Court Opinion

ID: 4070837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-30 01:33:10.873309+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:33:10.588922
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                            03-15-00335-CV
                                                                                    6286512
                                                                 THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                            AUSTIN, TEXAS
                                                                       7/30/2015 9:54:05 AM
                                                                          JEFFREY D. KYLE
                                                                                     CLERK
                      NO. 03-15-00335-CV
                                                   FILED IN
             IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS   3rd COURT OF APPEALS
        ____________________________________________
                                                 AUSTIN, TEXAS
                                                  7/30/2015 9:54:05 AM
                                                    JEFFREY D. KYLE
                     HERBERT ROLNICK                      Clerk

                               v.

                 SIGHT’S MY LINE, INC, et al

        ____________________________________________
         Accelerated Appeal from the 200th District Court
                      Travis County, Texas

           Brief of Appellee Riggs, Aleshire & Ray, P.C.
       ______________________________________________

                                     KIDD LAW FIRM
                                     819 West 11th Street
                                     Austin, TX 78701
                                     512-330-1709 (fax)
                                     Scott R. Kidd
                                     State Bar No. 11385500
                                     512-330-1713
                                     scott@kiddlawaustin.com
                                     Scott V. Kidd
                                     State Bar No. 24065556
                                     512-542-9895
                                     svk@kiddlawaustin.com

	
  
	
  
	
  
                         TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents                                         i

Index of Authorities                                      ii

Caption                                                   1

Statement of Facts                                        1

Summary of Argument                                       7

Argument & Authorities                                    8

       Standard of Review                                 8

       No Error In Denial Of Unsworn Special Appearance   9

       Rolnick’s Contacts Meet The “Minimum Contacts”
       Test For Jurisdiction in Texas                     12

       Analysis Of The Jurisdictional Facts               15

       Fair Play And Substantial Justice                  22

Conclusion                                                25

Prayer                                                    26

Certificate of Compliance                                 26

Certificate of Service                                    27
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
                                                             i	
  
	
  
                                       INDEX	
  OF	
  AUTHORITIES	
  
                                                           	
  
                                                       Cases	
  
                                                           	
  
Abilene	
  Diagnostic	
  Clinic,	
  PLLC	
  v.	
  Paley,	
  Rothman,	
  
	
        Goldstein,	
  Rosenberg,	
  Eig	
  &	
  Cooper,	
  Chartered,	
  
	
        364	
  S.W.3d	
  359	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Eastland	
  2012,	
  no	
  pet.)	
   	
                                            19	
  
	
  
Ahrens	
  &	
  DeAngeli	
  v.	
  Flinn,	
  318	
  S.W.3d	
  474	
  (Tex.App.—	
  
	
        Dallas	
  2010,	
  pet.	
  denied)	
             	
      	
           	
   	
                  	
                        19	
  
	
  
Am.	
  Type	
  Culture	
  Collection,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  Coleman,	
  83	
  S.W.3d	
  
	
        801	
  (Tex.	
  2002)	
   	
           	
        	
      	
           	
   	
                  	
                        14	
  
	
  
BMC	
  Software	
  Belgium,	
  N.V.	
  v.	
  Marchand,	
  	
  
	
        83	
  S.W.3d	
  789	
  (Tex.	
  2002)	
   	
             	
           	
   	
                  	
  	
  	
  8,	
  9,	
  13	
  
	
  
Burger	
  King	
  Corp.	
  v.	
  Rudzewicz,	
  471	
  U.S.	
  462	
  (1985)	
   	
                       	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  22,	
  23	
  
	
  
Casino	
  Magic	
  Corp.	
  v.	
  King,	
  43	
  S.W.3d	
  14	
  (Tex.	
  App.—	
  
	
        Dallas	
  2001,	
  pet.	
  denied)	
             	
      	
           	
   	
                  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  10,	
  11	
  
	
  
CSR	
  Ltd	
  v.	
  Link,	
  925	
  S.W.2d	
  591	
  (Tex.	
  1996)	
           	
   	
                  	
                        12	
  
	
  
Guardian	
  Royal	
  Exch.	
  Assurance,	
  Ltd	
  v.	
  English	
  
	
        China	
  Clays,	
  P.L.C.,	
  815	
  S.W.2d	
  223	
  (Tex.	
  1991)	
   	
                    	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  15,	
  23	
  
	
  
Kelly	
  v.	
  Gen.	
  Interior	
  Construction,	
  Inc.,	
  	
  
	
        301	
  S.W.3d	
  653	
  (Tex.	
  2010)	
   	
            	
           	
   	
                  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  12,	
  13	
  
	
  
Kytel	
  International	
  Group,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  Rent-­‐A-­‐Center,	
  Inc.,	
  
	
        132	
  S.W.3d	
  717	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Dallas	
  2004,	
  no	
  pet.)	
                         	
                        11	
  
	
  
Markette	
  v.	
  X-­‐Ray	
  X-­‐Press	
  Corp.,	
  240	
  S.W.3d	
  464	
  	
  
	
        Tex.	
  App.—Houston[14th	
  Dist.]	
  2007,	
  no	
  pet.)	
   	
                             	
                        20	
  
	
  
Michiana	
  Easy	
  Livin’	
  Country,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  Holten,	
  	
  
	
        168	
  S.W.3d	
  777	
  (Tex.	
  2005)	
   	
            	
           	
   	
  	
  	
  14,	
  15,	
  19,	
  20	
  

	
                                                                                                                                           ii	
  
	
  
Moki	
  Mac	
  River	
  Expeditions	
  v.	
  Drugg,	
  
	
       221	
  S.W.3d	
  569	
  (Tex.	
  2007)	
   	
                	
       	
   	
   12,	
  13,	
  14	
  
	
  
Moncrief	
  Oil	
  International,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  OAO	
  Gazprom,	
  
	
       414	
  S.W.3d	
  142	
  (Tex.	
  2013)	
   	
                	
       	
   	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  13,	
  15	
  
	
  
Proskauer	
  Rose	
  LLP	
  v.	
  Pelican	
  Trading,	
  Inc.,	
  
	
       2009	
  WL	
  242993	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Houston	
  [14th	
  Dist.]	
  2009)	
  	
  	
  20,	
  22	
  
	
  
Prosperous	
  Maritime	
  Corp.	
  v.	
  Farwah,	
  189	
  S.W.3d	
  389	
  	
  
	
       (Tex.	
  App.—Beaumont	
  2006,	
  no	
  pet.)	
                      	
   	
   	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  10,	
  11	
  
	
  
Retamco	
  Operating,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  Republic	
  Drilling,	
  	
  
	
       278	
  S.W.3d	
  333	
  (Tex.	
  2009)	
   	
                	
       	
   	
   	
                               	
  	
  	
  13	
  
	
  
Siemens	
  AG	
  v.	
  Houston	
  Casualty	
  Company,	
  
	
       127	
  S.W.3d	
  436	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Dallas	
  2004,	
  no	
  pet.)	
          	
                               	
  	
  	
  11	
  
	
  
Villapando	
  v.	
  De	
  La	
  Garza,	
  793	
  S.W.2d	
  274	
  
	
       (Tex.	
  App.—Corpus	
  Christi	
  1990,	
  no	
  writ)	
  	
              	
   	
                               	
  	
  	
  10	
  
	
  
York	
  v.	
  State,	
  73	
  Tex.	
  651,	
  11	
  S.W.	
  869	
  (1889),	
  
	
       aff’d	
  137	
  U.S.	
  15,	
  11	
  S.Ct.	
  869	
  (1889)	
         	
   	
   	
                               	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  9	
  
	
  
                                               Statutes	
  and	
  Rules	
  
                                                               	
  
TEX.	
  CIV.	
  PRAC.	
  &	
  REM.	
  CODE	
  §17.41	
                	
       	
   	
   	
                               	
  	
  	
  12	
  
	
  
TEX.	
  R.	
  CIV.	
  P.	
  120a	
       	
          	
        	
     	
       	
   	
   	
                               	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  9	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  
	
  

	
                                                                                                                                                iii	
  
	
  
	
  
                                       NO. 03-15-00335-CV

                 IN THE THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
            ____________________________________________

                                      HERBERT ROLNICK

                                                         v.

                                   SIGHT’S MY LINE, INC, et al

            ____________________________________________
             Accelerated Appeal from the 200th District Court
                          Travis County, Texas

               Brief of Appellee Riggs, Aleshire & Ray
         ______________________________________________
	
  
	
        Comes	
   now	
   Appellee	
   Riggs,	
   Aleshire	
   &	
   Ray	
   and	
   files	
   this	
  

Appellee’s	
  Brief.	
  	
  	
  

                                       STATEMENT	
  OF	
  FACTS	
  

	
        Appellant’s	
   Statement	
   of	
   Facts	
   includes	
   many	
   characterizations	
   of	
  

the	
   facts	
   and	
   omits	
   certain	
   important	
   evidence.	
   Accordingly,	
   Appellee	
  

Riggs,	
  Aleshire	
  &	
  Ray	
  offers	
  its	
  own	
  Statement	
  of	
  Facts.	
  

	
        Sight’s	
   My	
   Line,	
   Inc.,	
   (“SML”)	
   is	
   a	
   Florida	
   corporation	
   that	
   was	
  

engaged	
  in	
  the	
  retail	
  optical	
  business	
  in	
  Texas.	
  (CR	
  389,	
  390).	
  	
  SML	
  had	
  

	
                                                                                                                 1	
  
locations	
  in	
  several	
  South	
  Texas	
  cities,	
  and	
  it	
  did	
  business	
  only	
  in	
  Texas.	
  

(CR	
   390,	
   514).	
   	
   The	
   sole	
   stockholder	
   of	
   SML	
   was	
   Stewart	
   Lantz	
  

(“Lantz”),	
  a	
  resident	
  of	
  Florida.	
  	
