Court Opinion

ID: 9926013
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-23 18:01:37.786227+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:58.542515
License: Public Domain

FOR PUBLICATION

   UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
        FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PAUL SNITKO; JENNIFER                     No. 22-56050
SNITKO; JOSEPH RUIZ; TYLER
GOTHIER; JENI VERDON-                       D.C. No.
PEARSONS; MICHAEL STORC;                 2:21-cv-04405-
TRAVIS MAY,                                RGK-MAR

              Plaintiffs-Appellants,
                                            OPINION
 v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; E.
MARTIN ESTRADA, in his official
capacity as Acting United States
Attorney for the Central District of
California; DONALD ALWAY, in his
official capacity as an Assistant
Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation,

              Defendants-Appellees.

       Appeal from the United States District Court
          for the Central District of California
       R. Gary Klausner, District Judge, Presiding

        Argued and Submitted December 7, 2023
                 Pasadena, California
2                         SNITKO V. USA

                     Filed January 23, 2024

    Before: CARLOS T. BEA, MILAN D. SMITH, JR., and
          LAWRENCE VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

          Opinion by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.;
         Concurrence by Judge Milan D. Smith, Jr.;
          Partial Concurrence by Judge VanDyke

                          SUMMARY *

          Fourth Amendment/Inventory Searches

    The panel reversed the district court’s judgment holding
that plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment rights were not violated
when the FBI “inventoried” 700 safe deposit boxes at US
Private Vaults (USPV), and remanded for the FBI to
sequester or destroy the records of its inventory search
pertaining to the class members.
    USPV operated a business which rented safe deposit
boxes to customers. The government obtained a warrant to
search and seize USPV’s facilities, including its safe deposit
boxes, as part of its investigation of USPV for various
criminal activities. The warrant explicitly did not authorize
a criminal search or seizure of box contents, and required
agents to follow their written policies to inventory items and

*
 This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
                         SNITKO V. USA                        3

contact box owners so that they could claim their property
after the search.
    Following the seizure of their property, plaintiffs filed
suit alleging claims for return of property pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b) and violations of their
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights. Although plaintiffs’
property was returned, they continued to seek equitable
relief requiring the government to return or destroy records
of the inventory search. The district court denied plaintiffs’
requested relief, finding that the government’s “inventory”
of the safe deposit contents was a constitutionally proper
inventory search.
    In Part I of its analysis, the panel held that the inventory
search doctrine, an exception to the warrant requirement that
allows authorities to search items within their lawful
custody, did not apply. One of the most important features
of the doctrine is the existence of standardized instructions,
which limit the discretion of officers and apply consistently
across cases. Here, in support of its warrant application, the
government, in addition to submitting standardized
instructions, also submitted Supplemental Instructions that
were designed specifically for the USPV raid. The panel
held that the Supplemental Instructions took this case out of
the realm of a standardized “inventory” procedure.
    In Part II of its analysis, the panel held that the
government exceeded the scope of the warrant, which did
not authorize a criminal search or seizure of the contents of
the safe deposit boxes.
    Concurring, Judge M. Smith wrote separately to address
plaintiffs’ additional argument that the origins and rationale
of the inventory search doctrine makes it inapplicable to safe
deposit boxes in a locked vault. Judge M. Smith would hold
4                      SNITKO V. USA

that given the greater privacy interests and the implications
of the rights of third parties, the inventory search doctrine
does not extend to searches of the box contents in a locked
vault.
    Concurring in part, Judge VanDyke joined the majority’s
opinion except as to Part II of its analysis, which he viewed
as unnecessary given the panel’s resolution of Part I.

                        COUNSEL

Robert E. Johnson (argued), Institute for Justice, Shaker
Heights, Ohio; Robert P. Frommer, Joseph Gay, and Michael
Greenberg, Institute for Justice, Arlington, Virginia; Nilay
U. Vora and Jeffrey A. Atteberry, The Vora Law Firm PC,
Santa Monica, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.
Victor A. Rodgers (argued), Assistant United States
Attorney, Asset Forfeiture and Recovery Section; Maxwell
K. Coll and Bram M. Alden, Assistant United States
Attorneys; Mack E. Jenkins, Assistant United States
Attorney, Criminal Division Chief; Martin E. Estrada,
United States Attorney; Office of the United States Attorney,
Los Angeles, California; for Defendants-Appellees.
Mark A. Perry, Weil Gotshal & Manges LLP, Washington,
D.C., for Amicus Curiae Cato Institute.
                         SNITKO V. USA                          5

                          OPINION

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, with whom BEA and
VANDYKE, Circuit Judges, join as to Part I of the Analysis
and with whom BEA, Circuit Judge, joins as to Part II of the
Analysis:

    This case arises out of the government’s “inventory” of
700 safe deposit boxes at US Private Vaults (USPV), a
company the government was investigating for various
criminal activities, including money laundering. The
government obtained a warrant to search and seize USPV’s
facilities and instrumentalities of its crime, including its
“nests” of safe deposit boxes. The warrant issued by the
magistrate judge explicitly “d[id] not authorize a criminal
search or seizure of box contents,” and required agents to
follow their “written policies” to inventory items and contact
box owners so that they could claim their property after the
search.
    After the search at USPV, non-criminal Plaintiffs Paul
and Jennifer Snitko, Joseph Ruiz, Tyler Gothier, Jeni-
Verdon Pearsons, Michael Storc, and Travis May
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) made claims to the FBI seeking
return of their property. The government refused to return
their property, informing Plaintiffs that it sought to civilly
forfeit their property instead. Plaintiffs filed suit, and, during
the course of litigation, the government eventually returned
all of Plaintiffs’ property. However, Plaintiffs continued to
press for equitable relief in the form of destruction of
records, a remedy we approved in United States v.
Comprehensive Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162, 1172 (9th
Cir. 2010) (CDT), overruled in part on other grounds as
6                      SNITKO V. USA

recognized by Demaree v. Pederson, 887 F.3d 870, 876 (9th
Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
    After a trial on the briefs, the district court granted
judgment in favor of the government, holding that Plaintiffs’
Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because the
government’s “inventory” was not pretextual pursuant to our
case law regarding the inventory search exception to the
warrant requirement. Plaintiffs timely appealed. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    I.    USPV
    USPV operated a business in Beverly Hills, California,
which rented safe deposit boxes to customers. See Snitko v.
United States, 2022 WL 20016427, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29,
2022). Unlike banks, which also rent safe deposit boxes,
USPV did not require customers to provide personal
information, social security numbers, driver’s licenses, or
any other form of identification in order to rent a box. Id.
Customers kept all keys to the boxes. Id. USPV’s facility
featured significant security measures, including iris-scan
vault access, 24/7 electronic monitoring, 24/7 armed
response, and a time lock on the vault itself. Id.
    Protection of customers’ anonymity was USPV’s main
selling point. On its website, the company explained: “Our
business is one of very few where we don’t even want to
know your name. For your privacy and the security of your
assets in our vault, the less we know the better.” Id. The
website even went so far as to say that it “would only
cooperate with the government under court order.”
   Perhaps unsurprisingly, investigations by various
government agencies of individual criminals resulted in the
                            SNITKO V. USA                              7

execution of search warrants at USPV. Id. For example,
past searches pursuant to a warrant of individual safe deposit
boxes at USPV have uncovered proceeds of crimes such as
drug trafficking, illegal gambling, and prostitution rings. Id.
    II.   The Government Investigation into USPV
    After years of investigating individual USPV
boxholders, agencies like the FBI, DEA, and USPIS
concluded that the individual investigations “weren’t doing
anything effective” because the “real problem” was USPV,
which they believed served as a “money laundering
facilitator.” Id. at *2. Accordingly, the agencies opened an
investigation into USPV’s business and its principals in
April 2019. Id. at *2.
     The investigation confirmed that the owners of USPV
knew of its use by criminals to launder money, solicited
illicit business, and committed several crimes themselves,
not limited to money laundering. Id. at *2. The agencies
thus began discussions about obtaining indictments and
warrants against the company. Internally, the agencies
discussed taking “[USPV’s] business out,” which they
believed involved seizing “eye scanners, the money
counter,” and “the nest[s] of safe deposit boxes.” Id. at *2.
    In the summer of 2020, discussions among and within
the agencies began regarding the civil forfeiture 1 of assets

