Court Opinion

ID: 9397756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-26 09:10:18.286903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:27.335906
License: Public Domain

IN THE
                          TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

                                 No. 10-23-00086-CV

                    IN THE INTEREST OF R.J.N., A CHILD

                       From the County Court at Law No. 1
                              Johnson County, Texas
                          Trial Court No. CC-D20180168

                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

       C.N. appeals the termination of her parental rights. In four issues, she complains

of the sufficiency of the evidence to support the judgment. We affirm.

                                       Background

       The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services sought to terminate

C.N.'s parental rights to her son, R.J.N. After a final trial on the merits, the trial court

terminated her rights pursuant to Texas Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and

(O) and a finding that termination was in the best interest of the child. See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O); 161.001(b)(2). The order of termination approved and

incorporated the mediated settlement agreement between intervenors Mollie and Kristin
Myers, the foster parents, and C.B., the child's maternal grandmother.            Subject to

termination of C.N.'s parental rights, that agreement provides that the Department will

look first to the Myerses as a potential adoptive placement for R.J.N., and C.B. will have

visitation rights.

                                        Termination Proceedings

        C.N., the mother of R.J.N., was incarcerated at the time of his birth in 2018. On

July 19, 2019, the court appointed C.B., the child's maternal grandmother, permanent

managing conservator.                The Department of Family and Protective Services took

possession of the child on June 21, 2021 and filed a Petition for Intervention for Protection

of a Child, for Conservatorship, and for Termination in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child

Relationship the following day. The trial court signed an emergency order naming the

Department as temporary sole managing conservator of R.J.N. The child was placed with

foster parents, Mollie and Kristin Myers.

        At the hearing on the petition, the Department's investigator testified that C.N.

was concerned that C.B. may be using drugs and not properly caring for R.J.N. But C.N.,

who had just been released from prison, "was in the process of turning herself back in for

a violation" and had no contact with R.J.N. C.N. was not able to provide a safe and stable

environment for the child. However, she allowed him to remain with her mother in

unsafe and unsanitary conditions where he was exposed to drugs thereby endangering

his emotional or physical well-being. The investigator had significant concerns about

In the Interest of R.J.N., a Child                                                     Page 2
C.N.'s history of drug use, as well as C.B.'s drug use. The department has removed other

children from C.N. and K.B., the biological father. Both parents have a criminal history,

neither have been involved in R.J.N.'s life, and neither participated in services through

the department. C.N. received probation for endangerment and abandonment of a child

and tampering with and fabricating physical evidence. She was also assessed jail time

for another charge of abandonment and endangerment of a child and criminal

negligence. The investigator recommended termination.

        The caseworker assigned to the case testified that although she talked to C.N. "on

and off," she had difficulty contacting her, and their contact was minimal. C.N. would

not provide her address or participate in court proceedings due to the outstanding

warrant and her fear of Child Protective Services and of being picked up by the police. A

service plan has been in place for C.N. since August 2021. She was required to complete

a psychological evaluation, parenting class, counseling, a substance abuse assessment,

and random drug testing. She was also required to maintain employment and a safe and

stable home. C.N. knew she needed to "work services" but they were never set up due to

C.N.'s instability.       There was no way for service providers to contact her.     C.N.

purportedly participated in an online parenting class but there is no supporting

documentation, and she has not done any of the other services. During this investigation,

C.N. had another baby. That baby was removed and placed into the same foster home as

R.J.N. C.N. has had no contact with R.J.N. and has made no effort to have a relationship

In the Interest of R.J.N., a Child                                                  Page 3
with him. The caseworker does not believe C.N. can provide a safe and stable home for

R.J.N.

         C.N. testified that she is currently drug-free, attending college, and in the process

of starting services for this case. She explained that, when she had a stable home, she did

not provide an address, and then was unable to comply with the service requirements,

because of the outstanding warrant. She did not want to go back to jail where she would

be unable to meet the service requirements. That case has been resolved and she intends

to comply with service requirements going forward. She explained that she has moved

around, been evicted once, was homeless for a time, and often did not have a working

phone. C.N. has two children who were placed with her father because she was unable

to care for them. C.N. stated that she does not want custody. She wants R.J.N. placed

with her mother. She admitted that she has been in and out of jail his entire life and her

actions have impacted him.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

         Involuntary termination of parental rights is a serious matter that implicates

fundamental constitutional rights.       Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. 1985).

