Court Opinion

ID: 9780942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 14:01:05.96953+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:09:47.174544
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 20-11126     Document: 64-1    Date Filed: 08/30/2023   Page: 1 of 5

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                No. 20-11126
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       TONY L. FORD,
       a.k.a. BoBo,
       a.k.a. Bo,
       a.k.a. Big Head,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 20-11126      Document: 64-1       Date Filed: 08/30/2023     Page: 2 of 5

       2                       Opinion of the Court                  20-11126

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                   D.C. Docket No. 8:05-cr-00044-SCB-JSS-1
                           ____________________

       Before NEWSOM, ANDERSON, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               ON REMAND FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
                          UNITED STATES
              We previously issued an opinion aﬃrming the district
       court’s denial of Tony Ford’s motion for a sentence reduction un-
       der section 404 of the First Step Act of 2018. See United States v.
       Ford, 858 F. App’x 325 (11th Cir. 2021) (unpublished).
              In our original opinion, we concluded that a sentence of life
       imprisonment remained the lowest possible penalty available to
       Ford under the Fair Sentencing Act given the quantity of drugs in-
       volved in Ford’s oﬀense (5 kilograms of powder cocaine and 50
       grams of crack cocaine) and Ford’s two prior felony drug convic-
       tions. See id. at 328 (explaining that, “[b]oth before and after pas-
       sage of the Fair Sentencing Act, [21 U.S.C. §] 841(b)(1)(A)(ii) im-
       posed a mandatory life sentence for oﬀenses involving ﬁve kilo-
       grams or more of powder cocaine committed by defendants with
       two or more prior felony drug convictions.”). For that reason, we
       concluded -- relying on our decision in United States v. Jones, 962 F.3d
       1290 (11th Cir. 2020) -- that the district court lacked authority to
       reduce Ford’s sentence. See Ford, 858 F. App’x at 327-28.
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       20-11126                Opinion of the Court                           3

              We also rejected Ford’s suggestion that his sentence should
       be reduced based on other changes in the law that had since low-
       ered the statutory-mandatory-penalty for his oﬀense. We ex-
       plained that -- because the district court was not free to consider
       changes in the law “beyond those mandated by sections 2 and 3” of
       the Fair Sentencing Act -- it was immaterial that “Ford might be
       subject to a lower statutory mandatory sentence under the most
       recent version of section 841(b)(1)(A).” See id. at 328.
              The Supreme Court later granted certiorari, vacated our de-
       cision, and remanded the case to us for additional consideration in
       the light of its decision in Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389
       (2022). See Ford v. United States, 143 S. Ct. 71 (2022). In Concepcion,
       the Supreme Court concluded that district courts may “consider
       intervening changes of law or fact in exercising their discretion to
       reduce a sentence pursuant to the First Step Act.” See 142 S. Ct. at
       2404. The parties have ﬁled supplemental briefs addressing what
       eﬀect, if any, Concepcion has on the disposition of this appeal.
              In his supplemental brief, Ford contends that the district
       court had discretion under Concepcion to consider an intervening
       change to the statutory-mandatory-minimum sentence in section
       841(b)(1)(A) in ruling on Ford’s First Step Act motion. We disagree.
               We have already concluded that the Supreme Court’s deci-
       sion in Concepcion did not abrogate our decision in Jones. See United
       States v. Jackson, 58 F.4th 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2023). In distinguish-
       ing the circumstances presented in Concepcion from those pre-
       sented in Jones, we explained that Jones involved a determination
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 20-11126

       about drug-quantity: “an issue that arises before the sentencing
       court’s discretion comes into play.” Id. at 1336. Concepcion, on the
       other hand, addressed what factors a district court may consider
       when exercising its discretion to modify a movant’s sentence: “an
       issue that arises only after drug quantity and the corresponding
       statutory penalties have been established.” See id. In drawing that
       distinction, we were guided by language in Concepcion specifying
       that “[a] district court cannot . . . recalculate a movant’s benchmark
       Guidelines range in any way other than to reﬂect the retroactive
       application of the Fair Sentencing Act.” See id. at 1337 (citing Con-
       cepcion, 142 S. Ct. at 2402 n.6, 2403 n.8).
               We have also reaﬃrmed post-Concepcion our conclusion in
       Jones that a district court lacks authority to reduce a sentence under
       the First Step Act if the movant “received the lowest statutory pen-
       alty that also would be available to him under the Fair Sentencing
       Act.” See United States v. Clowers, 62 F.4th 1377, 1380-81 (11th Cir.
       2023) (aﬃrming the denial of a sentence reduction under the First
       Step Act because the movant would still be subject to a mandatory
       life sentence had the Fair Sentencing Act been in eﬀect when he
       committed his oﬀense). And we have stressed that a district court
       determines the applicable statutory penalty by “recalculat[ing] the
       statutory sentencing range as if the Fair Sentencing Act’s changes -
       - and only those changes -- were in eﬀect at the time the oﬀense was
       committed.” See id. at 1378 (emphasis added).
            The central issue in this case involves the calculation of the
       minimum-statutory-penalty Ford would face under the Fair
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       20-11126              Opinion of the Court                        5

       Sentencing Act: a matter “that arises before the sentencing court’s
       discretion comes into play.” See Jackson, 58 F.4th at 1336. Applying
       only those changes made by the Fair Sentencing Act, Ford would
       still be subject to a statutory-mandatory-minimum-sentence of life
       imprisonment. The district court, thus, lacked authority to reduce
       Ford’s sentence and never reached the discretionary decision-mak-
       ing stage addressed in Concepcion. See Clowers, 62 F.4th at 1380-81.
              We see no conﬂict between our prior opinion in this appeal
       and the Supreme Court’s decision in Concepcion. We reinstate our
       prior opinion and aﬃrm the district court’s order denying Ford’s
       motion for a reduced sentence.
             OPINION REINSTATED; AFFIRMED.