Court Opinion

ID: 9841356
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 05:05:40.694587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:55.710186
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE AND                                       FOR PUBLICATION
RURAL DEVELOPMENT,                                                  September 21, 2023
                                                                    9:10 a.m.
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                   No. 363515
                                                                    Ingham Circuit Court
ZANTE, INC., doing business as MARLENA’S                            LC No. 2021-000113-CZ
BISTRO & PIZZERIA,

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: GLEICHER, C.J., and JANSEN and RICK, JJ.

GLEICHER, C.J.

        During the COVID-19 pandemic, the Michigan Department of Agriculture and Rural
Development (MDARD) suspended the food establishment license for Marlena’s Bistro and
Pizzeria. Marlena Pavlos-Hackney, the restaurant’s sole owner, deliberately defied the license
suspension, keeping the establishment open for business. MDARD filed this lawsuit seeking a
court order enjoining the restaurant’s operation. The circuit court entered a temporary restraining
order (TRO), which Pavlos-Hackney also defied. The circuit court held her in contempt and
converted the TRO into a preliminary injunction. Pavlos-Hackney kept the restaurant open and
the circuit court entered a second contempt judgment and a permanent injunction.

        This Court affirmed the contempt judgments in In re Contempt of Pavlos-Hackney, ___
Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2022) (Docket No. 357407) (Pavlos-Hackney I). The circuit court
subsequently granted summary disposition to MDARD and denied Pavlos-Hackney’s motion for
a declaratory judgment.

       Pavlos-Hackney appeals, offering a smorgasbord of challenges to the license suspension
and the contempt judgments. None of Pavlos-Hackney’s arguments have merit, and we affirm.

                                                -1-
                                       I. BACKGROUND

       The 2022 opinion in Pavlos-Hackney I describes the facts leading to the contempt citations
in considerable detail, and we need not revisit most of them here. Only a couple of facts require
mention.

        In November 2020, the Director of the Michigan Department of Health and Human
Services (MDHHS) issued an order under the authority granted by MCL 333.2253 of the Public
Health Code, MCL 333.1101 et seq., prohibiting indoor dining. The Food Law of 2000, MCL
289.1101 et seq., mandates that restaurants maintain a valid food license to operate, MCL
289.4101, and empowers local health departments to inspect restaurants for compliance with
public health rules and regulations. MCL 289.3105. MDARD administers the Food Law.

        Pavlos-Hackney disagreed with the MDHHS order prohibiting indoor dining and
purposefully flouted it. In December 2020, the Allegan County Health Department warned Pavlos-
Hackney that her restaurant was not in compliance with the MDHHS order, but Pavlos-Hackney
disregarded the warning. Later that month MDARD ordered Marlena’s to close. Pavlos-Hackney
ignored this order and the restaurant remained open. In January 2021, MDARD summarily
suspended the food license for Marlena’s Bistro and Pizzeria under the authority of MCL
289.4125(4) of the Food Law. After a hearing, an administrative law judge continued the
suspension in a February 2021 order. Pavlos-Hackney did not appeal that order. MDARD filed
this injunctive action two weeks later seeking to prevent Pavlos-Hackney from operating her
restaurant without a license.1

        The circuit court issued a TRO shutting down the restaurant, and Pavlos-Hackney was
personally served with the order. Pavlos-Hackney violated the TRO, keeping the restaurant open.
MDARD sought a contempt sanction and requested conversion of the TRO into a preliminary
injunction. The court held Pavlos-Hackney in contempt, ordered her to pay $7,500, and issued a
preliminary injunction. The court’s order specifically warned Pavlos-Hackney that if she
continued to operate the restaurant without a license, she would be arrested and incarcerated to
compel her compliance. Pavlos-Hackney scorned that order, too, and was arrested. The court
responded with a second contempt judgment, a second fine of $7,500, and a permanent injunction.
A few days later, Pavlos-Hackney paid the $15,000 and was released from jail.

