Court Opinion

ID: 9715373
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:02:21.920277+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:34.131411
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE LORENZ, dissenting in part: I disagree with the reasons given by the majority to justify reversal of defendant Nielsen’s conviction for the failure of the trial court to grant a severance. The majority concludes the joint trial violated defendant Nielsen’s sixth amendment right of confrontation because, although Schmitt’s confession was used as evidence against Schmitt, that evidence implicated Nielsen and Schmitt did not testify against Nielsen. In support, the opinion focuses on authority applying the Supreme Court’s ruling in Bruton v. United States (1968), 391 U.S. 123, 20 L. Ed. 2d 476, 88 S. Ct. 1620. In Bruton, the Supreme Court held that, in a joint trial, the introduction of a codefendant’s out-of-court statement, implicating the defendant, violates that defendant’s right to confrontation where the codefendant making the statement is not subjected to cross-examination at trial. That basis for the majority’s holding suffers for two reasons. First, the Bruton rule does not necessarily obtain in nonjury trials, such as in the case at bar, because it is presumed that the trial judge relied only on competent and admissible evidence. (People v. Monroe (1984), 125 Ill. App. 3d 592, 466 N.E.2d 393; People v. McNeal (1977), 56 Ill. App. 3d 132, 371 N.E.2d 926.) While the presumption is rebuttable (see, e.g., People v. Pettis (1982), 104 Ill. App. 3d 275, 432 N.E.2d 935), the majority fails to clearly and succinctly explain anywhere in its lengthy opinion how the presumption has been overcome here. The trial judge was at all times aware of the implications presented by admission of the agents’ testimony relating to Schmitt’s statements in Nielsen’s trial. The record is replete with defendant Nielsen’s counsel’s objections that the trial court should ignore that testimony relating to Schmitt’s statements, which implicated Nielsen, for purposes of the case against Nielsen. Those objections were sustained. Schmitt did not testify in the presentation of the case against Nielsen. Further, as the majority notes, the trial judge stated she did not consider evidence used against either defendant as to the other. Nevertheless, the majority dismisses the attaching presumption and concludes that the trial judge could not have properly ignored Schmitt’s statements which inculpated Nielsen. Moreover, it is difficult to envision whatever harmful impact any Bruton violation might have had in this case. The majority effectively ignores that other evidence, independent of Schmitt’s statements, supports the trial court’s verdict as to Nielsen. Agents Hamm, Callahan, and Williams all testified to firsthand accounts of the conversation and exchange of money between defendants Nielsen and Schmitt. Nielsen’s conviction, therefore, did not rest to any significant degree on any statement of Schmitt. I respectfully dissent.