Court Opinion

ID: 9732960
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:46:22.628139+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:26:59.412906
License: Public Domain

Robert L. Brown, Justice, Justice, concurring. My ment with the majority opinion concerns its conclusion that photographs could not have been abstracted in words under Ark. Sup. Ct. R. 4-2(a)(6), as it read on May 17, 2001, when the appellants’ brief was filed, but had to be reproduced as part of the abstract absent a court waiver.1 Under the majority’s interpretation, maps, plats, photographs and similar exhibits could not have been abstracted in words at that time but had to have been reproduced in their entirety as part of the abstract. I disagree with the majority because the clear language of Rule 4-2(a)(6), as it read on May 17, 2001, contradicts that construction. It provides in pertinent part: Whenever a map, plat, photograph, or other similar exhibit, which cannot be abstracted in words, must be examined for a clear understanding of the testimony, the appellant shall reproduce the exhibit by photography or other process and attach it to the copies of the abstract filed in the Court and served upon the opposing counsel, unless this requirement is shown to be impracticable and is waived by the Court upon motion. (Emphasis added). The clause, “which cannot be abstracted in words,” is unquestionably a condition that had to have been met before reproduction of the photograph was required. There is, too, the fact that we removed this clause in our May 31, 2001 per curiam. See In re: Modification of the Abstracting System-Amendments to Supreme Court Rules 2-3, 4-2, 4-3, and 4-4, 345 Ark. Appendix 626 (2001). The clause had to have had some meaning or we would not have removed it. The majority deals with this clause by making a highly technical grammatical distinction between the pronouns “that” and “which.” The result of this analysis is to deny the appellants appellate review on a grammatical point. I object to that. This court has taken pains to remove procedural pitfalls that have plagued parties in the past. The creation of this “trap” is unnecessary in my judgment. Having said that, I too would affirm this case, but I would do so on the merits. The photograph in question was adequately described in the abstract through the testimony of the prosecuting attorney. In describing the photograph on the cassette which is at issue, the prosecutor said: “This is the CD of Marcus Turner standing on the outside of the vehicle. The sports car looks dark.” That description is repeated in the abstract by the appellants and adequately describes the front cover of the cassette that was admitted into evidence. We, thus, have a sufficiently described photograph in the abstract to allow us to decide this issue on the merits. The appellants argue that the cassette photograph was “of no consequence” as to whether Marcus Turner was driving a black car with appellants as passengers. Apparently, the appellants are arguing irrelevancy as they cite Arkansas Rule of Evidence 401, which defines “relevant evidence,” but they cite no other authority. When an appellant’s arguments are obviously lacking in merit and are unsupported by any citation of authority, this court has declined to research the issue on the appellant’s behalf or consider the point. See Gardner v. State, 296 Ark. 41, 754 S.W.2d 518 (1988). Furthermore, the cassette photograph is clearly relevant as it showed Marcus Turner, a co-defendant to be tried in a separate trial, standing in front of a car similar to the one described by prosecution witness as the dark-colored sports car in which the appellants were riding when the crime was committed. A ruling on .the relevancy of evidence is discretionary with the trial court and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. See Bohanan v. State, 324 Ark. 158, 919 S.W.2d 198 (1996). There was no abuse of discretion in this case. For that reason, I would affirm. Imber, J., joins.   By per curiam dated May 31, 2001, we amended our Supreme Court Rules to eliminate the clause “which cannot be abstracted in words.” Rule 4-2(a)(6) is now Rule 4-2(a)(5).