Court Opinion

ID: 9887070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 17:03:37.199267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:42:02.572705
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/6/23 Hughes v. Avakian CA4/1

                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

                 COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ZACHARY JACK HUGHES,                                                         D081250

          Respondent,

          v.                                                                 (Super. Ct. No. 22FDV01972N)

TERI ANNE AVAKIAN,

          Appellant.

          APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Sara Kirby, Commissioner. Affirmed.
          Oscar Valencia for Appellant.
          Decker Law and James D. Decker for Respondent.
      This case involves a complicated relationship between a mother, Teri
Anne Avakian, and her son, Zachary Jack Hughes. Throughout his high
school and college years, Hughes felt that Avakian attempted to exercise
control over his life, including his romantic relationships and income. During
a tense period in their relationship, Hughes moved out of Avakian’s home
and informed her that he did not want to have further contact. Over
Hughes’s repeated objections, Avakian continued to reach out to him by mail,
text message, e-mail, and by showing up to his home unannounced. Hughes
claimed that after he moved out, Avakian nearly ran him over with her car as
he walked along the sidewalk near his residence. Following this incident,
Avakian sent Hughes a series of e-mails that caused him significant
emotional distress. In one e-mail she called him pathetic, and in another she
discussed her newly developed interest in firearms.
      Immediately after receiving Avakian’s e-mail referencing firearms,
Hughes sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO). During the
DVRO hearing, the trial court found Hughes’s testimony—describing
Avakian’s repeated unwanted contact and the incident in which she nearly
ran him over—to be credible. It concluded that the evidence established
Hughes was in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily harm
and issued a DVRO for a period of one year, including a related firearms
prohibition.
      On appeal, Avakian claims the trial court abused its discretion by
issuing the DVRO because it was not supported by substantial evidence and
because the DVRO resulted from evidentiary errors by the trial court. She
further contends the firearms prohibition violated her constitutional rights
under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

                                      2
Constitution. As we discuss, we conclude the court did not abuse its
discretion when it issued the DVRO. We further determine that the
firearms restriction issued in conjunction with the DVRO was constitutional.
We therefore affirm the orders.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      Hughes filed a request for a DVRO against Avakian in April 2022.
The trial court held a hearing that took place on two nonconsecutive days in
August and October 2022. Both parties testified at the hearing.
      During Hughes’s testimony, he provided the court with the background
of his relationship with Avakian. He described incidents of violence
throughout his childhood in which Avakian hit him with a wooden spoon,
slapped him with a wet hand, and made him kneel on uncooked rice that she
scattered on the floor. Hughes alleged that while he was in college, Avakian
took his paychecks and cashed them without his consent. He felt that
Avakian’s behavior was aimed at manipulation and control, including her
attempts to influence his romantic relationships.
      In October 2020, Hughes informed Avakian that he intended to move
out of her home at the end of the month. In response, Avakian told him,
“ ‘No, you’re not, get your shit now and get the hell out of my house.’ ”
Hughes moved out of Avakian’s home to an apartment complex nearby.
Although he did not share the location of his new residence with Avakian,
she sent Hughes a text message a few weeks later stating, “[H]ave fun at [the
name of Hughes’s new apartment complex].” Hughes testified that Avakian’s
text message “created a great sense of emotional distress and mental
distress, because [he] didn’t feel safe.” Following her text message, Hughes
told Avakian that he did not want to have any further contact with her.

                                        3
      In July 2021, Avakian went to Hughes’s home unannounced. Although
Hughes did not interact with Avakian, he observed her standing at his front
door through his Ring door camera. Less than two weeks later, Avakian
again went to Hughes’s residence unannounced, this time on his birthday.
Avakian left a present at his doorstep and Hughes observed her “pacing back
and forth and then ultimately going up and pounding on what actually was
[Hughes’s] neighbor’s window.” Again in August, Avakian went to Hughes’s
home unannounced for a third time and dropped off some of Hughes’s
childhood belongings. Hughes felt unsafe and emotionally distressed because
Avakian repeatedly ignored his requests to stay away and refrain from
contacting him.
      In October 2021, Hughes and his girlfriend encountered Avakian
driving her vehicle as they walked along a sidewalk. They hid in a bush to
avoid her and then ran towards their apartment building. Avakian made a
U-turn and drove onto the curb, nearly running them over. As Hughes

started to film Avakian using his cell phone’s camera,1 he heard her giggle
and say “run, [Hughes’s girlfriend], run, run, [Hughes], run, run . . . .”
Avakian got out of her vehicle and continued to follow Hughes on foot.
Hughes testified he “was scared for [his] life at that point” because Avakian
attempted to hit him with her car.
      Two days later, Hughes again encountered Avakian in her vehicle as he
walked along the sidewalk. She slowed her car as she drove in the center
median, and attempted to communicate something to Hughes. Hughes

