Court Opinion

ID: 9490194
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:35:38.094806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:53:56.761513
License: Public Domain

MAGILL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
Because I believe that the majority’s reading of North Dakota Century Code Annotated § 26.1 — 41—08(l)(b) (1995) is fundamentally flawed, I respectfully dissent.
In assessing the evidence of damages for future medical expenses, the majority concludes that “[bjecause no certainty exists as to any treatment or costs, benefits are not payable under the No-Fault Aet[, N.D.Cent. Code Ann. Ch. 26.1-41 (1995) ].” Maj.Op. at 1316 (emphasis added). The majority then holds: “[t]he term ‘become payable’ requires certainty, not mere probability. Thus, Johnson’s damages for future medical expenses do not qualify for payable benefits under the No-Fault Act.” Id. at 1317 (emphasis added). The basic problem with the majority’s reading of § 26.1-41-08(l)(b) is that, by stressing the requirement that future damages be certain, the majority’s construction reads the word “become” out of the statute in contravention of North Dakota law. Cf. N.D.Cent.Code Ann. § 1-02-02 (1987) (‘Words used in any statute are to be understood in their ordinary sense____”); N.D.Cent.Code Ann. § 1-02-03 (1987) (Words and phrases must be construed according to the context and the rules of grammar and the approved usage of the language.”).
I disagree with the majority’s reading of the statute because the phrase “become payable” does not require the degree of absolute certainty that the majority ascribes to it. Indeed, the word “become” indicates a future event; therefore, insofar as the future is inherently uncertain, the phrase “become payable” necessarily indicates an event that is, to some extent, inherently uncertain.
However, under the majority’s reasoning, a future economic loss would never be “certain” enough to fall into the “become payable” category. Only a right to be paid that is currently due would be certain. As a result, under the majority’s reading, only a right to be paid for an economic loss that is currently due would warrant a reduction of a jury verdict under § 26.1 — 41—08(l)(b). In other words, the majority omits the word “become” from its reading of § 26.1-41-08(l)(b): the majority reads § 26.1-41-08(l)(b) as exempting economic loss to the extent of all basic no-fault benefits paid or payable.
Yet § 26.1 — 41—08(1)(b) exempts “[ejconomic loss to the extent of all basic no-fault benefits paid or to become payable____” N.D.Cent.Code Ann. . § 26.1-41-08(1)(b) (1995) (emphasis added). Thus, § 26.1-41-08(1)(b) exempts liability not only for economic losses that are currently due and payable, but also for future losses that are less than certain to become payable.
As the majority notes, “benefits are payable only after the no-fault insurer receives ‘reasonable proof of the fact and the amount of loss----’” Maj.Op. at 1315 (ellipses in original) (quoting N.D.Cent.Code Ann. § 26.1-41-09(2) (1995)). The majority, however, does not explain why the jury’s finding that Johnson has suffered a $30,000 economic loss in the form of future medical expenses is not “reasonable proof of the fact and the *1319amount of loss,” id. (quotations and citations omitted), or why the jury’s finding is otherwise insufficient to hold that Johnson’s injuries will become payable under the no-fault system. See Maj.Op. at 1816 n. 2.5
The majority’s holding also undermines the purposes behind the No-Fault Act. The “key aspect” of North Dakota’s no-fault insurance scheme is “to transfer victim compensation from fault-based common law tort recovery to a compulsory no-fault insurance fund.” Reisenauer v. Schaefer, 515 N.W.2d 152, 155 (N.D.1994). By allowing Johnson to recover in a fault-based tort action, the majority has prevented this transfer of compensation.
Furthermore, the majority’s holding creates a substantial risk of double recovery by allowing Johnson to recover in her tort action.6 No provision of Chapter 26.1-41 of the No-Fault Act expressly prevents Johnson from seeking recovery from the no-fault fund for the same medical expenses that she has already recovered in tort. Therefore, although she has recovered from Methorst, Johnson is still free to seek recovery from the no-fault system, and in doing so, she may be twice compensated for a single injury.
For the foregoing reasons, I would hold that Johnson’s recovery of future medical damages in her action against Methorst makes it sufficiently likely that her economic loss will become payable under the no-fault system. I would therefore affirm the decision of the magistrate judge to reduce the jury award.

. Instead, the majority engages in de novo fact-finding to conclude that Johnson’s injuries are not sufficiently certain to warrant a reduction of her jury award. Although "both parties argued this issue as a matter of law," the majority concludes that "[t]he facts ... play a significant role in the decision because the court must determine whether the future damages, in this case medical expenses, constitute an 'economic loss’ under the secured person exemption." Maj.Op. at 1316. Accordingly, the majority “requested and received the deposition testimony of three doctors who testified on behalf of Johnson and one doctor who testified on behalf of Methorst." Id. After a de novo review, the majority makes the finding that "[n]o certainty as to treatment exists. ...” Id. at 1316.
The majority's de novo factfinding upon appellate review is procedurally troubling, if not procedurally erroneous. Reviewing the depositions of expert witnesses to determine the certainty of treatment is an endeavor best left to the trial court. See Reisenauer v. Schaefer, 515 N.W.2d 152, 156 (N.D.1994) (holding that, though tort victim had not met his burden of presenting evidence pertaining to his past economic losses, "justice best is served by reversing and remanding with direction to the trial court to determine the amount of basic no-fault benefits paid or payable”).

. Soon after the enactment of N.D.Cent.Code Ch. 26-41 — the predecessor to N.D.Cent.Code Ann. Ch. 26.1-41 — Thomas O. Smith, the Special At-tomey General to the North Dakota Insurance Department, wrote a law review article explaining the operation and purposes of the No-Fault Act. He stressed that courts should reduce jury awards to prevent double recovery. Specifically, he wrote:
[A] 'secured person' is exempt from liability to pay damages for 'economic loss' to the extent that an injured person has been paid or will be paid basic no-fault benefits. This means that recovery cannot be had from a 'secured person' in a tort action for any ‘economic loss' which has been recovered or will be recovered in the future from an insurance company. This eliminates the possibility of an injured person recovering basic no-fault benefits for his 'economic loss' from his insurance company and also recovering the same element of 'economic loss’ from the secured person's insurance company under the motor vehicle liability insurance coverage. Thus, a court in order to comply with the spirit of the law should consider in any suit for damages evidence of basic no-fault benefits which have been paid or will be paid in the future to an injured person(s) and reduce any judgment rendered in his favor by that amount.
Thomas O. Smith, "North Dakota Auto Accident Reparations Act" — North Dakota’s No-Fault Insurance Law, 52 N.D.L.Rev. 147, 158 (1975) (construing N.D.Cent.Code Ch. 26-41 (Interim Supp.1975)) (notes omitted).