Court Opinion

ID: 9965102
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Date Created: 2024-05-01 17:10:01.842177+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:42.348618
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This decision of the New Mexico Court of Appeals was not selected for publication in
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          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO

No. A-1-CA-40578

FOX GUINN,

       Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,

v.

PEGGY WILLIAMS,

       Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant.

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF CURRY COUNTY
Drew D. Tatum, District Court Judge

Floyd D. Wilson, P.C.
Floyd D. Wilson
Cedar Crest, NM

for Appellee

Lovell, Lovell, Isern & Farabough, LLP
Joe L. Lovell
Hannah L. Rivera
Amarillo, TX

for Appellant

                                MEMORANDUM OPINION

BOGARDUS, Judge.

{1}     Defendant Peggy Williams appeals from a judgment entered against her by the
district court following a bench trial. On appeal, Defendant argues that the district court
erred by (1) concluding that Plaintiff Fox Guinn’s claim was timely filed, (2) granting
Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment, and (3) rejecting Plaintiff’s counterclaims.
Because we conclude that Plaintiff’s claim was not time-barred, was supported by
substantial evidence, and that Defendant’s counterclaims were either granted,
unpreserved or unsupported, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

{2}     The following factual background is drawn from the district court’s findings of fact
entered after the trial. Plaintiff and Defendant’s late husband, Bennett Williams, entered
into an arrangement to acquire vacant lots and develop them. Plaintiff and Williams
never entered into a formal contract or partnership. Nevertheless, under the
arrangement, Williams purchased land and financed construction of buildings on it,
including the purchase of materials, permits, and the cost of subcontractors. In return,
Plaintiff served as the general contractor for construction. After construction and sale of
the properties, Plaintiff and Williams would equally share the net profit. Williams and
Plaintiff developed and sold approximately thirteen properties in this fashion.

{3}     In September 2011, Williams and Defendant purchased property at 117 and 121
Gayland (the properties). Williams and Defendant took title to the properties as joint
tenants with a right of survivorship. They financed the construction of a duplex on each
lot with loans they borrowed from the Bank of Clovis. They were the only obligors on the
loans. Williams died in October 2011 shortly after purchasing the properties.

{4}     In November 2011, Fox Homes, Inc., Plaintiff’s company, received the permits for
construction of the duplexes on the properties. Construction was completed in April
2012. Defendant with Plaintiff’s knowledge, began renting out the duplexes the same
month, and paid all expenses associated with the ownership, maintenance, and rental
of the two duplexes. By September 2012, Defendant had paid all subcontractor
invoices, bills, and charges for goods and services incurred in connection with the
construction of the duplexes. Plaintiff never received his share of the net rental income,
nor did he request Defendant pay him for his construction services related to the
properties, or reimburse him for gross receipts taxes (GRT) he was assessed on the
properties.

{5}     In March 2020, Defendant attempted to sell both properties without splitting the
profits with Plaintiff. In response to Defendant’s attempt to sell, Plaintiff delivered an
invoice to the title company, which was reviewing the properties for sale, asserting his
claim for the money owed to him. As a result, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff
demanding he withdraw the claim. After receiving the letter, Plaintiff filed his complaint.

{6}     The district court concluded that, although Defendant and Plaintiff were not
engaged in a partnership, and neither Williams nor Defendant entered into an
enforceable contract with Plaintiff, nonetheless, Defendant was unjustly enriched by the
services Plaintiff provided. The district court ordered Defendant pay restitution to
Plaintiff for his services and to pay the GRTs assessed against him, altogether
approximately $85,000. Defendant appeals.

