Court Opinion

ID: 9910455
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 18:01:07.48976+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:00.009256
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-6089     Document: 010110969343         Date Filed: 12/15/2023     Page: 1
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           December 15, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                             Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                 Clerk of Court
  WENDELL MONTRELL HAYES,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                           No. 23-6089
                                                      (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-00879-SLP)
  JOSEPH NORWOOD,                                             (W.D. Okla.)

        Respondent - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

             ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
                    _________________________________

 Before McHUGH, MURPHY, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

        Petitioner Wendell Montrell Hayes, appearing pro se, seeks a certificate of

 appealability (“COA”) to challenge the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254

 application for habeas relief. He also requests leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For

 the reasons stated below, we deny his request for a COA and dismiss this matter. We

 also deny the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

                                              I.

        In 2000, an Oklahoma jury convicted Petitioner of first-degree murder and

 conspiracy to commit a felony. A public defender represented Petitioner during his trial

        *
          This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
 res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
 consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-6089      Document: 010110969343           Date Filed: 12/15/2023     Page: 2

 and sentencing, although Petitioner tried unsuccessfully to bring in a private defense

 attorney on the day his trial began. After sentencing, the judge informed Petitioner of his

 right to appeal, reminding Petitioner that he must file a notice of intent to appeal within

 ten days if he wished to appeal. Petitioner stated that he wished to appeal. The judge

 also stated that she believed Petitioner was able to afford appellate counsel because of

 Petitioner’s last-minute attempts to hire counsel. Accordingly, the judge denied any

 request for court-appointed counsel or transcripts at public expense. Petitioner filed a

 notice of appeal but failed to timely file a petition in error for his appeal, so the

 Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA”) dismissed his appeal on June 19, 2001.1

        Over twenty years later—on February 2, 2022—Petitioner applied for

 postconviction relief in the Oklahoma County District Court seeking an appeal out of

 time from his judgment and sentence. Petitioner claimed that he received ineffective

 assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not file his appeal brief. Plaintiff also

 claimed that the court abused its discretion in refusing to appoint appellate counsel. The

 court denied his request, finding that the OCCA dismissed his appeal because of

 Petitioner’s own inaction. The OCCA denied Petitioner’s appeal for the same reasons.

        On October 6, 2022, Petitioner filed an application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the

 United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, raising the same

        1
          Petitioner apparently believes that his attorney failed to file the Notice of Intent
 to Appeal and Designation of Record required by Rule 1.14(C), Rules of the Oklahoma
 Court of Criminal Appeals (“OCCA Rules”). According to the fact findings of the
 Oklahoma County District Court Case No. CF-1999-5510, Petitioner’s public defender
 filed a notice of intent to appeal and withdrew as counsel.
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Appellate Case: 23-6089      Document: 010110969343          Date Filed: 12/15/2023      Page: 3

 claims he raised in his state court proceeding. The magistrate judge filed a Report and

 Recommendation, recommending dismissal for untimeliness because Petitioner filed his

 petition twenty years too late and was not entitled to statutory or equitable tolling. The

 Report and Recommendation advised Petitioner of his right to file an objection, stating

 that failure to timely file an objection would result in waiver of the right to appellate

 review.

        Petitioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation. The district court

 found the objections timely, but not specific. It adopted the Report and

 Recommendation, dismissing Petitioner’s action with prejudice as untimely and denying

 a COA.

        Petitioner appeals the dismissal and requests a COA.

                                               II.

                                               A.

        A party may object to a magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations within

 fourteen days of receiving service. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2). A party’s objections must

 be specific to preserve an issue for review. Id.; accord United States v. 2121 E. 30th St.,

 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Under our firm waiver rule, failure to timely object

 forecloses appellate review unless the interests of justice require our review or unless a

 pro se litigant was not “informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences of

 failing to object.” Johnson v. Reyna, 57 F.4th 769, 778 (10th Cir. 2023) (quoting

 Wardell v. Duncan, 470 F.3d 954, 958 (10th Cir. 2006)).

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         Here, the magistrate judge informed Petitioner of the period for objecting and the

 consequences of failing to object to the Report and Recommendation. Petitioner filed

 timely objections. But Petitioner’s objections lacked specificity because he did not

 address the magistrate judge’s finding that Petitioner filed his habeas petition decades too

 late.

