Court Opinion

ID: 9414729
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 16:12:15.071906+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:58.357264
License: Public Domain

J-S19006-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA             :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                          :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                          :
              v.                          :
                                          :
                                          :
 WILLIE ABNER VELAZQUEZ                   :
                                          :
                    Appellant             :   No. 1100 MDA 2022

        Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 20, 2022
   In the Court of Common Pleas of Schuylkill County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-54-CR-0000379-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., McLAUGHLIN, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                       FILED: AUGUST 2, 2023

      Appellant, Willie Abner Velazquez, appeals from the judgment of

sentence of 120 days’ to 5 years’ incarceration, as well as fines and costs,

imposed after a jury convicted him of driving under the influence of alcohol

(DUI), 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c) (highest rate of alcohol), and driving under the

influence of a combination of a controlled substance and alcohol, 75 Pa.C.S. §

3802(d)(3).   The trial court also convicted Appellant of driving while his

operating privileges were suspended/revoked, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1.1)(i).

On appeal, Appellant seeks to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to

sustain his convictions. Additionally, his counsel, Kent D. Watkins, Esq., seeks

to withdraw his representation of Appellant pursuant to Anders v. California,

386 U.S. 738 (1967), and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa.

2009). After careful review, we affirm Appellant’s judgment of sentence and

grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
J-S19006-23

      The trial court summarized the facts of this case, as follows:

      Testimony offered at the June 24, 2022 trial included that elicited
      from Trooper William Moyer of the Pennsylvania State Police. On
      August 19, 2019, Trooper Moyer was then employed as an officer
      with the Shenandoah Police Department in Shenandoah, Schuylkill
      County. Shortly before 3:00 p.m. that day, he was dispatched to
      respond with EMS to outside of the Dollar Tree for an unresponsive
      male. He was at the scene within a few minutes, and he found
      [Appellant] slumped over while sitting in the driver[’s] seat of a
      motor vehicle which was parked in the wrong direction on the two-
      lane roadway — facing head-on to opposing traffic — directly
      outside the store. [Appellant] was the only occupant in the
      vehicle. The keys were in the ignition and the vehicle’s engine
      was running.

      After the officer yelled through an open window of the vehicle,
      [Appellant] awoke. Trooper Moyer testified that [Appellant]
      slurred his speech; he had a strong odor of alcoholic beverages
      emanating from his body, and exhibited glassy, bloodshot eyes.
      [Appellant] was unable to stay focused on the trooper’s
      communication or to maintain his balance. After Trooper Moyer
      advised [Appellant] that he was determined to be too impaired to
      complete field sobriety tests, [Appellant] stated that he was
      “drunk.” [Appellant] subsequently submitted to a timely blood
      draw which, after testing, indicated that he had a .179% blood
      alcohol content, together with various drugs in his system,
      including methamphetamine[] and sedatives.

Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/22, at 2 (footnote omitted).

      Based on this evidence, Appellant was convicted of the above-stated

offenses. On July 20, 2022, he was sentenced to the term of incarceration set

forth supra. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he complied with

the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal, preserving a single issue challenging the sufficiency

of the evidence to sustain his convictions. The court filed its Rule 1925(a)

opinion on September 15, 2022.

                                     -2-
J-S19006-23

     On November 30, 2022, Attorney Watkins filed with this Court a petition

to withdraw from representing Appellant. That same day, counsel also filed

an Anders brief, discussing the following issue that Appellant seeks to raise

on appeal: “Did the Commonwealth present sufficient evidence that …

[A]ppellant was in actual control of the vehicle when he was [convicted of

DUI]?”   Anders Brief at 4.    Attorney Watkins concludes that this issue is

frivolous, and that Appellant has no other, non-frivolous claims he could

pursue herein. Accordingly,

     this Court must first pass upon counsel’s petition to withdraw
     before reviewing the merits of the underlying issues presented by
     [the appellant]. Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 928 A.2d 287,
     290 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc).

