Court Opinion

ID: 9398404
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-31 08:04:24.852092+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:33.475924
License: Public Domain

taxpayers’ properties for the 2020 tax year. Accordingly, the court affirms the

district court order dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim.
                 The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
                 2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

                                  2023 CO 26

                      Supreme Court Case No. 22SC798
               C.A.R. 50 Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals
                     Court of Appeals Case No. 21CA1731
             Jefferson County District Court Case No. 20CV31506
                    Honorable Lindsay L. VanGilder, Judge

                                  Petitioners:

MJB Motels LLC; Samarah Investments LLC; Meek Enterprises LLC; Tosh Amir;
MW Real Estate LLC; Palmetto Club Associates LLP; Winddrift Associates LLC;
   Sheridan LLC; Pickerings LLC; 2220 Rand, LLC; FGS Retail & Commercial
   Operations LLC; Firestone Real Estate Leasing Company; Kong Real Estate
    Holdings LLC; SFCA LLC; Rocky Mountain School of Art Inc; Schreivogel
 Investments LLC; Baron Ventures LLC; 875 Tabor Street LLC; Garney Holding
   Co; Dean Carson Grape St LLC; Golden Automotive Group Holdings LLC;
Public Service Employees Credit Union; MPSC Limited Liability; Marketplace at
     Ken Caryl LTD Liability Co; GEP Investments Inc; Sooper Credit Union;
 Sartorius Corporation; Texas Roadhouse Holdings LLC; TR Alkire LLC; DLDL
      LLC; Deep Sky Holdings LLC; Software Bisque Inc; Alma D Gianolini
Grandchildrens Trust; BTP 10445 Town Center LLC; New World Ventures LLC;
 Lee Doud Inc; Fawcett Enterprises LLC; B C S Community Credit Union; 9797
West Colfax LLC; Lifeloc Technologies Inc; Robb Street LLC; Brettler Real Estate
  Inc; Mauldin 50 LLP; The Mountainview Group LLC; Kastin Company, LLC;
   Keystone Group LLC; Suman Properties LLC; Hill Industries LLC; Hill Real
   Estate Rental LLC; Buffalo Partners LP; Raeouf Mohammad; Tehrani Simin;
  Sautter Arvada School Property LLC; Vivian Fortress LLC; Carol Pack Living
Trust; Simms LLC; Norton Frickey Family Partnership; Kim R Haarberg; North
 Bear Meadows LLC; 1600 Garrison Street LLC; 9201 West Colfax Avenue LLC;
    Braman Colorado European Imports Inc.; 6833 Joyce Street LLC; Maxson
   Holdings LLC; Denver Area Council Boy Scouts of America; Southwestern
 Investments LLC; MNR LLC; J&S Holdings LLC; Showme Mountain Investors
   LLC; DDK Properties LLC; Janey Blehm; Terry Blehm; Surkalo Harry Mtarri;
 Paul B Trost; Bear Land Holdings LLC; Ivarsson LLC; Stern Lawrence Holdings
LLC; Parkview Place LLC; United Land Investments LLC; Partners Credit Union;
    Solera National Bank; 6350 AEF LLC; Semcken Commercial LLC; Garlock
  Pipeline Technologies Inc; 10639 Bradford LLC; Castle Court LLC; 430 Indiana
LLC; Going Green LLC; Signature Assisted Living LP; FFT Holdings LLC; SCFT
   Holdings LLC; Westland LLC; Ralston Development Corporation; Premium
     Panels Inc; Associated Bodywork & Massage Professionals; Yukon Court
     Apartments Holding Company LLC; Terra Village Apartments Holding
 Company LLC; Wellington Resources LLC; 1150 Catamount LLC; 4240 Kipling
  LLC; Summit Commercial Properties I LLC; 150 Capital Drive LLC; Domenico
      Real Estate Partnership III LLP; Maxim United LLC; PWN 1 LLC; Tebo
 Superstore LLC; 15000 W Kendrick St LLC; Morton Properties LLC; Hennessey;
     CFC Investments LLC; 4301 Wadsworth LLC; Doris N Guernsey; Paul L
    Guernsey; Enger Enterprises LLC; Warren Family Funeral Homes Inc; LHI
  Group LLC; 55 West LLC; TF Holdings LLC; UGWUD Properties LLC; Clay &
      Imes Inc; Creekside West Partnership LLP; Cheryl Rogers; Aleksander
     Staninovski & Ivka Staninovski Trust; Bridgestone Company LLC; Vlade
   Sekulovski; Tome Nechovski Living Trust; LFP&JP JJC; El Rancho Colorado
                                  Restaurant LLC,

                                       v.

                                  Respondents:

County of Jefferson Board of Equalization and Scott Kersgaard, Jefferson County
                                   Assessor.

