Court Opinion

ID: 9914177
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-29 19:02:20.047649+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:10:27.634393
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/29/23 P. v. Olguin CA2/1
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION ONE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B329490

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. BA062441)
           v.

 JUAN CANELA OLGUIN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Affirmed.
      Claire H. Kim for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Stephanie
A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
              __________________________________
      In a hearing that occurred in 1992, appellant Juan Canela
Olguin pled guilty to two different crimes in two different cases.
Before accepting the pleas, the trial court advised Olguin that his
pleas could have adverse immigration consequences; Olguin
stated he understood.
      Nearly three decades later, Olguin brought a motion under
Penal Code section 1473.7 to vacate his conviction in one of those
cases, claiming he did not meaningfully understand the adverse
immigration consequences of his guilty plea.1 The superior court
disbelieved Olguin and denied his claim. Olguin did not appeal
this denial. Instead, he brought a second motion under the same
statute, again claiming he did not understand the adverse
immigration consequences of his guilty plea. The court again
denied the motion and Olguin appealed. We affirmed and, after
our Supreme Court denied review, we issued a remittitur.
      Five months after he filed his initial motion in the first
case, Olguin also filed a motion in the second case under section
1473.7, again claiming he did not meaningfully understand the
adverse immigration consequences of his guilty plea; the superior
court denied this motion, too. Again, rather than appeal that
denial, Olguin filed a second motion in the second case under the
same statute on the same grounds. This current appeal is from
the superior court’s denial of that second motion in the second
case.
      As discussed below, we conclude that the superior court
has, in a final decision, already resolved against Olguin the issue
of whether he meaningfully understood the immigration

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                 2
consequences of his guilty pleas. Because issue preclusion bars
him from relitigating this issue, we affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2

      A.     Olguin Pleads Guilty in Two Cases
       In 1991, in Case No. BA045520 (the 520 Case), Olguin was
charged with robbery and possession of cocaine.3 At his
arraignment, the trial court advised him: “If you are not a
citizen, you are hereby advised that a conviction of the offense for
which you have been charged may have the consequences of
deportation, exclusion from admission to the United States, or
denial of naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United
States.” After the trial court dismissed the robbery count and
held Olguin to answer for the cocaine possession, Olguin was
placed on informal probation in a deferred entry of judgment
program.
       In August 1992, in Case No. BA062441 (the 441 Case),
Olguin was charged with one count of grand theft. At his
arraignment, he was again advised: “If you are not a citizen, you
are hereby advised that a conviction of the offense for which you
have been charged may have the consequences of deportation,

      2 We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history

relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
      3 In the 520 Case, Olguin was referred to as Pedro Prado

Canela. In a February 2023 hearing in the case on appeal, his
counsel clarified to the court that Pedro Prado Canela and Juan
Canela Olguin were the same person. Because the caption in this
case is People v. Juan Canela Olguin, we refer to appellant as
Olguin herein.

                                 3
exclusion from admission to the United States, or denial of
naturalization pursuant to the laws of the United States.”
Olguin pled not guilty. After a preliminary hearing, Olguin was
held to answer on grand theft.
        In September 1992, Olguin pled guilty in both cases at the
same hearing. In accepting his pleas, the trial court once again
advised him: “If you’re not a citizen of the United States,
pleading guilty to these two charges could very prevent [sic] you
from becoming a citizen, get you deported. [¶] If you’re here
lawfully but not as a citizen, that right could be taken from you.
You could be denied a right to remain in the country lawfully in
the future. Do you understand that?” Olguin responded: “Yes.”
After the court accepted the pleas, Olguin’s counsel asked the
court that “in the event he gets deported, if the formal probation
could revert to probation without supervision.” The court agreed
and addressed Olguin directly, stating: “I’m going to place you
officially, sir, on formal probation. If you are deported, that will
revert to probation without formal supervision.” The court
sentenced Olguin to three years of probation, including 365 days
of jail time. In 1993, Olguin was accused of violating probation.
An immigration judge ordered him removed from the United
States on April 5, 1993.

      B.    Olguin Repeatedly Asks to Vacate His
            Convictions

            1.    The 520 Case

                  (a)   First Motion
     In September 2019, Olguin filed a motion in the 520 Case
under section 1473.7, arguing that his conviction was “legally

                                 4
invalid” because he did not “meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences” of his guilty plea. He claimed he was
“never advised of the proper immigration consequences of his
guilty plea” and would not have pled guilty had he understood
the immigration consequences of his plea.
       The superior court denied the motion, finding that Olguin
had not met his burden to demonstrate he did not understand the
immigration consequences of his plea. The court cited to Olguin’s
affirmative response to the trial court’s initial question to him
regarding his understanding of the potential immigration
consequences of his plea, to the request of Olguin’s counsel to
change Olguin’s status from formal probation to probation
without supervision should he be deported, and to the direct
statement the court made to Olguin regarding how his probation
would change from formal to unsupervised should he be deported.
       Olguin’s counsel argued that the trial court’s warning was
insufficient because it stated only that Olguin “could” be
deported, not that he would be. The superior court rejected this
argument, reasoning that courts could not truthfully give a
definitive statement that a defendant would be deported without
being “psychic,” because no one could know with certainty
whether a defendant would “definitely” be deported—the court
posited a hypothetical in which an immigrant was granted
citizenship for performing a heroic act. The superior court added
that the law required more than a defendant’s averment that he
did not understand the immigration consequences of his plea
because such a standard would permit anybody to “just file a
declaration and simply say ‘I didn’t underst[an]d what I was told

                               5
in 1985 and didn’t understand that this was going to happen.’
It’s called lying. It’s called credibility.”
       During a discussion with Olguin’s counsel regarding
Olguin’s statement at a preliminary hearing that he did not
understand his constitutional rights very well, the court
interpreted Olguin’s statement “as a precursor to letting the
defendant know you’ve got to know all your rights. You’ve got to
talk to your lawyer and know your rights. And at that time[,] he
said whatever it was that he said and that it is a good point, in
that he would have to understand what was happening down the
road, which in this Court’s opinion[,] he did.” (Italics added.)
       Olguin did not appeal the denial of this motion.

                  (b)    Second Motion
       In July 2021, Olguin filed a second motion under section
1473.7, arguing he had received ineffective assistance of counsel
because his counsel never advised him of the adverse
immigration consequences of his plea. He claimed again that he
therefore “did not ‘meaningfully[] understand, defend[] against,
or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse immigration
consequences’ of his plea.” The superior court dismissed the
motion with prejudice, finding the motion had previously been
filed and heard and “[t]here’s no changed circumstances, no new
facts . . . .”
       Olguin appealed the denial of this second motion and we
affirmed, holding he had failed to demonstrate prejudice from the
court’s dismissal order. (People v. Canela (Oct. 10, 2022,
B315246), 13–14.)4 Specifically, we found that he had failed to

      4 In the instant appeal, we granted Olguin’s request to take

judicial notice of the record from the B315246 appeal.

                                6
demonstrate his counsel was ineffective and that nothing in his
second motion would have affected the court’s previous
determination that he was not credible in claiming he did not
understand the immigration consequences of his plea. (Id. at pp.
11–13.) In December 2022, our Supreme Court denied Olguin’s
petition for review and we issued a remittitur.

             2.    The 441 Case

                   (a)     First Motion
       In February 2020, Olguin filed a motion in propria persona
in the 441 Case under section 1473.7, asking to vacate his
conviction and sentence. As in his motions in the 520 Case, he
claimed that when he pled guilty, he did “not meaningfully
understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the immigration
consequences of a conviction” and “was not advised of the proper
immigration consequences” of pleading guilty. He claimed if he
had “meaningfully underst[oo]d that by accepting the guilty plea,
[he] was going to lose [his] rights,” he never would have accepted
the plea, and would have “fought [his] case” or “accepted a
harsher punishment or even taken more time incarcerated to
avoid the deportation.” The superior court summarily denied the
petition “for lack of eligibility under the statute, lack of service to
the necessary parties.” Olguin did not appeal the denial of this
motion.

                   (b)   Second Motion
       Instead, in January 2023, Olguin—now again with the
same retained counsel that filed the motions in the 520 Case—
filed a second motion for relief under section 1473.7. The motion
was based on the same grounds but included more detail, such as

                                   7
that the record was “silent as to whether defense counsel
discussed defendant’s noncitizen status during the plea
negotiations with the prosecutor or whether the prosecutor was
made aware of petitioner’s noncitizen status when crafting the
plea agreement with his attorney”; that the court “used tentative
language” in advising Olguin regarding deportation; and that
there was “no written waiver form.” Although the district
attorney’s office stated it would not oppose Olguin’s motion, the
superior court nevertheless denied it. The court remarked that
Olguin had filed “successive motions” of the same nature—
including one whose denial had been appealed and affirmed—and
that, when Olguin pled guilty, “the discussions regarding
deportation were clearly, clearly, clearly had.” Olguin timely
appealed this second denial.

                           DISCUSSION
       Olguin contends the superior court erred in denying his
motion because the evidence he submitted established that his
counsel failed to advise him of the immigration consequences of
his plea, as a result of which he “was ignorant of his options and
lost the opportunity to make a meaningful and knowing decision
about the immigration consequences of the plea.” Olguin further
contends his extensive ties to the United States and the
likelihood of resolving his case with a plea agreement without
immigration consequences demonstrated he would have “rejected
the plea and either gone to trial or sought a different,
immigration-neutral disposition.” Finally, Olguin argues the
court erred in denying his motion as successive because “the laws
governing 1473.7 statutes have evolved since 2019” and issue
preclusion is inapplicable.

                                8
      The People counter that the court properly denied the
motion as successive, the motion was barred by issue preclusion,
and even had the court erred in denying the motion as successive
or precluded, such an error was harmless because a different
result was not reasonably probable. The People add that,
contrary to Olguin’s claim, the court also correctly considered and
rejected his motion on the merits.
      Because we conclude that Olguin’s motion was barred by
issue preclusion, we need not consider the parties’ other
arguments.

      A.     Governing Law
      “A person who is no longer in criminal custody may file a
motion to vacate a conviction or sentence” if “[t]he conviction or
sentence is legally invalid due to prejudicial error damaging the
moving party’s ability to meaningfully understand, defend
against, or knowingly accept the actual or potential adverse
immigration consequences of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere.”
(§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) “[S]howing prejudicial error under
section 1473.7, subdivision (a)(1) means demonstrating a
reasonable probability that the defendant would have rejected
the plea if the defendant had correctly understood its actual or
potential immigration consequences.” (People v. Vivar (2021) 11
Cal.5th 510, 529; see also People v. Mejia (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th
859, 862 [“to establish a ‘prejudicial error’ under section 1473.7, a
person need only show by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) he
did not ‘meaningfully understand’ or ‘knowingly accept’ the
actual or potential adverse immigration consequences of the plea;
and (2) had he understood the consequences, it is reasonably
probable he would have instead attempted to ‘defend against’ the
charges”].)

                                  9
       “In general, whether a prior finding will be given conclusive
effect in a later proceeding is governed by the doctrine of issue
preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel. [Citations.] This
common law doctrine is ‘grounded on the premise that “once an
issue has been resolved in a prior proceeding, there is no further
factfinding function to be performed.” ’ [Citation.] The doctrine
‘ “has the dual purpose of protecting litigants from the burden of
relitigating an identical issue with the same party or his privy
and of promoting judicial economy by preventing needless
litigation.” ’ [Citation.] It applies in criminal as well as civil
proceedings.” (People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698, 715–716.)
“[I]ssue preclusion bars relitigation of issues earlier decided ‘only
if several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue
sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that
decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have
been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must
have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth,
the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the
merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought
must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former
proceeding.’ ” (Id. at p. 716.)

      B.    Analysis

            1.    Issue Preclusion Applies
      In September 2019, Olguin brought a motion in the 520
Case under section 1473.7, arguing that his conviction was
invalid because he was never properly advised of the immigration
consequences of his plea, and would not have pled guilty had he
understood those consequences. The superior court denied the
motion, finding that Olguin had understood the immigration

                                 10
consequences of his plea, and disbelieving Olguin’s assertions to
the contrary. Olguin did not appeal the order denying his
motion, and that order is now final.
       Thus, the issue of whether Olguin understood the
immigration consequences of his guilty pleas in both the 520
Case and the 441 Case—as both pleas occurred simultaneously—
was actually litigated in the 520 Case, and necessarily decided
against him in a final decision on the merits. Olguin is therefore
precluded from relitigating the same issue.
       Olguin argues that the issue preclusion factors have not
been met because: “Trial court ruling is based on 2019 and 2021
motions to vacate BA045520, which is a different case, where the
trial court did not consider the factors required in deciding 1473.7
motions under existing law. [sic]” To the extent that we
understand this argument, Olguin is contending that the
superior court’s ruling in the 520 Case cannot have preclusive
effect because the court did not consider the factors required in
deciding motions under section 1473.7. We disagree. Olguin
cites nothing in the record to support his contention that the
superior court did not consider the relevant factors under section
1473.7 and, in any case, ample evidence demonstrates it
considered a key factor—whether Olguin understood the
immigration consequences of his guilty plea—and decided that
factor against him.

            2.     Equity Does Not Mandate a Different
                   Result
      Olguin contends that even if all elements necessary for
issue preclusion were met, equity precludes us from applying the
doctrine in this case, because his “interest in a [sic] having his
second motion considered by the trial court is consistent with

                                11
maintaining integrity and public confidence in the judicial
system, while the application of collateral estoppel threatens
those policies” and because applying issue preclusion “would
frustrate the legislative intent of section 1473.7”—“ensuring that
a person prosecuted in state court does not suffer penalties or
adverse consequences as a result of a legally invalid conviction.”
Olguin additionally argues that “[t]he Legislature did not intend
those motions brought under the new statutory standard would
be denied because courts had denied earlier motions to vacate
brought on different grounds.” We find Olguin’s arguments
unpersuasive.
       As discussed above, the superior court denied Olguin’s
initial motion in the 520 Case because, based on the transcript
from the plea hearing, it found not credible Olguin’s professed
ignorance of the immigration consequences of his guilty pleas.
Olguin cites nothing in his successive motions that would have
changed the court’s mind about this finding—a finding he never
appealed. “Filing a second motion under section 1473.7 and
asking the superior court to conduct the same analysis and come
to a different conclusion does not preserve the integrity of the
judicial system or promote judicial economy.” (People v.
DeMontoya (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 1159, 1182.) To the extent that
Olguin argues the law has changed in some fashion since the first
denial, Olguin presents no authority showing a change in the
requirement that he demonstrate he did not “meaningfully
understand, defend against, or knowingly accept the actual or
potential adverse immigration consequences of a plea of guilty.”
(§ 1473.7, subd. (a)(1).) Whether any other portion of the law has
changed, Olguin is not entitled to relief unless he can make a
showing of his ignorance. (See People v. Perez (2018) 19

                               12
Cal.App.5th 818, 829 [affirming trial court’s denial of section
1473.7 motion when “record belies [appellant’s] contention that
he did not meaningfully understand the immigration
consequences of his plea”].)
      To obtain relief under section 1473.7, Olguin was required
to demonstrate that he did not understand the immigration
consequences of his plea. Because he is precluded from making
such an argument, and there is no equitable reason to bar the
application of issue preclusion, the superior court did not err in
denying his motion.

                         DISPOSITION
      The order is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                                                      CHANEY, J.

We concur:

             ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

             BENDIX, J.

                                13