Court Opinion

ID: 9398044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-29 15:07:27.114265+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:30.342991
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued May 25, 2023

                                     In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                         First District of Texas
                            ————————————
                              NO. 01-21-00225-CV
                           ———————————
           WESTLAKE CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Appellant
                                       V.
     BERKLEY REGIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY AND ZURICH
          AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellees

                   On Appeal from the 270th District Court
                            Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 2017-43569

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      This appeal involves a commercial insurance coverage dispute. Appellant

Westlake Chemical Corporation tendered claims to Appellees Berkley Regional

Insurance Company and Zurich American Insurance Company seeking coverage for

nearly $16,000,000 in losses resulting from the payment of fraudulent invoices for
shipping bags used to export Westlake Chemical Corporation’s products. After a

dispute arose among the parties regarding coverage for the tendered claims,

Westlake Chemical Corporation sued Appellees for breach of contract, violations of

the Texas Insurance Code, and declaratory relief. Appellees counterclaimed for

attorney’s fees. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees on

Westlake Chemical Corporation’s claims, and Appellees subsequently nonsuited

their counterclaim for attorney’s fees. This appeal followed.

      Westlake Chemical Corporation argues the trial court erred in granting

summary judgment in favor of Appellees. In two issues, Westlake Chemical

Corporation argues the trial court erred by finding that (1) its loss was not covered

by the insurance policy’s computer fraud clause, and (2) the insurance policy

contained an exclusion that barred coverage for its loss.

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                   Background1

      Appellant Westlake Chemical Corporation (“Westlake”) manufactures

polyethylene and polyvinyl chloride products, which it sells internationally. From

2007 until 2014, Westlake purchased plastic shipping bags and other supplies to

1
      Appellant Westlake Chemical Corporation and Appellees Berkley Regional
      Insurance Company and Zurich American Insurance Company filed cross-motions
      for summary judgment and a joint statement of stipulated facts. This background
      section is based on the parties’ stipulated facts.

                                          2
export its products from John Tinkle (“Tinkle”) through his company Tinkle

Management Inc. (“TMI”), a supplier of shipping bags to chemical companies.2

TMI delivered Westlake’s plastic shipping bags to a warehouse owned by Packwell,

Inc. (“Packwell”), a plastic bagging and logistics company, and Packwell used the

supplies to package and ship Westlake’s chemical products overseas. After the

shipping supplies were delivered by TMI, Tinkle would submit an invoice to

Westlake for payment of the supplies.

      From March 2010 until October 2014, Tinkle submitted fraudulent invoices

and supporting documentation to Westlake via email for fictitious bags that were

never delivered to Packwell. Relying on these false invoices and shipping reports,

Westlake paid Tinkle $16,423,941.78 for shipping bags that Tinkle never provided.

Westlake did not discover Tinkle’s fraud until October 23, 2014.

      On July 21, 2015, Tinkle was indicted by a federal Grand Jury for fraud and

money laundering. In April 2017, Tinkle pleaded guilty and was sentenced to 48

months in prison and ordered to pay restitution to Westlake in the amount of

$15,633,403.98.

2
      During this time, Tinkle also worked as an employee of Packwell, Inc., a plastic
      bagging and logistics company that provided bagging and shipping services to
      Westlake.

                                           3
A.    Insurance Contracts

      Westlake purchased a Commercial Crime Insurance Policy from Appellee

Berkley Regional Insurance Company (“Berkley”) that provided coverage of

$10,000,000 for each occurrence of computer fraud (“Berkley Policy”) and a Crime

Insurance Excess Policy from Appellee Zurich American Insurance Company

(“Zurich,” collectively with Berkley, the “Insurers”) that provided Westlake an

additional $5,000,000 in coverage (“Zurich Policy”).

      Berkley Policy

      Section A.6 of the Berkley Policy, titled Computer Fraud (“Computer Fraud

Clause”), provides that Berkley

      [W]ill pay for loss of or damage to “money”, “securities” and “other
      property” resulting directly from the use of any computer to
      fraudulently cause a transfer of that property from inside the “premises”
      or “banking premises”:
      a.    To a person (other than a “messenger”) outside those premises;
            or
      b.    To a place outside those “premises”.

