Court Opinion

ID: 9925301
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-19 14:06:42.529213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:02.918384
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. McWilliams, 2024-Ohio-97.]

                               IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                                  SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                      CHAMPAIGN COUNTY

 STATE OF OHIO                                       :
                                                     :
       Appellant                                     :   C.A. No. 2023-CA-16
                                                     :
 v.                                                  :   Trial Court Case No. 2023 CR 014
                                                     :
 DEREK ULLMAN McWILLIAMS                             :   (Criminal Appeal from Common Pleas
                                                     :   Court)
       Appellee                                      :
                                                     :

                                                ...........

                                                OPINION

                                     Rendered on January 12, 2024

                                                ...........

KEVIN S. TALEBI & JANE A. NAPIER, Attorneys for Appellant

ADDIE J. KING, Attorney for Appellee

                                               .............

LEWIS, J.

        {¶ 1} Appellant the State of Ohio appeals from a judgment of the Champaign

County Common Pleas Court that acquitted Appellee Derek Ullman McWilliams of

aggravated possession of drugs pursuant to a Crim.R. 29 motion. This Court granted

leave to appeal based on the State’s argument that it is not appealing the judgment of

acquittal but is instead seeking review of a discreet legal issue regarding venue that is
                                                                                         -2-

capable of repetition, yet evading review. Because we find that the trial court erred in

refusing to consider whether venue could be appropriate pursuant to R.C. 2901.12(H)(3),

the State’s assignment of error is sustained; however, we do not disturb the judgment of

acquittal.

         I.   Procedural History and Facts

       {¶ 2} On January 3, 2023, McWilliams was indicted by the Champaign County

grand jury on one count of aggravated possession of drugs, in violation of R.C.

2925.11(A),(C)(1)(a), a felony of the fifth degree; one count of operating a vehicle while

under the influence of a listed controlled substance or a listed metabolite of a controlled

substance (“OVI”) (500 ng/ml or more of methamphetamine in urine), in violation of R.C.

4511.19(A)(1)(j)(ix),(G)(1)(a), a misdemeanor of the first degree; and one count of OVI

(500ng/ml     or   more      amphetamine      in    urine),   in    violation   of    R.C.

4511.19(A)(1)(j)(i),(G)(1)(a), a misdemeanor of the first degree. Each of the offenses

listed in the indictment was alleged to have occurred in Champaign County, Ohio.

       {¶ 3} McWilliams entered a not guilty plea at his arraignment, waived his right to a

jury trial, and proceeded to a bench trial on April 11, 2023. At trial, the State presented

the testimony of two witnesses: Deputy Daniel Fisher and Parole Officer Victor Bullock.

       {¶ 4} Deputy Daniel Fisher, a four-year veteran of the Champaign County Sheriff’s

Office, testified that on September 17, 2022, he was running routine checks on vehicle

registrations while traveling southbound on State Route 4. While running a check of

McWilliams’ vehicle registration, Deputy Fisher discovered that McWilliams’ driver’s

license was suspended. Fisher made a traffic stop and approached the vehicle from the
                                                                                       -3-

passenger side. McWilliams was in the driver’s seat while Shelby Riley was in the

passenger seat. Fisher requested McWilliams’ license and, while he was searching for

it, McWilliams explained why his license was suspended. McWilliams was speaking very

fast, and his motions appeared erratic, jerking from side to side.

       {¶ 5} Deputy Fisher asked if there was anything illegal in the car, and McWilliams

pulled a bag containing a green leafy substance from the center console; he claimed it

was CBD weed that he could purchase at any gas station. Riley claimed to have a

medical marijuana card, pulled out a dispensary container from the glove box, and

showed Fisher that it had some “roaches” in it. McWilliams provided his identification

card showing that his address was in Union County, Ohio. Riley’s address was identified

as being in Logan County, Ohio.

       {¶ 6} Deputy Fisher asked the occupants to get out of the vehicle in order to

conduct a search of the car. During the search, methamphetamine was discovered in a

bag which had originally been under the front passenger’s seat of the vehicle but was

surreptitiously moved by Riley in an attempt to conceal it. McWilliams told Fisher that he

had picked up Riley to take her to her mother’s house in Clark County but denied knowing

anything about drugs in his car. Riley was later charged and convicted related to the

methamphetamine that was recovered from the vehicle.

