Court Opinion

ID: 9956695
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-02 19:01:15.235176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:17:45.545156
License: Public Domain

United States Tax Court

                             162 T.C. No. 7

        MOHAMED K. ABDO AND FARDOWSA J. FARAH,
                      Petitioners

                                   v.

           COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,
                       Respondent

                              —————

Docket No. 5514-20.                                  Filed April 2, 2024.

                              —————

            R issued Ps a notice of deficiency dated December 2,
      2019. The notice specified March 2, 2020, as the last day
      to petition the Court. That date was not a Saturday,
      Sunday, or legal holiday in the District of Columbia.
      Ps mailed the Petition on March 17, 2020.

             Ps resided in Ohio at all relevant times. On March
      31, 2020, the President issued a major disaster declaration
      under the authority of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
      Relief and Emergency Assistance Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–
      5207, with respect to Ohio as a result of the COVID-19
      pandemic.      The declaration identified the disaster
      conditions as “beginning on January 20, 2020, and
      continuing.”

             On September 2, 2020, R filed a Motion to Dismiss
      for Lack of Jurisdiction on the ground that the Petition was
      not filed within the time prescribed by I.R.C. § 6213(a) or
      I.R.C. § 7502. Ps contend that I.R.C. § 7508A(d), which
      provides for a mandatory 60-day extension of certain tax-
      related deadlines by reason of a federally declared disaster,
      operated in conjunction with the President’s declaration to
      automatically extend the filing deadline.

                           Served 04/02/24
                                    2

              On June 11, 2021, final regulations were issued with
      respect to I.R.C. § 7508A(d). See Treas. Reg. § 301.7508A-
      1(g). R contends that the regulations apply to this case,
      that they are entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A.,
      Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and
      that the Petition was untimely filed under their provisions.
      Ps agree that Chevron provides the proper framework for
      the Court to review the regulations and that the deadline
      to file their Petition was not extended under the
      regulations. Ps contend, however, that the Petition was
      timely under all reasonable constructions of I.R.C.
      § 7508A(d) and that Treas. Reg. § 301.7508A-1(g)(1) and (2)
      is invalid.

              Held:      I.R.C. § 7508A(d) provides for an
      unambiguously self-executing postponement period for the
      filing of a petition with the Court for a redetermination of
      a deficiency.

             Held, further, Treas. Reg. § 301.7508A-1(g)(1)
      and (2) is invalid to the extent it limits the non-pension-
      related “time-sensitive acts that are postponed for the
      mandatory 60-day postponement period . . . [to] the acts
      determined to be postponed by the Secretary’s exercise of
      authority under [I.R.C. §] 7508A(a).”

            Held, further, Ps were entitled to an automatic,
      mandatory 60-day postponement period from January 20,
      2020, to at least March 20, 2020, to file their Petition.
      Ps’ Petition was filed timely, and we have jurisdiction.
      R’s Motion will be denied.

                               —————

Megan L. Sullivan and David L. Meenach, for petitioner.

Louis H. Hill and Eric O. Young, for respondent.

                               OPINION

      MARSHALL, Judge: This deficiency case is before the Court on
respondent’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction (Motion) on the
                                           3

ground that the petition was not filed within the time prescribed by
section 6213(a)1 or section 7502. To decide the Motion, we must
interpret for the first time section 7508A(d), which provides for the
mandatory 60-day extension of certain tax-related deadlines by reason
of a federally declared disaster. 2 We will deny respondent’s Motion for
the reasons set forth below.

                                    Background

        The following facts are derived from the pleadings, the parties’
Motion papers, and the Exhibits attached thereto. These facts are
stated solely for the purpose of ruling on the Motion and not as findings
of fact in this case. See Rule 1(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Pearson v.
Commissioner, 149 T.C. 424, 425 (2017). Petitioners resided in Ohio at
all relevant times. 3

       Respondent issued petitioners a notice of deficiency dated
December 2, 2019, in which respondent determined a $9,634 income tax
deficiency and a $166 accuracy-related penalty under section 6662(a) for
petitioners’ taxable year 2018. The 90th day after December 2, 2019,
was Sunday, March 1, 2020. The notice of deficiency specified the
following day, March 2, 2020, as the last day to petition the Court. That
date was not a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday in the District of
Columbia. The parties agree that petitioners mailed their Petition to
the Court on March 17, 2020.

      Between March 19 and July 9, 2020, the Court did not receive
mail because of the Court’s closure in response to the Coronavirus

        1 Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Internal Revenue

Code, Title 26 U.S.C., in effect at all relevant times, regulation references are to the
Code of Federal Regulations, Title 26 (Treas. Reg.), in effect at all relevant times, and
Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
        2 Section 7508A(d) has the heading “Mandatory 60-day extension.”    Although
60 days is a minimum duration, see § 7508A(d)(1) and (2), in keeping with the parties’
arguments and for ease of discussion throughout, we will generally refer to a section
7508A(d) extension as lasting 60 days.
        3 Absent stipulation to the contrary, any appeal of this case would lie to the

U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. See § 7482(b)(1)(A), (2). Where relevant
to the discussion, we note that court’s precedent. See Bontrager v. Commissioner, 151
T.C. 213, 215 n.2 (2018); Golsen v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 742, 757 (1970), aff’d, 445
F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971).
                                           4

Disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic.                 On July 10, 2020, the Court
received and filed the Petition.

       On March 13, 2020, the President of the United States declared a
nationwide emergency under section 501(b) of the Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (Stafford Act), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 5121–5207, as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic (Nationwide
Emergency Declaration). See Letter to Federal Agencies on an
Emergency Determination for the Coronavirus Disease 2019
(COVID-19) Pandemic Under the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act, 2020 Daily Comp. Pres. Doc. 159 (Mar. 13,
2020). The President also approved major disaster declarations for each
of the 50 states pursuant to section 401 of the Stafford Act. On
March 31, 2020, Pete Gaynor, the administrator of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), at the direction of the
President, signed DR-4507-OH (Ohio Disaster Declaration), which
declared the State of Ohio a major disaster area. See Ohio; Major
Disaster and Related Determinations, 85 Fed. Reg. 26,702 (May 5,
2020). As with each other state disaster declaration, the Ohio Disaster
Declaration identified the pandemic conditions warranting the
declaration as “beginning on January 20, 2020, and continuing.” See id.
at 26,703.

       The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) subsequently issued a series
of notices in which the stated purpose was to provide relief under section
7508A(a) pursuant to the Nationwide Emergency Declaration. Section
7508A(a) generally gives the Secretary of the Treasury (Secretary) or his
delegate (i.e., the IRS) the discretion to postpone certain tax-related
deadlines for up to one year for those taxpayers he or it determines to
be affected by a federally declared disaster. 4 Included in this series of
IRS notices was I.R.S. Notice 2020-23, 2020-18 I.R.B. 742, which was
issued on April 11, 2020. 5 Among other specified deadline extensions,
Notice 2020-23 extended the deadline for filing a Tax Court petition to
July 15, 2020, for those taxpayers who had a petition due to be filed on

        4 When discussing the conferee of discretion in section 7508A(a), we hereinafter

refer to the Secretary and IRS interchangeably. See § 7701(a)(11)(B), (12)(A)(i).
         5 Also included in this series were, e.g., I.R.S. Notice 2020-17, 2020-15 I.R.B.

590 (postponing the due date for making federal income tax payments), I.R.S. Notice
2020-18, 2020-15 I.R.B. 590 (postponing the due date for filing federal income tax
returns), and I.R.S. Notice 2020-20, 2020-16 I.R.B. 660 (postponing the due date for
filing federal gift and generation-skipping transfer tax returns and making federal gift
and generation-skipping transfer tax payments).
                                      5

or after April 1, 2020, and before July 15, 2020. Id. at 743–44. Notice
2020-23 specified, however, that it did not provide relief for the period
for filing a petition if that period expired before April 1, 2020. Id. at 744.

