Court Opinion

ID: 9926612
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-25 15:05:37.306999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:47.723666
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1884-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KHALIL WHEELERWEAVER,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_____________________________

                   Argued December 6, 2023 – Decided January 25, 2024

                   Before Judges Currier, Firko and Susswein.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 17-02-0547.

                   Stephen William Kirsch, Designated Counsel, argued
                   the cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
                   Defender, attorney; Stephen William Kirsch, on the
                   brief).

                   Frank J. Ducoat, Special Deputy Attorney
                   General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause
                   for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens II, Acting Essex
                   County Prosecutor, attorney; Frank J. Ducoat, of
                   counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

       Defendant Khalil Wheelerweaver1 appeals his jury trial convictions for

the murder of three women and the sexual assault and attempted murder of a

fourth woman. He also was convicted of kidnapping, aggravated sexual assault,

desecration of human remains, and aggravated arson, and was sentenced to an

aggregate prison term of 160 years.

       On appeal, defendant contends the charges involving each victim should

have been tried separately. He argues the judge improperly instructed the jury

on how to consider the evidence of the multiple criminal episodes. He also

argues police violated his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and the trial

judge erred when he informed the jury on his ruling issued following the

Miranda2 hearing.     Further, defendant contends his sentence is manifestly

excessive. Based upon our review of the record, the parties' arguments, and the

applicable legal principles, we affirm.

1
  Defendant's surname is also spelled as "Wheeler-Weaver" at times. However,
the judgment of conviction and notice of appeal use the non-hyphenated
spelling.
2
    Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
                                                                         A-1884-21
                                          2
                                         I.

        We discern the following pertinent facts from the record. We summarize

the crimes in the chronological order in which they were committed.

Victim R.W.3 (deceased)

        On August 31, 2016, R.W. was walking with Breniesha Patterson and

another woman on a street known for prostitution in Newark. They planned to

engage in sex work. Patterson testified a car drove up and the driver "wanted"

R.W., who got into the vehicle. Patterson told the driver, "[b]e careful with my

sister because I love her," and "I'm going to take your license plate." She

recorded the license plate number. R.W. sent Patterson a Facebook message

twenty minutes later.      Patterson never heard from R.W. again.        Patterson

reported R.W. missing on September 2, 2016. She provided police with the

license plate number of the car R.W. entered.

        On September 1, 2016, firefighters responded to a fire at an abandoned

house on Lakeside Avenue in Orange. It took several hours to get the fire under

control. Investigators found badly burned human remains inside the house.

Dental records confirmed the burned body was R.W. An expert testified the

cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation. There was no soot in her

3
    We use initials to protect the victims' privacy. R. 1:38-3(c)(12).
                                                                            A-1884-21
                                         3
airways, indicating R.W. was dead before the fire began. The investigation into

the cause of the fire revealed there was no gas, electricity, or stove in the house.

There was evidence of squatters, trespassing, and drug use.

      On September 7, 2016, Detective Sergio Pereira of the Union Township

Police Department was conducting the missing persons investigation.              He

determined the license plate number provided by Patterson was linked to

defendant's car.   Pereira went to defendant's residence and showed him a

photograph of R.W. Defendant admitted he was with R.W. on August 31.

Defendant explained he was driving in Newark and saw R.W. He said she

wanted pizza, so he offered to drive her to a store. R.W. asked defendant if she

could stay with him. He said no, but told her about an abandoned house in

Orange where people stayed. He claimed he dropped her off at that location.

Defendant volunteered to take the officers there. However, he took them to a

different address than the house that was set on fire.

      Defendant's phone records revealed he was near the location of the fire on

August 31. His phone records also showed defendant searched the internet for

missing persons in Union County, his home address, and "can text apps be

traced."

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                                         4
Victim J.B. (deceased)

      On October 22, 2016, J.B. and her long-time friend, Amina Nobles, were

on Frelinghuysen and Evergreen Avenues in Newark near a fast-food restaurant.

J.B. let another friend use her phone, and then left the area. J.B. later called

Nobles from someone else's phone—which was later shown in phone records to

be defendant's phone. Nobles testified J.B. seemed okay during the call. J.B.

told Nobles she expected to be gone for an hour. She never returned. Later that

day, Nobles received a call from the number J.B. used earlier. The caller did

not speak. A missing persons report was filed a few days later.

      On December 5, 2016, two construction workers went to an abandoned

house on Highland Ave in Orange to write a contract for repairs.          They

discovered J.B.'s body inside. A jacket was wrapped around J.B.'s face and neck

area. Her face was covered with duct tape from the nose down. The medical

examiner determined the cause of death was mechanical asphyxiation.

      Phone records indicate defendant called Nobles on October 22, 2016.

Defendant also called J.B. four times that day. Defendant's phone records

confirmed he was near the fast-food restaurant in Newark and then the

abandoned house.

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                                       5
      In the days leading up to J.B.'s disappearance, defendant conducted the

following searches on the internet: "Walgreen needles," "what stores that sell

syringes," "drug that put you to sleep instantly," "homemade poison," and "how

do you make deadly poisons out of common household objects."

Victim T.T. (survived)

      T.T. had been introduced to defendant by a former friend. In April 2016,

defendant texted her and offered money for sex. T.T. went to defendant's home.

He gave her the money upfront. She told defendant she had to go to her car to

retrieve a condom but left and never returned.

      In November 2016, T.T. was staying at a motel in Elizabeth. She was

pregnant and no longer engaging in prostitution. She was, however, "conning"

prospective "tricks," that is, "[s]omeone who gives money for sex."

      On November 15, 2016, defendant reached out to T.T. She decided to try

to con him and take his money. Defendant arrived at the motel wearing all black

and what T.T. described as "half a mask thing." He was also wearing gloves

and a hat with his hood over it. T.T. did not find this unusual because it was

November.

      T.T. and defendant did not have identification, which prevented them from

getting a motel room. T.T. told him they might be able to get a room at a

                                                                         A-1884-21
                                       6
different motel without having to produce identification. She then went to her

room to get the keys to her friend Arnold's car. T.T. left her phone in the room.

      T.T. and defendant drove to a gas station and then to a motel in Linden.

T.T. exited the car and asked motel staff about getting a room, but the cost was

too high. Defendant waited in the car. As they pulled out of motel parking lot,

defendant asked her to pull over to use the bathroom. She parked the car on a

side street and defendant got out to relieve himself.

      T.T. testified it was a "blur" after defendant got back to the car. She thinks

he hit her over the head. She woke up in the back seat. T.T. said defendant was

"raping [her] from behind and then choking [her] out at the same time." She

passed out and woke up "about three times all together" because of the

strangling. T.T. tried to scratch defendant's face. He then put her hands behind

her back, handcuffed her, and duct-taped her nose and mouth.

      At some point, defendant moved to the front seat and took off his mask.

He asked T.T. if she remembered him. He reminded her she had previously

taken his money. Because the duct tape loosened from her crying and sweating,

she was able to speak. She told defendant she left her phone with his text

messages in her room. Defendant replied, "[o]h, no, we got to go back and get

                                                                              A-1884-21
                                         7
that phone." She told him if he took her back to her room, she would have

Arnold pay him if he let them go.

      On the way back to the first motel, T.T. slipped out of one of the

handcuffs. She testified defendant wanted her:

             to go upstairs, grab the phone. He was going to follow
             at a distance behind me, have the old man [Arnold]
             come out, come downstairs, get in the car. He was
             going to follow and from there he was going to take us
             to [an] ATM and take us to a secluded area and then let
             us go.

T.T. kicked on the door. When Arnold opened it, she entered and locked the

door behind her. After banging on the door, defendant ran off. Arnold called

9-1-1. T.T. told the operator she had been kidnapped. She told responding

officers defendant kidnapped, choked, and duct taped her.

      Phone location data showed defendant's phone was at the motel where

T.T. was staying between 7:51 p.m. and 8:04 p.m. on November 15, was at the

gas station between 8:07 p.m. and 8:11 p.m., was at the motel in Linden, and

then returned to T.T.'s motel. T.T. made a positive in-court identification of

defendant.

                                                                        A-1884-21
                                       8
Victim S.B. (deceased)

      On November 19, 2016, defendant texted S.B., "[d]o you want to make

money?" and "[s]ex for money?" S.B. replied, "[h]ow much money?" She later

texted, "[t]o f*** me, 500."

      S.B.'s phone records revealed defendant agreed to pick her up in Jersey

City, where she went to school, drive her to his house and bring her back after.

S.B. asked if he would pay her first. He responded he would pay her at his

house. She then texted, "[y]ou're not a serial killer, right? LMAO [laughing my

ass off]?" Defendant responded, "no" and she replied, "[o]kay, cool." The

planned rendezvous on November 19 never occurred.

      On November 21, defendant texted S.B., "[w]assup." She responded,

"[s]orry about the other day" and "I got really nervous."

      On November 22, S.B.'s mother picked her up from school. Later that

night, S.B. drove her mother's van to visit a friend. She told her mother she

would be right back, but never returned. Her body was later found at Eagle Rock

Reservation in West Orange.

      A convenience store's surveillance video showed defendant get out of

S.B.'s mother's van and enter the store. S.B. remained in the van on her phone.

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                                        9
       Lamia Brown, S.B.'s friend, contacted her on the day S.B. disappeared.

S.B. used an app called "Tagged," which Lamina described as an app that "just

let's you connect with local people." Lamia 4 testified S.B. was communicating

with somebody on Tagged leading up to November 22. The last time Lamia

spoke with S.B. was on November 22 at 10:04 p.m.

       On November 23, S.B.'s mother went to Lamia's place of employment and

said she had not spoken to her daughter all day. They filed a police report that

day.

       Detective Pierre Falaise from the Montclair Police testified S.B.'s mother's

van was found on November 25 in the rear of a lot on Nassau Street in Orange.

