Court Opinion

ID: 9919016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-17 14:02:24.58776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:07:21.590863
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
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official text of the opinion.

In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: January 17, 2024

                        S23A1075. REMLER v. THE STATE.

        MCMILLIAN, Justice.

        Justin Remler challenges his 2019 conviction for felony murder

in connection with the death of Tristan Mitchell, who was two years

and nine months old.1 Remler contends that the evidence was not

legally sufficient to support the jury’s verdict, that a defense expert

was wrongly prevented from testifying that a preexisting heart

        1 Tristan died on September 12, 2016.   On May 10, 2017, Remler was
indicted by a Chatham County grand jury for malice murder, felony murder,
and aggravated assault. After a trial held from December 16 to 20, 2019, the
jury acquitted Remler of malice murder, but it found him guilty of felony
murder and aggravated assault. Following a sentencing hearing held on
January 17, 2020, the trial court imposed a sentence of life in prison with the
possibility of parole for the felony murder and merged the aggravated assault
into the felony murder. On January 21, 2020, Remler filed a motion for a new
trial, which he amended on February 16, 2022. After conducting a hearing on
May 17, 2022, the trial court denied the amended motion on May 1, 2023.
Remler filed a timely notice of appeal on May 3, 2023, and this appeal was
docketed to the August 2023 term of this Court and was submitted for a
decision on the briefs.
condition was the likely cause of Tristan’s death, that the trial

court’s instruction to the jury on proximate cause was erroneous,

that the trial court’s instruction regarding the relationship between

the counts of aggravated assault and felony murder was erroneous,

that trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance, and that the

cumulative effect of the trial court’s errors and trial counsel’s

deficiencies require a new trial. For the reasons set forth below, we

affirm.

     The evidence presented at Remler’s trial showed the following.

In August 2016, Remler was dating Courtney Metts, and the pair

frequently exchanged text messages, including about the behavior

of Metts’s son, Tristan, who was two years and nine months old. On

August 2, 2016, Remler texted, “[Y]ou need to just let me keep him

for a few days.” He then suggested, “[S]lap the s**t out of him.”

When Metts texted to complain about Tristan again just over an

hour later, Remler texted: “[G]rr, go in there, grab him, and look

him in the eye. Shake him around, make sure he knows you mean

f***ing business.”

                                 2
     On August 11, 2016, Metts sent Remler a video recording from

earlier that evening of Tristan sitting on the floor intermittently

making wailing sounds, and she commented that Tristan was then

in his bed crying. Remler suggested in reply: “Go in there and storm

up to him and grab him hard. Shake him and slap him and tell him

no crying. You have to use force, like more than you think. It’s not

going to hurt him. He’s super tough.” He added, “You don’t actually

have to hurt him. They get the message as long as you use force and

make eye contact and [a] loud voice.” Then just over an hour later,

Remler offered: “I can try to help discipline him. But it will take

time and multiple days with me.” He added: “And I’ll discipline him

so good that by the time he’s done, he’ll want to come home to you so

bad.” Metts responded, “Y’all have to have fun, too though. He’s

only [nearly] three.   If it’s all punishment and no fun he won’t

understand.” Remler replied, “I’m not just going to beat him the

whole time.”

     On August 13, 2016, Metts texted Remler:          “Don’t spank

Tristan’s a** today. He has bruises on his a** for some reason.”

                                 3
Remler replied: “I didn’t even spank his butt that hard either for

real. Maybe his butt is more sensitive than anything else. Ha.”

Several hours later, Remler texted: “He’s still got those bruises on

his back from the washing machine, I think.” He added, “But I really

didn’t spank his butt that much.”

     On August 15, 2016, Tristan showed one of the teachers at his

daycare center a large, protruding bruise on his forehead.       The

teacher also discovered bruises on his ear and in his ear that she

thought “looked really bad” and a bruise on his leg or thigh area.

She and the school director then lifted his shirt and saw more

bruises on his back. The director took photographs and reported the

matter to the Division of Family and Children Services (“DFCS”).

That same day, a DFCS worker contacted Metts, who “stated that

the child was on a washer or a dryer and fell off while her boyfriend

[Remler] was watching the child that day.”       The DFCS worker

instructed Metts to take Tristan to the emergency room for

evaluation, but he took no further action on the case. Metts texted

Remler about the bruises on Tristan, and Remler replied, “I don’t

                                 4
touch his ears. I knew about the forehead, and the washer kind of

scraped up his back.”

