Court Opinion

ID: 9746185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:06:40.952568+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:10.579522
License: Public Domain

EPSTEIN, J.
I dissent because I believe that appellant can state a cause of action that is not preempted by federal law. I agree that his tort claims are preempted by the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq.) under the Garmon theory. (San Diego Unions v. Garmon (1959) 359 U.S. 236 [79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775].) But that does not end the matter.
Plaintiff has pleaded that his employment arrangement with defendant gave him a right of continued employment, terminable only for cause, and he claims that he was terminated in violation of that arrangement. This sets up a simple suit for breach of contract. The majority takes the position that defendant will claim that plaintiff’s termination was the result of a reduction in work force, and that plaintiff will counter with an assertion that this reason is pretextual, set up to mask the real reason—that he was fired because he testified against the company at an arbitration hearing. Since that hearing was conducted pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, the majority reasons, the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board would be invoked.
I suspect that defendant’s principal defense will be that plaintiff was an at-will employee, and, as such, that he was terminable without the necessity of a showing of cause. It is not unlikely that defendant will tender the pretext issue the majority anticipates. The issue before us is whether that *129prospect ousts the state court of jurisdiction if plaintiff’s action is for breach of contract alone. Kelecheva v. Multivision Cable T.V. Corp. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 521 [22 Cal.Rptr.2d 453] addressed substantially the same question, and concluded that Garmon does not require preemption of the contract-based claim. (Id. at p. 529.) I believe Kelecheva was correctly decided and is not meaningfully distinguished from this case. I therefore would reverse the trial court’s order of dismissal, and remand to allow plaintiff to plead a single cause of action for breach of contract.