Court Opinion

ID: 9393563
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 17:01:04.223253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.977558
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                  UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                           MAY 10 2023
                                                                       MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

BALJINDER SINGH,                                 No. 22-447
                                                 Agency No.
             Petitioner,                         A201-431-944
 v.
                                                 MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

             Respondent.

                   On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                       Board of Immigration Appeals

                            Submitted May 8, 2023 **
                            San Francisco, California

Before: FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges, and BENNETT, District
Judge.***

      Petitioner Baljinder Singh, a native and citizen of India, petitions this

court for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”)

upholding the denial by the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) of his application for

      *
            This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not
precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
              The Honorable Richard D. Bennett, United States District Judge
for the District of Maryland, sitting by designation.
asylum.1 We hold that the agency’s adverse credibility determination is

supported by substantial evidence and deny the petition.

      We review adverse credibility determinations for substantial evidence.

See Kumar v. Garland, 18 F.4th 1148, 1153 (9th Cir. 2021). Because the BIA

adopted and affirmed the IJ’s adverse credibility determination, we review the

“IJ’s decision as if it were that of the BIA.” Abebe v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 1037,

1039 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Hoque v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 1190, 1194

(9th Cir. 2004)).

      The IJ’s finding that Singh was not credible in light of inter-proceeding

similarities in personal accounts of persecution, internal inconsistencies

between his testimony and the declarations he submitted, his non-

responsiveness, and his failure to adequately corroborate his claim is supported

by substantial evidence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(C) (explaining that the IJ

may, considering the totality of the circumstances, “base a credibility

determination on the demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant . . .,

the inherent plausibility of the applicant’s . . . account, the consistency between

the applicant’s or witness’s written and oral statements . . ., the consistency of

such statements with other evidence of record . . ., or any other relevant

factor”).

      1
        Singh also applied for withholding of removal and protection under the
Convention Against Torture. The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of both of those
forms of relief, but Singh does not appear to challenge those parts of the BIA’s
decision here.

                                         2
      When considering the inter-proceeding similarities, the IJ followed the

procedural framework established in Matter of R-K-K-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 658

(B.I.A. 2015), and reasonably concluded that there was a suspicious degree of

similarity between Singh’s story and the stories of three other asylum applicants

that Singh could not explain, raising the specter of a fabricated asylum claim. 2

See id. at 661 (explaining that the IJ must (1) give the petitioner notice of the

perceived significant similarities, (2) afford the petitioner a reasonable

opportunity to explain them, and then (3) consider these similarities in light of

the totality of the circumstances).

      Here, the IJ first gave Singh meaningful notice of the significant

similarities and provided Singh’s counsel with copies of the declarations from

the three proceedings containing similar narratives. The IJ reasonably

concluded that the similarities between Singh’s narrative and the three other

narratives are overwhelming. All four petitioners described two attacks in

common: the first involving kicking and slapping by four people while the

petitioner was hanging Mann Party posters and ending when people from

nearby homes came to the rescue, and the second involving a beating with sticks

      2
         Singh does not challenge the premise that similarities between personal
accounts of persecution can raise suspicion about fabrication, nor does he
contest the framework established in Matter of R-K-K- for evaluating inter-
proceeding similarities. He argues only that the similarities between his case
and the other proceedings at issue are insufficient to warrant an adverse
credibility finding because his declaration’s language and grammatical structure
are not identical to those in the declarations from the other proceedings.

                                         3
while the petitioner was going home after a wedding orchestrated by the Mann

Party for charity and ending when farmers working in nearby fields came to the

rescue.

      The IJ afforded Singh a continuance from the hearing to consider these

similarities and held a second hearing during which Singh was given an

opportunity to explain them. But the IJ determined that Singh was unable to

provide a satisfactory explanation. Substantial evidence supports the conclusion

that these similarities—among several other shared details—could not have

plausibly resulted from a common practice of persecution.

      The IJ did not rely on these similarities alone, however; the adverse

credibility determination was appropriately based on the totality of the

circumstances. The IJ evaluated the potential corroborative evidence but found

suspicious similarities between the third-party declarations Singh submitted.

The IJ also considered the inconsistencies between Singh’s testimony and his

declaration, which Singh was unable to explain, and his non-responsiveness.

The record as a whole thus does not compel us to reach a contrary conclusion

regarding Singh’s credibility.

      Without credible testimony, there is insufficient evidence to support

Singh’s asylum claim, so we deny the petition for review. See Loho v.

Mukasey, 531 F.3d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that, in light of the

adverse credibility finding, the evidence was insufficient to compel a finding of

past persecution or well-founded fear of future persecution).

                                        4
Petition DENIED.

                   5