Court Opinion

ID: 9761598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:46:59.433468+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:24.892326
License: Public Domain

TODD, J.,
Concurring.
¶ 1 While I agree that the trial court’s decision should be affirmed, I would do so on a more narrow basis. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the Majority.
¶ 2 I disagree with the Majority’s characterization of the easement at issue here as a right of way in “general terms” (Op. at 112, 114) or impliedly as one “without any expressed limitation of its use.” (Op. at 113.) I do not find the phrase “ingress and egress” to be unlimited. Such a characterization strips these words of any meaning and, specifically in this case, ignores the drafting changes made by the parties. For this reason, I find to be inapplicable many of the cases relied on by the Majority in support of its contention that utility access is the favored interpretation of the phrase “ingress and egress”. For example, in Dowgiel v. Reid, 359 Pa. 448, 59 A.2d 115 (1948), the sole Pennsylvania case cited by the Majority on this issue, the easements provided for “right and privilege of a private road ... for the use” or “for the benefit” of the grantees, language which I find is broader than that presented here. Id. at 450, 59 A.2d at 116. See also Atkinson v. Mentzel, 211 Wis.2d 628, 566 N.W.2d 158, 161 (1997) (easement provides for “access for all uses ... other than retail sales”); Ware v. Public Serv. Co. of New Hampshire, 412 A.2d 84, 85 (Me.1980) (easement grants “right to use, for all purposes”); Kelly v. Schmelz, 439 S.W.2d 211, 212 (Mo.Ct.App.1969) (grants “an easement 18 feet wide”); Fleming v. Napili Kai, Ltd., 50 Haw. 66, 430 P.2d 316, 317 (1967) (partition decree provides roads are “for the use of everyone having any interest in the said lands”). Further, for a resolution of this matter I do not believe our analysis needs to extend beyond an assessment of the intention of the parties.
¶ 3 In that regard, I agree with the Majority that the phrase “ingress and egress” is ambiguous because, given the circumstances in which this easement was drafted, that phrase reasonably could be interpreted to include only pedestrian or vehicle access, or more broadly to include the placement of utilities. See Baney v. Eoute, 784 A.2d 132, 2001 WL 1002817, at *2 (Pa.Super.Sept.4, 2001) (term in easement is ambiguous if “susceptible of more than one reasonable interpretation”); Madison Constr. Co. v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 557 Pa. 595, 606, 735 A.2d 100, 106 (1999) (“contractual terms are ambiguous if they are subject to more than one *117reasonable interpretation when applied to a particular set of facts.”). I find the Restatement (Third) of Property § 4.10, which the Majority cites, to be particularly persuasive on this point, as this section notes the varying definitions which may be ascribed to the phrase “ingress and egress,” including access for utilities. Given that the phrase is ambiguous, I conclude the trial court properly considered extrinsic evidence of the intention of the parties regarding its meaning, and agree with the Majority that the trial court’s conclusion that utility access as encompassed by the easement was supported by the evidence. On that basis, I would affirm its decision.