Court Opinion

ID: 9484184
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:43:07.319946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:04.504163
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part.
This appeal presents an issue of first impression in the courts of appeals: can a prison disciplinary board find an inmate guilty of violating a prison rule or regulation on something less than a preponder-*1443anee of the evidence? 1 The only circuit to have addressed this issue, albeit in dicta, was the Third, in which it indicated that
[i]f [the appellant] is correct in his assertion that [the prison regulation] provides for a burden of proof lower than a preponderance of the evidence, then it follows that an inmate can be punished for acts which he in all probability did not commit. We have grave doubts about the constitutionality of such a regulation. Also if [the appellant’s interpretation of the regulation is correct, then the district court was incorrect in relying on Superintendent v. Hill. In Hill, the Court did not address whether the Constitution requires a particular burden of proof in prison disciplinary proceedings. Hill only spoke to issues involving standards of appellate review.
Brown v. Fauver, 819 F.2d 395, 399 n. 4 (3d Cir.1987) (citation omitted). Distinguishing between the standard of proof and the standard of review posed no difficulty for the district court in its thorough and scholarly determination of the instant case. See Goff v. Dailey, 789 F.Supp. 978, 982-83 (S.D.Iowa 1992); see also Spalding v. Matthews, No. 89-3417-RDR, 1992 WL 363653, at *2 n. 2 (D.Kan. Nov. 6, 1992) (distinguishing between standard of proof and standard of review and determining that proper standard of proof in prison disciplinary hearings is preponderance of the evidence); Young v. Coughlin, No. CIV-87-877E, 1989 WL 132012, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 1989) (distinguishing between standard of proof and standard of review in prison disciplinary hearings); Gerald L. Neuman, The Constitutional Requirement of “Some Evidence,” 25 San Diego L.Rev. 631, 664 (1988) (“The ‘some evidence’ requirement is a standard of review, not a procedural requirement applicable to the original tribunal.... A tribunal that announces that it has ‘some evidence’ before it and therefore can proceed to deprive an individual of liberty or property is not fulfilling a constitutionally imposed duty.”) Yet despite the district court’s careful exposition, the majority of this court treats the two as essentially identical, citing only standard of review cases as authority for its assertion that prison disciplinary boards may employ a lesser standard of proof than a preponderance of the evidence. Because the majority’s assertion has neither precedential nor academic support, and because it portends gross violations of inmates’ constitutional guarantees of due process, I respectfully dissent.
The majority does not dispute that prison inmates are entitled to due process of law before they may be deprived of protected liberty interests. Supra at 1440 (citing Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 94 S.Ct. 2963, 41 L.Ed.2d 935 (1974)). Though exigent circumstances may entitle prison authorities to deprive an inmate of protected liberties without a prior disciplinary hearing, as the majority contends, the inmate retains the constitutional right to a hearing once those exigencies have passed. See Franco v. Moreland, 805 F.2d 798, 801 & n. 1 (8th Cir.1986).2 That school administrators are not constitutionally obligated to provide the same level of process to students is irrelevant. Due process requires that a hearing take place before inmates are disciplined through deprivation of a protected interest, and the only remaining *1444question is what standard of proof must be employed in those hearings.
In Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1394, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), the Court indicated that the “deter-min[ation] whether a particular standard of proof in a particular proceeding satisfies due process” depends on “a straightforward consideration of the factors identified in [Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S.Ct. 893, 903, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) ].” The Court identified three factors: “the private interests affected by the proceeding; the risk of error created by the State's chosen procedure; and the countervailing governmental interest supporting use of the challenged procedure.” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 754, 102 S.Ct. at 1394. Though the district court carefully examined these factors, see Goff, 789 F.Supp. at 983-84, the majority fails to do so.
The district court’s analysis is straightforward and on the mark: the inmate’s interest in not being erroneously disciplined is an important one; the risk of error with use of a “some evidence” standard of proof is high; and the state’s interest in swift and certain punishment is not impeded by use of the preponderance standard of proof. Id. at 984. Additionally, the state has an interest in accurate determinations, for “neither the state nor the inmate has any valid interest in treating the innocent as though he were guilty.” United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 718 (7th Cir.1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146, 94 S.Ct. 900, 39 L.Ed.2d 102 (1974).
No application of the Eldridge and San-tosky standards has resulted in adoption of less than a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard of proof. The Santosky Court determined that a clear-and-convincing standard of proof was required in cases of termination of parental rights, and in so doing it stated that “application of a ‘fair preponderance of the evidence’ standard indicates ... society’s ‘minimal concern with the outcome.’ ” Santosky, 455 U.S. at 755, 102 S.Ct. at 1395 (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979)).
Administrative factfinding occurs throughout our legal system, yet no examples can be cited in which a fact is “found” by less than a preponderance of the evidence.
[I]n American law a preponderance of the evidence is rock bottom at the fact-finding level of civil litigation. Nowhere in our jurisprudence have we discerned acceptance of a standard of proof tolerating “something less than the weight of the evidence.”
... [T]he bare minimum for a finding of misconduct is the greater convincing power of the evidence. That the proceeding is administrative rather than judicial does not diminish this wholesome demand....
Charlton v. FTC, 543 F.2d 903, 907, 908 (D.C.Cir.1976) (footnotes omitted) (quoting In re Adriaans, 28 App.D.C. 515, 524 (1907)); see also Sea Island Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, 627 F.2d 240, 243 (D.C.Cir.) (“the ‘preponderance of evidence’ standard is the traditional standard in civil and administrative proceedings”), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 834, 101 S.Ct. 105, 66 L.Ed.2d 39 (1980); Collins Secs. Corp. v. SEC, 562 F.2d 820, 823 (D.C.Cir.1977) (same); Smyth v. Lubbers, 398 F.Supp. 777, 799 (W.D.Mich.1975) (“[t]he application of any standard [of proof] lower than a ‘preponderance of evidence’ would have the effect of requiring the accused to prove his innocence”).
Searches not only of “our jurisprudence,” but of scholarly works as well yield the same result: “One can never prove a fact by something less than a preponderance of the evidence. Any view to the contrary is based on misunderstanding.” 3 Kenneth Culp Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 16.9, at 256 (2d ed. 1980); see also 4 Jacob A. Stein et al., Administrative Law § 24.03 (June 1987) (agency decisions are based on preponderance of the evidence unless a higher standard applies); Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law § 7.9 (3d ed. 1991) (same).
The prison regulations in effect within this circuit at both the state and federal level appear to recognize this integral as*1445pect of factfinding, for not one of the sets of regulations provides for use of a “some evidence” standard. Federal regulations require that “[t]he Unit Discipline Committee shall consider all evidence presented at the hearing and shall make a decision based on at least some facts, and if there is conflicting evidence, it must be based on the greater weight of the evidence.” 28 C.F.R. § 541.15(f) (1992).
Minnesota’s regulations, which are governed by a federal court consent decree, require that a “finding of guilty ... be based on a majority vote of the members of the board, who must be convinced that the inmate’s guilt is more probable than his innocence.” Inmate 24394 v. Schoen, 363 F.Supp. 683, 687 (D.Minn.1973); see also Minnesota Department of Corrections, Inmate Discipline Regulations for Minnesota Correctional Facilities 7 (1988). Iowa’s policy regarding disciplinary hearing procedures, which governs the hearing in this case, provides that after reviewing the available evidence, the disciplinary committee/administrative law judge shall “[e]x-cuse the inmate and begin deliberations to determine whether the alleged rule violation^), in fact, occurred.” Iowa Department of Corrections, Division of Institutions, Department Policy and Procedure 111(D)(9)(h) (effective April 1984) (emphasis added). As all legal and scholarly authority indicates that facts can only be found by a preponderance of the evidence, in order to satisfy Iowa’s own regulations, the preponderance standard must be met. Any belief to the contrary is, as Professor Davis indicates, based on misunderstanding.
Under the approach adopted by the majority today, an inmate is now faced with proving his or her innocence. This proof of innocence must meet not simply a preponderance of the evidence, but some higher standard, perhaps clear-and-convincing evidence or even higher, for as long as some evidence exists of an accused inmate’s guilt, the disciplinary board can judge the inmate guilty, notwithstanding the weight of the evidence to the contrary.3 Because such procedures in no way comport with the requirements of due process, I respectfully dissent from Part II.C. of the court’s opinion.