1
   “Civil forfeiture is an in rem proceeding” against the object the
government seeks to forfeit. United States v. Liquidators of Eur. Fed.
Credit Bank, 630 F.3d 1139, 1149 (9th Cir. 2011). “Criminal forfeiture
is an in personam proceeding against the defendant personally and is part
of the defendant’s punishment.” Id. “To achieve criminal forfeiture, the
government first must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
defendant is guilty of the crime. The government then must prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, a nexus between the property and the
8                          SNITKO V. USA

they expected to find within the safe deposit boxes. Id. at
*3. Special Agent in Charge (SAC) Matt Moon contacted
Agent Jessie Murray about the USPV investigation and
“asked whether the FBI LA field office had the capacity to
handle civil forfeiture regarding [USPV].” Id. at *3. Murray
responded that the office could handle a large-scale seizure,
but she could not offer an opinion on whether there was
probable cause to forfeit the assets until she reviewed the
finalized warrant affidavit. Id. at *3. Upon reviewing the
affidavit in February 2021 (prior to its submission to the
magistrate judge), Murray determined that there was
probable cause to seize the contents of the safe deposit
boxes. Id. at *3.
III.    Indictment and Warrant Application
    On March 9, 2021, a grand jury returned an indictment
against USPV. Id. at *3. The indictment charged USPV
with conspiracy to money launder, distribute controlled
substances, and structure financial transactions. Id. at *3.
The indictment also included forfeiture allegations, which
reflected a finding of “probable cause to believe” that certain
items to be seized were “subject to forfeiture” such as “[t]he
nests of safety [sic] deposit boxes and keys.” The two
forfeiture counts stated that “the United States will seek
forfeiture” of USPV’s property “in the event of defendant
USPV’s conviction under [the counts] of th[e] Indictment.”
   About a week and a half later, on March 17, 2021, the
Government submitted applications to Magistrate Judge
Steve Kim for search and seizure warrants, both of which

crime.” Id. To achieve civil forfeiture, however, the government must
only “prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, the culpability of the
owner and a nexus between the property and the illegal activity.” Id.
                         SNITKO V. USA                        9

included a common affidavit by Special Agent Lynne
Zellhart, the agent in charge of the FBI’s investigation. Id.
at *3. The affidavit largely discussed how USPV’s business
operated, including how its owners knew its boxes were
rented to facilitate money laundering. Id. at *3. According
to an exchange between a confidential informant and an
owner of USPV, the owner stated, “Listen, you don’t want
every drug dealer in your place either. You need normal
people too.” The affidavit explained that this statement
“suggests that drug dealers comprise the majority of USPV
customers, and the business has to make an effort to attract
a non-criminal clientele as well, so as not to be too obvious
a haven for criminals.”
    The affidavit also noted that the Government sought to
seize the box nests as “evidence and instrumentalities of
USPV’s criminality.” Id. at *3. It explained that “[t]he
search and seizure warrants the government seeks . . .
authorize the seizure of the nests of the [safe deposit] boxes
themselves, not their contents.” Id. at *3. But immediately
after that sentence, the affidavit read, “[b]y seizing the nests
of safety [sic] deposit boxes, the government will necessarily
end up with custody of what is inside those boxes initially.”
Id. at *3. “[T]o protect their agencies from claims of theft or
damage to the contents of the boxes,” the affidavit stated that
“[a]gents will follow their written inventory policies.” Id. at
*3. The affidavit also stated that:

       Agents will attempt to notify the lawful
       owners of the property stored in the boxes
       how to claim their property, such as by
       posting that information on the internet or at
       USPV itself, or by contacting the owners
       directly. In order to notify the owners
10                      SNITKO V. USA

       directly, agents will, in accordance with their
       policies regarding an unknown person’s
       property, look for contact information or
       something which identifies the owner.
       (USPV recommends that box renters include
       their or their designees’ telephone numbers
       on a note in the box in the event that USPV
       removes the contents for nonpayment of
       rental fees.)

    A footnote in the affidavit explained that “[t]he FBI
policy regarding taking custody of an unknown person’s
property provides, in part, that agents “inspect the property
as necessary to identify the owner and preserve the property
for safekeeping,” and that the “inspection should extend no
further than necessary to determine ownership.”
    Ultimately, the warrant issued by Judge Kim approved
the following “items to seized,” at USPV: “the business
computers; [t]he money counters; . . . [t]he digital and video
surveillance and security equipment; and [t]he biometric
scanners,” and the “nests of safety [sic] deposit boxes and
keys.” Id. at *3. With respect to this last item, the warrant
stated:

       This warrant does not authorize a criminal
       search or seizure of the contents of the safety
       [sic] deposit boxes. In seizing the nests of
       safety [sic] deposit boxes, agents shall follow
       their written inventory policies to protect
       their agencies and the contents of the boxes.
       Also in accordance with their written
       policies, agents shall inspect the contents of
       the boxes in an effort to identify their owners
                             SNITKO V. USA                              11

         in order to notify them so that they can claim
         their property[.]

Although the warrant provided that agents must “follow their
written inventory policies,” the details of those written
policies were not included in the government’s application
for a warrant, except for the one sentence above regarding
the “unknown persons policy.” Id. at *3.
    i. Written Inventory Policy
    The FBI’s inventory policy is contained in its Domestic
Investigations and Operations Guide (“DIOG”), which
Zellhart described as a “dictionary or a thesaurus” for FBI
agents. The DIOG instructs the agents that, “after lawfully
taking custody of property,” they must “conduct a prompt
and thorough search of the contents of the property,
including searching any locked or unlocked containers and
inventorying their contents.” Id. at *4. Agents must then
record the results of the inventory on certain specified forms,
and the summary “must include, but is not limited to, a
description of the property and the items secured for
safekeeping.” Id. at *4. 2
    The DIOG provision further instructs that agents may not
conduct inventories “solely for investigative purposes,” and
that “[w]henever there is probable cause to believe an
inventory search would also yield items of evidence or

2
   Under “Inventory Searches Generally,” the DIOG provides: “The
purpose of an inventory search is to 1) protect the owner’s property while
it is in FBI custody; 2) protect the FBI against claims of lost or stolen
property; or 3) protect FBI personnel from potential danger. As a
threshold matter, in order for an inventory search to be valid, agents must
first have lawful custody of the property. The justification for an
inventory search is the production of an inventory of the property.”
12                     SNITKO V. USA

contraband, agents must obtain a search warrant when
feasible.”
     ii. Policy Regarding Custody of an Unknown
         Person’s Property
    The warrant also referred to an FBI policy on the
procedure to follow should agents come into possession of
an “unknown person’s” property. Id. at *4. That policy
states that agents should “inspect the property as necessary
to identify the owner and preserve the property for
safekeeping,” and that such an inspection should “extend no
further than necessary to determine ownership.” Id. at *4.
    The district court below found that [t]he “unknown
persons” policy is “separate from the FBI’s inventory
policy.” Id. at *4. However, the only written reference to
language matching this “unknown persons” policy in the
record is on the same page of the DIOG above, which
discusses inventory searches. The language is contained in
a provision titled “Administrative Inventory Searches of
Lost or Misplaced Items.” As with the inventory policy,
these instructions state that “if, within the scope of the
examination necessary to determine ownership, agents
discover incriminating evidence or contraband, agents
should seek a warrant to continue the search, absent
emergency circumstances.”
IV.     Preparation and Execution of the Warrant
     i. Preparation
    The agencies prepared two relevant documents prior to
applying for the warrant in preparation for the search at
USPV. One is the “Operation Order Search Plan” document.
That document states that “agents will seize and inventory
the facilities of the business, including the nest of safe
                            SNITKO V. USA                              13

