Court Opinion

ID: 9959313
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-11 15:09:16.084548+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:07.558924
License: Public Domain

[Cite as In re T.H., 2024-Ohio-1372.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                             EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

IN RE T.H., ET AL.                            :
                                                           No. 113277
Minor Children                                :

[Appeal by R.H., Father]                      :

                                              :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 11, 2024

            Civil Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                                   Juvenile Division
                                Case No. AD22901108

                                        Appearances:

                 Barbara Martincic, for appellant.

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Joseph C. Young, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J.:

                 Appellant-Father, R.H., appeals the trial court’s decision to grant

permanent custody of two of his children to the Cuyahoga County Division of
Children and Family Services (“CCDCFS” or “agency”). After a considered review of

the facts and the law, we affirm.

              Two children are at issue here: T.H. and Ti.H. The agency became

involved with the family in 2021 when it was alleged that the children’s mother was

abusing fentanyl and marijuana while pregnant with another child (the sibling is not

at issue in this appeal). Father had endangered the children, and Father engaged in

domestic violence against Mother.1 Mother and Father are not married, and the

children resided solely with Mother. The agency developed case plans for Mother

and Father to address issues with substance abuse, mental health, parenting, and

domestic violence. Father additionally had anger management, basic needs, and

housing as part of his case plan.

              On February 1, 2022, the agency filed a complaint for abuse and neglect

requesting temporary custody of both children after Mother tested positive for drugs

while giving birth to the children’s sibling. In March 2022, the children were

adjudicated dependent and placed in the emergency custody of the agency. On April

13, 2022, the agency received temporary custody of the children. In June 2022, the

agency unilaterally stopped visitation “due to aggression and inappropriate

behaviors by [Father] during the visits” and filed a motion for an emergency change

in the case plan, citing Father’s behavior at visits with the children. According to the

agency, Father inappropriately roughhoused with his daughters to the point that his

       1 Mother has not appealed the trial court’s grant of permanent custody; therefore,

the facts discussed in this case will mainly pertain to Father.
behavior was referred to the agency’s sex abuse investigation unit. It was concluded

that there was not enough to substantiate that Father was “priming” or “grooming”

his daughters but that the agency should “keep a close lookout for the children.” The

agency case worker testified at a hearing on the motion that “dad had been acting

inappropriately more than once and every time we tried to address him with the

issue, dad would become irate * * * and threatening to the point that security had to

escort him several times out of the building.” The social worker further testified that

the confrontations with Father were almost “physical confrontations” and every

time he came for visits with his daughters he was “just hollering and screaming.”

             The case worker’s main concern occurred on June 23, 2022, during a

visit where Father’s arm was placed in an inappropriate position relative to Ta.H.

When the case worker tried to redirect Father and pointed out his inappropriate

behavior, Father became irate and began to scream and swear at her.

             According to the agency worker, security had to get involved with

Father during five visits in April and May 2022. At his last visit, in June 2022,

Father “shoulder-checked” the agency receptionist as he was leaving the building.

Despite the agency’s concerns, based on the guardian ad litem’s (“GAL”)

recommendation that supervised visits continue, the trial court determined that

supervised visitation would take place at a new location and with a new case worker.

             In December 2022, the agency moved to modify temporary custody to

permanent custody.
             In January 2023, the trial court suspended Father’s supervised

visitation with the children after an outburst during a supervised visit with the

children.

             The motion for permanent custody was heard on September 5, 2023.

CCDCFS supervisor Sarah Narine testified that the agency attempted to engage

Father in his case plan services but was unsuccessful, mainly due to Father’s volatile

behavior. Narine testified that the agency had difficulty dealing with Father:

      [He] does not listen. He aggressively talks over myself or any worker
      or advocate that is with me. He does not want to listen or process what
      we’re trying to tell him to help him in regard to his case plan services.
      He gets verbally aggressive. * * * Yelling. There’s some cursing at
      times. So it’s very difficult to communicate with him.

             According to Narine, Father had acted “very aggressive” with each of

the four agency workers that had been assigned to the family and exhibited volatile

behavior whenever he interacted with the agency. She testified that Father was

unable to regulate his temper and his aggression “increased” as time went on: “Once

[Father] starts on one topic, he just escalates and continues to go and there’s really

no communicating or getting through to him at that point. He does not seem to be

able to regulate his anger because it continually increases.”

              Nadine testified that the agency was additionally concerned because

although Father had taken some anger management classes, it was evident he had

not benefitted from the service. In addition, the trial court assigned Father a GAL

to help him “manage courtroom behaviors.”
               A video from the January 2023 visit, which was played for the court,

showed that security had to intervene, and the visit was cut short due to Father’s

behavior; his behavior left both children upset, crying, and pleading for him to stop.

