Court Opinion

ID: 9899880
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-17 20:05:10.042625+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:53.346118
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/17/23 P. v. Valle CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,                                                            B322059

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Los Angeles County
                                                                        Super. Ct. No. BA040676)
           v.

 LUIS ALONZO VALLE et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

      APPEAL from postjudgment orders of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Stephen A. Marcus, Judge, and
Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.
      Elizabeth K. Horowitz, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Luis Alonzo Valle.
      Adrian K. Panton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Raul Guzman.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Shezad H.
Thakor, and Kristen J. Inberg, Deputy Attorneys General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.

         ____________________________________________

      Luis Alonzo Valle and Raul Guzman appeal the denial of
their petitions for resentencing under Penal Code1 section 1172.6
(former § 1170.95)2 at the prima facie stage. Appellants contend
that because the instructions given permitted the jury to convict
on a theory of imputed malice, the superior court erred in finding
that appellants did not make a prima facie case for relief under
section 1172.6. Appellant Guzman also contends that the
superior court committed prejudicial error by conducting the
prima facie hearing under section 1172.6, subdivision (c) in
Guzman’s absence without a waiver of his right to personal
presence at the hearing. We disagree and affirm.
                   FACTUAL BACKGROUND3
      Shortly after midnight on June 19, 1991, codefendant
Reyes Saul Aguilar approached Armando Lopez and Raul Ortega,
while appellants Valle and Guzman were hidden nearby.
Pointing a small gun at Ortega’s chest, Aguilar demanded to
know where Ortega was from. Ortega responded, “I’m Nardo

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

      2 Effective June 30, 2022, Penal Code section 1170.95 was
renumbered section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022,
ch. 58, § 10.)
      3 The underlying facts are summarized for context from
this court’s unpublished opinion in the defendants’ direct appeal.
(People v. Valle et al. (Dec. 8, 1994, B073825 [nonpub. opn.].)

                                2
from Third Street.” Guzman then emerged also holding a gun,
and asked Ortega, “What’s up Nardo?” Ortega responded,
“What’s up, Ese?” The men began to argue and Valle emerged
from hiding, holding a shotgun. As Valle approached Ortega,
Ortega said, “If you are gonna do it, just do it.” Valle fired the
shotgun at Ortega, striking him below the hip. Aguilar and
Guzman then fired their guns at Ortega several times from a
distance of two or three feet. Valle fired another round in
Ortega’s direction, before he, Guzman and Aguilar ran away.
(People v. Valle et al., supra, B073825.)
       Valle, Guzman and Aguilar matched the descriptions of the
assailants given by Ortega’s companion and were arrested
shortly after the shooting. Police recovered a .32-caliber handgun
they had seen Aguilar drop before his arrest. (People v. Valle et
al., supra, B073825.)
       Ortega died as a result of his wounds. A bullet recovered
from his chest had been fired from the .32-caliber weapon
dropped by Aguilar. Shotgun wadding recovered from Ortega’s
clothing and the dispersal of the shotgun pellets indicated the
shotgun had been fired from a distance of six to eight feet from
the victim. Police recovered three .32-caliber casings, one spent
shotgun shell, one live shotgun shell, and many bullet fragments
from the scene of the shooting. (People v. Valle et al., supra,
B073825.)
                 PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In 1993, a jury convicted appellant Valle and codefendant
Aguilar of first degree murder, and appellant Guzman of second
degree murder. (§ 187, subd. (a).) As to each defendant, the jury
found true the allegation that the defendant had personally used
a firearm (§ 12022.5), and a principal in the offense was armed

                                3
with a firearm (§ 12022, subd. (a)(1).) Valle was sentenced to 25
years to life, plus five years for the personal firearm use
enhancement, and Guzman was sentenced to 15 years to life, plus
five years for the personal firearm use enhancement. This court
affirmed the judgments against all three defendants in an
unpublished opinion filed December 8, 1994.
       On December 8, 2021, appellant Valle filed a section 1172.6
petition for resentencing, and appellant Guzman filed his petition
in January 2022.4 After appointment of counsel, briefing and an
opportunity for argument, the superior court denied Valle’s
petition on June 16, 2022. After reviewing the jury instructions
given at trial, the court determined that Valle’s murder
conviction was not based on a felony-murder theory or the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. Accordingly, Valle
had failed to make a prima facie showing of eligibility for relief
under section 1172.6.
       As for Guzman’s resentencing petition, following
appointment of counsel, briefing and an opportunity for
argument, the superior court denied Guzman’s section 1172.6
petition on the ground that Guzman had not made a prima facie
case demonstrating eligibility for relief.

