Court Opinion

ID: 9951672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 18:01:20.765683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:00.683389
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13095    Document: 39-1      Date Filed: 03/18/2024   Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13095
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        CHARLES COLEMAN,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20135-DPG-1
                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                22-13095

        Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
                Charles Coleman was indicted on one count of possession
        of a ﬁrearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, see 18 U.S.C.
        § 922(g)(1), after a gun was found in the center console of his car
        during a traﬃc stop. Coleman moved to suppress the evidence, ar-
        guing that neither probable cause nor reasonable suspicion sup-
        ported the warrantless search of his car. Following an evidentiary
        hearing, the district court denied the motion to suppress, and a jury
        later found Coleman guilty at trial. Coleman appeals the denial of
        his motion to suppress. He also raises, for the ﬁrst time on appeal,
        arguments that the indictment was defective and that § 922(g)(1) is
        unconstitutional as applied to convicted felons. After careful re-
        view, we aﬃrm.
                                         I.
                At around 4:00 a.m. on November 30, 2020, two City of Mi-
        ami Police Department Oﬃcers on patrol together in separate ve-
        hicles saw a black Chevrolet Impala that Coleman was driving, run
        a red light in the Little Havana neighborhood. The oﬃcers, Pedro
        Moreno and David Torres, activated their overhead lights and
        pulled the car over.
              When the Impala came to a stop, both oﬃcers observed
        Coleman turning his upper body to the right and moving his arms
        and shoulders, as if he was “ﬁddling” or “ﬁdgeting” with the center
        console. Oﬃcer Moreno approached the driver’s side door with his
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        22-13095               Opinion of the Court                        3

        gun drawn and ordered Coleman to put his hands up and step out
        of the car. Coleman complied, and Oﬃcer Torres detained him at
        the rear of the Impala.
               While Oﬃcer Moreno was standing near the driver’s side
        door, he observed with the aid of a ﬂashlight that the center con-
        sole was “partially open” and was being prevented from closing by
        “what appeared to be the back strap of a ﬁrearm.” Moreno reached
        inside the car and retrieved a ﬁrearm from the console. Coleman
        was not in handcuﬀs at this time. The oﬃcers secured the ﬁrearm
        and after making additional inquiries, learned that Coleman was a
        convicted felon, at which point they placed him under arrest.
                                         II.
                 In March 2021, a federal grand jury returned an indictment
        charging Coleman with one count of possession of a ﬁrearm and
        ammunition after having been convicted of a felony, in violation of
        18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). The indictment alleged that, on November
        30, 2020, Coleman “knowingly possessed a ﬁrearm and ammuni-
        tion . . . , knowing that he had previously been convicted of a crime
        punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.”
                Coleman ﬁled a motion to suppress the evidence, and the
        district court held an evidentiary hearing in May 2022. After hear-
        ing the oﬃcers’ testimony and viewing body-worn camera video
        of the incident, the court denied the motion to suppress. The court
        found that the oﬃcers testiﬁed credibly and consistently with each
        other and the body-worn camera video. And the court concluded
        that probable cause existed for the traﬃc stop and that reasonable
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                       22-13095

        suspicion supported conducting a protective search of the center
        console for weapons.
               Coleman proceeded to a jury trial in June 2022. Among
        other evidence presented, the parties stipulated that Coleman
        “knew that prior to November 30, 2020, he had been convicted of
        a felony oﬀen[s]e, which is a crime punishable by imprisonment for
        more than one year.” The court also instructed the jury that one
        of the elements they must ﬁnd beyond a reasonable doubt was that
        “at the time the defendant possessed the ﬁrearm or ammunition,
        the defendant knew he had previously been convicted of a felony.”
        The jury returned a guilty verdict. 1 Coleman appeals.
                                              III.
               We start with the denial of the motion to suppress. We re-
        view the district court’s ﬁndings of fact for clear error and its appli-
        cation of law to the facts de novo. United States v. Johnson, 921 F.3d
        991, 997 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc). “We view the evidence in the
        light most favorable to the government, as the party that prevailed
        in the district court.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
               Under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), “[w]hen an oﬃcer rea-
        sonably believes that a suspect threatens his safety or the safety of
        others, he may search the suspect and seize concealed objects that
        he reasonably believes may be weapons or other instruments of as-
        sault.” Johnson, 921 F.3d at 997. The “sole justiﬁcation” for such a

