Court Opinion

ID: 9529405
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:50:29.718302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:45.994947
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion
Arterburn, J.
I concur in the majority opinion, with certain reservations. First, I think the term “final judgment” as used in the cases of Haag v. Haag (1959), 240 Ind. 291, 163 N. E. 2d 243; Cirtin v. Cirtin (1928), 199 Ind. 737, 164 N. E. 493; and Bahre v. Bahre (1964), 245 Ind. 522, 198 N. E. 2d 751, does not necessarily have an application as broad as the majority opinion seems to indicate. Those cases construed the term “final judgment” as used in Burns’ Ind. Stat. Anno. § 2-3201 [1946 Repl.] and as distinguished from an interlocutory order for the purpose of appeal only. The context within which that term is used is that procedural statute does not necessarily force a like meaning under other circumstances.
I likewise feel that no implication should be drawn from the majority opinion that a trial court is impotent in its ability to force the payment of attorney fees in order that a party may have an adequate and fair representation in a divorce case and on appeal. Crowe v. Crowe (1965), 247 Ind. 51, 211 N. E. 2d 164.
It appears here that the appellant has given bond, pending the appeal to pay the costs and “final judgment” involving the sums that are also the subject of this contempt citation *663in this case, and thus it might be said that the appellee has not been deprived of adequately paid counsel, which was necessary by reason of the appeal brought by the opposing party.
If the majority opinion is to be interpreted as leaving the court without power to assure the adequate payment of the expenses of litigation, including that of appeal, such as transcripts and attorney fees once the appeal is determined, it will leave a party helpless unless the court insists that final payments be made pending the litigation. The majority opinion, therefore, will probably induce trial courts, in order to see that parties are fairly represented in divorce cases, to insist that full payment of all attorney fees and court costs incidental to the litigation on behalf of the party lacking funds (normally the wife) be paid practically instanter and pending the litigation and before the case is finally determined.
Note.—Reported in 230 N. E. 2d 411.