Court Opinion

ID: 9928165
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-30 22:00:51.95922+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:50:32.696415
License: Public Domain

In the

     United States Court of Appeals
                   For the Seventh Circuit
                       ____________________
No. 21-1730
BENJAMIN ADAMS,
                                                    Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                   v.

CHRISTINA REAGLE, et al.,
                                                 Defendants-Appellees.
                       ____________________

          Appeal from the United States District Court for the
          Southern District of Indiana, Terre Haute Division.
      No. 2:17-cv-00483-JPH-MJD — James Patrick Hanlon, Judge.
                       ____________________

  ARGUED NOVEMBER 28, 2022 — DECIDED JANUARY 30, 2024
               ____________________

    Before ROVNER, ST. EVE, and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.
   ROVNER, Circuit Judge.1 Benjamin Adams has sued the cur-
rent and former commissioners of the Indiana Department of
Corrections and various other officials at Indiana’s Plainfield

    1 Judge Rovner’s opinion represents the opinion of the court except as

to Section II.B. That section constitutes Judge Rovner’s dissent as to the
due process claim. Judge St. Eve’s separate concurrence, joined by Judge
Kirsch, represents the majority opinion as to Adams’ due process claim.
2                                                   No. 21-1730

Correctional Facility pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, charging
them with violating his First and Eighth Amendment rights,
as well as his Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process
and equal protection. On cross-motions for summary judg-
ment, the district court resolved all of these claims in favor of
the defendants. Adams v. Peltier, 2021 WL 1061223 (S.D. Ind.
Mar. 19, 2021). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
                               I.
   Benjamin Adams was sentenced by an Indiana court in
2004 to a prison term of 30 years for attempted murder and a
consecutive term of four years for involuntary manslaughter.
As of January 2017, Adams was housed at Plainfield.
    On January 18, 2017, he was assigned to work in the prison
kitchen, but that assignment was rescinded at the behest of
Clinton Feldkamp, Plainfield’s Director of Intelligence and In-
vestigation, and Investigator Paul Prulhier out of concern that
Adams might use the assignment to smuggle drugs into the
prison—in December 2016, Adams had been found guilty on
a disciplinary charge related to drug trafficking (the “drug-
trafficking charge”). This prompted Adams to file an internal
ombudsperson complaint against Feldkamp and Prulhier.
That complaint was denied, and Adams was removed from
the kitchen assignment.
     On February 5, 2017, Plainfield inmate Kenneth Garretson
engaged in a physical altercation which left another, uniden-
tified inmate injured. Feldkamp investigated and interviewed
Adams, Garretson, inmate Raymond Barnett (whom Feld-
kamp found was also involved in the assault), and several
other confidential witnesses. Feldkamp concluded that Ad-
ams had ordered the assault because the victim had stopped
No. 21-1730                                                        3

paying protection money to either Adams or the security
threat group (a.k.a. gang) with which Adams purportedly
was affiliated, the Vice Lords. Garretson, who had carried out
the assault, was affiliated with another security threat group,
the Almighty Gaylords, which was known to coordinate ac-
tivities with the Vice Lords. Feldkamp also determined in the
course of his investigation that one of the correctional officers,
Officer Nelson, who was on duty at the time of the altercation
and whom Feldkamp suspected of favoring and having im-
proper relationships with one or more Black offenders, had
failed to maintain appropriate control over Adams. Nelson
ultimately left IDOC during this investigation. In the mean-
time, in the aftermath of the assault, Adams was assigned to
disciplinary segregation on February 10.
    Adams denies any responsibility for the assault. On Feb-
ruary 18, 2017, Garretson sent an email to the ombudsperson
averring that Adams had no knowledge of and did not par-
ticipate in the assault.
   On March 7, based on his investigative findings regarding
the assault, Feldkamp charged Adams with offense A-100 for
engaging in criminal gang activity. We will refer to this
charged offense throughout our opinion as the “assault
charge,” the “assault offense,” or the “assault conviction,” alt-
hough the particular label that IDOC attached to the offense
changed over time. Disciplinary Hearing Officer J. Peltier
found Adams guilty of that offense on March 16. Peltier did
not allow live testimony at the hearing (and therefore denied
Adams’ witness requests), 2 denied Adams’ request for video

    2 Adams had requested testimony from Garretson and Barnett, among

other individuals.
4                                                 No. 21-1730

surveillance evidence, and resolved the matter based on the
written statements submitted, crediting Feldkamp’s state-
ment over Adams’ own statement. Adams was ordered to
spend one year in disciplinary segregation, 365 days of his
earned good time credits were revoked, and he was demoted
from credit-earning class 1 to class 3.
     Separately, on February 23, Adams was charged with the
unlawful possession of a cell phone (the “cell phone charge”
or “cell phone offense”). On March 11, Peltier conducted a
hearing on that charge and found Adams guilty. Peltier sanc-
tioned Adams with one year in disciplinary segregation and
the loss of 180 days of earned good time credits. He also rec-
ommended that Adams be transferred to a more secure facil-
ity.
    On March 22, 2017, Plainfield counselor B. Newman,
pursuant to a reclassification hearing, R. 202-1 at 3,
determined that Adams should be reclassified to department-
wide restrictive housing for having committed eight different
conduct violations within one year, with the assault offense
constituting one of those violations. (The other seven
violations included multiple offenses involving the
possession of a cell phone, wireless device, or electrical
device; staff/offender provocation; and attempting to engage
in drug trafficking.) The following reasons were cited for the
reclassification: “poor adjustment,” “disciplinary,” “threat to
facility security,” “recent negative adjustment,” and
“departmental needs.” R. 202-1 at 4. The decision was not
attributable to any single incident but rather to the
aggregation of multiple violations. R. 202-1 at 1 (declaration
of Diane Pfeiffer ¶¶ 5–6). Pursuant to the reclassification,
Adams was to remain in department-wide restrictive housing
No. 21-1730                                                     5

for a period of two years. Department-wide restrictive
housing is a form of long-term segregation which, we
understand, follows an inmate from one correctional facility
to the next. See Crouch v. Brown, 27 F.4th 1315, 1318 n.2 (7th
Cir. 2022) (noting that restrictive housing may be operated
either at a facility level or on a department-wide basis).
    On June 30, 2017, Adams was transferred to the restricted
housing unit at the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility.
Wabash Valley has a Secured Housing Unit or Secured
Control Unit to which inmates in department-wide
administrative restrictive housing are assigned. This unit is
considered a “supermax” section of the prison. See Alkhalidi v.
Buss, 2015 WL 1268285, at *1 n.3 (S.D. Ind. Mar. 19, 2015). The
record does not make clear whether this was the unit to which
Adams was assigned. His declarations and deposition
testimony make reference to being housed in the “SHU” or
the “segregated housing unit.” E.g., R. 189 at 7 (declaration of
Benjamin E. Adams ¶ 53); R. 217 at 42 (deposition of Benjamin
E. Adams at 41).
    Adams appealed the assault conviction up through the
prison hierarchy unsuccessfully (officer C.A. Penfold denied
his first-level appeal), but after he filed a habeas petition in
federal court in which he argued that he had been denied the
right to call witnesses at his disciplinary hearing and that he
had been singled out for adverse treatment on the basis of his
race in violation of his equal protection rights, the final prison
review officer reconsidered his internal appeal, designated
the matter for rehearing, and vacated all sanctions imposed,
thereby mooting his habeas petition. See Adams v. Sup’t, No.
1:17-cv-01534-WTL-TAB, R. 20 (Sep. 15, 2017) (dismissing
case as moot).
6                                                         No. 21-1730

    On October 13, 2017, Feldkamp amended the charging
document to charge Adams with offense A-111/102, conspir-
acy to commit assault and battery with serious bodily injury.
(We will continue to use the moniker “assault” to describe this
amended charge.) Adams again requested live witness testi-
mony, including testimony from Garretson, Barnett, the in-
jured inmate, and multiple prison officers. Barnett submitted
a written statement on Adams’ behalf averring that neither he
nor Adams was involved in the assault. On October 20, Disci-
plinary Hearing Officer H. Andrews conducted the rehearing
on the charge. Andrews did not allow testimony from any of
the witnesses that Adams had requested, including Barnett;
Andrews gave no explanation for why he did not allow Bar-
nett to testify. Andrews convicted Adams of the assault
charge. Essentially the same penalties were imposed as a re-
sult of the conviction on rehearing: Adams was deprived of
360 days of good time credits, he was demoted from credit-
earning class 2 to class 3, and he was ordered to spend one
year in disciplinary segregation. Adams again appealed the
disciplinary conviction, and while that appeal was pending
within the prison hierarchy—it would be unsuccessful—he
again filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal
court, arguing that his requests for live witness testimony and
other evidence had been denied in violation of his right to due
process. 3
   On February 26, 2018, the final prison reviewing authority
reconsidered Adams’ appeal as to the drug-trafficking charge
dating back to 2016, designated that charge for rehearing, and

    3 Adams had been transferred to Wabash Valley by the time of the

rehearing on the assault charge, and it was the warden at Wabash Valley,
Richard Brown, who denied his final internal appeal from the rehearing.
No. 21-1730                                                  7

vacated the sanctions that had been imposed on that charge.
After that ruling, Adams agreed to plead guilty to a lesser
charge and in return faced no additional time in disciplinary
segregation on that charge.
    Shortly thereafter, Adams was again reclassified, to
department-wide administrative restrictive housing, based
on the seven conduct violations of which he had been found
guilty in the previous two years. (The drug-trafficking charge
had been one of the eight violations cited for his previous
reclassification to department-wide restrictive housing in
March 2017.) Adams’ involvement in an assault and battery
that resulted in serious bodily injury to an inmate was cited
as a reason for the reclassification. See Adams v. Warden, No.
2:18-cv-00294-JMS-MJD, R. 15-1 (exhibit submitted ex parte
and confidentially).
    In August 2018, the habeas court granted Adams’ request
for a writ of habeas corpus as to his conviction on the assault
charge, concluding that the prison had deprived him of
procedural due process. Adams v. Sup’t, 2018 WL 4077022
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 27, 2018) (Magnus-Stinson, J.). Based on his
disciplinary conviction for assault, Adams had inter alia lost
360 days of earned credit time, and the court noted that the
loss of good-time credits required certain procedural
protections, including the opportunity to present evidence to
an impartial decisionmaker and the right to call witnesses. Id.
at *1. The judge went on to conclude that the prison had
wrongfully denied Adams the opportunity to present the live
testimony of at least one witness, inmate Barnett, who would
have testified that he and Adams had nothing to do with the
attack on the victim. Although the hearing officer had
considered Barnett’s written statement, the officer had,
8                                                   No. 21-1730

without any explanation, refused Adams’ request for live
testimony from Barnett. Id. at *3. The judge noted that this
court had previously rejected the contention that a witness’s
testimony at a prison disciplinary hearing is categorically
unnecessary when the witness has submitted a written
statement. Id. (citing, inter alia, Whitlock v. Johnson, 153 F.3d
380, 388 (7th Cir. 1998)). In this case, the prison had not met
its burden of providing a justification for the denial of
Barnett’s requested testimony. Id. The judge thus concluded
that Adams’ due process rights had been violated. Id. She
ordered that two of the three sanctions that had been
imposed—the revocation of 360 days of good time credit and
the demotion from credit-earning class 2 to class 3—be
vacated. Id.
    Adams was then charged for a third and final time in con-
nection with the assault: on September 17, 2018, Feldkamp
modified the charge to aiding/attempted/conspiracy to as-
sault. After a hearing at which Adams was allowed to call
some but not all of the witnesses he requested, see R. 217 at
87–88 (Deposition of Benjamin E. Adams at 86–87), Discipli-
nary Hearing Officer Carpenter found Adams guilty. (The
record does not make clear which witnesses were allowed or
denied, nor does it reveal what penalties were imposed upon
Adams’ conviction.) But on December 3, 2018, pursuant to
Adams’ internal administrative appeal, the warden dismissed
the conduct report and expunged the sanctions on the ground
that the allegations against Adams were too vague, thereby
bringing the matter to a close.
    In the meantime, Adams had also obtained relief on the
cell phone charge, with the result that the revocation of his
No. 21-1730                                                    9

