Court Opinion

ID: 9368796
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-07 01:00:29.847981+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:10.974461
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-40366         Document: 00516636585             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/06/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                        United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                                       FILED
                                                                                February 6, 2023
                                        No. 21-40366
                                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                       Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                                      Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                             versus

   James Morris Balagia,

                                                                  Defendant—Appellant.

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Eastern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 4:16-CR-176

   Before Elrod, Haynes, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          A jury found James Morris Balagia guilty of five crimes related to his
   legal representation of various drug traffickers. Through appointed counsel
   on appeal, Balagia challenged: (1) the sufficiency of the evidence for four
   convictions; (2) the propriety of a jury instruction on willful ignorance; and
   (3) the length of his sentence. Balagia then moved to terminate his counsel,
   and his counsel withdrew. Proceeding pro se, he raised thirteen issues on

          *
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                         No. 21-40366

   appeal. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM Balagia’s convictions
   and accompanying sentences. 1
                                               I
            Balagia worked as a police officer for ten years before obtaining his law
   degree and opening a criminal defense practice. Balagia promoted himself as
   the “DWI Dude” and mostly represented clients charged with drunk driving
   or marijuana possession. However, he also handled some federal cases
   involving drugs, money laundering, or both. The facts relevant for this
   appeal arise out of Balagia’s involvement in two separate matters: (A) the
   McKeown case and (B) the Colombian drug-trafficking cases.
                                               A
            Jill McKeown was arrested for traveling interstate to buy large
   quantities of marijuana. The Drug Enforcement Agency seized $50,000 in
   cash that she planned on using for the transaction. McKeown then retained
   Balagia as her criminal defense attorney. Balagia told McKeown that “he
   knew judges,” “he knew prosecutors,” and “it wasn’t a problem” to get her
   charges dismissed. McKeown was surprised to hear a lawyer make such a
   claim.
            Balagia’s insinuations about his supposed ability to get McKeown’s
   charges dropped ended up being unneeded, as she was placed on a pretrial
   diversion program. But she also wanted to seek return of the $50,000 in
   seized funds. Balagia helped her prepare an affidavit wherein she stated that

            1
             The factual summaries below are written with all reasonable inferences fairly
   raised by the evidence drawn in the light most favorable to the verdict. United States v.
   Frye, 489 F.3d 201, 207 (5th Cir. 2007). For this reason, phrases such as “Person testified
   that [assertion]” or “the evidence suggests that [assertion]” are omitted from the factual
   recitation.

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   she was merely an “innocent owner” of the money and that her possession
   of it was “not in violation of the law.” Balagia would later admit to the State
   Bar of Texas that he had reason to know these sworn statements were false.
           Based on the statements in McKeown’s affidavit, the DEA told
   Balagia it would return the funds. But instead of providing the DEA with
   McKeown’s banking information, he supplied his own law office’s account
   numbers. He claimed this was to recoup unpaid legal fees. That was a lie.
   McKeown had already paid all fees owed. And rather than sharing the news
   of the DEA’s agreement with McKeown, Balagia sent her a letter through
   an intermediary asking, “[I]f we could at least get you back 9,000 or $10,000,
   would you be happy with that?” Not knowing she was being swindled,
   McKeown agreed.            Balagia then received the $50,000 by wire and
   subsequently transferred $9,500 to McKeown’s intermediary. 2
                                               B
           Balagia’s indictment also stems from activity he engaged in related to
   representing certain Colombian drug traffickers in a drug-importation case.
   In sum, Balagia accepted drug money from cocaine producers and
   distributors on the pretense that he and his team would bribe American law-
   enforcement and/or judicial officials to get their criminal charges dismissed. 3
           The three primary traffickers involved are Ordonez, Segundo, and
   Aldemar. 4 Segundo and Aldemar are brothers who controlled a Colombian

           2
            He later returned another $7,000 or $7,500, but only “after the State Bar
   intervened.” .
           3
            The complete details are lengthy and complex, spanning over twenty pages of the
   United States’ principal brief. The factual recitation here has been edited for clarity and
   brevity.
           4
           The traffickers’ full names are Hermes Alirio Casanova Ordonez, also known as
   “Megatron”; Segundo Villota-Segura; and Aldemar Villota-Segura.

