Court Opinion

ID: 9669063
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 02:38:38.860493+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:51.927899
License: Public Domain

OPINION
BURGESS, Justice.
A jury convicted Ruben Hernandez of aggravated assault on a correctional officer, found the two enhancement paragraphs “true”, and assessed punishment at fifty years’ confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. *194The indictment alleged Hernandez struck prison guard Jimmy Johnson in the face with Hernandez’ fist during an altercation involving four other prisoners and four other prison guards.1 The incident occurred when the guards intervened in a confrontation between black and Hispanic inmates over an earlier assault on co-defendant Acosta.
The trial court granted the state’s motion for a joint trial of the five defendants. The attorney from the Inmate Defense Program filed a motion for appointment of separate counsel for each of the five defendants, on conflict of interest grounds. The court denied this motion and proceeded to trial with the single counsel for all five defendants. Appellant raises three points of error: 1) the trial court erred in granting the state’s motion for joint trial and trying appellant jointly with the other defendants, 2) the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for separate counsel based upon conflict of interest and in forcing the joint defendants to be represented by the same counsel, and 3) the trial court erred in denying appellant’s motion for an interpreter. We hold the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a joint trial and denied all five defendants the effective assistance of counsel by requiring them to be tried in one proceeding with one lawyer, and erred in refusing a translator for appellant.
In analyzing point of error one, Ex parte Mitchell, 608 S.W.2d 915 (Tex.Crim. App.1980), is significant and controls. Tex. Code Crim.Proc.Ann. art. 36.09 (Vernon 1981) allows for two or more defendants, who are indicted separately, to be tried jointly for any offense(s) growing out of the same transaction. Ex parte Mitchell is the only case which defines “same transaction” in the context of article 36.09. The court says a determination requires consideration of the facts in each case. 608 S.W.2d at 917. In Mitchell, six defendants were charged, in six separate informations, with soliciting drinks from six different complainants. The court noted that each defendant was charged in a separate information which made no reference to other charging instruments and failed to allege any joint action. All the informations alleged the offenses occurred on the same date, at the same address and with a common employer. The court held the charges did not grow out of the same transaction, therefore it was not within the trial court’s discretion to order a joint trial over appellant’s objection. Id. at 918. The Court, at 917, stated:
A defendant’s guilt should be determined on the basis of evidence admissible against him. Article 36.09, supra, is partially based upon the recognition that, even in cases where more than one defendant is charged with the same offense or offenses arising out of the same transaction, there is the possibility in joint trials that a jury might confuse evidence or consider evidence admissible against only one defendant in determining the guilt of another defendant.
Our cases are strikingly similar to those in Mitchell. There are five defendants charged in five separate indictments with different grades of assaults against five different victims. All of the offenses occurred at the same location at or near the same time. Following the rationale of Mitchell, it was an abuse of discretion to grant the motion to consolidate in view of the defendants’ objections.
Moreover, the abuse of discretion must be viewed in light of the trial court’s refusal to appoint separate counsel for each defendant. Counsel explained to the trial judge that it was impossible to argue any type of punishment recommendation to the jury without pointing out the various differences between the defendants. Counsel even alluded to his dilemma in his jury argument at the punishment phase.
None of the cases cited by the state address the situation before us. Almanzar v. State, 702 S.W.2d 653 (Tex.Crim.App.1986), *195involved joint retained representation. Moreover, there was no pretrial objection, only a post trial compliant. The court of criminal appeals found no actual conflict of interest, thus no error. In Ferguson v. State, 639 S.W.2d 307 (Tex.Crim.App.1982), there was no objection at trial to the dual representation. Here again the court found no conflict thus no ineffective assistance of counsel.
Calloway v. State, 699 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), was a case which reversed this court, 700 S.W.2d 3 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1984). This court, based primarily on Lemma v. State, 679 S.W.2d 488 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) (opinion on rehearing), held it was error for the trial court not to hold a hearing to determine if a conflict of interest existed. The court of criminal appeals discussed Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d. 426 (1978), and Lerma, 679 S.W.2d at 488. The court found no error since appellant never advanced any valid basis for his conflict of interest claim.
Holloway v. Arkansas is the flagship case. Chief Justice Burger acknowledged the rule announced in Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 62 S.Ct. 457, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942), that requiring joint representation is not per se violative of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel. 435 U.S. at 482, 98 S.Ct. at 1177, 55 L.Ed.2d at 433. The Court further states:
Additionally, since the decision in Glasser, most courts have held that an attorney’s request for the appointment of separate counsel, based on his representations as an officer of the court regarding a conflict of interests, should be granted [citations omitted].... An ‘attorney representing two defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine when a conflict exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial’ [citation omitted]_ Finally, attorneys are officers of the court, and ‘when they address the judge solemnly upon a matter before the court, their declarations are virtually made under oath’ [citation omitted]. We find these considerations persuasive.
435 U.S. at 485, 98 S.Ct. at 1178, 55 L.Ed.2d at 435.
The Court went on to reaffirm that whenever a trial court improperly requires joint representation over a timely objection, then a reversal is automatic. Furthermore prejudice is presumed regardless of whether is was independently shown. 435 U.S. at 488, 98 S.Ct. at 1180, 55 L.Ed.2d at 437. They went on to say, in very impressive language:
Moreover, this Court has concluded that the assistance of counsel is among those ‘constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error’ (citation omitted).... Joint representation of conflicting interests is suspect because of what it tends to prevent the attorney from doing. For example, ... it may well have precluded defense counsel ... from exploring possible plea negotiations and the possibility of an agreement to testify for the prosecution, provided a lesser charge or a favorable sentencing recommendation would be acceptable. Generally speaking, a conflict may also prevent an attorney from challenging the admission of evidence prejudicial to one client but perhaps favorable to another, or from arguing at the sentencing hearing the relative involvement and culpability of his clients in order to minimize the culpability of one by emphasizing that of another, (emphasis added)_ Finally, a rule requiring a defendant to show that a conflict of interests — -which he and his counsel tried to avoid by timely objections to the joint representation — prejudiced him in some specific fashion would not be susceptible of intelligent, evenhanded application. In the normal ease where a harmless-error rule is applied, the error occurs at trial and its scope is readily identifiable. Accordingly, the reviewing court can undertake with some confidence its relatively narrow task of assessing the likelihood that the error materially affected the deliberations of the jury, (citations omitted). But in a case of joint representation of conflicting interests the evil — it bears repeating — is in what the advocate *196finds himself compelled to refrain from doing, not only at trial but also as to possible pretrial plea negotiations and in the sentencing process, (emphasis added). It may be possible in some cases to identify from the record the prejudice resulting from an attorney’s failure to undertake certain trial tasks, but even with a record of the sentencing hearing available it would be difficult to judge intelligently the impact of a conflict on the attorney’s representation of a client. And to assess the impact of a conflict of interests on the attorney’s options, tactics, and decisions in plea negotiations would be virtually impossible. Thus, an inquiry into a claim of harmless error here would require, unlike most cases, unguided speculation.
435 U.S. at 489-491, 98 S.Ct. at 1181-82, 55 L.Ed.2d at 437-438.
Despite the admonitions of our highest court, we will indulge in unguided speculation about the harm suffered.
The following chart capsulizes each case:
[[Image here]]
Defendant Charge Injury Weapon Punishment Priors
Acosta Agg. Assault neck lock life 8 yrs. burg,
w/deadly hab.
weapon 15 yrs. burg,
hab.
Hernandez Agg. Assault head n/a 50 yrs. 3 yrs. burg.
15 yrs. att.
burg.
15 yrs. burg,
hab.
Ledon Agg. Assault knee knife life 15 yrs. burg,
w/deadly hab.
weapon 15 yrs. burg,
hab.
Robledo Agg. Assault mouth lock 99 yrs. 5 yrs. arson
w/deadly 5 yrs.
weapon Unauth. use
motor
vehicle
Salas Agg. Assault head n/a 99 yrs. 25 yrs. del.
(kicked) heroin 25 yrs. del. heroin 25 yrs. del. heroin 5 yrs. burg, veh.
This chart shows that despite varying acts of assault and varying criminal histories, the jury virtually treated the defendants identically at punishment. For example, Robledo’s criminal history is mild compared to the other defendants, yet Robledo receives 99 years. Acosta uses a lock as a weapon while Ledon uses a shank or knife, yet they receive the same punishment. It is unguided speculation that the jury would have treated the defendants differently if they each had been afforded separate lawyers. It is not speculation, however, that the separate lawyers could, and we submit would, have argued the differing degrees of assault and differing criminal backgrounds of each of the defendants; attempting to put their own client in the best possible light. The single lawyer for all five defendants could not do this, there*197fore, all the defendants were denied effective assistance of counsel.
By the denial of appellant’s motion for an interpreter, appellant is being penalized because he understands and speaks some English. The record is woefully deficient as to any meaningful inquiry into appellant’s understanding of English as it relates to criminal proceedings. The participants below were more concerned about the cost of the translator than the plight of the non-English speaking defendant. We hold the trial court committed reversible error in refusing appellant’s request for a translator without first determining appellant’s understanding of English as it relates to criminal proceedings.
Accordingly, we reverse each case and remand for either five separate trials or a consolidated trial, each defendant having separate counsel and this appellant being furnished a translator.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

. The unpublished companion cases filed this day are: Acosta v. State, No. 09-92-072 CR, 1993 WL 390008 (Tex.App.—Beaumont, Sept. 29, 1993, n.p.h.); Ledon v. State, No. 09-92-074 CR, 1993 WL 390003 (Tex.App.—Beaumont, Sept. 29, 1993, n.p.h.); Robledo v. State, No. 09-92-075 CR, 1993 WL 389969 (Tex.App.—Beaumont, Sept. 29, 1993, n.p.h.); and Salas v. State, No. 09-92-076 CR, 1993 WL 389968 (Tex.App.— Beaumont, Sept. 29, 1993, n.p.h.).