Court Opinion

ID: 3601962
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 23:48:14.128366+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:07:26.567160
License: Public Domain

There can be no doubt that the People were permitted upon the trial of the defendant, now under review, to give proof of the commission by him of two distinct crimes, namely, the poisoning of Barnet and the poisoning of Mrs. Adams. The only crime charged in the indictment was the murder of the latter. We all agree that a vital part of the testimony with respect to the death of Barnet and its cause was mere hearsay and incompetent. Whether any proof bearing upon the sickness and death of Barnet, or the defendant's connection with it, was admissible upon the trial of the case at bar is a much broader and more important question. The defendant was indicted for feloniously causing or procuring the death of Mrs. Adams, and the fact, if it be a fact, that at some other time and place he also caused the death of Barnet, is not admissible to prove the offense charged. That is certainly the general rule established by abundant authority and founded upon the plainest principles of reason and justice.
The only question upon which there is an opportunity for minds to differ is whether the events connected with Barnet's sickness and death are so related to the case at bar as to form an exception to the general rule and thus bring the proof that was given at the trial within some one of these recognized exceptions.
The issue in this case was whether the defendant was guilty *Page 336 
of causing the death of Mrs. Adams, and not whether he was guilty of causing the death of Barnet. In a more specific sense the issue was whether he sent upon its errand of death, through the mail, the package from which the deceased, through mistake, took the deadly poison that killed her, or to be still more specific, the issue was whether the defendant wrote the direction upon the package with the felonious intent to transmit it by mail to Cornish. If the address upon the package was in fact written by the defendant all the elements of the crime were to be deduced from the maxim res ipsa loquitur. The events constituting the history of Barnet's sickness and death did not prove, or tend to prove, the fact that the defendant wrote the address upon the poison package that eventually came to the hands of Mrs. Adams, and that was the material issue at the trial.
The death of Mrs. Adams resulted from poison administered by her own hand, but the real author of her death was the person who made use of the mail to transmit to some one the deadly substance that produced death. In any inquiry concerning the identity of the author of a great crime, where the evidence is purely circumstantial, the human mind instinctively adopts processes in arriving at results that are not sanctioned by the rules of evidence. The hardened and habitual criminal is more likely to be suspected than one who had never committed a crime before. If the party suspected committed a similar crime before by the same or similar means, or a series of such crimes, proof of these facts goes far to establish his guilt in the popular mind of the offense charged and for which he is on trial; and yet nothing is better established than the rule that the vicious character of a person on trial for a specific offense cannot be shown, unless he himself makes his character or the events of his life a subject of inquiry by becoming a witness in the case. No matter how notorious a criminal the party on trial may be, neither his general reputation nor other specific offenses can legally be proven against him as evidence of his guilt of the offense charged. That such proof is persuasive and has great influence when introduced, upon *Page 337 
courts and juries, cannot be doubted; but the law does not permit it to be given upon the trial of an issue concerning the guilt or innocence of the party on trial for a specific offense. The reason is that such proof does not bear upon the issue in the case, and hence it is misleading, since it does not follow that a party who has committed one crime, or many, is guilty of some other crime for which he is on trial.
It is said that the evidence culminating in Barnet's death tends to identify the defendant as the author of the death of Mrs. Adams; but that is only another way of asserting the general proposition that the commission by the defendant of one crime tends to prove that he committed another crime, and no matter in what form, or how often that proposition is asserted, or how persuasive and plausible it may appear, it is erroneous and misleading, since it violates a salutary principle of the law of evidence which should be applied in all cases without regard to the question of actual guilt or innocence. If the guilty cannot be convicted without breaking down the barriers which the law has erected for the protection of every person accused of crime, it is better that they should escape rather than that the life or liberty of an innocent person should be imperilled. I think the evidence relating to Barnet's sickness and death would not for a moment be considered competent but for the fact that it creates a strong impression upon the mind that the author of his death must also be the author of Mrs. Adams' death, since in both cases death was caused by similar means. We may attempt to deceive ourselves with words and phrases by arguing that it is admissible to prove intent, or identity, or the absence of mistake, or something else in order to bring the case within some exception to the general rule; but what is in the mind all the time is the thought, so difficult to suppress, that the vicious and criminal agency that caused the death of Barnet also caused the death of Mrs. Adams. The rule of law that excludes the evidence for such a purpose may be, and probably is, contrary to the tendency of the human mind, but since the law was intended to curb the speculations of the mind and to guard the accused from *Page 338 
the result of error in its operation, I am for maintaining the law in all its integrity and not for undermining it by qualifications that rest upon no reasonable or logical basis.
The cases cited to show that proof of Barnet's death was admissible to prove that the defendant wrote the address upon the package sent to Cornish have all been explained in the opinion of Judge WERNER, and it is unnecessary to comment upon them further than to say that in my opinion none of them apply to the case at bar. When these cases and all the considerations urged in behalf of the People have been given due weight, it is still safe to say that the question as to the competency of the proof is by no means clear, but at best is very doubtful, and, therefore, the accused, and not the prosecution, should be given the benefit of that doubt. It is so difficult for the human mind to discard false theories that assume the disguise of truth, and so easy to substitute suspicions and speculations for evidence of facts that proof of the general bad character of the accused, or of participation in other crimes, which is practically the same thing, would no doubt be of great aid to the People in procuring a conviction for the specific offense charged in the indictment. Such proof in a doubtful case might turn the scale against the accused, but the law, for obvious reasons, does not permit it, and it is dangerous to subvert the rule upon the vague theory that it identifies the accused as the author of the offense charged, which means nothing more than that it proves, or tends to prove, that he is guilty.
If the defendant procured or caused the death of Barnet, he is liable to be indicted and tried for that offense, but it is contrary to the plainest principles of justice to require him, when accused of poisoning Mrs. Adams, to clear himself from all suspicion of participation in another crime of the same character. If the Barnet evidence was properly admitted in the case it must follow that in every case proof of other crimes is admissible, since in every case it can be said, as it is said in this, that proof of the other crime identifies the accused as the real author of the crime charged. *Page 339 
If the defendant wrote the address upon the poison package that was sent to Cornish then he is identified, but proof that at another time he sent another package to Barnet proves nothing in regard to the address. All it proves is that possibly he was capable of the wicked act charged in the indictment, and that is only another way of proving his general bad character, not even by reputation, but by a specific act, which all agree is not admissible.
While the chain of proof to connect the defendant with the poisoning of Barnet is fatally defective in that there is no competent testimony to show that he ever sent to him by mail or otherwise the bottle of Kutnow powders which it is said contained the poison, yet if the missing link had been supplied it would only make the proof all the more dangerous and incompetent. The defendant was required to answer the charge of causing the death of Mrs. Adams, and not the charge of causing the death of Barnet; but by the whole course of the trial and the rulings of the court he was really and substantially required to answer both charges, and since this constitutes a clear error of law the defendant is entitled to have the judgment of conviction reversed, and as this may possibly result in a new trial it is scarcely within the province of this court to express any opinion upon the facts.
Comparison of a disputed writing with a writing shown to be genuine is allowed now by the statute. (Laws 1880, ch. 36; Laws 1888, ch. 555.) It is not very clear what the legislature meant in these statutes by the words "disputed writing," and while I think the construction given to these acts by my brethren is quite liberal, notwithstanding the rule that statutes changing the common law are to be strictly construed, yet I an disposed to concur in their view, since it is based on the ground that any other construction would render the legislation practically useless.