Court Opinion

ID: 9463482
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:08:39.196393+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:08.767593
License: Public Domain

COFFIN, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
Although I am in sympathy with the result reached by the court in this deeply troubling case, I have difficulty with its holding that Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975), does not prohibit Massachusetts from commencing adult criminal prosecutions against petitioners. Since I agree with the suggestion in footnote 1 of the court’s opinion that Younger v, Harris does not bar this suit,1 I *221would reluctantly uphold the stay and allow further proceedings to be held.
I recognize the undesirable consequences of holding Breed retroactive, but I think Mr. Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for a unanimous court in Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 93 S.Ct. 876, 35 L.Ed.2d 29 (1973) virtually compels the conclusion that Breed is retroactive. In Robinson, the issue was the retroactivity of Waller v. Florida, 406 U.S. 916, 92 S.Ct. 1800, 32 L.Ed.2d 115 (1972) which held that the double jeopardy clause prohibits a state from prosecuting an individual for an offense which had previously been the subject of a municipal prosecution. In 1962, Robinson had been tried and convicted in municipal court for three counts of assault and battery, and he was fined $50 on each count. Thereafter, he was tried upon state charges and was convicted and sentenced for up to 25 years in jail. The Court held Waller retroactive and ordered that the state conviction be vacated if the state and municipal offenses were found to be the same. The Court refused to apply the three prong Linkletter-Desist criteria, reasoning that they had no applicability to rules that in practice prevent a trial from taking place at all, rather than merely prescribing procedural rules. Id. 409 U.S. at 510, 93 S.Ct. 876.2
I am not persuaded by the court’s attempt to distinguish Robinson on the ground that the retroactive application of Breed, as was not the case with the retroactive application of Waller in Robinson, will make it impossible for the Commonwealth to impose sanctions on any of the petitioners. The Breed Court left no doubt that under California’s system there was no bar to further juvenile proceedings against successful juvenile double jeopardy claimants. 421 U.S. at 541, 95 S.Ct. 1779. Massachusetts’ pre-Breed system did differ from California’s,3 but the differences are not significant. I see no constitutional impediment to further juvenile proceedings against those of the petitioners who are still juveniles,4 and I believe the Massachusetts statutes can be construed to authorize such proceedings. But even if it were the case that none of the petitioners could hereafter be punished, I am not sure it would follow that Robinson is distinguishable. The Robinson Court recognized that its ruling seriously prejudiced the state’s interest in imposing appropriate punishments upon wrongdoers; it observed that its ruling gave Robinson a “relatively painless form of immunity” ($150 in fines) from state prosecutions for what must have been serious offenses. See 409 U.S. at 510, 93 S.Ct. 876. I cannot imagine that Robinson would *222have been decided differently if the municipal prosecution had been dismissed with prejudice after jeopardy had attached, for I doubt that a distinction between relatively painless immunity and completely painless immunity can possess constitutional significance.
I also am unable to accept the suggestion that Breed can be characterized as a prophylactic rule directed primarily at making the adult trial “fairer” by reducing the need of the juvenile to “tip his hand” at the transfer hearing. Breed, like Waller announces a rule which prevents the states from unconstitutionally placing an individual in jeopardy twice. Although avoiding “handtipping” is a value protected by the double jeopardy clause, it is not the primary one. If it were the case that a second trial would result in undue interference with the constitutionally protected interest only when no handtipping occurred at the first proceeding, Robinson presumably would have been decided differently: the case would have been remanded for a determination whether the municipal prosecution had prejudiced Robinson’s subsequent state proceeding.
I would affirm the judgment of the District Court.

. Although the Supreme Court has never addressed this point, the most recent interpretations of Younger’s doctrine of equitable restraint suggest to me that it does not bar federal intervention in pending state criminal proceedings when the highest court of the state has conclusively rejected the federal claim and when there is no reason whatsoever to believe that the state court will reconsider its earlier rulings. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 756, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975); cf. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 577, 93 S.Ct. 1689, 36 L.Ed.2d 488 (1973). Whether or not there is to be a general “futility” exception to the Younger doctrine, an exception seems appropriate in the case of double jeopardy claimants who are to be denied the opportunity in the state court system to demonstrate that they have a right not to be retried. Cf. United States ex rel. Webb v. Court of Common Pleas, 516 F.2d 1034, 1037 (3d Cir. 1975).

. The Robinson Court concluded that the state was unjustified in relying upon the belief that the state and the municipality were, like the state and the federal government, see Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 79 S.Ct. 676, 3 L.Ed.2d 684 (1959), separate sovereigns for purposes of the double jeopardy clause, and it intimated no view on the weight which should be accorded justifiable reliance in determining retroactivity. I too need not face that question. Whatever else might be said about Massachusetts’ reliance on the concept of “continuing jeopardy”, which has never attracted a majority of the Court, it was certainly no more reasonable than Florida’s reliance on the “dual sovereignty” of its state and municipal governments.

. Unlike the earlier California practice, a preBreed Massachusetts juvenile court would order a transfer without making an express finding of guilt. The Massachusetts court would, as a concomitant to the transfer, dismiss the juvenile complaint and cause an adult complaint to be issued.

. I see no double jeopardy bar to further juvenile proceedings against petitioners. Insofar as they might object to such proceedings, they are in a position which, for double jeopardy purposes, is identical to that of a criminal defendant who has succeeded in having a judgment of conviction set aside. Here, petitioners are objecting to the disposition of the juvenile proceedings. If the objections have merit, their cases can be remanded for further proceedings in the juvenile court. See Breed v. Jones; supra; North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 23 L.Ed.2d 656 (1969).
That the juveniles’ complaints were formally dismissed without a determination of guilt presents no constitutional problems. The dismissals clearly arose neither from what could have been a favorable determination on the merits, compare United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358, 95 S.Ct. 1006, 43 L.Ed.2d 250 (1975), nor from any judicial or prosecutorial overreaching, see Illinois v. Somerville, 410 U.S. 458, 93 S.Ct. 1066, 35 L.Ed.2d 425 (1973).