Court Opinion

ID: 9906377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-01 21:02:24.254604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:18.697839
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/1/23 P. v. Pena CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,                                                  B321600

     Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BA496424)
                   v.

BIANCA PENA,

    Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Norman J. Shapiro, Judge. Affirmed.
      Larenda R. Delaini, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Wyatt E. Bloomfield and Lindsay Boyd,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                                        **********
       Defendant and appellant Bianca Pena appeals from her
conviction by jury of two counts of felony stalking. Her sole
contention on appeal is that her trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to file a mental health diversion application pursuant to
Penal Code section 1001.36.
       We affirm.
          FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
       From approximately April 2020 through June 2021,
defendant repeatedly harassed Ingrid M. and her adult daughter
Raquel M. because defendant erroneously believed Raquel was
seeing defendant’s boyfriend Moises (we identify the victims only
by their first names to protect their privacy). Raquel, who was
married, pregnant and in her early 30’s at the time, had not
dated or been in contact with Moises since she was a teenager.
       Defendant made threatening and crude phone calls
(sometimes multiple times a day) to both women, in addition to
sending e-mails and messages through social media. At one
point, she told Ingrid she was going to kill her and her unborn
grandchild. Defendant told Raquel she needed to die and to abort
her unborn child and that she had people watching her, her
mother and her grandmother. Raquel was so frightened by
defendant’s behavior that she moved to Orange County where
defendant eventually tracked her down.
       Defendant also made over 150 calls to 911 that resulted in
officers going out to the victims’ homes on false pretenses, and
she made a false report to the California Board of Registered
Nursing about Raquel, who is a registered nurse. After
defendant’s arrest, she admitted to engaging in most of this
conduct, but denied that she ever made any threats.

                                2
       Defendant was charged with two counts of making criminal
threats (Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a); counts 1 & 4) and two counts
of felony stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (a); counts 2 & 3).
       Trial by jury began in May 2022. Just before the start of
jury selection, defense counsel advised the court that defendant
“for the first time” that morning told him she was interested “in
mental health diversion” or, because she is a former army guard,
“going to military court.” The prosecutor objected saying the jury
was outside waiting, defendant had already been in custody long
enough to satisfy a low term sentence, and she had already
rejected a prior offer for probation and counseling. The court said
it would consider a request for diversion at the right time but
that they needed to proceed with jury selection.
       At the conclusion of jury selection, the court told defendant
that if she was serious about mental health diversion or going to
military court, then a proper record would need to be made
regarding her potential eligibility. The court invited defendant to
file appropriate paperwork. No application was filed and trial
proceeded.
       The jury found defendant guilty on counts 2 and 3
(stalking) and was unable to reach a decision on counts 1 and 4
(making criminal threats). The court declared a mistrial as to
counts 1 and 4 and dismissed them pursuant to Penal Code
section 1385. The court sentenced defendant to two years eight
months calculated as follows: a two-year midterm on count 2,
plus a consecutive eight-month term (one-third the midterm) on
count 3. The court also issued a one-year protective order in
favor of the victims (Pen. Code, § 646.9, subd. (k)). Defendant
was awarded 710 days of presentence custody credits (355
actual/355 conduct).

                                 3
       This appeal followed.
                            DISCUSSION
       The “two-prong standard governing claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel is well settled. ‘ “ ‘In assessing claims of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel, we consider whether
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms and whether
the defendant suffered prejudice to a reasonable probability, that
is, a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Johnson (2016) 62 Cal.4th 600, 653
(Johnson); Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 688,
693–696.)
       Attorneys have broad discretion in deciding trial tactics
and in choosing “the means by which to provide constitutionally
adequate representation” to their clients. (Johnson, supra,
62 Cal.4th at p. 653.) Attorneys are entitled to a presumption
that their “performance fell within the wide range of professional
competence and that [their] actions and inactions can be
explained as a matter of sound trial strategy. Defendant thus
bears the burden of establishing constitutionally inadequate
assistance of counsel.” (People v. Gamache (2010) 48 Cal.4th 347,
391 (Gamache).)
       Our ability as an appellate court to assess whether an
attorney’s representation was constitutionally deficient is limited
because the record usually does not contain any explanation of
the attorney’s strategy. (Johnson, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 653.)
For this reason, the Supreme Court “long ago adopted the rule
that ‘ “[i]f the record on appeal fails to show why counsel acted or
failed to act in the instance asserted to be ineffective, unless
counsel was asked for an explanation and failed to provide one, or

                                 4
unless there simply could be no satisfactory explanation, the
claim must be rejected on appeal. [Citation.]” ’ [Citations.] The
merits of such claims are more appropriately resolved, not on the
basis of the appellate record, but rather by way of a petition for
writ of habeas corpus.” (Ibid., italics added.)
        Defendant has not discharged her burden of showing
ineffective assistance of counsel. (Gamache, supra, 48 Cal.4th at
p. 391.) There is nothing in the record explaining why defense
counsel did not file an application for mental health diversion
after the discussion with the court on the day of jury selection.
The record shows only that defendant told her counsel “for the
first time” that morning that she was interested in pursuing it,
having previously rejected the People’s offer of probation and
counseling. There is nothing showing it was objectively
unreasonable for defense counsel not to file an application.
Defendant may have changed her mind after discussing it further
with counsel. Defense counsel may have determined defendant
had not been diagnosed with a qualifying disorder or did not
otherwise meet the statutory eligibility requirements. We are
left only to speculate in the face of a silent record.
        There is also nothing in the record to support a finding of
prejudice—that it was reasonably probable defendant would have
qualified for diversion.
        An application for mental health diversion requires a
showing of multiple eligibility criteria. The defendant must show
she has been “diagnosed with a mental disorder as identified in
the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders . . . . Evidence of the defendant’s mental
disorder shall be provided by the defense and shall include a
diagnosis or treatment for a diagnosed mental disorder within

                                 5
the last five years by a qualified mental health expert.” (Pen.
Code, § 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) The defendant must also
demonstrate that the diagnosed mental disorder “was a
significant factor in the commission of the charged offense.” (Id.,
subd. (b)(2).)
       The court has discretion to grant mental health diversion if
those eligibility criteria are met and if it is shown that the
defendant is suitable for diversion. (People v. Frahs (2020)
9 Cal.5th 618, 627.) A defendant is suitable for diversion if “all of
the following criteria are met: [¶] (1) In the opinion of a
qualified mental health expert, the defendant’s symptoms of the
mental disorder causing, contributing to, or motivating the
criminal behavior would respond to mental health treatment. [¶]
(2) The defendant consents to diversion and waives the
defendant’s right to a speedy trial . . . . [¶] (3) The defendant
agrees to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion . . . .
[¶] (4) The defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated
in the community.” (Pen. Code, § 1001.36, subd. (c), italics
added.)
       Defendant, at best, self-reported to the police officers who
interviewed her that she suffers from posttraumatic stress
disorder from childhood abuse and from “retroactive jealousy
OCD.” The record does not contain any formal diagnosis by a
qualified doctor or other evidence of any suitability factor.
Defendant testified at trial that she harassed the victims because
she “wanted to prove a point, not create fear but to piss them off
so they would finally back away.”

                                  6
      On this record, we have no basis to conclude it was
reasonably probable defendant would have qualified for
diversion.
                         DISPOSITION
      The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

                        GRIMES, J.

      WE CONCUR:

                        STRATTON, P. J.

                        WILEY, J.

                                7