Court Opinion

ID: 2964264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:22:58.412135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:56.140936
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
                                 ____________________

          No. 96-1065

                                   PAUL FERRAGAMO,

                                Plaintiff - Appellant,

                                          v.

                       CHUBB LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF AMERICA,

                                Defendant - Appellee.

                                 ____________________

                     APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

                     [Hon. Morris E. Lasker, U.S. District Judge]
                                             ___________________

                                 ____________________

                                        Before

                               Torruella, Chief Judge,
                                          ___________

                                Boudin, Circuit Judge,
                                        _____________

                           and Barbadoro,* District Judge.
                                           ______________

                                _____________________

               Maria  A.  Luise,  with whom  Frank  Mondano  and  Balliro &
               ________________              ______________       _________
          Mondano were on brief for appellant.
          _______
               Paul M. Sanford,  with whom Medeiros  Karmen & Sanford  Inc.
               _______________             ________________________________
          was on brief for appellee.

                                 ____________________

                                  September 3, 1996
                                 ____________________

                              
          ____________________

          *  Of the District of New Hampshire, sitting by designation.

                    Per  Curiam.   On  December  14,  1981, appellant  Paul
                    Per  Curiam
                    ___________

          Ferragamo ("Ferragamo")  was insured by United  Life and Accident

          Insurance  Company ("United  Life")  pursuant to  a policy  which

          entitled  Ferragamo to benefit payments in the event of his total

          disability.2   At  that time  he  owned and  operated  Northshore

          Recycling, a scrap metal recycling business.  Shortly thereafter,

          Ferragamo submitted  a claim for total  disability benefits based

          on an  accident  suffered  while  at  work  which  caused  severe

          injuries to his  left leg and ankle.  As  required by the policy,

          he  proceeded  to  file  monthly reports  regarding  his  injury.

          Relying on  these reports  and the information  contained therein

          establishing that Ferragamo remained totally disabled and was not

          working for pay  or profit, appellee Chubb Life Insurance Company

          of  America ("Chubb"),  United Life's  successor,  paid Ferragamo

          total  disability benefits  of $2,400  per month from  April 1982

          until June 1993,3 as  well as social  insurance benefits of  $750

          per month  over the initial five year period of his claim.  Chubb

          also  waived the further payment of premiums pursuant to a policy

          provision.

                    Although   the   monthly  reports   requested  detailed

          information  from  Ferragamo regarding  the  nature  of any  work

                              
          ____________________

          2  We present the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's
          verdict.  See,  e.g., Coastal  Fuels of P.R.,  Inc. v.  Caribbean
                    ___   ____  _____________________________     _________
          Petroleum Corp., 79 F.3d  182, 186, petition for cert.  filed, 65
          _______________                     _________________________
          U.S.L.W. 3034 (July 2, 1996).

          3   The disputed period  is limited to  the period after  January
          1988.

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          activities,4 he continuously represented  that he was not working

          or earning  any income other  than "investment income."5   During

          the course of Ferragamo's  eleven- year claimed disability, Chubb

          attempted  to verify the nature of his disability in a variety of

          ways including telephone contacts, personal interviews, reviewing

          his income  tax returns, independent medical  evaluations, and by

          "spot-checks" of Ferragamo's activities by private investigators.

          These  efforts  eventually  revealed that,  while  Ferragamo  was

          claiming total  disability, he was actually  engaging in numerous

          and  varied  physical  and  work  activities,  including  playing

          racquetball with  his trial lawyer, signing  public records under

          oath  to the  effect that  he  was working  as a  builder, filing

          federal income tax  returns where  he stated under  oath that  he

          received  significant profits  from his  real  estate development

          business,  operating a  construction company  known as  Ferragamo

          Development which purchased, developed, and sold over $10,000,000

          in  real estate, and disclosing to various persons, including his

          doctors, creditors, banks and various  town officers, that he was

          a  self-employed real  estate  developer, contractor  or  builder

          earning from $100,000 to $250,000 per year.  To mention only some

          of  the   discovered  evidence,   Ferragamo  fully  developed   a
                              
          ____________________

          4  The inquiries included  questions regarding his occupation and
          duties, whether he was self-employed, whether he  had returned to
          work on either  a part-time  or full-time basis,  what his  daily
          activities consisted  of, the amount  of his monthly  income, and
          whether he was partially or totally disabled.

          5   Ferragamo  signed each  report below  the statement  that: "I
          certify that  the foregoing  statements and answers  are complete
          and true to the best of my knowledge."

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          $6,000,000  condominium  complex  in  Swampscott,  Massachusetts,

          where he would be  at the job site  almost continuously each  day

          from 7:00-7:30 AM to 4:00-5:00 PM.  He not only drove his pick-up

          truck  to  work, but  at times  operated  a front-end  loader and

          climbed  down inside the newly dug foundation holes to check them

          out.   He was also fully  active in all aspects  of the planning,

          financing, supervision and sale of this project.

                    In addition  to the Swampscott condominium,  during the

          time of  his alleged total  disability Ferragamo also  engaged in

          various land  transactions including  those involving a  340 acre

          tract in  Littleton, New  Hampshire, two  lots in  North Andover,

          Massachusetts, two  in Salem,  and others in  Lynnfield, Peabody,

          Revere, and Swampscott, as well as at Chuebeque Island, Maine.