      4 Appellants had previously filed petitions for resentencing,
which the superior court summarily denied without appointment
of counsel. This court affirmed the denial of appellant Guzman’s
petition. (People v. Guzman (Aug. 3, 2020, B297087 [nonpub.
opn.].) Appellants’ renewed petitions were filed after the
California Supreme Court held in People v. Lewis (2021) 11
Cal.5th 952, 970 (Lewis) that a superior court must appoint
counsel, if requested, for all facially sufficient petitions filed
under section 1172.6.

                                 4
                            DISCUSSION
  I. Appellants Are Ineligible for Relief Under
       Section 1172.6 as a Matter of Law
       Appellants contend the superior court denied their
resentencing petitions at the prima facie stage in error. We
disagree. Based on the jury instructions given at trial and the
jury’s verdicts and findings, the superior court properly ruled
that appellants were not convicted under any theory that would
entitle them to relief under section 1172.6. Accordingly, the
superior court properly denied the resentencing petitions at the
prima facie stage.
    A. Proceedings in the superior court5
       1. The hearing on appellant Valle’s petition
       At the outset of the hearing, the superior court observed
the matter was at the “ ‘prima facie phase,’ ” and announced it
had “read all the documents,” including the parties’ briefs.
Counsel submitted on the briefing. The court ruled that Valle
had failed to carry his burden to make a prima facie showing that
he is entitled to relief under section 1172.6, explaining that in
order to be eligible for relief, “petitioner must, at a minimum,
show he’s been convicted under either a natural and probable
consequence theory of murder or a felony murder theory.” But
given the absence of jury instructions on the natural and
probable consequence doctrine or a felony-murder theory, the
court determined the prosecution did not pursue a murder

     5 Appellants’ petitions for resentencing under section
1172.6 were heard separately by two different judges of the
superior court. Judge Stephen A. Marcus heard and denied
appellant Valle’s petition, and appellant Guzman’s petition was
heard and denied by Judge Eleanor J. Hunter.

                                5
conviction under either theory, and Valle did not establish
eligibility for relief under section 1172.6. The court rejected the
argument that the trial court’s giving of CALJIC No. 3.006
established that the natural and probable consequences doctrine
was presented to the jury as a theory of the murder.
       The superior court cited two cases in support of its decision.
(People v. Mancilla (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 854, and People v. Soto
(2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 1043.) The court also cited the facts of the
offense as supporting its ruling, and emphasized the jury’s
finding that Valle had personally used a firearm, which indicated
Valle had the intent to kill even though it was a bullet from
another gun that killed the victim. The court stressed, however,
that the “obvious reason” for its conclusion that Valle was
ineligible for relief was “the lack of jury instructions” on felony
murder and natural and probable consequences theories.
       Suggesting the superior court had engaged in
impermissible factfinding, defense counsel requested clarification
about what the court was relying on in making its ruling. The
court responded that it was relying on the absence of jury
instructions on the only two theories relevant to a section 1172.6
petition⎯felony murder and natural and probable consequences.

      6 It appears the superior court misspoke when it referred to
CALJIC No. 3.00. That instruction defines principals, and
contains no reference to natural and probable consequences. Nor
does CALJIC No. 3.01, which defines aiding and abetting. Only
CALJIC No. 8.11, defining implied malice, contains a reference to
the “natural consequences of [an] act” being dangerous to human
life.

                                 6
       2. The hearing on appellant Guzman’s petition
       Appellant Guzman was not present at the hearing on his
petition, but appeared through counsel. The parties submitted on
the briefing.
       The superior court observed that the matter was “at the
prima facie phase,” and stated it had reviewed the record of
conviction, jury instructions, verdict, and “the appellate
opinion.”7 Based on its review of the record, the court noted that
“there was no felony murder instruction given, [and] there was no
natural and probable consequence[s] instruction given.” The
court stated that the jury found appellant Guzman guilty of
second degree murder and also found true the allegation that
Guzman had personally used a firearm.
       In light of these facts, the superior court concluded that
appellant Guzman was not convicted under either a felony-
murder theory or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine. Accordingly, the court declared Guzman to be “legally
ineligible for relief under [section 1172.6]” and denied the petition
for resentencing.
   B. Applicable legal principles
       The Legislature enacted Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018
Reg. Sess.) in 2018, effectively abolishing the natural and
probable consequences doctrine in cases of murder and limiting
the application of the felony-murder doctrine. (Stats. 2018,
ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f); Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957.) With
one narrow exception (§ 189, subd. (f)), Senate Bill No. 1437

