Court Opinion

ID: 9487597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:21:31.679151+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:22.949229
License: Public Domain

JAMES R. BROWNING, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I write separately because I believe the majority’s reasoning conflicts with Ninth Circuit precedent. I concur in the judgment because a different analysis consistent with our precedent leads to the same result.
I.
The majority interprets United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 102 S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982), as holding federal defendants who seek to attack their convictions collaterally must show “cause” for, and “actual prejudice” from, their failure to raise their constitutional claim only if they have also violated a specific rule providing the particular claim will be barred if not raised during the direct criminal proceedings. Based on this interpretation of Frady, the majority concludes English, Taño, and Davis were not required to show cause and prejudice to collaterally challenge their convictions on the basis of Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 109 S.Ct. 2237, 104 L.Ed.2d 923 (1989), despite their failure to raise this issue on appeal or otherwise in their direct criminal proceedings, because there was no rule providing such claims were forfeited unless they were raised during the direct proceedings.
Our circuit has already interpreted Frady as requiring federal defendants who fail to seek review of an issue on appeal in direct proceedings to show cause and prejudice for that default in order to pursue collateral relief, without regard to whether they also violated an express waiver provision. In United States v. Dunham, 767 F.2d 1395, 1397 & n. 2 (9th Cir.1985), we held in reliance on Frady that a collateral attack based on an alleged omission from the trial transcript and a faulty jury instruction was barred by the cause and prejudice standard solely because the defendant failed to raise these challenges on direct appeal. The majority points to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(e) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30 as special procedural rules requiring that these claims be raised in the course of the criminal proceedings. Majority Op. at 480-81 & n. 9. Neither rule is mentioned in the Dunham opinion. There is nothing to suggest the court relied upon them in concluding that under Frady failure to raise an issue on direct appeal was itself a default sufficient to trigger the requirement that cause and prejudice be shown to obtain collateral review.
Even if the majority’s distinction of Dun-ham is accepted, our decision in United States v. Johnson, 988 F.2d 941, 945 (9th Cir.1993), commits this court to the position that failure to appeal in itself requires a showing of cause and prejudice to justify a collateral attack. Johnson relied on Frady in requiring a showing of cause and prejudice *485even though, as the majority concedes, there was no statute or procedural rule requiring defendant to raise in the direct proceedings the issue he sought to raise collaterally — the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. The default that triggered the requirement that cause and prejudice be shown in Johnson was clearly no more than failure to raise the issue on direct appeal.
The majority seeks to avoid this conclusion by characterizing Johnson’s interpretation of Frady as dicta and arguing that, if not disregarded on this ground, it established a “new rule” that should not be applied retroactively. Neither argument is persuasive. First, Johnson denied defendant’s 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion both because his pleadings were con-elusory and because he failed to show cause and prejudice. See 988 F.2d at 945. Alternative holdings are not dicta. See Woods v. Interstate Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535, 537, 69 S.Ct. 1235, 1236-37, 93 L.Ed. 1524 (1949) (“where a decision rests on two or more grounds, none can be relegated to the category of obiter dictum”); Kimble v. D.J. McDuffy, Inc., 454 U.S. 1110, 1113 n. 4, 102 S.Ct. 687, 689 n. 4, 70 L.Ed.2d 651 (1981) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (alternative holdings do not mitigate precedential effect of a federal appellate decision). Second, the issue of retroactivity is not presented: Dunham and Johnson did not establish a new rule. Both simply interpreted and followed the rule announced in Frady, which applies here as well.
The majority develops a substantial argument that Frady is more limited than the panels that decided Dunham and Johnson found it to be. A three-judge panel does not sit in review of decisions of prior three-judge panels. We would be bound to follow the interpretation in Dunham and Johnson of the rule established in Frady, even if we thought those panel decisions were wrong. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 914 F.2d 1215, 1221 (9th Cir.1990) (circuit precedent that allegedly conflicts with prior Supreme Court authority is nevertheless binding on three-judge panel).
The comment in Clow v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 948 F.2d 614 (9th Cir.1991) (per curiam), is especially pertinent:
