Court Opinion

ID: 4474106
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2020-01-16 21:10:45.944958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:53:45.256281
License: Public Domain

OPINION Laro, Judge: The parties submitted this case to the Court without trial. See Rule 122. Respondent determined deficiencies of $15,288, $14,372, and $14,375 in petitioner’s respective taxable years ended October 31, 1993, 1994, and 1995. Following concessions, we must decide whether petitioner may deduct the exit and entrance fees which its subsidiary, Metrobank, paid to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (fdic) with respect to a “conversion transaction” under 12 U.S.C. sec. 1815(d)(2)(B)(iv) (1994). We hold it may.1 Unless otherwise indicated, section references are to the Internal Revenue Code applicable to the relevant years. Rule references are to the Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. Background The parties have filed with the Court a stipulation of facts and certain related exhibits. We incorporate herein by reference that stipulation of facts and those exhibits. We find the stipulated facts accordingly, and we set forth the relevant facts in this background section. We also set forth in this section, as they relate to the operation of the FDIC and of the insurance funds at issue, the pertinent provisions of title 12 of the United States Code (1994) (title 12). Petitioner is a Delaware corporation whose principal office was in East Moline, Illinois, when its petition was filed. It is a bank holding company that files consolidated Federal income tax returns.2 It reports its income and expenses using an accrual method and on the basis of a fiscal year ending on October 31. It includes in its consolidated returns a wholly owned subsidiary, Metrobank, that is a bank chartered in Illinois. The FDic is a congressionally established corporation that serves primarily to protect financial institution depositors by insuring any deposit up to $100,000 that is held by a bank or savings association participating in the FDIC insurance program. The Banking Insurance Fund (bif) and the Savings Association Insurance Fund (saif) are separate funds which the FDIC maintains and administers under this program. The BIF insures the deposit liabilities of participating banks, e.g., Metrobank. The SAIF insures the deposit liabilities of participating savings associations; e.g., Community Federal Savings Bank (Community). Each financial institution that participates in the FDic’s insurance program is generally assessed a semiannual charge (premium) equal to its liability for deposits multiplied by the applicable rate set forth in 12 U.S.C. sec. 1817(b)(1)(C) or (D) (1994). Any amount assessed against a participant in the BIF is deposited into the BIF and is available to the FDIC for use with respect to any BIF participant. Any amount assessed against a participant in the SAIF is deposited into the SAIF and is available to the FDIC for use with respect to any SAIF participant. Community is a failed savings association. On October 16, 1990, Metrobank submitted to the FDIC a bid to consummate a transaction (transaction) under which Metrobank would acquire a portion of Community’s assets and assume a portion of Community’s deposit liabilities. Because Community and Metrobank each insured its deposit liabilities through a different FDIC fund, and Metrobank had agreed to assume Community’s deposit liabilities, which would be insured after the transaction by the BIF instead of the SAIF, the transaction was a conversion transaction under 12 U.S.C. sec. 1815(d)(2)(B)(iv) (1994). Section 1815(d)(2)(B) of title 12 defines a "conversion transaction” as: (i) the change of status of an insured depository institution from a Bank Insurance Fund member to a Savings Association Insurance Fund member or from a Savings Association Insurance Fund member to a Bank Insurance Fund member; (ii) the merger or consolidation of a Bank Insurance Fund member with a Savings Association Insurance Fund member; (iii) the assumption of any liability by— (I) any Bank Insurance Fund member to pay any deposits of a Savings Association Insurance Fund member; or (II) any Savings Association Insurance Fund member to pay any deposits of a Bank Insurance Fund member; (iv) the transfer of assets of— (I) any Bank Insurance Fund member to any Savings Association Insurance Fund member in consideration of the assumption of liabilities for any portion of the deposits of such Bank Insurance Fund member; or (II) any Savings Association Insurance Fund member to any Bank Insurance Fund member in consideration of the assumption of liabilities for any portion of the deposits of such Savings Association Insurance Fund member; Financial institutions are required by 12 U.S.C. sec. 1815(d)(2)(E) (1994) to pay to the FDIC exit and entrance fees on conversion transactions, and Metrobank agreed in its bid to pay these fees to the FDIC. That section provides: Each insured depository institution participating in a conversion transaction shall pay— (i) in the case of a conversion