Court Opinion

ID: 9427016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:19:27.893144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:23:04.520505
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Marshall,
with whom Mr. Justice Brennan joins,
dissenting.
Today the Court, in its first encounter with the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, 29 U. S. C. § 621 et seq., sharply limits the reach of that important law. In apparent disregard of settled principles of statutory construction, it gives an unduly narrow interpretation to a congressional enactment designed to remedy arbitrary discrimination in the workplace. Because I believe that the Court misinterprets the Act, I respectfully dissent.
But for §4 (f)(2) of the Act, 29 U. S. C. § 623 (f)(2), petitioner’s decision to discharge respondent because he reached the age of 60 would violate § 4 (a)(1), 29 U. S. C. § 623 (a)(1). This latter section makes it unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual [between 40 and 65] with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s age.”
The language used in §4 (a)(1) tracks the language of § 703 (a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a)(1).1 This section has been interpreted as forbidding involuntary retirement when improper criteria, such as race or sex, are used in selecting those to be retired. With reference to the statutory language, courts have reasoned that forced retirement is “tantamount to a discharge,” Bartmess v. Drewrys U. S. A., Inc., 444 F. 2d 1186, 1189 (CA7), cert. denied, 404 U. S. 939 (1971), or that the employer requiring *209retirement is “discriminating] against” the retired employee “with respect to . . . [a] condition ... of employment,” see Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R. Co., 483 F. 2d 490, 492 n. 3 (CA5), cert. denied, 414 U. S. 1002 (1973); Rosen v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 477 F. 2d 90, 94-95 (CA3 1973); Bartmess v. Drewrys U. S. A., Inc., supra, at 1188-1189.2
Given these constructions of § 703 (a)(1) of the Civil Rights Act and the absence of any indication that Congress intended §4 (a)(1) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to be interpreted differently, I would construe the identical language of the two statutes in an identical manner. The question that remains is whether § 4 (f) (2) sanctions this otherwise unlawful act. That section provides:
“It shall not be unlawful for an employer ... to observe the terms of a bona fide seniority system or any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the purposes of {the Act] . . . .”
The opinion of the Court assumes that this language is clear on its face. Ante, at 199. I cannot agree with this premise. In my view, the statutory language is susceptible of at least two interpretations, and the only reading consonant with congressional intent would preclude involuntary retirement of employees covered by the Act.
On this latter reading, § 4 (f) (2) allows different treatment of older employees only with respect to the benefits paid or available under certain employee benefit plans, including pen*210sion and retirement plans.3 Alternatively, the section may be read, as the Court has read it, also to permit involuntary retirement of older employees prior to age 65 pursuant to a pension or retirement benefit plan. Ante, at 198. The critical question, then, is whether the phrase "employee benefit plan,” as used by Congress here to include a “retirement, pension or insurance plan,” encompasses only the rules defining what benefits retirees receive, or whether it also encompasses rules mandating retirement at a particular age.
We need not decide on a Strictly grammatical basis which reading is preferable. We are judges, not linguists, and our task is to divine congressional intent, using all available evidence. “[W]ords are inexact tools at best, and for that reason there is wisely no rule of law forbidding resort to explanatory legislative history no matter how 'clear the words may appear on “superficial examination.” ’ ” Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U. S. 476, 479 (1943), quoting United States v. American Trucking Assns., 310 U. S. 534, 544 (1940). See Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, 426 U. S. 1, 10 (1976).
The Courtis analysis of the legislative history establishes that the primary purpose of the Act was to facilitate the *211hiring of older workers. I have no quarrel with that proposition. Understanding this primary purpose, however, aids not at all in determining whether Congress also intended to prohibit forced retirement of those already employed. The Court’s analysis of the legislative history on this issue, ante, at 199-202, on which Mr. Justice White relies, ante, at 206, is unpersuasive, since it relies primarily on references to an exception that was not enacted.
There can be no question, that had Congress enacted § 4 (f) (2) in the form in which it was proposed by the administration, forced retirement would be permissible. That section of the initial bill quite specifically allowed such retirement. It provided:
“It shall not be unlawful for an employer ... to separate involuntarily an employee under a retirement policy or system where such policy or system is not merely a subterfuge to evade the purposes of this Act . . . .” S. 830 and H. R. 4221, §4 (f)(2), 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967).
