Court Opinion

ID: 9895439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-07 14:04:47.77393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:36.495550
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to modification resulting from motions for reconsideration under Supreme Court
Rule 27, the Court’s reconsideration, and editorial revisions by the Reporter of Decisions. The version of the
opinion published in the Advance Sheets for the Georgia Reports, designated as the “Final Copy,” will replace any
prior version on the Court’s website and docket. A bound volume of the Georgia Reports will contain the final and
official text of the opinion.
In the Supreme Court of Georgia

                                                   Decided: November 7, 2023

S23Y0970. IN THE MATTER OF CORY HOWERTON FLEMING.

        PER CURIAM.

        This disciplinary matter is before the Court on the petition for

voluntary discipline filed by Respondent Cory Howerton Fleming

(State Bar No. 292955) before the issuance of a formal complaint.

See Bar Rule 4-227 (b) (2). In the petition, Fleming admits that

during his representation of a client in South Carolina, he violated

Rules 1.4 (a) (3), 1.5 (c) (1), 1.7 (a), 1.8 (b), 1.15 (I) (c), 5.4 (c), and 8.4

(a) (4) of the Georgia Rules of Professional Conduct (“GRPC”) found

in Bar Rule 4-102 (d).1 As discipline, Fleming requests that this

Court accept the voluntary surrender of his license to practice law.

        1 The maximum penalty for a violation of 1.4 (a) (3) or 1.5 (c) (1) is a

public reprimand, while the maximum penalty for a violation of 1.7 (a), 1.8 (b),
1.15 (I) (c), 5.4 (c), or 8.4 (a) (4) is disbarment.
The State Bar has filed a response, stating that we should accept the

petition, and we do.2

      In his petition, Fleming states that he has been a member of

the Georgia Bar since January 1995 and has also been a longtime

member of the Bar in his home state of South Carolina. On October

8, 2021, however, the Supreme Court of South Carolina placed

Fleming on interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17 (b) of the Rules

for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement contained in Rule 413 of the

South Carolina Appellate Court Rules,3 and after Fleming notified

the Georgia Bar of this action, this Court similarly placed Fleming

on an emergency suspension pursuant to its Bar Rule 4-108 (a)

      2 Because of the procedural posture of this case—i.e., that this case comes

to us as a petition for voluntary discipline—our review consists of evaluating
Fleming’s petition, which is based solely on his self-selected admissions, and
evaluating the Bar’s responses to that petition. As explained later in this
opinion, we acknowledge that the facts pertaining to this case may well be more
egregious than Fleming admits in his petition.
      3 Rule 17 (b) allows the South Carolina Supreme Court to place a lawyer

on interim suspension “[u]pon receipt of sufficient evidence demonstrating that
a lawyer poses a substantial threat of serious harm to the public or to the
administration of justice.”

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(emergency suspension) and GRPC 9.4 (b) (reciprocal discipline). See

In the Matter of Fleming, 313 Ga. 77 (867 SE2d 819) (2022).

     With regard to the conduct at issue in this case, Fleming states

that, on February 2018, a woman sustained injuries to her head at

the home of R. Alexander Murdaugh, a lawyer then-licensed in

South Carolina; that Murdaugh contacted Fleming asking that he

represent the woman or, if she passed away, her estate; that the

woman—who was a long-time employee of Murdaugh’s—later died

from her injuries, leaving two sons; and that one of the woman’s sons

was appointed as the Personal Representative of the woman’s

probate estate. At the relevant time, Murdaugh had two insurance

policies providing coverage for this type of incident: Lloyd’s of

London (“Lloyd’s”), through which Murdaugh had $505,000 in

insurance coverage, and Nautilus Insurance Group (“Nautilus”),

through which Murdaugh had excess coverage of an additional

$5,000,000. At some point in 2018, Fleming apparently filed suit

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against Murdaugh—presumably on behalf of the woman’s estate—4

and, in November 2018, Lloyd’s tendered its policy limits to settle

Fleming’s client’s claims against Murdaugh. Fleming did not inform

his client about this fact, however; instead, in December 2018,

Fleming allowed the woman’s son to be replaced by Chad

Westendorf as the Personal Representative for the estate and then

petitioned the probate court to approve the wrongful death

settlement with Lloyd’s for a payment of $505,000. Fleming admits

that the petition detailed payments of $166,000 to his law firm for

legal fees and $11,500 for “prosecution expenses”; that those figures

were misrepresentations; and that there were no legitimate

prosecution expenses. In December 2018, the probate court held a

hearing and approved the settlement.

