Court Opinion

ID: 9963379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 14:01:11.143853+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:47.854473
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS

                                            No. 22-3957

                               BRUCE MOSEBY BRACK, APPELLANT,

                                                 V.

                                    DENIS MCDONOUGH,
                          SECRETARY OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, APPELLEE.

                         On Appeal from the Board of Veterans' Appeals

(Argued November 28, 2023                                                   Decided April 24, 2024)

       Kenneth H. Dojaquez, of Topeka, Kansas, for the appellant.

       Emily P. Stanley, with whom Richard J. Hipolit, Deputy General Counsel; Mary Ann
Flynn, Chief Counsel; and Mark J. Hamel, Deputy Chief Counsel, were on the brief, all of
Washington, D.C., for the appellee.

       Before TOTH, LAURER, and JAQUITH, Judges.

        TOTH, Judge, filed the opinion of the Court. JAQUITH, Judge, filed an opinion concurring
in the judgment.

       TOTH, Judge: Although VA claimants have a right to submit argument to the Board in
support of their appeals, no regulation or other rule explicitly states the timeframe for doing so. In
cases where no Board hearing was requested, VA historically advised claimants that they should
submit argument, if any, during the 90-day period for submitting evidence following certification
of appeals to the Board. That submission period was codified formerly at 38 C.F.R. § 20.1304(a).
Relying on § 20.1304(a), we held in Bryant v. Wilkie, 33 Vet.App. 43 (2020), that the fair process
doctrine prohibited the Board from issuing a decision before the expiration of that 90-day period
when a claimant states an intention to submit argument (unless argument is, in fact, submitted
sooner).
       But Bryant addressed the system—now known as the legacy system—that existed before
passage of the Veterans Appeals Improvement and Modernization Act of 2017 (AMA). The AMA
replaced the one-size-fits-all period for evidentiary submissions to the Board with three review
lanes, each of which operates on a distinct timeframe for submissions. One of those options, the
direct review lane, can be chosen when a claimant doesn't wish to submit evidence or receive a
hearing and instead wants the Board to issue a decision as soon as possible. This differentiates the
direct review lane from the other two paths, both of which explicitly provide 90-day periods before
which the Board will not issue a decision.
       In this case governed by the modernized system, Army veteran Bruce Moseby Brack asked
the Board to delay issuing a decision until 90 days after his non-attorney representative received a
copy of his claims file so that the latter could submit evidence. Thereafter, however, the veteran
filed a formal appeal to the Board and chose the direct review lane. The Board didn't wait the 90
days. The question before the Court is whether the Board failed to liberally construe Mr. Brack's
delay request as stating an intention to submit argument and, if so, whether Bryant's fair process
holding required the Board to honor the request in these circumstances for an exception to the
expedited procedures of the direct review lane.
       We conclude that, even if the Board did misconstrue the veteran's request, fair process
didn't require the Board to delay issuing its decision. The appellate procedures and options
provided by the AMA ensure that a claimant in Mr. Brack's circumstances has ample opportunity
to present argument to the Board, thereby affording all the procedural rights the fair process
doctrine is meant to protect. That Mr. Brack chose the one appellate option ill-suited to his
circumstances is not a proper basis for the Court, in the name of fair process, to alter the essential
nature of that option.

                                        I. BACKGROUND
       Mr. Brack served in Vietnam for nearly a year beginning in October 1967 and, as a result
of that service, is presumed exposed to herbicide agents. In 2021, he sought and was granted
compensation for coronary artery disease with atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease with a 10%
rating effective from January 5 of that year. He disagreed with the effective date assigned.
       The regional office (RO) denied an earlier effective date for cardiovascular disease
compensation in July 2021. The following month, on August 25, the veteran's representative filed
a VA Form 3288, "Request for and Consent to Release of Information from Individual's Records,"
seeking a copy of his "entire VA claims file" under the Privacy Act. R. at 104. The form stated: "I
am requesting these documents so that I may have the benefit of a complete file review for
presentation and prosecution of his current and future requests." Id. In a cover letter submitted with
the form, the representative wrote:

                                                  2
       Please send me a copy of the entire claims folder on CD. We are working on
       securing an independent evaluation or opinion to support the claims and or [sic]
       appeals filed for compensation purposes. Should any issues be pending [Board]
       review, I am asking for a 90 day extension from the date in which this [Privacy Act]
       request is completed to submit additional supporting evidence.
R. at 103. At the time of these August 2021 submissions, the veteran had not yet taken any direct
action to challenge the RO's effective date decision.
       That changed a few months later, in October 2021, when Mr. Brack appealed the issue to
the Board via VA Form 10182, a Notice of Disagreement (NOD). He selected "Direct Review" by
a Board member; in so doing, he indicated (per the form): "I do not want a Board hearing, and will
not submit any additional evidence in support of my appeal." R. at 96. The form also advised:
"Choosing this option often results in the Board issuing its decision most quickly." Id. (emphasis
omitted). VA supplied Mr. Brack's representative a copy of the claims file on January 20, 2022.
       The Board issued the present decision 47 days later, on March 8, 2022, denying an earlier
effective date. Because Mr. Brack chose the direct review lane, the Board considered only the
evidence of record at the time of the July 2021 RO decision. The Board acknowledged that the
veteran's representative "requested a 90[-day] extension from the date the Privacy Act Request
was fulfilled to submit additional supporting evidence should any issues be pending [Board]
review." R. at 6. But, the Board observed, based on the direct review option later selected by the
veteran in his NOD, no new evidence could be considered by the Board at all. And because the
review lane Mr. Brack selected obviated the stated reason for the requested 90-day delay, and
because the claims file had been provided, the Board found "no legal basis to delay adjudication
of this Veteran's earlier effective date appeal" and proceeded to issue its decision. R. at 7.