deposit boxes, according to the federal seizure warrant”
(which had not yet issued). The portion of the plan titled
“Execution” explains that “Teams 1-4” would search the
residences of the owners of USPV; “Team 5 will execute a
search warrant at USPV” and “will seize evidence itemized
in the warrant regarding underlying crimes (money
laundering, fraud, drug trafficking, etc.)” Team 6 will
“process and inventory the facilities of USPV, including the
nest of boxes.” The document then refers the reader to the
second relevant document, “Supplemental Instructions on
Box Inventory.” 3
    The Supplemental Instructions begin by explaining that
pursuant to the warrant (not yet) issued by Magistrate Judge
Kim, “agents are authorized to seize the facilities of [USPV]
and conduct an inventory of the contents therein.” Agents
were to “search and inventory all boxes according to FBI
policies and procedures.” All “inventoried contents [are to]
be processed as described in [the] memo.”
    The first part of the memo, titled “General Procedure,”
provides instructions on how agents should conduct their
inventory and log the contents of boxes. According to the
memo, two teams of three agents were to “methodically open
and inventory each box.” This involved removing the box,
labeling it, and “taking care to preserve possible fingerprint
evidence.” Teams would then “identify the contents of each

3
 In drafting the Supplemental Instructions, Zellhart, as the government’s
30(b)(6) witness, testified that she did not “have the DIOG in [her] hand”
but “understood the policy and [] wrote the supplemental instructions for
the team to follow based on” it. In other words, while the DIOG was a
sort of “general policy,” Zellhart confirmed that the Supplemental
Instructions were “sort of the operative policy, the policy that was in
place on the ground.”
14                      SNITKO V. USA

box, creating an inventory list,” and filling out various
forms.
    The memo states that “[e]ach inventory [would] likely
include the following”: the USPV box door with its lock, a
form with emergency contact information, the physical
deposit box, and the box’s contents. Although the memo
instructs agents to “identify” the box’s contents, it does not
provide further instructions on how to do so.
    Separately, teams were to “note if the box includes a
USPV notification form identifying a contact person for the
box.” The memo provides that agents “[could not] search
the content of boxes for evidence, but [could] examine the
contents to identify the box owner.” Inventories of each box
would be video recorded, and a copy of any paperwork
would go to the Asset Forfeiture team.
    The next part of the memo provides more specific
instructions on how to secure and handle “evidence.” For
example, any amount of cash over $5,000 was to be placed
in an “evidence bag” and given a “forfeiture identification
number.” Any cash would then be taken to a canine unit
which was on the scene. Agents were to take notes on the
“condition of cash,” including how “the cash is bundled
(rubber bands, bank bands); if it has a strong odor
(marijuana, soil, gasoline, coffee, chemical, etc.); if there
appears to be a drug residue present; if a gun is also present;
or anything else of note.”
     To facilitate the inventory, the FBI also created a form
specifically for use at USPV. The form includes a space for
“Cash Observations” and, like the Supplemental
Instructions, tells agents to record “how the cash is bundled,”
“if it has a strong odor,” and if “drug residue” or “a gun” is
found with cash. It also includes space to record the results
                        SNITKO V. USA                      15

of a drug dog sniff. And it prompts agents to record, as part
of the inventory, “serial numbers on firearms or watches.”
      ii. Execution
     The Government executed the search and seizure
warrants on-site at USPV from March 22 to March 26, 2021.
During that time, the FBI inventoried the contents of over
700 safe deposit boxes. In performing the “inventory,”
agents found letters taped to the inside sleeve of the deposit
box, identifying the owner of the box and providing the
owner’s contact information. The district court found,
however, that “occasionally” “[e]ven after finding these
letters, agents would break open the interior of the box and
inventory the box’s contents.”
    Per the Supplemental Instructions, agents used the
inventory form to document the condition of cash; ran all
cash over $5,000 by drug-sniffing dogs; tagged items with
forfeiture numbers; and photographed objects found in the
boxes. All cash was “taken to Loomis,” which generated
receipts, and the money was “wired to the US Marshals
Service.” All non-cash valuables were “transported to
Evidence Control” for storage. All “general evidence [was]
inventoried, processed, labeled and taken to FBI ECC
[redacted] for storage. . . .”
 V.      Results of the Search
    Despite the affidavit’s assertion that “it would be
irrational for non-criminal customers to choose USPV,” it
turned out that a number of non-criminals were customers at
the facility. These include the following Plaintiffs:

         •   Paul and Jennifer Snitko, who used their USPV
             box to store legal documents, watches with
16                        SNITKO V. USA

            sentimental value, hard-drive backups, coins, and
            gold jewelry. They used USPV “because [their]
            bank had a waiting list for a safe deposit box,
            [they] live in a wildfire prone area . . . and [they]
            require a place to store [their] wedding bands
            when engaging in sports activities . . . .”
        •   Tyler Gothier, who stored “silver and other
            personal property” in his box and used USPV due
            to its convenient location.
        •   Joseph Ruiz, who stored $57,000 in cash in his
            box and used USPV because he was concerned
            that “the COVID pandemic would make it
            impossible for [him] to withdraw [his] funds
            from a bank account.”
        •   Michael Storc and Jeni-Verdon Pearsons, who
            stored “approximately $2,000 in cash, as well as
            approximately $20,000 worth of silver,” along
            with “personal documents” in their box. They
            used USPV because they needed a safe place to
            keep the silver.
        •   Travis May, who stored $63,000 in cash,
            $100,000 in gold, and various documents in
            sealed envelopes in his box, and used USPV as
            an “alternative location to access valuables in
            case of emergencies.”

Snitko, 2022 WL 20016427, at *2. After the raid on USPV,
Plaintiffs filed claims with the FBI seeking return of their
seized property. 4 The government did not return the

4
 See Order re: Plaintiff’s Ex Parte Application for a TRO at 2, Paul
Snitko v. United States of America et. al., 2:21-cv-4405, Dkt. No. 52
                             SNITKO V. USA                           17

property in response to these claims; instead, it indicated that
it was seeking to forfeit the property. Order re: Request for
Preliminary Injunction at 2, Paul Snitko v. United States of
America et. al., 2:21-cv-4405, Dkt. No. 58 (Jul. 16, 2021)
(Dist. Dkt. No. 58). On May 20, 2021, the Government
initiated administrative forfeiture 5 proceedings against any
box contents that met a minimum monetary threshold of
$5,000, by issuing a “Notice of Seizure of Property and

(Jun. 22, 2021) (Dist. Dkt. No. 52); Order re: Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction at 2, Paul Snitko v. United States of America et.
al., 2:21-cv-4405, Dkt. No. 60 (Jul. 23, 2021) (Dist. Dkt. No. 60)
(explaining that Ruiz had filed a claim with the FBI on April 8, 2021).
5
  “As the term implies, in nonjudicial (administrative) forfeiture
proceedings, the government may obtain title to forfeited property
without any involvement by the courts.” Omidi v. United States, 851
F.3d 859, 861 (9th Cir. 2017). The process works as follows:
         To start the administrative forfeiture process, the
         government must provide notice to interested parties
         after seizing the targeted property.          19 U.S.C.
         § 1607(a). If no one comes forward to claim an
         interest in the property within the deadline specified in
         the notice, the government may declare the property
         forfeited, at which point title passes to the United
         States. 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(2)(B); 19 U.S.C. § 1609.
         If a claimant does come forward to claim an interest in
         the property, the administrative forfeiture process
         ceases and within 90 days the government must
         initiate a judicial forfeiture proceeding—a formal
         court action which, if successful, results in a court
         order declaring the property forfeited. 18 U.S.C.
         § 983(a)(3). The government may initiate judicial
         forfeiture proceedings in one of two ways: by filing a
         civil forfeiture complaint in the district court, or by
         obtaining a criminal indictment alleging that the
         property is subject to forfeiture.
Id. at 861–62.
18                             SNITKO V. USA

