Court Opinion

ID: 9653174
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:40:20.967093+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:56.809124
License: Public Domain

EVANS, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
Only a simple question of fact is before us. Was Kaufman’s conveyance of property of the value of $443,400 a few months before he died a transfer in contemplation of death ? Not only do I think Judge Barnes was justified in answering this question as he did, in the affirmative, but it seems to me that the evidence — unsupported by the District Court’s findings — necessitated such a conclusion.
The court, in its twenty-third finding, found:
“The transfer of 4434 shares of stock of Congress Hotel Company, transferred in December, 1921, by the decedent to his wife, was made by the decedent in contemplation of death.”
A similar conclusion of law was made by the court.
No disagreement with the majority opinion exists over its conclusion that the trial court might differ on this issue with the.Boaxd of Tax Appeals, although the evidence be the same. The weight which an appellate court should give to a trial court’s findings, in view of the contrary views of another fact finding tribunal, was doubtless somewhat lessened. Uihlein v. General Electric Co. (C. C. A.) 47 F.(2d) 997.
In this case it seems to me that the Board’s expression of views in its opinion (not supported by a finding) was obiter dictum, and moreover, the evidence before it was not the same as before the District Court.
I cannot accept, with the same persuasive effect as my brethren, the decision in the ease of United States v. Wells, 283 U. S. 102, 51 S. Ct. 446, 75 L. Ed. 867. There are similarities between that case and the facts in .the instant appeal, it is true, but we are dealing with an issue of fact, not with a legal principle.
It is well nigh impossible to find two eases where the facts are identical Even though the spoken words of witnesses be the same, the variance in the integrity of the speakers makes it impossible for a court to give the same weight to the same answers. To illustrate: Take tw;o criminal cases wherein the defendant in each case takes the stand and denies the facts which, if undisputed, would establish his guilt. A jury or a court would be a most unusual one, if it relied solely or even largely upon the spoken word of the witness or the accused. Rather must guilt depend upon the jury’s faith or lack of faith in the individual who spoke the words. It is for this reason that precedents in eases involving issues of fact are not impressive.
Whether a gift be in contemplation of death presents a question of fact which is not unlike a question of accidental or suicidal death. Of necessity, there is considerable doubt as to the correct answer. No living witness can testify vrith much cogency as to the deceased’s intentions. Only those circumstances from which inferences are dedueible may be shown, and all such circumstances are peculiarly within the knowledge of those interested in establishing the negative side of the proposition.
As a background of all discussion and all deductions is the fact that the deceased, by a transfer shortly before his death, relieved his widow of a substantial inheritance tax — in this case some $25,000.
The last sentence of section 402 (e), in effect when Kaufman died, is significant:
“ * * * Any transfer of a material part of his property in the nature of a final disposition or distribution thereof, made by the decedent within two years prior to his death * * * shall, unless shown to the contrary, be deemed to have been made in contemplation of death within the meaning of this title.”
*647Various states have adopted different periods of time within which such a presumption will arise. In Schlesinger v. Wisconsin, 270 U. S. 230, 46 S. Ct. 260, 70 L. Ed. 557, 43 A. L. R. 1224, the court considered the validity of a Wisconsin statute which provided that a transfer executed within six years of death was conclusively presumed to be made in contemplation of death. It was held that such a statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment. A conclusive presumption is, however, vastly different from the rebuttable presumption which arises by virtue of death within two years (and in the instant case, within six months) from the date of the gift. Heiner v. Donnan, 285 U. S. 312, 52 S. Ct. 358, 76 L. Ed. 772. I think it significant in any ease (and the instant case is no exception) that death followed shortly after a large gift. The size of the gift, the closeness of the death to the date of the gift, are the significant facts, which must ordinarily affect the persuasiveness of the presumption of reasonable observers. Presumptions of fact from the establishment of other facts are the reasonable deductions of ordinary men and are based upon the experiences and observations of the mass of humanity. In the present ease the deceased had been sick, most seriously ill — nigh unto death — a few months before. When able “to get up and about” after this illness, he made this large gift. Within five months thereafter he died. He did not die from an accidental cause, but from a physical ailment. His last illness was short. His death was sudden, but. in view of his previous serious illness, not surprising. May it not be fairly inferable that deceased had heart trouble or other warnings of such a death*, even though he thought it best not to worry other members of his family or his intimates with a recital of his afflictions ? There are, fortunately, many of this rugged type who bear their cares and their burdens alone.
There are, too, additional facts which are somewhat illuminating. Although deceased had signed the certificates of stock, worth $443,400, over to his wife, he instructed Ihe secretary of the company which issued the stock, to pay all dividends declared on this stock to him. After the assignment of stock was executed in December, he collected and retained a four per cent, dividend which was declared in January and a two per cent, dividend which was declared in April on the 4434 shares of stock previously transferred. Are there no inferences to bo drawn from these facts which indicated the gift was in contemplation of death ? Surely deceased would not have attempted to reserve the life use of this property in this indefinite, clumsy way had he not believed his life was of short duration.
Then, too, the oral evidence respecting differences with his brothers and his desire to avoid the agreement with them, and which agreement became operative in ease he died before they did, is not helpful to appellants.
It seems that the brothers had entered into an agreement whereby the surviving brother or brothers could purchase, upon the death of either of the others, the stock ho held at death, at a price well below its market value. To avoid the effect of this agreement, appellants’ witness testified that deceased transferred this stock. But the agreement was not effective unless he died. Was there something he knew which made him believe he would die before his brothers? In the absence of any spoken word must the court not look to his acts ?
This witness said the deceased transferred his stock because he wanted to avoid or lessen his income taxes, and because he wished to avoid the agreement with his brothers which would affect his estate in case of his death. Similar motives would have prompted him to attempt to avoid his inheritance taxes. Nor is it reasonable to attribute to him a desire to avoid a solemnly executed agreement with his brothers, which became effective only upon his death, if he had no expectations of an early death. If avoidance of an agreement with his brothers were prompted by mercenary motives, action taken to avoid the agreement must have been on the assumption that he would die before they did; otherwise he would have profited by the enforcement of the agreement.
The foregoing reasons are advanced not merely to establish the fact which the District Court found, but to show there existed evi-dentiary support for such finding. The action was one at law. The parties waived a jury trial. The decision of the trial court on an issue of fact was therefore not reviewable, save to ascertain whether there existed any substantial evidence to support it. Perkins v. Prudential Insurance Company of America (C. C. A.) 60 F.(2d) 218, decided January 19, 1934. This was not the situation on the appeal of the United States in the case of United States v. Wells.