1      The video recording was admitted into evidence and reviewed by the
trial court. The court noted that the video did not record most of the incident
in the manner described by Hughes, showing only the sidewalk as Hughes
ran away. The court specifically found, however, that Avakian could be
heard at the beginning of the video saying the word “run.”
                                        4
testified that Avakian was smiling and laughing at him. He felt terrified by
the experience and no longer felt safe walking outside alone.
      Two months later, in December 2021, Avakian went to Hughes’s home
unannounced. She left an easter basket from Hughes’s childhood at his
doorstep. Through his Ring camera, Hughes observed Avakian bend down
and examine mail that was left at his front door.
      In response to her repeated unwanted contact, Hughes e-mailed
Avakian and told her, “[S]top leaving objects in the way of my apartment.
You are not welcome here and I do not want any contact with you as well as
my roommate. Examining mail that is not mine is not welcomed either. Do
not harass me while I walk down the road either as there is no justifiable
reason to be doing so.” Avakian continued to e-mail Hughes from January
through March 2022.
      On March 10, Hughes arrived home and noticed Avakian’s vehicle
“inching slowly next to the curb by [his] apartment.” He started recording
the incident and Avakian drove away. Later that day, Avakian sent Hughes
an e-mail that said, “you are pathetic” in the subject line, and “truly pathetic”
in the body of the e-mail. Hughes testified he felt distressed because “she
was not respecting [his] wishes that [he] had stated multiple times at this
point to refrain from contact.”
      On April 29, 2022, Avakian sent Hughes and his sister a series of e-
mails. The first e-mail contained images of a text message exchange between
Avakian and a third party. Avakian and the third party discussed parenting
and she expressed gratitude to the third party for his advice regarding
firearms. Avakian sent a second e-mail later that day stating, “I did forget to
mention that in my first e-mail today I talk about guns. Yes I am shooting

                                        5
now and I am part of [A Girl & A Gun] nationwide group. Tony and I talk
guns now. [¶] I am good with a pistol but prefer an AR.”
      Hughes was “extremely distressed” by Avakian’s e-mail discussing
firearms because she was previously “anti-firearms.” He felt that Avakian’s
reference to firearms was “utilized as an intimidation factor, as a scare
tactic.” Within thirty minutes of receiving the e-mail, Hughes went to the
courthouse to seek a restraining order. Hughes testified that his sister also
sought and obtained a restraining order against Avakian in the state of
Arizona. The trial court took judicial notice of the restraining order involving
Hughes’s sister.
      In her testimony, Avakian denied Hughes’s claims that she was
physically violent with him during in his childhood. Rather, she claimed that
Hughes’s father was an alcoholic and that the violent episodes testified to by
Hughes were perpetrated by his father. Avakian felt her relationship with
Hughes became strained after her divorce from his father, and further
deteriorated when Hughes began dating his girlfriend.
      Avakian told the court that when Hughes moved out of her residence,
he rented an apartment in a complex less than a mile away. Due to his close
proximity to her home, Avakian encountered Hughes while driving her
vehicle because he walked along the “path in and out of [her] neighborhood.”
She explained that she learned of Hughes’s new address because she received
notice from the post office. She repeatedly dropped off Hughes’s belongings
at his apartment because she found the items as she cleaned out her garage
in segments.
      Avakian also testified regarding the October 2022 incident in which
Hughes claimed she nearly ran him over with her car. She explained that
she attempted to contact Hughes as he walked along the sidewalk to inform

