Court Opinion

ID: 9637514
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:08:39.9825+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:56.983713
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent.
Legislative interpretation is controlled by the Statutory Construction Act1 which sets forth the polestar for determining legislative intent:
(b) When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b). See In re Estate of Fox, 494 Pa. 584, 431 A.2d 1008 (1981); Black v. Billy Penn Cory., 72 Pa. Cmwlth. 628, 457 A.2d 192 (1983); Shestack v. General Braddock Area School District, 63 Pa.Cmwlth. 204, 437 A.2d 1059 (1981).
The statute in question states:
The compensation or pension herein mentioned shall not be subject to attachment or execution, and shall be payable only to the beneficiary designated, and shall not be subject to assignment or transfer. (Emphasis added).
53 P.S. § 39351.
The majority creates an ambiguity in this statute by its interpretation of the enforcement provisions of our support *52statutes (See 48 P.S. § 136 and Pa.R.Civ.P. 1910.22) and exemption statute (See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8124(b)). Nothing in these provisions creates, such an ambiguity. Section 136 specifically provides for attachment of trusts, not otherwise subject to attachment, while Rule 1910.22 speaks generally of wages, salaries and commissions. Likewise, I take exception to the majority’s reliance upon 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8124(b), in that section 8124(b) is as explicit as § 39351 of the Third Class City Code, in exempting pension plans from attachment or execution. For this reason, I would not adopt the reasoning of the Superior Court in Hopkinson v. Hopkinson, 323 Pa.Super. 404, 470 A.2d 981 (1984) anymore than I agree with the majority in the present case.
Thus, I find no ambiguity, either within the pension statute itself or in conjunction with the support statutes or exemption statutes, which permits the majority to undertake the task of determining the “spirit” of the law in derogation of its obvious meaning.2
NIX, C.J., and FLAHERTY, J., join in this dissenting opinion.

. Act of December 6, 1972, P.L. 1339, 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1501 et seq.

. The majority correctly holds that the Divorce Code, Act of April 2, 1980, P.L. 63 No. 26, 23 P.S. § 101 et seq., is inapplicable to this appeal. The views which I have expressed today should not be interpreted as necessarily being applicable if the Divorce Code applied.