Court Opinion

ID: 9582788
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:31:22.046608+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:30.547194
License: Public Domain

Fletcher, Presiding Justice,
concurring specially.
The majority continues the confusing and unfair practice of allowing evidence of other crimes so long as the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator of the independent act is proved by “sufficient” evidence. The bench and bar deserve clarification of how this standard compares with the more traditional formulations for standards of proof. By refusing to give that clarification, the court deprives trial judges of a familiar and recognizable standard by which to determine the admissibility of this type of evidence.
Because of the highly prejudicial nature of other crimes evidence, I would require the state to prove the defendant’s identity as perpetrator of the prior crime by clear and convincing evidence. This Court has previously affirmed admission of the evidence when the defendant’s identity was shown by clear and convincing evidence such as a prior conviction, eyewitness testimony or substantial circumstantial evidence such as scientific evidence.2 This clear and convincing standard is consistent with our sister states of Tennessee, Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina and Alabama.3 These states recognize that evidence of other crimes will be probative of the issues in the trial only if proof of the other crime and the defendant’s identity as perpetrator is clear.4 Requiring the state at the Rule 31.3 hearing to show by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant committed the prior crime would establish a clear, recognizable standard for courts and lawyers and is consistent with the due process owed *366under the federal and state constitutions.
Decided December 5, 1996.
Ellis W. Peetluk, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Leonora Grant, Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Beth Attaway, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
After reviewing the record in this case, I conclude that the eyewitnesses and DNA evidence linking Smith to Hubert’s rape and disappearance met the clear and convincing standard. Therefore, I concur specially in the affirmance of Smith’s conviction.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Benham and Justice Sears join in this special concurrence.

 See, e.g., Chastain v. State, 260 Ga. 789, 791 (400 SE2d 329) (1991) (defendant’s own admissions and testimony by victim established defendant as perpetrator of prior acts); Williams v. State, 251 Ga. 749, 783 (312 SE2d 40) (1983) (victims of other murders connected to defendant by fibers and animal hair); Wallace v. State, 246 Ga. 738, 739-740 (273 SE2d 143) (1980) (eyewitness and fingerprint identification); Dobbs v. State, 199 Ga. App. 793, 795 (406 SE2d 252) (1991) (eyewitness testimony); Thomas v. State, 176 Ga. App. 53, 54 (335 SE2d 135) (1985) (victim’s in-court identification).

 See State v. McCary, 922 SW2d 511 (Tenn. 1996); Phillips v. State, 591 S2d 987, 989 (Fla. App. 1991); State v. Brooks, 541 S2d 801, 813-814 (La. 1989); State v. Smith, 387 SE2d 245, 247 (S.C. 1989); Williams v. State, 538 S2d 1250, 1253 (Ala. Crim. App. 1988). Texas requires the even higher standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. See Harrell v. State, 884 SW2d 154, 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).

 See Wrather v. State, 169 SW2d 854, 858 (Tenn. 1943).