Court Opinion

ID: 9952630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-20 14:10:46.818526+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:41:48.328195
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1551-22

DORETTA CERCIELLO, on
behalf of herself and others
similarly situated,

          Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

SALERNO DUANE, INC., and
RAYMOND DUANE,

     Defendants-Respondents.
_____________________________

                   Submitted on February 28, 2024 – Decided March 20, 2024

                   Before Judges Currier and Vanek.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Union County, Docket No. L-1690-17.

                   Dann Law Firm, PC, and Law Office of David C. Ricci,
                   LLC, attorneys for appellant (Javier Luis Merino,
                   Andrew R. Wolf, and David C. Ricci, on the briefs).

                   Jardim, Meisner & Susser, PC, attorneys                                        for
                   respondents (Michael V. Gilberti, on the brief).

PER CURIAM
      In Cerciello v. Salerno Duane, Inc. (Cerciello I), 473 N.J. Super. 249

(App. Div. 2022), we declined to accept substantially the same arguments being

raised by plaintiff Doretta Cerciello in this appeal.            Plaintiff argues

reconsideration of our prior decision is warranted because our opinion in

Largoza v. FKM Real Estate Holdings, Inc., 474 N.J. Super. 61 (App. Div.

2022), mandates that her claims be viewed in a new light.           We disagree.

Accordingly, we affirm the January 6, 2023 trial court order denying plaintiff's

motion for reconsideration of the trial court order denying class certification.

                                        I.

      A complete recitation of the facts pertinent to this appeal is detailed in

Cerciello I, 473 N.J. Super. at 252-60. We briefly summarize only the facts

pertinent to our decision.

      On October 8, 2016, plaintiff purchased a used car from defendants

Salerno Duane, Inc., a car dealership, and its principal owner, Raymond Duane,1

after seeing the car listed for sale on the dealership's website for $26,990.

1
  Because of the similarities in defendants' names, for clarity of the record and
ease of the reader, we refer to Salerno Duane, Inc. as "the dealership" and
Raymond Duane as "Duane."
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Plaintiff paid $28,855 for the vehicle, in addition to registration and document

fees.

        At the time of purchase, plaintiff signed a Motor Vehicle Retail Order

(MVRO) and Retail Installment Sale Contract (RISC). The MVRO, which

plaintiff asserts is the same form that defendants use for all of their transactions,

contained the following arbitration provision:

             AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE ALL CLAIMS.
             READ THE FOLLOWING ARBITRATION
             PROVISION CAREFULLY, IT LIMITS YOUR
             RIGHTS, AND WAIVES THE RIGHT TO
             MAINTAIN A COURT ACTION, OR TO PURSUE
             A CLASS ACTION IN COURT AND IN
             ARBITRATION.

                   . . . Further, the parties understand that they may
             not pursue any claim, even in arbitration, on behalf of
             a class or to consolidate their claim with those of other
             persons or entities. . . . THIS ARBITRATION
             PROVISION IS GOVERNED BY THE FEDERAL
             ARBITRATION ACT.                 THIS ARBITRATION
             PROVISION LIMITS YOUR RIGHTS, AND
             WAIVES THE RIGHT TO MAINTAIN A COURT
             ACTION OR PURSUE A CLASS ACTION IN
             COURT OR IN ARBITRATION. PLEASE READ
             IT CAREFULLY, PRIOR TO SIGNING.

        On January 20, 2017, plaintiff filed an arbitration demand with the

American Arbitration Association (AAA) alleging the dealership refused to sell

her the vehicle she saw online for the advertised price and, instead, required that

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she pay thousands of dollars extra in various fees, in violation of the Consumer

Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -227, the Automotive Sales Practices

Regulations (ASPR), N.J.A.C. 13:45A-26B.1 to -26B.4, the Motor Vehicle

Advertising   Practices   Regulations    (MVAPR),        N.J.A.C.   13:45A-26A.1

to -26A.10, and the Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act

(TCCWNA), N.J.S.A. 56:12-14 to -18.

      In February 2017, AAA sent a letter to the dealership advising the

arbitration demand was filed and the dealership was required to pay the

arbitration administration fees. The dealership did not pay the required fees, so

AAA declined to administer the case and closed its file.

