Court Opinion

ID: 9925321
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 15:03:28.730614+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:50.187305
License: Public Domain

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF FLORIDA
                        SECOND DISTRICT

                      CHESTERSON CAPITAL, LLC,

                                Appellant,

                                     v.

             CHARLES YANCY; LINDA YANCY KIDSLEY;
         AMERICAN FAMILY PROPERTIES, LLC; AFP9723, LLC;
               JOHN WALSH; and JOHN WALSH, III,

                                 Appellees.

                              No. 2D22-3628

                            January 19, 2024

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Hillsborough County; Paul L. Huey,
Judge.

Ryan Fojo, Gabrielle Wright, Peter Ticktin of The Ticktin Law Group,
Deerfield Beach, for Appellant.

Charles Yancy, pro se.

No appearance for remaining Appellees.

PER CURIAM.
     Chesterton Capital, LLC, appeals the trial court's order dismissing
with prejudice this case based upon Chesterton Capital's discovery
violations and "nine years of repeated failures to comply with [the trial
court's] orders." Chesterton Capital argues that the trial court erred in
entering the order because it did not consider the six factors described in
Kozel v. Ostendorf, 629 So. 2d 817, 818 (Fla. 1993). Before entering the
harshest of sanctions—dismissal with prejudice—a trial court should
consider the following six factors:
     1) whether the attorney's disobedience was willful, deliberate,
     or contumacious, rather than an act of neglect or
     inexperience; 2) whether the attorney has been previously
     sanctioned; 3) whether the client was personally involved in
     the act of disobedience; 4) whether the delay prejudiced the
     opposing party through undue expense, loss of evidence, or in
     some other fashion; 5) whether the attorney offered
     reasonable justification for noncompliance; and 6) whether
     the delay created significant problems of judicial
     administration. Upon consideration of these factors, if a
     sanction less severe than dismissal with prejudice appears to
     be a viable alternative, the trial court should employ such an
     alternative.
Id. While the trial court has broad discretion to enter sanctions for
repeated discovery violations and for failing to comply with court orders,
the record before us does not reflect that the trial court considered the
six Kozel factors. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for the trial court
to make written findings of fact on each of the six Kozel factors.1 See
Ballard v. Bank of Am., N.A., 310 So. 3d 999, 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 2020)
(holding that the trial court failed to conduct the Kozel analysis and
"remanding for the trial court to reconsider the order and make the
appropriate written Kozel findings if dismissal is appropriate"); Bennet ex
rel. Bennett v. Tenet St. Mary's, Inc., 67 So. 3d 422, 424 (Fla. 4th DCA
2011) ("[B]ecause the trial court failed to expressly set forth an analysis

     1 Nothing herein shall be construed as a comment on the merits of

whether the dismissal with prejudice was an appropriate sanction.

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of the Kozel factors prior to dismissal, we reverse and remand for written
findings on that order.").

      Reversed and remanded.

MORRIS, LUCAS, and SMITH, JJ., Concur.

Opinion subject to revision prior to official publication.

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