Court Opinion

ID: 9758938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 23:56:30.121702+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:57.318867
License: Public Domain

LAURA DENVIR STITH, Judge,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the separate opinions of Judges White and Wolff, and in the portion of the principal opinion that holds that venue does not change when a party is dropped or when a third-party defendant is added. I also write separately to express my disagreement with the principal opinion’s conclusion that venue may be redetermined whenever a plaintiff adds another defendant to a case already filed.
Section 508.010, RSMo 2000, is the general venue statute in Missouri. It is entitled “Suits by summons, where brought” and provides that “Suits instituted by summons shall, except as otherwise pro*863vided by law, be brought ...” (emphasis added). It then sets out where suits shall be brought in any of six different circumstances. The term “suits” refers to “any proceeding by a party or parties against another in a court of law.” Black’s Law Dictionaby 1448 (7th ed.1999). The word “institute” means to “begin or start; commence.” Id. at 801.
The principal opinion reasons that “[a]l-though a suit is ‘brought’ against the original defendants when the petition is initially filed, in like manner, it is also ‘brought’ against subsequent defendants when they are added to the lawsuit by amendment.” Op. at 858. It says that the plain language of the statute requires that a court must redetermine venue, if requested to do so, each time plaintiff adds a new defendant to the case.
I respectfully disagree with this reasoning. By the principal opinion’s interpretation, the addition of a new defendant is treated as the bringing of a different suit. But, in fact, the addition of the party is taking place within the same suit, already instituted. Neither State ex rel. DePaul Health Center v. Mummert, 870 S.W.2d 820 (Mo. banc 1994), nor any other decision of this Court, has previously equated adding a party with filing a new suit. And, as Judge White’s analysis of prior decisions demonstrates, no other decision of this Court, until today, has interpreted the language of section 508.010 as if it stated that venue shall be redetermined whenever a claim is added against another defendant, for it does not so state. It states that venue shall be determined when suits initiated by summons are brought — that is, when the suit itself is brought.
The legislature’s intent to have a single determination of venue at the initiation of the suit is supported by the legislature’s interchangeable use of the words “brought,” “commenced” and “instituted” in other sections of Chapter 508 dealing with venue. For example, while section 508.010 states that “Suits instituted by summons shall ... be brought ” in a particular venue, section 508.020 states that when a replevin suit is “commenced” it shall be “brought” in a certain county. Section 508.060 says where a suit against a county shall be “commenced.” Thus, the legislature uses the terms brought and commenced interchangeably. The Revisor of Statutes has further intermixed these terms in the statutory titles. While section 508.010 is entitled “Suits by summons, where brought, ” section 508.020 is entitled “Suits by attachment or replevin, where commenced,” and section 508.060 is entitled “Actions against counties, where instituted.”
In sum, the term “brought” has been equated with “instituted” or “commenced,” by the legislature, the Revisor, and even Black’s Law Dictionary, quoted above. Self-evidently, all these terms are intended to refer to when suit is first filed and to establish the proper venue of the action at that time. Had the legislature wanted venue to be redeterminable whenever parties were added, it would have been easy to provide for such a mechanism. The legislature could have entitled section 508.010, for example, “Suit by summons, when brought against particular defendants,” and begun that statute with a phrase such as “Venue shall be determined when suit is brought and may be redetermined whenever a plaintiff adds an additional defendant, as follows: ... ”. It did not, however, choose to write the venue statute in this manner.
The legislature’s intent to choose the time suit is brought as the time to determine venue, and not to provide for rede-termination of that question as the suit evolves, is thus manifest in the language of *864section 508.010 and the other venue statutes. Since the Court so interpreted the venue laws in DePaul Health Center, revision to the venue statutes has been proposed in the legislature, but not adopted. The legislature has continued to base venue on when the suit itself was brought. That determination has resulted in predictability, efficiency and stability. Should the legislature at some point decide that addition of any new defendant, or even any new party, should allow a redetermination of venue, then it can adopt a new statute so stating. But, this Court is not permitted to make these choices for it. Jepson v. Stubbs, 555 S.W.2d, 307, 313 (Mo. banc 1977) (Court will not rewrite statutes;“[i]f that is be done, it must be by legislative action”).
The principal opinion nonetheless suggests that its approach is preferable because it makes venue depend on the residency of defendants, and the legislature’s desire to make residency determinative is evident from section 508.010’s use of residency as a key factor in determining venue. But, under section 508.010, no particular defendant has a right to have a case venued in the county where he or she resides. For example, when there is only one defendant, venue is still proper in the county where the claim arose; when there are multiple defendants, venue also can be in the county of residence of any one of them even though quite distant from the residence of other defendants. Sec. 508.010.2 and .6.
Moreover, logically, if the legislature’s purpose were to give the same “rights” to object to venue to later-named defendants as are given to those sued when suit is first filed, then would not the law also require the courts to redetermine venue when a defendant was dropped, or when a third-party defendant was added? Of course, it does not, and should not. The purpose of the venue statutes is to provide a convenient, logical, and orderly forum for the litigation itself, DePaul Health Center, 870 S.W.2d at 822, not just for a particular party. Thus, despite the changes in venue law approved today, the residence of third-party defendants continues to be irrelevant to venue, and the opinion reaffirms the rule set out in DePaul Health Center that dropping a defendant does not affect venue.1
But, surely, there is little point in referring to a particular defendant’s venue rights as a basis for refashioning our venue laws in the manner the principal opinion proposes, when under that approach the redetermination will occur only if it is the plaintiff, not a third-party plaintiff, who adds a new party defendant, when a redetermination can be made regardless of whether the new party is even served, and regardless of the effect of the transfer on those already in a long-pending action. There is also a good deal of elegance to the simplicity of a rule that states that the time of the original filing of the suit is the point the only point — at which venue is to be determined.
*865While the principal opinion never mentions the words “pretensive non-joinder,” that is the phrase that defendants in this and other cases have used in arguing that this Court should provide for a reconsideration of venue whenever plaintiff adds a defendant after suit has been filed. “Pre-tensive non-joinder” is a pejorative term sometimes used to describe the practice of suing only non-resident defendants in the initial petition, thus permitting suit to be brought in a venue in which verdicts are often thought to be high, such as St. Louis City, and then joining resident defendants at a later point by amendment.
