Court Opinion

ID: 9947423
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-04 20:03:17.101812+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:25.791765
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/4/24 P. v. Mendoza CA5

                    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                         FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F084290
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                              (Super. Ct. No. MCR021840)
                    v.

 RAUL ISMAEL MENDOZA,                                                                     OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Madera County. Michael J.
Jurkovich, Judge.
         Linda J. Zachritz, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Clara M. Levers and Julie A. Hokans,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                          -ooOoo-
       On September 12, 2019, the Madera County District Attorney filed a petition to
commit defendant, Raul Mendoza, to the Department of State Hospitals (DSH) pursuant to
the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 6600, et seq.1). On April
8, 2022, a jury found that defendant qualified as a sexually violent predator. On appeal,
defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support “a finding of the predatory
nature of potential future sexually violent behavior.” The People disagree. We affirm.
                                PROCEDURAL HISTORY
       On June 17, 2005, defendant was convicted of engaging in three or more acts of
sexual abuse of a child under the age of 14, and he was sentenced to prison. On September
12, 2019, the Madera County District Attorney filed a petition to commit defendant to the
DSH pursuant to the SVPA. On April 5, 2022, a jury found that defendant qualified as a
sexually violent predator, and he was committed to the DSH for an indeterminate term. On
April 26, 2022, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
                                 FACTUAL SUMMARY2
The People’s Case
       On July 18, 2005,3 defendant was convicted of continuous sexual abuse of a child
under the age of 14, in violation of Penal Code section 288.5, subdivision (a). The victim
was the daughter of defendant’s brother’s girlfriend. This was a qualifying sexually violent
offense under section 6600.

1      All further undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code
unless otherwise stated.
2      Defendant only challenges the sufficiency of the evidence as to the predatory nature
of potential future sexually violent behavior, so we focus the factual summary on evidence
related to this element.
3      Dr. Eric Simon testified that the date of conviction was July 18, 2015. However,
according to the redacted report and recommendation of the probation officer, which was
admitted into evidence, defendant was convicted on June 17, 2005. He was sentenced on
July 18, 2015.

                                              2.
       Additionally, defendant was arrested and sent to juvenile hall for sexually abusing his
sister. The abuse started when she was approximately five years old and defendant was
approximately 10 years old.4
       Dr. Eric Simon, a psychologist, testified on behalf of the People. Dr. Simon was a
Sexually Violent Predator (SVP) evaluator for the DSH. Dr. Simon evaluated defendant as
a potential SVP. In so doing, he reviewed, among other things, the probation officer’s
report related to the qualifying offense, defendant’s rap sheet, and medical records. He also
conducted a clinical interview with defendant.
       Dr. Simon diagnosed defendant with, among other things, pedophilic disorder, which
is a qualifying mental disorder under section 6600. Additionally, Dr. Simon concluded that,
if defendant were released, he would likely commit a future sexually violent offense. Dr.
Simon further concluded that defendant qualified as an SVP.
       As to the predatory nature of potential future sexually violent behavior by defendant,
Dr. Simon testified that future offenses would likely be predatory based on defendant
“having committed at least one predatory sex offense,” and because defendant’s “access to
the new victim pool would likely be nonfamilial victims.”
       Dr. Kathleen Longwell, a psychologist, also testified on behalf of the People. Dr.
Longwell had contracts to conduct SVP evaluations for the DSH, and she evaluated
defendant as a potential SVP. In so doing, she reviewed, among other things, defendant’s
state prison central file, the probation officer’s report related to the qualifying offense,
defendant’s rap sheet, medical records, and psychiatric records. She also conducted an
interview with defendant.
       Dr. Longwell diagnosed defendant with, among other things, pedophilic disorder,
which is a qualifying mental disorder under section 6600. Dr. Longwell concluded that

4      There was conflicting evidence as to the timeframe of the sexual abuse and
defendant’s age when the conduct occurred. However, these conflicts are not relevant to the
analysis.

                                                3.
“there is a serious and well-founded risk that [defendant] will commit another sexually
violent and predatory offense in the future without appropriate treatment and custody.”
       As to the predatory nature of potential future sexually violent behavior by defendant,
Dr. Longwell testified that future offenses would likely be predatory because defendant’s
most recent victim was not related to him by blood, and he began to sexually molest her
shortly after moving into the family house.
Defendant’s Case
       Dr. Dana Putnam, a psychologist, testified on behalf of defendant. Dr. Putnam was
an SVP evaluator for the DSH. Dr. Putnam evaluated defendant as a potential SVP. In so
doing, he reviewed, among other things, the probation officer’s report related to the
qualifying offense, documents regarding defendant’s behavior while in prison, and
documents regarding defendant’s criminal history. He also conducted an interview with
defendant.
       As to the predatory nature of potential future sexually violent behavior by defendant,
Dr. Putnam testified that he had no reason to conclude that future offenses would be
predatory because defendant’s past offenses were not predatory. The first victim was
defendant’s sister. The victim of the qualifying offense was not a stranger or casual
acquaintance, and Dr. Putnam had no information suggesting that the relationship with this
victim was established or promoted for the primary purpose of victimization.
       Dr. Putnam also testified that defendant did not have a qualifying mental disorder
under section 6600.
       Defendant testified on his own behalf. Defendant testified that he and his sister
orally copulated and fondled each other’s genitals when she was six or seven and he was 13
or 14. This occurred approximately three times.
       Defendant further testified that he moved in with his oldest brother when defendant
was around 24. Defendant’s brother’s girlfriend and her six children also lived there.

