Court Opinion

ID: 9389781
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-26 14:07:37.079396+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:29.526259
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Christine Marie Novak, as                :
Administratrix of the Estate of          :
Charles John Nasta, deceased,            :
                   Appellant             :
                                         :
             v.                          :
                                         :
William McLaughlin, Jr., Delicia         :
Nahman, City of Bethlehem, and           :   No. 528 C.D. 2022
Moravian College                         :   Argued: April 3, 2023

BEFORE:      HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge
             HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
             HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE COVEY                                          FILED: April 26, 2023

             Christine Marie Novak (Novak), as Administratrix of the Estate of
Charles John Nasta (Decedent), appeals from the Northampton County Common
Pleas Court’s (trial court) May 16, 2022 order granting the City of Bethlehem’s
(Bethlehem) Motion for Summary Judgment (Summary Judgment Motion), and
October 15, 2018 order sustaining Moravian College’s (Moravian) preliminary
objections to Counts VII and VIII of Novak’s Amended Complaint (Preliminary
Objections). Novak presents two issues for this Court’s review: (1) whether the trial
court erred as a matter of law by ruling that Novak failed to establish the necessary
elements of a negligence claim against Bethlehem; and (2) whether the trial court
erred by sustaining Moravian’s Preliminary Objections when Moravian owed
Decedent a duty of care. After review, this Court affirms.
               On July 12, 2018, Novak filed the Amended Complaint against William
McLaughlin, Jr. (McLaughlin), Delicia Nahman (Nahman), Bethlehem, and
Moravian (collectively, Defendants), asserting therein survival and wrongful death
causes of action arising from a motor vehicle striking and killing Decedent, a
pedestrian, as he was crossing Elizabeth Avenue at Iron Street (Intersection),
following a Moravian soccer game in Bethlehem. On August 1, 2018, Moravian
filed the Preliminary Objections to Novak’s Amended Complaint, alleging therein
that Novak’s claim was legally insufficient because, under Pennsylvania law, a
landowner owes no duty to pedestrians on adjoining public roadways. Specifically,
Moravian asserted that it did not have a duty to control traffic or otherwise provide
safe passage for pedestrians over a public road or highway such as Elizabeth Avenue.
On October 15, 2018, the trial court sustained Moravian’s Preliminary Objections.
               On February 1, 2022, Bethlehem filed the Summary Judgment Motion.
Therein, Bethlehem asserted that it is immune from Novak’s claims under the
portion of the Judicial Code commonly referred to as the Political Subdivision Tort
Claims Act (Tort Claims Act).1 Specifically, Bethlehem averred that the traffic
controls exception to the immunity provisions does not apply in the instant case
because Bethlehem had no duty to erect traffic controls and did not create and/or
have notice of a dangerous condition. On May 16, 2022, the trial court granted
Bethlehem’s Summary Judgment Motion, concluding that Novak failed to establish
the necessary elements of a negligence claim against Bethlehem by failing to

      1
          42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542.

                                         2
establish that Bethlehem owed a duty under the circumstances of this case or the
proximate cause of the fatal collision. Novak timely appealed to this Court.2, 3
              Initially,

            [s]ummary judgment may be granted only in those cases
            where the record clearly shows that there are no genuine
            issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled
            to judgment as a matter of law. P.J.S. v. [Pa.] State Ethics
            Comm[’n], . . . 723 A.2d 174, 176 ([Pa.] 1999). On a
            motion for summary judgment, the record must be viewed
            in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, and all
            doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of material
            fact must be resolved in [her] favor. Id. The question of
            whether [Bethlehem] is entitled to summary judgment is
            based purely upon the statutory construction of the
            applicable immunity provisions. Dean v. [Pa.] Dep[’t] of
            Transp[.], . . . 751 A.2d 1130, 1132 ([Pa.] 2000).
Texeira v. Commonwealth, 284 A.3d 1279, 1283 n.3 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022).
              Novak first argues that the trial court committed an error of law and a
manifest abuse of discretion by granting Bethlehem’s Summary Judgment Motion.
Specifically, Novak contends that Bethlehem had a duty to maintain its roadways
free of dangerous conditions, including a duty to install an appropriate traffic control
device to alleviate a known dangerous condition. Novak asserts that the Intersection

