Court Opinion

ID: 9381307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-22 17:03:28.515381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:31.569265
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/21/23 Kobler v. Mark CA1/4

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                  DIVISION FOUR

 AMANDA KOBLER,
             Plaintiff and Respondent,                                 A166038
                            v.                                         (Alameda County Super. Ct.
 JEFFREY W.T. MARK et al.,                                             No. RG21100707)
         Defendants and Appellants.

                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION1
                                                               I.
         In an effort to enforce a settlement agreement, appellants Jeffrey W.T.
Mark and Li Wen Bu obtained a judgment in Alameda County Superior
Court No. RG16829323 against respondent Amanda Kobler and initiated
proceedings in Sint Maarten to enforce the judgment by foreclosing on a
home owned there by respondent.
         Respondent then filed Alameda County Superior Court
No. RG21100707, the action that gives rise to this appeal, seeking to attack
the judgment against her in No. RG16829323 as void. She alleged that she
was never served with the complaint in No. RG16829323, appellants’ showing

       We resolve this case by a memorandum opinion pursuant to the
         1

California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.

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on that issue was fraudulent, and thus the court lacked personal jurisdiction
over her.
        The trial court in No. RG21100707 granted a preliminary injunction
enjoining appellants from further pursuing the Sint Maarten foreclosure
proceedings. Emphasizing that its determination was preliminary, the trial
court found that respondent made a plausible showing that she would prevail
in No. RG21100707, and that the balance of harms tipped in her favor.
        This timely appeal followed.
                                        II.
        “The decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction lies in the
sound discretion of the trial court, which we do not disturb absent an abuse of
discretion. [Citations.] On appeal we do not weigh conflicting evidence, but
defer to the trial court’s factual findings if they are supported by substantial
evidence. [Citation.] To the extent the trial court’s ruling rests on a legal
issue, we review it de novo. [Citation.] The burden is on the party
challenging the injunction to make a clear showing the trial court abused its
discretion.” (People v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 266,
283.)
        “In general, when considering a request for a preliminary injunction,
the trial court weighs two interrelated factors. The first is the likelihood the
party seeking relief will prevail on the merits, and the second is the relative
interim harm to the parties if the preliminary injunction is granted or denied.
[Citations.] The goal is to minimize the harm that an erroneous interim
decision would cause.” (People v. Uber Technologies, Inc., supra,
56 Cal.App.5th at p. 283.)
        Appellants argue reversible error on three grounds: (1) respondent
failed to show a plausible likelihood of success and the balance of interim

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harms favored appellants, (2) even assuming respondent’s allegations of
fraudulent service in No. RG16829323 are true, she failed to demonstrate
that she has a defense on the merits because she signed a settlement
agreement in which she agreed that judgment could be taken against her if
she defaulted, which she indisputably did, and (3) respondent consented to
jurisdiction in No. RG16829323 by entering into a settlement agreement in
which she agreed that, in the event of a default, a stipulated judgment could
be taken against her under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6 and that the
Alameda County Superior Court would have continuing jurisdiction in any
such enforcement action.
      We see no error and will affirm.
      First, although appellants wish to reargue the facts here on appeal,
respondent made a factual showing that she was not served with the
complaint in No. RG16829323, and that, based on the circumstances set forth
on the process server’s affidavit, it was objectively impossible for her to have
been served. The trial court made no finding on this issue one way or
another. It simply observed that respondent had produced enough evidence
to demonstrate she has a plausible chance of proving she was sued without
notice, an allegation which, if true, would entitle her to relief on her first
cause of action seeking to set aside the judgment in No. RG16829323.
      Applying the sliding scale analysis that governs preliminary injunctive
relief, the trial court noted that the gravity of the potential harm to
respondent from allowing execution to proceed—loss of her home in Sint
Maarten—was enough to warrant interim relief. The dispositive
consideration was that, in the court’s estimation, the balance of interim
harms favored respondent. Appellants point to a declaration they filed from
a Sint Maarten attorney, who opined as to local procedural law governing

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judgment execution in that venue. According to appellants, any delay in
their ability to execute on their judgment will mean that other creditors of
respondent may be able to interpose competing liens, to appellants’
disadvantage. That was a matter for the court to assess. We decline to
second-guess the court’s assessment of likelihood of success and relative
harms.
      Second, respondent made a showing that she had a defense on the
merits. The first cause of action she pleaded in No. RG21100707 was
essentially a collateral attack on the judgment in No. RG16829323 for lack of
service. The court’s assessment of whether she made a sufficient showing to
show likelihood of success—it found she did—met this requirement.
Appellants appear to want to argue about the merits of whether they were
entitled to take a judgment against respondent in No. RG16829323, which is
a related but different matter. They argue at length that respondent owed a
certain settlement payment by a certain date and defaulted, which they claim
respondent has never denied and cannot deny. But those facts are not
material to respondent’s collateral attack on the judgment in
No. RG16829323. Her collateral attack is procedural in nature; she pleaded
the necessary procedural facts and made a sufficient preliminary showing to
support them. Whether she can prevail at trial is another matter.
      Third, appellants conflate consent to jurisdiction with waiver of notice.
Even if appellants were correct that, in signing a settlement agreement with
a clause acknowledging the continuing jurisdiction of the Alameda County
Superior Court in No. RG16829323, that does not mean respondent agreed to
be sued without notice. The purpose of a summons is to provide notice to the
person sued of the need to appear in the action, generally or specially. Here,

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respondent alleges she received no summons and hence no notice of the suit
against her.
      Had respondent received notice, made a special appearance, and tried
to contest the court’s personal jurisdiction, her argument may well have
failed in the face of a factual showing from appellants that she consented to
jurisdiction in the settlement agreement. But that is different from the issue
of notice, a due process requirement that is implicated when no service is
made at all. It would be an extraordinary claim indeed—one that, so far as
we can discern, has not been made here—if appellants claimed that
respondent agreed to be sued without notice. To the extent appellants claim
that in the settlement agreement respondent not only waived notice of suit
but made a prospective general appearance in an action that had not been
filed yet, we disagree.
                               DISPOSITION
      Affirmed. Costs on appeal will be awarded to respondent.

                                                   STREETER, J.

WE CONCUR:

BROWN, Acting P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.

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