Court Opinion

ID: 9568261
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:01:54.916989+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:24:31.268267
License: Public Domain

HABHAB, Judge,
specially concurring.
I concur in all respects with the majority opinion, but would like to add the comments which follow.
The Double Jeopardy Clause, in its most basic form, is intended to protect against: (1) retrial following an acquittal; (2) a second prosecution for the same offense after a conviction; and (3) multiple punishments for the same offense. State v. Dixon, 534 N.W.2d 435, 439 (Iowa 1995). However, a reprosecution following a hung jury does not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Richardson v. United States, 468 U.S. 317, 324, 104 S.Ct. 3081, 3085-86, 82 L.Ed.2d 242, 250 (1984).
A mistrial may be declared without the defendant’s consent and even over the defendant’s objection when the “trial judge determines in his or her own discretion that manifest necessity or the ends of public justice so require.” Dixon, 534 N.W.2d at 440 (citing Gori v. United States, 367 U.S. 364, 368, 81 S.Ct. 1523, 1526, 6 L.Ed.2d 901, 904 (1961)). When the defendant does not consent to a mistrial, the defendant may be retried as long as there was “manifest necessity” for the termination of the first trial. United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S. 600, 607, 96 S.Ct. 1075, 1079, 47 L.Ed.2d 267, 274 (1976). The district court has considerable discretion to declare a mistrial, and we will not reverse the court’s decision absent a finding of abuse of discretion. State v. Watts, 244 N.W.2d 586, 588 (Iowa 1976).
“Manifest necessity” does not mean an absolute necessity must exist for a mistrial and our supreme court has recognized there are varying degrees of necessity. Dixon, 534 N.W.2d at 440 (citing Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 506, 98 S.Ct. 824, 831, 54 L.Ed.2d 717, 728-29 (1978)). In defining the two extremes of the spectrum of degrees, our supreme court stated:
At one extreme of the spectrum, courts refuse to sanction trial courts’ grants of mistrials when the prosecution deliberately sought a mistrial in order to strengthen the State’s case. Therefore, courts apply the strictest scrutiny when the basis for the mistrial is the unavailability of critical prosecution evidence or when it appears the prosecutor may be using the superior resources of the State to harass the defendant or achieve a tactical advantage. At the other extreme of the necessity spectrum and appellate court deference is the mistrial premised on the existence of a “hung jury.” Long considered the classic basis for a proper mistrial, courts have consistently found manifest necessity for a *333mistrial declaration where the trial judge determined the jury was unable to agree on a verdict — even where multiple trials have resulted in hung juries.
Dixon, 534 N.W.2d at 440 (citations omitted). In commenting on this last degree of necessity regarding a mistrial due to a “hung jury,” the United States Supreme Court has stated:
[Wjithout exception, the courts have held that the trial judge may discharge a genuinely deadlocked jury and require the defendant to submit to a second trial. This rule accords recognition to society’s interest in giving the prosecution one complete opportunity to convict those who have violated its laws.
Moreover, in this situation there are especially compelling reasons for allowing the trial judge to exercise broad discretion in deciding whether or not “manifest necessity” justifies a discharge of the jury. On the one hand, if he discharges the jury when further deliberations may produce a fair verdict, the defendant is deprived of his “valued right to have his trial completed by a particular tribunal,” but if he fails to discharge a jury which is unable to reach a verdict after protracted and exhausting deliberations, there exists a significant risk that a verdict may result from pressures inherent in the situation rather than the considered judgment of all the jurors. If retrial of the defendant were barred whenever an appellate court views the “necessity” for mistrial differently from the trial judge, there would be a danger that the latter, cognizant of the serious societal consequences of an erroneous ruling, would employ coercive means to break the apparent deadlock. Such a rule would frustrate the public interest in just judgments. The trial judge’s decision to declare a mistrial when he considers the jury deadlocked is therefore accorded great deference by a reviewing court.
Washington, 434 U.S. at 509-10, 98 S.Ct. at 832, 54 L.Ed.2d at 730-31 (citations omitted).
Appellate courts have frequently set out a number of considerations for a trial judge to make in determining whether a mistrial should be declared due to a deadlocked jury. One such court stated a court should consider: (1) the jury’s collective opinion that it cannot agree, (2) the length of the deliberations, (3) the length of the trial, (4) the complexity of the issues, (5) any proper communications which the judge has had with the jury, and (6) the effects of possible exhaustion and the impact which coercion of further deliberations might have had on the verdict. United States v. Byrski, 854 F.2d 955, 961 (7th Cir.1988). While not a requirement in every case, polling the jurors as to whether there is truly a deadlock can be useful in determining if a mistrial is necessary. United States v. Barbioni, 62 F.3d 5, 7 (1st Cir.1995); Fay v. McCotter, 765 F.2d 475, 478 (5th Cir.1985).
The majority in its opinion has stated that a trial judge should not declare a mistrial without allowing the defendant an opportunity to object or to offer input. I agree, for even though the manifest necessity rule vests the trial court with certain discretionary powers, the defendant should be given the opportunity to be heard and the court thereafter should on the record state its reasoning for declaring a mistrial employing the factors set forth above. This will lend considerable assistance to the appellate court when it is called upon to determine whether there has been an abuse of discretion.