Court Opinion

ID: 9942060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 15:00:47.216424+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:38.724137
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-6050     Document: 010111002451         Date Filed: 02/20/2024      Page: 1
                                                                                      FILED
                                                                          United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                             Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                            February 20, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                              Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                                  Clerk of Court
  MARQUISE MILLER; DEKOVEN
  RIGGINS; RICHARD OSEI; CHAD
  TYLER,

        Plaintiffs - Appellants,

  and

  CDMR, LLC, an Oklahoma limited
  liability company,

        Plaintiff,

  v.                                                            No. 23-6050
                                                         (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-00185-F)
  FIRST UNITED BANK AND TRUST                                   (W.D. Okla.)
  COMPANY, an Oklahoma banking
  corporation, d/b/a First United Bank,

        Defendant - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

        *
          After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this
 appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may
 be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-6050      Document: 010111002451         Date Filed: 02/20/2024        Page: 2

        Marquise Miller, Dekoven Riggins, Richard Osei, and Chad Tyler (together,

 Individuals), appearing pro se, appeal the district court’s judgment dismissing their

 claims of credit discrimination. They also appeal the district court’s denial of their

 motion to alter or amend the judgment. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,

 we affirm.

                                    I. BACKGROUND

        The Individuals filed a pro se complaint alleging credit discrimination claims

 against First United Bank and Trust Co. (First United) under the Equal Credit

 Opportunity Act (ECOA), see 15 U.S.C. §1691(a); the Fair Housing Act (FHA), see

 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604–3605; and 42 U.S.C. § 1981. 1 The claims arose from First United’s

 denial of a loan application to finance the purchase of an apartment complex. The

 Individuals, who are Black, alleged that they applied for financing through First United,

 that they also were to be guarantors of the loan, and that First United denied the

 application based on their race. They sought damages.

        First United filed a motion to dismiss the FHA claim. The district court granted

 the motion and dismissed the FHA claim without prejudice, reasoning that the FHA did

 not apply under the alleged circumstances. However, the court gave the Individuals leave

 to amend their complaint.

        1
         In relevant part, § 1981 provides: “All persons within the jurisdiction of the
 United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
 contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.” § 1981(a). It also protects those rights
 “against impairment by nongovernmental discrimination.” § 1981(c).
                                               2
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        An attorney then entered an appearance on behalf of the Individuals and filed a

 motion for leave to add CDMR, LLC as a necessary party-plaintiff because “the loan

 application guaranteed by the four individual Plaintiffs [was] directed to and made by . . .

 CDMR, . . . which is owned by the four individual Plaintiffs.” R. at 80. The motion also

 sought permission to file a first amended complaint (FAC). The FAC added CDMR as a

 plaintiff, asserted the same three claims as the original complaint, and sought damages.

 The court granted the motion.

        Next, First United filed a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),

 seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’ FHA and ECOA claims and the Individuals’ § 1981

 claim. 2 The court granted the motion as to Plaintiffs’ FHA claim, dismissing it without

 prejudice. On appeal, the Individuals 3 do not challenge this ruling, so we omit further

 discussion of it.

        The district court also granted the motion as to the Individuals’ ECOA claim,

 dismissing it without prejudice. The court concluded that the Individuals failed to

 establish their right to sue under the ECOA because the ECOA prohibits racial

 discrimination against loan applicants, but they alleged they were to be personal

 guarantors of the loan. The court also observed that although 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e)

 defines “applicant” to include a guarantor, it does so only for purposes of 12 C.F.R.

 § 1002.7(d). Section 1002.7(d) is part of the ECOA’s implementing regulation,

        2
            We refer to CDMR and the Individuals together as “Plaintiffs.”
        3
            CDMR is not an appellant.
                                               3
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 Regulation B, and prohibits requiring spouses to guarantee loans (referred to as the

 “signature rules” or the “spouse-guarantor rules”). See Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington,

 D.C. v. Linch, 36 F.3d 370, 374 (4th Cir. 1994) (“It is well-established that the ECOA

 and its implementing regulations prohibit a creditor from requiring a spouse’s signature

 on a note when the applicant individually qualifies for the requested credit.” (citations

 omitted)). However, the court determined that there were no allegations that First United

 violated the signature rules. But with respect to CDMR, the court concluded that the

 FAC alleged sufficient facts to establish a prima facie ECOA claim. The court therefore

 dismissed only the Individuals’ ECOA claim.

