Court Opinion

ID: 9405090
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-27 15:09:41.293295+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:39.266479
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Philadelphia Community                            :
Development Coalition, Inc.                       :
                                                  :
               v.                                 :
                                                  :
Philadelphia Redevelopment                        :
Authority,                                        :   No. 213 C.D. 2022
                  Appellant                       :   Submitted: March 17, 2023

BEFORE:        HONORABLE PATRICIA A. McCULLOUGH, Judge
               HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
               HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                                     FILED: June 27, 2023

               The Philadelphia Redevelopment Authority (PRA) appeals from the
Philadelphia County Common Pleas Court’s (trial court) October 22, 2021 order1
(October 22, 2021 Order) terminating the Philadelphia Community Development
Coalition, Inc.’s (PCDC) Petition for the Appointment of Conservator (Petition),
lifting the lis pendens,2 and permitting PCDC to file a Petition for Costs. PRA

       1
          The trial court’s order was entered on November 4, 2021. In its Notice of Appeal, PRA
also appealed from the trial court’s October 22, 2021 order denying PRA’s Motion to Dismiss for
Lack of Jurisdiction; however, PRA abandoned that appeal in its brief to this Court. See PRA Br.
at 2. Therefore, this Court affirms that order. See Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908, 912
n.2 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted) (“[A]n issue identified on appeal but not developed in the
appellant’s brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived.”).
        2
          The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:
               A lis pendens is the jurisdiction, power, or control which courts
               acquire over property involved in a suit, pending the continuance of
               the action, and until its final judgment thereon. The existence of a
               lis pendens merely notifies third parties that any interest that may be
               acquired in the res pending the litigation will be subject to the result
               of the action and is not therefore an actual lien on the property. An
               order lifting a lis pendens during the course of an equity action fixes
presents four issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether the October 22, 2021 Order
is appealable as of right under Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Rule)
311(a)(2) or, in the alternative, as a collateral order under Rule 313(a); (2) whether
PCDC is precluded from recovering fees and costs relating to the Petition’s
preparation and filing, where a third party abated the conditions on the subject
property prior to a hearing on the merits; (3) whether the trial court erred by failing
to dismiss the action as moot, where the conditions complained of in the Petition
were abated by an independent third party prior to a hearing on the merits; and (4)
whether the American Rule,3 controlling Pennsylvania case law, and the statutory
language of Section 5(f) of the Abandoned and Blighted Property Conservatorship
Act (Act),4 preclude the recovery of attorney’s fees. After review, this Court affirms.

                                               Facts
               On April 13, 2021, PCDC filed its Petition pertaining to a building on
PRA’s property located at 3110 West Berks Street in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
(Property). Therein, PCDC alleged that the building on the Property (Building) met
the conditions for conservatorship under the Act. On May 7, 2021, the trial court
scheduled a June 23, 2021 status hearing on the Petition. On May 11, 2021, the
City’s Department of Licenses and Inspections (L&I) deemed the Property

               neither rights, duties, nor liabilities between the parties, puts no one
               out of court, and does not terminate the underlying litigation by
               prohibiting parties from proceeding with the action. Accordingly,
               the requisite “finality” is not present when a lis pendens is lifted and
               the order, therefore, is interlocutory.
U.S. Nat’l Bank in Johnstown v. Johnson, 487 A.2d 809, 812 (Pa. 1985) (citations omitted).
        3
          “The American Rule states that a litigant cannot recover counsel fees from an adverse
party unless there is express statutory authorization, a clear agreement of the parties[,] or some
other established exception.” Richard Allen Preparatory Charter Sch. v. Dep’t of Educ., 161 A.3d
415, 428 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017), aff’d, 185 A.3d 984 (Pa. 2018).
        4
          Act of November 26, 2008, P.L. 1672, as amended, 68 P.S. § 1105(f).
                                                  2
imminently dangerous. On May 13, 2021, L&I issued a demolition permit and, that
same day, the City hired a contractor that demolished the Building.5 On May 27,
2021, PRA answered the Petition and raised affirmative defenses, including that the
Building’s demolition rendered the Petition moot. On June 15, 2021, PCDC filed
its answer to PRA’s new matter and affirmative defenses.
                  On August 4, 2021, following oral argument, the trial court concluded
that the demolition rendered the matter moot and dismissed the Petition. On August
17, 2021, PCDC filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Motion for Post-Trial Relief
(Motion for Reconsideration), requesting the trial court to vacate its August 4, 2021
order.       On August 30, 2021, PRA submitted its response to the Motion for
Reconsideration. On September 2, 2021, the trial court granted the Motion for
Reconsideration and vacated its August 4, 2021 order.
                  The trial court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for October 22, 2021,
to determine whether PCDC met the conditions for conservatorship on the Petition’s
April 13, 2021 filing date. Prior to the evidentiary hearing, on September 28, 2021,
PRA filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Motion to Dismiss).6 The
trial court conducted the evidentiary hearing on October 22, 2021. At the hearing’s
conclusion, the trial court held that PCDC proved that the Property met the
conservatorship conditions on the Petition filing date, and terminated the Petition
because the Building’s demolition remediated the Property’s blighted condition.

