Court Opinion

ID: 9560680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:53:35.444751+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:05.942971
License: Public Domain

LOHR, Justice,
dissenting:
The majority holds that section 16-4-109(3), 8 C.R.S. (1978), and Crim.P. 46(a)(8)(III) authorize a court to set aside a forfeiture of a bail bond only before judgment of forfeiture has been entered. The majority further states that since the criminal procedure rules do not provide for post-judgment relief in bail bond cases, such relief is available only under the terms of C.R.C.P. 60(b), which does not allow a judgment to be set aside unless extreme or extraordinary circumstances are established. In Owens v. People, 194 Colo. 389, 572 P.2d 837 (1977), however, we held that section 16-4-109(3) and Crim.P. 46(a)(8)(III) allow a trial court discretion to set aside a judgment of forfeiture in whole or in part if it appears that justice so requires. I would adhere to that decision. I also would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in this case. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Section 16-4-109 provides in relevant part:
(2) Where the defendant has been released upon deposit of cash, stocks, or bonds or upon a surety bond secured by property, if the defendant fails to appear in accordance with the primary condition of the bond, the court shall declare a forfeiture. Notice of the order of forfeiture shall be mailed forthwith by the court to the defendant and sureties, if any, at their last known address. If the defendant does not appear and surrender to the court having jurisdiction within thirty days from the date of the forfeiture or within that period satisfy the court that appearance and surrender by the defendant is impossible and without his fault, the court shall enter judgment for the state against the defendant for the amount of the bail and costs of the court proceedings. Any cash deposits made with the clerk of the court shall be applied to the payment of costs. If any amount of such cash deposit remains after the payment of costs, it shall be applied to payment of the judgment.
(3) The court may order that a forfeiture be set aside, upon such conditions as the court may impose, if it appears that justice so requires.
In support of its conclusion that subsection (3) permits only orders of forfeiture, not judgments of forfeiture, to be set aside, the majority states that the statute plainly distinguishes between an order of forfeiture and an entry of final judgment on a forfeiture. However, the language of section 16-4-109(3) makes no such precise distinction, and courts have not been careful in differentiating between the order of forfeiture and the entry of judgment of forfeiture, referring to each as a forfeiture of the bond. See Owens v. People, 194 Colo. 389, 572 P.2d 837 (1977); People v. Mendez, 708 P.2d 126 (Colo.App.1985).
The majority makes a persuasive argument that the history of the statute and the rule supports a construction that section 16-4-109(3) relates only to orders of forfeiture, not judgments of forfeiture. The majority’s interpretation, however, is not the only reasonable reading of the statutory scheme, and it is expressly contrary to the construction adopted by this court only eleven years ago in Owens v. People, 194 Colo. 389, 572 P.2d 837 (1977). Principles of stare decisis counsel that we follow that decision. See, e.g., Huydts v. Dixon, 199 Colo. 260, 606 P.2d 1303 (1980); Jennings v. Bradfield, 169 Colo. 146, 454 P.2d 81 (1969); City & County of Denver v. Duffy Storage & Moving Co., 168 Colo. 91, 450 P.2d 339 (1969).
*203The statutory structure and the language of section 16-4-109 readily lend themselves to the interpretation adopted in Owens v. People. Sections 16-4-108(1) and 109(2) set forth the ways that a surety can be exonerated from liability on a bail bond prior to judgment of forfeiture. Under section 108(1) exoneration follows when the condition of the bond has been satisfied, when the amount of the forfeiture has been paid, or when the defendant has been surrendered into custody prior to entry of judgment of forfeiture and all costs have been paid. Section 109(2) provides that after an order of forfeiture has been issued for failure of a defendant to appear, judgment on the forfeiture can be avoided only if the defendant appears and surrenders to the court having jurisdiction within thirty days from the date of the forfeiture or the court is satisfied within that period that appearance and surrender by the defendant is impossible and without his fault. Absent compliance with one of these two requirements, “the court shall enter judgment for the state against the defendant for the amount of the bail and costs of the court proceedings.” § 16-4-109(2). After the provisions for exoneration in sections 16-4-108(1) and 109(2) and after the requirement for entry of judgment in absence of exoneration in section 16-4-109(2), the statute sets forth in section 16-4-109(3) the basis upon which a “forfeiture” may be set aside. Section 16-4-110 then goes on to elaborate upon the procedure to be followed in obtaining a judgment against the surety following the order of forfeiture, and makes provision for enforcement of the judgment. This statutory organization strongly suggests that the provision of section 16-4-109(3) for setting aside a “forfeiture,” coming as it does after the provisions for exoneration of the surety and the entry of judgment in absence of such exoneration, relates to the judgment of forfeiture, not the order of forfeiture. So construed, it serves the important purpose of allowing a court flexibility to achieve a just result when conditions change after judgment — as when a defendant surrenders to authorities and no prejudice has been caused to the state. This flexibility is further promoted by the provision in section 16-4-109(3) that the court may impose conditions on setting aside a forfeiture.
In People v. Owens, we expressly relied on section 16-4-109(3) and the corresponding criminal procedure rule, Crim.P. 46(a)(8)(III), as then in effect,1 in allowing postjudgment remission of a bail bond. In Owens, the defendant failed to appear for his probation revocation hearing as required under his bail bond. The court declared a forfeiture of the bond and subsequently entered judgment on the forfeiture.2 The defendant later returned voluntarily to Colorado, and the bondsman surrendered him to custody less than one year after his scheduled appearance date. The bondsman then filed a motion for return of the forfeited bond. The parties stipulated that the People had not incurred any expenses or lost any legal rights as a result of the defendant’s failure to appear and that the contractual obligation of the defendant’s mother to repay the bondsman was working an extreme hardship on her and her family. The district court denied the motion for the remission of the bond, and the court of appeals affirmed. People v. Schliesser, 39 Colo.App. 54, 563 P.2d 377 (1977).
This court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals. We determined that section 16-4-109(3) applied even though a judgment had been entered, stating:
The decision as to whether or not a forfeited bond should be remitted is entrusted to the trial court’s discretion by *204section 16-4-109(3), C.R.S. 1973 and Crim.P. 46(a)(8)(III). Both of these provisions state that bond forfeitures may be vacated “if it appears that justice so requires.” This standard is essentially an appeal to the conscience of the court. No clear rule can be set down which will guide the trial court in every case since the facts and circumstances of each individual case must be considered in their totality. No one factor will be determinative in all cases.
Id. 194 Colo. at 391, 572 P.2d at 838. The court of appeals has since followed our holding in Owens. See People v. Mendez, 708 P.2d 126 (Colo.App.1985); People v. Saviano, 677 P.2d 414 (Colo.App.1983); People v. Rothe, 43 Colo.App. 274, 606 P.2d 79 (1979). The People argue in their brief that Owens was wrong and should be overruled. In footnote 7 to its opinion, the majority “disapproves” Owens to the extent the case relies on section 16-4-109(3) or Crim.P. 46(a)(8)(III), thereby rejecting completely the analysis upon which we relied in deciding Owens. The majority approves the result in Owens, however, as a proper outcome under C.R.C.P. 60(b)(5), an authority not discussed or even cited in Owens. I am unpersuaded that Owens was incorrect in its analysis. It is based upon a reasonable reading of the statute and rule, one that gives a court flexibility to tailor a result to fit the circumstances in order to accord fairness to both the surety and the state. In any event, sound principles of stare decisis militate against overruling that decision. See, e.g., People v. Quimby, 152 Colo. 231, 235, 381 P.2d 275, 277 (1963) (“The doctrine of ‘stare decisis’ should be adhered to in the absence of sound reason for rejecting it.”); Creacy v. Industrial Comm’n, 148 Colo. 429, 433, 366 P.2d 384, 386 (1961) (The doctrine “has for its object, uniformity, certainty, and stability of the law” and “will not be departed from for slight or'trivial causes, and certainly not where such departure would promote injustice or defeat justice.”).
II.
Under Owens, the decision as to whether a forfeited bond should be remitted is within the trial court’s discretion, and the trial court’s determination should not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. 194 Colo. at 391, 572 P.2d at 838. In Owens, we elaborated upon the reasons for bail bonds and the standards to be applied by a trial court in exercising its discretion to remit such bonds. We said:
We stated the policy of this state with respect to forfeited bonds in Allison v. People, 132 Colo. 156, 286 P.2d 1102 (1955) where we quoted with approval the following statement relating to the giving of bail from State v. Jakshitz, 76 Wash. 253, 136 P. 132 (1913):
“... That the state may be relieved of the burden of keeping an accused person; that the innocent shall not be confined pending a trial and formal acquittal; that, in eases of flight, a recapture may be aided by the bondsmen who, it is presumed will be moved by an incentive to prevent judgment, or, if it has been entered, to absolve it and to mitigate its penalties. To accomplish these things and others, courts have been liberal in vacating judgments entered on bail bonds, exercising always a broad discretion and in proper cases preserving the equities of the public by deducting such costs and expenses as may have been incurred by the state. To hold otherwise would discourage the giving of bail and defeat the manifest purpose of the statute.” (emphasis supplied)
In addition, we stated in Smith v. People, 67 Colo. 452, 184 P. 372 (1919), that “The enriching of the public treasury is no part of the object at which the proceeding is aimed. There is no reason for penalizing the sureties when it appears that they are unable by no fault of their own or of their principal, to perform the condition of the bond.”