Section D.1.c of the Berkley Policy excludes coverage for certain “Acts Of

Employees, Managers, Directors, Trustees Or Representatives.” Section D.1.c

provides that coverage is excluded for

      Loss resulting from “theft” or any other dishonest act committed by any
      of your “employees,” “managers,” directors, trustees or authorized
      representatives:

      Whether acting alone or in collusion with other persons; or

                                         4
      While performing services for you or otherwise; except when covered
      under Insuring Agreement A.1.

The Berkley Policy does not define the terms “computer fraud,” “from the use of

any computer,” or “authorized representative.”

      Zurich Policy

      The Zurich Policy’s “Insuring Clause” states:

      [Zurich] shall provide [Westlake] with insurance coverage during the
      Policy Period excess of the [Berkley Policy]. Coverage under this
      policy shall attach only after all of the Limit(s) of Liability of [the
      Berkley Policy] has been exhausted by the actual payment of loss(es).
      Except as otherwise provided herein, coverage under this policy shall
      then apply in conformance with and subject to the warranties,
      limitations, conditions, provisions, and other terms of the [Berkley
      Policy] as in effect the first day of the Policy Period, together with the
      warranties and limitations of [the Berkley Policy]. In no event shall
      coverage under this policy be broader than coverage under [the Berkley
      Policy].

      After Westlake discovered Tinkle’s fraud in October 2014, Westlake tendered

timely notices of its discovery and Proof of Loss Statements to Berkley and Zurich.

On March 25, 2016, Berkley denied coverage for Westlake’s loss under the Berkley

Policy because the loss did not result directly from the use of a computer and because

it resulted from a dishonest act by an authorized representative of Westlake. The

parties do not dispute that Westlake’s loss is not covered by the Zurich Policy unless

the loss is also covered by the Berkley Policy.

                                          5
B.    Procedural History

      On June 29, 2017, Westlake sued Berkley for breach of the Berkley Policy

and violations of the Texas Insurance Code. Westlake also sought declaratory

judgment against Zurich as to coverage. Westlake requested attorney’s fees pursuant

to Sections 37.009 and 38.001(8) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code, and

statutory damages pursuant to Sections 541.152(a)(1) and 542.060(a) of the Texas

Insurance Code. Berkley and Zurich counterclaimed for attorney’s fees.

      The Insurers filed a traditional and no-evidence motion for summary

judgment on Westlake’s claims. They argued that Westlake’s losses were not

covered by the Berkley Policy because the policy’s Computer Fraud Clause only

covered losses incurred as a result of computer hacking. They also argued that no

evidence supported Westlake’s extracontractual claims. Westlake cross-moved for

summary judgment on its claims arguing its loss was covered because the Computer

Fraud Clause in the Berkley Policy provides coverage for losses “resulting directly

from the use of any computer” and Tinkle had submitted the fraudulent invoices and

supporting documents via email. The Insurers later filed an Amended Motion for

Summary Judgment arguing that Westlake’s losses were not covered by the

Computer Fraud Clause because the losses did not result “directly” from Tinkle’s

use of a computer to transmit the fraudulent invoices and supporting documents.

The Insurers also argued the Computer Fraud Clause provides coverage only for

                                        6
transfers of money fraudulently caused while accessing a computer without

authorization. Following a hearing on the cross-motions for summary judgment, the

trial court denied the motions, and directed the parties to prepare a Statement of

Stipulated Facts and Documents and to re-file their motions for summary judgment.

      The Insurers filed an Amended Motion for Traditional and No-Evidence

Summary Judgment arguing they were entitled to summary judgment on Westlake’s

claims because Westlake’s losses had not resulted from computer hacking, Tinkle’s

unauthorized access to Westlake’s computer systems, the “use of any computer,” or

“directly” from Tinkle’s emails. The Insurers also argued that coverage was barred

by Section D.l.c. of the Berkley Policy because Tinkle was Westlake’s “authorized

representative” for purposes of ordering the shipping bags and supplies. The parties

also filed a “Joint Statement of Certain Stipulated Facts and Documents for Purposes

of Cross Motions for Summary Judgment.” Westlake also filed a Traditional Motion

for Partial Summary Judgment on its breach of contract claim against Berkley and

its request for declaratory judgment against Zurich.

