Court Opinion

ID: 9951755
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-18 21:17:05.760036+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:42:20.180021
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 STATE OF WASHINGTON,
                                                  No. 85161-6-I
                     Respondent,
                                                  DIVISION ONE
              v.
                                                  UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 JOSHUA DEAN MCINTYRE,

                     Appellant.

      MANN, J. — Joshua McIntyre appeals his sentence following a remand by this

court. On resentencing, the trial court clarified a condition of community custody and

eliminated all legal financial obligations other than a $500 victim penalty assessment

(VPA). The trial court did not disturb the original ordered restitution payment. McIntyre

appeals the imposition of the VPA and seeks a waiver of the interest on the restitution

payment. In a statement of additional grounds (SAG), McIntyre challenges the revised

community custody condition. We remand to strike the VPA from McIntyre’s judgment

and sentence but otherwise affirm.

                                            I

      After a bench trial, McIntyre was found guilty of third degree rape of a child and

second degree rape of a child. McIntyre was sentenced to concurrent terms of 41
No. 85161-6-I/2

months for the third degree rape and 158 months to life for the second degree rape.

The trial court imposed the following legal financial obligations (LFO): $500 victim

assessment, $200 criminal filing fee, and $100 DNA collection fee. Separately, the trial

court ordered restitution in the amount of $253.55 to be paid to the crime victim

compensation fund with the court to retain jurisdiction until the restitution was paid in

full. The restitution judgment was satisfied on June 10, 2022. Community custody

condition 8 required that McIntyre “not date women or form relationships with families

who have minor children, as directed by the supervising Community Corrections

Officer.” McIntyre unsuccessfully appealed and raised multiple issues including

challenging community condition 8 as being unrelated to the crime. 1

       McIntyre then filed a timely personal restraint petition and argued that the LFOs

for the criminal filing and DNA collection fees should be stricken. McIntyre also argued

that community custody condition 8 was unconstitutionally vague. Because the

condition “provide[d] no guidance about when routine, friendly interactions between

McIntyre and a family slips from a mere passing acquaintance into more,” this court

agreed with McIntyre. In an unpublished decision, we granted the petition in part and

remanded the matter for resentencing to strike or clarify the condition of community

custody and to determine whether McIntyre was indigent. 2 In re Pers. Restraint of

McIntyre, No. 81806-6-I, slip op. at 1-2 (Wash. Ct. App. July 19, 2021) (unpublished),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/818066.pdf.

       1 State v. McIntyre, No. 76873-5-I, slip op. at 7-9 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 11, 2019) (unpublished),

https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/768735opin.pdf.

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No. 85161-6-I/3

      On remand, the trial court eliminated the LFOs other than the $500 VPA. The

court maintained the restitution order. The court also revised and clarified community

custody condition 8 as follows:

      8. Do not date women or form romantic, dating relationships* with women
      who have minor children as directed by the supervising Community
      Corrections Officer. *As defined in Appendix 4.3.

             ....

      Appendix 4.3

      [H]ere are some of the things that constitute the difference between
      friendship and dating in the eyes of the Court. If you are with a woman
      who has minor children, visitation rights, parental rights over minor
      children, you may not kiss her, you may not hold hands with her, you may
      not do Eskimo kisses with her, you may not whisper sweet nothings into
      her ear. You may not be affectionate. To clarify what I mean by that, any
      form of touching where accompanied by a look, a smile, a wink. You may
      not give nor get back rubs. Sexual contact is definitely out. I’m pretty sure
      I don’t have to define that. You may not even sit on adjacent barstools
      and engage in frivolous, flirty conversation. If you are dining at the same
      table, you may not touch feet under the table. And if you feel one of them
      touch your feet, you must move your foot. And if that proves to be
      impracticable, you must get up and find another seat or excuse yourself
      entirely from the dinner.

      Further, while in the company of a woman who has a child, should you
      feel a warm, maybe tingly, sense of closeness or even suspect that she is
      feeling such a warm, possibly tingly, feeling of closeness to you, you must
      leave. And you may not contact her anymore.

      McIntyre appeals the resentencing.

                                           II

                                           A

      McIntyre first argues that the VPA should be stricken. We agree.

      In 2023, the legislature added a subsection to RCW 7.68.035 that prohibits

courts from imposing the VPA on indigent defendants as defined in RCW 10.01.160(3).

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No. 85161-6-I/4

LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1. We agree with Division Two of this court that recent

amendments to statutes governing LFOs apply retroactively to matters pending on

direct appeal. State v. Ellis, 27 Wn. App. 2d 1, 16, 530 P.3d 1048 (2023).

