Court Opinion

ID: 9897285
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:09:40.927484+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:41.088868
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                        Sep 25 2023, 8:46 am

                                                                             CLERK
                                                                         Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                            Court of Appeals
                                                                              and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
David W. Stone IV                                          Theodore E. Rokita
Anderson, Indiana                                          Attorney General
                                                           Courtney Staton
                                                           Deputy Attorney General
                                                           Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Robert J. Plato,                                           September 25, 2023
Appellant-Petitioner,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           23A-PC-452
        v.                                                 Appeal from the
                                                           Madison Circuit Court
State of Indiana,                                          The Honorable
Appellee-Respondent                                        Andrew R. Hopper, Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           48C03-2204-PC-4

                                Opinion by Judge Vaidik
                                 Judge Mathias concurs.
                         Judge Pyle dissents with separate opinion.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023                            Page 1 of 14
      Vaidik, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   The police obtained a search warrant for a property associated with Robert J.

      Plato, Jr., that authorized them to search for and seize “paperwork relating to

      title work for vehicles.” While executing the warrant, the police seized a

      computer belonging to Plato. Plato then made threats against the police,

      claiming his computer was improperly seized. He was charged with and

      convicted of Level 6 felony intimidation for making threats against the police

      for a prior lawful act—in this case, the seizure of his computer. Plato later

      sought post-conviction relief, alleging his appellate counsel was ineffective for

      not arguing on direct appeal that the seizure of his computer was unlawful

      because it was not specified in the warrant. We find that the police had reason

      to seize Plato’s computer but not to search the contents without a second, more

      specific warrant. Because the police acted within the scope of the warrant when

      they seized Plato’s computer, appellate counsel was not ineffective for not

      challenging the seizure of Plato’s computer on direct appeal. Accordingly, we

      affirm the post-conviction court.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   In April 2018, the Madison County Drug Task Force was investigating Plato

      for a robbery he had planned that involved forcing the owner of a car lot to sign

      over titles to three cars in exchange for an unpaid drug debt. See Cause No.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023     Page 2 of 14
      48C03-1805-F5-1294.1 The Drug Task Force obtained a search warrant for an

      address in Anderson associated with Plato. The warrant authorized the Drug

      Task Force to search for and seize “[w]eapons, ammunitions, and paperwork

      relating to title work for vehicles.” Appellant’s P-C App. Vol. II p. 28; see also

      Plato v. State, No. 21A-CR-1870, 2022 WL 570538 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 25,

      2022). While executing the search warrant, Detective LeeAnn Dwiggins with

      the Madison County Sheriff’s Department seized Plato’s computer. After the

      seizure, Plato sent a letter to the Sheriff of Madison County, which provides in

      part:

                 You need to resolve this issue with my computer right away.
                 Dwiggins is nothing more than a common thief not a DTF [Drug
                 Task Force] deputy and the very first time I see that thief, I will
                 not treat her as a deputy of Madison County but as a thief, and
                 will beat the breaks [sic] off that bi*ch. McDonalds, Walmart,
                 don’t matter where I see her, she will be beat like a thief!

      Plato, 2022 WL 570538, *1.

[3]   The State charged Plato with Level 6 felony intimidation. The charging

      information alleges that Plato “knowingly or intentionally communicate[d] a

      threat to a law enforcement officer, to wit: LeeAnn Dwiggins, with the intent

      that LeeAnn Dwiggins, be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful act, to

      wit: seizing Robert J. Plato’s computer pursuant to a lawful search warrant.”

      1
          Plato eventually pled guilty to Level 5 felony attempted robbery.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023        Page 3 of 14
      Appellant’s P-C App. Vol. II p. 62; see also Ind. Code § 35-45-2-1(a)(2). The

      State later added a habitual-offender charge.

[4]   Plato represented himself at trial. The jury found Plato guilty of intimidation,

      and he admitted being a habitual offender. The trial court sentenced Plato to

      two years for intimidation, enhanced by six years for the habitual-offender

      finding, for a total sentence of eight years.

[5]   Plato, represented by counsel, appealed to this Court, making three arguments:

      (1) the State made an improper comment during closing argument; (2) the trial

      court abused its discretion in sentencing Plato; and (3) Plato’s sentence is

      inappropriate. We found the first issue waived because Plato did not object to

      the State’s comments during closing argument or argue fundamental error on

      appeal. We also found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

      sentencing Plato and that his sentence was not inappropriate.

[6]   In April 2022, Plato, representing himself, filed a petition for post-conviction

      relief. As relevant to this appeal, Plato alleged that his appellate counsel was

      ineffective for not arguing on direct appeal that the seizure of his computer was

      unlawful. Appellant’s P-C App. Vol. II p. 18. Following a hearing, the post-

      conviction court denied relief.

