Court Opinion

ID: 9578526
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:46:04.005753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:19.881950
License: Public Domain

Head, Presiding Justice,
dissenting. The writer concedes that this dissent can not change the opinion and judgment of the court. In vital areas of the law it may demonstrate the basis of the disagreement, not for the enlightenment of the Judiciary (since it has no effect as a judgment), but to indicate to the legislative branch of government (if it does) areas wherein remedial legislation might properly be considered by the General Assembly.
The record discloses that on July 27, 1963, three members of the Board of Education of Floyd County (the chairman and one other member not participating) purportedly removed Mr. J. F. Murdock, the County School Superintendent, from his office, and Mr. Murdock appealed to the State Board of Education. On September 9, 1963, with only eight of the ten members of the State Board of Education present, Mr. Henry Stewart (a member of the board) made a motion, “That the decision of the Floyd County Board of Education be reversed and that Mr. Murdock be reinstated as Superintendent of the County Schools.” There was a second to the motion and on the roll call vote four members of the board voted for the motion and four voted against it. On September 10, 1963, Mr. Murdock filed a written motion with the State Board of Education requesting that they reconsider their action of the day before. On September 18, 1963, Mr. J. B. Johnson (a member of the board) made a statement to the board that since the last meeting of the board was recessed, and after much thought, he planned to make a recommendation at the October meeting of the State board that the action on the Murdock appeal be reconsidered. “The Chairman ruled that such a motion will be in order and Mr. Johnson's motion will be considered." At the October meeting of the State Board of Education, on October 16, 1963, a motion was made by Mr. Johnson, and duly seconded, that the board reconsider the action previously taken on the appeal of J. F. Murdock. This motion was carried. Mr. Henry Stewart made a motion that the appeal of Mr. Murdock be sustained and that *766he be reinstated as County School Superintendent of Floyd County. On the roll call vote seven of the ten members voted for the motion made by Mr. Stewart to reinstate Mr. Murdock. Mr. Murdock testified that on October 17, 1963, (the date the present action was filed against him to enjoin him from serving as County School Superintendent) he occupied the office of County School Superintendent and discharged the duties of the office.
1. In Division 1 of the opinion it is held that the petition stated a cause of action for equitable relief, and in support of this contention the case of Cummings v. Robinson, 194 Ga. 336, supra, is cited. In the Cummings case a member of the county board of commissioners had died, and on a motion to elect Cummings as a member of the board two members of the board voted for the motion and two against it. In the opinion of this court it was said (headnote 1) that where it was shown “that neither the defendant nor any one else had been so elected to fill such vacancy, but that despite this fact the defendant would, unless restrained, present himself as a member of the board and would attempt to act and serve as such member and would thereby interfere with the lawful members in the performance of their official duties, the petition stated a cause of action for injunctive relief, . . Immediately preceding the quotation in the majority opinion of the court, the opinion in the Cummings case stated: “It can not be held that quo warranto is the exclusive remedy where persons rightfully in office desire protection against intrusion and interference from one having-no right or authority in the premises, but who will nevertheless so intrude and interfere, unless restrained by judicial act.” Under the record in the present case it is my view that Cummings v. Robinson, supra, does not support the ruling in the opinion of the majority but, on the contrary, supports the view and contention of counsel for Mr. Murdock that the court was without authority to enjoin Mr. Murdock from occupying the office of County School Superintendent.
In order for three members of the County Board of Education of Floyd County to remove Mr. Murdock from his office, it must have been conceded that he had been duly and legally *767elected County School Superintendent by the board, had qualified, and was acting as such. The action of the State Board of Education on October 16, voting to reinstate Mr. Murdock as County School Superintendent, must be presumed to have reinstated him to the office, since it is a presumption of law in this State that all public officials do their duty. The grant of an injunction restraining Mr. Murdock from occupying the office of County School Superintendent presupposed that the action of the State Board of Education in reinstating him to his office was ultra vires and void.
