Court Opinion

ID: 9365594
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-24 17:02:38.248442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:45.906616
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
 UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
                 AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

                                    IN THE
             ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
                                DIVISION ONE

                              In re the Matter of:

                            RAYMOND BOLKAN,
                              Petitioner/Appellee,

                                        v.

                            TRINITY DONOVAN,
                             Respondent/Appellant.

                           No. 1 CA-CV 22-0112 FC
                               FILED 01-24-2023

           Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
                          No. FC2020-095177

              The Honorable Jacki Ireland, Judge Pro Tempore

    AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART AND REMANDED

                                   COUNSEL

Law Offices of John R. Zarzynski, Phoenix
By John R. Zarzynski
Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

Davis Miles McGuire Gardner, PLLC, Tempe
By Douglas C. Gardner, Francis B. Espiritu
Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee
                         BOLKAN v. DONOVAN
                          Decision of the Court

                      MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge David D. Weinzweig delivered the decision of the Court,
in which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge D. Steven Williams joined.

W E I N Z W E I G, Judge:

¶1           Trinity Donovan (“Mother”) appeals from the superior
court’s dissolution decree ending her marriage to Raymond Bolkan
(“Father”). For the reasons set forth below, we affirm in part and vacate in
part.

            FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

¶2            Mother and Father married in 2011 and share two children.
Father filed for divorce in June 2020. Among other things, he sought
temporary orders for sole legal decision-making and primary-parent
designation. Soon after, Mother sought and obtained an order of protection
against Father, alleging multiple instances of domestic violence. The order
of protection included the children, but Mother later agreed to remove
them. After a temporary-orders hearing, the superior court awarded joint
legal decision-making, as well as weekly and bimonthly parenting time to
Father. Mother did not challenge the temporary orders.

¶3            A year later, the court held an evidentiary hearing in
connection with the dissolution decree. Mother described several recurring
instances of domestic violence dating back to 2017. Father denied the
allegations. The court awarded Father joint legal decision-making. It
acknowledged that Father had committed “several incidents of domestic
violence” but concluded that Father’s conduct did not rise to the level of
“significant domestic violence.” It also found that Father rebutted the
statutory presumption against legal decision-making under A.R.S.
§ 25-403(D).

¶4          The court found that Father owed money to Mother and the
community for marital waste, health insurance premiums and other
expenses. Even so, the court ordered this debt to be offset by Father’s
unknown interest in the equitable lien the community held over Mother’s

1      We view the facts in the light most favorable to affirming the decree.
In re Marriage of Foster, 240 Ariz. 99, 100, ¶ 2 (App. 2016).

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                        BOLKAN v. DONOVAN
                         Decision of the Court

sole and separate properties. Mother owned two properties in Mexico
before the marriage, which remained her sole and separate property at
dissolution. At various points, however, the community paid the mortgage
on the Mexico properties. As a result, the superior court found the
community held an equitable lien over Mother’s sole and separate
properties.

¶5           Mother appeals. We have jurisdiction. See Ariz. Const. art. 6,
§ 9 and A.R.S. § 12-120.21(A)(1).

                             DISCUSSION

¶6           Mother raises five issues on appeal.

I.    Legal Decision-Making and Parenting Time

¶7            First, Mother challenges the legal decision-making order,
arguing the court abused its discretion by declining to classify several
incidents of domestic violence as “significant” under § 25-403.03.
Alternatively, Mother contends the record does not support the court’s
determination that Father rebutted the statutory presumption against joint
legal decision-making under § 25-403.03(D).

¶8            We review legal decision-making orders for an abuse of
discretion. DeLuna v. Petitto, 247 Ariz. 420, 423, ¶ 9 (App. 2019). A court
abuses its discretion when it “commits an error of law in reaching a
discretionary decision or when the record does not support” its decision.
Id. We will accept “the court’s findings of fact unless they are clearly
erroneous but review conclusions of law and the interpretation of statutes
de novo.” Id.

¶9            To determine legal decision-making and parenting time, the
superior court considers the best-interest factors under A.R.S. § 25-403,
including “whether there has been domestic violence or child abuse
pursuant to § 25-403.03.” A.R.S. § 25-403(A)(8); DeLuna, 247 Ariz. at 423,
¶ 11. If the court finds domestic violence has occurred, it must determine
whether it constituted (1) “significant domestic violence pursuant to
§ 13-3601,” or (2) “a significant history of domestic violence.” A.R.S.
§ 25-403.03(A); DeLuna, 247 Ariz. at 423–24, ¶¶ 11, 16.

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                          BOLKAN v. DONOVAN
                           Decision of the Court

       A.     Significant Domestic Violence or Significant History of Domestic
              Violence

¶10           The legislature did not define “significant domestic violence”
or “significant history of domestic violence” under A.R.S. § 25-403.03,
leaving the superior court with “discretion to weigh the evidence and
determine the degree of the domestic violence’s ‘significance’ for the
purpose of § 25-403.03(A).” DeLuna, 247 Ariz. at 424, ¶ 15.

