Court Opinion

ID: 9850018
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:51:01.615209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:30.460867
License: Public Domain

Grice, Presiding Justice,
concurring specially. I am in full accord with everything stated in the opinion except Division 1, as to making a constitutional attack.
While the law of the case has been established as to the sufficiency of the attacks made here by virtue of North Ga. Finishing v. Di-Chem, 230 Ga. 623 (198 SE2d 284), I desire to take this opportunity to express some views that I have on the subject.
Requirements for attacking the constitutionality of a statute have been in force for many years in this state. The following statement of them should suffice.
"In order to raise a question as to the constitutionality of a 'law’ . . . at least three things must always be shown: (1) the statute or *265part of a statute which the party would challenge must be stated, or pointed out with fair precision; (2) the provision of the Constitution which it is claimed has been violated must also be clearly designated; and (3) it must be shown wherein the statute violates such constitutional provision. [Cits.]” Stegall v. Southwest Ga. Housing Authority, 197 Ga. 571, 582 (30 SE2d 196).
There is indeed a solid reason for these requirements. It has been well put. "Since a statute is presumed to be valid and constitutional until the contrary appears, and can not be lawfully set aside by the courts unless the alleged conflict with the Constitution is plain and palpable, the burden is upon any party who assails it to present his attack in clear and definite terms, in order to call forth judicial action concerning it. In so grave or important a matter as declaring invalid an act of a co-ordinate department of government, the courts will not act upon vague and uncertain charges, and should decline to do so unless and until a clear and specific contention or question is presented for determination. [Cits.].” Abel v. State, 190 Ga. 651, 654 (10 SE2d 198).
Accordingly, on many occasions this court has refused to consider attacks which do not measure up to these requirements.
As I view this record, the motion to dismiss the garnishment fails to set forth or point out with fair precision the statute which is challenged.
This court has consistently held that mere designation of "Georgia Code Annotated,” or the like, without reference to the statute itself, is not sufficient. There has been no legislative enactment officially adopting such code as law. Therefore it does not have the legal effect of a statute.
In Bowen v. State, 215 Ga. 471 (111 SE2d 44) it was sought to attack the constitutionality of "subparagraph (a) of Code (Ann.) § 68-1626.” However this court held as follows: "The attempt thus to attack the constitutionality of subparagraph (a) of Code (Ann.) § 68-1626 is futile, since there is no such paragraph and section in the official Code of 1933. Such subparagraph and such section have never become law in consequence of any necessary and required adopting or enacting legislative action. Hence, any decision rendered by this court at this time respecting the validity or the invalidity of subparagraph (a) of Code (Ann.) § 68-1626 would in no way affect the act from which these provisions were taken and placed in an unofficial annotated Code, which a publishing company in the City of Atlanta compiled for distribution and sale.”
In Widemon v. Burson, 224 Ga. 665 (164 SE2d 128), each *266enumeration of error complained of failing to declare a section of the Annotated Code unconstitutional. This court held that "Any ruling upon the constitutionality of a section of the Annotated Code, which has never been adopted by the General Assembly, an essential necessary for it to become law, would in no wise affect the Act of the General Assembly from which the section of the Annotated Code was taken.”
In Turk v. State Hwy. Dept., 226 Ga. 245, 246 (174 SE2d 791), the attack was made upon "section 36-1307 Ga. Code Ann.” This court held that this designation was not sufficient.
See also, Morgan v. Todd, 214 Ga. 497, 499 (106 SE2d 37); Holmes v. State, 224 Ga. 553, 558 (163 SE2d 803); Cox v. Burson, 226 Ga. 13 (2) (172 SE2d 406).
These unreversed unanimous decisions of this court are binding precedents which should have been adhered to in the disposition of this matter.
