Court Opinion

ID: 9396279
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-20 06:11:34.787945+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:15.812322
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed May 18, 2023

                                        In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                     __________

                               No. 11-22-00290-CV
                                   __________

                  IN THE INTEREST OF A.O., A CHILD

                     On Appeal from the 326th District Court
                              Taylor County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. 10371-CX

          MEMORAND UM OPI NI ON ON MOTI ON
                 FOR REHEAR I NG
      On April 6, 2023, this court issued an opinion in this cause in which we held
that the evidence was legally sufficient to support all of the trial court’s findings with
respect to Appellant but that the evidence was factually insufficient to show that the
termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the best interest of A.O. The
Department of Family and Protective Services has filed a motion for rehearing in
which it asserts that “critical evidence” was missing from this court’s analysis.
Although we previously considered all of the evidence in the record, we now address
the Department’s stated concerns.
       The Department points to evidence in the record indicating that Appellant
failed to comply with various provisions of his family service plan. We held in our
April 6 opinion that the evidence was legally sufficient to show that Appellant failed
to comply with the provisions of his family service plan, and we pointed out that
Appellant conceded this fact in his testimony. Because we upheld the trial court’s
finding related to Appellant’s failure to comply with the terms and conditions of his
court-ordered family service plan, we did not detail all of Appellant’s failures in this
regard. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 236 (Tex. 2019) (recognizing that, “when a
court of appeals reverses a finding based on insufficient evidence, the court must
‘detail the evidence relevant to the issue of parental termination and clearly state
why the evidence is insufficient to support a termination finding by clear and
convincing evidence’” (emphasis added) (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503
(Tex. 2014))); see also In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 19 (Tex. 2002) (same).
       We agree with the Department, as we did in our original opinion, that the
evidence shows that Appellant failed to comply with his court-ordered family service
plan. He failed to complete parenting classes, failed to obtain stable housing, failed
to provide information about the person with whom he lived, drove without a valid
license, and failed to submit to at least two of the Department’s requests for drug
testing.
       The Department also asserts in its motion for rehearing that this court
“assume[d]” that Appellant was in compliance with his probation. We did not, nor
did we state that he was in compliance with his probation. We stated: “Appellant
testified that, at the time of the termination hearing, he was in compliance with all of
the terms and conditions of his probation” and that the record did not indicate
otherwise.   The record shows that the Department had had no contact with

                                           2
Appellant’s probation officer and that the case manager for the Department testified
that she “[did] not know” if Appellant was “compliant with his probation officer.”
      Pursuant to Appellant’s service plan, he was court-ordered to continue daily
testing through a breathalyzer provided by his probation officer, the results of which
were sent directly to the probation officer. Under the service plan, the Department
was responsible for contacting Appellant’s probation officer in regard to the results
of his in-home breathalyzer tests and his progress with the terms and conditions of
probation. The service plan provided: “If needed, [Appellant] will sign a release of
information to allow 2INgage to communicate with his probation officer regarding
his progress.”
      In support of its motion for rehearing, the Department points to the
permanency case manager’s testimony indicating that Appellant refused to provide
his probation officer’s information to the caseworker and that she, therefore, did not
know if Appellant was in compliance with his probation. The Department, however,
fails to acknowledge the case manager’s testimony on cross-examination:
            Q. Do you know whether . . . his probation officer’s information
      was ever provided to [the prior caseworker]?
             A. I do not know.
            Q. At what point prior to yesterday when you were trying to
      verify that he had permission to travel here did you ask him for his
      probation officer’s information?
             A. I don’t believe I did before that.
            Q. So, you’ve been on this case since February of 2022; and
      you’ve never asked him for his probation officer’s information.
             A. Correct.
                   ....
             Q. Okay. Did you call the probation department where he lives
      ...?
             A. No, ma’am, because I need him to sign a release form --

                                          3
             Q. Okay.
             A. -- in order for me to be able to contact. . . .
             ....
            Q. . . . At what point, ma’am, did you ask him to sign a release
      form for you?
             A. I didn’t ask him yet.
      The Department additionally asserts that Appellant failed to attend AA as
required. The Department’s case manager testified that Appellant failed to provide
any sign-in sheets from AA meetings; however, she later testified that the
Department may have agreed that Appellant’s participation in a supportive
outpatient program would replace the requirement that he attend AA meetings.
      When issuing its ruling, the trial court stated that “the clear and convincing
standard . . . doesn’t take into account some of the failures by the various 2INgage
workers with regard to the timing that they did something or how they did
something; but . . . (O) requires proactive activity” by the parent. In issuing our
previous opinion, we upheld the trial court’s finding under subsection (O) and held
that a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its
finding under subsection (O)—that Appellant failed to comply with the provisions
of a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for Appellant to
obtain the return of A.O.—was true. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(O)
(West 2022); see also In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (stating the
appellate standard of review). We considered the entire record, but it was not
necessary to detail all of the evidence related to the finding under subsection (O) in
the opinion—because we did not hold that the evidence was insufficient to support
the trial court’s finding under subsection (O).
      We further note that we did consider (1) the entire record—including the
evidence addressed in this opinion on motion for rehearing and all other evidence in

                                           4
the record—and (2) the nine non-exhaustive Holley factors when we addressed
Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence with respect to the trial
court’s best interest finding and determined that the evidence was factually
insufficient to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s
parental rights would be in A.O.’s best interest. See Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d
367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).
      We deny the Department’s motion for rehearing.

                                            W. BRUCE WILLIAMS
                                            JUSTICE

May 18, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

                                        5