Court Opinion

ID: 9665463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 00:49:07.531443+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:15.894169
License: Public Domain

McCORMICK, Judge,
dissenting.
The majority errs in reversing this case and in failing to overrule the per se rule of fundamental error allegedly announced in Harris v. State, 522 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.Cr.App.1975), and followed so unquestioningly since Williams v. State, 547 S.W.2d 18 (Tex.Cr.App.1977). Harris, and the cases cited therein, graphically illustrate that the case at bar is not in fact controlled by an “age old principle of law” as the majority asserts, but instead is being reversed on the basis of *745an ill-founded distortion of that “age old principle” that is of recent vintage.
In Harris v. State, supra, the Court held that the charge was fundamentally defective for failing to apply the law (which the Court noted was adequately explained) to the facts and issues in evidence. As the Court also noted:
“This Court has consistently held that where no objection is made to the court’s charge in accordance with Article 36.14, V.A.C.C.P., a judgment will not be reversed on appeal because of error in the charge unless it appears that he has not had a fair and impartial trial.” 522 S.W.2d at 201.
The charge in Harris was as follows: “MEMBERS OF THE JURY:
“The defendant, Arthur Franklyn (sic) Harris, stands charged by indictment with the offense of rape by force and threats, alleged to have been committed in Dallas County, Texas on or about the 10th day of November 1973.
“To this charge the defendant has pleaded not guilty. ‘Rape’ is the carnal knowledge of a woman without her consent, obtained by force or threats or both.
“ ‘Carnal knowledge’ is the penetration of the private female organ of the alleged female by the private male organ of the accused person. The slightest penetration of the female sexual organ by the male sexual organ is sufficient to constitute penetration and it need not be to any particular depth.
“To constitute ‘rape by force,’ the accused must have ravished the alleged female by having carnal knowledge of her without her consent and against her will by means of force. The force must have been such as might reasonably be sufficient to overcome any resistance, taking into consideration the relative strength of the parties and other circumstances of the case.
“To constitute ‘rape by threats,’ it must appear that the party charged assaulted the alleged female and by means of threats ravished and had carnal knowledge of her without her consent and against her will. The ‘threats’ must be such as might reasonably create fear of death or great bodily harm, in view of the relative condition of the parties as to health, strength, and all other circumstances of the case.
“Further, before there can be rape, penetration of the sexual organ of the female alleged to have been ravished by the male organ of the party accused must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
T)
“You are further instructed that the law allows the defendant to testify in his own behalf, but a failure on his part to do so is not a circumstance against him and no presumption of guilt can be indulged in by the jury for a failure on his part to do so. I instruct you in this case not to refer to or discuss such failure on the part of the defendant to testify during your consideration of this case.
“You are limited in your deliberation as jurors on the verdict of guilt or innocence only. You are to consider and discuss only the facts and circumstances as were admitted into evidence. You should not consider nor discuss facts and circumstances that are not in evidence, and in this connection, you are instructed that no juror may lawfully relate any fact or circumstance of which he or she may claim to have personal knowledge which has not been admitted into evidence before you. If any evidence has been withdrawn from the jury by the Court, you will not discuss or consider it for any purpose.
“You will make no finding in your verdict except to show whether the defendant is guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, or not guilty, as you may find and determine from the law and evidence in this case.
“Now, if you find and believe from the evidence or have a reasonable doubt thereof that at the time of the commission of the offense, if any, the defendant was at his Aunt’s house, Gracy Branch, on Harwood, then you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict ‘not guilty.’
*746“You are further instructed that an indictment is no evidence of guilt. Therefore, you are instructed in this case that the indictment herein shall not be considered by the jury as any evidence of guilty, if any.
“In all criminal cases the burden of proof is on the State. The defendant is presumed to be innocent until his guilt is established by legal evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and in case you have a reasonable doubt as to the defendant’s guilt, you will acquit the defendant and say by your verdict ‘not guilty.’
“You are further instructed that your verdict must be unanimous and shall be arrived at by due deliberation and not by a majority vote, nor by any method of chance.
“You are the exclusive judges of the facts proved, of the credibility of the witnesses, and of the weight to be given to the testimony, but you are bound to receive the law from the Court, which is herein given you and be governed thereby.”