                                               3
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   cocaine lab that could produce 2,000 kilograms of cocaine each week (2,000
   kilograms could be worth up to tens of millions of dollars). Before the
   prosecution began, Segundo and Aldemar’s cocaine lab was, by some
   estimates, the largest in the world. Ordonez also produced cocaine in
   Colombia. All three traffickers were high-priority targets of United States
   law enforcement.
          Those three men were among a group of other individuals who were
   indicted by a grand jury in Texas for offenses related to their importing of
   cocaine into the United States. Following that indictment, the Treasury
   Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control designated Ordonez,
   Segundo, and Aldemar as significant foreign narcotics traffickers under the
   Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, 21 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq. For an
   attorney in the United States to accept payments from an OFAC-designated
   person, the lawyer must get a case-specific license. 5 See 21 U.S.C. § 1904(c)
   (“Prohibited transactions”).
                                            1
          The relevant facts begin with Balagia’s representation of Ordonez and
   Segundo.     A Colombian attorney introduced Ordonez and Segundo to
   Balagia. In agreeing to represent Ordonez and Segundo, Balagia promised to
   bribe federal officials to drop the charges.           Balagia charged Ordonez
   $700,000 for this, and he charged Segundo $900,000. Balagia and the
   Colombian attorney agreed to split the fees between themselves and several
   others that were assisting.

          5
         However, such a license is not difficult to procure. A lawyer can apply through
   OFAC’s website, and OFAC almost always grants the request.

                                            4
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          Using structured deposits of amounts all below $10,000 (and spread
   across various states), Balagia began depositing funds received from Ordonez
   and Segundo. By the time he had deposited at least $172,000, Balagia was
   explicitly informed by an Assistant United States Attorney that Ordonez and
   Segundo had been identified by OFAC and that Balagia would need a license
   to accept payments from them.        Balagia ignored this information and
   continued his representation without a license. Sometime after that warning,
   Balagia and his assistants picked up cash in parking lots in Houston from
   carriers that were moving the money in paper bags. The paper-bag cash
   deliveries led to Balagia making bank-account deposits in the amounts of
   $78,000; $84,000; and $42,300.
         At this point, Ordonez was arrested in Colombia by Colombian law
   enforcement. Balagia met with him and assured Ordonez not to worry
   because Balagia could still get the U.S. charges dropped. Instead, Balagia
   tricked Ordonez—a Spanish-language speaker—into signing a plea
   agreement written in English. Balagia then met with the same AUSA who
   provided him with the OFAC warning and presented the AUSA with the
   agreement. This struck the AUSA as “really odd” because Ordonez had not
   been extradited, which is when plea discussions usually begin.
         At the same meeting, Balagia told the AUSA that Segundo wanted to
   cooperate too. The AUSA noted that timely cooperation would be helpful.
   However, Balagia’s promised cooperation never materialized, as Balagia
   always canceled the scheduled meetings shortly before they were to occur.
         After months of failing to cooperate, Segundo was also arrested in
   Colombia. Balagia and his assistants went to Colombia to meet with him.
   Segundo expressed concerns that Balagia’s promises to bribe federal officials
   were not showing any results. One of Balagia’s associates said that thanks to

                                         5
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                                    No. 21-40366

   the money Segundo had provided, he “was able to pay four people . . . in
   Washington, D.C.” This was a lie. No bribery payments had been made.
          However, Balagia continued his charade of carrying through his
   bribery promises. At the meeting, Balagia explained how the payments were
   allegedly going on. Balagia’s non-lawyer associate was the “meat in the
   sandwich” between Balagia and Segundo. Balagia told Segundo that using a
   non-lawyer associate as an intermediary would allow him to “stay very, very
   clean” as the payments were occurring. Balagia said, “it gives me the ability
   to close my ears sometimes, if I need to, and it protects all of us.” Balagia
   then left the room so that his non-lawyer associate could talk with Segundo
   and Balagia could “pretend to be deaf with some things,” like bribery
   proposals.
          At that same meeting, Balagia or his associates told Segundo that he
   should provide 30 or so names to the DEA. However, the names were not
   to be real leads on identifying who was leading the cocaine operations in
   Colombia.     They were to be people “already under investigation” or
   “picking out names just to pick them” so that Segundo could give the
   appearance of cooperating while gumming up the DEA’s investigation.
          Ordonez was then extradited to the United States. Balagia hounded
   Ordonez for payment, saying that “the prosecutor has to see a fat wallet. If
   not, I can’t work it.” Ordonez seemed to realize that Balagia was not going
   to be able to get the charges removed, so he pleaded guilty. Balagia continued
   to say that he needed more money to help Ordonez get a lighter sentence. He
   told Ordonez, “We have a saying up here. Money talks. You know the rest
   of it?” Balagia also said that he could not obtain results for Ordonez until he
   was paid in full.