       2
              The standard of review of the grant of summary judgment is de novo.
              See e.g., Pyeritz v. Commonwealth, . . . 32 A.3d 687, 692 ([Pa.]
              2011). “The scope of review over an order granting summary
              judgment is “limited to a determination of whether the trial court
              abused its discretion or committed an error of law.”
Texeira v. Commonwealth, 284 A.3d 1279, 1283 n.2 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022) (quoting Bowles v. Se.
Pa. Transp. Auth., 581 A.2d 700, 702-03 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990)).
       “Our review of a trial court’s order sustaining preliminary objections . . . is limited to
determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or committed an error of law.” Ward v.
Potteiger, 142 A.3d 139, 142 n.6 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (quoting Pub. Advoc. v. Brunwasser, 22 A.3d
261, 266 n.5 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011)).
       3
         On December 23, 2022, Nahman filed a Notice of Non-Participation. On December 30,
2022, McLaughlin filed a Notice of Non-Participation. It appears that those Defendants settled on
May 13, 2021.
                                               3
was a known dangerous condition and, while proximate cause is left to the jury to
decide, it is clear from the record evidence that Bethlehem’s failure to remedy the
known dangerous condition was a proximate cause of Novak’s damages.
             Bethlehem rejoins that the trial court correctly concluded that Novak
failed to meet her burden of proving that Bethlehem had a duty to install a traffic
control device (be it a mid-block crosswalk or signage, or another purported
remedial measure) at the Intersection. Bethlehem further retorts that the trial court
also properly held that Novak failed to establish causation - a necessary element of
her negligence claim. Bethlehem maintains that because Novak failed to produce
competent evidence, she could not overcome the immunity the Tort Claims Act
afforded Bethlehem.
             Section 8542(b) of the Tort Claims Act provides, in relevant part:

             Acts which may impose liability.—The following acts by
             a local agency or any of its employees may result in the
             imposition of liability on a local agency:
             ....
             (4) Trees, traffic controls and street lighting.--A
             dangerous condition of trees, traffic signs, lights or other
             traffic controls, street lights or street lighting systems
             under the care, custody or control of the local agency,
             except that the claimant to recover must establish that the
             dangerous condition created a reasonably foreseeable risk
             of the kind of injury which was incurred and that the local
             agency had actual notice or could reasonably be charged
             with notice under the circumstances of the dangerous
             condition at a sufficient time prior to the event to have
             taken measures to protect against the dangerous condition.
             ....
             (6) Streets.--
             (i) A dangerous condition of streets owned by the local
             agency, except that the claimant to recover must establish
             that the dangerous condition created a reasonably
                                          4
            foreseeable risk of the kind of injury which was incurred
            and that the local agency had actual notice or could
            reasonably be charged with notice under the circumstances
            of the dangerous condition at a sufficient time prior to the
            event to have taken measures to protect against the
            dangerous condition.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b).
            The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has explained:

            Under the Tort Claims Act, local government agencies
            such as [Bethlehem] are generally immune from tort
            liability, except in circumstances where immunity is
            expressly waived. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541. The General
            Assembly has waived immunity when two distinct
            conditions are satisfied: (1) the damages would be
            recoverable under statutory or common law against a
            person unprotected by governmental immunity, and (2)
            the negligent act of the political subdivision which caused
            the injury falls within one of the eight enumerated
            categories listed in Section 8542(b) of the Tort Claims
            Act, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b). See generally White v. Sch[.]
            Dist. of Phila., . . . 718 A.2d 778, 779 ([Pa.] 1998). Our
            decision in this case turns upon the element of duty.

Starr v. Veneziano, 747 A.2d 867, 871 (Pa. 2000) (emphasis added).
            The Starr Court expounded:

            [T]o establish a duty of care on the part of a municipality
            related to the installation of a traffic control device, a
            plaintiff must demonstrate that: 1) the municipality had
            actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition
            that caused the plaintiff’s injuries; 2) the pertinent device
            would have constituted an appropriate remedial measure;
            and 3) the municipality’s authority was such that it can
            fairly be charged with the failure to install the device.
Id. at 873 (emphasis added).

                                         5
               Here, Novak asserts in her brief, see Novak Br. at 18,4 and the trial court
concluded, see Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 471a,5 that the first element - whether
Bethlehem had actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition - was a
question of fact for the jury.

