Court Opinion

ID: 9606298
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:48:53.817264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:02:34.039646
License: Public Domain

*258ORDER ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
The respondent AT&T Nassau Metals Corporation (Nassau) has petitioned this court for a rehearing in the above-captioned matter. This case was heard June 17, 1987 and decided September 8, 1987.
At the request of this court, the appellant William A. Nash filed a supplemental brief on the question of the impact of Cook v. Mack’s Transfer & Storage, 291 S. C. 84, 352 S. E. (2d) 296 (Ct. App. 1986), cert. den., 292 S. C. 230, 355 S. E. (2d) 861 (1987) on Nash’s cause of action for outrageous conduct. In his supplemental brief, Nash conceded, as requested in paragraph 7 of the petition, that this question warranted a remand to the trial court for development of relevant facts. We also granted a petition by Nassau to file a reply brief. In its reply brief, Nassau took the position that the record was sufficient to warrant a dismissal by this court.
In our decision of September 8,1987, we held that Nash’s allegations against Nassau were sufficient to constitute a cause of action for outrageous conduct. Accordingly, we reversed the trial court’s order of summary judgment against Nash on his action for outrageous conduct and remanded the matter for further proceedings. In so doing, however, we limited our holding to the sufficiency of Nash’s pleadings and expressly stated that we intimated no opinion about the ultimate viability of Nash’s claim.
After consideration of the supplemental briefs and other documents filed in this case since our decision as well as a review of the record and briefs prepared for the appeal, we hold that no further purpose would be served by additional argument before this court and that a remand to the trial court is appropriate to develop the facts surrounding Nash’s action for outrageous conduct to determine if it should be dismissed under Cook v. Mack's Transfer & Storage. We, therefore, adhere to our decision to remand the case, but add several clarifications as to the specific questions to be considered on remand.
In Cook v. Mack’s Transfer & Storage, this court held that the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act is the exclusive means of settling all claims against an employer where a personal injury to an employee comes within the *259Act. The holding in Cook was based in large part on Section 42-1-540, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976), which provides in part:
The rights and remedies granted by this Title to an employee when he and his employer have accepted the provisions of this Title, respectively, to pay and accept compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident, shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, parents, dependents or next of kin as against his employer, at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service or death. [Emphasis added.]
Section 42-1-130, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976) defines the term “employee” as “every person engaged in an employment under any appointment, contract of hire or apprenticeship, express or implied, oral or written____” Section 42-1-160, Code of Laws of South Carolina (1976) limits the term personal injury to mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of employment. ” [Emphasis added.] Under these statutes, a workers’ compensation award is authorized if and only if the employer-employee relationship existed at the time of the alleged injury for which the claim is made. Alewine v. Tobin Quarries, Inc., 206 S. C. 103, 33 S. E. (2d) 81 (1945). See also Sola v. Sunny Slope Farms, 244 S. C. 6, 135 S. E. (2d) 321 (1964) (holding that the injury must occur within the period of employment and arise because of the employment as when the employment is a contributing proximate cause).
In his complaint, Nash stated that Nassau informed him July 18, 1985 that his employment and employee benefits had been retroactively terminated as of June 1,1985. Correspondence included in the record supports this allegation. The sequence of events alone is sufficient to question the applicability of the workers’ compensation act since the alleged outrage, namely, the delayed notification by Nassau to Nash that he lost his employee benefits, occurred after the effective date of his discharge. Nassau argues Nash’s subsequent reinstatement with his original effective service date means that he never left the employment of Nassau; therefore, his claim of outrageous conduct arose in the course of his employment. We disagree. Whether the terms *260of the reinstatement apply to matters other than seniority and benefits is an issue of fact. Moreover, Ñassau’s position is tantamount to saying that the acts of which Nash complains never happened, an untenable conclusion given the undisputed facts of record.
The exclusivity provision of the South-Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act is of uncertain application to the present case for yet another reason. Section 42-1-540 is operative only where the injury is “by accident.” By contrast, the gravamen of Nash’s action for outrageous conduct is the alleged “wilful and malicious wrongful conduct” of Nassau, which, according to Nash, caused him “to suffer shock, emotional distress and other bodily harm.” Since the damages Nash sought to prove were not necessarily limited to physical disability, we hold that additional inquiry by the trial court is necessary to determine whether Nash’s alleged injury is an “accident” within the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act. See Stewart v. McClellan’s Stores Co., 194 S. C. 50, 9 S. E. (2d) 35 (1940) (holding that an intentional and malicious assault and battery by an employer on an employee, where no physical disability has been suffered, is not an “accident” within the terms of the Workers’ Compensation Act so as to preclude recovery at common law).
We dismiss the other issues raised in the petition as without merit.
For the reasons stated, we remand the action for outrageous conduct for proceedings consistent with this order.