Court Opinion

ID: 9376911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-06 11:06:47.06808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:10.258341
License: Public Domain

In the
                  Court of Appeals
          Second Appellate District of Texas
                   at Fort Worth
               ___________________________
                    No. 02-22-00213-CV
               ___________________________

SERVICE CORPORATION INTERNATIONAL, GREGORY W. SPENCER
FUNERAL DIRECTORS, AND DIGNITY MEMORIAL NETWORK, INC.,
                       Appellants

                              V.

          TONYEKA WILLIAMS-BIRDOW, Appellee

            On Appeal from the 342nd District Court
                    Tarrant County, Texas
                Trial Court No. 342-320822-20

           Before Birdwell, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
           Memorandum Opinion by Justice Womack
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                  I. INTRODUCTION

      Appellant Gregory W. Spencer Funeral Directors (Spencer)1 appeals from the

trial court’s order regarding its motion to compel arbitration of claims brought against

it by Appellee Tonyeka Williams-Birdow (Williams-Birdow). In three issues, Spencer

complains of the trial court’s (1) striking its amended motion to compel arbitration,

(2) striking its exhibit submitted as evidence in its brief and in support of its amended

motion, and (3) denying its motion to compel arbitration; and in its fourth issue,

Spencer argues that we should consider de novo whether the arbitration agreement is

enforceable. Holding that the trial court abused its discretion by striking the amended

motion and exhibit but overruling the challenge to the denial of the original motion to

compel arbitration, we will reverse and remand for proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

                                  II. BACKGROUND

      This case arises out of the death of Williams-Birdow’s husband, Albert Birdow,

Jr. (Birdow), who passed away on November 1, 2018. According to Spencer, the day

      1
        Only Spencer has filed a notice of appeal, although the pleadings and the
briefs also refer to Service Corporation International (SCI) and Dignity Memorial
Network, Inc. (Dignity) as appellants. In her pleadings, Williams-Birdow alleged that
Spencer is owned by Dignity, which is in turn owned by SCI. Although these entities
were defendants below, Spencer’s answer contended that they were not “the proper
defendant[s] in this matter.” The subject ruling concerns the denial of a motion to
compel arbitration filed only by Spencer. For all of these reasons, we consider
Spencer as the only appellant.

                                           2
that Birdow died, Williams-Birdow contacted it and requested that Birdow’s body be

removed from her home. On the same day, the body was removed and taken to

Spencer’s facility. The following day, Williams-Birdow viewed Birdow’s body at the

facility and signed an “Identification Acknowledgement” and an “Authorization to

Embalm at Funeral Establishment or Other Location.”

      As alleged in the pleadings, Williams-Birdow requested that she see the body in

private before any services because she was not home the day Birdow died. When

Williams-Birdow arrived at the funeral home, “there was a strong smell.” When she

got to the back of the funeral home, “Birdow’s body was completely unrecognizable”

and “[h]is body was bloated and distorted because he was left in an open room and

not refrigerated.”

      The following day, the body was moved to a mortuary service and then to the

Tarrant County Medical Examiner’s office for autopsy.        On November 8, after

completion of the autopsy, the body was transported back to the mortuary service.

According to Williams-Birdow’s pleadings, none of these transports were discussed

with or approved by her. However, she did sign an “Authorization for Cremation

and Disposition” on the same day, allowing the transfer of the cremated remains from

the mortuary service back to Spencer. According to Williams-Birdow, she “was

forced to cremate her husband because the condition of his body could not be

repaired enough to have his body inside of the church or to have an open casket.”

                                          3
      On November 9, Williams-Birdow signed a document entitled “Statement of

Funeral Goods and Services Selected/Purchase Agreement” (Contract), which

contained the following paragraph:

      BY SIGNING THIS AGREEMENT, YOU ARE AGREEING
      THAT ANY CLAIM YOU MAY HAVE AGAINST THE
      SELLER SHALL BE RESOLVED BY ARBITRATION AND
      YOU ARE GIVING UP YOUR RIGHT TO A COURT OR JURY
      TRIAL AS WELL AS YOUR RIGHT OF APPEAL.

The document was also signed by Andrea Q Franklin on behalf of “Seller,” who was

identified as Spencer.

      Williams-Birdow ultimately filed suit against Spencer, alleging causes of action

for negligence, gross negligence, negligence per se, fraud and forgery, intentional

infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of

contract, and breach of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act. Among her claims,

she alleged that Spencer owed her “a duty to properly care for her husband’s remains”

and that it had “left [Birdow’s body] unrefrigerated which caused him to decompose

at an accelerated rate,” which in turn caused her to suffer “insurmountable damages

because she had to see her husband’s body in its bloated state, [and] she was left with

no option but to have her husband cremated.”

