Court Opinion

ID: 9574286
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:03:55.284455+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:44:20.405972
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
dissenting.
The majority is dead wrong. Because its analysis is neither logical nor consistent, and because its opinion effectively signals the demise of the established concept of an accomplice as a matter of law, I respectfully dissent.
The majority correctly observes that the test for determining when a witness should be viewed as an accomplice is whether the witness could be indicted as an accomplice to the offense charged against the defendant. State v. Hull, 286 Or 511, 515, 595 P2d 1240 (1979). Here, the undisputed evidence is that Spindler, Bradbrook and Minor not only had been indicted but had been convicted for the crimes with which defendant was charged. It is inescapable that they were *338accomplices as a matter of law regarding the commission of that crime.
After correctly stating the rule, however, the majority proceeds to create a new test that makes it impossible to give jury instructions regarding the testimony of accomplice witnesses. It reasons that the testimony of Spindler, Bradbrook and Minor could be viewed with distrust only if the “evidence showed that * * * the witnesses were in fact involved with defendant in a crime.” 93 Or App at 335. That would mean that the three witnesses could be viewed as accomplices only if defendant were proved guilty first. Obviously, that assumption cannot be made in defendant’s own trial.
Apparently, the majority has confused the separate concepts of “accomplice to the defendant” and “accomplice witness to a crime.” The Supreme Court has made it clear that, if the jury believes that there is probable cause to charge the witness with the offense for which the defendant is on trial, it should view that witness as an accomplice for purposes of the defendant’s trial, whether or not the evidence convinces them that the witness is guilty. State v. Hull, supra, 286 Or at 516-17. Logic dictates that, when the witnesses actually have been convicted of the identical crime with which the defendant is charged, they are accomplices as a matter of law.
The majority seems to be suggesting that, merely by giving the jury accomplice witness instructions, the court impermissibly encouraged it to find defendant guilty by creating a link between him and the three convicted witnesses. The jury, however, was already well aware that the primary issue in the case was whether such a link existed. The state’s entire theory of the case was that defendant had acted jointly and in concert with Spindler, Bradbrook and Minor to commit a theft. Taken to its logical extreme, the majority’s argument would prevent the court ever from giving those instructions necessary to a jury’s deliberation. A jury cannot be expected to try a case in a vacuum.
Common sense tells us that this is exactly the type of case in which the jury should be given the instructions in question. As the majority notes, one basis for mistrusting the testimony of an accomplice witness is that “the witness was a participant in the crime at issue.” 93 Or App at 335. Because Spindler, Bradbrook and Minor already had been convicted of *339the very crime with which defendant was being charged, there was no need for the jury to decide whether or not to view their testimony with distrust. The trial court correctly instructed them to do so as a matter of law.
Finally, the majority misconstrues the trial court’s instruction as tantamount to a directed verdict of guilty. Such a conclusion is difficult to reconcile with a reading of the instructions as a whole, which is the way they are supposed to be examined and evaluated. The instructions state:
“The testimony of an accomplice witness in and of itself is not sufficient to support a conviction. There must be, in addition, some evidence other than testimony of an accomplice witness that tends to connect the Defendant with the commission of the crime. This other evidence or corroboration need not be sufficient by itself to support a conviction, but it must tend to show something more than just a crime was committed. It must also connect or tend to connect the Defendant with the commission of the crime. * * *
“You are instructed that as a matter of law Christopher Spindler, William Bradbrook, and Billy Minor are accomplice witnesses in this case in the commission of the crimes of theft in the first degree, unauthorized use of a vehicle and conspiracy.
“The other evidence that is required to corroborate the testimony of a witness may not be supplied by the testimony of another accomplice or accomplices. It must instead come from other evidence apart from the activity of another accomplice or accomplices.
“When you find that a person is an accomplice witness, then you should view that accomplice witness’ testimony with distrust.
“The law presumes that the Defendant is innocent of all of these charges, and this presumption follows the Defendant until guilt is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
“The burden is upon the State to prove the guilt of the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. * * *
“Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is such as you would be willing to act upon in the most important of your own affairs — and I am going to reread the first paragraph of that again because I left out one phrase, and it was the phrase ‘unless and’ — the law presumes that the Defendant is innocent, and this presumption follows the Defendant unless and until guilt is proven beyond a reasonable doubt.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*340There is nothing in the instructions that compels — or even suggests — to the jury that defendant has been determined by the court to be linked to the witnesses. It remains for the jury to decide whether defendant was involved with the witnesses in the commission of the crime. The jury was appropriately and thoroughly admonished that defendant is presumed innocent and that the burden is on the state to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. There was no error in the instructions and, even if there had been, there was no prejudice to defendant. The trial court should be affirmed.