Court Opinion

ID: 9404122
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-22 07:12:32.250927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:11.710076
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 52

                  SUPREME COURT         OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2020AP2012-CR

COMPLETE TITLE:        State of Wisconsin,
                                 Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
                            v.
                       James P. Killian,
                                 Defendant-Respondent.

                         REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                         Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 451, 979 N.W.2d 569
                             PDC No: 2022 WI App 43 - Published

OPINION FILED:         June 21, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         April 17, 2023

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Trempealeau
   JUDGE:              Rian Radtke

JUSTICES:
ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ROGGENSACK, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Kara L. Janson, assistant attorney general, with whom
on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an
oral argument by Kara L. Janson, assistant attorney general.

       For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Todd E. Schroeder and Schroeder & Lough, S.C., La Crosse. There
was an oral argument by Todd E. Schroeder.
                                                                   2023 WI 52
                                                           NOTICE
                                             This opinion is subject to further
                                             editing and modification.   The final
                                             version will appear in the bound
                                             volume of the official reports.
No.       2020AP2012-CR
(L.C. No.   2019CF163)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                       :            IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

             Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
                                                                FILED
      v.                                                   JUN 21, 2023

James P. Killian,                                           Samuel A. Christensen
                                                           Clerk of Supreme Court

             Defendant-Respondent.

ZIEGLER, C.J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ROGGENSACK, DALLET, HAGEDORN, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., joined.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.             Reversed and

cause remanded.

      ¶1     ANNETTE KINGSLAND ZIEGLER, C.J.        This is a review of

a published decision of the court of appeals, State v. Killian,

2022 WI App 43, 404 Wis. 2d 451, 979 N.W.2d 569, affirming the

Trempealeau County circuit court's1 order dismissing a criminal

complaint against James Killian as barred by double jeopardy.

We reverse.

      1   The Honorable Rian Radtke presided.
                                                                           No.      2020AP2012-CR

       ¶2        Killian argues the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy

Clause prohibits the State from prosecuting the present case.

According to Killian, the State previously prosecuted him for

the offenses charged in this case because "[t]he evidence the

State intended to submit in the preceding trial was sufficient

to convict [Killian] of all the charges in the current case,"

and "the State intended to amend the charges against [Killian]

during the trial to include charges for which he is again placed

in   jeopardy         here."          Because   that      case     ended      in    a   mistrial

intentionally              provoked        by       the         prosecutor——a           judicial

determination the parties do not contest here——Killian argues

double jeopardy bars the State's prosecuting the present case.

Killian argues in the alternative that issue preclusion, under

both the Double Jeopardy Clause and the common law, bars the

present case.

       ¶3        We conclude that Killian's previous trial does not bar

the State from prosecuting the present case because the scope of

Killian's jeopardy in his trial did not include the offenses
with    which         he   is    now    charged.          The    scope     of      jeopardy     is

established by "the defendant's actual exposure to jeopardy in a

prior prosecution."                State v. Schultz, 2020 WI 24, ¶31, 390

Wis. 2d 570, 939 N.W.2d 519.                    This requires that the defendant

faced       a    "risk      of    a    determination        of      guilt"         regarding     a

particular offense.                Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377,

391-92      (1975).          Killian      was   never       exposed      to      the    risk    of

conviction for the offenses charged in the present case.                                      As a
result,         the   offenses        prosecuted     in    Killian's        trial       are    not
                                                2
                                                                       No.    2020AP2012-CR

identical in law and in fact to the offenses charged in this

case, so double jeopardy does not bar the present prosecution.

    ¶4      We    also     conclude       that      issue      preclusion     under      the

Double Jeopardy Clause and common law issue preclusion do not

bar the present prosecution.               Issue preclusion under the Double

Jeopardy    Clause       requires     a    valid      judicial      determination         of

ultimate fact, and none exists in this case because Killian's

trial ended in a mistrial.                See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436

(1970).     Common law issue preclusion also does not bar this

prosecution.         The     circuit       court's          order      dismissing      with

prejudice   the    criminal     complaint           in   the    first    case    did     not

decide the scope of Killian's jeopardy.                        Therefore, that issue

was never "actually litigated," and issue preclusion does not

bar the present prosecution.               See Aldrich v. LIRC, 2012 WI 53,

¶88, 341 Wis. 2d 36, 814 N.W.2d 433.

    ¶5      We therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand

to the circuit court to consider Killian's unresolved argument

regarding prosecutorial vindictiveness.
            I.    FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

    ¶6      This case involves Killian's alleged sexual assaults

of two minors:       Britney and Ashley.2                On March 17, 2015, the

State charged Killian in Case No. 2015CF47 with one count of

first-degree     sexual     assault       of    a   child      under    the   age   of   12

    2  "Britney" and "Ashley" are pseudonyms used in place of the
victims' names. The parties used these same pseudonyms in their
briefs.    See Wis. Stat. (Rule) § 809.86(4) (2021-22).       All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version
unless otherwise noted.

                                            3
                                                                         No.     2020AP2012-CR

contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.02.                       The complaint alleged that,

"on or about Monday, August 18, 2014," Britney, then ten years

old, "was laying on a bed at [a] residence and [Killian] came

in, laid beside her and grabbed her buttocks."                                  The probable

cause section further stated that during a forensic interview,

Britney reported "that Killian had squeezed her butt on five

different occasions starting when she was about eight years old"

and   that   Killian         also   "touched         her     'boobies'     underneath       her

clothes" in 2014.

      ¶7     The       State     filed     a        second    criminal         complaint     on

March 15,     2016,      in    Case   No.       2016CF38,      charging         Killian    with

repeated     sexual      assault      of    a       child    contrary      to    Wis.     Stat.

§ 948.025.         The       complaint     alleged,         "from   April       1994   through

December          1999,"        Killian          sexually           assaulted          Ashley.

Additionally,          the    complaint's        probable       cause      section       stated

Ashley "had been sexually assaulted by [Killian], starting at

the age of six and ending at 17 years of age . . . start[ing] in

about January 1988 and end[ing] about December 1999."
      ¶8     The       two    cases   were       later       joined   for       trial.       On

October 5, 2016, prior to the cases being joined, the circuit

court3     held    a     hearing      in    Britney's          case   on       the     parties'

respective motions to admit or exclude other-acts evidence.                                 The

circuit court granted the State's motion to admit evidence of

sexual assaults against Ashley that "occurred over a period of

time between January 1988 and December of 1999" to demonstrate

      3   The Honorable Anna L. Becker presided.

                                                4
                                                                   No.     2020AP2012-CR

Killian's "motive, intent, preparation, absence of mistake or

accident, and plan."             The court also addressed Killian's motion

to prohibit the State "from using evidence pertaining to other

crimes,     wrongs,      or    acts."    The   State    argued      it     planned    to

introduce evidence of Killian's past interactions with Britney

to show Killian "groomed [Britney] by engaging in behavior that

include[d] asking her if he could be her boyfriend," "[b]uying

her gifts," and "[n]ormalizing the behavior of sleeping with her

in the bed together."             Killian did not object to such evidence

of "grooming" but only to "other acts of sexual assault."                            The

State      agreed   it     was    "not   alleging      that   [Killian]          touched

[Britney] outside of anything that was alleged here."                          The State

then said it would not object, and the court granted Killian's

motion     to    exclude      evidence   of   other    acts   of    sexual       assault

against Britney.

      ¶9        On June 15, 2017, four days before Killian's trial,

the State filed a motion for leave to amend the Information.

The proposed Amended Information included in Ashley's case one
count of incest with a child contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.06.

The   proposed      Amended      Information    also    expanded         the    charging

period for Britney's case from "on or about Monday, August 18,

2014" to "on or between January, 2014 to August 18, 2014."

      ¶10       The circuit court discussed the State's motion with

the parties in the morning on the first day of trial.                            Due to

the State's delay, the court denied the addition of the incest

charge.      The prosecutor then commented that "maybe the proof at
the trial will be sufficient to convince the Court that more
                                          5
                                                                    No.        2020AP2012-CR

sexual intercourse occurred which would be a basis for this

charge."     In response, the court reiterated how "the state's

lack of preparation should not prejudice the defendant" and made

clear, "I'm not going to allow [the amendment]."

      ¶11   As for the expanded charging period in Britney's case,

Killian's counsel expressed concern about how "the act that's

charged is a single act" and that the State was "attempting

to . . . expand the date range in the hopes that it would make

admissible       evidence    of   other    allegations       that    have        not     been

charged."        Defense counsel also reminded the court of the other-

acts ruling in October and said, "So even if the date range were

widened,     I    would     argue   that       at   this    point,        it     would    be

inadmissible to bring in allegations of sexual contact."                                  He

reiterated, "[W]e came here to defend an alleged sexual contact

that occurred on August 18th.                  And I think at the same time,

this raises concerns that are even more broad than this one

count."      The prosecutor responded, "I think it's quite clear

that we do not have to prove the actual date of the allegation,"
and   clarified,      "[O]f    course,     [Killian        is]   correct.          We    are

charging one sole act."             He further noted the possibility of

amending the Information:

      Interestingly, it appears to me that if more acts are
      disclosed at trial, the Information could be changed.
      And it could, in fact, I think naturally prejudice the
      defendant more. But I don't think that's unusual. It
      happens at trial that more facts are accused and
      Informations are changed and juries deliberate on
      multiple issues.

                                           6
                                                                    No.   2020AP2012-CR

The circuit court clarified that the State was "not alleging

there   were     additional         things   that     happened. . . . [I]t's        the

same    events      or   package      that   we've     heard      about   all    along.

Nothing      new."        The       prosecutor       confirmed      but   nonetheless

included, "If more facts are introduced at trial, the Court can

amend the Information and give that instruction to the jury."