Initiation of Admin. Forfeiture Proceedings” to USPV. 6 The
Notice attached an “Asset List” of items seized from the
USPV safe deposit boxes, and listed the deadline to contest
forfeiture slightly over a month from the date the notice was
issued, on June 24, 2021.
VI.        Litigation
    On June 9, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their First Amended
Complaint against the government, alleging, inter alia,
claims for return of property pursuant to Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 41(g) and “violations of Plaintiffs’
rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments.”
    A few plaintiffs also filed an Application for a
Temporary Restraining Order asking the district court to
enjoin the government from continuing with the forfeiture
proceedings. The district court granted the application
because the forfeiture notice “put bluntly, provide[d] no
factual basis for the seizure of Plaintiffs’ property” as needed
to comply with due process requirements under Gete v.
I.N.S., 121 F.3d 1285, 1297 (9th Cir. 1997).
    During the litigation, nearly all Plaintiffs and class
members ultimately had their physical property returned.
The Government then moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’
complaint, arguing that their action had become moot.
Plaintiffs argued that their action was not moot because the
government still retained records of its search, including the
agents’ notes and photos of box contents, and they sought an
injunction ordering the government to “sequester and return”
“or otherwise destroy” the records generated during the
inventory of the USPV deposit boxes.

6
    The government sent notices to some, but not all, Plaintiffs.
                             SNITKO V. USA                               19

    The district court dismissed most of Plaintiffs’ counts
involving physical return of seized property as moot.
However, the district court held that Plaintiffs’ claim for
“Return of Property Pursuant to [Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure] 41(g)” (Count VII) was not moot, citing our case
law interpreting that rule, which allows, under certain
circumstances, “an order requiring the government to return
or destroy all copies of records that it has seized.” 7 To
understand this remedy, we must briefly discuss Rule 41(g)
and our primary case interpreting it, CDT, 621 F.3d at 1172.
VII.     Rule 41(g) and CDT
    Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) provides: “[a]
person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure of
property or by the deprivation of property may move for the
property’s return.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g). In CDT, we
explained that, “[t]hough styled as a motion under a Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure, when [a Rule 41(g)] motion is
made by a party against whom no criminal charges have
been brought, such a motion is in fact a petition that the
district court invoke its civil equitable jurisdiction.” 621
F.3d at 1172.
   Citing the advisory notes to the rule, the CDT panel
explained that “[i]n some circumstances, [] equitable
considerations might justify an order requiring the
government to return or destroy all copies of records that it
has seized.” Id. at 1174 (quoting Fed. R. Crim. P. 41
advisory committee notes (1989 amendments)). The CDT
court did not list the “circumstances” in which such an order

7
 The district court also held that Plaintiffs’ Count I, “violation of Fourth
Amendment rights,” was not moot, but construed that claim as part and
parcel of their 41(g) claim.
20                            SNITKO V. USA

is warranted, but instead provided that “[w]hat
circumstances merit this remedy is left to the discretion of
the district court in the first instance.” Id. It went on to
affirm the district court on two bases: (1) “equitable
considerations” required sequestration and the return of
copies of evidence because the risk of harm to the plaintiffs
associated with disclosure of the evidence was great, and (2)
when “the government comes into possession of evidence by
circumventing or willfully disregarding limitations in a
search warrant, it must not be allowed to benefit from its own
wrongdoing by retaining the wrongfully obtained evidence
or any fruits thereof.” Id.
    In reaching its conclusion, the CDT panel referenced the
fourth factor of the Ramsden balancing test 8 typically
applied to Rule 41(g) motions in criminal proceedings—
whether “the government showed a callous disregard for the
[Fourth Amendment] rights of third parties”—and explained
that “[w]hen the district court determines that the
government has obtained the evidence through intentional
wrongdoing—rather than through a technical or good faith
mistake—it should order return of the property without the
need for balancing that is applicable in the more ordinary
case.” Id.
    In a separate concurrence, five judges explained that the
government had also violated its “duty of candor in
presenting a warrant application,” because it had created a
“false impression” that if the magistrate judge did not issue
the warrant soon, the evidence would be destroyed. Id. at

8
 The other three factors of the Ramsden test require the district court to
consider whether the claimant is (1) plainly aggrieved by the deprivation,
(2) is likely to suffer irreparable injury if the property is not returned, and
(3) there is no adequate remedy at law. CDT, 621 F.3d at 1173.
                         SNITKO V. USA                         21

1178 (Kozinski, C.J., concurring). The concurrence stated
that “[a] lack of candor in this or any other aspect of the
warrant application must bear heavily against the
government in the calculus of any subsequent motion to
return or suppress the seized data.” Id.
VIII. The District Court’s Order
    Having resolved the motion to dismiss, the district court
certified a class of plaintiffs, defined as “[a]ll renters of U.S.
Private Vaults safe deposit boxes who (a) had property
within their safe-deposit box seized by the federal
government on or around March 22, 2021; (b) have
identified themselves to the FBI since the seizure; and (3)
have had their property returned to them.” After all briefing
was filed, the district court notified the parties that the matter
was submitted on the papers for a “trial on the briefs.”
    On September 29, 2022, the district court issued its order
granting judgment in favor of the government. Plaintiffs had
argued, among other things, that the Government “callously
disregarded” their Fourth Amendment rights because “(1)
the Government’s search and seizure exceeded the
limitations set out in the USPV warrant; and (2) that the
Government breached its duty of candor by misleading
Judge Kim in its warrant application.”
    The district court rejected both arguments. First, it
reasoned that “Plaintiffs’ claim that the Government
exceeded the bounds of the warrant hinges on whether the
Government’s actions were a valid inventory” pursuant to
the inventory search exception to the warrant requirement.
Because Plaintiffs failed to show under the rules governing
that exception that the government’s “improper
investigatory motive was the only reason that the
Government opened the safety [sic] deposit boxes,” the
22                      SNITKO V. USA

district court concluded that the Government’s “inventory”
was not pretextual.       Thus, “[h]aving found a valid
inventory,” the district court “necessarily f[ound] that the
Government did not exceed the bounds of the warrant.”
    Second, the district court held that the government did
not breach its duty of candor by misleading the magistrate
judge in its application for a warrant. Plaintiffs argued that
the government omitted from the supporting affidavit that it
intended not only to inventory the box contents at USPV, but
to civilly forfeit them as well. The district court held that
this kind of omission was immaterial, however, and that
“[a]ny reasonable magistrate judge would have inferred that
the inventory could lead to the potential discovery of
criminal proceeds in certain boxes, which would then lead to
forfeiture.” The district court therefore denied Plaintiffs’
requested relief.
               STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review an order denying a motion made pursuant to
Rule 41(g) by “part[ies] against whom no criminal charges
have been brought,” for an abuse of discretion. See CDT,
621 F.3d at 1172. A district court abuses its discretion when
it makes “an error of law,” Strauss v. Comm’r of the Soc.
Sec. Admin., 635 F.3d 1135, 1137 (9th Cir. 2011), or its
decision rests on an unreasonable finding of a material fact.
See Briseño v. Henderson, 998 F.3d 1014, 1022 (9th Cir.
2021). We review pure questions of law de novo. See, e.g.,
United States v. Depew, 210 F.3d 1061, 1066 (9th Cir. 2000).
                            SNITKO V. USA                              23

                             ANALYSIS
    I.   The Supplemental Instructions take this case out
         of the inventory search context.
    As discussed above, the district court reasoned that “to
determine whether the Government’s search exceeded the
bounds of the warrant, [it] must ascertain whether the
Government conducted a constitutionally proper inventory
search.” And, to “ascertain whether the Government
conducted a constitutionally proper inventory search,” the
district court applied our court’s precedents governing the
inventory search exception to the warrant requirement,
which includes the test for assessing when an inventory is
“pretextual,” and therefore invalid.
    As a threshold matter, however, Plaintiffs argue that the
district court should not have assumed that the inventory
search doctrine extends to the context of this case.
Specifically, they argue that the Supplemental
Instructions—which were the “operative instructions” 9 on
the ground—were not the kind of “standardized policy” the
inventory search doctrine contemplates.
   The inventory search doctrine is an exception to the
warrant requirement that allows authorities to search items
within their lawful custody. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428