good time credits and his one-year assignment to disciplinary
segregation in that matter were also vacated.
    By this time, however, Adams had already served 730
days (two years) in restrictive housing pursuant to his
reclassification (in 2017, and again in 2018) to department-
wide restrictive housing, which reclassification decision was
based in part on his disciplinary conviction for the assault.
Inmates placed in restrictive housing are confined to their
cells for 23 hours a day, are not granted access to commissary
or hygiene items, may not participate in religious services,
have limited telephone rights, limited showering rights,
limited human contact, and are given smaller portions of food
(they are served an afternoon meal at 3 p.m. and are not fed
again until breakfast the following day). Adams alleges that
these harsh conditions negatively affected his health, both
physically and mentally.
    While he was challenging his assault conviction, Adams
filed suit in the district court seeking declaratory, injunctive,
and monetary relief. As amended and as relevant here, Ad-
ams alleged that the defendants (among them Feldkamp, the
two disciplinary officers, Peltier and Andrews, who con-
ducted the original hearing and the rehearing on the assault
charge and adjudged him guilty, and Penfold, who among
other things denied his first internal appeal of his assault con-
viction) violated his First Amendment right to free speech by
wrongfully charging and convicting him in the assault case in
retaliation for having complained about his rescinded kitchen
assignment; deprived him of his Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights by not allowing him to present live witnesses
and other evidence at the first two disciplinary hearings on
the assault charge; deprived him of his Fourteenth
10                                                   No. 21-1730

Amendment right to equal protection of the law by punishing
him more harshly for the assault based on his race; and vio-
lated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to the
allegedly cruel and inhumane conditions of department-wide
restrictive housing as a result of his wrongful disciplinary
conviction. Adams was pro se in the district court.
    On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district
court (Hanlon, J.) granted summary judgment to the defend-
ants. Adams v. Peltier, 2021 WL 1601223. As to the First
Amendment retaliation claim, there was no dispute that Ad-
ams’ ombudsperson complaint about Feldkamp having him
removed from the kitchen assignment constituted protected
speech, nor was there any dispute that spending a significant
amount of time in restrictive housing would deter First
Amendment activity. Id. at *6. But the court found the evi-
dence wanting as to whether Adams’ complaint was a moti-
vating factor for the disciplinary action taken against Adams
in the assault matter. Id. at *7. With respect to the due process
claim, the court was not persuaded that Adams had been de-
prived of procedural due process when he was denied the op-
portunity to present live witnesses at his disciplinary hearings
on the assault charge. The judge assumed, in view of the sig-
nificant period of time Adams had spent in restrictive hous-
ing and the relatively harsh conditions he described, that Ad-
ams was deprived of a protected liberty interest by being as-
signed to that housing. Id. at *8. There was also a question of
fact as to whether Adams’ disciplinary conviction in the as-
sault case contributed to the reclassification decision that
placed him in department-wide restrictive housing. Id. at *4.
But, relying on this court’s opinion in Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d
679, 685 (7th Cir. 2012), which indicates that such placement
decisions require only “informal due process” which
No. 21-1730                                                     11

“leave[s] substantial discretion and flexibility in the hands of
prison administrators,” the court was satisfied that Adams
had been given an ”opportunity to present his views” and
was not deprived of due process despite being denied the op-
portunity to present live witness testimony. Id. at *7. As to the
equal protection claim of race discrimination, which was fo-
cused primarily on Feldkamp, the court determined that Ad-
ams had not presented evidence that another, similarly situ-
ated inmate of a different race was treated more favorably
than he was vis-à-vis the assault. Id. at *5. Nor was the court
convinced that evidence of Feldkamp’s racially-conscious re-
marks and actions constituted direct evidence of a discrimi-
natory animus on Feldkamp’s part. Id. Finally, as to the Eighth
Amendment claim, the court determined there was no evi-
dence that Feldkamp or any of the other defendants had any
control over the conditions Adams experienced in restrictive
housing; consequently, they could not be held liable for any
Eighth Amendment violation. Id. at *8.
                                II.
    We review the district court’s summary judgment deci-
sion de novo, e.g., Gnutek v. Ill. Gaming Bd., 80 F.4th 820, 823–24
(7th Cir. 2023), resolving any factual disputes in Adams’ favor
and granting him the benefit of all reasonable inferences that
may be drawn from the evidentiary record, e.g., Smith v.
Crounse Corp., 72 F.4th 799, 804 (7th Cir. 2023). We agree with
12                                                            No. 21-1730

the district court that the defendants were entitled to sum-
mary judgment on each of Adams’ claims. 4
A. First Amendment claim.
    The First Amendment claim is premised on the notion that
Feldkamp pursued the assault charge against Adams in retal-
iation for his complaint to the ombudsperson that Feldkamp
had wrongfully blocked him from serving in the kitchen at
Plainfield, and that the various hearing officers who subse-
quently ruled against Adams on the assault charge were in-
fluenced by Feldkamp to do so. To succeed on this claim, Ad-
ams must establish that (1) that he engaged in protected First
Amendment activity; (2) that an adverse action was taken
against him, and (3) that his protected conduct was at least a
factor that motivated the adverse action. Holleman v. Zatecky,
951 F.3d 873, 878 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Bridges v. Gilbert, 557
F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009)). There is no dispute here as to the
first two elements; our focus is on the third. We agree with the
district court that the evidence is insufficient to suggest that
Feldkamp was motivated by the ombudsperson complaint to
pursue disciplinary action against Adams. 5
    As developed on appeal, there is more to Adams’ case in
this regard beyond the chronology of events. Recall that the

