Court Opinion

ID: 9919397
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-18 15:05:16.591919+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:10.499175
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13411

              COMMONWEALTH   vs.   DANTE S. PADILLA.

                        January 18, 2024.

Pretrial Detention. Bail. Department of Youth Services.
     Statute, Construction. Moot Question.

     This case is before us on three questions reported by a
Superior Court judge, pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P. 34, as
amended, 442 Mass. 1501 (2004). The parties agree that the
first and second questions have since been answered by this
court's recent opinion in Nicholas-Taylor v. Commonwealth, 490
Mass. 552 (2022). The third question asks for a determination
whether G. L. c. 119, § 68, eighth par., which concerns the
pretrial confinement of juveniles who have been charged with
murder, is unconstitutional. With some minor points of
clarification, we agree that our opinion in Nicholas-Taylor,
supra, controls the answers to the first and second questions.
However, for the reasons discussed infra, we decline to answer
the third question concerning the constitutionality of the
statute, where the issue has become moot in the circumstances of
this case.1

     1. Background. The defendant was indicted in the Superior
Court in Suffolk County for murder in the second degree, among
other charges, when he was sixteen years old. He was ordered

     1 We acknowledge the amicus brief filed jointly by the youth
advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel Services,
the Massachusetts Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and
Citizens for Juvenile Justice in support of the defendant. We
also allow the motion filed by the Department of Youth Services
(DYS) seeking leave to respond to the amici. See Mass. R. A. P.
17 (b), as appearing in 481 Mass. 1635 (2019).
                                                                   2

held without bail pending trial. Pursuant to G. L. c. 119,
§ 68, eighth par., the court was required to commit him "to the
custody of the sheriff" for his pretrial detention. The Suffolk
County sheriff entered into a "courtesy" arrangement with the
Department of Youth Services (DYS), whereby the defendant would
be held at a DYS facility until his eighteenth birthday.

     In advance of the defendant's eighteenth birthday, he was
informed that, upon turning eighteen, he would be returned to
the sheriff for placement in an adult facility for the remainder
of his pretrial detention. In an attempt to facilitate the
defendant's continued placement with DYS, a judge in the
Superior Court ordered that the defendant be released on
personal recognizance on the murder charge, held on cash bail on
one of the related nonmurder charges, and remain held by DYS
pending further court order. Thereafter, DYS entered the case
as an interested party and moved for reconsideration of the bail
order or, in the alternative, for the judge to report questions
of law concerning the court's authority to impose such an order.
The judge chose to report the following three questions to the
Appeals Court:

     1. "Does G. L. c. 119, § 68[,] allow a Superior Court
     judge to commit a person under age [eighteen] charged with
     committing murder in the first or second degree pursuant to
     G. L. c. 119, § 74[,] to DYS's care as a pre-trial detainee
     pending disposition of the murder charge(s)?"

     2. "If the answer to question 1 is 'No,' can a Superior
     Court judge set bail on a charge related to, but other than
     murder in the first or second degree, charged pursuant to
     G. L. c. 119, § 74, whether severed or joined, such that a
     person under age [eighteen] is not held on bail on the
     murder charge and the last paragraph of G. L. c. 119,
     § 68[,] does not apply, thus committing a person under age
     [eighteen] to DYS's care as a pre-trial detainee pending
     disposition of the murder charge(s)?"

     3. "If the answer[s] to questions 1 and 2 are 'No,' is the
     last paragraph of G. L. c. 119, § 68[,] unconstitutional?"

     We subsequently transferred the matter from the Appeals
Court on our own motion.2

     2 The defendant has since turned eighteen and pleaded guilty
to, inter alia, the lesser charge of manslaughter, rendering
this appeal moot. DYS nonetheless urges the court to answer the
                                                                   3

     2. Discussion. a. First and second questions. The
parties assert, and we agree, that this court's recent opinion
in Nicholas-Taylor v. Commonwealth, 490 Mass. 552 (2022),
controls the answers to the first and second questions.
However, in light of ambiguous phrasing that appears in both
questions, we begin by clarifying their meaning.

     The first two questions are phrased in terms of the trial
court judge's ability to commit an individual to "DYS's care" as
a pretrial detainee. The report from the Superior Court
includes the parties' joint stipulation that the current
practice of DYS is to accept pretrial "care" of juvenile
defendants charged with murder until their eighteenth birthday.3
See G. L. c. 119, § 68, first par. (permitting court to commit
juveniles, other than those charged with murder, "to the care"
of DYS prior to trial). Taken together, these statements would
seem to suggest that the first two reported questions concern
the legality of DYS's current practice of housing pretrial
detainees charged with murder until their eighteenth birthday.
However, a closer review of the stipulated record4 indicates that
this is not the issue at stake in the reported questions.

     Although DYS houses certain juvenile defendants charged
with murder pretrial, it does not do so by court order but
pursuant to an agreement with the county sheriff that is
designed to accommodate Federal law. As we noted in Nicholas-

reported questions, as did the defendant in his brief before the
Appeals Court. We agree that the questions raised are of public
importance, and we recognize that the appeal has been fully
briefed by both parties. See Commonwealth v. Humberto H., 466
Mass. 562, 573 (2013); Commonwealth v. Lester L., 445 Mass. 250,
253 (2005) (reaching reported questions about statute concerning
pretrial detention where issue was of recurring importance, but
very likely to evade review). However, we decline to answer the
third reported question for the reasons discussed in the last
section of this decision.