                                       6
him that her aunt passed away. Avakian claimed that as she attempted to
tell Hughes about her aunt’s funeral through the car window, he ran down
the sidewalk “laughing and giggling and ducking behind cars.” She denied
attempting to run him over and claimed that it would have been impossible
for her to drive onto the curb because there were cars parked along the
sidewalk.
      Avakian also provided context for the e-mails she sent to Hughes and
his sister discussing firearms. She testified that she sent the text message
exchange so that her children could see a different perspective regarding
their relationship and the difficulty of parenting. Her purpose in sending the
e-mail referencing her preference for an “AR” over a pistol was to convey to
her children that she had moved on her with life and was exploring other
interests.
      Following Avakian’s testimony, the trial court rendered its decision.
In deciding to issue the requested restraining order, the court expressly found
Hughes to be credible, including his testimony that he repeatedly told
Avakian, orally and in writing, to leave him alone. It determined that the
evidence clearly established Hughes did not want to be contacted by Avakian,
and that Avakian understood Hughes’s request for no-contact but “just didn’t
think that she should listen to that or that she thought she knew better.”
The court did not believe Avakian’s contact with Hughes during these
incidents was “an issue of being in the same neighborhood and accidentally
coming upon somebody.” Rather, it characterized the case as one in which
Avakian intentionally and repeatedly interacted with Hughes after he
expressly communicated that he did not want to have any contact.
      The court also believed Hughes’s testimony regarding the October 2022
incident in which Avakian “nearly ran over Mr. Hughes and his girlfriend.”

                                       7
In its view, the evidence established that Hughes was in “reasonable
apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or another
regarding that October 16th incident about driving up on the curb and
nearly—per [Hughes’s] testimony, nearly running him over and his girlfriend
over that day.” By a preponderance of the evidence, it found that Hughes
met his burden of demonstrating his need for a DVRO.
      The court granted Hughes’s request for a permanent restraining order
and issued the DVRO for a period of one year. As a result of the restraining
order, the court prohibited Avakian from owning, possessing, or having
access to any firearms or ammunition while the DVRO was in effect.

                                 DISCUSSION

      Avakian contends the DVRO was not supported by substantial evidence
such that its issuance was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. Relatedly,
she argues the trial court erred on several evidentiary matters, including
improperly taking judicial notice of an out-of-state restraining order issued
for the protection of Avakian’s daughter, and allowing Hughes to introduce
three exhibits not included in his exhibit list. Finally, she objects to the
firearms prohibition issued in conjunction with the DVRO on various
constitutional grounds. As we discuss, we perceive no reversible error in the
evidence considered by the trial court and determine the court did not abuse
its discretion in granting Hughes’s request for a DVRO. As to the firearms
restriction, we conclude that the order prohibiting Avakian from possessing a
firearm or ammunition, and the statute authorizing the issuance of the
restriction, are constitutional. We therefore affirm.

                                        8
A.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Granting the DVRO

      The Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA) (Fam. Code,2 § 6200 et
seq.) authorizes a court to issue a protective order “ ‘ “to restrain any person
for the purpose of preventing a recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring
a period of separation of the persons involved” upon “reasonable proof of a
past act of acts of abuse.” ’ ” (In re Marriage of Davila and Mejia (2018) 29
Cal.App.5th 220, 225.) “Abuse includes ‘plac[ing] a person in reasonable
apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury to that person or to another’
or ‘engag[ing] in any behavior that has been or could be enjoined pursuant to
Section 6320.’ [Citation.] Enjoined conduct includes molesting, striking,
stalking, threatening, or harassing. [Citation.] The DVPA requires a
showing of past abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Id. at p. 226;
accord § 6320, subd. (a).)
      “We review an order granting or denying a DVRO for abuse of
discretion. [Citation.] In reviewing the trial court’s factual findings, we
apply the substantial evidence rule. [Citation.] The inquiry is whether
substantial evidence supports the court’s finding, not whether a contrary
finding might have been made. [Citation.] We accept as true all evidence
tending to establish the correctness of the trial court’s findings and resolve
every conflict in favor of the judgment.” (M.S. v. A.S. (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th
1139, 1143–1144.)
      Avakian argues the trial court’s order was not supported by substantial
evidence because the court improperly interpreted Avakian’s “benign
behavior” as abuse under the DVPA. She urges us to reject the court’s
credibility findings pertaining to Hughes’s testimony because it “accepted
statements from Mr. Hughes without truly examining their validity.”

