Court Opinion

ID: 9905727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 00:03:42.575368+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:51.701723
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/29/23
                 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                  FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                         DIVISION FOUR

 MICHAEL RATTARY et al.,

        Plaintiffs and Appellants,      A164441
 v.
                                        (Contra Costa County
 BRIAN FAVRO,                           Super. Ct. No. MSC13-
      Defendant and                     01934)
 Respondent.

       Plaintiffs Michael Rattary and Stephen Rogness (the
firefighters) are firefighters who brought a personal injury suit
against respondent Brian Favro, who crashed his car into a
firetruck before receiving aid from the plaintiffs. At trial, the
firefighters alleged that Favro was negligent in failing to comply
with their directions and that Favro’s failure in this respect
caused them to be harmed by yet another crashing vehicle. On
appeal, the firefighters argue that Favro’s counsel committed
misconduct by misrepresenting to the jury the law applicable to
these unusual circumstances. They further contend that the trial
court’s subsequent admonition failed to cure the error. We agree
and therefore reverse the judgment, remanding the matter for a
new trial.

                                  1
                           BACKGROUND
      The firefighters initially sought to hold Favro liable for
both crashing his car and failing to cooperate after the crash.
(Moraga-Orinda Fire District v. Favro (April 30, 2019, A150651,
A150712) [nonpub. opn.] (Favro).) Favro moved for summary
judgment, which the trial court granted on the ground that the
suit was precluded by the firefighter’s rule, which negates
“liability to [firefighters] by one whose negligence causes or
contributes to the fire which in turn causes the death or injury of
the [firefighter].” (Giorgi v. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (1968)
266 Cal.App.2d 355, 357.) The firefighters appealed from that
order, arguing that Favro’s alleged conduct fell within certain
statutory exceptions to the firefighter’s rule, as well as the
“independent cause” exception at common law (independent
clause exception). (Favro, supra, A150651, A150712.)
      We held that that the independent cause exception was
inapplicable, but reversed the trial court’s order because there
was “a triable issue of fact material to the statutory exception set
forth in [Civil Code1] section 1714.9, subdivision (a)(1).” (Favro,
supra, A150651, A150712, capitalization omitted.) As relevant
here, that subdivision provides as follows: “(a) Notwithstanding
statutory or decisional law to the contrary, any person is
responsible not only for the results of that person’s willful acts
causing injury to a . . . firefighter, . . . but also for any injury
occasioned to [the firefighter] by the want of ordinary care or skill

      1 All subsequent statutory references are to the Civil Code

unless otherwise specified.

                                    2
in the management of the person’s property or person, in . . . the
following situation[]: (1) Where the conduct causing the injury
occurs after the person knows or should have known of the
presence of the . . . firefighter.” (§ 1714.9, subd. (a)(1).)
      Thus, within the language of the statutory exception we
held to be applicable, the issue for trial was whether, (1) “after”
Favro knew “or should have known of the presence of
the . . . firefighter[s],” he (2) engaged in conduct instantiating a
“want of ordinary care or skill in the management of [his]
property or person,” and (3) that conduct “caus[ed] the”
firefighters’ “injur[ies].” (§ 1714.9, subd. (a)(1).)
      After the presentation of evidence, the trial court
instructed the jury with a modified version of the Judicial
Council’s California Jury Instruction No. 473 — “Assumption of
Risk/Exception/Occupation Involving Inherent Risk” (instruction
No. 473). In relevant part, the court instructed the jury as
follows: “Stephen Rogness[] and Michael Rattary claim that they
were harmed by Brian Favro while they were performing their
job duties as firefighters/emergency medical personnel. Brian
Favro is not liable if . . . Rogness[] and Rattary’s injuries arose
from a risk inherent in the occupation of firefighter/emergency
medical personnel. . . . Rogness[] and Rattary may recover,
however, if they prove: [¶] (1) Brian Favro increased the risk
to . . . Rogness[] and Rattary through conduct occurring after he
knew or should have known of the presence of fire-fighters or
emergency personnel.”

