Court Opinion

ID: 9896559
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-13 18:02:16.579609+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:07.843320
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12258    Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 11/13/2023   Page: 1 of 14

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-12258
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        DARRIN CHRISTOPHER WALLACE,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 9:22-cr-80027-RLR-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-12258

        Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and HULL, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                After pleading guilty, defendant Darrin Wallace appeals his
        96-month sentence for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.
        On appeal, Wallace argues that the district court erred by:
        (1) assigning a base offense level of 22 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3)
        based on his prior Florida conviction for aggravated assault with a
        firearm being a crime of violence; (2) applying a four-level increase
        under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) for possessing a firearm in
        connection with another felony offense; and (3) denying his motion
        for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b).
               Because we lack jurisdiction to review the district court’s
        denial of Wallace’s downward-departure motion, we dismiss that
        part of his appeal. As to the district court’s application of the two
        challenged guidelines enhancements, we find no error and affirm.
                           I. BACKGROUND FACTS
        A.    Offense Conduct
               Wallace does not dispute these facts. In 2019, Wallace was
        convicted in a Florida state court of felony aggravated assault with
        a firearm. As a convicted felon, Wallace was prohibited from
        possessing a firearm and ammunition.
              In November 2021, police received a 911 call reporting that
        Wallace was outside the caller’s residence, had a firearm, and was
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        22-12258              Opinion of the Court                        3

        having a dispute with his uncle, A.W., and A.W.’s girlfriend, W.U.
        During the 911 call, Wallace discharged three rounds.
                As officers arrived, they saw Wallace driving away in A.W.’s
        car. As Wallace fled, he drove toward one marked patrol car,
        forcing it off the road, and rammed the back of the patrol car.
        Wallace then led police on a high-speed chase at over 100 miles per
        hour, before crashing his car. Officers immediately detained
        Wallace at the accident scene and found a firearm on the front
        passenger floorboard of his car. The firearm, a semi-automatic
        pistol, had a magazine with a thirty-round capacity and was loaded
        with sixteen rounds.
               An officer interviewed the victims, A.W. and W.U., who
        confirmed that the incident stemmed from a dispute over $15,000.
        While the three were riding in A.W.’s car, Wallace pulled out the
        firearm and demanded the money. A.W. drove to the residence to
        get the money, leaving W.U. in the car with Wallace.
               While they waited, Wallace made W.U. open the trunk of
        the car to look for money. Wallace placed the firearm to the side
        of W.U.’s head and told her if A.W. did not return he would kill
        her. Wallace demanded that W.U. give him her cell phone so she
        could not call 911. Eventually, W.U. went to the front door of the
        residence and laid down. Soon after, Wallace shot the passenger
        side of the car and then took the car and fled. Crime scene
        investigators found three shell casings where A.W.’s car had been
        parked at the residence and three suspected bullet defects on the
        passenger side of A.W.’s car.
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        4                        Opinion of the Court                     22-12258

               Based on this incident, Wallace was arrested and charged in
        Florida state court with multiple offenses, including robbery with
        a firearm; shooting into a building; grand theft of a motor vehicle
        while in possession of a firearm; fleeing or attempting to elude
        police at reckless high speed; tampering with a witness, victim, or
        informant; and aggravated assault with a firearm. When Wallace
        was indicted in federal court, the state charges were dropped.
        B.     Conviction and Sentence
               In March 2022, a federal grand jury returned a single-count
        indictment charging Wallace with possession of a firearm by a
        convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Wallace pled
        guilty pursuant to a written plea agreement.
               Wallace’s presentence investigation report (“PSI”) assigned
        a base offense level of 22 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3) because his
        offense involved a semi-automatic firearm capable of accepting a
        large capacity magazine and he had committed the offense after
        sustaining a conviction for a crime of violence, namely his 2019
        Florida felony conviction for aggravated assault with a firearm.
        The PSI increased Wallace’s offense level: (1) by four levels under
        § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because he possessed a firearm in connection with
        a felony offense, specifically the state charges that were later
        dropped; 1 and (2) by two levels under § 3C1.2 because Wallace
        recklessly created a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury

        1 The PSI identified U.S.S.G. § 2K1.1(b)(6)(B), but that is clearly a
        typographical error, as § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) is the relevant guideline provision.
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        22-12258               Opinion of the Court                          5

        to another person when he led police on the high-speed chase.
        After a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under
        § 3E1.1, the PSI arrived at a total offense level of 25.
               The PSI assigned 13 criminal history points based on eight
        prior convictions in Wallace’s criminal history, which resulted in a
        criminal history category of VI. Wallace’s initial guidelines range
        was 110 to 137 months. Because the statutory maximum sentence
        was 120 months, the PSI noted that the advisory guidelines range
        became 110 to 120 months pursuant to § 5G1.1(c)(1).
               In his written objections and at sentencing, Wallace
        objected, inter alia, to an enhanced base offense level of 22 under
        § 2K2.1(a)(3). Citing Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. ----,141 S. Ct.
        1817 (2021), Wallace argued that his prior Florida conviction for
        aggravated assault did not constitute a crime of violence because
        that offense could be committed recklessly. Wallace observed that
        this Court had certified questions to the Florida Supreme Court on
        the issue. The district court overruled the objection, relying on this
        Court’s pre-Borden precedent in United States v. Golden, 854 F.3d
        1256 (11th Cir. 2017), which held that a Florida conviction for
        aggravated assault constituted a crime of violence for purposes of
        § 2K2.1.
              Wallace also objected to the four-level increase under
        § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) because the state felony offenses listed in the PSI
        “were all dropped” and using them to increase his base offense level
        would violate his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights. Wallace’s
        counsel acknowledged he had found no case law to support this
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-12258

        position. Wallace also acknowledged that the commentary to
        § 2K2.1 provided that the other felony offense qualified “regardless
        of whether a criminal charge was brought, or a conviction
        obtained.” See U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1 cmt. n.14(C). But he maintained
        the commentary was not binding because it violated “the
        [c]onstitutional prohibition against increasing a penalty without a
        jury finding of guilty on the elements of the crime.”
               The district court overruled this objection too, finding “the
        four-point enhancement is appropriate under the facts as set forth
        in the PSI.” The district court found that the total offense level was
        25, the criminal history category was VI, and the advisory
        guidelines range was 110 to 120 months.
               Prior to sentencing, Wallace moved for a downward
        departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(b) or for a downward variance,
        contending that a criminal history category of VI significantly
        overrepresented the seriousness of his criminal record. Wallace
        pointed out that some of the convictions for which he received
        criminal history points were “relatively minor traffic [offenses]
        and/or misdemeanors” not typically associated with Category VI
        offenders. At sentencing, Wallace asked for a reduced criminal
        history category of IV.
               The government opposed the motion, noting that Wallace
        did not receive any criminal history points for many other offenses,
        and he had amassed an extensive criminal history by his early
        twenties, which showed a pattern of disregard for the law and an
        escalation in seriousness over time.
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        22-12258              Opinion of the Court                        7

               The district court allowed Wallace to allocute and listened
        to the parties’ arguments as to the aggravating and mitigating
        circumstances that should determine the appropriate sentence. In
        considering the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the district
        court noted, among many other things, Wallace’s extensive
        criminal history over a relatively short life, which the court noted
        was “what [was] driving the Guidelines so high.” The district court
        also agreed with the government’s argument that Wallace’s
        criminal history was serious and that he needed to be deterred to
        protect the public. The district court stated that it would “give a
        slight variance” to, among other things, ensure Wallace was
        treated similarly to other § 922(g) defendants the court had
        sentenced, including an individual “who also had an offense level
        of 25 and a criminal history VI.” Stating that it was “granting in
        part the motion for downward variance,” the district court
        imposed a 96-month sentence, followed by three years of
        supervised release.
               After objecting to the reasonableness of the sentence,
        defense counsel asked whether the “downward departure variance
        [was] on the basis that the criminal history over state[d] the
        seriousness.” The district court responded that the sentence was
        based on the totality of the circumstances, “a combination of
        everything” rather than “any one particular factor” and “not
        premised on an explicit finding of an over statement.” The district
        court assured Wallace it had considered all his arguments,
        including his background and personal history.
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                      22-12258

