Court Opinion

ID: 9741310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:53:09.070862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:23.338635
License: Public Domain

Reimer, District Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion, and would have affirmed, in part, the decision of the District Court and remanded the matter to the District Court with directions to partition in kind the subject matter of the litigation and set over to the plaintiff whatever right to renew the tickets for the four seats plaintiff has used for the past 17 years as might exist in the defendant.
In this case, the majority makes much of the absence of a monetary consideration, but in the past has not expressed so great a concern. In Litz v. Wilson, ante p. 483, 304 N.W.2d 48 (1981), a nominal recitation of a $1 downpayment was sufficient monetary consideration for a $100,000 contract; and in Kinkenon v. Hue, 207 Neb. 698, 301 N.W.2d 77 (1981), a “live-in” arrangement which had already been performed by the promisee was sufficient consideration for transfer of a home for life use. The real consideration in each of the referenced cases is the mutuality of the promises exchanged, and the same is true in the instant case with some 17 years of recognition.