Court Opinion

ID: 9540903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:20:38.814099+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:01:34.881393
License: Public Domain

KENNARD, J., Concurring and Dissenting.
In this case, the majority makes a sharp departure from the mainstream of insurance coverage law. Rather than hewing to the language of the insurance policy at issue in this case, the majority concludes that coverage within the ordinary and unambiguous meaning of the policy language does not exist.
Specifically, the majority holds that the liability insurance policy issued by defendant insurers excludes coverage for bodily injuries related to economic (i.e., intangible property) losses. The majority errs in doing so, for its conclusion finds no support in the language of the policy or in any other evidence of the mutual intent of defendant insurers and plaintiff insureds. The plain language of the policy covers liability for all bodily injuries caused by an “occurrence.” The policy defines “occurrence” as any “event, or series of events . . . proximately caused by an act or omission of the *38insured . . . which results ... in bodily injury . . . neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.” Nothing in the ordinary meaning of this language, and nothing in the rest of the policy, excludes coverage for bodily injuries resulting from events that either themselves are economic losses or cause economic losses in addition to bodily injury.
Because the majority’s approach has no support in our law or in the language of the contract at issue here, I disagree with the majority’s reasoning. As I shall explain, however, I would nonetheless affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal because there is an independent reason why defendant insurers properly denied coverage here: Plaintiff insureds sought coverage under the bodily injury coverage of the insurance policy for a lawsuit alleging they had intentionally caused someone to suffer emotional and physical distress; the insurance policy excludes coverage for bodily injuries expected or intended by the insureds, such as the intentional injuries alleged against the insureds; thus, there was no coverage under the policy for the lawsuit against plaintiff insureds.
I
Waller owned 60 percent of Marmac, Inc. (Marmac) and was its president; Amey owned 40 percent and was its vice-president. Waller sold his stock to Marmac employees Akers, Hendrix, He.pple, and Petersen (referred to hereafter collectively with Waller and Marmac as the insureds), who thereafter demoted and ultimately terminated Amey.
Amey sued the insureds. Amey alleged 12 causes of action in his amended complaint, including, as relevant here, one for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
In his cause of action for emotional distress, Amey alleged that he suffered “humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional and physical distress” from the “conduct” of the individual insureds alleged in the other causes of action (for example, Waller’s sale of his stock to Akers, Hendrix, Hepple, and Petersen without notice to Amey and allegedly in breach of a contract to sell the stock to Amey; the alleged interference by Akers, Hendrix, Hepple, and Petersen with Amey’s contract with Waller for the sale of Waller’s stock; Amey’s demotion and subsequent termination in breach of his employment contract with Marmac; Akers, Hendrix, Hepple, and Petersen’s bad faith abuse of their positions as controlling shareholders and directors to engage in self-dealing and to deny Amey a voice in corporate affairs). Amey alleged that the individual insureds’ conduct had been “intentional and malicious and . . . done for the purpose of causing Amey . . . emotional *39and physical distress.” At his deposition, Amey testified he had suffered headaches, back pains, and rashes as a result of the individual insureds’ conduct.
The insureds were insured under a policy issued by Truck Insurance Exchange through Farmers Insurance Exchange (collectively Truck). The insureds tendered their defense to Truck, which rejected it on the ground that Amey’s causes of action were not covered under the policy. The insureds sued Truck for bad faith denial of its duty to defend, contending that Amey’s cause of action for emotional distress was covered under the Truck policy. The insureds also alleged that Truck had breached its duties under Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h), which prohibits various acts and practices by insurers in processing and settling the claims of their insureds. In a bifurcated proceeding, the trial court held that Amey’s cause of action for emotional distress was covered under the policy and, accordingly, Truck had a duty to defend; a jury then determined that Truck had also breached its duties under Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h).
The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the Truck policy did not cover bodily injury related to economic loss, and holding that there could be no cause of action under Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h) because there was no coverage under the Truck policy.