Although parental rights are of constitutional magnitude, they are not absolute. In re

C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002).          Termination proceedings should be strictly

scrutinized, and involuntary termination statutes are strictly construed in favor of the

parent. Holick, 685 S.W.2d at 20.

In the Interest of R.J.N., a Child                                                      Page 4
        Parental rights may be terminated if clear and convincing evidence shows (1) the

parent has engaged in one of the statutory grounds for termination and (2) termination

is in the child's best interests. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1), (2). Clear and

convincing means the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the

trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be

established. Id. § 101.007.

        Evidence is legally sufficient if, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable

to the finding and considering undisputed contrary evidence, a reasonable factfinder

could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d

624, 631 (Tex. 2018). We assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its

finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so. Id. at 630-31.

        Factual sufficiency, in comparison, requires weighing disputed evidence contrary

to the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding. Id. at 631. In a factual

sufficiency review, the appellate court must consider whether disputed evidence is such

that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the finding. Id.

Evidence is factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence a

reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is so significant that

the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.

Id.

In the Interest of R.J.N., a Child                                                       Page 5
        The factfinder is the sole arbiter when assessing the credibility and demeanor of

witnesses. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014). The appellate court may not second

guess the factfinder's resolution of a factual dispute by relying on disputed evidence or

evidence the factfinder could have rejected as not credible. In re L.M.I., 119 S.W.3d 707,

712 (Tex. 2003).

PREDICATE TERMINATION FINDINGS

        In her first, second, and third issues, C.N. asserts that the evidence is legally and

factually insufficient to support the court's findings that termination is warranted under

Family Code Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and (O).

        Only one predicate finding under Section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a

judgment of termination when there is also a finding that termination is in the child's best

interest. In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam). However, due to the

potential application of Section 161.001(b)(1)(M), we must consider the sufficiency of the

evidence pursuant to subsections (D) and (E) when raised on appeal. See id. at 234-35.

Due process requires a sufficiency review if parental rights are terminated pursuant to

Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) because that ground becomes a basis to terminate that

parent's rights to other children pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(M). See TEX. FAM. CODE

ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M).

        Subsection (E) authorizes termination if the parent "engaged in conduct or

knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the

In the Interest of R.J.N., a Child                                                     Page 6
physical or emotional well-being of the child." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E).

In this context, "endanger" means "to expose to loss or injury; to jeopardize." In re M.C.,

917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam). It is not necessary that the conduct was

directed at the child or that the child suffered actual injury. Id. The relevant inquiry is

whether evidence exists that the endangerment was the result of the parent's conduct,

including acts, omissions, and failures to act. In re S.L.W., 529 S.W.3d 601, 609 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2017, pet. denied). The specific danger to the child's well-being may

be inferred from the parent's misconduct. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. denied).

         The statute requires a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct by

the parent. See In re V.A., 598 S.W.3d 317, 331 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, pet.

denied). We may consider actions and inactions occurring both before and after the

child's birth. Id. As a general rule, subjecting children to a life of uncertainty and

instability endangers the children's physical and emotional well-being. In re M.L.L., 573

S.W.3d 353, 363 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, no pet.). Evidence of criminal conduct,

convictions, imprisonment, and their effects on a parent's life and ability to parent may

establish an endangering course of conduct. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 360-61. Evidence of

drug use may constitute evidence of endangerment. In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 345 (Tex.

2009).

In the Interest of R.J.N., a Child                                                   Page 7
        We consider whether the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support a

finding that C.N. engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-

being of the child, thus authorizing termination under Section 161.001(b)(1)(E).

