Court Opinion

ID: 9897393
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:11:01.012415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:01.734380
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                   May 18 2023, 9:05 am

                                                                        CLERK
                                                                    Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                       Court of Appeals
                                                                         and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Brian A. Karle                                            Theodore E. Rokita
Ball Eggleston, PC                                        Attorney General of Indiana
Lafayette, Indiana                                        Daylon L. Welliver
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Adam B. Kenny,                                            May 18, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-2082
        v.                                                Appeal from the Tippecanoe
                                                          Superior Court
State of Indiana,                                         The Honorable Steven Meyer,
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       Judge
                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          79D02-2110-F2-36

                                Opinion by Judge Riley.
                        Chief Judge Altice and Judge Pyle concur.

Riley, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023                            Page 1 of 15
      STATEMENT OF THE CASE
[1]   Appellant-Defendant, Adam Kenny (Kenny), appeals his convictions for

      dealing in methamphetamine, a Level 2 felony, Ind. Code § 35-48-4-

      1.1(a)(2)(e)(1); unlawful possession of a syringe, a level 6 felony, I.C. § 16-42-

      19-18(a); possession of paraphernalia, a Class C misdemeanor, I.C. § 35-48-4-

      8.3(b)(1); carrying a handgun without a license, a Class A misdemeanor, I.C. §

      35-47-2-1; and three Counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by a dangerous

      person, Class A misdemeanors, I.C. § 35-47-4-6.5.

[2]   We affirm.

      ISSUE
[3]   Kenny presents this court with one issue, which we restate as: Whether the trial

      court’s admission of evidence procured from the traffic stop of a taxi-van in

      which Kenny was a passenger was an abuse of discretion because the stop

      violated Kenny’s Fourth Amendment rights.

      FACTS AND PROCEDUAL HISTORY
[4]   In October 2021, the Tippecanoe County Drug Task Force (Task Force) was

      investigating Kenny for dealing in methamphetamine and illegally carrying

      firearms. The Task Force had also received information that Heather Boruff

      (Boruff) was using her taxi-van to facilitate methamphetamine deals. On

      October 12, 2021, Task Force officers conducted surveillance of Kenny and

      Boruff at the Days Inn hotel off Frontage Road in Lafayette, Indiana. Kenny

      was followed by officers when he left the Days Inn and drove to a Taco Bell on
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023           Page 2 of 15
      Teal Road, where he parked his car in the restaurant’s parking lot. Shortly

      thereafter, Boruff was observed arriving at the Taco Bell in her taxi-van,

      whereupon Kenny got out of his own vehicle and got into Boruff’s vehicle,

      sitting behind her in the back passenger seat. Boruff drove out of the Taco Bell

      parking lot and was followed by Detective Zachary Hall (Detective Hall).

      Detective Hall observed Boruff drive fifty miles per hour in a thirty-five-mile-

      per-hour zone, and Detective Hall observed Boruff fail to stop at an automated

      traffic signal. Detective Hall broadcast the fact that Boruff had committed two

      traffic infractions over the radio to other Task Force officers, including

      Detective Alix Sliger (Detective Sliger).

[5]   At 2:57 p.m., after learning that Boruff had committed two traffic infractions,

      Detective Sliger initiated a traffic stop of Boruff’s taxi-van at Manitou Drive

      and 18th Street. Detective Sliger had been informed by other officers that

      Kenny was “extremely violent[,]” was known to carry firearms, and had been

      physically combative with law enforcement in the past. (Transcript Vol. II, p.

      19). Detective Sliger had also been informed by other law enforcement officers

      that Kenny did not have a permit to carry concealed firearms. Detective Sliger

      approached Boruff’s van from the passenger side and made contact with Boruff

      and Kenny. Detective Sliger observed that Boruff, who immediately lit a

      cigarette, appeared to be nervous, in that her voice trembled and her hands

      shook. Boruff orally identified herself, but Kenny refused to do so. Detective

      Sliger spoke with Boruff about where they were going and radioed back Boruff’s

      information from where he was standing. Detective Sliger chose to stay with

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023             Page 3 of 15
the taxi-van instead of returning to his squad car to conduct his investigation

because of what he knew about Kenny and out of concern for his own safety.