                                    3
      In his closing argument, Favro’s attorney quoted the jury
instruction’s reference to the “risk inherent in the occupation of
firefighter” before turning his attention to “how [the firefighters]
might recover”: “And . . . number one is that Brian Favro
increased the risk . . . . [¶] So it is recognized under the law that
there are certain risks that are inherent, and one of those risks
that are inherent, we heard from [testimony], is that patients will
resist.” “So if Mr. Favro is to be held liable, they must prove that
his resistance was greater than what is inherent in the job of
being a [rescuer]. [¶] In other words, his resistance must be
beyond, the kind of resistance expectation that is to be expected
in that job.”
      Then, after explaining the policy considerations underlying
the firefighter’s rule, Favro’s attorney told jurors: “So the law
seems to have a . . . reason as to why if it’s a risk inherent in the
job, something that’s essential[] to the job, that is something
expected in the job, then they cannot recover against Brian Favro
or anyone. Unless — and here the law does provide protection for
them. Unless they have proved that what they faced from the
person they are suing was beyond the risk that’s inherent to their
job.” (Italics added.)
      After the firefighters’ counsel objected to these statements,
the trial court admonished the jury as follows: “I want to remind
you one of the things I mentioned in the instruction is that the
instructions tell you what the law is. The attorneys don’t tell you
what the law is. So if you hear an attorney say something that
doesn't sound like what I read off, don’t worry about it. [¶] The

                                  4
guidance is found in the instructions, and in particular there’s
been a lot of talk about instruction [No.] 473 which concerns what
we call assumption of the risks, and you might want to devote
particular attention to that. [¶] Although, as I’ve said before, you
need to look at all the instructions and consider them together.”
      Question 1 on the Special Verdict Form asked jurors: “Did
Brian Favro increase the risks to . . . Rogness[] and Rattary
through conduct occurring after he knew or should have known of
the presence of the firefighters or emergency personnel?” The
presiding juror marked, “No,” thereby deciding the form’s
dispositive question in Favro’s favor.
      This appeal followed.
                           DISCUSSION
      According to the firefighters, what Favro’s counsel “told the
jury was an erroneous statement of law” that prejudiced the
plaintiffs. We agree.
I.   The Firefighter’s Rule and Section 1714.9,
     Subdivision (a)(1)
      The firefighter’s rule is “an example of the proper
application of the doctrine of assumption of risk.” (Neighbarger v.
Irwin Industries (1994) 8 Cal.4th 532, 538.) That doctrine applies
“when it is appropriate to find that the defendant owes no duty of
care.” (Ibid.) Thus, in “its most classic form, the firefighter’s
rule” provides that “a person who negligently has started a fire”
is not “liable for an injury sustained by a firefighter who is
summoned to fight the fire.” (Priebe v. Nelson (2006) 39 Cal.4th
1112, 1122.) This is because “the party who negligently start[s]

                                  5
the fire” has “no legal duty to protect the firefighter from the very
danger that the firefighter is employed to confront.” (Ibid.)
      “The firefighter’s rule, however, is hedged about with
exceptions. The firefighter does not assume every risk of his or
her occupation. [Citation.] The rule does not apply to conduct
other than that which necessitated the summoning of the
firefighter,” for example. (Neighbarger, supra, 8 Cal.4th at
p. 538.) The independent cause exception to the firefighter’s rule,
mentioned previously and discussed in Favro, supra, A150651,
A150712, is well illustrated by Donohue v. San Francisco
Housing Authority (1993) 16 Cal.App.4th 658, 660. In Donohue, a
“firefighter slipped on wet, slick stairs during a unannounced fire
safety inspection.” (Terry v. Garcia (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 245,
251.) Under those circumstances, “the court held the firefighter’s
rule did not bar the negligence action because the alleged
negligence was not the reason for the firefighter’s presence.”
(Ibid., citing Donohue, at p. 663.)
      Section 1714.9, subdivision (a)(1) concerns liability to a
firefighter for tortious “conduct . . . occur[ring] after the person
knows or should have known of the presence of
the . . . firefighter.” (§ 1714.9, subd. (a)(1).) “Although most of
the cases analyzing the effect of section 1714.9 treat it as stating
an exception to the firefighter’s rule (e.g. Gibb v. Stetson [(1988)]
199 Cal.App.3d 1008, 1014–1015), the Supreme Court has more
accurately described the effect of the statute as reimposing ‘a
duty of ordinary care (see [Civ. Code,] § 1714), which would
otherwise be abrogated by the firefighter’s rule.’ ” (Boon v.

