Court Opinion

ID: 9663793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:50:58.75798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:56.491244
License: Public Domain

Heffernan, J.
(dissenting). As I understand the facts of this case, the defendant was charged with one offense and then, after all the evidence was in — after the defendant was foreclosed of any opportunity to defend on another charge — the judge sua sponte found the defendant guilty of a crime with which he had not been charged, but which he felt was proved by the evidence.
This on its face violates the provision of the Wisconsin Constitution stating:
“In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right ... to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him . . . .” Art. I, sec. 7.
In Roth v. State (1923), 180 Wis. 573, 576, 193 N. W. 650, we stated, in reversing a conviction in which the *145evidence showed that the defendant sold a product containing more than one-half percent alcohol, when he was not so charged:
“The defendant could not be accused of one offense and convicted of another [citing case]. Under the provisions of sec. 7, art. I, of the state constitution ... he was entitled to know the offense of which he was charged.”
The statute upon which the majority relies is not applicable. Sec. 957.16, Stats., refers to “variances.” The variances that may be disregarded or corrected by amendment are those “not material to the merits of the action.” In the instant case, as the majority opinion makes clear, the failure of proof resulted in the inapplicability of the entire count charged. The majority’s explanation of the fact that the new charge is not “double jeopardy” is proof that the new charge is materially different than the one appearing in the information. The difference is no mere variance.
Nor is it an answer to say, as does the majority, that, “he could have been subsequently prosecuted under sec. 947.15 (1) (a), Stats.” Of course, he could have been, but if he were, he then would have the option of defending himself to that charge or, as appears likely in this case, to plead guilty — a right that is too often overlooked — with the consequent possibility of seeking the court’s mercy.
I also consider the conclusion of the majority, that the issue cannot now be raised because there was no objection, to be without merit. If there was a waiver, it was of a constitutional right. While we have concluded that the presence of an attorney supplies the presumption that the defendant was apprised of his rights, we at least require an articulated waiver. In this case we have only a tacit agreement by counsel and no overt consent by the defendant. This is not sufficient. Although we are committed to the position that a waiver by a defendant who has counsel is made with full cognizance of his constitutional *145arights, we do adhere to the requirement, in absence of other proof, that there be an express waiver by the defendant. There was none here. Moreover, the failure of a party to object does not foreclose this court from raising the matter if justice so requires.
“The right, long ago established in English law, of everyone accused of crime to be informed of the nature of the accusation against him is expressly preserved in the constitutions of the several jurisdictions.” 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law, p. 352, sec. 325.
The defendant was convicted of a crime not charged against him. Fundamental fairness, as well as adherence to the Constitution of Wisconsin and federal due process, requires a reversal.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Wilkie joins me in this dissent.
The following memorandum was filed February 9, 1968.