Court Opinion

ID: 9854700
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:12:11.1027+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:16.196401
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice McWilliams
dissenting:
The City of Longmont stated that its reason for denying plaintiff’s application was that in its judgment “the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood are amply supplied, and the desires of the inhabitants as aforesaid are opposed to same.” The issue now to be determined is whether the City Council in so holding abused its discretion, acted capriciously and in disregard of the evidence before it.
C.R.S. ’53, 75-2-9, provides that a local liquor licensing authority shall consider “the reasonable requirements of *316the neighborhood and the desires of the inhabitants as evidenced by petitions, remonstrances or otherwise * * Both factors, i.e., the requirements and desires of the neighborhood, must be considered and weighed together by the licensing authority. No other tests or standards are laid down by the General Assembly. It is my considered judgment that the City Council of Longmont did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when it denied plaintiff’s application. Whether it acted reasonably or arbitrarily depends, of course, upon the nature and amount of evidence presented upon hearing. Accordingly, it becomes necessary to review and analyze the evidence produced at the hearing before the City Council.
Whether plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to establish a prima facie case that the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood dictated the issuance of a liquor license is certainly a matter upon which reasonable minds might well differ. The mere lack of an existing outlet in the neighborhood does not in and of itself prove that the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood for liquor are not being met. It is conceivable that a neighborhood even in this day and age could be composed of inhabitants who do not drink alcoholic beverages. In such circumstances one outlet would be one too many insofar as the reasonable requirements of the particular neighborhood were concerned. And the fact of no existing liquor outlet of the type here sought is just about the only evidence plaintiff offered to show that the reasonable requirements of the neighborhood were not met. In other words the applicant must go further and show that the particular neighborhood involved reasonably requires the existence of the proposed outlet. See Commission v. Salardino, 138 Colo. 66, 329 P. (2d) 629; The Hauf Brau, et al. v. Board of County Commissioners, 145 Colo. 522, 359 P. (2d) 659, decided February 27, 1961. The fact that motoring tourists may desire alcoholic beverages to break the monotony of their travel or contribute to the enjoyment of their journey, is a *317matter not provided for by our statute. Perhaps many believe it should be, but it is not. The test prescribed by the statute is the reasonable requirement of the neighborhood where the proposed outlet is to be situated and not the requirements of those who reside outside the neighborhood but who on occasion may patronize such establishment while passing through.
Additionally, evidence as to the desires of the inhabitants of the neighborhood is such that the City Council may not be charged with arbitrary or high-handed action by concluding that such desires were against the issuance of the license. Plaintiff’s evidence consisted essentially of a petition signed by eighteen persons who favored the issuance of the license. It would appear that each of these eighteen persons either worked or had a business located within a three-block radius of plaintiff’s restaurant, but that none of them were really inhabitants of the neighborhood in the sense that they resided within that area. From the record it is ascertained that there is a relatively small industrial or business area immediately surrounding plaintiff’s restaurant and beyond this residential area. A petition against the issuance of the license was signed by 645 persons, two of whom resided within a 3 block radius of plaintiff’s restaurant; 36 within a 6 block radius, 392 within a 12 block radius, with the balance living outside the 12 block radius, but still residing, with a few exceptions, in Longmont. Plaintiff contends that the “neighborhood” consisted only of that area within a 3 block radius of plaintiff’s restaurant, and not one inch more. No authority is cited for thusly limiting the licensing authority in its determination as to what constituted the neighborhood. As a matter of fact, since apparently none of those who signed plaintiff’s petition reside within the 3 block area of the restaurant, plaintiff is in no position to claim them as “inhabitants” of the neighborhood within the meaning of the statute. See MacArthur v. Presto, 122 Colo. 202, 221 P. (2d) 934; Quedens v. J. S. Dillon and Sons Stores *318Co., 146 Colo. 161, 360 P. (2d) 984 (decided April 3, 1961), and MacArthur v. Bishop, 123 Colo. 452, 230 P. (2d) 589.
The foregoing recitation is simply intended to demonstrate that on the basis of the evidence presented to the City Council whether the license should, or should not, issue is at the very least a matter upon which reasonable minds might differ. If such be the case the power of decision rests with the licensing authority which is vested with wide discretion by the statute, and we should not substitute our judgment for theirs. See Gem Beverage Co. v. Geer, 138 Colo. 420, 334 P. (2d) 744.
The judgment should be affirmed.