Court Opinion

ID: 9374895
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-24 16:01:35.279078+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:53.938442
License: Public Domain

Rel: February 24, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern
Reporter. Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts,
300 Dexter Avenue, Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other
errors, in order that corrections may be made before the opinion is printed in Southern Reporter.

         SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
                             OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023

                                _________________________

                                      SC-2022-0787
                                _________________________

                                       Orlando Bethel

                                                  v.

 Brennan James Franklin, Mikki Franklin, and Hughes Funeral
                   Home and Crematory

                         Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
                                   (CV-22-900287)

SELLERS, Justice.
SC-2022-0787

     Orlando Bethel appeals from an order of the Baldwin Circuit Court

denying his motion for a preliminary injunction pursuant to Rule 65, Ala.

R. Civ. P. We reverse and remand.

                     I. Facts and Procedural History

     On February 18, 2022, Zoe Sozo Bethel ("the decedent") died

intestate in Florida; she was survived by her spouse, Brennan James

Franklin ("the spouse"), and their five-year-old daughter.        After the

decedent's death, the spouse arranged for the body to be cremated in

Florida and had the cremated remains ("the ashes") shipped to Hughes

Funeral Home and Crematory ("the funeral home") in Alabama, where

the spouse's mother, Mikki Franklin, was employed.            Thereafter, a

dispute arose between the spouse and the decedent's father, Orlando

Bethel ("the father"), concerning the right to control the disposition of the

ashes.

     On March 8, 2022, the father filed an emergency petition, pursuant

to § 34-13-11(b)(4), Ala. Code 1975, in the Baldwin Probate Court seeking

a determination that the spouse and the decedent had been estranged at

the time of the decedent's death and that the spouse had therefore

forfeited his right as an "authorizing agent" to control the disposition of

                                     2
SC-2022-0787

ashes. The father requested that he, rather than the spouse, be granted

the right to control the disposition of the ashes. While the probate action

was pending, the father filed in the Baldwin Circuit Court a motion for a

temporary restraining order or, alternatively, for a preliminary

injunction enjoining the spouse, the spouse's mother, and the funeral

home ("the defendants") from further "dividing, diminishing, splitting up

or otherwise disposing of" the ashes; the proceeding on the father's

request for injunctive relief was assigned case no. CV-22-900248. The

circuit court entered a five-day temporary restraining order enjoining the

defendants from disposing of the ashes and scheduling a preliminary

hearing on the matter. Thereafter, the funeral home, through its owner,

Benjamin Hughes, Sr., filed a motion requesting that the funeral home

be dismissed from the action; in that motion, Hughes represented, in

relevant part, that he understood that the funeral home could not "take

any action [with regard to the ashes] until the pending Probate Court

action is completed through all of the Court's deliberation and any

subsequent appeals thereto that could possibly follow." Based on that

representation, the father voluntarily moved the circuit court to dismiss

his motion for injunctive relief. Accordingly, the circuit court entered an

                                    3
SC-2022-0787

order dismissing the father's request for injunctive relief filed in case no.

CV-22-900248.

     On March 16, 2022, the probate court entered a final order in the

probate action, dismissing the father's petition filed pursuant to § 34-13-

11(b)(4) as moot. The probate court opined that the purpose of § 34-13-11

is "to give direction and/or protection to a funeral home director as to who

has the legal authority to determine the manner in which the remains of

a deceased person may be disposed, i.e., buried or cremated." The probate

court reasoned that, because the decedent's remains had been disposed

of by cremation, the father's request to be awarded the right to control

the disposition of the remains was moot. Accordingly, the probate court

did not address the father's allegation that the spouse and the decedent

had been estranged at the time of the decedent's death.

     On March 23, 2022, the father appealed the probate court's order to

the circuit court ("the probate appeal"). That appeal is presently pending

in the circuit court and is not currently before us. In that same action,

the father filed another motion for a preliminary injunction, the denial of

                                     4
SC-2022-0787

which is the subject of this appeal.1 In support of his requested injunctive

relief, the father averred, among other things, that the funeral home had

possession of the ashes and that the spouse had communicated to the

father his intent to "split up" or otherwise dispose of the ashes, which,

the father claimed, would not only "violate the decedent's wishes and her

religious beliefs," but would also constitute a desecration of her ashes.

The father also alleged that Hughes, the owner of the funeral home, had

informed him that the ashes had already been "split up," despite

Hughes's previous representation that the funeral home could take no

action regarding the ashes pending resolution of the issue regarding the

right of disposition. Accordingly, the father requested that the circuit

court enter a preliminary injunction enjoining the defendants from

     1On  appeal, the defendants unpersuasively argue that the doctrine
of res judicata barred the father's second request for injunctive relief.
There are four elements of res judicata, all of which must be present for
the doctrine to apply: (1) a prior judgment on the merits, (2) rendered by
a court of competent jurisdiction, (3) involving substantial identity of
parties, and (4) involving the same cause of action in both actions. See
Benetton S.p.A. v. Benedot, Inc., 642 So. 2d 394, 399 (Ala. 1994). In this
case, the defendants have not demonstrated that the order granting the
father's motion to voluntarily dismiss case no. CV-22-900248, in which
the father had requested injunctive relief, constituted a judgment on the
merits. See generally Rule 41, Ala. R. Civ. P. (regarding dismissal of
actions).
                                      5
SC-2022-0787

further "dividing, diminishing, splitting up or otherwise disposing of" the

ashes.

     On June 3, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on the father's

request for a preliminary injunction, at which the father proceeded pro

se. Although the father elicited substantial testimony on the issue of

whether the spouse and the decedent had been estranged, we do not find

that testimony entirely relevant or dispositive of the issues in this appeal.

Nonetheless, the undisputed testimony at the hearing indicated that the

decedent and the spouse had been living apart since the end of 2020 but

that they were still legally married when the decedent died in February

2022. The spouse testified that, after the decedent died, he had her body

cremated and that he wanted to keep the ashes for their minor daughter.

Despite having knowledge of the ongoing dispute regarding the right to

control the disposition of the ashes, the spouse testified that he had

directed the funeral home to divide or split the ashes; however, he could

not remember the date he had done so. The spouse further stated that,

on April 9, 2022, he relinquished possession of the "divided" ashes to

"third parties." Notably, the spouse refused to disclose the names of those

individuals, stating that he was "not at liberty to discuss [their identity]

                                     6
SC-2022-0787

under advice of counsel." A discussion then ensued off the record, after

which the circuit-court judge stated, "I'm going to order someone to file

under seal to me who's got [the ashes]," to which the spouse's attorney

stated, "I will be happy to file that under seal." The circuit-court judge

then stated, "I know you will because I'm ordering it, and then we'll

decide who gets [the ashes] at that point." Finally, near the conclusion

of the hearing, the father indicated his intent to testify, to which the

circuit-court judge replied, "[y]ou can certainly testify if you want to. I

can tell you that I'm inclined to grant the temporary [injunction] and

order all of the defendants to -- if they have possession of any of the

[ashes] not to dispose of them. … And it's just going to be temporary until

we get to the final hearing." Accordingly, the father did not testify.

Despite the circuit-court judge's representation that he planned to order

the defendants to file under the seal the names of the individuals who

had possession of the ashes and despite his representation that he was

"inclined" to issue the preliminary injunction pending a final hearing on

the merits, the circuit court, nonetheless, entered an order denying the

father's requested injunctive relief, without any stated reasons or

                                    7
SC-2022-0787

explanation. The father filed a motion to reconsider, which the circuit

court denied. This appeal followed. See Rule 4(a)(1)(A), Ala. R. App. P.

                          II. Standard of Review

     A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate (1) that

the party would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction, (2) that

the party has no adequate remedy at law, (3) that the party has at least

a reasonable chance of success on the ultimate merits of the case, and (4)

that the hardship that the injunction will impose on the opposing party

will not unreasonably outweigh the benefit accruing to the party seeking

the injunction. Holiday Isle, LLC v. Adkins, 12 So. 3d 1173, 1176 (Ala.

2008). Generally, " ' [t]he decision to grant or to deny a preliminary

injunction is within the trial court's sound discretion. In reviewing an

order granting [or denying] a preliminary injunction, the Court

determines whether the trial court exceeded that discretion.' " Holiday

Isle, 12 So. 3d at 1175-76 (quoting SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. v.

Webb-Stiles Co., 931 So. 2d 706, 709 (Ala. 2005)). We review the legal

rulings of the trial court, to the extent they resolve questions of law based

on undisputed facts, de novo. Id. at 1176.

                                 III. Discussion

                                     8
SC-2022-0787

     The dispositive issue on appeal is whether the circuit court

exceeded its discretion in denying the father's request for a preliminary

injunction pending a final hearing on the merits of the probate appeal.

           A. Reasonable Chance of Success on the Ultimate Merits

     Chief among the factors to be considered in issuing a preliminary

injunction is the demonstration of a reasonable probability of success on

the merits. The father argues that he sufficiently demonstrated

entitlement to a preliminary injunction based on the plain language of §

34-13-11(b)(4), regarding estrangement; the testimony adduced at the

preliminary-injunction hearing regarding the spouse and the decedent's

estrangement; and his allegation that the probate court erred in

determining, as a matter of law, that cremation alone constitutes

"disposition" and, thus, dismissing his petition filed in that court as moot.

The defendants, on the other hand, argue that the father lacked

"standing" under § 34-13-11 to commence the probate-court action

because, they say, that statute provides that a surviving spouse has

priority status over a surviving parent to control the disposition of a

decedent's remains. Our resolution of whether the father has

demonstrated a reasonable probability of success on the ultimate merits

                                     9
SC-2022-0787

hinges on the statutory interpretation of § 34-13-11. In this opinion, for

the purpose of providing guidance to the probate court and the circuit

court, this Court interprets § 34-13-11, specifically those sections of the

statute relevant to the facts presented in this appeal. 2

     Section 34-13-11(a) begins by recognizing that any person "who is

at least 18 years of age and of sound mind may enter into a contract to

act as authorizing agent and direct the location, manner, and conditions

of disposition of deceased human remains and arrange for funeral and

     2In  McRae v. Booth, 938 So. 2d 432, 433 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006), the
Court of Civil Appeals was presented with an argument regarding § 34-
13-11. At the time McRae was decided, the version of the statute then in
effect contained only a priority structure for determining who possessed
the right to be an authorizing agent permitted to order cremation or final
disposition of the remains of a decedent, which is presently contained in
subsection (a). See Act No. 2002-239, 503 (§ 34-13-1(a)(5) and § 34-13-
123), Ala. Acts 2002. In 2011, the statute was essentially rewritten to
amend what is now subsection (a) to permit an authorizing agent to direct
"the location, manner, and conditions of disposition of remains and
arrange for funeral goods and services" and to add subsections (b), (c), (d),
and (e). See Act No. 2011-623, Ala. Acts 2011. Accordingly, in McRae,
the Court of Civil Appeals correctly stated that " 'Alabama does not have
a statute addressing the custody of the remains of deceased persons.' "
McRae, 938 So. 2d at 433 (quoting Cottingham v. McKee, 821 So. 2d 169,
171 (Ala. 2001) (emphasis added)). Following the 2011 amendment to the
statute, that is no longer the case.
                                     10
SC-2022-0787

burial goods and services to be provided upon death." 3   Id. Subsection

(a) then continues:

     "Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), the right to
     control the disposition of the remains of a deceased person as
     an authorizing agent, including the location, manner, and
     conditions of disposition and arrangements for funeral and
     burial goods and services to be provided, shall vest in the
     following persons in the priority listed and the order named,
     provided the person is at least 18 years of age and of sound
     mind:

                "(1) The person designated by the decedent
           as authorized to direct disposition pursuant to
           Public Law No. 109-163, Section 564, … if the
           decedent died while serving on active duty in any
           branch of the United States Armed Forces, United
           States Reserve Forces, or National Guard.

                "(2)a. The person designated by the decedent
           in an affidavit executed in accordance with
           paragraph b.

                 "b. ...

                 "(3) The surviving spouse.

                "(4) The sole surviving child [or children] of
           the decedent ….

     3Section  34-13-11 was amended effective May 1, 2022, after the
proceedings leading to the probate appeal were initiated. Because the
parties, in their briefs, have relied upon the current version of the
statute, and because the changes effected by the amendment were
relatively minor, we quote from the current version of the statute.
                                   11
SC-2022-0787

                 "(5) The sole surviving grandchild [or
            grandchildren] of the decedent ….

                 "(6) The surviving parent or parents of the
            decedent. …

                 " …." 4

(Emphasis added.)

     Relevant to the facts here, under subsection (a), a decedent's

"surviving spouse" has priority status over a "surviving parent" of a

decedent with regard to the right of disposition. It is undisputed that the

decedent died without a written directive regarding the disposition of her

remains; thus, except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), the spouse,

rather than the father, was entitled to the right to control the disposition

of the decedent's remains, "including the location, manner, and

conditions of disposition and arrangements for funeral and burial goods

and services to be provided."5 § 34-13-11(a).

     4The   statute lists in priority 13 classes of persons entitled to the
right of disposition.

     5Contrary  to the probate court's findings, the plain language of §
34-13-11 does not restrict "disposition of the remains" to deciding merely
whether the remains should be buried or cremated. The plain wording
of the statute also provides that the right to control the disposition of
remains would also include the right to control "arrangements for funeral
                                     12
SC-2022-0787

     But, § 34-13-11(b) sets forth the following five circumstances in

which the right of disposition "shall be forfeited and passed to the next

qualifying person listed in subsection (a)":

           "(1) [When the] person is charged with murder or
     manslaughter in connection with the death of the decedent
     and the charges are known by the mortician. If the charges
     against the person are dismissed or the person is acquitted of
     the charges, the right of disposition shall be reinstated.

           "(2) [When the] person does not exercise his or her right
     of disposition within two days after notification of the death
     of the decedent or within three days after the death of the
     decedent, whichever is earlier.

           "(3) If the person is the spouse of the decedent and a
     petition to dissolve the marriage was pending at the time of
     death of the decedent.

           "(4) If the judge of probate court determines, pursuant
     to subsection (c), that the person entitled to the right of
     disposition and the decedent were estranged at the time of
     death. For the purposes of this subdivision, estranged means
     a physical and emotional separation that has existed for such
     a period of time that an absence of affection, trust, and regard
     for the decedent is clearly demonstrated."

(Emphasis added.)

     Subsection (b)(4) contemplates that the probate court will employ a

fact-finding analysis regarding whether there was an estrangement, i.e.,

and burial goods and services to be provided." § 34-13-11(a); see also § 34-
13-1(22), Ala. Code 1975 (defining "funeral arrangements").
                                    13
SC-2022-0787

whether there was "a physical and emotional separation." Because the

probate court erroneously determined that cremation of the remains

rendered the father's requested relief moot, it never engaged in a fact-

finding analysis regarding whether the decedent and the spouse were

estranged at the time of the decedent's death.

     Section 34-13-11(c) provides:

     "[1.] Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b), the judge of
     probate of the county of residence of the decedent may award
     the right of disposition to the person the judge of probate
     determines to be the most fit and appropriate to manage the
     right of disposition, and may make decisions regarding the
     remains of the decedent if the persons possessing the right of
     disposition do not agree. [2.] If two or more persons who
     possess an equal right of disposition are not able by majority
     vote to agree upon the disposition of the remains of the
     decedent, any of those persons or the funeral establishment
     with custody of the remains may file a petition asking the
     judge of probate to make a determination in the matter. In
     making such a determination, the judge of probate shall
     consider all of the following:

                "(1) The reasonableness and practicality of
           the    proposed    funeral   and    disposition
           arrangements.

                 "(2) The degree of the personal relationship
           between the decedent and each person possessing
           a right of disposition.

                "(3) The financial ability and willingness of
           each person possessing a right of disposition to pay

                                     14
SC-2022-0787

           the cost of       the   funeral    and     disposition
           arrangements.

                 "(4) The convenience and needs of other
           family members and friends who wish to pay their
           respects and the degree to which the funeral
           arrangements        would      allow     maximum
           participation by all who wish to pay their respects.

                 "(5) The desires of the decedent."