     4 Adams sought injunctive and declaratory relief below, but as he is

no longer in the custody of IDOC, any such claims are moot. Calhoun v.
DeTella, 319 F.3d 936, 939 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Higgason v. Farley, 83 F.3d
807, 811 (7th Cir. 1996)). Only monetary relief from the defendants in their
individual capacities is available at this juncture.
     5 Below, Adams pursued failure-to-train theories of liability against

then-IDOC Commissioner Robert Carter as to both his First Amendment
retaliation claim and his equal protection claim. He does not pursue any
such theory of liability as to Carter on appeal.
No. 21-1730                                                    13

district court reasoned that the chronology alone was insuffi-
cient to suggest retaliation, given that more than two weeks
passed between the complaint and Feldkamp’s first report
implicating Adams in the assault. But, granting Adams the
benefit of an assumption that Feldkamp knew about the com-
plaint, the additional evidence to which Adams points is not
sufficient to support an inference that Feldkamp was moti-
vated by a retaliatory animus to pursue the assault charge
against him.
    Adams points to a prior incident in which Feldkamp sent
him to segregation in 2016 after he complained about a strip-
search. But even if we indulge the assumption that Feld-
kamp’s motive in that instance was retaliatory, Adams does
not explain how that incident is relevant apart from a propen-
sity inference that because Feldkamp had retaliated against
Adams previously, it was likely that he did so again when
Adams complained about being excluded from kitchen duty.
See Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1); United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845,
856 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc); Lange v. City of Oconto, 28 F.4th
825, 843 (7th Cir. 2022); see also, e.g., Turley v. Todaro, 682
F. App’x 502, 503–04 (7th Cir. 2017) (non-precedential deci-
sion) (plaintiff prisoner’s theory that act of retaliation against
another prisoner was relevant to show that defendants retali-
ated against plaintiff as well depended on impermissible pro-
pensity inference).
   Beyond that, Adams essentially argues there is evidence
that Feldkamp trumped up the assault charge against him.
Certainly it is true that Adams has consistently denied the
charge, and Adams asserts that inmates Barnett and Garret-
son have both represented that Adams was not involved in
the assault. But we discern no admissible evidence to support
14                                                   No. 21-1730

the proposition that Feldkamp knew, as a result of his inves-
tigation into the assault, that Adams was not involved. Ad-
ams, in his own declaration, makes assertions about various
false statements that Feldkamp made in his report and points
to certain evidentiary sources that would, he believes, expose
the falsity of these statements. Adams can of course speak to
his own innocence. But Adams does not have personal
knowledge as to what Feldkamp knew or did not know was
false, and Adams points to no evidence suggesting that Feld-
kamp looked at the evidence he has cited and either misrep-
resented what the evidence revealed and/or realized that the
evidence exculpated Adams. The question is not whether
Feldkamp was right or wrong in pointing the finger at Ad-
ams; it is whether he genuinely believed that Adams was cul-
pably involved with the assault. In the employment context,
we routinely hold that a disciplined or discharged employee’s
avowal of good work performance is insufficient to create a
dispute of fact as to whether the employer believed the qual-
ity of his performance to be otherwise. E.g., Luks v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., 467 F.3d 1049, 1056 (7th Cir. 2006); Ptasznik v.
St. Joseph Hosp., 464 F.3d 691, 696 (7th Cir. 2006); Lucas v. Chi-
cago Transit Auth., 367 F.3d 714, 731 (7th Cir. 2004). The same
principle applies here. There is no record evidence, apart from
Adams’ protestations, supporting a reasonable inference that
Feldkamp knew that Adams was innocent of any involve-
ment with the assault and did not honestly believe in the ve-
racity of his own report. (For his part, Feldkamp averred in
his declaration he believed the information set forth in his re-
port to be true. R. 202-3 at 1 (declaration of Clinton Feldkamp
¶ 4).) That ends our inquiry.
   In the absence of any evidence that Feldkamp pursued the
assault charge out of a retaliatory motive, the officers whom
No. 21-1730                                                    15

Adams alleges were influenced by Feldkamp in finding Ad-
ams guilty of this charge (or denying one or more of his ap-
peals) likewise cannot be held liable on this claim. The district
court properly granted summary judgment against Adams on
the First Amendment claim.
B. Due process claim.
   A reminder to the reader that this section constitutes my
dissent as to Adams’ due process claim.
    Adams pursues two theories as to how the hearings he
was given on the assault charge deprived him of due process:
first, that he was not given an adequate opportunity to pre-
sent witnesses and access other evidence (including surveil-
lance videos) at his hearing; and second, that he was not
granted a neutral hearing officer, in that Feldkamp essentially
dictated to the first two hearing officers who heard this claim
how they should resolve the disciplinary charge. Because I
find that Adams has presented sufficient evidence to survive
summary judgment on the first of these two theories, I would
remand for further proceedings on that theory. My colleagues
disagree with me on that point, for the reasons set forth in
Judge St. Eve’s concurrence. Her concurrence also addresses
the second theory regarding a neutral arbiter. I express no
opinion as to that theory.
    As a general matter, a procedural due process claim re-
quires a plaintiff to show that state actors deprived him of a
protected property or liberty interest and that he did not re-
ceive adequate process when he was deprived of that interest.
See Reed v. Goertz, 598 U.S. 230, 236, 143 S. Ct. 955, 961 (2023).
The process owed to a prisoner depends on the particular cir-
cumstances and what rights of the prisoner are at stake. See
16                                                    No. 21-1730

Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 893, 903 (1976);
Munson v. Gaetz, 673 F.3d 630, 637–38 (7th Cir. 2012). See also
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556–58, 563–68, 94 S. Ct. 2963,
2975–76, 2978–80 (1974) (denial of prisoner’s good-time cred-
its); Prude v. Meli, 76 F.4th 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2023) (prison dis-
ciplinary hearings generally); cf. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S.
209, 125 S. Ct. 2384 (2005) (assignment to supermax prison fa-
cility which imposes atypical and significant hardship on in-
mate in relation to ordinary incidents of prison life).
       It is well-settled that due process in a prison dis-
       ciplinary hearing requires advance notice of the
       charges, a hearing before an impartial deci-
       sionmaker, the right to call witnesses and pre-
       sent evidence (when consistent with institu-
       tional safety), and a written explanation of the
       outcome. [Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934, 939
       (7th Cir. 2007).] At the same time, these proce-
       dural requirements are not overly rigid. See Pig-
       gie v. Cotton, 344 F.3d 674, 678 (7th Cir. 2003).
       Any procedures required in a prison “must bal-
       ance the inmate's interest in avoiding loss ...
       against the needs of the prison, and some
       amount of flexibility and accommodation is re-
       quired.” Wolff, 418 U.S. at 566, 94 S. Ct. 2963 [at
       2979–80]. Because of the unique issues present
       in the prison context and the need to maintain
       safety and order, “[r]ules of procedure may be
       shaped by consideration of the risks of error and
       should also be shaped by the consequences
       which will follow their adoption.” Id. at 567, 94
       S. Ct. 2963 [at 2980] (citations omitted).
No. 21-1730                                                   17

Prude, 76 F.4th at 657 (footnote omitted). With respect to wit-
nesses, our decision in Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666 (7th
Cir. 2003) (per curiam), adds that “[a]lthough prison discipli-
nary committees may deny witness requests that threaten in-
stitutional goals or are irrelevant, repetitive, or unnecessary,
they may not exclude witnesses requested by an offender
with no explanation at all.”
    The finding that Adams was responsible for the assault
had multiple consequences: he was deprived of good time
credits, he was demoted to a lower credit-earning class, he
was assigned to disciplinary segregation for a one-year pe-
riod, and, based on the assault finding and other adverse dis-
ciplinary findings, he was reclassified to department-wide re-
strictive housing. The reclassification in particular is what led
to Adams’ extended assignment to restrictive housing—in
multiple facilities—where he experienced the harsh condi-
tions he has described.
    In evaluating this claim, the district court made two
determinations in Adams’ favor that the defendants do not
contest on appeal. First, in view of the two years Adams spent
in department-wide restrictive housing and the harsh
conditions that Adams described, the court determined that a
reasonable jury could find that he was deprived of a protected
liberty interest. 2021 WL 1061223, at *8. Second, the court also
determined that there was a question of fact as to whether,
without the adverse finding on the assault charge, Adams
would have been reclassified to department-wide restrictive
housing. Id. at *4.
    The relevant question here, then, is whether Adams was
deprived of due process in connection with the hearings on
the assault charge. The district court reasoned that he was not,
18                                                     No. 21-1730

based on the lesser degree of due process required for hear-
ings on whether an inmate should be assigned to segregation.
Recall that in both the original and the rehearing conducted
on the assault charge (I will disregard the third hearing con-
ducted after Adams’ habeas petition was granted, given that
the prison warden vacated the sanctions imposed at that hear-
ing and dismissed the charge), Adams was at risk of losing
good time credits, and in fact, the penalties ordered by the
hearing officers included the loss of good time credits. But
given that Adams’ successful habeas petition had resulted in
the restoration of his good time credits and his credit-earning
class, “the only injury Mr. Adams challenges here is the time
he spent in segregation [i.e., restrictive housing].” Id. at *7. Cit-
ing our decision in Westefer v. Neal, supra, 682 F.3d at 685, the
district court reasoned that assignments to segregation, even
disciplinary segregation, demand only that an inmate be
given an “opportunity to present his views” rather than a full-
blown hearing, and that “[i]f the prison holds a hearing, in-
mates do not have a constitutional right to call witnesses or to
require prison officials to interview witnesses.” 2021 WL
1061223, at *7. Consequently, the district court concluded that
the record did not support a finding that Adams was de-
prived of due process.
    But this analysis is inconsistent with the chronology of
events and the way in which the assault finding contributed
to the reclassification determination that resulted in Adams’
assignment to department-wide restrictive housing. As one of
the eight predicates for the reclassification determination
(and one of the seven predicates for the follow-up
reclassification determination in 2018), the assault conviction
is relevant less for what particular types of discipline were
imposed at the assault hearing than for the underlying
No. 21-1730                                                      19

finding that Adams had participated in the assault on another
prisoner. Cf. Love v. Vanihel, 73 F.4th 439, 451–52 (7th Cir. 2023)
(op. of Brennan, J.) (distinguishing between disciplinary
hearing which resulted in finding of guilt—which inmate’s
procedural due process claim did not challenge—and
discretionary decision as to what penalties were warranted—
as to which inmate argued additional process was due). That
finding, in turn, was rendered in a hearing where Adams was
exposed to disciplinary penalties including the loss of good
time credits—and, in fact, the hearing officer ultimately did
sanction Adams with the loss of 365 days of earned good time
credits in addition to one year of disciplinary segregation. The
same was true in the October 20, 2017 rehearing in the assault
case, where Adams was again found guilty and the sanctions
imposed again included the loss of earned good time credits.
Given Adams’ exposure to the loss of good time credits in
both the original hearing and the rehearing on the assault
charge, he was entitled, inter alia, to present relevant live
witness testimony, and the hearing officer’s decision to refuse
testimony even from an exculpatory witness like Barnett,
without explanation, amounted to a denial of his due process
rights under Wolff, as Judge Magnus-Stinson would later rule
in granting Adams’ request for a writ of habeas corpus. Adams
v. Sup’t, 2018 WL 4077022, at *3 (citing, inter alia, Whitlock, 133
F.3d at 388); see also Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 646–47,
117 S. Ct. 1584, 1588 (1997); Sup’t, Mass. Correct. Inst., Walpole
v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 2773 (1985); Wolff, 418
U.S. at 566–67, 94 S. Ct. at 1979–80; Ellison v. Zatecky, 820 F.3d
271, 274 (7th Cir. 2016); Donelson v. Pfister, 811 F.3d 911, 917–
18 (7th Cir. 2016).
   On March 21, 2017, five days after the original assault
hearing and conviction, a prison official reclassified him to
20                                                   No. 21-1730

