Court Opinion

ID: 9899155
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-16 01:00:34.08065+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:54.519175
License: Public Domain

Case: 23-50191        Document: 00516969765             Page: 1      Date Filed: 11/15/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                  Fifth Circuit
                                     ____________                               FILED
                                                                        November 15, 2023
                                       No. 23-50191
                                                                           Lyle W. Cayce
                                     ____________                               Clerk

   Emiliano Zapata,

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Hays County Juvenile Detention Center; Brett
   Littlejohn,

                                              Defendants—Appellees.
                     ______________________________

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                               USDC No. 1:21-CV-562
                     ______________________________

   Before Jones, Barksdale, and Elrod, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Emiliano Zapata, then 16 years old, was detained for 48 days in the
   summer of 2020. During this time, Zapata alleges, the Hays County Juvenile
   Detention Center failed to provide him educational and mental health
   services. He brought this lawsuit, and the district court granted summary
   judgment in favor of the Defendants on Zapata’s claims under the Eighth

         _____________________
         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                    No. 23-50191

   Amendment, the Rehabilitation Act, and the Americans with Disabilities
   Act, and affirmed the prior dismissal of Zapata’s Individuals with Disabilities
   in Education Act claims. Zapata appeals. We AFFIRM IN PART and
   REVERSE IN PART and REMAND for further proceedings. We also
   AFFIRM the prior dismissal of Zapata’s claims arising under the
   Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act.
                                          I
                                         A
          The Hays County Juvenile Detention Center is a correctional facility
   in San Marcos, Texas, operated and overseen by the Hays County Juvenile
   Board, that provides pre- and post-adjudication detention for juveniles. The
   Detention Center contracted with the John H. Woods Charter School—
   Inspire Academy to serve as the “local education agency” and to provide
   educational services under the IDEA to its residents. In May 2020, the
   Detention Center had a 14-day isolation requirement for new detainees to
   prevent the spread of COVID-19.
          Zapata was sent to the Detention Center on May 20, 2020, upon his
   arrest. Texas law demands that detention facilities conduct “[a] health
   screening” for juvenile pre-trial detainees “within two hours before or after
   admission,” 37 Tex. Admin. Code § 343.406(a), so upon his arrival,
   Detention Center personnel administered multiple assessments to Zapata.
          First, Zapata’s Intake Assessment. In the portion titled “Information
   From Child,” the officer marked “N” as to whether Zapata was in any
   special education classes. The official “also noted in the form that [Zapata]
   did not appear confused, depressed, agitated, or angry, and that he did not
   appear to be suicidal or violent.” Detention Center personnel documented
   that Zapata “may be dangerous to himself [] or . . . may threaten the safety of
   the public if released.”

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          Zapata was next given an Initial Health Assessment, which lists “No”
   in response to whether he “had or [is] being treated for any mental
   conditions/disorders.” Zapata also denied taking any medications. The
   screening officer opined that Zapata did not “appear to need mental health
   services” and that he did not need a referral for medical or emergency
   services.
          A staff member then administered a Behavioral Screening assessment.
   When asked, “Have you had or are you being treated for any mental
   disabilities?”, and “Do you have any Intellectual or Developmental
   Disabilities?”, Zapata responded “No.” The official observed that Zapata
   had an “Average” “Level of Emotional and Cognitive Development,” with
   the other possible answers being “Low” and “High.” And when asked to
   identify any other information regarding his mental abilities, Zapata did not
   offer additional details.
          The next morning, a nurse administered Zapata’s health appraisal.
   The nurse described Zapata’s behavior as “appropriate” during the
   assessment, and Zapata denied having any mental health conditions or
   attendant treatments, save for trouble sleeping.
          As a new detainee, Zapata was subject to the facility’s 14-day
   quarantine protocols upon arriving. Throughout this initial quarantine, call
   logs show that Zapata called his father seven times. On June 4, 2020,
   Zapata’s initial medical isolation concluded, and he was released into the
   facility’s general population. Two weeks later, on June 17, 2020, Zapata left
   the Detention Center for several hours for a psychological evaluation, which
   was conducted by Dr. Keeley Crowfoot.
          On June 24, Zapata tested positive for COVID-19 and was
   immediately placed in medical quarantine. Throughout this second isolation,
   Zapata could not call his father because the telephone was in a public space.

