Court Opinion

ID: 9372162
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-18 11:00:30.58349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:33.417435
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30075         Document: 00516650076             Page: 1     Date Filed: 02/17/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                                                                             FILED
                                                                                      February 17, 2023
                                        No. 22-30075                                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                             Clerk

   Mark Anthony Spell; First Apostolic Church of East
   Baton Rouge Parish, doing business as Life Tabernacle
   Church,

                                                                   Plaintiffs—Appellants,

                                             versus

   John Bel Edwards, in his individual capacity and his official capacity as
   Governor of the State of Louisiana; Roger Corcoran, in his individual
   capacity and official capacity as Chief of Police of Central City, Louisiana; Sid
   Gautreaux, individually and in his official capacity as Sheriff of East Baton
   Rouge Parish, Louisiana,

                                                                 Defendants—Appellees,

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Middle District of Louisiana
                                USDC No. 3:20-CV-282
                                  c/w No. 3:21-CV-423

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Elrod and Oldham, Circuit
   Judges.
   Per Curiam:*

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-30075        Document: 00516650076             Page: 2      Date Filed: 02/17/2023

                                        No. 22-30075

           Pastor Mark Anthony Spell and his church appeal the dismissal of
   their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims alleging that state officials violated their rights
   under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Because Pastor Spell
   cannot prevail on the legal theory he advances, we affirm.
                                              I
           Pastor Spell, the pastor of Life Tabernacle Church in the city of
   Central, Louisiana, held church services in violation of stay-at-home orders
   implemented by Governor John Bel Edwards in the early months of the
   COVID-19 pandemic. Local law enforcement officials, including Sheriff Sid
   Gautreaux and Chief of Police Roger Corcoran, enforced the Governor’s
   orders. Pastor Spell brought an action against these officials under 42 U.S.C.
   § 1983, seeking injunctive relief and damages for violations of his First
   Amendment rights as well as his rights under the Louisiana Constitution.
   Following two appeals to this court at various stages of the litigation, the
   district court dismissed the claims for damages on grounds of qualified
   immunity, dismissed the claims for injunctive relief as moot, and dismissed
   the supplemental state law claims.
                                              II
           We first address the district court’s dismissal of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983
   claims on the basis of qualified immunity. “We review a district court’s grant
   of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity de novo.”1 In deciding
   whether an official is entitled to qualified immunity, we use a two-pronged
   inquiry. “[A] plaintiff seeking to defeat qualified immunity must show:
   ‘(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that

   1
    Turner v. Lieutenant Driver, 848 F.3d 678, 684 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Whitley v. Hanna,
   726 F.3d 631, 637 (5th Cir. 2013)).

                                              2
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                                         No. 22-30075

   the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.’”2
   “[T]he plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the inapplicability” of the
   qualified immunity defense if raised by the defendant.3
           Pastor Spell explicitly waived the argument that defendants’ actions
   violated his constitutional rights under current free exercise jurisprudence,
   and so we do not address that argument.4 In his briefing for this case, Pastor
   Spell instead advanced an absolute, categorical theory of the Religion
   Clauses, arguing that church assembly is “beyond the jurisdiction of the
   government.” At oral argument, Pastor Spell reiterated that the legal theory
   being advanced is a strict, jurisdictional theory. He maintained that, under
   Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township,5 there is a “jurisdictional

   2
    Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371 (5th Cir. 2011) (en banc) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-
   Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
   3
    Turner, 848 F.3d at 685 (citing Atteberry v. Nocona Gen. Hosp., 430 F.3d 245, 253 (5th Cir.
   2005) abrogated on other grounds by Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015)).
   4
    See Duarte v. City of Lewisville, 858 F.3d 348, 353 n.3 (5th Cir. 2017) (“Because Duarte
   explicitly waived any arguments about whether effective banishment would infringe
   substantive due process, both in his briefing and at oral argument, we do not address
   whether the Ordinance infringes on a fundamental right or liberty interest.”).
   5
    330 U.S. 1 (1947). At oral argument, Judge Elrod had the following exchange with
   Pastor Spell’s counsel:
           Judge Elrod: “[P]erhaps I misunderstood your briefs, but I thought
                        your briefs argued that other entities were allowed to
                        remain open.”
                             ....
           Counsel:          “We argued throughout the brief that that’s what
                             happened, yes.”
           Judge Elrod: “And that that’s what makes it wrong, under Lukumi.”
           Counsel:          “No, that’s what makes it wrong under Everson.”
   Oral Argument at 9:54-10:37.

