Court Opinion

ID: 9572211
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:39:40.830502+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:31:56.662899
License: Public Domain

Riley, J.
(dissenting in part). While I agree with the majority regarding the issues resolved in parts i to in and join those holdings, because the majority inappropriately utilizes findings determined under an incorrect legal standard, I respectfully dissent from the Court’s holding in part iv.
i
As recognized by the majority, in 1982 the Legislature amended the wdca to require that a claimant who has suffered injury from heart or cardiovascular conditions establish that employment contributed to or aggravated or accelerated the injury *226in a significant manner to recover compensation under the act. MCL 418.301, 418.401; MSA 17.237(301), 17.237(401).
The amendments at issue were but a component of a broad reformation of the wdca, which was motivated by a crippled economic environment and a perceived need to reduce the burden and costs imposed upon free enterprise by the then-existing wdca.1 A major portion of the reform entailed the restriction of expansive interpretations of liability placed on business by the courts:
A purpose of the comprehensive 1980 and 1981 revisions of the workers’ compensation system was to overturn or modify expansive interpretations placed upon the act by this Court. Although the *227dollar amount of benefits payable to workers eligible for compensation was increased, there can be no doubt that the Legislature also intended through its 1980 and 1981 reform efforts to narrow and restrict the eligibility qualifications. [Dean v Chrysler Corp, 434 Mich 655, 666-667; 455 NW2d 699 (1990).]
In fact, as recognized by the majority, the amendments at issue were specifically designed to replace the liberal standard of recovery for cardiovascular injuries established in Kostamo v Marquette Iron Mining Co, 405 Mich 105, 116; 274 NW2d 411 (1979). The legislative intent was undoubtedly to protect employers from unfairly paying compensation to workers suffering heart injuries not significantly caused by employment. The specific legislative history reveals that the Legislature believed that the unamended statute did "not prescribe definite standards as to what constitutes compensable heart or mental disabilities.” Workers’ Compensation Reform Task Force, Report of the Special Committee to Study Workers’ Compensation, December, 1980, Issue No. 2c. Hence, proponents of the bill maintained "that the lack of such standards has led to reckless judicial interpretation of the disability standard as it applies to heart and mental cases resulting in compensation being paid to workers whose disability was not work related.” Id. A copy of Kostamo, supra, was even attached to the task force report discussing the issue. Id. The Legislature, therefore, amended the wdca to prohibit compensation for "heart and cardiovascular conditions” unless they were "contributed to or aggravated or accelerated by the employment in a significant manner.” MCL *228418.301(2); MSA 17.237(301X2); MCL 418.401(2)(b); MSA 17.237(401)(2)(b).2
In sum, to determine whether the employment contributed to or aggravated cardiovascular injury, the factfinder should consider both the importance of any work incident and the totality of the claimant’s health and other nonoccupational factors. Unless the magistrate determines that employment was a significant aggravating factor in the totality of circumstances, no recovery is permitted.
ii
In any event, all the triers of fact below ignored the Legislature’s mandate and granted benefits by relying on an erroneous liberal standard of recovery. Hence, the trier of fact did not appropriately examine the surrounding circumstances to determine if the injury in question was significantly aggravated by plaintiff’s employment. Because the findings of fact were premised on an incorrect legal standard, they are inherently suspect. Nevertheless, the majority accepts those findings as conclusive in the instant case. Therefore, I write separately because I believe that reliance on those findings is unwise and contradicts the clear intent of the Legislature to subject such fact finding to a higher degree of scrutiny. Indeed, the Court’s utilization of the conclusions below deprives those presumed finders of fact their adjudicative role because they never possessed the opportunity to examine the facts in light of the correct legal standard. Moreover, the majority’s reliance upon scientific authorities denigrates the role of the *229factfinder by improperly assuming that such authorities would be utilized by the factfinder.3 The better course would permit the factfinder to determine which authorities of causation are persuasive. Thus, I would remand this case for a new trial on the merits in light of the correct legal standard.
Brickley and Griffin, JJ., concurred with Riley, J._

 Indeed, the legislation’s proponents explained that reducing the excessive costs of the then-current wbca was essential to the economic survival of Michigan:
Since 1979, and prior to that, 1978 during the elections, everybody said that worker’s compensation is the highest priority in the State of Michigan. We cannot afford to lose industry and jobs in this state. We cannot afford to see people going to other states ....
I think it is a Number One priority; one that we have neglected. One that we have pushed aside. One that we have tried to pacify by saying that we are going to have this study committee, or that study committee, but it is one that is very necessary that we get at if we want to retain Michigan as a state than [sic] can provide jobs and not as an industrial wasteland. [1980 Journal of the Senate 820 (Senator Welborn).]
Senator Guastello echoed his colleague’s premonitions just before introduction of the reform bill:
[A]U of us here today, both on the floor of the Senate and in the galleries, are faced with a real moment of truth as far as Michigan is concerned and I think that moment of truth is simply — what are we going to do to insure a healthy economic climate, not only for ourselves in this state, but for our children. [1980 Journal of the Senate 822.]
See also 1980 Journal of the Senate 1310 (Senator DeMaso).

 Similarly, the wdca also prohibits compensation for "[a]n ordinary disease of life to which the public is generally exposed outside of the employment. . . .” MCL 418.401(2)(b); MSA 17.237(401)(2)(b).

 Furthermore, such reliance appears unwarranted as it tends to vitiate the standard of recovery by positing that nearly any activity may have a "significant” causal connection to a subsequent heart injury. See, e.g., ante, pp 223-224, ns 22, 23. Hence, the standard of recovery appears to be nearly as generous as the Kostamo standard clearly rejected by the Legislature.