Court Opinion

ID: 9837059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-02 03:16:10.981546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:45:20.119565
License: Public Domain

CRAWFORD, Judge
(dissenting):
The Government tried appellant for drug use nearly 4 years before the charges arose in this case. During that trial, he employed the “innocent ingestion” defense * and was acquitted. The majority, by their ruling today, would allow appellant to argue the innocent ingestion defense again in his second trial, while keeping the members in the dark about his first trial.
The unknowing ingestion of a drug is a defense to drug-use offenses. However, the fact that appellant was tried for a drug offense and acquitted at one trial was relevant to his second trial for a drug offense because, during the second trial, he again testified that he was “flabbergasted” that his urinalysis was positive. Both the Supreme Court, Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 343-44, 110 S.Ct. 668,107 L.Ed.2d 708 (1990), and this Court, United States v. Cuellar, 27 MJ 50, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 811, 110 S.Ct. 54, 107 L.Ed.2d 23 (1989), have held that the Government may present evidence of an accused’s alleged prior bad acts without violating the Double Jeopardy Clause or the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, even if *64the accused was acquitted of offenses arising from those alleged acts.
Dowling was charged with armed robbery of a bank. 493 U.S. at 344, 110 S.Ct. 668. At trial, the judge admitted evidence that Dowling had committed burglary 2 weeks after the bank robbery. Id. at 344-45, 110 S.Ct. 668. Testimony to this effect was admitted at the bank robbery trial, even though Dowling had been acquitted of the burglary. Id. at 345, 110 S.Ct. 668. This testimony indicated that appellant had a connection to another suspect in the bank robbery; that a similar get-away ear was involved in both events; that appellant had previously worn a similar ski mask and carried a similar handgun while committing a bad act; and that the prior crime was in the same locality. Id. at 344-45, 110 S.Ct. 668.
The Third Circuit held that a jury should not be permitted to consider the evidence of a bad act if there had been an acquittal. Nonetheless, it affirmed the defendant’s conviction by holding that the error was harmless. 855 F.2d 114, 122-24 (1988).
The Supreme Court held that Dowling had the burden to demonstrate that his acquittal represented a jury determination that he was not the person who entered the home. 493 U.S. at 352, 110 S.Ct. 668. The Court rejected Dowling’s argument that evidence relating to an acquittal is “inherently unreliable.” It noted that the defendant had an opportunity to refute this evidence but did not. Id. at 353, 110 S.Ct. 668.
Likewise, this Court, anticipating Dowling, held in United States v. Cuellar, supra, that collateral estoppel did not prohibit admission of prior bad acts, even if the accused was acquitted of offenses arising from those alleged acts in a different jurisdiction. Cuellar was charged with molesting a 10-year-old female in 1983. 27 MJ at 51-52. The judge allowed prosecutors to introduce evidence that Cuellar had molested four other females between 1980 and 1982, even though he was acquitted of these charges. Id. at 52-53. This Court held that evidence about acts resulting in the prior acquittals was not barred by collateral estoppel. Id. at 54-55. It also ruled that not allowing the defense, upon its request, to introduce evidence that the accused had been acquitted in the prior proceedings was error. Id. at 55-56.
A third case, United States v. Rocha, 553 F.2d 615 (1977), also supports admission of appellant’s first positive urinalysis. Rocha was arrested for transporting 231 pounds of marijuana in a van across the Mexican border. Id. Rocha had been charged on a prior occasion with transportation of marijuana in a truck. Id. at 615-16. At the prior trial, he testified that he believed “he was moving a load of furniture” and “denied knowing the contents of the truck.” Id. He was acquitted. Id. at 616.
At the later trial, the Government introduced evidence of Rocha’s prior arrest for transporting marijuana in a truck. Id. Rocha explained the circumstances surrounding the first arrest and that the police found marijuana in the truck. The Ninth Circuit held that admission of evidence surrounding the first acquittal was relevant and probative in the later trial. Id.
All three of these cases demonstrate the doctrine of chance, i.e., what are the odds of the same set of facts occurring more than once to the same person? The Department of Defense has set the cut-off level to determine a positive reading for marijuana at 300 nanograms per milliliter. This cut-off level is set high to discount the possibility of unknowing ingestion and to demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that the user would note the physical and psychological effects of the drug. In the case at bar, the members, who are well aware of the random urinalysis program and the high cutoff levels, should have the opportunity to determine appellant’s credibility and whether appellant would mistakenly test positive for drugs twice within 4 years.
Under an abuse-of-discretion standard of review for an evidentiary issue, we should not reverse a military judge unless an appellant shows that the evidence admitted “clearly had no bearing upon any of the issues involved.” United States v. Marin-Cifuentes, 866 F.2d 988, 996 (8th Cir.1989). Time and similarity of conduct are important factors to consider when determining admis*65sibility of prior bad acts. But, the key here is to apply a reasonableness standard to the issue in the case. Evidence of prior positive-urinalysis results was admissible because it was more probative than prejudicial under Mil.R.Evid. 403, Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.). Thus, the prior positive-urinalysis results should have been admitted as substantive evidence of appellant’s knowing ingestion of marijuana.

 RCM 701(b)(2), Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (1995 ed.); see also United States v. Fisiorek, 43 MJ 244, 249 (1995) (Crawford, J., dissenting).