Court Opinion

ID: 9912947
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 16:01:01.421558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:26.253647
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-1731    Document: 123            Page: 1       Filed: 12/26/2023

         NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.

    United States Court of Appeals
        for the Federal Circuit
                   ______________________

            CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P.,
                     Appellant

                                   v.

   KATHERINE K. VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF
   COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
     AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES
       PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
                   Intervenor

            -------------------------------------------------

            CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P.,
                     Appellant

                                   v.

                UNIFIED PATENTS, LLC,
                       Appellee

   KATHERINE K. VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF
   COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
     AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES
       PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
                   Intervenor
             ______________________

  2021-1731, 2021-1734, 2021-1735, 2021-1736, 2021-1737
                 ______________________
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 2                             CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL

     Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2019-
 01079, IPR2019-01101, IPR2019-01102, IPR2019-01103,
 IPR2019-01105, IPR2019-01573.

            -------------------------------------------------

            CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P.,
                     Appellant

                                   v.

     KATHERINE K. VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF
     COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
       AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES
         PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
                     Intervenor
               ______________________

        2021-1911, 2021-1912, 2021-1913, 2021-1914
                 ______________________

     Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2019-
 01298, IPR2019-01404, IPR2019-01441, IPR2019-01442,
 IPR2019-01635, IPR2019-01644.
                  ______________________

                Decided: December 26, 2023
                  ______________________

    BRIAN T. BEAR, Spencer Fane LLP, Kansas City, MO,
 argued for appellant. Also represented by ANDY LESTER,
 Oklahoma City, OK; ERICK ROBINSON, Houston, TX; R.
 SCOTT RHOADES, Warren Rhoades LLP, Arlington, TX.

      DEBRA JANECE MCCOMAS, Haynes and Boone, LLP,
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 CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL                          3

 Dallas, TX, argued for appellee. Also represented by
 RAGHAV BAJAJ, Austin, TX; ANGELA M. OLIVER, Washing-
 ton, DC; MICHELLE ASPEN, ROSHAN MANSINGHANI, Unified
 Patents, LLC, Chevy Chase, MD.

     MICHAEL TYLER, Office of the Solicitor, United States
 Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, argued for
 intervenor. Also represented by PETER J. AYERS, ROBERT
 MCBRIDE, FARHEENA YASMEEN RASHEED. Also represented
 by PETER JOHN SAWERT in 2021-1911, 2021-1912, 2021-
 1913, 2021-1914.
                  ______________________

      Before DYK, SCHALL, and STARK, Circuit Judges.
 STARK, Circuit Judge.
     Carucel Investments L.P. (“Carucel”) appeals the final
 written decisions of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board
 (“Board”) holding that certain claims of U.S. Patent Nos.
 7,221,904 (“’904 patent”), 7,848,701 (“’701 patent”),
 7,979,023 (“’023 patent”), and 8,718,543 (“’543 patent” and,
 together with the ’904, ’701, and ’023 patents, the “Carucel
 patents”) are unpatentable as obvious. For the reasons
 provided below, we affirm.
                              I
                              A
      The Carucel patents, each entitled “mobile communi-
 cation system with moving base station,” share substan-
 tially identical specifications. The patents disclose a
 mobile communication system that “employs moving base
 stations moving in the direction of flow of traffic moving
 along a roadway.” ’904 patent, Abstract. These “moving
 base stations” then “communicate with a plurality of fixed
 radio ports connected by a signal transmission link to a
 gateway office which, in turn, is connected to the wire line
 network.” Id. This general configuration of the various
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 4                          CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL

 elements of the invention is illustrated in Figure 1 of the
 Carucel patents, reproduced below, which depicts 1) “mo-
 bile units 20 traveling on a first roadway 10,” 2) “[a] plural-
 ity of moving base stations 30 [which] are disposed along
 one side of the roadway 10 . . . [and which] may be moved
 by means of a rail 35, or other suitable conveying device
 which may include an automotive vehicle travelling on the
 roadway, in the same direction as the traffic flow on the
 roadway 10,” and 3) “a plurality of fixed radio ports 50
 which are connected . . . to a telephone office connected to
 the wire line telephone network and referred to as a . . .
 gateway office 60 [which] forms the interface between the
 mobile telecommunication system and the wire line tele-
 phone network.” Id. at 3:66-4:28.