      The trial court held a hearing on the amended cross-motions for summary

judgment and during the hearing, the trial court denied Westlake’s motion because

the court found the Insurers proved that Tinkle was Westlake’s “authorized

representative” and thus, the Berkley Policy’s exclusion barred coverage. After

hearing further arguments, the trial court took the motions under advisement, and

                                         7
continued the hearing to allow the parties to submit supplemental briefing

concerning the Berkley Policy exclusion.

      One month later, on September 26, 2019, the trial court denied the Insurers’

Amended Motion for Summary Judgment. Then, on September 4, 2020, the trial

court granted the parties’ joint motion for rehearing. On March 15, 2021, Westlake

filed a “Traditional and No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment on Questions

of Law for Resolution by the Court” regarding the interpretation of the Computer

Fraud Clause.

      On April 20, 2021, the trial court vacated its September 26, 2019 order,

granted the Insurers’ Amended Motion for Summary Judgment, denied Westlake’s

Traditional and No Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment on Questions of Law

for Resolution by the Court, and ordered that Westlake take nothing on its claims

against the Insurers. The Insurers subsequently non-suited their counterclaim for

attorney’s fees rendering the trial court’s April 20, 2021 order a final and appealable

judgment. This appeal followed.

                                Summary Judgment

      Although a denial of a summary-judgment motion is generally not appealable,

we may review the ruling when both parties have moved for summary judgment and

the trial court grants one motion and denies the other. Tex. Mun. Power Agency v.

Pub. Util. Comm’n of Tex., 253 S.W.3d 184, 192 (Tex. 2007); Fallon v. Univ. of Tex.

                                           8
MD Anderson Cancer Ctr., 586 S.W.3d 58, 63 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2019, pet. denied). In our review of such cross-motions, we review the summary

judgment evidence presented by each party, determine all issues presented, and

render the judgment that the trial court should have rendered. Tex. Mun. Power

Agency, 253 S.W.3d at 192; Fallon, 586 S.W.3d at 63. Each party bears the burden

of establishing that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tarr v. Timberwood

Park Owners Ass’n, 556 S.W.3d 274, 278 (Tex. 2018).

      We review a trial court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. Valence

Operating Co. v. Dorsett, 164 S.W.3d 656, 661 (Tex. 2005). The movant on a

traditional motion for summary judgment has the burden of showing that no genuine

issue of material fact exists and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289

S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). If the movant satisfies its initial burden on the issues

expressly presented in the motion, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present

to the trial court any issues or evidence that would preclude a summary judgment.

See Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 510–11

(Tex. 2014).

      To decide whether issues of material fact preclude summary judgment,

evidence favorable to the non-moving party must be taken as true, every reasonable

inference must be indulged in its favor, and any doubts resolved in its favor.

                                           9
Sandberg v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 600 S.W.3d 511, 521 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2020, pet. denied). The movant must conclusively establish its right to judgment as

a matter of law. See id. A matter is conclusively established if reasonable people

could not differ as to the conclusion to be drawn from the evidence. City of Keller

v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005).

                                 Insurance Policies

       An insured has the initial burden of establishing coverage under the terms of

the policy. JAW The Pointe, L.L.C. v. Lexington Ins. Co., 460 S.W.3d 597, 603 (Tex.

2015). To avoid liability, the insurer then has the burden to plead and prove that the

loss falls within an exclusion to the policy’s coverage. Id.; TEX. R. CIV. P. 94

(“Where the suit is on an insurance contract which insures against certain general

hazards, but contains other provisions limiting such general liability, the party suing

on such contract shall never be required to allege that the loss was not due to a risk

or cause coming within any of the exceptions specified in the contract, nor shall the

insurer be allowed to raise such issue unless it shall specifically allege that the loss

was due to a risk or cause coming within a particular exception to the general

liability[.]”).