Defendant lived about five or six blocks away from where the van was

discovered. Lamia testified S.B. was wearing red hair extensions on the day she

disappeared. In the van, police found a black purse with S.B.'s property in it, a

condom box, and a cigar. In the lot, they found a hair extension and clear tape

with red hair stuck on it. S.B.'s hair extension had high levels of saliva in it.

       S.B.'s sister testified she, Lamia, and a friend, Samantha Rivera, searched

S.B.'s computer. Rivera created a profile on Tagged. "Lilyachtrock," an account

4
  Because Lamia Brown coincidently shares the same last name with one of the
victims, we use her first name to avoid confusion. We mean no disrespect in
doing so.
                                                                              A-1884-21
                                        10
who contacted S.B. before her disappearance, contacted Rivera. Rivera and

Lamia conversed with Lilyachtrock—later revealed to be defendant—to "see if

anything was similar, to just see if we can locate, find clues." They arranged to

meet defendant at a restaurant in Glen Ridge. The women alerted Montclair

police about their plan.

      When defendant arrived at the restaurant, police approached him. They

told defendant they wanted to speak with him because he may have been one of

the last people to speak with a missing person—S.B. Defendant agreed to go to

police headquarters and speak with police. Detective Falaise testified police

were investigating a missing persons report at the time and did not know S.B.

was dead. For that reason, the conversation with defendant was not recorded.

Defendant was not confined or restrained.

      Falaise testified defendant said he had met S.B. at New Jersey City

University. Defendant messaged her on Tagged after recognizing her. He told

police he wanted to see if she used the app to solicit money for sex. Defendant

admitted he was "lilyachtrock" but said the profile photo was a picture of his

stepbrother.   He   created   the   account   using   the   email   address    of

pimpkillerghost@yahoo.com.

                                                                           A-1884-21
                                      11
      Defendant told police that on the night of November 22, S.B. picked him

up from the Orange Commons parking lot. She asked if he wanted to smoke,

but he did not. S.B. then went into a building to purchase marijuana. After

driving around, defendant said S.B. picked up another man. S.B. and the other

man were smoking so defendant asked her to bring him back to Orange

Commons. On the drive back, defendant received a text from his friend, Richard

Isaacs, at 8:17 p.m. S.B. dropped defendant off at Orange Commons. Defendant

told police the other man did not exit the car, but instead moved to the front seat.

Defendant claimed he never heard from S.B. again.

      On November 29, defendant rode with police to show them the route S.B.

took on the night she disappeared. Defendant was free to leave and was not

placed in handcuffs. During the drive, defendant pointed out a car and explained

he and Isaacs were working on it after S.B. dropped him off that night.

      On December 1, 2016, police found S.B.'s body covered with sticks and

brush in a wooded area in the Eagle Rock Reservation. A pair of sweatpants

were wrapped around her neck. A medical examiner testified S.B.'s cause of

death was compression of the neck.

      Police interviewed Isaacs. Originally, he told police he was working on

cars with defendant on the night of November 22. He later admitted this was a

                                                                              A-1884-21
                                        12
lie. He testified he told police he was with defendant on multiple occasions

because, "I was covering for him, saying I was with him."

      Phone records show defendant's phone was near High Point Pavilion and

Eagle Rock Reservation from 10:38 p.m. until 12:43 a.m. on November 23. On

November 23, defendant searched: "how to remove Apple i.d. from iPhone 6"

and "factory reset iPhone to remove Apple i.d." on his phone. On August 27,

2016, he searched for "Eagle Rock Reservation, New Jersey."

Evidence Found in Defendant's Residence and Car

      On December 6, 2016, police conducted a search of defendant's home and

car. In defendant's house, police found a pair of black and yellow gloves, a

black hat, a black Nike sweatshirt, black Nike sweatpants, black sneakers, and

three cell phones. In his car, police found a pair of black gloves, plastic wire

ties, pepper spray, a first aid kit, and a "body fluid cleaner kit."

Defendant's Statements

      On December 6, defendant spoke with Essex County detectives, who told

defendant they knew he was not with Isaacs on November 22 because of his

phone records. Defendant admitted he lied to them and that he had previously

lied to Montclair police. After learning he was captured on a convenience store's

                                                                           A-1884-21
                                        13
surveillance camera, defendant admitted to visiting the store with S.B. on the

night she disappeared.

      Defendant told detectives he bought a box of condoms, cigars, a rollup

and maybe something to drink. He also admitted to having sex with S.B. that

night. After leaving the convenience store, defendant said they went to get

marijuana, picked up her friend in Newark, and went to the reservation. At first,

defendant claimed they had a "threesome," but then changed his story. He said

the other man had sex with S.B. first, after which defendant had sex with her.

He claimed S.B. then dropped him off at the same street she had picked him up

from. Defendant denied any involvement in R.W.'s death and the fire that

burned her remains.