Harris v. State, at 200-201, fn. 1.
It is obvious that nowhere did the court, after charging on the law, apply the law to the facts and require the jury to find the same beyond a reasonable doubt. That paragraph, which would normally appear where the asterisk (*) appears, was completely omitted from the court’s charge, leaving the charge without an “application” paragraph. The net effect of such a charge was to give to the jury nothing more than abstract propositions of law without ever “instructing” them as to their duties.
The effect of Harris was to adopt a “per se” rule that failure of the charge to apply the law to the facts was fundamental error, thereby presuming appellant did not receive a fair and impartial trial. The Court in Harris relied primarily on two cases to reach its conclusions. The first, Ross v. State, 487 S.W.2d 744 (Tex.Cr.App.1972), does not support the Court’s holding in Harris. In Ross, the court’s instructions authorized the jury to convict the defendant of an offense separate and distinct from the one charged in the indictment. But, that is not the situation that existed in Harris.
The second case is Fennell v. State, 424 S.W.2d 631 (Tex.Cr.App.1968). On original submission in Fennell, the Court found that the evidence established self-defense as a matter of law. On rehearing, the Court reversed its original holding relating to the establishment of self-defense as a matter of law, but concluded that the evidence of self-defense was so strong that the defendant was clearly harmed by the failure of the charge to apply the law of self-defense to the facts. In passing, the Court noted:
“We are reinforced in our opinion by virtue of the trial court’s refusal to respond to appellant’s timely presented special requested charge to the effect that the intoxication or drinking of the deceased would not excuse his attack upon appellant or take from the appellant his right of self-defense.
“It may not have been reversible error to have refused such a charge had the appellant been given an adequate, comprehensive, complete and unrestricted instruction on self-defense, but that, of course was not done as observed earlier. [Citations omitted] The court’s charge as a whole did not fairly and adequately protect the rights of the appellant.”1
Although the original opinion in Fennell, which was withdrawn, had reversed on “fundamental error”, the ultimate holding on rehearing does not reach that conclusion.
Fennell, like Ross, does not stand for the proposition that failure to apply the law to the facts is, per se, reversible. The Court in Fennell was very careful to explain its reasons for concluding the defendant had not received a fair and impartial trial. In other words, the Court in Fennell examined the facts of the case, other errors in the trial court’s failure to give requested charges, and the sufficiency of the evidence before concluding that the defendant was harmed. Unfortunately, in adopting the “per se” rule of Harris, this Court no longer looks to *747the facts of the case nor requires a showing of harm. This is clearly contrary to over 100 years of sound legal precedent.
But, an examination of Harris should not stop here. Not only did the decision rely on a misinterpretation of those cases previously discussed, there is a total failure to recognize the caselaw which existed at the time of the Harris decision.
In The Charge In Criminal Cases, Jim D. Bowmer, Luther E. Jones, Jr., and John H. Miller, 12 Baylor L.Rev. 261, the authors discuss the rationale and methods of submission of the general charge in criminal cases. The following language from that article is pertinent to the present inquiry:
“The usual method if imparting this information to the jury is to apply the law to the ultimate facts constituting the theory being submitted, i.e. to include instructions setting forth a hypothetical statement showing what verdict or other consequence is required by law if the jury find such facts have been sufficiently proved.
“The trial court is bound to follow this method .of issue submission if there be proper objection to an omission to follow it. But this method, in the absence of objection, is not exclusive. Thus, where the accused does not complain, a submission of the issues of a particular theory may be accomplished merely by the giving to the jury of abstract law applicable to such issues.62
The above illustrates clearly how this Court deviated from the established principles of law in adopting the per se rule of Harris. The true “age old principle of law” is easily deciphered by examining the earliest cases on the subject. In 1886, the Court of Appeals in Leache v. State, 22 Tex.App. 279, 3 S.W. 539, noted:
“It is a well-settled rule that a charge of the court, when first questioned as to its correctness in the motion for new trial, will not be revised on appeal unless, when reviewed in the light of the circumstances, it was calculated to prejudice the rights of the accused.” 3 S.W. at 546.
