Court Opinion

ID: 9383837
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-31 14:06:05.305973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:48.364589
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  20-P-405

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                                 PAUL BRADLEY.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       After a trial in the Boston Municipal Court, the jury found

 the defendant, Paul Bradley, guilty of assault and battery on a

 family or household member, a woman he had been dating for eight

 months, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13M (a).              The jury

 acquitted him of a charge of strangulation.            See G. L. c. 265,

 § 15D (b).     On appeal he argues that his motions for required

 findings of not guilty at the close of the Commonwealth's case

 and at the close of all the evidence should have been allowed.

 We affirm.

       Evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if "after

 viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the

 prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the

 essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt."

 Commonwealth v. Latimore, 378 Mass. 671, 677 (1979), quoting
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-319 (1979).   If the jury

believed the victim, her testimony, standing alone, was

sufficient to prove all the essential elements of the crime of

assault and battery on a family or household member.1   See

Commonwealth v. Santos, 100 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 3 (2021).    The

Commonwealth's evidence satisfied the Latimore standard, and it

did not deteriorate after the Commonwealth rested.   See Cramer

v. Commonwealth, 419 Mass. 106, 112 (1994).

     The defendant does not argue otherwise.   Rather, he points

to evidence that he contends so severely undermined the victim's

credibility regarding the assault and battery that no rational

juror could convict him.   Such evidence included the victim's

own testimony, corroborated by both prosecution and defense

witnesses, that the defendant himself called 911; that the

victim did not report the incident to the police when they

responded; that, after leaving the defendant's apartment, she

returned and spent the night there with him; and that she did

not report the incident until one or two weeks later.     Such

evidence also included the defendant's testimony, which painted

an entirely different picture of the evening in question, and

the testimony of the defendant's friend that when he visited the

1 The victim's testimony was corroborated with photographs
showing her swollen face and lips and bruises on her neck, lips,
and cheeks.

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apartment in the early morning hours the next day, the victim

did not appear upset or injured.

    Setting aside the complex dynamics of partner abuse that

may explain the victim's behavior, see Commonwealth v. Gordon,

87 Mass. App. Ct. 322, 333 n.13 (2015), at bottom, the defendant

is asking us to supersede the jury's assessment of the

witnesses' credibility.   This is emphatically not our function.

Presented with all of the evidence described above, the properly

instructed jury found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable

doubt of committing an assault and battery.    "Credibility is for

the jury, not for appellate courts.    We will not substitute our

view of a witness's credibility for that of the jury."

Commonwealth v. Ford, 397 Mass. 298, 301–302 (1986).

    The defendant also asserts that the verdicts were factually

inconsistent, and that "justice was not served" because the jury

may have "split the verdict out of caution."   As an initial

matter, the verdicts were not necessarily inconsistent.     The

jury may well have found that the Commonwealth proved the

assault and battery charge beyond a reasonable doubt, but that

the evidence of strangulation failed to satisfy that high

standard of proof.   In any event, even if the verdicts were

inconsistent or the result of compromise, "[i]nconsistency of

verdicts in criminal cases is not a matter for judicial

inquiry."   Commonwealth v. Therrien, 383 Mass. 529, 537 (1981).

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"[T]he rule is well established in criminal cases that mere

inconsistency in verdicts, one of which is an acquittal, will

not render the verdict of guilty erroneous even though such

inconsistency may have indicated the possibility of compromise

on the part of the jury."     Commonwealth v. Medeiros, 456 Mass.

52, 57 (2010), quoting Commonwealth v. Scott, 355 Mass. 471, 475

(1969).

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Massing,
                                        Hershfang & D'Angelo, JJ.2),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    March 31, 2023.

2   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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