This court has spoken many times on the effect of unanimous unreversed decisions. In Crown Laundry v. Burch, 205 Ga. 211, 212 (53 SE2d 116), referring to three such decisions, Mr. Justice Candler speaking on behalf of the full-court declared: "Those cases are unquestionably authority for the ruling complained of; and the three cases from this court are all full-bench decisions which have not been overruled or materially modified, and since they are not in conflict with any of our older decisions, they are binding upon us and must be followed. There is no request to review and overrule those decisions in the manner prescribed by law (Code, § 6-1611), and so long as they are permitted to stand they have the force and effect of a statute and are controlling on the question there decided.” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Hagan v. Asa G. Candler, Inc., 189 Ga. 250, 258 (5 SE2d 739, 126 ALR 108).
Reference to "Georgia Code Annotated” has been for mere convenience and aid in locating the law of this state and when it has been accompanied by citation to the statute enacted by the General Assembly there has been no problem. But here no such accompanying reference is made. The citation is only "Georgia Code Annotated § 46-101.” With due regard for the high quality of the codal publication involved here, we must conclude that reference to it alone does not constitute a legal citation. We cannot take judicial notice of it.
These requirements for attacking a statute were not done away with by the Civil Practice Act (Ga. L. 1966, p. 609 as amended; Code Ann. § 81A-101 et seq.) or the Appellate Practice Act (Ga. L. 1965, *267p. 18, as amended; Code Ann. § 6-701 et seq.)
Rather, without exception, they have been reaffirmed in many cases of this court decided after the passage of these Acts, as is shown in the cases cited hereinbefore. Significantly, in none of such cases are those Acts ever mentioned.
There is no language in the Civil Practice Act which gives any support to the contention that it abrogated the requirements for challenging the constitutionality of a statute. None is forthcoming from Section 1 of that Act (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 610; Code Ann. § 81A-101) to the effect that it governs procedure in all courts of record in all civil suits, with a noted exception, or from the provision which recites that the Act "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action.” I approve of these objectives but the Act does not change the law involved here.
Furthermore, the concept of notice pleading derived from Section 8 of the Civil Practice Act and exemplified by such cases as Bourn v. Herring, 225 Ga. 67 (3) (166 SE2d 89) and Harper v. DeFreitas, 117 Ga. App. 236, 238 (160 SE2d 260) is not applicable here. This is because a motion is not a pleading within the purview of the Civil Practice Act.
In this regard, Section 7 of that Act (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 609, 618; 1967, pp. 226, 230; Code Ann. § 81A-107) makes a clear distinction.
Subsection (a) of that section is headed "Pleadings,” and enumerates specifically what pleadings are allowed, making no reference whatever to motions.
On the other hand, subsection (b) is headed "Motions and other papers,” and in material part provides as follows: "(1) An application to the court for an order shall be made by motion which . . . shall state with particularity the grounds therefor ... (2) The rules applicable to captions, signing, and all other matters of form of pleadings apply to all motions and other papers provided for by this Title.” (Emphasis supplied.)
This last provision, as to "matters of form,” obviously does not relate to the content of the attacks made upon the constitutionality of a statute, as called for by the requirements set forth previously in this opinion.
It is significant that Section 7 (b) (1) requires that the grounds of motions be stated with particularity. Here the motion to dismiss the garnishment did not do so.
Thus, as I apprise the situation, nothing in the Civil Practice Act abrogates the aforementioned requirements for attacking the *268validity of a statute.
Likewise, there is no provision in the Appellate Practice Act (Ga. L. 1965, p. 18; Code Ann. § 6-701 et seq.) which does so. Section 23 (Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 40; Code Ann. § 6-905), which declares in substance that the Act is intended to provide a new appellate procedure, and should be liberally construed to bring about a decision on the merits to avoid dismissal of appeals except as specifically referred to therein, has my full support. However, it has nothing to do with the requirements of making a proper attack upon the constitutionality of a statute.
As I view it, there is no merit in the contention that the plaintiffs failure to object in the trial court to the content of the defendant’s grounds for dismissal of the garnishment proceeding and the argument on certain cases resulted in a waiver of its right to challenge now the rules for attacking the validity of the garnishment statute. As stressed in this concurring opinion these are well established requirements for making such attacks. The burden is upon the party making the attacks to do so properly. It was not carried here.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Mobley and Justice Nichols join me in this special concurrence.