      On May 5, 2017, plaintiff filed a putative class action complaint against

defendants, alleging violations of the CFA, ASPR, MVAPR, and TCCWNA. On

June 19, 2017, defendants filed an answer including sixteen affirmative

defenses. Within those defenses, defendants asserted the Law Division lacked

subject matter jurisdiction based on the arbitration provision without specific

reference to the class action waiver contained within it, though defendants

subsequently asserted during a case management conference that plaintiff was

precluded under the contract from class action relief.

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      Plaintiff filed a motion for class certification, which the trial court denied

on August 13, 2020. In its written decision, the trial court found "[p]laintiff

knowingly and voluntarily agreed to proceed only in . . . her own individual

capacity and not as a class representative or member in any forum" and,

therefore, plaintiff could not represent the class.

      On October 1, 2020, plaintiff filed a second motion for class certification.

The trial court denied plaintiff's motion and found plaintiff had continued as the

class representative despite the August 13, 2020 order setting forth that she

could not proceed in that representative capacity. The trial court also found that

plaintiff improperly changed the definitions of the proposed classes without

obtaining leave to file an amended complaint.

      Plaintiff appealed, arguing the trial court erred in finding that she could

not be a class representative, as well as contending error in allowing defendants

to rely on the arbitration clause in the MVRO as a defense when they failed to

pay the arbitration fees. On July 20, 2022, we affirmed, holding "[t]he class

action waiver contained in the arbitration agreement was clear and

unambiguous." Cerciello, 473 N.J. Super. at 258. We stated:

            [P]laintiff waived her right to pursue any claims she
            might have against defendants in a class action.
            Plaintiff was informed the waiver applied whether she
            brought her claims in an arbitration or before a court.

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            Therefore, plaintiff was on notice, and agreed, that she
            could not bring a class action in court. Defendants'
            inability to compel arbitration does not affect plaintiff's
            waiver of her right to pursue a class action in court.
            Because plaintiff was clearly informed of the waiver
            that applied both in court and arbitration, we are
            satisfied the class action waiver survives defendants'
            breach of the agreement and remains applicable to
            plaintiff's claims.

                   . . . The court did not err in denying class
            certification because plaintiff could not serve as a class
            representative . . . . Without a class representative, the
            court properly denied class certification.

                   . . . For the reasons already stated regarding
            plaintiff's claims, the putative class members were also
            foreclosed from joining a class and being part of a class
            action in a court.

                   . . . [D]efendants asserted the affirmative defense
            and moved to dismiss the complaint and to compel
            arbitration soon after plaintiff filed the class action
            complaint. Defendants did not delay in raising the
            defense.

            [Id. at 258-259.]

      Plaintiff sought interlocutory leave to appeal, which the Court denied.

Cerciello v. Salerno Duane, Inc., 252 N.J. 184 (2022). On November 21, 2022,

we published our opinion in Largoza, 474 N.J. Super. 61. Relying on Largoza,

plaintiff then filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the trial court's August

13, 2020 order denying her motion for class certification.

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      On January 6, 2023, the trial court denied plaintiff's motion in an oral

decision determining Largoza did not materially change the law so as to render

its prior decisions in the matter invalid. The trial court ruled that Largoza

applied the standard for waiver set forth in Cole v. Jersey City Medical Center,

215 N.J. 265 (2013), and, as the court had already conducted the requisite

analysis under Cole, there was no basis to change its decision. This appeal

follows.

                                           II.

      Our review of the trial court's denial of plaintiff's motion for

reconsideration of the August 13, 2020 order is governed in part by Rule 4:42-2,

which provides that an interlocutory order "shall be subject to revision at any

time before the entry of final judgment in the sound discretion of the court in

the interest of justice." As set forth in Lawson v. Dewar, "Until entry of final

judgment, only 'sound discretion' and the 'interest of justice' guides the trial

court. . . ." 468 N.J. Super. 128, 134 (App. Div. 2021) (quoting R. 4:42-2).

                                           III.

