Court Opinion

ID: 9809854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:30:10.443255+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:26.070179
License: Public Domain

ScheNCK, J.
On 3 July, 1937, tbe petitioner procured from Harris, J., an order temporarily restraining tbe respondents from interfering with its taking top soil from tbe lands of tbe respondents with which to construct a public highway, and on 5 July, 1937, tbe respondents procured from Parker, J., an order temporarily restraining tbe petitioner from taking top soil from tbeir lands for tbe purpose of constructing a public highway. Both orders were returnable to Parker, *222Resident Judge, wbo, after bolding a joint bearing tbereon, dissolved tbe order procured by tbe respondents and continued in effect tbe order procured by tbe petitioner, and directed “tbat tbis cause be retained on tbe special proceeding docket for tbe purpose of determining tbe amount of compensation wbicb tbe defendants may be entitled to.” From tbis ruling tbe respondents appealed, assigning errors.
Tbe proceeding of the petitioner was instituted under section 22 of chapter 2 of tbe Public Laws of 1921 (being sec. 3846 [bb], N. C. Code of 1935, Michie), creating tbe State Highway Commission, and containing tbis specific grant of power: “Tbe State Highway Commission is vested with tbe power to acquire such rights of way and title to such land, gravel, gravel beds or bars, sand, sand beds or bars, rock, stone, boulders, quarries, or quarry beds, lime, or other earth or mineral deposits or formations, and such standing timber as it may deem necessary and suitable for road constructions, maintenance, and repair, and tbe necessary approaches and ways through, and a sufficient amount of land surrounding and adjacent thereto, as it may determine to enable it to properly prosecute tbe work, either by purchase, donation, or condemnation, in tbe manner hereinafter set out: . . .”
It is tbe contention of tbe respondents, first, tbat tbe statute does not vest in tbe petitioner tbe power to acquire top soil, deemed necessary and suitable for road construction, and, second, even if tbe statute does vest tbe power to acquire top soil, tbat it does not vest such power to acquire top soil from lands not contiguous to tbe highway upon tbe construction of which such soil is to be used.
We are of tbe opinion, and so bold, tbat neither of these contentions can be sustained.
Tbe statute uses tbe word “earth,” wbicb, as used, is a generic term and includes top soil, á species of earth. Hoke, J., in Jennings v. Highway Commission, 183 N. C., 68, in interpreting tbis statute, says: “And in chapter 2, section 22, they have also given defendant board tbe right to acquire material, gravel beds, sand bars, rocks, or other soil, mineral deposits, etc., necessary and suitable for tbe construction and maintenance of such roads. . . .”
There is nothing in tbe statute tbat limits tbe taking of tbe earth deemed necessary and suitable for road construction, maintenance, and repair to lands contiguous to tbe highway upon wbicb it is to be used.
Tbe judgment of tbe Superior Court is
Affirmed.