Court Opinion

ID: 9713562
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:17:34.114877+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:19.302550
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE GREEN, concurring. I concur. If the conduct required of plaintiffs in making various applications constituted perjury, that conduct had already occurred and those offenses had been committed before plaintiffs left the tavern. The order they are charged with disobeying required them to return to the tavern and operate it. No evidence was presented that this would require commission of perjury. However, as pointed out in the majority opinion, the ownership of the tavern operation had been structured in such a way that plaintiffs had an interest therein. As they were “law enforcing public official[s]” within the meaning of section 2 of article VI of the Dramshop Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1977, ch. 43, par. 120 (14)) (see Bock v. Long (1972), 3 Ill. App. 3d 691, 279 N.E.2d 464), their continued operation of the tavern would violate that statutory provision. Accordingly, I agree that they were being required to perform illegal acts. Undercover operations are an accepted tool of law enforcement. I am concerned with our decision because of the effect it may have on law enforcement. The conduct required here does not concern the civil rights of others as in Olmstead nor the integrity of a judicial proceeding as in Friedman. Undoubtedly, the statutory provision in question was passed to prevent evils not involved here. However, unless legislation.is enacted in aid of undercover operations, to permit this type of tavern ownership or additional otherwise illegal acts, IBI agents cannot be fired for refusal to perform those acts.