9
  The district court stated in a footnote that it was “not convinced” that
the Supplemental Instructions were the “operative policy,” insofar as
“the agents were not actually following their standardized inventory
policies” because “the Supplemental Instructions . . . superseded the
DIOG.” It proceeded to explain why it believed that the Supplemental
Instructions were consistent with the DIOG. But it did not dispute that,
insofar as agents were following any directions on the ground, they were
following the Supplemental Instructions (if not also the standardized
instructions).
24                      SNITKO V. USA

U.S. 364, 369 (1976); Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640, 648
(1983); Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1990). One of the
most important features of the doctrine is the existence of
standardized instructions. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S.
367, 375–76 (1987). “Standardized” need not mean
“written.” Rather, our case law indicates that “standardized”
instructions limit the discretion of officers and apply
consistently across cases. See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4 (referring
to “standardized criteria” or “established routine”); see also
Standardized, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, available at
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/standardized
(“brought into conformity with a standard: done or produced
in a standard, consistent way”).
    For example, in United States v. Mancera-Londono, 912
F.2d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1990), defendants sought to suppress
the fruits of an inventory search they asserted followed
policies which were “not sufficiently standardized,” because
they were unwritten. Id. The panel rejected that argument,
noting that regardless of the policy’s form, the oral policy
was identical to those found in the DEA’s manual for
forfeiture, which required return of all rental cars to the
rental agency and an inventory of the same prior to the
return. Id. at 375-76.
    The need for a “standardized” policy is necessarily a
feature of the inventory search doctrine because, if an
inventory is conducted pursuant to a standardized policy, a
court knows that such a search would have been conducted
regardless of the degree of suspicion an officer has of a
person’s (or an automobile’s) criminality. See United States
v. Garay, 938 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2019) (explaining
that a “department’s policies do not define constitutional
rights,” but instead “assist courts to determine whether an
inventory search is legitimate, as opposed to pretextual”). In
                           SNITKO V. USA                           25

other words, a court can be reassured that regardless of
motive, an inventory will reveal what it will reveal, as it
requires an officer to do the same thing every time. See
Bertine, 479 U.S. at 367 (“In the present case, as in
Opperman and Lafayette, there was no showing that the
police, who were following standardized procedures, acted
in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation.”)
(emphasis added); see, e.g., Wells, 495 U.S. at 5 (“Our cases
have required that inventory searches be ‘sufficiently
regulated,’ so as to avoid the possibility that police will
abuse their power to conduct such a search.”) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (internal citation omitted).
    That presumably is a reason why, at least in this circuit,
“dual motives” are permissible in the inventory search
context. That is, in the case of inventory searches, “the mere
presence of a criminal investigatory motive or a dual
motive—one valid, and one impermissible—does not render
an [inventory] search invalid.” United States v. Johnson,
889 F.3d 1120, 1126 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal quotation
marks omitted). If an officer follows a truly “standardized”
policy, it is inevitable that he or she would find evidence of
a crime, regardless of whether he or she intends it. See, e.g.,
Mancera-Londono, 912 F.2d at 375 (holding that inevitable
discovery doctrine permitted officers to seize items, because
they followed a sufficiently “standardized” inventory and
would have found the items pursuant to that inventory).
    However, if an agency is given the discretion to create
customized 10 inventory policies, based on the features of

10
    The antonyms of the word “standardized” are “tailored,”
“individualized.” and “customized.” See Standardized, Merriam-
Webster      Thesaurus,    available     at      https://www.merriam-
webster.com/thesaurus/standardized. Plaintiffs use the word “bespoke.”
26                          SNITKO V. USA

each car it impounds and each person detained, the ensuing
search stops looking like an “inventory” meant to simply
protect property, and looks more like a criminal
investigation of that particular car or person, i.e., more like
a “ruse.” See Wells, 495 U.S. at 4 (“[A]n inventory search
must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to
discover incriminating evidence.”) Unlike the inventory
policies followed in the leading inventory search cases,
which were all “standardized” to the extent they pre-existed
the search of the car or arrestee, and applied consistently
across subjects of “inventories,” 11 the Supplemental
Instructions in this case were designed specifically for the
USPV raid. That is apparent from the title of the
instructions, the testimony of their author, and the
introduction which prefaces the instructions by explaining
that agents were (to be) authorized to “seize the facilities of
the target business (USPV) and conduct an inventory of the
contents therein.”
    The district court, which recognized a difference
between the Supplemental Instructions and the FBI’s
“standardized” ones, seemed to believe that the inventory
search doctrine was nonetheless applicable because the
agents merely followed the Supplemental Instructions “in
addition” to the FBI’s standardized ones. But once the
government begins adding a set of “customized” instructions
to a “standardized” inventory policy—particularly the type
of custom instructions presented by this case—the entire
search stops being conducted pursuant to a “standardized”
policy, regardless of whether the customized instructions

11
  See e.g., Bertine, 479 U.S. at 369 (“The backup officer inventoried the
van in accordance with local police procedures, which require a detailed
inspection and inventory of impounded vehicles.”)
                        SNITKO V. USA                       27

conflict with the standardized ones. Here, the fact that the
Supplemental Instructions were created specifically for the
USPV search takes this case out of the realm of a
standardized “inventory” procedure.
    We note that it is particularly troubling that the
government has failed to provide a limiting principle to how
far a hypothetical “inventory search” conducted pursuant to
customized instructions can go. At oral argument, for
example, the government failed to explain why applying the
inventory exception to this case would not open the door to
the kinds of “writs of assistance” the British authorities used
prior to the Founding to conduct limitless searches of an
individual’s personal belongings. It was those very abuses
of power, after all, that led to adoption of the Fourth
Amendment in the first place.
 II.   The district court abused its discretion in holding
       that the government did not exceed the scope of
       the warrant.
    The district court’s incorrect assumption that the
ordinary rules of the inventory search doctrine applied to this
case also infected its analysis of other Fourth Amendment
issues, such as Plaintiffs’ claim that the government
exceeded the scope of the warrant. Specifically, the district
court concluded that whether the government exceeded the
warrant’s scope “hing[ed]” on whether the search it
conducted fit within the inventory search exception, without
considering how those two inquiries might not be one and
the same.
   They are not the same. Compare Perez Cruz v. Barr, 926
F.3d 1128, 1143 (9th Cir. 2019) (assessing whether search
complied with administrative search exception to the
warrant requirement) with id. at 1145 n.9 (“Even if some
28                           SNITKO V. USA

initial detention during a search for documents could have
been justified under Summers, Perez Cruz’s detention likely
exceeded anything that could be considered proper in scope,
because the ICE agents appear to have departed even from
the warrant itself.”). 12
    As the district court recognized, the inventory search
doctrine as developed in our circuit tolerates “the [] presence
of a criminal investigatory motive” when conducting an
inventory, “or a dual-motive—one valid and one
impermissible.”      The standard for determining the
permissibility of an inventory search is whether the search
would have occurred “but for” the Government’s allegedly
improper investigatory purpose. United States v. Orozco,
858 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2017). By contrast, to
determine whether the government exceeded the scope of a
warrant, we compare the terms of the warrant to the search
actually conducted. See, e.g., United States v. Payton, 573
F.3d 859, 864 (9th Cir. 2009) (concluding that search of
defendant’s computer “exceeded the scope of that warrant”
because it was done “without explicit authorization in the
warrant”); CDT, 621 F.3d at 1166 (holding that government

