Court Opinion

ID: 9941717
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-16 20:02:35.723401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:57.932731
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/16/24 P. v. Schemensky CA4/1
                   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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                  COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                       DIVISION ONE

                                              STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,                                                                  D082339

          Plaintiff and Respondent,

          v.                                                                 (Super. Ct. No. SCN432254)

RANDI L. SCHEMENSKY,

          Defendant and Appellant.

          APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Superior Court of San
Diego County, Daniel F. Link, Judge. Affirmed.
          Richard Schwartzberg, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
          Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, and
Steve Oetting, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                       I
                              INTRODUCTION
      Appellant Randi L. Schemensky and her husband, Jeffrey Frear, raised
and homeschooled their nine-year-old son, J.F., in an apartment containing
illegally owned firearms, methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia. One
night, Frear accidentally discharged a firearm inside the apartment. The
bullet grazed an infant in an adjoining apartment, injuring the child. After a
joint trial, a jury found Schemensky (and Frear) guilty of felony child
endangerment for endangering the health and safety of J.F. Schemensky
was sentenced to a stayed jail term of 180 days and placed on formal
probation for four years. At a later probation hearing, the court reduced her
conviction to a misdemeanor with four years of informal probation.
      Schemensky appeals the judgment and the order imposing four years of
informal probation. She asserts insufficient evidence supported her child
endangerment conviction. She also claims the court abused its discretion by
imposing a four-year informal probation term because the court purportedly
was unaware it possessed the discretion to impose a shorter probation term.
We reject these contentions and affirm.
                                       II
                               BACKGROUND
   A. Factual Background
      Schemensky and Frear were married to one another. They had a son,
J.F. Frear also had a daughter, J.H. (Schemensky’s stepdaughter).
Schemensky, Frear, 17-year-old J.H., nine-year-old J.F., and J.H.’s friend
lived together in a three bedroom apartment in Oceanside. Their apartment
shared a wall with an apartment in which J.M. lived with her four-year-old
child and infant.

                                       2
      Frear battled a methamphetamine addiction and relapsed shortly
before the events described herein. He was a convicted felon as well;
therefore, he was unable to own or possess a firearm legally. Nevertheless,
Frear owned two firearms. He sourced the parts for the firearms online and
assembled them himself. Schemensky was aware he possessed one of the
firearms. In addition to owning firearms, Frear possessed bows and arrows,
throwing knives, airsoft guns, and swords. According to Frear, he usually
stored his firearms and methamphetamine in separate safes located in the
master bathroom of the apartment.
      Schemensky and Frear occupied and shared the master bedroom and
the attached master bathroom. Schemensky homeschooled J.F. during the
day and worked in the late afternoon and early evening. Frear was
unemployed for the entire four-year period in which the family lived in the
apartment. He typically left the master bedroom door open when he was
present and, in J.H.’s words, he was at the apartment “almost 24/7.”
According to Frear and J.H., the master bedroom remained locked when no
parent was home. J.H. testified that the family had an unwritten rule the
children were not allowed in the master bedroom or master bathroom without
a parent present. However, J.H. sometimes observed J.F. playing in the
master bedroom while unaccompanied by a parent. J.F. also bathed
regularly in the master bathroom while Schemensky was present.
      One evening, Frear was testing one of his firearms to make sure the
extractor (a gun part that pulls the casing from the barrel) and the ejector (a
gun part that ejects the round out of the weapon) worked properly. While he
was testing the firearm, he accidentally pulled the trigger and fired a live
round of ammunition. At the time, J.M. was seated on the couch in her next
door apartment, cradling her sleeping infant. The bullet from Frear’s firearm

