Court Opinion

ID: 9458937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:05:55.373412+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:57.190967
License: Public Domain

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Appellant Finnerty was indicted on three counts for violations of the counterfeiting statute. Count I charged that on December 19, 1970, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472, Finnerty, with intent to defraud, wilfully and knowingly uttered a counterfeit $100 Federal Reserve Note at the Mertz Outlet Store, Scranton, Pennsylvania. Count II charged that on the same date Finnerty, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 472, with intent to defraud, wilfully and knowingly attempted to utter a counterfeit $100 Federal Reserve Note at the Beverly Shop, Scranton, Pennsylvania. Count III charged possession of a counterfeit note. The district court dismissed Count III because it was an offense included in the other two counts.
In the Government’s case several witnesses from the Mertz Outlet Store (Count I) established that on December 19, 1970, a counterfeit $100 Federal Reserve Note was passed at the store by a young man who said he wanted to purchase a Christmas present for his mother. He was described as wearing what in 1970 was a fairly common youth peer group uniform, dungarees, boots and a short denim jacket. He was hirsute. Of the four witnesses from the Mertz Outlet Store, only one, Maxine Kaplan, the clerk who waited on the man who passed the counterfeit note, identified *84that person. She stepped down from the witness stand and positively identified someone other than Finnerty. Thus in the Government’s case the only testimony identifying the passer of the counterfeit note at the Mertz Outlet Store was that he was someone other than Finnerty.
Finnerty was positively identified as the person who passed the counterfeit note at the Beverly Shop on. the same day. As I will develop hereafter, the evidence of his knowledge and wilfulness in the Beverly Store transaction, if one looks at the testimony concerning that transaction alone, is not sufficient to sustain conviction on Count II. The majority opinion sustains that conviction, however, by finding evidence of knowledge and wilfulness in the testimony about the Mertz transaction and in the defense testimony. But the district court properly granted a motion for judgment of acquittal on Count I because the Government’s proofs established that someone else passed the counterfeit note at the Mertz store. The court then charged the jury:
“Now, if you will recall, Count One charged the defendant with intent to defraud; wilfully and knowingly passing and uttering a $100.00 counterfeit note at Mirtz [sic] Outlet Store, 410 Lackawanna Avenue. Count Two charges the same crime as to the Beverly Shop at 424 Lackawanna Avenue, and Count Three charges the defendant with intent to defraud, wilfully and knowingly, and having in his possession falsely made or counterfeit obligations. Now, Members of the Jury, defense counsel has just made a motion for a directed verdict of acquittal as to Count One and I have granted that motion, the reason being that there was no identification of this defendant in the Mirtz [sic] store. Any testimony as to identification was that of Maxine Kaplan, and she identified someone who is not the defendant as the person who was in the store. Now, it is true there is testimony of similarity of appearance and conversation and general description of the person in the Mirtz [sic] store, but I instruct you that it fails totally in the proof that is necessary to show the commission of the crime, and, consequently, you are not to consider Count One in your deliberations, and on Count Three, consequently, we are limiting the possession charge to the one counterfeit bill that was allegedly brought into the Beverly store. We are not concerned with the Mirtz [sic] store at all, and I must instruct you with great emphasis that we have allowed evidence into the case as to what happened at the Mirtz [sic] store because the Government thought they would have sufficient proof to justify submitting it to the jury. I have concluded otherwise. So you are not to consider for any purpose any testimony concerning what occurred at the Mirtz [sic] store. It would be improper for you to do so and in violation of your oath if you allow your decision on Count Two and Count Three to be influenced to any degree or in any manner by testimony concerning the occurrence at the Mirtz [sic] store.”
(Tr. at 80-81).
The majority opinion, by assuming that the jury could, in finding the necessary knowledge and intent, consider the Mertz Outlet Store testimony, assumes that the jury was free to disregard the court’s instruction and substitute its own judgment as to what evidence was admissible on Count II. This, presumably, the jury was not free to do.
We cannot, of course, review the district court’s grant of a motion for judgment of acquittal on Count I. We can, however, review the trial court’s denial of that motion on Count II.
The proof with respect to the Beverly Shop transaction, at the end of the Government’s case, consisted of the testimony of Linda Capozza, a salesgirl; Sandra Walsh, a salesgirl; Betty Miles, head cashier; Josephine Lahr, a bookkeeper; James Carter, a supervisor of some sort in the store; and three offi*85cers of the Scranton Police Department who participated in Finnerty’s apprehension at the scene.1 The only thing significant about the testimony of the Scranton police officers was that when they arrived at the Beverly Shop, having been summoned by Mr. Carter, Finnerty was entirely cooperative, voluntarily accompanied them to the police station, and gave them a statement as to where he obtained the counterfeit note. Miss Capozza, one of the salesclerks, testified that when others in the store, becoming suspicious of the note, directed her to detain Finnerty, she did so by asking him to wait while she got a free gift box of candles, and by engaging him in conversation in which he disclosed he was from New Jersey and played in a band. When he had been kept waiting for fifteen minutes, Finnerty asked Miss Lahr: “Where’s that girl who waited on me? I want my package.” (Tr. at 30). He was told he would have to wait, and he did so. Miss Walsh, who took the note from Miss Capozza to the cashier in the main office of the store, returned without change. She advised Finnerty he would have to wait for change. She was asked :
“Q What did this person say ?
A He acted very calmly and said he’d wait.” (Tr. at 35).
Miss Miles, who received the bill from Miss Walsh, was about to make change when Mr. Carter came in and said to her that she had better check the note “that the possessor of the bill looked suspicious.” (Tr. at 38). She sent Mr. Carter with the note to the head bookkeeper. Finnerty came over briefly to ask Miss Miles if he could have his bill or his package, but she “did not get a look at him.” (Tr. at 39). Eventually Mr. Carter was sent for a policeman. Miss Lahr testified that after Finnerty had been waiting for a considerable time while the salespeople were stalling him, he said: “Either give me my money or give me my merchandise.” He also said, according to Miss Lahr:
“ ‘Well, can I go down . . . ’ and I think he said his brother or somebody was supposed to be in the car waiting, and he said, ‘I’ll go down and tell him I’m being delayed and I’ll be right back.’” (Tr. at 45).
At that point Mr. Carter arrived with the police.
Mr. Carter had no conversation with Finnerty. He testified that he observed Finnerty outside the store. His testimony about Finnerty’s “suspicious” appearance is as follows:
“Q What was this person doing?
A Well, in my opinion the person looked very suspicious because of the way he carried himself by walking by the store and back by the store again, and just something gave me this feeling that something was up, and I really didn’t know what was coming up.
Q Was this person looking in the window ?
A Yes. Not directly but like he would walk past the store and look in and all of a sudden come back and look in again and back. I was standing in the front and it seemed kind of strange to me.” (Tr. at 50).
Mr. Carter could not or at least did not elaborate the reasons for his opinion that Finnerty looked suspicious. There was no evidence that when Finnerty was taken into custody he had any other counterfeit notes, any change from the note cashed at the Mertz store, or any merchandise from the Mertz transaction, which had taken place prior to the Beverly transaction. Thus if the events at the Mertz store cannot be connected to Finnerty, the only evidence tending to establish that he knew the bill was counterfeit was Mr. Carter’s opinion that he looked “suspicious”, and Miss Lahr’s and *86Miss Miles’ testimony that after having-been delayed for over fifteen minutes by various subterfuges he asked for his money or his merchandise but did not leave the shop.
Mere passing of the counterfeit note is insufficient for a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 472. Proof of guilty knowledge is essential for conviction. E. g., Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224, 41 S.Ct. 271, 65 L.Ed. 597 (1921); Miller v. United States, 392 F.2d 790, 792 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v. Meisch, 370 F.2d 768, 771 (3d Cir. 1966); United States v. Litberg, 175 F.2d 20, 22 (7th Cir. 1949). There is no direct evidence in the Government’s case that Finnerty knew the Beverly Shop note was counterfeit. Putting aside the evidence about the Mertz transaction there is no circumstantial evidence tending to show such knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. See United States v. Blair, 456 F.2d 514, 517 (3d Cir. 1972). At the close of the Government’s case the only evidence relating to the Beverly transaction which was in the slightest way indicative of guilty knowledge was Mr. Carter’s conclusion that Finnerty looked “suspicious”. This was not enough. The court should have granted the motion for judgment of acquittal on Count II on the basis of its conclusion that evidence of the Mertz transaction had not been connected to Finnerty.
