Court Opinion

ID: 9632838
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:26:03.769817+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:00:16.339950
License: Public Domain

Schroeder, C.J.,
dissenting: I fully join in the dissenting opinion written by Justice McFarland, but feel duty bound to call attention to difficult problems of interpretation and implementation of the court’s opinion and the havoc this opinion will cause in deprived child cases from the past where severance of parental rights has not been sought by the State.
The sole issue determined by the court in this case is whether in “deprived child” hearings where the State in the exercise of its parental power seeks to give care, guidance, and discipline such as will best serve the child’s welfare and where there may be a temporary loss of custody by the parents, it is necessary that the natural parent or parents be represented by court-appointed counsel at the expense of the county when the parent or parents are financially unable to employ counsel.
There is no due process requirement under the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court, under the Kansas Constitution, nor under the Kansas Juvenile Code that counsel be appointed for the indigent parent or parents under these circumstances.
By reversing the Court of Appeals the majority opinion attempts to straddle the fence and have it both ways — yes, appoint counsel in some cases, but no, do not appoint counsel in other cases. The majority opinion states:
“In 1980 there were 2,206 deprived child hearings in Kansas, many of which had for their purpose a temporary change of custody to provide for special care and treatment of the child and training of the parent or parents to develop the proper skills to enable the parents to care for the child in the home. In these cases we see no due process requirement necessitating the appointment of counsel for indigent parents at the expense of the county.”
Many of these were “deprived child” hearings where temporary *74change of custody was sought by the State, but the trial judges of the State are now admonished to determine prior to the hearing of such cases whether counsel should be appointed for the indigent parent or parents. The court states:
“In any case when the parents request an attorney, a record should be made of their financial circumstances bearing on indigency, and if the judge should refuse the request for counsel it is important that grounds for the refusal be stated in the record so a meaningful judicial review of the refusal can be had.”
Our appellate courts on review of the trial court’s determination, which was made prior to hearing any evidence in the case, will review the transcript of the evidence taken at the trial. In other words, the appellate court will use hindsight to determine the crucial constitutional issue. Obviously, the trial judge should not be put in the position of deciding this crucial issue on the basis of evidence yet to be heard and in light of standards which give no definitive guidance. The net result will be that the trial judge, to be on the safe side in making the determination, will appoint counsel for the indigent parent or parents at the expense of the taxpayer in nearly every case where temporary custody is sought by the State in a “deprived child” hearing.
Related to the dilemma of the trial court in appointing counsel in future deprived child hearings is the effect of this opinion on decisions not to appoint counsel in past hearings. By raising to constitutional dimensions under the due process clause of the United States Constitution the requirement for the appointment of counsel to represent the indigent parent or parents in deprived child cases where the State seeks only temporary custody, the validity of many adoptions in Kansas, long considered to be final, is placed in jeopardy. A collateral attack can now be made to overturn an adoption heretofore considered final on the ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction to sever the parental rights in the first place because of violation of that parent’s due process rights enunciated by the court today. The issue in the collateral attack will be indigency of the parent or parents in the original deprived child hearing where only temporary custody was sought by the State. If the appellate court perceives an error in failure to appoint counsel, that error will render evidence presented in the prior proceeding inadmissible in future proceedings.
In my opinion the court’s decision is founded upon an erroneous premise which is stated by the court as follows: “[A]ny *75evidence introduced at the deprived child hearing may well be inadmissible in a later severance hearing.”
It is submitted where severance of parental rights is sought in a deprived child hearing all relevant evidence is admissible, whether there has previously been a hearing to take temporary custody of the children by the State or not. The appointment of an attorney to represent the indigent parent or parents at the severance hearings, as required by our statute K.S.A. 1980 Supp. 38-820, satisfies the due process constitutional requirement addressed by the court in this case.
Any decision of this court imposing a due process requirement of counsel in a deprived child hearing and exclusion of evidence in later severance proceedings because of alleged violation of due process would permit unfit parents to abuse their children without recourse by the State to protect the children.
This proposed exclusion of evidence in a later proceeding goes farther than necessary. If, in a hearing where permanent severance of parental rights is sought, the parents are indigent and no attorney is appointed to represent them as required by 38-820, what order would the court enter in reversing judgment? It is submitted the order would be precisely as the order of the Court of Appeals is worded in this case of In re Cooper, 5 Kan. App. 2d 584, 592, 621 P.2d 437 (1980). It reads:
“The judgment is remanded with directions that the trial court determine whether appellant was indigent at the time of the ‘deprived child’ hearing. If it is determined that appellant was indigent at that time, then the trial court’s judgment herein is reversed and the trial court is directed to appoint an attorney for appellant and to grant her a new trial to determine whether Julie Cooper is a deprived child.”
Finally, I cannot reconcile the court’s statement of the law with its disposition of this case. It is inconceivable to me that the court can arbitrarily find there was no requirement to appoint counsel for Marilyn Dickey, the appellant, in this case and affirm the triaf court on the basis of the law as stated in the court’s opinion and the facts in this case. If ever a case existed where severance of parental rights loomed in the offing, this is the case.
Prior to January 1979, police assigned to the child abuse division assisted social workers in making calls at the second floor apartment of Marilyn Dickey and Roy Dickey concerning the well-being of their two children, Joseph Dickey, age four months, and Julie Cooper, age eighteen months, following re*76ports that the children were being left in the apartment alone at night. Those reports proved well-founded and symptomatic of a disintegrating family unit. The professionals discovered the two undernourished children living in generally unsanitary conditions. On January 1, 1979, the infant Joseph died. At the later deprived child hearing regarding the girl Julie, the deputy coroner who performed the autopsy on Joseph’s body testified Joseph suffered multiple bruises and was severely undernourished, the prolonged malnutrition being one of the causes of death.
After hearing the testimony of police, social workers, the deputy coroner, and Marilyn Dickey, the trial judge terminated the hearing saying he had heard enough evidence. Note, the State was merely seeking to take temporary custody of the remaining child, Julie Cooper. The order of the trial court reads:
“The Court would urge Mr. and Mrs. Dickey to cooperate with the professional persons with a goal of reuniting Julie with her mother and step-father. The Court, however, does caution that if Mr. and Mrs. Dickey should choose to continue their chaotic lifestyle, over the next several months, and fail to cooperate with the Department of SRS, and should the Court have evidence presented of illegal drug involvement in the Dickey home, the Court would recommend that the State file a petition requesting the Court to sever permanently parental rights in Julie Cooper.”
It is respectfully submitted the court should not require appointment of counsel to represent a parent or parents where only temporary deprivation of custody is sought by the State in a deprived child hearing, and the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Miller and McFarland, JJ., join the foregoing dissenting opinion.