Court Opinion

ID: 9949308
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-11 14:00:43.396711+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:29:54.007022
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-4118    Document: 010111013110    Date Filed: 03/11/2024   Page: 1
                                                                FILED
                                                    United States Court of Appeals
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS         Tenth Circuit

                           FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        March 11, 2024
                       _________________________________
                                                                     Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                         Clerk of Court
  ANTHONY CHARLES MURPHY,

           Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                     No. 23-4118
                                                (D.C. No. 1:21-CV-00097-RJS)
  WARDEN ROBERT POWELL,                                    (D. Utah)

           Respondent - Appellee.
                        _________________________________

           ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
                  _________________________________

 Before PHILLIPS, BRISCOE, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       Anthony Murphy, a Utah state inmate proceeding pro se, seeks a

 Certificate of Appealability (COA) to appeal the district court’s denial of his

 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition. He also requests to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP).

 For the reasons explained below, we deny Murphy a COA but grant his IFP

 motion.

                                     BACKGROUND

       In 2016, Murphy was convicted of four felonies for sexually assaulting

 his then-wife: (1) aggravated sexual assault, (2) aggravated kidnapping,

       *
         This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
 the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
 persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 23-4118   Document: 010111013110     Date Filed: 03/11/2024   Page: 2

 (3) forcible sexual abuse, and (4) aggravated assault. On the aggravated-sexual-

 assault and aggravated-kidnapping convictions, he was sentenced to

 consecutive terms of 15 years’ to life imprisonment. For his other two

 convictions, he was sentenced to concurrent terms of 1-to-15 years’

 imprisonment and zero-to-5 years’ imprisonment.

       Murphy appealed his conviction to the Utah Court of Appeals. In his

 appeal, Murphy raised five state-law claims, including a challenge to prior-

 sexual-assault evidence admitted under Utah Rules of Evidence 403 and

 404(b). 1 He also raised one federal claim—ineffective assistance of trial

 counsel. The Utah Court of Appeals ruled that Murphy had waived three of his

 state-law claims by failing to preserve them and failing to brief his arguments

 under any “exceptions to the preservation rule,” such as plain error. State v.

 Murphy, 441 P.3d 787, 792–93 (Utah Ct. App. 2019). As for his ineffective-

 assistance-of-counsel claim, the court declined to decide whether Murphy’s

 trial counsel’s performance was deficient because Murphy had failed to show

 prejudice. Id. at 800 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

 (1984)). In all, the court affirmed his convictions, rejecting his two preserved

 state-law claims. Id.

       1
        His four other state-law claims alleged (1) prosecutorial misconduct
 during closing arguments, (2) wrongful denial of his motion for a mistrial,
 (3) wrongful failure to merge the aggravated-kidnapping charge and the
 aggravated-sexual-assault charge, and (4) insufficiency of the evidence.
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       From there, Murphy petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for certiorari. In

 his petition, Murphy raised a state-law claim only: he challenged the admission

 of prior-sexual-assault evidence under Utah Rule of Evidence 403. The Utah

 Supreme Court denied certiorari. State v. Murphy, 466 P.3d 1074 (Utah 2020)

 (table).

       Murphy then filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief in Utah state

 court, cabining his arguments to five legal theories: (1) insufficient evidence in

 support of the convicted crimes, (2) prosecutorial misconduct, (3) violation of

 Utah Rule of Evidence 702, (4) violations of Fourth and Fourteenth

 Amendments, and (5) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. In

 November 2020, the state court “summarily dismissed” Murphy’s first four

 claims, finding them “frivolous on their face.” R. 641–42. The court concluded

 that Murphy’s ineffective-assistance claims were full of “pleading errors,” so

 the court granted Murphy twenty-one days to amend his petition. R. 642.

 Before the twenty-one days expired, Murphy successfully moved for an

 extension because he had contracted COVID-19. Murphy timely amended his

 petition and added more ineffective-assistance claims, bringing his total to

 twenty-two of such claims. On March 1, 2021, the court dismissed the

 remaining claims, finding the claims barred for a variety of reasons. Some were

 barred because Murphy had failed to raise them on direct appeal; some were

 barred because they had been adjudicated on the merits; and some were

 frivolous on their face.

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       Rather than appealing this dismissal, on May 2, 2021, Murphy petitioned

 for federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. 2 In his federal petition,

 Murphy asserts eight claims: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel,

 (2) ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, (3) admission of evidence

 obtained from an illegal warrantless search, (4) prosecutorial misconduct,

 (5) Brady violations, (6) insufficiency of the evidence, (7) a Fourteenth

 Amendment violation by the Utah Court of Appeals, and (8) the admission of

 evidence in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clause. Before the district court,

 Murphy argued that he had cause to excuse his failure to appeal the denial of

 his state-postconviction petition: he claimed that he missed the deadline

 because he had emergency heart surgery. According to Murphy, he was

 admitted for surgery on March 5, 2021, and remained hospitalized until March

 26, 2021. Murphy asserts that, after he left the hospital, he was placed in the

 prison’s infirmary until March 28. The district court concluded that Murphy

 had procedurally defaulted his claims by failing to appeal any federal issues to

 the Utah Supreme Court. Murphy v. Utah, No. 21-CV-97, 2023 WL 4934268, at

 *6–7 (D. Utah Aug. 2, 2023).

