Court Opinion

ID: 9897385
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:10:54.855224+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:14:14.750491
License: Public Domain

FILED
                                                                          May 26 2023, 8:33 am

                                                                               CLERK
                                                                           Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                              Court of Appeals
                                                                                and Tax Court

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
M. Slaimon Ayoubi                                         Theodore E. Rokita
Indianapolis, Indiana                                     Attorney General of Indiana

                                                          Robert M. Yoke
                                                          Deputy Attorney General
                                                          Indianapolis, Indiana

                                            IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Cody Moore,                                               May 26, 2023
Appellant-Defendant,                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
                                                          22A-CR-1979
        v.
                                                          Appeal from the
State of Indiana,                                         Marion Superior Court
Appellee-Plaintiff.                                       The Honorable
                                                          William J. Nelson, Judge

                                                          The Honorable
                                                          Mark F. Renner, Magistrate

                                                          Trial Court Cause No.
                                                          49D18-2008-F6-26849

                             Opinion by Senior Judge Shepard
                            Judges Pyle and Weissmann concur.

Shepard, Senior Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023                             Page 1 of 15
[1]   In this interlocutory appeal, Cody Moore challenges the trial court’s denial of

      his motion to suppress. He argues that the similarity in smell of marijuana and

      legal hemp is fatal to the search. Concluding that Moore’s rights were not

      violated, we affirm.

      Facts and Procedural History
[2]   In August 2020, Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department Officer Ryan

      Dienhart performed a license plate check on a blue Volkswagen vehicle that

      was traveling in front of him. The check revealed that the license plate was

      both expired and registered to a different vehicle—a gray Jeep. Based on this

      information, Officer Dienhart stopped the car. Dienhart identified Moore as

      the driver of the car and immediately smelled a strong odor of marijuana.

      Initially, Moore refused to exit the car, but he eventually complied, and officers

      searched the car. Officers found five bundles of cash totaling about $5,000 in a

      backpack on the front passenger floorboard. Appellant’s App. Vol. II, p. 24

      (Aff. Prob. Cause). In another backpack in the trunk, officers found four large

      plastic bags of raw marijuana as well as more cash that totaled over $6,500. Id.

      at 24-25. The total weight of the recovered marijuana was approximately three

      and one-half pounds. Id. at 25.

[3]   The State charged Moore with dealing in marijuana, a Level 6 felony;

      possession of marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor; and resisting law

      enforcement, a Class A misdemeanor. Moore moved to suppress the items

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023         Page 2 of 15
      seized from the car, and following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion.

      The trial court also denied Moore’s motion to reconsider.

      Issue
[4]   Moore’s sole contention in this appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his

      motion to suppress the evidence obtained pursuant to the search.

      Discussion and Decision
[5]   “We review the denial of a motion to suppress similar to claims challenging the

      sufficiency of the evidence.” Meek v. State, 950 N.E.2d 816, 819 (Ind. Ct. App.

      2011), trans. denied. We do not reweigh the evidence. State v. Jones, 191 N.E.3d

      878 (Ind. Ct. App.), trans. denied, 197 N.E.3d 823 (Ind. 2022). We construe

      conflicting evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, and

      we also consider any substantial and uncontested evidence favorable to the

      defendant. Id. We will affirm the decision of the trial court if it is supported by

      substantial evidence of probative value. Meek, 950 N.E.2d 816. If a motion to

      suppress concerns the constitutionality of a search or seizure, it presents a legal

      question that we review de novo. Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254 (Ind.

      2019).

[6]   Separately claiming violations of both the federal and state constitutions,

      Moore contends: (1) the purpose of the traffic stop was complete prior to the

      search of the car and there was no reasonable suspicion to detain him beyond

      the reason for the stop; and (2) the officer lacked probable cause to search the

      car.
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023           Page 3 of 15
      A. Fourth Amendment
[7]   Moore first argues a violation of the Fourth Amendment, which protects

      against unreasonable searches and seizures. The stop of a vehicle and detention

      of its occupants constitute a seizure within the meaning of the Fourth

      Amendment, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting

      detention is brief. Thayer v. State, 904 N.E.2d 706 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). If a

      detention exceeds its proper scope, any items seized must be excluded from

      evidence as fruit of the poisonous tree. Id. (quoting U.S. v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258,

      264 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. denied).