       Insurance policies are interpreted under the rules of construction applicable to

contracts in general. See JAW The Pointe, L.L.C., 460 S.W.3d at 603; see also

Nassar v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 508 S.W.3d 254, 257 (Tex. 2017) (stating Texas

                                          10
courts construe insurance policies “using ordinary rules of contract interpretation”).

The primary goal of contract construction is to effectuate the parties’ intent as

expressed in the contract. See JAW The Pointe, L.L.C., 460 S.W.3d at 603. Courts

“determine the parties’ intent through the terms of the policy, giving words and

phrases their ordinary meaning, informed by context.” Dillon Gage Inc. of Dallas

v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyds Subscribing to Policy No. EE1701590, 636

S.W.3d 640, 643 (Tex. 2021). “Unless the policy dictates otherwise, [courts] give

words and phrases their ordinary and generally accepted meaning, reading them in

context and in light of the rules of grammar and common usage.” RSUI Indem. Co.

v. The Lynd Co., 466 S.W.3d 113, 118 (Tex. 2015) (citing Gilbert Tex. Constr., L.P.

v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 327 S.W.3d 118, 126 (Tex. 2010)).               To

determine a statutory term’s common, ordinary meaning, courts “typically look first

to their dictionary definitions and then consider the term’s usage in other statutes,

court decisions, and similar authorities.” Tex. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Marriage and

Fam. Therapists v. Tex. Med. Ass’n, 511 S.W.3d 28, 35 (Tex. 2017).

      If we determine that only one party’s interpretation of the insurance policy is

reasonable, then the policy is unambiguous, and the reasonable interpretation should

be adopted. Nassar, 508 S.W.3d at 258. If both interpretations are reasonable, then

the policy is ambiguous. Id. (“A policy is ambiguous if it is genuinely subject to

more than one meaning after applying the pertinent rules of contract

                                         11
interpretation.”). In that event, “we must resolve the uncertainty by adopting the

construction that most favors the insured,” and because we are construing a

limitation on coverage, we must do so “even if the construction urged by the insurer

appears to be more reasonable or a more accurate reflection of the parties’ intent.”

RSUI, 466 S.W.3d at 118 (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v.

Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. 1991)); see also Gilbert Tex. Const.,

L.P., 327 S.W.3d at 133 (“Terms in insurance policies that are subject to more than

one reasonable construction are interpreted in favor of coverage.”).

                                      Discussion

      Westlake and the Insurers moved for summary judgment based on their

competing interpretations of the Berkley Policy. In its first issue, Westlake argues

the trial court erred by granting summary in the Insurers’ favor because

(1) Westlake’s loss is covered by the Berkley Policy’s Computer Fraud Clause, and

(2) Section D.1.c of the Berkley Policy does not bar coverage because Tinkle is not

Westlake’s “authorized representative.”

      Assuming without deciding that Westlake met its burden of proving that its

loss is covered under the Berkley Policy’s Computer Fraud Clause, we conclude that

the Insurers carried their burden to prove that coverage is excluded under the Policy.

Once an insured meets its burden to establish that its loss is covered under the

relevant insurance policy, the burden shifts to the insurer to prove that the loss falls

                                          12
within an exclusion to the policy’s coverage. See JAW The Pointe, L.L.C., 460

S.W.3d at 603.      The Insurers argue that Tinkle is Westlake’s “authorized

representative” and thus, whether or not the loss originated from “Computer Fraud,”

Westlake’s loss is excluded from coverage based on Section D.1.c of the Berkley

Policy, which excludes coverage for “Acts Of Employees, Managers, Directors,

Trustees Or Representatives.”

A.    Definition of “Authorized Representative”

      Section D.1.c of the Berkley Policy bars coverage for losses “resulting from

‘theft’ or any other dishonest act committed by any of [Westlake’s] ‘employees’,

‘managers’, directors, trustees or authorized representatives.” The parties do not

dispute that Tinkle is not Westlake’s employee, manager, director, or trustee, or that

the losses “result[ed] from ‘theft’ or any other dishonest act.” Thus, the only

question presented is whether Tinkle was Westlake’s “authorized representative”

during the relevant time period.

