Court Opinion

ID: 9958984
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-10 16:01:27.584154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:22.117869
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                   MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ERIC WILLIAMS,                                  DOCKET NUMBER
                    Appellant,                  DC-3330-22-0113-I-1

             v.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                          DATE: April 9, 2024
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Eric Williams , North Charleston, South Carolina, pro se.

      Sally R. Bacon , Esquire, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the agency.

                                      BEFORE

                           Cathy A. Harris, Chairman
                        Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chairman

                                 REMAND ORDER

      The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
denied his request for corrective action under the Veterans Employment
Opportunities Act of 1998 (VEOA).           For the reasons discussed below, we
GRANT the appellant’s petition for review, VACATE the initial decision, and
REMAND the case to the regional office for further adjudication in accordance
with this Remand Order.

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                  BACKGROUND
      The appellant is a preference eligible veteran with a service-connected
disability rating of 30% or more. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 9 at 37, 56. He
submitted an application for a Professor of Life Cycle Logistics Management
position with the agency’s Defense Acquisition University (DAU) pursuant to
vacancy announcement DAU-10954360-STH202010007F.                  Id. at 36-46.     The
agency posted this announcement on November 18, 2020, and it closed 96 days
later, on February 22, 2021. Id. at 69-77. A five-member panel reviewed the
résumés and scored the applicants based on the five criteria identified in the
vacancy announcement.       IAF, Tab 9 at 72-73, Tab 18 at 4-6.         Based on this
review, a select number of candidates were offered an interview. IAF, Tab 18 at
4-6. The appellant was not among them. Id. at 6. On October 19, 2021, the
agency notified the appellant that he was not selected for three of the four
positions to which he applied. 2 Id. at 16.
      The appellant timely filed a VEOA complaint with the Department of
Labor (DOL) regarding his nonselection, and DOL notified him that it did not
find evidence that the agency violated his rights.         IAF, Tab 1 at 7-9.      The
appellant subsequently filed the instant Board appeal challenging his nonselection
for the vacancy and requested a hearing. IAF, Tab 1 at 2. On his appeal form, the
appellant alleged that the agency violated his veterans’ preference rights under
VEOA and committed a prohibited personnel practice by violating Office of
Personnel Management (OPM) regulations in connection with his nonselection for
the position. Id. at 5. The appellant identified 5 U.S.C. §§ 3317(a)-(b), 3318(b),

2
  On his application, the appellant requested that he be considered for positions in the
following locations: Huntsville, Alabama; Fort Belvoir, Virginia; Norfolk, Virginia; and
Richmond, Virginia. IAF, Tab 9 at 37-38. The email notifying the appellant of his
nonselection identified that his application had been referred to the hiring manager for
all four locations and that he had not been selected for all but the Richmond, VA
positions. Id. at 16. It is unclear from the record why the nonselection notice did not
identify the status of the appellant’s application for the Richmond, VA location.
However, neither party has raised an issue regarding the status of the appellant’s
application for that location on review, so we have not addressed the issue.
and 3319 as the specific statutes he believed the agency violated in connection
with his nonselection.
      The administrative judge issued a jurisdictional order stating that the
appellant appeared to be raising a claim under VEOA and apprising the appellant
of the applicable law and burden of proof requirements for a VEOA appeal.
IAF, Tab 3.    The order further instructed the appellant to file evidence or
argument establishing Board jurisdiction over his VEOA appeal. Id. at 6-7. After
both parties responded, IAF, Tabs 7-9, 18, and the appellant filed a number of
additional pleadings, IAF, Tabs 10-17, 19-21, the administrative judge issued
an initial decision based on the written record without holding the appellant’s
requested hearing, denying his request for corrective action under VEOA,
IAF, Tab 22, Initial Decision (ID) at 1-2, 14. 3 The administrative judge found
that the appellant established that the Board has jurisdiction over his VEOA
appeal. ID at 7-8. Nevertheless, the administrative judge determined that the
appellant did not establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether
the agency violated his veterans’ preference rights; therefore, he denied the
appellant’s request for corrective action based on the written record. ID at 11-14.
      Specifically, the administrative judge determined that it was undisputed
that the Professor positions at issue in this appeal were filled under Schedule A of
the excepted service, and so the agency was not required to strictly comply with
the excepted-service veterans’ preference hiring requirements under title 5 and
instead could fill the vacancy according to the agency’s Civilian Faculty Plan
(CFP). ID at 9. Based on his review of the record evidence, the administrative
judge determined that the agency filled the vacancy in accordance with the CFP,
including by considering veteran status as a “positive factor,” and so the agency’s
selection procedures complied with the controlling legal authority relating to

