Court Opinion

ID: 9594708
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:32:14.096257+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:07.770396
License: Public Domain

GILBERT, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. In light of the undisputed fact that there was a specific threat of litigation made by the developer of the property at issue, allowing a short time-out for the city officials to consult privately with the city attorney seems to be the most reasonable course of action. In a letter, Ryan Contracting Co. (Ryan) alleged severe financial harm as a result of the city’s revocation of its gravel removal and grading permit. Ryan’s letter went on to threaten legal action to recover lost revenues and/or costs if the city decided to either deny its request for a conditional use permit (CUP) or require an environmental assessment worksheet (EAW).
The council’s first opportunity to consider Ryan’s letter took place at its regularly scheduled meeting on February 7, 2000. At that meeting, there were two resolutions before the council: one to deny the EAW and one to approve the CUP. The council had tabled the CUP application at its prior meeting after it learned that the Environmental Quality Board had received a petition for an EAW and that no further action could be taken on the CUP until the council determined whether to require an EAW.
Ryan’s threat of litigation related to the same project, the same development permit, and the same responsible government unit and involved environmental and non-environmental issues. The letter threatened specific legal action and was a direct, relevant, and material legal matter intertwined with the revocation of Ryan’s 1997 and 1998 grading permits and its request for a CUP allowing gravel extraction on its property.
There is no allegation that Ryan’s threat of litigation was frivolous. It is undisput*743ed that the district court found that there was a specific threat of litigation and that the council needed advice from its attorney relating to that specific situation. The district court held that this type of advice rose above the level of mere general legal advice, that the mayor and council members demonstrated a need to discuss the matter with the city attorney in confidence, and that this need outweighed the public’s right to access. Minnesota statutes and our precedent allow for the closure of public meetings when permitted by the attorney-client privilege. Minn.Stat. § 13D.05, subd. 3(b) (2000); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Hous. & Redev. Auth., 310 Minn. 313, 323, 251 N.W.2d 620, 625 (1976). The majority opinion wrongfully singles out one reason for open meetings — “the fundamental proposition that a well-informed populace is essential to the vitality of our democratic form of government” — but then ignores both the facts of this case and the equally compelling fundamental proposition that, in a democratic society, citizens should be encouraged to participate in governmental functions as elected officials. When there is a real threat of litigation relating to their decisions, they should be allowed to seek legal counsel. This fundamental proposition is particularly compelling when, as here, the threatened litigation includes claims for damages against the city itself and potential statutory liability for individual council members.
Our citizen taxpayers expect their city council members to be prudent in exercising their judgment. When faced with a specific threat of litigation, it is prudent for a city council to seek timely advice from its counsel. Without legal advice, the council may fail to take proper legal considerations into account in making its decision and unwittingly expose its taxpayer constituents to potentially millions of dollars of damages.
This case does not come close to representing the blind application of the attorney-client privilege to all cases. The record demonstrates that the privilege was invoked only in response to a specific, written threat of litigation that included a claim for damages. This minimal intrusion on the principle of open meetings is the responsible reaction to an increasingly litigious society in which city councils are brought into court on a regular basis to defend themselves and/or pay damages for wrongful conduct.
I submit that when there is a bona fide threat of specific litigation, there is also a corresponding need to recognize the importance of timely and confidential attorney-client communications between public servants and their counsel. The majority opinion fails to deal with the facts of this case, which are uncontested with respect to the written threat of specific litigation. Although the majority purports to discard a bright-line rule in favor of a case-by-case approach, it in fact adopts a bright-line rule that applies irrespective of the specific facts of the case. Under the majority’s analysis, the threat of litigation would never justify a public body’s decision to close a public meeting to obtain confidential legal advice from its attorney. This case presents one of the rare situations in which we must balance the public policy of favoring open meetings against the need for absolute confidentiality. Furthermore, there is no basis for discounting or ignoring the threat of litigation in this analysis. In fact, we have declined to make a distinction between threatened and pending litigation in the past. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 310 Minn. at 324, 251 N.W.2d at 626. The record in the case at bar reflects that the only item that prompted the closed session with counsel was the threat of litigation.