       {¶ 7} Deputy Fisher testified that, during the traffic stop, McWilliams had very

erratic movements and refused to look at Fisher, or if he did, then he would look away

very fast. When McWilliams was looking for his identification card, his movements were

jerky and twitchy. Fisher attributed McWilliams’ mannerisms to methamphetamine use
                                                                                        -4-

and therefore asked McWilliams to consent to a urine sample. McWilliams stated that

“he would be hot because he parties,” meaning that he would test positive for drugs.

Fisher asked what McWilliams would be “hot” for, and McWilliams responded, “marijuana

and some lines.”    When Fisher asked for clarification as to the “lines” substance,

McWilliams stated “cocaine, methamphetamine, and probably some meds.”              Tr. 22.

McWilliams claimed to have “partied” on Monday, which was five days prior to the traffic

stop. He did not identify where he partied.

      {¶ 8} Deputy Fisher collected a sample of McWilliams’ urine, which was sent to the

Ohio State Patrol Crime Laboratory. The results of the testing, which were stipulated to

by the parties, indicated that the urine screen was positive for methamphetamine with

results greater than 1,000 ng/mL and was positive for amphetamine with results greater

than 1,000 ng/mL. Fisher testified that methamphetamine is a Schedule II controlled

substance.

      {¶ 9} State of Ohio Parole Officer Victor Bullock testified that he had been a parole

officer for 20 years and he was supervising McWilliams on post-release control out of

Union County.    Officer Bullock discussed the September 17, 2022 traffic stop with

McWilliams, who denied knowing anything about the drugs that were in the car that day,

but admitted to having used a lot of cocaine as well as methamphetamines and marijuana.

As a result, Bullock ordered McWilliams to get himself into treatment. When questioned

if he asked McWilliams whether McWilliams had used drugs on the date of the traffic stop,

Bullock responded, “Well, the conversation was – well, he did admit that he did use.

[McWilliams] had confirmed possession, that he was partying, using lots of cocaine, but
                                                                                      -5-

he did not give me a time frame.” Tr. 31.

      {¶ 10} Following the admission of the State’s exhibit, which was a copy of the

stipulations, the State rested. Relevant to this appeal, McWilliams made a Crim.R. 29

motion for acquittal challenging venue for the aggravated drug possession charge. The

State conceded that had McWilliams only been charged with the drug possession offense,

and the only evidence submitted of possession was the urinalysis results showing that he

had methamphetamine in his system, then the State would have been unable to proceed.

However, the State argued that because McWilliams had been charged with multiple

offenses related to the same underlying methamphetamine use, the State sufficiently

proved venue because the events occurred in a continuing course of conduct and at least

one element of one of the offenses occurred in Champaign County. The State relied on

R.C. 2901.12(G) and 2901.12(H)(3) to support its position, arguing that the basis for

McWilliams’ possession charge was the same methamphetamine that was the basis of

the OVI charge, meaning that McWilliams used methamphetamine and continued his

course of conduct by operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of that same

methamphetamine in Champaign County.

      {¶ 11} In relying on the Ohio Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Foreman, 166

Ohio St.3d 204, 2021-Ohio-3409, 184 N.E.3d 70, the trial court found that the State had

not offered sufficient evidence that McWilliams committed the drug possession offense in

Champaign County. Specifically, the trial court stated that “the State has not offered

evidence that the Defendant had been in Champaign County before the stop, what he

was doing in Champaign County before the stop, [or] that the metabolites that were found
                                                                                         -6-

in State’s Exhibit 1 would have been in his system at the same time that the Defendant

was in Champaign County.” Tr. 39. When the trial court asked the State if there was

any additional evidence as to when McWilliams had ingested the methamphetamine, the

State argued that because McWilliams had twice the minimum level in his urine for the

per se OVI violation, an inference could be made as to when he ingested the drugs. The

trial court responded that it could not make such an inference without an expert

toxicologist to testify about the metabolism of the drug. Consequently, the trial court

sustained McWilliams’ Crim.R. 29 motion, finding that the State had not presented

sufficient evidence to prove venue, and it acquitted him of aggravated possession of

drugs.

         {¶ 12} No additional evidence was introduced and, after the defense rested, the

trial court found McWilliams guilty of the two misdemeanor OVI counts.            Following

McWilliams’ sentencing on the misdemeanor charges, the State filed a motion for leave

to appeal the trial court’s legal conclusion regarding venue for the felony drug charge.

This Court granted the State leave to appeal.

          II.   Assignment of Error

         {¶ 13} The State raises a single assignment of error on appeal, which states:

                The trial court’s legal and evidentiary findings regarding venue were

         in error as the State presented sufficient evidence that venue was proper in

         Champaign County pursuant to R.C. 2901.12.

         {¶ 14} The State argues first that the trial court misconstrued the import of

Foreman, 166 Ohio St.3d 204, 2021-Ohio-3409, 184 N.E.3d 70, and contends that case
                                                                                              -7-

is distinguishable. Secondly, the State argues that the trial court failed to address the

applicability of R.C. 2901.12(G) and (H), which the State argues permitted McWilliams to

be charged with and convicted of all counts in Champaign County, as the offenses

constituted a continuing course of criminal conduct.

                  a. Standard of Review

       {¶ 15} “A directed verdict of acquittal by the trial judge in a criminal case is a ‘final

verdict’ within the meaning of R.C. 2945.67(A) which is not appealable by the state as a

matter of right or by leave to appeal pursuant to that statute.” State v. Keeton, 18 Ohio

St.3d 379, 481 N.E.2d 629 (1985), paragraph two of the syllabus. “In cases resulting in

a judgment of acquittal, however, the prosecution may nevertheless appeal, by leave of

court, evidentiary rulings and rulings on issues of law, because those rulings fall within

the language of ‘any other decision, except the final verdict,’ in R.C. 2945.67(A).”

(Citations omitted.) State v. Pawelski, 178 Ohio App.3d 426, 2008-Ohio-5180, 898 N.E.2d

85, ¶ 11 (2d Dist.). Accordingly, under R.C. 2945.67(A), a court of appeals has discretion

to review the rulings of substantive law that result in a judgment of acquittal as long as

the judgment itself is not appealed. State v. Bistricky, 51 Ohio St.3d 157, 159-160, 555

N.E.2d 644 (1990). In this case, we granted the State’s request for leave to appeal the

trial court’s ruling on an issue of law. We review questions of law under a de novo

standard of review. State v. Clay, 2d Dist. Miami No. 2015-CA-17, 2016-Ohio-424, ¶ 5.

                  b. Venue

       {¶ 16} “Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution fixes venue, or the proper

place to try a criminal matter, as follows: ‘ * * * In any trial, in any court, the party accused
                                                                                              -8-

shall be allowed * * * a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county in which the

offense is alleged to have been committed * * *.’ Thus, the rule is that the place of trial

is to be where the offense occurred.” State v. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 477, 453

N.E.2d 716 (1983). “Venue is not a material element of any offense charged. The

elements of the offense charged and the venue of the matter are separate and distinct.”

State v. Draggo, 65 Ohio St.2d 88, 90, 418 N.E.2d 1343 (1981). Nevertheless, “[u]nder

Article I, Section 10 and R.C. 2901.12, evidence of proper venue must be presented in

order to sustain a conviction for an offense.” (Citations omitted.) State v. Hampton, 134

Ohio St.3d 447, 2012-Ohio-5688, 983 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 20. “In the prosecution of a criminal

case, it is not essential that the venue of the crime be proven in express terms, provided

it be established by all the facts and circumstances in the case, beyond a reasonable

doubt, that the crime was committed in the county and state as alleged in the indictment.”

State v. Dickerson, 77 Ohio St. 34, 82 N.E. 969 (1907), syllabus.              “[I]n all criminal

prosecutions, venue is a fact that must be proved at trial unless waived.” Draggo at 90,

citing State v. Nevius, 147 Ohio St. 263, 71 N.E.2d 258 (1947).

       {¶ 17} “Under Ohio's venue statute, R.C. 2901.12, venue generally lies in the

territory in which the offense is committed. R.C. 2901.12(A). However, venue is also

proper in other territories, under special circumstances.” State v. Moore, 6th Dist. Erie

No. E-18-064, 2020-Ohio-6781, ¶ 42. R.C. 2901.12 states, in relevant part:

       (A) The trial of a criminal case in this state shall be held in a court having

       jurisdiction of the subject matter, and * * * in the territory of which the offense

       or any element of the offense was committed.
                                                                                          -9-

       ***

       (G) When it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that an offense or any

       element of an offense was committed in any of two or more jurisdictions,

       but it cannot reasonably be determined in which jurisdiction the offense or

       element was committed, the offender may be tried in any of those

       jurisdictions.

