Court Opinion

ID: 9910511
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-15 19:02:32.18967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:53:07.773349
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/15/23

                      CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

             IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                               FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

    THE PEOPLE,
                                                                         F084489
         Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                              (Super. Ct. No. BF159352B)
                 v.

    BRYSON CLAYTON MITCHELL,                                           OPINION
         Defendant and Appellant.

        APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. Kenneth C.
Twisselman II, Judge.
        Christine Vento, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
        Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Louis M. Vasquez, Lewis A.
Martinez and Ian Whitney, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                            -ooOoo-

*       Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is
certified for publication with the exception of part I.B. of the Discussion.

                                SEE CONCURRING OPINION
                                      INTRODUCTION
       In 2015, appellant Bryson Clayton Mitchell went on a crime spree with two
accomplices. In 2017, appellant was convicted of 21 felonies stemming from this crime
spree, including various robberies and assaults with a semiautomatic firearm. Numerous
gang enhancements were found true, and the jury convicted appellant of being an active
gang member. He received an aggregate determinate sentence of 67 years, along with a
consecutive aggregate indeterminate term of 144 years.
       In 2021, this court issued a nonpublished opinion in which we vacated appellant’s
sentence and remanded this matter for a full resentencing after we determined a firearm
enhancement had been improperly imposed in a particular count. We otherwise affirmed
appellant’s judgment.1 (People v. Mitchell (Feb. 18, 2021, F075878) [nonpub. opn.].)
       On May 26, 2021, the California Supreme Court denied review of this matter. The
following day, this court issued the remittitur.
       On January 1, 2022, Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly
Bill 333) became effective. This legislation made significant changes to the elements
necessary to establish a criminal street gang.
       On May 27, 2022, the trial court resentenced appellant in this matter. Prior to
resentencing, the court expressed concern that newly enacted Assembly Bill 333 applied
retroactively to appellant. However, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to
address the validity of appellant’s gang conviction and the gang enhancements. The
court resentenced appellant to an aggregate determinate term of 63 years eight months,
along with a consecutive aggregate indeterminate sentence of 144 years.

1       As noted in our prior opinion, appellant had been sentenced in this matter three times
before we directed the lower court to conduct another sentencing hearing. The original
sentencing occurred in June 2017. On October 19, 2018, appellant was resentenced to correct
certain errors that the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation had brought to the
trial court’s attention. Finally, on October 31, 2018, the court recalled the sentence to correct a
mathematical error.

                                                2.
       In the present appeal, the parties dispute whether appellant is entitled to the
retroactive benefits of Assembly Bill 333. We conclude that appellant has the better
argument. It is undisputed that Assembly Bill 333 applies retroactively to any criminal
matter that is not yet final on appeal. (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206–1207
(Tran).) In the published portion of this opinion, we hold that, because this matter is still
pending before us, it cannot be said that this criminal prosecution or proceeding
concluded before the ameliorative legislation took effect. Accordingly, appellant’s
judgment is not yet final, and we must presume the Legislature intended for this
ameliorative enactment to apply as broadly as is constitutionally permissible. (See
People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671, 677 (Esquivel).) Appellant benefits from
Assembly Bill 333.
       In the nonpublished portion of this opinion, we conclude that this record no longer
contains admissible evidence to establish the predicate offenses necessary to prove a
pattern of criminal gang activity. (See People v. Valencia (2021) 11 Cal.5th 818, 839
(Valencia) [the particular events and participants alleged to have been involved in
predicate offenses must be proved by independently admissible evidence].)
Consequently, we will vacate the gang conviction and the gang enhancements. We will
remand this matter for further proceedings, including a full resentencing, but the People
shall have an opportunity to retry the gang charge and the gang enhancement allegations
under the new law. (See People v. Oliva (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 76, 89; People v. Sek
(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 657, 669–670.) We otherwise affirm appellant’s judgment.2
                                     BACKGROUND
       We summarize the material trial evidence. A more detailed summary of the trial
facts may be found in our prior nonpublished opinion. (People v. Mitchell, supra,

2      Because we remand for further proceedings, we do not address appellant’s claim that
sentencing error occurred. Following remand, a full resentencing is required because we have
vacated part of the sentence. (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.)

                                              3.
F075878).) When appellant and his two accomplices3 went on their crime spree, they
were each members of the East Side Crips. Under the law in effect at the time of
appellant’s offenses in 2015 and this trial in 2017, the prosecution established that the
East Side Crips are a criminal street gang in Kern County.
I.     The Crimes Charged in Counts 1–3 (the Robbery of the Restaurant)
       On February 25, 2015, at about 3:06 a.m., appellant and his two accomplices
entered a restaurant located in Kern County. A single employee was present. Appellant
was armed with a semiautomatic firearm. Appellant and his accomplices took property
belonging to both the employee and the restaurant.
II.    The Crimes Charged in Counts 4–8 (the Robbery of the Convenience Store)
       About 45 minutes after the incident above, appellant and his accomplices entered a
convenience store in Kern County. Two employees were present. Appellant was armed
with a semiautomatic firearm. Appellant and his accomplices left with property
belonging to the convenience store.
III.   The Crimes Charged in Counts 9–16 (the Home Invasion)
       About 15 minutes after the incident above, appellant and his accomplices entered a
residence in Kern County. Two parents and their baby were present, along with another
adult relative.4 Appellant was armed with a semiautomatic weapon. Appellant and his
accomplices took property belonging to the family.5

