Court Opinion

ID: 9376558
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 06:04:59.093543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.615955
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                   UNPUBLISHED
                                                                   March 2, 2023
              Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                  Nos. 358529; 358536; 358538
                                                                   Genesee Circuit Court
KELVIN JONES,                                                      LC Nos. 19-044670-FC;
                                                                           19-044738-FC;
              Defendant-Appellant.                                         19-044812-FC

Before: JANSEN, P.J., and REDFORD and YATES, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        These are consolidated cases.1 In Docket No. 358529, the jury found defendant guilty of
one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), MCL 750.520b(1)(a); MCL
750.520b(2)(b) (sexual penetration of person under 13 years of age by defendant 17 years of age
or older). In Docket No. 358536, the jury found defendant guilty of two counts of CSC-I, MCL
750.520b(1)(a) (sexual penetration of person under 13 years of age). In Docket No. 358538, the
jury found defendant guilty of six counts of CSC-I, MCL 750.520b(1)(a) (sexual penetration of
person under 13 years of age). All three cases were joined for a single trial with one jury. The
trial court sentenced defendant to serve concurrent prison sentences of 25 to 60 years in Docket
No. 358529; 30 to 60 years for each count in Docket No. 358536; and 30 to 60 years for each count
in Docket No. 358538. Defendant appeals by right. We affirm.

                                      I. BACKGROUND

      These three cases involve defendant’s sexual abuse of three children: TC, NK, and JW.
TC and NK are sisters, and the abuse occurred in 2004. JW’s abuse occurred in 2018.

       TC testified that her abuse occurred in 2004 when she was nine years old. She was living
with her mother, siblings, and defendant. Defendant was her mother’s boyfriend at the time and

1
 People v Jones, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered September 21, 2021 (Docket
Nos. 358529; 358536; 358538).

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often watched TC. TC testified that the abuse happened multiple times per week whenever her
mother was gone. TC testified that, on one of these occasions, she was on her mother’s bed when
defendant came onto the bed naked, had TC climb on top of him, and told her to touch his penis.
TC testified that defendant also put his penis partially inside her anus. TC testified that this
occurred in other instances of abuse, which TC described in detail. TC eventually told her school
principal about the abuse, but TC was unable to testify at a prior trial. Over a decade later, TC
was informed by police about the new allegations against defendant regarding abuse of JW, and
TC agreed to testify at trial regarding her own allegations from 2004.

        NK testified that her abuse began in 2004 when she was eight years old. NK testified that
on one particular occasion defendant pulled off NK’s pants, penetrated her vagina with his fingers,
got on top of her, and put his penis outside her vagina. NK explained that defendant was unable
to put his penis inside her vagina because she prevented him from doing so and left the room.
However, NK testified that similar abuse occurred on several other occasions and that, on these
occasions, defendant did put his penis inside NK’s vagina.

       JW testified that, on November 28, 2018, when he was seven years old, defendant, who
was his aunt’s boyfriend at the time, came to JW, told him to pull his pants and underwear down,
and put his “private part” inside JW’s anus. Defendant stopped as soon as somebody entered the
house. JW subsequently told his mother what happened.

        In Docket No. 358529, defendant was bound over on one count of CSC-I. In Docket
No. 358536, defendant was bound over on two counts of CSC-I and six counts of CSC-II (which
were subsequently dismissed). In Docket No. 358538, defendant was bound over on six counts of
CSC-I. Prior to joinder of the cases, the prosecution filed a notice of intent to introduce other-acts
evidence under MCL 768.27a(1), which provides that “in a criminal case in which the defendant
is accused of committing a listed offense against a minor, evidence that the defendant committed
another listed offense against a minor is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any
matter to which it is relevant.”

        The prosecution intended to use the allegations from each case as evidence under MCL
768.27a in each of the other cases. The prosecution contended that the evidence was admissible
under the six-part test stated in People v Watkins, 491 Mich 450, 487; 818 NW2d 296 (2012). At
a later hearing held to address the admissibility of the other-acts evidence, the parties and trial
court discovered that the three cases had not been consolidated or joined despite their
understanding that this had already occurred. Although defendant’s first trial counsel believed
joinder had already occurred, he nonetheless placed an objection on the record to preserve the
issue; however, he offered no further argument or comment against it. The trial court joined the
cases for a single trial after determining that it would not cause unfair prejudice to defendant.