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                                                2
           The second part of the relevant facts relates to Balagia’s attempt to
   represent Aldemar, Segundo’s brother. Following all the above events with
   Ordonez and Segundo, Aldemar made his initial appearance in the
   importation case. At that point, Balagia sought to recruit him as a client.
   Aldemar knew who Balagia was because Segundo had relayed the way that
   representation was going. Aldemar was not pleased with Balagia’s treatment
   of his brother. Aldemar told the government that he would pretend to be
   interested in Balagia’s services so he could record conversations with Balagia
   and his team.
           Aldemar and an undercover agent (posing as an accountant for the
   cocaine operation) then met with Balagia and two of Balagia’s associates.
   Aldemar recorded the conversations that occurred therein. The undercover
   agent asked Balagia if it was okay that all money Aldemar would use to pay
   him would be drug money. Balagia replied, “I have paperwork I have to fill
   out. That’s on me.” The undercover agent also stated that Balagia was “able
   to pay some people in Washington” on behalf of Segundo, which Balagia did
   not deny. And one of Balagia’s associates said that he “might have been
   generous with some things, but — maybe an extra scoop of ice cream on a
   sundae.” 6
           Following that meeting, the undercover agent followed Balagia and his
   associates outside and said, “[Y]ou understand what [Aldemar] was looking
   for, right? . . . [H]is understanding was basically like this money was given to
   the right people to get him off the charge. And that’s what he was looking
   for.”       Balagia replied by saying it was nice to meet Aldemar and his
   accountant. Balagia then left, but one of Balagia’s associates stayed to

           6
               Filler words have been removed from this quotation.

                                                7
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   continue talking to the undercover officer.         In that further discussion,
   Balagia’s associate told the undercover officer, “I don’t have a problem with
   one word that you said.”
          Balagia agreed to represent Aldemar for $1.2 million. The undercover
   agent who had been in the initial meeting agreed to meet one of Balagia’s
   associates and make a $300,000 down payment. The undercover agent gave
   Balagia’s associate a bag with $300,000 in cash. The associate took the bag,
   walked away, and was arrested. In his possession was a signed affidavit from
   Balagia wherein Balagia averred that Aldemar had hired him and that
   Balagia’s firm employed the associate who had just been arrested for taking
   payment from the undercover agent.
                                          II
          Based on the actions described above, a jury convicted Balagia of five
   crimes: Money-laundering conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) (Count One);
   obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (Count Two); willful violation of the
   Kingpin Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 1904(c) and 1906(a) (Count Three); wire-fraud
   conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1349 (Count Four); and conspiracy to obstruct
   justice, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (Count Five). The district court sentenced Balagia
   to 188 months in prison, a special assessment of $500, and supervised release
   for a term of 3 years.
          In Balagia’s first two briefs on appeal, which were submitted by
   appointed counsel, Balagia raised the following issues:
          1. Whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain his
              convictions for Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5.
          2. Whether the district court reversibly erred in giving a
              willful blindness instruction.
          3. Whether the district court imposed an unreasonable
              sentence.

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          We then granted Balagia’s motion to proceed pro se. He filed a second
   supplemental brief that raised 13 claims for relief, 11 of which bore no relation
   to the claims presented by his attorneys. Those issues, consolidated where
   possible, are as follows:
          1. Whether the district court violated Balagia’s qualified right
              to counsel of choice. (Issues 1 and 2).
          2. Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying
              trial counsel’s motions to continue. (Issues 3 and 5).
          3. Whether the district court abused its discretion in declining
              to strike Agent Rennie’s testimony after he said that he was
              not an expert. (Issue 4).
          4. Whether the district court limited the impeachment of
              Anthony Felsing and, if so, whether it plainly erred. (Issue
              6).
          5. Whether the district court abused its discretion in its
              handling of alleged “jury misconduct.” (Issues 7 and 8).
          6. Whether the district court correctly calculated Balagia’s
              advisory Guidelines range. (Issues 11 and 12).
          7. Whether Balagia’s prison term, which was nearly four years
              below the advisory range, was unreasonably severe. (Issue
              13).
          8. Whether Balagia shows any error in the forfeiture of his
              house and office. (Issues 9 and 10).
                                          A
          We first address the issues raised by Balagia through counsel.
                                          1
          Balagia argues that the record lacks sufficient evidence to sustain his
   convictions for obstructing justice, willfully violating the Kingpin Act, wire-