                                          II. ANALYSIS
       Mr. Brack does not challenge the merits of the Board's decision on the earlier effective date
issue. His argument is procedural. First, he contends that the Board should have construed his
August 2021 submissions together and in a liberal manner so as to recognize that his representative
was seeking a 90-day period in which to submit argument as well as evidence. With that proper
understanding of the basis for the requested delay, Mr. Brack argues, the Board's failure to delay
its decision until the 90 days expired or he submitted argument violated the fair process doctrine.
In so arguing, he relies almost entirely on Bryant, which held that, when an appellant notifies VA
of an intent "to submit additional argument or evidence to the Board during the period specified in

                                                  3
§ 20.1304(a)"—what is now 38 C.F.R. § 20.1305(a)—"principles of fair process prohibit the
Board from issuing an adverse decision until it either receives that argument or evidence or until
90 days have elapsed since mailing" the notice of the certification of the appeal to the Board.
33 Vet.App. at 44. Although Bryant addressed procedures in the legacy system, Mr. Brack asserts
that the decision's fair process holding is equally applicable in the modernized system.
        In resolving this argument, we consider the principles of the fair process doctrine, the
relevant changes in appellate procedure effected by the AMA, and the circumstances presented in
this case. And all considered, we conclude that Mr. Brack was not denied fair process.
                                                  A.
        This Court "created what became known as the 'fair process' doctrine'" in Thurber v.
Brown, 5 Vet. App. 119 (1993). Sprinkle v. Shinseki, 733 F.3d 1180, 1185 (Fed. Cir. 2013). It is a
non-constitutional right fashioned at a time when it was not yet clear whether VA claimants had
property rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment; such rights have
since been recognized. Id. The doctrine supplements statutes and regulations "in situations where
no particular procedural process is required" but there can be discerned an implicit need for
additional process "when viewed against the underlying concepts of procedural regularity and
basic fair play of the VA benefits adjudicatory system," a system which "provides for notice and
an opportunity to be heard at virtually every step." Bryant, 33 Vet.App. at 46 (cleaned up). Put
differently, the concept of fair process is derived primarily from "the underlying VA adjudicatory
scheme" in which it is invoked. Sprinkle, 733 F.3d at 1185. But while fair process supplements the
procedural rules of statutes and regulations, it cannot supplant them. See, e.g., id. at 1186 (rejecting
a veteran's "argument for incorporating a 60-day response period into the fair process doctrine"
because the regulation from which the veteran extracted that period was "inapplicable" to the facts
of his case).
        When VA procedural rules are validly altered or amended, the fair process doctrine must
adapt to that new reality. For example, in Aviles-Rivera v. McDonough, 35 Vet.App. 268 (2022),
we rejected a fair process challenge to the AMA's restriction of the evidentiary record in direct
review appeals. The veteran there failed to explain "how the evidentiary record restriction is an
unfair flaw in the new review process rather than an intended feature of that process." Id. at 279.
Although he argued that this restriction "does not reflect a veteran-friendly system," the Court
recognized that, in adopting the AMA, "Congress sought to reduce a key inefficiency in the legacy

                                                   4
appeals process—the continuous cycle of evidence-gathering and readjudication of the same
claim—while still protecting claimants' rights." Id. In other words, once the veteran chose the
direct review lane option, which by law restricts the universe of evidence that may be considered
on appeal, he could not then claim that the fair process doctrine requires an exception to that
restricted evidence rule. The requirements of the fair process doctrine must be derived from the
procedural context in which the doctrine is invoked. Sprinkle, 733 F.3d at 1185.
                                                 B.
        Bryant's fair process ruling was based on § 20.1304 as it stood before it was amended by
the AMA; it therefore concerned the legacy system. See 33 Vet.App. at 44 n.2. And there are key
differences between the appellate scheme at issue in that case and the adjudicatory scheme at issue
in this case.
        In the pre-AMA legacy system that Bryant addresses, all Board appeals were governed by
the same procedures. (These legacy provisions are presently codified in part 19 of VA regulations.)
Save for minor variations not relevant here, a claimant dissatisfied with a rating decision filed an
NOD with the RO and, if benefits could not be granted in full, received a Statement of the Case.
38 C.F.R. §§ 19.26(d), 19.51 (2023). The claimant could then seek Board review by filing a timely
Substantive Appeal—again, usually with the RO—and deciding whether to request or forego a
personal hearing before the Board and the manner of that hearing. 38 C.F.R. § 19.30, 19.51 (2023).
Once a Substantive Appeal was filed, the RO would certify the case to the Board and notice of
such would be sent to the claimant. 38 C.F.R. §§ 19.35, 19.36 (2023). This notice was commonly
referred to as the "90-day letter." E.g., Bryant, 33 Vet.App. at 45 (brackets omitted).
        This "mailing of notice that an appeal had been certified and transferred to the Board" was
"the triggering event for application of § 20.1304(a)." Williams v. Wilkie, 32 Vet.App. 46, 51
(2019), aff'd per curiam, 828 F. App'x 721 (Fed. Cir. 2019) (mem.). This regulation provided:
        An appellant and his or her representative, if any, will be granted a period of 90
        days following the mailing of notice to them that an appeal has been certified to the
        Board for appellate review and that the appellate record has been transferred to the
        Board, or until the date the appellate decision is promulgated by the Board . . . ,
        whichever comes first, during which they may submit a request for a personal
        hearing, additional evidence, or a request for a change in representation.
38 C.F.R. § 20.1304(a) (2017). The Board would "not accept a request for a change in
representation, a request for a personal hearing, or additional evidence" after the 90 days expired
"except when the appellant demonstrates on motion that there was good cause for the delay," such