Detective Sliger saw that Kenny had two “massive bulges” in his front pants

pockets, one on each side. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 21). While Detective Sliger was at

the side of Boruff’s van, Kenny pulled his hands in and out of his pockets,

placing his hands on the bulges. This also made Detective Sliger concerned for

his safety, and he decided to remove Kenny from the van before proceeding

with the traffic stop. In preparation for removing Kenny from the van,

Detective Sliger called for backup, and officer James Jarrett (Officer Jarrett)

responded at 3:00 p.m. while Detective Sliger was still talking to Boruff. At

3:04 p.m., Officer Jarrett opened the van’s sliding door and asked Kenny to

exit. Kenny begrudgingly complied but moved his hands towards his

waistband and near the bulge in his right front pants pocket. Officer Jarrett and

Detective Sliger each grabbed one of Kenny’s arms to place him in handcuffs.

Kenny stiffened his body and briefly resisted the officers. Officer Jarrett asked

Kenny if he had any weapons on his person, and Kenny stated that he had two

firearms in his possession for which he had a permit. The officers performed a

pat-down search and removed two firearms from Kenny’s front pants pockets.

Kenny was then escorted to Officer Jarrett’s squad car. After Kenny was seated

in the squad car, Detective Sliger ran Kenny’s information through dispatch

and checked to determine if Kenny’s firearms had been reported as stolen.

Detective Sliger then went back to Boruff’s taxi-van and had her exit the

vehicle. Upon being removed from the van, at 3:09 p.m., Boruff admitted that

she had “riggs”, which is a slang term for kits for using intravenous drugs, in

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023          Page 4 of 15
      her van. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 25). At 3:10 p.m., a canine unit arrived, and at 3:11

      p.m., the canine officer alerted to the presence of narcotics in Boruff’s van. A

      black bag containing what was later determined to be 110.08 grams of

      methamphetamine was found under the third row of the van’s seats. The

      search of the van also turned up a set of scales, baggies with suspected

      methamphetamine residue, and suspected Alprazolam. The same canine unit

      deployed at Boruff’s van was then brought to Kenny’s car which had remained

      parked at the Taco Bell. The canine officer performed an open-air sniff on

      Kenny’s car and alerted to the presence of narcotics. A subsequent search of

      Kenny’s car netted an additional firearm, syringes, and a pipe used to smoke

      methamphetamine.

[6]   On October 19, 2021, the State filed an Information, charging Kenny with

      Level 2 felony conspiracy to commit dealing in methamphetamine; Level 2

      felony dealing in methamphetamine; Level 3 felony possession of

      methamphetamine; Level 6 felony possession of a controlled substance

      (Alprazolam); Level 6 felony unlawful possession of a syringe; Class C

      misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia; Class A misdemeanor carrying a

      handgun without a license; and three Counts of Class A misdemeanor unlawful

      possession of a firearm by a dangerous person.

[7]   On June 23, 2022, Kenny filed a motion to suppress evidence garnered from the

      traffic stop, arguing that he had independent standing to challenge the search of

      the interior of the taxi-van and that the traffic stop had been impermissibly

      prolonged. On July 11, 2022, the trial court held a hearing on Kenny’s

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023           Page 5 of 15
      suppression motion. When asked about preparing traffic citations after

      initiating the traffic stop, Detective Sliger testified that when he initially spoke

      with Boruff and Kenny, he “was simply going through [his] investigation. [He]

      wasn’t up into that point yet.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 29). Detective Sliger could not

      recall if he had any conversations with other officers about issuing traffic

      citations after the stop but stated that, after he believed there was probable

      cause to search the taxi-van, the officers prioritized that task and that they

      would “get to the other stuff later on.” (Tr. Vol. III, p. 34). No evidence was

      presented at the suppression hearing regarding the ownership of the taxi-van

      Boruff drove or that Kenny intended to pay Boruff for transporting him on the

      day of the traffic stop. On July 15, 2022, the trial court issued its Order,

      denying Kenny’s motion to suppress, ruling that Kenny, as a passenger, had no

      standing to challenge the search of Boruff’s taxi-van because, in light of the fact

      that there was no evidence that he had hired the taxi-van or paid Boruff, he was

      a “normal passenger in a moving vehicle[.]” (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 94).

      The trial court further ruled that the traffic stop was valid, even if pretextual,

      Kenny’s detention and pat-down were valid, and the traffic stop was not

      unreasonably prolonged because, during the thirteen minutes between the

      initial stop and the dog sniff, the officers were dealing with “legitimate safety

      concerns presented by Kenny” and because Boruff had admitted that she had

      paraphernalia in the taxi-van. (Appellant’s App. Vol. III, p. 96).

