Court Opinion

ID: 9366970
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-30 15:06:47.623713+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:15:56.544963
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Suppan v. Suppan, 2023-Ohio-249.]

STATE OF OHIO                   )                    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                )ss:                 NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF WAYNE                 )

SARAH SUPPAN                                         C.A. No.       21AP0040

        Appellant

        v.                                           APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                     ENTERED IN THE
JASON SUPPAN                                         COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
                                                     COUNTY OF WAYNE, OHIO
        Appellee                                     CASE No.   2014 DR 0382

                                DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: January 30, 2023

        TEODOSIO, Presiding Judge.

        {¶1}    Plaintiff-Appellant, Sarah Suppan (“Wife”), appeals from the judgment of the

Wayne County Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division. This Court affirms.

                                                I.

        {¶2}    This is the third time this matter has come before the Court. In Suppan v. Suppan,

9th Dist. Wayne No. 17AP0015, 2018-Ohio-2569 (“Suppan I”), and Suppan v. Suppan, 9th Dist.

Wayne No. 20AP0005, 2020-Ohio-6883 (“Suppan II”), this Court reversed certain aspects of the

lower court’s judgment and remanded the matter for further proceedings. This appeal stems from

the judgment the trial court issued following this Court’s most recent remand.

        {¶3}    Wife and Dr. Jason Suppan (“Husband”) married in July 1997 and had two children

during their marriage. Their daughter was born in October 1998 and emancipated in May 2017.

Their son was born in July 2000 and emancipated in July 2018. Husband was starting his residency

when he and Wife met, and he eventually became the sole practitioner at his family’s podiatry
                                                   2

practice, the Suppan Foot & Ankle Clinic (“the Clinic”). During the marriage, Husband purchased

stock in two physician groups, Commerce Parkway LLC (“Commerce Parkway”) and Wooster

Ambulatory Surgical Center (“Wooster Ambulatory”). Additionally, he and Wife purchased a

commercial building adjacent to the Clinic. Although Wife was employed at the outset of the

marriage, she stopped working when the children were born. Thereafter, she primarily contributed

to the marriage by raising the children and maintaining the household.

        {¶4}    Wife filed for divorce in October 2014. She agreed to vacate the marital residence

by January 1, 2015, and the parties executed an agreement regarding temporary orders. They also

later reached several stipulations as to the valuation of various assets, the division of certain assets

and debts, and parenting time. A final hearing was held to address matters upon which the parties

could not agree, including the valuation of the Clinic, the length of the marriage, the calculation

of child and spousal support, the classification of certain property as marital or separate, various

contempt issues, and each party’s request for attorney fees. A magistrate heard evidence over the

course of three days in February 2016.

        {¶5}    After the magistrate issued a decision, Wife and Husband filed objections. The trial

court sustained one objection related to the valuation of Wife’s horse but otherwise overruled the

objections. Wife appealed, and this Court issued Suppan I. In that decision, we determined the

trial court acted within its discretion when it (1) found the de facto termination date of the marriage

was December 31, 2014; (2) classified 6.61 acres of land as Husband’s separate property; (3)

valued the Clinic; (4) divided the parties’ interests in their respective vehicles and associated debts;

and (5) issued orders related to the sale of their commercial building. Suppan I, 2018-Ohio-2569,

at ¶ 18, ¶ 20-29, ¶ 32; ¶ 38; ¶ 40-45. We were unable to determine, however, “what consideration,

if any, the trial court gave to the distributions [Husband] received from [the Clinic] when it
                                                  3

determined his gross income * * *.” Id. at ¶ 9. Accordingly, we reversed and remanded the matter

for the trial court to provide further analysis as to its income calculations. Id. Based on that

resolution, we declined to address Wife’s remaining arguments about child support, spousal

support, and her request for attorney fees. Id. at ¶ 11, ¶ 12, ¶ 47.

       {¶6}    While Wife’s first appeal was pending, the parties’ eldest child emancipated, and

the Child Support Enforcement Agency (“CSEA”) initiated administrative proceedings to

terminate Husband’s current child support obligation. Wife challenged the CSEA’s findings and

recommendations at the administrative level and, thereafter, requested a judicial hearing to

challenge those findings and recommendations. Because Wife’s appeal was pending in this Court

when she requested judicial review of the CSEA’s order, the lower court ordered her request stayed

pending the resolution of her appeal.

       {¶7}    Following this Court’s decision and remand in Suppan I, the trial court permitted

further discovery to address the issues identified in that decision. A hearing before a magistrate

took place in December 2018. Although the hearing encompassed the issues identified in Suppan

I, the magistrate also heard testimony and arguments on other issues pending with the trial court.

