Court Opinion

ID: 9663979
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:57:33.972862+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:15:00.208134
License: Public Domain

ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.
¶ 75. {concurring in part, dissenting in part). This court's decision in Burnett v. Alt, 224 Wis. 2d 72, 589 N.W.2d 21 (1999) left much uncertainty in its wake. Seminars were con*98ducted to explore its meaning, committees were established to curb the abuses proliferating from its application, and articles from both the defense bar and plaintiffs' bar appeared decrying the confusion.1
¶ 76. We attempted to clarify the nature and extent of the Alt privilege in Glenn v. Plante, 2004 WI 24, 269 Wis. 2d 575, 676 N.W.2d 413. There, we an*99nounced that "Alt does not apply to observations made by a person's treating physician regarding the care and treatment provided to the patient, but rather applies to expert testimony from such a physician as to the standard of care and treatment provided by another physician." Glenn, 269 Wis. 2d 575, ¶ 2.
¶ 77. Now the instant case is before us, again requiring clarification of the Alt doctrine. Unfortunately, rather than clarify, the majority has added to the confusion. With this opinion, lower courts and practicing attorneys are left with something just short of a Byzantine maze. Accordingly, I write separately to express regret for not only what the court is doing, but what it has failed to do.
¶ 78. Here is what the court has done: The bench and bar will have to learn new categories of witnesses. The first is an ordinary "medical witness" These witnesses must testify about their own conduct relevant to the case, including their observations and thought processes, treatment of the patient, why they took or did not take certain actions, what institutional rules they believed applied to their conduct, and their training and education pertaining to the relevant subject. Majority op., ¶ 5.
¶ 79. The second category is an "Alt medical witness." Subject to the compelling need exception recognized in Alt, these witnesses cannot be forced to give their opinion of the standard of care applicable to another person or their opinion of the treatment provided by another person. Id. These witnesses also cannot be required to give an opinion on the standard of care governing their own conduct. Id.
¶ 80. Finally, the third category is a "Shurpit medical witness." These witnesses differ from the previous two kinds in that they are alleged to have caused *100injury to the plaintiff by their medical negligence. Id. As a result, they may be required to give their opinion on the standard of care governing their own conduct. Id.
¶ 81. In addition, the majority sets forth duties for the circuit court. It would have the circuit court "assess the reasonableness and good faith of a decision to make a person a Shurpit witness by naming the person as a defendant or otherwise accusing the witness of causal negligence." Id., ¶ 42. It mandates that the circuit court "assure that a defendant/witness from whom expert testimony is required is not asked to give opinions on subjects beyond the witness's competence." Id., ¶ 45. The court explains that such a mandate means "[i]n other words, the witness must be qualified to answer each question asked." Id. Additionally, the majority instructs that the circuit court "may employ evidentiary rules, including §§ 904.02, 904.03, and 906.11 to maintain the focus of a medical malpractice trial on whether the defendant conformed to the standard of care, not whether the defendant performed well as an expert witness." Id., ¶ 5.
¶ 82. Essentially the court has failed to clarify the Alt morass. The majority opinion seems to raise more questions than it answers:
• Does the opinion apply only to medical witnesses, or does it apply to all expert witnesses?
• Even though an expert witness may not be required to opine on the standard of care question, can the witness still be required to give expert testimony in response to other questions?
• Can an Alt witness be transformed into a Shurpit witness? Can a Shurpit witness be transformed into an Alt witness? How does such a transformation take place?
*101• If a hospital is accused of causal negligence, why are not all of its agents/employees who worked with the patient potential Shurpit witnesses?
• If the heart of the Alt opinion is that a medical witness cannot be forced to give her opinion of the standard of care applicable to another person, why cannot an Alt witness be asked to give an opinion of the standard of care applicable to herself?
¶ 83. Ultimately, what the majority has failed to do is set forth a simple standard for all medical witnesses: (1) No witness, except a voluntary expert witness, should be forced to testify about someone else's standard of care. (2) Any witness may testify about his or her own standard of care regardless of whether the person is a named party and regardless of any allegation of negligence, as long as that testimony is relevant.
¶ 84. In light of the majority opinion, I have no doubt that Alt issues will continue to plague the litigants and courts of this state. Inevitably we will see these issues again. For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully concur in part and dissent in part.
¶ 85. I am authorized to state that Chief Justice SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON and Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER join this opinion.

 For example:
• State Bar of Wisconsin Litigation Section, Litigation News, Vol. 30, No. 1, Winter 2004 (litigation section board activities in 2004 included "[r]eviewing practice issues and abuses arising from application of the decision in Burnett v. Alt").
• 2004 Tort Seminar, sponsored by Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers, December 3 & 4, 2004 (Friday Morning Sessions - "Hot Topics": 8:30 a.m. Alt v. Cline - presentation by Lynn R. Laufenberg).
• Michael R Russart, Just the Facts, Ma'am: Glenn v. Plante and the Reluctant Expert, Wisconsin Civil Trial Journal, Fall 2004.
• Minutes of the State Bar Board of Governors, July 11, 2003, p. 4 (President Burnett appointed committee to "study and report on ... special problems presented by Alt v. Cline.").
• State Bar of Wisconsin Litigation Section Board of Directors Minutes, Teleconference, June 30, 2003 ("It was agreed by those present that the interpretation being given Alt by physicians and other experts as well as trial and appellate courts affected all litigation practitioners within the state. A request from the State Bar was received for funding of a committee chaired by Attorney Marie Stanton of Madison to study the Alt issue with an eye towards proposing a new rule or legislation needed to remediate the Alt interpretations.").
• Timothy J. Aiken, David M. Skoglind and William C. Gleisner, III, Why Alt v. Cline Violates the Constitutional Rights of Plaintiffs, Wisconsin Academy of Trial Lawyers, "The Verdict," (Vol. 26:3, Summer 2003).
• Patrick O. Dunphy, Ramifications of Alt v. Cline, presented at the State Bar of Wisconsin Annual Convention Litigation Section, May 2, 2001.