Court Opinion

ID: 9629721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:47:49.658168+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:22.707809
License: Public Domain

BIRD, C. J., Dissenting.
The First Amendment protects the expression of political opinions—the polite utterance along with the rude remark, the sober judgment along with the emotional exaggeration. However, the majority find that an article criticizing the official conduct of three city councilmen may have gone beyond the expression of opinion to include one false statement of fact. This, the majority conclude, warrants denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
I cannot agree. When read in context, the offending phrase, which supposedly accuses the councilmen of criminal blackmail, emerges clearly as a literary device for ridiculing their political conduct. Beyond the instant case, I fear the majority opinion will have a “chilling effect” on the exercise of legitimate First Amendment rights. Every critic of government must now unduly restrain his or her language, lest some imaginary reader mistake literary license for criminal allegations.
I
This country has “a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials.” (New *690York Times Co. v. Sullivan (1964) 376 U.S. 254, 270 [11 L.Ed.2d 686, 701, 84 S.Ct. 710, 95 A.L.R.2d 1412].) The constitutional guarantees of free speech and press assure every person “the right to criticize public men and measures—and that means not only informed and responsible criticism but the freedom to speak foolishly and without moderation.” (Baumgartner v. United States (1944) 322 U.S. 665, 674 [88 L.Ed. 1525, 1531, 64 S.Ct. 1240].) It is, after all, a sign of a free society that politics still engenders passion—and the excesses of passion. Therefore, courts wisely refuse to prescribe rules of etiquette for political parlance. “Rhetorical hyperbole,” “vigorous epithet[s]” and opinions couched “even in the most pejorative terms” are all in order. (Greenbelt Pub. Assn. v. Bresler (1970) 398 U.S. 6, 14 [26 L.Ed.2d 6, 15, 90 S.Ct. 1537]; Letter Carriers v. Austin (1974) 418 U.S. 264, 284 [41 L.Ed.2d 745, 761-762, 94 S.Ct. 2770].) For we must recognize that how one talks about a political candidate is often what one wants to say. Therefore, to restrict the language of political dialogue is ultimately to restrict the dialogue itself. The First Amendment was promulgated in recognition of this fact.
Unlike an expression of opinion, a false statement of fact may be the basis of a defamation action. Unfortunately, few words are immutably cast as either statements of fact or opinion.1 “[W]hat constitutes a statement of fact in one context may be treated as a statement of opinion in another . . . .” (Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 596, 601 [131 Cal.Rptr. 641, 552 P.2d 425].) Therefore, a court looks to see whether a particular expression is one of fact or opinion. In making this determination, courts look to the nature and content of the communication and to the knowledge and understanding of the individuals to whom the publication is directed. “ ‘A publication claimed to be defamatory must be read and construed in the sense in which the readers to whom it is addressed would ordinarily understand it. So the whole item . . . should be read and construed together, and its meaning and signification thus determined.’ ” (Washington Post Co. v. Chaloner (1919) 250 U.S. 290, 293 [63 L.Ed. 987, 989, 39 S.Ct. 448], italics added; accord Hoffman v. Washington Post Co. (D.D.C. 1977) 433 F.Supp. 600, 602, fn. 1; Scott v. McDonnell Douglas Corp. (1974) 37 Cal.App.3d 277, 291, fn. 11 [112 Cal.Rptr. 609]; see Eldredge, The Law of Defamation (1978) § 9, pp. 44-45.)
*691The events and environment which precipitate the publication must also be examined. “[WJhere potentially defamatory statements are published in a public debate ... or in another setting in which the audience may anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade others to their positions by use of epithets, fieiy rhetoric or hyperbole, language which generally might be considered as statements of fact may well assume the character of statements of opinion.” (Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 601; see Letter Carriers v. Austin, supra, 418 U.S. at pp. 284-286 [41 L.Ed.2d at pp. 761-762].)
This is particularly relevant where a heated political controversy prompts the publication. The United States Supreme Court has observed that in the midst of such political campaigns “ ‘[cjharges of gross incompetence, disregard of the public interest, communist sympathies, and the like usually have filled the air; and hints of bribery, embezzlement, and other criminal conduct are not infrequent.’ ” (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at p. 273, fn. 14 [11 L.Ed.2d at p. 702].) As a result, courts must decide whether the challenged language constitutes a statement of fact in “light of the usual political hyperbole customarily encountered when political figures clash on controversial public matters.” (Scott v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 291.)
II
Appellate courts are required to “ ‘make an independent examination of the whole record’ ” to guarantee that these principles “have been constitutionally applied.” (New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra, 376 U.S. at p. 285 [11 L.Ed.2d at p. 709].) Consider the record. In July 1970, Morton Baum and Thomas Hogard assumed their offices as two of the five councilmen for the City of Seal Beach. Less than a month later, Baum and Hogard joined with incumbent Councilman Conroy Fuhrman to fire the city manager and city attorney. A citizens’ group claimed this violated the city charter and promptly filed a notice of intention to circulate recall petitions against Fuhrman.
The city manager had been investigating charges of misconduct and drug abuse at a teenage dance hall operated by William Robertson. This investigation was continued by the interim city manager, who found the charges to be true and suspended the dance hall’s license. Robertson appealed to the city council, and public hearings were held over a *692two-month period. Baum refused to disqualify himself despite his close personal relationship with Robertson. In a final 3-2 vote, Baum, Hogard and Fuhrman united to reject the city manager’s findings.