3      Appellant’s accomplices are not parties in the present appeal.
4      The parents had two other minor children who were outside sitting in an idling vehicle
when the home invasion occurred. The parents had been loading up their vehicle for a trip out of
town when appellant and his accomplices entered the residence.
5      At one point, one of appellant’s accomplices threatened the mother that they would
kidnap her baby if she did not give them property.

                                               4.
IV.    The Crimes Charged in Counts 17–18 (the Shooting)
       About four hours after the incident above, appellant was outside near a market in
Kern County. The market was a known hangout for gang members from the Country
Boy Crips, a rival to appellant’s gang. Appellant was alone, and he fired multiple shots
at Terrance Wiley. Wiley is known as “T.T.,” and he is a gang member in the Country
Boy Crips. Nobody was injured in this shooting, but at least one of appellant’s shots
struck a parked vehicle that was occupied.
V.     The Forensic Evidence
       Shortly after this crime spree ended, an officer on patrol happened to spot two
African-American males on a public street. They matched the general description of
some of the suspects from the crime spree. The officer initiated contact, and the suspects
fled. One of the suspects tossed a semiautomatic firearm aside. Appellant’s DNA was
later discovered on this firearm. Law enforcement recovered two spent shell casings
from the scene of the shooting at the market. The two spent shell casings were identical
to the ammunition that was loaded in the recovered semiautomatic firearm.
VI.    Appellant Commits an Alleged Assault While in Jail and He Later Tries to
       Escape While in Custody
       Law enforcement located and arrested appellant less than 24 hours after this crime
spree ended. While in jail in May 2015, appellant and two other fellow East Side Crip
gang members (who were not the accomplices in the crime spree) assaulted a rival
Country Boy Crip gang member. Appellant punched the victim, while the other East
Side Crip gang members kicked the victim. The jury saw video of this assault. At trial,
the prosecution’s gang expert opined that appellant’s participation in this assault showed
his ongoing association with the East Side Crips despite being arrested.
VII.   The Convictions and Sentences
       When he was resentenced in this matter in 2022, appellant received an aggregate
determinate sentence of 63 years eight months, along with a consecutive aggregate

                                             5.
indeterminate term of 144 years. As noted in our prior opinion, the trial court found true
that appellant had a prior conviction for voluntary manslaughter. (People v. Mitchell,
supra, F075878).)
       We summarize appellant’s convictions and the sentences imposed in each count.
       1.      Count 1
       In count 1, appellant was convicted of second degree robbery (Pen. Code, § 212.5,
subd. (c)).6 He received an upper prison term of 10 years (§ 213, subd. (a)(2)). An
additional 10 years was imposed for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)). An
additional 10 years was imposed for a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). This
sentence and enhancements were stayed pursuant to section 654.
       2.      Count 2
       In count 2, appellant was convicted of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and an
upper term of 18 years was imposed. (§ 245, subd. (b).) This sentence was enhanced by
five years for a prior serious felony (§ 667, subd. (a)) and further enhanced by 10 years
for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). A gang enhancement of five years was
imposed (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), but that enhancement was stayed.
       3.      Count 3
       In count 3, appellant was convicted of second degree burglary and the court
imposed an upper term of six years. (§ 460, subd. (b).) This sentence was enhanced by
10 years for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and further enhanced by four
years for a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). This sentence and enhancements
were stayed.
       4.      Count 4
       In count 4, appellant was convicted of second degree robbery (§ 212.5, subd. (c)).
He received an upper term of 10 years. (§ 213, subd. (a)(2).) This sentence was

6      Further statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise indicated.

                                               6.
enhanced by 10 years for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and further
enhanced 10 years for a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). This sentence and
enhancements were stayed.
      5.       Count 5
      In count 5, appellant was convicted of second degree robbery and he received an
upper term of 10 years. (§ 212.5, subd. (c).) This sentence was enhanced by 10 years for
a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)) and further enhanced 10 years for a gang
enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). This sentence and enhancements were stayed.
      6.       Count 6
      In count 6, appellant was convicted of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and a
subordinate term of four years was imposed. (§ 245, subd. (b).) This sentence was
enhanced by three years four months for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). A
gang enhancement of five years was imposed (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), but that
enhancement was stayed.
      7.       Count 7
      In count 7, appellant was convicted of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and a
subordinate term of four years was imposed. (§ 245, subd. (b).) This sentence was
enhanced by three years four months for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). A
gang enhancement of five years was imposed (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), but that
enhancement was stayed.
      8.       Count 8
      In count 8, appellant was convicted of second degree burglary and the court
imposed an upper term of six years. (§ 460, subd. (b).) This sentence was enhanced by
10 years for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and further enhanced by four
years for a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). This sentence and enhancements
were stayed.