     3 Throughout this opinion, we use the term "juvenile
defendant" to refer to a defendant who was under the age of
eighteen at the time of the commission of the offense. See
Nicholas-Taylor v. Commonwealth, 490 Mass. 552, 552 n.1 (2022).

     4 With the assent of the defendant, DYS has filed a motion
to expand the record to include a supplemental appendix. We
hereby allow that motion.
                                                                   4

Taylor, 490 Mass. at 554 & n.5, certain Federal grant programs
generally restrict individuals under eighteen from having "sight
or sound contact" with the adult population of a detention
facility. See 34 U.S.C. § 11133(a)(11),(12),(13); 28 C.F.R.
§ 115.14. County sheriffs lack detention facilities that are
capable of accommodating this requirement. As a result, when a
sheriff receives custody of a juvenile defendant charged with
murder, the sheriff requests that DYS agree to temporarily hold
the defendant on a "courtesy" basis. Under a courtesy hold
agreement, the juvenile defendant is held in a restrictive, so-
called "hardware secure" program within a DYS facility until his
or her eighteenth birthday. For the duration of the courtesy
hold, the sheriff retains responsibility for the juvenile's
court transportation and security, medical and dental care, and
mental health treatment. Since 2017, the average number of
juvenile defendants held by DYS under this arrangement has
hovered between four and five individuals.

     In the proceedings below, no party contested the ability of
the Suffolk County sheriff to enter into a courtesy agreement
with DYS to hold the defendant until he turned eighteen.
Rather, the reported questions arose out of DYS's challenge to
the bail order, issued shortly before the defendant's eighteenth
birthday, placing him in DYS custody and ordering that he remain
held at a DYS facility until further order of the court. The
judge below indicated that the questions were being reported for
the purpose of assessing whether the defendant could "remain in
DYS custody during the pendency of the charges after turning age
[eighteen]." Accordingly, we construe the first and second
questions as concerning whether the judge has the authority to
commit a juvenile defendant charged with murder to the custody
of DYS.

     So construed, the first and second questions have been
answered in the negative in this court's recent opinion in
Nicholas-Taylor. There, we observed that the plain language of
G. L. c. 119, § 68, "is clear: if a juvenile offender is
charged with murder and held pending trial, he or she is to be
committed to the custody of the sheriff." Nicholas-Taylor, 490
Mass. at 557. A trial court judge may not seek to sidestep the
statutory language by ordering that a juvenile defendant charged
with murder be committed to the custody of DYS on a related
nonmurder offense that has been properly joined.5 See id.

    5  We note that the second question is phrased in terms of
setting bail on a related nonmurder charge, "whether severed or
joined" with the murder charge. Neither this case nor Nicholas-
                                                                   5

Rather, "where a juvenile defendant charged with murder and a
nonmurder offense properly joined pursuant to Mass. R. Crim. P.
9 (a)[, 378 Mass. 859 (1979),] is held by the Superior Court for
trial, the plain language of G. L. c. 119, § 68, requires that
the Superior Court judge commit the defendant to the custody of
the sheriff." Id. at 559. Accordingly, the answers to the
first and second questions are "No."

     b. Third question. The third reported question asks
whether, "[i]f the answer[s] to questions 1 and 2 are 'no,'
. . . the last paragraph of G. L. c. 119, § 68[,] [is]
unconstitutional." Put more simply, the third question asks
whether G. L. c. 119, § 68, eighth par., is unconstitutional
because it does not permit a Superior Court judge to commit a
juvenile defendant charged with murder and held for trial to the
custody of DYS.

     As a general matter, "[w]e do not decide constitutional
questions unless they must necessarily be reached" (citation
omitted). Dinkins v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 486 Mass. 605,
616 (2021). And in the context of reported questions, we are
reluctant to answer a question that calls for a "determination
of the constitutionality of [a statute] in the abstract."
Commonwealth v. Two Juveniles, 397 Mass. 261, 264–265 (1986)
("It is a traditional and salutary practice of this court to
decline to answer a constitutional question until the
circumstances of a case are established and require an answer to
the constitutional question"). This is particularly true where,
as here, the constitutional question has become moot. See note
2, supra. See also Matter of Sturtz, 410 Mass. 58, 60 (1991).
Although this court has exercised its discretion to reach a moot
constitutional question in certain circumstances, such as those
involving an issue of "broad importance" where the unresolved
question has resulted in ongoing uncertainty and confusion, we
decline to do so here. Commonwealth v. Feliz, 486 Mass. 510,
513-514 (2020). The defendant asks this court not to reach the
issue, and DYS has not provided a compelling reason for this
court to opine, in the abstract, as to the constitutionality of
the statute. Accordingly, we decline to provide an answer to
the third reported question.

Taylor concerned a charge that had been severed from the murder
indictment, and neither party has briefed the issue. Thus, we
construe and answer the second question only insofar as it
concerns related nonmurder charges properly joined with the
murder indictment, without expressing an opinion as to severed
charges. See Nicholas-Taylor, 490 Mass. at 559.
                                                                  6

     Conclusion. We answer "No" to the first and second
questions, as we have construed them, and decline to answer the
third question. See Commonwealth v. Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 91
(1985). The report is discharged, and the case is remanded to
the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

                                   So ordered.

     Katherine W. Briggs for Department of Youth Services.
     Eva G. Jellison for the defendant.
     Taylor Henley, Committee for Public Counsel Services, for
youth advocacy division of the Committee for Public Counsel
Services & others, amici curiae, submitted a brief.