Court Opinion

ID: 9953201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-21 16:14:33.033123+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:45:45.199823
License: Public Domain

J-S08045-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  KRISTOPHER ALLEN SMITH                       :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 610 MDA 2023

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 9, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-36-CR-0002935-2018

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                         FILED: MARCH 21, 2024

       Appellant, Kristopher Allen Smith, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County following

his conviction by a jury on one count of first-degree murder, three counts of

burglary, one count of robbery, and two counts of conspiracy (to commit

burglary).1 After a careful review, we affirm.

       The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows: Dennis Pitch

was shot and killed during a home invasion between the late evening and early

morning hours of December 2 and 3, 2016, in Narvon, Pennsylvania. His body

was discovered by his brother and stepson on December 4, 2016, after he

____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 3502(a)(1), 3701(a), and 903, respectively,
J-S08045-24

failed to appear for work. The victim sustained four gunshot wounds, as well

as bruising and abrasions.         There were no signs of forced entry into the

victim’s home; however, several rooms had been ransacked.                   Law

enforcement recovered 9-millimeter shells from the home, as well as BBs that

appeared to be from birdshot.

       Following a sixteen-month investigation, charges were filed against

Appellant and his three co-conspirators (Brandon James Bills, Christopher

James Lyles, and Michael Patrick Baker)2 on April 23, 2018, based on the

presentment by the fifth Lancaster County Investigating Grand Jury.          The

Commonwealth alleged Appellant and his three co-conspirators traveled in

Appellant’s car on the night of December 2, 2016. The Commonwealth alleged

that, after burglarizing an Amish-owned business in Lancaster County,

Appellant parked his car at a church behind the victim’s home, and he then

retrieved two shotguns from the trunk. The Commonwealth further alleged

____________________________________________

2 Appellant’s three co-conspirators were charged at separate docket numbers.

Baker and Lyles were tried separately and convicted of second-degree murder.
They were both sentenced to life in prison, and after they filed direct appeals,
this Court affirmed their judgments of sentence. See Commonwealth v.
Baker, No. 696-697 MDA 2022 (Pa.Super. filed 2/22/23) (unpublished
memorandum); Commonwealth v. Lyles, 1367 MDA 2020 (Pa.Super. filed
4/1/22) (unpublished memorandum). Our Supreme Court denied Baker’s
petition for allowance of appeal. Lyles did not seek review by our Supreme
Court.
       Bills entered a negotiated guilty plea, and he was sentenced to five years
to ten years in prison in exchange for his testimony against Appellant. Bills
did not appeal his judgment of sentence.

                                           -2-
J-S08045-24

Appellant, Baker, and Lyles entered the victim’s residence while Bills remained

in the car. During the home invasion, the victim was shot and killed.

      Appellant was arrested on April 23, 2018, and on August 19, 2022,

Appellant, who was represented by counsel, proceeded to a jury trial. The

trial court has aptly summarized the evidence presented at Appellant’s jury

trial as follows:

            [T]he Commonwealth presented direct and circumstantial
      evidence at trial which proved that Pitch was shot and killed
      between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m. on December 3, 2016, in his home
      in Narvon. Dr. Wayne Ross, the forensic pathologist for Lancaster
      County, testified that the cause of death was four gunshot wounds
      to the head and chest, the manner of death was homicide. N.T.,
      8/23/22, at 443-44, 448-49, 451-52, 460-62[.] The time of death
      was estimated by Dr. Ross to be between the late hours of
      December 2, 2016, and the early morning hours of December 3,
      2016. Id. at 474.
            There was forensic evidence that Pitch put up a fight as
      there were defensive wounds to his hands. [Id.] at 452. There
      was blunt force trauma to his body, face, chest, hands, and legs.
      Id. at 451. Pitch’s face was swollen from being beaten. Id. Dr.
      Ross testified that the four shots that killed the victim were fired
      from a distance of three to four feet or greater. Id. at 456, 459,
      461. From the physical evidence, Dr. Ross was able to determine
      that the bullets to the body were all fired downward. Id. at 459,
      472-73. This suggested to Dr. Ross that Pitch was either on his
      knees or on the ground when he was shot and killed. Id. at 459.
      The victim was discovered lying on his stomach on the floor in the
      hallway between his bedroom and bathroom. N.T., 8/22/22, at
      265-66, 354, 371-72. There was blood splatter on the hallway
      wall. Id. at 354, 370-71. His fatal wounds were from small-arms
      fire. N.T., 8/23/22, at 453, 457-61. No weapon was recovered
      from the scene. N.T., 8/22/22, at 354-55.
            The Commonwealth introduced evidence obtained by
      Trooper Donna Harrison of the forensic services unit at
      Pennsylvania State Police Troop J in Lancaster. [Id.] at 346.
      Upon arrival at the scene on December 4, 2016, shortly after 1:00
      p.m., Trooper Harrison very quickly determined that this was a

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     homicide scene as the injuries had not been self-inflicted given
     the absence of the gun in the proximate area. Id. at 348, 354-
     55. While waiting for the approval of a search warrant, Trooper
     Harrison photographed the exterior of Pitch’s residence, as well as
     the surrounding area. Id. at 356-65[.]
             Once the search warrant was approved, Trooper Harrison
     began processing the interior crime scene at approximately 7:30
     p.m. on December 4, 2016. [Id.] at 356, 365-66, 429. She
     initially photographed the rooms of the house. Id. at 366. She
     observed no obvious signs of forced entry to the home. Id. at
     362-63, 378.
            Trooper Harrison recovered two shell casings: one 9-
     millimeter casing on the living room floor and another on the
     dining room floor. [Id.] at 350, 368-69, 391[.] After the victim’s
     body was removed by the coroner, another 9-millemeter shell
     casing was recovered from underneath the body. Id. at 395. A
     bullet hole was observed in the trim around the door leading into
     the victim’s bedroom. [Id.] at 387-88. The bullet entered the
     trim on the hallway side and exited the back side of the trim,
     blowing off a piece of wood which landed on a chair in the
     bedroom. Id. at 388-89. The discharged round struck a stud in
     the back wall of the bedroom and ricocheted back out and landed
     on the bedroom floor. Id.
           Trooper Harrison testified that another bullet was fired into
     the hallway floor, traveled through the insulation below, and
     imbedded in a floor joist in the basement. [Id.] at 392-93, 405.
     A bullet had also been fired in the hallway above where the
     victim’s body had been and was removed from the drywall. Id.
     at 396-97. A live 9-millimeter round was recovered from the
     victim’s bedroom floor. Id. at 394[.]
           Trooper Harrison further processed the crime scene for
     latent fingerprints. [Id.] at 411-13. Nothing of value was
     recovered. Id. at 415-19. Trooper Harrison also attempted to
     locate and identify touch DNA from various objects recovered from
     the crime scene. Id. at 413. Again, nothing of identifiable value
     was found. Id. at 415-19.
           On January 8, 2017, the victim’s family was cleaning the
     house to get it ready for sale and discovered a hole in the bedroom
     floor when they removed the carpet. N.T., 8/23/22, at 549-50.
     The police were called, and Trooper Nelson Renno arrived the
     same day to investigate. Id. at 552, 577. He initially observed a
     BB or gunshot pellet stuck in the wood subfloor. Id. at 577[.]

                                    -4-
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     Trooper Renno went into the basement and discovered small BBs
     on the floor and damage to the ceiling insulation and to a
     basement window. Id. at 578-79. In total, Trooper Renno
     recovered 65 birdshot-type BBs from the crime scene. Id. at 589.
            The Commonwealth introduced trial testimony from several
     witnesses that Dennis Pitch’s home, which was usually tidy and
     orderly, had been ransacked. N.T., 8/22/22, at 265, 277-78, 312,
     373. In the victim’s bedroom, drawers were pulled out of the
     dresser, cabinet doors opened, furniture moved, and boxes pulled
     out of the closet and flipped over. Id. at 373, 376, 394. In the
     living room, a trunk had been opened, and the kitchen and part
     of the garage had also been ransacked. Id. at 385, 424-25.
     Neither the victim’s wallet nor his cash was ever found by the
     police. N.T., 8/23/22, at 615, 629.
            The Commonwealth’s evidence established that, at the time
     of his death, Pitch was separated from his wife and anticipating a
     divorce. N.T., 8/22/22, at 254, 308, 320[.] Pitch was attempting
     to borrow money from his employer’s 401(k) plan to pay for an
     attorney, but he was required to pay back an outstanding loan of
     almost $4,000 before being permitted to withdraw more funds
     from his plan. N.T., 8/23/22, at 510-12. When Pitch met with his
     employer’s account manager on Tuesday, November 29, 2016, he
     said he had the cash with him to repay the loan. Id. at 512. The
     account manager advised Pitch to think more about his decision,
     and they made plans for him to return later that week to take care
     of the repayment.      Id. at 514-16.     Pitch never kept that
     appointment. Id. at 517.
            It was common knowledge in the Welsh Mountain
     community in Narvon, where Pitch lived, that he carried large
     amounts of cash on his person, and several witnesses personally
     observed Pitch in possession of several thousand dollars. N.T.,
     8/22/22, at 259-60, 294-95, 309, 311. As part of a canvassing
     of the neighborhood following the murder, Trooper Brian McNally
     interviewed [Appellant], who lived on Welsh Mountain about a
     mile from Pitch’s residence. N.T., 8/23/22, at 485, 491-93, 661[.]
     At that voluntary interview on January 2, 2017, [Appellant] told
     Trooper McNally that he had heard that Pitch had taken a large
     sum of money from his 401(k) for his divorce. Id. at 491, 493.
          Acting on the information in December 2016, [Appellant]
     contacted two friends, Baker and Lyles, both of whom lived just
     west of Philadelphia. N.T., 8/24/22, at 727, 797, 822[.] [The
     Commonwealth presented evidence that Appellant, Baker, and