     Prior to withdrawing as counsel on a direct appeal under Anders,
     counsel must file a brief that meets the requirements established
     by our Supreme Court in Santiago. The brief must:

         (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
         with citations to the record;

         (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes
         arguably supports the appeal;

         (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
         frivolous; and

         (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
         frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
         record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
         have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

     Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. Counsel also must provide a copy of
     the Anders brief to his client. Attending the brief must be a letter
     that advises the client of his right to: “(1) retain new counsel to
     pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any
     points that the appellant deems worthy of the court[’]s attention
     in addition to the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.”

                                     -3-
J-S19006-23

      Commonwealth v. Nischan, 928 A.2d 349, 353 (Pa. Super.
      2007), appeal denied, 594 Pa. 704, 936 A.2d 40 (2007).

Commonwealth v. Orellana, 86 A.3d 877, 879-80 (Pa. Super. 2014). After

determining that counsel has satisfied these technical requirements of Anders

and Santiago, this Court must then “conduct a simple review of the record to

ascertain if there appear[s] on its face to be arguably meritorious issues that

counsel, intentionally or not, missed or misstated.”      Commonwealth v.

Dempster, 187 A.3d 266, 272 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc).

      In this case, Attorney Watkins’ Anders brief complies with the above-

stated requirements. Namely, he includes a summary of the relevant factual

and procedural history, he refers to portions of the record that could arguably

support Appellant’s claims, and he sets forth his conclusion that Appellant’s

appeal is frivolous.     He also explains his reasons for reaching that

determination, and supports his rationale with citations to the record and

pertinent legal authority.   Attorney Watkins also states in his petition to

withdraw that he has supplied Appellant with a copy of his Anders brief.

Additionally, while Attorney Watkins initially failed to provide this Court with

a copy of the letter informing Appellant of the rights enumerated in Nischan,

counsel subsequently filed a copy of that letter when ordered to do so by this

Court. Accordingly, counsel has complied with the technical requirements for

withdrawal.    To date, this Court has not received a pro se response from

Appellant.    We will now independently review the record to determine if

Appellant’s issue is frivolous, and to ascertain if there are any other, non-

frivolous issues he could pursue on appeal.

                                     -4-
J-S19006-23

      Appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his

convictions because the Commonwealth failed to prove that he drove,

operated, or was in actual physical control of his vehicle, as required for his

two DUI offenses and his summary offense of driving while his license was

revoked. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c) (“An individual may not drive, operate

or be in actual physical control of the movement of a vehicle after imbibing

a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol concentration in the

individual’s blood or breath is 0.16% or higher within two hours after the

individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the

movement of the vehicle.”) (emphasis added); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(3) (“An

individual may not drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the

movement of a vehicle under any of the following circumstances: … (3) The

individual is under the combined influence of alcohol and a drug or

combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual’s ability to safely

drive, operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of the

vehicle.”) (emphasis added); 75 Pa.C.S. § 1543(b)(1.1)(i) (“A person who has

an amount of alcohol by weight in his blood that is equal to or greater than

.02% at the time of testing or who at the time of testing has in his blood any

amount of a Schedule I or nonprescribed Schedule II or III controlled

substance, as defined in the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known

as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, or its metabolite

or who refuses testing of blood or breath and who drives a motor vehicle

on any highway or trafficway of this Commonwealth at a time when the

                                      -5-
J-S19006-23

person’s operating privilege is suspended or revoked as a condition of

acceptance of Accelerated Rehabilitative Disposition for a violation of section

3802 or former section 3731 or because of a violation of section 1547(b)(1)

or 3802 or former section 3731 or is suspended under section 1581 for an

offense substantially similar to a violation of section 3802 or former section

3731 shall, upon a first conviction, be guilty of a summary offense and shall

be sentenced to pay a fine of $1,000 and to undergo imprisonment for a period

of not less than 90 days.”) (emphasis added; footnote omitted).

