Court Opinion

ID: 9646388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 12:58:35.581361+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:37.784688
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
On original submission a panel opinion reversed the judgments of conviction and ordered the indictments dismissed because the trial court had overruled an exception to the form of each indictment — styled a motion to quash.1 The panel correctly referred to Craven v. State, 613 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Cr.App.1981), in finding that the claimed error had been preserved for appellate review,2 but it did not address the legislative admonition of Article 21.19, V.A. C.C.P., on which the judgment in Craven was affirmed, in that “the record before us will not shed any light on the ultimate issue of prejudice to substantial rights of appellant,” id., at 490.
For more than one hundred years our code of criminal procedure has insisted:
“An indictment shall not be held insufficient, nor shall the trial, judgment or other proceedings thereon be affected, by reason of any defect of form which does not prejudice the substantial rights of the defendant.”3
Article 21.19, Y.A.C.C.P. One of the few remaining parts of the “Common Sense Indictment Act,” 4 the provision obviously was an effort by the Legislature to bar reversing a judgment of conviction for defects of form in an indictment (or information).5 See Cresendo v. State, 73 Tex.Cr.R. 436, 165 S.W. 936, 938 (1914); Gragg v. State, 148 Tex.Cr.R. 267, 186 S.W.2d 243, 246 (1945) (Graves, J., dissenting).
*190American Plant Food Corp. v. State, 508 S.W.2d 598 (Tex.Cr.App.1974) found:
“The last two requirements stated in Terry [v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 471 S.W.2d 848], supra, that the State’s pleading must allege facts sufficient to bar a subsequent prosecution and sufficient to give the defendant notice of precisely what he is charged with, though relating to the substance of the charge in one sense, are, in contemplation of exceptions under Articles 27.08 and 27.09, supra, grounds for an exception to the form under Articles 27.09(2) and 21.21(7), and not for an exception to the substance under Article 27.08(1).” Id., at 603.
Therefore, when a trial court overrules a “notice” exception to form, and the issue is properly brought to an appellate court for review by ground of error, the ultimate question of law is whether, assuming a defect as to form in the indictment may be found, a judgment of conviction must be ipso facto reversed without a showing of prejudice to substantial rights of appellant. Craven v. State, 613 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Cr. App.1981) concluded that “the record before us will not shed any light on the ultimate issue of prejudice to substantial rights of appellant, though there be error in denying the motion to quash,” and overruled a ground of error asserting a “notice” exception had been erroneously rejected by the trial court.6
Of course, sufficiency of an indictment with respect to notice is facially tested “ ‘by itself, as a pleading,’ just as was most recently done in Lindsay v. State, 588 5.W.2d 570, 572 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) and Doty v. State, 585 S.W.2d 726 (Tex.Cr.App.1979),” Brasfield v. State, 600 S.W.2d 288, 294 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), and from the perspective of the accused, King v. State, 594 S.W.2d 425, 426 (Tex.Cr.App.1980).7 But to find that a motion to quash has “merits” does not answer the question under Article 21.19, supra, whether substantial rights of the accused have been prejudiced by overruling the motion and then taking his plea of guilty and his judicial confession — comporting with allegations in the indictment— and entering a judgment of conviction thereon.
Craven, it must be remembered, and the instant case as well, is bottomed on a plea of guilty. Without more, by entering his plea of guilty appellant waived “all nonju-risdictional defects” in the indictment and other proceedings in the trial court. Helms v. State, 484 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex.Cr.App.1972). But there is more: the plea was entered pursuant to a plea bargain that was honored. Thus, to be sure, the Court is authorized by Article 44.02, supra, to review the ground of error, but we should not ignore the mandate of Article 21.19 and reverse the judgment without finding some harm suffered by appellant requires that disposition.8 The majority partially justifies what it is doing by opining that Taylor v. State, 134 Tex.Cr.R. 561, 116 S.W.2d 392 (1939) was misunderstood by the Court in Craven. Rather than reiterate an interpretation, I merely reproduce all that follows a preliminary statement of the case, viz:
“The only bill of exception found in the record relates to appellant’s motion to *191quash the complaint and information. We deem it unnecessary to discuss the ground of the motion. The complaint and information are sufficient to charge the offense.
No statement of facts is brought forward. The judgment is affirmed.”
As to the exact intendment of the Court, compare among others, where there is a statement of facts, Cresencio v. State, supra, 165 S.W. at 938:
“In this case it is an absolute certainty that appellant and no other was the identical person who is alleged to have committed the offense charged therein. He so testified, and all of the evidence ... shows that he is that person. * * * And it is without a shadow of doubt shown that his substantial rights have in no way been prejudiced by not giving his full name, and therefore the indictment should not be held insufficient, nor should the trial, judgment, or other proceeding thereon be affected, by reason of any defect or imperfection of form in the indictment.”
So here, being unable to say from the record that substantial rights of appellant have been prejudiced, I would grant the State’s motion for rehearing and affirm the judgments of conviction.
W.C. DAVIS, McCORMICK and CAMPBELL, JJ., join.

. Among pleadings of an accused prescribed by Article 27.02, V.A.C.C.P., is: “(1) A motion to set aside or an exception to an indictment or information for some matter of form or substance.” Article 27.03, id., in addition to those authorized by law, lists three grounds for a motion to set aside; Article 27.08, id., restricts exceptions to substance to four enumerated ones; Article 27.09, id., gives three general grounds for exceptions to form. See also Article 28.01, id., for matters to be determined at pretrial hearing, e.g., “(4) Exceptions to the form or substance of the indictment..

. Appellant’s precise contention was: “There is no way the State could have discharged its burden of proof ... without adducing facts that described the agreement [to bet], the parties to the agreement, and the ‘something of value’ involved. In short, it was necessary for the State to prove the manner and means whereby the defendant ‘received a bet and offer to bet.’ ”

. All emphasis is added by the writer of this opinion unless otherwise indicated.

. Acts 1881, 17th Leg., ch. 57, p. 60. See forms of indictment set out in Historical Note following Article 21.16, V.A.C.C.P.

. Quoted approvingly and followed literally in Jones v. State, 504 S.W.2d 442, 443, 444 (Tex.Cr.App.1974).

. Nolan v. State, 629 S.W.2d 940 (Tex.Cr.App.1982) followed Craven v. State, supra, as did Smith v. State, 629 S.W.2d 238, 240 (Tex.App. —Ft. Worth 1982).

. Neither Craven nor its followings hold that the merits of a motion to quash an indictment for insufficient notice cannot be made without reviewing a statement of facts. What we did say is that “a determination of the kind of prejudice a defect of form may have engendered” cannot be made without our reviewing a statement of facts. Nowhere in the annals of this Court has “prejudice” equalled “merits.”

.In the trial court a pretrial hearing was held on several motions of appellant; the motion to quash was presented and argued, but both parties waived the taking of it by the court reporter. In his brief appellant cites certain decisions of the Court preceding Craven to show that he was “entitled” to allegations of facts showing “manner or means” of his committing the alleged offense; still, he does not indicate the slightest hint or suggestion of harm. From the record we cannot say the adverse ruling of the trial court prejudiced substantial rights of appellant. Article 21.19, supra; Craven v. State, supra; Nolan v. State, 629 S.W.2d 940 (Tex.Cr App.1982).