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                                            No. 22-30075

   limit on intrusion by the state into the church.”6 In so doing, he expressly
   waived other arguments.7
             Pastor Spell is the master of his case, and he cannot prevail on the
   theory he advances.            Controlling precedent directly contradicts Pastor

   6
       Oral Argument at 7:00.
   7
     At oral argument, Judge Elrod had the following exchange with Pastor Spell’s
   counsel:
             Judge Elrod: “If you can win under Lukumi and you can’t win under
                          Everson, are you going to pass on a win? . . . If the
                          caselaw is not such that there is this impregnable barrier
                          between church and state such that there can be no
                          regulation among all kinds of entities, but the law is
                          instead that you can’t treat religious entities different
                          than other entities—if that is the law in the United
                          States, are you saying that you don’t wish to argue that
                          theory even if you could prevail on it?”
                                ....
             Counsel:           “We can’t win on any other argument. It’s a loss
                                because it violates the United States Constitution. The
                                first Establishment Clause case in our history has never
                                been backed off of . . . . Our case stands for the
                                proposition of what the first Supreme Court case to
                                address this problem says, and I’ll read that very quickly.
                                [Reads from Everson.].”
   Oral Argument at 10:41-12:33; see also Oral Argument at 9:06 (“We’ve never backed off the
   strict argument that separation of church and state means there’s no jurisdictional position
   that the state can take where they can restrict church assembly.”); Oral Argument at 13:10
   (“[T]he basis of our argument is that there is no jurisdiction to limit a church
   attendance.”); Jackson v. Watkins, 619 F.3d 463, 466 n.1 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam)
   (“Jackson conceded at oral argument that this is solely a pretext case, not a mixed-motive
   case, so we consider any mixed-motive arguments to be waived.”); United States v. Joseph
   G. Moretti, Inc., 478 F.2d 418, 421 n.4 (5th Cir. 1973) (explaining that the disposition
   “expresses no approval” as to issues that “appellant expressly waived . . . at oral
   argument”).

                                                   4
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                                            No. 22-30075

   Spell’s jurisdictional theory of the Religion Clauses.8 The district court did
   not err in dismissing the claims as Pastor Spell argues them.
                                                III
              Next, we address the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. “A
   party forfeits an argument . . . by failing to adequately brief the argument on
   appeal.”9         Pastor Spell failed to raise arguments in his opening brief
   challenging the district court’s resolution of this issue or offering reasons as
   to why permanent injunctive relief is appropriate here. At oral argument
   Pastor Spell was unclear as to whether he seeks injunctive relief.10 Because
   Pastor Spell failed to provide arguments in favor of permanent injunctive
   relief, he has abandoned them.11
                                                IV
              Last, we address the district court’s dismissal of the pendent state law
   claims. After dismissing the federal law claims, the district court declined
   jurisdiction over the state law claims and dismissed them without prejudice.

   8
    See Roman Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 529 U.S. __, 141 S. Ct. 63, 67 (2020) (per
   curiam) (“Because the challenged restrictions are not ‘neutral’ and of ‘general
   applicability,’ they must satisfy ‘strict scrutiny,’ and this means that they must be
   ‘narrowly tailored’ to serve a ‘compelling’ state interest.”); Church of the Lukumi Babalu
   Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546 (1993) (“A law burdening religious practice
   that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of
   scrutiny.”); Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding
   that the limitation articulated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963)—i.e., that
   governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a
   compelling governmental interest—does not apply to neutral, generally applicable laws).
   9
    See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021) (first citing Norris v.
   Causey, 869 F.3d 360, 373 n.10 (5th Cir. 2017); and then citing Fed. R. App. P.
   28(a)(8)(A)).
   10
        See Oral Argument at 14:29-15:40.
   11
        See Rollins, 8 F.4th at 397.