This same language can be found in the earliest cases reported in this State. See Bishop v. State, 43 Tex. 390 (Tex.Cr.App.1875); Robinson v. State, 24 Tex. 152 (Tex.Cr.App.1859); and Tuller v. State, 8 Tex.App. 501 (Tex.Cr.App.1880).
In Tuiler, the Court said: “The principle so ably and thoroughly elucidated in the case just cited [Bishop v. State, supra] has been uniformly followed since, and constitutes an established principle in criminal procedure in this State.”
Again, in 1880, the Court of Appeals, addressed the issue before us. In Mace v. State, 9 Tex.App. 110, the defendant was charged with burglary in the nighttime. The court’s instructions authorized the jury to convict for either daytime or nighttime burglary, separate offenses under the then-existing law. In affirming the conviction, *748the Court noted that such was clearly error but not of such character as to invalidate the judgment:
“On appeal, an erroneous charge occupies a very different attitude, where it has been promptly and properly excepted to on the trial, from that of one not so excepted to. Our statutes contemplate and it is beyond doubt the proper practice, to reserve exceptions by bill to an erroneous charge at the time it is given. Code Cr.Proc., arts. 685, 686. If such exceptions are reserved, then it is the duty of this court to reverse the case for the error, without further inquiry as to the effect it may have had upon the result of the trial. But when no bill of exceptions is reserved, and it is attempted to take advantage of the error for the first time in the motion for new trial, upon appeal, then it is not a matter of course that the error should prevail in effecting a new trial, or that in this court it should even necessarily be revised, much less require a reversal of the case. As was said by Roberts, C. J., in Bishop v. The State: ‘If such a charge is not excepted to at the time of trial, but presented in a motion for a new trial, which is the next point at which it could be presented, then its consideration by this court would be subject to another and a very different rule, which would be whether or not such charge was an error which, under all the circumstances as exhibited in the record, was “calculated to injure the rights of the defendant,” and which is prescribed as one of the grounds for the granting of a motion for a new trial, in the following language: “Where the court has misdirected the jury as to the law, or has committed any other material error calculated to injure the rights of the defendant.” Pasc.Dig., art. 3137 (Rev.Code Cr.Proc., art. 777); 23 Texas, 221, 231; 24 Texas, 154, 398, 399; 28 Texas, 495, 496. This difference in the rule, dependent upon the time when the objection to the action of the court is made, is in harmony with the rules of judicial proceedings generally, that a party who makes his objection at the proper
time, which is usually the first practical opportunity, shall have his objection more favorably considered than if it had been inopportunely delayed.’ But again he says: ‘In this court on appeal, as well as in the District Court on a motion for a new trial, a material misdirection of the law as applicable to the case, calculated to mislead the jury, would be error justifying and requiring a reversal; and a failure to give in charge to the jury the law which was required by the evidence in the case, and which failure was to the extent to be calculated to injure the rights of the defendant, would be a material error, justifying and requiring a reversal on appeal.’ Pasc.Dig., art. 3137; 40 Texas, 15, 203, 527; Bishop v. The State, 43 Texas, 390; Tuller v. The State, 8 Texas Ct.App. 501.
“Now, in the case we are considering, the burglary was charged to have been committed in the night-time; the evidence established conclusively, and without conflict, that it was committed in the night-time; and the court sufficiently charged the law applicable to the offence as alleged and proven. As before remarked, the instruction complained of with regard to the offence, if committed in the daytime, had and could have had no pertinency to the case being tried, and it is not well perceived how it could have injuriously affected the rights of the defendant.”
The rule that was well-settled in 1886 remained in force until the opinion in Harris, but was, after over 100 years, abandoned for a per se rule that ignores the statutes as well as the caselaw.
Judge Clinton in his concurring opinion misses the point of my dissent. His opinion dwells on the idea that I am saying the doctrine of fundamental error in Texas jurisprudence is a new development. I am not saying that at all. I am saying that, throughout the history of Texas jurisprudence until Harris, the presence of fundamental error in a jury charge did not per se mean a reversal of the conviction. Rather, a conviction was reversed upon the presence *749of fundamental error only if there was a showing that the appellant was harmed by the charge.