                                Order Affirmed
                                    en banc
                                 May 30, 2023

Attorneys for Petitioners:
Law Offices of James P. Bick, Jr PC
James P. Bick, Jr.
      Chesterfield, Missouri

Hutchinson Black and Cook, LLC
Glen F. Gordon

                                       2
Matthew A. Simonsen
     Boulder, Colorado

Attorneys for Respondents:
Jefferson County Attorney’s Office
Amber J. Munck, Assistant County Attorney
Jason W. Soronson, Assistant County Attorney
       Golden, Colorado

Attorneys for Amici Curiae Assessor for Larimer County; Assessors and
Boards of Equalization for Adams County, Arapahoe County, Boulder County,
El Paso County, Mesa County, Routt County, Eagle County, Weld County, the
City and County of Broomfield, and the City and County of Denver; and
Colorado Assessor’s Association:

Adams County Attorney’s Office
Meredith P. Van Horn, Assistant County Attorney
     Brighton, Colorado

Arapahoe County Attorney’s Office
Ronald A. Carl, County Attorney
Benjamin P. Swartzendruber, Assistant County Attorney
     Littleton Colorado

Boulder County Attorney’s Office
Michael A. Koertje, Assistant County Attorney
     Boulder, Colorado

Office of the City & County Attorney of the City & County of Broomfield
Patricia W. Gilbert, Deputy City and County Attorney
       Broomfield, Colorado

Denver City Attorney’s Office
Charles T. Solomon, Assistant County Attorney
Paige A. Arrants, Assistant County Attorney
      Denver, Colorado

Kathryn L. Schroeder

                                       3
      Pueblo West, Colorado

El Paso County Attorney’s Office
Steven Klaffky, Senior Assistant County Attorney
      Colorado Springs, Colorado

Larimer County Attorney’s Office
David P. Ayraud, Deputy County Attorney
     Fort Collins, Colorado

Mesa County Attorney’s Office
Andrea Nina Atencio, Chief Deputy County Attorney—Civil Division
John R. Rhoads, Assistant County Attorney II
      Grand Junction, Colorado

Routt County Attorney’s Office
Erick Knaus, County Attorney
Lynaia M. South, Senior Assistant County Attorney
      Steamboat Springs, Colorado

Eagle County Attorney’s Office
Christina C. Hooper, Senior Assistant County Attorney
      Eagle, Colorado

Weld County Attorney’s Office
Karin McDougal, Assistant County Attorney
      Greeley, Colorado

Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Colorado Property Tax Administrator:
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General
Robert H. Dodd, First Assistant Attorney General
John H. Ridge, Senior Assistant Attorney General
Jessica E. Ross, Assistant Attorney General
       Denver, Colorado

                                      4
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which CHIEF
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE
HART, JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

                                   5
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1      This is one of several cases filed in Colorado in which commercial property

owners have sued to compel the county assessor to revalue their properties and

lower their property tax assessments for the 2020 tax year to account for the

economic impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic. This case concerns the valuation of

hundreds of parcels of commercial real property located in Jefferson County. The

taxpayers here—and in the other cases—contend that the pandemic and various

state and local public health orders issued in response were “unusual conditions”

that required revaluation of their properties under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I),

C.R.S. (2022).

¶2      We accepted jurisdiction under section 13-4-109, C.R.S. (2022), in four of

these    cases   to   consider   how   the       “unusual   conditions”   exception   in

section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) applies to the circumstances created by the COVID-19

pandemic during the 2020 property tax year. See Larimer Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v.

1303 Frontage Holdings LLC, 2023 CO 28, __ P.3d __; Educhildren LLC v. Cnty. of

Douglas Bd. of Equalization, 2023 CO 29, __ P.3d __; Hunter Douglas Inc. v. City &

Cnty. of Broomfield Bd. of Equalization, 2023 CO 27, __ P.3d __. In 1303 Frontage, we

address when an assessor must revalue property based on an unusual condition.

There, we conclude that article 1 of title 39 does not require an assessor to revalue

real property when an unusual condition occurs after the January 1 assessment

                                             6
date for the intervening (second) year of the reassessment cycle. See 1303 Frontage,

¶ 90; accord Educhildren, ¶ 5.

¶3      In this case and in Hunter Douglas, we consider whether the COVID-19

pandemic and the public health orders issued in response constituted “unusual

conditions” for purposes of section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I).1 We conclude they did not.