       ***

       (H) When an offender, as part of a course of criminal conduct, commits

       offenses in different jurisdictions, the offender may be tried for all of those

       offenses in any jurisdiction in which one of those offenses or any element

       of one of those offenses occurred. Without limitation on the evidence that

       may be used to establish the course of criminal conduct, any of the following

       is prima-facie evidence of a course of criminal conduct:

       ***

       (3) The offenses were committed as part of the same transaction or chain

       of events, or in furtherance of the same purpose or objective.

       {¶ 18} “R.C. 2901.12(G) and (H) are statutory reflections of the modern mobility of

criminals to perform unlawful deeds over vast geographical boundaries. The above-

noted statutory provisions effectuate a sensible, efficient approach to justice by permitting

one court to hear a matter which has roots in several court jurisdictions.” Draggo, 65

Ohio St.2d at 90, 418 N.E.2d 1343. “R.C. 2901.12(H) exists to promote judicial economy

and allow the state to prosecute multiple offenses during one trial in one county.” State
                                                                                      -10-

v. Moore, 169 Ohio St.3d 18, 2022-Ohio-1460, 201 N.E.3d 834, ¶ 20.

                 c. Analysis

      {¶ 19} McWilliams was charged with aggravated possession of drugs in violation

of R.C. 2925.11(A),(C)(1)(a). The statute provides that “[n]o person shall knowingly

obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance[.]” R.C. 2925.11(A). In this case, the

controlled substance at issue was methamphetamine, a Schedule II controlled substance,

which falls under section 2925.11(C)(1)(a). " ‘Possess’ or ‘possession’ means having

control over a thing or substance, but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the

thing or substance through ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing

or substance is found.” R.C. 2925.01(K). “[W]hen a controlled substance is assimilated

into a person’s body, the person loses the ability to control or possess the substance.”

Foreman, 166 Ohio St.3d 204, 2021-Ohio-3409, 184 N.E.3d 70, at ¶ 17, 19. Accordingly,

an individual cannot be in “possession” of a controlled substance, as is required under

R.C. 2925.11(A), if the possession is based on the mere presence of the substance that

was assimilated into the person’s body.

      {¶ 20} As the State conceded, McWilliams was not in possession of drugs at the

time of the traffic stop in Champaign County as it is defined in R.C. 2925.11(A). The

State informed the trial court that “we’re not going to be able to establish that the

Defendant used drugs in Champaign County” or that any element of that offense was

committed in Champaign County. Tr. 13, 44. However, the State argued that they did

not have to identify where or when McWilliams used any drugs, because since

McWilliams’ urine screen showed that he had consumed methamphetamine, he was
                                                                                           -11-

unlawfully in possession of the methamphetamine at some point in time. Then, at some

point after taking the drugs, he proceeded to drive his vehicle into Champaign County

while under the influence of that same methamphetamine, thereby constituting a

continuous course of criminal conduct. The State relied primarily on R.C. 2901.12(H),

which provides that, “[w]hen an offender, as part of a course of criminal conduct, commits

offenses in different jurisdictions, the offender may be tried for all of those offenses in any

jurisdiction in which one of those offenses or any element of one of those offenses

occurred.” Offenses “committed as part of the same transaction or chain of events, or in

furtherance of the same purpose or objective,” constitute prima-facie evidence to

establish a course of criminal conduct. R.C. 2901.12(H)(3). The State further argued

that R.C. 2901.12(G) allowed the State to pursue the charge in Champaign County,

although it is unclear how that statute purportedly helps the State since the State did not

provide any evidence that the offense was committed in two or more jurisdictions, one of

which was Champaign County.

       {¶ 21} The trial court rejected the State’s argument and found that the State had

failed to present sufficient evidence of venue with respect to the charge of aggravated

possession of drugs. In deciding whether the State sufficiently established venue, the

trial court questioned, “where is the evidence that [the aggravated possession of drugs]

occurred in Champaign County?” Tr. 38. The trial court stated that “the State has not

offered evidence that the Defendant had been in Champaign County before the stop,

what he was doing in Champaign County before the stop, [or] that the metabolites that

were found in State’s Exhibit 1 would have been in his system at the same time that the
                                                                                      -12-

Defendant was in Champaign County.” Tr. 39. The trial court relied heavily on Foreman

to support its decision sustaining McWilliams’ Crim.R. 29 motion.

