Court Opinion

ID: 9395542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-18 15:00:29.043432+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:09.375458
License: Public Domain

22-562
   United States v. Elmowsky

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                           SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT.
CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS
PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE
FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION
“SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A
COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
   held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the
   City of New York, on the 18th day of May, two thousand twenty-three.

   PRESENT:

              SUSAN L. CARNEY,
              RICHARD J. SULLIVAN,
              EUNICE C. LEE,
                    Circuit Judges.
   _________________________________________

   UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                               Appellee,

                     v.                                            No. 22-562

   PAUL ELMOWSKY,

                    Defendant-Appellant.
   __________________________________________
For Defendant-Appellant:                     MICHAEL K. BURKE, Hodges Walsh &
                                             Burke, LLP, White Plains, NY.

For Appellee:                                JEFFREY C. COFFMAN (James F.
                                             McMahon, David Abramowicz, on the
                                             brief), Assistant United States Attorneys,
                                             for Damian Williams, United States
                                             Attorney for the Southern District of
                                             New York, New York, NY.

      Appeal from a judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern

District of New York (Nelson S. Román, Judge).

      UPON      DUE     CONSIDERATION,             IT   IS   HEREBY       ORDERED,

ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the judgment of the district court is

AFFIRMED.

      Paul Elmowsky appeals from his judgment of conviction following a jury

trial in which he was found guilty of possessing an unregistered short-barreled

rifle (the “Uzi”), in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845(a)(4) and 5861(d). The district

court thereafter sentenced Elmowsky to a term of three months’ imprisonment, to

be followed by two years’ supervised release, the first nine months of which would

be served on home detention. On appeal, Elmowsky raises four challenges to his

conviction, which we address in turn. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts, procedural history, and issues on appeal.

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       First, Elmowsky contends that his prosecution was time-barred, asserting

that the three-year limitations period prescribed by 26 U.S.C. § 6531 began to run

when the Uzi was transferred to him in September 1991, thus expiring decades

before he was indicted on November 9, 2020. We disagree. We review a district

court’s application of a statute of limitations de novo. See United States v. Sampson,

898 F.3d 270, 276 (2d Cir. 2018). Limitations periods “normally begin to run when

a crime is complete,” and for offenses that “involve[] a prolonged course of

conduct,” this means when the “conduct has run its course.” United States v.

Eppolito, 543 F.3d 25, 46 (2d Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Because section 5861 makes it unlawful “to receive or possess a firearm which is not

registered,” 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) (emphasis added), it is a continuing offense that

“ceases only when the possession stops,” United States v. Estevez, 961 F.3d 519, 528

(2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the three-year limitations

period did not commence when Elmowsky received the Uzi in September 1991,

but rather when Elmowsky’s possession of it ended on December 31, 2018. As a

result, Elmowsky’s 2020 indictment was clearly timely. 1

1 Although Elmowsky relies extensively on the Tenth Circuit’s vintage decision in Waters v.
United States, 328 F.2d 739, 740–44 (10th Cir. 1964), that case is not to the contrary, as there the
information was filed more than three years after the date of the alleged illegal possession.

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      Second, Elmowsky argues that a new trial is warranted because the

government violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United

States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972), by failing to timely disclose a certain Bureau of Alcohol,

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (“ATF”) form, known as ATF Form 4473, which

documents firearm transfers. Elmowsky does not dispute that the government

produced before trial an ATF Form 4473 documenting the 1991 transfer of the Uzi

from a federally licensed firearms dealer to Elmowsky (the “Uzi 4473”).            He

nonetheless asserts that the government suppressed until trial an ATF Form 4473

documenting the transfer of a different gun from the same dealer to a different

customer (the “Glock 4473”), a transfer that just happened to bear the same

transaction number as the Uzi 4473.           Having “conduct[ed] an independent

examination of the record,” United States v. Zagari, 111 F.3d 307, 320 (2d Cir. 1997),

we conclude that the government’s late disclosure of the Glock 4473 did not

constitute a Brady or Giglio violation.

      To establish such a violation, “a defendant must show that:              (1) the

[g]overnment, either willfully or inadvertently, suppressed evidence; (2) the

evidence at issue is favorable to the defendant; and (3) the failure to disclose this

evidence resulted in prejudice.” United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132, 140 (2d Cir.

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2001). Even assuming that the government suppressed the Glock 4473 for some

period of time, Elmowsky cannot explain how the document was favorable to

him – either as exculpatory evidence or as a basis for impeaching the ATF witness.

Nor has Elmowsky explained how the trial’s outcome would have been any

different had the document been disclosed prior to, rather than during, trial. See

id. at 141–42 (“[W]e have never interpreted due process of law as requiring more

than that Brady material must be disclosed in time for its effective use at trial.”);

see also Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 (1999) (noting that nondisclosure will

result in a new trial only if the evidence was material, meaning there is “a

reasonable probability that the suppressed evidence would have produced a

different verdict”).

      Third, Elmowsky asserts that there was insufficient evidence to prove the

knowledge element of the charged offense. Again, we disagree. A defendant

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence faces an “exceedingly deferential

standard of review.” United States v. Hassan, 578 F.3d 108, 126 (2d Cir. 2008). A

reviewing court must view the evidence “in its totality,” United States v. Cassese,

428 F.3d 92, 98–99 (2d Cir. 2005), drawing “[a]ll permissible inferences . . . in the

government’s favor,” United States v. Guadagna, 183 F.3d 122, 129 (2d Cir. 1999), to

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“determine whether . . . a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt,” United States v. Autuori, 212 F.3d 105, 114 (2d Cir. 2000) (internal

quotation marks omitted). Applying that standard here, we are confident that

ample evidence supported the jury’s finding that Elmowsky satisfied section

5861(d)’s knowledge requirement.

      To be convicted under section 5861(d), Elmowsky must have “kn[own] of

the characteristics of his weapon that made it a ‘firearm’” as statutorily defined.

Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 604 (1994); see also 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(4)

(defining a “firearm” to include “a weapon made from a rifle if such weapon as

modified has an overall length of less than 26 inches or a barrel or barrels of less

than 16 inches in length”); id. § 5845(c) (defining rifle).         The government

presented more than sufficient evidence on this score, including testimony and

exhibits demonstrating that (1) the Uzi’s total length was approximately twenty-

four inches and its barrel was approximately eight inches, see App’x at 137, 377;

(2) the Uzi was engraved with the word “carbine,” which refers to a type of rifle,

and was cut down from a factory barrel length of more than sixteen inches, id. at

130, 394–400; (3) Elmowsky owned the Uzi for almost three decades, id. at 318, 640;

and (4) Elmowsky was admittedly very familiar with federal firearm statutes, id.

                                          6
at 317.   Considering the evidence in its totality and drawing all reasonable

inferences in the government’s favor, we have no basis to disturb the jury’s verdict

for insufficiency of evidence.

      Fourth, and finally, Elmowsky contends that the district court erred when it

refused to instruct the jury that he could not be convicted if he believed in good

faith that the Uzi was not a firearm as defined by 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a)(4). We

review a challenge to the district court’s jury instructions de novo. See United

States v. Naiman, 211 F.3d 40, 50–51 (2d Cir. 2000). When a defendant claims that

the district court misled the jury by omitting an instruction that he requested, the

defendant must demonstrate that (1) he requested a charge that “accurately

represented the law in every respect,” and (2) the charge delivered instead was

both (i) “erroneous” and (ii) “prejudicial.” United States v. Roy, 783 F.3d 418, 420

(2d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).       Simply put, Elmowsky’s

requested charge did not accurately reflect the law, since even a good-faith belief

that the Uzi did not need to be registered is not a defense to the general-intent

crime embodied in section 5861(d). See Staples, 511 U.S. at 604, 609, 619 (requiring

only knowledge of the characteristics of one’s weapon that make it a firearm as

defined by section 5845(a)(4)); id. at 622 n.3 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (“The mens

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rea presumption requires knowledge only of the facts that make the defendant’s

conduct illegal, lest it conflict with the related presumption . . . that, ordinarily,

ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense to criminal prosecution”

(internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Champegnie, 925 F.2d 54, 55 (2d

Cir. 1991) (holding that “good faith or mistaken belief” was not a defense to a

general-intent crime where “[t]he statute contain[ed] no language requiring proof

of a particular mental state”); see also App’x at 612–13 (district court so instructing

the jury).

      We have considered Elmowsky’s remaining arguments and find them to be

without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

                                        FOR THE COURT:
                                        Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

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