Another controversy began on October 21, 1970, when the City of Seal Beach issued building permits for the construction of an apartment complex by R & B Development Company. On October 30th, these permits were revoked because the final plans had not been fully examined and approved. On November 2d, a building moratorium in the area encompassing the development project was passed 3-2 by the city council because “. . . absolutely no investigation, study, evaluation or consideration was made or given to the possible adverse, or even catastrophic effects that the implementation of the [Redevelopment] Project Plan might have upon the quality and purity of the environment . . . .” No building permits were to be issued until environmental studies had been completed. The R & B Development Company filed suit seeking the reissuance of the building permits, an injunction against the enforcement of the moratorium, and damages.
At an executive session on November 23d, the council reversed itself and exempted the R & B Development Company from the moratorium. The building permits were immediately reissued in exchange for the development company’s agreement to pay $100,000 to the city, to drop its lawsuit, and to rent to married as well as single persons. The development company made no changes in its building plans and no environmental studies were conducted. Councilman Holden, joined by Councilman Gummere, charged that the city’s activities amounted to “extortion” and “blackmail.” Nevertheless, a majority of the. council approved the settlement that evening after its terms were discussed in a public council meeting.
In August 1970, petitions were circulated to recall Fuhrman, and 6,900 signatures were submitted, including 55 percent of the district represented by Fuhrman. Although the required number of signatures were certified by the city clerk, Baum and Hogard voted against setting a date for the recall election.2 A mandate proceeding, initiated by the Good *693Government Group, was filed requesting the court to order the council to set an election.
In December 1970, a recall election was ordered by the superior court, but Baum, Hogard and Fuhrman filed an appeal. Councilman Gummere, who had consistently opposed Baum, Hogard and Fuhrman, offered to resign if the recall election were allowed to go forward. This offer was accepted, and the Fuhrman recall election was set. In January 1971, notices of intent to circulate recall petitions were filed against Hogard and Baum. Fuhrman was recalled by a 6-1 margin in March, and Hogard was recalled by two-thirds of the electorate in August.
These events were reported in the defendants’ monthly newsletter. In front page articles during November and December, the newsletter detailed the “arbitrary actions,” “irresponsible” conduct and “machinations” of the “combine” (Baum, Hogard and Fuhrman). A third-page article appearing in the February issue formed the basis of this action by real party in interest, Hogard.3
The article discussed the conduct of Hogard, Baum and Fuhrman, denominated the “combine,” in their capacity as public officials. They were criticized for expending public funds to fight the Fuhrman recall effort, refusing to set a date for the recall election, and forcing another councilman to resign in exchange for setting a date for the recall election. The article deemed the “combine’s” performance of their official duties “recalcitrant” and “irresponsible.” Their conduct was denigrated as “daily chicanery and machinations,” their actions were considered “infamy.” The article concluded that “the combine will pay for its infamy and lose its stranglehold on the City” through recall elections. Readers were warned to expect to hear “a lot of political hog-wash” from the “combine” in defense of their conduct as the recall elections approached.
The paragraph containing the words found objectionable by the majority is buried in the middle of the article.4 The subject of that *694paragraph was the settlement of the dispute between the city council and R & B Development Company. Specifically the article charged the “combine” with “extort[ing] by blackmail $100,000.00 from the R & B Development Company.” The majority argue this court cannot conclude, as a matter of law, that this was only a colorful characterization of the way these councilmen handled the city’s business. The majority fasten on the failure to state explicitly that the development company’s payment went to the city. This omission supposedly leaves the article ambiguous and creates a jury question: would an ordinary reader have understood that sentence as making the factual assertion that the councilmen had personally pocketed the money? (Maj. opn., ante, at pp. 681-683.)
I cannot agree that this article, which clears its ground with the subtlety of a bulldozer, is ambiguous or suggests in any way that the councilmen were guilty of the crime of blackmail. No reader of the article could miss the strident tone and hyperbole used to express the author’s criticisms of the councilmen’s official conduct. The article was a partisan indictment of their actions, alleging abuses of power and unprincipled conduct. The councilmen were accused of undermining “honest and responsible government,” of “arrogance,” of “daily chicanery and machinations,” and of refusing to answer “charges of misconduct and illegal activities.” Surely if the author intended to blacken their reputations by alleging the receipt of a personal payment in exchange for official favors, he would have proclaimed the outrage openly and in the first paragraph, not the fourth.
Moreover, even scant attention to the language of the offending paragraph, set in the midst of this tirade, makes abundantly clear the rhetorical nature of the blackmail charge. The paragraph labeled the $100,000 settlement a “ ‘holdup.’ ” By placing the word in quotation marks, the author clearly announced he was castigating the combine for the settlement’s unfairness, not its unlawfulness.
The deliberate use of figurative language was again impressed upon the reader when the $100,000 was referred to as “thirty pieces of silver.” Judas received thirty pieces of silver, not the three councilmen of Seal Beach. Finally, the paragraph concluded by noting that R & B Development Company dropped its lawsuit against the city as part of the settlement. This belies any suggestion that the councilmen personally *695pocketed the money. The statement confirms that it was the city, acting through the council, which negotiated and received the payment.
