Court Opinion

ID: 9595022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:34:58.128522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:53.479267
License: Public Domain

*356MARKS, J., pro tem., Dissenting.
I dissent.
I agree with the conclusion reached in the opinion prepared by Mr. Justice Curtis and with much of the reasoning and arguments there set forth. I believe that the concession that the picketing described in the complaint can be classified as “peaceful picketing”, requires further examination. While my reasoning follows" closely that of Mr. Justice Curtis in most important particulars, there are certain departures and some additional reasons and authorities that I wish to particularize.
I have two points of departure from the majority opinion:
First, it was not necessary for the plaintiffs to allege that they had “organized a bona fide independent labor union”. They alleged that they were all of the salesmen of the employer company and had “united and organized and designated three of their number a committee to negotiate rates of pay”, etc., and that such committee had been recognized as bargaining agent for the entire sales force, being all the plaintiffs. These allegations follow the language of sections 921 and 923 of the Labor Code.
Second, the language used in the sections of the Labor Code just referred to is too simple and clear, the intent of the legislature in using that language is too plain to permit of judicial interpretation. Under such circumstances the courts must accept the language used by the legislature and give to it the usual, common and accepted meaning of the words employed. This being true, there is no room for judicial interpretation or speculation as to what the framers of the measure might have intended to accomplish by the legislation. The intent is clear from the act. Amendment of the act should be left to the legislature. It should not be accomplished by judicial legislation.
In considering these questions it should be observed that the word “union” or the words “labor union” do not appear in either of the three sections. It is there declared to be the public policy of the state to protect the individual worker in his “freedom of labor, and thereby to obtain acceptable terms and conditions of employment . . . that the individual workman have full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of .representatives of his own choosing, to negotiate the terms and conditions of his employment ...”
*357This statute was followed in the allegations of the complaint. The pleading therefore should be sufficient to support the conclusion that the plaintiffs had formed and joined an organization of their own forming and choosing and had selected and designated their own bargaining representatives to negotiate with the employer the terms and conditions of employment. This is all the statute requires. The courts should demand no more.
A demurrer admits the truth of the allegations of a complaint. It adds nothing to those allegations nor does it subtract from them. The question of the issuance of an injunction was also submitted on the undenied allegations of the complaint, the truth of which were thus admitted.
The complaint here contains nothing that would in the slightest degree intimate that plaintiffs’ organization was company inspired or company controlled. It would be purest speculation without any foundation of allegation or inference from any allegation for me to assume that the organization was dominated by the employer. Such influence or domination by the employer is prohibited by the Labor Code and is unlawful. The presumption “that a person is innocent of crime or wrong’’ (sec. 1963, Code Civ. Proc.) is a sufficient answer to any such speculation should I desire to indulge in it.
I am thus brought to the point where I must conclude from the allegations of the complaint that plaintiffs voluntarily and lawfully formed their own organization and freely selected their own bargaining agents to negotiate the terms of their employment. This they had the right to do under the statute. In the lawful exercise of this right they should be protected.
The last paragraph of the first section of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (29 U. S. C. A., sec. 151) declares it to be the policy of the United States to eliminate certain obstructions to the free flow of commerce “by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection ’ ’. This language is so similar to that used in section 923 of our Labor Code in declaring the public policy of California that the, construction of the federal act by the Supreme Court of the *358United States should be most persuasive here. In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones db Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U. S. 1 [57 Sup. Ct. 615, 81 L. Ed. 893, 108 A. L. R. 1352], it was said:
“Thus, in its present application, the statute goes no further than to safeguard the right of employees to self-organization and to select representatives of their own choosing for collective bargaining or other mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their employer.
“That is a fundamental right. Employees have as clear a right to organize and select their representatives for lawful purposes as the respondent has to organize its business and select its own officers and agents. Discrimination and coercion to prevent the free exercise of the right of employees to self-organization and representation is a proper subject for condemnation by competent legislative authority. Long ago we stated the reason for labor organizations. . . .
