Court Opinion

ID: 9846029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:33:03.699921+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:31.463473
License: Public Domain

BENTON, Judge,
concurring in part, and dissenting in part.
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), Bruton’s codefendant’s statement was *764admitted in evidence solely against the codefendant and not as evidence against Bruton. Id. at 125, 88 S.Ct. at 1622. The United States Supreme Court “held [in Bruton ] that a defendant is deprived of his rights under the Confrontation Clause when his codefendant’s incriminating confession is introduced at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed to consider that confession only against the codefendant.” Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 187-88, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 1716, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987).
The record is uncontroverted that Deshon Pitt and the codefendant, Lambert Bonds, were tried jointly and that the codefendant’s statement implicating Pitt was proved at trial. The record is also uncontroverted that the codefendant’s statement was admitted at trial against the codefendant but not against Pitt. The trial judge so ruled and, indeed, instructed the jury “that any statements made by ... [the codefendant] to the police are not evidence against ... Pitt and may not be considered by you in determining the guilt or innocence of ... Pitt.” The Commonwealth did not object to the limiting instruction. Indeed, the Commonwealth informed the trial judge that “the jury needs to be instructed in that regard.” Thus, Pitt’s trial is indistinguishable on the adjudicatory facts from Bruton.
In Cruz, the defendant and the codefendant were tried together. The defendant’s statement was admitted in evidence only against the defendant and the codefendant’s statement, which implicated the defendant, was admitted in evidence only against the codefendant. 481 U.S. at 189, 107 S.Ct. at 1717. The Supreme Court held that the rule announced in “Bruton applies where the defendant’s own confession, corroborating that of his codefendant, is introduced against him” in a joint trial. Id. at 188, 193, 107 S.Ct. at 1716, 1719. Thus, the Supreme Court unambiguously “h[e]ld that, where a nontestifying codefendant’s confession incriminating the defendant is not directly admissible against the defendant, the Confrontation Clause bars its admission at their joint trial, even if the jury is instructed not to consider it against the defendant, and *765even if the defendant’s own confession is admitted against him.” Id. at 198, 107 S.Ct. at 1719.
The Confrontation Clause issue that arises in Pitt’s case is substantially similar to the issue in Cruz. Applying Cruz to this case, we must necessarily conclude that a violation of Pitt’s rights under the Confrontation Clause occurred. Furthermore, Cruz expressly bars, as a Confrontation Clause violation under the Bruton rule, introduction of a codefendant’s confession, even if it “interlocks” with the defendant’s confession. Id. at 191-93, 107 S.Ct. at 1718-19. Thus, by applying the holding in Cruz, which squarely mirrors the circumstances in this case, I would hold that the admission of the codefendant’s statement deprived Pitt of his Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause rights.
As an abstract proposition, I agree with several portions of Judge Elder’s opinion. I concur in Part I; I agree with the analyses in Part II (Motion for joint trial under Code § 19.2-262.1) but not its conclusion that the admission of the codefendant’s statement was harmless; I concur in Part 11(A)(1); I concur substantially in Part 11(A)(2) and in the conclusion that the codefendant’s statement was hearsay; and I concur in Part 11(A)(3). However, I am unable to give more than a qualified agreement because I believe the basic assumption that underlies Judge Elder’s opinion is not applicable to this case. In my judgment, Judge Elder’s opinion is incorrectly premised upon the view that the codefendant’s statement was admissible as evidence against Pitt. It was not. Because it was not admitted in evidence at trial against Pitt, and, indeed, was not admissible against Pitt, the issue in this case is analogous to the issue in Bruton and Cruz and unlike the issue in Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986).
Because Judge Elder uses a Lee analysis rather than a Bruton analysis, and for the reasons that I have more fully explained above, I disagree with and dissent from Part 11(B) *766and all of Part 11(C) of his opinion.12 I would hold that Pitt’s *769rights under the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause were violated. Furthermore, the constitutional error was not harmless.