     On August 19, 2016, Metts texted Remler about how Tristan

had been asking about him, and Remler replied, “I’m surprised he

likes me so much even though I spank and smack him.”

     Metts and Remler then apparently took a break in their

relationship, but their relationship had resumed by September 12,

2016, when Remler took Tristan to the house he lived in with his

parents to babysit him while Metts worked. Remler’s mother, who

was suffering from a medical condition and was essentially confined

to her bedroom, later reported that during that day she heard

banging coming from Remler’s bedroom above her own, which she

assumed    was    Tristan    “jumping”    or   Remler    and    Tristan

“roughhousing.” At 5:01 p.m., Remler texted Metts, saying: “IDK [I

don’t know] if you felt it or not but there’s a little bump on his head.

IDK if he got it from staying with Brandon [his father] or what. I

just felt it. It’s nothing big but still a bump.” However, at about this

same time, according to his audio-recorded statement to an

                                   5
investigator, Remler was just discovering that Tristan was

unresponsive following a nap. Remler took Tristan from his own

room to his mother’s room downstairs. His mother, a former nurse,

noted that Tristan’s heart was beating rapidly but that he was not

breathing. She performed artificial respiration as she spoke with a

911 operator. A paramedic, who responded to the 911 call, examined

Tristan and noted, “[H]is eyes were fixed and dilated which means

there’s been obviously no oxygen to his brain for some time.” He also

noted “bruising around the eyes” that is indicative of someone not

breathing, and one eye being “bigger than the other, like indicative

of head injury.” He also testified about Remler’s communication

with him at the scene:     “he was changing his story as to what

happened.”    Tristan was taken to the hospital where he was

pronounced dead.

     Dr. Natasha Grandhi, who performed Tristan’s autopsy, was

called to testify at trial by the State. In addition to numerous minor

injuries, Dr. Grandhi noted a number of bruises and abrasions on

Tristan’s head.    An internal examination of the head revealed

                                  6
bleeding in the muscle tissue in the jaw, “fine pinpoint areas of

bleeding that were scattered through the eyelids,” “subgaleal scalp

hemorrhages” in multiple places, “bleeding on the surface of the

brain, a “slightly enlarged” brain indicative of the brain’s self-

healing reaction to an injury, and “a bruise on one of the portions on

the base of the brain.” She explained that the brain injuries could

have been caused by “[b]lunt trauma which can be from a variety of

mechanisms” but not typically from simple trips and falls in

children. She opined that Tristan’s brain injuries could have been

caused at different times but that they were all sustained within

“one or two days” of his death and that the death was caused by

“blunt force head trauma.” She also noted an “enlargement of the

heart” and “rounded appearance” to the heart; however, microscopic

examination failed to reveal “pathology or disease” in the heart.

     Dr. Donna Evans, a physician board-certified in evaluating

children who are suspected victims of abuse, was also called to

testify by the State. She noted various aspects of Tristan’s condition

at the scene, in the emergency room, and in his autopsy that were

                                  7
indicative of “inflicted head trauma.” Her opinion was that “this was

an inertial event with an impact, given that there are signs of impact

in the skull and on the skull, in the brain, and in the scalp that

ultimately led to [Tristan’s] death” by causing “a lack of oxygen to

the brain” through impaired breathing.          She dismissed any

suggestion of some other cause of death such as a heart condition.

     Dr. Byron Mainor, who had treated Tristan on the day of his

death, was called by the defense to testify as an expert in pediatrics

and emergency pediatric medicine.        His testimony essentially

excluded trauma as a cause for many of Tristan’s minor injuries;

however,   he   testified   that   Tristan   had   bilateral   retinal

hemorrhaging and that such a finding “should raise clinical

suspicions for an injury to the head.”