      Spencer answered and later filed its “Defendant’s Motion to Compel

Arbitration and Abate Suit” (Motion). Attached to the Motion were (1) the Contract,

which importantly consisted of only two pages; (2) “Plaintiff’s Third Amended

Petition”; (3) the “Identification Acknowledgement”; (4) the “Authorization to

                                          4
Embalm at Funeral Establishment or Other Location”; (5) the “Authorization for

Cremation and Disposition”; and (6) a release that was signed by Williams-Birdow on

November 10, 2018. The Motion was set for hearing on March 31, 2022.

       Prior to the hearing, Williams-Birdow filed a response to the Motion, alleging

that the arbitration agreement in the Contract was unenforceable because (1) “it does

not meet the interstate commerce requirement under the Federal Arbitration Act or

requirements under the Texas Arbitration Act,” (2) “it is not a valid contract due to

unconscionability,” (3) “it is vague,” and (4) Spencer “has substantially invoked the

judicial process to [Williams-Birdow’s] detriment and thus waived the right to compel

arbitration.”   Spencer filed a reply to the response which attached March 2022

affidavits of Warren A. “Tony” Lynch and Tomekco Webster as well as an email from

Williams-Birdow’s attorney. The affidavit of Lynch—an employee of SCI—explained

the business operations of Spencer, including the names of companies referenced in

the Contract and other documents signed by Williams-Birdow. The affidavit of

Webster—also identified as an employee of SCI—provided details of the execution of

the Contract by Williams-Birdow and Spencer and stated that the Contract was signed

by all parties at Spencer’s offices rather than “in the limo on the way to [Birdow’s]

funeral” as alleged by Williams-Birdow’s attorney in an email.

       At the March 31 hearing on the Motion, the trial court raised questions

regarding whether part of the Contract was missing and whether the arbitration clause

was too vague to be enforceable. Williams-Birdow’s attorney argued that there were

                                           5
“terms and conditions on the backside” of the Contract that were omitted and “could

limit the terms of enforcement or could waive arbitration.” Indeed, directly above the

arbitration clause in the two-page Contract, were the following words:           “SEE

OTHER SIDE FOR TERMS AND CONDITIONS THAT ARE PART OF

THIS AGREEMENT.” In response to this argument, the trial court stated, “Y’all

need to provide briefing on this issue.” The trial court continued, “My concern is that

if there were no terms and conditions that were attached to this, you’re saying that

you don’t even know if they existed, and then this is so vague, I want something

saying that it can be that vague and still be enforceable.” The trial court added, “I

mean, I understand they didn’t provide the terms and conditions, so if you want to

talk about that. This is too vague.” Williams-Birdow’s attorney also pointed out that

Spencer’s “head honcho” was deposed the previous day and stated “that this contract

that they’re trying to enforce was rescinded and there was a new contract.” While

Spencer’s attorney disputed this account of the deposition, the trial court reserved its

ruling and gave the parties “two weeks to get the deposition transcribed and get me

something showing that she said that it was rescinded and that there is no contract

currently” and “if you want to provide some kind of briefing on the issue of

vagueness on the arbitration clause, then I’ll look at that.” The trial court ultimately

set April 15 as the deadline to provide briefing and stated that the new hearing would

be by submission after the deadline.

                                           6
      On April 12, Spencer filed its “Defendant’s Amended Motion to Compel

Arbitration and Abate Suit” (Amended Motion) as well as its “Brief on Vagueness and

Ambiguity in Support of Defendant’s Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration and

Abate Suit” (Brief on Vagueness and Ambiguity). Attached to the Amended Motion

were several documents. First, the Contract was again attached, but this time it

consisted of four pages, including the “Terms and Conditions” referenced at the

March 31 hearing. An additional arbitration clause was contained on page three of

the Contract. It provided:

      ARBITRATION: YOU AGREE THAT ANY CLAIM YOU MAY
      HAVE     RELATING      TO    THE    TRANSACTION
      CONTEMPLATED BY THIS AGREEMENT (INCLUDING
      ANY CLAIM OR CONTROVERSY REGARDING THE
      INTERPRETATION OF THIS ARBITRATION CLAUSE)
      SHALL BE SUBMITTED TO AND FINALLY RESOLVED BY
      MANDATORY      AND    BINDING   ARBITRATION    IN
      ACCORDANCE WITH THE APPLICABLE RULES OF THE
      AMERICAN    ARBITRATION     ASSOCIATION   (“AAA”);
      PROVIDED, HOWEVER, THAT THE FOREGOING
      REFERENCE TO THE AAA RULES SHALL NOT BE
      DEEMED TO REQUIRE ANY FILING WITH THAT
      ORGANIZATION, NOR ANY DIRECT INVOLVEMENT OF
      THAT ORGANIZATION. THE ARBITRATOR SHALL BE
      SELECTED BY MUTUAL AGREEMENT OF THE PARTIES.
      IF THE PARTIES FAIL TO OR ARE UNABLE TO AGREE ON
      THE SELECTION OF AN APPROPRIATE ARBITRATOR,
      THE AAA SHALL SELECT THE ARBITRATOR PURSUANT
      TO ITS RULES AND PROCEDURES UPON THE
      APPLICATION OF ONE OR BOTH PARTIES. THIS
      AGREEMENT TO ARBITRATE ALSO APPLIES TO ANY
      CLAIM OR DISPUTE BETWEEN OR AMONG THE SELLER,
      YOU AS THE PURCHASER, ANY PERSON WHO CLAIMS TO
      BE A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THIS
      AGREEMENT, ANY OF THE SELLER’S EMPLOYEES OR