       ¶12   The court allowed the expanded date range, but only

for purposes of establishing "when exactly [the alleged act of

grabbing Britney's buttocks] happened on the calendar."                         Defense

counsel sought clarification "that there can be no reference to

other alleged touching that would constitute sexual assault of

any kind," and the court agreed:                 "If there were intentions to

introduce those at trial, then those were required to have been

addressed     and    they      were    not   addressed       at   all.    So    there's

already been a ruling on that."

       ¶13   The trial commenced later that same day.                     During the

prosecutor's opening statement, he told the jury Killian "would

rub himself on [Britney]."              The prosecutor continued, describing
to the jury how, on one occasion, Killian "was rubbing himself

on   [Britney].          And   by     himself,   I    mean    his   penis.      Erect.

Rubbing on her. . . .            It's an unmistakable course of conduct."

With regard to Ashley, the prosecutor told the jury they would

hear testimony that Killian "started molesting her at about 6 or

7 years old [1988–89] and didn't stop until she was about 17

[1999].      So approximately 10 years."

                                             7
                                                                No.     2020AP2012-CR

      ¶14     On   the   second    day    of   trial,   just     before     Britney

testified, the prosecutor argued to the court that he                          could

introduce other acts of sexual assault against Britney:

      I re-reviewed the Criminal Complaint.     What is on
      trial, the course of conduct, there was a motion in
      limine filed by the defense regarding other acts.   I
      believe we could bring all that out.     Look at the
      court minutes. I don't think these are other acts. I
      think they're a course of conduct. They're relevant.
      They set the stage for our allegation of sexual
      contact.   And I think although there is one incident
      charged, the state doesn't have to charge every
      incident.    The state had discretion.    But in the
      Complaint, the course of conduct is there.        The
      different things that she says happened.
Defense counsel objected to the State's introducing other acts

of   sexual    assault    and     reminded     the   court     of     its   previous

ruling:     "[I]f there's an other act that would constitute sexual

conduct, I'm going to be objecting and asking for a mistrial if

that comes out at any point in this trial because that's been

thoroughly litigated and decided as of yesterday again."                         The

prosecutor further argued that "the way to address this is let

[Britney]      speak. . . . [I]f         there's     more     information,      more
charges can be brought.           The [I]nformation can be changed."             The

court rejected such a possibility.              It reminded the prosecutor,

"[T]here was a ruling on that. . . .                 You're changing the game

on them.       If you wanted to include that, then we should have

addressed     that."      The     prosecutor    continued,      "Anything     could

happen when she testifies.           I don't know.          But if she starts to

speak about a vagina rub or him rubbing his penis on her leg, I
can't control that.        And if she does that, then I guess [defense

                                          8
                                                                  No.   2020AP2012-CR

counsel's] going to move for a mistrial."                  The court warned the

prosecutor, "It will be a mistrial because you didn't, again,

prepare      for    trial    adequately     until   the    last    moment."      The

circuit court reminded the parties that the offense "charged in

the    Complaint . . . was            the   butt[-grab],"         and   the    court

thoroughly explained its ruling because it was "concerned about

a mistrial":

       [T]he state can bring in anything that they would like
       to regarding other acts that are grooming type
       activities but not other sexual assaults because those
       should have been properly dealt with when we talked
       about the motions that were filed for other acts.    I
       think these are clearly allegations that were other
       acts of sexual assault that go to your concerns. But
       that wasn't what the argument was when we had those.

            So I don't think at this point, it's appropriate
       to allow that in.   I think there are other ways that
       the Court has less prejudicial or the ability to make
       this less confusing for the jury so that they
       understand what the exact one is that's being accused
       here which is the one dating back to August 18th.
       ¶15    After    the    court    reaffirmed    its    other-acts        ruling,

Britney took the stand.               She testified first about Killian's

grooming behaviors, such as engaging her in conversations about

sex.    The following exchange then took place:

       Q. So so far, we've talked about mostly conversations
       about sex, right?

       A.    Yes.

       Q. Did you tell [your mother] something else relating
       to a private part of your body?

       A. When I told her that one day when we were in bed
       he was rubbing my back and he rubbed -- he was rubbing
       my stomach.    So he rubbed up and he rubbed on my

                                            9
                                                                   No.      2020AP2012-CR

      breasts.   And then when he was done, he rubbed on my
      private spot. It was just a swift rub.
Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, which the

court granted.            The court later found "that the prosecutor's

actions were intentional" and "designed to create another chance

to convict, and was an act done so as to allow the State another

'kick at the cat.'"            The court therefore concluded that "the

State is barred from retrial in this matter due to prosecutorial

overreaching," and it dismissed the case with prejudice.                              The

State did not appeal the circuit court's decision, and it does

not   dispute       the     circuit    court's       finding      of     prosecutorial

overreach.

      ¶16     On October 1, 2019, the State filed a new criminal

complaint     against      Killian     in   the   case   now      before     us.      The

complaint contained the following counts:

      Count 1:      First-degree sexual assault of a child contrary

to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (1989-90) against Ashley "in or around

1990 to 1991."

      Count 2:      First-degree sexual assault of a child contrary
to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (1989-90) against Ashley "in or around

1990 to 1991."

      Count    3:    Incest     with    a    child    contrary         to   Wis.   Stat.

§ 948.06(1)     (1989-90)      against       Ashley    "in   or    around      1990   to

1991."

      Count 4:      First-degree sexual assault of a child contrary

to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1) (1991-92) against Ashley "in or around
1992 to 1993."

                                            10
                                                                        No.       2020AP2012-CR

    Count     5:    Incest        with   a     child       contrary     to        Wis.      Stat.

§ 948.06(1)      (1991-92)        against      Ashley      "in    or    around        1992     to

1993."

    Count     6:    Incest        with   a     child       contrary         to    Wis.      Stat.

§ 948.06(1)      (1993-94)        against      Ashley      "in    or    around        1993     to

1994."

    Count     7:    Incest        with   a     child       contrary     to        Wis.      Stat.

§ 948.06(1)      (1993-94)        against      Ashley      "in    or    around        1994     to

1995."

    Count     8:    Incest        with   a     child       contrary     to        Wis.      Stat.

§ 948.06(1)      (1995-96)        against      Ashley      "in    or    around        1995     to

1996."

    Count     9:    Incest        with   a     child       contrary     to        Wis.      Stat.

§ 948.06(1)      (1995-96)        against      Ashley      "in    or    around        1996     to

1997."

    Count     10:      Repeated       acts    of     sexual      assault         of   the    same

child    contrary      to     Wis.    Stat.     § 948.02(1)         (2011-12),           "namely

[Britney],"      "in     or     around       June     2012,      and    no        later     than
August 17, 2014."

    ¶17     Killian         thereafter       filed     a    motion     to        dismiss      the

State's new charges.              He argued dismissal was required because

"this action violates Judge Becker's Order declaring that the

mistrial    in    Case      No.      15-CF-47       was    caused      by     prosecutorial

overreaching and that any retrial of this matter would violate

                                              11
                                                                    No.    2020AP2012-CR

the defendant's . . . right to be free from Double Jeopardy."4

In an oral ruling, the circuit court observed, "In a strict

comparison of the Complaints in 15-CF-48 (sic) and 19-CF-163 of

the charged offenses under Blockburger,[5] the time frames and

elements are different and would pass the Blockburger test."

The court nonetheless concluded the second prosecution violates

double jeopardy because "[t]he State's plan was to bring all of

the   alleged     acts   into        trial    and   then     seek    to    amend     the

Information after testimony to conform to the evidence."                             The

court also viewed the order dismissing the first prosecution as

"meant to encompass future prosecutions involving the same facts

alleged in 15-CF-47 where additional charges may be added in

future     prosecutions."       The     circuit     court    therefore       concluded

Killian's scope of jeopardy, "in light of the record, which

includes Judge Becker's order, includes all facts contained in

the Complaints that were later joined and amended, including

acts in the Complaints that were not specifically the basis for

the   charged    offenses      in    15-CF-47,      and    also    facts    raised    at
trial."

      ¶18    The State appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.

The court of appeals concluded "that the circuit court properly

considered      the   entire        record    of    the    first    prosecution      to

determine whether Killian was in jeopardy for the offenses now

      4Killian also has a prosecutorial vindictiveness argument
pending in the circuit court. The circuit court never ruled on
that issue, and it was not raised on appeal.
      5   Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).

                                             12
                                                                   No.   2020AP2012-CR

charged," and it "agree[d] with the circuit court in this case

that Killian was, in fact, in jeopardy of being convicted of the

offenses now charged."            Killian, 404 Wis. 2d 451, ¶4.              The State

petitioned this court for review, which we granted.

                            II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW

       ¶19   "The issue of whether a person's right to be free from

double jeopardy has been violated presents a question of law

that we review de novo."             State v. Trawitzki, 2001 WI 77, ¶19,

244   Wis. 2d 523,      628    N.W.2d 801.          "The    application        of    issue

preclusion to a set of facts is a question of law, which this

court reviews without deference to the lower courts."                          State v.

Canon, 2001 WI 11, ¶7, 241 Wis. 2d 164, 622 N.W.2d 270.

                                   III.    ANALYSIS

       ¶20   We begin our review by discussing general principles

of double jeopardy and how to ascertain a defendant's scope of

jeopardy in a previous trial.               We then examine Killian's scope

of    jeopardy   in   the     previous      trial   and     conclude     the    present

prosecution does not place him in jeopardy for any of the same
offenses.     Finally, we conclude issue preclusion also does not

bar the present prosecution.

