Court Opinion

ID: 9838962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-09 00:00:30.060173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:05:00.125019
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30243      Document: 00516888946      Page: 1     Date Filed: 09/08/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                                  United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                Fifth Circuit

                               ____________                                   FILED
                                                                      September 8, 2023
                                No. 22-30243                             Lyle W. Cayce
                               ____________                                   Clerk

   James Self; Wilma Self,

                                                         Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                     versus

   BPX Operating Company,

                                                         Defendant—Appellee,

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Louisiana
                            USDC No. 5:19-CV-927
                  ______________________________

   Before Dennis, Elrod, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Jennifer Walker Elrod, Circuit Judge:
         This case concerns the interplay between Louisiana’s relatively new
   conservation laws and its deeply rooted negotiorum gestio doctrine. Because
   we cannot make a reliable Erie guess as to the applicability of Louisiana’s
   negotiorum gestio doctrine, we CERTIFY a question to the Louisiana
   Supreme Court.
                                        I
         Louisiana oil and gas law authorizes the state Commissioner of
   Conservation to combine separate tracts of land and appoint a unit operator
   to extract the minerals. La. Stat. Ann. § 30:9(B) (2022); id. § 30:10(A)(1)
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                                         No. 22-30243

   (2022). Where a tract is not subject to a lease, the unit operator can sell the
   landowner’s share of production but must pay the landowner a pro rata share
   of the proceeds within one hundred eighty days of the sale. Id. § 30:10(A)(3)
   (2022).
           James and Wilma Self own unleased mineral interests in Louisiana
   that are part of a forced drilling unit. BPX is the operator. The Selfs allege
   on behalf of themselves and a named class that BPX has been improperly
   deducting post-production costs from their pro rata share of production and
   that this practice is improper per se. The district court granted BPX’s motion
   to dismiss the Selfs’ per se claims, holding that the quasi-contractual doctrine
   of negotiorum gestio provides a mechanism for BPX to properly deduct post-
   production costs.1
           The Selfs filed this action as purported representatives of a named
   class of unleased mineral owners whose interests are situated within forced
   drilling units formed by the Louisiana Office of Conservation and operated
   by BPX. Neither the Selfs nor the class members have made separate
   arrangements to dispose of their shares of production, so the unit operator
   can sell the shares but must pay the owners a pro rata share of the proceeds
   within one hundred eighty days of the sale. La. Stat. Ann. § 30:10(A)(3)
   (2022). BPX has been paying the pro rata share of production but has been
   withholding from that amount the pro rata post-production costs for
   transporting, gathering, marketing, treating, and compressing produced
   minerals, as well as amounts related to minimum volume commitments or
   capacity reservation fees. The Selfs alleged, consistent with district court
   authority at the time, that the practice of withholding the post-production

           _____________________
           1
             This case was consolidated for oral argument with Johnson v. Chesapeake
   Louisiana, No. 22-30302, because both cases raise the same statutory interpretation issue.

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   costs from their pro rata share of production is improper per se.2 See Johnson
   v. Chesapeake La., L.P., No. CV-16-1543, 2019 WL 1301985 (W.D. La. Mar.
   21, 2019), vacated on reconsideration, 2022 WL 989341.
           BPX timely removed this action to the district court, based on both
   diversity and federal question jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(a), 1332(d).
   BPX sought dismissal of the Selfs’ primary claim that BPX can never deduct
   post-production costs incurred in the sale of unleased mineral owners’ pro
   rata shares of production. The district court granted BPX’s motion to
   dismiss and held that the Louisiana Civil Code doctrine of negotiorum gestio
   provides a mechanism for unit operators to be reimbursed for post-
   production costs not otherwise covered by specific statutes. La. Civ. Code
   Ann. art. 2292 (2023). The district court certified its ruling for interlocutory
   appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). This court granted the Selfs’ motion
   for leave to appeal from an interlocutory order.
                                                 II
           We review a district court’s dismissal of a complaint for failure to state
   a claim de novo. Gonzalez v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass'n, 62 F.4th 891, 898
   (5th Cir. 2023). We accept all well-pleaded facts as true and view those facts
   in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Id.
                                                III
           Louisiana is one of many states with forced pooling laws designed to
   prevent the waste of mineral resources. These laws provide mechanisms for
   sharing both the risks and benefits of production in the absence of a contract.