3
  Although the appellant’s jurisdictional response was untimely, it appears that the
administrative judge considered it, along with the appellant’s other submissions.
ID at 4, 14.
veterans’ preference. ID at 9-14. Consequently, the administrative judge denied
the appellant’s request for corrective action.
      The appellant has filed a petition for review, to which the agency has
responded. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tabs 1, 3. The appellant has replied
to the agency’s response. PFR File, Tab 4.

                DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
      On review, the appellant restates his argument that the agency was required
to seek passover authority from OPM in order bypass him because of his
service-connected disability of 30% or more.         PFR File, Tab 1 at 4-5, 9-11.
Additionally, he reasserts that the agency violated other statutes, regulations, and
rules related to veterans’ preference. Id. at 5-9.
      As the administrative judge correctly observed, when, as here, an appellant
alleges an agency violated his veterans’ preference rights under VEOA, he may
establish jurisdiction by (1) showing that he exhausted his remedy with DOL; and
(2) making nonfrivolous allegations that: (a) he is a preference eligible within the
meaning of VEOA, and (b) the agency violated his rights under a statute or
regulation relating to veterans’ preference.     5 U.S.C. § 3330a(a)(1)(A), (d)(1);
Jarrard v. Social Security Administration, 115 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 7 (2010), aff’d
sub nom., Jarrard v. Department of Justice, 669 F.3d 1320 (Fed. Cir. 2012);
see Davis v. Department of Defense, 2022 MSPB 20, ¶ 5 n.1 (determining that
an accurate exposition of the VEOA jurisdictional elements may omit reference to
the requirement that an appellant nonfrivolously allege that the action at issue
took place on or after the October 30, 1998 enactment date of VEOA). A statute
or regulation “relating to veterans’ preference” under VEOA is one that stands in
some relation to, has a bearing on, concerns, and has a connection with veterans’
preference rights.   Dean v. Department of Agriculture, 99 M.S.P.R. 533, ¶ 17
(2005), aff’d on recons., 104 M.S.P.R. 1 (2006). Once an appellant establishes
Board jurisdiction under VEOA, the Board may address the merits of the appeal.
Jarrard, 115 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 8.
      The parties have not challenged the administrative judge’s findings that the
appellant exhausted his administrative remedy with DOL and made nonfrivolous
allegations that he was a preference eligible and the agency violated a statute or
regulation relating to veterans’ preference.    ID at 8.   Accordingly, we affirm
those findings and agree with the administrative judge that the appellant
established jurisdiction over his VEOA appeal. The sole contested issue in this
appeal concerns whether the appellant proved, by preponderant evidence, that the
agency violated one or more statutory or regulatory provisions relating to
veterans’ preference in its selection process. Boston v. Department of the Army,
122 M.S.P.R. 577, ¶ 6 (2015).

The appellant is entitled to a hearing on the merits.
      The Board may decide the merits of an appeal alleging the violation of
rights under VEOA without holding a hearing when there is no genuine dispute of
material fact and one party must prevail as a matter of law.       Montgomery v.
Department of Health and Human Services, 123 M.S.P.R. 216, ¶ 13 (2016).
If an administrative judge finds jurisdiction but declines to hold a hearing, he is
responsible for notifying the parties that there will be no hearing, setting a date
on which the record will close, and affording the parties the opportunity to submit
evidence regarding the merits of the appeal before that date. Id. In this case,
the administrative judge found that the Board has jurisdiction under VEOA and
declined to hold a hearing as he indicated he would in the acknowledgment order,
IAF, Tab 2 at 2, Tab 3 at 7, without giving the parties the required notice. This
error was prejudicial to the appellant because, as discussed below, there remain
genuine disputes of material facts that cannot be resolved on the current record.
Therefore, we remand this appeal for a hearing on the merits and a new initial
decision.
      There remain genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether
      the agency used its Schedule A hiring authority.
      On review, the appellant identifies a number of statutes relating to
veterans’ preference that he believes the agency violated, including 5 U.S.C.
§§ 3309, 3317, 3318, 3319, and 3320. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5, 8-9. Regarding
5 U.S.C. § 3319, the administrative judge found that the category ranking
procedures set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 3319, including the requirement that preference
eligibles must be listed ahead of non-preference eligible applicants within each
quality category, are not applicable here. ID at 11-12. The appellant continues to
assert that the vacancy at issue in this appeal was “[p]art of the competitive
examining process.” PFR File, Tab 1 at 6. We agree with the administrative
judge that the appellant failed to establish a genuine dispute that the agency used
anything other than an excepted-service hiring authority. ID at 10-11.
      A factual dispute is “material” if, in light of the governing law, its
resolution could affect the outcome.         Oram v. Department of the Navy,
2022 MSPB 30, ¶ 9 n.5. A factual dispute is “genuine” when there is sufficient
evidence favoring the party seeking an evidentiary hearing for the administrative
judge to rule in favor of that party if the judge credits that party’s evidence. Id.
The administrative judge concluded that the vacancy was announced within the
excepted service. IAF, Tab 9 at 58, 63, 70, 78; PFR File, Tab 1 at 6; ID at 10-11.
The record supports this finding and contains no evidence to the contrary;
therefore, we discern no error in his finding.
      The    category    ranking   requirements    in   section   3319    apply   to
competitive-service positions and not to the excepted-service positions at issue in
this case. See 5 U.S.C. § 3319(a) (stating that an agency with delegated
examining authority “may establish category rating systems for evaluating
applications for positions in the competitive service . . . based on merit consistent
with regulations prescribed by [OPM]” (emphasis added)); Dean v. Office of
Personnel Management, 115 M.S.P.R. 157, ¶ 18 n.6 (2010) (explaining that
ranking procedures may be applied, if certain requirements are met, to
competitive-service     examinations).           Accordingly,   we       agree       with   the
administrative judge’s finding that the agency did not violate the appellant’s
veterans’ preference rights under 5 U.S.C. § 3319. 4
      However, OPM has adopted regulations for excepted-service appointments
that provide for similar rating and ranking of candidates. 5 C.F.R. § 302.302;
see Patterson v. Department of the Interior, 424 F.3d 1151, 1156 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(recognizing that “OPM has issued regulations [at 5 C.F.R. part 302] setting forth
procedures for applying veterans’ preference rights to the excepted service”).
Pursuant to OPM’s regulations, an agency may assign qualitative numerical
scores on a scale of 100, or may make an initial determination of eligibility
without such scores.      5 C.F.R. § 302.302(a).         If the agency refers eligible
candidates    without   qualitative    scores,     preference-eligible     candidates       are
considered      ahead      of      non-preference        eligibles.              5      C.F.R.
§§ 302.201(b), .302(a), .304(b)(5). If it uses scoring, the agency must score all
qualified applicants at 70 or more and, as applicable here, add 10 points to such
candidates’ scores. 5 C.F.R. §§ 302.201(a), .302(b).
      OPM mandates that all agencies follow its excepted-service selection
procedures.     5 C.F.R. § 302.104.         However, it exempts certain positions
including, as relevant here, positions that an agency, with OPM agreement,

