Court Opinion

ID: 9954199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-25 20:03:17.709694+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:52.949812
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/25/24 P. v. Ward CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                               B327697

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                        (Los Angeles County
                                                           Super. Ct. No.
          v.                                               BA405490)

 KEVIN WARD,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Michael D. Carter, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
      Jonathan E. Demson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Irvi, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Roberta L. Davis, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
      Defendant and appellant Kevin Ward (defendant) appeals
from an order denying his petition for resentencing pursuant to
Penal Code section 1172.6 (former Penal Code section 1170.95).1
The Attorney General concedes the cause should be remanded for
issuance of an order to show cause because the record of
conviction does not establish as a matter of law that defendant
was the attempted murder victim’s actual killer. We shall
reverse and remand for that reason.

                         I. BACKGROUND
       The Los Angeles County District Attorney charged
defendant in 2012 with willfully, deliberately, and
premeditatively attempting to murder victim Israil Barri (Barri).
The charging document additionally alleged defendant personally
used a deadly and dangerous weapon (a knife) and personally
inflicted great bodily injury in connection with the attempted
murder. (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1)), 12022.7, subd. (a).)
       Tonya Edwards (Edwards) was charged as a co-defendant
in the attempted murder of Barri. Defendant and Edwards were
also charged with two assault offenses arising out of the same
attack on Barri.
       In 2014, pursuant to an agreement with the prosecution,
defendant resolved the charges against him by pleading guilty to
an attempted murder charge (and admitting certain sentencing
enhancements—though not the charging document’s allegation
that the attempted murder was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated) in exchange for a 19-year prison sentence. The

1
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

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trial court imposed the contemplated sentence, comprised of
seven years for attempted murder, doubled to 14 years for having
sustained a prior “strike” conviction, plus a five-year
enhancement for sustaining a prior serious felony conviction.
       Years later, in January 2022, defendant filed a section
1172.6 form petition for resentencing. He checked boxes on the
petition to assert he was convicted of attempted murder but could
not be convicted of murder under prevailing law because of
changes to section 188 and 189, which had the effect of
eliminating attempted murder liability under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine (see generally People v. Curiel
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 462 [section 188 “eliminated the doctrine
of natural and probable consequences in its entirety”]; People v.
Sanchez (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 191, 196). Defendant’s petition
also requested appointment of counsel, a request the trial court
granted.
       The People opposed defendant’s resentencing position.
Relying on a transcript of the preliminary hearing held before
defendant’s guilty plea,2 the People argued defendant was Barri’s
actual attempted killer. The People specifically pointed to Barri’s

2
       The People’s opposition explained the statement of the case
provided derived from two exhibits, one of which was defendant’s
preliminary hearing transcript and the other of which was a pre-
conviction report prepared by the probation office. No exhibits
are attached to the copy of the People’s opposition that is
included in the appellate record, but the probation office’s report
is included elsewhere in the appellate record and this court
granted the Attorney General’s separate request to judicially
notice the clerk’s transcript from defendant’s direct appeal of his
conviction—which includes a copy of the transcript of defendant’s
preliminary hearing.

                                 3
testimony at the preliminary hearing identifying defendant as
the person among the three-member group of attackers
(defendant, Edwards, and an unidentified woman) who stabbed
him with a knife. The probation report that the People submitted
as an exhibit to their opposition, however, provided some reason
to believe Edwards was the one who stabbed Barri. The report
explains a surveillance camera captured at least part of the
attack on Barri and the report states the surveillance footage
“show[s] a female, later identified as co-defendant Edwards,
making stabbing, lunging motions towards the location where the
victim was found.”
       Defendant’s reply to the People’s opposition argued he was
not ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of law because
neither his plea nor the information precluded the prosecution
from proceeding under a natural and probable consequences
theory and there was reasonable doubt defendant was the actual
stabber. Defendant asserted the knife in the attack on Barri was
not used until Edwards and the unidentified woman joined the
fight, surveillance video showed Edwards making lunging and
stabbing motions towards the victim, and the victim was knocked
unconscious which could have caused him to mistakenly identify
who the actual stabber was.
        The trial court denied defendant’s section 1172.6 petition
without issuing an order to show cause or holding an evidentiary
hearing. Considering “readily ascertainable information
including, but not limited to the court file, records and records of
conviction,” the trial court found defendant was not entitled to
relief as a matter of law because “undisputed” evidence showed

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“[d]efendant was the actual person who stabbed the victim
several times.”3

                         II. DISCUSSION
       The trial court should not have denied defendant’s section
1172.6 petition without issuing an order to show cause because
the record of conviction does not establish—as a matter of law—
that defendant was Barri’s actual attempted killer.4 Defendant
has not admitted he was the person, among the group of
attackers, who stabbed Barri, and no other materials in the
record prove as a matter of law that he was. Indeed, the
probation report’s description of the surveillance video footage
suggests there is instead a conflict in the evidence on this point.
We shall elaborate.
       Senate Bill 1437 “amend[ed] the felony murder rule and
the natural and probable consequences doctrine, as it relates to
murder, to ensure that murder liability is not imposed on a
person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who
acted with reckless indifference to human life.” (Stats. 2018, ch.
1015, § 1, subd. (f).) Under section 1172.6, a defendant may file a

3
      The trial court specifically cited Barri’s identification of
defendant as the stabber a day after the attack occurred and
Barri’s selection of defendant out of a “six pack.”
4
      Because it does not affect the disposition of this appeal, we
shall assume for the sake of argument that the principle that a
defendant who is a murder victim’s actual killer is ineligible for
section 1172.6 relief (see, e.g., People v. Fisher (2023) 95
Cal.App.5th 1022, 1030) applies analogously to a defendant who
seeks relief with respect to an attempted murder conviction.

                                  5
petition seeking vacatur of an attempted murder conviction if the
prosecution filed a complaint “that allowed the prosecution to
proceed under a theory of . . . attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine” and the defendant
“accepted a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which the petitioner
could have been convicted of murder or attempted murder.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1), (2).)
       It is undisputed that, had defendant’s case gone to trial, the
prosecution could have proceeded on a natural and probable
consequences theory of aiding and abetting to prove the
attempted murder charge against him. Thus, the only question
on appeal from the trial court’s finding that defendant’s section
1172.6 petition presented no prima facie case for relief is the
question of whether the record of conviction establishes as a
matter of law that defendant was the person who actually
stabbed Barri. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 972 [“In
reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this preliminary
juncture, a trial court should not engage in ‘factfinding involving
the weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.’ [Citation.]
As the People emphasize, the ‘prima facie bar was intentionally
and correctly set very low’”].) It does not, as the Attorney
General appropriately concedes.
       In pleading guilty to the attempted murder charge,
defendant made no admission he was the person among the
group of attackers who stabbed Barri and he did not stipulate to
the preliminary hearing transcript as the factual basis for his
plea. To be sure, Barri himself identified defendant as his
stabber when testifying at the preliminary hearing, but a trial
court may not weigh the evidence or make credibility
determinations when ruling on a section 1172.6 petition at the

                                 6
prima facie stage. (People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14
[“A petitioner is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law if
the record of conviction conclusively establishes, with no
factfinding, weighing of evidence, or credibility determinations,
that . . . the petitioner was the actual killer . . .”].) That principle
alone establishes denial of defendant’s petition was premature.
Moreover, in this case, the probation report’s description of the
surveillance video footage of the attack indicates Edwards could
have been the stabber and Barri’s identification of defendant as
his actual attempted killer might have been mistaken.
       We therefore hold defendant has made a prima facie case
for section 1172.6 relief and resolution of the question of who
actually stabbed Barri requires an evidentiary hearing, which
must be preceded by issuance of an order to show cause.

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                          DISPOSITION
      The order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition is
reversed. The matter is remanded to the superior court with
directions to issue an order to show cause and to thereafter
proceed as required by section 1172.6, subdivision (d).

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                       BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

      KIM, J.

      LEE, J.*

*
      Judge of the San Bernardino County Superior Court,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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