Court Opinion

ID: 9727037
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:18:06.302126+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:33.032442
License: Public Domain

*949STANIFORTH, Acting P. J., Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
In setting aside the entire order approving the “good faith” settlement, the majority engaged in an act of judicial overkill. They would disapprove of a $1,450,000 settlement—the sum total of all the settling parties’ available insurance policy limits. This settlement was reached as the result of lengthy negotiations with the help of a highly skilled, retired, “settlement” judge. It was approved by a trial judge after a hearing that complied insofar as the settling parties are concerned (and the record before this court) with the requirements of Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488 [213 Cal.Rptr. 256, 698 P.2d 159].
Upsetting this settlement (and the underlying agreement which is contingent upon court approval) leaves a quadriplegic young woman without any agreement for settlement, bereft of any legal obligation owing by any tortfeasor to pay her one dime. This would occur after she has received substantial monthly payments under the now-adjudged invalid settlement agreement.
That there was a due process wrong committed against Joni Curtis, the nonserved, non-notified, alleged joint tortfeasor in the good faith hearing, cannot be questioned. Such wrong, however, is not to be righted by the chucking out, without sound basis in fact or law, a settlement which is here sought to be approved by both the plaintiff and the settling defendants. The majority decision would refuse to permit a less than all tortfeasors’ settlement because of a procedural due process wrong done to a nonparticipating alleged tortfeasor. This refusal to let less than all settle without the notification or presence of a nonserved defendant—if there is compliance with Tech-Bilt, Inc.—would in effect violate both the spirit and letter of Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6.1
I
Section 877.6 reads in part: “(a) Any party to an action wherein it is alleged that two or more parties are joint tortfeasors shall be entitled to a hearing on the issue of the good faith of a settlement entered into by the plaintiff or other claimant and one or more alleged tortfeasors, upon giving notice thereof in the manner provided in Section 1010 and 1011 at least 20 days before the hearing.” (Italics added.) This code section does not by its plain and clear language require the parties desiring to settle to invite participation by all potentially responsible tortfeasors to the hearing. Instead, the code section permits the notification and thereby the involvement of nonmovant parties. As to such parties as are notified and given the opportunity to appear and participate in the good faith hearing, section 877.6, *950subdivision (c), directs that a bar be raised to such person from recovery of equitable contribution or indemnity from the settling parties.
A nonparticipating, uninvited, unserved defendant or cross-defendant, however, should not be barred from seeking contribution or indemnity from the settling parties under subdivision (c) of section 877.6. To do so would invite a declaration that sections 877 and 877.6, so construed, are unconstitutional. The appellate court in Singer Co. v. Superior Court (1986) 179 Cal.App.3d 875, 890-891 [225 Cal.Rptr. 159], held that if sections 877 and 877.6 are “not interpreted to entitle a later-named defendant to a right to be heard on the good faith of the settlement, the statute unconstitutionally deprives [a party] of a significant property right without due process of law. (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 17.)”
A federal court in Commercial U. Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co. (9th Cir. 1981) 640 F.2d 210, 213, certiorari denied 454 U.S. 858 [70 L.Ed.2d 154, 102 S.Ct. 310], said: “In determining whether the policy of settlement has been furthered, we look to the conduct of the parties. When a plaintiff dismisses an action, the policy is furthered only when the dismissal resulted from a mutual decision to settle the dispute. . . .
“Individuals not participating in the settlement are barred from seeking contribution only if the settling parties acted in good faith with respect to them. Hence, good faith of the dismissal alone is not sufficient. The dismissal must represent a settlement which is a good faith determination of relative liabilities.” Certainly a denial of due process, coupled with potential liability sans right of indemnity against pursuing parties results in an unfair hearing as to Curtis. However, conceding (as do the majority) that there has been a failure of due process2—an unfair hearing—as regards Curtis, does this failure require the entire settlement to be destroyed? Certainly not. In the circumstances of this case, such a consequence would be a disaster not only in fact but in law. It would negate any hope of fulfilling the statutory purpose of early settlement by all or as many parties who are willing and desiring to settle on Tech-Bilt, Inc. conditions. Rather than destroy the carefully crafted settlement, the appropriate remedy is a simple refusal to bar the *951due-process-denied-party from rights of indemnity or contribution if she is pursued to judgment by the settling parties. Such result is compatible with the clear purposes of the settlement statute.
II
More than just upsetting a “fair settlement,” the majority further erred in granting relief to a person not properly before this court. The opinion would set aside an order that does not on its face effect any right or obligation of Curtis. In short, Curtis has no right to seek a writ overturning the order; she is not an “aggrieved” person.
It is fundamental law. The right to seek assistance of an appellate court whether by appeal or by writ is dependent upon the person being aggrieved, injuriously affected or prejudiced by the challenged judgment order or decree. (Estate of Colton (1912) 164 Cal. 1, 5 [127 P. 643]; Guardianship of Pankey (1974) 38 Cal.App.3d 919, 925 [113 Cal.Rptr. 858]; Mize v. Crail (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 797, 805 [106 Cal.Rptr. 34]; Edwards v. City of Santa Paula (1956) 138 Cal.App.2d 375 [292 P.2d 31].)
The record discloses the agreement here approved as a “good faith” settlement did not include Curtis as a party either named, referred to, or as signator. She was not mentioned. This agreement for “effectiveness” is expressly conditioned upon a judicial determination pursuant to section 877.6—that the “settlement is made in good faith.” The agreement by its terms makes neither overt nor covert attempts to effect any rights of Curtis. The document simply ignores her.
Curtis did not sign the agreement. Nor did she join in the motion to declare the settlement in good faith to dismiss the cross-complaint. Only the parties signatory to the agreement filed the petition seeking “an order declaring their settlement [with plaintiff] in good faith and dismissing all cross-complaints and barring potential claims for partial indemnity against them . . . .” For the first time in the points and authorities supporting this request do the attorneys for moving parties declare they “contemplate prosecution . . . against the remaining, defendants not participating in the settlement proposed including . . . Joni Curtis.” No mention is made of a request to apply the bar of section 877.6, subdivision (c), to Curtis except obliquely in the request “to [dismiss] any existing and potential cross-complaints for partial indemnification against these moving defendants participating in the settlement . . . .” (Italics added.)
The court order that followed did not grant the relief requested. Instead, paragraph (2) declared “[t]hat all Cross-Complaints for indemnity or con*952tribution against these Defendants, relating to the facts of this case, shall be and are hereby dismissed.’1'1 (Apr. 16, 1986, italics added.)
This order followed upon defense attorney’s “Notice of Ruling” (Apr. 10, 1984) which recited that the court “ordered, adjudged and decreed”:
“2. That all Cross-Complaints for indemnity or contribution then pending against First Baptist Church of Del Cerro, the San Diego Southern Baptist Association, the Southern Baptist General Convention of California, Phil Nall, Sam Williams, the Southern Baptist Convention, First Presbyterian Church of San Diego, d/b/a Rancho Del Cielo, Presbytery of San Diego, Synod of Southern California and Hawaii, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) and Jim Menges relating to the facts of this case, be dismissed.
“Dated: April 6, 1984.
“WlNGERT, GREBING, ANEELO & CHAPIN
“By: (s[_
Alan K. Brubaker . . . .” (Italics added.)
The facts here indicate that on the date this order was made (Apr. 16, 1984), Curtis had not yet been served with the complaint. She had no cross-complaint on file on that date. Her cross-complaint was in fact filed September 26, 1984. Thus, the order complained of by Rankin does not on its face affect any right she had for partial indemnity or contribution—if she was later pursued as threatened by the settling defendants. If she is served with process by these defendants (or plaintiff) and if judgment is taken against her, and if she does seek indemnification from the settling defendants, and if a court should then determine she is also barred either by an order which does not name her or does not on its face appear by its plain words to bar her claim, or on any other basis, then and only then would she have standing as an “aggrieved party” to complain.
Ill
Nowhere can it be derived from the plain language of the statutes that an agreement may not be in “good faith” as to one party yet held to be in bad faith as to another. Yet the majority opinion would so interpret the statutes.
In determining whether the entire package here should be rejected or simply that part which has been established to be unfair as to Curtis (if she has standing as an “aggrieved” person), it is necessary to examine the purposes of the tort contribution legislation as embodied in sections 877 and 877.6. They are (1) the amelioration of the punitive effects of the no *953contribution rule on joint tortfeasors by providing for “equitable sharing of costs among the parties at fault, and second, encouragement of settlements.” (River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 986, 993, fn. omitted [103 Cal.Rptr. 498].) Neither goal should be applied to defeat the other. Thus, the “good faith provision of section 877 mandates that the court review agreements purportedly made under its aegis to insure that such settlements appropriately balance the contribution statute’s dual objectives.” (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 494, fn. omitted.) And since the finding of good faith discharges a settling tortfeasor from any claim for partial or comparative indemnity by a joint tortfeasor (§ 877.6, subd. (c)), the Supreme Court has declared this bar should apply only when the dual roles of the statute have been furthered. (Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 496.)
Under the facts and circumstances of this case, the settlement amounts reached as among the settling defendants and the plaintiff may well be within the reasonable range as to them and should, absent evidence to the contrary, be approved as a good faith settlement. However, as to Joni Curtis, the settlement fails the good faith test. She was not given the opportunity to participate. Thus, the benefits of section 877.6, subdivision (c) should not be extended to the settling defendants to bar Curtis even if she is in fact barred by the trial court order.
IV
Finally, if it be assumed arguendo Curtis has cause (“standing”) to complain about the substance of a settlement made, this further question arises. Was the settlement here a good faith settlement insofar as the settling parties are concerned? A quick answer to this question is that under the Tech-Bilt rule, the party objecting (Curtis) to the good faith settlement, claiming bad faith, has the burden of proof on this issue. Curtis has offered no evidence to sustain her claim that the total settlement agreement entered into by these parties is in bad faith as between the settling parties.
