Court Opinion

ID: 9768686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 13:44:30.020969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:42.740062
License: Public Domain

LAMBERT, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent upon the view that the majority has abridged the basic constitutional rights of citizens to vote, speak and associate for the advancement of their political beliefs. While the majority has attempted to diminish the implications of the effect of the statute at issue, it is indisputable that appellants, Virginia Chapman and Ron Peace, are prohibited from seeking re-election and serving upon a school board of which they are long-time members. It is not an an*244swer to say that “if their relatives transfer to work in another school district or change jobs entirely, appellants will no longer be foreclosed from seeking re-election to their posts.”
In Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d.547 (1983), the constitutional challenge was to an Ohio statute which required independent candidates for President to file a nominating petition with the requisite number of signatures on or before March 20 of the election year. To reach its decision, the Court reviewed certain basic principles of constitutional law which are applicable here. It was reiterated that “[t]he impact of candidate eligibility requirements on voters implicates basic constitutional rights.” Id., 460 U.S. at 786, 103 S.Ct. at 1568. Citing NAACP v. Alabama, ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S.Ct. 1163, 2 L.Ed.2d 1488 (1958), which held that “freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the liberty assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which embraces freedom of speech ...,” the Court in Anderson held that the voters’ fundamental right of political association under the First Amendment and their Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest was directly affected by limitations on the rights of candidates for public office. The Court acknowledged the necessity for reasonable, non-discriminatory restrictions to promote legitimate state interests such as electoral integrity and substantial electoral support, but held such restrictions to an exacting standard of justification.
The justification advanced here is in a phrase “prevention of nepotism.” Much is made in Rose v. Council for Better Education, Inc., Ky., 790 S.W.2d 186 (1989), of the practice of nepotism and favoritism in the operation of Kentucky’s public schools. However, with enactment of the KERA, a virtual battery of statutes was enacted to combat this evil. As shown in the majority opinion, school board members must now take an oath that they will not in any way influence the hiring or appointment of school district employees. Violation of the oath is grounds for removing the offending board member from office. Board members are prohibited from trading influence and from basing personnel decisions on race, sex, age and other matters improper for consideration. Board members no longer have the unrestricted power to hire and fire superintendents as approval by the chief state school officer is required. Finally, the superintendent, not the school board, is charged with “the general conduct of the schools” and “for the hiring and dismissal of all personnel in the district.”
Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra, sets forth the analytical process by which challenges to state election laws must be measured. First, it directs consideration of the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Here, the injury is manifest. Voters are absolutely denied an opportunity to vote for an otherwise qualified candidate based solely on the candidate’s kinship to a school district employee. The political debate such a candidate would promote is lost to the electorate. In addition, denial of voters’ rights to associate and support the candidate reduces the diversity of choice and runs contrary to the “principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open." New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270, 84 S.Ct. 710, 720, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964).
Finally, Anderson v. Celebrezze, supra, suggests that reviewing courts weigh the competing interests to determine whether the challenged statute may survive. While nepotism has been declared to be an impediment to efficient public education, the remedy need not be so drastic as prohibition of the candidacy. The improper conduct has been proscribed and additional less intrusive remedies, if desired, could be fashioned to prevent the practice denounced. It is simply unnecessary to prohibit candidacy, particularly when the political rights of the entire electorate are infringed, in order to alleviate nepotism.
Even when pursuing a legitimate state interest, the state may not choose a means which unnecessarily restricts constitution*245ally protected liberty. When constitutionally protected rights are infringed, the regulations must be precise (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S.Ct. 328, 9 L.Ed.2d 405 (1963); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 94 S.Ct. 303, 38 L.Ed.2d 260 (1973)), and the state must employ the least restrictive means of satisfying its interest. When measured against the foregoing principles, the statute contested here must fail.
Special Justice L.T. PENISTON joins in this dissenting opinion.