II
Whether Truck had a duty to defend turns on whether the relevant facts or pleadings give rise to any potential for coverage under the policy. (Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co. (1966) 65 Cal.2d 263, 277 [54 Cal.Rptr. 104, 419 P.2d 168].) The insureds contend that there was the potential for coverage under the policy of Amey’s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. I conclude that there was no potential for coverage because Amey’s cause of action fell within the policy’s exclusion of injuries expected or intended by the insured.
In La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 27, 37 [36 Cal.Rptr.2d 100, 884 P.2d 1048], this court recently summarized the principles governing the interpretation of insurance contracts: “ ‘While insurance contracts have special features, they are still contracts to which the ordinary rules of contractual interpretation apply.’ (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545]; see AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 821-822 [274 Cal.Rptr. 820, 799 P.2d 1253].) ‘The fundamental goal of contractual interpretation is to give effect to the mutual intention of *40the parties. (Civ. Code, § 1636.)’ (Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1264.) ‘Such intent is to be inferred, if possible, solely from the written provisions of the contract. ’ (AIU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 822.) ‘If contractual language is clear and explicit, it governs. (Civ. Code, § 1638.)’ (Bank of the West v. Superior Court, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1264.)”
Application of these principles yields a straightforward resolution of this case. No party has put forward extrinsic evidence bearing on the interpretation of the policy. Therefore, it is solely the language of the policy that determines whether coverage exists.
The coverage clause of the policy obligates the insurer to “pay all damages which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of [cf0 (C) bodily injury to any person . . . [H . . . P3D • • • [H • • • caused by an occurrence.” (Italics added.) The question of coverage therefore turns on whether there was “bodily injury” caused by an “occurrence.”
Did Amey allege a “bodily injury” within the meaning of the policy? The policy defines “bodily injury” as “bodily injury, sickness, or disease.” Amey alleged in his complaint that he had suffered both emotional and physical distress as a result of the insureds’ conduct. At his deposition, Amey testified that the insureds’ conduct had caused him to suffer headaches, back pains, and rashes.1
Most of the courts that have addressed the issue have held that any physical manifestations accompanying emotional distress are “bodily injuries” as that term is used in insurance policies. (Aim Ins. Co. v. Culcasi (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 209, 220, 226 [280 Cal.Rptr. 766]; Employers Cas. Ins. Co. v. Foust (1972) 29 Cal.App.3d 382, 387 [105 Cal.Rptr. 505]; Garvis v. Employers Mut. Cas. Co. (Minn. 1993) 497 N.W.2d 254, 257 [“emotional distress with appreciable physical manifestations can qualify as a ‘bodily injury’ within the meaning of the insurance policy”; as here, policy defined “bodily injury” as “bodily injury, sickness, or disease”]; Voorhees v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co. (1992) 128 N.J. 165, 179 [607 A.2d 1255, 1262, 8 A.L.R.5th 937]; Ostrager & Newman, Handbook on Insurance Coverage Disputes (7th ed. 1994) § 7.03[a][3][B], pp. 237-238 [collecting cases]; see also Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1078-1079 [9 Cal.Rptr.2d 615, 831 P.2d 1197] [physical symptoms of emotional distress are “physical injury”]; Molien v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 929 [167 Cal.Rptr. 831, 616 P.2d 813, 16 A.L.R.4th 518] *41[same].) On its face, the policy’s definitional language, “bodily injury, sickness, or disease,” broadly covers any somatic condition, and does not exclude those that are caused or accompanied by mental distress. Although I therefore assume for purposes of this case that at least the physical symptoms Amey alleged he suffered were “bodily injuries” within the meaning of the policy, it is not necessary to decide the issue because I conclude, for the reasons discussed below, that there was no “occurrence” within the policy’s definition of that term.