“We reiterated these views when we had under consideration the Railway Labor Act of 1926, 44 Stat. 577. Fully recognizing the legality of collective action on the part of employees in order to safeguard their proper interests, we said that Congress was not required to ignore this right but could safeguard it. Congress could seek to make appropriate collective action of employees an instrument of peace rather than of strife. We said that such collective action would be a mockery if representation were made futile by interference with freedom of choice. Hence the prohibition by Congress of interference with the selection of representatives for the purpose of negotiation and conference between employers and employees, ‘ instead of being an invasion of the constitutional right of either, was based on the recognition of the rights of both’. (Texas N. O. R. Co. v. [Brotherhood of] Railway & S. S. Clerks, 281 U. S. 548, 50 S. Ct. 427, 74 L. Ed. 1034.) We have reasserted the same principle in sustaining the application of the Railway Labor Act as amended in 1934 (45 U. S. C. A., sec. 151 et seq.). (Virginian Railway Co. v. System Federation, No. 40, 300 U. S. 515, 57 S. Ct. 592, 81 L. Ed. 789.)”
There can be no doubt of the right of the workingman to organize for his own protection and betterment. There is the eminent authority I have quoted, besides the statute, for the conclusion that the exact form such organization takes *359is immaterial. It may take the form of the closely knit craft union, the larger industrial union or the loose organization of workers for the purpose of selecting bargaining agents such as we have here. The statute so specifies. (See. 923, Labor Code.)
Having concluded that plaintiffs’ organization is legal and their membership in it a matter of lawful right, it is necessary to consider the effect of the judgment on plaintiffs and their organization under the allegations of the complaint. No court should by judgment force the dissolution of a lawful organization. Neither should it force individual members to forfeit membership in one lawful organization and to join another if such action be against their will and without their consent. Freedom of individual action within lawful limits is a fundamental principle of our government.
It is alleged that plaintiffs are all the salesmen employed by their employer; that they compose all of the membership of their organization; that none of them desires to become a member of any of the defendant unions which are maintaining the picket line; that defendant Salesmen’s Union has solicited each of the plaintiffs to join that union; that each plaintiff has refused to do so; that a picket line has been placed around the employer plant; that the picket line will be maintained until the employer “compels plaintiffs to join said union or discharges said plaintiffs”; that unless the picketing be restrained the employer “intends to, and . . . will discharge all the plaintiffs from their said employment., or demand that plaintiffs and each of them join the said union”. It is also alleged that the picket line “has had the effect of closing down the said plant, (and) stopping all work therein ... ”.
These allegations must be accepted as true as the demurrer admits their verity and the ease was not tried on its merits. But one conclusion can be drawn from them, namely, that unless they be enjoined the defendant unions will compel plaintiffs to forfeit memberships in their own organization and to join the defendant Salesmen’s Union; that as a penalty for failing so to do they will forfeit their employment; that as a condition of future employment the employer will be compelled to require plaintiffs to belong to that union,—all this against the will and without the consent of plaintiffs.
*360Thus the ease resolves itself into a jurisdictional dispute between labor organizations,—that of the plaintiffs small and weak numerically and those of the defendants, strong in numbers and powerful in influence.
A fundamental concept of our government always has been and always should be the protection of the lawful rights of minorities,—protection of the weak against the strong. Mere might should never make right. Mere force of numbers should never prevail over or be allowed to destroy the lawful rights of the few. Volumes have been written both in and out of the courts supporting this thesis. It should be unnecessary to cite any supporting authority other than the words of Thomas Jefferson when he wrote:
“We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.”
In this case these principles may be violated. On the face of the record they will be violated. If this order be sustained it might not be inappropriate to ask what would happen to a numerically small craft union when confronted in a jurisdictional dispute with a stronger industrial union. There is a procedure to determine the equities under the law in such a case as this. The restraining order should be continued until the parties are put on their proof. Evidence should be talien and weighed by a court. Not until that is done should the grave questions here presented be decided with the complaint containing the allegations presenting these serious problems.