       On September 2, 2020, respondent filed the Motion on the ground
that the Petition was not filed within the time prescribed by section
6213(a) or section 7502. Section 6213(a) provides, in pertinent part, that
a taxpayer may file a petition with the Court for a redetermination of a
deficiency within 90 days after the notice of deficiency is mailed, not
counting Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday in the District of
Columbia as the last day. Section 7502 generally allows a timely mailed
petition to be treated as timely filed.

       On October 8, 2020, petitioners filed a Response to respondent’s
Motion. Proceeding pro se, petitioners stated in the Response that they
did not receive a copy of respondent’s Motion and requested a copy.
Thereafter, on October 19, 2020, petitioners filed a First Supplement to
their Response to respondent’s Motion. In the First Supplement,
petitioners stated: “We suggest the Tax Court has jurisdiction to hear
our case, and to mitigate to ‘zero’ the IRS assessment and return the
withheld refunds. We request the Tax Court to set a trial date in
Columbus, OH.”

       On November 19, 2020, counsel entered an appearance on
petitioners’ behalf and filed petitioners’ Supplemental Objection to
respondent’s Motion. In that filing, petitioners contended that section
7508A(d) operated in conjunction with the Ohio Disaster Declaration to
extend the deadline to file their Petition. Subsection (d) was added to
section 7508A on December 20, 2019, and made effective with respect to
federally declared disasters declared after that date.           Further
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-94, div. Q, § 205,
133 Stat. 2534, 3245–46 (2019). On January 13, 2021, the Treasury
Department and the IRS proposed regulations with respect to section
7508A(d). See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 301.7508A-1(g), 86 Fed. Reg. 2607,
2613 (Jan. 13, 2021). On February 12, 2021, respondent filed a reply to
petitioners’ supplemental objection, disputing that section 7508A(d)
applies in this case. On June 11, 2021, the Treasury Department and
the IRS issued final regulations with respect to section 7508A(d). See
Treas. Reg. § 301.7508A-1(g); T.D. 9950, 86 Fed. Reg. 31,146, 31,150
(June 11, 2021). The final regulations were issued following notice and
comment procedures. See T.D. 9950, 86 Fed. Reg. at 31,147; Prop. Treas.
Reg. § 301.7508A-1, 86 Fed. Reg. at 2607–08. In correspondence with
subsection (d), the final regulations were made effective with respect to
                                    6

disasters declared on or after December 21, 2019. See T.D. 9950, 86 Fed.
Reg. at 31,149–50.

       On August 29, 2023, the Court ordered the parties to address the
applicability of the final regulations to this case and the deference, if
any, to be given to the regulations. On October 31, 2023, the parties
filed their respective simultaneous briefs. On November 6, 2023, the
Court permitted the parties to file simultaneous answering briefs, which
were filed by respondent and petitioners on November 30, 2023, and
December 1, 2023, respectively.

      Respondent contends that the final regulations apply to this case,
they are entitled to deference under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and petitioners did
not timely file their Petition under their provisions. Petitioners agree
that Chevron provides the proper framework for the Court to review the
regulations and that the deadline to file their Petition was not extended
under the regulations. They contend, however, that the Petition was
timely filed under all reasonable constructions of section 7508A(d) and
that Treasury Regulation § 301.7508A-1(g)(1) and (2) is invalid.

                               Discussion

I.    The Statutory and Regulatory Text

      We first set forth the relevant statutory and regulatory text.

      A.     Section 7508A

      Section 7508A, as in effect when petitioners’ petition was filed,
provided as follows:

      Sec. 7508A. Authority to postpone certain deadlines by
      reason of Presidentially declared disaster or terroristic or
      military actions.
             (a) In general.—In the case of a taxpayer determined
      by the Secretary to be affected by a federally declared
      disaster (as defined by section 165(i)(5)(A)) or a terroristic
      or military action (as defined in section 692(c)(2)), the
      Secretary may specify a period of up to 1 year that may be
      disregarded in determining, under the internal revenue
      laws, in respect of any tax liability of such taxpayer—
                     (1) whether any of the acts described in
             paragraph (1) of section 7508(a) were performed
                             7

       within the time prescribed therefor (determined
       without regard to extension under any other
       provision of this subtitle for periods after the date
       (determined by the Secretary) of such disaster or
       action),
              (2) the amount of any interest, penalty,
       additional amount, or addition to the tax for periods
       after such date, and
              (3) the amount of any credit or refund.
       (b) Special rules regarding pensions, etc.—In the
case of a pension or other employee benefit plan, or any
sponsor, administrator, participant, beneficiary, or other
person with respect to such plan, affected by a disaster or
action described in subsection (a), the Secretary may
specify a period of up to 1 year which may be disregarded
in determining the date by which any action is required or
permitted to be completed under this title. No plan shall
be treated as failing to be operated in accordance with the
terms of the plan solely as the result of disregarding any
period by reason of the preceding sentence.
       (c) Special rules for overpayments.—The rules of
section 7508(b) shall apply for purposes of this section.
       (d) Mandatory 60-day extension.—
              (1) In general.—In the case of any qualified
       taxpayer, the period—
                     (A) beginning on the earliest incident
              date specified in the declaration to which the
              disaster area referred to in paragraph (2)
              relates, and
                     (B) ending on the date which is 60 days
              after the latest incident date so specified,
       shall be disregarded in the same manner as a period
       specified under subsection (a).
              (2) Qualified taxpayer.—For purposes of this
       subsection, the term “qualified taxpayer” means—
                     (A) any individual whose principal
              residence (for purposes of section 1033(h)(4))
              is located in a disaster area,
                     (B) any taxpayer if the taxpayer’s
              principal place of business (other than the
              business of performing services as an
              employee) is located in a disaster area,
                       8

              (C) any individual who is a relief
       worker affiliated with a              recognized
       government or philanthropic organization
       and who is assisting in a disaster area,
              (D) any taxpayer whose records
       necessary to meet a deadline for an act
       described     in    section    7508(a)(1)     are
       maintained in a disaster area,
              (E) any individual visiting a disaster
       area who was killed or injured as a result of
       the disaster, and
              (F) solely with respect to a joint return,
       any spouse of an individual described in any
       preceding subparagraph of this paragraph.
       (3) Disaster area.—For purposes of this
subsection, the term “disaster area” has the meaning
given such term under subparagraph (B) of section
165(i)(5) with respect to a Federally declared
disaster (as defined in subparagraph (A) of such
section).
       (4) Application to rules regarding pensions.—
In the case of any person described in subsection (b),
a rule similar to the rule of paragraph (1) shall apply
for purposes of subsection (b) with respect to—
              (A) making contributions to a qualified
       retirement plan (within the meaning of
       section 4974(c)) under section 219(f)(3),
       404(a)(6), 404(h)(1)(B), or 404(m)(2),
              (B) making distributions under section
       408(d)(4),
              (C) recharacterizing contributions
       under section 408A(d)(6), and
              (D) making a rollover under section
       402(c), 403(a)(4), 403(b)(8), or 408(d)(3).
       (5) Coordination with periods specified by the
Secretary.—Any period described in paragraph (1)
with respect to any person (including by reason of
the application of paragraph (4)) shall be in addition
to (or concurrent with, as the case may be) any
period specified under subsection (a) or (b) with
respect to such person.
                                   9

      B.     Treasury Regulation § 301.7508A-1(g)

        The final regulations issued with respect to section 7508A(d) set
forth, in pertinent part, the following rules as to its operation:

      Treas. Reg. § 301.7508A-1(g) Mandatory 60-day
      postponement—
             (1) In general. In addition to (or concurrent with)
      the postponement period specified by the Secretary in an
      exercise of the authority under section 7508A(a) to
      postpone time-sensitive acts by reason of a federally
      declared disaster, qualified taxpayers (as defined in section
      7508A(d)(2)) are entitled to a mandatory 60-day
      postponement period during which the time to perform
      those time-sensitive acts is disregarded in the same
      manner as under section 7508A(a). The rules of this
      paragraph (g)(1) apply with respect to a postponement
      period specified by the Secretary under section 7508A(b),
      to postpone acts as provided in section 7508A(d)(4). Except
      for the acts set forth in paragraph (g)(2) of this section,
      section 7508A(d) does not apply to postpone any acts.
             (2) Acts postponed. The time-sensitive acts that are
      postponed for the mandatory 60-day postponement period
      are the acts determined to be postponed by the Secretary’s
      exercise of authority under section 7508A(a) or (b). In
      addition, in the case of any person described in section
      7508A(b), the time-sensitive acts postponed for the
      mandatory 60-day postponement period include those
      described in section 7508A(d)(4):
                    (i) Making contributions to a qualified
             retirement plan (within the meaning of section
             4974(c)) under section 219(f)(3), 404(a)(6),
             404(h)(1)(B), or 404(m)(2);
                    (ii) Making distributions under section
             408(d)(4);
                    (iii) Recharacterizing contributions under
             section 408A(d)(6); and
                    (iv) Making a rollover under section 402(c),
             403(a)(4), 403(b)(8), or 408(d)(3).
                                   10

II.   The Parties’ Contentions, In General

       Respondent contends that, because they did not mail their
Petition until March 17, 2020, petitioners failed to file their Petition
within the time prescribed by sections 6213(a) and 7502 and the Court
therefore lacks jurisdiction to redetermine the income tax deficiency
determined for their taxable year 2018. See Hallmark Rsch. Collective
v. Commissioner, 159 T.C. 126 (2022) (reaffirming that a timely filed
petition is a prerequisite to the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction in a
deficiency case); see also Sanders v. Commissioner, No. 15143-22,
161 T.C. (Nov. 2, 2023) (reaffirming the Court’s holding in Hallmark
Rsch. Collective). Petitioners contend that section 7508A(d) entitled
them to an automatic, mandatory postponement of time to file until
March 21, 2020, and that their Petition was therefore timely. The
parties’ dispute centers on the proper interpretation of section 7508A(d)
and whether Treasury Regulation § 301.7508A-1(g)(1) and (2) provides
a valid construction of the statute.

       Section 7508A(d)(1) provides that, in the case of any “qualified
taxpayer,” the period beginning on the earliest incident date specified in
the declaration to which the relevant disaster area relates and ending
on the date which is 60 days after the latest incident date so specified
“shall be disregarded in the same manner as a period specified under
[section 7508A(a)].”      Section 7508A(d)(2)(A) defines a “qualified
taxpayer” to include an individual whose principal residence is located
in a disaster area. Section 7508A(d)(3), by cross-reference to section
165(i)(5)(A) and (B), defines a disaster area as an area determined by
the President to warrant federal assistance under the Stafford Act.
Petitioners contend that they are qualified taxpayers because they
resided in Ohio at all relevant times.

       Petitioners argue that Congress clearly intended section 7508A(d)
to operate in a mandatory and automatic manner and, therefore, the
Secretary’s interpretation of section 7508A(d) fails under Chevron
step 1. Specifically, petitioners contend that section 7508A(d) provides
a mandatory extension of the deadlines and gives no discretion to the
Secretary. In effect, petitioners argue that section 7508A(d)(1) provides
an unambiguously self-executing postponement period that, by virtue of
its “shall be disregarded in the same manner as a period specified under
[section 7508A(a)]” language, incorporates all of the acts referenced by
section 7508A(a). Section 7508A(a) references “any of the acts described
in paragraph (1) of section 7508(a).” Section 7508(a)(1) generally
postpones the time for performing certain tax-related acts, including the
                                           11

filing of a petition with the Court for a redetermination of a deficiency,
for individuals serving in a combat zone for the U.S. Armed Forces. 6 See
§ 7508(a)(1)(C). Petitioners therefore conclude that they were entitled
to an automatic, mandatory 60-day postponement period from
January 20, 2020, the earliest incident date specified in the Ohio
Disaster Declaration, 7 to March 21, 2020, to file their Petition. 8

       In reaching this conclusion, petitioners interpret section 7508A(d)
to provide for “a mandatory postponement period for taxpayers affected

        6 As in effect when petitioners’ Petition was filed, section 7508(a)(1) provided

11 categories of acts as follows:
                 (A) Filing any return of income, estate, gift, employment, or
        excise tax;
                 (B) Payment of any income, estate, gift, employment, or excise
        tax or any installment thereof or of any other liability to the United
        States in respect thereof;
                 (C) Filing a petition with the Tax Court for redetermination of
        a deficiency, or for review of a decision rendered by the Tax Court;
                 (D) Allowance of a credit or refund of any tax;
                 (E) Filing a claim for credit or refund of any tax;
                 (F) Bringing suit upon any such claim for credit or refund;
                 (G) Assessment of any tax;
                 (H) Giving or making any notice or demand for the payment of
        any tax, or with respect to any liability to the United States in respect
        of any tax;
                 (I) Collection, by the Secretary, by levy or otherwise, of the
        amount of any liability in respect of any tax;
                 (J) Bringing suit by the United States, or any officer on its
        behalf, in respect of any liability in respect of any tax; and
                 (K) Any other act required or permitted under the internal
        revenue laws specified by the Secretary . . . .
        7 Petitioners suggest that section 7508A(d)(1) does not require that the earliest

and latest specified incident dates be different dates and that, because January 20,
2020, is the only incident date specified in the Ohio Disaster Declaration, it is both the
earliest and latest specified date. Respondent raises no dispute in this regard.
        8 Petitioners calculate March 21, 2020, as the 60th day after January 20, 2020.

Because 2020 was a leap year, however, we note that March 20, 2020, is in fact the
60th day after January 20, 2020.
        We further note that on February 10, 2023, FEMA and the Department of
Homeland Security amended the “notices of major disaster declarations and related
determinations resulting from the . . . pandemic beginning on January 20, 2020.”
Major Disaster Declarations and Related Determinations: Expiration of COVID-19-
Related Measures, 88 Fed. Reg. 8884 (Feb. 10, 2023). The amendments provided that
“the incident period for all COVID-19 major disaster declarations and the nationwide
emergency declaration will close effective May 11, 2023.” Id. Because these
amendments have no impact on the outcome of this case, we address them no further.
                                   12

by federally declared disasters, separate from but complementing the
discretionary postponement provision in section 7508A(a).” And,
because Treasury Regulation § 301.7508A-1(g)(1) and (2) limits the acts
subject to the mandatory postponement period of section 7508A(d) to
“the acts determined to be postponed by the Secretary’s exercise of
authority under section 7508A(a) or (b),” petitioners construe the
regulations as “nullify[ing] subsection (d), in its entirety, and
convert[ing] a mandatory provision to a permissive provision.”
Contending that the regulations thereby conflict with the statutory
scheme and its legislative purpose, petitioners stake their position that
the regulations are invalid under the Chevron standard.

        Respondent contends that the “shall be disregarded in the same
manner as a period specified under [section 7508A(a)]” language of
section 7508A(d)(1) does not clearly provide a self-executing
postponement period for the acts referenced by section 7508A(a) but that
it is instead silent and ambiguous as to the acts to which the mandatory
postponement period applies. To that end, respondent further contends
that the statute is ambiguous in two ways: First, Congress did not
address what specific time-sensitive acts are postponed pursuant to
section 7508A(d), and second, Congress did not directly address
federally declared disasters without an incident date under section
7508A. In respondent’s view, the regulations are necessary to resolve
these ambiguities.

