Court Opinion

ID: 9390310
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-27 15:05:32.046068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:33.624585
License: Public Domain

IMPORTANT NOTICE
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED OPINION

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PROMULGATED BY THE SUPREME COURT, CR 76.28(4)(C),
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                                                    RENDERED: APRIL 27, 2023
                                                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2021-SC-0476-MR

JEREMIAH WOLFORK                                                     APPELLANT

               ON APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
V.              HONORABLE ANN BAILEY SMITH, JUDGE
                     NOS. 19-CR-1838 & 19-CR-2283

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                  MEMORANDUM OPINION OF THE COURT

                                  AFFIRMING

      Jeremiah Wolfork pled guilty to possession of a handgun by a convicted

felon, tampering with physical evidence and escape in the second degree. He

received a sentence, through a negotiated plea agreement, of ten years. Wolfork

also pled guilty to manslaughter in the first-degree, possession of a handgun

by a convicted felon, wanton endangerment in the first degree, and being a

persistent felony offender in the second degree. After entering his plea, but

prior to his sentencing, Wolfork was released to a Home Incarceration Program

(HIP). He then immediately cut his ankle monitor and escaped from

supervision. Upon recapture, Wolfork was brought before the trial court and

sought to vacate his plea. After holding a hearing, the trial court imposed the

sentence as previously agreed by Wolfork, for a total of thirty years. Wolfork
appealed to this Court as a matter of right,1 but upon review, we find no error,

and hereby affirm the judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court.

                    I.     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      Wolfork was indicted by a Jefferson County grand jury on July 3, 2019,

for possession of a handgun by a convicted felon, tampering with physical

evidence, criminal trespass in the third degree, and escape in the second

degree.2 These charges stemmed, with the exception of the escape charge, from

a police response to gunshots that were fired on May 1, 2019. The escape

occurred after Wolfork was initially charged and captured after he absconded

from custody on the 27th of May. While Wolfork was on the run, he was

indicted for murder, robbery in the first degree, possession of a handgun and

firearm by a convicted felon, wanton endangerment in the first degree, and

being a persistent felon in the second degree.3 These latter charges stemmed

from events which occurred on July 11, 2019.

       Wolfork was initially represented by Andrew daMota.4 On February 12,

2020, daMota filed a motion to suppress evidence in the first case. In the

second case, on the 25th of March, he filed a motion to dismiss under KRS

503.0855 wherein daMota asserted Wolfork was immune from prosecution

because he acted in self-defense. After filing these motions but before they

      1  Ky. Const. § 110(2)(b).
      2  Indictment No. 19-CR-001838
       3 Indictment No. 19-CR-002283
       4 daMota spells his last name as shown, with a lower case “d.”
       5 Kentucky Revised Statutes: “Justification and criminal and civil immunity for

use of permitted force.”

                                          2
were heard, daMota was replaced as counsel by Kevin Coleman who entered

his appearance on July 2, 2020.

      Wolfork entered a plea to resolve both cases on August 19, 2020. During

this hearing the trial court placed Wolfork under oath and conducted a plea

colloquy. The court asked Wolfork if he had enough time to discuss the case

with Coleman, whether he was satisfied with Coleman’s performance, whether

Wolfork needed more time with his attorney, and whether he had any

complaints about Coleman. Wolfork stated he completed the 11th grade in high

school and could read, write and understand the English language and

understood the terms of the plea agreement. Wolfork also stated that he knew,

by accepting this plea agreement, he was waiving his right to a jury trial. The

trial court accepted the plea agreement and released Wolfork on HIP pending

his final sentencing which was scheduled for September 9, 2020.

      After he was released, less than twenty-four hours later, Wolfork

removed his ankle monitor, did not comply with HIP, and failed to appear for

his final sentencing. A warrant was issued on the 21st of August and Wolfork

was rearrested on September 17, 2020. Wolfork sought to withdraw his plea.

