Court Opinion

ID: 9704908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:49:42.001071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:06.421758
License: Public Domain

Opinion by
Judge Palladino,
Donna Homan (Petitioner) appeals an order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review (Board) which upheld a referees determination that she is ineligible for benefits under Section 402(b) of the Unemployment Compensation Law1 for voluntarily terminating her employment without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature. We reverse.
Petitioner was employed as a clerk-steno in the Construction Department at Pennsylvania Power and Light Company’s Montour Susquehanna Steam Electric Station for approximately two (2) years. Petitioner was the only female employee working in a storeroom with approximately three hundred (300) men. Petitioner terminated her employment on May 3, 1985, because of sexual harassment from some of the men with whom she worked.
Prior to quitting, the record shows that Petitioner complained to her supervisors of harassment which included: (1) that the union steward asked her out on several occasions and she did not like it; (2) that a subfore*175man asked her out and was difficult to work with after she refused by not giving her necessary information to do her job and giving her “a rough time;” and (3) that male workers pounded on the door of a bathroom she had to share with them while she was inside. The Board found that Petitioner had been subjected to sexual remarks from male employees; had received several notes on her car containing remarks of a sexual nature; and was kissed by a male employee against her will.
Petitioner testified that she did not continue to complain to her supervisors about these latter incidents of harassment because she was embarrassed, and recognized the total indifference of her supervisors to her concerns. Petitioner stated: “[T]he other times I complained about something, it didn’t do any good, . . . I didn’t get a very encouraging response.”2 For example, when she complained about the subforeman her supervisor responded that “some people never grow up.”3
The Board determined that Petitioner was ineligible for benefits because she did not take appropriate action to report the incidents to her supervisor. The decision was based on findings that Petitioner had never filed a formal complaint of sexual harassment and had not complained about each specific incident of sexual harassment. On appeal, Petitioner contends that the Board erred in determining she had not established a cause of necessitous and compelling nature for voluntarily quitting her job.4
Sexual harassment can be a necessitous and compelling reason for quitting, provided the employee has tak*176en reasonable and prudent steps to alleviate the problem. Weissman v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 94 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 67, 502 A.2d 782 (1986). Petitioner bears the burden of proving she took such steps. Colduvell v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 48 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 185, 408 A.2d 1207 (1979). Whether a claimant has established a cause of necessitous and compelling nature is a question of law reviewable by this court. Adamski v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 64 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 639, 441 A.2d 502 (1982). This court has held that a claimant must take “common sense action” so that the employer is given “an opportunity to understand” what she is objecting to. Colduvell, 48 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. at 187, 408 A.2d at 1208.
Petitioner asserts that she took reasonable and prudent steps. Petitioner argues she is not required to complain about each and every incident and is not required to make a formal complaint of sexual harassment. She contends that under the circumstances present here, the actions she took were sufficient to meet her burden of providing her supervisors with “an opportunity to understand” prior to quitting.
Petitioner did report several incidents of harassment to her supervisors, but a review of their testimony shows that they did not consider these to be harassment. The construction supervisor, George Smith, when being examined about the bathroom incident testified as follows:5
Q: Did Donna ever complain to you about any sort of harassment?
A: No.
Q: She mentioned in her testimony about people banging at the door.
*177A: That she did, yes, if you call that harassment.
When questioned about whether Petitioner ever complained about language used towards her in the office, this same supervisor testified:6
A: She never come in to me in a complaint form tell me that there was a problem.
Q: You did hear it?
A: Sure.
Q: But you just assumed that it didn’t cause a problem for her?
A: I would say an occasional slip happened, yes. Anything that was meant derogatory, no.
The record also reveals that Petitioner attempted, on at least eleven occasions, to secure a job transfer or a new position without success. This supports her contention that she took reasonable and prudent steps to alleviate the problem and remain in the work force.
Although Petitioner did not complain about all the incidents of sexual harassment which she experienced, the steps which she did take were sufficient to meet her burden. The law does not require a claimant to complain of each and every incident of sexual harassment nor does it require a formal complaint be filed. We conclude that Petitioner “acted as a reasonable person would under these circumstances.” Danner v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 66 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 252, 254, 443 A.2d 1211, 1213 (1982).7 *178Therefore, the Board erred, as a matter of law, in determining that Petitioner had not established a necessitous and compelling reason for voluntarily quitting her job.* ***56*8
Accordingly, we reverse.
Order
And Now, June 30, 1987, the order of the Unemployment Compensation Board of Review in the above-captioned case is reversed.

 Act of December 5, 1936, Second Ex. Sess., P.L. (1937) 2897, as amended, 43 P.S. §802(b).

 N.T. (second hearing) at 10.

 N.T. (first hearing) at 11.

 Our scope of review is limited to determining whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence, an error of law was made or constitutional rights were violated. 2 Pa. C. S. §704.

 N.T. (first hearing) at 8-9.

 N.T. (first hearing) at 11, 12.

 St. Barnabas, Inc. v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 106 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 191, 525 A.2d 885 (1987) held that employee foiled to produce substantial evidence to support a finding that she made her employer aware of the harassment.

 Petitioner also contends that two of the Boards findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Since we have concluded that the Board made an error of law, it is not necessary to reach this issue.