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   fraud conspiracy, and conspiracy to obstruct justice (Counts 2, 3, 4, and 5).
   Because Balagia fails to meet the high bar of showing that no rational jury
   could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we affirm. United States
   v. Beacham, 774 F.3d 267, 272 (5th Cir. 2014).
                                          a
          The convictions for obstructing justice and conspiring to obstruct
   justice are supported by similar evidence. On the substantive Count, the
   government was required to prove: “(1) that a judicial proceeding was
   pending; (2) that [Balagia] had knowledge of the judicial proceeding; and (3)
   that [Balagia] acted corruptly with the specific intent to influence, obstruct,
   or impede that judicial proceeding in its due administration of justice.”
   United States v . Richardson, 676 F.3d 491, 502 (5th Cir. 2012); 18 U.S.C.
   § 1503(a). The associated conspiracy claim requires a showing that Balagia
   joined an agreement between two or more people to pursue that unlawful
   objective and that Balagia possessed “the same degree of criminal intent as is
   necessary for proof of the underlying substantive offense.” United States v.
   Fisch, 851 F.3d 402, 407 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Peterson, 244
   F.3d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 2001)).
          The evidence recounted above shows that a reasonable jury could
   have found all those elements to have been proved beyond a reasonable
   doubt. Balagia knew that the United States had indicted 17 defendants,
   including Ordonez, Segundo, and Aldemar. Balagia’s promises to his clients
   to bribe federal officials ensured that those clients would not cooperate with
   the governmental investigation (as they previously had done) because, as the
   jury could infer, the clients would believe they were immune from normal
   prosecution and had no reason to cooperate. Not only did Balagia act
   corruptly by promising to bribe federal officials and defrauding his clients, he
   also devised a plan to affirmatively mislead the government by having

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   Segundo provide red-herring names to the DEA. All along the way, Balagia
   made agreements with his clients, his associates, and the Colombian attorney
   to further these unlawful objectives.
                                           b
          A reasonable jury could have delivered a guilty verdict for conspiracy
   to commit wire fraud. To prove that offense, the government had to show
   that “(1) two or more persons made an agreement to commit wire fraud; (2)
   the defendant knew the unlawful purpose of the agreement; and (3) the
   defendant joined in the agreement willfully, i.e., with specific intent.” United
   States v. Kuhrt, 788 F.3d 403, 414 (5th Cir. 2015). Here, Balagia conspired
   with at least one or more of his associates and the Colombian attorney to
   defraud all four of McKeown, Ordonez, Segundo, and Aldemar.
          Balagia’s handling of the partial return of McKeown’s seized funds is,
   itself, enough to sustain a conviction on this Count. In that matter, Balagia
   and his associate received all $50,000 of McKeown’s funds from the DEA
   but misrepresented that information to McKeown and her representatives so
   that Balagia could fraudulently retain most of that money.
          Balagia’s involvement in the Colombian drug trafficking case also gave
   rise to enough evidence to sustain his wire fraud conviction. The basis of that
   representation, for all three Colombian drug traffickers, was that Balagia
   would work with others to bribe federal officials and get the charges dropped.
   The lawyers and their teams would transmit messages over phone and
   receive money payments to be electronically deposited or transferred into
   their bank accounts.     This is supported by audio recording, multiple
   witnesses’ testimony, and Balagia’s own admission that he was present for
   discussions with the defendants about paying people off (though Balagia
   claimed to have been “shocked” to hear that brought up during those
   meetings). Because the evidence shows that Balagia did not actually bribe

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   officials (which would have given rise to other forms of criminal liability), the
   evidence supports a conviction for conspiracy to defraud his clients on the
   basis of the false promise to engage in such bribery.
                                          c
          Evidence also supports Balagia’s conviction for violating the Kingpin
   Act. That law prevents any United States person, including attorneys, from
   dealing with individuals identified by OFAC without obtaining the proper
   license. 21 U.S.C. § 1906(a)(1). The Act provides criminal penalties for
   failing to comply with that requirement. At no time did Balagia obtain or even
   seek a license to represent his OFAC-designated clients. The only question
   is whether this failure was willful. The jury had good reason to find it was.
          The district court instructed the jury that for this purpose, to
   “willfully” violate the act means “voluntarily and purposely, with the
   specific intent to do something the law forbids; that is to say, with bad
   purpose either to disobey or disregard the law.” The evidence reveals that
   Balagia either knew that his clients were designated by OFAC or Balagia
   willfully avoided knowing that. First, Balagia was an experienced criminal
   defense attorney. Second, he received multiple notices from an AUSA that
   his clients were designated by OFAC and required additional paperwork to
   be represented. Third, even a cursory Google search of Balagia’s clients’
   names reveals near the top of the search results that they have been
   designated as drug traffickers by OFAC. As the government argues, that is
   “willfulness on stilts.”
                                          2
          Balagia also contends that the district court erred in instructing the
   jury on “deliberate ignorance.” We review the district court’s decision to
   do so for abuse of discretion. Fisch, 851 F.3d at 411. While it is true that the
   circumstances properly giving rise to such an instruction are “rare,” United

