Court Opinion

ID: 9536440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:59:53.486005+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:29.677313
License: Public Domain

HALL, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I dissent based upon the principles of stare decisis and judicial self-restraint, precepts having significant application to the development of law by the courts.1 Appellants have not requested or sought on appeal consideration of our established boundary by acquiescence doctrine or the overruling of Halladay v. Cluff2 and its progeny. Indeed, except for appellees Holmes and Jensen, none of the parties seek the extraordinary involvement in which a majority of the Court endeavors to participate. Further, the issue of the continuing validity and force of the “objective uncertainty” element reelucidated in Halla-day is not properly before us and has not been adequately briefed. And based upon the facts of this case, reaching the issue is unnecessary since the trial court’s decision may be correctly affirmed without consideration or application of the objective uncertainty element. Accordingly, overruling established rules and settled case law is untimely, unwarranted, and unwise.
Today’s decision needs be controlled [b]y the important doctrine of stare deci-sis, the means by which we ensure that the law will not merely change erratically, but will develop in a principled and intelligible fashion. That doctrine permits society to presume that bedrock principles are founded in the law rather than in the proclivities of individuals, and thereby contributes to the integrity of our constitutional system of government, both in appearance and in fact. While stare decisis is not an inexorable command, the careful observer will discern that any detours from the straight path of stare decisis in our past have occurred for articulable reasons, and only when the Court has felt obliged “to bring its opinions into agreement with experience and with facts newly ascertained.”
Our history does not impose any rigid formula to constrain the Court in the disposition of cases. Rather, its lesson is that every successful proponent of overruling precedent has borne the heavy burden of persuading the Court that changes in society or in the law dictate that the values served by stare decisis yield in favor of a greater objective. In [this case] we have been offered no reason to believe that any such metamorphosis has rendered the Court’s long commitment to a rule of reversal outdated, ill-founded, unworkable, or otherwise legitimately vulnerable to serious reconsideration. On the contrary, the need for such a rule is as compelling today as it *425was at its inception.3
The exceptional action of overruling existing precedent “demands special justification.” 4 As Justice Stevens has eloquently-stated:
Of even greater importance, however, [than the fact that existing precedent (1) did not state a rule fundamentally at odds with current understanding of constitutional rights; (2) was not rested upon discredited interpretation of relevant historical documents; and (3) cannot be characterized as unreasonable or egregiously incorrect] is my concern about the potential damage to the legal system that may be caused by frequent or sudden reversals of direction that may appear to have been occasioned by nothing more significant than a change in the identity of this Court’s personnel. Granting that a zigzag is sometimes the best course, I am firmly convinced that we have a profound obligation to give recently decided cases the strongest presumption of validity. That presumption is supported by much more than the desire to foster an appearance of certainty and impartiality in the administration of justice, or the interest in facilitating the labors of judges. The presumption is an essential thread in the mantel of protection that the law affords the individual. Citizens must have confidence that the rules on which they rely in ordering their affairs — particularly when they are prepared to take issue with those in power in doing so — are rules of law and not merely the opinions of a small group of men who temporarily occupy high office. It is the unpopular or beleaguered individual — not the man in power — who has the greatest stake in the integrity of the law.
For me, the adverse consequences of adhering to an arguably erroneous precedent in this case are far less serious than the consequences of further unraveling the doctrine of stare decisis.5
Justifications for refusing to apply the doctrine of stare decisis sometimes exist,6 but *426even if the arguments in favor of overruling Halladay may on their surface seem appealing,7 the appropriate rationalizations are either not available8 or at most unconvincing in this case, and the proponents have not “borne the heavy burden of persuading the Court that changes in society or in the law dictate that the values served by stare decisis [must] yield in favor of a ' greater objective.” 9 Instead, appellees Holmes and Jensen (the only parties urging the overruling of our settled boundary by acquiescence standard) expressly argued below for the continued application of Hal-laday and its progeny. Counsel for these parties stated in part:
Justice Howe has been consistent in his dissent in all three cases in saying that the majority opinion of the Supreme Court has sounded the death knell to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. In fact his opinion is the sole [dissenting] opinion, and as I read those cases is not an accurate portrayal of boundary by acquiescence as advocated by the Supreme Court since 1984.
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I disagree vehemently that the State of Utah has outlawed in essence the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence....
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I do not believe, as Justice Howe states ... that a [sic] boundary by acquiescence has been invalidated in the State of Utah. I believe it is a valid doctrine, but the [C]ourt is saying we are not going to allow every fence case that comes down the pike is a boundary action [sic]. We see a fence case we are going to look at it [sic]. Did the owners intend this to be a boundary? Was there ever a boundary by acquiescence?
