Court Opinion

ID: 9928390
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-31 17:10:21.21882+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:48:05.494427
License: Public Domain

No. 52              January 31, 2024                   425

         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                 STATE OF OREGON

                 STATE OF OREGON,
                  Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
                 JAMES GARY TACIA,
                  Defendant-Appellant.
              Jackson County Circuit Court
                  19CR24287; A175706

  Timothy Barnack, Judge.
  Argued and submitted April 26, 2023.
   David L. Sherbo-Huggins, Deputy Public Defender, argued
the cause for appellant. Also on the brief was Ernest G.
Lannet, Chief Defender, Criminal Appellate Section, Office
of Public Defense Services.
   Rolf Moan, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause
for respondent. Also on the brief were Ellen F. Rosenblum,
Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
  Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, and Mooney, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
  MOONEY, J.
    Conviction on Count 1 reversed and remanded for entry
of judgment of conviction for attempted delivery of metham-
phetamine; remanded for resentencing; otherwise affirmed.
  Pagán, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.
426   State v. Tacia
Cite as 330 Or App 425 (2024)                                               427

           MOONEY, J.
         Defendant appeals a judgment of conviction, entered
after a jury trial, for unlawful delivery of methamphetamine
(Count 1), ORS 475.890;1 unlawful manufacture of metham-
phetamine (Count 2), ORS 475.886;2 and unlawful posses-
sion of methamphetamine (Count 3), ORS 475.894(1).3 He
contends in his first three assignments of error that the trial
court erred by failing to sua sponte acquit him of all counts
because there was obviously insufficient evidence that he
possessed the quantity of methamphetamine necessary for
each offense and the sentence imposed by the court. As we
will explain, it was not obvious that the evidence did not sup-
port a finding that defendant constructively possessed 10 or
more grams of methamphetamine and we, therefore, reject
the first assignment and affirm the conviction for unlaw-
ful possession of 10 or more grams of methamphetamine
(Count 3). As we will also explain, it was not obvious that
the evidence did not support a finding that defendant man-
ufactured 100 or more grams of methamphetamine and we,
thus, reject the third assignment and affirm the conviction
for unlawful manufacture of methamphetamine (Count 2)
as well.
         In his second and fourth assignments, defendant
relies on our decision in State v. Hubbell, 314 Or App 844,
500 P3d 728 (2021), aff’d, 371 Or 340, 537 P3d 503 (2023)
(Hubbell I), as a basis for plain error review of his deliv-
ery conviction. The parties briefed and argued this mat-
ter before the Supreme Court issued its decision in State
v. Hubbell, 371 Or 340, 537 P3d 503 (2023) (Hubbell II), in
which it affirmed Hubbell I. As we will explain, Hubbell II
requires us to reverse the delivery conviction (Count 1). But
because we also conclude that the evidence was sufficient
to establish the lesser included offense of attempted deliv-
ery, and because the jury necessarily found the elements of

     1
       ORS 475.890 provides, in part: “(1) * * * it is unlawful for any person to
deliver methamphetamine.”
     2
       ORS 475.886 provides, in part: “(1) * * * it is unlawful for any person to
manufacture methamphetamine.”
     3
       ORS 475.894 provides, in part: “(1) It is unlawful for any person knowingly
or intentionally to possess methamphetamine[.]”
428                                                        State v. Tacia