The family advocate assigned to the case, Amanda Whitman, testified that Father’s

behavior escalated and worsened as security removed Father from the building. She

further testified that in the weeks prior to the hearing, Father sent a barrage of text

messages to her in response to the agency’s request for a urine screen. Father sent

two series of text messages, more than 20 text messages each time, in which he

called the worker names and used other inappropriate language.

               Father was referred to substance abuse services on multiple occasions

but failed to follow through with services as referred. Although Father maintained

that he had a medical marijuana card, he failed to provide sufficient documentation

to validate his claim. According to the agency, Father had not made progress in

addressing his substance abuse concerns and did not have an established sobriety

date. Father continued to test positive for cannabis, alcohol, and, at least on one

occasion, methamphetamine.

               Mark Pountney, the current agency case worker, testified that there

was a civil protection order between Mother and Father; Father was the petitioner.

According to Pountney, Father failed to sufficiently engage in mental health services,

failed to demonstrate benefit from the parenting and domestic violence services he

did attend, and only recently obtained housing.
               Pountney testified that in all his interactions with Father, Father was

calm only on one occasion and other than that occasion, Father would “talk in an

aggressive, overbearing manner,” interrupting Pountney and also “interrupt and

overtalk other [a]gency staff.”

               Pountney conceded he had yet to assess Father’s housing but testified

that it was because it was required that a detective accompany him for his safety,

and he was unable to secure the detective. According to Pountney, Father had not

benefitted from domestic violence services because “in order to benefit from

domestic violence [services] it would require someone to better manage their anger,

and I have not seen him better manage his anger.” As to the substance abuse portion

of his case plan, Pountney noted that Father was not compliant with drug screens,

and when Father did submit to tests, the tests would come back positive for

marijuana, alcohol, and, on at least one occasion, methamphetamine. Pountney

testified that although Father had had some counseling, he was unable to show that

he benefitted from the mental health component of his case plan, because he was

unable to “appropriately deal with his anger” or control his emotions.

               As of the hearing date, the children were six and eight years old and

placed with a paternal aunt, where they were doing well. The aunt was willing and

able to adopt both children should the agency be granted permanent custody of the

children. Both children were engaged in counseling services.

               Father testified he had housing, which he secured in the weeks prior

to the permanent custody hearing but did not yet have a stove or refrigerator.
Father’s 17-year-old daughter from another relationship lived with him. Father

testified that he was employed as a traveling barber. He acknowledged that he went

to prison in 2017 to serve an 18-month term for attempted domestic violence against

Mother and had also served time for felony drug offenses.

              Father’s 17-year-old daughter testified that she was currently living

with Father and had lived with him “for a few months” because her mother was ill.

Prior to moving in with Father, she had not seen him since she was 12. The daughter

described Father as “very respectful and calm” and stated that he helped her with

schoolwork.

              At the conclusion of the hearing, the children’s GAL reaffirmed the

recommendation from her written report, which was to grant permanent custody of

the children to the agency.

              The trial court subsequently journalized an entry for each child in

which it terminated all parental rights and ordered the children placed in the

permanent custody of CCDCFS.

              Father filed a notice of appeal and raises one assignment of error in

which he argues that the trial court erred in finding there was clear and convincing

evidence to grant permanent custody of the children to the agency.

              The right to raise one’s own child is “‘an essential and basic civil

right. ’” In re N.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101390, 2015-Ohio-314, ¶ 67, quoting In

re Hayes, 79 Ohio St.3d 46, 48, 679 N.E.2d 680 (1997); see also In re Murray, 52

Ohio St.3d 155, 157, 556 N.E.2d 1169 (1990) (a parent has a “‘fundamental liberty
interest’ in the care, custody, and management” of his or her child), quoting

Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982).

However, this right is not absolute. It is “‘always subject to the ultimate welfare of

the child, which is the polestar or controlling principle to be observed.’” In re L.D.,

2017-Ohio-1037, 86 N.E.3d 1012, ¶ 29 (8th Dist.), quoting In re Cunningham, 59

Ohio St.2d 100, 106, 391 N.E.2d 1034 (1979).

               Pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1), a juvenile court may grant a public

children services agency’s motion for permanent custody if it determines, by clear

and convincing evidence, that permanent custody is in the best interest of the child

and, as is pertinent to this appeal:

      (a) The child is not abandoned or orphaned, has not been in the
      temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
      private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
      consecutive twenty-two-month period, or has not been in the
      temporary custody of one or more public children services agencies or
      private child placing agencies for twelve or more months of a
      consecutive twenty-two-month period if, as described in division (D)(1)
      of section 2151.413 of the Revised Code, the child was previously in the
      temporary custody of an equivalent agency in another state, and the
      child cannot be placed with either of the child’s parents within a
      reasonable time or should not be placed with the child’s parents.