In short, these appellees claimed, “The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence [as stated in Halladay ] is alive and well in the State of Utah and should be applied in the present case.” It was not until appellants submitted their brief on appeal urging continued application of Halladay and its progeny, that appellees Holmes and Jensen made an about-face and, without significant analysis, suggested the unnecessary overruling of Halladay, Stratford v. Morgan,10 and Parsons v. Anderson11 and the discarding of the “objective uncertainty” requirement.12 Of more importance than the observation that appellees have neither acknowledged nor explained this recent divergence is the fact that they have not offered any new facts, claims, or special justifications,13 in view of other decisions by the Court in this context,14 meriting “serious reconsideration” or rendering the “Court’s long commitment to a rule of reversal outdated, ill-founded, unworkable, or otherwise legitimately vulnerable to serious reconsideration.” 15 In fact, these ap-pellees are still urging affirmance of the trial court’s decision resolving the boundary issue along fence lines.
The impact of this premature or inappropriate decision to discard settled precedent is even more critical in view of the continued compelling reasons for adhering to stare decisis in applying the settled bound*427ary by acquiescence principles. The cited eases were considered with care after extensive briefing. The Court has consistently accepted and applied the established law,16 and careful reconsideration of those factual situations which Halladay and its progeny served to solve mandates continued support for the settled precedent. In fact, without application of the objective uncertainty element, the first four elements of boundary by acquiescence may often appear to exist in situations where the doctrine and the principles behind it are not in actuality satisfied. In contrast, to speculate that, due to application of this settled doctrine, problems have emerged in our case law, boundary by acquiescence has proved less practical, and the doctrine increases litigation by serving as a basis for challenging boundaries not founded on recent survey information ignores the realities of the situations, the benefits of these well-deliberated concepts, and the policy considerations at issue.
Also, any perceived “problems” which might be presented by this ease do not justify reconsidering the objective uncertainty requirement. This is primarily so because the trial court’s determination may be correctly affirmed without application of this specific element. The best evidence before the court was that the fences were placed upon what an erroneous survey determined were the actual property lines. Appellants’ attempt to refute these proffered facts was unsuccessful. Nevertheless, even if this Court were to conclude that the objective uncertainty element was improperly considered below (or were to be applied anew on remand), appellees would prevail since the remaining elements of boundary by acquiescence were unquestionably satisfied and appellants have not carried their burden of overturning this determination on appeal.17 This fact further encourages reliance upon principles of stare decisis and the conclusion that it is improper to use this case to overturn our established precedent where briefing is inadequate and the facts do not demand the same.
Certainly “unfortunate problems” may appear to exist in cases which come before us. But “problematic cases” persuaded us in the first instance to apply the established criteria.18 And “solving” perceived problems in this case may only serve to create other concerns in cases pending or in situations where other parties have relied upon the established precedent. There will always exist cases which might be labeled “unfair,” where justices may individually wish that the law were otherwise. However, to allow such a case to precipitate premature decision making will only result in bad law and is to turn the Court’s processes into nothing more than emotional reflexing. Until such time as the issue is adequately before us and the Court has been properly briefed and counseled from both prospectives as to the benefits and detriments of discarding our established doctrine and precedent, in short, until the case demands it, justice would be better served by following the principles of stare decisis and refraining from addressing the objective uncertainty issue here. The Court has successfully followed this approach as it concerns other legal issues.19
The fact that this case should appropriately be affirmed notwithstanding elimination of the Halladay precedent, together *428with the rationale noted above which urges adherence to stare decisis principles, may be encapsulated in a precept often termed “judicial self-restraint.” Judicial self-restraint is “[s]elf-imposed discipline by judges in deciding cases without permitting themselves to indulge their own personal views or ideas which may be inconsistent with existing decisional or statutory law.”20 As noted by one commentator in the context of legislative and constitutional analysis,
[JJudicial restraint means that courts should exercise their unquestioned authority of judicial review only in compelling cases....
Judicial restraint in constitutional matters is not only important to good government; it is a mainstay of our constitutional system. It is also an essential element of a strong judiciary....
Judicial restraint is a free-standing value, whose worth is independent of the substantive issue in the particular case....
... Judicial decisions are usually influenced by what lawyers urge the courts to do, not because judges become less bold once they don their robes of office, but because that is the way a legal system governed by the case or controversy limitation works. The judge makes his or her decision in the context of competing views presented by adversaries in a lawsuit. ...