               To satisfy the second requirement for establishing a duty
               to implement a traffic control measure, [Novak] was
               required to demonstrate that the relevant control would
               have constituted a proper and effective measure to
               mitigate the hazard at the [I]ntersection. This requirement
               arises naturally from the nature of the duty alleged, as it
               would be both illogical and contrary to public policy to
               deem a governmental entity obligated to install or erect a
               device which would be inappropriate to the location at
               issue.

Starr, 747 A.2d at 873.
               The Starr Court explicated:

               In this regard, it is important to note that, under the
               Vehicle Code, the Commonwealth and its subdivisions
               may not erect traffic control devices unless it is first
               determined, based upon a traffic and engineering
               investigation, that a particular device is an appropriate
               means of regulating traffic. See [Sections 6105, 6109(e),
               and 6122(b) of the Vehicle Code,] 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 6105
               [(Department of Transportation (Department) to prescribe
               traffic and engineering investigations.)], 6109(e)
               [(Engineering and traffic investigation required.)],
               6122(b) [(Standards for Department approval.)]; see
               generally . . . [Sections 212.5(b)(1)(iii) and 212.1 of the
               Department’s Regulations, 67 Pa. Code §§ 212.5(b)(1)(iii)
               (Department’s written approval required “before installing
               any new . . . traffic[ ]control device.”), 212.1 (defines
               “[t]raffic[ ]control devices” as “[s]igns, signals, markings
       4
         Novak asserted: “[T]here is sufficient evidence in the record to put before the jury the
question of whether [] Bethlehem had actual notice of the dangerous condition of the Intersection.”
Novak Br. at 18 (emphasis added).
       5
         The trial court stated that “both the question of what constitutes a ‘dangerous condition,’
and whether a local agency had either actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition, would
be questions of fact for a jury to decide.” R.R. at 471a.
                                                 6
              and devices consistent with this chapter[]”)]. These
              statutes and regulations reflect the concern that some
              devices may have undesirable effects upon the larger
              system of traffic regulation and control that preclude their
              use in certain locations. Because the determination of
              appropriateness entails consideration of principles and
              methods of traffic engineering that are beyond the scope
              of a layman’s training, expert opinion expressed within a
              reasonable degree of engineering certainty is generally
              required for the plaintiff to meet this requirement.

Id. (emphasis added); see also Bender v. Dep’t of Transp. (Pa. Cmwlth. No. 77 C.D.
2019, filed June 30, 2020).6
              In the instant mater, Novak’s expert, Richard M. Balgowan, PE, PP,
CPM, CPWM, PWLF (Balgowan), provided in his report, in relevant part:

              Within the bounds of reasonable engineering certainty,
              and subject to change if additional information becomes
              available, it is my professional opinion that:
              ....
              3) If a mid-block crosswalk is properly designed based on
              effective safety engineering checks and studies, then these
              crossings can potentially decrease the risk of
              pedestrians crossing between intersections. Mid-block
              crosswalks make it more convenient for people to reach
              their destination by eliminating extra walking to a street
              corner.
              ....
              5) Had a safe pedestrian crossing been in place at the time
              that [Decedent] attempted to cross the [Intersection] or had
              . . . Bethlehem taken positive actions to protect pedestrians
              at this [I]ntersection, the [] incident would not have
              occurred and [Decedent] would not have been fatality
              injured.

       6
        Unreported decisions of this Court, while not binding, may be cited for their persuasive
value. Section 414(a) of the Internal Operating Procedures of the Commonwealth Court, 210 Pa.
Code § 69.414(a). Bender is cited herein for its persuasive value.
                                               7
                6) Based on the evidence[,] the proximate cause of the
                collision was the failure of McLaughlin to recognize in
                time and yield the right-of-way to the pedestrian
                ([Decedent]) crossing within the unmarked crosswalk at
                Iron Street.
                7) Within a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, 1)
                the conditions that then existed to cross [the Intersection]
                were inheritably dangerous and misleading for pedestrians
                attempting to cross Elizabeth Avenue; and 2) had there
                been a marked crosswalk and other safety elements
                alerting McLaughlin of the presence that pedestrians
                were present and in the process of crossing, this
                collision would have been avoided.
                8) Within a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, in
                failing to erect any measures whatsoever prior to October
                5, 2016[,] to guard or warn pedestrians crossing, . . .
                Bethlehem breached [its] duty to protect pedestrians and
                motorists of the roadway. Bethlehem would have not
                breached [its] duty to the public, even if [it] had merely
                warned pedestrians by placing a “NO PEDESTRIAN”
                warning sign, ‘Use Crosswalk’ supplemental plaque, or
                ‘CROSS ONLY AT CROSSWALKS’ indicating the
                dangers of crossing at this specific unmarked crosswalk
                and indicating the direction of the safe crossing.

R.R. at 382a-383a (emphasis added). Balgowan’s expert report does not offer an
opinion on the feasibility or appropriateness of installing a crosswalk at the
Intersection.

                [A]lthough [Balgowan] [opin]ed generally that a [traffic
                control device] would have prevented the accident
                involving [Decedent], he failed to offer even a conclusory
                opinion on the larger issue of whether a [mid-block
                crosswalk] was appropriate to this [I]ntersection.
                Specifically, no expert opinion evidence was offered to
                establish the feasibility of a [mid-block crosswalk], or that
                the net effect of a [mid-block crosswalk] upon the larger
                system of traffic control in the vicinity of the [I]ntersection
                would have been beneficial.

                                              8
Starr, 747 A.2d at 873-74. This evidence is especially warranted here, where there
are other conditions in the vicinity to consider, including the lack of sidewalks, the
proximity of other marked crosswalks, and whether a crosswalk in that location
would be safe in light of limited sight distance caused by the street slope.
             Further, as aptly noted by the trial court:

             [Balgowan] asserts that “mid-block crosswalks” require
             submission to [the Department] and approval by the [s]tate
             [t]raffic [e]ngineer. See [R.R. at 873a]. Starr further
             provides: “a plaintiff seeking to establish authority on the
             part of a municipality to erect or install a traffic control
             device will necessarily be required to prove that, more
             likely than not, [the Department’s] approval would have
             been forthcoming.” Starr[, 747 A.2d] at 874. Here,
             [Balgowan’s] expert report does not provide any opinion
             on whether [the Department] or the [s]tate [t]raffic
             [e]ngineer would be likely to approve such a mid-block
             crosswalk at this location. In cases “where [Department]
             approval is a pre-requisite to municipal action, a
             plaintiff[’]s expert must support his or her opinion as to
             appropriateness with an analysis of the same facts that [the
             Department] would consider when its approval is sought.”
             Wenger v. W[.] Pennsb[o]ro [Twp.], 868 A.2d 638, 643
             (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005). Although [Balgowan’s] expert report
             identifies the relevant factors, he does not undertake any
             analysis of those factors or reach any conclusions on the
             application of the factors to the circumstances of the
             location at issue.

Trial Ct. Op. at 5 n.3; R.R. at 472a. Without a sufficient expert report, Novak cannot
establish that Bethlehem had a duty to remedy the alleged dangerous condition on
Elizabeth Avenue.
             Nevertheless, Novak maintains that Balgowan’s expert report was
sufficient to prove that Bethlehem owed a duty to install a crosswalk pursuant to
Wenger, because the Wenger Court held “that the holding in Starr does not require
a plaintiff’s expert to undertake and/or document an engineering and traffic
investigation in accordance with any particular [Department] [R]egulation.”
                                           9
Wenger, 868 A.2d at 643. However, the Wenger Court continued: “Of course, in
circumstances where [Department] approval is a prerequisite to municipal action, a
plaintiff’s expert must support his or her opinion as to appropriateness with an
analysis of the same facts that [the Department] would consider when its approval is
sought.” Id. It is undisputed that Department approval is required herein; however,
in Wenger, it was not. Accordingly, Wenger is inapposite.
             Regarding causation, the trial court opined:

             [T]o the extent that [Novak] argues that [Bethlehem] could
             have installed speed limit signage or speed bumps on
             [Bethlehem] streets without undertaking [Department]
             approval, [the trial court] note[s] that there is no evidence
             of record that the driver, McLaughlin, who struck
             Decedent, was exceeding the posted speed limit of 25
             miles per hour at the time. See . . . Summary Judgment
             [Motion] at Exhibit D, [D]eposition of [] McLaughlin, at
             page 14, and police crash reports appended thereto.
             Similarly, [Novak] also argues that [Bethlehem] could
             have installed signage warning pedestrians not to cross
             Elizabeth Avenue at Iron Street. [Balgowan] opines that
             such signage would have discharged [Bethlehem’s] duty,
             however, he also opined that “most people are not going
             to walk 750 feet to cross the street.” [R.R. at 383a.]
             Consequently, [Novak] has not demonstrated that
             additional signage would have mitigated the hazard of
             Decedent crossing the street at that [Intersection]. More
             specifically, even if [Bethlehem] could be considered to
             have had a duty to erect additional signage, [Novak] has
             not established that the failure to do so was the proximate
             cause of the fatal collision.

R.R. at 473a-474a. This Court discerns no error in the trial court’s reasoning.
             Balgowan’s expert report does not contain sufficient evidence to prove
that Bethlehem had a duty to erect a traffic control device. Even if Bethlehem had
a duty to erect signage, Balgowan’s expert report was insufficient to prove that lack
of such signage was the proximate cause of Decedent’s accident. In the absence of
such duty, Novak cannot prove Bethlehem’s requisite negligence to overcome
                                          10
Bethlehem’s immunity from suit afforded by the Tort Claims Act. Accordingly,
because “the record clearly shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact
and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law[,]” the trial court
properly granted Bethlehem’s Summary Judgment Motion. Texeira, 284 A.3d at
1283 n.3.
             Novak next argues that the trial court erred by sustaining Moravian’s
Preliminary Objections when Moravian owed Decedent a duty of care. Specifically,
Novak contends that case law makes clear that a landowner can assume a duty based
on its prior conduct. Further, Novak asserts that the record evidence reveals that the
parking lot location in relationship to the campus is dangerous in light of the known
risk of harm created by pedestrians crossing the Intersection to get to and from areas
on the college campus. Thus, Novak proclaims that Moravian owed its invited
guests, including Decedent, a duty to exercise reasonable care to make the crossing
safe. Moravian rejoins that Newell v. Montana West, Inc., 154 A.3d 819 (Pa. Super.
2017), when applied correctly to the present circumstances, supports the trial court’s
ruling that Moravian owed no duty to Decedent.
             Initially,

             [w]hen considering preliminary objections, we must
             accept as true all well-pled facts set forth in the complaint,
             as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom,
             but not conclusions of law. Preliminary objections in the
             nature of a demurrer should be sustained only where the
             pleadings are clearly insufficient to establish a right to
             relief and any doubt must be resolved in favor of
             overruling the demurrer.

Ward v. Potteiger, 142 A.3d 139, 143 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (quoting Dadds v.
Walters, 924 A.2d 740, 742 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (citation omitted)).

                                          11
              Section 349 of the [Restatement (Second) of Torts
              (]Second Restatement[)] . . . provides:
              Dangerous Conditions in Public Highway or Private
              Right of Way
              A possessor of land over which there is a public highway
              or private right of way is not subject to liability for
              physical harm caused to travelers upon the highway or
              persons lawfully using the way by his failure to exercise
              reasonable care[:]
              (a) to maintain the highway or way in safe condition for
              their use, or
              (b) to warn them of dangerous conditions in the way
              which, although not created by him, are known to him and
              which they neither know nor are likely to discover.

Newell, 154 A.3d at 824 (footnote omitted) (quoting Allen v. Mellinger, 625 A.2d
1326, 1328 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993)).

              A pedestrian who walks on a public highway places
              himself at risk of injury from vehicles traveling on the
              highway. Any duty of care owed to that pedestrian must
              belong to those who maintain the road and those motorists
              who are licensed to drive safely on it. The duty does not
              extend to landowners who have premises adjacent to the
              roadway.
Id. at 826.
              [Novak] must prove a duty of care on the part of
              [Moravian], and a breach thereof causing [Decedent’s]
              injuries. [Novak] has failed to do this. [Moravian] [is] not
              liable to [Novak] because, by her own admission,
              [Decedent] [was killed in the Intersection] located off
              [Moravian’s] property. As Section 349 of the [Second]
              Restatement makes clear, [Moravian], as [an] abutting
              landowner[], owed no duty to [Decedent], which could be
              breached, to maintain a public highway in a safe condition.

Id. at 824 (quoting Allen, 625 A.2d at 1329).

