Court Opinion

ID: 9791181
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:07:15.466894+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:34.646930
License: Public Domain

Opinion
THE COURT.
California Teachers Association (CTA) sought a peremptory writ of mandate from the superior court directing the San Diego Community College District and its chancellor (district) to reclassify and reemploy certain part-time teachers (part-timers) as contract or regular employees for the 1976-1977 school year and to award the part-timers back pay, with interest, equal to the difference between their salaries as temporary employees and the salaries to which they would have been entitled as permanent employees.
The superior court granted the writ on the issue of reclassification but denied it as to back pay. The district appealed from the former ruling, and CTA appealed from the latter. Most of the issues presented in these appeals were resolved by our decision in Peralta Federation of Teachers v. Peralta Community College Dist. (1979) 24 Cal.3d 369 [155 Cal.Rptr. 679, 595 P.2d 113]. The principal question remaining, which we now must decide, is the appropriate method of computing the back pay to which those part-timers who will be reclassified are entitled.
CTA brought this action on behalf of its members who were part-time instructors in the district during the 1976 spring semester and who were classified as temporary employees because they worked less than *69660 percent of the hours per week considered a full-time assignment for permanent employees having comparable duties.
The district employs three classes of instructors: regular (permanent or tenured), contract (probationary) and temporary. Some regular and contract teachers are employed part-time and are paid a salary prorated to the salary of a full-time teacher. Temporary teachers are paid a flat hourly rate which is less than the amount paid a salaried employee. Temporary employees do not receive certain fringe benefits associated with contract or regular employment, and they may be dismissed without notice or hearing. They are not, however, expected to hold office hours, serve on professional committees or supervise student activities, all of which are required of full-time teachers.
In Peralta Federation of Teachers v. Peralta Community College Dist., supra, 24 Cal.3d 369, we clarified the meaning of Education Code section 13337.5 (now recodified as § 87482).1 We held that the final paragraph of that section must be read independently from the preceding three paragraphs and that therefore part-timers coming under that provision shall be classified as temporary employees only. Section 13337.5 does not, however, apply to persons who were hired before its effective date, November 8, 1967. (Ibid.; see also Balen v. Peralta Junior College Dist. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 821 [114 Cal.Rptr. 589, 523 P.2d 629].) We therefore concluded that part-time employees who had been employed before November 8, 1967, became regular employees pursuant to section 13346.25 and were entitled to receive pro rata back pay insofar as such claims were not barred by the applicable three-year statute of limitations (Code Civ. Proc., § 338, subd. 1).
*697Our holding in Peralta that the plaintiffs who had been employed before November 8, 1967, were entitled to additional back pay was based on our conclusion that Education Code section 13503.1 applied to community college districts.2 Present arguments of the district and amici urging reexamination of that conclusion are essentially the same as those ably articulated in the dissent in Peralta, and we are not persuaded to overrule that case.
Since the rights of part-timers who were initially employed before November 8, 1967, are clearly encompassed in CTA’s description in its petition of those on whose behalf the action was brought,3 we turn now to the principal issue in this case. What is the proper method of determining pro rata pay under section 13503.1?
Section 13503.1 provides that “In fixing the compensation of part-time employees, governing boards shall provide an amount which bears the same ratio to the amount provided full-time employees as the time actually served by such part-time employees bears to the time actually served by full-time employees of the same grade or assignment.”
The key question is the meaning of the phrase “time actually served.” CTA asserts that it refers to classroom hours only. The district, on the other hand, asserts that the phrase “time actually served” refers to time spent working on the job, including time spent both inside and outside of the classroom.
*698In construing a statute “we begin with the fundamental rule that a court ‘should ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.’” (Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230 [110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224]; Select Base Materials v. Board of Equal. (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645 [335 P.2d 672].) “An equally basic rule of statutory construction is, however, that courts are bound to give effect to statutes according to the usual, ordinary import of the language employed in framing them.” (Rich v. State Board of Optometry (1965) 235 Cal.App.2d 591, 604 [45 Cal.Rptr. 512]; Moyer v. Workmen’s Comp. Appeals Bd., supra, 10 Cal.3d, at p. 230.) Although a court may properly rely on extrinsic aids, it should first turn to the words of the statute to determine the intent of the Legislature. (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182 [217 P.2d 1]; Tracy v. Municipal Court (1978) 22 Cal.3d 760, 764 [150 Cal.Rptr. 785, 587 P.2d 227].) “If the words of the statute are clear, the court should not add to or alter them to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the statute or from its legislative history.” (People v. Knowles, supra, 35 Cal.2d, at p. 183; Rich v. State Board of Optometry, supra, 235 Cal.App.2d, at p. 604.)
The language of section 13503.1 supports the district’s position. Community' college instructors commonly have a number of duties besides classroom teaching. Such duties include counseling, holding office hours, supervising student activities and serving on professional committees. The phrase “time actually served” clearly encompasses those activities as well as classroom teaching. Moreover, the scanty legislative history of the statute appears to support its plain meaning.
Section 13503.1 was amended in 1968 to read as stated. The amendment originated from Senate Bill No. 138, introduced by Senator Rodda. The portion of the statute at issue here formerly provided that the measure of the ratio was as the amount of “time actually served by such part-time employees bears to the time required of full-time employees assigned to the same grade.” (Italics added.) The emphasized language was deleted in favor of the language now at issue, thereby making the measure the time “actually served by full-time employees” rather than the time “required of full-time employees.” The Legislative Counsel’s Digest provides little guidance as to the purpose of the change. It states only that the amendment “Alters the method for establishing the rate of compensation for such part-time employee as a ratio to amount paid full-time employees.”
*699CTA relies on a statement by the author of the bill, Senator Rodda, in support of its proffered interpretation of “time actually served” as referring only to classroom hours taught. This statement was submitted by Senator Rodda to Governor Reagan in support of the bill’s approval. The statement said: “Certificated employees may contract with a school district to serve on a part-time basis. Such part-time certificated employees are paid a pro-rated amount in proportion to the amount of time they serve as to the amount of time required of full-time employees of like positions on the salary schedule.
