Court Opinion

ID: 9856649
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:53:58.824661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:13.436884
License: Public Domain

CalhouN, Judge,
dissenting:
Believing that the majority opinion represents an unnecessarily harsh construction of a statute which has been characterized as “highly remedial”, I respectfully dissent.
The majority opinion states that it “clearly” appears that the allegation that the trial court directed a verdict against the plaintiff “does not amount to a dismissal or abatement of the action;” and that the allegations ‘ ‘ do not establish an involuntary dismissal or abatement of the action first instituted, * * *.”
It is true that a plaintiff may be permitted to take a nonsuit immediately after the court, out of the presence of the jury, has announced its decision to direct a verdict for the defendant and before such verdict has been actually directed. Lykens v. Jarrett, 123 W. Va. 631, 17 S. E. 2d 328. Had plaintiff done so in this case, it could hardly be said that, with the directed *113verdict impending, snob nonsuit would bave been “voluntary” in tbe sense of abandonment of purpose and desire to prosecute tbe action further.
It is difficult for me to perceive wbat alternative was available to tbe plaintiff. Tbe plaintiff “was not bound to move for a reinstatement but could elect to institute a new action, as permitted by Code, 55-2-18. ’ ’ Keener v. Reynolds Transportation Co., 134 W. Va. 712, 719, 61 S. E. 2d 629, 633. A motion to set aside tbe verdict would bave been futile and could bave bad no basis in reality. Tbe verdict was not directed on tbe basis of a variance, and bence I fail to see that a motion for leave to amend could bave been availing. Alias or other process could not bave been issued under code, 56-3-21, because tbe process was returned executed. In Keener v. Reynolds Transportation Co., 134 W. Va. 712, 718, 61 S. E. 2d 629, 632, tbe Court stated: “Neither was it neglect on tbe part of tbe plaintiff to bave failed to bave alias process issued in tbe first action. He bad tbe right to bave tbe court pass upon tbe sufficiency of tbe return of process, and be bad no right to bave such alias process issued after tbe returns were held insufficient, because of tbe hiatus that would bave existed. See Dunaway v. Lord, 114 W. Va. 671, 173 S. E. 568.” Tbe only alternative to nonsuit or court order of dismissal of which I can conceive would bave been a motion to tbe court for permission to remand to rules for further process, and that would bave been an initial process, as distinguished from alias or pluries process. Remand to rules for further process would bave been, in effect, and to all intents and purposes, a new action.
Tbe trial having proceeded to that point, tbe action of tbe court in directing a verdict was an adjudication on tbe merits. It was a final termination of tbe action in relation to tbe “defendant” served with process. Tbe action was functus officio; and I am unable to perceive any legal and proper way in which tbe court could bave breathed tbe breath of life into that action at that stage so that it may bave been continued or *114revived as an action against another and different person.
The declaration in the new action alleges that the plaintiff instituted the previous action and the second action against the same defendant. By the issuance of process in the first action against that defendant, the action came into being against him within the statutory period. U. S. Oil & Gas Well Supply Co. v. Gartlan and Ahner, 58 W. Va. 267, pt. 1 syl., 52 S. E. 524; Nicholas Land Co. v. Crowder, 127 W. Va. 216, 32 S. E. 2d 563, 567. Just as we do not require of a motorist that he pursue that which, by hindsight, appears to have been the wisest course in a sudden emergency confronting him on the highway, so it seems to me that we should not appraise too harshly the course followed by the plaintiff’s counsel when faced with the sudden, perplexing and perhaps unprecedented situation with which he was confronted. I am unable to say that he pursued a course other than one which would have been followed by any other astute and discerning attorney under such circumstances. Indeed, if I comprehend properly the full significance of a directed verdict, it was “the end of the road” so far as that case was concerned. I am unable to comprehend that a verdict directed against a plaintiff constitutes a voluntary termination, abandonment or dismissal of the action so far as the losing litigant is concerned. To the extent that the majority opinion holds that the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his action, I feel that it does violence both to the facts of the case and to the letter and spirit of the statute involved.
