Court Opinion

ID: 9890246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-12 17:11:24.287294+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:35.490522
License: Public Domain

J-S31009-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA              :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                           :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                           :
               v.                          :
                                           :
                                           :
 TYREESE SCOTT                             :
                                           :
                    Appellant              :   No. 308 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered November 9, 2021
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0004603-2014

BEFORE: OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.:                           FILED OCTOBER 12, 2023

      Appellant, Tyreese Scott, appeals from the order entered on November

9, 2021, which denied him relief on his petition filed under the Post Conviction

Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.

      The trial court ably summarized the facts underlying Appellant’s

convictions:

        On February 17, 2014, at approximately 11:15 p.m., Police
        Officers Anthony Santulli, Brian Nolan, Sergeant Waddell, and
        Sergeant Jose Medina were conducting a pedestrian stop at
        the intersection of Tenth and Cumberland Streets in the city
        and county of Philadelphia, when they heard gunshots
        coming from the location of Thirteenth and Cambria Streets.
        En route to that location via a police vehicle, Officers Santulli
        and Nolan observed a 2004 Silver Pontiac Grand Prix ignore
        a stoplight and cross the intersection at Twelfth and Somerset
        Streets. Co-defendant Gregory Nash drove the Pontiac, with
        co-defendant Vincent McClenny in the front passenger seat,
        and [Appellant] in the rear passenger seat.
J-S31009-23

        Officers Santulli and Nolan turned left on Somerset, where
        they followed the Pontiac westbound and shined a spotlight
        into its rear windshield. As the light shone, Officer Nolan
        observed [Appellant] holding a silver barreled handgun,
        which he attempted to conceal in the light housing inside the
        roof of the car. Upon seeing the gun, the officers activated
        their lights, and a chase ensued.

        [Appellant’s] vehicle turned southbound towards Lehigh
        Avenue, where it turned eastbound towards Ninth Street, a
        northbound one-way street. With Officers Santulli, Nolan,
        Waddell, and Medina now in pursuit, the Pontiac turned
        southbound on Ninth Street, and traveled the wrong way
        before making a sudden left turn on Norris Street. There,
        [Appellant], Nash, and McClenny exited the vehicle and
        attempted to evade the police by foot. After a brief chase,
        Sergeant Medina apprehended [Appellant], while Officers
        Santulli and Nolan apprehended Nash and McClenny,
        respectively.

        After arresting McClenny, Officer Nolan returned to the
        Pontiac and looked into the light housing in the rear of the
        vehicle, where he observed three pistols hidden inside.
        Detective Richard Bova, the assigned detective in this matter,
        received a search warrant for the Pontiac and recovered a
        loaded black Glock 26 40-caliber, a Ruger P-89
        9[-millimeter], and a Ruger P-95 9[-millimeter] handgun,
        along with [13] small plastic baggies of marijuana. Officer
        Lawrence Flager of the Firearms Investigative Unit examined
        each pistol and determined that they were operable.

        At trial, the Commonwealth presented a Certificate of
        Non-Licensure indicating that [Appellant] did not have a valid
        license to possess a firearm at the time of the incident, and
        the parties stipulated that [Appellant] had a prior
        enumerated felony conviction for the purposes of [18
        Pa.C.S.A. § 6105 (persons not to possess firearms)].

        [Appellant] elected to take the stand and testified that he
        owned the 2004 Pontiac Grand Prix used in the chase, that
        he drove the vehicle, that he knew that his co-defendants
        were armed, but that he did not carry a firearm that night.

Trial Court Opinion, 12/18/17, at 2-3 (citations omitted).

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        Following a bench trial, Appellant was found guilty of criminal

conspiracy, persons not to possess firearms, carrying a firearm without a

license, carrying a firearm on the public streets of Philadelphia, and possessing

a small amount of marijuana.1             On December 12, 2016, the trial court

sentenced Appellant to serve an aggregate term of six to 12 years in prison,

followed by five years of probation, for his convictions.          We affirmed

Appellant’s judgment of sentence on November 2, 2018 and the Pennsylvania

Supreme Court denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on April 23,

2019.      Commonwealth v. Scott, 201 A.3d 812 (Pa. Super. 2018)

(unpublished memorandum) at 1-12, appeal denied, 207 A.3d 288 (Pa. 2019).