        C.N. has a history of criminal activity and drug use. That criminal activity

included endangerment and abandonment of a child, establishing an endangering course

of conduct. See In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d at 360-61. She was incarcerated at the time of R.J.N.'s

birth and has never had any contact with him. When she was released from prison, she

made no effort to contact him. Instead, she engaged in a course of conduct focused on

evading Child Protective Services and the police. Her two older children and her

youngest child were removed from her custody in separate proceedings spanning several

years before and after R.J.N.'s birth. A parent's past endangering conduct may create an

inference that the parent's past conduct may recur and further jeopardize a child's present

or future physical or emotional well-being. See In re D.M., 58 S.W.3d 801, 812-13 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2001, no pet.).

        C.N. denied none of this and admitted that she deliberately refused to provide her

contact information to avoid being arrested, knowing she could not comply with service

requirements. She also admitted that, since getting out of jail, she had moved around,

been evicted, and was homeless for a time. She also acknowledged that her actions have

impacted R.J.N. C.N's conduct over multiple years constitutes a voluntary, deliberate,

In the Interest of R.J.N., a Child                                                      Page 8
and conscious course of conduct subjecting R.J.N. to a life of uncertainty and instability.

See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345; In re V.A., 598 S.W.3d at 331.

        Although C.N. testified that she is currently drug free, attending college, and in

the process of starting services, even if believed, the trial court is entitled to determine

the weight to give this testimony. See In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 503. Although significant,

evidence of improved conduct, especially of short duration, does not conclusively negate

the probative value of a parent's history of drug use and irresponsible choices. See In re

J.F.-G., 627 S.W.3d 304, 316-17 (Tex. 2021).

        C.N. contends that Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) is vague and claims that a reading of

subsection (b)(1)(D) together with (b)(1)(E) suggests that, in (b)(1)(E), the legislature was

concerned only with the time the child was placed. She argues that subsection (b)(1)(D)

provides that two separate, distinct actions can lead to termination, placing a child in

dangerous conditions or allowing the child to remain in dangerous conditions. She urges

us to interpret subsection (b)(1)(E) as requiring the court to look only at the conduct of

the relevant persons at the time R.J.N. was placed in C.B.'s home. She asserts the statute

requires a finding that a child was placed into an environment that was dangerous at the

time the child was placed there.

        In construing a statute, we must look to the plain meaning of statutory text unless

a different meaning is apparent from the context or the plain meaning leads to absurd or

nonsensical results. PHI, Inc. v. Tex. Juvenile Justice Dep't, 593 S.W.3d 296, 303 (Tex. 2019).

In the Interest of R.J.N., a Child                                                      Page 9
If a statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its words according to their common

meaning without resort to rules of construction or extrinsic aids. Id. We look at the entire

act, and not a single section in isolation. Fitzgerald v. Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., 996

S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1999).

        Subsection (b)(1)(E) allows termination of the parent-child relationship if the

parent engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-being of the

child. Because the statute is clear and unambiguous, we apply its words according to

their common meaning. Subsection (b)(1)(E) does not specify the applicable time period.

Other subsections reference a time period indicating that the legislature considered

timing of the activity: (b)(1)(B)--at least three months; (b)(1)(C)—at least six months;

(b)(1)(F)—one year; (b)(1)(H)—since birth; (b)(1)(J)(ii)—substantial length of time. See

TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(B), (C), (F), (H), (J). C.N. would have us engraft new,

limiting language into the statute. This, we decline to do. We may add words into a

statutory provision only when necessary to give effect to clear legislative intent.

Fitzgerald, 996 S.W.2d at 867.       "Only truly extraordinary circumstances showing

unmistakable legislative intent should divert us from enforcing the statute as written."

Id. Thus, we consider all of C.N.'s conduct that may be relevant to the question of whether

she endangered her son, not just her conduct at the time R.J.N. was placed in C.B.'s care.

        We conclude that the evidence is sufficiently clear and convincing to support the

trial court's finding under subsection (b)(1)(E). The trial court could have formed a firm

In the Interest of R.J.N., a Child                                                   Page 10
conviction that C.N. engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-

being of the child. The disputed evidence is not so significant that the factfinder could

not have resolved it in favor of the finding. See In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. Thus, the

evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial court's finding that

termination is warranted under subsection (b)(1)(E). Because only one predicate finding

is necessary for termination of parental rights, we need not address C.N.'s complaints

regarding subsection (b)(1)(D) in her first issue or her complaint regarding subsection

(b)(1)(O) in her third issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1; In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 232. We

overrule C.N.'s second issue.

