Court Opinion

ID: 9466644
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:21:44.673262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:50.720963
License: Public Domain

*1028K. K. HALL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I can agree with the majority decision that upon the facts of this case Williams was denied due process of law and equal protection of the law in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution; however, I cannot agree that the fault therefor was with the trial judge. The South Carolina statute, S.C.Code § 17-3-80 (Cum.Supp.1978), which lies at the heart of this case, limits to fifty thousand dollars the total amount of money which may be spent and gives the trial judge considerable discretion in reimbursement of funds to counsel representing indigent criminal defendants. In my view, it was incumbent upon counsel to make his case before the judge that funds were available, that expenses had been (or would be) incurred, and that the circumstances of his case brought it within the terms of the statute.
If co-counsel, who was responsible for expert testimony, had been diligent, he would have presented his case to the court in a proper manner. It is no excuse that he was engaged in another case, during the three days between arraignment and trial. It is difficult to see how he could have been adequately prepared on any phase of the case under such circumstances. Yet the record fails to show a motion for continuance.
I would reverse for ineffective assistance of counsel. That is where the true fault lies.
The majority opinion more grievously errs in the relief portion of the opinion.
I would reverse and remand for a new trial. Counsel should have the opportunity to make and argue a motion for allowance of expenses for the employment of an independent forensic pathologist to evaluate the medical and scientific causes of the victim’s death and to advise counsel during trial. The trial judge would then have an opportunity to make a determination as to whether such relief should be granted.
There is more involved in the proper defense of a case than its mere presentation at the trial itself. More often than not the preparation for trial is of greater importance. How is counsel to prepare a defense unless he can secure information upon which to base it? Here he needed to consult an expert to determine whether the state’s pathologist was correct in his opinion as to the cause of death. The expert would undoubtedly have been helpful to counsel in understanding the medical testimony, in cross examining the state’s expert and in presenting his argument to the court and jury.
The majority proposes to let this conviction stand unless “. . . the testimony of the pathologist would have been relevant to [the] defense.” As I interpret this phrase, it makes the pathologist’s testimony conclusive on the constitutional issue. This is inconsistent with the majority’s position that the assistance of an expert was necessary for an adequate defense, regardless of whether the expert would have provided helpful testimony at trial. Maj. op. at 1026-1027.- Defense counsel might well have been able to raise a reasonable doubt by astute cross-examination of the state’s expert — but not without his own expert to advise him.
As a practical matter, I wonder if the appointed expert will have enough physical evidence to reach an independent conclusion on the cause of death, or if he will have to base his opinion solely on the state expert’s autopsy report. If that is so, and if his opinion agrees with the state expert, the defendant will not get a new trial despite all the majority opinion says about the defendant’s constitutional rights. The majority declares: “We reverse because we believe that the appointment of an expert was constitutionally required for Williams’ adequate defense against a charge for murder.” These are strong words. Appointment of an independent expert to give an opinion is weak action.
The majority likens this case to Jacobs v. United States, 350 F.2d 571 (4th Cir. 1965). I find no significant similarity. There the sole issue was the mental capacity of the defendant at the time of trial. Testimony by an expert on that point is subject to the *1029most limited cross examination. The facts in this case call for opinion as to cause of death, and all the defendant needs to do is to raise a reasonable doubt. Under no theory can this be compared to evaluating the results of an I.Q. test to determine whether defendant was mentally competent to stand trial in Jacobs.
I cannot see how the majority can say so much and do so little.