Court Opinion

ID: 9556168
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-16 14:11:42.453098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:41:39.692755
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

City of Philadelphia                       :
                                           :
             v.                            :
                                           :
Marshall L. Williams,                      :   No. 168 C.D. 2022
                  Appellant                :   Submitted: April 6, 2023

BEFORE:      HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
             HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
             HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                            FILED: August 16, 2023

             Marshall L. Williams (Williams), pro se, appeals from the Philadelphia
County Common Pleas Courts’ (trial court) January 21, 2022 decree (Decree)
authorizing the sheriff’s sale of Williams’ property located at 1201-1203 Sansom
Street (Property) in the City of Philadelphia (City). Williams presents four issues
for this Court’s review: (1) whether the trial court’s Decree should be reversed based
on inadequate service of the City’s Petition for Rule to Show Cause Why Property
Should be Sold Free and Clear of All Liens and Encumbrances (Petition), and the
trial court’s Rule to Show Cause (Rule); (2) whether the trial court erred by
conducting the telephone/Zoom hearing despite Williams’ alleged inability to
participate; (3) whether substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding of
Williams’ outstanding tax liability; and (4) whether the trial court erred by granting
an expedited hearing.1 After review, this Court affirms.

      1
         This Court has rephrased and reordered Williams’ issues for clarity and ease of
discussion.
              Williams purchased the Property on February 12, 1998. On November
27, 2018, the City filed the Petition against Williams for unpaid real estate taxes
pursuant to what is commonly referred to as the Municipal Claims and Tax Liens
Act (MCTLA).2         The City sought to sell the Property free and clear of all
encumbrances due to the unpaid tax liabilities. The trial court issued the Rule on
November 28, 2018.
              The City served a copy of the Petition and the Rule, via certified and
first-class mail, on all interested parties and filed an Affidavit of Service in the trial
court on December 5, 2018. On December 13, 2018, the City posted a copy of the
Petition and Rule to the front door of the Property3 and filed another Affidavit of
Service on December 20, 2018. On December 31, 2018, Williams filed his answer
to the Petition. On January 7, 2019, Williams filed a Motion to Quash and to Strike,
which the trial court denied.
              Following a series of procedural and COVID-19 pandemic-related
delays, on November 8, 2021, the trial court scheduled a status conference on the
Petition for February 22, 2022 (Status Conference). Also on November 8, 2021, the
City filed a Motion for Extraordinary Relief (Extraordinary Relief Motion) seeking
to cancel the Status Conference and obtain an expedited hearing on the merits
because the case had been pending for several years. Williams did not timely
respond to the Extraordinary Relief Motion.4 On November 22, 2021, the trial court
granted the Extraordinary Relief Motion and initially scheduled a telephone/Zoom
hearing for January 22, 2022, but immediately rescheduled it for January 18, 2022
(Hearing), due to a scheduling conflict.

       2
         Act of May 16, 1923, P.L. 207, as amended, 53 P.S. §§ 7101-7455.
       3
         The City provided a photograph of the posting to the trial court.
       4
         According to the trial court, Williams’ response to the Extraordinary Relief Motion was
due on November 18, 2021. According to the trial court’s docket, Williams filed his response on
November 23, 2021.
                                               2
               On December 8, 2021, Williams filed a Motion for Reconsideration
(Reconsideration Motion) seeking to cancel the Hearing and dismiss the entire
matter. On December 9, 2021, the trial court denied Williams’ Reconsideration
Motion. Williams filed an appeal from the trial court’s December 9, 2021 order in
the Pennsylvania Superior Court.5 On May 24, 2022, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court quashed Williams’ appeal as interlocutory.
               On January 17, 2022, the day before the Hearing, Williams filed an
Emergency Motion for Continuance (Continuance Motion). The trial court denied
the Continuance Motion, and proceeded to the Hearing on the Petition on January
18, 2022. Williams appeared at the Hearing via telephone/Zoom,6 but failed to
respond to any direct questions from the trial court and generally did not participate.
The trial court took a 30-minute recess to give Williams an opportunity to resolve
any technical issues he was possibly experiencing, and tried unsuccessfully to
contact Williams by email and telephone. The trial court concluded at that time that
Williams was intentionally avoiding participating in the proceeding.7
               After the recess, the City presented the Affidavit of Service for the
Petition signed by Domenic DeMuro (DeMuro), an independent contractor who
worked for Philadelphia Writ Service. Philadelphia Writ Service President, Blake
Rubin (Rubin), recognized DeMuro’s handwriting, and identified the signature on