Although “Confrontation Clause error[ ] is subject to ... harmless error analysis[,] ... the correct inquiry is whether, assuming that the damaging potential of the [evidence] were fully realized, a reviewing court might nonetheless say that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 684, 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1438, 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986). The Supreme Court noted the following in Cruz:
[I]t seems to us that “interlocking” bears a positively inverse relationship to devastation. A codefendant’s confession will be relatively harmless if the incriminating story it tells is different from that which the defendant himself is alleged to have told, but enormously damaging if it confirms, in all essential respects, the defendant’s alleged confession. It might be otherwise if the defendant were standing by his confession, in which case it could be said that the *770codefendant’s confession does no more than support the defendant’s very own case. But in the real world of criminal litigation, the defendant is seeking to avoid his confession — on the ground that it was not accurately reported, or that it was not really true when made. In the present case, for example, petitioner sought to establish that [the codefendant] had a motive for falsely reporting a confession that never in fact occurred. In such circumstances a codefendant’s confession that corroborates the defendant’s confession significantly harms the defendant’s case, whereas one that is positively incompatible gives credence to the defendant’s assertion that his own alleged confession was nonexistent or false. Quite obviously, what the “interlocking” nature of the codefendant’s confession pertains to is not its harmfulness ....
481 U.S. at 192, 107 S.Ct. at 1718-19 (third emphasis added). Under these circumstances and if, as Judge Elder asserts, the statements were “interlocking,” the error cannot be said to be harmless.
As the Court further noted in Cruz, the interlocking nature of the defendant’s and the codefendant’s confessions was devastating and prejudicial to the defendant in the eyes of the trier of fact for another significant reason. “[F]or example, the precise content and even the existence of [the defendant’s] own confession were open to question, since they depended upon acceptance of [a witness’] testimony, whereas the incriminating confession of [the] codefendant ... was on videotape.” 481 U.S. at 192, 107 S.Ct. at 1718. These same circumstances hold sway in this case. The officer was testifying from notes and memory regarding Pitt’s statement. However, the codefendant’s confession was recorded and, thus, was presented to the jury without any of the ambiguities and uncertainties of testimony which is dependent upon a witness’ memory. The recorded statement eliminated any uncertainty that the jury might have otherwise entertained. Clearly, under these circumstances we cannot say the error in admitting the codefendant’s statements was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
*771For these reasons, I would reverse Pitt’s conviction and remand for a new trial.

. As stated above, I agree with Judge Elder’s opinion that the statement made by the codefendant was hearsay. It was not admissible against Pitt because the statement did not satisfy Virginia's requirements for a statement against penal interest. However, I strongly disagree with Judge Elder's view that, for Confrontation Clause purposes, the codefendant’s statement could have been admitted against Pitt.
When a statement against the penal interest of a declarant is also inculpatory as to a defendant, it can only be admitted in evidence in the criminal trial of the defendant when, additionally, it is proved to be trustworthy. See Ellison v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 404, 408, 247 S.E.2d 685, 688 (1978); Randolph v. Commonwealth, 24 Va.App. 345, 355, 482 S.E.2d 101, 106 (1997). See also United States v. Rasmussen, 790 F.2d 55, 56 (8th Cir.1986); United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836 (3d Cir.1988). In addition, when, as in this case, a statement does not fall within a firmly rooted exception to the hearsay rule, the Commonwealth bears the burden of establishing, for Confrontation Clause purposes, that the statement is cloaked with "indicia of reliability,” which means that the Commonwealth must make "a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.” Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66, 100 S.Ct. 2531, 2539, 65 L.Ed.2d 597 (1980).
In Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 106 S.Ct. 2056, 90 L.Ed.2d 514 (1986), a codefendant's statement was offered by the prosecution in a joint trial as evidence only against the codefendant. However, the record established that the trial judge, in fact, considered the statement as evidence against Lee when convicting Lee. Id. at 538, 106 S.Ct. at 2060-61. The Supreme Court, in determining admissibility under the Confrontation Clause, considered not only whether the statement fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception” but also "recognized that even if certain hearsay evidence does not fall within 'a firmly rooted hearsay exception' and is thus presumptively unreliable and inadmissible for Confrontation Clause purposes, it may nonetheless meet Confrontation Clause reliability standards if it is supported by a ‘showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.' ” Id. at 543, 106 S.Ct. at 2063 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66, 100 S.Ct. at 2539) (emphasis added).
