Court Opinion

ID: 9494672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:43:49.522611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:33.075182
License: Public Domain

PARKER, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I wholly concur with Section II.B. of the majority opinion, which vacates the conviction because of the inappropriate way in which the jury was selected. I also concur in the majority’s conclusion in Section II.A. that 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) represents a constitutional exercise of Congress’s power under the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, although I disagree with a portion of the reasoning in support of that conclusion. I also respectfully dissent from the majority’s analysis of the meaning of the word “because” in section II.A.1.C. and its con-*214elusion in Section II.A.2.B.(b) that the government presented sufficient evidence that this crime was committed because of the fact that Yankel Rosenbaum (“Rosen-baum”) was using a public street at the time he was attacked. I concur in the remainder except as otherwise specifically noted in this partial dissent.
I. The Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 24.5(b)(2)(B) under the Thirteenth Amendment.
I agree with that portion of the majority’s analysis which concludes that the Thirteenth Amendment provides Congress with the authority to prohibit violent acts directed at persons by virtue of their religion. In other words, I agree that Congress’s power to enforce the elimination of slavery in this country is not limited to enslavement, or its badges and incidents, by virtue of race.
I do not agree with the majority’s statement, however, that there is “strong precedent” to support the view “that the Thirteenth Amendment extends its protections to religions directly and thus to members of the Jewish religion, without” regard to race. The fact is that the Thirteenth Amendment was enacted in response to the enslavement of African-Americans in this country, and congressional enactments pursuant to the Amendment have been directed at the plight of African-Americans in the aftermath of that enslavement. It is not surprising, therefore, that the case law has addressed itself to situations arising out of racial rather than religious or other discrimination. Precedent suggesting that the Thirteenth Amendment is not restricted to racial animus is limited. We have the dicta in Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102, 91 S.Ct. 1790, 29 L.Ed.2d 338 (1971), that “perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminating animus” may be addressed under the Thirteenth Amendment, and the fact that in United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 108 S.Ct. 2751, 101 L.Ed.2d 788 (1988), protection against involuntary servitude was addressed without consideration of the class to which the victims belonged.
However, it is beyond dispute, as the opinion states, that the Thirteenth Amendment does not make any reference to race. It abolishes “slavery” and “involuntary servitude.” Given the fact, pointed out in the majority opinion, that throughout history enslavement has occurred without regard to race, there is every reason to conclude that the Thirteenth Amendment is not limited to slavery that is imposed by virtue of race.
Nor do I agree with that portion of the majority’s analysis which indicates that because Jews were considered to be a race at the time of the enactment of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to provide religious protection under § 245(b)(2)(B). If the power of Congress, under the Thirteenth Amendment, were limited to providing protection by virtue of race, then the fact that Jews were considered a race in the mid-Nineteenth Century does not seem to me to support the enactment of a statute which provides religious protection in the mid-Twentieth Century when Judaism was considered a religion. This I think is especially true since this entire case was tried as a religious discrimination case, not a race discrimination case. However, since, as I indicated above, I believe that the Thirteenth Amendment provides congressional power to prohibit imposition of the badges and incidents of slavery on the basis of religion, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that § 245(b)(2)(B) is constitutional. I do not, however, concur in footnote 29 on page 59, which is wholly dicta and in no way affects the results in this case.
*215II. Motive — Use of a Public Facility.
The defendants argue that there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that the defendants acted “because” the victim Rosenbaum was “enjoying any ... facility ... provided or administered by any State or subdivision thereof,” 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B), that is, that the violence occurred in part because the victim was using a public street. The majority opinion disagrees with that argument in part on the basis of statutory construction contained in section II.A.1.C. and in part on the basis of the jury’s ability to draw inferences of intent from the circumstantial evidence presented. (Section II. A.2.B.(b).) I cannot agree with either portion of the majority opinion.
The majority first goes astray, in my view, when it concludes that the meaning of the word “because” in 18 U.S.C. § 245(b)(2)(B) is anything but plain, i.e. ambiguous. The argument proceeds from the sound observation that “[cjausation is one of the most famously complicated concepts in language and in law.” The opinion refers by way of example to “cause in fact,” “but for” cause, “proximate” or “legal” cause and “causal link or tendency,” used in modern tort law. This is all very well but does little to further the inquiry of the meaning of the word “because” which appears in the criminal statute at issue here and seems to have suffered not at all from the complications surrounding the word “cause.” In fact, “because” does not even appear as a defined word in either Black’s1 or Bouvier’s2 Law Dictionaries. This suggests to me at least that the word should be given its ordinary, uncomplicated meaning.
Because is defined in Webster’s Third International Dictionary as a preposition3 as “by reason of: on account of.” Webster’s Third International Dictionary 194 (14th ed.1961). This I take to be' the word’s plain meaning and I therefore disagree with the majority’s view that “the face of the Act is inescapably ambiguous -” I do, however, agree, as the majority points out, that “[w]hen confronted with a statute which is plain and unambiguous on its face, [a court] ordinarily do[es] not look to legislative history as a guide to its meaning.” (citations omitted).
There are significant consequences to applying the plain meaning of “because” to § 245(b)(2)(B). First, it avoids the necessity of looking to legislative history, which I will later discuss as being highly ambiguous in itself when applied to this statute. This means that all of the majority opinion running from page 48/1 to 53/1 is unnecessary to the determination of the meaning of the word because.
