Court Opinion

ID: 9652768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:31:35.422633+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:53.971261
License: Public Domain

Justice FLAHERTY,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority that the defendant failed to preserve his Fourth Amendment contentions on appeal.
The record on appeal reflects the following facts. The defendant was arraigned and charged with violating G.L. 1956 § 11-47-8(a)6 and § 11-47-24, and he pled “not guilty.” The defendant vigorously contested the constitutionality of the search and seizure over two days of hearings on his motion to suppress evidence of the firearm in question and his statement to police. *557At the suppression hearing, Huy testified, presented his passenger as a witness, and cross-examined the state’s three police witnesses. After the motion to suppress was denied, he waived his right to a jury trial. Huy stipulated to the date of his arrest and to the fact that he did not have a license to carry a weapon. He also assented to a stipulation based on the facts elicited at the suppression hearing, which the trial justice read into the record. Huy made “qualifications” to the stipulation so that he could contest the voluntariness of his confession and the reliability of the informant. Counsel then explained that those issues would be the subject of an appeal to this Court, an intention which the trial justice acknowledged on the record. After reading the stipulation into the record, the trial justice recited the standard for a motion to dismiss and acknowledged his duty to “weigh and evaluate the trial evidence, pass upon the credibility of the trial witnesses and engage in the inferential process.” The state and Huy each rested, and the court then found that, “[biased upon the stipulation, based upon the hearing that the Court held in this matter on February 21 st and 22nd of 2005 in the Motion to Suppress, and based upon the stipulated facts, recognizing the qualifications” made by defense counsel, the evidence was “sufficient to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” The court then found Huy guilty of the charges and again acknowledged Huy’s intent to appeal.
The exclusionary rule
The majority is troubled by the fact that neither the gun nor Huy’s incriminating statement was entered into evidence during the jury-waived trial. Citing Linkey v. Maryland, 46 Md.App. 312, 416 A.2d 286 (Ct.Spec.App.1980), it concludes that the exclusionary rule is not implicated unless the challenged evidence is introduced at trial. See id. at 288-89. In Linkey, the defendant was charged with murder and moved to suppress certain incriminating statements he had made to the police. Id. at 288. After the court denied his motion, the parties entered into a plea bargain, under the terms of which the defendant pled not guilty and the state submitted an “agreed statement of facts” in which the defendant assented to the “ultimate facts”: that the defendant stabbed the victim to death with malice and without justification. Id. The Maryland Court held that the defendant’s appeal was not properly preserved because the evidence that he argued that law enforcement had improperly obtained — the incriminating statements— was not referred to or submitted at trial, nor was it considered in determining his guilt. Id. at 288-89. Rather, the prosecutor merely rested on the agreed statement of ultimate facts. In my opinion, the rule set forth in Linkey does not apply to this appeal because, as discussed further below, this defendant did not admit all essential elements of the crimes charged. Equally important here, in contrast to Lin-key, this defendant’s statement and the firearm found in his vehicle were considered by the trial justice as the result of the testimony of the police officers who testified in the suppression hearing, even though they physically did not become part of the trial record.
Furthermore, I disagree with the majority’s view that the poisonous tree lacked fruit. In Linkey, the court reasoned that the exclusionary rule keeps out tainted evidence, so that if the tainted evidence, or its fruit, never becomes part of the eviden-tiary bundle at trial, the conviction is not based on any error that would warrant the application of the exclusionary rule. But, there is no requirement that evidence that a defendant seeks to exclude must be documentary or tangible in nature. To the contrary, under the Fourth Amendment, *558there is “no basis in the cases or in logic for distinguishing between the introduction into evidence of physical objects illegally taken and the introduction of testimony concerning objects illegally observed.” McGinnis v. United States, 227 F.2d 598, 603 (1st Cir.1955) (holding suppression of evidence of illegal search extends to testimony of observations made during the search); see also United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 470, 100 S.Ct. 1244, 63 L.Ed.2d 537 (1980).
