Court Opinion

ID: 9793910
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:55:07.076594+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:47.104232
License: Public Domain

*909SIMMS, Justice,
DISSENTING:
Today the majority extends the public policy exception to the termination-at-will doctrine well beyond the narrow boundaries intended to circumscribe it. This public policy exception first announced in Burk v. K-Mart Corp., 770 P.2d 24 (Okla.1989), was adopted with the understanding that it would apply only in a “narrow class of cases.” Id. Today’s pronouncement permits the exception to apply in a case which does not fit within that narrow class, therefore I must respectfully dissent.
Burk recognized a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge where the employee shows that the discharge was contrary to “a clear mandate of public policy as articulated by constitutional, statutory or decisional law.” 770 P.2d at 28. The majority finds that the termination of the employee (Groce) in this case was contrary to the public policy guaranteeing litigants access to court.
First, Groce’s access to court has not been denied by the actions of his employer. His action against the third party was not affected by the termination, and from all indications it appears his action against the third party is viable. In other words, Groce’s access to the courts is not hindered. See DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 384 So.2d 1253, 1254 fn. 1 (Fla.1980) (trial court dismissal of employee’s action for wrongful discharge was proper where employee’s personal injury action against employer on behalf of daughter was still pending and neither employee nor his daughter had been denied access to the courts).
Moreover, by instituting an action against his employer’s customer, Hydraulic Well Control, Inc., Groce was not “exercising his legal rights” under Okla. Const, art. 2, § 6.1 The majority states that under Burk and Hinson v. Cameron, 742 P.2d 549 (Okla.1987), a discharge is actionable when it is done in response to the employee exercising a legal right. However, the “open courts” provision does not create an affirmative right to be exercised by citizens such as the right to own property or the right to bear arms. Rather, it is a constitutional mandate addressed to and placed upon the courts of Oklahoma to open their doors to any person with a legally cognizable claim. Such provisions are designed to limit the actions of government rather than the actions of private individuals. Deiters v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 842 F.Supp. 1023 (M.D.Tenn.1993); Kavanagh v. ELM Royal Dutch Airlines, 566 F.Supp. 242 (N.D.Ill.1983).
In Moses v. Hoebel, 646 P.2d 601 (Okla.1982), this Court unanimously held that Oklahoma’s “open courts” provision prohibited a district court from enjoining the prosecution of a personal injury action until the plaintiff paid the legal expenses of defendants from an earlier action arising from the same injuries which the plaintiff had dismissed while trial was proceeding. We stated:
“Under the Open-Court-of-Justice Clause of the state constitution, the obligation adjudicated against Moses cannot serve as a bar to his courthouse access for the prosecution of another case. Art. 2 § 6, Okl. Const. Moses’ right to proceed with his claim in a subsequent action is protected by that clause. The judge’s attempted use of the unsatisfied obligation adjudicated in the dismissed case to prevent Moses from pursuing his claim in the refiled case plainly contravenes both the Open-Court-of-Justice Clause of our own constitution as well as the federal and state minimum standards of due process.” 646 P.2d at 604 (Citations omitted).
Therefore, Oklahoma jurisprudence indicates that the purpose of Okla. Const, art. 2, § 6, like the “open courts” clauses of other states, is to limit the actions of the courts of the state, and not the actions of private individuals such as Groce’s employer. As a result, Groce’s discharge could not have been in retaliation for the exercise of his right to an “open court.” Accord Rigsby v. Murray Ohio Manufacturing Co., 1991 WL 95710 *910(Tenn.App.1991), (firing of an at will employee for exercising his constitutional right to free speech on the employer’s premises during working hours does not violate the public policy of the state).