Were Amey’s “bodily injuries” caused by an “occurrence”? The policy defines “occurrence” to mean “an event, or series of events, including injurious exposure to conditions, proximately caused by an act or omission of the insured regardless of the number of persons, vehicles or objects affected by such act or omission which results, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage, neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.” (Italics added.) Stated otherwise, the elements of an “occurrence” can be broken down into (1) an event or series of events (2) proximately caused by the insured (3) resulting in bodily injury or property damage, (4) with the injury or damage being neither expected nor intended.
The majority and I agree on the elements of the “occurrence” definition. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 20 [“to demonstrate a potential for coverage under [Truck’s] policy, an insured must show the claim he must defend is an alleged act or omission that caused bodily injury or tangible property damage (as defined by the policy) to the third party, and that the alleged injury was neither expected nor intended by the insured”].) The majority, however, never applies these elements to the facts of this case to determine whether there was a potential for coverage of Amey’s claims against the insureds. Accordingly, I do so here.
The first element of the definition of “occurrence” requires an “event, or series of events.”2 The conduct of plaintiffs that Amey alleged caused his injury (e.g., his demotion, the sale of stock from Waller to the other four plaintiffs) certainly was a series of events in the ordinary meaning of the term.
*42The second element of “occurrence” requires that the insured proximately cause the event or events. There is no dispute that the events alleged by Amey to have caused his injury were ones that he alleged the individual insureds had proximately caused.
The third element of “occurrence” requires, as relevant here, that the events result in bodily injury. As I have already explained, to the extent Amey suffered physical manifestations of his emotional distress, I assume the events resulted in bodily injury.
The fourth element of the definition of “occurrence” requires that the bodily injury be “neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.” It is on this point that the insureds’ claim for coverage fails. The intentional infliction of emotional distress that Amey alleged is not an occurrence within the policy’s definition because the tort requires that the insured either intend or expect that the emotional distress (and any accompanying physical manifestations) occur. “The tort calls for intentional, or at least reckless conduct—conduct intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.” (Davidson v. City of Westminster (1982) 32 Cal.3d 197, 210 [185 Cal.Rptr. 252, 649 P.2d 894].) To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must allege “that the conduct of . . . the defendants was directed primarily at them, was calculated to cause them severe emotional distress, or was done with knowledge of their presence and of a substantial certainty that they would suffer severe emotional injury.” (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 906 [2 Cal.Rptr.2d 79, 820 P.2d 181].)
Any injury caused by the insured that is calculated (i.e., intended), or which the insured knew was substantially certain to result from the insured’s conduct, however, is an injury that the insured “expected or intended.” (Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 745-748 [insured “expected or intended” a result if the insured intended the result or believed the result was substantially certain or highly likely to occur].) Because the intentional infliction of emotional distress is an injury that is either “calculated” by the insured or that the insured knew was “substantially] certain[]” to result (Christensen v. Superior Court, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 906), policy language that, as here, excludes from coverage acts that the insured “expected or intended” thereby excludes coverage of any cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
*43In this case, Amey specifically alleged that the insureds’ acts were intended to cause him both emotional and physical injury. Both Amey’s original complaint and his amended complaint alleged that the conduct of the insureds “was intentional and malicious and was done for the purpose of causing Amey to suffer humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional and physical distress.” The definition of “occurrence” in the Truck policy excludes events resulting in injuries that the insured expects or intends. (See Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss Ins. Co., supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at pp. 745-748.) Therefore, Amey’s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress cannot be a covered occurrence because it alleged that the insureds intended the emotional and physical injuries that they caused him.3 (Accord, Smith v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. (1985) 127 Wis.2d 298, 302-304 [380 N.W.2d 372, 374-375].) Because there was no potential for coverage under the policy’s definition of “occurrence” for the emotional and physical distress the insureds allegedly intentionally caused to Amey, Truck properly denied the insureds’ tender of their defense.4
Ill
The majority, however, ignores the controlling language of the policy that I have just discussed. Instead, the majority manufactures an exclusion of bodily injuries “related to” economic losses that has no basis in the policy language or in any other indicia of the parties’ intent, and on that ground concludes there was no potential for coverage of Amey’s lawsuit against the insureds. The majority asserts that because the events underlying Amey’s lawsuit caused uncovered “economic” (i.e., intangible property) losses to Amey, there can be no coverage for any bodily injuries to Amey that were *44caused by, or even related to, the same events. Under the majority’s view, there is no coverage for bodily injuries that are in any way related to economic losses.