Here, although the prosecutor never offered the actual firearm or the documents containing Huy’s incriminating statement at trial, in my judgment this is irrelevant to the preservation of Huy’s appeal. Huy’s pre trial motion sought to “suppress any and all reference to or use of, tangible evidence seized” and “all use of or reference to any evidence derived from this unlawfully seized material.” There can be no doubt that the trial justice considered the fruit of the alleged illegal search. He considered the police officer’s testimony that he found a weapon in the trunk of the car. Also, he considered the police officer’s testimony that Huy gave a statement in which he admitted to owning the firearm.7 Therefore, I cannot agree that Huy waived his appeal merely because neither the firearm nor the incriminating statement was entered into evidence as a tangible object.
Huy’s stipulated-bench trial is not a plea of guilty
In effect, the majority’s decision essentially equates Huy’s stipulated-bench trial to a guilty plea by concluding that Huy waived his right to appeal to this Court because he stipulated to the facts and relieved the prosecutor of her burden of proof. See State v. Keohane, 814 A.2d 327, 329 (R.I.2003) (guilty plea waives appeal of issue of motion to suppress). It is significant that this Court has never held that a defendant waives his appeal of a suppression motion when he pleads not guilty and participates in a stipulated-bench trial.8 To the contrary, in State v. Dustin, 874 A.2d 244 (R.I.2005), we held that a defendant did not waive his appeal when he stipulated to the criminal information packet because “the adversarial nature of the proceedings below were sufficient to preserve the hearing justice’s denial of defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress.”9 Id. at 247.
*559In my opinion, the better reasoned view is that a stipulated-beneh trial usually avoids the waiver rule. See People v. Sullivan, 72 Ill.App.3d 533, 29 Ill.Dec. 82, 391 N.E.2d 241, 243 (1979). In Sullivan, the court held that defendant’s stipulated-beneh trial was not tantamount to a guilty plea when the state set forth facts that would be brought out in testimony and defendant presented no evidence, because he maintained a challenge as to admissibility of evidence. Id. at 243-44. “In a stipulated facts trial, the judge or jury still determines the defendant’s guilt or innocence; the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the defendant’s guilt; and the defendant is not precluded from offering evidence or cross-examining witnesses but in essence, by the stipulation, agrees that what the State presents is what the witness would say. Furthermore, in a stipulated facts trial the defendant maintains his right to appeal * * State v. Johnson, 104 Wash.2d 338, 705 P.2d 773, 775-76 (1985). As a result, when a defendant’s pretrial motion to suppress is denied, a defendant does not waive his appeal with respect to the admissibility of the evidence by submitting his case to a bench trial based on stipulated evidence. See State v. Gossett, 120 Ariz. 44, 583 P.2d 1364, 1366 (Ct.App.1978) (holding the defendant did not waive appeal of denial of motion to suppress in bench trial after he stipulated to hearing transcript and police records).
In the case at hand, the proceedings below were distinctly adversarial. Huy did not plea bargain, he did not plead guilty, he did not plead nolo contendere, he did not waive his right to present evidence, and he did not waive his right to cross-examine witnesses. The trial justice weighed the evidence, engaged in inferential fact-finding, and found sufficient evidence to conclude that Huy was guilty. During the trial, Huy also asserted “qualifications” that were essentially defenses challenging the admissibility of the state’s evidence. See Sullivan, 29 Ill.Dec. 82, 391 N.E.2d at 243 (stipulated-beneh trial does not waive an appeal when defendant asserts a defense relating to the admissibility of the evidence). Furthermore, it is very clear from reading the record that Huy, his counsel, the trial justice, and the prosecutor, all believed that by participating in a stipulated-beneh trial, Huy would not be giving up his right to appeal to this Court; indeed, he specifically preserved it. Therefore, I do not believe that Huy waived his appeal merely by submitting to a stipulated-beneh trial.
Huy’s appeal is not moot
It seems to me that the majority’s opinion is based upon principles of mootness. In other words, it suggests that a ruling by this Court would not affect the conviction and would therefore, not redress Huy’s injury. Cf. United States v. Larson, 302 F.3d 1016, 1018-20 (9th Cir.2002) (holding appeal of suppression motion mooted by stipulation to all elements of crime). The majority asserts that because Huy stipulated to the facts upon which his conviction rests, even if the contested evidence were suppressed, the conviction would still *560stand. In addressing this issue, several courts have held that when a defendant stipulates to the “ultimate facts” or “each element of the crime,” the conviction is in essence untainted by illegal evidence and thus not subject to appeal on the basis of a motion to suppress that was denied. See id. at 1018 (defendant stipulated that he was a felon and “knowingly had in his possession” a pistol that crossed state lines); Linkey, 416 A.2d at 288 (defendant stipulated that he stabbed the victim to death “with malice, but without premeditation, deliberation, and without justification, excuse or mitigating circumstances”). Those courts reason that because the conviction rests solely on the stipulation, there is no error to address on appeal. See Larson, 302 F.3d at 1019; Linkey, 416 A.2d at 288-89. Under these circumstances, “[a]ll the court was asked to do was to determine whether, as a matter of law, those facts sufficed to constitute [the charged crime].” Linkey, 416 A.2d at 288 (citing Barnes v. State, 31 Md.App. 25, 354 A.2d 499 (Ct.Spec.App.1976)); see also Larson, 302 F.3d at 1019 (“the stipulation itself was sufficient to convict him”).