      The Insurers argue that the term “authorized representative” refers to someone

who has permission to act on behalf of another. They argue that the summary

judgment evidence conclusively established that Westlake authorized Tinkle to act

on its behalf in placing orders for shipping supplies and managing Westlake’s

inventory.

                                         13
      Westlake argues that the term “authorized representative” “has a meaning

similar (if not identical) to ‘agent,’” and thus, to prevail on summary judgment, the

Insurers had to establish that, as a matter of law, “Tinkle was entitled to act

essentially as Westlake’s agent.” According to Westlake, “an agent is one who is

empowered to act on the principal’s behalf.” Westlake argues that the Insurers were

not entitled to summary judgment because the evidence established that Tinkle was

simply Westlake’s vendor, not its agent or authorized representative.

      The phrase “authorized representative” is not defined in the Berkley Policy.

Thus, we must look at the phrase’s “ordinary and generally accepted meaning.” See

RSUI Indem. Co., 466 S.W.3d at 118 (“Unless the policy dictates otherwise, [courts]

give words and phrases their ordinary and generally accepted meaning, reading them

in context and in light of the rules of grammar and common usage.”). In determining

the common and ordinary meaning of a term, courts typically look for the term’s

dictionary definition.   See Tex. State Bd. of Exam’rs of Marriage and Fam.

Therapists, 511 S.W.3d at 35 (stating courts typically look first to term’s dictionary

definition to determine term’s common, ordinary meaning).

      The word “authorized” is defined as “having official permission to do

something” and being “endowed with authority.” See Authorized, Cambridge.org,

https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/authorized (last visited May 22,

2023) (defining authorized as “having official permission to do something or for

                                         14
something     to    happen”);     Authorized,     https://www.merriam-webster.com/

dictionary/authorized (last visited May 22, 2023) (defining authorized as “endowed

with authority”).3 The word “representative” is defined as “someone who speaks or

does something officially for another person or group of people” and “one that

represents” another. See Representative, Cambridge.org, https://dictionary.

cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/representative (last visited May 22, 2023)

(defining representative as “someone who speaks or does something officially for

another person or group of people”); Representative, https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/representative (last visited May 22, 2023) (defining

representative as “one that represents another or others,” “one that represents another

as agent, deputy, substitute, or delegate usually being invested with the authority of

the principal,” and “one that represents a business organization”); Represent,

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/represents (defining represent as “to

take the place of in some respect”).

      Given these dictionary definitions, the phrase “authorized representative” can

be commonly understood to mean someone who has permission to speak or act for

another, or someone who is empowered to act on another’s behalf. Nothing in the

3
      See      also    Authorize,    MERRIAM-WEBSTER.COM                DICTIONARY,
      https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/authorize#legalDictionary/authorize
      (last visited May 22, 2023) (defining authorize as “to give permission to” and “to
      give authority to act to”).
                                          15
Berkley Policy indicates that the phrase “authorized representative” was intended to

have a technical or legal definition. To the extent Westlake attempts to augment the

definition of “authorized representative” to encompass a legal or technical definition

of agent, such an interpretation is inconsistent with the commonly understood

meaning of the term and is thus unreasonable.4

B.    Tinkle is Westlake’s Authorized Representative

      Based on the plain meaning of “authorized representative,” the Insurers were

entitled to summary judgment if they conclusively established that Tinkle had

permission to or was otherwise empowered to act on Westlake’s behalf. As part of

its summary judgment evidence, the Insurers submitted deposition testimony from

Westlake’s Corporate Representative Christopher Anderson (“Anderson”),

Westlake’s interrogatory responses, and a letter from Westlake responding to

4
      We further note that Westlake’s agency arguments appear to be based on the legal
      principle of agency, as opposed to the commonly understood meaning of the term.
      Compare Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572, 589 (Tex. 2017), with
      Agent, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/agent (last visited May 22,
      2023) (defining agent as “one who is authorized to act for or in the place of
      another”). This principle is typically employed to determine whether one party (the
      alleged principal) is liable for the conduct of another (the alleged agent) and whether
      one party’s contacts with a forum can be imputed to another for purposes of
      establishing jurisdiction. See Gaines v. Kelly, 235 S.W.3d 179, 182 (Tex. 2007)
      (stating principal is liable for acts of another acting as its agent only when agent has
      actual or apparent authority to do those acts); F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v.
      Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680, 686 (Tex. 2007) (stating doctrine of vicarious liability
      makes principal liable for his agent’s conduct); Stocksy United v. Morris, 592
      S.W.3d 538, 547 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (“Under Texas law,
      an agency-based theory of imputed contacts may serve as the basis for the exercise
      of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant.”).