       Respondent contends that the regulations provide a permissible
and reasonable construction of the statute that builds upon the
“statutory nexus between the time-sensitive acts in I.R.C. § 7508A(a)
and (d).” Consequently, he concludes that the regulations are entitled
to Chevron deference. Respondent notes that the Secretary did not use
his discretion under section 7508A(a) in response to the Ohio Disaster
Declaration to postpone the time for petitioners to file a petition with
the Court. Instead, he points us to the Nationwide Emergency
Declaration on which the Secretary relied to issue Notice 2020-23.
Because the Secretary relied on the Nationwide Emergency Declaration
rather than the Ohio Disaster Declaration to extend certain timeframes
pursuant to section 7508A(a), respondent argues that the Ohio Disaster
Declaration does not trigger section 7508A(d). In his view, the
regulations implement respondent’s reading of section 7508A(d) and
dictate that the Ohio Disaster Declaration did not extend the time for
petitioners to file their Petition. We disagree.
                                     13

III.   Chevron Analysis

       To interpret section 7508A(d) and consider whether Treasury
Regulation § 301.7508A-1(g)(1) and (2) provides a valid construction of
the statute, we turn to Chevron and its familiar two-step analysis. In
Chevron, the Supreme Court provided the following framework for court
review of an agency’s authoritative construction of a statute:

              When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the
       statute which it administers, it is confronted with two
       questions. First, always, is the question whether Congress
       has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
       intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for
       the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
       unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however,
       the court determines Congress has not directly addressed
       the precise question at issue, the court does not simply
       impose its own construction on the statute, as would be
       necessary in the absence of an administrative
       interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
       with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court
       is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
       construction of the statute.

Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (footnotes omitted).

       At step 1 of the Chevron analysis, we must therefore ask whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. Id. at 842.
And, if we determine the statute is silent or ambiguous on the point, we
proceed to Chevron step 2 where we ask whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute. Id. at 843.
Consequently, we do not ask whether the agency’s statutory
interpretation is the best one possible. See Atl. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
Commissioner, 523 U.S. 382, 389 (1998). Instead, we inquire only
whether the agency made a reasonable policy choice in reaching its
interpretation. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet
Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 986 (2005); see also Ohio Periodical Distribs., Inc.
v. Commissioner, 105 F.3d 322, 326 (6th Cir. 1997), aff’g T.C. Memo.
1995-496. And we defer to the agency’s interpretation unless it is
“arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.” Chevron,
467 U.S. at 843–44; see also Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v.
United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011) (confirming that Chevron deference
                                           14

applies to both specific authority and general authority Treasury
regulations).

       Turning here to Chevron step 1, we identify the precise question
at issue as whether section 7508A(d) automatically entitles a qualified
taxpayer to a mandatory extension to file a petition with the Tax Court
in the context of a federal disaster declaration containing an incident
date. To determine whether Congress has spoken to this question, we
consider the “plain” and “literal” language of the statute itself, the
specific context in which the language is used, and the broader context
of the statute as a whole. See Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 519 U.S. 337,
341 (1997); Allen v. United States, 83 F.4th 564, 569 (6th Cir. 2023).
In so doing, we employ the traditional tools of statutory construction,
including the canons of construction. 9 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.9;
Gun Owners of Am., Inc. v. Garland, 19 F.4th 890, 904 (6th Cir. 2021);
Sunrise Coop., Inc., 891 F.3d at 656.

       Petitioners argue that section 7508A(d) unambiguously provides
a self-executing postponement period for all of the tax-related acts
included in section 7508(a)(1) by cross-reference to section 7508A(a). In
their view, the contrast of the discretionary language of section 7508A(a)
with the mandatory language of section 7508A(d) demonstrates that
Congress intended these tax deadlines to be automatically extended
when it added subsection (d). In support of this view, petitioners provide
on brief the following table to illustrate the distinctions between the
language of subsection (a) and subsection (d)(1): 10

        9 The Sixth Circuit has explained that “[w]hen a statute is unambiguous, resort

to legislative history and policy considerations is improper.” Sunrise Coop., Inc. v.
USDA, 891 F.3d 652, 658 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Koenig Sporting Goods, Inc. v. Morse
Rd. Co. (In re Koenig), 203 F.3d 986, 988 (6th Cir. 2000)). As we conclude infra that
the statute at issue is unambiguous, we do not consider legislative history in our
application of the canons of construction. See Square D Co. & Subs. v. Commissioner,
118 T.C. 299, 310 n.6 (2002) (“The extent to which extrinsic factors (i.e., factors outside
the statutory language itself) may be considered in step 1 of a Chevron analysis may
not be entirely clear . . . . In light of the position of the Court of Appeals, we do not
consider legislative history as part of our analysis of step 1 of Chevron in the instant
case.”), aff’d, 438 F.3d 739 (7th Cir. 2006).
        10 Petitioners reproduced this table from a comment submitted with respect to

the proposed regulations. See Jonathan L. Holbrook & Spencer F. Walters, Comment
on Mandatory 60-Day Postponement of Certain Tax-Related Deadlines by Reason of a
Federally Declared Disaster, at 5 (Mar. 14, 2021), https://www.regulations.gov/
comment/IRS-2021-0002-0008 (choose “Download”).
                                          15

   Aspect                     Subsection (a)                    [Subsection] (d)(1)
Whether to      Discretionary:                                 Automatic:
disregard       “the Secretary may specify a period”           “the period . . . shall be
                                                               disregarded”
How long to     Discretionary: “up to 1 year”                  Automatic:
disregard                                                      “beginning on the
                                                               earliest          incident
                                                               [date*] . . . and ending
                                                               on the date which is 60
                                                               days after the latest
                                                               incident date”
For whom to     Discretionary:                                 Automatic:
disregard       “a    taxpayer     determined        by   the  “any             qualified
                Secretary to be affected”                      taxpayer”
For     what Discretionary:                                    Automatic:
purposes to “a period . . . that may be disregarded in         “the period . . .
disregard       determining . . . any of the acts described in shall[***]              be
                paragraph (1) of section 7508(a)[**] . . . the disregarded in the
                amount of any interest, penalty, additional    same manner as a
                amount, or addition to tax . . . and the       period specified under
                amount of any credit or refund”                subsection (a)”
   *Petitioners’ brief incorrectly omitted this word.
   **Petitioners’ brief incorrectly refers to section 7508A(a) here.
   ***Emphasis added.

According to petitioners, respondent disregards “this clear difference in
language between subsections (a) and (d).”

        Respondent, in turn, contends that section 7508A(d) is silent and
ambiguous “in at least two ways . . . . First, Congress did not identify
the time sensitive acts subject to I.R.C. § 7508A(d). Second, Congress
did not specify how the mandatory postponement in I.R.C. § 7508A(d)
applies to a Federal disaster declaration without an incident date.”
Respondent first argues that the statute is ambiguous regarding
whether a taxpayer has an automatic, mandatory postponement period
for filing a Tax Court petition. Respondent contends this is so because,
except for the rules regarding pensions described in section 7508A(d)(4),
subsection (d) does not specify the time-sensitive acts to be postponed
during the mandatory postponement period but only that the period is
to be disregarded “in the same manner as a period specified under
subsection (a).” § 7508A(d)(1). Respondent disagrees with petitioners’
reading of the statute to state that section 7508A(d) requires every act
that the Secretary has discretion to postpone under section 7508A(a) to
be independently postponed for a mandatory period under section
7508A(d), regardless of whether the Secretary actually postponed any
acts under section 7508A(a). According to respondent, this approach
“clearly was not required by the language” of the statute. Respondent
                                    16

also argues that the statute is ambiguous because Congress did not
specify how the mandatory postponement period in section 7508A(d)
applies to a federal disaster declaration without an incident date.
Concluding that the statute is ambiguous for these two reasons,
respondent urges us to move on to Chevron step 2.

