Court Opinion

ID: 9942173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-20 17:01:00.357148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:47:48.185679
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10654    Document: 18-1      Date Filed: 02/20/2024   Page: 1 of 10

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 23-10654
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        OLEN FAISON,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                      D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-02901-SPF
                           ____________________
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        2                          Opinion of the Court                       23-10654

        Before JORDAN, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Olen Faison appeals the district court’s order affirming the
        Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of his application for a pe-
        riod of disability and disability insurance benefits. He argues that
        the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in assessing his residual
        functional capacity by not relying on uncontroverted medical opin-
        ion evidence. After careful review, we affirm.
                                               I.
               Faison applied for a period of disability and disability insur-
        ance benefits with the Social Security Administration, alleging that
        he was disabled due to various impairments. 1 An ALJ held multiple
        evidentiary hearings on Faison’s application for benefits.2 The rec-
        ord before the ALJ showed that Faison was a Navy veteran who
        had previously worked for the Department of Veterans Affairs
        (“VA”) at a VA hospital as a purchasing agent. Faison testified that
        he was no longer able to work due to a variety of impairments,

        1 Because we write for the parties, we assume their familiarity with the under-

        lying record and include only what is necessary to resolve this appeal.
        2 After the first two hearings, the ALJ found that Faison was not disabled and

        denied his application for benefits. Faison sought review of that decision in the
        district court, which reversed the Commissioner’s decision and remanded for
        further proceedings. See Faison v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 8:19-cv-1959, 2020
        WL 13401909, at *5 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2020). Upon remand, the ALJ held a
        third evidentiary hearing.
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        23-10654                   Opinion of the Court                         3

        including post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”) and anxiety. Fai-
        son reported that due to these conditions, he had problems follow-
        ing instructions, had difficulty managing stress, had panic attacks
        around crowds, and found it hard to learn a new routine.
               The evidence before the ALJ included Faison’s medical rec-
        ords. The ALJ also reviewed VA determinations that Faison was
        disabled. In 2010, the VA determined that Faison had a service-con-
        nected disability rating of 100%, 70% of which was assessed for
        “[r]ecurrent major depressive disorder without psychotic features;
        post traumatic stress disorder; panic disorder; and intermittent ex-
        plosive disorder.” Doc. 8-7 at 2. 3 In a later review in 2016, the VA
        again concluded that he had a service-connected disability rating of
        100%, this time with 70% assessed for panic disorder.
               The record before the ALJ also included evidence about a
        2015 incident when Faison was seeking care at a VA clinic. A health
        care worker reported that Faison had made a statement reflecting
        suicidal ideation. As a result, Faison was involuntarily committed
        overnight. Both at the time of his commitment and before the ALJ,
        Faison denied making any statement reflecting suicidal ideation or
        that he would hurt himself.
              After reviewing the entire record, the ALJ issued a decision
        concluding Faison was not disabled. The ALJ used the five-step se-
        quential evaluation framework to evaluate whether Faison was

        3 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 23-10654

        disabled. At the first step, she found that Faison had not been en-
        gaged in substantial gainful activity during the relevant time pe-
        riod.
                At the second step, the ALJ found that Faison suffered from
        the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease of the
        lumbar spine, osteoarthritis of the wrists and knees, and obesity.
        She acknowledged that Faison also had been diagnosed with de-
        pression and anxiety but concluded that these mental impairments
        were not severe because they “did not cause more than minimal
        limitation in [Faison’s] ability to perform basic mental work activi-
        ties.” Doc. 8-18 at 15. The ALJ explained that treatment notes
        showed that for his mental health conditions, Faison received “only
        conservative treatment, which appear[ed] to have been success-
        ful.” Id. at 16.
              At the third step, the ALJ determined that Faison did not
        have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or
        medically equaled the severity of a listed impairment.
                The ALJ then assessed Faison’s residual functional capacity.
        She concluded that Faison could engage in light work with certain
        exertional limitations. But she determined that Faison’s mental im-
        pairments “cause[d] . . . no more than minimal limitations in his
        ability to perform basic work activities.” Id. at 25. In reaching this
        conclusion, the ALJ found that Faison’s “statements concerning the
        intensity, persistence[,] and limiting effects of [his] symptoms
        [were] not entirely consistent with the medical evidence and other
        evidence in the record.” Id. at 24.
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        23-10654               Opinion of the Court                          5

               The ALJ acknowledged that State agency psychological con-
        sultants had opined that Faison’s anxiety disorder caused moderate
        limitations in several areas, including interacting with others; main-
        taining concentration, persistence, and pace; following instruc-
        tions; responding to criticism; and responding appropriately to
        changes in a work setting. But the ALJ assigned these opinions “lit-
        tle weight” because they were inconsistent with Faison’s medical
        records from during the period, which showed that he had “no
        more than mild symptoms and limitations.” Id. at 18.
               The ALJ also acknowledged that the VA had assigned Faison
        a 70% disability rating for his mental impairments. But the ALJ
        found that this rating was of “little probative value” because “sub-
        stantial evidence of record . . . support[ed] a departure from the
        VA’s decision.” Id. at 25.
              Based on the residual functional capacity assessment, the
        ALJ concluded at step four that Faison was able to perform his past
        relevant work as an order clerk. The ALJ thus determined that Fai-
        son was not disabled during the relevant time period.
                Faison sought review from the Appeals Council, arguing
        that the ALJ “erred in the evaluation of [his] mental impairments.”
        Id. at 2. The Appeals Council disagreed, concluding that the “evi-
        dence [did] not . . . indicate” that Faison had “more than a minimal
        limitation in [his] ability to do basic work activities.” Id. at 3. Be-
        cause the ALJ’s decision was “consistent with [the] applicable laws,
        regulations, and Social Security Rulings,” the Appeals Council de-
        clined to assume jurisdiction. Id.
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10654

                Faison then filed an action in district court alleging that the
        Commissioner improperly denied him benefits. Before the district
        court, Faison raised just one issue: “Whether the ALJ erred by sub-
        stituting her opinion for the medical opinion evidence of record.”
        Doc. 18 at 5.
               The district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision,
        concluding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s assess-
        ment of Faison’s residual functional capacity, including her deci-
        sion to include no limitations related to Faison’s mental impair-
        ments. This is Faison’s appeal.
                                          II.
                We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine
        whether it is supported by substantial evidence, but we review de
        novo the legal principles upon which the decision is based. Moore v.
        Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence
        refers to “such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would ac-
        cept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Id. Our limited review
        precludes us from “deciding the facts anew, making credibility de-
        terminations, or re-weighing the evidence.” Id. “Even if we find
        that the evidence preponderates against the [Commissioner’s] de-
        cision, we must affirm if the decision is supported by substantial
        evidence.” Barnes v. Sullivan, 932 F.2d 1356, 1358 (11th Cir. 1991).
                                         III.
               A disabled individual may be eligible for disability insurance
        benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). To be eligible, a claimant must
        prove that he became disabled on or before the date for which he
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        23-10654                  Opinion of the Court                                7

        was last insured. See Moore, 405 F.3d at 1211. Because Faison’s last
        insured date was December 31, 2018, he had to show a disability
        on or before that date.
                To determine whether a claimant is disabled, an ALJ applies
        a five-step sequential evaluation process. The ALJ asks whether the
        claimant: (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a se-
        vere and medically determinable impairment or combination of
        impairments; (3) has an impairment or combination of impair-
        ments that satisfies the criteria of a listing; (4) can perform his past
        relevant work in light of his residual functional capacity; and (5) can
        adjust to other work in light of his residual functional capacity, age,
        education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4).
               In this case, we are concerned with the ALJ’s assessment of
        Faison’s residual functional capacity. Faison argues that the ALJ
        erred “by substituting her opinion for uncontroverted medical
        opinion evidence.” Appellant’s Br. 3. He says that the uncontro-
        verted medical opinion evidence showed that his PTSD and anxi-
        ety caused at least moderate limitations in concentration; ability to
        interact with others; and ability to maintain concentration, persis-
        tence, or pace.4

        4 Faison raises several other arguments for the first time on appeal, including

        that the ALJ erred by (1) finding that he had mild limitations in his ability to
        concentrate and engage in social functioning yet adopting a residual functional
        capacity assessment that included no corresponding limitations, and (2) con-
        cluding that he could perform his past work given his limitations in interacting
        with others. We will not consider these issues because Faison raises them for
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                         23-10654

               But the ALJ’s decision reflects that she considered these
        opinions and ultimately concluded that they were entitled to little
        weight because they were inconsistent with Faison’s medical rec-
        ords, which showed milder limitations. Substantial evidence sup-
        ports this determination. The record reflects that Faison received
        conservative treatment for his mental impairments and at times re-
        ported experiencing no anxiety, no depression, and no decreased
        functioning. In addition, his medical providers assigned GAF scores
        that showed only mild mental health limitations. 5 And during the
        relevant period a VA examiner determined that Faison’s symptoms
        did not satisfy the diagnostic criteria for PTSD. As a result, we can-
        not say that the ALJ erred when she gave the opinion evidence little
        weight and concluded that Faison’s mental health impairments

        the first time on appeal. See United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871–72 (11th
        Cir. 2022) (en banc).
        5 The GAF is a numeric scale used to rate an individual’s overall level of func-

        tioning. American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
        of Mental Disorders 32–33 (4th ed. 2000). The DSM later abandoned the use
        of GAF scoring, noting “its conceptual lack of clarity” and “questionable psy-
        chometrics in routine practice.” American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic
        and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders 16 (5th ed. 2013) (“DSM-V”). After
        the DSM-V was published, the Social Security Administration issued a di-
        rective to ALJs instructing them to consider GAF scores as medical opinion
        evidence but emphasizing that they should not be considered in isolation be-
        cause a GAF score is a snapshot about a person’s level of functioning. Soc. Sec.
        Admin., Administrative Message 13066 (July 22, 2013).
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        23-10654                  Opinion of the Court                                9

        caused no more than minimal limitations. 6 In reaching this result,
        we emphasize that given our deferential standard of review, “we
        must affirm if the [ALJ’s] decision is supported by substantial evi-
        dence” and are not addressing whether we would have reached a
        different result in weighing the conflicting evidence. See Barnes,
        932 F.2d at 1358.
                 Faison also argues that the ALJ erred in assessing his residual
        functional capacity because her decision conflicted with the VA’s
        disability ratings. But the decision of another governmental
        agency, based on the rules of that agency, does not bind an ALJ
        considering whether the claimant was disabled for purposes of So-
        cial Security benefits. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1504 (2016) (“A decision
        by . . . any other governmental agency about whether you are dis-
        abled . . . is based on its rules and is not our decision . . . [and] is not
        binding on us.”). We have held that an ALJ is not required to follow
        a VA decision finding a claimant disabled so long as the “ALJ’s de-
        cision shows that she considered the other agency’s decision” and
        “substantial evidence in the record supports the ALJ’s decision to
        depart from the other agency’s decision.” Noble v. Comm’r of Soc.
        Sec., 963 F.3d 1317, 1330 (11th Cir. 2020). Here, the ALJ gave ade-
        quate consideration to the VA’s disability determinations. The

        6 Faison also suggests that the ALJ erred because she failed “to explicitly con-

        sider [his] mental impairments when assessing” his residual functional capac-
        ity. Appellant’s Br. 12 (internal quotation marks omitted). We disagree. The
        ALJ’s decision reflects that she did consider Faison’s mental impairments when
        assessing his residual functional capacity and concluded that the impairments
        “cause[d] no more than minimal limitations.” Doc. 8-18 at 25.
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        10                    Opinion of the Court               23-10654

        ALJ’s decision showed that she considered the VA decisions. And
        for the reasons given above, we conclude that substantial evidence
        supported the ALJ’s decision to depart from the VA’s ratings when
        assessing Faison’s limitations.
              Accordingly, we affirm the Commissioner’s decision.
              AFFIRMED.