                                   -5-
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     Lyles met each other in prison, and they were members of a prison
     gang known as the “215 Gang.”] Baker and Lyles traveled to
     Narvon from the Philadelphia area on the evening of December 2,
     2016, arriving just before 8:00 p.m. N.T., 8/25/22, at 1001-04,
     1009-12. They met up with [Appellant] and were subsequently
     joined by Bills, who also lived in Narvon. N.T., 8/23/22, at 672.
             At trial, co-conspirator Bills testified as an eyewitness to the
     events that occurred after Baker and Lyles arrived in Narvon the
     night Pitch was murdered. [Appellant, who Bills referred to as
     “Florida,”] and Bills were close friends and close neighbors on
     Narvon Road on Welsh Mountain. N.T., 8/24/22, at 830-32, 875.
     On the evening of December 2, 2016, [Appellant] pulled up to
     Bills’ home garage in his tan Lincoln MKZ sedan and asked Bills if
     he needed anything from the gas station as Bills had no car at the
     time. Id. at 833, 879-80[.] Bills said he needed cigarettes, and
     [Appellant] told Bills to jump in the car. Id. at 833. Bills got in
     behind the driver’s seat. Id. at 834. Baker was seated in the
     front seat with [Appellant], and Lyles was seated in the rear right
     passenger seat—opposite Bills. Id. at 834-36. Bills had seen
     Lyles before at a cookout at [Appellant’s] house in the summer of
     2016, but had never before seen Baker. [Bills identified Appellant,
     Baker, and Lyles from photo arrays presented by Trooper Chad
     Roberts on January 30, 2018, while Bills was incarcerated in Berks
     County on unrelated charges. Id. He also identified Lyles and
     Baker from a Facebook photo shown to him on February 2, 2018.
     Id.]
             Bills testified that the four men took off from Bills’ house on
     Narvon Road heading south. Id. at 836. [Appellant] drove to a
     local [Amish-owned] hardware store where [he], Lyles, and Baker
     got out of the car, disappeared around the building, and returned
     quickly after Bills heard a burglar alarm sound. Id. at 836-40.
     [Bills indicated he remained in the car “getting high.” Id. at 838,
     883-84.]
           Bills related that the four [men] then [drove away] from the
     hardware store in [Appellant’s] car and drove directly to
     Dukeman’s Sunoco in the Narvon area. [Id.] at 841. [Appellant]
     parked on the east side of the parking lot, exited the vehicle,
     entered the convenience store, and returned to the vehicle a short
     time later. Id. at 841-43. The other three occupants stayed in
     the car. Id. at 841-42.
          Surveillance video from the Sunoco station showed
     [Appellant] arriving in a light-colored four-door sedan on

                                      -6-
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     December 2, 2016, at 9:23 p.m. [Id.] at 935, 942[.] [When he
     was questioned by the police on February 2, 2018, Bills identified
     Appellant as the driver of the vehicle in the surveillance video from
     the Sunoco station. Id. at 825. Additionally, Trooper Jonathan
     Potoka testified that the vehicle in the surveillance video matched
     the one belonging to Appellant, and the man entering the driver’s
     side of the vehicle was Appellant. N.T., 8/25/22, at 968.]
     [Appellant] parked the vehicle in the parking lot on the east side
     of the store. N.T., 8/24/22, at 825. [Appellant] is captured on
     surveillance entering the store at 9:24 p.m. Id. [Appellant]
     returns to the driver’s side of the vehicle at 9:26 p.m. and then
     drives out of the parking lot. Id. The Sunoco surveillance video
     confirmed this portion of Bills’ trial testimony. See id. at 783-85.
            Bills further testified that the four men subsequently
     traveled east towards Honey Brook in Chester County to a Turkey
     Hill convenience store, where [Appellant] parked the car in the
     parking lot. [Id.] at 751-52, 843, 876. [Appellant] and Baker
     exited the car and went into the store while Bills and Lyles
     remained in the vehicle. Id. at 844. Five minutes later, the pair
     exited the store, returned to the car, handed Bills a pack of
     cigarettes and drove out of the parking lot. Id. at 844-45. Bills
     informed [Appellant] at that time that he needed to get home
     because he had a female friend, Cindy Roop, waiting for him. Id.
     at 845, 881. [Appellant], however, did not immediately return
     Bills to his home.
           It was later that night that [Appellant] pulled his car into the
     Gospel Tabernacle Church. [Id.] at 845-46. [Appellant] parked
     the car on a back road leading to a cemetery to the rear of the
     church near some woods located behind Pitch’s residence. Id. at
     773, 816-18, 847-49, 861, 887[.] [The distance between the
     church and Pitch’s home was approximately 100 feet. N.T.,
     8/22/22, at 429.] When Bills asked what they were doing,
     [Appellant] told him they planned to “do a lick,” meaning they
     planned to rob someone. N.T., 8/24/22, at 849. All four men
     exited [Appellant’s] vehicle. Id. at 849-50. [Appellant] popped
     the trunk of the car and handed a sawed-off shotgun to Baker and
     took one for himself. Id. at 850-51. [Although Bills informed the
     police that he was unsure whether Lyles was in possession of a
     weapon, the evidence established Lyles possessed a handgun
     since the victim suffered fatal gunshot wounds from small-arms
     fire and not from shotgun blasts.] [Appellant], Lyles, and Baker
     put on black gloves and masks and left through the woods with
     the guns. Id. at 851-52. Bills remained near the car. Id. at 852.

