Court Opinion

ID: 2964854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2015-09-21 21:32:14.424199+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:43:02.079709
License: Public Domain

USCA1 Opinion

	

                                [NOT FOR PUBLICATION]
                           United States Court of Appeals
                                For the First Circuit
                                ____________________
       No. 97-1258
                                  MARK L. EDWARDS,
                                Plaintiff, Appellant,
                                         v.
                             CITY OF MANCHESTER ET AL.,
                               Defendants, Appellees.
                                ____________________
                    APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                          FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
                  [Hon. Stephen J. McAuliffe, U.S. District Judge]
                                ____________________
                                       Before
                                Selya, Circuit Judge,
                           Gibson, Senior Circuit Judge,
                              and Lynch, Circuit Judge.
                                ____________________
            Gordon R. Blakeney, Jr., for appellant.
            Kevin M. St.Onge
                           , with whom 
                                       Thomas R. Clark
                                                      , City Solicitor, was on
       brief, for appellees.
                                ____________________
                                   August 6, 1997
                                ____________________
                           
       Hon. John R. Gibson, of the Eighth Circuit, sitting by designation.

                      LYNCH, Circuit Judge.  This suit arises out of damage
            to plaintiff's two vintage airplanes, which were stored at the
            City of Manchester Airport in Londonderry, New Hampshire.
            After unsuccessfully bringing tort and breach of contract
            claims against the city and others in state court, Mark Edwards
            alleged violations of his civil rights in federal district
            court. The district court held that the federal suit was in
            large part an impermissible attack on a judgment by the state
            court and dismissed the complaint. We affirm.
                                         I.
                      Mark Edwards began keeping his airplanes at the
            airport in 1973 pursuant to an oral agreement. In 1990, the
            airport instituted new licensing, insurance and indemnity
            requirements for its tenants. Edwards had his airplanes
            inspected for licensing purposes and discovered damage to the
            planes, dating from around 1987, caused, he believed, by sand
            and other debris blown about by jet and propeller wash. The
            damage apparently rendered the airplanes inoperable. Without
            repairs, which would cost at least $25,000 for one of the
            planes alone, Edwards was unable to comply with the defendants'
            new leasing requirements.
                      Edwards brought suit in state court seeking
            compensatory damages and an injunction preventing the
            defendants from moving or further harming the planes. Edwards'
            claims were based on theories of breach of bailment contract
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            and conversion in tort. The action was dismissed in June 1995.
            The state court reasoned that the contract claim failed because
            Edwards had not pleaded facts sufficient to allege a bailment
            contract, and that the tort claim failed because N.H. Rev.
            Stat. Ann. S 422:17 bars on sovereign immunity grounds any tort
            action based on "the construction, maintenance, operation,
            superintendence or management of any air navigation facility."
            The dismissal was summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court of
            New Hampshire in December 1995 and April 1996.
                      The defendants began eviction proceedings in state
            court. Edwards raised several counterclaims, arguing that the
            sovereign immunity statute was unconstitutional for numerous
            reasons, but later non-suited the counterclaims. The city
            prevailed in the eviction proceeding in April 1996 and took
            non-exclusive possession of one of the airplanes. The aircraft
            has since been stored by the city at its own expense.
            Plaintiff now claims that defendants "have undertaken to
            dispose [of] the appellant's one aircraft remaining on the
            airport grounds without complying with applicable state law
            that prescribes a procedure that must be followed for such
            actions."
                      Plaintiff initiated a federal action in October 1996.
            He filed an amended complaint in November 1996, accompanied by
                                
            1.  The counterclaims of unconstitutionality seemed to be based
            on the state rather than the federal constitution.
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            a motion for a temporary restraining order and a preliminary
            injunction. The amended complaint asserted four causes of
            action under 42 U.S.C. S  1983: (1) the state court
            interpretation of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 422:17 violated
            plaintiff's rights to procedural and substantive due process of
            law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2)
            the state court interpretation of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 422:17
            deprived plaintiff of his property without due process of law
            in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (3) N.H.
            Rev. Stat. Ann. S 422:17 is facially unconstitutional in that
            it deprives individuals of equal protection of law as
            guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (4) the
            state court interpretation of N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 422:17
            violated the Contracts Clause. The amended complaint also
            included supplemental state law causes of action.
                      Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. The district
            court held a status conference and issued an order directing
            plaintiff to show cause why the complaint should not be
            dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The court dismissed the
            complaint in December 1996, concluding that the federal claims
            were barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and res judicata,
                                
