Court Opinion

ID: 9370092
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-10 19:07:59.535618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:19.310905
License: Public Domain

J-A25029-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    IN THE INTEREST OF: J.H. AND S.H. :        IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                      :             PENNSYLVANIA
                                      :
    APPEAL OF: J.H., MOTHER AND B.H., :
    FATHER                            :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :
                                      :        No. 557 WDA 2022

                 Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2022
     In the Court of Common Pleas of Cambria County Children and Youth
                 Services at No(s): CP-11-DP-0000123-2021,
                           CP-11-DP-0000124-2021

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., NICHOLS, J., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                      FILED: FEBRUARY 10, 2023

       Appellants J.H. (Mother) and B.H. (Father) appeal from the order

adjudicating their minor adoptive children, J.H.-M.1 and S.H. (collectively,

Children) dependent and finding that both Mother and Father were

perpetrators of child abuse. We affirm, in part, and vacate, in part.

       Briefly, on October 18, 2021, Cambria County Children and Youth

Services (CYS) received a ChildLine report alleging that (1) S.H. had been

“unreasonably restrained and that her breathing was restricted,” (2) both

Children had been hit with a spoon, and (3) S.H. exhibited significant bruising

on her buttocks.       Appellants subsequently entered a voluntary placement

agreement stating that the Children would be placed in CYS’s care and custody

____________________________________________

1 Father and one of the dependent children, J.H., share the same initials.
Throughout this memorandum, we will refer to the child as J.H.-M.
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while the Regional Office of the Bureau of Child and Family Services (OCYF)

investigated the allegations.    After the voluntary placement agreement

expired on November 17, 2021, the trial court granted CYS’s emergency

petition to formally remove the Children from Appellants’ care and placed the

Children in CYS’s custody.

      Following a shelter care hearing on November 19, 2021, CYS filed

dependency petitions for the Children. The trial court held an adjudicatory

hearing on December 6, 2021. The trial court conducted an in camera hearing

with S.H., who stated that Father beat her with his hand and that Mother beat

her with a plastic spoon. S.H. also stated that on a separate occasion, Mother

applied pressure to her throat and she could not breathe, and that although

Father was present, he did not intervene.

      CYS also presented testimony from caseworker Barbara Lusczek. Ms.

Lusczek stated during the initial interview, S.H. confirmed that Mother had hit

her on the buttocks with a spoon and that Mother had choked her on one

occasion. N.T. Hr’g, 12/6/21, at 5-6. S.H. also stated that “she was spanked

by Father with an open hand” and that “[J.H.-M.] also would get hit by his

parents.” Id. S.H. also told Ms. Lusczek that Father was present and sitting

on a loveseat in the room when the choking incident occurred. Id. at 10.

      Ms. Lusczek stated that she also observed S.H.’s interview at the Child

Advocacy Center (CAC).       Id. at 6.   During that interview, Ms. Lusczek

explained that S.H. “was able to give more detail as to what was going on

when she was choked by her mother, specifically, that she was able to tell us

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that when [Mother] pushed down on her neck that the sofa tilted back . . .

she couldn’t breathe, that she kind of like zoned out” and was in “what she

called somewhat of a trance. She told the interviewer that there was a ringing

in her ear, which is consistent with choking.” Id. at 6-7. CYS also introduced

photos depicting bruising on S.H.’s buttocks and a memorandum detailing the

Children’s interviews. Id. at 12.

       At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that the Children

were dependent. The trial court also concluded that S.H. was a victim of child

abuse as defined by the Child Protective Services Law (CPSL) at 23 Pa.C.S. §

6303 and that Appellants were the perpetrators of that abuse, Mother by

commission and Father by omission and commission. On January 5, 2022,

the trial court issued an order adjudicating the Children dependent, which was

entered on January 10, 2022.2

       Appellants simultaneously filed a timely notice of appeal and a motion

for reconsideration, which the trial court granted on February 8, 2022. After

conducting additional hearings and ordering additional briefing from the

parties, the trial court issued an order reiterating its finding that Appellants

were perpetrators of child abuse. See Trial Ct. Order, 4/13/22. The trial court

____________________________________________

2 According to the trial court docket entries, the trial court served the parties
with notice of the written order on January 10, 2022. See Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1)
(providing that the date of entry of an order is the day the clerk of court mails
or delivers copies of the order to the parties); see also Pa.R.C.P. 236(b).