                                             16
Berkley’s questions about Westlake’s loss prepared as part of the claims process.

Relying on these exhibits, the Insurers argue that “Westlake admit[ted] that Tinkle

was its ‘authorized representative’ because Westlake admit[ted] that it empowered

[Tinkle] to act on its behalf.”

      Anderson testified that “Westlake gave John Tinkle the responsibility to

manage how many supplies we needed at a given time.” When asked why Westlake

trusted Tinkle to “order bags on [Westlake’s] behalf,” Anderson explained that

Westlake believed it to be “his forte” and that Tinkle had also served in a similar

role for other companies. According to Anderson, Westlake did not have an

independent system in place to “ensure that Westlake was receiving the inventory”

Tinkle ordered. Rather, Westlake “outsourced that to Mr. Tinkle. . .[a]nd [Westlake]

relied on him to ensure [it] had enough supplies in place when [it] needed them.”

As a result of Tinkle’s fraud, Westlake now “manages [its] own inventory supplies.”

      In response to the Insurers’ interrogatories, Westlake responded that “John

Tinkle ordered the bags and shipping supplies for each packaging warehouse as he

determined to be necessary.” Westlake also stated that TMI “had authority for

calculating how many bags Westlake needed at any given time” and that “TMI

ordered additional bags and shipping supplies when it believed the bags and shipping

supplies on hand at the packaging warehouses needed to be replenished.” In a letter

Westlake sent to Berkley as part of the claims process, Westlake stated that, because

                                         17
“TMI maintained bag and shipping supply levels” at Westlake’s facilities, “[n]o

approval process existed” for those orders after March 2010.

      Anderson’s testimony, Westlake’s interrogatory responses, and its letter to

Berkley demonstrate that Westlake authorized Tinkle to manage its shipping

supplies, to order additional shipping bags for Westlake, and to ensure that Westlake

received the ordered inventory. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 816 (stating matter

is conclusively established if reasonable people could not differ as to conclusion to

be drawn from evidence). Westlake does not dispute that Tinkle was authorized to

act on its behalf in a limited capacity. In its opening brief, Westlake asserts that “the

question for adjudication is whether a vendor is an ‘authorized representative’ when

the scope of his authorization is to monitor his customer’s inventory and suggest

purchases and does not include making payments.” (Emphasis added). Thus, at a

minimum, Westlake does not dispute that it authorized Tinkle to “monitor”

Westlake’s “inventory and suggest purchases.” Rather, Westlake argues that the

evidence is insufficient to establish that Tinkle was its “authorized representative”

because an “authorized representative” is akin to an agent and therefore the term

requires more than managing supplies and suggesting purchases, such as the ability

to make payments for the shipping supplies using Westlake’s funds.5 But the plain

5
      In its reply brief, Westlake argues that although it “has admitted the details of its
      relationship with Tinkle. . .those details plainly do not rise to the level of ‘agency.’”
                                             18
language of the Berkley Policy does not support this technical or legal definition.

The plain terms of Section D.1.c. only require evidence that Tinkle had permission

to or was otherwise empowered to act on Westlake’s behalf, because that is the plain

and ordinary meaning of the phrase “authorized representative.”

      The only remaining question is whether Westlake presented some evidence

raising a question of material fact precluding summary judgment on this issue.

Citing to the affidavit of David Bourgeois (“Bourgeois”), Westlake’s Director of

Supply Chain from 2007 to 2016, and the parties’ joint stipulation of facts, Westlake

argues that the summary judgment evidence establishes that “Tinkle was merely a

vendor who could not submit an invoice for payment without approval.”

