Court Opinion

ID: 9849730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:45:10.26543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:25.450975
License: Public Domain

Blackburn, Judge,
concurring and concurring specially.
I fully concur with the analysis and holding of the majority in this case. While I do not question the holdings of the trial judge or the opinion of Dr. Cohen in this matter, I write separately to point out a systemic problem in the general use of “independent” experts in the litigation process. This problem, while not limited thereto, is greatest where insurance companies use “independent” medical experts’ opinions to deny or limit payment of claims. The inherent weakness of this process is that the insurance company which controls the flow of business to the “independent” medical services provider has a financial interest in the negative finding of such provider.
Where companies are established for the sole purpose of selecting or providing medical experts for insurance companies, either individually or as an industry, they can by no means be deemed to be independent, unless a major portion of their income is derived from providing medical services or expert testimony on behalf of plaintiffs. Where essentially all of a company’s business comes from a single insurance company, from the insurance industry, from providing defense services to the medical profession, or some combination thereof, such companies clearly have a financial interest in providing opinions which are favorable to healthcare or insurance company defendants. If they did not do so, they would soon find themselves without business, as the parties who retain them are advocates seeking partisan advantage. It is not the responsibility of parties to advocate or pay for the production of evidence which will benefit their opponent. It is only natural that defendants and plaintiffs alike will employ only those who support their position under our existing system of expert selection. Parties are free to shop any number of potential experts until they locate one who supports their position. The factfinder is rarely aware of the numerous experts who may have rejected the advocated position. Where the parties are totally free to select and employ an expert, the term “independent expert” becomes an oxymoron. The law has long recognized the natural allegiance one generally has to the one from whom payment is received. In addition, experts are not exempt from normal human frailties, and their position might be affected by the amount of the fee received for services rendered.
Truth is the province of the trial judge and the jury. It is in the search for truth and justice that the trial court has great discretion *810in the control of a case. It would seem an appropriate function of the trial judge to inquire into the “independence” of any company which provides or selects “independent” expert services or opinions, be they for plaintiffs or defendants. In the event such inquiry results in a determination of bias in favor of either party by the trial judge, such judge could limit or exclude such evidence, allow the use of another expert under rules imposed by the trial court, or consider such bias in the judge’s evaluation of such evidence or charge the jury that it is free to do so where the matter is submitted to a jury.
Decided May 22, 1998
Reconsideration denied June 9, 1998.
In considering whether the involved service or expert is “independent” or biased, the trial court could consider the above-listed factors as well as the amount of the fee received. If the subject service does not get a significant portion of its business from both plaintiffs and defendants, such condition would authorize a presumption of bias and dependence and authorize the trial court to act.
It is important that trial courts be fair in the exercise of their discretion and in limiting evidence. Except in the most egregious of cases the trial court should seek to permit the parties to select replacement experts who are truly independent, unbiased experts or services, where bias is found. Such issue must be timely raised by the party asserting expert bias so as not to unduly delay the trial of such case or to result in injustice.
As to those services which do not directly provide expert opinions to either plaintiffs or defendants, but rather select those who do, the trial court could consider whether such services are provided generally to plaintiffs and defendants or insurance companies. Where a company essentially limits its searches to finding experts for one side or the other, the court can conclude that such experts are not independent, and are inclined to render opinions which are consistent with their client’s position. The trial court would be free to consider such presumptive bias, whether or not any direct bias by the selected expert can be shown. The trial court can also consider the fees charged by the service or expert, any contingent interest in the subject litigation, the volume of business derived by such providers from either party or the industry of which they are a part.
The trial courts have inherent authority to exercise their discretion in the area of “independent” experts under the existing laws of Georgia, and I would encourage them to fully exercise such authority in appropriate cases.
*811Donald J. Sharp, for appellant.
Saveli & Williams, John C. Parker, for appellee.