Court Opinion

ID: 9601463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:44:28.264779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:33:58.978249
License: Public Domain

*417ALMA WILSON, Justice,
dissenting:
In resolving the jurisdictional question— when did the appeal time in this case begin to run — the majority classifies “common law actions” for special appellate treatment. Under today’s opinion, an unreserved general verdict in a “common law action” tried to a jury becomes the appealable judgment of the court when it is entered by the court clerk. That is, the appeal time will run from the rendering of the jury verdict. Further, under today’s opinion, appeal from an unreserved jury verdict in a “common law action” is restricted to those issues submitted to the jury. That is, the parties are denied a right to appeal issues not submitted to the jury. Classification of “common law actions” separate and distinct from other civil actions for limitation of appeal time and restriction of appealable issues is untenable.1 It is inconsistent with 12 O.S.1991, § 2002, which provides that “[tjhere shall be one form of action to be known as ‘civil action.’ ” It has a chilling affect on the right to a trial by jury2 and access to the courts.3
In this medical malpractice ease, the trial court sustained several of defendants’ demurrers to the evidence. The general verdict returned by the jury did not dispose of the warranty, fraud and misrepresentation issues which were withheld from the jury. The petition in error seeks review of errors committed by the trial court in sustaining the mid-trial demurrers to the evidence. In deciding the untimeliness of this appeal, the majority finds that under our transitional approach to “causes of action” appellants are not entitled to an appeal from the trial court’s mid-trial rulings on the demurrers to the evidence — that the only appealable issues are those determined by general jury verdict. I disagree.
The appellants have a right to appeal the sustaining of appellees’ mid-trial demurrers to the evidence. The appeal must be perfected within thirty days of the recording of the judgment that disposes of all the issues.4 The petition in error herein was filed within thirty days of the recording of the trial court’s judgment.5
Trial was had in this case approximately one month before publication of our order in Jaco Production Company v. Luca, 823 P.2d 364 (Okla.1991), holding that the appeal time *418runs from the record entry of the unreserved general jury verdict. The majority writes that we cannot “flippantly ignore the doctrine of stare decisis and overrule Jaco merely because an unwary litigant missed the deadline for filing an appeal.” Refusal to adhere to Jaco in this case does not ignore the doctrine of stare decisis. Jaco was not an appeal from mid-trial orders sustaining demurrers to the evidence. Jaco is inapposite. Jaco is not authority for denying a party the right to an appeal from the mid-trial sustaining of demurrers to the evidence; nor does it intimate that the appeal time shall be calculated from the entry of a jury verdict on the appearance docket.6
The Jaco holding rests upon 12 O.S.1991, § 696.1.7 Section 696.1 provides:
When a trial by jury has been had, judgment must be entered by the clerk in conformity to the verdict, unless it is special, or the court order the case to be reserved for future argument or consideration. [Emphasis added.]
The only sensible and reasonable reading of the plain words of § 696.1 is that it specifies a duty of the various court clerks — when entering a judgment, the court clerk must ascertain that the judgment conforms to the verdict. This reading is consistent with 12 O.S.1991, § 32.3 which provides:
A. It is the duty of the court to write out, sign and record its orders, judgments and decrees within a reasonable time after rendition....
B. A recorded written order, judgment or decree signed by the court is a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review. [Emphasis added.]
Nothing in § 696.1 indicates a legislative intent to dispense with the appellate jurisdictional prerequisite plainly set out in § 32.3.8 Nothing in § 696.1 indicates a legislative intent to “transform” an “unreserved general jury verdict” in a “common law action” into the appealable judgment of the court.
Under today’s ruling, the appeal time in those “not common law actions” will run from the filing of the written journal entry signed by the trial judge in accordance with the latest statutory changes and the parties will be entitled to appeal all issues raised before the trial court, including issues withheld from the jury. But, the appeal time in “common law actions” tried to a jury will continue under the old appellate regime — the appeal time will be triggered by the pronouncement *419or when the trial court accepts the general jury verdict and discharges the jury. I find no reason to transform an unreserved jury verdict in any action into the appealable judgment of the court.
In this case, judgment was rendered on March 6, 1992, when the trial court accepted the verdict and discharged the jury. The judgment signed by the trial judge and entered in the record on March 26, 1992 is the appealable judgment. Accordingly, this appeal ⅛ timely. I dissent to dismissal of this appeal and join the dissent by Justice Summers.

