Court Opinion

ID: 9611958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:01:52.533932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:03:18.242455
License: Public Domain

*55IV. MERITS
Glacier Construction offered proof that it had transferred certain property to the bank which, in turn, had sold it to Braund, Inc.; that the list attached to the bill of sale between the bank and Braund, Inc., was identical with the list of property which Glacier Construction had transferred to the bank; and that neither list included the property alleged to have been converted by Braund, Inc.
While Glacier contends it did not transfer ownership of the disputed property to the bank, the affidavits of Padgett and Mel Braund indicate that Frank White of Glacier and his attorney were present at a meeting with officers of the bank when it was agreed that all the property of Glacier at the Palmer yard would be sold to Braund, Inc. Braund contends that certain portions of the bill of sale were intended to reflect this intention.
In response, Glacier asserts that the evidence submitted in the Padgett and Braund affidavits would be inadmissible under the parol evidence rule because it would vary the terms of an unambiguous contract between the bank and Braund. Therefore, Glacier argues that summary judgment was proper because there was- no competent evidence to establish a genuine issue of fact.
While Glacier is correct in its legal argument that the propriety of granting summary judgment depends on the absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact,7 and that no genuine issue of fact is raised where one party’s understanding of such a fact is based on inadmissible evidence,8 it is not correct as to the application of the parol evidence rule in this case.9
The sale transactions between Glacier Construction and Matanuska Valley Bank, and between the bank and Braund, Inc., were covered by the terms of the Uniform Commercial Code in AS 45.05.052, which provides the following statement with regard to the admission of parol evidence:
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the parties agree, or which are otherwise set out in a writing intended by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to the terms included in the writing, may„not be contradicted by evidence of a prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agreement, but may be explained or supplemented
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(2) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds the writing was intended also as a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the agreement.
This section permits the introduction of parol evidence in sale transactions to explain or supplement the writing through evidence of consistent additional terms, unless the court finds the writing was intended as a complete and exclusive expression of the terms of the contract.10 No finding *56of ambiguity is necessary in order to permit the additional testimony.
Therefore, in order to exclude pa-rol evidence testimony concerning the inclusion of the additional terms in the sale agreements between either Glacier and the bank, or the bank and Braund, Inc., the trial court must make the specific finding either that the agreement was intended to be a complete and exclusive statement of the terms of the contract,11 or that, as a matter of- law, the additional terms asserted were such that, if they had been agreed upon, they certainly would have been included in the documents of sale.12 In the absence of either of these findings, the superior court must admit evidence of consistent terms.13 Neither finding was made by the court. Therefore, evidence as to the intention of Glacier, Braun<j, Inc., and the bank would be admissible, and a genuine issue of material fact presented.
In the event the trial court determines that, under the Uniform Commercial Code, no parol evidence can be introduced, this does not end the inquiry. The Code does not preclude the common law remedy of reformation14 for mutual mistake,15 to which the parol evidence rule is not applicable.16
The evidence in the affidavits of Braund and Padgett, together with the pleadings, indicates a forced sale from Glacier to the bank, the latter then selling to Braund, Inc., with all parties participating in a conference at the bank where the details of the double transaction were worked out. If Braund, Inc., can present convincing evidence that the parties to the two contracts intended them to cover the disputed property, then reformation would be available to correct the documents to reflect the true agreements of the parties.
It is possible that the factual evidence will show that the contracts were intended by the parties as a complete and exclusive statement of all the terms of the agreements, and that there was no intent to transfer the property in question. The problem, however, is that the present record does not reveal undisputed facts as to these material issues. Only testimony from officers of the bank can settfe with reasonable certainty these questions and establish whether Glacier or Braund, Inc., is correct concerning the question of ownership. Braund, Inc., requested an opportunity to take further discovery from the bank on this point. However, that request was denied. Under this state of the pleadings, we hold the denial to be error, and the granting of partial summary judgment to be premature.
This case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion.17
BONEY, C. J., not participating.

. Civ.R. 56(c).

. Twelve Hundred “L” Street Corp. v. Inlet Co., 438 P.2d 708, 710 (Alaska 1968).

. Although there is a conflict of authority on this point, we think the better view is that Glacier can raise the parol evidence rule even though it is a stranger to the agreement between the bank and Braund, Inc. 9 Wigmore, Evidence, § 2446 at 149-51 (3d ed. 1940); 4 Williston, Contracts § 647 at 1154-1167 (3d ed. 1981); 3 Corbin, Contracts § 596 (1950); Akamine & Sons Ltd. v. Am. Security Bank, 50 Haw. 304, 368, 440 P.2d 262, 265-266 (1968).

. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-202, Official Comment 3; Michael Schiavone *56& Sons, Ine. v. Securalloy Co., 812 F. Supp. 801, 803 (D.Conn.1970).

. AS 45.05.052(2).

. Uniform Commercial Code § 2-202, Official Comment 3; Crispin Co. v. Delaware Steel Co., 283 F.Supp. 574, 575 (E.D.Pa.1968).

. “To be inconsistent the term must contradict or negate a term of the writing. A term or condition which has a lesser effect is provable.” Whirlpool Corp. v. Regis Leasing Corp., 29 A.D.2d 395, 288 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (1968). See also McDown v. Wilson, 426 S.W.2d 112, 117 (Mo.App.1968); Hunt Foods & Industries, Inc. v. Doliner, 26 A.D.2d 41, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937, 940 (1966); cf. Crispin Co. v. Delaware Steel Co., 283 F.Supp. 574, 575 (E.D.Pa.1968).

. AS 45.05.006.

. 13 Williston, Contracts §§ 1547-1549 at 111-137 (3d ed. 1970); Restatement of Contracts § 504 (1932); Gablick v. Wolfe, 469 P.2d 391, 394-395 (Alaska 1970).

. Gablick v. Wolfe, 469 P.2d 391, 394 (Alaska 1970); Stephenson v. Ketchikan, Spruce Mills, Inc., 412 P.2d 496, 500 (Alaska 1966).

. Braund; Inc., alleged error in tlie failure of the court to permit the filing of a third party complaint against the Matanuska Valley Bank. Since this case is returned to the superior court for further proceedings, we do not pass on this claim except to note that this matter should be further considered by the superior court in line with the opinions expressed herein.