Court Opinion

ID: 9658764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:11:59.155822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:59.082435
License: Public Domain

CARTER, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The result reached in the opinion of the court is an extreme measure that unnecessarily depreciates the consequences of a criminal conviction based on defendant’s solemn confession of guilt in open court. At the time of his guilty plea, defendant was fully advised of his right to counsel and elected to forego being represented. Defendant’s earlier OWI conviction is still on his record and will remain that way because the statute of limitations for seeking postconviction relief has now run. To permit a collateral attack on the earlier conviction in the present litigation should only be permitted on a convincing showing that defendant was not guilty with regard to the first OWI conviction or that some compelling federal authority requires that it be disregarded for sentencing enhance-*122raent purposes. Neither of these circumstances exists in the present case.
The opinion of the court correctly suggests that a pragmatic approach should be taken in determining whether a waiver of right to counsel is knowingly and voluntarily made. That is the teaching of Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 298, 108 S.Ct. 2389, 2397-98, 101 L.Ed.2d 261, 275-76 (1988). But, the standard that the majority of this court applies is not pragmatic in any sense. It is a rigid standard which requires that the party seeking to waive counsel must, in all instances, be expressly advised of the dangers that exist in proceeding without counsel.
Prior to the Court’s decision in Patterson, we approached the problem of determining whether a waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary solely on the basis of whether the accused had been properly advised of the right to counsel. State v. Moe, 379 N.W.2d 347, 348 (Iowa 1985). The Patterson case has injected another consideration, which is whether the accused is aware of the consequences of proceeding without counsel. However, nothing in Patterson suggests that a waiver of counsel is never voluntary unless an express admonition concerning the potential adverse effect of that decision is given the accused. Quite the contrary is true. Patterson recognized that the accused’s knowledge of the consequences of proceeding without counsel could be inferred from his having been given Miranda warnings. Patterson, 487 U.S. at 293-94, 108 S.Ct. at 2395-96, 101 L.Ed.2d at 272-73.
In the present case, the State argues persuasively that Tovar was sufficiently made aware of the adverse consequences that might befall him from the district court’s guilty-plea admonition. In addition to advising Tovar concerning his waiver of the constitutional rights described in the opinion of the court, he was also advised concerning both the maximum and mandatory minimum sentences that would befall him upon a plea of guilty. He was therefore made fully aware of the penal consequences that might befall him if he went forward without counsel and pleaded guilty.
It is true that there are other adverse consequences that might arise from proceeding without counsel. A search for these consequences leads the court into speculation concerning unidentified potential defenses that an able lawyer might have advanced. I submit that it is not reasonable to ignore the consequences of a voluntary guilty plea based on that type of speculation. As the Supreme Court observed in Patterson:
If petitioner [after having been advised of his right to counsel in a Miranda warning] nonetheless lacked “a full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing” from this waiver, it does not defeat the State’s showing that the information it provided to him satisfied the constitutional minimum.
Id. (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 316-17, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1296-97, 84 L.Ed.2d 222, 236-37 (1985)). The showing of the State in Patterson did not include evidence that an express admonition of the dangers that existed in proceeding without counsel had been given the accused. Nevertheless, the Court found that the waiver was knowingly and voluntarily made. I would reach the same result in the present case. I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
NEUMAN and STREIT, JJ„ join this dissent.