Court Opinion

ID: 9743114
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:25:40.358646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:39.385414
License: Public Domain

HENDERSON, Justice
(dissenting).
For the reasons expressed herein, I would reverse the trial court’s ruling and hold SDCL 32-22-55 to be void as it violates the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy embodied in S.D. Const, art. VI, § 9, and U.S. Const, amend. V.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part: “No person shall ... be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... ” The South Dakota Constitution also protects this personal right and in Article VI, § 9, it provides: “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against himself or be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.” In State v. Grey Owl, 316 N.W.2d 801, 803 (S.D.1982), we expressed with respect to this specific Bill of Right composed by our forefathers:
The constitutional guaranty against double jeopardy does three things: (1) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 78 S.Ct. 221, 2 L.Ed.2d 199 (1957); (2) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 9 S.Ct. 672, 33 L.Ed. 118 (1889); and (3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense, United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 51 S.Ct. 113, 75 L.Ed. 354 (1931).
Addressing the multiple punishment issue, the United States Supreme Court stated:
“The argument seems to us irresistible, and we do not doubt that the Constitution was designed as much to prevent the criminal from being twice punished for the same offense as from being twice tried for it.”
United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304, 308, 51 S.Ct. 113, 114, 75 L.Ed. 354, 357 (1931) (quoting Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 173, 21 L.Ed. 872, 878 (1874)). “The double jeopardy provision protects an accused not only from a second prosecution, but also from multiple punishments for the same criminal conduct.” 1 C. Torcia, Wharton’s Criminal Law § 54, at 280 (14th ed. 1978). It is multiple punishments that we address in this case and it is vital that we understand our state and national *543constitutions upon which to predicate a sound constitutional holding.
In the present case, defendant Feiok was charged with operating an overweight motor vehicle on a public highway in violation of SDCL 32-22-16. This criminal offense is a Class 2 misdemeanor and is subject to a maximum fine of $100.00 or 30 days in the county jail or both. After trial to the court in Magistrate Court, Feiok was found guilty of an SDCL 32-22-16 violation and fined $88.00 plus $12.00 costs. In addition, the Magistrate Court, under the purview of SDCL 32-22-55, exacted another fine in the amount of $1,290.00. We are confronted with this issue: Is the fine imposed under SDCL 32-22-55, in addition to the punishment imposed under SDCL 32-22-16, a double punishment for the same offense and therefore in violation of the state and federal constitutional provisions hereinbe-fore mentioned?
SDCL 32-22-55 obviously violates the double jeopardy provisions of the United States and South Dakota Constitutions. By operating an overweight motor vehicle on the public highways of this state, a person commits a single criminal violation of SDCL 32-22-16 and a fine is imposed upon those convicted of its violation. One offense — one punishment. SDCL 32-22-55, however, multiplies punishment by providing that any person convicted of operating an overweight vehicle “shall he fined in addition to and not in substitution for any and all penalties now provided by law for such offense ” (Emphasis supplied.) One offense — two punishments. The latter statute intensifies, aggravates, and simply goes too far as it exacts a second “fine,” a second punishment, “in addition to” any previous fine or previous punishment. That the people are protected from such multiple punishments for the same offense is beyond contention.
The majority opinion seeks to save and preserve SDCL 32-22-55 by denominating the punishment commanded thereunder to be a civil penalty. There is no language to suggest, expressly or impliedly, that this is a civil penalty. Although this Court is not shackled to the literal meaning of words, the statute in question speaks of “fines” and “fine schedules.” SDCL 2-14-1 tells us: “Words used are to be understood in their ordinary sense.... ” The legislature did not use the words “civil penalty.” This Court must follow what the legislature said and not what it might have said or should have said or could have said. Elk Point Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 3 v. State Comm’n on Elementary & Secondary Educ., 85 S.D. 600, 187 N.W.2d 666 (1971). We have no right, once it is obvious that a state statute is plain and clear in its meaning, to avoid or produce a particular result.
We have repeatedly stated that when the terms of a statute are clear, certain and unambiguous in their meaning, it is the function of the court to give them effect and not to amend the statute to avoid or produce a particular result.
Matter of Sales Tax Refund Applications, 298 N.W.2d 799, 802 (S.D.1980) (citing Elfring v. Paterson, 66 S.D. 458, 285 N.W. 443 (1939)). “In applying legislative enactments, we must accept them as written. The legislative intent is determined from what the legislature said, rather than from what we or others think it should have said.” Petition of Famous Brands, Inc., 347 N.W.2d 882, 885 (S.D.1984). SDCL 32-22-55 imposes an additional fine for those convicted of violating a criminal statute. A “fine” has consistently been defined as a sum of money exacted from a person guilty of crime, as a pecuniary punishment. Marquart v. Maucker, 215 N.W.2d 278, 281 (Iowa 1974). “Fines” may be distinguished from “penalties” in that fines refer to punishments for violation of criminal law; however, penalties are not so limited. See 36 Am.Jur.2d Forfeitures and Penalties § 4 (1968).
Had the legislature intended to attach a civil penalty to a criminal violation, it most assuredly would have expressed such an intention. It did not do so. Rather, it imposed a second punishment. Because SDCL 32-22-55 implements an additional criminal punishment by reference to a criminal conviction under which a person has *544already been punished, it constitutes double punishment-double jeopardy and is therefore unconstitutional.