Court Opinion

ID: 9767807
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 05:27:54.896362+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:33.155767
License: Public Domain

W. O. MURRAY, Chief Justice.
I do not concur in the majority opinion.
It seems to me that appellee bases his entire cause upon the validity of the written assignment of the trade name “Wolfe’s Inn,” signed by Mrs. Estelle A. Wolfe on August 9, 1945. It is appellee’s contention that by this alleged assignment Mrs. Wolfe has' assigned her right to re-enter the restaurant business under the name of W. W. Wolfe, Mama Wolfe or any similar name, or to1 use the slogans she had theretofore popularized, such as “A Nice Place for Nice People.”
The attempted transfer of the trade name “Wolfe’s Inn” by Mrs. Wolfe was an attempt to- transfer a naked trade name not made in connection with the transfer of any business owned by her and not made for the purpose of passing the good will of such business. Such a transfer of a trade name is known as one “in gross” and is void and unenforcible. In 52 Am. Jur. § 32, p. 525, it is said: “It may be stated as a general rule that a trade-mark or a trade name is not an article of property that may be transferred separately from the product or business with which it has become identified.”
In Falk v. American West Indies Trading Co., 180 N.Y. 445, 73 N.E. 239, 240, 1 L.R.A.,N.S., 704, it is stated: “A trademark is not a piece of property that passes from hand to hand by assignment separate from the business of the owner of the trademark, or of the article which it may serve to distinguish. Generally, it passes only with the business and good will of which it is an inseparable part.” See also: Corr v. Oldetyme Distillers, 118 F.2d 919, 28 C.C.P.A., Patents, 1057; Atlas Beverage Co. v. Minneapolis Brewing Co., 8 Cir., 113 F.2d 672; Mayer v. Flanagan, 12 Tex.Civ.App. 405, 34 S.W. 785.
The evidence is undisputed that prior to August 9, 1945, appellant, the former Mrs. Wolfe, had retired from the restaurant business and had moved to Leakey, Texas, to live. She had disposed of the premises formerly occupied by her in her restaurant business at the corner of Fredericksburg and Wurzbach Roads in Bexar County, Texas, by conveying them to a Mr. Jackson. We are not informed as to the details of this conveyance. Whether appellant, the former Mrs. Wolfe, sold the land *783and premises together with the restaurant business and the good will thereof, or only the land and premises, the evidence does not show. The burden was on appellee to establish these facts. We do know that some time prior to August 9, 1945, appellant had gone out of the restaurant business and transferred the land and premises formerly occupied by her to Mr. Jackson. She held a note in the sum of $16,000 signed by Jackson, which was a vendor’s lien against said land and premises, but this did not give her an interest in any business that might be conducted there. After the former Mrs. Wolfe had gone out of business and disposed of the property, she had either reserved the trade name to herself, abandoned it, or conveyed it to Mr. Jackson. She might have an interest in this name which she and her former husband, W. W. Wolfe, had popularized and given value in the restaurant business, but it was not such an interest as she could convey in gross to another after she had no business, nor good will of a business, to convey in connection with the trade name. Collas v. Brown, 211 Ala. 443, 100 So. 769.
In Mayer v. Flanagan, 34 S.W. 785, 786, the Court said: “But the primary function of a trade-mark is to indicate ownership and origin, and, unless this is truthfully done, it becomes a means of fraud upon the public, and will not be protected. And if a trade-mark is a personal one, designating a particular person and his reputation and skill, it cannot truthfully be used by any other person, and consequently cannot be assigned.”
In 52 Am.Jur. § 33, p. 527, it is stated: “Where a trade-mark or trade-name is a personal one — that is, where it indicates to the public that the personal care and skill of a certain individual have been exercised in the selection or production of the goods or the rendition of the services in connection with which the mark or name is used— the general rule is that it is not assignable, for the reason that it would be a fraud on the public if such a mark or name were used by other persons.”