                 A.   General Double Jeopardy Principles

       ¶21   Under    the     Fifth       Amendment    to    the    United          States

Constitution,     "No   person      shall       be . . . subject       for     the    same

offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."

U.S. Const. amend. V; see also Wis. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1

                                           13
                                                                            No.    2020AP2012-CR

("[N]o person for the same offense may be put twice in jeopardy

of punishment . . . .").6

      ¶22    "Over 40 years ago, we held that two prosecutions are

for   the        'same   offense,'        and        therefore       violate       the   Double

Jeopardy     Clause,      when     the    offenses         in   both    prosecutions         are

'identical in the law and in fact.'"                        Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570,

¶22   (quoting       State    v.    Van    Meter,          72   Wis. 2d 754,         758,    242

N.W.2d 206 (1976)).               Two offenses are not "identical in law"

where "each provision requires proof of a fact which the other

does not."          Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304

(1932).      Further, offenses are not "identical in fact" where

"allegation of substitute facts, all of which furnish the same

legal element of the crime, . . . are either separated in time

or are of a significantly different nature in fact."                                  State v.

Eisch,      96     Wis. 2d 25,      31,     291        N.W.2d 800       (1980)       (footnote

omitted).

      ¶23    "[A]        motion     by     the        defendant        for        mistrial    is

ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier to reprosecution, even
if the defendant's motion is necessitated by prosecutorial or

judicial     error."         United      States       v.   Jorn,      400    U.S.    470,    485

(1971)    (footnote        omitted).            However,        as    the     United     States

Supreme Court has held, "Only where the governmental conduct in

question is intended to 'goad' the defendant into moving for a

mistrial may a defendant raise the bar of double jeopardy to a

      6"Our tradition is to view these provisions as identical in
scope and purpose."    State v. Davidson, 2003 WI 89, ¶18, 263
Wis. 2d 145, 666 N.W.2d 1.

                                                14
                                                                               No.    2020AP2012-CR

second trial after having succeeded in aborting the first on his

own motion."         Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 676 (1982).                                  The

circuit      court    in     Killian's      first          prosecution         made     a    factual

finding that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct, a finding the

State did not appeal and does not dispute here.                                 Therefore, any

offenses in the present prosecution that are identical in law

and in fact to an offense in the prior prosecution are barred by

double jeopardy.

       ¶24     Before we can analyze whether the offenses in this

prosecution are identical in law and in fact to any offenses in

the    prior    prosecution,         we     must       first      discern        the       scope      of

Killian's      jeopardy       during       that       prior      prosecution.               It   is    a

"fundamental         principle       that    an       accused      must        suffer       jeopardy

before he can suffer double jeopardy."                             Serfass, 420 U.S. at

393.      "The       ambit    of     the    constitutional               bar     to    subsequent

prosecution is coextensive with the scope of jeopardy created in

the    prior    prosecution."              22A    C.J.S.         Crim.    Proc.        &    Rts.      of

Accused § 618 (2023).               If the offenses now prosecuted were not
previously       within       the     scope           of    Killian's          jeopardy,         then

prosecuting those offenses in this case could not violate double

jeopardy.

                  B.       Determining The Scope of Jeopardy.

       ¶25     Related to the scope of jeopardy is the method for

determining when jeopardy attaches.                           See Crist v. Bretz, 437

U.S. 28, 38 (1978) (quoting Bretz v. Crist, 546 F.2d 1336, 1343

(9th Cir. 1976)) ("[T]he time when jeopardy attaches in a jury
trial     'serves       as     the     lynchpin            for     all     double           jeopardy
                                                 15
                                                                      No.     2020AP2012-CR

jurisprudence.'").          "[T]he conclusion that jeopardy has attached

begins . . . the          inquiry   as      to     whether     the    Double     Jeopardy

Clause bars retrial."          Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 467

(1973).       "Jeopardy attaches when a person has been placed on

trial on a valid indictment or information before a court of

competent jurisdiction, has been arraigned and has pleaded, and

a   jury     has   been    impaneled     and       sworn,    and     charged    with    his

deliverance."        State v. B——, 173 Wis. 608, 617, 182 N.W. 474

(1921).      In other words, jeopardy attaches when "an accused has

been subjected to the risk of conviction."                       Serfass, 420 U.S. at

392.       "Without risk of a determination of guilt, jeopardy does

not    attach,     and    neither      an    appeal      nor     further      prosecution

constitutes double jeopardy."                 Id. at 391-92.           It follows that

if a defendant was never subject to the "risk of a determination

of guilt" of an offense, then jeopardy never attached for that

offense, and it is not within the scope of jeopardy.7

       ¶26    In   Serfass,      the        Supreme      Court     addressed      whether

jeopardy attached where charges for "willfully failing to report
for    and    submit      to   induction          into   the     Armed      Forces"    were

       We recognize that our decision in State v. Schultz
       7

contained a footnote stating, "The point at which jeopardy
attaches has nothing to say about the actual scope of jeopardy."
2020 WI 24, ¶24 n.13, 390 Wis. 2d 570, 939 N.W.2d 519.
However, that footnote merely explained that "[t]he time at
which jeopardy attaches does not lock in the scope of jeopardy."
Id.   Though true the scope of jeopardy may change after the
point in time when jeopardy initially attaches, this does not
affect the method by which jeopardy must attach.    Jeopardy may
expand to include additional offenses the same way it initially
attached: by placing the defendant at risk of a determination
of guilt of an additional offense.

                                             16
                                                                       No.       2020AP2012-CR

dismissed, prior to trial, because the "local board did not

state     adequate      reasons       for       its    refusal        to     reopen        [the

defendant's Selective Service] file."                     Id. at 379.              The Court

noted    that   it     "has    consistently           adhered    to    the        view     that

jeopardy does not attach, and the constitutional prohibition can

have no application, until a defendant is 'put to trial before

the trier of facts, whether the trier be a jury or a judge.'"

Id. at 388 (quoting Jorn, 400 U.S. at 479).                      Because the charges

were earlier dismissed, "[t]he District Court was without power

to    make   any     determination        regarding      [defendant's]             guilt    or

innocence."        Id. at 389.

       ¶27    The Court also rejected the argument that dismissal

"was the 'functional equivalent of an acquittal on the merits'

and    'constructively        jeopardy      had       attached.'"            Id.    at     390.

Finding this argument "divorced from the procedural context,"

the court reemphasized that jeopardy attaches when "an accused

has   been    subjected       to    the   risk    of    conviction"          by    "a    trier

'having      jurisdiction      to    try    the       question    of       the     guilt    or
innocence of the accused.'"                 Id. at 391-92 (quoting Kepner v.

United States, 195 U.S. 100, 133 (1904)).

       ¶28    The Supreme Court later doubled down on this rule in

United States v. Felix, 503 U.S. 378, 385 (1992).                            The criminal

defendant in Felix was first charged in the Western District of

Missouri      with    "attempting          to    manufacture       [methamphetamine]

between      August    26     and    August      31,    1987,"    and        the     conduct

underlying the charge was the defendant's "order[ing] precursor
chemicals and equipment for the manufacture of methamphetamine
                                            17
                                                                 No.     2020AP2012-CR

to be delivered to him at Joplin, Missouri."                     Id. at 380.       At

his    trial,        "the   Government      introduced       evidence    that     [the

defendant] had manufactured methamphetamine in Oklahoma earlier

in 1987" in order to prove his "criminal intent with respect to

the items delivered in Missouri."                 Id. at 381.    He was convicted

and    later    charged     a   second    time    in   the   Eastern    District    of

Oklahoma.       Id. at 381-82.           The conduct underlying some of the

charges in the Oklahoma case was the same conduct the government

used as evidence of intent in the Missouri case.                  Id. at 382-83.

       ¶29     The     Court    found      no     double     jeopardy    violation,

rejecting the notion "that if the Government offers in evidence

in one prosecution acts of misconduct that might ultimately be

charged as criminal offenses in a second prosecution, the latter

prosecution is barred under the Double Jeopardy Clause."                        Id. at

386.    The Court's "precedents hold that a mere overlap in proof

between two prosecutions does not establish a double jeopardy

violation"      and     have    explicitly       "disclaimed    any    intention    of

adopting a 'same evidence' test."                  Id. at 386 (citing Grady v.
Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 521 & n.12 (1990); Gavieres v. United

States, 220 U.S. 338 (1911); Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S.

342    (1990)).         Thus,    the     Court    reaffirmed    "the    basic,     yet

important, principle that the introduction of relevant evidence

of particular misconduct in a case is not the same thing as

prosecution for that conduct."              Id. at 387.

       ¶30     Recently, we also weighed in on the question of how to

determine the scope of a defendant's jeopardy.                    In Schultz, 390
Wis. 2d 570, the defendant was charged in a criminal complaint
                                           18
                                                                     No.    2020AP2012-CR

with repeated sexual assault of a child during "late summer to

early fall of 2012."             Id., ¶5.        No evidence at trial indicated

any such acts of sexual assault occurred in October 2012, and

the prosecutor in closing argument stated "the assaults started

in   July   and   ended     in     September       2012."       Id.,       ¶¶8-9.      The

defendant was acquitted but later charged again, this time with

sexual assault of a child under the age of 16 "on or about

October 19, 2012."         Id., ¶11.         The issue was whether the scope

of jeopardy in the trial included the offense of sexual assault

"on or about October 19, 2012."

      ¶31   In line with the Supreme Court's decisions in Serfass

and Felix, we focused our inquiry on "the defendant's actual

exposure to jeopardy in a prior prosecution."                              Schultz, 390

Wis. 2d 570,      ¶31.     We     decided        "examining   the     entire    record,

including evidentiary facts adduced at trial," is relevant to

discerning the scope of jeopardy in a prior trial.                            Id., ¶32.