                                     -7-
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             Approximately ten minutes later, Bills heard gunshots from
       the direction in which the men had walked. [Id.] at 852-53[.]
       Shortly thereafter, [Appellant], Lyles, and Baker emerged from
       the woods with Baker and [Appellant] still holding the shotguns.
       Id. at 853-54. After pulling away, [Appellant] told Bills, “It didn’t
       go…as planned.” Id. at 854.
             Surveillance video from the Gospel Tabernacle Church on
       December 3, 2016, showed a light-colored sedan entering the
       parking lot at approximately 1:25 a.m. N.T., 8/23/22, at 483-
       44[.] The vehicle in the church parking lot was the same vehicle
       [Appellant] was operating at the Sunoco station. N.T., 8/25/22,
       at 980-81. This same vehicle passes the church security camera
       again at 1:35 a.m. N.T., 8/24/22, at 934. This surveillance video
       confirms Bills’ trial testimony. Id. at 785-86.
             Bills further testified that [Appellant] then drove his vehicle
       away from the church heading south on Narvon Road. [Id.] at
       856. Bills told [Appellant] at that time that he had to get home.
       Id. at 857. [Appellant] pulled into the driveway of an Amish farm,
       stopped the vehicle, and shut his car lights off. Id. Bills jumped
       out of the vehicle and ran back to his residence about an eighth
       of a mile down the road because “[his] mind was a wreck from
       what [he] heard, and [he] just wanted to get away.” Id. at 856-
       57, 873. Bills saw [Appellant] back his vehicle out of the driveway
       and proceed back in the direction from where he had come—
       heading north on Narvon Road. Id. at 857-58.
             Two individuals were present at Bills’ residence when he
       returned: Cindy Roop and Scott Montag. [Id.] at 858-59, 888.
       Scott Montag testified that Bills arrived at the residence on foot,
       and [he] related that Bills was “visibly shaken up” and “very, very
       nervous.” Id. at 909-10.
             Later that day, Bills learned of the murder of Dennis Pitch.
       [Id.] at 860. It was at that point Bills made the connection
       between the location of Pitch’s home to the church parking lot and
       the sound of gunshots. Id. at 861-82. Bills, however, did not go
       to the police at that time out of fear of what might happen to his
       family if he turned in the others. Id. at 862.
             Bills [was] eventually arrested and incarcerated on
       unrelated charges in Berks County in January of 2018. [Id.] at
       863. Ten days after his arrest, [after waiving his Miranda3
____________________________________________

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

                                           -8-
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     rights,] Bills gave a…statement to the police implicating himself
     and his three co-conspirators - [Appellant], Baker, and Lyles – in
     the murder of Dennis Pitch. Id. at 863-68[.] The police made no
     promises or other inducements to encourage Bills to give this
     statement; Bills provided it voluntarily. Id. at 743, 750.
           Over the course of the 16-month investigation into the
     death of Dennis Pitch, [Appellant] met voluntarily with the police
     on three separate occasions: January 2, 2017, February 21, 2017,
     and August 4, 2017. During the initial meeting on January 2,
     2017, as part of a neighborhood canvassing, [Appellant] told
     Trooper McNally that he had heard that Pitch had taken a large
     sum of money from his 401(k) and that a Pagan gang member,
     Ralph “Corby” Trego, had recently come into some money and had
     purchased an Infinity luxury car. N.T., 8/23/22, at 491-94.
     [Appellant] further informed the police that Dennis Pitch and his
     brother, Darren, were small-time drug dealers in the Welsh
     Mountain area. Id. at 494.
            As part of their continuing investigation, the police had
     analyzed and cross-referenced cell tower data with known cell
     phone numbers and developed two numbers of particular interest.
     [Id.] at 662-63. The known subscriber for one Philadelphia
     number was [Appellant]. Id. at 664. The police did not know the
     subscriber for the other number of interest from Delaware[.] Id.
     at 663. On the night of the homicide, there were numerous calls
     and texts between [Appellant’s] number and the Delaware
     number. Id. at 665-66, 670. At this stage of the investigation,
     the police had developed Bills as a person of interest. Id. at 666.
     Bills had relatives in Delaware, so they suspected the number
     belonged to him. Id. at 667. On February 21, 2017, Trooper
     Potoka re-interviewed [Appellant] in an effort to identify the
     subscriber of the Delaware cell number. Id.
            In the initial part of the recorded interview, [Appellant]
     repeatedly denied knowing Dennis Pitch and denied ever being at
     his home. Id. at 669. He continued to implicate “Corby” Trego
     in the murder and suggested it could have been the boyfriend of
     Pitch’s estranged wife. Id. Trooper Potoka then asked [Appellant]
     to dial the Delaware number…on his phone and, when he did, the
     name “Billions” came up as the contact. Id. [Appellant] told the
     Trooper that this number belonged to Bills and that his mother
     lives in Delaware, which accounts for the Delaware area code. Id.
     at 670.