In Vol. 2, Callmann’s Unfair Competition and Trade Marks, § 784(a), p. 1085; it is stated: “Other cases have stated that an invalid assignment of a trade-mark amounts ‘To nothing more than a declaration of non-ownership on the part of the unsuccessful assignor’; it ‘accomplished nothing more than an abandonment of the mark (to the public) by the assignor,’ or it ‘resulted in the abandonment of the mark to the public.’ ” See also: Ranft v. Reimers, 200 Ill. 386, 65 N.E. 720, 60 L.R.A. 291; Buffalo Oyster Co. v. Nenno, 132 Misc. 213, 229 N.Y.S. 210; Wilcoxen v. McCray, 38 N.J.Eq. 466; Sarris v. Christie, Tex.Civ.App., 217 S.W.2d 99.
In Broeg v. Duchaine, 319 Mass. 711, 67 N.E.2d 466, 468, the Court said: “In these circumstances we think the plaintiff is in no' position to invoke the aid of a court of equity to prevent the defendant from further using the trade mark. If the plaintiff has a valid trade mark in the name ‘Mother Parker’s,’ it is, because the public has become accustomed to regard'the bakery products sold under that name as having been made by her or, at least, as emanating from a single source. When she permitted it to be used by the defendant in the circumstances here disclosed, .she was enabling the defendant to palm off his goods as hers, thereby deceiving the public. It has been held, and we think rightly, that where the owner of a trade mark or trade name licenses another to use it in circumstances similar to those here he cannot call upon a court of equity to protect it.”
While in the case at bar the licensee rather than'the licensor of the trade name is seeking equitable relief surely neither one is in a position to enter a court of equity seeking redress. The court should leave the parties where it found them and lend its aid to neither.
The value of the trade name to appellant, the former Mrs. Wolfe, after she had re-retired from business was personal to her and could not be transferred to another in gross. The trade name when disassociated with her former business represented the skill and ability of appellant *784and her former husband to select, cook and serve .delicious chicken and steak dinners, and to transfer it to another in gross would be to make it possible for such other person to' perpetrate a fraud upon the public by .making them believe they were receiving this skill and ability, if' they should patronize the restaurant of the transferee, when in truth and in fact they were not. Mayer v. Flanagan, supra, 52 Am.Jur., §33, p. 527; Sarris v. Christie, supra; Vol. 2, Callmann’s Unfair Competition, p. 1060, § 78, 1(d); Wilcoxen v. McCray, supra; Broeg v. Duchaine, 319 Mass. 711, 67 N.E. 466.
The evidence shows that Greive conducted the business under ' the name “Wolfe’s Inn” and used the pictorial display of the animal .wolf, together with the slogans coined by the Wolfes without letting the public know that the restaurant was under new management. It was his duty ’ under the circumstances to inform the public of the change in management and his failure to do so precludes him and appellee, Harris, who claims under him, from receiving aid from a court of equity. Appellee does not come here with clean hands. Mayer v. Flanagan, supra; Sarris v. Christie, supra.
In 52 Am.Jur., § 152, p. 629, it is said: “Under the requirement of clean hands, material misrepresentation in the use of a trade-mark, trade-name, or label will defeat the right of the owner to relief in equity against an infringement or imitation by others, such provision in some cases being made by legislative enactment.” 19 Am.Jur. § 469, pp. 323, 324; 30 C.J.S., Equity, § 98, p. 487; Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive M. M. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 65 S.Ct. 993, 89 L.Ed. 1381; Hazlett v. Pollack Stogie Co., 3 Cir., 195 F. 28, 39 L.R.A.,N.S., 632; Buckland v. Rice, 40 Ohio St. 526; Clinton E. Worden & Co. v. California Fig Syrup Co., 187 U.S. 516, 23 S.Ct. 161, 47 L.Ed. 282; W. A. Gaines & Co. v. Turner Looker Co., 6 Cir., 204 F. 553; Manhattan Medicine Co. v. Wood, 108 U.S. 218, 2 S.Ct. 436, 27 L.Ed. 706; Rosenthal v. Blatt, 80 N.J.Eq. 90, 83 A. 387; Broeg v. Duchaine, 319 Mass. 711, 67 N.E.2d 466.