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... Judicial restraint is ... a good example of the even broader principle that the highest manifestation of respect for power is willingness, on appropriate occasions, to refrain from using it.21
A court’s opinion should not substantially exceed the resolution urged by lawyers.22 In the analogous context of the evaluation of constitutional issues, the United States Supreme Court has developed a series of rules whereby it avoids passing upon a large part of the constitutional questions pressed upon it. These include:
(1) The Court-will not pass upon the constitutionality of legislation in a friendly, non-adversary proceeding, declining because to decide such questions “is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could transfer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legislative act.”
(2) The Court will not “anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.” “It is not the habit of the Court to decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.”
(3) The Court will not “formulate a rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise facts to which it is to be applied.”
(4) The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question, the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the Court will decide only the latter....
(5) The Court will not pass upon the validity of a statute upon'complaint of one who fails to show that he is injured by its operation....
(6) The Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute at the instance of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
(7) “When the validity of an act of the Congress is drawn in question, and even if a. serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this *429Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” 23
The wisdom underlying these rules has application in the instant case. Realizing that the law will be better served in the long run by deciding eases only upon existing appropriate grounds, appellate courts should avoid anticipating, formulating, or passing upon questions of law, especially questions involving the overruling of precedent and the principles of stare decisis, unless absolutely necessary or required by the precise facts of the case. While rules of law may merit reconsideration and perhaps, in some instances, revamping by the Court, law made or changed in a vacuum without the benefit of a pertinent case controlled by or hinged upon the application of a specific issue and without the benefit of counsel’s briefing is no better law than that which the efforts themselves seek to correct, and it may in many instances amount to worse law, raising problems not heretofore planned for or seen. This case should not be used as a vehicle to overturn settled law. When a case actually turns on the validity of the boundary by acquiescence principles enumerated in Halladay and its progeny, there will be time enough to resolve that case and those issues.24
Finally, I also dissent since the majority’s opinion implicitly indicates that summary judgment was inappropriately granted, thus requiring remand in this case. In considering an appeal from an adverse decision on a motion for summary judgment, an appellate court must inquire whether there is any genuine issue as to any material fact and, if there is not, whether the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.25 As we have repeatedly stated:
“In reviewing the record on any appeal from summary judgment, we treat the statements and evidentiary materials of the appellant as if a jury would receive them as the only credible evidence, and we sustain the judgment only if no issues of fact which could affect the outcome can be discerned.”26
This standard is identical to that utilized by the trial court.27 Thus, in reviewing each case, we, as was required below, must be mindful that “[i]f there is any genuine issue as to any material fact, summary judgment should be denied.”28 To successfully oppose a motion for summary judgment, it is not necessary for the party to prove its legal theory.29 Indeed, it only requires one sworn statement to. dispute the claims on the other side of the controversy and create an issue of fact.30 In resolving the issue, the court does not judge the credibility of the claims or the witnesses or the weight of the evidence.31
Notwithstanding these established rules, the majority’s consideration of the record reflects the existence of myriad disputed facts centered around the boundary issue. The majority implicitly emphasizes the inappropriateness of the order granting sum*430mary judgment by noting that the facts are unclear as to (1) how long the fences established for boundary purposes have been in existence; (2) whether there was acquiescence in the fences as boundaries after 1972 and whether successive landowners from 1890 until 1972 regarded the fences as the true boundaries; and (3) whether an actual erroneous survey of the boundaries was made and what the survey results were. These “disputed facts” might be perceived as such given the brevity of the trial court’s order granting summary judgment. While findings of fact are unnecessary in deciding summary judgment motions,32 a brief written statement justifying summary judgment would provide a more effective basis for an appellate court to review the judgment33 by clarifying the “ ‘mind of the court’ and the analysis used to resolve the dispute.”34 While in my view summary judgment was not inappropriately granted in this case, if a majority of the Court implicitly concludes otherwise, the case should be remanded for a trial on the disputed issues. As noted above, in doing so reconsideration of the boundary by acquiescence doctrine is still unnecessary and inappropriate.
Based upon the foregoing, I would affirm the trial court’s ruling and not offend principles of stare decisis and judicial self-restraint by straining to reach the issue of the objective uncertainty element of our settled boundary by acquiescence doctrine.
STEWART, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of HALL, C.J.

