Court Opinion

ID: 9729522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:39:08.591136+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:59.202171
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Chief Justice Jones:
While I agree with that portion of the majority opinion which holds that appellant cannot be convicted as a seller, I cannot agree with the majority’s decision to limit their review to “whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that appellant ‘sold’ a prohibited drug.”
Appellant was indicted, tried and convicted by a jury for violation of Section 4(q) of The Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, Act of September 26, 1961, P. L. 1664, §4(q), 35 P.S. §780-4(q). It should be noted that the language of the indictment returned by the grand jury was virtually identical to the language of the statute and alleged that appellant “did possess, deal in, dispense, sell, deliver, distribute or traffic in a narcotic drug; to wit: Hashish.” Even if the appellant did not “sell” the hashish, his activity constituted some, if not all, of the other acts charged, and this fact distinguishes the cases cited by the majority where the accused was indicted solely as a seller. However, the majority opinion sees fit to solely discuss appellant’s conviction as a seller due to a concession contained in the Commonwealth’s brief and the bill of particulars.
Turning to the Commonwealth’s “concession”, we have held in the past that “concessions” made by the Commonwealth in its brief are not dispositive. Com. v. Armao, 446 Pa. 325, 330 n.6, 286 A. 2d 626, 628 n.6 (1972); Demczuk Estate, 444 Pa. 212, 216, 282 A. 2d 700, 705 (1971). Secondly, the Commonwealth’s “concession” was, in reality, an answer to a contention advanced by the appellant only in the court below that the indictment violated Pa. E. Crim. P. 219. I do not believe that the Commonwealth’s unnecessary answer *482should limit our review. Thirdly, if the majority decide to attach significance to the Commonwealth’s “concession”, it should also be noted that appellant concedes the prosecution was not based solely on the sale of narcotics. The portion of appellant’s brief addressing this issue prefaces the argument by noting, “[f]or purposes of the ensuing discussion, the writer’s remarks will be limited to the selling charge exclusive of the other offenses charged to the appellant in the same indictment”. Lastly, an examination of the bill of particulars and the trial judge’s charge demonstrates that appellant was not prosecuted solely as a seller.
Appellant’s application for a bill of particulars requested, “the specific offense or offenses of those for which he has been indicted which he will be required to defend. . . .” In answer thereto, the Commonwealth stated: “[t]he defendant is charged with violation of Section 4(q) of The Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, 35 P.S. 780-1 through 780-31. Section 4(q), 35 P.S. 780-4(q) prohibits the following acts: The possession, control, dealing in, dispensing, selling, delivery, prescription, trafficking in, or giving of, any dangerous or narcotic drug. . . .” Similarly, the second paragraph of the trial judge’s charge recites Section 4(q). It appears to me that the specific use of the words “sale” or “sold” in other portions of the bill of particulars and the charge was merely an abbreviation, and not a limitation, of the indictment.
Thus, I am of the opinion that this Court should also review the evidence to determine whether appellant “did possess, dear in, dispense . . . deliver, distribute or traffic in a narcotic drug; to wit: Hashish”. Since appellant’s sole defense was a complete denial of any participation, the verdict of guilty delivered by the jury indicates a total rejection of appellant’s flat denial and a complete acceptance of the Commonwealth’s *483version, whatever appellant’s participation may he termed.
T dissent.