Court Opinion

ID: 9761688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:50:35.915603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:25.429069
License: Public Domain

BARDGETT, Judge
(concurring).
The dissenting opinion of Morgan, J., casts the issue in this case to be one of adjudicating the meaning of the word “purpose” as used in Art. IV, sec. 23, Mo.Const., and determining whether the appropriation laws involved in this case satisfied that section of our constitution. I do not believe that Is the issue at all and for this reason I file this concurring opinion.
No one contends that the appropriation laws here involved failed to meet the requirements of Art. IV, sec. 23. To the contrary, the case is premised on the assumption, which I believe to be a valid one, that these appropriation bills satisfy the requirements of Art. IV, sec. 23, as to the “purpose” clause.
The basic issue here is whether or not the general assembly can constitutionally authorize a legislative committee and a representative of the executive branch of government, the commissioner of administration, to amend an appropriation law by switching money from one legislatively designated purpose to a different legislatively designated purpose.
In State ex rel. Cason v. Bond, 495 S.W.2d 385 (Mo. banc 1973), the court held the governor could not constitutionally change the purpose clause of an appropriation bill under his veto powers.
The case today holds that the general assembly cannot constitutionally delegate to a committee or to the executive department or to both of them the power to amend a law.