Court Opinion

ID: 9398154
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-30 15:00:42.907581+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:31.326806
License: Public Domain

20-2827
     Sultan v. Garland
                                                                               BIA
                                                                          Nelson, IJ
                                                                       A095 952 529
                              UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                  FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                    SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
 3   United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
 4   New York, on the 30th day of May, two thousand twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7            DENNY CHIN,
 8            RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
 9            ALISON J. NATHAN,
10                 Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   ALI ALI SULTAN, AKA RAHAMAT ALI
14   SULTAN,
15            Petitioner,
16
17                       v.                                  20-2827
18                                                           NAC
19   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
20   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
21            Respondent.
22   _____________________________________
23
24   FOR PETITIONER:                     Pankaj Malik, Warshaw Burstein,
25                                       LLP, New York, NY.
26
27   FOR RESPONDENT:                     Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant
28                                       Attorney General; Anthony P.
 1                                    Nicastro, Assistant Director;
 2                                    Linda Y. Cheng, Trial Attorney,
 3                                    Office of Immigration Litigation,
 4                                    United States Department of
 5                                    Justice, Washington, DC.

 6       UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 8   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

9    is DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.

10       Petitioner       Ali Ali Sultan, a native and                 citizen of

11   Trinidad and Tobago, seeks review of a July 28, 2020 decision

12   of the BIA affirming a June 7, 2018 decision of an Immigration

13   Judge   (“IJ”),      which   denied    his    application      for   asylum,

14   withholding    of    removal,    and   relief      under    the   Convention

15   Against   Torture     (“CAT”),    as   well    as   an     application      for

16   cancellation of removal.         In re Ali Ali Sultan, No. A 095 952

17   529 (B.I.A. July 28, 2020), aff’g No. A 095 952 529 (Immig.

18   Ct. N.Y.C. June 7, 2018).        We assume the parties’ familiarity

19   with the underlying facts and procedural history.

20       We have considered both the IJ’s and BIA’s decisions “for

21   the sake of completeness.”            Wangchuck v. Dep’t of Homeland

22   Sec., 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006).                    Sultan primarily

23   challenges     the    agency’s    denial      of    his     motion    for     a

24   continuance.      We find no abuse of discretion in that ruling
                                      2
 1   and       conclude      that    Sultan   has       not    otherwise    sufficiently

 2   exhausted or argued his claims for relief from removal.

 3        I.     Motion to Continue

 4             “We review the agency’s denial of a continuance for abuse

 5   of discretion.”            Flores v. Holder, 779 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir.

 6   2015).           The    agency    abuses      its       discretion    “if   (1) [its]

 7   decision rests on an error of law (such as application of the

 8   wrong legal principle) or a clearly erroneous factual finding

 9   or (2) [its] decision—though not necessarily the product of

10   a legal error or a clearly erroneous factual finding—cannot

11   be    located          within    the   range       of    permissible    decisions.”

12   Morgan v. Gonzales, 445 F.3d 549, 551–52 (2d Cir. 2006)

13   (quotation marks omitted).                 “IJs have . . . broad discretion

14   with respect to calendaring matters.”                        Sanusi v. Gonzales,

15   445       F.3d   193,     199    (2d   Cir.       2006)    (finding    no   abuse   of

16   discretion where an IJ denied a third motion to continue

17   “after months of delay”).                While an IJ “may grant a motion

18   for continuance for good cause shown,” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29,

19   the moving party has the burden of establishing good cause,

20   see Matter of L–A–B–R–, 27 I. & N. Dec. 405, 413 (A.G. 2018).

21             The IJ did not abuse her discretion in concluding that

                                                   3
 1   Sultan did not show good cause for a continuance.               A motion

 2   for a continuance based on lack of preparation must be

 3   supported    by   “a   reasonable       showing   that   the    lack       of

 4   preparation occurred despite a good faith effort to be ready

 5   to proceed.”      Matter of Sibrun, 18 I. & N. Dec. 354, 356

 6   (B.I.A. 1983).     Sultan offered no evidence to establish the

 7   circumstances preventing him from being prepared for the

 8   hearing or any good faith effort to be ready for the hearing,

 9   beyond counsel’s assertions when arguing for the continuance.