                                       3
passed through the shared wall between the adjoining apartments and
grazed J.M.’s infant on the leg. When J.M. heard the pop of the gunshot, saw
the bullet hole in the apartment wall, and realized her infant was bleeding,
she grabbed her children, fled the apartment, and called the police.
      Meanwhile, Frear realized that he, in his own words, had “really
messed up.” He rushed his family and J.H.’s friend out of the apartment and
they drove to a nearby grocery store. They remained in the grocery store
parking lot for a few hours and went to a motel to spend the night. While the
rest of the family slept, Frear returned to the family’s apartment to retrieve
cash. Police detained him as he was en route between the apartment and the
motel.
      Police obtained a search warrant and searched the family’s apartment,
which, according to one officer, was “extremely messy,” in “disarray,” and had
“trash everywhere.” There was a bullet hole in the shared wall between the
apartment and J.M.’s apartment. In the master bedroom, police found
swords, a bow, gun parts, dozens of rounds of 9-millimeter handgun
ammunition, and airsoft guns. They also found a fully assembled and loaded
9-millimeter firearm hanging from a shoulder holster on the back of the door
leading from the master bedroom into the master bathroom. Police located a
second fully assembled and unsecured 9-millimeter handgun in the top
drawer of the master bathroom vanity. The firearm had an empty cartridge
casing inside it, meaning a round had been fired from the gun. Police also
found a bindle of methamphetamine on top of the master bathroom vanity
countertop next to a toy car. Elsewhere in the master bathroom, police
discovered several glass pipes used to smoke methamphetamine.

                                       4
    B. Procedural Background
      After a joint trial, a jury found Schemensky and Frear guilty of one

count of felony child endangerment (Pen. Code, § 273a, subd. (a); count 1).1
The jury also found Frear guilty of one count of being a felon in possession of
a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1); count 3), and it deadlocked on a charge that
Frear discharged a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3, subd. (a);
count 2). The trial court placed Schemensky on formal probation for four
years and imposed, but stayed, a custodial term of 180 days in county jail.
      At a subsequent probation hearing, the court reduced Schemensky’s
child endangerment conviction to a misdemeanor pursuant to section 17,
subdivision (b). During the hearing, the court asked the prosecutor, “If it is
reduced to a misdemeanor, is it still four years?” The prosecutor replied, “It
is, Your Honor.” Thereafter, the court resentenced Schemensky to informal
probation for four years.
                                      III
                                DISCUSSION
    A. Substantial Evidence Supported the Child Endangerment Conviction
      Schemensky contends there was insufficient evidence to support her
conviction for child endangerment. Viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment, and drawing every reasonable inference from the
evidence to support the judgment, we reject Schemensky’s argument and
conclude the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction.
      1. Legal Standards
      In assessing whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain a
criminal conviction, we apply the substantial evidence standard of review.
(People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192, 1212.) Under that standard, “ ‘ “we

1     Further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
                                       5
review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is
reasonable, credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” ’ ” (People v.
Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 144.) We “ ‘presume[] in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from
the evidence[,]’ ” and we “ ‘may not substitute [our] judgment for that of the
jury.’ ” (Ibid.) “We do not reweigh the evidence or resolve conflicts in the
testimony when determining its legal sufficiency. [Citation.] Rather, before
we can set aside a judgment of conviction for insufficiency of the evidence, ‘it
must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
evidence to support [the jury’s finding].’ ” (Id. at p. 145.)
      2. Application
      The jury found Schemensky guilty of child endangerment in violation of
section 273a, subdivision (a). “Section 273a, subdivision (a) ‘is an omnibus
statute that proscribes essentially four branches of conduct.’ [Citation.] As
relevant here, it provides: ‘Any person who, under circumstances or
conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, [1] willfully causes or
permits any child to suffer, or [2] inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain
or mental suffering, or [3] having the care or custody of any child, willfully
causes or permits the person or health of that child to be injured, or
[4] willfully causes or permits that child to be placed in a situation where his
or her person or health is endangered, shall be punished by imprisonment in
a county jail not exceeding one year, or in the state prison for two, four, or six
years.’ ” (People v. Valdez (2002) 27 Cal.4th 778, 783 (Valdez).)
      “Violation of section 273a, subdivision (a) ‘ “can occur in a wide variety
of situations: the definition broadly includes both active and passive conduct,