                                   6
Rivera (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1330–31, quoting Calatayud
v. State of California (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1057, 1068.)
      Thus, whereas the independent cause exception to the
firefighter’s rule identifies the limit of the rule’s reach, section
1714.9 sets forth circumstances that trigger the rule’s suspension
and the concomitant return of a defendant’s ordinary duty of
care. As a result, applying the independent cause exception may
involve considering whether a defendant’s conduct has increased
the risk to a firefighter beyond the “risks inherent in performing”
a particular “duty” (Seibert Security Services, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 394, 411); by contrast, the increased
risk contemplated when section 1714.9, subdivision (a)(1) applies
is simply an “increase[d] . . . risk of injury,” without further
qualification. (Id. at p. 410.)
II.   Misstatement of the Law by Favro’s Counsel
      As Favro acknowledges, and irrespective of an attorney’s
intentions, it is misconduct for that attorney to misrepresent or
misstate the law. (Gotcher v. Metcalf (1970) 6 Cal.App.3d 96,
100.) “As in criminal cases, misconduct by counsel in closing
argument in civil cases can constitute prejudicial error entitling
the aggrieved party to reversal of the judgment and a new trial.”
(Cassim v. Allstate Ins. Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 780, 802.) However,
such relief is warranted only where “it is reasonably probable”
that the appellant “would have achieved a more favorable result
in the absence of that portion of [the] closing argument now
challenged.” (Ibid.)

                                   7
      Here, Favro’s attorney misstated the law when he told
jurors that Favro could not be held liable unless he had increased
the risk to the firefighters “beyond the risk that’s inherent to
their job.”2 Section 1714.9, subdivision (a)(1) does not refer to the
risks inherent to the firefighters’ occupation, and neither does the
portion of our opinion in Favro, supra, A150651, A150712
explaining the application of that statute to Favro’s case. Nor is
the “inherent risk” of being a firefighter invoked in the discussion
of section 1714.9, subdivision (a)(1) in Seibert, supra,
18 Cal.App.5th at page 410, which explained that subdivision
(a)(1) “applies only to conduct committed after the [firefighter]
responds to a call for assistance, or while he is in the performance
of his duties with respect to a specific incident, and such conduct
increases the risk of injury to the [firefighter].” In other words,
for subdivision (a)(1) to apply, the tortious conduct must increase
a firefighter’s risk of injury beyond the level of risk that would
have attended those specific circumstances but for that conduct;
contrary to the argument of Favro’s counsel, the firefighters here
were not required to establish that Favro’s conduct increased the
risk of injury beyond the level “inherent to [the firefighters’] job.”
      Favro argues that any error in his closing argument was
cured by the trial court’s subsequent admonition to the jury. We
disagree. The error was compounded by that admonition.

      2 Notwithstanding this conclusion, we infer no ill intent on

the part of Favro’s counsel. As we explain below, his
misstatement of the law was arguably a reasonable
interpretation of the modified jury instruction he was then
discussing.

                                  8
      As we have already explained, Favro’s counsel misled the
jurors by telling them that the question of Favro’s liability
depended on whether he increased the risk to the firefighters
“beyond the risk that’s inherent to their job.” In response to this
error, the trial court told jurors that “the instructions,” not the
attorneys, “tell you what the law is.” He further advised jurors
“to devote particular attention” to “instruction [No. ]473 which
concerns what we call assumption of the risks.” And he reminded
the jury “to look at all the instructions and consider them
together.”
      The problem with this admonition is that instruction
No. 473 is more confusing than clarifying. As given here, that
instruction sets forth the firefighter’s rule, telling jurors that
“Brian Favro is not liable if . . . Rogness[] and Rattary’s injuries
arose from a risk inherent in the occupation of
firefighter/emergency medical personnel.” However, it also
allows “Rogness[] and Rattary [to] recover . . . if they prove: [¶]
(1) Brian Favro increased the risk to . . . Rogness[] and Rattary
through conduct occurring after he knew or should have known of
the presence of fire-fighters or emergency personnel.”
      There is an apparent tension between the instruction’s two
references to risk. On the one hand, the jurors were instructed
that there can be no liability for injuries arising from “a risk
inherent in the [plaintiffs’] occupation”; on the other, they were
told that liability may be found for injuries arising from conduct
that “increased the risk to” plaintiffs. One way of reading the
instruction is to conclude that these provisions contradict each