However, in reaching this conclusion, we also clarified that the

focus of the inquiry remains on the defendant's "actual exposure
to   jeopardy,"      not   on     the   parties'      subjective       understandings

concerning     the       scope     of    jeopardy.            Id.,     ¶¶24-25,        31.

"Jeopardy,"    as    we    explained,       includes     "the    actual       danger   to

which a person is exposed, as opposed to the danger a person

fears."     Id., ¶31.      It is not based "on the criminal defendant's

fears, beliefs, or perceptions regarding his exposure in the

first     prosecution."           Id.        Furthermore,       we     declined        the

invitation to adopt the "reasonable person" test for discerning
the scope of jeopardy espoused by the Second Circuit in United
                                            19
                                                                     No.     2020AP2012-CR

States v. Olmeda, 461 F.3d 271 (2d Cir. 2006).                             Schultz, 390

Wis. 2d 570,         ¶¶45-50.         The   proposed     test    was       "whether      'a

reasonable person familiar with the totality of the facts and

circumstances would construe the initial indictment, at the time

jeopardy attached in the first case, to cover the offense that

is charged in the subsequent prosecution.'"                      Id., ¶46 (quoting

Olmeda, 461 F.3d at 282).               We rejected this test as unsupported

in   the     case    law   and    contrary   to   the    language      of     the   Fifth

Amendment,      which      contemplates      actual     jeopardy,      not     perceived

jeopardy.      Id., ¶¶47-49.

       ¶32    Killian relies heavily on the "entire-record" analysis

we used in Schultz.               According to Killian, the present case

violates      double       jeopardy     because   "[t]he     evidence        the    State

intended to submit in the preceding trial was sufficient to

convict [Killian] of all the charges in the current case."                               He

argues this evidence established jeopardy of conviction for "a

broad range of conduct beyond the charging document" because

"the   State        presented     the   conduct    underlying        the     subsequent
prosecution not as other act evidence in the first trial but

with   the     intent      to    include    the   evidence      as    charges       in   an

amendment."         See Wis. Stat. § 971.29(2).

       ¶33    We do not read Schultz to be quite so broad.                      We agree

with Killian, as we stated in Schultz, that "[i]t is the record

as a whole . . . which provides the subsequent protection from

double jeopardy, rather than just the indictment."                         Schultz, 390

Wis. 2d 570, ¶30 (quoting United States v. Roman, 728 F.2d 846,
854 (7th Cir. 1984)).             However, when ascertaining the scope of
                                            20
                                                                       No.     2020AP2012-CR

jeopardy, the analysis must nonetheless focus on the defendant's

actual jeopardy——"the actual danger" of conviction.                             Id., ¶31;

Serfass, 420 U.S. at 391-92.

       ¶34    Schultz framed the question, as applied to the facts

of that case, as "whether the initial charge for repeated sexual

assault of a child during the timeframe of 'late summer to early

fall     of   2012'       includes     the        date    charged      in     the    second

prosecution         for   sexual      assault       of     a   child    'on     or   about

October 19, 2012.'"           Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, ¶33.                    To answer

this question, "[w]e beg[a]n our analysis with the complaint

charging [the defendant] in the initial prosecution."                            Id., ¶34.

After analyzing the complaint's language, along with a police

report    incorporated        by    reference,       we    concluded      the    complaint

"clearly identifie[d] [the defendant's] scope of jeopardy in the

first prosecution at the time jeopardy attached."                            Id., ¶36.    We

then continued to examine the record at trial, but only "to see

if anything suggest[ed] 'early fall' extended past mid-September

to include October 19, 2012."                      Id., ¶37.        The focus of the
analysis      was    always    on     the    defendant's         actual       jeopardy    as

established by the language in the criminal complaint.                                   The

trial record helped inform this analysis by providing evidence

of what exactly the complaint meant by "early fall."

       ¶35    Schultz never suggested that the trial record, and the

trial    record      alone,    could       expand        the   defendant's       scope    of

jeopardy beyond the jeopardy created by a fair reading of the

charging      documents.           After    all,    "[t]he      defendant       cannot   be
convicted," and the court is "without jurisdiction to convict"
                                             21
                                                                      No.   2020AP2012-CR

the defendant, "of a crime for which he is not charged."                               State

ex rel. Winnie v. Harris, 75 Wis. 2d 547, 553, 249 N.W.2d 791

(1977); see also Malaga v. United States, 57 F.2d 822, 825 (1st

Cir.       1932)        ("Even     though      the   evidence   warranted        it,    the

respondent could not be convicted of an offense with which he

was not charged."); State v. Rogers, 545 P.2d 930, 932 (Ariz.

1976) ("It is basic that a person cannot be convicted of an

offense not charged against him by indictment or information.");

In re Hess, 288 P.2d 5, 7 (Cal. 1955) ("A person cannot be

convicted          of     an     offense . . . not      charged       against    him     by

indictment or information, whether or not there was evidence at

his trial to show that he had committed that offense.").                               Were

we to conclude jeopardy could attach based on "[t]he evidence

the State intended to submit in the preceding trial" alone, this

would contravene the Supreme Court's holding in Felix "that a

mere       overlap       in      proof   between     two   prosecutions         does    not

establish a double jeopardy violation."8                   503 U.S. at 386.

       ¶36    The        fact     that   the    information     may    be   amended      to
conform to the evidence presented at trial does not affect our

analysis.          Under Wis. Stat. § 971.29(2),

       At the trial, the court may allow amendment                          of the
       complaint, indictment or information to conform                      to the
       proof where such amendment is not prejudicial                        to the
       defendant. After verdict the pleading shall be                        deemed

       If we ascribed a broader meaning to our holding in
       8

Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, it would bar subsequent prosecutions
based simply on evidence related to uncharged crimes.  Schultz
cannot be interpreted to bar a later prosecution based just on
that evidence.

                                                22
                                                                      No.        2020AP2012-CR

      amended to conform to the proof if no objection to the
      relevance of the evidence was timely raised upon the
      trial.
But before the information may be amended to conform to the

evidence,      such       evidence    must    have     been     admitted          at       trial.

Evidence      in    a    criminal     trial    is    inadmissible          unless          it   is

relevant      to    the    defendant's       guilt     or   innocence           of     a   crime

charged at the time the evidence is introduced.                            See Wis. Stat.

§ 904.02 ("Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.");

cf.   State    v.       Alsteen,     108    Wis. 2d 723,       731,       324     N.W.2d 426
(1982) (stating evidence "must be relevant to an issue in the

case to be admissible").              If evidence is relevant and therefore

admitted, then the defendant is in jeopardy insofar as that

evidence is being used to prove the charged offense.                              See Felix,

503 U.S. at 379.            Even if that same evidence could be relevant

to proving some other offense, jeopardy for that offense does

not   attach        until     the     defendant        faces        the        "risk       of    a

determination of guilt" with regard to that offense.                                   Serfass,

420 U.S. at 391-92.            Until the Information is actually amended,

there exists no such risk, and therefore no jeopardy.
      ¶37     Likewise, we disagree with Killian that a prosecutor's

introducing        evidence    merely       with     intent    to    bring        additional

charges can expand the scope of jeopardy.                      We similarly rejected

analyzing the parties' states of mind as a method for discerning

the scope of jeopardy in Schultz.                   See 390 Wis. 2d 570, ¶¶24-25,

31, 49.       Just like the proposed tests in Schultz, Killian's

proposed      intent-based           test     runs     contrary           to     the        Fifth
Amendment's requirement of actual jeopardy.                         Regardless of the

                                             23
                                                                    No.     2020AP2012-CR

prosecutor's intentions, the Information could not be amended

without leave of the court.              Wis. Stat. § 971.29(2).

       ¶38      We    therefore   hold    that,    where      a   trial     ends   in   a

mistrial,9 the defendant's scope of jeopardy consists of those

offenses        for    which   the   defendant       faced        actual      danger    of

conviction, meaning the defendant was exposed to the "risk of a

determination of guilt" regarding those offenses.10                        Serfass, 420

U.S.       at   391-92.     The   inquiry       should   focus     on     the   charging

documents, but the entire record may be examined if necessary to

confirm the scope of jeopardy as established by those charging

documents.           Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, ¶¶33–40.              "[M]ere overlap

in proof between two prosecutions does not establish a double

jeopardy        violation,"    Felix,     503    U.S.    at   386,      nor     does   the

prosecutor's intent.              The inquiry must always focus on "the

defendant's actual exposure to jeopardy in a prior prosecution."

Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, ¶31.

                C.    Whether Killian Was Twice Put In Jeopardy.

       "[F]or purposes of barring a future prosecution, it is the
       9

judgment and not the indictment alone which acts as a bar, and
the entire record may be considered in evaluating a subsequent
claim of double jeopardy."       Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, ¶30
(quoting United States v. Hamilton, 992 F.2d 1126, 1130 (10th
Cir. 1993)).

       This "risk" refers to the possibility that a jury might
       10

find the defendant guilty of the crime charged.    It does not
refer to the possibility that a jury might consider conduct
which could constitute an otherwise uncharged offense.     The
Constitution requires that there be actual as opposed to
hypothetical jeopardy. Id., ¶31.

                                           24
                                                                  No.    2020AP2012-CR

    ¶39        We now turn to the issue of whether Killian's second

prosecution violates double jeopardy.                 We conclude it does not.

