Court Opinion

ID: 9673537
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:14:14.91429+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:22.563826
License: Public Domain

Weaver, J.
(concurring in the result only). I concur with the result of the lead opinion. I agree that we should reverse the Court of Appeals in Gibbons v Caraway,1 affirm the Court of Appeals in Mariin v Fleur, Inc,2 and remand both matters to the trial court for further proceedings. However, I write separately because I would limit the fireman’s rule to premises liability. I believe such a limitation is consonant with the rule’s original purpose of preventing an undue burden on property owners.
In Kreski v Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co, this Court provided a history of the development of the fireman’s rule.3 The Kreski Court noted that firefighters and police are “different” and do not fit neatly into any of the three traditional premises liability categories.4 Some of these differences include: (1) firemen and police officers often enter an owner or occupier’s land at unexpected times or places, *335(2) they often enter portions of the premises not open to the public, and (3) generally, their presence is mandated by emergency.5 In light of these factors, Kreski concluded it would be unreasonably burdensome to require landowners to maintain their premises in a suitable manner for the potential arrival of firemen and police officers.6
However, when Kreski adopted the fireman’s rule, the scope of its holding reached beyond owners and occupiers of land. In Kreski, the plaintiff firefighter was precluded from suing the electric company that was allegedly responsible for the fire that caused the roof to collapse on him.7 The electric company was neither an occupier nor an owner of the premises.8 This Court further expanded the rule in Woods v City of Warren9 to encompass public spaces.
While on the Court of Appeals, I was bound to follow the law established by this Court in Kreski and expanded in Woods.10 However, I would now, given the opportunity, limit application of this judicially created rule to the facts in Reetz v Tipit, Inc, the companion case to Kreski, thus tailoring the rule’s appli*336cation to defendants who are owners or occupiers of land.11
Again, I believe such a limitation is consistent with the rule’s original and most compelling purpose of preventing the imposition of an undue, unreasonable burden on possessors of land. Accordingly, I concur with the result of the lead opinion because it does not apply the fireman’s rule to the facts in Gibbons or Mariin.

 Docket Nos. 163560, 163605, issued January 20, 1995.

 208 Mich App 631; 528 NW2d 218 (1995).

 429 Mich 347; 415 NW2d 178 (1987). In particular, this Court traced the rule’s origin to Gibson v Leonard, 143 Ill 182; 32 NE 182 (1892), an Illinois case in which the plaintiff firefighter was classified as a licensee, one of the three traditional premises liability categories, which also includes invitees and trespassers. Several jurisdictions have analyzed the duty owed a firefighter by an owner or occupier of land within these three categories. See Kreski, supra at 359, citing anno: Liability of owner or occupant of premises to fireman coming thereon in discharge of his duty, 11 ALR4th 597. Post-Gibson, courts in other jurisdictions have vacillated considerably regarding in which category firefighters should be classified. Id.
Although Kreski did not envision a categorical rule, this Court held that, “fire fighters or police officers may not recover for injuries occasioned by the negligence which caused their presence on the premises in their professional capacities.” Id. at 372.

 Id. at 367-368.

 Id. at 368.

 Id.

 Id. at 374-376.

 Id.

 439 Mich 186; 482 NW2d 696 (1992) (applying the firemen’s rule to bar a tort lawsuit arising from injury sustained by a police officer in a public street).

 See Stehlik v Johnson, 204 Mich App 53; 514 NW2d 508 (1994) (Weaver, P.J., dissenting) (applying the fireman’s rule established by this Court); 206 Mich App 83; 520 NW2d 633 (1994) (rehearing) (adopting reasoning similar to the Weaver dissent for the majority opinion).

 In Reetz, the plaintiff police officer, responding to a breaking and entering call, entered a closed bar through the window. The premises were dark when the plaintiff unknowingly stepped into a trap door, fell ten feet below, and sustained serious injuries. Reetz illustrates the unique circumstances in which firefighters and police officers arrive on premises as this Court noted in Kreski and as discussed. Kreski, supra at 355.