  (CR	
  391)	
  

	
        Herbert	
   Rolnick	
   (“Rolnick”)	
   is	
   a	
   lawyer	
   living	
   in	
   Coral	
   Gables,	
  

Florida.	
  (CR	
  502).	
  	
  He	
  has	
  represented	
  Lantz	
  and	
  entities	
  in	
  which	
  Lantz	
  

has	
  been	
  involved	
  for	
  over	
  twenty	
  years.	
  (CR	
  382).	
  	
  	
  Rolnick	
  represented	
  

Lantz	
  in	
  the	
  formation	
  of	
  SML.	
  	
  (CR	
  390,	
  503).	
  

	
        In	
   2009,	
   SML	
   came	
   under	
   investigation	
   by	
   the	
   Texas	
   Health	
   &	
  

Human	
   Services	
   Commission	
   related	
   to	
   a	
   possible	
   overcharge	
   claim.	
  	
  

(CR	
   389,	
   548).	
   	
   To	
   represent	
   SML	
   in	
   that	
   investigation,	
   Lantz	
   retained	
  

Jason	
  Ray	
  (“Ray”),	
  a	
  member	
  of	
  Riggs,	
  Aleshire	
  &	
  Ray	
  (“RAR”).	
  	
  (CR	
  548).	
  	
  

Ray	
   is	
   Board	
   Certified	
   in	
   Administrative	
   Law	
   by	
   the	
   Texas	
   Board	
   of	
  

Legal	
  Specialization.	
  (CR	
  548).	
  

	
        Lantz	
   had	
   engaged	
   in	
   some	
   initial	
   negotiations	
   with	
   American	
  

Optical	
   Services	
   (“AOS”)	
   about	
   a	
   potential	
   sale	
   of	
   the	
   assets	
   of	
   SML	
   to	
  

AOS,	
   but	
   those	
   negotiations	
   had	
   not	
   progressed	
   and	
   Lantz	
   had	
  

abandoned	
   the	
   process.	
   (CR	
   503-­‐504).	
   However,	
   in	
   June	
   2012,	
   Lantz	
  

decided	
   that	
   he	
   should	
   again	
   pursue	
   sale	
   of	
   the	
   SML	
   business	
   due	
   to	
   his	
  

perception	
   of	
   the	
   regulatory	
   climate	
   related	
   to	
   the	
   business.	
   (CR	
   382).	
  

Negotiations	
  with	
  AOS	
  began	
  again.	
  (CR	
  504).	
  

	
                                                                                                                          2	
  
	
        AOS	
  is	
  a	
  Delaware	
  Corporation	
  with	
  its	
  principal	
  place	
  of	
  business	
  

in	
  Nevada.	
  	
  The	
  parties	
  did	
  negotiate	
  a	
  contract	
  for	
  sale	
  of	
  the	
  assets	
  of	
  

SML	
   to	
   AOS,	
   and	
   that	
   contract	
   was	
   dated	
   October	
   5,	
   2012.	
   	
   Rolnick	
  

represented	
   SML	
   in	
   the	
   negotiations	
   and	
   sale	
   for	
   a	
   flat	
   fee	
   of	
   between	
  	
  

$40,000.00	
   and	
   $50,000.00.	
   (CR	
   394,	
   514).	
   The	
   negotiations	
   for	
   the	
   sale	
  

were	
  all	
  handled	
  by	
  Rolnick.	
  (CR	
  391,	
  505,	
  559).	
  

	
        On	
   or	
   about	
   October	
   1,	
   2012,	
   Lantz	
   and	
   Rolnick	
   telephoned	
   Ray.	
  	
  

(CR	
   384,	
   391,	
   505,	
   549-­‐550).	
   	
   They	
   explained	
   to	
   Ray	
   that	
   Lantz	
   had	
  

contracted	
  to	
  sell	
  the	
  assets	
  of	
  SML,	
  and	
  they	
  wanted	
  a	
  Texas	
  lawyer	
  to	
  

review	
   some	
   of	
   the	
   documents.	
   (CR	
   549).	
   	
   There	
   is	
   a	
   dispute	
   in	
   the	
  

evidence	
  concerning	
  whether	
  Ray	
  informed	
  Lantz	
  and	
  Rolnick	
  that	
  Ray	
  

did	
  not	
  feel	
  qualified	
  to	
  review	
  documents	
  related	
  to	
  an	
  asset	
  sale.	
  	
  Ray	
  

testified	
   that	
   he	
   did	
   inform	
   them	
   of	
   that	
   fact	
   and	
   indicated	
   that	
   he	
   did	
  

not	
   want	
   to	
   undertake	
   the	
   review.	
   (CR	
   549,551)	
   	
   According	
   to	
   Ray’s	
  

testimony,	
   Lantz	
   and	
   Rolnick	
   stated	
   that	
   they	
   wanted	
   him	
   involved	
   in	
  

the	
   transaction	
   anyway.	
   (CR	
   549).	
   	
   According	
   to	
   Lantz	
   and	
   Rolnick,	
   they	
  

were	
   not	
   informed	
   of	
   any	
   limitations	
   on	
   Ray’s	
   ability	
   to	
   review	
   the	
  

documents.	
  (CR	
  385,	
  506).	
  	
  Ray	
  also	
  testified	
  that	
  he	
  informed	
  Lantz	
  and	
  

Rolnick	
  that	
  he	
  would	
  have	
  another	
  lawyer,	
  Paul	
  Browder,	
  an	
  attorney	
  

	
                                                                                                                           3	
  
with	
   Blazier,	
   Christensen,	
   Bigelow	
   &	
   Virr	
   (“BCBV”),	
   review	
   the	
  

documents-­‐-­‐testimony	
  that	
  Lantz	
  and	
  Rolnick	
  dispute.	
  (CR	
  549).	
  

	
        Ray	
   had	
   one	
   more	
   conversation	
   with	
   Rolnick	
   shortly	
   after	
   the	
  

initial	
   conversation	
   with	
   Lantz	
   and	
   Rolnick.	
   	
   Ray	
   then	
   received	
   an	
   email	
  

from	
   Rolnick’s	
   legal	
   assistant	
   with	
   instructions	
   as	
   to	
   what	
   Rolnick	
  

wanted	
  Ray	
  to	
  do.	
  (CR	
  506-­‐507,	
  552).	
  

                    “Mr.	
   Rolnick	
   is	
   out	
   of	
   the	
   country	
   this	
   week,	
   however,	
  
                    pursuant	
  to	
  your	
  previous	
  conversation	
  with	
  him,	
  he	
  asked	
  
                    that	
   I	
   forward	
   you	
   a	
   copy	
   of	
   the	
   Security	
   Agreement	
   and	
  
                    Promissory	
   Note	
   (which	
   are	
   attached	
   to	
   this	
   email).	
   	
   Also	
  
                    attached	
   you	
   will	
   find	
   a	
   copy	
   of	
   the	
   fully	
   executed	
   copy	
   of	
  
                    the	
   Agreement	
   so	
   you	
   have	
   some	
   understanding	
   of	
   the	
  
                    transaction.	
   	
   Mr.	
   Rolnick	
   would	
   like	
   you	
   to	
   review	
   the	
  
                    Security	
   Agreement	
   and	
   Promissory	
   Note	
   and	
   confirm	
   that	
  
                    these	
   are	
   acceptable	
   for	
   Texas	
   law,	
   i.e.	
   that	
   they	
   can	
   be	
  
                    recorded	
  and	
  that	
  they	
  would	
  enable	
  us	
  to	
  foreclose	
  in	
  the	
  
                    event	
  of	
  a	
  default.”	
  (CR	
  424)	
  
	
  
Ray	
  received	
  the	
  executed	
  contract,	
  draft	
  security	
  agreement,	
  and	
  draft	
  

promissory	
  note.	
  	
  Ray	
  then	
  forwarded	
  those	
  documents	
  to	
  Browder	
  for	
  

his	
   review.	
   (CR	
   550).	
   	
   Browder	
   made	
   comments	
   and	
   raised	
   questions	
  

with	
  regard	
  to	
  the	
  documents.	
  (CR	
  550).	
  	
  Ray	
  then	
  took	
  those	
  comments	
  

and	
   questions,	
   incorporated	
   them	
   into	
   an	
   email,	
   and	
   forwarded	
   them	
   to	
  

Rolnick.	
  	
  (CR	
  550).	
  

	
        Among	
  the	
  provisions	
  of	
  the	
  promissory	
  note	
  was	
  a	
  reference	
  that	
  

the	
   security	
   interest	
   would	
   be	
   recorded	
   in	
   Delaware.	
   	
   The	
   specific	
  

	
                                                                                                                          4	
  
language	
  in	
  the	
  promissory	
  note	
  stated	
  “Holder	
  may	
  file	
  a	
  Form	
  UCC-­‐1	
  

with	
  the	
  Secretary	
  of	
  State	
  of	
  the	
  State	
  of	
  Delaware	
  to	
  perfect	
  such	
  lien	
  

of	
   record.”	
   (CR	
   486).	
   	
   Contrary	
   to	
   the	
   assertion	
   by	
   Appellant	
   in	
   his	
  

Statement	
   of	
   Facts	
   that	
   “comments	
   by	
   Ray	
   sent	
   back	
   to	
   Rolnick	
   in	
  

Florida,	
   however,	
   included	
   one	
   indicating	
   the	
   UCC-­‐1	
   instead	
   should	
   be	
  

filed	
   in	
   Texas	
   where	
   the	
   assets	
   at	
   issue	
   were	
   located,”	
   what	
   Browder	
  

actually	
  raised,	
  and	
  what	
  was	
  passed	
  on	
  in	
  Ray’s	
  email,	
  was	
  a	
  question.	
  	
  

The	
  actual	
  question	
  that	
  was	
  raised	
  was	
  as	
  follows:	
  

                    “Where	
  will	
  the	
  assets	
  be	
  held?	
  	
  Texas,	
  right?	
  	
  Shouldn’t	
  the	
  
                    UCC-­‐1	
  be	
  filed	
  where	
  the	
  assets	
  are	
  located?”	
  
	
  
Rolnick	
   never	
   contacted	
   Ray	
   to	
   resolve	
   those	
   questions.	
   (CR	
   508,	
   553)	
  

Rolnick	
   proceeded	
   to	
   close	
   the	
   transaction	
   on	
   November	
   1,	
   2012,	
   and	
  

Ray	
   had	
   no	
   knowledge	
   of	
   or	
   participation	
   in	
   the	
   drafting	
   of	
   the	
   final	
  

documents	
  or	
  the	
  closing.	
  (CR	
  508-­‐510,	
  560).	
  

	
        The	
   next	
   time	
   Ray	
   had	
   any	
   participation	
   in	
   the	
   transaction	
   at	
   all	
  

(or	
  even	
  knew	
  that	
  it	
  had	
  closed)	
  was	
  when	
  he	
  was	
  contacted	
  by	
  Rolnick	
  

with	
   a	
   direction	
   to	
   record	
   the	
   UCC-­‐1	
   in	
   Texas	
   approximately	
   two	
  

months	
  after	
  the	
  transaction	
  had	
  closed.	
  (CR	
  555-­‐556,	
  560,	
  562).	
  	
  Ray	
  at	
  

first	
  declined	
  because	
  he	
  did	
  not	
  know	
  procedurally	
  how	
  to	
  do	
  so.	
  (CR	
  

562).	
  	
  Rolnick	
  prevailed	
  on	
  Ray	
  to	
  do	
  so	
  for	
  him	
  since	
  Ray	
  was	
  in	
  Austin.	
  

	
                                                                                                                      5	
  
(CR	
   562).	
   	
   Rolnick	
   sent	
   the	
   UCC-­‐1	
   to	
   Ray,	
   and	
   Ray	
   forwarded	
   it	
   to	
  

Browder	
  for	
  recordation	
  at	
  the	
  office	
  of	
  the	
  Secretary	
  of	
  State.	
  	
  (CR	
  558).	
  

	
        Ray	
   had	
   no	
   further	
   contact	
   with	
   Lantz	
   or	
   Rolnick	
   until	
   over	
   a	
   year	
  

later	
   when	
   he	
   was	
   contacted	
   about	
   AOS’s	
   default.	
   (CR	
   560).	
   	
   Rolnick	
  

contacted	
   him	
   about	
   pursuing	
   litigation	
   to	
   foreclose	
   on	
   the	
   assets.	
   (CR	
  

560).	
  	
  Again,	
  that	
  was	
  not	
  Ray’s	
  area	
  of	
  practice,	
  and	
  SML	
  was	
  referred	
  

to	
  Adams	
  &	
  Graham	
  (“A&G”)	
  to	
  pursue	
  the	
  litigation.	
  	
  (CR	
  387).	
  

	
        SML	
   filed	
   suit	
   against	
   AOS	
   on	
   the	
   debt	
   and	
   to	
   foreclose	
   on	
   the	
  

security,	
   to	
   the	
   extent	
   the	
   collateral	
   still	
   existed.	
   	
   At	
   that	
   time,	
   AOS’s	
  

parent	
  company,	
  MacEyser	
  Holdings,	
  filed	
  for	
  bankruptcy	
  protection	
  in	
  

Delaware.	
  	
  SML	
  filed	
  a	
  motion	
  to	
  lift	
  stay	
  in	
  the	
  bankruptcy	
  proceeding.	
  	
  

That	
   motion	
   was	
   denied	
   on	
   the	
   basis	
   that	
   SML	
   had	
   not	
   perfected	
   its	
  

security	
   interest	
   by	
   recording	
   the	
   UCC-­‐1	
   in	
   Delaware.	
   	
   In	
   light	
   of	
   that	
  

ruling,	
   Lantz	
   contacted	
   Rolnick	
   and	
   Ray	
   concerning	
   the	
   issue	
   of	
  

perfection	
  of	
  the	
  security	
  interest.	
  (CR	
  512).	
  	
  At	
  that	
  time,	
  Rolnick	
  was	
  

successful	
  in	
  diverting	
  Lantz’s	
  attention	
  from	
  him	
  to	
  Ray.	
  (CR	
  512-­‐513).	
  

	
        SML	
   and	
   Lantz	
   then	
   filed	
   suit	
   in	
   Travis	
   County	
   District	
   Court	
  

against	
  RAR,	
  BCBV,	
  and	
  A&G.	
  (CR	
  3).	
  	
  RAR	
  immediately	
  joined	
  Rolnick	
  as	
  

a	
  third-­‐party	
  defendant,	
  and	
  plaintiffs	
  then	
  amended	
  their	
  pleadings	
  to	
  

add	
  Rolnick	
  as	
  a	
  defendant.	
  (CR	
  17,	
  137).	
  	
  In	
  answer	
  to	
  both	
  RAR’s	
  third-­‐

	
                                                                                                                           6	
  
party	
   petition	
   and	
   plaintiffs’	
   First	
   Amended	
   Original	
   Petition,	
   Rolnick	
  

filed	
   unsworn	
   special	
   appearances.	
   (CR	
   23,	
   147).	
   	
   Rolnick’s	
   special	
  

appearance	
  was	
  heard	
  and	
  overruled	
  by	
  the	
  trial	
  court.	
  (CR	
  697).	
  

	
  

                                       SUMMARY	
  OF	
  ARGUMENT	
  

	
        The	
   requirements	
   for	
   filing	
   a	
   special	
   appearance	
   are	
   stated	
   in	
  

Rule	
   120a,	
   Texas	
   Rules	
   of	
   Civil	
   Procedure.	
   	
   Strict	
   compliance	
   with	
   the	
  

rule	
   is	
   required.	
   	
   Rule	
   120a	
   requires	
   that	
   the	
   special	
   appearance	
   be	
  

made	
  by	
  sworn	
  motion.	
  	
  The	
  special	
  appearances	
  filed	
  by	
  Rolnick	
  were	
  

not	
  sworn,	
  and	
  therefore	
  were	
  not	
  in	
  compliance	
  with	
  Rule	
  120a.	
  	
  The	
  

trial	
   court	
   does	
   not	
   commit	
   error	
   in	
   overruling	
   an	
   unsworn	
   special	
  

appearance.	
  

	
        Jurisdiction	
   of	
   nonresident	
   defendants	
   is	
   determined	
   based	
   on	
  

whether	
   the	
   defendant	
   has	
   sufficient	
   minimum	
   contacts	
   with	
   Texas	
   to	
  

support	
   jurisdiction	
   under	
   the	
   Texas	
   Long-­‐Arm	
   Statute.	
   	
   Those	
  

minimum	
   contacts	
   exist	
   if	
   the	
   nonresident	
   defendant	
   has	
   availed	
  

himself	
   of	
   the	
   privilege	
   of	
   conducting	
   activities	
   in	
   Texas.	
   	
   The	
   contact	
  

with	
   Texas	
   must	
   have	
   been	
   purposeful,	
   and	
   the	
   defendant	
   must	
   have	
  

sought	
   some	
   benefit	
   from	
   the	
   contact.	
   	
   In	
   addition,	
   the	
   assertion	
   of	
   such	
  

	
                                                                                                                        7	
  
jurisdiction	
   must	
   comport	
   with	
   traditional	
   notions	
   of	
   fair	
   play	
   and	
  

substantial	
  justice.	
  

	
        SML’s	
  business	
  was	
  entirely	
  a	
  Texas	
  operation.	
  	
  All	
  of	
  its	
  business	
  

activity	
   was	
   in	
   Texas,	
   and	
   all	
   of	
   its	
   assets	
   (including	
   its	
   real	
   estate	
  

interests)	
  were	
  in	
  Texas.	
  	
  When	
  SML	
  sold	
  its	
  assets,	
  Rolnick	
  negotiated	
  

the	
   contract	
   and	
   closed	
   the	
   transaction.	
   	
   He	
   had	
   Jason	
   Ray	
   review	
   the	
  

promissory	
   note	
   and	
   security	
   agreement,	
   but	
   all	
   decisions	
   about	
  

perfection	
   of	
   the	
   security	
   interest	
   were	
   made	
   by	
   Rolnick.	
   	
   Rolnick	
   made	
  

the	
   decision	
   to	
   record	
   the	
   UCC-­‐1	
   in	
   Texas,	
   and	
   Rolnick	
   sent	
   it	
   to	
   Ray	
  

with	
   instructions	
   to	
   record	
   it	
   in	
   Texas.	
   	
   When	
   SML’s	
   purchaser	
   sought	
  

bankruptcy	
  protection	
  it	
  was	
  discovered	
  that	
  Rolnick	
  had	
  recorded	
  the	
  

UCC-­‐1	
  in	
  the	
  wrong	
  state	
  to	
  properly	
  perfect	
  that	
  interest.	
  	
  Since	
  the	
  suit	
  

by	
  SML	
  and	
  its	
  owner	
  is	
  over	
  the	
  failure	
  to	
  properly	
  perfect	
  that	
  security	
  

interest,	
  Rolnick	
  has	
  sufficient	
  contacts	
  with	
  Texas	
  to	
  be	
  subject	
  to	
  the	
  

jurisdiction	
  of	
  the	
  Texas	
  courts.	
  

	
  

                                     ARGUMENT	
  &	
  AUTHORITIES	
  

                                              Standard	
  of	
  Review	
  

	
        Whether	
  a	
  trial	
  court	
  has	
  personal	
  jurisdiction	
  over	
  a	
  defendant	
  is	
  

a	
  matter	
  of	
  law	
  and	
  is	
  reviewed	
  de	
  novo.	
  	
  BMC	
  Software	
  Belgium,	
  N.V.	
  v.	
  