On what basis does the majority reach this conclusion? Instead of closely analyzing the policy language to determine whether coverage exists, the majority engages in a lengthy recitation of three cases on which the Court of Appeal relied, and then in a conclusory paragraph asserts that “CGL policies do not provide coverage for economic losses that cause emotional distress. . . . These policies were never intended to cover emotional distress damages that flow from an uncovered ‘occurrence,’ ...” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23.) Accordingly, the majority concludes that there was no potential for coverage because “[a] 11 allegations in the Amey complaint were related to Amey’s asserted economic loss as a Marmac shareholder.” (Ibid.)
The majority’s conclusion is wrong. The majority’s exclusion of all bodily injuries “related to” an economic loss is an unsupportable judicial rewriting of the insurance contract at issue here. The majority does not and cannot justify its sweeping statements by anything found in the language of the policy. Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, nothing in the language of the insureds’ policy with Truck excludes coverage for bodily injuries that are “related to” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 23) economic losses. The Truck policy’s definition of “bodily injury” does not exclude injuries that are caused by or related to economic losses. It covers all “bodily injury, sickness or disease,” regardless of the cause.
Likewise, the Truck policy’s definition of “occurrence” broadly encompasses any “event, or series of events,” that “results in . . . bodily injury,” whether or not one of the events in the chain of causation also causes a concurrent economic loss or is itself an economic loss.5 The policy’s definition of “occurrence” nowhere excludes from that term events that either are economic losses or are “related to” economic losses. The ordinary meaning of “event” is “something that happens.” (Webster’s New Collegiate Diet. (9th ed. 1988) p. 430.) An economic loss is “something that happens.”
Thus, there is nothing in the policy language that limits “occurrence,” as the majority does, to “an event based on a noneconomic act” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 26). Rather, as I set forth earlier, the policy defines an “occurrence” to include events that result in bodily injury. An occurrence does not become a nonoccurrence simply because the event causes both bodily injury and economic loss.
*45The majority’s erroneous conclusion arises from its mistaken view that the bodily injury and property damage coverages of the Truck policy are somehow interdependent, and that therefore “the occurrence or act leading to coverage must be an injury to tangible property, not to one’s economic interest.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 26.) The majority’s conclusion is contrary to the express policy language at issue in this case.6
The coverage clause of the policy obligates the insurer to “pay all damages which the insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of [<]0 (C) bodily injury to any person, and [U . . . [U (E) damage to property . . . [1 to which this insurance applies, caused by an occurrence.” (Italics added.) The bodily injury coverage (which the policy refers to as “Coverage C”) is independent of the property damage coverage (which the policy refers to as “Coverage E”). Coverage E and coverage C, for example, are subject to different exclusions, can be separately purchased, and can be subject to different liability limits. The coverage clause does not require that for a bodily injury to be covered under coverage C it must be caused by property damage covered under coverage E. Likewise, under the policy’s definition of occurrence, it is irrelevant whether the event resulting in bodily injury under coverage C takes the form of property loss that is not covered under coverage E; all that is necessary is that the event, whatever its nature, “result[] in . . . bodily injury.”
The majority is therefore wrong in its assertion that coverage for bodily injury under coverage C is limited to events that also cause property damage that is covered under coverage E. (“[T]he occurrence or act leading to coverage [for bodily injury under coverage C] must be an injury to tangible property [i.e., property damage covered under coverage E], not to one’s economic interest.” Maj. opn., ante, at p. 26.) The Truck policy independently covers either property damage or bodily injury resulting from an event or series of events proximately caused by an insured, regardless of the nature of the intermediate events in the chain of causation.