Clay Kennedy was appointed to represent him as conflict counsel. Kennedy

filed a motion on Wolfork’s behalf alleging Coleman misled Wolfork and

provided ineffective assistance of counsel rendering Wolfork’s entry of a guilty

plea involuntary. On May 11, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on the issue

where Wolfork and Coleman testified. The Commonwealth also introduced a

number of phone call recordings the jail had from Wolfork’s account.

                                        3
      At the hearing, Wolfork related that he had regular contact with daMota

during his representation and had extensive discussions with him about his

cases. Wolfork also testified that daMota told him that immunity motions were

very difficult to win. But during Coleman’s represention, Wolfork claimed to

only have met him twice. During the first meeting Wolfork claimed that

Coleman advised that his two pending motions had been overruled and that his

current charges were eligible for the death penalty. Wolfork insists that

Coleman never discussed any potential defenses, including the concept of

imperfect self-defense. On cross-examination, the Commonwealth elicited from

Wolfork that he was aware there had been no hearing yet on the issue of

immunity and the idea of HIP was Wolfork’s. Wolfork stated that while he had

understood the trial court’s questions during the plea colloquy, he only

answered yes to many of the questions because Coleman told him to. At this

hearing Wolfork insisted that he only reached the eighth-grade level of

education while at the previous hearing he told the court he reached the

eleventh grade. When the trial court asked Wolfork if he lied at the earlier

hearing when he testified that he was satisfied with Coleman’s representation

and had no complaints, he responded that he “must of did.”

      Coleman testified to the following version of events, which differ greatly

from Wolfork’s. Coleman visited Wolfork at the jail four times prior to his entry

of a plea. On July 6, he introduced himself to Wolfork as his new attorney and

requested permission from Wolfork to seek a continuance in the upcoming

                                        4
hearing regarding justification.6 According to Wolfork, Coleman told him during

this meeting that this motion had been overruled. Coleman, however, denied

this. Instead, Coleman insists that Wolfork gave him permission to seek a

continuance at this initial meeting.

      Coleman again visited Wolfork on July 24, 2020, when he made Wolfork

aware of a plea offer by the Commonwealth. Coleman discussed the initial offer

from the Commonwealth, which was to dismiss the robbery and amend the

murder to manslaughter in the second degree for a total of thirty years on both

cases with twenty percent parole eligibility. During this meeting Coleman

discussed the concept of imperfect self-defense, though Coleman conceded he

did not get into much detail. Instead, he opined to Wolfork that the offer

seemed fair considering the facts of the case. During this meeting, Coleman

also discussed the full range of penalties including the possibility of aggravated

penalties, i.e., the death penalty and life without parole.

      On the 7th of August, Coleman met with Wolfork at the jail to discuss

the offer further. Wolfork was agreeable to this offer but wanted to request HIP,

and by way of inducement to the Commonwealth, proposed a reverse hammer-

clause wherein he would plead guilty to manslaughter in the first degree but,

should he fully comply with HIP, the manslaughter in the first degree would be

amended to manslaughter in the second degree at his final sentencing.7

      6 This hearing was scheduled for the 10th of July.
      7 Manslaughter in the first degree is classified as a violent offense and has a
parole eligibility of eighty-five percent while manslaughter in the second degree carries
a parole eligibility of twenty percent and is classified as a non-violent offense.

                                            5
Coleman also stressed that there was a potential ambiguity in the law

regarding parole eligibility regarding a blended sentence that is composed of

offenses classified as violent and non-violent.8 After this meeting Coleman

conveyed to the Commonwealth that Wolfork would accept the offer. Coleman

again met Wolfork at the jail on August 11, 2020, to sign the plea agreement.

Coleman also testified that he specifically asked Wolfork if he was comfortable

going forward with the plea despite Coleman’s short tenure as his attorney.

Wolfork told him that he was comfortable going forward to enter his plea

because he had discussed his case extensively with his previous attorney

daMota.

