Court Opinion

ID: 9371474
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 16:02:18.243015+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:27.747017
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
  UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                  AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                     IN THE
              ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                 DIVISION ONE

                               In re the Matter of:

                  BRANDY TOMSICH, Petitioner/Appellant,

                                         v.

                    JOHN TOMSICH, Respondent/Appellee.

                            No. 1 CA-CV 22-0314 FC
                                FILED 2-16-2023

            Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                           No. FN2020-097762
                The Honorable David E. McDowell, Judge

                       VACATED AND REMANDED

                                    COUNSEL

The Hogle Firm PLC, Mesa
By Nathan J. Hogle
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellant

Rowley Law Group PLLC, Mesa
By Scott R. Rowley
Counsel for Respondent/Appellee
                          TOMSICH v. TOMSICH
                           Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which
Presiding Judge Brian Y. Furuya and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

C A T T A N I, Judge:

¶1            Brandy Tomsich (“Wife”) appeals from the superior court’s
award of attorney’s fees in favor of John Tomsich (“Husband”) in this
dissolution case. For reasons that follow, we vacate the award and remand
for reconsideration.

             FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶2             Husband and Wife were married in 2014. Husband was in
the military at the beginning of the marriage and continued his career as an
air traffic controller after leaving the service. Wife had started nursing
school at the time of marriage but deferred her education for two years to
accommodate Husband’s posting abroad. Wife ultimately completed
nursing school after returning to the U.S., paid for in part with Husband’s
G.I. Bill benefits.

¶3            Wife filed and served her petition for dissolution of marriage
in December 2020. She declined Husband’s March 2021 settlement offer,
which would have assigned Husband his entire retirement account (valued
at over $93,000 and earned entirely during the marriage) and granted no
spousal maintenance. The parties ultimately reported that they had
reached informal agreements on the division of community property and
debts, and the court set trial on Wife’s request for spousal maintenance of
$1,500 per month for 3 years.

¶4            At the beginning of trial, the parties recited the terms of a
property settlement agreement on the record. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P.
(“Rule”) 69(a)(2). They agreed that Wife would receive $37,720 and
Husband $30,113.23 (in effect, an equalization payment of just over $3,800
from Husband to Wife) from proceeds from the sale of the marital home.
As described by Husband’s counsel, the agreement accounted for funds
from the sale of the house, the parties’ 2020 tax refund, the parties’ vehicles
with associated debt, and community credit card debt. The stated
agreement did not mention or otherwise account for the single largest

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community asset—Husband’s retirement account—even though both
parties’ pretrial statements requested the account be divided equally by
QDRO. Nevertheless, the parties agreed on the record that each would
keep the personal property in their possession, and the court approved the
agreement as fair and equitable.

¶5            After trial, the court denied Wife’s request for spousal
maintenance, finding that Wife did not meet any of the five qualifying
criteria under A.R.S. § 25-319(A). The court also awarded Husband a
portion of his attorney’s fees under A.R.S. § 25-324(A), finding no
substantial disparity of financial resources between the parties and that
Wife had acted unreasonably in several regards during the litigation:

      [1] [Wife] did not fully participate in discovery and did not
      disclose her rental costs until the eve of trial;

      [2] [Wife] understated her income;

      [3] [Wife’s] position regarding spousal maintenance was not
      supported by Arizona law and there was no evidence that she
      made a substantial contribution to [Husband’s] career or
      earning capacity or that she lacked the ability to be self
      sufficient. Arizona law awards spousal maintenance to
      promote self sufficiency and [Wife] already had the ability to
      be self sufficient based on her earnings and reasonable
      expenses[; and]

      [4] [Wife] did not engage in settlement efforts in a timely
      fashion as the settlement offer made in March 2021 was
      substantially similar to that agreed upon [at trial].

The court entered judgment awarding Husband just over $9,000 in
attorney’s fees, and Wife timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
A.R.S. § 12-2101(A).

                              DISCUSSION

I.    Award of Attorney’s Fees Under A.R.S. § 25-324(A).

¶6            Wife’s appeal challenges only the award of attorney’s fees in
favor of Husband; she does not otherwise contest the dissolution decree.
The superior court is authorized to award reasonable attorney’s fees to a
party to dissolution proceedings “after considering the financial resources
of both parties and the reasonableness of the positions each party has taken

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throughout the proceedings.” A.R.S. § 25-324(A). We review such an
award for an abuse of discretion. Murray v. Murray, 239 Ariz. 174, 179, ¶ 20
(App. 2016). The award is subject to reversal, however, if the record does
not adequately support it or if it is grounded in an error of law. See Breitbart-
Napp v. Napp, 216 Ariz. 74, 84, ¶ 39 (App. 2007); In re Marriage of Williams,
219 Ariz. 546, 548, ¶ 8 (App. 2008).

¶7            Here, although the record supports some facets of the
superior court’s ruling, certain factual anomalies—including those related
to the disposition of Husband’s retirement account—undermine other
considerations as to the parties’ financial resources and the reasonableness
of Wife’s positions. We thus vacate the award and remand for the superior
court’s reconsideration.