         5
             The Property is now a vacant lot.
         6
             On October 19, 2021, PCDC filed its response to PRA’s Motion to Dismiss.

                                                 3
              The trial court declared in the October 22, 2021 Order:

              1. The [trial c]ourt finds that [PCDC] has satisfied its
              burden to show that the conditions of conservatorship have
              been met as of the date of filing of the Petition under
              Section [5(d) of the Act], 68 P.S. § 1105(d);
              2. The [trial c]ourt further finds that, [because] the City []
              having demolished the building on the [] Property
              subsequent to the filing of the [P]etition, the conditions
              alleged in the Petition and proven by [PCDC] have
              subsequently been remediated and no longer exist;
              3. The Petition is accordingly TERMINATED and the lis
              pendens LIFTED.
              4. [PCDC] may, no later than thirty (30) days from the
              docketing of this [October 22, 2021] Order, file a Petition
              for Fees and Costs to recover such fees and costs
              authorized under the Act.

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 250a. The trial court also denied PRA’s Motion to
Dismiss.7
              PRA appealed to the Pennsylvania Superior Court. On February 7,
2022, the appeal was transferred to this Court. On March 18, 2022, PCDC filed a
motion to quash the appeal (Motion to Quash) in this Court, alleging therein that this
Court lacks jurisdiction because the trial court’s orders are not final orders. On May
2, 2022, PRA filed its answer to the Motion to Quash. By May 10, 2022 Order, this
Court directed that the Motion to Quash be decided with the appeal’s merits.

       7
          On November 15, 2021, PRA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, renewing its request to
dismiss the Petition for lack of jurisdiction. On November 19, 2021, PCDC filed a Petition for
Statutory Costs and Fees. On December 3, 2021, PCDC filed its response to PRA’s Motion for
Reconsideration. On December 9, 2021, the trial court concluded that the Notice of Appeal
rendered PRA’s Motion for Reconsideration moot. On that same day, PRA filed its response to
PCDC’s Petition for Statutory Costs and Fees. On December 6, 2021, the trial court ordered PRA
to file a Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b) (Rule 1925(b)
Statement). On December 22, 2021, PRA filed its Rule 1925(b) Statement.
                                              4
                                            Discussion
                                        Motion to Quash
               Preliminarily, because PCDC’s Motion to Quash is dispositive, this
Court will address it first. PCDC argues that the trial court’s October 22, 2021 Order
is not appealable, and, therefore, the instant appeal should be quashed.8 PRA
contends that it may appeal from the October 22, 2021 Order as of right under Rule
311(a)(2) or, in the alternative, as a collateral order under Rule 313(a).
               Rule 311(a) provides, in pertinent part:

               General Rule. An appeal may be taken as of right and
               without reference to [Rule] 341(c) [(relating to
               determinations of finality)] from the following types of
               orders:
               ....
               (2) Attachments, etc. An order confirming, modifying,
               dissolving, or refusing to confirm, modify or dissolve an
               attachment, custodianship, receivership, or similar
               matter[9] affecting the possession or control of
               property . . . .

       8
          “In order to appeal to this Court as a matter of right, a party generally must take an appeal
from a final order as defined by [Rule] 341.” Saint Joseph Hosp. v. Berks Cnty. Bd. of Assessment
Appeals, 709 A.2d 928, 934 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998) (footnote omitted). Rule 341(b) states:
                A final order:
                        (1) disposes of all claims and of all parties;
                        ....
                        (3) is entered as a final order pursuant to subdivision (c) of
                        this rule; or
                        (4) is an order pursuant to subdivision (f) of this rule
                        [pertaining to post-conviction relief].
Pa.R.A.P. 341. The parties do not dispute that the October 22, 2021 Order was not a final order.
        9
          In Philadelphia Community Development Coalition v. Isabella (Pa. Cmwlth. Nos. 11, 12,
268 C.D. 2019, filed August 4, 2019), this Court concluded that an appeal from a proceeding under
the Act fell within Rule 311(a)(2). This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may be cited
“for [their] persuasive value, but not as a binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the
Commonwealth Court’s Internal Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). Isabella is cited
herein for its persuasive authority.
                                                  5
Pa.R.A.P. 311(a).
             Notably,

             [the Act] authorizes a court to appoint a conservator to
             rehabilitate a deteriorating building, thereby incurring
             debt that ultimately may be the owner’s responsibility.
             The conservator is responsible for bringing buildings into
             municipal code compliance when owners fail to do so.
             Section 2 of [the Act], 68 P.S. § 1102, authorizes the filing
             of a Petition for the Appointment of a Conservator with
             the court of common pleas by certain named interested
             parties who seek the appointment of a conservator to take
             possession of the property, undertake its rehabilitation
             and, as appropriate, ultimately sell the property unless
             reclaimed by the owner(s).

In re Conservatorship Proceeding in Rem by Germantown Conservancy, Inc., 995
A.2d 451, 453 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010). PCDC argues that the trial court’s October 22,
2021 Order is not appealable because, although the trial court found that conditions
existed for a conservator’s appointment under the Act, the trial court did not appoint
a conservator, and it dismissed the action after the Building’s demolition removed
the blight. Thus, PCDC asserts that the trial court’s October 22, 2021 Order did not
“affect[] the possession or control of property,” and it is not an appealable
interlocutory order under Rule 311.
             PRA retorts that “[a] conservatorship proceeding is a ‘similar matter,’
akin to an attachment, custodianship, or receivership invoking Rule 311(a)(2).”
PRA Br. at 12. Citing Triffin v. Interstate Printing Co., 515 A.2d 956 (Pa. Super.
1986), PRA equates the trial court’s October 22, 2021 Order “granting conditional
relief but not appointing a conservator” as “a refusal to confirm a conservatorship[.]”
PRA Br. at 14. In Triffin, a secured creditor sought to execute his judgment by
attaching the debtor’s bank accounts. The trial court denied the creditor’s motion
for entry of judgment on the pleadings, and the creditor appealed.

                                          6
               On appeal, the Pennsylvania Superior Court considered its jurisdiction
pursuant to Rule 311(a)(2), reasoning:

               Rule 311(a)(2) authorizes appeals from interlocutory
               orders that either do or refuse to modify, confirm[,] or
               dissolve attachments or similar matter[s] affecting the
               possession or control of property. The [b]ank asserts that
               the order of the trial court did not accomplish any of the
               results contemplated by Rule 311(a)(2).              [The
               Pennsylvania Superior Court] find[s] that the [b]ank’s
               assertion is incorrect.
               To comply with Rule 311(a)(2), [the creditor] sought
               judgment on the pleadings which, if granted, would have
               confirmed [the creditor’s] attachment.
               In opposing [the creditor’s] motion for judgment on the
               pleadings, the [b]ank was seeking to have the trial court
               refuse to confirm the attachment by not entering
               judgment against the garnishee [b]ank. This was the
               heart of the dispute that the [trial] court’s order
               resolved against [the creditor] and the court did so only
               after permitting discovery of the facts pertinent to
               whether the . . . accounts could be attached. There was
               no further action required by the [trial] court. The [trial]
               court had all relevant facts before it when it denied [the
               creditor’s] judgment on the pleadings, thereby
               refusing to confirm the attachment. [Rule] 311(a)(2).
               Therefore, [the creditor’s] appeal from the [trial]
               court’s denial of judgment on the pleadings falls
               squarely within [Rule] 311(a)(2), as an action refusing
               to confirm an attachment.[10]

