Court Opinion

ID: 9892948
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-25 16:10:07.499322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:40.784340
License: Public Domain

J-A18016-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JALASPIAN CHARLES                            :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 805 WDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 3, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-02-CR-0002325-2020

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.:                           FILED: OCTOBER 25, 2023

       Jalaspian Charles appeals from the judgment of sentence, entered in the

Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, following his convictions of first-

degree murder,1 recklessly endangering another person (REAP),2 and carrying

a firearm without a license.3 After review, we affirm.

       On the evening of May 27, 2019, Dezhane Ferguson and Mattie Sims

were walking in the Chauncey Drive area of Bedford Dwellings in the Hill

District of Pittsburgh.      Ferguson and Sim encountered Damian Gray, an

acquaintance, and struck up a conversation with him.         As they conversed,

Charles approached the group and aggressively confronted Ferguson, stating
____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a).

2 Id. at § 2705.

3 Id. at § 6106(a)(1).
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“I’ll have my bitch whoop your ass.”4 At that time, Ferguson, Sims, and Grey

attempted to leave the area; however, Charles followed them.

         Immediately thereafter, Charles whistled toward a vehicle occupied by

his girlfriend, Doshanic McLauren.             McLauren exited the vehicle and, at

Charles’ behest, engaged in a physical altercation with Ferguson. During the

altercation, Charles brandished a firearm5 and demanded that Ferguson and

McLauren continue to fight. Charles then pointed the firearm at Sims’ face

and threatened to shoot her when Sims attempted to intercede on Ferguson’s

behalf.

         Shortly thereafter, the victim, Isaac Harrison, appeared at the scene

and attempted to break up the fight between Ferguson and McLauren. Charles

aggressively approached Harrison with the firearm, and an argument between

Charles and Harrison ensued. While exchanging words, Harrison backed away

from Charles. Charles also began to walk away from Harrison and towards

his vehicle; however, Charles turned around to reengage with Harrison.

Charles then shot Harrison multiple times, as Harrison attempted to flee to

safety. Charles and McLauren returned to the vehicle in which they arrived

and fled the scene.

____________________________________________

4 The events described herein were captured via surveillance video, discussed

infra.

5 Charles did not have a license to carry a firearm.           See N.T. Jury Trial,
11/8/21, at 350-51.

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       City of Pittsburgh Police officers responded to a notification regarding

shots that had been fired at or near 2507 Bedford Avenue. Upon their arrival,

the officers were informed by dispatch that Harrison had been transported by

a private vehicle to the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center (UPMC) Mercy.

The officers encountered an innocent bystander, Terrina Daniels, who was

shot in the foot by one of Charles’ bullets but survived her injuries. The area

was processed, and ten spent shell casings were recovered. Jason Very, a

firearm and toolmarks expert from the medical examiner’s office, determined

that all ten casings, which were the only casings recovered from the murder

scene, had been fired from the same gun.

       Harrison was pronounced dead at UPMC Mercy at 11:13 p.m. on May

27, 2019. Todd Luckashevic, M.D., a forensic pathologist and the associate

Medical Examiner for the Allegheny Counter Medical Examiner’s Office,

performed an autopsy on Harrison and determined that Harrison suffered five

separate gunshot wounds—one each to his upper chest, right thigh, and left

foot, and two to his back. Doctor Luckasevic concluded that Harrison died as

a result of the gunshot wounds, and his manner of death was ruled a homicide.

       Within three hours of Harrison’s death, detectives identified Charles and

his vehicle from a surveillance video obtained from the housing authority. 6 A

search warrant was executed for Charles’ vehicle, which revealed large
____________________________________________

6 Detectives were able to identify Charles as the person with the firearm and

his vehicle in the housing authority video because they were familiar with him
from prior encounters. See N.T. Jury Trial, 11/6/21, at 169, 183-88; id.,
11/7/21, at 197-98, 201, 216.

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amounts of road dirt and grime on it, except for the areas on the top of the

driver and passenger doors, which had been wiped clean. After the shooting,

Charles avoided returning to his home, and he evaded arrest for several

months.     Ultimately, Charles was located and arrested in Colorado, five

months after the shooting occurred.

