Court Opinion

ID: 9604937
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:28:34.904565+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:07:30.556957
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Justice,
with whom HARGRAVE, Vice Chief Justice, and HODGES and LAVENDER, Justices, join, dissenting.
The court holds that the risk carrier of uninsured/underinsured motorist [UM] coverage must answer in damages for the death of its insured even though the tort-feasor-motorist stands shielded from liability by the immunity conferred in the Workers’ Compensation Act.1 I cannot join in today’s pronouncement.
The purpose of the statutory mandate for UM coverage, 36 O.S. 1981 § 3636, is to afford first-party protection for bodily injury or death occasioned to an insured who is "... legally entitled to recover damages from owners or operators of uninsured motor vehicles_” [Emphasis added.] The insurer’s liability clearly is gauged by that of another — the uninsured/underin-sured tortfeasor. Although the carrier’s ex contractu obligation may be enforced under a longer statute of limitations than that which governs the ex delicto claim against an uninsured tortfeasor,2 the insured must nonetheless show, as a condition of recovery, that the uninsured/underinsured motorist bears liability for the harmful event. The coverage extends only to situations in which the offending motorist lacks insurance or is inadequately insured; it does not apply when the owner or operator is cloaked with immunity from liability. In the latter event the insured cannot be regarded as one who, within the meaning of § 3636, stands "... legally entitled to recover damages from ...” the uninsured tortfeasor.3
*1114I would hold that the plaintiff-administra-trix does not have an actionable claim against her decedent’s UM carrier. The demand she presses here is not for a tort loss that is legally recoverable from the co-employee-driver. I would hence affirm the trial court’s summary judgment for the insurer.

. 85 O.S.Supp.1984 § 12 and 85 O.S.1981 § 122; see in this connection, Harter Concrete Products, Inc. v. Harris, Okl., 592 P.2d 526 [1979] and Carroll v. District Ct. of Fifteenth Jud. Dist., Cherokee County, Okl., 579 P.2d 828 [1978].

. See, Uptegraft v. Home Insurance Co., Okl., 662 P.2d 681, 684 [1983].

. Williams v. Country Mutual Insurance Company, 28 Ill.App.3d 274, 328 N.E.2d 117 [1975] (workers’ compensation immunity) (the later case of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Elkins, 77 Ill.2d 384, 33 Ill.Dec. 139, 396 N.E.2d 528 [1979] neither overrules, nor is its rationale in discord with, Williams, supra); Gray v. Margot Inc., 408 So.2d 436, 438 [La.App.1981] (workers' compensation immunity); Hopkins v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, 41 Mich.App. 635, 638, 200 N.W.2d 784, 786 [1972] (workers’ compensation immunity); Hubbel v. Western Fire Ins. Co., 706 P.2d 111, 112-113 [Mont.1985] (workers’ compensation immunity); York v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 64 Ohio St.2d 199, 414 N.E.2d 423 [1980] (governmental immunity) and Sayan v. United Services Auto. Ass’n, 43 Wash.App. 148, 716 P.2d 895, 897 [1986] (workers’ compensation immunity); see also Karlson v. City of Oklahoma City, Okl., 711 P.2d 72, 75 [1985] (Opala, J., dissenting) (limited governmental liability); see also, Annot., Actual Notice or Knowledge by Governmental Body or Officer of Injury or Incident Resulting in Injury as Constituting Required Claim or Notice of Claim for Injury — Modern Status, 7 ALR4th 1063 [1981]. In Hopkins v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company, supra, the court concluded that ”[b]ecause of *1114the exclusiveness of the workman’s compensation coverage, plaintiff never had a remedy against the tortfeasor" and to allow the plaintiff to recover “would be to grant ...a windfall not contemplated by the parties ... and not intended by the Legislature_" [Emphasis supplied.]