Court Opinion

ID: 9738306
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:49:41.028971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:05.361966
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
I dissent from the majority because the policy of the parole board which prevents a citizen from being represented by his counsel at a parole revocation hearing violates that citizen’s rights to due process of law guaranteed to him by both the Federal and State Constitutions.
Recently the United States Supreme Court in Morrissey v. Brewer (1972), 92 S. Ct. 2593, 33 L. Ed. 2d 484, held that parole revocation hearings are the type of proceedings by which the individual may be condemned to suffer grievous loss and furthermore that the type of loss suffered is one within the contemplation of the “liberty or property” language of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore such hearings must be conducted pursuant to due process and certain procedural safeguards must be afforded to a parolee at his revocation hearing. The court, speaking through Chief Justice Burger, stated that the parolee must be given a preliminary hearing and further found that at his main hearing he should be afforded the opportunity to cross examine opposing witnesses, present his own witnesses, receive written notice of the claimed violation of parole, and have his hearing conducted before a neutral and detached hearing officer. Although the majority opinion specifically stated that it would not reach the *674issue of the right to retain counsel at such hearings I believe that both previous decisions of the higher federal courts delineating basic Fourteenth Amendment due process procedures and the nature of the right itself indicate that the State cannot act to bar counsel from such a hearing.1
The main purpose of a parole revocation hearing is to establish the truth or falsity of certain allegations. Essentially it is a fact finding process concerned with whether a parolee committed certain specified acts which violate his parole agreement. Attorneys are often the keystone of fact finding hearings and represent the most meaningful and significant aspect of basic due process procedure. The right to cross examine and present evidence in rebuttal, as guaranteed by Morrissey v. Brewer, supra, would be of little help to one untrained in their use. Attorneys, on the other hand, are experienced and trained in the use of these tools to establish or discredit facts and allegations. They can be of immeasurable assistance in clearly delineating the issues confronting the parolee, in presenting factual contentions in an orderly manner, in conducting cross examination and in generally insuring the interest of the parolee. I can think of no legitimate State interest which would justify the exclusion of counsel from this type of hearing. Rather it seems to me that the integrity of this fact finding process would only be strengthened by the presence of trained counsel.
The prior decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and lower federal courts, when confronting this issue indicate that the right to retain counsel is an integral part of the procedural requirements of due process as defined by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Due process, essentially, is the opportunity to be heard. Wisconsin v. *675Constantineau (1971), 400 U.S. 433, 91 S. Ct. 507, 27 L. Ed. 2d 515; Grannis v. Ordean (1914), 234 U.S. 385, 34 S. Ct. 779, 58 L. Ed. 1363. All the procedural requirements incorporated into a due process hearing are tools to insure that this opportunity is afforded in a “meaningful manner”. Armstrong v. Manzo (1965), 380 U.S. 545, 85 S. Ct. 1187, 14 L. Ed. 2d 62. As Justice Sutherland wrote in reference to the right to be represented:
“The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.” Powell v. Alabama (1932), 287 U.S. 45, 53 S. Ct. 55, 77 L. Ed. 158.
Although the court in Powell was writing in reference to the Sixth Amendment and not in the context of Fourteenth Amendment due process proceedings with which we are concerned here, the rationale of the' observation prevails. The right to be represented by counsel is an important aspect of being heard in a meaningful manner, regardless of whether the proceeding is deemed criminal or non-criminal in nature. The United States Supreme Court, citing the rationale of the Powell decision above, has found that due process requires that counsel be allowed to represent a welfare recipient in an administrative hearing concerned with the termination of welfare benefits. Goldberg v. Kelly (1970), 397 U.S. 254, 90 S. Ct. 1011, 25 L. Ed. 2d 287. The United States Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit also included the right to be represented by counsel in its outline of Fourteenth Amendment due process requirements in reference to a probation revocation hearing. Gunsolus v. Gagnon, 454 F. 2d 416 (7th Cir. 1971). It seems apparent to me, therefore, that federal decisions delineating due process requirements include the right to retain counsel in those proceedings which necessitate a due process approach, and since the proceedings with which we are concerned here have been clearly held to require such an approach counsel should not be excluded from the hearings.