      1. Reasonable Suspicion for Further Detention

[8]   Traffic violations, even minor ones, create probable cause for officers to stop a

      vehicle. State v. Torres, 159 N.E.3d 1018 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting State v.

      Quirk, 842 N.E.2d 334 (Ind. 2006)). But once the purpose of the traffic stop is

      completed, a motorist cannot be further detained unless something occurred

      during the stop to cause the officer to have a reasonable and articulable

      suspicion that criminal activity was occurring. Thayer, 904 N.E.2d 706 (quoting

      Hill, 195 F.3d at 264).

[9]   Although Moore concedes that his operation of a vehicle with an expired

      license plate justified the initial stop, he asserts the circumstances of the traffic

      stop did not establish reasonable suspicion that criminal activity was occurring

      to justify further detention. He maintains that Officer Dienhart’s drug

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023             Page 4 of 15
       investigation “began well after the mission and purpose of the stop was

       accomplished.” Appellant’s Br. p. 15.

[10]   At the suppression hearing, Officer Dienhart testified that he made contact with

       Moore at the passenger window. Moore told the officer the car was a rental

       and that he did not have the paperwork with him. Moore then made a call,

       allegedly to the rental company, to obtain the paperwork. Dienhart testified

       that “upon initial contact and during the entirety” of his conversation with

       Moore, he “detected the strong odor of marijuana emanating from inside the

       car.” Tr. Vol. 2, p. 31. The officer stated that “the odor was so strong and

       apparent that I just came . . . right out and ask[ed] [him] how much marijuana

       is inside the car.” Id. at 32. Dienhart explained that Moore “denied any

       presence of or usage of marijuana whatsoever, which is an immediate red flag”

       and “an indicator to me that he was obviously lying.” Id. Officer Dienhart also

       noticed that Moore’s hands were shaking and that he appeared very nervous

       and pale. On cross examination, defense counsel asked when the drug

       investigation commenced, and Dienhart responded, “as soon as I detect the

       odor of marijuana.” Id. at 45.

[11]   Officer Dienhart also testified that he has had training in recognizing both raw

       and burnt marijuana. Id. at 24. He further stated that he can distinguish

       between the two types and that in seven and one-half years he had taken part in

       hundreds, if not thousands, of investigations that involved marijuana. Id. at 27.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023          Page 5 of 15
[12]   These facts are sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that criminal activity

       was occurring. Before the traffic stop was completed, indeed as soon as it

       began, Officer Dienhart smelled what he believed, in his training and

       experience, to be the odor of marijuana. The officer was thus justified in his

       brief detention of Moore for further investigation into the odor coming from the

       car.

       2. Probable Cause to Search the Car

[13]   Moore next alleges that the officers did not have probable cause to search the

       car. As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment prohibits warrantless searches,

       but the rule is not without exceptions. Myers v. State, 839 N.E.2d 1146 (Ind.

       2005). For instance, the automobile exception allows police to search a vehicle

       without obtaining a warrant if they have probable cause to believe evidence of a

       crime will be found there. State v. Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281 (Ind. 2010). This

       exception stems from an automobile’s ready mobility, in that the evidence may

       disappear while a warrant is being obtained, and from citizens’ lower

       expectations of privacy in their automobiles due to government regulation. Id.

       Under this exception, the courts of this state have held that an officer’s

       detection of the odor of marijuana from a vehicle provides probable cause to

       search the vehicle. See Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252, 260 (Ind. 2013) (“the

       smell of burnt marijuana emanating from [a person’s] car windows, to a trained

       officer, would provide such an officer with probable cause sufficient to justify

       searching at least the open interior of the car”); Bell v. State, 13 N.E.3d 543, 546

       (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (“like the smell of burnt marijuana, the smell of raw

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023             Page 6 of 15
       marijuana on a person is sufficient to provide probable cause that the person

       possesses marijuana”), trans. denied.

[14]   Pertinent to Moore’s claim is that our General Assembly has amended state law

       to recognize the legality of some forms of cannabis containing low levels of
              1
       THC. See Ind. Code § 15-15-13-6 (2019) (defining “hemp” as any part of the

       cannabis plant, including derivatives and extracts, with a delta-9-

       tetrahydrocannabinol concentration of not more than three-tenths of one

       percent (0.3%)). And marijuana and hemp purportedly have indistinguishable

       odors. See North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation, “Industrial

       Hemp/CBD Issues,” available at

       https://www.sog.unc.edu/sites/default/files/doc_warehouse/NC%20SBI%20

       -%20Issues%20with%20Hemp%20and%20CBD%20Full.pdf

       [https://perma.cc/DX25-455S] (last visited May 19, 2023).