      7 The superior court did not specify which appellate opinion
it had reviewed⎯People v. Valle et al., supra, B073825, or People
v. Guzman, supra, B297087.

                                 7
effectively eliminated murder convictions premised on any theory
of imputed malice—that is, any theory by which a person can be
convicted of murder for a killing committed by someone else, such
as felony murder or the natural and probable consequences
doctrine—unless the People also prove that the nonkiller
defendant personally acted with the intent to kill or was a major
participant who acted with reckless disregard to human life.
(§§ 188, subd. (a)(3) & 189, subd. (e).) Specifically, the
Legislature amended section 188 to require that, when the
felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal in the crime of
murder “shall act with malice aforethought” and “[m]alice shall
not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her
participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843 (Gentile).)
       Senate Bill No. 1437 also enacted former section 1170.95
(now § 1172.6), which established a procedure for vacating the
murder convictions of defendants who could no longer be
convicted of murder because of the amendments to sections 188
and 189. (Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 4; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
pp. 957, 959, 971; Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) Section
1172.6, subdivision (c) requires the court to appoint counsel when
requested upon the filing of a properly pleaded petition for
resentencing. (Lewis, at pp. 963, 966.) The court must then
conduct a prima facie analysis with briefing to determine the
petitioner’s eligibility for relief, and, if the requisite prima facie
showing is made, issue an order to show cause. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c); Lewis, at p. 971; People v. Nieber (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
458, 469–470.)
       Effective January 1, 2022, Senate Bill No. 775 amended
section 1172.6 to expand its coverage to murder convictions

                                  8
“under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on
that person’s participation in a crime.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a), as
amended by Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2, new text italicized; People v.
Langi (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 972, 978 (Langi).) A petitioner is
ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law if, for
example, the jury instructions show that jurors were not
instructed on any theory of liability for murder that allowed
malice to be imputed to the defendant. (People v. Cortes (2022)
75 Cal.App.5th 198, 205 (Cortes).) A petitioner is also ineligible
for relief if the record of conviction shows that his or her
conviction was based on a theory of liability that remains valid
under Senate Bill 1437. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 850
[“notwithstanding Senate Bill 1437’s elimination of natural and
probable consequences,” implied malice remains a valid theory of
second degree murder]; Cortes, at p. 205 [same]; see also People v.
Medrano (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 177, 182–183 [a defendant
convicted of conspiracy to murder ineligible for § 1172.6 relief].)
       We review de novo the superior court’s prima facie
determination that a petitioner is ineligible for section 1172.6
relief as a matter of law. (People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th
539, 545; People v. Williams (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1244, 1251
(Williams).)
   C. The superior court properly denied appellants’
petitions at the prima facie stage because appellants are
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law
       Appellants contend that the jury could have convicted them
of murder on a theory of imputed malice. But the jury in this
case was not instructed on any theory of liability for murder that
allowed malice to be imputed to appellants Valle or Guzman.

                                 9
(See Cortes, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 205.) Nevertheless,
appellants focus on isolated phrases in the jury instructions to
argue that the instructions given in this case permitted the jury
to impute malice to them. Reading the instructions as a whole,
as we must (People v. Burton (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 917, 925), we
conclude the only theory on which appellants’ jury was instructed
was direct aiding and abetting, which does not qualify for section
1172.6 relief.
       Specifically, the trial court instructed with CALJIC
No. 8.10 that murder requires malice aforethought. The court
explained via CALJIC No. 8.11 that malice may be express or
implied: express “when there is manifested an intention
unlawfully to kill a human being”; and implied when “1. The
killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶] 2. The natural
consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and [¶]
3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the
danger to, and with conscious disregard for human life.”
       The trial court instructed the jury that all principals in a
crime are “equally guilty” of that crime. (CALJIC No. 3.00.)
CALJIC No. 3.00 defined principals as “[t]hose who directly and
actively commit the act constituting the crime,” as well as
“[t]hose who aid and abet the commission of the crime.” Reading
CALJIC No. 3.01, the court further instructed that “[a] person
aids and abets the commission or attempted commission of a
crime when he or she, [¶] 1. with knowledge of the unlawful
purpose of the perpetrator and [¶] 2. with the intent or purpose of
committing, encouraging, or facilitating the commission of the
crime, by act or advice aids, promotes, encourages or instigates
the commission of the crime.” (CALJIC No. 3.01.)