      In 2017, defendant was charged by indictment with three counts of first -

degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1); three counts of second-degree

disturbing human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:22-1(a); second-degree aggravated

arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(a)(1); first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1);

first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1); and

two counts of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a)(3).

      In August 2018, the court granted the State's motion to admit defendant's

statements to police, rejecting defendant's contention police violated his

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                                      14
Miranda rights. The court also denied defendant's motion to sever the case in to

four separate trials.

      Defendant's trial was held over the course of eight weeks in October

through December 2019. A different judge presided over the trial than the judge

who decided the Miranda and severance motions. Defendant was convicted of

all counts and sentenced to 160 years in prison with 145 years of parole

ineligibility. This appeal follows.

      Defendant raises the following contentions for our consideration:

             POINT I

             THE MOTION FOR SEVERANCE SHOULD HAVE
             BEEN GRANTED. JOINDER OF THESE FOUR
             SEPARATE SETS OF ALLEGATIONS FOR TRIAL
             WAS NOT WARRANTED BY THE CASE LAW,
             WAS TOO UNDULY PREJUDICIAL, AND DENIED
             DEFENDANT DUE PROCESS AND A FAIR TRIAL;
             ALTERNATIVELY, AN N.J.R.E. 404(B) LIMITING
             INSTRUCTION SHOULD HAVE BEEN GIVEN ON
             THE PROPER AND IMPROPER USE OF THE
             JOINED COUNTS AGAINST ONE ANOTHER.

             POINT II

             THE DEFENDANT'S DECEMBER 6, 2016
             STATEMENT TO POLICE SHOULD HAVE BEEN
             SUPPRESSED BECAUSE, AFTER VIOLATING
             STATE V. VINCENTY, POLICE THEN IGNORED
             DEFENDANT'S INVOCATION OF HIS RIGHT TO
             SILENCE AND GOADED HIM INTO SPEAKING BY
             TELLING HIM ABOUT THE CHARGES THAT

                                                                          A-1884-21
                                      15
           WERE BEING FILED AGAINST HIM AFTER HE
           HAD INVOKED HIS RIGHT TO SILENCE.

           POINT III

           THE JUDGE IMPROPERLY IMPINGED ON
           DEFENDANT'S DUE-PROCESS RIGHTS AND HIS
           RIGHT TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY—IN DIRECT
           VIOLATION OF STATE V. HAMPTON AND
           N.J.R.E. 104(C)—WHEN HE TOLD JURORS THAT
           HE HAD FOUND DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS
           TO POLICE TO BE VOLUNTARY AND
           ADMISSIBLE.

           POINT IV
           THE SENTENCE IMPOSED IS MANIFESTLY
           EXCESSIVE.
                           II.

     We first address defendant's contention the trial court erred by denying

his motion for severance. Recently, we summarized the rules governing joinder

and severance in State v. Smith, 471 N.J. Super. 548 (App. Div. 2022). Former

Chief Appellate Judge Messano explained:

           Rule 3:7-6 permits the joinder of offenses in a single
           indictment for a single trial if they are of a "same or
           similar character or are based on the same act or
           transaction or on [two] or more acts or transactions
           connected together or constituting parts of a common
           scheme or plan." (Emphasis added). "Charges need not
           be identical to qualify as 'similar' for purposes of
           joinder under Rule 3:7-6," [State v.] Sterling, 215 N.J.
           [65] at 91 [2013] (citing State v. Baker, 49 N.J. 103,
           105 (1967)), but they must be "connected together," id.

                                                                       A-1884-21
                                     16
             215 N.J. at 91, or be "parts of a common scheme or
             plan," id. 215 N.J. at 72.

             [Id. at 575.]

Judge Messano added, "[t]he preference is for joinder of the offenses in a single

trial unless the defendant demonstrates prejudice."         Ibid. (citing State v.

Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334, 341 (1996)); see also R. 3:15-2(b) (providing for

relief from prejudicial joinder in criminal trials).

      In Sterling, our Supreme Court explained "[t]he test for assessing

prejudice is 'whether, assuming the charges were tried separately, evidence of

the offenses sought to be severed would be admissible under [N.J.R.E. 404(b)]

in the trial of the remaining charges.'" 215 N.J. at 73 (quoting Chenique- Puey,

145 N.J. at 341).

      In State v. Cofield, the Court established a multi-factor test to determine

when and in what circumstances "other crimes" evidence is admissible in a

criminal trial. 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992). The Cofield factors are:

             (1) The evidence of the other crime must be admissible
             as relevant to a material issue; (2) It must be similar in
             kind and reasonably close in time to the offense
             charged; (3) The evidence of the other crime must be
             clear and convincing; and (4) The probative value of
             the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent
             prejudice.

             [Ibid.]

