Court Opinion

ID: 9722919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:55:34.640926+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:42.034713
License: Public Domain

Sharpe, J.
(dissenting). I am not in accord with the opinion of Mr. Justice Bushnell insofar as he adopts the finding of facts of the trial court. In the reasons for denying the motion for a new trial by the trial court we find the following statement:
“In 1945, decedent married the mother of claimant, and services rendered after this marriage are presumed to be gratuitous and an express contract must be shown.”
The record shows that decedent married the mother of claimant’s husband and not the mother of claimant. Under the facts in this case claimant was never a member of decedent’s household, hence, there is no presumption that such services were rendered gratuitous.
The trial court held that the statute of limitations (CLS 1952, § 609.13 [Stat Ann 1953 Cum Supp § 27.605]) barred any claim of plaintiff prior to October 26, 1945, and relied on In re Thompson’s Estate, 297 Mich 479, as authority for such holding. In that case the statute of limitations was invoked to bar part of Olds claim for the reason that Olds lived in decedent’s home since he was 14 or 15 years of age and stood in the relationship of father and son, but Olds was permitted to receive remuneration for services rendered after he (Olds) was married and no longer was a person in the relationship of father and - son.
The record clearly establishes that.there was an implied contract on the part of decedent to pay for services performed. The evidence shows that full *109time services were rendered from September, 1938, to 1941 and part time services were rendered from 1941 to 1946.
In Carter v. Carter, 36 Mich 207 (syllabus), we said:
“Where a person goes into the service of another upon an indefinite promise of payment for the same, and no price and no period is fixed, the bargain and service are alike continuous, and the statute of limitations does not begin to run against the claim until the service is concluded; the right of action at the close of the service is an entire right and applies to the entire service, and the employee is entitled to claim for the whole amount of all unpaid wages for all the service rendered under the agreement.”
See, also, In re Dei’s Estate, 293 Mich 651 and Wisniewski v. Wisniewski's Estate, 254 Mich 663.
The above authorities establish the principle that when services are rendered by virtue of an implied contract and with no agreement as to duration, the statute of limitations does not begin to run against the claim until the service is concluded. Because of the fact that the trial court based his conclusions, in part, upon findings of fact contrary to facts contained in the record and because the court failed to apply existing law to established facts, the judgment should be reversed and remanded for a new trial. Plaintiff may recover costs.
Dethmers, J., concurred with Sharpe, J.