                                                 5
as "the discovery of evidence that was not available prior to the expiration of the period." 38 C.F.R.
§ 20.1304(b) (2017).
         Noticeably, § 20.1304(a) said nothing about the time period for submitting argument (save
tangentially through its reference to a personal hearing). But VA had often treated the regulation's
90-day period for submitting evidence as implicitly covering the timeframe for submitting
arguments as well, at least in cases where a claimant had not requested a hearing before the Board.
See, e.g., VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL § 13.3.2 & Appendix 13-A-1 (Barton F. Stichman et al.
eds., 2023-2024); see also Kutscherousky v. West, 12 Vet.App. 369, 372–73 (1999) (invoking
§ 20.1304(a) to conclude that claimants have a right to a 90-day period following a remand from
this Court to submit "additional evidence and argument" to the Board).
         That is clearly what the Agency did in Bryant when it sent him a 90-day letter. See
33 Vet.App. at 45. And "[o]nce Mr. Bryant affirmatively notified the Board that he intended to
submit additional argument during the § 20.1304(a) period," we concluded that he had "implicitly
request[ed] that VA withhold a decision until he had done so" and held that "basic principles of
fair play, inherent in the VA benefits adjudication system in general and that regulation in
particular, required the Board to wait to issue its decision until the veteran either submitted the
additional argument or until the maximum 90 days for doing so without needing to show good
cause had elapsed." Id. at 47. Stated otherwise, the Court determined that § 20.1304(a) and the 90-
day letter created "a reasonable expectation that, absent a contrary response from the Board, he or
she will have the maximum 90 days to submit that additional argument and evidence without
needing to show good cause." Id. at 48.
         But the Board in Bryant did not wait. By issuing a decision after only 70 days, the Board
violated that reasonable expectation and failed to provide a meaningful opportunity for the
appellant to participate in the appeals process, "ignor[ing] the appellant's request to submit
supporting argument during a period when such submissions are generally authorized by
regulation." Id. at 48–49. Requiring the Board to wait in those circumstances for the full 90 days
specified in § 20.1304(a), we reasoned, "furthers, rather than subverts, the orderly processing and
resource-saving purposes of that regulation."1 Id. at 49.

         1
          When a claimant doesn't state an intention to submit additional evidence or argument during § 20.1304(a)'s
90-day period, fair process does not oblige the Board to wait 90 days to issue its decision. See Bryant, 33 Vet.App. at
47–48.

                                                          6
         The AMA fundamentally altered VA's appellate scheme.2 Claimants in the legacy system
"had only one pathway to seek administrative review of an unsatisfactory initial decision on their
disability claim from the agency of original jurisdiction (AOJ)." Military-Veterans Advocacy v.
Sec'y of Veterans Affairs (MVA), 7 F.4th 1110, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2021). "This one-size-fits-all-claims
pathway was long and complicated," considered by many to be "broken, marked by lengthy delays,
and plagued with a formidable backlog of cases." Id. (quotation marks omitted). Through the
AMA, Congress sought to "streamlin[e] the administrative appeals system while still protecting
claimants' due process rights." Id. at 1119.
         In the modernized system governing Mr. Brack's appeal, certification no longer occurs and
an NOD is filed directly with the Board. 38 C.F.R. § 20.203(a) (2023). Most relevant here, there
is no longer a general 90-day period for submitting additional evidence provided by § 20.1304.
See 38 C.F.R. § 20.1304 (2023) (now covering only requests for changes in representation).
Instead, the AMA introduced a key reform, allowing claimants to "choose from three procedural
lanes to obtain review of their claim within one year of the initial decision." MVA, 7 F.4th at 1119.
"The AMA's three-lane system was intended to alleviate the legacy system's growing appeals
backlog by allowing claimants to choose from new and more efficient administrative review
pathways specifically tailored for their needs." Id. at 1140.
         A claimant must choose a specific review lane when submitting an NOD, 38 C.F.R.
§ 20.202(b) (2023), and with that choice the claimant also decides the timeframe on which the
appeal will operate. The three options are as follows:
         (1) Direct review by the Board of the record before the [AOJ] at the time of its
         decision, without submission of additional evidence or a Board hearing;
         (2) A Board hearing, to include an opportunity to submit additional evidence at the
         hearing and within 90 days following the hearing; or
         (3) An opportunity to submit additional evidence without a Board hearing with the
         [NOD] and within 90 days following receipt of the [NOD].
Id.; see 38 U.S.C. §§ 7105(b)(3), 7113. The direct review lane is the only review lane that doesn't
permit submission of additional evidence and doesn't defer issuance of a Board decision for a

         2
          Following passage of the AMA, VA amended § 20.1304(a) and recodified it as § 20.1305(a). Bryant,
33 Vet.App. at 44 n.2. That provision continues to govern appeals in the legacy system and contains all the procedural
components of pre-amendment § 20.1304(a). Compare 38 C.F.R. § 20.1305 (2023), with 38 C.F.R. § 20.1304 (2017).
In Costello v. McDonough, 36 Vet.App. 43, 55 (2023), we held that § 20.1305(a) doesn't facially deprive a legacy
claimant of the due process right to notice and the opportunity to respond if the claimant's appeal is decided less than
90 days after notice of certification to the Board.