     Dr. Ian Hood also was called by the defense, as an expert in

clinical and forensic pathology. He explained that Tristan’s bruises

were “all pretty trivial” and that persons who suffer sudden death

from blunt force trauma have severe injuries such as “multiple skull

fractures” and will present as “massively bruised.” However, he

                                   8
explained that “the exception” would be where the victim suffered

“shaking” or “perhaps the child is flung violently into a soft forgiving

surface so that the head shakes.”       While he acknowledged that

Tristan had some injuries consistent with such an action, he

dismissed the subdural hemorrhaging as being “pretty minimal,”

the brain swelling as only being secondary to lengthy resuscitation

efforts, the bruise to the brain as being “really trivial,” and the

retinal hemorrhages as having not been properly examined to

determine their severity and potentially having been caused by

resuscitation efforts. He opined that a “far more competent cause of

sudden loss of circulation in this child” was the fact that he had “a

grossly abnormal enlarged heart” that was “abnormally formed” and

“globular in shape.”

     Dr. Victor Rosenfeld was then called by the defense as an

expert in neurology.      He opined that the medical examiner’s

conclusion that “blunt force trauma” was the cause of death “was not

supported by any of the evidence stated in that autopsy report.”

Specifically regarding the subdural hemorrhaging and the temporal

                                   9
lobe brain contusion, he stated: “Neither of those injuries would be

responsible for death.   Neither of those injuries would even be

responsible for any neurological injury in a live patient.”        He

attempted to describe an alternative “finding that was most

concerning to [him],” but the trial court sustained an objection by

the State that any testimony from him regarding an alleged heart

deformity was beyond the scope of his expertise in neurology.

     As a rebuttal witness, Dr. James Downs was called by the State

as an expert in clinical and forensic pathology and abusive head

trauma. He rejected the suggestion that any of Tristan’s injuries

were from resuscitation efforts. He noted that Tristan had signs of

nine separate impacts to the head, with some on each side and with

the largest two creating injuries greater than one inch in length. He

stated that the nine impacts could have been from either something

striking Tristan’s head or Tristan’s head striking something, and he

found the latter to be more likely. He also stated that the absence

of additional external injuries could be explained by Tristan’s having

impacted “a broad flat soft surface like a couch.” He testified that

                                 10
“[w]hat damages people with this type of injury is damage to the

nerve fibers of the brain.” He ruled out the possibility that Tristan’s

fatal injuries had occurred a day or two before his death. Finally, he

rejected Dr. Hood’s theory regarding an allegedly enlarged and

abnormally shaped heart, explaining that the angle of the autopsy

photographs of the heart created a distorted impression and that the

weight of the heart was in the middle of the normal range for a child

of Tristan’s age.

     Finally, Dr. Hood was called as a witness again by the defense.

He reasserted his opinion that resuscitation efforts had caused

many of Tristan’s injuries, and he maintained that it is “very

unusual” for a brain trauma to cause a sudden stoppage of the heart

and that such cases usually involve “massive very obvious trauma

to the brain.”      He also asserted that the absence of small

hemorrhages in the “white matter of the brain” was inconsistent

with Dr. Downs’s theory of the case.

     1. Remler argues that the evidence presented at trial was

insufficient to support his conviction as a matter of constitutional

                                  11
due process. In considering such a claim, “the relevant question is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to

the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson

v. Virginia, 443 U. S. 307, 319 (III) (B) (99 SCt 2781, 61 LE2d 560)

(1979) (emphasis in original). It is undisputed that Remler was

alone with Tristan in the hours before he died and that Remler had

admitted in text messages that he previously hit Tristan on several

occasions in an attempt to discipline him.       The State’s expert

witnesses also opined that Tristan died from blunt force trauma, and

Dr. Downs ruled out that Tristan’s fatal injuries could have occurred

a day or two before his death. Although the expert evidence was

conflicting, we conclude, construing all of the evidence in the light

most favorable to the verdict, that the evidence was sufficient to

authorize a rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable

doubt that Remler was guilty of felony murder predicated on

aggravated assault. See Foster v. State, 306 Ga. 587, 590 (1) (832

                                 12
SE2d 346) (2019) (concluding that the evidence was sufficient

despite the presence of “competing expert testimony”).

     Remler also contends that the evidence was insufficient as a

matter of Georgia statutory law because circumstantial evidence of

guilt must “‘exclude every other reasonable hypothesis save that of

the guilt of the accused.’” Sullivan v. State, 308 Ga. 772, 777 (1) (a)

(843 SE2d 411) (2020) (quoting OCGA § 24-14-6).            Specifically,

Remler argues that the evidence supported that Tristan died due to

an enlarged heart or that Tristan’s father had watched Tristan the

weekend before Tristan’s death and could have inflicted the injuries.