transaction in which the resulting or acquiring depository institution is not a Savings Association Insurance Fund member, an exit fee * * * which— (I) shall be deposited in the Savings Association Insurance Fund; or (II) shall be paid to the Financing Corporation, if the Secretary of the Treasury determines that the Financing Corporation has exhausted all other sources of funding for interest payments on the obligations of the Financing Corporation and orders that such fees be paid to the Financing Corporation; (ii) in the case of a conversion transaction in which the resulting or acquiring depository institution is not a Bank Insurance Fund member, an exit fee in an amount to be determined by the [Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation * * * which shall be deposited in the Bank Insurance Fund; and (iii) an entrance fee in an amount to be determined by the [Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation * * *, except that— (I) in the case of a conversion transaction in which the resulting or acquiring depository institution is a Bank Insurance Fund member, the fee shall be the approximate amount which the [Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation calculates as necessary to prevent dilution of the Bank Insurance Fund, and shall be paid to the Bank Insurance Fund; and (II) in the case of a conversion transaction in which the resulting or acquiring depository institution is a Savings Association Insurance Fund member, the fee shall be the approximate amount which the [Federal Deposit Insurance] Corporation calculates as necessary to prevent dilution of the Savings Association Insurance Fund, and shall be paid to the Savings Association Insurance Fund. Metrobank consummated the transaction on November 2, 1990, and the FDIC approved the transaction on November 6, 1990, effective as of November 2, 1990. After the transaction, all of Metrobank’s deposit liabilities (including those assumed from Community) were insured by the BIF. Metrobank could not have insured through the BIF the deposit liabilities it had assumed from Community without paying the exit and entrance fees. In total, Metrobank paid to the FDIC an exit fee of $309,565 and an entrance fee of $43,339 on its assumption of Community’s deposit liabilities. Metrobank paid those fees in five annual installments, paying $71,518 in each subject year ($62,735 for the exit fee and $8,783 for the entrance fee).3 For each of the subject years, petitioner claimed a deduction for the payment of the fees during that year. Petitioner also claimed for those respective years deductions of $465,046, $463,583, and $311,245 that Metrobank paid to the FDIC as semiannual insurance premiums under 12 U.S.C. sec. 1817 (1994). Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. sec. 1815(d)(2)(E)(i) and (iii) (1994), the FDIC deposited the exit fee into the SAIF, and it deposited the entrance fee into the BIF. Metrobank calculated the exit fee from a formula under which the fee equaled 0.9 percent (.009) multiplied by the total liability that it assumed from Community as to the deposits. See 12 C.F.R. secs. 312.1(j), 312.5(c) (2000). Metrobank calculated the entrance fee from a different formula under which the fee equaled the “Bank Insurance Fund reserve ratio” (BIF reserve ratio) multiplied by the “entrance fee deposit base” received from Community. 12 C.F.R. secs. 312.1(g), 312.4(b) (2000). The BIF reserve ratio was the ratio of the net worth of the BIF to the value of the aggregate total domestic deposits held in all participants of the BIF. See 12 C.F.R. sec. 312.1(c) (2000). The entrance fee deposit base was “those deposits which the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation * * * [estimated] to have a high probability of remaining with * * * [Metrobank] for a reasonable period of time following the * * * [conversion transaction], in excess of those deposits that would have remained in the * * * [SAIF had Community] been resolved by means of an insured deposit transfer.” 12 C.F.R. sec. 312.1(g) (2000). Community generally would have been resolved by an insured deposit transfer if its deposit liabilities had been paid by the FDIC or Resolution Trust Corporation. See id. If Metrobank did not pay its annual FDIC insurance premiums after the transaction, the FDIC could commence administrative proceedings to terminate involuntarily Metrobank’s FDIC insurance. Metrobank could also in certain circumstances voluntarily terminate its FDIC insurance. Metrobank would not have been entitled to a refund for the exit or entrance fee which it paid to the FDIC incident to the transaction if it terminated its FDIC insurance after the transaction either voluntarily or involuntarily. At the end of 1990, the approximate rates for depository insurance under the BIF and the SAIF were .12 percent (.0012) and .208 percent (.00208), respectively. As of the same time, SAIF rates were set to exceed BIF rates until 1998. Respondent determined that petitioner could not deduct either fee that Metrobank paid to the FDIC incident to the conversion transaction and disallowed petitioner’s deductions for those payments. According to the notice of deficiency: It has been determined that your deductions for the entrance and exit fee paid to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation for the transfer of your insured deposits from one depository insurance to another depository insurance fund is a non-deductible capital expenditure that is not subject to depreciation or amortization.