        On October 25, 2019, Appellant filed a timely, pro se PCRA petition. The

PCRA court appointed counsel to represent Appellant during the proceedings

and counsel filed an amended petition on Appellant’s behalf.         Within the

amended petition, Appellant claimed that his “plea-stage counsel [(hereinafter

“Plea Counsel”)] was ineffective for failing to convey a plea offer prior to the

commencement of trial.” See Amended PCRA Petition, 6/2/21, at 4.

        On August 30, 2021, the PCRA court held a hearing on Appellant’s

claim.2 As the PCRA court thoroughly explained:

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 903, 6105(a)(1), 6106(a)(1), and 6108 and 35 P.S.
§ 780-113(a)(31), respectively.

2 We note that Plea Counsel passed away prior to Appellant’s PCRA hearing.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/6/22, at 2 n.1.

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       Appellant asserts in his petition that the Commonwealth
       offered a plea deal of [18 to 36] months' incarceration, but
       that due to [Plea Counsel’s] inadequate representation, he
       could not properly evaluate the Commonwealth's offer.
       Appellant claimed that [Plea Counsel] incorrectly advised him
       by letter that he faced a mandatory minimum sentence of
       three [] years' incarceration, that he had a prior record score
       of zero [], and that the sentencing guidelines ranged from
       [22 to 36] months' incarceration. Appellant attached [Plea
       Counsel’s] June 19, 2014 letter to his petition. The letter
       states in pertinent part as follows:

          Dear [Appellant],

          Please find the letter of May 29, 2014 that I sent you
          regarding the offer in the above case which was returned
          to my office. Can you also explain why you are at
          Graterford? My criminal record printout does not show
          any convictions that explain your placement there.

          I understand that the case is a mandatory minimum of 3
          years. Secondly, the [Violation of the Uniform Firearms
          Act (“VUFA”) § 6105 has an offense gravity score of 10,
          and with a prior record score of 0 (I am unaware of your
          juvenile record if one exists), the recommendations per
          the guidelines is 22-36 months incarceration, plus or
          minus 12 months. As you can see 18-36 months is less
          than what you would receive for that one charge alone
          and your plea would be to Conspiracy and VUFA § 6106.

          I have also enclosed your discovery for your review.
          Please return the offer form within 2 days. I will see you
          at the [Criminal Justice Center (“CJC”)] on 6/26/14.

       (See Letter dated June 19, 2014, attached to Appellant's
       amended PCRA Petition).

       Appellant testified at his PCRA hearing that after receiving
       [Plea Counsel’s] letter, he next spoke to her at the scheduling
       conference at the [CJC] on June 26, 2014. Appellant claimed
       he had questions for [Plea Counsel] regarding the letter, but
       that he met with her for only a few minutes and "she told
       [him] to just take or leave the deal." Appellant testified that
       he specifically sought to ask [Plea Counsel] about her

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       reference to the mandatory minimum sentence of 3 years'
       incarceration, which Appellant purportedly believed meant
       that the maximum sentence he could receive was 3 years'
       incarceration.

       Appellant testified that [Plea Counsel] asked him why he was
       incarcerated and that he advised her he had prior convictions
       for aggravated assault, firearm possession, and marijuana
       possession. According to Appellant, after [Plea Counsel]
       learned of Appellant's prior record, she still did not recalculate
       his prior record score or recommended sentencing guidelines.
       Appellant testified that he rejected the Commonwealth's plea
       offer of [18 to 36 months’] incarceration, and opted to go to
       trial, because he believed the maximum sentence he could
       receive was 3 years' incarceration.