                                           7.
       9.     Count 9
       In count 9, appellant was convicted of first degree robbery and the court imposed a
term of 48 years to life. (§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A).)
       10.    Count 10
       In count 10, appellant was convicted of first degree robbery and the court imposed
a consecutive term of 48 years to life. (§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A).)
       11.    Count 11
       In count 11, appellant was convicted of first degree robbery and the court imposed
a consecutive term of 48 years to life. (§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A).)
       12.    Count 12
       In count 12, appellant was convicted of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and
an upper term of 18 years was imposed. (§ 245, subd. (b).) This sentence was enhanced
by 10 years for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). A gang enhancement of
five years was imposed (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). This sentence and enhancements were
stayed.
       13.    Count 13
       In count 13, appellant was convicted of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and
an upper term of 18 years was imposed. (§ 245, subd. (b).) This sentence was enhanced
by 10 years for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). A gang enhancement of
five years was imposed (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). This sentence and enhancements were
stayed.
       14.    Count 14
       In count 14, appellant was convicted of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and
an upper term of 18 years was imposed. (§ 245, subd. (b).) This sentence was enhanced
by 10 years for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). A gang enhancement of
five years was imposed (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). This sentence and enhancements were
stayed.

                                             8.
      15.    Count 15
      In count 15, appellant was convicted of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and a
subordinate term of four years was imposed. (§ 245, subd. (b).) This sentence was
enhanced by three years four months for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). A
gang enhancement of five years was imposed (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), but that
enhancement was stayed.
      16.    Count 16
      In count 16, appellant was convicted of first degree burglary and the court
imposed a middle term of eight years. (§ 460, subd. (a).) This sentence was enhanced by
10 years for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and further enhanced five years
for a gang enhancement (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). This sentence and enhancements were
stayed.
      17.    Count 17
      In count 17, appellant was convicted of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and a
subordinate term of four years was imposed. (§ 245, subd. (b).) This sentence was
enhanced by three years four months for a firearm enhancement (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). A
gang enhancement of five years was imposed (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)), but that
enhancement was stayed.
      18.    Count 18
      In count 18, appellant was found guilty of grossly negligent discharge of a firearm
and he received a subordinate term of one year four months. (§ 246.3, subd. (a).) This
sentence was further enhanced by five years for a gang enhancement (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)), but that enhancement was stayed.
      19.    Count 19
      In count 19, appellant was convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm
and he received an upper term of six years. (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1).) This sentence was
stayed.

                                           9.
       20.    Count 20
       In count 20, appellant was convicted of carrying a loaded firearm as an active
criminal street gang member and he received an upper term of six years. (§ 25850,
subd. (c)(3).) This sentence was stayed.
       21.    Count 21
       In count 21, appellant was convicted for active participation in a criminal street
gang and he received an upper term of six years. (§ 186.22, subd. (a).) This sentence
was stayed.
                                       DISCUSSION
I.     Appellant is Entitled to the Retroactive Benefits of Assembly Bill 333; We
       Vacate His Gang Conviction (Count 21) and All Gang Enhancements; We
       Remand For Further Proceedings
       Appellant’s prior appeal in this matter occurred before Assembly Bill 333 became
effective. As such, our prior opinion did not address this legislation and we directed the
trial court to resentence appellant stemming from other unrelated issues. We otherwise
affirmed appellant’s judgment. (People v. Mitchell, supra, F075878).)
       Following remand, and before appellant was resentenced, Assembly Bill 333
became effective on January 1, 2022. (Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1206.) Our Supreme
Court holds that this legislation applies retroactively to any criminal matter that is not yet
final on appeal. (Id. at pp. 1206–1207.)
       When appellant was resentenced in 2022, the trial court was concerned that
Assembly Bill 333 applied in this matter. The court asked the parties to brief this new
legislation and its impact on appellant’s case. After reviewing this issue with the parties,
the court ruled that appellant’s case had become final regarding the issue of appellant’s
guilt because appellant had exhausted his appeal rights. The court noted that appellant
would be entitled to any ameliorative changes in law for resentencing purposes.
However, the court felt it was bound by the scope of our remittitur. As such, the court