2     Unspecified statutory references are to the Family Code.
                                        9
In support of her argument, Avakian emphasizes her own testimony, which

proffered competing explanations of the events testified to by Hughes.3
      During the hearing, the trial court expressly found Hughes to be
credible, specifically including his testimony about how Avakian drove her
vehicle onto a curb and nearly ran over Hughes and his girlfriend. As a
result of this incident, it properly concluded that Avakian’s conduct qualified
as abuse under the DVPA because it placed Hughes “in reasonable
apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury.” (§ 6203, subd. (a)(3).)
Although Avakian argues that Hughes’s testimony, which she characterizes
as “unsupported,” provided insufficient evidence to justify the issuance of the
DVRO, the testimony of a single witness may constitute substantial evidence
to support a finding of fact. (In re Marriage of F.M. & M.M. (2021) 65
Cal.App.5th 106, 119 (F.M. & M.M.) [“ ‘The testimony of one witness, even
that of a party, may constitute substantial evidence’ ”].) Thus, Hughes’s
testimony that Avakian placed him in apprehension of serious bodily injury
when she nearly hit him with her car provided substantial evidence of abuse
under the DVPA.
      Avakian’s argument that Hughes’s apprehension of harm was not
reasonable under the circumstances, considering that he moved less than a
mile away from her home, asks us to disregard the trial court’s credibility
findings and reweigh the evidence. We decline to do so. “[T]rial courts are in

3      In her opening brief on appeal, Avakian cites to unpublished case law
in violation of the California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115. She asserts that
rule 8.1115(b) permits her to cite to unpublished authority in this case.
However, rule 8.1115(b) permits citation to an unpublished opinion only
when the opinion is relevant under the doctrines of the law of the case, res
judicata, collateral estoppel, or when the opinion is relevant to a criminal or
disciplinary action. None of the enumerated exceptions in rule 8.1115(b)
apply to this case and we decline to consider this authority.
                                       10
the best position to assess witness credibility” and therefore we must
generally defer to their credibility determinations. (Doe v. Lee (2022) 79
Cal.App.5th 612, 621; accord Sabbah v. Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818,
823 [“ ‘We must accept as true all evidence . . . tending to establish the
correctness of the trial court’s findings . . . , resolving every conflict in favor of
the judgment.’ ”].) We also note that during his testimony, Hughes provided
context for his decision to move to an apartment complex near Avakian’s
home, explaining that there were limited apartments available during the
COVID-19 pandemic and the residence he ultimately rented was the only one
available to him during that time.
      Further, although the trial court did not expressly find that Avakian’s
conduct disturbed Hughes’s peace, we conclude substantial evidence supports
such an implied finding as an additional basis for the issuance of the DVRO.
Under the DVPA, abuse includes conduct that, under the totality of the
circumstances, “ ‘disturb[s] the peace of the other party’ ” in a way that
“destroys the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” (§ 6320, subd. (c);
see also In re Marriage of Nadkarni (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1497
[“ ‘[D]isturbing the peace of the other party’ ” refers to conduct that, based on
the totality of the circumstances, “destroys the mental or emotional calm of
the other party.”].) Repeated unwanted contact by phone, e-mail, and text,
and unannounced home visits following a request of no-contact, may
constitute disturbing someone’s peace under section 6320. (Burquet v.
Brumbaugh (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1140, 1144.)
      Hughes testified that Avakian repeatedly contacted him after he
expressed to her, orally and in writing, that he did not wish to have any
further interaction. Despite his requests, she continued to e-mail Hughes
and go to his home unannounced. Hughes testified that the recurring

                                         11
unwanted contact caused him mental and emotional distress. Hughes’s
testimony, and the video recordings of Avakian’s visits to his home, are ample
evidence of conduct that disturbed Hughes’s peace. Although Avakian
claimed she was simply attempting to communicate with her son to discuss
family matters and to deliver family heirlooms, the trial court was not
required to credit Avakian’s testimony over that of Hughes. (F.M. & M.M.,
supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 119 [“ ‘A trier of fact is free to disbelieve a
witness . . . if there is a rational ground for doing so.’ ”].)
       Finally, we do not perceive any abuse of discretion in the evidence
considered by the trial court in rendering its decision, including its judicial
notice of an out-of-state restraining order issued against Avakian. (See
Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine v. Los Angeles Unified School
Dist. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 175, 182 [“We review judicial notice rulings for
abuse of discretion”].) As Avakian acknowledges in her opening brief,
Evidence Code section 452 permitted the trial court to take judicial notice of
the restraining order as a record from a “court of record of the United States
or of any state of the United States.” (Id., subd. (d).) Although the trial court
was not permitted to judicially notice the truth of any factual assertions
within the DVRO (Espinoza v. Calva (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 1393, 1396
[“[w]e can take judicial notice of the fact the pleadings were filed, but not of
the truth of the statements contained in them”]), there is no evidence in the
record to suggest the trial court improperly considered the statements within
the order. Further, during her own testimony, Avakian admitted that her
daughter obtained the judicially noticed restraining order against her. To the
extent Avakian suggests the order was not properly authenticated, she
forfeited this argument by failing to object on these grounds in the trial court.