                                10
      The trial court also instructed that “[t]he word ‘defendant’
applies equally to each defendant.” (CALJIC No. 1.11.) Finally,
two other instructions ensured that in order to convict any
defendant as an aider and abettor of the murder, the jury had to
consider each defendant’s guilt separately from the others’
(CALJIC No. 17.00 [“You must decide separately whether each of
the defendants is guilty or not guilty”], and also find that each
defendant himself harbored the requisite intent to kill (CALJIC
No. 3.31 [“Unless such specific intent exists the crime to which it
relates is not committed”]).
      In order to convict, these instructions required the jury to
find that each defendant separately committed murder⎯whether
as the actual killer or as a direct aider and abettor⎯with express
or implied malice. “ ‘[T]o be liable for an implied malice murder,
the direct aider and abettor must, by words or conduct, aid the
commission of the life-endangering act, not the result of that act.
The mens rea, which must be personally harbored by the direct
aider and abettor, is knowledge that the perpetrator intended to
commit the act, intent to aid the perpetrator in the commission of
the act, knowledge that the act is dangerous to human life, and
acting in conscious disregard for human life.’ ” (People v. Reyes
(2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 991, quoting People v. Powell (2021) 63
Cal.App.5th 689, 713 (Powell).) Thus, aiding and abetting
implied malice murder is a theory of murder based on the aider
and abettor’s own mental state; it does not rely on imputed
malice. (People v. Silva (2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 632, 639; People v.
Schell (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 437, 443–444; People v. Vizcarra
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 377, 390–391; People v. Vargas (2022) 84
Cal.App.5th 943, 955.)

                                11
        Appellants contend that the “equally guilty” language in
CALJIC No. 3.00 allowed the jury to convict them of murder
“without ever determining that [they] personally acted with
malice, or that [Valle] personally premeditated anything.” We
disagree.
        Our Supreme Court has declared that “ ‘ “A defendant
challenging an instruction as being subject to erroneous
interpretation by the jury must demonstrate a reasonable
likelihood that the jury understood the instruction in the way
asserted by the defendant. [Citations.]” [Citation.] “ ‘[T]he
correctness of jury instructions is to be determined from the
entire charge of the court, not from a consideration of parts of an
instruction or from a particular instruction.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 433 (Bryant
et al.).)
        Since appellants’ 1993 trial, courts have recognized that
the “equally guilty” language in former CALJIC No. 3.00 “could
be misleading if the principals in a particular case might be
guilty of different crimes and the jury interprets the instruction
to preclude such a finding.” (Bryant et al., supra, 60 Cal.4th at
p. 433; People v. Amezcua and Flores (2019) 6 Cal.5th 886, 918
(Amezcua and Flores).) The instruction was subsequently revised
“to address the circumstance that aiders and abettors are not
always guilty of the same crime as the actual perpetrators.”
(Bryant et al., at p. 433.) However, as applied in most cases, the
court “recognized that the standard instruction ‘generally stated
a correct rule of law,’ in that ‘[a]ll principals, including aiders and
abettors, are “equally guilty” in the sense that they are all
criminally liable.’ ” ([Bryant et al.] at p. 433.) (Amezcua and
Flores, at p. 918.)

