Court Opinion

ID: 9841735
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 20:03:55.633533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:29.377830
License: Public Domain

*107Mu. Justice Field,
with whom concurred the Chief Justice, Mi?,- Justice- Millbe, and Me. Justice - Biwtcheoed, dissenting.
I am not . able to give my assent to tbe judgment, of the court in this case.
The statement by the physician as to -the condition' of the injured party, the admission of which is. held to have been error, was proved by his deposition to have been -correct. • Every material fact also which it contained was established by his independent testimony.. It would not be in accordance ivith the usual action of men, in the- ordinary concerns of life, to reject as incompetent evidence, a written statement thus made by a physician as to the condition of a patient under his charge, when it is subsequently proved by. him to be true in all its details. And.it should seem, that evidence upon which' every one Avould act without hesitation in the common affairs of life, ought not to be excluded from consideration, except for clear reasons of policy, or long established rules to the contrary, when those affairs are brought into litigation before the courts.
If the recollection of the condition of the patient had passed from the mind .of the physician, and he could still have testified that the statement made by him when the patient was under his charge was true, it Would have been admissible.. It is, difficult, therefore, to find any just reason for excluding it, from the fact that, in corroboration of its truth, the physician also testified to the facts therein stated.
The admission of the declaration of the engineer, as to 'the rate of speed of the train at the time of the accident, Avas, in my judgment, admissible as part of the res gestes. The rails and cross-ties of the road were in a bad condition. Some of the rails'had been used for over forty years; .and some of the cross-ties were decayed, and it appears, that the accident Avas caused by a decayed cross-tie and a broken rail.
As the declaration was made between ten and thirty minutes after the accident, we may well conclude that .it was made insight of the wrecked train, and in presence of the injured parties, and whilst surrounded by excited passengers. The *108engineer was tbe only person from whom the company could have learned of the exact speed of the train- at the time; to him it would have been obliged to apply for information on ' that point. It would seem, therefore, that his declaration, as that of its agent or servant, should have been received. The modern doctrine has relaxed the ancient rule, that declarations, to be admissible as part of the res gestes, must be strictly contemporaneous with the main transaction. It now allows evidence of them, when they appear to have been made' under the immediate influence of the principal transaction, and are so connected with it as-to-characterize or explain it.
The case of the Hanover Railroad Company v. Coyle, 55 Penn. St. 396, 402, is in point. There it appeared that a peddler’s wagon 'was struck by a locomotive and the peddler was injured; and the question was as to the admissibility of the declaration of the engineer that the train was behind time, to show carelessness and negligence. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held it admissible. “We cannot say,” said the court, “ that the declaration of the engineer was no part of the res gestee. It was made at the time, in view of the goods strewn along the road by the breaking up of the boxes, and seems to have grown directly out of and immediately after the happening of the fact. The snegligence complained of being that of the engineer, himself, we cannot say that his declarations, made upon the spot, at the time, and in view of the effects of his conduct, are not evidence against the company' as a part of the very transaction itself.”
What time may elapse between the happening of the event in respect to which the declaration is jnade, and the time of the declaration, and yet the-declaration be admissible, must depend upon the character of the transaction itself. An accident happening to-a 'railway train, by Which a car is wrecked, would naturally lead to a.great deal of excitement among the passen- ' gers on the train, and the character and cause of the accident would be the subject of explanation for a considerable- time afterwards. by persons connected with the train. The admissibility of a declaration-, in connection with evidence of the principal fact, as stated by Greenleaf, must be determined by *109the judge, according to the degree of its relation to that fact, and in the exercise of a sound discretion ; it being extremely -difficult, if not impossible, to bring this class of cases within, the limits' of a more particular description. The principal points of attention are, he adds, whether the declaration was contemporaneous with the main fact, and so connected with it as to illustrate its character.
But, independently of this consideration, there is another answer to the objection taken "to the' admissibility of the declaration of the engineer. It was, immaterial in any view of the case. The engagement of a railroad company is to carry its , passengers safely •; and, for any injury arising from a defect in its road, or in the rails or ties, which could have been guarded against by the exercise of proper care, it is hable. - Its liability does not depend upon the speed of the train, whether it was ■ one mile or eighteen miles' an hour. Though as a carrier of passengers it is not, like a carrier of property, an insurer against all accidents except those caused by the act of God or the pub'■lic enemy, it is charged with the utmost oare and skill in the performance of its duty ;• and this implies not merely the utmost attention in respect to the movement of the cars, but also to the condition of the road, and of its ties, rails, and all other appliances essential to the safety of the train and passengers. For all' injuries through negligence, to which the passenger does not contribute by his own-acts, it is hable.. So it matters not . what the speed of the. train was in the case at bar, nor what was the declaration of the engineer in that respect.
I am authorized to state that the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Miller, and Mr. Justice Blatchford concur in this dissent.