Court Opinion

ID: 9687759
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:46:52.817003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:31.441084
License: Public Domain

McCormack, J.,
concurring in part, and in part dissenting.
I concur with the majority that the McKerns failed to present clear and convincing evidence of a significant beneficial relationship with the children. However, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that Arlene failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) a significant beneficial relationship existed between herself and the children and (2) it would be in the best interests of the children to allow such relationship to continue. I would reverse the Court of Appeals’ decision in part and restore the district court’s award of visitation rights to Arlene.
*374Any inquiry into the “significant beneficial relationship” requirement of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-1802(2) (Reissue 1998) will necessarily be “fact-dependent.” Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. 967, 973, 510 N.W.2d 73, 78 (1994). The record in this case indicates that Arlene was the children’s daycare provider for about 2 years. She went to Deborah and Terry’s house every day at about 6:15 a.m., cleaned the kitchen, fed the children breakfast, took them to school, and picked them up from school. During the summer, Arlene took them to and picked them up from swimming lessons and again watched them on a daily basis. Based on this evidence, I would conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that a significant beneficial relationship existed between Arlene and the children.
The majority reaches the opposite conclusion because Arlene’s testimony “reveals nothing about the nature of the relationship” between herself and the children and leaves unclear whether that relationship was “congenial or acrimonious, affectionate or indifferent, trusting or deceitful, loving or simply custodial.” The majority’s construction of the “significant beneficial relationship” prong of § 43-1802(2) apparently requires evidence of an interpersonal, emotional bond between grandparent and grandchild. The majority contrasts this case with Rosse v. Rosse, supra, where there was plentiful evidence of hugs and kisses between grandparents and their grandchild. I certainly agree that outward signs of affection between grandparents and grandchildren, such as those in Rosse, are evidence that a significant beneficial relationship exists. However, there are many ways a grandparent can establish a relationship with a grandchild that is beneficial to both the grandparent and, more important, to the grandchild. In this case, Arlene attended to the children’s needs every day for 2 years and performed many of the same tasks that a parent might otherwise perform. Arlene’s contact with the children is not appreciably different than the contact between the grandparents and grandchild in Rosse. There, the grandmother read stories to her grandchild and the grandfather took his grandchild to the park and zoo, he played with her, and apparently they went “places” together. Rosse v. Rosse, 244 Neb. at 974, 510 N.W.2d at 78. The primary distinction between the grandparent-grandchild relationship in Rosse and the one in this case is not the contacts, but the *375additional evidence of hugs and kisses in Rosse. I would not find the presence or absence of such evidence in the record dispositive of the issue. Common sense indicates to me that caring for your grandchildren’s everyday needs for 2 years constitutes clear and convincing evidence that a significant beneficial relationship exists. In light of these findings, I would also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that it was in the best interests of the children that their relationship with Arlene continue. See Rosse v. Rosse, supra.
The final criterion of § 43-1802 required Arlene to prove by clear and convincing evidence that visitation would not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship. As indicated by the statement Arlene made at trial, the relationship between herself and Deborah may be fairly characterized as strained. Were it not, court-ordered visitation would be unnecessary. However, there is no evidence that Arlene has ever directed toward the children any scorn she feels about Deborah or has otherwise sought to undermine or disparage Deborah in the children’s presence. Furthermore, the district court’s order expressly prohibited such comments from being made in the future. I would conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Arlene’s visitation would not adversely interfere with the parent-child relationship. For all of the above reasons, I believe the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the district court’s award of visitation rights to Arlene.