Court Opinion

ID: 9778620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 21:14:01.685996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:12.140498
License: Public Domain

on appellant’s motion for rehearing
WOODLEY, Presiding Judge.
Appellant’s punishment was enhanced under Art. 63 P.C. by two prior convictions for felonies less than capital.
The indictment alleges both of these prior convictions to have been for the offense of “Breaking and entering a motor vehicle.”
There being no statement of facts, we are not apprised of the contents or form of the indictments.
In his motion for rehearing appellant, for the first time, challenges the validity of the prior convictions contending that the statute under which the prosecutions for “Breaking and entering a motor vehicle” were had is void for indefiniteness and uncertainty.
The statute in question is Art. 1404b P.C.
The statute was enacted in 1951 (Acts 52nd Legislature p. 447). It was amended in 1955 (Acts 54th Legislature p. 351). The amended statute was in effect on the date the indictment alleged the second conviction was had.
*573Art. 1404b P.C. standing alone might well be vulnerable to the attack made upon it. This would be equally true of Art. 1389 and 1390 P.C. which define the offense of burglary. Neither statute stands alone however.
The Legislature, in enacting Art. 1404b providing a punishment for the entry by breaking of a vehicle for the purpose of committing a felony or misdemeanor, made such statute a part of said Chapter 6, Title 17 of the Penal Code, in the following language:
“Be it enacted by the Legislature of the State of Texas : Section 1. That Chapter 6, Title 17 of the Penal Code of the State of Texas, 1925, be and the same is hereby amended by adding a new Article to be known as Article 1404b to read as follows * * *”
Chapter 6 Title 17 of the Penal Code includes Art. 1406 P.C. which provides in part that the definitions, rules and explanation of terms in the preceding chapter are applicable to such terms in Chapter 6.
It follows that the statute here in question, like Articles 1389 and 1390 defining burglary, are to be construed in the light of other provisions of Chapter 5 and 6 of Title 17 of the Penal Code, including Arts. 1392 and 1393 defining “entry” and 1394 defining “breaking”.
So construing Art. 1404b P.C. before and after its amendment in 1955, we overrule appellant’s contention that the statute is void.
In Musick v. State, 121 Texas Cr. Rep. 616, 51 S.W. 2d 715, relied upon by appellant, the statute held to be void was Art. 1426a enacted in 1929 (Acts 41st Legislature p. 62) providing a punishment for the fraudulent taking of cotton or cotton seed, or both, of the value of less than $50, the punishment being different from that for theft of property under Art. 1422 P.C. Judge Morrow, speaking for the Court in Musick’s case, supra, stated:
“Neither in the name of the offense nor in its elements can the statute be identified as one under which a prosecution for theft can be maintained.”
The essential elements of the offense of burglary are a breaking and an entry. These elements are clearly embraced in the *574statute under consideration. While the essential element of lack of consent, as required by Art. 1392 V.A.P.C., is lacking in this statute, Art. 1404b, this essential element is supplied by Art. 1406, which does give effect and make applicable the provisions of Art. 1392. It is obvious to us that we do here have under consideration a burglary statute, which was not apparent in Musick, supra.
Appellant’s motion for rehearing is overruled.
ON MOTION FOR REHEARING