department-wide restrictive housing, citing the eight conduct
violations Adams was found to have committed within the
previous year, including the assault violation, which was ar-
guably one of the more serious, if not the most serious, of the
eight violations cited. One year later, after Adams’ conviction
on the drug charge was vacated in February 2018 and he
pleaded guilty to a lesser offense, Adams was again assigned
to department-wide (administrative) restrictive housing
based on the now-seven violations he had committed over the
course of the previous two years. The latter reclassification
decision specifically noted that one of those seven discipli-
nary infractions had resulted in serious bodily injury to an-
other inmate, which appears to have been a reference to the
assault violation. So as the district court noted, there is a rec-
ord basis on which a factfinder could readily conclude that
the assault finding contributed to the reclassification.
    To my mind, nothing about the grant of habeas relief in
August 2018, which restored to Adams the good time credits
that had been revoked as a result of the assault hearing (and
rehearing) should alter the analysis. As a historical matter, it
remains the case that the finding that Adams had committed
the assault was one of the triggers for the reclassification de-
cision, and whether or not good time credits were taken away
from Adams has no bearing on that causal connection. I un-
derstand the district court’s point that once Adams’ good time
credits and his credit-earning class were restored by way of
his successful habeas petition, the only remaining penalty im-
posed on him in the assault hearing (and rehearing) was the
order that he serve a year in disciplinary segregation, a pen-
alty that the district court believed warranted only a lesser
level of process and did not require that Adams be given the
right to call witnesses. I assume, without deciding, that the
No. 21-1730                                                    21

district court was correct on this point. But see Williams v.
Brown, 849 F. App’x 154, 157 (7th Cir. 2021) (non-precedential
decision) (“There is no question here that Williams ade-
quately pleaded deficient procedure in the disciplinary pro-
cess that led to his punitive segregation. He alleged that the
defendants violated his due process rights by filing a discipli-
nary report that did not notify him of the details of his charges
and by refusing to call or interview his witnesses.”) (emphasis
mine) (citing Wolff, 418 U.S. at 563–69, 94 S. Ct. at 2978–81). If
Adams were challenging the validity of the hearing officer’s
order that he spend one year in disciplinary segregation, this
might matter. But he is not. His claim, as I understand it, is
focused on the assault finding as a predicate for the reclassifi-
cation decision that assigned him to department-wide restric-
tive housing.
    To be clear, I am not proposing to hold that when the sole
penalty that a prisoner faces in a disciplinary hearing is as-
signment to segregation (for however long a period of time),
he necessarily is entitled to witness testimony at the hearing.
Nor am I suggesting that a reclassification decision assigning
a prisoner to department-wide restricting housing itself re-
quires a hearing at which he is entitled to witness testimony.
I would hold only that where a prisoner has been reclassified
to department-wide restrictive housing based in part on a
prior disciplinary finding rendered at a hearing where the
prisoner was in fact exposed to the loss of good time credits,
he may assert a due process challenge to that disciplinary
hearing (and, in turn, the reclassification decision based on
the result of that hearing) on the ground that he was not per-
mitted to present witness testimony in defending himself
against the disciplinary charge.
22                                                           No. 21-1730

    Because the assault finding was rendered in a hearing
(and later a rehearing) in which Adams was, in fact, exposed
to the loss of good time credits, he was entitled to live witness
testimony absent some justification for why such testimony
was not appropriate or feasible. See Hill, 472 U.S. at 454, 105
S. Ct. at 1588 (“[w]here a prison disciplinary hearing may re-
sult in the loss of good time credits,” Wolff requirements, in-
cluding opportunity to call witnesses, apply). And because he
was deprived of that right, the hearing as conducted violated
his right to procedural due process, as the habeas court con-
cluded. 6
    There is a question of fact as to whether, had Adams been
granted the right to call witnesses, he would have been exon-
erated of the assault charge, and this in turn results in a sec-
ond question of fact as to whether, absent the assault finding,
Adams would have been reclassified to department-wide re-
strictive housing. Adams is entitled to have a factfinder re-
solve these questions, and if resolved favorably to him, to de-
termine what injuries he suffered as a result of the reclassifi-
cation. In my view, the district court therefore erred in enter-
ing summary judgment on this claim against Adams. I

     6 Although, as noted, Adams was allowed to call at least some wit-

nesses at the third hearing, I am not prepared to say on the current record
that he had a sufficient opportunity to present testimony in support of his
defense and that the hearing officer’s decision to convict him at that hear-
ing shows that the due process violations at the previous two hearings on
the assault charge were harmless. See, e.g., R. 217 at 87–88 (Adams Dep.
86–87) (regarding inmate Barnett, Adams testifies that he was only al-
lowed to submit inmate Barnett’s written statement at the third hearing
and believes he was not allowed to call Barnett to testify, although he is
not positive).
No. 21-1730                                                    23

respectfully dissent from the court’s decision to instead affirm
the judgment as to the due process claim.
C. Equal protection claim.
    The equal protection claim is premised on the notion that
Feldkamp discriminated against Adams based on his race in
drafting his disciplinary report on the assault incident and
recommending that Adams be charged, and that the succes-
sive officers who found Adams guilty of the assault and or-
dered him punished (and denied his appeals) were in turn in-
fluenced by Feldkamp’s purportedly discriminatory recom-
mendation. Absent direct evidence of a racial animus on Feld-
kamp’s part, Adams (who is Black) must show that he was
treated differently from a similarly situated individual of a
different race owing at least in part to a discriminatory mo-
tive. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing Dev. Corp.,
429 U.S. 252, 264–65, 97 S. Ct. 555, 563 (1977); Brown v. Budz,
398 F.3d 904, 916 (7th Cir. 2005).
    Adams cites Garretson (who is White) as his comparator.
We can assume for present purposes that the two were simi-
larly situated, in that both were involved (per Feldkamp) in
the assault upon another prisoner. But Adams has not identi-
fied evidence that the two were treated differently: both were
charged and found guilty in connection with the assault and
both were penalized with one year in disciplinary segrega-
tion. Adams points out that he was ordered to serve a total of
two years in segregation, but of course the second year was
the result of the guilty finding on the cell phone charge. Ad-
ams appears to suggest that because the cell phone charge in-
volved a phone that was confiscated on November 9, 2016,
but he was not charged for the cell phone until February 23,
2017—less than three weeks after the assault—the cell phone
24                                                 No. 21-1730

charge was essentially a vehicle to penalize him for the as-
sault. But beyond his own speculation, Adams cites no evi-
dence supporting any connection between the two charges.
    Adams also posits that he was treated more harshly than
Garretson in that he (Adams) was innocent of the assault,
whereas Garretson was guilty. This may be true from Adams’
perspective, but—so far as the record reveals—not from the
defendants’ point of view. Feldkamp concluded, as a result of
his investigation, that Adams ordered the assault, and the
hearing and review officers who subsequently examined the
evidence likewise concluded that Adams was culpable.
Again, they may all have been wrong, but there is no admis-
sible evidence suggesting that either Feldkamp or the hearing
and review officers did not genuinely believe that Adams, like
Garretson, was culpable.
    Alternatively, Adams cites various remarks and actions on
the part of Feldkamp that purport to directly show racial bias
on his part, including his use of urban slang to address a hear-
ing officer who emailed him regarding one of Adams’ ap-
peals, his evident distaste when Adams explained that one of
his tattoos depicted the African continent, and his interest, in
the course of investigating the assault, as to whether officer
Nelson favored Black inmates. We agree with the district
court that none of these statements or actions, considered sep-
arately or together, is sufficient to support an inference that
Feldkamp’s actions vis-à-vis Adams were animated by racial
bias.
   Because the evidence does not support a finding that Ad-
ams was treated more harshly than Garretson, or that Feld-
kamp took adverse action against Adams out of racial bias,
No. 21-1730                                                           25

the district court properly granted summary judgment on this
claim in favor of the defendants.
D. Eighth Amendment claim.
    The Eighth Amendment claim posits that the conditions of
department-wide restrictive housing were so harsh as to have
deprived Adams of “’the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities,’ creating an excessive risk to [his] health and
safety,” Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 521 (7th Cir. 2017) (quot-
ing Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S. Ct. 2392, 2399
(1981)), and that the defendants subjected him to these condi-
tions with “a culpable state of mind,” id. (citing Farmer v. Bren-
nan, 511 U.S. 825, 834, 114 S. Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994)). We need
not reach the first of these two elements. The dispositive ques-
tion is whether Feldkamp or the hearing and review officers
can be charged with subjecting Adams to the harsh conditions
of restrictive housing. 7 There is no evidence that they had con-
trol over the conditions in restrictive housing (how long he
was confined to his cell, how often he was fed, and so on).
Indeed, as of the June 30, 2017 transfer to the Wabash Valley
facility, Adams was no longer housed at Plainfield, where
Feldkamp and the hearing and review officers remained. It is
true, as Adams points out, that a defendant’s knowledge of
conditions that pose a risk of serious harm to an inmate may
give rise to Eighth Amendment liability when coupled with
evidence supporting an inference that the defendant was de-
liberately indifferent to the inmate’s plight, i.e., that the

    7 Adams has waived any Eighth Amendment claim against Carter as

the then-IDOC Commissioner. Apart from his failure to develop such a
claim below, he does not separately discuss the prospective basis for
Carter’s liability on the Eighth Amendment claim in his briefs on appeal.
26                                                   No. 21-1730

defendant intentionally or recklessly disregarded the risk of
harm to the inmate. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S. Ct. at
1977; Haywood v. Hathaway, 842 F.3d 1026, 1031 (7th Cir. 2016)
(per curiam). But this presumes—apart from whether any of
the defendants here knew what the conditions of restrictive
housing were outside of the Plainfield facility—that the de-
fendant has some authority over the conditions and a respon-
sibility to address them. See, e.g., Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000,
1008 (7th Cir. 2016) (evidence indicated that prison warden
not only knew of ongoing problem with infestation of vermin,
insects, and birds in inmate’s cell, but was personally respon-
sible for changing prison policies so that those conditions
would be addressed).
    Our decision in Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th
Cir. 2009), rejects the notion that simply because a prison
employee is on notice of conditions that may violate the
Eighth Amendment, he necessarily has a duty to respond
(and may be held liable if he does not), regardless of whether
those conditions are within his purview. See also Figgs v.
Dawson, 829 F.3d 895, 903–04 (7th Cir. 2016); George v. Smith,
507 F.3d 605, 609–10 (7th Cir. 2007). The defendant at issue in
Burks was a grievance handler, Salinas, who processed two of
the plaintiff-inmate Burks’ grievances about an untreated eye
condition, one of which she dismissed as untimely. Given that
the latter grievance placed Salinas on notice of Burks’ need for
medical treatment, Burks alleged that she could be held liable
for the injury he suffered when it remained untreated. We
disagreed:
       Salinas did not create the peril facing Burks or
       do anything that increased the peril, or made it
       harder for Burks (or anyone else) to solve the
No. 21-1730                                                    27

      problem. The most one can say is that Salinas
      did nothing, when she might have gone beyond
      the requirements of her job and tried to help
      him. A layperson’s failure to tell the medical
      staff how to do its job cannot be called deliber-
      ate indifference; it is just a form of failing to sup-
      ply a gratuitous rescue service.
555 F.3d at 596. By contrast, we did agree that Burks had a
viable claim against the individual who managed the prison
medical unit, as she was not only in a position to have known
about Burks’ eye condition, but had the authority to address
it presuming she did have such knowledge. See id. at 594.
    By virtue of their handling of the assault charge, Feldkamp
and the other officers arguably may have been responsible for
Adams’ reclassification to department-wide restrictive hous-
ing; and if they violated his rights in charging him with as-
sault and finding him guilty of that offense (if they actually
did deprive him of procedural due process, for example), they
could be held liable for that particular wrong. Any depriva-
tions and injuries that Adams suffered in restrictive housing
would certainly be relevant to his damages on such a claim.
With respect to the Eighth Amendment, however, the restric-
tive housing conditions that Adams has described were not
unique to him, and there is no evidence that any of the de-
fendants here created those conditions or somehow made
them worse for Adams in particular; they were the same con-
ditions that would have faced any inmate assigned (rightly or
wrongly) to restrictive housing. Even assuming that the de-
fendants were aware of the conditions of that unit at
28                                                          No. 21-1730

Plainfield and at Wabash Valley, 8 there is no evidence that
their positions within the prison charged them with any re-
sponsibility for the conditions in that unit or gave them the
authority to change those conditions—there is no evidence
that they had anything to do with the restrictive housing unit
at all. Consequently, they cannot be held to account for the
conditions Adams has described. 9 The district court correctly
entered summary judgment against Adams on this claim.