[8]   On July 19, 2022, the trial court convened Kenny’s two-day jury trial, which

      was bifurcated so that the three misdemeanor charges of unlawful possession of

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023            Page 6 of 15
       a firearm by a dangerous person were not initially submitted to the jury. The

       jury found Kenny not guilty of Level 6 felony possession of a controlled

       substance but guilty of all the remaining charges. Kenny waived his right to a

       jury trial on the remaining charges. After further evidence was heard, the trial

       court found Kenny guilty of three Counts of unlawful possession of a firearm by

       a dangerous person.

[9]    On August 15, 2022, the trial court convened Kenny’s sentencing hearing. The

       trial court vacated Kenny’s convictions for conspiracy to deal in

       methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine. The trial court

       sentenced Kenny to an aggregate sentence of twenty years, with five years

       suspended to probation.

[10]   Kenny now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

       DISCUSSION
       I. Standard of Review

[11]   Kenny challenges the admission of evidence after his trial and conviction.

       Therefore, despite the fact that Kenny filed a motion to suppress, the issue is

       framed on appeal as whether the trial court erred in admitting the challenged

       evidence at trial. Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 259 (Ind. 2013). We will

       review the trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of its discretion, which

       only occurs when its decision is against the logic and effect of the facts and

       circumstances. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). We do not

       reweigh the evidence, considering any conflicting evidence in the light most
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023          Page 7 of 15
       favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Meredith v. State, 906 N.E.2d 867, 869 (Ind.

       2009). We will defer to the trial court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly

       erroneous. Id. However, when a challenge to the trial court’s ruling implicates

       the constitutionality of the search or seizure of evidence, it raises a question of

       law that we review de novo. Id. We may affirm the trial court on any basis

       supported by the record, even if it was not a basis relied upon by the trial court.

       Harris v. State, 19 N.E.3d 298, 301 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

       II. Standing

[12]   Kenny argues that as “a passenger in a taxicab who expected to pay for the

       ride,” he had a protectable Fourth Amendment privacy interest in the taxi-van

       that provided him with “standing” to challenge the search of the interior of the

       vehicle. 1 (Appellant’s Br. p. 12). The United States Supreme Court has never

       expressly held that taxi passengers have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest

       in the interior of the taxi, and, in support of his argument that this court should

       recognize such an interest, Kenny only cites to non-binding authority from

       other jurisdictions. Kenny makes no separate argument on state constitutional

       grounds regarding standing.

       1
        This court has acknowledged that in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.128, 99 S.Ct. 421, 58 L.Ed.2d 387 (1978), the
       United States Supreme Court abandoned the concept of standing, concluding that the issue of whether a
       defendant is asserting his own legal rights, as opposed to a third party’s, is an issue more properly within the
       purview of substantive Fourth Amendment law than within that of standing. Allen v. State, 893 N.E.2d 1092,
       1096 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023                                    Page 8 of 15
[13]   Under our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the passenger in a car driven by

       its owner does not have standing to challenge the search of the vehicle,

       although a passenger in a car whose owner is absent may have standing. See

       Campos v. State, 885 N.E.2d 590, 598-99 (Ind. 2008) (concluding that where

       both the driver of the car and the passenger, Campos, said the car searched

       belonged to Campos’ brother and it was uncontroverted that Campos had

       permission to use the car, Campos had standing to contest the search). As

       Kenny acknowledges on appeal, no Indiana court to date has concluded that a

       passenger who has paid for a ride in a taxi has a protectable Fourth

       Amendment privacy interest in the interior of the taxi sufficient to allow the

       passenger to contest the search of the taxi’s interior.

[14]   We observe, however, that it is established in Indiana that a passenger in a

       vehicle that is stopped may challenge “any part of a vehicle stop . . . because

       they are essentially seized when the driver is seized.” Id. at 598 (citing Brendlin

       v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 255, 127 S.Ct. 2400, 2403, 168 L.Ed.2d 132 (2007));

       Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254, 1258 (Ind. 2019) (citing Heien v. North

       Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60, 135 S.Ct. 530, 536, 190 L.Ed.2d 475 (2014), in turn

       citing Brendlin). Here, Kenny argues that all the evidence obtained following

       the traffic stop, including the firearms removed from his person and the

       contraband found as a result of the search of the taxi-van, were the products of

       an impermissibly prolongated traffic stop. This court has resolved such

       challenges without determining that the passenger/defendant had separate

       standing to challenge the search of the interior of a vehicle. See, e.g., Powers v.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023            Page 9 of 15
       State, 190 N.E.3d 440, 443-47 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (addressing Powers’ claim

       that evidence was procured from the search of the interior of the vehicle in

       which she was a passenger in violation of the Fourth Amendment because the

       traffic stop was unreasonably extended); Chauncy v. State, 204 N.E.3d 311, 314-

       20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (appeal of the denial of a motion to suppress evidence

       found after the search of the interior of the automobile in which Chauncy was a

       passenger, challenging the basis for the initial traffic stop and the prolongation

       of the stop to conduct a dog sniff as violative of the Fourth Amendment).

