Court Opinion

ID: 9529911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:55:26.189023+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:57.074206
License: Public Domain

OPINION
CRONE, Judge.
Case Summary
Morris Windhorst appeals his four-year sentence for class C felony child solicitation. We affirm.
Issue
The issue is whether Windhorst's sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character.
Facts and Procedural History
Windhorst admitted to the following factual basis at his guilty plea hearing:
On February 20th of 2006, [Indianapolis Police] Officer Spivey, in affiliation with the Internet Crimes Against Children Taskforce, conducted a child solicitation operation. There was an undercover online investigation in which he used the persona of "Stacey" [and] contacted [Windhorst]. [Windhorst] knew "Stacey" to be fourteen years old and said that he was thirty-eight. He displayed a picture of himself apparently shirtless. He then presented himself on a web camera again shirtless. He invited this "Stacey" persona to a movie, indicating an intention of meeting. He expressed concern about whether or not she was a police officer. He then subsequently went ahead and sent three additional pictures of himself, one of which was a picture of himself in a full state of frontal nudity in a standing position. He admitted to being nude in the picture also. He, during this conversation, set up a time to meet with the "Stacey" [persona] describing his intent to fondle her. He described his intent to perform oral sex on her after the movie. He was also intending to bring, during this conversation, Bailey's Irish Creme liqueur to this fourteen year old person who[m] he believed to be fourteen years old. This was all through the use of his computer and he then subsequently did go to the meeting point[.]
Tr. at 15-16. Upon his arrival, police arrested the forty-four-year-old Windhorst.
On February 22, 2006, the State charged Windhorst with one count of class C felony child solicitation and two counts of class D felony dissemination of material harmful to minors. At a hearing on May 12, 2006, Windhorst agreed to plead guilty to the child solicitation count in exchange for the dismissal of the remaining counts, with a cap of two years on the executed portion of his sentence. Windhorst asked the trial court to consider the following mitigating factors: (1) that he had "pled guilty and accepted responsibility for his actions"; (2) that he was "very remorseful for those actions"; (8) that he had no prior convie-tions; (4) that he had been steadily employed for most of his life; (5) that he had served in the military; (6) that he had cooperated with police by giving a statement and consenting to a search of his home and computer; (7) that he had been suffering from depression; and (8) that he had participated in a program while in jail.1 Id. at 28-29. The trial court found no aggravating or mitigating cireum-stances and imposed the advisory sentence of four years, with two years executed in the Department of Correction and two years suspended to probation. Windhorst now appeals his sentence.
*678Discussion and Decision
Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-6 provides that a person who commits a class C felony "shall be imprisoned for a fixed term of between two (2) and eight (8) years, with the advisory sentence being four (4) years." Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-7.1(d) allows trial courts to impose any sentence that is authorized by statute and permissible under the Indiana Constitution "regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating cireumstances or mitigating cireumstances." Article 7, Section 6 of the Indiana Constitution authorizes this Court to review and revise criminal defendants' sentences pursuant to the rules of our supreme court. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that we "may revise a sentence authorized by statute if, after due consideration of the trial court's decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender." Windhorst challenges the appropriateness of his four-year sentence for class C felony child solicitation.2
Our supreme court recently stated that the advisory sentence "is the starting point the Legislature has selected as an appropriate sentence for the crime com*679mitted." Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073, 1081 (Ind.2006). We disagree with Windhorst's suggestion that the particulars of his offense are unremarkable and do not go beyond the inherent nature of the crime charged.3 At the guilty plea hearing, Windhorst admitted to sending "Stacey" photos of himself in partial and complete undress. He also admitted his intention to bring an alcoholic beverage to his planned rendezvous with a person he believed to be a fourteen-year-old girl. These facts go beyond the mere solicitation of a purported child by using a computer network. See Ind.Code § 35-42-4-6(c).
Moreover, these facts reflect unfavorably on Windhorst's character and significantly diminish the luster of his lack of prior convictions, employment history, military service, and cooperation with the police. Regarding Windhorst's guilty plea, we note that the State dismissed two additional felony charges and agreed to limit the executed sentence that the trial court could impose, thereby offsetting the benefit that Windhorst conferred upon the State by pleading guilty. Cf. Francis v. State, 817 N.E.2d 235, 237 n. 3 (Ind.2004) (noting that the mitigating significance of a guilty plea "will vary from case to case"). To the extent Windhorst contends that he should receive consideration for his expression of "deep remorse[,]" Appellant's Br. at 7, we note that the determination of the sincerity of a defendant's remorse is a matter best left to the trial court. See Pickens v. State, 767 N.E.2d 530, 534-35 (Ind.2002) ("We find the court's determination [of the sincerity of a defendant's remorse] to be similar to a determination of credibility."). Finally, Windhorst states that he lost his mother and his job in the year prior to the offense and claims that he was "severely depressed[.]' Appellant's Br. at 7. We note that Windhorst provided no independent evidence to support this claim or to establish that his depression affected his ability to differentiate between right and wrong. In fact, Windhorst's statement to the trial court indicates otherwise. See, eg., Tr. at 25 ("Though tempted, I had every opportunity to turn away. In my arrogance and in my self-destruction, I chose not to.... We can choose what we want or what God wants. I chose what I wanted.... I was raised by good parents who have taught me right and wrong. I chose wrong.")...
In sum, we cannot conclude that Win-dhorst's four-year sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and his character. We therefore affirm.
Affirmed.
VAIDIK, J., concurs in result with separate opinion.
BAKER, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with separate opinion.

