Court Opinion

ID: 9646770
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:10:33.011154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:41.712880
License: Public Domain

*369KERN, Associate Judge,
concurring:
When the Council of the District of Columbia determined to cease having certain minor traffic violations treated as offenses prosecuted in the trial court I am persuaded that such determination, as enacted in the Traffic Adjudication Act of 1978, passes statutory and constitutional muster.1 The Act does not run afoul of the Home Rule Act since it is neither an act “with respect to any provision of title 23 ... (relating to criminal procedure), or with respect to any provision ... of titles 22 or 24 ... (relating to crimes and treatment of prisoners)”, nor is it an act “with respect to any provision of title 11 ... (relating to organization and jurisdiction of the District of Columbia courts).” See D.C.Code 1978 Supp., § 1-147(a)(4) and (9).
In addition, the Act clearly meets the dictates of due process by providing for a hearing before a fine can be imposed or attendance at traffic school can be required of those who are found by the examiner to have committed traffic and parking infractions. The Act also creates an Appeals Board to provide administrative review of examiners’ decisions and permits an application to the trial court for an allowance of an appeal so that there is a form of judicial review.2
I am not persuaded that these newly-constituted proceedings to dispose of this limited group of vehicular and pedestrian infractions constitute contested cases and so must be governed by the DCAPA. The term “contested ease” has an established meaning within the context of administrative law. However, the Council, as enunciated in its Statement of Purpose and in the exercise of its police powers, was attempting by the Act to create “a uniform and more expeditious system .... for the disposition of traffic offenses.” (Emphasis added.) To me, the Council by enacting the Act was attempting to divert criminal cases from the crowded dockets of the trial court into a different and more efficient system of disposition by civilian authority. I would analogize this to the use of United States Magistrates to dispose of minor criminal offenses to prevent further burgeoning of the federal district court dockets. See 18 U.S.C. § 3401.
Accordingly, I agree that the order of dismissal for want of jurisdiction must be reversed.

. “Serious offenders” are specifically excepted from the reach of the Act. D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 40-1111. In the instant case, appel-lees were found by a hearing examiner, respectively, to have failed to give full time and attention while operating a motor vehicle, turning left from the wrong lane and changing lanes without caution, and passing a red light.

. Decisions that suspend or revoke a driver’s license are to be reviewed pursuant to the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act. D.C.Code 1980 Supp., § 40-1125.