Court Opinion

ID: 9742631
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:17:15.29573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:34.310391
License: Public Domain

BROOK, Judge,
concurring.
Notwithstanding my concurrence in Dishroon v. State, 722 N.E.2d 385 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), further consideration of the relevant statutes and the underlying purpose of probation has convineed me that Judge Baker's analysis is the sounder approach to this complicated issue. I write separately to offer my reasons for my concurrence and to echo his plea for our legislature to revisit and reconcile the disparate strands of the alternative-sentencing scheme.
In Cox v. State, 706 N.E.2d 547 (Ind.1999), our supreme court acknowledged that
*531[bloth probation and community corrections programs serve as alternatives to commitment to the Department of Correction and both are made at the sole discretion of the trial court. A defendant is not entitled to serve a sentence in either probation or a community corrections program. Rather, placement in either is a "matter of grace" and a "conditional liberty that is a favor, not a right." Id. at 549 (citations omitted). In Purcell v. State, 72l NE.2d 220 (Ind.1999), our supreme court determined that a person who violates the terms of his community corrections home detention placement is entitled to credit for time served because he must serve only the "remainder" of his sentence under Indiana Code Section 35-38-2.6-5. See id. at 228. The Dishroon court examined Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-6(a), which contains no such provision, and concluded that the statute "does not restrict the ability" of a probationer on home detention to earn credit for time served. 722 N.E.2d at 389. However, "it is just as important to recognize what a statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does say." Rush v. Elkhart County Plan Comm'n, 698 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. de-mied. We "may not read into a statute that which is not the expressed intent of the legislature," and we "will not add something to a statute that the legislature has purposely omitted." Id. (citations omitted). After much deliberation, I have concluded that although the legislature has specifically expressed its intent to allow credit for time served on home detention in the community corrections context, we may not simply infer such intent by analogy in the probation context, especially when the corresponding statutes differ in several important respects.
Id. at 549 (citations omitted). In Purcell v. State, T2l NE.2d 220 (Ind.1999), our supreme court determined that a person who violates the terms of his community corrections home detention placement is entitled to credit for time served because he must serve only the "remainder" of his sentence under Indiana Code Section 35-38-2.6-5. See id. at 228. The Dishroon court examined Indiana Code Section 35-50-6-6(a), which contains no such provision, and concluded that the statute "does not restrict the ability" of a probationer on home detention to earn credit for time served. 722 N.E.2d at 389.
However, "it is just as important to recognize what a statute does not say as it is to recognize what it does say." Rush v. Elkhart County Plan Comm'n, 698 N.E.2d 1211, 1215 (Ind.Ct.App.1998), trans. de-mied. We "may not read into a statute that which is not the expressed intent of the legislature," and we "will not add something to a statute that the legislature has purposely omitted." Id. (citations omitted). After much deliberation, I have concluded that although the legislature has specifically expressed its intent to allow credit for time served on home detention in the community corrections context, we may not simply infer such intent by analogy in the probation context, especially when the corresponding statutes differ in several important respects.
As Judge Baker points out, the definition of "home" in the probation context is much broader than in the community corrections context, and a probationer on home detention is expressly permitted to "attend his or her place of employment, an educational institution or program, and a place of worship." Op. at 530 (citing Inp. Cope § 35-38-2.5-6). The legislature has granted no such specific liberties to persons detained at home in community corrections placements. Consequently, I must respectfully disagree with Dishroon's "restriction of liberty" test, since it neither accounts for these differences nor rests on any supporting authority.
Furthermore, I agree with Judge Baker's observation that granting a home detention probationer credit for time served would "severely underminel ] the purpose and policy underlying probation, as it [would] decrease[ ] the probationer's incentive to comply with the conditions of his probation by reducing the consequence of committing a violation." Id. at 529. Indeed, denying a probationer credit for time served on home detention might progressively increase his incentive for compliance and rehabilitation, if only to avoid being incarcerated for the duration of his sentence after enjoying months of relative freedom on home detention.
My reconsideration of this issue was prompted by Judge Baker's thorough and persuasive analysis, but my concurrence in this case should not be interpreted as an outright dismissal of the arguments contained in Dishkroon. Because reasonable minds can (and do) differ on this issue, I wholeheartedly endorse Judge Baker's request for the General Assembly to offer some much-needed clarification, consistency, and guidance in the alternative-sentencing realm.1

. Our colleague Judge Sullivan anticipated a need for such clarification in Gardner v. State, 678 N.E.2d 398 (Ind.Ct.App.1997):
*532The bright line between suspended-sentence punishments and executed-sentence punishments has been blurred by the implementation of the: new alternative programs. Therefore, it may no longer be appropriate to make broad-sweeping assertions of punishments in either category. With the community corrections programs, for example, we have a hybrid punishment involving a suspended sentence which may be revoked, yei requires the defendant receive credit for time served. The case before us does not require the resolution of the host of legal issues which arise from the characterization of the sentence. Other problems may occur which find their genesis in this hybrid-type sentence; however, it is for the courts to solve those problems as they arise unless our legislature sees fit to clarify the exact nature of these "alternative" forms of senlencing.
Id. at 401.