Court Opinion

ID: 9550186
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:30:58.538209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:16:37.263875
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION OF
LEVINSON, J.
I dissent.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in State v. Olivera, 53 Haw. 551, 555, 497 P.2d 1360, 1362 (1972) I do not think an open court demand for a non-jury trial made by counsel in the accused’s presence constitutes a voluntary and knowing waiver by the accused of his right to trial by jury.
It is equally clear to me that an accused is denied the right to effective assistance of counsel1 when counsel advises a waiver of the right to trial by jury without first having read a decision of this court bearing directly upon his reason for giving such advice. “[Ujnlike other decisions, which are often called ‘trial decisions,’ where it is counsel who decides whether to cross examine a particular witness or introduce a particular document,” Poe v. United States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.C.C. 1964) (Wright, J., sitting by designation), the decision whether to waive the right to trial by jury is personal to the accused. Since it is the accused who must make the ultimate decision, it is counsel’s duty to provide him with all *34relevant information, both factual and legal, on which he can rely in making his decision. People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rpter. 863 (1963).
In this case, counsel’s failure to read and thereby take into account a matter of law, particularly one established by the highest court in this state, relating to an important legal fact counsel himself considered highly significant, establishes, in my view, a clear violation of appellant’s right to effective assistance of counsel. Without first . familiarizing himself with the applicable law, counsel could not and did not exercise any judgment with respect to his advice to waive trial by jury.
The cost of keeping abreast of current legal developments in this jurisdiction, where counsel is licensed and practices law, is minimal. Further, it is not unrealistic to expect counsel to subscribe to and read decisions of this court within a reasonable time after they are published. At the least, upon undertaking representation, counsel can be expected to examine the advance sheets, as a matter of course, to determine whether any recent decisions bear upon the matter at hand. As it is stated in the Code of Professional Responsibility adopted by this court, counsel “should strive to become and remain proficient in his practice and should accept employment only in matters which he is or intends to become competent to handle.” Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 6-1 (1970).
*39Helen B: Ryan (Ryan ir Ryan of counsel) for Appellants, Kam Hon Ho, et al.
Earl S. Robinson (Fong, Miho, Robinson, Zimmermann ér McComish of counsel) for Appellees, Kam Moon Kam, et al.
G. Richard Morry (Anthony B. Craven with him on the brief, Conroy, Hamilton, Gibson, Nickelsen & Rush of counsel) for Administrator C.T.A. and Receiver, First Hawaiian Bank, Appellee.
Wilfred H. C. Youth (Lo, Youth ir Ikazaki) for Ellen Wong Ho, et al.

 An accused in a criminal trial has the right to the effective assistance of counsel in his defense. This right is guaranteed and protected by the Sixth Amendment and is a necessary requisite of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932); People v. Ibarra, 60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963) .