Certainly Curtis has established there is bad faith insofar as she is concerned if the court order is construed as a bar under section 877.6, subdivision (c). The factors pertaining to Curtis’s relative liability, if any, are not shown to have been considered as the law requires before a good faith settlement could be made and legally sustained—at least as to her.
The Supreme Court in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates, supra, 38 Cal.3d 488, has clarified the rules governing standards and procedures to be used in determining whether an agreement is made in good faith. The Supreme Court defined good faith in these words: “[W]hether *954the amount of the settlement is within the reasonable range of the settling tortfeasor’s proportional share of comparative liability for the plaintiff’s injuries. This is not to say that bad faith is ‘established by a showing that a settling defendant paid less than his theoretical proportionate or fair share.’ (Cf. Dompeling, supra, 117 Cal.App.3d at p. 809.) Such a rule would unduly discourage settlements. ‘For the damages are often speculative, and the probability of legal liability therefor is often uncertain or remote. And even where the claimant’s damages are obviously great, and the liability therefor certain, a disproportionately low settlement figure is often reasonable in the case of a relatively insolvent, and uninsured, or underinsured, joint tortfeasor.’ [Citation.] Moreover, such a rule would tend to convert the pretrial settlement approval procedure into a full-scale minitrial [citation].
“But these considerations do not lead to the conclusion that the amount of the settlement is irrelevant in determining good faith. Rather, the intent and policies underlying section 877.6 require that a number of factors be taken into account including a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability, the amount paid in settlement, the allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs, and a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than he would if he were found liable after a trial. Other relevant considerations include the financial conditions and insurance policy limits of settling defendants, as well as the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of nonsettling defendants. [Citation.] Finally, practical considerations obviously require that the evaluation be made on the basis of information available at the time of settlement. ‘[A] defendant’s settlement figure must not be grossly disproportionate to what a reasonable person, at the time of the settlement, would estimate the settling defendant’s liability to be.’ [Citation.] The party asserting the lack of good faith, who has the burden of proof on that issue (§ 877.6, subd. (d)), should be permitted to demonstrate, if he can, that the settlement is so far ‘out of the ballpark’ in relation to these factors as to be inconsistent with the equitable objectives of the statute. Such a demonstration would establish that the proposed settlement was not a ‘settlement made in good faith’ within the terms of section 877.6.” (Id. 38 Cal.3d at pp. 499-500, fn. omitted, italics added.) Defendants contend substantial evidence supports and requires our finding the order confirming the settlement agreement was made in good faith. The evidence supporting defendants’ claim is to be found in the moving papers, points and authorities and the declaration of Attorney Brubaker (counsel for, inter alia, Church) submitted in support of the motion for confirmation. The declaration of Brubaker states, in part: “At all times relevant, the discussions and negotiations of settlement between the plaintiff and her lawyers, and the moving defendants participating in the proposed settlement, have been at arms *955length. Beginning on December 14, 1983, and continuing through the finish of these negotiations, the effort of counsel on behalf of all parties and principals was directed by the Honorable William A. Yale, Judge Retired. Judge Yale’s experience and abilities in mediating disputes and negotiating resolutions in similar cases was well known to everyone involved in this process and is well known in the community at large.
“[T]he settlement proposed is in the exact specifics recommended by Judge Yale as a result of his review of this case. . . .
“The combined structure and cash settlement detailed in this declaration is made in good faith. No other agreement exists between the parties to the settlement beyond that agreement which is reflected here.” Defendants also urge additional proof that the settlement agreement was made in good faith is found in the fact they are paying “their fair share, since they contributed the entire limits of their liability insurance policy . . . .”
The settlement agreement for about $1.5 million provides for structure lifetime payments to Wendy as well as a lump-sum cash payment. Details of the settlement agreement placed before the court provide information concerning the amounts each of the settling defendant’s respective insurers will pay on behalf of the defendants.
While there is little detailing of the procedural facts showing “good faith” by Tech-Bilt standard to support this settlement, yet the burden is on Curtis to show evidence of bad faith. This she has not done. (See Tech-Bilt, Inc., supra, 38 Cal ..3d at p. 500.)
I would affirm the order (par. 1) confirming the settlement agreement as being made in good faith as to the signatory parties and approve the dismissal of the specified cross-complaints for indemnity or contribution.
As to Joni Curtis, the order of dismissal (par. 2), if it be interpreted to bar her rights for indemnity or contribution from the settling defendants, should be found to be void as a deprivation of her due process rights. It should be declared unenforceable as to Joni Curtis. Alternatively, this issue should not be now determined; this court should await the issue being appropriately raised by an aggrieved party.

All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless otherwise specified.

Curtis points to the court’s failure to grant a continuance in the context of lack of notice, lack of participation, negotiation and lack of opportunity to prepare constituted an abuse of discretion. Under the particular circumstances of this case, it is patent she did not have sufficient time to conduct discovery on the issue of good faith. Thus, she was denied a meaningful opportunity to participate in, to sustain her burden of proving the settlement agreement was not made in good faith at least as to her. (§ 877.6, subd. (d).)