[7]   Plato, again represented by counsel, now appeals.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023        Page 4 of 14
       Discussion and Decision
[8]    Plato appeals the denial of post-conviction relief. A defendant who petitions for

       post-conviction relief must establish the grounds for relief by a preponderance

       of the evidence. Hollowell v. State, 19 N.E.3d 263, 268-69 (Ind. 2014). If the post-

       conviction court denies relief, and the petitioner appeals, the petitioner must

       show the evidence leads unerringly and unmistakably to a conclusion opposite

       that reached by the post-conviction court. Id. at 269.

[9]    Plato contends his appellate counsel was ineffective. The standard for a claim of

       ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is the same as that for trial counsel in

       that the defendant must show that appellate counsel was deficient in his

       performance and that the deficiency resulted in prejudice. Overstreet v. State, 877

       N.E.2d 144, 165 (Ind. 2007). Our Supreme Court has recognized three types of

       ineffective assistance of appellate counsel: (1) denial of access to appeal; (2)

       failure to raise issues that should have been raised; and (3) failure to present

       issues well. Wrinkles v. State, 749 N.E.2d 1179, 1203 (Ind. 2001). Plato’s claim

       falls into the second category: failure to raise an issue. In evaluating such

       claims, we must consider whether the unraised issue was (1) “significant and

       obvious” from the face of the record and (2) “clearly stronger” than the raised

       issues. Gray v. State, 841 N.E.2d 1210, 1214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied.

[10]   Here, to convict Plato of Level 6 felony intimidation, the State was required to

       prove that he knowingly or intentionally communicated a threat to Detective

       Dwiggins with the intent that she be placed in fear of retaliation “for a prior

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023      Page 5 of 14
       lawful act, to wit: seizing Robert J. Plato’s computer pursuant to a lawful search

       warrant.” Plato argues his appellate counsel was ineffective for not arguing on

       direct appeal that his computer was unlawfully seized because the warrant did

       not specify that his computer could be searched or seized.

[11]   The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a

       warrant “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or

       things to be seized.” Here, the search warrant authorized the Madison County

       Drug Task Force to search for and seize “paperwork relating to title work for

       vehicles.” When the search warrant was obtained, the police were investigating

       Plato for a robbery he had planned that involved forcing the owner of a car lot

       to sign over titles to three cars. Plato asserts that if the police wanted to seize his

       computer, then they should have asked to do so when requesting the search

       warrant.2 The State responds that Plato’s computer “was plainly covered by the

       search warrant” because “it was reasonable for [Detective Dwiggins] to believe

       that paperwork related to title work could have been recorded or stored digitally

       on Plato’s computer.” Appellee’s Br. p. 17.

[12]   Although neither party directs us to an on-point case, the Ninth Circuit

       addressed a similar issue in United States v. Giberson, 527 F.3d 882, 887 (9th Cir.

       2008). There, law enforcement obtained a warrant to search the defendant’s

       house for “records” and “documents” related to his use of a false identification.

       2
        The search warrant incorporates by reference Detective Dwiggins’s sworn testimony. See Appellant’s P-C
       App. Vol. II p. 28. However, the record doesn’t contain her testimony.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023                         Page 6 of 14
       As here, the warrant did not explicitly authorize the search or seizure of any

       computers. While executing the search warrant, law enforcement saw a

       computer, which was connected to a printer. Next to the printer was what

       appeared to be a sheet of fake identification cards that were not high quality and

       looked as if they could have been printed on the adjacent printer. Law

       enforcement seized the computer and obtained a second warrant to search it for

       records relating to the production of fake identification cards. During the search

       of the computer, law enforcement discovered evidence of child pornography,

       and the defendant was charged in federal court with child-pornography-related

       offenses. The defendant moved to suppress the evidence of child pornography,

       arguing law enforcement exceeded the scope of the first warrant when it seized

       his computer. The court denied the motion to suppress, and the defendant

       entered a conditional guilty plea.

[13]   On appeal, the defendant argued his computer was unlawfully seized because

       the first search warrant did not specify that law enforcement could search or

       seize a computer. The Ninth Circuit first noted that it had “not yet had

       occasion to determine, in an opinion, whether computers are an exception to

       the general principle that a warrant authorizing the seizure of particular

       documents also authorizes the search of a container likely to contain those

       documents.” Id. at 887. The defendant asserted that computers are different

       than other containers (such as filing cabinets and briefcases) and therefore are

       entitled to “heightened protection” and must be specified in the warrant. Id.