But “[w]hether alternative hypotheses are reasonable, however, is

usually a question for the jury, and this Court will not disturb the

jury’s finding unless it is insufficient as a matter of law.” Id. It was

within the jury’s purview to reject the alternative hypotheses that

someone else inflicted the trauma on Tristan before the day of his

death or that Tristan’s death was caused by an enlarged heart as

unreasonable given the evidence presented. Thus, we conclude that

                                  13
the evidence was also sufficient as a matter of Georgia statutory law.

See OCGA § 24-14-6.

     2. Remler also argues that the trial court improperly refused

to allow one of his expert witnesses, Dr. Rosenfeld, to testify that

Tristan’s death was caused by an enlarged heart. Dr. Hood, whom

the trial court qualified as an expert in clinical and forensic

pathology, was permitted to testify under questioning by the defense

that Tristan’s death was likely caused by a previously undiagnosed

heart deformity. However, the trial court sustained an objection by

the State when Dr. Rosenfeld, who had been qualified as an expert

in neurology, stated that he was prepared to testify under

questioning by the defense regarding a cause of death other than

blunt force trauma to the head, referring implicitly to the victim’s

alleged heart deformity. The trial court stated: “You know, given

the specialty that he’s tendered under, which does not include

forensic pathology which is what we’re talking about here, I’m going

to have to sustain the objection.” Remler argues that the trial court

abused its discretion by excluding Dr. Rosenfeld’s testimony. See

                                 14
OCGA § 24-7-707 (effective prior to July 1, 2022); Corbett v. State,

266 Ga. 561, 563 (2) (468 SE2d 757) (1996) (“In Georgia, a medical

expert is an individual possessing technical and peculiar knowledge,

and any person learned in medical or physiological matters is

qualified to testify as an expert thereon, even though he is not a

medical practitioner.”) (citation and punctuation omitted).

     Pretermitting whether the trial court abused its discretion in

restricting Dr. Rosenfeld’s testimony, any such error is harmless if

it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the verdict.

See Jackson v. State, 306 Ga. 69, 80 (2) (c) (829 SE2d 142) (2019)

(“[T]he test for determining nonconstitutional harmless error is

whether it is highly probable that the error did not contribute to the

verdict.” (citation and punctuation omitted)).     As the trial court

noted in deciding Remler’s motion for a new trial, Dr. Rosenfeld

testified freely about his opinion as an expert in neurology that the

victim had not died from his brain injuries, and Dr. Rosenfeld’s

potential testimony regarding the possibility that the victim died as

the result of an enlarged heart was cumulative of the testimony of

                                  15
Dr. Hood in his role as an expert in pathology. See Neuman v. State,

311 Ga. 83, 94 (4) (b) (ii) (856 SE2d 289) (2021) (“Even if we assume

that the trial court abused its discretion by limiting Dr. Flores’s

testimony about these subjects, such error was harmless because the

excluded testimony was cumulative of other admitted evidence.”).

Also, Dr. Rosenfeld’s credibility was undermined because it came out

in testimony that Remler’s father, who was also a physician,

practiced with Dr. Rosenfeld and had asked Dr. Rosenfeld to testify

on Remler’s behalf, a fact that could lead reasonable jurors to doubt

his testimony. Thus, even if the trial court abused its discretion in

not allowing Dr. Rosenfeld to testify that Tristan’s death was caused

by an enlarged heart, it was highly probable that the error did not

contribute to the verdict.

     3. Remler also contends that the trial court erred in responding

to a question the jury asked about the causal relationship between

the felony of aggravated assault and the subsequent death. During

its deliberations, the jury sent a note to the trial court asking:

“Question on felony murder – ‘It is not enough that the homicide

                                 16
occurred soon or presently after the felony was attempted or

committed.’ Does this mean it has to be sudden death? Or can it be

the felony can be the start of a continuous process to death or the

precipitating event to death?” After conferring with counsel, the

trial court announced that it would repeat its charge on felony

murder, instruct the jury that “cause” meant “proximate cause,” and

then define “proximate cause.” The trial court indicated that it

would use the definition of “proximate cause” in Anthony v. State,

303 Ga. 399, 413 (13) n.19 (811 SE2d 399) (2018), as requested by

the State, rather than the one in State v. Jackson, 287 Ga. 646, 652

(2) (697 SE2d 757) (2010), as requested by the defense. The trial

court proposed revising the definition in Anthony, and it ultimately

charged as follows:

     Proximate cause exists when the alleged act played a
     substantial part in the bringing about of the decedent’s
     death, and the death was either a direct result or
     reasonable probable consequence of the act. Where one
     inflicts an unlawful injury upon the person of another,
     such injury may be found to be the cause of death of the
     person injured whenever it shall be made to appear that
     the injury itself constituted the cause of death or directly

                                 17
     and materially contributed to the happening of a
     consequential death.