        A provision will be considered ambiguous where the disputed
language is “reasonably susceptible of different interpretations.”
Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 470
U.S. 451, 473 n.27 (1985); see also Gun Owners of Am., Inc., 19 F.4th
at 904–05 (“[B]oth terms admit of more than one interpretation—that is,
they are ambiguous.”); All. for Cmty. Media v. FCC, 529 F.3d 763, 778
(6th Cir. 2008); Lansing Dairy, Inc. v. Espy, 39 F.3d 1339, 1351 (6th Cir.
1994). We conclude that, in the context of a federal disaster declaration
containing an incident date, subsection (d) is not reasonably susceptible
of different interpretations with respect to whether a qualified taxpayer
is automatically entitled to a mandatory extension to file a petition with
the Tax Court. We agree with petitioners that the natural reading of
subsection (d) is that a qualified taxpayer is so entitled.

       We first consider the mandatory nature of subsection (d). As the
foregoing chart demonstrates, the mandatory language of subsection (d)
stands in stark contrast to the discretionary language of subsection (a).
Under the discretionary language of section 7508A(a), the Secretary
may specify (1) whether a period is disregarded, (2) how long a period is
disregarded, (3) for whom a period is disregarded, and (4) for what
purposes a period is disregarded.          The mandatory language of
subsection (d), however, provides the Secretary no discretion whatsoever
regarding any of these four aspects of the extension. Instead,
subsection (d) provides that, for a defined person, a defined period “shall
be disregarded” in a defined manner. On the basis of the plain and
literal language of the statute, we thus read Congress to have clearly
intended to provide for a postponement period that is mandatory.
See Kingdomware Techs., Inc. v. United States, 579 U.S. 162, 172 (2016)
(“When a statute distinguishes between ‘may’ and ‘shall,’ it is generally
clear that ‘shall’ imposes a mandatory duty.”); see also Antonin Scalia &
Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 112
(2012) (describing the “Mandatory/Permissive Canon”).

       The heading of subsection (d)—“Mandatory 60-day extension”—
further confirms this reading. As has been established, “the title of a
statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain meaning of
the text.” See Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 331 U.S.
                                     17

519, 528–29 (1947); see also § 7806(b) (providing that no “descriptive
matter relating to the content of this title [shall] be given any legal
effect”). They are, however, “‘tools available for the resolution of a doubt’
about the meaning of a statute.” Almendarez-Torres v. United States,
523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998) (quoting Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen, 331 U.S.
at 529); United States v. Nakhleh, 895 F.3d 838, 841 (6th Cir. 2018)
(quoting Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 234). In the case of section
7508A(d), the heading is not at any variance with the text. The language
of subsection (d) speaks of the defined postponement period in
mandatory terms, and the heading uses the term “mandatory” itself.
Consequently, this is an instance in which the heading is of some use for
interpretative purposes, and it supports our reading of the statute.
See Caltex Oil Venture v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 18, 28 (2012); see also
Scalia & Garner, supra, at 221 (describing the “Title-and-Headings
Canon”).

       Having established our general understanding that section
7508A(d) creates a mandatory postponement period, we next consider
whether the statute requires that this period automatically extend the
date for filing a Tax Court petition by at least 60 days. Respondent
argues that the statute is silent and hence ambiguous in this regard.
Petitioners, meanwhile, contend that section 7508A(d)(1) provides an
unambiguously self-executing postponement period that, by virtue of
the requirement that the period “shall be disregarded in the same
manner as a period specified under [section 7508A(a)],” incorporates all
of the acts referenced by section 7508A(a), including the deadline to file
a petition with the Tax Court.

      Petitioners allow that “[a]t first glance it seems possible” the “in
the same manner” language of subsection (d)(1) could be construed as
ambiguous, referring either to the specific time-sensitive acts which may
be postponed by operation of section 7508A(a) or to the process by which
the Secretary grants a postponement under subsection (a). They argue,
however, that full consideration of the statute makes clear that
respondent’s interpretation conflicts with both the plain wording and
the mandatory and specific nature of subsection (d). Petitioners query:
“Why would Congress provide qualified taxpayers with an automatic
60-day extension, only to have it limited, or even nullified if the
Secretary doesn’t act? That makes no sense.”

      We acknowledge that, in other statutory contexts, the phrase “in
the same manner” has been construed as meaning “to use the same
‘methodology and procedures.’” See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v.
                                    18

Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 545 (2012) (interpreting the section 5000A(g)(1)
requirement that a “[s]hared responsibility payment” made with respect
to minimum essential healthcare coverage “be assessed and collected in
the same manner” as tax penalties); Michigan v. DeVos, 481 F. Supp. 3d
984, 992 (N.D. Cal. 2020) (interpreting the requirement of Coronavirus
Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 18005,
134 Stat. 281, 568 (2020), that local educational agencies receiving
certain funds “provide equitable services in the same manner” as
provided under section 1117 of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965). We further acknowledge that the phrase has
also been interpreted as ambiguous. See Ass’n of Irritated Residents v.
EPA, 790 F.3d 934, 948 (9th Cir. 2015) (construing the 42 U.S.C.
§ 7410(k)(6) provision for the correction of an erroneous approval,
disapproval or promulgation by the Environmental Protection Agency
“in the same manner as” such approval, disapproval, or promulgation as
ambiguous with respect to whether the phrase imposed a procedural or
substantive requirement); see also Swallows Holding, Ltd. v.
Commissioner, 515 F.3d 162, 171 (3d Cir. 2008) (construing the section
882(c)(2) requirement that certain returns be filed “in the manner
prescribed in subtitle F” as ambiguous with respect to whether the term
“manner” included an element of timeliness), vacating and remanding
126 T.C. 96 (2006). Upon conducting the required consideration of the
plain and literal language of section 7508A(d), the specific context in
which the language is used, and the broader context of the statute as a
whole, however, we conclude that the “in the same manner” language of
this statute is not “reasonably susceptible” of being interpreted to refer
to the process or procedure by which the Secretary grants a
postponement under subsection (a) or of demonstrating any ambiguity;
instead, it provides for an unambiguously self-executing postponement
period that incorporates all of the acts referenced by section 7508A(a).

      To understand the requirement that the subsection (d)
postponement period “shall be disregarded in the same manner as a
period specified under subsection (a),” we necessarily look to section
7508A(a). Section 7508A(a) provides, in pertinent part: “In the case of a
taxpayer determined by the Secretary to be affected by a federally
declared disaster . . . , the Secretary may specify a period of up to 1 year
that may be disregarded in determining . . . whether any of the acts
described in paragraph (1) of section 7508(a) were performed within the
time prescribed therefor.” When we read the “shall be disregarded”
language of subsection (d) in this context, the manner in which the
subsection (d) postponement period must be treated becomes readily
apparent. More specifically, the mandatory postponement period “shall
                                    19

be disregarded” “in determining, . . . whether any of the acts described
in paragraph (1) of section 7508(a) were performed within the time
prescribed therefor.”

