Court Opinion

ID: 9582020
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:21:31.093369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:24.033788
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice
(dissenting) :
I respectfully dissent and would reverse the order of the lower court.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity from actions on contract has long been recognized as the law in South Carolina. Neal v. Suber, 56 S. C. 298, 33 S. E. 463 (1898); Harris v. Fulp, 178 S. C. 332, 183 S. E. 158 (1935). Other states take a different view. No less than 13 states have adopted a rule contra to ours, including our sister state of North Carolina. See Smith v. State, 289 N. C. 303, 222 S. E. (2d) 412 (1976), and cases cited therein. See, also, 73 Am. Jur. (2d), States, Territories and Dependencies, § 118.
In Harris v. Fulp, supra, the order of the trial court, printed along with the opinion approving it, quoted from Neal v. Suber, supra:
“. . . The counterclaim is a suit by Súber against the state penitentiary. A judgment could be paid only out of the state’s resources. The state’s resources are under the exclusive jurisdiction of the general assembly. This is no hardship on defendant. Every citizen who contracts with the agents of the state, as such, takes notice of the state’s immunity from suit. The rule is a wise one. The revenues of the state would be subject to grievous hindrances, if they could be litigated by every citizen in the courts of the state.” 183 S. E. at 160.
*176In my view article V, § 7 of our constitution is of no comfort to the plaintiff. That section, quoted in the majority opinion, does not confer upon a litigant a cause of action not otherwise authorized by law. It merely declares the circuit court to be . . a general trial court with original jurisdiction in civil and criminal cases, . . .”
Both our constitution and our statutory law have provided for the processing of claims such as those involved in this proceeding. Article XVII, § 2 of the present South Carolina Constitution (a similar version of which first appeared in the 1868 constitution as article XIV, § 4) provides:
“The General Assembly may direct, by law, in what manner claims against the State may be established and adjusted.”
Within ten years of the adoption of Article XVI, § 4 of the 1868 Constitution, the legislature exercised its constitutional prerogative by enacting statutes presently codified as §§ 2-9-10 through 2-9-50, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976). Section 2-9-10 provides:
“All claims for the payment for services rendered or supplies furnished to the State shall be presented to the State Budget and Control Board by petition, fully setting forth the facts upon whidi such claim is based, together with such evidence thereof as the Board may require.”
While the case of Chesterfield County v. State Highway Department of South Carolina, 181 S. C. 323, 187 S. E. 548 (1936), is of interest, it is not authority for the position taken by the lower court and adopted by the majority opinion. It did not involve an action “for services rendered or supplies furnished to the State.” In this action the respondents seek to recover payment for services rendered and supplies furnished to the State pursuant to the contract with the Department. In my view § 2-9-10 provides the exclusive remedy and the demurrer should have been sustained.
*177Without so stating the majority opinion, for all practical purposes, abolishes the doctrine of sovereign immunity as relates to contracts in this state. Substantially all contracts made by any state employee are expressly or impliedly authorized by law. Only unauthorized purchases and contracts would be exempt from suit.
Admittedly, pursuit of claims through the Budget and Control Board is not a practical approach. This is a matter to which the legislature might give appropriate attention. If the right to sue has constitutonal dignity by reason of Article 5, § 7, then the power of the Assembly to deal with claims is in serious doubt.