. Serious procedural confusion is certain under today’s opinion. Case by case, the appellate courts will have to classify actions as "common law” or “not common law." This civil action, based on medical malpractice or medical negligence, fraud, misrepresentation, consent and warranty theories, is classified as a "common law action,” even though those theories are recognized in our statutes. In our order in McGinnis v. Republic-Underwriters Insurance Company, 830 P.2d 191 (Okla. 1992), this Court refused to apply Jaco Production Company v. Luca, 823 P.2d 364 (Okla.1991). We said that a special statutory postjudgment garnishment proceeding is not a "common-law action.” However, 12 O.S.1991, § 1177 provides that the issues in a postjudgment garnishment “shall stand for trial as a civil action.”

. Okla. Const., art. 2, § 19. In deciding to exercise their constitutional right to trial by jury, litigants must consider the risk that appeal may be restricted to the issues given to the jury.

. Okla. Const., art. 2, § 6. The denial of an appeal of issues withheld from a jury closes the courts to those issues.

. 12 O.S.1991, §§ 681 and 990A; Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Tidwell, 820 P.2d 1338 (Okla.1991); DBL Energy Corp. v. Oklahoma Corporation Commission, 805 P.2d 657 (Okla.1991); Reeves v. Agee, 769 P.2d 745 (Okla.1989); Eason Oil Company v. Howard Engineering, Inc., 755 P.2d 669 (Okla.1988); Methvin v. Methvin, 191 Okl. 177, 127 P.2d 186 (1942); and Hurley v. Hurley, 191 Okl. 194, 127 P.2d 147 (1942).

.The journal entry, memorializing the mid-trial rulings and granting judgment on the jury verdict, was filed on March 26, 1992, and provides:
On March 6th, Plaintiffs completed their evidence and rested and the Defendants interposed demurrers on the warranty claim which was sustained; on the fraud and misrepresentation claim which was sustained; on the consortium claim which was overruled; and the informed consent claim which was overruled. The Defendants proceeded to put on evidence and rested on March 6th. There being no rebuttal, the Court instructed the jury and closing arguments were made by both sides. After due deliberation, the jury returned into open court with their ten (10) person verdict signed by ten (10) jurors. The Court examined the verdict forms as well as the attorneys and there being no request to poll the juiy, the Court received and accepted the verdict in favor of the Defendants.
The petition in error was filed with this Court on April 17, 1992.

.In Martin v. Liberty National Bank and Trust Company of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 839 P.2d 179, 180 (Okla.1992), we said that "an appeal-able judgment is entered when a record entry was signed” by the judge. Consistent with Martin, the majority opinion correctly says that "(r)ecord entry is never effected by a clerk’s minute posted on the appearance docket; the appearance docket is nothing more or less than a chronological index of filings and an abstract of significant courtroom events.” Yet, it is the appearance docket entry that is before this Court. It is the mere entry of the. jury verdict in the appearance docket which the majority finds triggered the appeal time.
Attached to appellant’s response to the dismissal request is a copy of the Daily Minutes for March 6, 1992 filed in the office of the Tulsa County Court Clerk on March 11, 1992, which is substantially the same as the entry on the appearance docket attached to appellees’ dismissal request. The appearance docket is labeled "Civil Action Docket, Clerk of Court, Tulsa County, Oklahoma, Judge, DIV-D-7 — Hon. DJ. BOU-DREAU, File Date, 05/25/90, Case ID CJ-TU-90-002558-07, Medical Mal-Practice.” The entry under the date of March 6, 1992, is an abstract of the trial proceeding, including the verdict returned by the jury and accepted and recorded by the trial court.

. Prior to 1990, the thirty day time in which an appeal could be perfected was triggered by the pronouncement of judgment. Martin v. Liberty National Band and Trust Company of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 839 P.2d 179 (Okla.1992). In 1990, the statutes were amended providing the appeal time be calculated from the filing of the judgment. 1990 Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 251, § 4. The filing of the judgment is the event which begins the appeal time limitation under the latest amendments. 1991 Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 251.

. Strictly adhering to § 32.3, in Martin v. Liberty National Bank and Trust Company of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 839 P.2d 179 (Okla.1992), we rejected a minute order initialed by the judge as an appealable judgment, finding that the legislature clearly and explicitly required the signature of the judge as a jurisdictional prerequisite to appellate review. Section 696.1, as well as §§ 32.3 and 990A were amended and/or reenacted in 1991. 1991 Okla.Sess.Laws, ch. 251. Our construction of § 696.1 should be consistent with the other provisions of the 1991 law.