        BEST INTEREST FINDING

        In her fourth issue, C.N. contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient

to support the trial court's finding that termination of her parental rights is in the best

interest of the child. She asserts that she is doing everything she needs to do to become

a productive member of society. Arguing that the Department failed to show by clear

and convincing evidence that termination would be in R.J.N.'s best interest, C.N. claims

that R.J.N. would benefit from a relationship with C.N. in the future.

        The best-interest inquiry is child-centered and focuses on the child's well-being,

safety, and development. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. The factfinder may consider

several factors to determine the child's best interest, including: (1) the desires of the child;

(2) the present and future physical and emotional needs of the child; (3) the present and

In the Interest of R.J.N., a Child                                                       Page 11
future emotional and physical danger to the child; (4) the parental abilities of the persons

seeking custody; (5) the programs available to assist those persons seeking custody in

promoting the best interest of the child; (6) the plans for the child by the individuals or

agency seeking custody; (7) the stability of the home or proposed placement; (8) acts or

omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing parent-child relationship is not

appropriate; and (9) any excuse for the parent's acts or omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544

S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). The evidence need not prove all of the Holley factors in

order to show that the termination of parental rights is in a child's best interest. Id. at 372.

        Courts apply a strong presumption that the best interest of the child is served by

keeping the child with the child's natural parents, and it is the Department's burden to

rebut that presumption. In re D.R.A., 374 S.W.3d 528, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Prompt and permanent placement in a safe environment also is

presumed to be in the child's best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.307(a). When a

child is too young to express his desires, the fact finder may consider that the child has

bonded with the foster parents, is well cared for by them, and has spent minimal time

with the parent. In re V.A., 598 S.W.3d at 333.

        The caseworker testified that R.J.N. is currently living in a foster home with his

younger sister. He has bonded with the foster parents who hope to adopt R.J.N. and his

sister. He is currently in a safe and stable environment where his emotional and physical

In the Interest of R.J.N., a Child                                                      Page 12
needs can be met. The foster parents hope to adopt R.J.N. and would continue to meet

his needs in the future.

        C.N. has a history of instability and poor parenting, having four children removed

from her custody. While C.N. testified that she is currently attempting to comply with

required services, the trial court could note that until recently she had not attempted to

comply. A parent's lack of motivation to improve parenting skills supports a finding that

termination is in the best interest of the child. See Wilson v. State, 116 S.W.3d 923, 925

(Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.). Furthermore, C.N. is not seeking custody of R.J.N.

        C.N. has no relationship with R.J.N. and has not had any contact with him. Upon

her release from jail, she focused on avoiding arrest, rather than focusing on her son. As

analyzed above with respect to the trial court's subsection (b)(1)(E) finding, the evidence

supports the finding that C.N. engaged in a course of conduct that endangered R.J.N.'s

physical or emotional well-being. See In re V.A., 598 S.W.3d at 333. Based on the evidence

presented at trial, the trial court reasonably could conclude that this pattern of behavior

would continue into the future notwithstanding C.N.'s testimony. Additionally, C.N. has

a criminal history, including child endangerment and drug use. We may take into

account a parent's continuing criminal history, past performance, and poor judgment. See

in re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 28; In re C.A.J., 122 S.W.3d 888, 893 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003,

no pet.). The record does not contain any evidence of factors that mitigate C.N.'s acts and

omissions.

In the Interest of R.J.N., a Child                                                  Page 13
        Based on the evidence presented at trial and an examination of the Holley factors,

we conclude that the trial court could have reasonably formed a firm belief or conviction

that termination of C.N.'s parental rights to R.J.N. was in his best interest. See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2); In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631. We find there is legally and

factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's best interest finding. We overrule

C.N.'s fourth issue.

                                            Conclusion

        We conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the trial

court's Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) and best interest findings. We affirm the trial court's

termination order.

                                                   STEVE SMITH
                                                   Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray
       Justice Johnson
       and Justice Smith
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed May 24, 2023
[CV06]

In the Interest of R.J.N., a Child                                                     Page 14