Triffin, 515 A.2d at 957-58 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).
               Unlike in Triffin, which involved an attachment, the instant matter
involves a conservatorship “to take possession of the property, undertake its

       10
           In Foulke v. Lavelle, 454 A.2d 56 (Pa. Super. 1982), the Pennsylvania Superior Court
held that a trial court order, which denied a motion to set aside or stay a writ of attachment, “has
final aspects since it has the result of ‘affecting the possession or control of property.’ It therefore
falls within the class of orders which are appealable as o[f] right under [Rule] 311(a)(2).” Foulke,
454 A.2d at 58.
                                                   7
rehabilitation and, as appropriate, ultimately sell the property unless reclaimed by
the owner(s).” Germantown Conservancy, Inc., 995 A.2d at 453. Nonetheless, both
Triffin and the instant matter involve “an order . . . affecting the possession and
control of property[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 311(a). Although the Building was demolished,
the purpose of the trial court’s hearing was to determine whether the conservatorship
conditions were met as of the Petition’s filing date, i.e., whether to confirm a
conservator, or refuse to confirm a conservator.
             Further, the Act provides for a petitioner to recover fees and costs if the
petitioner meets the conditions for conservatorship. The PCDC alleged in the
Petition that “the Property is a vacant, three[-]story residential building . . . .” R.R.
at 33a. Section 3 of the Act defines “building” as, “[a] residential, commercial or
industrial building or structure and the land appurtenant thereto, including a vacant
lot on which a building has been demolished.” 68 P.S. § 1103 (emphasis added).
The fact that the building had been demolished does not alter the fact that the trial
court’s order denying the conservatorship affected the Property by declining to direct
that a conservator “take possession of the property[.]” Germantown Conservancy,
Inc., 995 A.2d at 453. It “was the heart of the dispute that the [trial] court resolved
. . . .” Triffin, 515 A.2d at 958. Accordingly, because the instant appeal “falls
squarely within [Rule] 311(a)(2),” id., this Court denies the Motion to Quash.

                                    Fees and Costs
             PRA contends that PCDC is precluded from recovering fees and costs
under the Act relating to its preparation and filing of the Petition because the
conditions on the Property were abated by a third party before a hearing on the
merits. See Section 10 of the Act, 68 P.S. § 1110. PRA further argues that fees and
costs may not be awarded under Section 5(f) of the Act, entitled “Conditional relief,”
68 P.S. § 1105(f) (Conditional Relief Provision).
                                           8
                Section 5(f) of the Act states:

                (1) If the court finds after a hearing that the conditions
                for conservatorship set forth in subsection (d) [(pertaining
                to conditions for conservatorship as of the date of the
                petition’s filing11)] have been established, but the owner
                represents that the conditions, violations or nuisance
                or emergency condition will be abated in a reasonable
                period, the court may allow the owner to proceed to
                remedy the conditions.
                (2) If the conditions set forth in paragraph (1) have been
                satisfied, the court shall enter an order providing that, in
                the event that the violations or nuisance or emergency
                conditions are not abated by the owner by a specific date
                or that other specified remedial activities have not
                occurred by a specific date or dates, an order granting the
                relief requested in the petition shall be entered.
                (3) The court shall also require the owner to post a bond in
                the amount of the repair costs estimated in the petition as
                a condition to retaining possession of the building.
                (4) Upon a finding that:
                     (i) the   petition          states       conditions         for
                     conservatorship; or
                     (ii) the owner elects to either:
                        (A) remedy all violations and nuisance or
                        emergency conditions; or
                        (B) sell the property              subject     to    the
                        conservatorship,
                the owner shall reimburse the petitioner for all costs
                incurred by the petitioner in preparing and filing the
                petition in accordance with the requirements of
                [S]ection 4 [of the Act] and the conservator’s or
                developer’s fee.

