Court Opinion

ID: 9466925
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:32:41.211805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:02.710025
License: Public Domain

FEINBERG, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I dissent because I am unable to distinguish this case from United States v. Buenaventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980), where the panel, in a thorough opinion by Judge Timbers, held on substantially similar facts that an investigative stop was illegal. The majority opinion here analyzes the facts in this case and the alleged differ*225enees from the facts in Buenaventura-Ariza at such inordinate length that it might be enough merely to observe that the majority “doth protest too much, methinks.” But it is also worth noting that the distinctions that are offered to justify the inconsistent results in the two cases turn out to be these: (1) In this case, appellant and Yepes carried “identical, untagged shoulderbags,” while the pair in Buenaventura-Ariza did not; (2) appellant and Yepes whispered before they separated, while the pair in Buenaventura-Ariza merely conversed; (3) Yepes, while walking ahead, “stopped and turned in full circle to look at those around her,” while Buenaventura, while walking behind, merely “glancefd] about as he walked”; and (4) appellant and Yepes made a “concerted attempt to appear separate,” while the pair in Buenaventura-Ariza did not. The first three of these purported distinctions in the facts are too unimportant to merit a difference in legal result. The fourth alleged factual difference is more significant but not enough to justify the difference in result.1 We noted in Buenaventura-Ariza that the line between investigatory stops based on reasonable suspicion and stops based on the subjective hunches of experienced agents is by no means clear. But, if undue reliance is placed upon an agent’s “perception” or “interpretation” of observed conduct, then the requirement of specific, objective facts may easily be circumvented. In this case, as in Buenaventura-Ariza, the line has been crossed. I would reverse the judgment of the district court.

. The majority, presumably to show appellant’s nervousness, also relies on the “attempt” by appellant and Yepes “to avoid Iglesias.” But the facts in Buenaventura-Ariza in this regard were quite similar, since we noted that the pair in that case “seemed to be nervous.” We statr ed there, however, that:
There must be other objective facts which, when viewed in conjunction with nervous behavior and arrival from a source city, raise the complex of conduct to a level justifying reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Id. at 36 (footnote omitted).