Court Opinion

ID: 9880682
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-28 14:03:55.945212+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:57:09.584498
License: Public Domain

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             DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS

                                  No. 20-CV-0556

          1417 BELMONT COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, LLC, APPELLANT,

                                           v.

                        DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, APPELLEE.

                          Appeal from the Superior Court
                           of the District of Columbia
                              (2010-CA-007158-B)

                       (Hon. Michael L. Rankin, Trial Judge)
                      (Hon. Anthony C. Epstein, Trial Judge)

(Argued May 9, 2023                                    Decided September 28, 2023)

      S. Micah Salb for appellant.

       Thais-Lyn Trayer, Deputy Solicitor General, with whom Karl A. Racine,
Attorney General for the District of Columbia at the time the brief was filed,
Caroline S. Van Zile, Solicitor General, Ashwin P. Phatak, Principal Deputy
Solicitor General, and Carl J. Schifferle, Deputy Solicitor General, were on the brief
for appellee.

      Before EASTERLY, MCLEESE, and DEAHL, Associate Judges.

      MCLEESE,     Associate    Judge:   Appellant    1417    Belmont    Community

Development, LLC (“Belmont”) claims that the District of Columbia violated

Belmont’s constitutional procedural-due-process rights by demolishing a building
                                         2

owned by Belmont without giving Belmont adequate notice. We affirm the trial

court’s decision to grant summary judgment to the District.

                     I. Factual and Procedural Background

      The following facts appear to be undisputed for current purposes, except as

noted. Belmont began developing an existing building into condominium units.

Several safety issues arose during the development period, including a partial

collapse of the building in May 2008. The District of Columbia Department of

Consumer and Regulatory Affairs (“DCRA”) hired building engineers to inspect the

structure. The inspection report indicated that the building was “unstable,” “in

imminent danger of collapse,” and “a life safety issue for the surrounding public and

structures.”

      Belmont retained a structural engineering firm to consult on the partially

collapsed structure. Belmont’s engineer agreed that “the building was in an unsafe

condition and was in danger of collapse.”

      On March 30, 2009, DCRA inspected the property and issued to Belmont a

notice of violation and notice to abate (“NOV”). The NOV listed several violations
                                           3

and identified statutory and regulatory provisions giving the District authority to take

action with respect to the property. See 12-A D.C.M.R. § 115.1 (2008) (“Right to

Deem Unsafe”; “All buildings or structures that are . . . abandoned, deteriorated,

unsafe . . . , or are otherwise dangerous to human life . . . shall be taken down and

removed or made safe and secure, as the code official may deem necessary . . . .”);

D.C. Code § 42-3131.01(c)(1) (2001 ed., 2009) (“The Mayor may cause the

summary correction of housing regulation violations or violations of the construction

codes where a life-or-health threatening condition exists, as determined by the

Mayor.”)    Under “violation,” the NOV reproduced portions of the relevant

regulatory and statutory provisions, stating:

             All buildings or structures that are or hereafter shall
             become abandoned, deteriorated, unsafe, unsanitary or
             deficient . . . or are otherwise dangerous to human life or
             the public welfare . . . shall be taken down and removed or
             made safe and secure, as the code official may deem
             necessary pursuant to this section or pursuant to
             [D.C. Code] § 42-3131.01, et seq. . . .

                                        * * *

             The Mayor may cause the summary correction of housing
             regulation violations where a life-or-health threatening
             condition exists, as determined by the Mayor. A
             life-or-health threatening condition means a condition that
             imminently endangers the health or safety of the tenant or
             occupant of the premises . . . .
                                           4

                                        * * *

             The owner or authorized agent shall be notified by
             personal service or by registered mail to the last known
             address and by conspicuous posting on the property . . . .

See D.C. Code § 42-3131.01(c)(1) (2009).