                                             10.
concluded it did not have jurisdiction to set aside the gang-related conviction or
enhancements.
       Respondent concedes that, in general, Assembly Bill 333 is retroactive. However,
respondent argues that appellant’s judgment of conviction became final long before
Assembly Bill 333 became effective. According to respondent, the trial court only had
jurisdiction to resentence appellant within the confines of the remittitur when this matter
was remanded, and no further litigation of guilt was permitted. In contrast, appellant
contends he is entitled to the ameliorative benefits of Assembly Bill 333 because his
criminal matter is not yet final. Appellant argues that his gang-related conviction and
enhancements must be reversed following this change in law.
       A.      Appellant is Entitled to the Retroactive Benefits of Assembly Bill 333
       In In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740 (Estrada), our high court held that, if an
ameliorative statute is silent regarding its retroactivity, a presumption exists that the
Legislature must have intended the new statute to apply “to every case to which it
constitutionally could apply.” (Id. at p. 745.) This means a qualifying new law applies to
all cases that have not been reduced to a final judgment. (Id. at p. 746.)
       For purposes of the Estrada rule, finality occurs “when the availability of an
appeal and the time for filing a petition for certiorari with the United States Supreme
Court have expired.” (People v. Buycks, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 876, fn. 5.) In two fairly
recent opinions, our Supreme Court made clear when a case becomes final for purposes
of retroactivity under Estrada. The test for finality is “whether the criminal prosecution
or proceeding as a whole is complete.” (Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 679.) The
question is whether the “criminal prosecution or proceeding concluded before the
ameliorative legislation took effect.” (People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 46
(McKenzie).)

                                              11.
       Esquivel and McKenzie involved unique circumstances. In McKenzie, the trial
court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed the defendant on formal probation.
(McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 43.) In Esquivel, the defendant was sentenced, but the
execution of sentence was suspended, and the defendant was placed on formal probation.
(Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 673.) In both instances, neither defendant initially filed
an appeal. After several years, however, the defendants in each case appealed after they
were found to have violated their respective terms of probation and their sentences had
been ordered into effect. (McKenzie, supra, at p. 43; Esquivel, supra, at p. 673.) In both
cases, our Supreme Court rejected the People’s argument that the criminal judgments had
already become final. Instead, because the defendants had been on probation, their
criminal cases had not concluded and they were entitled to the benefits of intervening
ameliorative legislation. (See McKenzie, supra, at pp. 48–51; Esquivel, supra, at
pp. 679–680.)
       Although the procedural histories of McKenzie and Esquivel are different from the
situation presented here, the high court’s reasoning in those opinions is instructive. A
judgment and sentence are generally considered synonymous, and there is no judgment of
conviction without a sentence. (McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 46.) A presumption
exists that our Legislature intends for ameliorative enactments to apply as broadly as is
constitutionally permissible, and they apply to all nonfinal judgments. (Esquivel, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 677, citing Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)
       Respondent contends that part of appellant’s judgment—the portion relating to
appellant’s guilt—became final long before appellant was resentenced in 2022.
Respondent notes that this court issued its prior opinion in this matter in February 2021,
and appellant filed a petition for review with the California Supreme Court on March 20,
2021. The high court denied review on May 26, 2021. Respondent further notes that
there is no evidence appellant filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States
Supreme Court. Accordingly, respondent calculates that appellant’s judgment regarding

                                              12.
the “legality of his convictions and his gang enhancement” became final on or about
August 24, 2021. That is when the time passed for appellant to petition for a writ with
the United States Supreme Court.
       To support its position that appellant’s guilt may no longer be adjudicated,
respondent relies on language taken from People v. Padilla (2022) 13 Cal.5th 152
(Padilla). In Padilla, a juvenile committed murder and conspiracy to commit murder.
He was convicted and sentenced in adult court. (Id. at p. 159.) Padilla’s juvenile murder
conviction became final in 2001 when our Supreme Court denied his petition for review
and he did not petition the United States Supreme Court for certiorari. (Id. at p. 170 (dis.
opn. by Corrigan, J.).) More than a decade later, however, he successfully obtained a
resentencing following a petition for a writ of habeas corpus after the law was amended
regarding juvenile sentencing. (Id. at pp. 170–171 (dis. opn. by Corrigan, J.).) While the
case was on appeal following his successful petition, California voters passed a different
new law, the Public Safety and Rehabilitation Act of 2016 (as approved by voters, Gen.
Elec. (Nov. 8, 2016) (Proposition 57)). (Padilla, supra, at p. 159.) Proposition 57
provided a juvenile could be tried in adult court only after a transfer hearing. Following
Proposition 57, the trial court did not hold a transfer hearing and it again imposed the
same sentence on Padilla. (Padilla, supra, at p. 159.)
       The Supreme Court reviewed the matter and it confirmed that, under Estrada,
Proposition 57 applied in criminal cases not yet final. (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 160.) The high court held that Padilla’s conviction was not yet final for this purpose
because his sentence had been vacated after petitioning for habeas corpus relief. (Id. at
p. 161.)
       Padilla articulated the following, and we highlight in bold the language upon
which respondent in this matter relies. Padilla stated: “[T]he Attorney General argues
that vacatur of a defendant’s sentence ‘does not allow a resentencing court to consider
new claims or affect any part of the judgment other than the sentence.’ But the right and

