Court Opinion

ID: 9488138
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:37:27.303288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:43.117469
License: Public Domain

HANSEN, Circuit Judge,
concurring specially.
I agree with most all of the court’s opinion and I readily concur in its judgment. I believe that the court is correct in finding plain error, but I write separately because I do not believe a “possible effect” on the jury or “the potential for prejudice,” ante, at 922, is sufficient as a matter of current law to support a plain error reversal. As we have very recently observed, for there “to be plain error in a civil case, [the error] must have ‘almost surely affected the outcome of the case.’ ” Champagne v. United States, 40 F.3d 946, 947 (8th Cir.1994) (quoting Angelo v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 11 F.3d 957, 961 (10th Cir.1993)) (other quotation *924omitted) (emphasis added). Similarly, the criminal cases interpreting the Supreme Court’s most recent elucidation of the plain error standard (applying Fed.R.Crim.P. 52(b)) in Olano, indicate that a “possible effect” or “potential for prejudice” is insufficient to establish plain error. See, e.g., United States v. Turcks, 41 F.3d 893, 898 (3d Cir.1994) (under Olano to establish “prejudice” requirement defendant must “show that the outcome of his trial was actually affected”) (emphasis added); United States v. Miro, 29 F.3d 194, 200 (5th Cir.1994) (under Olano in normal case defendant must show “actual prejudice ”) (emphasis added); United States v. Ullyses-Salazar, 28 F.3d 932, 938 (9th Cir.1994) (plain error requires “highly prejudicial error” affecting substantial rights) (emphasis added).
I would conclude that the trial judge’s comments here constituted plain error by finding that those comments give rise to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice. The Supreme Court specifically observed in Ola-no that there may be a category of cases where otherwise forfeited errors could be corrected regardless of their effect on the trial’s outcome, or that there exists a category of errors that are presumed prejudicial even if the defendant cannot make a specific showing of prejudice. — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1778. As our court’s opinion notes, ante, at 923, n. 3, the Supreme Court did not address the nature of the errors that fall into those categories. In my view, the egregious and unprecedented comments made by the trial judge in this case are precisely the type of error that should be considered presumptively prejudicial.
Our court’s opinion has thoughtfully and thoroughly explained the inherent danger of the trial judge’s remarks here given the uniquely influential role of the trial judge coupled with the racially polarizing nature of the comments made to an all-white jury in a case brought by an African-American, most of whose key witnesses also were African-American. I would further add that a critical function of a trial judge is to ensure that the very type of highly inappropriate and irrelevant racially charged commentary involved in this case gets no play before the jury. The fact that the trial court itself, by its own comments, failed in this critical function troubles me deeply.
I too believe the risk of prejudice in a case like this is unacceptably high. I would conclude that in exceptionally rare cases, like this, where the trial judge makes racially oriented comments which tend to separate the trial’s participants including the jury itself along racial lines, a rebuttable presumption of prejudice is warranted. See generally United States v. Doe, 903 F.2d 16, 25 (D.C.Cir.1990) (“Racial fairness of the trial is an indispensable ingredient of due process and racial equality a hallmark of justice”). The rare nature of the cases falling into this category makes them amenable to a presumption of prejudice because the category, by its very nature, would be very limited and easily definable.
As indicated, I would apply a rebuttable presumption of prejudice to this ease. After reviewing the record, however, I find that not one of the arguments made by the defendants is sufficient to rebut the presumption. Accordingly, like our court, I would find plain error and would exercise our remedial discretion to reverse for a new trial because the error in this case strikes at the heart of the “integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” Olano, — U.S. at -, 113 S.Ct. at 1779 (quoting United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160, 56 S.Ct. 391, 392, 80 L.Ed. 555 (1936)).