¶11           The superior court found Mother testified “credibly” to
multiple instances of domestic violence, but it determined that “those acts
in the spectrum of domestic violence do not constitute significant [domestic
violence] as contemplated by [the] statute.” The court considered three
factors in reaching its conclusion: “(1) [t]he seriousness of the particular
incident of domestic violence, (2) the frequency or pervasiveness of the
domestic violence, (3) and the passage of time and its impact.” See Id. 424,
¶ 15 n.6 (noting that the factors in this three-part test, which has circulated
in the superior court, “seem reasonable” but “do not appear in
§ 25-403.03(A), any family court rule, or published Arizona opinions”).

¶12           Mother argues that she proved Father engaged in “significant
domestic violence” or a “significant history of domestic violence.” But we
will not reweigh the evidence on appeal, Lehn v. Al-Thanayyan, 246 Ariz.
277, 284, ¶ 20 (App. 2019), and the record contains reasonable evidence to
support the court’s decision.

       B.     Rebuttal of Presumption Against Legal Decision-Making

¶13            If the superior court finds a parent has committed domestic
violence, the law imposes a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole
or joint legal decision-making to that parent would not be in the children’s
best interests. See A.R.S. § 25-403.03(D). Here, the court found that Father
rebutted this presumption.

¶14             Mother disagrees, but we discern no error. The court assessed
the rebuttal factors under § 25-403.03(E) and found, based on the totality of
the evidence, that Father rebutted the presumption. The record supports
the court’s finding. Mother never expressed fears or concerns for the
children’s safety with Father, and, as the superior court observed, the
parties had experienced “minimal problems since issuance of the
temporary orders.” Again, we do not reweigh facts or second-guess the
trial court’s credibility determinations. Matter of Ghostley, 248 Ariz. 112, 117,
¶ 21 (App. 2020).

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                         BOLKAN v. DONOVAN
                          Decision of the Court

¶15           Mother also contests the superior court’s award of parenting
time, but she never develops her argument or cites supporting legal
authority, thus waiving the argument on appeal. See ARCAP 13(a)(6), (7);
Polanco v. Indus. Comm’n of Arizona, 214 Ariz. 489, 491, ¶ 6 n.2 (App. 2007)
(declining to reach merits when appellant only “mentions this argument in
passing in his opening brief, . . . cites no relevant supporting authority and
does not develop it further”). Even so, the record supports the court’s
finding. See Ghostley, 248 Ariz. at 117, ¶ 21.

II.    Child Support

¶16            Mother next contests the child support award, arguing the
superior court never considered that Father recently sold a home for
$133,000. “We review child support awards for abuse of discretion.”
Birnstihl v. Birnstihl, 243 Ariz. 588, 590, ¶ 8 (App. 2018). We uphold child
support awards for any reason supported by the record, unless the record
lacks competent supporting evidence. Nia v. Nia, 242 Ariz. 419, 422, ¶ 7
(App. 2017).

¶17          Father introduced his June 2020 affidavit of financial
information (“AFI”) into evidence. Father described his occupation as “real
estate salesperson,” characterizing his compensation as “commission
based.” At trial, Father testified about a recent one-time payment of
$133,000, which he received for selling property. Mother argues the
superior court should have added this one-time payment to Father’s gross
income calculation under the Child Support Guidelines.

¶18           Mother shows no abuse of discretion. First, the superior court
did not have to add the one-time, non-recurring payment to Father’s gross
income calculations. See A.R.S. § 25-320, Arizona Child Support Guidelines
§ 2(A)(1)(d) (2021) (“The court has discretion to consider whether
non-continuing or non-recurring income is considered income for purposes
of calculating child support.”). Second, the record included evidence to
support the court’s calculation, including Father’s AFI and the
unchallenged findings made in the temporary orders. Mother never
objected to the admission of Father’s AFI at trial and never moved to
modify the temporary orders. We will not reweigh the evidence. See Hurd
v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16 (App. 2009).

III.   The Offset

¶19           Mother next challenges the superior court’s use of an
equitable lien to offset Father’s debt for marital waste, health insurance
premiums and other expenses. The “amount of the community interest in

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                         BOLKAN v. DONOVAN
                          Decision of the Court

separate property resulting in an equitable lien is a mixed question of fact
and law,” and “so we defer to the trial court’s factual findings but review
legal conclusions de novo.” Saba v. Khoury, 516 P.3d 891, 894, ¶ 7 (Ariz.
2022).

¶20           The superior court found that Father owed the community a
debt for marital waste, health insurance premiums and other expenses.
Even so, the court ordered this debt was offset by Father’s interest in an
equitable lien the community held over Mother’s sole and separate
property. In particular, Mother owned two properties in Mexico before the
marriage, which remained her sole and separate property at dissolution. At
various points, however, the community paid the mortgage on the Mexico
properties. As a result, the superior court found the community held an
equitable lien over Mother’s sole and separate property.

