Court Opinion

ID: 9488034
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:34:19.650862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:38.757702
License: Public Domain

CARNES, Circuit Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part:
I concur with the majority’s holding that the convictions and sentences of Hazel Lyons, Terry Reese, a/k/a Terrance Towns, *1205and Angela Reese are due to be affirmed. However, I dissent from the majority’s holding that the government presented sufficient evidence to sustain Judith Price’s conviction.
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court is limited to inquiring whether, construing the evidence and drawing all inferences and credibility choices in the Government’s favor, any reasonable jury could have found the defendant ] guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v. Newton, 44 F.3d 913, 921 (11th Cir.1994). After reviewing the record and drawing all inferences and credibility choices in the government’s favor, the evidence supports only the following relevant facts.
On April 29, 1992, Judith Price sat in the front passenger seat of a ear driven by Angela Reese. Reese stopped that car at a crack house and, while Price remained in the car, Reese exited the vehicle to approach the building. After Reese drove the ear to another location, a government agent entered the back seat of the vehicle, and Price observed Reese selling the agent $700-worth of cocaine. During that time, Price never spoke, handled any drugs, or did anything that facilitated the drug transaction. After the agent asked Reese to secure an additional $1000-worth of cocaine, Price remained a passenger in the car as Reese picked up Towns and as Reese searched for more cocaine before rejoining the agent. During Reése’s search for cocaine, Reese again stopped the car at the crack house, and Reese, Price, and Towns exited the car. However, the DEA special agent observing the trio never saw Price enter or exit the crack house, and there is no evidence that she did. The jury, acquitted Price of the charge that she distributed crack cocaine on April 29, 1992, the .only substantive charge against her related to that date.
On May 8, 1992, Price sat in Reese’s car as the conspirators conducted another drug transaction in the agent’s car. No evidence indicates that Price saw any cocaine on this occasion, nor is there any evidence she overheard any conversation relating to the drug transaction. There is certainly no evidence that she did anything to facilitate the drug transaction. All that the evidence shows as to Price on May 8, 1992, is that she was merely present. In spite of the lack of evidence that Price was involved in any crime that occurred on that date, the jury convicted her of two counts of possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute on that date. One of these counts related to the narcotics seized from the crack house, while the other count involved the narcotics from Towns’s drug transaction in the agent’s car on that date.
The jury also convicted Price of conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute crack cocaine. However, there was no evidence relating to her involvement in such a conspiracy, other than the evidence of her mere presence on the two occasions discussed.
The majority’s conclusions about the events of April 29 and May 8, 1992, lack a foundation in the evidence. For example, the majority concludes that on April 29,1992, Price “accompanied Reese to the crack house to secure the crack cocaine for agent Smith” and “to secure more drugs.” Majority op. at 1202. But there is no evidence that Price went to that location for the purpose of securing cocaine, nor any evidence that she secured any cocaine. She was never seen entering or leaving the crack house. The most the evidence establishes is that she was merely present outside the house.
The majority’s rendition of the facts attributes to Price actions of Reese. For example, the majority says that, “After Reese went up to the house, Reese and Price drove to a Burger King which was five minutes away and parked in the lot,” id. at 1200, and that, “Reese and Price dropped Towns off there and' drove around briefly before parking across the street,” id. at 1200. It is undisputed that Reese was the driver. Price was merely a passenger. It was Reese the driver, not Price the passenger, who drove to the Burger King, who dropped Towns off, and who parked the car. The government does not contend otherwise, nor could it.
The majority also states that because Price returned to the Burger King with Reese and Towns, a jury could infer “she intended to contribute to the conspiratorial objective by *1206assisting Reese in eountersurveiUanee.” Id. at 1202. The majority offers no justification whatsoever for that deductive leap other than a footnote reference to the fact that Reese the driver — not Price the passenger— engaged in what an officer believed was countersurveillance when Reese dropped off Towns. Id. at 1202 n. 2. There is no evidence at all that Price engaged in any coun-tersurveillance.
As for the May 8, 1992, incident, the majority states that “the similarity of the circumstances of the two sales, and Price’s voluntary presence again, supports the jury’s conclusion that beyond a reasonable doubt Price was not only present, but she was a knowing and willing participant in the conspiracy.” Majority op. at 1202. However, the majority cites no authority for the proposition that if one is merely present twice, a jury can infer knowing and willful involvement in a drug conspiracy.* Such a proposition runs counter to this circuit’s well-established rule that “[m]ere presence is insufficient to establish knowing participation in a conspiracy, as is mere association with conspirators.” United States v. Sullivan, 763 F.2d 1215, 1218 (11th Cir.1985) (citation omitted); see also Newton, 44 F.3d at 922 (“Association with a coconspirator is insufficient to prove participation in a conspiracy. At a minimum, the defendant must willfully associate himself in some way with the criminal venture and willfully participate in it as he would in something he wished to bring about.” (citation omitted)); United States v. Young, 39 F.3d 1561, 1566 (11th Cir.1994) (“It is axiomatic that mere association, without more, cannot give rise to a conspiracy conviction.”); United States v. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d 1552, 1557 (11th Cir.1994) (“The inference of participation from presence and association with conspirators alone does not suffice to convict.”). Even while recognizing that clear rule of law, however, the majority still affirms Price’s conviction based on nothing other than mere presence and association.
