. Thus, the Court’s plan contains a number of legislative districts which reach to that, in my view, excessive level of deviation. For example, District 149, containing a population of 64,-529, deviates by 14 per cent above the norm. On the other hand, .District 99, with a population of 47,908, is 15.3 per cent below the House norm.17
•While I fully recognize that some minor deviation from the population norm, made necessary by considerations seeking to preserve the integrity of local gov*375ernmental subdivisions or to retain some convenient and realistic units for voters and the efficient functioning of local election machinery, is acceptable, the population disparities which the majority here countenances are without compelling reason or necessity. Under such circumstances, I cannot approve of , the . result achieved and must dissent from the House apportionment plan adopted today.

 The odd or even numerical designation of all senatorial districts was fixed by the Legislature. The vast majority of these designations can be traced back at least as far as 1921. See Act of May 10, 1921, P. L. 449. With minor exceptions, these same designations were retained in the 1964 Act, Act of January 9, 1964, P. L. (1963) 1432, 25 P.S. §2217 (Supp. 1965), and in Senate Bill 1162 of the 1965 Session. The Senate plan adopted by the Court in no way changes the odd or even numerical character assigned to any senatorial district by the Legislature. The Court merely accepted, retained and utilized the Legislative numbering system.

 Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A. 2d 556 (1964).

 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362 (1964); Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 203 A. 2d 556 (1964).

 Butcher v. Bloom, 415 Pa. 438, 462-63, 203 A. 2d 556, 570-71 (1964).

 96 per cent of the districts under the present plan, or all but 2, deviate by less than 9 per cent from the apportionment norm. The remaining 2 districts, numbered Districts 34 and 26, presented special problems because of peculiarities of geography and population. District 34, consisting of the Counties of Cameron, Centre, Clearfield, and Clinton, contains the lowest number of inhabitants. of any district in the plan, and deviates by 9 per cent from the norm.-However, the district consist's of a contiguous and compact area of 3562 square miles and embraces more than 4 times the total aréa of both Philadelphia (127 square miles) and Allegheny (730 square miles) Counties,. Since this deviation is well within constitutional tolerance, a further reduction, which could only be accomplished by the fracturing of county boundary lines, did not appear justified in view of the size of the area already embraced and the nature-of the adjoining'area.
District 26, located within Delaware County, embraces an area of high population density and is composed of 12 boroughs and 8 townships. It contains a population of 248,695, the highest of any district in the plan and deviates by 9.8 per cent from the ideal. No significant reduction in this deviation was possible, however, Without invading the integrity of municipal subdivisions or affecting adjoining districts. In light of the minimal nature of the de*369viatien, the dislocation which would result from such' an invasion did not appear necessary or justified.
•Compare the Supplemental Report of the Advisory Council. on Reapportionment to the Legislature of the State of New York, dated January 17, 1966. The Council, in its amended recommendations, justified deviations extending to 10.8 per cent in order to increase materially the number of county lines preserved intact, thus reversing a previous recommendation which sought to hold- maximum deviations to a somewhat lesser level.

 This figure is obtained by calculating the percentage of the' total population of the Commonwealth which is' embraced by the 26 least populous senatorial districts. Under the Senate plan adopted today, 5,666,S79 persons, out of the total population of 11,319,-366, reside in areas embraced by these 26 districts. The 1964 act invalidated by this Court in our prior adjudication permitted districts containing a minority of 44.02 per cent of the total population of the Commonwealth to elect a majority of the membership of the Senate. ........

 The Act of January 9, 1964, No. 2, P. L. (1963) 1432, 25 P.S. §2217 (Supp. 1965).

 So long as the resulting plan does not submerge' the overriding objective of substantial equality of population among legislrtive districts, “a State may legitimately desire to maintain the integrity of various political subdivisions, insofar as possible, and provide for compact districts of contiguous territory in designing a legislative apportionment scheme. Valid considerations may un*370derlie such aims. Indiscriminate districting, without any regard for political subdivision or natural or historical boundary lines, may be little more than an open invitation to partisan gerrymandering . .. . .” Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-79, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 1390 (1964).
Moreover, the utilization of existing county units as the building block of the plan here adopted' has the additional advantage of preserving established and convenient electoral units for the voters and, thus, avoiding unnecessary dislocation of local election machinery.

 People ex rel. Engle v. Kerner, 33 Ill. 2d 11, 210 N.E. 2d 165 (1965).

 Id. at 167.

 Senate Bill No. 1162 (Printers No. 1466) was passed by the Senate of the General Assembly during the 1965 Session. The measure did not, however, secure approval of the House of Representatives, but was embodied in one of the plans submitted to this Court for consideration.

 An illustration of such an infusion may be seen by an examination of District 25 proposed under Senate Bill 1162. Crawford and Forest Counties, containing a total population of 82,441, were added to the areas embraced by District 25. Thus, under Senate Bill 1162, the voters of these additional counties would be represented by the incumbent until the 1968 general election even though they were not eligible to participate in his selection. A similar result would have obtained in District 23, where Lycoming County, containing a population of 109,367 people, was added to the arqa embraced by that district; District 33, where Juniata, Fulton, Huntingdon, and Mifflin Counties, containing a total population of 110,276 people, were added to the area embraced by that district. Analysis of the 25 districts involved reveals that areas embracing approximately 800,000 persons were added to districts represented by-. Senators elected in 1964 and, under the Bill,'not required to stand for election until 1968.

 The extent and number of deviant districts may well be accounted for by the fact that the Bill as structured was designed to preserve the senatorial seats of those Senators elected in 1964. As a result, a certain rigidity was introduced which limited the avail*373able avenues .for reducing deviation from tbe apportionment norm.. Thus, under Senate Bill 1162, District 33, containing a population of "198,257, adjoins District 30, which contains a population of 257,-171. That district adjoins Districts 32 and 39, which contain populations of 258,003 and 258,407 respectively. But for the attempt to tailor the plan to preserve certain districts, a more equitable distribution of population would have been possible. Moreover, because of the limited avenues available, to equalize population among the districts, the following district was created: Mercer and Crawford Counties, traditionally one senatorial" district, were divided and 'Crawford County, bounded on the "West by the Ohio State line, was joined with ah area to the "East to. form a district extending over 180 miles eastward, a distance greater than half-way apross the width of the State. This result obtained notwithstanding the fact that when joined to form a single district, Mercer and Crawford Counties contain a population which does not deviate significantly from the apportionment norm.-

 Under Senate Bill 1162, the 26 least populous districts contain a total population of 5,560,339, 49.1 per cent of the total population of the Commonwealth.

 The constitutional and practical significance of the fact that under Senate Bill 1162 districts containing a minority of 49.1 per cent of the population of the State could elect a majority of the Senate, when contrasted with the 50.1 per cent achieved under the Court’s plan, is indicated by the results of the 1960 Presidential Election. In that election, the popular vote plurality was approximately 112,000", a margin of only .0016 per cent of the electorate.

 Under the majority’s House plan, the 102 least populous districts contain 5,323,964 inhabitants, 47.03 per cent of the total population of the Commonwealth.

 For some further illustrations of large population disparities, see House Districts, 8, 26, 139, 176 (substantially above the apportionment norm), and Districts 48, 59, 61, and 63 (substantially below the apportionment norm).