Court Opinion

ID: 9897355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:33.521841+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:44.087128
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                           Jun 28 2023, 8:45 am

                                                                                CLERK
                                                                            Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                               Court of Appeals
                                                                                 and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                     ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
Jeffrey A. Flores                                          William Joseph Jenner
Flores Law Office                                          Jenner, Pattison & Sharpe
Madison, Indiana                                           Madison, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Jonathon D. Simpson,                                       June 28, 2023
Appellant-Defendant                                        Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                           22A-MI-246
        v.                                                 Appeal from the Jefferson Superior
                                                           Court
City of Madison, Indiana,                                  The Honorable Michael J.
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                        Hensley, Special Judge
                                                           Trial Court Cause No.
                                                           39D01-2002-MI-183

                                      Opinion by Judge Pyle

                   Senior Judge Robb and Judge Weissmann concur.

Pyle, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023                               Page 1 of 25
      Statement of the Case
[1]   Jonathon D. Simpson (“Simpson”) appeals the trial court’s order upholding the

      City of Madison’s (“City”) Police Merit Board Commission’s (“Merit Board”)

      decision to terminate Simpson’s employment with the Madison Police

      Department (“MPD”). Simpson argues that the trial court erred by upholding

      the Merit Board’s decision to terminate his employment. Concluding that the

      trial court did not err, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

[2]   We affirm.

      Issue
               Whether the trial court erred by upholding the Merit Board’s
               decision to terminate Simpson’s employment.

      Facts1
[3]   In 2004, Simpson started working for MPD as an officer. Simpson later

      became a lieutenant detective. In 2006, the Indiana State Police (“ISP”)

      1
        We note that Simpson has provided minimal record materials for our review in this appeal. Specifically, in
      his Appellant’s Appendix, Simpson included only the chronological case summary (“CCS”) and the orders
      from Merit Board and trial court. He did not include any pleadings that had been filed with the Merit Board
      or the trial court. We direct Simpson’s attention to Indiana Appellate Rule 50(A)(1), which provides that the
      “purpose of an Appendix in civil appeals and appeals from Administrative Agencies is to present our Court
      with copies of only those parts of the Record on Appeal that are necessary for the Court to decide the issues
      presented.” Additionally, we direct Simpson to Appellate Rule 50(A)(2)(f), which provides that an
      Appellant’s Appendix “shall contain[,]” among other things, “pleadings and documents from the Clerk’s
      Record in chronological order that are necessary for the resolution of the issues raised on appeal[.]” We also
      note that Simpson failed to comply with Appellate Rule 22(C), which provides that “[a]ny record material
      cited in an appellate brief must be reproduced in an Appendix or Transcript or exhibits.” The City has
      included, in its Appellee’s Appendix, the relevant pleadings filed with the Merit Board along with the
      transcript and exhibits from the Merit Board hearings. Neither party, however, has included the pleadings

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023                                   Page 2 of 25
      investigated Simpson regarding an allegation of improper relationships with

      various people potentially involved in criminal investigations or cases. Two of

      the questioned relationships included Carrie Brown (“Brown”) and Misty

      Owens (“Owens”). In February 2006, Simpson admitted to then MPD police

      chief, Chief Robert Wolf (“Chief Wolf”), that he had engaged in a sexual

      relationship with Brown in 2002 and 2005 and that he had desired to have a

      sexual relationship with Owens. At that time, Chief Wolf gave Simpson a

      written informal reprimand for conduct unbecoming an officer.

[4]   In 2013, ISP conducted a second investigation relating to Simpson. This

      investigation related to Simpson’s evidence handling and packaging.

      Specifically, Simpson had had evidence, including drugs and drug

      paraphernalia, in his office, and he had not packaged, sealed, or placed that

      evidence in the MPD evidence locker. Then MPD police chief, Chief Dan

      Thurston (“Chief Thurston”) spoke to Simpson and gave him a verbal

      reprimand about proper evidence practices and instructed Simpson to “follow

      the proper chain of collecting evidence, packaging evidence, and logging

      evidence.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 4 at 223).

[5]   Sometime between 2011-2013, then Jefferson County Prosecutor Chad Lewis

      (“Prosecutor Lewis”) heard rumors about Simpson and asked Simpson whether

      filed with the trial court on judicial review. For example, neither party’s appendix contains the briefs filed by
      Simpson and the City in support of their arguments on judicial review.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023                                     Page 3 of 25
      he was having a sexual relationship with any defendants, confidential

      informants, or witnesses in then-pending cases. Simpson denied being engaged

      in any such relationship.

