Court Opinion

ID: 9706041
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:30:15.776115+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:18.555685
License: Public Domain

CIRILLO, President Judge:
This is an appeal from an order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, granting United States Steel Corporation’s (hereinafter USX) motion for a new trial, and denying its motion for judgment non obstante veredicto. We affirm.
In 1984, USX maintained and partially operated a steel manufacturing plant, known as the Carrie Furnace Works, along the eastern bank of the Monongahela River in the borough of Swissvale. Between December of 1983 and June of 1984, Andrew Carter, a fourteen year-old resident of Swissvale, frequently trespassed with his friends, including Christian Stonebraker, on the plant property. While steel manufacturing at the plant had ceased, an electric generating plant remained in operation and security patrolled the plant at irregular intervals. .
The generating plant produced and transmitted electricity for the Homestead Works across the river. The electricity was transmitted through high voltage lines suspended on fabricated steel towers. Tower No. 13D, located in the western part of the plant, was of particular interest to Carter and his friends; it had open access to its base and a ladder that ascended the tower. The ladder began at ground level and extended upward 146 feet, affording entry to two platforms, one at the 112-foot level and the other at the 135-foot level.
On the evening of June 1, 1984, Carter and Stonebraker entered the plant again. Stonebraker, who had climbed tower 13D on a prior visit, taunted Carter with attacks on his courage until Carter followed Stonebraker up the tower. *271After stopping briefly on the 112-foot platform, the pair climbed to the higher platform.
The platform at 185-feet had railing on two sides and was approximately fifteen feet by eight feet in size. Carter and Stonebraker decided to venture to the far edge of the platform on the side without a railing. To accomplish this, they had to duck under four grayish-colored insulated wires that draped to within four feet of the platform. Stonebraker maneuvered first and after passing under the first set of wires heard a crackling sound. He turned to see Carter receive a charge of electricity while Ms left hand touched one of the wires. Electric flashes discharged from Carter’s hand, right shoulder, and left foot until he collapsed. Carter subsequently regained consciousness with some delirium. Stonebraker assisted Mm down the tower, through the plant and into a nearby field before going on for help.
As a result of the incident, Carter was hospitalized for several months and required numerous operations. His left hand, the small toe on Ms left foot, and part of his left forearm were amputated. Part of his right scapula was injured permanently, leaving scars.
On September 17, 1984, Carter’s parents filed suit to recover damages on behalf of their minor son for the injuries he sustained and on behalf of Andrew Carter’s father, Donald Carter, for the expenses incurred in effecting the recovery of his son. Trial by jury commenced on February 6, 1987, and on February 13, 1987 the jury returned a verdict in favor of Andrew Carter in the amount of one million five hundred thousand dollars ($1,500,000.00). Because the jury also found Andrew Carter twenty percent negligent, the verdict was molded appropriately to arrive at a one million two hundred thousand dollar ($1,200,000.00) award.
USX filed motions seeking judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, a new trial. The Honorable Richard G. Zeleznik denied USX’s motion for judgment n.o.v., and granted it motion for a new trial on liability and damages. The Carters filed this timely appeal from the order granting *272USX a new trial; USX cross-appealed from the order denying judgment n.o.v. We will address the Carters’ issues in part I, and USX’s cross-appeal with respect to the denial of judgment n.o.v. in part II.
I.
The Carters raise the following issues on appeal:
1. After receipt of a jury verdict in a civil action, can the trial judge, with the assistance of defense counsel, properly question each juror as to his awareness of publicity, discussion of the publicity during deliberations, and its effect on the juror’s decisions, and then award the defendant a new trial on the basis of the publicity, which accurately described the occurrence of a subsequent accident on defendant’s premises, evidence of which was admissible?
2. Can a defendant which submits to a medial interview while a trial is in progress and openly discusses a subsequent accident which occurred on its premises later obtain a new trial on the basis of the resulting publicity about the subsequent accident?