                                                           7
specified 90-day period. Based on these review lanes, the Board maintains three separate dockets
and—barring exceptions—"each appeal will be decided in the order in which it is entered on the
docket to which it is assigned." 38 C.F.R. § 20.800(a)(1), (b) (2023).
          And a claimant who wishes to switch from one review lane to another may do so by
submitting a new NOD within a certain time; an appeal "moved from one docket to another will
retain its original docket date." 38 C.F.R. § 20.800(a)(2); see 38 C.F.R. § 20.202(c)(2). So, for
example, a claimant who initially chose lane (2) or (3) may switch to lane (1) if the claimant
decides, within the specified time, not to submit evidence or Board testimony after all. See
38 C.F.R. § 20.202(c)(2); see also Andrews v. McDonough, 34 Vet.App. 151, 156–57 (2021).
          "The direct review lane is the quickest review option available at the Board. The Board's
goal for processing appeals in the direct review docket is 365 days from the filing of the NOD."
VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL § 13.2.3.1 (citing 84 Fed. Reg. 138, 153 (Jan. 18, 2019)).
          With this far-reaching overhaul of VA appellate procedures in mind, we consider whether
Bryant's fair process ruling can be transplanted from the legacy system in which it exists to the
"whole new world" of the modernized system that governs Mr. Brack's case. Andrews, 34 Vet.App.
at 156.
                                                 C.
          As a preliminary matter, we note the veteran's argument that the August 2021 submission
should have been liberally construed by the Board as a request for a 90-day delay "to provide both
evidence and argument." Appellant's Br. at 5 (emphasis added). Instead, the Board read his request
as an intention to submit evidence that was abandoned when the veteran subsequently chose the
direct review lane. R. at 6–7. It's true that the Board is obliged to construe all claimants'
submissions liberally. See Scott v. McDonald, 789 F.3d 1375, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2015). But in
liberally construing submissions, the Board must "consider the full context within which those
submissions are made." Rivera v. Shinseki, 654 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2011); see also Rickett
v. Shinseki, 26 Vet.App. 210, 220 (2013) (en banc) (observing that the liberal construction of a
submission takes into account not only "the context of its language" but also the "circumstances
of filing"), withdrawn on other grounds, 27 Vet.App. 240 (2015).
          Mr. Brack has limited his liberal construction argument to the four corners of the August
2021 submission without addressing the full context in which the Board was bound to consider it.
That full context includes the modernized system, which introduced multiple appeal lanes from

                                                  8
which a claimant could choose, each with differing procedures, scopes, and timeframes for Board
review. Nevertheless, we assume without deciding in this appeal that the Board should have
understood Mr. Brack as having requested a 90-day delay in its issuing a decision in the direct
review lane so that he could submit argument.3 Even with that assumption, however, we are not
persuaded that the veteran was denied fair process in this case.
        Recall that the fair process doctrine, formulated in the context of a one-size-fits-all VA
benefits adjudicatory system, imposes additional process not specified in statutes or regulations
when such process is necessary to protect claimants' rights to notice and the meaningful
opportunity to be heard—rights that are foundational to that system. Bryant, 33 Vet.App. at 46.
Mr. Brack asserts that, to ensure that he had a "reasonable amount of time" to submit argument,
fair process "demand[ed]" here that the Board delay issuing a decision until 90 days after his
representative received a copy of the claims file even after he chose the direct review lane for his
appeal. Reply Br. at 6–7.
        We disagree. While Mr. Brack clearly had a right to submit argument to the Board, and
that right logically encompasses an appropriate amount of time to obtain and review the claims
file so as to develop such argument, the 90-day delay he sought is unmoored from any procedural
standard applicable to the direct review lane and inconsistent with the expeditious process it was
designed to provide. In other words, the procedures of the direct review lane that Mr. Brack chose
provided no reasonable expectation that the Board would delay issuing a decision for 90 days.
What is more, Mr. Brack could have taken advantage of the appeal deadlines and alternative review
lanes provided by the modernized system, which would have afforded him the fair process he
contends his circumstances warranted—namely, the reasonable opportunity for his representative
to obtain and review the claims file and to submit argument.
        It is important to clarify what is at issue in this appeal. Whether in the legacy system or the
modernized system, a claimant's right to submit argument to VA generally, and the Board
specifically, is recognized by VA regulations and is not in dispute here. See, e.g., 38 C.F.R.
§§ 3.103(c)(1), (d)(2), 19.22, 19.29, 20.104(c), 20.202(a), 20.404, 20.700, 20.701 (2023). The crux
of this case is the timeframe for exercising this right in a particular procedural context.

        3
          Neither our caselaw nor the Federal Circuit's clearly identifies the proper standard for reviewing whether
the Board properly discharged its liberal construction obligation in particular circumstances. Given our assumption,
however, we need not resolve that question here.

                                                         9
       And except for a few special circumstances not relevant here, regulations do not address
that issue. In the legacy context addressed by Bryant, VA had come to treat the 90-day period set
forth in the pre-AMA version of § 20.1304(a) as the default period for submitting argument. In
formulating rules for the modernized system, VA declined to specify "a reasonable time period for
submission of a written statement addressing relevant evidence and argument" to the Board in the
direct review lane. 84 Fed. Reg. at 156. The Agency recognized that, although the modernized
system "confines evidence submission to certain periods, the statute and proposed regulations do
not—apart from creating a faster review process—restrict a representative's ability to submit
argument." Id. But it thought the "design of the system" sufficed to encourage "advocacy early in
the appeals process" because, with respect to the direct review lane, this was "the most efficient
way to reach a comprehensive and speedy decision." Id. Noting this lack of specified timeframe
in the modernized system, the leading practice manual for representatives of VA claimants advises
that "[w]ritten argument can be submitted to the Board any time from the filing of the NOD until
the issuance of the Board's decision." VETERANS BENEFITS MANUAL § 13.2.3. Thus, when the
Board issues a decision is a function of which review lane in the modernized system a claimant
chooses.
       The fair process doctrine did not require the Board to wait 90 days to issue its decision
once Mr. Brack chose the direct review lane. As we've already discussed, Bryant's legacy system
holding cannot simply be grafted onto the modernized system. Cf. Appellant's Br. at 3. Pre-AMA
§ 20.1304(a) governed Mr. Bryant's case, and its universally applicable timeframe created "a
reasonable expectation" that he could submit argument within the 90-day post-certification period.
Bryant, 33 Vet.App. at 48. Because argument submission was "generally authorized by regulation"
during this period, we reasoned that the concept of fair play inherent in that regulatory framework
required the Board to wait when it received affirmative indication that Mr. Bryant intended to
submit argument, so that he could participate in that appellate process. Id. at 47–49.
       The framework of the direct review lane provides no such submission timeframe and gives
rise to no such reasonable expectation. Claimants are clearly advised that this review option is
meant to result in issuance of a Board decision as soon as possible, and no intervening procedural
steps between the filing of the NOD and the issuance of the decision are specified. This speed is
not an "an unfair flaw" in the direct review lane process but rather "an intended feature of that
process." Aviles-Rivera, 35 Vet.App. at 279. If Mr. Brack did not think the direct review lane was