Specifically, we hold that COVID-19 was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” and

the orders issued in response to COVID-19 were not “regulations restricting . . .

the     use   of   the   land”    under    section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I).    Therefore,

section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) did not require the Jefferson County Assessor to revalue

the taxpayers’ 2020 property valuations, and it did not require the Board of

1   We accepted jurisdiction under section 13-4-109 to review the following issues:
        1. Whether the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law,
           that the COVID-19 pandemic was not a detrimental act of nature
           as contemplated by C.R.S. § 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) and therefore not an
           “unusual condition” thereunder.
        2. Whether the district court erred in concluding, as a matter of law,
           that the various regulations imposed by the Governor and Public
           Health authorities in response to the pandemic were not
           regulations restricting or increasing the use of land as
           contemplated by C.R.S. § 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) and therefore not an
           “unusual condition” thereunder.
        3. Whether the district court erred in dismissing Taxpayers’
           complaint on the basis of factual assumptions and speculation.

                                          7
Equalization to correct the Assessor’s valuations. Accordingly, we affirm the

order of the district court dismissing the complaint for failure to state a claim.

                                  I. Background

¶4    The Colorado Constitution sets forth a broad directive to achieve “just and

equalized valuations” for taxing real and personal property:

      Each property tax levy shall be uniform upon all real and personal
      property . . . . The actual value of all real and personal property . . .
      shall be determined under general laws, which shall prescribe such
      methods and regulations as shall secure just and equalized valuations
      for assessments of all real and personal property.

Colo. Const. art. X, § 3(1)(a).

¶5    Pursuant to this mandate, the General Assembly has enacted a statutory

framework establishing a backward-looking, two-year reassessment cycle for

property taxes in Colorado. § 39-1-104(10.2)(a). In an odd-numbered year (the

first year of the two-year cycle), the assessor in the county where the property is

located determines the “actual value” of the property, which the assessor uses to

determine a “valuation for assessment.”          § 39-1-104(1)(a); § 39-1-104(1.8)(b);

§ 39-1-104(10.2)(a). The actual value does not reflect the current value of the

property on the January 1 assessment date. § 39-1-105, C.R.S. (2022). Rather, it is

based on data gathered during a one-and-one-half year period “immediately prior

to July 1 immediately preceding the assessment date.” § 39-1-104(10.2)(d). For

example, assessors calculated the actual value for 2019 tax assessments using a

                                          8
data-gathering period of January 1, 2017, to June 30, 2018.           See id.; see also

1303 Frontage, ¶ 13 (describing the data-gathering periods for tax assessments for

the 2019 through 2024 tax years).

¶6    Generally, property valuations are calculated only once every two years.

That is, the actual value for the first (odd-numbered) year carries over to the

second    (even-numbered)      year    of       the   biennial   reassessment   cycle.

§ 39-1-104(10.2)(a).   However, section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) instructs assessors to

revalue a property before the next odd-year assessment date under certain limited

circumstances, including where “unusual conditions in or related to any real

property . . . would result in an increase or decrease in actual value.” 2        This

“unusual conditions” exception allows revaluation where “a change in the

property or the property’s use rendered application of the base year value unjust.”

LaDuke v. CF & I Steel Corp., 785 P.2d 605, 608 (Colo. 1990).

¶7    The “unusual conditions” that require an assessor to reassess the actual

value of a property are expressly limited to:

      [1] the installation of an on-site improvement, [2] the ending of the
      economic life of an improvement with only salvage value remaining,

2 Additional exceptions to the two-year reassessment cycle include the total
destruction of property and a clerical error. See 1303 Frontage, ¶ 14 (first citing
§ 39-1-123, C.R.S. (2022); and then citing Thibodeau v. Denver Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs,
2018 COA 124, ¶ 12, 428 P.3d 706, 709).

                                            9
      [3] the addition to or remodeling of a structure, [4] a change of use of
      the land, [5] the creation of a condominium ownership of real
      property as recognized in the “Condominium Ownership Act”,
      article 33 of title 38, C.R.S., [6] any new regulations restricting or
      increasing the use of the land, or a combination thereof, [7] the
      installation and operation of surface equipment relating to oil and gas
      wells on agricultural land, [8] any detrimental acts of nature, and [9] any
      damage due to accident, vandalism, fire, or explosion.

§ 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) (emphases added); see also LaDuke, 785 P.2d at 609 (“[W]e are

not free to adopt additional ‘unusual conditions.’”).

¶8    In interpreting section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), we also look to the Assessors’

Reference Library (“ARL”), which describes “assessment policies and procedures

for real property valuation according to the Colorado Constitution and statutes.”

3 Colo. Div. of Prop. Tax’n & Dep’t of Loc. Affs., Assessors’ Reference Library: Real

Property Valuation Manual (“3 ARL”) Preface (Rev. Jan. 2023). The Colorado

Property Tax Administrator (“Administrator”) publishes the ARL pursuant to

section 39-2-109(1)(e), C.R.S. (2022), which authorizes the Administrator “[t]o

prepare and publish from time to time manuals, appraisal procedures, and

instructions.”   The ARL is binding on the county assessors charged with

administering the statute. Huddleston v. Grand Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 913 P.2d

15, 18 (Colo. 1996).    Although we may defer to an administrative agency’s

reasonable interpretation of that statute, Gessler v. Colo. Common Cause, 2014 CO

44, ¶ 7, 327 P.3d 232, 235, we are not bound by its interpretation. BP Am. Prod.

