Court Opinion

ID: 9634224
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:06:10.4126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:58.887027
License: Public Domain

GLICKMAN, Associate Judge,
with whom NEWMAN, Senior Judge, joins, concurring:
I am pleased to join the majority opinion. I write separately to identify two implications of the analysis that the majority embraces. The first implication is that the defendant’s due process right to the effective assistance of counsel on direct *605appeal extends to appellate counsel’s obligation under District of Columbia law to pursue certain challenges by way of a motion in the trial court to set aside the conviction pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110. The second implication is that a defendant must be granted a new opportunity to appeal from the denial of a § 28-110 motion if his appointed counsel neglects to note a timely appeal even if the motion was not pursued in conjunction with a direct appeal of the defendant’s conviction.

Effective Assistance of § 23-110 Motion Counsel

In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396-97, 106 S.Ct. 830, 83 L.Ed.2d 821 (1985), the Supreme Court held that a criminal defendant is constitutionally entitled to the effective assistance of counsel in his first appeal as of right. A defendant is denied due process if the deficient performance of his appellate counsel deprives him of “ ‘an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the State’s appellate process.’” Id. at 402, 105 S.Ct. 830 (quoting Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616, 94 S.Ct. 2437, 41 L.Ed.2d 341 (1974)). Such a deprivation occurred in Evitts when counsel’s failure to file a “statement of appeal” as required by state procedural rules “essentially waived respondent’s opportunity to make a case on the merits.” Id. at 395 n. 6,105 S.Ct. 830.
In holding that appellate counsel has a duty to note an appeal from the denial of a § 23-110 motion, the majority opinion in the present case relies in part on a mandatory feature of the direct appeal process in the District of Columbia. Under the law of the District, available claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel are “essentially waived” if the claims are not pursued during the pendency of the direct appeal by means of a motion in the trial court pursuant to D.C.Code § 23-110. Although such Sixth Amendment claims are more likely to require amplification of the record, in principle they are “no different from any of the [other] myriad claims that may be raised on direct appeal.” Ante at 601. Under Shepard v. United States, 533 A.2d 1278, 1280 (D.C.1987) and Doe v. United States, 583 A.2d 670, 674 (D.C.1990), such claims therefore “must ... be raised within the framework of the direct appeal by the attorney appointed for the appeal.” Ante at 600.1 Furthermore, as the majority opinion states, “[t]he fact that, under Shepard, the vehicle for mounting the claim of ineffectiveness is this jurisdiction’s statutory post-conviction procedure does not change the character of appellate counsel’s obligation.” Ante at 602. As the majority acknowledges, citing Snell v. United States, 754 A.2d 289, 292 (D.C.2000), and Watson v. United States, 536 A.2d 1056, 1061 (D.C.1987) (en banc), instead of requiring ineffective assistance *606claims to be heard under § 23-110, this court as easily could have required such claims to be raised as a formal part of the direct appeal via remand of the record to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing. Ante at 602. By whatever name — a “ § 23-110 motion hearing” or a “record remand” — the procedure is functionally the same, a proceeding to augment the record for purposes of permitting claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel to be heard on their merits in the defendant’s direct appeal.2
In short, under District of Columbia law, the § 23-110 motion to pursue Sixth Amendment ineffective assistance claims is an integral component of the defendant’s direct appeal from his criminal conviction. The motion furnishes the defendant his only “ ‘adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly in the context of the [District’s] appellate process.’ ” Evitts, 469 U.S. at 402, 105 S.Ct. 830 (citation omitted). The obligations of appellate counsel are not limited, therefore, to the duty we recognize today to note a timely appeal from the denial of a § 23-110 motion filed in accordance with Shepard. Under Evitts the defendant in the District of Columbia has a due process right to the effective assistance of appellate counsel in the identification, investigation and prosecution by § 23-110 motion of available claims of trial counsel ineffectiveness.3

Duty of Appointed Counsel to Appeal Denial of § 23-110 Motion

Although the majority opinion appropriately emphasizes the obligations of appellate counsel under Shepard and Doe, the holding of the opinion is that it is “appointed counsel’s duty to provide continued representation through appeals’ ” pursuant to D.C.Code § 11-2603 (2001), ante at 603, that obligates appointed counsel upon request to file “a properly noticed appeal from the denial of the [§ 23-110] motion.” Ante at 603. That statutory obligation of appointed counsel is independent of Shepard and Doe, and it is not limited to § 23-110 motions that are filed while the direct appeal is still pending; for under D.C.Code § 11-2601(3)(A) (2001), counsel may be appointed for persons “seeking collateral relief’ pursuant to § 23-110 at other times. Successor counsel commonly are appointed, for example, to pursue post-appeal § 23-110 motions raising ineffectiveness claims that appellate counsel could not pursue because of a conflict of interest. See Ramsey v. United States, 569 A.2d 142, 146 (D.C.1990) (holding that the failure to raise an ineffectiveness claim during the direct appeal in accordance with Shepard does not bar consideration of a post-appeal § 23-110 motion raising the claim if the defendant was represented in the direct appeal by the allegedly ineffective lawyer). Hence, if appointed counsel breaches his statutory duty to take a timely appeal from the denial of a § 23-110 motion, the defendant should be entitled to the remedy that, the majority opinion holds, “the Criminal Justice Act provides,” ante at 603 — namely, reentry of the judgment so as to permit the defendant to notice a timely appeal — whether or not the motion is ancillary to a direct appeal.

. "[I]f an appellant does not raise a claim of ineffective assistance of [trial] counsel during the pendency of the direct appeal, when at the time appellant demonstrably knew or should have known of the grounds for alleging counsel's ineffectiveness, that procedural default will be a barrier to this court's consideration of appellant’s claim.” Shepard, 533 A.2d at 1280. "[I]t follows that an inherent part of counsel’s responsibility on direct appeal is to consider whether the client’s interests require the filing of a motion under § 23-110 based on ineffectiveness of counsel.” Doe, 583 A.2d at 674. "[C]ounsel on direct appeal is obliged to make reasonable inquiry into the possibility of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial by researching and developing points thus uncovered that might give rise to a claim of ineffectiveness.” Id. at 675. Thereafter, if appellate counsel concludes that there is "an adequate basis for advancing a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel,” appellate counsel should, inter alia, file a § 23-110 motion and "a request by appellant to the Superior Court for it to appoint appellate counsel or other counsel as § 23-110 counsel.” Id.

. Indeed, to treat these two functionally equivalent procedures as if they were different would raise due process (equal protection) concerns. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499, 74 S.Ct. 693, 98 L.Ed. 884 (1954).

. And also other claims that require the vehicle of a § 23-110 motion to be pursued because they depend on the development of facts outside the record.