Court Opinion

ID: 9378469
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-10 17:02:02.258968+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:21.505495
License: Public Domain

Rel: March 10, 2023

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

 ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
                               OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
                                _________________________

                                         CL-2022-0751
                                   _________________________

                                  Clarence G. Shanklin, Jr.

                                                       v.

                Rahamah Brook Shanklin and Judy Ann Rowe

                          Appeal from Walker Circuit Court
                                    (DR-10-277.01)

THOMPSON, Presiding Judge.

        Clarence G. Shanklin ("the father") appeals the judgment of the

Walker Circuit Court ("the trial court") denying his motion for relief from

a judgment entered on January 28, 2015, that awarded Judy Ann Rowe

("the maternal great-grandmother") and Henry McDonald ("the maternal
CL-2022-0751

great-grandfather") custody of the father's two children born in December

2005 and September 2007. We affirm.

     The record indicates that the father and Rahamah Brook Shanklin

("the mother") were married in 2004, that two children were born of the

marriage, and that in 2010, the trial court entered a judgment divorcing

the mother and the father. The divorce judgment awarded the mother

and the father joint legal custody of the children, the father sole physical

custody of the children, and the mother visitation that was to be

supervised by the maternal great-grandmother.

     In May 2011, the father filed a custody-modification petition

alleging that a material change in circumstance had occurred that

warranted a suspension of the mother's visitation.        Specifically, the

father alleged that the children were not safe visiting with the mother

because the mother had withheld the older child from school, that she

had taken the younger child without permission and had refused to

return him, and that she had suffered and continued to suffer from

substance-abuse issues. On November 19, 2013, the maternal great-

grandparents filed in the trial court a motion to intervene in the father's

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custody-modification action. They asserted as grounds supporting their

motion:

     "1. That the [maternal great-grandparents] have a bona fide
     interest in the outcome of the pending pleadings.

     "2. That it is not in the best interest of the minor children[,
     who were seven and six years old,] to allow custody to remain
     with [the father or the mother].

     "3. That the mother of the minor children cannot provide a
     stable home for the minor children, she is unemployed, and
     [she] lives with the [maternal] great-grandparents.

     "4. That the father is employed and works all over the state.
     He lives in another county and would be unable to see that
     the minor children were in school."

The maternal great-grandparents asked the trial court to grant their

motion to intervene and to "allow a petition to be filed and heard by the

court at a later date." The record does not indicate that the trial court

granted the maternal great-grandparents' motion to intervene or that the

maternal great-grandparents filed a subsequent petition in the trial

court.1 Rather, the record reflects that on January 28, 2015, the trial

court entered a judgment. The judgment's preamble reads:

     1In D.K. v. S.M.S., 297 So. 3d 466 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019), this court
held that because the parties and the juvenile court had treated the
paternal aunt and uncle, who had moved to intervene, as intervenors in
the termination-of-parental-rights action, we would also consider the
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     "Whereas, [the father having] filed a petition for modification
     in the [trial court] and the maternal great-grandparents
     having filed a motion to intervene, the parties wishing to settle
     their differences in an amicable manner, the parties have
     reached an agreement, and it is the opinion of this court that
     the following [judgment] is due to be entered."

The judgment incorporated a November 19, 2013, agreement entered into

by the mother, the father, and the maternal great-grandparents and

awarding the maternal great-grandparents custody of the children, the

mother visitation that was to be supervised by the maternal great-

grandmother, and the father visitation. The trial court ordered both the

mother and the father to pay the maternal great-grandparents child

support.

     On May 10, 2022, the father filed in the trial court a motion which

in substance constituted a Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion seeking

relief from the January 28, 2015, judgment.2 The father stated in his

paternal aunt and uncle as intervenors and parties to the termination-
of-parental-rights action and its appeal. Similarly, in this case, the
mother, the father, and the trial court treated the maternal great-
grandparents as parties to the custody-modification action. Accordingly,
for purposes of this appeal, we will treat the maternal great-
grandparents as parties to the custody-modification action.

     2Although   the father styled his pleading as a "motion to dismiss for
lack of jurisdiction," the substance of the father's pleading requested
relief is pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. R. Civ. P. See D.H. v. V.P., [Ms.
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motion that although the trial court had awarded the maternal great-

grandparents custody of the children in the January 28, 2015, judgment,

the maternal great-grandparents never had exclusive control or custody

of the children. The father asserted that the trial court should have

construed the allegations in the maternal great-grandparents' motion to

intervene as allegations that the children were dependent and

transferred the case to the appropriate juvenile court, which has

exclusive jurisdiction over dependency actions. See § 12-15-114(a), Ala.

Code 1975 ("A juvenile court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction

of juvenile court proceedings in which a child is alleged … to be

dependent, or to be in need of supervision."), and P.S.R. v. C.L.P., 67 So.

3d 917 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011). The father further argued that after the

filing of the maternal great-grandparents' motion to intervene on

November 19, 2013, which he claims made allegations that the children

2200888, Dec. 3, 2021] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App. 2021); and Ex parte
Alfa Mut. Gen. Ins. Co., 684 So. 2d 1281, 1282 (Ala. 1996)(quoting Union
Springs Tel. Co. v. Green, 285 Ala. 114, 117, 229 So. 2d 503, 505
(1969))("The 'character of a [motion] is determined and interpreted from
its essential substance, and not from its descriptive name or title.' "). A
Rule 60(b)(4) motion may be brought at any time. L.R.B. v. J.C., 263 So.
3d 1068, 1069 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018).

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CL-2022-0751

were dependent, the trial court no longer had subject-matter jurisdiction

to determine the custody of the children and, consequently, the January

28, 2015, judgment awarding custody of the children to the maternal

great-grandparents is void.      See Ex parte R.S.C., 853 So. 2d 228, 235

(Ala. Civ. App. 2002)("A judgment is void under Rule 60(b)(4) only if the

court that rendered the judgment lacked subject-matter jurisdiction [or]

personal jurisdiction ....").   After conducting a hearing on the father's

Rule 60(b)(4) motion, the trial court, on May 16, 2022, entered an order

denying the father's motion. On June 15, 2022, the father filed his notice

of appeal.

      Rule 60(b)(4), Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:

      "On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may
      relieve a party or a party's legal representative from a final
      judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reason[] … (4)
      the judgment is void."

      In Burgett v. Porter, 180 So. 3d 20, 21 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015), this

court recognized that

      "[o]ur review of the grant or denial of a Rule 60(b)(4) motion
      is de novo; such a motion challenges the underlying judgment
      as being void, so the question of the validity of the judgment
      is a purely legal one in which discretion has no place.
      Northbrook Indem. Co. v. Westgate, Ltd., 769 So. 2d 890, 893
      (Ala. 2000); see also General Motors Corp. v. Plantation

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CL-2022-0751

     Pontiac-Cadillac, Buick, GMC Truck, Inc., 762 So. 2d 859, 861
     (Ala. Civ. App. 1999)."

     In Campbell v. Taylor, 159 So. 3d 4, 8 (Ala. 2014), our supreme court

explained:

                        " ' "The standard of review on
                 appeal from the denial of relief under
                 Rule 60(b)(4) is not whether there has
                 been an abuse of discretion. When the
                 grant or denial of relief turns on the
                 validity of the judgment, as under Rule
                 60(b)(4), discretion has no place. If the
                 judgment is valid, it must stand; if it is
                 void, it must be set aside. A judgment is
                 void only if the court rendering it lacked
                 jurisdiction of the subject matter or of
                 the parties, or if it acted in a manner
                 inconsistent      with    due     process.
                 Satterfield v. Winston Industries, Inc.,
                 553 So. 2d 61 (Ala. 1989)." '

             " 'Insurance Mgmt. & Admin., Inc. v. Palomar Ins.
             Corp., 590 So. 2d 209, 212 (Ala. 1991). In other
             words, if the underlying judgment is void because
             the trial court lacked subject-matter …, then the
             trial court has no discretion and must grant relief
             under Rule 60(b)(4).'

     "Allsopp v. Bolding, 86 So. 3d 952, 957 (Ala. 2011). See also
     Bowen v. Bowen, 28 So. 3d 9, 14 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009)(holding
     that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion will be granted only when the
     prior judgment is void and not merely voidable)."

     On appeal the father contends that the trial court erred in denying

his Rule 60(b) motion and refusing to set aside the January 28, 2015,

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CL-2022-0751

judgment as void. The father maintains that the grounds alleged by the

maternal great-grandparents in the motion to intervene, in substance,

were sufficient to allege that the children were dependent, and, therefore,

that the trial court should have construed the motion to intervene as a

dependency petition and transferred the case to a juvenile court, which

has exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over dependency matters. See

§ 12-15-114(a), Ala. Code 1975, and § 12-11-11, Ala. Code 1975 (requiring

a court to transfer a case outside its subject-matter jurisdiction to an

appropriate court with subject-matter jurisdiction within the same

county). See also Moore v. Griffin, 256 So. 3d 1201 (Ala. Civ. App. 2018).

He reasons that because a juvenile court, not the trial court, had

jurisdiction to determine whether the children were dependent, the trial

court did not have jurisdiction to enter its January 28, 2015, judgment

determining custody of the children and as a result that judgment is void.

