Court Opinion

ID: 9945709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 15:03:20.414149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:38.104034
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2024 Ark. App. 156
                       ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                            DIVISION I
                                           No. CV-22-549

                                                    Opinion Delivered February 28, 2024
 EDWARD WESTER
                                    APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE SHARP COUNTY
                                              CIRCUIT COURT
 V.                                           [NOS. 68DR-17-189 & 68CV-18-171]

 TRINA WESTER, FLOYD PROCK, AND                     HONORABLE MICHELLE C. HUFF, JUDGE
 DEBBIE ANDERSON
                                                    AFFIRMED
                                     APPELLEES

                               WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge

       This appeal is taken from Sharp County Circuit Court orders entered in consolidated cases

Edward Wester v. Trina Wester (68DR-17-189), a divorce action, and Floyd Prock and Debbie Anderson v.

Edward Wester (68CV-18-171), a civil proceeding. On appeal, appellant Edward Wester asserts

various challenges to the validity and scope of the default judgment entered in the divorce action. He

also attacks the amended order and the contempt order entered in the cases. We affirm the

arguments properly before the court.

       Edward and separate appellee Trina Wester were married on January 11, 2017. The parties

separated later that same year, on October 20. The marriage, although brief, brought about

prolonged litigation, multiple cases, additional parties asserting claims related to the same piece of

real property, and findings of contempt. The recitation of facts is somewhat repetitive based on the

overlapping of the two underlying cases in both time and claims.
       Edward filed a complaint for divorce on October 26. In his complaint, Edward stated, “The

parties have made an equitable division of the real and personal property and debt.” Trina filed an

answer and counterclaim for divorce on November 20. In her counterclaim, Trina stated, “[T]he

parties have both real property and personal property rights that require adjudication or resolution

through agreement by the parties.” Edward filed an answer to the counterclaim on November 28.

In his answer, Edward stated “that his real property is not marital property[.]” On February 26, 2018,

appellees Floyd Prock and Debbie Anderson filed a motion for leave to intervene in the Westers’

divorce action. The motion stated that Anderson is Trina’s mother, and as such, prior to the Westers’

marriage,

       On August 5, 2016, Floyd Prock and Debbie Anderson gave a Promissory Note to Gary R.
       Troyan, Trustee, in the principal sum of Twenty Two thousand Four Hundred Dollars
       ($22,400.00), which was the equity for Plaintiff’s purchase of the following described lands
       lying in Sharp County, Arkansas:

               Lot 55, Block 4 Navajo 2nd Addition to Cherokee Village Subdivision, Sharp County,
               Arkansas.

               A/D/A: 82 Enid Road, Cherokee Village, Arkansas 72529.

       On October 24, 2016, Gary R. Troyan, Trustee, caused to be filed Book 2016 at Page 12814
       of the records of the Clerk of the Courts of Sharp County, Arkansas a certain Satisfaction of
       Mortgage, reflecting payment of the indebtedness by Floyd Prock and Debbie Anderson.

Prock and Anderson claimed entitlement to an equitable lien in the amount of $22,400 on the subject

property and that they are necessary parties to the Westers’ divorce case. The court denied the

motion for leave to intervene on May 9.

       On August 16, Prock and Anderson filed a separate civil action against Edward concerning

the residence located at 82 Enid Road. The complaint stated that Prock and Anderson “wanted Trina

to begin her marriage in a new home”; however, Edward represented to them that title must be in

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his name only in order to qualify for financing through his military benefits. Prock and Anderson

gave a $22,400 promissory note to Gary Troyan, Trustee, “which was the equity for the purchase of

the subject property.” On October 24, 2016, a warranty deed was filed conveying the subject

property to Edward “with no consideration.” A satisfaction of mortgage was also filed that same day,

reflecting payment of indebtedness by Prock and Anderson. Prock and Anderson asserted that they

“are victims of fraud, actual, or constructive, undue influence and failure of consideration.” They

claimed that Edward made false representations of material fact intending to cause them to act in

reliance on his representations “with the result being the loss of their [$22,400] equity in the subject

property.” Prock and Anderson requested an award for actual and punitive damages, as well as

attorney’s fees.

        Trina filed an amended counterclaim for divorce on December 7, 2018. In her amended

counterclaim, she asserted the same claims that Prock and Anderson made in their civil complaint

regarding certain real property. Trina stated that Prock and Anderson gave a $22,400 promissory

note to Gary Troyan, Trustee, “which was the equity for the purchase of the subject property with

the intent that this was a gift to [Trina], the daughter of [Anderson]. Trina asserted that she, Prock,

and Anderson were victims of fraud, actual, or constructive, undue influence and failure of

consideration. She requested an absolute divorce; equitable division of marital property and marital

debts; that the marital residence be sold; that the first $22,400 of net proceeds from the sale of the

marital residence be paid either to her or to Prock and Anderson; that the remaining net proceeds be

divided; that the court award actual and punitive damages; that her name be restored to Trina Marie

Polston; and for all other relief to which she is entitled.

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        On December 12, Prock and Anderson filed a motion to consolidate cases, stating that the

divorce proceeding and the civil action both concern claims to assets by Edward, specifically to certain

real property located in Sharp County.

        Edward did not file a response to Trina’s amended counterclaim. Based on his failure to

respond, Trina filed a motion for partial summary judgment on November 4, 2019. Edward then,

on November 13, filed an answer to the amended counterclaim, approximately eleven months after

the amended counterclaim was filed by Trina. In his answer, Edward asserted various affirmative

defenses and moved to dismiss Trina’s amended counterclaim pursuant to Rule 12(b) of the Arkansas

Rules of Civil Procedure for lack of jurisdiction over the person, insufficiency of process,

insufficiency of service, and failure to state facts upon which relief could be granted. In response,

Trina filed a motion to strike untimely answer to amended counterclaim and for default judgment

under Rule 55 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Edward failed to respond to the motion to

strike untimely answer to amended counterclaim and for default judgment.

        On February 3, 2020, for purposes of judicial economy, the circuit court entered an order

consolidating the divorce action and the civil proceeding. On that same day, February 3, the circuit

court entered an order granting Trina’s motion for default judgment on her amended counterclaim

and striking untimely answer. Trina was granted the relief requested in her amended counterclaim.

Edward was adjudged liable to Trina, Prock, and Anderson for both actual and punitive damages for

actual fraud, for constructive fraud, for undue influence, and for failure of consideration in amounts

to be proved at trial. Edward filed a motion to set aside the default judgment; this motion was denied

two years later, on February 7, 2022, in the amended order entered in the cases.

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       On September 30, 2020, Edward filed a countercomplaint against Prock and Anderson for

breach of contract, breach of warranty, breach of seisen, and complaint against Trina for tortious

interference of contract. Trina, Prock, and Anderson moved to strike Edward’s countercomplaint.

An order was entered on January 5, 2022, disposing of the outstanding motions:

        Edward’s motion for partial summary judgment was denied.

        Trina’s motion for partial summary judgment was rendered moot by the order granting
         default judgment.

        Edward’s motion to set aside default judgment was denied.

        Trina’s motion to strike motion to set aside default judgment or, alternatively, response
         to motion to set aside default judgment was moot.

        Edward’s complaint against third-party plaintiffs/defendants for breach of contract,
         breach of warranty, breach of seisen and complaint against Trina for tortious interference
         of a contract was time-barred.

        Trina, Prock, and Anderson’s motion to strike countercomplaint was granted.

        Trina’s motion to direct Edward to relocate from the premises was granted.

The order directed that Trina, Prock, and Anderson’s attorneys’ fees and costs shall be deducted

from Edward’s net proceeds from the sale of the property; $22,400 of Edward’s net proceeds shall

be deducted and paid to Prock and Anderson; if Edward’s net proceeds are insufficient to pay all of

the above, he shall immediately pay from his personal funds any deficiency. Edward was directed to

immediately vacate the subject property; he was authorized to remove only his clothing and toiletries;

and the court ordered the subject real property to be sold with the proceeds distributed as specified

in the order. Edward filed a motion to set aside the order for fraud contending that at the November

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22, 2021 hearing on the motion to set aside default judgment, an agreement was read into the record,

but no final order was signed and filed.

       Trina filed a motion for contempt on January 12, 2022, a week after the court’s entry of the

“order.” She stated that Edward was in contempt of the court’s order directing him to vacate the

residence immediately. She stated that Edward “has steadfastly and vehemently refused to vacate the

premises in violation of” the court’s order.

       The circuit court entered an amended order on February 7 finding it “necessary to be

amended to indicate agreement of the parties and the continuing jurisdiction of the Court.” The

amended order was duplicative of the January 5 order, except that it now directed Edward to vacate

the residence on or before March 5, 2022, instead of “immediately.” Trina filed another motion for

contempt and order to show cause on March 9, and an amended motion for contempt and order to

show cause on March 16 asserting that Edward, in violation of the circuit court’s amended order,

removed “all personal property, including all furniture, personal property, and both free standing

and built-in appliances” from the residence. Edward, in his sworn affidavit attached to his response

to Trina’s contempt motion, stated the removal of the property from the house was an “honest

mistake” and that he is willing to return the personal property to the home.

       On May 11, a decree of absolute divorce between Edward and Trina was entered on the

grounds of eighteen months’ continuous separation. Also on May 11, an order for contempt was

entered finding that Edward was in willful disobedience of the orders of the court. “This Court finds

that the language directing [Edward] to vacate on a date certain and to leave all personal property

except his clothes and toiletries is clear.” Further, “[t]his Court finds that [Edward] offered nothing

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reasonable that he did not know he was to leave the personal property behind when he vacated and

that it is too late to return it.”

        The court sentenced Edward to thirty days in jail, suspending the imposition of sentence

contingent on Edward’s obedience of the court’s order until he has fully complied with the orders.

Edward was directed to pay a total of $13,500 in attorney’s fees for the necessity of adjudicating his

contempt. The contempt order directed that pursuant to the amended order, Trina, Prock, and

Anderson’s attorneys’ fees and costs shall be deducted from Edward’s net proceeds from the sale of

the property; $22,400 of Edward’s net proceeds shall be deducted and paid to Prock and Anderson

for equity in the subject property; $24,000 of Edward’s net proceeds shall be deducted and paid to

Prock and Anderson for their personal property; $3,300 shall be deducted and paid to Trina for new

appliances; $1,450 shall be deducted and paid to Trina for her handguns; $600 shall be deducted and

paid to Trina for utilities and security; $7,500 shall be deducted and paid to Trina for the cost of a

boat dock; and that if Edward’s net proceeds are insufficient to pay all of the above, he shall

immediately pay from his personal funds any deficiency. Edward now appeals.

        As an initial matter, we note that appellees urge this court to dismiss the appeal in its entirety

without considering any of Edward’s arguments because although the appeal principally challenges

the default judgment entered on February 3, 2020, Edward did not file an appeal from the default

judgment until June 8, 2022, thereby making it untimely. While we do find that we cannot address

the merit of Edward’s arguments related to the default judgment, we disagree with appellees

explanation as to why we cannot reach the default-judgment challenges.

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        Rule 2(a)(4) permits an interlocutory appeal from “an order which strikes out an answer, or

any part of an answer, or any pleading in an action.”1 If an order is appealable under Rule 2(a), it

must be appealed within the thirty days after entry of the order as prescribed by Rule 4(a). 2 Here,

Edward failed to timely appeal from the portion of the February 3, 2020 order striking his answer to

the amended counterclaim for untimeliness. Therefore, we grant appellees’ motion to dismiss in

part, as to the order striking Edward’s untimely answer to the amended counterclaim.

        Following entry of the order granting default judgment, Edward filed a motion to set aside

the order of default. The motion to set aside was denied in the amended order filed on February 7,

2022. Edward also appeals from the amended order that denied his motion to set aside the order of

default.3

        Rule 55 of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure governs default judgments. Subsection (c)

provides the means for setting aside default judgments:

        The court may, upon motion, set aside a default judgment previously entered for the
        following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) the
        judgment is void; (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic),
        misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; or (4) any other reason justifying
        relief from the operation of the judgment. The party seeking to have the judgment set aside
        must demonstrate a meritorious defense to the action; however, if the judgment is void, no
        other defense to the action need be shown.

        1   See Ark. R. App. P.–Civ. 2(a)(4).
        2   See In re Estate of Stinnett, 2011 Ark. 278, 383 S.W.3d 357.

        The notice of appeal was also not filed within thirty days of the amended order. However,
        3

the amended order lacked finality due to a pending motion for contempt. Because “contempt is not
merely a collateral issue, like attorney’s fees,” a circuit court’s order is not final and appealable when
a contempt issue remains pending. Anderson-Tully Co. v. Vaden, 2018 Ark. App. 484, 562 S.W.3d
249. Edward’s notice of appeal was filed after the decree of divorce and the contempt orders were
entered.

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        Our standard of review for an order denying a motion to set aside a default judgment depends

on which grounds the appellant claims the default judgment should be set aside. 4 When an appellant

claims that the default judgment is void, we conduct a de novo review and give no deference to the

circuit court’s ruling because the matter on appeal is a question of law.5 In all other challenges to the

denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment, we do not reverse absent an abuse of discretion.6

        In his motion to set aside the default judgment, Edward stated:

                The entry of the default judgment was entered through no fault of the plaintiff; and
        should be set aside due to mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect. See Rule
        55(c), Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure.

                 An email from Plaintiff’s Attorney, a copy of which is attached hereto and
        incorporated by reference herein, to the Court and opposing counsel in response to
        Defendant’s Motion to Strike Untimely Answer to Amended Counterclaim and for Default
        Judgment, affirmatively shows that the default judgment was entered through no fault of the
        Plaintiff.

        In his brief in support of the motion, Edward stated, “The fault in this case lies solely with

plaintiff’s attorney’s failure to timely file a responsive pleading to defendant’s amended

counterclaim.” Trina’s amended counterclaim was filed on December 7, 2018. Edward’s answer to

amended counterclaim was filed nearly a year later on November 13, 2019. Edward had ample time

to respond to the amended counterclaim. He offered no argument that his counsel’s neglect was

excusable. Failure to attend to business is not excusable neglect. 7 We find no abuse of discretion in

the circuit court’s denial of the motion to set aside default judgment.

       4   Steward v. Kuettel, 2014 Ark. 499, 450 S.W.3d 672.
       5   Glover v. Glover, 2020 Ark. App. 89, 595 S.W.3d 54.
       6   Id.
       7   Volunteer Transp., Inc. v. House, 357 Ark. 95, 162 S.W.3d 456 (2004).

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        Furthermore, once a default judgment has been entered, Rule 55(c) requires a two-step

analysis before a defaulting defendant can succeed in having a default judgment set aside. In this case,

as discussed above, Edward failed to make a threshold showing by proving that one of the four

enumerated categories of legally acceptable reasons or excuses existed to justify setting aside the

default judgment.8 Because the threshold was not met, this court does not reach the second step of

the analysis—whether Edward had a meritorious defense to the action. Moreover, even if the

threshold showing had been met, we would still be unable to reach the second step of the analysis;

Edward failed to present any argument as to a meritorious defense to the action.

    In his appeal, Edward argues the following:

     The default judgment as pled does not support the judgments entered; or at all as to Prock
      and Anderson, who were not parties to the divorce proceeding.

     The default judgment was entered without hearing, based on an impermissible motion
      default, and without factual findings as to service of the underlying counterclaim.

     The consideration of damage claims in divorce proceeding was beyond the scope of default.

     The award of damages not pled in the amended counterclaim was beyond the scope of default.

     Absent default, there was no proof of the civil proceeding claims.

In the above points, Edward challenges the default judgment for a multitude of reasons: (1) Prock

and Anderson were not parties in the divorce, thus, default was improper as to them; (2) Prock and

Anderson did not file a motion for default; (3) Prock and Anderson’s claims for relief were granted

by way of the default without analysis of their individual claims; (4) the default judgment exceeded

       8   See Truhe v. Grimes, 318 Ark. 117, 884 S.W.2d 255 (1994).

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the scope of the causes of action sufficiently pled; (5) no hearing was held on the motion for default;

(6) the court made no finding as to service of the pleadings prior to entering the default judgment;

(7) a divorce default should have resulted in the equitable division of assets; (8) certain damages

awarded were not pled in the amended counterclaim and could not be recovered by default; and (9)

due to the default judgment, there was a lack of proof required to support Prock and Anderson’s

claims for damages in the civil action. It is well settled that a party must object at the first opportunity

to preserve an issue for appeal, including arguments that default judgments should be set aside.9 Our

review of the record reveals that these challenges, to the extent they are before us, are not preserved

for our review because they were not raised below.

        It is clear that Edward timely appealed from the circuit court’s entry of the decree of absolute

divorce and order for criminal contempt filed on May 11, 2022.

        Edward asserts that the circuit court erroneously found him in contempt. To establish

contempt, there must be willful disobedience of a valid order of a court. 10 Before a person can be

held in contempt for violating a court’s order, the order must be definite in its terms, clear as to

what duties it imposes, and express in its commands.11 This court will not reverse a finding of

contempt unless it is clearly against the preponderance of the evidence.12 A contempt finding is

clearly against the preponderance of the evidence if, although there is evidence to support it, the

        9   Bates v. Homan, 2021 Ark. App. 266.
        10   Williams v. Arnold, 2015 Ark. App. 715, 479 S.W.3d 56.
        11   Id.
        12   Elder v. Elder, 2018 Ark. App. 276, 549 S.W.3d 919.

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reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has

been made.13

        In challenging the circuit court’s contempt finding, Edward contends “contempt should be

reversed or terminated to the extent it purports to enforce any judgment or order otherwise

overturned here.” As this court has not, by way of this appeal, “overturned” any orders on which

Edward’s contempt was based, we need not consider this argument.

        To the extent that Edward’s argument may be construed as an assertion that he did not

willfully disobey a valid court order, we find no merit.

        On February 26, 2018, the circuit court entered a mutual restraining order directing that the

“parties are further enjoined from selling . . . any of the property belonging to the parties . . . except

by agreement of the parties, or except by further Orders of the Court.” In the February 7, 2022

amended order, Edward was ordered to “vacate the residence located at 82 Enid Drive, Cherokee

Village, AR 75259 on or before March 5, 2022.” The amended order further directed that “[a]ll

personal property therein shall remain except his clothes and toiletries.” On March 6, appellees

discovered that Edward had “cleaned out” the house, removing all furniture and personal property;

even the kitchen appliances, including the refrigerator, oven, stove, and dishwasher were removed.

Edward admitted that, in December 2021, he also sold the boat dock that served the property.

Edward testified that he was unaware that he was supposed to leave the personal property, that it was

a mistake to remove the items, and that he would return the property that he had mistakenly

removed. The circuit court’s orders were clear and definite in their terms that Edward was to vacate

        13   Id.

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the premises and no personal property was to be removed from the residence. We are unpersuaded

by Edward’s claim that he was unaware of the prohibition against removing property from the

residence. Accordingly, we find substantial evidence supports the circuit court’s finding that Edward

willfully disobeyed a valid court order.

        For his last point, Edward seeks reversal of the attorney’s-fee award to counsel for Trina,

Prock, and Anderson. He argues that no motion or proof was presented in compliance with Rule

54(e) of the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, he asserts that no motion for fees was

filed, and no authority for the award of fees was submitted to the court. He further contends that no

proof was presented as to the reasonableness of the fees awarded. We find that Edward fails to

recognize that the court directed him to pay the $13,500 award of attorney’s fees as sanctions for the

necessity of adjudicating his contempt. At the hearing, the circuit court in its ruling stated that “ the

$13,500 comes off of [Edward’s] side. And that’s part of the contempt.” In contempt cases, the

circuit court has discretion to fashion the punishment to fit the circumstances. 14 A circuit court has

wide discretion in determining the severity of the punishment for contempt. 15 In addition, our

review of the record demonstrates Edward’s response to the contempt motion, in bold print,

provides, “In good faith, Mr. Wester will assume any legal fees that flow from his error.” We find

no abuse of discretion in the circuit court’s award of attorney’s fees as sanctions for Edward’s

contempt.

        Affirmed.

       14   Conlee v. Conlee, 2014 Ark. App. 261, 434 S.W.3d 923.
       15   Davenport v. Uselton, 2013 Ark. App. 344.

                                                   13
KLAPPENBACH and HIXSON, JJ., agree.

Jeremy B. Lowrey, for appellant.

Robert S. Tschiemer, for appellees.

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