The majority maintains nonetheless that it was the “intent of the parties” to exclude from coverage bodily injuries related to economic losses. (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 28.) But the majority offers no evidence that the parties here mutually held this supposed intent. What the majority calls the “intent” of the parties is actually its own opinion of how insurance policies should be drafted. It is not this court’s function, however, to draft or redraft insurance policies. The true intent of the parties in this case is the meaning to be found in the language of the policy—nothing more, nothing less. As the analysis *46above reveals, the policy language reflects no intent to exclude all bodily injuries related to economic losses.
Nor are the three cases relied on by the majority and by the Court of Appeal persuasive. Like the majority, those decisions failed to ground their conclusions in the contractual language before them. In the first of those cases, Chatton v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 846, 857 [13 Cal.Rptr.2d 318], defrauded investors sought to recover from the insurer of a corporation’s directors and officers for the emotional distress (without any physical symptoms) caused by “the loss of their investment.” The Court of Appeal in Chatton concluded that emotional distress without accompanying physical manifestations is not “bodily injury” for purposes of a policy containing the same “bodily injury” definition that is at issue here. (Id. at pp. 853-857.) Although this holding was dispositive of the case, since the shareholders had not claimed any physical symptoms, the court went on to conclude that the wrongful acts also were not accidental and therefore were not “occurrences” under a policy definition that, unlike the policy in this case, required that occurrences be accidents, not merely events. (Id. at pp. 860-862.) Finally, Chatton held that when a policy provides coverage for bodily injury or tangible property damage, there is no coverage for bodily injuries caused by intangible property loss. (Id. at pp. 857-860.)
The Court of Appeal in Chatton based its conclusion that the policy before it excluded coverage for bodily injuries caused by intangible property loss on its assertion that “the ‘bodily injury’ clause of the CGL policy . . . incorporated coverage for loss or destruction of tangible property as well.” (Chatton v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 860.) The court, however, did not explain how the bodily injury coverage “incorporated” the property damage coverage, nor could it have done so, for in Chatton, as here, the two forms of coverage were independent. Like the majority, the Chatton court erroneously collapsed the two forms of coverage together. Chatton failed to recognize that any bodily injuries, whatever their cause, were independently covered under the bodily injury coverage, and it viewed bodily injury caused by economic loss only as a form of consequential damages accompanying an uncovered intangible property loss. The two cases that follow Chatton, and on which the majority also relies, Keating v. National Union Fire Ins. (9th Cir. 1993) 995 F.2d 154, 156-157, and McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1150-1151 [29 Cal.Rptr.2d 559], adopt Chatton's faulty analysis without adding anything to it.7
In addition to being contrary to the language of the Truck policy, the majority’s adoption of Chatton's approach is at odds with this court’s *47decision in Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B. (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1076, 1084 [17 Cal.Rptr.2d 210, 846 P.2d 792], Horace Mann rejected the notion that the existence of a duty to defend turns on whether there is coverage for the “dominant factor” of the lawsuit. Rather, in determining the duty to defend, “[w]e look not to whether noncovered acts predominate in the third party’s action, but rather to whether there is any potential for liability under the policy.” (Ibid.., original italics.) Horace Mann thus precludes the majority’s approach of excluding covered losses simply because they are “related to” (maj. opn., ante, at p. 30) uncovered losses that are the dominant factor in the lawsuit against the insured.