      The NOV indicated that an inspection of the building’s construction and

“[o]ther [d]angerous [c]ondition” had been performed. The NOV also stated that

the owner was required to abate the violations by taking the listed “required

corrective action,” which was to “[i]mmediately render structure safe by repair,

demolition or raze.” The NOV also stated that, within 15 days, “[t]he [o]wner of the

property must cause construction to commence, remove exterior building supports

and[] re-open the rear alley, or apply for a [raze] permit.”

      The second page of the NOV stated, “[t]he cited violation(s) must be abated

as ordered within . . . 15 (fifteen) days from receipt of this notice. Failure to comply

will result in this notice being forwarded to the Office of Compliance for

enforcement action.”
                                           5

      The third page of the NOV, titled “Failure to Correct Violations,” stated that

DCRA would re-inspect the property “on or around the time” by which the property

owner was required to complete the corrections. The NOV further stated that “[i]f

DCRA determines that you have failed to correct or abate the violation, this matter

will be referred for correction under the authority of [D.C. Code]

§ 42-3131.01(a) . . . .” See D.C. Code § 42-3131.01(a)(1) (2009) (“[W]henever the

owner of any real property in the District of Columbia shall fail or refuse, after the

service of reasonable notice in the manner provided in § 42-3131.03, to correct any

condition which exists on or has arisen from such property in violation of law . . .

the Mayor . . . is authorized to: [c]ause such condition to be corrected” and to recover

costs or fair market value of correction from property owner). The NOV also

provided information about how to request a hearing to dispute the NOV.

      On or about the day that the NOV was issued, a DCRA building inspector

posted the NOV on the front door of the property and caused the NOV to be sent by

first-class (regular) mail to the addresses on record for Belmont. The mail was not

returned to the sender by the U.S. Postal Service, but Belmont asserts that it never

received the mailed NOV.
                                          6

         According to Don Masoero, the District’s Chief Building Inspector,

Belmont’s owner did not attend a meeting with District inspectors that had been

scheduled for March 31, 2009, to discuss remedying the safety issues.          Also

according to Mr. Masoero, Belmont’s owner did not answer his phone and the

owner’s phone did not accept voicemail messages.          Belmont disputed those

statements but does not appear to have presented evidence of its own about any

contacts between Belmont and the District between the issuance of the notice and

the razing of the building.

         In May 2009, a DCRA inspector inspected the building and saw that the NOV

was still posted on the structure. A second major collapse of the building occurred

a few days later. DCRA determined that the building was a dangerous structure

pursuant to 12-A D.C.M.R. § 115. On July 2, 2009, DCRA issued a permit to raze

the structure. The District caused the structure to be razed approximately one week

later.

         Belmont filed an action in Superior Court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging

among other things that (1) DCRA employees had violated Belmont’s Fifth

Amendment procedural-due-process rights by razing Belmont’s building without

proper notice, and (2) the District was liable for the DCRA employees’ actions under
                                           7

Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)

(municipalities are liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for actions of municipal employees

when employees are executing municipality’s “policy or custom”).

      The trial court initially granted summary judgment to Belmont, concluding

that DCRA had violated Belmont’s constitutional due-process rights by (1) failing

to strictly comply with the statutory requirement to provide notice by personal

service or registered—rather than regular—mail, as required by D.C. Code

§ 42-3131.01; and (2) serving an NOV that failed to put Belmont on notice of the

intended razing of the building and that was issued before the District made its final

decision to raze the building. The trial court also concluded that the razing of the

building was an official policy decision of the District, so that the District was liable

under Monell for razing the building.

      The trial court subsequently reconsidered its ruling and granted summary

judgment to the District. The court held that (1) DCRA’s method of providing notice

(posting and using first-class regular mail) was constitutionally adequate; (2) the

content and timing of the notice was not constitutionally adequate; and (3) Belmont

failed, however, to establish that the District was liable under Monell for the razing

of the building without proper notice.
                                         8

                                      II. Analysis

      We review de novo the trial court’s order granting summary judgment.

PHCDC1, LLC v. Evans & Joyce Willoughby Tr., 257 A.3d 1039, 1042 (D.C. 2021).

“Summary judgment is only appropriate where there is no genuine issue of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,” viewing the

record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. at 1042-43 (internal

quotation marks omitted). “[C]onclusory allegations by the nonmoving party are

insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact or to defeat the entry of

summary judgment.” Franco v. District of Columbia, 39 A.3d 890, 894 (D.C. 2012)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

                         A. Municipal Liability under Monell

      Belmont contends that the trial court erred in concluding that the District was

not liable for the actions of DCRA employees in this case. Because we hold that

Belmont’s constitutional rights were not violated, we need not and do not reach the

question whether the District would properly be held responsible for the actions at

issue in this case. See Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 120 (1992)
                                          9

(analysis of § 1983 claim asserted against municipality has two parts: “(1) whether

plaintiff’s harm was caused by a constitutional violation, and (2) if so, whether the

city is responsible for that violation”); Whitney v. City of St. Louis, 887 F.3d 857,

861 (8th Cir. 2018) (“It follows [from Monell] that, absent a constitutional violation

by a city employee, there can be no § 1983 or Monell liability for the [c]ity.”).

Because more precise terminology therefore is not relevant for current purposes, we

hereinafter refer interchangeably to the District and its employees.

                   B. Constitutional Procedural Due Process

      The District does not dispute that it failed to fully comply with the statutory

provisions governing notice. See D.C. Code § 42-3131.01(c)(1) (2009) (before

Mayor summarily corrects “life-or-health threatening condition,” owner shall be

notified by posting on property and by personal service or registered mail, unless

owner’s address is unknown or cannot be found). Belmont seeks relief under § 1983,

alleging that the District’s failure violated Belmont’s federal constitutional rights

under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

      The Due Process Clause requires the government to provide adequate notice

and an opportunity to be heard before depriving an individual of a protected liberty
                                          10

or property interest. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43,

48 (1993). The District does not dispute that it deprived Belmont of a protected

property interest when it razed Belmont’s building. The question for this court,

therefore, is whether the notice provided to Belmont by the District was

constitutionally adequate. We conclude that it was.

             1. Per Se Due-Process Violation

      Most broadly, Belmont argues that any failure to strictly follow state-law

procedural requirements in connection with the deprivation of a constitutionally

protected property interest necessarily amounts to a constitutional due-process

violation. Although this is not entirely clear, Belmont appears to have retracted that

argument in its broadest form. In any event, we are not persuaded by the argument.

      The Supreme Court long ago held that the constitutional requirement of due

process is distinct from the particular procedural protections a given governmental

entity chooses to provide. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.

532, 541 (1985) (“The right to due process is conferred, not by legislative grace, but

by constitutional guarantee.”) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also, e.g.,

Rivera v. Illinois, 556 U.S. 148, 158 (2009) (“A mere error of state law . . . is not a
                                         11

denial of due process. The Due Process Clause . . . safeguards not the meticulous

observance of state procedural prescriptions, but the fundamental elements of

fairness . . . .”) (brackets, citations, and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus,

even where constitutionally protected property or liberty interests are at stake,

numerous courts have held that a violation of a state or local procedural law

governing notice does not by itself establish a violation of the constitutional

due-process requirement. See, e.g., GEFT Outdoors, LLC v. City of Westfield, 922

F.3d 357, 366 (7th Cir. 2019) (rejecting procedural-due-process claim resting on

argument that city-issued notices did not comply with requirements of state law;

“[T]here is no constitutional procedural due process right to state-mandated

procedures.”); Onyx Props. LLC v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 838 F.3d 1039, 1044 (10th

Cir. 2016) (rejecting procedural-due-process claim resting on failure to hold hearing

with 14-day advance notice as required by state law; “A failure to comply with state

or local procedural requirements does not necessarily constitute a denial of federal

due process; the alleged violation must result in a procedure which itself falls short

of standards derived from the Due Process Clause.”) (internal quotation marks

omitted); Tate v. District of Columbia, 627 F.3d 904, 908 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“That

the District may have . . . violated its own statutory notice requirement does not

mean that it deprived [appellant] of the process due under the Fifth Amendment.

The fact of a state law violation does not resolve whether a plaintiff has been
                                          12

deprived of due process.”) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted); Log

Creek, LLC v. Kessler, 717 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1245 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (failure to

comply with county ordinance requiring notice by certified mail was not

procedural-due-process violation; “The Due Process Clause does not transform

every violation of a state or local procedure into a constitutional violation.”).

      We agree with those holdings. We note that a contrary rule would have

sweeping and surprising consequences. For example, imagine that District law

required notice by registered mail at least six months before a hearing to determine

whether an apparently abandoned building could be demolished. Imagine further

that the District provided a building owner with actual notice in person over six

months before the hearing, that the District also provided notice by registered mail

over five months before the hearing, and that the owner actually appeared and

participated at the hearing. On Belmont’s broadest argument, the District would

have violated the owner’s constitutional procedural-due-process right, even though

the owner would certainly have received ample notice and a full opportunity to be

heard. We see no basis for such a conclusion.

      Belmont cites a number of decisions that Belmont contends stand for the

principle that, where a constitutionally protected property or liberty interest is at
                                          13

stake, violation of a state procedural rule does necessarily establish a constitutional

due-process violation. In our view, none of the cases cited by Belmont stand for that

proposition.   Belmont’s strongest support is from a line of cases including

Associated Estates, LLC v. Caldwell, 779 A.2d 939 (D.C. 2001). In that case, this

court upheld the invalidation of a tax sale on the ground that proper statutory notice

had not been provided. Id. at 941-45. In doing so, the court stated that “[s]trict

compliance [with applicable statutory procedures] is required to guard against the

deprivation of property without due process of law.” Id. at 943 (internal quotation

marks omitted). Pointing out that compliance with local procedures “guard[s]

against” constitutional violations is quite different from holding that a failure to

follow local procedures by itself establishes a federal constitutional violation.

Neither in Associated Estates nor in any of the other cases cited by Belmont did the

court endorse the latter principle.

      For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that Belmont has not established a

constitutional claim simply because the District did not comply with the applicable

statutory provisions. We therefore turn to the question whether the notice provided

by the District comported with the requirements of the Due Process Clause.
                                          14

            2. Method of Notice

      It is undisputed in this court that the District both mailed notice of the NOV

by first-class regular mail and posted the NOV on the building. The trial court

concluded that the combination of mailing and posting met minimum constitutional

due-process requirements. We agree.

      To satisfy procedural due process, “notice must be accomplished by a method

reasonably calculated to afford the party an opportunity to be heard.” Kidd Int’l

Home Care, Inc. v. Prince, 917 A.2d 1083, 1086 (D.C. 2007) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).    Notice is “constitutionally sufficient if it was

reasonably calculated to reach the intended recipient when sent.” Id. (internal

quotation marks and citations omitted).

      “Service by [regular] mail is reasonably calculated to give notice in most

circumstances.” Coleman v. Scheve, 367 A.2d 135, 137 n.1 (D.C. 1976); see Boddie

v. Robinson, 430 A.2d 519, 521 n.4 (D.C. 1981) (“Notice by mail generally satisfies

due process demands.”). Posting notice on the property in conjunction with mailing

“affords an additional measure of notification.” Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank &

Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 316 (1950); see Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444, 455 n.9
                                           15

(1982) (mailing and posting together are “constitutionally preferable” to mailing

alone).