      {¶ 22} In Foreman, the defendant gave birth to a baby boy at Tiffin Mercy Hospital,

located in Seneca County, Ohio. Following the baby’s birth, it was discovered that the

umbilical-cord tissue and the child’s urine and meconium tested positive for the presence

of cocaine metabolites. Foreman, 166 Ohio St.3d 204, 2021-Ohio-3409, 184 N.E.3d 70,

at ¶ 2. Foreman was confronted about the positive test results and admitted that she

had consumed cocaine several times during the course of her pregnancy, including as

recently as a week or two prior to giving birth. However, Foreman denied using any

drugs at her home, which was located in Seneca County. Relying on the positive drug

tests collected from the hospital, Foreman was indicted on a single count of possession

of cocaine in Seneca County.      Following a bench trial, Foreman was convicted as

charged. Id. at ¶ 6.

      {¶ 23} The Ohio Supreme Court reversed Foreman’s conviction, finding that the

State failed to prove that Foreman knowingly possessed cocaine in Seneca County. Id.

at ¶ 31.   The Court reasoned that the statutory definition of the word “possession”

requires an individual to have control over a substance or thing. But when a person

ingests a controlled substance, it assimilates into the body and the individual no longer

has control over it. Thus, when the presence of cocaine metabolites was discovered at

the time Foreman gave birth to her son, she could not have been in possession of cocaine

because she could not have controlled it. Id. at ¶ 20.

      {¶ 24} Although the Court found that Foreman had not been in possession of
                                                                                         -13-

cocaine at the hospital, it considered whether the State had presented circumstantial

evidence that Foreman possessed cocaine somewhere else in Seneca County. The

Court noted that “[b]ased on a positive drug-test result, a fact-finder may deduce that the

defendant ingested the drug and likely possessed it but is left to speculate as to where

that prior possession occurred.      Thus, for purposes of proving venue under R.C.

2901.12(A), sufficient corroborating evidence is necessary to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt that the defendant possessed the drug within the charging county.” (Emphasis

sic.) Id. at ¶ 26.   The Court determined that the State failed to present any such

corroborating evidence to prove that Foreman possessed the cocaine at a prior time in

Seneca County. Rather, the evidence merely established that Foreman “possessed

cocaine somewhere at some time, not that Foreman possessed cocaine in Seneca

County.”   Id. at ¶ 28.   The Court specifically noted that the State did not present

evidence concerning the amount of time that cocaine metabolites remain in a person’s

system after ingesting it, or that Foreman had been present in Seneca County during the

time frame in which she admitted she had consumed cocaine. Id. at ¶ 29.

       {¶ 25} Foreman is certainly pertinent to the case at hand in validating that

McWilliams was not in possession of methamphetamine as defined in R.C. 2925.11(A) at

the time he was stopped in Champaign County. But unlike Foreman, McWilliams was

charged with more than one offense. In that regard, R.C. 2901.12(H)(3) may have been

applicable, so long as the State could prove that the offenses occurred as a course of

criminal conduct in that the offenses were committed in different jurisdictions and “as part

of the same transaction or chain of events, or in furtherance of the same purpose or
                                                                                      -14-

objective.”

       {¶ 26} A defendant may be indicted in one county for an offense that occurred in

another county when the offenses are related by a course of criminal conduct that

included crimes in the charging county. State v. Jackson, 141 Ohio St.3d 171, 2014-

Ohio-3707, 23 N.E.3d 1023, ¶ 131. R.C. 2901.12 “provides the criteria for which territory

an offender may be tried for multiple offenses which involve different jurisdictions or

venues.” State v. DeBoe, 6th Dist. Huron No. H-02-057, 2004-Ohio-403, ¶ 38. R.C.

2901.12(H)(3) specifically provides that the offender may be tried in any jurisdiction in

which at least one of the offenses, or any element of one of those offenses, occurred

when all of the offenses were committed as part of a course of criminal conduct.

Moreover, as the Supreme Court of Ohio explained, the purpose of R.C. 2901.12(H) is to

promote judicial economy and allow the State to prosecute multiple offenses during one

trial in one county. Moore, 169 Ohio St.3d 18, 2022-Ohio-1460, 201 N.E.3d 834, at ¶ 20.

