Court Opinion

ID: 9716833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:52:11.798145+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:49.345844
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McCULLOUGH, dissenting: As pointed out, the law is clear that the reviewing court will not disturb the findings of the Industrial Commission when they are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. (U.S. Industrial Chemical Co. v. Industrial Comm’n (1986), 143 Ill. App. 3d 881.) The Industrial Commission has the responsibility for determining the facts and drawing inferences from the complete evidence and a court will not overturn the Commission’s findings simply because a different inference could be drawn, or otherwise substitute its judgment for that of the Commission. Niles Police Department v. Industrial Comm’n (1981), 83 Ill. 2d 528. In this case, there is more than sufficient evidence for the Industrial Commission to determine that the petitioner should not recover. There was evidence that the petitioner on a company form indicated that an accidental injury was not involved. Petitioner on that disability form answered “no,” an accidental injury was not involved. If he had answered “yes” to that question, “Was an accidental injury involved,” he would have also been required by the form to show that “date,” “place,” “details of the accident,” and “whether the accident happened while on the job at Caterpillar.” The only doctors to testify in this case were the doctors of the petitioner’s choice. Dr. Alameda had been the petitioner’s doctor before this particular incident. With respect to the history given by the patient, Dr. Alameda testified: “He gave a history that he was doing well until two weeks before the examination when he started to get out of the bath tub and fell from the knee being locked.” The doctor’s testimony is not clear as to when he first saw the petitioner with respect to this accident. He first testified that he saw the petitioner on April 21, 1978. He then testified concerning seeing him on April 23, 1978, and also that he saw the petitioner on April 10, 1978. The doctor, on a disability form, checked that the patient’s disability was not caused by an injury at work. His testimony also was not clear as to whether the incident that the petitioner related to him occurred two weeks prior to April 21 or April 24, 1978, or two weeks prior to April 10, 1978. The doctor did testify that there would be no connection between the injury and the work if the incident occurred on April 10, 1978. Regardless of the doctor’s recollection and testimony as to dates, the Commission could determine according to the testimony of the doctor that the petitioner fell in the bathtub and the injury was not work related. The respondent’s arguments concerning the record in this case dictate against reversal of the Commission. Petitioner’s testimony did conflict with the history he gave to Dr. Alameda. Dr. Alameda did conclude that a fall in the bathtub caused the disability. Both Dr. Shultz and Dr. Alameda, in answer to a hypothetical question, based upon facts in the record, stated the injury was not work related. As indicated by the majority, the petitioner performed his regular duties on March 25, 1978, made no complaints, and both he and Dr. Alameda indicated on the disability form an accidental injury at work was not involved. In order to overturn the decision of the Industrial Commission in this case, we must find that it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. Whether evidence is conflicting or of such a nature that different inferences that may be drawn therefrom, a reviewing court will not disregard a permissible inference that may be drawn. (Sterling Steel Casting Co. v. Industrial Comm’n (1979), 74 Ill. 2d 273.) As the Commission is the judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony, it is for the Commission to decide which of the conflicting medical opinions in a case is to be accepted. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Industrial Comm’n (1983), 97 Ill. 2d 35. Additionally, no importance should be given or any application of additional scrutiny to the record be made to the Commission’s rejecting the arbitrator’s factual findings without receiving any new evidence. Additional evidence may be presented to the Commission only when such evidence: “(1) relates to the condition of the employee since the time of the arbitration hearing, (2) relates to matters that occurred or conditions that developed after the arbitration hearing, or (3) was, for good cause, not introduced at the arbitration hearing.” Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 48, par. 138.19(e). There are cases where the manifest weight of the evidence question is close. In this particular case, the question is not close and we should not overturn the decision of the Industrial Commission. Of equal importance, a reviewing court should also be wary of eroding the responsibility of the Commission as it pertains to arbitrators’ decisions. Such action tends to destroy the legislative purpose of the Industrial Commission’s responsibility. McNAMARA, J., concurs.