       The plain and literal language of subsections (a) and (d) read
together demonstrates that the deadlines for “any of the acts” described
in section 7508(a)(1) “may” be disregarded under section 7508A(a) but
that those deadlines “shall be disregarded” under section 7508A(d).
Petitioners and respondent appear to agree that the “may” language of
section 7508A(a) provides the Secretary with the discretion to postpone
deadlines for any or all of the categories of acts identified by section
7508(a)(1). They dispute only whether the “in the same manner”
language carries this discretion over to the mandatory postponement
period set forth by subsection (d) (or is simply silent on the matter). But,
we see neither ambiguity nor silence in subsection (d) on the point.
Instead, we see a near mirror image of section 7508(a).

        Section 7508(a) provides that, for a defined person, a defined
period “shall be disregarded” in a defined manner, i.e., in determining
whether “any of the . . . acts [described in its paragraph (1)] was
performed within the time prescribed therefor.” We have readily
construed that provision as requiring an extension of the time that
includes a postponement of the period to file a petition with this Court.
See Stone v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 617, 620–21 (1980) (“Section
7508(a)(1)(C) excludes the period during which a member of the Armed
Forces is present in a ‘combat zone’ in determining the time allowable
for the filing of a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of a
deficiency.”); Munoz v. Commissioner, T.C. Memo. 2000-18, 79 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1366, 1367 (“Section 7508(a)(1)(C) serves to extend the normal
90-day . . . period within which a petition must generally be filed by
disregarding the time when a member of the Armed Forces is present in
a combat zone . . . .”); see also, e.g., Hampton v. United States, 513 F.2d
1234, 1246 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (“A Serviceman in combat is also given an
automatic extension of time to perform certain acts under the revenue
laws by virtue of § 7508 of the Code. . . . The postponement authorized
under § 7508 generally applies to the filing of returns, the payment of
any tax, the assessment of any tax, and the commencement of any
suit.”). We read the language and context of section 7508A(d) to lend
itself just as readily to the same interpretation.

       We also view the coordination provision of section 7508A(d)(5) as
further bolstering this interpretation. Subsection (d)(5) provides that
“[a]ny period described in [subsection (d)](1) with respect to any person
                                          20

(including by reason of the application of [subsection (d)](4)) shall be in
addition to (or concurrent with, as the case may be) any period specified
under subsection (a) . . . with respect to such person.” We read the broad
and inclusive language of this subsection to allow a mandatory
extension described under section 7508A(d) to operate independently
from any discretionary extension specified under section 7508A(a).

       Having given full consideration to section 7508A(d) and its
context, we must agree with petitioners that respondent’s interpretation
conflicts with both the plain wording and the mandatory and specific
nature of subsection (d). Postponement of any section 7508(a)(1) act
would not be mandatory if it needed to be triggered by a discretionary
act of the Secretary, who could use his discretion not to act at all.
Instead, we think Congress’s intent is clear. For a defined person
(a “qualified taxpayer”), a defined period (“beginning on the earliest
incident date . . . and . . . ending on the date which is 60 days after the
latest incident date”) “shall be disregarded in the same manner as a
period specified under subsection (a)” of section 7508A, that is by
mandatorily and automatically disregarding “whether any of the acts
described in paragraph (1) of section 7508(a),” including the act of filing
a petition with the Court, “were performed within the time prescribed
therefor.” 11

       Respondent also contends that the statute is ambiguous because
it does not address federally declared disasters without an incident date.
In support of this contention, respondent points to the Nationwide
Emergency Declaration that did not specify an incident date.
Respondent contends that “Congress did not address whether the
mandatory 60-day postponement in subsection (d) applies to Federal
disaster declarations that do not have an incident date. Therefore,
I.R.C. § 7508A(d) is ambiguous with respect to Federal disaster
declarations without an incident date, which satisfies the first step in
the Chevron framework.”

      Petitioners, however, do not argue that they are entitled to a
60-day postponement with respect to the Nationwide Emergency
Declaration.    Instead, petitioners focus on the Ohio Disaster

        11 Recall that a qualified taxpayer, in addition to one who principally resides

in a disaster area, is defined to include, inter alia, “any taxpayer whose records
necessary to meet a deadline for an act described in section 7508(a)(1) are maintained
in a disaster area.” § 7508A(d)(2)(D). This definition, which appears to sweep in
records with respect to all of the categories described by section 7508(a)(1), offers
additional and noteworthy context.
                                          21

Declaration, which determined “that the emergency conditions in the
State of Ohio resulting from the [COVID-19] pandemic beginning on
January 20, 2020, and continuing, are of sufficient severity and
magnitude to warrant a major disaster declaration under the [Stafford
Act].” The precise question at issue here addresses the context of a
federal disaster declaration containing an incident date, and we
conclude that Congress has directly spoken to that precise question. See
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.

       Petitioners’ situation demonstrates that the Court’s reading of
section 7508A(d) does not render section 7508A(a) a nullity. Instead, by
giving effect to every word that Congress used in the statute, it protects
taxpayers like them with the required “mandatory 60-day extension”
while the Secretary considers whether and how to exercise his discretion
under subsection (a). See Lowe v. SEC, 472 U.S. 181, 207 n.53 (1985);
see also Scalia & Garner, supra, at 174 (describing the “Surplusage
Canon”). Having concluded that section 7508A(d) unambiguously
provides for a mandatory, automatic extension of at least 60 days for the
time to file a petition with the Tax Court, we conclude that deference to
Treasury Regulation § 301.7508A-1(g)(1) and (2) is unwarranted, and
we hold Treasury Regulation § 301.7508A-1(g)(1) and (2) invalid to the
extent it limits the non-pension-related “time-sensitive acts that are
postponed for the mandatory 60-day postponement period . . . [to] the
acts determined to be postponed by the Secretary’s exercise of authority
under section 7508A(a).” 12 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43.

       Respondent’s regulation, promulgated after the petition in this
case was filed, cannot change the result dictated by an unambiguous
statute. See, e.g., Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1485 (2021)
(“[A]s this Court has long made plain, pleas of administrative
inconvenience and self-serving regulations never ‘justify departing from
the statute’s clear text.’” (quoting Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105,
2118 (2018)); Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43 (“If the intent of Congress is
clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”).
We do not reach Chevron step 2.

         12 The parties do not address the validity of Treasury Regulation § 301.7508A-

1(g)(1) and (2) as to section 7508A(b) and (d)(4), and their pension-related provisions;
accordingly, in reaching this holding, neither do we.
                                            22

IV.     Conclusion

       As in effect when petitioners’ Petition was filed, section
7508A(d)(1) provided that, in the case of any “qualified taxpayer,” the
period beginning on the earliest incident date specified in the
declaration to which the relevant disaster area relates, and ending on
the date which is 60 days after the latest incident date so specified,
“shall be disregarded in the same manner as a period specified under
[section 7508A(a)].” We have determined this language provides for an
automatic and mandatory postponement period that incorporates all of
the acts referenced by section 7508A(a), including the filing of a Tax
Court petition for the redetermination of a deficiency, and interpret it to
do so. The parties do not dispute that petitioners resided in Ohio at all
relevant times. See § 7508A(d)(2). Petitioners are therefore qualified
taxpayers entitled to an automatic 60-day postponement period starting
from January 20, 2020, the earliest incident date specified in the Ohio
Disaster Declaration, to at least March 20, 2020, to file their Petition. 13
The parties agree that petitioners mailed their petition to the Court on
March 17, 2020. As petitioners’ Petition was mailed on March 17, 2020,
their Petition was timely and we have jurisdiction in this case.
See § 7502. We will therefore deny respondent’s Motion.

      We have considered the parties’ other arguments and, to the
extent they are not discussed herein, find them to be irrelevant, moot,
or without merit.

        To reflect the foregoing,

        An appropriate order will be issued.

