Court Opinion

ID: 9385004
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-05 19:02:52.399806+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:58.257331
License: Public Domain

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                                                         Electronically Filed
                                                         Supreme Court
                                                         SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                         05-APR-2023
                                                         08:31 AM
                                                         Dkt. 23 OP

           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAIʻI

                              ---o0o---

               THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS and
    THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE OFFICE OF HAWAIIAN AFFAIRS,
                      Plaintiffs-Appellees,

                                 vs.

 LESLIE H. KONDO, in his official capacity as State Auditor, and
          STATE OF HAWAIʻI OFFICE OF THE STATE AUDITOR,
                      Defendants-Appellants.

                          SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX

         CERTIORARI TO THE INTERMEDIATE COURT OF APPEALS
           (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 1CCV-XX-XXXXXXX)

                           APRIL 5, 2023

     RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, AND EDDINS, JJ.,
          AND WILSON, J., ASSIGNED BY REASON OF VACANCY

                OPINION OF THE COURT BY EDDINS, J.

     In this declaratory action, two constitutionally created

state agencies square off over two major laws, Hawaiʻi Revised
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Statutes (HRS) § 23-5 (2009 & Supp. 2014) and the attorney-

client privilege, codified in HRS Chapter 626.

     The Office of the Auditor believes HRS § 23-5 empowers it

to receive all records of an auditee, even attorney-client

communications.   The Office of Hawaiian Affairs, the subject of

an audit, sued.   It argues HRS § 626-1, Rule 503 (2016), the

lawyer-client privilege, overcomes the auditor’s authority and

preserves the confidentiality of attorney-client communications.

     We hold that the Office of the Auditor lacks authority to

pierce the attorney-client privilege and obtain an auditee’s

confidential communications.

     We also reject the Office of the Auditor’s jurisdiction and

non-justiciability bars to the Office of Hawaiian Affairs’ suit.

                                 I.

     In 2019 the Hawaiʻi Legislature directed an audit of the

Office of Hawaiian Affairs.    Act 37, the Office of Hawaiian

Affairs Appropriations Act of 2019, conditioned the release of

OHA’s 2020-2021 general funds upon the legislature’s receipt of

an audit report “no later than twenty days prior to the

convening of the regular session[] of 2020.”     2019 Haw. Sess.

Laws Act 37, § 9 at 97.

     Per this legislative directive, Defendants Leslie H. Kondo,

in his official capacity as State Auditor, and the State of

Hawai‘i Office of the Auditor, began an audit of Plaintiffs, the

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Office of Hawaiian Affairs and the Board of Trustees of the

Office of Hawaiian Affairs (collectively, OHA).

     The Auditor asked OHA to hand over lots of records.      One

tranche requested OHA’s unredacted executive sessions minutes

from 2006-2019.   Because the executive session minutes contained

privileged attorney-client communications, OHA proposed giving

the Auditor redacted minutes.

     This dissatisfied the Auditor.    The Office of the Auditor

has unlimited power to access all OHA records, he told OHA.       The

Auditor’s authority extends to OHA’s privileged attorney-client

communications.   In an email to OHA, Kondo outlined his stance:

“It is our position that section 23-5, HRS, provides us with the

authority to access all records maintained by an auditee,

including attorney-client communication[s] and other records

that are not accessible by the public, like minutes to executive

sessions.”

     OHA resisted.   Kondo repeated his position: per HRS § 23-5,

“we have access to all records, with no exception[s].”      In turn,

OHA recapped its position: the law lets the Auditor access

records, but attorney-client communications are off-limits.       OHA

gave the Auditor all requested executive session minutes with

redactions for confidential attorney-client privileged

information.

     A stalemate ensued.

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     Then the Auditor packed up his audit, explaining in a late

December 2020 letter to OHA that he could not finish the audit

without OHA’s attorney-client communications.     Unless he had

access to the unredacted executive session minutes, Kondo wrote,

there was “an unreasonable risk” that the Office of the

Auditors’ “findings, conclusions, and recommendations may be

based on improper or incomplete information.”

     Before suspending the audit, Kondo told OHA that he had

“the ability to if necessary to subpoena records, or subpoena

people” but that “I don’t believe we ever need to pull that

trigger for a State Agency.    I believe a State Agency must

cooperate.”   Ultimately, Kondo chose not to use his subpoena

power.