DISCUSSION
{7}     We begin by reiterating basic appellate principles to remind Defendant of her
burdens on appeal. First, this Court operates pursuant to a presumption of correctness
in favor of the district court’s rulings, and it is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate
error on appeal. See Farmers, Inc. v. Dal Mach. & Fabricating, Inc., 1990-NMSC-100, ¶
8, 111 N.M. 6, 800 P.2d 1063 (stating that the burden is on the appellant to clearly
demonstrate that the district court erred); see also State v. Aragon, 1999-NMCA-060, ¶
10, 127 N.M. 393, 981 P.2d 1211 (stating that there is a presumption of correctness in
the rulings or decisions of the district court, and the party claiming error bears the
burden of showing such error). Second, “[w]e will not search the record for facts,
arguments, and rulings in order to support generalized arguments.” Muse v. Muse,
2009-NMCA-003, ¶ 72, 145 N.M. 451, 200 P.3d 104. Summarizing the evidence and
making a generalized assertion that the evidence does not support the district court’s
findings of fact, without directly attacking them, is insufficient. See Tres Ladrones, Inc. v.
Fitch, 1999-NMCA-076, ¶ 17, 127 N.M. 437, 982 P.2d 488 (rejecting the contention that
no evidence supported a finding because the appellant failed to properly attack the
finding). Lastly, it is Defendant’s burden to provide citations to the record. See Santa Fe
Expl. Co. v. Oil Conservation Comm’n, 1992-NMSC-044, ¶ 11, 114 N.M. 103, 835 P.2d
819 (stating that appellate courts have no duty to entertain factual contentions on
appeal not supported by citations to the record proper). With these principles in mind,
we turn to our discussion of the issues raised.

I.     The District Court Did Not Err in Determining Defendant Was Unjustly
       Enriched

A.     Plaintiff’s Unjust Enrichment Claim Is Not Barred by the Applicable Statute
       of Limitations

{8}     Defendant first asserts that the district court erred in granting Plaintiff’s claim for
unjust enrichment because it was barred by the applicable four-year statute of
limitations. The parties agree that the applicable statute of limitations is four years, see
NMSA 1978, § 37-1-4 (1880). However, Defendant argues that the cause of action
accrued in 2012 upon the completion of the construction of the duplexes, rather than in
2020 when Defendant sought to sell the properties without splitting the profit with
Plaintiff. We agree with the district court that the cause of action accrued in 2020.

{9}    The determination of which accrual rule applies to a cause of action is a question
of law when the applicable statute is silent. Roberts v. Sw. Cmty. Health Servs., 1992-
NMSC-042, ¶ 15, 114 N.M. 248, 837 P.2d 442 (“In absence of explicit instructions from
the legislature, when a cause of action accrues under a statute of limitation is a judicial
determination.”). However, once the district court has determined the applicable rule,
the question of when the cause of action accrued under that rule is a question of fact.
See Williams v. Stewart, 2005-NMCA-061, ¶ 16, 137 N.M. 420, 112 P.3d 281 (stating
that the application of an accrual rule is a jury question especially when conflicting
inferences may be drawn); Yurcic v. City of Gallup, 2013-NMCA-039, ¶ 10, 298 P.3d
500 (stating that whether a claim has been filed timely is a question of fact that only
becomes a question of law “when the facts are undisputed”).
{10} The district court found that Plaintiff and Williams had formed an arrangement in
which Plaintiff would act as general contractor for the properties jointly owned. It further
determined that approximately thirteen homes were built this way and Plaintiff was paid
for his work only after the properties were sold. Additionally, the district court
determined that Defendant attempted to sell the homes without paying Plaintiff and told
Plaintiff she would file suit against him if he did not withdraw the invoice Plaintiff
submitted to the title company requesting payment. Lastly, the district court found that
Plaintiff had not been paid and, because of the existing arrangement, he had not
expected to be paid until the properties were sold. Based on these findings, the district
court concluded that Plaintiff’s claim of unjust enrichment did not accrue until Plaintiff
learned that Defendant attempted to sell the properties without paying him.

{11} The district court’s findings were supported by Plaintiff’s testimony concerning
the longstanding arrangement between Williams and himself. Therefore, we conclude
that the district court’s findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. See
Autrey v. Autrey, 2022-NMCA-042, ¶ 9, 516 P.3d 207 (“The testimony of a single
witness, if found credible by the district court, is sufficient to constitute substantial
evidence supporting a finding.”).

{12} Moreover, the district court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s cause of action accrued in
2020 is in accordance with the law. Defendant sought to profit at Plaintiff’s expense
when she put the properties up for sale without paying Plaintiff. See Martin v. Comcast
Cablevision Corp. of Cal., LLC, 2014-NMCA-114, ¶ 13, 338 P.3d 107 (explaining that
“[a] ‘benefit’ for purposes of an unjust enrichment claim is any form of advantage that
has a measurable value including the advantage of being saved from an expense or
loss” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). Thus, Plaintiff’s claim was
triggered in March 2020 when Defendant put the properties up for sale. Since Plaintiff
filed his complaint in April of the same year, his cause of action for unjust enrichment
was timely filed. Based on the foregoing, we discern no error.