                                  12
       Here, in order for the jury to impute malice to appellants
Valle and Guzman and convict them as aiders and abettors based
on the “equally guilty” language in CALJIC No. 3.00, jurors
would have had to misinterpret or completely ignore several
other instructions. Those instructions required that the jury
consider each defendant’s guilt separately (CALJIC No. 17.00),
find an intent to kill on the part of each defendant individually
(CALJIC No. 3.31), and find that each defendant who
participated in the murder as an aider and abettor did so with
knowledge of the perpetrator’s unlawful purpose and acted with
his own intent to commit the crime. (CALJIC No. 3.01.)
       Given that the jury convicted all three defendants of
murder and found all three had personally used a firearm in the
commission of that murder, there appears no reasonable
likelihood that the jury understood the instructions to permit a
murder conviction on any theory of imputed malice in this case.
(See Amezcua and Flores, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 918 [“Because the
circumstances of this case reflected defendants’ joint
participation in the offenses at issue with the required intent to
kill, the trial court did not err in giving the jury the unmodified
CALJIC No. 3.00”].) Not only do “ ‘we presume jurors understand
and correlate all of the instructions’ [citation],” but the jury is
also “ ‘presumed to have followed the court’s instructions’ (People
v. Sanchez (2001) 26 Cal.4th 834, 852).” (Williams, supra, 86
Cal.App.5th at p. 1256, italics added; Bryant et al., supra, 60
Cal.4th at p. 433 [“ ‘It is fundamental that jurors are presumed to
be intelligent and capable of understanding and applying the
court’s instructions’ ”]; People v. McKinnon (2011) 52 Cal.4th 610,
670 [“We ‘credit jurors with intelligence and common sense’

                                13
[citation] and presume they generally understand and follow
instructions”].)
       Because neither Senate Bill No. 1437 nor 775 eliminated
direct aiding and abetting liability for murder under an implied
malice theory, the instructions given at appellants’ trial
demonstrate appellants are ineligible for relief under section
1172.6 as a matter of law. (Gentile, supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 850;
Cortes, supra, 75 Cal.App.5th at p. 205.)
    D. The Powell, Langi, and Loza8 decisions are
inapposite
       Appellants rely on Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th 689,
Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th 972, and Loza, supra, 27
Cal.App.5th 797, to argue that where, as here, the aiding and
abetting and implied malice instructions fail to distinguish the
perpetrator(s) from the aider and abettor(s), resulting
ambiguities in the instructions permit a jury to convict an aider
and abettor of implied malice murder by imputing malice to the
aider and abettor. These cases do not support appellants’
argument.
       1. Powell
       In Powell, defendants Powell and Langlois appealed their
convictions for second degree murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 189) and
first degree residential burglary (§§ 459, 460). After forcibly
entering the victim’s home, defendants and two others beat the
victim and fled. The victim died from a stab wound to the heart
inflicted by Powell. The jury found Powell had personally used a
deadly weapon during the commission of the crime (§ 12022,
subd. (b)(1)). (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 692.) The trial

      8 In re Loza (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 797 (Loza).

                                14
court instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 401, aiding and
abetting, CALCRIM No. 403, natural and probable consequences,
and CALCRIM No. 520, malice. (Powell, at pp. 706–708.) The
prosecutor argued the jury could convict Langlois of murder on
two theories: that he directly aided and abetted an express
malice murder, or that he aided and abetted an assault, the
natural and probable consequence of which was death. Although
the prosecutor did not specifically advance a murder theory based
on implied malice as to Langlois, he did explain implied malice
murder with respect to “the person who committed the stabbing.”
(Id. at p. 708.)
       Langlois contended the court instructed the jury in a
manner which permitted the jury to convict him on an invalid
theory of murder; that is, as a direct aider and abettor of an
implied malice murder independent of the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 709.)
The court “reject[ed] Langlois’s contention that direct aiding and
abetting implied malice murder is an invalid legal theory” in all
cases, but nevertheless found the aiding and abetting
instructions given in that case were erroneous because they “were
not tailored for implied malice murder.” (Id. at p. 714.)
       Powell explained that the standard aiding and abetting
instruction given (CALCRIM No. 401) described the aider and
abettor’s intent in terms of aiding and abetting the crime of
murder rather than “intend[ing] the commission of the
perpetrator’s act, the natural and probable consequences of which
are dangerous to human life, intentionally aid[ing] in the
commission of that act and do[ing] so with conscious disregard for
human life.” (Powell, supra, 63 Cal.App.5th at p. 714, italics
added.) The instruction was “not tailored for” aiding and