                                            13.
remedy we recognize today does not allow Padilla to raise claims unrelated to his
sentence.… He must receive a transfer hearing in a juvenile court, where the court will
decide whether criminal adjudication is appropriate for the murder of his mother and
conspiracy to kill his stepfather. Whatever potential that hearing may have for
reducing his punishment (the nonfinal part of his judgment), it does not authorize
or constitute relitigation of guilt.” (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 169–170, boldface
added.)
       Respondent focuses on this highlighted passage in Padilla. According to
respondent, this language strongly suggests, if not explicitly states, that portions of a
judgment may be final while other portions of a judgment may be nonfinal. As such,
respondent asserts that appellant’s guilt in this matter was final for purposes of Estrada at
the time appellant’s case was remanded to the trial court for resentencing.
       We reject respondent’s position. Setting aside the language from Padilla, our high
court otherwise makes it very clear that, in criminal cases, the terms “‘judgment’” and
“‘“sentence”’” are generally synonymous, and there is no judgment of conviction without
a sentence. (McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 46.) The cutoff point for application of
ameliorative amendments is the date when the entire case or prosecution is reduced to a
final judgment. (Ibid.)
       We do not read Padilla as creating bifurcated judgments in the manner respondent
now advocates—especially for a criminal matter, such as this one, that never had its
sentence reduced to a final judgment. Instead, Padilla was unique because that criminal
matter was reopened through a habeas petition long after the judgment was final. The
Padilla court was addressing a difficult question regarding the scope of the reopening.
However, all of the justices accepted that Estrada’s retroactivity applied to cases that had
never become final at all. (See Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 161 [“[a] case is final
when ‘the criminal proceeding as a whole’ has ended”]; id. at p. 173 (dis. opn. by
Corrigan, J.) [“we have consistently understood Estrada’s rule to apply to a case that had

                                             14.
not been reduced to a final judgment”].) Padilla is distinguishable from the present
matter and Padilla does not demonstrate that appellant should be precluded from
receiving the benefits of Assembly Bill 333.
       When this matter was before the trial court for resentencing in 2022, the court
expressed concern that it lacked jurisdiction to address Assembly Bill 333. In general,
when a reviewing court identifies an error relating solely to sentencing—which is what
occurred in this matter when we remanded this case in 2021—the appellate court
typically does not reverse the judgment of conviction or remand for a new trial, but,
instead, simply remands for resentencing. (Peracchi v. Superior Court (2003) 30 Cal.4th
1245, 1255.) The appellate court’s order reflected in the remittitur “‘“is decisive of the
character of the judgment to which the appellant is entitled.”’ [Citation.] On remand, the
lower court may act only within these express jurisdictional limits.” (People v. Lewis
(2004) 33 Cal.4th 214, 228.) In other words, the remittitur “‘defines the scope of the
jurisdiction of the court to which the matter is returned[,]’” and the trial court “‘is
empowered to act only in accordance with the direction of the reviewing court .…’”
(Ayyad v. Sprint Spectrum, L.P. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 851, 859.)
       The scope of our previous remittitur did not encompass Assembly Bill 333.
Instead, we vacated appellant’s sentence and remanded for a full resentencing to address
other issues. (People v. Mitchell, supra, F075878).) As such, we do not fault the trial
court for expressing concern that it lacked jurisdiction to go beyond the scope of our
remittitur. However, this criminal prosecution had not concluded before the ameliorative
legislation took effect. Appellant was still waiting for his 2022 resentencing to occur
when this new law became operative on January 1, 2022. Accordingly, appellant’s
criminal judgment never became final, and we must presume the Legislature intended for
this ameliorative enactment to apply as broadly as is constitutionally permissible. (See
Esquivel, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 677, citing Estrada, supra, 63 Cal.2d at p. 745.)
Consequently, we hold that appellant is entitled to the benefits of Assembly Bill 333, and

                                              15.
we reject respondent’s assertion that the issue of appellant’s guilt is final even though the
validity of appellant’s sentence is still being adjudicated.
       Our holding today is consistent with this court’s opinion in People v. Lewis (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 34 (Lewis). In Lewis, this court issued an opinion in 2015 resolving
issues the defendant had raised following his convictions for numerous felonies. The
matter was remanded for resentencing. (Id. at pp. 36–37.) The defendant again appealed
and, in 2020, this court again remanded the defendant’s matter for the trial court to
exercise its sentencing discretion under new legislation that had been recently enacted.
(Id. at p. 37.) In March 2021, the trial court resentenced the defendant, who again
appealed. (Id. at pp. 37–39.) In the interim, Assembly Bill 333 became effective on
January 1, 2022. During the third appeal, the Attorney General conceded that Assembly
Bill 333 required reversal of the defendant’s gang counts and gang-related enhancements.
(Lewis, supra, at pp. 36, 39.) This court accepted the Attorney General’s concession and,
in December 2022, the matter was again remanded for a possible retrial of the gang-
related charges and enhancements. (Id. at p. 42.)
       Contrary to the present matter, the Attorney General in Lewis did not dispute that
the defendant was entitled to the retroactive benefit of Assembly Bill 333. In Lewis, this
court extended the benefits of Assembly Bill 333 to the defendant, whose crimes had
occurred prior to 2015, and who had his criminal matter on appeal before this court two
times before Assembly Bill 333 became effective. The disposition in this matter is
consistent with the disposition in Lewis.
       Finally, we note that a divided panel of the Fourth Appellate District, Division
Two, recently analyzed a similar issue to the one presented here. In People v. Lopez
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1110 (Lopez), review granted November 15, 2023, S281488, the
defendant had his appeal heard before Assembly Bill 333 became effective. In 2020, the
appellate court modified the defendant’s judgment and conditionally reversed it. The
trial court was directed to consider whether to strike certain enhancements. (Lopez,