¶21           Mother acknowledges the community made mortgage
payments on her sole and separate properties in Mexico, but she argues the
superior court had no evidence to determine the amount of the
community’s equitable lien, much less to use Father’s interest in that lien as
an offset against his debts for marital waste and other expenses. We agree.

¶22           Arizona courts have long recognized “that a marital
community is entitled to reimbursement for its contributions to a spouse’s
separate property.” Id. at ¶ 8. When the community’s assets are “used to
make mortgage payments on [the sole and separate] property [of one
spouse], the community is entitled to some form of compensation and has
an equitable lien against the property.” Barnett v. Jedynak, 219 Ariz. 550,
553-54, ¶ 14 (App. 2009). To prove the amount of an equitable lien,
however, the movant must prove “the amount of the community
contribution and a division of equity reflecting the increase in value due to
the community contribution consistent with a market rate of return on that
contribution.” Saba, 516 P.3d at 896, ¶ 16; see Valento v. Valento, 225 Ariz.
477, 482, ¶ 14 (App. 2010) (when imposing an equitable lien, the superior
court “determine[s] the value of the property on the date of trial to compute
the value of the community lien”).

¶23            Here, the superior court lamented that “[n]either party
presented any credible evidence regarding what the Mexico properties
were worth at [the] time of termination of the community, nor the dollar
amount the community contributed towards the loan payoffs,” even
confessing it “cannot pull numbers out of thin air.” Without that evidence,
Father did not meet his burden of proof. See Lawwill v. Lawwill, 21 Ariz.

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                         BOLKAN v. DONOVAN
                          Decision of the Court

App. 75, 78 (1973) (“[T]he party seeking relief [has] the burden of proving
the grounds relied upon for relief.”).

¶24            We therefore vacate the superior court’s finding of an
equitable lien on Mother’s sole and separate property, and we remand for
the court to determine who owes what to whom under the decree in light
of this decision.

IV.    Amber Street House

¶25           Mother purchased the Amber Street house before the
marriage, but she later refinanced the mortgage during the marriage and
added Father to the title. At the last evidentiary hearing, the superior court
received sworn testimony from Father and Mother on who would receive
the Amber Street house at dissolution. Father agreed he would be “willing
to give” the Amber Street house “free and clear” to Mother and
acknowledged that she was “getting all of the interest in” this house.
Mother said she was “agreeable to that” during her testimony. Despite the
parties’ in-court testimony, the superior court divided the Amber Street
house equally between Mother and Father in its final dissolution decree.

¶26            Mother argues that the testimony represented and
memorialized a binding settlement agreement under Rule 69 of the Arizona
Rules of Family Law Procedure (“ARFLP”) on how the Amber Street house
would be distributed, and the superior court erroneously ignored the
agreement. “We review de novo the interpretation of statutes and rules.”
State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, 235, ¶ 30 (App. 2004).

¶27         Mother shows no error. Although the terms of a binding
agreement may be “stated on the record before a judge,” see ARFLP 69(a)(2),
the agreement “is not binding on the court until it is submitted to and
approved by the court as provided by law,” see ARFLP 69(b). The court
never approved the purported agreement here.

V.     Appraisal on Carla Vista House and Final Judgment

¶28            Mother and Father purchased the Carla Vista house during
the marriage. The court ordered the parties to obtain updated appraisals of
the house and split the proceeds. Mother argues this was error because the
court did not explain in its written order how to resolve disagreements on
the appraisal. For that reason, Mother also contends the court improperly
certified the judgment as final and appealable under Rule 78. See ARFLP
78. We review both issues de novo. Robinson v. Kay, 225 Ariz. 191, 192, ¶ 4
(App. 2010).

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                          BOLKAN v. DONOVAN
                           Decision of the Court

¶29              We discern no error. The superior court advised at the close
of trial: “[I]f you disagree [with the appraisal figures], I’ll have you pick the
number in the middle. It’s patently unfair based on the housing market
right now to use an appraisal from last September.”

¶30           The superior court appropriately certified the judgment as
final and appealable. A family court’s ruling is final and appealable when
the court resolves all pending issues and certifies the judgment as final.
ARFLP 78; Natale v. Natale, 234 Ariz. 507, 509, ¶ 9 (App. 2014); In re Marriage
of Chapman, 251 Ariz. 40, 43, ¶ 10 (App. 2021) (finality certification “also
must be substantively warranted”) (citation omitted).               The court
substantively disposed of all pending issues here, including with its oral
instructions on “what would happen in the event of a disagreement” about
the appraisal. See Chapman, 251 Ariz. at 43, ¶ 10; Allen v. Allen, 129 Ariz.
112, 114 (App. 1981) (“[R]endition is generally, if not always, an oral act by
the court from the bench.”) (citation omitted).

                               CONCLUSION

¶31           We affirm the dissolution decree, but vacate the superior
court’s finding of an equitable lien. We remand for the court to determine
who owes what to whom in light of this decision.

¶32           Both parties seek fees and costs on appeal, which we deny in
our discretion. See Clark v. Clark, 239 Ariz. 281, 283, ¶ 14 (App. 2016).

                           AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
                           FILED:    HB

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