[6]   In October 2016, Simpson was conducting surveillance in an area where Brown

      was in a car with Demontre Jones (“Jones”) and Tracie Pedraza (“Pedraza”)

      (“the Jones/Pedraza investigation”). Simpson found drugs in the car and

      arrested Jones and Pedraza. Simpson did not arrest Brown. Simpson wrote the

      probable cause affidavit, which mentioned Brown’s presence at the scene.

      Simpson did not inform Prosecutor Lewis, who was the prosecutor at that time,

      about his prior sexual relationship with Brown. The prosecutor’s office brought

      charges against Jones and Pedraza and obtained convictions against them.

[7]   In December 2017, Simpson searched the residence of James Wainman

      (“Wainman”), who was a convicted felon (“the Wainman investigation”).

      During the search of Wainman’s residence, Simpson recovered

      methamphetamine, two guns, drug paraphernalia, and scales. Simpson

      collected the evidence but made no arrests. Jefferson County Sheriff Deputy

      Ben Flint (“Deputy Flint”) and ISP Trooper Andrew Garrett (“Trooper

      Garrett”) were also on the scene as Simpson searched the house. While on the

      scene, Deputy Flint and Trooper Garrett expressed concern about Simpson’s

      actions during the search. As Simpson was searching the house, Trooper

      Garrett went to his vehicle and radioed his sergeant to express his concerns.

      The ISP sergeant told Trooper Garrett to stay on the scene and document his

      observations. After Deputy Flint had left the scene, he sent an email to his

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023         Page 4 of 25
      superior officer to set out his concerns about Simpson’s search at the Wainman

      residence.

[8]   Simpson waited more than six months before he logged the evidence from the

      Wainman investigation into the MPD’s evidence system. Additionally,

      Simpson did not submit an investigation report to MPD’s case report system.

      Nor did Simpson send a report to the prosecutor’s office. As a result, the

      prosecutor’s office did not file any charges relating to the Wainman

      investigation. About a month after Simpson had logged the evidence into

      MPD’s evidence tracking system, he filed a system request to have an item of

      the evidence collected from the Wainman investigation be “destroyed . . . for no

      charges filed.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 86, Vol. 4 at 147). Specifically,

      Simpson sought to destroy eight “individual plastic bags each weighing .5

      grams to 1 gram[.]” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 4 at 144). This evidence, however,

      was not destroyed.

[9]   The ISP commenced a third investigation of Simpson in 2017 (“the 2017 ISP

      investigation”). Trooper Tracy Rohlfing (“Trooper Rohlfing”) conducted the

      investigation. This third investigation related in part to Simpson’s actions in

      the Wainman investigation. The ISP investigation also looked into the

      Jones/Pedraza investigation and Simpson’s failure to report his previous sexual

      relationship with Brown to the prosecutor. Trooper Rohlfing interviewed

      Simpson and other witnesses, including Brown and Owens, during this

      investigation. When Trooper Rohlfing interviewed Simpson, Simpson

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023          Page 5 of 25
       indicated that he had up to fourteen other cases or reports that he had not

       logged.

[10]   Trooper Rohlfing later went to the MPD station in 2018 and discussed the 2017

       ISP investigation with MPD Chief Jeremy Perkins (“Chief Perkins”). At that

       time, Chief Perkins learned of the Wainman investigation and Simpson’s prior

       problems with evidentiary practices. Chief Perkins searched the MPD case

       report system for a report on the Wainman investigation, but no report existed.

       Chief Perkins later placed Simpson on administrative leave. The ISP later

       transferred out and took control of the evidence from the Wainman

       investigation.

[11]   On March 15, 2019, Jefferson County Prosecutor David Sutter (“Prosecutor

       Sutter”) asked to meet with Chief Perkins. During that meeting, Prosecutor

       Sutter informed Chief Perkins that the prosecutor’s office had decided to no

       longer accept cases filed by Simpson. Prosecutor Sutter also gave Chief Perkins

       a letter (“March 2019 Prosecutor Letter”) that indicated that decision. The

       letter provided, in relevant part, as follows:

               I have received and reviewed two police reports from the Indiana
               State Police; 17ISPC013857 and 13ISPC007678. Both reports
               involve City of Madison Police Department Lieutenant Detective
               Jonathon Simpson. The reports contain allegations that bear
               directly on Lieutenant Detective Simpson’s truthfulness.
               Additionally, there is concerning information contained in the
               reports regarding evidence handling practices in cases that
               Lieutenant Detective Simpson investigated.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023         Page 6 of 25
               The Indiana Rules of Professional Responsibility and the United
               States Supreme Court cases of Brady v. Maryland and U.S. v.
               Giglio [sic] require me to disclose any information about
               character for untruthfulness for any State’s witnesses. All
               exculpatory evidence that is material to guilt or punishment must
               be produced to a defendant or defense attorney including
               impeachment evidence of government witnesses. I am providing
               disclosure of the allegations contained in the above referenced
               police reports to any defendant or defense attorney who has a
               case where Lieutenant Detective Jonathon Simpson is a witness
               or affiant pursuant to Brady v. Maryland and U.S. v. Giglio [sic].

