Court Opinion

ID: 9950207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-13 16:01:08.244172+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:06.027755
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13216    Document: 36-1      Date Filed: 03/13/2024   Page: 1 of 13

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13216
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        JESMINA RAMIREZ,

                                                    Defendant-Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Florida
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:21-cr-20154-JLK-1
                           ____________________
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        2                       Opinion of the Court                    22-13216

        Before BRASHER, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Jesmina Ramirez appeals her 63-month sentence for conspir-
        acy to commit money laundering and money laundering. First, she
        argues that the district court erred by imposing a four-level en-
        hancement under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C) when it concluded she
        was in the business of laundering money and in doing so relied on
        the commentary to the guideline. Second, she argues that the
        court clearly erred by declining to apply a two-level reduction un-
        der U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) when it concluded that she did not play a
        minor role in the offense. Third, she argues that the court plainly
        erred when it failed to personally address her before imposing its
        sentence. Finally, she argues that, as a first-time offender, her
        63-month, within-guidelines sentence is substantively unreasona-
        ble.
                                            I.
                Ordinarily, “[w]e review the interpretation of the Sentenc-
        ing Guidelines de novo and any underlying factual findings for clear
        error.” United States v. Gayden, 977 F.3d 1146, 1153 (11th Cir. 2020)
        (quotation marks omitted). However, arguments not raised below
        are reviewed for plain error. United States v. Sanchez, 940 F.3d 526,
        537 (11th Cir. 2019). Under plain error review, we will reverse a
        district court’s decision only if “there is: (1) error, (2) that is plain,
        and (3) that affects substantial rights, and if (4) the error seriously
        affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
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        22-13216               Opinion of the Court                         3

        proceedings.” United States v. Doyle, 857 F.3d 1115, 1118 (11th Cir.
        2017) (quotation marks omitted). “[W]here the explicit language
        of a statute or rule does not specifically resolve an issue, there can
        be no plain error where there is no precedent from the Supreme
        Court or this Court directly resolving it.” United States v. Chau, 426
        F.3d 1318, 1322 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted).
               To preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant “must raise an
        objection that is sufficient to apprise the trial court and the oppos-
        ing party of the particular grounds upon which appellate relief will
        later be sought.” United States v. Straub, 508 F.3d 1003, 1011 (11th
        Cir. 2007) (quotation marks omitted). However, “once a party has
        preserved an issue, it ‘may make any argument in support of that
        claim; parties are not limited to the precise arguments they made
        below.’” United States v. Brown, 934 F.3d 1278, 1306-07 (11th Cir.
        2019) (quoting Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992)).
                The Sentencing Guideline for an 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) viola-
        tion is found in U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1. Section 2S1.1(a) contains two pro-
        visions to calculate a defendant’s base offense level. In relevant
        part, § 2S1.1(a)(2) calculates a defendant’s total base offense level
        by assigning a base offense level of eight and then adding the num-
        ber of offense levels “corresponding to the value of the laundered
        funds” from the table in § 2B1.1. After calculating a defendant’s
        base offense level under § 2S1.1(a), courts turn to “Specific Offense
        Characteristics” under § 2S1.1(b). In relevant part, a four-level in-
        crease applies “[i]f (i) subsection (a)(2) applies; and (ii) the
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13216

        defendant was in the business of laundering funds.” U.S.S.G.
        § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C).
                To determine whether a defendant “was in the business of
        laundering funds,” the Commentary to § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C) instructs
        courts to examine the “totality of the circumstances” and consider
        a “non-exhaustive list” of factors, including whether: (i) the defend-
        ant regularly engaged in laundering funds; (ii) the defendant en-
        gaged in laundering funds for an extended period of time; (iii) the
        defendant engaged in laundering funds from multiple sources;
        (iv) the defendant generated a substantial amount of revenue in re-
        turn for laundering funds; (v) the defendant had one or more pre-
        vious convictions for money laundering-related offenses; and
        (vi) during the course of an undercover investigation, the defend-
        ant made statements that she engaged in any of the conduct indi-
        cating that she was in the business of laundering money. U.S.S.G.
        § 2S1.1, comment. (n.4).
               Although we have not addressed what it means to be “in the
        business” of laundering funds, we have, in addressing a similar
        guideline issue, determined that “in the business” requires “more
        than isolated, casual, or sporadic activity.” United States v. Saunders,
        318 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir. 2003) (determining the meaning of
        “in the business” of receiving and selling stolen property); see also
        Amend. 634, U.S.S.G. Supp. to App’x C, Reason for Amendment
        (explaining the reason for the four-level “in the business of launder-
        ing funds” enhancement and comparing defendants who “rou-
        tinely engage in laundering funds on behalf of others” to a
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        22-13216               Opinion of the Court                         5

