Court Opinion

ID: 9366256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-26 15:05:05.075275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:51.023507
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-50700     Document: 00516448026          Page: 1    Date Filed: 08/25/2022

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                          Fifth Circuit

                                                                        FILED
                                                                  August 25, 2022
                                   No. 21-50700                    Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                        Clerk

   United States of America,

                                                             Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                       versus

   Israel Garcia-Marcelo,

                                                         Defendant—Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                           USDC No. 2:21-CR-141-1

   Before Jones, Ho, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
          Israel Garcia-Marcelo pleaded guilty to one count of illegal reentry.
   On appeal, he contends that the district court erred in entering judgment
   under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2) based on his prior conviction under Louisiana
   Revised Statutes § 14:81(A). Garcia also argues that his written judgment

          *
            Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
   opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
   circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-50700      Document: 00516448026            Page: 2   Date Filed: 08/25/2022

                                      No. 21-50700

   includes various discretionary conditions of supervised release that were not
   pronounced at sentencing.
          We agree with Garcia as to both issues. Accordingly, we vacate his
   sentence in part and remand for the district court to reform and amend its
   written judgment in accordance with this opinion.
                                           I.
          In 2016, Garcia, a citizen of Mexico, was convicted of “indecent
   behavior with a juvenile” in violation of § 14:81(A) of the Louisiana Revised
   Statutes and sentenced to 32 months’ imprisonment. Garcia was deported
   after serving his sentence. In 2021, Garcia pleaded guilty to illegal reentry in
   violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a).
          Garcia’s presentence report (PSR) calculated a guidelines range of 15
   to 21 months’ imprisonment and explained that, because of his 2016
   Louisiana conviction, Garcia was subject to a statutory maximum sentence of
   twenty years’ imprisonment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2). The PSR went on
   to detail six special conditions of supervised release that it recommended
   imposing “[i]n addition to the mandatory and standard conditions adopted
   by the Court.”
          The district court sentenced Garcia to an above-Guidelines sentence
   of 30 months’ imprisonment and a three-year term of supervised release.
   The district court did not orally adopt the PSR at sentencing. However, the
   district court did impose special conditions of supervised release that were
   virtually identical to those recommended in the PSR. The district court also
   informed Garcia that, in the event he was deported, “[i]t would be a violation
   of [his] supervised release” to “return to the United States.”
          After sentencing, the district court issued its written judgment, which
   stated that Garcia was convicted of illegal reentry under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a)

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   and (b)(2).    The written judgment included the special conditions of
   supervised release that were discussed at sentencing, along with nine
   “mandatory” and seventeen “standard” conditions of supervised release
   that the district court had not referenced. Garcia timely appealed.
          On appeal, Garcia contends that (1) the district court erred by entering
   judgment under § 1326(b)(2) based on his Louisiana conviction because it
   does not qualify as an “aggravated felony” and (2) that the district court
   failed to orally pronounce discretionary conditions of supervised release that
   were included in the written judgment.
                                          II.
          We start with Garcia’s claim that the district court erred by entering
   judgment under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).
                                          A.
          Because Garcia raises this argument for the first time on appeal, we
   review the district court’s decision for plain error. See United States v.
   Castaneda-Lozoya, 812 F.3d 457, 459 (5th Cir. 2016). To prevail under that
   standard, Garcia must identify (1) a forfeited error (2) that is clear or obvious,
   rather than subject to reasonable dispute, and (3) that affects his substantial
   rights. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009). If he satisfies
   these three requirements, we may correct the error at our discretion if it
   “seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
   proceedings.” Id. (cleaned up).
                                          B.
          “When a defendant is convicted of illegal reentry following his
   removal from the United States, and his prior removal followed a conviction
   for an ‘aggravated felony,’ he is subject to a maximum sentence of twenty
   years.” United States v. Trujillo, 4 F.4th 287, 290 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting 8