In fact, the Montana Supreme Court has interpreted its constitutional “open courts” provision, Mont. Const, art. Ill, § 6, which is almost identical to Oklahoma’s provision, Okla. Const, art. 2, § 6, to be a “mandate to the courts to provide equal access to causes of action recognized at law.” Meech v. Hill-haven West, Inc., 238 Mont. 21, 776 P.2d 488, 491-92 (1989). Although Montana’s provision was amended in 1972, the amendment had no effect upon the court’s decision that “the guarantee was directed at the courts, and it was framed to provide equality in the administration of justice.” 776 P.2d at 492. The Montana Supreme Court had traced the origins of the “open courts” provision to portions of the Magna Carta and noted that the meaning of those portions historically have been interpreted to secure a remedy from those who administer the law, i.e., the courts.2
This is further seen in a Missouri Court of Appeals decision in which the court affirmed the lower court’s order dismissing the employee’s wrongful discharge action for failure to state a claim. McCloskey v. Eagleton, 789 S.W.2d 518 (Mo.App.1990). The employee, an attorney, argued that his employer, a law firm, fired him in retaliation for bringing an action in his own name against a realtor, a bank and others. The court noted that the “open courts” provision of the Missouri Constitution was not designed to create rights but to allow a person with a legitimate claim recognized by the law access to the courts. In other words, the employee could avail himself of the protections of the “open courts” provision “if and only if he had a legitimate, recognizable claim” against his employer. 789 S.W.2d at 520. There being no such claim, the court determined the employee had failed to state a cognizable action. See also DeMarco v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 360 So.2d 134, 136 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1978) aff'd 384 So.2d 1253 (1980) (“there is no civil cause of action for the interference with the exercise of one’s right” to access to courts).
In addition, the “open courts” clause is not a “clear mandate of public policy” which prevents an employer from discharging its employee for bringing a lawsuit against the customer of that employer. A clear mandate of public policy is crucial to the application of the exception to the termination-at-will doctrine. Throughout the Burk opinion, the Court emphasized that the public policy exception should only be applied in a very narrow class of cases, i.e. those where there exists a clear mandate of public policy. For instance, the Court stated:
“In light of the vague meaning of the term public policy we believe the public policy exception must be tightly circumscribed.” 770 P.2d at 28-9 (Emphasis added). See also Smith v. Farmers Cooperative Ass’n of Butler, 825 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Okla.1992).
As noted above, it is not the employer’s conduct against which the “open courts” provision is designed to guard. It’s purpose is to ensure that the State does not deny a litigant the right to have a legitimate action heard by a court. Other than the fact that the Oklahoma Constitution contains the “open courts” provision, the majority points to no clear mandate of any public policy contravening Groce’s termination. However, other jurisdictions have specifically determined that constitutional or statutory “open courts” provisions are not clear mandates of public policy preventing employers from discharging employees who file legal actions against the employer or others.
In Wagner v. General Elec. Co., 760 F.Supp. 1146 (E.D.Pa.1991), the court granted summary judgment to the employer in an action for wrongful discharge where the employee alleged he was terminated for bringing an action against the community in which he lived. The employer had expressed con*911cern about the publicity and visibility which the employee received due to the lawsuit, but the employee continued active participation in the litigation. In holding that a constitutional provision guaranteeing access to courts was not a clear mandate of public policy, the court noted that the employee:
“brought a lawsuit by an act of free choice; he sued another as a result of no other coercive force than a singular dispute between two minds. Plaintiff was not caught between Scylla and Charybdis as would an employee called to jury duty who, threatened with termination or statutory penalties, had no free and independent choice— either would result in harm.” 760 F.Supp. at 1154.
A New Jersey appellate court also found no clear mandate of public policy in a ease where the employer discharged the employee after the employee brought an action over a salary dispute. Alexander v. Kay Finlay Jewelers, Inc., 208 N.J.Super. 503, 506 A.2d 379 (1986), cert. denied, 104 N.J. 466, 517 A.2d 449 (1986).
A federal district court addressed the issue in Kavanagh v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, swpra, and found no violation of a public policy. The court held:
“There is no question that the right to counsel and to free access to the courts are important public policies. However, these freedoms usually are expressed in terms of limitations on government, not on private parties. The invocation of the public interest in the effectuation of these policies to create new common law rights would be unprecedented; a party does not violate another party’s right to counsel or to free access to the courts by taking measures, even though retaliatory and spiteful in nature, which lawfully are available to him simply because resort to these measures somehow penalizes the other party for suing. For instance, if a squabble developed between merchants who regularly conducted business with one another, although they were not under contract to do so, would one of the merchants commit a tort if he told the other that they would no longer do business if suit were filed?
