Court Opinion

ID: 9494384
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:36:55.299871+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:23.335010
License: Public Domain

RICE, Chief District Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the judgment of the majority, but I write separately because I believe that Baird would lack standing even if this lawsuit had been joined by other members of the Michigan legislature. Unlike the majority, I do not believe that Baird’s lack of standing stems from her failure to sue as part of a bloc. Rather, her lack of standing is attributable to the fact that her vote on CR 115 was given full effect. Although she was on the losing side, her vote was not in any sense “nullified.” Baird’s complaint is simply that a concurrent resolution was an improper way for the Michigan House of Representatives to approve the gaming compacts at issue. She contends that she should have received the opportunity to vote on legislation proposing the compacts. According to Baird, the Secretary of the Interior unlawfully endorsed the compacts, without obtaining the necessary approval of the state legislature,1 *414thereby depriving her of the right to vote on them in the manner prescribed by the Michigan Constitution. Such an injury, however, is insufficient to confer Article III standing, with or without the presence of Baird’s colleagues in this lawsuit.
The foregoing conclusion is consistent with, and mandated by, Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 59 S.Ct. 972, 83 L.Ed. 1385 (1939), and Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997). In Coleman, 20 of 40 Kansas state Senators voted against ratification of a constitutional amendment. The Lieutenant Governor then cast a tie-breaking vote in favor of the amendment, which was ratified as a result of his vote. Thereafter, the 20 members of the Kansas Senate who had voted against the amendment sought a writ of mandamus from the Kansas Supreme Court to compel state officials to recognize that the legislature, had not ratified the amendment because the Lieutenant Governor should not have been permitted to vote. Upon review, the Kansas Supreme Court held that the legislators had standing to bring their mandamus action, but it ruled against them on the merits. The United States Supreme Court subsequently agreed, holding that the members of the legislature had standing. In reaching this conclusion, the Coleman Court noted that, if the legislators were correct on the merits, then their votes against ratification were nullified. In relevant part, the Court reasoned:
Here, the plaintiffs include twenty senators, whose votes against ratification have been overridden and virtually held for naught although if they are right in their contentions their votes would have been sufficient to defeat ratification. We think that these senators have a plain, direct and adequate interest in maintaining the effectiveness of them votes.
[T]he twenty senators were not only qualified to vote on the question of ratification but their votes, if the Lieutenant Governor were excluded as not being a part of the legislature for that purpose, would have been decisive in defeating the ratifying resolution.
[W]e find no departure from principle in recognizing in the instant case that at least the twenty senators whose votes, if their contention were sustained, would have been sufficient to defeat the resolution ratifying the proposed constitutional amendment, have an interest in the controversy which, treated by the state court as a basis for entertaining and deciding the federal questions, is sufficient to give the Court jurisdiction to review that decision.
Coleman, 307 U.S. at 438, 441, 446, 59 S.Ct. 972.
The Supreme Court subsequently read Coleman narrowly in Raines, holding that members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act because they had not alleged a sufficiently concrete injury.2 In reaching this conclusion, the Raines Court read Coleman as standing “at most” for “the proposition that legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), *415on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 823,117 S.Ct. 2312 (footnote omitted).
After restricting Coleman to the proposition set forth above, the Raines Court reasoned:
It should be equally obvious that ap-pellees’ claim does not fall within our holding in Coleman, as thus understood. They have not alleged that they voted for a specific bill, that there were sufficient votes to pass the bill, and that the bill was nonetheless deemed defeated. In the vote on the Act, their votes were given full effect. They simply lost that vote.
Id. at 824, 117 S.Ct. 2312 (footnote omitted).
Likewise, in the present case, it is evident that Baird’s claim does not fall within the scope of Coleman, as interpreted by Raines. Baird does not contend that she voted against CR 115, that there were sufficient votes to defeat CR 115, and that CR 115 nevertheless went into effect. To the contrary, Baird was plainly on the losing side with respect to the vote on the concurrent resolution. As in Raines, then, her vote was given full effect. She simply lost that vote.
Baird’s true complaint is that she was deprived of the opportunity to vote on the compacts in the manner prescribed by the Michigan Constitution (i.e., she was deprived of the opportunity to vote on legislation proposing the compacts). In particular, she reasons that
[b]y offering a concurrent resolution instead of legislation, the requirements of the Michigan Constitution were subverted. Had those requirements been honored, Appellant Legislators’ “votes would have been decisive in defeating” the approval of the [gaming compacts]. Coleman, at 307 U.S. 441, 59 S.Ct. 972. Thus, just as in Coleman, the Appellant Legislators’ votes here were rendered completely ineffective.
(Appellants’ Brief at 12).
