Court Opinion

ID: 9753269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:05:49.058966+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:32.955141
License: Public Domain

HARRELL, Judge,
Concurring.
I concur in the judgment only. Although I would have found error, under the greater protections offered by Art. 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights than the Fifth Amendment 0See Maj. op. 366 Md. at 524, n. 6), in the allowance of the State’s use of Crosby’s refusal to give a written statement, I also would have concluded, on the record of Crosby’s trial, such error to be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brown v. State, 364 Md. 37, 42, 770 A.2d 679, 682 (2001).
The store manager/victim identified Crosby. Although masked, Crosby, a former employee of the K-Mart, was recognized by the manager based on Crosby’s voice, a known limp, and his general appearance. Crosby’s co-defendant, Eugene Robinson, corroborated the manager’s identification. Moreover, the facts that the manager’s assailant knew of the store’s alarm panel and that his victim was the manager with keys to the store and the code to disarm the alarm panel corroborated that the assailant was more likely a former employee of the K-Mart. Finally, Crosby’s own statements to *535the police, including the false alibi about being with Byrd, inculpated him. Based on this, I would conclude that there is no reasonable probability that the jury’s verdict would have been different had the fleeting reference to Crosby’s refusal to give a written statement never occurred. See Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665, 678 (1976). Therefore, I would affirm the judgments below.