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                                            No. 22-30075

   We review a district court’s decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction for
   abuse of discretion.12 District courts are afforded “wide latitude” in their
   disposition of state law claims,13 and “[t]he general rule is that a court should
   decline to exercise jurisdiction over remaining state-law claims when all
   federal-law claims are eliminated before trial.”14
           The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise
   jurisdiction over the state law claims. It considered the statutory factors15
   and our circuit’s common law factors,16 concluding that “all factors favor[ed]
   dismissing” the state law claims. As to the statutory factors, it found that the
   question of “whether the Louisiana Constitution protects Plaintiffs from the
   Governor’s crowd-size limits” was a novel question of state law and that the
   state law claims “obviously predominate[d] over the nonexistent federal
   claims.” As to the common law factors, it explained that each was “served
   by allowing Louisiana’s courts to address Plaintiffs’ state law claims in the

   12
     Priester v. Lowndes Cnty., 354 F.3d 414, 425 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Sibley v. Lemaire, 184
   F.3d 481, 490 (5th Cir. 1999)).
   13
    See Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 161 (5th Cir. 2011) (quoting United Mine
   Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 727 (1966)).
   14
     Brookshire Bros. Holding v. Dayco Prod., Inc., 554 F.3d 595, 602 (5th Cir. 2009); see also
   Parker & Parsley Petroleum Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 585 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Our
   general rule is to dismiss state claims when the federal claims to which they are pendent are
   dismissed.” (citing Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989))).
   15
     28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (providing that “district courts may decline to exercise supplemental
   jurisdiction . . . if—(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the claim
   substantially predominates over the claim or claims over which the district court has
   original jurisdiction, (3) the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original
   jurisdiction, or (4) in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
   declining jurisdiction”).
   16
     Enochs, 641 F.3d at 159-60 (explaining that we “look to the statutory factors set forth by
   28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), and to the common law factors of judicial economy, convenience,
   fairness, and comity” in reviewing a district court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction).

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                                      No. 22-30075

   first instance.” The district court concluded that the state law issues were
   “deserving of a state court adjudication unencumbered by a parallel federal
   civil proceeding.” The dismissal of the state law claims was not an abuse of
   discretion.
                                  *        *         *
            For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district
   court.

                                           7
Case: 22-30075      Document: 00516650076          Page: 8   Date Filed: 02/17/2023

                                    No. 22-30075

   Andrew S. Oldham, Circuit Judge, joined by Elrod, Circuit Judge,
   concurring:
          For decades, it has been clearly established that treating houses of
   worship worse than comparable secular assemblies—as the district court
   assumed Louisiana did here—violates the Constitution. Church of the Lukumi
   Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1993); see Roman
   Cath. Diocese of Brooklyn v. Cuomo, 141 S. Ct. 63, 66–67 (2020) (applying
   Lukumi’s disparate-treatment rule to COVID-19 regulations). Had Pastor
   Spell’s counsel not affirmatively waived the Lukumi argument, his victory
   was all but assured. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993)
   (“Whereas forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of a right,
   waiver is the intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right.”
   (quotation omitted)); Cargill v. Garland, — F.4th —, 2023 WL 119435, at
   *13 (5th Cir. 2023) (en banc) (noting that, unlike a forfeited argument, courts
   generally cannot pursue a waived argument); Essinger v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins.
   Co., 534 F.3d 450, 453 (5th Cir. 2008) (clarifying that when a forfeited
   argument involves a legal error and the failure to consider it will result in a
   “miscarriage of justice” courts may pursue the argument). But oddly, Pastor
   Spell’s counsel insisted on taking a loss.

                                          8