                                        7
      AGENTS, ANY OF THE SELLER’S PARENT, SUBSIDIARY,
      OR AFFILIATE CORPORATIONS, AND ANY OF THE
      EMPLOYEES OR AGENTS OF THOSE PARENT,
      SUBSIDIARY, OR AFFILIATE CORPORATIONS, EXCEPT AS
      MAY BE REQUIRED BY LAW. NEITHER PARTY NOR AN
      ARBITRATOR MAY DISCLOSE THE EXISTENCE,
      CONTENT, OR RESULTS OF ANY ARBITRATION
      HEREUNDER      WITHOUT    THE   PRIOR   WRITTEN
      CONSENT OF BOTH PARTIES.

Further terms of the arbitration agreement were found on page four of the Contract:

      ARBITRATION: You agree that any dispute, controversy or claim
      arising out of or relating to this Agreement shall be submitted to and
      finally resolved by mandatory and binding arbitration in accordance with
      the rules of the American Arbitration Association. The arbitration shall
      be conducted by one arbitrator selected by mutual agreement of the
      parties and shall occur in the city or county in which this Agreement was
      executed. The prevailing party in any such arbitration shall be entitled to
      recover its reasonable costs and attorneys fees as part of any award
      entered therein, and judgment may be entered upon any arbitration
      award in any court having jurisdiction.

The “Terms and Conditions” also included the following paragraph:

      ENTIRE AGREEMENT: This Agreement contains all terms which
      have been agreed upon by us and you relating to the goods and services
      listed on the Statement of Funeral Goods and Services
      Selected/Purchase Agreement. This Agreement replaces all other
      discussions and agreements, whether oral or written, relating to those
      goods and services. No subsequent discussion or agreement can change
      the terms of this Agreement unless it is written and is signed by both us
      and you.

Several additional exhibits were attached to the Amended Motion, including

“Plaintiff’s Third Amended Petition,” April 2022 affidavits of Lynch and Franklin, the

“Authorization to Embalm at Funeral Establishment or Other Location,” the

“Authorization for Cremation and Disposition,” and a release. The affidavit of Lynch

                                          8
clarified that the Contract consisted of four pages and again explained the business

operations of Spencer, including the names of companies referenced in the Contract

and other documents signed by Williams-Birdow.             The affidavit of Franklin—

identified as Spencer’s “embalmer and funeral director”—set out details of the

execution of the various documents by Williams-Birdow.

      On April 18,2 Williams-Birdow filed her “Plaintiff’s Brief on Vagueness in

Support of Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and

Abate Suit, Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendant’s Brief Evidence, and Plaintiff’s

Motion to Strike Defendant’s First Amended Motion to Compel Arbitration and

Abate Suit.” In the brief, Williams-Birdow argued that the two-page Contract in

Spencer’s Motion was “too vague to be enforceable” because it provides “no guidance

on which arbitration forum to utilize, which set of arbitration rules that would govern

the proceeding, the number of arbitrators, whether or not the arbitration is binding,

etc.” In addition, she contended that the Contract was “unilaterally renegotiated and

rescinded in favor o[f] a new contract that only covered goods/merchandise and not

goods plus services.” Williams-Birdow moved the trial court to strike Spencer’s

Amended Motion “because the deadline for amendments or responses to that motion

has passed and [Spencer’s] amendment was not timely.”             Williams-Birdow also

objected to “Exhibit 1” (the four-page Contract) to Spencer’s brief because it was not

      2
        Although the trial court set April 15 as the deadline to file briefs, no party has
raised a timeliness issue regarding Williams-Birdow’s brief.

                                            9
a true and correct copy of the contract; there is no business records affidavit to

authenticate it; “there are severe irregularities on the pages that make it apparent that

pages 3 and 4 are not part of the same document as pages 1 and 2”; and Webster’s

deposition testimony “directly contradicts the statements in her affidavit” and

“therefore negates any authentication” of the exhibit. In support of her arguments,

Williams-Birdow attached portions of the depositions of Webster and Lorna Downs,

another employee of Spencer.