                                             16.
supra, at p. 1115.) Following remand to the trial court, Assembly Bill 333 became
effective, but the trial court concluded that the defendant was not entitled to its benefits
because his conviction had previously become final, and the court resentenced the
defendant in 2022. (Lopez, supra, at p. 1115.) The defendant again appealed, asserting
he was entitled to the benefits of the new legislation, and one of his gang enhancements
should be reversed for insufficient evidence. (Id. at p. 1113.)
       The majority in Lopez concluded that the defendant was entitled to the
ameliorative benefits of Assembly Bill 333 when his matter was remanded to the trial
court. (Lopez, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at p. 1119, review granted.) However, although the
defendant was entitled to those benefits, the majority held that those benefits were
“irrelevant” because the matter had been remanded solely for resentencing, and the trial
court only had jurisdiction to act in accordance with the directions from the reviewing
court. (Id. at pp. 1114, 1119.) The majority in Lopez was swayed by the passage from
Padilla, which we previously highlighted in this opinion.7 The Lopez majority
acknowledged that this language from the high court was dicta, but the Lopez majority
felt it nevertheless held persuasive value. (Lopez, supra, at pp. 1118–1119.)
Accordingly, the majority held that, even though Assembly Bill 333 applied to the
defendant on remand, the trial court had no jurisdiction to relitigate the gang
enhancements. (Lopez, supra, at p. 1120.) The majority in Lopez affirmed the judgment
without affording the defendant the benefit of Assembly Bill 333. (Lopez, supra, at
pp. 1120-–1121.) According to the majority, “there was nothing the trial court could or
should have done” about Assembly Bill 333. (Lopez, supra, at p. 1120.)

7       To assist the reader, we again note that the high court in Padilla stated that, in extending
retroactive benefits from Proposition 57 to Padilla, he was not allowed to raise claims unrelated
to his sentence and whatever potential a juvenile transfer hearing “may have for reducing his
punishment (the nonfinal part of his judgment), it does not authorize or constitute relitigation of
guilt.” (Padilla, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 169–170, boldface added.)

                                                 17.
       In contrast to the majority, the dissent in Lopez asserted that the criminal matter
had not been reduced to a final judgment, and the majority’s approach was in conflict
with precedent from the California Supreme Court. (Lopez, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1125, review granted (dis. opn. of Raphael, J.).) The dissent urged the majority to
extend the benefits of Assembly Bill 333 to the defendant. (Lopez, supra, at p. 1123 (dis.
opn. of Raphael, J.).)
       On November 15, 2023, the California Supreme Court granted a petition to review
Lopez. The high court will resolve the following issue: Is the defendant entitled to
retroactive application of Assembly Bill 333 “where he appeals for a second time after
his judgment was conditionally reversed and the Court of Appeal issued a limited remand
to the trial court to address sentencing issues?”
       We conclude that, like appellant in this matter, the defendant in Lopez is entitled to
the retroactive application of Assembly Bill 333. We disagree with the majority’s
approach in Lopez. It affirmed the defendant’s judgment without providing the defendant
any ameliorative benefits of Assembly Bill 333, even though the majority agreed that
those benefits retroactively applied to the defendant. (See Lopez, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1120–1121, review granted.) Although the trial court in Lopez (like the lower court
in this matter) may have been bound by the scope of the prior remittitur, the retroactive
benefits should have been extended to the defendant on appeal because his criminal
proceeding had not yet been reduced to a final judgment.
       We turn to the validity of this record.
       B.     This Record No Longer Establishes the Required Predicate Offenses
              Necessary to Sustain the Gang Charge and Enhancements
       Since we issued our prior opinion in February 2021, Assembly Bill 333 added new
elements necessary to establish a criminal street gang. This included a heightened

      See footnote, ante, page 1.

