Court Opinion

ID: 9897883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:26:39.86558+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:14.054260
License: Public Domain

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             FILE                                                THIS OPINION WAS FILED
                                                                                  FOR RECORD AT 8 A.M. ON
                                                                                      AUGUST 10, 2023
        IN CLERK’S OFFICE
 SUPREME COURT, STATE OF WASHINGTON
         AUGUST 10, 2023
                                                                                      ERIN L. LENNON
                                                                                   SUPREME COURT CLERK

         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

         In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of
                                             )
                                             )                No. 100753-1
         PETER DANIEL ANSELL,                )
                                             )                EN BANC
                       Respondent.           )
                                             )                Filed: August 10, 2023
         ____________________________________)

                MONTOYA-LEWIS, J.—Peter Ansell is serving an indeterminate life

         sentence in community custody. The Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board

         (ISRB) seeks reversal of a Court of Appeals decision invalidating certain community

         custody conditions. We conclude that the conditions relating to sexually explicit

         materials, dating, and relationships are not unconstitutionally vague. However, the

         ISRB exceeded its authority in imposing the cannabis condition, which it concedes

         is not related to Ansell’s crimes. We therefore affirm in part and reverse in part.

                    FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                Ansell is serving an indeterminate life sentence for multiple counts of child

         molestation. He and his wife were part of a babysitting group with two other families

         in his neighborhood. The parents took turns taking care of the children when the
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       In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell
       No. 100753-1

       other couples went out in the evenings. Between 2006 and 2008, Ansell molested

       the children of his friends and neighbors when he was in charge of babysitting the

       children. He pleaded guilty to three counts of child molestation.

              Ansell received an indeterminate sentence of 130 months to life. After he

       served the minimum term of incarceration, the ISRB reviewed Ansell’s file and, in

       2020, found him eligible to serve the remainder of his sentence in community

       custody.

              As part of that review, the Department of Corrections referred Ansell for a

       sexual deviancy evaluation and risk assessment. Although there is no evidence that

       the crimes involved any drugs, the evaluation inquired into Ansell’s drug and alcohol

       history. He reported some drug experimentation and alcohol use in his youth and

       infrequent use of alcohol and cannabis 1 in his adulthood.

              The ISRB determined Ansell to be a low risk and releasable under RCW

       9.95.420, subject to over two dozen conditions. Ansell timely filed a personal

       restraint petition (PRP) challenging eight of the community custody conditions. The

       Court of Appeals found the following five conditions invalid:

              B.      You must not enter the area of Seattle that is south of Hwy 523
                      and north of I[nterstate]-90, in between Lake Washington and the
                      Puget Sound/Elliott Bay, without prior written approval of your
                      [Community Corrections Officer] CCO and the ISRB. (See
                      attached map[.])

              1
              We use the term “cannabis” except where quoting the record. See State v. Fraser, 199
       Wn.2d 465, 469 n.1, 509 P.3d 282 (2022).
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              ....
              D.   You must not use, possess or control any Marijuana/THC or
                   enter any establishments whose primary purpose is the sale of
                   Marijuana/THC.
              ....
              G.   You must not possess or access sexually explicit materials.
                   Sexually explicit materials consists of any item reasonably
                   deemed to be intended for sexual gratification and which
                   displays, portrays, depicts, or describes: a) Nudity, which
                   includes, but is not limited to, exposed/visible (in whole or part,
                   including under or through translucent/thin materials providing
                   intimate physical detail) genitals/genitalia, anus, buttocks and/or
                   female/transgender breast nipple(s); b) A sex act which includes,
                   but is not limited to, genital-genital, oral-genital, anal-genital, or
                   oral-anal contact/penetration, genital or anal contact/penetration
                   with an inanimate object, masturbation and/or bodily excretory
                   behavior; c) Sadistic/masochistic abuse, bondage, bestiality,
                   and/or a participant who appears to be nonconsenting,
                   dominated, degraded, humiliated, or in a submissive role, and/or
                   a participant who appears to be acting in a forceful, threatening,
                   dominating, or violent manner; and/or d) A minor, or a model or
                   cartoon depicting a minor, in a sexually suggestive
                   setting/pose/attire.
              ....
              N.   You must not date individuals who have minor children, unless
                   you receive prior approval from your CCO and the ISRB.
              O.   You must not form relationships with persons/families with
                   minor children without first disclosing your sex offender status
                   and having this relationship approved by your CCO.

       Mot. for Discr. Rev., App. F at 2-3.

              Accordingly, the Court of Appeals granted the PRP in part, dismissed it in

       part, and directed the ISRB to strike or revise several conditions. In re Pers.

       Restraint of Ansell, No. 82506-2-I, slip op. at 21 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 18, 2022)

       (unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/825062.pdf.            The court

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       found condition D (cannabis) unauthorized under Winton. 2 Id. at 6. It found

       conditions G (sexually explicit materials), N (dating), and O (relationships)

       unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 11-13, 16-17. It directed the ISRB to modify

       condition B (travel) to develop standards for exceptions to travel through the

       exclusion zone. Id. at 21.

              We granted the ISRB’s motion for discretionary review regarding conditions

       D, G, N, and O. No party sought review regarding condition B (travel). However,

       the ISRB indicated that it had amended that condition, and Ansell subsequently filed

       a motion for an injunction for this court to compel the ISRB to further revise

       condition B.       For the reasons stated below, we now deny the motion for an

       injunction, and we affirm in part and reverse in part.

                                                 ANALYSIS

       I.     Motion for Injunction

              We first address the request for injunctive relief. This court has authority to

       issue orders granting injunctive or other relief to a party “to insure effective and

       equitable review.” RAP 8.3. The purpose of that rule is to “preserve[] the status

       quo” by “permit[ting] appellate courts to grant preliminary relief in aid of their

       appellate jurisdiction so as to prevent destruction of the fruits of a successful appeal.”

       Wash. Fed’n of State Emps., Council 28, AFL-CIO v. State, 99 Wn.2d 878, 883, 665

              2
                  In re Pers. Restraint of Winton, 196 Wn.2d 270, 278, 474 P.3d 532 (2020).
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       P.2d 1337 (1983).

              The Court of Appeals directed the ISRB to modify the travel restriction in

       condition B to “develop ascertainable standards applicable on a case-by-case basis

       to allow travel into and through the exclusion zone.” Ansell, slip op. at 21.

       Following the Court of Appeals decision, the ISRB revised that condition to permit

       exceptions “for medical purposes only.” Mot. for Inj. at 8. After we granted review

       regarding the other conditions, Ansell filed a motion for an injunction to compel the

       ISRB to further revise condition B to permit other exceptions.

              This court may grant injunctive relief “to insure effective and equitable

       review.” RAP 8.3. But Ansell has not shown that an injunction is necessary to

       ensure this court’s effective and equitable review of the issues before us. When this

       court accepts review of a Court of Appeals decision, we review only the questions

       raised in the motion for discretionary review or answer. RAP 13.7(b). No party

       sought discretionary review regarding the travel restriction; that condition has not

       been raised before this court. Moreover, the nature of the challenge to condition B

       is distinct from the vagueness and statutory challenges to the other conditions before

       this court. An injunction regarding condition B would not aid our review of the

       issues that are properly before us. RAP 8.3. Nor is an injunction necessary to

       prevent destruction of the fruits of Ansell’s successful challenge to condition B,

       Wash. Fed’n of State Emps., 99 Wn.2d at 883, as our decision on the issues properly

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       before us has no bearing on condition B.

              Accordingly, the motion for an injunction is denied. We next turn to the

       challenges to the community custody conditions properly before us.

       II.    Community Custody Conditions

              Under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), a person convicted of a sex

       offense receives an indeterminate sentence with a minimum and maximum term.

       RCW 9.94A.507(3). These indeterminate sentences include community custody,

       which is required for any period of time between the release from total confinement

       and the expiration of the maximum sentence. RCW 9.94A.507(5). Release into

       community custody is subject to conditions, which may be imposed either by a court

       at sentencing or by the department or the ISRB upon finding the person releasable.

       RCW 9.94A.703, .704. This case involves community custody conditions imposed

       by the ISRB.

              Before releasing the person into community custody, the department conducts

       an evaluation to predict the probability they will engage in additional sex offenses if

       released. RCW 9.95.420(1)(a). The ISRB will order the person released if it

       determines, based on the department’s recommendations and the ISRB hearing, that

       they are unlikely to engage in sex offenses if released under certain conditions.

       RCW 9.95.420(3).