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a).

               This court has previously held that it will not reverse a permanent-

custody decision if there is “competent and credible evidence” in the record from

which the trial court could have found that the statutory elements for permanent

custody were established by clear and convincing evidence. In re G.W., 8th Dist.

Cuyahoga No. 107512, 2019-Ohio-1533, ¶ 62, citing In re A.P., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga
No. 104130, 2016-Ohio-5849, ¶ 16. “In other words, the trial court determines

whether there is clear and convincing evidence to support the statutory factors for

permanent custody (R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)) and this court determines whether there is

competent and credible evidence in the record to support the trial court’s findings.”

In re M.A., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 112411, 2023-Ohio-3251, ¶ 41. In In re M.A., we

further stated that “[t]he appellate court cannot overturn a trial court’s finding ‘if the

record contains competent, credible evidence by which the court could have formed

a firm belief or conviction that the essential statutory elements for a termination of

parental rights have been established.’” In re M.A. at id., quoting In re Adkins, 5th

Dist. Tuscarawas Nos. 2005 AP06-0044 and 2005 AP07-0049, 2006-Ohio-431,

¶ 17, citing Cross v. Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469, 120 N.E.2d 118 (1954), paragraph

three of the syllabus.

               Shortly after In re M.A. was released, the Supreme Court of Ohio

clarified the standard of review:

      Given that R.C. 2151.414 requires that a juvenile court find by clear and
      convincing evidence that the statutory requirements are met, * * * the
      sufficiency-of-the-evidence and/or manifest-weight-of-the-evidence
      standards of review are the proper appellate standards of review of a
      juvenile court’s permanent-custody determination, as appropriate
      depending on the nature of the arguments that are presented by the
      parties.

In re Z.C., Slip Opinion No. 2023-Ohio-4703, ¶ 11. The court noted that “although

the phrase ‘some competent, credible evidence’ can be helpful in describing the

reviewing court’s deferential role in the manifest-weight analysis, it should not be
used as a substitute for the separate sufficiency and manifest-weight analyses

appropriate for permanent-custody determinations.” Id. at ¶ 15.

                On    appeal,    Father     makes     manifest-weight-of-the-evidence

arguments. Regarding a challenge based upon manifest weight of the evidence, the

Supreme Court of Ohio has explained:

        Weight of the evidence concerns “the inclination of the greater amount
        of credible evidence, offered in a trial, to support one side of the issue
        rather than the other. It indicates clearly to the [factfinder] that the
        party having the burden of proof will be entitled to their [judgment], if,
        on weighing the evidence in their minds, they shall find the greater
        amount of credible evidence sustains the issue which is to be
        established before them. Weight is not a question of mathematics but
        depends on its effect in inducing belief.”

In re JA.B., 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 113056 and 113087, 2024-Ohio-453, ¶ 34,

quoting Eastley v. Volkman, 132 Ohio St.3d 328, 2012-Ohio-2179, 972 N.E.2d 517,

¶ 12.

                The agency moved for permanent custody of the children pursuant to

R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) and 2151.414(D)(1).2 Father claims that the agency was

unable to prove, by clear and convincing evidence that the children could not be

placed with him within a reasonable time period.

                The trial court found pursuant to R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a) that the

children could not be placed with either of their parents within a reasonable time or

        2 Father does not challenge the trial court’s findings on appeal that a grant of

permanent custody to CCDCFS was in the best interest of the children; therefore, we limit
our discussion to a review of whether there was competent credible evidence supporting
the trial court’s findings under R.C. 2151.414(B).
should not be placed with the parents. In making this finding, the trial court relied

on the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E). Specifically, R.C. 2151.414(E) states, in

pertinent part, that “[i]f the court determines, by clear and convincing evidence, * * *

that one or more of the [enumerated (E) factors] exist as to each of the child’s

parents, the court shall enter a finding that the child cannot be placed with either

parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with either parent[.]”

               Here, the trial court relied on R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), (2), and (4). Under

R.C. 2151.414(E)(1), the trial court found that Father had failed to remedy the

conditions that led to the removal of the children. CCDCFS established a case plan

for Father, which required him to work on issues relative to housing, basic needs,

mental health, anger management, domestic violence, and substance abuse. Father

engaged in mental health, domestic violence, and anger management classes, but

the record reflects that he did not benefit from the classes. In its decision granting

permanent custody, the court noted that the father had had multiple case workers

over the course of the case “due to his aggression and anger.” We note that the court

issued an order halting Father’s visitation with his children after a January 2023

incident, which was on video, in which Father had to be removed by security due to

his behavior. The record reflects that Father had to be removed from visits with his

children numerous times by security due to his angry and aggressive behavior. And

Father’s volatile behavior was not limited to agency workers; the trial court had to

appoint a separate GAL for Father to manage his courtroom behavior.
               Multiple agency workers testified that Father was angry and

aggressive in his conversations with agency employees. This included yelling,

swearing, sending inappropriate text messages, “over-talking,” getting into agency

workers’ personal space, and shoulder-checking an agency receptionist.

