Court Opinion

ID: 9761234
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:35:09.184055+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:21.322321
License: Public Domain

HILL, J.
dissenting.
[149] I believe that the Board's decision should be reversed because the Vosses are not landlocked; consequently, I respectfully dissent from the majority decision. Ms. Goodman should not be collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of whether the BLM road is a public road, and accordingly, whether the Vosses are landlocked. She had no opportunity or reason to litigate the public nature of the BLM road in the first action because the Vosses were seeking a private road along the Creek Road, which only affected the Stevens property. Once the Voss-es changed their chosen route to one over the Goodman property, Ms. Goodman was entitled to freely litigate all relevant issues, including whether the Vosses were actually landlocked and, as part of that argument, the public nature of the BLM road.
[150] The private road statute, Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (Lexis 1999), allows a taking of private property. Section 24-9-101 states:
Any person whose land has no outlet to, nor connection with a public road, may apply in writing to the board of county commissioners of his county for a private road leading from his premises to some convenient public road. [Emphasis added.]
In order to pass constitutional muster, the private road must be necessary in the sense that the petitioner must be landlocked. Reidy v. Stratton Sheep Co., 2006 WY 69, ¶ 11, 135 P.3d 598, 604 (Wyo.2006).
[151] The route initially chosen by the viewers and appraisers was a modified version of the Highway-BLM road. The chosen route included access over the BLM road, pursuant to a thirty-year license; the Stevens property, pursuant to an easement which limited access to a single land owner and would not provide access if the Voss property were divided; the Goodman property, pursuant to an unrestricted easement; and a bump out on the Goodman property to avoid property belonging to a landowner who was not included as a party in the private road action.8 The only part of the modified Highway-BLM road that was not an existing road was the "bump out." Voss v. Albany County Commissioners, 2003 WY 94, ¶ 3, 4, 7, 74 P.3d 714, 716-18 (Wyo.2003) (Voss I).
[152] The district court reversed, "ruling that the Highway-BLM road did not provide the Vosses adequate legal access to their land because the BLM Right-of-Way Grant does not provide legally enforceable permanent access." Voss I, ¶ 8, 74 P.3d at 718. On appeal to this Court in Voss I, we agreed with the district court that the BLM Right-of-Way which had a thirty-year limit and was assignable only with approval of the BLM did not " 'constitute an outlet or connection within the purview of the statute." Voss I, ¶ 13, 74 P.3d at 719, quoting Reaves v. Riley, 782 P.2d 1186, 1187 (Wyo.1989). We also ruled that, because the Stevens easement was restricted, it did not provide the appurtenant access contemplated by the statute. Id., ¶ 31, 74 P.3d at 723.
[T53] On remand, the Stevens recorded a right-of-way easement in favor of the public across their land along the modified Highway-BLM route originally chosen by the viewers. The respondents then filed a motion to dismiss the Voss petition for a private road on the basis that the Vosses were no longer landlocked. As part of their argument, the respondents asserted that the BLM road was actually a public road. They cited to our ruling in Reidy as confirming that the issue of whether the BLM road was public was not decided in Voss I. In response, the Vosses stated that the issue of whether they were landlocked was decided in Voss I and, under the preclusion doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and law of the case, could not be reopened.
[154] The Board of County Commissioners ruled on the respondents' motion to dismiss as follows:
The Board FINDS that the decision of [Voss I ] is the "law of the case," affirming the determination by implication of this *1134Board that Petitioners established the necessity of a private road, and that they are "any person whose land has no outlet to, nor connection with a public road" under Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 24-9-101 (Lexis 1999). The Board is bound by res judicata to its findings as affirmed by the Supreme Court.
The Board further FINDS that Respondents' position in their Motion to Dismiss that the BLM road is a "public road" is not a relevant inquiry in view of the underlying basis of the decision in Voss I. In their cross-appeal in Voss I, Respondents stated their issues as:
1. Does BLM land containing no restrictions on use by motor vehicle constitute a public road such that it is not a factor in determining whether a land owner's property is landlocked under W.S. § 24-9-1017
If crossing BLM land is a factor, does a right of way grant issued by the BLM pursuant to the Federal Land Policy and Management Act . which is for a term of 80 years and renewable, constitute an "outlet to, or connection with a public road" under W.S. § 24-9-1017
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the District Court that the Highway-BLM road did not provide the Vosses adequate legal access to their land because the BLM right of way does not provide legally enforceable permanent access. The Supreme Court found that the BLM grant to Voss of a duration of 80 years, although renewable, the renewal was not guaranteed. The permit was found to be personal to Vosses and did not pass automatically upon conveyance of the property. The Court found that since the BLM road does not constitute an outlet or connection within the purview of W.S. § 24-9-101, and the BLM is not subject to the Board's jurisdiction, the Petitioners' application is remanded to the Board for reconsideration in a manner consistent with its decision. Although the Voss case was distinguished in Reidy v. Stratton Sheep Company, it was not reversed or modified and remains as precedent in these proceedings.
The Board ORDERS that Respondents' Motion to Dismiss Petition for Private Road be and the same is hereby denied. [Record citations omitted.]
[T 55] The majority decision accepts the collateral estoppel rationale employed by the Board. Collateral estoppel applies when there has been a final adjudication on the merits and the same issue is raised in a subsequent action between the same parties. Two of the requirements for application of collateral estoppel are: the prior adjudication resulted in a judgment on the merits, and the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was given a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. Erwin v. State, Dep't of Family Services, 2010 WY 117, 110, 237 P.3d 409, 412-18 (Wyo.2010). Voss I and the case before us involve the same action. There had been no final judgment on the merits when Voss I was remanded. In addition, Ms. Goodman did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the public nature of the BLM road. The Vosses were not seeking a private road across Goodman property in Voss I. They were seeking to condemn the Creek Road across Stevens. Thus, Ms. Goodman had no interest in proving the Vosses were not landlocked or that the BLM road was public. Because she did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate those issues, Ms. Goodman's arguments should not be barred by collateral estoppel.
[156] In an alternative ruling, the majority concludes that Ms. Goodman is precluded from litigating those issues by the law of the case doctrine.
Under the law of the case doctrine, a court's decision on an issue of law at one stage of a proceeding is binding in successive stages of the litigation. Triton Coal Co. v. Husman, Inc., 846 P.2d 664, 667 (Wyo.1993), citing 1B James W. Moore, Jo Esha Lucas & Thomas S. Currier, Moore's Federal Practice, ¶ 0.A404[1] (2d ed.1983). Ordinarily, the law of the case doctrine requires a trial court to adhere to its own prior rulings, the rulings of an appellate court, or another judge's rulings in the case or a closely related case. Id. at 667-68. The law of the case doctrine is a *1135discretionary rule which does not constitute a limitation on the court's power but merely "expresses the practice of courts generally to refuse to reopen what has been decided." Brown v. State, 953 P.2d 1170, 1174 (Wyo.1998).
Boykin v. Parkhurst (In re Parkhurst), 2010 WY 155, ¶ 15, 243 P.3d 961, 966 (Wyo.2010), quoting Lieberman v. Mossbrook, 2009 WY 65, ¶¶ 28-29, 208 P.3d 1296, 1305-06 (Wyo.2009).
[157] There are exeeptions to application of the law of the case doctrine:
One of those exceptions applies when the evidence in a subsequent trial is substantially different from that presented in the earlier proceeding. Id. Additionally, the law of the case doctrine applies only to issues actually decided, not to issues left open. 18B Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction § 4478 (2d ed. 2002).
Boykin, ¶ 15, 243 P.3d at 966. See also, Wessel v. City of Albuquerque, 463 F.3d 1138, 1144 (10th Cir.2006).
[158] Both of these exeeptions apply here. The facts, including the existence of the public easement granted by Stevens, have changed since the first proceeding, and as we stated in Reidy, ¶ 23, 135 P.3d at 607, the issue of whether the BLM road was public was not actually decided in Voss I. As such, the law of the case doctrine does not prohibit consideration of the nature of the BLM road and whether, on the facts as they now exist, the Vosses are landlocked. Moreover, the law of the case doctrine is discretionary. I think it is appropriate and, in fact, imperative to allow the respondents to argue that the legal status of the route initially chosen by the viewers had changed since Voss I, such that the Vosses have legally enforceable access and are not landlocked under the statute.
