Court Opinion

ID: 9856523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:49:36.132707+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:58.138600
License: Public Domain

Jordan, Judge,
dissenting. It is my opinion that the only damages- recoverable by the plaintiff alleged in the petition are based on an action in tort for damage to the plaintiff’s reputation. Under Code Ann. § 3-1004 injuries to a person’s reputation must be brought within one year after the right of action accrues. This petition shows- on its face that the acts of the defendants allegedly damaging the plaintiff were done over the period from August 18, 1962, to September 5, 1962, and that the petition was filed on August 17, 1964. The statute of limitation was raised by demurrer to the petition and I think it was properly sustained by the trial court.
Paragraph 4 of the plaintiff’s petition alleges that as a result of the actions of the defendants “plaintiff’s reputation and standing in the profession of trade and electrical engineering and electrical contracting was destroyed.” The petition further alleges that because of the acts of the defendants “plaintiff cannot obtain credit, procure a contractor’s bond, or secure employment”; that his earning capacity has been destroyed, and that the wrongful acts of the defendants in filing said liens “attributed financial weakness, instability and irresponsibility to the plaintiff” and that “many persons, the exact number of which plaintiff cannot state, considered and understood said purported liens to indicate plaintiff to be personally, financially weak, unstable and irresponsible,” and that plaintiff has suffered “by damage to his feelings and humiliation.”
Such allegations clearly subject the petition to the construction that the alleged acts of the defendants have damaged plaintiff’s reputation in his profession to the extent that he has been deprived of earning a livelihood in his profession as a result thereof. In the case of Sicklesmith v. Citizens Bank of Hapeville, 101 Ga. App. 533 (114 SE2d 319), this court construed allegations of injury to the plaintiff’s credit and financial standing in the community to be an action in tort for damage to- the plaintiff’s reputation, subjecting it to the one-year statute of limitation set forth in Code Ann. § 3-1004. The court *731further held in that case that the defense of the statute of limitation, being apparent on the face of the petition, was properly raised by demurrer, citing Hollingsworth v. Redwine, 73 Ga. App. 397 (36 SE2d 869).
The majority opinion says that the petition is loosely drawn, and then makes a unique attempt to breathe life into it by calling it an action for damage to plaintiff’s property, thus giving plaintiff four years in which to bring the action. For this strained construction, the opinion cites McCullough v. Atlantic Refining Co., 50 Ga. App. 237 (177 SE 601), which deals with a situation where, as Judge Sutton said, “it is difficult to determine from the plaintiff’s petition the particular form of action on which he relies” and concludes that “where plaintiff’s petition is ambiguous to the extent that the plaintiff’s intention is not clearly manifest as to which form of action is relied upon, but there is no appropriate demurrer interposed, it should not be held that no cause of action is stated.” Such is not the situation here facing the court for the petition is not ambiguous but clearly demands the conclusion that it is an action for damage to the plaintiff's reputation, appropriate demurrers were filed thereto, and the plaintiff’s intention is clearly manifest as to which form of action he relies upon. This could not be more clearly shown than by the plaintiff’s own statement on page 1 of his brief that he is “seeking in count 1 to recover damages in the amount of $309,367.67 by reason of injury to plaintiff’s reputation resulting from the acts of the defendant alleged in the petition.” (Emphasis supplied). Count 2 of the petition is not involved in this appeal since no exception was taken to the order sustaining the demurrers to that count.
The case of Studdard v. Evans, 108 Ga. App. 819 (135 SE2d 60) relied upon by Judge Hall in his special concurrence is not analogous to the facts here since that case involved a property right arising out of a contract. The allegation of loss of salary for a period of time (itself remote and speculative) is not asserted as a property right but merely as one of the results of the alleged damage to the plaintiff’s reputation and supports the previous allegation that plaintiff had been unable “to secure employment” as one of the results of the defendant’s *732actions. The cause of action was still one for injury to the plaintiff’s reputation and the alleged loss of salary merely an item of damages flowing from the cause of action. Under Judge Hall’s theory, any action based on injury to the plaintiff’s reputation would be converted into an action for damage to plaintiff’s property when the usual items of damage resulting therefrom, such as loss of earning capacity, inability to obtain credit, loss of employment, etc., are set forth to support the cause of action.
It being clear that plaintiff’s petition seeks damages for injury to his reputation, and it appearing on the face of the petition that it was filed more than one year after the right of action accrued, the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrers and dismissing the petition.
I am authorized to state that Bell, P. J., Frankum and Eberhardt, JJ., concur in this dissent.