       Appellant testified that he obtained new counsel after
       rejecting the Commonwealth's offer, but that he still did not
       learn until after trial that the sentencing guidelines ranged
       from 72 to 84 months' incarceration (plus or minus 12
       months). Furthermore, although Appellant knew he had a
       criminal record as both an adult and a juvenile, he testified
       he was unaware that he had a prior record score higher than
       zero. Appellant testified that if [Plea Counsel] informed him
       that his prior record score and pending charges warranted a
       sentencing guideline of 72 to 84 months' incarceration (plus
       or minus 12 months), he would have accepted the
       Commonwealth's plea offer of 18 to 36 months' incarceration.
       As the remedy for [Plea Counsel’s] ineffectiveness, Appellant
       requested the court to grant his PCRA petition, to compel the
       Commonwealth to "re-offer" the [previous] deal of 18 to 36
       months' incarceration, and to have [the PCRA court] "do what
       the court would normally do when deciding whether or not to
       accept a negotiated plea."

       In response to Appellant's argument, the Commonwealth
       noted that its [prior] offer was based on the Commonwealth's
       inaccurate calculation of the sentencing guidelines and
       [Appellant’s] prior record score. Had the Commonwealth
       known at the time that Appellant's prior record score was in
       the "Repeat Felony 1 and Felony 2 Offender" (RFEL) category,
       it would not have made the lenient offer. The Assistant
       District Attorney, Cydney Pope, explained:

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          Ms. Pope: He was a 5. Technically he's a re-fel. Just in
          looking here, he's a re-fel. He had been charged with an
          aggravated assault that night, and he would have been a
          re-fel.

          The Court: Why at that time would [an] offer for
          [Appellant] be [18 to 36 months], and his co-defendant
          was four to 10 [years], and his co-defendant's prior
          record score was a 2.

          Ms. Pope: I will tell you that the reason why is because
          the Commonwealth, the DA who had the case at the time
          that the offer was made, and at that time, because I have
          the central file from the time, at that time, and I know
          this personally, every single offer was approved by the
          Chief or Assistant Chief of central at that time, and that
          offer was approved, and it was approved based on a prior
          record score that was inaccurately a zero.

          By the time it came to trial and . . . pre-trial, the motion
          to suppress, that prior record score had been determined
          to be incorrect.

                                      ...

          I don't know how it is in this case that it happened, but
          clearly the prior DA who had the case at the time of the
          [prior offer] miscalculated, and by miscalculated, when
          they pulled the record, this was the only open case.

       [N.T. PCRA Hearing, 8/30/21, at 35-36].

       Ms. Pope emphasized that the offer "was made entirely due
       to a mistake of the DA." In that regard, [the PCRA] court
       itself noted that Appellant's charge of illegally possessing a
       firearm under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105 meant that "he had to have
       been convicted of a prior offense." Even PCRA counsel
       agreed that it is reasonable to conclude that the offer was
       erroneously extended based on Appellant's inaccurate prior
       record score. In counsel's words: "It's more egregious
       because Ms. Pope is right, the offer was, I guess, made in
       error. I can't answer that. Certainly she could have contacted
       the DA that made the offer, but I think that's a reasonable
       assessment."

                                   -6-
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PCRA Court Opinion, 4/6/22, at 2-5 (some citations and capitalization

omitted).

       The PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on November 9, 2021 and

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on December 21, 2021.3 Appellant raises