           _____________________
           2
              The lawsuit has three distinct counts. The first count, seeking monetary
   damages, declaratory, and permanent injunctive relief to prohibit BPX from deducting any
   post-production costs from plaintiffs’ pro rata share of production proceeds as per se illegal,
   is the only one now at issue.

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   TDX Energy, LLC v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 857 F.3d 253, 257 (5th Cir.
   2017). Accordingly, the forced pooling law allows the recovery of certain
   costs:
            In the event a drilling unit is formed by a pooling order by the
            commissioner and absent any agreement or contract between
            owners as provided in this Section, then the cost of
            development and operation of the pooled unit chargeable to the
            owners therein shall be determined and recovered as provided
            herein.
   La. Stat. Ann. § 30:10(A)(2) (2022).
            Louisiana law and the oil and gas industry in general recognize a
   distinction between production and post-production costs. Production costs
   end “at the wellhead when the minerals are reduced to possession. Post-
   production costs . . . include those related to taxes, transportation,
   dehydration, treating, compressing, and gathering.” J. Fleet Oil & Gas Corp.
   v. Chesapeake La., L.P., No. CV-15-2461, 2018 WL 1463529, at *6 (W.D. La.
   Mar. 22, 2018) (citation omitted). The provision addressing recovery of
   costs mentions only certain types of production costs: “drilling, testing,
   completing, equipping, and operating expenses,” as well as a charge for
   supervision. See La. Stat. Ann. § 30:10(A)(2)(b)(i) (2016). It is silent as to
   post-production costs. Most relevant here is La. Stat. Ann. § 30:10(A)(3),
   which addresses payment of production proceeds:
            If there is included in any unit created by the commissioner of
            conservation one or more unleased interests for which the
            party or parties entitled to market production therefrom have
            not made arrangements to separately dispose of the share of
            such production attributable to such tract, and the unit
            operator proceeds with the sale of unit production, then the
            unit operator shall pay to such party or parties such tract’s pro
            rata share of the proceeds of the sale of production within one
            hundred eighty days of such sale.

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   La. Stat. Ann. § 30:10(A)(3) (2022).
          The Selfs contend that “proceeds” of the sale here mean “gross
   proceeds.” BPX countered initially that “proceeds” is ambiguous and
   should be interpreted to mean “net proceeds,” after deduction of pro rata
   post-production costs. BPX later contended, however, that when section
   (A)(3) is properly harmonized with Louisiana’s civil code regime, there is a
   legal mechanism to support the deductibility of post-production costs: the
   quasi-contractual regime of negotiorum gestio.
          The Louisiana Supreme Court has held, and the parties agree, that the
   relationship between them is quasi-contractual. Wells v. Zadeck, 89 So. 3d
   1145, 1149 (La. 2012) (“A quasi-contractual relationship is created between
   the unit operator and the unleased mineral interest owner with whom the
   operator has not entered into contract.”). The parties disagree, though, as
   to what type of quasi-contractual relationship they have. The Louisiana Code
   provides two non-exclusive examples that give rise to quasi-contractual
   obligations in the state: negotiorium gestio and enrichment without cause. La.
   Civ. Code Ann. art. 2292, 2298 (2023); Louisiana is the only state that
   employs negotiorium gestio, and it has “deep roots” in the state. Under this
   doctrine, a proposed “gestor” must act 1) voluntarily and without authority,
   2) to protect the interests of another, and 3) in the reasonable belief that the
   owner would approve of the action if made aware of the circumstances. La.
   Civ. Code Ann. art. 2292 (2023). If negotiorum gestio applies, Louisiana Civil
   Code Article 2297 requires “[t]he owner whose affair has been managed [to]
   . . . fulfill the obligations that the manager has undertaken as a prudent
   administrator and to reimburse the manager for all necessary and useful
   expenses.” La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 2297 (2023).3

          _____________________
          3
              The district court ruling preserved the questions as to the scope and extent of

