Court Opinion

ID: 9834180
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 23:21:58.784128+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:44:12.469604
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
As stated in our original opinion, on the trial appellee introduced in evidence the vendor’s lien note sued upon, and rested. Appellant introduced in evidence a release in due form, properly signed and acknowledged by the proper officers of appellee bank, acknowledging payment of said note in full and releasing the vendor’s lien securing same, and rested. Both sides asked for an instructed verdict. The court granted appellee’s request and refused that of appellant. Appellant's appeal was based principally on the contention that if said release was executed •by appellee by mistake, as it had fully set out in its pleading, it was the duty of appellee, after appellant had rested, to go forward with its evidence and so prove. Appellee in its brief did not admit nor deny the correctness of this contention, but submitted counterprop-ositions to the effect that appellant’s plea of payment was not sufficient to authorize evidence in support of same, and so the court erred in admitting said release in evidence. Both sides have filed motion for rehearing, appellee contending that we misconceived the real issue in the ease, to wit, the sufficiency of the plea of payment to authorize evidence in support of same, and the action of the court in admitting the release; appellant contending that, having reversed the case, we should have rendered judgment in his favor. Appellee presented one cross-assignment of error, contending the court erred in overruling its objection to the introduction of the release' in evidence because same was irrelevant and immaterial, in that there was no sufficient plea of payment of said note to authorize thp admission of any evidence thereon. There was no demurrer or exception presented by appellee to the trial court questioning the sufficiency of said plea of payment.
Article 2014 of our Revised Statutes, providing that payment must be specially pleaded and stating the requisites of such plea, we do not think was intended to create an exception to the general rule that the sufficiency of a pleading should be tested by demurrer or exception, and not by an objection to the evidence when offered. May v. Taylor, 22 Tex. 348; Weinstein v. National Bank, 69 Tex. 40, 6 S. W. 173, 5 Am. St. Rep. 23; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Jeanes, 88 Tex. 230, 31 S. W. 187. If an exception to the sufficiency of said plea had been presented and sustained, or if appellee’s objection to the admission of said release had been sustained upon the ground said plea of payment was insufficient, appellant would have had the right to and doubtless would have amended said plea. Appellee, having failed to challenge the sufficiency of said plea by an exception, and the court having overruled its objection to the admission of the release on the ground of the insufficiency of said plea, thereby holding said plea sufficient, and admitting said release, could not afford, and neither could this court afford, to refuse to consider said-release upon the ground of the insufficiency of the plea of payment, and proceed to render judgment, ignoring said release. So if the trial court was in error in admitting said release as contended by appellee, which we do not hold, said error could not result in the affirmance of the judgment.
It is the policy and intent of the law that cases should be tried upon their merits and not upon defects in pleading or a violation of the rules governing the introduction of evidence, especially when the ruling of the trial court has led either party to believe that such error does not exist. Saner-Whiteman Lumber Co. v. Texas & N. O. Ry. Co. (Tex. Com. App.) 288 S. W. 127, and cases there cited. In our original opinion we discussed the contentions raised by appellant, because the overruling of same would have resulted in the affirmance of the judgment of the trial court. We did not discuss ’appellee’s cross-assignment and propositions submitted thereunder, because the sustaining of same could not have resulted in the affirmance of the judgment.
We overrule the motion for rehearing ot both appellant and appellee.