Court Opinion

ID: 9718644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:28:46.108264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:01.101445
License: Public Domain

HOLLANDER, Judge,
dissenting.
This is most assuredly a painful case. Indeed, no “Solomonic” solution is available as we try to resolve this profoundly difficult matter, in which we consider the interests of the biological father, the adoptive parents, and Baby Girl S. The panel majority acknowledges that, in a case involving a violation of the Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (“ICPC”), “the trial court has the discretion to make a case-by-case determination based on the facts and circumstances before it.” Maj. op. at 503. I respectfully dissent because, upon review of the trial judge’s painstaking, well-reasoned, sixty-three page opinion, it is evident that his factual findings are not clearly erroneous and that he did not abuse his discretion. Therefore, his decision should be affirmed.
I.
Balancing all the facts, circumstances, and equities, the trial court was entitled to conclude that the ICPC violation was unintentional and that it did not warrant dismissal of the adoption petition. In making this decision, the trial judge did not err.
The panel majority correctly observes that “[a] major factor in every case, of course, is the best interests of the child.” Maj. op. at 503. Indeed, as the Court of Appeals said in In re Adoption No. 10087, 324 Md. 394, 411, 597 A.2d 456 (1991), the seminal Maryland case on the ICPC, “The ‘golden rule’ of adoption in Maryland is, and has always been, the best interest of the child.” In its resolution of the ICPC violation, however, the majority essentially concludes, as a matter of *520ICPC policy, that the “best interest of the child” is actually the best interest of children in general, as opposed to the particular child before the court. For example, the majority states: “Continued violations of the ICPC will jeopardize the ‘best interests of the child.’ ... [Violations of the ICPC are contrary to the ‘best interest of the child’ and must be deterred.” Maj. op. at 508. The panel majority also relies on the opinion of the New York Family Court that “ ‘the general welfare of children illegally transported over state lines will be promoted by strict enforcement of the I.C.P.C. and the discouragement of its evasion.’ ” Maj. op. at 510, quoting In re Adoption of Jon K., 141 Misc.2d 949, 535 N.Y.S.2d 660, 662 (N.Y.Fam.Ct.1988) (emphasis supplied). Thus, although the majority contends otherwise, see maj. op. at 503, the upshot of its analysis is that, for anything other than a de minimis ICPC violation, prophylactic dismissal of an adoption petition is required.
Certainly, the importance of enforcement of the ICPC cannot be overstated. But “[t]he fact that the ICPC had been violated in this case does not mandate dismissal; rather it indicates the need for a prompt determination of the best interest of this child.” In re Adoption No. 10087, 324 Md. at 412, 597 A.2d 456. (Emphasis supplied). Therefore, the proper focus here is not the interest of a hypothetical child. Rather, we must focus upon the interests of Baby Girl S.
Clearly, the trial court must have discretion to balance the type and gravity of an ICPC violation with the child’s best interests, in light of all the facts and circumstances in the particular case. “Discretion” has been defined as “a reasoned decision based on the weighing of various alternatives.” Judge v. R and T Construction Co., 68 Md.App. 57, 60, 509 A.2d 1236 (1986). “[W]hen the consequences of a particular exercise of discretion are clear, i.e., one result is clearly unjust and the other, clearly not, the limits of the exercise of discretion are narrow.” Thodos v. Bland, 75 Md.App. 700, 712, 542 A.2d 1307 (1988) (emphasis supplied). But “when the consequences are not so clear, i.e., no result is clearly just or unjust, the limits of the exercise of discretion are considerably *521broader.” Id. In such a situation, “we will not find an abuse of discretion whichever way the trial court may choose to exercise discretion.” Id.
While the majority recognizes the discretion vested in the trial court, it nonetheless rejects Judge Whitfill’s exercise of that discretion under the guise of abuse. Appellate review of discretionary decisions is deferential, however. As the Court of Appeals stated almost half a century ago, questions within the discretion of the trial court “are much better decided by the trial judges than by appellate courts, and the decisions of such judges should only be disturbed where it is apparent that some serious error or abuse of discretion or autocratic action has occurred.” Northwestern National Insurance Co. v. Samuel R. Rosoff, Ltd., 195 Md. 421, 436, 73 A.2d 461 (1950). See also Petrini v. Petrini, 336 Md. 453, 469-70, 648 A.2d 1016 (1994) (child custody determinations reviewed for abuse of discretion). That the ICPC does not contain a penalty provision applicable to the facts of this case is yet another reason why we should uphold the trial court’s determination not to dismiss the adoption petition.
Judge Whitfill’s thorough opinion evidences that he considered the evidence, the issues, and the equities.1 He expressly found that any violation of the ICPC was unintentional and unknowing, that the biological father’s legal rights had been protected, and that neither Maryland nor New York had any interest that would be served in dismissing the petition. He also specifically found that the adoptive parents acted in “good faith” in bringing Baby Girl S. to Maryland only after they were orally advised that the compact administrator had approved the placement of the child in Maryland.2 In addition, *522he pointed to the fact that appellees hired an attorney in New York to file the appropriate documents to obtain compact approval, which were then transmitted to Maryland. Further, the New York compact office apparently asked the Maryland compact office to call with a verbal approval, which was consistent with appellees’ version that they were orally advised of the approval to bring the baby to Maryland. Moreover, in the letter from Sharon Hackett, Maryland’s Interstate Compact administrator, to New York’s Administrator, dated May 27, 1992, the bringing of Baby Girl S. to Maryland was described as “a mixup.” Finally, Judge Whitfill found that appellees were already an approved foster family and “had actually had foster children placed in their home.”
Judge Whitfill’s findings on this issue are clear:
We therefore find that it is uncontradicted that [appellees] employed an attorney to file for Interstate Compact approval, that the application was transmitted to the State of Maryland Compact Administrator, that the baby was not moved from New York to Maryland until [appellee] had been verbally advised that compact approval had been given, that [appellee] relying in good faith upon that communication brought the baby to Maryland, that [appellees] had been previously approved as a suitable home for placing foster children and that [appellees] are in fact ... suitable parents for a placement of a child such as the one in question.
We believe that the Court of Appeals in Re Adoption 10087, 324 Md. 394, 597 A.2d 456 (1991) has instructed us *523that under these circumstances we should not return the baby to the State of New York while the wheels of bureaucracy grind. Section 5-602 of the Family Law Article tells us that one of the purposes of the act is to see that each child requiring a placement receives maximum opportunity to be placed in a suitable environment with persons having appropriate qualifications and facilities to provide a necessary and desirable degree and type of care. That purpose has certainly been met in this case.
We find that the petitioners acted in good faith. We find that the interest of the child would not be served by returning the child to New York until the compact approval is given. Further we find no interest in the State of Maryland that overrides the best interests of the child. The State of Maryland was aware of this proceeding and has asserted no interest that needs to be protected vis a vis this particular child. We therefore conclude, in light of In re Adoption 10087[,] that the failure to complete the Interstate Compact process, is not a bar to this adoption.
(Italics added; underlining in original).
Moreover, as shall be discussed in more detail, infra, the court concluded that Baby Girl S. should not suffer for the cause of the ICPC. In reaching that decision, Judge Whitfill considered appellant’s conduct and the testimony of the court-appointed expert regarding the probable trauma to the child if she were uprooted. Judge Whitfill thus said:
Therefore, when it comes to considering the conduct of [natural mother] versus the conduct of [appellant] we do not feel that [appellant] is entitled to complain. The only reason this child should be moved from the home of [appellees] to the home of [appellant] is to correct some injustice perpetrated on [appellant] by [natural mother], [appellees], or one or more of the State authorities. Although [natural mother] was not totally truthful when she denied knowledge of the whereabouts of [appellant], she was not perpetrating an injustice upon him. Further, neither the State of New York nor the State of Maryland has denied him any substantial right. He simply did not move quickly enough to *524plan for and provide a home for an infant child. Someone else is now doing that task and doing it well. It would be a grave injustice to the child to require her to break the bonds she has established with the [appellees] to correct any injustice we might perceive as having been done to [appellant].
(Emphasis supplied).
The court’s decision rests on factual findings supported by the record and represents an appropriate exercise of discretion, “a reasoned decision based on the weighing of various alternatives.” Yet the majority engages in appellate fact finding and then substitutes its judgment for that of Judge Whitfill. For example, the majority disregards the evidence that appellees acted in good faith and finds as a fact that the ICPC was violated “knowingly” by either appellees or their attorney. Maj. op. at 503.3
While there is certainly evidence in the record that “[t]he illegal removal of Baby Girl S. from New York greatly impaired the rights of the natural father to have custody of Baby Girl S.,” maj. op. at 504-505, the trial court relied on evidence that cuts the other way. For example, appellees filed their petition for adoption less than three weeks after the child’s birth. They duly named appellant as the natural father, noted that his consent had not been obtained, and provided his full name and address to the court. Within less than one month, the court issued to appellant the first of four show cause orders. With respect to the initial attempt to serve him, *525appellant failed on several occasions to claim his certified mail. Subsequently, a private process server made repeated attempts to serve appellant, but appellant never returned the process server’s telephone calls. Ultimately, almost an entire year elapsed before service was achieved upon appellant.
Additionally, the trial court considered that appellant personally spoke with appellees’ Maryland attorney in September 1992 and met with appellees in New York in November 1992. It is thus undisputed that, months before appellant was served, and while Baby Girl S. was still an infant, appellant had actual knowledge of the adoption proceedings in Maryland. Yet he never filed an objection to the adoption until June 1993. Moreover, appellant did not file an action for custody until March 1994; by that time, the child was twenty-two months old. Further, he did not file for visitation until September 1994, after the trial in Maryland had already concluded.
The foregoing establishes that Judge Whitfill reasonably concluded that Baby Girl S. should not be made a martyr for the ICPC. His decision was an appropriate exercise of judicial discretion and should be affirmed.
II.
I disagree with the panel majority’s conclusion that Judge Whitfill erred by terminating appellant’s parental rights and approving the adoption. The majority correctly notes the fundamental right of a biological parent to raise his or her own child. See may. op. at 511. But the case law has also established that there are occasions in which the natural parent’s right to raise the child must yield to the child’s best interests. What the New York Court of Appeals stated in the oft-cited case of Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 546, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 824-25, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281 (1976), is pertinent here:
The day is long past in this State, if it had ever been, when the right of a parent to the custody of his or her child, *526where the extraordinary circumstances are present, would be enforced inexorably, contrary to the best interest of the child, on the theory solely of an absolute legal right. Instead, in the extraordinary circumstance, when there is a conflict, the best interest of the child has always been regarded as superior to the right of parental custody. Indeed, analysis of the cases reveals a shifting of emphasis rather than a remaking of substance. This shifting reflects more the modem principle that a child is a person, and not a subperson over whom the parent has an absolute possessory interest. A child has rights too, some of which are of a constitutional magnitude____
(Emphasis supplied).
In Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 372 A.2d 582 (1977), which involved a custody contest between a parent and third-parties who had extensively cared for the child, the Court adopted the principle enunciated in Bennett. It said: “Our decisions make clear ... that the right of a parent to the custody of the child would not be enforced inexorably, contrary to the best interest of the child, on the theory of an absolute legal right.” 280 Md. at 176, 372 A.2d 582. Thus, it is firmly settled in Maryland that, “while the parents are ordinarily entitled to the custody of their minor children by the natural law, the common law, and the statute, this right is not an absolute one, but may be forfeited where it appears that any parent is unfit to have custody of a child, or where some exceptional circumstances render such custody detrimental to the best interests of the childI.” Ross v. Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463 (1952) (emphasis supplied). Accord Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. at 178-79, 372 A.2d 582; Lipiano v. Lipiano, 89 Md.App. 571, 577, 598 A.2d 854 (1991), cert. denied, 325 Md. 620, 602 A.2d 710 (1992); Boothe v. Boothe, 56 Md.App. 1, 466 A.2d 58 (1983). See generally John F. Fader, II & Richard J. Gilbert, Maryland Family Law § 5-5 (2nd ed. 1995).
These principles apply with full force in the adoption context. In In re Adoption No. A91-71A 334 Md. 538, 640 A.2d 1085 (1994), the Court recognized that, although the decision *527on whether to grant an adoption petition must “be made with due regard to the rights of the natural parent,”
we have also made clear that the controlling factor, or guiding principle, in adoption and custody cases is not the natural parent’s interest in raising the child, but rather what serves the interests of the child.... We have said that in all cases where the interests of a child are in jeopardy the paramount consideration is what will best promote the child’s welfare, a consideration that is of transcendant importance.
Id., 334 Md. at 560, 561, 640 A.2d 1085 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
In the case before us, Judge Whitfill explicitly found that “extraordinary circumstances” were present, and that they warranted the granting of appellees’ petition for adoption. His decision was not based only on his assessment of appellant’s unfitness as a parent; rather, he also concluded that this case presents exceptional circumstances within the meaning of Ross v. Hoffman and Bennett v. Jeffreys. The trial court stated in its opinion:
We find that there are exceptional circumstances why the child should not be turned over to her biological father which include his failure to develop a plan for the care of the child prior to the child’s birth, his failure to provide for medical care for the mother prior to the child’s birth, his failure to provide care and support for the child since the time of its birth, his lack of capacity to meet the needs of the child and the fact that the child is well bonded to the petitioners and has no bond to the respondent. These factors are independent of anything that the natural mother did.
In my view, Judge Whitfill’s decision rests upon factual findings that are not clearly erroneous. Nor did the court abuse its discretion. Therefore, the trial court’s decision should not be disturbed.
Md.Code (1984, 1991 Repl.Vol.), § 5-312(b) of the Family Law Article (“F.L.”), contains the criteria for an independent *528adoption when a natural parent objects. Under this provision, the child must have been in the “physical care, custody, or control” of the petitioner for at least six months and the court must first find by clear and convincing evidence that each of the following criteria is met: (1) “it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the natural parent’s rights as to the child” (F.L. § 5—312(b)(1)); (2) “the child has been out of the custody of the natural parent for at least 1 year” (F.L. § 5-321(b)(2)); and (3) “the child has developed significant feelings toward, and emotional ties with, the petitioner” (F.L. § 5-312(b)(3)). Fourth, the court must also find, by clear and convincing evidence, that at least one of the following three criteria is met: (a) the natural parent “has not maintained meaningful contact with the child during the time the petitioner has had custody despite the opportunity to do so” (F.L. § 5—312(b)(4)(i)); (b) the natural parent “has repeatedly failed to contribute to the physical care and support of the child although financially able to do so” (F.L. § 5—312(b)(4)(ii)); or (c) the natural parent “has been convicted of child abuse of the child” (F.L. § 5-312(b)(4)(iii)).4
The issue of the child’s best interests, embodied in F.L. § 5—312(b)(1), occupied much of the trial court’s analysis.5 Central to the court’s decision is its unflinching conclusion that the best interest of Baby Girl S. compels termination of appellant’s parental rights and approval of the adoption. Indeed, the court unequivocally concluded that “[tjhere is no question in our mind that it is in the best interest of the child that she remain with appellees.”6 The trial court did not err in its consideration of F.L. § 5-312(b).
*529It is the trial judge’s function to resolve conflicts in the evidence. His factual findings should not be disturbed unless they are “clearly erroneous.” See In re Adoption No. A9171A, supra, 334 Md. at 564, 640 A.2d 1085; Wamsley v. Wamsley, 333 Md. 454, 462, 635 A.2d 1322 (1994). See also Styka v. Styka, 257 Md. 464, 469, 263 A.2d 555 (1970) (where trial judge, who was presented with two essentially different stories, saw witnesses and heard them testify, reviewing court could not say that his judgment as to the witnesses’ credibility was clearly erroneous); Kerber v. Kerber, 240 Md. 312, 316-17, 214 A.2d 164 (1965); Thurlow v. Thurlow, 212 Md. 222, 227, 129 A.2d 170 (1957); Sullivan v. Sullivan, 199 Md. 594, 600-01, 87 A.2d 604 (1952); Fantasy Valley Resort, Inc. v. Gaylord Fuel Corp., 92 Md.App. 267, 275, 607 A.2d 584, cert. denied, 328 Md. 237, 614 A.2d 83 (1992) (weighing of evidence and credibility of witnesses are matters for trial court, and will not be disturbed on appeal unless clearly erroneous).
