Court Opinion

ID: 9525060
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:59:37.341985+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:12:46.336221
License: Public Domain

BUCHANAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the "substantial relationship" test announced in State ex rel. Meyers v. Tippecanoe County Court (1982), Ind., 432 N.E.2d 1377, required Lawler and his staff to withdraw from prosecuting Jaske for escape.
The purpose of appointing a special prosecutor is to prevent the prosecuting attorney from using, to his former client's detriment, information that was obtained from the client in confidence. Sears v. State (1983), Ind., 457 N.E.2d 192; Havens v. State (1981), Ind., 429 N.E.2d 618. Disqualification of a prosecutor is favored only when a serious doubt arises as to whether the prosecuting attorney's knowledge of a former client's prior cases will result in prejudice to the defendant. Tippecanoe, supra. Tippecanoe and like cases recognized that when an habitual offender charge is based upon the same two prior felony convictions, and the prosecutor had previously represented the defendant in those two cases, the "substantial relationship" test was satisfied and the prosecutor and his staff of deputies had to be disqualified. Id.; State ex rel. Goldsmith v. Superior Court of Hancock County (1979), 270 Ind. 487, 386 N.E.2d 942. In such instances, defense counsel would certainly acquire intimate facts directly related to the guilt or innocence of his client. Consequently, he may well have gleaned information closely interwoven with the facts nee-essary to obtain a conviction for the habitual offender count. To the contrary, the record in this case reflects that Lawler represented Jaske in a post-conviction relief setting only, and was not involved in the first degree murder conviction. And, Lawler did not complete his representation of Jaske in the post-conviction proceeding inasmuch as Lawler resigned as counsel when he was elected to the prosecutor's office.
Unlike prosecution of an habitual offender, the State need only prove that the defendant intentionally fled from lawful detention in order to convict for escape. Ind. Code 35-44-8-5 (1988). The record in no way demonstrates that the facts Lawler might have acquired during his representation of Jaske in the post-conviction proceedings were so closely interwoven with the prosecution of this case (escape). Under the circumstances, it is reasonable to conclude without speculation, that the knowledge Lawler gleaned of Jaske's prior murder conviction would not actually prejudice Jaske so as to require Lawler's withdrawal as prosecuting attorney on. the escape charge. The relationship between Lawler's representation of Jaske during the post-conviction relief action and Lawler's prosecution of Jaske on the offense of escape is tenuous at best. I therefore cannot conclude that the "substantial relationship" *497test of Tippeconce was satisfied, and the trial court acted properly in denying Jaske's motion to appoint a special progecutor.
The conviction should be affirmed.