	
                                                                                                                          8	
  
Marchand,	
  83	
   S.W.3d	
   789,	
   794	
   (Tex.	
   2002).	
   	
   If	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   does	
   not	
  

issue	
   findings	
   of	
   fact	
   and	
   conclusions	
   of	
   law,	
   all	
   facts	
   necessary	
   to	
  

support	
  the	
  judgment	
  and	
  supported	
  by	
  the	
  evidence	
  are	
  implied.	
  	
  BMC	
  

at	
  795.	
  

                   No	
  Error	
  In	
  Denial	
  of	
  Unsworn	
  Special	
  Appearance	
  

           Rule	
  120a	
  was	
  adopted	
  to	
  address	
  the	
  issue	
  presented	
  by	
  York	
   v.	
  

State,	
   73	
   Tex.	
   651,	
   11	
   S.W.	
   869	
   (1889),	
   aff’d	
   137	
   U.S.	
   15,	
   11	
   S.Ct.	
   869	
  

(1889).	
   	
   	
   The	
   court	
   in	
   York	
   held	
   that	
   any	
   appearance,	
   even	
   one	
   to	
  

challenge	
  service	
  or	
  jurisdiction,	
  constituted	
  a	
  general	
  appearance.	
  	
  This	
  

resulted	
   in	
   there	
   being	
   no	
   direct	
   way	
   that	
   a	
   nonresident	
   defendant	
  

could	
   challenge	
   the	
   court’s	
   jurisdiction	
   over	
   that	
   defendant.	
   	
   That	
  

continued	
   to	
   be	
   the	
   law	
   in	
   Texas	
   until	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Court	
   of	
   Texas	
  

adopted	
   Rule	
   120a	
   in	
   1962.	
   	
   Rule	
   120a	
   provided	
   a	
   vehicle	
   for	
   a	
  

defendant	
  to	
  challenge	
  the	
  court’s	
  in	
  personam	
  jurisdiction	
  without	
  the	
  

challenge	
  itself	
  constituting	
  a	
  general	
  appearance.	
  

           Rule	
   120a	
   provides	
   specific	
   requirements	
   to	
   which	
   the	
   special	
  

appearance	
  must	
  conform.	
  	
  These	
  requirements	
  include,	
  among	
  others,	
  

that	
  the	
  “special	
  appearance	
  shall	
  be	
  made	
  by	
  sworn	
  motion	
  filed	
  prior	
  

to	
   motion	
   to	
   transfer	
   venue	
   or	
   any	
   other	
   plea,	
   pleading,	
   or	
   motion….”	
  	
  

	
                                                                                                                              9	
  
The	
   motion	
   must	
   be	
   heard	
   before	
   a	
   motion	
   to	
   transfer	
   venue	
   or	
   any	
  

other	
  plea	
  or	
  pleading.	
  

          RAR	
  was	
  an	
  original	
  defendant	
  in	
  the	
  Plaintiffs’	
  Original	
  Petition.	
  	
  

(CR	
   3).	
   	
   Upon	
   filing	
   its	
   original	
   answer,	
   Herbert	
   Rolnick	
   was	
  

immediately	
   added	
   as	
   a	
   third-­‐party	
   defendant	
   by	
   RAR.	
   (CR	
   17).	
   	
   Rolnick	
  

filed	
   a	
   special	
   appearance	
   to	
   the	
   third-­‐party	
   petition	
   filed	
   by	
   RAR,	
   and	
  

the	
   plaintiffs	
   then	
   amended	
   and	
   added	
   Rolnick	
   as	
   an	
   additional	
  

defendant.	
  (CR	
  137).	
  	
  Rolnick	
  again	
  filed	
  a	
  special	
  appearance	
  as	
  to	
  the	
  

plaintiff’s	
   First	
   Amended	
   Original	
   Petition.	
   (CR	
   147).	
   	
   Neither	
   of	
   the	
  

special	
   appearances	
   filed	
   by	
   Rolnick	
   were	
   sworn	
   as	
   required	
   by	
   Rule	
  

120a.	
  	
  Rolnick	
  did	
  file	
  two	
  nearly	
  identical	
  affidavits	
  in	
  conjunction	
  with	
  

the	
   special	
   appearances	
   he	
   filed.	
   	
   However,	
   in	
   those	
   affidavits	
   Rolnick	
  

swears	
   to	
   the	
   facts	
   stated	
   in	
   the	
   affidavits	
   but	
   does	
   not	
   swear	
   to	
   the	
  

facts	
  stated	
  in	
  the	
  special	
  appearances	
  he	
  filed.	
  	
  (CR	
  35,	
  159).	
  

          Strict	
   compliance	
   with	
   the	
   rule	
   governing	
   special	
   appearances	
   is	
  

required.	
   	
   Casino	
   Magic	
   Corp.	
   v.	
   King,	
   43	
   S.W.3d	
   14	
   (Tex.	
   App.—Dallas	
  

2001,	
   pet.	
   denied).	
   	
   A	
   trial	
   court	
   does	
   not	
   commit	
   error	
   in	
   denying	
   an	
  

unsworn	
  special	
  appearance.	
  	
  Casino	
  Magic	
  Corp	
  at	
  18;	
  Villapando	
  v.	
  De	
  

La	
   Garza,	
   793	
   S.W.2d	
   274,	
   276	
   (Tex.	
   App.—Corpus	
   Christi	
   1990,	
   no	
  

writ);	
  	
   Prosperous	
  Maritime	
  Corp.	
  v.	
  Farwah,	
  189	
  S.W.3d	
  389,	
  392	
  (Tex.	
  

	
                                                                                                                       10	
  
App.—Beaumont	
   2006,	
   no	
   pet.).	
   	
   When	
   the	
   affidavits	
   attached	
   to	
   the	
  

special	
   appearance	
   pleadings	
   do	
   not	
   state	
   that	
   the	
   facts	
   set	
   out	
   in	
   the	
  

pleadings	
   are	
   true	
   and	
   correct,	
   but	
   instead	
   state	
   only	
   that	
   the	
   facts	
   in	
  

the	
  affidavits	
  are	
  true	
  and	
  correct,	
  the	
  affidavits	
  do	
  not	
  verify	
  the	
  special	
  

appearance.	
  	
  Prosperous	
  Maritime	
  at	
  393-­‐394;	
  Casino	
  Magic	
  at	
  18.	
  	
  The	
  

courts	
  have	
  routinely	
  upheld	
  the	
  denial	
  of	
  a	
  special	
  appearance	
  on	
  the	
  

basis	
   that	
   the	
   nonresident	
   failed	
   to	
   file	
   a	
   sworn	
   motion.	
   	
   See	
   Kytel	
  

International	
  Group,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  Rent-­‐A-­‐Center,	
  Inc.,	
  132	
   S.W.3d	
   717,	
   719	
   (Tex.	
  

App.—Dallas	
   2004,	
   no	
   pet.);	
   Siemens	
   AG	
   v.	
   Houston	
   Casualty	
   Company,	
  

127	
  S.W.3d	
  436,	
  439	
  (Tex.	
  App.—Dallas	
  2004,	
  no	
  pet.).	
  

          Rolnick	
  did	
  not	
  file	
  a	
  sworn	
  motion	
  as	
  required	
  by	
  Rule	
  120a.	
  	
  (CR	
  

23,	
   147).	
   	
   While	
   Rolnick	
   did	
   file	
   affidavits	
   in	
   support	
   of	
   his	
   motion,	
   all	
  

that	
   the	
   affidavits	
   did	
   was	
   swear	
   to	
   the	
   facts	
   stated	
   in	
   the	
   affidavits.	
   (CR	
  

35,	
   159).	
   	
   Rolnick’s	
   affidavits	
   did	
   not	
   swear	
   to	
   the	
   facts	
   stated	
   in	
   his	
  

special	
  appearance.	
  	
  Rolnick’s	
  special	
  appearance	
  was	
  not	
  in	
  compliance	
  

with	
  the	
  Rule,	
  and	
  therefore	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  did	
  not	
  commit	
  any	
  error	
  in	
  

denying	
  the	
  special	
  appearance.	
  

	
  

	
                                         	
  

	
                                                                                                                             11	
  
              Rolnick’s	
  Contacts	
  Meet	
  the	
  “Minimum	
  Contacts”	
  Test	
  	
  
                                   for	
  Jurisdiction	
  in	
  Texas	
  
                                                   	
  
          Jurisdiction	
  over	
  nonresident	
  defendants	
  is	
  governed	
  by	
  the	
  Texas	
  

Long-­‐Arm	
   Statute,	
   TEX.	
   CIV.	
   PRAC.	
   &	
   REM.	
   CODE	
   §17.41	
   et	
   seq.	
   	
   The	
  

extent	
  of	
  the	
  jurisdictional	
  grant	
  in	
  the	
  Texas	
  Long-­‐Arm	
  Statute	
  is	
  to	
  the	
  

fullest	
   extent	
   permitted	
   by	
   the	
   federal	
   constitutional	
   requirements	
   of	
  

due	
  process.	
  	
  Moki	
   Mac	
   River	
   Expeditions	
   v.	
   Drugg,	
   221	
  S.W.3d	
  569,	
  575	
  

(Tex.	
  2007).	
  	
  

          A	
   Texas	
   court	
   may	
   exercise	
   personal	
   jurisdiction	
   over	
   a	
  

nonresident	
   defendant	
   only	
   if	
   the	
   requirements	
   of	
   both	
   the	
   due	
   process	
  

clause	
   of	
   the	
   Fourteenth	
   Amendment	
   to	
   the	
   United	
   States	
   Constitution	
  

and	
   the	
   Texas	
   Long-­‐Arm	
   Statute	
   are	
   satisfied.	
   	
   CSR	
   Ltd.	
   v.	
   Link,	
   925	
  

S.W.2d	
   591,	
   594	
   (Tex.	
   1996).	
   	