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                                        17
Here, the motion judge made specific Cofield findings, stating:

      I find pursuant to Cofield that the subject evidence—
      that the evidence, I should say of each killing and
      related charges can be properly admitted in the trial of
      the other for the following reasons: the evidence of each
      murder or killing, or related charges is relevant to show
      a common scheme or plan, motive, and as a signature
      crime evidence. As argued by the State as to motive,
      the four incidents support motive evidence for one
      another. Viewing one of the homicides in isolation, it
      would be difficult to comprehend, for example, why the
      defendant would want to kill [S.B]. To place it in the
      context with the other strangulation, murders of sex
      workers the motive comes clear. Also as argued by the
      State, defendant's signature crime here is to prey on
      those vulnerable women who due to their occupations
      in the sex worker industry perhaps are seen by society
      at large to be disposable. I also note as to each victim
      they were targeted for who they were and what they did
      for money. They were killed in the same manner,
      noting at least two[,] [S.B.]and [J.B.], strangled with
      articles of clothing, [R.W.], although strangled as well,
      but because of the fire allegedly set by the defendant
      destroyed any articles of clothing that may have been
      around her neck. I also note that T.T. was being
      strangled while being raped and handcuffed when she
      managed to interrupt the attack. I find that these
      murders or attempted murders are sufficiently unique in
      terms of the combined similarities, in victim, cause, and
      manner of death. The signature of clothing, articles of
      clothing around the next, desecration or concealment of
      body remains, and again as noted earlier, even the
      proffered alibi that can be used by the jury to make an
      inference with regard to identify as opposed to mere
      propensity. Reference again is made to [Cofield,] 127
      N.J. 236.

                                                                  A-1884-21
                                18
      The judge also noted the four episodes occurred over the course of

approximately three months. The judge found the evidence of each crime clear

and convincing, and the probative value outweighed any potential for prejudice

to defendant. The judge also noted "that much, if not all" of the State's evidence

overlapped.     The overlapping evidence included defendant's Miranda

statements, which referred to three murders; the alibis defendant offered in

regard to R.W. and S.B. both involved working on cars with Isaacs; and

defendant encouraged Isaacs to support a false alibi.

      We are not convinced the similarities between the four criminal episodes

are sufficient to constitute a "signature."      See Sterling, 215 N.J. at 97

(noting,"[a]lthough there were some similarities between the burglaries and

sexual assaults" involving the two victims, "there is no uniqueness to the manner

in which those crimes were committed").         We are satisfied, however, the

severance motion judge acted within his discretion in finding there was a

common plan or scheme connecting the four criminal episodes. In this instance,

defendant's common scheme or plan was to solicit sex workers, strangle them,

and destroy or dispose their remains.

      We add this was not a situation involving two similar criminal episodes.

See State v. Lumumba, 253 N.J. Super. 375 (App. Div. 1992). Here, the

                                                                            A-1884-21
                                        19
evidence shows defendant is a serial murderer; he targeted four sex workers over

the course of a few months. The repetition of similar circumstances shows this

was no mere coincidence but rather a pattern of recurring behavior that evinces

a common plan or scheme.

      We are unpersuaded by counsel's contention at oral argument that a

common plan or scheme must be corroborated by some form of extrinsic proof,

such as an admission or statements made to confederates or others. A common

plan or scheme for purposes of N.J.R.E. 404(b) and Rules 3:7-6 and 3:15-2(b)

does not require direct evidence of a conspiracy or joint venture. An individual

acting alone can have a common plan or scheme to commit a series of crimes

notwithstanding the "plan" is not articulated to others. Stated another way, the

common plan or scheme can be proved circumstantially from the nature and

circumstances of multiple episodes.

      Finally, we reiterate and stress "[t]he decision to sever is within the trial

court's discretion, and it will be reversed only if it constitutes an abuse of

discretion." State v. Weaver, 219 N.J. 131, 149 (2014); see also State v. Sterling,

215 N.J. 65, 72-73 (2013). We decline to substitute our judgment for the trial

court's judgment in evaluating the Cofield factors and in gauging the prejudice

inherent in joining like offenses. Although the evidence defendant committed

                                                                             A-1884-21
                                       20
multiple crimes is inherently prejudicial, "it was prejudicial in the way that all

highly probative evidence is prejudicial: because it tends to prove a material

issue in dispute." State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 164 (2011).

                                      III.

      We turn next to defendant's contention, raised for the first time on appeal,

"a[] N.J.R.E. 404(B) limiting instruction should have been given on the proper

and improper use of the joined counts against one another." The trial judge

instructed the jury:

            There are [eleven]offenses charged in the indictment.
            They are separate offenses by separate counts in the
            indictment . . . In your determination of whether the
            State has proven the defendant guilty of the crimes
            charged in the indictment beyond a reasonable doubt,
            the defendant is entitled to have each count considered
            separately by the evidence which is relevant and
            material to that particular charge based on the law as I
            will give it to you.

      On appeal, defendant relies on the general proposition that "if Rule 404(b)

evidence is admitted at trial, the judge is required to provide a 'carefully crafted

limiting instruction . . . explain[ing] to the jury the limited purpose for which

the other-crime evidence is being offered' . . . and 'setting forth the prohibited

and permitted purposes of the evidence.'" State v. Smith, 471 N.J. Super. 548,

577 (App. Div. 2022). That general principle is based on the notion that "[i] t is

                                                                              A-1884-21
                                        21
the danger that other-crimes evidence may indelibly brand the defendant as a

bad person and blind the jury from a careful consideration of the elements of the

charged offense that requires the trial court to deliver the limiting instructions

in a way that the jury can readily understand." State v. Blakney, 189 N.J. 88, 93

(2006).

