Court Opinion

ID: 9632024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:59:04.916482+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:04.651676
License: Public Domain

DURHAM, Justice
(dissenting):
I cannot agree with Justice Zimmerman’s interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 30-2-4 (1984), his analysis of the relevant case law, or his refusal to allow spouses a cause of action for loss of consortium due to negligent injury by a third party. I therefore dissent.
In this case, the trial court dismissed appellant’s claim on the basis that Utah does not recognize a cause of action for loss of consortium on behalf of the wife of an injured plaintiff. That result was dictated by this Court’s decisions holding that “the wife has no basis for her action [for loss of consortium],” Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 144, 493 P.2d 985, 986 (1972), and that “a husband may not maintain a loss of consortium action for the claimed negligent injury to his wife.” Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438, 440 (Utah 1979).
At common law, “a husband had a claim for loss of consortium against one who negligently injured his wife, though the wife had no corresponding right.” Black v. United States, 263 F.Supp. 470, 471 (D.Utah 1967). The common law right to recover for loss of consortium in Utah, however, was never explicitly addressed by any court until the federal district court discussed it in 1967 in Black.1 In Black, the federal district court held that The Married Woman’s Act eliminated a husband’s common law right to recover for loss of consortium. Thereafter, this Court followed the rationale of Black without *1290analysis and rejected the cause of action for both wives and husbands in Ellis and Tjas, respectively. In so doing, the Court failed to adopt a rule now espoused by nearly all other states.2 In my judgment, this Court has never sufficiently analyzed the right to recover for loss of consortium arising from negligent injury. The current state of our law depends instead upon an unexamined federal precedent. Accordingly, I undertake an independent analysis here and would hold that each spouse has a cause of action for loss of consortium, as defined herein, arising from a negligent injury to the other spouse caused by a third party. I would decline to follow the decision of the United States district court in Black and would overrule our prior opinions in Ellis and Tjas.

Definition and Nature of Consortium Action

“Consortium” refers to the right of one spouse to the conjugal fellowship of the other. Black’s Law Dictionary defines consortium as the right of each spouse “to the company, society, co-operation, affection and aid of the other in every conjugal relation.” Black’s Law Dictionary 280 (5th ed. 1979); see also Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1225 (Utah 1983) (Durham, J., dissenting). While at common law recovery for loss of consortium by the husband was based upon loss of services, custody, and conjugal affection, Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 Mich.L.Rev. 1 (1923), damages for loss of consortium no longer include loss of services since those damages are properly considered to be part of the injured spouse’s claim. Hitaffer v. Argonne, 183 F.2d 811 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852, 71 S.Ct. 80, 95 L.Ed. 624 (1950), overruled on other grounds sub nom., Smither and Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C.Cir.1957); see also Utah Code. Ann. § 30-2-4 (1984). Generally, an action for loss of consortium encompasses the injury to the marital relationship from the loss of society, affection, companionship, sexual relations, and conjugal fellowship. See Hitaffer, 183 F.2d at 814.
The cause of action for loss of consortium is a separate and distinct action that belongs to the nonphysically injured spouse. See infra note 4. Although the action is nominally derivative in the limited sense that it arose out of or was occasioned by an injury to the spouse, an action for loss of consortium is in fact an action for direct injury to the plaintiff spouse who no longer has the marital benefits of society, comfort, and protection. See, e.g., Hitaffer, supra note 2, at 816 (“Marriage gives each [spouse] the same rights.... Each is entitled to the comfort, companionship, and affection of the other_ Any interference with these rights, whether of the husband or of the wife, is a violation, not only of natural right, but also of a legal right *1291arising out of the marriage relation.”) (quoting Bennett v. Bennett, 116 N.Y. 584, 23 N.E. 17, 18 (1889)) (emphasis omitted); Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 899, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305, 308 (1968) (Injury from loss of consortium “is personal to the wife. It is the interest which may have turned a happily married woman into a life-long nurse and deprived her of the opportunity of rearing children.... [T]he mental and emotional anguish caused by seeing a healthy, loving companionable mate turned into a shell of a person is real enough. To describe the loss as ‘indirect’ is only to evade the issue.”); Peeples v. Sargent, 77 Wis.2d 612, 253 N.W.2d 459, 471 (1977) (“The cause of action for consortium occasioned by an injury to one marriage partner is a separate cause of action belonging to the spouse of the injured marriage partner. ... [Ljoss of consortium is a direct injury to the spouse who has lost the consortium.”).

