Court Opinion

ID: 9834591
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 01:07:08.853384+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:35.023944
License: Public Domain

Upon application for rehearing:
. Defendant insists that whatever may have been the effect of the original agreement to repurchase the property from *316plaintiff, his acceptance of the second contract (which did not contain such provision) and payment of installments thereunder, constituted a waiver by him of the special agreement. This argument is based upon the theory that the contract of purchase by plaintiff, which provided that his rights thereunder would be forfeited by default in payment of the monthly installments for a period of three months, is inconsistent with the agreement of defendant to repurchase the property. As they may stand together, the two agreements are not inconsistent. This béing so, we are of opinion that the ommission of the special agreement from the body of the second contract did not necessarily charge plaintiff with notice of its rejection by defendant.
As the agreement of the seller to repurchase at the option of the buyer is not inconsistent with the contract of sale, the cases of United Fuel Gas Co. v. Ledsome, 109 W. Va. 14, 153 S. E. 303; Myers v. Carnahan, 61 W. Va. 414, 57 S. E. 134, and Poteet v. Imboden, 73 W. Va. 570, 80 S. E. 958, relied on by defendant, do not support its contention. The doctrine of those cases is: “A subsequent contract which does not by express terms abrogate an earlier contract, will nevertheless operate as a discharge thereof if it is inconsistent with the earlier contract. But to operate as a discharge, in the absence of an express agreement to that effect, the new contract must be clearly inconsistent with the continued existence of the original contract.”