     Illustrative claim 22 of the ’904 patent recites:
     22. An apparatus adapted to move in accordance
     with a movement of a mobile unit moving relative
     to a plurality of fixed radio ports, the apparatus
     comprising:
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 CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL                           5

     a receiver adapted to receive a plurality of signals,
     each of the plurality of signals transmitted from
     each of the plurality of fixed radio ports within a
     frequency band having a lower limit greater than
     300 megahertz;
     a transmitter adapted to transmit, within the fre-
     quency band, a resultant signal to the mobile unit
     in accordance with at least one of the plurality of
     signals; and
     a processor adapted to maximize an amount of
     transferred information to the mobile unit by eval-
     uating a quality of each of the plurality of signals
     transmitted from the plurality of fixed radio ports.
                               B
      Carucel brought patent infringement lawsuits against
 Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. (“Volkswagen”) and
 Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (“Mercedes-Benz”) in the U.S.
 District Court for the Northern District of Texas, asserting
 all four Carucel patents. Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz
 then filed petitions for several inter partes review (“IPR”)
 proceedings of all of the Carucel patents, which were insti-
 tuted by the Board. A third-party organization, Unified
 Patents, Inc. (“Unified”), also obtained institution of an IPR
 of certain claims of the ’023 patent.
      In their petitions seeking institution of IPRs,
 Volkswagen and Mercedes-Benz set out various obvious-
 ness combinations, based on (as pertinent to here) primary
 prior art references U.S. Patent Nos. 5,559,865 (“Gil-
 housen865”), 5,519,761 (“Gilhousen761”), and 5,276,686
 (“Ito”). 1 Gilhousen865 and Gilhousen761, which share

     1  Unified’s grounds for unpatentability were obvi-
 ousness combinations involving primary references U.S.
 Patent Nos. 5,422,934 (“Massa”) and 4,748,655
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 6                         CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL

 substantially identical specifications, disclose an airborne
 communication system that allows radiotelephones on a
 plane to communicate with a ground-based telephone sys-
 tem. Figure 1 shows the Gilhousen system with ground-
 based subsystem 105 and airborne-based subsystem 125.
 No. 21-1911 J.A. 1241, 1245. 2 As shown, the ground-based
 subsystem 105 includes base station 120 coupled to an-
 tenna 150 and to mobile switching center 115, which in
 turn is coupled to public switched telephone network
 (“PSTN”) 110. J.A. 1245.

 (“Thrower”), which are not at issue in Carucel’s appeal with
 respect to Unified (No. 21-1731).
     2   “J.A.” refers to the joint appendix filed in Appeal
 No. 21-1911, unless otherwise indicated.
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 CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL                          7

     Figure 2 of the Gilhousen references depicts an air-
 borne-based subsystem having radiotelephones 205, signal
 repeater 210, and antenna 215. J.A. 1243, 1245. Repeater
 210 receives signals from radiotelephones 205 within an
 aircraft and relays them to antenna 215 mounted outside
 the aircraft, which in turn relays the signals to the base
 station on the ground. J.A. 1245. These references disclose
 that signal repeater 210 may be replaced by “an airborne
 base station that has the ability to register the radiotele-
 phones on the aircraft. The airborne base station then reg-
 isters the radiotelephone with the ground based
 subsystem.” J.A. 1246 at 3:9-13. The airborne base station
 has “the same functionality of its ground-based counter-
 part but on a much smaller scale since it does not have to
 handle the thousands of radiotelephones of the ground-
 based station.” Id. at 3:13-16.

     Ito discloses “a mobile radio communication system
 that wirelessly connects not only between a base station
 and a mobile station but also between a mobile station, or
 a mobile base device, and a portable device by a radio chan-
 nel in order to eliminate the necessity of wiring the mobile
 base device and portable device and enhance the
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 8                         CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL

 maneuverability of an automobile telephone handset.” J.A.
 1212 at 2:6-12. This system is illustrated in Figure 6 of Ito,
 J.A. 1208, which depicts a mobile radio communication sys-
 tem, in which a mobile base device (MSS) is “connected
 simultaneously with two portable devices PSS1 and PSS2.”
 J.A. 1217 at 12:50-54. The base station (BSS) and the mo-
 bile base device (MSS) communicate with each other by
 way of radio frequencies, and the mobile base device (MSS)
 and portable devices (PSS1 and PSS2) communicate with
 each other by way of different radio frequencies. J.A. 1217.
 Ito teaches using frequency-division multiple access
 (“FDMA”) and time-division multiple access (“TDMA”)
 techniques “for connection between a base station and a
 mobile base device as well as for connection between a mo-
 bile base device MSS and a portable device PSS. With a
 FDMA/TDMA technique, a number of radio frequencies are
 shared by a plurality of stations.” J.A. 1214 at 5:47-52.