“Where an officer is in possession of an office, and another person, even though he be a claimant thereto, seeks to interfere by force with such possession, a court of equity, at the instance of the incumbent, will prevent such interference until right to the office' has been determined in a proper proceeding.” Patten v. Miller, 190 Ga. 105 (8 SE2d 776). The rule stated in Patten v. Miller, supra, is the rule in this State applicable to a situation where a person has been rightfully elected to an office and is discharging the duties thereof. The majority opinion cites no case, and my search has revealed none, where injunction is held to be the proper remedy to exclude an office holder from his office prior to a valid determination or adjudication that he has been legally removed therefrom.
The case of Moultrie Milk Shed, Inc. v. City of Cairo, 206 Ga. 348, supra, is not in point on its facts with the present case and/ in my opinion, does not support the ruling in Division 1 of the opinion. The City of Cairo was attempting to enforce penal ordinances of the city, and on the principle that “equity has jurisdiction to protect property rights where employees refuse to serve because of threatened criminal action,” this court reversed the judgment of the trial court denying injunctive relief.
Whether or not Mr. Murdock was interfering in the administration of the office of County School Superintendent depends entirely on the contention that he had been properly removed from his office. If by action of the State Board of Education he was County School Superintendent, there could be no interference by him with an office lawfully occupied and held by him. The sole substantial issue made by the petition was the right *768and title of Mr. Murdock to the office of County School Superintendent. “Quo warranto affords an adequate remedy for the trial of title to a public office; and where title is the sole issue, all equitable jurisdiction is ousted.” Stanford v. Lynch, 147 Ga. 518 (1) (94 SE 1001); Tupper v. Dart, 104 Ga. 179 (30 SE 624); Moore v. Dugas, 166 Ga. 493 (143 SE 591); Hornady v. Goodman, 167 Ga. 555 (3) (146 SE 173); Davis v. Matthews, 169 Ga. 321 (150 SE 158); Rogers v. Croft, 203 Ga. 654 (3) (47 SE2d 739).
2. It is my view that the action against the State Board of Education was an action against the State. The petitioners were seeking to control the discretion of the State Board of Education in determining whether or not Mr. Murdock had been properly removed from his office as County School Superintendent. Furthermore, they were seeking to control the action of tlic State Board of Education as to the person it could recognize as County School Superintendent of Floyd County, and to control the action of the State in regard to the person who could receive and disburse school funds for and on behalf of Floyd County. It is my opinion that if an action seeking to control the authority and discretion of the State Board of Education is not an action against the State, the State can never validly contend that it is being sued without its consent. Peters v. Boggs, 217 Ga. 471 (123 SE2d 258).
3. The General Assembly of this State has never by legislative act imposed any restriction or limitation on the discretion of the State Board of Education in the review of matters appealed to it from county boards of education, nor has the General Assembly given direction as to the manner or time in which the State Board of Education should exercise its appellate jurisdiction. Under the original School Act of 1919 (Ga. L. 1919, p. 288) on appeal to the State Board of Education the judgment of that tribunal was final. Board of Education of Long County v. Board of Education of Liberty County, 173 Ga. 203 (159 SE 712). This provision was carried forward under the terms of the Act of 1937 (Ga. L. 1937, pp. 864, 867; Code Ann. § 32-414). It was omitted from the amendment of 1961 (Ga. L. 1961, p. 39; Code Ann. Supp. § 32-910), but under the 1961 amendment no restric*769tion, condition, or limitation was imposed upon the State Board of Education in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
It is my -view, therefore, that it is not proper to analogize the jurisdiction and powers of the State Board of Education to those of the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation. This court has pointed out in numerous decisions that when a judgment is rendered by the State Board of Workmen’s Compensation, the only right of review remaining in the board is limited by statute to a situation where there has been a change in condition. The powers and jurisdiction of the State Board of Education can not properly be analogized to limitations imposed upon this court by statute, since the General Assembly in its wisdom did not see fit to impose similar limitations on the State Board of Education.
