Court Opinion

ID: 9587647
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:24:42.336457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:20.444792
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KEENAN,
dissenting.
While I do not dispute the majority’s analysis that Mizenko is the borrowed servant of Metro, nevertheless, I would hold that Metro’s appeal of this interlocutory order is procedurally barred by Code § 8.01-670.* 1 Pursuant to that section, Metro could only appeal from the final judgment order entered in this case. It did not do so.
The trial court’s order of January 26, 1990, which denied Metro’s initial motion for summary judgment, and from which Metro has appealed, is not a final order. A final order is one which disposes of the entire action and leaves nothing to be done except the ministerial superintendence of execution of the order. Daniels v. Truck Corporation, 205 Va. 579, 585, 139 S.E.2d 31, 35 (1964); Marchant v. *87Mathews Co., 139 Va. 723, 734, 124 S.E. 420, 423 (1924). Following the order denying Metro’s initial summary judgment motion of January 26, 1990, Metro remained a party defendant in this action at law. Thus, the January 26, 1990 order, which is the subject of this appeal, is not a final order. Id.
On February 28, 1991, Metro was dismissed from the case with prejudice. That was the final order in this case, and it is the order from which Mizenko has appealed. In the final order, Metro did not preserve its objection to the trial court’s earlier denial of summary judgment. Further, Metro did not appeal any aspect of this order.
Allen v. Parkey, 154 Va. 739, 749, 149 S.E. 615, 619 (1929), aff’d, Allen v. Parkey, 154 Va. 739, 750, 154 S.E. 919, 919 (1930), cited by the majority, is inapposite to the appeal before us. Allen involved an appeal from an interlocutory decree in chancery which adjudicated the principles of a cause. Such decrees may be appealed under the special provision of Code § 8.01-670(B)(3). No such special provision exists, however, for the appeal of an interlocutory order in an action at law such as the one presented here. Instead, Metro’s appeal is governed and precluded by the general provision of Code § 8.01-670(A)(3) which states that “[a]ny person may present a petition for an appeal to the Supreme Court if he believes himself aggrieved . . . [b]y a final judgment in any other civil case.”

 Code § 8.01-670 provides:
A. Any person may present a petition for an appeal to the Supreme Court if he believes himself aggrieved:
1. By any judgment in a controversy concerning:
a. The title to or boundaries of land,
b. The condemnation of property,
c. The probate of a will,
d. The appointment or qualification of a personal representative, guardian, committee, or curator,
e. A mill, roadway, ferry, wharf, or landing,
f. The right of the Commonwealth, or a county, or municipal corporation to levy tolls or taxes,
g. The construction of any statute, ordinance, or county proceeding imposing taxes; or
2. By the order of a court refusing a writ of quo warranto or by the final judgment on any such writ; or
3. By a final judgment in any other civil case; or
B. Any party to any case in chancery wherein there is an interlocutory decree or order:
1. Granting, dissolving or denying an injunction; or
2. Requiring money to be paid or the possession or title of property to be changed; or
3. Adjudicating the principles of a cause.