attempted delivery, we remand for entry of a judgment of
conviction for attempted delivery on Count 1.4
                   I. PLAIN ERROR REVIEW
         Defendant did not move for a judgment of acquittal
(MJOA) on any count in the trial court, and therefore, he
failed to preserve the arguments he now makes on appeal.
In general, issues “not preserved in the trial court will not
be considered on appeal.” State v. Wyatt, 331 Or 335, 341, 15
P3d 22 (2000). We do, however, have discretion to correct an
error that is “plain.” ORAP 5.45(1); State v. Gornick, 340 Or
160, 166, 130 P3d 780 (2006). “An error is ‘plain’ when it is
an error of law, the legal point is obvious and not reasonably
in dispute, and the error is apparent on the record without
our having to choose among competing inferences.” State v.
Durant, 327 Or App 363, 364, 535 P3d 808 (2023) (citing
State v. Vanornum, 354 Or 614, 629, 317 P3d 889 (2013)).
         Defendant contends that the trial court plainly
erred by not sua sponte acquitting him of the charged
offenses, and he urges us to exercise our discretion to cor-
rect those errors. “Because defendant did not preserve [his]
argument[s] below, [he] faces the additional obstacle of
establishing that the trial court committed an error that is
plain.” State v. Gayman, 312 Or App 193, 196, 492 P3d 130
(2021). To establish an error of law here, defendant must
demonstrate that it is obvious and not reasonably in dispute
that no reasonable trier of fact could have found that the
state proved the essential elements of the charged crimes
beyond a reasonable doubt.
                 II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A.    Sufficiency of the Evidence
         In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the state,
State v. Daniels, 348 Or 513, 518, 234 P3d 976 (2010), and
we “resolve all conflicts of evidence in favor of the state and
give the state the benefit of all reasonable inferences.” State
v. Rader, 348 Or 81, 91, 228 P3d 552 (2010).

    4
      We reject as unpreserved defendant’s fifth assignment challenging the
court’s imposition of an upward departure sentence without further discussion.
Cite as 330 Or App 425 (2024)                                429

B.    Instructional Error
         We review a court’s jury instructions for legal error.
State v. Wier, 260 Or App 341, 345, 317 P3d 330 (2013). We
review the instructions as a whole and will not reverse
unless the instruction likely “ ‘created an erroneous impres-
sion of the law in the minds of the [jurors] which affected
the outcome of the case.’ ” State v. Maney, 244 Or App 1,
7, 260 P3d 547 (2011), rev den, 351 Or 545 (2012) (quoting
Waterway Terminals v. P. S. Lord, 256 Or 361, 370, 474 P2d
309 (1970)) (brackets in original).
                            III.   FACTS
         The facts occurred during a traffic stop, the legality
of which is not disputed. We draw the facts, in accordance
with our standard of review, from the testimony and exhib-
its in the record.
         Jackson County Sheriff’s Deputies Tuff and Grieve
stopped defendant while defendant was driving a car with
three passengers. Mahoney occupied the front passenger
seat and there were two others seated in the back seat.
The car was registered to Mahoney’s mother or brother. As
lead investigator, Tuff approached defendant on the driv-
er’s side of the vehicle and Grieve approached Mahoney on
the passenger side of the vehicle. Tuff asked whether the
car was insured. Mahoney responded that it was covered
by Farmers and Tuff asked for proof of insurance. When
Grieve approached Mahoney, he observed that she was
wearing a “zip-down jacket” or “sweatshirt” and he “saw
her hand shoving stuff towards her left side.” When asked
if he observed Mahoney “grab it from the center console—or
something and put it into her sweatshirt,” Grieve testified:
     “I did, yes. The—the transfer that I saw was something up
     to her right hand, which was then stuffed to the left side
     of—in her jacket.”
         During the stop, an officer with an assigned nar-
cotics dog was called to assist and the dog alerted that offi-
cer to the “presence of a narcotic odor within the vehicle.”
Grieve then performed a “brief pat-down” of Mahoney and
called for a female officer, Stone, to conduct a more thorough
search. Grieve advised Stone that Mahoney had “disclosed
430                                            State v. Tacia

