Court Opinion

ID: 9402793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-16 21:00:39.86639+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:02.596014
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 20-1680

        JAMES RANDY SCHOONOVER,

                             Plaintiff – Appellant,

                      v.

        CLAY COUNTY SHERIFF’S DEPARTMENT, a division of the Clay County
        Commission; CLAY COUNTY COMMISSION, a political division of Clay County,
        West Virginia; MICHAEL PATRICK MORRIS, a deputy sheriff of Clay County;
        JONATHAN HOLCOMB, a deputy sheriff of Clay County,

                             Defendants – Appellees.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia, at
        Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr., Senior District Judge. (2:19-cv-00386)

        Argued: December 7, 2022                                          Decided: June 15, 2023

        Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, and Patricia Tolliver
        GILES, United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by
        designation.

        Affirmed by unpublished opinion. District Judge Giles wrote the opinion in which Chief
        Judge Gregory and Judge Niemeyer joined.

        ARGUED: John-Mark Atkinson, ATKINSON & FRAMPTON, PLLC, Charleston, West
        Virginia, for Appellant. Drannon L. Adkins, PULLIN, FOWLER, FLANAGAN, BROWN
        & POE, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Wendy E. Greve,
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        PULLIN, FOWLER, FLANAGAN, BROWN & POE, PLLC, Charleston, West Virginia,
        for Appellees.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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        GILES, District Judge:

               James Randy Schoonover brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law,

        arguing, as relevant here, that two deputy sheriffs from the Clay County Sheriff’s

        Department violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from the use of excessive force.

        Specifically, Schoonover, whose left arm is amputated, alleged that the deputies used

        excessive force when they handcuffed his right wrist to his right ankle during his arrest for

        several minor traffic violations. The district court dismissed this claim, concluding that,

        while their conduct amounted to a constitutional violation, the deputies were entitled to

        qualified immunity. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the district court’s judgment.

                                                     I.

               The following facts are drawn from the Complaint.           Appellant James Randy

        Schoonover is a sixty-five-year-old resident of Clay County, West Virginia. J.A. 7. On

        September 27, 2018, Schoonover began to experience chest pain and drove to his brother’s

        house to ask for a ride to the hospital in Charleston. J.A. 8. Schoonover arrived at his

        brother’s house, exited his car, and started walking up the driveway when Appellee Deputy

        Sheriff Michael Patrick Morris pulled into the driveway and turned on his vehicle’s police

        lights. 1 Id. Morris requested Schoonover’s license and registration and asked if he had

               1
                 According to a criminal complaint against Schoonover, Morris conducted a
        “routine traffic stop” based on an expired vehicle registration. J.A. 45. Morris ran
        Schoonover’s vehicle registration through the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”),
        which indicated that the license tags were stolen. Id. Morris also ran Schoonover’s name
        and date of birth through the DMV, which revealed that his license was suspended for
        unpaid citations. Id.

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        insurance. J.A. 8, 45. Schoonover responded that he did not have the requested documents

        and did not have insurance. J.A. 8, 45. Schoonover stated that he was experiencing chest

        pain and needed an aspirin. J.A. 9. Morris responded that Schoonover could not get an

        aspirin right now and stated that he needed to “figure out what’s going on here.” Id. At

        that point, Schoonover’s sister-in-law asked if she could give him an aspirin, which Morris

        allowed. Id. Schoonover went into the house and took an aspirin. Id. While inside the

        house, Schoonover also called a local magistrate, Magistrate Jeffery Boggs, to ask if he

        could stay after 4:00 p.m. in case Schoonover was going to be brought before him. Id.

        Schoonover exited the house and Morris asked who he had called. Id. When Schoonover

        responded, Morris told him that he would be arrested “because he called Magistrate

        Boggs.” Id.

               Appellee Deputy Sheriff Jonathan Holcomb, who had arrived on the scene by that

        point, arrested Schoonover, handcuffed his right wrist to his right ankle, and placed him in

        the back of Morris’ vehicle. J.A. 9–10. Schoonover was handcuffed in this manner

        because he is missing his left arm, which was amputated prior to the events of this suit.