      On April 19, a notice of hearing on the Amended Motion was filed, setting the

hearing for May 27. On May 5, an amended notice of hearing was filed, changing the

hearing date to June 16. Before a hearing was held on the Amended Motion, the trial

court signed an order3 on May 18 (1) denying Spencer’s Motion, (2) striking Spencer’s

Amended Motion, and (3) striking Exhibit 1 (the Contract consisting of four pages) to

Spencer’s Brief on Vagueness and Ambiguity. Spencer appealed from this order.

Spencer requested findings of fact and conclusions of law and gave notice of past due

findings of fact and conclusions of law, but none were filed.

                                   III. DISCUSSION

      On appeal, Spencer challenges the trial court’s order (1) striking its Amended

Motion, (2) striking its Exhibit 1—the four-page Contract—submitted as evidence in

its Brief on Vagueness and Ambiguity, and (3) denying its Motion. In what is labeled

      3
       In its brief, Spencer states that the motion to strike was never set for hearing
and the trial court’s ruling was “without prior notice to the parties.”

                                           10
as its fourth issue, Spencer contends that we should consider de novo whether the

arbitration agreement is enforceable.

A. Striking the Amended Motion and Evidence

      With regard to the first two issues, Spencer contends that by striking the

Amended Motion and evidence, the trial court “denied [Spencer] the opportunity to

establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement” and abused its discretion “by

ignoring applicable contract interpretation principles.” Williams-Birdow responds

that the trial court did not err by striking the Amended Motion because it violated

Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 63, which limits the ability to amend pleadings within

seven days of trial. With regard to the four-page Contract, Williams-Birdow contends

that it was not authenticated and that pages three and four were not part of the

agreement.

      1. Standard of Review for Striking the Motion and Evidence

      We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to strike4 amended pleadings for an

abuse of discretion. Strange v. HRsmart, 400 S.W.3d 125, 131 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2013, no pet.); see Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 657

(Tex. 1990) (op. on reh’g) (motion to strike petition in intervention); Wells v. Best Ins.

      4
         We note that there is no rule specifically authorizing a motion to strike a
motion to compel arbitration. See Rodriguez v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., 162 S.W.3d 868,
873 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (stating that a motion to strike
used to dismiss claims is an “unauthorized procedural vehicle”); see also O’Carolan v.
Hopper, 414 S.W.3d 288, 297 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.) (“Although the rules
of civil procedure do not provide for a motion to strike pleadings (except in a motion
for sanctions) . . . .”).

                                           11
Servs., Inc., No. 13-09-00236-CV, 2010 WL 4264792, at *2 (Tex. App.—Corpus

Christi–Edinburg, Oct. 28, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (motion to strike deemed

admissions).

       A trial court’s rulings admitting or excluding evidence are also reviewable for an

abuse of discretion. Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Sols., Inc., 464 S.W.3d 338, 347 (Tex.

2015). An appellate court must uphold the trial court’s evidentiary ruling if there is

any legitimate basis in the record for the ruling. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Malone,

972 S.W.2d 35, 43 (Tex. 1998). A trial court abuses its discretion if the court acts

without reference to any guiding rules or principles, that is, if the act is arbitrary or

unreasonable. Low v. Henry, 221 S.W.3d 609, 614 (Tex. 2007); Downer v. Aquamarine

Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 241–42 (Tex. 1985).

       2. Applicable Law Regarding the Motion

       Section 171.021 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs

proceedings to compel arbitration. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 171.021. If a

party opposing a motion to compel denies the existence of the arbitration agreement,

the trial court must “summarily determine that issue” and order arbitration if it finds

such an agreement exists. Id. § 171.021(b). Whether or not an evidentiary hearing is

held depends on the circumstances. In re MP Ventures of S. Tx., Ltd., 276 S.W.3d 524,

528 n.4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2008, orig. proceeding). If material facts are

uncontroverted, the trial court may decide whether to compel arbitration based on the

affidavits, pleadings, discovery, and stipulations. Id. (citing Jack B. Anglin Co. v. Tipps,

                                            12
842 S.W.2d 266, 269 (Tex. 1992)). The trial court is only required to hold a hearing to

resolve disputed facts. Id.

      Where a hearing is necessary, the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a

motion and notice of a hearing “must be served upon all other parties not less than

three days before the time specified for the hearing, unless otherwise provided by

these rules or shortened by the court.” Tex. R. Civ. P. 21(b). A trial court is required

to consider and rule upon a motion within a reasonable time. Safety-Kleen Corp. v.

Garcia, 945 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1997, orig. proceeding). When

a motion is properly filed and pending before a trial court, the act of giving

consideration to and ruling upon that motion is a ministerial act. Id. While an

appellate court may not tell a trial court how to rule, mandamus may issue to compel a

trial court to act on a properly filed and pending motion. In re Blakeney, 254 S.W.3d

659, 661 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2008, orig. proceeding).