    ¶40        Killian    argues    he    was    in   jeopardy    with    regard   to

certain    offenses      against     Britney      because,      "[i]n   the    State's

opening in the first trial, the State explained it would present

evidence       regarding     'a     course       of   conduct,'     including      the

defendant      'touching    her     inappropriately'       and    'rub[bing]      [his

penis]    on    her."       Killian       also    points   to    the    prosecutor's

statement to the circuit court that he could present evidence of

"a breast rub . . . alleged humping, penis rubbing . . . also a

vaginal rub."        "With respect to Ashley," Killian argues he was

in jeopardy because "the State explained to the empaneled jury,

the evidence will show that [Killian] sexually assaulted Ashley

from when she was about 6 years old until she was 17," from 1988

to 1999.        According to Killian, the prosecutor's attempts to

introduce this evidence, combined with his intent to amend the

Information, constituted an "active pursuit of convictions in

front of an empaneled jury [which] created the actual jeopardy."
    ¶41        We disagree.        A review of the entire record, with a

focus on Killian's actual exposure to jeopardy, reveals a far

more limited scope of jeopardy than Killian contends.                          Killian

was never in jeopardy of being convicted for these offenses

because he was never exposed to a risk of a determination of

guilt regarding these offenses.

    ¶42        The entire record demonstrates that the only alleged

offense    against       Britney    for    which      Killian   faced    a    possible
determination      of     guilt    was     the    allegation     that    he    grabbed
                                           25
                                                                        No.       2020AP2012-CR

Britney's buttocks.             The Amended Information included one count

of sexually assaulting Britney "on or between January, 2014 to

August,     2014."        The     probable    cause      section       of     the    original

complaint alleged Killian "grabbed her buttocks" in that time

period.          During     the    October        5,   2016    motion         hearing,      the

prosecutor confirmed that the State was not alleging any acts of

sexual assault beyond touching Britney's buttocks, and the court

issued     an    order    excluding       evidence      of    other        acts    of    sexual

assault     against         Britney.         While       discussing           the       Amended

Information on the first day of trial, the circuit court further

confirmed with the prosecutor that the State was "not alleging

there were additional things that happened."                          Any other acts of

sexual assault, the court emphasized, "were required to have

been addressed and they were not addressed at all."                                 The court

repeated this ruling before Britney's testimony, and it granted

a   mistrial      when    the      prosecutor      violated         that    ruling.         The

circuit court made it abundantly clear that Killian was not at

risk of being convicted for any act of sexual assault against
Britney other than grabbing her buttocks.

      ¶43       As for the alleged offenses against Ashley, Killian

was   in    jeopardy      of      being   convicted      for        committing       repeated

sexual assault "from April, 1994 through December, 1999."                                   The

court denied the State's motion to include a count for incest,

meaning that offense was never before the jury.                                   Though the

prosecutor       in   his      opening    statement          told    the      jury      Killian

"started molesting [Ashley] since she was about 6 or 7 years old
[1988-89] and didn't stop until she was about 17 [1999]," this
                                             26
                                                                        No.       2020AP2012-CR

clearly    goes       beyond    the      date    range     in    the   Information.             In

contrast with the Information in Schultz, there is no reading of

"April, 1994 through December, 1999" that also includes 1988 to

1993.     The only time period the jury could consider was that

listed in the Information: "from April, 1994 through December,

1999."

    ¶44        Furthermore,         the    prosecutor's          stated       intention         to

amend    the    Information         and    add    more     charges     at    the       close   of

evidence did not expand the scope of Killian's jeopardy.                                       The

prosecutor's intent alone was insufficient to put Killian at

risk of a determination of guilt.                      The jury would have had no

ability find Killian guilty of any additional offenses unless

and until that amendment took place.                            No such amendment ever

took place, so jeopardy never attached.

    ¶45        Accordingly,         we     conclude        the    scope      of     Killian's

jeopardy in his trial included the following offenses:                                 sexually

assaulting       Britney       by   grabbing         her   buttocks     "on       or    between

January,       2014    to   August        18,    2014"     contrary         to    Wis.    Stat.
§ 948.02, and repeated sexual assault of Ashley "from April,

1994 through December, 1999" contrary to Wis. Stat. § 948.025.

    ¶46        Having ascertained the scope of Killian's jeopardy in

his first prosecution, we proceed to the question of whether

Killian's jeopardy in his second prosecution is identical in law

and in fact.          To repeat, "two offenses are identical in law if

one offense does not require proof of any fact in addition to

those which must be proved for the other offense."                                     State v.
Ziegler,       2012    WI   73,     ¶60,    342      Wis. 2d 256,       816       N.W.2d 238.
                                                27
                                                                            No.     2020AP2012-CR

Offenses      "are    not    identical          in    fact     if    the     acts       allegedly

committed are sufficiently different in fact to demonstrate that

separate crimes have been committed."                     Id.

       ¶47    In the present prosecution, counts 3 and 5 through 9

are    not   identical       in    law     to    an    offense        in    Killian's        first

prosecution.          Those       counts        allege    Killian          committed         incest

against      Ashley    contrary       to    Wis.       Stat.        § 948.06.           To    prove

incest, the State must show the defendant "kn[ew] [the child

victim] is related, either by blood or adoption, and the child

is    related    in   a     degree   of     kinship       closer       than       2nd    cousin."

§ 948.06.       The crime of repeated sexual assault of a child under

Wis. Stat. § 948.025, charged in the first case, contains no

similar element.            The crime of incest also requires proof that

the victim "ha[d] not attained the age of 18 years."                                Wis. Stat.

§ 948.01(1) (defining "child").                       In contrast, repeated sexual

assault of a child requires proof that the victim "ha[d] not

attained the age of 16 years."                       Wis. Stat. §§ 948.025, 948.02.

The statute also requires proof of "3 or more violations."                                      Id.
Counts 3 and 5 through 9 charging Killian with committing incest

against Ashley therefore do not violate double jeopardy because

each offense "require[s] proof of a[] fact in addition to those

which    must    be   proved       for   the      other      offense."            Ziegler,      342

Wis. 2d 256, ¶60; see also State v. Swanson, No. 2015AP1521-CR,

unpublished       slip      op.,     ¶42    (Wis.        Ct.    App.        Mar.        7,   2017)

(concluding Wis. Stat. §§ 948.06 and 948.025 are not identical

in law under the Blockburger test).

                                                28
                                                                     No.     2020AP2012-CR

      ¶48    Counts    1    through   5     do   not    violate       double    jeopardy

because     they    are    not   identical       in     fact    to    an     offense    in

Killian's first prosecution.              Counts 1 through 5, which allege

offenses against Ashley, are factually different because they

cover different timeframes than the offense in Killian's first

prosecution.        Whereas the timeframe in the first prosecution was

"April, 1994 through December, 1999," counts 1 through 5 allege

various offenses "in or around" 1990 to 1993.                     This precedes the

timeframe     for    the   offenses    against         Ashley   prosecuted       in    the

previous case, making these counts not identical in fact.

      ¶49    Count 10, the only count alleging an offense against

Britney, is also not identical in fact to an offense in the

previous case.         The State prosecuted Killian in the first case

for grabbing Britney's buttocks "on or between January, 2014 to

August 18, 2014."          Count 10 alleges Killian committed repeated

acts of sexual assault against Britney "in or around June 2012,

and   no    later   than    August    17,    2014."        Though      there    is     some

overlap in the time period and the complaint's probable cause
section      alleges       Killian    "grabbed         [Britney's]          butt,"     the

complaint also alleges other acts of sexual assault.                          It alleges

Killian grabbed Britney's buttocks five times and that only one

of these times was on August 18, 2014.                   It also alleges Killian

"touched     her     'boobies,'"      "hump[ed]"        her,    and        "touched    her

'private part.'"           These acts "are significantly different in

nature, involving different methods of intrusion and contact."

Ziegler,     342    Wis. 2d 256,      ¶73.       Count     10    is    therefore       not
identical in fact to an offense prosecuted in the previous case,
                                          29
                                                                           No.     2020AP2012-CR

and it does not violate double jeopardy to the extent it alleges

acts of sexual assault other than grabbing Britney's buttocks

"on or between January, 2014 to August 18, 2014."

    ¶50     Because       no     count          in        the    present    prosecution         is

identical both in law and in fact with an offense charged in

Killian's    previous      prosecution,                   the   present    case     is    not    a

prosecution for the same offense and does not violate Killian's

right against double jeopardy.

                                D.    Issue Preclusion

    ¶51     Finally,       Killian          raises              issue   preclusion         as    a

potential    bar    to    prosecution                in    this    case.         Specifically,

Killian argues that issue preclusion, as "ro[o]ted in the Double

Jeopardy    Clause,"      bars       the    present             prosecution      because       "the

trials would be identical, but for the State seeking to bolster

its case."        He also argues that issue preclusion prevents the

State from bringing more charges because the circuit court's

order in the first case "clearly ruled that the State could not

bring these charges" and the State did not appeal that order.
    ¶52     Killian's first argument relies largely on the United

States Supreme Court's decision in Ashe, 397 U.S. 436.                                          The

defendant    in    Ashe    was       charged          with      robbing    one    of     six    men

playing a poker game in a residential basement.                                   Id. at 437.

"The trial judge instructed the jury that if it found that the

[defendant]       was     one        of     the           participants      in     the     armed

robbery . . . he was guilty under the law even if he had not

personally robbed [the victim]."                          Id. at 439.         The jury found
the defendant not guilty.                 Id.     "Six weeks later the [defendant]
                                                30
                                                               No.   2020AP2012-CR

was brought to trial again, this time for the robbery of another

participant in the poker game . . . ."           Id.    The Court addressed

whether issue preclusion "is a part of the Fifth Amendment's

guarantee against double jeopardy" and therefore "no longer a

matter to be left for state court determination within the broad

bounds of 'fundamental fairness.'"             Id. at 442-43.           The Court

described the doctrine as "mean[ing] simply that when an issue

of ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final

judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the same

parties   in   any   future    lawsuit."11      Id.    at    443.       The   Court

concluded issue preclusion barred the second prosecution because

the "jury determined by its verdict that the [defendant] was not

one of the robbers."       Id. at 446.