     Then, in March 2019, Murdaugh, Fleming, Westendorf, and

John Grantland, a lawyer representing Nautilus, participated in a

     4 From    the imprecise admissions included in Fleming’s petition, it is
difficult to know with any degree of certainty whether he filed suit or merely
threatened to do so and which specific party or parties Fleming represented at
what times, but it appears that by 2019, a lawsuit had been filed and that
Fleming represented the woman’s estate in that suit.

                                      4
mediation that ultimately led to an additional settlement in

Fleming’s client’s case that involved a total payment from Nautilus

of $3,800,000. In May 2019, a hearing was held to obtain the court’s

approval of the global $4,305,000 settlement reached with both

insurance companies. Fleming acknowledges that the settlement

statement presented to the court in this instance,5 like the petition

submitted in December 2018, contained false representations. He

further admits that the disbursement sheet prepared after the

second settlement also contained false statements.

      After both settlements, Murdaugh—a defendant in the

lawsuit—requested that Fleming make the net settlement proceeds

check payable to “Forge,” apparently explaining that he had created

structured settlement or annuity accounts for the woman’s

surviving sons with Michael E. Gunn of Forge Consulting, LLC

(“Forge Consulting”). In 2019, checks payable to “Forge” were issued

      5 The statement showed receipt of $505,000 from Lloyd’s and $3,800,000

from Nautilus, deductions for $1,434,999.90 in attorney fees and $105,000 in
total “prosecution expenses,” with net total proceeds (according to Fleming) to
the woman’s estate of $2,765,000.

                                      5
from Fleming’s IOLTA account in a total amount exceeding

$3,400,000. Fleming asserts that he gave the checks to Murdaugh,

allegedly because Murdaugh advised that he would “hand deliver”

the checks to Gunn.6 Instead, Murdaugh apparently converted the

funds to his own benefit.

     In addition to delivering a large portion of the settlement

proceeds to Murdaugh, Fleming asserts that he paid Westendorf at

least $20,0007 for his services as Personal Representative, and

between May 2019 and October 2020, Fleming withdrew an

additional $26,200 from the IOLTA account, falsely documenting

these withdrawals as expenses of the litigation. Although it is clear

that the money was removed from the IOLTA account and that it

was not used for the purposes it was supposed to be used for,

Fleming does not specify whether he retained the $26,200 for his

     6 Fleming did not recite any actions that he may have taken to ensure

that Forge Consulting had actually created any annuity or structured
settlement accounts related to this matter.
     7 The Bar recites that this payment to Westendorf was for $30,000, but

given Fleming’s decision to surrender his license, resolution of this factual
dispute is unnecessary at this time.

                                     6
own benefit or passed some of the money to Murdaugh, as suggested

by the Bar’s response to the petition. He does admit, however, that

he agreed to hold monies in his firm’s IOLTA account from the

settlement that would be accessible to Murdaugh. After October

2020, some portion of the proceeds from the settlements apparently

remained, undistributed, in Fleming’s law firm’s IOLTA account,8

and Fleming apparently never advised the woman’s sons that he had

recovered any monies as a result of the litigation against Murdaugh.

     Fleming claims that from the time of the settlement until

September 2021, he was under the impression that Murdaugh (one

of the defendants in the lawsuit) was handling the creation of

structured settlement annuities with Forge Consulting for the

benefit of the heirs of Fleming’s client (the plaintiff). He asserts that,

on September 3, 2021, however, he learned from one of Murdaugh’s

law partners that the firm had discovered that Murdaugh was

stealing money from it by using a fictitious bank account in the

     8 The numbers set out in Fleming’s petition do not tally and therefore we

are unable to determine the exact amount of settlement funds misappropriated
and who specifically ended up with those funds.

                                     7
name of “FORGE dba R. Murdaugh.” Fleming then states that

thereafter, he was informed that Forge Consulting did not have any

accounts related to this matter and had never received the funds

from either settlement.

     Fleming admits that on September 15, 2021, a new lawsuit was

filed on behalf of the woman’s sons naming as defendants

Murdaugh,    Fleming,     Fleming’s   law   firm,   Westendorf   and

Westendorf’s employer. Fleming states that he and his law firm and

their insurance carrier signed a settlement statement on October 1,

2021 to resolve that lawsuit, with the firm to contribute $676,255.59

(allegedly representing all legal fees obtained on behalf of and all

expenses paid by the woman’s estate) and the firm’s insurance

carrier to pay $650,000 for a total payment of $1,326,255.59.

Fleming also states that on October 8, 2021, his law firm initiated a

wire transfer of $113,800 from its IOLTA account to counsel for the

woman’s sons. Fleming contends that the $113,800 represented the

remaining funds in that account belonging to the woman’s estate.

