Court Opinion

ID: 9548793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:08:45.145043+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:19:25.797232
License: Public Domain

HUNTLEY, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur with the majority opinion with the caveat that there can be instances where an employer’s knowing ordering of an employee into an unsafe working environment would, in my judgment, rise to the level of wilful physical aggression.
The issue is whether conduct which lacks a specific intent to injure can properly be termed intentional under the terms of I.C. § 72-209(3). As noted by the Court in Jones v. VIP Development, 472 N.E.2d 1046 (Ohio 1984),
[A]n intentional tort is an act committed with the intent to injure another, or committed with the belief that such injury is substantially certain to occur. See 1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 15, Section 8A. We hereby reject the proposition that a specific intent to injure is necessary to a finding of intentional misconduct. (Emphasis added.)
1 Restatement of the Law 2d, Torts (1965) 15, Section 8A reads:
The word “intent” is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to denote that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it.
In the instant case there is no evidence to demonstrate that the employer knew the employee would operate the machine without the grass catcher affixed, which installation would have covered the opening in the chassis which exposed the blade.