[that] she does have dope on her” and that “[s]he says she has
4 ounces.” Ultimately, a red makeup bag with several bag-
gies containing a total of 98.95 grams of methamphetamine,
several unused baggies, two capped needles, and a digital
scale was removed from the sleeve of Mahoney’s sweatshirt.
         In the meantime, Tuff had questioned defendant,
who admitted that he had “a little bit” of methamphetamine
that he described as a “ball” that “was just cut.” Tuff later
testified that when he heard defendant say that it “was just
cut” he understood that to mean “that it was just cut off or
broken off of a bigger piece of methamphetamine” or that
some other substance had been mixed in “to make a smaller
quantity a little bigger.” Tuff searched defendant and found
4.3 grams of methamphetamine in a baggie located in defen-
dant’s pocket. While Tuff field-tested the contents of that
baggie, defendant asked if Tuff would like to borrow “his
scale.” The only scale found in the vehicle was the one found
in Mahoney’s makeup bag. When Tuff asked whether defen-
dant had any needles, he replied that he “might” and he
made a remark about his “girlfriend,” but the full comment
was not audibly captured on Tuff’s bodycam. Defendant and
Mahoney both denied that she was defendant’s “girlfriend,”
although defendant also referred to Mahoney as “honey”
and “baby” in a recorded jailhouse call.
         Mahoney testified that before the traffic stop, she
and defendant had been at her house, and that, at the time
of the stop, she was giving defendant a ride to his car. They
did not make any stops between the time they left the house
and the time they were pulled over by Tuff and Grieve. In
total, deputies seized just over 100 grams of methamphet-
amine from defendant and Mahoney, which Tuff testified is
a dealer quantity.
          IV. CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION
         Defendant notes that the amount of methamphet-
amine found in his personal possession was insufficient
alone to prove that he had committed the crimes with
which he was charged, and he contends that the evidence is
plainly insufficient to establish that he constructively pos-
sessed the methamphetamine found in Mahoney’s makeup
Cite as 330 Or App 425 (2024)                               431

bag. Specifically, defendant argues that the fact that he was
driving the car and that Mahoney may have been his girl-
friend do not establish that he had a right to control all the
drugs in the car. The state counters that the evidence is
legally sufficient, or at least not plainly insufficient, because
defendant physically possessed some of the methamphet-
amine found in the car, the makeup bag had been accessible
to him in the center console before the stop, and defendant
referred to the scale as his own.
         “Proof of either actual or constructive possession” is
sufficient to establish that defendant possessed a controlled
substance. State v. Sosa-Vasquez, 158 Or App 445, 448, 974
P2d 701 (1999). To prove constructive possession of a con-
trolled substance, the state must show that the defendant
exercised control over or had the right to control the sub-
stance. State v. Fry, 191 Or App 90, 93, 80 P3d 506 (2003).
One may exercise control jointly with other persons. State
v. Sherman, 270 Or App 459, 461, 349 P3d 573, rev den, 357
Or 596 (2015). Mere proximity to a controlled substance “is
not a sufficient basis from which to draw an inference of
constructive possession[.]” Fry, 191 Or App at 93. The state
must link the defendant’s proximity to the substance with
a right to control it, and defendant’s “own statements can
provide the necessary link.” Id. at 94. Constructive posses-
sion “may be established by circumstantial evidence.” State
v. Leyva, 229 Or App 479, 483, 211 P3d 968, rev den, 347 Or
290 (2009). We note, however, that if defendant’s statements
amount to a confession that he committed the crime of pos-
sessing a controlled substance, then his confession must
be corroborated by other evidence independent of his own
statements. See State v. Lerch, 296 Or 377, 394, 677 P2d 678
(1984).
        We have issued more than a handful of opinions
assessing the sufficiency of the evidence presented to estab-
lish constructive possession in drug possession and other
criminal cases. We have, for example, concluded that evi-
dence of a defendant’s close connection to the house where
drugs were located, including mail addressed to him at that
house, his own statement that he had “a $400-per-day crack
cocaine habit and that he supported that habit by stealing
432                                              State v. Tacia

