Court Opinion

ID: 9626754
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:23:20.635794+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:33.340661
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Justice,
specially concurring, with whom MACY, Justice, joins.
For years in Wyoming, without required count, the state bar, trial bench, and law school faculty classified this state as an evidence-of-negligence jurisdiction for application of statutory-violation rules for jury instruction. But then came Distad v. Cubin, Wyo., 633 P.2d 167 (1981).
One is almost led to conclude that sometimes architectural proclivities overwhelm adjudicatory necessities.
It was my opinion then, which remains unchanged, that Distad says everything and means nothing, or says nothing definable and means everything in cultivating and nursing to fruition in Wyoming the Restatement confusion on evidence of negligence versus the per-se rules for violation *1202of statutes or promulgated regulatory regiment. Restatement of Torts 2d, §§ 286 and 288.
Alaska courts quickly amplified from Ferrell v. Baxter, Alaska, 484 P.2d 250 (1971), to Breitkreutz v. Baker, Alaska, 514 P.2d 17 (1973), to Clabaugh v. Bottcher, Alaska, 545 P.2d 172 (1976), as the latter case is now noted in the opinion of this court as it has “modified the expansive application of any rule of negligence per se.” 1
I am faced with the dual quandary of why the issue should be addressed in this case, and whether we affirm a complex, convoluted, and imprecise standard created by the Restatement, so that trial and appellate courts may then spend the next couple of decades devising case motivated excep*1203tions and exclusions. This is explicitly demonstrable from the text of Restatement 2d of Torts § 286, “The court may” and § 288, “The court will not.” One can easily be confused by the substantive concern of what happens between the “may” and the “will not,” in wonderment whether this means that you may not or will. Additionally, the confusion is magnified where the appellate court does not resolve whether the trial court or the appellate court is solely granted the undefined discretion to determine the rule to be applied for the substantive decision as in many cases may constitute a directed verdict result. This indeterminate confusion of authority and standard invades the entire litigative process from initial interview analysis to final appellate court pronouncement.
If the unspoken exception for use of the Restatement approach is motor vehicle cases, then we should say so, and why. Two quick examples illustrate the Scylla and Charybdis status which we consequently create for the practicing bar and the trial bench:
A long-haul truck driver is over-hour in driving time in violation of federal law, traveling at least ten miles in excess of federal regulations and state law, driving while drinking, and then passes without an audible signal. Failing to keep the vehicle under control, that driver now causes an accident.
Under Distad and this case, do we apply per se to any, each or all of these well-defined and clearly expressed criminal-law violations? See Alaska cases, supra fn. 1. At least I would contemplate that the purpose of the legislative enactment is found exclusively or in part (a) to protect a class of persons which includes the one whose interest is invaded; (b) to protect the particular interest which is invaded; (c) to protect that interest against the kind of harm which resulted; and (d) to protect that interest from the particular hazard from which the harm results.
I could easily find that regulations involving driving time, speed, driving while drinking, passing, and keeping a vehicle under control, are intended to protect others who may choose to be upon the highway.
The second example is:
A truck driver, moving slowly on a dusty county road, drives in the middle of the road, intentionally blocking the passage of a following vehicle desiring to pass. At least three state statutes are violated, each of which was adopted specifically to protect the class of persons whose interests were invaded. Summary judgment was granted against the injured party, whose misadventure resulted directly from the proscribed activity. England v. Simmons, Wyo., 728 P.2d 1137, 1143 (1986), Urbigkit, J., dissenting.
I agree with the court that this case affords an insufficient record upon which to send §§ 286 and 288 of the Restatement back to the law professors, and consequently I specially concur in the decision of the trial court.
Unfortunately, this court’s undesired approval of Distad will only serve to confuse the practicing attorney, and create a burdensome and uninstructed gambling requirement for the trial judges in courtroom decision on the applied evidentiary standard. There may be a case where a per-se judicial determination is necessary or even appropriate, but not having ever seen one, I suspect that the trial jury can recognize the significance of statutory violation under general-evidence and proximate-cause instructions.
I would not address the subject, but, if addressed, I would inter Distad v. Cubin, supra, and the Restatement which it adopted. I specially concur because our discussion in this case may only constitute dicta. See Dangel v. State, Wyo., 724 P.2d 1145 (1986). The subject can more forcefully and exhaustively be addressed in a case where the issue is dispositive.

. Clabaugh v. Bottcher, supra, which involved a decision that speeding did not invoke a per-se rule, was called into question by Bachner v. Rich, Alaska, 554 P.2d 430 (1976), wherein the general safety code was adopted as the per-se standard of care as involving a safe place to work. This necessitated some moderate review by me to try to determine what might occur if it is considered that we are following the Alaska law precedent development.
