Court Opinion

ID: 9376740
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 18:01:59.559403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.848054
License: Public Domain

Rel: March 3, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

 ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
                                _________________________

                                         CL-2022-0927
                                   _________________________

                                           J.A. f/k/a J.A.H.

                                                      v.

                                        C.G.H. and M.C.H.

                       Appeal from Jefferson Probate Court
                                  (18BHM01915)

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

        On August 13, 2018, C.G.H. ("the maternal great-uncle") and

M.C.H. ("the maternal great-aunt") filed in the Jefferson Probate Court

("the probate court") a petition seeking to adopt E.G.S. ("the child"), who

was born in May 2009. In their petition, the maternal great-aunt and
CL-2022-0927

great-uncle alleged that the child had been living in their home since

March 1, 2018. They also asserted that, pursuant to a 2015 judgment of

the Jefferson Juvenile Court, the child's maternal grandmother, M.W.

("the maternal grandmother"), had been awarded custody of the child.

The petition did not contain an explanation indicating why the child no

longer lived with the maternal grandmother. On September 4, 2018, the

probate court entered an order awarding custody of the child to the

maternal great-aunt and great-uncle.

     On March 12, 2019, the probate court made an entry on the "docket

entry listing" for the adoption action stating that the petition for the

adoption was granted but that a final judgment would not be entered

until the probate court "receive[d] all of the missing paperwork, which

includes proof of service to both birth parents at their [last known

address], an affidavit perfecting service," and a response by the Jefferson

County Department of Human Resources. On May 1, 2019, the probate

court entered a judgment granting the adoption petition.

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     Thereafter, on July 11, 2019, the child's mother, J.A. ("the

mother"), 1 filed in the probate court a verified motion seeking to set aside

the May 1, 2019, adoption judgment; in that motion, the mother alleged

that she had not been provided adequate notice of the adoption action,

and, therefore, that the May 1, 2019, adoption judgment was void.

Although the mother titled her motion "motion to set aside," because of

the nature of the arguments asserted in the mother's July 11, 2019,

motion, that motion was, in substance, a motion filed pursuant to Rule

60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P. See C.S. v. J.B., 305 So. 3d 243, 246 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2020) ("We begin by observing that the father's motions, because

they challenge service of process and seek a determination that the

adoption judgments are void for lack of proper service of process, are

motions filed pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.]"); and K.M.G. v.

B.A., 73 So. 3d 708, 711 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (noting that the substance

of a motion, rather than its title, governs how this court interprets the

motion). The probate court received ore tenus evidence at a hearing on

February 22, 2022, on the mother's July 11, 2019, motion. On June 30,

     1The  mother testified that, when the child was born, her name was
J.A.H., but that she had legally changed her name to J.A. approximately
one year after the child's birth.
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2022, the probate court entered a judgment denying the mother's Rule

60(b) motion seeking relief from the adoption judgment.

     The time for filing a timely notice of appeal from the denial of a

Rule 60(b) motion that seeks relief from an adoption judgment is 42 days.

J.B.M. v. J.C.M., 142 So. 3d 676, 682 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013). In that case,

this court explained:

            "The plain text of § 26-10A-26(a)[, Ala. Code 1975,]
     provides that an aggrieved party has 14 days to file an appeal
     from the final judgment of adoption. The denial of a Rule
     60(b)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion pertaining to a case governed
     by the Alabama Adoption Code[, § 26-10A-1 et seq., Ala. Code
     1975,] is not a final judgment of adoption from which an
     appeal must be taken within 14 days. Rather, it is a separate
     final judgment from which an appeal lies and to which the 14-
     day prescriptive period of § 26-10A-26(a) does not apply.
     Therefore, the period for filing a notice of appeal from the
     denial of a Rule 60(b) motion pertaining to an adoption
     proceeding before the probate court is 42 days pursuant to
     Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P.4

     "_________________

          "4Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P., provides, with limited
     exceptions, that a notice of appeal to this court must be filed
     within 42 days of the date of the entry of the judgment
     appealed from."

J.B.M. v. J.C.M., 142 So. 3d at 681-82. See also K.L.R. v. K.G.S., 264 So.