        11
           Section 5(d) of the Act states, in relevant part: “If a petition is filed under [S]ection 4 [of
the Act], the court may appoint a conservator if all of the following apply as of the date of filing[,]”
and lists relevant conditions thereunder. 68 P.S. § 1105(d) (emphasis added).
                                                    9
68 P.S. § 1105(f) (emphasis added).
            Section 10 of the Act, which addresses conservatorship termination,
similarly provides:

            Upon request of a party in interest or the conservator, the
            court may order the termination of the conservatorship if
            it determines:
            (1) the conditions that were the grounds for the petition
            and all other code violations have been abated or
            corrected, the obligations, expenses and improvements
            of the conservatorship, including all fees and expenses
            of the conservator, have been fully paid or provided for
            and the purposes of the conservatorship have been
            fulfilled;
            (2) the owner, mortgagee[,] or lienholder has requested the
            conservatorship be terminated and has provided adequate
            assurances to the court that the conditions that constituted
            grounds for the petition will be promptly abated, all
            obligations, expenses and improvements of the
            conservatorship, including all fees and expenses of the
            conservator, have been fully paid or provided for[,] and
            the purposes of the conservatorship have been fulfilled;
            (3) the building has been sold by the conservator and the
            proceeds distributed in accordance with [S]ection 9(d) [of
            the Act, 68 P.S. § 1109(d)]; or
            (4) the conservator has been unable, after diligent effort,
            to present a plan that could be approved under [S]ection
            6(b)(3) [of the Act, 68 P.S. § 1106(b)(3)] or to implement
            a previously approved plan or, for any reason, the purposes
            of the conservatorship cannot be fulfilled.

68 P.S. § 1110 (emphasis added).
            The Act’s language clearly represents the General Assembly’s intent
that, where a petition states conditions for conservatorship under the Act, fees and
costs should be awarded both when a conservator need not be appointed under the

                                        10
Conditional Relief Provision, see Section 5(f) of the Act, and when a conservator is
appointed. See Section 10 of the Act.
             PRA asserts that the Conditional Relief Provision applies only if, “after
a hearing[,]” 68 P.S. § 1105(f)(1) (emphasis added), the owner “elects[,]” 68 P.S. §
1105(f)(4)(ii) (emphasis added), to either remedy all violations or to sell the property
subject to the conservatorship. Here, PRA describes that PRA made no such
election; rather, L&I, by contractor, demolished the Building on the Property before
the hearing. PRA expounds:

             There is no provision in the Act providing for payment of
             costs and developer’s fees to a petitioner where an
             independent third party, here L&I, with the undisputed
             authority to do so, demolishes the [p]roperty prior to a
             hearing. The PRA, as owner here, never made any
             election or representation under the Conditional Relief
             [P]rovision . . . , either to remedy any alleged conditions
             or to sell the Property. Nor could it have done so, because
             of L&I’s intervening action that led to the [Building] being
             demolished. Accordingly, Section 5(f) of the Act is
             simply not applicable.

PRA Br. at 20-21.
             Contrary to PRA’s contention, the Conditional Relief Provision’s plain
language provides for payment of costs and fees when either the petition states
conditions for conservatorship or the owner elects to either remedy the violations or
sell the property. See 68 P.S. § 1105(f)(4); see also Francisville Neighborhood Dev.
Corp. v. Est. of Moore, 174 A.3d 1193 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017).
             In   Francisville,   a   neighborhood     organization    petitioned   for
appointment of a conservator. In its answer to the petition, the owner noted that the
property was listed for sale. At a hearing, the parties agreed to allow the property to
be sold. Following the property’s sale, the trial court held a hearing regarding fees

                                          11
and costs. The trial court granted fees and costs and a conservator’s fee and the
owner appealed. This Court stated:

             We recognize that “[t]he object of all interpretation and
             construction of statutes is to ascertain and effectuate the
             intention of the General Assembly.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).
             “Every statute, shall be construed to give effect to all of its
             provisions.” Id. (emphasis added). In ascertaining
             legislative intent, it is presumed that the General Assembly
             did not intend a result that is absurd or unreasonable. 1
             Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). Further[,] it is presumed that the
             General Assembly intends that the entire statute be
             effective and certain. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(2).
             Under the clear language of [the Conditional Relief
             Provision] there are two alternate findings which
             would require a trial court to award fees and costs to a
             petitioner . . . : 1) a finding that “the petition states
             conditions for conservatorship;” or 2) the owner makes
             certain elections, including to “sell the property subject to
             the conservatorship.” 68 P.S. § 1105(f)(4).