3. Can a defendant obtain a new trial on the basis of allegedly prejudicial publicity even though it did not raise the issue during voir dire, did not inform the court of the publicity until after the jury had completed two hours of deliberations, and then elected to gamble on the verdict rather than request cautionary instructions?
Our standard of review from an order granting a new trial is, generally, whether the trial court clearly and palpably abused its discretion or committed an error of law which controlled the outcome of the case. Stevenson v. General Motors Corporation, 513 Pa. 411, 521 A.2d 413 (1987). However, where a trial court, in granting a motion for a new trial, gives a single reason for its decision, the validity of its legal justification for a new trial is at issue. Appellate review is then focused upon the legal adequacy of the reason given for the new trial. Westinghouse Elevator *273Company v. Herron, 514 Pa. 252, 523 A.2d 723 (1987). In the case before us, the trial court granted USX’s motion for a new trial based solely on the prejudicial effect that the February 12, 1987 newspaper and television reports had upon the jury. Consequently, our duty is to review the legal adequacy of Judge Zeleznik’s reason supporting his order granting USX a new trial.
On the morning of February 13, 1987, while the jury was deliberating, the trial court was alerted to two media reports released on February 12, 1987 concerning an accident subsequent to the Carter incident where 16 year old Orlando Dudley was killed at the Carrie Furnace Works. At that point, counsel for USX requested that the jury be polled as to whether or not they had seen or heard of either the newspaper story or the television news report. Judge Zeleznik refused to interrupt jury deliberations at that time, opting to wait for the verdict. The jury then came in with a verdict awarding Carter $1.5 million dollars which was later molded to $1.2 million dollars, since the jury found Carter twenty percent negligent. After the verdict was read, Judge Zeleznik, along with counsel for the Carters and USX, questioned each juror individually in the judge’s chambers. Judge Zeleznik asked each juror whether or not he or she was aware of either media report and whether the content of these reports changed their opinion regarding the outcome of the case.
While Judge Zeleznik’s question as to whether or not a juror was aware of either of the media reports was permissible, his questions as to the effect of the reports on the jurors’ deliberations were impermissible, therefore error on the part of the trial judge. Questions put to a juror regarding the process by which the verdict is reached are impermissible, as a juror may not impeach his own verdict by testifying about his thought process during deliberations. See Commonwealth v. Carr, 370 Pa.Super. 1, 535 A.2d 1120 (1987). After the inquiry revealed that jurors numbers four, eight, and ten had changed their opinion after seeing or hearing about the news report, USX filed a *274motion for judgment n.o.v. or, in the alternative, a new trial. Judge Zeleznik denied judgment n.o.v., but granted a new trial in favor of USX, finding that the news report was extraneous information that had a prejudicial impact on the jury. Notwithstanding Judge Zeleznik’s error in questioning the jurors regarding the effect of the media reports on their deliberations, the trial court’s order granting a new trial will be affirmed.
We disagree with the view, as expressed in Judge Olszewski’s Concurring and Dissenting Opinion, that the newscast did not constitute an extra-evidentiary prejudicial influence on the jury. Ignoring the testimony of the jurors as to the effect of the news report, it is clear that the jury’s receipt of the evidence of the subsequent accident at Carrie Furnace Works was prejudicial.
Pennsylvania case law holds that accidents subsequent to the one in question may only be admitted for a limited purpose, for example, as evidence of a dangerous condition. See, e.g., Yoffee v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 385 Pa. 520, 123 A.2d 636 (1956) (evidence of a plane accident which occurred after the one that killed plaintiff’s decedent was admissible to prove the dangerous condition of electrical wires strung across a river between two towers). See also Packel and Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence, § 412.2 (West 1987). Assuming in the instant case that the evidence of the subsequent Dudley case would have been admissible, the evidence would have only been admissible for one purpose, to show the dangerous condition of USX’s facility. When evidence is admissible for a limited purpose, the jury must be given a cautionary instruction limiting their use of the evidence if such an instruction is requested by the party against whom the evidence is being used:
[Ejvidence which is admissible for one purpose or against one party is not rendered inadmissible because it is inadmissible for another purpose or against another party. When the general rule is followed and the evidence is admitted, there is a risk that the jury will consider the evidence for the inadmissible purpose. In view of this, *275the opposing party is entitled to an instruction explaining to the jury the purpose for which the evidence may be considered and the purpose for which it may not be considered. The opposing party must request such an instruction.