                                 8
      By this conduct, Fleming admits that his failure to reasonably

communicate with the Personal Representative of the woman’s

estate9 violated Rule 1.4 (a) (3);10 that the absence of a fee agreement

with the Personal Representative of the woman’s estate violated

Rule 1.5 (c) (1);11 that his agreement with Murdaugh to allow

Murdaugh to receive settlement funds violated Rules 1.7 (a)12 and

1.8 (b);13 that his treatment of the settlement proceeds violated Rule

      9 Although Fleming is not clear regarding when he failed to communicate

with the estate’s Personal Representative, the admitted facts allow for the
conclusion that he failed to communicate with the woman’s son when that son
served as the Personal Representative of the estate in late 2018.
      10 Rule 1.4 (a) (3) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] lawyer shall . . .

keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter.”
      11Rule 1.5 (c) (1) provides, in relevant part, that “[a] contingent fee
agreement shall be in writing and shall state the method by which the fee is to
be determined, including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the
lawyer in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, litigation and other expenses
to be deducted from the recovery, and whether such expenses are to be
deducted before or after the contingent fee is calculated.”
      12 Rule 1.7 (a) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not [without obtaining
informed consent] represent or continue to represent a client if there is a
significant risk that the lawyer’s own interests or the lawyer’s duties to . . . a
third person will materially and adversely affect the representation of the
client.”
      13 Rule 1.8 (b) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not use information gained

in the professional relationship with a client to the disadvantage of the client
unless the client gives informed consent, except as permitted or required by
these rules.”

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1.15 (I) (c);14 that allowing Murdaugh to interfere with his

professional judgment during his representation of the Personal

Representative of the woman’s estate violated Rule 5.4 (c);15 and

that various of his actions throughout this representation violated

Rule 8.4 (a) (4).16 Fleming states that he has admitted facts

sufficient to allow the imposition of discipline and offers to surrender

his license as a way of streamlining the disciplinary process.

      In its response, the Bar provides additional information and

context about Fleming’s participation in the settlement scheme and

contends that Fleming’s misconduct warrants disbarment. It urges

this Court to accept his petition for voluntary surrender of his

      14 Rule 1.15 (I) (c) provides that “[u]pon receiving funds or other property

in which a client or third person has an interest, a lawyer shall promptly notify
the client or third person. Except as stated in this rule or otherwise permitted
by law or by agreement with the client, a lawyer shall promptly deliver to the
client or third person any funds or other property that the client or third person
is entitled to receive and, upon request by the client or third person, shall
promptly render a full accounting regarding such property.”
      15 Rule 5.4 (c) provides that “[a] lawyer shall not permit a person who

recommends . . . the lawyer to render legal services for another to direct or
regulate the lawyer’s professional judgment in rendering such legal services.”
      16 Rule 8.4 (a) (4) provides that it is a violation of the GRPC for a lawyer

to “engage in professional conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or
misrepresentation.”

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license, which is tantamount to disbarment. See Rule 1.0 (s). See

also, e.g., In the Matter of Dabney-Froe, 302 Ga. 746, 746-747 (808

SE2d 649) (2017) (accepting petition for voluntary surrender of

license where attorney failed to promptly account for and disburse

funds in violation of Rule 1.15 (I)); In the Matter of Gardner, 286 Ga.

623 (690 SE2d 611) (2010) (accepting petition for voluntary

surrender of license when attorney admitted facilitating and

concealing mortgage fraud); In the Matter of Skandalakis, 279 Ga.

865, 866 (621 SE2d 750) (2005) (disbarment is typical discipline

imposed in cases where a lawyer “engages in criminal conduct

involving interference with the administration of justice, false

swearing, misrepresentation, or fraud”).

      We have reviewed the petition in this case and conclude that

Fleming has admitted conduct sufficient to establish violations of

Rules 1.4 (a) (3), 1.5 (c) (1), 1.7 (a), 1.8 (b), 1.15 (I) (c), 5.4 (c) and 8.4

(a) (4) of the GRPC. Our review of this case indicates that the

underlying facts may well be more egregious than Fleming admits,

but we need not delve into those details, because the conduct to

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which Fleming admits is sufficient to establish the violations of the

GRPC discussed above. Indeed, we need not determine whether

Fleming’s conduct was worse than he acknowledges, because he has

admitted (and we agree) that he warrants the most serious sanction

we can impose in a bar discipline matter: disbarment (or, as here,

acceptance of the voluntary surrender of his license, which is

tantamount to disbarment). We therefore accept Fleming’s

voluntary surrender of his license, and it is ordered that the name

of Cory Howerton Fleming be removed from the rolls of persons

authorized to practice law in the State of Georgia. Fleming is

reminded of his duties pursuant to Bar Rule 4-219 (b).

     Voluntary surrender of license accepted. All the Justices concur.

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