      3. Analysis

      Here, Spencer filed its Amended Motion after concerns regarding vagueness

and rescission were raised at the hearing on the Motion. The reasons cited by

Williams-Birdow in support of her motion to strike the Amended Motion were that

“the deadline for amendments or responses to that motion ha[d] passed and

[Spencer’s] amendment was not timely” and that leave to amend the Motion was

neither requested nor granted. Williams-Birdow cited no authority in support of her

motion to strike. The record does not reflect that a hearing was set on the motion to

                                          13
strike, but a hearing was set on the Amended Motion. However, the trial court struck

the Amended Motion as well as the four-page Contract attached to Spencer’s brief

before any hearing was held.

       On appeal, Williams-Birdow expands her argument supporting her motion to

strike to state that a motion to compel arbitration filed pursuant to Texas Civil

Practice & Remedies Code Section 171.023(b) cannot be amended except as allowed

by Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 63. And because the Amended Motion was filed

without leave of court and less than seven days from the two-week due date set by the

trial court, the Amended Motion and additional evidence “were a complete surprise”

to her. She concludes that “[t]his conduct is expressly prohibited by Texas Rule of

Civil Procedure 63,” and therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in

striking the Amended Motion.

       But Williams-Birdow’s argument misconstrues the nature of the Amended

Motion filed by Spencer.        The Amended Motion was a new motion with new

evidence and arguments which was set for a new hearing. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 65

(“Unless the substituted instrument shall be set aside on exceptions, the instrument

for which it is substituted shall no longer be regarded as a part of the pleading in the

record of the cause . . . .”); see also FKM P’ship, Ltd. v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Hous.

Sys., 255 S.W.3d 619, 633 (Tex. 2008) (“Our rules provide that amended pleadings and

their contents take the place of prior pleadings.”). It was neither a disguised motion

for rehearing nor a supplement to the original Motion. See 21st Mortg. Corp. v. Moore,

                                              14
No. 11-17-00167-CV, 2019 WL 150953, at *2 (Tex. App.—Eastland Jan. 10, 2019, no

pet.) (mem. op.) (“Because the second motion to compel arbitration arose from a

different arbitration agreement and it involved a new argument, it constituted a

distinct motion to compel arbitration rather than a motion to reconsider the previous

motion to compel arbitration.”). As evidenced by the record in this case, a new

hearing was set more than thirty days from the filing of the Amended Motion and

well before the pending trial date.

      The crux of Williams-Birdow’s argument is that a summary-judgment

proceeding is a “trial” within the meaning of Rule 63; under Section 171.023(b), a

hearing on a motion to compel arbitration is a trial; and therefore, application of

Rule 63 supports striking the Amended Motion and evidence. Williams-Birdow relies

on the language in Section 171.023(b) which provides that “[i]f there is a substantial

bona fide dispute as to whether an agreement to arbitrate exists, the court shall try the

issue promptly and summarily,” as well as Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 63, which

provides:

      Parties may amend their pleadings, respond to pleadings on file of other
      parties, file suggestions of death and make representative parties, and file
      such other pleas as they may desire by filing such pleas with the clerk at
      such time as not to operate as a surprise to the opposite party; provided,
      that any pleadings, responses or pleas offered for filing within seven days
      of the date of trial or thereafter, or after such time as may be ordered by
      the judge under rule 166, shall be filed only after leave of the judge is
      obtained, which leave shall be granted by the judge unless there is a
      showing that such filing will operate as a surprise to the opposite party.

                                           15
Tex. R. Civ. P. 63.5 However, neither of these rules support striking the Amended

Motion.

      Williams-Birdow contends that just as a summary-judgment proceeding is a

trial within the meaning of Rule 63, Goswami v. Metro. Sa. & Loan Ass’n, 751 S.W.2d

487, 490 (Tex. 1988), a hearing on a motion to compel arbitration equates to a trial.

But a hearing on a motion to compel arbitration is neither a trial nor a summary-

judgment proceeding. Rather, it has been described as a “pretrial matter” and a

“summary proceeding.” See In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 180 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Tex.

2005) (orig. proceeding) (stating that Texas procedural rules call for determination of

arbitrability by “summary proceedings”); Wright v. Hernandez, 469 S.W.3d 744, 753

(Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (“[A] proceeding on a motion to compel

arbitration is a pretrial matter, and [ ] the civil rules governing jury trials are

inapplicable.”); see also Coyle v. Coyle Fam. Farm, Inc., No. 04-18-00457-CV, 2019 WL

2110692, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 15, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding

that a motion to compel arbitration does not require twenty-one days’ notice of the

hearing because it “is not the equivalent of a summary judgment motion but is simply

a pre-trial motion”).   Accordingly, Rule 63’s prohibition of certain amendments

without leave of court does not apply.

