Court Opinion

ID: 9656879
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:05:45.741004+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:00.617626
License: Public Domain

GRAVES, Justice,
Dissenting.
Appellant, Susan D. Miller, is a blue collar worker who performed manual labor her entire life. She was impaired by chronic arthritis at the time she was involved in an automobile collision. As a result of the collision, she experienced shoulder, chest, and knee pain. Dr. Peter Jannace testified that Appellant had an acute injury superimposed on a chronic condition of arthritis. It is clear from the record that the automobile collision exacerbated her pre-existing impairments and inflicted additional injuries upon Appellant. The jury awarded the full amount of her medical bills and lost wages, but gave zero damages for pain and suffering.
Dr. Thurman, M.D., a physiatrist, treated Appellant for the injuries sustained in the automobile accident, and testified that she had black and blue discoloration to the right upper anterior chest and shoulder, secondary to the trauma from the seat and harness belt. He opined that Appellant suffered a bruise to the acromioclavicular joint. He testified that within a week of the collision, Appellant developed pain in the right knee when standing and walking, as well as swelling of the lateral aspect of the joint line of the right knee with accompanying pain in this area. Dr. Thurman testified that Appellant also had a sprain of the coronary ligaments of the lateral meniscus of the knee which he related to the automobile collision.
Upon such evidence, it is inconceivable that damages for pain and suffering were not awarded. It is irrational for a jury to find that Appellant was unable to work and that needed medical treatment was rendered, yet she experienced no pain and suffering. Such a verdict is illogical and inconsistent with human experience. When an injured party has medical bills that are reasonably related to the collision, and they are accrued in good faith and are not merely diagnostic, it must be presumed that compensable injury occurred. Had the verdict been adequate but ungenerous, there would be no error. However, “0” is inadequate as well as inconsistent with the balance of the verdict.
A majority of the Court of Appeals opined that Appellant’s pre-existing injury and condition may well have rendered her in a condition such that the auto collision *604inflicted no additional pain and suffering. However, the jury did not receive any conflicting evidence with respect to injuries inflicted by the auto collision. Appellant manifested many new symptoms (bruising, locking knee joint, etc.) in addition to her pre-existing arthritis. She had acute symptoms superimposed upon chronic problems. Diagnostic studies verified that Appellant received a new injury.
Damages for pain and suffering are a significant part of our compensation system. The right to these damages has been long recognized in our jurisprudence. In the case of Schriewer v. Schworer, Ky., 296 Ky. 749, 178 S.W.2d 598, 599 (1944), where the jury awarded no pain and suffering damages even though medical expenses were compensated, this Court stated:
The sum found by the jury is the exact sum established by the evidence for the doctor and nursing, and the jury specifically stated in its verdict that the sum found was for doctor and nursing. These facts are conclusive that the jury found nothing for pain and suffering of the decedent, which is contrary to all the evidence as well as the presumption of law that decedent did suffer pain....
This well-established holding states that the right to damages for pain and suffering is presumed when palpable injury exists. Our predecessor Court also stated in Howard v. Henderson Traction Co., Ky., 121 S.W. 954, 955 (1909), the following with respect to a plaintiffs entitlement to pain and suffering damages:
This court has so often held, in personal injury cases, that a recovery may be had for all pain and suffering endured as a direct or proximate result of the injury that a citation of the authorities is deemed unnecessary. In all cases where this question has arisen, a recovery has been permitted, where the facts justified a recovery at all, not only for the pain and suffering endured before the trial, but for such as the evidence shows it is reasonably certain the plaintiff will thereafter endure as the direct or proximate result of the injury, and in an instruction upon this point the plaintiff is as much entitled to have the jury told that he may recover for pain and suffering which he may thereafter endure as he is that he may recover for such pain and suffering as he has theretofore endured; and it will not do for the trial judge, where there is any substantial evidence showing that there is likelihood that the plaintiff will still continue to suffer because of the injury, to refuse to give the jury an instruction such as was asked in this case.
Hence the entitlement to damages for pain and suffering is firmly rooted in our jurisprudence, and failure to award same, when evidence is presented proving injury, is erroneous.
In Schmeltekopf v. Johnson Well Service, 810 S.W.2d 865 (Tex.App.1991), the Texas Court of Appeals reviewed a case wherein the defendant was found 85% liable by a jury who then returned no damages. With respect to the jury’s actions, the Court stated:
A jury’s failure to find a fact need not be supported by any evidence, but the jury may not refuse to find a fact in the face of overwhelming evidence of the existence of the fact. Russell v. Hankerson 771 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.App.1989). A jury is not at liberty to disregard evidence that an injury has occurred and to refuse to award damages.
Id. at 869. Essentially, the jury below in the instant case refused to award damages even though they were confronted with overwhelming evidence of same.
In Maier v. Santucci, 697 A.2d 747 (Del.1997), the Supreme Court of Delaware addressed a case in which a directed verdict on liability was entered and a “0” award of damages was returned by the jury, pre*605sumably in response to the vigorous defense that the pain and suffering of the plaintiff was largely caused by pre-existing arthritis. The Court held, “[i]n light of the uncontradicted medical testimony that [Plaintiff] suffered an injury as a result of the accident, the jury’s award of $0 damages is inadequate and unacceptable as a matter of law.” Id. at 749.
Here, the jury found that Appellant could not go to work and had medical bills related to injuries received in the accident. It further found that the medical bills were accrued in good faith, as it returned a verdict for their total amount. The jury obviously accepted that an injury took place, but believed that it was somehow sustained without compensable pain and suffering. Such a conclusion flies in the face of ordinary experience and logic.
Further, it is inhumane to deny damages for pain and suffering to one who already has pre-existing pain. This draws a “bull’s eye” on the infirm and handicapped. It unconstitutionally sets them apart as a different class of citizens with different tort rights. This is an especially unfortunate rule of law in a country which is supposed to be in the process of vindicating the rights of the infirm with such legislation as Americans with Disabilities Act. Further, in a state with an aging population, are we to understand that our tort rights dimmish as we become infirm and impaired from the degenerative aging process? Will we eventually become too old to experience suffering at the hand of a wrongdoer'? If such is the case, the alternative to old age may well be a better choice.
LAMBERT, C.J. and STUMBO, J., join in this dissent.