Court Opinion

ID: 9859650
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 22:15:42.049176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:59:53.433383
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
JACKSON, J.
I concur in the result of Judge DeBruler’s opinion on the theory that the appellant did not interpose timely and proper procedural objections to the testimony of State’s witness, Bryant, as shown on pages 3 and 4 of the opinion. The questions, answers, objections and rulings of the court are as follows:
“Q. Well, you were taken to a hospital, you awakened up in a hospital. What hospital was that?
A. Welborn.
Q. All right, how long did you remain at Welborn Hospital?
A. From that time until the next Tuesday, I believe.
(1) MR. KIELY: Now, if the court please, we object to him going into detail as to the hospital, because it is not a part of the case in chief, it is not competent evidence in this case.
COURT: I will permit the question to be answered.
I will overrule the objection.
Q. The question was, how long were you in the hospital at that time?
(2) MR. KIELY: Same objection.
COURT: Objection overruled.
A. From Wednesday morning, April 26 until the following Tuesday, I think it was Monday or Tuesday, I really don’t know, when I went to Marion.
Q. Yes. Then what is Marion?
A. V.A. Hospital at Marion, Illinois.
Q. How long did you remain there? At Marion?
A. About two weeks.
(3) MR. KIELY: Just a minute. We object to how long he remained in the Marion Hospital for the *693reason that it is irrelevant, incompetent and immaterial, not relevant to the issues involved in this case.
COURT: I will overrule the objection.
MR. KIELY: And not part of the res gestae.
Q. All right, after the two weeks at the Marion V.A. Hospital, were you hospitalized somewhere after that?
(4) MR. KIELY: We object to that, if the court please, for the reason it is not relevant to the issues involved in this case, and for the further reason it is remote, has nothing to do with this case before the court.
COURT: I will overrule the objection.
Q. You may answer the question.
A. What was the question?
Q. The question was, what further hospitalization, if any, did you have after the Marion V.A. Hospital?
A. I was transferred from Marion V.A. Hospital to John Cochran V.A. Hospital in St. Louis.
Q. How long were you there?
A. Until the 14th day of August, this year.
Q. And were you discharged at that time?
A. For a couple of weeks,
Q. All right, then did you go back to any hospital?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And was that because of your condition you had originally gone for?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did you go?
A. Back to St. Louis.
(5) MR. KIELY: We object, if the court please, just a minute, we object and move to strike his answer. We object for the reason it is too remote, and not a part of the issues involved in this criminal case. It tends to create prejudice in the minds of the jurors. It is prejudicial.
COURT: I will overrule the objection. I will permit you to put in testimony as to the length of the stay in the hospital by this witness. So if you want to *694ask how long he was in the hospital altogether, all right.
Q. How long were you in the hospital altogether after the early morning of the 26th of April, this year?
(6) MR. KIELY: Same objection as I stated above.
COURT: Show the court overrules the objection.
A. I exactly don’t remember. I know the first time I was out was the 14th of August. I have been four , or five times.”
I have, in an attempt to shorten this opinion as much as possible, incorporated so much of the questions, objections, answers and rulings as are necessary for a determination as to whether or not reversible error was committed by the court in its rulings as to the admissibility of evidence as to hospitalization. Such determination will here have to be made on narrow technical grounds.
In order to present my conclusions on the various objections and rulings I have marked them by numbered circles and from hereon shall refer to them by appropriate consecutive reference thereto.
Objection (1) presents no questions here for the reason the witness had already answered the question and appellant did not move to have the answer stricken and the jury admonished to disregard the same. The question was not properly raised or saved as the objection, without the motion to strike, raised no question.
Objection (2) in my opinion presents no question here for the reason that while the objection was proper and should have been sustained it was merely repetitious of the previous question that had been previously answered and appellant was not injured thereby.
Objection (3) was made after the witness had answered the question, no motion was made to strike the answer, and in the absence of such motion an objection to the question after the witness has answered presents no question here on appeal.
*695Objection (4) relates to the question immediately preceding the objection, is proper and should have been sustained. The court’s ruling however is harmless as the witness had to ask what the question was, the question was then somewhat changed and rephrased, no objection was made to the new question, no motion made to strike the answer or objection made to the next several questions and answers. If there was harmful error here appellant waived it by his failure to properly and promptly raise the question.
Objection (5) and the motion to strike would refer to the question and the answer immediately preceding the same. In view of the court’s ruling on this objection and objection (6) and the answer thereto I will discuss and consider them together. In my opinion the failure of the court to sustain either objection (5) or (6) did not harm appellant and did not constitute reversible error for the reason that the witness had previously testified, in substance at least, to the same effect without objection on the part of appellant.
I agree with Judge. Hunter’s dissent herein that the amount of time spent by the state’s witness in various hospitals is not always relevant in proving intent to kill, nor do I feel in this case that the length of hospitalization is evidence of such intent. It is my contention, in the case at bar, that if appellant’s cause was prejudiced by evidence of hospitalization the blame must rest on appellant’s shoulders for failure to promptly, properly and precisely follow the rules, of criminal practice and procedure and thus save the questions for consideration here. I want it clearly understood that what I have here said is not to be construed as criticism of counsel. We here have the advantage of having before us the transcript, briefs, authorities and the time necessary for careful study, counsel in the heat of trial has none of these advantages.