Court Opinion

ID: 9820205
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 07:00:28.88988+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:38.260349
License: Public Domain

NEWELL, J.,
filed a concurring opinion.
I agree with the plurality that the court of appeals properly dismissed the State’s appeal in this case because the court of appeals lacked jurisdiction. I write separately because I believe the plurality opinion in this case serves no purpose when the court of appeals opinion correctly laid out the settled, applicable law and properly resolved the issue at hand based upon this Court’s existing precedent. State v. Wachtendorf, No. 03-14-0633-CR, 2015 WL 894731 at *2 (Tex.App.-Austin Feb. 26, 2015) (not designated for publication) (holding that the State’s notice of appeal was untimely based upon State v. Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) and State ex rel. Sutton v. Bage, 822 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)). As a matter of consistency, we should have resolved this case in the same way we resolved Davis v. State — by simply refusing discretionary review. Davis v. State, No, PD-1490-14, slip op. at 2 (Tex. Crim. App. Mar. 18, 2015) (not designated for publication). Because that avenue is no longer available, we should just dismiss the petition for discretionary review as improvidently granted now that it is clear that the court of appeals reached the right result for the right reasons.
With these thoughts I concur.
KELLER, P.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which KEASLER, HERVEY and ALCALA, JJ., joined.
I agree with former Presiding Judge McCormick that “entered” is a legal term of art that means “the clerical act of entry into the record”1 and that the clerical act *905of entry occurs when the signed order is “file marked by the clerk.”2 Although the interests of stare decisis are at their height for judicial constructions of legislative enactments upon which the parties rely for guidance in conforming to those enactments,3 there are nevertheless times when a court should reconsider a decision that construes a statute.4 I think this is one of those times, because the construction of the term “entered” in Rosenbaum to mean “signed” is contrary to the plain meaning .of the term “entered” and because the present case illustrates the problems that can be caused by that construction.
Nevertheless, the trial court has the power to remedy the situation in this case if it believes that the State was unfairly deprived of notice of the suppression order in time to file an appeal. An,order suppressing evidence is an interlocutory order that may be revised by the trial court at any time before the end of trial.5 The trial court could rescind its order granting the motion to suppress on the basis that the State was not given timely notice of the order. The trial court could then issue a new order granting the motion to suppress, and the appellate timetables would then run from that new order. Regardless of whether the trial court provides a remedy in this case, I would not continue to uphold an interpretation of a statute that requires the State to rely solely upon the grace of the trial court to correct the deprivation of the State’s right to appeal when the plain language of the statute does not require such a result.
With these comments, I respectfully dissent. ' ' - ■

. State v. Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d 398, 404 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) (McCormick, P.J., concurring).

. Id. at 405.

. Jones v. State, 323 S.W.3d 885, 889 (Tex. Crim.App.2010).

. See e.g., Blake v. State, 971 S.W.2d 451 (Tex.Crim.App.1998) (revisiting and ultimately overruling earlier holding that construed the accpmplice . witness rule not to cover accomplices who are juveniles).

. Black v. State, 362 S.W.3d 626, 633 (Tex. Crim.App.2012).