                                         6
i.e., child abuse by direct assault and child endangering by extreme neglect.”
[Citation.] ... Section 273a[, subdivision (a)] is “intended to protect a child
from an abusive situation in which the probability of serious injury is great.”
[Citation.] “[T]here is no requirement that the actual result be great bodily
injury.” ’ ” (Valdez, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 784; see also People v. Wilson
(2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1205 (Wilson) [“Actual physical injury is not an
element of felony child endangerment.”].)
      Here, the district attorney prosecuted Schemensky solely under the
theory she violated the fourth branch of conduct proscribed by section 273a,
subdivision (a)—i.e., she willfully caused or permitted J.F. to be placed in a
situation where his person or health was endangered. To establish felony
child endangerment, the district attorney was required to prove: “(1) care or
custody of a child by the defendant; (2) circumstances likely to produce great
bodily harm or death; and (3) criminal negligence in permitting the child to
be placed in a situation endangering the child’s person or health.” (People v.
Sanders (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1268, 1273 (Sanders).) The requirement that
great bodily harm or death must be “likely” does not mean “that death or
serious injury is probable or more likely than not.” (Wilson, supra, 138
Cal.App.4th at p. 1204.) Rather, “ ‘likely’ as used in section 273a means a
substantial danger, i.e., a serious and well-founded risk, of great bodily harm
or death.” (Ibid.)
      On appeal, Schemensky broadly argues the evidence was insufficient to
support her child endangerment conviction. She does not specify which
elements of the conviction were, in her view, unproven. However, she
emphasizes that there was evidence adduced at trial tending to establish that
she did not own the illegal firearms and methamphetamine that were kept in
the apartment (Frear owned them); the firearms and methamphetamine

                                         7
were usually stored in safes in the master bathroom; and the family had an
unspoken rule that J.F. was not allowed in the master bedroom or master
bathroom without adult supervision. This evidence is generally probative of
the second and third elements of the child endangerment offense—that is,
whether the circumstances were likely to produce great bodily harm or death,
and whether Schemensky was criminally negligent in permitting J.F. to be
placed in a situation endangering his person or health. Thus, we will focus
our attention on whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s

findings as to these two elements.2
      Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the judgment of
conviction, we conclude substantial evidence supported the jury’s finding that
there was a serious and well-founded risk J.F. would suffer great bodily harm
or death due to the presence of illegal firearms and methamphetamine in the
family’s apartment. This same evidence amply supported the jury’s finding
that Schemensky endangered J.F. in a criminally negligent manner by
raising and homeschooling him in such a potentially dangerous environment.
      When police searched the family’s apartment, they recovered two fully
assembled, illegally owned 9-millimeter firearms—one of which was loaded
and the other of which had been fired inside the apartment that same night.
The police found dozens of rounds of 9-millimeter handgun ammunition and
numerous other gun parts in the apartment as well. Notably, both of the
fully assembled firearms were accessible to nine-year-old J.F. and the other
minor occupants of the apartment. Police found one of the firearms hanging
freely from a shoulder holster on the back of the door leading from the master
bedroom to the master bathroom, while they found the second firearm

2      Schemensky does not make any argument, express or implied, that
there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding that she cared
for, or had custody of, J.F.
                                       8
similarly unsecured in a bathroom vanity drawer. “Storing loaded firearms
in a home occupied by children without denying the children access to the
weapons creates a potential peril under the [child endangerment] statute.”
(People v. Hansen (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 473, 479–480; see People v. Odom
(1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1028, 1033 [substantial evidence supported child
endangerment conviction where defendant’s children had access to twelve
guns, included three loaded guns]; accord In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7
Cal.App.5th 987, 995 [“It takes little to persuade us that a young child with
access to a loaded gun is at substantial risk of serious physical harm.”].) As
Frear’s accidental discharge of a firearm inside the apartment perfectly
demonstrates, a person or child who handles a loaded firearm without
adequate care can easily shoot the firearm—intentionally or
unintentionally—with potentially fatal consequences for himself or others.
      A reasonable jury could also find Schemensky jeopardized the health
and safety of J.F., in a criminally negligent manner, by raising and
homeschooling him in an apartment where methamphetamine was present.
(People v. Bernal (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1160, 1168 [“keeping and using
methamphetamine in a home with a six-year-old and a one-month-old meets
the standard of placing children in a situation where their health may be
endangered” under child endangerment statute]; People v. Perez (2008) 164
Cal.App.4th 1462, 1472–1474 (Perez) [substantial evidence supported willful
endangerment element of child endangerment conviction where there was
evidence that defendant left heroin in unlocked drawer in entry room end
table and on bedroom dresser]; People v. Little (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 766,
772 [“That defendant possessed and used drugs in the residence ... only
strengthens the finding that the circumstances in the residence posed a
threat to the child’s health and safety.”].) During the search of the