   The	
   assertion	
   of	
   jurisdiction	
   over	
   a	
  

nonresident	
   is	
   proper	
   and	
   consistent	
   with	
   due	
   process	
   when	
   the	
  

nonresident	
   defendant	
   has	
   established	
   minimum	
   contacts	
   with	
   the	
  

forum	
   state	
   and	
   the	
   exercise	
   of	
   jurisdiction	
   comports	
   with	
   traditional	
  

notions	
   of	
   fair	
   play	
   and	
   substantial	
   justice.	
   	
   Kelly	
   v.	
   Gen.	
   Interior	
  

Construction,	
   Inc.,	
   301	
   S.W.3d	
   653	
   (Tex.	
   2010).	
   	
   The	
   defendant	
   has	
  

established	
  minimum	
  contacts	
  with	
  the	
  forum	
  state	
  when	
  the	
  defendant	
  

has	
   purposefully	
   availed	
   himself	
   of	
   the	
   privilege	
   of	
   conducting	
   activities	
  

	
                                                                                                                   12	
  
within	
   the	
   forum	
   state,	
   and	
   has	
   thus	
   invoked	
   the	
   benefits	
   and	
  

protections	
   of	
   the	
   forum	
   state’s	
   laws.	
   	
   Retamco	
   Operating,	
   Inc.	
   v.	
  

Republic	
   Drilling,	
   278	
   S.W.3d	
   333	
   (Tex.	
   2009);	
   Moncrief	
   Oil	
  

International,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  OAO	
  Gazprom,	
  414	
  S.W.3d	
  142	
  (Tex.	
  2013).	
  

          The	
  plaintiff	
  (and	
  third-­‐party	
  plaintiff)	
  bears	
  the	
  initial	
  burden	
  of	
  

pleading	
   sufficient	
   allegations	
   to	
   bring	
   the	
   nonresident	
   defendant	
  

within	
   the	
   provisions	
   of	
   the	
   Texas	
   long-­‐arm	
   statute.	
   	
   Moki	
  Mac	
  at	
   574;	
  

BMC	
  Software	
  at	
  793.	
  	
  Once	
  the	
  plaintiff	
  satisfies	
  this	
  burden,	
  the	
  burden	
  

shifts	
   to	
   the	
   nonresident	
   defendant	
   to	
   negate	
   all	
   bases	
   for	
   personal	
  

jurisdiction	
  alleged	
  by	
  the	
  plaintiff.	
  	
  Kelly	
  v.	
  Gen.	
  Interior	
  Constr.,	
  Inc.,	
  301	
  

S.W.3d	
  653,	
  658	
  (Tex.	
  2010).	
  

	
        As	
   noted	
   in	
   Retamco	
  Operating,	
  Inc,	
  a	
   nonresident’s	
   contacts	
   can	
  

give	
   rise	
   to	
   either	
   specific	
   jurisdiction	
   or	
   general	
   jurisdiction.	
   	
   Specific	
  

jurisdiction	
   exists	
   when	
   the	
   defendant	
   purposefully	
   avails	
   himself	
   of	
  

conducting	
   activities	
   in	
   the	
   forum	
   state,	
   and	
   the	
   cause	
   of	
   action	
   arises	
  

from	
  or	
  is	
  related	
  to	
  those	
  contacts	
  or	
  activities.	
  	
  	
  

	
        In	
   a	
   specific	
   jurisdiction	
   analysis,	
   the	
   court	
   must	
   focus	
   on	
   the	
  

relationship	
   between	
   the	
   defendant,	
   the	
   forum,	
   and	
   the	
   litigation.	
  	
  

Moncrief	
  Oil,	
  414	
  S.W.3d	
  at	
  150.	
  	
  There	
  must	
  be	
  a	
  substantial	
  connection	
  

between	
  the	
  defendant’s	
  contacts	
  with	
  the	
  forum	
  and	
  the	
  operative	
  facts	
  

	
                                                                                                                   13	
  
of	
   the	
   litigation	
   itself.	
   	
   Moki	
   Mac,	
   221	
   S.W.3d	
   at	
   585.	
   	
   In	
   the	
   specific	
  

jurisdiction	
   analysis,	
   the	
   court	
   must	
   focus	
   on	
   only	
   the	
   defendant’s	
  

contacts	
  with	
  the	
  forum.	
  	
  The	
  defendant’s	
  contacts	
  must	
  be	
  purposeful	
  

and	
   not	
   random,	
   isolated,	
   or	
   fortuitous,	
   and	
   the	
   defendant	
   must	
   seek	
  

some	
   benefit,	
   advantage,	
   or	
   profit	
   by	
   availing	
   himself	
   of	
   the	
   jurisdiction.	
  	
  

Michiana	
   Easy	
   Livin’	
   Country,	
   Inc.	
   v.	
   Holten,	
   168	
   S.W.3d	
   777,	
   785	
   (Tex.	
  

2005).	
  

	
        The	
   defendant’s	
   activities,	
   whether	
   they	
   consist	
   of	
   direct	
   acts	
  

within	
   Texas	
   or	
   conduct	
   outside	
   Texas,	
   must	
   justify	
   a	
   conclusion	
   that	
  

the	
   defendant	
   could	
   reasonably	
   anticipate	
   being	
   haled	
   into	
   a	
   Texas	
  

court.	
   	
   Am.	
  Type	
  Culture	
  Collection,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  Coleman,	
  83	
   S.W.3d	
   801,	
   806	
  

(Tex.	
  2002).	
  	
  Jurisdiction	
  is	
  premised	
  on	
  the	
  notions	
  of	
  implied	
  consent	
  

that,	
   by	
   invoking	
   the	
   benefits	
   and	
   protections	
   of	
   a	
   forum’s	
   laws,	
   the	
  

nonresident	
   consents	
   to	
   suit	
   there.	
   	
   Michiana	
   at	
   785.	
   	
   It	
   is	
   the	
   quality	
  

and	
   nature	
   of	
   the	
   defendant’s	
   contacts	
   with	
   the	
   forum	
   state,	
   rather	
   than	
  

their	
   number,	
   that	
   are	
   important	
   in	
   analyzing	
   minimum	
   contacts.	
   	
   Am.	
  

Type	
  Culture	
  Collection	
  at	
  806.	
  

	
        Specific	
   jurisdiction	
   is	
   established	
   if	
   the	
   defendant’s	
   alleged	
  

liability	
   arises	
   out	
   of	
   or	
   is	
   related	
   to	
   an	
   activity	
   conducted	
   within	
   the	
  

forum	
   state.	
   	
   Moki	
   Mac	
   at	
   575-­‐576.	
   	
   When	
   specific	
   jurisdiction	
   is	
  

	
                                                                                                                             14	
  
asserted,	
   the	
   minimum-­‐contacts	
   analysis	
   focuses	
   on	
   the	
   relationship	
  

among	
  the	
  defendant,	
  the	
  forum,	
  and	
  the	
  litigation.	
  	
  Moncreif	
  Oil	
  at	
  150;	
  

Guardian	
   Royal	
   Exch.	
   Assurance,	
   Ltd	
   v.	
   English	
   China	
   Clays,	
   P.L.C.,	
   815	
  

S.W.2d	
   223,	
   228	
   (Tex.	
   1991).	
   	
   The	
   focus	
   is	
   on	
   the	
   defendant’s	
   conduct	
  

and	
  connections	
  with	
  the	
  forum	
  state	
  in	
  relation	
  to	
  the	
  alleged	
  liability.	
  	
  

Michiana	
  at	
  788-­‐790.	
  

	
        	
  

                              Analysis	
  Of	
  The	
  Jurisdictional	
  Facts	
  

	
        Rolnick	
   was	
   the	
   person	
   in	
   charge	
   of	
   negotiating	
   and	
   closing	
   the	
  

sale	
  of	
  SML’s	
  assets.	
  (CR	
  391,	
  392).	
  	
  All	
  of	
  those	
  assets	
  were	
  located	
  in	
  

Texas,	
   including	
   SML’s	
   real	
   property	
   interests.	
   (CR	
   390).	
   	
   Ray’s	
  

participation	
   in	
   the	
   transaction	
   was	
   minimal—he	
  was	
  asked	
  to	
  review	
  a	
  

note	
   and	
   security	
   agreement	
   to	
   see	
   if	
   they	
   could	
   be	
   recorded	
   in	
   Texas	
  

and	
   if	
   SML	
   would	
   be	
   able	
   to	
   foreclose	
   upon	
   default.	
   	
   Rolnick	
   directed	
  

what	
  Ray	
  was	
  to	
  do,	
  and	
  the	
  limitations	
  on	
  Ray’s	
  engagement.	
  	
  Ray	
  felt	
  

that	
  he	
  had	
  been	
  engaged	
  by	
  Rolnick.	
  (CR	
  556).	
  

	
        After	
  forwarding	
  comments	
  and	
  questions	
  to	
  Rolnick,	
  Ray	
  was	
  not	
  

contacted	
  again	
  by	
  Rolnick	
  to	
  answer	
  any	
  of	
  the	
  questions	
  that	
  had	
  been	
  

raised	
   about	
   the	
   documents.	
   (CR	
   555-­‐556).	
   	
   Instead,	
   Rolnick	
   made	
   all	
   of	
  

the	
   decisions	
   about	
   the	
   sale	
   of	
   the	
   Texas	
   assets	
   and	
   closed	
   the	
  

	
                                                                                                                  15	
  
transaction	
   without	
   Ray	
   even	
   being	
   informed	
   that	
   the	
   transaction	
   had	
  

closed.	
  

	
        Approximately	
   two	
   months	
   after	
   closing,	
   Rolnick	
   contacted	
   Ray	
  

and	
  requested	
  that	
  Ray	
  record	
  the	
  UCC-­‐1	
  for	
  Rolnick	
  in	
  Texas.	
  (CR	
  555-­‐

556).	
  	
