Court Opinion

ID: 9529607
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:52:28.141678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:51.444762
License: Public Domain

Steffen, C. J.,
dissenting:
Respectfully, I dissent.
The primary basis for the majority’s reversal of Alward’s judgment of conviction is based upon the conclusion that the State engaged in an unlawful search and seizure that produced incriminating evidence in violation of the Fourth Amendment. I disagree. Using what I consider to be common sense and compelling logic, the district court denied the defense motion to suppress on the basis that Alward “is the one that instigated the investigation that led to the evidence being reviewed and secured by the law enforcement officers.”
Alward is the one who summoned help and directed the officers to the tent where the victim allegedly shot herself. Alward, who was seeking to convince officers that the death was a suicide, made no suggestion to the officers that they were not free to fully examine and investigate the scene of the victim’s death. The tent, which belonged to the victim, was being shared by the two young people, and there is no indication that Alward intended to direct investigating officers to the body, and then invoke a constitutional right to restrict any search and investigation of the area to a time after which a search warrant was obtained.
I am unable to discern any aspect of “unreasonableness” to the search undertaken by the officers. Nor do I derive relevant meaning from the fact that the tent and truck housed closed containers. There is no reason to believe from what occurred before or after Alward summoned assistance, that he went about *159closing containers so that the investigators he summoned would be foreclosed from gaining entry without a warrant. Indeed, a reasonable mind would conclude that when a person summons officers to what he or she describes as a suicide scene, the surviving witness would want the officers to freely seek evidence confirming the fact of suicide. In this case, it is clear that Alward hoped to convince the officers that the young woman indeed succumbed to her own act of suicide. It is ridiculous to assume that he would expect to appear credible in the face of restricting the officers’ freedom of access to anything at the death scene pending the acquisition of a search warrant. This conclusion is especially cogent under circumstances where the victim and Alward were sharing such close and temporary quarters.
I have no difficulty distinguishing Gooch from the instant case. Gooch was firing at other campers and did not invite the assistance or presence of police officers in his tent. His expectation of privacy was not eliminated by an invitation of entry and investigation to law enforcement authorities. However, in the instant case, Alward sought assistance from the officers, and intended to convince them of his girlfriend’s suicide. At the very least, he impliedly waived all right to an expectancy of privacy and consented to the officers’ searching investigation.
Although there was trial error discussed by the majority, I would hold that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under the circumstances of this case.
For the reasons briefly outlined above, I would affirm the judgment of conviction entered against Alward pursuant to the verdict of the jury. I therefore dissent.