      Aside from Wolfork’s and Coleman’s testimony, the Commonwealth also

played recordings of jail phone calls originating from Wolfork’s account.9 On an

August 14, 2020, phone call Wolfork is heard discussing his plea agreement

and that he would receive home incarceration with a hammer clause, “but I got

my withdrawal papers to where if I won’t come back, whenever I get caught or

whatever, you feel me, I can withdraw the plea . . . . I ain’t no dummy, you

know I know this sh*t.” Later, he tells the unknown woman he is speaking with

to go to the library and get a fake lease and fill it out, presumably to be eligible

for the HIP program. Later, a person other than Wolfork, but calling from his

account, is heard telling someone that he needed a big favor, “He needs a lease.

      8 During Coleman’s testimony he recounted how he specifically discussed with

Wolfork our decision in Kentucky Department of Corrections v. Dixon, 572 S.W.3d
46 (Ky. 2019).
      9 Wolfork does not mention these phone calls at all in his brief.

                                         6
They gave him HIP; he got nowhere to go, right. But he’s not even trying to go,

like, as soon as he walks out the door it’s off, he’s gone. As soon as he walks

out of there, he’s ripping it off, you know . . . . He just needs to get out of the

building.” Wolfork’s response to these calls, at the hearing, was to say that he

was not released on HIP with a fake lease, rather he was released to a woman’s

address who owned a home. He did admit the first call was his voice but offered

by way of explanation that he only talked with the unknown woman about fake

leases because he was cheating with her on the other woman whose address he

was released to.

      The trial court denied the motion and ruled Wolfork’s plea was

voluntarily entered and sentenced him according to the terms of the plea

agreement. This appeal followed. We now address the merits of the appeal.

Further facts will be adduced as needed below.

                                    II.   ANALYSIS

      Wolfork argues here that the trial court should have allowed him to

withdraw his guilty plea because he contends that Coleman provided ineffective

assistance of counsel during the course of his representation and thereby

rendered his plea involuntary. This issue is preserved.

      The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a

trial court make a showing that a guilty plea be entered intelligently and

voluntarily. Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 189 S.W.3d 558, 565 (Ky. 2006) (citing

Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 241–42 (1969)). RCr10 8.10 states “[a]t any

      10   Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure

                                          7
time before judgment the court may permit the plea of guilty or guilty but

mentally ill, to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.” A decision

whether or not to grant a defendant’s motion to withdraw a voluntarily entered

guilty plea is within the sound discretion of the trial court. Rigdon v.

Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004). However, this Court has

held that “the discretion to deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea exists only

after a determination has been made that the plea was voluntary. If

the plea was involuntary, the motion to withdraw it must be granted.”

Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 87 S.W.3d 8, 10 (Ky. 2002). A trial court’s factual

finding on the voluntariness of the plea will be reviewed for clear error while its

determinations of law will be reviewed de novo. Commonwealth v Pridham, 394

S.W.3d 867, 875 (Ky. 2012).

      A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must show his

counsel’s performance was deficient and this deficiency caused prejudice. Id.

(citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Defendants must

show “that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as

the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687. To establish prejudice in a guilty plea a defendant has to show

that but for the errors of counsel, the defendant would have insisted on

proceeding to trial and would not have entered a guilty plea. Pridham, 394

S.W.3d at 876.

      Wolfork contends that Coleman’s representation of him was deficient

under the Strickland standard because Coleman only had the case for a limited

                                         8
period of time prior to Wolfork’s entry of a plea and did not sufficiently discuss

any potential defenses with him.11 As noted above, Wolfork claimed Coleman

only visited him in jail twice and claimed at the hearing that Coleman lied to

him when he indicated that the motions pending before the trial court had

been denied. But Coleman denied telling Wolfork this and testified that during

his first meeting with Wolfork he asked for his permission to seek a

continuance to which Wolfork agreed.

      Wolfork also claims that Coleman did not adequately discuss any

defenses available at trial, for example, the concept of imperfect self-defense.

While Coleman did testify that he, admittedly, had a brief discussion about

imperfect self-defense, but he doubted that he discussed it in depth with

Wolfork. We cannot say this brief discussion fell outside the range of

acceptable performance of counsel as contemplated by the Sixth Amendment.