                                       9
apartment, police found a bindle of methamphetamine on top of the master
bathroom vanity countertop directly next to a toy car. They also found
numerous glass methamphetamine pipes elsewhere in the bathroom. The
presence of methamphetamine and methamphetamine pipes inside the
apartment created a serious and well-founded risk J.F. would ingest the
methamphetamine and potentially suffer serious bodily injury or death.
      Schemensky does not dispute the fact that police found firearms,
methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia inside the apartment, but
contends the evidence was nonetheless insufficient to support the conviction
because she (and Frear) took measures to prevent J.F. from accessing these
unlawful and dangerous items. In particular, Frear testified that he usually
stored his firearms and methamphetamine in safes located in the master
bedroom. However, “[a] trier of fact is free to disbelieve a witness, even one
uncontradicted, if there is any rational ground for doing so.” (In re Jessica C.
(2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 1027, 1043.) Here, the jury could reasonably reject
Frear’s self-serving testimony that he typically kept his firearms,
methamphetamine, and drug paraphernalia in safes, given that none of these
items were stored in safes or otherwise secured when the police searched the
extremely messy and trash-filled family apartment.
      Along similar lines, Schemensky claims she and Frear adequately
minimized the threat of peril to J.F. because, according to Frear and J.H.,
Schemensky and Frear forbade the children from accessing the master
bedroom and master bathroom without parental supervision. However, J.H.
testified that, notwithstanding this prohibition, she saw J.F. playing in the
master bedroom unaccompanied by parents. According to J.H., she saw J.F.
in the master bedroom touching or playing with forbidden items like
throwing knives, airsoft guns, bows and arrows, and swords. Based on this

                                       10
evidence, a jury could rationally conclude either that the family did not have
a rule prohibiting the children from accessing the areas in which the firearms
and narcotics were stored, or if such a rule existed, it was ineffective in light
of nine-year-old J.F.’s natural curiosity. (Perez, supra, 164 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1473–1474 [“the jury was free to disbelieve [mother’s] testimony that she
had educated [minor] regarding the use of syringes, or to draw the reasonable
inference that even if [mother] had attempted to educate [minor] regarding
syringe safety, it would be difficult for a child [minor’s] age to apply those
rules to a situation that did not involve her mother’s syringes, or to overcome
a child’s natural sense of curiosity”].)
      Finally, Schemensky argues the evidence was insufficient to support
the conviction because the illegal firearms, methamphetamine, and drug
paraphernalia recovered from the apartment belonged to Frear, not her.
Schemensky misunderstands the requirements of a child endangerment
conviction. To prove child endangerment, the district attorney was not
obligated to show that Schemensky herself owned the property or caused the
dangerous conditions that imperiled the child. Rather, it was required to
prove that, under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or death,
Schemensky willfully permitted a child in her care or custody to be placed in
a situation in which the child’s person or health was endangered. (Sanders,
supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1273.) Applying these standards, and viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment, we conclude substantial
evidence supported the jury’s verdict.
   B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Imposing a Four-Year
      Informal Probation Term
      When the trial court reduced Schemensky’s conviction from a felony to
a misdemeanor, it resentenced her to informal probation for a term of four
years. Schemensky asserts the court abused its discretion during

