Court Opinion

ID: 9773260
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:40:48.537428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:51.335189
License: Public Domain

OSBORN, Chief Justice,
concurring.
I concur in Justice Fuller’s opinion for the Court. I write only to discuss the issues which both trial and appellate courts have concerning an award of damages on issues which have no exact standard for review. This Court noted the problem in the opinion by Justice Woodard in Brown v. Robinson, 747 S.W.2d 24 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1988, no writ) which noted that with regard to an award for mental anguish “there are no objective standards of measurement.” The Court said “[o]nce the existence of some amount of mental anguish has been established, the incalculable quantity cannot logically be refuted or shown to be factually insufficient because there are no objective facts to calibrate measurement.” We have continued to recognize that without objective standards, the jury’s determination must necessarily be an arbitrary process, not subject to objective analysis on appeal. Daylin, Inc. v. Juarez, 766 S.W.2d 347 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1989, writ denied) and Paragon Hotel Corporation v. Ramirez, 783 S.W.2d 654 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1990, writ denied); National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh Pennsylvania v. Dominguez, 793 S.W.2d 66 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1990, writ denied).
Likewise, in awarding exemplary damages, the jury’s determination is an arbitrary process without any objective standards. Perhaps the most cited case on this issue is Alamo National Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908 (Tex.1981). First, that opinion tells us that “[ejxemplary damages must be reasonably proportioned to actual damages.” If that is the overriding test, the case now before us is easy because there is no reasonable proportionment. But, in Kraus, the Court went further and set forth five factors to consider in determining whether an award of exemplary damages is reasonable. As noted by Justice Fuller, the trial court in this case added two additional factors. Perhaps each of those seven factors are relevant with regard to what evidence is admissible on the issue of exemplary damages. But, do they give either the jury or the appellate court any standards by which to make a proper determination of the issue? I submit that the answer is no. If the jury finds evidence to support two factors, are the exemplary damages two times “something”? Or if they find all seven factors are the *607exemplary damages seven times “something”? No, and even if the answer is yes, the question remains seven times “what”? If the jury is to follow the direction from the Kraus opinion, the single most important instruction would very simply be “[i]n answer to the question as to exemplary damages, you are instructed that your answer must be reasonably proportioned to your answer to question no._”, which number would be the issue inquiring as to actual damages.
Until we are able to devise an objective standard by which the jury is to award exemplary damages, we must recognize that the jury’s answer will always be arbitrary. If the original award is arbitrary, is it really bad to have an arbitrary review? In Dallas Ry. & Terminal Co. v. Farnsworth, 148 Tex. 584, 227 S.W.2d 1017 (1950), the Court, in an opinion by Justice Smedley, recognized that an intermediate appellate court could find a verdict excessive and subject to a remittitur when, after consideration of the amount of the verdict and the evidence bearing upon the amount, it finds that the verdict is excessive and that the cause should be reversed for that reason only. The Court concluded that there need not be extraneous proof of passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. Did not the Court conclude that the intermediate appellate judges probably had some good sense and reasonable judgment and that they ought to apply both in a proper case?
This Court has tried to be guided by those principles. In Halliburton Company v. Olivas, 517 S.W.2d 349, 353 (Tex.Civ.App.—El Paso 1974, no writ), Justice Ward wrote:
The test repeatedly made it that “All the Court of Civil Appeals can do, and all that is required of it to do, ..., is to exercise its sound discretion in the ascertainment of what amount would be reasonable compensation for the injury sustained, and treat the balance as excess.” Wilson v. Freeman, 108 Tex. 121, 185 S.W. 993 (1916); Flanigan v. Carswell, 159 Tex. 598, 324 S.W.2d 835 (1959).
As noted in Flanigan v. Carswell, 159 Tex. 598, 324 S.W.2d 835 (1959), intermediate courts in this state have exercised the right of remittitur through “sound judicial judgment” since 1893. That opinion rejected the motion that the test should be “one of the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the verdict.” 324 S.W.2d 835, 840.
Apparently that standard of review worked well for more than four score of years until, in 1986, the Court in a per curiam opinion determined that “[fjaetual sufficiency is the sole remittitur standard for actual damages.” Pope v. Moore, 711 S.W.2d 622 (Tex.1986). Not far behind was Justice Kilgarlin’s opinion in Larson v. Cactus Utility Company, 730 S.W.2d 640 (Tex.1987), with which Chief Justice Hill and Justice Gonzalez chose to dissent. Justice Kilgarlin wrote “[tjrial courts and courts of appeals should be subject to the same standard for a simple reason: no court is free to substitute its judgment for that of the jury.” I translate that language to mean that when there is no real standard by which to judge damages, we will tolerate an arbitrary determination by a jury but not by a trial judge or an intermediate court of appeals.
The most dramatic effect that the present rule will have is in those cases where a jury awards damages for mental anguish suffered by one family member for the wrongful death of another family member. Parents, because of a family relationship, present some evidence of mental anguish from the wrongful death of a child even when there is no testimony concerning what effect the loss of the child has on their lives. Moore v. Lillebo, 722 S.W.2d 683 (Tex.1986). In such a case, if a jury awards $1,000.00 or $100,000.00 or $1,000,-000.00, by what standard is a question of excessiveness to be reviewed? No longer is it sound judicial discretion. Does the “family relationship” justify any or all of the figures noted above?
The issue now before this Court was noted by Professors William Powers, Jr. and Jack Ratliff in the recent article entitled Another Look at “No Evidence” and *608“Insufficient Evidence”, 69 Texas L.Rev. 515, 567 (1991), where they wrote:
In cases involving intangible damages, it will be difficult for appellate courts to point to specific testimony that demonstrates excessiveness (or inadequacy, for that matter). Nevertheless, common sense suggests that courts should have some authority to review excessive or inadequate damage awards. It would be unwise to permit a jury to make any award it thinks fit without limit, even though it is dealing with damages that resist exact calculation or quantification. Juries have no way to compare an award in a given case with other awards in similar cases, but judges do. Without some kind of review, the system will produce radically inconsistent awards for the same kinds of injuries and will be destined to take on more of the aspects of a lottery than it already has.
Although Pope did not deal with punitive damages, its rationale seems equally applicable to them. The problems concerning compensatory damages are at least equally severe in cases involving punitive damages. In both types of cases, we suggest that Texas courts should be cautious before applying Pool requirements to cases involving remit-titur.
Again, I concur.