Husband’s Common Law Right to Recover for Loss of Consortium

At common law, there were two reasons why a husband was the only spouse who could recover for loss of consortium. First, the doctrine of coverture recognized the husband as the sole legal entity in marriage. A wife could not contract, own property, or sue or be sued in her own name. Thus, she could not bring suit for personal injuries she suffered; she had to sue jointly with her husband. Moreover, any damages recovered by her belonged entirely to the husband. 41 Am.Jur.2d Husband and Wife § 440 (1968); see also Stoker v. Stoker, 616 P.2d 590 (Utah 1980). Second, a wife had no legally recognized right to her husband’s services. The wife traditionally had a right to the husband’s “protection and support,” while only he had a right to his wife’s “services.” See Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d at 1224 (Durham, J., dissenting). Thus, only the husband had a cause of action for loss of consortium at common law because of the legal restrictions of coverture and the different marital obligations of each spouse.

Effect of Married Woman’s Act

The Utah legislature recognized the inequitable position of a wife at common law and in 1898 enacted the Married Woman’s Act. See Rev.Stat. of Utah 1898, §§ 1198 to 1207, now found at Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-2-1 to -10 (1984). The Married Woman’s Act relieved a married woman of the disabilities of coverture and granted her status equal to that of an unmarried woman. W.W. Clyde v. Dyess, 126 F.2d 719, 722 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 638, 63 S.Ct. 24, 87 L.Ed. 514 (1942). Section 30-2-4 grants women the right to sue and be sued and provides in pertinent part:
A wife may receive the wages for her personal labor, maintain an action therefore in her own name and hold the same in her own right, and may prosecute and defend all actions for the preservation and protection of her rights and property as if unmarried. There shall be no right of recovery by the husband on account of personal injury or wrong to his wife, or for expenses connected therewith, but the wife may recover against a third person as if unmarried, and such recovery shall include expenses of medical treatment and other expenses paid or assumed by the husband.

Id.

