Court Opinion

ID: 9717782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:10:14.268509+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:55.367206
License: Public Domain

WILLIAM RAY PRICE, JR., Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because the majority abandons settled Missouri law and the theory behind it in favor of an unworkable rule, I dissent.
Missouri law regarding the discovery of experts was clearly set out in State ex rel. Tracy v. Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d 831 (Mo. banc 2000). This Court stated in unequivocal language: “All materials given to a testifying expert must, if requested, be disclosed. This is a ‘bright line’ rule ... It is clear, understandable, and does not require the application of a multi-prong test.”1 The Court provided the reasoning for its holding in the following words: “Rule 56.01(b)(4) should be read to require production of all the materials provided to the expert. To hold otherwise would allow the expert witness or the party retaining the expert to select which documents to produce after the expert has reviewed the documents in preparation for the expert’s testimony.”2
Unlike a lay witness, an expert does not have his own knowledge of the facts of the case.3 “The documents, materials, and other information provided to him are the sources of the facts he knows.”4 While counsel may not force the other side’s *809expert to work for him, this Court stated that “it is appropriate ... to cross-examine an expert witness as to information provided to [him or her] that may contradict or weaken the basis for his or her opinion.”5 Tracy is unambiguous on this issue.
The majority’s interpretation is simply a gloss on the language of Rule 56.01(b)(4)(a) and (b). Rule 56.01(b)(4)(b), which governs depositions, provides that “a party may discover by deposition the facts and opinions to which an expert is expected to testify.” The majority attempts to limit this language, which is not limited itself, by reference to Rule 56.01(b)(4)(a). Rule 56.01(b)(4)(a), which governs interrogatories, states that “a party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as a witness at trial....”6 To reach its conclusion then, the majority grafts the “at trial” language from the paragraph governing interrogatories onto the one governing depositions. In doing so, the majority ignores the introductory language of 56.01(b)(4), which provides that the rule permits discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts that were “acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial.”7 Rule 56.01(b)(4) does not limit the application of subsections (a) and (b) to experts expected to be called only at trial.
The distinction intended by the rule is between consulting and testifying expert witnesses — not between pretrial and trial testifying expert witnesses. The reasoning supporting this distinction is simple and clear.
A consulting expert collaborates with counsel on trial strategy; the work product protection serves to incentivize and reward diligent trial preparation and free communication between counsel and his consultant.8 “A lawyer’s decisions about which people to use in confidence for which purposes in preparing a case ... are as central to lawyering strategy as one can get.”9
Once counsel decides to have his expert present opinions to a fact finder, however, the privilege is waived. When “an attorney communicates opinion work product to an expert witness specifically intended to testify ... he unavoidably foresees the likelihood that those opinions will be communicated to the fact finder, through the expert.”10 Opposing counsel must know what information was provided to the expert to test the experts’ opinions. Because expert testimony usually focuses on subjects about which the fact finder knows little, and because the fact finder depends *810on the “efficacy of cross-examination of the expert’s testimony to point out any weaknesses,” the rule set out in Tracy preserves the integrity of the adversary system.11 It would be “manifestly unfair to allow a party to use the privilege to shield information which it had deliberately chosen to use offensively.”12
The federal courts have held, as this Court did in Tracy, that opposing counsel is permitted the opportunity to “reveal [any] influence that counsel has achieved over the expert’s testimony.”13 And the federal courts have adopted a bright-line rule, as this Court did in Tracy, to enable effective cross-examination of expert witnesses and dispel any lingering uncertainty over the disclosure of documents divulged to a testifying expert.14
What neither this Court nor any other jurisdiction has done is to recognize a “trial” on the merits as a temporal limitation for purposes of expert discovery. The time at which an expert witness testifies has nothing to do with whether he should be subject to cross-examination or the discovery process. The moment Crown decided to avail itself of the benefits of having its consulting expert testify, it waived the privilege over the materials it provided to him.15
The majority’s attempt to split the baby invites a whole new world of “hide the ball” expert shenanigans. The new rule proposed today is an “invitation for abuse” that allows an attorney to “effectively construct the ... opinion testimony to support the attorney’s theory of the case, while blocking opposing counsel from learning of or exposing this influence.”16 The majority’s new interpretation permits only the expert and his counsel to know the entirety of the information provided and relied on and leaves the fox guarding the hen house.
The majority’s new interpretation also sets Rule 56.01(b)(4) in contradiction to section 490.065(3), RSMo 2000. The statute allows an expert opinion to be based on “facts or data ... made known to him at or before the hearing.” It recognizes no temporal distinction as to when the expert’s testimony is offered during the litigation process. To have a narrower rule for discovery than admissibility at trial simply makes no sense.
The reality of this case is that Crown made a mistake. It used the same expert witness to perform two functions — to provide focus group jury selection work and to give testimony regarding venue selection. What would have been protected work product was then waived and subject to discovery. In trying to help Crown out of its predicament, the majority creates an artificial distinction in Rule 56.01(b)(4) that opens the door to manipulation of the discovery process. This Court should leave the consequences of the mistake to the party who made it instead of gutting Missouri law governing expert discovery.
I respectfully dissent.

. Tracy v. Dandurand, 30 S.W.3d at 835.

. Id.

. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party’s Expert Information, 14 Stan.L.Rev. 455, 482 (1962).

. Tracy, 30 S.W.3d at 834; Heitmann v. Concrete Pipe Machinery, 98 F.R.D. 740, 742 (E.D.Mo.1983).

. Id.; John Doe v. U.S., 350 F.3d 299, 302 (2nd Cir.2003); Heitmann, 98 F.R.D. at 742 (holding that even when a report was prepared by a non-testifying expert, it was subject to discovery when it was needed for effective cross-examination of a testifying expert who relied on it in reaching his opinion).

. The majority opinion is internally inconsistent. Because Beisecker was never designated to testify at trial, not only his supposedly unrelated work but his entire file should have been protected from disclosure. Yet the majority specifically sanctions discovery of Bei-secker's venue-related work.

. Rule 56.01(b)(4). Emphasis added.

. Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888, 891 (10th Cir.1984); Employees Committed for Justice v. Eastman Kodak Company, 251 F.R.D. 101, 104 (W.D.N.Y.2008) (holding that materials used by experts retained as litigation consultants are privileged and immune from disclosure).

. In re Pizza Time Theatre Securities Litigation, 113 F.R.D. 94, 98 (N.D.Cal.1986) (stating that a non-testifying expert is a "unique repository of insights into counsel's opinion work product”).

. Musselman v. Phillips, 176 F.R.D. 194, 199 (D.Md.1997).

. Id.

. CP Kelco U.S. Inc. v. Pharmacia Corp., 213 F.R.D. 176, 178-79 (D.Del.2003).

. Musselman, 176 F.R.D. at 198.

. Karn v. Rand, 168 F.R.D. 633, 639-40 (N.D.Ind.1996).

. See Employees Committed for Justice, 251 F.R.D. at 104 (holding that “when an expert alternately dons and doffs the 'privileged hat' of a litigation consultant and the ‘non-privilege hat’ hat of a testifying witness” the materials he uses to form his opinion testimony are discoverable).

. Musselman, 176 F.R.D. at 199.