Court Opinion

ID: 9686963
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:12:16.891051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:23.242268
License: Public Domain

J. H. Gillis, J.
(dissenting). At 1:30 a.m. on September 2, 1977, defendant and a companion were observed apparently sleeping in a car parked on the street. The passenger door was open and the dome light was on. As a uniformed officer approached on the passenger side of the car, defendant took a tinfoil packet out of his pocket and dropped it on the floor. From experience, the officer knew that similar packets were often used to transport drugs. The packet was seized and opened, revealing a substance which was later determined to be heroin. Defendant was thereupon arrested.
Following the preliminary examination and bind over, the lower court granted defendant’s motion to quash the information. Relying upon the case of People v Falconer, 76 Mich App 367; 256 NW2d 597 (1977), the court held that there was not probable cause to seize the packet.
In Falconer, the defendant was observed on three occasions removing manila coin envelopes from a car and exchanging them for money. The defendant was unaware that he was under police observation at the time. The Court held there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant or search the car, saying:
"There was no testimony that the officer was in possession of any information from any source linking the defendant, any of the persons who approached the defendant, the car, or the locality, with prior narcotics *765involvement. The sole ground of the arrest and search was the officer’s suspicion that the manila coin envelopes contained narcotics. Such suspicion does not constitute probable cause for either the arrest of the defendant or the search of the car.” Id., at 369.
In People v Ridgeway, 74 Mich App 306; 253 NW2d 743 (1977), the defendant was stopped for a minor traffic offense. The officers smelled marijuana and observed a tinfoil packet on the floor. In determining that there was probable cause, the Court placed much reliance upon the officers’ knowledge that tinfoil packets such as the one in defendant’s car often contain narcotics. The Court gave some weight to the fact that the officers smelled marijuana, since it might be inferred that one who smokes marijuana may also be in possession of more dangerous drugs. However, it is readily apparent that this was not the controlling factor in the Court’s decision. As the Court noted:
"We are not overly impressed by that inference, but it may be entitled to some weight.”
In the instant case, like in Ridgeway, the officer testified that he had seen packets similar to the one observed and that in his experience packets of that type ordinarily contain narcotics or other controlled substances.
In addition, defendant’s actions can certainly be characterized as "suspicious”. Defendant was partially lying down in the front seat of the car. A marked police car stopped next to the automobile. As a uniformed officer walked around the rear of the car, defendant got up. As the officer approached the passenger door, defendant reached into his pocket, removed the packet, and threw it to the floor. I do not believe it is unreasonable to *766infer from these circumstances that defendant was attempting to get rid of the possession of incriminating material.
An obviously evasive action by a person who is aware that he is being observed by the police is one factor to be considered in the probable cause formula. People v Nelson Pitts, 40 Mich App 567, 576; 199 NW2d 271 (1972). While a "furtive gesture” standing alone does not create probable cause, id., in the instant case the defendant’s actions, when coupled with the officer’s knowledge from prior experience, was sufficient to justify the seizure of the packet.
I would reverse.