Court Opinion

ID: 9624340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:58:54.842542+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:44.277813
License: Public Domain

MOISE, Justice (dissenting). I hereby express my disagreement with 'the opinion of the majority. I see no escape ■from the conclusion that no proper foundation was laid for the admission of State’s Exhibit 26. It is nothing more than a copy ■of some fingerprints of a person by the -name of Lloyd L. Miller, a white male, 'taken by someone whose name is illegible. No evidence was introduced as to how, ■when, where, or by what authority the prints were taken, or from whence this • document came originally. Objection was made to its introduction. I can think of no theory under which it would possibly be ad■missible without proof of such foundation. -5 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940), §§ 1635a and 1678a; State v. Seales, 245 Iowa 1074, 65 N.W.2d 448 (1954). Although admittedly the fingerprints in "Exhibit 26 were not being introduced as TaRoi Miller’s prints and thus did not need to be authenticated as such, a founda'tion would seem to be required so as to 'insure that the circumstances of their '“taking” were legal. We do know that 'the fingerprints were taken somewhere, some time, under “official” supervision. 'They are not strictly latent prints. Defendant is entitled to know the time, place, and ■manner of the taking, so as to be able to '•effectively cross-examine on the surrounding circumstances. This is particularly im■portant here because inadmissible prints had been taken pursuant to an illegal arrest, as held in the first appeal (76 N.M. 62, 412 P.2d 240 (1966). See Annots., 9 A.L.R.2d :899, 920 (1950); 28 A.L.R.2d 1115, 1144 (1953). See also, 2 Jones on Evidence, (5th Ed. 1958), §§ 442, 457; Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence, §§ 2.15, 6.25, and 18.1-18.14 (1961). Compare Richardson, Modern Scientific Evidence, §§ 16.3, 16.19, 16.22 (1961). I cannot agree that anything found in :a file of a public office is ipso facto admissible in evidence as an official report or record without some further foundation. Exhibit 26, here being discussed, is nothing more than a sheet of paper with a set of fingerprints imposed on it and with no indication as to where, when, or by whom taken (an illegible signature of the officer who took them appears on the exhibit). Such an instrument cannot be considered to be an “official report or record,” discussed in McCormick, Evidence, § 191, at 403 (1954) in the quotation set forth by the majority. Neither can it be said that it is a fingerprint record submitted and preserved as required under 28 C.F.R., § 0.85 (1967), relied on by the majority. As stated by Wigmore in Volume V of his work on Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940), § 1639, at, 545, “Practically, then, the admissibility of a given register or record depends ultimately on zvhether the officer has the duty to do the class of things recorded; if they are zvithin his duty then the record is admissible; otherwise not.” From this it can be seen that not everything appearing in an official file, regardless of its nature or origin, is, because of its location, to be admitted in evidence in a criminal trial. In this connection, attention is directed to the quotation by the majority from 5 Wigmore, Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940), § 1678a, at 758, and its reference to “duly prepared certification of the above sort.” An examination of what is stated in the section concerning due preparation clearly demonstrates the inapplicability of the quotation under the facts of this case. Exhibit 26 in no way discloses that it was taken or forwarded, as required by 28 C.F.R., § 0.86 (1967). It does not even bear a stamp showing it to have been received and filed in the office of the F.B.I. It is not certified or authenticated. To permit its introduction so that the facts concerning its taking cannot be gone into on cross-examination, or otherwise, is in my view a denial of appellant’s constitutional rights under the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made obligatory on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, and a procedure not heretofore countenanced. Compare Smith v. State of Illinois, 390 U.S. 129, 88 S.Ct. 748, 19 L.Ed.2d 956 (1968). It also violates appellant’s rights under Art. II, Sec. 14, of the New Mexico Constitution. I have no quarrel with the holding in Higgins v. Fuller, 48 N.M. 218, 148 P.2d 575 (1944). The document there held admissible was an examined copy of a tax deed issued by the state tax commission which had been compared with the copy of the original in the files of the state tax commission. The other cases relied on by the majority are similar. City of Columbus v. Ogletree, 102 Ga. 293, 29 S.E. 749 (1897), permitted introduction of a city council’s minutes upon showing that the clerk in whose custody they reposed was absent from his office, and that the minutes tendered had been brought from the clerk’s office by the city treasurer who was acting for the clerk in his absence. McLeod v. Crosby, 128 Mich. 641, 87 N.W. 883 (1901), involved files from a prior criminal trial permitted to be introduced on testimony of the lawyer who produced them that they were papers used in a prior trial of a case. This case directly points up the weakness in the exhibit here being discussed. Nobody was present to testify as to what the exhibit was — only concerning its last place of repose. Wausau Sulphate Fibre Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 61 F.2d 879 (7th Cir. 1932), is in no sense comparable. Involved were papers in the files of the commissioner bearing the taxpayer’s corporate seal which afforded prima facie proof of their genuineness. There was no question of what the instruments were or purported to be, or as to whether they were properly in possession of the commissioner. In State v. Brady, 2 Ariz.App. 210, 407 P.2d 399 (1965), the fingerprints offered were identified by the officers who lifted them and by the officer who compared them. Involved was a question of chain of custody, held not necessary to be established under the facts of the case. No question of chain of custody is here involved. Our concern is with their very origin. • Following is a quotation from VII Wig-more, Evidence (3rd Ed. 1940), § 2158, at 629, also cited by the majority: “The case of papers purporting to be executed by another person than the official, but filed with the record as a part of it, is a difficult one to resolve, and there seems to be little authority regarding it; but it may be suggested that the test should be whether it is made the duty of the custodian to satisfy himself of the genuineness of the document before filing it, or whether in a subsequent part of the judicial proceedings the document in question has been treated as-genuine by the Court or by the party now-charged. A document satisfying either of these tests should be received as sufficiently evidenced, if it is found filed in the appropriate place. The case of a bill or answer or affidavit in chancery has. often been passed upon in rulings which seem to justify some such generalization.” In my view, the section generally supports-my conclusion that the exhibit should not have been admitted. The majority would conclude that by virtue of the fact that the paper was found in: an official file, any and all shortcomings inherent in it are instantly overcome. Clearly, the exhibit was inadmissible to prove-anything unless a proper foundation had been laid. State v. Seals, supra. Compare State v. Apodaca, 42 N.M. 544, 82 P.2d 641 (1938). By what theory its deposit in an official file for an unknown period of time-can serve to overcome this requirement I cannot understand. As an illustration of’ my argument, would a birth certificate,, death certificate, letter, or other unsigned,, undated and unidentified paper be admissible in court upon the mere showing that it was found in an official file? I submit the answer is “No.” The exhibit in question is-nothing more, and the court erred in admitting it. Finally, it seems to me, that the discussion, rationale and disposition of State v. Apodaca, supra, clearly dictates that this. exhibit is inadmissible and, further, requires a reversal of the conviction. See, also, State v. Johnson, 37 N.M. 280, 21 P.2d 813 (1933), 89 A.L.R. 1368 (1934). The exhibit here is equally, if not more unreliable than was the one held erroneously admitted in Apodaca, supra. That it was prejudicial is self-evident. There is no other proof by which the known prints of defendant in Exhibit 25 could be compared to the prints found on the bottle at the scene of the murder. Only by showing that the prints in Exhibit 25 were made by the same person as those in Exhibit 26, and then comparing the one print in Exhibit 26 to the print on the bottle (Exhibit 23), was a complete relationship established. I would reverse and remand the cause for a new trial because of the error discussed above. Since the majority do not agree, I respectfully dissent.