[4] Discussion We are faced once again with the question of whether an expenditure may be deducted currently as an expense or must be capitalized and deducted in a later year. Following INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. 79 (1992), in which the Supreme Court clarified that non-asset-producing expenditures5 may require capitalization if they provide significant future benefits to the payor, the parties dispute whether petitioner’s entrance and exit fees are capitalizable expenditures. Respondent determined and asserts they are. Respondent’s sole argument in support of his assertion is that Metrobank’s payment of the fees generated significant future benefits for it. Respondent lists the following as future benefits which are significant to Metrobank: (1) Metrobank was able to insure its entire liability for deposits through one fund, subjecting itself to only one regulatory scheme and minimizing its risk of complicated compliance problems; (2) insurance premiums under the BIF were less than insurance premiums under the SAIF; and (3) the BIF was more stable than the SAIF. Petitioner asserts it may deduct the fees. Petitioner argues that Metrobank derived no significant long-term benefit from its payment of either fee. We decide this case as framed by respondent and hold that petitioner may deduct the fees. In reaching this holding, we specifically note that respondent did not determine, and has declined to argue, that the fees should be capitalized on the grounds that they were necessarily incurred in connection with the acquisition of another financial institution or, more specifically, the acquisition of the assets and liabilities of another financial institution. See, e.g., INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra; Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982), affg. in part and remanding in part on an issue not relevant herein T.C. Memo. 1981-123; American Stores Co. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 458 (2000). If respondent had made such a determination or argument, petitioner might well have wanted to offer evidence relating to it. In order to avoid prejudicing petitioner with respect to a theory not raised before the case was submitted, we save any comment on that theory for another day. See Leahy v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 56, 64-65 (1986) (Court declined to consider a theory raised by respondent on brief where, as here, the parties submitted the case with the facts fully stipulated and presumably with an understanding of the legal issues to be presented and defended); see also Concord Consumer Hous. Coop. v. Commissioner, 89 T.C. 105, 106-107 n.3 (1987). Our analysis begins with a general background of the FDIC and the pertinent insurance funds. Congress established the FDIC in 1933 to insure bank deposits, see Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 388 (1995); FDIC v. Godshall, 558 F.2d 220, 221 (4th Cir. 1977), and it established the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLic) in 1934 to insure savings association deposits, see United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 844 (1996). Savings associations were required to participate in the FSLIC insurance system but could withdraw from the FSLIC insurance fund by converting from a Federal to a State charter. See Great W. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 916 F.2d 1421, 1423 (9th Cir. 1990). High interest rates, inflation, Government deregulation, fraud, and insider abuse caused a crisis in the savings association industry during the late 1970’s and the 1980’s. The FSLic’s insurance fund was threatened by this crisis when a large number of failing savings associations approached the FSLIC with deposit insurance liabilities and hundreds of savings associations actually failed. The FSLic’s insurance fund became insolvent by billions of dollars after the FSLIC paid out billions of dollars to cover the failed savings associations’ insured deposits and incurred additional liabilities on its closing of hundreds of problem savings associations. See United States v. Winstar Corp., supra at 845-846; Great W. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, supra at 1423. The Federal Home Loan Bank Board (Bank Board) was an independent agency in the executive branch of the United States with broad discretionary powers over the Federal home loan bank system. In 1985, the Bank Board attempted to replenish the FSLIC insurance fund by raising the insurance premiums charged to the FSLlC-insured institutions through a “special assessment” at the maximum amount allowed by Congress. As a result, many healthy FSLIC-insured savings associations, which paid insurance premiums of approximately $2.08 per $1,000 of insured deposits, took the steps necessary to meet the requirements to withdraw from the FSLIC insurance system and obtain insurance from the FDIC, which charged insurance premiums of only 83 cents per $1,000 of insured deposits. See Great W. Bank v. Office of Thrift Supervision, supra at 1423-1424. Congress responded to the savings associations’ attempt to change their insurer from the FSLIC to the FDIC by passing the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA), Pub. L. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552. In relevant part, CEBA: (1) Imposed a moratorium that prohibited savings associations from leaving the FSLIC insurance fund and (2) imposed a final insur-anee premium on savings associations which left the FSLIC insurance fund after the moratorium expired. See CEBA sec. 306(h), 101 Stat. 602, amended by Pub. L. 100-378, sec. 10, 102 Stat. 887, 889 (1988), current version at 12 U.S.C. sec. 1730(d)(1) (1994). The intent of CEBA was to recapitalize the depleted FSLIC. See Branch Banking & Trust Co. v. FDIC, 172 F.3d 317, 320 (4th Cir. 1999). CEBA proved to be ineffective in replenishing the FSLic’s insurance funds, and, on August 9, 1989, Congress enacted the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (firrea), Pub. L. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183, as an emergency measure to prevent the collapse of the savings association industry. See H. Rept. 101-54 (I), at 307 (1989); see also H. Conf. Rept. 101-222, at 393 (1989); United States v. Winstar Corp., supra at 856. In relevant part, FIRREA abolished the FSLIC, transferred to the FDIC the responsibility of insuring the deposits at savings associations, and established the BIF and the SAIF. FIRREA gave the FDIC responsibility for regulating both the insurance fund it had traditionally administered (now known as the BIF) and the insurance fund formerly regulated by the FSLIC (now known as the saif). See FIRREA secs. 202, 215, 103 Stat. 188, 252. FIRREA imposed on SAIF (as opposed to BIF) participants higher deposit premiums and a higher degree of supervision in an attempt to ensure the Saif’s strength. See generally 12 U.S.C. sec. 1817 (1994). Congress anticipated that SAIF participants would try to convert to BIF participants in order to escape the higher SAIF premiums and regulatory costs. Thus, Congress included in FIRREA certain control measures to prevent an exodus from the SAIF. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 1815(d)(2)(E) and (F) (1994). First, FIRREA required that entrance and exit fees be paid to the respective funds as to a conversion transaction between a BIF participant and a SAIF participant. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 1815(d)(2)(E) (1994). A higher exit fee was placed on financial institutions leaving the SAIF for the BIF in order to discourage SAlF-insured institutions from insuring their deposits with the BIF. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 1815(d)(2)(F) (1994). Second, FIRREA imposed a 5-year moratorium beginning on August 9, 1989, to replace the expired CEBA moratorium.6 See 12 U.S.C. sec. 1815(d)(2)(A)(ii) (1994). Under the FIRREA moratorium, SAlF-insured institutions were generally unable to enter into conversion transactions, which essentially prevented them from converting to BlF-insured institutions and essentially ensured mandatory SAIF participation for savings associations during the moratorium’s duration. FIRREA imposed two relevant exceptions to the moratorium. First, the FDIC could allow certain conversion transactions involving the acquisition of a depository institution that was in default or in danger of default.7 A financial institution that utilized this exception was required to pay an exit fee to the fund that insured the assumed deposit liabilities before the transaction and an entrance fee to the fund that insured the assumed deposit liabilities after the transaction. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 1815(d)(2)(C), (E) (1994). Congress provided explicitly that the entrance fee was imposed to prevent dilution of the reserves of the fund that began insuring the assumed deposit liabilities as a result of the transaction. See H. Rept. 101-54 (I), supra at 325. The pertinent legislative history does not contain an explicit explanation of Congress’ intent as to the imposition of the exit fee. Under the second exception to the moratorium, certain conversion transactions could be consummated through a merger or consolidation (collectively, merger). See 12 U.S.C. sec. 1815(d)(3) (1994); see also FIRREA sec. 206(a)(7), 103 Stat. 196. Under this exception, which Metrobank could have utilized to effect the transaction, but decided not to, a bank holding company that controlled a SAlF-insured savings association could generally merge the savings association’s assets and liabilities with a BlF-insured subsidiary. Because the deposit liabilities of the SAlF-insured institution and a certain percentage of future