Thus the remarks of Secretary Wirtz, Senator Javits, and the representative of the AFL-CIO on which the Court relies, see ante, at 199-201, quite properly reflect that the bill as it then existed would have authorized involuntary retirement. But the present benefit-plan exception to the § 4 (a) prohibition on age discrimination differs significantly from that contained in the original bill. The specific authorization for involuntary retirement was deleted. That this deletion was made may of itself suggest that Congress concluded such an exception was unwise; a review of the legislative history strongly supports this view.
Two sets of objections were made to the bill during the Senate and House hearings.4 Many persons, including mem*212bers of the Committees, expressed concern that the bill did “not provide any flexibility in the amount of pension benefits payable to older workers depending on their age when hired, and thus may actually encourage employers, faced with the necessity of paying greatly increased premiums, to look for excuses not to hire older workers when they might have hired them under a law granting them a degree of flexibility with respect to such matters.” Statement of Sen. Javits, Senate Hearings 27; see also, e. cj., House Hearings 62-63 (statement of Labor Counsel, Chamber of Commerce of the United States). Representatives of organized labor voiced totally different objections to the initial version of § 4 (f) (2); they argued against permitting any involuntary retirement based on age for those within the coverage of the bill, whether or not pursuant to a bona fide plan. Senate Hearings 98; House Hearings 413. In addition, they suggested that bona fide seniority systems should receive express protection under § 4 (f).
After the hearings, the House and Senate Committees changed the exemption section to its present form. By adding to § 4 (f) (2) a provision permitting observance of bona fide seniority systems, Congress acceded to organized labor’s concern that seniority systems not be abrogated. The addition of language permitting observance of the terms of a benefit plan was plainly responsive to the numerous criticisms that the bill would deter employment of older workers.5 But the third ehange that was made — the deletion of the specific language permitting involuntary retirement — was not responsive to either of those criticisms, since deletion of that language could have no effect on the hiring of older workers or on seniority systems. A reasonable ihference to be drawn from the dele*213tion, therefore, is that Congress was responding to labor’s other objection by removing the authorization for involuntary retirement from the exceptions to the statute’s prohibitions. While, as the Court notes, ante, at 201, the specific language proposed by labor was not adopted, the Court offers no alternative explanation for the deletion of the explicit authorization for involuntary retirement.6
In contrast to the hearings on the original version of the § 4 (f) (2) exception, where there are repeated references to the fact that the bill permitted involuntary retirement, there are no similar statements in the Committee Reports or in the House and Senate debates with respect to the amended version of §4(f)(2). For example, the House and Senate Committee Reports explain the purpose and effect of § 4 (f)(2) as follows:
“This exception serves to emphasize the primary purpose of the bill — hiring of older workers — by permitting employment without necessarily including such workers in employee benefit plans. The specific exception was an amendment to the original bill, is considered vita[l] to the legislation, and was favorably received by witnesses at the hearings.” H. R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1967).
See S. Rep. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1967).7 Nowhere did the Committees suggest that the exemption per*214mitted involuntary retirements. Indeed, their emphasis on encouraging the employment of older workers by allowing employers to make distinctions based on age in the provision of certain ancillary employment benefits, fully accords with the view that § 4 (f) (2) was intended only to permit those variations. Moreover, when the sponsors of the legislation explained the bill to the House and Senate during the debates preceding its passage, they made no mention of the possibility that § 4 (f) (2) permitted involuntary retirement and discussed it in terms incompatible with any such interpretation.8 The following exchange between Senator Javits, the minority floor manager of the bill and Senator Yarborough, the majority floor manager, is illustrative:
“Mr. JAVITS. The meaning of this provision is as follows: An employer will not be compelled under this section to afford to older workers exactly the same pension, retirement, or insurance benefits as he affords to younger workers. If the older worker chooses to waive all of those provisions, then the older worker can obtain the benefits of this act, but the older worker cannot compel an employer through the use of this act to undertake some special relationship, course, or other condition with respect to a retirement, pension, or insurance plan which is not merely a subterfuge to evade the purposes of the act— *215and we understand that — in order to give that older employee employment on the same terms as others.
“I would like to ask the manager of the bill whether he agrees with that interpretation, because I think it is very necessary to make its meaning clear to both employers and employees. . . .