                               15
abetting an implied malice murder, and was thus erroneous as
applied to Langlois because it did not require “proof of the aider
and abettor’s knowledge and intent with regard to the direct
perpetrator’s life endangering act” as opposed to the result of
that act, that is, murder. (Reyes, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 991,
boldface added, citing Powell, supra, at pp. 712–713.)
       2. Langi
       Langi applied the Powell court’s reasoning to its review of
the superior court’s denial of a section 1172.6 petition for
resentencing. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982 [where a
trial court applies the standard aiding and abetting instruction to
the crime of second degree murder “without tailoring it to the
specifics of that crime, the instruction creates an ambiguity
under which the jury may find the defendant guilty of aiding and
abetting second degree murder without finding that the
defendant personally acted with malice”].)
       In Langi, the defendant was convicted of second degree
murder as an aider and abettor based on his participation in a
fistfight among several people, in which the victim died as a
result of falling and hitting the back of his head on the pavement
after being punched in the face. (Langi, supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 975, 976–977.) On appeal from the summary denial of
defendant’s section 1172.6 petition, the appellate court
determined that the instruction on aiding and abetting (CALJIC
No. 3.01) creates an ambiguity in the context of second degree
implied malice murder, which may allow the jury to “find the
defendant guilty of aiding and abetting second degree murder
without finding that he personally acted with malice.” (Langi,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 982.)

                                16
       The court explained, “The aiding-and-abetting instruction
stated that a person aids and abets a crime if he or she acts ‘with
knowledge of the unlawful purpose of the perpetrator, and . . .
with the intent or purpose of committing or encouraging or
facilitating the commission of the crime.’ (CALJIC No. 3.01,
italics added.) However, . . . the second degree murder
instruction specified that the direct perpetrator of that crime
need not act with the unlawful intent of causing death. . . . If the
perpetrator need not have had ‘murderous intent,’ certainly the
aider and abettor need not have had such an intent. Although
the definition of second degree murder in CALJIC No. 8.31 states
that the perpetrator must have acted with conscious disregard for
human life, the definition of an aider and abettor in CALJIC
No. 3.01 does not include the same requirement.” (Langi,
supra,73 Cal.App.5th at pp. 982–983.) In this situation, the
ambiguity in the instructions allows an aider and abettor to be
found guilty simply for intending to aid the perpetrator’s act,
without personally and consciously disregarding the danger to
human life. (Id. at p. 983.)
       To avoid this ambiguity, Langi declared that “[t]he
instructions should have explained that, to be guilty as a direct
aider and abettor of second degree murder, an accomplice must
have acted with the mental state of implied malice.” (Langi,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 983, citing Powell, supra, 63
Cal.App.5th at pp. 713–714.) In the absence of such clarification,
the theory presented to the jury thus fell within section 1172.6’s
prohibition on theories of imputed malice, and the defendant was
not necessarily ineligible for relief as a matter of law. (Id. at
p. 984.)

                                17
       Here, the jury was instructed on, and convicted appellant
Valle of first degree murder. Therefore, the jury necessarily
found Valle committed a “willful, deliberate and premeditated
killing with express malice aforethought.” (CALJIC No. 8.20,
italics added.) Because the verdict establishes appellant Valle
was not convicted under any theory of imputed malice, Langi is
inapplicable, and Valle is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a
matter of law. (See Coley, supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 547
[distinguishing Langi on the ground that instructions required a
finding of express rather than implied malice].)
       Langi is also distinguishable as applied to appellant
Guzman. In Langi, no weapons were used. The victim died
because he fell and struck his head after someone in the group
that included the defendant punched him. (Langi, supra, 73
Cal.App.5th at p. 976.) In that context, the Langi court found
CALJIC No. 3.01 to be ambiguous because the instruction did
“not state that the aider and abettor must himself have known
that the act he aided was life-threatening, or that he must
himself have acted with indifference to human life.” (Langi, at
p. 982.)
       In contrast to Langi, all three defendants in this case—
including Guzman—fired guns in Ortega’s murder. The jury
found that each defendant—including Guzman—personally used
a firearm in the commission of the offense. Although the same
aiding and abetting instruction (CALJIC No. 3.01) given in Langi
was given here, and both juries received instructions on implied