Justice Zimmerman adopts the view that section 30-2-4 eliminates a husband’s common law right to recover for loss of consortium. This interpretation originated in Black v. United States, 263 F.Supp. at 473, 480, when the United States District Court for the District of Utah concluded that the second sentence of section 30-2-4 eliminated the husband’s common law right to maintain a cause of action for loss of services, aid, comfort, society, and companionship arising out of negligent injury to his wife. In reaching that conclusion, the district court was deciding a new question of Utah law without the benefit of prior decisions by the Utah Supreme Court or express guidance from the Utah legislature. The court observed that the second sentence of 30-2-4 was unique to the Utah statute and concluded that the Utah statute *1292should therefore be construed differently from other married woman’s acts, which had been interpreted not to affect the husband’s common law rights. Id. at 473. Much of the Black opinion relied upon the trial judge’s observations that, in his experience, members of the Utah Bar did not consider loss of consortium to be an element of damages under Utah law, that public policy disfavored the possibility of double recovery, and that allowing the husband to recover for loss of consortium would lead to a similar action for wives and possibly children. Id. at 479-80.
Shortly after the decision in Black, this Court relied on section 30-2-4 to hold that a husband may not recover for his lost wages and the babysitting expenses incurred as a result of his wife’s personal injury. Corbridge v. M. Morrin and Son, Inc., 19 Utah 2d 409, 432 P.2d 41 (1967). In Corbridge, the Court said, “The wife, if anybody, should recover the expenses incurred in connection with her injuries. The reasonable value of the services which she was unable to perform as a result of her injuries and which she otherwise would have performed would be part of her recovery if any she is entitled to.” Id. at 410, 432 P.2d at 42. Unlike the husband in Black, Mr. Corbridge did not claim damages for loss of companionship, society, and conjugal relations. Mr. Corbridge only claimed damages for additional expenses the family incurred as a result of the personal injury to his wife. By denying recovery to the husband for the value of the wife’s services, the opinion in Corbridge comports with the precise language of section 30-2-4 and the generally accepted position that loss of consortium does not include loss of services.
However, in Ellis v. Hathaway, 27 Utah 2d 143, 144, 493 P.2d 985, 986 (1972), this Court implicitly accepted Black’s construction of the statute and thus rejected a wife’s claim for loss of support, companionship, love, and affection due to the negligent injury of her husband. The Court reasoned that section 30-2-4 placed a husband and wife on an equal basis by barring either of them from recovering for loss of consortium. 27 Utah 2d at 144, 493 P.2d at 986. Then in Tjas v. Proctor, 591 P.2d 438 (Utah 1979), this Court held that a husband may not bring an action for loss of consortium 3 arising out of the negligent injury to his wife. Id. at 440.
Although Tjas and Ellis ruled on the principles raised in this case, they both relied explicitly or implicitly and without analysis on Black’s holding that section 30-2-4 bars a husband from bringing an action for loss of consortium. This presents the anomalous circumstance of a state court deferring to a federal court’s analysis of a question of state law. Construction and interpretation of state statutes are principally the responsibility of state courts. H. Black, Handbook on the Law of Judicial Precedents, § 110-11, at 366 (1912).
The federal district court in Black mistakenly construed section 30-2-4 to bar a husband’s independent action for loss of consortium. The action for loss of consortium is meant to compensate a spouse for his or her own injury arising from the loss of companionship, affection, society, and conjugal relations. The language of section 30-2-4, “There shall be no right of recovery by the husband on account of personal injury or wrong to his wife,” does not prevent a husband from recovering for his own injuries that are proximately caused by injuries to his wife. The statute merely prevents a husband from recovering personal injury damages suffered by *1293his wife. The foregoing interpretation is buttressed by the fact that the statute expressly prohibits the husband from recovering for medical expenses or loss of his wife’s services. These amounts provide a measure of the value of the injury to the wife for which she alone is entitled to recover.
As Justice Zimmerman points out, section 30-2-4 must be interpreted in light of the historical conditions at the time of its enactment. See Howe v. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269, 421 P.2d 159 (1966). At common law, the restrictions of coverture required that the husband pursue an action for his wife’s personal injuries and recovery of damages belonged to the husband. When viewed in this context, the first sentence .to section 30-2-4 expressly permits a wife to bring an action for her own personal injuries without joining her husband. The second sentence confirms that the wife — and not the husband — is entitled to recover the proceeds from any judgment as if she were an unmarried woman. Thus, by adding the second sentence to section 30-2-4, the Utah legislature simply insured that all common law restrictions on the wife’s ability to maintain an action and recover a judgment were eliminated.