      It is true that Belmont denies having received a copy of the NOV. Belmont

did not introduce evidence to support that denial, but in any event, “[a]dequate

notice, rather than actual notice,” is required by the Due Process Clause. Kidd Int’l,

917 A.2d at 1086 (internal quotation marks omitted).

      Belmont relies on a federal decision holding that, “[b]ased upon the peculiar

facts” of the case, attempted service by first-class regular mail was not

constitutionally adequate. Miles v. District of Columbia, , 585 (D.D.C. 1973), aff’d,

510 F.2d 188 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Miles does not aid Belmont for two reasons. First,

in this case there was service not only by first-class mail but also by posting on the

property at issue. Second, the facts in Miles are quite removed from those of the

present case. In Miles, over seven years passed between the provision of notice and

the razing of the building at issue, and during that period the District and the property

owner had engaged in negotiations and the property owner had arranged for

financing to repair the property. Miles v. District of Columbia, 510 F.2d 188, 192 &

n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
                                          16

      In sum, we uphold the trial court’s ruling that the method of service in this

case met the requirements of the Due Process Clause.

             3. Content and Timing of Notice

      The trial court initially concluded that the content and timing of the NOV were

constitutionally deficient, because (1) the NOV did not inform Belmont that the

District could summarily raze the building if Belmont did not correct the violations,

instead indicating that Belmont could apply for a raze permit; and (2) the NOV was

issued before the District had made a final decision to demolish the building. The

trial court subsequently stated that the NOV did put Belmont on notice that the

District might take summary action, but was “ambiguous” as to whether the District

would provide additional notice before the District razed the building. We hold to

the contrary that the content and timing of the NOV in this case satisfied the

requirements of procedural due process.

      We note a threshold point. The District argued that this court could properly

affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment on the alternative ground that not

only the manner but also the content and timing of the notice were constitutionally

adequate. That purely legal issue was fully briefed in the trial court, and the trial
                                         17

court explicitly decided the issue favorably to Belmont. After the District challenged

that ruling in its brief on appeal, Belmont had the opportunity to respond to that

argument in its reply brief but failed to do so. We need not address whether

Belmont’s failure to respond in the reply brief to the District’s argument could

appropriately be treated as a forfeiture or concession. Compare Frankel v. D.C. Off.

for Plan. & Econ. Dev., 110 A.3d 553, 559 n.11 (D.C. 2015) (court was not aware

of case law or court rule “suggesting that a party waives an issue by choosing not to

address it in a reply brief”), with Classic CAB v. D.C. Dep’t of For-Hire Vehicles,

244 A.3d 703, 707 (D.C. 2021) (petitioner “effectively conceded” issue by failing to

respond in reply brief to argument raised in respondent’s brief) (internal quotation

marks omitted). In any event, given the circumstances, we see no procedural

unfairness to Belmont in affirming on the alternative ground advocated by the

District. Cf., e.g., Fadero v. United States, 180 A.3d 1068, 1072 n.3 (D.C. 2018)

(no procedural unfairness in affirming on ground not relied upon by trial court,

where argument was made in appellee’s brief and appellant could have responded to

argument in reply brief but did not).

      The NOV indicated that the building was unsafe and cited statutory and

regulatory provisions providing that the District had the authority to itself raze the

building if the dangerous conditions were not corrected within 15 days. That
                                          18

language was sufficiently specific to put Belmont on notice that, if it did not correct

the dangerous condition of the building within the specified time, the District might

raze the building at any time.

      We further conclude that the NOV did not state or imply that the District

would necessarily provide further notice before razing the structure. Rather, the

notice indicated that if the cited violations were not corrected within 15 days, the

notice would be “forwarded to the Office of Compliance for enforcement action.”

The notice further stated that “[i]f DCRA determines that you have failed to correct

or abate the violation [after DCRA’s re-inspection], this matter will be referred for

correction under the authority of [D.C. Code] § 42-3131.01(a) (2003).”             That

language did not state or imply that there would be further notification before razing

if Belmont did not take action to correct the cited violations within the specified time

period. To the contrary, the citation to D.C. Code § 42-3131.01(a) made clear that

the District was asserting the authority to itself “[c]ause such condition to be

corrected” and to be compensated by the owner. D.C. Code § 42-3131.01(a)(1)

(2009). We conclude that the NOV gave adequate notice to Belmont of the possible

razing of the building. See, e.g., Keystone Comm. Props., Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh,

347 A.2d 707, 710 (Pa. 1975) (“The purpose of notice here is not to inform the

property owner of the exact or even approximate time of demolition,” but rather to
                                          19

provide owner with opportunity for a hearing “in which to litigate the question of

whether property is actually a danger to public safety” and to provide “reasonable

time in which to make repairs . . . to eliminate the dangerous condition.”).