     No audit report was prepared.    So OHA did not receive its

2020-2021 general funds.   Later though, in 2021, the legislature

amended Act 37 to remove the audit precondition and released the

previous year’s general funds allocation to OHA.      See 2021 Haw.

Sess. Laws Act 29, § 8 at 50.

     After the suspension of the audit, but before OHA received

the funds, OHA sued Kondo and the Office of the Auditor.      In

February 2020, OHA filed a two-count complaint for declaratory

relief in the Circuit Court of the First Circuit.

     Count 1 sought a declaratory judgment that the Auditor

violated Act 37 by failing to submit an audit report.      Later, by

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stipulation, the circuit court dismissed this count in October

2021.

     As to Count 2, OHA sought a declaratory judgment “that

neither HRS Chapter 23 nor the Hawai‘i State Constitution

requires OHA to disclose to the State Auditor privileged

attorney-client communications protected from disclosure.”

     OHA moved for summary judgment.     OHA argued that HRS § 23-5

does not allow the Auditor to look at its privileged attorney-

client communications.

     The Office of the Auditor moved for judgment on the

pleadings.   It argued that HRS § 23-5 gave the Auditor authority

to access all auditee records.    Kondo also moved to dismiss

based on lack of jurisdiction and several non-justiciability

doctrines: standing, mootness, no advisory opinions, and

political question.

     Before ruling on the motions, Circuit Court Judge Jeffrey

Crabtree reviewed OHA’s redacted and unredacted executive

sessions minutes in camera.    The court “saw the issue of in

camera review as related to defendant’s motion to dismiss” for

lack of jurisdiction, explaining that “by actually determining

the factual and legal status of the redacted documents as

attorney-client privileged material, the court has resolved an

important issue and can move forward without risk of issuing a

hypothetical ruling based on ‘if’ or ‘assuming’ the redacted

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documents are protected by the attorney-client privilege.”

Nearly all the redactions were attorney-client communications,

the court found.

     The circuit court sided with OHA, granting its motion for

summary judgment and denying the Auditor’s motion for judgment

on the pleadings.   HRS § 626-1, Rule 503 controlled, not HRS

§ 23-5, the court ruled:

          [T]he key legal issue here is whether HRS [§] 23-5 or
          Chapter 626, and in particular Rule 503, wins if it’s an
          arm wrestle match between those two statutes. . . .
          [T]here’s good arguments on both sides, but I’m siding in
          favor of Rule 503 being more specific and more controlling
          than 23-5 is . . . . I think there’s true value in
          protecting the attorney-client privilege.

     In September 2020, the circuit court issued a minute order

and short-form orders that granted OHA’s motion and denied the

Auditor’s motion.   The minute order detailed the court’s

document review and explained its decision:

                There is no question whatsoever that the vast
          majority of the redactions are attorney-client
          communications. The un-redacted portions show Board
          members discussing all manner of legal issues with their
          counsel present. This includes but is not limited to items
          on the Board’s public agenda, including updates from
          counsel about ongoing litigation, confidential personnel
          issues, legal authority necessary or helpful to guide Board
          decision-making, and much more. The redacted information
          is confidential by law (e.g., OHA is entitled to move into
          Executive Session to discuss it), and clearly covered by
          the attorney-client privilege as well.

The court entered a final judgment for OHA in November 2021.

     The Office of the Auditor appealed.        Then OHA applied for

transfer to this court, and we accepted.

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     Kondo argues there is no subject matter jurisdiction and

offers his non-justiciability arguments.

     About the merits, Kondo says HRS § 23-5 empowers him to

review all OHA records.   He acknowledges that OHA’s executive

session minutes contain privileged attorney-client

communications.   But all has no exceptions: “There is no carve-

out for privileged records.[]”    Kondo also maintains that

disclosure to the Office of the Auditor does not waive the

attorney-client privilege because it is “mandatory, not

voluntary.”   Kondo asks us to reverse the circuit court’s orders

and judgment.

     OHA counters that the circuit court got it right.      OHA may

seek judicial relief and has the right to shield its attorney-

client communications from the Auditor’s prying eyes.      OHA

rejects the Auditor’s waiver of privilege position.      Handing

over its privileged communications without a court order

constitutes a voluntary disclosure and waives the attorney-

client privilege, asserts OHA.