The [majority] does not argue that an intervening Supreme Court decision has east doubt on our prior circuit law, rather it asserts that the very Supreme Court decision upon which these cases rely does not support their holdings. If we were all free to disregard our prior circuit law based on our own predilections as to whether these decisions properly construe the Supreme Court cases upon which they rely, the doctrine of stare decisis would have little meaning in our circuit.
Id. at 616 n. 2.
II.
I agree with the majority that these eases call for a remedy. If the merits can be reached, reversal is required. The obstacles to doing so are technical and formal, and protect little of substance. They should be surmounted if possible.
Frady’s holding that failure to raise constitutional issues during appellate review in the direct proceeding bars collateral challenge absent cause and prejudice was based principally on the government’s interests in the finality of criminal judgments and in avoiding lengthy delays often associated with collateral review. This central rationale is inapplicable to this case. As the majority opinion states, all three appellants filed petitions raising Gomez claims before their convictions became final. English and Davis raised the Gomez claim in motions under § 2255 filed in the district court before the Supreme Court denied certiorari in their direct appeals. Tano filed his motion raising the Gomez issue after certiorari was denied but before expiration of the time to file a petition for rehearing of the denial.1
*486It would have been preferable if English, Taño, and Davis had raised their Gomez claims in motions in this court to recall the mandates. However, the defendants’ failure to follow the preferable course does not require that we consider their motions as collateral attacks. Although filing a motion under § 2255 while direct criminal proceedings are pending in another forum is discouraged, the limitation is not jurisdictional. United States v. Taylor, 648 F.2d 565, 572 (9th Cir.1981) (citing cases).2 Furthermore, federal courts are not so bound by form that papers filed in one forum can never be considered as though filed in another.3 As we have noted, appellants filed their motions raising the Gomez issue before the direct criminal proceedings were concluded, and those motions are now before us on appeal from the district court. But for the detour through district court, the paper record in this court is virtually the same as if defendants had filed their motions in this court as motions to recall our mandates.
In United States v. France, 886 F.2d 223 (9th Cir.1989), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 498 U.S. 335, 111 S.Ct. 805, 112 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), we permitted the defendant to raise a Gomez claim in a supplemental brief on direct appeal, even though the claim was not raised below or in the defendant’s opening brief on appeal. Id. at 225. We excused these defaults on the ground that it would have been futile for the defendant to raise the issue prior to the Gomez decision because this circuit had repeatedly rejected the argument that defendants tried before juries selected under the supervision of an unauthorized magistrate judge are entitled to new trials. Id. at 227-28. We reversed France’s conviction on the ground that Gomez applies to all cases not yet final at the time oí the Supreme Court’s decision. Id. at 227.
Under France and Gomez, the defendants in this case are entitled to new trials unless a distinction should be drawn between raising a Gomez claim in a supplemental brief and raising it in a form equivalent to a motion to recall our mandate. Because such a distinction would exalt form over substance and unjustly deny the benefit of our decision in France to the defendants, I concur in the judgments directing that English, Taño, and Davis be tried anew.

. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 321 n. 6, 107 S.Ct. 708, 712 n. 6, 93 L.Ed.2d 649 (1987) ("By 'final,’ we mean a case in which a judgment of conviction has been rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari elapsed or a petition for certiorari finally denied.”); Sup.Ct.R. 44.2 (providing 25 days for petitions for rehearing of a denial of certiorari).

. In an analogous context, federal defendants may seek new trials in district court before completion of their direct appeals. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 667 n. 42, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 2051 n. 42, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) ("[t]he District Court ha[s] jurisdiction to entertain [a Rule 33] motion and either deny the motion on its merits, or certify its intention to grant the motion to the Court of Appeals, which could then entertain a motion to remand the case”).

. Cf., e.g., Miller v. Hambrick, 905 F.2d 259, 262-63 (9th Cir.1990) (transferring a federal prisoner's 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition to a district court with jurisdiction); Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1) (providing that a notice of appeal mistakenly filed in the court of appeals should be treated as though correctly filed in the district court).