        Turning to the Individuals’ § 1981 claim, the district court observed that “‘a

 plaintiff cannot state a claim under § 1981 unless he has (or would have) rights under the

 existing (or proposed) contract that he wishes “to make and enforce.”’” R. at 238

 (quoting Domino’s Pizza, Inc. v. McDonald, 546 U.S. 470, 479–80 (2006), which quoted

 § 1981). Applying that rule, the court concluded the Individuals lacked statutory

 standing because they had not identified “any injuries flowing from any alleged racially

 motivated breach of [their] contractual relationship with [First United],” but only

 “injuries flowing from the allegedly racially motivated breach of CDMR’s proposed

 contractual relationship with [First United].” Id. The court therefore dismissed the

 Individuals’ § 1981 claim.

        The court’s rulings left only CDMR’s ECOA and § 1981 claims.

        The Individuals then filed a pro se “Motion to Add Necessary Party,” seeking to

 add themselves back into the case as to the ECOA claim. See R. at 240–42. While that

                                              4
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 motion was pending, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a motion to withdraw. The district court

 granted the motion to withdraw and gave CDMR a month to secure an entry of

 appearance by new counsel. Soon thereafter, the Individuals filed a pro se motion for

 leave to file a second amended complaint (SAC) to add allegations that they were

 “co-borrowers[] along with CDMR.” R. at 273.

        The district court denied the Individuals’ pending motions. The court construed

 the Motion to Add Necessary Party as a motion for reconsideration of its dismissal of the

 Individuals’ ECOA claim and found no reason to reconsider its earlier ruling. The court

 rejected the Individuals’ reliance on Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Bulk Petroleum Corp.,

 No. 08-CV-654, 2010 WL 3931496 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 5, 2010) (unpublished), which

 concluded that the ECOA’s protections against discrimination extended to a guarantor

 who was required to sign a spousal guaranty, see id. at *7–9. After explaining that it was

 not bound by the decision of other federal district courts, the district court distinguished

 Citgo Petroleum because it involved an alleged violation of the signature rules, whereas

 there was no such alleged violation in the instant case.

        Turning to the motion to amend, the district court concluded that the Individuals

 could not seek amendment because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(1) provides

 that a “party” may be granted leave to amend, but they were no longer parties to the

 case—the court had denied reconsideration of its dismissal of their ECOA claim, and

 they had not sought reconsideration of their FHA or § 1981 claims. In the alternative, the

 court denied leave to amend because the proposed SAC appeared to be offered in bad

 faith given an irreconcilable factual contradiction between the FAC and the SAC. The

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 FAC, which was “filed by retained counsel,” alleged that the Individuals, “‘through their

 business entity, CDMR,’” had “applied for financing through First United, and that the

 individual Plaintiffs ‘were personal guarantors of the loan.’” R. at 343 (quoting

 R. at 112, ¶ 6, and 116, ¶ 33). In contrast, the proposed SAC alleged that the Individuals

 were “‘co-borrowers’ and that they, ‘along with CDMR,’” had “‘applied for financing’

 through First United.” R. at 343 (apparently quoting R. at 279, ¶ 7). The court found it

 “clear . . . that the proposed [SAC] is making factual allegations that the individual

 plaintiffs would have been aware of when the [FAC] was filed, but they did not choose to

 advance those factual allegations until after the court dismissed their claims.”

 R. at 343–44. Thus, the court denied the motion to amend.

        By separate order on the same day, the district court dismissed CDMR’s FAC and

 action without prejudice because CDMR did not secure an entry of new counsel by the

 court’s deadline. R. at 345–46. The court also entered a separate judgment.