. See generally Davis v. Modine Mfg. Co., 526 F.Supp. 943 (D.C.Kan.1981); Krupp v. Sackwitz, 30 Ill.App.2d 450, 174 N.E.2d 877 (1961); City of Rocky River v. State Employ. Relations Bd., 43 Ohio St.3d 1, 539 N.E.2d 103 (1989); Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 69 Ohio St.2d 152, 431 N.E.2d 998, cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1135, 102 S.Ct. 2963, 73 L.Ed.2d 1352 (1982); Crown Controls, Inc. v. Smiley, 110 Wash.2d 695, 756 P.2d 717 (1988) (en banc); In re Mercer, 108 Wash.2d 714, 741 P.2d 559 (1987); Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis.2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975).

. 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984).

. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265-66, 106 S.Ct. 617, 624, 88 L.Ed.2d 598 (1986) (quoting Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 412, 52 S.Ct. 443, 449, 76 L.Ed. 815 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).

. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S.Ct. 2305, 2310, 81 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984) (citations omitted).

. Florida Department of Health and Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. 147, 152-55, 101 S.Ct. 1032, 1035-37, 67 L.Ed.2d 132 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted; citing in part B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, 149 (1921) (" '[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case, and one could not lay one’s own course of bricks on the secure foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him.’ ”); Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 652, 15 S.Ct. 673, 716, 39 L.Ed. 759 (1894) (White, J., dissenting) (" 'The fundamental conception of a judicial body is that of one hedged about by precedents which are binding on the court without regard to the personality of its members. Break down this belief in judicial continuity, and let it be felt that on great constitutional questions this court is to depart from the settled conclusions of its predecessors, and to determine them all according to the mere opinion of those who temporarily fill its bench, and our Constitution will, in my judgment, be bereft of value and become a most dangerous instrument to the rights and liberties of the people.’”), overruled on other grounds, South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 108 S.Ct. 1355, 99 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988)); accord Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. — -,-, 109 S.Ct. 3040, 3077-79, 106 L.Ed.2d 410, 461-63 (Blackman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

.See, e.g., Webster, 492 U.S. at-, 109 S.Ct. at 3056, 106 L.Ed.2d at 435 (construction of constitution proved " ‘unsound in principle and unworkable in practice' ’’ (quoting Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528, 546, 105 S.Ct. 1005, 1015, 83 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1985), overruled on other grounds as recognized in Board of Governors v. United States Dep’t of Labor, 722 F.Supp. 1301 (E.D.N.C.1989)); South Carolina v. Gathers, 490 U.S. -, -, 109 S.Ct. 2207, 2217-18, 104 L.Ed.2d 876, 891-92 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“freshness of error" of case decided only two years earlier and fact that case involved capital punishment justified departure from precedent); Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. at 152-53, 101 S.Ct. at 1035-36 (Stevens, J., concurring) (overruling not justified since rule not fundamentally at odds with scope of constitutionally protected civil rights, rested upon discredited interpretation of historical documents, or unreasonably or egregiously incorrect), and cases cited therein; Burnet, 285 U.S. at 412, 52 S.Ct. at 449 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (experience and newly *426ascertained facts discussed as rationale relevant to variation of opinions and stare decisis policy)-

. See Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. at 151, 101 S.Ct. at 1035 (Stevens, J., concurring).