The concurring opinion is correct in stating that the law in Texas has been that the written jury charge should distinctly set forth the law applicable to the case. And, it is also true that the Court prior to 1897 would review jury charges which were not applicable to the facts, whether excepted to or not. However, in situations where there had been no exception, reversals would not occur unless it was shown that the failure to apply the law to the facts was injurious to the appellant. See Bishop v. State, supra; Mace v. State, supra. This is amply illustrated in Tuller v. State, supra. Tuller was charged with burning down houses belonging to Emil Reaume. At trial, some question developed as to whether Emil Re-aume actually owned the houses or whether they were still owned by a Mrs. Lloyd and Mrs. Tuller, with whom Emil Reaume had contracted to buy the houses. In dealing with this question, the judge charged the jury that even if they believed the houses were the property of Mrs. Lloyd and Mrs. Tuller, and if they believed Mrs. Lloyd and Mrs. Tuller had authorized the appellant to burn the houses, and if they believed that at the time of the fires there was property in the houses belonging to another person, they should convict. This portion of the charge was not excepted to at trial but was brought up in the motion for new trial. The Court, in considering the defendant’s contention, noted that the charge was not applicable to the facts of the case. However, the Court went on to note that since the error was being presented for the first time in the motion for new trial, an inquiry had to be made whether, in view of all the evidence and the whole case, it was of such a material character as to require a reversal of the judgment.
“The particular portion of the charge complained of, though inapplicable to the case, could not have misled the jury or injured the rights of the defendant. The possession and occupancy of the premises by Reaume at the time of their destruction were not controverted, and, under the evidence, either for the State or the defense, the jury could not have found otherwise.... Under the facts, the law and the charge of the court, it was impossible for the jury to have found the ownership in any other person than the alleged, and the error complained of was therefore harmless.” Tuller v. State, 8 Tex.App. 501 (Ct.App.1880), at 508, 509.
After the amendment of Article 723 by Acts 1897, 25th Leg., ch. 21, p. 17, Article 723 read as follows:
“Whenever it appears by the record in any criminal action, upon appeal of defendant, that any of the requirements of the eight preceding articles (rules regarding the contents of jury charges) have been disregarded, the judgment shall not be reversed unless the error appearing from the record was calculated to injure the rights of defendant, which error shall be excepted to at the time of trial or on motion for new trial.” (Material in parenthesis added and emphasis added).
Once again, it is clear that judgments were not to be reversed because of error in the jury charge unless the error was calculated to injure the rights of the defendant. This is clearly demonstrated by the cases cited in the concurring opinion. In Stewart v. State, 50 S.W. 459 (Tex.Cr.App.1899), the Court examined the court’s charge even though the appellant had not properly excepted as required by Article 723. Finding no error calculated to injure the appellant, Stewart’s judgment was affirmed. In Ford v. State, 41 Tex.Cr.R. 1, 51 S.W. 935 (1899), Ford was charged with robbery. On appeal Ford complained that the trial court erred in giving a charge which directed the jury to acquit him if they believed he had acquired the property by purchase or gift. Ford contended this was error since there was no evidence that he or his co-defendants acquired the property by gift. In its opinion, the Court agreed that the trial court erred in giving the instruction however: “We do not think it was such error as was calculated to injure the rights of appellant. ... We do not see fit to reverse the judgment on this account.” Ford v. State, *75051 S.W. at 937. In Reid v. State, 57 S.W. 662 (Tex.Cr.App.1900), Reid complained on appeal that there was fundamental error in the jury charge. The Court, noting that Reid had failed to except to the charge at trial, nonetheless examined the jury charge and found that it sufficiently covered every defense available to Reid and thus ,he suffered no harm. The conviction was affirmed. In Jones v. State, 53 Tex.Cr.R. 131, 110 S.W. 741 (1908), Jones was convicted of murder in the second degree. On appeal, Jones maintained the court erred in not charging the jury on the subject of alibi. On original submission, the conviction was affirmed. On rehearing, the Court wrote:
“A case will not be reversed for the mere failure of the court to charge on the subject of alibi, unless a special charge submitted the issue is requested or an exception reserved at the time. We are the more constrained to do so in this case for the • reason that the charge of the court herein in effect submitted the doctrine and issue of alibi, and the same was reasonably included in the charge herein copied. In any event, the failure of the court to charge on the law of alibi was not calculated to injure appellant.” Jones v. State, 110 S.W. at 745.