        A week later, the Individuals filed a motion to alter or amend the judgment under

 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e). They asked the court “to include them in the

 lawsuit as necessary parties” and “to allow them to amend their complaint to add all

 relevant causes of action.” R. at 401. In support of those requests, they advanced

 multiple theories regarding their standing to bring their ECOA and § 1981 claims as

 personal guarantors or co-borrowers. The district court construed the motion as

 proposing a need to correct clear error and denied it. Although the court concluded that

 the arguments and authorities could have been raised in prior briefing, it nevertheless

 addressed the merits and concluded that the Individuals had not demonstrated clear error.

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 We postpone further discussion of the district court’s ruling until the relevant sections of

 our analysis.

        The Individuals filed a timely notice of appeal.

                                       II. DISCUSSION

 A.     Standards of review

        The Individuals’ appellate arguments chiefly concern (and largely without clearly

 discerning between) the district court’s orders denying the Motion to Add Necessary

 Parties (construed as a motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the Individuals’

 ECOA claim), the motion for leave to file the SAC, and the Rule 59(e) motion. We

 review those orders for an abuse of discretion. See Roberts v. Winder, 16 F.4th 1367,

 1385 (10th Cir. 2021) (motion for reconsideration); Jensen v. W. Jordan City, 968 F.3d

 1187, 1201 (10th Cir. 2020) (motion for leave to amend); Pueblo of Jemez v. United

 States, 63 F.4th 881, 889 (10th Cir. 2023) (Rule 59(e) motion). A district court abuses its

 discretion if its ruling “was arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or manifestly unreasonable,”

 or the court made “an error of law.” Pueblo of Jemez, 63 F.4th at 889 (internal quotation

 marks omitted).

        To the extent the Individuals’ appellate arguments implicate the district court’s

 Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of their ECOA and § 1981 claims as set out in the FAC, our

 review is de novo. See Albers v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 771 F.3d 697, 700 (10th Cir.

 2014). “To survive a [Rule 12(b)(6)] motion to dismiss, a plaintiff must plead facts

 sufficient to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. (internal quotation

 marks omitted). And “we must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint

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 as true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Id. (internal

 quotation marks omitted).

        We afford the Individuals’ pro se filings a liberal construction, but we may not

 serve as their advocates. See Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 927 n.1 (10th Cir. 2008).

 B.     Arguments concerning ECOA claim

        1. Guarantor theory

        The Individuals first argue that, as guarantors of the loan to CDMR, they had

 statutory standing to bring their ECOA claim. We disagree.

        In relevant part, the ECOA makes it “unlawful for any creditor to discriminate

 against any applicant, with respect to any aspect of a credit transaction . . . on the basis of

 race.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(1). It defines “[t]he term ‘applicant’” as “any person who

 applies to a creditor directly for an extension, renewal, or continuation of credit.”

 § 1691a(b). 4 The plain language of the statute does not include guarantors. However,

 Regulation B’s definition of “applicant” includes a guarantor, but only for purposes of the

 signature rules: “Applicant means any person who requests or who has received an

 extension of credit from a creditor, and includes any person who is or may become

 contractually liable regarding an extension of credit. For purposes of [12 C.F.R.]

 § 1002.7(d), the term includes guarantors, sureties, endorsers, and similar parties.”

 12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e) (emphasis added).

        4
          “The term ‘person’ means a natural person, a corporation, government or
 governmental subdivision or agency, trust, estate, partnership, cooperative, or
 association.” 15 U.S.C. § 1691a(f).
                                                8
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        Section 1002.2(e)’s plain language allows a guarantor to be considered an

 applicant for one limited purpose—violation of the signature rules. And, as the district

 court found, the Individuals never alleged a violation of the signature rules. Thus, the

 district court concluded that they lacked statutory standing.

        In contesting the district court’s handling of their ECOA claim, the Individuals

 lean heavily on several statements in RL BB Acquisitions, LLC v. Bridgemill Commons

 Development Group, 754 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2014) (RL BB), which they relied on in their

 Rule 59(e) motion. In that case, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the statutory definition

 of “applicant” is “ambiguous because it could be read to include third parties who do not

 initiate an application for credit, and who do not seek credit for themselves—a category

 that includes guarantors.” Id. at 384–85. The court saw “no reason to artificially limit

 the possible meanings of ‘applicant’” because the “ECOA prohibits discrimination ‘with

 respect to any aspect of a credit transaction,’” id. at 385 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a))

 (emphasis in RL BB), and because the ECOA “has broad remedial goals,” id. (internal

 quotation marks omitted).

