Court Opinion

ID: 9796281
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:54:14.272735+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:49:40.537544
License: Public Domain

Hardesty, J.,
dissenting:
The majority improperly compares two independent legal concepts within NRS Chapter 41A, one a jurisdictional requirement and the other a rule of evidence, to circumvent the clear and unambiguous filing requirements that provide a district court with jurisdiction over a medical malpractice case. The affidavit requirement of NRS 41A.071 is jurisdictional in nature, intended to prevent frivolous lawsuits and ensure that medical malpractice cases are filed in good faith based on competent expert opinion.1 NRS 41 A. 100, Nevada’s limited codification of res ipsa loquitor, is a rule of evidence creating the rebuttable presumption that a defendant is negligent in medical malpractice cases.
Szydel’s malpractice action focuses on the retained foreign object provisions of NRS 41A. 100. Although retained foreign object cases frequently demonstrate clear examples of medical malpractice, that is not always the case. Szydel initially filed a complaint with the medical-legal screening panel, claiming that medical malpractice occurred based on the temporary retention of a needle during a bilateral mastopexy. The retained needle was removed before postoperative recuperation. The panel dismissed her claim without prejudice because she failed to procure an expert opinion stating that negligence occurred. After Szydel’s case was dismissed by the medical-legal screening panel, Szydel filed a complaint in district court under NRS 41A. 100. Again, however, Szydel failed to provide an expert opinion after the district court gave her several extensions of time to do so. Without an expert opinion, the district court dismissed the case. Szydel conceded that she was never able to procure an expert opinion to meet the requirements of the medical-legal screening panel or NRS 41A.071. In spite of Szydel’s futile efforts to *462procure an expert opinion, the majority breathes new life into a case that lacks merit and was properly dismissed under NRS 41A.071.
General rules of statutory construction apply in this instance. It is well-established that the language of a statute should be given its plain meaning unless, in so doing, the spirit of the act is violated.2 “Thus, when ‘a statute is clear on its face, a court may not go beyond the language of the statute in determining the legislature’s intent.’”3 An ambiguous statute, however, which “‘is capable of being understood in two or more senses by reasonably informed persons,’ ” or one that otherwise does not speak to the issue before the court, may be examined through reason and consideration of public policy to determine the legislature’s intent.4 ‘ ‘ ‘The meaning of the words used may be determined by examining the context and the spirit of the law or the causes which induced the legislature to enact it.’ ”5 In addition, “when the legislature enacts a statute, this court presumes that it does so ‘with full knowledge of existing statutes relating to the same subject.’ ”6 Further, “when separate statutes are potentially conflicting, [this court] attempt[s] to construe both statutes in a manner to avoid conflict and promote harmony.”7
NRS 41A.071 is clear and unambiguous, providing that “the district court shall dismiss the action, without prejudice, if the action is filed without an affidavit.” The plain meaning of the statute clearly intends to prevent fraudulent claims from being filed. Generally, in res ipsa loquitor cases involving retained foreign objects, the affidavit requirement of NRS 41A.071 should be relatively easy to satisfy; however, if the affidavit requirement is not met, the case must be dismissed under NRS 41A.071.
My colleagues reach a conclusion that NRS 41A.071 and NRS 41 A. 100, when read together, conflict because NRS 41 A. 100(1) permits a jury to infer negligence without any expert testimony at trial, whereas NRS 41A.071 requires dismissal whenever the expert affidavit requirement is not met.
*463The affidavit requirement is not susceptible to two meanings, and it cannot be read to say that the need for an affidavit in a res ipsa case has been excused or not addressed by our Legislature. An affidavit is required in all cases.
The plain meaning of both statutes is not in conflict and can be harmonized. NRS 41A.071 is a procedural rule that requires a sworn affidavit from a medical professional before the district court may entertain a medical malpractice claim. Once a party has met that initial requirement, the district court must later determine during trial whether, as a matter of law, the res ipsa loquitor rule in NRS 41A.100 applies, which allows the plaintiff to proceed to the jury without producing expert testimony regarding negligence and causation on the part of the defendant.
Without applying the affidavit requirement of NRS 41A.071 to res ipsa loquitor cases, even the most frivolous of res ipsa claims could be brought to district court. Further, the purpose behind NRS 41A.071, to reduce frivolous lawsuits that have “some vague hope that a favorable expert opinion might eventually surface,”8 would be thwarted. It is unlikely that the Legislature intended cases to be excluded from a review for frivolity under NRS 41A.071. Instead, the Legislature more likely intended that a party bringing a res ipsa case would establish, through a medical expert opinion, that the party’s case is not frivolous, regardless of whether the party would produce expert opinion evidence later in trial. The approach taken by the majority runs contrary to the goals of NRS 41A.071 because, by the time a decision is made on whether a party is entitled to the res ipsa instruction, a substantial amount of time, energy, and money in discovery and trial is expended.
The majority suggests a remedy if an expert opinion is not required with the complaint filing and the res ipsa loquitor instruction is later denied. They conclude that the case must be dismissed. Nothing in the statutory structure of NRS Chapter 41A provides for such a procedure or dismissal. The better approach is to require the medical affidavit initially, even if a party does not intend to rely later on expert testimony at trial.
For these reasons, I would affirm the dismissal by the district court.

 See Borger v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 1021, 1029, 102 P.3d 600, 606 (2004).

 University Sys. v. Nevadans for Sound Gov’t, 120 Nev. 712, 731, 100 P.3d 179, 193 (2004).

 Id. (quoting McKay v. Bd. of Supervisors, 102 Nev. 644, 648, 730 P.2d 438, 441 (1986)).

 Id. (quoting McKay, 102 Nev. at 649, 730 P.2d at 442); Clark County v. Sun State Properties, 119 Nev. 329, 334, 72 P.3d 954, 957 (2003).

 University Sys., 120 Nev. at 731, 100 P.3d at 193 (quoting McKay, 102 Nev. at 650-51, 730 P.2d at 443).

 State, Div. of Insurance v. State Farm, 116 Nev. 290, 295, 995 P.2d 482, 486 (2000) (quoting City of Boulder v. General Sales Drivers, 101 Nev. 117, 118-19, 694 P.2d 498, 500 (1985)).

 Beazer Homes Nevada, Inc. v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 575, 587, 97 P.3d 1132, 1140 (2004).

 Borger, 120 Nev. at 1029, 102 P.3d at 606.