However, unlike Linkey or Larson, and contrary to the majority’s assertion, I respectfully submit that Huy did not concede to “the ultimate facts sought to be proved.” The defendant did not stipulate that he knowingly carried a firearm with obliterated marks. Rather, he stipulated that he did not have a license to carry a firearm, that he “was in the driver’s seat,” that “[p]olice [ojfficer A’Vant conducted a search of the vehicle’s trunk and discovered a .45 caliber with laser site hidden beneath a large speaker,” and that “[t]he .45 caliber with laser site had an obliterated serial number.” An essential element to convict under § ll-47-8(a) requires “conscious carrying,” and there must be proof that “the defendant’s knowledge was there, that he was knowingly carrying a pistol in that vehicle.” State v. Benevides, 425 A.2d 77, 79-80 (R.I.1981). The defendant never admitted or stipulated that he knowingly possessed the firearm or that he was conscious of the presence of the firearm in the trunk of the automobile he was driving. The stipulation simply does not address the necessary element of Huy’s mental state.10 The element of knowledge is typically established by circumstantial evidence and logical inferences. See, e.g., State v. Hernandez, 641 A.2d 62, 72 (R.I.1994); State v. Mercado, 635 A.2d 260, 263-64 (R.I.1993). Making inferences is a function of the fact-finder. Labbe v. Hill Brothers, Inc., 97 R.I. 269, 273, 197 A.2d 305, 308 (1964). Thus, to render a judgment of conviction in this case, the trial justice was required to make an inference that Huy knew there was a firearm in the trunk of his girlfriend’s mother’s car at the time he was driving it. It is clear to me that the court was asked to do more than just “determine whether, as a matter of law, those facts sufficed to constitute [the crime charged].” Linkey, 416 A.2d at 288. Furthermore, it is clear from the record that the trial court weighed evidence other than the stipulation when the trial justice said that he also considered the testimony from the two days of the suppression hearing when he found Huy guilty. Therefore, the defendant’s conviction was not based solely on the stipulation, and the argument that it *561was tainted by illegal evidence should remain viable.
The distinction between stipulations and agreed facts
I agree with the majority that there may be a difference in the effect of stipulating to the facts that the evidence will show and submitting an agreed statement of facts. See Barnes, 354 A.2d at 505. When a party agrees to the “ultimate facts,” the facts are no longer in dispute and they are established as true. Id. Furthermore, when a party enters into an agreed statement of facts those facts are binding on the parties on appeal. Rhode Island Public Telecommunications Authority v. Russell, 914 A.2d 984, 990 (R.I.2007).11 Alternatively, when a party stipulates to the facts in evidence, there is no agreement as to the “ultimate facts;” rather, the stipulation only pertains to what the testimony of a particular witness would be if he were testifying. Barnes, 354 A.2d at 505. “The agreement is to what the evidence will be, not to what the facts are.” Id.
I see little foundation for the majority’s assumption that Huy “agreed to the facts upon which the decision of the trial justice was based.” In my opinion, this is not so clear from the record. The written document entered into the record is simply entitled “Stipulation.” When presented with the stipulation, the trial justice, remarked, “I might add for the record that the Court has held a motion to suppress in this case. The stipulated facts seem to track the evidence that came out in that hearing on that motion.” Further, Huy’s counsel said that “these were the facts that were elicited at the suppression hearing, and that’s why we agree and stipulate to that.”12 The introduction portion of the stipulation document says that the parties “agree and stipulate to the following facts elicited at the [suppression [h]earing.” Respectfully, I cannot concur with the majority’s conclusion that Huy agreed to the “ultimate facts.”13
Conclusion
In sum, the majority’s decision dispatches Huy’s appeal as if he had pled guilty, when he clearly did not intend to waive his rights to a decision by a fact-finder. To preserve his appeal, the majority would have him go through the repetition of a proceeding in which the state would call *562the exact same witnesses to offer the same testimony that already had been offered at the suppression hearing, and before the same trial justice, sitting as fact-finder in a jury-waived trial. This not only burdens the defendant by placing an unnecessary roadblock to the exercise of the right to appeal, but it also burdens the efficient administration of justice and strains judicial resources. For all these reasons, in my opinion, Huy did not waive his appeal, and thus, I respectfully dissent from the holding in this case.

