Court Opinion

ID: 9791190
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:07:22.244093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:34.701361
License: Public Domain

Petrich, J.
(dissenting)—I dissent from that portion of the majority decision which would limit the plaintiff landlords' recovery to the amount of $5,000. The majority's basis for such a limitation is its interpretation and application of the supplemental agreement between the landlords *661and Huffman, the building's purchaser.4 However, a careful review of the record fails to disclose that the defendant raised this issue to the trial court. There are no tried briefs, *662findings (adopted or proposed), or record of oral arguments suggesting that the agreement would somehow limit the defendants' liability. Although the agreement was introduced in evidence, so far as the record on appeal is concerned the question of whether it established "diminution in value" or some other limitation on the defendants' liability for damages was never presented to the trial court. Issues not raised before the trial court will not be considered for the first time on appeal. Barnes v. Seattle School Dist. 1, 88 Wn.2d 483, 563 P.2d 199 (1977); Fuqua v. Fuqua, 88 Wn.2d 100, 558 P.2d 801 (1977); Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 94 Wn.2d 359, 617 P.2d 704 (1980).
The facts as resolved by the trial court also preclude this court from applying the supplemental agreement as a limitation on the damages suffered by the plaintiff. The record is devoid of any findings proposed by the defendant that the agreement was entered into. The defendant totally ignored RAP 10.3(g), which requires a separate assignment of error for each challenged finding of fact, as well as for each finding refused by the trial court. Where no errors have been assigned, the trial court's findings become verities on appeal. E.g., Ebenezer A.M.E. Zion Church v. Corporate Loan & Sec. Co., 72 Wn.2d 128, 432 P.2d 291 (1967); Nerbun v. State, 8 Wn. App. 370, 506 P.2d 873 (1973). Since the agreement is not properly before us on review, it should not be applied to limit the plaintiff's recovery.
I am well aware of the policy of the court to avoid hypertechnical application of the rules in furtherance of justice. I believe, however, that the majority may well have misinterpreted the effect of the supplemental agreement. The majority focuses its attention on one aspect of the agreement, namely the limitation of the plaintiff's liability to Huffman. It ignores what appears to be the plaintiff's *663responsibility to pursue the owner's remedies under the lease and to apply the proceeds of the judgment to specified repairs which, as it turned out, were substantially the same repairs the tenant was obligated to perform under the lease. By reducing the judgment to $5,000, the majority has exposed the plaintiff to additional liability under the agreement. From the reduced judgment of $5,000 is first deducted attorney's fees and costs of suit. The balance is then apportioned to the cost of repairs. Assuming costs and attorney's fees in the modest sum of $3,000, the plaintiff is entitled only to a credit of $1,000 on his agreed contribution and is required to pay an additional sum of $4,000. The majority may or may not agree with this interpretation. At best, the agreement is ambiguous. The trial court is the appropriate forum to resolve the ambiguity. This was not done. The trial court having been deprived of the opportunity to consider this issue, this court should not inject it into the case.
The majority's concern of a "windfall'' to the plaintiff is misplaced. In my view, the majority, by its opinion, grants a "windfall" to the "wrongdoer," the tenant who breached the lease agreement. I would deny the defendant the use of the supplemental agreement as a shield on the rationale of the "collateral source" doctrine.
I would further point out that Huffman, to the extent that it contributes to the repairs occasioned by the defendants' breach of the lease agreement, is subrogated to the plaintiff's rights to enforce the agreement. Double recovery is thus eliminated. Although subrogation rights are most generally applied in tort actions, the principle equally applies to contract rights. Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. Moore, 38 Wn.2d 427, 430-31, 229 P.2d 882 (1951):
It is a well settled rule in tort actions that a party has a cause of action notwithstanding the payment of his loss by an insurance company. The purpose of this rule is to implement the insurance company's right of subrogation, and not to afford the respondent a double recovery.
*664"It [subrogation] is a device adopted by equity to compel the ultimate discharge of an obligation by him who in good conscience ought to pay it." 50 Am. Jur. 678.
That insurance company recoveries, under their right of subrogation, most often flow from tort actions is quite natural, but without significance. Subrogation is an equitable principle and applies to contract rights as fully as it does to tort actions.
By his contract the appellant bound himself to pay the loss. Respondent has a contractual right to recover it from him. This cause of action is not defeated by the insurance company's payment of the judgment. The insurer is subrogated to respondent's contract right of indemnity. This sustains the cause of action against appellant for the identical reason that subrogation sustains a tort action where the plaintiff has been paid for his loss.
(Citations omitted.)
For the reasons stated, I believe the trial court's judgment should be affirmed in toto.
Reconsideration denied December 26, 1980.
Review granted by Supreme Court April 17, 1981.

The Supplemental Agreement stated:
"Comes now Harry S. Ruddach and Huffman Motors, Inc., and recite as follows:
"Whereas, an Earnest Money Agreement was entered into between the parties on November 28,1976; and
"Whereas, the purchasers went through the premises prior to making the earnest money payment and added the words (including hoist and compressor) which items seller agrees should remain on the premises; and
"Whereas, the parties knew the conditions of the premises on November 28, 1976; and
"Whereas, there may be a dispute as to performance of the lease by the lessee and that it is indicated lessee may attempt to remove fixtures that should properly be part of the Real Estate; and
"Whereas, purchasers are intending to grant permission to the lessees to continue in possession two months after January 1st, 1978; and
"Whereas, the seller and purchaser do not presently know to what extent lessees may remove or attempt to remove such fixtures; and
"Whereas, purchaser does not desire to be involved in a suit against lessee or incur expenses of such action,
"It Is Mutually Agreed as follows:
"1. That the Contract will be signed and down payment will be promptly paid and effective as of January 1st, 1978, purchasers will be considered in possession.
"2. Seller retains the right to enforce the terms of the lease effective January 1st, 1968 and extended December 30, 1971 with termination date of December 31st, 1977 against the lessor.
"3. Seller will take legal steps necessary to restrain the removal of the hoist and compressor, if lessee attempts to remove the same.
"4. That it is agreed that the following will be repaired by Purchaser at the most reasonable cost and an itemized list of materials and repairs will be furnished Seller of the following items:
" (a) Boiler and heating system to be made operable.
"(b) Overhead doors to he repaired into a safe and operable condition.
" (c) Ceiling tile to be repaired in damaged area in show room above Jefferson Street entrance door.
"(d) Repair light fixtures that are inoperable inside (excluding lights, tubes and bulbs which are at Purchaser's account) and outside.
" (e) Cleaning up and placing exhaust system in operable condition.
"(f) Repair damage to fence next to alley.
"(g) Eight hoists will be made operable.
"When these repairs are completed and an itemized accounting furnished, Seller and Purchaser will share costs 50-50; provided that in no event shall the Seller be responsible for an amount in excess of $5,000.00 for his share.
" (5) Seller will enforce the terms of the lease against lessee including the seven items set out above. That from the proceeds of any judgment received the costs, *662including attorney's fees and the monies expended as above determined on a SO-SO basis, shall first be deducted.
"Dated this 20 day of January, 1980.
[Signatures omitted.]"