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           The Selfs assert that BPX cannot be a gestor because it did not act
   “voluntarily and without authority”; it acted pursuant to a statutory duty.
   The Selfs also contend that BPX did not act exclusively to protect the
   unleased mineral owners’ interests, but rather to protect its own interests.4
   If gestio principles are applicable, the Selfs assert, a factfinder would need to
   determine that BPX always acted for the plaintiffs’ benefit in marketing unit
   production before BPX would be entitled to reimbursement under Article
   2297.
           BPX contends that Louisiana case law recognizes it as a gestor in all
   circumstances when dealing with unleased mineral owners, but the parties
   agree that no controlling case deals with the specific facts at hand. In Taylor
   v. Smith, the Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal held that a cause of
   action under section 30:10(A)(3) of the Louisiana Revised Statutes should be
   construed together with the Civil Code’s negotiorum gestio doctrine. 619 So.
   2d 881, 887 (La. App. 1993) (“The statute gives the owner a cause of action
   in quasi-contract under LSA-C.C. art. 2292, et. seq., insofar as the operator,
   in selling the owner’s proportionate share of the oil produced, is acting as a
   negotiorum gestor or manager of the owner’s business in selling the oil
   produced.”). The Louisiana Supreme Court cited Taylor in Wells, where it
   held that the relationship between an unleased mineral interest owner and
   operator is quasi-contractual. Wells, 89 So. 3d at 1149 (citing Taylor, 619 So.
   2d 881). Yet that case involved the proper prescriptive period for an action
   brought under section (A)(3) and did not directly reference the part of Taylor

           _____________________
   reimbursable expenses, as those questions relate solely to Counts II and III, which are not
   before us on appeal.
           4
             The Selfs’ third claim for relief (which is not at issue in this appeal) alleges, among
   other things, “self-dealing” on the part of BPX.

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   discussing gestores. Thus, no controlling Louisiana case resolves the parties’
   issue.
            This unsettled state of the law raises the question whether the
   appropriate course is to certify the issue for resolution by the state court of
   last resort. The rules of the Louisiana Supreme Court allow for certification
   from the federal courts of appeals of dispositive questions of Louisiana law.
   La. Sup. Ct. R. 12, §§ 1–2 (2023). The issue presented here satisfies that
   condition.
            The issue presented also satisfies the three factors used by this court
   in deciding whether to certify:
            1) [T]he closeness of the question and the existence of
               sufficient sources of state law;
            2) [T]he degree to which considerations of comity are relevant
               in light of the particular issue and case to be decided; and
            3) [P]ractical limitations on the certification process: signifi-
               cant delay and possible inability to frame the issue so as to
               produce a helpful response on the part of the state court.

   In re Gabriel Inv. Grp., 24 F.4th 503, 507 (5th Cir. 2022); see also Austin v.
   Kroger Tex. LP, 746 F.3d 191, 196 (5th Cir. 2014).          As explained above,
   Louisiana law is unsettled on this issue. “[A]ny Erie guess would involve
   more divining than discerning.” McMillan v. Amazon.com, Inc., 983 F.3d 194,
   202 (5th Cir. 2020). The Louisiana Third Circuit Court of Appeal and the
   district court in this case both concluded that the negotiorum gestio doctrine
   applies. But the scholarly dissent provides cogent reasons to think it does
   not. And the district court concluded that the issue was sufficiently close to
   certify its ruling for interlocutory appeal.
            Comity interests also favor certification. The interplay between
   Louisiana’s oil and gas law and its unique negotiorum gestio doctrine presents

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   a complex and novel issue “peculiarly calling for the exercise of judgment by
   the [Louisiana] courts.”     McKesson v. Doe, 141 S. Ct. 48, 51 (2020).
   “Speculation by a federal court” about how to square Louisiana’s new
   conservation laws with its ancient civilian doctrines is inappropriate “when
   . . . the state courts stand willing to address questions of state law on
   certification.” Arizonans for Official Eng. v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997)
   (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted). Finally, we are unaware
   of any practical impediments to certification.
                                  *        *         *
          Accordingly, we CERTIFY the following determinative question of
   law to the Louisiana Supreme Court:
          1) Does La. Civ. Code art. 2292 apply to unit operators selling
          production in accordance with La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3)?
          We disclaim any intention or desire that the Louisiana Supreme Court
   confine its reply to the precise form or scope of the question certified. We
   will resolve this case in accordance with any opinion provided on this
   question by the Court. The Clerk of this Court is directed to transmit this
   certification and request to the Louisiana Supreme Court in conformity with
   the usual practice.
          QUESTION CERTIFIED.