       The Commonwealth charged Charles with the aforementioned offenses7

and, on October 6, 2021, he proceeded to a jury trial, during which he testified

that he shot and killed Harrison in defense of himself and his family. The jury

convicted Charles of the above-mentioned offenses. The trial court deferred

sentencing and ordered the preparation of a pre-sentence investigation report

(PSI). On February 3, 2022, the trial court imposed a mandatory term of life

imprisonment without parole for Charles’s first-degree murder conviction, a

consecutive term of imprisonment of one to two years for carrying a firearm

without a license, and an additional term of one to two years’ incarceration for

the REAP conviction, to be served consecutively to the sentence for the

firearms violation sentence.        On February 14, 2022, Charles filed a timely

____________________________________________

7 Charles was also charged with person not to possess a firearm. However, on

September 16, 2021, the trial court issued an order severing the charge from
the case to a separate jury trial, upon Charles’s request.

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post-sentence motion,8, 9 which the trial court denied on June 7, 2022. On

July 7, 2022, Charles filed a timely notice of appeal and a court-ordered

Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.10

       Charles now raises the following questions for our review:

       [1.] Did the trial court err in sustaining [Charles’] conviction for
       murder in the first degree where the evidence at trial was
       quantitatively and/or qualitatively insufficient to disprove that
       [Charles] was acting reasonably and/or unreasonably in self-
       defense or defense of others?

       [2.] Did the trial court err in sustaining [Charles’] conviction for
       recklessly endangering another person where the evidence at trial
       was quantitatively and/or qualitatively insufficient to disprove that
       [Charles] was acting reasonably and/or unreasonably in self-
       defense or defense of others?

       [3.] Did the trial court err in sustaining [Charles’] conviction for
       carrying a firearm without a license where the evidence at trial
       was quantitatively and/or qualitatively insufficient to disprove that
       [Charles] possessed a pistol with a barrel length of less than 16

____________________________________________

8 The 10th day to file a timely post-sentence motion was February 13, 2022, a

Sunday, and accordingly, Charles had until February 14, 2022, to file a timely
post-sentence motion. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1908 (“[w]henever the last day of
any such time period shall fall on a Saturday or Sunday . . . such day shall be
omitted from the computation.”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(A)(1) (requiring “written
post-sentence motion shall be filed no later than 10 days after imposition of
sentence”).

9 On March 11, 2022, Charles filed an amended post-sentence motion, nunc

pro tunc, which expanded on the arguments set forth in his previously filed
post-sentence motion.

10 We note that neither the Rule 1925(b) order, nor the concise statement
appear in the record before this Court. Nevertheless, the docket indicates that
both were filed, and the trial court, in its opinion, references claims raised
therein. See Trial Court Opinion, 11/21/22, at 3-4. Accordingly, this omission
does not impede our review.

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      inches as determined from measuring the muzzle of the barrel to
      the face of the closed action, bolt, or cylinder?

Brief for Appellant, at 4.

      When examining a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we

adhere to the following standard of review:

      The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence
      is whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light
      most favorable to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence
      to enable the fact-finder to find every element of the crime beyond
      a reasonable doubt. In applying [the above] test, we may not [re-
      ]weigh the evidence and substitute our judgment for the fact-
      finder. In addition, we note that the facts and circumstances
      established by the Commonwealth need not preclude every
      possibility of innocence. Any doubts regarding a defendant’s guilt
      may be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak
      and inconclusive that[,] as a matter of law[,] no probability of fact
      may be drawn from the combined circumstances.                    The
      Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element
      of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly
      circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying the above test,
      the entire record must be evaluated and all evidence actually
      received must be considered. Finally, the [trier] of fact[,] while
      passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the
      evidence produced, is free to believe all, part[,] or none of the
      evidence.

Commonwealth v. Smith, 97 A.3d 782, 790 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation

omitted).

      In his first claim, Charles argues that the Commonwealth failed to

disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that his use of deadly force against

Harrison was undertaken in self-defense and/or in the defense of others. See

Brief for Appellant, at 13-26. Charles also argues that even if he was not

acting in self-defense and/or in the defense of others, he was acting in

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imperfect self-defense and/or defense of others, and, therefore, he should

have been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, rather than first-degree

murder.    See id. 15-26. We disagree.