The foregoing analysis of section 30-2-4 is consistent with our decisions permitting parental recovery for the loss of society, love, and companionship in cases in which the claim arises out of wrongful death, Jones v. Carvell, 641 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1982), or spousal recovery for the intentional tort of alienation of affections. Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1215 (Utah 1983). In Nelson, we recognized that each spouse has a valuable and protectible “interest in the marriage relationship, including its intimacy, companionship, support, duties and affection.” Id. at 1215. I find no logical reason to permit an action for loss of consortium for an intentional tort, yet prohibit the action for a negligent tort. In both cases, the harm to a protectible interest in the marital relationship and the injury to the spouse are the same.4 Furthermore, the literal interpretation espoused by Justice Zimmerman does not explain' why a husband cannot recover for loss of consortium but can recover for the wrongful death of his wife when section 30-2-4 dictates, “There shall be no right of recovery by the husband on account of personal injury or wrong to his wife.” The distinction between deceased and incapacitated spouses should be one of degree only. As the Arizona Supreme Court stated: “Often death is separated from severe injury by mere fortuity; and it would be anomalous to distinguish between the two when the quality of consortium is negative*1294ly affected by both.” Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 230, 722 P.2d 955, 957 (1986). The words of section 30-2-4 were obviously not intended to mean that a husband can never recover for damages to him caused by injuries to his wife.
Several policy grounds were relied upon by the district court in Black to justify an interpretation of section 30-2-4 that eliminated the husband’s cause of action. First, it was argued that a cause of action by the nonphysically injured spouse would result in double recovery for the same wrong. See Black, 263 F.Supp. at 480. The problem with this argument, however, is that it is based on the mistaken assumption that the husband and the wife are seeking recovery for the same wrong. It ignores the fact that the injury to consortium is a separate and distinct loss to the nonphysically injured spouse. The argument against double recovery was aptly summarized by the California Supreme Court in Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal.3d 382, 404, 525 P.2d 669, 683, 115 Cal.Rptr. 765, 779 (1974):
Virtually every decision granting the wife the right to recover for loss of consortium ... has considered and rejected [the double recovery argument].... The cases have made it crystal clear that recovery of damages for impairment of “his” ability to participate in a normal married life does not necessarily compensate for the impairment of “her” ability to participate in that life.
The rule against double recovery prevents both the husband and the wife from recovering for the lost wages, medical expenses, and other expenses of the injured spouse. Recovery of those damages is properly part of the claim of the injured spouse only. In contrast, loss of consortium reflects loss of society, companionship, affection, and conjugal relations, elements that are personal to the noninjured spouse. Thus, compensating the noninjured spouse for damages for a personal loss of consortium cannot result in double recovery. Rodriguez, 12 Cal.3d at 405-06, 525 P.2d at 684-85, 115 Cal.Rptr. at 780-81.
Black also asserts that permitting a husband to recover for loss of consortium would lead to a corresponding right for anyone who loves and shares a close relationship with the injured person, such as the parents, the children, the fiance, aunts and uncles, and possibly even business partners. See Black, 263 F.Supp. at 480.5 Justice Zimmerman shares that concern. I do not agree that speculation regarding unrelated and merely potential litigation should preclude the availability of relief under long-standing, well-accepted tort doctrines in meritorious cases. Ekalo v. Constructive Service Corp., 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1, 4 (1965). If increased litigation from such parties occurs, “the existence of a multitude of claims merely shows society’s pressing need for [such] redress.” Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. at 233-34, 722 P.2d at 960-61 (quoting Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.2d 728, 735 n. 3, 441 P.2d 912, 917 n. 3, 69 Cal.Rptr. 72, 77 n. 3 (1968), which recognized a loss-of-consortium cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress).
Finally, the respondents in this case argue that numerous procedural and substantive difficulties will arise if the noninjured spouse is permitted to recover for loss of consortium. Respondents contend that an action by the non-physically injured spouse raises problems concerning the effect of contributory negligence by the physically injured spouse, including whether negli*1295gence should be imputed to the nonphysically injured spouse, overlapping statutes of limitation, the necessity of joinder of all nonphysically injured plaintiffs, settlement of claims by different parties, and the effects of res judicata and collateral estoppel on the claim of the noninjured plaintiff. While these procedural problems may be substantial, the appropriate response is not to arbitrarily eliminate a common law cause of action altogether. I am unable to find any authority that supports the contention that these procedural problems justify the abrogation of the cause of action for loss of consortium.6 On the contrary, 94 percent of the other states in the Union obviously cope with these purported problems.7
In my judgment the rationale relied on in Black v. United States is flawed, and I would decline to follow that case. The enactment of section 30-2-4 only affected the husband’s common law right to recover for his wife’s services. The husband’s right to recover for loss of consortium was in reality unaffected by the enactment of the Utah Married Woman’s Act. Because Tjas v. Proctor and Ellis v. Hathaway are is inconsistent with this conclusion, I would overrule those decisions.