                                              4.
Defendant would show the children movies and “just let them be kids.” One of the children
was six years old, and defendant referred to this child as his niece.
         Finally, defendant testified that he started partying, drinking, and doing drugs with
his brother’s friends. Defendant sexually abused the six-year-old child because he was “not
in [his] right state of mind,” he “lost control with the drugs and alcohol,” and he wanted “to
release [his] sexual urges.” However, defendant was not attracted to children. If defendant
was not on drugs or alcohol, he would not have sexually abused the six-year-old child.
                                         DISCUSSION
         Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove that any future sex
offense would be predatory, and that the judgment should thus be reversed.
    I.      APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
         The SVPA defines “[s]exually violent predator” as “a person who has been convicted
of a sexually violent offense against one or more victims and who has a diagnosed mental
disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others in that it is likely
that he or she will engage in sexually violent criminal behavior.” (§ 6600, subd. (a)(1).)
         “In order to commit someone under the [SVPA], the state must establish four
conditions: (1) the person has previously been convicted of at least one qualifying ‘sexually
violent offense’ listed in section 6600, subdivision (b) [citation]; (2) the person has ‘a
diagnosed mental disorder that makes the person a danger to the health and safety of others’
[citation]; (3) the mental disorder makes it likely the person will engage in future acts of
sexually violent criminal behavior if released from custody [citation]; and (4) those acts will
be predatory in nature [citation]. Civil commitment can commence only if, after a trial, the
trier of fact finds beyond a reasonable doubt that each of these four requirements is met.”5
(Walker v. Superior Ct., supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 190.)

5      “[A] person is ‘likely [to] engage in sexually violent criminal behavior’ if at trial the
person is found to present a substantial danger, that is, a serious and well-founded risk, of
committing such crimes if released from custody.” (People v. Roberge (2003) 29 Cal.4th
979, 988, fn. omitted.)

                                                5.
         Under the SVPA, “ ‘[p]redatory’ means an act is directed toward a stranger, a person
of casual acquaintance with whom no substantial relationship exists, or an individual with
whom a relationship has been established or promoted for the primary purpose of
victimization.” (§ 6600, subd. (e).)
         “In reviewing the evidence sufficient to support a commitment under [the SVPA],
‘courts apply the same test as for reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
criminal conviction.’ ” (People v. Carlin (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 322, 333; People v.
McCloud (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1088.) When evaluating a sufficiency of evidence
claim, “ ‘we review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it discloses substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find [that defendant
is an SVP] beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th 500, 507.)
“The test for evaluating a sufficiency of evidence claim is deferential.” (People v. Flores
(2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411.) “We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of
every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence.” (People v.
Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.) “We must also ‘accept logical inferences that the jury
might have drawn from the circumstantial evidence.’ ” (Flores, supra, at p. 411.) “The
[judgment] shall stand ‘unless it appears “that upon no hypothesis whatever is there
sufficient substantial evidence to support [the judgment].” ’ ” (Cravens, supra, at p. 508.)
   II.      ANALYSIS
         Both of the People’s experts testified that future offenses would likely be predatory.
According to Dr. Simon, they would likely be predatory based on defendant “having
committed at least one predatory sex offense,” and because defendant’s “access to the new
victim pool would likely be nonfamilial victims.” According to Dr. Longwell, they would
likely be predatory because defendant’s most recent victim was not related to him by blood
and defendant began to sexually molest her shortly after moving into the family house. In
reaching their conclusions, both experts interviewed defendant and reviewed numerous

                                                6.
documents, including documents related to the prior offense they deemed predatory. Thus,
the experts’ testimony is reasonable, credible, and of solid value, and substantial evidence
supports the judgment. (People v. Mercer (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 463, 466–467 [“The
credibility of the experts and their conclusions were matters resolved against defendant by
the jury. We are not free to reweigh or reinterpret the evidence.”].)
       Defendant argues otherwise. According to defendant, the conclusions of both Dr.
Simon and Dr. Longwell were “contrary to their own knowledge.” Dr. Simon “neglected to
tell the jury that he was aware that [defendant] knew the victim for more than a brief time,
and that he baby-sat for the family, both facts that tend to negate a predatory act.” Dr.
Longwell testified that defendant only knew the victim for a short time before he started
abusing her, even though she was aware that this was not true.6
       Defendant’s arguments misstate the record. Even assuming that Dr. Simon had an
independent duty to inform the jury about the above-mentioned facts, he did so. During the
course of his testimony, Dr. Simon stated that defendant told him defendant knew the victim
for approximately a year and a half to two years before defendant began abusing her.
Additionally, on cross-examination, Dr. Simon stated that defendant earned money by
babysitting the victim. He also stated that defendant did not have any known stranger
victims. Thus, Dr. Simon did not fail to tell the jury that he was aware of this information.7
As to Dr. Longwell, she did not state that defendant only knew the victim for a short time
before he started abusing her. While she began stating this, she corrected herself: “The
second victim … he knew her for a -- knew her for a very short period of time, and clearly
became -- I mean, his involvement with her, once he moved into the family house, shortly
thereafter, he began to sexually molest her.” Thus, her testimony was that the abuse began