      On appeal, plaintiff renews her prior arguments and asks that we defer to

the long-standing preference to allow class actions in consumer cases. We find

no compelling reason to reanalyze plaintiff's arguments in full since we

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thoroughly considered them in Cerciello I. See Cerciello I, 473 N.J. Super. at

252-60. Accordingly, we address only plaintiff's newly raised contentions in

light of Largoza.

      Plaintiff argues that Largoza supports her argument that the trial court did

not engage in sufficient analysis when considering plaintiff's motion for class

certification. We disagree.

       In Largoza, the plaintiffs entered into a contract to purchase property,

signing loan and mortgage agreements which included forum selection clauses

requiring litigation in a jurisdiction other than New Jersey. 474 N.J. Super. at

68. After the agreements were signed, the plaintiffs alleged the bank improperly

valued their assets as part of the loan process. Id. at 68-69. The plaintiffs filed

an eighteen-count complaint against the defendants in New Jersey. Id. at 69.

The defendants' motion to dismiss was granted on grounds other than the forum

selection clause, which was not raised as a basis for the motion. Ibid.      After

plaintiff filed an amended complaint, the defendants raised the forum selection

clause in a letter and then in a motion to dismiss, which was granted. Id. at 71-

72.

      On appeal, we remanded to the trial court to apply the Cole factors and

address why the defendants delayed in raising the forum selection clause as an

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affirmative defense. Id. at 86-87. Cole sets forth that "[a]mong other factors,

courts should evaluate" the following when determining if an affirmative

defense, such as a forum selection or an arbitration clause, has been waived:

             (1) the delay in making the arbitration request; (2) the
             filing of any motions, particularly dispositive motions,
             and their outcomes; (3) whether the delay in seeking
             arbitration was part of the party's litigation strategy; (4)
             the extent of discovery conducted; (5) whether the party
             raised the arbitration issue in its pleadings, particularly
             as an affirmative defense, or provided other notification
             of its intent to seek arbitration; (6) the proximity of the
             date on which the party sought arbitration to the date of
             trial; and (7) the resulting prejudice suffered by the
             other party, if any. No one factor is dispositive. A
             court will consider an agreement to arbitrate waived,
             however, if arbitration is simply asserted in the answer
             and no other measures are taken to preserve the
             affirmative defense.

             [215 N.J. 280-81.]

      Plaintiff argues that under Largoza, the trial court did not engage in a full

analysis to determine if defendants, through delay, waived their affirmative

defense to the class action based on the arbitration provision. Our opinion in

Cerciello I addresses plaintiff's assertion:

             We only briefly address plaintiff's argument that
             defendants did not timely raise the arbitration
             agreement as an affirmative defense and therefore
             waived their right to enforce the agreement. As [the
             trial court] found, defendants asserted the affirmative
             defense and moved to dismiss the complaint and to

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            compel arbitration soon after plaintiff filed the class
            action complaint. Defendants did not delay in raising
            the defense. See Cole[], 215 N.J. [at] 277-81. . . .

            [473 N.J. Super. at 259.]

      Plaintiff asserts that the argument warrants revisiting because Largoza had

not yet been decided at the time of the prior appeal. However, plaintiff does not

posit any viable argument that Largoza set forth new law. Instead, Largoza

applied the existing Cole standard to a forum selection clause. We remain

convinced that the trial court sufficiently analyzed the Cole factors before

entering the August 13, 2020 order denying plaintiff's motion for class

certification and the January 6, 2023 order denying plaintiff's motion for

reconsideration was not an abuse of discretion. With no newly established law

or substantive arguments to consider, the interests of justice do not warrant a

different conclusion post-Largoza.

      We reject plaintiff's argument the trial court's August 13, 2020 order

should be reversed because it was erroneously based on the assumption that

defendants asserted the affirmative defense relating to the class action waiver

soon after litigation initially began. It is undisputed that defendants filed an

answer, only weeks after plaintiff filed the putative class action complaint, with

an affirmative defense referencing the arbitration clause which encompassed the

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class action waiver. As previously articulated, other actions were thereafter

taken by defendants to alert plaintiff to their position that the class action portion

of the suit was barred based upon the waiver in the arbitration clause.

      To the extent we have not addressed any of plaintiff's remaining

arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

      Affirmed.

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