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did not make any findings or render any further conclusions with respect to

the underlying dependency petition. Id. at 1-2.

       On May 13, 2022, Appellants filed a timely3,4 notice of appeal and

complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i). The trial court issued a Rule 1925(a)

opinion addressing Appellants’ claims.

       On appeal, Appellants raise the following issues for review:

       1. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in concluding
          that [CYS] met its burden by clear and convincing evidence
          that [Mother] is a perpetrator of child abuse by commission.

       2. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in concluding
          that [CYS] met its burden of proof by clear and convincing
____________________________________________

3 Appellants filed a notice of appeal on May 13, 2022. As noted previously,
the trial court expressly granted reconsideration of its January 10, 2022 order
on February 8, 2022, before the thirty-day appeal period expired. See
Pa.R.A.P. 1701(b)(3) (providing that although the entry of a final order
triggers the thirty-day appeal period, this period may be tolled if the trial court
expressly grants a motion for reconsideration). After conducting additional
hearings, the trial court issued an order reiterating its findings of abuse on
April 13, 2022. Therefore, Appellants’ May 13, 2022 notice of appeal was
timely. See id.

4 On June 13, 2022, this Court issued a rule to show cause as to why
Appellants’ appeal should not be quashed, as it was unclear whether the
orders were final or otherwise appealable because “[a] court determination of
child abuse without disposition would . . . be an interlocutory order.” Rule to
Show Cause, 6/13/22 (quoting In Interest of R.M.R., 530 A.2d 1381, 1386
(Pa. Super. 1987)). After Appellants filed a response, this Court discharged
the order. Upon review, it is clear that when the trial court expressly granted
reconsideration of a final, appealable order, the appeal lies from the order
entering the trial court’s reconsidered decision, even if it reaffirms the trial
court’s previous order. See, e.g., Long v. Long, 282 A.3d 694, 698 n.2 (Pa.
Super. 2022); Ford-Bey v. Prof'l Anesthesia Servs. of N. Am., LLC, 229
A.3d 984, 986 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2020). Therefore, Appellants properly appealed
from the April 13, 2022 order which reaffirmed the trial court’s finding of child
abuse after reconsideration.

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         evidence that [Father] is a perpetrator of child abuse by
         commission and omission.

      3. The trial court erred and abused its discretion in concluding
         that [CYS] met its burden by clear and convincing evidence
         that both children are dependent children as defined by law.

Appellants’ Brief at 6.

      In their first two issues, Appellants argue that CYS failed to establish

that Mother or Father were perpetrators of child abuse. With respect to the

claims against Mother, Appellants refer to the two alleged incidents in which

(1) Mother used a plastic spoon to spank S.H. on the buttocks and (2) Mother

restricted S.H.’s breathing by pushing on the child’s neck.     Regarding the

plastic spoon incident, Appellants argue that Mother’s conduct fell under the

corporal punishment exception to the CPSL.       As to the choking incident,

Appellants argue that CYS “solely relied on the CPS investigation wherein

there was no injury discovered, no photographs taken, no marks seen by the

caseworker” and where “[t]he sole evidence regarding this incident was the

child saying that it occurred.” Id. at 23-24. Therefore, Appellants conclude

that the trial court erred in finding that Mother was a perpetrator of child

abuse.

      Appellants also argue that CYS failed to prove that Father was a

perpetrator of child abuse by omission for failing to act during the incidents

where Mother allegedly abused S.H. Id. at 13. In support, Appellants assert

that Father’s alleged presence in the room is insufficient to prove child abuse

by omission.    Id. at 15.   Further, Appellants contend that “[t]he record

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contains very little information about Father’s alleged omission,” including

where Father was seated “in relation to the incident, whether [F]ather knew

what was going on, and whether [F]ather said or did anything to indicate he

knew what was going on.” Id. at 15-16. With respect to the choking incident,

Appellants argue that “the CPSL simply does not include failure to act as an

option under interfering with the breathing of the child.” Id. at 16. Appellants

also claim that the plastic spoon incident “does not rise to the level of child

abuse and therefore Father cannot be considered a perpetrator by omission

or failing to act.” Id.