In resolving conflicts in the evidence, it is the trial judge’s prerogative to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence presented. See Mercedes-Benz v. Garten, 94 Md.App. 547, 556, 618 A.2d 233 (1993) (in reviewing the lower court’s factual findings, we will assume the truth of all evidence, and all reasonable inferences therefrom, that support the court’s decision); Holly v. Maryland Auto Insurance Fund, 29 Md.App. 498, 506, 349 A.2d 670 (1975) (trial court’s conclusion must stand if there is any competent, material evidence that directly or by reasonable inference tends to justify that conclusion). See also Larmore v. Larmore, 241 Md. 586, 589, 217 A.2d 338 (1966). Moreover, we must uphold the trial judge’s decision unless he has abused his discretion. See In re Adoption No. 11137, 106 Md.App. 308, 314, 664 A.2d 443 (1995). As I see it, Judge Whitfill’s decision passes muster on all fronts.
*530A review of the record establishes that the court’s decision was well founded. To establish and underscore the trial court’s careful consideration of the evidence and its proper exercise of discretion, I must rely heavily on the trial court’s opinion.
The natural mother testified that, during her pregnancy, appellant was uninterested, did not provide financial or other support for her (beyond taking her to the doctor twice), and did not try to develop a plan for the care or raising of the couple’s child.7 Judge Whitfill believed the natural mother’s *531version of events. Indeed, he said that the mother “impressed us as a sincere young lady,” and he added, “We accept as true her characterization of [appellant] as not providing anything other than talk toward the care and planning for care of the baby.” On the other hand, the court did not find appellant particularly credible. For example, the court noted that appellant “has alternately claimed an ability to provide properly for the child and to be indigent. In fact, he provided nothing toward the financial support of the child or toward the physical care of the child.”
Appellant’s failure to support the mother of the couple’s child during pregnancy, or to make any plans for the child’s future, indicated to the court that appellant was unwilling to assume, or incapable of assuming, the responsibilities of parenthood. The majority says, “[W]e believe that the trial judge wrongly focused his attention on appellant’s failure to provide financial support for the mother before the birth of Baby Girl S. F.L. § 5-312 focuses on whether appellant provides support for the baby, not the mother.” Maj. op. at 515.
*532But the language of F.L. § 5-312(b) speaks to the child. As the trial judge observed, appellant’s conduct during the period of expectancy is a relevant factor for the court’s consideration. See In re Adoption No. A91-71A supra, 334 Md. at 563, 640 A.2d 1085. By failing to support the woman who was carrying his child, appellant revealed his own inadequacies as a would-be father. Logically, evidence as to appellant’s conduct could not be restricted solely to events occurring after the birth of the child. Indeed, in In re Adoption No. A91-71A the Court explicitly said that evidence of a natural father’s abandonment of the child before the child’s birth is a relevant factor in determining the existence of exceptional circumstances. Id., 334 Md. at 563, 640 A.2d 1085. Chief Judge Murphy wrote for the Court:
A man who deserts the expectant mother, aware that there is a substantial possibility that he is the father of her child, leaving her dependent upon others, with no regard for her prenatal care or concern as to whether the mother will have an abortion or carry the child to term, thereby shows a distinct lack of regard for the future well-being of both the mother and child.
Id., 334 Md. at 563-64, 640 A.2d 1085. Thus, the court below did not err in considering evidence of appellant’s conduct during the natural mother’s pregnancy.
In any event, the trial judge did not focus only on appellant’s failure to provide support during the pregnancy. Instead, that was but one of the many factors on which the court relied. Appellant conceded that, even after the baby was born, he did not buy formula, clothes, or diapers, although he thought the baby was still in New York with the natural mother.8
*533Judge Whitfill also considered as bizarre the circumstances of the one occasion in which appellant took the natural mother to his own mother’s house, left her there with people whom she did not know, and then never came back.9 Early the next morning, the natural mother, who was then about six months pregnant, had to walk some two miles to a hospital to call home for a ride. Judge Whitfill wrote: “He took her to his home on one occasion but left her in a crowded house with persons who were strangers to her without advising her he was leaving and without leaving any messages as to where he was going. This only added to her belief that [appellant] could not be trusted to provide a stable environment for her and the child.”
Additionally, the trial judge had substantial concerns about appellant’s maturity. He said: “[Appellant] tries to present *534an image that he was enthusiastic about being a father, that he was anxious to support and pay medical expenses for his child and [natural mother] that he very much loves his daughter.” Again, the judge concluded that appellant did not provide “anything but talk” to the natural mother during her pregnancy. The court stated:
We see [appellant] as immature in his outlook on life and grandiose in his thinking. While having offered no money for medical expenses for [natural mother] and the child, and while claiming indigence when he initially appeared in this court, he claimed to be well-established in his job, well liked by all involved, destined to advance to a management position and to earn $35,000.00 per year by the end of 1994. He claimed that his mother was going to sell her house on Stout Court to him. Later, when confronted with the magnitude of the outstanding mortgage, he claimed that she would give him the house. He claimed to have a 401(k) Plan for the benefit of the child. On cross-examination he acknowledged that he had not started a 401(k) Plan but only had an intent to do that in the future.10
Judge Whitfill also wrote:
[Appellant] ... in our judgment is emotionally immature and has no real concept as to the responsibilities of parenting a child.... He believes it will be fun to be a parent. He has grandiose ideas as to how he will advance and how *535he will be able to provide a home for this child. In fact, he has done little to think through the process of being physically as well as financially responsible for the child.