              A person subject to such community custody conditions may raise a challenge

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       to the conditions through a PRP, where they must show that they are restrained and

       that the restraint is unlawful. RAP 16.4(a)-(c); In re Pers. Restraint of Blackburn,

       168 Wn.2d 881, 883-84, 232 P.3d 1091 (2010). A person “who is transferred from

       total confinement to community custody remains under the continuing jurisdiction

       of the ISRB” and is under restraint for purposes of RAP 16.4(b). In re Pers.

       Restraint of Winton, 196 Wn.2d 270, 275, 474 P.3d 532 (2020). Restraint is

       unlawful if the conditions or manner of the restraint violates the constitution or a

       state law. RAP 16.4(c)(2); In re Pers. Restraint of Williams, 198 Wn.2d 342, 352,

       496 P.3d 289 (2021).

              Ansell argues that three community custody conditions are unconstitutionally

       vague and the other is not authorized by statute because it is not related to his crimes.

       Whether an entity has authority to impose certain community custody conditions

       under the SRA is a question of statutory interpretation, which we review de novo.

       State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007). When there is no

       question as to authority but rather a challenge that the entity erred in imposing a

       condition, we review the condition for abuse of discretion and will invalidate

       conditions “if they are manifestly unreasonable.” State v. Hai Minh Nguyen, 191

       Wn.2d 671, 678, 425 P.3d 847 (2018) (citing State v. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 753,

       193 P.3d 678 (2008)). Imposition of an unconstitutional condition is manifestly

       unreasonable. State v. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d 672, 677, 416 P.3d 712 (2018); Bahl, 164

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       Wn.2d at 753.

              We conclude the conditions relating to sexually explicit materials, dating, and

       relationships are not unconstitutionally vague, and we therefore reverse the Court of

       Appeals with respect to those conditions. However, we conclude the cannabis

       condition is not within the ISRB’s authority to impose under these circumstances,

       and we therefore affirm with respect to that condition.

              A.      Vagueness

              Due process under both the state and federal constitutions requires that

       citizens have fair warning of proscribed conduct. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 752 (citing

       City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 178, 795 P.2d 693 (1990)). “A legal

       prohibition, such as a community custody condition, is unconstitutionally vague if

       (1) it does not sufficiently define the proscribed conduct so an ordinary person can

       understand the prohibition or (2) it does not provide sufficiently ascertainable

       standards to protect against arbitrary enforcement.” Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677

       (citing Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 752-53).

              When deciding a vagueness challenge, “the terms are not considered in a

       ‘vacuum,’ rather, they are considered in the context in which they are used.” Bahl,

       164 Wn.2d at 754 (quoting Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 180). A condition that contains

       a definition may be unconstitutionally vague if the definition itself is vague or

       overbroad. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 674-75. If the term is not defined, we “may

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       consider the plain and ordinary meaning as set forth in a standard dictionary.” Bahl,

       164 Wn.2d at 754.

              The vagueness doctrine does not demand community custody conditions to be

       drafted with such precision that a person is able to “‘predict with complete certainty

       the exact point at which [their] actions would be classified as prohibited conduct.’”

       Padilla, 190 Wn.3d at 677 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v.

       Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 793, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010)); see also Douglass,

       115 Wn.2d at 179 (“This test . . . does not demand impossible standards of specificity

       or absolute agreement.”).         Instead, “[i]f persons of ordinary intelligence can

       understand what the [condition] proscribes, notwithstanding some possible areas of

       disagreement, the [condition] is sufficiently definite.” Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 179.

       A “stricter standard of definiteness” applies when a community custody condition

       implicates First Amendment rights. Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 679 (citing Bahl, 164

       Wn.2d at 753); U.S. CONST. amend. I.

              For the reasons stated below, we agree with the ISRB that the three conditions

       challenged for vagueness here are sufficiently definite to pass constitutional muster.

       Thus, the ISRB did not abuse its discretion in imposing those conditions; we reverse

       the Court of Appeals as to conditions G, N, and O.

                      1.      Possession or Access to Sexually Explicit Materials

              First, condition G prohibits Ansell from “possess[ing] or access[ing] sexually

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       explicit materials” and includes a definition that “[s]exually explicit materials

       consists of any item reasonably deemed to be intended for sexual gratification and

       which displays, portrays, depicts, or describes” various listed sex acts, scenarios, or

       nudity. Mot. for Discr. Rev., App. F at 2. Ansell argues the definition of sexually

       explicit materials is overly broad—particularly the definition of nudity to include

       “intimate physical detail” that is “exposed/visible (in whole or part, including under

       or through translucent/thin materials. . .).” Id. The ISRB argues the definition of

       sexually explicit materials is sufficiently limited by the requirement the depiction be

       “reasonably deemed to be intended for sexual gratification.” Id.

              The condition is not unconstitutionally vague. We have previously upheld

       prohibitions on “sexually explicit materials” against vagueness challenges when an

       ordinary person would be able to understand the prohibition in context and with the

       aid of dictionary and statutory definitions. See Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 680-81; Bahl,

       164 Wn.2d at 743, 756 (“‘[b]ecause of the inherent vagueness of language, citizens

       may need to utilize other statutes and court rulings to clarify the meaning of a

       statute’—‘[s]uch sources are considered presumptively available to all citizens’”

       (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Watson,

       160 Wn.2d 1, 8, 154 P.3d 909 (2007))).

              Here, the condition includes a definition of “sexually explicit materials,”

       listing specific acts, images, and scenarios, qualified by the requirement that the

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       depiction must be “reasonably deemed to be intended for sexual gratification.” Mot.

       for Discr. Rev., App. F at 2. In Nguyen, we held that a condition prohibiting

       “‘sexually explicit material as defined by RCW 9.68.130’” was not

       unconstitutionally vague because “persons of ordinary intelligence can discern

       ‘sexually explicit material’ from works of art and anthropological significance,”

       which the referenced statute excluded. 191 Wn.2d at 679-81 (quoting the record).

       Similarly, here, reading the definition in context, a person of ordinary intelligence

       can understand that it does not prohibit all nude images but, rather, only those

       depictions “reasonably deemed to be intended for sexual gratification.” Mot. for

       Discr. Rev., App. F at 2. Contrary to Ansell’s contention, an ordinary person would

       understand that portrayals of sexual scenes in films like Titanic or Love and

       Basketball are not prohibited under this condition. Similarly, portrayals of nudity,

       such as in Frida Kahlo’s Two Nudes in the Forest, Michelangelo’s David, or a

       drawing of the human anatomy in a medical textbook are not prohibited. See

       Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 680-81 (discerning works of art from sexually explicit

       material). An ordinary person would understand the intended purpose of those

       images is not for sexual gratification. See id.

              Ansell also argues that the phrase “reasonably deemed to be intended for

       sexual gratification” invites arbitrary enforcement subject to the personal interests

       of the individual CCO. Mot. for Discr. Rev., App. F at 2. But the condition does

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       not prohibit material a CCO personally finds sexually gratifying; it prohibits material

       that is reasonably deemed intended for that purpose. We generally interpret the term

       “reasonable” to denote an objective, rather than a subjective, standard. See, e.g., In

       re Disciplinary Proceeding Against Keenan, 199 Wn.2d 87, 96, 502 P.3d 1271

       (2022) (canons of judicial conduct); In re Pers. Restraint of Garcia-Mendoza, 196

       Wn.2d 836, 844, 479 P.3d 674 (2021) (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v.

       Escalante, 195 Wn.2d 526, 533-34, 461 P.3d 1183 (2020) (custody for purposes of

       a Miranda warning). Thus, this condition includes a sufficiently ascertainable

       standard, based on whether a reasonable objective person would consider the image

       or depiction intended for sexual gratification.

              We conclude that condition G adequately defines the proscribed conduct so

       an ordinary person can understand the prohibition and provides sufficiently

       ascertainable standards to protect against arbitrary enforcement. As is often the case

       in vagueness challenges, Ansell wants us to find that the absence of a precise

       definition equates to a vague definition. That cannot be the correct conclusion—we

       can fairly describe and define the prohibited materials in a thorough and objective

       manner, as the ISRB did here, and know that the prohibition can be appropriately

       communicated to the person subject to the restriction. The prohibition on sexually

       explicit materials is not unconstitutionally vague, and the ISRB did not abuse its

       discretion in imposing this condition. See Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677.

