Court Opinion

ID: 9665722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:55:33.063969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:18.183132
License: Public Domain

Williams, J.
(concurring in result). I concur with the result in this case for reasons stated in my concurring opinion in People v. Zimmerman, (1971), 385 Mich 417, decided today. In the Zimmerman case, Billings would have testified in two different areas of expertise. First, as to speed from skid marks, there was an inadequate showing of data that the state of the art is developed to the point that it has a reasonable degree of reliability. Second, as to speed plus impact, there was no showing of the state of the art or the witnesses’ qualifications in the area.
The facts of this case involve accident reconstruction which is an expertise different in nature and degree from those involved in Zimmerman. The opinions offered here relate to the place and angle of impact including a determination of the course of the automobiles prior to the accident. Michigan *515courts have in the past admitted place of impact testimony.1 This Court, however, has not had occasion to consider the state of the art as to the course of automobiles prior to accident based on angles of impact, etc. There is no satisfactory showing of the state of the relevant art in this case nor the qualification of the expert therein.
Justice Adams adequately portrays the capacity of Billings to wander about in speculation and assump*516tion in the reconstruction of the facts of this case. In addition to what I have said in Zimmerman, I would add the following brief comments.
It is apparent from the literature on the subject that even the best men make gross errors resulting, for example, from the unknown applicability of peculiar principles of crash dynamics. Very little experimentation has concerned the precise issue of crash testing with a view to determining why the crash occurred as it did. Most experimentation to date has involved tests designed to assess the causes of damage to the occupant, or the causes of buckling of particular structural members. The Highway Safety Research Institute, for example, has conducted substantial experimentation in the area of damage to occupants, but are just beginning a program using skid marks and other factors as determinants of trajectory to see whether a car is “out of control” in the scientific sense.
The Federal government has recently funded the Cornell Aerospace Laboratories to begin a school for training accident investigators. How soon any reliable data may be available from these sources is not known, but for the present it is clear that this “science” is in its gestation period.
I would remand this case for a determination along the lines previously indicated in Zimmerman with particular attention to establishing a satisfactory state of the art and the qualification of the witness in the exact area in which it is desired he testify before allowing either Billings or Trooper Brantner to testify as to their opinions on the point of impact and more especially the course of vehicles prior to impact.2

 Dudek v. Popp (1964), 373 Mich 300. (Police officers held qualified to render opinion as to place of impact based on investigation of scene, debris, etc.)
Magda v. Johns (1964), 374 Mich 14. (Police officer may testify as to location of defendant’s car on the highway at the point of collision based on location of debris in the road, tire tracks, etc.) This case apparently resolves the conflict purportedly created by Washburn v. Lucas (1964), 373 Mich 610, in which unsupported conclusions of fact were offered by a police officer without objection but the Court nonetheless expressed strong opinions as to their highly inadmissible character.
Woolner v. Ponicki (1966), 3 Mich App 590. (Police officer’s testimony as to point of impact based upon examination of debris was admissible. The issue, however, was not really presented as to whether or not he may testify but rather whether there was error in refusing the use of a blackboard.)
LaFave v. Kroger (1966), 5 Mich App 446. (Error to exclude testimony of police officer as to point of impact in a head-on collision based upon debris and other data -at the scene of the investigation.)
Coles v. Galloway (1967), 7 Mich App 93. (Successive collision involving two defendants; Billings testified for plaintiff, police officer and Manos testified for two defendants. Court in passing said Billings was qualified to render an opinion on the events of the collision but the issue raised was not whether any witness was qualified but rather that the defendant had no notice of Billings’ testimony as prescribed by rules of procedure.)
Schweim v. Johnson (1968), 10 Mich App 81. (Police officer gave opinion as “qualified” witness but the issue raised on appeal was whether absence of objection bound the party to his qualifications. Held, failure to raise objection is a waiver.)
Cook v. Kendrick (1969), 16 Mich App 48. (Police officer not shown to be qualified to testify as to facts of three-car accident.)
Brummitt v. Chaney (1969), 18 Mich App 59. (Police officer may render opinion on point of impact based merely on debris and skid marks.)
Hoffman v. Rengo Oil Company, Inc. (1969), 20 Mich App 575. (Police officer held qualified to testify as to point of impact where he would render no “legal conclusions.”)
Motorists Mutual Insurance Company v. Howard (1970), 21 Mich App 146. (Police officer may testify as to point of impact based merely on debris and skid marks.)

 Trooper Brantner may certainly testify as to the facts he observed in his investigation. How far he may go beyond this will depend upon the trial court’s determination. In this regard the analysis *517of the court in Deaver v. Hickox (1967), 81 Ill App 2d 79 (224 NE2d 468), may be of help.
See also Jackson v. Trogan (1961), 364 Mich 148. (Inexperienced police officer held unqualified to testify as to speed based on force of impact where there was insufficient evidence of skid marks and he was unable to corroborate his opinion by mathematical computations. The number of factors made his opinion too speculative.)
With regard to the qualifications of Billings in this area Justice Adams points out that the witness has had no actual experience in controlled experiments. The qualifications noted in Snyder v. New York Central Transport Company (1966), 4 Mich App 38, should be noted by way of comparison.