Court Opinion

ID: 9719932
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:09:34.015842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:11.332740
License: Public Domain

DUNN, J.,
Concurring and Dissenting.—I concur in the reversal because of the trial court’s error in admitting defendant’s statements. However, I dissent from that part of the opinion that holds it was errqr for the trial judge to permit the testimony of Mrs. Parker regarding experiments.
*438I also dissent from the publication of this opinion, because of rule 976(b), California Rules of Court (see my conc. opn. in People v. Reyes (1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 53 [132 Cal.Rptr. 848]).
Regarding Mrs. Parker’s, testimony, a nonexpert witness is permitted by Evidence Code section 800 to testify concerning these matters: “(a) Rationally based on the perception of the witness; and (b) Helpful to a clear understanding of his testimony.” Permission so to testify properly may have been given by the trial court. (Nolan v. Nolan (1909) 155 Cal. 476, 480-481 [101 P. 520].) Mrs. Parker testified as follows:
“A. Well, I tried to—from the outside I tried to reach around and take the chain off, just slide it off the hook.
“Q. And did you try to do this by getting your arm in as far as you possibly could?
“A. Yes, sir. It was impossible because the door would not close enough. You don’t have enough leeway to reach your hand in.
“Q. Did you see me attempt it?
“A. Yes, sir.
“Q. Where were you when I did this?
“A. I was watching also.
“Q. Did you see if my entire arm got inside the door?
“A. It was impossible because there’s—the space is very, very narrow. You can’t get a hand in.”
To a juror not familiar with door chains, this would have been, and was, helpful evidence.
The court, without any limitation, permitted cross-examination regarding the experiment.
Furthermore, I cannot concur with the majority’s statement that “the credibility of Mrs. Parker relative to whether the chain had been placed on the door was subject to serious question because her testimony . . . *439was predicated upon habit. . . .” It was not; her testimony about the chain on the door was based upon recollection. She gave direct testimony to that effect.
I would reverse the judgment but for the reasons stated, and not by virtue of the evidence regarding experimental matters.
A petition for a rehearing was denied January 11, 1977, and respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 23, 1977.