. See id. at 153 n. 9, 101 S.Ct. at 1036 n. 9.

. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 266, 106 S.Ct. at 624 (emphasis added).

. 689 P.2d 360 (Utah 1984).

. 690 P.2d 535 (Utah 1984).

. See generally Florida Nursing Home Ass’n, 450 U.S. at 151 n. 1, 101 S.Ct. at 1035 n. 1 (Stevens, J., concurring) (reverse of position by parties in case).

. Rumsey, 467 U.S. at 212, 104 S.Ct. at 2310.

. See, e.g., Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (1989); Parsons, 690 P.2d 535; Stratford, 689 P.2d 360; Halladay, 685 P.2d 500; Wood v. Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255 (Utah 1984); Condas v. Willesen, 674 P.2d 115 (Utah 1983); Leon v. Dansie, 639 P.2d 730 (Utah 1981) (per curiam); Madsen v. Clegg, 639 P.2d 726 (Utah 1981); Brown v. Peterson Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1980); Park v. Farnsworth, 622 P.2d 788 (Utah 1980); Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979).

. Vasquez, 474 U.S. at 266, 106 S.Ct. at 624.

. See supra note 14 and accompanying text; cf. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 419 n. 1, 103 S.Ct. 2481, 2487 n. 1, 76 L.Ed.2d 687 (1983) (compelling reasons for adhering to stare decisis discussed).

. Grayson Roper Ltd. Partnership, at 472 (limitation of Halladay urged but party failed to otherwise carry burden of overturning finding).

. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.

. See, e.g., Cottam v. Heppner, 111 P.2d 468 (Utah 1989) (precedent regarding availability of deficiency judgments in commercially unreasonable sale cases under Uniform Commercial Code not considered or overruled because unnecessary to case); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803, 805-06 (Utah 1986) (state constitutional issues, although existent, not considered by Court since not raised; "It is imperative that Utah lawyers brief this Court on relevant state constitutional questions.”), cited in State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 & n. 5 (Utah 1988) (nominal reliance on state constitutional provisions without briefing is inadequate to trigger analysis).

. Black's Law Dictionary, 762 (5th ed. 1979).

. R. Lee, The Supreme Court and Antitrust Law: Remarks on Judicial Restraint in the Context of Antitrust and Constitutional Law, 1982 B.Y.U.L.Rev. 873, 876-81.

.Cf. id. at 877.

. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48, 56 S.Ct. 466, 482-83, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1935) (Brandéis, J., dissenting in part) (citations, quoted sources, and footnotes omitted); accord Webster, 492 U.S. at -, 109 S.Ct. at 3060-61, 106 L.Ed.2d at 440-41 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

. Cf. Webster, 492 U.S. at — -, 109 S.Ct. at 3061, 106 L.Ed.2d at 441 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (time to reexamine case is when validity of statute actually turns on validity of case).

. Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1092 (Utah 1988).

. Id. (quoting Merrill v. Cache Valley Dairy Ass'n, 750 P.2d 539-40 (Utah 1988)).

. Durham v. Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977), cited in Briggs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 281, 283 (Utah Ct.App.1987).

. Ruffinengo v. Miller, 579 P.2d 342, 343 (Utah 1978) (footnote omitted).

. Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constructors, Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 47 (Utah Ct.App.1988).

. Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975).

. See id.; Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Atkin, Wright, and Miles Chartered, 681 P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1984).

. Weber ex rel. Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 1986), cited in Taylor v. Estate of Taylor, 770 P.2d 163, 168(Utah Ct.App.1989).

. See Masters v. Worsley, 777 P.2d 499, 501 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (importance of written statement in context of motion based on multiple grounds).

. Id. (quoting Dover Elevator Co. v. Hill Mangum Investment, 766 P.2d 424, 426 (Utah Ct.App.1988), and citing Parks v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983)). Appellants noted in their brief, “Inasmuch as the lower court did not recite any facts in its summary judgment ruling, it is unknown which of the controverted facts or other facts alleged in the affidavits were accepted by the court and on what basis the decision was made to hold as a matter of law that the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence applied to defeat the record title.” (Citation omitted.)