        1 Based on a jury note during deliberations, Coleman filed a motion to recon-

        sider the denial of his motion to suppress, which the district court denied.
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        22-13095                  Opinion of the Court                               5

        search “is the protection of the police oﬃcer and others nearby,” so
        it must “be conﬁned in scope to an intrusion reasonably designed
        to discover” weapons. Terry, 392 U.S. at 29.
                In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), “the Supreme Court
        held that a protective Terry search can extend to the passenger com-
        partment of an automobile in the absence of probable cause to ar-
        rest.” United States v. Aldridge, 719 F.2d 368, 372 (11th Cir. 1983).
        The Court reasoned “that roadside encounters between police and
        suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may arise from
        the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a sus-
        pect.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1049. These interests, according to the
        Court, compelled the conclusion that oﬃcers may search a vehi-
        cle’s passenger compartment for weapons, so long as they have rea-
        sonable suspicion that the suspect is dangerous and might access
        the vehicle to gain immediate control of weapons. Id. at 1048–51;
        See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 346 (2009) (“[Long] permits an of-
        ﬁcer to search a vehicle’s passenger compartment when he has rea-
        sonable suspicion than an individual . . . is dangerous and might
        access the vehicle to gain immediate control of weapons.”).
               This case is controlled by Long, though any reference to that
        case is conspicuously absent from Coleman’s brieﬁng. 2 Coleman

        2 Coleman’s briefing instead concerns the “protective sweep” doctrine, a re-

        lated but distinct doctrine extending Terry to permit a cursory inspection of a
        residence upon reasonable suspicion “that the area to be swept harbors an in-
        dividual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.” Maryland v. Buie, 494
        U.S. 325, 333–35 (1990). Of course, as Coleman notes, “It is highly unlikely
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        6                        Opinion of the Court                    22-13095

        does not dispute that the traﬃc stop was supported by probable
        cause. And the circumstances facing the oﬃcers provided reason-
        able suspicion that Coleman was armed and dangerous.
               As the district court found, both oﬃcers credibly testiﬁed
        that they could see into Coleman’s vehicle when it came to a stop,
        and that they saw him “ﬁdgeting in the vehicle” and “mov[ing] his
        torso toward the center console.” Based on their training and ex-
        perience, as well as common sense, the oﬃcers could reasonably
        believe that Coleman was attempting to conceal or retrieve some-
        thing from the center console. Consistent with that suspicion,
        when Oﬃcer Moreno reached the driver’s side door and ordered
        Coleman out of the vehicle, he could see the center console
        propped open by a black object, which he suspected to be a ﬁrearm.
        Moreno then lifted the lid to the console—an area where a weapon
        could be placed or hidden and easily accessed by the driver—and
        recovered a ﬁrearm from inside. See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049–50.
               Given the “especially hazardous” nature of roadside encoun-
        ters between police and suspects, the oﬃcers’ observations at the
        scene were suﬃcient to justify an “articulable and objectively rea-
        sonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.” Long, 463
        U.S. at 1051. That Coleman may have been eﬀectively under the
        oﬃcers’ control during the stop—detained by Oﬃcer Torres near
        the rear of the vehicle, but not in handcuﬀs or under arrest—does
        not eliminate the danger to oﬃcer safety. See id. at 1051–52.

        that another individual would be found hiding in the vehicle’s console.” But
        that’s not the inquiry here, as Long makes clear.
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        22-13095               Opinion of the Court                          7

        Rejecting this same argument, the Supreme Court in Long ex-
        plained that a Terry suspect may “break away from police control
        and retrieve a weapon from his automobile,” or he may regain “ac-
        cess to weapons” if permitted to return to his vehicle when the stop
        ends. Id. at 1052; see Johnson, 921 F.3d at 1001 (“[S]uspects have been
        known to reach for weapons even when handcuﬀed.”). So the Su-
        preme Court has “not required that oﬃcers adopt alternate means
        to ensure their safety in order to avoid the intrusion involved in a
        Terry encounter.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1052. Accordingly, the district
        court did not err in denying the motion to suppress.
                                         IV.
               Next, Coleman contends for the ﬁrst time on appeal that his
        indictment was jurisdictionally defective and failed to provide fair
        notice because it did not allege that he knew his status as a felon,
        also known as the “knowledge-of-status” element. See Rehaif v.
        United States, 588 U.S. ___, 139 S. Ct. 2191, 2194 (2019) (“To convict
        a defendant, the [g]overnment . . . must show that the defendant
        knew he possessed a ﬁrearm and also that he knew he had the rel-
        evant status [as a felon] when he possessed it.”).
               For starters, as Coleman acknowledges, our precedent fore-
        closes his jurisdictional argument. United States v. Moore, 954 F.3d
        1322, 1336 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that the omission of the
        knowledge-of-status element in an indictment “does not deprive
        the district court of subject matter jurisdiction”). That’s so even
        though the indictment failed to reference § 924(a)(2), which sets
        out the penalties for a § 922(g) violation. United States v. Leonard, 4
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        8                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13095

