Court Opinion

ID: 9959598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-12 14:00:48.301213+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:38.160016
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-12706    Document: 21-1     Date Filed: 04/12/2024   Page: 1 of 9

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-12706
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       RENGIN GUNDOGDU,
                                                     Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
       versus
       LINKEDIN CORPORATION,

                                                   Defendant-Appellee.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 0:23-cv-60804-WPD
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-12706      Document: 21-1     Date Filed: 04/12/2024     Page: 2 of 9

       2                      Opinion of the Court                 23-12706

       Before JILL PRYOR, NEWSOM, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               In this employment discrimination and breach of contract
       case, the district court granted defendant-appellee LinkedIn
       Corporation’s motion to dismiss and denied plaintiff-appellant
       Rengin Gundogdu’s motion for a preliminary injunction.
       Gundogdu appeals, asserting that both decisions were error. On
       appeal, however, Gundogdu principally addresses issues not raised
       in this case, and offers no citations to the record or legal authority
       in support of her claims. Thus, we conclude that she has forfeited
       the relevant issues, and we affirm.
                                 I.     Background
               This case is Gundogdu’s third attempt to plausibly allege
       that LinkedIn violated her rights when it suspended her account
       for allegedly violating its terms of service by posting content
       opposed to the COVID-19 vaccine on her page. In March 2023, she
       sued LinkedIn, alleging it had violated her First Amendment rights
       and breached a contract with her. The district court dismissed the
       action without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
       failure to state a claim, and frivolousness. Later that same month,
       Gundogdu filed an amended complaint, this time alleging breach
       of contract and a claim for religious discrimination under Title VII.
       The court again dismissed her claims without prejudice, this time
       for failure to rectify many of the deficiencies it had identified in
       dismissing the first complaint—as well as for failure to state a clam.
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       23-12706              Opinion of the Court                      3

              Gundogdu ﬁled this action in May of 2023, now alleging
       (1) a violation of under Title VII and (2) breach of express
       warranties and a contract with her. In the operative complaint,
       Gundogdu sought damages and reinstatement of her LinkedIn
       account (including during the pendency of this lawsuit).
             Gundogdu alleged that she is an independent contractor
       who runs a consulting company and looks for job opportunities
       using LinkedIn. She used her personal LinkedIn account to keep
       in touch with potential clients and previous coworkers, as well as
       to receive news and look for job opportunities. She also has a
       business account associated with her consulting business, which
       she used to create brand awareness, attract new clients, and hire
       employees for her clients. Gundogdu used both accounts to
       promote her consulting business.
             According to the complaint, LinkedIn suspended her
       personal account in 2022 and then again in 2023, which also
       deprived her of access to her business account. The suspension
       happened, Gundogdu alleged, after she “express[ed] her religious
       opinions that are conservative in nature” about her the COVID-19
       vaccine. She wrote to LinkedIn support, and eventually her
       account was restored in November 2022. But when Gundogdu
       resumed sharing “her opinions based on her religious conservative
       views,” her account was closed again for sharing “misleading
       content” about the COVID-19 vaccines. Gundogdu alleged that
       she was suspended for voicing her views, which are rooted in her
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       4                         Opinion of the Court                      23-12706

       religion. Gundogdu alleged she lost income as a result of the
       suspension.
              The complaint alleged (essentially) two claims. First,
       Gundogdu alleged that, when LinkedIn suspended her account “for
       expressing her religious conservative beliefs,” and “label[ed] her
       posts ‘misinformation,’” it discriminated against her because of her
       religion in violation of Title VII. To that end, Gundogdu alleged
       that LinkedIn is an “employment agency” for purposes of Title VII
       because it “provid[es] job-search [functionality] on its platform.”1
       Second, Gundogdu alleged that LinkedIn’s User Agreement
       constituted a contract with her, and that LinkedIn breached that
       contract and an express warranty to her by “block[ing] her right to
       be more productive and successful,” modifying “the meaning of
       her expression by labeling it misinformation,” “misleadingly
       promis[ing] freedom of expression [in] its User Agreement,” and
       representing itself as a platform where she could freely share her
       opinions and ﬁnd job opportunities.
             Gundogdu ﬁled a motion for a preliminary injunction,
       seeking reinstatement to LinkedIn during the pendency of the

       1 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (providing that “[i]t shall be an unlawful
       employment practice for an employment agency to fail or refuse to refer for
       employment, or otherwise to discriminate against, any individual because of
       his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, or to classify or refer for
       employment any individual on the basis of his race, color, religion, sex, or
       national origin”(emphasis added)).
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       23-12706                   Opinion of the Court                                 5

       litigation. LinkedIn opposed the motion and moved to dismiss the
       complaint.2
              The district court granted the motion to dismiss. First, the
       court concluded that the Title VII claim failed because LinkedIn is
       not an employment agency within the meaning of Title VII.
       “Though [Gundogdu] allege[d] that LinkedIn provided a platform
       for her to look for job opportunities and promote her business,”
       the court explained, “merely providing users with access to
       employment opportunities” was not “a signiﬁcant degree of
       engagement in employment-related activities.” Second, even
       assuming LinkedIn was an employment agency within the
       meaning of Title VII, the district court concluded that Gundogdu’s
       religious discrimination claim would fail because she “[did] not
       speciﬁcally allege any facts suggesting that she relayed these
       religious beliefs to LinkedIn”—meaning she could not show that
       “LinkedIn failed or refused to refer her to any speciﬁc employment
       opportunity because of her religious beliefs[.]” Third, the court
       rejected Gundogdu’s claims for Breach of Express Warranty and
       Contract. The district court explained that Gundogdu only
       “vaguely allege[d] that LinkedIn breached its User Agreement,”
       without “alleg[ing the] speciﬁc provisions of the User Agreement
       which correspond to these alleged breaches.” To the extent that