         Nearly one year later, defendant’s new trial counsel moved for the trial court to reconsider
its prior ruling on joinder, arguing that the cases were too dissimilar, too far apart in time, and too
prejudicial for one jury to hear. At the first portion of the motion hearing, the parties and trial
court discovered that the trial court had never formally ruled on the admissibility of the other-acts
evidence. Defendant’s trial counsel requested additional time to review the matter, and the hearing
was adjourned. At the continued hearing, defendant’s trial counsel opposed admitting the
allegations from the other victims because it was essentially “backdooring . . . character evidence

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and propensity evidence,” which would prevent defendant from “a fair chance.” Defendant also
summarily contended that admitting the evidence would be unfairly prejudicial under MRE 403.
The parties and trial court agreed that the other-acts-evidence issue would be essentially moot if
the trial court allowed joinder because the jury would hear each victim’s testimony regardless.

         The trial court allowed the other-acts evidence and denied defendant’s motion for
reconsideration, reasoning that defendant’s argument essentially amounted to an argument against
propensity and character evidence despite that MCL 768.27a clearly allowed admission of such
evidence. The trial court determined that defendant had failed to show why the probative value of
this evidence would be outweighed by any unfair prejudice. Given that this evidence was
admissible, the trial court ruled that there was no reason not to have a single trial. A single trial
would be more economical because it would prevent the victims and witnesses from having to
testify at three separate trials.

         At trial, in addition to the victims’ testimony, Julie Swift, a sexual assault nurse examiner
(SANE) with specialized training in the area of sexual assault examinations, testified that she
performed an examination on JW after he was brought to the emergency room. JW informed Swift
of defendant’s abuse. Swift testified that her examination of JW revealed “redness and
abrasions . . . around the rectal opening.” Swift was asked, “[B]ased on your training and
experience, is that indicative of anything?” Swift replied, “It can be indicative of some sort of a
sexual trauma to the area. On some children, it can be a sign of uncleanliness, not cleaning well.
Those are the two most common.” Swift testified that she had not observed “any stool” in JW’s
rectum area. Thomas Cottrell, an expert in child sexual abuse and offender dynamics, testified
that, although children’s reactions to abuse varied, such children typically had difficulty disclosing
the abuse and sometimes exhibited behavioral issues. Cottrell explained why delayed disclosures
were common for abused children and why such children often had behavioral problems. Cottrell
never directly addressed the victims or allegations; rather, he discussed child sexual abuse
dynamics in a general fashion. In fact, Cottrell testified that he knew nothing about the cases,
victims, or allegations.

        On appeal, defendant advances three positions. First, defendant argues that joining the
three cases for a single trial was an abuse of discretion. Second, he contends that Swift’s and
Cottrell’s testimony constituted improper vouching for the victims’ credibility and that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge such testimony. Finally, he maintains that the
other-acts evidence was inadmissible under MCL 768.27a.

                                          II. ANALYSIS

                                           A. JOINDER

       Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by joining his three cases
together. We disagree.

       “Whether joinder is appropriate is a mixed question of fact and law,” and “[t]o determine
whether joinder is permissible, a trial court must first find the relevant facts and then must decide
whether those facts constitute ‘related’ offenses for which joinder is appropriate.” People v
Gaines, 306 Mich App 289, 304; 856 NW2d 222 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

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The trial court’s factual findings are reviewed for clear error, but its interpretation of a court rule
is reviewed de novo. Id. Yet, the trial court’s “ultimate decision on permissive joinder of related
charges lies firmly within the discretion of trial courts.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).
A court abuses its discretion when its decision is “outside the range of principled outcomes.”
Watkins, 491 Mich at 467.

       Joinder is governed by MCR 6.120, which provides in relevant part:

               (B) Postcharging Permissive Joinder or Severance. On its own initiative,
       the motion of a party, or the stipulation of all parties, except as provided in subrule
       (C), the court may join offenses charged in two or more informations or indictments
       against a single defendant, or sever offenses charged in a single information or
       indictment against a single defendant, when appropriate to promote fairness to the
       parties and a fair determination of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of each
       offense.

               (1) Joinder is appropriate if the offenses are related. For purposes of this
       rule, offenses are related if they are based on

               (a) the same conduct or transaction, or

               (b) a series of connected acts, or

               (c) a series of acts constituting parts of a single scheme or plan.

               (2) Other relevant factors include the timeliness of the motion, the drain on
       the parties’ resources, the potential for confusion or prejudice stemming from either
       the number of charges or the complexity or nature of the evidence, the potential for
       harassment, the convenience of witnesses, and the parties’ readiness for trial.