In this case, there is no "showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness,” id., that would make the codefendant’s statement admissible against Pitt under the second prong of the Roberts test. A very high standard must be met before a statement is deemed to be "trustworthy” under this second prong. In Lee, the Court stated that under the second prong, "the [Confrontation] Clause countenances only hearsay marked with such trustworthiness that 'there is no material departure from the reason of the general [hearsay] rule.' " Id. (citations omitted). See also People v. Watkins, 438 Mich. 627, 475 N.W.2d 727, 742 (1991) (analyzing Lee, the court reasoned that “because [the statement in question in Lee ] constituted accusatory hearsay contained in a codefendant confession, it was properly presumed at the outset to be uniquely and especially suspect and unreliable, much more so than *767typical, run-of-the-mill hearsay” (emphasis in original)). Along similar lines, the Nebraska Supreme Court noted the following:
Unlike other exceptions to the hearsay rule, statements made in response to police interrogation generally do not have inherent guarantees of reliability and trustworthiness. For example, the spontaneity of an excited utterance reduces the risk of inaccuracies because the statement is not the result of a declarant's conscious effort to make a statement. On the other hand, a statement made by a person subject to criminal liability, in which the declarant incriminates a third party, may be the result of the declarant’s motivation and opportunity to curry favor with the authorities.
State v. Hughes, 244 Neb. 810, 510 N.W.2d 33, 38 (Neb.1993) (citations omitted). These and other cases strongly suggest that the statements made by the codefendant "suffer from the classic indicia of unreliability affecting virtually all custodial codefendant confessions.” Watkins, 475 N.W.2d at 746.
In Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 110 S.Ct. 3139, 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990), a child victim's statement was admitted as evidence against Wright. Id. at 809-12, 110 S.Ct. at 3143-45. The Supreme Court stated that “[bjecause evidence possessing 'particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ must be at least as reliable as evidence admitted under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, ... we think that evidence admitted under the former requirement must similarly be so trustworthy that adversarial testing would add little to its reliability.” Id. at 821, 110 S.Ct. at 3149 (emphasis added). The Court gave an indication of what it considered untrustworthy by holding the statement under consideration in that case inadmissible because it was "not made under circumstances of reliability comparable to those required, for example, for the admission of excited utterances or statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment.” Id. at 827, 110 S.Ct. at 3152.
Judge Elder correctly points out that one of the factors the United States Supreme Court held to be irrelevant in determining “trustworthiness” as a basis for admissibility under the Confrontation Clause was whether the other evidence at trial corroborates the truth of the declarant’s statement. See Wright, 497 U.S. at 822-23, 110 S.Ct. at 3150-51. See also Watkins, 475 N.W.2d at 745 (noting that "the United States Supreme Court ... squarely prohibited reliance on corroborative evidence of any kind in assessing whether presumptively unreliable hearsay bears sufficient ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness' for Confrontation Clause purposes." (emphasis added)); Simmons v. State, 333 Md. 547, 636 A.2d 463, 470 (1994) (noting that "the majority of the [Supreme] Court ... shot down its prior holdings that corroborating evidence could be used”). The Court in Wright summarized the issue as follows:
In short, the use of corroborating evidence to support a hearsay statement's “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness” would permit admission of a presumptively unreliable statement by bootstrapping on the trustworthiness of other evidence at trial, a result we think at odds with the requirement that hearsay evidence admitted under the Confrontation Clause be so trustworthy that cross-examination of the declarant would be of marginal utility----
*768Moreover, although we considered in Lee v. Illinois the “interlocking” nature of a codefendant’s and a defendant's confessions to determine whether the codefendant’s confession was sufficiently trustworthy for confrontation purposes, we decline to rely on corroborative physical evidence and indeed rejected the "interlock” theory in that case.
