Court Opinion

ID: 9838846
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-08 14:06:01.725315+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:02:08.589802
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 1, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                    Commonwealth of Kentucky
                                Court of Appeals
                                   NO. 2022-CA-0798-MR

CALVIN ANDREW MCKINNEY                                                APPELLANT

                      APPEAL FROM WARREN CIRCUIT COURT
v.                       HONORABLE JOHN GRISE, JUDGE
                             ACTION NO. 85-CR-00768

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                               APPELLEE

                                     OPINION
                             REVERSING AND REMANDING

                                         ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Calvin McKinney appeals from the order of the Warren Circuit

Court, entered May 23, 2022, denying his motion to correct his sentence pursuant

to CR1 60.02(e) and CR 60.02(f). Following review of the record, briefs, and law,

we reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.
             BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                In 1986, when he was 17 years old, McKinney entered a guilty plea to

intentional murder, first-degree robbery, second-degree burglary, and theft by

unlawful taking over $100. The trial court sentenced McKinney to life for murder

plus a total of 35 years’ incarceration for the remaining offenses. All sentences

were ordered to run consecutively with each other and consecutively to the life

sentence.

                McKinney filed his first post-conviction motion in 1989 pursuant to

RCr2 11.42, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The trial court denied

relief, and this Court affirmed. In 2006, McKinney filed a second collateral attack

on his conviction pursuant to both RCr 11.42 and CR 60.02. The trial court denied

relief, and this Court again affirmed.3 In 2019, McKinney, pro se, filed the

underlying motion for relief. The trial court appointed counsel, who supplemented

the motion. McKinney argued trial counsel failed to review his presentence

investigation pursuant to KRS4 532.050(4) and also that his sentence of life plus 35

years was illegal pursuant to Bedell v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 779 (Ky.

1993).

2
    Kentucky Rules of Criminal Procedure.
3
 See McKinney v. Commonwealth, No. 2009-CA-1166-MR, 2011 WL 43235 (Ky. App. Jan. 7,
2011).
4
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

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                 The trial court denied relief, finding that KRS 532.050(4) was

inapplicable because McKinney had not been convicted of a sex crime. The trial

court also denied relief pursuant to CR 60.02, reasoning that Bedell created a new

rule of law, and new rules of law “are not to be retroactively applied in the context

of collateral attacks.” Leonard v. Commonwealth, 279 S.W.3d 151, 160 (Ky.

2009). This appeal followed.5

                                 STANDARD OF REVIEW

                 This Court reviews orders on CR 60.02 motions for abuse of

discretion. White v. Commonwealth, 32 S.W.3d 83, 86 (Ky. App. 2000) (citation

omitted). “The test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was

arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Foley v.

Commonwealth, 425 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky. 2014) (citation omitted).

                                     LEGAL ANALYSIS

                 When McKinney was sentenced in 1986, KRS 532.110(1)(c) provided

“[t]he aggregate of consecutive indeterminate terms shall not exceed in maximum

length the longest extended term which would be authorized by KRS 532.080 for

the highest class of crime for which any of the sentences is imposed.”6 In Rackley

5
  On appeal, McKinney merely requests in a footnote that this Court consider his argument
related to KRS 532.050(4). He fails to expand any argument in his brief related to the statute.
Therefore, we decline to address it.
6
    KRS 532.080 addresses sentencing for persistent felony offenders.

                                                -3-
v. Commonwealth, 674 S.W.2d 512 (Ky. 1984), the Kentucky Supreme Court

interpreted the statutory language to mean capital cases were an exception and,

therefore, there were no statutory prohibitions to running a life sentence

consecutive to a 20-year sentence for burglary. However, Rackley was overruled

by Bedell in 1993, when our highest court held that “no sentence can be ordered to

run consecutively with such a life sentence in any case, capital or non-

capital.” Bedell, 870 S.W.2d at 783. In the instant action, the Commonwealth

argues Rackley was still controlling in 1986 when McKinney was sentenced in a

capital case and, therefore, McKinney’s sentence was legal at the time it was

imposed. Due to recently published caselaw, however, we are compelled to

disagree.

             In July 2022, approximately two months after the trial court entered

its order denying relief to McKinney, this Court published Meadows v.

Commonwealth, 648 S.W.3d 701 (Ky. App. 2022). In that case, Meadows argued

his sentence of life plus a combined total of 25 years’ incarceration, to be served

consecutively, was impermissible pursuant to Bedell. Meadows unequivocally

determined the holding in Bedell is retroactive. In its analysis, a panel of this

Court also looked to Phon v. Commonwealth, 545 S.W.3d 284 (Ky. App. 2018),

and reasoned that the Court was required to “retroactively apply a ruling when it

consists of merely a clarification of an already existing sentencing statute. Id. at

                                          -4-
301. See also Duncan v. Commonwealth, 640 S.W.3d 84 (Ky. App. 2021).”

Meadows, 648 S.W.3d at 705. This Court then held:

            [b]ased upon the holdings in Phon and Duncan,
            Appellant is entitled to challenge the allegedly illegal
            sentence under CR 60.02 even though he did not file the
            motion within a reasonable time. Applying the principles
            of Bedell and Phon to Appellant, the holding of Bedell
            would appear to be retroactive. The relevant portion of
            the statute in question in Appellant’s case, KRS 532.110,
            is unchanged since the time of Appellant’s sentencing in
            1977. The clarification of the statute’s application via
            Bedell did not adopt a new rule of constitutional law or
            procedure but was merely a new interpretation of the
            same statute. Appellant is correct in the assertion that
            this case is governed retroactively by Bedell[.]

Id.

            Ultimately, this Court affirmed the trial court and denied relief to

Meadows, recognizing an important exception to Bedell, which provides a life

sentence can run consecutively to a previously imposed sentence. See Stewart v.

Commonwealth, 153 S.W.3d 789 (Ky. 2005). This exception applied in Meadows,

because Meadows’ sentences were the result of multiple trials and guilty pleas. In

other words, there were multiple sets of facts related to separate indictments. Most

importantly, due to the numerous trials and pleas involved, Meadows’ various

sentences were imposed at varying times. Because Meadows had sentences

previously imposed, this Court determined his sentences could run consecutively,

including the life sentence. This exception does not apply to McKinney because

                                        -5-
his sentences were imposed at the same time and involved just one set of facts (i.e.,

there is no previously imposed sentence).

            Meadows is directly on point. Because Bedell did not adopt a new

rule of law but simply provided a new interpretation of KRS 532.110, the holding

in Bedell is retroactive. The remedy is to have the trial court correct McKinney’s

sentence. See Phon, 545 S.W.3d at 308-09.

                                 CONCLUSION

            Accordingly, we REVERSE AND REMAND to the Warren Circuit

Court for proceedings consistent with this Opinion.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Alana S. Meyer                              Daniel Cameron
Frankfort, Kentucky                         Attorney General of Kentucky

                                            Courtney E. Albini
                                            Assistant Attorney General
                                            Frankfort, Kentucky

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