Charges are “not ‘related’ simply because they [are] ‘of the same or similar character’ ”; rather,
charges are related when the evidence shows that a “defendant engaged in ongoing acts
constituting parts of his overall scheme or plan . . . .” People v Williams, 483 Mich 226, 235; 769
NW2d 605 (2009) (citation omitted).

       For example, in Gaines, we held that joinder was proper when “[t]he evidence
demonstrated that defendant engaged in ongoing acts related to his scheme of preying upon young,
teenage girls from his high school.” Gaines, 306 Mich App at 305. The Gaines defendant had

       used text messages to communicate with the victims and encouraged them to keep
       their communications secret. In at least two cases, defendant requested naked
       photographs from the victims and, if they refused, threatened to cut off ties with
       them. He also used his parents’ basement to isolate two of the young girls and
       sexually penetrate them. [Id.]

Moreover, we reasoned that “[t]he facts were not complex and presented little potential for
confusion” and that, “[b]ecause defendant’s actions against each victim were admissible in each
case pursuant to MCL 768.27a, each victim would have been required to testify in each trial if the

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cases were tried separately.” Id. at 305. Accordingly, “[j]oinder offered convenience to the
victims, who had already suffered harassment in their communities as a result of these cases.” Id.

        In the present case, the evidence demonstrated that defendant engaged in ongoing acts
related to his scheme of preying upon young children who were close to him and over whom he
had supervision. The victims were between seven and nine years old; defendant had been dating
someone close to the victims; the abuse occurred in a house that defendant resided in; and the
abuse was similar in its characteristics. The charges were not complex or confusing, but involved
the same type of offense—criminal sexual conduct. Trial occurred in July 2021, and joinder
occurred on February 20, 2020, which made joinder timely, and allowed defendant ample time to
prepare his defense. Furthermore, a single case meant that the victims and witnesses would not
need to testify at three separate trials, which made joinder more convenient and economical.
Finally, as will be discussed in more detail in the proceeding paragraphs, the victims’ allegations
were admissible under MCL 768.27a. Therefore, “each victim would have been required to testify
in each trial if the cases were tried separately.” Gaines, 306 Mich App at 305.

                                    B. EXPERT TESTIMONY

       Defendant argues that the admission of Cottrell’s and Swift’s testimony was plain error
because it improperly vouched for the victims’ credibility. He further contends that his trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge such testimony. We disagree.

         Because defendant failed to preserve this issue by objecting to the complained-of testimony
on the same ground as that raised on appeal, we review it for plain error affecting substantial rights.
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 763-764; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). Additionally, we review an
unpreserved issue concerning ineffective assistance for errors apparent from the record. People v
Lockett, 295 Mich App 165, 186; 814 NW2d 295 (2012). “If the record does not contain sufficient
detail to support defendant’s ineffective assistance claim, then he has effectively waived the issue.”
Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). “The standards for ‘plain error’ review and ineffective
assistance of counsel are distinct, and therefore, a defendant can obtain relief for ineffective
assistance of counsel even if he or she cannot demonstrate plain error.” People v Hughes, 506
Mich 512, 523; 958 NW2d 98 (2020).

         “An expert may testify regarding typical symptoms of child sexual abuse for the sole
purpose of explaining a victim’s specific behavior that might be incorrectly construed by the jury
as inconsistent with that of an abuse victim or to rebut an attack on the victim’s credibility.”
People v Peterson, 450 Mich 349, 373; 537 NW2d 857 (1995), amended 450 Mich 1212 (1995).
However, “(1) an expert may not testify that the sexual abuse occurred, (2) an expert may not
vouch for the veracity of a victim, and (3) an expert may not testify whether the defendant is
guilty.” Id. at 352. “[A]n examining physician cannot give an opinion on whether a complainant
had been sexually assaulted if the ‘conclusion [is] nothing more than the doctor’s opinion that the
victim had told the truth.’ ” People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 255; 934 NW2d 693 (2019) (citation
omitted; second alteration in original). Similarly, “expert witnesses may not testify that children
overwhelmingly do not lie when reporting sexual abuse because such testimony improperly
vouches for the complainant’s veracity.” Id. at 235. Moreover, “examining physicians cannot
testify that a complainant has been sexually assaulted or has been diagnosed with sexual abuse
without physical evidence that corroborates the complainant’s account of sexual assault or abuse

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because such testimony vouches for the complainant’s veracity and improperly interferes with the
role of the jury.” Id.