      Initially, we observe that,

      [w]hether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the charge
      presents a question of law. Commonwealth v. Toritto, 67 A.3d
      29 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). Our standard of review is de
      novo, and our scope of review is plenary. Commonwealth v.
      Walls, 144 A.3d 926 (Pa. Super. 2016). In conducting our
      inquiry, we examine[,]

         whether the evidence at trial, and all reasonable inferences
         derived therefrom, when viewed in the light most favorable
         to the Commonwealth as verdict-winner, [is] sufficient to
         establish all elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
         doubt. We may not weigh the evidence or substitute our
         judgment for that of the fact-finder. Additionally, the
         evidence at trial need not preclude every possibility of
         innocence, and the fact-finder is free to resolve any doubts
         regarding a defendant’s guilt unless the evidence is so weak
         and inconclusive that as a matter of law no probability of
         fact may be drawn from the combined circumstances. When
         evaluating the credibility and weight of the evidence, the
         fact-finder is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence.
         For purposes of our review under these principles, we must
         review the entire record and consider all of the evidence
         introduced.

      Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 1031, 1038 (Pa. Super.
      2014) (quotation omitted).

                                       -6-
J-S19006-23

Commonwealth v. Rojas-Rolon, 256 A.3d 432, 436 (Pa. Super. 2021),

appeal denied, 285 A.3d 879 (Pa. 2022).

      According to Attorney Watkins, it would be frivolous to claim that the

evidence was insufficient to prove that Appellant drove, operated, or was in

actual physical control of his vehicle, where Appellant was found asleep in the

driver’s seat of the car, with the keys in the ignition, and the vehicle’s engine

running. See Anders Brief at 11. Considering these circumstances, as well

as the fact that Appellant’s vehicle was parked oddly, we agree.

      In Commonwealth v. Brotherson, 888 A.2d 901 (Pa. Super. 2005),

we explained that “[t]he term ‘operate’ requires evidence of actual physical

control of either the machinery of the motor vehicle or the management of

the vehicle’s movement, but not evidence that the vehicle was in motion.” Id.

at 904. The Brotherson panel acknowledged that “[i]n a majority of cases,

the suspect location of the vehicle, which supports an inference that it was

driven, is a key factor in a finding of actual control.” Id. at 905 (citations

omitted). The panel then concluded that the “highly inappropriate location”

of Brotherson’s car, which was found “on the basketball court of a gated

children’s playground[,] created a strong inference that it was an already[-

]intoxicated Brotherson who had driven the car to that spot.” Id. Similarly,

in Commonwealth v. Dirosa, 249 A.3d 586 (Pa. Super. 2021), appeal

denied, 261 A.3d 1033 (Pa. 2021), we found the evidence sufficient to support

Dirosa’s DUI conviction, where officers discovered Dirosa asleep in the driver’s

seat of his vehicle, which was parked outside a Wawa gas station at

                                      -7-
J-S19006-23

approximately 2:30 a.m., in between the clearly marked lines of the handicap

parking spaces in front of the store.         Id. at 590.     Additionally, in

Commonwealth v. Toland, 995 A.2d 1242 (Pa. Super. 2010), we concluded

the Commonwealth had presented sufficient evidence of actual physical

control where officers found Toland parked outside a store and asleep in the

driver’s seat of his vehicle with the motor running and headlights illuminated.

Id. at 1246.

      As in Brotherson, Dirosa, and Toland, we conclude that the evidence

in this case was sufficient to prove that Appellant operated, drove, or was in

actual physical control of his vehicle. Appellant “was found behind the wheel

without the warning lights [and] with the engine running[,] asleep in the

driver’s seat.” Anders Brief at 11. Additionally, his vehicle was parked facing

the wrong direction, toward oncoming traffic directly outside of a store. These

facts were sufficient to circumstantially prove that Appellant had driven the

car to that location while in an inebriated state. Thus, we agree with Attorney

Watkins that Appellant’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is

frivolous. Additionally, our independent review of the record reveals no other,

non-frivolous claims he could assert herein. Therefore, we affirm Appellant’s

judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.

                                     -8-
J-S19006-23

Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/2/2023

                                   -9-