       The Ninth Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument and concluded that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023      Page 7 of 14
       because documents related to the production of fake identification cards were

       found in and around the defendant’s computer and were arguably created on

       and printed from it, it was “reasonable for officers to believe that the items they

       were authorized to seize would be found in the computer, and they acted within

       the scope of the warrant when they secured the computer.” Id. at 888.

[14]   A year after Giberson, the Ninth Circuit addressed a related issue in United States

       v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859 (9th Cir. 2009). There, the police were investigating the

       defendant for selling drugs and obtained a warrant to search his house for

       “[s]ales ledgers showing narcotics transactions such as pay/owe sheets.” Id. at

       863. Again, the warrant did not explicitly authorize the search or seizure of any

       computers. While executing the search warrant, the police found no evidence of

       drug sales but found a computer in the defendant’s bedroom with a screensaver

       activated. An officer moved the mouse, which removed the screensaver, and

       clicked open a file, disclosing an image that looked to be child pornography.

       The defendant was charged in federal court with possession of child

       pornography and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search of his

       computer exceeded the scope of the warrant. The court denied the motion to

       suppress, and the defendant entered a conditional guilty plea.

[15]   On appeal, the Ninth Circuit distinguished the case from Giberson. The court

       pointed out that in Giberson, law enforcement seized the computer and did not

       search it until after obtaining a second warrant. In Payton, however, the officer

       “searched first and seized afterwards.” Id. at 863. The court highlighted that

       “[a] seizure of a computer to await a second warrant is nevertheless a Fourth

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023     Page 8 of 14
       Amendment seizure, but it is far less intrusive than a search.” Id. The court

       concluded that the police acted unreasonably in searching the defendant’s

       computer without first obtaining another warrant.

[16]   Here, Plato does not allege that his computer was searched, and thus we are not

       tasked with addressing the reasonableness of any search. 3 Instead, Plato only

       challenges the seizure of his computer. But we agree with the Ninth Circuit that

       a seizure is far less intrusive than a search. Given that the Madison County

       Drug Task Force’s investigation of Plato involved paperwork, it was reasonable

       for the police to believe that paperwork (titles) may have been stored in Plato’s

       computer. Hence, the police had reason to seize the computer but not to search

       the contents without a second, more specific warrant. Because Detective

       Dwiggins acted within the scope of the warrant when she seized Plato’s

       computer, the seizure issue was not clearly stronger than the issues appellate

       counsel raised on direct appeal. Accordingly, the post-conviction court did not

       err in finding no ineffective assistance of appellate counsel.

[17]   Affirmed.

       Mathias, J., concurs.

       Pyle, J., dissents with separate opinion.

       3
           Plato, who represented himself at trial, argued the following during closing argument:
                  There was no evidence given, whatsoever, that [Detective Dwiggins] even accessed that
                  laptop. To even see what was on it. She never once contacted me and ask[ed] me what the
                  password was so that’s a pretty good indication that she never even accessed that laptop.”
       Trial Tr. Vol. II p. 20.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023                            Page 9 of 14
       Pyle, Judge, dissenting.

[18]   I respectfully dissent from my colleagues’ opinion affirming the denial of Plato’s

       petition for post-conviction relief. The majority ably concludes that Plato’s

       appellate counsel was not ineffective for failing to challenge on direct appeal the

       validity of the search warrant used to seize his laptop. Specifically, my

       colleagues hold that the language contained in the search warrant justifying the

       seizure of the laptop was sufficient to satisfy the particularity requirement of the

       Fourth Amendment. However, I believe that the warrant violated the

       particularity requirement. In addition, the deficiency in the search warrant was

       obvious from the face of the record and it represented a stronger issue than

       those raised by appellate counsel. See Reed v. State, 856 N.E.2d 1189, 1195 (Ind.

       2006) (holding appellate counsel ineffective when unraised issue was significant

       and obvious, stronger than those raised on direct appeal, and precedent was

       available supporting the unraised issue). As a result, I believe that appellate

       counsel’s performance fell below prevailing professional norms because the

       State’s reliance on a lawful search warrant was an essential element of the

       charged crime. Further, if appellate counsel had cited relevant authority,

       appellant’s counsel would have likely been successful on direct appeal.

       Davidson v. State, 763 N.E.2d 441, 444 (Ind. 2002) (citing Strickland v.

       Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), reh’g denied), reh’g denied, cert. denied.

