Court Opinion

ID: 9854463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:07:56.459148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:05.575929
License: Public Domain

*223Hunt, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
A trial judge, upon reading this opinion, and our opinion in Amadeo v. State, 259 Ga. 469 (384 SE2d 181) (1989) may well wonder whether he or she has any remaining discretion in the appointment of counsel under these circumstances. By circumstances, I mean the factors common both to Amadeo and Davis, to-wit: the lawyers who seek appointment are the only lawyers who, in addition to being highly competent in due process cases, have a long association with the defendant, and are familiar with the complexities of the case. Given the presence of these factors, is the appointment of the defendant’s choice of counsel mandated? The answer, provided by this opinion and our opinion in Amadeo is yes, in the absence of “countervailing considerations of comparable weight.”1
I can, at the moment, think of only a few examples of considerations which might authorize the exercise of the trial court’s discretion in favor of appointment of local counsel, and against the defendant’s choice of counsel. These might include: the fact that the defendant’s choice maintains his primary office some considerable distance from the court so that his availability to the court and to the defendant over the course of the litigation would be difficult; the fact that the defendant’s choice is presently engaged in a time-consuming case which will cause conflict and delay in this court’s case; the fact that the defendant’s choice has a recent well-documented history of disruptive behavior calculated to require a mistrial or otherwise sabotage the normal proceedings of the case; or where competent local counsel also has some previous connection with the case.
I do not, however, concur with the majority’s holding that the trial court was required to appoint both counsel of defendant’s choosing. Assuming two lawyers are necessary, or even desirable, I see no reason why it would not be within the trial court’s discretion to appoint one, but not both, of those lawyers and one local attorney, who might not be as qualified in due process cases, but who would profit from the experience so that his appointment in a later case might be appropriate.2 Therefore, I would remand this case to the trial court with direction that it consider, in its discretion-, whether to appoint both Farmer and Friend, or whether to appoint one of them, and, in addition, a local lawyer, as the defense team.
I am authorized to state that Justice Fletcher joins in this con*224currence and dissent.
Decided May 10, 1991.
Millard C. Farmer, Jr., Carla J. Friend, for appellant.
William G. Hamrick, Jr., District Attorney, for appellee.
Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Assistant Attorney General, amici curiae.

 We adopted this phrase in Amadeo v. State, supra, from the California case of Harris v. People, 567 P2d 750, 759 (140 Cal. Rptr. 318) (1977).

 In an indigent’s defense, must the trial court defer to lead counsel as to the choice of associate counsel as it would if the lawyers were hired? Such a requirement would certainly not be in the system’s interest. How else does a lawyer gain death-penalty competence other than by association, in the trial, with a lawyer of recognized accomplishment? See Amadeo v. State, supra at 470, n. 4.