Court Opinion

ID: 9640773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:15:00.505615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:32.761066
License: Public Domain

BLEIL, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the conclusion that Cole waived any complaint he may have had by failing to object to the sentencing procedure, and therefore concur with the Court’s decision affirming the trial court’s judgment. I choose to write separately to further address the question whether the trial court denied Cole his due process rights by announcing in advance what punishment would be assessed in the event of a revocation of the unadjudicated probation. We previously addressed this issue, presented to us as an alternative contention in Pipkin v. State, 750 S.W.2d 21 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 1988, no pet.). While we there candidly recognized that the particular announcement in that case was not an advisable procedure, we concluded that Pipkin failed to show, as he had alternatively alleged on appeal, a violation of his right to due process of law as guaranteed by the Texas Constitution, relying in part on Fielding v. State, 719 S.W.2d 361 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1986, pet. ref’d).
The Fielding case illustrates that appellate courts must make distinctions between instances of inadvisable comments on the part of the trial court and instances of a demonstrated refusal of the trial court to either hear evidence in mitigation of punishment or consider the full range of punishment. The majority and dissenting views in that case did not disagree on the law on that point but as to its application to the facts.
The majority correctly indicated that in the absence of a clear showing to the contrary the trial court’s actions are presumed to be correct. Id., at 366. The majority held that Fielding had failed to rebut the presumption of correct action as set forth in Thompson v. State, 641 S.W.2d 920 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1982). By contrast, the dissenting justice in Fielding viewed the record as establishing that the trial court did not consider the full range of punishment. Fielding v. State, 719 S.W.2d at 370. There was no disagreement in Fielding, nor in the case now before us, about whether an arbitrary refusal by a trial court to consider the full range of *867punishment can amount to a denial of due process: it clearly can.