  The	
  UCC-­‐1	
  had	
  been	
  drafted	
  or	
  approved	
  by	
  Rolnick,	
  and	
  Ray	
  had	
  

never	
   seen	
   it.	
   	
   At	
   first	
   resistant,	
   Ray	
   eventually	
   agreed	
   to	
   record	
   the	
  

document	
   for	
   Rolnick	
   with	
   the	
   Secretary	
   of	
   State.	
   (CR	
   561).	
   	
   The	
  

decision	
   to	
   record	
   it	
   in	
   Texas	
   was	
   Rolnick’s	
   decision,	
   and	
   Ray	
   was	
  

merely	
  performing	
  a	
  favor	
  upon	
  Rolnick’s	
  request.	
  (CR	
  393,	
  562).	
  	
  It	
  is	
  

no	
   different	
   than	
   if	
   Rolnick	
   had	
   himself	
   recorded	
   the	
   UCC-­‐l	
   at	
   the	
  

Secretary	
  of	
  State.	
  

	
        None	
   of	
   this	
   analysis	
   focuses	
   on	
   the	
   conduct	
   of	
   anyone	
   but	
  

Rolnick.	
   	
   He	
   negotiated	
   the	
   contract	
   for	
   the	
   sale	
   of	
   Texas	
   assets.	
   	
   He	
  

negotiated	
   the	
   sale	
   of	
   Texas	
   real	
   estate	
   interests.	
   	
   He	
   decided	
   how	
   to	
  

obtain	
  the	
  security	
  interest	
  in	
  the	
  Texas	
  assets.	
  	
  And	
  most	
  importantly,	
  

Rolnick	
  directed	
  the	
  recordation	
  of	
  the	
  UCC-­‐1	
  in	
  Texas.	
  	
  	
  

	
        The	
   plaintiffs’	
   claims	
   here	
   are	
   focused	
   on	
   their	
   claimed	
   losses	
  

from	
   the	
   loss	
   of	
   those	
   Texas	
   assets.	
   	
   Their	
   complaints	
   relate	
   to	
   their	
  

claimed	
  security	
  interests	
  in	
  those	
  assets,	
  and	
  their	
  particular	
  complaint	
  

is	
  that	
  the	
  recordation	
  of	
  that	
  security	
  interest	
  in	
  Texas	
  was	
  negligence.	
  	
  

	
                                                                                                                       16	
  
Rolnick	
   negotiated	
   and	
   closed	
   the	
   transaction,	
   and	
   he	
   made	
   all	
   of	
   the	
  

decisions	
   related	
   to	
   obtaining	
   and	
   protecting	
   the	
   plaintiffs’	
   security	
  

interests.	
   	
   Most	
   specifically,	
   Rolnick	
   is	
   the	
   one	
   who	
   had	
   the	
   UCC-­‐1	
  

recorded	
  in	
  Texas.	
  	
  	
  

	
        These	
   are	
   not	
   fortuitous	
   contacts	
   with	
   Texas.	
   	
   Rolnick	
   was	
  

certainly	
  aware	
  where	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  assets,	
  including	
  the	
  real	
  property,	
  were	
  

located	
   when	
   he	
   undertook	
   the	
   representation.	
   	
   Rolnick	
   made	
   the	
  

conscious	
  decision	
  to	
  record	
  the	
  UCC-­‐1	
  in	
  Texas,	
  and	
  he	
  is	
  the	
  one	
  who	
  

sent	
  it	
  to	
  Texas	
  for	
  filing.	
  	
  That	
  was	
  certainly	
  a	
  purposeful	
  contact,	
  and	
  

was	
   not	
   random,	
   fortuitous,	
   or	
   attenuated.	
   	
   These	
   are	
   only	
   Rolnick’s	
  

contacts	
   with	
   Texas,	
   and	
   this	
   analysis	
   does	
   not	
   consider	
   any	
   other	
  

person’s	
  contacts	
  or	
  activities.	
  

	
        Rolnick	
  certainly	
  sought	
  to	
  benefit	
  from	
  these	
  contacts.	
  	
  Not	
  only	
  

had	
  he	
  represented	
  Lantz	
  and	
  his	
  entities	
  for	
  a	
  number	
  of	
  years,	
  Rolnick	
  

made	
  a	
  fee	
  of	
  over	
  $40,000.00	
  for	
  handling	
  this	
  Texas	
  sale.	
  	
  To	
  say	
  that	
  

Rolnick	
  did	
  not	
  seek	
  or	
  obtain	
  any	
  benefit	
  from	
  his	
  contacts	
  with	
  Texas	
  

(including	
   the	
   recordation	
   of	
   the	
   UCC-­‐1)	
   is	
   to	
   turn	
   a	
   blind	
   eye	
   to	
   the	
  

realities	
  of	
  the	
  practice	
  of	
  law.	
  

	
        These	
  contacts	
  are	
  directly	
  related	
  to	
  the	
  pending	
  litigation.	
  	
  The	
  

plaintiffs’	
  claimed	
  damages	
  are	
  the	
  loss	
  of	
  the	
  Texas	
  assets	
  that	
  were	
  to	
  

	
                                                                                                                         17	
  
serve	
  as	
  security.	
  	
  The	
  specific	
  act	
  about	
  which	
  the	
  plaintiffs’	
  complain	
  is	
  

the	
   recording	
   of	
   the	
   UCC-­‐1	
   in	
   Texas,	
   an	
   act	
   specifically	
   directed	
   by	
  

Rolnick.	
   	
   Jurisdiction	
   of	
   Rolnick	
   is	
   obvious	
   based	
   on	
   his	
   conduct	
   and	
  

connections	
  with	
  Texas	
  in	
  relation	
  to	
  this	
  alleged	
  liability.	
  

	
        Appellant	
   seems	
   to	
   argue	
   that	
   the	
   conventional	
   analysis	
   of	
  

personal	
   jurisdiction	
   that	
   applies	
   to	
   all	
   other	
   defendants	
   does	
   not	
   apply	
  

to	
  Rolnick	
  solely	
  because	
  he	
  is	
  a	
  lawyer.	
  	
  According	
  to	
  the	
  argument	
  by	
  

Appellant,	
   there	
   is	
   a	
   special	
   “Lawyer	
   Rule.”	
   	
   Under	
   that	
   “rule”	
   as	
  

advanced	
   by	
   Appellant,	
   as	
   long	
   as	
   the	
   nonresident	
   lawyer	
   sits	
   in	
   his	
  

office	
   in	
   another	
   State,	
   he	
   simply	
   cannot	
   be	
   subject	
   to	
   jurisdiction	
   in	
  

Texas	
   no	
   matter	
   how	
   much	
   he	
   has	
   contact	
   with	
   Texas	
   and	
   no	
   matter	
  

how	
  much	
  those	
  contacts	
  are	
  the	
  source	
  of	
  the	
  Texas	
  litigation.	
  	
  That	
  is	
  

not	
  and	
  cannot	
  be	
  the	
  law.	
  

	
        Lawyers	
  do	
  not	
  get	
  a	
  free	
  pass.	
  	
  The	
  cases	
  cited	
  by	
  Appellant	
  for	
  

his	
  odd	
  argument	
  are	
  all	
  distinguishable	
  on	
  their	
  facts.	
  	
  In	
  fact,	
  each	
  of	
  

those	
  cases	
  analyzes	
  the	
  jurisdictional	
  issues	
  just	
  as	
  Appellee	
  has	
  done	
  

in	
   this	
   brief.	
   	
   In	
   those	
   cases,	
   the	
   court	
   has	
   analyzed	
   the	
   quality	
   and	
  

nature	
   of	
   the	
   lawyer’s	
   contacts	
   with	
   Texas.	
   	
   In	
   each	
   of	
   those	
   cases,	
   the	
  

court	
   has	
   analyzed	
   the	
   connections	
   with	
   Texas	
   in	
   relation	
   to	
   the	
   alleged	
  

liability.	
   	
   Those	
   courts	
   did	
   not	
   decide	
   that	
   simply	
   because	
   the	
   lawyer	
  

	
                                                                                                                         18	
  
was	
   not	
   physically	
   in	
   Texas	
   he	
   could	
   not	
   be	
   subject	
   to	
   jurisdiction	
   in	
  

Texas.	
  	
  	
  

	
           In	
   Abilene	
   Diagnostic	
   Clinic,	
   PLLC	
   v.	
   Paley,	
   Rothman,	
   Goldstein,	
  

Rosenberg,	
   Eig	
   &	
   Cooper,	
   Chartered,	
   364	
   S.W.3d	
   359	
   (Tex.	
   App.—

Eastland	
   2012,	
   no	
   pet.),	
   a	
   Texas	
   clinic	
   sued	
   a	
   Maryland	
   law	
   firm	
   for	
  

alleged	
   malpractice	
   in	
   the	
   preparation	
   of	
   a	
   defined	
   benefit	
   plan.	
   	
   The	
  

claim	
  of	
  specific	
  jurisdiction	
  in	
  that	
  case	
  was	
  that	
  all	
  of	
  the	
  defendants	
  

“purposefully	
   availed	
   themselves	
   of	
   the	
   benefits	
   of	
   Texas	
   law	
   by	
   doing	
  

business	
  with	
  a	
  Texas	
  entity.”	
  	
  In	
  sum,	
  what	
  the	
  defendant	
  had	
  done	
  is	
  

prepare	
   several	
   defined	
   benefit	
   plans	
   in	
   Maryland	
   and	
   send	
   them	
   to	
   the	
  

plaintiff	
   in	
   Texas.	
   	
   As	
   the	
   court	
   noted,	
   this	
   is	
   the	
   “direct-­‐a-­‐tort”	
  

jurisdictional	
  theory	
  that	
  was	
  rejected	
  in	
  Michiana.	
  	