4
  Additionally, although the appellant appears to argue on review that the agency also
violated his veterans’ preference rights by failing to apply 5 U.S.C. § 3309 in
connection with his nonselection, he did not raise this argument before the
administrative judge. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8, 10; see Clay v. Department of the Army,
123 M.S.P.R. 245, ¶ 6 (2016) (noting that the Board generally will not consider
an argument raised for the first time in a petition for review absent a showing that it is
based on new and material evidence not previously available despite the party’s due
diligence); Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 268, 271 (1980) (same);
5 C.F.R. § 1201.115(d). The appellant also has not provided any evidence that
he exhausted this claim before DOL. See Graves v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
117 M.S.P.R. 491, ¶ 11 (2012) (explaining that the exhaustion requirement is mandated
by statute and evidence as to exhaustion is not liberally construed). Accordingly,
we have not considered it here.
“included in Schedule A.” 5 C.F.R. § 302.101(c)(6). OPM has issued regulations
authorizing the agency to appoint DAU Professors using a Schedule A hiring
authority. 5 C.F.R. § 213.3101 (stating that, if authorized by OPM, agencies may
make appointments under Schedule A “to positions which are not of a
confidential or policy-determining character . . . [and] for which it is not
practicable to examine”); Office of Personnel Management, Excepted Service;
Consolidated Listings of Schedules A, B, and C Exceptions, 85 Fed. Reg. 13,282,
13,283-84 (Mar. 6, 2020) (authorizing the agency to appoint DAU Professors
using Schedule A). For such Schedule A positions, the agency must consider
veterans’ preferences as a “‘positive factor’ in reviewing applications.”
Patterson, 424 F.3d at 1156-57, 1159-60.
      DAU’s CFP identifies alternatives for hiring faculty, including the
agency’s direct hiring authorities and Schedule A. IAF, Tab 9 at 63. Further, its
guidance embraces the use of “[n]on-traditional rating and ranking” to determine
which candidates are “best qualified,” followed by providing a single unscored
list to the requesting official “with preference eligibility annotated,” from which
the selecting official makes his selection, treating “preference eligibility . . . as a
positive factor before the final selection.” Id.
      The record reflects that as applications were received by the agency for the
Professor   vacancy,   they   were    placed   on   certificates   in   three   batches,
at approximately the 30-, 60-, and 90-day marks, regardless of whether they met
the minimum qualifications for the position. IAF, Tab 18 at 4. The résumés from
each applicant batch were then provided to a résumé review panel, and each
member of the panel assessed them based on a set of 5 factors and gave them a
total “score” of up to 125 based on a personalized assessment.              Id. at 4-6.
The panel then totaled the panel members’ scores to assign a cumulative score.
Id. at 6. If an applicant had a cumulative score at or above 91, he was placed in
the “Best Meets Mission Requirements” (“Best Qualified”) category or, if not so
identified, received no further consideration. Id. at 6. Only candidates identified
as Best Qualified were offered an interview. Id.
      The appellant’s application was in the third batch, which included 106
applicants. Id. According to the agency, because his total “score” of 47 was
below the cutoff score for placement on the Best Qualified list, he was not
interviewed or selected for the position.       Id.   However, in conducting its
investigation, DOL represented that the agency had stated it used a title 10
excepted-service hiring authority, that the appellant was in the Best Qualified
category, and he was referred to the hiring official. IAF, Tab 1 at 8.
      Neither party has provided any evidence from which to determine the type
of hiring authority used, such as sworn statements from those involved in the
hiring process or a Standard Form 50 for the successful candidate or candidates
referencing the appointment authority. Further, the use of scoring criteria does
not appear to comport with Schedule A hiring, generally. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 6.2
(stating that Schedule A positions are “[p]ositions other than those of a
confidential or policy-determining character for which it is not practicable to
examine”), 302.101(c)(6).    Finally, after conducting an investigation into his
complaint, DOL advised the appellant that the agency used a title 10 hiring
authority, rather than Schedule A. IAF, Tab 1 at 8. Therefore, we do not agree
with the administrative judge that “the unrefuted facts in this case prove” that the
agency used a Schedule A hiring authority. ID at 9-11.
      If the agency did not hire using Schedule A or another authority that
excepted it from OPM’s excepted-service hiring requirements in 5 C.F.R.
part 302, then the record is lacking evidence regarding whether it complied with
those requirements. For example, the agency has not stated whether the appellant
was qualified, and thus entitled to a minimal score of 70 out of 100, whether it
referred candidates past the résumé review panel without their numerical ratings,
as required by its CFP, or how it accounted for preference eligibility in its
ultimate hiring decision. Even if the candidates were referred without scoring,
the lead for the résumé review panel was also on the interview panel, and thus
aware of the assigned scores.       IAF, Tab 18 at 4.       However, he did not
state whether or how those scores factored into the interview panel’s decision.
Id. at 4-6. Therefore, we find that the administrative judge erred in determining
that “the agency complied with the controlling legal authority relating to
veterans’ preference.”    ID at 10.     Instead, the record in this instance is
ambiguous, and there remain genuine issues of material fact as to whether the
agency observed preference eligibility requirements in its hiring.
      The administrative judge alternatively found that, even if 5 U.S.C. § 3319
were applicable to the excepted-service vacancy announcement at issue in this
appeal, the appellant would not be entitled to corrective action because he was
not placed among the “Best Qualified” candidates from whom the agency
ultimately made its selection.        ID at 12-13.      Although, as mentioned
above, section 3319 did not apply to this excepted-service selection, OPM’s
excepted-service hiring regulations applied unless the agency used its Schedule A
or other exempted hiring authority.     We recognize that the appellant was not
placed in the Best Qualified category and, on that basis, was not referred for
further consideration. Therefore, we have considered whether the written record
could support a finding that he was not entitled to corrective action. See Jones v.
Department of Health and Human Services, 119 M.S.P.R. 355, ¶¶ 15-16 (2013)
(concluding that even if the agency had accorded the appellant veterans’
preference under 5 U.S.C. § 3319(b), he would not have been entitled to
corrective action on his VEOA claim because he was rated “Well Qualified” and
the only candidates whose names appeared on the certificate of eligible were
rated “Best Qualified,” and so the appellant’s placement at the top of the “Well
Qualified” list would not have resulted in his selection), aff’d per curiam,
544F. App’x 976 (Fed. Cir. 2013). However, we believe it is inappropriate to
reach this conclusion without first determining what hiring authority the agency
used and whether it complied with the appropriate laws and regulations
concerning that authority.