               A video recording of an incident that occurred during a January 2023

supervised visit led to court-ordered suspension of Father’s visitation. The video

showed security intervening with Father because the children were crying and upset,

as well as Father making inappropriate statements to the children. Whitman

testified that Father’s behavior worsened after Father was led outside by the

security. The record also reflects that Father’s aggressive behavior continued right

up until trial, as evidenced by two series of “rapid fire” text messages Father sent to

Whitman prior to the hearing, each series consisting of at least 20 text messages.

               Father also has not shown that he complied with the substance abuse

component of his case plan. Father was referred to substance abuse services on

multiple occasions but failed to follow through with services as referred. Father

failed to submit the required documentation showing he possessed a medical

marijuana card, did not submit urine screens as requested, and continued to test

positive for marijuana, alcohol, and, at least on one occasion, methamphetamine.

Father also was unable to establish a sobriety date.

               As to the housing and basic needs components of his case plan,

although Father recently secured housing, he did not have a refrigerator or stove.

The agency was also unable to check Father’s house because, due to Father’s
behavior, case workers were required to have a detective escort and as of the hearing

date had not been able to arrange an escort.

               On this record, the weight of the evidence clearly and convincingly

supports the trial court’s “failure to remedy” finding.

               Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(2), the trial court found that Father’s

      [c]hronic mental illness, chronic emotional illness, intellectual
      disability, physical disability, or chemical dependency of the parent
      * * * is so severe that it makes the parent unable to provide an adequate
      permanent home for the child at the present time and, as anticipated,
      within one year after the court holds the hearing pursuant to division
      (A) of this section or for the purposes of division (A)(4) of section
      2151.353 of the Revised Code.

               The record supports the trial court’s findings. As to Father’s mental

health, testimony established that he had been diagnosed with anxiety disorder,

panic disorder, and major depressive disorder, but did not consistently engage in

mental health services. With regard to Father’s chronic substance abuse, testimony

established that Father was referred to substance abuse services on multiple

occasions but failed to follow through with services as referred. Father failed to

provide sufficient documentation to validate his claims relative to a medical

marijuana card and continued to test positive for cannabis, alcohol, and/or

methamphetamines. Father also did not have an established sobriety date.

               The record therefore supports the trial court’s findings under

R.C. 2151.414(E)(2).

               Under R.C. 2151.414(E)(4), the trial court found that Father had

“demonstrated a lack of commitment” to the children by failing to “regularly
support, visit or communicate with the child[ren] when able to do so, or by other

actions showing an unwillingness to provide an adequate permanent home for the

child[ren].”

               Father argues that he was prevented from visiting with his children.

The agency had previously tried to halt supervised visits, after the case worker

observed Father acting inappropriately towards one of the children. The court

determined, however, that visits would continue at a new location and with a

different case worker. Despite this, Father continued to display aggressive behavior,

so the court eventually stopped visitation. Father has failed to show that he

addressed his anger and aggression issues, a prerequisite to reestablishing

visitation.

               Father also points to the fact that his 17-year-old daughter lives with

him and describes him as a good parent. The daughter testified, however, that she

had just recently moved in with her father and, before that, she had not had any

contact with him for several years. But the needs of a six- and eight-year-old child,

the ages of the children at issue here, differ greatly from those of a child nearing

adulthood; moreover, an older child is in a better position to protect herself, should

that be necessary, than those of tender years.

               Father either failed or refused to engage in many of the services the

agency referred him to so that he could demonstrate his willingness or ability to

provide adequate care for the children.
               Given this evidence, the trial court’s finding as to lack of commitment

was supported by clear and convincing evidence in the record.

               Finally, as mentioned, Father does not challenge the trial court’s

finding that permanent custody was in the best interest of the children. After our

review of the record, we conclude that the trial court’s determination that a grant of

permanent custody is in the children’s best interest and not against the manifest

weight of the evidence.

               We recognize that Father loves his children and was willing to care for

them. However, Father did not progress on his case plan by either refusing to

engage in services or by failing to benefit from the services. The trial court’s decision

to grant permanent custody to the agency was supported by clear and convincing

evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

               The sole assignment of error is overruled.

               Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate be sent to said court to carry this judgment

into execution.
      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, JUDGE

EMANUELLA D. GROVES, P.J., and
FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, J., CONCUR