[19]   In this case, the State alleged that, on or about April 14, 2019, Plato committed

       intimidation, a Level 6 felony. At that time, the State was required to prove

       that Plato communicated a threat to Detective Dwiggins, a law enforcement

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023      Page 10 of 14
       officer, with the intent that she be placed in fear of retaliation for a prior lawful

       act. INDIANA CODE § 35-45-2-1(a)(2) and (b)(1)(B)(i). The prior lawful act that

       the State relied upon was “seizing [Plato’s] computer pursuant to a lawful search

       warrant.” (App. Vol. 2 at 29) (emphasis added). At his trial, Plato challenged

       the search and seizure of his laptop computer pursuant to the search warrant,

       preserving the issue for appeal. (App. Vol. 2 at 234). In addition, the trial court

       instructed the jury that the State had to prove “each of these elements beyond a

       reasonable doubt.” (Prior Case Tr. Vol. 2 at 203). On these facts alone, the

       record clearly shows that proving Detective Dwiggins was acting pursuant to a

       lawfully issued search warrant was critical to the State’s case. Instead of raising

       an issue challenging the search warrant or the sufficiency of the evidence,

       appellate counsel challenged the State’s closing argument and raised sentencing

       issues.

[20]   The Fourth Amendment of our Federal Constitution provides that “no warrants

       shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and

       particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be

       seized.” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. (emphasis added). “The Founding

       generation crafted the Fourth Amendment as a ‘response to the reviled general

       warrant and writs of assistance of the colonial era, which allowed British

       officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of

       criminal activity.’” Carpenter v. U.S., 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2213 (2018) (quoting Riley

       v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2492 (2014)) (cleaned up). “The problem posed

       by the general warrant is not that of intrusion per se, but of a general,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023       Page 11 of 14
       exploratory rummaging in a person’s belongings . . . .” Warren v. State, 760

       N.E.2d 608, 610 (Ind. 2002) (cleaned up). In other words, a warrant that does

       not particularly describe the items to be seized gives a law enforcement officer

       too much discretion. “This requirement makes general searches . . . impossible

       and prevents the seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another. As to

       what is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer executing the

       warrant.” Id. (cleaned up) (emphasis added). “The uniformly applied rule is

       that a search conducted pursuant to a warrant that fails to conform to the

       particularity requirement of the Fourth Amendment is unconstitutional.” Groh

       v. Ramirez, 124 S. Ct. 1264, 1291 (2004) (citations omitted) (holding that the

       search warrant must particularly describe the items to be seized independently

       of the affidavit or application supporting the warrant). However, the

       particularity requirement is not draconian; it does not require an exact

       description of the property to be searched for and seized. State v. Foy, 862

       N.E.2d 1219, 1227 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied. “In practice, courts have

       . . . demanded that the executing officers be able to identify the things to be

       seized with reasonable certainty and that the warrant description be as

       particular as circumstances permit.” Id. (cleaned up).

[21]   In this case, the relevant portion of the search warrant used to seize Plato’s

       laptop computer contained the following description: “paperwork relating to

       title work for vehicles.” (App. Vol. 2 at 28) (emphasis added). There is no

       mention of a computer. Today, it is difficult to make the argument that the

       term “paperwork” is sufficiently specific so as to lead a reasonable person to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023      Page 12 of 14
       believe that it also means “computers.” It is insufficient to posit that, because

       computers might contain scanned copies of paperwork relating to vehicle titles,

       the term “paperwork” adequately describes computers. My esteemed

       colleagues conclude that this approach is sufficient. They believe the officers

       had the authority to seize the laptop but could not search it without obtaining a

       second warrant. In my view, my colleagues’ Solomonic approach is

       confounding. The officers either had the lawful authority to seize and search

       the computer or they did not.

[22]   My colleagues’ approach frustrates the very purpose of the particularity

       requirement: assuring “the individual whose property is searched or seized of

       the lawful authority of the executing officer, his need to search, and the limits of

       his power to search.” Groh, 124 S. Ct. at 1292 (emphasis added). The question

       is whether the term “paperwork” describes Plato’s computer with as much

       reasonable certainty and particularity as possible under the circumstances. I

       believe that the search warrant in this case gave law enforcement too much

       discretion. The term “paperwork” neither described Plato’s laptop with

       reasonable certainty nor with as much particularity as possible under the

       circumstances. If the officers had probable cause to believe that a search for

       evidence of a robbery scheme involving vehicle titles would be found on Plato’s

       laptop, all they had to do was request the judicial authority to include the term

       “computers” on the search warrant.

[23]   Because appellate counsel did not raise an issue challenging the sufficiency of

       the evidence, regarding the particularity of the search warrant, I believe

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023     Page 13 of 14
appellate counsel’s performance was deficient and that Plato was prejudiced.

This issue was significant and obvious from the face of the record and was

stronger than the issues raised on direct appeal, likely resulting in reversal on

appeal. As a result, I would reverse the post-conviction court’s denial of post-

conviction relief.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-PC-452 | September 25, 2023     Page 14 of 14