Court Opinion

ID: 9486215
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:41:10.41909+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:35.064078
License: Public Domain

RICHARD S. ARNOLD, Chief Judge,
dissenting,
joined by McMILLIAN and WOLLMAN, Circuit Judges.
I would grant the suggestion for rehearing en banc to consider two questions raised by the petitioner Lloyd Sehlup.
1. Sehlup argues that he is actually innocent of the crime of capital murder in the sense necessary to enable this Court to avoid the state’s procedural defenses and reach the merits of his contention that his trial counsel was ineffective. In assessing this claim, our panel applied the rule of McCoy v. Lockhart, 969 F.2d 649 (8th Cir.1992). In McCoy, we held that a miscarriage of justice for purposes of avoiding procedural defenses can be found only when petitioner has shown by clear and convincing evidence that but for the constitutional error, no reasonable juror could find him guilty. 969 F.2d at 661. The McCoy Court lifted this standard from Sawyer v. Whitley, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992), a case having to do only with the question of punishment, not that of guilt or innocence.
As our panel in the present case acknowledged, there is some warrant for Schlup’s argument that Sawyer was intended by the Supreme Court to apply only to questions of punishment, and that the Sawyer opinion itself preserves unchanged, for purposes of the guilt-phase, the earlier standard of Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 106 S.Ct. *7552616, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986) (requiring a petitioner to show a fair probability that, in light of all the evidence, the jury would have entertained a reasonable doubt of his guilt). See Sawyer, — U.S. at - n. 5, 112 S.Ct. at 2519 n. 5.
Our panel did what it had to do. It was bound to follow McCoy and it did not, as a panel, err in doing so. It seems to me, though, that there is a substantial question whether McCoy correctly interpreted Sawyer. This is a question of great importance in habeas corpus jurisprudence, and I believe it qualifies as deserving of this Court’s en banc time.
2.- Petitioner raises another “innocence” issue — this one an independent ground for habeas relief, rather than just a gateway through which procedural defenses can be avoided. As I understand the various opinions in Herrera v. Collins, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 853, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), a majority of the Court appears to believe that, in a sufficiently strong case, innocence would be a ground for habeas relief. The case would have to be “truly persuasive” and “extraordinary.” We know that these standards were not met in Herrera itself or in Delo v. Blair, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2922, 125 L.Ed.2d 751 (1993) (per curiam). In Blair, a stay of execution was dissolved on the ground that the evidence of innocence was no more persuasive than that presented in Herrera.
In my view, it is likely that Sehlup’s evidence of innocence is substantially more persuasive than Herrera’s or Blair’s. I am not nearly so familiar with the record as the members of the panel, but Judge Heaney’s dissent convinces me that there is at least a substantial likelihood that a trier of fact would consider Schlup’s evidence sufficiently persuasive to meet the high Herrera standard if an evidentiary hearing were held. To be sure, there are contradictions in both sides’ evidence, and I agree with the panel that, even after all of the new evidence is considered, a reasonable jury could still find Sehlup guilty. In this sense, the Herrera standard seems easier to meet than the Sawyer standard, which is quite close to that of Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). In other words, under Herrera, if evidence is newly discovered, a habeas petitioner could obtain relief by making a “truly persuasive” or “extraordinary” case, even if, after considering the new evidence, á reasonable jury could still convict him.
This, at any rate, seems to me the present state of the law. If I am right, Sehlup may have a substantial ground for relief. Whether he does or not is admittedly a fact-intensive question, not the sort of thing of which en banc proceedings are normally made. But where human life is at stake, I believe rehearing en banc is appropriate whenever a petitioner makes a substantial claim, even if it is fact-specific.
For these reasons, I would grant the suggestion for rehearing en banc, and I respectfully dissent from the order denying it.