Co. v. Colo. Dep’t of Revenue, 2016 CO 23, ¶ 15, 369 P.3d 281, 285.

                                          10
¶9    Having outlined the constitutional and statutory authority that guides our

inquiry, we now turn to the facts.

                       II. Facts and Procedural History

¶10   The petitioners in this case are taxpayers who own commercial real property

located in Jefferson County. On December 10, 2020, the taxpayers sued the County

of Jefferson Board of Equalization and the County of Jefferson Assessor, Scott

Kersgaard, (collectively, “the County”) in Jefferson County District Court. The

complaint alleges that beginning in March 2020, in response to the COVID-19

pandemic, Colorado state and local authorities began issuing numerous

“executive orders and other regulations restricting the use and access to Plaintiffs’

properties.” According to the taxpayers, the pandemic and the related orders

issued by the Governor, the Colorado Department of Public Health &

Environment, and Jefferson County Public Health (collectively, “public health

orders”) amounted to “unusual conditions” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) that

required the Jefferson County Assessor to revalue their properties and required

the Board of Equalization to lower the Assessor’s valuations of their properties for

the 2020 tax year.

¶11   The taxpayers’ complaint sought mandamus relief, declaratory relief, and

de novo review of section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). The taxpayers focused on two of the

enumerated unusual conditions in section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). First, they argued

                                         11
that the COVID-19 pandemic was a detrimental act of nature. Second, they argued

that the public health orders issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic

constituted new regulations restricting the use of the land. The taxpayers attached

their estimations of the value of their properties for the 2020 tax year, which

were—across the board—50% less than the Assessor’s valuations.

¶12   In June 2021, the County filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that (1) the

taxpayers failed to state a claim for relief; (2) the COVID-19 pandemic and public

health orders occurred after the statutory timeframe for consideration of an

unusual condition for the 2020 tax year; and (3) the COVID-19 pandemic and

related public health orders were not unusual conditions.

¶13   On September 23, 2021, the district court dismissed the taxpayers’ complaint

on the ground that the pandemic and public health orders did not qualify as

unusual conditions. The district court concluded that the COVID-19 pandemic

was not a detrimental act of nature because unlike direct, tangible forces such as

forest fires, landslides, and immediate erosion problems—the examples provided

by the ARL—the pandemic’s impacts on real property were “indirect and

intangible.”

¶14   The district court further found that the public health orders did not qualify

as regulations restricting the use of the land because the orders did not regulate

the land itself. The court reasoned that, “[w]hile the practical effect of those

                                        12
regulations may have prevented Plaintiffs, in their capacities as owners of the

improvements on the Subject properties, from using those improvements for a

time, the ‘use of the land’ was never directly restricted.”

¶15   Having concluded as a matter of law that the pandemic and public health

orders were not unusual conditions, the district court dismissed the taxpayers’

complaint without reaching the County’s remaining arguments.

¶16   The taxpayers appealed.           The court of appeals filed a motion for

determination of jurisdiction, requesting that this case and its three companion

cases be referred to this court because they raise issues of significant public

importance. See §§ 13-4-109 to -110, C.R.S. (2022); C.A.R. 50(a). In November 2022,

we granted the motion and accepted jurisdiction.

                                      III. Analysis

¶17   After setting forth the standards of review, we explain why the COVID-19

pandemic     did   not   constitute     a   “detrimental   act[]   of   nature.”   See

§ 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Then, we describe why the public health orders issued in

response were not “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land.” See id. Finally,

we discuss prior cases stating that economic fluctuations are not unusual

conditions, which underscores our conclusion that the COVID-19 pandemic did

not trigger revaluation under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I).

                                            13
                             A. Standards of Review

¶18   We review rulings on motions to dismiss de novo. Bly v. Story, 241 P.3d 529,

533 (Colo. 2010); Allen v. Steele, 252 P.3d 476, 481 (Colo. 2011).               Under

C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), defendants may move to dismiss for “failure to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted.” “[W]here the plaintiff’s factual allegations

cannot, as a matter of law, support a claim for relief,” the trial court properly grants

a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion. Bly, 241 P.3d at 533. Factual allegations in a complaint

“must be enough to raise a right to relief ‘above the speculative level,’ and provide

‘plausible grounds to infer’” a situation giving rise to a cause of action. Warne v.

Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶ 9, 373 P.3d 588, 591 (citation omitted) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.

Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)).

¶19   We also review de novo questions of statutory interpretation. Jefferson Cnty.

Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932, 935 (Colo. 2010). “We begin by

looking to the express language of the statute, construing words and phrases

according to grammar and common usage.” Id. If the statute’s language is

unambiguous and “the intent appears with reasonable certainty, our analysis is

complete.” Id.

                          B. Detrimental Act of Nature

¶20   The taxpayers first contend that the COVID-19 pandemic was a

“detrimental act[] of nature” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). They start with the

                                          14
definition of “detrimental”—“[c]ausing harm, damage, or loss; injurious or

hurtful”—and observe that the COVID-19 pandemic caused harm to communities,

damage to the economy, and loss of life. Detrimental, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th

ed. 2019). The taxpayers then borrow the definition of “natural cause” from

elsewhere in the tax code to argue that COVID-19 was an act of nature. See

§ 39-1-102(8.4), C.R.S. (2022) (defining “[n]atural cause” as “fire, explosion, flood,

tornado, action of the elements, act of war or terror, or similar cause beyond the

control of and not caused by the party holding title to the property destroyed”).

According to the taxpayers, because the COVID-19 pandemic fits within

definitions of “detrimental” and “act of nature,” it was a “detrimental act[] of

nature” for purposes of section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I).

¶21   We disagree. The exception in section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) instructs assessors

to take into account “any unusual conditions in or related to any real property

which would result in an increase or decrease in actual value.” To fall within this

provision, the unusual condition must be both an “act of nature” and “in or related

to any real property.”       Id.   An “act of nature” is “[a]n overwhelming,

unpreventable event caused exclusively by forces of nature, such as an earthquake,

flood, or tornado.” Act of nature, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (referring

to the definition of an “act of God”). And to be “in or related to any real property,”

                                         15
an act must be “[c]onnected in some way” to real property. See Related, Black’s

Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

¶22   COVID-19 meets neither of these requirements. COVID-19 is “a respiratory

disease caused by a novel coronavirus.” See In re Interrogatory on House Joint Resol.

20-1006, 2020 CO 23, ¶ 5, 500 P.3d 1053, 1056 (citing Colo. Exec. Order No. D 2020

003, at 1 (Mar. 11, 2020), https://www.colorado.gov/governor/sites/default/

files/inline-files/D%202020%20003%20Declaring%20a%20Disaster%

20Emergency_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/66FD-5MUY]). On March 11, 2020, the

World Health Organization officially declared COVID-19 to be a pandemic. Id. at

¶ 8, 500 P.3d at 1057 (citing H.R.J. Res. 20-1006, 72d Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess.,

at 1 (Colo. 2020)). Whether COVID-19 is viewed as a virus or a pandemic, it did

not resemble the natural events—earthquakes, floods, and tornados—that we

consider acts of nature. See Act of nature, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

¶23   Moreover, the COVID-19 pandemic was not “in or related to any real

property.” § 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). COVID-19 may have infected people who were

on the property. See In re Interrogatory, ¶ 5, 500 P.3d at 1056 (“COVID-19 is

transmitted by close exposure to a person with the virus, particularly an infected

person’s respiratory droplets from coughing or sneezing.”). But COVID-19 did

not infect the property itself. Because the COVID-19 pandemic was not an act of

                                         16
nature and because it was not “in or related to” the taxpayers’ properties, COVID-19

was not an “unusual condition” for purposes of section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I).

¶24   The Administrator’s interpretation of the statute bolsters our conclusion. It

lists as examples of “[d]etrimental acts of nature” forest fires, landslides, and

immediate erosion problems. 3 ARL 1.10. These examples share three qualities.

First, as the district court observed, they are “direct, tangible forces . . . capable of

‘diminish[ing] the use or availability of a parcel of land.’” (Quoting 3 ARL 1.10.)

Second, they affect properties in a limited geographic area. And third, their impact

occurs in a defined window of time. As a virus, COVID-19 is different in all three

respects: It does not directly affect the use or availability of real property, its

impact is worldwide, and its duration has spanned years.

¶25   These    differences    are   relevant    to   the   practical   application    of

section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). As discussed, the existence of an unusual condition

permits an otherwise prohibited mid-cycle revaluation of a property.               Such

revaluation is feasible in the event of a forest fire, landslide, or immediate erosion

problem that affects a limited number of properties. But requiring a mid-cycle

revaluation based on a global pandemic would be absurd, both because every

property would be at least indirectly affected by it and because COVID-19 is not a

single event (like a landslide); rather, the intangible impacts of COVID-19 have

spanned years. It is therefore not clear under the taxpayers’ interpretation when—

                                           17
or how many times—an assessor would have to undertake such revaluation.

(Each time a new or revised public health order issues?)

