Court Opinion

ID: 9525160
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:00:24.5062+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:13:11.488488
License: Public Domain

M. J. Kelly, J.
(dissenting). I believe that a suit brought against a governmental agency based on the alleged maintenance of an intentional nuisance on a public sidewalk is subject to the two-year period of limitations provided at § 11 of the governmental immunity act, MCL 691.1411(2); MSA 3.996(111)(2), rather than the three-year period provided at MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8).
*7Any suit against a governmental agency1 necessarily involves application of the governmental immunity act, MCL 691.1401-691.1415; MSA 3.996(101)-3.996(115). Section 11 of the act provides a two-year period of limitations for all claims arising under § 2 of the act, MCL 691.1402; MSA 3.996(102). Section 2, in turn, is a specific statutory waiver of governmental immunity for all suits arising as a result of bodily injury or property damage by reason of failure of a governmental agency to keep a highway2 under its jurisdiction in reasonable repair and in a condition reasonably safe and fit for travel. Any suit against a governmental agency resulting from alleged defects in a public highway should fall within the specific statutory waiver of governmental immunity and should, therefore, be subject to the accompanying two-year period of limitations.
As the majority notes, this Court held in Palomba v East Detroit, 112 Mich App 209; 315 NW2d 898 (1982), that when a plaintiff alleges that a defect in a highway was an "intentional nuisance”3 the suit proceeds outside the scope of § 2 and, therefore, is subject to the general three-year period of limitations "for injury to person or property” provided at MCL 600.5805(8); MSA 27A.5805(8). I cannot accept the analysis advanced by the Court in Palomba. There, the Court refers to § 2 as a legislative authorization of claims aris*8ing out of only the negligent maintenance of highways. Section 2, however, makes no reference to negligence suits. Rather, it refers broadly to "any person sustaining bodily injury or damage to his property by reason of failure of any governmental agency to keep any highway in its jurisdiction in reasonable repair”. The Court in Palomba limited § 2 solely to negligence actions without providing any analysis or authority in support of this limitation.4
The Court in Palomba reasoned that "[t]he claimant need not rely upon the legislatively created highway exception to the immunity statute but may, rather, rely on the judicially created nuisance exception”. Palomba, supra, p 215. Judicial exceptions to the doctrine of governmental immunity, however, are valid only due to the *9legislative codification of the common law of governmental immunity in § 7 of the governmental immunity act, MCL 691.1407; MSA 3.996(107). See Thomas v Dep’t of State Highways, 398 Mich 1, 11; 247 NW2d 530 (1976). Otherwise, the common law of governmental immunity has been abolished. See Pittman v City of Taylor, 398 Mich 41, 49; 247 NW2d 512 (1976). Section 7 retains the intricacies of the common law of governmental immunity only "except as otherwise provided” in the remainder of the act. Since the governmental immunity act provides that suits arising from a person’s sustaining bodily injury on a public highway are subject to a two-year period of limitations, the common law’s independent intentional nuisance exception to governmental immunity is replaced by § 2 of the act when the maintenance of the nuisance is in fact a failure on the part of a governmental agency to keep its highways in reasonable repair.
In construing the two statutes of limitations which may arguably be applicable in the instant case, we must advance the intent of the Legislature. See City of Lansing v Lansing Twp, 356 Mich 641; 97 NW2d 804 (1959). Retention of the specific two-year period of limitations for commencing suits based on injury resulting from a defective highway would advance the intent of the Legislature. As noted by the Supreme Court:
"[A] rational basis does exist for a two-year statute of limitations as to claims by victims of governmental tortfeasors as opposed to claims by victims of private tortfeasors. The statute unquestionably affords plaintiffs a reasonable time within which to commence suit. However, by setting a time limit of two years, the state is assured that plaintiffs will promptly conduct such investigations as necessary to determine the merits of *10their claims and will not be unduly dilatory in commencing their suits. This is especially important in times such as these when governments are continually launching highway improvement programs.
"Moreover, the statute is essential to the organization of the finances of state and local government agencies in that it allows them to estimate with some degree of certainty the extent of their future financial obligations. It cannot be overlooked that no private party has a potential tort responsibility comparable to that of the government for injuries allegedly caused by defective or unsafe conditions of highways.” Forest v Parmalee, 402 Mich 348, 360; 262 NW2d 653 (1978).
I submit that the Palomba decision is incorrect and should be overruled.
I would affirm.

A municipal corporation, such as the City of Detroit in the instant case, is a "governmental agency”. See MCL 691.1401(d); MSA 3.996(101)(d).

 The term "highway” includes sidewalks. MCL 691.1401(e); MSA 3.996(101)(e).

 An intentional nuisance results when the governmental agency intends to bring about the conditions which are in fact found to be a nuisance. Rosario v Lansing, 403 Mich 124, 142; 268 NW2d 230 (1978) (Moody, J., concurring); accord Denny v Garavaglia, 333 Mich 317, 331; 52 NW2d 521 (1952), quoting Beckwith v Stratford, 129 Conn 506; 29 A2d 775 (1942).

 When the governmental immunity act was originally enacted, the Legislature expressed in the title to the act that it was directed at negligence actions. This led to the Legislature’s attempt to retain governmental immunity being declared unconstitutional, because the act on its face applied to all tort actions, not solely to negligence actions, and, therefore, embraced an object not within its title, in violation of Const 1963, art 4, § 24. See Maki v City of East Tawas, 18 Mich App 109; 170 NW2d 530 (1969), aff'd 385 Mich 151; 188 NW2d 593 (1971). The Legislature re-enacted the governmental immunity act and rewrote its title, which no longer referenced the act to negligence actions. In Maki, both the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court were faced with deciding only whether § 7 of the governmental immunity act violated Const 1963, art 4, § 24. The plaintiffs in Maki challenged only the retention provision of the governmental immunity act and not the related sections dealing with exceptions to the immunity. In specifically holding § 7 of the act to be unconstitutional because it involved more than only negligence actions, the Court of Appeals stated:
"[W]e do not imply that none of the other sections might not violate Const 1963, art 4, § 24. For the purposes of this case, we deem it unnecessary to rule on the constitutionality of each of the sections.” 18 Mich App 124.
Notwithstanding the Legislature’s re-enactment of the governmental immunity act under a title which referred to making uniform the liability of governmental agencies when engaged in the exercise or discharge of a governmental function, the Court in Palomba executes an end-run on the Legislature and limits § 2 of the governmental immunity act solely to negligence actions.