Court Opinion

ID: 9587290
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:20:45.669891+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:12.296092
License: Public Domain

Thompson, Justice.
Shortly after assuming the office of Sheriff of Clayton County in January 2005, appellant Victor Hill sent notices summarily terminating the employment of 27 employees of the Clayton County Sheriffs Office, and advising them that they are not entitled to the protections of the Clayton County Civil Service System Act, Ga. L. 1994, p. 4399 (“the 1994 Act”). Two discharged employees, appellees Holly Watkins and Sherrie Martin (hereafter “Watkins”), brought a petition for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief, asserting that they are subject to the 1994 Act, which affords them due process *279and prohibits termination without just cause. The trial court agreed with Watkins that employees of the Clayton County Sheriffs Office are covered by the 1994Act, and it granted summary judgment in her favor. Hill appeals, asserting that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous in several respects. Finding no error, we affirm.
1. In order to place employees under a county civil service system, specific authorizing legislation must be passed pursuant to a constitutional amendment, or the procedure set out in OCGA § 36-1-21 must be followed. Gwinnett County v. Yates, 265 Ga. 504 (1) (458 SE2d 791) (1995). See OCGA § 36-1-21 (d) (1) (A) (pursuant to a local constitutional amendment, the General Assembly may provide by law for any civil service or merit system for any county). It is uncontroverted that the statutory method was not utilized in this case. Thus, the question before the Court is whether there was proper authorization under the Georgia Constitution for the specific inclusion of sheriffs office employees in the 1994 Act.
In summary, the 1994 Act was authorized by a 1963 local constitutional amendment, which was continued in effect by legislation enacted in 1986. The history is as follows:
The current 1994Act was established by Ga. L. 1994, p. 4400, § 2, to create “a civil service system of personnel administration, to be known as the Clayton County Civil Service System.” The 1994 Act expressly repealed an earlier version of the Clayton County Civil Service System Act, Ga. L. 1963, p. 2747, as amended.1 Ga. L. 1994, p. 4406, § 15. As relevant to our analysis, the 1994Act states: “Except as provided in this Act, all positions within the following offices are subject to and covered by the civil service system:... sheriffs.” Id. at p. 4400, § 2 (b). The next section expressly excludes from coverage, “elected officials.” Id. at p. 4401, § 2 (c). Viewing these provisions in pari materia as we must, see Swims v. Fulton County, 267 Ga. 94, 96 (475 SE2d 597) (1996) (“all statutes relating to the same subject matter are to be construed together, and harmonized wherever possible, so as to give effect to legislative intent”), it is clear that the elected sheriff is not subject to the civil service system, but those occupying positions in his office are. The Act further provides that no employee who is covered under the civil service system may be dismissed from employment “except for good cause and in accordance with civil service system rules and regulations.” Id. at p. 4404, § 9.
*280The legal authority for the 1994 Act was a local amendment to Art. VII, Sec. IV, Par. I of the Georgia Constitution, proposed by 1963 House Resolution 50 (Ga. L. 1963, p. 681), and ratified at the general election in 1964. The 1963 local constitutional amendment provided as follows: “The General Assembly shall have the authority, however, to enact laws creating a Civil Service System [for Clayton County] for all those persons, other than officials elected by the people, whose wages or salaries are paid in whole or in part out of the funds of Clayton County.”2 (Emphasis supplied.) Ga. L. 1963, pp. 681-682, § 1. After the adoption of the 1983 Constitution, the 1963 constitutional amendment was specifically “continued in effect by an Act approved March 28, 1986 (Ga. L. 1986, p. 5573).” Ga. L. 1994, p. 4400, § 2.
Virtually identical constitutional language was considered in Shead v. Scholes, 239 Ga. 804 (238 SE2d 859) (1977), where a 1963 constitutional amendment authorized the creation of a civil service system in Cobb County for “any or all persons, other than elected officials, whose wages or salaries are paid in whole or in part out of the funds of Cobb County.” Id. at 807. Because this Court determined that the constitutional amendment extended coverage to more than just those individuals who were designated as county employees, the Court held that employees of a pretrial services agency, which was not part of county government, but was created by judicial decree and funded by the county, may come under the jurisdiction of the civil service system. Shead, supra at 808.
The dissent fails to either cite or distinguish Shead; instead it places great emphasis on Gwinnett County v. Yates, 265 Ga. 504 (458 SE2d 791) (1995). In that case, the clerk of the superior court of Gwinnett County, an elected official, discharged a deputy clerk. The issue was whether the language of a local constitutional amendment which authorized Gwinnett County to provide by law for a “ ‘[mjerit [s]ystem for any or all present and future employees of Gwinnett County other than elected officials’ ” (emphasis supplied), was broad enough to bring the discharged employee within the coverage of the county merit system. Id. at 505. Recognizing a distinction between county employees and employees of an elected official of the county, we determined that the Gwinnett act, which explicitly authorized inclusion of only county employees, was insufficient to include the deputy clerk within the county merit system. Yates, supra at 505 (1) (a). Thus, we hold that Shead, not Yates, is controlling authority.
Here, the General Assembly specifically authorized Clayton County, via an unambiguous 1963 local constitutional amendment, as extended in 1986, to enact a civil service system which includes any *281person whose wages or salary are paid by the county. See Yates, supra at 512, Benham, P. J., dissenting (opining that “one is an employee of [the county] if one is on a regular payroll maintained by [the county] and [the county] is the payor of the wages or salary one receives as compensation for one’s toil.”). Pursuant to the 1963 and 1986 constitutional authorization, the 1994 Act properly included “all positions within the . . . office[ ] ... [of] sheriff.” Ga. L. 1994, p. 4400, § 2 (b), within the coverage of the Clayton County civil service system as those employees are paid by the county.3
2. Hill asserts that a certain resolution adopted by the Clayton Board of Commissioners in 1965 to implement the 1963 Civil Service Act violated the Home Rule provision of the Georgia Constitution, Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (c) (1) (legislative power granted to counties shall not extend to an action affecting any elective county office or the personnel thereof, except the personnel subject to the jurisdiction of the county governing authority). Under the 1963 Civil Service Act, any department of Clayton County could be brought under the civil service system by a vote of more than 50 percent of its employees. The resolution in question shows that the Clayton County Sheriffs Office voted for coverage. As noted previously, the 1963 Act was expressly repealedby the 1994Act. Thus, we find that the resolution in question has no applicability here. Even assuming that it does, we agree with the trial court’s finding that the resolution represents a reasonable exercise of the discretion conferred by the constitutional amendment. See generally Schrenko v. DeKalb County School Dist., 276 Ga. 786 (2) (582 SE2d 109) (2003). We find no violation of Art. IX, Sec. II, Par. I (c) (1).

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Benham, J., who dissents.

 Both parties devote much of their argument to addressing the constitutionality of the 1963 Civil Service Act. But because the 1963 Act was expressly repealed, the outcome of this case is controlled by the current 1994 Act.

 It is without dispute that Watkins’ salary is paid from county funds.

 Our holding today is in no way intended to diminish the autonomy granted to the sheriff to appoint or discharge employees, see OCGA§ 15-16-23; Wayne County v. Herrin, 210 Ga. App. 747 (437 SE2d 793) (1993), or to maintain the independence of his elected position.