Court Opinion

ID: 9366087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-25 20:04:34.856249+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:49.904853
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except
            in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

                                         2023 IL App (3d) 200390-U

                                 Order filed January 25, 2023
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                   IN THE

                                    APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

                                             THIRD DISTRICT

                                                     2023

      THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF                        )      Appeal from the Circuit Court
      ILLINOIS,                                         )      of the 13th Judicial Circuit,
                                                        )      La Salle County, Illinois,
             Plaintiff-Appellee,                        )
                                                        )      Appeal No. 3-20-0390
             v.                                         )      Circuit No. 11-CF-239
                                                        )
      JAMIE LOMELI,                                     )      Honorable
                                                        )      Cynthia M. Raccuglia,
             Defendant-Appellant.                       )      Judge, Presiding.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

            JUSTICE DAVENPORT delivered the judgment of the court.
            Presiding Justice Holdridge and Justice Brennan concurred in the judgment.
      ____________________________________________________________________________

                                                  ORDER

¶1          Held: The circuit court erred when it failed to recognize that it had discretion to appoint
                  counsel to represent defendant in a petition for relief from judgment.

¶2          Defendant, Jamie Lomeli, appeals the dismissal of her petition for relief from judgment.

     Defendant argues the circuit court erred in failing to appoint counsel based on its erroneous

     belief that it lacked discretion to do so. We reverse and remand with directions.

¶3                                          I. BACKGROUND
¶4             Following a jury trial, defendant was found guilty of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-

     1(a)(3) (West 2010)). The court sentenced defendant to 24 years’ imprisonment. On direct

     appeal, we affirmed defendant’s conviction. People v. Lomeli, 2016 IL App (3d) 130817-U.

¶5             On June 29, 2017, defendant filed a postconviction petition. The court appointed counsel

     to represent defendant in the postconviction proceedings.

¶6             On December 26, 2017, defendant, as a self-represented litigant, petitioned for relief from

     judgment under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401

     (West 2016)) and separately moved for appointment of counsel. Legal aid assisted defendant in

     drafting and filing the petition and the motion. The State later moved to dismiss defendant’s

     petition.

¶7             On March 1, 2018, appointed counsel indicated that while he represented defendant on

     her postconviction petition, he would not “necessarily” be involved in defendant’s petition for

     relief from judgment. The court addressed defendant’s request for appointment of counsel and

     stated,

                      “The one post-conviction motion is, of course, where you’re entitled to a lawyer

                      [defendant]. *** On your 2-1401 motion, I need to consider that pro se or if

                      someone’s going to come from [legal aid], that’s another thing, but you’re not

                      entitled to an appointed lawyer for [the petition for relief from judgment] because

                      that’s considered in the nature of a civil action.”

                              So you’re going to have to talk to the [legal aid] people to see—you’re not

                      going to get a lawyer appointed on that one so if they want to represent you or do

                      something, you need to investigate that before I will hear it ***.”

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¶8            On June 6, 2018, when discussing defendant’s petition for relief from judgment, the court

       informed counsel that he did not need to appear because he did not represent defendant on that

       petition. Counsel indicated that he did not think he could be appointed to represent defendant on

       the petition. The court responded that counsel “can’t be appointed.”

¶9            On July 18, 2018, when discussing how to proceed with defendant’s petition, counsel

       indicated that he was not involved and that it was a civil issue. The court responded that

       defendant was “not entitled to a lawyer.”

¶ 10          On August 29, 2018, the court told the State that “[defendant]’s not entitled to the

       appointment of a lawyer.” Later, defendant said, “I’m not sure if I can get somebody appointed

       to me for [the petition],” and the court responded, “No. You can’t. *** [Y]our only alternative is

       to hire somebody. Otherwise, you have to argue it yourself.” When defendant indicated that she

       could not hire an attorney, the court responded that the nature of her allegations “do[ ] not allow

       for an appointed lawyer.”

¶ 11          On November 14, 2018, the court told defendant, “you are not entitled to an appointed

       lawyer because [section] 2-1401 proceedings are civil in nature.”

¶ 12          On August 6, 2020, defendant told the court that she did not feel “competent enough” to

       represent herself in the proceeding. The court responded that defendant did not “have a right ***

       to have a lawyer appointed.”

¶ 13          At the hearing on defendant’s petition, defendant informed the court that she had

       difficulty reading and writing and did not understand the State’s argument. Defendant proceeded

       through the hearing as a self-represented litigant. The court dismissed defendant’s petition, and

       this appeal followed.