      Finally, Appellants claim that CYS failed to prove that Father was a

perpetrator of child abuse by commission.        Appellants acknowledge that

Father admitted to smacking S.H. on the buttocks with an open hand

approximately five times.    Id. at 20.    Appellants also note that S.H. had

bruising on the area three days after the incident occurred.        Id. at 21.

However, Appellants argue that “[i]t is apparent based on the case law, that

this incident does not rise to the level of unreasonable force.” Id. Therefore,

Appellants contend that there was insufficient evidence to establish that

Father was a perpetrator of child abuse by commission. Id. at 22.

      In dependency cases, we “accept the findings of fact and credibility

determinations of the trial court if they are supported by the record” and we

review the determinations for an abuse of discretion. In re L.Z., 111 A.3d

1164, 1174 (Pa. 2015) (citation omitted).          As part of a dependency

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adjudication, a trial court may find a person to be “the perpetrator of child

abuse[.]” Id. at 1176.

      The requisite standard of proof for a finding of child abuse
      pursuant to Section 6303(b.1) is clear and convincing evidence.
      Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so clear, direct,
      weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to
      a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise
      facts in issue.

Interest of A.C., 237 A.3d 553, 558 (Pa. Super. 2020) (citations and

quotation marks omitted).

      23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

      (b.1) Child abuse.—The term “child abuse” shall mean
      intentionally, knowingly or recklessly doing any of the following:

         (1) Causing bodily injury to a child through any recent act or
         failure to act.

                                 *     *     *

         (5) Creating a reasonable likelihood of bodily injury to a child
         through any recent act or failure to act.

                                 *     *     *

         (8) Engaging in any of the following recent acts:

                                 *     *     *

            (v) Interfering with the breathing of a child.

23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1). The CPSL defines “bodily injury” as “[i]mpairment of

physical condition or substantial pain.” Id. at § 6303(a).

      Under the corporal punishment exemption set forth at Section 6304(d),

parents may “use reasonable force on or against their children for the

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purposes of supervision, control and discipline of their children.          Such

reasonable force shall not constitute child abuse.” Id. at § 6304(d).

       In determining whether corporal punishment constitutes abuse, the

Commonwealth Court5,6 has explained:

       [W]here the allegation of child abuse involves a parent’s
       administration of corporal punishment for the purpose of
       disciplining a child, the ultimate question is whether the parent
       used ‘reasonable force.’”      J.S. v. Department of Human
       Services, 221 A.3d 333, 343 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (citing 23
       Pa.C.S. § 6304(d)). Notably, the focus is “on the parent’s conduct
       rather than the result.” Id.

       To differentiate “abuse” from an “accident” in the context of
       corporal punishment, our Supreme Court has offered the following
       guidance:

____________________________________________

5 We note that although Commonwealth Court decisions are not binding on
this Court, they may be considered as persuasive authority. Commonwealth
v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 395 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2014).

6 The CPSL definition of “child abuse” has been interpreted in numerous cases
by both this Court and the Commonwealth Court. Although the definition of
abuse has been consistently applied between both Courts, the evidentiary
burden differs. As noted previously, CYS must present clear and convincing
evidence to support a finding of child abuse in a dependency case. See L.Z.,
111 A.3d at 1174. Further, “[t]he finding of child abuse in a dependency
proceeding can be appealed to [this Court.]” Id. at 1177. Outside of the
dependency context, CYS or the Department of Public Welfare may file “an
‘indicated report’ of child abuse when ‘substantial evidence’ exists that an
individual perpetrated child abuse[.]” Id. (citations and footnote omitted).
“An individual can also petition to expunge the founded report from ChildLine
through a Department of Public Welfare administrative process that would
eventually be subject to appeal in Commonwealth Court.” Id.

Therefore, although we rely on decisions by the Commonwealth Court for
purposes of interpreting the CPSL statute, we do not apply the preponderance
of the evidence standard set forth in those cases.

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        To balance the competing objectives of protecting children
        from abuse while maintaining the parental right to use
        corporal punishment, the legal standard for differentiating
        abuse from accident must acknowledge some level of
        culpability by the perpetrator that his actions could
        reasonably create a serious injury to the child. The standard
        that best comports with the problem of defining abuse in
        terms of nonaccidental injury is criminal negligence.