one extant claim on appeal:
____________________________________________

3 As noted, the PCRA court denied Appellant’s petition on November 9, 2021

and Appellant filed a notice of appeal on December 21, 2021. Thus,
Appellant’s notice of appeal is facially untimely. See, e.g., Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
Nevertheless, the clerk of courts failed to note, on the docket, the date upon
which the November 9, 2021 order was served upon Appellant's attorney.
This constitutes a breakdown in the operation of the courts and renders
Appellant's December 21, 2021 notice of appeal timely. To be sure,
Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 114(B)(1) requires the clerk of courts
to serve promptly a copy of any trial court order or notice on each party's
attorney-of-record or the party if unrepresented. Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(B)(1). To
memorialize that proper service of a trial court order or notice was provided,
Rule 114(C)(2)(c) requires the clerk of courts to note, via a docket entry, the
date of service of such trial court order or notice. Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(C)(2)(c).
It is well-settled that the appeal period only begins to run on the date the
clerk of courts mails or delivers a copy of the trial court order or notice to the
parties. Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1), (d), and Note (stating, the purpose of this rule
is to fix that date from which the time for appeal shall be computed); see
also Commonwealth v. Carter, 122 A.3d 388, 391 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(stating that, the “appeal period only begins running on the date the [clerk of
courts] mails or delivers copies of the orders to the parties” (original quotation
marks omitted)), Commonwealth v. Jerman, 762 A.2d 366, 368 (Pa. Super.
2000).

Because the PCRA court docket does not contain the entry information
prescribed by Rule 114, we are unable to discern the date upon which the
clerk of courts served Appellant with a copy of the November 9, 2021 dismissal
order. A breakdown in the judicial system occurs if the clerk of courts fails to
note on the docket the date upon which a trial court order or notice has been
served upon a party. Jerman, 762 A.2d at 368 (finding a breakdown in the
judicial system and deeming the appeal timely when the clerk of courts failed
to serve a copy of an order on the party). As a result of this breakdown, the
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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         [1.] Did the PCRA court err in dismissing the PCRA petition
         as [Plea Counsel] was ineffective for failing to accurately and
         effectively advise [Appellant] and participate in meaningful
         pre-trial negotiations with the Commonwealth, there was no
         reasonable basis for this failure and but-for this failure, there
         is a reasonable probability that after meaningful and effective
         negotiations with the Commonwealth there would have been
         an offer made that [Appellant] would have taken.

         [Plea Counsel] ill-advised [Appellant] based on inaccurate
         prior record score and guideline range and a non-existent
         mandatory minimum, which made [Appellant] unaware of his
         true sentencing exposure and he was therefore unable to
         intelligently evaluate any offer. The PCRA court erred in
         ruling [Appellant] was not prejudiced, as [Appellant] rejected
         an offer he would have otherwise accepted, was subsequently
         convicted and sentenced to a substantial state sentence, and
         due to ineffective [Plea Counsel], any meaningful pre-trial
         negotiations were frustrated and denied.         Due to this
         ineffectiveness [Appellant] was never afforded the
         opportunity of any true offer based on accurate prior record
         score?

Appellant’s Brief at 5-6.4

       “We review a ruling by the PCRA court to determine whether it is

supported by the record and is free of legal error. Our standard of review of

a PCRA court's legal conclusions is de novo.” Commonwealth v. Cousar,

154 A.3d 287, 296 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted). However, we afford “great

deference” to the PCRA court’s credibility determinations. Commonwealth
____________________________________________

period in which Appellant may file a notice of appeal has not begun to run.
Therefore, we deem Appellant's notice of appeal to be timely filed on
December 21, 2021.

4 On appeal, Appellant also raises a claim concerning the timeliness of his
notice of appeal. See Appellant’s Brief at 5. Since we have already concluded
that Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, we will not restate this issue.

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v. Flor, 259 A.3d 891, 910-911 (Pa. 2021).       As our Supreme Court has

explained:

        We will not disturb the findings of the PCRA court if they are
        supported by the record, even where the record could
        support a contrary holding. [An appellate court’s] scope of
        review is limited to the findings of the PCRA court and the
        evidence on the record of the PCRA court's hearing, viewed
        in the light most favorable to the prevailing party.

Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted).