cocaine from nearly all of the approximately 50 buyers who
visited the house each day[,]” and the fact that he had a
crack pipe on his person, was sufficient to establish con-
structive possession of the drugs found in the house. State
v. Presley, 175 Or App 439, 441-42, 446, 28 P3d 1238 (2001).
We likewise concluded that the evidence was sufficient to
support an inference that the defendant constructively
possessed marijuana where a large quantity was found in
garbage bags in the back seat and in the cargo area of a
sport utility vehicle in which defendant and the driver had
been driving for a considerable distance, and where the
defendant lied to the police about the driver’s identity and
had a significant amount of cash in his pockets. Leyva, 229
Or App at 484.
         In State v. Coria, 39 Or App 507, 511, 592 P2d 1057,
rev den, 286 Or 449 (1979), we concluded that the evidence
was sufficient to support constructive possession of heroin
discovered in an upholstery panel next to the rear seat of
the car in which the defendant drove with two other persons
to deliver narcotics between California and Oregon. We con-
cluded that, given evidence that the defendant had traveled
with the other two individuals for one week, a reasonable
factfinder could find that the defendant constructively pos-
sessed the drugs because he and the driver were “engaged
in a joint endeavor to transport the narcotics from Los
Angeles to Umatilla.” Id. We reached a similar conclusion
in Sherman, where a dealer amount of cocaine was found
hidden in the passenger’s vagina after the defendant-driver
had told her to “ ‘keep her mouth shut’ ” during a traffic stop.
270 Or App at 460. In that case, there was evidence that
they were both associated with an apartment suspected of
illegal drug activity and that drugs were found in a pair
of defendant’s pants found in the apartment. Id. at 460-61.
That evidence was sufficient to permit an inference that the
defendant and his passenger were engaged in a joint enter-
prise to sell cocaine which, in turn, permitted an inference
that the defendant had a right to control the drugs found in
his passenger’s vagina. Id. at 463.
        We reached a different conclusion in State v. Kulick,
314 Or App 680, 681-82, 497 P3d 789 (2021), where we held
Cite as 330 Or App 425 (2024)                            433

that the evidence was insufficient to establish that defen-
dant constructively possessed a “tooter,” a tool for using
methamphetamine, discovered in the center console of the
car he was driving. Although the defendant admitted that
he sometimes used drugs, the evidence did not link his past
drug use to a right to control the tooter. Id. at 681-82, 684.
The car did not belong to him, he denied ownership of the
tooter, and he was not under the influence when he was
stopped. Id. at 684.
         In Fry, we similarly concluded that the evidence
was insufficient to support constructive possession of meth-
amphetamine found in a parked car in which the defendant
and his companions were seated, where a syringe was found
on the person of two passengers and a third was found under
another seat, and there was no evidence of needle sharing.
191 Or App at 96. There was “nothing more than defen-
dant’s presence in the car to connect him to that syringe—
no link between his proximity and some right to control.” Id.
See also State v. Borden, 307 Or App 526, 531, 476 P3d 979
(2020) (holding that the evidence was insufficient to estab-
lish constructive possession of methamphetamine located
under the defendant’s car seat where the car did not belong
to the defendant and she did not ride in it regularly or for
extended periods of time, other passengers conferred about
drugs but did not mention the defendant in their discus-
sion, and there was no evidence that the defendant had used
methamphetamine while she was in car); State v. Keller, 280
Or App 249, 254-55, 380 P3d 1144 (2016) (holding that a
police officer did not have probable cause to believe that the
defendant constructively possessed heroin where the defen-
dant had been sitting in the driver’s seat of a parked car
but the plastic baggie containing residue was located out of
his line of sight); Daniels, 348 Or at 520-23, (holding that
the defendant’s proximity to property owned by his roman-
tic partner did not give rise to an inference of a partnership
relationship or a right to control that property).
        Not surprisingly, defendant focuses on those cases in
which we concluded that the evidence of constructive posses-
sion was insufficient, and the state argues that those cases
are distinguishable and inapposite. Defendant likewise
434                                             State v. Tacia

distinguishes the facts of this case from cases where we
concluded that there was sufficient evidence of construc-
tive possession. More importantly, though, all of those cases
concerned assignments of error that had been preserved for
appeal. And as we have already explained, because defen-
dant did not move for a judgment of acquittal, his burden on
plain-error review is more onerous than if he had done so.
He must establish that the trial court plainly erred when it
failed to enter a judgment of acquittal in the absence of a
motion requesting that it do so.
         We think it is reasonably in dispute whether
rational jurors could draw the necessary inferences about
constructive possession on this record. Viewing the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the state—which is the
required standard of appellate review—we conclude that it
is not plain or obvious that a rational jury could not find
that the state established beyond a reasonable doubt that
defendant constructively possessed the methamphetamine
in Mahoney’s makeup bag.
         There is evidence from which a jury could find that
the makeup bag holding nearly 100 grams of methamphet-
amine, a scale, and baggies, was in the console of the car
and was equally accessible to defendant up to the point that
Mahoney moved it to her sweatshirt. But this is not a case
of mere proximity. Defendant personally possessed a portion
of the methamphetamine seized by law enforcement, and he
stated that it had just been “cut.” Defendant offered “his
scale” to Tuff during the stop, and the only scale in the vehi-
cle was in Mahoney’s makeup bag. Although nothing in the
record suggests that defendant or Mahoney were under the
influence at the time of the traffic stop, defendant told the
deputy that he might find needles in the search, and there
were two in Mahoney’s makeup bag. Defendant was driv-
ing a car registered to Mahoney’s mother or brother and he
referred to Mahoney as “honey” and “baby,” suggesting an
established relationship marked by some level of trust and
familiarity. We cannot say, on that record, that the evidence
was plainly and obviously insufficient to establish defen-
dant’s constructive possession of the items in Mahoney’s
makeup bag.
Cite as 330 Or App 425 (2024)                               435

