Court Opinion

ID: 9373912
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:10:28.431238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:49.437596
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                                   NOV 23 2022
                            NOT FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                               SUSAN M. SPRAUL, CLERK
                                                                                 U.S. BKCY. APP. PANEL
                                                                                 OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT
           UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL
                     OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

 In re:                                               BAP No. OR-22-1012-BFT
 PETER SZANTO,
              Debtor.                                 Bk. No. 3:16-bk-33185-pcm7

 PETER SZANTO,
              Appellant,
 v.                                 MEMORANDUM∗
 CANDACE AMBORN, Chapter 7 Trustee,
              Appellee.

               Appeal from the United States Bankruptcy Court
                          for the District of Oregon
               Peter C. McKittrick, Bankruptcy Judge, Presiding

Before: BRAND, FARIS, and TAYLOR, Bankruptcy Judges.

       Debtor Peter Szanto appeals pro se1 an order overruling his objection to

a motion filed by the chapter 72 trustee, Candace Amborn ("Trustee"), to incur

expenses for monthly banking fees for the estate's account at Independent

       ∗  This disposition is not appropriate for publication. Although it may be cited for
whatever persuasive value it may have, see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1, it has no precedential
value, see 9th Cir. BAP Rule 8024-1.
        1 As prior Panels have noted, Szanto is not the ordinary pro se litigant. He has an

MBA and a J.D.; he has filed at least three bankruptcy cases in three different states; and he
is a serial litigant and party to numerous court cases nationwide. Among other courts, he
is subject to a vexatious litigant pre-filing review order in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. See In re Szanto, No. 17-80195, Doc. 6 (9th Cir. Nov. 24, 2017).
        2 Unless specified otherwise, all chapter and section references are to the

Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532.
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Financial (aka Independent Bank).

     Szanto filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy case in 2016. After not disclosing

some financial accounts and engaging in unauthorized postpetition transfers

of funds, Szanto's case was converted to chapter 7. Ultimately, he was denied

a discharge.

     Since then, Szanto has been on a relentless crusade against Trustee and

her professionals in the Oregon bankruptcy court. He has burdened not only

that court with his many meritless pleadings, but he also has burdened the

Oregon district court, this Panel, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals with

his many meritless bankruptcy appeals. This appeal is no different.

     Trustee maintains a bank account for the Szanto chapter 7 estate with

Independent Financial, which had agreed to waive monthly fees for several

years. However, due to the length of time the case has been pending (over six

years), waiver of these fees was no longer reasonable or feasible.

     Trustee filed a Motion and Notice of Intent to Incur Expenses for the

monthly banking fees of approximately $570.00 for the Szanto account

("Banking Fees Motion"). Szanto objected, arguing that Independent Financial

was not an FDIC bank, it was not located in Oregon, and Trustee was

improperly allowing a non-FDIC, non-Oregon bank to hold the estate's

money. He also accused Trustee of pocketing the "phony" fees and alleged

that the bankruptcy court would condone such conduct. Finally, he argued

that the fees were usurious and excessive. In response, Trustee presented

evidence that Independent Financial is an FDIC insured bank, as part of the

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Independent Bank Group, Inc., the funds are held in accordance with

statutory and United States Trustee requirements, and under the Uniform

Depository Agreement in place, Independent Financial is permitted to assess

fees for services, subject to court approval as reasonable. Trustee argued that

the monthly banking fees were reasonable.

      The bankruptcy court granted the Banking Fees Motion. It first found

that Szanto likely lacked standing to object because he was not "directly and

adversely affected pecuniarily" by an order approving banking fees.

However, even if Szanto had standing, the court overruled his objection

because Independent Financial is an FDIC insured bank and has complied

with all requirements for bankruptcy estate accounts, and the monthly fee

amount was consistent with similar cases and reasonable, particularly since

Trustee had negotiated a fee waiver for several years.

      "We lack jurisdiction over appeals when the appellant lacks standing."

Landress v. Cambridge Land Co. II, LLC (In re Cambridge Land Co. II, LLC), 626

B.R. 319, 323 (9th Cir. BAP 2021), appeal dismissed, No. 21-60027, 2022 WL

15523094 (9th Cir. Oct. 27, 2022). As the appellant, Szanto has the burden to

establish standing. Id. Bankruptcy appellate standing requires an appellant to

show that it is a "person aggrieved" who was "directly and adversely affected

pecuniarily" by the bankruptcy court's decision. Palmdale Hills Prop., LLC v.

Lehman Com. Paper, Inc. (In re Palmdale Hills Prop., LLC), 654 F.3d 868, 874 (9th

Cir. 2011); Fondiller v. Robertson (In re Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 442-43 (9th Cir.

1983). "A 'person aggrieved' is someone whose interest is directly affected by

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the bankruptcy court's order, either by a diminution in property, an increase

in the burdens on the property, or some other detrimental effect on the rights

of ownership inherent in the property." In re Cambridge Land Co. II, LLC, 626

B.R. at 323 (citing In re Fondiller, 707 F.2d at 442-43).

      Generally, a chapter 7 debtor lacks standing to challenge a bankruptcy

court order concerning the administration of the estate. However, when the

debtor has been denied a discharge, the debtor has a pecuniary interest in the

administration of the estate and has standing to challenge the trustee's

actions. Koshkalda v. Schoenmann (In re Koshkalda), 622 B.R. 749, 764 n.7 (9th

Cir. BAP 2020). Because Szanto was denied a discharge, he is directly and

adversely affected pecuniarily by the order granting the Banking Fees

Motion; he is a "person aggrieved," and has standing to appeal. To the extent

the bankruptcy court granted the Banking Fees Motion on the basis of lack of

standing, this was error; but it was harmless error.

      The only argument Szanto asserts in his opening brief is that

Independent Financial does not exist. He did not raise this argument before

the bankruptcy court. Generally, we will not consider arguments raised for

the first time on appeal. Smith v. Marsh, 194 F.3d 1045, 1052 (9th Cir. 1999).

Even if we did, Szanto's argument lacks merit. Trustee submitted ample

evidence to show that Independent Financial exists and is qualified to hold

estate assets. Szanto's remaining arguments raised for the first time in his

reply brief are waived. Id. (appellate court does not consider arguments

raised for the first time in a reply brief). In summary, the record demonstrates

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that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in granting the Banking

Fees Motion.

      At oral argument, Szanto railed against Trustee and her professionals

accusing them of "thieving" and "looting" the estate and accusing the court of

being complicit in these acts. These arguments had no basis in the record and

were not relevant to the issues on appeal. This is not the first time that Szanto

has engaged in this type of conduct before this Panel.3 He has been given a

full and fair opportunity to argue the issues in all of his appeals; however, the

Panel will no longer tolerate his repeated practice of using every appeal

before us as an opportunity to hurl insults and make absurd accusations

about Trustee, her professionals, and the court. Szanto is cautioned to use his

time to address the issues presented in his appeals without unwarranted

personal attacks.

      For the reasons stated above, we AFFIRM.

      3
         For example, see Szanto v. Amborn (In re Szanto), BAP No. 21-1118-GBS; Szanto v.
Hon (In re Szanto), BAP No. 21-1069-FBS; Szanto v. Amborn (In re Szanto), 20-1167-LBT;
Szanto v. Amborn (In re Szanto), BAP No. 20-1148-BTL; Szanto v. United States Tr. (In re
Szanto), BAP No. OR-20-1106-TLB.
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