      Importantly, however, in Smith, we acknowledged, "[w]e know of no

reported case that requires similar instructions be given when two different sets

of charges are tried together." 471 N.J. Super. at 577. Here, the trial evidence

pertaining to the four criminal episodes was not "other crimes" evidence within

the meaning of Rule 404(b). It was admitted to prove indicted charges that were

before the jury to decide. In these circumstances, we conclude the trial judge's

jury instruction that "the defendant is entitled to have each count considered

separately by the evidence which is relevant and material to that particular

charge based on the law as I will give it to you" was adequate. See State v. Pitts,

116 N.J. 580, 603 (1989). We add defendant did not object to that instruction.

See State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320 (2017) ("Without an objection at the

time a jury instruction is given, 'there is a presumption that the charge was not

error and was unlikely to prejudice the defendant's case.'") (quoting State v.

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                                       22
Singleton, 211 N.J. 157, 182 (2012)); see R. 1:7-2 (plain error rule); see also

State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016).

                                       IV.

      Defendant next argues detectives violated his Fifth Amendment rights,

first by failing to advise him of the charges he was facing when they

administered Miranda warnings, and thereafter by failing to scrupulously honor

his assertion of the right to remain silent. We begin our analysis by recounting

the relevant facts adduced at the suppression hearing.

      On December 6th, 2016, defendant was transported to the Essex County

Homicide Task Force for a DNA buccal swab. Defendant's interaction with

detectives in the interrogation room was electronically recorded. We refer to

the time stamps on the video to provide context for the sequence of events.

      Officers first inquired about defendant's identity, age, address, education,

and employment status at 19:25:50. Defendant was then advised of his Miranda

rights at 19:27:12. Defendant stated he did not wish to talk to the police. The

detectives stopped questioning him. They advised defendant they had a court

order to obtain a DNA sample and began taking his sample at 19:30:05. After

taking the sample, the detectives left the room.

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                                      23
      Detective Christopher Smith consulted prosecutors who authorized

charges against defendant. A short time later, at 19:48:12, Detective Smith

returned to the interrogation room. He advised defendant he was under arrest

and would be charged with murder and desecration of human remains.

Defendant was then left alone in the room until he was removed for processing

at 20:03:05.

      While getting into the elevators with Detectives Herman Sherilian and

Michael DiPrimio, defendant said, "[t]his shit is ridiculous. I didn't get to tell

my side of the story." At first, Detective DiPrimio did not hear defendant. He

asked defendant to repeat himself. Defendant repeated, "[t]his is ridiculous. I

didn't get to tell my side of the story." DiPrimio asked defendant if he wanted

to talk to the detectives, to which the defendant responded that he did.

Defendant was brought back into the interrogation room at 20:05:38.            He

confirmed he wanted to speak with the detectives at 20:06:18. Defendant was

re-read his Miranda rights at 20:08:43. He waived those rights and gave a

statement.5

      The judge hearing the suppression motion ruled:

5
  We have already recounted the gist of defendant's statement in our recitation
of the facts adduced at trial.
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            Based on my review of all of the aforementioned, I find
            that the … recording of the defendant's statement
            clearly demonstrates that [defendant] was advised of
            his Miranda Rights, understood them, and after initially
            invoking them, [defendant] re-initiated questioning and
            made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver of
            his Miranda Rights before providing a lengthy
            statement.

      We need only briefly address defendant's contention the detectives

violated his Fifth Amendment rights by failing to comply with the rule

announced in State v. Vincenty, 237 N.J. 122 (2019). In Vincenty, detectives

asked the defendant to waive his right against self-incrimination without

informing him of charges filed against him.      Id. at 135.   The Court held

"[w]ithholding that 'critically important information' deprived [the defendant]

of the ability to knowingly and voluntarily waive the right against self-

incrimination." Ibid. However, in State v. Sims, our Supreme Court declined

to expand that requirement to apply to situations where a defendant has not yet

been formally charged. 250 N.J. 189, 210-17 (2022). The Court rejected and

reversed a new rule proposed by the Appellate Division "requiring officers to

tell an arrestee, not subject to a complaint-warrant or arrest warrant, what

charges he faces before interrogating him." Id. at 217.

      Here, detectives administered the first set of Miranda warnings before

defendant was charged with any offense. Detectives only received authorization

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                                      25
to apply for a murder complaint-warrant after defendant invoked his right to

remain silent. Nor was defendant formally charged with murder by complaint-

warrant when Miranda warnings were readministered. Although by that point,

detectives had advised defendant they would be applying for a complaint-

warrant charging murder.