        J.A. 7. As he was being placed in the vehicle, Schoonover asked for another aspirin and

        Holcomb raised his arm as if preparing to strike Schoonover, and said: “Shut your mouth,

        old man, or I’ll shut it for you.” J.A. 10. Neither Morris nor Holcomb informed

        Schoonover of the reason for his arrest or read him his Miranda rights. Id. When they

        reached the courthouse, Holcomb took Schoonover out of the police vehicle and said to a

        group of young men standing outside the courthouse: “You see this criminal here? Be

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        good or you’ll end up here.” Id. Holcomb and Morris also told their supervisor that they

        should have made Schoonover “quack like Donald Duck” while he was handcuffed. Id.

               Schoonover was charged with four criminal violations: (1) driving with a suspended

        or revoked license, (2) driving without proof of insurance, (3) improper vehicle

        registration, and (4) receiving or transferring stolen property. J.A. 44. Schoonover pleaded

        guilty to receiving or transferring stolen property, and the remaining charges against him

        were dismissed. J.A. 48, 50–53.

               On May 15, 2019, Schoonover filed a complaint in the United States District Court

        for the Southern District of West Virginia against the Clay County Sheriff’s Department,

        the Clay County Commission, Morris in his individual capacity, and Holcomb in his

        individual capacity. See J.A. 7. Schoonover alleged he suffered physical injuries to his

        back, ankle, and wrist because of the way Morris and Holcomb had handcuffed him and

        alleged claims of excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment under 42 U.S.C.

        § 1983, state constitutional violations, and negligence against all Defendants. J.A. 11–16.

        Defendants moved to dismiss all claims. J.A. 18.

               On May 21, 2020, the district court granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss.

        Regarding Schoonover’s excessive force claim under section 1983, the district court

        concluded that Morris and Holcomb’s actions constituted excessive force in violation of

        the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable seizures. J.A. 99–101. The

        district court explained that “[h]andcuffing an elderly amputee wrist-to-ankle under these

        circumstances is so extreme that any reasonable officer on the scene should know that the

        conduct constituted the imposition of excessive force in violation of the Fourth

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        Amendment.” J.A. 101. Nevertheless, the district court determined that Morris and

        Holcomb were entitled to qualified immunity because there was “no indication that the

        officers were or should have been on notice of a clearly established right not to handcuff

        one such as [Schoonover] in this way.” J.A. 102.

               Schoonover timely appealed the district court’s dismissal of his Fourth Amendment

        claims of excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Morris and Holcomb. J.A. 120.

                                                    II.

               We review the district court’s grant of a qualified immunity-based motion to dismiss

        de novo. 2 Tobey v. Jones, 706 F.3d 379, 385 (4th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted). We accept

        as true all of the factual allegations contained in Schoonover’s Complaint and draw all

        reasonable inferences in his favor. Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc.,

        591 F.3d 250, 253 (4th Cir. 2009) (citing Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244

        (4th Cir. 1999)).

               2
                 On appeal, Schoonover appears to cite to materials that were not part of the record
        before the district court, including the testimonies of Holcomb and Morris and the sheriff
        department’s handcuffing policies. Because this Court is reviewing the district court’s
        grant of a motion to dismiss—which “test[s] the sufficiency of a complaint”—we will not
        consider materials that arose for the first time in discovery. Edwards v. City of Goldsboro,
        178 F.3d 231, 243 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150,
        1165 (3d Cir. 1986) (“The only proper function of a court of appeals is to review the
        decision below on the basis of the record that was before the district court.”).

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                                                     III.

               Schoonover argues that the district court erred by concluding that Morris and

        Holcomb were entitled to qualified immunity. 3 Qualified immunity shields government

        officials “from civil damages liability as long as their actions could reasonably have been

        thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.”          Anderson v.

        Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987) (citations omitted); see also Tobey, 706 F.3d at 385.