                                 18
malice murder,9 the ambiguity present in the Langi instructions
did not arise in this case because Guzman personally used a
firearm in the offense, an intentional act which itself
demonstrates a conscious disregard for human life.
       Langi is thus inapposite: Even if the jury convicted
Guzman as an aider and abettor of implied malice murder, in
light of the jury’s verdicts and considering the instructions as a
whole, we find no reasonable likelihood that the jury convicted
appellants Valle or Guzman of murder on any theory of imputed
malice.
       3. Loza
       Appellants’ reliance on Loza is similarly misplaced.
       In Loza, gang members Loza, Loza’s brother Luis, Rizo,
Andrade, and Flores attacked members of a rival gang. Loza had
a knife, Rizo had a baseball bat, and Flores had a .38-caliber
semiautomatic handgun. During the fight, Flores passed his gun
to Loza, but it did not work when Loza tried to fire it. Loza
passed the gun to Andrade who shot the victim in the chest and
killed him. The jury convicted Loza and the other defendants of

      9 Here, the trial court instructed with CALJIC No. 8.11,
defining implied malice. In Langi, the trial court used CALJIC
No. 8.31 to instruct the jury “that a killing is a second degree
murder if ‘1. The killing resulted from an intentional act, [¶]
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human
life, and [¶] 3. The act was deliberately performed with
knowledge of the danger to, and with conscious disregard for,
human life. [¶] When the killing is the direct result of such an
act, it is not necessary to prove that the defendant intended that
the act would result in the death of a human being.’ ” (Langi,
supra, 73 Cal.App.5th at p. 981.)

                                19
first degree premeditated murder. (Loza, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th
at p. 800.)
       The trial court instructed on direct aiding and abetting
(CALJIC No. 3.01) as well as a natural and probable
consequences theory of aiding and abetting (CALJIC No. 3.02).
On first degree murder, the court instructed: “ ‘If you find that
the killing was preceded and accompanied by a clear, deliberate
intent on the part of the defendant to kill, which was the result of
deliberation and premeditation, so that it must have been formed
upon pre-existing reflection and not under a sudden heat of
passion . . . it is murder of the first degree.’ (CALJIC No. 8.20,
italics added.) The instruction also stated: ‘To constitute a
deliberate and premeditated killing, the slayer must weigh and
consider the question of killing and the reasons for and against
such a choice and, having in mind the consequences, decides to
and does kill.’ (CALJIC No. 8.20, italics added.)” (Loza, supra,
27 Cal.App.5th at pp. 802–803.)
       Loza challenged his first degree murder conviction in a
habeas corpus proceeding under People v. Chiu (2014) 59 Cal.4th
155 (Chiu). (Loza, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 799.) The Loza
court found that the trial court’s instructions included one legally
valid theory of first degree murder—direct aider and abettor
liability, and one legally invalid theory—the natural and
probable consequences doctrine. The court explained, “ ‘ “When
a trial court instructs a jury on two theories of guilt, one of which
was legally correct and one legally incorrect, reversal is required
unless there is a basis in the record to find that the verdict was
actually based on a valid ground.” ’ ” (Loza, at p. 803, quoting
Chiu, at p. 176.)

                                 20
      The Loza court found no reason to conclude the verdict
against Loza was based on the legally valid theory. “[T]he court’s
instructions here allowed the jurors to find defendant (Loza)
guilty of first degree murder if they found that one of the other
three defendants—the ‘slayer’ Andrade—deliberated and
premeditated. This is precisely the type of instructional error
that our Supreme Court identified and found unacceptable in
Chiu, supra, 59 Cal.4th 155.” (Loza, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at
p. 805.) The court determined the error was not harmless beyond
a reasonable doubt (see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S.
18, 24), and vacated Loza’s conviction for first degree murder.
(Loza, at pp. 803, 808.)
      Loza has no application to the instant case. Unlike Loza,
the jury here was not instructed on a natural and probable
consequences theory of liability or any other legally invalid
theory. Appellants’ assertion that this distinction is of no
consequence is simply wrong. The sole focus of Loza’s analysis
was whether the record could support a determination that the
jury relied on the legally valid theory rather than the invalid one
to convict. As the court explained, “the analysis is on all fours
with Chiu. In this habeas corpus review, we find no basis in the
record to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury relied
on the legally valid (direct aider and abettor) liability theory.
(See In re Martinez (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1216, 1218 [‘on a petition for
writ of habeas corpus, as on direct appeal, Chiu error requires
reversal unless the reviewing court concludes beyond a
reasonable doubt that the jury actually relied on a legally valid
theory in convicting the defendant of first degree murder’].)”
(Loza, supra, 27 Cal.App.5th at p. 803.)

