Court Opinion

ID: 9766371
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 04:43:39.27422+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:21.905539
License: Public Domain

MASSEY, Chief Justice
(dissenting).
Believing that the appellee insurance company failed to indisputably establish the mailing of the prescribed notice of cancellation, and/or that it was the prescribed notice of cancellation that was mailed, I would reverse and remand.
The receipt from the post office showed only that a mail item was received by it on September 8, 1966. That such was the prescribed notice of cancellation was not proved according to my view of the evidence (proper of consideration for purposes of a summary judgment).
I do agree that the appellant’s counter affidavit did not raise a fact issue if the appellee company’s evidence did prima, facie establish its right to summary judgment— absent any counter showing by appellant.
The only affidavit attached to appellee’s motion was that of one Jeff Jones, an employee presenting himself as having some *937knowledge. Therein he states, “ * * * said policy of insurance was duly cancelled on September 20, 1966, and the same has never been reinstated. Exhibit D is a true and correct copy of the notice of cancellation mailed by Defendant insurance company to Plaintiff on the 8th day of September, 1966. Notice of cancellation (exhibit D) of the insurance policy in question was deposited in the mail addressed to the insured on September 8, 1966, * * An Exhibit D was attached to the affidavit. It was a photostat. Essential portions of some character of writing of Exhibit D was obscured by reason of the fact that another small written instrument covered the same. The small written instrument read: “Notice of Default. To reinstate pay TWO (2) installments on or before cancellation date unless this is the final payment. If this is a Second Default, unpaid balance must be paid,” Such was the condition of Exhibit D before the trial court.
Certainly it must be conceded that in the form in which Exhibit D appears as a part of Mr. Jones’ affidavit it could not constitute evidence of any notice of cancellation of any insurance policy. No doubt a notice of cancellation of the policy in question would have been possible to be shown, but it was not shown by Exhibit D. Without there having been any such showing the statements we have quoted from Mr. Jones’ affidavit would constitute no more than his own conclusion that the notice of cancellation provided by the policy had been mailed. Over objection such would not constitute admissible testimony if tendered upon a trial on the merits. If admitted without objection it would not entitle appellee to an instructed verdict. Therefore it would not constitute sufficient evidence upon which a summary judgment should be founded.
Furthermore I am of the opinion that his credibility would have been cast in issue even if Mr. Jones’ affidavit had been sufficient and where such is the case summary judgment is improper. Great American R. Ins. Co. v. San Antonio Pl. Sup. Co., 391 S.W.2d 41, 47 (Tex.Sup.1965). Jones was an employee of the party in whose behalf his testimony was given; where the liability of his employer, if established, would be due in part or whole to his own neglect of duty or negligence in relation to the mailing of cancellation. 98 C.J.S. 492 “Witnesses” § 551, “(Relations with Party, etc.) — Business, Professional, or Financial Relations”; State Division, Lone Star Ins. Union v. Blassengame, Tex.Civ.App., 162 S.W. 6 (Fort Worth Civ.App., 1913, no writ hist.). Undoubtedly it is proper to allow an employee of an insurance company, charged with the duty to mail notice of cancellation to a policyholder, to testify that he had performed such duty. A fact finder presented such testimony could accept such evidence as positive proof. But I believe that it would be a dangerous practice in summary judgment proceedings to found a judgment upon his affidavit that he had performed the duty when evidence to the contrary, if any, would be completely unavailable to the respondent party and impossible for him to attack in any manner other than by cross-examination.
The same rule would apply though it be proved that some article was posted in the mail on a material date, if the identity of the article would be known only to such witness. The circumstances themselves would supply the possibility of contradiction no matter how clear, direct and positive the testimony.
We find in the record that a notice of cancellation which, if mailed to the appellant on September 8, 1966, would have effected a cancellation of the policy on September 20, 1966. However, it was found as an exhibit attached to answers returned by appellee to interrogatories of the appellant served under the provisions of T.R. C.P. 168, “Interrogatories to Parties”, in compliance with the request as follows: “ * * * please attach a copy of written proof that notice of cancellation was given to the Insured showing on what date such *938cancellation was given to the Insured.” I do not believe that the answers to the interrogatories nor the exhibit attached thereto could be used by the appellee, the respondent party with reference thereto, as evidence upon the subsequent summary judgment proceedings.
In Rule 168 it is provided that such answers may be used only against the party answering the interrogatories. Certainly the respondent party would not be entitled to use as evidence supporting its own motion for summary judgment, either the factual statements or exhibits disclosed as part of its own response thereunder.
I would reverse and remand.