Court Opinion

ID: 9662883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:20:53.656525+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:43.489540
License: Public Domain

COOK, Justice,
concurring.
I concur in the opinion of this court, but would also hold that the motion for contempt filed by David Brister failed to give specific notice of which provision of the divorce decree Deborah Brister allegedly violated. The motion quoted and specifically pointed out the “periods of possession” portions of the decree (including the “modification” provision), but failed to quote or otherwise specifically identify the portion of the decree directing Deborah to surrender the child.
Civil contempt proceedings are quasi-criminal in nature, and the contemnor is entitled to procedural due process throughout the proceedings. Ex parte Johnson, 654 S.W.2d 415, 420 (Tex.1983). Among these procedural due process rights is the right to reasonable notice of each alleged contumacious act. The due process requirement is one of “full and complete notification” of the charges alleged with a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges by defense or explanation. Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d 686, 688 (Tex.1979); see also Ex parte Edgerly, 441 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Tex.1969). A contempt judgment rendered without such adequate notification is void. Ex parte Gordon, 584 S.W.2d at 688.
The legislature, with due regard to the due process rights of parents, enacted a section in the Texas Family Code setting forth the requirements of a motion for contempt of certain family law orders, judgments and decrees. The version of the Family Code provision in effect when David filed his motion1 stated as follows:
The motion shall set out specifically and with particularity the provisions of the final order, decree, or judgment sought *836to be enforced and, in separate counts, the date, place, and, if applicable, the time of each occasion upon which the respondent has not complied with the order, the manner of the noncompliance, and the relief sought by the movant.
Act of July 20, 1987, ch. 73, § 5, 1987 Tex.Laws, 1st Spec.Sess. 225, 227, repealed by Act of July 16, 1989, ch. 25, § 17, 1989 Tex.Laws, 1st Spec.Sess. 74, 80-82.
This version of the statute and its predecessors has been held to require a very specific identification in the motion for contempt of the particular provisions of the order alleged to have been violated, as a statutorily set requirement for reasonable notice and procedural due process. See e.g., Ex parte Conoly, 732 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1987, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Durham, 708 S.W.2d 536, 537 (Tex.App.—Dallas 1986, orig. proceeding); Ex parte Deckert, 559 S.W.2d 847, 849 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, orig. proceeding).
The contempt judgment in the instant case expressly recites it was based on two instances of “failing to surrender the minor child” by Deborah. David argues that his motion sufficiently identified the provision of the order to surrender the child in its paragraph 6, which states:
6. On two or more occasions, Respondent has failed to comply with the order of this Court by failing to surrender the minor child to Movant as ordered. Mov-ant requests that the Court order a bond or security for compliance with the Court’s order granting possession or access to the child.
This paragraph, taken with the allegations in other paragraphs about Deborah’s conduct, may be sufficient to allege the manner of noncompliance, but it is not sufficient to point out the portion of the decree directing Deborah to surrender the child. I would hold that the contempt motion was insufficient because it failed to identify the precise provision of the order Deborah was alleged to have violated.
In sum, I would hold that the trial court’s judgment of contempt conflicts with the statutory requirement for specific notice in the contempt motion of the particular provision in the order which is alleged to have been violated.
HIGHTOWER, J., joins in this opinion.

. In 1989 the legislature amended the provision and recodified it, effective November 1, 1989, as sections 14.311(a) and 14.312(b) of the Family Code. Those sections now provide:
(a) Information. A motion under this sub-chapter must give the respondent, in ordinary and concise language, notice of the provisions of the final order, decree, or judgment sought to be enforced, the manner of noncompliance, and the relief sought by the movant. ******
(b) Other Motions. If contempt for failure to obey an order relating to possession of or access to a child or for violation of other provisions of a final order, decree, or judgment is sought, the motion must allege the portion of the order allegedly violated, and, as to each violation for which punishment is *836sought, the date, place, and, if applicable, the time of each occasion on which the respondent has not complied with the order.
Tex.Fam.Code Ann. §§ 14.311(a), 14.312(b) (Vernon Supp.1991).