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                      2.      Dating

              Second, condition N states, “You must not date individuals who have minor

       children, unless you receive prior approval from your CCO and the ISRB.” Mot. for

       Discr. Rev., App. F at 3. As this condition does not contain definitions, we “may

       consider the plain and ordinary meaning as set forth in a standard dictionary.” Bahl,

       164 Wn.2d at 754. “Date” means “an appointment between two persons” “for the

       mutual enjoyment of some form of social activity” or “an occasion (as an evening)

       of social activity arranged in advance between two persons.” WEBSTER’S THIRD

       NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 576 (2002).

              In Nguyen, we upheld a similar prohibition against any “dating relationship,”

       looking to the plain and ordinary meaning according to the dictionary as well as a

       statutory definition and concluding that “a person of ordinary intelligence can

       distinguish a ‘dating relationship’ from other types of relationships.” 191 Wn.2d at

       682. Likewise, we conclude an ordinary person could understand that condition N

       prohibits social and romantic meetings with people who have minor children without

       prior approval. 3

              Ansell emphasizes that in the 21st century, the question of whether people are

              3
                The ISRB points to State v. Kinzle, where the Court of Appeals upheld a similar condition
       because the crime involved children Kinzle accessed “through a social relationship with their
       parents.” 181 Wn. App. 774, 785, 326 P.3d 870 (2014). But the Kinzle court did not analyze that
       condition for vagueness; it found the condition reasonably crime related and necessary to protect
       the public. Id. Kinzle is unpersuasive as to the vagueness analysis of Ansell’s condition N.
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       considered dating can be rife with uncertainty if, for example, they meet for

       conversation over coffee or have a one-time sexual encounter. But the question is

       not whether a pair of people would agree to the label of “dating”; rather, the question

       is whether the proscribed conduct is sufficiently definite and objectively

       ascertainable. Based on the plain and ordinary meaning, a person of ordinary

       intelligence would understand that both of the aforementioned activities would be

       prohibited if the other person had minor children and Ansell failed to obtain prior

       approval. Further, this provides an objective standard, not a subjective one. Thus,

       the proscribed conduct is sufficiently definite. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 752-53.

               We conclude the prohibition on dating is not unconstitutionally vague and the

       ISRB did not abuse its discretion in imposing condition N. See Padilla, 190 Wn.2d

       at 677.

                      3.      Forming Relationships

               Third, condition O states, “You must not form relationships with

       persons/families with minor children without first disclosing your sex offender status

       and having this relationship approved by your CCO.” Mot. for Discr. Rev., App. F

       at 3.

               Ansell argues this condition lacks guidance on the types of relationships it

       prohibits. But when deciding a vagueness challenge, “the terms are not considered

       in a ‘vacuum,’ rather, they are considered in the context in which they are used.”

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       Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 754 (quoting Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 180). Community custody

       conditions should be “read in a commonsense fashion in the context of the judgment

       and sentence, and related documents that will be available to [the CCO].” State v.

       Johnson, 197 Wn.2d 740, 748, 487 P.3d 893 (2021). Here, Ansell’s judgment and

       sentence shows that he was convicted of three counts of child molestation, and the

       release decision describes how Ansell committed the offenses against children in his

       family’s babysitting group—the children of friends and neighbors. Additionally,

       condition N prohibits Ansell from dating people who have children, and an

       unchallenged condition I also prohibits Ansell from having contact with minors

       without the permission and supervision of a chaperone. Cf. State v. Wallmuller, 194

       Wn.2d 234, 245, 449 P.3d 619 (2019) (reading a community custody condition in

       the context of other conditions). Condition O must be read in the context of the

       underlying criminal conduct and documents available to the CCO—which together

       indicate that the condition relates to preventing Ansell from accessing children based

       on his relationship with their parents, as he did with the children he molested. Bahl,

       164 Wn.2d at 754; Johnson, 197 Wn.2d at 748 & n.3. Thus, read in context with the

       other community custody conditions and release decision, condition O provides

       sufficient standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d at 748.4

              4
               The concurrence/dissent expresses concern about reliance on extrinsic documents that
       might not be available to the defendant, see concurrence/dissent (Gordon McCloud, J.) at 7, but
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              Ansell also argues that condition O lacks guidance on the degree of

       friendliness in an interaction that amounts to a “relationship.” Due process does not

       require that he should be able to “‘predict with complete certainty the exact point at

       which his actions would be classified as prohibited conduct,’” as long as a person of

       ordinary intelligence can understand what is proscribed. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677

       (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d at 793);

       Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 179 (“‘vagueness in the constitutional sense is not mere

       uncertainty’” (quoting State v. Smith, 111 Wn.2d 1, 10, 759 P.2d 372 (1988))). In

       context, an ordinary person could understand that condition O is aimed at preventing

       easy access to children, which is a possibility in any relationship. Context shows

       that the condition prohibits Ansell from accessing children through friendly

       relationships, business relationships, neighborly relationships, and the like.

              Condition O, though broad, is not unconstitutionally vague. An ordinary

       person would understand that when Ansell has friendly dealings with people who

       have minor children, he must disclose his sex offender status and get the approval of

       his CCO.        This condition allows for the easy differentiation between an

       inconsequential conversation in a grocery store checkout line and a lengthier

       conversation between, for example, two parents whose children share a teacher and

       we consider only the release decision and order of release stating the conditions—documents that
       are central to understanding the conditions and are readily available to the parties here.
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       who are planning a birthday party. One such conversation leads to nothing further,

       while the other involves children and begins the formation of a friendly relationship.

       Ansell fails to demonstrate that the term is unconstitutionally vague. Therefore, the

       ISRB did not abuse its discretion in imposing this condition. See Padilla, 190 Wn.2d

       at 677.

              B.      Conditions Unrelated to the Crime

              Last, Ansell challenged condition D, which prohibits the use of cannabis. The

       ISRB concedes that there is no evidence that Ansell’s crimes involved any drugs.

       However, the ISRB argues community custody conditions need not be related to the

       crime of conviction as long as they meet a single one of the other statutory

       requirements. We disagree.

              The scope of the ISRB’s authority to impose community custody conditions

       is a question of statutory interpretation we review de novo. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d

       at 110. The objective of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and implement the

       legislature’s intent. Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9,

       43 P.3d 4 (2002). If the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, then we must give

       effect to that meaning as an expression of legislative intent. Id. at 9-10. Plain

       meaning is discerned from both the text of the statute, the statutory scheme as a

       whole, and related statutes. Id. at 11. If the statute is ambiguous, we may resort to

       aids to construction. Id. at 12.

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       In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell
       No. 100753-1

              The ISRB contends that RCW 9.94A.704 clearly outlines its authority to set

       community custody conditions, but that is not quite an accurate characterization of

       the law. Ansell committed these crimes between 2006 and 2008, so his sentence is

       governed by the version of the law in effect at that time: former RCW 9.94A.713(5)

       (2001) (LAWS OF 2001, 2d Spec. Sess., ch. 12, § 304). RCW 9.94A.345; State v.

       Medina, 180 Wn.2d 282, 287, 324 P.3d 682 (2014). Since then, the statute has been

       recodified as RCW 9.94A.704. LAWS OF 2008, ch. 231, §§ 57-59; LAWS OF 2009,

       ch. 28, § 12.

              Rather than declaring affirmative parameters for the ISRB’s authority to

       impose conditions, former RCW 9.94A.713(5) outlines an administrative process for

       the person subject to community custody conditions to object to a condition imposed

       by the department or ISRB. Conditions will be stricken if they are not reasonably

       related to any of three criteria:

              By the close of the next business day, after receiving notice of a
              condition imposed by the board or the department, an offender may
              request an administrative hearing under rules adopted by the board.
              The condition shall remain in effect unless the hearing examiner finds
              that it is not reasonably related to any of the following:
                      (a) The crime of conviction;
                      (b) The offender’s risk of reoffending; or
                      (c) The safety of the community.

       Former RCW 9.94A.713(5) (emphasis added). 5

              5
                The legislature has revised the statute several times in the decade and a half since Ansell
       committed these crimes, including a 2019 amendment adding “[t]he offender’s risk of domestic
       violence reoffense” as another basis for a challenge to conditions imposed by the ISRB under
                                                       18
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       In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell
       No. 100753-1

              The ISRB argues that former RCW 9.94A.713(5) authorizes imposing a

       community custody condition that reasonably relates to any one of those matters, but

       the condition does not need to relate to all of them. It concedes that the cannabis

       condition does not relate to Ansell’s crimes, but it argues a condition is valid

       nevertheless if it relates to the risk of reoffending or the safety of the community.

       Ansell argues, and we agree, that the statute requires that ISRB-imposed community

       custody conditions relate to all three topics.