  The	
  court	
  held	
  that	
  

to	
   determine	
   specific	
   jurisdiction,	
   the	
   court	
   had	
   to	
   focus	
   on	
   whether	
  

there	
  was	
  a	
  substantial	
  connection	
  between	
  the	
  defendant’s	
  purposeful	
  

contacts	
   with	
   the	
   forum	
   state	
   and	
   the	
   operative	
   facts	
   of	
   the	
   litigation.	
  	
  

The	
   court	
   noted	
   that	
   Texas	
   authority	
   had	
   focused	
   on	
   where	
   the	
   legal	
  

work	
  was	
  performed,	
  but	
  the	
  jurisdictional	
  analysis	
  on	
  which	
  the	
  court	
  

determined	
  the	
  case	
  was	
  the	
  traditional	
  analysis	
  of	
  specific	
  jurisdiction.	
  

	
           In	
   Ahrens	
  &	
  DeAngeli	
  v.	
  Flinn,	
  318	
   S.W.3d	
   474	
   (Tex.	
   App.—Dallas	
  

2010,	
   pet.	
   denied),	
   a	
   Washington	
   and	
   Idaho	
   law	
   firm	
   was	
   sued,	
   along	
  

	
                                                                                                                    19	
  
with	
   others,	
   for	
   promoting	
   an	
   abusive	
   tax	
   shelter.	
   	
   The	
   law	
   firm	
   had	
  

provided	
   representation	
   to	
   one	
   of	
   the	
   other	
   defendants	
   in	
   the	
  

developing	
   and	
   marketing	
   of	
   the	
   tax	
   shelter.	
   	
   However,	
   the	
   legal	
   work	
  

had	
   all	
   been	
   performed	
   in	
   Washington	
   or	
   Idaho,	
   and	
   only	
  

communicated	
   to	
   a	
   codefendant	
   in	
   Texas.	
   	
   The	
   court	
   utilized	
   the	
  

traditional	
   analysis	
   in	
   determining	
   that	
   there	
   were	
   not	
   sufficient	
  

contacts	
   with	
   Texas	
   to	
   support	
   personal	
   jurisdiction.	
   	
   Performing	
   legal	
  

work	
   in	
   one	
   state	
   and	
   merely	
   communicating	
   with	
   persons	
   in	
   another	
  

state	
   is	
   not	
   enough	
   in	
   itself	
   to	
   support	
   jurisdiction.	
   	
   However,	
   in	
   the	
  

present	
   case,	
   Rolnick	
   actually	
   took	
   action	
   in	
   Texas	
   with	
   regard	
   to	
  

perfecting	
  the	
  security	
  interest	
  in	
  the	
  collateral,	
  and	
  that	
  is	
  at	
  the	
  core	
  of	
  

plaintiffs’	
  claims	
  in	
  this	
  case.	
  

	
        Proskauer	
  Rose	
  LLP	
  v.	
  Pelican	
  Trading,	
  Inc.,	
  2009	
   WL	
   242993	
   (Tex.	
  

App.—Houston	
   [14th	
   Dist.]	
   2009,	
   no	
   pet.)	
   also	
   involved	
   an	
   abusive	
   tax	
  

shelter.	
   	
   The	
   plaintiffs	
   had	
   been	
   introduced	
   to	
   the	
   concept	
   of	
   the	
   tax	
  

shelter	
   by	
   their	
   accounting	
   firm.	
   	
   The	
   accounting	
   firm	
   had	
  

recommended	
   that	
   the	
   plaintiffs	
   use	
   Proskauer	
   Rose	
   to	
   prepare	
   and	
  

deliver	
   an	
   opinion	
   letter	
   on	
   the	
   proposed	
   tax	
   shelter.	
   	
   Proskauer	
   Rose	
  

prepared	
   drafts	
   of	
   the	
   opinion	
   letter,	
   communicated	
   with	
   the	
   plaintiffs	
  

(Texas	
  residents)	
  and	
  ultimately	
  prepared	
  the	
  opinion	
  letter	
  and	
  sent	
  it	
  

	
                                                                                                                    20	
  
to	
   the	
   Texas	
   residents.	
   	
   However,	
   all	
   of	
   Proskauer	
   Rose’s	
   work	
   was	
   in	
  

New	
   York.	
   	
   Again,	
   the	
   court	
   conducted	
   a	
   traditional	
   specific	
  

jurisdictional	
   analysis.	
   	
   Routine	
   correspondence	
   from	
   the	
   out-­‐of-­‐state	
  

lawyer	
   is	
   not	
   the	
   kind	
   of	
   purposeful	
   contacts	
   that	
   support	
   personal	
  

jurisdiction,	
   and	
   the	
   sending	
   of	
   the	
   opinion	
   letter	
   to	
   Texas	
   could	
   not	
  

support	
   jurisdiction	
   as	
   “directing	
   a	
   tort	
   to	
   Texas”	
   under	
   the	
   holding	
   in	
  

Michiana.	
  	
  The	
  present	
  case	
  differs	
  markedly	
  from	
  the	
  facts	
  in	
  Proskauer	
  

Rose.	
   	
   In	
   the	
   present	
   case,	
   Rolnick’s	
   filing	
   of	
   the	
   UCC-­‐1	
   in	
   Texas	
   is	
   the	
  

basis	
  on	
  which	
  the	
  plaintiffs	
  claim	
  liability.	
  

	
         Markette	
   v.	
   X-­‐Ray	
   X-­‐Press	
   Corp.,	
   240	
   S.W.3d	
   464	
   (Tex.	
   App.—

Houston	
   [14th	
   Dist.]	
   2007,	
   no	
   pet.)	
   involved	
   an	
   Indiana	
   attorney	
  

representing	
   a	
   Texas	
   resident	
   in	
   an	
   Indiana	
   lawsuit.	
   	
   The	
   client	
   had	
  

challenged	
  the	
  jurisdiction	
  of	
  the	
  Indiana	
  court,	
  and	
  that	
  challenge	
  had	
  

been	
   denied.	
   	
   The	
   attorney	
   wrote	
   the	
   Texas	
   client	
   and	
   reviewed	
   the	
  

three	
   alternatives	
   available	
   to	
   it,	
   one	
   of	
   which	
   was	
   to	
   allow	
   a	
   default	
  

judgment	
  in	
  Indiana	
  and	
  challenge	
  the	
  Indiana	
  court’s	
  jurisdiction	
  when	
  

the	
  plaintiff	
  in	
  the	
  Indiana	
  case	
  sought	
  to	
  enforce	
  the	
  judgment	
  in	
  Texas.	
  	
  

The	
  client	
  adopted	
  that	
  strategy,	
  and	
  it	
  ultimately	
  proved	
  unsuccessful.	
  	
  

When	
   the	
   client	
   sued	
   the	
   Indiana	
   lawyer	
   for	
   malpractice	
   in	
   Texas,	
   the	
  

court	
   again	
   applied	
   a	
   traditional	
   specific	
   jurisdiction	
   analysis	
   and	
  

	
                                                                                                                               21	
  
determined	
  that	
  it	
  had	
  to	
  focus	
  on	
  the	
  connection	
  between	
  the	
  contacts	
  

and	
   the	
   litigation,	
   and	
   it	
   rejected	
   the	
   “direct-­‐a-­‐tort”	
   theory.	
   	
   The	
   mere	
  

sending	
   of	
   a	
   letter	
   from	
   one	
   jurisdiction	
   to	
   another,	
   as	
   in	
   Proskauer,	
  

differs	
   markedly	
   from	
   the	
   filing	
   of	
   a	
   legal	
   document	
   such	
   as	
   a	
   UCC-­‐1,	
  

especially	
  when	
  the	
  filing	
  of	
  that	
  UCC-­‐1	
  is	
  at	
  the	
  core	
  of	
  the	
  litigation.	
  

	
        Under	
   the	
   controlling	
   decisions	
   by	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Court	
   of	
   Texas	
  

and	
   the	
   evidence	
   in	
   this	
   record,	
   Rolnick	
   had	
   sufficient	
   minimum	
  

contacts	
   with	
   Texas	
   to	
   subject	
   him	
   to	
   jurisdiction	
   in	
   this	
   case.	
  	
  

Accordingly,	
   the	
   District	
   Court	
   of	
   Travis	
   County	
   has	
   personal	
  

jurisdiction	
   of	
   him,	
   and	
   the	
   trial	
   court	
   correctly	
   decided	
   that	
   the	
  

minimum-­‐contacts	
   requirements	
   of	
   the	
   Texas	
   Long-­‐Arm	
   statute	
   had	
  

been	
  satisfied.	
  

                                  Fair	
  Play	
  and	
  Substantial	
  Justice	
  

	
        Even	
   if	
   a	
   defendant	
   has	
   the	
   minimum	
   contacts	
   with	
   Texas	
   to	
  

justify	
  the	
  assertion	
  of	
  jurisdiction	
  under	
  the	
  long-­‐arm	
  statute,	
  the	
  court	
  

cannot	
  exercise	
  jurisdiction	
  if	
  doing	
  so	
  would	
  offend	
  traditional	
  notions	
  

of	
  fair	
  play	
  and	
  substantial	
  justice.	
  	
  Burger	
  King	
  Corp.	
  v.	
  Rudzewicz,	
   471	
  

U.S.	
   462,	
   477	
   (1985).	
   	
   Only	
   in	
   “rare	
   cases”	
   will	
   the	
   exercise	
   of	
  

jurisdiction	
  not	
  comport	
  with	
  fair	
  play	
  and	
  substantial	
  justice	
  when	
  the	
  

nonresident	
   defendant	
   has	
   minimum	
   contacts	
   with	
   the	
   forum	
   state.	
  	
  

	
                                                                                                                        22	
  
Burger	
  King	
  at	
  471.	
  	