12
   In a footnote, the district court rejected Plaintiffs’ argument that “the
[inventory doctrine’s] ‘dual motive’ analysis is only applicable to
warrantless searches,” stating “the Ninth Circuit has recently applied the
dual-motive framework to searches conducted pursuant to a warrant.”
See Perez Cruz, 926 F.3d at 1143. But as shown above, the court in
Perez-Cruz drew a distinction between whether the government
exceeded the scope of the warrant in that case and whether its search was
justified under the general principles of the administrative search
doctrine. Moreover, the warrant in Perez-Cruz, unlike the one here,
actually did authorize a criminal search, so the precise question discussed
above—whether the government exceeds the scope of a warrant when
the warrant prohibits a “criminal search or seizure”—was inapplicable
there.
                        SNITKO V. USA                       29

disregarded terms of warrant where it “failed to comply with
the procedures specified in the warrant”); United States v.
Rettig, 589 F.2d 418, 423 (9th Cir. 1978) (“Where evidence
is uncovered during a search pursuant to a warrant, the
threshold question must be whether the search was confined
to the warrant’s terms.”).
    The warrant in this case “d[id] not authorize a criminal
search or seizure of the contents of the safety [sic] deposit
boxes.” The district court never analyzed what this
prohibition in the warrant meant. But it did, by all accounts,
find that the search at USPV constituted a “criminal search
or seizure” of box contents, i.e., “[a]n examination of a
person’s [] property, . . . for the purpose of finding evidence
of a crime.” Search, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed.
2019).
    For example, the district court noted that “[g]iven th[e]
[record] evidence, there can be no question that the
Government expected, or even hoped, to find criminal
evidence during its inventory.” The district court cited
testimony by investigating agents who “candidly admitted”
that they “fully expected there to be criminal customers at
this business,” and they anticipated “that there would be
criminal proceeds in the safe deposit boxes.” It also found
that the Supplemental Instructions drafted by Agent Zellhart
“gave guidance on how to handle items with indicia of
criminality, along with instructing agents on how to properly
inventory the seized property.” And it noted that “[t]he
agents executing the warrant also arranged for drug-sniffing
dogs to be present at USPV, a tactic that would be
unnecessary unless agents expected to discover drugs or
drug-adjacent cash.”
30                      SNITKO V. USA

    A look at the record, and the Supplemental Instructions
in particular, confirms that the search was criminal in nature.
The instructions required agents to not only write a summary
of the items found in the safe deposit boxes, but in a section
discussing preservation of “evidence,” told them to tag items
with forfeiture numbers; send them to “evidence control”;
and take care to preserve “drug evidence” for fingerprints.
Cf. Johnson, 889 F.3d at 1127 (invalidating purported
“inventory search” where arrest report made references to
“seiz[ing] . . . evidence” of a crime and “plac[ing] [items]
into evidence.”); United States v. Grey, 959 F.3d 1166, 1184
(9th Cir. 2020) (noting that the “conduct at issue” in the case
“more closely resembled a criminal raid than an
administrative inspection,” given the “[defendant’s] arrest,
the number of deputies involved and the length of the
‘protective sweep,’” which resulted in “a greater intrusion
on [defendant’s] privacy interests”).
    Moreover, the government has confirmed that the
records of box contents can be used to investigate crimes,
and that they have been stored on a criminal database called
Sentinel and are to be kept there indefinitely. If there
remained any doubt regarding whether the government
conducted a “criminal search or seizure,” that doubt is put to
rest by the fact the government has already used some of the
information from inside the boxes to obtain additional
warrants to further its investigation and begin new ones.
CDT at 621 F.3d at 1169 (noting that, contrary to
government’s representation in affidavit that it would
segregate data, the case agent “himself reviewed the seized
computer data and used what he learned to obtain the
subsequent search warrants” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Because the district court’s own findings show
that the FBI conducted a “criminal search and seizure of box
                        SNITKO V. USA                       31

contents,” it abused its discretion in holding that the
government did not exceed the scope of the warrant’s terms.
See Saucillo v. Peck, 25 F.4th 1118, 1129 (9th Cir. 2022).
    In addition, the district court abused its discretion in
holding that the government did not exceed the bounds of
the warrant in this case because it clearly erred in finding
that the government was incapable of following its own
standardized instructions. Recall that the warrant in this case
required agents to follow their “written policies.”
Incidentally, the FBI’s written policies did indicate what an
agent should do in the event he or she (1) comes across
evidence of criminality during an inventory search or (2)
expects an inventory search to yield contraband.
    Specifically, the inventory policy in the DIOG states:
“[w]henever there is probable cause to believe an inventory
search would also yield items of evidence or contraband,
agents must obtain a search warrant when feasible.”
     As discussed above, the district court found that the
government “fully expected there to be evidence of criminal
proceedings” and that, during the course of the search,
agents did find contraband, which they seized, tagged,
inspected and secured, without obtaining a warrant. That
shows that the FBI exceeded the scope of the warrant—by
failing to “follow their written policies,” above. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ladson, 774 F.2d 436, 438 (11th Cir. 1985)
(“We hold only that absent exigent circumstances, the
government must follow the advice in [its] own Guide to
Forfeiture of Assets: if probable cause exists to enter the
32                      SNITKO V. USA

premises, obtain a warrant.”).           The district court
acknowledged this fact. In a footnote, it stated:

       The FBI’s standardized policy tells agents
       that, “where feasible,” they should obtain a
       warrant for property that may be subject to an
       inventory search. Here, the anonymous
       nature of the boxes prevented the
       Government from determining who owned a
       specific box or what was inside, and thus
       prevented them from describing with
       particularity “both the place to be searched
       and the . . . things to be seized.” United States
       v. Spilotro, 800 F.2d 959, 963 (9th Cir. 1986).

The district court’s finding that “the anonymous nature of
the boxes prevented the government from determining who
owned a specific box or what was inside” was clearly
erroneous.
    First, unlike all other portions of the order which involve
factual findings, this statement lacks any citation to the
record. See Oregon Nat. Res. Council v. Marsh, 52 F.3d
1485, 1492 (9th Cir. 1995), as amended on denial of reh’g
(June 29, 1995) (district court abuses its discretion when
“record contains no evidence on which [it] rationally could
have based that decision”). Its conclusory nature is
concerning, especially in light of the fact that “the
anonymous nature of the boxes” apparently did not prevent
the government from (1) obtaining and executing search and
seizure warrants of safe deposit boxes in the past, (2)
contacting owners of boxes when it issued its administrative
forfeiture notices, and (3) applying for, and receiving,
additional search and seizure warrants based off of the
                        SNITKO V. USA                       33

contents of the items found in the safe deposit boxes after the
entire USPV raid was complete.
    Moreover, the statement is inconsistent with the
government’s representation in its affidavit that it would
“notify [box] owners directly [by] look[ing] for contact
information or something which identifies the owner.
(USPV recommends that box renters include their or their
designees’ telephone numbers on a note in the box in the
event that USPV removes the contents for nonpayment of
rental fees.)” The conclusion that the government would not
be able to obtain warrants for individual boxes appears to
merely be an adoption of a representation made by the
government in its response brief below, which itself did not
cite to anything in the record.
    Because the district court’s conclusion that the
government was excused from following its standardized
policy rested on its clearly erroneous finding that the
government simply could not apply for warrants as to
individual box holders, it abused its discretion in concluding
that the government did not exceed the scope of the warrant
for this reason as well. See Briseño, 998 F.3d at 1022 (“A
district court abuses its discretion when it . . . bases its
decision on unreasonable findings of fact.” (cleaned up)).
                      CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we REVERSE the district
court’s order which held that Plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment
rights were not violated. In light of the government’s
expressed willingness in its “Motion to Vacate and Remand
with Instructions to Grant Plaintiffs’ Requested Relief,” to
have the district court order the “FBI to sequester or destroy
the records of its inventory search pertaining to class
members” (ECF No. 48), we REMAND for the district court
34                           SNITKO V. USA

to order the FBI to so dispose of the records, including copies
of the records kept on the Sentinel database. See CDT, 621
F.3d at 1162. As such, the government’s motion is DENIED
AS MOOT.
     REVERSED AND REMANDED.