        In the present case, defendant fails to point to the specific testimony from Cottrell that
supposedly vouched for any of the victims’ credibility. “Trial courts are not the research assistants
of the litigants; the parties have a duty to fully present their legal arguments to the court for its
resolution of their dispute.” Walters v Nadell, 481 Mich 377, 388; 751 NW2d 431 (2008)
(emphasis added). Regardless, we discern no plain error in Cottrell’s testimony. Cottrell never
discussed any of the victims; in fact, he knew nothing about the cases, victims, or allegations and
could not, therefore, speak to their credibility. Cottrell testified only as to generalities regarding
child abuse victims, such as disclosure, behavioral issues, and grooming. Swift’s testimony was
not merely her opinion that JW had been abused; rather, she testified that, based on physical
evidence, i.e., redness and abrasions around the rectum area without stool, there was a possibility
that JW had been sexually abused. This was entirely proper. See Thorpe, 504 Mich at 235. Trial
counsel has no duty to make a meritless or futile objection, see People v Putman, 309 Mich App
240, 245; 870 NW2d 593 (2015), and defendant has accordingly failed to demonstrate that his trial
counsel was ineffective.

                                  C. OTHER-ACTS EVIDENCE

      Defendant argues that the admission of each victim’s testimony at trial constituted the
improper admission of other-acts evidence under MCL 768.27a. We disagree.

        A trial court’s decision to admit or preclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
People v Mardlin, 487 Mich 609, 614; 790 NW2d 607 (2010). A court abuses its discretion when
its decision is “outside the range of principled outcomes.” People v Musser, 494 Mich 337, 348;
835 NW2d 319 (2013). But when “the decision involves a preliminary question of law, which is
whether a rule of evidence precludes admissibility, the question is reviewed de novo.” People v
McDaniel, 469 Mich 409, 412; 670 NW2d 659 (2003).

       Under MCL 768.27a(1),

       in a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of committing a listed offense
       against a minor, evidence that the defendant committed another listed offense
       against a minor is admissible and may be considered for its bearing on any matter
       to which it is relevant. If the prosecuting attorney intends to offer evidence under
       this section, the prosecuting attorney shall disclose the evidence to the defendant at
       least 15 days before the scheduled date of trial or at a later time as allowed by the
       court for good cause shown, including the statements of witnesses or a summary of
       the substance of any testimony that is expected to be offered.

MCL 768.27a remains subject to MRE 403. Watkins, 491 Mich at 486. MRE 403 provides that
“[a]lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.”
However, “when applying MRE 403 to evidence admissible under MCL 768.27a, courts must

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weigh the propensity inference in favor of the evidence’s probative value rather than its prejudicial
effect.” Watkins, 491 Mich at 487.

       Our Supreme Court clarified that “[t]his does not mean, however, that other-acts evidence
admissible under MCL 768.27a may never be excluded under MRE 403 as overly prejudicial.” Id.
The Court set forth a list of six factors for trial courts to consider when determining whether MCL
768.27a evidence should be excluded under MRE 403:

        (1) the dissimilarity between the other acts and the charged crime, (2) the temporal
        proximity of the other acts to the charged crime, (3) the infrequency of the other
        acts, (4) the presence of intervening acts, (5) the lack of reliability of the evidence
        supporting the occurrence of the other acts, and (6) the lack of need for evidence
        beyond the complainant’s and the defendant’s testimony. [Id. at 487-488.]

This list is “illustrative rather than exhaustive.” Id. at 488.

        As previously discussed, the allegations in these three cases were substantially similar and
involved defendant’s scheme of preying upon young children between seven to nine years old,
who were close to him both relationally and physically, and over whom he had supervision.
Defendant had been dating someone close to each of the victims, and the abuse was similar in its
characteristics. NK and TC were sisters, and their abuse occurred close in time and was
continuous. Although JW’s abuse occurred approximately 14 years later, Cottrell explained that
delayed disclosure was typical for abused children, and the temporal gap was outweighed by the
pattern of abuse. Additionally, although JW’s abuse occurred only once, this was because of his
immediate disclosure of the abuse. Regarding reliability, each victim testified in detail about the
abuse, and JW’s testimony was supported by physical evidence. Furthermore, given that this case
involved largely a credibility contest of the victims, the other-acts evidence was helpful for the
jury to understand defendant’s propensity to commit these acts. Although normally propensity is
improper for the jury to consider, MCL 768.27a clearly allows for this and, under MRE 403, must
be weighed in favor of admissibility. See Watkins, 491 Mich at 487. We discern no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court. See also Gaines, 306 Mich App at 305-306.

        Affirmed.

                                                                  /s/ Kathleen Jansen
                                                                  /s/ James Robert Redford
                                                                  /s/ Christopher P. Yates

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