[15]   Here, Moore asserts there is no distinction between the odor of legal and illegal

       cannabis-derived substances and argues that the mere odor of marijuana is thus

       no longer a sufficient basis for a warrantless search of a vehicle. Not

       surprisingly, this topic has created much debate in the last few years as more

       and more states legalize cannabis-derived substances. See, e.g., Cynthia A.

       1
         “Delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) is the primary psychoactive cannabinoid extracted from the cannabis
       (marijuana) plant.” https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK563174/#:~:text=Go%20to%3A-
       ,Indications,the%20cannabis%20(marijuana)%20plant [https://perma.cc/F38Z-Z368] (last visited May 19,
       2023).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023                             Page 7 of 15
       Sherwood et al., Even Dogs Can’t Smell the Difference: The Death of “Plain Smell”

       as Hemp is Legalized, 55 Tenn. B.J. 14 (December 2019); see generally Brynn

       Holland, The Hazy History of ‘420’ (updated April 20, 2022),

       https://www.history.com/news/the-hazy-history-of-420

       [https://perma.cc/CB4K-WN2U] (last visited May 19, 2023).

[16]   Some federal courts have had recent occasion to address the argument

       presented by Moore, and they have rejected it. In United States v. Vaughn, 429

       F. Supp. 3d 499 (E.D. Tenn. 2019), the court found probable cause for the

       issuance of a search warrant based in part upon the officers smelling the odor of

       marijuana when the defendants’ apartment door was opened. The defendants

       argued the odor the officers detected could have been hemp, but the court

       applied the “fair probability” test and found probable cause. The court held:

               Probable cause for a search warrant requires “a fair probability,
               given the totality of the circumstances, that contraband or
               evidence will be found in a particular place.” Absolute certainty
               is not required. As a result, Defendants’ contention that the
               smell could have been hemp does not change the fact that it also
               could be, and was, marijuana. The officers’ detection of a
               marijuana odor meant there was a fair probability that marijuana
               would be found within the apartment, which is sufficient for
               probable cause.

       Id. at 510 (internal citations omitted).

[17]   More recently in United States v. Garth, No. 3:20-CR-43-TAV-HBG, 2021 WL

       8442271 (E.D. Tenn. July 6, 2021), report and recommendation adopted in part

       by No. 3:20-CR-43-KAC-JEM, 2022 WL 1084740 (E.D. Tenn. Apr. 11, 2022),
       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023          Page 8 of 15
       the District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee held that an officer had

       probable cause to search a vehicle for drugs based upon the odor of raw

       marijuana coming from the vehicle. The defendants argued that the odor of

       marijuana did not provide probable cause to search the car because the odor of

       marijuana cannot be distinguished from the odor of lawful substances, such as

       hemp. Noting the officer testified he is familiar with the odor of marijuana, the

       court applied the “fair probability” test set forth in Vaughn and held that the

       officer’s detection of the odor at the window of the vehicle established a fair

       probability that the car contained marijuana. Id. at *13. See also U.S. v. Nava,

       No. 2:22-CR-20002-PKH-1, 2022 WL 3593724 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 1, 2022)

       (where defendant contended that odor of marijuana alone no longer provides

       probable cause to search vehicle because medical marijuana and industrial

       hemp are legal in Arkansas, court disagreed and relied on Arkansas state

       caselaw that, post-legalization, continued to hold that odor of marijuana

       justifies vehicular search), report and recommendation adopted by No. 2:22-

       CR-20002, 2022 WL 3589493 (W.D. Ark. Aug. 22, 2022).