       5
           In his appeal, Williams challenged the trial court’s conclusion that his response to the
Extraordinary Relief Motion was untimely based on alleged defects in service. However, he did
not raise or argue the issue in his brief to this Court. Thus, the issue is waived. See Commonwealth
v. Feineigle, 690 A.2d 748, 751 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997) (quoting Wicker v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n,
460 A.2d 407, 408 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1983)) (“When issues are not properly raised and developed in
briefs, [and] when the briefs are wholly inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court
will not consider the merits thereof.”).
         6
           The Zoom screen identified Williams’ telephone connection.
         7
           Williams is not unfamiliar with the court system or with legal practice. He was admitted
to the New Jersey Bar in 1984. He practiced as an attorney, but the New Jersey Supreme Court
suspended his law license in 2021. See Supplemental Reproduced Record at 72b.
                                                 3
the Affidavit of Service as belonging to DeMuro. Rubin also verified that the posting
photographs were part of Philadelphia Writ Service’s business records, and declared
that the picture appended to the December 20, 2018 Affidavit of Service matches
Philadelphia Writ Service’s records.                 City Revenue Examiner, Marlanna
Dalessandro (Dalessandro), confirmed based on official City records that the
Property had $282,189.10 in outstanding tax liabilities. Based on the evidence
presented at the Hearing, the trial court concluded that the City fulfilled its service
obligations under Section 39.2 of the MCTLA and ordered the sale of the Property.8
Williams appealed to this Court.9 The trial court ordered Williams to file a Concise
Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal (Statement of Errors) pursuant to
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure (Appellate Rule) 1925(b), which he did
on March 14, 2022.
               Williams first asserts that the trial court erred by granting the Decree
because the City failed to properly serve him in accordance with the MCTLA.10

       8
           Section 39.2 of the MCTLA was added by Section 4 of the Act of December 14, 1992,
P.L. 859, 53 P.S. § 7193.2.
        9
          “Our scope of review in tax sale cases is limited to determining whether the trial court
abused its discretion, rendered a decision with a lack of supporting evidence, or clearly erred as a
matter of law.” Shipley v. Tax Claim Bureau of Del. Cnty., 74 A.3d 1101, 1104 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2013) (quoting Plank v. Monroe Cnty. Tax Claim Bureau, 735 A.2d 178, 181 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1999)).
        10
            Section 39.2(a) of the MCTLA provides in relevant part:
               In cities of the first class, notice of a rule to show cause why a
               property should not be sold free and clear of all encumbrances issued
               by a court pursuant to a petition filed by a claimant under [S]ection
               31.2 of [the MCTLA, added by the Act of March 15, 1956, P.L.
               (1955) 1274, 53 P.S. § 7283,] shall be served by the claimant upon
               owners, mortgagees, holders of ground rents, liens and charges or
               estates of whatsoever kind as follows:
                  (1) By posting a true and correct copy of the petition and rule on
                  the most public part of the property;
                  (2) By mailing by first class mail to the address registered by any
                  interested party pursuant to [S]ection 39.1 of [the MCTLA, added
                                                 4
             In East Allegheny School District v. Snyder (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 1288
C.D. 2009, filed November 5, 2010),11 this Court explained:

             [P]articipating in [] proceedings may result in the waiver
             of objections to a trial court’s jurisdiction, [but] that
             participation must be on the merits. See Demetriou v.
             Carlin, 408 A.2d 565, 568 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1979) (stating
             that the Commonwealth waived a jurisdictional defect by
             appearing before a court of common pleas and asserting
             the defense of sovereign immunity, rather than objecting
             to jurisdiction preliminarily, thereby subjecting itself to
             the jurisdiction of the court); Ball v. Barber, 621 A.2d 156,
             158 (Pa. Super. 1993) (holding that once a party takes
             action on the merits of a case, he waives his right to object
             to defective service of process). . . . [The filing of]
             preliminary objections . . . is the exclusive manner in
             which one challenges the jurisdiction of a tribunal.