      Pursuant to section 2502(a) of the Crimes Code, “[a] criminal homicide

constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional

killing.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(a). The Crimes Code defines “intentional killing”

as a “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing” of another person. Id. at §

2502(d). To sustain a conviction for first-degree murder, the Commonwealth

must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:            (1) a human being was

unlawfully killed; (2) the defendant, in fact, did the killing; (3) the defendant

acted with a specific intent to kill; and (4) the killing was done with

premeditation and deliberation.      Commonwealth v. Simmons, 662 A.2d

621, 627-28 (Pa. 1995); see also Commonwealth v. Counterman, 719

A.2d 284, 292 (Pa. 1998) (stating “no particular period of premeditation is

required to form the requisite intent”). The Commonwealth may prove the

specific   intent   to   kill   “solely    through   circumstantial   evidence.”

Commonwealth v. Blakeney, 946 A.2d 645, 652 (Pa. 2008). Moreover, a

fact-finder may infer the specific intent to kill “based on the defendant’s use

of a deadly weapon upon a vital part of the victim’s body.” Id.

      Charles argues that the Commonwealth failed to disprove that he was

acting in self-defense and/or defense of others. Generally, the use of force

against a person is justified “when the actor believes that such force is

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immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against the use

of unlawful force” by another person. 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 505(a). Moreover, the

use of force against a person is justified to protect a third person only when:

      (1) the actor would be justified under section 505 (relating to use
      of force in self-protection) in using such force to protect himself
      against the injury he believes to be threatened to the person
      whom he seeks to protect;

      (2) under the circumstances as the actor believes them to be, the
      person whom he seeks to protect would be justified in using such
      protective force; and

      (3) the actor believes that his intervention is necessary for the
      protection of such other person.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 506(a).

      In order to successfully invoke a “defense of others” claim, “the same

standards   which    are   required    for    self-defense    must   be     met.”

Commonwealth v. Simmons, 475 A.2d 1310, 1313 (Pa. 1984); see also

Commonwealth v. La, 640 A.2d 1336, 1346 (Pa. Super. 1994) (“Because

the right to take a human life is dependent upon the surrounding

circumstances, persons acting in defense of others are in the same situation

and upon the same plane, as those who act in defense of themselves”).

      There is no burden on the defendant to prove a claim of self-defense or

defense of others, but there must be some evidence, from any source, to

justify a finding of self-defense or defense of others.      Commonwealth v.

Black, 376 A.2d 627, 630 (Pa. 1977).         If there is any evidence that will

support the claim, then the issue is properly before the fact-finder.        See

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Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 585 A.2d 1069, 1071 (Pa. Super. 1991). “If

the defendant properly raises self-defense under Section 505 or defense of

other under Section 506,     the burden is on the Commonwealth to prove

beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's act was not justifiable self-

defense or defense of others.”   Commonwealth v. McClendon, 874 A.2d

1223, 1229-30 (Pa. Super. 2005).

      The Commonwealth can disprove a claim of self-defense or defense of

others by establishing that: “[1] the accused did not reasonably believe that

he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury; or [2] the accused provoked

or continued the use of force; or [3] the accused had a duty to retreat[,] and

the retreat was possible with complete safety.” Smith, 97 A.3d at 787. The

Commonwealth must establish only one of these three elements beyond a

reasonable doubt.   Commonwealth v. Burns, 765 A.2d 1144, 1149 (Pa.

Super. 2000).

      The finder of fact is not required to believe the defendant’s testimony

that he thought that he was in imminent danger and acted in self-defense or

defense of others. See Commonwealth v. Houser, 18 A.3d 1128, 1135 (Pa.

2011). Disbelief of the defendant’s testimony, however, is not sufficient to

satisfy the Commonwealth’s burden to disprove self-defense or defense of

others absent some evidence negating self-defense or defense of others.

Commonwealth v. Ward, 188 A.3d 1301, 1304 (Pa. Super. 2018).

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       Instantly, the record reveals that Charles arrived at Chancery Drive in

his vehicle with his girlfriend, McLauren, and approached Ferguson, Sims, and

Gray in an agitated state. See N.T. Jury Trial, 11/6/21, at 34; id., 11/8/21,

at 353, 462. Immediately thereafter, Charles directed McLauren to exit the

vehicle and, at Charles’s behest, McLauren engaged in a physical altercation

with Ferguson. Id., 11/8/21, at 432-33; 459, 461-62. During the physical

altercation, Charles brandished a firearm and demanded that Ferguson

continue fighting McLauren. Id. at 463-64. Charles also pointed the firearm

in Sims’s face and threatened to shoot her when she tried to help Ferguson.

