Court Opinion

ID: 9369542
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 08:10:50.12621+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:16.046004
License: Public Domain

In The
                             Court of Appeals
                    Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

                                  No. 07-23-00014-CV

                           IN RE JENNY CURB, RELATOR

                              ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

                                   February 6, 2023
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION
                Before QUINN, C.J., and PARKER and YARBROUGH, JJ.

      Relator, Jenny Curb, seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the Honorable Reed

Filley to vacate his order of November 7, 2022, regarding possession of and access to

her minor child, Z.Z.D. We deny the requested relief.

                                     BACKGROUND

      Curb and Zachary L. Dissinger are divorced and share custody of a son who was

born in 2011. In a 2019 temporary order, which Curb is not challenging, she was named

possessory conservator; however, her visitation was “suspended until a recommendation

is received by the Court from the child’s counselor stating that Jenny Curb’s times of

possession should be resumed.” For the next few years, Curb filed various pleadings
seeking to modify temporary orders and to establish personal contact with her child. On

April 1, 2022, the trial court approved an agreed order for joint counseling between Curb

and her child with supervision by a counselor, one video call per week, and allowed

attendance at the child’s extracurricular activities. Curb continued her attempts to modify

temporary orders based on Dissinger’s refusal to comply with the agreed order.1

        Finally, on October 3, 2022, Curb filed her Amended Motion for Modification of

Custody. She moved for modification with respect to her visitation and requested specific

provisions granting her access to her child on alternating weekends as well as on holidays

and school breaks. Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court signed an order on

November 7, 2022, denying her motion and ordering that the parties “take all steps

reasonably necessary for counseling with the Child to effect reunification with

Mother . . . .”    The order recited that Curb attend the joint counseling sessions by

“telephone or other remote audio means.” On November 21, 2022, Curb moved for

reconsideration arguing that Dissinger had ignored previous orders and that the trial

court’s order was depriving her of constitutional parental rights. She asserted that the

trial court’s failure to recognize her rights left her with “no choice but to seek mandamus

relief.” By order dated November 29, 2022, the trial court denied Curb’s motion for

reconsideration.

                                  MANDAMUS STANDARD OF REVIEW

        Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy granted only when a relator can show that

(1) the trial court abused its discretion and (2) that no adequate appellate remedy exists.

         1 Dissinger was found in criminal contempt and jailed for five days for willfully violating orders and

interfering with Curb’s communications with the child.
                                                      2
In re Acad. Ltd., 625 S.W.3d 19, 25 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); In re N. Cypress Med.

Ctr. Operating Co., 559 S.W.3d 128, 130 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding). When seeking

mandamus relief, a relator bears the burden of proving these two requirements. Walker

v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).

      A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts arbitrarily, unreasonably, or without

reference to any guiding rules or principles. See In re Allstate Indem. Co., 622 S.W.3d

870, 875 (Tex. 2021); Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42

(Tex. 1985). To establish no adequate remedy by appeal, a relator must show there is

no adequate remedy at law to address the alleged harm and that the act requested is a

ministerial act, not involving a discretionary or judicial decision. State ex rel. Young v.

Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (orig.

proceeding). We determine the adequacy of an appellate remedy by balancing the

benefits of mandamus review against the detriments. In re Essex Ins. Co., 450 S.W.3d

524, 528 (Tex. 2014) (orig. proceeding). Furthermore, to establish a ministerial act, a

relator must also show (1) a legal duty to perform, (2) a demand for performance, and (3)

a refusal to act. Stoner v. Massey, 586 S.W.2d 843, 846 (Tex. 1979).

                                        ANALYSIS

      Curb maintains the trial court abused its discretion in entering the order denying

her Amended Motion for Modification of Custody and her Motion for Reconsideration.

Relying on In re Justin M., 549 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, orig.

proceeding), she contends “[t]here is no appeal available from the ruling under review.”

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Without elaborating on why she has no adequate appellate remedy, she argues that she

is entitled to mandamus relief because her parental rights have been violated.2

        Generally, temporary orders in conservatorship matters are not subject to

interlocutory appeal under the Texas Family Code. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 105.001(E); In

re Allen, 359 S.W.3d 284, 288 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, orig. proceeding). Thus,

when a trial court abuses its discretion in the issuance of temporary orders in a suit

affecting the parent-child relationship, mandamus relief is proper because there are no

adequate appellate remedies. Dancy v. Daggett, 815 S.W.2d 548, 549 (Tex. 1991) (orig.

proceeding); In re O’Connor, No. 03-21-00159-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 7255, at *1

(Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 31, 2021, orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief from trial

court’s order for relator to pay attorney’s fees because he established that he had no

adequate remedy by appeal).

        A suit to modify possession, access, and conservatorship, however, is a “new suit”

and results in a final and appealable order. In re Velez-Uresti, 361 S.W.3d 200, 202 (Tex.

App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied); Bilyeu v. Bilyeu, 86 S.W.3d 278, 282 (Tex. App.—

Austin, 2002, no pet.). Here, Curb represents that the order she complains of is a post-

divorce proceeding “regarding possession, care and custody of the minor child.” Such

suits are governed by chapter 156 of the Texas Family Code. While a court may enter

temporary orders in a modification suit under section 156.006, the record before us does

not indicate that the complained-of order is a temporary order. Curb’s pleading is labeled

        2 See In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 811–12 (Tex. 2020) (citing Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57,
65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 147 L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000) (acknowledging that the interest of parents in the care, custody,
and control of their children is the oldest of fundamental liberty interests recognized)); Santosky v. Kramer,
455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d (1982) (recognizing in a termination of parental rights
case that natural parents have an interest in the care, custody, and management of their child).
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“Amended Motion for Modification of Custody.” She specifically requested modification

to include specific periods of visitation and her prayer requested “modification of the

custody.” We are directed to look at the substance of a pleading to determine its nature

and the relief sought. Cupit v. Tex. Civil Commitment Office, No. 07-18-00228-CV, 2018

Tex. App. LEXIS 9384, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Nov. 16, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).

Her pleading resulted in a new suit under the Texas Family Code. In re Honea, 415

S.W.3d 888, 890–91 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2013, orig. proceeding). The trial court’s order

of November 7, 2022, denying her motion to modify conservatorship resulted in a final

and appealable order. Such an order is reviewable by direct appeal and thus, Curb’s

claim that she has no adequate remedy to challenge the order is erroneous.3 Mandamus

will not lie under the documents presented in the record before us.

        Even if mandamus review was available, Curb did not present any argument on

the lack of an adequate remedy by appeal other than a conclusory statement and an

argument that her parental rights were violated.4                She did not satisfy one of the

requirements for showing entitlement to mandamus relief. See generally In re Smith, No.

07-12-00511-CV, 2012 Tex. App. LEXIS 10383, at *5 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 13, 2012,

orig. proceeding) (discussing a relator’s burden to show no adequate remedy).

        We deny Curb’s petition for writ of mandamus.

                                                                Per Curiam

        3Curb’s reliance on In re Justin M., 549 S.W.3d 330 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, orig.
proceeding), is misplaced. That case involved the issuance of temporary orders and mandamus relief was
denied because the relator failed to show the trial court abused its discretion.

         4 This Court expresses no opinion on whether Curb established a clear abuse of discretion by the

trial court.
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