Court Opinion

ID: 9841361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 05:05:44.067488+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:08.799221
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

                                                                     UNPUBLISHED
In re K. R. WATKINS , Minor.                                         September 21, 2023

                                                                     No. 365074
                                                                     Wayne Circuit Court
                                                                     Family Division
                                                                     LC No. 2019-001681-NA

Before: GADOLA, P.J., and CAVANAGH and K. F. KELLY, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights
to the minor child, KRW, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), (i), and (j). Because the trial
court did not clearly err when it found that clear and convincing evidence supported a statutory
ground for termination and that termination was in the child’s best interests, we affirm.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

        In July 2019 respondent’s son KML sustained a burn on his hand from respondent’s lit
cigarette. A treating physician suspected that the injury was nonaccidental and alerted Child
Protective Services (CPS). The CPS investigation concluded that KML and his younger sister
KRW, then nine months old, were not safe in respondent’s care because of physical abuse,
respondent’s mental health issues, financial instability, and imminent homelessness. In September
2019 petitioner, the Department of Health and Human Services (“DHHS”), petitioned the court
requesting that it take temporary custody of the children and remove them from respondent’s care.
After respondent entered a plea of admission, the court found statutory grounds to assume
jurisdiction over the children. KML was placed with his maternal grandparents and KRW was
placed in a non-relative licensed foster home. The children would remain in these placements for
the duration of the case. In October 2019, the trial court ordered respondent to comply with a
treatment plan designed to address her mental health issues, improve her parenting skills, and assist
her in acquiring stable housing and income.

        For more than 2½ years, respondent was offered a multitude of services which she
participated in but failed to benefit from. Accordingly, in June 2022, DHHS petitioned the court
to terminate respondent’s parental rights to both KML and KRW. The trial court concluded that
statutory grounds to terminate respondent’s parental rights to both children were established by

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clear and convincing evidence and that termination of respondent’s parental rights was in KRW’s
best interests. However, the court did not find that termination was in KML’s best interests. The
court found that that KML would be better served if he remained with his maternal grandparents
pursuant to a guardianship. Respondent now appeals the termination of her parental rights to
KRW.

                                             II. ANALYSIS

                                    A. STATUTORY GROUNDS

         Respondent challenges the trial court’s findings regarding the existence of statutory
grounds for termination. After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly
err in finding that the statutory grounds were established under MCL 712A.19b (3)(c)(i), (c)(ii),
(g), and (j). The trial court did clearly err in finding that termination of respondent’s parental rights
was justified under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i), but this error was harmless because only one statutory
ground must be established to support termination of parental rights, “even if the court erroneously
found sufficient evidence under other statutory grounds.” In re Ellis, 294 Mich App 30, 32; 817
NW2d 111 (2011).

         In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must find that at least one of the statutory
grounds for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462
Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). This Court reviews the trial court’s findings under the
clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(K). A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court
is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In re Long, 326 Mich
App 455, 460; 927 NW2d 724 (2018).

      The trial court terminated respondent’s parental rights to KRW under MCL
712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), (i), and (j), which provide:

               (c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter,
        182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order,
        and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:

               (i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is
        no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable
        time considering the child’s age.

                (ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court's
        jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions,
        the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received
        notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the
        conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified
        within a reasonable time considering the child's age.

                                                 * * *

                (g) The parent, although, in the court’s discretion, financially able to do so,
        fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable

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       expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a
       reasonable time considering the child’s age.

                                              * *

               (i) Parental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated
       due to serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse, and the parent has
       failed to rectify the conditions the led to the prior termination of parental rights.

               (j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the
       child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of
       the parent.

        The trial court did not clearly err when it found clear and convincing evidence to terminate
respondent’s parental rights to KRW under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), (g), and (j). After the
court authorized the petition and removed the children, respondent entered a plea of admission in
October 2019. Respondent admitted that KML was burned by her lit cigarette, that she was soon
to be homeless, that she had no plan for alternative housing, and that she had attempted suicide a
few weeks earlier. During the dispositional hearing that followed, respondent was ordered to
comply with and benefit from a service plan designed to address respondent’s mental health issues,
improve her parenting skills, and assist her in establishing suitable income and housing.
Approximately 2½ years later, DHHS filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of
respondent’s parental rights. The petition alleged that respondent failed to benefit from the
services offered.

         We recognize that many witnesses testified that respondent was in substantial compliance
with her case service plan. However, DHHS presented evidence that respondent did not benefit
from the treatment plan, specifically from the parenting classes she completed. Indeed, despite
brief periods when she was granted unsupervised parenting time, respondent never progressed to
the point that overnight visits with KRW were possible. The case aide who supervised the visits
testified that respondent was unable to parent both children at the same time. Despite three years
of services, respondent continued to struggle with implementing appropriate discipline and
engaging with the children. Respondent’s parenting ability remained a barrier to reunification.