The majority does so in spite of its recognition that “[a] showing of knowing participation is required,” and that in order to be entitled to an affirmance, the government “must have proved that an agreement existed between two or more persons illegally to possess and distribute drugs and that Price knowingly and voluntarily joined or participated in the conspiracy.” Majority op. at 1201. Beyond Price’s mere presence at the drug transactions, there is no “proof’ that she was involved in a conspiracy to sell drugs. Beyond her mere presence, there is not one jot, tittle, or iota of evidence that Price did anything to facilitate or participate in any crime.
The problem is not one of the nature of the evidence — whether circumstantial or direct— but of its quantity. A defendant’s participation in a crime certainly can be proven by circumstantial evidence, if there is enough of it. Until today, however, the decisions of this Court had squarely and consistently held that evidence of mere presence without additional evidence — whether circumstantial or direct — is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt participation in a crime.
Even when a defendant’s presence has been accompanied by circumstances raising more suspicions than those attendant to Price’s presence in this case, we still have held the evidence insufficient to support a conviction. In United States v. Hernandez, 896 F.2d 513 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 858, 111 S.Ct. 159, 112 L.Ed.2d 125 (1990), we explained:
Essentially, the government’s case against Giral consists of Giral’s presence in Aquino’s car and at the trunk when Aquino delivered the package to Garcia, Giral’s walking away after catching Garcia’s eye, Giral’s talking to a dead phone, and Giral’s prior conviction of cocaine possession. Yet *1207Giral’s mere association with Aquino or presence at the transaction does not prove that he was a part of the conspiracy....
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the government, we can surmise that Giral’s association with Aquino may have been criminal, that Giral’s presence at the scene of the crime could have been because of his involvement in the conspiracy, that Giral’s abrupt departure might have occurred because he caught on to Garcia, was guilty and hoped to avoid arrest, and that Giral’s intent in this case could have been identical to his intent in the narcotics crime for which he was convicted in 1985. We cannot find, however, that the government proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Giral was a member of this particular conspiracy to sell a kilogram or two of cocaine to Garcia.
Id. at 519-20 (citations omitted). Here, the government does not claim that in addition to being present Price engaged in any suspicious activity — such as talking into a dead phone — and the government presented no evidence to link Price to previous drug crimes.
More recently, in Perez-Tosta, we reversed the conviction of a defendant who had been present at two separate events linked to a drug conspiracy. On one occasion, the defendant not only was present but also produced the keys, registration, and insurance binder for a truck when two co-conspirators met to transfer trucks with concealed compartments and to discuss details of a cocaine transfer. Perez-Tosta, 36 F.3d at 1558. Later, the defendant was present in a car with the two co-conspirators as one drove the car “erratically” and as the two co-conspirators conducted “eountersurveillance.” Id. We concluded the following:
[A] reasonable jury could not ignore the doubts raised by the possibility that [the defendant] was an unwitting dupe in’ his sole action that furthered the conspiracy. Furthermore, in the absence of any evidence that [the defendant] himself was on the lookout, a reasonable jury could not infer from [his] mere presence in [the co-conspirator’s] rental car that [the defendant] was knowingly engaged in counter-surveillance in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Id. at 1559 (citation omitted). The evidence underlying Price’s conviction is even more tenuous than that in Perez-Tosta, because no evidence demonstrates that Price did anything which had the effect of furthering the conspiracy. See also United States v. Villegas, 911 F.2d 623, 628-31 (11th Cir.1990) (rejecting government argument that defendant’s countersurveillance showed knowing participation in conspiracy), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 977, 111 S.Ct. 1625, 113 L.Ed.2d 722 (1991).
The mere presence rule is not a loophole or technicality designed to benefit drug conspirators and other criminals, but -instead serves to protect cherished freedoms such as our right to be present in public places and to associate with whomever we please without fear of prosecution and punishment. Inroads into the rule, however well Mentioned, may ultimately threaten those freedoms. Of course, no one has the right to be present anywhere for the purpose of facilitating a crime or to associate with others for criminal purposes. But the law has functioned, and should continue to function, to require that the government not only establish, but prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the presence and association were for a criminal purpose. That is what the mere presence rule is about.
It is true that in this case Price did not affirmatively act to thwart the conspiracy or prevent the crime. The record reflects that Price, who was eight months pregnant, did not flee from the car, nor did she alert authorities that a drug transaction was occurring. However, she was not charged with misprision of a felony, but with drug crimes. She was convicted despite the insufficiency of the evidence to prove that she was guilty. What we said in Hernandez is equally applicable to this case: we can surmise that Price’s association with Reese and Towns may have been criminal, and that Price’s presence at the scene of two drug transactions may have been because of involvement in a conspiracy; but no reasonable factfinder could conclude that the government proved that beyond a reasonable doubt.
*1208As a society we have given much to the war on drugs, but one thing we should not sacrifice is the fundamental constitutional principle that no man or woman may be convicted of a crime except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

 The majority focuses on the sufficiency of the evidence supporting Price's conspiracy conviction, not her conviction for possessing crack cocaine with the intent to distribute it. For that reason, my focus is on the insufficiency of the evidence to support the conspiracy conviction. However, because no evidence indicates any link between Price and the crack cocaine in this case, when considering the possession counts, the jury must have attributed the crack cocaine to Price as a result of her presumed involvement with the drug conspiracy. Because there is insufficient evidence to find that she participated in the conspiracy, Price’s conviction for possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine should be reversed as well.