                  V. MANUFACTURING
         Defendant further argues that the evidence is
plainly insufficient to show that he packaged or repackaged
the methamphetamine found in Mahoney’s makeup bag.
ORS 475.005(15) defines manufacture as “the production,
preparation, * * * or processing of a controlled substance, * * *
and includes any packaging or repackaging of the substance
or labeling or relabeling of its container.” (Emphasis added.)
While packaging a substance does not include removing a
substance from its package and giving a smaller piece of
that substance to another individual, State v. Tellez, 170
Or App 745, 751, 14 P3d 78 (2000), the evidence here would
permit a jury to infer that defendant participated in pack-
aging the methamphetamine into multiple bags.
         Defendant and Mahoney were together in her home
before entering the vehicle, and after methamphetamine
was discovered on his person, defendant described the sub-
stance as having just been “cut.” Whether that meant it had
recently been broken off of a bigger piece of methamphet-
amine or that it had been mixed with some other substance,
it was consistent with preparing a controlled substance for
distribution. Finally, the methamphetamine discovered in
the makeup bag was packaged in multiple baggies alongside
unused packaging. We conclude that it is neither plain nor
obvious that a reasonable factfinder could not conclude that
defendant participated in packaging the methamphetamine
into multiple bags on that record. The trial court did not
plainly err when it did not sua sponte acquit defendant of the
possession and manufacturing charges.
          VI. DELIVERY – POST-HUBBELL II
         In his second and fourth assignments of error,
defendant challenges his delivery conviction under Hubbell I,
arguing that the evidence was plainly insufficient, and that
the jury instruction on delivery was plainly erroneous. In
light of Hubbell II, we conclude that the trial court plainly
erred and we exercise our discretion to correct the error
for the reasons expressed in State v. Jury, 185 Or App 132,
139-40, 57 P3d 970 (2002), rev den, 335 Or 504 (2003) (fail-
ing to preserve error was justified because the trial court
436                                                State v. Tacia

could have properly rejected the challenge under existing
authority and the error was not harmless). See also State
v. Hernandez, 320 Or App 270, 271-72, 512 P3d 475 (2022)
(citing Jury for same proposition).
          ORS 475.005(8) defines delivery as the “actual, con-
structive or attempted transfer” of a controlled substance.
(Emphasis added.) In Hubbell II, the Supreme Court held
that evidence of possession with intent to sell is not alone suf-
ficient to convict a defendant of delivery under an attempted
transfer theory:
   “We understand the statute to mean that a person has
   engaged in an ‘attempted transfer’ if the person has made
   some effort to undertake the act or acts of causing con-
   trolled substances to pass from one person to another.
   Steps preceding such an effort are insufficient to show an
   attempted transfer, even if they are consistent with a gen-
   eralized intent to distribute the controlled substance in the
   future. * * *
       “Some additional evidence that the person made an
   effort to engage in the act of transferring is required.”
371 Or at 359-60 (emphasis in original). The court did not
specify the exact sort of additional evidence that might be
sufficient, noting that “[t]ransfers of controlled substances
take varying forms, * * * and what is necessary for an
‘attempted transfer’ will depend on the circumstances.” Id.
at 360.
         While defendant and Mahoney had a dealer quan-
tity of methamphetamine, baggies, and a scale, there was
no evidence of any effort on their part to actually transfer
the methamphetamine to another person. The state argues
that because defendant and Mahoney were transporting the
drugs by car, a reasonable factfinder could infer that they
were attempting to transfer the drugs to a buyer. But the
fact that they were in a moving vehicle with a controlled
substance and packaging materials does not, without more,
support the inference that they were en route to make a
sale. See State v. Wesley, 326 Or App 500, 509, 533 P3d 786,
rev den, 371 Or 511 (2023) (evidence was sufficient to support
a conviction for the inchoate crime of attempted delivery, but
not the completed crime of delivery, where defendant was
Cite as 330 Or App 425 (2024)                              437