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   James L. Dennis, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
          This case is straightforward. La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3), part of
   Louisiana’s oil and gas conservation law, allows a unit operator to unilaterally
   sell production under specific conditions and imposes a specific duty of
   repayment to the owner. Negotiorum gestio, by contrast, is a traditional civilian
   doctrine, codified at La. Civ. Code art. 2292, that allows one person to
   manage the property of another if certain circumstances are met. Not only
   are La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) and article 2292 distinct legal regimes with
   different requirements and different duties, they are necessarily
   incompatible. A unit operator who sells an owner’s production under the
   statutory authority of La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) cannot be a gestor as defined in
   article 2292, because a gestor, as the codal article provides, is one who acts
   “without authority.” In certifying the question of whether a unit operator
   acting under the authority of § 30:10(A)(3) may simultaneously act as a gestor
   under article 2292, the majority disregards not only the plain text of article
   2292 but also basic rules of statutory interpretation. Because the answer is
   clear that negotiorum gestio cannot apply, I find certification to the Louisiana
   Supreme Court inappropriate. I respectfully dissent.
                                          I.
          Title 30 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes includes a comprehensive
   regime for the conservation of the state’s oil and gas during extraction. The
   Commissioner of Conservation, for the prevention of waste and to avoid the
   drilling of unnecessary wells, is vested with authority to establish a drilling
   unit for each pool of underground oil or gas. B.A. Kelly Land Co. v. Aethon
   Energy Operating, L.L.C., 25 F.4th 369, 374 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing La. R.S.
   30:9(B)). The Commissioner “has the plenary authority to declare drilling
   and production units, to force pool neighboring tracts and leases into a single
   unit, to designate a single well and operator for the unit, and to allocate

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   production from the unit well to each participating tract and lease—all for
   the purpose of conserving resources, avoiding waste, and eliminating
   unnecessary wells.” Peironnet v. Matador Res. Co., 2012-2292, p. 42 (La.
   6/28/13), 144 So. 3d 791, 822 (citing La. R.S. 30:4, 9, 10).
          The designated unit operator has several duties. The operator is
   charged with drilling within the unit and paying a proportionate share of
   production to the owners of mineral interests in the unit. B.A. Kelly, 25 F.4th
   at 275 (citing T D X Energy, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 857 F.3d
   253, 257 (5th Cir. 2017)). However, if an unleased owner is included in the
   unit, as relevant here, the law authorizes the unit operator to instead sell the
   share of production owed to the unleased owner and provide the owner the
   proceeds within 180 days. La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3). Louisiana law also imposes
   a duty on operators to report information to unleased owners if
   requested. B.A. Kelly, 25 F.4th at 375-76 (citing La. R.S. 30:103.1).
          “In both voluntary and compulsory unitization, well cost disputes
   arise. When there is an operating agreement [i.e. a contract or mineral lease]
   among the parties, such disputes are generally addressed in the agreement.”
   Id. at 375 (alteration in original) (quoting 1 Bruce M. Kramer &
   Patrick H. Martin, The Law of Pooling and Unitization
   § 14.04 (3d ed. 2016)). But, in a “forced pooling” regime, the statute itself
   “‘has to address a number of issues that contracts usually decide, such as
   how to allocate costs and risk among those holding interests in the oil and
   gas,’ and how the operator should provide an accounting of well production
   and costs to owners of oil and gas interests.” Id. (quoting T D X Energy,
   L.L.C., 857 F.3d at 256). When the operator proposes to drill a well in a unit,
   it may give notice to owners of oil and gas interests within the unit, allowing
   owners to elect to participate in the risk by contributing to the drilling costs
   up front. Id. (citing T D X Energy, L.L.C., 857 F.3d at 258). If an owner does
   not participate and the well produces, the operator may recover out of