Id. Shortly thereafter, Harrison arrived at the scene and attempted to break

up the fight between Ferguson and McLauren. Id. at 463, 467. At this point,

Charles aggressively approached Harrison with the firearm. Id., 11/6/21, at

35. An argument between the two ensued, during which Harrison began to

back away from Charles. Id., 11/8/21, at 464-65, 473. Charles also started

to walk away from Harrison and towards his vehicle; however, Charles turned

back around to reengage with Harrison and then shot him. Id. at 464-65.

Even though Harrison had been struck in the chest and was running away

from Charles to safety, Charles continued to run towards Harrison and shot at

him 10 times, striking him with at least 5 of those shots. Id. 11/6/21, at 54-

56, 132; id., 11/7/21, at 210-11, 214; id., 11/7/21, at 351, 459, 468-69,

474.

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      Based upon the above facts, the Commonwealth disproved Charles’s

claim that he was acting in self-defense and/or in the defense of others beyond

a reasonable doubt where Charles employed an excessive use of force. See

Commonwealth v. Harvey, 812 A.2d 1190, 1196 (Pa. 2002) (even

assuming victim threatened defendant with deadly force before defendant

shot him, where “the autopsy report revealed that [the victim] had been shot

a total of six times, which was simply more force than would have been

necessary for [the defendant] to use in order to protect himself”); see also

Commonwealth v. Rivera, 983 A.2d 1211, 1222 n.10 (Pa. 2009) (“even if

[a]ppellant believed that [the victim] was pursuing him with a deadly weapon,

the use of force employed by [a]ppellant was excessive in that he shot [the

victim] a second time at close range after already having shot him in the chest,

causing the victim to fall forward”).

      Charles provoked the altercation by instigating the fight between

Ferguson and McLauren and by approaching Harrison in an agitated state with

a firearm when Harrison attempted to break up the fight. It is also evident

that Charles used deadly force when he brandished his firearm first at

Ferguson, demanding she continue to fight McLauren; when he pointed the

firearm in Sims’ face and threatened to shoot her; and when he approached

Harrison in an agitated state with his firearm. Similarly, it is apparent that

Charles escalated that force when he shot Harrison, continued to shoot at him

at least 10 times—striking Harrison with at least 5 of those shots, two of which

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struck Harrison in the back as he tried to run to safety. Smith, supra.

Moreover, Charles had an unobstructed path of retreat to his vehicle but

instead decided to reengage with Harrison and shoot at him. Meanwhile,

Harrison neither possessed or brandished a weapon or firearm at any point

during his interactions with Charles.11            Therefore, we conclude that the

Commonwealth offered sufficient evidence to disprove beyond a reasonable

doubt that Charles was acting in self-defense and/or in the defense of others.

See Smith, supra; see also Harvey, supra. Accordingly, we grant him no

relief.12

____________________________________________

11 No witness called by either the prosecution or the defense testified that they

saw Harrison in possession of a weapon, the surveillance footage did not
depict a weapon in Harrison’s hands at any stage of his interaction with
Charles, and Charles himself admitted at trial that Harrison’s hands were down
when he shot him. See N.T. Jury Trial, 11/8/21, at 468.

12 Moreover, we conclude that after shooting Harrison, Charles fled the scene

with McLauren in their vehicle and wiped clean the top of the driver side and
passenger’s side doors. See N.T. Jury Trial, 11/6/21, at 153; id., 11/7/21, at
221-30, 240; id., 11/8/21, at 351, 457, 469. The weapon Charles used to kill
Harrison was never found. See N.T. Jury Trial, 11/7/21, 214; id., 11/8/21,
at 351. Additionally, after fleeing the scene, Charles avoided returning to his
home, fled out of state, and evaded arrest for several months. See N.T.
11/7/21, at 216-17, 221-22; id., 11/8/21, at 305-351, 472; see also
Commonwealth v. Hughes, 865 A.2d 761, 792 (Pa. 2004) (conduct of
defendant after crime may be admitted showing guilt); Commonwealth v.
Bradley, 69 A.3d 253, 258-59 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“[D]efendant’s attempts to
cover up after a crime can be inferred to demonstrate consciousness of
guilt.”). Thus, Charles’s flight and subsequent attempted concealment of his
firearm also undermine his claim of self-defense.

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     Charles also argues that even if he was not acting in self-defense and/or

in the defense of others, he was acting in imperfect self-defense and/or

defense of others, and, therefore, he should have been found guilty or

voluntary manslaughter, not first degree murder.     See Brief for Appellant, at

15-16, 25-26.