         This Court has not decided whether the firm waiver rule operates as an

 independent basis for denying a COA. See Glaser v. Archuleta, 736 F. App’x 733, 736

 (10th Cir. 2018) (unpublished); United States v. Thyberg, 722 F. App’x 847, 850 (10th

 Cir. 2018) (unpublished). We decline to decide whether to apply the firm waiver rule

 here and, if so, whether the interests-of-justice exception requires our consideration

 despite waiver. Instead, we conclude that even without the firm waiver rule as a bar,

 Petitioner is not entitled to a COA under the traditional framework.

                                              B.

         To receive a COA, a petitioner must make “a substantial showing of the denial of

 a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This requires a petitioner to “show that

 the district court’s resolution of the constitutional claim was either ‘debatable or wrong.’”

 Laurson v. Leyba, 507 F.3d 1230, 1232 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529

 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). When a district court denies a habeas application on procedural

 grounds, including for untimeliness, a petitioner requesting a COA must also show us

 that reasonable jurists could debate the correctness of the procedural ruling. Slack, 529

 U.S. at 484. When we can rule based on the procedural question without addressing the

 constitutional merits question, we often do so. Id. at 485.

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        Petitioners generally must file a habeas application within one year of the date

 their judgment becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A); Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d

 1153, 1154 (10th Cir. 1999). Petitioner’s judgment became final on March 7, 2001, his

 deadline to file a petition-in-error for his direct appeal under OCCA Rule 2.1(C).

 Petitioner waited over twenty years to file a habeas application. Thus, Petitioner’s

 application was untimely under § 2244(d)(1)(A).

        Statutory tolling is available under § 2244(d)(1)(D), which tolls the 1-year clock to

 file a § 2254 petition until the date a petitioner could have discovered the claims using

 due diligence. We also recognize equitable tolling “when an inmate diligently pursues

 his claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by extraordinary

 circumstances beyond his control.” United States v. Gabaldon, 522 F.3d 1121, 1124

 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Marsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000)).

        In a supplementary filing, Petitioner invoked statutory tolling under

 § 2244(d)(1)(D). In support, Petitioner claims his mental health and reduced mental

 capacity prevented him from understanding his rights on appeal, recognizing his

 counsel’s ineffectiveness, and filing his habeas claim for over twenty years. We also

 construe these arguments as invoking equitable tolling.

        Petitioner points to Hannon v. Maschner, 781 F. Supp. 1547, 1550 (D. Kan.),

 aff’d, 981 F.2d 1142 (10th Cir. 1992), in which a district court excused a delay of over

 twenty years in filing a habeas petition based on the petitioner’s “unusual diligence in his

 attempt to plead his cause” “almost from the day he was incarcerated.” This is neither

 controlling nor analogous. Petitioner’s arguments do not show that he exercised due

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 diligence or that he could not have discovered his habeas claims for over two decades

 even if he had exercised due diligence.

        The record reflects that Petitioner took no action for over twenty years. Multiple

 unpublished opinions from this Court hold that much shorter gaps cannot constitute due

 diligence. See Trujillo v. Tapia, 359 F. App’x 952, 954 (10th Cir. 2010) (three years of

 inaction showed lack of due diligence); Hicks v. Kaiser, 203 F.3d 835 (10th Cir. 2000)

 (two-year gap between finality of conviction and habeas challenge “demonstrates a lack

 of diligence, even if [the petitioner] was initially hampered by his attorney’s

 unavailability.”). We hold that Petitioner did not exercise due diligence. Thus, Petitioner

 is entitled to neither statutory tolling under § 2244(d)(1)(D) nor equitable tolling.

        Petitioner argued for tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) at the district court but

 abandoned the argument on appeal. On appeal, Petitioner argued for tolling under

 § 2244(d)(1)(B)—but he failed to make this argument at the district court and did not

 request plain-error review. Thus, Petitioner waived both these arguments. See United

 States v. Carrasco-Salazar, 494 F.3d 1270, 1272–73 (10th Cir. 2007) (“an abandoned

 objection is waived”); In re Rumsey Land Co., LLC, 944 F.3d 1259, 1271 (10th Cir.

 2019) (citing Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1131 (10th Cir. 2011) (failure

 to argue for plain error of an argument raised for the first time on appeal constitutes

 waiver).

        Because Petitioner fails to meet the statutory requirements and does not qualify for

 equitable tolling, reasonable jurists could not debate whether the court should have

 resolved the petition differently. We therefore deny Petitioner’s request for a COA.

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 Because we deny the COA, we do not reach the merits of his petition and dismiss this

 matter. We deny the motion to proceed in forma pauperis.

                                             Entered for the Court

                                             Joel M. Carson III
                                             Circuit Judge

                                            7