The court did not do so, however, and Finnerty elected to put in a defense. By doing so, according to the conventional federal court formulation, Finnerty “waived” his objections to the court’s denial of his motion to acquit on Count II. United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160, 164 n. 1, 75 S.Ct. 186, 99 L.Ed. 202 (1954). See McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 215, 91 S.Ct. 1454, 28 L. Ed.2d 711 (1971). Cf. American Bar Association Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Trial by Jury, 107-108 (Approved Draft 1968). But see Comment, The Motion for Acquittal: A Neglected Safeguard, 70 Yale L.J. 1151 (1961); Cf. Cephus v. United States, 117 U.S.App.D.C. 15, 324 F.2d 893 (1963). Since the Supreme Court has expressed approval of the Calderon rule as recently as 1971 it is proper for the majority to refer, as it does, to portions of the defense case for evidence to bolster the Government’s proof of Finnerty’s guilty knowledge. The Calderon rule is unfortunate, for as one commentator has observed:
“As long as there is no effective appellate review of motions for acquittal, the inevitable cautionary tendency of trial judges will result in continued denial of relief at this stage of the trial and render the motion meaningless. It is doubtful whether any measure short of outright abolition of the waiver doctrine will permit effective review and will reverse this tendency.” 8 J. Moore, Federal Practice 29.05, at 29-18 (2d ed. Robert M. Cipes 1972). (Footnote omitted).
This case is a good illustration of the cautionary tendency of trial judges to which the commentator referred. The district court, Solomon like, halved the problem by taking on itself the decision that the Government must be bound by its identification evidence on Count I, but refusing to take on itself the decision that Mr. Carter’s opinion that Fin-nerty looked suspicious was insufficient to establish guilty knowledge.
If the majority, applying the Calderon rule, merely looked at the defense evidence to bolster the Government’s proof of guilty knowledge on Count II, I would be unhappy but not dissentious. But as the majority opinion makes clear, even the defense evidence supporting guilty knowledge can only be related to Count II by reference to the evidence on the Mertz transaction (Count I). Under the waiver rule the defense proof may lay the foundation for otherwise inadmissible evidence in the Government’s case, Ladrey v. United States, 81 U.S.App.D.C. 127, 155 F.2d 417 (1946), or provide corroboration for essential elements of the Government’s case, United States v. Goldstein, 168 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1948); Ercoli v. United States, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 360, 131 F.2d 354 (1942). Here the majority opinion goes further, however, for nothing in the defense *87proof served to supply the essential defect in the link between the Mertz transaction and Finnerty — the identification of the Mertz culprit. The district court recognized as much, for it never departed from its charge to the jury that the Mertz transaction could not be considered for any purpose. But on appeal, by piecing together evidence in the Government’s ease respecting that transaction, evidence in the Government’s case on Count II and evidence from the defense case, the majority finds enough evidence not only to sustain the denial of the motion for judgment of acquittal, but also to sustain a jury verdict.
If the jury acted upon the Mertz transaction evidence, upon which the majority relies, it disobeyed the court’s instructions. If it followed the court’s instructions, it had an insufficient evi-dentiary basis for its verdict; and that verdict is for this reason suspect. Moreover, even if under Calderon the evidence in the defense case were found to be sufficient to cure the defects in proof of the Government’s case on Count II, the verdict could not be sustained, for the court instructed the jury to disregard the Mertz evidence for any purpose. Thus the jury was instructed to disregard the identification of the Mertz perpetrator as someone other than Fin-nerty, even for the purpose of establishing a reasonable doubt as to his guilty knowledge on Count II. Under these circumstances one would think that an appellate court could go no further than to order a new trial. A new trial would be proper, however, only if by application of the Calderon waiver rule the insufficiency of the evidence at the end of the Government’s case was cured by the defense evidence. Here it was not. The Government did not contend at the end of its case that Count II could be sustained without reference to the Mertz evidence. (Tr. at 75). It does not contend in its brief on appeal that Count II can be sustained without reference to the Mertz evidence. I would simply reverse.

. Other witnesses established the chain of possession of the counterfeit note after Finnerty’s arrest, his identification from photographs as the person apprehended, and the fact that the note was a counterfeit.