       A.     Parties’ Financial Resources.

¶8             The superior court’s first consideration in determining a fee
award in this context is the “financial resources of both parties.” A.R.S. §
25-324(A). This involves a comparative assessment of the “relative financial
disparity in income and/or assets” between the spouses, including each
party’s ability to pay their own (and the other’s) fees and “other similar
matters.” Magee v. Magee, 206 Ariz. 589, 589, 592–93, ¶¶ 1, 17–18 (App.
2004).

¶9            Here, the superior court found “no substantial disparity of
financial resources between the parties.” Wife challenges this finding based
on the parties’ respective incomes, arguing that undisputed evidence
showed that she earned only about half as much as Husband. The record
shows that, even at Wife’s higher pay rate for working nightshifts, her
annual gross income totaled around $60,000, whereas Husband’s yearly
income exceeded $110,000.

¶10            Husband asserts that despite the difference in gross incomes,
the parties’ disposable incomes after expenses were roughly equal. Although
the appellate record is not entirely clear, Husband’s AFI showed that his
total monthly income exceeded expenses by over $4,000. In contrast, Wife
testified that (before adding potential future housing expenses) her
disposable income was only around $1,100.

¶11            We note that, anomalously, the record on appeal does not
include Wife’s AFI, which should have clearly stated her monthly income
and expenses. Although the court admitted Wife’s AFI as Exhibit 32, the
exhibit filed in the record was a copy of Husband’s AFI instead. While the
court also heard testimony about Wife’s income and expenses, the misfiled

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exhibit may have influenced its assessment of the parties’ respective
financial resources.

¶12           As to other assets, Husband notes that Wife received several
thousand dollars more in cash from the property settlement. But neither
Husband nor the court acknowledged that Husband retained his retirement
account in its entirety—the single most valuable community asset, worth
over $93,000 at the time of service.

¶13           Given the considerable disparity of gross income, along with
a misfiled exhibit that potentially misled the court as to Wife’s disposable
income, and omission of at least one substantial asset retained by Husband,
the record as it currently stands does not support the court’s finding of no
significant disparity of financial resources. Cf. Breitbart-Napp, 216 Ariz. at
84, ¶ 39.

       B.     Reasonableness of Wife’s Positions.

¶14           The court’s second consideration in awarding fees is the
objective “reasonableness of the positions each party has taken throughout
the proceedings.” A.R.S. § 25-324(A); Williams, 219 Ariz. at 548, ¶ 10. Here,
the court cited four unreasonable positions taken by Wife. Although the
record supports the court’s assessment of two of the four, the factual
anomaly regarding the disposition of Husband’s retirement account
undermines the court’s finding of unreasonableness as to Wife’s settlement
efforts and her request for spousal maintenance.

              1.     Settlement Efforts.

¶15           The superior court found Wife had unreasonably failed to
timely engage in settlement efforts, citing substantial similarity between the
offer Husband made in March 2021 and the Rule 69 agreement ultimately
entered in December 2021. Wife contests this characterization, asserting
that Husband’s initial offer unreasonably declined to split the value of his
retirement account, and that the approximately $3,800 equalization
payment in the December agreement was a major concession, ostensibly
reflecting her share of that account.

¶16           Objectively, the terms expressly accounted for in the Rule 69
agreement were substantially similar to those Husband had offered the
previous March. Both provided for an equal split of proceeds from the sale
of the marital home and an equal division of the parties’ 2020 tax refund.
Both likewise assigned the parties their respective vehicles. Although the
final agreement (unlike the initial offer) granted Wife over $4,000 for her

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share of the equity in Husband’s motorcycles, that amount was largely
offset by an equal division of approximately $6,000 in community credit
card debt that Husband had initially offered to assume.

¶17           But the parties’ intended disposition of Husband’s retirement
account—the single most valuable community asset—seems to have shifted
over time. Husband’s initial proposal would have granted him the entirety
of his retirement account, valued at over $93,000 and earned entirely during
the marriage, without any equalization or offset. By the time of trial, in
contrast, Husband (as well as Wife) took the position that Husband’s
retirement account should be split evenly by QDRO.

¶18           The agreement read into the record did not expressly
reference or otherwise account for Husband’s retirement account. Wife
now argues that the equalization payment in the ultimate agreement
divided the value of that account. It did not. That payment accounted for
the division of the marital residence, the parties’ vehicles, their tax refund,
and community credit card debt—but not Husband’s retirement account.
Husband, on the other hand, now argues that he “never changed his
position that each party would keep their own retirement accounts without
offset to each other.” That, too, is false. He had changed his position at
least two months before trial, and his pretrial statement asked for equal
division of his retirement account by QDRO, which he listed as an
uncontested issue.

¶19            Nevertheless, the parties’ agreement on the record that each
would keep any other personal property in their possession arguably
assigned Husband that account—consistent with Husband’s initial
position. But there is no explanation for the parties’ omission of any express
provision accounting for this substantial asset, and the record is not at all
clear whether the superior court would or could have found the agreement
fair and equitable if it knew of the omission. See A.R.S. § 25-317(B); see also
Hutki v. Hutki, 244 Ariz. 39, 44–45, ¶¶ 29–30, 32 (App. 2018) (superior court
must independently determine whether the parties’ proposed property
settlement is fair and equitable); cf. Buckholtz v. Buckholtz, 246 Ariz. 126, 130–
31, ¶¶ 12, 16 (App. 2019) (court must have adequate record basis to assess
fairness).