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   Instead, Zapata wrote letters to his father and was given an email that his
   father wrote to him. On July 5, Detention Center officials decided to conduct
   daily counseling with Zapata. Pursuant to that schedule, he received his first
   counseling session the day he was released from quarantine, July 6. The
   following day, Zapata was discharged from the Detention Center.
                                         B
          Zapata filed an administrative complaint under the IDEA concerning
   his detention, which was heard and subsequently dismissed by a Texas
   Special Education Hearing Officer. Zapata then commenced this action
   against the Detention Center and its administrator, Brett Littlejohn, seeking
   review of the Special Education Hearing Officer’s dismissal of his IDEA
   claims as well as alleging violations of: (1) his Eighth Amendment rights
   brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act;
   and (3) the Americans with Disabilities Act.
          The parties filed dueling motions for summary judgment. The district
   court granted the Detention Center’s and Littlejohn’s joint motion on all
   claims, concluding that (1) the local education agency, not the Detention
   Center, is “tasked with providing the relevant services” such that failure to
   provide them did not render the Detention Center liable under the IDEA and
   dismissal by the Special Education Hearing Officer was appropriate; (2) the
   Detention Center was not on notice of Zapata’s disability and, even if it had
   been, the facility provided a reasonable accommodation as required by the
   Rehabilitation Act and the ADA; and (3) Littlejohn was not a policymaker,
   vitiating any Monell-based claims under § 1983. Zapata appeals.
                                         II
          “We review a grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing all
   evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and drawing all
   reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” J.W. v. Paley, 81 F.4th 440, 447

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   (5th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted) (italics added). “Summary judgment is
   appropriate only when the moving party establishes that ‘there is no genuine
   dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
   matter of law.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). “We may affirm a
   summary judgment on any ground supported by the record, even if it is
   different from that relied on by the district court.” Campos v. Steves & Sons,
   Inc., 10 F.4th 515, 520 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
          Notably, “IDEA litigation invariably involves an inextricable tangle of
   law and fact.” Leigh Ann H. v. Riesel Indep. Sch. Dist., 18 F.4th 788, 794 (5th
   Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). “We review the district court’s decision de
   novo, as a mixed question of law and fact, and the district court’s underlying
   findings of fact for clear error.” Krawietz ex rel. Parker v. Galveston Indep.
   Sch. Dist., 900 F.3d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 2018). A district court commits clear
   error only when “we are ‘left with a definite and firm conviction that a
   mistake has been committed.’” R.P. ex rel. R.P. v. Alamo Heights Indep. Sch.
   Dist., 703 F.3d 801, 808 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Hou. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. V.P.
   ex rel. Juan P., 582 F.3d 576, 583 (5th Cir. 2009)).
                                         III
                                          A
          Zapata appeals the district court’s order affirming the Special
   Education Hearing Officer’s dismissal of his IDEA claim as having been
   brought against the wrong defendant.
          Enacted by Congress in 1970, the IDEA requires that “all children
   with disabilities,” including incarcerated children, receive a “free
   appropriate public education.” Texas Educ. Agency v. U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 908
   F.3d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 2018); see 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)(C). States are
   responsible for implementing its provisions and adhering to its safeguards.
   See 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a). Relevant here, the IDEA endows states with near-

