Court Opinion

ID: 9857688
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 15:55:17.839636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:44:09.369365
License: Public Domain

MARING, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
[¶ 20] I concur with parts I and II of the majority opinion. Moreover, I concur with Part III of the majority opinion to the extent it concludes the trial court applied an erroneous view of the law in determining the award of attorney fees. I must *353respectfully dissent, however, because I would remand the issue of attorney fees to the trial court for a correct application of the law.
[¶ 21] A trial court’s decision regarding an award of attorney fees will not be disturbed unless it is established the court abused its discretion. Weigel v. Weigel, 2000 ND 16, ¶ 16, 604 N.W.2d 462. A trial court abuses its discretion when it misinterprets or misapplies the law. Heller v. Heller, 367 N.W.2d 179, 184 (N.D.1985). The principle considerations in determining whether to award attorney fees in a divorce action are one spouse’s ability to pay and the other spouse’s needs. Kjonaas v. Kjonaas, 1999 ND 50, ¶ 17, 590 N.W.2d 440. The trial court may further consider whether one party’s conduct has unreasonably increased the time spent on the case. Id.
[¶ 22] The trial court’s explanation for its decision to award attorney fees rests exclusively on Jeffrey’s behavior during the divorce. As the majority indicated, general fault during the marriage is not a relevant consideration in the decision to award attorney fees. Because the trial court based its decision on an improper criterion, I would remand for it to apply the correct criterion.
[¶ 23] Lisa never argued she had a need for the attorney fees award. She, however, did argue there was evidence Jeffrey unreasonably escalated the cost of the litigation. During trial, Lisa testified Jeffrey failed to cooperate in preparing the N.D.R.Ct. 8.3 property and debt statement. Specifically, Lisa stated Jeffrey did not include certain property in the Rule 8.3 statement. Jeffrey’s failure to cooperate in preparing the Rule 8.3 statement caused Lisa to introduce evidence at trial detailing that property he excluded from the statement. Lisa also obtained an Interim Order prohibiting Jeffrey from contacting her, and he violated the Order on at least two occasions. In light of such evidence, the trial court should be provided the opportunity to address the issue regarding an award of attorney fees to the extent Jeffrey’s actions may have unreasonably increased the time and effort spent on the litigation. Kautzman v. Kautzman, 1998 ND 192, ¶ 36, 585 N.W.2d 561.
[¶24] I would, therefore, remand and direct the trial court to apply the correct law in its determination of the award of attorney fees.
[¶ 25] Mary Muehlen Maring