Court Opinion

ID: 9393532
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-10 16:00:59.009272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:53.861613
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                            FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        MAY 10 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                        U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No.    16-17202

                Plaintiff-Appellee,             D.C. Nos.     2:16-cv-02204-RCJ
                                                              2:08-cr-00283-RCJ-
 v.                                             PAL-5

JACOREY TAYLOR, AKA Mo-B,
                                                MEMORANDUM*
                Defendant-Appellant.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Nevada
                   Robert Clive Jones, District Judge, Presiding

                            Submitted April 17, 2023**
                             San Francisco, California

Before: CALLAHAN and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and BOLTON,*** District
Judge.

      Jacorey Taylor seeks review of the district court’s denial of his petition to

vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. In 2013, a jury found Taylor guilty of

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
             The Honorable Susan R. Bolton, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
both murder and using a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence under 18

U.S.C. § 924(c)(3), but the jury did not clarify whether the verdict was for first- or

second-degree murder. Taylor moved to vacate his § 924(c)(3) conviction and

sentence under Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), arguing that the

subpart of § 924(c)(3) under which he was convicted was void for vagueness. 1 The

district court denied his Johnson claim, holding that it was procedurally defaulted.

We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2253 and affirm.

      “We review de novo a district court’s denial of relief to a federal prisoner

under 28 U.S.C. § 2255” and apply de novo review as to whether there has been a

procedural default. United States v. Swisher, 811 F.3d 299, 306 (9th Cir. 2016) (en

banc); United States v. Ratigan, 351 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 2003). “A § 2255

movant procedurally defaults his claims by not raising them on direct appeal and not

showing cause and prejudice or actual innocence in response to the default.”

Ratigan, 351 F.3d at 962 (citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998)).

      We apply the categorical approach to determine whether an offense is a crime

of violence, analyzing “whether the elements of the statute of conviction meet the

federal standard.” Borden v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1817, 1822 (2021). Under the

categorical approach, “the facts of a given case are irrelevant.” Id. A crime of

1
 Johnson was a precursor to United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319, 2323–27
(2019), which held that § 924(c)(3)(B) was void for vagueness. Any § 924(c)(3)
conviction must now stand under § 924(c)(3)(A).

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violence requires a mens rea more culpable than ordinary recklessness and must have

“as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the

person or property of another.” Id. at 1821–22, 1825; § 924(c)(3)(A). “If any—even

the least culpable—of the acts criminalized do not entail that kind of [physical] force,

the statute of conviction does not categorically match the federal standard, and so

cannot serve as” a predicate offense per § 924(c)(3)(A). Borden, 141 S. Ct. at 1822.

      Taylor argues that his § 924(c)(3) conviction must be vacated because Nevada

second-degree murder lacks the heightened mens rea and direct physical force

requirements for a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). He contends that he has

shown prejudice to excuse his procedural default. 2 We disagree.

      1.     The mens rea required for Nevada second-degree murder meets the

federal standard for a crime of violence. Under Nevada law, “[m]urder is the

unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought, either express or

implied.” N.R.S. § 200.010(1) (cleaned up). “Malice shall be implied when no

considerable provocation appears, or when all the circumstances of the killing show

an abandoned and malignant heart.” Id. § 200.020(2). “Depraved heart” and

“‘abandoned and malignant heart’ both refer to the same ‘essential concept . . . one

of extreme recklessness regarding homicidal risk.’” Collman v. State, 7 P.3d 426,

2
 The Government does not argue that Taylor has not shown cause for his
procedural default.

                                           3
442, 445 n.13 (Nev. 2000) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). Indeed, to

convict Taylor of murder under Nevada law, the trial judge instructed that the jury

must find that Taylor acted with malice aforethought, explaining:

      The condition of mind described as malice aforethought may arise, not
      alone from anger, hatred, revenge or from particular ill will, spite or
      grudge toward the person killed, but may also result from any
      unjustifiable or unlawful motive or purpose to injure another, which
      proceeds from a heart fatally bent on mischief, or with reckless
      disregard of consequences and social duty.

      Taylor argues that McCurdy v. State, 809 P.2d 1265 (Nev. 1991) shows that

Nevada’s second-degree “implied malice” murder does not require a defendant act

with heightened recklessness or direct physical force at his victim. In that case,

defendant Enoch McCurdy, a gang member, “approached the victim and his friends

in order to stir up trouble. . . . During the [ensuing] turmoil, McCurdy handed [co-

defendant] Warren [a] loaded and cocked gun.” McCurdy, 809 P.2d at 1266. Warren

then used the gun to shoot and kill an opposing gang member. Id. The Nevada

Supreme Court upheld McCurdy’s conviction, reasoning that “[t]he jury could have

properly concluded that, from McCurdy’s perspective, it should have been clear that

handing the gun to Warren under these circumstances was malignantly reckless and

that death or serious injury was likely to result.” Id. at 1266–67. This reasoning

contradicts Taylor’s argument.

      We have already determined that such malignant recklessness meets the mens

rea criterion for a crime of violence. Offenses charged as murder “necessarily require

                                          4
a mental state of malice aforethought, which, as we have explained, involves ‘an

intentional act that ha[s] a high probability of resulting in death.’” United States v.

Begay, 33 F.4th 1081, 1091, 1095 (9th Cir. 2022) (alteration in original) (quoting

Pollard v. White, 119 F.3d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1997)) (finding federal second-

degree murder committed with “depraved heart (i.e., reckless indifference)” is a

crime of violence). Specifically, “the killing of another human being with malice

aforethought requires finding that the defendant acted with extreme indifference, and

that the indifference was toward human life. The elements of second-degree murder

stand in stark contrast to the elements of offenses that do not require a showing of

malice aforethought.” Id. at 1094–95 (emphasis original).

      Like federal second-degree murder, Nevada second-degree murder requires a

defendant act with at least reckless or extreme indifference toward human life. And

even though the inquiry for a crime of violence is categorical, the jury instructions

in Taylor’s case affirm that he would not have been convicted absent a finding that

he acted with at least reckless indifference.

      2.     Because Nevada second-degree murder requires a mens rea of at least

extreme recklessness, it necessarily requires actual or threatened use of targeted

physical force. “[A]s the First Circuit observed, a defendant who acts with extreme

indifference to the value of human life can ‘fairly be said to have actively employed

force (i.e., “use[d]” force) “against the person of another.”’” Id. at 1095 (alterations

                                           5
in original) (quoting United States v. Báez-Martínez, 950 F.3d 119, 127 (1st Cir.

2020)). Because Taylor’s Johnson claim has no merit, he suffers no prejudice from

his procedural default.

      AFFIRMED.

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