deposits always remained assessable by the SAIF, the financial institution utilizing this exception was not required to pay the exit and entrance fees as to the conversion transaction. See 12 U.S.C. sec. 1815(d)(3)(B), (G) (1994). The institution, however, could not during the moratorium period stop paying SAIF assessments on the ascertained percentage of the future deposits. The institution could switch the insurance coverage on those deposits, if it so desired, after the moratorium expired but only if the FDIC approved the switch and the institution paid the requisite exit and entrance fees. With this backdrop in mind, we turn to the relevant text of the Internal Revenue Code. Section 162(a) generally provides that a taxpayer may deduct “all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business”.8 Section 263(a)(1) generally provides that a deduction is not allowed for “Any amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate.” Whether an expense is deductible under section 162(a) or must be capitalized under section 263(a)(1) is a factual determination for which there is no controlling rule. Petitioner, as the taxpayer, bears the burden of establishing its right to deduct the disputed fees. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. at 84, 86; Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114-116 (1933); see also A.E. Staley Manufacturing Co. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 119 F.3d 482, 486 (7th Cir. 1997), revg. and remanding 105 T.C. 166 (1995). When an expense creates a separate and distinct asset, it usually must be capitalized. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Association, 403 U.S. 345 (1971); FMR Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 402, 417 (1998); Iowa-Des Moines Natl. Bank v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 872, 878 (1977), affd. 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979). When an expense does not create such an asset, the most critical factors to consider in passing on the question of deductibility are the period of time over which the taxpayer will derive a benefit from the expense and the significance to the taxpayer of that benefit. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 87-88; United States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298, 310 (1972); FMR Corp. & Subs. v. Commissioner, supra at 426; Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 106 T.C. 445, 453 (1996). Expenses must generally be capitalized when they either: (1) Create or enhance a separate and distinct asset or (2) otherwise generate significant benefits for the taxpayer extending beyond the end of the taxable year. Respondent makes no assertion that either fee created or enhanced a separate and distinct capital asset. Respondent’s sole argument in support of the determination is that the fees generated for Metrobank the proffered benefits listed supra p. 217, which, respondent asserts, are significant long-term benefits to Metrobank. We disagree with respondent that any of these benefits are significant long-term benefits which would require either fee’s capitalization. Although the fees may arguably have produced one or more future benefits for Metrobank, none of those benefits, when considered either separately or together, is enough to characterize either fee as a capitalizable expense. Under the requisite test, capitalization is not always required when an incidental future benefit is generated by an expense. See INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, supra at 87. We are unable to find as a fact that Metrobank’s payment of either fee produced for Metrobank a significant future benefit requiring capitalization. Whether a benefit is significant to the taxpayer who incurs the underlying expense rests on the duration and extent of the benefit, and a future benefit that flows incidentally from an expense may not be significant. See id. at 87-88. We find as a fact that Metrobank’s payment of the fees produced for it no significant long-term benefit. Metrobank did not pay either fee as a condition to obtaining FDIC insurance in the first place. Metrobank always had and, absent a decision by it to the contrary, would always have had FDIC insurance for its deposit liabilities, including those deposit liabilities assumed from Community. Metrobank paid the fees to insure its assumed deposit liabilities with the BIF, the insurance fund in which it was already a participant, rather than with the SAIF, a fund with which it was unaffiliated. Any benefit that Metrobank derived from insuring the assumed deposit liabilities with the bif, rather than the SAIF, is insignificant when weighed against the primary purpose for the payment of the fees. That purpose, as explained herein, was, in the case of the exit fee, to protect the integrity of the SAIF for the direct benefit of the FDIC and the potential benefit of the saif’s participants, one of which was not Metrobank, by imposing upon Metrobank a final premium for the insurance coverage that the assumed deposit liabilities had received while insured by