E. Allegheny, slip op. at 7-8.

                by the Act of December 14, 1992, P.L. 850, 53 P.S. § 7193.1,] a
                true and correct copy of the petition and rule; and
                (3) By reviewing a title search, title insurance policy or tax
                information certificate that identifies interested parties of record
                who have not registered their addresses pursuant to [S]ection
                39.1 of [the MCTLA], the city shall mail by first class mail and
                either by certified mail, return receipt requested, or by registered
                mail to such addresses as appear on the respective records
                relating to the premises a true and correct copy of the petition and
                rule.
             Service of notice pursuant to this section shall be deemed
             accomplished on the date of mailing. The city shall file an affidavit
             of service with the court prior to seeking a decree ordering the sale
             of the premises.
53 P.S. § 7193.2(a).
        11
           This Court’s unreported memorandum opinions may be cited “for [their] persuasive
value, but not as a binding precedent.” Section 414(a) of the Commonwealth Court’s Internal
Operating Procedures, 210 Pa. Code § 69.414(a). The unreported memorandum opinions
referenced herein are cited for their persuasive authority.
                                               5
               In Duquesne City v. Comensky (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 389 C.D. 2016, filed
February 1, 2017), this Court rejected a property owner’s challenge to service under
the MCTLA, reasoning:

               Here, the rationale behind requiring strict compliance is
               not furthered because it is undisputed that [the a]ppellant
               had notice of the hearing on the [r]ule and an opportunity
               to be heard. [The a]ppellant attended the December 10,
               2015 hearing, of which he complains notice was
               ineffective . . . . This case is more akin to City of
               Philadelphia v. Robinson, 123 A.3d 791, 796 (Pa.
               Cmwlth. 2015), wherein we concluded service was proper,
               but even if it was not, the property owner appeared at the
               hearing, so it was presumed he received notice and was not
               prejudiced by the form of service. See also City of Phila[.]
               v. F.A. Realty Inv[s.] Corp., 129 A.3d 1279, 1283 (Pa.
               Cmwlth. 2015) (holding same). This is consistent with the
               principle that the general appearance by a defendant is a
               waiver of defects in service. See City of Phila. v.
               Schofield, . . . 31 A. 119, 120 (Pa. 1895).

Duquesne, slip op. at 12-13 (footnote omitted).
               Here, Williams filed an answer to the Petition directly admitting and/or
denying the Petition’s substantive allegations.             Williams claims that “without
waiving any of [his] rights to proper service,” he “filed [his] answer including
defenses and affirmative defenses . . . .” Williams Br. at 15 (emphasis added).
According to Williams, “[t]hree of the objections in [his] answer included the
affirmative defenses of insufficient service of process, lack of jurisdiction[,] and the
denial of due process.” Id. Indeed, this Court observes that Williams’ answer
contained “New Matter - Affirmative Defenses[,]” Reproduced Record (R.R.) at
20a, wherein he included, among a laundry list of defenses, a general assertion that
the City’s claim is barred by “insufficient service of process.”12 R.R. at 21a.

       12
         Notably, defective service, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and denial of due process
do not constitute affirmative defenses. See Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure (Civil Rule)
                                                6
               In addition to answering the Petition’s substantive allegations,
Williams participated in the action by filing the Motion to Quash and to Strike, filing
the Reconsideration Motion, attempting to cancel the Hearing, and filing the
Continuance Motion. Further, Williams joined the Hearing via telephone/Zoom.13
Under the instant circumstances, this Court concludes that Williams’ improper
service claim is meritless.
               Williams next argues that he could not meaningfully participate in the
Hearing due to technical issues and that the trial court erred by not continuing and
rescheduling the Hearing. According to Williams, “[w]hile then traveling in New
Jersey and connected to the Court Crier in the Virtual Court Room on January 18,
2022, I lost my telephone connection with the Court Crier. I was not able to re-
connect with the Court Crier Virtual Courtroom.” Williams Br. at 20 (emphasis
added; citation omitted). Importantly, Williams’ assertion directly contradicts the
averment in his Statement of the Errors, wherein Williams represented that “[w]hile
then traveling in New Jersey and connected to the Court Crier in the Virtual Court
Room on January 18, 2022, I lost my telephone (or it just disappeared).” Original
Record (O.R.) at 217 (emphasis added).14 Williams did not raise technical issues in
his Statement of Errors as a justification for his failure to continue to participate in
the Hearing.
               Appellate Rule 1925(b)(4)(vii) states: “Issues not included in the
[s]tatement [of errors] and/or not raised in accordance with the provisions of this

