Court Opinion

ID: 9919229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 19:01:14.45032+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:28.457487
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 v.                                                            Case No. 1:21-cr-315-RCL

 JAMES LITTLE,

        Defendant.

                               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

       For his involvement in the January 6, 2021 attack on the United States Capitol, Defendant

James Little pleaded guilty to a petty offense. This Court imposed a sentence of imprisonment,

followed by probation. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit held that Little’s “split sentence” was unlawful.

It therefore “vacate[d] Little’s sentence and remand[ed] to the district court for resentencing.”

United States v. Little, 78 F.4th 453, 461 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

       Now, Little asks the Court to disregard the D.C. Circuit’s directive to resentence him and

to instead simply let him off probation. Yet the Court is bound by the mandate rule to follow the

instructions from the D.C. Circuit. The Court will thus DENY Little’s motion and proceed to

resentencing as scheduled on January 25, 2024. Little’s double jeopardy objection to resentencing

is squarely foreclosed by governing precedent, so when the Court resentences Little, it may

lawfully impose an additional term of imprisonment or probation, if it chooses to do so.

                                      I.   BACKGROUND

       1. Little’s Initial Sentence

       The Court previously summarized Little’s contribution to the events of January 6, 2021:

       January 6, 2021, marked a tragic day in American history. The peaceful transfer of
       power—one of our most important and sacred democratic processes—came under

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       a full-fledged assault. While the immediate threat may have subsided, the damage
       from January 6 persists. Rioters interrupted the certification of the 2020 Electoral
       College vote count, injured more than one hundred law enforcement officers, and
       caused more than a million dollars of property damage to the U.S. Capitol. Some
       of the rioters—now defendants in criminal cases—directly contributed to this
       violence by assaulting members of law enforcement or by planning, preparing, and
       facilitating this violence. Others, like Little here, did not directly assault officers.
       But even Little and those who engaged in this “lesser” criminal conduct were an
       essential component to the harm. Law-enforcement officers were overwhelmed by
       the sheer swath of criminality. And those who engaged in violence that day were
       able to do so because they found safety in numbers.

United States v. Little, 590 F. Supp. 3d 340, 342 (D.D.C. 2022), vacated and remanded, 78 F.4th

453 (D.C. Cir. 2023).

       On November 16, 2021, Little pleaded guilty to Parading, Demonstrating, or Picketing in

a Capitol Building in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 5104(e)(2)(G). See Plea Agr., ECF No. 25. Little

admitted to entering the United States Capitol, despite knowing that he lacked permission, and

then parading, demonstrating, and/or picketing within the building. Statement of Offense, ECF

No. 26, 4.

       On March 14, 2022, the Court sentenced Little to a “split sentence,” meaning “a term of

imprisonment followed by a term of probation.” Little, 590 F. Supp. 3d. at 343. The Court

recognized that because the statutory maximum term of imprisonment for Little’s offense was six

months, federal law classifies the crime as a petty offense. Id. (citing 40 U.S.C. § 5109(b), 18

U.S.C. § 3559(a)(7), and 18 U.S.C. § 19). But it held that a split sentence was legally permissible

for a defendant convicted of a petty offense. It also concluded that a split sentence was warranted

in this case, because “[s]ome term of imprisonment may serve sentencing’s retributive goals . . .

[b]ut only a longer-term period of probation is adequate to ensure that Little will not become an

active participant in another riot.” Little, 590 F. Supp. 3d at 344. It therefore sentenced Little to

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60 days’ imprisonment, 36 months’ probation, $500 in restitution, and $10 in special assessment.

Id. at 351.

        2. Little’s Appeal

        On appeal, Little challenged his sentence, arguing that a split sentence for a single

conviction for a petty offense was illegal. Br. for Appellant *40, United States v. Little, 78 F.4th

453 (D.C. Cir. 2023) (No. 22-3018). He argued that because he had “already served his entire

term of imprisonment, the proper remedy is to reverse and remand with instructions that Little be

immediately discharged from probation and that an amended judgment be issued reflecting no

probationary term.” Id.

        A divided panel of the D.C. Circuit agreed with Little’s substantive argument, holding that

under 18 U.S.C. § 3561(a)(3), a court could impose imprisonment or probation but not both. Little,

78 F.4th at 454. However, it rejected Little’s proposed remedy of instructing the district court to

discharge Little from probation and issue an amended judgment reflecting no term of probation.

