Court Opinion

ID: 9518510
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 00:54:49.847591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:22.756224
License: Public Domain

Currie, J.
(concurring). The denial of admission to probate of the instant propounded will and codicil most likely will result in the propounding of the May 7, 1958, will, which also was drafted by Horan for the testator. *651Therefore, while the court’s opinion herein does not pass on the issue of undue influence, this issue undoubtedly will be raised before the county court if any of the series of wills drafted by Horan, in which he is a beneficiary, are hereafter offered for probate.
As pointed out by Mr. Justice Fairchild in his concurring opinion, if a person standing in a confidential relationship to the testator is named as a legatee in the testator’s will, and such beneficiary has also participated in the drafting and execution of the will, an inference of undue influence arises. This rule was laid down in Will of Faulks (1945), 246 Wis. 319, 360, 17 N. W. (2d) 423. However, it was not applied in that case because the legatee, who there stood in a confidential relationship to the testator, had not participated in the drafting of the will.
In a recent case, Estate of Hendricks (N. D. 1961), 110 N. W. (2d) 417, the North Dakota court had before it a situation where a confidential relationship existed between a chiropractor and an elderly patient, and the former had assisted the latter in carrying on his business affairs. The chiropractor acted as scrivener in drafting a will for the patient whereunder the chiropractor was the principal beneficiary. The court held that the circumstances gave rise to an inference of undue influence and cast upon the proponent of the will the burden of going forward with the evidence to overcome this inference.
Other courts, in stating this rule, have substituted the word “presumption” for “inference.” Belfield v. Coop (1956), 8 Ill. (2d) 293, 134 N. E. (2d) 249, 58 A. L. R. (2d) 1008; Will of Rittenhouse (1955), 19 N. J. 376, 117 Atl. (2d) 401. However, whether the rule be stated in terms of an inference or a presumption makes very little difference from a practical standpoint. This is because this type of presumption is not one which disappears upon the introduction of any evidence that conflicts *652with the presumption. The reason for this is explained m Schlichting v. Schlichting (1961), 15 Wis. (2d) 147, 112 N. W. (2d) 149.
If the learned trial court had invoked this inference of undue influence in deciding the instant case, it is doubtful if the evidence produced by the proponent would have been found sufficient to outweigh the inference.
The trial court's memorandum opinion clearly indicates that it does not believe that Horan was guilty of any wrongdoing. This may very well be the case. However, he has only himself to blame for acting as scrivener and personally procuring the execution of the will. He thereby put himself in a position where his own lips are sealed by the “dead man’s statute,” sec. 325.16, and he is prevented thereby from giving testimony on such matters as whether the will was properly explained to testator before execution. It was also this fact of acting as scrivener, coupled with the confidential relationship, which called into being the inference of undue influence. All of this could have been avoided if Horan had recognized the conflict of interest, which existed between his position as attorney and confidential business adviser to the testator, on the one hand, and his role as a principal beneficiary under the will, on the other, and had insisted that a disinterested attorney be called in to draft the will.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Hallows joins in this concurring opinion.