*744In support of its decision, the majority-attempts to isolate the EAW decision from other actions impacting Ryan’s project, i.e., the grading and extraction permit and the CUP. The majority states that “[t]he factors that determine whether to require an EAW are detailed and specific. The assessment of litigation risks is not among them.” However, in this case, the city had already issued a grading permit for the property at issue and then summarily revoked the permit. The EAW was considered only in the context of Ryan’s CUP application and the validity of the city’s revocation of Ryan’s grading permit. Indeed, these other decisions directly impact the EAW as to the type, extent, and reversibility of any environmental effects and the cumulative potential effects of related or anticipated future projects, such as the site that was being graded immediately adjacent to Ryan’s property. The majority then concludes that “[t]he Council did not need information regarding possible litigation with Ryan to determine whether Ryan’s project may have the potential for significant environmental effects.” The majority’s great concern with the open meeting principle throws out of balance the ramifications of disallowing an attorney-client privilege exception to the Open Meeting Law. Such an exception would allow the council to close its meeting to discuss how to assess a collaterally related threat of litigation arising from the grading permit revocation and the CUP. Moreover, our citizens expect more of then-elected officials and the attorneys who advise them when they are faced with a specific threat of litigation. Importantly, all of these matters — including the grading permit, the CUP, and the EAW — were within the city’s jurisdiction. We should not splice out segments of these governmental actions and review them in isolation, but rather look to the context of the whole picture. Furthermore, contrary to the majority’s assertion, the fact that the threatened litigation is contingent upon a public matter pending before the council should have no bearing on this analysis.
In a practical sense, the majority either forces a city council to proceed with their business and avoid discussing the threatened litigation or, alternatively, to conduct a public discussion of the threatened litigation with their city attorney in an open meeting. Such a discussion would force the city attorney to become a witness in any litigation that ensues. It may also require the city to seek outside counsel because of the conflict that is created when the city attorney becomes a material -witness in the litigation. See Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 3.7 (stating the general rule that a “lawyer shall not act as advocate at a trial in which the lawyer is likely to be a necessary witness”). Having closed sessions with an attorney to discuss settlement or ultimate strategy involving actual litigation is obviously not the sole purpose of having confidential communications with an attorney. The attorney’s advice can also be used in anticipation of litigation and in mitigation of potential damages. The availability of confidential advice from an attorney to a representative of a public body assists the making of informed decisions and prevents legal mistakes. Such advice should be deemed by this court to be appropriate preventive legal medicine that justifies the invocation of the attorney-client privilege.
The majority remands this case to the district court, commenting that “because the lower courts found no such violation [of the Open Meeting Law], they did not consider what remedy to impose, if any.” The potential consequences of intentionally violating the Open Meeting Law are serious. In this case, the city council obviously intended to close its meeting to the public to discuss with its attorney the ramifications of the threatened litigation in the *745context of this very complex land development situation. The record also reflects that the council was fully aware of the Open Meeting Law. One council member voted against the closure and, in addition, a member of the media challenged the closure. Upon remand now, the district court may have to consider whether to assess a civil penalty of up to $300 against the individual council members, “which may not be paid by the public body.” Minn.Stat. § 13D.06, subd. 1 (2000). An action to enforce this penalty may be brought by “any person.” Id., subd. 2. Moreover, if an individual intentionally violates the Open Meeting Law on three or more occasions, the individual must forfeit his or her office. Id., subd. 3. In addition to other remedies, the court may award reasonable costs, disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees up to $13,000 to any party. Id., subd. 4. Although the city “may pay any costs, disbursements, or attorney fees incurred by or awarded against any of its [city council] members,” id., subd. 4(c), it is not required to do so. It is true that these monetary penalties and attorney fees can be awarded against a council member only if the court finds that there was a specific intent to violate the Open Meeting Law. Id., subd. 4(c). Yet this rule does not remove the possibility that council members will have to individually defend themselves and incur personal liability if the city chooses not to indemnify them. The city may also incur further costs in defending such actions and then paying out an ultimate award. The taxpayers again may end up footing the bill on these additional costs and expenses. Could there be a closed meeting to discuss possible disposition of these further claims? Or would that discussion have to take place in a public meeting?
Anything short of affirming the decision of the lower courts will jeopardize our citizens’ trust and confidence in the decisions under consideration by public bodies and may even discourage our citizens from serving in an elected capacity. This service is essential in our democratic form of government. Finally, if a mistake is made and the city unknowingly or unwittingly makes a legal blunder because of its inability to consult with its attorney in private, the taxpayers are the ones who really lose. The balance needed in our system compels allowing our city officials to meet and discuss a specific threat of litigation in confidence with their attorney. We have thousands of public bodies meeting throughout the state on a regular basis.1 These entities are dealing with ever-more complex issues that often end up in court. We must be mindful of exposing our individual city council members and public bodies to damages and the enormous costs of defending such litigation. A short recess to consider preventative legal remedies provides the proper balance to these important, competing public interests when there is a bona fide threat of litigation.

. There are 87 counties, 854 cities, and 1,792 townships in Minnesota.