Even if the decisions in Chatton v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., supra, 10 Cal.App.4th 846, Keating v. National Union Fire Ins., supra, 995 F.2d 154, and McLaughlin v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., supra, 23 Cal.App.4th 1132, were correct, they would be inapplicable on the facts of this case. The injured parties in the three cases just cited were defrauded investors who were emotionally distressed because they had lost money, not because of the content of the fraudulent statements or the other conduct by the insureds that caused them to lose money. Unlike the injured investors in those cases, however, Amey did not allege that his emotional and physical distress arose from the financial loss caused by the insureds. Rather, he alleged that his emotional and physical distress arose from his demotion and termination, his loss of influence and control over Marmac, and other “conduct” by the insureds—conduct that in addition caused him financial loss. Intangible economic loss was not the cause, only an accompaniment, of Amey’s emotional and physical distress. Amey’s distress and his economic loss were concurrent effects of the insureds’ conduct, not successive effects as was the case in Chatton. Thus, here Amey’s emotional and physical distress was independent of his economic loss in a way that was not true in Chatton,8
Nor can the majority’s holding be justified by its assertion that the exclusion of bodily injury related to economic loss conforms to the “reasonable expectations” of the insureds. The reasonable expectations doctrine *48comes into play only when the language of an insurance policy relevant to a particular question of coverage is ambiguous. (La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co., supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 37; Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1264-1265 [10 Cal.Rptr.2d 538, 833 P.2d 545]; Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 807-808 [180 Cal.Rptr. 628, 640 P.2d 764].) As there is no ambiguous policy language to construe here, there is no basis for applying the reasonable expectations doctrine in this case. Even if there were some basis for applying it here, the doctrine requires a court to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the insured by extending coverage to the insured. (La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co., supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 37; ALU Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 807, 822 [274 Cal.Rptr. 820, 799 P.2d 1253].) This court has never deployed the reasonable expectations doctrine as the majority does here to deny an insured coverage that is within the ordinary and unambiguous meaning of the policy language, and it is a misuse of the doctrine to do so.
The majority creates a blanket rule that no coverage exists under the bodily injury liability provisions of an insurance policy if the bodily injury is related to property damage not covered by the policy. That rule will restrict the bodily injury coverage provided by any policy that, like the Truck policy here, on its face covers bodily injury independent of whether or not any related property damage is covered by the policy. For example, assume a policy that provides coverage for bodily injuries, but not property damage, caused by the insured. The majority’s reasoning would deny an insured coverage for any bodily injury caused by property damage (e.g., if the insured’s car strikes and damages a tree that falls and injures someone) solely because there is no coverage for the property damage that is the immediate cause of the bodily injury.
Conclusion
The ordinary meaning of the pertinent Truck policy language covers bodily injuries without regard for the nature of the event causing the bodily injury. The policy therefore covers bodily injuries that are caused by economic losses or, as here, are caused by an event that also causes an economic loss. Had Truck wanted to exclude coverage for bodily injuries related to economic loss, it could, as the drafter of the policy at issue in this case, have so provided. It is not the proper role of this court to manufacture coverage *49exclusions that are contrary to the express language of the policy, as the majority does here.
As I have previously explained, however, Amey’s complaint did not allege an “occurrence” within the meaning of the Truck policy for a far different reason. The policy defines an “occurrence” as an event resulting in bodily injury neither expected nor intended by the insured. Amey alleged that the emotional and physical distress that he suffered was intended by the insureds. Because he alleged that the insureds intended to cause him those injuries, those injuries were not caused by an “occurrence” within the policy’s definition of that term. It is on that ground that I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.
Respondents’ petition for a rehearing was denied October 26, 1995, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. Kennard, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.

The insureds renewed their tender of defense on the basis of Amey’s deposition testimony; Truck never responded.

The requirement of an “event” that causes injury is a departure in Truck’s policy from the language of the current standard commercial general liability (CGL) policy drafted by the Insurance Services Office (an insurance industry trade group). The standard CGL policy requires that an “accident,” not an “event,” cause the injury. (Insurance Services Office, Commercial General Liability Coverage Form (eff. Jan. 1, 1986), reprinted in 3 Cal. Insurance Law and Practice (1995) Business General Liability Policies, appen. C.) The Truck policy represents a broadening of coverage in that the cause of injury no longer need be sudden and fortuitous, as it must be under an “accident” occurrence clause. (Compare United Pacific Ins. Co. v. McGuire Co. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 1560, 1565 [281 Cal.Rptr. 375] [“the word ‘event’ is not limited to fortuitous happenings”] with Shell Oil Co. v. Winterthur Swiss
*42Ins. Co. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 715, 751 [15 Cal.Rptr.2d 815] [discussing “accident” occurrence clause’s requirements of suddenness and fortuity].)