        The Individuals argue that we should extend these broad statements beyond the

 specific circumstances of RL BB to conclude they have ECOA standing based on their

 proposed role as guarantors of the loan CDMR applied for. We decline to do so because

 this argument rests on an incomplete reading of the Sixth Circuit’s opinion and requires

 us to use a disfavored canon of statutory construction.

        In RL BB, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the regulatory definition of

 applicant was “entitled to deference such that guarantors may raise ECOA claims.” Id.

                                              9
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  at 384. To answer that question, the court applied the two-step inquiry set out in

  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43

  (1984). The court recognized that at Chevron’s first step, the inquiry is whether the

  statute is silent or ambiguous on the relevant issue. RL BB, 754 F.3d at 384. The court

  concluded that the statutory definition was ambiguous such that it could include

  guarantors. See id. at 384–85. At Chevron’s second step, the court asked whether the

  regulatory definition was a permissible construction of the statutory definition. See

  id. at 385. The court determined that it was, but only to the extent of asserting violations

  of the signature rules. See id. at 385–86. Importantly, the Sixth Circuit observed that

  treating guarantors as applicants for the limited purpose of the signature rules was “a

  result that the regulators reached with caution. When the Federal Reserve began the

  process of amending Regulation B to cover guarantors, it initially proposed that

  guarantors would be deemed applicants throughout the regulation.” Id. at 385 (citing

  50 Fed. Reg. 48018, 48020 (Nov. 20, 1985) (Official Staff Commentary)). 5 “This

  definition would have allowed guarantors to sue for violations of any portion of

  Regulation B. But the final version limited the definition of applicant so it would only

  apply to the spouse-guarantor rule.” Id. at 386. “The Federal Reserve reached this

  conclusion ‘in response to the concerns of industry commenters who believed that the

         5
           The 1985 Official Staff Commentary cited in RL BB concerned 12 C.F.R.
  §§ 202.2(e) and 202.7(d). The regulations at issue here, 12 C.F.R. §§ 1002.2(e) and
  1002.7(d), were not promulgated until 2011. See 76 Fed. Reg. 79442-01, 79442, 79445
  (Dec. 21, 2011). However, because the two regulatory definitions of “applicant” are
  materially identical, we may apply the 1985 Official Staff Commentary to our
  interpretation of § 1002.2(e).
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  unlimited inclusion of guarantors and similar parties in the definition might subject

  creditors to a risk of liability for technical violations of various provisions of the

  regulation.’” Id. (quoting 50 Fed. Reg. at 48,020).

           For our purposes, we may assume, without deciding, that RL BB correctly

  determined that the statutory definition of “applicant” is ambiguous and that the inclusion

  of guarantors in the regulatory definition of applicant is entitled to deference. 6 But even

  so, the regulatory definition brings guarantors within the meaning of “applicant” only for

  purposes of the signature rules, and the Individuals did not allege any violation of those

  rules.

           Furthermore, even assuming the ECOA has “broad remedial goals,” id. at 385

  (internal quotation marks omitted), we may not use that purpose to employ a liberal

  construction of the statute or the regulation “as a substitute for a conclusion grounded in

  . . . text and structure.” CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1, 12 (2014). 7 The text and

  structure here show that the ECOA and its implementing regulations define an applicant

  as including guarantors only for purposes of the signature rules. That conclusion is

           Other circuit courts that have considered the issue have reached the opposite
           6

  conclusion and, consequently, have held that Regulation B’s inclusion of guarantors in
  the definition of applicant is not entitled to Chevron deference. See Regions Bank v.
  Legal Outsource PA, 936 F.3d 1184, 1193 (11th Cir. 2019); Hawkins v. Cmty. Bank of
  Raymore, 761 F.3d 937, 942 (8th Cir. 2014), aff’d by an equally divided court, 577 U.S.
  495 (2016); Moran Foods, Inc. v. Mid-Atl. Mkt. Dev. Co., 476 F.3d 436, 441 (7th Cir.
  2007)). We do not weigh in on this circuit split.
           Canons of statutory construction are equally applicable to the interpretation of
           7

  regulations. See Time Warner Ent. Co. v. Everest Midwest Licensee, L.L.C., 381 F.3d
  1039, 1050 (10th Cir. 2004).
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  reinforced by evidence that the Federal Reserve rejected the idea of allowing guarantors

  to be considered applicants for all portions of Regulation B (and, by extension, all

  portions of the ECOA). 8

         The Individuals also point out that the regulatory definition of applicant “includes

  any person who is or may become contractually liable regarding an extension of credit.”