The charges made against the three councilmen are not uncommon in a vigorously contested political campaign. The readers of this newsletter had previously read critical articles about the “combine’s” conduct. The electorate was aware of the intense emotions generated by the recall campaign. The dispute between the city and the development company had been discussed at length in two public council meetings and reported in the local press. The settlement was publicly memorialized in the council’s minutes and in the agreements and letters between the parties. The majority concede that “[t]he fact that the city had received the $100,000 payment in settlement of the dispute with the developer was public knowledge.” (Maj. opn., ante, atp. 681, italics added.)5
In such a highly political context, readers would readily “anticipate efforts by the parties to persuade [them] to their positions by the use of epithets, fiery rhetoric or hyperbole . . . .” (Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 601.) Reasonable readers, who persevered through the article’s repeated criticisms, would easily understand that “blackmail” referred to political, not criminal, misconduct. As such, the statement clearly is an expression of opinion characterizing the conduct of a public official. Therefore, it is constitutionally protected as a matter of law.
The case law is in accord. In Greenbelt Pub. Assn. v. Bresler, supra, 398 U.S. 6, a small weekly newspaper was sued for libel for reporting that individuals at a public city council meeting had charged “blackmail” in connection with a developer’s negotiations with the council. The articles, as in the present case, presented only the salient features of the event reported, not a verbatim transcript. Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court held, as a matter of constitutional law, that the word “blackmail” was not defamatory when spoken at the meeting or printed in the newspaper. (Id., at p. 13 [26 L.Ed.2d at pp. 14-15].) The court *696found that the word was “no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a vigorous epithet. . . .” (Id., at p. 14 [26 L.Ed.2d at p. 15].) The language was not defamatory since a member of the audience and a reader of the paper would “have understood exactly what was meant: it was [the plaintiff’s] public and wholly legal negotiating proposals that were being criticized.” (Ibid.) That is equally true here.6
In Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 17 Cal.3d at page 603, this court unanimously held accusations that union officers were “willing to sacrifice the interests of the members of their union to further their own political aspirations and personal ambitions” were incapable of supporting a defamation action. Such accusations are as capable of being construed as statements of fact as the statements in the present case. However, this court held that since “the charges are of the kind typically generated in the ‘economic give-and-take’ of a spirited labor dispute ...,” they “constituted protected statements of opinion . . . .” (Id., at pp. 603-604.)7
*697Similarly, it has been held that charging a person with the kind of “paranoid thinking that you get from a schizophrenic” was “not capable of a defamatory meaning.” (From v. Yellow Cab Company of Pittsburgh (W.D.Pa. 1975) 380 F.Supp. 1314, 1323, 1330.) The court noted that in the context of a television talk show the audience was accustomed to hearing criticism and controversy, and would understand the comment as colorful rebuttal rather than an accusation of mental illness. (Id., at pp. 1329-1331.)8
Another recent case held that a broadcast was not defamatory despite the omission of an important statement of fact. The broadcast, entitled “Public Bridges & Private Riches,” created the impression that a former member and chairman of the Delaware River Port Authority privately benefited from inside information, failed to reveal conflicts of interest, and abused his public trust. (Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc. (3d Cir. 1978) 576 F.2d 495.) The broadcast stated that “ ‘some Port Authority Commissioners saw an opportunity for enormous profits, profits on land deals ....’” (Id., at p. 498.) Land purchases involving plaintiff, who appeared to benefit from the authority’s decisions, were described in detail. In describing one transaction, the defendant omitted the date of the plaintiff’s purchase, creating the impression that the plaintiff benefitted from inside information. In fact, the land was purchased after the authority’s action was public knowledge. Despite the *698fact that the failure to include this statement offact led to the impression of misconduct and unlawful dealings in office, the court held that the broadcast was “incapable of a defamatory meaning.” (Id., at p. 510; cf. Time v. Pape (1971) 401 U.S. 279, 289-290 [28 L.Ed.2d 45, 52-54, 91 S.Ct. 633].)
The reasoning of these decisions is compelling. The comments were made in the middle of a public controversy, where caustic language, exaggeration and fiery rhetoric are regularly employed. In this context, many comments which might be construed as assertions of fact in a more tranquil setting are found, as a matter of law, to be opinions intended to persuade. The First Amendment protects such statements from judicial incursions. “Any other conclusion would have ‘disquieting implications for criticism of governmental conduct,’ for it would likely lead to the kind of chilling effect on the media that New York Times and its successors directly seek to avoid.” (Pierce v. Capital Cities Communications, Inc., supra, 576 F.2d atp. 510, fns. omitted.)9
III
The majority’s reason for affirming the denial of defendants’ motion for summary judgment portends a judicial intervention in the area of our free press which is inimical to the principles enshrined in the First Amendment. In holding that a defamation suit will lie because of the alleged failure to make one statement sufficiently explicit, the majority set a course which bodes ill for the future. Their analysis would make editors of judges. The judiciary’s red pen is thereby unleashed to strike vexatious language or to demand augmentation according to the judges’ image of how the public should be informed.
This will cause publishers to moderate their political commentaiy and to dilute the intensity of their judgments in order to avoid the shadow of liability cast by this court’s opinion. As a consequence, the vigorous and vital public debate essential to a healthy electoral process will be tempered to polite sparring. Today, “good government” is made a double Victim.
Petitioners’ application for a rehearing was denied December 27, 1978. Newman, J., was of the opinion that the application should be granted.