Packel and Poulin, Pennsylvania Evidence, § 105 (West 1987) (footnotes omitted). See also Bialek v. Pittsburgh Brewing Co., 430 Pa. 176, 185, 242 A.2d 231, 235 (1968); Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 294, 282 A.2d 206, 233 (1971). If the Carters had sought to admit evidence of the Dudley case at trial, and the court had allowed it to be admitted, USX would have been entitled to a jury instruction explaining the limited purpose for which this evidence could be considered by the jury in reaching their verdict.
Since the information concerning the Dudley case was made known to the jury outside of the evidence presented in the courtroom, the jury was left to consider this information without a proper limiting instruction. Left unqualified in the minds of the jury, evidence of the Dudley incident could have been considered by the jury in a manner prejudicial to USX. Because the jury received this information without benefit of any instruction, we find that the media reports were prejudicial and destroyed USX’s chance for a fair trial.
The Carters also argue that the fact that a representative of USX openly discussed the subsequent accident with the media during the trial of this action should preclude it from obtaining a new trial based on publicity about the subsequent accident. We disagree with this argument. USX did not “educe[ ] the evidence to which [it] objects ...” Ellsworth v. Lauth, 311 Pa. 286, 290, 166 A. 855 (1933). USX did not contact the media; a newspaper reporter from the Post-Gazette contacted USX’s Public Affairs Manager. Moreover, the trial judge stated that when the Carter trial was commencing, the newspaper reporter contacted the court and the court permitted her to read the complaint. In our opinion, the appellant has failed to show that USX in any way provoked this media coverage.
*276II.
USX raises the following issue in its cross-appeal:
When a minor plaintiff has been injured while trespassing on defendant’s electrical transmission tower and plaintiffs failed to establish at trial that defendant knew or had reason to know that children were likely to trespass there, failed to establish that defendant knew or had reason to know that a condition on its property involved an unreasonable risk to children, failed to establish that the minor plaintiff did not realize the risk involved, and failed to establish that defendant breached the duty of care normally owed a trespasser, is defendant entitled to a compulsory non-suit or judgment n.o.v.?
When reviewing the propriety of an order granting or denying judgment n.o.v., we must determine whether there was sufficient competent evidence to sustain the verdict, granting the verdict winner the benefit of every reasonable inference that can reasonably be drawn from the evidence and rejecting all unfavorable testimony and inferences. Mitzelfelt v. Kamrin, 379 Pa.Super. 121, 125-126, 549 A.2d 935, 937-938 (1988). “Judgment n.o.v. may be granted only in a clear case where the facts are such that no two reasonable minds could fail to agree that the verdict was improper.” Id., 379 Pa.Superior Ct. at 126, 549 A.2d at 938, citing Ingrassia Construction Co., Inc. v. Walsh, 337 Pa.Super. 58, 61, 486 A.2d 478, 480 (1984). We submit that this is not a clear case, such that “no two reasonable persons could disagree that the verdict was improper.” McCloskey v. New York Life Insurance Co., 292 Pa.Super. 1, 436 A.2d 690 (1981). See also Frank v. Peckich, 257 Pa.Super. 561, 391 A.2d 624 (1978) (the rendering of a judgment n.o.v. is a drastic act and should be entered only when the facts are such that no two reasonable persons could fail to agree that the verdict was improper).
This action was based upon section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, which was adopted by our supreme court in Bartleson v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 361 Pa. 519, 64 *277A.2d 846 (1949). Section 339 sets forth the prerequisites for successfully asserting a claim for injuries to children trespassing into highly dangerous artificial conditions as follows:
§ 339. Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the possessor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasonable risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to children involved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the danger or otherwise protect the children.