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   plenary authority to do so as they see fit, including the right to “assign to any
   public agency in the State the responsibility of ensuring that the requirements
   of this subchapter” are met for incarcerated children. Id. § 1412(a)(11)(C).
   Because the IDEA authorizes states to transfer in full the responsibility of
   IDEA compliance to another governmental entity, “questions of which
   agency is responsible for providing a student with a [free appropriate public
   education] are determined under state law.” L.A. Unified Sch. Dist. v.
   Garcia, 669 F.3d 956, 960 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing Union Sch. Dist. v. Smith, 15
   F.3d 1519, 1525–27 (9th Cir. 1994)).
          Texas state law requires “[t]he Texas Education Agency, the Health
   and Human Services Commission, the Department of Family and Protective
   Services, and the Texas Juvenile Justice Department” to “establish the
   respective responsibilities of school districts and of residential facilities for
   the provision of a free, appropriate public education, as required by the
   [IDEA] . . . , including each requirement for children with disabilities who
   reside in those facilities[.]” Tex. Educ. Code Ann. § 29.012(d). Pursuant to
   an agreement codified into law by these agencies, local education agencies—
   not detention facilities—are responsible for “provid[ing] or ensur[ing] the
   provision of a [free appropriate public education] to students with disabilities
   residing in [residential facilities] in accordance with [the] IDEA, applicable
   federal regulations, and state laws and rules.”        19 Tex. Admin. Code
   § 89.1115(d)(1)(A).
          The Detention Center is such a “residential facility,” Tex. Educ.
   Code Ann. § 5.001(8), meaning a local education agency with which it
   works—not the Detention Center itself—is responsible for IDEA
   compliance. Under this framework, the John H. Woods Charter School—
   Inspire Academy agreed to be the Detention Center’s local education agency
   and to take responsibility for its IDEA compliance. Thus, we agree with the
   Special Education Hearing Officer and the district court that Texas’s

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   delegation of responsibility and the operative contract between the Detention
   Center and the local education agency absolves the Detention Center of
   responsibility for IDEA implementation and compliance.
          Zapata argues that federal regulations prohibit the state from
   relinquishing responsibility in full for IDEA compliance and absolving itself
   from attendant liability arising from IDEA shortcomings. Like the district
   court, we disagree.
          Zapata relies on 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b), which reads: “The provisions
   of this part—(1) Apply to all political subdivisions of the State that are
   involved in the education of children with disabilities, including: (i) The State
   educational agency . . . [and] (iv) State and local juvenile and adult
   correctional facilities[.]”    Zapata cites no authority for his implied
   proposition that this regulation overrides the U.S. Code provision that allows
   a state to “assign to any public agency . . . the responsibility of ensuring”
   IDEA compliance for incarcerated children. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(11)(C).
   Nor could he, for “[w]hen [] regulations are contrary to the wording of the
   statute itself, [] this Court must follow the plain statutory language and not
   the regulations.” Salinas v. Rodriguez, 963 F.2d 791, 793 (5th Cir. 1992).
   Rather, the “harmonious interpretation of the statute[] [and] the
   regulations,” id. at 794, is that a detention facility is responsible for meeting
   IDEA’s mandates unless a state government assigns that specific
   responsibility to another agency or organization. Because Texas charged
   local education agencies with IDEA compliance, the Detention Center
   cannot be held liable for IDEA noncompliance.
                                          B
          Zapata also appeals the district court’s order granting the Detention
   Center and Littlejohn summary judgment on his Rehabilitation Act and ADA
   claims.

