Court Opinion

ID: 9550778
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:42:21.396105+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:24.712261
License: Public Domain

Judge TURSI
specially concurring.
I specially concur.
I agree that the trial court’s refusal to instruct on heat of passion as an affirmative defense to second degree murder was not error. Nevertheless, because the culpable mental state of second degree murder, § 18-3-103, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8b) and heat of passion manslaughter, § 18-3-104(l)(c), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B), the pattern instructions COLJI-Crim. No. 9:05 and No. 9:08 (1983), and the critical instructions as given here failed to address the mitigating nature of heat of passion, I write separately.
When, as here, there is sufficient evidence to instruct on second degree murder and also to instruct on the lesser offense of heat of passion manslaughter, I believe the better practice would be to instruct the jury that if it finds the culpable mental state of knowingly as required for second degree murder, it should, after weighing all the evidence whether introduced by the People or the defendant, determine if the homicidal act was performed upon a sudden heat of passion caused by a sufficiently provoking act of the intended victim as required for a verdict of manslaughter.
Alternatively, a special mitigating interrogatory instruction could be addressed to the jury directing that, if it finds the act causing death to have been knowingly committed, it must determine whether, under all the evidence, the act was performed under heat of passion as defined in § 18-3-104(l)(c). An example of this type of instruction is the special enhancing interrogatory used when a crime of violence is charged.
Absent either of these alternatives, or some comparable course of action, once a jury finds the culpable mental state of knowingly as an element of second degree murder, there is little reason or incentive for it to consider whether the prosecution has proven the element of heat of passion necessary for a verdict of manslaughter. Thus, in the interest of fundamental fairness and to avoid the anomalous problem of instructing a jury to determine if the lesser offense has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt by the People, an offense with an element that the People have contested throughout the trial, one of the above alternatives, or some comparable instruction should be given to the jury.