     In Ex parte L.B.S., 333 So. 3d 681 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021), this court

considered whether a motion to intervene filed by the Blount County

Department of Human Resources ("DHR"), a nonparty to a custody-

modification action initiated by a father in the Blount Circuit Court ("the

circuit court"), was in substance a dependency petition that served to

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deprive the circuit court of subject-matter jurisdiction over the action. In

L.B.S., the circuit court had entered a judgment divorcing the parties and

awarded sole custody of the parties' child to the mother. Subsequently,

the circuit court entered a judgment modifying custody and awarding the

parties joint legal custody of the child, the mother sole physical custody

of the child, and the father visitation. Approximately two years after the

modification judgment was entered, DHR filed a petition in the Blount

Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") asserting that the child was

dependent. The juvenile court awarded the father temporary custody of

the child. The father filed in the circuit court a petition to modify custody

of the child, arguing that because the juvenile court had awarded him

temporary custody of the child in the dependency action, a material

change in circumstances had occurred warranting a modification of the

most recent custody judgment entered by the circuit court. DHR filed in

the circuit court a motion to intervene in the father's custody-

modification action, asserting that it was " 'a vital and interested party'

in the modification action" and

     "that it had 'very real concerns that unless it is a party to the
     modification action, the previous findings of [the juvenile
     court], i.e., that custody should be awarded to the father, and
     the mother allowed supervised visitation may be

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     changed/modified by the parties prior to a final order being
     entered.' "

33 So. 3d at 683-84. The circuit court granted DHR's motion to intervene

in the father's child-custody-modification action.     The mother filed a

petition for a writ of mandamus asking this court to direct the circuit

court to vacate its order allowing DHR to intervene in the father's

custody-modification action because, she said, the circuit court did not

have jurisdiction over that custody-modification action.

     We addressed the mother's argument, stating:

           "The mother contends that DHR's intervention in the
     modification action converts that action into a 'de facto'
     dependency action over which the divorce court has no
     jurisdiction. In support of her contention, the mother relies
     on A.M. v. A.K., 321 So. 3d 1278 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020), which
     discussed an exception to a circuit court's continuing
     jurisdiction over custody matters decided pursuant to a
     divorce -- namely, that, ' "in the event a genuine dispute
     between a parent and a third party arises as to the
     dependency of the child, the juvenile court assumes exclusive
     jurisdiction to adjudicate that dispute." ' 321 So. 3d at 1281
     (quoting P.S.R. v. C.L.P., 67 So. 3d 917, 922 (Ala. Civ. App.
     2011)).

           "It is well settled that a circuit court lacks original
     subject-matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the custody of a child
     in a proceeding in which the child has been alleged to be
     dependent. P.S.R., 67 So. 3d at 922. In A.M., this court held
     that courts must look to the substance of a pleading to
     determine whether it alleges the dependency of a child so as
     to invoke the exclusive jurisdiction of a juvenile court. In A.M.,

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     the mother had been awarded sole physical custody of her
     child when she and the father divorced. The mother died, and
     a maternal aunt sought custody of the child in the circuit
     court, alleging that the child's father was unfit to parent the
     child because he had been incarcerated after being convicted
     of a felony assault on the mother in the presence of the child,
     that he had failed to financially support the child, and that
     his relationship with the child had become strained. This
     court determined that the maternal aunt's petition was, in
     fact, a dependency petition and that, therefore, the circuit
     court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to consider her
     request for custody.

           "The mother in this case argues that DHR's motion to
     intervene essentially asserted a 'de facto' claim alleging
     dependency that, once granted, deprived the divorce court of
     jurisdiction. However, in reviewing the motion to intervene,
     it is clear that DHR did not seek a determination of
     dependency or seek custody of the child. Instead, DHR sought
     to intervene in the modification action to protect its interest
     in ensuring the safety of the child. In other words, DHR's
     motion to intervene cannot be construed as a mislabeled
     dependency petition that would invoke the exclusive
     jurisdiction of the juvenile court."

Ex parte L.B.S., 333 So. 3d at 685.

     In accord with L.B.S., we must determine whether the maternal

great-grandparents' motion to intervene initiated a de facto dependency

action divesting the trial court of jurisdiction over the father's custody-

modification action. First, we must consider whether the substance of

the motion to intervene pleaded a genuine dispute between the parents,

who had custody of the children, and the maternal great-grandparents as

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to the dependency of the children, see, P.S.R., 67 So. 3d at 922 (quoting

Ex parte Leo, 61 So. 3d 1042, 1047 (Ala. 2010))(recognizing that a child

is dependent if the child is not " 'receiving adequate care and supervision

from those persons legally obligated to care for and/or supervise the

child' ").   In other words, we must determine if the maternal great-

grandparents asserted facts indicating or implying that the children were

dependent within the meaning of § 12-15-102(8), Ala. Code 1975. See

A.M. v. A.K., 321 So. 3d 1278, 1281 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020)("If a complaint

filed in circuit court asserts facts indicating or implying that a child is a

dependent child, within the meaning of Ala. Code 1975, § 12-15-102(8),

the complaint shall be treated as a dependency petition over which the

circuit court has no subject-matter jurisdiction and the juvenile court has

exclusive jurisdiction."). Section 12-15-102(8) defines a dependent child

as:

       "a. A child who has been adjudicated dependent by a juvenile
       court and is in need of care or supervision and meets any of
       the following circumstances:

                  "….