M. SMITH, Circuit Judge, concurring:
    I write separately to address Plaintiff’s additional
argument that the origins and rationale of the inventory
search doctrine makes it inapplicable to this context, i.e.,
safe deposit boxes in a locked vault. 1
    The inventory search doctrine is an exception to the
warrant requirement. The Supreme Court first established
the doctrine in Opperman, after the criminal defendant’s car
was impounded for multiple parking violations. 428 U.S. at
365–66. The police, without a warrant, inventoried the car’s
contents pursuant to a department policy. Id. at 366. Inside

1
  The government argues that Plaintiffs waived their argument that the
inventory search doctrine is inapplicable to safe deposit boxes because
“plaintiffs failed to advance it below.” Although there is “no bright line
rule . . . to determine whether a matter has been properly raised below,”
Yamada v. Nobel Biocare Holding AG, 825 F.3d 536, 543 (9th Cir. 2016)
(internal quotation omitted), I conclude that Plaintiffs preserved their
argument here. Plaintiffs contended below that the government violated
their Fourth Amendment rights, and in doing so, argued that the
government proceeded in a manner that contravened “the purposes
traditionally associated with an inventory,” citing the leading case on the
inventory search doctrine, South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369
(1976). “[H]aving advanced its [impermissible search] theory before the
district court,” Plaintiffs are “able to make a more precise argument on
appeal as to why” the inventory search doctrine should not be extended
here. United States v. Williams, 846 F.3d 303, 312 (9th Cir. 2016).
                       SNITKO V. USA                      35

the car, the police discovered marijuana, for which the
defendant was charged with possession and convicted. Id.
    The Court in Opperman upheld the search, concluding
that the exception to the warrant requirement was justified
when balancing the privacy interests of the individual
against the government interest in protecting itself. Id. at
367, 369. It noted that individuals have a lesser expectation
of privacy in their automobiles than in “one’s home or
office,” given “the obviously public nature of automobile
travel,” and the fact that “automobiles, unlike homes, are
subjected to pervasive and continuing government
regulations and controls, including periodic inspections and
licensing requirements.” Id. at 367-68.
    Furthermore, the Opperman court noted that the
“inherent mobility” of an automobile makes enforcing the
warrant requirement challenging. Id. at 367. And it
identified three governmental interests that the doctrine
served: (1) to protect an owner’s property while it is in the
custody of the police, (2) to insure against claims of lost,
stolen, or vandalized property, and (3) to guard the police
from danger. Id. at 369. Justice Powell, in a concurrence
that provided the deciding vote in the case, emphasized:

       Inventory searches, however, are not
       conducted in order to discover evidence of
       crime.    The officer does not make a
       discretionary determination to search based
       on a judgment that certain conditions are
       present. Inventory searches are conducted in
       accordance     with    established    police
36                      SNITKO V. USA

       department rules or policy and occur
       whenever an automobile is seized.

Id. at 383 (Powell, J., concurring). In other words,
“[u]pholding searches of this type provides no general
license for the police to examine all the contents of such
automobiles.” Id. at 380.
    Seven years later, the Court extended the inventory
search doctrine to routine administrative procedures incident
to incarcerating an arrested person. See Illinois v. Lafayette,
462 U.S. 640, 648 (1983) (discussing an inventory search of
the arrestee’s shoulder bag revealing amphetamine pills). As
in Opperman, the Court explained that the search served
legitimate government interests and emphasized that the
inventory of containers must be done “in accordance with
established inventory procedures.” Id.
    Similarly, in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 368–69
(1987), the Court upheld a warrantless search of the contents
of petitioner’s vehicle inventoried after he was arrested for
driving under the influence, and his car was impounded. Id.
The Court noted that, “as in Opperman and Lafayette, there
was no showing that the police, who were following
standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole
purpose of investigation.” Id. at 372. By contrast, in Florida
v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1990), the Court invalidated an
“inventory search” of a suitcase in a car because the Florida
Highway Patrol had “no policy what[so]ever with respect to
the opening of closed containers encountered during an
inventory search,” and so was not permitted to search and
seize the items without a warrant under that doctrine. Id.
                            SNITKO V. USA                            37

    Unlike the administrative search exception, 2 which has
been extended to sites like the border, traffic checkpoints,
and certain highly regulated businesses, the inventory search
exception has largely (if not exclusively) been confined to
the context of searches of (1) individuals booked into jail,
and (2) impounded vehicles. Cf. United States v. Showalter,
858 F.2d 149, 153 (3d Cir. 1988) (noting that the court did
not “know of [any] authority which creates an inventory
exception to the warrant requirement which pertains to one’s
home, rather than an automobile.”) Plaintiffs insist that
extending the inventory doctrine to allow a search of
hundreds of safe deposit boxes would take it too far afield
from the “rationale [for the doctrine] espoused in
Opperman.”
    I agree and would so hold. As discussed above, a key
rationale in Opperman was the lesser expectation of privacy
in and the challenges posed by the “inherent mobility” of
automobiles. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367–68. Neither of
those considerations is present here. The government does
not dispute that one has an expectation of privacy in the
contents of his or her locked safe deposit box. Nor is there
anything “inherently mobile” about the boxes, located at a

2
 Although our court has sometimes used the phrases “inventory search”
and “administrative search” interchangeably, see, e.g., United States v.
Orozco, 858 F.3d 1204, 1211 (9th Cir. 2017), we recognized a difference
between these two types of searches in United States v. Grey, 959 F.3d
1166, 1180 (9th Cir. 2020). See id. (“[W]e would hesitate to extend the
Orozco test – applicable to border searches, inventory searches, and
commercial inspections of vehicles and businesses – to an administrative
search or seizure involving a private residence.”) The government does
not assert that its search of USPV fits into the administrative search
exception.
38                       SNITKO V. USA

facility where the government successfully executed search
warrants in the past.
    It is true that Opperman and its progeny involved certain
governmental interests which, at first blush, also appear
present here. While the “inventory” approved did not “guard
the police from [any] danger,” it did purport to “protect . . .
the contents of the boxes,” “preserve the property for
safekeeping,” and “protect [] agencies from claims of theft
or damage to the contents of the boxes.” See Opperman, 428
U.S. at 369.
     But that those governmental interests are served in the
context of inventorying an impounded automobile or an
arrested person makes much more sense than in the context
of an “inventory” of a locked vault. Unlike the execution of
search warrants at a stationary location, vehicles are
typically impounded on an unplanned basis—explaining
why we have justified impoundment by the community
caretaking function. See Miranda v. City of Cornelius, 429
F.3d 858, 865–86 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that impoundment
is only appropriate where a car is “creating an[] impediment
to traffic or threatening public safety,” or where “the driver’s
violation of a vehicle regulation prevents the driver from
lawfully operating the vehicle”); United States v. Garay, 938
F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2019) (noting that defendant did
not dispute that the decision to tow the car was a reasonable
and good-faith exercise of the officers’ care-taking function
where he had just been arrested and the car was totaled and
lying in a ditch). And because the police must often seize
the car without the owner’s permission to take care of the
community, it makes sense that performing an inventory in
such an instance would protect against claims of theft or loss
or protect property found in the car. Cf. Miranda, 429 F.3d
at 865 (explaining that impounding a car “without regard to
                        SNITKO V. USA                       39

whether the defendant can provide for its removal” may in
fact be “patently unreasonable”) (quoting United States v.
Duguay, 93 F.3d 346, 353 (7th Cir. 1996)).
    But in the context of stationary locations like the safe
deposit boxes here—where authorities can generally plan
searches ahead of time—it is less clear how the benefits of
an “inventory” could outweigh the higher privacy interests
at stake. Cf. Miranda, 429 F.3d at 864 (invalidating
impoundment where car was “parked in the driveway of an
owner who ha[d] a valid license”). To further illustrate this
point, Plaintiffs analogize their situation to one in which the
government seizes an apartment building based on
allegations against the landlord, and, having seized the
building, the government then searches the contents of every
tenant’s apartment—on the basis that it needed to
“inventory” the items it found there to “protect” the items
and protect itself “from claims of theft or loss.” Without
question, we would find such reasoning unconvincing, given
that the apartment tenants were completely unrelated to the
investigation, and their items were already “protected”
against any harm, in their own homes.
    In support of their argument, Plaintiffs note that some
courts of appeals have already declined, or expressed a
reluctance, to extend the inventory search doctrine outside
of the context of cars and arrestees: the Eleventh Circuit in
United States v. Ladson, 774 F.2d 436 (11th Cir. 1985), and
the Third Circuit in United States v. Showalter, 858 F.2d 149
(3d Cir. 1988).
    In Ladson, authorities obtained a warrant which ordered
seizure of defendant’s real property and directed the
executing federal agent to “prepare a written inventory of the
real estate and property thereon seized.” 774 F.2d at 438.
40                      SNITKO V. USA