In this respect, the majority is mistaken in describing the Truck policy as a “standard” CGL policy. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 19.)

The insureds do not contend that, although Amey’s complaint was limited to the intentional infliction of emotional distress, he might have ultimately recovered damages for emotional and physical distress on a theory that those injuries were negligently inflicted and that therefore there was a potential for coverage. (See Gray v. Zurich Insurance Co., supra, 65 Cal.2d at p. 276.)

Truck denied coverage to the insureds on the ground that “Intentional Acts are not covered . . . .” Although inartfully phrased (because it focuses on intentional acts rather than intentional damage or injury), it seems clear that the purpose of Truck’s letter was to invoke the “neither expected nor intended” language of the “occurrence” definition. Because I conclude that there was no potential for coverage for the same reason, I find it unnecessary to address the waiver and estoppel arguments addressed in section C of the majority opinion. Likewise, I do not have occasion to address the retroactivity and legal uncertainty issues considered by the majority. (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 24-26.) Nor is it necessary for me to address the other alternative grounds for denying coverage put forward by Truck. (See maj. opn., ante, at p. 20, fn. 1.)
I concur in the majority’s decision that in the absence of any potential for coverage the insureds do not have a cause of action against Truck for its alleged violation of its duties under Insurance Code section 790.03, subdivision (h) with respect to its processing and resolution of the insureds’ claim for coverage.

In this part, I put aside for the moment the “neither expected nor intended” portion of the Truck policy’s definition of “occurrence” that I discussed previously in part II, as the majority does not base its exclusion of bodily injuries related to economic losses on that language.

The majority’s conclusion is also contrary to its acknowledgment elsewhere that “the CGL policy provides coverage for ‘occurrences’ that cause bodily injury or tangible property losses.” (Maj. opn., ante, at p. 23, italics added.)

Nor does Allstate Ins. Co. v. Interbank Financial Services (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 825 [264 Cal.Rptr. 25] support the majority’s holding. Allstate involved a policy with language quite different from either the Truck policy at issue in this case or the standard CGL policy. In *47Allstate the insureds were sued for economic losses (but not emotional or physical injuries) allegedly caused by erroneous and fraudulent investment advice they had provided. (Id. at pp. 827-828.) The policy in Allstate excluded coverage for damages “ ‘arising out of the rendering of or the failure to render . . . professional services, or consulting business . . . services.’ ” (Id. at p. 829.) The court held that under this exclusion there was no coverage under the policy for the lawsuit against the insureds; “the clear bases of the complaints are that the insureds gave poor professional advice . . . .” (Id. at p. 831.) That the quite different policy language in Allstate did not cover economic losses caused by the investment advice given by the insureds in that case says nothing about whether the Truck policy covers the insureds for the bodily injury they allegedly caused to Amey.

Moreover, Amey claimed the insureds caused him emotional and physical distress by conduct that did not cause any accompanying economic loss. Amey testified at his deposition in his lawsuit against the insureds that the insureds had humiliated him by cutting his office telephone lines, packing his belongings and putting them out on the sidewalk, and humiliating him in front of a client. None of these acts caused economic loss to Amey. As I have noted *48previously, the insureds renewed their tender of defense on the basis of Amey’s deposition testimony.
This case presents other distinctions as well from Chatton v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., supra, 10 Cal.App.4th 846. Unlike Chatton, here there was physical injury accompanying the emotional distress. Also unlike Chatton, here the Truck policy defines “occurrence” in terms of events, not accidents.