                                             18.
requirement for the type of prior crimes that must be introduced to establish a “‘pattern of
criminal gang activity.’” (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1), (2); see Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 1207.) These prior crimes are known as “predicate offenses.” (People v. Navarro
(2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 311.)
       Appellant argues that, following Assembly Bill 333, this record is no longer
sufficient to establish the predicate offenses that were introduced in his trial. Appellant
also raises a claim of instructional error, asserting the jury was not given the elements
now required under Assembly Bill 333. According to appellant, the jury convicted him
of the gang crime, and found true the gang enhancements, based on a now legally invalid
theory.
       At trial in this matter, the prosecution introduced into evidence six predicate
offenses. In its initial brief, respondent conceded that, if Assembly Bill 333 retroactively
applies in this matter, then the evidence is insufficient under the amended law to support
a majority of those predicate offenses. However, respondent initially argued that two of
the predicate offenses were still valid. Thus, respondent took the position that any error
in failing to instruct the jury regarding the additional elements imposed by Assembly
Bill 333 was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. According to respondent in its initial
brief, remand was unnecessary because—based on the two remaining predicate
offenses—the jury would have nevertheless found that the East Side Crips was a criminal
street gang even under Assembly Bill 333’s more stringent requirements.
       However, Assembly Bill 333 is not the only significant change that has occurred
regarding gang-related charges and enhancements since we issued our prior opinion in
this matter. In 2021, and before Assembly Bill 333 went into effect, the California
Supreme Court clarified that predicate offenses can no longer be proven through an
expert witness who simply relays hearsay information derived from other sources.
Instead, the facts underlying a predicate offense “must be proved by independently
admissible evidence.” (Valencia, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 839.) The Valencia court noted

                                             19.
that contents of police reports may contain testimonial hearsay. (Id. at p. 840.) If the
improperly admitted hearsay is testimonial within the meaning of the confrontation
clause (see, e.g., Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36, 68–69), the error must be
reviewed for prejudice under the federal Constitution (Valencia, supra, at p. 840, citing
Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24).
       Our high court published Valencia in July 2021, almost five months after we
issued our prior opinion. As such, just like Assembly Bill 333, neither the parties nor this
court had an opportunity to discuss Valencia or apply it to this matter.
       In general, a new rule for the conduct of criminal prosecutions is applied
retroactively to all cases pending on appeal or not yet final, even if the new rule presents
a “‘clear break’ with the past.” (Griffith v. Kentucky (1987) 479 U.S. 314, 328; see
People v. Jeffrey G. (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 501, 507.) A criminal conviction is typically
tested on appeal under the current law, and not the law prevailing at the time of trial.
(People v. Welch (1999) 20 Cal.4th 701, 732, fn. 4.)
       The new rules announced in Valencia must be applied in this matter for the same
reason Assembly Bill 333 applies; this criminal matter has never been reduced to a final
judgment and it is currently pending on direct appeal.
       After we reviewed the parties’ briefs, we directed respondent to provide
supplemental briefing to address whether the predicate offenses introduced at appellant’s
trial satisfy the requirements of Valencia. Respondent now concedes that, if Assembly
Bill 333 retroactively applies in this matter, it is appropriate to reverse the gang
enhancements. We agree.
       The two predicate offenses, which respondent relies upon, were established
through the testimony of the prosecution’s gang expert. In both instances, the expert
simply relayed information to the jury obtained from other sources.8 In other words, the

8       The first predicate offense upon which respondent focuses involved DeShawn Roberts,
an alleged gang member who was convicted of driving another gang member to shoot at a gang

                                             20.
two predicate offenses in this matter that might have otherwise satisfied the requirements
of Assembly Bill 333 were nevertheless introduced into evidence solely through hearsay
testimony. Accordingly, the requirements in Valencia are lacking.
       With the changes first brought by Valencia and then by Assembly Bill 333, this
record no longer contains independently admissible evidence that establishes at least two
valid predicate offenses. Consequently, a “‘pattern of criminal gang activity’” has not
been proven under the current standards. (See § 186.22, subds. (e)(1) & (f).) Thus, we
agree with respondent that the gang enhancements must be reversed and this matter
remanded for a potential retrial. Likewise, the gang conviction in count 21 must be
reversed.9 Because the law was amended, the People shall have an opportunity to retry
the gang charge and the gang enhancement allegations. (See People v. Oliva, supra, 89
Cal.App.5th at p. 89; People v. Sek, supra, 74 Cal.App.5th at pp. 669–670.)
       Because respondent concedes reversal is required in light of Valencia, we need not
address the parties’ other disputed points from their initial briefing regarding whether or
not the two remaining disputed predicate offenses satisfy the requirements of Assembly
Bill 333. We likewise need not address appellant’s claim of instructional error involving
Assembly Bill 333. We vacate appellant’s sentence and remand for further proceedings.

rival. The second predicate offense involved Kai Williams, an alleged gang member who was
convicted of shooting at officers while they were attempting to stop a stolen vehicle. Neither of
these predicate offenses were established with independently admissible evidence.
9       Respondent argues that appellant only requested reversal of the gang enhancements and
not the substantive gang conviction. In his reply brief, however, appellant clarifies that he also
seeks reversal of the gang conviction. In any event, the gang conviction must be reversed due to
the change in law. (See § 186.22, subds. (a) & (e)(1).) We note that, in counts 10 and 11, the
trial court imposed consecutive sentences. However, the indeterminate abstract of judgment
erroneously shows that concurrent sentences were imposed in these counts. Following
resentencing, all abstracts of judgment should accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of
judgment.