       {¶ 27} When deciding whether the State proved venue, the trial court relied on the

jury instruction that requires the trier of fact to consider each count separately. Then,

relying on Foreman, the trial court determined that the State was required to establish

that McWilliams committed aggravated possession of drugs, or at least an element of that

offense, within Champaign County as alleged in the indictment. Because the State could

not demonstrate either of those requirements, the trial court acquitted McWilliams. To

the extent the trial court failed to consider whether the State proved the offenses were

committed in different jurisdictions as part of a continuing course of conduct under R.C.

2901.12(H)(3), we sustain the State’s assignment of error. In deciding whether the State
                                                                                         -15-

established venue, the trial court considered the aggravated possession of drugs offense

in a vacuum rather than as part of a potential course of criminal conduct which, if

established, would have allowed the prosecution of the aggravated possession of drugs

offense to be tried in Champaign County even if none of the elements of that offense were

committed in Champaign County.

       {¶ 28} R.C. 2901.12(H)(3) does not require that at least one of the elements of

each offense be committed in the charging county, only that one of the elements of one

of the offenses charged be committed in the charging county. Although the indictment

listed Champaign County as the venue for the aggravated possession of drugs offense,

that was not necessarily fatal to the State’s case. When alleging that offenses occurred

pursuant to a course of criminal conduct under R.C. 2901.12(H)(3), the State may identify

the charging county in which the offenses are indicted where at least one of the elements

of one of the offenses occurred there. State v. Armengau, 2017-Ohio-4452, 93 N.E.3d

284, ¶ 116 (10th Dist.). It is, however, preferable for the State to identify which offenses

occurred out-of-county or for the indictment to include “course of conduct” language when

the State intends to proceed under R.C. 2901.12(H).

       {¶ 29} Whether or not the State submitted sufficient evidence that the offenses

occurred in different jurisdictions as part of a course of criminal conduct to satisfy the

venue statute in this case, however, is a factual determination that we will not consider.

While this Court may accept a State’s appeal from an acquittal to evaluate issues of law,

we are not to consider the sufficiency of the evidence, because that is tied to the specific

facts of the case and would in essence be asking this Court to review the acquittal itself,
                                                                                          -16-

which is prohibited by R.C. 2945.67(A). State ex rel. Ramirez-Ortiz v. Twelfth Dist. Ct.

of Appeals, 151 Ohio St.3d 46, 2017-Ohio-7816, 85 N.E.3d 725, ¶ 9-13.

       {¶ 30} We do note that the State’s reliance on R.C. 2901.12(G), however, is

misplaced.    R.C. 2901.12(G) provides that, “[w]hen it appears beyond a reasonable

doubt that an offense or any element of an offense was committed in any of two or more

jurisdictions, but it cannot reasonably be determined in which jurisdiction the offense or

element was committed, the offender may be tried in any of those jurisdictions.” “[V]enue

questions arising under R.C. 2901.12(G) must * * * be resolved by determining whether

‘any element’ of the offense was committed within the jurisdiction where the trial is to take

place.’ ” Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d at 478, 453 N.E.2d 716, citing Draggo, 65 Ohio St.2d at

91, 418 N.E.2d 1343. The plain language of this statute does not apply to a course of

conduct for multiple offenses as is provided in R.C. 2901.12(H). Moreover, there is no

dispute that the State could not prove that any of the elements of aggravated possession

of drugs occurred in Champaign County in order to satisfy the requirement that the

offense be tried in one of the “two or more jurisdictions” where any element of the offense

occurred. Thus, R.C. 2901.12(G) did not apply to this case, and the trial court did not err

in failing to consider the applicability of this statute.

       {¶ 31} Accordingly, we sustain the State’s assignment of error to the extent that

the trial court failed to consider whether the State proved the offenses were committed in

different jurisdictions as part of a continuing course of conduct under R.C. 2901.12(H)(3).

However, we overrule the State’s assignment of error to the extent that the State

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence presented.
                                                                                       -17-

       III.   Conclusion

       {¶ 32} The trial court erred as a matter of law in failing to consider whether R.C.

2901.12(H)(3) applied. We note, however, that this legal conclusion has no effect on

McWilliams’ acquittal in this case.

                                      .............

TUCKER, J. and EPLEY, J., concur.