     P.R. v. Department of Public Welfare, Office of Hearings
     and Appeals, 801 A.2d 478, 486-87 ([Pa.] 2002).

     Criminal negligence is defined as follows: A person acts
     negligently with respect to a material element of an offense when
     he should be aware of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the
     material element exists or will result from his conduct. The risk
     must be of such a nature and degree that the actor’s failure to
     perceive it, considering the nature and intent of his conduct and
     the circumstances known to him, involves a gross deviation from
     the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in
     the actor’s situation.

     18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(4).

P.L. v. Department of Human Services, 236 A.3d 1208, 1211-12 (Pa.

Cmwlth. 2020) (some formatting altered).

     Here, the trial court addressed the allegations of abuse as follows:

     [T]he record indicates that the trial court removed S.H. from
     [Appellants’] home based on allegations of physical abuse by
     commission and omission. Specifically, [CYS] received a Childline
     report [which] indicated that one or both of [Appellants]
     unreasonably restrained S.H., restricted her breathing, and hit her
     with a spoon, causing significant bruising on her buttocks.

     Agency Caseworker Barbara Lusczek testified at the Adjudication
     Hearing that she had spoken with S.H. and that the child
     confirmed these reports, stating that Mother had hit her on her
     buttocks with a spoon and had choked her on one occasion, while
     Father sat nearby and did not intervene. Additionally, Ms. Lusczek
     submitted a memorandum detailing an interview S.H. did with the
     Child Advocacy Center (CAC) in which she made consistent
     allegations of abuse and indicated that [Appellants] had instructed

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      J.H[-M.], to lie regarding what occurred in the home. Out of
      concern for S.H.’s welfare, she was removed from [Appellants’]
      home along with her brother.

      A shelter care hearing was held on November 19, 2021, and on
      December 1, 2021 this [c]ourt issued a Shelter Care Order, finding
      that S.H. was a dependent child and granting her legal and
      physical custody to the Agency. This [c]ourt held an Adjudicatory
      hearing on December 6, 2021, at which it found that S.H. was a
      dependent child. Additionally, this [c]ourt found that S.H. was a
      victim of child abuse as defined at 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303 and that
      [Appellants] were the perpetrators of that abuse.

      In its second Adjudicatory hearing on this matter, held on March
      16, 2022, this [c]ourt found that Father had repeatedly struck
      S.H. with an open hand, that Mother struck S.H. with a plastic
      spoon while [F]other was present, and that Mother had pressed
      her hands against S.H.’s throat to the point of obstructing her
      breathing while Father was present. The [c]ourt also found that
      this conduct did not fall within the corporal punishment exception
      to child abuse and that [Appellants’] behavior deviated from the
      standard of care of a reasonable person. Accordingly, the [c]ourt
      determined that [Appellants] acted in a criminally negligent
      manner by clear and convincing evidence and found [Appellants]
      to be perpetrators of child abuse.

                                 *       *      *

      While this Court did not make a finding that J.H.[-M.] was himself
      the victim of child abuse, the aforementioned abuse of his sibling,
      as well as his statements to the CYS caseworker and in the CAC
      interview created serious concerns for this [c]ourt regarding J.H.[-
      M.’s] welfare.       Accordingly, J.H.[-M.] was removed from
      [Appellants’] home along with his sibling. This removal was
      proper and based on the []Children’s best interests and in a
      manner free of bias or prejudice.

Trial Ct. Op., 6/13/22, at 9-10, 12.

      After the trial court conducted an additional hearing on Appellants’

claims, the trial court made the following findings of fact:

      [F]ather repeatedly struck S.H. with an open hand, then [M]other
      repeatedly struck the child with a plastic spoon while Father was

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     present. S.H. testified to the pain caused, and photographs
     introduced at [the] hearing show the great majority of the child’s
     buttocks to be solidly bruised, with the perimeter of her buttocks
     covered in smaller, circular bruises. On a separate day, [M]other
     placed a hand on S.H.’s throat and pressed against her throat with
     such force that the child testified she could not breathe, and that
     once released, her ears were ringing. She testified [that F]ather
     was present when this occurred and did not intervene. S.H. was
     specific in her testimony as to the location of the incident,
     [M]other’s glasses flying off, the couch tipping slightly, and how
     she gagged when [M]other released her grip from S.H.’s throat.

