Court Opinion

ID: 9463578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:10:09.444937+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:10.443210
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT and HENLEY, Circuit Judges,
dissenting:
This case presents the question of whether foreign sovereigns are “persons” entitled to sue for treble damages under § 4 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 15). As the majority opinion acknowledges, two Supreme Court decisions provide the only instances in which similar questions have been considered. In United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 61 S.Ct. 742, 85 L.Ed. 1071 (1941), the Court ruled that the United States was not a “person” entitled to sue for treble damages under the anti-trust laws. In Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 62 S.Ct. 972, 86 L.Ed. 1346 (1942), the Court held that Congress did intend the states to be such “persons.” We believe that Cooper is the proper guide for decision of the instant case.
It seems anomalous to suggest that foreign sovereigns should enjoy the right to sue for treble damages when that right has not been granted to the United States. The Cooper Court stated, “Since, in common usage, the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, statutes employing the phrase are ordinarily construed to exclude it.” Id. 312 U.S. at 604, 61 S.Ct. at 743. Furthermore, the Court noted that “if the United States was intended to be included Congress would have so provided expressly.” Id. at 607, 61 S.Ct. at 745. We would apply this pronouncement here and exclude foreign governments as “persons” entitled to sue under the Clayton Act.
Congress made no express provision for foreign governments, nor is there any evidence that Congress considered granting a foreign government the right to sue for treble damages. Judge Ross in a separate concurrence (joined by Chief Judge Gibson and Judge Webster) appropriately observed that Congress “gave no consideration nor did it have any legislative intent whatsoever, concerning the question of whether foreign governments are ‘persons’ under the Act.” [At 399.] The Cooper Court stated:
[I]t is not our function to engraft on a statute additions which we think the legislature logically might or should have made. [312 U.S. 605, 61 S.Ct. 744.]
The judiciary ought not to add foreign governments to the “person” class without a clear Congressional intent to do so.
The majority opinion reasons that because Georgia v. Evans, supra, authorizes a state of the United States to bring treble damage suits as a “person” under the Clayton Act, that, therefore, foreign sovereigns must also be granted the right to sue. We do not agree with the logic of such conclusion.
The Evans Court reasoned that Congress intended that a State be deemed a person authorized to sue for treble damages for otherwise it would have no redress for antitrust violations; that no reason exists for believing that Congress wanted to deny a State this remedy, and, finally, that because it already had been held that municipalities, which are subdivisions of States, were entitled to such remedy, that such remedy should be afforded the State. The majority finds “the same reasoning [is] applicable to a foreign sovereign” [at 399], we cannot agree. States and municipalities of these United States are not analogous to foreign sovereigns. Certainly Congress would face different or additional policy questions in deciding whether foreign sovereigns should be authorized to sue a domestic corporation for treble damages.
*401The majority has concluded that in light of Evans, “Congress intended other bodies politic, such as a foreign government, to enjoy the same right.” [At 399.] If this conclusion rests upon Congressional intent, the analysis is tenuous at best. If this conclusion is bottomed upon reasoning that since Evans expanded the reach of the term “person,” the definition of “person” should now be even further expanded, then the majority has adopted a questionable principle of statutory construction.
The arguments and briefs of the parties demonstrate that the issue of granting an antitrust remedy to foreign governments presents complex matters relating to international trade and foreign policy. We note that many foreign countries foster monopolistic practices as a matter of government policy. For example, Iran, one of the plaintiffs-appellees, belongs to the cartel of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Granting such sovereigns the right to sue American companies for treble damages will not diminish their own restraint of trade. Nevertheless, plaintiffs-appellees, and the United States, as amicus curiae, argue that granting foreign sovereigns the right to sue under the antitrust laws will assure effective enforcement of those laws. Furthermore, the United States declares that granting such a right will “assure optimum financial efficiency in the allocation of American dollars sent abroad.” [Amicus br. at 5.] Whether these and other policy considerations will be best implemented by authorizing a foreign government to recover treble damages for antitrust violations is a determination which Congress should make.
The Supreme Court has cautioned restraint on the part of the judiciary in expanding the scope of the Clayton Act beyond statutory language without a clear expression of Congressional purpose. See, e. g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 202, 95 S.Ct. 392, 42 L.Ed.2d 378 (1974); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 264, 92 S.Ct. 885, 31 L.Ed.2d 184 (1972). We would heed that caution and reverse the district court.