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   States v. Lara-Velasquez, 919 F.2d 946, 951 (5th Cir. 1990), this is one such
   case where it was appropriate.
          A district court may provide a deliberate-ignorance instruction when
   the evidence at trial raises two inferences: “(1) the defendant was
   subjectively aware of a high probability of the existence of the illegal conduct;
   and (2) the defendant purposely contrived to avoid learning of the illegal
   conduct.” Id. (quoting United States v. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314 (9th Cir.
   1987)). Both inferences are raised here.
          First, Balagia was subjectively aware of a high probability of illegal
   conduct. As he admitted at trial, he heard his associate telling Segundo that
   he had paid off four officials in Washington, D.C. And even though the bribes
   did not actually happen, Balagia’s hearing that comment would have put him
   on alert that it was highly likely something unlawful was occurring. See
   United States v. Araiza-Jacobo, 917 F.3d 360, 366 (5th Cir. 2019) (noting that
   subjective awareness “often overlaps with” actual knowledge).
          Second, Balagia took steps to avoid gaining knowledge of what was
   really occurring in his representation of the Colombian drug traffickers.
   Balagia’s associate told Segundo, in Balagia’s presence, that the team’s
   tactics would be “messy,” that Balagia had to stay “clean.” Balagia’s
   associate said he would be the “meat in the sandwich” between Segundo and
   Balagia. As Balagia himself then told Segundo, running the representation
   this way would “give[] me the ability to close my ears sometimes.” The
   government correctly argues that “[c]onsciously closing one’s ears is the
   definition of deliberate ignorance.”
          Because the evidence gives rise to both necessary inferences, the
   district court was within its discretion to instruct the jury on deliberate
   ignorance.

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                                          3
          Balagia’s final argument raised through counsel is that the district
   court “sentenced Balagia based upon an improperly calculated advisory
   Guidelines range that should have been multiple offense levels lower.”
   Because the district court did not commit clear error, we affirm.
          Using the 2018 Sentencing Guidelines, the probation office prepared
   a presentence report that calculated an offense level of 38, a criminal history
   category of I, and an imprisonment range of 235 to 293 months. The PSR
   also recommended a four-level leadership enhancement under U.S.S.G. §
   3B1.1(a) and a two-level abuse-of-trust enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3.
   The district court adopted the PSR’s calculations but varied downward from
   the applicable range because of Balagia’s age, lack of criminal history, good
   works, and family ties. The district court also wanted to avoid disparity
   between Balagia’s sentence and the sentence of one of Balagia’s associates,
   who did not receive a leadership enhancement but possibly should have.
   Without the four-level leadership enhancement, the Guidelines range was
   151 to 188 months. The court imposed a term of 188 months.
          Balagia makes three challenges to the district court’s calculations. He
   disputes the sum of laundered funds, argues against the leadership
   enhancement, and rejects the abuse-of-trust enhancement. We review each
   of the district court’s findings for clear error. United States v. Tansley, 986
   F.2d 880, 884 (5th Cir. 1993) (value of laundered funds); United States v.
   Alaniz, 726 F.3d 586, 622 (5th Cir. 2013) (leadership); United States v. Miller,
   607 F.3d 144, 147–48 (5th Cir. 2010) (abuse of trust). “A factual finding is
   not clearly erroneous if it is plausible in light of the record as a whole.”
   Alaniz, 726 F.3d at 618 (quoting United States v. Johnston, 127 F.3d 380, 403
   (5th Cir. 1997)).

