Court Opinion

ID: 9819257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:21:08.172273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:11:31.768901
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, specially concurring in part and dissenting in part: I respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion rejecting the defendant’s constitutional argument that section 2—4(f) violated Helen’s constitutional right to “dispose of her legacy as she desired.” The right to pass on property to one’s heirs is a valuable and constitutionally protected right. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 715, 95 L. Ed. 2d 668, 679, 107 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (1987). I would find under the Hodel rationale that Helen’s natural-born grandchildren have sufficient standing to assert and defend that right. Hodel, 481 U.S at 711-12, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 677, 107 S. Ct. at 2081. Helen also had the right to exclude nonblood persons from taking any part of her legacy. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176, 62 L. Ed. 2d 332, 343-44, 100 S. Ct. 383, 391 (1979). Now, decades after she clearly expressed her intentions in her will, the legislature has attempted to reach back through time and defeat her intention. I would find that this attempt by the legislature to negate the clear intent of the testator some 40 years after her death violated due process. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 717, 95 L. Ed. 2d at 681, 107 S. Ct. at 2084. I therefore dissent on that basis from that portion of the majority’s disposition.