Court Opinion

ID: 9655234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:03:20.37843+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:18.637949
License: Public Domain

BUTTS, Justice,
dissenting,
joined by PEEPLES, Justice.
I respectfully dissent.
This is an attempted appeal from the denial of appellant’s pretrial special plea in bar of a second prosecution of the same offense after mistrial was granted during his first trial. Appellant argued to the trial court that to proceed with the second trial would violate his constitutional right not to be twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense. The majority opinion incorrectly concludes we have appellate jurisdiction to entertain an appeal from the special plea.
The jurisdiction of the courts of appeals is not unlimited. In fact the Texas Constitution, art. 5, sec. 6 plainly states:
... Said Courts of Appeals shall have appellate jurisdiction co-extensive with the limits of their respective districts, which shall extend to all cases of which the District Courts or County Courts have original or appellate jurisdiction, under such restrictions and regulations as may be prescribed by law. Provided, that the decision of said courts shall be conclusive on all questions of fact before them on appeal or error. Said courts shall have such other jurisdiction, original and appellate, as may be prescribed by law. (emphasis added)
The legislature has provided two methods whereby a defendant may assert a double jeopardy claim before embarking on a second trial of the same offense or an offense arising from the same criminal episode. Both of these procedures are begun at the trial level. One method is by way of TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 27.05 (Vernon 1989):
A defendant’s only special plea is that he has already been prosecuted for the same or a different offense arising out of the same criminal episode that was or should have been consolidated into one trial, and that the former prosecution:
(1) resulted in acquittal;
(2) resulted in conviction;
(3) was improperly terminated; or
(4) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established to secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution.
Article 27.07 provides that all issues of fact presented by a special plea shall be tried by the trier of facts on a trial on the merits. TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 27.07 (Vernon 1989) (emphasis added). This statute in understandable and unambiguous words specifies how the plea of double jeopardy shall be presented to the trial court and the correct procedure to follow. The issue will be submitted to the jury if raised by the evidence. In some instances the trial court may decide as a matter of law the evidence does not warrant submitting the issue to the jury. See, e.g., Chvojka v. State, 582 S.W.2d 828 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). There is no other procedure outlined in the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure or the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governing determination of a defendant’s special plea of double jeopardy. The appeal from denial of his special plea of double jeopardy must come to this court by the customary appellate route, that is, an appeal from the final judgment of conviction.
The defendant in this case filed a special plea as authorized by article 27.05 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This court of appeals, which is not a court of unlimited appellate jurisdiction, therefore does not have jurisdiction of this attempted interlocutory appeal of the denial of this defendant’s special plea of double jeopardy. We may not create a new appellate procedure not heretofore recognized or authorized by the Texas Constitution or the legislature.
The procedure utilized in this case in the trial court was not the writ of habeas corpus. Denial of habeas corpus relief stem*113ming from a double jeopardy claim is the second method by which such a claim may reach the court of appeals. That unquestionably is the only permissible appellate route at this time for a defendant to follow to assure that the court of appeals does acquire jurisdiction of the interlocutory appeal. The only predicate giving this court appellate jurisdiction of denial of this kind of double jeopardy claim is the written order denying habeas corpus relief and the written notice of appeal from that “appeal-able order.” See TEX.R.APP.P. 44. Again, the law is plainly set out in Rule 44, which is entitled APPEALS IN HABEAS CORPUS AND BAIL; CRIMINAL CASES. Interlocutory appeal from denial [of relief] pursuant to a pretrial writ of habeas corpus alleging that trial on the merits will subject applicant to double jeopardy is proper. Ex parte Tarver, 725 S.W.2d 195 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Ex parte Rathmell, 717 S.W.2d 33 (Tex.Crim.App.1986); Ex parte Robinson, 641 S.W.2d 552 (Tex.Crim.App.1982). However, interlocutory appeal from denial of a pretrial special plea in bar pursuant to article 27.05 is not proper. It is a departure from jurisdictional law that cannot be sustained by proclaiming that the “style of pleading” is wrong in this case and that the court of appeals is not “bound by the denomination of the pleadings.” The reason this court cannot obtain jurisdiction of this attempted appeal is that we are bound to follow the law as prescribed, and the law in this area is precise.
Before September 1981 the courts of appeals had no jurisdiction of criminal cases and no jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals based on denial of habeas corpus relief in double jeopardy claims. Now we have been granted that jurisdiction by the legislature, as authorized by the Constitution. However, the courts of appeals cannot bestow upon a special plea of double jeopardy, which also has stringent statutory requirements, the status of a writ of habeas corpus.
To hold the court of appeals has no jurisdiction of the attempted appeal in this case is not to deny altogether the right to appeal the question of double jeopardy in this case. That remedy is still available. This court would simply be applying the correct law, and the defendant would be required to follow the correct procedure. Thus there is no denial of due process to a defendant because the remedy is available to test his double jeopardy claim. A similar argument would fail in post-conviction cases. The courts of appeals have no jurisdiction to hear those habeas corpus collateral attacks even if some are grounded on double jeopardy claims. The defendants in those cases are not deprived of a constitutional right since they always have an available remedy. Only the Court of Criminal Appeals has that jurisdiction. Stated differently, the forum for review of a constitutional claim has not been denied. Nor has it in the present case.
In Rios v. State, 751 S.W.2d 892 (Tex.App.—San Antonio 1988, no pet.), this court had before it an appeal from denial of habeas corpus relief, although the “magic word” relief was not employed. Instead it was stated to be an appeal from a denial of application for habeas corpus, in spite of the obvious fact that a hearing had been conducted and relief denied. We held in that case that use of the improper designation would not foreclose the habeas corpus appeal. We did not hold that it is proper to appeal from denial of the pretrial special plea of double jeopardy.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.