                   "2. Who is without a parent, legal guardian,
             or legal custodian willing and able to provide for
             the care, support, or education of the child.

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                 "….

                "4. Whose parent, legal guardian, legal
           custodian, or other custodian fails, refuses, or
           neglects to send the child to school in accordance
           with the terms of the compulsory school
           attendance laws of this state.

                 "….

                "6. Whose parent, legal guardian, legal
           custodian, or other custodian is unable or
           unwilling to discharge his or her responsibilities to
           and for the child."

See also Ex parte L.E.O., 61 So. 3d 1042, 1047 (Ala. 2010)("A child is

dependent if, at the time [the pleading alleging dependency] is filed in

the juvenile court alleging dependency, the child meets the statutory

definition of a dependent child.").

     Our review of the allegations made in the maternal great-

grandparents' motion to intervene leads us to conclude that the

substance of the allegations did not constitute allegations that the

children were dependent. The maternal great-grandparents alleged that

the mother was unemployed and could not provide a stable home for the

children and that, although the father was employed, he resided in

another county and could not ensure that the children would attend

school. Significantly, the maternal great-grandparents did not allege

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that the children were not being cared for or supervised. Arguably, the

maternal great-grandparents' allegations with regard to the mother may

have been sufficient if true, to allege that the mother was unwilling or

unable to care for the children. 3 The allegations with regard to the father

were not sufficient, if true, to prove that the children were dependent.

The allegations that the father had full-time employment and lived in

another county did not imply that he had not been caring for or

supervising the children. Rather, these allegations imply that due to his

work schedule, the father may have had or in the future will have to

arrange for childcare for the children and that the children may have had

or may need in the future to change schools. These allegations do not

rise to the level of allegations that the father was unable to care for or

supervise the children, i.e., that the children were dependent. Instead,

those allegations indicate that he may not be the best person to exercise

custody of the children. Simply, the allegations made by the maternal

great-grandparents at the time they filed their motion to intervene do not

imply that the children were dependent; rather, they, at best, speculate

     3The   record appears to indicate that the mother and the children
had been living with the maternal great-grandparents and that the
children's needs were being met.
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that the children might become dependent in the future. "A child is

dependent if, at the time [the pleading alleging dependency] is filed …,

the child meets the statutory definition of a dependent child." Ex parte

L.E.O., 61 So. 3d at 1046. The maternal great-grandparents did not

allege that the father was unwilling or unable "to provide for the care,

support, or education of the children," see § 12-15-102(8)a.2., had failed,

refused, or neglected to send the children to school, see § 12-15-102(8)a.4.,

or was "unable or unwilling to discharge his … responsibilities to and for

the [children]," see § 12-15-(8)a.6. A fair reading of the maternal great-

grandparents' pleading reveals that the maternal great-grandparents did

not seek a dependency determination but, instead, only intervention in

the custody-modification action to allow them to seek an award of custody

of the children. Therefore, the maternal great-grandparents' motion to

intervene did not initiate a de facto dependency action divesting the trial

court of its jurisdiction. Additionally, because the trial court retained

jurisdiction over the custody-modification action, the trial court acted

within its jurisdiction when it considered the parties' agreement to allow

the maternal great-grandparents to obtain custody of the children and,

in accord with the parties' agreement, awarded custody of the children to

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the maternal great-grandparents.

     It is not the role of a circuit court or an appellate court, when it

reviews factual allegations in a pleading filed by a nonparty in a custody-

modification action initiated by a parent, to recast the non-party's

pleading in a manner so as to convert a parent's custody-modification

action into a dependency action that negates the choice of parents to

agree to a remedy for a simple dispute about their children. Parents have

a fundamental right "to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and

control of their children." Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000). In

this case, the father and the mother exercised their fundamental right to

make such a decision about the care, custody, and control of their

children, and they decided in an agreement to allow the maternal great-

grandparents to have custody of the children.        The trial court had

jurisdiction to enter a judgment memorializing the parties' agreement.

     For the foregoing reasons, the trial court properly denied the

father's request for Rule 60(b)(4) relief, and the judgment is affirmed.

     AFFIRMED.

     Hanson and Fridy, JJ., concur.

     Moore and Edwards, JJ., concur in the result, without opinions.

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