      To be eligible for relief under the PCRA, the petitioner must plead and

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence

resulted from “one or more” of the          seven, specifically enumerated

circumstances listed in 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2). One of these statutorily

enumerated circumstances is the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in

the circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-determining

process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken

place.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

      Counsel is presumed to be effective and “the burden of demonstrating

ineffectiveness rests on [A]ppellant.” Commonwealth v. Rivera, 10 A.3d

1276, 1279 (Pa. Super. 2010). To satisfy this burden, Appellant must plead

and prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:

        (1) his underlying claim is of arguable merit; (2) the
        particular course of conduct pursued by counsel did not have
        some reasonable basis designed to effectuate his interests;
        and, (3) but for counsel’s ineffectiveness, there is a
        reasonable probability that the outcome of the challenged
        proceedings would have been different.

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Commonwealth v. Fulton, 830 A.2d 567, 572 (Pa. 2003). As this Court has

explained:

        A claim has arguable merit where the factual averments, if
        accurate, could establish cause for relief.                 See
        Commonwealth v. Jones, 876 A.2d 380, 385 (Pa. 2005)
        (“if a petitioner raises allegations, which, even if accepted as
        true, do not establish the underlying claim . . . , he or she
        will have failed to establish the arguable merit prong related
        to the claim”). Whether the facts rise to the level of arguable
        merit is a legal determination.

        The test for deciding whether counsel had a reasonable basis
        for his action or inaction is whether no competent counsel
        would have chosen that action or inaction, or, the alternative,
        not chosen, offered a significantly greater potential chance of
        success. Counsel’s decisions will be considered reasonable if
        they effectuated his client's interests. We do not employ a
        hindsight analysis in comparing trial counsel's actions with
        other efforts he may have taken.

        Prejudice is established if there is a reasonable probability
        that, but for counsel’s errors, the result of the proceeding
        would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
        probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
        outcome.

Commonwealth v. Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 2013) (some

quotations and citations omitted). “A failure to satisfy any prong of the test

for ineffectiveness will require rejection of the claim.” Id.

      On appeal, Appellant claims that Plea Counsel was ineffective for failing

to “properly advise [Appellant] of the correct guideline range and the actual

substantial [sentencing] exposure [Appellant] faced.” Appellant’s Brief at 25.

According to Appellant, Plea Counsel’s improper advice caused him to reject

the Commonwealth’s offer of 18 to 36 months in prison – and, eventually,

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caused him to be sentenced to serve an aggregate term of six to 12 years in

prison, followed by five years of probation, for his convictions. See id. at

25-29. As a remedy for counsel’s allegedly deficient performance, Appellant

requests that we “allow [him] to accept the Commonwealth’s original offer of

18 months to 36 months of incarceration.” Id. at 30. This claim fails.

      As we have explained:

        a post-conviction petitioner seeking relief on the basis that
        ineffective assistance of counsel caused him or her to reject
        a guilty plea must demonstrate [that] . . . [but] for the
        ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability
        that the plea offer would have been presented to the court
        (i.e., that the defendant would have accepted the plea and
        the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of
        intervening circumstances), that the court would have
        accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or
        both, under the offer's terms would have been less severe
        than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were
        imposed.

Commonwealth v. Steckley, 128 A.3d 826, 832 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting

Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156 (2012)); see also Commonwealth v.

Hudson, 820 A.2d 720, 727-728 (Pa. Super. 2003) (“The Pennsylvania Rules

of Criminal Procedure grant the trial court broad discretion in the acceptance

and rejection of plea agreements. There is no absolute right to have a guilty

plea accepted”) (quotation marks and citations omitted); Commonwealth v.

White, 787 A.2d 1088, 1091 (Pa. Super. 2001) (“[w]hile the Commonwealth

and a criminal defendant are free to enter into an arrangement that the parties

deem fitting, the terms of a plea agreement are not binding upon the [trial]

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court. Rather the court may reject those terms if the court believes the terms

do not serve justice”).

      The PCRA court judge in this case was also Appellant’s trial court judge.