                                    II. DISCUSSION
        A.    Enhanced         Base      Offense      Level     Under       U.S.S.G.
        § 2K2.1(a)(3)
               Section 2K2.1(a) provides for a base offense level of 22 if the
        defendant committed the instant offense after sustaining one
        felony conviction for a “crime of violence.” U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(3).
        Section 2K2.1 cross-references § 4B1.2(a) for the definition of
        “crime of violence,” which includes an elements clause. Id. cmt.
        n.1. That is, § 4B1.2(a) defines a crime of violence as any federal or
        state offense punishable by more than one year of imprisonment
        that “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use
        of physical force against the person of another.” U.S.S.G.
        § 4B1.2(a)(1). 2
              After Wallace filed his opening brief, this Court issued
        Somers v. United States, 66 F.4th 890 (11th Cir. 2023). In Somers, this
        Court received responses to certified questions from the Supreme
        Court of Florida indicating that Florida aggravated assault cannot
        be committed recklessly. 66 F.4th at 894-96. Accordingly, the
        Somers Court reaffirmed that Florida aggravated assault
        categorically qualifies as a violent felony under the Armed Career
        Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) elements clause. Id. at 896.

        2 We review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence

        under the Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Palomino Garcia, 606 F.3d
        1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2010).
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        22-12258               Opinion of the Court                         9

               As Wallace concedes in his reply brief, Somers forecloses his
        challenge to the government’s use of his Florida aggravated assault
        conviction as a predicate crime of violence under U.S.S.G.
        § 2K2.1(a)(3). Indeed, Wallace now states his base offense level was
        properly calculated, and we agree. While Somers addressed
        whether Florida aggravated assault is a violent felony under the
        ACCA’s elements clause, its reasoning applies equally here to the
        elements clause in § 4B1.2(a)(1). See United States v. Ochoa, 941 F.3d
        1074, 1107 (11th Cir. 2019) (explaining that this Court looks to
        decisions applying the ACCA for guidance in whether an offense
        qualifies as a crime of violence under the guidelines, and vice versa,
        because the two elements clauses are “virtually identical”). In light
        of Somers, we readily conclude that Wallace’s Florida conviction for
        aggravated assault also categorically qualifies as a crime of violence
        under the elements clause in § 4B1.2(a)(1).
        B.    Four-Level Increase Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B)
               Section 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) provides for a four-level increase in
        the offense level if the defendant “used or possessed any firearm or
        ammunition in connection with another felony offense; or
        possessed or transferred any firearm or ammunition with
        knowledge, intent, or reason to believe that it would be used or
        possessed in connection with another felony offense.” U.S.S.G.
        § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). The commentary to § 2K2.1 defines “another
        felony offense” for purposes of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B) as “any federal,
        state, or local offense . . . punishable by imprisonment for a term
        exceeding one year, regardless of whether a criminal charge was
        brought, or a conviction obtained.” Id. cmt. n.14(c) (emphasis added).
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        10                       Opinion of the Court                    22-12258

               Once a defendant objects, the government bears the burden
        to prove the facts supporting a sentencing enhancement by a
        preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Grady, 18 F.4th
        1275, 1291-92 (11th Cir. 2021). It is well settled that sentencing
        courts may consider conduct for which a defendant has been
        acquitted if the government proves that conduct by a
        preponderance of the evidence and the enhancement results in a
        sentence below the maximum statutory penalty authorized by the
        jury’s verdict. United States v. Maddox, 803 F.3d 1215, 1220 (11th
        Cir. 2015); United States v. Duncan, 400 F.3d 1297, 1304-05 (11th Cir.
        2005) (holding that after United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005),
        a sentencing court applying the Sentencing Guidelines in an
        advisory manner can consider acquitted conduct when
        determining a sentence without violating the Sixth Amendment
        “as long as the judge does not impose a sentence that exceeds what
        is authorized by the jury verdict”).
               Wallace does not challenge the district court’s finding that
        the undisputed facts in the PSI supported the four-level increase.
        Instead, Wallace argues that the four-level increase violated the
        Sixth Amendment because it was based on his dismissed state
        felony charges that “w[ere] not proven to a jury.” Wallace
        acknowledges that the commentary to § 2K2.1 allows uncharged
        conduct to support the enhancement, but argues the commentary
        is not binding where it violates the Constitution.3 He also