[18]   Similar rulings occurred in United States v. Holt, No. 3:21-CR-80 (MPS), 2021

       WL 5281366 (D. Conn. Nov. 12, 2021) (discussing that, although there was

       possibility odor may have emanated from hemp or non-criminally possessed

       marijuana, it did not undermine reasonableness of officer’s suspicion that odor

       was criminally-possessed marijuana in affirming denial of motion to suppress

       and concluding police had probable cause to search vehicle based upon odor

       and defendant’s statement of possessing “a blunt”) and United States v. Brooks,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023          Page 9 of 15
       No. 319CR00211FDWDCK, 2021 WL 1668048 (W.D.N.C. Apr. 28, 2021)

       (defendant cited North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation report seeming to

       suggest that marijuana and hemp look and smell almost identical and argued

       that because substances found in vehicle were not tested, evidence must be

       suppressed; court denied suppression, stating that, even assuming hemp and

       marijuana smell identical, presence of hemp does not render unreasonable all

       police probable cause searches based on odor because, regardless of ever-

       changing state marijuana legal landscape, marijuana remains illegal under

       federal law and precedent of odor of marijuana giving law enforcement

       probable cause to search has not been overturned).

[19]   In accord with these holdings were: United States v. Boggess, 444 F. Supp. 3d 730

       (S.D.W. Va. 2020) (where defendant asserted that, due to legalization of hemp,

       precedent of odor of marijuana providing probable cause to search should be

       revisited because marijuana and hemp cannot be distinguished by smell, court

       recognized both nationwide movement to legalize or decriminalize marijuana

       and fact that possession of marijuana remains criminal offense under West

       Virginia state law and federal law and held there was probable cause to search

       where officer’s belief that there was illegal contraband in defendant’s vehicle

       was reasonable based on odor of marijuana emanating from vehicle) and United

       States v. Bignon, No. 18-CR-783 (JMF), 2019 WL 643177 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 15,

       2019) (finding officer had probable cause even if he reasonably, but mistakenly,

       believed he smelled marijuana given the close similarity of marijuana and

       hemp), aff’d by No. 19-2050, 813 F. App’x 34 (2nd Cir. N.Y. May 19, 2020).

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023        Page 10 of 15
[20]   Accordingly, we apply the test of “fair probability” to the facts before us.

       Although it was equally possible that the strong odor emanating from the

       vehicle and detected by Officer Dienhart was hemp as it was marijuana, these

       circumstances created a fair probability—that is, “a substantial chance”—that

       the vehicle contained contraband. Eaton v. State, 889 N.E.2d 297, 300 (Ind.

       2008). We thus conclude that Officer Dienhart’s detection of the odor of

       marijuana immediately upon his arrival at the open window of the car driven

       by Moore provided probable cause for him to search the car.

       B. Indiana Constitution
[21]   Article 1, section 11 of the Indiana Constitution protects citizens from

       unreasonable searches and seizures, and, although its text mirrors the Fourth

       Amendment, we interpret it separately and independently. Robinson v. State, 5

       N.E.3d 362 (Ind. 2014). When a section 11 claim is raised, the State must show

       the police conduct was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.

       Farris v. State, 144 N.E.3d 814 (Ind. Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Robinson, 5 N.E.3d

       at 368), trans. denied. A determination of the reasonableness of the conduct

       turns on a balance of three factors: (1) the degree of concern, suspicion, or

       knowledge that a violation has occurred; (2) the degree of intrusion the method

       of the search or seizure imposes on the citizen’s ordinary activities; and (3) the

       extent of law enforcement needs. Id.

[22]   Here, as he has acknowledged, Moore was in clear violation of the law by

       operating a vehicle with an expired license plate at the time Officer Dienhart

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023           Page 11 of 15
       stopped him. Immediately upon approaching the car to inquire about the issues

       with the license plate, the officer smelled a very strong odor of marijuana. The

       degree of suspicion of criminal activity increased exponentially upon this

       observation, which justified Dienhart’s continued detention of Moore, as we

       discussed above.

[23]   The heart of this case, though, is whether the odor also justified the subsequent

       search of the car. We note that since our state’s legalization of some cannabis-

       derived substances, we have addressed issues concerning the similarity in the

       odors of marijuana and hemp. See Alexander-Woods v. State, 163 N.E.3d 902

       (Ind. Ct. App.) (where, following trial on charges arising from traffic stop and

       vehicle search based on odor of marijuana, defendant challenged probable

       cause for search on ground that State failed to prove officer was qualified to

       distinguish between odors of illegal marijuana and legal hemp, Court’s review

       of issue was precluded by waiver for failure to assert argument in trial court),

       trans. denied, 168 N.E.3d 737 (Ind. 2021), and disapproved of by Bunnell v. State,

