Court Opinion

ID: 9875432
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 22:33:47.284096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:47:02.469154
License: Public Domain

Crothers, Justice.
[¶ 1] Donald Cossette and the Angela R. Cossette Revocable Living Trust appeal a district court order dismissing their complaint against the Cass County Joint Water Resource District. The Cossettes requested declaratory relief and appealed from the District’s resolution of necessity relating to the District’s intent to acquire an interest in the Cossettes’ real property through eminent domain. We affirm that part of the district court order dismissing the Cossettes’ request for declaratory relief. We reverse that part of the district court order concluding the Cossettes were not entitled to appeal the District’s resolution of necessity, and remand.
I
[¶ 2] Red River Valley governmental authorities, including the District, designed a flood control and protection project referred to as the Diversion Project. The District is responsible for obtaining property rights in North Dakota necessary for the Diversion Project. The Cossettes own approximately eighty acres of farmland in the Red River Valley. Representatives acting on behalf of the District notified the Cossettes in January 2016 that their property may be affected by the Diversion Project and “that some type of easement rights may be necessary.” The Cossettes also were notified their property would be inspected by an appraisal company. In March 2016 the District notified the Cos-settes it would “be acquiring your property ... for the proposed construction of the [Diversion Project],” and offered to purchase the property for $476,040. The Cos-settes rejected the District’s offer.
[¶ 3] In May 2016 the District passed a resolution of necessity determining the Cossettes’ property was necessary for the Diversion Project and the District intended “to acquire a Permanent Right of Way Easement over, across, and through the [Cossettes’] Property.” The resolution also indicated the District “will proceed with the requisite legal proceedings as necessary ... to acquire a Permanent Right of Way Easement over, across, and through the Property.”
[¶ 4] After the District passed the resolution of necessity the Cossettes sued the *860District seeking a declaration that the District acted inappropriately in passing the resolution of necessity. The Cossettes’ complaint also appealed the District’s resolution of necessity to the district court, claiming the resolution was based on false representations and was passed without legal authority.
[¶ 5] The District moved to dismiss the Cossettes’ complaint, arguing their request for declaratory relief was improper because it cannot be combined with an appeal from the District’s resolution of necessity. The District also' argued the resolution of necessity was not appealable because the Cossettes were not aggrieved by the resolution. The district court agreed and issued an order dismissing the Cossettes’ complaint.
• II
[¶ 6] The district court dismissed the Cossettes’ complaint under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). “A motion to dismiss a complaint under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(vi) tests the legal sufficiency of the claim presented in the complaint.” Brandvold v. Lewis & Clark Pub. Sch. Dist., 2011 ND 185, ¶ 6, 803 N.W.2d 827 (quoting Vandall v. Trinity Hosps., 2004 ND 47, ¶ 5, 676 N.W.2d 88). In reviewing an appeal from a Rule 12(b) dismissal, the complaint is construed in the light most' favorable to the plaintiff, taking as true the well-pleaded allegations in- the complaint. Brandvold, at ¶ 6. Dismissal of a complaint under N.D.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) is reviewed de novo. Brandvold, at ¶ 6.
Ill
[¶ 7] The Cossettes argue the district court erred in dismissing its complaint requesting a declaratory judgment against the District. The Cossettes sought declaratory relief and to appeal from the District’s resolution of necessity. The court dismissed the Cossettes’ request for declaratory relief, concluding their “attempt to assert an equitable remedy with their administrative appeal is inappropriate.” We agree.
[¶ 8] In Anderson v. Richland Cty. Water Res. Bd., 506 N.W.2d 362, 364 (N.D. 1993), a group of landowners appealed the Richland County Water Resource Board’s administrative order relating to assessments and also brought a separate action in district court seeking declaratory relief. The court consolidated the cases, denied the landowners’ request for declaratory relief and affirmed the Water Board’s administrative order. Id. at 364-65. Before addressing the issues raised on appeal this Court stated: “We note that the ,.. landowners’ declaratory judgment action was inappropriate because N.D.C.C. § 28-34-01 ‘governs any appeal ... from the decision of a local governing body.’ Therefore, we review only the appeal from the decision of the political subdivision.” Anderson, at 365. See also Hector v. City of Fargo, 2014 ND 53, ¶ 23, 844 N.W.2d 542 (“a statutory appeal provides an adequate legal remedy for reviewing a local governing body’s decision, and in those cases where an appeal is authorized by law, an action for equitable relief generally is not available”).