            2.  Although the district court apprised counsel of its
            interest in the relationship of the 
                                               Rooker-Feldman doctrine to
            this case, neither party addressed the issue. The court
            nevertheless based its decision on that ground. As a
            jurisdictional issue, it was within the court's purview to
            bring up sua sponte.
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            and declining to exercise jurisdiction over the supplemental
            state law claims. This appeal followed.
                                         II.
                      The 
                         Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits federal courts
            other than the Supreme Court from engaging in direct review of
            state court decisions.   See  District 
                                                   of  
                                                       Columbia 
                                                                Court 
                                                                       of
            Appeals v.  Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476 (1983);     Rooker v.
            Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). A corollary
            of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is that lower federal courts
            lack jurisdiction to consider claims inextricably intertwined
            with review of state judicial proceedings. This kind of
            interrelationship occurs if resolution of the claims in federal
            court would amount to federal appellate review of the state
            court decision. Lancellotti v. 
                                           Fay, 909 F.2d 15, 17 (1st Cir.
            1990).
                      Here, three of Edwards' federal causes of action are
            "as applied" challenges to the constitutionality of N.H. Rev.
            Stat. Ann. S 422:17. Edwards argues that the state courts
            violated the federal Constitution by refusing to hear his
            claims against the defendants. He argues that his claims
            concerning the unconstitutionality of the New Hampshire statute
            "were only brought . . . after his attempt to litigate in state
            court was unsuccessful, due to the application of a state
            sovereign immunity statute to him." But "[i]t is well-
            established that lower federal courts have no jurisdiction to
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            hear appeals from state court decisions, even if the state
            judgment is challenged as unconstitutional."    Schneider v.
            Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico
                                             , 917 F.2d 620, 628 (1st Cir.
            1990).
                      As the district court aptly stated, these claims are
            a "not-so-cleverly disguised" attack on the decisions of the
            state court.   Edwards v.  City  
                                            of 
                                                Manchester, No. 96-517-M
            (D.N.H. Dec. 17, 1996). As such, under the     Rooker-Feldman
            doctrine, we lack jurisdiction to consider them.
                      Plaintiff's only remaining federal cause of action,
            which is based on the Equal Protection Clause, is a facial
            constitutional challenge to N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. S 422:17. The
            Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not bar a party from challenging
            the constitutionality of a state statute on its face.
            Schneider, 917 F.2d at 628. However, this claim is
                                
            3.  Plaintiff's claim -- that the    Rooker-Feldman doctrine
            cannot be applied here because "the courts of the State of New
            Hampshire never had nor assumed jurisdiction" over his state
            court suit -- is without merit.  Cf. United 
                                                        States v.  United
            Mine Workers of America
                                  , 330 U.S. 258, 292 n.57 (1947) (noting
            that it cannot "be broadly asserted that a judgment is always
            a nullity if jurisdiction . . . is wanting" because "a court
            has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction" (internal
            quotation marks and citation omitted)).
            4.  One of these federal claims arguably involves an issue on
            which the state court has not passed. Plaintiff's claim that
            he has been deprived of property without due process of law is
            based in part on his allegation that the defendants are
            planning to sell his one airplane remaining at the airport
            without following the proper state procedures. Edwards could
            have raised his concerns about the disposition of his airplane
            at the eviction proceedings, and thus the claim is barred by
            res judicata principles.
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            nevertheless barred by the doctrine of res judicata.    Res
            judicata precludes later litigation of matters that could have
            been litigated (as well as those that actually were litigated)
            in an earlier action between the same parties for the same
            cause of action.  In 
                                 re 
                                    Alfred 
                                           P., 495 A.2d 1264, 1265 (N.H.
            1985); see 
                       also ERG, 
                                 Inc. v. Barnes, 624 A.2d 555, 558 (N.H.
            1993) (defining "cause of action" as "embrac[ing] all theories
            on which relief could be claimed arising out of the same
            factual transaction"). Here, plaintiff could have raised his
            equal protection challenge to the statute during the state
            court proceedings. The claim is, in any event, without merit,
            as it is rational for a state to grant sovereign immunity in
            the form of the New Hampshire statute.
                      Affirmed.
                                
            5.  A federal court applies state law to determine the
            preclusive effect of a state court decision. 28 U.S.C. S 1738;
            New 
                Hampshire 
                          Motor 
                                Transport 
                                          Ass'n v.  Town 
                                                         of 
                                                            Plaistow, 67
            F.3d 326, 328 (1st Cir. 1995).
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