  12 C.F.R. § 1002.2(e). They argue that this phrase includes guarantors because a

  guarantor may become contractually liable for repayment of a loan by, for example,

  intervening in the contract to make payments to avert a default. See Aplt. Reply Br.

  at 3–6. We disagree. “[O]ne of the most basic interpretive canons [is] that a statute

  should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no part will be

  inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.” United States v. Dawes (In re Dawes),

  652 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Crediting the

  Individuals’ reading of § 1002.2(e)’s first sentence would render the next sentence of the

  definition superfluous; if guarantors are applicants because they “may become

  contractually liable regarding an extension of credit,” there would have been no need to

  specify that guarantors are applicants for purposes of the signature rules. Furthermore, as

  we have already explained, when it revised the regulatory definition of applicant, the

  Federal Reserve clearly intended guarantors to fall within that definition only for

  purposes of enforcing the signature rules.

         8
          For the same reasons, the Individuals’ continued reliance on Citgo Petroleum
  Corp. v. Bulk Petroleum Corp., No. 08-CV-654, 2010 WL 3931496 (N.D. Okla. Oct. 5,
  2010) (unpublished), is misplaced.
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         2. Principal borrower theory

         The Individuals next argue that they were the principal borrowers for ECOA

  purposes because CDMR had no credit or financial history, which they claim this court

  requires a borrower to have under United States v. Gregory, 54 F.4th 1183 (10th Cir.

  2022), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 1756 (2023). Gregory, however, was a direct criminal

  appeal involving a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a federal bank

  fraud conviction. In that context we discussed a lender’s consideration of one “type[] of

  information banks evaluate and expect to receive when they are asked to consider a

  loan,” namely, “the character of the borrowers.” Id. at 1193 (emphasis omitted). We

  observed that “[l]enders need to know the character of the borrower and those serving as

  guarantors on the loan.” Id. at 1194 (emphasis added). Even if we might import that

  principle into an ECOA analysis, it does not equate a guarantor to a borrower (or, for

  ECOA purposes, an applicant) when the borrower (applicant) lacks a credit or financial

  history. To the contrary, it only heightens the distinction between a borrower (applicant)

  and a guarantor. The Individuals’ reliance on Gregory, therefore, is misplaced.

         3. Co-borrower theory

         The Individuals next rely on several general principles concerning sureties and

  guarantors—that guarantors have the same rights as sureties, including the right to

  proceed against a creditor; and that like borrowers, guarantors are directly responsible to

  the creditor. From these principles they argue that although a guarantor does not become

  the principal borrower, he can act in the principal borrower’s place “vicariously in his

  individual capacity,” Aplt. Opening Br. at 14 (italics omitted), which they apparently

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  conclude renders them co-borrowers. None of the cases they rely on for support,

  however, are ECOA cases; they instead concern state or common law principles and

  causes of action. It is true that we must adopt a common-law rule of decision or

  incorporate state law where a question involving “a federal claim . . . cannot be answered

  by statutory interpretation.” Ellis v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Bos., 958 F.3d 1271,

  1280 (10th Cir. 2020). But here we are satisfied that the ECOA and its implementing

  regulations adequately answer the question before us. We therefore reject this line of

  argument.