     Subsection (c) clearly empowers the probate court to resolve

disputes and to make decisions regarding the right of disposition. The

first sentence of subsection (c) contemplates that, notwithstanding the

priority structure set forth in subsection (a), and notwithstanding the

circumstances constituting forfeiture listed in subsection (b), the probate

court may still award the right of disposition to "the person" the probate

court determines "to be the most fit and appropriate to manage the right

of disposition …." Applying the statute to the facts, if the spouse was

entitled to control the right of disposition under subsection (a), but he

forfeited that right under subsection (b) based on a probate court's finding

of estrangement, the probate court could still determine, pursuant to

subsection (c), that the spouse would be the "most fit and appropriate"

person to manage the right of disposition. In summary, the first sentence

of subsection (c) contemplates that a person with a lower priority status
                                    15
SC-2022-0787

under subsection (a) may challenge another person's priority status

under the statute; therefore, in this case, the father was permitted to

challenge the spouse's priority status based on an allegation of

estrangement.

     In comparison, the second sentence of subsection (c) relates solely

to disputes between persons possessing an "equal" right of disposition,

such as siblings or parents. That sentence states that, if two or more

persons possessing an equal right of disposition are not able to agree

upon the right of disposition, "any of those persons or the funeral

establishment with custody of the remains may file a petition asking the

judge of probate to make a determination in the matter." Immediately

thereafter,    subsection   (c)   provides   that,   "[i]n   making   such   a

determination, the judge … shall consider" the five factors listed.

Subsection (c), then, clearly requires a specific analysis by the probate

court in deciding disputes among persons possessing an equal right of

disposition.

     Notably absent from subsection (c) is any language authorizing

persons who do not possess an equal right of disposition, such as the

father and the spouse in this case, to file a petition in the probate court

                                      16
SC-2022-0787

seeking a determination regarding the right of disposition. However,

nothing in the statute expressly precludes persons not possessing an

equal right of disposition from filing such a petition. The fact that the

statute contemplates that a probate court may determine that the person

entitled to the right of disposition and the decedent were estranged at the

time of the decedent's death implies that a petition seeking such a

determination is permitted. The legislature has dictated that we should

liberally construe the statute. See § 34-13-2, Ala. Code 1975 (noting that

Chapter 13 of Title 34 "shall be construed liberally and in a manner to

carry out its obvious intents and purposes"). 6 Thus, contrary to the

defendants' argument, the father had the capacity to petition the probate

court for a determination on the issue of estrangement.

     In summary, subsection (a) lists in priority those persons legally

authorized to control the disposition of a decedent's remains, subsection

(b) lists specific circumstances in which a person entitled to the right of

disposition forfeits that right to the next qualifying person listed in

     6Section  34-13-2 was amended effective May 1, 2022, after the
proceedings leading to the probate appeal were initiated. Before that
amendment, the statute provided, in relevant part, that "all the
provisions of [Chapter 13 of Title 34] shall be construed liberally and in
a manner to carry out its obvious intents and purposes."
                                    17
SC-2022-0787

subsection (a), and subsection (c) empowers a probate court to resolve

disputes regarding the right of disposition.7 Based on the foregoing, we

agree with the father that the plain language of § 34-13-11(b)(4), coupled

with the evidence presented at the preliminary-injunction hearing,

demonstrated that the father has a reasonable chance of success on the

ultimate merits of the probate appeal.

 B. Irreparable Harm for Which There is No Adequate Remedy at Law

     The father asserts that he demonstrated a level of irreparable harm

that would support injunctive relief because, he says, if the defendants

destroy the ashes, he will have no adequate remedy at law. We agree

that the father has met his burden of demonstrating irreparable harm

for which there is no adequate remedy at law. In Water Works & Sewer

Board of Birmingham v. Inland Lake Investments, LLC, 31 So. 3d 686,

692 (Ala. 2009), this Court stated that

     " ' "[i]rreparable injury" is an injury that is not redressable in
     a court of law through an award of money damages.' Perley v.
     Tapscan, Inc., 646 So. 2d 585, 587 (Ala. 1994). The Court has
     likewise stated that '[a] plaintiff that can recover damages has
     an adequate remedy at law and is not entitled to an
     injunction.' SouthTrust Bank of Alabama, N.A. v. Webb-Stiles
     Co., 931 So. 2d 706, 709 (Ala. 2005). Thus, 'a conclusion that

     7Although   § 34-13-11 also contains subsections (d) and (e), those
subsections are irrelevant to the facts presented in this appeal.
                                    18
SC-2022-0787

     the injury is irreparable necessarily shows that there is no
     adequate remedy at law.' Fleet Wholesale Supply Co. v.
     Remington Arms Co., 846 F.2d 1095, 1098 (7th Cir. 1988)."

