Court Opinion

ID: 9408129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-11 17:05:59.275603+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:41.951764
License: Public Domain

Filed 7/11/23 P. v. Terrell CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                         (Yuba)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C096318

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                   (Super. Ct. No. CRF18-01944)

           v.

    KENNETH MORGAN TERRELL,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Kenneth Morgan Terrell argues that we must vacate his five-year
prison sentence because the trial court improperly imposed punishment for more than one
offense based on a single act, in violation of Penal Code section 654.1 Defendant also
contends the trial court imposed fines, fees, and assessments in violation of his
constitutional rights. The Attorney General concedes defendant must be resentenced to

1        Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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stay the sentences imposed for all but one of his convictions pursuant to section 654. We
will accept the Attorney General’s concession, vacate defendant’s sentence, and remand
for resentencing. Because we are remanding for a full resentencing, defendant’s claims
regarding fines, fees, and assessments can be addressed to the trial court in the first
instance.
                                     BACKGROUND
       The prosecution charged defendant with possession of methamphetamine for sale
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11378); transportation of methamphetamine for sale (Health &
Saf. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)); possession of methamphetamine while armed with a
loaded, operable firearm (Health & Saf. Code, § 11370.1, subd. (a)); and possession of a
firearm by a felon. (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1).) Because defendant only challenges his
sentence in this appeal, we relate the evidence adduced at trial for these offenses only to
the extent they are relevant to the sentencing issues raised.
       A sheriff’s deputy saw defendant driving erratically with an expired registration
sticker on his truck and pulled him over. The officer saw a bag containing a large
quantity of methamphetamine on the floorboard of the truck. After arresting defendant,
the officer searched the truck and found another large bag of methamphetamine and a
loaded handgun hidden together below the steering column.
       At trial, defendant’s counsel argued the evidence failed to show he intended to sell
the methamphetamine. To prove this intent, the prosecution adduced testimony from an
expert in the possession, sale, and distribution of controlled substances. The expert
testified that methamphetamine dealers often have firearms alongside their stash of drugs
for protection in case they are robbed.
       The prosecution did not offer any evidence that defendant possessed the
methamphetamine or the handgun before his arrest or had any intent for possessing the
handgun other than protecting the inventory and proceeds of his methamphetamine
business. Likewise, the charging document and the jury instructions do not indicate that

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defendant’s possession of the methamphetamine and the handgun occurred at any time
other than the time of his arrest.
       The jury found defendant guilty of each of the four charged offenses. The
probation officer’s postconviction report recommended sentencing defendant to
consecutive prison terms on count 2, transportation of methamphetamine for sale, and
count 3, possession of methamphetamine while armed with a loaded, operable firearm.
The probation report recommended staying the sentences on count 1, possession of
methamphetamine for sale, and count 4, possession of a firearm by a felon, pursuant to
section 654, because the conduct for those offenses “mirror[ed]” the conduct for the other
two offenses. The report reasoned that the trial court could execute the sentences on both
counts 2 and 3 because “defendant’s possession of a firearm is not inherently tied to drug
use or sales; it does not require the offender to transport drugs or possess them for sale. It
simply requires possession.” Thus, the probation report concluded that the “firearm and
controlled substances [were] independent of each other.”
       The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of four years in state prison
on count 2, plus a consecutive term of one year in prison on count 3, and stayed the
sentences on counts 1 and 4 pursuant to section 654. The court also imposed a $600
restitution fine (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)); a $600 parole revocation restitution fine
(§ 1202.45); a $50 criminal laboratory analysis fee (§ 11372.5, subd. (a)); a $150 drug
program fee (Health & Saf. Code, § 11372.7); $505 in unspecified penalty assessments;
$160 in court operations assessments (§ 1465.8); and $120 in conviction assessments.
(Gov. Code, § 70373.) Defense counsel did not raise section 654 as an impediment to the
five-year sentence and did not object to the imposition of fines, fees, or assessments.
       Defendant timely appealed the judgment.

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                                      DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends the trial court violated section 654 by failing to stay all but
one of the sentences imposed because all four convictions were based on a single act.
The Attorney General concedes the issue, and we agree with the parties.
       Section 654 provides, in part: “An act or omission that is punishable in different
ways by different provisions of law may be punished under either of such provisions, but
in no case shall the act or omission be punished under more than one provision. . . .”
(§ 654, subd. (a).) In other words, “[s]ection 654 prohibits multiple punishment for a
single physical act that violates different provisions of law.” (People v. Jones (2012)
54 Cal.4th 350, 358 (Jones).) “[T]he proper method of eliminating the punitive
consequences of multiple convictions [i]s to stay execution of sentence for all but one
conviction arising out of each act or indivisible course of conduct.” (People v. Pearson
(1986) 42 Cal.3d 351, 360, disapproved on another ground in People v. Vidana (2016)
1 Cal.5th 632, 651.)
       The trial court correctly determined that it could not execute sentences for both
transporting and possessing the same methamphetamine (see People v. Buchanan (2016)
248 Cal.App.4th 603, 613), or for both possessing the handgun with methamphetamine
and for possessing it having been convicted of a felony. (See Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at
p. 357.) But the trial court, by executing sentences for both counts 2 and 3, implicitly
agreed with the probation department’s assessment that the two offenses were
independent of each other. We agree with the parties that defendant’s act of transporting
methamphetamine for sale was not separate from the act of possessing the same
methamphetamine while armed with the handgun, so executing the sentences for both
offenses did not comport with section 654.
       Because “ ‘simultaneous possession of different items of contraband’ are separate
acts for these purposes” (Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 358), we must consider
defendant’s “intent or objective,” the “test generally applied when there has been a course

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of conduct rather than a single criminal act.” (Id. at p. 359.) “ ‘Whether a course of
criminal conduct is divisible and therefore gives rise to more than one act within the
meaning of section 654 depends on the intent and objective of the actor. If all of the
offenses were incident to one objective, the defendant may be punished for any one of
such offenses but not for more than one.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Latimer (1993)
5 Cal.4th 1203, 1208.) “We apply a substantial evidence standard of review when
determining whether section 654 applies. ‘The determination of whether there was more
than one objective is a factual determination, which will not be reversed on appeal unless
unsupported by the evidence presented at trial.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Kurtenbach
(2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1289.)
       Here, all of the evidence at trial showed defendant had a single purpose in
transporting the methamphetamine and possessing the handgun. One large bag of
methamphetamine was hidden together with the handgun below the steering wheel,
within defendant’s reach. The prosecution expert testified that methamphetamine dealers
often have firearms alongside their stash of drugs for protection in case they are robbed.
No evidence was introduced to establish that defendant possessed the methamphetamine
or the handgun at any time before his arrest, or had any intent for possessing the handgun
other than protecting the inventory and proceeds of his methamphetamine business.
Likewise, the charging document and the jury instructions do not indicate that
defendant’s possession of the methamphetamine and the handgun occurred at any time
other than the time of his arrest. (See Jones, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 359 [despite evidence
that the defendant possessed the gun three days prior, charging document, jury
instructions, and prosecutor’s closing argument established “that the jury convicted [the]
defendant of each crime due to his being caught with the gun in the car on May 26, 2008,
not due to any antecedent possession”].)
       Because no substantial evidence supports a finding that defendant had more than
one objective in transporting methamphetamine in his truck while armed with a handgun,

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we must vacate defendant’s sentence and remand for resentencing consistent with section
654. On remand, “the full resentencing rule allows a court to revisit all prior sentencing
decisions when resentencing a defendant.” (People v. Valenzuela (2019) 7 Cal.5th 415,
424-425.) Accordingly, defendant will be able to present his contentions regarding fines,
fees, and assessments to the trial court in the first instance, and we need not address those
issues in this appeal.
                                      DISPOSITION
       Defendant’s sentence is vacated, and the case is remanded for a full resentencing
consistent with section 654. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                        KRAUSE                  , J.

We concur:

      MAURO                 , Acting P. J.

      MESIWALA              , J.

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