Court Opinion

ID: 9552579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:13:21.961716+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:28:13.006397
License: Public Domain

LUMPKIN, Judge:
concur in results.
¶ 1 I agree that Appellants conviction and sentence should be affirmed. I write separately because I do not agree with the standard of review the Court uses here to determine the sufficiency of the evidence, and some of the analysis utilized by the Court.
¶2 I have previously stated my belief this Court should adopt a unified Spuehler-type approach to evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence in all cases, whether they contain both direct and circumstantial evidence, or whether they contain entirely circumstantial evidence. See White v. State, 900 P.2d 982 (Okl.Cr.1995) (Lumpkin, J., specially concurring). I re-urge that here because this case presents a prime example why a unified approach would be clearer and more concise.
¶ 3 In addition, as a part of its discussion of Proposition I, the Court incorrectly cites Carter v. State, 1994 OK CR 49, ¶ 53, 879 P.2d 1234, 1251, for the holding that “[a]n abuse of discretion in the filing of a Bill of Particulars will be found where the filing is based on impermissible discriminating grounds.” This Court in Carter did not make that statement. We did say that in accordance with our holding in Romano v. State, 847 P.2d 368, 392 (Okl.Cr.1993), “it was the obligation of a criminal defendant to demonstrate that the governments prosecution of him was based upon impermissible discriminating grounds citing to United States v. Blitstein, 626 F.2d 774, 782 (10th Cir.1980).” In Romano, we recognized “[p]rosecutors are presumed by law to act in good faith when determining which crimes to prosecute and which punishments to seek [citations omitted.]” We stated:
The decision regarding which criminal charge to bring lies within the wide parameters of prosecutorial discretion. Gray v. State, 650 P.2d 880, 882 (Okl.Cr.1982). See also Dangerfield v. State, 742 P.2d 573 (Okl.Cr.1987). However, prosecutorial discretion is not unlimited. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364, 98 S.Ct. 663, 668, 54 L.Ed.2d 604 (1978), the Supreme Court stated:
the conscious exercise of some selectivity in enforcement is not in itself a federal constitutional violation so long as the selection was [not] deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification.
Romano, 847 P.2d at 393.
¶ 4 As I have stated many times before, this Court must be accurate and consistent in the application of its precedent. Too often slight variations in wording of holdings or improper paraphrasing of holdings leads to *1116unsupported conclusions that we have departed from our prior caselaw. Our responsibility is to be clear in our decisions. We are tasked with the obligation to • clarify, not confuse, the rule of law.
¶ 5 Finally, I disagree with the Courts finding in Proposition' VII that Detective Craig Gravels response to the cross-examination by defense counsel was an evidentiary harpoon. When the entirety of the line of questioning is read in context, it is readily apparent the response was germane to the questions asked, and while it could be construed to be information of other crimes, it was in response to the question asked regarding when she had asked Appellant to leave the house on the night in question.