    ¶53    The   Supreme      Court   has    recently       described    Ashe    as

imposing a rigorous standard:

    [Ashe's] test is a demanding one.      Ashe forbids a
    second trial only if to secure a conviction the
    prosecution must prevail on an issue the jury
    necessarily resolved in the defendant's favor in the
    first trial. A second trial "is not precluded simply
    because it is unlikely——or even very unlikely——that
    the original jury acquitted without finding the fact
    in question."     To say that the second trial is
    tantamount to a trial of the same offense as the first
    and thus forbidden by the Double Jeopardy Clause, we
    must be able to say that "it would have been
    irrational for the jury" in the first trial to acquit

    11 Ashe used the term "collateral estoppel" to describe this
doctrine. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). However, the Supreme Court "has
[since] observed, 'issue preclusion' is the more descriptive
term" as opposed to "collateral estoppel."    Bravo-Fernandez v.
United States, 580 U.S. 5, 7 n.1 (2016).

                                      31
                                                                No.    2020AP2012-CR

      without finding in the defendant's favor on a fact
      essential to a conviction in the second.
Currier v. Virginia, 585 U.S.                , 138 S. Ct. 2144, 2150 (2018)

(citations omitted); see also Bravo-Fernandez v. United States,

580 U.S. 5, 12 (2016) (describing the inquiry as "what a jury in

a   previous    trial     necessarily    decided").        We     have    likewise

explained that issue preclusion applies to "an issue of ultimate

fact that is determined by a valid and full judgment."                    State v.

Vassos, 218 Wis. 2d 330, 343, 579 N.W.2d 35 (1998); Canon, 241

Wis. 2d 164,     ¶13    ("[I]ssue     preclusion . . . is        a    doctrine   to

prevent prosecutorial misconduct and give finality to judicial

determinations made in one criminal transaction . . . .").                       We

therefore      conclude    that   a    valid    judicial   determination         of

ultimate fact is necessary for issue preclusion to apply under

Ashe.      Because the jury in Killian's trial did not reach a

verdict, the doctrine is inapplicable to this case.12

       Killian argues this conclusion "allows a prosecutor, upon
      12

believing the trial is going badly, to intentionally goad the
defense into moving for a mistrial and then remain free from the
perils of issue preclusion, which is exactly what happened in
this case."      This argument is based on an unknowable,
hypothetical verdict the jury might have issued, and it assumes
all charges relating to the same conduct must be brought in the
same prosecution.

      The collateral-estoppel effect attributed to the
      Double Jeopardy Clause, may bar a later prosecution
      for a separate offense where the Government has lost
      an earlier prosecution involving the same facts.     But
      this   does   not   establish   that   the   Government
      "must . . . bring   its   prosecutions . . . together."
      It is entirely free to bring them separately . . . .

United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 705 (1993).

                                        32
                                                                        No.        2020AP2012-CR

      ¶54    Killian's      second      argument——that           the    circuit        court's

order dismissing the first case with prejudice bars the present

prosecution——fails         in   a      similar      vein.         "The        [common       law]

doctrine     of    issue    preclusion . . . is            designed         to      limit     the

relitigation of issues that have been actually litigated in a

previous action."          Aldrich, 341 Wis. 2d 36, ¶88.                      "An issue is

'actually      litigated'       when     it    is    'properly         raised,         by    the

pleadings or otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and

is   determined.'"          Dostal      v.     Strand,      2023       WI     6,     ¶24,     405

Wis. 2d 572, 984 N.W.2d 382 (quoting Randall v. Felt, 2002 WI

App 157, ¶9, 256 Wis. 2d 563, 647 N.W.2d 373).

      ¶55    In    the     circuit      court's      order       following           Killian's

trial,   the      court    described     the       issue    as    "whether          the     Fifth

Amendment's protection against double jeopardy bars the retrial

of   [Killian]      because     of     prosecutorial         overreaching             in     this

case."      The court stated its findings as follows:

      The Court finds that the prosecutor's actions were
      intentional and the record shows that he knew his
      actions would be prejudicial to the defendant.     The
      Court finds also that the prosecutor's conduct was
      designed to create another chance to convict, and was
      an act done so as to allow the State another "kick at
      the cat" – a chance to prepare more thoroughly and
      with a better understanding of the issues, a chance to
      file different motions and obtain more favorable
      pretrial rulings, and a chance to add more charges and
      incriminating evidence into the record in the hopes of
      solidifying the State’s chances of conviction.
The court then ordered "that the State is barred from retrial in

this matter due to prosecutorial overreaching" (emphasis added).
The circuit court's order addressed the issue of prosecutorial

                                              33
                                                                         No.    2020AP2012-CR

overreach.        Nowhere did the circuit court analyze the scope of

Killian's jeopardy in his trial.                     The one question before the

circuit court, and the court's one ruling, concerned whether the

prosecutor engaged in overreach such that double jeopardy barred

retrial "in th[at] matter."                 The circuit court never determined

the scope of Killian's jeopardy in his trial.                            Accordingly, the

issue     was     not     actually       litigated,            and   common     law   issue

preclusion does not apply.

                                   IV.      CONCLUSION

       ¶56   We conclude that Killian's previous trial does not bar

the State from prosecuting the present case because the scope of

Killian's jeopardy in his trial did not include the offenses

with    which     he    is   now    charged.             The    scope    of    jeopardy    is

established by "the defendant's actual exposure to jeopardy in a

prior    prosecution."             Schultz,        390    Wis. 2d 570,         ¶31.     This

requires that the defendant faced a "risk of a determination of

guilt" regarding a particular offense.                           Serfass, 420 U.S. at

391-92.      Killian was never exposed to the risk of conviction for
the offenses charged in the present case.                               As a result, the

offenses prosecuted in Killian's trial are not identical in law

and in fact to the offenses charged in this case, so double

jeopardy does not bar the present prosecution.

       ¶57   We    also      conclude       that    issue        preclusion     under     the

Double Jeopardy Clause and common law issue preclusion do not

bar the present prosecution.                 Issue preclusion under the Double

Jeopardy     Clause       requires      a    valid       judicial       determination      of
ultimate fact, and none exists in this case because Killian's
                                             34
                                                                  No.     2020AP2012-CR

trial ended in a mistrial.               See Ashe, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).

Common law issue preclusion also does not bar this prosecution.

The circuit court's order dismissing with prejudice the criminal

complaint   in    the    first    case    did      not   decide     the     scope   of

Killian's jeopardy.         Therefore, that issue was never "actually

litigated,"      and    issue    preclusion     does     not   bar      the   present

prosecution.      See Aldrich, 341 Wis. 2d 36, ¶88.

    ¶58     We therefore reverse the court of appeals and remand

to the circuit court to consider Killian's unresolved argument

regarding prosecutorial vindictiveness.

    By    the    Court.—The      decision     of   the   court     of     appeals   is

reversed, and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                         35
                                                                       No.   2020AP2012-CR.awb

    ¶59     ANN   WALSH       BRADLEY,        J.     (dissenting).                As   pretrial

rulings     unfolded       and    trial        testimony         was     introduced,           the

woefully    unprepared        State     realized        that      things      were      looking

bleak.     So instead of allowing the jury to perform its function,

the prosecutor intentionally induced a mistrial in an attempt to

later refile charges against James Killian.

    ¶60     Importantly, the circuit court made a finding that the

"trial was going poorly" for the prosecutor and that "[t]he

prosecutor    knew     that      if    he   retried        the   case,       he    might   fare

better      and      the        defendant           could        face        more       ominous

charges . . . ."           It     further          found    that       "the       prosecutor's

actions were intentional" and that his "conduct was designed to

create another chance to convict, and was an act done so as to

allow the State another 'kick at the cat.'"

    ¶61     The circuit court could see right through the State's

gamesmanship.     According to the court, the ploy was designed to

afford "a chance to prepare more thoroughly and with a better

understanding of the issues, a chance to file different motions
and obtain more favorable pretrial rulings, and a chance to add

more charges and incriminating evidence into the record in the

hopes of solidifying the State's chances of conviction."

    ¶62     Attempting to circumvent these findings, the majority

opinion    rewards     the      State's       scheme,       giving      it    just      what    it

sought through its egregious conduct.                        In the majority's view,

double    jeopardy     does      not    bar    retrial       "because         the      scope    of

Killian's jeopardy in his trial did not include the offenses
with which he is now charged."                     Majority op., ¶3.                In effect,

                                              1
                                                                    No.   2020AP2012-CR.awb

the majority's decision sends a direct signal to prosecutors who

are losing at trial:           if you want a do-over, consider throwing

the trial.

      ¶63    The majority errs in two primary ways.                            First, it

sidesteps     the      circuit       court's          detailed      factual     findings,

disregarding the prosecutor's clear intent.                        Second, by focusing

singularly on the charging documents in determining the scope of

Killian's jeopardy, rather than examining the record as a whole,

the majority employs an analysis which this court explicitly

rejected in a recent case.              See State v. Schultz, 2020 WI 24,

390 Wis. 2d 570, 939 N.W.2d 519.

      ¶64    Under a proper application of Schultz, I conclude that

jeopardy attaches where the prosecutor's desire to amend the

information based on the evidence at trial is clearly manifest

in   the    record    and    where    the    prosecutor           purposely    induced   a

mistrial with the intent to later refile charges.                              Any other

result     would     allow   the     State       to    reap   a    windfall     from   its

intentional wrongdoing.
      ¶65    Because I would not lend judicial imprimatur to the

State's gambit in this case, I respectfully dissent.

                                             I

      ¶66    Killian     was     charged         with    sexual      assaults     of   two

minors, referred to as Britney and Ashley.1                         Majority op., ¶6.

The complaint regarding Britney charged Killian with one count

of first-degree sexual assault of a child2 and alleged a single

      1"Britney" and "Ashley" are pseudonyms.                             See Wis. Stat.
(Rule) § 809.86(4).
      2   Wis. Stat. § 948.02.
                                             2
                                                                 No.    2020AP2012-CR.awb

assaultive act——that Killian "laid beside [Britney] and grabbed

her buttocks."         Id.

     ¶67    About a year after the complaint regarding Britney was

filed, the State filed an additional complaint against Killian

concerning      acts    against      Ashley.      Id.,    ¶7.          In   this   second

complaint,      the     State   charged        Killian    with     repeated        sexual

assault    of    the    same    child,3   alleging        that    Killian      sexually

assaulted Ashley from "April 1994 through December 1999."                          Id.

     ¶68    After the cases were joined for trial, Killian brought

a motion to exclude other-acts evidence, while the State sought

to admit such evidence.           Id., ¶8.       Ultimately, the circuit court

denied the State's motion to admit other-acts evidence as to

other instances of assault against Britney.4                 Id.

     ¶69    As trial approached, the State tried to add additional

charges by amending the information.                    Id., ¶9.        On the day of

trial,    the   circuit      court    denied     this    motion,       describing     the

addition of new charges at such a late date as prejudicial.

Id., ¶10.       As the parties and the circuit court discussed this
motion, the prosecutor confirmed that Killian was being charged

with "one sole act" with regard to Britney.                      Id., ¶11.         But he

     3   Wis. Stat. § 948.025.
     4 The circuit court allowed the State to present evidence of
"grooming" behavior, but it did not allow the State to present
evidence of assaultive behavior other than Killian grabbing
Britney's buttocks as alleged in the complaint.     Majority op.,
¶8. Additionally, the circuit court granted the State's motion
to admit evidence of sexual assaults against Ashley going back
to 1988 to demonstrate Killian's "motive, intent, preparation,
absence of mistake or accident, and plan." Id.

                                          3
                                                                 No.   2020AP2012-CR.awb

reiterated his desire to later amend the information "if more

acts are disclosed at trial."            Id.

       ¶70    Despite    the    circuit         court's    admonition,      from    his

opening statement onward, the prosecutor continually described

other instances of alleged sexual assault committed by Killian

against Britney.         Id., ¶13.      Prior to Britney taking the stand,

the prosecutor yet again referenced the possibility that the

information could be amended to conform with the proof offered

and stated that "[a]nything could happen when she testifies."

Id., ¶14.       As part of this discussion, the circuit court made

clear that a mistrial was a distinct possibility if any excluded

other-acts evidence surfaced.            Id.

       ¶71    Britney    took   the    stand      and     the   prosecutor     quickly

elicited such testimony.              Id., ¶15.          Defense counsel objected

and moved for a mistrial, which the circuit court granted.                          Id.

The circuit court later determined that the prosecutor's actions

were intentional, with the object being to retry the defendant.

Id.
       ¶72    Consistent with that object, the State subsequently

filed a new criminal complaint, this time charging Killian with

10 counts, relying on the other-acts evidence that was excluded

from the initial trial.            Id., ¶16.       Nine of these counts related

to    Ashley,   and     included    three       counts    of    first-degree    sexual

assault of a child and six counts of incest with a child.5                          Id.

One count related to Britney, and charged Killian with repeated

sexual assault of the same child.                Id.

       5   Wis. Stat. § 948.06(1).

                                            4
                                                                       No.    2020AP2012-CR.awb

      ¶73       Killian moved to dismiss the new complaint on double

jeopardy grounds.            Id., ¶17.           The circuit court agreed with

Killian, and the court of appeals affirmed.                            It concluded that

"the circuit court properly considered the entire record of the

first prosecution to determine whether Killian was in jeopardy

for the offenses now charged."                   State v. Killian, 2022 WI App

43, ¶4, 404 Wis. 2d 451, 979 N.W.2d 569.                      Reviewing the record,

the court of appeals concluded that "Killian was, in fact, in

jeopardy of being convicted of the offenses now charged" in the

second complaint.          Id.

      ¶74       The State petitioned for review, and the majority now

reverses a unanimous decision of the court of appeals.

                                            II

                                            A

      ¶75       The majority concludes that "Killian was never exposed

to   the    risk    of   conviction       for     the   offenses             charged   in    the

present     case."       Majority    op.,       ¶3.     In    the       majority's       view,

"Killian's        previous       trial     does       not    bar        the      State      from
prosecuting        the   present    case    because         the    scope       of   Killian's

jeopardy in his trial did not include the offenses with which he

is now charged."         Id.

      ¶76       The double jeopardy clause provides:                         "nor shall any

person     be    subject    for    the   same     offence         to    be     twice   put    in

jeopardy of life or limb."               U.S. Const. amend. V.                  At its core,

it recognizes the State's power and serves as a check on that

power:

      The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in
      at least the Anglo-American system of jurisprudence,
                                5
                                                        No.    2020AP2012-CR.awb

    is that the State with all its resources and power
    should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to
    convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
    subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal
    and compelling him to live in a continuing state of
    anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the
    possibility that even though innocent he may be found
    guilty.
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957).

    ¶77     This clause serves various purposes.               It protects a

defendant      from   multiple   trials    and   punishments   for   the   same

offense, preserves the finality and integrity of judgments, bars
the government from a second chance to supply evidence it failed

to provide in the first proceeding, and protects a defendant's

right to have the trial completed by a particular tribunal.

State v. Martin, 121 Wis. 2d 670, 675, 360 N.W.2d 43 (1985).

    ¶78     However, the double jeopardy bar does not apply in all

situations.       When a defendant requests a mistrial, and that

request is granted, the general rule is that the double jeopardy

clause does not bar a retrial.            State v. Hill, 2000 WI App 259,

¶11, 240 Wis. 2d 1, 622 N.W.2d 34 (citing State v. Copening, 100

Wis. 2d 700, 709, 303 N.W.2d 821 (1981)).             In such a situation,

the defendant exercises control over the mistrial decision and

in effect chooses to be tried by a different tribunal.               Id.

    ¶79     But this rule is not absolute.              Where governmental

conduct is intended to goad the defendant into moving for a

mistrial, double jeopardy can be raised as a bar to a second

trial   even    after   the   defendant    successfully   ends     the   first.

Oregon v. Kennedy, 456 U.S. 667, 675-76 (1982).
    ¶80     Here, the prosecutor plainly "goaded" the defendant

into moving for a mistrial.               The circuit court made such a
                                      6
                                                                 No.   2020AP2012-CR.awb

determination, supported by 21 factual findings.                          It observed

that the prosecutor clearly knew that things were not going his

way:

              "The prosecutor had multiple reasons to believe the

               trial was going poorly even before the trial started

               (medical subpoenas, excluded expert, excluded forensic

               interview,       improperly            crafted          proposal      to

               settle) . . . ."

The circuit court further found unbelievable the prosecutor's

claim that he unintentionally elicited the prohibited testimony:

              "The prosecutor claimed the error was an unintentional

               mishap yet the prosecutor had clearly educated himself

               that the only way he would be barred from retrial if a

               mistrial was declared was if there was prosecutorial

               overreaching and he discussed this research with the

               defense team moments before the child was called to

               testify.     There would be no other purpose to call in

               the defense counsel over lunch other than to lay out
               what    he   intended   to       do   if   they    objected     to   the

               introduction and a mistrial was declared."

It also noted that the prosecutor was aware that another trial

may    bring    both    additional     charges        and   a    better    chance    of

conviction:

              "The prosecutor knew that if he retried the case, he

               might fare better and the defendant could face more

               ominous charges 'because if she were to testify and

                                            7
                                                                 No.    2020AP2012-CR.awb

              she goes and tells her story, Mr. Killian is facing

              more charges.'"

Finally,      the   circuit    court     observed         the   State's     failure     to

prepare and the subsequent scramble to cover it up:

             "The State was not prepared for trial and realized

              only the week prior to trial that there were a series

              of sexual assaults alleged by the child.                            It then

              requested     leave   to      amend    to    include     a   date     range,

              hoping to get the entire set of acts included, by

              sidestepping the prior ruling on [other-acts evidence]

              to which it had previously failed to object."

       ¶81    Accordingly,      the      circuit      court      found       that      "the

prosecutor's actions were intentional and the record shows that

he knew his actions would be prejudicial to the defendant."                              It

continued:       "The Court finds also that the prosecutor's conduct

was designed to create another chance to convict, and was an act

done so as to allow the State another 'kick at the cat' . . . ."

The circuit court thus determined that "the State is barred from
retrial in this matter due to prosecutorial overreaching."

       ¶82    The majority sidesteps the circuit court's findings.

It   asserts     that   "Killian      was    never    exposed      to      the   risk    of

conviction for the offenses charged in the present case" and

that     "the    offenses     prosecuted        in   Killian's         trial     are    not

identical in law and in fact to the offenses charged in this

case."       Majority op., ¶3.

