Court Opinion

ID: 9655055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 18:58:59.674553+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:15.807519
License: Public Domain

MONTGOMERY, Judge
(dissenting).
The majority opinion deals with the second ground urged for reversal of the death sentence. As stated by appellant’s counsel, *735it is that he “was denied his constitutional and statutory rights when his counsel was not present at the time the verdict was returned by the jury which resulted in a denial of his right to have the jury polled.” There are two answers to this contention: (1) The accused was not denied “a reasonable opportunity to have his counsel present,” and (2) the accused waived his right to have the jury polled.
The majority opinion rests its holding upon a statement from Carver v. Commonwealth, Ky., 256 S.W.2d 375, 49 A.L.R.2d 616, and, in particular, upon a quotation in that case from Temple v. Commonwealth, 13 Bush 769, 77 Ky. 769, 29 Am.St. Rep. 442, as follows:
" ‘The right to be heard by * * counsel * * * embraces the right * * * to have a reasonable opportunity to have his counsel present * * ⅜9»
The Temple case quotation also appears in the Lett and Kokas cases cited in the majority opinion.
Powell was represented by eminent and able counsel of his own choice, not court appointed counsel. He had placed his cause in the hands of counsel whom he believed to be capable of protecting his rights on trial. The conduct of his defense was a matter entrusted to the skill and discretion of this counsel. In what way then, if any, was this accused denied a reasonable opportunity to have his counsel present?
It is unquestioned that the counsel absented himself voluntarily by going to his office to keep an appointment. The record discloses no communication between counsel and trial judge concerning counsel’s departure and return except the statement by counsel that he was leaving. There is no hint that counsel desired, requested, or expected to be called to the courtroom when the jury returned a verdict. So far as the record shows, accused’s counsel and the prosecuting attorney both left the courtroom without any apparent intention of returning when the jury retired to consider its verdict.
On this point alone, the present case is distinguishable from the Carver case. There, counsel left the courtroom for a brief visit to the men’s restroom in the same building, while here, counsel left the courthouse and went to his office in another building. The jury returned a verdict within thirty to forty-five minutes and was discharged before appellant’s counsel returned. The record does not show when he returned. It was not the duty of the trial judge to require accused’s counsel to be present at all times any more than it was his duty to require counsel to cross examine a witness or to do other things in the exercise of his discretion in conducting the defense of the accused. Under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the accused was denied “a reasonable opportunity to have his counsel present.”
The real question presented is: Did the accused waive his right to have the jury polled? Criminal Code, § 267, quoted in the majority opinion, provides that “ * * the jury may be polled, at the instance of either party, * * *.” The accused had no right to have a jury polled except by request. In Asher v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 700, 299 S.W. 568, the record did not show any request had been made. The right to poll was held to have been waived by the failure to make a request. Dietz-man, J., wrote: “ * * * the Code only requires the jury to be polled ‘at the instance of either party.’ ” The rule was stated in State v. Vaszorich, 13 N.J. 99, 98 A.2d 299, 314, by Mr. Justice Brennan, now of the United States Supreme Court, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court, thus:
“Although a poll of the jury is the right of the accused, it is not a necessary ingredient of his conviction, but must be requested by timely request, Rule 2:7-9(d), and may be waived by a failure to make such request, State *736v. Blisak, 58 A.2d 711, 26 N.J.Misc. 197 (Qtr.Sess.1948); People v. Chamberlain, 55 P.2d 240 (CaL.D.Ct.App.1936); Asher v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 700, 299 S.W. 568 (Ky.Ct.App. 1927) ; People v. Schneider, 154 App. Div. 203, 139 N.Y.S. 104 (App.Div.1912); Owens v. United States, 61 App.D.C. 132, 58 F.2d 684 (D.C.Ct, App.1932); Hommer v. State, 85 Md. 562, 37 A. 26 (Md.Ct.App.1897); Annotation Ann.Cas.1912B, 1236.”
May the accused not waive this privilege by sitting silently by and permitting his counsel to depart from the courtroom to his office in another building without hint or suggestion of his return ?
The Carver case recognizes that the polling of the jury may be waived. In Johnson v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 709, 215 S.W.2d 838, the judgment was reversed for failure to poll after demand was made, but the right to waive the privilege was again recognized. See also Wooten v. State, 19 Ga.App. 739, 92 S.E. 233. When the record does not show whether a poll was taken, it is assumed that the verdict was unanimous. Green v. Commonwealth, Ky., 281 S.W.2d 637.
It was not error to receive the verdict in the absence of accused’s counsel. In Tartar v. Commonwealth, 274 Ky. 109, 118 S.W.2d 190, the verdict was returned in the absence of counsel and it was held not to be error. The Tartar holding was based on Penn v. State, 62 Miss. 450; State v. Jones, 91 N.C. 654; and Frank v. State, 142 Ga. 741, 83 S.E. 645, L.R.A.1915D, 817, certiorari denied Ex parte Frank, 235 U.S. 694, 35 S.Ct. 208, 59 L.Ed. 429. In the Penn case, the jury was polled in the absence of counsel and a death sentence was affirmed. In the Jones case, the verdict was upheld although counsel was absent and there was no poll. A death sentence was affirmed in the Frank case where it was agreed that the verdict should be received in the absence of counsel on both sides.
The present case is factually identical with Hommer v. State, 85 Md. 562, 37 A. 26, wherein the poll of the jury was held to have been waived. It was further held that it was not error to receive a verdict in the absence of counsel. Martin v. State, 79 Wis. 165, 48 N.W. 119; Barnard v. State, 88 Wis. 659, 60 N.W. 1058; O’Bannon v. State, 76 Ga. 29, 32; Baker v. State, 58 Ark. 513, 25 S.W. 603; Huffman v. State, 28 Tex.App. 174, 12 S.W. 588; State v. Boozer, 92 S.C. 495, 75 S.E. 864. In Lovvorn v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 118 F.2d 704, it was said that the voluntary absence of the accused’s counsel does not affect the right of the court to proceed to a verdict and judgment. The Lovvorn case followed the reasoning in Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 35 S.Ct. 582, 59 L.Ed. 969, holding that the accused by voluntary absence could waive his right to be present when the jury rendered its verdict; a fortiori, the accused could waive the absence of his counsel.
It, therefore, is concluded that the accused was afforded a reasonable opportunity to have his counsel present, that he waived the privilege of having the jury polled, and that it was not error for the verdict to be received in the absence of his counsel.
I am strengthened in these conclusions by a record which shows that the polling of the jury was an afterthought. Counsel first made such a claim by filing an amended motion and grounds for a new trial on November 17, 1959, thus indicating that the poll of the jury was not contemplated by accused’s counsel on the day the verdict was rendered, October 13, 1959, or on October 22, 1959, when he filed his motion for a new trial. Had accused’s counsel intended other than to waive the polling of the jury, he would have raised the question sooner. Further strengthening my conclusions are the statements in the majority opinion that “the court substantially polled the jury” and doubtless, “had the defendant’s counsel been present, he would have deemed it sufficient.” To the same effect, *737see Ryan v. People, SO Colo. 99, 114 P. 306, Ann.Cas.l912B, 1232, in which it was held that a proceeding similar to the one in the present case, in effect, amounted to a poll of the jury.
I would affirm the judgment.
STEWART and WILLIAMS, JJ., join in the dissent.