Because the plea bargain, as agreed to by the parties, accomplished what

Wolfork would have hoped to achieve at trial had the jury agreed the

circumstances of the case merited a verdict reflecting imperfect self-defense.12

Besides, as the name implies, imperfect self-defense is not a complete defense,

so its not at all certain, that had Wolfork had a greater understanding of

      11  Wolfork did not argue in his motion to the trial court to set aside his guilty
plea that Coleman had failed to sufficiently investigate his case. As such, the issue
went unaddressed during the hearing and the subsequent order from the trial court.
Since he is only now asserting this issue, we will not discuss it. Commonwealth v.
Steadman, 411 S.W.3d 717, 724 (Ky. 2013).
       12 See Commonwealth v. Hager, for an extended discussion of imperfect self-

defense. 41 S.W.3d 828, 841-842 (Ky. 2001).

                                            9
imperfect self-defense, he would have insisted on going to trial. Rather,

Wolfork likely would have chosen to do what he actually did, which was to

enter his plea according to the terms as offered. It also is worth noting that

Wolfork could have received twenty years just on the possession of a handgun

by a convicted felon as enhanced by the persistent felony offender in the

second-degree charge.13

        Wolfork also complains that Coleman, when he told Wolfork his motions

had been denied, told him that he could get the death penalty even though the

Commonwealth had not filed a notice of its intention to seek aggravated

penalties. Wolfork strongly implies he only acceded to the plea agreement

because Coleman wrongly asserted that the death penalty was on the table.

Coleman addressed this during his testimony and told the court that he

considers it his duty to inform his clients that whenever they are charged with

murder as well as an eligible aggravator, he informs them of the full range of

penalties possible by statute, including the death penalty. He does so, he

explained, even if the Commonwealth has not filed a notice seeking aggravated

penalties because, he reasoned, it remains a possibility that a defendant

should be aware of, even if it appears unlikely given the facts of a particular

case.

       13 KRS 527.040(2)(b) states that a convicted felon found in possession of a

handgun is a class C felony, and if enhanced by KRS 532.080(5), the persistent felony
offender in the second degree statute, the sentencing range is ten to twenty years in
prison.

                                         10
      The trial court found Wolfork lacked credibility. Based upon Wolfork’s

past performance and the contents of jailhouse telephone conversations, this

Court cannot say the trial court was incorrect in that assessment. Aside from

his admitted false statements during his plea colloquy, after reviewing the

phone calls from the jail, it is clear Wolfork attempted to swindle the trial court.

Wolfork negotiated a plea agreement in bad faith knowing that he would escape

from home incarceration, and should he get caught, seek to withdraw his plea.

The trial court, in its order stated:

              He testified that he lied under oath at the time of his guilty
      plea when he told the Court that he was satisfied with Mr.
      Coleman’s representation and that his acknowledgement of guilt
      was likewise a lie; he testified he only made these statements so he
      could get out of jail. This Court can only conclude that this
      Defendant says, even under oath, what he believes he needs to say
      to get what he wants. In this instance he testifies that his attorney
      lied to him about the status of pending motions so that he can
      claim that his guilty plea was involuntarily made; this then is his
      lifeline to save him from what he believes to be a bad outcome to
      his case. Of course, his jail telephone call sinks him in this regard
      as he admits, even before entering his guilty plea, that he intends
      to withdraw his plea should he get “caught.”

Because of this the trial court found Wolfork’s plea was knowingly, voluntarily,

and intelligently made. We find the trial court was correct regarding the

circumstances regarding Wolfork’s plea and its findings are not clearly

erroneous.

                                 III.   CONCLUSION

      Based on the foregoing, we find no error and hereby affirm the judgment

of the Jefferson Circuit Court that Wolfork had reasonably competent

                                        11
representation when entering his plea. Thus, his plea was intelligently,

knowingly, and voluntarily entered and will not be set aside.

      All sitting. All concur.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Karen Shuff Maurer
Assistant Public Advocate

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Daniel Cameron
Attorney General of Kentucky

Robert Baldridge
Assistant Attorney General

Stephanie L. McKeehan
Assistant Attorney General

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