Court Opinion

ID: 9654579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:27:21.934382+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:10.949513
License: Public Domain

FINE, J.
¶ 21. 0concurring). Although I agree with the Majority's decision to affirm, I would not reach the forfeiture issue because, as explained in State v. Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, 295 Wis. 2d 801, 722 N.W.2d 136, none of the statements were "testimonial" as that word of art is used in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, ¶¶ 2-27, 295 Wis. 2d at 808-825, 722 N.W.2d at 140-148. State v. Jensen, 2007 WI 26, 299 Wis. 2d 267, 727 N.W.2d 518, did not alter this analysis.
Jensen explained:
*143"The proper inquiry, then, is whether the declarant intends to bear testimony against the accused. That intent, in turn, may he determined by querying whether a reasonable person in the declarant's position would anticipate his statement being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime."
Thus, we believe a broad definition of testimonial is required to guarantee that the right to confrontation is preserved. That is, we do not agree with the State's position that the government needs to be involved in the creation of the statement. We believe such a narrow definition of testimonial could create situations where a declarant could nefariously incriminate a defendant.
Jensen, 2007 WI 26, ¶ 24, 299 Wis. 2d at 284, 727 N.W.2d at 526-527 (footnote overruling State v. Hemphill, 2005 WI App 248, 287 Wis. 2d 600, 707 N.W.2d 313, omitted) (quoting United States v. Cromer, 389 F.3d 662, 675 (6th Cir. 2004)) (internal citation omitted). This is fully consistent with what we wrote in Rodriguez:
A similar analysis applies when police talk to an attack-victim when the stress and cognitive disruption caused by the attack is still dominant, because the key consideration in connection with both the third Crawford/Manuel formulation and Davis's rubric, focuses on an objective analysis of the out-of-court declarant's expectation as to how what he or she tells law enforcement will be used. See Davis [v. Washington], 126 S. Ct. [2266,] 2272-2273 [(2006)]; [State v.] Manuel, 2005 WI 75, ¶ 37, 281 Wis. 2d [554,] 576, 697 N.W.2d [811,] 821 (third formulation concerns " 'statements that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial'") (citation to Crawford omitted). Thus, the out-*144of-court declaration must be evaluated to determine whether it is, on one hand, overtly or covertly intended by the speaker to implicate an accused at a later judicial proceeding, or, on the other hand, is a burst of stress-generated words whose main function is to get help and succor, or to secure safety, and are thus devoid of the "possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation." See [Idaho v.] Wright, 497 U.S. [805,] 820 [(1990)]. We examine against this background what Ms. LaMoore and her daughter Casey told the officers, both at the initial response to the neighbor's 911-call, and the following day.
There is nothing in the Record here that indicates that what Rodriguez does not dispute were "excited utterances" by Ms. LaMoore and Casey when the officers first spoke with them were motivated by anything other than their desire to get help and secure safety. Moreover, given their contemporaneously endured trauma it cannot be said that objectively they said what they said to the officers with a conscious expectation that their words would somehow have the potential for use in court against Rodriguez. It also cannot be said that, objectively, the officers intended to record past activities rather than assess the then-current situation. Moreover, there is nothing in the Record that indicates that anything either Ms. LaMoore or her daughter told the officers during that first encounter was in response to any sort of structured interrogation to questioning beyond simple inquiries. Simply put, Officers Sterling and Kurtz did not go to the LaMoore house looking for evidence with which to prosecute Rodriguez, and, after they arrived, their focus was not on building a case against him but, rather, trying to ensure the safety of Ms. LaMoore and her daughter, and other members of the community. Thus, those out-of-court declarations were not testimonial. Similarly, when Officer Kurtz went to the LaMoore house the next morning to return the dog and other property, his inquiries were limited to an assessment of whether Ms. LaMoore and Casey were *145still in danger, and Casey's tug on the officer's trouser leg and spontaneous exclamation begging her mother not to lie and revealing that Rodriguez was still there and still a severe threat to their safety was also, under our de novo analysis, not "testimonial." Once prodded by her daughter, Ms. LaMoore broke down and admitted the truth in an otherwise unprompted collapse of her fragile pretense that all was well. Those statements, also, were not "testimonial."
Rodriguez, 2006 WI App 163, ¶¶ 26-27, 295 Wis. 2d at 823-825, 722 N.W.2d at 147-148.
¶ 22. As we have seen, a focus of the inquiry of whether an out-of-court declaration is "testimonial" is " 'whether the declarant intends to bear testimony against the accused.'" Jensen, 2007 WI 26, ¶ 24, 299 Wis. 2d at 284, 727 N.W.2d at 527 (quoting Cromer, 389 F.3d at 675)." 'That intent, in turn, may be determined by querying whether a reasonable person in the declarant's position would anticipate his statement being used against the accused in investigating and prosecuting the crime.'" Ibid, (emphasis added). I emphasize the word "may" because almost any person who watches even an occasional law/crime drama on television, or sees a law/crime film would, if he or she thought about it even for a moment, per force, "anticipate" that a statement made to law enforcement would he used in court. Thus, as we explained in Rodriguez, and as we noted above in our long quotation from that decision,
the out-of-court declaration must be evaluated to determine whether it is, on one hand, overtly or covertly intended by the speaker to implicate an accused at a later judicial proceeding, or, on the other hand, is a burst of stress-generated words whose main function is to get help and succor, or to secure safety, and is thus devoid of the "possibility of fabrication, coaching, or confabulation."
*146Id., 2006 WI App 163, ¶ 26, 295 Wis. 2d at 823-824, 722 N.W.2d at 147 (quoted source omitted).
¶ 23. Based on the foregoing, I would affirm but not on the ground chosen by the Majority. Accordingly, I respectfully concur.