         In further support of their theory that their submission of their personal financial

  information rendered them co-borrowers, the Individuals rely on Durdin v. Cheyenne

  Mountain Bank, 98 P.3d 899 (Colo. App. 2004). 9 In Durdin, the Colorado Court of

  Appeals considered whether Durdin, the sole shareholder and owner of a corporation

  called Carefree, had standing to pursue an ECOA claim involving a bank’s allegedly

  untimely notice of an adverse decision on a loan application. See id. at 901. Because

  Durdin had not brought a claim under the signature rules, the court concluded that he

  would lack standing if he had “alleged that his status in submitting the application was

  simply as a potential guarantor of Carefree’s loan.” Id. at 902. The court then

  determined that Durdin was both a guarantor and a co-borrower because, among other

  things, he had “submitted the loan application to [the bank] not simply as a guarantor of

         9
           The Individuals discuss Durdin as part of their challenge to the district court’s
  refusal to allow them to file the SAC. But analytically, Durdin also bears on their theory
  that they were co-borrowers. We therefore examine it as part of their co-borrower theory.
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  Carefree, but also as a coborrower”; there was evidence “that [the bank] ordered a credit

  report on him and requested his personal financial records, personal income tax returns,

  and personal financial statement”; and he had “specifically requested in writing that [the

  bank] consider the loan as a personal one secured by his assets.” Id. at 903.

         The district court rejected the Individuals’ reliance on Durdin in its order denying

  their Rule 59(e) motion. The court distinguished Durdin because the Individuals “did not

  allege or proffer any facts that they specifically requested in writing that First United

  consider the loan to purchase the apartment complex as a personal one to them.”

  R. at 427. In support, the district court relied on “Paragraph 7(d)(1) of the Official Staff

  Interpretations to Regulation B.” Id. That paragraph states: “The term ‘joint applicant’

  refers to someone who applies contemporaneously with the applicant for shared or joint

  credit. It does not refer to someone whose signature is required by the creditor as a

  condition for granting the credit requested.” 12 C.F.R. Pt. 1002, Supp. I., ¶ 7(d)(1).2. It

  also states that “[a] person’s intent to be a joint applicant must be evidenced at the time of

  the application.” Id., ¶ 7(d)(1).3.

         The district court determined that the record facts at the time it denied the Motion

  to Add Necessary Parties (treated as a motion for reconsideration of the court’s dismissal

  of the Individuals’ ECOA claim) did not show that the Individuals had “requested in

  writing to First United that the commercial loan be a personal loan for them or that they

  were applying for the loan individually as well as on behalf of CDMR.” R. at 427. The

  court explained that the then-existing record facts, as set out in the counseled motion to

  add CDMR as a plaintiff, the FAC, and the Motion to Add Necessary Parties, showed just

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  the opposite—the Individuals were proposed personal guarantors of the loan, CDMR

  made the loan application, and CDMR was to purchase the complex, as indicated on the

  purchase contract. Id. The court afforded no significance to the fact that the Individuals

  had supplied their personal financial information: “[T]hat First United required and

  examined the financial information of [the Individuals], who were the proposed personal

  guarantors of the loan, was not unusual since the bank could extend credit ‘solely on the

  financial strength of’ the guarantors.” Id. at 427–28 (quoting 12 C.F.R.

  § 217.122(b)(2)(i)).

         In challenging the district court’s treatment of their Durdin argument, the

  Individuals fail to address the key distinguishing fact—the absence of any allegations that

  they had submitted a loan application as co-borrowers (other than in the SAC, the

  rejection of which, as we later explain, was not an abuse of discretion) or had specifically

  requested in writing that First United consider the loan a personal one secured by their

  assets. This distinction is fatal to their reliance on Durdin.

  C.     Arguments concerning § 1981 claim

         As the district court observed, the Supreme Court has held “that a plaintiff cannot

  state a claim under § 1981 unless he has (or would have) rights under the existing (or

  proposed) contract that he wishes ‘to make and enforce.’” Domino’s Pizza, Inc., 546 U.S.

  at 479–80 (quoting § 1981). To do that, “[§] 1981 plaintiffs must identify injuries

  flowing from a racially motivated breach of their own contractual relationship, not of

  someone else’s.” Id. at 480.

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         The Individuals contest the district court’s rulings that they lacked standing to

  pursue their § 1981 claim. First United argues that, through inadequate briefing, the

  Individuals have waived review of those rulings. We disagree. Liberally construed,

  part VI of the opening brief adequately advances an argument concerning the district

  court’s dismissal of the Individuals’ § 1981 claim. That argument, however, lacks merit.

