Court Opinion

ID: 9527990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:36:03.273326+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:26:22.521238
License: Public Domain

PIVARNIK, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur in this opinion on all issues except the holding of the majority in Issue IV, in which it determined there was insuf*1219ficient evidence to support the finding of habitual offender,. This issue was not raised at any time during trial, in the Motion to Correct Error, or on appeal. All briefs were filed by December 18, 1984. After publication of our opinions in Clark v. State (1985), Ind., 480 N.E.2d 555, and Steelman v. State (1985), Ind., 486 N.E.2d 523, Appellant filed what he called Additional Citation to Authority, in which he raised this issue for the first time in May, 1986. I am mindful of the fact that a total lack of sufficiency is fundamental error which this Court can recognize sua sponte, and by which this Court can properly set aside the judgment of conviction. In doing so, however, it is our duty to examine and reconcile the evidence in a light most favorable to the one bearing the burden, to yield to the fact-finder in the weight and credibility to be given to the facts, and to determine if there were facts, and inferences from those facts, justifying the finding of the jury.
The only question raised by Appellant here with regard to sufficiency in the habitual offender phase of the trial was that he had not been properly identified on the 1975 theft conviction. Following the 1975 theft, Appellant fled to Georgia and apparently got involved with authorities there. He had given his name as Ronald Wade to the Georgia police. Warsaw City Police Chief, Eugene Brumfield, testified that the one arrested by Georgia police going by the name of Ronald Wade was Appellant, and directly identified him as such.
The issue of sequence of the commission of these crimes was not raised. Although it would have been better for the State to present direct evidence as to the date of the commission of each crime, it would appear that the sequence was so apparent that no one saw the need to do so. There is no question but what the first predicate felony, the theft, was committed prior to 1975 and the conviction and sentence came in 1975. Appellant received a two (2) year suspended sentence and two (2) years probation. The next series of erimes proved and discussed were a number of thefts and an escape from the jail. All of these, including the escape, were class D felonies. Appellant was convicted of these crimes on May 16, 1980. Officer Holderman, a detective in the Sheriff's Department of Kosciusko County, testified that he was a detective during 1979-80, and knew Appellant to be the person named and convicted in the 1980 convictions because of his, Holder-man's, association with the county jail and Sheriff's Department, and the fact that he saw the individual who was charged and convicted under these charges. There is certainly inference there that these matters came about in 1979 and 1980, particularly since one of the charges was an escape from that jail. The escape, as a matter of fact, was in 1979, a fact Appellant admitted to the probation officer and recited in the presentence report to the judge. The pre-sentence report, of course, was not in evidence before the jury.
I fail to see grounds for us to make an independent search of the evidence and find insufficiency. To do so, we would have to find that the evidence equally inferred the 1980 convictions were committed prior to 1975. No such inferences are justified or apparent. I would affirm the trial court in all respects.
GIVAN, C.J., concurs.