Court Opinion

ID: 9943349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-23 14:00:47.218513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:50.045780
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13508    Document: 49-1     Date Filed: 02/23/2024   Page: 1 of 8

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-13508
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       ALEXANDER ROS LAZO,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20536-JEM-1
                          ____________________
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       2                          Opinion of the Court                         22-13508

       Before ROSENBAUM, BRANCH, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Alexander Lazo appeals the district court’s denial of his
       motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
       He argues that the district court erred in determining that (1) he
       failed to show extraordinary and compelling reasons for his
       compassionate release, and (2) compassionate release was
       inappropriate because he posed a danger to the community.1 After
       review, we affirm.
                                      I.      Background
              In 2018, Lazo pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea
       agreement, to conspiracy to commit heath care and wire fraud in
       violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349, and he received a sentence of 87

       1
         We note that the district court denied Lazo’s motion for compassionate
       release on September 23, 2022, and Lazo did not file a notice of appeal until
       October 14, 2022, which is outside the 14-day window for filing a timely notice
       of appeal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 4(b). However, in its brief
       on appeal, the government affirmatively waives any challenge to the
       timeliness of the appeal. See United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1311–13 (11th
       Cir. 2009) (explaining that the deadline for criminal appeals is not jurisdictional
       and may be waived by the government).
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       22-13508                  Opinion of the Court                              3

       months’ imprisonment. 2 Lazo began serving his sentence in May
       2021. 3
              In February 2022, Lazo filed a motion for compassionate
       release and requested that he be resentenced to home
       confinement, arguing that he suffered from medical conditions that
       placed him at high risk for serious illness from COVID-19,
       including diabetes, high blood pressure, asthma, obesity,
       polycythemia vera (a rare blood disorder), and an abnormal lymph
       node in his abdomen. He asserted that his primary care physician
       recommended that he not be vaccinated for COVID-19 due to his
       health conditions. Thus, he maintained that the “unparalleled
       health crisis” caused by the global COVID-19 pandemic coupled
       with his high risk constituted extraordinary and compelling reasons
       for compassionate release under the “other reasons” catch-all
       provision set forth in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(1)(D). Additionally, he

       2 The conspiracy involved submitting false and fraudulent claims to Medicare
       for services that were either not rendered, medically unnecessary, or not
       eligible for Medicare reimbursement. In exchange for Lazo’s guilty plea to the
       conspiracy count, the remaining counts for healthcare fraud (4 counts),
       conspiracy to defraud the United States and pay and receive health care
       kickbacks, and payment of bribes and kickbacks in connection with a federal
       health care program (2 counts) were dismissed.
       3 Lazo’s wife also pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit healthcare and wire
       fraud, and she was sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment. However, because
       Lazo and his wife were the primary caregivers to their elderly parents, the
       district court staggered their sentences, and Lazo’s wife served her sentence
       first, at which point Lazo then had to self-surrender in May 2021.
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                22-13508

       asserted that the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors supported his request.
       The government opposed the motion.
               The district court denied the motion, concluding that Lazo
       did not show extraordinary and compelling reasons as his prison
       medical records showed that his medical conditions were being
       monitored and treated by the prison and those conditions did not
       substantially diminish his ability to provide-self care in prison.
       Furthermore, the district court concluded that even if
       extraordinary and compelling reasons were present,
       compassionate release was not warranted because Lazo posed a
       danger to the community given the nature of his offense. The
       district court noted that Lazo had played a role in an “elaborate and
       sophisticated multi-million-dollar health care fraud scheme that
       spanned nearly a decade” and that his crime “greatly impacted the
       public’s most vulnerable.” Lazo appealed.
                                 II.    Discussion
               Lazo argues that in light of his various medical conditions,
       the district court erred in concluding that he failed to establish
       extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release.
       He maintains that “his high susceptibility to COVID-19 falls within
       the purview of [the] catchall” provision in U.S.S.G. 1B1.13,
       application note (1)(D). Additionally, he argues that the district
       court abused its discretion in finding that he posed a danger to the
       community—a conclusion which he contends is undermined
       significantly by the fact that the district court allowed him to stay
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       22-13508               Opinion of the Court                         5

       out of custody for over two years after sentencing before self-
       surrendering.
               We review de novo whether a defendant is eligible for an
       18 U.S.C. § 3582(c) sentence reduction. United States v. Bryant, 996
       F.3d 1243, 1251 (11th Cir. 2021). We review a district court’s denial
       of a movant’s § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion. United
       States v. Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 911 (11th Cir. 2021).
             Generally, a court “may not modify a term of imprisonment
       once it has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). Section
       3582(c)(1)(A), however, provides the following limited exception:
             the court, upon motion of the Director of the [BOP],
             or upon motion of the defendant after the defendant
             has fully exhausted all administrative rights . . . may
             reduce the term of imprisonment . . ., after
             considering the factors set forth in section 3553(a) to
             the extent that they are applicable, if it ﬁnds that . . .
             extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a
             reduction . . . and that such a reduction is consistent
             with applicable policy statements issued by the
             Sentencing Commission.

       Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Thus, under § 3582(c)(1)(A), the district court
       may reduce a movant’s imprisonment term if: (1) there are
       “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for doing so,
       (2) the factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) favor doing so, and
       (3) doing so is consistent with the policy statements in U.S.S.G.
       § 1B1.13. United States v. Tinker, 14 F.4th 1234, 1237 (11th Cir.
       2021). If the district court finds against the movant on any one of
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       6                          Opinion of the Court                         22-13508

       these requirements, it cannot grant relief, and need not analyze the
       other requirements. United States v. Giron, 15 F.4th 1343, 1347–48
       (11th Cir. 2021); Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–38 (explaining that
       “nothing on the face of 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) requires a court to
       conduct the compassionate-release analysis in any particular
       order”).
              When the district court ruled on Lazo’s motion in
       September 2022, the Sentencing Commission defined
       “extraordinary and compelling reasons” for purposes of
       § 3582(c)(1)(A) in Application Note 1 to U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. 4
       Pursuant to this definition, there were four circumstances under
       which “extraordinary and compelling reasons exist[ed],” including
       as relevant here, that: (A) the defendant suffers from (i) “a terminal

       4 Notably, while this appeal was pending, the United States Sentencing
       Commission amended § 1B1.13 and added new grounds that constitute
       extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release, which took
       effect in November 2023. See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b) (2023). One of these new
       grounds is that the movant has health risk factors that place him “at increased
       risk of suffering severe medical complications or death as a result of exposure
       to [an] ongoing outbreak of infectious disease” and “such risk cannot be
       adequately mitigated in a timely manner.” Id. § 1B1.13(b)(1)(D). We note,
       however, that these substantive changes to § 1B1.13 do not apply
       retroactively, and the parties do not argue otherwise. See United States v.
       Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181, 1184 (11th Cir. 2011) (explaining that only “clarifying”
       amendments are given retroactive effect on appeal; “substantive”
       amendments are “not applied retroactively”); United States v. Summers, 176
       F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[A]lteration of actual Guideline language
       strongly suggests that a substantive change was being made.”). Therefore, we
       focus on the version of U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 that was in effect at the time the district
       court rendered its decision. Jerchower, 631 F.3d at 1184.
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       22-13508               Opinion of the Court                        7

       illness,” or (ii) a permanent health condition “that substantially
       diminish the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within the
       environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is
       not expected to recover”; or (D) there exist “other” extraordinary
       and compelling reasons “[a]s determined by the Director of the
       Bureau of Prisons.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1 (A), (D). We held
       in Bryant that “district courts are bound by the Commission’s
       definition of ‘extraordinary and compelling reasons’ found in
       [§] 1B1.13,” and that Application Note 1(D) “[did] not grant
       discretion to courts to develop ‘other reasons’ that might justify a
       reduction in a defendant’s sentence.” Bryant, 996 F.3d at 1248,
       1262–65.
               Lazo was eligible for compassionate release only if he
       showed that he had a terminal illness or that the medical conditions
       substantially diminished his ability to provide self-care while in
       prison. U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 cmt. n.1(A). He failed to show either.
       Although he argues that his medical conditions place him at severe
       risk from COVID-19, his medical records show that his conditions
       are being treated and are manageable in prison. We have upheld
       denials of similar motions for compassionate release where an
       inmate’s medical conditions are manageable in prison, even when
       those conditions may place an inmate at an increased risk from
       COVID-19. See Giron, 15 F.4th at 1346 (holding that the district
       court did not err in denying compassionate release to an inmate
       with high cholesterol, high blood pressure, and coronary artery
       disease even though inmate was at increased risk from COVID-19
       because his conditions were manageable in prison); United States v.
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       8                          Opinion of the Court                       22-13508

       Harris, 989 F.3d 908, 912 (11th Cir. 2021) (holding that the district
       court did not abuse its discretion by denying compassionate release
       to an inmate with hypertension despite the increased risk of death
       or severe medical complications from COVID-19). Moreover,
       Lazo made no allegation that any of his medical conditions
       interfered with his ability to provide self-care. Thus, he did not
       satisfy § 1B1.13 cmt. (n.1)(A).
              Finally, although Lazo asserts that the district court had the
       discretion under subsection (D) to determine that his
       circumstances qualified as “other” extraordinary and compelling
       reasons, his argument is foreclosed by our decision in Bryant. 996
       F.3d at 1248, 1262–65. 5
            Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s denial of Lazo’s
       motion for compassionate release.
               AFFIRMED.

       5 Because we conclude that Lazo failed to establish extraordinary and
       compelling reasons for compassionate release, we do not reach his argument
       that the district court abused its discretion in determining that his request was
       not supported by the § 3553(a) factors because he posed a danger to the
       community. See Tinker, 14 F.4th at 1237–38 (“Because all three conditions—
       i.e., support in the § 3553(a) factors, extraordinary and compelling reasons, and
       adherence to § 1B1.13’s policy statement—are necessary, the absence of even
       one would foreclose a sentence reduction.”).