. That this issue would not have reached a court of appeals previously is not surprising. Those who assert constitutional deprivations by prison disciplinary boards regularly argue that the given board determination was not supported by the evidence, a claim that falls under the "some evidence" standard of review. This appeal raises the additional issue that the board applied a constitutionally deficient standard of proof, that of “some evidence.” Should prison boards have previously required less than a preponderance of the evidence in making their findings, they have not surprisingly failed to make that point explicit. Additionally, as discussed infra, none of the prison regulations in effect in this circuit expressly allow disciplinary boards to rely on anything less than a preponderance of the evidence.

. This circuit's decision in Ryan v. Sargent, 969 F.2d 638 (8th Cir.1992), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 1000, 122 L.Ed.2d 150 (1993), is not inconsistent with Franco. Ryan was temporarily placed in administrative segregation when the warden received information from a confidential informant that Ryan’s escape was imminent. Before being placed in permanent administrative segregation, Ryan received the required disciplinary hearing. Id. at 640.

. As the author of the majority opinion said of the civil forfeiture statutes on another occasion, such "allocation of burdens and standards of proof requires that the claimant prove a negative, ... while the government must prove almost nothing. This creates a great risk of an erroneous, irreversible deprivation.” United States v. $12,390.00, 956 F.2d 801, 811 (8th Cir.1992) (Beam, J., dissenting in part).