Court Opinion

ID: 9960180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-15 17:01:05.708964+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:15.504208
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 15 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOSE RICARDO BONILLA RAMOS,                     No. 23-453
                                                Agency No.
             Petitioner,                        A202-087-087
 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted April 11, 2024**
                              Pasadena, California

Before: SILER ***, BEA, and IKUTA, Circuit Judges.

      Jose Ricardo Bonilla Ramos, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitions for

review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of his appeal of the

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
            The Honorable Eugene E. Siler, United States Circuit Judge for the
Court of Appeals, 6th Circuit, sitting by designation.
Immigration Judge's (“IJ”) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding

of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The parties

are familiar with the facts, so we discuss them here only where necessary. We deny

Bonilla’s petition for review and grant his unopposed motion to supplement the

record.

      We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). “Where, as here, the BIA

agrees with the IJ’s reasoning, we review both decisions.” Garcia-Martinez v.

Sessions, 886 F.3d 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 2018). We review factual findings for

substantial evidence. Grigoryan v. Barr, 959 F.3d 1233, 1239 (9th Cir. 2020).

“Whether a group constitutes a ‘particular social group’ is a question of law,” which

we review de novo. Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1081 (9th Cir. 2014).

Likewise, we review questions of law regarding CAT claims de novo. Park v.

Garland, 72 F.4th 965, 978 (9th Cir. 2023).

      1. Bonilla’s first claim fails because “El Salvadoran nationals who have

refused to join the gangs and are then the targets of retaliation for their refusal to

join” is not a cognizable particular social group. To establish that a proposed social

group is cognizable for purposes of withholding of removal, an applicant must show

that the proposed social group is “(1) composed of members who share a common

immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct

within the society in question.”   Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237

                                        2                                    23-453
(B.I.A. 2014). Individuals who are the target of gang retaliation share no “common

characteristic[s] aside from persecution.” Diaz-Reynoso v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1070,

1086 (9th Cir. 2020). In other words, the group would not exist if not for the harm—

in this case, the retaliation—asserted against them.      Id.   Therefore, Bonilla’s

proposed social group is “impermissibly circular.” Id.

      We now turn to the question of whether Bonilla’s proposed social group is

cognizable if defined without reference to the fact of persecution. Absent the

impermissibly circular reference to retaliation, Bonilla’s proposed social group of

“El Salvadorans who have refused to join gangs” still does not constitute a

cognizable social group. Bonilla did not present to the BIA any evidence showing

that individuals who refuse to join gangs or those who file a police report about gang

activity are perceived or recognized as a group by Salvadoran society. See Conde

Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 2020) (“For example, if there were

evidence that, in a specific country, people in the community knew who reported

crimes to the police, or if there were laws protecting those who did, the proposed

group potentially could be cognizable.”). Nor did Bonilla present any evidence of a

Salvadoran law or program protecting those who make police reports against gangs.

See id. at 1243-44. Moreover, Bonilla’s citation to a report referring to “members

of vulnerable populations” does not compel a conclusion contrary to the agency’s

regarding social distinction. And although Bonilla argues that his social group is

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defined by their tattoos, age, and gender, he failed to include these traits in the

definition of his social group before the IJ. Bonilla has therefore failed to establish

a cognizable social group and is ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal.

      2. Because Bonilla did not present his second proposed social group—

individuals taking concrete steps to oppose gang membership and gang authority—

to the IJ, we will not consider it here. Matter of W-Y-C & H-O-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec.

189 (B.I.A. 2018).

      3. Bonilla forfeited his CAT argument. To be eligible for CAT relief, Bonilla

must show that it is more likely than not that he would be tortured by or with the

consent or acquiescence of a Salvadoran public official. See Diaz-Reynoso, 968 F.3d

at 1089. In his opening brief, Bonilla contests the BIA’s finding that he did not

establish that it is more likely than not that a public official would acquiesce to any

future torture. But he failed to address the BIA’s findings that he had not shown that

it was more likely than not that he would be tortured upon his return and that he

failed to show a particularized and non-speculative risk of torture. Therefore, he

forfeited these arguments, and his CAT claim fails. See Koerner v. Grigas, 328 F.3d

1039, 1048 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that this court will not ordinarily consider

matters “that are not specifically and distinctly argued in appellant’s opening brief”

(quoting United States v. Ullah, 976 F.2d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 1992))).

      PETITION DENIED.

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