The court was also troubled by appellant’s failure to provide the natural mother with his last name. The panel majority seems to suggest that the natural mother could have easily investigated and determined appellant’s last name. The point, however, is that appellant’s decision to play games with his last name with the young woman who was carrying the couple’s child supports the trial court’s conclusion concerning appellant’s immaturity and lack of genuine interest. Indeed, Judge Whitfill found it “strange” that “a man would claim his love and affection for a child but would believe that the mother of that child, while carrying the child, had no need to know his last name.” The court concluded that appellant did not disclose his last name to avoid having to reimburse the New York Department of Social Services for expenses incurred by the mother in connection with the child.
As with the court’s other factual findings, we must defer to Judge Whitfill’s conclusion about appellant’s “immaturity.” The conclusion was based, at least in part, on Judge Whitfill’s assessment of appellant’s demeanor, which is precisely a matter within the province of the trial court. Indeed, in Petrini v. Petrini, supra, 336 Md. at 470, 648 A.2d 1016, the Court said: “Particularly important in custody cases is the trial court’s opportunity to observe the demeanor and the credibility of the parties and witnesses.”
Further support for the court’s conclusion that it is in the child’s best interest to approve the adoption comes from evidence about appellees and the child’s relationship with them. Evidence of “the length of time that a child has been with the prospective adoptive parents and the strength of the attachment between the child and the prospective adoptive parents” is a relevant consideration in contested adoption cases. In re Adoption No. A91-71A supra, 334 Md. at 562, 640 A.2d 1085. Judge Whitfill properly considered the evidence before him and said: “The child has developed ... *536significant feelings toward and ties with [appellees]. They are the only parents she has known. She identifies with them as her mommy and daddy. Again, not only is the evidence clear and convincing, it is uncontradicted and undisputed.” (Emphasis supplied).
In reaching its conclusion, the trial court considered the testimony of Ms. Jean Kushner, an L.C.S.W., who was the court-appointed expert. She said that appellees were “fit and proper parents.” Similarly, the court considered the view of the child’s court-appointed attorney, who recommended that the best interests of the child would be promoted by allowing appellees to adopt her. Thus, Judge Whitfill said: “[Appellees] are competent, caring parents with adequate resources and an adequate home to properly care for the child in question. The testimony of the friends and family, together with the report of Mrs. Kushner, show that the child has bonded to [appellees] in a loving and healthy way and that the child sees [appellees] as her parents.”
Judge Whitfill was, however, understandably troubled by appellant’s complete failure to cooperate with Ms. Kushner, who was thus never able to evaluate appellant. The court said: “Mrs. Kushner testified that she sent two letters to [appellant] inviting him to contact her so that she could include him in the investigation and that she received no response.”
■ The trial judge was also obviously troubled by appellant’s total lack of appreciation for the trauma the child will inevitably experience if she is uprooted from the only family she has ever known. In this regard, the court noted:
Mrs. Kushner ... said on the other hand that there is no question that removal of the child from the home of [appellees] would be a severe trauma to the child.
Hi H* H« Hs H« ❖
She also made it clear that she does not advocate removing children from loving homes when they have bonded since bonding is the bedrock of healthy human development. She testified that the prisons are filled with people who have *537never bonded to a parent figure. What happens in early life is crucial to healthy development without regard to memory.
(Emphasis supplied).
Ms. Kushner also testified that the child would grieve for appellees if she were removed from them. Yet, as the court observed, appellant did not understand the significance of the grieving process, and thought that the child would quickly forget her loss.11 In view of the testimony, the court expressed concern that appellant’s insensitivity would not help the child with her transition. He stated: “This lack of concern makes it highly unlikely that he would help the child make a meaningful transition from the adoptive parents to himself if custody were awarded to him.”
Regarding the other factors set forth in F.L. § 5-312(b), there is no dispute that the criterion stated in F.L. § 5-312(b)(3)—that the child “has developed significant feelings toward and emotional ties with” appellees—has been satisfied. Judge Whitfill correctly wrote: “In fact, the adequacy of [appellees’] parenting and the fact that the child has bonded to them is not seriously contested by [appellant].”
With respect to the disjunctive factors in F.L. § 5-312(b)(4), the trial judge determined that appellant did not maintain meaningful contact with the child, despite his opportunity to do so. F.L. § 5-312(b)(4)(i). The court said:
[Appellant] made no effort to have any contact with the mother and child between the time he was confronted at the *538hospital on May 5, 1992 and sometime in August of 1992 when he first learned that the child was not with [natural mother]. He filed a petition for paternity or filiation but never filed a petition for custody or visitation until March of 1994. He evaded service of process until he could obtain his order of filiation. He was more interested in pursuing the legal gamesmanship than he was in making actual contact with the child.
(Emphasis added).
The court also concluded that appellant did not contribute to the physical care and support of the child. F.L. § 5-312(b)(4)(ii). These findings, too, are supported by the record. The natural mother testified, for example, that appellant did not provide any support and, as earlier noted, appellant admitted that he assisted the natural mother in obtaining welfare but did not provide any material help for her, even after the baby was born. Thus, the court did not err in concluding:
In the instant case, [appellant] made no attempts to provide any support to the birth mother for her care or the prenatal care of the child prior to the child’s birth. At best, accepting his own testimony, he took her to the Welfare Office and transported her to one or two doctors visits where she could use her Medicaid. He made no plans for the care of the child after its birth and did not participate with the mother in developing any arrangements for the care of the child other than to suggest that the mother could live with his mother. There was no serious effort to develop a plan for the care of the child after its birth.
# * * # * *