      5
        At the time of the hearing on the Motion, trial was set for July 11, 2022.
According to Spencer, there were no other orders in the case under Texas Rule of
Civil Procedure 166.

                                          16
      Moreover, even if a motion to compel arbitration could be equated to a motion

for summary judgment, an amended or new motion for summary judgment can be

filed after a previous motion for summary judgment is denied. See Rentfro v. Cavazos,

No. 04-10-00617-CV, 2012 WL 566364, at *14 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 12,

2012, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“It is certainly possible that a summary judgment

movant might not have sufficient evidence to establish an affirmative defense as a

matter of law when the motion for summary judgment is first filed, but this does not

mean that prior to the entry of any final judgment such evidence might not become

available, allowing the movant to amend, refile, or reurge the motion for summary

judgment based on additional evidence.”). And if the trial court denies a summary

judgment, it has authority to later reconsider and grant a motion for summary

judgment or change or modify the original order. See Ravkind v. Mortg. Funding Corp.,

881 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, no writ); Bennett v. State

Nat’l Bank, 623 S.W.2d 719, 721 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref’d

n.r.e.); R.I.O. Sys. v. Union Carbide, 780 S.W.2d 489, 492 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi

1989, writ denied).

      Because the trial court should have considered the Amended Motion even if

the original Motion was denied, we next address whether striking the Amended

Motion was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. In an analogous situation, a sister

court held that it was. In Lucchese Boot Co. v. Licon, 388 S.W.3d 365 (Tex. App.—El

Paso 2012, no pet.), the appellant argued that the trial court had abused its discretion

                                          17
by striking its amended motion to compel arbitration and by refusing to compel

arbitration. Id. at 372. In making its decision, the court first looked at different

authorities allowing pleadings to be stricken. Id.

      Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, courts are authorized to strike a
      party’s pleadings in a limited variety of situations. For example, a court
      is required to strike a party’s pleadings under Tex. R. Civ. P. 12 if an
      attorney fails to show sufficient authority to prosecute or defend a suit
      on behalf of a party and no party who is authorized to prosecute or
      defend appears. A court may strike a groundless and false pleading.
      Tex. R. Civ. P. 13. A court is also authorized to strike a third party
      claim. Tex. R. Civ. P. 38(a). A plea in intervention is subject to being
      stricken by the court for sufficient cause on the motion of any party.
      Tex. R. Civ. P. 60. As another example, a court may strike a pleading
      filed after a deadline imposed by a pre-trial order. See Tex. R. Civ. P.
      166(p). The Rules of Civil Procedure also authorize trial courts to
      sanction a party for failure to comply with a discovery request by striking
      pleadings or by entering an order refusing to allow the disobedient party
      from supporting designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from
      introducing designated matters in evidence. Tex. R. Civ. P. 215.2(b)(5).

Id. The court noted that the party opposing arbitration had urged the trial court to

strike the amended motion to compel arbitration and refuse to consider evidence

attached to the motion based on (1) waiver of the right to assert the new grounds

alleged in the amended motion, (2) failure to exercise due diligence in presenting new

arguments and evidence, and (3) estoppel from reopening the arbitration issue. Id. at

372–73. Notably, the party opposing arbitration urged that, pursuant to Texas Rule

of Civil Procedure 270 (which provides in part “that in a jury case no evidence on a

controversial matter shall be received after the verdict of the jury”), the arbitration

movant “could not ‘reopen’ the arbitration issue and introduce new evidence.” Id.

                                           18
at 374. Rejecting all of these arguments and specifically finding that Rule 270 was

inapplicable to a motion to compel arbitration, the El Paso court concluded that the

trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion to strike. Id. at 376; see

Lucchese, Inc. v. Solano, 388 S.W.3d 343, 354 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.) (same);

Lucchese, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 388 S.W.3d 354, 365 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, no pet.)

(same).

      Similarly, here, none of the arguments made by Williams-Birdow support the

trial court’s order striking the Amended Motion. Accordingly, we conclude that the

trial court abused its discretion by granting the motion to strike and not considering

the Amended Motion. See Approximately $1,589.00 v. State, 230 S.W.3d 871, 875 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (holding that trial court erred by refusing

to hear motion to strike deemed admissions). We sustain Spencer’s first issue.

      With regard to the struck evidence, Williams-Birdow relies on Texas Rule of

Evidence 803(6) and 902(10) to support her argument that the trial court did not

abuse its discretion because Spencer “simply attached” the Contract to its brief and

“wholly failed to include any sort of business records affidavit to self-authenticate

their alleged complete arbitration agreement.” Spencer responds that this argument is

“contrary to the record and to controlling law” and is not properly raised on appeal

due to Williams-Birdow’s failure to obtain rulings on her objections. We agree.