As the United States Supreme Court has observed: “A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.” (Towne v. Eisner (1918) 245 U.S. 418, 425 [62 L.Ed. 372, 376, 38 S.Ct. 158], quoted in Bon Air Hotel, Inc. v. Time, Inc. (5th Cir. 1970) 426 F.2d 858, 867, fn. 17.)

Baum, Hogard and Fuhrman also voted to retain at public expense the attorney who had represented Robertson in the dance hall hearings. He was asked to investigate the recall movement. When the city treasurer questioned the legality of this act and refused to pay the attorney’s fees, Baum, Hogard and Fuhrman instituted civil suit. The superior court upheld the treasurer’s action.

The article is appended to the dissenting opinion by Justice Newman (ante, pp. 688-689).
Fuhrman filed suit based on the same article. Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was granted and an appeal is pending. {Fuhrman v. Day (2 Civ. 50641).)

The article’s fourth paragraph states: “This is the same combine which extorted by blackmail $100,000.00 from the R & B Development Company. For its thirty pieces of silver the combine agreed to forgo its concern for the City’s ecology, pollution and strain on our sanitation system that Baum had so sanctimoniously raised during his campaign and in City Council meetings. For economical reasons the R & B Development Company *694submitted to the ‘holdup’ and agreed to drop its multi-million dollar suit against the City so that it could begin the construction of apartment buildings in the downtown section of the City.”