“Mr. YARBOROUGH. I wish to say to the Senator that that is basically my understanding of the provision in line 22, page 20 of the bill, clause 2, subsection (f) of section 4, when it refers to retirement, pension, or insurance plan, it means that a man who would not have been employed except for this law does not have to receive the benefits of the plan. Say an applicant for employment is 55, comes in and seeks employment, and the company has bargained for a plan with its labor union that provides that certain moneys will be put up for a pension plan for anyone who worked for the employer for 20 years so that a 55-year-old employee would not be employed past 10 years. This means he cannot be denied employment because he is 55, but he will not be able to participate in that pension plan because unlike a man hired at 44, he has no chance to earn 20 years retirement. In other words, this will not disrupt the bargained-for pension plan. This will not deny an individual employment or prospective employment but will limit his rights to obtain full consideration in the pension, retirement, or insurance plan.
“Mr. JAYITS. I thank my colleague. That is important to business people.” 113 Cong. Rec. 31255 (1967) (emphasis added).9
*216The statements of those who criticized the bill for not going far enough lend still further support to the interpretation of the Act that would preclude forced retirement of persons covered by the Act. Senator Young spoke eloquently against subjecting those aged 65 or older to “[c]ompulsory retirement programs” which, he proclaimed, “have forged an iron collar” for those Americans “ready, willing and able” to work past 65. Id., at 31256. Senator Young never alluded to the possibility that compulsory retirement of those under 65 and thus covered by the Act would be permitted, since the unmistakable premise of his argument was that, under the law being considered, compulsory retirement of covered employees was prohibited. Ibid. Others criticized § 4 (f) (2) because it authorized employers to deny older employees various benefits in accordance with benefit plans, but again made no reference to the possibility of forced retirement of covered employees. 113 Cong. Rec., at 34745 (remarks of Rep. Smith); id., at 34750 (remarks of Rep. Randall). In view of the tenor and substance of those objections to the Act, it is inconceivable that these Congressmen would have remained silent had they understood § 4 (f) (2) to allow involuntary retirement before the age of 65.10
*217Any doubt as to the correctness of reading the Act to prohibit forced retirement is dispelled by considering the anomaly that results from the Court’s contrary interpretation. Under §§ 4 (a) and 4 (f)(2), see n. 5, supra, it is unlawful for an employer to refuse to hire a job applicant under the age of 65 because of his age. If, as the Court holds, involuntary retirement before age 65 is permissible under § 4 (f) (2), the individual so retired has a simple route to regain his job: He need only reapply for the vacancy created by his retirement. As a new applicant, the individual plainly cannot be denied the job because of his age. And as someone with experience in performing the tasks of the “vacant” job he once held, the individual likely will be better qualified than any other applicant. Thus the individual retired one day would have to be hired the next. We should be loathe to attribute to Congress an intention to produce such a bizarre result.
One final reason exists for rejecting the Court’s broad interpretation of the Act’s exemption. The Age Discrimination in Employment Act is a remedial statute designed, in the Act’s own words, “to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary *218age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment.” § 2 (b), 29 U. S. C. § 621 (b). It is well settled that such legislation should “be given a liberal interpretation . . . [and] exemptions from its sweep should be narrowed and limited to effect the remedy intended.” Piedmont & Northern R. Co. v. ICC, 286 U. S. 299, 311-312 (1932). See also, e. g., Phillips Co. v. Walling, 324 U. S. 490, 493 (1945). To construe the § 4 (f) (2) exemption broadly to authorize involuntary retirement when no statement in the Committee Reports or by the Act’s floor managers or sponsors in the debates supports that interpretation flouts this fundamental principle of construction.
The mischief the Court fashions today may be short lived. Both the House and Senate have passed amendments to the Act. 123 Cong. Rec. H9984-9985 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1977) ; id., at S17303 (daily ed. Oct. 19, 1977). The amendments to § 4 (f) (2) expressly provide that the involuntary retirement of employees shall not be permitted or required pursuant to any employee benefit plan. Thus, today’s decision may have virtually no prospective effect.11 But the Committee Reports of both Houses make plain that, properly understood, the existing Act already prohibits involuntary retirement, and that the amendment is only a clarification necessitated by court decisions misconstruing congressional intent. H. R. Rep. No. 95-527, pp. 5-6 (1977); id., at 27 (additional views of Rep. Weiss, quoting statement of Sen. Javits); S. Rep. No. 95-493, pp. 9-10 (1977).12 Because the Court today has also *219misconstrued congressional intent and has thereby deprived many older workers of the protection which Congress sought to afford, I must dissent.13

