Court Opinion

ID: 9465839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 00:57:14.288144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:23.964139
License: Public Domain

McKAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
Much of the dispute in this case focuses on the implications of N. L. R. B. v. Burns International Security Services, Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 92 S.Ct. 1571, 32 L.Ed.2d 61 (1972). The Supreme Court in that case affirmed the Board’s conclusion that a new employer was obligated to bargain with the union that a majority of its employees had recently chosen, even though those employees had selected the union while working for their previous employer. The Court was influenced by the fact that the new employer had hired its predecessor’s employees to labor in the same manner and in the same place as they had done previously. Id. at 278, 92 S.Ct. 1571. The Court suggested that the result would have been different had the new employer “reasonably . . . entertained a good-faith doubt about” the union’s representation of a majority of the employees. Id. While the Court did not expressly employ a “successor employer” analysis, it is apparent that such an analysis was implicated. See id. at 296, 299, 92 S.Ct. 1571, 1577 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).1
The Burns rationale leads both parties in this case to advance a two-part test for resolution of this appeal: (1) Was W & W a *941successor employer to Mosher Steel Co.? (2) If so, was W & W obligated to bargain with the Union? Resolution of the second question turns on whether W & W had a reasonable good faith doubt that the Union represented a majority of the employees.
I believe that the Board’s conclusion that W & W was a Mosher successor at the Lubbock plant is consistent with the relevant legal principles, and that its subsidiary factual determinations are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. I therefore believe that resolution of this case depends on the second part of the analytic test.
It is settled that subjective good faith on the employer’s part is not enough to justify a refusal to deal with a union. The employer “must show a rational basis in fact for doubt of majority status.” N. L. R. B. v. King Radio Corp., 510 F.2d 1154, 1156 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839, 96 S.Ct. 68, 46 L.Ed.2d 58 (1975) (emphasis added). If it cannot do so, its refusal to bargain is an unfair labor practice.
On the crucial issue of whether W & W had a reasonable good faith doubt as to the Union’s majority support on and following April 8, 1976,2 W & W relies on three factors: that only a minority of Lubbock employees supported an earlier strike; that the employees never separately voted for the Union; and that the employees themselves petitioned the Board for a new election. The Board was fully justified in finding that none of these factors provided a basis in fact for doubting W & W’s majority support.
The numerical evidence concerning strike participation was properly deemed to be of no consequence. The failure of employees to engage in a strike has consistently been recognized as warranting no inference that the employees no longer desire a union’s representation. E. g., Nazareth Regional High School v. N. L. R. B., 549 F.2d 873, 880 (2d Cir. 1977); Retail, Wholesale & Department Store Union, AFL-CIO v. N. L. R. B., 151 U.S.App.D.C. 209, 223, 466 F.2d 380, 394 (1972). The rationale for this rule is based on an understanding of human behavior. Reasons for not joining in a strike other than because of displeasure with a union are numerous. An employee might not participate in a strike because he fears loss of employment or loss of wages, or because he does not believe a particular strike is appropriate; he might nonetheless favor the union’s representation.3
The showing that Lubbock employees had never voted separately for the Union, because their votes had been pooled with others cast in a multiplant election, is similarly inconsequential. The simple fact that the Lubbock ballots were comingled with others provides no more basis for assuming a lack of majority Union support at the Lubbock plant than it does for concluding the employees were unanimous in their support for the Union. The Board properly found this fact did not provide a good faith basis for believing the Union did not enjoy majority support at the plant. See N. L. R. B. v. Fabsteel Co., 587 F.2d 689, 694 (5th Cir. 1979);4 N. L. R. B. v. Geronimo Service Co., 467 F.2d 903, 904 (10th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
Finally, W & W introduced evidence that the employees themselves had petitioned *942the Board for a new election. Assuming the proper time sequence, such evidence would readily supply a reasonable basis for doubting a continued Union majority. In this case, however, the employee petition came to W & W’s attention after its refusal to bargain with the Union. Therefore, as the majority acknowledges, this subsequent development could not have entered into the decision not to bargain.
The Board was fully justified in concluding that W & W’s evidence did not provide a good faith basis for doubting the majority support of the Union. Absent such a good faith basis, W & W’s refusal to recognize or bargain with the Union was unlawful. I would therefore enforce the Board’s order.5

. Justice Rehnquist was joined in dissent by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Brennan, and Justice Powell. The dissenters did not believe the successorship notion should have been extended to encompass the facts of the case.

. This was the date on which the Union formally notified W & W of its status as bargaining representative of the employees. Somewhat earlier W & W had learned that the Union was “involved” at the plant; several days later the Union sent a copy of its certification to W & W.

. I must register my rejection of the Board’s suggestion, made at oral argument, that the Board may have it both ways on this point. I would also consider that evidence of majority participation in a strike does not in the least indicate majority support for the union. Reasons for striking are as multifaceted as reasons for not striking. An employee may oppose continued representation by a particular union, but nonetheless go on strike as a result of intimidation or social pressure, or because he happens to agree with the goals a strike is designed to achieve.

. In Fabsteel, the Fifth Circuit enforced an NLRB order requiring an employer which had purchased one of the other Mosher plants to bargain with the Union.
*942The Fabsteel court referred to the rule which forms the basis for my conclusion that the fact the Lubbock employees had never voted as a group does not provide a reasonable basis for doubting their majority support of the Union:
It would appear that the presumption of majority accorded a representative as to an overall unit of plants would be a presumption of equal distribution throughout the whole unit and that the presumption would apply equally as to the individual plants involved. Absent some evidence of employee dissatisfaction or change, such presumption would continue to constitute evidence of a majority status throughout the unit [as] . . . well as in the separate parts of the overall unit. 587 F.2d at 694. I acknowledge that this presumption has not received universal acclaim. See, e. g., N. L. R. B. v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293, 302-03 & n.36 (9th Cir. 1978).

. Although the majority seems to believe the Board’s decision not to process W & W’s election petition is somehow before us for review, it clearly is not. The decision, as well as the decision not to process the employees’ decerti-fication petition, grew out of a separate NLRB proceeding from the one which resulted in the instant order. We are limited to reviewing the single Board order before us; we have no mandate to rectify all aspects of the underlying dispute.