         The Individuals’ § 1981 argument rests on three premises: a guarantor can (1) be

  sued individually, (2) act in place of the principal borrower, and (3) sue a creditor

  directly. From those premises, they conclude that the district court erred in dismissing

  their § 1981 claim on the ground that they had identified injuries flowing only from an

  allegedly racially motivated breach of CDMR’s proposed contractual relationship. None

  of the cases they rely on for this argument, however, involved a § 1981 claim. And in the

  § 1981 context, we have “reject[ed] the premise that a stockholder’s status as a guarantor

  gives the stockholder status to assert an individual [§ 1981] claim against a third party

  where that harm is derivative of that suffered by the corporation.” Guides, Ltd. v.

  Yarmouth Grp. Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 295 F.3d 1065, 1073 (10th Cir. 2002). Here, the

  Individuals have not shown that any harm they experienced is not derivative of any harm

  CDMR may have sustained from First United’s allegedly discriminatory denial of

  CDMR’s loan application. They have therefore failed to show reversible error in the

  district court’s dismissal of their § 1981 claim.

  D.     Arguments concerning denial of leave to file the SAC

         As discussed earlier, the district court denied the Individuals’ motion for leave to

  file the SAC based on the court’s view that the SAC was proposed in bad faith: In the

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  FAC, the Individuals alleged that they were personal guarantors, but in the proposed SAC

  they alleged they were co-borrowers—a fact, the district court found, that they would

  have been well aware of when they filed the FAC.

         The Individuals argue that allegations in their original complaint related to their

  submission of financial information to First United in order to get the loan, combined

  with the lack of any allegations that CDMR had to submit any financial information to

  qualify for the loan, implied that they were borrowers or co-borrowers, especially in light

  of Durdin. They also contend that their original pro se complaint came close to stating a

  claim and that the FAC related back to the original complaint under Federal Rule of Civil

  Procedure 15(c)(1). They therefore conclude that the district court should have allowed

  them to file the SAC.

         The first problem with this line of argument is that, under Rule 15(c)(1), an

  “amended complaint, as the operative complaint, supersedes the original complaint’s

  allegations, but not its timing.” May v. Segovia, 929 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2019).

  Thus, the FAC, which was filed by counsel, related back for purposes such as a statute of

  limitations, see id., but it superseded the original complaint’s allegations, thus leaving the

  district court to compare only the FAC and the SAC. And the FAC alleged that CDMR

  was “wholly owned and operated by the four individual Plaintiffs” and that they applied

  for the loan “through . . . CDMR.” R. at 112, ¶ 5–6. It also alleged that the Individuals

  “were personal guarantors of the loan.” R. at 116, ¶ 33; see also R. at 117, ¶ 49 (same).

  These allegations were clearly at odds with the allegations in the SAC that the Individuals

  were co-borrowers. The second problem with this argument is that, for the same reasons

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  we concluded that Durdin is distinguishable in the context of the Individuals’ ECOA

  claim, see supra, Part II.B.3., it fails to aid them here.

         Given that the Individuals did not seek to file the SAC until after the district court

  had dismissed their claims, we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s finding

  that the competing, contrary allegations in the FAC and the SAC were indicative of

  bad-faith because the Individuals would have been aware, when the FAC was filed,

  whether they were co-borrowers. See Viernow v. Euripides Dev. Corp., 157 F.3d 785,

  800 (10th Cir. 1998) (finding no abuse of discretion in refusal to permit amendment

  where “amended complaint proposed new theories that [the plaintiff] did not choose to

  advance until after his primary theories had been dismissed,” noting that “we do not favor

  permitting a party to attempt to salvage a lost case by untimely suggestion of new

  theories of recovery, especially after the trial judge has already expressed adverse

  rulings” (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted)).

                                      III. CONCLUSION

         We affirm the district court’s judgment and its order denying the Individuals’

  Rule 59(e) motion.

                                                  Entered for the Court

                                                  Gregory A. Phillips
                                                  Circuit Judge

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