        professional “fence,” as both “warrant substantial additional pun-
        ishment because they encourage the commission of additional
        criminal conduct”).
               A sentencing court may consider the Sentencing Commis-
        sion’s interpretation of a Guideline as contained in the Commen-
        tary to the extent that a Guideline is “genuinely ambiguous.”
        United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th 1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc).
               Here, even assuming that this issue of whether the district
        court erred in relying on the Guidelines Commentary is preserved,
        because the term, “in the business,” can bear multiple meanings, it
        is genuinely ambiguous, so the district court did not err when it
        considered the Commentary’s list of non-exhaustive factors.
               The district court did not clearly err in imposing a four-level
        enhancement to Ramirez’s sentence when it concluded that she
        was in the business of laundering funds. First, considering the non-
        exhaustive factors in the Commentary to § 2S1.1(b)(2)(C),
        Ramirez’s conduct was not isolated, casual, or sporadic. Saunders,
        318 F.3d at 1265. She cashed 134 checks. Second, she cashed those
        134 checks over a period of more than 2 years, up to several a week.
        Third, throughout those two years, although she only received
        checks from Chang and Gonzalez, the checks were drawn on the
        bank accounts of multiple sham durable medical equipment
        (“DME”) companies. Fourth, from those multiple sham DME
        companies, she generated $34,302.00, which is a substantial
        amount, especially when compared to her legal revenue. Although
        she had no criminal history and did not make any statements about
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        6                       Opinion of the Court                   22-13216

        her conduct during a government investigation (the fifth and sixth
        factors), given the other factors, and based on the totality of the
        circumstances, the district court did not err in finding that Ramirez
        was “in the business of laundering funds,” such that a four-level in-
        crease applied. See U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1 comment. n.4(B)(i) (vi). Ac-
        cordingly, we affirm as to this issue.
                                           II.
               We review the district court’s determination of a defend-
        ant’s role for clear error. United States v. De Varon, 175 F.3d 930, 934
        (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). The sentencing court’s factual findings
        “may be based on evidence heard during trial . . . undisputed state-
        ments in the presentence report, or evidence presented at the sen-
        tencing hearing.” Saunders, 318 F.3d at 1271 n.22 (quotation marks
        omitted). “The district court’s choice between two permissible
        views of the evidence as to the defendant’s role in the offense will
        rarely constitute clear error [s]o long as the basis of the trial court’s
        decision is supported by the record and does not involve a misap-
        plication of a rule of law.” United States v. Cruickshank, 837 F.3d
        1182, 1192 (11th Cir. 2016) (quotation marks omitted, alteration in
        original). “The defendant bears the burden of establishing his mi-
        nor role in the offense by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
        We, however, may affirm for any reason supported by the record,
        even if not relied upon by the district court. United States v. Chit-
        wood, 676 F.3d 971, 975 (11th Cir. 2012).
               The Sentencing Guidelines provide for a two-level reduction
        if a defendant was a minor participant in the criminal activity, a
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        22-13216                Opinion of the Court                           7

        four-level reduction if the defendant was a minimal participant, and
        a three-level reduction for cases falling between those two roles.
        U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2. The reductions apply to the defendants whose
        role in committing an offense makes them “substantially less cul-
        pable than the average participant in the criminal activity.” Id.,
        comment. (n.3(A)).
                A minimal participant “plays a minimal role in the criminal
        activity” and is “plainly among the least culpable of those involved
        in the conduct of a group.” Id., comment. (n.4). “[T]he defendant’s
        lack of knowledge or understanding of the scope and structure of
        the enterprise and of the activities of others is indicative of a role as
        minimal participant.” Id. A minor participant is one “who is less
        culpable than most other participants in the criminal activity, but
        whose role could not be described as minimal.” Id., comment.
        (n.5). The determination of whether to apply a mitigating-role ad-
        justment “is heavily dependent upon the facts of the particular
        case.” Id., comment. (n.3(C)).
              The Commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines provide the
        following list of “non-exhaustive” factors for a court to consider in
        determining whether to apply a role reduction:
               (i) the degree to which the defendant understood the
               scope and structure of the criminal activity;