Instead, the court of appeals “vacate[d] Little’s sentence and remand[ed] to the district court for

resentencing.” Id. at 461. Writing in dissent, Judge Wilkins stated that “[f]ollowing vacatur of

the sentence on remand, it appears that the district judge could impose a sentence of imprisonment

or probation, and that he would not be limited to the 90 days or three years that were imposed

before if he concluded that either a longer prison or probationary term were required to meet the

goals of 18 U.S.C. § 3551.” Id. at 469 n.3 (Wilkins, J., dissenting) (citing Davenport v. United

States, 353 F.2d 882, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1965)).

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        3.    The Present Dispute

        Little completed his sixty days of imprisonment on July 8, 2022, and is currently on

probation. See Gov. Opp’n 4. According to the Government, he has failed to pay either the $500

restitution or the $10 special assessment ordered by the Court. Id.

        On November 9, 2023, the Court received the mandate from the D.C. Circuit. ECF No.

57. Little moved for the Court to amend the judgment to remove the term of probation, to terminate

the term of probation, or to do both. Def. Mot., ECF No. 58. The Government initially moved to

hold Little’s motion in abeyance pending the D.C. Circuit’s decision in United States v. Caplinger,

No. 22-3057, ECF No. 61, but then withdrew that motion as filed in error, ECF No. 63. The

Government then filed an opposition to Little’s motion. See Gov. Opp’n, ECF No. 65. Little filed

a reply. See Def. Reply, ECF No. 66.

        Little’s motion is now ripe for review.

                                           II.     DISCUSSION

        Given the mandate from the D.C. Circuit, the Court must resentence Little. In doing so,

double jeopardy principles do not prevent the Court from imposing additional punishment, so long

as the Court credits the punishment already served by Little against any further penalty. 1

1
 Little also argues that even if double jeopardy does not require termination of probation, the Court should release
him from probation because “[h]e has been compliant with the terms of probation as far as counsel is aware, and
presents no future danger to the community.” Def. Mot. 10. He also contends that resentencing him to time served
without a hearing would be in compliance with the D.C. Circuit’s mandate. Def. Reply at 4. However, whenever the
Court imposes a sentence, it must carefully consider the factors provided in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). The Court will not
short-circuit the usual process for considering those factors by deciding the issue at this stage.

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    A. Under the Mandate Rule, the Court Must Resentence Little

         The D.C. Circuit did not leave Little’s remedy as an open question. Instead, it “vacate[d]

Little’s sentence and remand[ed] to the district court for resentencing.” Little, 78 F.4th at 461.

The mandate rule requires the Court to obey that directive by resentencing Little.

         The mandate rule means a district court must do as it was told by the court of appeals.

“Under the mandate rule, ‘an inferior court has no power or authority to deviate from the mandate

issued by an appellate court.’” Indep. Petroleum Ass’n of Am. v. Babbitt, 235 F.3d 588, 596 (D.C.

Cir. 2001) (quoting Briggs v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 334 U.S. 304, 306 (1948)); see also 28 U.S.C.

§ 2106 (“The Supreme Court or any other court of appellate jurisdiction may affirm, modify,

vacate, set aside or reverse any judgment, decree, or order of a court lawfully brought before it for

review, and may remand the cause and direct the entry of such appropriate judgment, decree, or

order, or require such further proceedings to be had as may be just under the circumstances.”).

Therefore, “[a] trial court is without power to do anything which is contrary to either the letter or

spirit of the mandate construed in the light of the opinion of [the] court deciding the case.”

Yablonski v. United Mine Workers of Am., 454 F.2d 1036, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (internal

quotation marks and citation omitted).2

         Little’s argument that this Court may disregard the mandate fails for two reasons. He

contends that the Court cannot resentence him as instructed because imposing any additional

punishment would violate double jeopardy. Def. Mot. 1–2. The first problem with this approach

is that the Court does not agree that double jeopardy precludes resentencing in this case, for the

2
  The mandate rule applies to criminal sentencing appeals. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g) (“A district court to which a case
is remanded pursuant to [§ 3742(f)(1), which permits a defendant to appeal a sentence “imposed in violation of law,”
or (f)(2)] shall resentence a defendant in accordance with [§ 3553] and with such instructions as may have been given
by the court of appeals . . . .”).