1030, Pa.R.Civ.P. 1030 (relating to New Matter). In fact, defective service and lack of jurisdiction
must be raised by preliminary objection. See Civil Rule 1028(a).
        13
           This Court acknowledges that although Williams did not respond to direct questions
from the trial court and generally did not participate in the Hearing, Williams did initially call into
the Hearing, thereby reflecting his awareness thereof, and he had the opportunity to be heard and
participate.
        14
           The trial court’s Original Record does not include page numbers. Page number
references herein are to this Court’s electronic pagination of the Original Record.
                                                  7
paragraph (b)(4) are waived.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(vii). Because Williams did not
raise purported technical issues in support of his assertion that the trial court
improperly deprived him of meaningful participation in the Hearing, Williams
waived that issue and may not now raise it to this Court as a basis to reverse the trial
court’s Decree.15
               Williams also contends that substantial evidence did not support the
trial court’s finding of his alleged outstanding tax liability. He asserts that the liens
prior to 2015 were docketed differently from those thereafter, and he disputes the
amounts of such liens. However, Dalessandro’s testimony, based on official City
records, demonstrating that the Property had $282,189.10 in outstanding tax
liabilities was substantial evidence of such tax liabilities. Although Williams
disputes his liability for such amounts and the accuracy thereof, he did not raise such
concerns at the Hearing, cross-examine Dalessandro, or otherwise present
contradicting evidence.
               Even assuming Williams had raised such objections, Dalessandro
stated that, in her role as a City revenue examiner, she regularly reviews and
maintains City Department of Revenue dockets with respect to real estate and
business tax liabilities. She further explained that the Department of Revenue
website accurately reflects internal City accounting system records regarding the

       15
           Even if such issue was not waived, Williams’ argument fails. Williams was aware of,
and initially joined in, the Hearing. Despite that Williams did not respond to direct questions from
the trial court, and generally did not participate in the Hearing, his telephone connection was
evident on the Zoom screen. Further, regardless of whether he experienced technical issues,
Williams did not respond to the trial court’s attempts at that time to reach him by telephone and
email to engage his involvement, and he did not contact the trial court to attempt to correct any
purported technical issues. See R.R. at 34a-36a. Given Williams’ conduct (or lack thereof), and
his prior, rebuffed attempts to reschedule the Hearing, the trial court concluded that Williams
intentionally avoided participating in the Hearing, and the trial court proceeded to conduct the
Hearing without his active participation. Under such circumstances, the trial court did not err by
not continuing the Hearing.

                                                 8
balances due, and that the Department of Revenue website printout for the Property
that she reviewed during her testimony accurately reflected the Property’s
outstanding tax liabilities. See R.R. at 44a. The law is well settled that “[t]he trial
court, as the finder of fact, has exclusive authority to weigh the evidence, make
credibility determinations, and draw reasonable inferences from the evidence
presented.” In re Tax Claim Bureau of Lehigh Cnty. 2012 Jud. Tax Sale, 107 A.3d
853, 857 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (quoting Picknick v. Wash. Cnty. Tax Claim
Bureau, 936 A.2d 1209, 1212 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007)). Thus, here, absent any
meritorious objection, the trial court was free to weigh Dalessandro’s testimony
based on the official City records and determine Williams’ outstanding real estate
tax liabilities.
               With respect to Williams’ allegations regarding lien docketing
differences, consistent with its representation to the trial court, the City explained:

               [T]he [trial court] altered its lien docketing system in
               2015, resulting in the generation of new numbers. [See
               R.R. at] 44a. This does not affect the analysis. First, the
               liens were filed prior to 2015 and a change in the court’s
               internal systems does not affect that filing. Second, there
               are no liens for tax years prior to [Williams’] 1998
               acquisition of the Property.