                                 II.

     First, we address the Office of the Auditors’ non-

justiciability arguments.   We hold that our courts have

jurisdiction, and there are no justiciability barriers to OHA’s

case.

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     Hawaiʻi has a declaratory action framework that advances

access to the justice system.    HRS Chapter 632’s purpose is to

“afford relief from the uncertainty and insecurity attendant

upon controversies over legal rights . . . with a view to making

the courts more serviceable to the people.”     HRS § 632-6 (2016).

Our declaratory action laws are “liberally interpreted and

administered.”   Id.

     In declaratory actions, HRS § 632-1(a) (2016) covers

subject matter jurisdiction, and HRS § 632-1(b) covers standing.

See Tax Found. of Hawaiʻi v. State, 144 Hawaiʻi 175, 186–88, 439

P.3d 127, 138–40 (2019).

     Declaratory actions require an “actual controversy.”       HRS

§ 632-1(a).   Otherwise, there is no subject matter jurisdiction.

Tax Found., 144 Hawai‘i at 192-94, 439 P.3d at 144-46.      A party

cannot simulate a dispute or make-up a hypothetical.      Id. at

196, 439 P.3d at 148.

     The Office of the Auditor asserts that OHA’s “real

controversy” involves others.    “If the funds were not released,

it was because of the way the Legislature wrote the provisos in

Act 37, or because the executive branch exercised its authority

on the release, non-release, or partial release of funds, and

not due to the suspension of the audit.”     Also, because OHA just

wanted the general funds, and ultimately got the money, there is

no jurisdiction, the Auditor says.

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     The Auditor overlooks count 2.       The parties stipulated to

dismiss count 1.   The case no longer concerns the Auditor’s

suspension of the audit and OHA’s general funds.

     Count 2 remains.     OHA and the Auditor’s quarrel concerns

statutory interpretation, classic fare for declaratory actions.

“Controversies involving the interpretation of . . . statutes”

may be determined by the courts.       HRS § 632-1(a).   Hawaiʻi’s

declaratory action law also broadly allows declaratory relief

“in other situations involving other antagonistic assertions or

denial of rights.”     See Tax Found., 144 Hawaiʻi at 193, 439 P.3d

at 145.

     OHA’s suit involves the Office of the Auditor’s statutory

power under HRS § 23-5 and Hawaiʻi Rules of Evidence (HRE) Rule

503, the lawyer-client privilege, codified in HRS Chapter 626.

The dispute is real, not conjectural.       Count 2 presents a

prototypical declaratory action.       There is an actual

controversy.   Our courts have jurisdiction.

     Next, standing.     Standing is about the role of courts in a

democratic society – a service to our tripartite system that

favors the courtroom as a space to resolve controversy.        Life of

the Land v. Land Use Comm’n, 63 Haw. 166, 172, 623 P.2d 431, 438

(1981).   Standing has a prudential spirit.      Tax Found., 144

Hawaiʻi at 196, 439 P.3d at 148.

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     HRS § 632-1(b) covers standing in declaratory actions.              Id.

This court has detailed when a party has standing to bring an

action for declaratory relief:

            (1) . . . antagonistic claims exist between the parties

                   (i) that indicate imminent and inevitable
                  litigation, or

                   (ii) where the party seeking declaratory relief has
                  a concrete interest in a legal relation, status,
                  right, or privilege that is challenged or denied by
                  the other party, who has or asserts a concrete
                  interest in the same legal relation, status, right,
                  or privilege; and

            (2) a declaratory judgment will serve to terminate the
            uncertainty or controversy giving rise to the proceeding.

Id. at 201, 439 P.3d at 153.

     OHA’s complaint satisfies both the “imminent and

inevitable” and “concrete interest” paths to standing.

     OHA has a concrete interest in safeguarding its attorney-

client communications.      And it has an interest to see if its

privilege claim stands up against the Auditor’s interest that

HRS § 23-5 requires disclosure.        The controversy is real.

     Turning to the law’s “imminent and inevitable” disjunctive,

because he never issued a subpoena duces tecum, the Auditor

argues that litigation was not inevitable.          Litigation is only

imminent and inevitable, if he “pulls the trigger” and uses his

subpoena power, Kondo claims.        And because he didn’t, OHA lacks

standing.