        In August 2021, almost two years after the children were removed from her care,
respondent was deemed to be in compliance with her treatment plan. She was attending parenting
classes, visitations, and individual counseling. She had suitable housing and had maintained the
same employment for four months. Despite these positive findings, a new circumstance hindered
respondent’s reunification efforts. A caseworker observed respondent’s then fiancé pull KML’s
arm in a hostile manner. This event gave DHHS concern regarding respondent’s ability to safely
parent her children and protect them from risk of harm.

       There were also ongoing concerns that respondent could not appropriately parent her
children because of her mental health issues. According to her treating psychiatrist, respondent
suffered from bipolar disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), and borderline
personality disorder. Respondent was compliant with her medication and therapy, but there was
clear and convincing evidence that, despite this compliance, respondent continued to have

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moments of crisis that would put her children at risk in her care. Shortly after DHHS filed the
petition in September 2019, respondent was hospitalized for a suicide attempt. Fifteen months
later, in January 2021, respondent again attempted suicide, which resulted in her hospitalization.
During a March 2021 psychological evaluation, respondent reported that she had been hospitalized
for symptoms of depression and thoughts of self-harm eight times in the preceding 10 years. Clear
and convincing evidence supported the trial court’s conclusion that respondent’s mental health
continued to be a barrier to reunification.

        This conclusion is further supported by the testimony of the children’s maternal
grandmother and KML’s long-time caregiver. The grandmother testified that she occasionally saw
some improvement in respondent’s parenting ability, but at other times she did not see any
progress. She was most concerned about the children being in respondent’s care when respondent
was experiencing one of her “off days.” On these occasions, respondent would shut down and not
want to talk or be around anybody. The grandmother questioned whether respondent would be
able to communicate with school administrators, teachers, and specialists involved in KML’s care.

        The evidence further supports the trial court’s finding that respondent struggled with
maintaining employment and securing suitable housing. It took her 18 months to obtain an
apartment suitable for visits with the children. Throughout the case respondent had multiple jobs
but she rarely was able to maintain employment at any given place for more than a month. When
the bench trial began, respondent was unemployed. While there was some testimony that
respondent had secured a job by the end of the bench trial, she had not verified the employment
with her caseworker.

       The foregoing evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrated that, at the time of
termination, the conditions that led to the adjudication, and other conditions that arose thereafter,
continued to exist. Further, the record clearly established that these conditions were not rectified
and that there was no reasonable likelihood that respondent would be in a position to safely and
appropriately parent her children within a reasonable time. Termination of parental rights under
§ 19b(3)(c)(i) is warranted when “the totality of the evidence amply supports” a finding that the
parent has not achieved “any meaningful change” in the conditions that led to the trial court
assuming jurisdiction of the child. In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 272; 779 NW2d 286 (2009).
Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err when it found clear and convincing evidence to
terminate respondent’s parental rights under § 19b(3)(c)(i) and (c)(ii).

        Considering the same evidentiary record, the court also did not clearly err when it also
found clear and convincing evidence to terminate respondent’s parental rights under §§ 19b(3)(g)
and (j). A parent’s failure to benefit from a service plan is evidence that the parent will not be able
to provide a child proper care and custody such that there is a reasonable likelihood the child will
be harmed if returned to the parent’s home. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 710-711; 846 NW2d
61 (2014).

        The trial court did clearly err when it found that termination was warranted under MCL
712A.19b(3)(i) (parental rights to 1 or more siblings of the child have been terminated due to
serious and chronic neglect or physical or sexual abuse…). Although DHHS presented evidence
that respondent’s parental rights to another child were previously terminated, there was no
evidence that respondent’s rights were terminated due to serious and chronic neglect, physical

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abuse, or sexual abuse. Thus, the trial court clearly erred by finding that termination was
established by clear and convincing evidence under MCL 712A.19b(3)(i). However, this was
harmless error because only one statutory ground must be established to terminate parental rights.
See Ellis, 294 Mich App at 32.

                                  B. REASONABLE EFFORTS

        Respondent also argues that the trial court erred by terminating her parental rights because
DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite her with the child. Respondent argues that
DHHS did not refer her to additional, specialized parenting classes after the trial court ordered
such services. We review a trial court’s finding that “reasonable efforts were made to preserve
and reunify the family” for clear error. In re Fried, 266 Mich App 535, 542-543; 702 NW2d 192
(2005).

        Generally, before a court may contemplate termination of a parent’s parental rights, DHHS
must make reasonable efforts to reunite the family. MCL 712A.19a(2). The purpose of the
treatment plan is to facilitate the return of the child to the parent or to facilitate the child’s
permanent placement. In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 156; 782 NW2d 747 (2010). DHHS’s statutory
duties to update a parent’s treatment plan and provide the parent with necessary and relevant
reunification services continue throughout the case. Id. The adequacy of DHHS’s efforts to
provide services “may bear on whether there is sufficient evidence to terminate a parent’s rights.”
In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 89; 763 NW2d 587 (2009).

         Respondent bases her claim on caseworker Meredith Hooker’s testimony on the final day
of trial in which Hooker indicated that she never re-referred respondent for an additional parenting
class despite the trial court ordering it. However, Hooker had only been the assigned caseworker
since August 2021, and the record shows that Hooker’s predecessor re-referred respondent for an
additional parenting class on May 6, 2021. The record further indicates that respondent completed
this class as of November 17, 2021. The previous caseworker also referred respondent to a parent-
partner program but, unfortunately, the demand was so great that respondent was put on the waiting
list. On the whole, DHHS assisted respondent in her job searches, helped her obtain housing,
referred her for two psychological evaluations, offered two parenting classes, coordinated
parenting time visits, and referred respondent for individual counseling and family therapy.
Considering the totality of DHHS’s efforts, it is clear that DHHS made reasonable efforts at
reunification.

                                       C. BEST INTERESTS

       Respondent also challenges the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights
was in KRW’s best interests. We find no error in this regard.

        If a court finds that there are statutory grounds for termination, the court may only terminate
parental rights if it finds that termination is in the child’s best interests. MCL 712A.19b (5). When
considering whether termination is in a child’s best interests, a court may consider a variety of
factors. White, 303 Mich App at 713. These factors include the bond between the child and the
parent, the parent’s ability to parent the child, the child’s need for permanency and stability, the
advantages of a foster home over the parent’s home, the parent’s compliance with the case service

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plan, the parent’s visitation history with the child, the child’s well-being, and the possibility of
adoption. Id. at 713-714.

        “The trial court should weigh all the evidence available to determine the children’s best
interests.” Id. at 713. The court’s focus must be on the child and not the parent. In re Moss, 301
Mich App 76, 87; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). Whether termination of parental rights is in a child’s
best interests must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 90. This Court reviews
for clear error a trial court’s finding that termination of parental rights is in a child’s best interests.
In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 129; 777 NW2d 728 (2009).

         KRW was nine months old when she was removed from respondent’s care. Two months
later, she was placed in a licensed foster home. KRW was doing well in the foster home and all
her needs were being met. Further, according to the foster mother, a bond existed between KRW
and her foster family, which included two foster siblings. The family was eager and willing to
adopt KRW if the court terminated respondent’s parental rights.

         A preponderance of the evidence suggested that KRW would be at risk of harm in
respondent’s care. Respondent was unwilling or unable to make meaningful changes to establish
the stability necessary to properly parent KRW and provide her with a safe home environment.
When considering a child’s best interests, the court may consider the advantages of a foster home
over the parent’s home. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 42; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). In this
case, a preponderance of the evidence supports a finding that the foster family’s home was
preferable to respondent’s home because it would provide KRW with the care she required to
facilitate her continued growth and development.

        The trial court also considered KRW’s need for security and stability. KRW had been a
ward of the court for more than three years. The instability caused by respondent’s failure to make
meaningful changes in her life was taking its toll on KRW. The child started to hide when it was
time to leave for visits with respondent and she was exhibiting behavioral issues after the visits.
The termination of respondent’s parental rights would give KRW an opportunity to benefit from
the stability and permanence her foster family was willing to provide.

         Respondent argues that termination of her parental rights was not in KRW’s best interests
because a strong parent-child bond existed. There was evidence that KRW recognized respondent
as her mother and would show her affection at parenting time. However, the testimony established
that the bond between respondent and KRW was significantly strained. Both the foster mother
and the case aide testified that in the couple of months before the trial, KRW started to object to
going to parenting time. Indeed, the case aide who transported KRW and then supervised the visits
testified that she essentially bribed KRW with a treat to encourage her cooperation with attending
visits. Further, on multiple occasions, KRW would ask to return to the foster home before the
visits were scheduled to end. On the basis of this testimony, the nature of the bond between
respondent and KRW was weakened over the significant length of time it took for respondent to
become compliant with her service plan. Accordingly, the existence of a bond was not a strong
factor that weighed in favor of preserving respondent’s parental rights.

       It is apparent from the record that the trial court properly weighed appropriate factors when
considering KRW’s best interests. The trial court recognized that respondent’s parenting ability

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continued to be adversely affected by her mental health and that KRW needed stability in her life.
A preponderance of the evidence weighed in favor of terminating respondent’s parental rights.
Accordingly, the trial court did not clearly err.

       Affirmed.

                                                            /s/ Michael F. Gadola
                                                            /s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
                                                            /s/ Kirsten Frank Kelly

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