Court Opinion

ID: 9697346
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:14:42.269445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:31.885240
License: Public Domain

SMITH, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority decision to affirm the order of the State Civil Service Commission (Commission) sustaining the furlough of Constance G. Masneri (Mas-neri) from her position at Western Center, Department of Public Welfare. Masneri maintains in her appeal to this Court that she presented sufficient evidence before the Commission to show that her furlough was the result of sex discrimination in violation of Section 905.1 of the Civil Service Act (Act) of August 5, 1941, P.L. 752, as amended, 71 P.S. § 741.905a, added by Section 25 of the Act of August 27, 1963, P.L. 1257. Because the Commission erred in its analysis of the evidence presented, I would remand this case to the Commission for it to conduct the appropriate evaluation of the evidence.
In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of State v. Stecker, 506 Pa. 203, 484 A.2d 755 (1984), the Supreme Court held that where the appointing authority determines that an employee’s services are no longer needed because they can be more efficiently performed through a reassignment to other staff, for cost or operational purposes, a furlough may be made on the grounds of a lack of work. In addition, an appointing authority may satisfy its burden of proof in a discrimination challenge to its furlough decision by showing that the employee’s position was eliminated due to organizational streamlining or restructuring and that management in good faith believed that the employee’s work could be more efficiently performed without the eliminated position.
When an employee of the civil service alleges discrimination, the employee bears the burden of proof. Price v. Luzerne/Wyoming Counties Area Agency On Aging, 672 A.2d 409 (Pa.Cmwlth.1996), appeal denied, 547 Pa. 720, 688 A.2d 174 (1997). In Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Health v. Nwogwugwu, 141 Pa.Cmwlth. 33, 594 A.2d 847 (1991), the Court reiterated the rule that alleged discrimination must be proved by some affirmative factual support to sustain the allegations. A uniform, yet flexible, standard of proof is utilized when reviewing claims of traditional discrimination, and it requires the complainant to produce sufficient credible and unrebutted evidence to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Henderson v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Office of the Budget, 126 Pa.Cmwlth. 607, 560 A.2d 859 (1989), appeal denied, 524 Pa. 633, 574 A.2d 73 (1990).
Where a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the appointing authority to clearly demonstrate a nondiserimi-natory reason for its action; if the allegations of discrimination are rebutted, the complainant may present evidence to show that the appointing authority’s proffered reasons are mere pretext for its actions. Id.; Nwogwugwu. Moreover, in Allegheny Housing Rehabilitation Corp. v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission, 516 Pa. 124, 532 A.2d 315 (1987), the Supreme Court explained that when the defendant offers a nondiscriminatory reason for its actions, the prima facie presumption of discrimination drops from the ease, and the entire body of evidence presented shall be evaluated on a “preponderance of the evidence” standard. This standard requires proof that would lead a trier of fact to find that the existence of a contested *827fact is more probable than its nonexistence, tantamount to a “more probable than not” standard. South Hills Health System v. Department of Public Welfare, 98 Pa.Cmwlth. 183, 510 A.2d 934 (1986); see also Commonwealth v. $32,950 U.S. Currency, 160 Pa.Cmwlth. 58, 634 A.2d 697 (1993), appeal denied sub. nom., Commonwealth v. Friel, 538 Pa. 637, 647 A.2d 512 (1994). This standard is not synonymous with the “substantial evidence” standard applied by the Commission and accepted by this Court.
Masneri directs the Court’s attention to several occurrences to support her claim of sex discrimination, and those occurrences are referenced in the majority opinion. Concisely put, the Commission obviously determined that Masneri presented a prima facie case of discrimination; when the Department’s witnesses offered what they and the Commission believed to be non-discriminatory reasons for the Department’s actions, the Commission should have evaluated the whole body of evidence on the preponderance of the evidence standard articulated by the Supreme Court. It did not do so. I recognize that this Court is precluded from reweighing the evidence and substituting its judicial discretion for that of the Commission. Bowman v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Environmental Resources, 549 Pa. 65, 700 A.2d 427 (1997). However, there was no discussion by the Commission, as it has provided in other cases, of whether Mas-neri satisfied her initial burden of proving a prima facie case of discrimination; nor was there discussion of the preponderance of the evidence standard applicable to the Commission’s evaluation of the evidence. Because the Commission erred in its analysis of the evidence, this case should be remanded to the Commission to conduct an evaluation of the evidence consistent with the standard of proof previously articulated by the courts.