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       OHA’s complaint anticipates the Auditor’s argument:

           This action is justiciable because litigation is imminent
           and inevitable either because the State Auditor will
           attempt to exercise his subpoena power under HRS section
           23-5(c)and OHA will move to quash, or OHA will file an
           action to prospectively enjoin the State Auditor from
           exercising his subpoena power to obtain OHA’s attorney-
           client privileged communications.

OHA says that if the Auditor issues a subpoena duces tecum for

its unredacted executive session minutes, then it will counter

with a Hawaiʻi Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 45 motion to

quash.    See HRS § 23-5(c) (“Upon application by the auditor”

circuit court may enforce subpoena “in the same manner as a

subpoena issued by the clerk of the circuit court.”).            OHA’s

complaint also signals it will seek declaratory and injunctive

relief.    OHA satisfies both HRS § 632-1(b)(1) disjunctives.

       The Auditor’s decision not to subpoena OHA’s records is

odd.    The legislature has given the Auditor subpoena power.            See

HRS § 23-5(c) (auditor may issue a subpoena duces tecum

“compelling the production of accounts, books, records, files,

papers, documents, or other evidence, which the auditor

reasonably believes may relate to an audit or other

investigation being conducted under this chapter.”).           If, as the

Auditor asserts, the audit “may be based on improper or

incomplete information” and cannot be prepared unless he views

OHA’s privileged attorney-client communications, then there is

no good reason for the Office of the Auditor to ditch the very

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tool that might pry information from OHA.     The Auditor gives no

explanation.

     Ultimately, the Auditor’s choice left OHA with only one

option.    OHA sued for declaratory relief.   A declaratory

judgment will terminate the uncertainty underlying the legal

issue.    OHA has standing.

     Turning to mootness, a case becomes moot when “it has lost

its character as a present, live controversy of the kind that

must exist if courts are to avoid advisory opinions on abstract

propositions of law.”    Kaho‘ohanohano v. State, 114 Hawai‘i 302,

332, 162 P.3d 696, 726 (2007).

     The Office of the Auditor argues that the case became moot

once “OHA decided to withhold the unredacted minutes and the

Auditor suspended the audit.”    We disagree.

     Because OHA’s requested relief focuses on its attorney-

client privilege - not the suspension of the audit or the

appropriation and release of funds – the case is live, not moot.

The Auditor packing up the audit, or the legislature reinstating

the funds, has nothing to do with count 2.      Since OHA asks for a

declaratory judgment about the confidentiality of its privileged

communications, the effective remedy remains and has not been

compromised.    Wong v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Hawaiʻi, 62 Haw.

391, 394, 616 P.2d 201, 203–04 (1980).

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     The case is not moot.    But we address an exception to the

mootness doctrine.   OHA satisfies each step of the “public

interest exception.”

     The public interest exception applies when the issue

“affects the public interest and an authoritative determination

is desirable for the guidance of public officials.”      See

Kaho‘ohanohano, 114 Hawai‘i at 333, 162 P.3d at 727.     This court

applies the public interest exception when (1) public, not

private, interests are affected; (2) guidance for public

officers is sensible; and (3) the issue is apt to repeat.       Id.

     Here, the exception applies.     First, this is a clash

between two constitutionally created state government agencies.

Article XII section 5 of the Hawaiʻi Constitution established the

Office of Hawaiian Affairs, and article VII, section 10

established the Office of the Auditor.     Not only does the public

have an interest in resolving a dispute between these two state

heavyweights, but the issue presented – interpretation of major

statutes – also has public importance.

     Second, this case offers a chance to guide public officers.

It will clarify how the Office of the Auditor and an auditee

tread when disclosure of privileged communications is at stake.

     Third, this issue is apt to resurface.     The Auditor

regularly conducts audits of agencies and issues reports.

Because the Office of the Auditor maintains that it has

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authority to review attorney-client communications, the

Auditor’s authority will likely arise in future audits.

       OHA and the Office of the Auditor are themselves likely to

tangle again.    At least every four years they interact.    “The

auditor shall conduct an audit of [OHA] at least once every four

years.”    HRS § 10-14.55 (2009).    There is no reason to think the

stalemate will not repeat.