¶26   The taxpayers contend that even if COVID-19 does not resemble the events

listed in the ARL definition, the pandemic nevertheless “fits squarely within the

ARL catchall provision” of “other natural occurrences that would diminish the use

or availability of a parcel of land.” But just as this court cannot add unusual

conditions to section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I)’s exhaustive list, neither can the Tax

Administrator.    So the “other natural occurrences” provision in the ARL is

necessarily limited to events that are “in or related to any real property.” As

discussed, COVID-19 was not such an event.

¶27   In light of the plain language of the statute, as well as the Tax

Administrator’s interpretation, we conclude that COVID-19 was not a

“detrimental act[] of nature” for purposes of section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I).

               C. Regulations Restricting the Use of the Land

¶28   Next, the taxpayers contend that the public health orders issued in response

to COVID-19 constituted regulations restricting the use of their land that triggered

revaluation under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I).     Their complaint references 141

orders issued by the Governor, 28 orders issued by the Colorado Department of

Public Health & Environment, and orders issued by Jefferson County Public

                                         18
Health related to the COVID-19 pandemic.3 The taxpayers contend that the orders

were “regulations” under the plain meaning of the word and that “[m]any of the[]

3 In their briefing to this court, the taxpayers focus on seven orders: (1) Executive
Order D 2020-017, directing non-critical businesses “to close temporarily, except
as necessary to engage in minimum basic operations,” Colo. Exec. Order
No. D 2020-017, at 2 (Mar. 25, 2020), https://www.colorado.gov/governor/sites/
default/files/inline-files/D%202020%20003%20Declaring%20a%20Disaster%
20Emergency_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SBC-TTDN]; (2) Executive Order
D 2020-003, declaring a disaster emergency due to the presence of coronavirus
disease in Colorado, Colo. Exec. Order No. D 2020-003, at 1 (Mar. 11, 2020),
https://www.colorado.gov/governor/sites/default/files/inline-files/
D%202020%20003%20Declaring%20a%20Disaster%20Emergency_1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/SJL2-SQL2]; (3) Executive Order D 2020-013, ordering Colorado
employers to reduce in-person workforce by fifty percent, Colo. Exec. Order
No. D 2020-013, at 2 (Mar. 22, 2020), https://www.colorado.gov/governor/sites/
default/files/inline-files/D%202020%20013%20Ordering%20Colorado%
20Employers%20to%20Reduce%20In-Person%20Workforce%20by%20Fifty%
20Percent_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/HFJ5-S8Y2]; (4) Public Health Order 20-22,
closing bars, restaurants, theaters, gyms, casinos, businesses offering non-essential
personal services, horse tracks, and off-track betting facilities statewide, Colo.
Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, Notice of Public Health Order 20-22 Closing Bars,
Restaurants, Theaters, Gymnasiums, and Casinos Statewide (Mar. 16, 2020), https://
covid19.colorado.gov/public-health-orders-and-executive-orders              [https://
perma.cc/V7HM-JTMS]; (5) Public Health Order 20-24, directing all Colorado
employers, except certain essential businesses, to reduce in-person work by fifty
percent and to implement work-from-home capabilities to the extent possible,
Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, Order No. 20-24, Implementing Fifty Percent
Reduction in Nonessential Business In-Person Work and Extreme Social Distancing
(Mar.             22,            2020),            https://drive.google.com/file/d/
1ndUBYTXVM7yULGMiDPRhjVrUj8qTF2pk/view                     [https://perma.cc/3LVE-
NJVD]; (6) Third Amended Public Health Order 20-28, setting forth requirements
for the implementation of Safer at Home, Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, Third
Amended Order No. 20-28, Safer at Home (May 14, 2020), https://
drive.google.com/file/d/1FSR3HMNIZqscMyNjn23j8GhT9xyuwaPp/view
[https://perma.cc/F32L-224H]; and (7) Fourth Amended Public Health

                                         19
orders significantly restricted the use of commercial land.” The taxpayers argue

that the orders required them to shift their business operations because “[n]o

customers were allowed to enter the properties”; the taxpayers “were not

permitted to enter let alone use their property”; and “‘non-critical properties’

[could] not be used for any purpose.”

¶29   We disagree that the public health orders were “regulations restricting . . .

the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). (Emphasis added.) “Land” is

“[a]n immovable and indestructible three-dimensional area.” Land, Black’s Law

Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). It is “not the fixed contents of th[e] space . . . , but the

space itself.” Id. (quoting Peter Butt, Land Law 9 (2d ed. 1988)). “Land” is therefore

distinct from an improvement (such as a building or business) on the land. See

Improvement, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “improvement” as

“[a]n addition to property, usu[ally] real estate, whether permanent or not;

esp[ecially], one that increases its value or utility”).

