Court Opinion

ID: 9447109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 22:25:45.171394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:54.061897
License: Public Domain

WILBUR K. MILLER, Circuit Judge.
The appellant met his estranged wife on the street and made such a violent assault upon her that fifty-five stitches were required to close her wounds. At the close of the evidence for the prosecution in his trial under an indictment charging assault with a dangerous weapon, Smith moved for acquittal on the ground of insanity, based on the idea that the Government itself had shown “some evidence” of insanity, and had wholly failed to carry the resulting burden of proving sanity beyond a reasonable doubt. The trial judge held there was no evidence of insanity and so denied the motion. He invited the appellant to offer evidence tending to show he was insane when he committed the crime but the appellant did not accept the invitation. Smith’s motion for an instruction on insanity was also denied. Electing to stand on his theory that the prosecution’s proof contained “some evidence” of insanity, thus throwing upon the Government the burden of proving sanity, he did not testify and offered no evidence.
On this appeal appellant complains principally that the trial judge erred in not submitting an insanity issue to the jury. He suggests the Government’s proof revealed there had been a deterioration in his family and social relationships and in his work habits. He says it showed a history of violent outbursts of temper in which he flew into rages; that he believed, probably without cause, that his wife had been unfaithful to him. ■ He says his attack on her was “bizarre” in that the proof showed he approached her from behind and put his hands over her eyes before he began the attack upon her which continued over a distance of several blocks, and in that he stamped on the foot of a woman in whose house his wife sought refuge and who was attempting to interfere with his attack. Finally appellant quotes the testimony of an officer that he was “not coherent” after the arrest.
These things, appellant contends, constituted “some evidence” of a mental disease or defect which made it the duty of the trial judge to instruct the jury on insanity. He particularly emphasizes the officer’s statement that appellant was “not coherent” shortly after the attack was over, and seems to regard that as strong evidence of insanity. It would not be surprising if a sane man were somewhat incoherent soon after he had *549engaged in such a violent outburst of temper. We do not regard a lack of coherence in such circumstances as indicative of insanity.
But, interestingly enough, the officer’s statement that Smith was “not coherent” was erroneously made, and was contrary to the fact. After the appellant sought to derive advantage from the statement, the witness was recalled and said he had been confused as to the difference between “coherent” and “incoherent” and had intended to say Smith was coherent.1 That this was true is conclusively shown by the fact that the officer had just finished repeating a perfectly coherent statement which appellant had made to him: that, within fifteen minutes after the arrest “He [Smith] said he cut his wife and he didn’t know why he did it except for the fact she had been talking to a man and he just lost his temper.” The officer also said the appellant told him he had used a knife which he later threw away. The fact that the police were unable to find the knife probably accounts for the verdict of simple assault only.
To hold that an insanity issue is presented in a criminal case merely because the accused has become increasingly indolent, has a violent temper, and then makes an unprovoked and unusually violent attack upon another because of some concocted grievance, would be tantamount to holding, as many psychiatrists profess to believe, that any person who commits a crime is mentally ill and should receive treatment instead of punishment. We are not prepared to make such a ruling.
One more thing remains to be noticed. In the District of Columbia every juror is given a copy of a booklet called “Jury Service, A Manual for the jury,” prepared by the Committee on Improving the Administration of Justice, District of Columbia Branch, American Bar Association. The jurors in this case received and read the handbook and said they would be inclined to be guided by the information contained therein. This, the appellant argues, disqualified them and requires reversal here. The trial judge asked: “Is there any member of the panel who would not follow the law as I give it to you, if it appeared that there was something in this handbook which might be in conflict with the law as I give it to the jury?” There was no response. We have examined the handbook and find it innocuous. Certainly it does not appear that it caused any prejudice to the appellant.
Other errors assigned do not justify discussion.
Affirmed.

. Appellant says the court erred in allowing the officer to be recalled, because he had remained in the courtroom after his first testimony when the rule as to separation of witnesses had been applied, This was within the discretion of the trial judge, and we do not flunk he abused it.