     The Board issued final written decisions determining
 that each of the challenged claims is unpatentable as obvi-
 ous over combinations of prior art references including Gil-
 housen865, Gilhousen761, and Ito. Carucel filed motions
 for rehearing, which were denied, and then timely
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 CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL                            9

 appealed. 3 Following the Supreme Court’s issuance of its
 decision in United States v. Arthrex, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 1970
 (2021), we remanded for the limited purpose of allowing
 Carucel to seek Director Review. After such review was
 denied, Carucel filed amended notices of appeal. Mercedes-
 Benz and Volkswagen then notified us they would not par-
 ticipate in the appeals. Hence, briefing was submitted only
 by Carucel, Unified, and the Director of the U.S. Patent
 and Trademark Office (“PTO”).
    The Board had jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 316(c).
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4)(A) and
 35 U.S.C. §§ 141(c), 319.
                               II
     Obviousness is a question of law based on underlying
 fact findings. See KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
 398, 427 (2007). Those findings include: (1) the scope and
 content of the prior art; (2) differences between the prior
 art and the claims at issue; (3) the level of ordinary skill in
 the pertinent art; and (4) secondary considerations such as
 commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, and fail-
 ure of others. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1,
 17-18 (1966). We review the Board’s legal conclusions on
 obviousness de novo and its findings of fact for substantial

     3    In No. 21-1731, Carucel appeals the final written
 decisions in IPR2019-1101/1573, regarding the ’904 patent;
 IPR2019-1102 (’701 patent); IPR2019-1103 (’023 patent);
 IPR2019-1079 (’023 patent); and IPR 2019-1105 (’543 pa-
 tent). All but one of the IPRs at issue in No. 21-1731 were
 filed by Volkswagen; the exception, IPR2019-1079 (’023 pa-
 tent), was filed by Unified. In No. 21-1911, Carucel appeals
 the final written decisions in IPR2019-1298/1635, regard-
 ing the ’904 patent; IPR2019-1442 (’701 patent); IPR2019-
 1404 (’023 patent); and IPR2019-1441/1644 (’543 patent).
 All of the IPRs in No. 21-1911 were filed by Mercedes-Benz.
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  10                         CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL

  evidence. See HTC Corp. v. Cellular Commc’ns Equip.,
  LLC, 877 F.3d 1361, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “Substantial
  evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
  might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Intel
  Corp. v. PACT XPP Schweiz AG, 61 F.4th 1373, 1378 (Fed.
  Cir. 2023). “[T]he possibility of drawing two inconsistent
  conclusions from the evidence does not prevent an admin-
  istrative agency’s finding from being supported by substan-
  tial evidence.” Consolo v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 383 U.S. 607,
  620 (1966). Additionally, we “defer to the Board’s findings
  concerning the credibility of expert witnesses.” Yorkey v.
  Diab, 601 F.3d 1279, 1284 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
      We review the Board’s claim construction de novo and
  any subsidiary factual findings based on extrinsic evidence
  for substantial evidence. See Polaris Innovations Ltd. v.
  Brent, 48 F.4th 1365, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2022). Claim terms
  are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning,
  which is the meaning understood by one of ordinary skill
  in the art at the time of the invention, reading the claim in
  the context of the full specification and prosecution history.
  See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313-14 (Fed.
  Cir. 2005) (en banc); see also Lexion Med., LLC v. Northgate
  Techs., Inc., 641 F.3d 1352, 1356 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “There
  are only two exceptions to this general rule: 1) when a pa-
  tentee sets out a definition and acts as his own lexicogra-
  pher, or 2) when the patentee disavows the full scope of the
  claim term either in the specification or during prosecu-
  tion.” Thorner v. Sony Computer Ent. Am. LLC, 669 F.3d
  1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
       We review the actions of the PTO for compliance with
  the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 551
  et seq. Applying this standard of review, we “hold unlawful
  and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions
  found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
  or otherwise not in accordance with law,” “without ob-
  servance of procedure required by law,” or “unsupported by
  substantial evidence.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(A), (D), (E).
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  CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL                          11

                               III
      On appeal, Carucel challenges: (1) the Board’s con-
  struction of the claim terms “mobile unit” and “mobile de-
  vice;” (2) the Board’s construction of “adapted to;” 4 (3) the
  Board’s conclusion that various claims of Carucel’s patents
  are invalid as obvious over several prior art combinations;
  and (4) the PTO’s “Director Review” procedures, which
  Carucel contends violate the APA. We conclude that none
  of these issues has merit.
                                A
       Before addressing Carucel’s contentions, we begin by
  rejecting the PTO’s position that Carucel forfeited its op-
  portunity to appeal the Board’s construction of “mobile
  unit” and “mobile device” by not first raising these chal-
  lenges in its request for Director Review. Appeals from IPR
  proceedings are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 319, which pro-
  vides that “[a] party dissatisfied with the final written de-
  cision of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board . . . may appeal
  the decision.” The statute does not impose as a further re-
  quirement for preserving issues that they also be presented
  as part of an intra-agency appeal.
      The only other authority the PTO cites for its forfeiture
  position is our non-precedential decision in Polycom, Inc. v.
  Fullview, Inc., 767 F. App’x 970, 980 (Fed. Cir. 2019), which
  held that “Polycom could have, and should have, raised [its]
  anticipation argument in its request for rehearing” and, as
  such, found the argument waived (forfeited). It would seem
  to us, however, that just as failure to seek rehearing cannot
  result in forfeiture, see In re Magnum Oil Tools Int’l, Ltd.,
  829 F.3d 1364, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2016), neither should failure
  to raise an issue when rehearing is sought result in