This principle was again reiterated in Wright v. State, 73 Tex.Cr.R. 178, 163 S.W. 976 (1914), where Judge Harper, writing for the Court, stated that a case will not be reversed because of error in the jury charge “unless the error appearing from the record was calculated to injure the rights of the defendant, or unless it appears from the record that the defendant has not had a fair and impartial trial.” 163 S.W. at 977.
In the main text of his opinion, Judge Clinton has referred us to only three cases prior to Harris which were reversed because of errors in the jury charge. Judge Davidson, writing in Williams v. State, 53 Tex.Cr.R. 2, 108 S.W. 371 (1908), stated that since the indictment charged burglary with intent to commit theft and the jury charge allowed the jury to convict if they believed Williams intended a felony or the misdemeanor crime of theft, the charge authorized a conviction for an offense not charged. The same situation presented itself in Moore v. State, 84 Tex.Cr.R. 256, 206 S.W. 683 (1918), where Judge Davidson wrote:
“It is error of a fundamental nature to authorize a conviction for any other offense than that charged, and this is true whether there was an exception reserved or not to the action of the court in so charging the jury.” 206 S.W. at 684.
Although not articulated, there is no doubt that the defendants in these cases were harmed by such charges. The last pre-Harris reversal cited in the concurring opinion was Garza v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 655, 288 S.W. 785 (1956), in which the Court held there was fundamental error because the jury charge gave erroneous instructions as to the law. Once again the defendant in that case was clearly harmed by the erroneous charge. But, as pointed out by all these cases, until Harris, there was no per se rule of reversal because of fundamental error. Reversals for errors in the jury charge were the exception and not the norm and could only be had when the court carefully examined the facts of each individual case and saw 'a definite harm to the defendant as a result of the error in the jury charge.
In the case now before us, the majority reverses on the ground that the charge to the jury omitted an essential element of the offense by failing to include the culpable mental state. An examination of the charge reveals otherwise. In the instructions, the jury was charged that:
“Possession is a voluntary act if the possessor knowingly obtains or receives the thing possessed or is aware of his control of the thing for a sufficient time to permit him to terminate his control.”
The jury was further instructed that in order to convict they must have found that appellant “possessed a firearm.” In reading the charge as a whole, it is clear that, before the jury could convict, they had to find that appellant knowingly obtained or received the firearm. Further, the majority, in following the per se rule of Harris, fails to demonstrate how the appellant' was harmed by this charge.
*751Not only should this conviction be affirmed, this Court should re-examine the holding in Harris and overrule it once and for all. Until such time as the majority recognizes and applies the statutes and caselaw of this State, I must dissent.
W. C. DAVIS, J., joins in this dissent.

. All emphasis is the writer’s unless otherwise noted.

Parnell v. State, 166 Tex.Cr.R. 239, 312 S.W.2d 506 (1958) (The charge authorized conviction on the jury’s finding that defendant did the acts constituting the offense of abortion charged in the indictment. But the proof conclusively showed that defendant did not personally do such acts and therefore could be guilty, if at all, only on a theory that he acted with another as a principal. Abstract instructions setting forth the substantive law of principals applicable to such theory were given to the jury but nowhere did the charge set forth instructions applying this law to the ultimate facts essential to the establishment of such theory. Defendant made no complaint of this omission. On appeal, the conviction was affirmed without mention, in the majority opinion, of the omission of the charge to apply the law to such ultimate facts. The necessary effect of this decision is to hold that abstract instructions as to substantive law applicable to a prosecution theory relied on by the State for conviction will be deemed sufficient to submit to the jury the issues of such theory if the defendant makes no complaint. This holding allowed the jury to perform, and necessarily presumed that the jury did properly perform, the judicial function of determining, from an interpretation of abstract instructions, what ultimate facts would have to be found to establish the State’s case.); McCoy v. State, 138 Tex.Cr.R. 138, 134 S.W.2d 273, 276 (Tex.Crim.1939) (‘While a charge should apply the law to the facts of the particular case, yet in the absence of an objection addressed thereto pri- or to the time the same is submitted to the jury, the presumption obtains that appellant was satisfied with the instruction.’).” (Emphasis supplied in original writing)