Court Opinion

ID: 9564411
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:59:58.30269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:23.717982
License: Public Domain

SPENCE, J.
I dissent. Plaintiff brought his action upon a written contract of employment. He sought certain added compensation and transportation expenses provided for in the contract, alleging that he had fully performed his contract until discharged by defendants on April 21, 1941, “without just cause.” Defendants denied that plaintiff had been dis*252charged without just cause and affirmatively alleged that plaintiff had been discharged “pursuant to Paragraph 8 of said contract and for the reason that the services of the plaintiff were not satisfactory to these answering defendants. ’ ’ The trial court found that on April 21, 1941, defendants “arbitrarily and without just cause” refused to permit plaintiff to continue performance of the contract. The sole question presented is whether the evidence was sufficient to support this finding.
The evidence was highly conflicting in some particulars) but even accepting plaintiff’s testimony as true, such testimony affirmatively showed that there was just cause for plaintiff’s discharge. The conclusion reached in the majority opinion that “plaintiff was doing nothing more than protesting or complaining to his employer concerning the ‘check in-check out’ system” and that “the activities of plaintiff did not constitute disloyalty or insubordination” cannot be reconciled with the admitted facts.
The notice posted by defendants on April 19th ordered the employees to follow a new procedure, known as the “check in-check out” system, commencing on April 21st. It is conceded that the adoption of such procedure by defendants had been ordered by the United States Navy and that defendants’ order to the employees to follow the new procedure was a reasonable order.
On the same day, plaintiff drew up and caused to be signed by himself and other employees the notice which was dated April 19th, and which was posted on the morning of April 20th. Said notice was addressed to defendants’ superintendent and a copy was sent to ‘ ‘ Commander Bentrees, U.S.N.R., Officer in Charge, Naval Construction Camp, Midway Island. ’ ’ While this notice was in part in the nature of a protest, it went much further. It stated that plaintiff and the others who signed found it necessary “to reject the plan.” On the evening of April 20th, plaintiff prepared, signed and posted a further notice reading as follows:
“Notice to All Those Men Who Signed the Answer to the Bulletin in Reference to the Check-In and CheckOut System. You are Expected to Report for Work Monday, April 21, as per Usual With No Change in the Procedure.
“Signed V. F. Greene”
*253There can be no question concerning the import of these notices posted by plaintiff. Defendants’ notice of April 19th had ordered a change in procedure commencing on April 21st. Plaintiff’s notice which bore the same date and which was posted on the morning of April 20th, constituted an unequivocal expression of an intention “to reject the plan.” Plaintiff's notice which was posted on the evening of April 20th, constituted an obvious attempt to incite his fellow-signers of the first notice to carry out their expressed intention “to reject the plan” by reporting to work on April 21st “as per usual with no change in the procedure.” There is only one reasonable interpretation which plaintiff’s employers, his fellow-employees or any other person could have given to the words used by plaintiff in these notices, and the admitted posting of these notices constituted just cause for plaintiff’s discharge. (Lab. Code, § 2856; May v. New York Motion Picture Corp., 45 Cal.App. 396 [187 P. 785]; Bank of America v. Republic Productions, Inc., 44 Cal.App.2d 651 [112 P.2d 972]; In re Nagel, 278 F. 105; Darst v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 81 F. 284.)
But aside from these written expressions of plaintiff’s attitude toward defendants’ order, plaintiff’s testimony concerning his attitude as orally expressed on the afternoon of April 21st, showed ample ground for the discharge which followed. He was still doing more than merely objecting to the new procedure despite his knowledge at that time that the United States Navy had required the adoption of such procedure. He testified: “He (defendants’ superintendent) said, ‘Well, just what is your objection to the plan?’ I said ... ‘if you can’t trust me to go out and do an honest day’s work, I see no reason why I should trust you. ’ ’ ’ Thereupon plaintiff was discharged.
An attempt is made in plaintiff’s briefs to explain away these definite expressions of plaintiff’s defiance of a reasonable order of his employers by reference to certain testimony of plaintiff which purported to show that he did not intend to “reject the plan” and did not intend to encourage others to do likewise. But defendants were entitled to act upon the only reasonable interpretation which could be placed upon the written notices posted by plaintiff, and were also entitled to act upon plaintiff’s continued attitude of defiance which was orally expressed by him to defendants’ superintendent *254immediately before his discharge. The testimony of plaintiff to which he refers and which purports to show that his real attitude and intentions were contrary to his expressed attitude and intentions, can have no bearing upon the right of his employers to discharge him.
In conclusion, it should be stated that this case concerns none of the broad questions relating to the rights of employees “to protest regarding working conditions” or “to make a peaceful and orderly presentation of these grievances” as indicated in the majority opinion. The existence of these rights cannot be questioned but neither these rights nor the rights of employees to organize, to bargain collectively, to strike, to picket, or to boycott are involved. This case presents only the limited question of the right of an individual employee to recover certain benefits under a written contract of employment, by the terms of which contract said benefits were to be denied in the event of the discharge of the employee for cause.
I am of the. opinion that the undisputed evidence shows that the plaintiff was discharged for just cause and that the judgment should therefore be reversed.
Shenk, J., concurred.