               (ii) the degree to which the defendant participated in
               planning or organizing the criminal activity;
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13216

               (iii) the degree to which the defendant exercised deci-
               sion-making authority or inﬂuenced the exercise of
               decision-making authority;

               (iv) the nature and extent of the defendant’s partici-
               pation in the commission of the criminal activity, in-
               cluding the acts the defendant performed and the re-
               sponsibility and discretion the defendant had in per-
               forming those acts;

               (v) the degree to which the defendant stood to beneﬁt
               from the criminal activity.
        Id.
               Two principles should guide a district court’s consideration
        of a defendant’s role: (1) the defendant’s role in the relevant con-
        duct for which she has been held accountable at sentencing, and
        (2) her role as compared to that of other participants in her relevant
        conduct. De Varon, 175 F.3d at 940.
               As to the first principle, “the district court must assess
        whether the defendant is a minor or minimal participant in relation
        to the relevant conduct attributed to the defendant in calculating [her]
        base offense level.” Id. at 941 (emphasis added). Thus, a defendant
        is not entitled to a mitigating role adjustment when she can point
        to a broader criminal scheme that she was a minor participant in
        but was not held accountable for. Id. “[S]uch an adjustment only
        makes sense analytically if the defendant can establish that [her]
        role was minor as compared to the relevant conduct attributed to
        her.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
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        22-13216               Opinion of the Court                          9

                As to the second principle, the district court may also meas-
        ure the defendant’s role against the other discernable participants
        in the relevant conduct. Id. at 944-45. The district court need not
        compare a defendant’s conduct with that of her codefendants be-
        cause, in many cases, measuring the defendant’s role against the
        relevant conduct for which she was held accountable at sentencing
        will be dispositive. United States v. Bernal-Benitez, 594 F.3d 1303,
        1321 n.25 (11th Cir. 2010). “The district court should look to other
        participants only to the extent that they are identifiable or discern-
        ible from the evidence.” De Varon, 175 F.3d at 944. It is also only
        participants who engaged in the relevant conduct attributed to the
        defendant who are relevant to any comparisons. United States v.
        Martin, 803 F.3d 581, 591 (11th Cir. 2015). Additionally, “[e]ven if
        a defendant played a lesser role than the other participants, that fact
        does not entitle [her] to a role reduction since it is possible that
        none are minor or minimal participants.” Id. (quotation marks
        omitted).
               Here, the district court did not clearly err in denying
        Ramirez’s request for a minor role reduction. De Varon’s first prin-
        ciple asks whether a defendant “played a relatively minor role in
        the conduct for which she has already been held accountable—not
        a minor role in any larger criminal conspiracy.” De Varon, 175 F.3d
        at 944. The record reflects that Ramirez understood the scope of
        the scheme, was important to the scheme, and was held accounta-
        ble for that conduct alone. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. n.3(C).
        When she cashed checks, she knew that the proceeds were from a
        broader scheme to defraud Medicare, Medicaid, and other private
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                22-13216