Wife’s Right to Recover for Loss of Consortium

The remaining question in this analysis is whether a wife has a cause of action for loss of consortium parallel to that of a husband. The answer, I submit, is clearly yes.
Article IV, section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides, “The rights of citizens of the State of Utah shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex. Both male and female citizens of this state shall enjoy equally all civil, political and religious rights and privileges.” Plain interpretation of this provision requires that married women enjoy the same civil right and privilege to maintain an action for loss of consortium as married men. I therefore conclude that article IV, section 1 of the Utah Constitution grants to married women the same right to recover for loss of consortium that married men had at common law. I would hold that the appellant in this case is entitled to maintain a cause of action to recover for loss of consortium as it is defined in this opinion.
STEWART, Associate C.J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of DURHAM, J.

. At the time the district court in Black made its ruling, the Utah Supreme Court had considered on two occasions claims by the husband for loss of the wife’s services. The first case, Paul v. Kirkendall, 1 Utah 2d 1, 261 P.2d 670 (1953), upheld a $5,000 award to the husband for loss of services. Paul is not controlling because it applied California law, but it should be noted that California has since granted both spouses the right to recover for loss of consortium. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal.3d 382, 525 P.2d 669, 686, 115 Cal.Rptr. 765, 782 (1974). In the second case, Robinson v. Hreinson, 17 Utah 2d 261, 409 P.2d 121 (1965), this Court affirmed, without comment, an award of $742 to the husband for loss of consortium. It appears the appellants had not challenged the propriety of the consortium award, thus the decision in Robinson did not treat the question.

. The leading case recognizing the wife’s right to recover for loss of consortium is Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852, 71 S.Ct. 80, 95 L.Ed. 624 (1950), overruled on other grounds sub nom., Smither and Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220, 226 (D.C.Cir.1957). Since Hitaffer, forty-seven states have recognized by judicial decision or by statute the wife’s right to recover for loss of consortium. See Annot., 36 A.L.R.3d 900 (Supp.1986) for a list of the decisions and statutes in thirty-five states; the states not listed in the A.L.R. supplement are: Connecticut, Hopson v. St. Mary’s Hospital, 176 Conn. 485, 408 A.2d 260 (1979); Kansas, Albertson v. Travis, 2 Kan.App.2d 153, 576 P.2d 1090 (1978); Kan.Stat. Ann. § 23-205 (1981); Maine, Me.Rev.Stat.Ann., tit. 19, § 167-A (1981); Maryland, Deems v. Western Maryland R.R., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1966); Nebraska, Luther v. Maple, 250 F.2d 916 (8th Cir.1958) (interpreting Nebraska state law); New Jersey, Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp., 46 N.J. 82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); North Carolina, Nicholson v. Hugh Chatham Memorial Hosp., 300 N.C. 295, 266 S.E.2d 818 (1980); Rhode Island, Mariani v. Nanni, 95 R.I. 153, 185 A.2d 119 (1962); South Carolina, S.C.Code Ann. § 15-5-170 (1976); Tennessee, Tenn.Code Ann. § 25-1-106 (1980); Vermont, Whitney v. Fisher, 138 Vt. 468, 417 A.2d 934 (1980); Wyoming, Weaver v. Mitchell, 715 P.2d 1361 (1986). Utah and Virginia have interpreted their respective state statutes to deny either spouse the right to recover for loss of consortium. See Harford Mutual Ins. Co. v. Bruchey, 248 Md. 669, 238 A.2d 115 (1966) (applying Va.Code Ann. § 55-36 (1959), which contains an express provision barring consortium claims). New Mexico is the only state to deny by judicial decision the right to recover for loss of consortium to either spouse. Roseberry v. Starkovich, 73 N.M. 211, 387 P.2d 321 (1963), aff'd sub nom., Tondre v. Thurmond-Hollis-Thurmond, Inc., 103 N.M. 292, 706 P.2d 156 (1985).

. The opinion in Tjas does not expressly state whether Mr. Tjas was seeking damages for "consortium” as defined herein or loss of services or both. The Court simply stated, "[A] wife is permitted to recover for loss of service to her family as a result of her injuries and this loss, sometimes referred to as consortium, is properly part of the wife's claim only_ [A] husband may not maintain a loss of consortium action for the claimed negligent injury to his wife.” Tjas, 591 P.2d at 440 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). Thus, it appears that the Court understood Mr. Tjas to be seeking damages for the loss of his wife’s services, which, consistent with Corbridge, are part of the wife’s claim only.

