Court Opinion

ID: 9908487
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-08 20:03:34.923079+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:12.403353
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                       Dec 08 2023, 11:30 am

                                                            CLERK
                                                        Indiana Supreme Court
                                                           Court of Appeals
                                                             and Tax Court

                        IN THE

 Indiana Supreme Court
           Supreme Court Case No. 23S-PL-358

                   Thomas DeCola,
                          Appellant,

                             –v–

         Norfolk Southern Corporation,
                          Appellee.

                  Decided: December 8, 2023

            Appeal from the LaPorte Circuit Court
                   No. 46C01-2111-PL-2250

           The Honorable Thomas Alevizos, Judge

  On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                       No. 23A-PL-610

                Opinion by Justice Slaughter
Chief Justice Rush and Justices Massa, Goff, and Molter concur.
Slaughter, Justice.

   Appellate jurisdiction here is premised on the trial court’s entry of a
final judgment. But the court’s entry—the denial of plaintiff’s summary-
judgment motion—was not final because (among other reasons) it did not
resolve all claims as to all parties. Thus, there was no final judgment. We
grant transfer, dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, and remand.

                                              I

   Through a subsidiary, defendant, Norfolk Southern Corporation,
owned property in LaPorte County, Indiana. In 2019, Norfolk fell
delinquent on its property taxes. Plaintiff, Thomas DeCola, bought the
property at a tax sale two years later. Afterward, the county auditor
issued DeCola a property-tax deed.

   Deed in hand, DeCola brought this suit against Norfolk to quiet title.
He sought judgment on the pleadings, which Norfolk opposed, arguing it
never received proper notice of anything—the county’s decision to tax the
property, the tax sale, the petition for tax deed, or its right of redemption.
Norfolk attached several exhibits to its opposition. DeCola’s reply, which
also included exhibits, argued the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
determine whether the tax deed was void for lack of notice. Norfolk’s sur-
reply asked the court to enter judgment for Norfolk on all DeCola’s
claims. Because the trial court considered evidence outside the pleadings,
it converted DeCola’s 12(C) motion to one for summary judgment. See
Ind. Trial Rule 12(C).

   In a detailed order, the trial court rejected DeCola’s jurisdictional
objection and found the tax deed was void because Norfolk did not
receive sufficient notice of the tax sale, the right of redemption, or the
petition for tax deed. The court ordered that DeCola’s “Motion for
Judgment on the Pleadings (converted to Summary Judgment) is
DENIED.” DeCola filed a motion to reconsider. And Norfolk filed its own
motion for final judgment, asking the court to award it summary
judgment on all claims. The trial court did not rule on either motion and,
by operation of law, the motion to reconsider was deemed denied. T.R.
53.4(B).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-358 | December 8, 2023         Page 2 of 4
   DeCola appealed the denial of summary judgment. His notice of appeal
said he was appealing “from a final order as defined by Ind. App. R.
2(H).” Reaching the merits, the court of appeals affirmed in a non-
precedential decision. DeCola v. Norfolk S. Corp., No. 23A-PL-610, at *8
(Ind. Ct. App. July 14, 2023) (mem.). The panel described the trial court’s
order as one denying DeCola’s motion for summary judgment and
“concluding that genuine issues of material fact exist as to whether
[Norfolk] received the statutorily required notices.” Ibid.

   DeCola then sought transfer, which we now grant, thus vacating the
appellate decision, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

                                             II

   An appellate court will typically hear an appeal only after a trial court
has entered a final judgment. Means v. State, 201 N.E.3d 1158, 1163 (Ind.
2023). The final-judgment rule’s rationale is to enhance judicial economy
by avoiding duplicative appeals. Ibid. The rule has exceptions, but no
exception applies here. DeCola premised his appeal on entry of a final
judgment below, and the court of appeals proceeded accordingly. Yet, on
this record, the trial court’s order satisfies none of the five definitions of a
“final judgment”—set out in Rule 2(H) of our appellate rules:

       •   The order did not “dispose[] of all claims as to all parties”. App.
           R. 2(H)(1). To the contrary, the order disposed of nothing.
           DeCola’s quiet-title claim remains, as does Norfolk’s lack-of-
           notice argument.

       •   The order made no express determination or direction in writing
           under Trial Rules 54(B) or 56(C) that judgment should be entered
           as to fewer than all issues, claims, or parties. Id. at 2(H)(2).

       •   The order was not deemed final under Trial Rule 60(C). Id. at
           2(H)(3).

       •   The order was not a ruling on a motion to correct error under
           Trial Rule 59. Id. at 2(H)(4).

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-358 | December 8, 2023          Page 3 of 4
       •   And the order was not otherwise deemed final by law. Id. at
           2(H)(5).

   No party raised the issue of appellate jurisdiction below, and neither
did the court of appeals. But whether an order is immediately appealable
is a jurisdictional question that cannot be waived and can be raised at any
time, including by a reviewing court on its own motion. Georgos v. Jackson,
790 N.E.2d 448, 451 (Ind. 2003). We raise the jurisdictional issue here to
remind ourselves and our judicial colleagues of the importance of
ensuring that courts exercise judicial power only where our jurisdiction is
secure. Imposing and enforcing limits on judicial power are important not
only in their own right, but in sending the vital message that we police
ourselves just as vigilantly as we do other government actors.

                                     *       *        *

  For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and
remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with our
opinion.

Rush, C.J., and Massa, Goff, and Molter, JJ., concur.

APPELLANT PRO SE
Thomas DeCola
North Judson, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE NORFOLK SOUTHERN
CORPORATION
Barry L. Loftus
Scotty N. Teal
Matthew M. Humble
Stuart & Branigin LLP
Lafayette, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 23S-PL-358 | December 8, 2023     Page 4 of 4