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            Further police investigation in the ensuing months
     determined that the Delaware number did not, in fact, belong to
     Bills as stated by [Appellant]. [Id.] at 673. Rather, it belonged
     to an Eileen Frame, whose son is co-conspirator Michael Baker.
     Id. Thus, in their third interview of August 4, 2017, Trooper
     Potoka and Trooper Todd McCurdy confronted [Appellant] with
     information indicating that “Billions” was not Bills, as [Appellant]
     had told them. Id. at 676. [Appellant] revealed that “Billions” is
     actually Baker, a friend from the Philadelphia area. Id. He denied
     trying to intentionally mislead the police and stated the
     misinformation was simply a mistake. Id. [Appellant] told the
     Troopers that Baker had never been in the Narvon area. Id. They
     confronted [Appellant] with cell phone evidence that the number
     corresponding to “Billions” had connected with [Appellant’s]
     phone in the hours before the homicide and that Baker’s cell phone
     was in Narvon on the night of the killing. Id. [Appellant]
     specifically denied ever seeing Baker in Narvon and continued to
     generally deny involvement in, or knowledge of, the homicide. Id.
            [Appellant] was subpoenaed to testify before the grand jury
     in November of 2018. N.T., 8/24/22, at 684. [At trial, with the
     use of the transcript from this prior legal proceeding, and during
     the direct examination of Trooper Potoka, the Commonwealth
     introduced into evidence statements Appellant made during the
     grand jury hearing.] [Specifically,] [d]uring [his grand jury]
     testimony, [Appellant] denied knowing Pitch, denied ever being at
     his home, and denied knowing anything about him. Id. at 686,
     688, 719-20, 729. [Appellant] stated that people on the Mountain
     were saying Brandon Bills had something to do with the murder.
     Id. at 696. [Appellant] admitted texting and calling Baker from
     6:24 p.m. on the evening of December 2, 2016, [to] 7:20 a.m.
     the morning of December 3, 2016.            Id. at 698-700, 703.
     [Appellant] explained the two were communicating about Baker’s
     car, which was experiencing computer problems. Id. at 699-700.
     [Appellant] acknowledged that one of Baker’s nicknames is
     “Billions.” Id. at 702. [Appellant] denied knowing that, while he
     was texting Baker about his car not working, Baker was in Narvon.
     Id. at 702-03, 717-18. [Appellant] testified that Bills told him he
     was at his mother’s home in Delaware at the time of the murder,
     and he didn’t have anything to do with it. Id. at 716.
           [Appellant] admitted knowing Christopher “Suse” Lyles, a
     friend from the Philadelphia area, and having him to his home in
     Narvon. [Id.] at 722-25, 728, 730. Although he could not
     specifically recall, [Appellant said] that it was possible that he and

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     Baker were both communicating with Lyles the night Pitch was
     murdered. Id. at 731. They were all friends, and despite having
     previously told the police that Baker had never been in Lancaster,
     [Appellant] admitted that the three of them had spent time
     together in Lancaster County. Id. at 720-25.
             The Commonwealth introduced substantial expert evidence
     regarding the cell phone records of the co-conspirators to
     establish their conspiracy. N.T., 8/25/22, at 987-1014[.]
     [Specifically, the Commonwealth offered the expert testimony of
     Detective Anthony Vega of the Philadelphia Police Department,
     who is assigned to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s cellular
     analysis survey team.] [Detective Vega indicated] [t]he historical
     cell site data for Baker’s phone established that his phone left the
     Philadelphia area at approximately 5:43 p.m. on December 2,
     2016, passed through the New Holland, Lancaster County area at
     approximately 6:56 p.m., and was in Narvon by at least 8:36 p.m.
     on December 2, 2016. Id. at 1003-04. The data was able to
     establish cell phone activity between [Appellant] and Baker from
     6:25 p.m. on December 2, 2016, through 7:02 a.m. on December
     3, 2016. Id. Most importantly, the data mapping proved the
     presence of Baker’s cell phone in Narvon on the night of the
     murder. Id. at 1003-05[.] Baker’s cell phone records established
     that he returned to the Philadelphia area at approximately 3:29
     a.m. on December 3, 2016. Id. at 1006.
            The cellular data for Lyles’ phone established that his phone
     left the Philadelphia area at 5:46 p.m. and arrived in Narvon at
     7:37 p.m. on the evening of December 2, 2016. [Id.] at 1009.
     During this time, there were numerous cellular contacts with
     [Appellant’s] cell phone. Id. at 1010. The data shows Lyles’
     phone’s location near the commercial burglary site, as well as the
     homicide site. Id. at 1012. Lyles’ last connection in the Narvon
     area was at 2:20 a.m. on December 3, 2016, and then the phone
     traveled back toward Philadelphia arriving there at approximately
     3:56 a.m. Id. at 1013-14.
            [Appellant’s] cell phone data established activity with
     Baker’s and Lyles’ phones between 5:49 p.m. and 9:56 p.m. on
     December 2, 2016. [Id.] at 1007-08. There was no cellular
     activity between these three phones between 9:56 p.m. on
     December 2, 2016, and 8:19 a.m. on December 3, 2016. Id. at
     1005-06[.]
            Finally,…Trooper Potoka [testified] that the vehicle depicted
     in the surveillance video from [the] Gospel Tabernacle Church was

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      [Appellant’s] Lincoln. [Id.] at 980. Trooper Potoka further
      testified that, in his opinion, the vehicle shown in the surveillance
      video from Dukeman’s Sunoco was also [Appellant’s vehicle] and
      that the person who is observed exiting the vehicle, going into the
      convenience store, and re-entering the driver’s side of the vehicle
      was [Appellant]. Id. at 981.
            [Appellant] did not exercise his right to take the stand after
      a thorough on-the-record colloquy. [Id.] at 1024-26. [Appellant
      did not] present any evidence [at trial]. Id. at 1029.

Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/8/23, at 6-19 (footnotes omitted) (footnote

added).

      At the conclusion of all evidence, the jury convicted Appellant of the

offenses indicated supra, and on December 9, 2022, the trial court sentenced

Appellant to an aggregate of life in prison without parole. Appellant filed a

timely, counseled post-sentence motion challenging the sufficiency and weight

of the evidence supporting his convictions. On March 22, 2023, the trial court

denied Appellant’s post-sentence motion, and this timely, counseled appeal

followed on April 21, 2023. All Pa.R.A.P. 1925 requirements have been met.

      On appeal, Appellant sets forth the following issue in his “Statement of

the Questions Involved” (verbatim):

      A. Whether the Honorable Trial Court erred by denying Appellant’s
         post-sentence motion for a new trial, when the jury returned a
         verdict of guilty on the charge of first-degree murder, that was
         against the weight of the evidence and insufficient as a matter
         of law.

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested answer

omitted).

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       Initially, we note Appellant conflates the issues of sufficiency and weight

of the evidence. We remind Appellant that sufficiency and weight claims are

clearly distinct. See Commonwealth v. Widmer, 560 Pa. 308, 744 A.2d 745

(2000) (discussing the distinctions between a claim challenging sufficiency of

the evidence and a claim the verdict is against weight of the evidence). “A

true weight of the evidence challenge concedes that sufficient evidence exists

to sustain the verdict but questions which evidence is to be believed.”

Commonwealth v. Charlton, 902 A.2d 554, 561 (Pa.Super. 2006)

(quotation omitted). With these legal precepts in mind, we turn first to an

examination of whether the evidence was sufficient to support Appellant’s

conviction for one count of first-degree murder.4

       Appellant contends the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient

evidence “tending to show [Appellant] himself branded the gun that killed the

victim” or “that Appellant had the specific intent to kill the victim as required

for a conviction of first-degree murder.” Appellant’s Brief at 9-10, 17

(emphasis omitted). Appellant contends he had, at most, the intent to rob

the victim, and the fact one of his cohorts killed the victim does not establish

Appellant’s guilt for first-degree murder.

____________________________________________

4 We note Appellant has neither raised nor developed an argument on appeal

challenging the sufficiency of the evidence as to his remaining convictions.
Appellant preserved his sufficiency claim in his court-ordered Rule 1925(b)
statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

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      We note this Court’s standard of review when considering a challenge

to the sufficiency of the evidence requires us to look at the evidence in a light

most favorable to the Commonwealth, as verdict winner, and determine

whether the evidence presented, actual and/or circumstantial, was sufficient

to enable a fact-finder to find every element of the crime charged, beyond a

reasonable doubt. See Commonwealth v. O'Brien, 939 A.2d 912 (Pa.Super.

2007).

             In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence
      and substitute our judgment for the fact-finder. In addition, we
      note that the facts and the circumstances established by the
      Commonwealth need not preclude every possibility of innocence.
      Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the
      fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
      as a matter of law no probability of fact may be drawn from the
      combined circumstances.

Id. at 913–914 (quotation omitted). The jury, as the finder of fact, is free to

believe all, some, or none of the evidence presented and is free to determine

the credibility of the witnesses. Commonwealth v. Dailey, 828 A.2d 356

(Pa.Super. 2003). In conducting review, the appellate court may not weigh

the evidence and substitute its judgment for the fact-finder. Commonwealth

v. Baumgartner, 206 A.3d 11, 14-15 (Pa.Super. 2019).

      Section 306 of the Crimes Code defines accomplice liability as follows:

      (a) General rule.—A person is guilty of an offense if it is
      committed by his own conduct or by the conduct of another person
      for which he is legally accountable, or both.
      (b) Conduct of another.—A person is legally accountable for the
      conduct of another person when:

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      (1) acting with the kind of culpability that is sufficient for the
      commission of the offense, he causes an innocent or irresponsible
      person to engage in such conduct;
      (2) he is made accountable for the conduct of such other person
      by this title or by the law defining the offense; or
      (3) he is an accomplice of such other person in the commission of
      the offense.
      (c) Accomplice defined.—A person is an accomplice of another
      person in the commission of an offense if:
      (1) with the intent of promoting or facilitating the commission of
      the offense, he:
      (i) solicits such other person to commit it; or
      (ii) aids or agrees or attempts to aid such other person in planning
      or committing it; or
      (2) his conduct is expressly declared by law to establish his
      complicity.
      (d) Culpability of accomplice.—When causing a particular
      result is an element of an offense, an accomplice in the conduct
      causing such result is an accomplice in the commission of that
      offense, if he acts with the kind of culpability, if any, with respect
      to that result that is sufficient for the commission of the offense.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306 (bold in original).

      Thus, proving a defendant’s guilt as an accomplice requires the

satisfaction of a two-prong test: (1) there must be evidence to show that the

defendant “intended to facilitate or promote the underlying offense” and (2)

there must be evidence that the defendant “actively participated in the crime

or crimes by soliciting, aiding, or agreeing to aid the principal[.]”