              The statute is ambiguous. Former RCW 9.94A.713(5) does not state that the

       ISRB can impose any condition as long as it relates to a single criterion. Rather, it

       outlines the grounds for a person to challenge a condition and states in the negative

       that the condition will remain in effect unless it is not reasonably related to any of

       three topics. Id. The ISRB argues the dictionary definition of the word “any,” in

       the phrase “any of the following,” supports its interpretation that the condition need

       relate to only one of the enumerated topics. But the word “any” can mean “one” or

       “all.” WEBSTER’S, supra, at 97 (“Any” means “one, some, or all indiscriminately of

       RCW 9.94A.704(10)(c). LAWS OF 2019, ch. 263, § 601. However, as explained above, the SRA
       declares that the law applicable to Ansell is that which was in effect at the time of the offenses.
       RCW 9.94A.345. Therefore, we agree with the concurrence that the current iteration of the statute
       is not at issue in this case, see concurrence (Whitener, J.) at 6, and therefore our analysis has no
       application to it. Our analysis applies to the version of the statute at issue in this case: former
       RCW 9.94A.713(5).
                                                       19
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       In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell
       No. 100753-1

       whatever quantity”). 6       Thus, the operative sentence can be read to mean that a

       condition is valid if it relates to any one of the enumerated topics or it can be read to

       mean that a condition is valid if it relates to all of those topics. More precisely, it

       means that a person has the right to challenge a condition and have it stricken either

       (a) if it is not related to one of those topics or (b) if it is unrelated to all of those

       topics.

              The more natural reading of the statute is that the person subject to the

       condition may challenge it on the basis that it does not relate to all three topics. Thus,

       the ISRB is authorized to impose community custody conditions that relate to the

       crime of conviction, the risk of reoffense, and the safety of the community—but if

       the condition fails to relate to all three topics, it will be stricken. Former RCW

       9.94A.713(5) (the challenged condition will not remain in effect if “the hearing

       examiner finds that it is not reasonably related to any of the following” criteria).

              This reading of the statute comports with the structure and purpose of the

       statutory scheme governing community custody, which aims to reduce the risk the

       person will commit another sex offense if released into the community. See RCW

       9.95.420(3); see also Campbell & Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 11. Reading the statutory

       scheme as a whole, the risk of reoffending and the safety of the community are

              6
               For example, “I can’t find any stamps” means I can’t find even a single stamp, while
       “give me any letters you find” means give me all the letters you find. See WEBSTER’S, supra, at
       97.
                                                     20
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       In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell
       No. 100753-1

       inextricably linked to the crime of conviction—that is, the risk of reoffending refers

       to the risk the person will commit another similar sex offense, and the safety to the

       community refers to protecting the public against that risk.            Former RCW

       9.94A.713(5). The ISRB’s concession that the cannabis prohibition does not relate

       to any of those purposes demonstrates this principle—no evidence suggests that

       cannabis relates to Ansell’s crime or that restricting his access to cannabis relates to

       his risk of reoffense or the safety of the community. The ISRB does not have

       unfettered discretion to impose conditions untethered to these risks. Thus, the ISRB

       is authorized to impose community custody conditions that are reasonably related to

       the crime of conviction, the risk of reoffense, and the safety of the community—a

       condition that fails to relate to all three topics is invalid. Id.

              We said as much in Winton. 196 Wn.2d at 278 (“Based on the statutory

       authority, the relevant inquiry is whether the imposed condition is ‘crime-related,’

       meaning it is reasonably related to the crime, the offender’s risk of reoffense, and

       the protection of public safety” (citing RCW 9.94A.704(10)(c)(i)-(iii); RCW

       9.95.0001(2))). That case involved a challenge to a travel restriction in a community

       custody condition. Id. at 273. We held that conditions restricting the constitutional

       right to travel are reviewed for reasonableness, and the condition at issue was a

       reasonable exercise of authority because it was “reasonably related to the crime,

       recidivism, and public safety.” Id. at 276, 279 (emphasis added). We explained:

                                                   21
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       In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell
       No. 100753-1

                     The condition complies with the statutory requirements; that is,
              it bears a reasonable relation to the crime, the risk of reoffense, and
              public safety. The condition directly relates to the crime because
              Winton’s victims reside, work, and attend school within Clark County.
              It also reasonably reduces the risk of reoffense, ensures public safety,
              and, notably, protects the victims and their families by preventing
              contact with Winton. The ISRB properly exercised its discretion in
              imposing this condition.

       Id. at 278-79 (emphasis added).

              Given the text of the statute, along with the structure and purpose of the

       statutory scheme and our precedent, we conclude the SRA authorizes the ISRB to

       impose community custody conditions only if they relate to the crime of conviction,

       the risk of reoffense, and the safety of the community. Former RCW 9.94A.713(5).

       No evidence suggests the cannabis condition is related to Ansell’s crimes, so the

       ISRB acted outside its authority in imposing condition D. We affirm the Court of

       Appeals with respect to condition D.

                                         CONCLUSION

              The ISRB’s authority to impose community custody conditions is broad, but

       not unlimited. It cannot impose conditions that are unconstitutionally vague, and it

       must adhere to the purpose of community custody under the SRA, which aims to

       reduce the risk a person will commit another sex offense if released into the

       community. In this case, conditions G, N, and O are not unconstitutionally vague;

       the ISRB did not abuse its discretion in imposing those conditions. However, the

       ISRB lacked authority to impose condition D, which is not related to the crime of

                                                22
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       In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell
       No. 100753-1

       conviction, risk of reoffending, and the safety of the community, as required by

       former RCW 9.94A.713(5). We therefore affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand

       for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                     ______________________________

       WE CONCUR:

       ___________________________                   ______________________________

       ___________________________                   ______________________________

       ___________________________                   ______________________________

       ___________________________                   ______________________________

                                                23
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       In re Personal Restraint of Ansell, No. 100753-1
       Whitener, J. (concurring)

                                                    No. 100753-1

              WHITENER, J. (concurring)—In his personal restraint petition Peter Ansell

       challenges many community custody conditions that the Indeterminate Sentencing

       Review Board (ISRB) imposed on him.

               I agree with the lead opinion that Ansell’s motion for injunctive relief be

       denied and, therefore, I join in Section I. I also agree with the lead opinion that the

       conditions related to sexually explicit materials, dating, and forming relationships

       are not unconstitutionally vague and, therefore, I join in Section II, subsection A.

              However, I disagree that the ISRB exceeds its authority under former RCW

       9.94A.713(5) (2001) when it imposes a community custody condition that is not

       crime related, so long as the condition is reasonably related to another of the

       enumerated criteria. Accordingly, I disagree with the lead opinion’s analysis as to

       condition D, prohibiting the use, possession, and control of cannabis.1 However,

       because the ISRB conceded at oral argument 2 that the cannabis condition is not

              1
                  Like the lead opinion, I also use the term “cannabis” instead of “marijuana.” Lead opinion
       at 2 (citing State v. Fraser, 199 Wn.2d 465, 469 n.1, 509 P.3d 282 (2022)).
                2
                  At oral argument, in response to a question from Justice Montoya-Lewis as to how the
       cannabis condition related to one or all of the enumerated criteria, counsel for the ISRB stated that
       “in Mr. Ansell’s case it does not seem to meet … any of the three or any of the four criteria” and
       conveyed that that is why the ISRB had withdrawn the condition prior to argument. Wash. Sup.
                                                            1
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       In re Personal Restraint of Ansell, No. 100753-1
       Whitener, J. (concurring)

       related to any of the three enumerated criteria, I would hold that the ISRB did exceed

       its authority in imposing the cannabis condition and it must be stricken, but I would

       affirm the Court of Appeals on this issue on different grounds.

              Therefore, I respectfully concur.

                                                 ANALYSIS

              Although we review community custody conditions for abuse of discretion,

       we review whether an entity had the authority to impose such restrictions de novo

       as it involves an issue of statutory interpretation. In re Pers. Restraint of Winton, 196

       Wn.2d 270, 474 P.3d 532 (2020); State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156

       P.3d 201 (2007). When interpreting a statute, our “fundamental objective is to

       ascertain and carry out the Legislature’s intent, and if the statute’s meaning is plain

       on its face, then the court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of

       legislative intent.” Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-

       10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). We also consider the text of the provision in question, the

       context of the statute in which the provision is found, related provisions, and the

       statutory scheme as a whole. City of Seattle v. Winebrenner, 167 Wn.2d 451, 456,

       219 P.3d 686 (2009).

       Ct., oral argument, In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell, No. 100753-1 (Jan. 17, 2023) at 13 min., 21
       sec., audio recording by TVW, Washington State’s Public Affairs Network, http://www.tvw.org.
                                                          2
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       In re Personal Restraint of Ansell, No. 100753-1
       Whitener, J. (concurring)

                In the present case, condition D prohibits Ansell from using, possessing, or

       controlling cannabis and prohibits him from entering establishments that sell

       cannabis.

