Court Opinion

ID: 9721775
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 09:09:10.86704+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:28.630314
License: Public Domain

*280PIVARNIK, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority who find that the trial court did not acquire jurisdietion over the person of Defendant Caldwell. At the time Defendant was charged, Ind.Code § 81-6-2-1(d) (Burns Supp.1983) was in effect and provided that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction over an individual for an alleged violation of murder, Ind.Code § 35-42-1-1 (Burns 1979). I agree with the State's interpretation that subparts (A) and (B) in § 31-6-2-1(d) apply only to robbery under part (4) and do not apply to murder, kidnapping or rape. The fact that Acts 1981, Public Law 266 reenacts § 81-6-2-4(c) while amending § 31-6-2-1 to include subsection (d) does not make this interpretation untenable. After all, an action which initially belongs in juvenile court and accordingly is filed therein may subsequently develop such that the action no longer belongs in juvenile court pursuant to § 31-6-2-1(d) and must be waived to adult criminal court pursuant to § 31-6-2-4(c). This would be the situation of an aggravated battery which becomes murder after the victim dies a lingering death. As of 1981, the juvenile court has no jurisdiction over the crime of murder. I therefore dissent and would affirm the trial court.