Court Opinion

ID: 9661522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:41:29.160452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:29.521979
License: Public Domain

GUDGEL, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the portion of the majority opinion which dismisses this appeal because appellant failed to file a timely notice of appeal. I dissent from the portion of the opinion which gratuitously addresses the merits of this case. Agreements of parents to share joint custody are not binding on the trial court. KRS 403.180(2). Further, even if such an agreement is initially *301approved, it is subject to modification. KRS 403.180(6). Moreover, a trial court may not grant or approve any agreement for joint custody unless it finds that joint custody is in the best interests of the child. KRS 403.270(3).
This case demonstrates the need for the statutory restrictions and limitations with respect to agreements for joint custody. Like so many theories which have a noble purpose they often prove to be unworkable when tested in a practical world. Although the parties in the instant action agreed to share joint custody, and their agreement was approved by the trial court, it did not take long for the agreement to become unworkable. Presently the Burchells are unable to agree on the basic issue of whether their child should attend a church school or a public school. Pursuant to their agreement a circuit judge has undertaken to make that decision for them. I simply cannot accede to the proposition that the joint custody agreement in the instant action is sustainable as being in the child’s best interests. In effect, under the terms of the agreement, the circuit judge has agreed to assume a role as Tad’s parent. I believe that it is an abuse of discretion for a circuit judge to voluntarily assume a parental decision making function for himself under the terms of a joint custody agreement. Further, I believe that any such agreement is unenforceable against the parent having physical custody of the child. KRS 403.330 confers a right to determine a child’s education on the child’s custodial parent unless the parents agree otherwise in writing. Here, the parties did not have such an agreement. They only agreed that if they could not agree as to the child’s education the court would determine the issue for them. The agreement contemplated by the statute, however, is one by which the custodial parent unconditionally agrees to permit the noncustodial parent to determine issues as to the child’s education. Thus, contrary to the majority’s conclusion, I am of the opinion that KRS 403.330 is applicable to this case. Appellant has a statutory right absent a finding that Tad’s physical health will be endangered or his emotional development impaired, to enrol Tad in the school of her choice. Wilhelm v. Wilhelm, Ky., 504 S.W.2d 699 (1973). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the portion of the majority opinion which reaches a contrary conclusion.