Court Opinion

ID: 9851279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:09:45.193232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:52.937978
License: Public Domain

GORDON, Vice Chief Justice
(specially concurring):
While I agree with the result reached by the majority, I believe it should be emphasized that double jeopardy does not apply to this case not because of who makes the sentencing decision but because of the nature of the sentencing decision to be made under A.R.S. § 13-604.01(B).
*160In United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 134, 101 S.Ct. 426, 436, 66 L.Ed.2d 328, 344 (1980) the Court stated that its decisions in the sentencing area “clearly establish that a sentence does not have the qualities of constitutional finality that attend an acquittal.” Thus, in the typical case, double jeopardy does not apply to the imposition of a sentence.
The sentencing procedure in the instant case more resembles a typical sentencing procedure than a death sentencing procedure because it is,
“determined in large part on the basis of information, such as the sentence report, developed outside the courtroom. It is purely a judicial determination, and much that goes into it is the result of inquiry that is nonadversary in nature.”
United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. at 136-137, 101 S.Ct. at 437, 66 L.Ed.2d at 345-346.
Based upon various information, the judge may find or not find that the defendant was on probation, parole, work furlough, or any other release from confinement. Whether the defendant is on such a release is not open to nearly as much debate as his guilt or innocence of a crime or whether he deserves or does not deserve the death penalty. It clearly appears that “much that goes into [the 604.01(B) decision] is nonadversary in nature.” Furthermore, as stated by-the majority, the trial court’s sentencing choice under § 604.01(B) involves much more judicial discretion than does the stark life or death decision in a death sentencing proceeding. This broad sentencing choice is characteristic of typical sentencing proceedings to which double jeopardy has no application. United States v. DiFrancesco, supra.
I also agree with the majority that the lower standard of proof in the § 604.01(B) hearing renders it less like a trial type proceeding. As pointed out in Bullington v. Missouri, 451 U.S. 430, 101 S.Ct. 1852, 68 L.Ed.2d 270 (1981), this reasonable doubt standard requires the state to prove its case much like in a trial. Bullington, supra, at 444, 101 S.Ct. at 1861, 68 L.Ed.2d at 282. In addition, the reasonable doubt standard is the same as used at the trial of guilt or innocence. Id. at 441, 101 S.Ct. at 1859, 68 L.Ed.2d at 280.
Furthermore,
“[t]he state’s use of this standard indicates that, as has been said generally of the criminal case, ‘the interests of the defendant are of such magnitude that * * * they have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the likelihood of an erroneous judgment * * *. [0]ur society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself.’ Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-424, 99 S.Ct. 1804, 1808, 60 L.Ed.2d 323 (1979).”
Id. at 441, 101 S.Ct. at 1859, 68 L.Ed.2d at 280.
Though implied in the majority opinion, I also wish to emphasize that today’s holding should not apply to A.R.S. § 13-604.01(A). We were presented only with the § 604.-01(B) issue and we should wait until the appropriate time to rule upon the double jeopardy consequences of § 604.01(A).
Thus, I specially concur in the majority’s opinion.