(emphasis supplied).

     As an initial matter, the State argues that Remler failed to

preserve this error for ordinary appellate review and that plain error

review applies because although Remler objected to the trial court’s

ruling that it would give an instruction based on Anthony, rather

than Jackson, Remler did not object again after the trial court had

actually given that instruction based on Anthony. Pretermitting

whether Remler was required to object a second time in order to

preserve this error for ordinary appellate review, we conclude that

Remler has not shown that the trial court committed any error.

     Remler argues that the trial court erred in not instructing that

proximate cause exists where a felony “directly and materially

contributed to the happening of a subsequent accruing immediate

cause of the death.” Jackson, 287 Ga. at 652 (2) (emphasis supplied)

(citation and punctuation omitted). Because the trial court did not

use this language and instead charged that the injury must have

                                 18
“directly and materially contributed to the happening of a

consequential death,” Remler contends that the charge as given in

his case only required that the victim was injured and eventually

died, even if there was some intervening cause of death.

     First, we think that Remler misunderstands the holding of

Jackson, because Jackson addresses the situation where an act

causes some other thing to happen that is the “immediate” cause of

the victim’s death. See Eubanks v. State, 317 Ga. 563, 570 (2) (a) (ii)

(894 SE2d 27) (2023) (citing Jackson and addressing the

foreseeability of intervening acts that may have ensued naturally

from a criminal act or may have been set in motion by that act).

Furthermore, although we can see why Remler preferred the

inclusion of the word “immediate” given that there was a time delay

between Tristan’s injuries and his subsequent death at the hospital,

Remler was not entitled to a charge “in the precise language

requested,” even if his interpretation of these cases were correct.

Thomas v. State, 297 Ga. 750, 754-55 (4) (778 SE2d 168) (2015).

After reviewing the charge as a whole, we conclude that the charge

                                  19
was “an accurate statement of the law and was sufficient to instruct

the jury on the principles of proximate causation relevant to this

case.” Treadaway v. State, 308 Ga. 882, 890 (843 SE2d 784) (2020)

(approving proximate cause charge that, like the charge here, did

not explicitly require “immediate” causation). See also Anthony, 303

Ga. at 413 (13). Accordingly, we see no error in the charge given by

the trial court.

     4. Remler also argues that the trial court erred in answering

the jury’s questions about the relationship between the counts for

aggravated assault and felony murder. During its deliberations, the

jury asked the following two-part question: “Could the defendant be

found guilty for aggravated assault but not felony murder. Or if

found guilty of aggravated assault, and victim dies, is defendant

automatically guilty of felony murder?”      When the trial court

proposed telling the jury that they were authorized to convict or

acquit on each charge independently, defense counsel objected and

argued that the court should simply answer “no” to the second part

of the two-part question.   Indicating that it did not want to be

                                20
“suggestive” in its response, the trial court instructed the jury: “The

defendant is charged with three counts in the indictment. And the

jury is authorized to find the defendant not guilty or guilty on any

or all of them independently.” Remler argues now that, by not

providing simple “yes” and “no” answers to each of the jury’s

questions, the trial court’s response was confusing and misleading.

     Pretermitting the State’s argument that this issue has not

been preserved for ordinary appellate review and that, instead,

plain error review applies, we conclude that the trial court’s charge

responded to the jury’s questions, accurately told the jury to consider

each count of the indictment independently, and was not misleading.

See Blake v. State, 292 Ga. 516, 517-18 (2) (739 SE2d 319) (2013) (no

error where a response to a jury question indicated the jury should

“‘consider each count separately’”).    Furthermore, we note that

Remler was not entitled to a charge “in the precise language

requested.”   Thomas, 297 Ga. at 754-55 (4).         Accordingly, we

conclude that the trial court did not err in responding to the jury’s

questions, regardless of the form of review that applies.