       ¶83    This "identical in law and in fact" formulation arises
from Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932).                                  In

                                            8
                                                                    No.       2020AP2012-CR.awb

Blockburger,       the   United     States         Supreme      Court     determined        that

"where the same act constitutes a violation of two distinct

statutory provisions, the test under the double jeopardy clause

is whether each provision requires proof of a fact which the

other does not."          State v. Lechner, 217 Wis. 2d 392, 405, 576

N.W.2d 912 (1998).           "Under this test, two offenses are different

in law if each statutory crime requires for conviction proof of

an element which the other does not require."                           Id.     Offenses are

not identical in fact if a conviction for each offense requires

proof    of   an     additional         fact    that   conviction         for      the     other

offenses      does    not,    or    if    they      are    different          in   nature     or

separated in time.           Schultz, 390 Wis. 2d 570, ¶22.                     This test is

rather    straightforward          to    apply,      but    a   particular         aspect     of

Wisconsin law illustrates that the application of the test is

not without nuance.

     ¶84      In     Wisconsin      the        State      may    move     to       amend    the

information to conform to the evidence produced at trial.                                   Wis.

Stat. § 971.29(2).6          Although the statute requires that any such
amendment not prejudice the defendant, the State's ability to

amend the information is fairly broad.                          "When an amendment to

the charging document does not change the crime charged, and

     6   Wisconsin Stat. § 971.29(2) provides:

     At the trial, the court may allow amendment of the
     complaint, indictment or information to conform to the
     proof where such amendment is not prejudicial to the
     defendant. After verdict the pleading shall be deemed
     amended to conform to the proof if no objection to the
     relevance of the evidence was timely raised upon the
     trial.

                                               9
                                                                   No.   2020AP2012-CR.awb

when the alleged offense is the same and results from the same

transaction, there is no prejudice to the defendant."                            State v.

DeRango, 229 Wis. 2d 1, 26, 599 N.W.2d 27 (Ct. App. 1999).                              But

this does not mean that an amendment cannot vastly expand the

jeopardy to which a defendant is subject.                          Indeed, precedent

indicates that amendment can even result in additional counts

that increase the maximum penalty a defendant may face.                                State

v. Wickstrom, 118 Wis. 2d 339, 349, 348 N.W.2d 183 (Ct. App.

1984).

      ¶85    What this means in practical terms is that in some

cases the charge or factual circumstance that is sent to the

jury for determination may be quite different from the charge or

factual     circumstance       set   forth       in    the     information        at    the

beginning of the trial.              This is a key point:                  the charging

document does not reflect the definitive final charge.                             It is

subject     to    amendment,    meaning        that    the    jeopardy      to   which    a

defendant is subject cannot be defined strictly by looking at

the   charging      document.        See   Schultz,          390   Wis. 2d 570,        ¶30,
(citing United States v. Hamilton, 992 F.2d 1126, 1130 (10th

Cir. 1993) ("[F]or purposes of barring a future prosecution, it

is the judgment and not the indictment alone which acts as a

bar, and the entire record may be considered in evaluating a

subsequent claim of double jeopardy.").

                                           B

      ¶86    In    its   laser-focus       on    the    charging         documents,     the

majority misapplies our recent decision in State v. Schultz, 390
Wis. 2d 570.        In   Schultz, the question before the court was

                                           10
                                                          No.    2020AP2012-CR.awb

whether a prosecution for a sexual assault "on or about October

19, 2012" was barred by double jeopardy when the defendant had

been previously acquitted for sexual assault in "late summer to

early fall of 2012."     In framing the analysis, the Schultz court

concluded that we must examine "the entire record, including

evidentiary facts adduced at trial, in ascertaining whether a

defendant's    double   jeopardy   rights   have    been        violated    by   a

second prosecution."      Id., ¶32.     It emphasized that "it is the

record in its entirety that reveals the scope of jeopardy and

protects a defendant against a subsequent prosecution for the

same crime."    Id.

     ¶87     In applying these principles to the facts before it,

the Schultz court rejected an approach that would merely compare

the charging documents to determine the scope of jeopardy.                       It

explained that such an approach would insufficiently protect the

defendant's double jeopardy rights and that we must examine the

record to determine whether any evidence supporting the charges

in the second case was introduced in the first:

     Limiting our review to the complaint . . . would not
     protect the defendant against double jeopardy if the
     State   introduced  evidence   of  a   sexual   assault
     occurring "on or about October 19" after jeopardy
     attached. In order to ascertain whether the defendant
     was   exposed   to double   jeopardy   in  the   second
     prosecution,   we  examine   the   entire   record   of
     proceedings in the first case to see if any evidence
     of a sexual assault occurring "on or about October 19"
     was introduced.
Id., ¶37.7

     7 Setting  forth   the   background           that         underlies    this
conclusion, the Schultz court wrote:

                                   11
                                                              No.    2020AP2012-CR.awb

      ¶88   This passage from         Schultz      explicitly indicates that

review of only the complaint fails to protect the defendant's

double jeopardy rights if the State introduces evidence of a

sexual assault outside the charging period.                   Id. ("Limiting our

review to the complaint . . . would not protect the defendant

against double jeopardy if the State introduced evidence of a

sexual assault occurring 'on or about October 19' after jeopardy

attached.").     Such   a   scenario        is   just    what   we     have   in   the

present case.    Accordingly, we must look to the "entire record,"

and not merely compare charging documents.                      Yet     despite the

Schultz court's admonition, the charging document is where the

majority's singular focus lies.          See majority op., ¶35.

      ¶89   The entire record here points in one direction——that

the prosecutor repeatedly and consistently sought to amend the

information to add additional charges.                  Had this clear goal of

the   prosecution   come    to   pass,      Killian     would       have   faced   the

possibility of conviction on those additional charges.

      Even though the incorporated and attached police
      report renders the complaint unambiguous, we also
      review the record of the first trial to see if
      anything suggests "early fall" extended past mid-
      September to include October 19, 2012.    We do so in
      order to safeguard the defendant's constitutional
      right against double jeopardy.      The facts alleged
      under the second complaint——a sexual assault "on or
      about October 19"——would not, if proven, support a
      conviction in the first prosecution. The complaint in
      the first prosecution alleged repeated sexual assaults
      during "late summer to early fall[,]" which the
      attached and incorporated police report clarified to
      have concluded in early to mid-September.

State v. Schultz,       2020     WI    24,       ¶37,   390     Wis. 2d 570,       939
N.W.2d 519.

                                       12
                                                                         No.   2020AP2012-CR.awb

       ¶90        The majority focuses on "actual jeopardy" rather than

"perceived jeopardy."                 See, e.g., majority op., ¶31.                      But this

focus fails to recognize, as the United States Supreme Court

has, that the concept of "potential" is inherent in the double

jeopardy clause.               Price v. Georgia, 398 U.S. 323, 326 (1970)

("The        'twice           put        in         jeopardy'        language            of      the

Constitution . . . relates to a potential, i.e., the risk that

an accused for a second time will be convicted of the 'same

offense' for which he was initially tried.").

       ¶91        In order to account for the State's ability to amend

the information to conform to the evidence at trial, I conclude

that in a situation as here, a straightforward application of

Schultz indicates that where the prosecutor's desire to amend

the    information            based      on    the    evidence      at   trial      is    clearly

manifest          in    the    record         and    where   the    prosecutor        purposely

induced a mistrial with the intent to later refile charges,

jeopardy attaches.

       ¶92        The series of events with which we are confronted here
is    not    common.           It   is    a     thankfully      rare     occurrence           that   a

prosecutor will purposely induce a mistrial with the intent to

later refile charges.                 But in such a situation, examination of

the entire record dictates that a determination that jeopardy

attaches          is    appropriate           and     even     necessary       to   protect          a

defendant's double jeopardy rights.

       ¶93        By concluding that Killian's double jeopardy rights

were        not        violated,         the        majority       rewards      the       State's
gamesmanship.            The State purposely induced a mistrial with the

                                                    13
                                                                        No.    2020AP2012-CR.awb

intent    to    get       a    chance   to     try       again    after       preparing       more

thoroughly.         And it gets exactly what it wanted.                              This simple

fact alone should cause any fair-minded reader to pause.                                     Unlike

the majority opinion, the application of our precedent presented

in   this      dissent         would    not     countenance            such     an     egregious

manipulation of the judicial machinery.

     ¶94       Contrary to the majority's assertions, Killian's first

trial    placed      him       in   jeopardy     of       conviction          for    the     crimes

charged in the second complaint with regard to both Britney and

Ashley.        The        prosecutor     was    clear       in    his     intent        to    seek

amendment      of    the      information      to     conform      with        the    evidence——

evidence that he hoped would contain proof of additional acts of

sexual assault against Britney and incest against Ashley.                                        No

speculation is necessary to guess at the charges the prosecutor

would have sought.

     ¶95       The intention to amend the information was clear and

manifest in the record.                 As the circuit court found, "[t]here

were numerous Informations filed, with various charges, changing
dates,    and       changing        penalties       up    to     and    during        the     trial

itself."         For       example,     several          days    prior        to     trial,     the

prosecutor filed an affidavit in support of a motion to amend

the information to allege a series of sexual assaults over a

period of time.            Then, on the day of trial, he again referenced

amending the information in what the circuit court termed "an

attempt to back door the prior ruling to which he failed [to]

object."            And       immediately      before          Britney        testified,       the
prosecutor raised the possibility that "if she were to testify

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                                                      No.   2020AP2012-CR.awb

and she goes and tells her story, Mr. Killian is facing more

charges."      The prosecutor's repeated efforts and stated intent

to amend the information are manifest in this record.

      ¶96     Also clear from the record is the prosecutor's intent

to   induce    a   mistrial.     The    circuit   court    found   that    the

prosecutor acted with specific intent to cause a mistrial and to

prejudice the defendant——findings which are supported by ample

evidence in the record.          For these reasons, the entire record

indicates      that   jeopardy   attached   and   double    jeopardy      bars

retrial.

      ¶97     For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

      ¶98     I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL

BRADLEY joins this dissent.

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    No.   2020AP2012-CR.awb

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