        3 We decline to address Wallace’s argument—raised for the first time in his

        reply brief—that the commentary’s definition of “another felony offense”
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        22-12258                   Opinion of the Court                               11

        acknowledges our well-settled precedent to the contrary but asks
        us to “reconsider the issue.” 4
               Wallace’s 96-month sentence was below the ten-year
        statutory maximum applicable to his offense of conviction. See 18
        U.S.C. § 924(a)(2) (2015). 5 Thus, under this Court’s well-settled
        precedent, the district court’s reliance on Wallace’s dismissed state
        charges to support the four-level increase in his offense level did
        not violate Wallace’s Sixth Amendment rights. Under our prior
        panel precedent rule, we are bound by this precedent and cannot
        “reconsider” it, as Wallace suggests. See United States v. Archer, 531
        F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) (explaining that “a prior panel’s
        holding is binding on all subsequent panels unless and until it is
        overruled or undermined to the point of abrogation by the
        Supreme Court or by this court sitting en banc.”).
        C.    Motion for Downward Departure Under U.S.S.G.
        § 4A1.3(b)
              A district court may depart downward from the guidelines
        range when reliable information suggests that a defendant’s
        criminal history category substantially over-represents the

        contradicts the plain text of § 2K2.1(b)(6)(B). See United States v. Campbell, 26
        F.4th 860, 870-873 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022).
        4 We review both the district court’s interpretation and application of the

        Sentencing Guidelines and any constitutional challenges to a sentence de novo.
        Maddox, 803 F.3d at 1220.
        5 Section 924 has since been amended, and the statutory maximum is now

        fifteen years. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                22-12258

        seriousness of the defendant’s criminal history or the likelihood
        that the defendant will reoffend. U.S.S.G.§ 4A1.3(b). On appeal,
        Wallace argues that the district court should have granted his
        motion for a downward departure because many of his scored
        prior convictions were “minor in nature.”
                We lack jurisdiction to review the denial of a motion for
        downward departure “unless the district court incorrectly believed
        that it lacked the authority to depart from the guidelines range.”
        United States v. Croteau, 819 F.3d 1293, 1310 (11th Cir. 2016).
        “[W]hen nothing in the record indicates otherwise, we assume the
        sentencing court understood it had authority to depart
        downward.” United States v. Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221, 1228 (11th Cir.
        2006) (quotation marks omitted).
              We agree with the government that we lack jurisdiction to
        review Wallace’s challenge to the denial of his departure motion.
        Nothing in the record indicates the district court believed it lacked
        authority to depart downward from the advisory guidelines range
        under § 4A1.3(b).
               We find no merit to Wallace’s argument that this Court was
        “not divested of jurisdiction” because the district court “never
        specifically ruled on” his requested departure. While the district
        court did not explicitly state that Wallace’s departure request was
        denied, the district court’s statements during the record as a whole
        leave us with no doubt that it in fact denied the request and left
        Wallace’s criminal history category at category VI, as originally
        calculated in the PSI.
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        22-12258                  Opinion of the Court                             13

                For example, the district court observed that Wallace’s
        extensive criminal history was what drove the advisory guidelines
        range (110 to 120 months) so high and agreed with the
        government’s position that this was appropriate given the
        seriousness of his criminal history and the need to protect the
        public. The district court also reiterated that Wallace had a
        criminal history category of VI when it explained its decision to
        give a downward variance (14 months) to ensure Wallace’s
        sentence was not disparate to similarly situated defendants. The
        district court stated that it was “granting in part” Wallace’s motion,
        which was styled as a motion for both a downward departure and a
        downward variance. Finally, after imposing the sentence, the
        district court clarified that the chosen sentence was based on the
        totality of the circumstances and not on “an explicit finding of an
        over statement” of Wallace’s criminal history.
              In short, the transcript makes clear that the district court
        denied the part of Wallace’s motion that sought a downward
        departure under § 4A1.3(b) but granted the part that sought a
        downward variance. Accordingly, we do not have jurisdiction to
        review the district court’s denial of the departure motion.6

        6 To the extent Wallace’s reply brief argues—for the first time on appeal—that

        the district court’s decision to impose only a 14-month downward variance
        was substantively unreasonable, we do not address that issue. See Campbell, 26
        F.4th at 870.
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        14                    Opinion of the Court               22-12258

                              III. CONCLUSION
               For the reasons given, we dismiss for lack of jurisdiction
        Wallace’s appeal of the denial of his motion for a downward
        departure. We find no error in the district court’s calculation of
        Wallace’s offense level using both § 2K2.1(a)(3) and (b)(6)(B) and
        affirm Wallace’s 96-month sentence.
              AFFIRMED IN PART, DISMISSED IN PART.