Even if the court limited plaintiffs theory to the employment context, it would metamorphose the supposedly narrow exception ... into the monster that swallowed the employment-at-will rule. Whenever a dispute between an employer and an at-will employee threatens to culminate in the employee’s discharge, the employee, simply by retaining an attorney and threatening to sue, could procure that which is unavailable to him through contract — employment security. KLM persuasively argues that inherent in the employment-at-will relationship it had with plaintiff was an understanding that the organization and its managers function more effectively in an atmosphere of trust' and cooperation; when this harmony is destroyed, regardless of who is. at fault, it is in the interest of all concerned to terminate their relationship. The rule advocated in the complaint ironically would penalize a company for discharging an at-will employee when the employment relationship has completely soured. Plaintiff cannot stake his claim on the allegation that KLM by discharging him violated general public policies in favor of the right to counsel and the right to free access to the courts.”
More recently, in Deiters v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 842 F.Supp. 1023, 1029 (M.D.Tenn.1993), the court concluded that the Tennessee constitutional provision guaranteeing access to courts “does not create a clear and unambiguous public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine.”
Other courts specifically holding an at-will-employee may not bring an action against his/her employer for wrongful discharge where the employee alleges the discharge contravened a constitutional or statutory provision guaranteeing access to courts include: Whitman v. Schlumberger Ltd., 793 F.Supp. 228 (N.D.Cal.1992); Beam v. IPCO Corp., 838 F.2d 242 (7th Cir.1988); Watson v. Peoples Sec. Life Ins. Co., 322 Md. 467, 588 A.2d 760 (1991); and, Smith v. Neyer, Tiseo & Hindo, Ltd., 1993 WL 57653 (E.D.Pa. March 1, 1993). Without mentioning “open courts” provisions, the following courts held that discharge of an at-will employee for bringing or *912threatening to bring a lawsuit against the employer did not violate any public policy: Becket v. Welton Becket & Assoc., 39 Cal.App.3d 815, 114 Cal.Rptr. 531 (1974); Abrams v. Echlin Corp., 174 Ill.App.3d 434, 123 Ill.Dec. 884, 528 N.E.2d 429 (1 Dist. 1988); Buysse v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 623 F.2d 1244 (8th Cir.1980) (construing Minnesota law); Meredith v. C.E. Walther, Inc., 422 So.2d 761 (Ala.1982); and, Daniel v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 620 P.2d 699 (App.1980).
Moreover, contrary to the inference of the majority opinion, this case is not about the employer reading “an implied covenant of relinquishment” of the right to access to courts into the employment contract. There is no indication that in order for Groce to be employed with the employer he must waive some constitutional right. Rather, the employer is doing what any prudent business would do; it is asking its employees not to sue customers of the business. Indeed, the motivation of the employer in the case at bar for discharging Groce seems quite clear to me. Litigation between an employee of a business and a customer of that business is going to have some negative effect upon the relationship of the business and its customer. It is therefore understandable why the employer would desire to sever its relationship with an employee who was actively pursuing litigation against a customer of the employer. Such a discharge of an at-will employee violates no public policy of this state.
Neither is this action one involving a discharge in retaliation for bringing a workers’ compensation claim pursuant to 85 O.S.1991, §§ 5-7 as suggested by the majority opinion.
The burden was on the employee, Groce, to prove that he was discharged in contravention of a clear mandate of public policy, Earner v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625, 631 (1982), and Groce has failed to meet that burden. It is beyond doubt that Groce could prove no set of facts which would entitle him to relief under Oklahoma law. Gunn v. Consol. Rural Water & Sewer District No. 1, 839 P.2d 1345 (Okla.1992). Since the employee did not have a legally recognized cause of action under the facts and circumstances of this case, it follows that the district court did not err in dismissing the action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 12 O.S.1991, § 2012(B)(6). I would affirm the order of the district court dismissing the action.
I am authorized to state that Vice Chief Justice LAVENDER, Justice HARGRAVE, and Justice SUMMERS join with me in the views expressed herein.

. Hereinafter, Okla. Const, art. 2, § 6, is referred to as the “open courts” provision or clause. It provides:
"The courts of justice of the State shall be open to every person, and speedy and certain remedy afforded for every wrong and for every injury to person, property, or reputation; and right and justice shall be administered without sale, denial, delay, or prejudice.”

. See also Woody v. State ex rel. Dept. of Corrections, 833 P.2d 257, 259 (Okla.1992) (Okla. Const, art. 2, § 6, "probably originated with the Magna Carta ... ”) For a discussion of the historical background of the "open courts” guarantees including comment on the Magna Carta provision, see Meech, 776 P.2d at 491-93 and E. Coke, The Second Part of the Institutes of the Laws of England, pt. 1, 53-56 (4th ed. 1671).