Order 20-28, restricting restaurants to fifty percent capacity or fifty people total,
whichever is less, for in-person dining, Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, Fourth
Amended Order No. 20-28, Safer at Home (May 26, 2020), https://
drive.google.com/file/d/19mjy5vyuLpPcrXz58nK1gWGWUFL4Op_D/view
[https://perma.cc/KX7W-D2GJ].

                                           20
¶30   The tax code reinforces this distinction between land and improvements

located on the land.       See, e.g., § 39-5-105(1), C.R.S. (2022) (requiring that

improvements be valued separately from land); § 39-1-102(14) (listing “[a]ll lands”

and “[i]mprovements” in separate subsections in the definition of real property);

§ 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) (listing as a separate unusual condition the installation of an

on-site improvement). As does the ARL. 3 ARL 1.1 (listing “practical reasons for

separation of land and improvements” in the Colorado statutes).

¶31   Because “‘land’ is given a technical meaning and is distinguished from

‘improvements’” in the property tax code, this court has previously rejected the

invitation to construe “land” in section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) as synonymous with

“improvements.” LaDuke, 785 P.2d at 609. In LaDuke, a steel manufacturing

facility “faced with severe financial stress due to the depressed state of the

American steel industry” decided to permanently close one of its mills. Id. at 606.

The issue was whether this shut-down constituted a “change in the use of the

land,” another unusual condition in section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Id. We viewed the

operation of the steel mill to be use of improvements on the land, not use of the land

itself. Id. at 609. As such, we rejected the taxpayer’s argument that the assessor

was required to consider the shutdown to the steel mill in its valuation. Id. at 606.

Because “the land was still being used as a site for an industrial plant producing

steel,” the use of the land did not change. Id. at 609–10.

                                         21
¶32   Here, because the public health orders regulated the operation of

commercial activity on the land, and not the use of the land itself, they were not

“regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). It

is true that the orders required certain businesses to shift their operations.4 For

example, a Colorado restaurant owner complying with the orders had to “reduce

in-person work requirements by fifty percent,” Colo. Exec. Order No. D 2020-013,

at 1 (Mar. 22, 2020); “offer food and beverage using delivery service, window

service, walk-up service, drive-through service, or drive-up service,” Colo. Dep’t

of Pub. Health & Env’t, Notice of Public Health Order 20-22 Closing Bars, Restaurants,

Theaters, Gymnasiums, and Casinos Statewide, at 5 (Mar. 16, 2020); and later limit

reopening to “fifty percent (50%) of their in-office occupancy,” Colo. Dep’t of Pub.

Health & Env’t, Third Amended Order No. 20-28, Safer at Home, at 20 (May 14,

2020). But critically, these orders did not change how the land itself was being

used. The land could still be used to operate a restaurant, even if the public health

orders meant such operations became “less intensive.” LaDuke, 785 P.2d at 610

4That said, it is not clear that the plaintiff taxpayers were directly affected by the
public health orders. In their complaint, the taxpayers do not allege how the public
health orders affected each of their specific business operations.

                                          22
(“Such a less intensive use of the land does not constitute a change in the use of

the land for purposes of section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I).”).

¶33   Further, to accept the taxpayers’ argument that the public health orders in

this case were an unusual condition would lead to absurd results. If the COVID-19

orders were deemed regulations restricting the use of land because they required

a temporary closure, then ordinary changes to fire codes affecting occupancy

limits or even a routine public health order requiring the temporary closure of a

particular restaurant would likewise amount to an unusual condition requiring

revaluation of the property. Such an outcome defies legislative intent and is

contrary to our holding in LaDuke.

¶34   Our conclusion today is bolstered by the ARL. As examples of “regulations

increasing or decreasing the use of the land,” it lists “changes in zoning; creation

of, or changes in, comprehensive land use policies; creation of land set-aside

requirements for open space; creation of new flood zones; or any other

governmental acts that would affect the ultimate use or disposition of a parcel of

land.” 3 ARL 1.10. These examples, all involving changes to the categorization of

the land, are intended to be permanent until and unless the land is subsequently

recategorized.   In contrast, the public health orders issued in response to

COVID-19 were intended to be temporary.              See, e.g., Colo. Exec. Order

No. D 2020-011 (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.colorado.gov/governor/sites/

                                         23
default/files/inline-files/D%202020%20011%20Ordering%20the%

20Temporary%20Suspension%20of%20Certain%20Regulatory%20Statutes_0.pdf

[https://perma.cc/R67X-3AD7] (“ordering the temporary suspension of certain

regulatory statutes due to the presence” of COVID-19 (emphasis added)).

¶35   Indeed, we note that the public health orders at issue here were repeatedly

clarified, amended, repealed, and re-enacted to adjust to the ever-fluctuating risks

of COVID-19. If each such public health order amounted to a regulation restricting

the use of land that triggered a mid-cycle revaluation, assessors would have had

to revalue every affected property dozens of times in the past two years, a result

the legislature could not have intended.