 Section 703 (a) (1) provides that it is unlawful for an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to disr-criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”

 Courts have also suggested that involuntary retirement of an employee on a discriminatory basis might violate § 703 (a) (2) of the' Civil Rights Act of 1964, which proscribes classification by an employer of an employee in a way which would “adversely affect his status as an employee,” 42 U. S. C. § 2000e-2 (a) (2). Bartmess v. Drewrys U. S. A., Inc., 444 F. 2d, at 1189; Peters v. Missouri-Pacific R. Co., 483 F. 2d, at 495. Section 4 (a) (2) of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U. S. C. §623 (a)(2), includes an identical prohibition.

 This reading is illustrated by Senator Yarborough’s example of the effect of § 4 (f) (2):
“Say an applicant for employment is 55, comes in and seeks employment, and the company has bargained for a plan with its labor union that provides that certain moneys will be put up for a pension plan for anyone who worked for the employer for 20 years so that a 55-year-old employee would not be employed past 10 years. This means be cannot be denied employment because he is 55, but he will not be able to participate in that pension plan because unlike a man hired at 44, he has no chance to earn 20 years retirement. In other words, this will not disrupt the bargained-for pension plan. This will not deny an individual employment or prospective employment but will limit his rights to obtain full consideration in the pension, retirement, or insurance plan.” 113 Cong. Rec. 31255 (1967).

 Hearings on S. 830 et al. before the Subcommittee on Labor of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (hereafter Senate Hearings); Hearings on H. R. 4221 et al. before *212the General Subcommittee on Labor of the House Committee on Education and Labor, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967) (hereafter House Hearings).

 The Committees’ concern that the Act not deter employers from hiring older employees is also reflected in the amendment to the section providing that “no such employee benefit plan shall excuse the failure to hire any individual.” §4 (f) (2), 29 U. S. C. § 623 (f) (2).

 The Committees were certainly aware that Congress could retain the provision specifically authorizing involuntary retirement and add to it a provision permitting variation in the coverage of insurance and benefit plans. Many of the state statutes at which the Committees looked employed that approach. Senate Hearings 298-315; House Hearings 501-518 (e. g., Connecticut, Indiana, Maine, Pennsylvania). That they deleted the specific authorization rather than follow the model of those state statutes is not without significance.

 The Senate Committee Report’s description, although otherwise identical, did not include the statement that the amendment was considered vital. Supra, this page.

 During the hearings, Senator Javits indicated that the administration bill might raise problems concerning existing pension plans. He stated that the involuntary retirement provision did not adequately address whether variations in benefits based on age would be permitted. Senate Hearings 27. Although, as the Court notes, he offered no objection during the hearings to the provision allowing involuntary retirement, it is significant that at no point in his statements on the floor of the Senate did he even hint that the bill as revised permitted involuntary retirement. Since Senator Javits had expressly acknowledged the permissibility of involuntary retirement under the administration’s bill at the hearings, in explaining at length the meaning of § 4 (f) (2) as revised by the Committee he would surely have adverted to involuntary retirement if it were still allowed.

 The Court somehow finds that the above dialogue indicates approval by Senators Yarborough and Javits of mandatory retirement before age 65. Ante, at 202. I see nothing in this dialogue to suggest that the Senators thought involuntary retirement before age 65 was permissible.

 In contrast to this history which demonstrates forcefully that § 4 (f) (2) was not intended to provide for involuntary retirement, there are only two pieces of legislative history that provide even a modicum of support for the Court’s interpretation. First, when he testified during the hearings on the House bill which then specifically permitted involuntary retirement, Secretary Wirtz was asked about the effect of the Senate Committee’s modification of §4 (f)(2). He responded that “[w]e count that change as not going to the substance and involving matters going to clarification which would present no problem.” House Hearings 40. Since no exemption for benefit plans had been provided in the original bill, it is difficult to understand how Secretary Wirtz could reasonably have called the change only a “clarification.” In any event, his statement at the hearings is entitled to far less weight than the Committee Reports and the statements by the floor managers and sponsors of the Act. See Maintenance *217Employes v. United States, 366 U. S. 169, 176-177 (1961); Leedom v. Mine, Mill, & Smelter Workers, 362 U. S. 145, 149-150 (1956).
Second, on the House floor, Representatives Eilberg and Olsen, in voicing their support for the bill, stated that one reason the bill was necessary was that people who were retired needed to have opportunities for other employment open to them. 113 Cong. Rec. 34745 (1967); id., at 34746. It is not entirely clear whether they were referring to people who would be involuntarily retired in the future, or only to those who had been retired prior to enactment of the Act. But even if they were implicitly expressing the view that the Act permits involuntary retirement, their statements stand in opposition to the clear import of every other statement on the floor of each House, as well as to the Committee Reports. Such a conflict must be resolved in favor of “the statements of those . . . most intimately connected with the final version of the statute.” Maintenance Employes v. United States, supra, at 176-177. See remarks of Senator Yar-borough, quoted supra, at 215.

 Indeed both the House and Senate bills provide that, because the addition to § 4 (f) (2) is only a clarification, it is to be effective immediately; by contrast, the effective date for other changes regarded as alterations of the 1967 Act has been deferred.

 The Committee Reports cite and discuss Zinger v. Blanchette, 549 F. 2d 901 (CA3 1977), cert. pending, No. 76-1375; Brennan v. Taft Broadcasting Co., 500 F. 2d 212 (CA5 1974); and the instant case. H. R. Rep. No. 95-527, p. 5; S. Rep. No. 95-493, p. 10.

 Because I do not interpret § 4 (f) (2) to authorize involuntary retirement, I have no occasion to address the questions discussed by the Court, ante, at 197-198, and by Mr. Justice Stewart, ante, at 204, as to whether the plan involved here is “a subterfuge to evade the purposes of [the Act],” 29 U. S. C. § 623 (f) (2). I am compelled to note, however, my emphatic disagreement with their suggestion that a pre-Act plan cannot be a subterfuge to avoid the purposes of the Act. The 1967 Committee Reports of both Houses expressly state: “It is important to note that [§ 4 (f) (2)] applies to new and existing employee benefit plans, and to both the establishment and maintenance of such plans. This exception serves to emphasize the primary purpose of the bill — hiring of older workers — by permitting employment without necessarily including such workers in employee benefit plans. The specific exception was an amendment to the original bill, is considered vita[l] to the legislation, and was favorably received by witnesses at the hearings.” H. R. Rep. No. 805, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1967); see S. Rep. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1967).