     The Crimes Code defines voluntary manslaughter as follows:

     (b) Unreasonable belief killing justifiable.--A person who
     intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary
     manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the
     circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the
     killing under Chapter 5 of this title, but his belief is unreasonable.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2503(b).

     The defense of “imperfect self-defense,” which reduces the crime of

murder to voluntary manslaughter, exists where the defendant believed that

deadly force was necessary to protect himself or another against the use of

unlawful force, but that belief was unreasonable. See Commonwealth v.

Truong, 36 A.3d 592, 599 (Pa. Super. 2012). This defense applies only in

limited circumstances.    See Commonwealth v. Green, 273 A.3d 1080,

1087-88 (Pa. Super. 2022). This Court has recently stated:

     If the Commonwealth proves that the defendant’s belief that
     deadly force was necessary was unreasonable but does not
     disprove that [] the defendant genuinely believed that he was in
     imminent danger that required deadly force and does not disprove
     either of the other elements of self-defense, the defendant may
     be found guilty only of voluntary manslaughter under the defense
     of imperfect self-defense.

Commonwealth v. Jones, 271 A.3d 452, 459 (Pa. Super. 2021)

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     Charles’s claim of imperfect self-defense and/or defense of other fails

for the same reasons as his claim of self-defense and/or defense of others.

Namely, Charles provoked the altercation by drawing his firearm, and used

excessive force by repeatedly firing his weapon even after Harrison was

running to safety, and even though Harrison was unarmed.         See Jones,

supra. Accordingly, we grant Charles no relief.

     In Charles’s second claim, he argues that the Commonwealth failed to

present sufficient evidence to sustain his REAP conviction.    See Brief for

Appellant, at 26. Specifically, Charles contends that the Commonwealth failed

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Charles was not acting in self-

defense when he shot at Harrison, and thus, his claim of self-defense negates

any element of recklessness necessary for a conviction for REAP. See id. at

26-28. We disagree.

     The Crimes Code states that a person is guilty of REAP “if he recklessly

engages in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of

death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705(a). To sustain a REAP

conviction, the Commonwealth must establish the defendant had “a conscious

disregard of a known risk of death or great bodily harm to another person,”

and that the defendant “had an actual present ability to inflict harm and not

merely the apparent ability to do so.” Commonwealth v. Klein, 795 A.2d

424, 427-28 (Pa. Super 2002).

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      Based upon the previously stated facts, the Commonwealth disproved

Charles’s claim of self-defense, and thus properly convicted Charles of REAP.

See Commonwealth v. Hopkins, 747 A.2d 910, 916 (Pa. Super. 2000)

(“brandishing a loaded firearm during the commission of crime provides a

sufficient basis” for factfinder to conclude “that a defendant proceeded with

conscious disregard for the safety of others, and that he had the present ability

to inflict great bodily harm or death”); see also Commonwealth v. Headley,

242 A.3d 940, 944 (Pa. Super 2020) (citing Commonwealth v. Shaw, 2019

PA Super 21, 203 A.3d 281, 284 (Pa. Super. 2019)) (proof of a defendant

“[d]ischarging a firearm near another person or in a manner where the

projectile could have struck a person” is sufficient to support a REAP

conviction).

      Sufficient competent evidence existed to disprove Charles’s self-defense

claim. See Smith, supra. It is clear that Charles provoked the use of force

when he brandished his firearm at Ferguson, Sims, and Harrison. It is also

clear that Charles escalated that use of force by repeatedly firing at Harrison

even after Harrison ran to safety, striking Harrison with five bullets and an

innocent bystander, Daniels, in the foot. Conversely, no other individual at

the scene, other than Charles, either possessed and/or brandished a firearm.

      Moreover, sufficient evidence existed to establish the element of

recklessness to convict Charles for REAP. Charles shot at Harrison at least 10

times outside Bedford Dwellings, a residential housing community. Detective

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Joseph Fabos also testified at trial that, in addition to Sims, Ferguson, and

Gray, there were several other people seen on the surveillance video near the

scene of the accident.    N.T. Jury Trial, 11/7/21, at 220.      Therefore, we

conclude that the Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence to sustain

Charles’ REAP conviction. See Hopkins, supra; see also Headley, supra.

