Court Opinion

ID: 9474712
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 05:06:31.876332+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:44:17.175992
License: Public Domain

CLARK, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In attempting to determine whether substantial evidence supports the administrative law judge’s (“AU”) implicit finding that Mr. Hutchison’s impairment is not listed in the regulations, the majority has conducted extensive and difficult fact-finding. Because we are not competent to interpret the medical evidence in this case and cannot review the AU’s ultimate finding with respect to step three of the sequential evaluation without more particular findings explaining how Hutchison’s impairment relates to the listings, we should remand this case so that the AU may set down his reasons for rejecting Hutchison’s claim of disability under the listings.
The majority appears to assume that once it deduces that an experienced AU who reaches step four of the sequential evaluation must have rejected any claim of disability at step three, it is free as a reviewing court to determine whether substantial evidence supports the implied finding. However, the issue in this case is not whether we can, as a logical matter, assume that there exists an implied finding for us to review. Rather, the issue is whether an appellate court should undertake to reconstruct the complex fact-finding that must underlie a conclusory finding of ultimate fact (implicit or not) in the name of reviewing the conclusory finding. The majority does not pause to reflect upon this issue but moves ahead to weigh the evidence in the first instance. In so doing, the majority steps out of its role as a reviewing court.
As the majority opinion reveals, determining whether substantial evidence supports a finding that Hutchison’s impairment is not described in the listings requires resolution of a series of complex issues of medical fact. The majority has resorted to conducting its own medical research to reach its decision. See, e.g., Majority op. at 1464 & n. 1. We have not the expertise to undertake such a review with any confidence. Just as importantly, we cannot expect litigants to trust in the justice of appellate decisions that depend on knowledge and experience outside the scope of our appellate expertise.
Moreover, although we may be able to deduce that the AU rejected Hutchison’s step three claim, we cannot be as certain that the AU gave the evaluation the careful attention required to reach the correct conclusions. Part of our role as a reviewing court must be to ensure that fact-finding is conducted in a manner that minimizes error and justifies the deference we accord the finder of fact. We fail to acknowledge that function when we provide the explanation needed to affirm the fact *1467finder’s conclusions instead of returning the case to allow the fact finder to make the requisite underlying findings.
In Todd v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 641 (11th Cir.1984), the claimant asserted that her impairment fell under the same listings— for ischemic heart disease — claimed by Hutchison to describe his impairment. The ALJ in that case had similarly neglected to record any findings with respect to the relationship of Todd’s impairment to the listings but had reached step five of the sequential evaluation. Although the record contained medical evidence in the form of electrocardiogram reports, the court did not attempt to review any step three finding implicit in the ALJ’s decision to go on to steps four and five. Instead, it remanded the case to allow the ALJ to fulfill its “duty to develop the facts fully and fairly.” Id. at 642. The virtually identical facts of this case demand the same result.
Edwards v. Heckler, 736 F.2d 625 (11th Cir.1984), does not support, or require, the majority’s decision to conduct the fact-finding necessary to review the AU’s conclusion at step three. In Edwards, the court was also faced with a record silent as to the status of the claimant’s impairment under the listings. The ALJ had found, however, that the claimant did not have a “severe impairment.” Because the court determined that the definition of “severe impairment” also described the requirements of the particular listing there at issue, it could conclude that the finding that the impairment was not severe amounted to a finding that the claimant did not meet the listing requirements. The court could be certain that the AU had conducted the evaluation required at step three because he had made another finding requiring the same analysis. It did not have to make its own findings to review the AU’s decision. Furthermore, review of the implicit finding in Edwards did not depend on the kind of knowledge and experience that must guide interpretation of the medical evidence and listings involved in this case.
My conviction that we should not review the AU’s conclusory finding in this case is strengthened by the difficulty I have experienced assessing whether to concur in the majority’s analysis of the medical evidence. For instance, the majority finds that the treadmill test is acceptable — a critical finding, for were the test unacceptable, the § 4.04 B 1 listings would apply and there is no dispute that Hutchison is disabled under § 4.04 B 7. My own review of that portion of the record purported to be relevant to the treadmill test leads me to suspect that the electrocardiogram tracings are unacceptable under § 4.00 F 2.
As an initial matter, I cannot be sure that the tracings claimed by the Secretary to reflect the results of the treadmill test (Record, Vol. 2 at 108-24) are in fact the correct tracings. The date on the first strip is illegible, so it is not possible to determine whether the tracings were obtained on the day the test was performed. The tracings are not otherwise labeled as part of the treadmill test and they are separated in the record by several unrelated documents from other documents that pertain to the treadmill test.
If these are the correct tracings, it is not clear that they meet the criteria for acceptability set forth in the regulations. Section 4.00 F 2 provides that “[electrocardiograms obtained in conjunction with exercise tests must include the original tracings or a legible copy of the appropriate leads____ [T]he standardization must be inscribed on the tracings and the strips must be labeled appropriately, including the times recorded.” I can find no marking that might be the “standardization” that is to be “inscribed on the tracings,” and Hutchison claims no such standardization is there to be found. Other tracings found in the record contain information that is absent from the alleged treadmill test tracings. Compare Record, Vol. 2, at *146896-101. The times do not appear to be recorded, and I have no basis upon which to determine whether the strips are otherwise “labeled appropriately.”
Even less can I be sure the majority’s determination that Hutchison’s impairment is not included among the § 4.04 A listings is correct. The conclusion reached by the majority, that “there exists substantial evidence that appellant met none of Appendix 1 listings,” Majority op. at 1464, is not deducible from the explanation immediately preceding that conclusion. Furthermore, were Hutchison’s impairment clearly not included among the listings, the AU would still be required to find that Hutchison’s impairment is not “equal to a listed impairment(s).” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d). As it stands, the medical evidence must be interpreted and translated into the language of the listings to determine whether Hutchison’s impairment is described therein. Because we are not competent — as appellate judges — to perform this task, I cannot be confident that substantial evidence supports the finding that Hutchison’s impairment does not fall within the listings.
My aim is not to convince anyone that the majority’s factual conclusions are wrong, but to illustrate the difficulties created by our lack of expertise. Of all the steps in the evaluation, the third is the most technical and the most difficult for an appellate court to review without particular explanatory findings. The majority’s attempt to find substantial evidence to support the AU’s implicit finding that Hutchison was not disabled under the listings is unconvincing for that reason. This case should be remanded to the AU with instructions to reconsider step three of the evaluation of Hutchison’s claim and record particular findings to explain its decision.

. All regulations cited may be found in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpart P, app. 1, unless otherwise noted.