Under the rule of this court in Cummings v. Robinson, 194 Ga. 336, supra, rights are neither gained nor lost on the vote of an agency, whether such vote be administrative or quasi-judicial, where the result is a tie vote. It is the general rule in this country that where members of an administrative agency are evenly divided on a question, the result is that no action can be taken thereon by such agency.
The State Board of Education is composed of ten members. On September 9, when the vote was taken and the members were divided four to four, only eight members of the board were present. Whether or not the motion for reconsideration filed by Mr. Murdock on September 10 required further consideration by the State Board of Education, it is my view that reconsideration was required of the board acting on its own motion, with all members present. I think it is significant that at the time of the tie vote, only one member of the State Board of Education was fully familiar with the record on the appeal of Mr. Murdock. Subsequently copies of the record were furnished to all members of the State Board of Education, and they had an opportunity to familiarize themselves with the record. Notice of the motion for reconsideration was served on .one of the three members of the Eloyd County Board of Education whose actions had purportedly resulted in the removal of Mr. Murdock as County School Superintendent, and the County Board of Education was *770represented by counsel at the hearing and action by the State Board of Education on October 16.
In 73 ALR2d, cited in the opinion of the majority, it is stated at page 938, quoting from the case of Anchor Cas. Co. v. Bongards Co-op. Creamery Asso., 253 Minn. 101 (91 NW2d 122), as follows: “It is generally recognized that one of the powers proper to an efficient and just administration of the right to adjudicate is the power to reverse adjudications which appear to be erroneous (Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 [b], 28 USCA). This power lasts until jurisdiction is lost by appeal or certiorari or until a reasonable time has run, which would be at least coextensive with the time required by statute for review.
“Where through fraud, mistake, or misconception of facts the commissioner enters an order which he promptly recognizes may be in error, there is no good reason why, on discovering the error, he should not, after due and prompt notice to the interested parties, correct it. We think the better view on this question is set forth in Handlon v. Town of Belleville, 4 NJ 99, 106, 71 A2d 624, 627, 16 ALR2d 1118, which stated: '. . . Barring statutory regulation, the power may be invoked by administrative agencies to serve the ends of essential justice and the policy of the law. But there must be reasonable diligence. The denial to such tribunals of the authority to correct error and injustice and to revise its judgments for good and sufficient cause would run counter to the public interest. The function cannot be denied except by legislative fiat; and there is none such here.
In 2 AmJur2d 336, Administrative Law, § 524, the general rule is stated to be: “Regardless of whether a determination is or is not deemed to be quasi-judicial, and even though the court may otherwise take the view denying the existence of power in administrative agencies to reconsider or modify their determinations, the courts hold or recognize that administrative agencies may reconsider and modify their determinations or correct errors on the ground of fraud or imposition, illegality, irregularity in vital matters, mistake, misconception of facts, erroneous conclusion of law, surprise, or inadvertence.”
It is my view that where it appeared without contradiction *771that only one member of the State Board of Education was fully familiar with the record, this alone would have authorized a reconsideration of the prior vote. The further fact that the board is composed of ten members and only eight were present when the original vote was a tie, in my opinion, placed a duty and responsibility upon the board to reconsider its action with all members present and voting, after notice to the county board and with opportunity to the county board to be heard.
It is suggested in the opinion that to allow reconsideration, there would be no limitation on the power to reconsider, and there would be no end to litigation. The full and complete answer to this is that the right to reconsider by an administrative agency, whether the action of the agency be administrative or quasi-judicial, ends finally and conclusively at the time some right of some party affected thereby has vested or become fixed, and until such time, common sense, reason, and justice demand that no limitation be applied other than the limitation imposed by the conscience and intelligence of competent, able, and efficient State board members.
The opinion of the majority in the present case demonstrates that the General Assembly should more fully fix and define the powers and duties of the State Board of Education in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
For all of the reasons set forth, I dissent from the opinion of the majority and the judgment of the court affirming the judgment of the trial court.