       The State does not dispute that McIntyre is indigent and concedes that this

matter should be remanded to strike the VPA from McIntyre’s judgment and sentence.

We accept the State’s concession and remand to strike the VPA.

                                             B

       McIntyre next argues that this court should remand to the trial court to consider

whether to impose interest on the restitution amount under recent amendments to RCW

10.82.090 given that McIntyre is indigent.

       Effective January 2023, prior to McIntyre’s resentencing, the legislature amended

RCW 10.82.090(2) to provide: “the court may elect not to impose interest on any

restitution the court orders.” Before making such a determination, courts shall inquire

into and consider several factors including whether the offender is indigent as defined in

RCW 10.01.160(3). RCW 10.82.090(2).

       Here, the amendment to RCW 10.82.090 was effective before McIntyre was

resentenced on March 30, 2023. McIntyre failed to seek waiver or reduction of interest

on restitution under RCW 10.82.090 at the resentencing hearing. An appellate court

“may refuse to review any claim of error which was not raised in the trial court.” RAP

2.5(a); Roberson v. Perez, 156 Wn.2d 33, 39, 123 P.3d 844 (2005). Because McIntyre

failed to raise the issue at resentencing, we do not address it.

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No. 85161-6-I/5

                                            III

                                             A

       In his SAG, McIntyre challenges several conditions of his community custody

including condition 8 that was recently clarified on resentencing. We disagree.

       We review community custody conditions for an abuse of discretion, and will

reverse them only if they are “manifestly unreasonable.” State v. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d

672, 677, 416 P.3d 712 (2018). “A trial court abuses its discretion if it imposes an

unconstitutional condition.” Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677. A trial court’s discretion to

resentence on remand is constrained by the scope of our court’s mandate. State v.

Kilgore, 167 Wn.2d 28, 42, 216 P.3d 393 (2009).

                                             B

       McIntyre argues that the court’s revision of community custody condition 8 and

clarification in Appendix 4.3 is both vague and not crime related. Because McIntyre is

prohibited from raising issues on a second appeal that were or could have been raised

on the first appeal, we only address his challenge to community custody condition 8.

State v. Mandanas, 163 Wn. App. 712, 716, 262 P.3d 522 (2011). Similarly, because

McIntyre already unsuccessfully challenged whether condition 8 was crime related, we

only address whether the clarified condition is unconstitutionally vague. State v.

Gregory, 192 Wn.2d 1, 29, 427 P.3d 621 (2018).

       “A community custody condition is valid if a person of ordinary intelligence can

understand what behavior a condition forbids, given the context in which its terms are

used.” State v. Houck, 9 Wn. App. 2d 636, 643, 446 P.3d 646 (2019) (citing State v.

Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d 671, 679, 425 P.3d 847 (2018)). A community custody condition is

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No. 85161-6-I/6

unconstitutionally vague if “(1) it does not sufficiently define the proscribed conduct so

an ordinary person can understand the prohibition or (2) it does not provide sufficiently

ascertainable standards to protect against arbitrary enforcement.” Padilla, 190 Wn.2d

at 677. However, a condition is not unconstitutionally vague simply because a person

cannot predict with complete certainty the exact point at which their actions become

prohibited conduct. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d at 677 (citing State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169

Wn.2d 782, 791-92, 239 P.3d 1059 (2010)).

       In Nguyen, our Supreme Court concluded a similar community custody condition

provided sufficient guidance and was not vague. 191 Wn.2d at 682-83. That condition

required a defendant convicted of second degree child molestation to notify her

community corrections officer of any “dating relationship” she entered. Nguyen, 191

Wn.2d at 681. The court upheld the condition, explaining “a person of ordinary

intelligence can distinguish a ‘dating relationship’ from other types of relationships,”

such as being “just friends” or “engag[ing] in a single social activity.” Nguyen, 191

Wn.2d at 682.

       Here, the revised and clarified condition no longer contains the vague prohibition

of “relationships with families” and now specifies that “romantic, dating relationships” are

prohibited. The term “dating relationship” is not unconstitutionally vague because an

ordinary person is able to distinguish this type of relationship from other types. Nguyen,

191 Wn.2d at 682. Because condition 8 uses the term “dating relationships,” the

condition is not unconstitutionally vague.

       We remand to strike the VPA from McIntyre’s judgment and sentence but

otherwise affirm.

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No. 85161-6-I/7

WE CONCUR:

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