Court Opinion

ID: 9647024
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 13:21:32.169077+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:44.930113
License: Public Domain

John E. Jennings, Judge, dissenting. In my view the majority loses sight of our standard of review in making its determination that the Commission’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence. In workers’ compensation cases, the Commission, and not this court, functions as the trier of fact. See Blevins v. Safeway Stores, 25 Ark. App. 297, 757 S.W.2d 569 (1988). In determining whether the Commission’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, we are obliged to view the evidence in the light most favorable to those findings and give the testimony its strongest probative force in favor of the Commission’s action. Blevins v. Safeway Stores, 25 Ark. App. 297, 757 S.W.2d 569 (1988). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. College Club Dairy v. Carr, 25 Ark. App. 215, 756 S.W.2d 128 (1988). We do not reverse the Commission’s decision unless we are convinced that fair-minded persons with the same facts before them could not have arrived at the conclusion reached by the Commission. Silvicraft, Inc. v. Lambert, 10 Ark. App. 28, 661 S.W.2d 403 (1983). The issue is not whether we might have reached a different result or whether the evidence would have supported a contrary finding. Bearden Lumber Co. v. Bond, 7 Ark. App. 65, 644 S.W.2d 321 (1983). The Commission’s decision is entitled to the weight we give a jury verdict. Marrable v. Southern LP Gas, Inc., 25 Ark. App. 1, 751 S.W.2d 15 (1988). The credibility of witnesses and any conflict and inconsistency in the evidence is for the Commission, as the trier of fact, to resolve. While it is true that conjecture and speculation cannot take the place of credible evidence, it is equally true that the Commission has the right to consider all of the facts and circumstances of the case and to draw all reasonable inferences deducible from them. Franklin Collier Farms v. Bullard, 33 Ark. App. 33, 800 S.W.2d 438 (1990). Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support an award and it may be based upon the reasonable inferences that arise from the reasonable probabilities flowing from the evidence; neither absolute certainty nor demonstration is required. Herron Lumber Co. v. Neal, 205 Ark. 1093, 172 S.W.2d 252 (1943). The majority finds no substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that it was the practice of higher ranking correction officers to use lower ranking officers to assist them with personal errands. Kenneth Luckett, the correction officer sent by Captain Mixon to relieve Lois Glover, testified that he had been relieved on a number of occasions at the order of a superior officer, that he would do whatever the officer told him to do, and that this was just “part of the way you go up in the system.” Calvin Spradlin, who had worked for the department for six years prior to his resignation in 1988, testified that it was the “standing practice” at the department for an officer to be relieved from duty to run errands for superior officers. The majority also holds that the Commission’s finding that lower ranking officers perceived performing these personal errands as a means of rapid career advancement is not supported by substantial evidence. Again, Luckett testified that being relieved from duty to do something for a superior officer was part of the way one advanced in the system. Spradlin testified that he knew that doing things that were not within “the line of duty” was in his career interest and that it was his perception that that was how one moved up in the system. The court also finds no substantial evidence to support the Commission’s finding that the venture engaged in on January 4, 1988, was not personal, to Lois Glover, who was a passenger in a vehicle driven by a supervisor, Spradlin, over whom Glover had no control. The majority states that the evidence shows only “that two friends, one of whom happened to be a superior ranking officer, decided to spend the afternoon drinking beer and perhaps taking care of some personal business.” (Emphasis added.) Captain Mixon testified that he made the decision to relieve Lois Glover at the request of Lieutenant Spradlin. There was no evidence that Glover asked Mixon to be relieved. It was Mixon’s recollection that Spradlin told him he needed Glover to go with him to get some money. Spradlin’s recollection was that he told Mixon he needed Glover to help him load a four-wheeler. In any event, Luckett testified that Mixon gave him a direct order to go relieve Glover at “Ten Barracks.” When Luckett arrived there he told Glover that Mixon wanted to see him in the East Hall, a command post. Although Mixon originally testified that he knew Glover had some time off coming, he subsequently admitted on further examination by appellee’s attorney that, in fact, he did not know whether Glover had any time coming or not. Although the majority concedes that Spradlin and Glover had not seen each other socially since high school, it states that “they had begun to renew their friendship” since Glover started work at the Department of Correction. When the testimony of Spradlin in this regard is read in context, it is clear that the “renewal of the friendship” consisted merely of the two men speaking to each other when they were on the same shift at work. The majority states that on the day of the accident Spradlin was off duty. Spradlin, however, testified that as an officer living on the department grounds, he was on duty twenty-four hours a day. The majority states that Spradlin “testified that when he picked up Glover, he asked him if he wanted to load the four-wheeler first or drink beer first and Glover replied he wanted to drink beer first.” In the first place, Spradlin’s testimony was that he asked Glover if he wanted to go get the beer before they unloaded the four-wheeler and that Glover said “let’s go get the beer.” Second, the Commission was not obligated to believe this testimony. Spradlin, by his own admission, was intoxicated at the time he picked Glover up. Furthermore, the Commission may believe part of a witness’s testimony and reject other parts. This is a traditional function of the trier of fact. See Williams v. State, 298 Ark. 484, 768 S.W.2d 539 (1989). Finally, it might be observed that according to Spradlin, although the beer they bought was his (Spradlin’s) brand, Glover had to pay for it because Spradlin had no money. Although I would concede that the decision in Crouch Funeral Home, Inc. v. Crouch, 262 Ark. 417, 557 S.W.2d 392 (1977), may be open to differing interpretations, I do not agree that that decision suggests that the Commission was wrong in awarding compensation here. With due respect to the majority, it seems to sift the evidence, picking out that testimony which supports the result it believes the Commission should have reached, and forgetting that it is the Commission and not this court which makes decisions on credibility. Lois Glover was not available to testify at the hearing and the appellee had to try to make her case, for the most part, through reluctant witnesses employed by the Department of Correction, the opposing party. The Commission found that she made her case, and in my view that conclusion is supported by substantial evidence. I respectfully dissent. Mayfield, J., joins.