Court Opinion

ID: 9626639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:20:19.610866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:31.562372
License: Public Domain

*349Spratley, J.,
dissenting.
I differ with my brethren of the.majority with respect to the factual aspects of this case. The law is not in dispute. In stating the facts, the majority have, perhaps unconsciously, over-emphasized or magnified the circumstances supporting the claim of the appellants, and have overlooked pertinent and material evidence of facts and circumstances favoring the father of the child. The application of the law to the realities of the case appear to me to be in violation of established rules of appellate review.
Despite the fact that the majority opinion notes that the father comes before this court with a judgment in his favor, based upon ore terms testimony given before the trial court, it sets out the facts in the light most favorable to the appellants and then concludes that the evidence does not support the judgment of the trial court as a matter of law. It seems to me that the question is one of fact.
The majority of the court has adopted a view based upon the facts as they evaluate them, and the trial judge a different view based upon the facts as he saw them. In such a case we have said time after time that the finding of a judge, who sees and hears the witnesses testify, is entitled to the greatest consideration, is usually accorded the full force of a jury’s verdict, and should not be disturbed if supported by credible evidence.
In great deference to my associates, I submit that their statement of facts should be enlarged. Viewed in the light most favorable to Russell, the following circumstances are disclosed:
The mother of the child sued for divorce while the father was in the Army and overseas. At that time the mother had placed the child with the Burtons without the knowledge of the father. Upon the. return of the father from service, he did not know the address of his wife or child. Immediately upon his discharge from the Army, he ascertained his child’s whereabouts, and paid a visit to his *350child, at the home of the Burtons.- Over the objection of the Burtons, he took the child with him in December, 1945, for a week’s visit to the home of his parents in Baltimore. He then had no home of his own, no occupation, and. no one to look out for his son. Consequently, in January, 1946, he did not contest in the divorce suit the award of the custody of the infant, then less than four years of age, to the mother.
In adjustment of himself after the war, Russell set out to better his condition and to make a home for himself. He obtained one job, then another, each succeeding employment improving his condition. In one year and six months he had worked himself into employment where he earned more than $200 per month.
In August, 1947, he married again and in September of that year bought a house and established quarters for his family. In the meantime, he was located some distance from his son. He saw little of his child. He, however, remembered him on his birthdays and at Easter and Christmas with small presents. Until 1948, he was hardly in a position to properly provide for and take care of a young child, although he still held the hope of obtaining the custody, as evidenced by the fact that he refused- to give his consent to the adoption of the child by the Burtons.
Russell did contribute to the support of his son during most of the time he was in the Army. Until December, 1945, the mother received $80 per month, out of which she says she expended $9 per week for the care of the child. She did obtain employment to assist in her support. So did thousands of Other young women married to men in the service. In the period of Russell’s adjustment, subsequent to January, 1946, he did not make proper provision for his child’s support; but this may be excused to some extent by reason of his circumstances and by the fact that he knew the child was receiving proper attention from those with whom he was living. In not disturbing the possession *351of the child during that period he manifestly regarded the best interest of his son.
In October, 1948,= when Russell asked for and obtained a decree from a court of competent jurisdiction awarding him the custody of his son, his fitness to have such custody was a major concern of the court. The mother, at that time, authorized her attorney to represent to the court that she had no objection to such an award. In this proceeding of habeas corpus, where again he was found to be a fit and proper person, at the time of the hearing, to have the custody of his child, the main contention of the appellants was that they were better situated as to surroundings to give to the infant greater care and attention.
We are faced with a record which gives evidence that the father is ambitious and industrious, solicitous as to the welfare of his child, and is now so.situated that he can provide fit and proper care for his son appropriate to his station in life. I would view with favor the successful effort of the father to rebuild his broken fortunes and assume the obligations created by law and good morals.
Every action of the father refutes the claim that he voluntarily relinquished the possession of his child to the Burtons. I agree that the Burtons are fit and proper persons to have the custody of a child, and I think that to deprive them of the custody of young Russell would result in a shock to their emotions. However, the testimony and actions of the Burtons show that they were volunteers. They took the risk of becoming fond of the child when they accepted his custody for compensation. It was long after their acceptance before their devotion developed to the extent that they asked for his adoption to prevent his return to either of his parents.
The right of a parent to the custody of his child is founded in nature, and in wisdom. The ties of blood are counted as among the strongest of human emotions. In the consideration of the welfare of a child they cannot be disregarded when the parent is a fit and proper person to rear *352his offspring. An infant son is entitled to the association and tender affection of his father as he grows into manhood. No stranger in blood can take the full place of the relationship created by nature. The embarrassment of an explanation of the absence of a parent presents a difficult situation to a young mind developing under the normal surroundings of family life. Therefore, I cannot subscribe to the view that where a father has been shown to be a fit arid proper person he may be deprived of the natural right to the custody of his son because some other person may provide the child with better social and financial opportunities. If such a view be adopted, thousands of parents could be deprived of the custody of their offspring.
The facts and circumstances in Wyatt v. Gleason, 117 Va. 196, 83 S. E. 1069, and Camp v. Bookman, 204 Ga. 670, 51 S. E. (2d) 391, may be readily distinguished from those here.
In the Wyatt Case, the relinquishment of the infant to its mother’s sister was a voluntary act of the father. In this case, at the time the child was placed in the custody of the Burtons, Russell was not advised of the transfer. As we have seen, he never acquiesced in any claim that the Burtons had a superior right to the custody of his son.
In the Camp Case, the father was shown to be unfit to have the custody of his child, and the mother’s character and ability to rear the child had been questioned.
The facts and circumstances of this case present an old, old story. Without the wisdom of Solomon, it is difficult to find the correct answer. Our emotions sway us in one direction, and our minds and experience direct us in another. The able, learned and experienced trial judge was in a much better position to arrive at a proper conclusion. He saw and heard the witnesses testify, observed their attitude, demeanor and general conduct, and was thereby able to get a closer and more accurate picture and coloring of the entire situation than this court can receive from the cold, hard print of the record. .
*353Considering all of the facts and circumstances supporting the finding of the trial judge, I prefer to be recorded as favoring the affirmation of his judgment.
Buchanan, J., concurs in this dissent.