        Pavlos-Hackney moved for relief from judgement in the circuit court, seeking to set aside
the contempt judgments and requesting a refund of the $15,000 plus an award of costs, fees, and
compensatory damages. The circuit court denied the motion but permitted Pavlos-Hackney to
request a hearing that would allow her to address her ability to pay. Instead, Pavlos-Hackney filed
an appeal in this Court, which affirmed the contempt judgments but remanded to the circuit court
with instructions regarding refashioning the second fine “to be civil in nature.” Pavlos-Hackney
I, ___ Mich App at ___, slip op at 19.

1
  MDARD sued Zante, Inc., the corporation that owns Marlena’s Bistro & Pizzeria, and the
pizzeria. Because Pavlos-Hackney is the sole owner of both enterprises, we refer to her as the
defendant.

                                                -2-
       Meanwhile, MDARD sought summary disposition in the circuit court case, and Pavlos-
Hackney moved for “declaratory judgment, to dismiss, vacate, void and set aside case/conviction,
and award damages.” The circuit court granted MDARD’s motion and denied Pavlos-Hackney’s
motion for declaratory and other relief.

                                           II. ANALYSIS

        Pavlos-Hackney’s appellate arguments rest on the proposition that she should be relieved
of the judgments of contempt and the order suspending her food license because the COVID-19-
related executive orders issued by Governor Whitmer and the emergency order issued by the
MDHHS in 2020 were unconstitutional. We need not address the Governor’s executive orders
because they have nothing to do with this case. The constitutionality of MCL 333.2253 is similarly
irrelevant.2

       Because she did not appeal the administrative order upholding the food license suspension,
Pavlos-Hackney may not now relitigate that decision. The merits of the administrative
proceedings and license suspension were not at issue in the circuit court; the question before that
court was whether an injunction closing the restaurant was warranted. Pavlos-Hackney tries
mightily to convince us otherwise, citing two sections of the Administrative Procedures Act of
1969 (APA), MCL 24.201 et seq., neither of which apply.

       Pavlos-Hackney first points to MCL 24.264, which provides:

               Unless an exclusive procedure or remedy is provided by a statute governing
       the agency, the validity or applicability of a rule, including the failure of an agency
       to accurately assess the impact of the rule on businesses, including small
       businesses, in its regulatory impact statement, may be determined in an action for
       declaratory judgment if the court finds that the rule or its threatened application
       interferes with or impairs, or imminently threatens to interfere with or impair, the
       legal rights or privileges of the plaintiff. The action shall be filed in the circuit
       court of the county where the plaintiff resides or has his or her principal place of
       business in this state or in the circuit court for Ingham county. The agency shall be
       made a party to the action. An action for declaratory judgment may not be
       commenced under this section unless the plaintiff has first requested the agency for
       a declaratory ruling and the agency has denied the request or failed to act upon it
       expeditiously. This section shall not be construed to prohibit the determination of
       the validity or applicability of the rule in any other action or proceeding in which
       its invalidity or inapplicability is asserted. [Emphasis added.]

First and foremost, this provision applies to challenges related to the validity or applicability of an
administrative rule, and not to the constitutionality of a statute such as MCL 333.2253. Second,

2
 In an opinion issued on June 29, 2023, a two-judge majority of this Court declared MCL 333.2253
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. T & V Assoc, Inc v Dir of Health & Human
Servs, ___ Mich App ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2023) (Docket No. 361727), app for lv pending. That
decision postdates the events underlying this case by more than two years.

                                                 -3-
even if we were to conflate administrative rules with statutes, Pavlos-Hackney never requested a
declaratory ruling from MDARD regarding the constitutionality of MCL 333.2253 or of the
MDHHS order. Moreover, Pavlos-Hackney did not bring a separate action in the circuit court
seeking a declaratory ruling. Instead, she raised her constitutional arguments only during the
permanent injunction and contempt proceedings. “As this Court has repeatedly recognized, when
an administrative scheme of relief exists an individual must exhaust those remedies before a circuit
court has jurisdiction.” In re Harper, 302 Mich App 349, 356; 839 NW2d 44 (2013).