Accordingly, we grant him no relief.

      In his third claim, Charles argues that the Commonwealth presented

insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction for carrying a firearm without a

license. See Brief for Appellant, at 29-33. Specifically, Charles contends that

because the firearm was not recovered, and therefore, never presented to the

jury, and because no testimony was given regarding the length of the barrel

of the firearm, the Commonwealth failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt

that his firearm had a barrel length of 16 inches or less consistent with the

definition of a “firearm” in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102. See id. We disagree.

      The Crimes Code defines the crime of carrying a firearm without

a license as follows:

      (a) Offense defined.--

            (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any person
            who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person
            who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person,
            except in his place of abode or fixed place of business,
            without a valid and lawfully issued license under this chapter
            commits a felony of the third degree.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).

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      Essentially, the offense of carrying a firearm without a license requires

proof of three elements: “(a) the weapon was a firearm, (b) the firearm was

unlicensed, and (c) the firearm was concealed on or about the person outside

his home or place of business.” Commonwealth v. Parker, 847 A.2d 745,

750 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quotation and citation omitted).        For purposes of

Section 6106(a)(1), the Crimes Code defines a firearm as follows:

      "Firearm." Any pistol or revolver with a barrel length less than 15
      inches, any shotgun with a barrel length less than 18 inches or
      any rifle with a barrel length less than 16 inches, or any pistol,
      revolver, rifle or shotgun with an overall length of less than 26
      inches. The barrel length of a firearm shall be determined by
      measuring from the muzzle of the barrel to the face of the closed
      action, bolt or cylinder, whichever is applicable.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6102.

      The Commonwealth may establish the barrel length of a weapon under

section 6102 through direct or circumstantial evidence. Commonwealth v.

Rozplochi, 561 A.2d 25, 31 (Pa. Super. 1989); see also Commonwealth

v. Jennings, 427 A.2d 231, 235 (Pa. Super. 1981) (“the length of a weapon

can be determined from what an object looks like, feels like, sounds like, or is

like a firearm”).

      Based upon our review of the record, we agree with the trial court’s

determination that the testimony and evidence admitted at trial established

that Charles possessed a firearm within the definition of the statute. Trial

Court Opinion, 11/21/21, at 10 (relying on factors set forth in Jennings,

supra and Rozplochi, supra); see Commonwealth v. Brown, 2019 WL

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4034023, *4 (Pa. Super. Aug. 27, 2019) (unpublished memorandum

decision)13 (holding although no gun was ever recovered, evidence presented

at trial that defendant “removed the gun from the glove compartment of his

[vehicle], ‘a relatively small space,’ held it in one hand, and placed it in his

lap, evidence that it was not large,” and called weapon a “pistol” and a

“handgun” was sufficient to establish weapon was less than lengths set forth

in section 6102); see also Commonwealth v. King, 251 A.3d 1266, 1266

(Pa. Super. 2021) (eyewitness testimony that defendant “was holding

the firearm with one hand seemingly waving it around, coupled with [the]

characterization of the firearm as a ‘pistol,’ and absent any evidence of an

exceptionally long barrel length,” could permit a factfinder to reasonably “infer

that the firearm's barrel length met the definition set forth in section 6102.”).

       In the instant case, sufficient evidence existed for the jury to reasonably

conclude that the length of Charles’s firearm did not exceed the limits set forth

in section 6102. Although the firearm was never recovered, the firearm was

clearly visible in Charles’s right hand throughout the surveillance video played

for the jury at trial.      See N.T. Jury Trial, 11/8/21, at 361-362, 436-38.

Moreover, we emphasize that Charles, himself, testified at trial that he had a

firearm in his pocket the moment he exited his vehicle at the scene, and that

he removed this firearm from his pocket during the physical altercation

____________________________________________

13 Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 126(b), non-precedential decisions of this Court filed

after May 1, 2019, may be cited for their persuasive value.

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between McLauren and Ferguson.       See id., at 436-38, 460-61. Detective

Anthony Beatty, who arrived at the scene to identify, collect, and document

any evidence following the shooting, stated that the firearm used by Charles

was a semi-automatic pistol based on the shell casings collected at the scene.

See id., 11/6/21, at 93-96. Thus, the Commonwealth presented sufficient

evidence to sustain Charles’s conviction for carrying a firearm without a

license, and we afford him no relief. See King, supra; see also Brown,

supra.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 10/25/2023

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