Court Opinion

ID: 9474616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:03:17.465081+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:12.982509
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM:
Charles Gross appeals from an order of the district court affirming the decision of the Secretary of Health and Human Services to deny disability, disability insurance, and supplemental security income benefits. The administrative law judge (AU) had found that Gross was disabled; the Appeals Council found that he was not disabled. Because the clear precedent of this circuit requires that the court defer to the Appeals Council, rather than the AU, and because the findings of the Appeals Council are supported by substantial evidence, we affirm the decision of the district court.
The AU initially decided that Gross was entitled to disability benefits. The Appeals Council reviewed the decision of the AU and concluded that it was not supported by substantial evidence. The Appeals Council then remanded the case to the AU, so that the AU could obtain a psychiatric examination of appellant with psychological testing, and conduct a hearing.
After the examinations and hearing, the AU again concluded that Gross was disabled. The Appeals Council again reviewed the decision of the AU on its own motion. After considering the entire record, the Appeals Council decided that Gross’ impairments were not severe, and that he was therefore not disabled.
*1165Gross then appealed to the district court, which determined that the finding of the Appeals Council was supported by substantial evidence, and accordingly granted summary judgment to the Secretary.
This appeal presents a recurrent question: when the AU and the Appeals Council disagree on the award of disability benefits, to whom do the courts owe deference? The answer is well-established. Two recent rulings make it clear that the courts owe deference to the findings of the Appeals Council. Parris v. Heckler, 733 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.1984); Kellough v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1147 (4th Cir.1986).
In Parris, the court said, “The statutorily-mandated deference runs in favor of the Secretary and the Appeals Council, not the AU and the Appeals Council may reach conclusions differing from those of the AU, which we must uphold if supported by substantial evidence.” 733 F.2d at 326. Kellough reaffirmed Parris, and thoughtfully set forth the reasons why deference is due the Appeals Council. At 785-1151 n. 5. The Council is entitled to this deference whether its review of the AU decision was de novo or on the record. The matter of deference has been much discussed; we decline to revisit it, and' we review the judgment of the district court on the authority of Parris and Kellough.
We have examined the ruling of the Appeals Council under the Parris standard, and have found that substantial evidence supports the ruling of the Appeals Council. The regulations state that the Appeals Council will review a case if the “action, findings or conclusions of the administrative law judge are not supported by substantial evidence.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.-970(a)(3). The Appeals Council explicitly concluded that the decision of the AU to award benefits to Gross was not supported by substantial evidence of a severe impairment. Since there is no question that the Appeals Council employed the correct standard of review, the question of whether the decision of the AU was supported by substantial evidence is not before us. The only issue is whether the decision of the Appeals Council is supported by substantial evidence.
In order to qualify for disability benefits, an applicant must have an “impairment or combination of impairments which significantly limits [his] physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Basic work activities are defined as the “abilities and aptitudes necessary to do most jobs.” 20 C.F.R. § 416.-921(b). For example, work activities might include walking, standing, sitting, lifting, pushing, pulling, and reaching; as well as capacities for seeing, hearing and speaking; and understanding, carrying out, and remembering simple instructions. 20 C.F.R. § 416.921(b).
The claimant has the burden of proving his disability to the satisfaction of the Secretary. The claimant must demonstrate that he has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, and that the impairment renders him unable to engage in substantial gainful employment. Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir.1972) (citations omitted).
The Appeals Council methodically considered the entire record, including the notes and reports of numerous doctors, and Gross’ own testimony. We believe that there is substantial evidence to support the Appeals Council’s finding that Gross’ impairments were not severe, that he was capable of gainful employment, and that he was therefore not entitled to disability benefits.
During his hearing before the AU, Gross said that he suffered from arthritis, poor vision, ulcers, blackout spells, nerves, and a heart condition. There was ample reason to conclude that Gross’ arthritis, poor vision and ulcers would all respond to basic medical attention, and were therefore not disabling. Glasses would correct Gross’ vision, which was tested at 20/25 in the right eye, and 20/50 in the left. Dr. Jo Ledwell reported that plaintiff could perform tasks requiring fine visual discrimination. His arthritis responded to conservative treatment, and his stomach pains were *1166relieved by antacids. If a symptom can be reasonably controlled by medication or treatment, it is not disabling. Purdham v. Celebrezze, 349 F.2d 828, 830 (4th Cir.1965); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1530. Therefore, the Appeals Council did not err in eliminating visual problems, arthritis and ulcers as evidence of disability.
Gross also complained of chest pain, which Dr. Neil Johnson said was atypical of angina pectoris. In order to qualify for disability benefits, one must have an impairment “that results from anatomical, physiological, or psychological abnormalities which are demonstrable by medically acceptable clinical and laboratory diagnostic techniques.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(3), (5)(A). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A). As the Appeals Council noted, there were no specific clinical findings, and no neurological, sensory, or reflex abnormalities which would explain Gross’ chest pain, blackouts, or anxiety. Cf Foster v. Heckler, 780 F.2d 1125 (4th Cir.1986).
It is certainly possible that Gross experienced some pain. However, while the Appeals Council may not utterly disregard complaints of pain, pain is not disabling per se. “The Secretary may not ignore entirely evidence of pain which the AU has found credible, Combs v. Weinberger, 501 F.2d 1361, 1363 (4th Cir.1974); nonetheless, subjective allegations alone cannot be determinative where there is at least some evidence, as here, that the Appeals Council gave attention to the matter. Pain is not disabling per se, and subjective evidence of pain cannot take precedence over objective medical evidence or the lack thereof.” Parris, 733 F.2d at 327.
In its decision, the Appeals Council discussed Gross’ complaints of pain. The Council could well have decided that Gross’ pain, in the absence of objective medical evidence, was not disabling. It noted Dr. Ledwell’s conclusion that plaintiff demonstrated an “over concern or hypersensitivity to minor dysfunction and numerous complaints without adequate physical pathology.” .
Several of the doctors who examined Gross suggested that he might have a psychological disorder, specifically, conversion disorder, hypochondriasis, or alcoholism. However, a psychological disorder is not necessarily disabling. There must be a showing of related functional loss. Sitar v. Schweiker, 671 F.2d 19, 20-21 (1st Cir.1982). As to alcoholism, Gross told one psychologist he had not had a drink in the past six months and another that he did not drink at home because his mother would not permit it. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1525(e) and 416.925(e) state that addiction to alcohol is not by itself a basis for determining whether one is disabled, and the Appeals Council had substantial evidence to support its conclusion that involuntary drinking habits did not “preclude claimant from sustained work.”
Thus, none of Gross’ ailments automatically entitle him to disability benefits. Moreover, the pattern of Gross’ daily activity suggests that he was not disabled from working. Gross could and did cook, wash dishes, and generally take care of a house. In his statement of living arrangements, Gross said that he acted as a caretaker in exchange for the use of the apartment in which he lived. Gross went grocery shopping and took care of his own personal needs. He walked to town every morning and cleaned up the local poolroom for about an hour, and was paid for doing so. After cleaning up, Gross would drink or socialize with the patrons of the pool hall until before dark, when he went home. The Appeals Council felt that “the claimant’s daily activities are indicative of a life style rather than any restriction imposed by an impairment.”
We believe that the decision of the Appeals Council was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.
AFFIRMED.