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            First, the district court did not clearly err in determining the amount
   of funds laundered. Balagia’s team charged or attempted to charge Ordonez,
   Segundo, and Aldemar a total of $700,000; $1,500,000; and $300,000 for
   the “legal services” provided. Based on these numbers, the PSR calculated
   a total value of funds intended to be laundered at $2.5 million. This total
   number, which came from Balagia’s team’s own proposed fees, is a
   “reasonable estimate.” Alaniz, 726 F.3d at 623 (quoting commentary to
   Section 2B1.1). And adopting this method for calculating the sum of funds
   intended to be laundered fits within the district court’s “broad discretion”
   in “determining value.” United States v. Tencer, 107 F.3d 1120, 1137 (5th Cir.
   1997).
            Even if Balagia could dispute that he is singularly responsible for that
   sum of money intended to be laundered, it is important that Balagia was
   convicted of conspiracy to launder funds. In a conspiracy case, a district court
   can include in its calculations the actions of a coconspirator that were
   reasonably foreseeable and that were within the scope of the conspiracy.
   U.S.S.G. § 1B1.3(a). And for conspiracy prosecutions and sentencing, even
   the “intention of laundering the entire amount is enough for sentencing
   purposes.” Tansley, 986 F.2d at 884. Regardless of whether the conspirators
   were adept enough at defrauding their clients to obtain the full amount
   sought, they still conspired to procure that amount of money. The conspiracy
   itself is a crime.
            Second, the district court did not err in its leadership-enhancement
   calculations. Section 3B1.1 prescribes a four-level enhancement if “the
   defendant was an organizer or leader of a criminal activity that involved five
   or more participants or was otherwise extensive.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1(a).
   Balagia’s conspiracy involved more than five people.              And he was
   undoubtedly a leader in the agreement. Taking the evidence in the light most
   favorable to the verdict, Balagia was the leader of a firm that was involved in

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   an organized attempt to defraud criminal defendants and accept their
   unlawfully obtained funds in contravention of the Kingpin Act. The law firm
   was Balagia’s, and the employees followed Balagia’s direction.
          The commentary lists several factors bearing on the leadership-
   enhancement inquiry: “exercise of decision making authority”; “nature of
   participation”; “recruitment of accomplices”; “the claimed right to a larger
   share of” proceeds; “degree of participation in planning or organizing”;
   “nature and scope of the illegal activity”; and “degree of control and
   authority exercised over others.” U.S.S.G. § 3B1.1 cmt. (n.4). We look at
   these factors as a whole. United States v. Warren, 986 F.3d 557, 568 (5th Cir.
   2021). On balance, the evidence supports the district court’s identification
   of Balagia as a leader in the crime for sentencing-enhancement purposes.
          Third, the district court did not err in applying an abuse-of-trust
   enhancement. Section 3B1.3 prescribes a two-level enhancement if “the
   defendant abused a position of public or private trust, or used a special skill,
   in a manner that significantly facilitated the commission or concealment of
   the offense.” An abuse-of-trust enhancement is warranted if the defendant
   (1) “occupied a position of trust,” and (2) used it “to significantly facilitate
   the commission or concealment of the offense.” United States v. Ollison, 555
   F.3d 152, 165 (5th Cir. 2009).
          We have routinely held that attorneys occupy a position of trust, so
   the first requirement is satisfied. See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 114
   F.3d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 1997).       “The integrity of our judicial system
   inextricably is intertwined with the integrity of our trial lawyers.
   Consequently, it cannot be gainsaid that lawyers occupy a position of public
   trust.” Id.
          The second requirement is satisfied too. Balagia used his position as
   an attorney to significantly facilitate the commission of his offense because

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   the very premise of Balagia’s operation was that Balagia would recruit
   McKeown and the Colombian drug traffickers as clients in his capacity as a
   lawyer. Cf. U.S.S.G. § 3B1.3 cmt. (n.1) (“This adjustment . . . applies in the
   case of an embezzlement of a client’s funds by an attorney serving as a
   guardian, a bank executive’s fraudulent loan scheme, or the criminal sexual
   abuse of a patient by a physician under the guise of an examination.”).
          Here are just two examples of culpable actions Balagia undertook
   while purporting to act as his client’s faithful attorney. Balagia accepted the
   DEA’s repayment of McKeown’s seized funds and fraudulently withheld a
   portion from her. And as counsel for Ordonez and Segundo, Balagia accepted
   client payments made on false assurances of dismissal while pocketing their
   funds instead. The facts recounted above provide numerous additional
   examples that the district court could have relied on in determining that
   Balagia abused his position of trust to significantly facilitate his criminal
   behavior.   As such, the district court committed no clear error in its
   calculations.
                                          B
          After moving to withdraw his second court-appointed counsel,
   Balagia raised a litany of additional, difficult-to-construe issues in his pro se
   supplemental brief. Normally, we apply a liberal standard in construing the
   arguments briefed by defendants who elect to proceed pro se in a direct
   criminal appeal. United States v. Diehl, 775 F.3d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 2015).
   That duty flows from the principle that a litigant should “not suffer simply
   because he did not attend law school or find a suitable attorney.” Id. (citation

