Court Opinion

ID: 9450768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 16:57:16.163546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:26.671096
License: Public Domain

SWYGERT, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
On the second day of the trial defendants moved for a mistrial predicated upon certain newspaper articles appearing in the Chicago Sun-Times and the Chicago’s American. The Sun-Times article, aside from narrating that the district judge had heard a playback of a tape recording and had upheld its admissibility, named the defendants and stated that Tenuto was an ex-convict and that Largo had been arrested the year before as a “keeper of a disorderly house.” The article further related that a Secret Service agent said he posed as a “phony money passer” and was in a room with the defendants negotiating to buy $100,-000 in counterfeit money.
The Chicago’s American article also referred to the tape recording and then went on to relate that the defendants had passed $12,000 in counterfeit money during the six weeks they had been under surveillance by the Secret Service. An assistant United States Attorney was quoted concerning the tape recording. The article also reported that the agent in charge of the Chicago Secret Service office identified the defendants as “kingpins” of a counterfeit ring which turned out “excellent forgeries.” The agent in charge did not testify at the trial.
When the matter was brought to the attention of the district court, the judge examined the jurors individually with regard to the articles. He asked substantially the same question of each juror: “It has been called to the court’s attention that certain articles appeared in the press in the Chicago newspapers pertaining to this trial. You will recall my admonition of yesterday. I will ask if you *257saw any of those articles that appeared in the press?” Juror Archer stated he had read the article in the Chicago’s American. The judge then asked, “Was there anything about that article that might or could influence you so that you could not be a fair and impartial juror in this case?” The juror answered, “No sir.”
The record indicates that the questioning of juror Archer took place while some of the other jurors were present. This, in itself, was a departure from the required procedure delineated in United States v. Accardo, 298 F.2d 133 (7th Cir. 1962). Moreover, the judge did not make a searching inquiry of this juror with regard to whether he might have been prejudiced by the article. United States v. Accardo, supra; Coppedge v. United States, 106 U.S.App.D.C. 275, 272 F.2d 504 (D.C. Cir. 1959). Rather, he merely asked the juror whether the article might or could influence him. In my opinion, this was not a sufficient inquiry under the circumstances. It was not the province of the juror to make the ultimate determination whether the article might or could have- prejudiced him. The judge, after further questioning, should have made that final decision himself. If the juror had been removed from the presence of the other jurors and questioned further by the judge, it might well have developed that the juror would have admitted his inability to disregard the statements in the news report.
The fact that only one juror read the article is not determinative. Moreover, the judge did not ask the juror whether he had discussed the article with the other jurors. Speculation, which is legitimate in these circumstances, suggests the possibility that this juror discussed the article with his fellow jurors.
The Government contends that the article under consideration was not inflammatory or prejudicial and cites our recent decision in United States v. Jannsen, 339 F.2d 916 (7th Cir. 1964). Although the majority does not discuss the Jannsen decision, it should be pointed out that the circumstances there were significantly different from those present here. In the first place, none of the jurors in Jannsen said that he had read the allegedly offending newspaper article. Secondly, we held there that the article was not prejudicial. The record in that case shows that the newspaper account related what allegedly had taken place during the trial itself and discussed the evidence presented to the jurors. On the other hand, in the instant case the article included certain information which was not brought before the jury. Moreover, the fact that the statements were exposed to a juror by appearance in a newspaper article rather than by another form of extrajudicial communication is unimportant. If the Government’s attorney or the agent had made the same statements as were contained in the newspaper article in the corridor of the courthouse and within the presence and hearing of juror Archer, it could hardly be said that the effect would have been less pernicious.
The majority says: “If the evidence adduced at the trial here had presented a close issue of guilt or innocence, we might well have concluded that prejudicial error existed in this case. However, in the face of the overwhelming proof of the defendants’ guilt, we find no justification for a new trial.” If I understand the majority correctly, this court is holding that the standard of a fair trial in a criminal case varies with the degree of guilt which we, as appellate judges, believe the evidence indicates. If the evidence of guilt seems overwhelming, the standard is not as exacting as when the evidence appears less conclusive. Such a variable standard, in my opinion, is antithetic to the very concept of due process. The sixth amendment’s guaranty of fair trial requires that the same kind of trial be afforded every defendant — to those whose guilt appears doubtless as well as to those whose guilt appears less certain. The standard of fair procedure ought not depend upon whether a seemingly just verdict has resulted.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial.