Court Opinion

ID: 9473246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:24:04.633913+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:24.665085
License: Public Domain

A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, Jr., Circuit Judge,
concurring.
The majority holds today that the Interstate Commerce Commission (“ICC”) erred in granting L.S. Geist, Inc. (“Geist”) authority to transport general commodities without a bulk restriction, one reason being that the ICC impermissibly inferred a “public demand or need” for bulk hauling from the fact that certain of the eleven supporting shippers’ commodities were “susceptible” to bulk transportation, in contravention of this court’s decision in Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC, 687 F.2d 803 (3d Cir.1982) (“Port Norris 7”). While I concur in the result, I write separately to note that the courts of appeals are perilously close to substituting their judgment for that of the ICC, the agency endowed with the administrative expertise to implement the congressional mandate underlying the Motor Carrier Act of 1980, Pub.L. No. 96-296, 94 Stat. 793 (1980).1 I write separately to caution lest we open the door for too broad an application of this court’s holding in Port Norris I.
As I view Port Norris I, having sat on the original panel, we set forth a minimum evidentiary standard by which to assess the sufficiency of a motor carrier’s application when supported only by the submission of shippers’ statements. In Port Norris I, *64this court vacated the ICC’s grant of a trucking company’s application for certificate of authority to transport general commodities, including bulk commodities. We held, inter alia, that the evidence of public demand or need, as gleaned from thirty-five supporting shippers’ statements, was insufficient, notwithstanding that a few shippers stated that they shipped commodities susceptible of being transported in bulk. Judge Adams, writing for the court, articulated our rationale: the supporting shippers failed to specifically articulate a need for bulk service. Port Norris I, supra, 687 F.2d at 813.2 Considering the permissible inferences that the ICC can draw from the evidence offered in support of an applicant’s requested authority, we stated:
The evidence of public demand or need in this proceeding is so indirect and speculative as to fail even the minimal standard of section 10922(b)(1)(B). Of course, the ICC is entitled to make certain inferences from the evidence. But when the sole “evidence presented by persons supporting the issuance of the certificate” pursuant to section 10922(b)(1)(B) is the statements of shippers who plan to use the service proposed, it cannot be too much to expect one or more of these shippers — we express no view as to how many are needed — to make it clear that they believe they have some need or are prepared to make a demand for the service.
Id. at 813 (emphasis added).
The majority does not address adequately the ICC’s assertion that Port Norris I is distinguishable from the present case because in that case, the shippers’ statements constituted the sole evidence of public demand or need supporting the application. The ICC contends that Geist’s grant was based not only on supporting shippers statements but also on additional evidence: Geist’s existing authority, Geist’s backhauling difficulties, and the ICC’s evaluation of competition and assessment of Geist’s efficiency. While none of the shippers here expressed a need for bulk service, the ICC argues that the “susceptibility” of shippers’ commodities to bulk transportation can be sufficient to constitute substantial evidence if viewed in conjunction with other evidence of public demand or need. From this perspective, the ICC asserts that Port Norris I is inapposite.3
The ICC’s argument is not without merit. This court recently discussed Port Norris I in Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC, 729 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.1984) (“Port Norms III’), noting that “[i]n the earlier case, there was no evidence supporting the grant of unrestricted authority____” 729 F.2d at 210. In that circumstance, the requirement of direct evidence from the shippers that they affirmatively desired or had a need for bulk service was entirely reasonable.4
While I believe Port Norris I controls insofar as it addresses the permissible inferences that the ICC can draw from the statements of shippers, in my opinion, it does not hold that the ICC can never legitimately recognize that certain commodities generally move in bulk and thus reasonably *65infer a need for bulk service from “mere susceptibility” when the application as a whole provides additional direct evidence to support such an inference. In other words, Port Norris I should not be construed as holding that the ICC’s reliance on the “susceptibility” of certain shippers’ commodities to transportation in bulk, in the absence of express statements of need, is always inappropriate and insufficient for purposes of satisfying the statutory requirements:
[A] reasonable inference [is] within the ICC’s range of expertise and experience, and supported by its past practice and precedents ... The Commission makes the inference from the need for service to move a certain commodity to the need for bulk service, where that commodity generally moves in bulk.
Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC, 746 F.2d 69, 74 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Port Norris D-X’) (MacKinnon dissenting).
In my view, a grant of bulk authority, where supporting shippers identify a range of bulk commodities which the applicant would be transporting for them under the operation authority, even if each shipper did not specifically express a need for the service, may be supported by substantial evidence so long as there is additional direct evidence submitted to permit the ICC to make a reasonable inference of need.5
My point is simply that Port Norris I does not command a reviewing court to conclude a lack of substantial evidence solely from the absence of express statements of need from shippers except where the shippers evidence constitutes the sole factual predicate for the proposed grant of authority. For instance, had Geist demonstrated not only that it had existing authority to transport in bulk but also that it had exercised that authority, I believe that it would have been well within the province of the ICC to infer a public demand or need when coupled with the “susceptibility” of the serviced shippers’ commodities to bulk transportation. See, e.g., Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC, 697 F.2d 497 (3d Cir.1982) (“Port Norris IF’). The shippers used Geist’s services and if Geist was indeed exercising its authority, presumably it was for the benefit of at least one shipper. “The line between an inference based on one shipper’s evidence of need, and an inference based on no evidence at all of need is a thin one. But it is a valid distinction ... because it is the minimum distinction required by the terms of section 10922(b)(1).” Port Norris — D-X, 746 F.2d at 73. Such a distinction, however, can not be made in this case; the additional evidence put forth is not sufficient to justify an inference of public demand or need. On that basis, mere “susceptibility” of commodities to bulk hauling, combined only with the existence of authority to transport in bulk without more does not satisfy the statutory criteria.
I concur with the hope that the deluge of Port Norris cases6 has peaked. Nonethe*66less, until the Supreme Court advises us that our decision in Port Norris I was in error, I trust that the ICC will be a bit more careful in articulating the bases for its grants of authority even though it may find our holding in Port Norris I less than palatable.

. 49 U.S.C. § 10922.
"The principal goals of the legislation ... are to promote greater competition by allowing easier carrier entry, to simplify and expedite the certification process, and to lessen restrictions on motor carrier operations.”
Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC, 687 F.2d 803, 806 (3d Cir.1982) (“Port Norris f) (quoting Gamble v. ICC, 636 F.2d 1101, 1103 (5th Cir. 1981)).

. In Port Norris I, the applicant, Dennis Trucking Co., did not have the authority to transport in bulk, had not previously carried bulk commodities, stated that it had no present intent to haul in bulk, and although the application was supported by statements of shippers who shipped commodities susceptible of being transported in bulk, none specifically stated that it needed Dennis to transport any commodities in bulk. Port Norris I, 687 F.2d at 811-813.

. Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC, 697 F.2d 497 (3d Cir.1982) ("Port Norris II") provided a stronger case for the ICC. In holding that substantial evidence supported the grant of bulk authority, this court noted that the supporting shippers identified a range of commodities which the applicant would be transporting for them under the operating authority and the applicant was an established bulk carrier. The supporting shippers, however, were shippers of bulk commodities and each expressed a need for the services.

. In Port Norris III, we held that Port Norris I was not controlling. The applicant for general commodities authority in Port Norris III did not specifically request bulk hauling authority but several of the supporting shipper statements did specifically express a need for bulk hauling. Port Norris III, 729 F.2d at 211.

. As we stated in Port Norris I:
The normal way to establish [evidence of a public need or demand for the service has been for applicants to submit evidence of some of those who would use the service proposed____ However, the [ICC is not restricted] in which factors it can consider in determining whether the proposed service is responsive to a public demand or need. These factors include the following: a need or demand for new services, innovative quality or price options, increased competition, greater fuel efficiency, improved service for small communities, improved opportunities for minorities, and any other benefits that would serve a useful public purpose.
Port Norris I, 687 F.2d at 807 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 96-1069, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 14-15 reprinted in 1980 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 2283, 2296-97.)

. See, e.g., Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC, 729 F.2d 204 (3d Cir.1984) (“Port Norris III); Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC, 697 F.2d 497 (3d Cir.1982) ("Port Norris II"); Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC, 687 F.2d 803 (3d Cir.1982) ("Port Norris I"); Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC, 751 F.2d 1280 (D.C.Cir.1985) ("Port Norris — Beneux"); Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC, 746 F.2d 69 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Port Norris — D-X"); Department of Transportation, et al. v. ICC, 733 F.2d 105 (D.C.Cir.1984) (Port Norris, Intervenor); Port Norris Express Co. v. ICC, 728 F.2d 543 (D.C.Cir.1984) (“Port Norris — Fiorot"); Ritter Transp., Inc. v. ICC, 697 F.2d 1153 (D.C.Cir.1983) (Port Norris Intervenor); Ritter Transp., Inc. v. ICC, 684 F.2d 86 (D.C.1982) (Port Norris, Interv*66enor); Central Transport, Inc. v. U.S., 694 F.2d 968 (4th Cir.1982) (Port Norris, Intervenor).