*676Furthermore the Constitution of this State at Article 1, § 12, contains a due course of law section comparable to the due process provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although parole revocation hearings are not strictly speaking an administrative proceeding the Appellate Court treatment of a similar situation in the context of Art. 1, § 12, is significant here. In a case dealing with hearings for unemployment compensation benefits the Appellate Court held that the exclusion of claimant’s counsel was a denial of due process. Hamm v. Review Board (1961), 132 Ind. App. 318, 177 N. E. 2d 337. The Court stated in its opinion:
“We do not deem it necessary to cite authority that the due process of law provisions in both constitutions apply equally to administrative boards, the same as the courts of law, and that the appellant herein has a right to be represented by counsel in this matter before the appeals referee, and at every stage of proceeding.”
It seems to me that the reasoning quoted in the Hamm case above applies even more strongly to our case here. The loss to be suffered by a revocation of parole is certainly as great, if not greater than that suffered by denial of unemployment benefits.2 A constitutional provision which would prohibit a counsel from a proceeding where one’s economic welfare is at stake would surely even more strongly condemn the exclusion of counsel where one’s liberty is at stake.
The majority opinion citation of Terry v. Byers (1903), 161 Ind. 360, 68 N. E. 596, is particularly inappropriate to this case. The Terry decision concerned not a parole revocation proceeding as we are faced with here, but rather a parole granting proceeding. There are recognized differences in the nature and concept behind these two types of hearings. A *677parole revocation hearing, as pointed out above, is essentially a fact finding hearing, but a parole granting hearing contemplates a more substantial degree of discretion and judgment on the part of the parole board which is not based particularly upon either establishing or discrediting certain facts. It should be pointed out also that the United States Supreme Court has specifically said that parole revocation proceedings must be conducted pursuant to certain procedural rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, however, that court has not as yet extended those rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to a parole granting hearing.
The majority also cites sections of Indiana statutory law which grant to the parole board a certain amount of discretion in its proceedings. This statute (I.C. 1971, 11-1-1-9, being Burns § 13-1609) again deals mostly with the granting of paroles rather than the case at bar which concerns revocation. In any event it is elementary constitutional law that when the United States Supreme Court has decided that certain procedural rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause must be afforded in a proceeding then the statutes of the state must conform to that constitutional mandate. Thus the discretion which is allowed to be exercised by the Indiana Parole Board must be bounded by the procedural rights guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.
Lastly this case does not pose the question as to whether or not the Morrissey decision is retroactive as the majority opinion seems to assume, but rather presents the issue of whether or not, given the fact that the Supreme Court has found that parole revocation proceedings should be conducted with certain procedural due process rights, the State can continue to exclude counsel from those proceedings. I believe that the answer is apparent and in the negative. I would hold therefore that the exclusion of counsel from parole revocation hearings deprives the parolee of due process of *678law under both Federal and State Constitutions and that if a parolee chooses to retain counsel at such a hearing he should be allowed to do so.
Prentice, J., concurs.
Note.—Reported in 291 N. E. 2d 361.

. After stating that they would not decide the question whether or not a parolee is entitled to the assistance of counsel at his revocation hearing the Court cited in a footnote the Model Penal Code § 305.16 which reads: “The institutional parole staif shall render reasonable aid to the parolee in preparation for the hearing and he shall be permitted to advise with his own legal counsel. . . .”

. It is also of note that the Legislature has deemed a right to have counsel present at all administrative adjudication so important that it has incorporated this right into a statute. See I.C. 1971, 4-22-1-22, being Burns § 63-3022. It has also provided that students faced with expulsion from school have the right to a hearing with the assistance of counsel if so desired. See I.C. 1971, 20-8-9.5-11, being Burns § 28-5364.