                                   9
other. In this “contradictory” reading, plaintiffs cannot recover if
the risks they faced were inherent to their occupation, but they
can recover if Favro, after he knew or should have known of
plaintiffs’ presence, engaged in conduct that increased the risk
(even if such increased risk is inherent to plaintiffs’ occupation).
      A more natural way of reading the instruction — especially
for jurors who have been advised to “look at all the instructions
and consider them together” — is to harmonize the two
propositions. In this “coherent” reading, plaintiffs cannot recover
if the risks they faced were inherent to their occupation, but they
can recover if defendant’s conduct increased the risk beyond the
level inherent to plaintiffs’ occupation. Not only does the
coherent reading avoid contradiction; it also resonates with the
closing argument of Favro’s counsel. Moreover, under the
coherent reading, both times the word “risk” is used, it is
connected to the same concept: risk inherent in the occupation.
In contrast, under the contradictory reading, “risk” refers in one
sentence to risk inherent in the occupation, and in the next
sentence to risk in general, irrespective of plaintiffs’ occupation.
      It is exceedingly likely that a jury who had heard the
closing argument of Favro’s counsel, heeded the trial court’s
purportedly curative admonition, and then read instruction
No. 473, would adopt the coherent — albeit legally incorrect —
reading and therefore believe that Favro could not be held liable
unless his conduct increased the risk to the firefighters beyond
the level of risk inherent to their occupation. As a result, the jury
probably misunderstood the law governing the case.

                                 10
      The closing argument of Favro’s counsel, along with the
trial court’s admonition and the misleading text of instruction
No. 473, thus effectively raised the firefighters’ burden of proof
beyond the requirements of section 1714.9, subdivision (a)(1). On
the verdict form, the only finding made by the jury was that
Favro had not “increase[d] the risks” — the very phrase that was
given an erroneous meaning by Favro’s counsel and the
ambiguous jury instructions. And for at least one plaintiff, a
hung jury was already within reach.3 For those reasons, “it is
reasonably probable” that the firefighters “would have achieved a
more favorable result in the absence of” the error. (Cassim v.
Allstate Ins. Co., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 802.)
      Finally, we reject Favro’s contention that the firefighters
have failed “to provide a record that adequately addresses the
issues the court has been asked to review.” “Failure to provide an
adequate record concerning an issue challenged on appeal
requires that the issue be resolved against the appellants.”
(Eureka Citizens for Responsible Government v. City of Eureka
(2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 357, 366.) Here, the dispositive issue
concerned the jury instructions, the closing argument of Favro’s
counsel and the trial court’s subsequent admonition, all of which
are documented in the record on appeal. Accordingly, we deem
the record adequate for review.

      3 In his brief, Favro refers twice to a “9-3” verdict, but when

the trial court polled the jury, the vote in Favro’s favor was 10-2
as to Rattary and 12-0 as to Rogness.

                                  11
                              DISPOSITION
       The judgment is reversed, and the matter is remanded for a
new trial. Plaintiffs shall recover their costs on appeal.

                                            BROWN, P. J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, J.
GOLDMAN, J.

Rattary et al. v. Favro et al. (A164441)

                                       12
Trial Court:   Contra Costa County Superior Court

Trial Judge:   Hon. Edward G. Weil

Counsel:       Walker Hamilton & Kearns, LLP, Walter H.
               Walker, III, Jeffrey S. Walker for Plaintiffs and
               Appellants.

               Stratman & Williams-Abrego, John D.
               Hourihan; Hayes, Scott, Bonino, Ellingson,
               Guslani, Simonson & Clause, LLP, Mark G.
               Bonino Defendant and Respondent.