                                                10
the best appellate route in his circumstances, he was free not to choose it. Having chosen the direct
review lane, however, he cannot use the fair process doctrine to incorporate a 90-day argument
submission period from an inapplicable regulation into it. See Sprinkle, 733 F.3d at 1186.
       Permitting claimants to choose the direct review lane and then demand individualized
adjudication timelines would introduce procedural complexity and alter the fundamentally
expeditious nature of the direct review lane, potentially causing delays for other claimants who
chose the direct review lane precisely for its quickness. See 38 C.F.R. § 20.800(b) (noting that
"each appeal will be decided in the order in which it is entered on the docket to which it is
assigned," as required by 38 U.S.C. § 7107(a)(4)). In passing the AMA, Congress sought to
streamline the VA appeals process and, as part of that overhaul, to give claimants choices about
how their claims should proceed. Aviles-Rivera, 35 Vet.App. at 279. And in implementing the
AMA, "VA possesses a duty not only to individual claimants, but to the effective functioning of
the veterans compensation system as a whole." Veterans Justice Grp, LLC v. Sec'y of Veterans
Affairs, 818 F.3d 1336, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The statutory and regulatory scheme surrounding
the direct review lane make clear that it is the option for claimants who want the Board to issue a
decision as quickly as possible. The fair process doctrine does not permit, much less require,
procedures that would disrupt that scheme.
       Moreover, the modernized system's broader procedural choices provided Mr. Brack's
representative ample opportunity to obtain and review the veteran's claims file and to submit
argument for Board consideration—the right that the veteran invokes the fair process doctrine to
protect in this case. There is no fair process violation when a claimant "had opportunities to raise
arguments to the Board but declined to do so." Williams, 32 Vet.App. at 59.
       Consider the filing of the NOD. Mr. Brack received a dissatisfactory RO decision in July
2021, and his representative requested a copy of the claims file the following month. He had until
July 2022 to file an NOD and could have sought an extension on that period for good cause. See
38 C.F.R. § 20.203(b)–(c). This one-year deadline afforded an adequate timeframe for the veteran's
representative to request, receive, and review his claims file before filing an NOD and choosing
an appropriate review lane. (And, in fact, his representative received the claims file in January
2022, leaving approximately six months until the NOD deadline.) Mr. Brack did not avail himself
of the full period for submitting an NOD, which could have accommodated his circumstances.

                                                 11
         And in addition to the generous period provided for filing an NOD, the modernized system
offered review lanes that may have been better suited to the veteran's predicament. Of the three
available review lanes, he chose the one that provides the speediest Board decision but, as a
consequence, also the briefest period for submitting argument. This is a feature, not a bug, of the
direct review lane. The Board hearing and evidence submission review lanes each designate 90-
day submission periods during which a Board decision will not issue. 38 C.F.R. § 20.202(b)(2)–
(3). True, these periods pertain specifically to submitting evidence rather than argument, and
neither review lane option is linked to fulfillment of a claims file request. But these lanes do specify
procedures that give claimants a reasonable expectation that Board decisions will not issue before
certain dates. Combined with a one-year NOD deadline, therefore, these alternative review lanes
offered choices for Mr. Brack, ones that would have delayed issuance of a Board decision in
keeping with the veteran's preferred timeline and provided him a reasonable opportunity to submit
argument to the Board after his representative received a copy of his claims file.4 Yet he did not
choose them.
         Thus, because there were procedural options open to Mr. Brack that would have provided
him a reasonable opportunity to submit argument to the Board before it issued a decision, the Court
is not persuaded that the fair process doctrine entitled him to a 90-day delay in the context of the
direct review lane, which was designed to produce a Board decision as quickly as possible.

                                               III. CONCLUSION
         Accordingly, the Court AFFIRMS the March 8, 2022, Board decision.

         JAQUITH, Judge, concurring in the judgment: In my view, the veteran has failed to
demonstrate prejudicial error, so I concur in the Court's judgment. I cannot concur further because
the majority opinion's tepid take on fair process under the AMA may be read to weaken the
commitment to fairness at the heart of the system for adjudicating veterans benefits, which would
needlessly exemplify "the adage that 'bad facts make bad law.'" Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319
(1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).

         4
           Even if Mr. Brack's representative wasn't able to present argument to the Board before it issued its decision,
he could still advance it in this Court. We routinely apply a "less strict" requirement for issue exhaustion and consider
new arguments on appeal when a claimant was not represented by an attorney before VA. Scott, 789 F.3d at 1380; see
Massie v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 123, 127 (2011).

                                                          12
       To start, it is undisputed that fair process is required in both legacy and AMA cases. The
Secretary specifically said that he "acknowledges that claimants have a general right to fair process
in the development and adjudication of their claims and appeals before VA, including under the
modernized system." Secretary's Supplemental (Supp.) Br. at 4. The Secretary agreed with the
veteran that "even in situations where no particular procedural process is required by statute or
regulation, the principle of fair process may nonetheless require additional process if it is implicitly
required when 'viewed against [the] underlying concepts of procedural regularity and basic fair
play' of the VA benefits adjudicatory system." Id. (quoting Smith v. Wilkie, 32 Vet.App. 332, 337
(2020) and citing Appellant's Br. at 4); see also Secretary's Br. at 7 ("Appellant is correct that
principles of fair play may require additional process even where not explicated by statute or
regulation."); Appellant's Supp. Br. at 2 ("A claimant has the right to fair process no matter whether
his appeal proceeds through the 'legacy' appellate system or pursuant to the procedures of the
[AMA]."). The parties' agreement comports with the vision of Congress for the AMA, the Court's
caselaw, and VA's assurances.
       In enacting the AMA, Congress embraced fair process as a pillar of appeals modernization,
saying that the AMA "was designed, in part, to 'streamline VA's appeal process' and 'help ensure
that the process is both timely and fair.'" H. Rep. No. 115-135 at 5 (2017). In implementing the
AMA and responding to comments recommending goals related to timeliness, VA offered this
assurance: "VA is committed to the purpose of appeals modernization, which is to provide fair,
efficient, and more timely resolution of cases in which a claimant disagrees with a VA decision."
VA Claims and Appeals Modernization, 84 Fed. Reg. 138-01, 147, 2019 WL 247518 (Jan. 18,
2019). And this Court held, in an AMA case last year, that "[t]he Board is obligated to provide fair
process to appellants in the adjudication of their claims." Davis v. McDonough, 36 Vet.App. 142,
155 (2023).
       In this case, the majority opinion is not sufficiently clear on that essential point. For
example, the majority relies on the Sprinkle decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit to state that the Court "'created what became known as the fair process doctrine' in Thurber
v. Brown, 5 Vet.App. 119 (1993), . . . at a time when it was not yet clear whether VA claimants
had property rights protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment," and noted that
"such rights have since been recognized." Ante at 4 (quoting Sprinkle v. Shinseki, 733 F.3d 1180,
1185 (Fed. Cir. 2013)). I fear that statement may be read as implying that fair process is no longer

                                                  13
viable—perhaps even that it has not been viable since the Federal Circuit held, in Cushman v.
Shinseki, 576 F.3d 1290, 1299-1300 (Fed. Cir. 2009), that "the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution applies to proceedings in which the VA decides whether claimants are eligible for
veterans' benefits." Sprinkle, 733 F.3d at 1185. Any such implication would be wrong.
       First, the characterization (by the majority and Sprinkle) of the origins of fair process is a
mite miserly. Even before Thurber, this Court observed that veterans benefits were not mere
privileges; their continued receipt was a statutorily created property interest protected by the Fifth
Amendment. Fugere v. Derwinski, 1 Vet.App. 103, 108 (1990) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424
U.S. 319, 332 (1976), and Walters v. Nat'l Assoc. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 333 (1985),
aff'd, 972 F.2d 331 (Fed. Cir. 1992). Thurber echoed Fugere, added that "some lower federal courts
[had] accorded due process rights to applicants," surveyed VA's nonadversarial claims system, and
observed that the system "is predicated upon a structure which provides for notice and an
opportunity to be heard at virtually every step in the process." Thurber, 5 Vet.App. at 123. Thurber
considered that structure in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Gonzales v. United States, a
case about denying conscientious objector classification, that notice and an opportunity to reply
were implicit in statutes and regulations that were silent on process requirements "'when viewed
against our underlying concepts of procedural regularity and basic fair play.'" Thurber, 5 Vet.App.
at 123 (quoting Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 411-12 (1955)). Based on Gonzales and
VA's nonadversarial claims system, Thurber held that before the Board relies on evidence to decide
a claim it "must provide a claimant with reasonable notice of such evidence and of the reliance
proposed to be placed on it, and a reasonable opportunity for the claimant to respond to it."
Thurber, 5 Vet.App. at 126.
       Our Court first explicitly recognized veterans' right to fair process in Austin v. Brown, 6
Vet.App. 547, 551 (1994). Holding "that basic fair play requires that evidence be procured by the
agency in an impartial, unbiased, and neutral manner," the Court in Austin embraced the fair
process principle it implicitly relied on in Thurber and seconded Thurber’s citation of the Supreme
Court's invocation, in Gonzales, of a fair process requirement "implicit in the statute and
regulations when "'viewed against our underlying concepts of procedural regularity and basic fair
play."'" Austin, 6 Vet.App. at 551-52 (quoting Thurber, 5 Vet.App. at 123, in turn quoting
Gonzales, 348 U.S. at 412). As Austin, Thurber, and cases after Cushman such as Smith and Bryant
v. Wilkie, 33 Vet.App. 43 (2020), have recognized, fair process was woven into the nonadversarial

                                                 14
system that Congress created for the adjudication of veterans claims, which is dramatically more
protective of veterans' rights than the construct for ordinary civil litigation. See Henderson v.
Shinseki, 562 U.S. 428, 440 (2011). The longstanding solicitude of Congress for veterans is
reflected in laws "that 'place a thumb on the scale in the veteran's favor in the course of
administrative and judicial review of VA decisions.'" Id. (quoting Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S.
396, 416 (2009) (Souter, J., dissenting)). For example, "VA is charged with the responsibility of
assisting veterans in developing evidence that supports their claims, and in evaluating that
evidence, the VA must give the veteran the benefit of any doubt." Henderson, 562 U.S. at 440.
       Far from expiring or being subsumed by Cushman's recognition that a veteran's
"entitlement to benefits is a property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment to the United States Constitution," Cushman, 576 F.3d at 1298, ensuring a veteran's
right to fair process in the adjudication of his or her claim has been held to be a "well-established"
obligation of the Board, existing "[a]side from any constitutional due process requirements that
may apply to administrative adjudications." Nohr v. McDonald, 27 Vet.App. 124, 134 n.5 (2014).
And the Court has made clear "that the principle of fair process applies throughout the process of
evidentiary development." Smith, 32 Vet.App. at 337. "In the claimant-friendly world of veterans
benefits, 'the importance of systemic fairness and the appearance of fairness carries great weight.'"
Arneson v. Shinseki, 24 Vet.App. 379, 387 (2011) (quoting Hodge v. West, 155 F.3d 1356, 1363
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
       Against this backdrop, the majority's observation that Bryant cannot be "transplanted" or
"grafted" onto the AMA system, ante at 8-10, is both unnecessary and misplaced. Fair process is
part of the soil in which the AMA system was planted. In the brave new AMA world, as in legacy
days of yore, we consider what the fair process principle requires when no particular procedural
process is prescribed by statute or regulation. Bryant, 33 Vet.App. at 46-47. I read the majority
opinion as a commendable effort to do just that—to determine what the fair process principle
requires in the sloppy circumstances of this case—and the Court's decision should not be read or
used to subvert the fair process principles on which the system for adjudicating veterans claims
rests. To that end, I cannot endorse statements that can be read to suggest that fair process
principles are foreclosed by the direct review lane's fast pace. See ante at 11 ("The fair process
doctrine does not permit, much less require, procedures that would disrupt th[e] scheme [to issue
a decision as quickly as possible].").