Francisville, 174 A.3d at 1199-1200 (bold emphasis added). The Francisville Court
also rejected the property owner’s argument that a conservatorship fee should not be
paid to the petitioner because it was not appointed conservator, stating: “Section
[]5(f) of the Act expressly requires the conservatorship fee to be paid to the petitioner
. . . if the trial court makes a finding satisfying one of the alternate statutory bases
for award of fees and costs.” Francisville, 174 A.3d at 1200.
             PRA attempts to distinguish Francisville on the basis that, therein, the
property owner elected to sell the property after the hearing, and such circumstances
fall squarely within the Conditional Relief Provision, thereby authorizing an award
of fees and costs. In contrast, PRA argues that, in the instant matter, “by the time of
the first status hearing . . . , the [Building] had been completely demolished by a
contractor selected by L&I.” PRA Br. at 20.

                                           12
              However, notwithstanding that PRA did not explicitly make an election
to “remedy all violations and nuisance or emergency conditions[,]” 68 P.S. §
1105(f)(4)(ii)(A), such was not necessary for PCDC to be awarded fees and costs.
As the Francisville Court noted, one of the “two alternate findings which would
require a trial court to award fees and costs to a petitioner . . . [is] a finding that ‘the
petition states conditions for conservatorship[.]” Id. at 1200. Here, the trial court
expressly found that “the conditions of conservatorship ha[d] been met[.]” R.R. at
250a. Accordingly, the trial court correctly held that PCDC was not precluded from
recovering fees and costs under the Act related to the Petition’s preparation and
filing.

                                      Mootness
              PRA next argues that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the action
as moot, where the conditions described in the Petition were abated by an
independent third party before a hearing on the merits.
              This Court has explained:

              Generally, courts do not decide moot issues. A case is
              moot if there exists no actual case or controversy, and the
              controversy must continue at every stage of a judicial
              proceeding. Mistich v. Commonwealth, 863 A.2d 116, 119
              (Pa. Cmwlth. 2004). This Court has described “actual case
              or controversy” as follows:
                     (1) a legal controversy that is real and not
                     hypothetical, (2) a legal controversy that
                     affects an individual in a concrete manner so
                     as to provide the factual predicate for a
                     reasoned adjudication, and (3) a legal
                     controversy with sufficiently adverse parties
                     so as to sharpen the issues for judicial
                     resolution.
              Id. A case is moot when a determination will not have any
              practical effect on the existing controversy. Butler v.
                                            13
              Indian Lake Borough, 14 A.3d 185, 188 (Pa. Cmwlth.
              2011).

Szabo v. Commonwealth, 212 A.3d 1168, 1172 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (citation
omitted).
              Following the trial court’s August 4, 2021 order determining that the
demolition rendered the matter moot, the trial court granted PCDC’s Motion for
Reconsideration based on the Act’s requirement that the trial court evaluate whether
conditions exist to appoint a conservator as of the date of the Petition’s filing. Upon
reconsideration, the trial court ruled that the matter was not moot because the issue
before the trial court was whether the conditions existed as of the Petition’s filing
date, rather than the hearing date. The subsequent remediation by the Building’s
demolition did not dispose of that issue. The trial court was required to conduct a
hearing in order to comply with the Act’s provisions and to consider whether the Act
required PRA to pay fees and costs. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted
reconsideration and refused to dismiss the case for mootness.12

                                         Conclusion
              For all of the above reasons, the Motion to Quash is denied, and the
trial court’s October 22, 2021 Order is affirmed.

                                            _________________________________
                                            ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

       12
           PRA also contends that the American Rule, controlling Pennsylvania case law, and the
statutory language of Section 5(f)(4) of the Act, preclude the recovery of attorney’s fees absent
statutory authority. Because this Court concluded herein that the Act provided for the award of
fees and costs, PRA’s contention is without merit.
                                               14
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Philadelphia Community               :
Development Coalition, Inc.          :
                                     :
            v.                       :
                                     :
Philadelphia Redevelopment           :
Authority,                           :   No. 213 C.D. 2022
                  Appellant          :

                                 ORDER

            AND NOW, this 27th day of June, 2023, the Philadelphia Community
Development Coalition, Inc.’s Motion to Quash is DENIED and the Philadelphia
County Common Pleas Court’s October 22, 2021 orders are AFFIRMED.

                                   _________________________________
                                   ANNE E. COVEY, Judge