Court Opinion

ID: 9382390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-27 17:00:22.295246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:39.045064
License: Public Domain

NOT PRECEDENTIAL

                        UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                                  _____________

                                       No. 22-2607
                                      _____________

                            UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

                                             v.

                                 GEORGE GONZALEZ,
                                                  Appellant
                                   _______________

                     On Appeal from the United States District Court
                         For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
                               (D.C. No. 4-02-cr-0271-002)
                     District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
                                    _______________

                      Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
                                   March 20, 2023

           Before: JORDAN, GREENAWAY, JR., and McKEE, Circuit Judges

                                  (Filed: March 27, 2023)
                                     _______________

                                       OPINION
                                    _______________

       
        This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.
JORDAN, Circuit Judge.

        In a counseled and unopposed motion, George Gonzalez asked to have his

sentence for violating his supervised release reduced from 48 months to 36 months, under

Section 404 of the First Step Act. That was granted by the District Court, but two years

later, Gonzalez filed a pro se motion to reconsider, requesting a sentence of time served.

The District Court took account of the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and

concluded that 36 months was indeed the appropriate sentence. Accordingly, it denied

his request for a further reduction. Gonzalez, still proceeding pro se, challenges that

denial. We will affirm.

I.      BACKGROUND

        In 2003, Gonzalez pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute more than

50 grams of cocaine base and 100 grams of heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. In

that case, 4:02-cr-0271, the District Court sentenced Gonzalez to 168 months in prison to

be followed by a five-year term of supervised release. Gonzalez began his term of

supervised release for that conviction in February 2015, having completed his prison

term.

        While on supervised release, Gonzalez participated in a drug trafficking

conspiracy to transport methamphetamine from California to Pennsylvania. He was

arrested and pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute at least 500 grams of

methamphetamine. In October 2017, the District Court sentenced him to 110 months in

prison in that case, 1:16-cr-00244, and imposed a 48-month sentence for revocation of

supervised release in 4:02-cr-0271, to run consecutively with his 110-month sentence.

                                             2
       Congress then passed the First Step Act. In relevant part, Section 404 of the First

Step Act authorized a federal district “court that imposed a sentence for a covered

offense” to “impose a reduced sentence as if sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act

of 2010 … were in effect at the time the covered offense was committed.” First Step Act

of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222.

       In pertinent part, Section 2 of the Fair Sentencing Act increased the minimum

quantity of cocaine base necessary to authorize a life sentence for distribution under 21

U.S.C. § 841(b) from 50 grams to 280 grams. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.

111-220, § 2, 124 Stat. 2372. After that modification, the maximum sentence for a

distribution offense involving 50 grams of cocaine base was reduced from a life sentence

to 40 years. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2012). That is significant in this case because, under 21

U.S.C. § 846, the penalties for conspiracy to distribute cocaine are the same as those

provided for distribution under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b).1

       In response to the changes in the law, Gonzalez filed a letter with the District

Court seeking “a reduction in the crack-cocaine portion of his sentence as authorized by

the … First Step Act … and [the] Fair Sentenc[ing] Act[.]” (Supp. App. at 038.) The

Court appointed the Federal Public Defender’s Office to represent Gonzalez, and that

Office then filed an unopposed motion for a reduction of his supervised-release-

       1
         The text of 21 U.S.C. § 846 was not changed by the First Step Act. See An Act
to Prevent the Manufacturing, Distribution, and Use of Illegal Drugs, and for Other
Purposes, Pub. L. No. 100-690, Title VI, § 6470, 102 Stat. 4377 (amending the text to its
current form in 1988).

                                             3
revocation sentence, under Section 404 of the First Step Act. The motion specifically

asked for a reduction from 48 months to 36 months.

       The Federal Public Defender’s Office argued that “[a] revocation sentence

constitutes a covered offense for purposes of the First Step Act.” 2 (Supp. App. at 045).

Gonzalez’s conviction would have constituted a class B felony had the Fair Sentencing

Act been in effect when he committed his crack-cocaine offense, as the statutory

maximum would have been 40 years. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(2) (2012) (providing that

an offense with a 40-year maximum term is classified as class B felony in cases such as

this where the “section defining” “[a]n offense” does not otherwise provide). Thus,

Gonzalez’s maximum term of imprisonment for a revocation of supervised release would

have been three years under the relevant statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2012)

(explaining that “a defendant whose term is revoked … may not be required to serve on

any such revocation … more than 3 years if [his] offense is a class B felony”).

Consequently, the Federal Public Defender’s Office argued, the 48-month revocation

       2
          The Federal Public Defender’s Office cited United States v. Venable, 943 F.3d
187, 193-94 (4th Cir. 2019), for this proposition. There, the Fourth Circuit held that a
district court has the “authority to resentence a defendant serving a term of imprisonment
for revocation of supervised release whose original, underlying conviction was for a
‘covered offense.’” Venable, 943 F.3d at 194 (emphasis removed). The government
does not dispute that Gonzalez’s original conviction was for a “covered offense.”
Further, the government represents that it did not oppose the motion for reduction before
the District Court on the assumption “that a sentence imposed upon revocation of
supervised release is eligible for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act when the
underlying crime is a covered offense within the meaning of the Act.” (Answering Br. at
12 n.1.)

