Court Opinion

ID: 9660204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 22:07:37.308792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:25.124061
License: Public Domain

ON MOTIONS FOR REHEARING
The Bank and the Chesshirs each have filed a motion for rehearing, seeking the withdrawal of our 31 March 1982 judgment and rendition of a more favorable judgment. We are not persuaded by the motions to disturb our judgment.
With the first two of four points of error, the Chesshirs reargue their contention of entitlement to recover on their DTPA action,.the same contention we considered and found lacking on original submission and rehearing. Upon further consideration, we adhere to our former determination that the Chesshirs were not “consumers” who could bring an action on the certificate of deposit transaction under the DTPA. 613 S.W.2d at 62-63. It seems significant that the Supreme Court, instead of accepting the contention and affirming the trial court’s judgment, remanded the cause for our consideration of the conversion cause of action. 620 S.W.2d at 102. The first two points are overruled.
By point of error three, the Ches-shirs complain of our administratively taxing two-thirds of the costs against them. The apportionment of costs was made because their recovery under the trial court’s judgment was reduced approximately two-thirds on appeal. Stevenson v. Sherman, 231 S.W.2d 506, 513 (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas 1950, writ ref’d). The point is overruled.
The Chesshirs utilize their fourth point to contend, as we understand their argument, that they were entitled to recover exemplary damages in their conversion action upon the special issue finding authorizing treble damages under the DTPA. With commendable candor, they concede that they neither requested the submission of or a jury finding on exemplary damages, and that they have found no authority to sustain their contention. Given this situation, it suffices to state that exemplary damages, being in the nature of an independent ground of recovery, are waived in the absence of a request for the submission thereof. Holland v. Lesesne, 350 S.W.2d 859, 865 (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio 1961, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The point is overruled.
The Bank’s first seven of its eight points of error constitute its attack on our 31 March 1982 judgment, and the supporting rationale expressed, decreeing recovery for *748the Chesshirs on their conversion cause of action. After a careful review of the Bank’s complaints, we remain convinced of the correctness of our judgment rendered on remand, and overrule the seven points.
By its eighth point, the Bank contends that we erred in not eliminating from the judgment the attorney’s fees awarded by the trial court. The Bank cites Jay Fikes and Associates v. Walton, 578 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Tex.Civ.App.—Amarillo 1979, writ ref’d n.r.e.), for the principle that, in a conversion action, attorney’s fees are not recoverable as actual or exemplary damages.
Notwithstanding, the trial court’s judgment recites that the amount of attorney’s fees awarded was stipulated and agreed in open court between the parties and accepted by the court. Prior to its present motion for rehearing, the Bank did not complain, by point of error or otherwise, of its adjudged liability for attorney’s fees. The point of error raised for the first time in the Bank’s motion for rehearing comes too late for consideration. Watson v. Glens Falls Insurance Company, 505 S.W.2d 793, 797 (Tex.1974). The eighth point is overruled.
The motions for rehearing are overruled.