Court Opinion

ID: 9573135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:48:19.817275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:33.709821
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
concurring and concurring specially.
I concur in the Court’s opinion, except that I concur specially as to part VII (Victim Impact Statement in Presentencing Report), part XIV (Aggravating Circumstances), part XV (Denial of Expert Assistance in Preparation of Post-Conviction Relief), part XVI (State’s Failure to Disclose Letter Regarding Pizzuto’s Mental Health) and part XIX (Proportionality of Death Sentence).
Victim Impact Statement in Presentence Report
I concur specially as to part VII on the basis that the trial court in this case specifically stated that it had not considered the victim impact statements in imposing the death penalty. This is similar to the state-*779merits of the trial court in State v. Paz, 118 Idaho 542,-, 798 P.2d 1, 15 (1990) that the victim impact statements there did not influence the court. In the absence of specific statements such as these, I would not find the error to be harmless.
Aggravating Circumstances
I concur specially in part XIY. In my view, the discussion of whether there is duplication between aggravating circumstances that are found is unnecessary. When the mitigating circumstances are weighed against each of the aggravating circumstances separately, as required by State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 153, 774 P.2d 299, 323 (1989), there is no reason to be concerned about duplication of some aspects of the aggravating circumstances found.
Denial of Expert Assistance in Preparation of Post-Conviction Relief
I concur specially in part XV because the trial court ordered and received Dr. Emery’s report before the sentencing hearing, Pizzuto called Dr. Emery as a witness at the sentencing hearing, and Pizzuto made no request for any further examination pri- or to the sentencing hearing. If Pizzuto had made a request for a neurological examination before the sentencing hearing, I believe it would have been an abuse of discretion not to have granted the request.
Proportionality of the Death Sentence
I concur specially in part XIX. Our duty to review the proportionality of the death sentence is created by I.C. § 19-2827(e)(3). In making this determination, I do not consider that I am making an independent analysis as to whether a defendant should have been sentenced to death or not, but only whether the sentence of death imposed by the trial court can be justified by reference to the sentence in similar cases reviewed by this Court after I.C. § 19-2827(c)(3) became effective in 1977.
In making my determination of proportionality, I do not consider any sentences that were reviewed by this Court prior to the effective date of I.C. § 19-2827(c)(3). Also, in making my determination of proportionality, I consider death penalty cases in which the trial court did not impose the death penalty. E.g., State v. Smith, 117 Idaho 891, 792 P.2d 916 (1990); State v. Enno, 119 Idaho 392, 807 P.2d 610 (1991).