Court Opinion

ID: 9852392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:29:43.693052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:27.124559
License: Public Domain

*97Wines, D. J.,
dissenting:
The Second Claim for Relief is stated in terms of unjust enrichment, the Third Claim is for overcharges. The facts alleged in the First Claim for Relief and the facts settled by the Stipulation of Facts between these parties, have been recited in the majority opinion, except specific mention is not therein made of these facts — there were no negotiations between these parties when the changeover was made; the Nyes were not informed by an agent of the Power Company concerning rate schedules, nor of the rate schedules assigned in charging the Nyes’ predecessor, nor of the Power Company’s policy regarding trailer parks. It is conceded that in neither the Stipulation of Facts or the Complaint is there any mention of fraud, per se. It does not appear affirmatively from the Record that the trial court was asked to find fraud, nor that fraud was considered by the trial court. But if the issue was before the trial court by virtue of the settled facts, and I think it was, the rule that a point not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal is not properly applied in this instance. The action was argued here without objection by the Power Company on the theory of fraud. If the import of settled facts was not discerned by the trial court it is error.
But it may be that I mistake the sense of the majority opinion. After referring to the rule of timely submission of theory we find this — “The absence of such an express finding implies a finding that there was no fraud if the question had been presented to the trial court.” One should not question serendipity. Instead I borrow the majority conclusion that it is the duty of the utility to inform the consumer on matters affecting his interest.
If the rule of the trial court is to be set aside, it must be held as a matter of law that the utility owes the consumer a duty to inform the consumer and to assign the rate he selects as favorable to him. Concealment of a material fact like a misrepresentation of a fact amounts to fraud, if there is an obligation to communicate. The obligation arises from the relationship of the *98parties, such as when a confidential relation exists, or it may result from the peculiar and exclusive knowledge of one of the parties. See Words and Phrases, Fraud, Yol. 17-A at page 34; and the same volume at page 127 on the subject of Fraudulent Concealment. A number of jurisdictions, as in Nevada since 1962 by rule of the Public Service Commission, have resolved this issue in favor of the consumer. See El Paso Electric Co. v. Reynolds Holding Co., 128 Tex. 495, 100 S.W.2d 97, 108 A.L.R. 744; 38 A.L.R. 1063; and Rules of the Public Service Commission of Nevada for 1962.
The duty to the consumer is found in the public nature of a utility enterprise and the fact that the utility has a knowledge of rate schedules not within the reasonable reach of the consumer. If there is any validity in these assigned reasons for abandoning the maxim of caveat emptor, though a number of jurisdictions have refused to do so, the common law is doctrinaire in this situation. We know by the public law that utilities are invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties to the consumer. If we are honest we will confess our bewilderment with the rate schedules here studied and grant that comprehension of the schedules requires esoteric knowledge. It is manifest that the utility comes to the arena especially well armed.
This is a general policy, but it should be noted that there is a fact peculiar to this action. The allusion is, of course, to be adopted but undeclared policy of assigning a specified rate schedule to a type of enterprise. Our Public Service Commission exists for the purpose of passing upon such policies and it is the duty of the utility to submit the policy for approval before acting upon it. The overcharge, or discriminatory rate, is not in this instance the consequence of an innocent unilateral mistake but of design.
I would therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court directing that judgment be entered for the plaintiff in the full amount prayed for together with the interest as prayed for.
Badt, C. J., and Thompson, J., being disqualified, the Governor commissioned Honorable Taylor H. Wines, *99Judge of the Fourth Judicial District Court, and Honorable David Zenoff, Judge of the Eighth Judicial District Court, to sit in their places.