                                                 15
         We should simply apply Bryant in the setting of this case, which should not diminish
Bryant or the fair process for which it stands. To be sure, the setting here is different, but a
meaningful similarity remains. In Bryant, the legacy § 20.1304 (now § 20.1305) gave veterans 90
days to request a hearing, submit evidence, or request a change in representation. Bryant, 33
Vet.App. at 45; 38 C.F.R § 20.1304(a) (2017). The current version of § 20.1304 covers only
requests for a change in representation, providing—as it did before the AMA—that an appellant
may request a change in representation within 90 days or until the Board promulgates its decision,
and may do so after 90 days upon demonstrating good cause for the delay.5 38 C.F.R § 20.1304
(2023). However, now the time for requesting a hearing is when filing an NOD and the time for
submitting evidence is at the hearing and within 90 days afterward (if a hearing is requested) or
with the NOD and within 90 days following its receipt (if no hearing is requested). 38 C.F.R §
20.202(b)(2) & (3) (2023). Mr. Brack chose direct review, without submission of additional
evidence or a Board hearing. 38 C.F.R § 20.202(b)(1). Notably, both before the AMA and under
it, the time for submitting argument is unrestricted but not expressed. See VA Claims and Appeals
Modernization, 84 Fed. Reg. 138-01, 156, 2019 WL 247518 (Jan. 18, 2019) ("Although the
modernized review system confines evidence submission to certain periods, the statute and
proposed regulations do not—apart from creating a faster review process—restrict a
representative's ability to submit argument."). The AMA did not alter the ability to submit
arguments, or the time frame for doing so. And 90 days remains the only benchmark in §§ 20.1304
and 20.1305 (at least for claims that are not simultaneously contested, where claimants have 60
days to comment on evidence, see § 20.1305(d)).
         In addition, on October 22, 2021—the day after the Board received the veteran's NOD
appealing the Board's July 29, 2021, decision—the Board advised the veteran that his appeal had
been "placed on the Direct Review docket" and, "[o]n average, appeals on the Direct Review
docket are decided within 365 days of being docketed." R. at 56. The Board also advised the
veteran that he could request to switch to another AMA docket within 60 days of the date the
Board had received his NOD or within one year of the VA decision being appealed, whichever
was later. Id. But the Board said nothing about the veteran's August 25, 2021, request for his claims

         5
            The new version of § 20.1304 changes the starting point for the 90 days from the date of mailing to
appellants notice that an appeal was certified to the Board and the appellate record transferred there to the date of
receipt of the NOD. Cf. 38 C.F.R § 20.1304 (2017) and 38 C.F.R § 20.1304 (2023).

                                                         16
file and a 90-day extension from the date he received it. Based upon the Board's response, the
veteran had more than 10 months to change dockets and no reason to expect a decision within that
time, much less the haste the majority emphasizes or the Board's unusually speedy judgment 47
days after the claims file was provided to the veteran (228 days faster than the Board's average and
with 143 days left to elect a different docket). The evidence of how and why that happened is
mixed.
         First, my view is that the Board was obliged to read the veteran's August 2021 submission
sympathetically. "The Government's interest in veterans cases is that justice be done, and the
systemic fairness essential for securing justice includes a duty to construe veterans' submissions
sympathetically, especially when the veteran is self-represented or represented by someone who
is not a licensed attorney." Perciavalle v. McDonough, 35 Vet.App. 11, 30 (2021) (en banc), aff'd
in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 74 F.4th 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2023); see Comer v. Peake, 552
F.3d 1362, 1368-70 (Fed. Cir. 2009). So when the Board received the veteran's August 2021
"Privacy Act request" seeking his complete claims file "for presentation and prosecution of his
current and future requests" and "asking for a 90 day extension from the date in which this [Privacy
Act] request is completed to submit additional supporting evidence," R. at 130-04, the Board
should have treated the extension request as encompassing both evidence and argument, the latter
of which was unaffected by the veteran's October 2021 choice of direct review. But the fair process
violation Bryant found intolerable was more than a fumble of a sympathetically construed request
for extra time within which evidence or argument might be submitted. The Court noted that Mr.
Bryant's appeal stated that "'[f]urther argument will be advanced in [a] memorandum in lieu of [a
form]" once the Board sent a 90-day letter and found that it was the Board ignoring "Mr. Bryant's
express statement that he would submit additional argument" during the 90-day period that
"offend[ed] the basic tenets of fair play that underlie the nonadversarial VA appeals process."
Bryant, 33 Vet.App. at 45, 48-49. Mr. Brack made no such express statement or clear
communication that he would submit argument to give rise to a reasonable expectation that, absent
a negative response from the Board, he would have 90 days to do so.
         However, the Board decision has a different (but related) problem. The Board construed
the veteran's August 2021 submission narrowly, as focused on submitting additional evidence, and
decided that his October 2021 selection of direct review foreclosed evidentiary submissions. R. at
6-7. But it did not address whether the conflict between the claimant seeking an extension of time

