Court Opinion

ID: 9671764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:43:08.881474+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:11.907119
License: Public Domain

HYDE, Presiding Judge
(concurring in result).
I agree that it was not error to give Instruction No. 5 in this case. However, I do not agree that submission in this case was or properly could be on res ipsa loquitur. In Jones v. Central States Oil Co., 350 Mo. 91, 164 S.W.2d 914, 920, we held that a similar instruction submitted specific negligence, saying: “Instruction No. 1, here, did require a finding of plaintiff’s position in a place where he had the right to be, operating his car properly as required by the highest degree of care, together with his environment and other facts of the situation which showed he could not have been negligent, and then required the finding of the affirmative act by the defendant of driving its truck into that part of the highway and against the rear end of plaintiff’s car. Surely all these facts hypothesized would conclusively show active negligence on defendant’s part as a matter of law, so that if the jury believed them no result other than a finding of negligence could be reached. We, therefore, hold that this instruction did sufficiently submit specific negligence, shown by substantial evidence, and is not subject to the criticism of giving the jury a roving commission.” See also State ex rel. Spears v. McCullen, 357 Mo. 686, 210 S.W.2d 68; Witherspoon v. Guttierez, Mo.Sup., 327 S.W.2d 874; Hughes v. St. Louis Public Service Co., Mo.App., 251 S.W.2d 360.
Plaintiff’s Instruction No. 1 herein perhaps did not require a finding that his car was in a place where he had a right to be as clearly as did the instruction in Jones v. Central States Oil Co., supra, because it did not hypothesize facts showing that his car was properly parked next to the curb as his evidence apparently showed it was. Although we are not concerned with *832deficiencies in plaintiff’s instruction since he did not get a verdict, it seems apparent that plaintiff attempted by this instruction to submit specific negligence under the so-called rear end collision rule established by the above-cited cases. Furthermore we have held that a collision of two automobiles on a highway is not a proper case for res ipsa loquitur, because it involves control of separate instrumentalities by different persons. State ex rel. Brancato v. Trimble, 322 Mo. 318, 18 S.W.2d 4; passenger-carrier cases come under a different rule. Running off the road does make res ipsa applicable because only one car and one driver is involved. See Lindsey v. Williams, Mo.Sup., 260 S.W.2d 472. I do not think we should say that plaintiff in this case was entitled to rely on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine when he had shown a specific negligence case; and when his brief says that he did submit specific negligence in accordance with our ruling in Jones v. Central States Oil Co., supra.
Therefore, I concur in the result.
DALTON, J., concurs.