Court Opinion

ID: 9393933
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-11 17:01:47.141116+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:56.175684
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-14177    Document: 16-1     Date Filed: 05/11/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 22-14177
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiff-Appellee,
       versus
       MIGUEL MORALES COLON,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 0:13-cr-60166-WPD-1
                          ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-14177

       Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Miguel Morales Colon, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se,
       appeals the district court’s order denying his motion under
       18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Rather than responding, the government
       moves for summary affirmance. We address the parties’ conten-
       tions in turn.
                                        I.
               In 2013, Colon was charged with one count of receipt of
       child pornography, based on an event occurring on June 20, 2013,
       in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (“Count One”); and one count
       of possession of child pornography, based on an event taking place
       the following day, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and
       (b)(2) (“Count Two”). After a trial, a jury found Colon guilty on
       both counts.
               The presentence investigation report later assigned Colon 2
       points under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) because the receipt and pos-
       session offenses also involved distribution of child pornography.
       Colon objected to this two-level increase both before sentencing
       and at sentencing, asserting that he did not distribute child pornog-
       raphy. Making a finding that Colon had knowingly distributed
       child pornography, the court overruled the objection. The court
       sentenced Colon to 240 months’ imprisonment as to each count,
       set to run concurrently, and 5 years of supervised release.
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       22-14177                Opinion of the Court                          3

              Later, Colon, proceeding pro se, moved the district court to
       reduce his total sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), based on
       Amendment 801 to the Sentencing Guidelines. He contended that
       Amendment 801 was implemented, in part, to address a circuit split
       as to whether a defendant had to “knowingly” distribute child por-
       nography to be eligible for the two-level offense level enhancement
       under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F). He also asserted that Amendment
       801 should apply because there was no evidence presented as to his
       mental state. He asserted that the amendment would have low-
       ered his guideline range to 168-210 months’ imprisonment.
              The district court denied Colon’s motion, setting forth three
       bases for this ruling. First, it found that Amendment 801 was a
       substantive amendment, not a merely clarifying amendment. Sec-
       ond, and in any event, it found that Colon had knowingly placed
       child pornography in shared files such that he knowingly distrib-
       uted child pornography even under Amendment 801. Finally, it
       noted that there would be no prejudice because a two-level reduc-
       tion of his offense level under the guidelines would have caused it
       to vary upwards to 240 months. Accordingly, it also denied the
       motion as a matter of discretion.
              This appeal followed.
                                         II.
              Summary disposition is appropriate where “the position of
       one of the parties is clearly right as a matter of law so that there can
       be no substantial question as to the outcome of the case, or where,
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       4                         Opinion of the Court                     22-14177

       as is more frequently the case, the appeal is frivolous.” Groendyke
       Transp., Inc. v. Davis, 406 F.2d 1158, 1161-62 (5th Cir. 1969). 1 We
       review de novo a district court’s legal conclusions regarding the
       scope of its authority under the Sentencing Guidelines in a
       § 3582(c)(2) proceeding. United States v. Anderson, 772 F.3d 662,
       666 (11th Cir. 2014).
               Once a sentence of imprisonment has been pronounced, a
       district court’s authority to modify it is narrowly limited by statute.
       United States v. Phillips, 597 F.3d 1190, 1194-95 (11th Cir. 2010). A
       district court may modify a defendant’s term of imprisonment
       where the defendant was sentenced “based on a sentencing range
       that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commis-
       sion . . . if such a reduction is consistent with the applicable policy
       statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 18 U.S.C.
       § 3582(c)(2). To obtain a reduction in a term of imprisonment
       based on an amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines, the relevant
       amendment must be listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d). U.S.S.G.
       § 1B1.10(a)(1).
               Amendment 801, which became effective in November 2016
       after Colon was sentenced in 2013, revised the language of U.S.S.G.
       § 2G2.2(b)(3)(F) from “[i]f the offense involved . . . distribution
       other than distribution described in subdivisions (A) through (E),”
       to “If the defendant knowingly engaged in distribution, other than

               1 We are bound by decisions issued by the former Fifth Circuit. Bon-
       ner v. City of Prichard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1210 (11th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
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       22-14177               Opinion of the Court                         5

       described in subdivisions (A) through (E).” U.S.S.G. amend. 801
       (emphasis added). Importantly, Amendment 801 is not one of the
       listed amendments in the policy statement in § 1B1.10(d). Id.
       § 1B1.10(d).
              On direct appeal, we typically review the district court’s ap-
       plication of the Guidelines using the version in effect on the date of
       sentencing. United States v. Jerchower, 631 F.3d 1181, 1184 (11th
       Cir. 2011). However, we will consider clarifying amendments to
       the Guidelines on direct appeal, regardless of the date of sentenc-
       ing, because the amendments do not represent a substantive
       change in the Guidelines. Id. Unlike with clarifying amendments,
       however, we will not apply substantive amendments retroactively.
       Id.
              Amendments to the commentary of the Sentencing Guide-
       lines—or “clarifying amendments”—that are not listed in subsec-
       tion (d) may be applied retroactively “only in the context of a direct
       appeal and a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition.” United States v.
       Armstrong, 347 F.3d 905, 908-09 & n.6 (11th Cir. 2003). In the con-
       text of a § 3582(c)(2) reduction of a term of imprisonment, an
       amendment, whether clarifying or not, may be applied retroac-
       tively only if it is listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d). Id. at 909.
              Here, the district court did not err. Amendment 801, which
       Colon based his instant § 3582(c)(2) motion upon, is not listed in
       § 1B1.10(d). See U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d). Therefore, the district court
       could not reduce his term of imprisonment because Amendment
       801 was not retroactively applicable in § 3582(c)(2) proceedings.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-14177

       See id. § 1B1.10(a)(1); 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). Likewise, Colon’s ar-
       gument concerning the difference between clarifying and substan-
       tive amendments is inapplicable here, because that rule only deter-
       mines whether an amendment is retroactive on direct appeal, not
       during § 3582(c)(2) proceedings. See Jerchower, 631 F.3d at 1184;
       Armstrong, 347 F.3d at 909. Accordingly, the district court lacked
       the authority to modify Colon’s total sentence and properly denied
       his § 3582(c)(2) motion. See Phillips, 597 F.3d at 1194-95.
              Moreover, as the district court found, the evidence pre-
       sented at trial and compiled in the presentence investigation report
       supported a conclusion that Colon had knowingly engaged in the
       distribution of child pornography. And the district court made
       such a finding at sentencing. Accordingly, Colon would not benefit
       from Amendment 801 even if it were retroactively applicable.
              For these reasons, the government’s position is clearly cor-
       rect as a matter of law, and we GRANT its motion for summary
       affirmance.
              AFFIRMED. 2

       2 We DENY as moot the Government’s motion to stay the briefing schedule.