Commonwealth v. Kimbrough, 872 A.2d 1244, 1251 (Pa.Super. 2005) (en

banc) (citations omitted). “Both requirements may be established wholly by

circumstantial evidence. Only the least degree of concert or collusion in the

                                     - 15 -
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commission of the offense is sufficient to sustain a finding of responsibility as

an accomplice. No agreement is required, only aid.” Id. (internal citations and

quotation omitted).    Accordingly, where the evidence reveals a defendant

acted as an accomplice, the defendant is criminally responsible for the acts

committed by himself, as well as his accomplices. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 306(a),

(b)(3).

      Regarding first-degree murder, “a criminal homicide constitutes murder

of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 2502(a).

      As our Supreme Court has held:

      There are three elements of first-degree murder: (i) a human
      being was unlawfully killed; (2) the defendant was responsible for
      the killing; and (3) the defendant acted with malice and a specific
      intent to kill. 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a); Commonwealth v. Houser,
      610 Pa. 264, 18 A.3d 1128, 1133 (2011). As set forth in the third
      element, first-degree murder is an intentional killing, i.e., a
      “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2502(a)
      and (d). “Premeditation and deliberation exist whenever the
      assailant possesses the conscious purpose to bring about death.”
      Commonwealth v. Drumheller, 570 Pa. 117, 808 A.2d 893, 910
      (2002). The law does not require a lengthy period of
      premeditation; indeed, the design to kill can be formulated in a
      fraction of a second. Commonwealth v. Earnest, 342 Pa. 544,
      21 A.2d 38, 40 (1941) (“Whether the intention to kill and the
      killing, that is, the premeditation and the fatal act, were within a
      brief space of time or a long space of time is immaterial if the
      killing was in fact intentional, willful, deliberate and
      premeditated.”). Specific intent to kill as well as malice can be
      inferred from the use of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the
      victim’s body. Whether the accused had formed the specific intent
      to kill is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.

                                     - 16 -
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Commonwealth v. Jordan, 619 Pa. 513, 65 A.3d 318, 323 (2013) (some

citations omitted).

      In Commonwealth v. Rios, 554 Pa. 419, 721 A.2d 1049 (1998), our

Supreme Court explained accomplice liability in the context of first-degree

murder as follows:

      It is well established that an accomplice is equally criminally liable
      for the acts of another if he acts with the intent of promoting or
      facilitating the commission of an offense and agrees, aids, or
      attempts to aid such other person in either planning or committing
      that offense. In order to sustain a conviction for first-degree
      murder via accomplice liability, the Commonwealth’s evidence
      must be sufficient to establish that appellant possessed specific
      intent to kill. Whether an accomplice possessed the same intent
      to kill as his co-conspirator may be inferred from words, conduct,
      the attendant circumstances including the actions taken after the
      killing and all reasonable inferences that follow from them.

Rios, supra, 721 A.2d at 1053 (citations omitted).

      Here, assuming, arguendo, the record reveals Lyles and/or Baker shot

the victim, and Appellant did not do so, we conclude the evidence is sufficient

to establish Appellant is criminally liable for first-degree murder under

accomplice liability. Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,

as verdict winner, the evidence reveals that, during the early evening of

December 2, 2016, Appellant contacted Lyles and Baker, both of whom

Appellant knew from his previous time in prison. Lyles and Baker traveled to

Narvon, where the victim, as well as Appellant and Bills lived. With Lyles,

Baker, and Bills in his vehicle, Appellant drove to several locations where one

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or more of the men burglarized an Amish-owned business during the evening

of December 2, 2016.

      Later that night, Appellant parked his vehicle at a church near some

woods by the victim’s residence. Appellant removed two sawed-off shotguns

from the trunk of his car. He handed one to Baker and took one for himself.

Appellant, Baker, and Lyles put on gloves and masks, and they then went to

the victim’s house where a violent struggle ensued. Specifically, while working

as a team, the men gained access to the victim’s home, beat him, and

ransacked his house looking for money. A shotgun was fired at least once

during the home invasion and resulted in a hole in the floor of the victim’s

bedroom. Moreover, during the struggle, while the victim was on his knees

or lying on the floor, he was shot four times from behind. “The victim was

shot through the back of his head, also through his right check into his chest,

through the back of the right upper arm into the chest, and finally through the

right upper back into the chest and through the right lung.” Trial Court

Opinion, filed 8/8/23, at 26 (citations to record omitted). The four shots were

from a handgun, which the Commonwealth argued was possessed by Lyles.

The trio then ran from the victim’s house, entered Appellant’s car where Bills

was still waiting, and left the scene. See Commonwealth v. Housman, 604

Pa. 596, 986 A.2d 822 (2009) (indicating flight can constitute circumstantial

evidence of consciousness of guilt).

                                       - 18 -
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      Based on the aforementioned, the Commonwealth proved beyond a

reasonable doubt that Appellant was guilty of first-degree murder under

accomplice liability. Although circumstantial, the evidence proves Appellant

intended to facilitate or promote first-degree murder, and he actively

participated in the crime by soliciting, aiding, or agreeing to aid Baker and

Lyles. Kimbrough, supra. Even if Appellant did not shoot a vital body part

of the victim or personally fire any shots, the jury could have properly found

Appellant had the requisite specific intent to kill based on his accomplice’s use

of a deadly weapon on a vital part of the victim’s body. Moreover, the victim

suffered four gunshot wounds, and the sheer number of bullets fired at the

victim allows the jury an inference that Appellant had the specific intent to

kill. Simply put, contrary to Appellant’s assertion, the Commonwealth was

not required to prove Appellant was the person who shot the victim. Rather,

since Appellant acted as an accomplice to Lyles and Baker, and the evidence

demonstrates he had the same intent to kill as his accomplices, he is criminally

responsible for the acts committed by one or both of them. See Rios, supra.