497 U.S. at 823-24, 110 S.Ct. at 3150-51. The Court in Wright further observed that "[t]he Court [in Cruz\ said nothing about whether the codefendant's confession would be admissible against the defendant simply because it may have ‘interlocked’ with the defendant’s confession.” Wright, 497 U.S. at 823 n. *, 110 S.Ct. at 3150, n. *.
In short, we must limit our review to the "totality of circumstances that surround the making of the [codefendant’s] statement, and that render the [codefendant] particularly worthy of belief.” Id. at 820, 110 S.Ct. at 3149 (emphasis added). The prosecution must provide an "affirmative reason, arising from the circumstances in which the statement was made [that] provides a basis for rebutting the presumption that a hearsay statement is not worthy of reliance at trial.” Id. at 821, 110 S.Ct. at 3149-50.
In judging "trustworthiness” of the codefendant’s statement, Judge Elder considers as a factor in this case "the extent to which the [codefendant's] and the defendant's confessions ‘interlock.’ ” However, Pitt's statement was not recorded and was minimal in its content. The degree of interlock that can be discerned was not so substantial that the codefendant’s statement can be deemed trustworthy by virtue of that circumstance. Significantly, in Lee, the Supreme Court expressly "reject[ed] Illinois’ second basis for establishing reliability, namely, that because Lee’s and [the codefendant’s] confessions ‘interlock’ on some points, [the codefendant's] confession should be deemed trustworthy in its entirety." 476 U.S. at 545, 106 S.Ct. at 2064. The reliance on this corroborating evidence runs counter to the expressed rulings of the Supreme Court.
Judge Elder also relies upon the circumstances of the police interrogation in judging "trustworthiness.” However, other courts generally consider as factors detracting from trustworthiness (1) whether the declarant was being questioned by the police, Watkins, 475 N.W.2d at 746 (observing that the statements were " ‘given in response to the questions of police, who ... no doubt knew what they were looking for, and [they] w[ere] not tested in any manner by contemporaneous cross-examination by counsel....’ ”), (2) "whether the declarant was in police custody when the statement was made,” Hughes, 510 N.W.2d at 39, (3) “whether the declarant had a motive to mitigate his own criminal liability,” id., and (4) "whether the declarant made the statement in response to leading questions.” Id. Additionally, when circumstances do not indicate that the declarant’s statement "was not motivated by a desire to carry favor with the ... police officer interrogating him” and further prove that the declarant was the beneficiary of favorable recommendations from the authorities, the evidence tends to suggest that the statement is not trustworthy. See United States v. Boyce, 849 F.2d 833, 836-37 (3rd Cir.1988). I believe these factors suggest that the codefendant’s statement in this case should be deemed sufficiently untrustworthy as to be not admissible against Pitt.
*769According to the codefendant’s statement in this case, a discussion between Pitt and the victim concerning a "rock” of cocaine escalated to a wrestling struggle. The codefendant did not "know if ... Pitt knew this guy or what.” The codefendant denied "trying to hurt no one or nothing like that.” The codefendant also said that when "the victim [began] getting the best of ... Pitt on the wrestling ... [, the codefendant] bumped into them to give ... Pitt an equal chance with the wrestling." Thus, while the codefendant implicates Pitt, he characterized his role in the incident as somewhat of a referee who intervened only to keep the victim from gaining a wrestling advantage over Pitt. Moreover, when the codefendant made this statement to the police, he did so knowing that the interrogating officer intended to inform the prosecutor and the magistrate that he, the codefendant, was fully cooperating with the police in their investigation. Nothing about the circumstances surrounding the making of the codefendant's statement tends to imbue it with an aura of trustworthiness.
Code § 19.2-262.1 permits codefendants to be tried jointly "unless such joint trial would constitute prejudice to a defendant.” The codefendant’s statement was inadmissible against Pitt and would have been barred had Pitt been tried by himself. The only way the codefendant’s statement could properly have been admitted into evidence was in the codefendant’s trial. Thus, Pitt properly contends that he was "prejudiced” by a joint trial because evidence incriminating him was admitted that would have been inadmissible had the trials been separated.