¶20          To be clear, the fairness of the Rule 69 agreement itself is not
at issue on appeal. But the superior court’s awareness of the omitted
asset—and especially the fact that Husband had reversed his settlement
position as to this asset after his initial offer—could have a substantial

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                          TOMSICH v. TOMSICH
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bearing on its assessment of Wife’s reasonableness for purposes of the
attorney’s fees award.

              2.     Request for Spousal Maintenance.

¶21           The superior court found that Wife’s request for spousal
maintenance “was not supported by Arizona law,” citing a lack of evidence
of significant contributions to Husband’s career or inability to be self-
sufficient—and specifically finding to the contrary that Wife’s earnings and
expenses showed present self-sufficiency. See Schroeder v. Schroeder, 161
Ariz. 316, 321 (1989) (noting that the “aim [of spousal maintenance] is to
achieve independence for both parties”). Highlighting the fact-intensive
inquiry at issue, Wife urges that her request was not objectively
unreasonable, even if it was within the court’s discretion to deny it.

¶22            Wife’s reticence to timely provide basic income and expense
information—and her conflation of gross and net income—undermined the
viability of her earnings-based request. See infra ¶¶ 25–26; see also A.R.S. §
25-319(A)(2). But the court did not consider the imbalance created by
awarding Husband his retirement account without offset when assessing
whether Wife had or received sufficient property to meet her needs. See
supra ¶ 12; see also A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(1). Similarly, a delay in professional
education for the benefit of the other spouse can support eligibility for
spousal maintenance if it results in a significant reduction in career
opportunities. See A.R.S. § 25-319(A)(4). Although Wife deferred nursing
school for only two years and had completed her education (with
Husband’s financial support) by the end of the marriage, even a two-year
delay could plausibly support a modest, short-duration award. Even if
ultimately unsuccessful, Wife’s request for spousal maintenance was not
entirely inconsistent with Arizona law.

¶23           To be sure, the superior court could likewise consider that
Wife never provided evidence to show whether or how the deferral of her
education affected her career or earnings. And Wife never provided any
reasonable basis for the amount ($1,500 per month) and duration (3 years)
of her request. On remand, the superior court retains the discretion to
consider the reasonableness of Wife’s positions in support of her request for
spousal maintenance, even though the fact of the request was not itself
unreasonable.

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                         TOMSICH v. TOMSICH
                          Decision of the Court

             3.     Other Unreasonable Positions.

¶24           To limit the scope of the litigation on remand, we note that
the record supports the court’s other findings regarding the reasonableness
of Wife’s positions during the proceedings.

¶25            First, the court found that Wife had unreasonably failed to
“fully participate in discovery” and to “disclose her rental costs until the
eve of trial.” Wife asserts that because she did not have any current rental
expenses while living with her parents, Rule 49 did not require her to
disclose potential future rental expenses. But Rule 49 requires disclosure of
an AFI if spousal maintenance is requested, and an AFI includes housing
expenses—and permits a party to list “anticipated expenses.” Rule 49(f)(1);
Rule 97, Form 2. To the extent Wife intended to rely on anticipated rental
expenses to support her claim for spousal maintenance, the record supports
the superior court’s conclusion that she acted unreasonably by failing to
timely update her disclosures or otherwise ensure Husband was fairly
informed of the basis for her claim. See Rule 49(a)(1), (b)(2)(A). Moreover,
Wife’s deposition was replete with uninformative or evasive answers,
especially those related to her income or expenses. Accordingly, the
superior court had ample basis to fault Wife for her disclosure and
discovery conduct.

¶26             Second, the court found that Wife had “understated her
income.” Wife contends that she accurately reported her income based on
her rate of pay, but that confusion arose because her paychecks varied due
to overtime pay or shift differentials for nightshift. Although Wife’s AFI
does not appear in the record, see supra ¶ 11, Wife’s pretrial statement
claimed monthly income of only $3,100, far less than the gross income
reflected on her contemporaneous pay stubs. Although $3,100 per month
appears roughly accurate for Wife’s net pay, the statement (without
clarification) created at least a misleading impression as to her income. The
court did not err by finding this to be unreasonable.

II.   Attorney’s Fees on Appeal.

¶27          Husband requests an award of attorney’s fees on appeal
under A.R.S. § 25-324, and he asks that we impose fees as a sanction under
ARCAP 25 for Wife’s filing of what he characterizes as a frivolous appeal.
Considering the relevant statutory factors and our ruling, we deny his
request.

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                         TOMSICH v. TOMSICH
                          Decision of the Court

                              CONCLUSION

¶28           For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the award of attorney’s
fees in favor of Husband and remand for reconsideration. Our decision
does not limit the superior court’s discretion on remand to grant (or deny)
attorney’s fees based on its independent assessment of the statutory factors
after accounting for the anomalies described above.

                        AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                        FILED: AA

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