Court Opinion

ID: 9373674
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:06:37.791428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:48.181241
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     FREDERICK GUY PATTERSON,                         DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                          CH-0752-16-0060-I-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND                           DATE: May 25, 2022
       SECURITY,
                 Agency.

                   THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Frederick Guy Patterson, Troy, Illinois, pro se.

           Aaron Baughman and Joseph Rieu, Esquire, Arlington, Virginia, for the
             agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Raymond A. Limon, Vice Chair
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed his constructive demotion appeal for lack of jurisdiction.           For the
     reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for review and

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administ rative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     REMAND the case to the Central Regional Office for further adjudication in
     accordance with this Remand Order.

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
¶2         In September 2015, the agency notified the appellant that it had identified
     his I-band Transportation Security Inspector (Cargo) position for elimination and,
     in   accordance      with   its    Human    Capital   Management     (HCM)     Policy
     No. 351-3, Involuntary Workforce Reduction (IWR) Procedures for Non-TSES,
     Non-TSO Positions (HCM Policy No. 351-3), offered him either voluntary
     placement into vacancies within his airport complex (hub/spoke) or a future offer
     of placement nationwide.          Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 4 at 9-12, Tab 14
     at 19-22.   Effective November 1, 2015, the appellant accepted a voluntary
     placement into an H-band position with saved pay for 2 years.           IAF, Tab 14
     at 24-29. Although the agency subsequently appointed him back to an I -band
     position as a Transportation Security Inspector, Explosives Detection Canine
     Handler, effective December 27, 2015, IAF, Tab 25 at 5, the appellant filed this
     appeal of his demotion to the H-band position, IAF, Tab 1.           He requested a
     hearing. Id. at 2.
¶3         The administrative judge gave the appellant notice of the elements and
     burdens of establishing that his demotion was involuntary.          IAF, Tab 3.     In
     response, the appellant asserted that he had accepted the lower-graded position
     under duress due to an on-the-job injury.       IAF, Tab 4 at 4-7. He challenged
     several agency decisions regarding who would be demoted and described his
     unsuccessful attempt to achieve a lateral transfer to avoid demotion. Id. He also
     indicated that he must work in the St. Louis area in order to care for his ill father.
     Id. at 77. The agency argued that the Board lacks jurisdiction and moved to stay
     the deadlines pending a decision on jurisdiction.             IAF, Tab 14.        The
     administrative judge granted the agency’s requested stay. IAF, Tab 15.
                                                                                             3

¶4         Without holding a hearing, the administrative judge dismissed the appeal
     for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the appellant failed to r aise a nonfrivolous
     allegation that his decision to accept a lower-graded position was involuntary.
     IAF, Tab 30, Initial Decision (ID).        In his petition for review, the appellant
     essentially repeats the arguments he made in his appeal below.              Petition for
     Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. The agency responds in opposition to the appellant’s
     petition for review. 2 PFR File, Tab 3.
¶5         We agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to
     nonfrivolously allege that his decision to accept the lower -graded position was
     involuntary. ID at 5-6. Although his options were not attractive, the Board has
     long held that having to choose between unpleasant alternatives does not render
     the ultimate decision involuntary.        E.g., Miller v. Department of Homeland
     Security, 111 M.S.P.R. 325, ¶ 10 (2009) (finding that an appellant’s decision to
     retire rather than accept a demotion was not involunta ry), aff’d, 361 F. App’x 134
     (Fed. Cir. 2010). As the administrative judge observed, just because the choices
     before the appellant involved the risk of involuntary separation and may have
     been dictated by his need to remain in the St. Louis area to care for his ill father,
     the appellant nonetheless had a choice. ID at 4-5. The appellant accepted the
     lower-graded position in writing, despite the reservations he expressed in doing
     so, indicating he voluntarily elected not to wait for a nationwide search that might
     have yielded a higher-graded position in another location or to risk involuntary
     separation. ID at 3-5; IAF, Tab 4 at 87-89.

     2
       After the record on review closed, the appellant filed an additional pleading, which the
     Clerk of the Board rejected because the Board’s rules do not provide for any pleadings
     other than a petition for review, a cross petition for review, a response to the petition
     for review or cross petition for review, and a reply to the response to the petition for
     review within the allotted time. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a)(5), (k); PFR File, Tab 4.
     Because the appellant failed to follow the Clerk’s instruction to file the required motion
     requesting leave to file the additional pleading, we have not considered it. 5 C.F.R.
     § 1201.114(a)(5).
                                                                                      4

¶6        Nevertheless, the Board has jurisdiction over an appeal challenging a
     reduction in force (RIF) action involving an excepted-service employee of the
     Transportation Security Administration (TSA), like the appellant.      Garofalo v.
     Department of Homeland Security, 108 M.S.P.R. 169, ¶ 7 (2008); Wilke v.
     Department of Homeland Security, 104 M.S.P.R. 662, ¶ 16 (2007); IAF, Tab 1.
     However, title 5 provisions governing RIF actions are not applicable to the
     TSA, instead, the Board applies the TSA’s internal RIF policy, which in this
     instance is contained in its HCM Policy No. 351-3. Garofalo, 108 M.S.P.R. 169,
     ¶ 8; IAF, Tab 14 at 19.
¶7        When the Board’s jurisdiction is in doubt, an appellant must receive explicit
     information on what is required to establish an appealable jurisdictional issue.
     E.g., Alvarez v. Department of Homeland Security, 112 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 9 (2009)
     (citing Burgess v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 758 F.2d 641, 643-44
     (Fed. Cir. 1985)).   Here, neither party has submitted a copy of HCM Policy
     No. 351-3. However, in a traditional RIF situation, an appellant who appears to
     have voluntarily accepted a demotion may establish jurisdiction over an agency’s
     RIF action by proving: (1) that he accepted a lower-graded position after the
     agency actually informed him that his original position would be abolished and,
     (2) that his acceptance of a lower-graded position occurred after the agency
     expressly notified him that he would not be assigned to a position at the same
     grade as the position which was abolished. E.g., Burger v. U.S. Postal Service,
     93 M.S.P.R. 582, ¶ 13 & n.3 (2003), aff’d sub nom. Hayes v. U.S. Postal Service,
     390 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
¶8        Because the record does not reflect that the administrative judge gave the
     appellant proper notice of the elements and burdens of challenging his demotion
     as an involuntary RIF action under the agency’s HCM Policy No. 351-3, we must
     remand the appeal for proper notice and, if the appellant establishes jurisdiction
     over his appeal, adjudication on the merits including any affirmative defenses that
     the appellant may interpose on remand.        E.g., Garofalo, 108 M.S.P.R. 169,
                                                                                         5

      ¶¶ 7-8, 19-22.    Although it appears that the appellant elected a voluntary
      demotion before he was informed specifically that he would not be placed at the
      same grade level, he was not given an opportunity to meet his jurisdiction al
      burden regarding a RIF demotion. In addition, absent the record’s development
      concerning the agency’s own RIF policies on voluntary demotions, we cannot
      determine whether the Board’s traditional RIF jurisdictional analysis applies in
      this instance.
¶9          On remand, the administrative judge should allow the parties to further
      develop the record regarding whether the Board has jurisdiction over the
      appellant’s RIF demotion, including providing the appellant with guidance as to
      how to meet his jurisdictional burden.         Because the administrative judge
      previously stayed discovery, she should determine if the parties wish to engage in
      discovery on this issue. IAF, Tab 15. If so, she should allow such discovery.
      See Parker v. Department of Housing & Urban Development, 106 M.S.P.R. 329,
      ¶ 9 (2007) (advising an administrative judge on remand to allow discovery that
      could lead to relevant evidence regarding the Board’s jurisdiction).
¶10         In addition, the administrative judge should also provide the parties with the
      opportunity to brief whether any RIF-related action is now moot. Although not
      entirely clear, it appears that the appellant may ultimately have lost no pay or
      benefits during the period that he was effectively demoted. As explained above,
      his demotion to an H-band position was with 2 years of saved pay. IAF, Tab 14
      at 27. In addition, he was provided with an I-band position within those 2 years.
      IAF, Tab 25 at 5.      However, on the record before us, we cannot determine
      whether the appellant received status quo ante relief, thus rendering moot any
      potential RIF claim.    See Hess v. U.S. Postal Service, 123 M.S.P.R. 183, ¶ 5
      (2016) (stating that status quo ante relief generally requires that the agency place
      an appellant in her former position or in one substantially equivalent in scope and
      status, remove references to the rescinded action, and restore any lost back pay or
      benefits). Further, it appears that the appellant attempted to raise a disability
                                                                                            6

      discrimination and equal employment opportunity (EEO) retaliation claim below,
      which may preclude a finding that the appeal is moot.             IAF, Tab 4 at 4-7;
      see Hess v. U.S. Postal Service, 124 M.S.P.R. 40, ¶¶ 8-20 (2016) (explaining that
      an administrative judge may not dismiss an appeal as moot if the appellant has
      discrimination   or   reprisal   claim    and   requests   compensatory      damages);
      Garofalo, 108 M.S.P.R. 169, ¶¶ 20-21 (finding that an administrative judge
      properly found a TSA employee did not prove his EEO affirmative defenses in a
      RIF appeal, but directing that administrative judge to revisit those defenses in
      light of any additional evidence gathered on remand).

                                               ORDER
¶11         Accordingly, we vacate the initial decision and remand the appeal for
      further proceedings consistent with this Remand Order. 3

      FOR THE BOARD:                              /s/ for
                                                  Jennifer Everling
                                                  Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      3
       The remand initial decision will incorporate the findings from this Order and include a
      notice of appeal rights for all claims raised by the appellant.