Court Opinion

ID: 9665647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:53:51.105805+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:36.992303
License: Public Domain

In their brief in support of the application for rehearing, counsel have requested that we extend our opinion to show certain additional facts in order to afford a full review in event of certiorari. This we are glad to do.
In their brief counsel state:
 "The Court on page 9 of its opinion intimates that one of the reasons for granting the Writ of Mandamus was the alleged failure of the record to show a motion by Appellee for a continuance. The Court does not set out any facts to justify an inference that no motion for a continuance was made. The record shows that the Appellee in open Court moved for a continuance of the case and the motion was resisted by Appellant's Attorneys. The affidavit of Appellee's attorney, Frank V. Potts, shows such motion and that 'appellant's attorneys then made strenuous objections to a continuance in said cause' (R. 33); and one of appellant's attorneys, Mr. E.B. Haltom, Jr., on, the hearing testified that 'if Frank says that he moved for a continuance and the Court denied it, I will take it at face value. I remember that he talked to me about a continuance and I said I would resist it and the Court intimated it would not grant it.' (Tr. 112)."
In his affidavit introduced in hearing on the motion for a new trial Mr. Frank V. Potts, one of the attorneys for the plaintiff below sets forth:
 "* * * When affiant asked the Court to call plaintiff's witnesses it was then learned that none of the witnesses which plaintiff had had subpoenaed *Page 635 
was present in Court. Thereupon affiant stated to the Court that the plaintiff would be unable to go to trial in the absence of the witness, Jesse Arlin Canerday, who was a passenger in the automobile involved in the collision and the only eye witness who knew the same facts as the plaintiff and defendant. The defendant's attorneys then made strenuous objections to a continuance in said cause and stated to the Court at that time that they had three witnesses who would testify that the defendant was not weaving his automobile just prior to the accident. Affiant stated to the Court that plaintiff's right to recover depended upon proof of wilful or wanton conduct on the part of the defendant and that witness, Canerday, would testify that the defendant, Lloyd Grigsby, Jr., just prior to the accident was driving at a high rate of speed and was purposely weaving his automobile from one edge of the pavement to the other and that the plaintiff and the witness, Canerday, had asked him to slow down or he would kill them all. Defendant's attorney also at that time stated to the Court that the defendant had a sworn statement from the witness, Canerday, contradictory to the facts which affiant had stated to the Court that the witness, Canerday, would testify to. Thereupon the Court made the statement that perhaps the reason Canerday was not present in Court was because he realized that he made inconsistent statements. Affiant then told the Court that Canerday insisted that he had not made inconsistent statements. The Court then stated to plaintiff's attorney that they would have to proceed the trial notwithstanding the absence of witness, Canderday, and that at the time the Court instructed the plaintiff's attorney that they would have to immediately proceed to trial without the witness, Canerday, the plaintiff was his only witness in Court. * * *"
Also, in the hearing on the motion for the new trial Mr. Bert Haltom, one of the attorneys for the defendant below testified:
 "A. It is my recollection that it was after our first conversation with the Court and whatever was said about a continuance was the first conversation. The Court didn't flatly say it would not grant a continuance if Frank asked for it, but it initimated it would not.
 "Q. You mean Frank didn't ask for a continuance? A. I don't think he moved for it, but if Frank says that he moved for a continuance and the Court denied it, I will take it at face value. I remember he talked to me about a continuance and I said I would resist it and the Court intimated it would not grant it."
We do not yet think the above reflects a formal motion for a continuance, and did not set out these details feeling the statement of the court in its order which we set forth, setting aside the consent judgment, was a sufficient picture of the situation, the court in said order, stating:
 "The Court being orally approached at the Bench on the matter of a possible continuance stated to plaintiffs' attorney that the Court thought the case ought to be either settled or tried that day, and at least, made strong implications that a formal application for continuance would be refused."
Further, if the above proceedings rose to the dignity of a motion to continue, and we think not, the record does not disclose such an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge as to amount to a reversible error. Ball v. State, 252 Ala. 686, 42 So.2d 626.
Counsel in brief state that in our opinion we stated that the court "advised the attorneys for the plaintiff that the court would use its processes to get the absent witness Canerday," but complain that we did not show that prior to the settlement, *Page 636 
upon discovering the absence of Canerday, counsel for plaintiff made diligent effort to locate Canerday, calling his home and also a filling station where he frequently stopped, and were unable to locate him.
The efforts of counsel to locate the witness Canerday are set forth in the affidavit of Mr. Potts, above mentioned. The court then advised the attorneys it would use its processes to get Canerday into court. We do not see that the omission complained of by counsel for appellant is of useful materiality, but are glad to set forth the matter in more detail as requested.