  In	
  determining	
  whether	
  the	
  assertion	
  of	
  jurisdiction	
  

comports	
  with	
  fair	
  play	
  and	
  substantial	
  justice,	
  the	
  court	
  considers	
  (1)	
  

the	
   burden	
   on	
   the	
   defendant;	
   (2)	
   the	
   interests	
   of	
   the	
   forum	
   state	
   in	
  

adjudicating	
   the	
   dispute;	
   (3)	
   the	
   plaintiff’s	
   interest	
   in	
   obtaining	
  

convenient	
   and	
   effective	
   relief;	
   (4)	
   the	
   interstate	
   judicial	
   system’s	
  

interest	
  in	
  obtaining	
  the	
  most	
  efficient	
  resolution	
  of	
  controversies;	
  and	
  

(5)	
   the	
   shared	
   interest	
   of	
   the	
   several	
   States	
   in	
   furthering	
   fundamental	
  

substantive	
  social	
  policies.	
  	
  Royal	
  Guardian	
  at	
  232.	
  

	
       The	
   burden	
   on	
   this	
   particular	
   defendant	
   is	
   certainly	
   no	
   greater	
  

than	
   that	
   on	
   any	
   nonresident	
   defendant	
   who	
   must	
   defend	
   himself	
   in	
  

another	
   jurisdiction.	
   	
   However,	
   defending	
   himself	
   in	
   Texas	
   would	
   not	
  

put	
   a	
   significantly	
   higher	
   burden	
   on	
   Rolnick	
   than	
   defending	
   himself	
   in	
  

Florida,	
  although	
  he	
  would	
  probably	
  have	
  to	
  travel	
  to	
  Texas	
  for	
  the	
  trial.	
  	
  

While	
   the	
   initial	
   discovery	
   in	
   this	
   case	
   was	
   limited	
   to	
   the	
   issue	
   of	
  

jurisdiction,	
   Rolnick	
   has	
   already	
   been	
   deposed	
   and	
   it	
   may	
   not	
   be	
  

necessary	
   to	
   depose	
   him	
   again.	
   	
   Therefore,	
   the	
   added	
   burden	
   of	
  

defending	
   himself	
   in	
   Texas	
   would	
   be	
   minimal,	
   especially	
   when	
  

compared	
  to	
  the	
  additional	
  burden	
  on	
  the	
  plaintiff	
  and	
  other	
  defendants	
  

in	
  pursuing	
  Rolnick	
  in	
  Florida	
  in	
  a	
  separate	
  case.	
  

	
                                                                                                                 23	
  
	
        The	
   interests	
   of	
   Texas	
   in	
   adjudicating	
   the	
   dispute	
   certainly	
  

outweigh	
   the	
   interests	
   of	
   any	
   other	
   state	
   in	
   adjudicating	
   this	
   dispute.	
  	
  

This	
  dispute	
  involves	
  interests	
  in	
  Texas	
  assets,	
  including	
  real	
  property.	
  	
  

The	
   dispute	
   involves	
   the	
   application	
   of	
   Texas	
   law,	
   and	
   the	
   dispute	
  

involves	
   the	
   adjudication	
   of	
   the	
   liability	
   of	
   three	
   Texas	
   entities.	
   	
   Since	
  

Rolnick	
   is	
   the	
   one	
   largely	
   (if	
   not	
   solely)	
   responsible	
   for	
   any	
   failure	
   to	
  

comply	
   with	
   the	
   standard	
   of	
   care,	
   Texas	
   has	
   a	
   significant	
   interest	
   in	
  

adjudicating	
  the	
  liability	
  of	
  all	
  the	
  parties	
  in	
  one	
  suit.	
  

	
        The	
   plaintiff	
   can	
   only	
   get	
   jurisdiction	
   of	
   RAR,	
   BCBV,	
   and	
   A&G	
   in	
  

Texas.	
   	
   While	
   the	
   plaintiffs	
   are	
   Florida	
   residents,	
   the	
   plaintiffs	
   must	
  

litigate	
   their	
   claim	
   against	
   the	
   Texas	
   defendants	
   in	
   Texas.	
   	
   It	
   is	
   certainly	
  

more	
   convenient	
   for	
   the	
   plaintiffs	
   to	
   litigate	
   one	
   case	
   against	
   all	
   of	
   the	
  

defendants	
   in	
   Texas	
   than	
   to	
   litigate	
   one	
   case	
   in	
   Texas	
   against	
   three	
  

Texas	
  defendants	
  and	
  one	
  case	
  in	
  Florida	
  against	
  one	
  Florida	
  defendant.	
  	
  

Additionally,	
   RAR	
   is	
   the	
   party	
   who	
   initially	
   joined	
   Rolnick	
   in	
   this	
  

litigation.	
   	
   It	
   is	
   certainly	
   more	
   convenient	
   and	
   effective	
   for	
   RAR	
   to	
  

litigate	
  one	
  case	
  in	
  Texas	
  than	
  to	
  have	
  to	
  defend	
  the	
  case	
  in	
  Texas,	
  and	
  if	
  

an	
  adverse	
  result	
  is	
  reached,	
  pursue	
  a	
  separate	
  case	
  against	
  Rolnick	
  in	
  

Florida.	
  

	
                                                                                                                         24	
  
	
           For	
  the	
  interstate	
  judicial	
  system,	
  the	
  most	
  efficient	
  resolution	
  of	
  

this	
   dispute	
   is	
   to	
   dispose	
   of	
   it	
   in	
   one	
   trial.	
   	
   Since	
   the	
   Texas	
   defendants	
  

are	
  only	
  amenable	
  to	
  jurisdiction	
  in	
  Texas,	
  the	
  most	
  efficient	
  resolution	
  

is	
   to	
   try	
   one	
   case	
   in	
   Texas	
   against	
   all	
   defendants,	
   including	
   Rolnick,	
  

rather	
   than	
   try	
   one	
   case	
   in	
   Texas	
   and	
   potentially	
   multiple	
   cases	
   in	
  

Florida.	
  	
  	
  

             It	
   is	
   the	
   rare	
   case	
   indeed	
   when	
   asserting	
   jurisdiction	
   over	
   a	
  

nonresident	
   offends	
   the	
   traditional	
   notions	
   of	
   fair	
   play	
   and	
   substantial	
  

justice	
   if	
   the	
   defendant	
   has	
   sufficient	
   minimum	
   contacts	
   to	
   support	
  

jurisdiction.	
  	
  This	
  is	
  not	
  that	
  rare	
  case.	
  	
  Rolnick	
  has	
  sufficient	
  minimum	
  

contacts	
   with	
   Texas	
   to	
   support	
   the	
   assertion	
   of	
   jurisdiction,	
   and	
   the	
  

assertion	
   of	
   that	
   jurisdiction	
   does	
   not	
   offend	
   traditional	
   notions	
   of	
   fair	
  

play	
  and	
  substantial	
  justice.	
  

                                                      CONCLUSION	
  

	
           The	
   transaction	
   out	
   of	
   which	
   this	
   case	
   grows	
   was	
   a	
   Texas	
  

transaction	
   involving	
   Texas	
   assets	
   and	
   Texas	
   real	
   property	
   interests.	
  

Rolnick	
   was	
   the	
   person	
   who	
   negotiated	
   the	
   contract,	
   prepared	
   all	
   of	
   the	
  

documents,	
   closed	
   the	
   transaction,	
   and	
   determined	
   to	
   record	
   the	
  

security	
   interest	
   in	
   Texas.	
   	
   Rolnick’s	
   contacts	
   with	
   Texas,	
   especially	
   in	
  

the	
   all-­‐important	
   recording	
   of	
   the	
   UCC-­‐1	
   in	
   Texas,	
   were	
   not	
   fortuitous	
  

	
                                                                                                                              25	
  
but	
  rather	
  were	
  deliberate.	
  	
  If	
  recording	
  the	
  UCC-­‐1	
  in	
  Texas,	
  as	
  Rolnick	
  

did,	
  is	
  the	
  basis	
  of	
  liability,	
  then	
  Rolnick	
  certainly	
  had	
  minimum	
  contacts	
  

with	
  Texas.	
  	
  If	
  the	
  plaintiffs	
  are	
  going	
  to	
  assert	
  that	
  there	
  was	
  negligence	
  

in	
   the	
   way	
   the	
   security	
   interest	
   was	
   perfected	
   by	
   filing	
   in	
   Texas,	
   then	
  

Rolnick	
   needs	
   to	
   answer	
   for	
   that	
   act.	
   	
   It	
   is	
   only	
   fair	
   and	
   just	
   that	
   he	
   be	
   a	
  

party	
  to	
  this	
  proceeding.	
  

                                                                PRAYER	
  

	
          Wherefore,	
   Appellee	
   Riggs,	
   Aleshire	
   &	
   Ray	
   prays	
   that	
   the	
   court	
  

affirm	
  the	
  order	
  of	
  the	
  trial	
  court	
  denying	
  Rolnick’s	
  special	
  appearance.	
  

                                                                                     KIDD LAW FIRM
                                                                                     819 West 11th Street
                                                                                     Austin, TX 78701
                                                                                     512-330-1709 (fax)
                                                                                     /s/Scott R. Kidd
                                                                                     Scott R. Kidd
                                                                                     State Bar No. 11385500
                                                                                     512-330-1713
                                                                                     scott@kiddlawaustin.com
                                                                                     Scott V. Kidd
                                                                                     State Bar No. 24065556
                                                                                     512-542-9895
                                                                                     svk@kiddlawaustin.com

                                                Certificate of Compliance

     This brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 9.4. This brief was prepared using Microsoft Word for
MAC, and exlusive of the exempted portions listed in Rule 9.4 contains
5157 words.
                                           /s/Scott R. Kidd

	
                                                                                                                                            26	
  
                          Certificate of Service

      A copy of this brief has been served on Ruth Malinas, J. Hampton
Skelton, Michael Johnson, and Robert Valdez through the electronic filing
system this 29th day of July, 2015.

                                                   /s/Scott R. Kidd

                                    	
  

	
     	
  

	
     	
  

	
  

	
  

	
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