Court Opinion

ID: 9736095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:43:38.923632+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:55.501625
License: Public Domain

Kuns, District Judge,
dissenting.
I concur entirely with the portion of the decision by the majority which affirms the denial of the divorce to the defendant, the provisions for the custody of the children, and the support allowed to the plaintiff. I respectfully dissent, however, from the affirmance of the action of the trial court in granting a decree of absolute divorce to the plaintiff for the reasons hereinafter set forth.
The statement of facts in the majority opinion conforms to the record in all respects and there is no reason to question any finding with respect to the credibility of any of the witnesses, including the parties. The record, however, does not contain sufficient evidence to constitute corroboration, as required by section 42-335, R. R. S. 1943.
It should be recognized at the outset, that jurisdiction over the matter relating to divorce arises entirely from statute and has never been considered to be within the *725equity jurisdiction of the court, even though divorce actions are tried as in equity. In Detter v. Erpelding, 176 Neb. 600, 126 N. W. 2d 827, it was said: “Divorce and its incidents are matters of public concern over which the Legislature has authority. What policies to adopt concerning its regulation are for it to- decide and are not for the courts. * * * Jurisdiction of the court in matters relating to divorce and alimony is given by the statute, and every power exercised by the court with reference thereto must look for its source in the statute, or it does not exist.” Similar statements are contained in Harrington v. Grieser, 154 Neb. 685, 48 N. W. 2d 753, and Cizek v. Cizek, on rehearing, 69 Neb. 800, 99 N. W. 28. A further statement of this principle is contained in Robinson v. Robinson, 164 Neb. 413, 82 N. W. 2d 550: “A marriage contract is one having a great public interest and it cannot be dissolved except when all conditions of controlling statutes are met. The parties to a marriage assume duties and obligations of a most solemn character. They may not be put aside at the will of the parties as in an ordinary partnership. A divorce or legal separation must be grounded on a legal fault within the grounds enumerated in the statute and proved in the manner therein provided. One party may not create the grounds that will sustain him or her in maintaining such a suit. It is not the province of the courts to. grant such decrees for sociological reasons. The policy of the state relative to- marriage is fixed by the Legislature. It is not for this court to do. what it deems best for the parties. The only relief that may be granted is that provided by statute when the evidence is sufficient to bring the case within its purview.” (Emphasis supplied.) This statement was reiterated in Birth v. Birth, 165 Neb. 11, 84 N. W. 2d 204. The requirement of corroboration is a matter of legislative policy and has remained unchanged in this state for a century, originally enacted in R. S. 1866, page 135, as a part of the original statutes of Nebraska. As stated in the majority opinion, this court *726has logically declined to impose strict requirements concerning the degree or the sufficiency of proof of corroboration. Whenever this court, however, has considered the nature of corroboration, it has held that corroboration should amount to competent evidence and independent proof of the facts and grounds alleged in the petition. Goodman v. Goodman, 168 Neb. 841, 97 N. W. 2d 336; Laughrey v. Laughrey, 171 Neb. 132, 105 N. W. 2d 576; Conry v. Conry, 176 Neb. 396, 126 N. W. 2d 188. Corroboration, in this sense, is entirely different from the corroboration of the complainant in a rape or paternity case where the evidence is required only to support the complainant as a witness and need not amount to independent proof; in these cases, the fact that the witness complained soon after the offense is considered corroborative although the contents of such extrajudicial statements are not admissible in evidence nor considered proof of the facts alleged. State v. Meyers, 46 Neb. 152, 64 N. W. 697, 37 L. R. A. 423; Krug v. State, 116 Neb. 185, 216 N. W. 664; Peery v. State, 163 Neb. 628, 80 N. W. 2d 699.
In the majority opinion the holding of this court in Kidder v. Kidder, 159 Neb. 666, 68 N. W. 2d 279, is cited as a controlling precedent. This case, however, should be considered in the light of Green v. Green, 148 Neb. 19, 26 N. W. 2d 299; the syllabus is substantially the same as syllabus 1 of the majority opinion here; in the summary of the evidence, the court referred to the plaintiff’s testimony that defendant had whipped their child severely and said: “The condition of the child after the whipping, showing marks on her body, was testified to by plaintiff’s mother.” There was no specific analysis of the reasons why such evidence was or was not adequate corroboration, and it is quite possible that the evidence in the record showed other details which might have made the corroboration entirely sufficient. In Kidder v. Kidder, supra, the evidence was quoted as showing that plaintiff received a lump and' bruise on *727her face, which she claimed resulted from a blow by defendant; other witnesses saw the lump and heard her statement that defendant had struck her. In disposing of the argument that the corroboration was not sufficient, the opinion said: “Unless this court is prepared to depart from its general holdings and the particular holding in Green v. Green, supra, it must be said that the testimony as to the incident of February 13, 1953, has been corroborated agreeable to- the statute.” Again, it is quite possible that additional circumstances might have been shown by the record entirely justifying this finding. It should be noted that this court has said repeatedly that the sufficiency of the corroborative evidence is determined upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
The use of plaintiff’s extrajudicial statements to amplify corroborative evidence violates both the letter and the spirit of section 42-335, R. R. S. 1943. In this case the purported corroboration does not connect the defendant with the incident, even to the extent of having been present, nor does it indicate even slightly his actions or any intention of being cruel; plaintiff’s injuries-were not such that they must have been inflicted by defendant; and there are many available hypotheses to the effect that such bruises could have been caused without any cruelty whatever. If defendant had suddenly pulled his wife back to save her from being struck by an automobile, he might have created the exact situation considered by the court. The point is that when corroboration is based upon a circumstantial showing, such showing must be sufficient to prove the ground for the divorce against- defendant, and not merely the effects of acts which, if done by defendant, might be grounds for divorce. Unless such a principle is recognized and carried into effect, a plaintiff might succeed in securing a decree of divorce, by exhibiting and complainng of marks or scars claimed to have been inflicted by cruelty months or even years previously. If the court- refrains -from re*728ferring to the plaintiff’s testimony or extrajudicial statements for the purpose of determining the sufficiency of corroboration, the legislative purpose will be accomplished; when such reference is made, it is almost inevitable that the' decree will be made solely upon the declarations and statements of the plaintiff.
It has also long been a rule of evidence that the prior consistent statements of a witness may be utilized only to support the credibility of that witness after an attack upon his credibility; and such statements are not admissible unless they were made before the witness had any reason to expect that his testimony would be given. Plaintiff’s extrajudicial statements should not have been received in evidence nor should they be given the slightest evidentiary weight. The purported corroboration does not support plaintiff’s claim of cruelty unless her own evidence and statements are first believed and then used to build the corroboration to the extent deemed sufficient by the majority.
If the subject of divorce were confided to the discretion of the court in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, the holding by the majority might be justified. Until the Legislature relinquishes its authority over the subject, the court should not erode or change the clear requirements of the statute.
For these reasons, the decree of the trial court granting a decree of absolute divorce to the plaintiff ought to be reversed for want of sufficient corroboration.
Carter and Brower, JJ., join in this dissent.