From the time of the child’s birth in May, 1992, until August, 1992, he believed the child was with the mother and yet he paid no support, paid no medical bills, made no demands to see the child, and no demands for custody.

*539
There was no financial support offered before or after birth of the child.

(Emphasis supplied).
III.
The majority paints a picture of a natural father who faithfully and steadfastly attempted to exercise and protect his rights, who truly desires to be a father to his child, and who has been thwarted by the conduct of the natural mother and appellees. In its fact finding mission, the majority accuses appellees of “flagrant violations of the law” and contends that, “as a direct result of appellees’ violation of the ICPC,” the child’s best interests “might dictate adoption____” It also states that “there is not a scintilla of evidence that appellant is not fit to be a father” and “[t]here is not a scintilla of evidence ... indicating that appellant did not want to assume the role of father.” To support its decision that the approval of the adoption was improper, the panel majority also relies, inter alia, on F.L. § 5-312(d)(2), which provides: “A court may not grant a decree of adoption under this section solely because a parent has been deprived of custody by the act of the other natural parent.” (Emphasis supplied).
The hue of the trial court’s picture is entirely different, however. While it is true that appellant never consented to the adoption, the trial judge described appellant’s interest and conduct as mere “posturing.” Apart from two visits to the doctor, one prenatal visit with the natural mother to his own mother’s home, one visit to the hospital at the time of the birth, and a paternity petition, the trial court saw no effort by appellant to establish genuine contact. The court found:
[Appellant] made no demands for custody of the child prior to his attorney writing a letter to opposing counsel on April 13,1993 [when the baby was eleven months old]. He did go to the hospital with his mother and other members of his family. He took flowers, balloons and a card. These items *540were in no way of benefit to the child but were his efforts to impress the mother.
******
When we examine the genuineness of [appellant’s] desires to care for, and to parent this child, we find they are suspect. There was no caring conduct exhibited prior to the birth of the child.
******
There were no efforts to visit with the child after she left the hospital....
Appellant testified that he made numerous attempts to see the child. In contrast, the natural mother said that, after the baby was born, appellant came by the house only “a couple of times.” Judge Whitfill concluded that “[appellant’s] claims of efforts to contact [natural mother] are greatly exaggerated.” (Emphasis supplied). Moreover, in his rebuke of appellant, the court concluded that appellant “stood back and did nothing to fulfill his responsibility as a father until after the natural mother made choices and he then complains. The natural mother was not required to leave the baby in a basket on his doorstep.”
Based on appellant’s behavior, the court also determined that, at least to some extent, the natural mother’s decision not to see appellant and to place the child for adoption was directly attributable to appellant’s conduct, through which he demonstrated his indifference and his irresponsibility. The birth mother was only a high school student when the child was born. In the court’s view, “[appellant] intended to let [the natural mother] struggle with the child, and draw public assistance while he and his mother thought about the issue. The child cannot wait. The child requires immediate and proper loving care.”
In addition, the trial court found that the birth mother did not deprive appellant of custody; rather, appellant did not seek custody. The court said, “[The] natural mother was not acting to deprive appellant of contact when she made a *541decision to place the child for adoption. She was acting in a responsible way ... to provide for this child.”
The majority quotes the portion of appellant’s trial testimony in which he expresses his heartbreak because he did not witness his daughter’s first step. Certainly, when this testimony is considered in isolation, it is very moving. But the panel majority fails to recognize that the trial judge heard the testimony and nevertheless concluded that appellant’s inability to see Baby Girl S. was a product of his own doing.

CONCLUSION

Without doubt, I do not condone actions by persons who wrongfully snatch or conceal a baby from a natural parent who does not wish to relinquish the child. Similarly, I do not approve of those who keep a baby for a sufficient period of time in order to create the bonds that no one can truly want to sever, and who then claim that they should be able to keep the baby because sending the child back to the natural parent would traumatize the child. But in a case where the ICPC has been violated, it is the circuit court that is vested with the discretion to balance the nature and gravity of the violation with the best interests of the child.
Nor do I intend any criticism of appellant. But again, it was the trial judge’s task to assess the credibility of the witnesses and to resolve the conflicting evidence. In carrying out this task, the court came to a conclusion unfavorable to appellant.
The majority has, in effect, usurped the trial court’s role. Given the majority’s acknowledgement of the discretion vested in the trial court and Judge Whitfill’s reasoned decision in such an extraordinarily difficult case, I cannot say that the trial court erred. Although there is some evidence supporting appellant, there is other evidence supporting appellees. Judge Whitfill heard the conflicting testimony and found in favor of appellees. In setting his decision aside, the majority has retried the case on the appellate record.
*542What Justice Charles Levin of the Michigan Supreme Court said in his dissent in the infamous “Baby Jessica” case is apt here: “[T]his is not a lawsuit concerning the ownership, the legal title, to a bale of hay.” In re Clausen, 442 Mich. 648, 691, 502 N.W.2d 649, 668 (1993), stay denied, DeBoer v. DeBoer, 509 U.S. 1301, 114 S.Ct. 1, 125 L.Ed.2d 755 (1993). See also Krebs v. Krebs, 255 Md. 264, 266, 257 A.2d 428 (1969) (“We are not here dealing with chattels.”). Justice. Levin added that the “majority, by ignoring the best interests of the child, has approached this case as if it were a contest between two parties over a piece of property.” In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d at 687. The same may be said here.
I respectfully dissent.

. While there are, of course, inordinate time pressures upon the trial court, it is regrettable that so many months elapsed from the time the trial ended until the time that the court issued its opinion.

. The adoptive mother testified:
[APPELLEES' COUNSEL]: Did you understand the Compact Administrator did clear it for you are [sic] to return to Maryland?
*522APPELLEE MOTHER: Yes.
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[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Did you get permission from Maryland to bring the child here?
APPELLEE MOTHER: Yes. Why do you think I stayed in New York City for two weeks? I stayed in New York until I had approval to come down here.
The trial judge was entitled to believe the testimony of the adoptive mother. See Hale v. Hale, 74 Md.App. 555, 569, 539 A.2d 247 cert. denied, 313 Md. 30, 542 A.2d 857 (1988) ("Assessing the credibility of witnesses is the role of the trial court, not the appellate court.”).

. The majority asserts that the adoptive parents falsely asserted in the adoption petition, filed on May 22, 1992, that they had complied with the ICPC and were awaiting approval to bring the child to Maryland. It points, inter alia, to the adoptive father’s testimony that the child was brought to Maryland on or before May 18, 1992. The petition was signed by the adoptive parents under penalties of perjury, but the record extract does not reflect the date on which it was signed. Certainly, the date of filing by appellees’ attorney does not necessarily correspond to the date the petition was signed; appellees’ statements may well have been true when made. Moreover, the adoptive mother specifically testified that she remained in New York for two weeks and did not proceed to Maryland until advised that it was lawful for her to do so. The court found her testimony credible.