       2
         Murphy mailed his § 2254 petition on May 2, 2021, but for some reason
 it was returned to him. He remailed it on June 28, 2021, and the petition arrived
 at the district court on July 1, 2021.
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                            STANDARD OF REVIEW

       Murphy must obtain a COA to appeal the district court’s order. See 28

 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). To do so, Murphy must show that “jurists of reason

 would find it debatable” (1) “whether the petition states a valid claim of the

 denial of a constitutional right” and (2) “whether the district court was correct

 in its procedural ruling.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).

                                   DISCUSSION

       We first determine whether Murphy is entitled to a COA, and then we

 address his motion to proceed IFP.

 I.    COA Application

       The district court denied Murphy’s habeas petition because he had

 neither exhausted his state-court remedies nor shown cause to excuse his

 default. Murphy, 2023 WL 4934268, at *6–7. On appeal, Murphy claims that he

 did in fact exhaust his remedies and, in the alternative, that he has shown cause

 to excuse a procedural default. We first consider whether Murphy exhausted his

 state remedies and then turn to any exceptions that may apply.

       A state petitioner seeking federal habeas relief must first exhaust his

 state remedies. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999). This

 exhaustion requirement, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A), ensures that

 “state courts [have] the opportunity to resolve state cases in the first instance

 before federal courts . . . intrude.” Ellis v. Raemisch, 872 F.3d 1064, 1081 (10th

 Cir. 2017) (citing O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 844); see also O’Sullivan, 526 U.S. at

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 845 (explaining that “the exhaustion doctrine is designed to give the state

 courts a full and fair opportunity to resolve federal constitutional claims before

 those claims are presented to the federal courts”). To exhaust his state

 remedies, a petitioner must invoke the federal issue through “one complete

 round of the State’s established appellate review process.” Simpson v.

 Carpenter, 912 F.3d 542, 565 (10th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). And the

 petitioner must raise the federal issue “in a manner sufficient to put the courts

 on notice of the federal constitutional claim.” Prendergast v. Clements, 699

 F.3d 1182, 1184 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 278

 (1971)).

       When a petitioner has failed to exhaust his state remedies, we sometimes

 dismiss those unexhausted claims without prejudice so that the “petitioner can

 pursue available state-court remedies.” Grant v. Royal, 886 F.3d 874, 891–92

 (10th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). But “dismissal without prejudice . . . is not

 appropriate if the state court would now find the claims procedurally barred”

 and refuse to hear them. Id. at 892 (citations omitted); see also Moore v.

 Schoeman, 288 F.3d 1231, 1233 n.3 (10th Cir. 2002) (“‘Anticipatory procedural

 bar’ occurs when the federal courts apply procedural bar to an unexhausted

 claim that would be procedurally barred under state law if the petitioner

 returned to state court to exhaust it.” (citation omitted)). When a state court

 would deem those claims barred under state law, we treat them as

 “procedural[ly] default[ed] for the purposes of federal habeas review.” Grant,

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 886 F.3d at 892 (citations omitted). The procedural default carries a heavy

 burden—we will consider the claims only if the petitioner can show “cause and

 prejudice or a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Tryon v. Quick, 81 F.4th

 1110, 1139 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation omitted). To show cause, a petitioner

 must demonstrate that “something external to the petitioner, something that

 cannot be fairly attributed to him, impeded his efforts to comply with the

 State’s procedural rule.” Id. (quoting Maples v. Thomas, 565 U.S. 266, 280

 (2012)). Then to show prejudice, the petitioner must establish “not merely a

 substantial federal claim, such that the errors at trial created a possibility of

 prejudice, but rather that the constitutional violation worked to his actual and

 substantial disadvantage.” Shinn v. Ramirez, 596 U.S. 366, 379–80 (2022)

 (cleaned up). And to establish a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a petitioner

 must make a credible claim of actual innocence. McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569

 U.S. 383, 392 (2013). The actual-innocence exception “is a markedly narrow

 one” that is “implicated only in extraordinary cases where a constitutional

 violation has probably resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually

 innocent.” Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816, 820 (10th Cir. 2007) (cleaned up).