City Br. at 20.16 Based thereon,

               [t]he City asked that the [trial c]ourt take [judicial] notice
               that the lien numbers on the exhibit matched the lien
               numbers filed for the corresponding tax years with the
               [trial court]. That is not disputable. The lien numbers in
               the exhibit in fact do correspond to the record in the [trial
               c]ourt’s own system.

City Br. at 17. Accordingly, “[t]he trial court took said notice, and found as a factual
matter that the taxes were owed and that the liens were docketed.” City Br. at 20.

       16
          The City’s brief does not contain page numbers. Page number references herein are to
the Court’s electronic pagination of the City’s brief.
                                              9
               Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 201(b), “[a] court may
judicially notice a fact that is not subject to reasonable dispute because it: (1) is
generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction; or (2) can be
accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably
be questioned.” Pa.R.E. 201(b). Given that the lien numbers correspond to the trial
court’s own system, this Court agrees that the trial court did not err by taking such
judicial notice thereof. For these reasons, substantial evidence supported the trial
court’s determination of Williams’ outstanding tax liability.
               Finally, Williams asserts that the trial court’s granting of the City’s
Extraordinary Relief Motion, which resulted in the Status Conference’s cancellation
and replacement with the expedited Hearing, “effectively denied [Williams] several
opportunities to enroll in administrative programs and to apply for out-of-court
initiatives designed for tax[]payers[,] including senior citizens[,] to address real
estate tax lien claims and the amounts allegedly owed by [Williams].” Williams Br.
at 17.
               Notably, Williams did not timely respond to the Extraordinary Relief
Motion to express such concerns.          Further, Williams provides no information
revealing how any trial court action prevented him from independently pursuing
“opportunities to enroll in administrative programs and to apply for out-of-court
initiatives” during the several years preceding the trial court’s order granting the
Extraordinary Relief Motion and/or the eight weeks following the order until the
Hearing. Id.
               Moreover, the trial court explained in its Opinion Pursuant to Appellate
Rule 1925(a) pertaining to Williams’ Superior Court appeal (Superior Court Rule
1925(a) Opinion):

               [T]he matter of calendar control is best left with the trial
               court, and appellate courts will not interfere unless justice

                                            10
                demands intervention. Dublin Sportswear v. Charlett, 403
                A.2d 568, 571 (Pa. 1979). In this case, [] Williams sought
                reconsideration of an order scheduling a hearing. This
                [c]ourt was within its discretion to schedule the hearing in
                a case that, due to procedural and C[OVID-19]-related
                delays, was over three years by the date of the hearing.
                Th[e trial c]ourt provided [] Williams with more than
                [eight] weeks between the scheduling order and the
                hearing date.

Superior Court Rule 1925(a) Opinion at 6, O.R. at 255. This Court agrees and
discerns no error.17
                For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s Decree is affirmed.

                                                _________________________________
                                                ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

       17
            This Court acknowledges:
                Our Supreme Court has also recognized the deference to be
                accorded to trial courts in their urgent and rightfully prioritized quest
                to expedite the matters before them in light of the heavy caseloads
                faced thereby; however that deference has been expressly tempered
                by our appellate courts’ refusal to place the efficient and timely
                adherence to trial court calendars above the cause of the needs of
                justice in all circumstances:
                        We are, of course, loath to interfere in the workings
                        of the calendar control court.
                        Nevertheless, we must caution that speedy
                        disposition is not the sole element to be considered
                        in dispensing justice, and that where special
                        circumstances exist, special consideration must be
                        given lest we allow statistical considerations and
                        analyses to become the be-all and end-all of our
                        system of justice.
                Budget Laundry Co. v. Munter, . . . 298 A.2d 55, 59 ([Pa.] 1972).
Cheng v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 981 A.2d 371, 378 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009). The aforementioned facts
and procedural history herein reflect that no such special circumstances existed and, thus, the trial
court did not err by granting the City’s Extraordinary Relief Motion.
                                                  11
            IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

City of Philadelphia                  :
                                      :
            v.                        :
                                      :
Marshall L. Williams,                 :   No. 168 C.D. 2022
                  Appellant           :

                                  ORDER

            AND NOW, this 16th day of August, 2023, the Philadelphia County
Common Pleas Court’s January 21, 2022 decree is affirmed.

                                    _________________________________
                                    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge