Court Opinion

ID: 9586498
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:12:08.44056+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:41.241036
License: Public Domain

Brailsford, Justice
(dissenting).
I reluctantly find myself in disagreement with'the majority opinion and will undertake to state my reasons therefor.
The majority opinion correctly holds that the first paragraph of Section 46-423 applies to “through highways” while the second paragraph applies to “stop intersections.” However, the real question is not whether the trial judge failed to read the applicable portion of the statute to the jury. The question is whether the jury was correctly instructed as to appellant’s duties on reaching the intersection. A comparison of the two paragraphs shows that the second imposes the same duties on the entering motorist at a stop intersection as are imposed on him at a through highway by the first paragraph and in substantially the same language. He must stop in obedience to a stop sign (present here) and yield the right of way “to vehicles which are within the intersection or approaching so closely as to constitute an immediate hazard, but then may proceed.” The majority opinion apparently concedes the adequacy of the second paragraph to state the duties of the entering motorist. Error is predicated on the omission from this paragraph of a statement of the corresponding duty of a motorist on the through highway, which is expressed in the first paragraph. After the entering motorist has stopped and yielded, he may proceed and “the driver [s] of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on such through highway shall yield the right of way * * Obviously this statutory duty, which was omitted from the instructions, does not arise until the entering motorist has obeyed the mandate to stop and yield, *470which the verdict of the jury establishes that appellant failed to do. Therefore, under the facts found by the jury, the corresponding duty of the motorist on the through highway never arose and an instruction on it could not have been helpful to appellant.
Turning now to the exception relating to the charge as to speed restrictions. The intersection in question is in a posted 35 mile per hour speed zone. This fact was put before the jury by oral testimony, a plat and pictures. Either inadvertently or upon the reasonable assumption that the significance of the speed zone would not escape the jury, the trial judge read Section 46-361, which states the reasonable and prudent rule, and omitted the other sections relating to speed from his charge. He made no comment on the effect of the speed limit signs, which, under the circumstances, would have been the only necessary or appropriate addition to the instructions. Inexplicably, instead of requesting such an instruction, counsel for appellant requested that Sections 46-361, 46-362 and 46-363 be read to the jury. This request was complied with. However, in reading Section 46-362 (prima jade speed limits), which was not applicable to the case, the trial judge omitted the last sentence thereof and stated to the jury “there is no evidence in the case showing this was a business district and there is no evidence showing it was a residential district, as described under the law.” Counsel for appellant did not object to the omission of the last sentence of the section, which refers to the authority of the Department to alter the prima jade speed limits, nor did he request an explanation of the effect of the posted signs on the prima jade speed limit. He did make the following objection:
“* * * The defendant respectfully excepts to the additional charge as to that portion where your Honor pointed out to the jury that there was no evidence that this was a business district or residential district * * * in view of the fact that the testimony concluded (sic.) that the posted limit of 35. miles an hour existed at the point in question.”
*471The exception on this point charges that the court erred in “remarking to the jury that there is no evidence in the record that the area in question is a business district and no evidence that there is a residential district when it is undisputed in the record that the area in question had a posted speed limit of 35 mi. per hour.”
Appellant’s counsel has not challenged the factual correctness of the trial judge’s statement as to the absence of such evidence, although the majority opinion appears to do so. His argument shows conclusively that the exception was not intended to mean that the judge’s statement was erroneous because the presence of the speed zone was evidence of the existence of a residential district. There is no inconsistency between the challenged statement of the trial judge and the existence, under the authority of Section 46-367, of a posted speed limit zone. Therefore, the exception fails to embody a meritorious assignment of error — not because of its form, but for lack of substance. It simply fails to put forward any proposition of law or fact which this court can review.
The only error in the charge was the failure of the trial judge to instruct the jury on the effect of the posting of speed limit signs, an error which was not properly reserved in the court below and which has not been properly raised on this appeal. Because counsel failed to request an instruction relating to the posted speed limit, a properly framed exception assigning this omission as error would not be considered on this appeal. In effect, the majority opinion allows appellant to come in through the back door and take advantage of an omission from the charge which was not requested in the court below.
I would affirm the judgment below.
Lewis, J., concurs.