10         Sultan also argues that the denial of the continuance

11   deprived him of due process.            To succeed on a due process

12   claim, a petitioner “must show that []he was denied a full

13   and   fair   opportunity   to   present     h[is] claims   or    .     .   .

14   otherwise deprived . . . of fundamental fairness,” Burger v.

15   Gonzales, 498 F.3d 131, 134 (2d Cir. 2007) (quotation marks

16   and citations omitted), and “some cognizable prejudice fairly

17   attributable to the challenged process,” Garcia-Villeda v.

18   Mukasey, 531 F.3d 141, 149 (2d Cir. 2008) (quotation marks

19   and citations omitted).     Sultan made no such showing.          He had

20   opportunities to present evidence and testify, and he has not

21   established how witness testimony or the appearance of a

                                         4
 1   different attorney would have changed the outcome.                    For

 2   example, he did not provide objective evidence that Muslims

 3   or ethnic Indians in Trinidad and Tobago are targeted for

 4   persecution or that he would be singled out for torture for

 5   any reason.     See Garcia-Villeda, 531 F.3d at 149 (denying a

 6   due   process    claim   where    the   “[p]etitioner      fail[ed]    to

 7   demonstrate how the alleged shortcomings . . . prejudiced the

 8   outcome”).

 9     II. Applications for Relief from Removal

10         We require petitioners to exhaust the specific forms of

11   relief they request and sufficiently argue the issues and

12   challenge the agency’s denial of relief in their petitions

13   for review.      See Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75, 78 (2d Cir.

14   2004); Karaj v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 113, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2006).

15   Sultan   has    failed   to   exhaust    and   has   not   sufficiently

16   challenged the agency’s denial of relief from removal.                 As

17   the BIA pointed out, Sultan did not challenge the denial of

18   cancellation of removal or the denial of asylum as time barred

19   on appeal to the BIA.         Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to

20   review those forms of relief.           See Karaj, 462 F.3d at 119–

21   20.   Nor did he identify factual or legal errors in the denial

                                        5
 1   of withholding of removal and CAT relief on appeal to the

 2   BIA.    See Foster, 376 F.3d at 78.   Moreover, Sultan’s briefs

 3   in support of his petition do not identify specific errors in

 4   the agency’s decisions.    See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426

 5   F.3d 540, 545 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (deeming claim abandoned

 6   where not sufficiently argued).       We therefore dismiss the

 7   petition insofar as Sultan challenges the agency’s denial of

 8   relief from removal, which he failed to exhaust.

 9          Even if we were to reach the merits of his arguments

10   relating to withholding of removal and CAT relief, we do not

11   identify any error in the agency’s decision.     Sultan alleged

12   that he was fired from his job, but under the circumstances

13   here, that harm alone does not amount to past persecution.

14   See Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011)

15   (“[P]ersecution is an extreme concept that does not include

16   every sort of treatment our society regards as offensive.”

17   (quotation marks omitted)); Ivanishvili v. U.S. Dep’t of

18   Just., 433 F.3d 332, 341 (2d Cir. 2006) (distinguishing

19   between persecution and harassment).       Moreover, the 2017

20   State Department report, which is the only country conditions

21   evidence in the record, does not support Sultan’s fear of

                                    6
 1   future persecution or torture because it does not confirm his

 2   allegation that Indian-Muslims are targeted for persecution

 3   or singled out for rape and murder, as Sultan claims.                    See 8

 4   C.F.R. §§ 1208.16(c)(2) (placing burden on CAT applicant to

 5   show torture is “more likely than not”), 1208.18(a)(1)–(2)

 6   (defining torture); Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 27–28

 7   (2d   Cir.   2018)    (“Eligibility         for    withholding    of    removal

 8   requires a clear probability of persecution, i.e., it is more

 9   likely   than   not     that     the       alien    would    be   subject   to

10   persecution.”        (ellipsis    and        internal       quotation    marks

11   omitted)).

12         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

13   DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.                 All pending motions

14   and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

15                                      FOR THE COURT:
16                                      Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
17                                      Clerk of Court

                                            7