Upon review, I cannot agree with Baird’s assertion that the present case is analogous to Coleman, particularly as it has been narrowly construed by Raines. As noted above, Coleman stands “at most” for “the proposition that legislators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative action goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that their votes have been completely nullified.” Raines, 521 U.S. at 823, 117 S.Ct. 2312 (footnote omitted). Under this test, Baird lacks standing. The only “specific legislative Act” or “legislative action” at issue in the present case is CR 115. Unlike the legislators in Coleman, Baird and the other opponents of the compacts lacked sufficient votes to defeat CR 115. Consequently, applying the language of Raines, it cannot be said that there were “sufficient votes” to defeat CR 115, but that it went into effect anyway, thereby nullifying the vote of Baird or the other opponents of the concurrent resolution. Consequently, even if Baird and her colleagues had sued as a bloc, they still would lack Article III standing. Contrary to Baird’s assertion, the Secretary of the Interior’s approval of the gaming compacts did not nullify anyone’s vote.
Insofar as Baird suggests that the Secretary of the Interior unlawfully endorsed the gaming compacts without obtaining proper approval from the Michigan legislature (i.e., approval in the form of legislation as opposed to the allegedly “null and void” concurrent resolution), her “injury” is insufficient to confer Article III standing. Baird complains that the Secretary’s endorsement of the gaming compacts, subsequent to the passage of the concurrent *416resolution, deprived her of the opportunity to participate in a valid vote on legislation proposing the compacts, as required by the Michigan Constitution. It is evident, however, that such an injury falls outside the scope of Coleman and Raines. Indeed, as the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals recently recognized in Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112, 115 (D.C.Cir.1999), cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1012, 120 S.Ct. 1286, 146 L.Ed.2d 233 (2000), a deprivation of the “right[ ] to participate and vote on legislation in a manner defined by the ... Constitution” is insufficient to confer Article III standing.
In Chenoweth, the court held that members of Congress lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of an Executive Order for the protection of rivers. The legislators in Chenoweth claimed that former President Clinton’s creation of a river preservation program by Executive Order deprived them of “ ‘their constitutionally guaranteed responsibility of open debate and vote on issues and legislation’ involving interstate commerce, federal lands, the expenditure of federal monies, and implementation of the [National Environmental Policy Act].” Id. at 113. The district court dismissed the lawsuit for lack of standing, reasoning that the legislators’ injury — the loss of their right to vote on the preservation program — was “too abstract and not sufficiently specific to support a finding of standing.” Id. Upon review, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying upon Raines, the appellate court reasoned:
If, as the Court held in Raines, a statute that allegedly “divests [congressmen] of their constitutional role” in the legislative process does not give them standing to sue, ... then neither does an Executive Order that allegedly deprives congressmen of their “right[ ] to participate and vote on legislation in a manner defined by the Constitution.”
Id. at 115.
In short, the Chenoweth court concluded that the legislators’ alleged “injury in fact” — their loss of the right to vote on the river preservation program due to “the President’s successful effort ‘to usurp Congressional authority by implementing a program, for which [he] has no constitutional authority, in a manner contrary to the Constitution’ ” —was insufficient to confer Article III standing.3 Id. at 116.
Likewise, in the present case, Baird contends that the Secretary of the Interior’s endorsement of the gaming compacts, which occurred in the absence of legislation authorizing them, deprived her of the right to vote on the compacts in the manner prescribed by the Michigan Constitution. As in Chenotueth, however, her loss of the right to vote, as the result of allegedly unlawful executive action,4 does not *417inflict an injury-in-fact sufficient to confer Article III standing.
In conclusion, I note that the foregoing reasoning is consistent with Saratoga County Chamber of Commerce, Inc. v. Pataki, 275 A.D.2d 145, 712 N.Y.S.2d 687 (N.Y.App.Div.2000), which was decided approximately three weeks after oral argument in the present case. In Saratoga County, New York state legislators and others sued Governor Pataki, alleging that he improperly entered into an Indian gaming compact, pursuant to the IGRA, without obtaining approval from the state legislature. The plaintiff legislators in Saratoga County were deprived of any opportunity to vote for or against the gaming compact, as Governor Pataki never presented the compact to the legislature at all. Upon review, the appellate court held that the legislators’ alleged “injury” — denial of their right to vote on approval of the compact — was insufficient to confer “legislator standing” upon them.5 In reaching this conclusion, the court reasoned that “their claim of standing is based on a loss of political power rather than the assertion that they have been deprived of something to which they personally are entitled.” Id. at 695. With respect to the legislators’ argument that Governor Pataki had acted improperly, the court noted that their claim did not “differentiate” them from the general public. Id. (citing, inter alia, Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 117 S.Ct. 2312, 138 L.Ed.2d 849 (1997), and Chenoweth v. Clinton, 181 F.3d 112 (D.C.Cir.1999)).
Likewise, Baird argues that the Secretary of the Interior acted unlawfully by endorsing the gaming compacts without obtaining valid approval from the Michigan legislature, as required by state law. As in Saratoga County, Baird complains that she was deprived of the opportunity to vote on legislation.6 As noted above, however, a deprivation of her “right[ ] to participate and vote on legislation in a manner defined by the [Michigan] Constitution” falls outside the scope of Coleman and Raines and, therefore, does not confer Article III standing. See Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 115.
Based on the reasoning and citation of authority set forth above, I agree that Baird lacks Article III standing to challenge the actions of the Secretary of the Interior, but for reasons other than her failure to sue as part of a bloc.

