Court Opinion

ID: 9617695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:59:52.766911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:14.379813
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(dissenting)—In this case the appellant, Charles T. McDonald, contends: (1) That the county had not provided adequate drainage facilities (culverts) for Huston creek, with the result that the creek water washed out the road; (2) that, even if the drainage facilities were normally sufficient for the waters of Huston creek, the cul*690verts were so clogged with silt and debris as to be inadequate on the day of the accident, with the result that the creek water washed out the road; (3) that the county had actual notice of imminent danger to the road and failed to take any precautions to warn the traveling public.
The county, on the other hand, contends: (1) That the drainage facilities were adequate under circumstances which could be reasonably anticipated; (2) that unprecedented flood conditions prevailed bn the day of the accident, such that reasonable caution would not have anticipated; i.e., that the washout resulted from an Act of God; (3) that the county had no actual notice of imminent danger to the road; and (4) that McDonald was guilty of contributory negligence.
Upon the issues so framed, the case went to trial before a jury. • - -
Since the decision in Kirtley v. Spokane County (1898), 20 Wash. 111, 54 Pac. 936, it has been clear in this state that counties, like other municipal corporations, are liable for damages resulting from their failure to use ordinary and reasonable care to keep county roads reasonably safe for the public. See Boggess v. King County (1929), 150 Wash. 578, 274 Pac. 188; Berglund v. Spokane County (1940), 4 Wn. (2d) 309, 103 P. (2d) 355, and cases cited therein.
In Sigurdson v. Seattle (1956), 48 Wn. (2d) 155, 292 P. (2d) 214, we recognized that there is
“ . . . no substantial difference between the function of improving and maintaining public streets and that of improving and maintaining drains . . . which are necessarily ancillary to the function of maintaining the streets.”
In Ronkosky v. Tacoma (1912), 71 Wash. 148, 128 Pac. 2, we said:
“Where a street is improved across ... [a] natural water course, it is incumbent upon the municipality not only to make an adequate bridge culvert, or passage for the water in the first instance, but to keep it in such condition that it shall not obstruct the stream thereafter. . . . [Citing cases,]
“Nor is this positive duty met by a provision merely ade*691quate to take care of the water of the stream, at its lowest or even at its ordinary stages. Proper regard must be had to the volume of water, the strength and rapidity, of the current at all seasons. While there is no liability for failure to provide against unprecedented floods, ordinary freshets must be anticipated. ...”
See, also, Dillabough v. Okanogan County (1919), 105 Wash. 609, 178 Pac. 802; Harkoff v. Whatcom County (1952), 40 Wn. (2d) 147, 241 P. (2d) 932; Cover v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation District (1956), 162 Neb. 146, 75 N. W. (2d) 661; and 18 McQuillin on Municipal Corporations (3d ed.), § 53.134, pp. 521-524. As to the size of the culverts which must be maintained, McQuillin states:
“The culvert must be sufficient to accommodate, not only the natural and normal flow of the stream, for example, where the culvert is constructed over a natural watercourse, but such.abnormal and excessive flow as may reasonably be'anticipated in time of high water and flood. However, ‘there is no duty to provide for floods so unusual and extraordinary as to bring them within the category of an “act of God.” ’ ”
From the foregoing, it is clear that thé county had a duty to maintain adequate drainage facilities. It is undisputed' that the record contains substantial evidence to the effect that the drainage facilities actually provided were inadequate.
• The majority are persuaded that, since the trial judge gave a general instruction relative to the county’s duty to use reasonable care to keep the roads in a reasonably safe condition for the traveling public, then appellant’s theory of the case was adequately covered. This seems to me inconsistent with prior holdings of this court on this subject. For example, in DeKoning v. Williams (1955), 47 Wn. (2d) 139, 286 P. (2d) 694, Judge Ott, speaking for the court, said:
“In instructing the jury, the court covered appellant’s theory by only a single general instruction. Each party is entitled to have his theory of a case presented to the jury by proper instructions, if there is any evidence to support it, and this right is not affected by the fact that the law is covered in a general way by the instructions given. Allen v. *692Hart, 32 Wn. (2d) 173, 176, 201 P. (2d) 145 (1948), and case and text cited; Adjustment Department, Olympia Credit Bureau v. Smedegard, 40 Wn. (2d) 76, 78, 241 P. (2d) 203 (1952), and cases cited; Billington v. Schaal, 42 Wn. (2d) 878, 881, 259 P. (2d) 634 (1953).” (Italics mine.)
And the court went on to say:
“Although any one of appellant’s proposed instructions Nos. 4, 5, and 6 would have called to the attention of the jury the application of the law to appellant’s theory of the case, we do not approve the precise wording used by the scrivener. Upon a retrial, the proposed instructions should be redrawn to more clearly and concisely present the law and appellant’s theory of the case to the jury following generally the rule announced in 1 Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice (Perm. Ed.), 538, § 668, and 2 Restatement, Torts, 796, § 296.” (Italics mine.)
It seems somewhat significant to me that the trial judge used the word condition at least seventeen times in the instructions to the jury—without ever clearly explaining or defining it. In and of itself, this would not be prejudicial or even erroneous under some circumstances; but in the case at bar I am. convinced that the word was so used as to most reasonably convey the impression to the jury that the county was not hable to the plaintiff unless it had actual or constructive notice of the hole in the road. Even the trial judge placed this interpretation on the word condition in at least one place in his memorandum opinion denying a judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial:
“Plaintiff has sued Spokane County for injuries and damages sustained by him in an auto accident caused by a defective condition of a Spokane County road. This condition of the highway was caused by a high run-off of water following a chinook thaw and rain, and consisted either of a washout of a substantial portion of the road and supporting fill, or simply of the fill, leaving the pavement suspended over it.” (Italics mine.)
I believe the ambiguity of the word condition, when coupled with the lack of a more specific instruction on the county’s duty to maintain adequate drainage facilities in the road, deprived the appellant of his right to have the jury *693decide fairly whether or not the county was guilty of negligence.
I believe the judgment should be reversed, and a new trial granted; therefore, I dissent.
Rosellini and Foster, JJ., concur with Finley, J.