                                          12
(See People v. Sims (1993) 5 Cal.4th 405, 448 [appellant forfeited
authentication argument by failing to object at trial].)
      Nor do we find merit in Avakian’s argument that the court’s
consideration of three exhibits not included in opposing counsel’s exhibit
list—exhibits 11, 12, and 13 (videos of Avakian near Hughes’s home)—
violated her due process rights. The record does not indicate these exhibits
were ever formally admitted, but assuming they were considered by the
court, we perceive no abuse of discretion in the decision to admit them.
(McDermott Ranch, LLC v. Connolly Ranch, Inc. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 549,
559 [“We review a trial court’s decision to admit evidence for abuse of
discretion.”].) Although it does not appear that Hughes’s counsel complied
with Superior Court of San Diego County, Local Rules, rule 5.5.5(C), which
required counsel to timely serve a notice of their intent to lodge that included
a description of their exhibits, Avakian cites to no authority suggesting that
the court has no discretion to excuse such a failure. In any event, considering
that the exhibits were only seconds long and provided to opposing counsel
prior to the hearing, and that Hughes independently described the events
depicted in the exhibits, we conclude that any purported error related to the
admission of the evidence was not prejudicial. (F.M. & M.M., supra, 65
Cal.App.5th at p. 118 [to establish prejudicial error relating to the admission
of evidence at a DVRO hearing, the appellant must demonstrate a
“ ‘ “ ‘reasonable probability that in the absence of . . . error, a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached’ ” ’ ”].) The trial
court expressly based its findings on Hughes’s testimony, which the court
found to be credible, and therefore the absence of the video evidence would
not have resulted in a more favorable result for Avakian.

                                         13
         In sum, we conclude the trial court’s findings were supported by
substantial admissible evidence of abuse under the DVPA. Accordingly, we
perceive no abuse of discretion in the issuance of the DVRO and we affirm the
order.

B.   The Firearms Prohibition Did Not Violate Avakian’s Constitutional
     Rights

         Avakian argues for the first time on appeal that the firearms
prohibition imposed by the trial court violated her Second Amendment rights.
She contends that because the court’s order did not allow her to possess a
firearm for self-protection, the order conflicts with the United States
Supreme Court’s decision in N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen (2022)
597 U.S. ___ [142 S.Ct. 2111] (Bruen). According to Avakian, had the trial
court prohibited her from possessing a firearm in public, but allowed her to
possess a firearm in her home for self-protection, the order would have
passed constitutional muster. She additionally argues that because section
6389, subdivision (h) provides an exception to the firearms relinquishment
requirement based on employment, but not based on the need for self-
protection, the statute violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As we discuss, we disagree with Avakian’s assertions and
conclude the firearms prohibition imposed by the trial court, and the statute
on which it was based, are constitutional.
         As a preliminary matter, we make clear that we do not consider
Avakian’s “as-applied” challenge to the firearms restriction because she
forfeited this claim by failing to object in the trial court. (People v. Patton
(2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 934, 946 (Patton) [“An as-applied constitutional
challenge is forfeited unless previously raised.”].) We construe Avakian’s
claim to be, at least partially, an as-applied challenge because she asserts the

                                        14
need for an exception to the firearms restriction based on a purported
individualized need for self-protection and her desire to attend “A Girl & A
Gun” meetings. (In re D.L. (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 144 [“[A]n ‘as applied’
challenge may seek ‘relief from a specific application of a facially valid statute
or ordinance to an individual or class of individuals who are under allegedly
impermissible present restraint or disability as a result of the manner or
circumstances in which the statute or ordinance has been applied”].) Because
an as-applied challenge asserts a “constitutional defense [that] may be
correctable only by examining factual findings in the record or remanding to
the trial court for further findings” (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875,
887 (Sheena K.)), it is not appropriately raised for the first time on appeal.
We do, however, consider Avakian’s facial challenges to section 6389 because
“the forfeiture rule does not extend to facial constitutional challenges
presenting pure questions of law that can be resolved without referring to the
particular [trial] record developed below.” (Patton, supra, 41 Cal.App.5th at
p. 946; accord Sheena K. supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 889 [a facial constitutional
challenge may be raised for the first time on appeal].)
      Section 6389 prohibits an individual subject to a DVRO from
possessing a firearm or ammunition. (§ 6389; see also § 6218.) In Altafulla v.
Ervin (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 571 (Altafulla), this court upheld section 6389
following a Second Amendment challenge to the statute. We concluded that
section 6389 is “analogous to a prohibition on felon weapon possession,”
which is a constitutionally valid restriction on an individual’s right to possess
a firearm. (Altafulla, at p. 581.) In our discussion, we explained that the
United States Supreme Court decision in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008)
554 U.S. 570 (Heller), which held that the Second Amendment confers an

