Court Opinion

ID: 9728513
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:09:46.570747+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:49.270459
License: Public Domain

FOSHEIM, Justice
(dissenting).
The majority opinion distinguishes this case from Melbourn v. Benham, 292 N.W.2d 335 (S.D.1980), with this language: “In the instant case, Rezek essentially is attempting to recover damages for having been required to perform what this court earlier held to be a valid contract.”
Following this court’s reversal of the judgment in the original Cook v. Rezek litigation, the trial judge in that case described the issue decided therein as follows:
It seems clear to me that the only issue before me as a trial judge in the original matter was whether or not the Plaintiff, Ted Cook, had a valid contract with the Defendant, John Rezek.

*735I think the record is clear that this court has never adjudicated the liability of Mr. Rezek under the contract. My concern, as it was the appellate court’s concern, was simply to determine whether or not a valid contract had been struck between . [Cook and Rezek].
The third-party complaint in the present action alleged that Juffer secretly acted as an agent for Cook and made false representations to Rezek, thereby causing an agreement by Rezek to convey his land. That claim, strikingly similar to the allegation in Melbourn which claimed a breach of agency and fiduciary obligations by the Benhams in their capacity as real estate agents for Mel-, ' bourn, was not litigated in the original Cook v. Rezek action. In Melbourn, we held that genuine issues of fact existed. Since the cases rest on similar grounds, it seems consistency compels recognition that genuine issues of fact remain.
In my view, the majority opinion’s attempt to distinguish this ease from Melbourn v. Benham, supra, draws unwarranted conclusions from disputed facts, conclusions similar to those we rejected in Mel-bourn. I would, therefore, reverse.