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   U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2)), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 837 (2022). But “[i]f his prior
   removal followed a conviction for a felony that does not qualify as an
   ‘aggravated felony,’ . . . he is subject to a maximum sentence of ten years.”
   Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326(b)(1)).
          Under federal law, “sexual abuse of a minor” is an “aggravated
   felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(A). To determine whether, “for the
   purpose of § 1326(b)(2),” Garcia’s Louisiana conviction qualifies as “sexual
   abuse of a minor,” we “employ a categorical approach by looking to the
   statute of conviction, rather than to the specific facts underlying the crime.”
   United States v. Montanez-Trejo, 708 F. App’x 161, 165 (5th Cir. 2017)
   (cleaned up). That approach requires us to ask whether “the state statute
   defining the crime of conviction categorically fits within the generic federal
   definition of a corresponding aggravated felony.” Esquivel-Quintana v.
   Sessions, 137 S. Ct. 1562, 1568 (2017) (quotations omitted). In other words,
   we must “presume that the state conviction rested upon the least of the acts
   criminalized by the statute, and then . . . determine whether that conduct
   would fall within the federal definition of [sexual abuse of a minor].” Id.
   (cleaned up).
                                          C.
          The Louisiana statute under which Garcia was convicted makes it a
   felony to engage in “[a]ny lewd or lascivious act” with a child “under the age
   of seventeen, where there is an age difference of greater than two years
   between the two persons.” La. Rev. Stat. § 14:81(A)(1) (emphasis
   added). It also criminalizes “[t]he transmission, delivery or utterance of any
   . . . communication depicting lewd or lascivious conduct . . . to any person
   reasonably believed to be under the age of seventeen and reasonably believed to
   be at least two years younger than the offender.” Id. § 14:81(A)(2) (emphasis
   added).

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           But in Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, the Supreme Court held that “in
   the context of statutory rape offenses that criminalize sexual intercourse
   based solely on the age of the participants, the generic federal definition of
   sexual abuse of a minor requires that the victim be younger than 16.” 137 S.
   Ct. at 1568. “Because the [Louisiana] statute at issue in this case does not
   categorically fall within that definition,” it does not qualify as an “aggravated
   felony under § 1101(a)(43)(A)” that warrants entry of judgment under
   § 1326(b)(2). Id.
           The Government, for its part, does not dispute any of this or otherwise
   contend that Garcia’s state conviction qualifies as an “aggravated felony.”
   Instead, it simply asserts that “[n]o federal court has ever determined
   whether the Louisiana statute under which Garcia was convicted qualifies as
   an . . . aggravated felony,” and so any error on the part of the district court
   cannot be “obvious plain error.”
           We disagree. To determine whether an error is plain, “we look to the
   state of the law at the time of appeal, and we must decide whether controlling
   circuit or Supreme Court precedent has reached the issue in question, or
   whether the legal question would be subject to reasonable dispute.” United
   States v. Fields, 777 F.3d 799, 802 (5th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted). Here,
   the district court’s error is not “subject to reasonable dispute” in light of
   Esquivel-Quintana.1 Id. (quotations omitted). So the district court plainly
   erred by treating Garcia’s Louisiana conviction as an “aggravated felony”
   that warranted entry of judgment under § 1326(b)(2).

           1
             Indeed, as Garcia notes, our court “has applied Esquivel-Quintana to materially
   identical . . . statutes and found [them] to be categorically broader than the generic
   definition of ‘sexual abuse of a minor’ because they included 16-year-old victims.” See
   United States v. Sanchez-Arvizu, 893 F.3d 312, 315 (5th Cir. 2018); Shroff v. Sessions, 890
   F.3d 542, 545–46 (5th Cir. 2018).

