Court Opinion

ID: 9553440
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:29:44.123141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:31:05.939793
License: Public Domain

MARTONE, Justice,
concurring in the judgment.
The court has been distracted by the supplemental issues upon which it requested briefing.1 I agree with the court that the administrative law judge erred, but look no further than the statute itself to find the correct answer. The court believes that the word “notice,” as used in A.R.S. § 23-1062(A), requires definition external to the statute itself. It sets up two extreme positions and then employs a common law methodology to select a rule of sufficiency somewhere between them. Ante, at 61.
I do not believe that the notice provision of A.R.S. § 23-1062(A) should be read in isolation. It must be read in conjunction with the immediately preceding section, A.R.S. § 23-1061, which defines “notice” for the universe of situations which requires the payment of compensation. Unless read in tandem with each other, A.R.S. § 23-1062 suggests that the only prerequisite to payment is notice. But we know that under A.R.S. § 23-1061 that is not the case. I am of the view that A.R.S. § 23-1062 merely describes the medical, surgical and hospital benefits payable pursuant to the notice of accident, form of notice, claim, reopening, and payment provisions of A.R.S. § 23-1061.
A.R.S. § 23-1061(H) provides that an employee may reopen his claim by filing a petition accompanied by a statement from a physician setting forth the physical condition of the employee relating to the claim. Under A.R.S. § 23-1061(1), the commission notifies the employer’s insurance carrier or the self insuring employer in writing which shall in turn notify the commission and the employee within 21 days of its acceptance or denial of the petition. If reopened, the claim will be processed as a new claim. Under A.R.S. § 23-1061(J), the commission will hold a hearing if it determines that denial is improper. Under A.R.S. § 23-1061(M), if the carrier or self insurer does not deny the claim within 21 days from the date of notice, it will immediately pay compensation including medical, surgical and hospital benefits.
This is precisely what happened in this case. On January 28, 1988, Lasiter filed a petition to reopen. It was accompanied by a statement of the physician. On February 2, 1988, the commission sent Industrial notice of the petition to reopen. On February 5, 1988, Industrial denied the petition. On February 11, Lasiter requested a hearing. After hearing all of the evidence, the administrative law judge concluded that “her claim should be reopened.” Ante, at 64. Because he thought, however, that the notice referred to in A.R.S. § 23-1062 was notice other than the notice required by A.R.S. § 23-1061, he found the carrier not liable. In this, he erred. No separate form of notice is required. If the claim is reopened, the expenses are paid. If the claim is not reopened, the expenses are not paid. In the case before us, the administrative law judge found that Lasiter’s claim should be reopened and that should have ended the inquiry. Her expenses then would be paid.
It cannot be said that the notice under A.R.S. § 23-1061(1) is inadequate since the carrier or self insured employer will have 21 days within which to investigate the *66claim and be heard on alternative courses of treatment. Any separate notice under A.R.S. § 23-1062 would be redundant. The court agrees in part, for it suggests that the petition to reopen itself was adequate notice of her need for surgery. Ante, at 62.
I do not agree with part B of the court’s opinion, ante at 62-63, for two separate and independent reasons. Because notice was adequate under either A.R.S. § 23-1061 or the court’s common law reformulation, we have no occasion to address the question of whether inadequate notice results in forfeiture of benefits. I do not understand how the court reaches an issue which is not before it. Even under the court’s common law reformulation, notice was adequate and there is no need to remand on that issue. But even if issues are to be decided on remand in connection with notice, the administrative law judge would only reach the question of forfeiture in the event he finds that notice was inadequate. Since a finding that notice was adequate would moot this issue, we should not reach it.
The second reason we should not reach the issue is that it simply does not arise under the statutory interpretation that notice under A.R.S. § 23-1061 is the notice referred to in A.R.S. § 23-1062. Since compensation would only be paid upon reopening, and reopening is dependent upon the filing of a petition to reopen, the notice of the petition itself would always precede compensation. Thus one could never forfeit benefits under A.R.S. § 23-1062 as long as there has been compliance with A.R.S. § 23-1061.
Finally, I do not understand the court’s uncertainty regarding the administrative law judge’s findings in this case. The court states that “the question of whether the surgeries were reasonably required is for the AU to address on remand.” Ante, at 64. But the AU has already decided that Lasiter’s claim should be reopened. And the notice is adequate under both the statute and the court’s common law reformulation.
I join the court in vacating the decision of the court of appeals and vacating the award of the administrative law judge. But because I believe that notice was adequate as a matter of law under A.R.S. § 23-1061, and the administrative law judge denied relief only because of a contrary ruling, I would remand with the expectation of the entry of an award in favor of Lasiter.

. The court says we did not grant review "on the issue of notice under the various subsections of A.R.S. § 23-1061." Ante, at 59, n. 1. On the contrary, the petition for review asked for “[a]n interpretation of A.R.S. [§] 23-1062(A) ... to define it's [sic] application with respect to a [sic] employer/carrier’s responsibility to promptly provide benefits upon notice that they are needed.” Petition for Review at 5. Neither the order granting review nor the order requesting supplemental briefs requires us to ignore the immediately preceding statutory section. Indeed, at oral argument, counsel for the petitioner agreed that notice under § 23-1061 was notice under § 23-1062.