Court Opinion

ID: 9793269
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:45:28.826261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:15.275742
License: Public Domain

VAN HOOMISSEN, J.,
concurring.
I agree that ORS 138.222 precludes appellate review of defendant’s sentence. I write separately to address two issues raised by this case that are not discussed by the majority.
In the Court of Appeals, defendant challenged only his sentence. He argued that the court could not impose the sentence that it did without making findings of substantial and compelling reasons to impose a departure sentence, which were not made. He asked that his conviction be reversed and that his case be remanded for a new trial. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial. In this court, defendant has changed his position. He now asks that his conviction be affirmed and that his case be remanded for resentencing only, arguing that the Court of Appeals lacked authority to remand for a new trial. I would agree with that argument if there were appellate jurisdiction in this case.
*368ORS 138.050 provides in part:
“(1) A defendant who has pleaded guilty or no contest may only take an appeal from a judgment or order described in ORS 138.053 where the disposition:
“(a) Exceeds the maximum allowable by law; or
“(b) Is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. ’ ’
Defendant does not argue that his sentence exceeds the maximum allowable by law or that it is unconstitutionally cruel and unusual. Moreover, the scope of review on direct appeal from a sentence under ORS 138.222 is limited to review of the sentence itself. Nowhere in that statute is there authority on direct appeal to review procedural errors concerning the acceptance of the no contest plea itself. Neither ORS 135.432 nor ORS 135.407, cited by the Court of Appeals, gave that court authority to remand for a new trial. Even if a remand for resentencing was appropriate (in this case it was not appropriate), the Court of Appeals should not have reversed defendant’s conviction. ORS 138.050; ORS 138.222(4) and (5); cf. State v. Loyer, 303 Or 612, 740 P2d 177 (1987) (ORS 138.050 provides a limited scope of review).
Next, defendant was represented by counsel. The parties negotiated a plea agreement that included a stipulated grid block classification, expressly because the sentence on which they had agreed was within the presumptive range for that grid block. Defense counsel specifically acknowledged that the state’s evidence would support a conviction for murder. After the prosecutor explained the factual basis for the charge, the plea agreement was accepted by the trial court. Defendant does not argue that the state has failed to honor the plea agreement. That should end the discussion.
Generally, I see no reason why a criminal defendant should not be permitted to stipulate to virtually anything that he or she chooses as a result of plea discussions. A defendant may plead guilty to the charge. Indeed, a defendant even may plead guilty to aggravated murder, which might result in a sentence of death. A defendant may waive his or her state and federal constitutional rights to counsel, trial, jury, confrontation, and cross-examination. A defendant may stipulate to the *369admissibility of otherwise inadmissible evidence.1 A defendant intentionally may fail to raise an otherwise valid objection at trial and, thus, waive the right to raise the issue on appeal. The parties may stipulate to facts. State v. Lyon, 304 Or 221, 231, 744 P2d 231 (1987). Why, then, shouldn’t he or she be permitted to stipulate to other things?
Of course, the parties may not stipulate to certain things, such as to the jurisdiction of the court, see, e.g., State v. Miner, 218 Or 502, 504, 342 P2d 773 (1959) (if the court has lost jurisdiction, the parties could not, by stipulation, confer such jurisdiction), or that a defendant could be sentenced to a term of imprisonment beyond the statutory maximum sentence prescribed by law. Generally, the parties may not stipulate as to the law.
I merely suggest a more generalized proposition of law, i.e., that, subject to the approval of the court, the parties should be permitted to stipulate to anything that the court has the authority to approve. This seems somewhat like analogizing plea agreements to contracts, i.e., they create their own “law” and are enforceable so long as they are approved by the court and do not violate public policy.2

 But see State v. Lyon, 304 Or 221, 232, 744 P2d 231 (1987), in which this court determined on policy grounds that it will not recognize a stipulation to the admissibility of polygraph evidence, even if the defendant is represented by counsel. The majority of jurisdictions that have considered the question have taken the opposite view. State v. Lyon also stands for the proposition, however, that where the admissibility of evidence is conditioned on the satisfaction of certain foundational requirements, the parties may stipulate to the satisfaction of those requirements and will be bound by that stipulation. Id. at 231.

 There is some discussion of this concept in State v. McDonnell, 310 Or 98, 114-16, 794 P2d 780 (1990) (Fadeley, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).