Court Opinion

ID: 9488338
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:42:13.150166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:49.494104
License: Public Domain

JACOBS, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the result:
I concur in the result and write separately because I think the tendency of the majority opinion is to create an inflexible rule that may preclude the issuance of a preliminary injunction in every ease of trade dress infringement where the party seeking the injunction has inexcusably delayed seeking preliminary relief. Contrary to the majority, I conclude that we should accept the district court’s findings on irreparable injury and that we should reverse on the ground that the district court abused its discretion in finding that plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on the ultimate merits. In particular, I conclude that the similarities between the Tough Traveler and Outbound child carriers are functional, and that the different trademarks displayed in the same prominent spot on both products avoid confusion.
I
The presumption of irreparable harm, as the majority states, is inoperative if the plaintiff has delayed in either bringing suit or in moving for a preliminary injunction, see Majorica, S.A v. R.H. Macy & Co., 762 F.2d 7, 8 (2d Cir.1985); but the district court did not rely on this presumption in granting the injunction. Rather, as the draft acknowledges, ante at 967, the district court made findings that Tough Traveler would suffer irreparable injury because
speculation as to the amount of lost sales, the future inability to accurately account for the amount of such lost sales, and the uncertain results of consumer confusion, represent unknown and incalculable damages. Accordingly, if defendant restocks its inventory of the allegedly infringing product and is permitted to market that inventory irreparable harm will occur.
These are sufficient findings in themselves to support the district court’s finding of irreparable injury. There was no impermissible reliance on the presumption.
The majority relies on Citibank, N.A. v. Citytrust, 756 F.2d 273 (2d Cir.1985), for the proposition that “[significant ... delay alone may justify denial of a preliminary injunc-tion_” Id. at 276 (emphasis added). The Citibank opinion also cautions that “[djelay in seeking enforcement of those rights ... tends to indicate at least a reduced need for such drastic, speedy action.” Id. Thus Citibank does not preclude preliminary relief even if the district court finds unexcused delay. Delay is just one of several factors to consider. In Citibank, we vacated the injunction and remanded for further proceedings because the district court had failed adequately to address the “irreparable injury” issue, and had instead relied solely on the presumption of irreparable injury applicable in trademark cases.
I appreciate that the findings made by the district court here echo the irreparable injuries deemed by this Court to justify the presumption: the difficulty of calculating the infringer’s illegal profits and the plaintiff’s lost business, and the irreparable loss of customers to products of other competitors. See Omega Importing Corp. v. Petri-Kine Camera Co., 451 F.2d 1190, 1195 (2d Cir.1971). However, that is the likely list of considerations available to support an inference of irreparable harm in the absence of a presumption. In this case the district court expressed these considerations as findings. Under the circumstances, they are not clearly erroneous. If the making of such findings is deemed tantamount to invoking the presumption, it is difficult to see what findings could ever be sufficient to overcome or counteract an unexcused delay.
In short, Citibank held that the presumption of irreparable injury does not apply in circumstances of unexcused delay; the tendency of the majority opinion is to make the contrary presumption irrebuttable in such circumstances.
II
Although I respectfully disagree with the majority on the irreparable injury issue, I concur in the result because, although the child carriers created by Outbound and Tough Traveler resemble each other, the re*970semblance is caused by features that are purely functional.
The appendix filed in this appeal includes full-color photographs of the two products. At oral argument the parties provided the court with sample child carriers for examination. Other than the difference between their logos, the products are generally similar. The plaintiff alleged, and the district court found, that the similarities include “the lightweight, narrow and slim design,” which “contribut[es] to” the carriers’ “overall look and appearance[,] [a] vertical stripe on the seats and back, ... shaped side flaps, a ... diagonal zipper located at the back accessing a deep pocket on the bottom, and [the] frame.” Memorandum Decision and Order, September 23, 1994 at 2.
As the majority sets forth, trade dress is protected under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, which provides a private right of action against any party who “in connection with any goods ... or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof ... which is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods ... by another person.” 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). To prevail in a § 43(a) case, a plaintiff must establish (1) that an identifying mark is either (a) inherently distinctive or (b) has acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning and (2) a likelihood of confusion exists between the similar products sold by plaintiff and defendant. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2753, 2758, 120 L.Ed.2d 615 (1992); Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Importers & Distrib., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.1993).
In addition, it is well established that functional packaging and product design are unprotected,1 and that functionality may be raised as a defense to an action for trade dress infringement. Paddington, 996 F.2d at 582. “Functional symbols (those that are essential to a product’s use as opposed to those which merely identify it) are not protected under” the Lanham Act. Warner Bros., Inc. v. Gay Toys, Inc., 724 F.2d 327, 330 (2d Cir.1983). This defense “was developed to protect advances in functional design from being monopolized. It is designed to encourage competition and the broadest dissemination of useful design features.” Id. at 331 (footnote omitted).
A functional feature is “one that ‘is essential to the use or purpose of the article or [that] affects the cost or quality of the article.’ ” LeSportsac, Inc. v. K Mart Corp., 754 F.2d 71, 76 (2d Cir.1985) (quoting Inwood Lab., Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 850 n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 2182, 2187 n. 10, 72 L.Ed.2d 606 (1982)) (alteration in LeSport-sac ). The burden of establishing this affirmative defense rests with the defendant. LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 75-76.
The district court specifically rejected Outbound’s argument that any similarity between its child carrier and Tough Traveler’s was attributable solely to functionality, noting simply:
In the instant case, it appears to the court that the overall appearance of Tough Traveler’s carrier is inherently distinctive: despite defendant’s claims to the contrary, the combination of such arbitrary and fanciful elements as a diagonal zipper and two-tone cloth panels of various sizes and shapes — incoiporated into a lightweight, narrow and slim design — conveys an inherently distinctive total image and overall appearance.
Memorandum Decision and Order at 5. The court, citing to LeSportsac, 754 F.2d 71, also offered the following comments in a footnote:
[Although non-distinctive individual elements might only be functional, “the particular combination and arrangement of [those] design elements ... when viewed in [their] entirety [can be] non-functional.” LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 76. Thus the inherent distinctiveness of a trade dress— created by a collection of wholly separate, *971but functional parts — is protectable, if that particular amalgamation of disparate parts is not essential to the use or purpose of the end product. See id.
Memorandum Decision and Order at 5 n. 4 (alterations in Memorandum).
In relying on LeSportsac, a case involving similar lines of lightweight luggage, the district court insufficiently appreciated that the defendants had copied arbitrary as well as functional elements of LeSportsac’s product. The LeSportsac opinion listed a number of arbitrary features of the LeSportsac design that defendants adopted, and explained how defendants could have differentiated their product without diminishing its functionality: “For example, the cotton carpet tape and carrying straps could be placed differently, contrasted in color with the bag or be made thicker or thinner; zipper pulls could be solid or nonrectangular; the repeating elliptical logo could be changed or placed differently.” LeSportsac, 754 F.2d at 77. In this case the district court failed to identify any specific changes that could be made in Outbound’s child carrier that would not affect the functionality of the product. The diagonal zipper creates a wider opening; two-toning is not much of an inspiration; and the lightweight, compact design will be deemed functional by any parent harnessed into this contraption.
The district court’s conclusion as to functionality does not consider the guidance furnished by this Court’s opinion in Stormy Clime Ltd. v. ProGroup, Inc., 809 F.2d 971 (2d Cir.1987). The district court had enjoined the defendant from marketing a fine of raincoats that bore a strong resemblance to Stormy Clime’s “COOL IT” rain jacket. In vacating the injunction, we reviewed the numerous features common to both products: the high-sheen waterproof fabric, the hood, and the cunning vents and folds which “appear[ed] to be dictated by the purpose of providing a low-cost, unemcumbering, waterproof jacket for wear while playing golf and other sports.” Id. at 976. Although the many functional materials, configurations and details resulted in “rainjackets [that] are similar in appearance, their purely ornamental features and labeling differ in almost every respect other than color....” Id.
In my view, this case is governed by Stormy Clime. Child carriers are as thoroughly functional as clothespins. Once the numerous functional elements of a child carrier are accounted for — the folding frame that forms a stand; the narrow, lightweight back harness; the waist straps; the forward-facing sling seat and headrest of soft fabric; the side flaps to keep out the wind; the utility pocket with a wide zipper opening; and so on — few arbitrary or decorative features can be identified. In affidavits submitted to the district court, defendants point out the functional qualities of nearly every independent component of their product. Joint Appendix (“JA”) at 339-47. These functional features dominate the design of the two products.
The one purely arbitrary feature of these products is the label. Both manufacturers have chosen to place their identifying mark squarely in the center of the rear panel. Both labels are large and legible, prominent to people buying the product and noticeable to passersby when the product is in use. As in Stormy Clime, the products’ “purely ornamental features and labeling differ in almost every respect”. And the names of the manufacturers themselves are distinctive and different, except insofar as both names suit the peripatetic use of the product. Furthermore, several aspects of the two products do differ. For example, the metal frame of the Outbound child carrier is black while Tough Traveler’s frame is white or unpainted metal. Finally, the record reflects that several other manufacturers make child carriers that employ similar functional features and configurations, and that resemble the Outbound and Tough Traveler models. See JA at 164.
Accordingly, I would vacate the preliminary injunction on the ground that district court erred in concluding that Tough Traveler succeeded in demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits.

. Under no circumstances do I believe this appeal compels us to decide whether, as urged by appellant, we should adopt the method of analysis recently identified by the Third Circuit in Duraco Products v. Joy Plastic Enterprises, Ltd., 40 F.3d 1431 (3d Cir.1994). Duraco classifies "product packaging” as separate from "product configuration” and states that different tests apply to each of the two classes.