¶36   In sum, we conclude that the public health orders issued in response to

COVID-19 did not constitute “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land” under

section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I).

                              D. Economic Conditions

¶37   Our conclusion that the COVID-19 pandemic did not constitute an unusual

condition is also consistent with case law holding that changed economic

conditions are not unusual conditions for purposes of section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I).

¶38   In Carrara Place, Ltd. v. Arapahoe County Board of Equalization, 761 P.2d 197,

199 (Colo. 1988), for example, the taxpayer plaintiffs protesting their 1985 property

valuations argued that, because vacancy rates and property tax rates were

                                         24
substantially higher in 1985 than in 1976 (the year used to determine the property’s

value for tax purposes), the assessor should “consider 1985 economic data in

making his appraisals.”5 We rejected this argument, observing that a change in

economic conditions does not amount to an unusual condition under

section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Id. at 201. As we explained, the legislature “chose to

limit revaluation to those cases in which it deemed that a change in the property

or in the property’s use rendered application of the base year value unjust.” Id.

Thus, although changed economic conditions resulted in the property’s value

falling below the 1976 value, the assessor was not required to revalue the property

to account for the economic downturn. Id.

¶39   Similarly, in LaDuke, this court reaffirmed that a change in economic

conditions does not constitute an unusual condition for purposes of

section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). 785 P.2d at 610. In appealing its 1984 tax assessment,

the steel manufacturing facility argued that “the permanent shut-down of a

portion of the steel mill and subsequent reduction of 52 percent in the number of

its employees constituted an ‘unusual condition.’” Id. at 608. We disagreed,

5 In Carrara Place, assessed values for the 1983 to 1986 tax years were determined
with reference to economic conditions in 1976. 761 P.2d at 200. As we explain in
1303 Frontage, the legislature subsequently amended title 39 to increase the
frequency of base year property tax assessments. See 1303 Frontage, ¶ 52.

                                        25
noting that “often there will be significant changes in the intensity of the use of

commercial property” between the year the actual value is set and the year of the

assessment. Id. at 610. But to take into account such changes would negate the

reassessment system to which unusual conditions are a limited exception. Id.

¶40   Our reasoning in LaDuke and Carrara Place applies with equal force here.

The General Assembly did not list “economic conditions” as an unusual condition

in section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). We cannot smuggle what amounts to a change in

economic conditions into section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) under cover of “any

detrimental act[] of nature” or “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land,”

without contravening the plain language of the statute.

¶41   Doing so would also undermine the advantages the legislature sought to

achieve through the tax code it enacted. If we expanded “unusual conditions” in

section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I) to include changed economic conditions, taxpayers—

unsure which economic fluctuations would trigger a revaluation—would struggle

to anticipate their future tax burdens. And in the event of an economic upturn, a

taxpayer whose property taxes increased in the intervening year would have to

shoulder a tax burden they could not reasonably have foreseen and for which they

were unable to adequately prepare. See Carrara Place, 761 P.2d at 204. What’s

more, assessors would be working incessantly to determine whether changed

economic conditions constitute an unusual condition and, if so, to revalue all the

                                        26
properties affected by that changed economic condition.            Such constant

revaluation would thwart the legislative intent (as well as the stability and

predictability) of the two-year reassessment cycle.

¶42   So here, for the reasons set forth in LaDuke and Carrara Place, the economic

impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic are not an unusual condition.6

¶43   While the COVID-19 pandemic and public health orders did not trigger

section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I)’s revaluation requirement, the tax code accounted—and

continues to account—for its economic impact elsewhere. Our legislature enacted

a backward-looking reassessment system in which the actual value of a property

is based on data from a preceding eighteen-month period. § 39-1-104(10.2)(d).

This means the economic impacts of COVID-19 from the first half of 2020, if any,

were reflected in the January 1, 2021 tax assessment. See 1303 Frontage, ¶¶ 4, 65.

And ensuing economic impacts will be reflected in subsequent two-year

reassessment cycles. Id.; accord Educhildren, ¶ 50.

6 Because we conclude that the COVID-19 pandemic and public health orders did
not constitute unusual conditions under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I), the taxpayers’
claims fail as a matter of law. Therefore, we need not address the third issue the
taxpayers raise contesting the factual support for the district court’s conclusion.

                                         27
                                 IV. Conclusion

¶44   Although COVID-19 has undoubtedly had negative, wide-ranging, and

lasting impacts, it was not a “detrimental act[] of nature,” nor were the public

health orders passed in response “regulations restricting . . . the use of the land”

under section 39-1-104(11)(b)(I). Thus, we affirm the district court’s order finding

that the taxpayers failed to state a claim for relief and granting the County’s motion

to dismiss.

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