       2 In the motion to dismiss, LinkedIn moved (in the alternative) to transfer the

       case to the Northern District of California under the User Agreement’s forum-
       selection clause. Because the district court granted the motion to dismiss, it
       did not reach the transfer request, and the forum-selection clause is not at issue
       in this appeal.
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                   23-12706

       Gundogdu pointed to LinkedIn’s policy statement that it would not
       modify the meaning of her expression, which she alleged it did by
       labeling her posts as misinformation, the district court concluded
       that the labels did not change or alter her posts. Finally, the court
       concluded that Gundogdu had “fail[ed] to state a plausible claim
       for breach of express warranty.” Gundogdu could not point to a
       breached express warranty, the court explained, because “none of
       the contractual provisions [she] cite[d] can reasonably be
       interpreted as an express warranty.”
              The court denied Gundogdu’s motion for a preliminary
       injunction for the same reasons: “[b]ecause [Gundogdu’s
       c]omplaint is dismissed with prejudice for failure to state a claim,
       [she] cannot demonstrate a substantial likelihood of success on the
       merits.” Gundogdu, proceeding pro se, timely appealed.
                                   II.    Discussion

               On appeal, Gundogdu asserts that “this Court should
       reverse the district court’s order and grant [her motion for a]
       preliminary injunction with the relief requested.” But Gundogdu
       fails to meaningfully support that request with argument and
       citation of authority as to the claims actually raised and dismissed
       in this case—Title VII religious discrimination, breach of contract,
       and breach of warranty.
               While we liberally construe the ﬁlings of pro se parties,
       “issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed
       abandoned.” Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008)
       (citation omitted); see also Campbell v. Air Jamaica Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165,
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       23-12706                  Opinion of the Court                                7

       1168-69 (11th Cir. 2014) (“even in the case of pro se litigants,” the
       customary leniency towards pro se parties “does not give a court
       license to serve as de facto counsel for a party, or to rewrite an
       otherwise deﬁcient pleading in order to sustain an action.”). An
       appellant’s brief must include an argument containing “appellant’s
       contentions and the reasons for them, with citations to the
       authorities and parts of the record on which the appellant relies[.]”
       Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A). Thus, “[w]e have long held that an
       appellant abandons a claim when [s]he either makes only passing
       references to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without
       supporting arguments and authority.” Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian
       Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014). We generally do not
       consider forfeited issues absent extraordinary circumstances.
       United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 872–73 (11th Cir. 2022) (en
       banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022). 3

       3 Such “extraordinary circumstances” include situations where

              (1) the issue involves a pure question of law and refusal to
              consider it would result in a miscarriage of justice; (2) the party
              lacked an opportunity to raise the issue at the district court
              level; (3) the interest of substantial justice is at stake; (4) the
              proper resolution is beyond any doubt; or (5) the issue presents
              signiﬁcant questions of general impact or of great public
              concern.

       Campbell, 26 F.4th at 873. Gundogdu has not argued any such circumstances
       exist, and we see none.
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       8                          Opinion of the Court                       23-12706

               Gundogdu’s brief offers no meaningful support for her
       contentions, forfeiting the only issues relevant to this appeal. See
       id. at 872 (“forfeiture is the failure to make the timely assertion of
       a right,” thus abandoning it). Her brief primarily discusses the First
       Amendment, but there is no First Amendment claim alleged in her
       operative complaint—that claim having been dismissed in a prior
       action. 4 Gundogdu also makes passing references to her Title VII
       claim, and her assertion that LinkedIn is an “employment agency”
       within the meaning of the statute. But she does not cite any
       authority for that proposition, parse the text of Title VII, or even
       point to what allegations in the complaint she relies on. 5 The same
       goes for her breach of contract and breach of warranty claims.6
       And Gundogdu offers no response at all to the district court’s
       conclusion that she failed to allege that she informed LinkedIn that
       her posts, which stated opposition to the COVID-19 vaccine, were
       religiously motivated. Finally, the only mentions of her bid for a
       preliminary injunction come in her discussion of Article III

       4 Gundogdu also discusses her standing to sue at some length.         But her
       standing is not in question, and her arguments to that end do not relate to the
       district court’s bases for dismissing her complaint.
       5 Gundogdu devotes a section of her brief to the state of the law in the Fifth

       Circuit—but she never identifies what case she is referring to, explains why it
       is persuasive here, or even ties the supposed authorities to the issues in this
       case.
       6 Gundogdu also appears to question the impartiality of the district judge

       assigned to her case, though she fails to substantiate her accusations or explain
       why reversal is warranted. Even assuming she properly raised this issue,
       though she has not, we find no merit in it.
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       23-12706               Opinion of the Court                          9

       standing (which, again, is not in question here) and in the
       conclusion section of her brief—neither of which come with any
       citations to the record or legal authority in support of an injunction.
              Thus, Gundogdu has forfeited any argument that the district
       court erred in dismissing her claims for Title VII religious
       discrimination, breach of contract or warranty, as well as her bid
       for a preliminary injunction.
                                  III.   Conclusion
              Because Gundogdu has not supported her claims of error
       with citations to the record or legal authority, she has abandoned
       those claims, and we must affirm.
              AFFIRMED.