      4   Carucel raises this issue only in Appeal No. 21-
  1731 and only in connection with IPRs filed by Volkswagen,
  not those initiated by Unified.
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  12                        CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL

  forfeiture. In any case, Polycom concerned inter partes
  reexamination, not inter partes review. Inter partes reex-
  aminations are governed by a regulation requiring parties
  seeking rehearing of a Board decision to “state with partic-
  ularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or
  overlooked in rendering the Board’s opinion reflecting its
  decision.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.79(b)(1). No similar regulation or
  other authority exists in the IPR context. 5 Thus, issues
  Carucel litigated in the IPR but chose not to present in its
  requested Director Review are not forfeited and may be
  pressed on appeal.
                                B
      Carucel appeals the Board’s construction of “mobile de-
  vice” and “mobile unit,” terms the parties agree have the
  same meaning as each other. Carucel proposed that these
  terms should be construed as “a device that must register
  with and be able to directly communicate with the cellular
  network.” The Board held, instead, that no construction

       5  At the time Carucel made its requests for Director
  Review, the PTO’s Arthrex Q&As webpage did not mention
  any exhaustion requirement. See PTO, Arthrex Q&As,
  https://www.uspto.gov/patents/patent-trial-and-appeal-
  board/procedures/arthrex-qas (last accessed December 18,
  2023). Later, on April 22, 2022, the Arthrex Q&As webpage
  was superseded by the PTO’s Interim Process for Director
  Review webpage, which instructed that parties “should
  raise any additional issues sparingly, if at all.” No. 21-1911
  Appellant’s Reply Br. at 9. On July 24, 2023, the PTO pub-
  lished “Revised Interim Director Review Process,” an-
  nouncing that henceforth “[a]ny argument not made within
  the Request [for Director Review] may be deemed waived.”
  See PTO, Revised Interim Director Review Process,
  https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/decisions/revised-in-
  terim-director-review-process (last accessed December 18,
  2023).
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  CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL                            13

  was necessary. On appeal we must address two disputes:
  (1) whether the “mobile device” and “mobile unit” are lim-
  ited to devices that work with a “cellular network” or may
  also include devices that work with other telephone net-
  works, such as cordless phones; and (2) whether the
  claimed “mobile device” and “mobile unit” must be capable
  of registering and communicating with the network “di-
  rectly” (i.e., “by itself”) without relying on actions by inter-
  mediaries. 6 We agree with the Board on both issues: the
  “mobile device” and “mobile unit” are not limited to devices
  that work with a “cellular network” or to those that are ca-
  pable of registering and communicating “directly” with the
  network.
      First, there is no basis in the intrinsic record to limit
  the “mobile device” or “mobile unit” to devices that work
  only with a “cellular network.” Nothing about the claim
  language – that is, the words “mobile,” which refers to ca-
  pability of movement, or “unit” or “device,” which are ge-
  neric indications of a physical article – even suggests
  Carucel’s proposed restriction.
      Turning to the specification, Carucel points to the
  “Field of the Invention,” which states that the Carucel pa-
  tents “relate[] to cellular telephone systems in which a mo-
  bile unit communicates by wireless communication to a

      6    Although its proposed construction does not explic-
  itly require that the claimed “mobile device” and “mobile
  unit” register with a network “by itself,” Carucel has main-
  tained, both during the IPRs and in the present appeals,
  that its proposed construction does so. See, e.g., No. 21-
  1731 J.A. 10635 (stating that prior art did not disclose “mo-
  bile device” limitation as prior art telephone was “not capa-
  ble of registering with a cellular network by itself”); No. 21-
  1731 Appellant’s Reply Br. at 12 (arguing that “mobile de-
  vice must register as part of its independent functionality”
  and “by definition . . . can do so by itself”).
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  14                        CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL

  base station connected to the wire telephone network.”
  E.g., ’904 patent at 1:15-18 (emphasis added). That the in-
  vention “relates to” cellular telephone systems does not
  mean the invention is also limited to, and may only be prac-
  ticed with, a cellular network. Carucel emphasizes that
  “[t]he only embodiments disclosed in the specification are
  mobile units and mobile base stations that connect to mo-
  bile cellular networks” and “[t]he only communications
  standards discussed” in the specification, “TDMA/CDMA
  and IS-95,” are “cellular phone standards.” No. 21-1731
  Appellant’s Br. at 36-37. However, “[e]ven when the spec-
  ification describes only a single embodiment, the claims of
  the patent will not be read restrictively unless the patentee
  has demonstrated a clear intention to limit the claim scope
  using words or expressions of manifest exclusion or re-
  striction.” Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d
  898, 906 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks omit-
  ted). We see no such clear intention here. To the contrary,
  adoption of Carucel’s construction would result in the
  claims failing to capture the breadth of the patents’ disclo-
  sure – including embodiments in which mobile devices
  communicate with the moving base stations using “a stand-
  ard radio interface, well known in the art,” ’904 patent at
  6:43-45 – a generally disfavored outcome in the absence of
  intrinsic evidence limiting the scope of the claims. See
  Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1583
  (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that claim construction excluding
  preferred embodiment “is rarely, if ever, correct”).
      Second, the intrinsic evidence does not require the “mo-
  bile device” or “mobile unit” to be able to “directly” com-
  municate with the telephone network or to register with
  the telephone network “by itself.” To the contrary, the
  specification repeatedly discloses embodiments in which
  the claimed “mobile device” or “mobile unit” communicates
  with the telephone network indirectly via intermediaries.
  In one such embodiment, “the mobile unit does not receive
  communications from the fixed radio port but only from the
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  CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL                          15