3d 65, 86 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018); and J.D. v. M.B., 226 So. 3d 706, 711 (Ala.

Civ. App. 2016).

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CL-2022-0927

     In this case, the mother's notice of appeal from the June 30, 2022,

judgment denying her Rule 60(b) motion was required to have been filed

by August 11, 2022, which was 42 days after the entry of that judgment.

Rule 4(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P.; J.B.M. v. J.C.M., supra; K.L.R. v. K.G.S.,

supra; J.D. v. M.B., supra. The mother did not file a notice of appeal by

that date. Rather, on August 4, 2022, within the period in which to

appeal, the mother filed in the probate court a verified motion,

purportedly pursuant to Rule 77(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., in which she sought

an order extending the time in which she could appeal the June 30, 2022,

judgment.2 In that motion, the mother's attorney stated that the mother's

     2Rule  77(d), Ala. R. Civ. P., is applicable in probate courts. Ex parte
C.D., [Ms. 2210248, Nov. 18, 2022] ___ So. 3d ___, ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2022); J.D. v. M.B., supra. This court has explained:

          "The Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure 'apply to the
     probate court in adoption proceedings to the extent they apply
     under Section 12-13-12[, Ala. Code 1975].' § 26-10A-37, Ala.
     Code 1975. Section 12-13-12, Ala. Code 1975, provides:

                  " 'The provisions of this code in reference to
             evidence, pleading and practice, judgments and
             orders in the circuit court, so far as the same are
             appropriate, and the mode of obtaining evidence
             by oral examination or by deposition and of
             compelling the attendance of witnesses and of
             enforcing orders and judgments, in the absence of
                                     5
CL-2022-0927

attorney had first received notice of the June 30, 2022, judgment on July

29, 2022, which, she incorrectly stated, meant that the time for filing a

timely appeal of the June 30, 2022, judgment had already expired. In her

August 4, 2022, motion, the mother sought to be allowed until August 12,

2022, to file a timely notice of appeal. The probate court entered an order

on August 9, 2022, purporting to grant the mother's August 4, 2022,

motion and purporting to extend the time for the mother to appeal to

August 12, 2022. The mother filed her notice of appeal on August 12,

2022.

        Rule 77(d) provides, in part:

        "Lack of notice of the entry by the clerk does not affect the
        time to appeal or relieve or authorize the court to relieve a
        party for failure to appeal within the time allowed, except that
        upon a showing of excusable neglect based on a failure of the
        party to learn of the entry of the judgment or order the circuit
        court in any action may extend the time for appeal not
        exceeding thirty (30) days from the expiration of the original
        time now provided for appeals in civil actions."

             express provision to the contrary, are applicable to
             the proceedings in the probate court.' "

J.D. v. M.B., 226 So. 3d at 708 n.2.

                                        6
CL-2022-0927

     Although Rule 77(d) is a mechanism for filing a timely appeal if a

party did not receive notice of the entry of a judgment, that rule does not

operate to extend a party's time for taking an appeal if the party learns

of the entry of the judgment prior to the expiration of the time for taking

a timely appeal from that judgment. Salvant v. Howell, 854 So. 2d 118,

123 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003). This court has explained:

                 " 'Rule 77(d), [Ala. R. Civ. P.,] exclusively,
           governs the situation in which a litigant claims
           that the clerk's office failed to give notice of the
           entry of the trial court's judgment. Lindstrom v.
           Jones, 603 So. 2d 960 (Ala. 1992). "The intent of
           Rule 77(d) was to allow an out of time appeal
           where fault for the untimely appeal does not lie
           with the party seeking to appeal." '

     "W.T.M. v. Department of Human Res., 736 So. 2d 1120, 1121
     (Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (quoting Moser v. Crayton, 726 So. 2d
     696, 698 (Ala. Civ. App. 1998)). This court has held that 'Rule
     77(d) is not applicable when a party learns of the entry of a
     judgment before the time for appeal lapses.' Salvant v.
     Howell, 854 So. 2d 118, 123 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)."