        F.4th 1134, 1143 (11th Cir. 2021) (stating that, “because the text of
        § 922(g) implies a knowledge-of-status element, an indictment that
        alleges violations of § 922(g) confers subject matter jurisdiction,”
        notwithstanding the failure to reference § 924(a)(2)).
                More fundamentally, Coleman’s challenge fails because the
        indictment included Rehaif’s knowledge-of-status element. The in-
        dictment expressly alleged that Coleman knowingly possessed the
        ﬁrearm “knowing that he had previously been convicted of a crime
        punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.” He
        later stipulated to that same fact at trial, and the jury was charged
        on the knowledge-of-status element. In other words, the indict-
        ment alleged, and the jury found, that Coleman knew he was a
        felon when he possessed the gun.
               Coleman responds that, in his view, the government was re-
        quired to go further and both allege and prove he knew that his
        felon status prohibited him from lawfully possessing a gun. But
        Rehaif itself does not support that claim. See Rehaif, 139 S. Ct. at
        2198 (explaining that a defendant’s ignorance of “the existence of
        a statute proscribing his conduct” is no excuse). Nor is it consistent
        with our precedent applying Rehaif. See, e.g., United States v. Coats,
        8 F.4th 1228, 1234–35 (11th Cir. 2021) (“[T]he knowledge-of-status
        element requires proof that at the time he possessed the ﬁrearm he
        was aware he had a prior conviction for a crime punishable by im-
        prisonment for a term exceeding one year.”) (quotation marks
        omitted); United States v. Innocent, 977 F.3d 1077, 1082 (11th Cir.
        2020) (“The Supreme Court clariﬁed in Rehaif v. United States that
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        22-13095                Opinion of the Court                          9

        a defendant must know both that he possesses a ﬁrearm and that
        he has been convicted of a crime punishable by imprisonment for
        more than a year to violate section 922(g)(1).”); see also United States
        v. Johnson, 981 F.3d 1171 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that a defendant
        convicted of possessing a ﬁrearm as a domestic misdemeanant
        needed to know only that he had been convicted of a misdemeanor
        and he must have known the facts that made the crime qualify as a
        misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, not that he needed to
        know that his status as a domestic misdemeanant precluded him
        from possessing a ﬁrearm).
                 In sum, either prior precedent forecloses or the record con-
        tradicts Coleman’s Rehaif arguments. See United States v. Vega-Cas-
        tillo, 540 F.3d 1235, 1236 (11th Cir. 2008) (“[W]e are bound to follow
        a prior binding precedent unless and until it is overruled by this
        court en banc or by the Supreme Court.”) (quotation marks omit-
        ted). We aﬃrm.
                                          V.
                 Finally, Coleman contends that § 922(g)(1) is unconstitu-
        tional as applied to convicted felons, in light of the Supreme
        Court’s recent decision in New York State Riﬂe & Pistol Association,
        Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022).
                We review this argument for plain error because Coleman
        raised it for the ﬁrst time on appeal. See United States v. Vereen, 920
        F.3d 1300, 1312 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Objections not raised in the dis-
        trict court are reviewed only for plain error.”). “When neither this
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13095

        Court nor the Supreme Court have resolved an issue, there can be
        no plain error in regard to that issue.” Id.
               Here, Coleman cannot establish any error, plain or other-
        wise. In United States v. Rozier, we held that felons as a class of per-
        sons were not qualiﬁed to possess a handgun under the Second
        Amendment. 598 F.3d 768, 771 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Dist. of Co-
        lumbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008)). Notwithstanding Rozier, Cole-
        man maintains Bruen changed the relevant inquiry and that
        § 922(g)(1) fails Bruen’s historical-tradition test. But we recently
        held that Bruen did not overrule or abrogate Rozier, which remains
        binding under the prior precedent rule. United States v. Dubois, __
        F.3d __, No. 22-10829, manuscript op. at 13–14 (11th Cir. Mar. 5,
        2024); see Vega-Castillo, 540 F.3d at 1236. Accordingly, we reject
        Coleman’s challenge based on the Second Amendment.
                                          VI.
               In sum, the district court properly denied Coleman’s motion
        to suppress, Coleman’s challenges to the indictment are contra-
        dicted by the record or prior precedent, and § 922(g)(1) is constitu-
        tional under our precedent notwithstanding Bruen. We therefore
        aﬃrm Coleman’s convictions and sentence.
               AFFIRMED.