        13 See supra notes 7–8. We need not, and therefore do not, express a view on

what the outer limits of the extension period may be where a declaration omits an
ending date or is extended. See Stromme v. Commissioner, 138 T.C. 213, 218 n.8
(2012). We note, however, that effective with respect to federally declared disasters
declared after November 15, 2021, the extension period has been redefined to end “on
the date which is 60 days after the later of . . . [the] earliest incident date . . . or the
date such declaration was issued.” See Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act,
Pub. L. No. 117-58, § 80501, 135 Stat. 429, 1335 (2021).
                              23

     Reviewed by the Court.

       KERRIGAN, FOLEY, BUCH, NEGA, PUGH, ASHFORD, URDA,
COPELAND, JONES, TORO, GREAVES, and WEILER, JJ., agree with
this opinion of the Court.

     BUCH, J., concurring.

     JONES, J., concurring.
                                    24

       BUCH, J., concurring: I join the opinion of the Court with only a
few additional observations. Following the parties’ lead, the opinion of
the Court reviews the issue before us under the familiar Chevron two-
step framework, Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984), and correctly concludes under that framework that
Treasury Regulation § 301.7508A-1(g) is invalid to the extent it limits
the acts subject to the mandatory postponement period of section
7508A(d). I note, however, that the continued viability of Chevron is
under review. See Relentless, Inc. v. Dep’t of Com., 144 S. Ct. 325 (2023)
(granting certiorari for the question of whether the Supreme Court
should overrule Chevron). And we could reach the same conclusion
without our heavy reliance on Chevron.

        Over a century of precedent supports the unremarkable
proposition that “[a] regulation to be valid must be reasonable and must
be consistent with law.” Int’l Ry. Co. v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506, 514
(1922). Before Chevron, it was clear that “regulations, in order to be
valid, must be consistent with the statute under which they are
promulgated.” United States v. Larionoff, 431 U.S. 864, 873 (1977).
In recent years, the Supreme Court has held regulations to be
inapplicable with only a fleeting reference to Chevron, see, e.g., Sturgeon
v. Frost, 139 S. Ct. 1066, 1080 n.3 (2019), or without referencing Chevron
at all, see, e.g., Niz-Chavez v. Garland, 141 S. Ct. 1474, 1485 (2021). And
the Supreme Court has specifically stated that it “need not resort to
Chevron deference . . . [when] Congress has supplied a clear and
unambiguous answer to the interpretive question at hand.” Pereira v.
Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2018).

       Regardless of whether the Supreme Court continues to adhere to
or overrules Chevron, we would reach the same conclusion here. The
Petition is timely under the mandatory postponement period of
section 7508A(d), and Treasury Regulation § 301.7508A-1(g) cannot
change that result.

       NEGA, ASHFORD, URDA, COPELAND, TORO, and GREAVES,
JJ., agree with this concurring opinion.
                                    25

       JONES, J., concurring: I join the opinion of the Court in full.
I write separately to underscore the consistency of the Court’s analysis
in Hallmark Research Collective v. Commissioner, 159 T.C. 126 (2022),
and Sanders v. Commissioner, No. 15143-22, 161 T.C. (Nov. 2, 2023),
with our holding here as well as the overall statutory scheme,
particularly the Anti-Injunction Act (AIA).

I.    Section 6213(a): Deficiency Jurisdiction

       The debate over the nature of the procedural requirement in
section 6213(a) has intensified in the wake of the Supreme Court’s
decision in Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. 1493 (2022).
Therein, the Supreme Court held that section 6330(d)(1)—the statute
that imposes the procedural requirement for filing a petition with the
Tax Court in a collection due process case—is a nonjurisdictional
deadline subject to equitable tolling. Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142
S. Ct. at 1501. In doing so, the Supreme Court rejected the
Commissioner’s argument that the express jurisdictional text of section
6330(e)(1) suggested that the deadline under section 6330(d)(1) was also
jurisdictional. Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1499–500.
The Supreme Court stated that while there were indicia that the
Commissioner’s interpretation may have been the better one, there was
not a clear expression from Congress and the arguments highlighted the
lack of clarity in the statute. Id. at 1499. Because section 6330(d)(1) was
susceptible to multiple plausible interpretations, there was not a clear
expression from Congress to imbue jurisdictional consequences.
Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct. at 1498. Thus, the Supreme
Court held that the statute is not jurisdictional. Id. at 1501.

       Section 6213 is arguably similar to section 6330. Accordingly, in
Hallmark, this Court was asked to consider the jurisdictional nature of
section 6213(a) in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Boechler. See
Hallmark Rsch. Collective, 159 T.C. at 126. We held that the 90-day
deficiency deadline under section 6213(a) is jurisdictional, and therefore
not subject to equitable tolling. Hallmark Rsch. Collective, 159 T.C.
at 166–67. In doing so, the Court principally relied on the prior-
construction canon and the lengthy “history of reenactments of and
amendments to section 6213(a) [that] demonstrate[d] that Congress’s
intention [was] to provide an adequate but strict timeframe within
which a taxpayer may file a deficiency petition in the Tax Court.” Id.
at 161; see Sanders, 161 T.C., slip op. at 7 (describing the prior-
construction canon as the principal ground of our decision in Hallmark).
                                           26

       However, in Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th 196, 205 (3d Cir.
2023), petition for cert. filed, No. 23-1037 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2024), the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the 90-day deadline to
petition for redetermination of a tax deficiency is a nonjurisdictional
deadline subject to equitable tolling. The Third Circuit relied
significantly on the Supreme Court’s analysis in Boechler. See Culp v.
Commissioner, 75 F.4th at 200–04 (citing Boechler throughout the
opinion). Highlighting the similarities between section 6330(d)(1) and
section 6213(a), the Third Circuit reasoned that “[i]f the § 6330(d)(1)
deadline in Boechler fell short of being jurisdictional, § 6213(a)’s limit
must as well.” Culp v. Commissioner, 75 F.4th at 201. The Court stated
that there is no “clear tie between the deadline and the jurisdictional
grant,” id. at 201–02 (quoting Boechler, P.C. v. Commissioner, 142 S. Ct.
at 1499), and that the remote possibility of a dismissal for untimeliness
having preclusive effect in a section 7422 refund suit “does little to
bolster the IRS’s case for the deadline being jurisdictional,” Culp v.
Commissioner, 75 F.4th at 202; see also § 7459(d).

       Thereafter, in Sanders, this Court was tasked with “thoroughly
reconsider[ing] the problem in the light of the reasoning of the reversing
appellate court and, if convinced thereby, . . . follow[ing] the higher
court.” Sanders, 161 T.C., slip op. at 6 (quoting Lawrence v.
Commissioner, 27 T.C. 713, 716–17 (1957), rev’d on other grounds, 258
F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1958)). In doing so, we declined to follow the Third
Circuit’s interpretation and reaffirmed our decision in Hallmark to
conclude that section 6213(a) imposes a jurisdictional deadline in all
cases except those appealable to the Third Circuit. Sanders, 161 T.C.,
slip op. at 7–8. 1

       Today, the opinion of the Court holds that section 7508A(d)
provides for an unambiguously self-executing postponement period for
certain acts set forth in section 7508(a), including the filing of a petition
for redetermination with the Tax Court. § 7508(a)(1)(C); see op. Ct. p. 18.
This position is consistent with the Court’s prior decisions in Hallmark
and Sanders that the deadline under section 6213(a) is jurisdictional,
because unlike equitable exceptions, statutory exceptions to
jurisdictional deadlines are of course permissible. Moreover, our prior
decisions in Hallmark and Sanders are further undergirded by the

        1 The Solicitor General recently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in Culp,

asking the Supreme Court to review and reverse the Third Circuit’s decision. Petition
for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Commissioner v. Culp, No. 23-1037 (U.S. Mar. 19, 2024).
As of this writing, a response is due on April 18, 2024.
                                           27

jurisdictional nature of the AIA, codified under section 7421(a), as
I explain below.