The majority see the article’s failure to include more details of the settlement as its downfall, presumably because the reader would not understand what actually occurred without more facts. However, Hogard seemed to have little doubt about the public’s awareness of the details of the dispute. In response to a notice of intent to circulate petitions to recall him just weeks before this article was published, Hogard published a list of the council’s “accomplishments,” including their successful effort to “ ‘persuade’ ” R & B Development Company, through the exercise of “ ‘Brinkmanship,’ ” to allow married couples to rent apartments in the proposed project. He pointed out that the “renegotiated agreement” won by the council also secured an additional $100,000 fee from the developer.

The trial court in Thuma v. Hearst Corporation (D.Md. 1972) 340 F.Supp. 867, relied on Greenbelt in finding that a libel action could not be based on a press report of a father’s lament that the shooting of his son by police was “cold-blooded murder.” “It would seem most improbable that persons seeing the words ‘cold-blooded murder,’ as they were used in the context of the events reported in the articles, would interpret them as meaning premeditated murder. Whatever those words may connote in other circumstances, in this situation they were rather clearly hyperbole expressing the father’s most vehement feeling that the shooting was completely unnecessary. . . . [T]heir clear import is that [the victim’s] family, friends and neighbors were as angry as they could be because they considered the shooting to have been unjustified and unnecessary. It is that import which would be impressed upon a reader of the articles, and which would prevent him from thinking that the father was charging Thuma with premeditated murder ....’’ (Id., at p. 871; cf. Curtis Publishing Company v. Birdsong (5th Cir. 1966) 360 F.2d 344.)

In its discussion of the kind of statements entitled to constitutional protection, the Gregory court discussed with approval two Court of Appeal decisions involving comments made during political contests. In Scott v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d 277, the trial court granted a demurrer in a lawsuit based on charges by a city councilman “that a city manager would ‘ “stoop to any form of action in . . . [his] power to . . . stay in office,” ’ that in a letter released to the press he ‘ “assume[d] the position of . . . City Dictator,” ’ that his administration of the city’s affairs had descended to a ‘ “mutinous character,” ’ and that the people of Santa Monica are not so fortunate as to have ‘ “. . . a City Manager who is dedicated to efficiently and honestly administer the affairs of the City for the people and through the people’s elected representatives . . . ” (Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 17 Cal.3d at p. 602.) In affirming the trial court’s action, the Court of Appeal stated: “The fact that plaintiff takes umbrage at the tone and level of criticism directed against him is not sufficient to sustain an action for defamation. The statements in the instant controversy should be considered in light of the usual political hyperbole customarily encountered when political figures clash on controversial public matters. An individual in this country has the right to severely criticize the performance of public officials.” (Scott v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 37 Cal.App.3d at p. 291.)
*697In the second cáse, Taylor v. Lewis (1933) 132 Cal.App. 381 [22 P.2d 569], the Court of Appeal affirmed the sustaining of a demurrer in a defamation action based on criticisms of a councilman in the midst of a recall proceeding. “[T]he court found as opinion rather than fact statements that certain councilmen ‘ “did not consistently serve the best interest of the city,” ’ ‘ “usurped the functions of the city manager, dictated appointments in violation of the charter, and forced out of office useful employees of the city,” ’ ‘ “had as little respect for sound business usage in their conduct of city affairs as they showed for the charter and the merit system in municipal service,” ’ did not always ‘ “take the highest and best bids when selling, and the lowest and best when buying,” ’ and ‘ “lacked that conscientious regard for the city’s interest which makes of public office a public trust”; . . .’” (Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 602-603.) Surely these allegations of misfeasance in public office are no less susceptible to construction as statements of fact than the expressions in the present case.

There is an. analogous case from this state. In Yorty v. Chandler (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 467, 472-473 [91 Cal.Rptr. 709], defendant published a cartoon suggesting plaintiff was “unqualified for high national office” and that plaintiff’s contrary view “was so far removed from reality . . . that [his] ambitions could popularly be described as insane, mad, or crazy.” Nevertheless, the court found no reasonable person would construe the cartoon other than as an expression of opinion, i.e., the cartoon was “not reasonably susceptible to a defamatory meaning.” (Id., at p. 477.) “[M]ere expression of opinion or severe criticism is not libelous, even though it adversely reflects on the fitness of an individual for public office.” (Id., at pp. 472-473.) The sustaining of a demurrer was affirmed.

“To deny to the press the right to use hyperbole, under the threat of removing the protective mantle of New York Times, would condemn the press to an arid, desiccated recital of bare facts.” (Time, Inc. v. Johnston (4th Cir. 1971) 448 F.2d 378, 384.)