                                          12
             The trial court explained:

             Under Pennsylvania law, to hold a defendant liable for
             negligence, the plaintiff must prove: (1) a legally
             recognized duty to which the defendant must conform; (2)
             the defendant breached that duty; (3) causation between
             the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual damage
             to the plaintiff. Truax v. Roulhac, 126 A.3d 991, 997 (Pa.
             Super. 2015). Here, [Novak] has failed to establish the
             first element of her [negligence] cause of action. . . . [A]
             Pennsylvania landowner owes no duty to an invitee
             injured on an adjoining roadway. Newell . . . . The facts
             of the instant case are consistent with those of Newell in
             that [] Decedent was struck and killed while crossing the
             roadway adjacent to the property owned by [Moravian].
             [Novak] has not asserted any factual allegations to
             distinguish the instant case from the facts in Newell, or to
             demonstrate that [Moravian] voluntarily assumed the duty
             of ensuring the safe passage of the Decedent.

R.R. at 104a. This Court discerns no error in the trial court’s reasoning.
             Notwithstanding, Novak argues that, under Laconis v. Burlington
County Bridge Commission, 583 A.2d 1218 (Pa. Super. 1990), a defendant can
assume a duty to warn of a danger existing on an adjacent property where the
defendant had provided such warnings in the past. Novak asserts that she could have
obtained evidence that Moravian had provided such warnings in the past, if she had
been given the opportunity to proceed with discovery. However, in Laconis, it was
the Burlington County Bridge Commission’s (Commission) assumption of
responsibility to repair the area below the bridge and to warn of the dangerous
condition that resulted in a finding of liability. The Laconis Court held:

             The Commission not only knew about the dangerous
             drainage problem, but it had assumed responsibility to
             correct it. In June[] 1979, it unsuccessfully attempted to
             repair the highway. In addition, it sent bridge police to
             the area when heavy rain fell in order to warn
             motorists to slow down prior to reaching the
             accumulation of water. Despite the fact that it both had

                                          13
             failed to repair the problem and that it also monitored the
             situation by warning motorists to slow down after a heavy
             rainfall, the Commission did not warn motorists the night
             the accident occurred. The trial court determined that
             heavy rain had been falling the entire evening prior to the
             accident. [The Pennsylvania Superior Court] affirm[ed]
             the trial court’s assessment of liability against the
             Commission based on its negligent failure to perform
             the duty which it had undertaken to perform.

Id. at 1221 (emphasis added). The decedent in Laconis had no choice but to drive
over the dangerous condition after exiting the Commission-operated bridge. Thus,
the Commission attempted to repair, and warn motorists of, the adjoining admittedly
dangerous condition.
             Novak contends that similarly, here, since the parking lot was on the
other side of the Intersection from where the soccer game was held, Moravian had a
duty to warn Decedent of the alleged dangerous condition. However, Decedent did
not have to cross at that location, and no amount of discovery would lead to a finding
of an assumption of a duty that Moravian clearly did not have. The sad fact is, it
was Decedent’s crossing of Elizabeth Avenue, at night, in traffic, in a space where
pedestrians were not invited, that proved fatal for him, not the fact that he had to
cross Elizabeth Avenue to reach his vehicle. As the record evidence reveals, and
Novak does not dispute, a crosswalk was available for Decedent to use a mere one
block east of Iron Street.      Accordingly, because “the pleadings are clearly
insufficient to establish a right to relief[,]” the trial court properly sustained the
Preliminary Objections when Moravian did not owe Decedent a duty of care. Ward,
142 A.3d at 143 (quoting Dadds, 924 A.2d at 742).
             For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s orders are affirmed.

                                        _________________________________
                                        ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

                                          14
          IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Christine Marie Novak, as             :
Administratrix of the Estate of       :
Charles John Nasta, deceased,         :
                   Appellant          :
                                      :
             v.                       :
                                      :
William McLaughlin, Jr., Delicia      :
Nahman, City of Bethlehem, and        :   No. 528 C.D. 2022
Moravian College                      :

                                   ORDER

             AND NOW, this 26th day of April, 2023, the Northampton County
Common Pleas Court’s May 16, 2022 and October 15, 2018 orders are affirmed.

                                    _________________________________
                                    ANNE E. COVEY, Judge