      In their joint stipulation of facts, the parties stipulated:

         • TMI served as a vendor to Westlake from 2007 until October 23,
           2014, and during that time sold to Westlake various supplies used
           in the exportation of Westlake’s polyethylene (‘PE’) and
           polyvinyl chloride (‘PVC’) products.

         • Tinkle and TMI were authorized by Westlake to ship plastic
           shipping bags and related supplies to Packwell for use by
           Packwell in bagging Westlake’s PE and PVC for export.

         • During the period of time from 2007 through 2014 that Tinkle
           perpetrated the fraud referenced in the Grand Jury Indictment,
           Westlake’s approval authority for polyethylene vendor invoices
           was as follows:

             • Logistics Manager – up to $10,000;

             • Director - Supply Chain – up to $25,000;

                                           19
             • Senior Vice President – Polyethylene – up to $100,000; and

             • Chief Executive Officer – above $100,000.

      Westlake also submitted Bourgeois’ affidavit as part of its summary judgment

evidence to explain Tinkle’s role in more detail. In his affidavit, Bourgeois testified

that “[s]hipping bags and related supplies were purchased from TMI either based

upon requests from Westlake or when Tinkle suggested additional bags were needed

by Westlake.”     According to Bourgeois, “Tinkle normally submitted a ‘Sales

Confirmation’ form noting what was to be ordered which was then submitted to

Westlake for approval,” and he later “submit[ted] invoices to Westlake for payment,

along with supporting documentation for those invoices.” Bourgeois stated that

“Tinkle was not appointed to represent or serve as the agent of Westlake,” nor was

Tinkle “authorized by Westlake to act on Westlake’s behalf in dealing with others.”

According to Bourgeois, Tinkle was “nothing more than a vendor” who “did not

have the authority to possess or disburse funds on behalf of Westlake.”

      Bourgeois’ testimony that Tinkle was not authorized to possess or disburse

funds or that Tinkle was “not appointed to represent or serve as the agent of

Westlake” with respect to others is inconsequential because, as we have concluded,

the plain and ordinary meaning of the term “authorized representative” in the

Berkley Policy does not require such findings.

                                          20
      Moreover, even if Bourgeois’ testimony that “[s]hipping bags and related

supplies were purchased from TMI[,] either based upon requests from Westlake or

when Tinkle suggested additional bags were needed by Westlake[,]” contradicted

Anderson’s testimony that Tinkle was authorized to order shipping bags on

Westlake’s behalf, and Westlake’s interrogatory responses that Tinkle and TMI

ordered bags and shipping supplies for Westlake when they believed it was

warranted, Bourgeois’ testimony does not contradict Anderson’s testimony that

Westlake, who currently “manages [its] own inventory supplies,” “outsourced” that

responsibility to Tinkle and authorized him to order shipping bags and supplies for

Westlake and to ensure Westlake received the ordered inventory. As the Insurers

argue, that Tinkle may have suggested quantities of shipping bags to order does not

mean that Tinkle did not place those orders on Westlake’s behalf; nor does

Bourgeois’ testimony dispute that Westlake relied on Tinkle to ensure Westlake

received the bags Tinkle ordered.

      Based on the plain meaning of “authorized representative,” the Insurers had

to conclusively establish that Tinkle had permission to, or was otherwise empowered

to, act on Westlake’s behalf.       We conclude that Anderson’s uncontradicted

testimony that Westlake “outsourced” responsibility to Tinkle to “ensure that

Westlake was receiving the [necessary] inventory” is enough to satisfy their burden.

See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 816 (stating matter is conclusively established if

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reasonable people could not differ as to conclusion to be drawn from evidence).

Thus, even taking Bourgeois’ testimony as true and indulging every reasonable

inference in Westlake’s favor, we conclude that Bourgeois’ testimony does not

create a question of fact precluding summary judgment with respect to the exclusion

clause in Section D.1.c of the Berkley Policy. See Sandberg, 600 S.W.3d at 521.

      We overrule Westlake’s second issue.6

                                      Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                Veronica Rivas-Molloy
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Hightower, Rivas-Molloy, and Farris.

6
      We need not consider Westlake’s first issue because, even if the Computer Fraud
      Clause applies, Westlake’s loss is barred under Section D.1.c. of the Berkley Policy.

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