Court Opinion

ID: 9703958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 00:15:01.429247+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:53.502684
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE BOWMAN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision that Deputy Culloton was not justified in making an investigatory stop of defendant. A police officer may make an investigatory stop if, based on all the facts and circumstances, he has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the suspect is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a crime. People v. Lockett, 311 Ill. App. 3d 661, 667 (2000). To justify such detention, an officer must be able to point to specific articulable facts that, when taken together with natural inferences, make the intrusion reasonable — such as when the officer observes unusual conduct that leads him reasonably to conclude in the light of his experience that criminal activity may be afoot. People v. Ertl, 292 Ill. App. 3d 863, 868 (1997). Deputy Culloton, a three-year veteran of the Ogle County sheriffs department, testified that he first observed defendant’s car following a semi-trailer truck “way too close” to the rear bumper of the truck. When the officer drove up behind defendant’s car, he saw it “weave back and forth within its own lane.” Defendant was traveling within a no-passing zone at the time and had not activated her turn signal. The officer estimated defendant’s speed at between 50 and 55 miles per hour. The officer pulled over the defendant. The majority relies on a dictionary definition of “weaving” to determine that- defendant’s conduct of driving back and forth within three to six inches of the center line and the “fog line,” as testified to by the officer, did not constitute weaving. According to the majority’s definition, weaving only occurs if a vehicle shifts from one lane to another. As defendant’s vehicle did not cross out of her lane, the majority concludes that she was not weaving. The majority also relies on the language of section 11 — 709(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code (625 ILCS 5/11 — 709(a) (West 1998)) as support for its conclusion that defendant’s conduct did not constitute weaving. Section 11 — 709(a) states that “[a] vehicle shall be driven as nearly as practicable entirely within a single lane.” 625 ILCS 5/11— 709(a) (West 1998). According to the majority, this section recognizes that a “vehicle cannot be driven in a perfectly straight line.” 317 Ill. App. 3d at 341. Apparently, the majority is implying that, although defendant was not driving in a straight line at the time she was observed by the officer, she was driving “as nearly as practicable” within her lane. It is well established that weaving in the lane of traffic within which a vehicle is traveling provides a sufficient basis for an investigatory stop of the vehicle. See, e.g., People v. Albright, 251 Ill. App. 3d 341, 343 (1993); People v. Diaz, 247 Ill. App. 3d 625, 627 (1993); People v. Loucks, 135 Ill. App. 3d 530, 533 (1985). Here, the evidence was undisputed that defendant was weaving in her lane. Deputy Culloton testified that he observed defendant’s vehicle weave back and forth within its lane, and defendant admitted that she weaved to the left part of her lane on three separate occasions. The evidence was also undisputed that defendant did not have her turn signal on at the time. Thus, defendant’s vehicle as observed by Deputy Culloton was not being driven “as nearly as practicable” within a single lane because it was weaving within the lane and, as noted above, weaving within a single lane is sufficient to justify a stop. Defendant’s erratic driving provided Deputy Culloton with articulable facts that showed there was a substantial possibility that defendant was committing a traffic violation. As there was a valid basis for the officer’s stop of defendant’s vehicle, I would reverse the trial court’s order granting defendant’s petition for rescission of the statutory summary suspension of her driving privileges.