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reasons stated below. But even if the Court were inclined to agree with Little on that, it still could

not flout the mandate of the D.C. Circuit. In arguing that the Court should refuse to resentence

him, Little asks the Court to do something it has no authority to do, since the Court lacks discretion

to deviate from the mandate. See Yablonski, 454 F.2d at 1038.

       Similarly, Little’s argument that the mandate rule does not apply because the D.C. Circuit

did not consider double jeopardy, Def. Reply 2–3, fails because a higher court’s decision is

binding, even if that decision did not take into account a relevant but unraised argument. Little

points out that the briefing on appeal did not raise the double jeopardy argument and that the

resulting opinion does not reference double jeopardy. Id. 3. But he offers no authority for the

radical idea that this absence saps the force of the mandate. His reliance on Independent Petroleum

Association of America v. Babbit is misplaced. 235 F.3d 588 (2001). In that case, a party argued

that the D.C. Circuit had already decided that the party had taken a certain action, and that the

mandate rule thus prevented the district court from holding otherwise. Id. at 596. The D.C. Circuit

rejected this argument on the basis that “ [a]lthough some portions of” its earlier “decision may be

read to suggest that” the party had taken that action, that question “was not before us, nor decided

by us, even by implication.” Id. at 597.

       The Court’s point was simply that the mandate rule does not control a district court’s

decision of a question not actually before or decided by the court of appeals. That is quite different

from Little’s suggestion that when the court of appeals expressly decides a matter without

considering a relevant but unraised argument, its directive to the lower court becomes optional.

Were he right, a district court could disregard instructions from above whenever a litigant

advanced a previously unraised objection to the otherwise binding decision. That cannot be

correct, because “[a] trial court is without power to do anything which is contrary to either the

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letter or spirit of the mandate construed in the light of the opinion of [the] court deciding the case.”

Yablonski, 454 F.2d at 1038. Accordingly, the Court will not give Little the remedy refused by

the D.C. Circuit.

    B. Double Jeopardy Principles Do Not Prevent the Court From Imposing Additional
       Punishment on Little, so Long as It Credits the Punishment Already Incurred

        Principles of double jeopardy do not prohibit the Court from imposing an additional term

of imprisonment or probation when it resentences Little, as long as it credits the time already

served in prison or probation against any new punishment.               Little’s argument disregards

established principles of law, according to which a defendant who appeals an illegal sentence has

no legitimate expectation of finality in that sentence and therefore may be resentenced even if he

receives additional punishment and even if he has already served part of the original sentence.

Applying these principles, it is clear that in resentencing Little, the Court may impose additional

penalties, provided it appropriately reduces the new punishment to reflect the time he has already

served of his initial terms of imprisonment and probation.

        Little relies on two Supreme Court decisions to argue that because he has already fully

served his term of imprisonment, double jeopardy prohibits the Court from imposing any

additional punishment. See Def. Mot. 2–9. He principally invokes the Supreme Court’s decision

in Ex Parte Lange, 85 U.S. 163 (1873). In that case, the defendant’s single statute of conviction

permitted imposition of a fine or imprisonment, but the judge imposed a maximum prison term

and a maximum fine. Id. at 164. The Supreme Court vacated the sentence and, applying double

jeopardy principles, held that because the defendant “had fully suffered one of the alternative

punishments to which alone the law subjected him, the power of the court to punish further was

gone.” Id. at 176. Little also cites In re Bradley, 318 U.S. 50 (1943). There, as in Lange, the

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judge sentenced the defendant to both a fine and imprisonment although the statute permitted only

one or the other. Id. at 51. After the defendant had already paid the fine, the court amended the

judgment to omit the fine but keep the imprisonment. Id. at 51–52. Citing Lange, the Supreme

Court concluded in a brief opinion that “[a]s the judgment of the court was thus executed so as to

be a full satisfaction of one of the alternative penalties of the law, the power of the court was at an

end.” Id. at 52 (citing Lange, 85 U.S. at 176). Based on these two cases, Little says that the

completion of his term of imprisonment amounts to “full satisfaction of one of the alternative

penalties of the law” and that the Court thus lacks authority to further punish him. Def. Mot. 3

(quoting Bradley, 318 U.S. at 52). Little’s argument fails, however, because the case law does not

support such a stark, sweeping reading of Lange or Bradley.