. General Laws 1956 § ll-47-8(a) provides in pertinent part:
“No person shall, without a license or permit issued as provided in §§ 11-47-11, 11-47-12 and 11-47-18, carry a pistol or revolver in any vehicle or conveyance or on or about his or her person whether visible or concealed, except in his or her dwelling house or place of business or on land possessed by him or her or as provided in §§ 11-47-9 and 11-47-10.”

. The exclusionary rule may apply to a defendant’s incriminating statements obtained by exploitation of illegally seized evidence. See State v. Jennings, 461 A.2d 361, 368 (R.I. 1983).

. In fact, I take note of several cases in which, although waiver was not at issue on appeal, this Court reached the merits of appeals based on motions to suppress after defendants were found guilty after stipulated-bench trials. See State v. Swindell, 895 A.2d 100, 103-04 (R.I.2006) (reaching merits of appeal of motion to suppress breath test results after stipulated-facts bench trial); State v. Black, 721 A.2d 826, 828 (R.I.1998) (vacating conviction upon appeal of denial of motion to suppress after the defendant’s stipulation to facts elicited at suppression hearing and facts contained in criminal information package); State v. Roberts, 420 A.2d 837, 839 (R.I.1980) (reaching merits of constitutional suppression issue on appeal after the defendant was found guilty after stipulated bench trial).

.Although in State v. Dustin, 874 A.2d 244 (R.I.2005), we expressed reservation and cautioned defendants against circumventing the rule against conditional pleas, it is important to note that this Court decided Dustin in 2005, after Huy’s trial was completed. It would be manifestly unfair to hold Huy to this vague cautionary rule, post hoc, that did not expressly prohibit appeals of stipulated-facts trials. I also distinguish State v. Beechum, 933 A.2d 687 (R.I.2007), where we held that a stipulated-facts trial waived the defendant’s appeal. Id. at 690. In Beechum, the defendant challenged the racial mix of the jury *559pool, but no jury was ever seated in his case because of his stipulated-facts trial. Id. at 689-90. This Court held that the stipulated-facts trial was tantamount to a conditional plea because defendant did not examine witnesses, merely incorporated the record from another trial into the record in his trial, and entered into a plea bargaining agreement for an amended indictment and reduced sentence. Id. at 690-91. Unlike Beechum, Huy never entered into any plea bargaining agreement, he presented defenses at trial, and testified and examined four other witnesses at the suppression motion hearing. Furthermore, Beechum also was decided after Huy’s trial.

. Although the record contains the stipulation that Huy gave a statement admitting that the gun belonged to him, he asserted the defense that the statement was not voluntary. Furthermore, this statement does not amount to an admission that Huy knew that his gun was in the car or that he knew he was carrying the gun. See § ll-47-8(a); State v. Benevides, 425 A.2d 77, 79 (R.I.1981).

.Huy is not seeking to withdraw his stipulation or contradict any stipulated facts on appeal. Rather, his appeal is based on facts submitted to the Court by stipulation that flowed from the testimony in the suppression hearing relating to an illegal search. With all due respect, I believe that the majority needlessly latches on to the fact that Huy attempted to contradict the stipulation by arguing he was arrested before the search. At oral argument, however, Huy's counsel acknowledged that his argument that there was an illegal arrest would not affect the outcome of his appeal. This is so because if the police had probable cause to search the vehicle at the time of the stop, whether he was arrested before or after the weapon was discovered would have no bearing on the outcome of the appeal. Likewise, if the police lacked probable cause to search, the illegality of the arrest would not change the outcome. Consequently, Huy essentially waived the arrest argument, basing his case solely on his arguments about the illegality of the search.

. It should be no surprise that at oral argument, Huy’s counsel asserted that the stipulation was to evidence.

. Huy's stipulation that he did not have a license to carry a weapon was made separate from the stipulation read into the record and can fairly be considered an agreed statement of fact rather than a stipulation of evidence because this fact was never elicited at the suppression hearing. The fact that Huy made this factual assertion separate from the stipulation at issue further supports a conclusion that the latter was meant to serve as an agreement only to the content of the testimony.