       172 N.E.3d 1231 (Ind. 2021); Bunnell, 172 N.E.3d 1231 (determining issue of

       first impression and holding that officer who affirms he or she detects odor of

       raw marijuana based on training and experience may establish probable cause

       without further details on his or her qualifications to recognize odor;

       disapproving Alexander-Woods, 163 N.E.3d 902 because its holding suggested

       that officer’s general statement of training and experience may not suffice for

       probable cause determination); Fedij v. State, 186 N.E.3d 696 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2022) (reversing defendant’s conviction for possession of marijuana due to

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023           Page 12 of 15
       State’s failure to prove seized substance was illegal marijuana, as opposed to

       legal hemp, where officer testified at trial that she could not distinguish between

       hemp and marijuana absent testing for concentration of THC and that she was

       trained on the smell of burnt marijuana and not burnt hemp or any differences

       that may exist between the two and analyst identified presence but not percent

       concentration of THC in substance); Toledo Rojo v. State, 202 N.E.3d 1085 (Ind.

       Ct. App.) (reversing a conviction based on insufficient evidence where an

       officer testified that he knew the substance seized was marijuana due to markers

       regarding sight and smell and holding this evidence insufficient to establish that

       the substance was illegal marijuana with concentration of THC of 0.3% or more

       as required to convict for possession of marijuana), trans. denied, 199 N.E.3d

       787 (Ind. 2022).

[24]   Still, this Court has not tackled the precise argument Moore presents here. The

       argument is this: given the concept that illegal marijuana and legal hemp

       cannot be distinguished by their smell due to the similarity of their odors, it can

       no longer be said that marijuana has a “distinct smell” that indicates criminal

       activity. We disagree.

[25]   Marijuana is not the only substance whose legality cannot be detected by

       human senses alone. For instance, innocuous substances such as talcum

       powder, flour, and sugar have a white powdery appearance similar to cocaine.

       But that does not mean that an untested white powder can never indicate

       criminal activity. See, e.g., Lamagna v. State, 776 N.E.2d 955 (Ind. Ct. App.

       2002) (ruling that police had probable cause to arrest defendant based solely on

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023         Page 13 of 15
       observations of his possession, transfer, and abandonment of packets of white

       powder). Similarly, an officer’s discovery of unidentified pills may indicate

       criminal activity, although some pills are not contraband because they either are

       not controlled substances or because the person possessing them has a valid

       prescription. See Strangeway v. State, 720 N.E.2d 724 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)

       (ruling that police officer had probable cause to arrest driver after passenger

       exited car and officer saw on seat of vehicle a cellophane wrapper containing

       white pills that he suspected were controlled substances); Ind. Code § 35-48-4-

       6(a) (2014) (defining offense of possession of narcotic as requiring possession of

       schedule I or II narcotic by a person “without a valid prescription or order of a

       practitioner acting in the course of the practitioner’s professional practice”).

[26]   It therefore is not convincing that the marijuana odor could be caused by legal

       hemp. Although the legal landscape for cannabis-derived substances is ever-

       changing, one thing remains true: some types of marijuana possession remain

       illegal in Indiana. It follows then that the odor of marijuana reasonably may

       indicate criminal activity. Therefore, in the consideration of the

       constitutionality of a search based on the odor of marijuana, as the law stands

       now it is of no moment that legal hemp smells similar to illegal marijuana

       because law enforcement’s conduct must be reasonable under the circumstances

       and such reasonableness does not require conclusive proof that a defendant

       committed a crime. Thus, in this case the strong odor of marijuana detected by

       Officer Dienhart as soon as he approached the car driven by Moore established

       a high degree of suspicion of criminal activity.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023          Page 14 of 15
[27]   With respect to the remaining factors, the degree of police intrusion on Moore’s

       ordinary activities was slight as Dienhart initially stopped Moore due to the

       car’s license plate being both expired and registered to a different vehicle. And,

       Officer Dienhart’s conduct in making the stop was appropriate to the

       enforcement of traffic laws, and his subsequent search of the car Moore was

       driving was consistent with law enforcement’s responsibility to deter crime, to

       intercept criminal activity, and to apprehend its perpetrators. See State v.

       Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200 (Ind. 2008). We conclude the warrantless search

       was reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and therefore did not

       violate Moore’s rights under article 1, section 11.

       Conclusion
[28]   We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Moore’s

       motion to suppress the evidence seized as a result of the stop.

[29]   Affirmed.

       Pyle, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 22A-CR-1979 | May 26, 2023         Page 15 of 15