[T59] I can certainly appreciate the Board's and the majority's efforts to reach a final resolution in this case, particularly in light of the fact that this matter has been dragging on since 1999. However, if the Vosses are not landlocked, then there is no necessity and, consequently, no constitutional basis to allow a taking of the Goodman property. See, Reidy, ¶ 11, 135 P.3d at 604; Wyo. Const. art. I, § 82. By refusing to allow the respondents to argue that the Voss-es were no longer landlocked, the Board and this Court have turned a blind eye and ignored the reality of the situation.
[T60] Onee the procedural hurdle is crossed, the Court must consider the merits-whether the record supports a finding that the Vosses are landlocked and, as part of that analysis, whether the BLM road is public in nature. The evidence is clear that the BLM road is open to the public. In many ways, it is similar to the Forest Service Road considered in Reidy. In addition, the evidence established that the Vosses and their predecessors have used the road to access their property for many years. In fact, that is the precise route (with the exception of the bump out) the Vosses used during the pendency of this very long action. Thus, I would conclude that the BLM road is public in nature and it, together with the public easement given by the Stevens, provides legally enforceable access to the Vosses. They simply are not landlocked.
[161] The Board concluded that, even if it could consider the Highway-BLM road, it would rule that the Vosses were landlocked because that road is "unreasonable, inconvenient, illogical, uneconomic and unproductive." That conclusion is incredible considering that the Board is discussing the exact same road initially chosen by the viewers and confirmed by it after the first hearing. How the exact same route changed from being the one chosen by the Board to one that is unreasonable, inconvenient, illogical, etc. is hard to fathom.
[162] The vast majority of the Board's findings about the inconvenience of the Highway-BLM road pertain to attributes of the Vosses property. The primary concern is the steepness of the road grade on the Voss-es property, which can make traveling problematic, particularly in winter. We considered a similar argument in Reidy when Stratton Sheep claimed that it was entitled to a private road across the Reidy property because it was difficult to access the corrals in the southern part of its property from the *1136north where the Forest Service road entered its property. We declined to address whether § 24-9-101 allows establishment of a private road "to remedy access difficulties related to barriers within the applicant's land" because the evidence did not establish the costs of constructing a road within the tract or that such road construction would be unusually difficult. Reidy, ¶ 38, 135 P.3d at 611 (emphasis in original). In this case, the evidence established that the road within the Voss property could be made more convenient with a relatively small expenditure of the funds. Ms. Goodman made similar improvements to her road, which is why the Vosses wanted to use it to access their property. So, even if difficulties within the Voss property were properly considered, the evidence does not establish the level of substantial inconvenience required to justify the taking of a private road.
[¥63] The other aspect of the modified Highway-BLM road that the Vosses argue make it substantially inconvenient is the necessity of constructing the "bump out" to avoid crossing property belonging to a landowner who had not been made a party to the proceeding. Voss I, ¶ 7, 74 P.3d at 717-18. The construction will apparently be fairly expensive.9 However, it was not seen as prohibitively expensive by the viewers or the Board when they initially chose that route instead of the Creek Road. Consequently, I would rule that the modified Highway-BLM Road provides sufficient access to the Vosses and that they are not landlocked.
[464] The Vosses purchased property on top of a mountain in Wyoming. It should not have come as a surprise to them that there would be certain inconveniences and expenses associated with ownership of mountain property and the decision to live there year round. The inconveniences with using the Highway-BLM Road, as they and their predecessors have been doing for years, do not justify a taking under our constitution or our private roads statute. I would reverse.

. Ms. Goodman has since conveyed her property along the Highway-BLM route to the Stevens.

. The respondents have consistently argued that the Vosses did not proceed in good faith when they purposely omitted the absent landowner from the private road action, thereby making it impossible for the Board to order them to use their historical access. The point is well taken. Had they noticed that landowner, they could have been required to use the existing Highway-BLM road and there would have been no need to construct the bump out or incur the additional expense associated with such.