      We turn next to defendant's contention the detectives ignored his

invocation of the right to remain silent and "goaded him into speaking by telling

him about the charges that were being filed against him after he had invoked his

right to silence."

      The scope of our review of a decision on a motion to suppress is limited.

State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021).         In Sims, our Supreme Court

reaffirmed that "[w]hen we review a trial court's decision on a motion to

suppress a defendant's statement, we defer to the factual findings of the trial

court if those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the

record." 250 N.J. at 210.

      A defendant's decision to remain silent must be "scrupulously honored"

by law enforcement. State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 261 (1986) (citations

omitted); see also Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96, 103 (1975). The "failure

[to] scrupulously honor a previously-invoked right to silence renders

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                                      26
unconstitutionally compelled any resultant incriminating statement made in

response to custodial interrogation." Ibid. Thus, "once a defendant clearly and

unambiguously invokes his right to remain silent, interrogation must cease. "

State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 545 (2015).

      "If a defendant initiates further police conversations after invoking his

right to remain silent, the resumption of police questioning will not constitute a

failure to scrupulously honor that right." State v. Mallon, 288 N.J. Super. 139,

147 (App. Div. 1996); see State v. Fuller, 118 N.J. 75, 83 (1990).

      The record clearly shows the detectives did not 'interrogate' defendant by

informing him he was going to be charged with murder. "[I]nterrogation refers

to 'any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally

attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely

to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.'" State in Interest of A.A.,

240 N.J. 341, 353-54 (2020) (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301

(1980)). In State v. Mallozzi, we held that "informing defendant of the charges

against him was not designed or done to elicit any type of response from

defendant and thus places [the agent's] actions outside the Innis definition of

'interrogation.'" 246 N.J. Super 509, 516 (App. Div. 1991).

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                                       27
      As in Mallozzi, telling defendant he was going to be charged with murder

was not designed or reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response. This

conclusion is confirmed by the fact the detective left the interrogation room after

he informed defendant of the impending charges. We conclude the detectives

scrupulously honored defendant's invocation of the right to remain silent —a

right he knowingly and voluntarily waived when he determined it would be in

his best interest to tell his side of the story.

                                           V.

      Defendant next argues the trial judge violated the rule announced in State

v. Hampton, 61 N.J. 250, 272 (1972), and codified in N.J.R.E. 104(c) when he

instructed the jury regarding the pretrial ruling denying defendant's motion to

suppress his statements to police. In Hampton, our Supreme Court held:

             [T]he trial court alone shall determine (1) whether the
             [Miranda] warnings were given to the accused and his
             rights thereunder waived by him before the confession
             was given; and that if it finds the warnings were not
             given, or if given the rights not waived, the confession
             must be excluded, and (2) if those conditions were
             satisfied, whether in light of all the circumstances
             attending the confession it was given voluntarily. If
             these questions are resolved in favor of the State, then,
             withou[t] being advised of the court's decision, the jury
             shall be instructed that they should decide whether in
             view of all the same circumstances the defendant's
             confession is true.

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             [61 N.J. at 272.]

Rule 104(c) further states, "[i]f the court admits the statement the jury shall not

be informed of the finding that the statement is admissible but shall be instructed

to disregard the statement if it finds that it is not credible."

      In this instance, the trial judge told the jury:

             In considering whether or not an oral statement was
             actually made by the defendant, and, if made, whether
             it is credible, you should receive, weigh, and consider
             the evidence with caution based on the generally
             recognized risk of misunderstanding by the hearer, or
             the ability of the hearer to recall accurately the words
             used by the defendant. The specific words used and the
             ability to remember them are important to the correct
             understanding of any oral communication because the
             presence or absence or change of a single word may
             substantially change the true meaning of even the
             shortest sentence. You should, therefore, receive,
             weigh, and consider such evidence with caution.

                   ....

             The Court has previously ruled that Miranda warnings
             were not required for the taking of the alleged statement
             on September 7th, 2016; November 26th and 29th of
             2016, as the defendant was not in custody on those
             dates. The Court has also previously ruled that
             defendant was properly advised of his Miranda rights
             and made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver
             of those rights prior to allegedly giving the audio/video
             recorded statement on December 6th, 2016. If, after
             consideration of all of these factors, you determine that
             the statement was not actually made, then you must
             disregard the statement completely. If you find that the

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                                         29
             statement was made, you may g[i]ve it the weight you
             think appropriate to the statement. If you find that the
             statement was made, but it was not truthful and/or
             credible and the defendant purposely gave a false
             statement knowing it was false, you may consider those
             false statements to show the defendant's consciousness
             of guilt.

      The two sentences we have highlighted run afoul of the spirit if not the

letter of Hampton and Rule 104(c). It bears noting, however, counsel did not

object to the jury charge. See Montalvo, 229 N.J. at 320.

      When a party does not object to an alleged trial error or otherwise properly

preserve the issue for appeal, it may nonetheless be considered by the appellate

court if it meets the plain error standard of Rule 2:10-2. State v. Clark, 251 N.J.

