Court Opinion

ID: 9553076
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:21:41.856585+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:29:39.218795
License: Public Domain

COMPTON, Justice,
dissenting in part.
Although I agree with the court’s disposition of matters alluded to in n. 6,1 cannot agree with its treatment of the principal issue in the case, i.e., whether Fisher’s First Amendment rights were violated by the manner in which his use of The Front Runner was treated.1
Analysis of this issue is made no easier by the fact that neither Brannian, nor anyone else as far as this record discloses, knew just what materials were meant to be encompassed by Policy 6160.1a, how that policy was to be implemented, or by whom. His October memorandum to Fisher merely paraphrases the policy, and admonishes Fisher not to use the book until it has been approved. His January memorandum only refers to Policy 6160.1a, a requirement that the book be approved, and that Fisher is to “submit a copy of the book to me [Branni-an] for approval.” Since the text of Policy 6160.1a does not require a teacher to do anything, the correspondence leaves one wondering whether it is the school board, the superintendent or Brannian, the principal, from whom approval must be obtained. Further, Brannian cannot unequivocally characterize the material as a textbook or as supplementary printed material, or either, if such a distinction is material to this case. Brannian’s unfamiliarity with the terrain may be best understood in light of the total absence in the record of any evidence that anyone was ever required to submit supplementary printed material to anyone for their approval.
James R. Ranney, social studies department head at Lathrop High School and Fisher’s supervisor, knew that The Front Runner had not been approved, since it had not been submitted to a newly created district wide social studies department curriculum committee for approval. However, Fisher had submitted the book to Ranney for purchase by the school and Ranney had leafed through it. Brannian had declined to purchase it for budgetary reasons. There is no evidence that any books Fisher requested to be purchased were submitted by Ranney to anyone for substantive approval. Furthermore, the policy makes no reference to any departmental curriculum committee.
If the issue before the court was simply whether school boards possess broad authority over curriculum in a secondary education setting, I would have little hesitancy in joining the court’s opinion. Certainly as far as the federal constitution is concerned, Pico’s 2 plurality, concurring and dissenting opinions almost conclusively so indicate. This indication is dicta, but strong enough to leave little room for doubt as to the outcome.
However, broad authority over curriculum does not mean that the First Amendment places no restrictions on school board *219conduct, a point acknowledged by the court. While the court identifies some areas of activity by teachers and students protected by the First Amendment, it neglects to identify those predicates that must exist before a school board may properly override otherwise protected conduct. It is here that the analysis fails.
In this case there is a prior restraint on Fisher’s constitutionally protected right. While prior restraints are not unconstitutional per se, their invalidity is heavily presumed. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70, 83 S.Ct. 631, 639, 9 L.Ed.2d 584, 593 (1963); Wilson v. Chancellor, 418 F.Supp. 1358, 1364 (D.Ore.1976). The school board has established no criteria for determining what texts it will or will not approve, nor any criteria to guide superintendents (or principals or curriculum committees) in the exercise of their responsibility regarding supplementary materials. Wilson at 1364. Indeed, the policy is so vague that Brannian cannot even tell us whether The Front Runner is a text (and hence required to be approved by the school board) or supplementary printed material (and hence required to be approved by the superintendent).
The policy, such as it is, suffers from yet another defect, that being its failure to provide any review mechanism when a teacher’s request for approval of textual or supplementary materials has been denied. Worse, there is no procedure whatsoever for obtaining substantive approval of such materials. Brannian’s memorandum to Fisher simply tells him to quit what he is doing. Brannian offers no guidance whatsoever. No written school board policy does, either.
If Policy 6160.1a is not unconstitutional on its face, a point I would not concede, it is unconstitutional as applied to Fisher in this case. None of the predicates for prior restraint of First Amendment rights have been established.

. I expressly disassociate myself from the court's venture into fact finding presented in n. 5. What the "worst” is, I suppose, lies like beauty in the eyes of the beholder. One could find from this record that Fisher enjoyed a good reputation with administrators until he became active in union affairs. He was then suspended, but voluntarily reinstated during a superior court trial de novo, which the school district lost anyway. Its appeal was dismissed for lack of progress. He was later again suspended for activities arising out of union affairs, but again reinstated.
When Fisher decided to include "gay rights" in his class, Brannian ordered Fisher not to teach it, but recanted on advice of counsel. Right about the time Brannian notified Fisher he was recommending nonretention, Fisher contacted the Fire Marshall about apparently impermissibly chained doors. This upset Bran-nian, who complained to custodians that he would "get the son-of-a-bitch yet.” He did.
The "worst" may thus be that Brannian and other administrators, displeased with Fisher and frightened by the spectre of notoriety arising from teaching too much about "gay rights,” used Policy 6160.1a to score a double victory. However, what is "worst” ought not concern us. What the constitution requires should.

. Board of Education, Island Trees Union Free School District No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 102 S.Ct. 2799, 73 L.Ed.2d 435 (1982).