Court Opinion

ID: 9903164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:30:32.452813+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:07.250578
License: Public Domain

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA
                     FIFTH DISTRICT

                                 NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO
                                 FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND
                                 DISPOSITION THEREOF IF FILED

MILDRED V. WASKIEWICZ, AS
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE ESTATE OF M.V.K.,

           Appellant,

v.                                     Case No. 5D21-2949
                                       LT Case Nos. 1658309308
                                                    21F-02302

DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILIES,

         Appellee.
______________________________/

Opinion filed May 19, 2023

Administrative Appeal from the
Department of Children and Families
Office of Appeal Hearings.

Jeffrey W. Gibson and Zoila Lahera,
of Macfarlane, Ferguson & McMullen,
Tampa, and Jack M. Rosenkranz, of
Rosenkranz Law Firm, Tampa, for
Appellant.

Jennifer L. Ware, Assistant Regional
Counsel, of Department of Children
and Families, Deland, for Appellee.

SOUD, J.
      Appellant Mildred V. Waskiewicz, as personal representative of her

mother M.V.K’s estate, seeks review of the Department of Children and

Families’ denial of her administrative appeal of DCF’s action denying her

mother’s application for Institutional Care Program (ICP) Medicaid benefits

for the period from January to April, 2021. We have jurisdiction. See Art. V,

§ 4(b)(2), Fla. Const.; Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(1)(C); § 120.68(2)(a), Fla.

Stat. (2021).

      At the heart of this appeal is Appellant’s claim that DCF wrongly

determined $32,908 in her mother’s “VA fiduciary account” 1 was an available

asset for the purpose of her mother’s application for ICP benefits. Appellant

argues that these funds, $30,000 of which were transferred from M.V.K.’s

personal checking account into the VA fiduciary account, were being held in

the VA fiduciary account for anticipated repayment to the Department of

Veteran Affairs (VA) for the VA’s erroneous overpayment of benefits for

which M.V.K. was otherwise eligible. In light of this calculation, DCF

concluded M.V.K. was not eligible for ICP benefits for January to April, 2021.

      1
        M.V.K.’s VA benefits would be deposited each month directly into the
VA fiduciary account. M.V.K.’s monthly income from social security and the
Florida Retirement System also flowed from her checking account into this
VA fiduciary account. The expenses associated with M.V.K.’s living at the
Lexington Place Assisted Living Facility were paid directly from the VA
fiduciary account.
                                      2
     The parties do not dispute that Appellant, on behalf of her mother,

owed the VA for overpayment (which was repaid in full from the VA fiduciary

account on May 11, 2021). 2 Of critical importance, there were no legal

restrictions placed on the VA fiduciary account. Further, the record before us

does not reveal any effort by the VA to exert control over the funds in the VA

fiduciary account, and the VA described the overpayment as a debt and

provided an array of options for payment from various sources, including

payment over time.

     As a result, DCF determined these funds were available for M.V.K.’s

support and maintenance prior to May 2021 and that Appellant could have

legally repaid the VA from any source. Since she was not legally prohibited

from using the funds in the VA account for assisted living facility expenses,

DCF simply viewed the VA debt as any other bill that would be due and

owing.

     Though Appellant’s reservation of the funds to repay the VA, as her

mother’s fiduciary, was proper (and even commendable), we must conclude

under Florida law that DCF correctly determined the money at issue was

     2
      Similarly, the parties do not dispute that the funds in the VA fiduciary
account were the reason the application for ICP benefits was denied for the
months at issue.

                                      3
available to Appellant’s mother, in the absence of any legal restriction on the

use of those funds. 3

            Once the individual’s ownership interest of an
            asset(s) is established, the availability of that asset
            must be determined. Asset(s) determined not to be
            available are not considered in determining eligibility.
            Assets are considered available to an individual
            when the individual has unrestricted access to it.
            Accessibility depends on the legal structure of
            the account or property. An asset is countable, if
            the asset is available to a representative
            possessing the legal ability to make the asset
            available for another’s support or maintenance,
            even though the representative chooses not to
            do so. Assets not available due to legal
            restrictions are not considered in determining
            total available assets unless the legal restrictions
            were caused or requested by the individual or
            another acting at their request or on their behalf.

Fla. Admin. Code. R. 65A-1.303 (emphasis added). As such, DCF correctly

denied her application for ICP benefits for the months at issue. See Kirk v.

Dep’t of Child. & Fam. Servs., 737 So. 2d 561, 562 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)

(rejecting argument that DCF should have considered certain debts

appellant owed when deciding eligibility for ICP benefits).

      AFFIRMED.

      It is so ordered.

      3
         Cf. Mason v. Dep’t of HRS, 614 So. 2d 1168 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)
(holding that settlement proceeds held in trust for the use and benefit of the
injured minor child were not legally available assets for purposes of eligibility
for the “Aid to Families With Dependent Children” assistance program).
                                       4
WALLIS and HARRIS, JJ., concur.

                                  5