  movable base station . . . thereby eliminating any direct
  communication from the mobile unit to the fixed radio
  port.” ’904 patent at 3:49-56 (emphasis added); see also id.
  at 3:18-21 (explaining that moving base stations may be
  interposed between fixed base stations and mobile device).
      For its narrower construction, Carucel relies on a por-
  tion of the specification which states, in pertinent part:
      When a mobile unit set is first powered up or first
      enters a service area, the mobile unit must register
      in the manner described earlier, by transmitting its
      unique address in the new service area. The ad-
      dress will be received by the closest moving base
      station 30 and transmitted via a fixed radio port
      and the gateway switch 60 to the telephone net-
      work. This registration procedure is required so
      that an incoming call for the mobile unit can be ap-
      propriately directed.
  ’904 patent at 9:64-10:4. Even this portion of the specifica-
  tion, however, describes indirect communication between
  the “mobile unit” and the telephone network during the
  registration process, explaining that the “address” of the
  mobile unit is relayed to the telephone network via inter-
  mediaries including “the closest moving base station 30 and
  . . . a fixed radio port and the gateway switch 60.” Id. (em-
  phasis added). This language does not support the restric-
  tive reading of the claim terms pushed by Carucel.
      Thus, we agree with the Board’s decision to reject
  Carucel’s proposed construction of the terms “mobile de-
  vice” and “mobile unit.” Because Carucel only challenges
  the Board’s claim construction to the extent that it failed
  to narrow claim scope in the manner Carucel had proposed,
  we need not determine whether the Board was also correct
  that these terms require no construction.
                               C
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  16                        CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL

      In appeal No. 21-1731 only, Carucel challenges the
  Board’s construction of the term “adapted to,” as it appears
  in the preambles of claims 22 and 34 of the ’904 patent. In
  previous litigation, a district court construed the term to
  mean “‘constructed to move with the traffic at a rate of
  speed which is comparable to the speed of the traffic.’” No.
  21-1731 J.A. 234-35 (quoting J.A. 5556-59). The Board ac-
  cepted the parties’ agreement to adopt this same construc-
  tion. Later, the parties developed a dispute over the
  meaning of “traffic” as used in the Board’s construction.
  Specifically, Carucel proposed that “traffic” refers only to
  “an automotive vehicle traveling on a roadway” and does
  not also include “airplane traffic.” No. 21-1731 J.A. 6639.
  Carucel argued that because “[a]n airplane does not move
  with traffic as it is not bound to predetermined roads,” and
  “an airplane can travel at speeds up to five hundred miles-
  per-hour and, as such, does not move with the traffic at a
  rate of speed which is comparable to the traffic,” airplanes
  must be excluded from the construction. Id. The Board
  rejected Carucel’s proposed narrowing of the term, as it
  was not supported by the specification or the prosecution
  history of the Carucel patents.
      We agree with the Board’s rejection of Carucel’s pro-
  posal to narrow the claim term “adapted to” by restricting
  “traffic” to only “vehicular traffic” traveling on “predeter-
  mined roads.” Carucel asserts that “[t]he type of traffic
  that is described in the specification is solely automobile
  traffic” and “the sole embodiment is directed to ‘roadways’
  involving ‘vehicular traffic.’” No. 21-1731 Appellant’s Br.
  at 46. However, as the Board explained and the PTO ar-
  gues on appeal, the specification also discloses pedestrian
  traffic. See, e.g., ’904 patent at 2:41 (“The low speed is
  mostly pedestrian traffic . . .”), 3:35-39 (“[A] number of
  fixed base stations are provided in addition to moving base
  stations allowing slower moving traffic, such as pedestrian
  traffic . . . to communicate via the fixed base stations.”),
  4:48-51 (“[F]ixed base stations 70 would accommodate
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  CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL                          17