                                  21
     5. Remler argues that his trial counsel rendered ineffective

assistance (a) by failing to elicit evidence that Tristan’s father, who

was housing Tristan on the weekend before his death, could have

caused Tristan’s injuries and (b) by failing to request a charge on

accident.   An ineffective assistance of counsel claim requires a

showing of both deficient performance by counsel and resulting

prejudice. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 687 (III) (104

SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). To show deficient performance, a

defendant must show that his or her counsel took an approach that

was “objectively unreasonable.” Romer v. State, 293 Ga. 339, 344 (3)

(745 SE2d 637) (2013) (citing Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687-88 (III)

(A)). “A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must

apply a ‘strong presumption’ that counsel’s representation was

within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”

Harrington v. Richter, 562 U. S. 86, 104 (IV) (104 SCt 770, 178 LE2d

624) (2011) (quoting Strickland, 466 U. S. at 689 (III) (A)).        If

counsel’s performance was deficient, relief is warranted only if

“there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

                                  22
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different.” Strickland, 466 U. S. at 694 (III) (B). This Court may

decide an ineffective assistance claim based solely on a lack of

deficient performance or based solely on an absence of prejudice. See

Caldwell. v. Edenfield, 316 Ga. 751, 753 (II) (890 SE2d 238) (2023)

(citing Strickland, 466 U. S. at 697 (IV)).

     (a)   Remler first argues that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to present evidence suggesting that

Tristan’s father was responsible for Tristan’s death. In support of

this theory, Remler argues that the father was housing Tristan

during the weekend before Tristan’s death and that, as shown by

court records, the father had a prior history of domestic violence

directed toward Tristan’s mother, a history that lead counsel

acknowledged in his motion for new trial testimony did not include

evidence of any violence toward Tristan. However, even if such

evidence of violence against Tristan’s mother had been admissible,

it would have been inconsistent with Remler’s main defense, which

was focused on evidence that Tristan died from an enlarged heart

                                  23
rather than abuse from anyone, and “the strategy of not presenting

logically conflicting alternative defense theories was objectively

reasonable professional conduct.” Williams v. State, 316 Ga. 304,

320 (5) (d) (888 SE2d 60) (2023).            Thus, Remler’s ineffective

assistance of counsel claim on this ground fails.

     (b)    Remler next argues that his trial counsel rendered

ineffective assistance by failing to request a jury charge on accident,

which we note was a theory that counsel did not discuss in his

closing argument at trial.2         The only evidence even arguably

supporting an accident in this case was the statement from Remler’s

mother that she heard Remler and Tristan “jumping around,

playing” or Remler and Tristan “roughhousing.” However, in light

of the weakness of the evidence suggesting an accidental death and

the strength of the evidence showing Remler’s role in Tristan’s

death, we conclude that Remler has failed to show deficient

performance regarding a possible charge on accident, especially

     2 However, we acknowledge lead counsel’s testimony that his failure to

request a charge on accident was “an oversight.”
                                     24
given the fact that counsel’s core strategy, as underscored by

counsel’s closing argument, was to show that, while the victim had

numerous bruises and had brain injuries, the cause of his death was

sudden cardiac arrest resulting from a congenital heart deformity.

See Williams, 316 Ga. at 320 (5) (d) (holding that it can be

“objectively reasonable professional conduct” to focus on one defense

theory). Remler’s claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on this

ground also fails.

     6.   Remler correctly notes that this Court will “consider

collectively the prejudicial effect, if any, of trial court errors, along

with the prejudice caused by any deficient performance of counsel,”

and he argues that such cumulative prejudice requires relief in his

case. State v. Lane, 308 Ga. 10, 17 (1) (838 SE2d 808) (2020). As set

forth above, we assume trial court error regarding the limitation of

the testimony of a defense expert; however, we identify no other trial

court errors that might affect our cumulative prejudice analysis. As

to the alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel, above we have

identified no deficient performance on the part of trial counsel;

                                   25
therefore, there is nothing from that claim to be considered for the

purpose of cumulative prejudice.      Accordingly, we conclude that

Remler’s claim here must fail.

     Judgment affirmed. All the Justices concur.

                                 26