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          The third prong of the plain error test is met, as we have previously
   recognized that “[e]ntering conviction based on § 1326(b)(2) rather than §
   1326(b)(1) can have collateral consequences for the defendant, such as
   permanent inadmissibility to the United States.” Trujillo, 4 F.4th at 291.
   And as to the fourth prong, we exercise our discretion to correct the district
   court’s error. See United States v. Rodriguez-Flores, 25 F.4th 385, 290 (5th
   Cir. 2022). In similar cases, we have remanded to the district court for the
   limited purpose of reforming the judgment to reflect the proper statute of
   conviction, even when reviewing for plain error. See, e.g., id. at 390-91;
   United States v. Medrano-Camarillo, 653 F. App’x 239, 240 (5th Cir. 2016);
   United States v. Quintanilla-Ventura, 616 F. App’x 189, 190 (5th Cir. 2015).
   We do so here as well.
                                         III.
          That leaves Garcia’s challenge to various conditions of supervised
   release that were included in his written judgment.
                                          A.
          “The district court’s obligation to orally pronounce its sentence is
   grounded in the defendant’s right to be present at sentencing, which in turn
   is derived from the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” United States
   v. Gomez, 960 F.3d 173, 178 (5th Cir. 2020). “If the in-court pronouncement
   differs from the judgment that later issues, what the judge said at sentencing
   controls.” United States v. Diggles, 957 F.3d 551, 557 (5th Cir. 2020) (en
   banc), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 825 (2020).
          This pronouncement requirement applies to certain conditions of
   supervised release. See id. So our court has established a framework “for
   determining which conditions of supervised release require oral
   pronouncement.” Gomez, 960 F.3d at 179 (citation omitted). Under that
   framework, a district court must pronounce at sentencing any condition of

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   supervised release that is not required by 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). Diggles, 957
   F.3d at 559.
          A district court satisfies the pronouncement requirement by giving the
   defendant notice at sentencing as to what conditions it is imposing, along
   with an opportunity to object. Id. at 560. “Oral in-court adoption of a written
   list of proposed conditions” is one method of providing “the necessary
   notice.” Id. But “the mere existence of such a document is not enough for
   pronouncement.” Id. at 561 n.5. The district court “must orally adopt the
   written recommendations when the defendant is in court” and “ensure . . .
   that the defendant had an opportunity to review [that document] with
   counsel.” Id.
                                          B.
          Here, Garcia’s written judgment contains nine “mandatory”
   conditions and seventeen “standard” conditions that the district court did
   not orally pronounce at sentencing. All agree that these conditions mirror
   those listed in the standing order of the Western District of Texas. See
   United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Conditions of
   Probation and Supervised Release, https://bit.ly/3ouyWtb (last visited Aug. 4,
   2022). But the district court did not reference that standing order at
   sentencing or confirm that Garcia had reviewed it with counsel. The district
   court also failed to orally adopt the PSR at sentencing or to confirm that
   Garcia had reviewed it with counsel.
          In short, the district court failed to adequately notify Garcia at
   sentencing that it was imposing the conditions listed in the standing order,
   and thus Garcia had no opportunity to object to its doing so. We must
   therefore review Garcia’s challenge to these conditions for abuse of
   discretion. United States v. Grogan, 977 F.3d 348, 352 (5th Cir. 2020).

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                                         C.
           As noted, a “district court must orally pronounce a criminal
   defendant’s sentence, including any discretionary conditions of supervised
   release, at the sentencing hearing.” United States v. Vargas, 23 F.4th 526,
   527 (5th Cir. 2022). Failing to do so is an error of law and thus an abuse of
   discretion. See United States v. Jackson, 2022 WL 738668, at *2 (5th Cir.
   Mar. 11, 2022). Any discretionary conditions that were not pronounced at
   sentencing “must be removed from the written judgment.” United States v.
   Fields, 977 F.3d 358, 366 (5th Cir. 2020).
           Garcia concedes, as he must, that the first seven “mandatory”
   conditions of supervised release included in his written judgment mirror the
   requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), and thus the district court was
   not required to pronounce them at sentencing. See Diggles, 957 F.3d at 559.
           The remaining conditions Garcia objects to can be grouped into three
   categories: (1) conditions related to Garcia’s finances; (2) conditions related
   to illegal activity; and (3) conditions related to Garcia’s obligations more
   generally while on supervision.
           In assessing the conditions within these categories, we note that our
   court recently addressed a largely identical challenge in United States v.
   Jackson. See 2022 WL 738668, at *3–4. Jackson is an unpublished decision,
   so we are not bound by it. See United States v. Sauseda, 596 F.3d 279, 282
   (5th Cir. 2010). But we find its reasoning compelling and largely adopt it
   here.
                                          1.
           At Garcia’s sentencing, the district court declined to impose a fine or
   restitution obligation but did orally order Garcia to pay a one-time $100