        health insurance companies. See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment.
        n.3(c)(i). Her use of burner phones, coded language, and cashing
        of checks for services that she did not perform bolsters this infer-
        ence. Despite knowing that her actions were aiding the health care
        fraud, Ramirez laundered $786,992.52 over the course of more
        than two years and sought to increase her participation. She ben-
        efitted from the criminal activity, generating $34,302 for herself.
        See U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2, comment. n.3(C)(v).
                Her role was also not minor when compared to other par-
        ticipants in the conduct for which she was held accountable. She
        argues that she was less culpable than Garces, Chang, and Gonza-
        lez, larger players in the health care fraud conspiracy. However,
        the relevant inquiry is whether Ramirez played a minor role in
        laundering the $786,992.52 for which she was held accountable. See
        De Varon, 175 F.3d at 940. Although Chang and Gonzalez gave
        Ramirez direction, the record reflects that her actions as a check
        casher were important to the laundering. Even though Garces,
        Chang, and Gonzalez also participated in laundering the
        $786,992.52, it does not follow that Ramirez played a minor role,
        because it is possible that none of the players were minor or mini-
        mal participants. See Martin, 803 F.3d at 591. We reject Ramirez’s
        argument that the district court focused exclusively on whether her
        conduct was essential to the success. For example, the district court
        emphasized: “134 transactions that she was involved in over two
        years is extremely—is an extreme involvement.” Dist. Ct. Doc. 176
        at 13. Based on the record before the district court, the court did
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        22-13216                Opinion of the Court                         11

        not clearly err in denying Ramirez a minor role reduction. Accord-
        ingly, we affirm as to this issue.
                                          III.
                Where a defendant does not object at sentencing to the dis-
        trict court’s denial of her right to allocution, we review for plain
        error. Doyle, 857 F.3d at 1118. Concessions of law are not binding
        on this Court. United States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179, 1187 (11th Cir.
        2021).
                Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32 requires that a court,
        before imposing a sentence, address the defendant personally to
        permit her to speak or present any information to mitigate the sen-
        tence. Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(4)(A)(ii). A court’s failure to address
        the defendant about whether she wished to make a statement is an
        error that is plain. United States v. George, 872 F.3d 1197, 1207 (11th
        Cir. 2017). Generally, we presume that a court’s failure to allow a
        defendant to allocute affects her substantial rights if the defendant’s
        sentence could somehow be reduced, unlike, for example, a de-
        fendant who received a mandatory minimum sentence. Id. This is
        because a defendant’s allocution could persuade the court to vary
        downward, even if her sentence is at the bottom of the Guidelines
        range. Doyle, 857 F.3d at 1120-21. We have noted that, even the
        most persuasive counsel may not “speak for a defendant as the de-
        fendant might, with halting eloquence, speak for [herself].” George,
        872 F.3d at 1208 (quotation marks omitted). A district court’s de-
        nial of a defendant’s right to allocute affects the fairness, integrity,
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13216

        and public reputation of judicial proceedings. United States v. Perez,
        661 F.3d 568, 586 (11th Cir. 2011).
               Accordingly, when a district court fails to give a defendant a
        chance to allocute before imposing a sentence, we generally vacate
        the sentence and remand so the district court can give the defend-
        ant a chance to speak. George, 872 F.3d at 1209. A defendant, how-
        ever, is not entitled to a new sentencing hearing on remand. Id.
        Instead, she is put in “the position [s]he was in on the day of h[er]
        original sentence hearing” and is given the opportunity to allocute
        that she was originally denied. Id. (quotation marks omitted). She
        may not reassert or reargue any of her objections to the presen-
        tence investigation report, file new objections, or file a new sen-
        tencing memorandum. Doyle, 857 F.3d at 1121. The defendant
        may, however, argue for a particular sentence in light of the 18
        U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors, the record, and any allocution. See id. She
        may also present evidence of her post-sentencing rehabilitation,
        and such evidence may, in the district court’s discretion, support a
        variance from her advisory Guidelines range. Id.
               Additionally, upon a remand to the district court for resen-
        tencing, the district court shall apply the Sentencing Guidelines
        that were in effect on the date of the defendants’ pre-appeal sen-
        tencing, along with any guideline amendments in effect on such
        date. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(g); see also U.S.S.G.§ 1B1.11(a), (b)(2).
              As the government concedes, the district court erred in not
        personally addressing Ramirez, and remand is needed to allow her
        an opportunity to allocute. Further, because the district court will
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        22-13216             Opinion of the Court                     13

        have an opportunity to reconsider the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors
        after allowing Ramirez an opportunity to be heard, we do not
        reach Ramirez’s remaining argument regarding the substantive
        reasonableness of her sentence. Accordingly, we vacate as to this
        issue and remand for resentencing.
            AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED AND REMANDED IN
        PART.