               Based on the allegations contained in the reports, the Jefferson
               Prosecutor’s Office will not call Lieutenant Detective Jonathon
               Simpson as [a] witness and will not accept cases where he has
               had any involvement.

       (Appellee’s App. Vol. 4 at 34).

[12]   On May 16, 2019, Chief Perkins referred charges to the Merit Board and

       against Simpson for “Neglect of Duty, Violation of Department Rules and

       Practices, and . . . conduct . . . unbecoming an officer.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2

       at 6). The charges against Simpson ultimately involved: (1) Simpson’s conduct

       in the Wainman investigation, including Simpson’s failure to timely and

       properly log evidence and submit a report; and (2) Simpson’s failure to inform

       prosecutors of his past sexual relationships with individuals who were the

       subjects of or involved with a case or an investigation. Chief Perkins alleged

       that Simpson had violated Standard Operating Procedure number eight (“SOP-

       008”) as well as rules of conduct from the Police Merit Board Handbook,

       including Article III(E)(1), Article III(E)(40), and Article III(E)(41).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023            Page 7 of 25
[13]   Chief Perkins alleged, in part, that Simpson had violated Standard Operating

       Procedure number eight (“SOP-008”). SOP-008 is the MPD standard operating

       procedure relating to “evidence and property control[,]” and it “[e]stablishe[d]

       guidelines for collecting, preserving and transporting physical evidence from a

       crime scene for analysis or storage.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 4 at 225, 238).

       SOP-008 provided, among other things, that MPD employees were required to

       properly record all evidence into the department’s evidence system.

[14]   Chief Perkins also alleged that Simpson had violated the rules of conduct from

       the Police Merit Board Handbook, including Article III(E)(1), Article

       III(E)(40), and Article III(E)(41). Police Merit Board Handbook Article

       III(E)(1) is the provision that relates to conduct unbecoming an officer. It

       provides, in part, that “[c]onduct unbecoming an officer shall include that

       which brings the Department into disrepute or reflects discredit upon any

       member, or that which impairs the operation or efficiency of the Department or

       its members.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 4 at 193). This provision also explains

       that conduct unbecoming an officer may include, among other things,

       “[k]nowingly withholding information from the Department, the prosecuting

       attorney, or any court in which the officer is a witness[.]” (Appellee’s App. Vol.

       4 at 193).

[15]   Police Merit Board Handbook Articles III(E)(40) and (41) provide as follows:

               (40) Departmental Reports. Members shall submit all necessary
               reports on time and in accordance with established departmental
               procedure. Reports submitted by members shall be truthful and

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023          Page 8 of 25
               complete, and no member shall knowingly enter or cause to be
               entered any inaccurate, false or improper information, or
               withhold information from the Prosecuting Attorney or from any
               court.

               (41) Processing Property and Evidence. Property or evidence
               which has been discovered, gathered or received in connection
               with departmental responsibilities will be processed in
               accordance with established departmental procedure. Members
               shall not convert to their own use, manufacture, conceal, falsify,
               destroy, remove, tamper with or withhold any property or
               evidence in connection with an investigation or other police
               action, except in accordance with established departmental
               procedure.

       (Appellee’s App. Vol. 4 at 202-03).

[16]   Chief Perkins requested that the Merit Board terminate Simpson’s employment

       with MPD. That same day, Chief Perkins notified Simpson of the pending

       disciplinary action and charges against him as well as his right to request a

       hearing before the Merit Board.

[17]   The Merit Board held a hearing in November 2019 and January 2020. At the

       beginning of the hearing, the parties agreed that all procedural matters for the

       hearing were proper. The hearing officer explained that the hearing would “not

       follow strict evidentiary rules” and that “hearsay w[ould] be allowed.” (Tr.

       Vol. 2 at 66). Additionally, the parties submitted a stipulated agreement

       regarding Simpson’s motion in limine, in which he had sought to exclude any

       evidence or reference to any prior disciplinary actions against or investigations

       of him. The parties’ stipulation provided that the parties had “agree[d] that

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023              Page 9 of 25
       witnesses may be questioned regarding previous reprimands of Officer Simpson

       so long as it relates to the specific allegations contained herein against Officer

       Simpson.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 51, 67).