“This legislation would provide that part-time employees shall be paid on the basis that the proportion of the time actually served bares [sz'c] to the minimum schoolday as provided in law, thereby proportional to the amount of state income received.
“Inasmuch as every school district may determine the amount of time required of full-time employees, there is a lack of consistency as to the basis upon which part-time employees may be paid. Under current law, it is possible for a school district to receive the equivalent state income generated by a full-time teacher while paying that teacher on a part-time basis.
“The effect of this bill would be to make the proportional ratio of salary payments to part-time employees based upon and consistent with the amount of state income they generate by their teaching activities; it would make such application consistent throughout the state.”
The district objects to use of Senator Rodda’s statement in determining the Legislature’s intent. CTA, however, asserts that we must not consider this point because no objection to the use of the material was made in the trial court.  The interpretation of a statute, however, is a question of law, and we are not bound by evidence presented on the question in the trial court. (See Rich v. State Board of Optometry, supra, 235 Cal.App.2d, at p. 604; Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 258 [104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049].) The propriety of the use of extrinsic materials in determining legislative intent is a question which may properly be considered on appeal regardless of whether the issue was raised in the trial court.
The district contends that the use of Senator Rodda’s statement would violate well-settled principles of statutory construction. We agree. “In construing a statute we do not consider the motives or under*700standings of individual legislators who cast their- votes in favor of it. [Citations.] Nor do we carve an exception to this principle simply because the legislator whose motives are proffered actually authored the bill in controversy [citation]; no guarantee can issue that those who supported his proposal shared his view of its compass.” (In re Marriage of Bouquet (1976) 16 Cal.3d 583, 589-590 [128 Cal.Rptr. 427, 546 P.2d 1371].) A legislator’s statement is entitled to consideration, however, when it is a reiteration of legislative discussion and events leading to adoption of proposed amendments rather than merely an expression of personal opinion. (Id., at p. 590; Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors, supra, 8 Cal.3d, at p. 284 (dis. opn. by Sullivan, J.); Rich v. State Board of Optometry, supra, 235 Cal.App.2d, at p. 603; see also Stanton v. Panish (1980) 28 Cal.3d 107, 114 [167 Cal.Rptr. 584, 615 P.2d 1372] [declaration of chairman of Cal. Const. Revision Com. considered insofar as it chronicled events leading to proposed amendment].) The statement of an individual legislator has also been accepted when it gave some indication of arguments made to the Legislature and was printed upon motion of the Legislature as a “letter of legislative intent.” (In re Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d, at pp. 590-591.)
The foregoing language in Bouquet, in our view, refers to the admissibility of the evidence rather than its weight, as suggested by the concurring opinion.4 In Bouquet the legislator’s letter was determined to be a proper subject of consideration because it alluded to arguments the legislator had presented in arguing for passage of the bill and because it had been printed on motion of the Legislature as a “letter of legislative intent.” (In re Marriage of Bouquet, supra, 16 Cal.3d at pp. 590-591.) This conclusion was followed by a discussion of the weight to be accorded the letter. (Ibid.) The latter discussion would have been unnecessary if the previous discussion regarding the propriety of considering such evidence had been referring to the weight to be accorded it rather than its admissibility.
*701There has been confusion in recent years regarding the propriety of considering statements and letters by individual legislators on the question of legislative intent. Indeed, the concurring opinion is correct in noting that recent opinions of this court have referred to such evidence without mention of the limitations on its use. In none of these opinions, however, was the subject of the propriety of the practice discussed or addressed. Such a departure from past rules of statutory construction, we believe, should be effected only after full discussion and exposure of the issue.
There are sound reasons underlying the rule against admitting statements of personal belief or intent by individual legislators on the issue of legislative intent. In addition to the lack of assurance that anyone shared the legislator’s view, as noted in Bouquet, there is the concern that letters such as those sent to the Governor on the question of signing the bill may never have beén exposed to public view so that those with differing opinions as to the bill’s meaning and scope had an opportunity to present their views also. To consider or to allow the admission of such evidence in the face of its admitted irrelevance (see cone, opn., p. 706) seems senseless. Accordingly, we believe that the wiser course is to adhere to the rules set forth in In re Marriage of Bouquet regarding the admissibility of evidence of statements by individual legislators on legislative intent.
The statement in the present case does not allude to “argument that he had presented in securing the passage of the amendment.” (Id., 16 Cal.3d at p. 590.) Nor does it reiterate the discussion and events which transpired in the Legislature. The statement reveals only the author’s personal opinion and understanding and accordingly, is not a proper subject for consideration in determining the Legislature’s intent in amending section 13503.1. Campbell v. Board of Dental Examiners (1975) 53 Cal.App.3d 283 [125 Cal.Rptr. 694], is disapproved to the extent it is inconsistent with this opinion.
Even if we were to consider Senator Rodda’s statement, it provides little guidance. Its reference to the asserted relationship of part-time teaching to school income provides no basis for concluding that “time actually served” means only classroom hours.
*702We conclude that the proper measure for apportioning part-time pay under section 13503.1 is the time actually spent on the job both inside and outside of the classroom. This does not mean that the required number of hours for full-time instructors set by the districts may be used as the measure, for that is the very measure that was deleted from the statute when it was amended to include the “time actually served” language now at issue. The reference to “time actually served,” in our view, requires consideration of the total amount of time spent by part and full-time teachers in connection with their teaching.
As previously mentioned, the issue of reclassification was resolved by our decision in Peralta Federation of Teachers v. Peralta Community College Dist., supra, 24 Cal.3d 369. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment for further proceedings to permit the trial court to determine which part-timers, if any, are entitled to reclassification and to determine the amount of pro rata back pay to be awarded.
The judgment is reversed for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Each side shall bear its own costs on these appeals.

Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Education Code of 1959, as it read just before its recodification effective April 30, 1977.
Section 13337.5 provided: “Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 13337, the governing board of a school district maintaining a community college may employ as a teacher in grade 13 or 14, for a complete school year but not less than a complete semester or quarter during a school year, any person holding appropriate certification documents, and may classify such person as a temporary employee. The employment of such persons shall be based upon the need for additional certificated employees for grades 13 and 14 during a particular semester or quarter because of the higher enrollment of students in those grades during that semester or quarter as compared to the other semester or quarter in the academic year, or because a certificated employee has been granted leave for a semester, quarter, or year, or is experiencing long-term illness, and shall be limited, in number of persons so employed, to that need, as determined by the governing board.
“Such employment may be pursuant to contract fixing a salary for the entire semester or quarter.
“No person shall be so employed' by any one district for more than two semesters or *697quarters within any period of three consecutive years.
“Notwithstanding any other provision to the contrary, any person who is employed to teach adult or community college classes for not more than 60 percent of the hours per week considered a full-time assignment for permanent employees having comparable duties shall be classified as a temporary employee, and shall not become a probationary employee under the provisions of Section 13446.”

Section 13503.1 provided: “Any person employed by a district in a position requiring certification qualifications who serves less than the minimum schoolday as defined in Sections 11003 to 11008, inclusive, or 11052 may specifically contract to serve as a part-time employee. In fixing the compensation of part-time employees, governing boards shall provide an amount which bears the same ratio to the amount provided full-time employees as the time actually served by such part-time employees bears to the time actually served by full-time employees of the same grade or assignment. This section shall not apply to any person classified as a temporary employee under Section 13337 and 13337.5, or any person employed as a part-time employee above and beyond his employment as a full-time employee in the same school district.”

The petition stated that it was brought on behalf of “CTA members who were part-time teachers in the DISTRICT during the Spring 1976 semester, who purportedly were classified by the DISTRICT as temporary employees, and who were employed to teach community college classes for not more than 60% of the hours per week considered a full-time assignment for permanent employees having comparable duties.”

Our use of the term admissibility here does not refer to the question of whether to allow the introduction of a piece of evidence in the trial court to prove a fact. Since the interpretation of a statute is a question of law on which we are not bound by the evidence presented in the trial court, we use the term admissibility here to refer to the issue of whether the evidence may properly be considered on the question. We recognize, however, that a court must make an initial review of the evidence in order to determine whether it is entitled to be considered on the question of determining the Legislature’s intent. (Cf. Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co. (1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 37-40 [69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641, 40 A.L.R.3d 1373]; Estate of Russell (1968) 69 Cal.2d 200, 207 [70 Cal.Rptr. 561, 444 P.2d 353].) Thus, *701the evidence must be preliminarily considered in order to determine whether it may ultimately be properly used in determining the Legislature’s intent or whether it instead should be rejected as being unworthy of consideration on that issue based upon the legal concepts above expressed.