       Indeed, the Supreme Court has read those cases narrowly. In Jones v. Thomas, the Court

emphasized that in Lange, the defendant had already paid the statutorily maximum fine and served

five days of his maximum one-year prison sentence when the trial court attempted to resentence

him to no fine but a further year in prison. 491 U.S. 376, 383 (1989) (citing Lange, 85 U.S. at

175). The Court explained that “Lange therefore stands for the uncontested proposition that the

Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits punishment in excess of that authorized by the legislature . . .

and not for the broader rule suggested by its dictum.” 491 U.S. at 383 (citing United States v.

DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 139 (1980)). The Court also stated that “we do not think the law

compels application of Bradley beyond its facts.” Id. at 386. And based on United States v.

DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980), the D.C. Circuit has concluded that “the holdings in Ex parte

Lange and [United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931)] now mean only that a court which imposes

a sentence greater than that authorized by the legislature subjects a defendant to multiple

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punishment in violation of the double jeopardy clause.” United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 86–

87 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

          By now it is well-established that the Constitution does not categorically bar additional

punishment at resentencing. In DiFrancesco, the Supreme Court held that neither a statutorily

authorized government appeal of a criminal sentence nor an increase of the sentence upon post-

appeal resentencing violates double jeopardy. 449 U.S. at 132, 136–37. The Court noted that its

precedents “clearly establish that a sentence does not have the qualities of constitutional finality

that attend an acquittal.” Id. at 134. And it observed that because the statute clearly permitted

appellate review of the sentences at issue, “[t]he defendant . . . has no expectation of finality in his

sentence until the appeal is concluded or the time to appeal has expired.” Id. at 136; see also id.

at 139.

          From this statement in DiFrancesco, the D.C. Circuit has derived the principle that

“whether ‘an increase in a sentence’ violates the Double Jeopardy Clause ‘turns on the extent and

legitimacy of a defendant’s expectation of finality in that sentence.’” United States v. Casseday,

807 F. App’x 5, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting Fogel, 829 F.2d at 87).3 When does a defendant not

have a legitimate expectation in the finality of a sentence? When “he is or should be aware at

sentencing that the sentence may permissibly be increased.” Fogel, 829 F.2d at 88. “If . . . there

is some circumstance which undermines the legitimacy of” the defendant’s expectation of finality,

“then a court may permissibly increase the sentence.” Id. at 87.

3
  Little asserts that “the ‘expectation of finality’ cases are not on point for a single-count, alternative-options case like
this one.” Def. Reply at 6. He seems to read DiFrancesco as applying only to instances in which the government
appeals the sentence pursuant to specific statutory authorization. See id. But there is no warrant to read DiFrancesco
as limited to its facts when the D.C. Circuit has already used it to distill a broader principle—in a single-count case,
no less. See Fogel, 829 F.2d at 79.

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       Here, Little lacked a legitimate expectation of finality under Fogel because he received an

illegal sentence and challenged it on direct appeal.        First, Little did not have a legitimate

expectation that his sentence was final because it was illegal. See Fogel, 829 F.2d at 88 (finding

that one reason the defendant had a legitimate expectation of finality was because “an increase in

appellant’s term of probation was not necessary to bring the sentence into compliance with any

statute” as “[t]he originally imposed sentence was not impermissible under the penalty statute”);

see also United States v. Rourke, 984 F.2d 1063, 1066 (10th Cir. 1992) (“A defendant cannot

acquire a legitimate expectation of finality in a sentence which is illegal, because such a sentence

remains subject to modification.”).

       Second, Little did not legitimately expect his sentence to be final because he challenged it

on direct appeal. Fogel’s holding that the district court violated double jeopardy by “unnecessarily

increase[ing]” the defendant’s sentence on its own initiative, Fogel, 829 F.2d at 80–81, 90, is

“inapposite” when, as in this case, the defendant “voluntarily placed his sentence at issue by

challenging it.” United States v. Townsend, 178 F.3d 558, 567 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1999); see also

United States v. Andersson, 813 F.2d 1450, 1461 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Andersson has no legitimate

expectation of finality in the original sentence when he has placed those sentences in issue by

direct appeal and has not completed serving a valid sentence.”).