Id.

In the case now before us, the district court held a hearing, listened to the arguments from both sides, and determined that a partial remission was appropriate. It ordered remission of the $100,000 cash deposit less a $15,000 fine and $1,025.24 to cover the costs incurred by law enforcement authorities in returning the defendant to Colorado. Although the defendant was *205absent for almost two years before being returned to Colorado authorities, the prosecution suffered no prejudice to its legal rights, since the defendant was convicted, and the costs to the state resulting from the defendant’s failure to appear were paid out of the bond. The cash for the bond was provided by the defendant’s elderly mother, a Colombian national. She appeared as the only witness at the hearing and testified through an interpreter that she is in poor health and living in New York with her husband on a limited income of $430 per month with a grandchild to support. She testified that the couple had invested their life savings in property in Colombia which they were forced to mortgage to obtain the cash for the bond. While it is true that the Caros did not report their son’s occasional telephone calls from undisclosed locations or surrender him to the police when he came to visit them on one occasion, they did encourage him to surrender to the authorities. The assessment of the credibility of the witness was a function of the trial court. On this record, it appears that the district court gave credence to the testimony, applied the proper legal standards, and acted within the range of its discretion in ordering partial remission of the bond. I would affirm the order of the district court.
VOLLACK, J., joins in this dissent.

. Crim.P. 46 was repealed and readopted on April 2, 1987, effective September 1, 1987. It now provides in its entirety:
In considering the question of bail, the Court shall be governed by the statutes and the Constitution of the State of Colorado and the United States Constitution.

. Our decision does not explicitly state that a judgment was taken on the forfeiture, but the court of appeals’ opinion and the trial court record confirm that the trial court entered judgment. See People v. Schliesser, 39 Colo.App. 54, 55, 563 P.2d 377, 378, rev'd sub nom. Owens v. People, 194 Colo. 389, 572 P.2d 837 (1977).