                As the lead opinion explains, former RCW 9.94A.713(5) outlines the process

       under which a person subject to community custody conditions may object to

       conditions imposed by the ISRB. Lead opinion at 17. Former RCW 9.94A.713(5)

       reads,

                By the close of the next business day, after receiving notice of a
                condition imposed by the board or the department, an offender may
                request an administrative hearing under rules adopted by the board. The
                condition shall remain in effect unless the hearing examiner finds that
                it is not reasonably related to any of the following:

                (a) The crime of conviction;

                (b) The offender’s risk of reoffending; or

                (c) The safety of the community . . .

       (Emphasis added).

                The lead opinion concludes that this statute is ambiguous. Lead opinion at 19.

       I disagree. A statute is “ambiguous” if, after analyzing the plain language, “the

       statute remains susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning.” Campbell &

       Gwinn, 146 Wn.2d at 12. At this point, we can resort to statutory construction,

       including legislative history. Id.

                                                          3
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       In re Personal Restraint of Ansell, No. 100753-1
       Whitener, J. (concurring)

              The lead opinion itself recognizes that “‘[a]ny’ means ‘one, some, or all

       indiscriminately of whatever quantity.’” Lead opinion at 19 (quoting WEBSTER’S

       THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 97 (2002)). Thus, “any” means one, some,

       or all, of the quantity of things under consideration.

              Thus, placing this definition into the statute it now reads,

              By the close of the next business day, after receiving notice of a
              condition imposed by the board or the department, an offender may
              request an administrative hearing under rules adopted by the board. The
              condition shall remain in effect unless the hearing examiner finds that
              it is not reasonably related to [one, some, or all] of the following:

              (a) The crime of conviction;

              (b) The offender’s risk of reoffending; or

              (c) The safety of the community.

       Former RCW 9.94A.713(5). While the double negative of “unless” and “not

       reasonably related” is admittedly confusing, the statute says that the hearing

       examiner will strike the condition if it is not reasonably related to one, some, or all

       of the criteria. It follows that if the condition is reasonably related to one, some, or

       all of the criteria, then the condition shall remain in effect.

               The lead opinion contends that “the operative sentence can be read to mean

       that a condition is valid if it relates to any one of the enumerated topics or it can be

       read to mean that a condition is valid if it relates to all of those topics.” Lead opinion

       at 19 (second emphasis added). Although I agree that both of these statements are

                                                          4
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       In re Personal Restraint of Ansell, No. 100753-1
       Whitener, J. (concurring)

       ways in which the statute can be read, I disagree with the lead opinion’s use of “or”

       because it is not that one or the other of these statements apply. Both of these

       statements apply and exist at once because there are three ways in which the

       community custody condition is valid: if one enumerated criterion is met, if two are

       met, and if all three are met. What the lead opinion deems to be “ambiguous” is that

       there are multiple ways in which the criteria of the statute can be met. This is not

       ambiguity. It is, instead, reasonable interpretations of the statute that can all exist at

       the same time because each alternative is a way to meet the criteria of the statute.

              The lead opinion then asserts that reading a condition as valid if one criterion

       is met or if all are met “[m]ore precisely . . . means that a person has the right to

       challenge a condition and have it stricken either (a) if it is not related to one of those

       topics or (b) if it is unrelated to all of those topics.” Lead opinion at 19-20. This is

       incorrect because it is based on the false premise that the condition is valid if one of

       the criteria is met or if all criteria are met, when instead the condition is valid if one

       criterion is met and also if all criteria are met (to include if some criteria are met).

       Further, under the scenario in which a person is challenging the condition for not

       being related to one of the criteria, if it is related to another of the two remaining

       criteria, then it would in fact be related to “one” of the criteria as required by the

       statute. The lead opinion is creating ambiguity where none exists.

                                                          5
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       In re Personal Restraint of Ansell, No. 100753-1
       Whitener, J. (concurring)

                In addition, the colloquial understanding of this phrasing is that only one of

       the enumerated criteria must be met. Take the hypothetical of a job posting. If,

       similar to the statute, a job posting indicated that “applications will be considered

       unless we determine you do not meet any of the following criteria: five years of

       experience, graduation from college, and live within 10 miles of the job site.” It

       would be reasonable for applicants to understand that their applications would be

       considered, so long as at least one of the criteria is met. Looking at this hypothetical

       another way, and removing the double negative, it reads that an application will be

       considered if someone does meet any (one, some, or all) of the criteria. While the

       phrasing could be clearer, there is no ambiguity. The same is true for the statute at

       issue.

                Additionally, when interpreting a statute, the court must presume that the

       legislature did not intend unlikely or absurd results. State v. Barbee, 187 Wn.2d 375,

       389, 386 P.3d 729 (2017). Although the current iteration of the statute is not at issue,

       the lead opinion’s reading of the statute will lead to absurd consequences under the

       current statute. In 2019, the legislature added a fourth factor to the list in RCW

       9.94A.704(10)(c),3 which, in addition to crime of conviction, risk of reoffending,

                3
                As the lead opinion correctly observes, the statute at issue in this case has been recodified
       as RCW 9.94A.704. Lead opinion at 18 (citing LAWS OF 2008, ch. 231, §§ 57-59; LAWS OF 2009,
       ch. 28, § 12).
                                                             6
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       In re Personal Restraint of Ansell, No. 100753-1
       Whitener, J. (concurring)

       and safety to the community, now includes “[t]he offender’s risk of domestic

       violence reoffense.” LAWS OF 2019, ch. 263, § 601(10)(c)(iv).

              The other pertinent language has not changed. Therefore, under the lead

       opinion’s reading of the statute, if one of those four factors is not met, then the

       hearing examiner must strike the condition. Accordingly, if a condition is not

       reasonably related to an offender’s risk of domestic violence reoffense, the condition

       cannot be imposed. This eviscerates the authority of the ISRB. The ISRB will now

       be unable to impose any conditions on any offender who has not committed a

       domestic violence offense because there would be no condition that would prevent

       a “reoffense” of an offense that never happened in the first place. This would be

       absurd and cannot be the intention of the legislature.

               In addition, former RCW 9.94A.713(1) reads,

              the department shall assess the offender’s risk of recidivism and shall
              recommend to the board any additional or modified conditions of the
              offender’s community custody based upon the risk to community
              safety. In addition, the department shall make a recommendation with
              regard to, and the board may require the offender to participate in,
              rehabilitative programs, or otherwise perform affirmative conduct, and
              obey all laws. The board must consider and may impose department-
              recommended conditions.

       It would also be absurd to require the ISRB to consider and grant it the discretion to

       impose community custody conditions related only to the risk to community safety,

       only to have said conditions stricken under a later section of the same statute because

       the condition does not relate to the crime of conviction and risk of reoffense.
                                                          7
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       In re Personal Restraint of Ansell, No. 100753-1
       Whitener, J. (concurring)

              The lead opinion and Ansell contend that Winton is determinative, but I would

       hold that it is not determinative but rather is distinguishable. Winton did not consider

       the same type of community custody condition at issue here nor did Winton engage

       in a full statutory interpretation of the statute at issue in the present case.

              In Winton, we examined a community custody condition that prohibited a

       parolee from entering Clark County without prior written approval. 196 Wn.2d at

       273. The ISRB included this condition because Winton’s victims lived in Clark

       County. Id. We held that this condition was reasonable under RCW

       9.94A.704(10)(c), a successor statute to RCW 9.94A.713, noting that “[t]he

       condition complies with the statutory requirements; that is, it bears a reasonable

       relation to the crime, the risk of reoffense, and public safety.” Id. at 278-79. The

       ISRB asserts that the Winton court incorrectly read the statute conjunctively because

       it implied that all factors must be met for a condition to be imposed. Pet’r’s Suppl.

       Br. at 18. I agree. Therefore, I would clarify the interpretation of RCW

       9.94A.704(10)(c) and hold that under the plain language of the statute, the

       enumerated requirements are disjunctive and only one must be met to impose a

       condition. Id. at 19.