stopped in his truck and found to have methamphetamine,
plastic baggies, a digital scale, plastic gloves, and $1,000 in
cash). Mahoney testified that she was giving defendant a
ride to his vehicle, and the state offered no evidence to con-
tradict that testimony. The evidence is plainly insufficient
to establish an attempted transfer.
          The jury instruction was also plainly incorrect
under Hubbell II. At trial, the jury was instructed that
delivery is “[t]he actual, constructive, or attempted transfer
* * * of a controlled substance” and that “[p]ossession with
intent to deliver constitutes delivery even when no actual
transfer is shown.” The state argues that the instruction
is not obviously erroneous when read in the context of all
the instructions because the trial court also instructed the
jury that “[o]nly [the] transferor, not [the] recipient, commits
the crime of delivery.” On that basis, the state argues that
the jury likely understood that it had to find that defendant
actually tried to transfer the methamphetamine to a recipi-
ent, as Hubbell II requires. We disagree.
         Defense counsel specifically argued that “if he’s the
buyer and she’s the dealer, then he can’t be guilty of deliv-
ery, it says [so] right in the instruction,” and the prosecu-
tor argued that “[p]ossession with the intent to deliver con-
stitutes delivery, even if no actual transfer is shown. That
means my officers don’t need to catch him handing someone
else methamphetamine.” The transferor-recipient instruc-
tion was, thus, consistent with defendant’s theory of the case
and at odds with the court’s instruction that actual transfer
need not be shown. Yet the prosecutor did nothing to clar-
ify the state’s burden of proof on the question of transfer.
Indeed, the arguments likely added to the confusion inher-
ent in the instructions, creating a misimpression of the law.
To be sure, the jury may well have understood that it had to
find that defendant was more than a drug user and was gen-
erally engaged in drug dealing. Such a finding on its own,
however, is insufficient under Hubbell II. The instructions
do not make it clear that to find defendant guilty of deliv-
ery, the jury must find that defendant went to some effort to
cause the methamphetamine to change hands. Accordingly,
we conclude that the jury instruction was plainly erroneous.
438                                            State v. Tacia

              VII.   REMEDY ON REMAND
         Because we conclude that reversal is required on
the delivery count, we turn our attention to the proper rem-
edy, a matter about which the parties do not agree. Our
dispositional options on the reversed delivery count are
rooted in Article VII (Amended), section 3, of the Oregon
Constitution. In determining whether to remand for entry of
a judgment of conviction for attempted delivery of metham-
phetamine, we first assess the sufficiency of the evidence to
support such a conviction and, if it does, whether we should
direct that conviction be entered. See, e.g., Hubbell II, 371
Or at 361 (2023) (using same approach to determine the
appropriate remedy on remand following reversal of deliv-
ery count); see also State v. Carr, 319 Or App 684, 692-93,
511 P3d 432 (2022), rev den, 371 Or 771 (2023) (using same
approach to determine the appropriate remedy on remand
in a post-Hubbell I case).
         We thus turn to whether the evidence is sufficient
to support a conviction for the crime of attempted delivery.
A person commits the inchoate crime of attempt when they
engage in intentional conduct that constitutes a substantial
step toward the commission of a crime. ORS 161.405. “A
substantial step occurs when a person’s conduct (1) advances
the criminal purpose charged and (2) provides verification of
the existence of that purpose.” Hubbell II, 371 Or at 362.
         In Hubbell II, the Supreme Court explained that the
defendant had taken “perhaps the most consequential step
necessary to traffic illegal drugs, which is to acquire them.”
Id. Because the defendant had also engaged in “conduct that
advanced and verified the existence of a criminal purpose—
the fentanyl had been prepackaged for sale,” the evidence
was “sufficient to convict defendant of the inchoate crime of
attempt.” Id. The court remanded for entry of a judgment of
conviction for attempted delivery, noting that the trial court
necessarily convicted defendant of the lesser-included incho-
ate crime. Id. at 362-63.
        Here, defendant possessed a large quantity of meth-
amphetamine packaged in multiple baggies along with
additional distribution packaging. He and Mahoney were
Cite as 330 Or App 425 (2024)                             439