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   production the nonparticipating interest owner’s share of “expenditures
   incurred in drilling, testing, completing, equipping, and operating the well,”
   and, in certain cases and except in the case of an unleased mineral owner, a
   “risk charge” of two hundred percent of the owner’s drilling expenditure
   share. La. R.S. 30:10(A)(2)(b)(i), (e)(i); B.A. Kelly, 25 F.4th at 275.
   However, if an operator fails to timely comply with an unleased mineral
   owner’s request for reporting and also fails to cure its default within thirty
   days of receiving notice of such failure from the unleased owner, then the
   operator cannot collect from the owner “the costs of the drilling operations
   of the well.” La. R.S. 30:103.2; B.A. Kelly, 25 F.4th at 276.
          The statute does not specifically address whether a unit operator may
   deduct post-production costs—those costs after the minerals are reduced to
   possession, including costs related to taxes, transportation, dehydration,
   treating, compressing, and gathering. See J. Fleet Oil & Gas Corp. v.
   Chesapeake La., L.P., No. CV-15-2461, 2018 WL 1463529, at *6 (W.D. La.
   Mar. 22, 2018). Unit operators like the Defendant in this case have raised
   several arguments for why they ought to be allowed to deduct post-
   production costs in the absence of a lease providing as much, but the only
   argument before us is the applicability of negotiorum gestio to the sale of an
   unleased mineral owner’s share of production under La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3).
                                        II.
          As noted, part of Louisiana’s oil and gas conservation law, La. R.S.
   30:10(A)(3), authorizes the unit operator to unilaterally sell the share of
   production owed to an unleased mineral owner. Section 30:10(A)(3) applies
   when there is 1) a unit created by the Commissioner of Conservation 2) which
   includes one or more unleased interests 3) for which the party entitled to
   market production therefrom has not made arrangements to separately sell
   or otherwise dispose of the share of such production attributable to such

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   tract, and 4) the unit operator sells or otherwise disposes of such unit
   production. Then, the unit operator must pay to such party its pro rata share
   of the proceeds within 180 days. Id. This relationship is quasi-contractual.
   Wells v. Zadeck, 2011-1232, p. 6 (La. 3/30/12), 89 So. 3d 1145, 1149. The
   purpose of this relationship is to “facilitate[] the sale of minerals.” See King
   v. Strohe, 95-656, p. 17 (La. App. 3 Cir. 5/8/96), 673 So. 2d 1329, 1338.
          On the other hand, negotiorum gestio—or management of affairs—“is
   a typically civilian institution that derives from the Romanist tradition and is
   found in all civil codes.” La. Civ. Code art. 2292 cmt. (a). Negotiorum
   gestio applies when a person, the manager or gestor, acts 1) without authority,
   2) to protect the interests of another, and 3) in the reasonable belief that the
   owner would approve of the action if made aware of the circumstances. La.
   Civ. Code art. 2292. The gestor must have “undertake[n] the management
   with the ‘benefit’ of the owner in mind” and not have “act[ed] in [its] own
   interest or contrary to the actual or presumed intention of the owner.” Id.
   cmts. (c)-(d); see also Johnco, Inc. v. Jameson Ints., 98-1925, pp. 5-6 (La. App.
   3 Cir. 6/23/99), 741 So. 2d 867, 870; Kirkpatrick v. Young, 456 So. 2d 622,
   624-25 (La. 1984). These requirements generally “depend[] on facts.”
   Woodlief v. Moncure, 17 La. Ann. 241, 242 (La. 1865); see also Bank of the S. v.
   Fort Lauderdale Tech. Coll., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 260, 261 (E.D. La. 1969). Only
   if all these requirements are met does a person qualify as a gestor such that
   “[t]he owner whose affair has been managed is bound to fulfill the obligations
   that the manager has undertaken as a prudent administrator and to reimburse
   the manager for all necessary and useful expenses.” La. Civ. Code art.
   2297. Negotiorum gestio is “rooted in altruism,” and its purpose is to
   “encourage people to assist friends and neighbors in need.” See Cheryl L.
   Martin, Louisiana State Law Institute Proposes Revision of Negotiorum Gestio
   and Codification of Unjust Enrichment, 69 Tul. L. Rev. 181, 186-87, 193
   (1994).