       Kenny’s only substantive argument regarding the challenged evidence is that it

       was garnered from a traffic stop that was impermissibly prolonged, and a

       determination of his claim of independent standing to search the taxi-van’s

       interior is not necessary to reach some otherwise unavailable argument.

       Because Kenny’s status as a passenger in the car driven by Boruff permits him

       to challenge the prolongation of the traffic stop, and thus to challenge the

       seizure of the challenged evidence, as a matter of judicial restraint, we decline

       to address his contentions regarding standing.

       III. Fourth Amendment

[15]   Kenny contends that the challenged evidence was garnered in violation of the

       Fourth Amendment, which states, in relevant part that “[t]he right of people to

       be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

       searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. IV. A

       traffic stop is a seizure for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, one that seizes

       both the driver and any passengers in the vehicle. Guthery v. State, 180 N.E.3d

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023         Page 10 of 15
       339, 347 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021) (citing Brendlin, 551 U.S. at 255), trans. denied. “It

       is unequivocal under our jurisprudence that even a minor traffic violation is

       sufficient to give an officer probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.”

       Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013). In addition to determining

       whether to issue a traffic ticket, an officer who has stopped a vehicle after

       witnessing a traffic infraction may make ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic

       stop, such as checking the driver’s license, checking if the driver has any

       outstanding warrants, and inspecting registration and proof of insurance

       information. Curry v. State, 90 N.E.3d 677, 684 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (citing

       Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615, 191 L.Ed.2d

       492 (2015)), trans. denied. However, even a valid traffic stop “can become

       unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete”

       the purpose of the stop. Id. (quoting Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125

       S.Ct. 834, 937, 160 L.Ed.2d 842 (2005)).

[16]   Kenny argues that the traffic stop of the taxi-van was impermissibly prolonged

       beyond the purposes of the stop. We do not agree. Detective Sliger stopped the

       taxi-van after another officer witnessed Boruff committing two traffic

       infractions. Detective Sliger approached the vehicle and made some routine

       inquiries about who was in the vehicle and the purpose of their travel, all of

       which was permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at

       355, 135 S.Ct. at 1615; Curry, 90 N.E.3d at 685 (preliminary inquiries regarding

       reasons for travel did not unconstitutionally prolong the stop). While making

       these inquiries, Detective Sliger observed that Kenny had large bulges in both

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023          Page 11 of 15
       front pockets of his pants and that Kenny was placing his hands on the bulges,

       making the officer concerned for his safety. Detective Sliger decided to remove

       Kenny from the vehicle before proceeding with the stop, and he radioed for

       assistance. The officer’s decision to remove Kenny from the vehicle, to radio

       for assistance, and to wait for the backup officer to arrive did not unreasonably

       prolong the traffic stop for purposes of the Fourth Amendment. See Mitchell v.

       State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 780 (Ind. 2001) (analogizing a traffic stop to a so-called

       “Terry stop” and holding that police may order occupants to exit a vehicle

       during a traffic stop, citing Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330,

       54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977)); Tinker v. State, 129 N.E.3d 251, 257 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2019) (holding that delay accrued in waiting for an assisting officer to arrive for

       purposes of officer safety and briefing the assisting officer on the stop was

       reasonable).

[17]   In addition, “[a]n officer may perform a Terry ‘pat-down’ of a driver or any

       passenger if he has reasonable suspicion that they may be armed and

       danergous.” Mitchell, 745 N.E.2d at 780. Here, as the officers removed Kenny,

       who was known to be violent and aggressive with police, from the van, he was

       verbally aggressive, he briefly resisted, and he made movements toward his

       waistband and toward the large bulge Detective Sliger had observed in his right

       front pocket. The officers restrained Kenny and performed a pat-down search

       which netted two firearms. See Tawdul v. State, 720 N.E.2d 1211, 1216-17 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 1999) (holding that, consistent with the Fourth Amendment, an officer

       has a limited right to briefly detain a passenger at an otherwise valid traffic stop

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023          Page 12 of 15
       “to ascertain the situation and to alleviate any concerns the officer has for his or

       her safety”), trans. denied. Detective Sliger then returned to the taxi-van to

       remove Boruff, who admitted that she had paraphernalia in the van, providing

       probable cause for the search of the van. Danner v. State, 931 N.E.2d 421, 428

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (“One exception to the warrant requirement is probable

       cause to believe an operable vehicle contains contraband or evidence of a

       crime.”), trans. denied. Twelve minutes elapsed between the initiation of the

       traffic stop and Boruff’s admission to the presence of paraphernalia in the van.

