Court Opinion

ID: 9772923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:33:22.120262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:49.384593
License: Public Domain

*134WINTERSHEIMER, Justice,
dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the opinion certifying the law in this matter. I do not believe the term “use of a motor vehicle” as defined in KRS 304.39-020(6), includes the unloading of a parked trailer by a worker who is called upon to assist in the unloading.
On August 12, 1983, Goodin assisted in the unloading of merchandise from a trailer owned by Overnight Transportation Company. The trailer was delivering pallets to a facility of the Delaware Powder Company where Goodin worked. The Overnight driver was assisted by four Delaware employees including Goodin. While the last pallet was being unloaded, Goodin entered the unlit trailer and stepped into a hole in the bed of the truck injuring his back.
On August 22, 1984, he filed suit for personal injuries in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky based on diversity jurisdiction. Overnight moved to dismiss the federal suit based on KRS 413.140, which provides for a one-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions in Kentucky. Goodin alleges the action is brought under the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act, KRS 304.39-010, which sets out a two-year statute of limitation for personal injury actions arising out of the use of a motor vehicle.
KRS 304.39-020(6), provides in part that the use of a motor vehicle means any utilization of the vehicle as a vehicle but it does not include conduct in the course of loading or unloading the vehicle unless the conduct occurs while occupying, entering, or alighting from it.
In my view the mere use or utilization of a motor vehicle, or in this case the occupying of the vehicle, is not sufficient to bring the conduct within the no-fault law. Goo-din must use or utilize the vehicle as a vehicle. The statute expressly excludes two types of conduct from the act, one of which is loading and unloading. The construction given by the majority extends the no-fault law beyond its natural meaning. Obviously, being inside a vehicle to load or unload is not always covered by the no-fault act. Loading and unloading presumably cannot be successfully accomplished without at some point in some manner or fashion occupying, entering into or alighting from the vehicle to be loaded or unloaded. The legislative intent then in including loading or unloading while occupying, entering into, or alighting from a vehicle must be read insofar as such conduct occurs in the use of the motor vehicle as a vehicle. I would not extend coverage to ordinary negligence actions which were not contemplated by the drafters. The unloading herein was not incidental to the use or utilization of a motor vehicle as a vehicle.
The condition of the truck bed inside the vehicle is what apparently caused the injury. As has been previously pointed out by this Court, basic automobile insurance policies are intended to cover driving the vehicle and not repairing or unloading merchandise from it. See Commercial Union Assurance Company v. Howard, Ky., 637 S.W.2d 647 at 649 (1982). As noted in that well-reasoned opinion, additional coverage should be provided by appropriate policies intended for those particular purposes. Here, Goodin was provided with Workers’ Compensation by his employer and could have brought a personal injury action against Overnight within the one-year statute of limitation. Overnight would be covered under a general liability policy which most businesses its size maintain.
In my opinion this Court has considered this issue and has decided the matter against the Goodin argument. See Commercial Union, supra. The Commercial Union case was a repair case and not an unloading case, but I believe the legal reasoning expressed in Commercial Union was well-founded and sound and can be applied to other situations such as the one presented here.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals in a similar unloading case, Clark v. Young, Ky.App., 692 S.W.2d 285 (1985), determined that a warehouse lead man who was injured while unloading pipes onto a flatbed trailer was not covered by the no-fault act. *135In that case, it was held that it was merely happenstance that the injury occurred while the workman was standing on the trailer. There the Court explained that standing on the trailer did not amount to occupying, entering into or alighting from a motor vehicle within the no-fault statute.
Therefore I would certify the question that the term “use of a motor vehicle,” as defined in KRS 304.39-020(6), does not include the unloading of a parked trailer where the injury occurs inside the trailer to an individual who is unloading it.
STEPHENSON, J., joins in this dissent.