        To determine whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity, we must examine, in

        either order: “(1) whether a constitutional violation occurred; and (2) whether the right was

        clearly established at the time of the violation[.]” Est. of Jones v. City of Martinsburg, 961

        F.3d 661, 667 (4th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted), as amended (June 10, 2020); see Pearson

        v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 236 (2009) (finding that courts “should be permitted to exercise

        their sound discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity

        analysis should be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at

        hand”).

               Schoonover’s “appeal is limited to the second prong of the qualified immunity

        analysis: whether a reasonable officer would have known that his actions violated a clearly

               3
                 As a threshold matter, this Court finds that Schoonover did not waive his argument
        that Holcomb and Morris are not entitled to qualified immunity. While Holcomb and
        Morris maintain that Schoonover did not argue before the district court that the right to not
        be handcuffed wrist-to-ankle is clearly established, they concede that Schoonover argued
        that the right to be free from the use of excessive force is a clearly established Fourth
        Amendment right. Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 3. Because these are “variations of the same
        basic argument[,]” we conclude that Schoonover did not waive his argument that Holcomb
        and Morris are not entitled to qualified immunity. United States v. Lavabit, LLC, 749 F.3d
        276, 288 (4th Cir. 2014).

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        established right.” Valladares v. Cordero, 552 F.3d 384, 389 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation

        omitted). A right is “clearly established” if “the contours of the right [are] sufficiently clear

        that a reasonable officer would understand that what he is doing violates that right.” Hill

        v. Crum, 727 F.3d 312, 321–22 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603,

        615 (1999)). Therefore, courts must examine “whether an official in the defendant’s

        position knew or reasonably should have known that the action he took violated the

        constitutional rights of the plaintiff.” Id. at 322 (citing Wilson, 526 U.S. at 614–15).

        However, “we do not impose on the official a duty to sort out conflicting decisions or to

        resolve subtle or open issues.” McVey v. Stacy, 157 F.3d 271, 277 (4th Cir. 1998).

        “Officials are not liable for bad guesses in gray areas; they are liable for transgressing

        bright lines.” Maciariello v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).

        Thus, “in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent.” Crum, 727 F.3d

        at 322 (quoting Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615). Officials, however, “‘can still be on notice that

        their conduct violates established law even in novel factual circumstances,’ so long as the

        law provided ‘fair warning’ that their conduct was unconstitutional.” Booker v. S.C. Dep’t

        of Corr., 855 F.3d 533, 538 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741

        (2002)).

               There is no doubt that the broad legal principle governing this case—that citizens

        have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures accomplished by

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        excessive force—was clearly established at the time of Schoonover’s arrest. 4 See Graham

        v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989) (“Where . . . the excessive force claim arises in the

        context of an arrest or investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most properly characterized

        as one invoking the protections of the Fourth Amendment, which guarantees citizens the

        right ‘to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures’ of the person.”);

        see also Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985) (“[T]here can be no question that

        apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to the reasonableness

        requirement of the Fourth Amendment.”). However, the Supreme Court has cautioned that

        this right, as articulated in Graham, is “cast at a high level of generality.” Brosseau v.

        Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 199 (2004) (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). Thus, Graham “does

        not by itself ‘create clearly established law outside “an obvious case.”’” E.W. ex rel. T.W.

        v. Dolgos, 884 F.3d 172, 186 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 80

        (2017)). While Schoonover’s right not to be unreasonably handcuffed is clearly implicated

        by his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizure, the Court finds that

        this seizure does not amount to “an obvious case” such that Holcomb and Morris were on

               4
                 Schoonover’s arguments on appeal are limited to the application of excessive force
        during arrest under the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court has noted that there is an
        open question regarding “whether the Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals
        with protection against the deliberate use of excessive physical force beyond the point at
        which arrest ends and pretrial detention begins” and that “[i]t is clear . . . that the Due
        Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to
        punishment.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (citing Bell v. Wolfish,
        441 U.S. 520, 535–539 (1979)). However, Schoonover made no argument before the
        district court regarding excessive force used beyond the point of arrest, or regarding his
        right to be free from pretrial punishment under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
        Amendment.

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        sufficient notice that their conduct—handcuffing Schoonover wrist-to-ankle—constituted

        an unreasonable seizure. Id.

               In defining the right at issue in the present case, we consider the Supreme Court’s

        admonition “not to define clearly established law at a high level of generality.” Mullenix

        v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015) (quoting Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011)).

        Rather, we must “take care to define the right at an ‘appropriate level of specificity[,]’”

        Thompson v. Virginia, 878 F.3d 89, 98 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Wilson, 526 U.S. at 615),

        especially in the Fourth Amendment context, where “[i]t is sometimes difficult for an

        officer to determine how the relevant legal doctrine, here excessive force, will apply to the

        factual situation the officer confronts[,]” Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12 (first alteration in

        original) (quoting Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 205 (2001), modified by Pearson, 555

        U.S. 223 (holding that the two-step inquiry for resolving qualified immunity claims may

        be taken in either order)).

               The parties diverge in defining the constitutional right at issue here. Schoonover

        argues that non-threatening individuals have a clearly established right to have their known

        injuries considered by police officers during handcuffing. 5 Appellant’s Op. Br. at 17–18.

        Appellees, on the other hand, argue that the district court correctly found that “the right not

        to be handcuffed wrist-to-ankle” is not clearly established. Appellees’ Resp. Br. at 5. The

               5
                 In the statement of the issue presented for review in his Opening Brief, however,
        Schoonover states the issue differently: “whether Morris and Holcomb were on notice of
        a clearly established right not to handcuff the 65-year-old, amputee Schoonover from wrist
        to ankle.” Appellant’s Op. Br. at 1. As discussed below, this recitation of the right at issue
        is appropriately specific.

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        district court held that “handcuffing the plaintiff wrist-to-ankle under the circumstances in

        this case seems unreasonable, but there is no indication that the officers were or should

        have been on notice of a clearly established right not to handcuff one such as the plaintiff

        in this way.” J.A. 102. We find that the district court’s narrow recitation of the right at

        issue is defined “at an appropriate level of specificity.” Thompson, 878 F.3d at 98.

        Accordingly, we must now determine whether Schoonover’s right not to be handcuffed

        wrist-to-ankle was clearly established.

               For a right to be clearly established, it must be grounded in “‘controlling authority’

        or ‘a robust “consensus of cases of persuasive authority.”’” District of Columbia v. Wesby,

        138 S. Ct. 577, 589–90 (2018)(quoting al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741–42); see also Williams v.

        Strickland, 917 F.3d 763, 769 (4th Cir. 2019). Cases of “controlling authority” are those

        handed down by the Supreme Court, this Court, and the “highest court of the state in which

        the case arose[.]” Booker, 855 F.3d at 538 (quoting Owens ex rel. Owens v. Lott, 372 F.3d

        267, 279 (4th Cir. 2004)). “We ‘ordinarily’ need not look any further than decisions from

        these courts.” Id. (quoting Owens, 372 F.3d at 279). However, “when ‘there are no such

        decisions from courts of controlling authority, we may look to “a consensus of cases of

        persuasive authority” from other jurisdictions, if such exists.’” Id. (emphasis in original)

        (quoting Owens, 372 F.3d at 279–80).

               Schoonover does not cite to any binding precedent that “place[s] the . . .

        constitutional question beyond debate.” al–Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741 (citations omitted).

        Thus, in the absence of controlling authority, this Court looks to whether there is a “robust

        consensus of persuasive authority,” Strickland, 917 F.3d at 769 (quoting Booker, 855 F.3d

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        at 544), “that would have given the defendants ‘fair warning that their conduct,’ under the

        circumstances, was wrongful,” id. (quoting Williamson v. Stirling, 912 F.3d 154, 187 (4th

        Cir. 2018)). Schoonover argues that a handful of district and circuit court cases create this

        “robust consensus of persuasive authority.” Id. However, these cases do not clearly

        establish that Schoonover had a Fourth Amendment right to be free from being handcuffed

        wrist-to-ankle, such that Holcomb and Morris had fair warning that their specific conduct

        was unconstitutional.

               Schoonover argues that Walton v. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331 (6th Cir. 1993),

        and Guite v. Wright, 147 F.3d 747 (8th Cir. 1998), are factually similar to the instant matter

        and evidence a clearly established right for officers to take known injuries into account

        during handcuffing. 6 In Walton, the plaintiff was arrested for driving with a suspended

               6
                 Schoonover also cites Howard v. Dickerson, 34 F.3d 978 (10th Cir. 1994), to show
        that the Tenth Circuit has established that an officer must consider known injuries when
        handcuffing a non-threatening individual. The plaintiff in Howard had recently undergone
        surgery and was wearing a neck brace at the time of arrest, and advised the arresting officer
        that handcuffing her behind her back would cause injury. Id. at 979. However, the plaintiff
        in Howard alleged a claim of deliberate indifference to her known medical needs under the
        Fourteenth Amendment, not a claim of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. Id.
        at 979–80. Thus, Howard is inapplicable here.

               Schoonover also cites to other cases in the Sixth Circuit related to the use of
        excessive force during handcuffing. See Martin v. Heideman, 106 F.3d 1308, 1313 (6th
        Cir. 1997) (finding that handcuffing an individual’s wrists too tightly could form the basis
        of an excessive force claim and remanding for a retrial); Kostrzewa v. City of Troy, 247
        F.3d 633, 641 (6th Cir. 2001) (reversing the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s
        excessive force claim based on an “overly-tight application of handcuffs”). These cases
        establish that handcuffing an individual’s wrists too tightly may be grounds for an
        excessive force claim, but they do not contribute to a robust consensus that there is a clearly
        established right to be free from being handcuffed as Schoonover was, wrist-to-ankle.

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        license and handcuffed behind her back. 995 F.2d at 1333–34. The plaintiff claimed that

        she “begged not to be handcuffed” due to a shoulder injury, while the officer claimed that

        the plaintiff “never told him why she did not want to be handcuffed, and only told him her

        shoulder was hurting when they were travelling to the station.” Id. at 1342. The Sixth

        Circuit concluded that there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officer

        used excessive force because there was a dispute over whether the officer knew that the

        plaintiff had an injured shoulder. Id. (finding that “[a]n excessive use of force claim could

        be premised on [the officer’s] handcuffing [of the plaintiff] if he knew that she had an

        injured arm and if he believed that she posed no threat to him”).

               In Guite, a plain clothed officer and three uniformed officers arrived at the plaintiff’s

        home to question his teenage son about a recent string of armed robberies. 147 F.3d at

        749. The plaintiff, who was recovering from surgery on his left shoulder and was wearing

        his arm in a sling, told the officers to either produce an arrest warrant or leave his property.

        Id. at 749–50. In response, one officer “grabbed [the plaintiff’s] wrist, pushed him

        backwards, and held him up against the open door inside the house.” Id. at 750. The Eighth

        Circuit concluded that, although “not every push or shove violates the Fourth

        Amendment,” there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the officer used

        excessive force because it was unclear “whether force was needed and whether such force

        was excessive under the circumstances.” Id. (citations omitted).

               However, the facts in Walton and Guite are distinct from those here in one key

        respect. In Walton and Guite, the officers were made aware (or there was a dispute over

        whether the officer was made aware) of the plaintiffs’ preexisting physical injuries and

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        proceeded to handcuff the plaintiffs in a manner that was likely to exacerbate those injuries.

        Here, Appellees did not handcuff Schoonover in a manner likely to exacerbate a preexisting

        physical injury or condition. Although the condition of his left arm was clearly visible,

        Schoonover does not allege that he notified Appellees that he was experiencing pain or

        discomfort when he was handcuffed.           Unlike the plaintiffs in Walton and Guite,

        Schoonover did not have a preexisting physical injury or condition that was clearly

        susceptible to aggravation or re-injury from handcuffing; indeed, Schoonover’s alleged

        injuries do not appear to stem from the site of his amputation. Given his amputated left

        arm, Appellees could not secure Schoonover in a traditional manner and in their attempt to

        handcuff him, caused new injuries to Schoonover’s back, ankle, and wrist. Thus, while

        Walton and Guite show there is some consensus around the right of arrestees to have their

        known, preexisting injuries considered during handcuffing, they do not constitute a “robust

        consensus of persuasive authority” that gave Appellees “fair warning that their conduct,

        under the circumstances, was wrongful[.]” Strickland, 917 F.3d at 769.