       Mootness and the no advisory opinion doctrine are closely

related non-justiciability doctrines.     Here we conclude that

there is no advisory opinion about an abstract proposition of

law.    Kaho‘ohanohano, 114 Hawaiʻi at 332, 162 P.3d at 726.

       Next, we address the argument that the case concerns a

political question.

       A non-justiciable political question involves an issue that

is more appropriate for the executive or legislative branch.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962) (“[t]he

nonjusticiability of a political question is primarily a

function of the separation of powers”).      The political question

doctrine bars issues that are too political to embroil the

judiciary.    Trustees of the Office of Hawaiian Affairs v.

Yamasaki, 69 Haw. 154, 172, 737 P.2d 446, 456-57 (1987).

       We reject Kondo’s argument that there are no “judicially

discoverable and manageable standards” to evaluate the case.

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Baker, 369 U.S. at 217 (detailing this standard and five more

criteria to govern the wisdom of judicial intervention.)

     OHA asks us to decide whether HRS § 23-5 allows the Auditor

access to OHA’s privileged attorney-client communications.

Statutory interpretation is the judiciary’s forte, central to

its mission.   A legal ruling does not intrude on another

governmental branch.

     Also, the legislature outlines a process (issue subpoenas

duces tecum) to resolve disputes regarding materials withheld by

an audit’s subject.    See HRS § 23-5(c).   The statute itself

suggests there are judicially manageable standards to end the

dispute.

     Lastly, the Office of the Auditor does not have sovereign

immunity.

     “The State’s sovereign immunity does not bar actions

seeking prospective declaratory or injunctive relief.”      Gold

Coast Neighborhood Ass’n v. State, 140 Hawaiʻi 437, 464, 403 P.3d

214, 241 (2017)).   OHA’s relief is prospective.     OHA’s complaint

asks for a ruling that Hawaiʻi law protects the disclosure of its

privileged communications during any state audit.      Also, because

Count 2 asks for declaratory relief, not compensation, the

Office of the Auditor has no sovereign immunity.      Pele Def. Fund

v. Paty, 73 Haw. 578, 609-10, 837 P.2d 1247, 1266 (1992).

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                                III.

     We go to the merits.

     OHA seeks a declaratory judgment that HRS § 23-5 does not

require it to “disclose to the State Auditor privileged

attorney-client communications protected from disclosure

pursuant to HRE 503 and common-law principles.”

     The Office of the Auditor opposes declaratory relief.       It

points to HRS § 23-5, titled “Auditor; powers” and claims it has

power to obtain an auditee’s privileged attorney-client

communications.   The Auditor “may examine and inspect all

accounts, books, records, files, papers, and documents and all

financial affairs of every . . . agency.”     HRS § 23-5(a).

     Kondo believes those words – primarily one word, all –

confer “unlimited” power.   He says HRS § 23-5 allows him to

review all auditee records in their entirety, even attorney-

client communications.   No exceptions, all means all.     Plus, the

Auditor insists, he does not need to use his subpoena power to

obtain the records.   See HRS § 23-5(c)(2) (auditor may “compel[]

the production of accounts, books, records, files, papers,

documents or other evidence, which the auditor reasonably

believes may relate to an audit or other investigation being

conducted under this chapter.”)

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                                 A.

     The Auditor contends that HRS § 23-5 and HRE Rule 503 do

not conflict.   And because there is no conflict, the Auditor’s

superior powers snap the attorney-client privilege.      But “even

if the two statutes did conflict,” the Auditor adds, HRS § 23-5

is “more specific” and prevails over HRE Rule 503 that way too.

     We reject the Office of the Auditor’s position.

     We hold that unless an audit’s subject waives the attorney-

client privilege, or a court orders disclosure, the Office of

the Auditor may not access an auditee’s privileged attorney-

client communications.

     Generally, two laws conflict when they “are explicitly

contrary to, or inconsistent with, each other.”      Boyd v. Hawaii

State Ethics Comm’n, 138 Hawaiʻi 218, 227, 378 P.3d 934, 943

(2016) (cleaned up) (charter school employee subject to two

distinct statutory regimes as to standards involving conflicts

of interest).   But if laws can be interpreted harmoniously,

there is no conflict.    “Two statutes conflict where it is not

possible to give effect to both.”     Carmichael v. Bd. of Land &

Nat. Res., 150 Hawaiʻi 547, 567, 506 P.3d 211, 231 (2022)

(cleaned up).