¶ 14                                               II. ANALYSIS

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¶ 15          On appeal, defendant argues the circuit court abused its discretion in denying her request

       for appointed counsel on her petition for relief from judgment where the record showed the court

       misconstrued the law and failed to recognize that it had discretion to appoint counsel. We agree.

¶ 16          Section 2-1401 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2016)) provides a statutory

       procedure through which final orders and judgments may be challenged more than 30 days after

       their entry. People v. Pinkonsly, 207 Ill. 2d 555, 562 (2003). Although this is a civil remedy, it

       has been extended to criminal cases. People v. Vincent, 226 Ill. 2d 1, 8 (2007).

¶ 17          “A petitioner seeking to collaterally attack a judgment has no constitutional right to the

       assistance of counsel.” People v. Stoecker, 2020 IL 124807, ¶ 35. Additionally, a petitioner

       seeking relief under section 2-1401 has no statutory right to counsel. Id. ¶ 36. Accordingly, a

       circuit court is not obligated to appoint counsel in such proceedings. Id. However, the court has

       discretionary authority to appoint counsel. Id. “There is error when a trial court refuses to

       exercise discretion in the erroneous belief that it has no discretion as to the question presented.”

       People v. Queen, 56 Ill. 2d 560, 565 (1974). When a court erroneously believes that it has no

       discretion in a matter, its failure to exercise discretion can constitute an abuse of discretion.

       People v. Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d 186, 223-24 (2000); See, e.g., People v. Bernard, 2021 IL App

       (2d) 181055, ¶ 35 (The circuit court abused its discretion by failing to recognize that it had

       discretion to appoint counsel on a petition for relief from judgment requiring remand where the

       record did “not conclusively establish that defendant was not harmed by the error.”). The effect

       of such a failure to exercise discretion must be assessed in the context of the entire proceeding.

       Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 224. Automatic reversal is not required because not every error is of

       such magnitude that relief is warranted. Id. at 224-25.

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¶ 18          Here, the record shows the circuit court held the erroneous belief that it did not have

       discretion to appoint counsel to represent defendant on her petition for relief from judgment. The

       court explained several times that due to the nature of defendant’s claims and because a petition

       for relief from judgment was a civil action, the court was “not allow[ed]” to and could not

       appoint counsel. While the court’s statements that defendant did not have a “right” and was “not

       entitled” to appointed counsel for her petition is correct under the statute, those statements do not

       reflect the full state of the law. As set forth above, the court overlooked that it could, in an

       exercise of its discretion, appoint counsel for defendant. Because the court failed to understand

       that it had discretion to appoint counsel, it could not exercise its discretion in denying

       defendant’s request for counsel. Accordingly, we conclude the circuit court abused its

       discretion. See Queen, 56 Ill. 2d at 565-66.

¶ 19          The State contends that even if the court committed error by failing to appoint counsel,

       the error was harmless, as the court ultimately found that defendant’s petition lacked merit. We

       disagree. When conducting harmless error analysis, we determine whether the outcome would

       have been the same regardless of the error. See People v. Mullins, 242 Ill. 2d 1, 23 (2011). We

       determine harmless error based on the particular facts of each case, considering the record as a

       whole. People v. Howard, 147 Ill. 2d 103, 148 (1991).

¶ 20          Here, the record does not conclusively establish that defendant was not harmed by the

       court’s error. See Chapman, 194 Ill. 2d at 224; see also Bernard, 2021 IL App (2d) 181055, ¶ 35.

       Specifically, we cannot determine whether appointed counsel would have amended defendant’s

       petition or how those amendments would have affected the outcome of the proceedings. See

       Bernard, 2021 IL App (2d) 181055, ¶ 35. Moreover, defendant would have benefitted from the

       representation of counsel in responding to the State’s motion to dismiss and representation at the

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       hearing, as defendant indicated that she was not “competent enough” to represent herself in those

       proceedings, had difficulty reading and writing, and did not understand the State’s argument.

       Therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s denial of defendant’s petition for relief from judgment

       and remand with directions for the court to exercise its discretion and determine whether to

       appoint counsel.

¶ 21                                          III. CONCLUSION

¶ 22          The judgment of the circuit court of La Salle County is reversed and remanded with

       directions.

¶ 23          Reversed and remanded with directions.

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