Court Opinion

ID: 9372106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-17 20:02:28.431308+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:32.784904
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/17/23 P. v. Anamani CA1/4
        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                            FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,
              Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                A163772
 v.
 TOTI ANAMANI,                                                  (San Francisco City &
                                                                County
      Defendant and
                                                                Super. Ct. No. 21008826)
 Appellant.

          Defendant’s postrelease community supervision (PRCS)
was revoked and reinstated in September 2021, and he appeals
from the trial court’s order extending his PRCS termination date
373 days beyond the original three-year term. The trial court set
the new termination date after concluding that defendant’s
supervision had been tolled for two periods of time (the tolling
periods). Defendant concedes that PRCS may be tolled when a
defendant absconds from supervision. (Penal Code1, § 3456,
subdivision (b).) However, he contends that he was incarcerated
in Solano County during the tolling periods, and there was no
basis to toll and extend his PRCS. We find that the trial court

       All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
          1

unless otherwise stated.

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did not have a sufficient basis to toll defendant’s PRCS and
reverse the portion of the court’s order extending defendant’s
PRCS termination date.
                         BACKGROUND
      After his release from prison, defendant was placed on
PRCS on October 3, 2018.
      On September 9, 2021, the San Francisco Adult Probation
Department (APD) filed a petition to revoke defendant’s PRCS,
alleging that defendant “failed to report upon release from Solano
County custody,” and “suffered a new arrest on 1/21/21 in
Fairfield.” The probable cause declaration attached to the
petition stated that, as conditions of his PRCS, defendant was
required to comply with all instructions from the APD and was
prohibited from engaging in illegal conduct. According to the
declaration, defendant violated these conditions as follows:
“[Defendant] failed to report to this Department upon release
from Solano County custody. While on warrant status
[defendant] was arrested in Fairfield, California on 11/18/19. An
arrest warrant was obtained on 11/20/19. Because the warrant
appears to have been removed from the system, another warrant
was obtained on 10/6/20.”2 The APD recommended that the court

      2  The last two quoted sentences discuss the warrants
obtained from the San Francisco Superior Court on November 20,
2019, and October 6, 2020. The record does not contain any
details regarding the other warrant mentioned in the declaration
(i.e., the basis for defendant being “on warrant status” as of
November 18, 2019).

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set a new PRCS termination date of June 11, 2023, based on 617
days that defendant’s supervision had allegedly been tolled.3
      On September 10, 2021, the court held a hearing, appointed
counsel for defendant, revoked defendant’s PRCS, and continued
the matter for arraignment. At a subsequent hearing, defendant
admitted that he was in violation of his PRCS, with the
prosecutor and defendant stipulating that the “PRCS report
dated September 8, 2021” served as the factual basis for
defendant’s admission.4
      The court reinstated defendant’s PRCS and continued the
matter for sentencing, directing the parties to submit briefing on
defendant’s PRCS termination date. The prosecutor asked the
court to adopt the termination date calculated in the PRCS
report. Defendant argued that he had reached his maximum
PRCS term. His counsel filed a declaration stating that

      3 The 617 days were broken down into the following three
periods: May 15, 2019, to May 31, 2019, when defendant’s PRCS
was revoked for an unrelated PRCS violation; November 20,
2019, to August 11, 2020, when the first San Francisco warrant
at issue in this case was outstanding; and October 6, 2020, to
September 4, 2021, from issuance of the second San Francisco
warrant to its service.
      4 The reporter’s transcript refers to the “PRCS report dated
September 8th, 2021.” The supervising agency seeking to revoke
PRCS is required to include, along with the petition, “a written
report that contains additional information regarding the
petition, including the relevant terms and conditions of [PRCS],
the circumstances of the alleged underlying violation, the history
and background of the violator, and any recommendation.”
(§ 3455, subd. (a).) This required information is set forth in the
APD’s “Declaration for Probable Cause Hearing,” and this
declaration appears to be the referenced “PRCS report.”

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defendant had been arrested in Fairfield, California, on
November 18, 2019, and that he was arraigned in the current
matter “based on” that arrest. Counsel declared that defendant
was in custody in Solano County from November 18, 2019, until
his transfer to San Francisco jail on September 4, 2021.
Defendant argued that, because a person “in the state’s actual
custody is a status that in no situation can be described as
absconding,” and because tolling under section 1203.2 could not
extend a maximum PRCS term, the court should terminate his
PRCS on its own motion.
      The court declined to adopt either proposed PRCS
termination date. Instead, the court determined that defendant’s
supervision had been tolled from November 20, 2019, until
August 11, 2020, and from October 6, 2020, until January 21,
2021, for a total of 373 days. The court set a PRCS termination
date of October 10, 2022.5 Defendant timely appealed.
                           DISCUSSION
      The Legislature set a maximum three-year term for PRCS.
(§§ 3455, subd. (e); 3456, subd. (a)(1).) At issue in this appeal is
whether the trial court properly established the tolling periods
and set a PRCS termination date of October 10, 2022. Both
parties agree that time during which a defendant absconds from
PRCS does not count when calculating a PRCS termination date.
(§§ 3455, subd. (e); 3456, subd. (b).) However, they disagree

      5 In supplemental briefing requested by this court, the
parties informed us that defendant’s PRCS was not terminated
on October 10, 2022. Defendant remains on PRCS, so this appeal
is not moot.