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          “The prima facie case of discrimination under the [Rehabilitation
   Act] is operationally identical to the test under the ADA.” Austin v. City of
   Pasadena, 74 F.4th 312, 334 (5th Cir. 2023) (quoting Melton v. Dall. Area
   Rapid Transit, 391 F.3d 669, 676 n.8 (5th Cir. 2004)). We thus evaluate these
   claims simultaneously, though we refer only to the ADA for clarity.
          To establish a prima facie case under the ADA, a plaintiff must show:
          (1) that he is a qualified individual within the meaning of the
          ADA; (2) that he is being excluded from participation in, or
          being denied benefits of, services, programs, or activities for
          which the public entity is responsible, or is otherwise being
          discriminated against by a public entity; and (3) that such
          exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination is by reason of
          his disability.
   Cadena v. El Paso Cnty., 946 F.3d 717, 723 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Melton,
   391 F.3d at 671–72).
          “[A] plaintiff can establish the third prong of the prima facie case—
   discrimination ‘by reason of his disability’—by showing that the defendants
   have failed to make reasonable accommodations.” Valentine v. Collier, 993
   F.3d 270, 290 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Windham v. Harris Cnty., 875 F.3d
   229, 235 (5th Cir. 2017)). “For this type of claim, a plaintiff must show that
   the entity knew of the disability and its consequential limitations, either
   because the plaintiff requested an accommodation or because the nature of
   the limitation was open and obvious.” Cadena, 946 F.3d at 724 (citing
   Windham, 875 F.3d at 236–37).
          The parties do not dispute that Zapata is a qualified individual.
   Rather, they dispute whether the Detention Center had knowledge of
   Zapata’s disabilities and whether Zapata was given a reasonable
   accommodation. The district court concluded that Zapata failed to show a
   genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the Detention Center “knew

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   of his disability, and . . . [whether] he was provided with a reasonable
   accommodation.” We disagree.
          Within two weeks of Zapata’s release from his initial medical
   quarantine, he left the facility for a psychological evaluation by Dr. Crowfoot.
   Days later, Littlejohn received Dr. Crowfoot’s report, which diagnosed
   Zapata with Anxiety Disorder, Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, Major
   Depressive Disorder, Autism Spectrum Disorder, and various Specific
   Learning Disabilities. The report also notes Zapata’s feelings of anxiety and
   depression, the trauma he experienced in his family life, and his history of
   suicidal ideations.     Finally, the report provides a laundry list of
   recommendations including counseling and regular assessments for suicidal
   ideations as well as his anxiety. This direct language may very well have
   placed the Detention Center and Littlejohn—its recipient—on notice of
   Zapata’s “disabilities, limitations, and possible accommodations.” Taylor v.
   Principal Fin. Grp., Inc., 93 F.3d 155, 165 (5th Cir. 1996).
          The district court dismissed the report simply because “Dr. Crowfoot
   listed a series of ‘diagnostic impressions’ rather than a conclusive
   diagnostic,” meaning it could not place the Detention Center on notice. The
   Detention Center does not push this reasoning with much force on appeal,
   though it cites medical dictionaries that distinguish between a diagnosis and
   a diagnostic impression. This is a distinction without a difference.
          Though the above-quoted section is titled “Diagnostic Impressions,”
   the table naming these diagnoses reads: “Principal Diagnosis and Specifiers.”
   Furthermore, when the report refers to these illnesses elsewhere, it uses the
   term diagnosis. To conclude, then, that no fact dispute remains and that this
   report did not notify the Detention Center of Zapata’s disabilities is to
   demand a degree of specificity not required by our caselaw, missing the forest
   for the trees—particularly when our posture commands us to review the

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   evidence in the light most favorable to Zapata. J.W., 81 F.4th at 447.
   Accordingly, we conclude that there is a genuine dispute of material fact as
   to whether the report put the Detention Center on notice of Zapata’s
   disability.1
           Given this conclusion, we turn to whether the Detention Center
   provided Zapata a reasonable accommodation. Upon receipt of the report,
   Littlejohn testified, the Detention Center did not immediately modify its
   plans for Zapata. Instead, record evidence shows that several days after
   Littlejohn received the report, the Detention Center decided to conduct daily
   counseling with Zapata upon his release.              Indeed, Zapata received “a
   counseling session on July 6, 2020, as soon as he was released from medical
   quarantine and less than a week after Littlejohn received Dr. Crowfoot’s
   report.” Without much analysis, the district court determined that this
   counseling session was a reasonable accommodation as a matter of law.
           We conclude that a genuine dispute of material fact precludes such a
   determination at this stage.          Whether a proposed accommodation is
   reasonable may sometimes turn on considerations that are best reserved “for
   the trier of fact.” See Riel v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 99 F.3d 678, 683 (5th Cir.
   1996); see also Jones v. Lubbock Cnty. Hosp. Dist., 834 F. App’x 923, 926 (5th
   Cir. 2020) (unpublished) (“Whether a proposed accommodation is
   reasonable is generally a fact issue.”). On June 18, 2020, Zapata was placed
   on medical observation after showing signs of COVID-19, only to be placed
   in quarantine after testing positive. Zapata’s quarantine was extended on
   July 3, as he remained symptomatic, and he was ultimately released from