              It is true that in Winton this court did refer to the enumerated list of criteria as

       a conjunctive list adding in “and.” See, e.g., Winton 196 Wn.2d at 276 (“Moreover,

       an imposed condition must be reasonably related to the crime of the conviction, the

                                                          8
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       In re Personal Restraint of Ansell, No. 100753-1
       Whitener, J. (concurring)

       offender’s risk of reoffending, and the safety of the community or it will be

       removed.” (emphasis added)). But the court did so only as it relates to “crime-

       related” prohibitions, which was the focus in Winton.

              As the Winton court correctly observed,

              “‘Community custody’ means that portion of an offender's sentence
              subject to controls including crime-related prohibitions and affirmative
              conditions from the court, the board, or the department of corrections
              based on risk to community safety, that is served under supervision in
              the community, and which may be modified or revoked for violations
              of release conditions.”

       Id. (emphasis omitted) (quoting RCW 9.95.0001(2)). Looking at this language, the

       ISRB can impose both crime-related and affirmative conditions. It follows these are

       not the same or else there would be no reason to list both. Consistent with this, in a

       footnote, the court recognized that “[b]ased on the language ‘including crime-related

       prohibitions and affirmative conditions,’ we recognize that RCW 9.95.0001(2)

       establishes nonexclusive considerations. However, in this case, our focus is on

       ‘crime-related prohibitions,’ and those additional considerations are not before us.”

       Id. at 276 n.5. Thus, the court recognized that it was not analyzing conditions that

       were not crime-related prohibitions and recognized that there are other possible type

       of conditions that were not before the court.

              The court went on to define and analyze crime-related prohibitions. And for

       crime-related prohibitions, concluded that conditions must be reasonably related to

       the crime of conviction, the offender’s risk of reoffending, and the safety of the
                                                          9
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       In re Personal Restraint of Ansell, No. 100753-1
       Whitener, J. (concurring)

       community. While this conclusion makes logical sense for crime-related

       prohibitions that are inextricably intertwined with all three enumerated criteria, the

       holding is also limited to crime-related prohibitions and does not apply to other

       affirmative conditions at issue in the present case.

              As discussed above, when engaging in the statutory interpretation of the

       language in this statute, the conclusion made by the lead opinion that this is a

       conjunctive list is incorrect. Therefore, while in Winton all three of the enumerated

       criteria were met, the legal underpinnings requiring all three to be met are limited to

       the facts of a crime-related condition.

              The Court of Appeals, Division Three, recently held that community custody

       conditions are not limited to conditions that are crime related and may be extended

       to “conditions that are reasonably related to the offender’s risk of reoffending.” State

       v. Frederick, 20 Wn. App. 2d 890, 903, 506 P.3d 690 (2022). Frederick argued that

       a condition that required drug monitoring was not crime related and could not be

       imposed. Id. at 902. The court found that the condition was crime related and further

       explained that “the [ISRB]’s authority to impose conditions of community custody

       is not limited to conditions that are crime related.” Id. at 903. In doing so, the court

       “agree[d] with the State’s assessment that the Winton court did not seek to define the

       [ISRB]’s full authority to impose release conditions; rather, it focused only on crime-

       related prohibitions.” Id. at 902 n. 1. Although not binding, Frederick is persuasive

                                                          10
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       In re Personal Restraint of Ansell, No. 100753-1
       Whitener, J. (concurring)

       and supports a statutory interpretation that all conditions need not be related to the

       crime of conviction.

              I would hold that the statute presents a disjunctive meaning in that at least one

       criterion must be satisfied, not all. The ISRB is within its authority to impose

       conditions not related to the crime if the condition is otherwise related to one of the

       enumerated criteria, as only one criterion on the list needs to be satisfied for a

       condition to remain in effect.

              However, the ISRB has conceded that the cannabis condition is not related to

       any of the three enumerated criteria, therefore, I agree solely with the result of the

       lead opinion that the condition must be stricken.

                                               CONCLUSION

              I would reverse the Court of Appeals. Under the plain language of RCW

       9.94A.713(5), only one of the enumerated criteria needs to be met for the condition

       to remain in effect. Accordingly, the ISRB has the authority to impose conditions

       unrelated to the crime but related to another enumerated criteria. However, here the

       ISRB conceded that the cannabis condition does not relate to any of the criteria,

       therefore, it must be stricken.

              I respectfully concur.

                                                          11
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       In re Personal Restraint of Ansell, No. 100753-1
       Whitener, J. (concurring)

                                                           ______________________________

                                                           ______________________________

                                                           ______________________________

                                                           ______________________________

                                                          12
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        In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell (Peter), No. 100753-1
        (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part)

                                          No. 100753-1

             GORDON McCLOUD, J. (concurring in part/dissenting in part)—

       Community custody conditions must be related to the crime of conviction. And

       the community custody conditions that the lead opinion upholds in this case are

       certainly related to Peter Daniel Ansell’s crimes of child molestation: he

       accomplished the molestation by using his neighborhood babysitting group as a

       source of victims and the Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board (ISRB) imposed

       community custody conditions that obviously limit his ability to gain such

       unsupervised access to children in the future.

             The majority of those conditions achieve that goal with clear and definite

       language. The condition barring Ansell from possessing or accessing “sexually

       explicit materials” and then explaining what that term means is crime related and is

       well defined. Mot. for Discr. Rev., App. F (Ord. of Release & Supervision

       Conditions) at 2. And the condition barring Ansell from “dat[ing] individuals who

       have minor children” absent “prior approval” is crime related and—given society’s

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        (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part)

       general understanding of what “dating” means—is also narrow and therefore

       sufficiently clear. Id., App. F at 3.

             But condition O is different. It bars Ansell from “form[ing] relationships”

       with persons who have minor children absent prior community corrections officer

       (CCO) approval. Id. Unlike condition G, which contains a clear definition of its

       prohibition on “sexually explicit materials,” id., App. F at 2, condition O contains

       no definition at all of its prohibition on “relationships.” And unlike condition N,

       which uses the narrow word “dating” to describe its bar on “dat[ing] individuals

       who have minor children” absent CCO approval, id., App. F at 3, condition O uses

       the expansive word “relationships,” without definition, to describe its bar on

       “form[ing] relationships” with persons who have minor children absent prior CCO

       approval. Even the lead opinion acknowledges that the word “relationships,”

       unlike the word “dating,” is “broad.” Lead opinion at 16.

             I therefore join the lead opinion in all respects, except for its decision about

       condition O. I would hold that because condition O lacks the clear and definite

       language contained in conditions N and G, it is unconstitutionally vague.

             I therefore respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

                                                 2
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        In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell (Peter), No. 100753-1
        (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part)

                                                  FACTS

               As the lead opinion states, Ansell molested children left in his care as part of

       a neighborhood babysitting group. He pleaded guilty to three counts of child

       molestation. Ansell received an indeterminate sentence of 130 months to life.

               After Ansell served his minimum term of 11 years, the ISRB released him

       subject to community custody conditions. One of those conditions, condition O,

       read:

               You must not form relationships with persons/families with minor children
               without first disclosing your sex offender status and having this relationship
               approved by your CCO.

       Mot. for Discr. Rev., App. F at 3.

               Ansell filed a personal restraint petition challenging condition O and other

       conditions, as the lead opinion explains. The Court of Appeals held, in part, that

       condition O was unconstitutionally vague and remanded with instructions for the

       ISRB to amend or strike the condition. In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell, No. 82506-2-

       I,   slip   op.   at   17   (Wash.   Ct.    App.   Jan.   18,   2022)   (unpublished),

       https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/825062.pdf. This court granted review.

       Ord., In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell, No. 100753-1 (Wash. 2022).

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        (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part)

                                             ANALYSIS

             The due process clauses of the state and United States constitutions

       “require[] that citizens have fair warning of proscribed conduct.” State v. Bahl, 164

       Wn.2d 739, 752, 193 P.3d 678 (2008) (citing City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115

       Wn.2d 171, 178, 795 P.2d 693 (1990)); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,

       108, 92 S. Ct. 2294, 33 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1972); WASH. CONST. art. I, § 3; U.S.

       CONST. amend. XIV.

             Thus, legal prohibitions like community custody conditions must be

       sufficiently clear and cannot survive if they are unduly vague.

             A community custody condition is unconstitutionally vague if it “(1) . . .

       does not sufficiently define the proscribed conduct so an ordinary person can

       understand the prohibition or (2) . . . does not provide sufficiently ascertainable

       standards to protect against arbitrary enforcement.” State v. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d

       672, 677, 416 P.3d 712 (2018) (emphasis added) (citing Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 752-

       53). In other words, a condition must contain sufficiently definite and clear

       descriptions of the prohibited conduct and the condition must contain clear

       standards for uniform, nonarbitrary, enforcement. A condition that lacks even one

       of these constitutionally required minimum protections must be stricken as vague.

       Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 178. Condition O’s use of the key term “relationships,”

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        (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part)

       without a narrowing explanation or definition for either Ansell or his CCO, lacks

       both of those constitutionally required minimum protections.

             The lead opinion comes to a different conclusion. It does so by holding that

       we should define the word “relationship,” and narrow its otherwise massive scope,

       by considering a variety of other documents that might be accessible to the CCO

       even if they are not available to Ansell. As the lead opinion explains it, “Condition

       O must be read in the context of the underlying criminal conduct and documents

       available to the CCO—which together indicate that the condition relates to

       preventing Ansell from accessing children based on his relationship with their

       parents, as he did with the children he molested.” Lead opinion at 15 (emphasis

       added) (citing Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 754; State v. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d 740, 748 &

       n.3, 487 P.3d 893 (2021)).

             This defeats both purposes of the vagueness doctrine.

             The first key purpose of the vagueness doctrine in this context is to inform

       the defendant, or probationer, or other supervisee, of the law’s requirements with

       sufficient definiteness for them to be able to understand what behavior is

       prohibited. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108; see also Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143,

       150, 117 S. Ct. 1148, 137 L. Ed. 2d 270 (1997). Forcing the defendant to predict

       the other documents on which the CCO might rely, concerning the goal of the

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        In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell (Peter), No. 100753-1
        (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part)

       challenged condition rather than the meaning of the operative word used in that

       condition, to predict what “relationships” encompasses, thwarts that purpose.

       Accord United States v. Guagliardo, 278 F.3d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (“A

       probationer . . . has a separate due process right to conditions of supervised release

       that are sufficiently clear to inform him of what conduct will result in his being

       returned to prison.” (citing Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09)); Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 752

       (due process clause “requires that citizens have fair warning of proscribed

       conduct”).

               The second key purpose of the vagueness doctrine in this context is to ensure

       that the person enforcing the condition—here, the CCO—cannot exercise

       discretion in an arbitrary manner. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 682. The lead opinion’s

       reliance on unspecified documents concerning the goal of condition O, rather than

       clearly explaining the meaning of the word “relationships,” also defeats that

       purpose.

          I.      Controlling precedent requires conditions of supervision to be clear on
                  their face. The lead opinion’s decision to look to other documents
                  available to the CCO to understand the purpose of condition O (but not
                  its language) conflicts with that precedent

               The lead opinion begins by reciting the two ways to test whether a community

       custody condition is unconstitutionally vague—whether it provides the defendant

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        (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part)

       with adequate notice and whether it is clear enough to prevent arbitrary enforcement.

       Lead opinion at 8 (quoting Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677). But the lead opinion does

       not apply those tests to the language of condition O. Instead, it applies those tests to

       other documents that are available to the CCO but that are absent from condition O

       (and absent from all the other conditions) and that are not even cross-referenced by

       those conditions. The lead opinion then concludes that those other documents—

       rather than the language of condition O itself—can adequately guide the CCO. But

       it does not explain how those other documents, which might not be available to the

       defendant can adequately guide that defendant.1

              1
                The lead opinion states in a footnote that there is no cause for concern about a
       reviewing court’s “reliance on extrinsic documents that might not be available to the
       defendant” because “we only consider the release decision and order of release stating the
       conditions.” Lead opinion at 15 n.4 (emphasis added). I certainly agree with the
       footnote’s advice about the limited number of documents that the court should consider.
       But the text of the lead opinion does not follow that advice. It actually relies on more than
       just the “release decision and order of release.” It also relies on the “judgment and
       sentence” and the “underlying criminal conduct and documents available to the CCO” in
       order to conclude that condition O is not vague. Lead opinion at 14-15 (emphasis added)
       (citing Johnson, 197 Wn.2d at 748 & n.3). And, as discussed further below, the cited
       Johnson decision does not support looking at all those other documents to see if the
       defendant has fair notice. Johnson held that the court may examine extrinsic documents
       like the judgment and sentence and the “documents available to the CCO” when
       considering the second prong of the vagueness test, i.e., whether a condition is
       sufficiently clear to prevent arbitrary enforcement—not when considering the first prong
       of the vagueness test, i.e., whether a condition “‘sufficiently define[s] the proscribed
       conduct so an ordinary person can understand the prohibition.’” Lead opinion at 8
       (quoting Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677 (citing Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 752-53)). In other words,
       despite the footnote, the lead opinion still seems to say that a condition provides
       sufficiently definite notice to the defendant even if the CCO has to look at unspecified
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        (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part)

              The lead opinion does this by stating, first, that “when deciding a vagueness

       challenge, ‘the terms are not considered in a “vacuum,” rather, they are considered

       in the context in which they are used.’” Lead opinion at 14 (quoting Bahl, 164 Wn.2d

       at 754 (quoting Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 180)). It then concludes—relying on one of

       our recent decisions—that community custody conditions should be “read in the

       context of the underlying criminal conduct and documents available to the CCO.”

       Id. (citing Johnson, 197 Wn.2d at 748 & n.3).

              In my view, the lead opinion’s analysis conflates the two prongs of the

       vagueness test in a way that conflicts with the case on which the lead opinion places

       primary reliance: Johnson, 197 Wn.2d at 748. By conflating the two prongs of the

       vagueness test, the lead opinion’s approach also conflicts with the controlling

       Supreme Court decisions that Johnson and our other vagueness cases implement.

       See, e.g., Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09.

              In Johnson, we considered whether a community custody condition stating

       that the defendant “shall ‘not use or access the World Wide Web unless

       specifically authorized by [his CCO] through approved filters’” was vague and/or

       overbroad. 197 Wn.2d at 744. In analyzing the first prong of the vagueness test,

       extrinsic documents, not necessarily available to the defendant, to figure out what the
       condition means.
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        (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring in part/dissenting in part)

       whether a defendant has sufficient notice of proscribed conduct, Johnson did not

       discuss or examine extrinsic documents. See id. at 747-48. Johnson considered

       only the language of the condition itself; Johnson determined that that language

       gave fair notice of the prohibited conduct. Id. And the decisions on which Johnson

       relies to analyze this first prong of the vagueness analysis did not look to extrinsic

       documents available to the future CCO to determine whether a condition gave fair

       notice, either. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 753; State v. Hai Minh Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d 671,

       681, 425 P.3d 847 (2018); State v. Wallmuller, 194 Wn.2d 234, 449 P.3d 619

       (2019) (reading community custody condition in context of that condition’s

       illustrative list of prohibited places and in context of other conditions); see also

       State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 794, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010) (examining

       the plain language of a community custody condition to determine whether it

       provided sufficient notice to the offender); Young, 520 U.S. at 150 (same, with

       offender’s conditional release document).

             It is true that the Johnson court used a different, broader, analysis when it

       addressed the second prong of the vagueness test. The Johnson court held that it

       was proper to view the condition in the “context of the judgment and sentence, and

       related documents that will be available to [the future CCO]” to figure out whether

       there are “sufficient benchmarks to prevent arbitrary enforcement.” 197 Wn.2d at

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       748. But the concern addressed by the second prong is different from the concern

       addressed by the first prong. The concern addressed by the second prong is whether

       a condition is clear enough to prevent arbitrary enforcement. In that context, it might

       make sense to consider documents that will be available to—and used by—the

       officer enforcing the condition.

             But it does not make sense to consider extrinsic documents available to the

       CCO when considering whether a condition provides the offender with sufficient

       notice. In fact, considering extrinsic documents available to the CCO when

       considering whether a condition provides the offender with sufficient notice is

       inconsistent with Johnson’s analysis. It also conflicts, in principle, with direction

       given by the United States Supreme Court about how to decide whether the offender

       received sufficient notice. Young, 520 U.S. at 150; Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108 (“[W]e

       insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to

       know what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly.”).

             Although this court has said that ordinary people have access to statutory law

       and thus are presumptively aware of statutory definitions that might affect the

       meaning of a community custody condition, see Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 756-57, we have

       never created any similar presumption regarding the access an ordinary person has

       to “related documents” that might be available to a CCO.

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             And rightly so—because one of the key purposes of the vagueness doctrine is

       to protect a defendant’s “right to conditions of supervised release that are sufficiently

       clear to inform him of what conduct will result in his being returned to prison.”

       Guagliardo, 278 F.3d at 872. To require a defendant to predict and search out other,

       unincorporated documents to determine the meaning of words used in a community

       custody condition defies this purpose.