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   omitted). Here, however, the pro se defendant did in fact go to law school. 7
   We therefore do not accord his briefing the advantage of liberal construction.
   Olivares v. Martin, 555 F.2d 1192, 1194 n.1 (5th Cir. 1977).
           Normally, we consider an appellant to have abandoned “all issues not
   raised and argued in its initial brief on appeal.” Cousin v. Trans Union Corp.,
   246 F.3d 359, 373 n.22 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). We retain
   discretion to consider any arguments Appellant raises after that point. Id.
   While we do not consider as waived the 11 additional issues Appellant raises
   in his third supplemental brief (submitted pro se), we do not accord them the
   liberal construction typically provided to pro se litigants. Because none have
   merit, we dispose quickly of each argument below.
                                             1&2
           In Balagia’s first and second issues for review, he argues that the
   district court violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel by preventing
   him from using his counsel of choice. As Balagia admits, his first-preferred
   counsel was disqualified after being suspended from practice in the Eastern
   District of Texas for disciplinary reasons.              Balagia’s second-preferred
   counsel could not represent Balagia because she had breast cancer. She
   moved to withdraw her representation after the trial had already been
   continued for months to accommodate her medical condition. The court
   then appointed another counsel (who joined a second counsel who had
   previously been appointed co-counsel to Balagia’s second-preferred lawyer).
           We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision to
   disqualify Balagia’s first counsel and the district court’s denial of an

           7
            Not only that, but he testified that his LSAT score was “in the top one and a half
   percent of the nation” and that his attendance at the University of Texas School of Law
   was funded by a “full scholarship for academics.”

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   additional medical-related continuance for Balagia’s second-preferred
   counsel. United States v. Dinitz, 538 F.2d 1214, 1219–20 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1976)
   (en banc) (disqualification); United States v. Hughey, 147 F.3d 423, 431 (5th
   Cir. 1998) (denial of continuance). Although criminal defendants do have a
   “qualified right to retain counsel of the defendant’s own choosing,” this
   right is not limitless. Hughey, 147 F.3d at 428. The district court did not
   abuse its discretion in managing the trial as it did, which resulted in Balagia’s
   having two separately appointed, competent co-counsel.
                                          3
          Balagia’s third issue for review is whether the district court erred in
   denying Balagia’s additional motions for continuance because that made
   Balagia “not ready for trial.” “We review the denial of a motion for
   continuance for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Barnett, 197 F.3d 138,
   144 (5th Cir. 1999). Balagia’s single-paragraph argument on this point does
   not identify the required “‘specific and compelling’ or ‘serious’ prejudice”
   needed to secure reversal. Id. (quoting United States v. Krout, 66 F.3d 1420,
   1436 (5th Cir. 1995).
                                          4
          Balagia’s fourth issue for review objects to the district court’s refusal
   to strike certain expert testimony. “We can overturn the ruling only if it was
   ‘manifestly erroneous.’” United States v. Lee, 966 F.3d 310, 322 (5th Cir,
   2020) (quoting Kuhrt, 788 F.3d at 418). “Even then, as is true for other
   evidentiary issues, the government can salvage the convictions by proving
   any error was harmless.” Id.
          The testimony in question was from an FBI Agent who spoke about
   money laundering.       The witness stated he was familiar with “money
   laundering techniques and transmission of currency including structuring
   techniques.” At some later point, the Agent said on the stand that he was

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   not an expert on whether a hypothetical fact scenario would violate statutes
   criminalizing money laundering. A witness’s disclaiming of expertise in one
   area does not prevent the district court judge from identifying the witness as
   an expert with regard to other testimony under Daubert v. Merrell Dow
   Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993). Thus, the district court did not err
   in making its own independent determination of the witness’s qualifications.
   And any error was harmless, as the record contains voluminous transcripts
   of testimony on which a reasonable jury could have reached the same result.
                                          5
           Balagia’s fifth issue for review argues that the district court’s denial
   of his motion for continuance violated his Sixth Amendment right to
   adequate counsel because it left 19 days for trial preparation. This argument
   fails. See United States v. Lewis, 476 F.3d 369, 387 (5th Cir. 2007) (10 days
   between appointment and trial).
                                          6
           Balagia’s sixth issue is that the trial court wrongfully prevented him
   from impeaching a witness. This issue is unreviewable as Balagia made no
   objection at trial and there is no written record of any decision by the district
   court to limit impeachment. Parliament Ins. Co. v. Hanson, 676 F.2d 1069,
   1074 (5th Cir. 1982).
                                          7
           Balagia’s seventh issue asserts that the district court erred in denying
   a mistrial after a man was removed from the audience for allegedly making
   threatening motions at the jury. Balagia argues both that the district court’s
   removing of the man and the court’s subsequent increase in security tainted
   the trial:

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            This created a visual and psychological appearance that there
            was a distinct barrier in the courtroom with the jury,
            prosecution table and prosecution audience/spectators side of
            the courtroom and a separate side consisting of the defense
            table and defense spectators/family/friends/supporters.
            There was a good side and a bad side for the jury to pick from
            and you can guess which side I was sitting on.

            Balagia’s argument as to the removal being improper fails because at
   trial he consented to the removal. And his argument about the prejudice of
   creating a “good side” and “bad side” fails to specifically identify any
   specific harm suffered. The adversarial nature of courtroom proceedings is
   a feature, not a bug, of criminal prosecution. See Jones v. Davis, 890 F.3d 559,
   571 (5th Cir. 2018).
                                           8
            Balagia’s eighth issue for review asserts that the district court also
   erred in not granting a mistrial based on allegedly disruptive activity during
   trial.   The second disruption (after the first disruption caused by the
   threatening motions) was an anonymous caller who claimed to be the
   husband of a juror. The caller said that the jurors feared if they did not
   convict Balagia, they would face retribution from the Colombian drug
   traffickers. The district court determined that the caller was an uninvolved
   outsider attempting to assist Balagia by creating circumstances that would
   lead to a mistrial.
            We review the district court’s decision for abuse of discretion. United
   States v. Kelley, 140 F.3d 596, 608. Because Balagia does not show that the
   district court failed to address “a colorable showing that an extrinsic
   influence was actually made on the jury,” the district court committed no
   error, reversible or otherwise. Id.

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                                        9 & 10
          Balagia’s ninth and tenth issues for review relate to an interlocutory
   motion for sale of his house and office. First, he says his appointed counsel
   who handled the motion was not qualified. He cites no law in support of this
   complaint. Nor is it clear what law he could cite. The issue is not presented
   as an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, and no alternative theory of
   relief is provided either. See United States v. Isgar, 739 F.3d 829, 841 (5th Cir.
   2014). Accordingly, this claim fails.
          Second, Balagia argues that the court erred in allowing the forfeiture
   of his office building because the value of unlawful, commingled funds could
   not justify sale of the entire building. Again, he cites no law under which such
   a complaint is legally cognizable.
                                        11 & 12
          Balagia’s eleventh and twelfth issues restate the arguments previously
   made by Balagia’s counsel that the district court erred in calculating his
   sentences. For the reasons discussed previously, this argument fails. See
   supra Section II.A.3.
                                           13
          Balagia’s thirteenth, and final, issue for review is that the district court
   erred in making Balagia’s sentence excessively severe. Balagia points to 18
   U.S.C. § 3553, but he cites no cases nor makes any explanation in law as to
   how the sentence was unreasonably severe. He notes that he “has missed his
   son’s wedding, his son’s swearing in as a member of the State Bar of Texas
   as a licensed attorney, and the graduation ceremony from the University of
   Texas School of Law.” These are the normal incidents of being incarcerated.
   They do not show that his sentence was unlawfully severe.

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          Balagia also argues that it was unusually severe to force him to forfeit
   certain property related to his crimes. Whether Balagia’s property was
   forfeitable was a fact question presented to the jury. The jury decided that
   Balagia’s office had the “required connection” to his offenses but that his
   house did not. However, Balagia was also required to forfeit $1.5 million in
   cash proceeds. When that sum could not be located, the district court
   ordered Balagia to forfeit his house as a substitute asset. The district court
   held a hearing on Balagia’s motion to reconsider the preliminary order of
   forfeiture and the government’s motion for interlocutory sale. The defense
   said that Balagia no longer had any interest in either property. The court
   asked the defense for confirmation that “you’re agreeing to the interlocutory
   sale” of the house and office. Defense counsel said yes. The court then
   entered an order authorizing interlocutory sale of both properties. There is
   no error to reverse.
                                    *        *         *
          Having reviewed all issues raised by Balagia’s multiple counsel and
   then later in his pro se brief, we find no reversible error in any part of Balagia’s
   convictions or related sentences. As such, we AFFIRM.

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