Court Opinion

ID: 9738109
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:42:53.149308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:03.759832
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE WOMBACHER delivered the opinion of the court: Defendants appeal on the pleadings the trial court’s order of March 25, 1987, vacating an order in their favor dated February 23, 1987, which order effectively dismissed plaintiff’s cause of action pursuant to an earlier order of dismissal entered on August 18, 1986. On May 24, 1985, plaintiff Julie Parrish sued defendants for medical negligence in treating her daughter, Danielle Parrish. Defendants appeared and moved for a transfer of venue; however, Brokaw Hospital never appeared and there is no record that Brokaw was ever served. On April 8, 1986, the trial court transferred this case to McLean County. Defendants moved to dismiss, alleging plaintiffs failed to pay the transfer costs. On August 18, 1986, the trial court granted defendants’ motions and dismissed the action. On August 28, 1986, plaintiffs’ attorney, Richard D. Price, Jr., filed a motion to vacate the dismissal order. On November 24, 1986, the trial court ordered defense counsel to submit an itemized list of expenses associated with the August 18 and November 24 hearings. Plaintiffs were to pay these related expenses within 21 days of their submission. The order further provided plaintiffs’ motion to vacate was granted subject to plaintiffs’ compliance with the subject order by making the payments provided for therein. The plaintiffs’ failed to make such payments. On January 29, 1987, defendants filed a motion to make the dismissal order final and appealable, or alternatively, to dismiss with prejudice since plaintiffs failed to comply with the November 24 order and prayed the trial court make the August 18 order final and appeal-able. On February 23, 1987, the trial court found plaintiffs failed to meet the conditions of the November 24 order, vacated that order, and dismissed the case pursuant to the August 18 order. The trial court declared there was “no just reason to delay enforcement or appeal,” consistent with Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (107 Ill. 2d R. 304(a).) On March 19, 1987, plaintiffs, having employed new and different attorneys, filed a motion to vacate the February 23 order of dismissal, with the affidavit of Julie Parrish attached thereto. A supplement to said motion was filed on March 23, 1987. On March 25, 1987, defendants filed a motion to strike the motion to vacate claiming the trial court lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its February 23 order. Plaintiffs’ motion was allowed providing the November 24 order once again became viable, except plaintiffs were to satisfy the conditions therein within five days. Defendants’ motion to strike was denied. On March 26, 1987, plaintiffs filed a letter indicating the expenses were paid pursuant to the March 25th order. On March 30, 1987, this case was docketed in McLean County. Thereafter, defendants filed their notices of appeal in Peoria County. For purposes of brevity, since the particular parties or substantive claims affected by the Rule 304(a) finding are not relevant in this appeal, there is no need for further elaboration on factual matters in this opinion. The question posed is does a timely filed motion to vacate the February 23 order of dismissal, which contained a Rule 304(a) finding, retain jurisdiction in the circuit court so as to permit said trial court to vacate the dismissal order of February 23, 1987? Rule 304(a), which governs “Appeals from Final Judgments That Do Not Dispose of an Entire Proceeding,” provides: “If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written finding that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. Such a finding may be made at the time of the entry of the judgment or thereafter on the court’s own motion or on motion of any party. The time for filing the notice of appeal shall run from the entry of the required finding. In the absence of such a finding, any judgment that adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights, and liabilities of all the parties.” (Emphasis added.) (107 Ill. 2d R. 304(a)).  “Unless the circuit court order incorporates the [language of Rule 304(a)], no appeal is permissible, and the circuit court retains jurisdiction over the entire cause, including the power to revise any or all judgments at any time prior to the entry of a judgment adjudicating all claims.” (Petersen Brothers Plastics, Inc. v. Ullo (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 625, 630, 373 N.E.2d 416.) On the other hand, when a trial court makes a Rule 304(a) finding, it loses jurisdiction and the respective final judgment cannot be revised, then a post-trial motion directed against such a judgment would be of no effect. Elg v. Whittington (1986), 149 Ill. App. 3d 307, 500 N.E.2d 568, affd (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 344 (prospective application to cases filed on or after November 16,1987). In Elg the appellate court held that the rationale of Rule 304(a) is to provide an immediate appeal from an order final as to fewer than all of the claims or all of the parties, when the necessary finding is made. The court reasoned that to countenance a Rule 304(a) finding followed by a post-judgment motion would be to thwart the rule’s purpose. The appellate court’s holding was subsequently affirmed by the Illinois Supreme Court and held prospectively to all cases in which the notice of appeal was filed or due to be filed on or after its decision of November 16,1987. Elg v. Whittington (1987), 119 Ill. 2d 344.  In the instant case, the trial court had divested itself of jurisdiction to rule on the plaintiff’s March 19, 1987, motion for vacature of the February 23, 1987, dismissal order. The 30 days allowed for filing an appeal of the partial trial court order of February 23 were not tolled by the subsequent motion to vacate. Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to timely file an appeal in this court for review of the propriety of the dismissal order. The order allowing the motion to vacate the February 23, 1987, order of dismissal is hereby vacated, and the defendants’ motion to strike the aforesaid motion to vacate is hereby allowed. The trial court’s order of February 23, 1987, is accordingly reinstated, and the plaintiffs’ cause of action is dismissed pursuant to the August 18, 1987, order dismissing plaintiffs’ cause of action. This case is reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Reversed and remanded. SCOTT, J., concurs.