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 339.
We find that there is sufficient evidence of record to support the verdict. First, it is reasonable to conclude that USX knew or had reason to know that children were likely to trespass at the plant. John Stasko, the general foreman for the Carrie Works on June 1, 1984, testified that numerous incidents of vandalism, including windows being broken, lockers overturned, and tools strewn about, had occurred prior to the incident in question. Moreover, Mr. Stasko testified that he found a dirt bike on the property the same day that Carter was injured. Additionally, the jury was presented with evidence that children had been seen on the property on numerous occasions and that USX *278employees knew of the trial leading from the plant to the playing field and playground, located only one-third of a mile from the plant. In fact, Carter and Stonehouse admitted that they had been at Carrie Works on several other occasions. Finally, the tower did not have any warning signs and Carrie Works had not been used for a lengthy period of time prior to the accident. Therefore, it was reasonable for the jury to conclude that USX was aware that children were likely to trespass.
Second, we find that USX realized or should have realized that the Carrie Works, and specifically the tower, involved an unreasonable risk of serious bodily harm to trespassing childrén. While we agree with USX’s assertion that the tower is located on private property and that the danger from high voltage wires was over one hundred feet in the air, our supreme court has stated that:
There is no rule which requires that the dangerous condition must be on the ground or within reach of a minor. Such a distinction is artificial, without logic or experience to support it. What this distinction drives at is the question of whether or not a defendant shall be held reasonably to anticipate that a child will bring himself within the orbit of danger.
Bartleson, 361 Pa. at 528, 64 A.2d at 851.1 In its brief, USX omits critical facts which were available to the jury.
There was testimony that a ladder led from the base of the tower directly to the tower platform high above the ground. The high voltage wires were easily within reach of any youth who had climbed up the tower; moreover, the *279tower was readily accessible to climbing by a child. Expert witnesses and USX employees testified that the tower was not enclosed by a fence or any type of barrier to prevent inquisitive children from climbing and encountering the perils of high voltage wires. Bearing in mind the jury’s determination that USX was aware of the child trespassers, we find that the jury had sufficient evidence before it to conclude that the hazards posed to those children were unreasonable.
Third, USX avers that Andrew Carter realized the risk involved when he entered the Carrie Works and climbed the tower. To the contrary, the record reflects that Carter and Stonebraker testified that they believed the electricity had been shut off because the plant appeared to be abandoned. They visited the Carrie Works on other occasions prior to the day of the incident, climbing different structures in the area. Stonebraker had climbed tower 13D in the presence of Carter on at least one occasion. Neither youth saw signs warning of dangerous conditions on the tower, but they did admit to listening for buzzing noises to ascertain whether the voltage lines were active. USX emphasizes in its brief that Carter knew he was on private property, believed that tower 13D carried power to mills along the river, and knew that his parents would have forbidden him to go to the plant had they known of his intention to play at the Carrie Works. It is this precise type of behavior that is covered by Section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts. An adult acting with reasonable rationality might very well conclude that the abovementioned considerations would weigh against climbing the tower. Unfortunately, Carter evaluated the situation from a child’s perspective. He weighed the potential for harm against both the peer pressure applied by Stonebraker and the allure of climbing, ultimately reaching an unwise, naive conclusion, i.e., the tower was safe to climb.2 The ability of Carter to fully appreciate the danger was a question for the *280jury, which found by its verdict that he did not fully comprehend the danger. See Felger v. Duquesne Light Co., 441 Pa. 421, 273 A.2d 738 (1971); Hyndman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 396 Pa. 190, 152 A.2d 251 (1959).