I am also of the opinion that the alleged assignment of August 9, 1945, was without consideration and therefore void. It is true that the instrument on its face recites a consideration, but Greive, the only witness testifying as to a- consideration, stated that he did not pay any money or thing of value for the assignment. There is some intimation that the exchange of vendor lien notes at the time of the closing of the deal between Jackson and Greive furnished a consideration for the assignment of the trade name. This very fact was in effect denied rather than established by Greive. Under examination by counsel for appellee, Greive testified as follows:
“Q. When you were out there wasn’t it about the matter of you assuming a note or giving her a new note for the one she held from Mr. Jackson from whom you purchased the business? Wasn’t that the nature of the transaction? A. No. The nature of the trip was that Mr. Jaokson had taken me over to Leakey to find out about the name.
* * * * * *
“Q. Did you give her any money, or anything of value, for her signing this instrument concerning the use of the name Wolfe’s Inn ? (No answer.)
“Q. Did you give anything to Mrs. Wolfe for signing this instrument? A. No.”
The assignment of the trade name being without consideration was null and void and unenforcible. 10 Tex.Jur. p. 112, § 65.
The assignment might, under some circumstances, estop Mrs. Carson from thereafter using the trade name, Wolfe’s Inn, but estoppel was not plead nor attempted to be proved by appellee and is, therefore, not- in this case. Vol. 2, Callmann’s Unfair Competition, § 87, 3(a), beginning on page 1445.
Likewise, there was no attempt made to allege and prove that Mrs. Car son had abandoned her right to use - the name *785Wolfe’s Inn, and therefore abandonment is not in the case. Mrs. Carson was not called upon to allege and prove that she had not abandoned the name Wolfe’s Inn. Ap-pellee, being the party seeking the injunc-tive relief, was charged with alleging, facts and showing by proof that he was entitled to the relief sought. This must be done by clear and convincing proof and nothing can be left to speculation, conjecture or surmise. Beech-Nut Packing Co. v. P. Lorillard Co., 273 U.S. 629, 47 S.Ct. 481, 71 L.Ed. 810.
“In order that an abandonment may be established as a defense, it is essential to show, not only acts indicating practical abandonment, but an intent to abandon.” Wallace & Co. v. Repetti, Inc., 2 Cir., 266 F. 307, 308, Southeastern Brewing Co. v. Blackwell, 4 Cir., 80 F.2d 607.
.Mrs. Carson had a right,to re-enter the restaurant business in a name by which she was known and one which she and her former husband had given valine in the restaurant business, unless she had in some way legally precluded herself from doing so. Her subsequent marriage to Keyes Carson did not have the effect of destroying this right. Appellee attempted to show that appellant had precluded herself from doing so by executing the assignment of the trade name on August 9, 1945. This contract being illegal and void, appellee is without any ground for the relief he se'eks. Dilworth v. Hake, Tex.Civ.App., 64 S.W.2d 829; Austin v. Lockett, Tex.Cr.App., 211 S.W.2d 986; Adam Hat Stores v. Lefco, 3 Cir., 134 F.2d 101; Edelstein v. Edelstein, Tex.Civ.App., 6 S.W.2d 400; Gleaves v. W. B. Fishburn Co., 5 Cir., 82 F.2d 627.
It is true that appellee has alleged in general terms unfair competition, but this was also plainly based upon the assignment of the trade name being valid.
Even if appellee was entitled to any character of relief herein, the judgment should go no further than to require appellants to use necessary precautions to inform the public that their restaurant is not in any way connected with the restaurant operated by appellee. Gleaves v. W. B. Fishburn Co., supra; Buffalo Oyster Co. v. Nenno, 132 Misc. 213, 229 N.Y.S. 210.
Accordingly, I here enter my dissent from the opinion of the majority.