     The two laws in this case do not conflict.      The Auditor’s

powers and the attorney-client privilege can coexist.      The laws

are not explicitly contrary or inconsistent.     And courts (like

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the circuit court here) can read HRE Rule 503 and HRS § 23-5 in

harmony, giving effect to both statutes.     The laws do not need

to incompatibly collide.   HRS § 23-5 says so.

     HRS § 23-5 has a buffer to address privileged

communications.   HRS § 23-5(c) gives the Auditor subpoena duces

tecum power and directs a circuit court to enforce it “in the

same manner as a subpoena issued by the clerk of the circuit

court.”   That is, per HRCP Rule 45, “the court, upon

motion . . . may (1) quash or modify the subpoena if it is

unreasonable and oppressive . . . .”

     HRS § 23-5 anticipates challenges to a subpoena’s validity.

The law’s language foreshadows grounds - like privileges - that

may curb the auditor’s power to access records.      The Auditor’s

authority “is hemmed by the constitution and the safeguards of

the statute itself.”   In re KAHEA, 150 Hawaiʻi 43, 51, 497 P.3d

58, 66 (2021) (referring to the Attorney General’s subpoena

power).   A subpoena that seeks an auditee’s privileged attorney-

client communications is an uncomplicated candidate for court

quashing or modifying.   HRS § 23-5 and in the end, the court,

limit the Auditor.

     This check also springs from the attorney-client

privilege’s centuries-long permanence.     It “is the oldest of the

privileges for confidential communications known to the common

law.”   Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981)

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(citing 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2290 (McNaughton rev. 1961)).

HRE Rule 503, the “Lawyer-client privilege,” codifies the common

law attorney-client privilege.    A client may invoke that

privilege to prevent disclosure of “confidential communications

made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of

professional legal services . . . .”     HRS § 626-1, Rule 503.

     The privilege’s singular value means that only waiver, see

HRE Rule 511 (2016), or a lawyer-client privilege exception, see

HRE Rule 503(d) (2016), may allow a court to disclose privileged

attorney-client communications.    For government lawyers and

their agency clients, the Sunshine Law’s narrower attorney-

client exception may also result in disclosure.      See HRS § 92-

5(a)(4) (2012) (closed board meeting allowed “[t]o consult with

the board’s attorney on questions and issues pertaining to the

board’s powers, duties, privileges, immunities, and

liabilities”); Civ. Beat L. Ctr. for the Pub. Int., Inc. v. City

& Cnty. of Honolulu, 144 Hawaiʻi 466, 489, 445 P.3d 47, 70 (2019)

(closed meeting must strictly conform to an exception and

“executive sessions must be purposeful and unclouded by

pretext”).

     The Auditor claims the court failed to consider whether

OHA’s invocation of the attorney-client privilege also satisfied

HRS § 92-5(a)(4).   He contends the circuit court “completely

glossed over whether a member of the public making the same

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request would have been allowed to see what the Auditor asked to

see.”   Contrary to Kondo’s assertion, the parties submitted

supplemental briefing that covered HRS § 92-5(a)(4).      Then,

after reviewing the redacted materials, the court ruled that

both § 92(5)(a)(4) and HRE 503 protected OHA’s executive session

minutes: “The redacted information is confidential by law (e.g.,

OHA is entitled to move into Executive Session to discuss it),

and clearly covered by the attorney-client privilege as well.”

     Returning to the statutes’ interplay, HRS § 23-5 simply

does not give the Auditor superpower to pop the attorney-client

privilege.    The Auditor offers no case law to support his

stance.

     The Auditor also argues that HRS § 23-5 prevails because it

is more specific.    But a specificity argument is mostly

unhelpful when there is no conflict and the laws can be

harmonized.    Mahiai v. Suwa, 69 Haw. 349, 356–57, 742 P.2d 359,

366 (1987) (courts favor a specific law over a general law when

there is an irreconcilable conflict, however, when the statutes

“overlap in their application, effect will be given to both if

possible”) (citing State v. Kuuku, 61 Haw. 79, 82, 595 P.2d 291,

294 (1979)).

     Some laws are powerhouses.    Here, even if the laws are

inconsistent, HRS § 626-3’s direct language supports the

attorney-client privilege’s supremacy.     “If any other provision

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of law, including any rule promulgated by the supreme court, is

inconsistent with this chapter, this chapter shall govern unless

this chapter or such inconsistent provision of law specifically

provides otherwise.”   HRS § 626-3 (2016) (emphasis added).

Nothing in chapter 626 allows the Auditor (or anyone) to

bulldoze HRE Rule 503.   And nothing in HRS § 23-5 provides an

express override of the lawyer-client privilege.      So, if the

statutes conflict, HRS § 626-1, Rule 503 pins HRS § 23-5.

     Kondo says that reliance on HRS § 626-3 is misplaced.       He

argues the attorney-client privilege only applies to

adjudicative proceedings.   The privilege, though, covers

“confidential communications made for the purpose of

facilitating the rendition of professional legal services,” HRE

Rule 503(b).   Naturally, these communications may precede an

adjudicative proceeding or court case: the lawyer-client

privilege applies when an individual seeks legal advice “from a

professional legal advisor in [their] capacity as such.”      Sapp

v. Wong, 62 Haw. 34, 38, 609 P.2d 137, 140 (1980) (cleaned up)).

                                  B.

     We turn to the Auditor’s position that OHA does not waive

its lawyer-client privilege if it discloses confidential

communications during an audit.

     Society values the secrecy of attorney-client

communications.   A compact guides these exchanges.     Business,

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government, and the legal system operate within a trusty

framework that shelters “confidential communications made for

the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional legal

services” between lawyer and client.     HRE Rule 503(b).   Absent

an understanding that words remain confidential, they may not be

spoken at all.    “The privilege recognizes that sound legal

advice or advocacy serves public ends and that such advice or

advocacy depends upon the lawyer’s being fully informed by the

client.”   Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389.

     A public entity must be able to freely and fully consult

legal counsel.    A government agency is a client worthy of the

privilege’s protections.    See United States v. Jicarilla Apache

Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 170 (2011) (quoting Restatement (Third) of

the Law Governing Lawyers § 74 (2000)) (“[G]overnmental agencies

and employees enjoy the same privilege as nongovernmental

counterparts”).

     Like any holder of the privilege, a government client may

waive the lawyer-client privilege.    “A person upon whom these

rules confer a privilege against disclosure waives the privilege

if, while holder of the privilege, the person or the person’s

predecessor voluntarily discloses or consents to disclosure of

any significant part of the privileged matter.”      HRE Rule 511.

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     OHA refuses to waive its privilege.     OHA maintains that if

it caves to the Auditor without a court order, it waives the

attorney-client privilege.

     The Auditor insists that OHA does not waive the privilege

if OHA gives him what he wants.    He points to HRS § 23-9.5

(2009): “[t]he auditor shall not be required to disclose any

working papers.”   If Kondo promises OHA he won’t tell anybody,

his argument seems to run, then OHA hasn’t waived the privilege

and should hand over its attorney-client communications.      The

Auditor also claims that complying with his demands make OHA’s

disclosure “involuntary,” and thus OHA does not waive its

privilege.

     Not so.   Just because the auditor “shall not be required to

disclose” records, does not mean the Auditor will not or cannot

disclose records containing privileged communications, or will

not mention privileged communications in an audit report.        Also,

HRS § 23-5 gives no assurance that any “involuntary” disclosure

will withstand challenge and remain confidential.      With no

protection, OHA’s counsel made the right call – the only one

consistent with a lawyer’s professional and ethical obligations.

See Hawaiʻi Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(a) (“A lawyer

shall not reveal confidential information relating to the

representation of a client unless the client consents after

consultation.”).

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                                  IV.

     We affirm the Circuit Court of the First Circuit’s

September 10, 2020 Orders.

Douglas S. Chin                         /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
(Patricia Ohara, Robyn B. Chun,
                                        /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Kukui Claydon on the briefs)
for appellants                          /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
                                        /s/ Todd W. Eddins
Kurt W. Klein
(Robert G. Klein, David A.              /s/ Michael D. Wilson
Robyak, James M. Yuda on the
briefs)
for appellees

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