Court Opinion

ID: 9742870
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:21:59.516253+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:37.357075
License: Public Domain

*697Dissenting Opinion
White, J.
We are unable to concur in the opinion written by Judge Sharp for our brethren because it impliedly holds that the Industrial Board has made a “finding of the facts on which . . . [its award] is based”, as required by section 60 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act.1 We hold that in one of its so-called findings it has merely stated a conclusion of law. That ‘finding’ is:
“That . . . the plaintiff sustained personal injuries while on a personal mission of his own, and that the said injury did not arise out of or in the course of his employment. . . .”
Since that “finding” is so similar to its counterpart in Block v. Fruehauf Trailer Division (146 Ind. App. 70, 1969), 252 N. E. 2d 612, 19 Ind. Dec. 489, much of what was said in the dissenting opinion in that case expresses our view of this case.
We concede that the case at bar may be distinguished from Block (and from most cases) in that here we find no dispute or contradiction in the evidence. But, as was said in the Block dissent:
“Even in those cases in which the ‘undisputed evidence’ seems to us to establish essential facts which the Board has failed to find, we are not at liberty to assume such facts in deciding whether the award is contrary to law. Such was the holding in Cole v. Sheehan Constr. Co. (1944), 222 Ind. 274, 280, 58 N. E. 2d 172, wherein the Supreme Court said:
“ ‘The Appellate Court found that the undisputed evidence produced by the appellant established that she and the decedent were husband and wife and they were living apart at the time of his death for their own convenience. The court concluded that, as a consequence, the appellant was entitled to compensation. Cole v. Sheehan Construction Co. (1943), 51 N. E. 2d 391. It is immaterial which party produced the evidence and it does not necessarily follow that there was no conflict in the evidence merely because the testimony was undisputed. A conflict may *698arise out of the testimony of a single witness, though it is not disputed by any other testimony. McKee v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. (1943), ante p. 10, 51 N. E. 2d 474. Since the full board made no finding as to some of the material issues the problem presented is not that of determining whether there is some evidence tending to support an award. We think, therefore, that it was an invasion of the province of the full board for the Appellate Court to undertake to find the ultimate facts in the first instance. The statute does not contemplate that the functions of the Industrial Board may be assumed by the courts. The better practice would appear to be to remand the proceeding to the board with directions for it to discharge its statutory duty by finding the essential facts, and by entering an award based thereon.’ (Emphasis added.)” 252 N. E. 2d at 624, 19 Ind. Dec. at 505.
What Judge Sharp has so ably done in his painstakingly detailed analysis of the evidence illustrates the vice inherent in permitting the Industrial Board to shirk its duty to find the facts. For notwithstanding all the valuable time spent at the judicial review level (in doing what the statute says should be done at the administrative review level) we still do not know on what ultimate facts the board based its decision. We know only the evidentiary facts. To fill the void left by the board’s failure to state its findings we presume that the board drew those inferences and made those findings which are “right” to support the legal conclusion it reached.
What this court does then, when it reviews an Industrial Board decision, is not to review what the board actually did, but to review what it might have done. In effect, we review the hypothetical findings of a hypothetical board — an ideal board which always draws from the evidence the inference most favorable to the conclusion of law which is its decision. If this hypothetical board ever commits error it must be the mistake of failing to know what evidence it heard; for we insure that it can never err as to the law because we find for it (by presumption) facts which fit only the right rules of law, And so we reverse only when the evidence is insuf*699ficient to sustain findings essential to the conclusion (i.e., decision).
The constitutional due process (i.e., the fairness) of any remedial statute which provides for administrative adjudication of justiciable controversies rests on its provisions for judicial review.2 The Indiana Supreme Court has repeatedly said that a finding of fact by the administrative agency is essential to that review, if the decision is to be intelligently reviewed. “The findings of fact must be specific enough to enable the court to review intelligently the Commission’s decision.”3 (Our emphasis.) “ Tn no other way would it be possible for this court to review the decree intelligently and to determine whether the decree should be affirmed, reversed, or modified.’ ”4
We should follow the mandate of Cole v. Sheehan Construction Co., supra, and remand this proceeding to the Industrial Board with directions for it to discharge its statutory duty *700by finding the essential facts and by entering an award based thereon.5
Buchanan, Robertson, and Staton, JJ., concur.
Note. — Reported in 269 N. E. 2d 772.

. IC 1971, 22-3-4-7, Ind. Acts 1929, Ch. 172, s. 60, as amended by Ind. Acts 1969, Ch. 94, s. 6, also Burns Ind. Ind. Stat. Ann. § 40-1511.

. “It is correct to say that the orders of an administrative body are subject to judicial review; and that they must be so to meet the requirements of due process. Such review is necessary to the end that there may be an adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction that the agency has acted within the scope of its powers; that substantial evidence supports the factual conclusions; and that its determination comports with the law applicable to the facts found. The provisions of the Compensation Act for a so-called appeal to the Appellate Court, whereby that tribunal is authorized so say whether the finding of facts made by the board and the award entered thereon are contrary to law, supplies every requirement of due process. In other words, when the Industrial Board has made a special finding of facts and entered an order or award, and the Appellate Court has considered whether the award is contrary to law, every essential element of due process has been met and the complaining party has had his day in court.” Warren v. Indiana Telephone Co. (1940), 217 Ind. 93, 105, 26 N.E. 2d 399, 404

. Wabash Valley Coach Co. v. Arrow Coach Lines, Inc. (1950), 228 Ind. 609, 613, 94 N.E. 2d 753, 754, as quoted in Carlton v. Board of Zoning Appeals (1969), 252 Ind. 56, 245 N.E. 2d 337, 343, 16 Ind. Dec. 704, 711.

. Dodge v. Barstow Stove Co. (1917), 40 R.I. 191, 100 A 245, as quoted in Cole v. Sheehan Construction Co. (1944), 222 Ind. 244, 281, 53 N.E. 2d 172, 175, in which the Supreme Court pointed out that in Rhode Island, “the facts in compensation cases are determined by certain courts, instead of by an administrative agency.”

. See also Stoner v. Howard Sober, Inc. (1954), 124 Ind. App. 581, 586, 118 N.E. 2d 504, 507, in which we remanded to the Industrial Board because “the finding ‘that plaintiff is not a dependent within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Law of the State of Indiana’ is clearly a conclusive of law and not a finding of fact, as such determination requires an application of abstract principles of law to the facts as the are found to exist.” (My italics).