(Footnote omitted.)

     The defendants do not dispute that the father would have an

inadequate remedy at law should the injunction not issue. Rather, the

defendants argue that, because the evidence confirms that none of the

defendants had possession of the ashes at the time of the preliminary-

injunction hearing, the relief sought by the father could not be compelled.

In other words, the defendants contend that, because they voluntarily

ceased the challenged conduct in this case, appellate review is moot. For

the reasons discussed below, we disagree.

     In Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013), the United

States Supreme Court elaborated on the voluntary-cessation doctrine,

explaining:

           "We have recognized, however, that a defendant cannot
     automatically moot a case simply by ending its unlawful
     conduct once sued. City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc.,
     455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982). Otherwise, a defendant could engage
     in unlawful conduct, stop when sued to have the case declared
     moot, then pick up where he left off, repeating this cycle until
     he achieves all his unlawful ends. Given this concern, our
     cases have explained that 'a defendant claiming that its
     voluntary compliance moots a case bears the formidable
     burden of showing that it is absolutely clear the allegedly
                                    19
SC-2022-0787

     wrongful behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.'
     Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services
     (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000)."

See also City News & Novelty, Inc. v. City of Waukesha, 531 U.S. 278,

284 n.1 (2001) (noting that the voluntary-cessation doctrine "traces to the

principle that a party should not be able to evade judicial review, or to

defeat a judgment, by temporarily altering questionable behavior"); see

also Knox v. Service Emps. Int'l Union, Local 1000, 567 U.S. 298, 307

(2012) (noting that the voluntary cessation of challenged conduct "must

be viewed with a critical eye").

     The challenged conduct here is the spouse's relinquishing

possession of the ashes during an ongoing dispute concerning who has

the right to control the disposition of the ashes under § 34-13-11. During

the preliminary-injunction hearing, the spouse offered no evidence as to

why he had relinquished possession of the ashes to nonparties, and he

provided no evidence indicating that he did not intend to regain

possession of the ashes. In fact, it appears more likely than not that the

spouse will at some point regain possession of the ashes based on his

testimony that he wanted the ashes for his minor daughter. More

critically, this lack of evidence calls into question the spouse's motivation

                                     20
SC-2022-0787

in relinquishing possession of the ashes before the scheduled

preliminary-injunction hearing and while the probate appeal concerning

competing claims to the right to control the disposition of the ashes is still

pending.   Under these circumstances, we conclude that the spouse's

relinquishing possession of the ashes creates a presumption of his intent

to evade not only the circuit court's injunctive power over the defendants

or the ashes, but also this Court's appellate review. Accordingly, the

defendants have not demonstrated that the father's request for injunctive

relief was moot under the voluntary-cessation doctrine. See Ellis v.

Brotherhood of Ry., Airline, and Steamship Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 442

(1984) ("[A]s long as the parties have a concrete interest, however small,

in the outcome of the litigation, the case is not moot.").

C. Whether the Hardships to the Defendants Unreasonably Outweigh
                   the Benefits to the Father

     Finally, the father argues that any harm imposed on the defendants

as a result of the issuance of a preliminary injunction would clearly be

outweighed by the benefit accruing to him. We agree. The father asserts

that the issuance of the injunction would simply maintain the status quo

by requiring the defendants to take no further action regarding the ashes

pending a final hearing on the merits of the probate appeal. See Irwin v.
                                     21
SC-2022-0787

Jefferson Cnty. Pers. Bd., 263 So. 3d 698, 702-03 (Ala. 2018) (noting that

the purpose of a preliminary injunction "is to maintain the status quo

pending the resolution of the action on its merits"). The father points out

that, despite having knowledge of the pending litigation over the right of

disposition, the funeral home, at the spouse's direction, divided the ashes

and that the spouse thereafter relinquished possession of the ashes to

"third parties" on his own initiative, seemingly in an attempt to defeat

the interest of the father and to avoid any accountability for his actions.