In brief, counsel for appellees state:
 "The opinion of the Court indicates that appellee failed to take prompt action to have said settlement vacated stating that appellee filed motion to set aside the consent judgment subsequent to defendant's motion to have clerk enter judgment. * * *"
We have carefully re-read our opinion in light of this statement by earnest counsel, and can find nothing indicating that we thought counsel had failed to take prompt action. While in his affidavit Mr. Potts states that before the opening of court on March 10, plaintiff's attorneys "advised the Court that the agreement to accept the $1000.00 was entered into under circumstances alleged in the motion and they requested that said agreement be held for naught and that if a judgment had been rendered pursuant to said agreement, that same be set aside and held for naught." Thereafter the motion was actually filed on 117 March 1960, as stated in our opinion.
Counsel for appellee also asks us to show that the witness Canerday, presented by the defendant below in the hearing on the motion for a new trial, testified as follows on direct examination:
 "Q. You did sign it (referring to Canerday's written sworn statement given to appellant's counsel)? A. That's right. The statement is no good to me. It is not right."
* * * * * *
 "Q. Do you state to the Court now that your statements contained in this two page statement were not given by you to Mr. Patterson back in August 1957? A. Well, that's not a right statement."
We think it should be further noted that Canerday testified, "I might have skimmed through it (the statement) but I am not sure," and, on whether he swore to the statement, "Well, I don't remember that one, but I do remember Mr. Pott's."
Mrs. Flora B. Cummings, a secretary in the office of appellant's attorneys, and a Notary Public, testified that she asked Canerday "point blank" before taking his acknowledgment to the statement if he knew "what he was signing; that he knew what the paper stated," and he said he did.
Counsel has also asked that we set out in detail the statements of several witnesses contained in affidavits given to counsel for appellee, and introduced in evidence at the hearing on the motion. All of these statements were obtained after the entry of the consent judgment. We think our summary in our opinion that these affidavits show these witnesses would have testified differently from their sworn statements is a sufficient reference to the contents of these statements. By this we mean that such statements would tend to establish that the defendant was guilty of wilful or wanton conduct.
Counsel also contend that the court at no time pronounced judgment pursuant to the agreement between the parties, but merely made a statement that the case had been settled between the parties, and neither made nor signed any bench note or entry from which a judgment could have been entered before plaintiff's attorneys made an oral motion the following morning that the agreement be held for naught.
We are in the dark as to counsel's expected contention in this regard. No argument touching this point was made in *Page 637 
brief upon original submission of this appeal. This in itself would preclude any point on this question being now raised.
Further, there is no law requiring a judge to make bench notes. Du Pree v. Hart, 242 Ala. 690, 8 So.2d 183. Also, in the order made on 25 March 1960, directing the clerk to proceed to the entering of the judgment, the court recited:
 "It appears to the Court that on March 11, 1960, defendant herein filed written motion praying that the Court direct the Clerk to enter and write up the judgment of the Court pronounced by the Court by consent of plaintiff and defendant in open Court on March 9, 1960, in the amount of $1,000.00 in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, together with accrued costs taxed against the defendant. * * *"
The court in said order then directed the clerk to "proceed to the entering of said judgment by proper judgment entry in the permanent records of this court."
Pursuant to said order the following judgment, dated 9 March 1960, was entered:
 "This day in open Court came the parties with their attorneys, and by consent of plaintiff and defendant made in open Court, the court by consent of both parties, on this day, entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant for the sum of $1,000.00 and costs.
 "It is therefore ordered and adjudged by the court that the plaintiff do have and recover of the defendant the sum of One Thousand Dollars, the amount of damages as so assessed by the Court, and all court costs in this cause created, for the recovery of which let execution issue."
A judgment entry speaks absolute verity. Ex parte McDermott, 224 Ala. 684, 141 So. 659. The correctness of this judgment has not been questioned by any proper proceedings, and an appeal is not the allowable method for correcting supposed errors or omissions of the officials of the trial court in the preparation and certification of the record for appeal. Gossett v. Pratt, 250 Ala. 300,34 So.2d 145.
Counsel for appellee also complain that we ignored his contention as to the presumption to be accorded the court's ruling granting the motion to set aside the consent judgment. The authorities cited by appellee in this connection, with one exception, pertain to the lower court's ruling made in connection with a judgment obtained upon trial of the issues, and not with consent judgments.
The exception above noted from which counsel might obtain some comfort is Ex parte Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation,32 Ala. App. 609, 28 So.2d 808. However, it is to be noted that in Ingalls Shipbuilding Corporation v. Cahela, 251 Ala. 163, 36 So.2d 513, 522, the Supreme Court commented as to the Court of Appeals' opinion as follows:
 "* * * We think the proceeding on mandamus from the Court of Appeals was viewed with an erroneous idea of the power of a court in term time over its judgments, when it is not a judgment by default, or nil dicit, or non-suit."
We are clear to the conclusion, that likewise under the numerous authorities cited in our original opinion, that insofar as setting aside consent judgments, a court is limited to the grounds mentioned in our opinion.
Application overruled.
 After Remandment