In the case of Tompkins v. The Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co., 53 W. Va. 479, 484, 44 S. E. 439, 441, the Court stated: “Our statute seems to be somewhat broader, or, to say the least, more positive and affirmative in the expression of the width of its scope than any of the other statutes; for it says ‘if there be occasion to bring a new suit by reason of the said cause having been dismissed for want of security for costs, or by *115reason of any other canse, which conld not be pleaded in bar of an action,’ a new action may be brought within one year after the dismissal. It is a highly remedial statute and ought to be liberally construed for the accomplishment of the purpose for which it is designed, namely, to save one who has brought his suit within the time limited by law, from loss of his right of action by reason of accident or inadvertence, and it would be a narrow construction of that statute to say that, because a plaintiff had, by mistake, attempted to assert his right in a court having no jurisdiction, he is not entitled to the benefit of it.” In the case of McClung v. Tieche, 126 W. Va. 575, 579, 29 S. E. 2d 250, 252, the Court summarized its prior decisions as follows: “The general rule to be deduced from the foregoing decisions of the Court is that where there has been a dismissal or abatement of an action by the voluntary act of the plaintiff or conduct equivalent thereto the running of the statute of limitations is not suspended by Code, 55-2-18. But if the dismissal is had by reason of accident, inadvertence or erroneous ruling of a trial court or for any reason not attributable to the voluntary act of a plaintiff, or conduct equivalent thereto, the cause of action is saved for one year after the dismissal or abatement under the provisions of the foregoing statute.” In the case of Ketterman v. Dry Fork Railroad Co., 48 W. Va. 606, 37 S. E. 683, the second point of the syllabus is as follows: “A summons commencing a suit, which is void because it has a wrong return day, is nevertheless effective to bring into being a suit such that its dismissal by the court for that cause will give one year after its dismissal for a new suit, under the statute of limitations.” In the body of the opinion (48 W. Va. at page 609, 37 S.E. at page 684), the Court distinguished this from a case of voluntary dismissal as follows: “The very object of the statute is to give further time for a second action when the first action is for any cause abortive, ineffectual for recovery. No matter what was the cause of the first action’s failure, no matter how bad the writ, no matter whether you call it void or voidable, it *116is all sufficient to save the second action. It is within the very reason of the statute; it is just the kind of a trouble for which the statute intended to save the second action. It aids the defendant none to cite Lawrence v. Winifrede, 35 S. E. 925, holding that a first action dismissed for failure to file a declaration will not save a second from the bar of limitation, as that case was a voluntary dismissal by the party, whereas here the fault is the clerk’s, and the dismissal the act of the law.” (Italics supplied.)
"While our West Virginia statute may be broader than similar statutes in other states, a general rule is stated in 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, Section 287, page 347, as follows: “A statute extending the time for the institution of a new action on failure of the original action for reasons other than on the merits is highly remedial, and should be liberally construed in furtherance of its purpose, to afford litigants a hearing on the merits, and is not to be frittered away by any narrow construction; * # “The general doctrine is well established, sometimes by reason of express statute, that a properly instituted claim voluntarily abandoned cannot be made available in a subsequent action to save it from the operation of the statute of limitations. The abandonment, however, must be express or positively implied, as where the plaintiff declares that he voluntarily abandons his action, or by some other voluntary act shows a clear intention to do so. If the reason for such abandonment is sufficiently explained or accounted for so as to relieve it of being voluntary the running of limitations is tolled by the commencement of the action.” (Italics supplied.) 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, Section 290, page 355. “This exception or proviso of the general statute of limitations is intended to reach all those cases where a suit is brought, and the merits of the action fail to be tried without the fault of plaintiff, and the period of limitations becomes complete during the pendency of the suit, and to insure to the diligent suitor the right to a bearing in court until he reaches a judgment on *117tbe merits. The prime object is the saving of canses of action, not the destroying of them.” 54 C.J.S., Limitations of Actions, Section 287, pages 346-347. For a collection of cases permitting a new action where the first action fails for reasons relating to process and service thereof, see 142 A.L.R. 1184.
It will be noted that Code, 55-2-18, the statute involved in this case, makes no suggestion of a necessity for revamping, revising or reviving the original action but, on the other hand, the statute throughout saves to the plaintiff a right to institute a “new action or suit.” In at least two analogous cases this Court permitted “new” actions and rejected contentions that the former actions were voluntarily dismissed. In Ketterman v. Dry Fork Railroad Co., 48 W. Va. 606, 37 S. E. 683, the trial court “quashed the summons” because, through error on the part of the clerk who issued it, the summons or process was made returnable to an impossible return date. This Court held that a “new” action was proper and rejected the contention that the bringing of such new action amounted to a voluntary dismissal of the first action, stating in that connection that “here the fault is the clerk’s and the dismissal the act of the law.” By analogy, the fault in the instant case was that of the officer who served the process and “the dismissal the act of the law.” In the case of Keener v. Reynolds Transportation Co., 134 W. Va. 712, 61 S. E. 2d 629, the first point of the syllabus is, in part, as follows: “Where a former action has been dismissed because of insufficiency of return of process, Code, 55-2-18, tolls the running of the statute of limitations * * #.” The Court specifically rejected a contention that the plaintiff had abandoned the first action, held that he had no right to issue alias process because a “hiatus” would have existed, and stated that the plaintiff was not required to move for reinstatement of the first action “but could elect to institute a new action as permitted ~by Code, 55-2-18.” (Italic Supplied.)
In my judgment, the Court has made a strict, harsh, technical application of a statute which it has previous*118ly characterized as “highly remedial”, and that thereby the plaintiff has been denied a right to a trial on the merits, the very thing which, by general authority, the statute is designed to preserve to him in a case such as this.
For the reasons stated herein, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court.