II.     Section 7421(a): The Anti-Injunction Act

       The AIA was first enacted in 1867, and it has remained
continuously in effect and largely unamended since then. Bob Jones
Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 731 n.6 (1974) (comparing text of Act of
Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 169, § 10, 14 Stat. 471, 475, with section 7421(a)). Now
codified in section 7421(a), the statute provides:

        Except as provided in sections 6015(e), 6212(a) and (c),
        6213(a), 6232(c), 6330(e)(1), 6331(i), 6672(c), 6694(c),
        7426(a) and (b)(1), 7429(b), and 7436, no suit for the
        purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any
        tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,
        whether or not such person is the person against whom
        such tax was assessed.

For those who consider legislative history relevant, Warger v. Shauers,
574 U.S. 40, 48 (2014), the AIA has no recorded legislative history, “but
its language could scarcely be more explicit,” Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S.
at 736. The Supreme Court has interpreted the principal purpose of the
AIA as the “protection of the Government’s need to assess and collect
taxes as expeditiously as possible with a minimum of preenforcement
judicial interference, ‘and to require that the legal right to the disputed
sums be determined in a suit for refund.’” Id. at 736–37 (quoting Enochs
v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962)). In short,
“[t]he object of [section] 7421(a) is to withdraw jurisdiction from the
state and federal courts to entertain suits seeking injunctions
prohibiting the collection of federal taxes.” 2 Williams Packing &
Navigation Co., 370 U.S. at 5.

      Historically, the government has had broad power to collect taxes,
and the AIA has served as a critical component of the statutory scheme

         2 The AIA does not apply in every situation, but rather the AIA “kicks in when

the target of a requested injunction is a tax obligation—or stated in the Act’s language,
when that injunction runs against the ‘collection or assessment of [a] tax.’” CIC Servs.,
LLC v. IRS, 141 S. Ct. 1582, 1590 (2021). Where a suit does not run against a tax at
all, the AIA has no applicability. Id. at 1593. A suit seeking relief from a separate legal
mandate that is only backed up by a tax provision is not a dispute over taxes.
Id.; see also Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 567 U.S. 519, 543–44 (2012)
(distinguishing between a “tax” and a “penalty”).
                                    28

by limiting the power of taxpayers to seek pre-enforcement judicial
review. See § 7421(a). “Because of the Anti-Injunction Act, taxes can
ordinarily be challenged only after they are paid, by suing for a refund,”
NFIB, 567 U.S. at 543 (citing Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370
U.S. at 7–8), and several courts have characterized the constraints of
the AIA as jurisdictional, see Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 749. The AIA
has “almost literal effect,” thereby depriving courts of jurisdiction over
any suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of
any tax. Id. at 737, 749; see also Maze v. IRS, 862 F.3d 1087, 1091 (D.C.
Cir. 2017); Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
In Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. at 7, the Supreme Court
stated that if the judicial exception to the AIA did not apply then “the
District Court is without jurisdiction, and the complaint must be
dismissed.” And more recently, at least two courts of appeals have stated
that the AIA is jurisdictional. See Rocky Branch Timberlands LLC v.
United States, No. 22-12646, 2023 WL 5746600, at *1 (11th Cir. Sept. 6,
2023) (“When the Anti-Injunction Act applies, it deprives federal courts
of jurisdiction.” (quoting United Mine Workers of Am. Combined Benefit
Fund v. Toffel (In re Walter Energy, Inc.), 911 F.3d 1121, 1136 (11th Cir.
2018)), cert. denied, No. 23-614, 2024 WL 674784 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2024);
Optimal Wireless LLC v. IRS, 77 F.4th 1069, 1073 (D.C. Cir. 2023)
(stating that the AIA “‘deprive[s] the District Court of jurisdiction’ when
it applies” (alteration in original) (quoting Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S.
at 749)).

III.   The Relationship Between Sections 6213(a) and 7421(a)

       When considering the procedural requirement imposed by section
6213(a), we must consider the “text, context, and relevant historical
treatment” of the provision. Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S.
154, 166 (2010). While Congress must make a clear statement
evidencing the procedural requirement’s jurisdictional effect, see id.,
Congress need not “make its clear statement in a single section or in
statutory provisions enacted at the same time,” Dep’t of Agric. Rural
Dev. Rural Hous. Serv. v. Kirtz, 144 S. Ct. 457, 466 (2024) (quoting Kimel
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 76 (2000)). The relationship between
sections 6213(a) and 7421(a) provides important context when
considering the jurisdictional nature of section 6213(a) and reveals
Congress’s clear expression of the statute’s jurisdictional effect.

       To better protect taxpayers’ rights, Congress established what is
now section 6213(a) as a limited exception to the AIA. Revenue Act of
1924, ch. 234, § 274, 43 Stat. 253, 297. Thus, 57 years after enacting the
                                          29

AIA, Congress amended the statutory scheme to create a limited
exception to the default rule, which permits a taxpayer to sustain a
challenge to taxes only after the amounts are paid and the taxpayer sues
for a refund. Compare Act of Mar. 2, 1867, § 10, 14 Stat. at 475, with
Revenue Act of 1924, § 274, 43 Stat. at 297. See also § 7422; Williams
Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. at 7–8; Hallmark Rsch. Collective,
159 T.C. at 134. In a deficiency proceeding before this Court, taxpayers
are afforded the opportunity to seek prepayment de novo review of the
IRS’s deficiency determination. Hallmark Rsch. Collective, 159 T.C. at
134, 165. But review under section 6213 occurs within the broader
statutory scheme that is framed by the jurisdictional constraints of the
AIA, codified under section 7421(a).

        Specifically, section 7421(a) provides: “Except as provided in
section[] . . . 6213(a), . . . no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by
any person.” And section 6213(a) provides: “Within 90 days, or 150 days
if the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States, after the
notice of deficiency authorized in section 6212 is mailed . . . , the
taxpayer may file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermination of
the deficiency.”

       If a “taxpayer does not file a petition with the Tax Court within
the time prescribed in subsection (a) [of section 6213, i.e., within the 90
or 150-day deadline], the deficiency, notice of which has been mailed to
the taxpayer, shall be assessed, and shall be paid upon notice and
demand from the Secretary.” § 6213(c). A taxpayer’s failure to file suit
within the prescribed period triggers the Government’s duty to assess
and collect the tax. See id.; see also Hallmark Rsch. Collective, 159 T.C.
at 161–62 n.29. Thus, any suit subsequently filed with the Tax Court
(such as one sustained through the application of equitable tolling)
would restrain the government’s ability to assess a tax that it had the
right to assess when the taxpayer failed to timely petition the Court. 3
Such a suit would therefore exceed the jurisdictional limits imposed by
section 6213(a) and the AIA and violate the restrictions imposed by the
AIA. See § 7421(a); Bob Jones Univ., 416 U.S. at 736–37 (citing Williams
Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. at 7).

         3 By contrast, the Court’s holding here does not raise such a concern, because

section 7508A(d) provides a statutory extension to the section 6213(a) deadline. Suits
filed timely under section 7508A(d) are therefore filed “as provided in section[] . . .
6213(a)” for purposes of the AIA. § 7421.
                                  30

IV.   Conclusion

       But for the limited exceptions provided therein, section 7421
provides that “no suit for the purpose of restraining the assessment or
collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person.”
The foregoing demonstrates that the opinion of the Court is consistent
with the Court’s analysis in Hallmark and Sanders, as well as the
context of the statutory framework established by the AIA.

       BUCH, NEGA, URDA, COPELAND, and TORO, JJ., agree with
this concurring opinion.

      GREAVES, J., agrees with Part I of this concurring opinion.