                                           11
resentencing because, she claims, the court was unaware it had the discretion
to impose a probation term shorter than four years. In response, the People
contend Schemensky has not shown that the court misapprehended the scope

of its sentencing discretion. We agree with the People.3
      In general, the maximum probation length for a felony is two years
(§ 1203.1, subd. (a)), and the maximum probation length for a misdemeanor
is one year (§ 1203a, subd. (a)). These limitations do not apply when a
defendant is convicted of an “offense that includes specific probation lengths
within its provisions.” (§§ 1203.1, subd. (l)(1)), 1203a, subd. (b).)
      The child endangerment statute is a statute that dictates specific
probation lengths within its provisions and, therefore, a child endangerment
conviction is not subject to the maximum probation length limitations set
forth in sections 1203.1 or 1203a. It provides that when a person is convicted
of child endangerment and receives probation, the sentencing court must
impose “[a] mandatory minimum period of probation of 48 months.” (§ 273a,
subd. (c)(1).) However, the court may waive this requirement (and other
minimum conditions of probation), “upon a finding that the condition would
not be in the best interests of justice.” (Id., subd. (c)(5).) In such cases, the
court must “state on the record its reasons for any waiver.” (Ibid.)
      We review the trial court’s sentencing decision for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 837.) “ ‘To prove an abuse of
discretion, “ ‘[t]he burden is on the party attacking the sentence to clearly
show that the sentencing decision was irrational or arbitrary. [Citation.] In

3      The People also argue Schemensky forfeited her argument by failing to
object to the trial court’s imposition of a four-year informal probation term.
We do not reach the merits of the People’s forfeiture argument because, even
if the argument is preserved, Schemensky has failed to establish that the
court misunderstood the scope of its sentencing discretion.
                                        12
the absence of such a showing, the trial court is presumed to have acted to
achieve legitimate sentencing objectives, and its discretionary determination
to impose a particular sentence will not be set aside on review.’ ” [Citation.]
To meet this burden, the defendant must “affirmatively demonstrate that the
trial court misunderstood its sentencing discretion.” ’ ” (People v. Fredrickson
(2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 988.)
      Schemensky contends the trial court abused its discretion when it
placed her on informal probation for a term of four years because, according
to Schemensky, the court misapprehended the scope of its sentencing
discretion. In particular, she claims the court was unaware it had the
authority under section 273a, subdivision (c)(5), to waive the four-year
mandatory minimum probation requirement. In support of this assertion,
she points to a brief colloquy between the court and the district attorney
during which the court asked, “If it is reduced to a misdemeanor, is it still
four years?” The district attorney replied, “It is, Your Honor.”
      Schemensky has not affirmatively shown that the court misunderstood
the scope of its sentencing discretion. Although the court briefly (and
correctly) confirmed with the district attorney that “it” (the presumptive
mandatory minimum probation requirement) was “still four years,” the court
did not state or otherwise suggest that it believed it had no authority to
waive the mandatory minimum probation requirement. The court did not
indicate that it would have imposed a shorter probation term if it could do so.
In short, as Schemensky herself concedes in her opening brief, “the record is
entirely silent as to whether the court was aware ... [it] could deviate from
the otherwise mandatory four-year [probation] term.”
      “On appeal, we presume that the trial court followed established law
and thus properly exercised its discretion in sentencing a criminal defendant.

                                       13
[Citations.] Thus, we may not assume the court was unaware of its discretion
simply because it failed to explicitly refer to its alternative sentencing
choices.” (People v. Weddington (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 468, 492; see People
v. Coleman (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 709, [“Defendant’s citation to a silent
record is insufficient to meet his burden to demonstrate an abuse of
[sentencing] discretion”]; People v. Gutierrez (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 515, 527
[“[I]n light of the presumption on a silent record that the trial court is aware
of the applicable law, including statutory discretion at sentencing, we cannot
presume error where the record does not establish on its face that the trial
court misunderstood the scope of that discretion.”].)
                                       IV
                                 DISPOSITION
      The judgment of conviction and the postjudgment order are affirmed.

                                                             McCONNELL, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

BUCHANAN, J.

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