Court Opinion

ID: 9762065
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:09:37.839284+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:29.709502
License: Public Domain

BROOKSHIRE, Justice,
concurring.
The information charged that the defendant, George M. Wawrykow, did intentionally, knowingly, and recklessly cause bodily injury to another; namely, Officer James Chilcutt by pushing on or about Chilcutt’s chest with his hands. Tex.Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(7) (Vernon 1974) entitled “Definitions” provides that bodily injury means physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition. From the evidence in the case, as well as the demonstration, the State met its burden of showing bodily injury. See and compare Lane v. State, 763 S.W.2d 785 (Tex.Crim.App.1989); Ramirez v. State, 518 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.Crim.App.1975).
The issues and opinions in this appeal demand my attention toward a dissenting opinion filed by Judge Sam Houston Clinton in Criner v. State, 860 S.W.2d 84 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). Judge Clinton’s dissent is entitled “Opinion Dissenting to Denial of Appellant’s Motion for Rehearing on the State’s Petition for Discretionary Review”. In this instant appeal, Criner is referred to in the Court’s opinion by Chief Justice Walker and in the dissent by Justice Burgess.
With sincere and deep humility, I state that I am very sorry that Judge Clinton characterizes my dissenting opinion in Criner as “frantic”. Several authoritative definitions of “frantic” are: “[Djelirious, insane, mad ... almost mentally deranged: nearly mad ... emotionally out of control: overwhelmed with feeling to the point of wildness . . .”. WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL Dictionaey 903 (Merriam-Webster, Inc. 1986). I have attempted with care to re-read my dissent in Criner v. State, 816 S.W.2d 137 (Tex.App.—Beaumont 1991), reversed, 860 S.W.2d 84 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). I had thought then and I think now that the dissent is not “frantic”. However, I perceive that Judge Clinton is just as unhappy with the opinion of his own court in Criner as he is with my dissent.
Judge Clinton seems to be offended by the fact that my dissent took up “ten pages of Southwestern Reporter”. See Criner v. State, 816 S.W.2d at 144. Our Ninth Court of Appeals majority opinion occupies about six pages. I submit that a number of Judge *93Clinton’s opinions are not noted for their brevity.
In Criner, I had an honest difference of view and opinion from the majority of the Ninth Court of Appeals and I maintain that I expressed this difference in a respectful manner. My judicial brothers on the Ninth Court of Appeals have not criticized me for the dissent. At least, they haven’t characterized it as being “frantic”.
The record in Criner was somewhat lengthy, I thought, challenging, and very interesting. I, at least, tried in a competent way to discuss the testimony given by the major and important witnesses in the case.
Perhaps the evidence concerning the screwdriver involved was not properly expressed by me, but there was a good deal of testimony about the screwdriver and also about the autopsy report as well as relevant expert medical testimony by a doctor and a serologist.
Mr. Criner made inculpatory statements to a number of witnesses. These witnesses the jury believed. Those statements and the physical facts and the time sequence of events coupled with medical testimony showed, at least by way of probative circumstantial evidence, how the serious bodily injuries to the victim occurred. And the victim met her death thereby. The jury was in a superior position to weigh the totality of the evidence.
In any event, as Judge Clinton has identified and located my dissent in Criner v. State in the Southwest Reporter, any reader may decide for himself or herself if the same is frantic. I note, however, that Judge Clinton is a lone dissenter. I will forego any discussion of some other issues raised in Clinton’s dissent in Criner.
In Criner, as shown by the majority opinion of our court and as determined by the Court of Criminal Appeals, the pertinent points of error that were reviewed were on the sufficiency or insufficiency of the evidence to prove the aggravating element of the sexual assault. Since the Ninth Court held that the evidence was insufficient, I thought that a very legitimate function of a dissent was to point out the evidence that I perceived was sufficient. My honest belief was that there was evidence of probative value that the appellant Criner caused serious bodily injury to Diana Ogg, the dead victim, by striking her in the head with a blunt instrument. I took a different view and analysis of the testimony of the medical examiner and of the autopsy report.
My “frantic” dissent in Criner is under-girded in substantial part by the testimony of two apparently unprejudiced, unbiased witnesses, Michael Ringo and Terry Hooker. The compelling testimonies of Ringo and Hooker and the exactness of the words spoken and actions displayed by Criner (according to Ringo’s testimony) satisfy the sufficiency standard as to the manner. Criner had said that he pulled the girl down in the seat by the hair of her head; Ringo heard Criner say that he (Criner) would kill the girl and then Criner executed and displayed a motion of his hand as in a jabbing motion. Ringo said that Criner was not laughing or joking. The testimonies of Ringo and Hooker, inter alia, again are sufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict as to manner.
Importantly also is the testimony of Jeff Pitts. Pitts testified that he was 23 years old and that Criner was working with him on Pitts’ family’s logging operation. Pitts swore that Criner told him (Pitts) that Criner had picked up a blond-haired girl and had taken her down the road, threatened her with a screwdriver, raped her; and then he left her in the road when he got through. The record reflected that the victim died as a result of a fracture to her skull due to a blunt trauma to her head and multiple stab wounds to her neck consisting of about eleven puncture wounds. The medical examiner testified that a screwdriver could have caused the puncture wounds. Puncture wounds are consistent with a screwdriver used in a jabbing manner. Also found were multiple contusions about the left ear. The testimony of a forensic serologist, Mamita Howarth, relating to her findings were significant. Although Judge Clinton condemns my dissent in Criner as being “frantic”, I respectfully submit that the crucial and compelling testimonies of Ringo, Hooker, the medical examiner who was Dr. Parungao, and the serolo*94gist Howarth are far from frantic. Thus, I submit, by circumstantial and direct evidence the means were shown.
It is glaringly obvious that eight members of the Court of Criminal Appeals writing through Judge White agreed with my dissent’s analysis and “gist” of the case and the probative record of the case on the appellant’s second point of error urging insufficiency of evidence.
Query: Does Judge Sam Houston Clinton also characterize, in effect, the eight vote majority opinion in his own court as being “frantic”? Are eight of his judicial brethren delirious, mad, almost mentally deranged, emotionally out of control?
In his dissent Judge Clinton agreed that the jury charge tracked the indictment in Criner. The indictment alleged that the appellant Criner caused serious bodily injury by striking his victim in the head with a blunt instrument, the nature of which is unknown to the grand jury. Judge Clinton’s dissent concedes, I submit, that appellant Criner agreed that there was evidence that the victim suffered a blunt trauma injury to the head, but that the appellant took the position that there was no indication in the record that the injury was caused by Criner when the victim was struck in the head by a blunt instrument or when the dead girl’s head hit an instrument or a part of the truck. An injury caused by trauma can be reasonably said to be equivalent to an injury caused by striking. Judge Clinton opines the matter may be one of semantics. Concerning who did it, the inculpatory confession-like statements of Criner to several witnesses, I submit, is evidence that meets the test set out in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) on that point.
Then Judge Clinton charges “but this court [Court of Criminal Appeals] on original submission conducted no independent analysis to demonstrate that the evidence is not insufficient to show the particular manner and means of inflicting serious bodily injury alleged in the indictment_” The indictment alleged that the means was a blunt instrument the nature of which is unknown to the grand jury. The manner is by striking the victim in the head. It is significant and very interesting to note that in an unnumbered footnote designated by an asterisk that Judge Clinton concedes:
The gist of Justice Brookshire’s dissent is that the evidence is sufficient to support a jury conclusion that it was appellant [Criner] who somehow caused the blunt trauma injury to the victim’s head. This Court believes the evidence supports no other inference, and I agree, (emphasis added)
Then Judge Clinton’s dissent criticized Judge Bill M. White for opining that “[i]n applying the ‘reasonable alternative hypothesis’ analysis, ‘[t]he correct procedure involves accepting the inculpatory circumstances ... and then asking if there is a reasonable hypothesis other than guilt which would also account for such circumstances.’ Girard v. State, 631 S.W.2d 162, at 164 (Tex.Cr.App.1982).” But it is conceded that Clinton’s dissent does not characterize White’s opinion as being “frantic”. Judge Clinton further indicts the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion with this statement: “We seem to grant a disproportionately high number of State’s petitions for discretionary review to review decisions of the courts of appeals holding the evidence to be illegally insufficient, and for no other reason than that we disagree with the lower court’s particular application of the law to the facts. For all the Court’s gloss in its opinion on original submission, the instant cause is but an example.”
I submit that the application of the law to the facts implicates the method and standard of applying and matching rules of law. As the caretaker of Texas law, the Court of Criminal Appeals in Criner explains that the Ninth Court had never presented an alternative hypothesis, that the Ninth Court failed to explain how the record raised the issue of the existence of an outstanding reasonable hypothesis to support an inference other then the guilt of appellant Criner. Furthermore, the Ninth Court disregarded the circumstantial evidence in the record. The dissenter on the High Court agrees that the principal role of the Court of Criminal Appeals is as a court of last resort as the caretaker of Texas law. And that is precisely what the Court of *95Criminal Appeals did in its opinion in Cri-ner — the High Court applied Texas law. Yet Judge Clinton indicts his brethren by wondering why the Court of Criminal Appeals would go out of its way to rectify some flaw, either real or invented, in the application of an “analytical construct”. Of course, no part of Judge Clinton’s dissent in Criner is “frantic”.
An outstanding hypothesis to be recognized as being reasonable, must be raised by the evidence in the record. Nilsson v. State, 477 S.W.2d 592 (Tex.Crim.App.1972). In order for a reasonable hypothesis to be outstanding, there must be no competent evidence to the contrary. Id. See and compare Nelson v. State, 848 S.W.2d 126 (Tex.Crim.App.1992).
In Nelson v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals in a carefully analyzed and excellently written opinion determined that certain circumstantial evidence sustained a verdict and conviction of capital murder including the death penalty. The Court carefully distinguished between the point in time in which the accused, Nelson, formulated his intent (supported by the evidence) to take the victim’s property — this intent being critical to differentiating between his commission of capital murder in the course of a robbery and the commission of a first degree murder later followed by a theft. The Court of Criminal Appeals then reasoned that the ultimate issue was whether any rational trier of fact could be justified in finding from the evidence taken as whole that the accused Nelson intended to take his victim’s property before or as he murdered the victim.
The Court recognized that it was possible to have murder followed by a subsequent theft without having murder in the course of a robbery. Nelson, under the entire record, was having financial difficulties and a drug problem; Nelson went through the deceased’s property and took some valuables including $50. Nelson later took Howard’s (the victim) car. The Court reasoned that a rational juror could have inferred from the victim’s possession of drugs and Nelson’s drug use that Nelson went to Howard’s apartment in order to assault him or take his drugs or obtain money for drugs. I submit the Court of Criminal Appeals was acting prudently as a conscientious, careful, caretaker of Texas law both substantial and procedural in Criner, Nilsson, and Nelson, supra.
Our dissenter, Justice Burgess in George Wawrykow v. State, confesses that he would not be “so cautious” as our Chief Justice in “following the recent dictates of our reviewing court in Criner v. State, 860 S.W.2d 84 (Tex.Crim.App.1992)”. Justice Burgess agrees with Judge Clinton that the Court of Criminal Appeals is simply playing lip service to its opinion in Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Crim.App.1992) and Meraz v. State, 785 S.W.2d 146 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). Our dissenter declares:
Either the courts of appeals are the final arbiters of fact questions or they are not; Arcila and Meraz say they are, Criner erodes that position. Either the “factual conclusivity clause” of our state constitution means something or it does not. Under the majority opinion in Criner, when the court of criminal appeals agrees with the court of appeals, the clause means what it says; when the court of criminal appeals disagrees with a lower court, the clause loses its meaning.
This criticism by Justice Burgess of the Court of Criminal Appeals opinion in Criner is unjustified and unsound because the High Court was acting as caretaker of Texas law.
Hence, the entire record in Criner supports the jury’s verdict and the entire record in Wawrykow supports the jury’s verdict. And thus, the circumstantial evidence in the Criner and George Wawrykow cases are certainly not speculation. Justice Burgess either misquotes or misapprehends the record by stating in a footnote and relying thereon that it is speculation that a “push” to the chest will cause physical pain. The record shows in George Wawrykow that more than a “push” was proved by the prosecution.
In this instant George Wawrykow case, the jury was in a much superior position to judge the demonstration and the details of what it showed than an appellate court. This is true because the demonstration was not videotaped nor were any motion pictures made *96thereof. No audio tape was made. Also, the verbal description of the pushes and the shoves, I think, was some evidence and therefore, our Ninth Court’s opinion is not based solely on the demonstration.
Our Ninth Court correctly recites that convictions are to be affirmed if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict (buttressed and undergirded by all reasonable inferences and credibility choices having been made in support of the verdict) is such that any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, supra. The actual, important testimony as set out in the majority opinion, I think, certainly by reasonable and logical inferences, demonstrates physical pain. Physical pain has been declared a term of common usage and according to the fair import of this term, is not so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. See Ramirez v. State, 518 S.W.2d 546 (Tex.Crim.App.1975). See and compare Goodin v. State, 750 S.W.2d 857 (Tex.App.—Corpus Christi 1988, pet. ref’d). People and jurors of common intelligence can and do understand pain and some of the natural causes or origins of physical pain. Id.
The record shows more than mere touching and more than offensive touching. The appellant pushed the officer’s chest. There was a second time that the appellant pushed and the second time the push was a pretty good push. I opine that a rational juror could have determined pain and physical pain resulted. Jackson v. Virginia, supra.
Thus, our Ninth Court’s opinion is not solely based upon the demonstration. Thus, the Court’s opinion is based upon the totality of the direct and circumstantial evidence before the jury as well as the demonstration. The record then, when properly analyzed, supports the verdict. I concur that any rational finder of fact could have found that Officer Chilcutt sustained bodily injury as alleged.
I concur in the judgment and sentence of George Wawrykow.