                                                17
to submit evidence and choosing the review that foreclosed such submissions obliged the Board
to "contact the claimant to request clarification of the claimant's intent." 38 C.F.R § 20.202(f)
(2023). See Edwards v. McDonough, 36 Vet.App. 56, 63 (2023) (holding that VA is required to
contact the claimant for clarification "in the face of confusion or uncertainty regarding the
claimant's NOD docket election," but not addressing "the situation where the veteran submits
additional statements or evidence after submitting the VA Form 10182").
       Even more problematic, by ignoring Mr. Brack's request entirely until it denied his appeal,
the Board chose the path least consonant with its obligation to provide fair process. As this Court
has recognized,
       "[t]he entire veterans claims adjudication process reflects the clear congressional
       intent to create an Agency environment in which VA is actually engaged in a
       continuing dialog with claimants in a paternalistic, collaborative effort to provide
       every benefit to which the claimant is entitled."[] That partnership only works if the
       Board allows an appellant to contribute to and meaningfully participate in the
       appellate process . . . .

Bryant, 33 Vet.App. at 48 (quoting Evans v. Shinseki, 25 Vet.App. 7, 16 (2011)). The Board could
have reminded Mr. Brack that he could not submit evidence but advised that he could submit
argument, perhaps with a reasonable deadline. The Board could have responded that if Mr. Brack
wanted to submit evidence he could ask for a different review docket. The Board could have denied
Mr. Brack's request for an extension and indicated that a decision on his appeal was forthcoming.
But the Board chose to ignore the veteran—the one course inconsistent with fair process built on
engaging in a "continuing dialog with claimants in a paternalistic, collaborative effort," Evans, 25
Vet.App. at 16, and allowing a veteran "to contribute to and meaningfully participate in" that
process. Bryant, 33 Vet.App. at 48; see Rogers v. Wilkie, No. 17-4958, 2020 WL 7017608, at *4
(Vet. App. Nov. 30, 2020) (mem. dec.) (persuasively holding that by neither affording the veteran
the time he requested to review his claims file nor informing him that his request for additional
time was denied, the Board denied him fair process).
       As the majority notes, ante at 10, VA purposely left the time for submitting argument
undefined:
       [A] commenter suggested that representatives do not have an opportunity to review
       the claims file, compile relevant evidence, and submit argument in support of the
       veteran's appeal prior to issuance of a Board direct review decision, and that a
       reasonable time period for submission of a written statement addressing relevant
       evidence and argument must be written into the regulations. Although the

                                                18
       modernized review system confines evidence submission to certain periods, the
       statute and proposed regulations do not—apart from creating a faster review
       process—restrict a representative's ability to submit argument. The design of the
       system favors advocacy early in the appeals process because this is the most
       efficient way to reach a comprehensive and speedy decision. VA is confident that
       veterans' advocates will be able to meet this expectation. VA made no changes
       based on these comments.

VA Claims and Appeals Modernization, 84 Fed. Reg. at 156. VA did not address—in the Federal
Register or in this case—how representatives can advocate early in the process when they don't
have the file, don't know how much time they have when they get the file, and don't receive any
response to their request for time until they read a Board decision denying the veteran's appeal.
The fair process foundation of our system for adjudicating veterans benefits requires a VA
response, at least to the veteran here. See Smith, 32 Vet.App. at 337 ("[E]ven in situations where
no particular procedural process is required by statute or regulation, the principle of fair process
may nonetheless require additional process if it is implicitly required 'when viewed against the
underlying concepts of procedural regularity and basic fair play of the VA benefits adjudicatory
system.'") (quoting Thurber, 5 Vet.App. at 123).
       However, finding error does not end our review, which must "take due account of the rule
of prejudicial error." 38 U.S.C. § 7261(b)(2). The veteran generally bears the burden of
demonstrating prejudice. Cook v. McDonough, 36 Vet.App. 175, 190 (2023); see Sanders, 556
U.S. at 409 ("[T]he burden of showing that an error is harmful normally falls upon the party
attacking the agency's determination."). Underdeveloped arguments do not satisfy that burden.
Sheppard v. McDonough, 33 Vet.App. 353, 364 (2021). Here, the shortcomings start with the
veteran's garbled request for his complete claims file, which aimed at both "presentation and
prosecution" of his claim—sympathetically read to include argument—and submitting additional
evidence, which was foreclosed by his selection of the direct review docket 2 months later. The
Board decision reflects that it denied the veteran's claim of an effective date for his coronary artery
disease based on the onset of his disability, rather than the date of his claim. R. at 9-10. Most
importantly, the veteran has not identified or developed any argument relating to that decision that
the Board's unresponsiveness to his August 2021 request stymied. See Sanders, 556 U.S. at 413
(2009) (finding error harmless when the veteran did not tell the Court "what specific additional
evidence proper notice would have led him to obtain or seek"); Costello v. McDonough, 36
Vet.App. 43, 54 (2023) ("The Bryant Court found that the veteran having identified argument and

                                                  19
evidence that he would have submitted during the 90-day period was essential in determining that
the veteran 'carried his burden of demonstrating that he was prejudiced by the Board issuing its
decision fewer than 90 days after mailing the § 20.1304(a) notice letter.'") (quoting Bryant, 33
Vet.App. at 50). At oral argument, the veteran's counsel said:
       I don't know what he intended to argue your honor. All I know is, as we pointed
       out in our opening brief, that because this was a Nehmer6claim and because there
       was an earlier claim for a Nehmer covered disease that that's at least one argument
       that could have been presented that the Board would have been required to address
       and could have led to additional benefits.
Oral Argument at 37:45 – 38:10, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=daysXzzAydo. Under the
circumstances here, such speculation regarding a general argument that might have been made is
insufficient to demonstrate prejudice. Based only on my view that the veteran has not
demonstrated prejudice from the Board's error, I concur in the judgment of the Court.

       6
           See Nehmer v. U.S. Veterans' Admin., 712 F. Supp. 1404 (N.D. Cal. 1989).

                                                       20