Court Opinion

ID: 9736177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:46:19.165802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:27:04.898679
License: Public Domain

BECK, Judge,
concurring:
I agree with the majority’s conclusion that the instant appellee has failed to prove immediate and irreparable harm and therefore is not entitled to a preliminary injunction.
However, I write separately because I believe that despite the explanation of irreparable harm contained in the majority’s first footnote, the majority’s opinion may be read as implying an overly restrictive construction of irreparable harm in a business setting. In the body of its opinion the majority maintains that “[ojnly when there is proof that the threatened monetary loss is so great as to threaten the existence of the business is a preliminary injunction properly granted.” (Emphasis added). Thus, the majority’s definition of irreparable harm appears to preclude relief where a plaintiff’s business will be severely circumscribed, but not completely destroyed, by a defendant’s conduct or where a *252defendant’s actions will not reduce a plaintiff’s business but will prevent expansion of the plaintiff’s business.
For this reason, I write to emphasize that to which the majority alludes in its first footnote. Now, as previously, a plaintiff may establish the irreparable harm prerequisite for a preliminary injunction by proving the likelihood of a loss that is not entirely ascertainable and compensable by money damages. John G. Bryant Co. v. Sling Testing and Repair, Inc., 471 Pa. 1, 369 A.2d 1164 (1977).
In commercial contexts, Pennsylvania courts have repeatedly issued preliminary injunctions upon proof of impending loss of business opportunities or market advantages, i.e., upon a showing of irreparable harm that did not endanger the plaintiff’s entire corporate existence. For example, in Courier Times, Inc. v. United Feature Syndicate, Inc., 300 Pa.Super. 40, 56, 445 A.2d 1288, 1296 (1982), three plaintiff newspapers asserted that they “would suffer irreparable injury by being deprived of an extremely popular feature [‘Peanuts’ comic strip], hampering their effort to compete” for the prior customers of a defunct newspaper. The defendant newspaper claimed that the plaintiffs had not evidenced irreparable harm because “the plaintiff newspapers would not cease to exist if deprived of ‘Peanuts.’ ” Id., 300 Pa.Superior Ct. at 56, 445 A.2d at 1296. Reasoning that “[p]laintiffs [were] required to show irreparable harm, not annihilation,” id., 300 Pa.Superior Ct. at 56, 445 A.2d at 1296, we held that the plaintiffs had carried their burden of proof by establishing the “superior value of ‘Peanuts’ in the competition for former ... subscribers” of the defunct newspaper, id., 300 Pa.Superior Ct. at 56, 445 A.2d at 1296, and the incalculable worth of “Peanuts” whose “drawing power ... [did] not stand on its own, but only in combination with other features.” Id., 300 Pa.Superior Ct. at 57, 445 A.2d at 1297 (footnote deleted). That is, plaintiffs demonstrated the probability of their suffering a loss that was unascertainable and not compensable by money damages.
*253Analogously, in John G. Bryant Co., the supreme court approved a preliminary injunction enforcing an anticompeti-tive employment covenant without proof that the plaintiff business would terminate unless the injunction were granted. In analyzing the irreparable harm to be averted by the preliminary injunction, the court explained that an anticom-petition
covenant seeks to prevent more than just the sales that might result by the prohibited contact but also the covenant is designed to prevent a disturbance in the relationship that has been established between appellees and their accounts through prior dealings. It is the possible consequences of this unwarranted interference with customer relationships that is unascertainable and not capable of being fully compensated by money damages ...
... [SJome customers may be persuaded, or even be very willing, to abandon the employer should the employee move to a competing organization or leave to set up a business of his own____
Id., 471 Pa. at 8-9, 369 A.2d at 1167-68 (emphasis added); see also Alabama Binder & Chemical Corp. v. Pennsylvania Industrial Chemical Corp., 410 Pa. 214, 189 A.2d 180 (1963) (supreme court sustained a preliminary injunction forbidding dissemination of trade secrets and violation of anticompetition covenant without proof that the plaintiff business would cease to exist in the absence of an injunction).
Accordingly, I would hold that irreparable harm in a business setting need not be premised upon proof that the plaintiff business will be destroyed if the defendant’s actions are permitted to continue. Rather, I would remain with the traditional definition of irreparable harm which requires a showing that the injury likely to be incurred by the plaintiff business is “unascertainable and not capable of being fully compensated by money damages.” John G. Bryant Co., 471 Pa. at 8, 369 A.2d at 1167.