Court Opinion

ID: 9774764
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 18:32:53.432754+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:15.277691
License: Public Domain

OPINION
KOEHLER, Justice.
Appellant, Johnny Gilbert, was indicted and convicted of burglary of a vehicle. Punishment was assessed by the court at nine years’ imprisonment. In two points of error, Appellant complains of the trial court’s evi-dentiary rulings. We affirm.
*602The evidence at trial showed that the radio was taken from a Chevrolet automobile belonging to complainant, Henry Steven Dutch-over, while the car was parked outside of the office building in which he worked, located in El Paso, Texas. Dutchover’s co-worker, Fernando Jacobo, had observed Appellant and a companion from an office window, one of whom was breaking a window of Dutchover’s vehicle and removing the stereo while the other person was standing nearby as a lookout.
Jacobo, believing the automobile belonged to Dutchover, immediately notified him of his observation. The two inspected the car and after having confirmed the burglary, set off in search of the burglars. They proceeded in an easterly direction, as Jacobo had observed Appellant and his companion walking east.
After examining an alleyway, Jacobo and Dutchover walked east down Paisano Street, where they saw Appellant and his companion walking in the same direction. Appellant and his companion then turned west heading toward Dutchover and Jacobo. When the two groups met, Jacobo grabbed Appellant “by the head” and Dutchover grabbed a workout-type bag that Appellant’s companion was carrying. The latter person almost immediately started talking about a radio before either Dutchover or Jacobo mentioned the stereo stolen from Dutchover’s vehicle.
By his first point of error, Appellant complains that reversible error occurred as a result of the trial court’s ruling that testimony regarding the statement about the radio was admissible under the excited utterance exception to the hearsay rule. Over Appellant’s objection, Jacobo testified1 that after he had grabbed the head of Appellant, Appellant’s companion said that he did not have their radio.2 The State first offered this evidence outside the presence of the jury. The trial court eventually ruled the evidence admissible. When asked before the jury whether the statement by Appellant’s eom-panion had been in response to a question posed by either Dutchover or himself, Jacobo responded that it had not.
Generally, a trial court is given broad discretion in deciding whether the proper foundation has been laid for the admission of evidence. Smith v. State, 683 S.W.2d 393, 404 (Tex.Crim.App.1984); see Tex.R.CRIM. Evid. 104(a). This Court is responsible for deciding whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing evidence. Parks v. State, 843 S.W.2d 693 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1992, pet. ref'd).
Appellant argues that the evidence was not admissible as an exception to the hearsay rule under Tex.R.CRIM.Evid. 803(2), which provides:
The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is available as a witness:
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(2) Excited Utterance. A statement relating to a startling event or condition made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.
This rule has its foundation on the belief that statements made as a result of a startling or exciting event are involuntary and do not allow the declarant an adequate opportunity to fabricate, thereby ensuring enough trustworthiness to fall outside the general rule against hearsay. Parks, 843 S.W.2d at 697.
In order to get a favorable ruling by the trial court, the proponent of evidence must show that there existed a startling event, that the declarant was dominated by the “emotions, excitement, fear, or pain of the event,” and the statement related to the circumstances of the startling occurrence. McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824, 846 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). The first prong is met by evidence that Appellant and his compan*603ion, the declarant, were immediately confronted by two men, one of whom grabbed Appellant by the head, apparently placing him in a headloek. Clearly, the trial court was warranted in finding this to be a startling event.3
Additionally, the evidence indicates that although declarant “appeared cocky,” which as Appellant contends may indicate declarant was not in a state of shock, the evidence as a whole is adequate to justify a finding that the “declarant was still under the emotional and physical stress of the assault when [he] made the statements.... ” See McFarland, 845 S.W.2d at 846. Outside the presence of the jury, the trial court considered the circumstances of the events:
[Appellant’s Counsel] So that would further show that there was no stress or excitement if he voluntarily opened his bag and showed it to you?
[Jacobo] Well, you had to have been there to have seen the guy. The guy was doing a lot of talking ...
and:
[State] Mr. Jacobo, was the defendant startled when you put the hammer lock on him?
[Jacobo] He was kind of groggy looking. I don’t know what the cause of that but he never said anything.
[State] Okay. How was the other person affected by what you were doing? Was he startled?
[Jacobo] Well, yes. I guess he was like you could say he was startled or excited and he got real defensive about it.
The evidence need only show that the declar-ant was affected by the event “so as to render the statement a spontaneous utterance.” Ward v. State, 657 S.W.2d 133, 136 (Tex.Crim.App.1983). In this case, the facts warrant such a finding by the trial court.
Lastly, there exists no debate as to whether the statement was related to the circumstances of the startling occurrence. Solely as a result of Dutchover’s loss, he and his coworker, Jacobo, pursued and confronted Appellant and his companion, whose statement directly related to the subject of the loss, namely a radio. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the out of court statement into evidence under the excited utterance exception. We overrule Point of Error No. One.
Appellant argues in his second point of error that the testimony elicited above constituted hearsay not subject to any exception, including the coconspirator exception. We need not address this contention, however, because we believe that the statements were properly admitted under the excited utterance exception. TexR.Crim.Evid. 803(2).
Finding no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

. The statement of facts indicates that Dutchover testified to approximately the same chain of events as Jacobo. Appellant’s brief, though, fails to identify either the statements or the conflict in Dutchover’s testimony about who first raised the issue of the radio.

. Appellant's companion is quoted by Jacobo as variously saying, “I ain’t got no radio[,]” and "I ain’t got your radio.” Dutchover remembered it as one or the other of the two suspects saying, ”[W]e don’t have what your [sic] looking for. We don’t have the radio.”

. Justice Barajas in a concurring opinion (labled Concurring and Dissenting Opinion) misses the point. The startling event was not the burglary of the auto and the taking of the radio, as he sees it, but was the event of Appellant and his accomplice being suddenly accosted by Jacobo and Dutchover with Jacobo putting a headloek on Appellant. The statement "I ain’t got your radio.” was made immediately and was neither the result of reflective thought nor was it self-serving because Appellant, by his denial, was in effect admitting that he knew a radio had been taken before he was accused of taking it.