Court Opinion

ID: 9534070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:36:40.047381+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:28.023667
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the decision of the majority holding that the tort action against the *790Union based on Idaho law is not pre-empt-ed by § 301 of LMRA. My view is that there is pre-emption.
In general, I concur with and adopt that part of the dissenting opinion of Justice Bakes in Rawson v. United Steelworkers of America, 111 Idaho 630, 649-53, 726 P.2d 742, 761-65 (1986), vacated, 482 U.S. 901, 107 S.Ct. 2475, 96 L.Ed.2d 368 (1987) {Rawson I) in which he expresses his view that there is pre-emption.
I am persuaded that IBEW, AFL-CIO v. Heckler, 481 U.S. 851, 107 S.Ct. 2161, 95 L.Ed.2d 791 (1987) requires us to hold that there is pre-emption. I am not persuaded that Lingle v. Norge, — U.S. -, 108 S.Ct. 1877, 100 L.Ed.2d 410 (1988) supports a holding that there is no pre-emption.
In Heckler the Court ruled that interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement would be necessary to determine whether the Union had assumed the duty of care to provide a safe work place and “the nature and scope of that duty.” 107 S.Ct. at 2168. The Court concluded: “The need for federal uniformity in the interpretation of contract terms therefore mandates that here, as in Allis-Chalmers, respondent is precluded from evading the pre-emptive force of § 301 by casting her claim as a state-law tort action.” Id. In my opinion, this statement applies with equal force to this case.
The complaint in this case states that the Union “undertook to act as accident prevention representative and enforcer of the Company-union agreement and did it negligently.” Except for any duty imposed by the collective bargaining agreement, the Union had no duty for the safety of its members. The existence of this duty and its nature and scope are dependent on the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement. In Rawson I this Court said that “the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement ... determine ... the nature and scope of the Union’s duty.” Id. 111 Idaho at 640, 726 P.2d at 752. I agree and for this reason would hold that Heckler applies.
Lingle does not dictate a different result. There, the Supreme court stated that “the state-law remedy ... is ‘independent’ of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of ‘independent’ that matters for § 301 pre-emption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not require' construing the collective-bargaining agreement.” 108 S.Ct. at 1882. The Court distinguished Allis-Chalmers and Heckler on the ground that in those cases, “pertinent principles of state law required construing the relevant collective-bargaining agreement.” Id. n. 7. Here, I am unable to see how a court could ascertain the duty of the Union without determining the meaning of the collective bargaining agreement. This would require the interpretation or construction of the collective bargaining agreement.