And, as the PCRA court explained, Appellant cannot establish that he was

prejudiced by Plea Counsel’s alleged ineffectiveness because, even if Appellant

agreed to the Commonwealth’s offer of 18 to 36 months, the trial court would

not have accepted the agreement, as the agreement was based upon an

incorrect prior record score. The PCRA court explained:

        Here, the record reflects that Appellant's now-deceased [Plea
        Counsel] initially relayed the Commonwealth's plea offer to
        Appellant in a letter dated June 19, 2014. The offer was
        based on the Commonwealth's mistaken belief that Appellant
        had a prior record score of zero and faced a guideline
        sentence of 22 to 36 months' incarceration (plus or minus 12
        months), when in fact he was a RFEL with numerous prior
        offenses and faced a guideline sentence of 72 to 84 months'
        incarceration (plus or minus 12). Since Appellant's charges
        included illegally possessing a firearm under 18 Pa.C.S.
        § 6105 — i.e., an offense that requires Appellant to already
        have a criminal record — it should have been obvious to both
        the Commonwealth and defense counsel that something was
        amiss. The incongruity would have been more obvious at the
        scheduling conference on June 26, 2014, when Appellant
        advised [Plea Counsel] that he was currently incarcerated for
        prior offenses of aggravated assault, firearm possession, and
        marijuana possession.

        . . . Given the record in this case, it is implausible to conclude
        that both the Commonwealth and the [trial] court would have
        failed to recognize that the lenient plea offer was predicated
        on Appellant's inaccurate prior record score of zero. Rather,
        it is highly probable that if there had there been a guilty plea
        hearing, the Commonwealth and the [trial] court (and
        defense counsel) would have known — by that time — that
        the offer was premised on an erroneous prior record score.
        The Commonwealth and [the trial] court (and defense

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        counsel) would have known that Appellant had a violent
        criminal record that elevated his prior record score to the
        category of a RFEL. Consequently, the parties would have
        known that the plea offer was based on inaccurate
        information that was integral to formulating the deal.

        Ultimately the plea offer was never “entered of record or
        accepted by [the trial] court.” Commonwealth v. McElroy,
        665 A.2d 813, 817 (Pa. Super. 1995). Appellant therefore
        was “not entitled to receive the benefit of what [was], at
        most, an executory bargain,” and [the trial] court either
        would have refused to approve the deal because the offer was
        tendered based on inaccurate information, or it would have
        allowed the Commonwealth to rescind its offer. Id. (“A
        district attorney may decide, as a function of her/his
        prosecutorial discretion, that a plea bargain agreement not
        yet entered of record and approved by the court is not in the
        best interests and/or for the general welfare of the citizens of
        this Commonwealth. In that case, it makes little sense, and,
        indeed, it would violate the trust imposed in that office, to
        abdicate or to force abdication of prosecutorial discretion to
        a criminal defendant whose interests are adverse to those of
        the general citizenry of this Commonwealth.”). In either
        situation, [the trial] court does not believe it would serve
        justice to approve/enforce a plea deal that was offered based
        on inaccurate information that was central to devising the
        terms of the agreement.

        Although Appellant plausibly establishe[d] that [Plea
        Counsel] failed to competently advise him when she
        presented the Commonwealth's plea offer, it is highly
        improbable that [the trial] court would ultimately have
        approved the offer. Therefore, Appellant failed to establish
        prejudice from his now-deceased counsel’s allegedly deficient
        performance.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/6/22, at 9-11 (some citations and capitalization

omitted).

     Here, the PCRA court found, as a fact, that, even if Appellant agreed to

the Commonwealth’s offer of 18 to 36 months, the trial court would not have

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accepted the agreement, as the agreement was based upon an incorrect prior

record score. The PCRA court’s factual findings are supported by the record

and, thus, are binding on this Court. Flor, 259 A.3d at 910-911. Therefore,

Appellant’s claim on appeal fails, as he failed to prove that, “[but] for the

ineffective advice of counsel[,] there [was] a reasonable probability that . . .

the court would have accepted [the] terms” of the plea. Steckley, 128 A.3d

at 832 (quotation marks and citations omitted).

      Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 10/12/2023

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