  communications with mobile units traveling at a speed of
  less than 30 miles per hour including pedestrian traffic and
  stationary units.”). Carucel’s narrowed construction, thus,
  would improperly read embodiments relating to pedestrian
  traffic out of the scope of the claims. See Vitronics, 90 F.3d
  at 1583.
      Carucel urges us to consider the testimony of its expert,
  Dr. Lanning, who opined that there is a significant differ-
  ence in the circuitry and signaling between a car-based sys-
  tem and one involving commercial aircraft. We may not,
  however, rely on extrinsic evidence to adopt a claim con-
  struction that contradicts what a person of ordinary skill
  in the art would understand from the intrinsic evidence.
  See Seabed Geosolutions (US) Inc. v. Magseis FF LLC, 8
  F.4th 1285, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (“If the meaning of a
  claim term is clear from the intrinsic evidence, there is no
  reason to resort to extrinsic evidence.”).
      For these reasons, we affirm the Board’s construction
  of the term “adapted to.”
                                D
      Carucel next contends that substantial evidence does
  not support the Board’s determination that its patent
  claims were proven to be invalid as obvious. In particular,
  Carucel challenges the Board’s findings with respect to the
  combination of Gilhousen865 with Gilhousen390 7 and the
  combinations of Ito with references relating to a CDMA cel-
  lular system. 8 We are unpersuaded.

      7   U.S. Patent No. 5,109,390. See No. 21-1731 J.A.
  2166-76.
      8   In the No. 21-1731 appeal, Carucel also faults com-
  binations involving the Vercauteren reference. But the
  Board did not consider the Vercauteren-based combina-
  tions in its final written decision and neither do we.
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  18                         CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL

       Carucel first attacks the Board’s findings regarding the
  combination of the aircraft repeater disclosures in Gil-
  housen865 with the CDMA system of Gilhousen390, criti-
  cizing the Board for failing to credit the testimony of
  Carucel’s expert, Dr. Lanning, who pointed out “technical
  flaws that would render the combination of the two refer-
  ences non-functional.” No. 21-1731 Appellant’s Br. at 48.
  Substantial evidence supports the Board’s determination
  of obviousness based on the combination of Gilhousen865
  and Gilhousen390. For instance, with respect to claim 22
  of the ’904 patent, the Board relied on the testimony of pe-
  titioner’s expert, Dr. Ding, to find that a person of ordinary
  skill in the art would have been motivated to modify Gil-
  housen865’s airborne communication system with Gil-
  housen390’s “various configurations to achieve signal
  diversity at the receiver,” at least for the purpose of “reduc-
  ing errors caused by well-known deleterious effects on
  wirelessly-transmitted signals.” No. 21-1731 J.A. 259, 261-
  62; see also No. 21-1731 J.A. 3457-65 ¶¶ 97-109. The Board
  also credited Dr. Ding’s testimony that an ordinarily
  skilled artisan would have combined these references “with
  a reasonable expectation of success.” No. 21-1731 J.A. 261
  (citing No. 21-1731 J.A. 10509-12 ¶¶ 46-50). The testimony
  cited by the Board directly addressed Carucel’s contentions
  as to the purported incompatibility caused by the high
  speed of aircraft. Having determined to credit the opinion
  of Dr. Ding, a finding to which we defer, see Yorkey, 601
  F.3d at 1284, the Board had substantial evidence for its
  conclusion that “the proposed combination of Gilhousen865
  and Gilhousen390 would involve nothing more than incor-
  porating well-known concepts . . . into a well-known sys-
  tem.” No. 21-1731 J.A. 263-64 (citing No. 21-1731 J.A.
  3465 ¶ 109). 9

       9   Carucel faults the Board’s final written decisions
  for failing to adequately explain why it was persuaded by
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  CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL                        19

      Carucel next challenges the Board’s obviousness deter-
  minations regarding combinations involving Ito and a
  CDMA cellular phone system. Carucel argues that Ito de-
  scribes a TDMA system and, because “CDMA and TDMA
  cellular phone systems are incompatible as a matter of
  technology,” a skilled artisan would not combine these ref-
  erences. No. 21-1731 Appellant’s Br. at 50. Substantial
  evidence supports the Board’s conclusion to the contrary.
       For example, looking again at ’904 patent claim 22 –
  which was challenged in IPR2019-1298/1635 based on the
  combination of Ito and Gilhousen501 10 – the Board credited
  testimony from petitioner’s expert, Dr. Fischer, that devel-
  opments in the telecommunications industry would have
  led a person of ordinary skill in the art to apply Gil-
  housen501’s CDMA technology to Ito’s disclosures, given
  the advantages of CDMA over FDMA/TDMA. J.A. 40-41
  (citing J.A. 1387-89 ¶¶ 104-09). The Board also pointed to
  Gilhousen501’s disclosure that CDMA technology has “sig-
  nificant advantages” over Ito’s FDMA/TDMA technology.
  J.A. 40 (citing J.A. 1230 at 1:18-23).
      Taking claim 13 of the ’543 patent as another example
  – which was challenged in IPR2019-1105 based on the com-
  bination of Ito, Paneth, 11 and Gilhousen390 – the Board