       Pavlos-Hackney next invokes MCL 24.306, which provides in relevant part:

               (1) Except when a statute or the constitution provides for a different scope
       of review, the court shall hold unlawful and set aside a decision or order of an
       agency if substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the
       decision or order is any of the following:

               (a) In violation of the constitution or a statute.

This statute is also located within the APA, and relates to the power of a court reviewing “a
decision or order in a contested case” before an agency after the exhaustion of “all administrative
remedies available within an agency.” MCL 24.301. It applies to appeals from an administrative
ruling under the APA; it is not a “cut and paste” provision opening the door to collateral attacks
on an agency’s decisions pursued in violation of the APA. See Womack-Scott v Dep’t of Corr,
246 Mich App 70, 80-81; 630 NW2d 650 (2001):

              To the extent that plaintiff suggests that she is entitled to file a separate
       cause of action in the circuit court to address the constitutional issue over which the
       administrative agency had no jurisdiction, we find her claim without merit. This
       Court has explained that when a constitutional issue is intermingled with issues
       properly before an administrative agency, exhaustion of administrative remedies is
       not excused:

          [T]he exhaustion requirement is displaced only when there are no issues in
          controversy other than the constitutional challenge. The mere presence of a
          constitutional issue is not the decisive factor in avoiding the exhaustion
          requirement. If there are factual issues for the agency to resolve, the presence
          of a constitutional issue, or the presence of an argument couched in
          constitutional terms, does not excuse the exhaustion requirement even if the
          administrative agency would not be able to provide all the relief requested.
          [Mich Supervisors Union OPEIU Local 512 v State of Michigan, 209 Mich
          App 573, 578; 531 NW2d 790 (citations omitted).]

               Constitutional issues not within the administrative agency’s jurisdiction can
       be raised in the circuit court through the review procedure in the APA; no separate
       action is contemplated or allowed.

        Here, the circuit court did not consider a petition seeking review of an agency’s decision;
it assessed the need for an injunction and whether to sanction Pavlos-Hackney for her repeated

                                                  -4-
violations of court orders. Pavlos-Hackney’s failure to pursue her administrative remedies
foreclosed the circuit court’s review of the constitutionality of an agency’s actions.

        Pavlos-Hackney’s challenge to the validity of the contempt judgments is also out of
bounds. “[T]he longstanding rule is that ‘a contempt proceeding does not open to reconsideration
the legal or factual basis of the order alleged to have been disobeyed and thus become a retrial of
the original controversy.’ ” In re JCB, 336 Mich App 736, 747; 971 NW2d 705 (2021), quoting
United States v Rylander, 460 US 752, 757; 103 S Ct 1548; 75 L Ed 2d 521 (1983). “ ‘A person
may not disregard a court order simply on the basis of his subjective view that the order is wrong
or will be declared invalid on appeal.’ ” Johnson v White, 261 Mich App 332, 346; 682 NW2d
505 (2004), quoting In re Contempt of Dudzinski, 257 Mich App 96, 111; 667 NW2d 68 (2003).

       Pavlos-Hackney’s efforts to avoid these holdings are futile. She contends that Dudzinski
involved criminal rather than civil contempt, thereby distinguishing it from her case. But our
Supreme Court has reiterated that the principles enunciated in Dudzinski apply to civil contempt.
“A party must obey an order entered by a court with proper jurisdiction, even if the order is clearly
incorrect, or the party must face the risk of being held in contempt and possibly being ordered to
comply with the order at a later date.” Kirby v Mich High Sch Athletic Ass’n, 459 Mich 23, 40;
585 NW2d 290 (1998) (emphasis added). Kirby was decided in the context of civil contempt five
years before this Court decided Dudzinski. See id. at 32 n 8.