the SAIF before their assumption. The primary purpose of the entrance fee, as also explained herein, was to protect the integrity of the BIF by charging an additional first-year premium for insurance coverage on the assumed deposit liabilities. It is critical that Metrobank would not have recovered any portion of either fee were it to have severed its relationship with the BIF. Metrobank paid the exit fee to the SAIF as a nonrefundable, final premium for insurance that it had already received. The SAIF had insured the assumed deposit liabilities before the conversion transaction, and Metrobank was not affiliated with the SAIF either before or after the transaction. Metrobank had neither a right nor a chance to recover any of the exit fee following its payment of the fee to the SAIF; SAIF funds were available for use by the FDic only with respect to SAIF participants. As we view the exit fee in the context of the statutory scheme, we see that the fee serves mainly to compensate the former insurer (in this case, the SAIF) for its future loss of income as to the assumed deposit liabilities, which compensation flowed to the direct benefit of the FDic and the potential benefit of the former insurance fund’s participants. But for the conversion transaction, the former insurer would have received income in the form of the semiannual insurance premiums payable on the deposit liabilities which were the subject of the assumption, and a failing SAIF participant could have had an opportunity to reach that income were the FDIC to have allowed it. Here, the exit fee gave to the SAIF (and to its participants) 0.9 percent of the deposit liabilities assumed by Metrobank, which translates into four to five times the annual assessment which the SAIF would otherwise have received as to those liabilities had they not been assumed by Metrobank. We view the entrance fee as also paid as a nonrefundable premium for insurance coverage; in contrast with the exit fee, however, we understand the entrance fee to be paid for the current year’s insurance. The use and purpose of the entrance fee is diametrically different from that of the exit fee. In addition to the fact that the entrance fee is significantly less than the exit fee, the entrance fee is paid to the fund that insures the deposits of the institution that assumes the deposit liabilities in a conversion transaction. Moreover, the entrance fee is imposed in accordance with an express congressional intent to prevent dilution of the reserves of the current insurer through the addition of unworthy participants which could prove to be financially troubled and cause an undesired depletion of that insurer’s resources. See H. Rept. 101-54(1), at 325 (1989). But for the imposition of the entrance fee, the participants in an FDIC fund could deplete the reserves of that fund if the fund became liable for an extraordinary amount of deposit liabilities which had been assumed by the participants in conversion transactions. After a BIF participant assumes the deposit liabilities of a SAIF participant and pays an entrance fee, however, the value of the BIF generally bears the same ratio to the total deposits insured by the BIF (inclusive of the deposits underlying the assumed deposit liabilities) as before the conversion transaction. We find additional support for our conclusion that Metrobank derived insignificant benefits from its payment of the fees by noting that Metrobank paid both fees incident to its management’s decision to assume the deposit liabilities of a failed savings association. Metrobank’s management obviously made a business decision to pay the two fees to insure the assumed deposit liabilities with its regular insurer, the BIF; management decided not to forgo the fees, merge under the second exception to the moratorium, and insure the deposit liabilities with the SAIF. The BlF’s annual insurance premiums were less expensive than those of the SAIF, and Metrobank, being a participant in the BIF, was obviously more familiar with its requirements. Although respondent observes correctly that Metrobank could have avoided the fees by assuming the deposit liabilities through a merger, Metrobank chose for business reasons not to do so. We decline to second-guess that business judgment. Under the facts herein, the exercise of such a sound and reasonable business practice under which a taxpayer such as Metrobank acts to minimize its recurring operating costs is not a significant future benefit that requires capitalization of the related non-asset-producing expenditures. Cost-saving expenditures such as this, which are incurred in the process of fulfilling an everyday sound and reasonable business practice, as opposed to effecting a change in corporate structure, qualify for current deductibility under section 162(a). See T.J. Enters., Inc. v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 581, 589 (1993) (“Expenditures designed to reduce costs are * * * generally deductible.”), and the cases cited therein. This is especially true where, as is here, the fees relate solely to the optional insurance of a liability and do not relate directly to either a capital asset or to an income-producing activity. Cf. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 503 U.S. at 83-84 (capitalization generally required to match an expense with the income to be generated therefrom). Respondent analogizes petitioner’s payment of the fees with the purchase of a nontransferable membership interest, which, respondent asserts, is a capitalizable expense. According to respondent, Metrobank’s membership interest in the BIF entitled it to: (1) A substantial reduction in future depository insurance premiums, (2) the right to insure all of its deposits in a more stable insurance fund, and (3) the need to adhere to only one regulatory scheme. We disagree with respondent’s analogy.9 First, as mentioned above, respondent makes no assertion that Metrobank’s payment of either fee was related to the purchase of a capital asset.10 Second, Metrobank was already participating in the BIF program before the transaction, and Metrobank could have continued its participation in the BIF program had it not consummated the transaction. Third, new banks are not charged either fee to insure their deposit liabilities with the BIF, nor is either fee imposed when a bank assumes the deposit liabilities of another bank. Fourth, the fees were nonrefundable, and any perceived benefit derived from Metrobank from its payment of the fees would have been extinguished completely had Metrobank terminated its FDIC insurance. We conclude and hold that the fees are currently deductible. In so concluding, we note that respondent does not argue that the facts at hand are similar to the facts of Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Association, 403 U.S. 345 (1971).11 Nor do we find that such is the case. Whereas the payments in the Lincoln Savings case served to create or enhance for the taxpayer a separate and distinct asset, to wit, a “distinct and recognized property interest in the Secondary Reserve”, id. at 354-355, the payments here did no such thing. We have considered all arguments of the parties and, to the extent not discussed herein, find those arguments to be irrelevant or without merit. To reflect concessions, Decision will be entered under Rule 155. Reviewed by the Court. Wells, Chabot, Cohen, Swift, Gerber, Colvin, Foley, Vasquez, and Thornton, JJ., agree with this majority opinion.   Our holding renders moot the parties’ other dispute; namely, whether the fees, if capitalizable, are amortizable.    For purposes of tit. 12, the term “bank” generally refers to a State-chartered bank, and the term “savings association” generally refers to a Federal- or State-chartered savings association (or savings and loan or thrift as it is sometimes called). 12 U.S.C. sec. 1813(a) and (b) (1994). We use herein the same terminology. We refer collectively to banks and savings associations as financial institutions.    We recognize that the sum of the exit and entrance fee ($309,565 + $43,339 = $352,904) is $4,186 less than the total of the five payments ($71,518 x 5 = $357,590). The record does not adequately explain the difference.    The notice of deficiency indicates that the deposits were actually transferred from the SAIF to the BIF. This is not true. As explained herein, the BIF and the SAIF do not hold a financial institution’s deposits but merely insure the deposits held by the financial institutions.    We use the term “non-asset-producing expenditures” to refer to expenditures which do not create or enhance a separate and distinct asset.    Congress later extended the 5-year FIEREA moratorium, which was in effect during the relevant years.    The subject transaction was consummated under this exception.    An expense is ordinary if it is of common or frequent occurrence in the type of business involved. See Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 495 (1940); Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 114 (1933). An expense is necessary if it is appropriate or helpful to the development of the taxpayer’s business. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689 (1966); Welch v. Helvering, supra.    We recognize that tit. 12 uses the terms “BIF member” and “SAIF member” to refer to the participants of those funds. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. sec. 1813(d) (1994). We do not understand Congress’ use of the word “member” to refer to a membership interest in the funds in the property sense of the word. In fact, respondent has not even made such an argument.    In this regard, respondent relies incorrectly on Darlington-Hartsville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 273 F. Supp. 229 (D.S.C. 1967), affd. 393 F.2d 494 (4th Cir. 1968), and Rodeway Inns of Am. v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 414 (1974), to support his position herein. The taxpayer in each of those cases purchased a capital asset incident to the payment of the expenses in dispute there.    In fact, respondent does not even mention Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Association, 403 U.S. 345 (1971), in his brief.