There are many who criticize this practice, and many who support it.2 To the extent that the principal opinion’s purpose in changing venue rules is to create a set of rules that are not capable of manipulation in this or another manner, to the advantage or disadvantage of one side or the other, few would disagree with its goal. But, it does so at the cost of rendering venue subject to redetermination in other circumstances, too, through a process that itself can be subjected to manipulation.
Moreover, such a drastic reshaping of Missouri venue law is not necessary to decide this case, in which the additional instate defendants were added before service was even effected on the out-of-state defendant originally sued. If this procedure troubles the Court, it could be resolved simply by holding that when an amended pleading has been filed before service of the original petition, or the filing of the original defendant’s answer, then the amended pleading, rather than the original pleading, becomes the basis for determining venue, as that is the pleading which defendant must answer.3 This simple approach would resolve the issue in this case, and, indeed, in most of the writs filed in this Court that raise the issue of “pretensive non-joinder.” Instead, the Court has chosen to go well beyond the facts of this case, and changes venue law for any case in which a defendant is added after suit is filed.
Appellate courts are normally loath to reach out in this manner, for to do so runs the risk of creating new problems when the new rule is applied in situations not then before the Court. That is a matter of concern here. While the principal opinion’s approach does avoid some of the difficulties associated with DePaul Health Center’s simpler, more efficient admonition that venue will be determined when suit is brought, it produces myriad, equally complex and troublesome problems of its own. For example:
1. Assume that a plaintiff had a suit on file in County A for eighteen months against a non-resident and during discovery has learned that another actor may be hable in addition to, or in place of, the original defendants. Or, a plaintiff learns *866that a person who plaintiff thought was insolvent and so did not sue originally, has become capable of paying a substantial verdict or has insurance not originally believed to be available. Plaintiff will want to join that new party. But, under the principal opinion’s approach, if the original party was not a Missouri resident and the new party is, then plaintiffs original venue choice will be invalidated if the newly joined party moves for a change of venue. Upon motion by any defendant, the judge who has become familiar with the case, the parties, and the issues, will be forced to transfer the case to a new circuit, where the new judge will have to learn these matters all over again. Certainly, this result is not desirable. Yet, it is the result that will occur under the principal opinion’s approach.
2. Assume plaintiff originally sued one non-resident defendant. Later, plaintiff adds a local defendant by filing an amended petition, only to dismiss that added defendant before service. As there was no service, the court never gained jurisdiction over the “added” defendant. Oney v. Pattison, 747 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Mo. banc 1988). Yet, because venue is determined at the time of filing, not at the time of service,4 and because, under the principal opinion’s approach, amending to name a new defendant now affects venue, but dropping a defendant does not, then that defendant’s one-or-two-day presence as an unserved party is determinative of venue. It means that, although a key rationale for adoption of the principal opinion’s new venue rule is that a defendant should have a say in determining the venue of a suit in which he or she has been joined, based on his or her residency, venue of the suit may in fact be determined by the residency of a defendant over whom the court never acquired jurisdiction and to whom the convenience of the location of the suit is thus absolutely irrelevant and unimportant.
8. When a defendant, as third-party plaintiff, brings in a third-party defendant, venue is unaffected. See note 1, supra. If the plaintiff later amends to make a claim directly against a third-party defendant, as suggested above, has a new action been “brought” and may venue be raised anew with the realignment of the third-party defendant as an ordinary defendant? In the past the answer was clearly no, and under the principal opinion it would remain no, as the third-party defendant is already in the suit, and has been brought there by defendant. But, plaintiff will have to file an amended petition to sue that new party directly, and this is sure to engender yet more litigation over this issue. Indeed, this Court could in the future find plaintiffs in such a case moving for transfer depending on the residence of the third-party brought in by defendant.
4. If the court orders a new party to be joined as a defendant, either as a party to be joined if feasible under Rule 52.04, or as a person permitted to intervene as of right under Rule 52.12(a), is there a new look at venue? One would presume not, for it is well-established that an injured party may choose whom to sue and cannot be forced to sue other alleged tortfeasors. See, e.g., Krohn v. Redings Mill Fire Dept., 893 S.W.2d 399, 400 (Mo.App.S.D.1995). For this reason, the principal opinion speaks only of redetermining venue when a plaintiff chooses to add a new party defendant. But, if the trial court decides that a party must be joined, the court does not actually *867join that party itself, but rather orders plaintiff to do so. Thus, technically, plaintiff will be adding a defendant, and the latter may argue that venue should be subject to redetermination of venue.
5. Cases and statutes dealing with issues other than venue also use the term “brought.”5 How will the principal opinion’s new interpretation of that term affect the interpretation of statutes of limitations? Or how the relation-back doctrine is applied? It is likely that this Court will be addressing these and other issues in the years to come, due to the principal opinion’s reading of the word “brought” today.
Whether these and the other problems with the approach adopted by the principal opinion are worse than the difficulties that have arisen under the legislature’s approach and this Court’s prior cases is, of course, a subjective matter about which the members of this Court can, and do, reasonably disagree. But, the existence of these problems highlights the fact that venue is a very complex issue, which requires consideration of competing interests in a wide variety of contexts. This task is better suited to the legislature than to adjudication on a case-by-case basis. That is why the legislature, not the court system, has traditionally balanced the competing policy concerns in this area, and chosen the approach that it finds best serves the public. See Budding v. SSM Healthcare System, 19 S.W.3d 678, 682 (Mo. banc 2000) (“when the legislature has spoken on the subject, the courts must defer to its determinations of public policy”). This Court should follow this principle here, and not substitute its judgment for that of the legislature.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from so much of the principal opinion as provides that venue shall be redetermined whenever plaintiff adds a defendant.