  certain obviousness arguments, analogizing the situation
  here to what we encountered in Alacritech, Inc. v. Intel
  Corp., 966 F.3d 1367, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2020). This compari-
  son lacks merit. Here, unlike in Alacritech, the Board out-
  lined the parties’ dispute and articulated its rationale,
  including by identifying the evidence it relied on, all of
  which allows us to “reasonably discern that [the Board] fol-
  lowed a proper path.” Ariosa Diagnostics v. Verinata
  Health, Inc., 805 F.3d 1359, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
      10  U.S. Patent No. 5,101,501. See J.A. 1225-40.
      11  U.S. Patent No. 4,675,863. See No. 21-1731 J.A.
  3341-76.
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  20                         CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL

  credited Dr. Ding’s testimony, considered Carucel’s com-
  peting evidence, and then found that a person of ordinary
  skill in the art would have been “motivated to combine the
  teachings of Ito and Paneth with the well-known CDMA
  technology of Gilhousen390 with a reasonable expectation
  of success.” No. 21-1731 J.A. 219 (citing J.A. 4125-28 ¶¶
  176-81; J.A. 10597-604 ¶¶ 49-61). The Board also noted
  that Dr. Ding provided “examples in the technical litera-
  ture describing the combination of TDMA, FDMA, and
  CDMA.” No. 21-1731 J.A. 218 (citing J.A. 10602-03 ¶¶ 59-
  60).
       Carucel’s reliance on In re IPR Licensing, Inc., 942 F.3d
  1363 (Fed. Cir. 2019), where we reversed a Board decision
  that was based on non-record evidence, is inapposite, as the
  record of the present appeals contains direct expert support
  for the Board’s findings. Most particularly, substantial ev-
  idence supports the Board’s conclusions of obviousness.
                                E
       We conclude by addressing Carucel’s APA arguments
  concerning its requests for Director Review of the Board’s
  final written decisions. Carucel acknowledges that our de-
  cision in Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 35 F.4th
  1328 (Fed. Cir. 2022) (“Arthrex II”), is dispositive on certain
  aspects of its challenges. It points to other issues that are
  not directly controlled by binding precedent. Because there
  is at least one dispositive flaw with respect to each of the
  issues Carucel raises, we need not, and do not, catalog all
  of the defects in its positions.
      Carucel first argues that the orders denying its re-
  quests for Director Review violate the APA because they
  are unsigned and provide no explanation. We disagree.
  The denial orders list the Office of the Under Secretary of
  Commerce and Director of the PTO as the issuing office,
  identify Commissioner Hirshfeld as the presiding officer,
  and state that Carucel’s requests had been referred to him.
  Although the orders do not bear the signatures of
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  CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL                          21

  Commissioner Hirshfeld, it is sufficiently clear that he is
  the official responsible for issuing them. See generally But-
  ler v. Principi, 244 F.3d 1337, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (ex-
  plaining that, “[i]n the absence of clear evidence to the
  contrary,” we “presume that what appears regular is regu-
  lar,” including that “public officers have properly dis-
  charged their official duties”). The orders at issue here are
  not, as Carucel suggests, anonymous.
       Nor is Carucel entitled to additional explanation for
  the denial of its requests for Director Review. Pursuant to
  the APA, agency decisions must “include a statement of . . .
  findings and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor,
  on all the material issues of fact, law, or discretion pre-
  sented on the record.” 5 U.S.C. § 557(c)(3)(A). Commis-
  sioner Hirshfeld’s determination not to disturb the Board’s
  final written decisions is not separately subject to these re-
  quirements because, as the orders expressly state, “the Pa-
  tent Trial and Appeal Board’s Final Written Decision is the
  final decision of the agency.” E.g., No. 21-1731 J.A. 12442.
  The Board’s final written decisions were and are reviewa-
  ble final decisions of the agency; they contain a reasoned
  explanation for the agency’s conclusion, an explanation
  that remained the position of the PTO even after Carucel’s
  request for Director Review was denied. Even where the
  agency adopts an earlier subordinate decision within the
  agency, adoption of the already-existing explanation in the
  subordinate decision for the agency’s action is permissible.
  See, e.g., City of Bethany v. Fed. Energy Regul. Comm’n,
  727 F.2d 1131, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“FERC’s summary
  affirmance of the ALJ’s adoption of a 5% transmission loss
  figure is not improper.”); Armstrong v. Commodity Futures
  Trading Comm’n, 12 F.3d 401, 403-04 (3d Cir. 1993) (“An
  administrative agency need not provide an independent
  statement if it specifically adopts an ALJ’s opinion that
  sets forth adequate findings and reasoning.”).
       Next, Carucel argues that the PTO violated the APA by
  failing to promulgate regulations governing the Director
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  22                         CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL

  Review process through notice-and-comment rulemaking,
  thereby rendering the orders denying Director Review null
  and void. According to Carucel, at the time it submitted its
  requests for Director Review, the PTO had only provided
  informal guidance about the review process on a webpage
  called “Arthrex Q&As.” The PTO, joined by Unified, re-
  sponds that notice-and-comment rulemaking is not re-
  quired because the challenged guidance explaining the
  agency’s internal processes and outlining the procedural
  requisites for seeking Director Review falls within the
  APA’s exemption for “rules of agency organization, proce-
  dure, or practice,” which need not emanate from notice-
  and-comment procedures. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A).
      We need not determine if the PTO’s guidance govern-
  ing the Director Review process is exempt from notice-and-
  comment rulemaking under the APA because, even assum-
  ing it is not exempt, any error by the PTO in this regard
  would be harmless and would not render the denial of
  Carucel’s requests for Director Review “null and void.”
  When we review agency actions for APA violations, we
  must take “due account . . . of the rule of prejudicial error.”
  5 U.S.C. § 706(2); see also Jicarilla Apache Nation v. U.S.
  Dep’t of Interior, 613 F.3d 1112, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The
  burden to demonstrate prejudicial error is on the party
  challenging agency action.”). We can find no prejudice to
  Carucel here. Carucel does not contend it was unaware of
  the relevant procedural requirements for filing a request
  for Director Review; nor does it identify any way in which
  it was prejudiced by the manner in which the PTO distrib-
  uted its guidance. Carucel filed its requests for Director
  Review in a timely manner and consistent with the proce-
  dures set out by the PTO. Its requests were not denied due
  to any failure to comply with that guidance. Thus, the
  PTO’s failure, if any, to follow the APA’s notice-and-com-
  ment requirement is harmless error. See generally Window
  Covering Mfrs. Ass’n v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 82
  F.4th 1273, 1284 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (“We will not set aside a
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  CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL                          23

  rule absent a showing by the petitioner[] that [it] suffered
  prejudice from the agency’s failure to provide an oppor-
  tunity for public comment.”) (internal quotation marks
  omitted); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of
  Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 659 (2007) (holding alleged agency
  error harmless). Furthermore, the APA provides that if a
  rule is erroneously issued outside the Federal Register
  publication process it may nonetheless bind a party, like
  Carucel, that had “actual and timely notice of the terms
  thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(1). 12
        Finally, Carucel argues that the PTO violated the APA
  by delegating the Director’s review function to unidentified
  “advisory committee” members. In Carucel’s view, because
  the identities of the “advisory committee” members are not
  made known to the parties requesting Director Review,
  conflicts of interest might escape the PTO’s attention and
  then avoid all scrutiny. Carucel grounds its argument on
  5 U.S.C. § 556(b)(3), which provides that “[t]he functions of
  . . . employees participating in decisions . . . shall be con-
  ducted in an impartial manner.” Even assuming the Direc-
  tor Review process is a formal adjudication, as defined in
  § 554 (making § 556 applicable), and even further assum-
  ing that the involvement of the “advisory committee” mem-
  bers in the Director Review process constitutes
  “participating in decisions,” issues we do not decide, we
  agree with the PTO that the Director is entitled to consult

      12  On July 20, 2022, the PTO published in the Federal
  Register a “Request for Comments on Director Review,
  Precedential Opinion Panel Review, and Internal Circula-
  tion and Review of Patent Trial and Appeal Board Deci-
  sions.” See 87 Fed. Reg. 43249-52; see also 87 Fed. Reg.
  58330-31 (extending comment period). The comment pe-
  riod closed on October 19, 2022. As of the issuance date of
  this opinion, the PTO has not adopted final rules on the
  Director Review process.
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  24                         CARUCEL INVESTMENTS L.P. v. VIDAL

  with subordinate agency employees in exercising her au-
  thority in connection with Director Review without disclos-
  ing the identities of these agency employees.
       In its reply brief, Carucel belatedly adds that the PTO
  further violated the APA by not publishing the recommen-
  dations made by the “advisory committee” members.
  Carucel’s reliance on 5 U.S.C. § 557(c), which requires that
  “[a]ll decisions, including initial, recommended, and tenta-
  tive decisions, are a part of the record,” is misplaced, as the
  “recommended decisions” referred to in the statute are
  those made by “the presiding employee or an employee
  qualified to preside at hearings pursuant to [S]ection 556.”
  5 U.S.C. § 557(b). Any “recommendations” made by the
  “advisory committee,” by contrast, are merely internal ad-
  vice provided to the Director, who is the agency deci-
  sionmaker.
     In sum, none of the purported APA violations provides
  any basis for us to reverse or vacate the Board’s decisions.
                                IV
       We have considered Carucel’s remaining arguments
  and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
  affirm the Board’s final written decisions holding the
  claims of the Carucel patents unpatentable as obvious.
                          AFFIRMED
                              COSTS
  Costs shall be assessed against Appellant.