Court Opinion

ID: 9711143
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:25:11.466246+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:00.652399
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE STOUDER, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority of the court. I believe the application of the appropriate principles of law requires the conclusion the verdict is not supported by sufficient evidence. I would reverse. The majority opinion sufficiently sets forth the facts and supporting testimony. From the statement of facts it is undisputed the stolen property was not found in the actual control and custody of the defendant. It is also undisputed the defendant was not the sole occupant of the house and in fact, as disclosed by the search warrant, other persons, i.e., the Huddlestons, were in possession of the house. Finally, the only serious factual dispute involves the defendant’s relationship to the premises and the legal effect of such relationship viewed in its aspect most favorably supporting the verdict of the jury. Initially I believe it appropriate to note no claim was made that the defendant was in actual possession and control of any stolen property. Thus the rules and consequences relating to actual possession of stolen property are not applicable as discussed in People v. Reynolds, 27 Ill. 2d 523, 190 N.E .2d 301, and People v. Harris, 53 Ill. 2d 83, 288 N.E.2d 873. Nor is this a case where possession of anything, let alone contraband, is the offense charged, as in People v. Inman (5th Dist. 1976), 38 Ill. 2d 752, 348 N.E.2d 510, and People v. Galloway, 28 Ill. 2d 355, 192 N.E.2d 370, cert, denied, 376 U.S. 910,11 L. Ed. 2d 608,84 S. Ct. 665. The remaining case cited in the majority opinion, People v. Christeson, 122 Ill. App. 2d 192, 258 N.E.2d 142, is inapplicable because there is no question but that defendant in Christeson was a general resident of the premises in which the stolen property was located. In addition, in the Christeson case there was no discussion of the ultimate conclusion of guilt and the constructive possession upon which such conclusion was based. The general rule is the recent unexplained possession of stolen property is prima facie evidence of guilt. (People v. Pride, 16 Ill. 2d 82, 156 N.E.2d 551; Comfort v. People, 54 Ill. 404; People v. Henkel, 60 Ill. App. 2d 331, 208 N.E .2d 107.) The inference that the possessor of recently stolen property is the thief is one which the jury may be permitted to draw, based on human experience and common sense, from known events or circumstances. (People v. Fiorito, 413 Ill. 123, 108 N.E.2d 455.) The inference is sufficient to sustain a conviction of burglary unless other circumstances create a reasonable doubt as to guilt. (People v. Woods, 26 Ill. 2d 557, 188 N.E .2d 1.) This inference in no way lessens the burden placed upon the State in a criminal prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of the crime charged and the perpetration of the crime by the person accused. People v. Buchholz, 363 Ill. 270, 2 N.E.2d 80. Before the inference may arise, the possession must be recent, unexplained, personal and exclusive (People v. Urban, 381 Ill. 64, 44 N.E .2d 885; People v. Blades, 329 Ill. 182, 160 N.E. 190), and “ ° ° ° with a distinct implied or express assertion of ownership. A mere constructive possession is not enough.” (People v. Mulvaney, 286 Ill. 114, 119, 121 N.E. 229.) Evidence of joint possession wiU also justify the inference if the joint exercise shows concerted action involving the accused and others sharing the joint control of the stolen goods. People v. Harris, 53 Ill. 2d 83, 288 N.E.2d 873; People v. Henkel, 60 Ill. App. 2d 331, 208 N.E.2d 107. In People v. Barnes, 311 Ill. 559, 562-63, 143N.E. 445, the court reversed a conviction for larceny of an automobile in which the accused was discovered to be a passenger within four hours of its theft. The court stated as follows: “Mere association with a stolen article is not necessarily possession of it, and before any presumption can arise from possession it must be shown that the person accused is actually in possession. In order that an inference of guilt may be drawn from possession of goods recently stolen it must be shown that there is an actual personal possession on the part of the accused, either singly or jointly, with others acting in concert with him, and that that possession is exclusive in him or those acting in concert with him.” From the foregoing cases and the discussions therein regarding possession of stolen goods and the consequences of such possession, the rule requires the possession of such property by a defendant must be definitely and unambiguously established before the conclusion is warranted that the possessor stole such property. Whether the conclusion be couched in terms of inference, presumption, or prima facie case, if the initial possession upon which the conclusion depends is not clearly shown, then the reason for justifying the conclusion of guilt disappears and a conviction based thereon ought not to stand. Even though the conclusion finds support to some extent in common experience, it is equally clear that the consequences of applying the conclusion are serious. Concededly in the instant case the stolen property was not found within the actual possession or control of the defendant. Even if the possession of some kind or character of premises where stolen property is located may be regarded as the equivalent of actual possession, for the purpose of applying the rules relating to possession of stolen property, there are two fatal weaknesses in the proof adduced to support the conviction in this case. The first relates to the nature of the evidence regarding defendant’s possession of the premises and the second relates to the relationship between whatever possession the defendant had and the stolen property. With respect to the first problem, as noted in the majority opinion the police officer expressed the opinion the defendant resided in the southeast bedroom on the premises. This opinion is based primarily on defendant’s presence in the house on the day of the execution of the search warrant, some documents bearing defendant’s name in the room, and the repair bill addressed to him at the Huddleston address. The majority opinion refers to “ ° ° ° numerous papers addressed to defendant ° ° An examination of the record shows the only paper found addressed to defendant at the Huddleston address was the bill for the repair of the Huddleston car. No other papers addressed to defendant at the Huddleston address were found. Although the officer testified to an intermittent surveillance of the premises, there was no testimony based on such surveillance that the defendant was commonly on the premises or that he was seen entering or leaving the premises during such surveillance even though other persons were so seen. No objection was interposed to the testimony of this police officer, but at best the facts upon which it is based show a casual relationship to the premises. The evidence fails to show any particular relationship between the defendant and the premises from which his control or possession of the whole or any part of the premises is warranted. Secondly, to the extent that any relationship between the defendant and the premises is shown, the nature of such possession is insufficient to warrant the conclusion the defendant was by virtue of possession of the premises in possession of the stolen goods. However defendant’s possession of the bedroom be viewed, there is no link between such possession and the possession of the stolen goods either individually or jointly with the Huddlestons. I believe the evidence was insufficient to establish defendant possessed recently stolen property, and no inference of guilt could be made on this basis. On this record, there is no proof of exclusive possession by the defendant, nor in fact any joint possession by him and others. It was not established he had possession or control of the premises or the articles found therein. People v. Robinson, 23 Ill. 2d 27, 177 N.E.2d 132; cf. People v. Mosley, 131 Ill. App. 2d 722, 265 N.E.2d 889; People v. Pugh, 36 Ill. 2d 435, 223 N.E.2d 115.