Court Opinion

ID: 9765031
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:48:15.605291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:03.680938
License: Public Domain

ROBERTS, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that an evidentiary hearing is appropriate and accordingly I join in the mandate of remand. I write separately to clarify what I believe is the meaning of the Culbertson case, 301 Pa. 438, 152 A. 540 (1930), on which the majority relies.
In Culbertson two brothers forged a document which they later had probated as the will of their mother. On subsequent discovery of this fraud the rightful heirs were permitted to challenge the will, even though the statutory period for appeal of its probate had passed. Admittedly Culbertson does suggest that cases of forgery are deserving of some special exception to the usual, already ample period for appeal. And those few cases following Culbertson suggest that there is something of a “forgery exception” to the finality afforded by the statutory period. Yet I believe this is only because cases of forgery almost always involve a claim of fraud. In my view it is the claim of fraud, not simply the existence of a possible forgery that is crucial.*
It is well-settled that a claim of fraud will toll the statutory period of limitations. Deemer v. Weaver, 324 Pa. 85, 187 A. 215 (1936); see Schaffer v. Larzelere, 410 Pa. 402, 405-406, 189 A.2d 267, 269-70 (1963). Although it is not *54completely clear in the present case that the party who offered for probate the allegedly forged will knew that the will was a forgery and thus was guilty of fraud, such an allegation may be fairly inferred from the pleadings. And I would allow appellants an opportunity to demonstrate that such fraud was perpetrated. On this ground I join in the remand.
Finally, it should be indicated that today’s determination in no way forecloses a demonstration that the present appellants, daughters of the testator, are barred by laches from now asserting this claim, or that the rights of third parties would be impermissibly disrupted by a decision revoking the 1976 probate.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this concurring opinion.

 Cases after Culbertson suggest that once the period for appeal has passed it. should be left to the discretion of the orphans’ court whether to permit as a matter of grace claims of forgery. Roberts’ Estate, 309 Pa. 389, 392, 164 A. 57, 58 (1932) (in cases of forgery appeal may be allowed “in the discretion of the court as a matter ex gratia”); Miller Will, 8 Fiduc.Rptr. 494 (Montg. Co. Orph. Ct. 1958); Lowry’s Estate, 26 Pa.D. & C. 200 (Phila. Co. Orph. Ct. 1936). In the present case the orphans’ court did not permit appellant’s challenge. Yet the majority does not pause to explain why, if Culbertson and its progeny are correct, such a refusal is impermissible. In my view, where fraud is properly alleged, the orphans’ court does not have discretion to deny a hearing.