Court Opinion

ID: 9560934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:59:36.742193+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:21.327636
License: Public Domain

RIGGS, J.,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the Tigard Police Department’s inventory rules are inadequate under State v. Atkinson, 298 Or 1, 688 P2d 832 (1984). The majority seems to believe that a policy impermissibly allows the exercise of discretion, unless it enumerates specific places *575in the vehicle to check when taking inventory of an impounded vehicle.1
An inventory policy need not provide great detail to remove discretion effectively. The Tigard Police Department’s policy requires an inventory and completion of an inventory report, including a property receipt form for valuable property, on all towed vehicles. Common sense dictates that, in order to inventory an impounded vehicle and make an accounting of valuable property, an officer must look throughout the vehicle. It would be impossible for inventory guidelines to list each and every location in each and every model of sedan, pickup, coupe, convertible, stationwagon, van or truck where valuables are likely to be kept. The general nature of this inventory procedure requires an inventory of every place designed or objectively likely to contain valuables. See, e.g., State v. Mundt/Fincher, 98 Or App 407, 413, 780 P2d 234, rev den 308 Or 660 (1989).
I also disagree with the majority’s analysis as to the scope of the inventory. Although the majority correctly concludes that the policy eliminates discretion about whether to inventory a vehicle, it poses the next question in the analysis as “Does the policy adequately curb individual discretion as to the scope of an inventory?” 110 Or App at 573. (Emphasis in original.) Discretion in an inventory and permissible scope of an inventory are separate questions, and the majority incorrectly lumps them together. Therefore, it applies the wrong analysis in deciding whether the inventory was valid.
The majority’s error appears to arise from its reading of Atkinson’s three-part test. Atkinson should be read to require (1) that the vehicle be lawfully impounded, (2) that a properly authorized policy eliminate discretion in taking an inventory and (3) that the scope of the inventory be constitutionally permissible. Atkinson’s own analysis supports that *576reading of the test,2 as does our analysis applying the Atkinson test in State v. Mundt/Fincher, supra 3
Under Atkinson, “[t]he scope of an inventory must be limited to that — an inventory. Objects found within the inventoried vehicle should be scrutinized only to the extent necessary to complete the inventory.” 298 Or at 10. (Footnote omitted.) The coin purse found during the inventory here was partially open, revealing the methamphetamine without further scrutiny. The officer did not exceed the permissible scope of an inventory.
I would hold that the inventory policy meets the Atkinson test and that the inventory was valid. Therefore, I dissent.

 The majority characterizes the holding in Atkinson as “in the absence of stated restrictions on the exercise of discretion, an inventory is invalid,” even under the facts of that case. 110 Or App at 573. (Emphasis supplied.) Atkinson does not require stated restrictions. It requires that the inventory “be conducted pursuant to a properly authorized administrative program, designed and systematically administered so that the inventory involves no exercise of discretion * * 298 Or at 10. The court could not reach a conclusion whether the inventory was valid, in part because it was unclear whether the inventory in that case was conducted pursuant to such a program. 298 Or at 11. It remanded the case for further proceedings. 298 Or at 12.

 In Atkinson, the court first addressed whether the vehicle was lawfully impounded and noted that the parties and the trial court assumed that it was. 298 Or at 11. Second, it concluded that it was unclear “whether this inventory was conducted pursuant to a properly authorized program designed and systematically administered to achieve the stated purpose.” 298 Or at 11. Finally, and separately, it concluded that it was unclear whether the inventory was within the scope permissible under Article I, section 9, of the Oregon Constitution. 298 Or at 11. For the last two reasons, the Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

 In Mundt/Fincher, we applied the second and third parts of the Atkinson test to the inventory of an arrestee’s personal property during the booking procedure. We considered whether the booking officer had discretion to inventory the contents of a wallet or a purse. After concluding that she had no discretion, we turned to the question of the scope of a valid inventory. 98 Or App at 415.