Court Opinion

ID: 9739173
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:10:03.012699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:10.425290
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
1. I agree with the majority that plaintiff’s contributory negligence does not bar her recovery as a matter of law under Issue I.
2. On Issue II, I agree with the majority that the trial court erred in determining that Jensen’s conduct constituted negligence per se as a matter of law.
3. Since we reverse and remand on Issue II, we should not reach Issue III. Anything we do say on Issue III is dicta because it is not necessary to the holding of the decision. If we discuss Issue III to provide guidance on retrial, we should caution only, not reverse, because there is evidence of substantial damages in the record. The children lost their mother’s companionship, guidance and services for their lifetime. Counsel’s request for “$50,000 a year for 20 years” is simply argument, not evidence, and the jury was so instructed. See Stormo v. Strong, 469 N.W.2d 816, 825 (S.D.1991) (not an abuse of trial court’s discretion to instruct jury to use their own knowledge to establish a value for services and to permit plaintiff’s attorney to illustrate how such damages might be calculated). Stormo is a very recent unanimous opinion of this court where we stated:
‘The rule against indefinite or uncertain damages applies only to such damages as are not the definite or certain results of the wrong. Uncertainty as to the fact is fatal to recovery, but uncertainty as to the measure or extent of the damages does not bar recovery.’ ... However, it would be a better practice to present *193some testimony on the reasonable value of the services actually provided.
Stormo, 469 N.W.2d at 825, (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
4.Since we reverse and remand on Issue II, I would not reach Issue IV either.