       The fact that Little has already served part of his initial sentence does not change the result.

An increased punishment is permissible even if the defendant has begun serving the original,

illegal sentence, although any punishment already incurred must be credited against the increased

punishment. “[T]here no longer exists a per se rule that prohibits a court from increasing a

defendant’s sentence after service has begun.” Fogel, 829 F.2d at 86–87. A defendant whose

initial sentence was “plainly illegal” may receive additional punishment at resentencing. United

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States v. Evans, 459 F.2d 1134, 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“It is well settled that a sentence in all

respects legal cannot be increased after the defendant has begun serving it . . . . A sentence plainly

illegal, however . . . may be corrected even after the defendant has begun serving it.”) (citations

omitted) (collecting cases); see also Hayes v. United States, 249 F.2d 516, 518–19 (D.C. Cir. 1957)

(“True it is that defendant had begun to serve time; but as we read [Bozza v. United States, 330

U.S. 160 (1947)] this time was not lawful punishment the augmentation of which, to make the

sentence equal to the statutory penalty, constituted double jeopardy.”); Davenport v. United States,

353 F.2d 882, 884 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (affirming the holding of Hayes “that a defendant who

successfully attacks an invalid sentence can ‘be validly resentenced though the resentence

increased the punishment’” (quoting Hayes, 249 F.2d at 517)). Therefore, because Little’s

sentence was illegal, he can receive further penalties at resentencing.

       This is not a case in which imposing an additional penalty would fall afoul of the Lange

rule that a defendant cannot be made to suffer greater criminal punishment than that prescribed by

the legislature. See Fogel, 829 F.2d at 86–87 (citing Lange, 85 U.S. 163). The defendant in Lange

had already paid the maximum fine permitted by law, Lange, 85 U.S. at 164, and so any further

penalty would have resulted in his total punishment exceeding the maximum set by Congress. In

contrast, although Little has fully served his term of imprisonment, those two months fall well

short of the statutory maximum of six months. See Little, 590 F. Supp. 3d at 343.

       And Little is misguided in arguing that under Bradley he can suffer no further penalty

because “one valid alternative provision of the original sentence has been satisfied” by his

completion of the term of imprisonment imposed. Def. Mot. 3 (quoting Bradley, 318 U.S. at 52).

Little can receive additional punishment so long as the Court credits the punishment already

incurred against the new punishment.         In Thomas, the Supreme Court explained that the

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“alternative sentences in Bradley” of fine and imprisonment “were of a different type,” meaning

that “it would not have been possible to ‘credit’ a fine against time in prison.” 491 U.S. at 384.

By contrast, “crediting time served under one sentence against the term of another has long been

an accepted practice.” Thomas, 491 U.S. at 384 (citing North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711

(1969)). Crediting time ensures the defendant’s punishment does not exceed the maximum

prescribed by the legislature, which would violate Lange. See Fogel, 829 F.2d at 86–87 (citing

Lange, 85 U.S. 163); cf. Pearce, 395 U.S. at 718–19 (“[T]he constitutional guarantee against

multiple punishments for the same offense absolutely requires that punishment already exacted

must be fully ‘credited’ in imposing sentence upon a new conviction for the same offense.”),

overruled on other grounds by Alabama v. Smith, 490 U.S. 794, 798–803 (1989).

       Accordingly, the Court may impose an additional punishment on Little so long as it

appropriately credits the time Little served in prison and on probation against the punishment. See

United States v. Lominac, 144 F.3d 308, 318 (4th Cir. 1998) (“Unlike the monetary sanction of a

fine, which cannot be converted into an equivalent temporal sanction, Lominac’s term of

supervised release restrained his liberty for a known period of time that can be credited against

any future sentence of imprisonment. Accordingly, Bradley does not bar resentencing.”),

abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694 (2000); United States v.

Martin, 363 F.3d 25, 38 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[W]e join other courts of appeals in holding that these

similarities [between probation and imprisonment] are sufficient to allow crediting of probation

against imprisonment” upon resentencing after an appeal) (collecting cases).

       If the Court decides to impose additional punishment, it must reduce that punishment to

reflect the punishment already incurred by Little of 60 days’ imprisonment and approximately 18

months’ probation. See Thomas, 491 U.S. at 384. In crediting time served on probation against a

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