     8 By the time Adams was deposed in 2020, he was assigned to the New

Castle Correctional Facility, where he remained in restrictive housing. But
so far as we can discern from the record, his transfer to that facility oc-
curred subsequent to the events at issue in this case.
     9 We do not understand our ruling to be inconsistent with the district

court’s decision in Vermillion v. Levenhagen, 2018 WL 2321112 (S.D. Ind.
May 22, 2018), which Adams has cited in support of his claim. Like Ad-
ams, Vermillion alleged that he was wrongfully assigned to punitive seg-
regation and then transferred to a form of restrictive housing where he
was placed in solitary confinement and forced to endure conditions of
confinement that allegedly violated his Eighth Amendment rights. On
summary judgment, the district court allowed this claim to proceed
against four defendants, and in so doing the court noted that these defend-
ants either knew or should have known that Vermillion had experienced
harsh conditions in solitary confinement for over three years and that be-
cause these defendants were also personally involved in his assignment to
restrictive housing and in keeping him there, a jury could find that they
had “deliberately subjected Vermillion” to the harsh conditions he had
endured. Id. at *10–*11. But more than that, those defendants also occupied
positions within the prison and IDOC that made them responsible in var-
ious ways for the conditions within the restrictive housing unit: one de-
fendant was the prison superintendent, a second was IDOC’s director of
operations, a third was an administrative assistant who oversaw the re-
strictive housing unit, and the fourth was a case manager who worked in
that restrictive housing unit. See id. at *3–*4.
No. 21-1730                                                      29

                                III.
    For the reasons set forth in Sections II.A., II.C., and II.D. of
this opinion and in the concurring opinion, we AFFIRM the
district court’s judgment.
30                                                            No. 21-1730

    ST. EVE, Circuit Judge, joined by KIRSCH, Circuit Judge, con-
curring. 1 I join all parts of the majority opinion except the
holding on Adams’s procedural due process claim. I respect-
fully disagree that Adams’s procedural due process claim
should proceed on his theory that he was not given an ade-
quate opportunity to present witnesses and access other evi-
dence at his assault charge hearing. Nor can the neutral arbi-
ter theory proceed. Adams’s claim that Feldkamp called the
shots in one of his assault hearings is disquieting, but later
proceedings corrected that procedural misstep. Put another
way, any error was harmless. I would aﬃrm the district court
across the board.
    Our law is clear that an inmate who is facing transfer to
disciplinary segregation is entitled only to “informal, nonad-
versarial due process,” which “leave[s] substantial discretion
and ﬂexibility in the hands of the prison administrators.”
Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 684–85 (7th Cir. 2012). Informal
due process calls for notice of the reasons for the inmate’s
placement and “an opportunity to present his views.” Id. And
the Supreme Court has made clear that “[o]rdinarily a written
statement by the inmate will accomplish this purpose …. So
long as this occurs, and the decisionmaker reviews the
charges and then-available evidence against the prisoner, the
Due Process Clause is satisﬁed.” Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460,
476 (1983), abrogated on other grounds by Sandin v. Conner, 515
U.S. 472 (1995); see also Westefer, 682 F.3d at 685. Consistent
with this right, Adams was given the opportunity to present

     1 This opinion sets forth the opinion of the majority of the court as to

the procedural due process claim.
No. 21-1730                                                 31

his arguments orally during the assault charge hearings. This
satisﬁes the Due Process Clause.
    The dissent nonetheless concludes that Adams was de-
prived of due process in connection with the assault charge
hearing because he was entitled to present live witness testi-
mony. According to the dissent, because the hearing included
the potential loss of good time credit as well as segregation,
Adams should have been able to present live testimony. It is
uncontested, however, that Adams’s good time credits were
restored. The only issue, therefore, is whether he should have
received more process for his transfer to a more restrictive
prison setting. He should not have. In holding otherwise, the
dissent improperly bootstraps this hearing about disciplinary
segregation into one about the loss of good time credits, all
because one of eight underlying violations (which is not at is-
sue here) might have called for more process. Our law does
not support this expansion of his rights.
    Adams similarly cannot proceed on his claim that he did
not receive an impartial decisionmaker. Due process entitles
a prisoner to an impartial decisionmaker during a prison dis-
ciplinary hearing. Prude v. Meli, 76 F.4th 648, 657 (7th Cir.
2023). That is so even under the informal due process stand-
ard set forth in Westefer. See 682 F.3d at 685. Adams adduced
an affidavit suggesting Feldkamp’s influence tainted the hear-
ings Peltier oversaw in the March 2017 assault case. Per the
affidavit, Peltier had told Adams that “higher ups” had pre-
determined the outcome of the hearings, adding that Feld-
kamp was going to make sure that Adams went to segrega-
tion for “a long time.” The allegedly biased Feldkamp even
followed up on Adams’s case later, intervening as another
32                                                  No. 21-1730

officer, Andrews, reviewed Adams’s procedural challenges.
That is not the model of due process.
    Still, any failure to provide a neutral arbiter at that stage
was harmless. The outcome of the Peltier hearings was ini-
tially a conviction in the assault case, which was later over-
turned. Then in September 2018, Hearing Officer Carpenter
presided over another case with the same conduct—finding
Adams guilty. Adams does not challenge the impartiality of
Officer Carpenter. In the end, an internal administrative ap-
peal process concluded that the allegations against Adams
had been too vague to support the assault charge. This is due
process at work, even if Adams did not get a fair shake in
front of Peltier. Through Carpenter and the appeals process,
Adams secured a neutral adjudication, a fair appellate deci-
sionmaker, and ultimately the charge’s dismissal and ex-
pungement.
   For these reasons, I would affirm the district court in all
respects.