Court Opinion

ID: 9578242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:43:20.010832+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:25:22.837765
License: Public Domain

(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent.
There is no clear, convincing and satisfactory showing that the mutual will of Mary A. Schneberger was in existence after the death of her husband, James. The trial court in his findings of fact in Paragraph 10 thereof says:
“Later, after the death of James, when Nelson went to the bank and had the lockbox opened for the purpose of securing data for the inventory, he saw therein an envelope with his letterhead and bearing the typewritten words ‘Last Will and Testament of Mary A. Schneberger’.”
The- record shows this question was asked the witness, “On that occasion did you see either of the envelopes in which you had placed these two wills that we have previously talked about ?” but the witness never answered the question. The record shows two pages of objections and preliminary matters as to what was written and typed on two envelopes at the time the wills were drawn, and without obtaining an answer to the above question moves into' the contents of the file in the Estate of James. Even if the witness had answered that he saw the envelope it would not have been any proof as to the will.
The appellees contend the following shows the will was in existence after the death of James:
“Q. Did she mention to you on that occasion anything about her will, the original of which or a copy of which has been identified here as plaintiff’s Exhibit 1?” (Five objections. A page of preliminary questions.)
“Q. All right, now state what she asked you with respect to> that will. A. She asked me if she had to' have that bank in there in her will.
“Q. As what? A. Well, as executor.”
There was absolutely no showing that Mary at that time was talking about the mutual will she executed with James. The preliminary questioning shows she was in the witness’s office to get her distributive share and sign a waiver of hearing and for no other purpose. If all she said at the time was what the witness says she did we have no- clear, convincing and satisfactory proof of the existence of the mutual will after the husband’s death. This may only be a question of examining a witness, but *975we should not fill in what might have been said. The contents of the question and the interpretation of the witness are not convincing. The important part of the testimony is what Mary said.
The mutual wills of James and Mary Schneberger were ambulatory until the death of James. Either or both could revoke the wills by notice to the other party. No formal notice is required, all the revoking party need do is to so advise the other and destroy his or her will, if that is the method chosen. Section 633.10, Code of Iowa, 1958. The only reason for the notice is to give the other party an opportunity to revoke if that party so desires. The other party need not revoke.
In Luthy v. Seaburn, 242 Iowa 184, at page 190, 46 N.W.2d 44, 48, this court said: “* * * We have held joint 'and mutual wills are valid, especially between husband and wife, that there is a contractual element in a joint or mutual will for .the benefit of the survivor, that either party may, with notice to the other, recede from the obligation, but if there be no revocation before the death of one of the parties the right of the survivor is fixed according to the terms of the mutual will. Anderson v. Anderson, 181 Iowa 578, 584, 164 N.W. 1042, 1044; Campbell v. Dunkelberger, 172 Iowa 385, 389, 153 N.W. 56; In re Estate of Parley, 237 Iowa 1069, 24 N.W.2d 453.”
See also In re Estate of Ramthun, 249 Iowa 790, 89 N.W.2d 337, and Allinson v. Horn, 249 Iowa 1351, 92 N.W.2d 645.
The appellees contend the burden of showing the revocation with notice is on the appellants and cite Curry v. Cotton, 356 Ill. 538, 191 N.E. 307. In that case the will was in existence. Here the will is admittedly lost. The appellees here have the same burden as they would to prove a lost will: (1) its execution, (2) its loss, (3) that the presumption of its intentional destruction by the testator has been rebutted, and (4) its contents. Goodale v. Murray, 227 Iowa 843, 289 N.W. 450, 126 A. L. R. 1121; Page v. Parks, 232 Iowa 879, 6 N.W.2d 298.
If a will is in existence the presumption is it was unrevoked. If it is not in existence the contrary presumption prevails'. Page v. Parks, supra. The appellees alleged in their petition their rights became fixed and determined at the time of the death of the said James. A condition precedent to their rights becoming *976fixed and determined is the existence, uurevoked, of the mutual will of Mary. If the will is then in existence, then the burden of proving- it had been revoked would be on the parties so claiming. Here it is a part of the cause of action that must be proved. The action here is- of course different from proving a lost will, but the effect of the proceedings is to- enforce the- terms of the lost will. The proof here must be clear-, satisfactory and convincing. In rei Estate of B-amthun, supra.
All of the other elements of the cause of action are properly proved as shown by the majority opinion. For the failure of proof -as herein indicated I would dismiss plaintiff’® petition, a<s amended, and reverse the case.