Court Opinion

ID: 9627672
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:50:09.420659+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:48.446694
License: Public Domain

John B. Robbins, Judge, concurring. I disagree with the majority’s holding with regard to the trial court’s decision to set aside the deed. The proof showed that virtually everything each party had acquired was commingled throughout their seventeen-year marriage, which included $97,000 of appellant’s Wal-Mart Stock, appellant’s inheritance of $18,000, and monthly social security benefits he received after the death of his children’s mother. The real property acquired by the appellee was also among the property placed into the joint ownership of the parties, and in my view the trial court clearly erred in finding that the appellant occupied such a superior position of dominance or advantage as would imply a dominating influence and raise the presumption of an invalid transfer. While I believe the belt is broken, the suspenders hold and save the trial court’s decision. I agree to affirm this case on the alternate basis recited in the trial court’s order. The trial court’s order stated, “That the court, taking into account all the factors of section 9-12-315(a)(l)(A) of the Arkansas Code, finds that an unequal division of marital assets to be equitable in this matter.” The majority correctly points out that while simply reciting the statutory factors is not sufficient to support an unequal distribution, the trial court in this case extensively covered the proof as it related to the factors in its oral ruling from the bench. Under our holding in Jones v. Jones, 17 Ark. App. 144, 705 S.W.2d 447 (1986), this was sufficient. In its oral ruling, the trial court adequately explained its reasons for awarding Ms. Scott the property, and in particular noted that the real estate was acquired relatively recently by Ms. Scott through her father’s trust, and that Ms. Scott would be solely responsible for the debt incurred to build the house. The trial court provided specific reasons to support an unequal distribution, and because that decision was not clearly erroneous, I concur in the majority’s affirmance of this case.