                                21
  E. The superior court neither engaged in factfinding nor
improperly relied on this court’s opinion in the direct
appeal in denying the petitions at the prima facie stage
      Appellants contend the superior court improperly referred
to the prior appellate opinion and engaged in factfinding in ruling
on their section 1172.6 petitions. We disagree.
      In Lewis, the California Supreme Court declared, “there is
no categorical bar to consulting the record of conviction at the
prima facie stage [of a section 1172.6 petition].” (Lewis, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 972, fn. 6.) However, the court cautioned that the
permissible scope of the superior court’s review of the record of
conviction—including the appellate opinion from a direct
appeal—is limited. (Id., at pp. 971–972.) While appellate
opinions “are generally considered to be part of the record of
conviction,” their probative value “is case specific, and ‘it is
certainly correct that an appellate opinion might not supply all
answers.’ [Citation.] In reviewing any part of the record of
conviction at this preliminary juncture, a trial court should not
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion.’ ” (Id. at p. 972.)
      Consistent with Lewis, then, the superior court properly
reviewed the appellate opinion in considering appellant
Guzman’s petition. Assuming the superior court that adjudicated
appellant Valle’s petition also reviewed the prior opinion, that
review was proper under Lewis.
      There is also no merit to appellants’ argument that the
superior court engaged in factfinding by referring to the prior
appellate opinion, or, in appellant Valle’s case, referring to the
basic facts of the case. Both courts stated clearly and
unequivocally on the record that appellants were ineligible for

                                22
relief under section 1172.6 as a matter of law because the jury in
appellants’ case was not instructed on the theories of felony
murder or natural and probable consequences.
        Finally, even if the courts did engage in factfinding, the
denials of both appellants’ petitions at the prima facie stage were
correct as discussed above. As our Supreme Court has
recognized, “a ruling will not be disturbed on appeal merely
because it was given for a wrong reason, if the ruling would
otherwise be correct ‘ “ ‘upon any theory of the law applicable to
the case,’ ” ’ and ‘ “ ‘regardless of the considerations which may
have moved the trial court to its conclusion. ’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Hopson (2017) 3 Cal.5th 424, 459.)
  II. Appellant Guzman Had No Constitutional Right
        to be Present at the Section 1172.6 Eligibility
        Hearing
        Appellant Guzman contends his constitutional right to be
present at the prima facie hearing on his petition was violated by
the failure to obtain a waiver of his personal presence. The claim
lacks merit.
        Although “[a] criminal defendant has the right under the
state and federal Constitutions to be personally present and
represented by counsel at all critical stages of the trial” (Bryant
et al., supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 465), that right is subject to certain
recognized limitations. (People v. Simms (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th
987, 996.) For example, “it is well established that a represented
defendant has no constitutional or statutory right to be present to
address purely legal questions or where his or her ‘presence
would not contribute to the fairness of the proceeding.’ ” (People
v. Fedalizo (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 98, 109; People v. Perry (2006)
38 Cal.4th 302, 312 [“a defendant’s right to be present depends on

                                 23
two conditions: (1) the proceeding is critical to the outcome of the
case, and (2) the defendant’s presence would contribute to the
fairness of the proceeding. [Citations.] Thus a defendant may
ordinarily be excluded from conferences on questions of law, even
if those questions are critical to the outcome of the case, because
the defendant’s presence would not contribute to the fairness of
the proceeding”].)
       In the context of a prima facie hearing on a petition for
resentencing under section 1172.6, the superior court is
prohibited from engaging in factfinding or exercising discretion
on any matter. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 972, 974 [“at the
prima facie stage, a petitioner’s allegations should be accepted as
true, and the court should not make credibility determinations or
engage in ‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the
exercise of discretion’ ”].) Thus, because the only issue at stake in
the prima facie hearing on a section 1172.6 petition is whether
the petitioner may be eligible for relief as a matter of law,
Guzman had no constitutional right to be personally present at
the hearing in this case.

                                 24
                         DISPOSITION
     The orders denying appellant Valle’s and appellant
Guzman’s petitions for resentencing under Penal Code section
1172.6 are affirmed.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                        LUI, P. J.
We concur:

     ASHMANN-GERST, J.

     CHAVEZ, J.

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