B.      Substantial Evidence Supports the District Court’s Conclusion That
        Defendant Was Unjustly Enriched

{13} Defendant contends that the district court erred in concluding she was unjustly
enriched because the claim was not supported by substantial evidence.1 Defendant
asserts that we should relax our deferential standard of review because the district court
adopted verbatim four of the five conclusions of law Plaintiff requested relating to his
claim for unjust enrichment. See Reynolds v. Landau, 2020-NMCA-036, ¶ 18, 468 P.3d
928 (stating that although substantial evidence review “is generally deferential, we may
relax our usual deference when the district court adopts verbatim the prevailing party’s

1Defendant also contends that the district court erred in granting Plaintiff’s unjust enrichment claim
because the only evidence presented at trial is that, if she was unjustly enriched, it was by Fox Homes,
Inc. not by Plaintiff. Defendant failed to raise this argument at trial, other than mentioning it in her closing
brief, and failed to assert it in her requested findings of fact and conclusions of law. Thus, we agree with
Plaintiff that Defendant failed to fairly invoke a ruling of the district court on these grounds and that the
issue was not preserved for appeal.
extensive requested findings and conclusions”). The district court rejected most of
Plaintiff’s proposed findings, as such, we reject Defendant’s assertion that the district
court adopted them wholesale and will apply our customary standard of review. Based
on well-known principles of review, we see no error in the district court’s conclusions.

{14} To prevail on a claim for unjust enrichment, “one must show that: (1) another has
been knowingly benefitted at one’s expense (2) in a manner such that allowance of the
other to retain the benefit would be unjust.” City of Rio Rancho v. AMREP Sw. Inc.,
2011-NMSC-037, ¶ 54, 150 N.M. 428, 260 P.3d 414 (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted). Here, the district court concluded that Defendant had been unjustly
enriched because Defendant knowingly benefited from Plaintiff’s work and then refused
to compensate him. In support of its conclusion, the district court found that Defendant
exclusively owned the properties in question, attempted to sell the properties without
splitting the profits with Plaintiff, has never compensated Plaintiff for his work as general
contractor nor reimbursed him for the GRT he was assessed, and “has mixed feelings
about whether or not Plaintiff should still be compensated for his work.”

{15} The district court’s findings were based on not just Plaintiff’s testimony, but also
on Defendant’s, which she fails to acknowledge on appeal. Defendant testified that
although she had nothing to do with the negotiation of the terms of the arrangement
between Williams and Plaintiff, she acted as the bookkeeper for the purchase,
development, and sale of properties pursuant to the arrangement. Defendant further
testified that after Williams’ death in 2011 she told Plaintiff to go ahead with the
construction on the two properties; Defendant understood Plaintiff would need to be
paid for his work despite not knowing the amount; Defendant conceded that Plaintiff had
not been paid; and Defendant stated that she had not paid the GRT, nor reimbursed
Plaintiff for the assessed GRT. The district court did not err in granting Plaintiff’s claim
for unjust enrichment because it is supported by substantial evidence.

II.     Defendant’s Counterclaims2

{16} Defendant argues that the district court erred in failing to grant her counterclaims
for declaratory judgment, fraudulent lien, tortious interference with a contract, and
sanctions. We disagree.

A.      Declaratory Judgment

{17} Defendant contends that the district court erred by failing to grant her request for
declaratory relief. The district court, however, granted all declaratory relief Defendant
sought, except for her claim of fraudulent lien and the claim that Plaintiff’s notice of lis

2Defendant also argues that the district court erred by failing to make findings in support of her affirmative
defenses. However, Defendant did not submit proposed findings of fact to the district court in support of
these defenses, and we are unable to review them. See Rule 12-321(A) NMRA; see also State v. Bell,
2015-NMCA-028, ¶ 2, 345 P.3d 342 (stating that one of the purposes of preservation is “to create a
record sufficient to allow this Court to make an informed decision regarding the contested issue”). We will
not consider this argument further.
pendens was baseless. Because of this, we limit our review to the district court’s denial
of declaratory relief to these two matters.