        Pavlos-Hackney next contends that Dudzinski relied on federal precedent that was mere
dicta, but does not explain why that undercuts the legitimacy of the case’s holding. Dudzinski’s
discussion of federal precedent reflects that the principle that a court order must be obeyed is of
long standing. See, e.g., Kirby, 459 Mich at 40; In re Hague, 412 Mich 532, 544; 315 NW2d 524
(1982) (stating that “[a]n order entered by a court with proper jurisdiction must be obeyed even if
the order is clearly incorrect”). Nor does this Court’s opinion in Johnson, 261 Mich App at 346,
provide Pavlos-Hackney with a life raft.

         In Johnson, 261 Mich App at 334, the defendant-father had violated the trial court’s “order
granting plaintiffs grandparenting time” by moving his children to Colorado in January 2001, and
the trial court entered a contempt judgment against him. He later moved to vacate the contempt
judgment based on this Court’s decision in DeRose v DeRose, 249 Mich App 388; 643 NW2d 259
(2002), which held the grandparent visitation statute unconstitutional. The defendant argued “that
because the grandparenting time order was void, the contempt order stemming from its violation
was also void.” Johnson, 261 Mich App at 334. The trial court disagreed, reasoning that DeRose
“had no precedential value because, at the time, leave was pending before the Michigan Supreme
Court and, therefore, the decision was not final.” Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial
court should have vacated its contempt order because the grandparenting-time order was
unenforceable. Id. at 345. This Court agreed. Id. at 350.

        We discussed and reaffirmed in Johnson the general principle that a party is required to
obey court orders regardless of their validity. Id. at 345-346. However, we noted that this principle
applied only when a court had proper jurisdiction over a party. Id. at 346. In reversing the trial
court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to vacate the judgment of contempt, this Court reasoned:

                                                -5-
                In this case, defendant violated the January 10, 2001, grandparenting time
       order in October 2001. Three months later, on January 25, 2002, this Court issued
       its decision in DeRose, which had an immediate precedential effect. At the March
       28, 2002, show cause hearing, defendant made an oral motion for relief from the
       grandparenting time order pursuant to MCR 2.612(C). Defendant argued that the
       trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the contempt proceedings because
       the Court of Appeals had declared the grandparenting time statute unconstitutional.
       The court denied defendant’s motion and found him in contempt. Giving
       precedential effect to this Court’s DeRose decision required that the trial court grant
       defendant’s motion and the court erred in failing to do so. Because the
       grandparenting time statute was declared unconstitutional before the contempt
       judgment was entered, the court did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter
       of the contempt judgment. Thus, we find that the trial court erred in denying
       defendant’s subsequent motion to vacate the contempt judgment. [Johnson, 261
       Mich 349-350 (emphasis added).]

       Johnson is a far narrower holding than Pavlos-Hackney claims. It does not stand for the
proposition that courts lack contempt jurisdiction when an underlying law is subsequently declared
unconstitutional. Johnson’s holding applies only if a statute has been declared to be
unconstitutional before a contempt judgment is entered. That is not what happened here.

        When the circuit court enjoined Pavlos-Hackney, found her in contempt, fined and jailed
her, it did so in full conformity with then-existing law. Pavlos-Hackney had an opportunity to
challenge the validity of the MDHHS order by pursuing an appeal from the administrative
proceedings. She did not do so. Pavlos-Hackney elected to bypass the administrative and
subsequent judicial processes that would have afforded her a full hearing on her constitutional
claims. Instead she deliberately violated two lawful court orders. “[R]espect for judicial process
is a small price to pay for the civilizing hand of law, which alone can give abiding meaning to
constitutional freedom.” Walker v City of Birmingham, 388 US 307, 321; 87 S Ct 1824; 18 L Ed
2d 1210 (1967).

       We affirm.

                                                              /s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher
                                                              /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                              /s/ Michelle M. Rick

                                                -6-