Court Opinion

ID: 9494622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 15:42:28.173049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:56:31.145789
License: Public Domain

NOONAN, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
At one level the issue on appeal is the meaning of a word; on a deeper level it is the right of a person not to be prosecuted for, and convicted of, a crime that he did not commit.
As to the meaning of the word, the court cites a popular college dictionary and follows it up with a thirty-year-old case telling us that the word needs no definition. The meaning deserves more attention than that.
The following summarizes the definitions to be found in Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1981):
After giving the etymology (from Latin inter and ferire to strike), the dictionary gives as the first definition “to strike one foot against the opposite foot in walking or running — used esp. of horses.” Definition 2 is “to come in collision; to be in opposition; to run at cross purposes: Clash”. Definition 3 is “to take a part in the concerns of others: Intermeddle, Interpose, Intervene.” Definition 4 is obsolete. Definition 5 is “to act reciprocally so as to augment, diminish, or otherwise affect one another — used of waves.” Definition 6 is “to claim substantially the same invention.” Definition 7 is “of a football player: (a) to run ahead of the ballcarrier ... (b) to hinder illegally an attempt of a player to receive a pass or make a fair catch.”
The etymology of “interfere” — its derivation from “strike” — and every one of its several meanings, as well as the examples of usage furnished by the dictionary, show that “to interfere” is to take an action of some kind.
In what sense was Willfong charged with interfering? We can be certain that he was not charged with pass interference or with imitating a horse or a wave or asserting a right to an invention. That leaves two meanings of “interfere” conceivably applicable to him. It would be diffi*1305cult to describe him as “taking a part” in Allendorfs concerns or intermeddling in them when he was ignoring them. Most likely, then, “interfere” in his indictment meant to “come into collision, to be in opposition, to run at cross-purposes.” The problem is that these equivalents point to action by the one doing the interference. “To clash,” which the capital in definition 2 signifies to be a synonym, is equally an active verb referring to action on the part of the one clashing.
In the period immediately preceding his arrest, Willfong was, in the words of the arresting officer, “compliant throughout ... a perfect gentleman.” How can one be interfering or clashing with an officer when one is behaving like a perfect gentleman? In fact the testimony of the officer is that Willfong responded to the officer’s order by saying nothing; he just didn’t obey. To quote Allendorf: “And I don’t believe he actually gave me a verbal answer. He may have nodded his head one way or the other, but I don’t recall which.” The court’s opinion — quite misleadingly— attempts to give color to its conclusion by quoting Willfong’s shout to the men. He was not charged with saying these words. They occurred after his arrest.
In the court’s extraordinarily strained interpretation, “to interfere” is equated with “to fail to obey an officer.” That meaning is not only contrary to the plain meaning of “interfere,” it is at war with the regulations read as a whole.
Title 36 of the Code of Federal Regulations, on “Parks, Forests, and Public Property,” has fifteen chapters. Seven of them relate to federal services using law enforcement officers or other officials who supervise the public: the National Park Service, the Forest Service, the Army Corps of Engineers, the Smithsonian Institution, the Library of Congress, the Presi-dio Trust, and the Oklahoma City National Memorial Trust. The Library of Congress and the Smithsonian Institution do not have prohibitions on interfering with their officers but require obedience to authorized personnel. And, with the exception of the Forest Service, each of the five services that have provisions prohibiting interfering with their officers also have provisions that explicitly require obedience to their officers:
Forest Service: 36 C.F.R. § 261.3(a), prohibits: “... interfering with any forest officer engaged in ... the performance of his official duties in the protection, improvement, or administration of the National Forest System ...” (passed in 1977, amended in 1981 and 1984). The chapter covering the Forest Service contains no provision prohibiting disobedience of a forest officer.
National Park Service: 36 C.F.R. § 2.32, is titled “Interfering with agency functions.” Subpart (a)(1) prohibits “... intimidating, or intentionally interfering with ... a government employee ... engaged in an official duty” (passed in 1983, amended in 1987). However, 36 C.F.R. § 2.32(a)(2) additionally explicitly prohibits “ [violating the lawful order of a government employee ... authorized to maintain order ... during ... law enforcement actions ...”
Army Corps of Engineers: 36 C.F.R. § 327.24(a), titled “Interference with Government employees,” makes it a crime to “... interfere with ... any ... employee for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers engaged in the performance of his or her official duties ...” Subpart (b) goes on to clarify that: “Failure to comply with a lawful order issued by a Federal employee acting pursuant to the regulations in this *1306part shall be considered as interference with that employee while engaged in the performance of their official duties.” (passed in 2000). Later, this chapter makes a similar point (about a different set of regulations). Section 331.16 states: “Interference with any Government employee in the conduct of his or her official duties pertaining to the administration of these regulations is prohibited. It is a violation to fail to comply with a lawful order directed by any government employee ...” (passed in 1983).
Presidio Trust: 36 C.F.R. § 1002.32, titled “Interfering with agency functions,” mirrors exactly § 2.32, governing lands under the National Park Service, prohibiting interference, and also, separately, prohibiting violating a lawful order of an official (passed in 1998).
Oklahoma City National Memorial Trust: 36 C.F.R. § 1501.1 adopts § 2.32 from Chapter I, regulating the National Park Service, incorporating both the “interference” provision and the explicit provision prohibiting violating the lawful order of an official (passed in 2000).
Smithsonian Institution: 36 C.F.R. § 504.4 requires visitors at the Smithsonian Institution to “comply with ... the directions of authorized individuals.” Section 520.5 requires the same, on the grounds of the Smithsonian’s Zoological Park (passed in 1968). There is no prohibition on “interference” with an officer.
Library of Congress: 36 C.F.R. § 702.3(a)(2) requires “complying] with any lawful order of the police or of other authorized individuals ...” (passed in 1987). There is no prohibition on “interference” with an officer.
In the face of this careful drafting that repeatedly distinguishes failure to obey from interfering, the court goes far beyond its function in creating a regulation that equates “failure to obey” and “interfere.”
Duane A. Willfong is an innocent man. He has been arrested, prosecuted and convicted for literally doing nothing. To affirm his conviction the court is compelled to construct a definition contrary to the dictionary and contrary to the federal regulations that define the offense. The precedent created is unfortunate. The injustice done is palpable.