      The NOV also contained detailed information about Belmont’s right to

request a hearing to challenge the required corrections, adequately informing

Belmont of its right to be heard before any deprivation. See Taylor v. District of

Columbia, 606 F. Supp. 2d 93, 96 (D.D.C. 2009) (plaintiff failed to state due-process

claim where plaintiff received notice expressly indicating plaintiff’s right to hearing

and advising plaintiff how to request hearing).

      It is true that about three months passed between the issuance of the NOV and

the razing of the building. We see no reason, however, to view that interval as giving

rise to a constitutional violation. First, there is no evidence in this case that the

District lulled Belmont into reasonably believing that the risk of action against the

building had passed. This case therefore does not raise the concern reflected in

Miller v. District of Columbia, 587 A.2d 213, 214 & n.4, 221-22 (D.C. 1991)

(constitutional due process might require District to provide second notice of intent

to raze building where first notice was followed by eighteen months of negotiations

in which agency told property owner to “keep [agency] abreast” of any work begun).
                                         20

There appears to be no evidence in the record that Belmont had been in negotiations

with the District during the period between when the NOV was issued in late March

and when the building was demolished in early July. In fact, the District presented

evidence that Belmont’s owner failed to respond to the District’s attempts to

communicate during that time period, and Belmont has not pointed to any evidence

in the record to the contrary.

      In addition, there appears to be no evidence in the record that Belmont

independently attempted to make improvements to the safety of the building or

began to undertake the required corrections during the period after the NOV was

issued and before the building was razed. Cf. Miles, 510 F.2d at 192 (concluding

that due process required District to provide new notice before demolishing

buildings, where property owner had “attempted to restore the buildings by obtaining

substantial financing after receiving several extensions of time from the [agency]”).

      Nor was the intervening time period so long that the Due Process Clause

would require a second notice. Approximately three months elapsed between

issuance of the NOV and the razing of the building. Cf., e.g., Miles, 510 F.2d at 192

& n.3 (over seven years passed between issuance of initial condemnation order and

razing of building).
                                          21

      Nor, finally, did the Due Process Clause require the District to provide further

notice after the District made a definite decision to raze the building. Rather, we

hold that it was constitutionally sufficient for the District to advise Belmont that the

building was unsafe, that the District claimed the authority to fix the problem itself

if Belmont did not in a timely fashion, and that Belmont had a right to be heard at a

hearing. In sum, we hold that the NOV was “reasonably calculated, under all the

circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford

them an opportunity to present their objections.” Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.

                             C. Takings Clause Claim

      Belmont argues that the District’s razing of Belmont’s building violated the

Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. The District responds that that issue is not

properly before this court, because Belmont belatedly attempted to raise a Takings

Clause claim in the trial court and then abandoned that claim. Belmont has not

contested the District’s argument on that point. The trial court concluded that

although Belmont had at some earlier points appeared to raise a Takings Clause

claim, Belmont subsequently failed to preserve that claim by failing to raise it in
                                          22

later filings and by indicating at a pretrial conference that its only claim was related

to procedural due process.

      We ordinarily do not decide issues that were not properly presented to the trial

court, except in “exceptional situations and when necessary to prevent a clear

miscarriage of justice apparent from the record.” Linen v. Lanford, 945 A.2d 1173,

1180 n.4 (D.C. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).             We see no such

exceptional circumstances in this case. We therefore conclude, as the trial court did,

that the Takings Clause claim was not properly preserved for our review, and we

decline to consider that claim.

      For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed.

                                                            So ordered.