The father also asserts that the benefit flowing from the issuance of a

preliminary injunction pending a final hearing on the merits of the

probate appeal will ensure that he will be able to "lay his decedent's

cremains in a final resting place according to her wishes." Finally, the

father reasserts that, in the event the defendants dispose of the ashes, he

will suffer irreparable damage for which there is no adequate remedy at

law. Thus, the father argues that he does not have any other means by

which to maintain the integrity of the ashes pending a final hearing on

the merits of the probate appeal. Notably, the defendants do not dispute

the father's argument that they would not suffer any hardship if a

preliminary injunction issued pending a final hearing on the merits of

                                    22
SC-2022-0787

the probate appeal. Accordingly, the father has demonstrated that any

harm imposed on the defendants by the issuance of a preliminary

injunction would not unreasonably outweigh the benefit accruing to him.

                                IV. Conclusion

     Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the circuit court exceeded

its discretion in denying the father's motion for a preliminary injunction

pending a final hearing on the merits of the probate appeal. Accordingly,

the order of the circuit court denying the father's motion for a preliminary

injunction is reversed, and the cause is remanded for proceedings

consistent with this opinion.

     REVERSED AND REMANDED.

     Wise, Mendheim, Stewart, Mitchell, and Cook, JJ., concur.

     Parker, C.J., concurs in part and concurs in the result, with opinion.

     Shaw and Bryan, JJ., concur in the result.

                                     23
SC-2022-0787

PARKER, Chief Justice (concurring in part and concurring in the result).

     I agree that the decedent's father's request for a preliminary

injunction is not moot, but for reasons different from those in the main

opinion. I do not believe that the voluntary-cessation doctrine is relevant

here. That doctrine is relevant when a litigant has voluntarily complied

with the relief sought by the opposing party. See, e.g., City of Mesquite

v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289 (1982); Friends of the Earth,

Inc. v. Laidlaw Env't Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189-90 (2000).

Here, the father sought the relief of an order prohibiting the defendants

(and anyone acting in concert with them) from handling or disposing of

-- or allowing or facilitating anyone else to handle or dispose of -- the

decedent's ashes during the pendency of the appeal of the probate court's

order. In effect, the father sought to maintain the status quo during that

appeal. The defendants do not argue that they have voluntarily complied

with that requested relief. Instead, they argue that they have already

done what the father sought to prohibit -- i.e., that they have already

altered the status quo -- by the funeral home's transferring the ashes to

the decedent's spouse and the spouse's transferring the ashes to

nonparties. That type of conduct is the opposite of voluntary cessation.

                                    24
SC-2022-0787

Cf. Mead v. Eagerton, 255 Ala. 66, 72, 50 So. 2d 253, 257 (1951) ("In our

case, instead of abandoning the matter sought to be enjoined, the

respondents proceeded to do it.").

     I believe that the father's requested relief is not moot because that

relief is still within the circuit court's power. When an injunction request

concerns the disposition of property or objects, the court's power is not

limited to prohibiting parties to the case from altering or transferring the

property or objects. The injunction power extends well beyond that: The

court may command parties to regain possession, see Mead, 255 Ala. at

70-72, 50 So. 2d at 256-58; Paris v. United States Dep't of Hous. & Urb.

Dev., 713 F.2d 1341, 1344-45 (7th Cir. 1983), and may even control the

conduct of nonparties who are sufficiently connected to the case, see Rule

65(d), Ala. R. Civ. P.; Ex parte Richardson, 380 So. 2d 831 (Ala. 1980).

Thus, even after the defendants transferred the ashes, the father's

requested relief of directing the defendants and connected persons to

maintain the status quo of the ashes -- whatever that status quo

currently is -- was within the circuit court's power. Moreover, the

defendants' intent and motives in transferring the ashes are not relevant

to the question of mootness. The sole issue is whether their transfers of

                                     25
SC-2022-0787

the ashes (for whatever reasons, good or bad) were sufficient to moot the

father's requested relief. For the above reasons, they were not.

     In addition, I agree with the main opinion's conclusion that the

elements for obtaining a preliminary injunction were satisfied and with

the opinion's analysis of the disposition-of-remains statute, § 34-13-11,

Ala. Code 1975. However, the opinion intermixes its analysis of three of

the elements for obtaining a preliminary injunction -- irreparable injury,

no adequate remedy at law, and balancing of hardships and benefits. I

believe that those elements are conceptually separate. See State ex rel.

Marshall v. TY Green's Massage Therapy, Inc., 332 So. 3d 413, 427-30

(Ala. 2021) (Parker, C.J., concurring in the result).

                                    26