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about whether defendant absconded during the tolling periods,
and they also disagree about whether PRCS can be extended
beyond the maximum term to account for time during which
supervision is revoked pursuant to section 1203.2. As set forth
below, we find no basis for the trial court’s tolling.
      “A person shall not remain under supervision or in custody
pursuant to this title on or after three years from the date of the
person’s initial entry onto [PRCS], except when his or her
supervision is tolled pursuant to Section 1203.2 or subdivision (b)
of Section 3456.” (§ 3455, subd. (e); see also § 3456, subd. (a)(1)
[the supervising agency “shall maintain postrelease supervision
over a person . . . until . . . [¶] . . . the person has been subject to
postrelease supervision pursuant to this title for three years at
which time the offender shall be immediately discharged from
postrelease supervision.”].) However, “[t]ime during which a
person on postrelease supervision is suspended because the
person has absconded shall not be credited toward any period of
postrelease supervision.” (§ 3456, subd. (b).)
      Although the parties disagree over whether a three-year
maximum PRCS term can be extended to account for time during
which PRCS is revoked under section 1203.2, subdivision (a), we
need not decide this issue because section 1203.2 was not a basis
for the trial court’s ruling.6 Defendant’s PRCS was revoked once
on May 15, 2019, and reinstated on May 31, 2019, and the court

      6 Defendant discusses tolling under section 1203.2,
subdivision (a) in his opening brief in “an abundance of caution,”
while acknowledging that the court did not appear to base its
tolling decision on that statute.

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next revoked his PRCS in September 2021. The trial court
determined that the tolling periods ran from November 20, 2019,
until August 11, 2020, and from October 6, 2020, until January
21, 2021. The tolling periods were thus not based on the court’s
revocation of PRCS under section 1203.2, leaving only the
question of whether section 3456, subdivision (b) supported the
court’s tolling analysis.
        Because tolling under section 3456, subdivision (b) occurs
when “the person has absconded,” we must determine the
meaning of the word “absconded.” As this is a question of
statutory interpretation, we conduct an independent review of
the statute. (People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1166.) “In
doing so, ‘ “our fundamental task is ‘to ascertain the intent of the
lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute.’ ” ’ ”
(Ibid.) “We begin by examining the words of the statute,
affording them ‘ “ ‘their ordinary and usual meaning and viewing
them in their statutory context’ ” ’ [citation], for ‘ “if the statutory
language is not ambiguous, then . . . the plain meaning of the
language governs.” ’ ” (People v. Colbert (2019) 6 Cal.5th 596,
603.)
        Neither party claims that section 3456, subdivision (b) is
ambiguous, and both parties agree that the plain meaning of the
word “abscond” governs. “Abscond”—although not defined in the
Penal Code—has an ordinary meaning of “to depart secretly and
hide oneself.” (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online (2022)
 [as of
February 10, 2023]; cf. People v. Nuckles (2013) 56 Cal.4th 601,

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610 [quoting the dictionary definition of absconding as
“depart[ing] secretly and hid[ing] oneself”].) Black’s Law
Dictionary similarly defines “abscond” as “[t]o depart secretly or
suddenly, esp. to avoid arrest, prosecution, or service of process.”
(Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).) The question, then, is
whether there is sufficient evidence that defendant departed
secretly and hid himself from supervision during the tolling
periods. (Cf. People v. Downey (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 899,
917 [sentencing determinations subject to substantial evidence
review].)
      Here, the court did not make an express finding that
defendant absconded from PRCS during the tolling periods, and
we find no support in the record for an implied finding. The APD
did not allege that defendant absconded in the PRCS revocation
proceeding, and defendant made no such admission. Instead, the
PRCS report stated that defendant violated the condition to obey
all instructions from the APD when, on an unspecified date, he
“failed to report to this Department upon release from Solano
County custody.” There is no evidence showing when defendant
was “release[d] from Solano County custody,” the exact date of
his missed reporting, or how much time passed between it and
defendant’s November 18, 2019 arrest. The “program referrals”
section of the PRCS report indicates that defendant last reported
on October 31, 2019, but the record does not reveal when
defendant was required to report after that date. Defense
counsel below declared that defendant was incarcerated in Solano
County from November 18, 2019, through September 4, 2021

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(which includes the tolling periods), and the Attorney General
concedes this fact on appeal. In addition, the record does not
establish whether the APD was aware or unaware of defendant’s
whereabouts (although we note that the APD obtained the first
warrant at issue on November 20, 2019, only two days after
defendant was arrested in Fairfield). The record thus provides no
factual basis to conclude that defendant absconded during the
tolling periods by departing secretly and hiding himself from
supervision.
                             DISPOSITION
      The court’s order extending defendant’s PRCS termination
date for 373 days to October 10, 2022, is reversed. As defendant’s
three-year PRCS term has expired, the matter is remanded for
the trial court to enter an order terminating defendant’s PRCS.

                                           BROWN, J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, ACTING P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.

People v.Anamani (A163772)

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