      Moreover, Appellant suggests that he cannot be guilty of first-degree

murder because, when the men entered the victim’s home, they only had the

specific intent to commit a burglary, and not murder the victim.           Even

assuming, arguendo, Appellant’s version of events is supported by the

evidence, we note the “law does not require a lengthy period of premeditation;

indeed, the design to kill can be formulated in a fraction of a second.” Rios,

                                     - 19 -
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supra, 721 A.2d at 1053 (citations omitted).             Here, the Commonwealth

proved the victim fought back during the home invasion, and he was severely

beaten. Also, several gunshots were fired, including one from a shotgun and

several from a handgun, which missed the victim, as well as four shots from

a handgun, which entered the victim’s body from behind as the victim knelt

and/or was lying on the floor. Accordingly, even if Appellant and his

accomplices did not have the specific intent to kill the victim when they

entered the victim’s home, the Commonwealth sufficiently demonstrated that,

at some point during the home invasion, Appellant and his accomplices formed

the specific intent to kill the victim. Rios, supra, 721 A.2d at 1053 (“Whether

an accomplice possessed the same intent to kill as his co-conspirator may be

inferred from words, conduct, the attendant circumstances including the

actions taken after the killing and all reasonable inferences that follow from

them.”) (citations omitted)).        Accordingly, we find no merit to Appellant’s

sufficiency of the evidence claim.

       Appellant also contends the jury’s verdict for first-degree murder is

against the weight of the evidence.5           Specifically, Appellant notes his co-

conspirators, Lyles and Baker, were convicted of second-degree murder in

____________________________________________

5 Appellant adequately preserved his weight claim in his post-sentence motion,

as well as his court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.Crim.P.
607; Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant has neither raised nor developed an
argument on appeal challenging the weight of the evidence as to his remaining
convictions.

                                          - 20 -
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separate trials, and, thus, the jury’s verdict of first-degree murder in

Appellant’s trial is wholly inconsistent and shocks one’s sense of justice.

      When considering challenges to the weight of the evidence, we apply

the following precepts.   “The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the

finder of fact, who is free to believe all, none[,] or some of the evidence and

to determine the credibility of the witnesses.” Commonwealth v. Talbert,

129 A.3d 536, 545 (Pa.Super. 2015) (quotation marks and quotation

omitted). Resolving contradictory testimony and questions of credibility are

matters for the finder of fact. Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910,

917 (Pa.Super. 2000). It is well-settled that we cannot substitute our

judgment for that of the trier of fact. Talbert, supra.

      Moreover, appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the trial

court’s exercise of discretion in denying the weight challenge raised in the

post-sentence motion; this Court does not review the underlying question of

whether the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. See id.

      Because the trial judge has had the opportunity to hear and see
      the evidence presented, an appellate court will give the gravest
      consideration to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial
      judge when reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict
      is against the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable
      reasons for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s
      conviction that the verdict was or was not against the weight of
      the evidence and that a new trial should be granted in the interest
      of justice.

Id. at 546 (quotation omitted). Furthermore, “[i]n order for a defendant to

prevail on a challenge to the weight of the evidence, the evidence must be so

                                     - 21 -
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tenuous, vague and uncertain that the verdict shocks the conscience of the

court.” Id. (quotation marks and quotation omitted).

       Our Supreme Court has held that inconsistent verdicts between co-

conspirators is not a basis for a new trial. See Commonwealth v. Miller,

613 Pa. 584, 35 A.3d 1206, 1213 (2012) (“[E]ven where two verdicts are

logically inconsistent, such inconsistency alone cannot be grounds for a new

trial or for reversal.”); Commonwealth v. Campbell, 539 Pa. 212, 651 A.2d

1096    (1994) (holding    even   where   co-defendants are      tried together

inconsistent verdicts alone is not grounds for a new trial).

       Here, in addressing Appellant’s claim, the trial court noted that any

inconsistency in the verdicts in Appellant’s, Lyles’, and Baker’s cases is not a

basis for a new trial given that the evidence was sufficient to support

Appellant’s first-degree murder conviction in the instant case. See Trial Court

Opinion, filed 8/8/23, at 30. As the trial court suggested, “we refuse to inquire

or speculate upon the nature of the jury’s deliberations or the rationale behind

the jury’s decision.” Campbell, supra, 651 A.2d at 1100–01. In the case sub

judice, the jury properly weighed the evidence presented at Appellant’s trial,

as detailed above, and found it sufficient to prove Appellant’s guilt of first-

degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt. In light of the foregoing, the trial

court did not err in concluding the verdict was not so contrary to the weight

of the evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice. See Talbert, supra.

       For all of the foregoing reasons, we affirm.

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     Affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/21/2024

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