Secondly, it avoids what to me seems an oddly anomalous (if not bizarre) characterization of the statute as containing “two distinct kinds of discriminatory attitudes with respect to the victim,” one being a motive and the other an intent, both *216springing from the identical word — “because.” If one simply gives because its plain, unambiguous meaning — “by reason of’ or “on account of’ — one concludes that the statute deals not with intent, but with motive. See State v. Corrigan, 195 N.Y. 1, 12, 87 N.E. 792 (1989) (distinguishing motive as “that which incites or stimulates a person to do the act” and intent as “the purpose as a particular means to effect [a] result” (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)).
There is nothing whatsoever on the face of the statute which would suggest that the word “because” used in the phrase
(2) any person because of his race, color, religion or national origin and because he is or has been — ....
was intended to convey two different concepts-motive in the first instance and intent in the second. Since the majority agrees that the first use of because connotes motive, see also United States v. Bledsoe, 728 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir.1984) (finding first use of because connotes motive), it naturally follows that the second use does as well, there being nothing in the statute to suggest otherwise.
Furthermore, if one does look at the legislative history (which one need not and should not), the result is anything but clear. For starters there is the fact that the statute initially covered acts done “while” the person was using public facilities. S. Rep. 90-121 at 7 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1887, 1844. The word “while” was removed in favor of “because,” resulting in a requirement that the government provide some evidence of motivation or as the Senate Committee on the Judiciary put it “a purpose to interfere with the activity.” Id. The majority’s analysis effectively reamends the statute to remove the because and put the while back in by creating an ambiguity which does not exist and further creating two different meanings of because.
The majority does, of course, point to instances in the Senate report where the word “intent” rather than “motive” is used. The terms motive and intent are often used interchangeably and I would attribute the use of “intent” in the legislative history to less than rigorous attention to the distinction. In any event, the legislative history is at best ambiguous on the point and there is no reason to resort to it.
The majority suggests that the Circuit Courts in which the “dual intent requirement” has been considered “have adopted statutory constructions consistent with, if occasionally less specific than, the construction we adopt.” The cases cited by the majority appear to me equivocal at best, and perhaps even supportive of the interpretation of the dual use of “because” that I urge. See United States v. Woodlee, 136 F.3d 1399, 1405 (10th Cir.1998) (addressing the only element of § 245(b) under contention, whether bodily injury resulted, not the elements “because of [the victim’s] race ...” or “because the [victim] was, or had been, enjoying a public facility”); United States v. Makowski, 120 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir.1997) (affirming conviction under § 245(b) where defendant-appellant shouted, inter alia, that the “park belonged to the white man” while beating Hispanic defendant who had been enjoying the use of a public park); United States v. Ebens, 800 F.2d 1422, 1428-29 (6th Cir.1986) (rejecting defendant’s challenge that there was insufficient evidence “that his purpose was to injure, intimidate, and interfere with [the victim’s] right to enjoy a place of public accommodation” where “[t]he jury could further have found that [the defendant’s] remarks were intended to make [the victim’s] remaining on the premises uncomfortable and embarrassing and to intimidate and dissuade him from *217remaining on the premises .... ”), abrogated on other grounds by Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 108 S.Ct. 1496, 99 L.Ed.2d 771 (1988); United States v. Price, 464 F.2d 1217, 1218 (affirming conviction and rejecting defendants’s contention that “the altercation only incidentally occurred on federal property” where defendant confronted victim at public swimming facility, blocked the victim’s access to his path of travel, and severely beat him and rendered him unconscious). Where the cases, like the legislative history, occasionally use the term “intent,” not “motive,” I again attribute the use of “intent” to less than rigorous attention to the distinction.
The result of using the plain meaning of the word because is important to the disposition. While it may be appropriate for a jury to infer that in these circumstances the defendants intended to interfere with Rosenbaum’s use of the public street, there is no evidence whatsoever from which a jury could conclude that the motivating force behind defendants’ actions was to prevent, deter, or even retaliate against the use of a public street. In fact, to the contrary, it is abundantly clear from the evidence that the motivating force for the actions taken was religion-based animus, pure and simple.
Our system of law gives great deference to conclusions drawn by juries. However, we do not permit juries to speculate in order to draw their conclusions. Radiation Dynamics, Inc. v. Goldmuntz, 464 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir.1972) (“[I]t is the duty of the court to withdraw the case from the jury when the necessary inference is so tenuous that it rests merely upon speculation and conjecture.”) Given the complete absence of any evidence which would support an inference that the defendant Nelson, or the defendant Price, was impelled to act — motivated—by the fact that Rosenbaum was using the public street, the jury’s conclusion to that effect was pure speculation. I would therefore reverse the judgment of the district court on that ground. In view of the fact, however, that this is a minority position, I wholeheartedly concur with the remainder of the majority’s opinion, except as pointed out otherwise herein.

. Black’s Law Dictionary (7th ed.1999).

. Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (8th ed.1914).

. Because is clearly used as a preposition in its first use in § 245(b)(2): ”[A]ny person because of his race ...." § 245(b)(2)(empha-sis added). It is also used as a preposition in its second appearance in § 245(b)(2), even though ’’of” does not follow ’’because”: ”[A]nd because he is or has been — ....” Id. (emphasis added). The second because cannot be a conjunction because it does not connect two dependent clauses, e.g., "We stopped at the filling station because we needed gasoline." Webster’s Third International Dictionary 194 (14th ed.1961). Even if “because” were construed as a conjunction, the definition of the conjunction because equally supports the plain meaning interpretation of the statute I urge. Because as a conjunction is defined as "for the reason that” or "on account of the cause that.” Id.