[¶ 9] Here, similar to Anderson, the Cos-settes’ lawsuit sought declaratory relief and to appeal from the District’s resolution of necessity. The district court correctly decided the Cossettes’ attempt to seek declaratory relief was inappropriate. We affirm that part of the court’s order dismissing the Cossettes’ complaint relating to their request for declaratory relief.
IV
[¶ 10] The Cossettes argue the district court erred in dismissing their appeal from the District’s resolution of necessity.
*861Pill] Chapter 61-16.1, N.D.C.C., governs water resource districts. Under N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-54, an appeal may be taken “from any order or decision of the water resource board by any person aggrieved.” “The appeal must be taken to the district court of the county in which the land claimed to be affected adversely by the order or decision appealed from is located and is governed by the procedure provided in section 28-34-01.” Id.
[¶ 12] The district court concluded that, under N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-54, the Cos-settes were not aggrieved by the resolution of necessity and could not appeal. The court stated the resolution “is only one of the steps taken toward eminent domain” and the Cossettes were only potentially aggrieved by the resolution. The court indicated the District subsequently began an eminent domain action against the Cos-settes, and “[i]f the [Cossettes] are aggrieved by a taking, the issues that they raise here may be raised in that proceeding.”
[¶ 13] The plain language of N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-54 allows an aggrieved party to appeal from any order or decision of a water resource board; however, the statute does not define how one becomes “aggrieved.” This Court has defined an aggrieved party in the context of appealing a judgment or order of the district court to the Supreme Court. Treiber v. Citizens State Bank, 1999 ND 130, ¶ 5, 598 N.W.2d 96. “An aggrieved party is one who has some legal interest that may be enlarged or diminished by the appealed decision.” Id. “The party’s interest must be immediately, directly, and adversely affected, and an effect that is contingent or indirect, or that results merely in some possible, remote consequence, is insufficient.” Id. See also Black’s Law Dictionary 1297 (10th ed. 2014) (“aggrieved party” is “a party whose. personal, pecuniary, or property rights have been adversely affected by another person’s actions or by a court’s decree or judgment”).
[¶ 14] The district court dismissed the Cossettes’ appeal from the resolution of necessity in part because the resolution “is only one of the steps taken toward eminent domain.” Although a resolution of necessity is one part of the entire eminent domain process, N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-54 allows an appeal from any water resource board order or decision relating to eminent domain.
[¶ 15] Here, the resolution of necessity provides the legal description of the Cos-settes’ property and states the property “is necessary for the construction, operation, and maintenance of the ... Diversion Project.” The resolution further states that “the [District] will proceed with the requisite legal proceedings as necessary under Section 61-16.1-09(2) and Chapter 32-15 of the North Dakota Century Code to acquire a Permanent Right of Way Easement over, across, and through the Property.” The resolution of necessity adversely affected the Cossettes’ property rights by describing the Cossettes’ property and stating the District will proceed with eminent domain to acquire an interest in the property. The Cossettes became aggrieved under N.D.C.C. § 61-16.1-54 upon the District’s passage of the resolution of necessity indicating the District will acquire an interest in the Cossettes’ property through eminent domain. We reverse that part of the district court’s order dismissing the Cossettes’ complaint appealing from the District’s resolution of necessity. We remand for the court to address the issues raised in the Cossettes’ appeal from the District’s resolution of necessity.1
*862V
[¶ 16] We have considered the Cossettes’ remaining arguments and conclude they are either unnecessary to our decision or without merit. We affirm that part of the district court order dismissing the Cos-settes’ request for declaratory relief. We reverse that part of the district court order concluding the Cossettes were not entitled to appeal the District’s resolution of necessity, and remand.
[¶ 17] Daniel J. Crothers
Carol Ronning Kapsner
Gerald W. VandeWalle, C.J.

. The Cossettes indicate the District failed to file the record relating to the resolution of necessity after the Cossettes appealed to the district court. On remand, the District must *862prepare and file the record as required under N.D.C.C. § 28-34-01(2).