Also it might not be inappropriate to ask what is to become of our constitutional guarantees, both federal and state, of equal protection of the laws if plaintiffs are forced to surrender their lawful membership in their own lawful organization and take membership in a defendant union without their will and against their consent ?
Is it not true, as said by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the National Labor Relations Board case, supra, ‘ ‘ that such collective action would be a mockery if representation were made futile by interference with freedom of choice ’ ’ when referring to employer interference? How much more *361true are those same words when applied to like interference by orders of the courts, reinforced as they are by all the powers of the state ?
It has been repeatedly held that the right of a man to sell his labor is a property right that is protected by the Constitution. It is also equally well settled that this right to sell his labor is limited by the language of the rule. It does not guarantee the right of a man to labor either as a union or a nonunion worker. It is merely the right to work that is guaranteed.
However, these rules should not control the decision here. While the right of plaintiffs to labor at all is involved, the immediate question is the right to force lawful members of one lawful organization of laborers to forfeit their membership in that organization and to join another lawful organization of laborers, all against their will and without their consent. If this end should be accomplished it would deny to plaintiffs and their organization the equal protection of the laws.
I have found no reported case in California even touching upon what I conceive to be the real question involved here,— the right to force members of one lawful organization of laborers to forfeit their membership in that organization and take membership in another labor organization. The question seems to be of first impression here.
The case of Greenwood v. Building Trades Council, 71 Cal. App. 159 [233 Pac. 823], is not even remotely related to that question. That case involved the right of Local Union No. 162 of the Sheet Metal Workers, a voluntary association, to membership and representation in the Building Trades Council of the city of Sacramento, a voluntary association,—and the collection of per capita dues. The real rule applied to settle the controversy in that case is thus stated in the opinion of the District Court of Appeal:
“In 3 California Jurisprudence, 350, section 5, the rule as to membership is stated as follows: ‘Membership in a voluntary association is not a right which can be gained independently and then enforced. It is rather a privilege which may be withheld, or accorded on such terms and conditions as the association sees fit to impose . . . ’ ... We have not been cited to any authority holding that the courts have any power to enforce the admission of members; the only rule *362which we have discovered is that which we have quoted from 3 California Jurisprudence.”
A new factor has been injected into cases of this kind by the adoption of sections 921, 922 and 923 of the Labor Code and similar earlier statutes on which those sections are founded. Those statutes have been enacted recently and render earlier decisions inapplicable to the legal situation here presented. Those earlier cases can only be relied upon now for the announcement of principles which do not conflict with the public policy of California as declared in these sections.
It is clear to me that the Labor Code now declares that it is the public policy of California to permit workmen, regardless of their numbers, to freely organize for the purpose of selecting their own bargaining agents to bargain with their employer concerning the terms of their employment; that in the exercise of this right the workers must be free from domination, intimidation or coercion. The constitutionality of an enactment having such purpose and effect may not now be questioned. (See National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., supra; Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5, 301 U. S. 468 [57 Sup. Ct. 857, 81 L. Ed. 1229].) There are many other cases supporting this conclusion.
It is very generally held that an act lawful in itself does not become unlawful because it was prompted by a bad motive; that “he who does what the law allows cannot be a wrongdoer whatever his motive”. (Union Labor Hospital Assn. v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., 158 Cal. 551 [112 Pac. 886, 33 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1034].)
It is also held that in labor disputes where an act lawful in itself has as its object the accomplishment of a result prohibited by law, the act becomes unlawful. This was recognized by Mr. Justice Frankfurter when he wrote in 44 Quarterly Law Review at page 182: “The damage inflicted by combative measures of a union—the strike, the boycott, the picket—must win immunity by its purpose”. That an unlawful purpose makes a strike illegal was established by the Supreme Court of the United States in Dorchy v. State of Kansas, 272 U. S. 306 [47 Sup. Ct. 86, 71 L. Ed. 248], where, in speaking through Mr. Justice Brandéis, it said:
“The right to carry on business—be it called liberty or property—has value. To interfere with this right without *363just cause is unlawful. The fact that the injury was inflicted by a strike is sometimes a justification. But a strike may be illegal because of its purpose, however orderly the manner in which it is conducted.” (See, also, Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, Local No. 5, supra; Overland Pub. Co. v. H. S. Crocker Co., 193 Cal. 109, at p. 119 [222 Pac. 812].)
In addition to the provisions of section 923 of the Labor Code to which we have already adverted, section 921 of that code interdicts any contract between an employer and employee “To join or to remain a member of a labor organization”,—“not to join or not to remain a member of a labor organization”,—“to withdraw from an employment relation in the event that he joins or remains a member of a labor organization ’ ’.
A fair construction of the allegations of the complaint requires me to conclude that the picket line established by the defendant union seeks to accomplish the following results: to compel the employer to require plaintiffs to surrender membership in their organization (a reasonable inference from the allegations of the complaint); to compel plaintiffs to join and remain members of defendant Retail Automobile Salesmen’s Local Union, No. 1067; or as an alternative to require plaintiffs to withdraw from their employment relationship with their employer. Each one of these purposes is made unlawful by the Labor Code. It should follow that the picket line, by seeking to accomplish unlawful results, is itself unlawful and that its maintenance should be enjoined, assuming the truth of the allegations which we must do at this stage of the proceedings.
Weight is lent to this conclusion by the eases of Texas & New Orleans Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U. S. 548 [50 Sup. Ct. 427, 74 L. Ed. 1034], and Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 95 Fed. (2d) 390, where employers were enjoined from committing some of the very acts which the picket line in the instant case sought to compel the employer here to commit.
Another new and novel question unapproached in any reported California case is presented by the allegations of the complaint, namely, is the picketing there described peaceful? This question is entirely unrelated to the others I have considered and can in itself be decisive of this appeal. It re*364volves around the question of what is peaceful picketing. Does this term only exclude acts or threats of physical injury or violence or does it also exclude conduct which amounts to mental and moral intimidation and coercion whereby the mind and will are overcome by fear of the consequences resulting from failure to yield to pressure ?
It is thoroughly established and admitted that only peaceful picketing is lawful,—that picketing which is not peaceful is not lawful and should be enjoined. The authorities cited in the prevailing opinion fully sustain this rule.
The complant alleges that the defendant unions “all have rules, regulations, by-laws and agreements enforceable by fines and penalties binding on their members respectively, not to pass picket lines or to do business with plants or firms under picket; that said company employs members of each and all of said associations; that the placing of a picket on the plant of said company will, pursuant to said by-laws, rules, regulations and agreements, compel each and all the members of each and all of said associations to abstain from visiting, delivering goods to, accepting goods from, or transacting business with or working for said company”. The briefs admit that all of the workmen employed in the plant except plaintiffs are members of the defendant unions. It is also alleged that “the continuance of said picket on the plant of said company has had the effect of closing down the said plant, stopping all work therein, and destroying its said business, . . . None of said pickets have been or are employees of said company, on strike or otherwise.” These allegations present the question I wish to consider, namely, can the picketing described in the complaint with the serious penalty to be imposed on union workmen for passing through the picket line be held to be peaceful 1
Peace is often defined as the absence of any force. Force may be applied to the mind as ■ well as to the body. The use of force may result in the lack of freedom of movement and action. This may result just as truly from coercion of the mind as restraint of the body. This court has recognized these truths and has held that mere intimidation and coercion of the mind is just as effective an application of force as is physical violence or restraint.
In Southern Cal. etc. Co. v. Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, 186 Cal. 604, at page 611 [20Q Pac, 1], this court said;
*365“ ‘Any act of boycotting, therefore, which tends to impair this constitutional right freely to labor, by means passing beyond moral suasion, and playing by intimidation upon the physical fears, is unlawful.’ (See, also, Goldberg etc. Co. v. Stablemen’s Union, 149 Cal. 429, [117 Am. St. Rep. 145, 9 Ann. Cas. 1219, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 460, 86 Pac. 806] ; Berger v. Superior Court, 175 Cal. 719 [167 Pac. 143 (15 A. L. R. 373)]; Rosenberg v. Retail Clerks’ Assn., 39 Cal. App. 67, [177 Pac. 864] ; Moore v. Cooks’ etc. Union, 39 Cal. App. 538, [179 Pac. 417] ; American Steel & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers’ etc. Unions, 90 Fed. 608; Union Pacific R. R. Co. v. Ruef, 120 Fed. 102; Atchison, Topeka & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Gee, 139 Fed. 582; Kolley v. Robinson, 187 Fed. 415, [109 C. C. A. 247] ; Franklin Union v. People, 220 Ill. 355, [110 Am. St. Rep. 248, 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1001, 77 N. E. 176] ; 4 L. R. A. [N. S.] 302, note.)
“We quote from Martin on Labor Unions, page 229: ‘The use of force and violence is not necessary to make picketing unlawful. Intimidation is not limited to threats of violence or to physical injury to person or property. It has a broader signification, and there may also be a moral intimidation which is illegal. In the guise of picketing strikers may obstruct and annoy others and by insult and menacing attitude intimidate them as effectually as by physical assault. ’ ’ ’ The same rule was restated in Lisse v. Local Union No. 31, 2 Cal. (2d) 312 [41 Pac. (2d) 314], as follows:
“In this regard it is held that in order to prove physical intimidation and fear it is not necessary to show that there was actual force or express threats of physical violence used, that such result may be accomplished as effectually by obstructing and annoying others and by insult and menacing attitude as by physical assault. (Southern Cal. Co. v. Amalgamated Assn., supra; Jordahl v. Hayda, 1 Cal. App. 696 [82 Pac. 1079] ; Martin on Labor Unions, p. 229.) In so holding the Supreme Court in the ease of Southern Cal. Co. v. Amalgamated Assn., supra, in quoting approvingly from another case (Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders Union, 150 Fed. 155, 173), said that ‘intimidation includes persuasion by or on behalf of a combination of persons resulting in coercion of the will from the mere force of numbers’; and the court then points out that the same rule is declared in Martin on Labor Unions, supra, as follows: ‘Even a simple “request” to do or not to do a thing, made by one or more *366of a body of strikers under circumstances calculated to convey a threatening intimidation, with a design to hinder or obstruct workmen, is unlawful intimidation, and not less obnoxious than the use of physical force for the same purpose. ’ The rule is applied with equal force as to customers and patrons. (Goldberg, Bowen & Co. v. Stablemen’s Union, supra.) ”
Here there is alleged the force of the rule which was applied by the picket line to all union employees working in the employer plant. The rule brought into effect by the picket prohibited union members from crossing the picket line. It imposed severe penalties on them should they violate the rule. The fact of the picket line brought that rule into play. The rule was the force applied by the picket line. The result of that force was alleged. No union member crossed the line. The plant was completely “knocked out”. A barricade manned by men could not have been more effective. I cannot distinguish between the mental and moral intimidation of the rule applied by the picket line and the physical intimidation of actual threats or actual violence. The results were the same, or perhaps more effective in the case of the rule and the picket line. Physical force may arouse such resentment that it may be met with like physical force. The intimidation and coercion of the rule and the picket line were so complete that no employee sought to cross the line.
It is instructive and very persuasive to study four decisions by this court in which injunctions against picketing that were approved or modified and approved are set forth in full. The injunctions actually approved and issued should be conclusive evidence of this court’s opinion of the powers it should exercise in picketing cases.
In Goldberg etc. Co. v. Stablemen’s Union, 149 Cal. 429 [86 Pac. 806, 117 Am. St. Rep. 145, 9 Ann. Cas. 1219, 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 460], the judgment, as amended by this court, enjoined the defendant union and its pickets from interfering with or harassing or obstructing plaintiff “by means of pickets or transparencies, or otherwise, threatening or intimidating any person or persons . . . being employed at said place or places by the plaintiff”.
In Pierce v. Stablemen’s Union, 156 Cal. 70 [103 Pac. 324], the injunction ordered issued by the trial court was modified and affirmed. As so modified the defendant, its agents and employees were enjoined from ' ‘ obstructing plain*367tiffs in the conduct of . . . their stable ... or from in any wise molesting, interfering with, threatening, intimidating or harassing any employee or employees of plaintiffs ... or from . . . placing in front of said plaintiffs’ place of business any picket, or pickets, for the purpose of . . . molesting, intimidating or coercing, or attempt to molest or intimidate or coerce . . . any employee now or hereafter employed by, or working for plaintiffs in their said business. ’'
In Southern Cal. etc. Co. v. Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, supra, this court set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered a judgment entered which commanded the defendants “to desist and refrain from directly or indirectly, or by any means or method doing, or attempting to do, any of the following described acts, with the intent or purpose of intimidating the employees of the plaintiff, so as to prevent them from continuing in said employment, or with the intent or purpose of intimidating persons intending to or about to enter such employment, so as to prevent them from becoming such employees, to wit: stationing or placing, or causing to be stationed or placed, on the street or elsewhere, at or near the plaintiff’s place of business, any picket or pickets; . . . The aforesaid defendants are also enjoined from and commanded to desist and refrain from interfering or attempting to interfere in any manner with the free use, occupation, and enjoyment by the plaintiff, its agents, officers, servants, and employees of any of its property and premises of any kind or nature, or hindering or obstructing or attempting to hinder or obstruct, in any manner, the plaintiff’s business or any part thereof; or molesting or interfering with or intimidating or harassing any employee of plaintiff or person who seeks to enter the emplo3unent of plaintiff”.
In Lisse v. Local Union No. 31, supra, the judgment was modified and ordered re-entered to read, in part, as follow's:
“ ‘It is therefore ordered, adjudged and decreed that defendants herein and each of them and all persons acting for them or either of them or in aid or assistance of them or either of them be and they are hereby perpetually enjoined and commanded to desist and refrain directly or indirectly or by any means or method from doing or attempting to do any of the following described acts: (a) intimidating, threatening, molesting or coercing plaintiffs in the conduct of their *368business known as the “Rainbow Cafe” situated at No. 1218 Broadway Street, in the city of Oakland, California, or for any such purposes obstructing or otherwise interfering with, or attempting to obstruct or interfere with the free use, occupation and enjoyment thereof by plaintiffs, their agents, servants and employees; ... ’ ” (Emphasis added.)
Each of these cases, especially the later ones in point of time, stoutly uphold the constitutional right of free speech, the right of the workingman to organize, to strike, to conduct primary and secondary boycotts, to persuade other workers, by peaceful means, to leave their employment, to seek members of their labor organization and use other such means as may be lawful to promote their own interest and better their own working conditions. These are still the lawful rights of labor if lawfully exercised. It is made equally clear, especially by the injunction in the Lisse case, that an employee who so desires is given the right to the free use and occupation of his employer’s premises free from obstruction or interference of anyone. An employee cannot have the free use and enjoyment of his employer’s premises unless he has the right to freely enter upon and leave those premises free from obstruction or interference by anyone. Thus the lawful rights of the unions and their members to promote their own welfare, and the lawful right of the individual workman, whether unionized or not, to sell his labor, were both protected.
Here the picket line and the rule interfere with the free use and enjoyment of the employer’s premises by all of its employees. Unless this court decides to overrule the four cases last considered, the order of the trial court should be reversed. Instead of overruling any of those cases, the majority opinion cites some of them with approval.
To argue that the picket line and the union rule has not coerced the union employees of the employer into refusing to enter their place of employment because they voluntarily obeyed the rule against crossing the picket line would be the purest sophistry. Union membership and free fraternization with other union members is a right that must be valued highly. Severe penalties for violation of the union rule are described in the complaint. A fine or other punishment are penalties provided for violation of the rule. It would be as logical to argue that penalties provided for the violations of statutes do not compel obedience to those laws. Here *369the obedience by the union members, while in a sense voluntary, is none the less under compulsion of the rule, and the penalty to be imposed for its violation.
For these reasons the orders here for review should be reversed.
Rehearing denied. Shenk, J., Curtis, J., and Houser, J., voted for a rehearing.