Court Opinion

ID: 9729366
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:33:03.297009+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:57.283777
License: Public Domain

WIENER, Acting P. J., Concurring.
Notwithstanding the apparent conflict in Supreme Court precedent on this issue (see maj. opn. ante, at pp. 1044-1046), I am of the opinion there must be evidence that the defendant was subjectively aware of and deliberately failed to avoid the probable *1053dangerous consequences of his conduct before the court is obligated to instruct on the issue of punitive damages. I tend to think the “should know” language in Peterson v. Superior Court (1982) 31 Cal.3d 147, 158 [181 Cal.Rptr. 784, 642 P.2d 1305] and Donnelly v. Southern Pacific Co. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 863, 869 [118 P.2d 465] is dictum and may properly be disregarded as such when compared with the more explicit statements in Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 895-896 [157 Cal.Rptr. 693, 598 P.2d 854] and Hasson v. Ford Motor Co. (1982) 32 Cal.3d 388, 402 [185 Cal.Rptr. 654, 650 P.2d 1171]. Even if Peterson and Donnelly were direct holdings on the standard necessary for an award of punitive damages, the inconsistency in Supreme Court precedent would require that we choose the appropriate rule. (See generally People v. Simon (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 125, 133-134 [228 Cal.Rptr. 855].)
When the purposes of tort recovery change from compensation to punishment for “malicious” conduct, the “should know” formulation provides an insufficiently definite standard which blurs too easily into “mere negligence.” Where a jury determines that a defendant did not realize the risk he was creating, compensatory damages provide an adequate deterrent. Inferentially, had he realized the danger, he would have taken steps to avoid it. A different kind of social risk, however, is created by the defendant who actually appreciates the substantial risk he is creating but nonetheless deliberately disregards the probable harm. In those cases, the defendant’s culpability approaches that of an individual who intends to cause injury and thus justifies the award of punitive damages.
In this case, because there was no evidence that the hospital knowingly disregarded a substantial likelihood of harm, I believe the trial court correctly refused to instruct the jury on the issue of punitive damages. Accordingly, I concur in the result reached by the majority. I also fully concur in the majority opinion to the extent it affirms the trial court’s reduction of the jury award to reflect the $250,000 limitation of Civil Code section 3333.2.