      First, Williams-Birdow misstates the evidence. In both its original Motion and

the Amended Motion, Spencer provided affidavit testimony of Lynch to prove up the

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Contract. Lynch attested to his “personal knowledge of the goods and services that

funeral homes owned by SCI, including [Spencer], offer and sell” and his personal

knowledge of how the contracts “extended and executed” by Spencer operate. He

attached a copy of the Contract to both affidavits. In his second affidavit, he added,

      Pages 3 and 4 of the Contract are labeled “Terms and Conditions.”
      These pages 3 and 4 to the Contract were and are standard for every
      agreement on Form FUN0099 REV (01/07) that SCI funeral homes,
      including [Spencer], provided and provide to customers. Pages 3 and 4
      were part of the agreement executed by [Williams-Birdow]. In 2018, at
      the time of the execution of the Contract, pages 3 and 4 would have
      been provided to every customer entering a Statement of Funeral Goods
      and Services Selected/Purchase Agreement, just like the Contract with
      [Williams-Birdow].

See In re Estate of Guerrero, 465 S.W.3d 693, 703–04 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]

2015, pet. denied) (stating that evidentiary standards for a motion to compel

arbitration are the same as for a motion for summary judgment and that a “properly

sworn affidavit stating that the attached documents are true and correct copies of the

original authenticates the copies so they may be considered as summary judgment

evidence”); Rockwall Commons Assocs., Ltd. v. MRC Mortg. Grantor Tr. I, 331 S.W.3d 500,

511 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, no pet.) (“The construction loan, mortgage note, and

guaranty agreement were admissible because, as contracts, they have legal effect

independent of the truth of any statements contained therein and are not hearsay.”);

Ltd. Logistics Servs., Inc. v. Villegas, 268 S.W.3d 141, 146 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 2008, no pet.) (“Moreover, a party to a contract will not normally prevail on

a hearsay objection to a contract because a signed instrument, such as a contract, that

                                          20
creates legal rights is not hearsay because it has the legal effect independent of the

truth of any statement contained in it.”).

       By striking the Contract, the trial court never ruled on Williams-Birdow’s

objections. As a result, they are waived and may not be urged on appeal. Nationwide

Coin & Bullion Rsrv., Inc. v. Thomas, 625 S.W.3d 498, 504 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th

Dist.] 2020, pet. denied). We sustain Spencer’s second issue.

B. Denying the Motion to Compel Arbitration

       In its third issue, Spencer argues that the trial court erred by denying its Motion

“because the record shows that, as a matter of law, Williams[-Birdow] and Spencer

were parties to an agreement containing a valid arbitration clause; this suit is within

the scope of the arbitration clause; and no valid defense to arbitration was provided

by Williams[-Birdow].” Therefore, according to Spencer’s fourth issue, we “should

determine de novo that the arbitration agreement is enforceable and compel

arbitration.”

       1. Standard of Review for a Motion to Compel Arbitration

       We review a trial court’s order denying a motion to compel arbitration for

abuse of discretion. Henry v. Cash Biz, LP, 551 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2018), cert.

denied, 139 S. Ct. 184 (2018); In re Labatt Food Serv., L.P., 279 S.W.3d 640, 642–43 (Tex.

2009) (orig. proceeding). We defer to the trial court’s factual determinations if they

are supported by evidence but review its legal determinations de novo. Id. A trial

court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner or acts

                                             21
without reference to any guiding rules or principles. In re Copart, 619 S.W.3d 710, 713

(Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding); Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 241–42. A trial court has no

discretion in determining what the law is or in applying the law to the facts. In re

Allstate Indem. Co., 622 S.W.3d 870, 875–76 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding). Where, as

here, the trial court did not issue findings of fact or conclusions of law to explain its

denial of a motion to compel arbitration, we must uphold the trial court’s decision on

any appropriate legal theory urged below. Bonded Builders Home Warranty Ass’n of Tex.

v. Rockoff, 509 S.W.3d 523, 531–32 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2016, no pet.).

      2. Applicable Law for Compelling Arbitration

      “A party seeking to compel arbitration must establish the existence of a valid

arbitration agreement and that the claims at issue fall within the scope of that

agreement.”    Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 115 (citing Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman,

435 S.W.3d 222, 227 (Tex. 2014)). We determine whether a claim falls within the

scope of an arbitration agreement by examining the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s

petition and the terms of the arbitration agreement. Amateur Athletic Union of the U.S.,

Inc. v. Bray, 499 S.W.3d 96, 102 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2016, no pet.) (citing In re

Rubiola, 334 S.W.3d 220, 225 (Tex. 2011) (orig. proceeding)). If the party seeking to

compel arbitration meets this burden, the burden then shifts, and to avoid arbitration,

the party opposing it must prove an affirmative defense to the provision’s

enforcement. Id.

