Court Opinion

ID: 9731073
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:32:11.059733+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:12.498946
License: Public Domain

VANCE, Justice,
dissenting.
The United States Supreme Court has said, “Because of the risk that the factor of race may enter the criminal justice process, we have engaged in ‘unceasing efforts’ to eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice system.” McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 309, 107 S.Ct. 1756, 1776, 95 L.Ed.2d 262 (1987) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 1716, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)). We should be engaged in the same endeavor.
The right to a trial free of racial prejudice is, in my view, a fundamental, systemic requirement of the criminal justice system. See Marin v. State, 851 S.W.2d 275, 279 (Tex.Crim.App.1993). ’ It is thus a category-one right under Marin, not subject to the preservation requirement of Rule 33 or a harm analysis under Rule 44. See id. at 280.
Although the record does not prove a sinister motive by the State, the fact is that the prosecutor unnecessarily asked questions that had the potential to appeal to racial prejudice. Because I view this as a violation of Resendez’ fundamental right to a trial free of racial prejudice, I would reverse the judgment. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.