[18]   During the hearing, both the City and Simpson called witnesses. The City

       called Chief Perkins, Trooper Rohlfing, Prosecutor Chad Lewis, Deputy Ben

       Flint, Trooper Garrett, Chief Thurston, and Chief Wolf, who testified to the

       facts as set forth above. Simpson testified and called numerous witnesses,

       including Brown and Owens. Simpson also called some former and current

       police officers to testify about evidence and report writing practices.

[19]   The parties entered joint exhibits, including the Police Merit Board Handbook

       and SOP-008. The City and Simpson also entered their own exhibits. Among

       the City’s exhibits were Exhibit C-1, the March 2019 Prosecutor letter, and

       Exhibit C-2, the 2017 ISP investigation report. The City introduced these two

       exhibits during Chief Perkins’ testimony. Simpson objected to both exhibits

       based on foundation. Specifically, Simpson argued that the City should not be

       able to introduce the exhibits through Chief Perkins because Chief Perkins had

       not written the letter or the ISP report. The hearing officer overruled Simpson’s

       objections and admitted the exhibits into evidence.

[20]   Despite objecting to the admission of Exhibits C-1 and C-2, Simpson’s counsel

       questioned witnesses about the content of these two exhibits. For example,

       Simpson’s counsel questioned Chief Perkins and Trooper Rohlfing on cross-

       examination about Exhibit C-1 and its contents. Specifically, Simpson’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023           Page 10 of 25
       counsel pointed out that Exhibit C-1 had mentioned that the ISP report had

       contained allegations regarding Simpson’s truthfulness. During Simpson’s

       testimony, Simpson’s counsel also asked Simpson about Exhibit C-1, including

       the specific contents of the letter. Specifically, Simpson’s counsel asked

       Simpson, “[W]hat does [the letter] basically say?” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 3 at

       181). Simpson then summarized the content of the letter. Moreover,

       Simpson’s counsel also questioned Trooper Rohlfing, who had authored the

       2017 ISP investigation report, about Exhibit C-2 and his investigation as set

       forth in Exhibit C-2.

[21]   During the hearing, various witnesses testified about Simpson’s conduct in the

       Wainman investigation, including Simpson’s failure to timely and properly log

       evidence and submit a report. Chief Perkins testified that Simpson had violated

       SOP-008 and multiple rules of conduct as set out in the Police Merit Board

       Handbook. Specifically, Chief Perkins testified that the Wainman investigation

       had been compromised by Simpson’s actions, including his failure to timely log

       evidence. Chief Perkins also testified that Simpson had violated the rules of

       conduct in Article III(E)(40) and (41) of the Police Merit Board Handbook by

       failing to complete a report in the Wainman investigation.

[22]   The City also presented testimony during the hearing to address Simpson’s

       failure to inform prosecutors of his past sexual relationships with individuals

       who were the subjects of or involved with a case or an investigation. This

       testimony focused mainly on the Jones/Pedraza investigation and Simpson’s

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023         Page 11 of 25
       prior sexual relationship with Brown. The City also presented testimony about

       Simpson’s prior relationship with Owens.

[23]   Chief Perkins and Prosecutor Lewis testified that Simpson had failed to report

       his relationship with Brown to prosecutors during the Jones/Pedraza

       proceedings. Prosecutor Lewis, who was the prosecutor at the time of the

       Jones/Pedraza investigation, testified that Simpson should have disclosed his

       relationship with Brown as part of the proceedings against Jones and Pedraza.

       Trooper Rohlfing testified that law enforcement officers have a “duty to bring

       forward and provide to the prosecutor any evidence that suggests whatsoever

       that [a] person may not be guilty.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 158). Chief

       Perkins testified that Simpson’s non-disclosure was a violation of the Brady rule

       and constituted conduct unbecoming an officer under Article III(E)(1)(g) of the

       Police Merit Board Rules. Additionally, Chief Perkins testified that the ISP had

       informed him that they had “released [Jones] from prison based on their

       findings” in the 2017 ISP investigation of Simpson. (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at

       98).

[24]   When Simpson testified, he stated that he did not understand why the ISP had

       “started yelling this Brady concern” during the 2017 ISP investigation.

       (Appellee’s App. Vol. 3 at 164). However, one of Simpson’s own witnesses,

       Tyson Eblen (“Eblen”), who was a former MPD detective from 2004 to 2017,

       acknowledged during cross-examination that a police officer who had been

       involved in a past sexual relationship with an individual who was a suspect,

       arrestee, or witness in a case had a duty to disclose that relationship to the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023           Page 12 of 25
       prosecutor. Eblen testified that it was “important to disclose that information”

       because “it could border on the line of perhaps exculpatory evidence” and

       “could indicate that maybe there is a bias there.” (Appellee’s App. Vol. 3 at

       148). Simpson testified that he was aware that the prosecutor’s office had

       modified Jones’ and Pedraza’s sentences based on Simpson’s failure to inform

       the prosecutor’s office about his relationship with Brown. Simpson also

       testified that he had told a deputy prosecutor, Richard Eppard (“Deputy

       Prosecutor Eppard”), about his prior sexual relationship with Brown. Simpson

       did not call Deputy Prosecutor Eppard as a witness.