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      3. Analysis

      After Spencer filed its Motion, Williams-Birdow filed a response raising

multiple challenges to the arbitration agreement, including that it did not meet certain

requirements under the Federal Arbitration Act or the Texas Arbitration Act, that it

was unconscionable, that it was vague, and that Spencer had waived arbitration by

substantially invoking the judicial process.        At the hearing, Williams-Birdow

concentrated on her allegation that the two-page Contract was “vague” and

incomplete.    On appeal, she expands that argument, noting that the two-page

Contract “does not provide the forum for arbitration, the rules applicable to this

arbitration, whether there will be a single arbitrator or a panel, whether the arbitration

is binding or not, or any other essential element to define the duties and obligations of

the parties in this proceeding.” Further, she argues that the Contract was “unilaterally

rescinded” by Spencer and therefore void.         In response, Spencer relies on the

“evidentiary record developed in the briefing of Spencer’s Amended Motion” to show

that the trial court erred in denying arbitration. However, the trial court never heard

the Amended Motion, and Spencer is limited to the record developed on the original

Motion.

      As set out above, Spencer’s initial burden on its Motion was to establish the

existence of a valid arbitration agreement between itself and Williams-Birdow. See

Henry, 551 S.W.3d at 115. At the hearing on Spencer’s Motion, Williams-Birdow

argued that Spencer did not establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement

                                           23
because the two-page Contract was “vague” or incomplete. In addition, she argued

that the Contract had been rescinded. By providing a four-page Contract in its

Amended Motion, Spencer implicitly acknowledged that it failed to provide the

complete Contract in its Motion.

      Even in its brief on appeal, Spencer repeatedly refers to the “missing pages” of

the Contract and acknowledges that it filed the Amended Motion after finding the

“missing pages” and “to assure that the record was clear and complete.” Moreover,

Spencer distinguishes between the “incomplete Contract” provided in its initial

Motion and the “complete Contact” tendered with its Amended Motion. Spencer

further acknowledges that the “effect of the May 18 Order [striking the Amended

Motion and evidence] is to deny Spencer the opportunity to establish the existence of

a valid arbitration agreement” and “a correct legal analysis must consider and construe

the complete Contract submitted with the Amended Motion to Compel.” We agree.

      While there is a strong presumption in favor of arbitration, it arises only after a

valid arbitration agreement is proven to exist. Wright, 469 S.W.3d at 751. As set out

above, the trial court never construed the complete Contract because an order was

entered striking the complete Contract and Amended Motion. It is clear that a trial

court must examine the parties’ entire agreement to construe an arbitration

agreement. J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. 2003); United

Healthcare of Tex., Inc. v. Low-T Physicians Serv., P.LL.C., No. 02-20-00033-CV, 2021 WL

210846, at *5–6 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Jan. 21, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). By

                                          24
failing to attach the complete four-page Contract to its original Motion or to offer the

four-page Contract into evidence at the hearing, Spencer failed to meet its initial

burden to establish the existence of a valid arbitration agreement. See Henry, 551 S.W.

3d at 115; see also Smart Call, LLC v. Genio Mobile, Inc., No. 14-13-00223-CV, 2014 WL

3955083, at *7 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Aug. 14, 2014, pet. denied) (mem.

op.) (affirming trial court’s denial of motion to compel arbitration where movant did

not conclusively establish existence of agreement and did not request evidentiary

hearing).

      Moreover, the trial court never ruled on any of Williams-Birdow’s defenses to

arbitration. While Spencer spends twenty-six pages on appeal arguing why all of the

defenses lack merit, the trial court failed to address any of the defenses except

rescission. And as pointed out at the hearing, the rescission issue only arose the

previous day at a deposition. Evidence pertinent to that defense was attached to

briefs and motions filed after the hearing. The trial court never ruled on any of these

matters, and we express no opinion on the merits of them or any other issue raised by

the parties. See Solano, 388 S.W.3d at 354 n.3 (“In the event Solano raises the

discovery sanction issue on remand to the trial court, our opinion should not be read

as expressing any opinion on the merits of that issue.”).

      While Spencer argues in its brief that the “evidentiary record . . . is complete”

and shows that this court should reverse and render judgment compelling the parties

to arbitration, the record is anything but complete. Because the trial court refused to

                                           25
hear Spencer’s Amended Motion and consider the Contract, we do not know what

evidence a complete record might have contained relative to the arguments made by

both parties. In addition, although requested, the trial court did not file findings of

fact or conclusions of law. We overrule Spencer’s third and fourth issues.

                                  IV. CONCLUSION

      Having overruled Spencer’s third and fourth issues, but having sustained its

first and second issues, we reverse the trial court’s order striking Spencer’s Amended

Motion and evidence and remand to the trial court for proceedings consistent with

this opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(d).

                                                     /s/ Dana Womack

                                                     Dana Womack
                                                     Justice

Delivered: March 2, 2023

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