             In my view, the lead opinion expands Johnson beyond its holding by

       concluding that it is appropriate to examine extrinsic documents when analyzing the

       first prong of the vagueness test. Because the first prong is concerned with whether

       the community custody condition provides sufficient notice to the defendant of

       proscribed conduct, this court’s focus when examining that prong has been, and

       should remain, what the community custody order itself says.

             I therefore disagree with the lead opinion’s implied expansion of Johnson

       beyond its actual holding. 2

             2
                I disagree with the lead opinion’s decision to look to extrinsic documents to
       determine whether Ansell’s other community custody conditions provide sufficient notice
       of proscribed conduct. I agree with the lead opinion that the conditions it upholds are
       sufficiently definite, but for the reason that their plain language in the context of the
       community custody order itself is sufficiently clear and definite—without reference to
       other, unincorporated documents.
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          II.      Even if it were appropriate to look at extrinsic documents when applying
                   both portions of the vagueness test, condition O would still be vague

                The First Amendment protects the fundamental right to freedom of

       association. State v. Frederick, 20 Wn. App. 2d 890, 909, 506 P.3d 690 (2022);

       U.S. CONST. amend. I. Condition O limits the people with whom Ansell can

       associate, so it burdens that right to freedom of association. See id.

                Community custody conditions can certainly burden such fundamental

       rights. But conditions burdening such a fundamental right must be “‘reasonably

       necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the state and public order.’” State v.

       Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 37-38, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993) (quoting Malone v. United

       States, 502 F.2d 554, 556 (9th Cir. 1974)). In addition, conditions that affect a

       fundamental right “demand[] a greater degree of specificity,” Padilla, 190 Wn.2d

       at 678, and must meet “a stricter standard of definiteness.” Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at

       679 (citing Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 753); see also State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 32,

       195 P.3d 940 (2008). They must be imposed “sensitively.” Riley, 121 Wn.2d at 37

       (citing United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975)).

       Specifically, “[m]ore careful review of sentencing conditions is required where

       those conditions interfere with a fundamental constitutional right.” Warren, 165

       Wn.2d at 32.

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             The reason for all these limits on supervision conditions that burden

       fundamental rights is clear: a vague prohibition “that encroaches on ‘sensitive

       areas of basic First Amendment freedoms’ naturally inhibits the exercise of those

       freedoms because individuals who are uncertain of the meaning of a statute will

       steer ‘far wider’ than necessary in order to ensure compliance.” Padilla, 190

       Wn.2d at 679 (quoting Grayned, 408 U.S. at 109 (internal quotation marks

       omitted)).

             The lead opinion recites this stricter standard but fails to apply it. Applying

       this stricter standard shows that condition O is vague under both prongs of the

       vagueness test, even if we do look at the extrinsic documents mentioned by the

       lead opinion.

             As to the first prong, even if the lead opinion is correct that it is appropriate

       to examine “‘the judgment and sentence, and related documents that will be

       available to [the CCO]’” in order to determine whether the offender has sufficient

       notice of proscribed conduct, condition O is still vague. Lead opinion at 14-15

       (quoting Johnson, 197 Wn.2d at 748). Condition O prohibits Ansell from

       “form[ing] relationships” with parents of minors without prior permission. But

       neither the condition itself nor those extrinsic documents define that term.

       Therefore, we look to dictionary definitions. Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 754.

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             The relevant definition of the verb “to form” is “develop, acquire.”

       MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-

       webster.com/dictionary/form#dictionary-entry-2 (last visited Aug. 3, 2023). The

       common meaning of “relationship” is extremely broad—it is defined as “a state of

       affairs existing between those having relations or dealings.” Id.,

       https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/relationship (last visited Aug. 3,

       2023). In common use, “relationship” can be used widely to encompass dealings

       ranging from relatively minor—the friendly relationship one has with a store

       cashier—to enormously significant—the relationship one has with family or close

       friends. “Forming” a relationship is equally broad. An ordinary person would

       understand “form[ing] relationships” as covering an enormously varied range of

       human interaction and connection.

             The lead opinion states that condition O as written permits “easy

       differentiation” between interactions requiring prior CCO permission and conditions

       not requiring CCO permission. Lead opinion at 16. I disagree. The extremely broad

       variation in the types of human contact that can count as a “relationship” makes it

       impossible for a person to determine what conduct is proscribed by condition O.3

             3
               The lead opinion opines that the term is not vague because read in context,
       condition O simply refers to “friendly dealings with people who have minor children.”
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       For example, what about the development of friendly rapport with a regular at the

       coffee shop or the gym? What about chatting with a fellow dog park regular or mail

       delivery person?

             Looking at other imposed conditions does not clarify the condition, either.

       Neither does looking at extrinsic related documents. For example, looking at the

       statement of probable cause shows the context in which Ansell committed the

       crimes. But that context still does not define “form relationships,” so it does not to

       allow Ansell to figure out what interactions rise to the level of forming a relationship.

             While the constitution does not require supervision conditions to enable a

       person to “‘predict with complete certainty the exact point at which his actions

       would be classified as prohibited conduct,’” conditions must still provide more

       notice than this one does. Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 679 (quoting City of Seattle v.

       Eze, 111 Wn.2d 22, 27, 759 P.2d 366 (1988)), As Ansell argues, condition O’s

       “lack of clarifying language does not even allow Ansell to predict what types of

       relationships need preapproval, let alone an exact point that a specific type crosses

       the line.” Pers. Restraint Pet. at 20 (Wash. Ct. App. No. 82506-2-I (2021)).

       Lead opinion at 16. But that’s not what the condition says. And even if the condition did
       say that, the adjective “friendly” poses the same vagueness problems that “relationship”
       poses, because one can have “friendly dealings” with vast variations in intimacy and
       longevity.
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                 Condition O therefore flunks the first prong of the vagueness test. Because

       failing either part of the vagueness test makes a condition vague, we could end our

       inquiry here. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d at 178.

                 But if we did consider the second prong, whether the condition’s language

       ensures nonarbitrary enforcement, condition O flunks that requirement, also. No

       matter how many extrinsic documents Ansell’s CCO reads, that CCO will not find

       a definition of “form” or “relationships.” The CCO’s decision about what condition

       O permits is therefore virtually unconstrained. Cf. Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d at 682

       (holding that “a person of ordinary intelligence can distinguish a ‘dating

       relationship’ from other types of relationships”). I would therefore hold that the

       condition fails the second prong of the vagueness test, too.

          III.      If the condition is not vague, it is overbroad

                 The only way to save condition O, as written, from vagueness, is to interpret

       it as barring all friendly repeated contact with another parent. But if this is what

       condition O means, then it is overbroad and unconstitutional for that reason. Resp’t

       Ansell’s Suppl. Br. at 21. The lead opinion does not address Ansell’s overbreadth

       argument.

                 As discussed above, a community custody condition can certainly limit a

       First Amendment right. But to do so, the condition must be sensitively imposed

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       and “narrowly tailored to the dangers posed by the specific defendant” to avoid

       overbreadth. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d at 744-45; see also Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114;

       Packingham v. North Carolina, 582 U.S. 98, 106, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 198 L. Ed. 2d

       273 (2017).

             The broader interpretation would violate that requirement. A blanket

       requirement that Ansell determine whether any person with whom he makes

       friendly contact has minor children, and that Ansell then obtain CCO approval

       before repeating the contact, is far from narrowly tailored. Ansell committed his

       serious offenses in a specific context: a neighborhood babysitting group. But

       requiring CCO permission before engaging in friendly human contact with any

       parents of minor children—even in contexts wholly dissimilar to babysitting

       groups, such as supermarkets, coffeeshops, and gyms—infringes on far more

       protected activity than necessary to ensure public safety. See, e.g., In re Pers.

       Restraint of Sickels, 14 Wn. App. 2d 51, 73, 469 P.3d 322 (2020) (condition

       requiring CCO approval for any use of the Internet was overbroad, given

       defendant’s specific sex crime conviction). Thus, even if we interpret condition O

       broadly to cure its vagueness problem, I would affirm the Court of Appeals on the

       ground that the condition is overbroad.

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                                           CONCLUSION

             Community custody conditions must provide sufficient notice of proscribed

       conduct to permit the supervisee—here, Ansell—to adjust his behavior

       accordingly. Community custody conditions burdening fundamental rights—here,

       the right to freedom of association—must also be tailored to the specific dangers

       that the supervisee poses. And community custody conditions must accomplish

       these goals on their face, without requiring research into other unspecified

       documents describing the underlying crime. In my view, condition O violates all

       of these constitutional requirements.

             I therefore respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.

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