Court Opinion

ID: 9585923
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:05:11.289643+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:16.879058
License: Public Domain

BURNS, Chief Judge,
concurring.
I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that a prosecutor’s improper comment at trial, alerting the jury to a fact prejudicial to the defendant’s case, violates defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial and is not a harmless error unless it is harmless-error-beyond-a-reasonable-doubt (HEBRD). In my view, the improper comment does not violate defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial and is a harmless error if it is harmless-error-more-probable-than-not (HEMPTN).
Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 52 states as follows:
HARMLESS ERROR AND PLAIN ERROR
(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
(b) Plain Error. Plain errors or defects affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 52(a) mirrors
HRPP Rule 52(a).
Although not explicitly stated in HRPP Rule 52(a), some errors are harmless errors if the harmlessness of the error is proven more probable than not. This is the HEMPTN degree. Other errors are harmless errors if the harmlessness of the error is proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This is the HEBRD degree. In each instance, the applicable degree should be clearly identified.
The United States Supreme Court has phrased both definitions in the negative. In their view, an error is not HEBRD if “there is a reasonable possibility that the [error] complained of might have contributed to the conviction.” Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23, 87 S.Ct. 824, 827, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967) (quoting Fahy v. Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85, 86-87, 84 S.Ct. 229, 230, 11 L.Ed.2d 171 (1963)). An error is not HEMPTN if it is “highly probable that the error had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776, 66 S.Ct. 1239, 1253, 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946).
However, the following two Ninth Circuit cases stated definitions of the HEMPTN degree that are easier to satisfy than the Kot-teakos definition.
When prosecutorial conduct is called in question, the issue is whether, considered in the context of the entire trial, that conduct appears likely to have affected the jury’s discharge of its duty to judge the evidence fairly. United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 11, 105 S.Ct. 1038, 1044, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) cited in U.S. v. McKay, 771 F.2d 1207, 1212 (9th Cir.1985). Prompt and effective action by the trial court may neutralize the damage by admonition to counsel or by appropriate curative instructions to the jury, see, e.g., United States v. Mikka, 586 F.2d 152, 156 (9th Cir.1978) cert. denied, 440 U.S. 921, 99 S.Ct. 1247, 59 L.Ed.2d 474 (1979), but prosecutorial misconduct invites reversal if it appears more probable than not that the alleged misconduct affected the jury’s verdict. United States v. Flake, 746 F.2d 535 (9th Cir.1984) cert. denied 469 U.S. 1225, 105 S.Ct. 1220, 84 L.Ed.2d 360 (1985). We look to see whether the court’s remarks *305were sufficient to undo the harm of the prosecutor’s remarks.
United States v. Simtob, 901 F.2d 799, 806 (9th Cir.1990).
Prosecutorial comments to which the defendant objects are reviewed for “harmless error.” United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 13 n. 10, 106 S.Ct. 1038, 1046 n. 10, 84 L.Ed.2d 1 (1985) (Young); United States v. Endicott, 803 F.2d 606, 513 (9th Cir.1986) (Endicott). We need not reach the question whether a comment was improper if it is clear that the trial judge promptly neutralized any harm to the defendant by giving appropriate curative instructions to the jury. Endicott, 803 F.2d at 513. Where, however, a defendant’s objection to prosecutorial remarks is overruled, we examine the remarks within the context of the whole trial to determine whether it is more probable than not that the allegedly improper remarks materially affected the verdict. Id.; United States v. Prantil, 764 F.2d 548, 556 (9th Cir.1985).
United States v. Chavez-Vernaza, 844 F.2d 1368, 1377 (9th Cir.1987).
Hawai'i has also spoken in terms of harmful error rather than harmless error. However, Hawai'i’s focus has been on the impact of the harmful error on defendant’s right to a fair trial rather than on the jury’s verdict. State v. McGriff, 76 Hawai'i 148, 871 P.2d 782 (1994), decided that “[pjrosecutorial misconduct [is harmful error that] warrants a new trial or the setting aside of a guilty verdict only where the actions of the prosecutor have caused prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Id. at 158, 871 P.2d at 792 (citations omitted).
In comparison, Kotteakos requires that the error did not have a “substantial influence[,]” Kotteakos 328 U.S. at 765, 66 S.Ct. at 1248, “upon the jury’s decision[,]” id. at 764, 66 S.Ct. at 1247, whereas McGriff requires that the error did not cause “prejudice to the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” McGriff, 76 Hawai'i at 158, 871 P.2d at 792.
Chapman held that, among other constitutional rights, the constitutional rights to counsel and to an impartial judge are rights “so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error[.]” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 23, 87 S.Ct. at 827-28. The court in Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 111 S.Ct. 1246, 113 L.Ed.2d 302 (1991), specified some of the other constitutional rights that enjoy this very special protection. Errors violating these specially protected constitutional rights are separately categorized in a never harmless error (NHE) category. As noted in the majority’s opinion, the NHE category also includes the impairment of a statutory right to peremptory challenges.
Chapman held that other federal constitutional errors may be held harmless, but “before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless, the court must be able to declare a belief that it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” Chapman, 386 U.S. at 24, 87 S.Ct. at 828. It follows that federal non-constitutional errors are harmless if they are HEMPTN.
Thus, there are three possible categories of error. First is the NHE category. Second is the HEBRD category. Third is the HEMPTN category. The difference between the HEBRD category and the HEMPTN category involves (1) the source of the right; and (2) the degree of proof required to show that the error did not prejudice the right.
Possibility Source of the Right Decree of Proof
NHE Constitution Cannot be proven Not constitution Cannot be proven
HEBRD Constitution Beyond a reasonable doubt
HEMPTN Not constitution More probable than not
*306An error by the prosecutor or the judge at trial is not a harmless error unless either the HEMPTN or HEBRD criteria for forgiveness is applicable and satisfied. Although the prosecutor’s improper remark in this case was not addressed to any of defendant’s constitutional rights, the majority concludes that it violated the defendant’s due process right to a fair trial and, therefore, the applicable criteria for forgiveness is the HEBRD criteria. Although the holding in this case involves only the prosecutor’s improper remark, its rationale can be applied to all trial errors by a prosecutor or judge, that alert the jury to a fact prejudicial to the defendant. In the context of harmless errors at trial, the majority’s rationale does not distinguish between constitutional errors and nonconstitu-tional errors.
I disagree with the majority’s rationale. An error by the prosecutor or judge is not a constitutional error simply because the jury witnessed it. The right to a fair trial does not include a right to a trial without any improper remarks by the prosecutor heard by the jury. Improper remarks by the prosecutor that are HEBRD or HEMPTN, whichever is applicable, do not prejudice a defendant’s right to a fair trial.
The Hawai'i Supreme Court has never expressly stated that Hawai'i’s application of HRPP Rule 52(a) differs from the federal application of FRCP Rule 52(a) in this respect. I know of no valid reason why the Hawai'i application should differ from the federal application in this respect.
In all other respects, I concur.