                    Predictably  upon  learning  the  above,  Chubb stopped

          disability payments  under the policy, and  incredibly, Ferragamo

          sued seeking  damages for breach of  contract, negligence, unfair

          and deceptive trade practices  pursuant to Mass. Gen. L.  ch. 93,

          negligent  infliction  of  emotional  distress,  and  intentional

          infliction of emotional distress.  Chubb denied these allegations

          and  counterclaimed   alleging   fraud,  deceit   and   negligent

          misrepresentation.

                    A  trial  was  held  at  which  the  above  facts  were

          presented to the jury.   At the  close of plaintiff's case  Chubb

          moved  for judgment pursuant to Fed. R.  Civ. P. 50, which motion

          was denied by the  district court on all counts  except regarding

          Chapter 93A, on   which ruling was reserved.   Thereafter, at the

                                         -4-

          close of the  evidence, Chubb  renewed the Rule  50 motion,  with

          similar  results.   The  jury  found  for  Chubb  on  all  counts

          including on  Chubb's counterclaim in the  amount of $192,401.71.

          Pursuant to special interrogatories the jury ruled that Chubb had

          not  breached  the policy  contract,  that  Ferragamo engaged  in

          misrepresentations  regarding his  claim, and that  after January

          1988, he  engaged in fraud in  this respect.   The district court

          then dismissed Ferragamo's chapter 93A claim.

                    Ferragamo raised three issues on appeal which under the

          circumstances  of this  case border  on the  frivolous:   (1) the

          admission into evidence of the investigator's reports which Chubb

          relied on in suspending Ferragamo's benefits; (2) the limiting of

          the cross-examination of Chubb's expert; and (3) the instructions

          given  to  the  jury  regarding  the  deceit   count  of  Chubb's

          counterclaim.

                    The challenged reports  were clearly admissible  within

          the discretion of the trial court, see Sinai v. New England Tel &
                                             ___ _____    _________________

          Tel. Co., 3 F.3d 471, 475 (1st Cir. 1993), cert. denied, ___ U.S.
          ________                                   ____________

          ___, 115  S. Ct. 597  (1994), because  they were relevant  to the

          issue  of whether  Chubb had reasonably  investigated Ferragamo's

          eligibility for  benefits before terminating them.   See Teishing
                                                               ___ ________

          v. SER-Jobs For Progress, Inc., 19 F.3d 755, 762 (1st Cir. 1994).
             ___________________________

          This  question  was put  at  issue  not  only by  the  nature  of

          Ferragamo's claim, but also  by the door that  was opened by  his

          counsel  in  the direct  examination of  his own  expert witness.

          Sinai,  3 F.3d at  475-76.  Furthermore,  considering the copious
          _____

                                         -5-

          independent  evidence heard  by  the  jury regarding  Ferragamo's

          activities, any error committed is at best harmless.  See Almonte
                                                                ___ _______

          v.  National Union Fire  Ins. Co.,  787 F.2d  763, 771  (1st Cir.
              _____________________________

          1986).

                    A trial court's discretion in limiting the conduct of a

          trial, although not limitless, is certainly ample enough to allow

          the curbing of the cross-examination of  Chubb's expert under the

          circumstances  of this trial.   See Fed. R.  Evid. 611(b) (noting
                                          ___

          that "cross examination  should be limited to  the subject matter

          of direct  examination").   On direct examination  Chubb's expert

          testified regarding its insurance  practices in August 1993, when

          Chubb  suspended   Ferragamo's  insurance  benefits.     He  also

          testified regarding  the reasonableness of Chubb's  actions as to

          the  period of time that  lapsed from the  time the investigative

          reports  were  received  to   the  suspension  of  the  benefits.

          Ferragamo's lawyer extensively fished outside these waters before

          the trial court properly ended the expedition.

                    Finally, in regard to the claim that the district court

          erred in  its jury instructions, it is  beyond reasonable dispute

          that Ferragamo did not make these objections after the charge was

          given  but  before  the  jury  retired  to  deliberate.    It  is

          elementary that the failure  to object to a jury charge  after it

          is given and  before the jury retires to  deliberate, is fatal to

          any claim of  error on  appeal.  Fed.  R. Civ.  P. 51; Scarfo  v.
                                                                 ______

          Cabletron  Sys., Inc., 54  F.3d 931, 940 (1st  Cir. 1995).  While
          _____________________

          there  are extraordinary  exceptions  to this  black-letter rule,

                                         -6-

          see, e.g., id., such  is not the present case.  Thus, we dwell no
          ___  ____  ___

          longer on this or any other alleged error.

                    We  can perceive  no appealable  error by  the district

          court.  In fact  the record shows actions by  appellant for which

          he could very well be held accountable before another forum.

          Considering  the  totally   meritless  nature  of   this  appeal,

          appellant is hereby ordered to show cause within 10 days from the

          issuance of this decision why he should not be held to pay double

          costs  and  attorney's fees  on  appeal.   See  28 U.S.C.    1919
                                                     ___

          (1994);  Fed. R. App. P. 38; Cronin  v. Town of Amesbury, 81 F.3d
                                       ______     ________________

          257, 261 (1st Cir. 1996).

                    The decision of the district court is affirmed.
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