     The [c]ourt also considered information from [CYS’s] exhibit #3
     (the memorandum prepared by caseworker Barb Lusczek and
     admitted without objection). Specifically: (1.) [S.H.] took part in
     a Child Advocacy Center (CAC) interview where she was
     consistent, and where she relayed that her parents had told her
     younger brother to lie and not to tell what happened to them in
     the home; (2.) younger brother, J.H.-M, was interviewed
     independently at the CAC and stated that his parents told him to
     lie and not to tell anything that occurred in the home, and
     admitted that he and his sister would get “beat” with a spoon; (3.)
     although neither [Appellant] testified, [M]other told caseworker
     that she never hit either of the children, but that [F]ather had
     struck S.H. [five] times with an open hand; and (4.) [F]ather told
     caseworker that S.H. probably obtained the bruises from
     cheer[leading], because she was the person lifted in the air. No
     testimony or evidence was ever presented to in any way
     substantiate [F]ather’s claim.

     The [c]ourt finds that both the abuse to S.H. by striking her with
     an object and the extensive bruising to the buttocks, as well as
     the choking, were precipitated by [Appellants] being upset by
     conduct, or perceived misconduct, of S.H. The first being an email
     S.H. sent to a friend about being uncomfortable because of a
     teacher touching her, and the second being misinformation about
     a grade/assignment. Based on their statements and conduct,
     [Appellants] seem quite concerned with their family name and
     reputation.

     The [c]ourt considered the corporal punishment exception to child
     abuse finding, and does not find it applicable, as the force used
     by [M]other was overtly unreasonable. Further, both [Appellants’]
     behavior, [M]other by commission, and [F]ather by omission,

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      deviated from a standard of care that a reasonable person would
      have observed in their situation.

Trial Ct. Order, 4/11/22, at 1-2.

      Following our review of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion in

the trial court’s conclusion that both Mother and Father were perpetrators of

child abuse based on the choking incident. See L.Z., 111 A.3d at 1174; see

also 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1)(8)(v).      As noted previously, the trial court

credited S.H.’s testimony that Mother “put her hands to [S.H.’s] throat to a

degree which cut off her airways and caused ringing in her ears” and that,

although Father was present, he “did not step in.” See N.T. Hr’g, 12/6/21, at

26. Given S.H.’s description of the incident, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion by concluding that Father could have and should have done

something to protect S.H. and that his failure to do so established child abuse

by omission under the CPSL. See 23 Pa.C.S. § 6303(b.1)(5). Under these

circumstances, we agree with the trial court that Father witnessed Mother

choking S.H. which was sufficient to establish that Father’s failure to act

intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly created a “reasonable likelihood of

bodily injury” to Child. Id. Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court’s

conclusion on that issue.

      With respect to the incidents where Appellants smacked S.H.’s buttocks,

Mother with a plastic spoon and Father with his hand, we conclude that CYS

failed to present clear and convincing evidence to establish child abuse.

Although S.H. suffered bruising as a result of these incidents, there is no

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evidence that either parent used unreasonable force on S.H. or disregarded a

substantial and unjustifiable risk or grossly deviated from the standard of care

that a reasonable parent would observe. See 18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(4); P.L.,

236 A.3d at 1211-12. Therefore, we conclude that the trial court erred in

finding that Appellants were perpetrators of child abuse based on these

incidents.

      Appellants also challenge the trial court’s adjudication of Children as

dependent. Specifically, they argue that because they were not perpetrators

of abuse, the trial court’s dependency determination has no basis. However,

because we have determined that Father and Mother were both properly found

to be perpetrators of abuse to S.H., this issue is moot. See In re R.P., 957

A.2d 1205, 1213 (Pa. Super. 2008) (holding that where trial court finds one

sibling dependent due to abuse, court may determine other siblings also

dependent, even if they have not been abused).

      For these reasons, we affirm the trial court’s finding of abuse with

respect to the incident involving Mother applying pressure to S.H.’s neck and

the order adjudicating Children dependent. We vacate the trial court’s finding

of abuse in all other respects.

      Order affirmed, in part, and vacated, in part. Jurisdiction relinquished.

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Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/10/2023

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