6       Defendant also argues that Dr. Simon erred when concluding the offense was
predatory based on defendant buying things for the victim. However, Dr. Simon did not
testify to this at trial.
7     Evidence that defendant babysat the victim was also provided to the jury as
Dr. Simon testified.

                                              7.
shortly after he moved into the same house as the victim, not shortly after meeting the
victim.
       Moreover, in addition to the opinions of the experts, there is evidence in the record of
reasonable, credible, and of solid value from which the jury could conclude that the prior
offense was predatory. There is evidence in the record, in the form of statements by the
victim, that the abuse began when the victim was four and before defendant moved in, not,
as alleged by defendant, when the victim was six. There is also evidence that defendant
knew the victim for approximately a year and a half to two years before she turned six. This
is evidence from which a jury could conclude that defendant did not know the victim long
before the abuse began. Additionally, while defendant testified that he referred to the victim
as his niece, when asked about his relationship with the victim before the abuse began,
defendant stated that it was “normal.” When asked to clarify, defendant stated “Well, …
she played with her dolls, and I would show them movies and just let them be kids.” There
is also evidence in the record, in the form of a statement by defendant, that defendant told
the victim that he loved her while he was abusing her, that he took her to McDonald’s on
one occasion after abusing her, and that he bought her “stuff” so that she would not tell her
mother that defendant abused her.
       Based on the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could conclude that at the time
defendant began abusing the victim, the victim was either a casual acquaintance with whom
no substantial relationship existed or that defendant promoted a relationship with the victim
for the primary purpose of victimization. (§ 6600, subd. (e).) And while it is true that there
was evidence to the contrary, “[i]n deciding the sufficiency of the evidence, a reviewing
court resolves neither credibility issues nor evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] Resolution of
conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive province of the trier of fact.”
(People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1181.)
       Finally, the jury was not required to find that a prior offense was predatory in order
to find it likely that future sexual offenses would be predatory. (People v. Torres (2001) 25

                                               8.
Cal.4th 680, 687 [“[U]nder the Sexually Violent Predators Act the trier of fact at the trial is
not required to find that a defendant’s prior convictions involved predatory acts.”].) And
here, Dr. Simon testified that future offenses would likely be predatory because defendant’s
“access to the new victim pool would likely be nonfamilial victims.” In his opening brief,
defendant does not challenge this testimony. Moreover, given defendant’s prior offenses, it
is likely that those close to defendant will protect their children from defendant, limiting his
access to new victims to strangers and casual acquaintances. Thus, even if there was not
substantial evidence that the prior offense was predatory, there is substantial evidence from
which a reasonably jury could find that future sexual offenses would likely be predatory.8
       In conclusion, there is substantial evidence supporting the jury’s finding that future
sexual offenses would likely be predatory.

8       Defendant does, for the first time in his reply brief, challenge this testimony on the
ground that defendant’s “family had to have fully known of his prior conduct with his sister,
and they did nothing to limit access with the victim of the qualifying offense.” We need not
address this new argument. (People v. Kocontes (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 787, 842, fn. 21
[“The general rule is we do not address new arguments presented in a reply.”].) Moreover,
this argument is not persuasive. Even if defendant’s family knew of defendant’s offense as
a juvenile and did nothing to limit his access to the victim, based on the fact that defendant
committed another sexual offense against a child as an adult, a reasonable jury could find
that those close to defendant would now protect their children from defendant.
       The other arguments in defendant’s reply are equally unpersuasive. Defendant
argues that the jury was not “entitled to draw psychological inferences from facts that the
psychologists did not necessarily testify as having relied on,” and that the People failed to
show that the People’s experts relied on the probation report in reaching their conclusions.
       While it may be true in certain circumstances that a jury may not draw psychological
inferences from facts that a psychologist did not necessary testify as having relied on,
defendant has not cited to any authority, nor are we aware of any, suggesting that a jury can
only find that a prior crime was predatory based on expert testimony alone.
       Additionally, the record shows that the People’s experts did rely on the probation
report in reaching their conclusions. Both Dr. Simon and Dr. Longwell testified that they
reviewed the probation report, and based on their testimony, this included facts in the report
regarding the qualifying offense. Moreover, the jury was provided with a copy of the
probation report and time to read it during the trial, so they had the ability to review the
factual basis of the qualifying conviction themselves.

                                               9.
                                  DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                FRANSON, J.
WE CONCUR:

LEVY, Acting P. J.

MEEHAN, J.

                                      10.