{18} We review the district court’s denial of declaratory judgment for an abuse of
discretion. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Firemen’s Ins. Co., 1966-NMSC-120, ¶ 9, 76 N.M. 430,
415 P.2d 553 (“It is the general rule that the granting of declaratory relief is
discretionary, under both the federal and the state acts.” (internal quotation marks, and
citation omitted)). Our task is to decide whether the ruling is “clearly against logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances presented by Defendant. See Headen v.
D’Antonio, 2011-NMCA-058, ¶ 6, 149 N.M. 667, 253 P.3d 957 (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). In so doing, we must also consider whether the district court’s
decision “is premised on a misapprehension of the law.” N.M. Right to Choose/NARAL
v. Johnson, 1999-NMSC-028, ¶ 7, 127 N.M. 654, 986 P.2d 450 (alteration, internal
quotation marks, and citation omitted). “[O]ur review of the application of the law to the
facts is conducted de novo.” Id. Moreover, interpretation of a statute is a question of law
we review de novo. Morgan Keegan Mortg. Co. v. Candelaria, 1998-NMCA-008, ¶ 5,
124 N.M. 405, 951 P.2d 1066. Based on our review of the facts presented to the district
court, we perceive no error.

{19} Defendant argues that the invoice Plaintiff sent to the title company seeking
compensation for his work on the properties was a fraudulent lien in violation of the
N.M. Lien Protection Efficiency Act, NMSA 1978, §§ 48-1A-1 to -9 (1999). However, the
district court explicitly concluded that the invoice was not a lien under Sections 48-1A-1
to -9. Section 48-1A-9(C) provides relief where a document purporting to create a
nonconsensual common law lien has been filed or recorded in the office of a filing
officer, such as a clerk or a county court. It is uncontested that Plaintiff did not file the
invoice with the county clerk or record it with any state, local, or federal official, and
without recordation, no lien was created. Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the
district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s requested relief
regarding the invoice given to the title company.

{20} Defendant further argues that because the district court found that Plaintiff had
no ownership interest in the properties either via contract or through a partnership and
that Plaintiff’s invoice did not qualify as a lien, the district court erred in determining that
Plaintiff’s lis pendens notice was not baseless. We disagree. Filing a notice of lis
pendens “is merely a republication of the pleadings filed in the pending judicial
proceedings.” High Mesa Gen. P’ship v. Patterson, 2010-NMCA-072, ¶ 10, 148 N.M.
863, 242 P.3d 430 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Such a filing “is not
limited to those cases in which the adverse party claims a beneficial interest in the title
to the property.” Id. Plaintiff asserted in his complaint that through his partnership with
Defendant, he had an interest in equally splitting any and all profits received from the
sale of the properties. Although the district court found that no partnership existed, it did
find that an informal arrangement existed between Williams and Plaintiff. Thus, Plaintiff
properly pleaded a cause of action, which involved an interest in the proceeds of the
sale of property that created the fund that measured his damages, and from which he
would be paid. The district court did not err in refusing to grant Defendant declaratory
relief based on her argument that the lis pendens was groundless.

{21} Finally, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing
to cancel the lis pendens before resolution of this appeal. It is within the district court’s
discretion to discontinue or revoke a notice of lis pendens once the action is settled.
See NMSA 1978, § 38-1-15 (1873-1874). Moreover, “the lis pendens established by [a]
suit continues until expiration of the time for appeal or until final disposition of the case
by the appellate court.” Salas v. Bolagh, 1987-NMCA-138, ¶ 12, 106 N.M. 613, 747
P.2d 259. Again, we find no error.

B.     Fraudulent Lien

{22} Next, Defendant argues that the district court erred by concluding that the invoice
Plaintiff sent to the title company was not a fraudulent lien in violation of Section 48-1A-
9. Because the district court did not err in determining that there was no lien we need
not review this argument.

C.     Tortious Interference With a Contract

{23} Defendant next argues that the district court erred in not granting judgment in
favor of her claim of tortious interference because her claim was supported by
substantial evidence. We disagree.

{24} To establish a claim of tortious interference with a contract, a claimant must
establish that the defendant induced the breach without justification or privilege to do
so. See LensCrafters, Inc. v. Kehoe, 2012-NMSC-020, ¶ 40, 282 P.3d 758 (stating the
elements of tortious interference with a contract). To establish that a party acted without
justification, the claimant must prove the other party acted with “either an improper
motive or improper means.” Martin v. Franklin Cap. Corp., 2008-NMCA-152, ¶ 7, 145
N.M. 179, 195 P.3d 24 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The inquiry is
whether the improper motive was “the [party]’s primary motivation for the interference.”
Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Interfering with a contract to benefit
oneself is not an improper motive. Williams v. Ashcraft, 1963-NMSC-080, ¶ 5, 72 N.M.
120, 381 P.2d 55 (“As a general rule, justification for interfering with . . . [the contract of
another] exists where the actor’s motive for doing so is to benefit himself.”). Thus, if
Plaintiff’s primary motivation for interfering with Defendant’s contract was to defend his
own financial interest, he was justified in doing so and Defendant could not establish
tortious interference with a contract.

{25} Defendant requested that the district court find that Plaintiff “did not have
justification or privilege to induce the breach of contracts to [the properties],” by sending
the invoice to the title company. The district court rejected this finding. See In re Yalkut,
2008-NMSC-009, ¶ 18, 143 N.M. 387, 176 P.3d 1119 (“[F]ailure to make a finding of
fact is regarded as a finding against the party seeking to establish the affirmative.”).
Instead, the district court found that Plaintiff sent the invoice to the title company after
learning of the sale of the properties “to assert a claim for money owed related to the
homes,” and not for some other purpose. The district court’s finding was supported by
Plaintiff’s testimony, and thus by substantial evidence. See Autrey, 2022-NMCA-042, ¶
9 (“The testimony of a single witness, if found credible by the district court, is sufficient
to constitute substantial evidence supporting a finding.”). Therefore, we conclude that
the district court did not err in determining that Defendant failed to establish tortious
interference with a contract.

D.     Sanctions

{26} Finally, Defendant contends the district court erred in failing to find facts to
support her request for sanctions. We review the imposition of sanctions or refusal to do
so under Rule 1-011 NMRA for an abuse of discretion, see Rivera v. Brazos Lodge
Corp., 1991-NMSC-030, ¶ 16, 111 N.M. 670, 808 P.2d 955, and conclude that the
district court did not err.

{27} A district court may impose sanctions on an attorney or party “in those rare cases
in which [a party or attorney] deliberately presses an unfounded claim or defense.” Id.
(alterations, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). The test for the propriety of
Rule 1-011 sanctions “depends on what the attorney or litigant knew and believed at the
relevant time.” Rivera, 1991-NMSC-030, ¶ 18. In order to support sanctions, there must
be particularized findings of misconduct. Bernier v. Bernier ex rel. Bernier, 2013-NMCA-
074, ¶ 21, 305 P.3d 978.

{28} The district court concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support
Defendant’s claim for sanctions. In so doing, the district court necessarily rejected
Defendant’s requested finding that Plaintiff brought his claims in bad faith and without
good cause. “[F]ailure to make a finding of fact is regarded as a finding against the party
seeking to establish the affirmative.” In re Yalkut, 2008-NMSC-009, ¶ 18. Deferring to
the district court’s weighing of the evidence and credibility determinations, see N.M.
Tax’n & Revenue Dep’t v. Casias Trucking, 2014-NMCA-099, ¶ 23, 336 P.3d 436, we
agree with the district court’s conclusion that sanctions were not warranted and find no
error. See Landess v. Gardner Turf Grass, Inc., 2008-NMCA-159, ¶ 16, 145 N.M. 372,
198 P.3d 871 (“[T]he [district court] judge is in the best position to view the factual
circumstances surrounding an alleged violation.”).

CONCLUSION

{29} For the reasons above, we affirm the district court’s final judgment granting
Plaintiff’s claim for unjust enrichment.

{30}   IT IS SO ORDERED.

KRISTINA BOGARDUS, Judge

WE CONCUR:
MEGAN P. DUFFY, Judge

MICHAEL D. BUSTAMANTE, Judge,
retired, Sitting by designation