Court Opinion

ID: 9547457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:47:39.219815+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:46.554892
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
May a person charged under the first degree escape statute, RCW 9A.76.110(1), challenge the constitutional validity of the convictions which led to confinement? We affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals and hold that in a prosecution for escape the State is not required to prove the defendant had been detained pursuant to a constitutionally valid conviction.
I
On Saturday, April 3, 1982, Robert B. Gonzales was detained at the Tri-State Work Release Facility pursuant to prior burglary convictions. At about 6:45 that morning, Gonzales signed out of the facility, telling the authorities that he was going to work. He indicated that he would return to the facility by 6 that evening. However, Gonzales did not return until about 8:30 p.m.
That afternoon, one of the corrections officers had contacted Gonzales' employer and discovered that the business was closed. When Gonzales finally returned to the work release facility, the correctional officer on duty told him that his work release was being suspended and that he was under arrest. Gonzales replied, "This ain't right. This just *566ain't right," and ran out of the building and down the street. He eventually went to California, and was subsequently extradited to Washington.
The Franklin County Prosecutor charged Gonzales under the first degree escape statute, RCW 9A.76.110. Although the trial court initially dismissed the matter citing State v. Danforth, 97 Wn.2d 255, 258, 643 P.2d 882 (1982), it vacated the order on reconsideration by distinguishing Danforth on the facts. However, the trial court agreed with Gonzales that the State could only rely on constitutionally valid convictions to prove the "conviction of a felony" element of first degree escape.
The State presented evidence of three prior convictions, each based upon a guilty plea. In December of 1979, Gonzales had pleaded guilty in Walla Walla Superior Court to one count of second degree robbery. The court accepted Gonzales' plea and placed him on probation.
In 1980, Gonzales was charged with another second degree burglary in Grant County Superior Court and also with second degree theft. He agreed to plead guilty to the burglary charge and to possession of stolen property in exchange for dismissal of the theft charge.
The trial court in the present case held that Gonzales' two prior burglary convictions were valid and could be used to prove the escape charge. The court also held that the stolen property conviction could not be used because Gonzales' description of his conduct established his guilt only to misdemeanor possession. (The monetary amount for felony possession is $250. RCW 9A.56.040(l)(a).)
The trial court found Gonzales guilty of first degree escape. The Court of Appeals affirmed. State v. Gonzales, 37 Wn. App. 251, 680 P.2d 63 (1984).
II
RCW 9A.76.110(1) provides that a "person is guilty of escape in the first degree if, being detained pursuant to a conviction of a felony or an equivalent juvenile offense, he escapes from custody or a detention, facility." Gonzales *567contends that "conviction of a felony" should be interpreted to refer only to constitutionally valid felony convictions. State v. Gore, 101 Wn.2d 481, 681 P.2d 227 (1984); State v. Swindell, 93 Wn.2d 192, 607 P.2d 852 (1980) (both interpreting the felon-in-possession statute, RCW 9.41.040, to require proof of a constitutionally valid predicate conviction); State v. Holsworth, 93 Wn.2d 148, 607 P.2d 845 (1980) (habitual criminal statute requires proof of constitutionally valid prior convictions).
The present case is distinguishable from Holsworth, Swindell and Gore. Holsworth involves sentence enhancement based on prior convictions. This is not analogous to the situation before us. In Swindell and Gore, however, the State relied on one or more of the defendant's prior convictions to prove his guilt of a status-type crime. The affected group in Gore and Swindell consisted of persons convicted, in this state or elsewhere, of a crime of violence. See RCW 9.41.040.
Were the conduct prohibited by RCW 9A.76.110(1) similar to that prohibited by RCW 9.41.040, we would again require the State to prove a constitutionally valid conviction. The statute involved in Gore and Swindell forbade exercise of a constitutionally protected right based on a person's criminal history. RCW 9.41.040 prohibits a person convicted of a crime of violence from owning, possessing or controlling a pistol. The ability of the individual citizen to bear arms, although subject to reasonable regulation by the State, State v. Krantz, 24 Wn.2d 350, 353, 164 P.2d 453 (1945), is unquestionably a constitutionally protected right. State v. Rupe, 101 Wn.2d 664, 706, 683 P.2d 571 (1984); Const. art. 1, § 24. The first degree escape statute, however, impinges upon no constitutionally protected rights. No constitutional right of escape could exist under even the most innovative interpretation of the state or federal constitution.
We today join the courts in the vast majority of jurisdictions in refusing to permit defendants charged with escape to challenge the legality of their confinement at the escape *568trial. See Annot., What Justifies Escape or Attempt To Escape or Assistance in That Regard, 70 A.L.R.2d 1430 (1960 & Supp. 1984). The petitioner, and others in his position, still retain the opportunity to attack their confinement due to their original charges in a personal restraint petition.
Brachtenbach, Dore, and Dimmick, JJ., and Cunningham, J. Pro Tern., concur.
Dolliver and Andersen, JJ., concur in the result.