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          “The general rule of statutory construction is that a specific statute
   controls over a broader, more general statute.” Burge v. Louisiana, 2010-
   2229, p. 5 (La. 2/11/11), 54 So. 3d 1110, 1113. This rule has been especially
   true regarding Louisiana’s oil and gas conservation law, modern statutes
   intended to alter and override general legal principles that were inadequate
   for mineral production and conservation.
          The prime example is Nunez v. Wainoco Oil & Gas Co., 488 So. 2d 955
   (La. 1986). In that case, a landowner within a drilling unit sued the unit
   operator for trespass because a well bore crossed onto his property several
   miles below the surface while drilling for oil. Id. at 956-58. The court held
   that “private property law concepts, such as trespass, have been superceded
   in part by Louisiana’s Conservation Law when a unit has been created by
   order of the Commissioner.” Id. at 964. To begin, the court recounted the
   developments in Louisiana’s oil and gas conservation law, from the initial
   “rule of capture” that resulted in “haste, inefficient operations, and
   immeasurable waste within the ground and above” to the present method of
   forced pooling into drilling units, which “was found to convert separate
   interests within the drilling unit into a common interest with regard to the
   development of the unit and the drilling of the well.” Id. at 960-62. This
   change marked a “departure from the traditional notions of private
   property,” and the court “conclude[d] that the established principles of
   private ownership, already found inadequate in Louisiana to deal with the
   problems of subsurface fugacious minerals, need not necessarily be applied
   to other property concepts, like trespass, within a unit.” Id. at 962-63
   (quoting Mire v. Hawkins, 186 So. 2d 591, 596 (La. 1966)). Thus, the court
   “h[e]ld that the more recent legislative enactments of Title 30 and Title 31
   supercede in part La.Civ.Code Ann. art. 490’s general concept of ownership
   of the subsurface by the surface owner of land.” Id. at 964. Importantly, the
   court noted that this scheme not only changed general property principles

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   but also other “legal relationships between landowners and lessees within the
   unit.” Id. at 963; see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. Thompson, 516 So. 2d 376, 393 (La.
   App. 1 Cir. 1987) (holding the oil and gas conservation law is “sui generis”);
   Teekell v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., No. 12-0044, 2012 WL 2049922, at *4
   (W.D. La. June 6, 2012) (“The Nunez opinion makes it clear that unitization
   changes the property rights and obligations of landowners.”); Peironnet,
   2012-2292, at p. 42, 144 So. 3d at 822 (“When such units are created, the
   operations of the designated operator constitute operations for all lessees
   participating in the unit, and the orders of the Commissioner creating said
   units supersede, supplement, replace and are incorporated in the provisions
   and obligations of the leases subject thereto.”).
          As in Nunez, here, the legislature has prescribed a specific quasi-
   contractual relationship between unleased mineral owners and unit operators
   under La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) as part of the oil and gas conservation law. This
   relationship is separate from negotiorum gestio under La. Civ. Code art.
   2292, as each has distinct and specific requirements and duties. The mere
   fact that each relationship is quasi-contractual does not make them the same,
   as a quasi-contractual obligation is simply one that “arise[s] directly from the
   law, regardless of a declaration of will.” See La. Civ. Code art. 1757
   (emphasis added) (noting a nonexclusive list of quasi-contractual obligations
   “in instances such as . . . the management of the affairs of another . . . and
   other acts or facts”); see also Martin, supra, at 184 (noting the term “quasi-
   contract” does not appear anywhere in the Civil Code but is “simply a
   shorthand method for distinguishing this particular type of obligation from a
   contract”).
          In addition to these two relationships being distinct, we cannot apply
   them both to a unit operator without conflict. As stated, a gestor must act
   “without authority.” La. Civ. Code art. 2292. In that way,
   “[m]anagement of another’s affairs pursuant to a legal duty does not give rise

