Court Opinion

ID: 9671654
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 03:41:13.283885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:11.303142
License: Public Domain

Krivosha, C.J.,
dissenting.
For reasons more fully set out in my dissents in Pegasus of Omaha, Inc. v. State, 203 Neb. 755, 280 N.W.2d 64 (1979), State v. Groves, 219 Neb. 382, 363 N.W.2d 507 (1985), and In re Interest of Siebert, ante p. 454, 390 N.W.2d 522 (1986), I must respectfully dissent from the decision rendered by those members of the court who have today affirmed the action of the district court in sustaining demurrers filed by the state and, in effect, finding Neb. Rev. Stat. § 2-1221 (Cum. Supp. 1984) constitutional.
Turning first to the vagueness argument addressed by the majority, I continue to be convinced that we have created a rule unique to Nebraska and not even followed by the U.S. Supreme Court, upon whom we base our original decision. In State v. Groves, supra, I set out at length note 8 from the case of Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 75 L. Ed. 2d 903 (1983), and will not repeat it here. As I read the note, the holding in Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 102 S. Ct. 1186, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362 (1982), was rejected and cannot be so lightly disposed of by us in merely saying that insufficient evidence was presented. Lawson was permitted to bring a civil declaratory judgment action, and further permitted to raise the vagueness argument, though there was no evidence that anyone had ever asked him for identification and refused to accept it. Unfortunately, we continue to pursue this line of cases relying upon Hoffman Estates, supra, to the extent that we have effectively eliminated in Nebraska the right to contest the constitutionality of a statute on the basis of vagueness.
I further continue to believe that the statute in question cannot be sustained as a constitutional act of the Legislature. Once the state permits parimutuel betting, then how the money arrives at the track cannot be limited under the guise of the police power. Section 2-1221 does not regulate gambling or even parimutuel betting. Rather, it insists that every person who *757places a bet at a track must himself or herself be present to place that bet. How the individual’s presence or the payment of a fee to enter the track can be said to be a matter of public health, safety, or welfare once parimutuel betting is permitted is simply beyond my comprehension.
Those members of the court who have upheld the constitutionality of the act in question rely in part upon language found in Finish Line Express, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 72 Ill. 2d 131, 140, 379 N.E.2d 290, 293 (1978), which reads: “ [I]t is clear that the State may utilize its police power to protect its sources of revenue and assure collection of taxes.” The language of the Illinois decision is interesting, to say the least. It reads in part at 139-40, 379 N.E.2d at 293:
As we noted earlier, the report of the Legislative Investigating Commission indicated that many of the messenger services book some of the bets themselves or book them with an illegal wire room, causing a substantial decrease in the total bets handled at the tracks and a corresponding loss of privilege-tax revenue. In addition the State suffers from the activities of those messenger services which actually take the bets to the track, for bettors need no longer attend the track in order to wager. Not only does admissions-tax revenue decline, but there is a reduction in the total bets and the tax revenue because, the report indicates, winning bettors, not being present at the track, cannot wager their winnings as many would otherwise do. These problems alone justify the legislative action here challenged since it is clear that the State may utilize its police power to protect its sources of revenue and assure collection of taxes.
It is difficult for me to perceive that it is in the public’s health, safety, or welfare to be certain that winners are in a position where they may gamble away their winnings or that rules should be prescribed so that individuals may not limit their losses but may be induced to continue betting in hopes of either “getting even” or “hitting it big.” It appears to me that the purpose of § 2-1221 has nothing to do with regulating gambling but, rather, is intended solely to ensure that both the tracks and the state realize as much revenue as possible. That is not within the *758police power of the state. As I did in Pegasus of Omaha, Inc. v. State, supra, I would have declared the act unconstitutional. I do so not because I favor gambling or even parimutuel betting. Rather, I do so because I believe granting to the state the right to prohibit legitimate businesses under the pretext of the police power is a dangerous mistake.