. The district court in Black distinguished the action of alienation of affections as a "direct” attack on the marital relationship, whereas the claim for loss of consortium in a negligence action is an "indirect" attack. Black, 263 F.Supp. at 476-77. This is a meaningless distinction. In speaking of the wife’s right to consortium, the Ohio Supreme Court observed in Clouston v. Remlinger Oldsmobile Cadillac, Inc., 22 Ohio St.2d 65, 73, 258 N.E.2d 230, 235 (1970):
There certainly is no doubt today that the wife of a husband who has been incapacitated suffers great pain and endures constant anguish, particularly if she is denied the opportunity to have children.... When a person is injured either intentionally or negligently, to the extent that such person can no longer be a companion and is no longer capable of giving love, affection, society, comfort and sexual relations to his or her spouse, that spouse has suffered a direct and real personal loss.
Moreover, I believe that principles of tort law make the direct-indirect distinction meaningless. The New Jersey Supreme Court relied on traditional tort principles in Ekalo v. Constructive Serv. Corp., 46 N.J. 82, 89-90, 95, 215 A.2d 1, 5, 8 (1965), when it rejected the argument that a wife’s injuries are indirect:
The position that [the wife's] injuries are indirect or too remote to warrant legal protection runs counter to basic principles of negligence and causation. ... While engaging in their activities, the defendants clearly came under the comprehensive common law duty of due care with tort liability for its breach. If, as alleged, they acted without due care causing serious bodily injury to the husband and consortium deprivation to the wife, they should, in all justice, be held liable in fair measure for the respective losses. Those losses were immediate and consequential rather than remote and unforeseeable and, there being no sufficient countervailing policy, the law now rightly views them as remediable by the responsible tortfeasors.
Id. at 89-90, 95, 215 A.2d at 5, 8.

. See generally Howard Frank, M.D., P.C. v. Superior Court, 150 Ariz. 228, 722 P.2d 955 (1986) (holding that parents may maintain a cause of action for loss of consortium against a third party who negligently injures their adult child); Hay v. Medical Center of Vermont, 145 Vt. 533, 496 A.2d 939 (1985) (recognizing minor child’s remedy for negligent deprivation of parental consortium); Butcher v. Superior Court of Orange County, 139 Cal.App.3d 58, 188 Cal.Rptr. 503 (1983) (awarding compensation to unmarried cohabitant upon showing that nonmarital relationship is "stable and significant”); Elden v. Sheldon, 164 Cal.App.3d 745, 210 Cal.Rptr. 755 (1985) (limiting compensation to married couples).

. See 36 A.L.R.3d 900 (Supp.1986).

. See supra note 2. Many jurisdictions have relied upon joinder rules to deal with several of the problems posed by respondents. I consider joinder of the spouses to be advisable to eliminate many of the procedural problems respondents mention and to avoid any jury confusion regarding double recovery. One of the best opinions on the subject of joinder of husband and wife in consortium claims is Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 153, 302 N.E.2d 555 (1973). There, the court explained:
As a practical matter, the consortium claim, when asserted at all, will usually be presented together with the negligence claim for the physical injuries, husband and wife joining in the same action. Such joinder is of course permitted and invited by the procedural rules. When, perchance, separate actions have been brought, the defendant (or plaintiffs in the actions) would normally be entitled to have them consolidated for trial. Further, we think the defendant could ordinarily insist, if he considered it to his advantage, that the other spouse be joined in the main negligence action so that a possible claim for loss of consortium should not be outstanding when the negligence claim was disposed of, leaving a possibility of duplicating recoveries.
302 N.E.2d at 560-61 (footnotes omitted).
The analysis of the joinder issue in Diaz was based upon rules very similar to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. That analysis is equally applicable in this state because we have adopted rules based on the federal rules.