       Under these circumstances, we hold that while effectuating a valid traffic stop,

       the officers were engaged in activities that were permitted under the Fourth

       Amendment before Boruff provided probable cause to search the van, and,

       therefore, the stop was not unreasonably prolonged. 2

[18]   Kenny contends that he was unconstitutionally seized because he was the

       subject of a narcotics investigation, Detective Sliger never intended to issue a

       citation to Boruff for the traffic violations, and, in fact, no citation was written.

       Kenny’s argument is essentially that the traffic stop was pretextual and that,

       pursuant to Caballes and Rodriguez, he could not be validly detained for any

       2
[1]      Kenny does not specifically address the gun and paraphernalia evidence gathered from the separate search
       of his car parked at the Taco Bell or explain why it should not have been admitted. We do not address that
       evidence separately except to note that a dog sniff is not a search protected by the Fourth Amendment, and,
       thus, not even reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is required to bring a canine unit to a car to perform
       an open-air dog sniff or to perform the sniff itself. Austin, 997 N.E.2d at 1027; State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d
       1281, 1286 (Ind. 2010).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023                                  Page 13 of 15
period of time. 3 However, for purposes of the Fourth Amendment, the

reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend on the actual motivations of the

individual officers involved. Whren v. U.S., 517 U.S. 806, 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769,

1774, 135 L.E.2d 89 (1996); see also Graham v. State, 971 N.E.2d 713, 715-17

(Ind. Ct. App. 2012) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation where an officer

observed Graham participating in a suspected drug deal, relayed his suspicion

to another officer, and the other officer stopped Graham’s car after witnessing

Graham commit a traffic infraction), trans. denied. We also observe that, when

asked about writing a warning or a ticket for the traffic infractions, Detective

Sliger testified at the suppression hearing that when he initially approached the

taxi-van, he “was simply going through [his] investigation. [He] wasn’t up into

that point yet” and that, after they believed there was probable cause to search

the van, the officers prioritized that task and would “get to the other stuff later

on.” (Tr. Vol. III, pp. 29, 34). This testimony is consistent with an intention to

write a warning or a ticket, and, insofar as Kenny contends it conflicts with

other testimony on the subject, it is the evidence which we must credit, as it

supports the trial court’s evidentiary ruling. See Meredith, 906 N.E.2d at 869. In

addition, in Curry, this court affirmed the admission of evidence garnered from

3
  Kenny also argues that his conviction should be reversed because the State spoliated evidence by
purportedly failing to preserve Detective Sliger’s body camera footage. Although Detective Sliger testified
about why his body camera footage was not available, Kenny did not raise this argument in the suppression
proceedings or object to the admission of any evidence at trial on that basis, and, therefore, he has waived the
issue. See Meriwether v. State, 984 N.E.2d 1259, 1262 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (finding an argument not raised in
the trial court to be waived on appeal), trans. denied; Hart v. State, 578 N.E.2d 336, 337 (Ind. 1991) (“In
general, a party may not object to the admission of evidence on one basis at trial and for a different reason on
appeal.”).

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023                                  Page 14 of 15
       a traffic stop which Curry, as the passenger in the vehicle, argued had been

       impermissibly extended to facilitate the arrival of a canine unit, even where we

       noted the driver “was released without being given a traffic citation or written

       warning.” Curry, 90 N.E.3d at 682. Therefore, although the issuing of a

       written warning or ticket is relevant to the inquiry, it is not dispositive of

       whether the traffic stop at issue was impermissibly extended. Accordingly,

       because the traffic stop, even if pretextual, was not impermissibly prolonged, we

       do not disturb the jury’s verdicts.

       CONCLUSION
[19]   Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its

       discretion in admitting evidence resulting from a valid traffic stop consistent

       with the Fourth Amendment.

[20]   Affirmed.

[21]   Altice, C. J. and Pyle, J. concur

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-2082 | May 18, 2023           Page 15 of 15