Johnson v. Emerson, 185 So. 3d 1120, 1126 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). See also

Ex parte Thrailkill, 543 So. 2d 1201, 1202 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999).

     In this case, the mother's Rule 77(d) motion states that she learned

on July 29, 2022, of the entry of the June 30, 2022, judgment denying her

Rule 60(b) motion. It appears that the mother mistakenly believed that

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she had only 14 days to appeal the June 30, 2022, judgment. However,

that mistake would not constitute excusable neglect under Rule 77(d).

"[A] litigant's miscalculation of the last day for filing a notice of appeal,

no matter how innocent or understandable, is not the kind of neglect

excused under Rule 77(d)," and, therefore, the probate court "was without

the power to grant … an extension of time to file [the] notice of appeal."

Greystone Close v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 664 So. 2d 900, 902 (Ala.

1995).

     In Smith v. Smith, 919 So. 2d 315 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005), the former

husband misread the date on which the trial court entered a

postjudgment order, and, therefore, he filed a notice of appeal that was

two days late. In his Rule 77(d) motion in that case, the former husband

argued that the date stamp was difficult to read, and, therefore, his

mistake constituted excusable neglect in determining the actual date of

the entry of the postjudgment order. The former wife cross-appealed from

the trial court's granting of the husband's Rule 77(d) motion, arguing that

Rule 77(d) did not apply to the miscalculation of a deadline to file an

appeal. This court agreed with the former wife and dismissed both the

appeal and the cross-appeal, explaining:

                                     8
CL-2022-0927

     " 'Rule 77(d)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] does not permit the trial court
     to extend the time for appeal for any reason other than failure
     to learn of entry of the judgment' or order from which an
     appeal is taken. Deborah A. Smith & Rhonda P. Chambers,
     'The Nuts and Bolts of Civil Appeals,' 56 Ala. Lawyer 304, 305
     (Sept. 1995) (emphasis added). Here, counsel for the former
     husband did not fail to learn of the entry of the judgment --
     instead, her agent miscalculated the final date for filing a
     notice of appeal based upon her unilateral interpretation of a
     digit produced by a filing stamp. As our Supreme Court has
     held, 'a litigant's miscalculation of the last day for filing a
     notice of appeal, no matter how innocent or understandable,
     is not the kind of neglect excused under Rule 77(d).' Greystone
     Close v. Fidelity & Guar. Ins. Co., 664 So. 2d 900, 902 (Ala.
     1995)."

Smith v. Smith, 919 So. 2d at 317.

     The mother learned of the entry of the June 30, 2022, judgment

within the 42 days allowed for taking a timely appeal from that

judgment. Rule 4(a)(1); J.B.M. v. J.C.M., supra. Therefore, because the

mother learned of the entry of the June 30, 2022, judgment during the

time in which she could file a timely appeal of that judgment, Rule 77(d)

was not available to extend the time for the mother to file her notice of

appeal. Salvant v. Howell, supra. The probate court's order purporting to

allow the mother until August 12, 2022, to file a timely notice of appeal

was ineffective.

                                     9
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     The mother's notice of appeal was required to have been filed by

August 11, 2022, to be timely taken from the June 30, 2022, judgment.

The mother filed her notice of appeal on August 12, 2022, one day late.

           "An appeal is not a vested right, but exists by the grace
     of a statute or a supreme court rule and must be perfected
     pursuant to the time and manner prescribed therein.
     Crawford v. Ray & Pearman Lincoln Mercury, 420 So. 2d 269
     (Ala. Civ. App. 1982). The time prescribed by statute for
     taking an appeal is jurisdictional; therefore, an untimely
     appeal must be dismissed. Holmes v. Powell, 363 So. 2d 760
     (Ala. 1978); Meeks [v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins.
     Co., 286 Ala. 513, 243 So. 2d 27 (1970)]."

Ex parte Thrailkill, 543 So. 2d at 1202. "An appeal shall be dismissed if

the notice of appeal was not timely filed to invoke the jurisdiction of the

appellate court." Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P. Therefore, the mother's

appeal is due to be dismissed.

     APPEAL DISMISSED.

     Moore, Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

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