                                               21.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The gang conviction in count 21 (§ 186.22, subd. (a)) is vacated. The jury’s true
findings regarding all gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) are vacated.
Appellant’s sentence is vacated and this matter is remanded for further proceedings. The
prosecution shall have the opportunity to retry the gang charge in count 21 (§ 186.22,
subd. (a)) and all gang enhancements (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)). Absent a waiver of time, if
the People do not bring appellant to retrial within the time limits of section 1382,
subdivision (a)(2), the trial court shall proceed to resentence appellant. Following
resentencing, the trial court shall cause new abstracts of judgment to be forwarded to the
appropriate authorities. In all other respects, appellant’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                               MEEHAN, J.
I CONCUR:

DeSANTOS, J.

                                             22.
POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J., Concurring.
       I concur in the majority opinion because the Supreme Court has clearly
determined that, for Estrada1 purposes, “there is no ‘judgment of conviction’ without a
sentence.” (People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 46 (McKenzie).) I write separately
to reflect on the import of this holding.
       McKenzie observed that “judgment” and “sentence” are generally synonymous.
(McKenzie, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 46.) Before McKenzie, however, courts had held that
“[i]t would be more accurate to state that the judgment in a criminal action is a record of
the adjudication of guilt and the determination of the penalty.” (People v. Pineda (1967)
253 Cal.App.2d 443, 451, italics added.) In other words, the sentence is not the
judgment, but rather one part of the judgment. The conviction is the other part.
       A corollary to this principle was that the finality of the guilt aspect of the
judgment (i.e., a conviction) was not affected merely because the penalty aspect of the
judgment (i.e., the sentence) was reopened. Specifically, that “an appellate court has
power and authority to open the penalty aspect of the judgment without affecting the
finality of the adjudication of guilt.” (People v. Pineda, supra, 253 Cal.App.2d at
p. 451.)
       For example, in People v. Vaughn (1973) 9 Cal.3d 321, the defendant’s “judgment
as to penalty” had been previously reversed while his “judgment as to guilt” had been
affirmed. (Id. at p. 323, superseded by statute on other grounds as noted in People v.
Chadd (1981) 28 Cal.3d 739, 749.) The penalty issue was retried, and the defendant
again appealed to the Supreme Court. In a second appeal, the defendant not only
challenged the penalty imposed on retrial, but also “raise[d] several contentions with
respect to the initial judgment of guilt.” (Vaughn, at p. 324.) Even though appellate
issues regarding the sentence remained, the Supreme Court observed that its “prior

       1 In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740.
affirmance of the judgment of guilt constitutes a final judgment as to guilt, at least with
respect to questions of state law.” (Id. at p. 26, fn. 3.)
       Similarly, in People v. Kemp (1974) 10 Cal.3d 611, the Supreme Court held a
judgment of conviction was “final” even though a writ of habeas corpus had vacated the
judgment as to penalty. (Id. at p. 614.)
       Cases like Pineda, Vaughn, and Kemp set limits on issues surrounding finality and
retroactivity.2 In the present era of recurring sentence-altering legislation, removal of
those constraints means that changes in substantive criminal law (not just ameliorative
sentencing legislation) can reverberate backwards to crimes committed many years
before the change in law.3

       2 The Supreme Court may revisit issues of finality in its review of People v. Lopez
(2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1110, review granted, November 15, 2023, S281488. The Court
of Appeal’s central point in Lopez regarding a trial court’s jurisdiction on remand is
correct. “ ‘The order of the appellate court as stated in the remittitur, “is decisive of the
character of the judgment to which the appellant is entitled. The lower court cannot
reopen the case on the facts, allow the filing of amended or supplemental pleadings, nor
retry the case, and if it should do so, the judgment rendered thereon would be void.” ’ ”
(Griset v. Fair Political Practices Com. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 688, 701.) A remittitur
ordering resentencing only vests in the trial court jurisdiction to resentence the defendant.
It has no jurisdiction to change the judgment in other respects, such as vacating a
conviction. The Lopez court was correct to conclude that its lower court was powerless
to vacate the defendants’ convictions under Assembly Bill No. 333 (2021–2022 Reg.
Sess.)
        However, while the trial court, bound by the terms of the prior remittitur, lacked
authority to vacate the convictions, the Court of Appeal was not so restricted and could
have itself reversed the convictions in the Lopez decision.
        3 This can lead to peculiar outcomes. For example, consider two defendants who
commit identical crimes at the same time. Imagine their convictions are affirmed, but a
sentencing error in one of the cases requires reversal, while the absence of sentencing
error in the other case results in affirmance. Under McKenzie, the finality of the entire
judgment in the former case is significantly delayed compared to the latter case. If an
intervening legislative change was made to the underlying substantive crime itself (i.e.,
not a sentencing change), one defendant may benefit from it while the other does not –
even though they committed the same crime at the same time.

                                               2.
       Not once has a court reversed any of the 21 felony convictions defendant suffered
in 2017. Yet, five years later those convictions still are not final. Nonetheless, given the
present state of the law, I must concur.

                                                               POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.

                                             3.