Court Opinion

ID: 9738844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:04:06.686504+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:08.769715
License: Public Domain

*49Hallows, J.
(dissenting in part). The majority opinion holds in effect this court has power to revoke or suspend a license of a member of the bar for acts in his private life which do not involve unprofessional conduct or moral turpitude and overrules language in State v. McKinnon (1953), 263 Wis. 413, 416, 57 N. W. (2d) 404, that “it is not within the scope of this court’s authority to impose discipline for conduct which has no relation to his duties and obligations as a lawyer, where the request for disciplinary action is based upon acts involving no moral turpitude.” It was pointed out in State v. McCarthy (1949), 255 Wis. 234, at page 246, 38 N. W. (2d) 679, that sec. 256.28 (8), Stats., provides for a special proceeding relating to the suspension and disbarment of attorneys and, under sec. 256.28 (7), a lawyer found guilty of unprofessional conduct or an act involving moral turpitude may be suspended or disbarred from practice,, but no other penalty is provided.
The majority opinion’s expression of this court’s power is apparently based upon the inherent power of this court to discipline and disbar attorneys. Such power is recognized in In re Stolen (1927), 193 Wis. 602, 214 N. W. 379. But inherent power is not unlimited or founded upon ipse dixit. By overruling the language of the McKinnon Case, the majority opinion leaves a clear implication that regardless of the statute this court has the power and jurisdiction to disbar or suspend an attorney for acts not amounting to unprofessional conduct or not involving moral turpitude. The majority opinion expresses a dangerous doctrine of inherent power and only softens its impact by stating as a general rule it will not exercise such power but there may be exceptions.
I quite agree that on the instant facts the defendant should be censured for his conduct which did not involve unprofessional conduct as defined in sec., 256.29 (2), Stats., or moral turpitude. But I have difficulty with the concept that every violation of the law is unprofessional conduct because *50the Canons of Ethics provide an attorney should obey the law. I do not think this court’s inherent power goes to the extent of disbarring or suspending an attorney for his, private life or his morals which do not amount to a breach of professional conduct or involve moral turpitude. I agree with what we said in the case of In re Richter (1925 ), 187 Wis. 490, 504, 204 N. W. 492: “This court does not sit in this or any other case as a court of inquisition to search out the private life and censor the morals of the attorneys who are its officers.” I must respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state Mr. Justice Dieterich joins in this dissent.