. Given her belief that a concurrent resolution is an unlawful way for the Michigan legislature to approve gaming compacts, *414Baird contends that CR 115 is null and void. (JA at 244, ¶ 30).

. The plaintiff-appellees in Raines were members of Congress who had voted against the Line Item Veto Act, which passed in the Senate by a vote of 69 to 31 and in the House by a vote of 232 to 177. After former President Clinton signed the Act into law, six of the losing legislators filed suit, alleging that the Act was unconstitutional. Raines, 521 U.S. at 814, 117 S.Ct. 2312.

. Although Raines and Chenoweth both involved federal legislators, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that the reasoning underlying Raines applies equally to suits brought by state legislators. See Alaska Legislative Council v. Babbitt, 181 F.3d 1333, 1337 (D.C.Cir.1999).

. Chenoweth and the present case plainly both involve a challenge to allegedly unlawful executive action that deprived lawmakers of the right to vote. In Chenoweth, the plaintiffs argued that former President Clinton’s issuance of an executive order for the protection of rivers deprived them of the right to vote on legislation proposing such protection, as required by the United States Constitution. Chenoweth, 181 F.3d at 115. Likewise, in the present case, Baird argues that the Secretary of the Interior’s endorsement of the gaming compacts deprived her of the right to vote on legislation proposing the compacts, as required by the Michigan Constitution. In the present case, of course, the reason why the Secretary’s endorsement of the compacts was allegedly unlawful is that proper legislative procedures were not followed prior to the Secretary's endorsement. The fact remains, *417however, that Baird's legal challenge, as in Chenoweth, is to allegedly unlawful executive action. This is apparent from the fact that she has named the Secretary of the Interior as the defendant, alleging, inter alia, that the gaming compacts the Secretary signed are unconstitutional. (See, e.g., JA at 244, 246, 250).

. While New York’s standing requirements do not mirror the requirements of Article III, both New York law and Article III require an "injury in fact,” and the analysis of that issue is essentially the same under New York and federal law. See, e.g., Soc’y of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. County of Suffolk, 77 N.Y.2d 761, 772-773, 570 N.Y.S.2d 778, 573 N.E.2d 1034 (N.Y.1991).

. In Saratoga County, the slate legislators had no opportunity to vote for or against the gaming compact, as Governor Pataki never presented it to them. In the present case, of course, Baird did participate in a vote on CR 115. However, given Baird’s allegation that the vote on CR 115 was a nullity, because gaming compacts must be approved by legislation, she cannot be meaningfully distinguished from the state legislators in Saratoga County. In both cases, the alleged deprivation at issue is a loss of the right to vote on gaming compacts in the manner prescribed by state law.