       Murphy has failed to properly exhaust his state remedies because he

 never invoked any of his federal claims through “one complete round of

 [Utah’s] established appellate review process.” Simpson, 912 F.3d at 565

 (citation omitted). In his direct appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals, Murphy

 presented one federal claim—ineffective assistance of trial counsel. But when

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 Murphy petitioned the Utah Supreme Court for review, he declined to present

 any federal issues and instead brought a state-law claim only. Though the Utah

 Supreme Court exercises discretionary review, it is part of Utah’s “established

 appellate review process.” Id. (citation omitted); see Utah R. App. P. 45

 (“[T]he review of a judgment . . . of the Court of Appeals shall be initiated by

 filing in the Utah Supreme Court a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Utah

 Court of Appeals.”). Thus, Murphy exhausted none of his federal claims on

 direct review.

       Though Murphy failed to fully appeal the denial of his state-

 postconviction petition, he argues that he nonetheless exhausted his state

 remedies. In support, he claims that he was under no duty to appeal because

 Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 65C(q) provides that he “may” appeal. But

 Murphy’s duty to exhaust—and thus to appeal the postconviction denial—arises

 from federal law, not Utah law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (requiring a

 petitioner to have “exhausted [his] remedies available in the courts of the

 State”); see also § 2254(c) (noting that a petitioner has not exhausted his state

 remedies “if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any

 available procedure, the question presented”). Because Rule 65C(q) gave

 Murphy the right to appeal the denial of his postconviction petition,

 § 2254(b)(1)(A) requires him to have exercised that appellate right. By failing

 to exercise his right to appeal, Murphy has not properly exhausted his state

 remedies.

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        Murphy cannot return to state court to assert his claims, so dismissal

 without prejudice is not appropriate. See Grant, 886 F.3d at 892. First, Murphy

 can no longer appeal the denial of his postconviction petition because the

 appellate deadline has expired. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a), (e). Second, Murphy

 cannot restart the process by bringing another state-postconviction petition.

 Utah bars prisoners from asserting claims in a postconviction petition that were

 “raised . . . or could have been, but [were] not, raised in a previous request for

 postconviction relief.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-9-106(1)(d). So Murphy has no

 avenue to present his claims to the Utah Supreme Court. Thus, his claims are

 procedurally defaulted, and we will consider them only if he can show cause

 and prejudice, or a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Grant, 886 F.3d at

 892.

        Murphy has not shown cause and prejudice to excuse his procedural

 default. Construing his brief liberally, we understand Murphy to assert that his

 emergency surgery prevented him from appealing his postconviction ruling.

 Even if a health emergency qualifies as “something external” to Murphy, see

 Tryon, 81 F.4th at 1139, he has failed to show that his surgery prevented him

 from complying with Utah’s appellate rules. The state trial court denied

 Murphy’s petition on March 1, 2021, so Murphy had thirty days to appeal the

 ruling. See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). But after the appellate deadline passed on

 March 31, 2021, Murphy still had another thirty days to file a motion to

 “extend the time for filing a notice of appeal”—giving Murphy until April 30,

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  2021. See id. R. 4(e)(2). Utah courts grant these motions when a party shows

  “good cause or excusable neglect,” id., and in assessing these motions, courts

  engage in an “inquiry [that] is fundamentally equitable in nature and entails

  broad discretion,” Reisbeck v. HCA Health Servs. of Utah, Inc., 2 P.3d 447, 450

  (Utah 2000). Murphy contends that he did not return to his prison unit from

  surgery until March 29, 2021, and that he did not receive the trial court’s denial

  until “sometime after” April 1, 2021. Op. Br. at 4. But rather than filing a

  motion to extend the time to appeal, Murphy waited until May 2, 2021—two

  days after the appellate-extension deadline passed—to mail his § 2254 petition.

  And by failing to seek an appellate extension, Murphy abandoned a state

  procedure to pursue his claims. See Ward v. Medina, 502 F. App’x 780, 782–83

  (10th Cir. 2012) (unpublished) (ruling that state prisoner failed to exhaust state

  remedies when he didn’t move to file a late appeal). As a result, Murphy has

  not shown cause to excuse his failure to seek an appellate extension, and we

  cannot excuse his procedural default.

        Murphy has not argued that he is actually innocent, and so he has not

  shown a fundamental miscarriage of justice. See Magar, 490 F.3d at 820. Thus,

  reasonable jurists would not debate the district court’s procedural ruling, and

  we deny Murphy a COA.

  II.   IFP Motion

        Murphy also requests to proceed IFP. We grant IFP motions when

  appellants show (1) “a financial inability to pay the required filing fees” and

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  (2) “the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the law and facts in

  support of the issues raised on appeal.” DeBardeleben v. Quinlan, 937 F.2d

  502, 505 (10th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). Murphy has shown an inability to

  pay through his financial affidavit. And Murphy has presented a nonfrivolous

  argument on appeal. For these reasons, we grant his IFP motion. IFP status

  allows Murphy to avoid paying the appellate-filing fee upfront, but he must

  continue to make partial payments until he pays the fee in full. See 28 U.S.C.

  § 1915(b).

                                  CONCLUSION

        For the reasons discussed above, we deny Murphy a COA, grant his IFP

  motion, and order the matter dismissed.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Gregory A. Phillips
                                            Circuit Judge

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