                                       15
individual right to keep and bear arms, did not affect the constitutionality of
section 6389. (Heller, at pp. 581–582.)
      The United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bruen, which
reaffirmed Heller’s guarantee of the right of “law-abiding responsible
citizens” to possess firearms, does not compel a different result. (Bruen,
supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2131.) In Bruen, the United States Supreme Court
held that New York’s public-carry licensing scheme violated the Second
Amendment because “it prevent[ed] law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-
defense needs from exercising their right to keep and bear arms.” (Id. at
p. 2156.)
      Here, however, the court’s findings in issuing the DVRO demonstrate
that Avakian is not a law-abiding citizen. Moreover, as Justice Alito
emphasized in his concurring opinion, “nothing about who may lawfully
possess a firearm” was affected by the United States Supreme Court’s
decision in Bruen, nor has it disturbed “restrictions that may be imposed on
the possession or carrying of guns.” (Bruen, supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 2157 (conc.
opn. of Alito, J.).) Since Bruen, numerous California courts have held that
the Bruen decision does not extend to statutes prohibiting the possession of
firearms by individuals convicted of a felony, or statutes criminalizing the
possession of illegal firearms. (See People v. Alexander (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th
469, 480 [rejecting Second Amendment challenge to statutes prohibiting
individuals convicted of felonies from possessing firearms or ammunition];
People v. Bocanegra (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 1236, 1250 [rejecting Second
Amendment challenge to a statute prohibiting possession of an assault
weapon].) Having previously concluded in Altafulla that section 6389 is
analogous to a prohibition on “felon weapon possession,” and recognizing the
California cases that uphold the prohibition of “felon weapon possession”

                                      16
post-Bruen—we conclude that Bruen does not call into question the
lawfulness of firearms restrictions imposed on individuals subject to

restraining orders.4
      Apart from the Second Amendment, Avakian also asserts that section
6389, subdivision (h), violates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment by allowing an exception to the DVRO-related firearms
prohibition based on employment, but not based on an individual’s need for
self-protection. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution “ ‘guarantee[s] all persons the equal protection of the laws.’ ”
(In re Williams (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 427, 433.) An analysis of an equal
protection claim under the Fourteenth Amendment has two steps.
(Conservatorship of Eric B. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 1085, 1102.) “ ‘ “ ‘The first
prerequisite . . . is a showing that the state has adopted a classification that
affects two or more similarly situated groups in an unequal manner.’
[Citations.] This initial inquiry is not whether persons are similarly situated
for all purposes, but ‘whether they are similarly situated for purposes of the
law challenged.’ ” ’ [Citation.] If the groups are similarly situated, the next

4      We recognize the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit recently held
that 18 U.S.C. section 922(g)(8), a federal statute prohibiting an individual
subject to a restraining order from possessing a firearm, is unconstitutional
in light of Bruen. (United States v. Rahimi (2023) 61 F.4th 443.) As we
emphasized in Altafulla, however, “ ‘anger management issues may arise in
domestic settings,’ and a firearm restriction in such cases ‘is thus a
temporary burden during a period when the subject of the order is adjudged
to pose a particular risk of further abuse.’ ” (Altafulla, supra, 238
Cal.App.4th at p. 582.) “ ‘Reducing domestic violence is a compelling
government interest [citation], and [a] temporary prohibition, while the
[restraining] order is outstanding, is narrowly tailored to that compelling
interest.’ ” (Ibid.) Considering the compelling government interest to reduce
domestic violence that we recognized in Altafulla, we decline to follow
Rahimi. (See People v. Williams (2013) 56 Cal.4th 630, 668 [federal court of
appeal decisions are not binding on California courts].)
                                       17
question is whether the disparate treatment can be justified by a
constitutionally sufficient state interest.” (Ibid.)
       Here, Avakian’s equal protection argument necessarily fails because
individuals seeking an exception to the firearms prohibition based on their
employment are not similarly situated with individuals who present a
generalized claim of the need to protect themselves with a firearm. Section
6389, subdivision (h) allows for a narrow exception to the firearms
prohibition mandated by subdivision (a) if the restrained party demonstrates
a firearm “is necessary as a condition of continued employment and that the
current employer is unable to reassign the [restrained party] to another
position where a firearm or ammunition is unnecessary.” Avakian cites to no
authority suggesting this narrow class of individuals, for whom firearms are
a necessary part of their employment, are similarly situated with individuals
who generally desire a firearm to protect themselves. Nor can we find any
precedent that would support such a claim—indeed, such a conclusion would
signify that the general public is similarly situated with a group seeking
relief from a court-ordered restriction based on a narrow employment-based

statutory exception.5

5      Courts have addressed equal protections claims challenging statutory
exceptions to court-imposed firearms limitations in the context of restrictions
resulting from criminal convictions. In People v. Delacy (2011) 192
Cal.App.4th 1481, 1495, the court evaluated a criminal statute that
prohibited the possession of firearms by persons convicted of certain
California misdemeanors, but did not prohibit the possession of firearms by
persons convicted of similar offenses from other jurisdictions. Although the
court did not explicitly address whether the challenge involved similarly
situated groups, it upheld the law, concluding that the Legislature’s decision
to exclude out-of-state misdemeanants from the law did not violate equal
protection. In People v. Conley 116 Cal.App.4th 566, 574 (Conley), the court
considered an equal protection challenge to a criminal statute that permitted
relief from a firearms restriction for individuals convicted of three
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      But even assuming the “similarly situated” requirement has been met,
section 6389, subdivision (h), does not violate equal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment. “[E]qual protection is not violated by a legislative
scheme that distinguishes between different groups of persons if the
classification bears a rational relationship to a legitimate public purpose.”
(Conley, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 574.) When a legislative classification
that distinguishes between different groups “ ‘does not involve a fundamental
right, we evaluate the classification under the ”rational basis” test.’ ” (Ibid.)
“The private right to bear arms is not a ‘fundamental’ right under the Second
Amendment to the United States Constitution” (In re Evans (1996) 49
Cal.App.4th 1263, 1270), and we therefore analyze an equal protection claim
implicating the private right to bear arms under the deferential rational
basis test. Under this test, we “uphold a statutory classification against an
equal protection challenge ‘if there is any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.’ ” (Conley, at
p. 574.)
      Here, the employment exception delineated in section 6389, subdivision
(h), permits only a limited category of individuals whose economic well-being
would be jeopardized by a firearms restriction to seek an exception to
maintain their employment. This exception is especially narrow—it allows
an individual to obtain an exception to the firearms prohibition only when
their employment requires them to possess a firearm and when they make a
showing that their employer is unable to reassign them to a position that

enumerated criminal offenses, but not for individuals convicted of other
criminal offenses. Again the court did not directly address the similarly
situated prong, but ultimately concluded that the legislative distinction
between the convictions that required a firearms restriction, and those that
did not, was constitutional. (Ibid.)
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does not require a firearm. (§ 6389, subd. (h).) Even when an individual
makes such a showing, they are only permitted to possess a firearm during
their work hours and during travel to and from their employment. (Ibid.)
      Considering that “ ‘reducing domestic violence is a compelling
government interest” (Altafulla, supra, 238 Cal.App.4th at p. 582, italics
added), the Legislature was justified in crafting such a narrow exception in
section 6389, subdivision (h). Unlike the broad exception Avakian seeks that
would permit her to possess a gun in her home without any restrictions, the
employment-based exception in section 6389, subdivision (h), appropriately
balances the need to protect victims of domestic violence from the possibility
of gun violence, with the economic interests of the restrained party. (See U.S.
v. Hayes (2009) 555 U.S. 415, 427 [“Firearms and domestic strife are a
potentially deadly combination nationwide.”].) The limited nature of the
firearms exception in section 6389 is rationally supported by a legislative
interest in prohibiting those who have committed acts of domestic violence
from having ready access to a firearm.
      We therefore affirm the affirm the order prohibiting Avakian from
possessing a firearm while the DVRO is in effect.

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                              DISPOSITION

     The order is affirmed. Hughes is entitled to costs on appeal.

                                                                     DATO, J.
WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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