[25]   In regard to Simpson’s relationship with Owens, Chief Perkins testified that he

       believed that Simpson had been involved in a prior sexual relationship with

       Owens. Trooper Rohlfing testified that, during the 2017 ISP investigation, he

       had interviewed Owens about her relationship with Simpson. Owens told

       Trooper Rohlfing that she and Simpson had engaged in a relationship that

       involved “heavy petting” and kissing. (Appellee’s App. Vol. 2 at 159). Owens

       also told Trooper Rohlfing that there were instances when Simpson had

       overlooked when she had drugs. Simpson cross-examined Trooper Rohlfing

       about his level of certainty regarding whether Simpson had had a sexual

       relationship with Owens. Trooper Rohlfing testified that he could not say for

       certain because Owens had reported that the two had engaged in a relationship

       while Simpson had denied it. When Simpson presented Owens as a witness,

       Owens denied that she had had a sexual relationship with Simpson. Owens

       further testified that she had lied during her ISP interview and that she was on

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023         Page 13 of 25
       drugs during that interview. During Trooper Rohlfing’s rebuttal testimony, he

       testified that Owens showed no signs of intoxication at the time of her ISP

       interview. Additionally, Trooper Rohlfing testified that he had been informed

       that Simpson had contacted another person to talk to Owens about her Merit

       Board hearing testimony.

[26]   On January 30, 2020, the Merit Board issued an order terminating Simpson’s

       employment with MPD. Specifically, the Merit Board concluded that

       Simpson’s failure to timely log the evidence from the Wainman investigation

       and failure to file a report had violated the MPD’s SOP-008 and the rules of

       conduct as set out in Articles III(E)(40) and (41) of the Police Merit Board

       Handbook. The Merit Board also concluded that these failures had

       compromised the investigation and future prosecution of any offenses against

       Wainman. Additionally, the Merit Board concluded that Simpson’s failure to

       disclose his previous intimate relationships with Brown and Owens had

       jeopardized prosecutions for the prosecutor’s office, had violated the rule of

       conduct in Article III(E)(1)(g) of the Police Merit Board Handbook, and

       constituted conduct unbecoming of an officer. Additionally, the Merit Board

       determined that Simpson’s failure to disclose his previous relationships had

       resulted in his violation or had caused the prosecutor’s office to violate the

       Brady rule that required “disclosing information of an exculpatory nature to

       defendants in criminal matters.” (App. Vol. 2 at 21).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023          Page 14 of 25
[27]   Thereafter, Simpson filed with the trial court a petition for judicial review of the

       Merit Board’s decision.2 In October 2021, the trial court held a hearing on

       Simpson’s judicial review petition. During the hearing, Simpson argued that he

       was deprived “fundamental fairness or due process” because the hearing officer

       admitted Exhibit C-1 (March 2019 Prosecutor letter) and Exhibit C-2 (2017 ISP

       investigation report), which he asserted had contained hearsay with

       “conclusory” assertions and “salacious allegations.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 4, 5, 7).

       Simpson conceded that the hearing officer had explained that hearsay would be

       allowed during the Merit Board hearing and acknowledged that it was

       “commonplace” in administrative hearings for hearsay to be admitted. (Tr.

       Vol. 2 at 4). He generally argued that the admission of the exhibits prevented

       the Merit Board from being impartial in its determination. Simpson also argued

       that the Merit Board had improperly used his 2006 informal reprimand as a

       basis of his termination and that the Merit Board’s finding that he had had a

       sexual relationship with Owens was not supported by the evidence.

[28]   In January 2022, the trial court issued an order upholding the Merit Board’s

       decision to terminate Simpson. The trial court made the following relevant

       findings to address Simpson’s arguments on judicial review:

                15. [Simpson] was afforded adequate due process as he was
                represented by counsel at all times of this process and never once

       2
         Again, the parties’ exact arguments to the trial court are not known because the parties, when filing their
       respective appellate appendices, did not include their briefs or pleadings that they had filed with the trial
       court on judicial review.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023                                   Page 15 of 25
        made a claim that the process that the City of Madison Merit
        Board had violated his due process rights. [Simpson’s] counsel
        accepted the matters at the time of the hearing of the Merit Board
        as procedurally proper. (Tr. Vol. I p. 6).

        16. The 2006 reprimand by then Chief Wolf was not improperly
        used by the Merit Board as a basis for this termination.

                 a.) In 2006, Simpson admitted to then Chief Robert Wolf
                 that he had [had] a sexual relationship with Carrie Brown
                 and desired to have a sexual relationship with Misty
                 Owens. (Tr. Vol I. p. 176).

                 b.) Simpson was informally reprimanded for his behavior
                 in 2006. (Hrg. Ex. C-2 pp. 32-33).

                 c.) The Merit Board found that, “by [O]fficer Simpson’s
                 failure to disclose his previous relationship with Carrie
                 Brown and Misty Owens he has violated or has caused the
                 Jefferson County Prosecutor’s Office to violate, the
                 standards set forth in the case of Brady v. Maryland and
                 U.S. v. Giglio [sic], which relate to the disclosing
                 information of an exculpatory nature to defendants in
                 criminal matters.” (Merit Board Decision p. 4).

                 d.) The fact that Simpson continued to investigate or be
                 involved in investigations that involved Brown and failed
                 to disclose such information regarding his past relationship
                 creates an entirely new action for which Simpson could be
                 reprimanded. (Merit Board Decision p. 3).

        17. The admission of Hearing Exhibits C-1 (A letter from
        Prosecutor David Sutter) and C-2 (2017 State Police
        investigation) did not constitute fundamental [e]rror.

                 a.) Police merit board hearings “are administrative actions
                 which allow for less formality than in civil proceedings
                 before a court and we will not disturb the [merit board’s]
                 decision for the lack of promulgated rules of evidence as

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023            Page 16 of 25
                 long as the hearing was full and fair, before an impartial
                 body and conducted in good faith.”. . . .

                 b.) [T]he admission of incompetent or immaterial evidence
                 will not justify setting aside [an] administrative agency
                 action if there is substantial evidence to support the
                 agency’s decision[]. . . .

                 c.) [Simpson] fails to cite to any case whereby an
                 administrative bodies [sic] decision has been overturned on
                 the bas[i]s of introducing evidence that constituted
                 fundamental error.

                 d.) The parties agreed and consented that the hearing
                 officer would be the one to rule on the admission of
                 evidence. (Tr. P. 9) The hearing officer stated at the
                 hearing “we will not follow strict evidentiary rules in the
                 hearing, so hearsay will be allowed.” [(] Tr. P. 7).

                 e.) The hearing officer admitted both C-1 and C-2. (Tr. P.
                 24).

                 f.) Exhibit C-1 (the letter from Prosecutor David Sutter
                 stating that the Jefferson County Prosecutors office would
                 no longer accept cases involving [O]fficer Simpson) was
                 relevant evidence.

                 g.) Exhibit C-2 (the 2017 Indiana State Police
                 Investigation) was relevant and although introduced
                 through Chief Perkins, the Trooper who authored the
                 report, Detective Tracy Rohlfing, testified and was
                 available for cross examination regarding the contents of
                 the report.

                 h.) The vast majority of the facts relied upon by the Merit
                 Board were provided through testimony presented at the
                 hearing. For example, in addition to exhibit C-1, the
                 Merit Board relied on the testimony of former Prosecutor
                 Chad Lewis who stated that Simpson did not inform him

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023                Page 17 of 25
                        of a previous sexual relationship with Brown and that
                        Lewis felt that Simpson should have disclosed his previous
                        relationship with Brown when it was learned that Carrie
                        Brown was either a suspect or witness in a criminal case.
                        (Tr. P. 127 and Merit Board Findings of Fact p. 2 and 3).

                        i.) The Merit Board relied upon substantial evidence when
                        formulating their findings of fact and conclusions of law.

                        j.) The probative value of Exhibits C-1 and C-2 outweigh
                        any prejudice that may have been caused for [Simpson].

               18. The Board[‘]s Findings of Fact supported by the evidence.

                                                      *****

                        e.) [Simpson] fails to provide the Court with any evidence
                        that illustrates the Merit Board[’]s findings are not
                        supported by substantial evidence.

       (App. Vol. 2 at 14-16).

[29]   Simpson now appeals.

       Decision
[30]   Simpson argues that the trial court erred by upholding the Merit Board’s

       decision to terminate his employment. As Simpson argued to the trial court on

       judicial review, Simpson contends that: (1) his due process rights were violated

       by the Merit Board hearing process; (2) the Merit Board improperly used his

       2006 informal reprimand as a basis for its decision to terminate his

       employment; (3) the admission of Exhibits C-1 and C-2 resulted in fundamental

       error; and (4) some of the Merit Board’s findings were not supported by

       substantial evidence. We will review each argument in turn.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023             Page 18 of 25
[31]   “Our review of an administrative action is very limited.” Gray v. Cty. of Starke,

       82 N.E.3d 913, 917 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017), reh’g denied, trans. denied. We give

       deference to the expertise of the administrative body, which includes a police

       merit commission, and will not reverse its discretionary decision absent a

       showing that the decision was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion,

       or otherwise not in accordance with the law. Id. “An arbitrary and capricious

       decision, which the challenging party bears the burden of proving, is a decision

       which is willful and unreasonable, made without any consideration of the facts

       and in total disregard of the circumstances, and lacks any basis which might

       lead a reasonable and honest person to the same decision.” Id. (cleaned up).

       Furthermore, “[o]ur review is limited to determining whether the administrative

       body adhered to proper legal procedure and made a finding based upon

       substantial evidence in accordance with appropriate constitutional and statutory

       provisions.” Id. “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable

       mind might accept as being adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. We will

       neither reweigh the evidence upon review nor substitute our judgment for that

       of the administrative body. Id. “The discipline of police officers is within the

       province of the executive branch of government, not the judicial branch. For

       this reason, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the administrative

       body when no compelling circumstances are present.” Winters v. City of

       Evansville, 29 N.E.3d 773, 781 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (cleaned up), trans. denied.

[32]   For Simpson’s first argument, he generally argues that his due process rights

       were violated by the Merit Board hearing process. We recognize that “[t]he

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023         Page 19 of 25
       tenure given a police officer ‘is a constitutionally protected interest requiring the

       opportunity for a fair hearing conducted in good faith before a full and

       impartial body.” Fornelli v. City of Knox, 902 N.E.2d 889, 893 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2009) (cleaned up), trans. denied. Simpson, however, has waived this argument

       because he failed to raise a due process objection in the first instance to the

       Merit Board. See Pigg v. State, 929 N.E.2d 799, 803 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)

       (explaining that “[d]ue process rights are subject to waiver, and claims are

       generally waived if raised for the first time on appeal”), trans. denied; Sedona Dev.

       Group Inc., v. Merrillville Rd. Ltd. P’ship, 801 N.E.2d 1274, 1280 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2004) (“[A] party may not present an argument or issue to an appellate court

       unless the party raised that argument or issue to the trial court.”); McBride v.

       Monroe County Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 194 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2003) (explaining that a party’s failure to raise constitutional due process

       challenge below waives the issue for appellate review). Waiver

       notwithstanding, Simpson has failed to show a violation of his due process

       rights by the hearing process. Indeed, Simpson received notice of the charges

       against him and his right to a hearing, and he was represented by counsel at the

       hearing. Moreover, at the beginning of the hearing, the parties agreed that all

       procedural matters for the hearing were proper.

[33]   Second, we address Simpson’s assertion that the Merit Board improperly

       considered his 2006 informal reprimand as a basis for its decision to terminate

       his employment. During the Merit Board hearing, Simpson and the City

       stipulated that the parties had “agree[d] that witnesses may be questioned

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023           Page 20 of 25
       regarding previous reprimands of Officer Simpson so long as it relates to the

       specific allegations contained herein against Officer Simpson.” (Appellee’s

       App. Vol. 2 at 51, 67). Here, Simpson’s 2006 reprimand regarding his previous

       sexual relationship with Brown related to the specific allegation that he had

       failed to disclose that relationship to the prosecutor’s office during the

       Jones/Pedraza investigation and proceedings. Indeed, a review of the Merit

       Board’s order reveals that the Merit Board terminated Simpson’s employment,

       in part, based on his failure to disclose his prior sexual relationship with Brown

       during the Jones/Pedraza investigation and proceedings and not based on the

       fact that he had previously engaged in a relationship with Brown. Accordingly,

       we conclude that Simpson’s argument on this issue is without merit.

[34]   Next, we turn to Simpson’s challenge to the admission of Exhibits C-1 and C-2.

       Simpson asserts that the admission of Exhibits C-1 and C-2 resulted in

       fundamental error. “The fundamental error doctrine is extremely narrow and

       applies only when the error constitutes a blatant violation of basic principles,

       the harm or potential for harm is substantial, and the resulting error denies the

       defendant fundamental due process.” Johnson v. Wait, 947 N.E.2d 951, 959

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (cleaned up), reh’g denied, trans. denied. However, “[w]e

       have applied the fundamental error doctrine only in limited situations in civil

       cases.” Id.

