Court Opinion

ID: 9776355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:31:26.229637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:37.746168
License: Public Domain

O’CONNOR, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. I would reverse and remand for a new trial because I agree with the appellant on two of the issues presented for review.

Comparison to Dahmer & Dupont

In point of error three, the appellant claims he was denied a fair trial because the trial court permitted the assistant district attorney (ADA) to discuss the Dah-mer and DuPont cases during voir dire, two notorious cases involving the insanity defense and incompetency. The appellant argues the ADA’s comments were a deliberate attempt to undermine the impartiality of the jury, rather than a test of their qualifications on the insanity defense. For a complete recitation of the ADA’s comments, see majority opinion, section D.
The State argues that the ADA’s questions to the venire were proper. The State relies on Smith v. State, 703 S.W.2d 641, 643 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), arguing that the ADA’s questions were proper because the State was entitled to question the veni-re on their understanding of how they might give effect to mitigating evidence, or on what is mitigating, if at all, about insanity, mental illness, mental defect, and other elements of the anticipated defense. I disagree that Smith applies to this case.
In Smith, the trial court denied the defendant’s request to ask four questions during voir dire. The appellate court held three of the four questions were proper and should have been allowed. Smith, 703 S.W.2d at 645. The defendant should have been allowed to question the venire members on the materials they had read concerning the defense of insanity, their exposure to any pre-trial publicity about *705that case, and their thoughts on the purposes of punishment. Id. However, the Court of Criminal Appeals held the question regarding the venire members’ “thoughts about the defense of insanity” was improper because it did not seek particular information from a particular member. Id. Instead, the court found it presented a general topic for discussion. Id.
I do not believe the ADA’s discussion of the Dahmer and DuPont cases was an attempt to question the venire members about the mitigating effect of the insanity defense. Unlike in the Smith case, the ADA was not attempting to determine what the venire members knew about the insanity defense, nor was the ADA attempting to determine bias or prejudice. See Smith, 703 S.W.2d at 643; see also Maddux v. State, 862 S.W.2d 590, 592 (Tex.Crim.App.1993); Nunfio v. State, 808 S.W.2d 482, 484-85 (Tex.Crim.App.1991). The ADA was not asking about the insanity defense as it related to the case against the appellant, and the ADA was not attempting to ask or direct restrictive questions of a particular juror to test the juror’s qualifications.1 See Tex.Code Crim.P. art. 35.20. Instead, the ADA initiated a general discussion when he asked, “Have you all ever heard of Jeffrey Dah-mer? Let me have a show of hands. Be hard not to .... ”
The ADA’s references went beyond the point of questioning and assessing the relative desirability of the venire members. The ADA went so far as to inject his opinion of the Dahmer case when he said, “I beg to ask anybody if they ever heard of a sicker case than that.” This, too, was improper. See Johnson v. State, 698 S.W.2d 154, 167 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (holding it was improper for prosecutor to inject personal opinion in statements to the jury in closing argument).
Generally, the error in an improper statement by a prosecutor can be corrected by an instruction to disregard, thus obviating the need for a mistrial. Swallow v. State, 829 S.W.2d 223, 226-27 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). In extreme cases, the improper statement is calculated to inflame the minds of the jury, or so indelibly ingrained in their minds that it is not susceptible to withdrawal or retraction by an instruction to disregard. Id. This is such a case.
I agree with the appellant that the sole purpose of the ADA’s comment was to implant in the minds of the jury a comparison between Dahmer and the appellant — if someone was as sick as Dahmer was not insane under the law, then surely the appellant was not insane. I would conclude the ADA’s improper references to Dahmer and DuPont, and the ADA’s injection of his opinion about them, were so prejudicial and calculated to inflame the minds of the jury that they were not susceptible to withdrawal or retraction by an instruction to disregard.

Limitation on Voir Dire

In point of error two, the appellant argues the trial court improperly limited the examination of the venire. The appellant claims this error prevented him from intelligently using his peremptory challenges. The majority agrees with the State’s argument, that the appellant’s questions improperly sought to commit jurors to a particular course of reasoning, and, therefore, the trial court did not err. For a complete recitation of the questions asked by the appellant, see the majority opinion, section C.
I would hold that the appellant’s question was proper, and, therefore, should have been allowed. The question posed by appellant’s counsel sought to determine bias or prejudice against the appellant because of his mental illness. Both the ADA and the appellant’s counsel spent considerable time discussing insanity and mental illness. During voir dire, the ADA admitted the appellant was mentally ill. The *706record reflects that the appellant’s only-defense to the State’s murder allegation was the insanity defense. Accordingly, the appellant was entitled to question the veni-re on how they might give effect to mitigating evidence of insanity, mental illness, mental defect, and other elements of the anticipated defense. See Shipley v. State, 790 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Tex.Crim.App.1990). The appellant should have been allowed to question the prospective jurors about their feelings on punishment and whether they could consider probation. See Mathis v. State, 576 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex.Crim.App.1979) (holding the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a question to prospective jurors on their feelings against recommending probation as punishment in a murder case).
Although the majority acknowledges that questions seeking to determine bias or prejudice are proper, it goes on to find that the appellant’s question sought to commit the jurors to a specific set of facts. I disagree. The only facts specific to the case that were part of the question were the facts that the appellant was mentally ill, he had no prior convictions, and he was eligible for probation. The facts injected in the question the appellant sought to ask are distinguishable from the facts of the improper questions in the cases upon which the majority relies. In those cases, the facts were a description of the offense with which the defendant was charged. See, e.g., Penry v. State, 903 S.W.2d 715, 739-40 (Tex.Crim.App.1995) (holding whether a juror could assess life imprisonment in a specific fact scenario constituting capital murder was an improper commitment to facts); Allridge v. State, 762 S.W.2d 146, 163-64 (Tex.Crim.App.1988) (asking a potential juror if he is unable to consider life imprisonment in a hypothetical situation that was an accurate statement of the State’s case); White v. State, 629 S.W.2d 701, 706 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (asking a member of the venire whether he could consider probation where a knife was used to commit the murder); Aquino v. State, 710 S.W.2d 747, 752 (Tex.App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 1986, pet. ref'd) (asking a potential juror whether he would consider probation where a knife was used to commit the murder).
Here, the facts injected by defense counsel were not a description of the offense. The appellant’s counsel asked a proper question to determine bias or prejudice against the appellant based on his mental illness. I would hold the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to allow a proper question. See Maddux, 862 S.W.2d at 592 (holding the denial of a proper question is always reversible error).

. In fact, the jurors responded in unison.