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   special assessment. Garcia’s written judgment, however, includes various
   conditions related to Garcia’s finances.
          Mandatory condition 8 requires Garcia to pay the special assessment
   that the district court imposed pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013. This condition
   is “consistent with the judgment imposing a special assessment, the statute
   which made the special assessment mandatory, and the district court’s intent
   that [Garcia] be required to pay the special assessment as required by
   statute.” Jackson, 2022 WL 738668, at *3. Accordingly, this condition is
   “consistent with the district court’s oral pronouncement.” Id. Standard
   condition 14—which makes Garcia’s payment of the special assessment a
   condition of his supervised release—is likewise “consistent with the oral
   pronouncement.” Id.
          Mandatory condition 9 directs Garcia to “notify the court of any
   material change in [his] economic circumstances that might affect [his]
   ability to pay restitution, fines or [the] special assessment.” And standard
   conditions 15 and 16 require Garcia to provide his “probation officer access
   to any requested financial information” and to refrain from “incur[ring] any
   new credit charges or open[ing] lines of credit without the approval of [his]
   probation officer, unless [he] is in compliance with the payment schedule”
   set forth in the written judgment. The Government is obviously correct in
   observing that these conditions “relate to” the special assessment that was
   orally pronounced at sentencing.           But they are significantly “more
   burdensome . . . and thus conflict[] with the district court’s oral
   pronouncement of [Garcia’s] sentence.” Id.
                                        2.
          Standard condition 10 states that Garcia “shall not own, possess or
   have access to a firearm, ammunition, destructive device, or dangerous
   weapon (i.e. anything that was designed, or was modified, for the specific

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   purpose of causing bodily injury or death to another person such as
   nunchakus or tasers).” This condition is “partially consistent with the
   statutorily required condition that the defendant shall not commit another
   federal, state, or local offense.” Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d). That’s because,
   as a matter of federal law, individuals who have previously been convicted of
   a felony are prohibited from possessing firearms, ammunition, or destructive
   devices. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). But “to the extent this condition
   broadens the statutory restriction by prohibiting the possession of other
   dangerous weapons, it conflicts with the district court’s oral pronouncement
   and must be stricken in part.” Jackson, 2022 WL 738668, at *3.
          Standard condition 17 provides that, in the event Garcia is deported
   upon his release, he shall “not illegally re-enter the United States” and his
   “term of supervision shall be a non-reporting term of . . . supervised release.”
   As Garcia appears to recognize, this portion of the condition is consistent
   with what the district court ordered at sentencing and with 18 U.S.C.
   § 3583(d)’s requirement that a defendant not commit any criminal offenses
   while on supervision.
                                         3.
          However, standard condition 17 goes on to specify other details
   regarding Garcia’s term of supervision. For instance, it mandates that Garcia
   “shall immediately report in person to the nearest U.S. Probation Office” in
   the event he is not deported upon his release from prison. And the remaining
   “standard” conditions Garcia objects to concern his general obligations
   while on supervised release.       “Taken together, these unpronounced,
   unincorporated, and unreferenced conditions found only in [Garcia’s]
   written judgment, although critical to effectuating the purposes of supervised

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   release, are required to be excised according to our existing precedent.”2
   Jackson, 2022 WL 738668, at *4.
                                             ***
           For the foregoing reasons, we vacate Garcia’s sentence in part and
   remand for the district court to reform and amend the judgment in
   accordance with this opinion.

           2
             As our court has previously noted, “in certain circumstances the district court
   may later modify and enlarge the conditions of supervised release.” United States v.
   Chavez, 2022 WL 767033, at *5 (5th Cir. Mar. 14, 2022) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e); Fed.
   R. Crim. P. 32.1(c)). If “the district court adheres to the procedural protections of these
   authorities, we see nothing that prevents the court from modifying [Garcia’s] conditions of
   supervised release to include the Western District’s standard conditions.” Id.

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