[35]   Even assuming that this civil proceeding was one of the limited situations in

       which the fundamental error doctrine would apply, Simpson has failed to show

       such error. Simpson acknowledges that he objected, based on foundation, to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023              Page 21 of 25
       the admission of these two exhibits during the Merit Board hearing. On judicial

       review and on appeal, Simpson argues that the admission of these exhibits

       constituted fundamental error because they contained hearsay. Simpson,

       however, recognizes that the hearing officer explained that the Merit Board

       hearing would “not follow strict evidentiary rules” and that “hearsay w[ould]

       be allowed.” (Tr. Vol. 2 at 66). Simpson also generally argues that the

       admission of the exhibits resulted in prejudice.

[36]   In reviewing this admission of evidence issue, we recognize “that [p]olice merit

       board hearings are administrative actions which allow for less formality than in

       civil proceedings before a court and we will not disturb the [merit board’s]

       decision for the lack of promulgated rules of evidence as long as the hearing

       was full and fair, before an impartial body and conducted in good faith.”

       Fornelli, 902 N.E.2d at 894 (cleaned up). Indeed, “it is well settled that the

       admission of incompetent or immaterial evidence will not justify setting aside

       administrative agency action if there is substantial evidence to support the

       agency’s decision.” Sullivan v. City of Evansville, 728 N.E.2d 182, 194 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2000). “[I]n the absence of a demonstration of actual bias, we will not

       interfere with the administrative process.” Jandura v. Town of Schererville, 937

       N.E.2d 814, 819 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (cleaned up), trans. denied. Instead, we

       presume that an administrative board or panel . . . act[ed] properly and without

       bias or prejudice.” Id. (cleaned up).

[37]   Here, Simpson objected to Exhibits C-1 and C-2 based on foundation. Thus,

       his objection to the admission of the exhibits was not based on the content of

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023          Page 22 of 25
       the exhibits but on the method through which they were introduced into

       evidence. Witnesses testified to the content of Exhibit C-1 and to the portions

       of Exhibit C-2 that were specifically related to the preferred charges against

       Simpson, and Simpson did not object to that testimony. Moreover, Simpson’s

       counsel questioned witnesses about the content of these two exhibits.

       Additionally, Simpson’s counsel also questioned Trooper Rohlfing, who had

       authored the 2017 ISP investigation report, about Exhibit C-2 and his

       investigation as set forth in Exhibit C-2. Because we presume that the Merit

       Board acted without prejudice and a review of the Merit Board’s order reveals

       that its conclusions regarding the preferred charges were supported by

       substantial evidence, we reject Simpson’s argument that the Merit Board’s

       decision should be reversed based on the admission of the two exhibits. See

       Jandura, 937 N.E.2d at 819 (explaining that we presume that an administrative

       board acted properly and without bias or prejudice); Sullivan, 728 N.E.2d at 194

       (explaining that even the improper admission of evidence in an administrative

       hearing “will not justify setting aside administrative agency action if there is

       substantial evidence to support the agency’s decision”).

[38]   Lastly, we also reject Simpson’s argument that some of the Merit Board’s

       findings were not supported by substantial evidence. “Substantial evidence is

       such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as being adequate to

       support a conclusion.” Gray, 82 N.E.3d at 917. We will neither reweigh the

       evidence upon review nor substitute our judgment for that of the administrative

       body. Id. Additionally, “we will not substitute our judgment for that of the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023           Page 23 of 25
       administrative body when no compelling circumstances are present.” Winters,

       29 N.E.3d at 781 (cleaned up).

[39]   We have thoroughly reviewed the findings that Simpson challenges. For

       example, Simpson argues that the Merit Board did not consider the testimony

       of his witnesses because the findings did not specifically mention his witnesses.

       However, the Merit Board’s order specifically states that it “considered the

       testimony of all witnesses in making its decision.” (App. Vol. 2 at 18).

       Simpson also challenges the Merit Board’s finding that he had had a

       relationship with Owens and points to the conflicting evidence presented during

       the hearing. However, such an argument is nothing more than a request for us

       to reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. See Gray, 82 N.E.3d at 917

       (explaining that we will neither reweigh the evidence upon review nor substitute

       our judgment for that of the administrative body).3 We will not individually

       discuss each of the findings that Simpson challenges because a review of each

       one reveals that Simpson’s challenges are nothing more than a request for us to

       reweigh the evidence. Accordingly, we reject Simpson’s challenge to the

       findings and affirm the trial court’s order upholding the Merit Board’s decision

       to terminate Simpson’s employment with MPD.

       3
         Moreover, it is clear from our review of the Merit Board proceedings and order that the primary evidence
       relating to the preferred charge regarding Simpson’s failure to disclose his prior sexual relationship was the
       evidence relating to Simpson’s relationship with Brown and his failure to disclose that relationship during the
       Jones/Pedraza investigation and proceedings.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023                                  Page 24 of 25
[40]   Affirmed.

       Robb, S.J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-MI-246| June 28, 2023   Page 25 of 25