Lopez v. Bowen, Alaska, 495 P.2d 64 (1972) (trial court evidence of negligence instruction in automobile case; reversed for retrial); Fruit v. Schreiner, Alaska, 502 P.2d 133 (1972) (traffic case per-se instruction was not required in affirming the verdict); Spruce Equipment Co. v. Maloney, Alaska, 527 P.2d 1295 (1974) (truck struck road gravel; apparent per-se rule applied, although plaintiff's verdict reversed on basis of mitigation); Adkins v. Lester, Alaska, 530 P.2d 11 (1974), reh. denied 532 P.2d 1027 (1975) (per se indicated as a proper test in traffic case in the absence of exception excuse or justification); Wilson v. Sibert, Alaska, 535 P.2d 1034 (1975) (auto case; sudden emergency; used' excuse rule to obviate per se); Leigh v. Lundquist, Alaska, 540 P.2d 492 (1975) (stop light apparent per-se rule; cited with approval Breitkreutz v. Baker, supra, and Ferrell v. Baxter, supra; however, the instruction was not necessary since the pedestrian was not within the protected class under the facts); Kaatz v. State, Alaska, 540 P.2d 1037 (1975) (highway road-sanding case, with the appellate court stating that an unexcused violation of administrative regulation may be negligence itself, or only evidence of negligence; however, verdict reversed for retrial in plaintiffs favor, on damages only); McLinn v. Kodiak Electric Association, Inc., Alaska, 546 P.2d 1305 (1976) (approved denial of per-se instruction when pedestrian hit vehicle where defendant was engaged in construction work involving noncompliance of administrative regulation); Morris v. City of Soldotna, Alaska, 553 P.2d 474 (1976) (safe place to work; act did not invoke a per-se standard upon violation); Northern Lights Motel, Inc. v. Sweaney, Alaska, 561 P.2d 1176 (1977) (building code violation required a per-se instruction and adopted even if provision was unknown or obscure; see State Mechanical, Inc. v. Liquid Air, Inc., Alaska, 665 P.2d 15 (1983)); Barton v. Lund, Alaska, 563 P.2d 875 (1977), overruled by Alesna v. LeGrue, Alaska, 614 P.2d 1387 (1980) (dram shop case where the appellate court in footnote did not express an opinion on per se in approving summary judgment on another basis); Ferriss v. Texaco, Inc., Alaska, 599 P.2d 161 (1979) (violation of the national electric code did not invoke a per-se status); Farnsworth v. Steiner, Alaska, 601 P.2d 266 (1979) (FAA regulation justified a per-se instruction); Coffel v. Steward, Alaska, 611 P.2d 543 (1980) (in reversing, and citing Ferrell v. Baxter, supra, held that violation of statute did not abrogate a contract); Godfrey v. Hemenway, Alaska, 617 P.2d 3 (1980) (failure to give per-se instruction in speeding case was reversible error); Bailey v. Lenord, Alaska, 625 P.2d 849 (1981) (illegal auto racing is negligence per se); Johnson v. State, Alaska, 636 P.2d 47 (1981) (utility road maintenance standard is not sufficiently applicable to a bicycle accident to invoke per se); Nazareno v. Urie, Alaska, 638 P.2d 671 (1981), overruled by Kavorkian v. Tommy's Elbow Room, Inc., Alaska, 711 P.2d 521 (1985) (automobile collision invokes per-se status in the dram-shop context; defendant’s verdict reversed); Grothe v. Olafson, Alaska, 659 P.2d 602 (1983) (Federal Mine Safety Act can invoke per se at work site as a required specific conduct rather than a general or abstract duty); Harned v. Dura Corporation, Alaska, 665 P.2d 5 (1983) (noncompliance with design standards of American Society of Mechanical Engineers was negligence per se; affirmed after retrial at 703 P.2d 396 (1985)); State Mechanical, Inc. v. Liquid Air, Inc., supra, 665 P.2d 15 (Compressed Gas Association pamphlet; violation justified a per-se instruction); Osborne v. Russell, Alaska, 669 P.2d 550, 554 (1983) (contact with electrical wire in restaurant invoked per se through National Electric Code by comment that the "discretion to refuse instruction was confined to the highly unusual cases in which the law may be so obscure or irrational as not to provide a standard as a matter of law”; vague or arcane rule); Lundquist v. Department of Public Safety, Alaska, 674 P.2d 780 (1983) (governmental duty to remove drunk drivers did not subject the municipality to the Baxter rule); Vance v. United States, 355 F.Supp. 756 (D.Alaska 1973) (dram shop violation invoked a per-se liability).
It may not be proper for me to conclude that the course of cases has modified the expansive application of the rule of negligence per se.