      There remain genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether
      the agency was required to seek passover approval from OPM.
      We now turn to the appellant’s argument that the agency violated the
passover requirement set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 3318. PFR File, Tab 1 at 8-10.
Under 5 U.S.C. § 3318, when an agency intends “to pass over a preference
eligible on a certificate” in favor of a non-preference eligible, the agency must
file written reasons for its intended passover with OPM and OPM must determine
whether the agency has provided a sufficient basis to warrant the intended
passover. 5 U.S.C. § 3318(c)(1); Jarrard, 115 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 9. Ordinarily,
if the preference eligible is a veteran with a compensable service-connected
disability of 30% or more, like the appellant, he will have the opportunity to
respond to the agency’s stated reasons for the intended passover, and OPM must
consider his response in rendering its decision. 5 U.S.C. § 3318(c)(1)-(2);
Jarrard, 115 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 9.
      In the initial decision, the administrative judge noted that, although the
procedures outlined in 5 U.S.C. §§ 3308-3318 explicitly apply to the competitive
service, they also generally apply to the excepted service through 5 U.S.C.
§ 3320.   ID at 11; see Jarrard, 115 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶¶ 10, 15 (reaching this
conclusion regarding the application of 5 U.S.C. § 3309 to excepted-service
hirings). Nevertheless, he determined that when an agency uses Schedule A to
make an appointment, as he found was the case here, it is exempt from the
passover requirements set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 3318(c). ID at 10-11. We are not
persuaded.
      OPM has exempted Schedule A positions from its regulation stating that
the passover provision applies to excepted service appointments.        5 C.F.R.
§§ 302.101(c)(6), .401(b). Instead, in making a Schedule A appointment, “each
agency shall follow the principle of veteran preference as far as administratively
feasible and, on the request of a qualified and available preference eligible, shall
furnish him/her with the reasons for his/her nonselection.” 5 C.F.R. § 302.101(c).
The Federal Circuit invalidated an OPM regulation that contained similar
language concerning the passover provision on the basis that the regulation
provided less protection than the statutory protection at 5 U.S.C. § 3318. Gingery
v. Department of Defense, 550 F.3d 1347, 1349-50, 1353-54 (2008) (invalidating
5 C.F.R. § 302.401(b) (2008)). However, it later agreed with OPM that attorney
hiring was excepted from the passover provision because Congress has prohibited
the rating of attorney candidates. Jarrard, 669 F.3d at 1324-26. It reasoned that
an agency appointing an attorney would be unable to generate a list of ranked
applicants, a requirement for the passover process under 5 U.S.C. § 3318.
Id. at 1325-26.
      We decline to resolve here whether the passover provision applies to the
non-attorney Schedule A excepted-service appointments of DAU professors.
First, as noted above, we are unable to determine whether the agency used its
Schedule A hiring authority. Further, the agency did, at one point in the process,
assign scores to the applicants, suggesting that it would be feasible to rank the
candidates.   IAF, Tab 18 at 4-6.    The parties have not directly addressed the
applicability of rating and ranking to the hiring of DAU Professors.          Thus,
we cannot conclude that hiring professors is inconsistent with the passover
provision at 5 U.S.C. § 3318. Again, we recognize that the appellant was not
among the Best Qualified candidates, and thus the passover requirements may not
be implicated.    However, we decline to make this finding based on this
incomplete record without affording the appellant his requested hearing on the
merits of his VEOA appeal.
                                    ORDER
      For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the regional office
for further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order.

FOR THE BOARD:                       ______________________________
                                     Gina K. Grippando
                                     Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.