               Finally, Schoonover cites to various out-of-circuit district court cases to further

        support his position that there is a clearly established right to have officers consider known

        injuries in their decision to handcuff a non-threatening individual. 7 However, as discussed

               7
                See Aceto v. Kachajian, 240 F. Supp. 2d 121, 126 (D. Mass. 2003); Eason v.
        Anoka–Hennepin E. Metro Narcotics & Violent Crimes Task Force, No. 00–CV–311–
        PAM/SRN, 2002 WL 1303023, at *5 (D. Minn. June 6, 2002); Caron v. Hester, No. 00–
        CV–394–M, 2001 WL 1568761, at *6 (D.N.H. Nov. 13, 2001); Ferguson v. Hall, 33 F.
        Supp. 2d 608, 612 (E.D. Mich. 1999); Pritzker v. City of Hudson, 26 F. Supp. 2d. 433, 444
        (N.D.N.Y. 1998).

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        above, in the present case, this definition of the right at issue is incorrect. Moreover, the

        out-of-circuit district court cases cited by Schoonover are only of limited persuasive

        authority. See Booker, 855 F.3d at 545 (finding that “unanimity” among the Second, Third,

        Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits created a “robust

        consensus of persuasive authority,” but noting that because “published district court

        opinions, like unpublished opinions from our Court, have no precedential value, it follows

        that we should not consider them [as persuasive authority]”); see also Camreta v. Greene,

        563 U.S. 692, 709 n.7 (2011) (“Many Courts of Appeals . . . decline to consider district

        court precedent when determining if constitutional rights are clearly established for

        purposes of qualified immunity.”).

               In any case, even if these district court cases were considered persuasive authority,

        they would still not form a “robust consensus” as other circuits have reached the conclusion

        opposite Schoonover’s position: that police officers are entitled to qualified immunity

        after injuring an individual during handcuffing, even when the officer was aware of the

        individual’s preexisting injury or complaints of pain or discomfort. See, e.g., Day v.

        Wooten, 947 F.3d 453, 463 (7th Cir. 2020) (reversing the district court’s denial of qualified

        immunity and finding no clearly established right “of an out-of-breath [and non-

        cooperative] arrestee to not have his hands cuffed behind his back after he complains of

        difficulty breathing”); Jackson v. Lubelan, 657 F. App’x 497, 502 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding

        that “handcuffing someone just tightly enough that an awkward arm placement or a minor

        lift causes an injury is not [a clearly established violation of the Fourth Amendment] . . .

        even when the suspect complains to the officers” (citation omitted)); Royster v. Nichols,

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        698 F.3d 681, 692 (8th Cir. 2012) (finding that handcuffing a cooperative individual with

        his hands behind his back after he informed the officer of a preexisting shoulder injury did

        not constitute excessive force); Secondo v. Campbell, 327 F. App’x 126, 132–33 (11th Cir.

        2009) (same); Morreale v. City of Cripple Creek, No. 96-1220, 1997 WL 290976, at *5–6

        (10th Cir. May 27, 1997) (unpublished table decision) (finding that handcuffing a non-

        threatening and cooperative individual with her hands behind her back, despite her stated

        shoulder injury, did not constitute excessive force).

               In sum, the cases cited by Schoonover do not amount to a “robust consensus of

        persuasive authority” that gave Appellees fair warning that their conduct was

        unconstitutional. While Appellees’ actions appear inappropriate and callous in hindsight,

        we conclude that Schoonover’s right not to be handcuffed in the manner that he was—

        wrist-to-ankle—was not clearly established, and Morris and Holcomb are entitled to

        qualified immunity.

                                                     IV.

               For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm the district court’s order granting

        Appellees’ motion to dismiss.

                                                                                         AFFIRMED

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