266, 286-87 (2022); see also State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021). "The mere

possibility of an unjust result is not enough." Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 79. "In

the context of a jury trial, the possibility must be 'sufficient to raise a reasonable

doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have

reached.'" State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 389 (2020) (quoting State v. Jordan,

147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997) (quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971))).

      Here, although the two sentences we have highlighted were inappropriate,

those remarks did not lead to an unjust result considering the strength of the

evidence of defendant's guilt. "The very purpose of a Hampton charge is to call

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                                         30
the jury's attention to the possible unreliability of the alleged statements made

by a criminal defendant." State v. Feaster, 156 N.J. 1, 72 (1998). In this instance,

the interrogation was recorded and played to the jury. The major portion of the

jury instruction we have reproduced properly tells the jury to "receive, weigh,

and consider the evidence with caution." Accordingly, when viewed in context,

we conclude the error does not rise to the level of plain error warranting reversal

of defendant's trial convictions.

                                        VI.

      Finally, we address defendant's contention the sentence imposed is

manifestly excessive. Defendant argues the trial judge failed to give proper

weight to his lack of criminal history and his age and provided an inadequate

explanation as to the overall fairness of his aggregate sentence. We disagree.

      Our review of a trial court's imposition of sentence is limited. State v.

Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221, 228 (2014). "[A]ppellate courts should not 'substitute

their judgment for those of our sentencing courts. . . .'" State v. Cuff, 239 N.J.

321, 347 (2019) (quoting State v. Case, 220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014)). It is well-

settled that "[o]nly when the facts and law show 'such a clear error of judgment

that it shocks the judicial conscience' should a sentence be modified on appeal."

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                                        31
State v. Roach, 146 N.J. 208, 230 (1996) (quoting State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334,

363-64 (1984)).

      Here, the trial court found four aggravating factors applied: the nature and

circumstances of the offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(1); the gravity and

seriousness of the harm inflicted on the victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(2); the risk

defendant will commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); and the need for

deterring defendant and others from violating the law, N.J.S.A. 2C:44 -1(a)(9).

The judge also gave minimal weight to the mitigating factor of defendant having

no prior criminal record, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(7).

      We see no abuse of discretion. The judge recounted the horrific facts of

defendant's crimes. Affording more weight to defendant's lack of a criminal

record would have made no difference in the ultimate balancing of aggravating

and mitigating circumstances. See State v. Copling, 326 N.J. Super. 417, 440

(App. Div. 1999) (noting the "aggravating factors are sufficient to outweigh the

single mitigating factor, particularly because, as the judge determined, the

nature of the murder . . . was exceptionally heinous."). Under any conceivable

circumstance, the aggravating factors would substantially outweigh the

mitigating circumstances.

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                                      32
      We likewise reject defendant's argument the judge did not adequately

articulate that the overall sentence was fair.      We note defendant does not

challenge the sentencing court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences

pursuant to State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985), holding modified by State

v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021). Rather, the gravamen of his argument is the trial

judge failed to explain why the overall imprisonment and parole ineligibility

terms are fair.

      In State v. Cuff, our Supreme Court applied the Yarbough criteria to a

defendant's lengthy sentence.     239 N.J. at 328. The Court stressed that a

"sentencing court's focus 'should be on the fairness of the overall sentence.'" Id.

at 352 (quoting State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 121 (1987)). The Court reiterated

this principle in State v. Torres, holding a sentencing court "should focus on 'the

fairness of the overall sentence,'" and "'should set forth in detail its reasons for

concluding a particular sentence is warranted.'" 246 N.J. at 267-68 (quoting

Miller, 108 N.J. at 122).

      But "fairness of the overall sentence" is not a talismanic phrase that must

invariably be recited verbatim. Here, the trial judge explained why a 160-year

prison term was warranted. He stated, "[t]he purpose of this sentence again is

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                                        33
that this defendant never walks among society again." The judge also explained,

"[t]he sentence justifies the actions of the defendant."

      We conclude the reasons for imposing the aggregate sentence that were

set forth by the trial judge in his comprehensive sentencing decision satisfy the

foundational requirements of Cuff and Torres, especially in view of the Torres

Court's recognition that "the severity of the crime is now the single most

important factor in the sentencing process." Id. at 262 (quoting State v. Hodge,

95 N.J. 369, 378-79 (1984)).       The Torres Court "reiterate[d] the repeated

instruction that a sentencing court's decision whether to impose consecutive

sentences should retain focus on 'the fairness of the overall sentence.'" Id. at

270 (quoting Miller 108 N.J. at 122). But as we have noted, defendant does not

challenge the sentencing court’s decision to impose consecutive sentences.

      In sum, it is not necessary to remand for the trial court to recite an explicit

"overall fairness" finding considering the entirety of the judge's sentencing

ruling, which clearly shows the judge deemed the aggregate sentence to be

necessary to serve the interests of justice. In the final analysis, the enormity of

the sentence is amply justified by the horrific nature of defendant's crimes.

      Affirmed.

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