           _____________________
           1
            Zapata also argues that the Detention Center was on notice based on statements
   he made during his intake assessments and his father’s outreach. Because we conclude that
   Dr. Crowfoot’s report may have put the Detention Center on notice, we need not resolve
   these secondary arguments.

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   isolation on July 6. The day he was released, he received a counseling session,
   and the next day, he was discharged. The Detention Center argues that the
   counseling session conducted the day he was released from quarantine was
   reasonable as a matter of law. The record does not compel this conclusion.
          Zapata’s father testified that during Zapata’s initial quarantine, he
   was able to have daily phone and video calls with Zapata. The Detention
   Center offers no evidence that such technology could not have been deployed
   while Zapata was in his second quarantine, while Littlejohn also testified that
   he received information regarding “a free online tool kit for individuals
   supporting children and youth autism during COVID-19.” It may be the case
   that securing such equipment could have jeopardized other detainees’ safety,
   thereby militating against any accommodation beyond the delayed counseling
   session. But the costs imposed by several more days in isolation were
   potentially severe given Zapata’s youth and mental state. Here, too, there is
   a genuine dispute of material fact.
          Because genuine disputes of material fact exist both as to whether the
   Detention Center was aware of Zapata’s disabilities, and whether its
   accommodation was “reasonable,” we must reverse and remand on the
   Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims.
                                           C
          Finally, Zapata appeals the dismissal of his constitutional claims,
   brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, that the Detention Center violated his
   Eighth Amendment rights. The district court did not reach the merits of his
   claims, instead granting summary judgment because Littlejohn “is not a
   policymaker for purposes of Monell liability.” We agree.
          In lawsuits against municipal actors in their official capacities,
   plaintiffs must prove the following elements of a suit against a municipality
   under Monell v. Department of Social Services: (1) a policy maker; (2) an official

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   policy; and (3) a violation of constitutional rights whose “moving force” is
   the policy or custom. 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). Regarding the first element,
   “[t]he authority to make municipal policy is necessarily the authority to make
   final policy.” City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)
   (plurality opinion). “[W]hether a particular official has ‘final policymaking
   authority’ is a question of state law.” Jett v. Dall. Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S.
   701, 737 (1989) (quoting Praprotnik, 485 U.S. at 123 (plurality opinion)).
          Years ago, we held that “state law supports the conclusion that the
   Juvenile Board possesses authority to establish official policy for [a] detention
   center” run by a county. Flores v. Cameron Cnty., 92 F.3d 258, 264 (5th Cir.
   1996) (citing Tex. Hum. Res. Code Ann. § 152.0372). Thus, Littlejohn
   cannot be considered the appropriate policymaker unless the Hays County
   Juvenile Board has delegated policymaking authority to him.             But the
   operative policy, the Detention Center’s 2020 Policy and Procedure Manual,
   plainly states that it is subject to annual inspection and approval by the Hays
   County Juvenile Board. Because the Detention Center and Littlejohn as its
   administrator must answer to the Hays County Juvenile Board regarding the
   policy at issue, it cannot also be the case that Littlejohn has been delegated
   the policymaking authority necessary to sustain Zapata’s claim under Monell.
                                         ***
          We AFFIRM IN PART and REVERSE IN PART and RE-
   MAND for further proceedings.

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