. The record does not disclose the precise nature of the program.

. Windhorst does not specifically challenge the trial court's failure to find mitigating circumstances at sentencing. In McMahon v. State, 856 N.E.2d 743 (Ind.Ct.App.2006), a different panel of this Court surveyed the legislature's April 2005 amendments to Indiana's sentencing statutes that were enacted in response to Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 124 S.Ct. 2531, 159 L.Ed.2d 403 (2004), and Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind.2005), cert. denied. In support of its determination that we must now "merge our review of the trial court's finding and balancing of aggravators and mitigators under Indiana Code § 35-38-1-7.1 into our review for inappropriateness under Appellate Rule 7(B)[]" McMahon, 856 N.E.2d at 748, the McMahon court stated,
[When it responded to Blakely, our General Assembly chose to keep intact the statute requiring a sentencing statement "if the court finds aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances." IC. § 35-38-1-3. As mentioned above, Indiana courts have read this statute to require a sentencing statement anytime the trial court imposes a sentence other than the presumptive. See Gardner [v. State, 270 Ind. 627, 635 n. 4, 388 N.E.2d 513, 518 n. 4 (1979)]. Because we presume that "the legislature is aware of the common law, and does not intend to make any change therein beyond what it declares," Bartrom v. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 618 N.E.2d 1, 10 (Ind.1993), we presume that by keeping Indiana Code § 35-38-1-3 in place, the legislature intended to require a sentencing statement anytime the trial court imposes a sentence other than the advisory sentence under the new statutes. This requirement continues to serve two important purposes under Indiana's new sentencing regime: to guard against arbitrary sentences and to provide an adequate basis for appellate review.
Id. at 749. We respectfully disagree with this view. The McMahon court's analysis downplays the significance of the legislature's amendment of Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-7.1(d), which states that a trial court may impose any sentence that is authorized by statute and permissible under the Indiana Constitution "regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances." (Emphasis added.) We believe that the legislature's amendment of Indiana Code Section 35-38-1-7.1 plainly indicates its intention to change the common law as it existed before April 2005 as to the requirement of "a sentencing statement anytime the trial court imposes a sentence other than the presumptive." McMahon, 856 N.E.2d at 749. We also believe that the McMahon court's imposition of such a requirement will resurrect the very Sixth Amendment problems that the legislature sought to eliminate with its amendment of Indiana's sentencing scheme. CJ. id. at 747 ("On March 9, 2005, in response to Blakely, the Indiana Supreme Court announced that the portion of Indiana's sentencing scheme allowing trial courts to enhance sentences based on judicial findings of aggravating circumstances violated the Sixth Amendment's right to trial by jury.") (citing Smylie, 823 N.E.2d 679).

. See Ind.Code § 35-42-4-6(c) ("A person at least twenty-one (21) years of age who knowingly or intentionally solicits ... an individual the person believes to be a child at least fourteen (14) years of age but less than sixteen (16) years of age, to engage in: (1) sexual intercourse; (2) deviate sexual conduct; or (3) any fondling or touching intended to arouse or satisfy the sexual desires of either the child or the older person; commits child solicitation, a Class D felony. However, the offense is a Class C felony if it is committed by using a computer network[.]").