. After the trial court rendered its decision, the General Assembly-enacted F.L. § 5~312(b)(4)(iv).

. It is undisputed that "the child has been out of the custody of the natural parent for at least 1 year” and had been in the custody of the petitioners for at least six months. Therefore, these factors need not be addressed.

. Judge Whitfill was overwhelmingly convinced that his decision regarding the best interests was correct. . He said:
*529Had the only issue in this case been the question of best interests of the child, we would have decided the matter from the bench the day the trial was completed. Our concerns have run not to the issue of best interests of the child but to the impact of our decision upon the legal rights of [appellant]____ It is the concern for his legal rights ... that has caused us to struggle with this matter.

. The following testimony of the natural mother is relevant:
[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: Did he ever offer any support to you during the pregnancy?
NATURAL MOTHER: He offered a couple of times, but all he did was offer. He never did anything.
[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: Tell me what he said when he made the offers?
NATURAL MOTHER: He would say "I could take you to the doctors.” That was about it.
[APPELLEES' COUNSEL]: Did he ever offer to provide you with any financial support?
NATURAL MOTHER: His mother did. She said I could live with them, but that’s all she said.
[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: Did she offer you any money?
NATURAL MOTHER: No.
[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: Did [appellant] ever say you could live at his house?
NATURAL MOTHER: I don’t believe he did, no.
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[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: You said he offered to take you to the doctor. Did he, in fact, take you to the doctor?
NATURAL MOTHER: Only twice.
[APPELLEES' COUNSEL]: Why didn’t you want to see him? NATURAL MOTHER: Because I made up my mind what I wanted to do with the child.
[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: How did you come to choose adoption for the child?
NATURAL MOTHER: I knew I didn’t have any support from him because he always said he would do things, but he never did. I didn't have any money. I was still in school.
*531(Emphasis supplied).
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[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Why didn’t you want him to see the baby or you?
NATURAL MOTHER: Because he wasn't interested, so he hasn’t called me in three or four months, so I didn't want him to see the baby.
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: It was his child?
NATURAL MOTHER: He didn't do anything throughout my pregnancy-
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[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Why did he take you twice [to the doctor]?
NATURAL MOTHER: He stopped.
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: If he didn’t care, why would he take you once?
NATURAL MOTHER: I think he lost interest. I didn’t think he cared anymore.
[APPELLANT’S COUNSEL]: Didn't he tell you he would do whatever you wanted him to do?
NATURAL MOTHER: Yeah. He always said things but he never did anything.
(Emphasis supplied).

. The following colloquies are relevant:
[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: Did you buy formula for the baby? APPELLANT: No.
[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: Did you buy diapers for the baby? APPELLANT: No.
[APPELLEES' COUNSEL]: Did you buy clothing for the baby?
*533APPELLANT: No.
[APPELLEES' COUNSEL]: Did you ever discuss with [appellant] or did he ever discuss getting married with you?
NATURAL MOTHER: No, he didn't.
[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: Did you ever ask him to pay any bills for you?
NATURAL MOTHER: No.
[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: Did he ever offer to pay child support? NATURAL MOTHER: No.
if: H« s-s # H* #
[APPELLEES' COUNSEL]: Have you ever received any financial support or financial support for [Baby Girl S.] from [appellant]? APPELLEE MOTHER: No, we haven't.
[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: To the best of your knowledge, has he made any efforts to provide financial support?
APPELLEE MOTHER: No, he hasn’t.

. The natural mother testified:
NATURAL MOTHER: He just left me there. He went somewhere. He didn't tell me where he went.
[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: Did he come home that evening? NATURAL MOTHER: No.
[APPELLEES' COUNSEL]: When did you leave?
NATURAL MOTHER: In the morning.

. The following colloquies are relevant:
[APPELLEES’ COUNSEL]: Are you going to buy [appellant's mother's house] from her?
APPELLANT: Yes.
[APPELLEES' COUNSEL]: What do you think the house is worth? APPELLANT: House could be somewhere—$130,000.
[APPELLEES' COUNSEL]: How much money do you earn?
* * # * * *
APPELLANT: I make $10.95 an hour.
* if! * * * *
APPELLANT: I am a cashier at the moment.
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I make—this time I grossed—$21,000, but every 500 hours I get a raise, and then I top out at $32,000 a year.

. The following testimony of appellant is relevant:
[APPELLANT]: [T]he baby has been with them for two years but she is at the age now where she will easily forget. She will cry for a couple days.... [H]ow many of us remember what we did at a year and, like, seven months. How many of us really remember? She will forget about [the appellees].... She will never know it will just—it wouldn’t even be a vague memory.
THE COURT: You don't think there will be any damage to her? [APPELLANT]: Not at all.... I don’t think it would be any emotional strain on her, psychological or anything. I don’t think she would have any problem. She will adapt to my family right away. She won't even remember this.