Court Opinion

ID: 9629466
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:43:17.115503+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:19.671129
License: Public Domain

KELLY, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree, on different grounds, that 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a)(2), is unconstitutional. I find, however, that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the blood test in the instant case. Hence, I dissent and would affirm judgment of sentence.
I. Constitutionality of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(c)
As enacted, the current implied consent statute leaves unfettered discretion to the officer in the field to determine whether or not to invoke implied consent and request that a conscious driver submit to the blood test or direct that the test be performed on an unconscious driver. 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 1547(a)(2). While every driver who falls within the triggering language of the statute is deemed to consent, *91there is no requirement that all deemed to consent be tested. Rather, the officer in the field may pick and choose which to test on an entirely ad hoc basis. The absence of sufficient restrictions on the officer’s discretion as to which conscious drivers are to be requested to submit to a blood test, or which unconscious drivers are to be subjected to the blood test, renders the implied consent provision unconstitutional, even if a mandatory “request or test” provision applicable to all such drivers could pass constitutional muster Cf. Florida v. Wells, — U.S. -, 110 S.Ct. 1632, 109 L.Ed.2d 1 (1990); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); Commonwealth v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277, 535 A.2d 1035 (1987); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 453 Pa. 107, 307 A.2d 875 (1973); Commonwealth v. Leninsky, 360 Pa.Super. 49, 519 A.2d 984 (1986). Hence, I agree that the statute is unconstitutional.
I do not find it necessary here to determine if the rationale of “special need” to preserve highly evanescent evidence of blood alcohol content at the time of a serious train accident via warrantless, suspicionless blood testing of train crews for non-criminal prosecution, regulatory purposes in Skinner v. Railway Labor Executive Assn., 489 U.S. -, 109 S.Ct. 1402, 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989), could be extended to permit warrantless, suspicionless blood tests of drivers involved in serious automobile accidents, for criminal prosecution purposes. Nonetheless, in response to the majority’s broad prohibition, I note that I would be inclined to agree with Judge Tamilia that the rationale of Skinner should be extended to cover implied consent cases, provided the officer’s discretion, as to which persons (deemed to have consented) would be tested, was regulated in a rational and systematic manner.
II. Presence of Reasonable Suspicion
I find that reasonable suspicion existed in this case to believe that appellant was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Given the circumstances presented, I find that reasonable suspicion was sufficient to justify the blood test, and to render that test constitutionally reasonable.
*92At approximately 4:00 a.m. on Saturday, March 30, 1985, Jeffrey Greb and Mark Moser were passengers in a car driven by appellant, Bruce A. Kohl. Though the pavement was dry and visibility was clear, the car failed to negotiate a turn, struck a telephone pole, and then an embankment.
Police arrived at the scene moments later. They pulled appellant from behind the steering wheel and removed his passengers shortly before the demolished vehicle burst into flames. Jeffrey Greb was pronounced dead at the scene; Mark Moser died en route to the hospital. Appellant, who was unconscious, was transported to the hospital by medivac helicopter. The police at the scene had no opportunity to question or examine appellant for signs of intoxication at the scene. After appellant had been evacuated, the investigation at the scene continued, and revealed several critical facts. The pavement was dry and visibility was clear, the car had been travelling at a high rate of speed, and the brakes were not applied prior to impact.
I find that a reasonable suspicion of possible intoxication is raised when a car carrying three young men at 4:00 a.m. on a Saturday morning fails to negotiate a curve at a high rate of speed, and a telephone pole is struck without the brakes having been applied, despite dry pavement and clear visibility. While other less burdensome alternatives might be more appropriate to confirm or dispel such reasonable suspicions when the driver is conscious and cooperative, I have no difficulty in affirming a request for a minimally intrusive blood test under the circumstances as presented here.1
When there is reasonable suspicion to believe a motorist has driven while being intoxicated, the police are fully authorized to detain the motorist, question the motorist, and *93request the performance of simple tasks like walking a straight line, focusing on a moving pen, picking up change while standing on one-foot, or reciting the alphabet. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984) (upon reasonable suspicion, detained motorist requested to perform balancing test); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 103 S.Ct. 916, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (upon reasonable suspicion, detained motorist requested to touch his finger to his nose and to walk a straigh line). Those activities, or even simply observing the suspect’s demeanor during a brief investigation detention, provide the officer with an opportunity to look for common signs of intoxication, including odor of breath, flushed appearance, lack of muscular coordination, speech difficulties, disorderly or unusual conduct, mental or visual difficulties, sleepiness, dizziness, and nausea. See Commonwealth v. Leninsky, supra, 519 A.2d at 990 n. 6. Observation of any such symptoms in a driver involved in a serious automobile accident gives rise to probable cause, and fully justifies a constitutionally reasonable, warrantless, minimally intrusive blood test. See Commonwealth v. Haynos, 363 Pa.Super. 1, 525 A.2d 394 (1987); Commonwealth v. Pelkey, 349 Pa.Super. 373, 503 A.2d 414 (1985).
When, as here, there is a serious accident and a driver/suspect is in need of prompt medical attention, the investigating officers must yield to that exigency, and fore-go investigative detention, questioning, and observation. It is the medical exigency requiring officers to forgo lawful investigative detention which I find creates a “special need” which renders a warrantless, minimally intrusive blood test based upon reasonable suspicion, constitutionally reasonable in such cases, especially when the suspect is unconscious.
The purpose of a blood test in such circumstances is to confirm or dispel suspicions of intoxication by preserving highly evanescent evidence of the blood alcohol content at the time of the accident, when lawful alternatives are precluded by the exigency of the suspect’s medical emer*94gency. It should not be forgotten that, in the circumstances presented here, such evidence may acquit one whom circumstances might otherwise convict by preserving potentially exculpatory evidence which an unconscious driver cannot act on his or her own behalf to preserve.
Hence, I dissent.

. Evidence in this case indicated that it is standard medical practice to conduct blood alcohol tests on auto accident trauma patients. In this case, a blood alcohol test had already been ordered by appellant's treating physician when the officer’s request was made. Blood alcohol tests generally are minimally intrusive. When the suspect is a patient subject to the same test for medical purposes, the disclosure of the results of a dual purpose test, or the drawing of two vials of blood for testing, is even less intrusive.