The government went inside the home and proceeded to
search its contents. Id. Because “[n]othing in the seizure
warrant . . . expressly authorized the government to enter the
house without permission,” the government argued that it
had to conduct a “walk-through” of the house to conduct the
inventory. Id. at 439. The Eleventh Circuit rejected that
reading of the warrant, and under its prior precedent, refused
to use the inventory search exception “as a bootstrap to
undermine the Fourth Amendment protections afforded the
sanctity of the home.” Id. at 440 (quoting United States v.
Parr, 716 F.2d 796, 814 (11th Cir. 1983). It also noted that
“[s]uch a result is particularly unappealing where, as here, it
would sanction warrantless governmental intrusions into the
homes of third parties unrelated to the original seizure.” Id.
    Similarly, in Showalter, the authorities had an order to
go to a property “for the purposes of conducting an
inspection of the property in order to note any hazardous
conditions and to inventory any items which are affixed to
the realty and are thereby subject to the forfeiture.” 858 F.2d
at 151. Looking to Opperman, the Third Circuit held that
the search did not “satisfy the requirements that courts have
established in applying the inventory exception.” Id. at 152–
53. It noted that the defendant had a greater expectation of
privacy in his home than the defendants in automobile cases,
and that the authorities did not conduct the search in a
manner “pursuant to a uniform or standard procedure.” Id.
at 153. In particular, the panel found problematic the
presence of federal troopers and DEA agents when they were
“not necessary for either the taking of the inventory or the
maintenance of security.” Id. at 154.
    The government’s main response to these cases is that
they involve searches of a private residence, where “privacy
rights are at their zenith.” But that does not mean that the
                         SNITKO V. USA                       41

privacy rights Plaintiffs have in their safe deposit boxes are
akin to those that individuals have in cars or on their persons
when booked after arrest. To the contrary, Plaintiffs do have
a significant privacy interest in their safe deposit boxes,
given that their conduct indicates they intended their items
to be “preserved . . . as private,” and society generally views
the privacy expectations of items in safe deposit boxes as
reasonable. United States v. Yang, 958 F.3d 851, 858 (9th
Cir. 2020) (articulating test to determine privacy interest);
see, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 878 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.
1989) (unpublished) (“We recognize that Thomas is correct
in claiming that citizens have legitimate expectations of
privacy in the contents of their safe deposit boxes.”)
    I find the reasoning in Ladson and Showalter helpful in
deciding whether to apply the inventory search doctrine to
this context. See, e.g., Showalter, 858 F.2d at 153 (looking
to “the factors which have been used to justify the
warrantless inventory search of an automobile” in deciding
whether to extend the doctrine). In particular, I find
compelling the point made in Ladson that extension of the
inventory search doctrine here invades the rights of “third
parties unrelated” to the target of the search, such as
Plaintiffs. Ladson, 774 F.2d at 440; cf. United States v.
Schesso, 730 F.3d 1040, 1049 (9th Cir. 2013) (distinguishing
between the case before it and CDT because CDT
“involve[d] an over-seizure of data that could expose
sensitive information about other individuals not implicated
in any criminal activity”).
    Finally, I note that the district court’s application of the
inventory search principles to this case demonstrates why the
doctrine should not extend to this context. As the district
court explained, “[w]hether an inventory was impermissibly
pretextual hinges [on] one question: would the challenged
42                    SNITKO V. USA

search have occurred but for the Government’s allegedly
improper investigatory purpose?”    The district court
concluded that the government’s search would have
occurred “but for” any improper investigatory purpose,
reasoning:

      The warrant authorized the Government to
      seize the nests of deposit boxes and inventory
      the contents of those boxes in accordance
      with standardized policy.          The FBI’s
      inventory policy requires that when an agent
      “lawfully take[s] custody of property,” he or
      she must “conduct a prompt and thorough
      search of the contents of the property,
      including searching any locked or unlocked
      containers.” Thus, because the Government
      had lawfully taken custody of the box nests
      (due to the warrant’s authorization to seize
      them), the inventory policy mandated that
      agents examine the locked containers within.
      Agents had no discretion to determine which
      boxes should be inventoried and which
      should not—indeed, a policy granting such
      discretionary authority would run afoul of the
      Supreme       Court’s      inventory    search
      jurisprudence. It therefore seems clear that
      the agents would have cracked the deposit
      boxes and searched their contents whether or
                             SNITKO V. USA                              43

         not they had an impermissible investigatory
         motive. 3

This passage illustrates the problem with applying the
inventory search doctrine to this case. The district court’s
reasoning is illogical: The agents would have searched the
contents of the boxes regardless of whether they had a
criminal investigatory motive, because they had to inventory
the boxes pursuant to policy, as they had “lawful[] custody”
of them—pursuant to a warrant which it obtained because
of its criminal investigatory motive. That is the challenge of
comparing this case to an “inventory” conducted of an
impounded vehicle: the reason the government has “lawful
custody” of a car in those cases is because it does not have
an improper investigatory motive in obtaining custody of the
car in the first place, but rather takes custody of the car
because the car was blocking traffic, posed a danger, 4 or
otherwise required removal. See United States v. Cervantes,

3
   The district court also concluded: “That the Government had a
legitimate inventory motive is evidenced by the fact that the [search was
a] 4-day process, wherein agents recorded the contents of 700 boxes . . .
It beggars belief that agents would have worked in this manner solely to
invent a pretext for a criminal search of the box contents.” The length
of time it takes to conduct an inventory is not legally relevant to whether
it was pretextual. Moreover, to the extent the inventory did take so long,
the point could easily cut the other way—it could have taken so long
because the government did not merely log the contents of the boxes, but
thoroughly inspected them using procedures such as dog sniffs. Cf.
Grey, 959 F.3d at 1184 (noting that the “conduct at issue” in the case
“more closely resembled a criminal raid than an administrative
inspection,” given, in part, the “the [longer] length of the ‘protective
sweep.’”)
4
 See, e.g., Opperman, 428 U.S. at 374 (explaining that, in another case,
“the police had reasonable grounds to believe a weapon might be in the
car, and thus available to vandals.”)
44                      SNITKO V. USA

703 F.3d 1135, 1141 (9th Cir. 2012) (noting that if “the
government fail[s] to establish a community caretaking
function for the impoundment” of a vehicle, it “fail[s] to
establish the constitutional reasonableness of the seizure and
subsequent inventory search.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). Here, the only reason the government had
“custody” of USPV and the safe deposit boxes therein was
because of its investigatory motive. Ultimately, given the
greater privacy interests at stake and the implication of the
rights of third parties, I would hold that the inventory search
doctrine does not extend to searches of box contents in a
locked vault.

VANDYKE, Circuit Judge, concurring in part:

   I join the majority’s opinion except as to Part II, which I
view as unnecessary given the panel’s resolution of Part I.