together immediately prior to the stop and, according to
defendant, the methamphetamine was “just cut.” That evi-
dence, viewed in accordance with our standard of review,
supports that (1) defendant had taken the most consequen-
tial step necessary to deliver methamphetamine—he had
acquired, and was in possession of, a dealer quantity of the
drug, and (2) he had participated in packaging it into multi-
ple bags for sale. Under Hubbell II, that conduct goes beyond
mere preparation “and constitutes a substantial step toward
committing the crime of delivery” and is, therefore, “suffi-
cient to convict defendant of the inchoate crime of attempt.”
Hubbell II, 371 Or at 362. Additionally, and as previously
noted, the jury was instructed that delivery is the “actual,
constructive, or attempted transfer” of a controlled sub-
stance. It was further instructed that possession with the
intent to deliver constitutes delivery. There was no evidence
presented of an actual or constructive transfer. The jury
necessarily convicted defendant on an attempted transfer
theory. That conviction for an attempted transfer of drugs
and the evidence that defendant took a substantial step
toward delivery of the drugs supports entry of a conviction
on remand for the inchoate crime of attempt.
         The dissent incorrectly concludes that our disposi-
tion violates defendant’s right to a jury trial. 330 Or App
at 442 (Pagán, J., dissenting). It does not. As we explained
in Wesley, where we similarly reviewed a verdict decided by
a jury, we may “remand for entry of a judgment of convic-
tion for a lesser-included crime such as attempt when the
jury necessarily found all the elements of that offense.”
326 Or App at 507. Indeed, Article VII (Amended), section
3, of the Oregon Constitution requires us to direct entry of
the judgment that “should have been entered in the court
below” when we can determine what that judgment should
have been. And even if the dissent is correct in describing
our Article VII (Amended), section 3 authority as “unique,”
330 Or App at 440 (Pagán, J., dissenting), we are bound to
adhere to it, along with all other constitutional provisions
that, together, define the keystone requirements of a fair
trial. Defendant was on notice that by exercising his right to
have a jury trial, the jury could find him guilty of the crimes
with which he was charged and all lesser-included crimes
440                                              State v. Tacia

including, specifically, any “attempt to commit” the crimes
with which he “[wa]s charged[.]” ORS 136.465. Our disposi-
tion should not come as a surprise. Indeed, it is the remedy
to which defendant is entitled in light of the plain legal error
that occurred and the record on which the jury reached its
verdict.
        Conviction on Count 1 reversed and remanded for
entry of judgment of conviction for attempted delivery of
methamphetamine; remanded for resentencing; otherwise
affirmed.
         PAGÁN, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part.
          I agree with the majority as to its rejection of defen-
dant’s first and third assignments of error and its disposition
regarding defendant’s convictions for unlawful manufacture
of methamphetamine (Count 2) and unlawful possession of
methamphetamine (Count 3); therefore, I concur in that
respect. I also agree with the majority that our decision
in State v. Hubbell, 314 Or App 844, 500 P3d 728 (2021),
aff’d, 371 Or 340, 537 P3d 503 (Hubbell I), and the Supreme
Court’s decision in State v. Hubbell, 371 Or 340, 537 P3d 503
(2023) (Hubbell II), require reversal of the delivery convic-
tion (Count 1). However, I disagree regarding the disposition
on that count.
         In my view, two competing constitutional provisions
are implicated when considering remanding for entry of
judgment of a lesser-included offense when that charge was
not argued or presented in the trial court: the right to a jury
trial, and the discretionary authority of the appellate courts
to enter a judgment below for what the court considers to
be the appropriate disposition. One of those provisions—the
right to a jury trial—establishes what many consider to be
a tent-pole principle of our entire jurisprudential system.
The other is a unique authority granted to Oregon courts
that exists almost nowhere else in the United States. In that
context, I believe our obligation is to protect the fundamen-
tal right rather than exercise the discretionary authority.
Instead of remanding for entry of a judgment of conviction
for attempted delivery of methamphetamine, I believe we
are required to reverse and remand that count for retrial.
Cite as 330 Or App 425 (2024)                              441

          In State v. Wesley, 326 Or App 500, 519-24, 533 P3d
786, rev den, 371 Or 511 (2023) (Pagán, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part), I dissented from the majority’s
disposition of a similar count for the same reason I do today.
Since then, the Supreme Court decided Hubbell II, but the
Supreme Court considered the appropriate disposition in
the context of a bench trial, not a jury trial. Hubbell II, 371
Or at 342. Accordingly, it did not address what I perceive to
be a fundamental tension between Article VII (Amended),
section 3, of the Oregon Constitution and a defendant’s right
to trial by jury. The state constitution grants us the author-
ity to direct that a different conviction be entered if we “can
determine what judgment should have been entered in the
court below.” Or Const, Art VII (Amended), § 3. But, at the
same time, a defendant in a criminal prosecution has “the
right to public trial by an impartial jury * * *.” Or Const, Art
1, § 11.
         Hubbell II concluded that the evidence in that case
was sufficient to convict the defendant of the inchoate crime
of attempt because the record contained the trial court’s
explanation of the findings that led it to conclude that the
defendant had taken a substantial step toward delivery of a
controlled substance. The Supreme Court stated that “the
trial court in effect did convict [the] defendant of attempted
delivery, so it is unnecessary to remand for the trial court to
consider in the first instance whether to convict [the] defen-
dant of that crime.” Hubbell II, 371 Or at 362-63 (emphasis
in original).
         Here, by contrast, a jury convicted defendant of
unlawful delivery of methamphetamine. As the majority
opinion explains, the evidence presented was plainly insuf-
ficient to establish an attempted transfer, and the jury
instruction was plainly incorrect under Hubbell II. 330
Or App at 435-37. However, regarding the disposition, I dis-
agree with the majority’s implicit assumption that the jury
necessarily found all of the elements of the lesser-included
offense of attempted delivery of methamphetamine. The jury
was instructed that a delivery can include an “attempted
transfer,” but the jury was not instructed regarding the
442                                               State v. Tacia

elements of the crime of attempt. As the Supreme Court
explained,
       “The crime of attempt has two elements: (1) intentional
   conduct that (2) constitutes a substantial step toward the
   commission of the crime. Conduct is intentional when a
   person acts with a conscious objective to cause the result
   or to engage in the conduct so described. A substantial step
   occurs when a person’s conduct (1) advances the criminal
   purpose charged and (2) provides verification of the exis-
   tence of that purpose. We have distinguished a substantial
   step, which is a predicate for attempt liability, from mere
   preparation, which is not sufficient.”
Hubbell II, 371 Or at 361-62 (citations and internal quota-
tion marks omitted).
         The jury was not instructed regarding inten-
tional conduct or conduct that constitutes a substantial
step toward delivery of a controlled substance. Nor was the
jury instructed regarding attempted delivery of metham-
phetamine as a lesser-included charge. In Hubbell II, the
Supreme Court noted that the trial court expressly found
that the “defendant’s possession of multiple prepackaged
bags of fentanyl constituted a substantial step.” Id. at 363.
But here, there is nothing in the record to suggest that the
jury considered and concluded that defendant’s constructive
possession of approximately 100 grams of methamphet-
amine, some baggies, a scale, and some needles, was inten-
tional conduct that constituted a substantial step toward
delivery of methamphetamine.
         Most importantly, neither the defendant nor the
state had the opportunity to argue the “substantial step”
instruction or adapt their trial strategies to address such
an instruction. That, in my view, deprives defendant of the
right to a jury trial on the charge for which he is now con-
victed. We should reverse and remand for a new trial on
whether defendant attempted to deliver methamphetamine.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent regarding the majority’s
disposition of Count 1, but otherwise concur.