. Op. at 858. The principal opinion acknowledges the long-standing rule, based on State ex rel. Garrison Wagner Co. v. Schaaf, 528 S.W.2d 438, 442 (Mo. banc 1975), that the institution of a third-party claim does not affect venue because section 508.010 refers only to “plaintiff” and “defendant,” not to third-party defendants. See also State ex rel. Bitting v. Adolf, 704 S.W.2d 671, 673 (Mo. banc 1986); State ex rel. Missouri Property & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n. v. Brown, 900 S.W.2d 268, 274-75 (Mo.App.W.D.1995). This rule is relevant here because, were it the legislature’s intent that the courts redetermine venue based on the residence of each newly-joined party, then the legislature would also have so provided in the case of third-party defendants.

. Those who criticize the practice suggest that it is used to manipulate the intrastate forum of a lawsuit to the disadvantage of defendants. Those who support it suggest that it is no more inappropriate than allowing a defendant to affect venue by choosing where to locate an agent for service of process. They also suggest that, as the venue laws are written and as our cases have interpreted them until today, plaintiffs’ "two-step” approach to joining defendants is perfectly permissible, so that a lawyer is merely fulfilling his or her duty as an advocate in filing the client’s claim in a venue and in a manner that the lawyer deems to be most favorable, and any desire to change this practice must be addressed to the legislature, not to the courts.

. A similar effect could be achieved by adopting a rule that venue not be determined until one or more defendants are served, but such a rule could itself be subject to manipulation, such as where a defendant learns of the filing of suit prior to service, and moves or relocates its agent for service of process in an attempt to defeat venue.

. See, e.g., DePaul Health Ctr., 870 S.W.2d at 823; State ex rel. Schnuck Markets, Inc. v. Koehr, 859 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Mo. banc 1993) (stating, " 'service' and 'filing' are two different and distinct words contemplating two different and distinct acts. We cannot construe one to mean another”).

. See Cooper v. Minor, 16 S.W.3d 578 (Mo. banc 2000), discussing, sec. 516.145, RSMo 1994 (“Within one year: all actions brought by an offender sec. 516.103, RSMo 1994 (for actions on penal statutes, the limitations period "shall not be tolled by the filing or pendency of any administrative complaint or action and no such suit may be brought or maintained unless commenced within the time prescribed....”). See also sec. 516.105, RSMo 2000 (all actions for medical malpractice "shall be brought within two years ....”); sec. 210.826.2, RSMo 2000 (under the Parentage Act, “ an action to determine the existence of the father and child relationship ... .may be brought by the child....”).