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   to an action under negotiorum gestio.” See Kilpatrick v. Kilpatrick, 27,241, p. 9
   (La. App. 2 Cir. 8/23/95), 660 So. 2d 182, 187. During the 1995 revision of
   the Civil Code articles governing negotiorum gestio, the legislature replaced
   the requirement that the gestor act “of his own accord” with the requirement
   that the gestor act “without authority” to make clear that the requirement is
   not merely voluntariness but “an absence of authority altogether,” including
   authority granted by statute—appropriate for a doctrine rooted in pure
   altruism. Martin, supra, at 189-90 (discussing examples of statutory grants of
   authority that eliminate negotiorum gestio as a theory of recovery after the
   revision). Here, however, the unit operator does not act without authority.
   To the contrary, the unit operator is specifically authorized to sell an
   unleased mineral owner’s share of production under La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3).
   Cf. Martin, supra, at 189-90 (“[A] co-owner has authority to manage that
   which is co-owned [under La. Civ. Code art. 802]. Therefore, the phrase
   ‘without authority’ clearly eliminates negotiorum gestio as a basis for liability
   among co-owners.”). Following the rules of statutory interpretation, we
   must “give meaning to every word in the statute” and cannot “read out of
   the statute” the elements one must prove to qualify as a gestor, including that
   one must act without authority. See Bergeron v. Richardson, 2020-01409, p. 5
   (La. 6/30/21), 320 So. 3d 1109, 1113. Because we cannot apply the two
   statutes together consistently, only the specific one applicable to
   conservation applies. See Burge, 54 So. 3d at 1113; Nunez, 488 So. 2d at 962-
   63.1

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           1
               I also note a gestor must act “to protect the interests of another . . . in the
   reasonable belief that the owner would approve of the action if made aware of the
   circumstances,” La. Civ. Code art. 2292, meaning the gestor must have “undertake[n]
   the management with the ‘benefit’ of the owner in mind” and not have “act[ed] in [its]
   own interest or contrary to the actual or presumed intention of the owner,” id. cmts. (c)-
   (d); see also Johnco, 98-1925, at pp. 5-6, 741 So. 2d at 870; Kirkpatrick, 456 So. 2d at 624-25.
   It is highly doubtful a unit operator like the Defendant did so when selling the Plaintiffs’

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Case: 22-30243       Document: 00516888946            Page: 16      Date Filed: 09/08/2023

                                       No. 22-30243

          Taylor v. Smith, 619 So. 2d 881, 887-88 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1993), relied
   on by the majority, did not hold otherwise. The only issue before the court in
   Taylor was whether the liberative prescription period applicable to actions in
   tort or the one applicable to actions in quasi-contract applied to an action by
   an unleased mineral owner seeking to recover proceeds under La. R.S.
   30:10(A)(3). Id. at 885-88. Because the obligation of the unit operator was
   “imposed ‘without any agreement’ but instead, ‘imposed by the sole
   authority of the laws,’” the court found the “cause of action against the unit
   operator sounds in quasi-contract and is subject to a liberative prescription of
   ten (10) years.” Id. at 888. While the court elsewhere stated, without
   analysis, that a unit operator “is acting as a negotiorum gestor or manager of
   the owner’s business in selling the oil produced,” that statement was dicta
   unnecessary to the court’s holding. To the extent the court did hold
   negotiorum gestio applied, it did so before the legislative amendment,
   discussed above, that clarified a gestor is only one who acts “without
   authority,” including statutory authority. La. Civ. Code art. 2292;
   Martin, supra, at 189-90. This amendment abrogated what the majority
   mistakenly believes is the holding in Taylor, that negotiorum gestio may apply
   to a unit operator acting under the authority of La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3).
                                           ***
          Because the oil and gas conservation law provides a unique quasi-
   contractual relationship between unleased mineral owners and unit operators
   under La. R.S. 30:10(A)(3) and this relationship cannot be applied
   consistently with negotiorum gestio under La. Civ. Code art. 2292, utilizing
   basic rules of statutory interpretation, we should apply only the specific

          _____________________
   share of production. However, that is a question of fact on which the Defendant has the
   burden of proof. See Woodlief, 17 La. Ann. at 242; Bank of the S., 301 F. Supp. at 261.

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                                   No. 22-30243

   provision under § 30:10(A)(3). With the proper outcome in this case clear,
   certification to the Louisiana Supreme Court is unwarranted.
         I respectfully dissent.

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