Judge Cavanaugh states in his Dissenting Opinion that “Andrew was fully aware of the risk of falling from a height equivalent to a fourteen-story building. He knew it was dangerous to be where he was.” (Dissenting Opinion by Cavanaugh, J., at p. 656). However, Carter’s testimony is certainly sufficient to justify a jury’s conclusion that he was not aware of the specific risk of electrocution on the date of the date of the accident. Moreover, the testimony to which Judge Cavanaugh refers reveals that Carter saw the “Danger, High Voltage” sign prior to June 1, 1984; Carter testified on direct examination that on that particular date, the date of the accident, there was no sign. (R.R. 218a-219a). Carter also testified that based on the appearance and condition of the plant, he was of the opinion that the plant was not operable and had been abandoned; he stated that equipment and tools were scattered and rusted, no lights were on at night, lockers were tipped over, and, in general, the appearance of the plant was “run down.” (R.R. 196a-219a).
In our view, this evidence was sufficient to raise a question for the jury as to whether Carter fully appreciated the risk of electrocution. See Bethay v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 271 Pa.Super. 366, 375, 413 A.2d 710, 714 (1979) (“The question of a child’s appreciation of danger is ordinarily one for the jury and not the court”); see also Trawick v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 242 Pa.Super. 271, 363 A.2d 1265 (1976) (judgment n.o.v. is improper where there is a question of fact for the jury; it may not be utilized so as to invade the province of the jury).
Fourth, USX does not address whether the burden of maintaining the tower and the burden of eliminating the danger were slight compared to the risk to child trespassers. Despite the absence of an argument from USX, we shall evaluate the evidence on this point. It seems that *281USX was virtually unconcerned with the idle portion of the Carrie Works. When this section of the Carrie Works was operational, security were permanently posted at various locations around the facility. In May of 1984, one month prior to the Carter incident, the security was changed from permanently posted guards to roving patrols covering an admittedly large area. The number of security men was substantially reduced, requiring roving patrols of the area around the tower to be limited to a maximum of two per day. Also, one expert witness testified that the tower did not conform to the safety standards set forth in the American National Standards Institute Electrical Code. Further, the youths testified as follows: there were scant warnings posted in the area, no fences obstructed them from entering the plant, the ladder on the tower was very accessible to them, and they had trespassed without detection on other occasions. Clearly, sufficient evidence was introduced from which a jury could conclude that USX could have acted to prevent children from encountering such risks.
Fifth, USX fails to present an argument that it could not reasonably have eliminated the danger to the children. For the express reasons stated in our discussion on the previous issue, we concur with the jury that USX could have eliminated the danger by reasonable means.
Finally, USX asserts that the contributory negligence of Carter was greater than the causal negligence of USX. The jury apportioned twenty percent of the negligence in this case to Carter. The totality of causal negligence is a matter properly before the jury. White by Stevens v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 359 Pa.Super. 123, 137, 518 A.2d 810, 817, alloc. denied, 515 Pa. 609, 529 A.2d 1083 (1987). In reviewing a jury verdict on the apportionment of causal negligence, this court should be very reluctant to overturn the jury’s decision. Id. After a thorough review of the evidence, discussed at length in this opinion, we find that the trial court has not abused its discretion nor that the jury rendered a verdict which shocks our sense of justice.
*282The trial court’s order granting a new trial and denying judgment n.o.v. is affirmed.
BROSKY and BECK, JJ., concur.
CAVANAUGH, J., files a dissenting opinion in which POPOVICH, J., joins,
OLSZEWSKI, J., files a concurring and dissenting opinion in which McEWEN and JOHNSON, JJ., join.

. Contrary to USX's protestations, Bartleson is strikingly similar to this case. In Bartleson, an eleven year-old child was electrocuted on a high tension transmission tower. The tower was surrounded by a seven-foot high fence with two six-foot high gates. Children frequently played in the area. Well-worn paths passed close by the tower. Railroad tracks surrounded the area. One day, the gate to the tower was open. Several youths believed the power was shut off since the gate was open. They climbed up the tower on metal studs which protruded from the column. Eventually, one youth came into contact with live electrical wires. This court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff, based upon Section 339 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.

. That children will accept an invitation to climb is matter of common knowledge. Bartleson, 361 Pa. at 529, 64 A.2d at 851.