                                             4
sentence exceeded the 36-month maximum. In July 2020, the District Court granted the

unopposed motion reducing Gonzalez’s sentence to 36 months, as requested.3

       More than two years later, Gonzalez filed a pro se motion for reconsideration,

asking the District Court to further reduce his penalty for violating supervised release to a

sentence of time served. The Court construed the motion to reconsider as being based on

United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318, 324 (3d Cir. 2020), which requires a district court

to consider afresh the sentencing factors in § 3553(a) when resentencing someone under

the First Step Act. 4

       The Court denied Gonzalez’s reconsideration request after examining the

§ 3553(a) factors and concluding that 36 months was the right sentence. The Court

considered the sentence to be appropriate “to reflect the serious nature of his drug

offenses and his repeated failure to abide by the law, to promote respect for the law, to

provide just punishment for the offenses, and to afford adequate deterrence to his

criminal conduct[.]” (Supp. App. at 064.) Further, the Court noted Gonzalez’s criminal

history and observed that he “show[ed] no remorse for his drug crimes” and did not

indicate he “t[ook] any responsibility for his criminal conduct.” (Id.) Moreover,

       3
        The order indicates it was signed on June 13, 2020, but that appears to be a
typographical error as the motion was filed in July 2020 and the docket reflects that the
order was filed on July 13, 2020.
       4
        Our decision in United States v. Easter, 975 F.3d 318 (3d Cir. 2020), was filed in
September 2020, three months after the District Court had issued its order granting the
requested reduction in June 2020.

                                              5
“Gonzalez continue[d] to represent a danger to the public if he is released from prison

and his sentence is reduced to time served.” (Id.)

       This appeal followed.

II.    DISCUSSION 5

       On appeal, Gonzalez fails to identify any legal error in the order denying his

request for an additional reduction of his revocation sentence and offers no argument that

the District Court abused its discretion. First, he fails to include any argument showing

that his already-reduced 36-month sentence exceeds the legal maximum or that the

conclusion that such a sentence was appropriate was substantively unreasonable. And

second, Gonzalez nowhere acknowledges that the District Court expressly considered the

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors before saying a 36-month sentence was appropriate.

Gonzalez has thus effectively waived any basis for altering the sentencing decision. See

United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“It is well settled that an

appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue in his opening brief constitutes waiver of

that issue on appeal.”).

       5
         The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and 3582(c)(1). We
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). When the District
Court determines that “a defendant [is] eligible for a sentence modification under” the
First Step Act but, upon consideration of that request, the District Court “declines to
reduce the sentence or imposes a reduced sentence with which the movant is not satisfied,
we review for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Shields, 48 F.4th 183, 189 (3d Cir.
2022). But “we exercise plenary review [when] we are presented with legal questions”
relating to a motion for sentence reduction. United States v. Birt, 966 F.3d 257, 259 n.2
(3d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. Thompson, 825 F.3d 198, 203 (3d Cir. 2016))
(alteration in original). “We review the denial of a motion for reconsideration for abuse
of discretion.” United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732 (3d Cir. 2010).

                                              6
       At any rate, we perceive no error in the decision. The initial order in 2020

provided all the relief Gonzalez’s counseled motion sought. The purpose of a motion to

reconsider is not to make arguments that a litigant could have made earlier and did not.

See United States v. Dupree, 617 F.3d 724, 732-33 (3d Cir. 2010) (explaining that

motions for reconsideration are neither “for addressing arguments that a party should

have raised earlier” nor intended to “empower litigants … to raise their arguments, piece

by piece”) (quoting Solis v. Current Dev. Corp., 557 F.3d 772, 780 (7th Cir. 2009))

(alteration in original). Thus, the District Court appropriately focused its analysis on the

import of our intervening decision in United States v. Easter. Any earlier error by the

District Court in not considering the § 3553(a) sentencing factors (without the benefit of

our decision in Easter) when granting all the relief sought in the counseled motion was

cured by the later consideration of those factors when denying the pro se motion for a

further reduction.

       With that said, in light of Gonzalez’s pro se status, we will briefly address three

additional points. First, despite what Gonzalez might think, it is beside the point that,

when he was sentenced in 2004, the Supreme Court had not yet rendered the sentencing

guidelines advisory by its decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The

District Court expressly considered (and rejected) a sentence of time served. No

argument has been made that the Court thought itself bound to impose a 36-month

sentence due to some vestige of the pre-Booker mandatory guidelines. Rather, the Court

plainly concluded that Gonzalez warranted a 36-month sentence.

                                              7
       That takes us to the second point: Gonzalez requests that we remand for re-

sentencing so that he can receive a substantively reasonable sentence – in his view, time

served. But Gonzalez has not explained why the conclusion that a 36-month sentence

was appropriate is either an abuse of discretion or substantively unreasonable, and, in our

view, a 36-month sentence for engaging in a methamphetamine conspiracy while on

supervised release for a cocaine conspiracy suffers from neither deficiency, for precisely

the reasons articulated by the District Court.

       Finally, Gonzalez asserts that he did not agree with the decision of the Federal

Public Defender’s Office to seek reduction to 36 months and had not seen the motion

before it was filed. Even crediting that assertion for the sake of argument, the outcome

remains the same. Gonzalez’s pro se motion for reconsideration made plain his request

that he be sentenced to time served and, as we have explained, that request was

adequately addressed by the District Court.

III.   CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm.

                                                 8