Those issues included Wife’s challenge to the CSEA’s order and several motions for contempt

filed by each party regarding the other’s alleged failure to comply with various orders of the court.

Following the hearing, the magistrate issued a decision, and each party filed objections to that

decision. The trial court overruled those objections and entered judgment on the magistrate’s

decision.

       {¶8}    Wife appealed the trial court’s judgment on the magistrate’s decision, and this

Court issued Suppan II. Relevant to this appeal, we determined the trial court erred when it

calculated Husband’s gross income. Suppan II, 2020-Ohio-6883, at ¶ 16-23. Specifically, we
                                                    4

concluded the trial court mistakenly treated distributions Husband received from the Clinic as

“bonuses” under R.C. 3119.05(D). Id. at ¶ 20. Because that statute was inapplicable, we remanded

the matter for the trial court to “evaluate the distributions without being limited by the constraints

of R.C. 3119.05(D).” Id. at ¶ 22. Based on that resolution, we declined to address Wife’s

remaining arguments about child support, spousal support, and her request for attorney fees. Id.

at ¶ 24.

           {¶9}   Following this Court’s remand in Suppan II, the lower court ordered the parties to

file briefs addressing the proper calculation of Husband’s gross income and the issues related to

that income calculation. Wife and Husband each filed a brief in response to the court’s order, and

each also filed a brief in opposition to the other’s filing. Upon review of the record and written

filings, a magistrate issued a decision. Wife objected to the magistrate’s decision, and Husband

filed a brief in opposition. The trial court overruled Wife’s objections and entered judgment on

the magistrate’s decision.

           {¶10} Wife now appeals from the trial court’s judgment and raises five assignments of

error for this Court’s review.

                                                    II.

                                    ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I

           THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CALCULATING [HUSBAND’S] INCOME
           FOR PURPOSES OF CHILD AND SPOUSAL SUPPORT.

           {¶11} In her first assignment of error, Wife argues the trial court erred when it calculated

Husband’s gross income. Specifically, she argues the trial court should have averaged the

distributions Husband received from the Clinic in 2012, 2013, and 2014. For the following

reasons, this Court rejects her argument.
                                                  5

       {¶12} This Court generally reviews a trial court’s decision to adopt a magistrate’s decision

for an abuse of discretion. Barlow v. Barlow, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 08CA0055, 2009-Ohio-3788,

¶ 5. “In so doing, we consider the trial court’s action with reference to the nature of the underlying

matter.” Tabatabai v. Tabatabai, 9th Dist. Medina No. 08CA0049-M, 2009-Ohio-3139, ¶ 18.

Decisions regarding child support, including the decision whether to employ averaging in

calculating a parent’s gross income, “lie[] in the sound discretion of the trial court * * *.” Morrow

v. Becker, 9th Dist. Medina No. 11CA0066-M, 2012-Ohio-3875, ¶ 37. Accordingly, this Court

reviews those decisions for an abuse of discretion. Seegert v. Seegert, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28932,

2018-Ohio-5119, ¶ 8. An abuse of discretion means the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary, or

unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). When

applying the abuse of discretion standard, this Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

trial court. Pons v. Ohio State Med. Bd., 66 Ohio St.3d 619, 621 (1993).

       {¶13} Evidence presented at the final hearing showed Husband had three sources of

income: his W-2 wages, distributions he received from Commerce Parkway and Wooster

Ambulatory, and distributions he received from the Clinic. The trial court used a three-year

average to calculate Husband’s W-2 wages. The trial court took the average of those wages from

2012, 2013, and 2014 to arrive at an average W-2 income of $106,957.                  Regarding the

distributions, the trial court only considered the ones Husband received in 2014. Wife argues the

trial court erred by not averaging the distributions Husband received from the Clinic in 2012, 2013,

and 2014.1

1
   Wife has not challenged the trial court’s decision not to average the distributions Husband
received from Commerce Parkway and Wooster Ambulatory. Accordingly, we only consider the
trial court’s decision not to average the distributions from the Clinic. See App.R. 16(A)(7).
                                                 6

       {¶14} The evidence showed Husband received the following distributions from the Clinic:

(1) $42,578 in 2012; (2) $55,566 in 2013; and (3) $28,601 in 2014. Both parties hired valuation

experts, and, at the final hearing, the experts offered their opinions about the Clinic, its revenue

trends, and its continued viability. Wife’s expert determined the Clinic was financially sound and

believed any decreases it had experienced in revenue could be offset by adjustments to expenses.

It was his opinion the Clinic was overstaffed, so a staffing reduction could be used to offset the

revenue losses. He admitted, however, that the Clinic had experienced a downward trend in

revenue over the last five years. He also projected zero growth for the Clinic. Wife’s expert

acknowledged Husband had accrued over $60,000 in debt on a line of credit through the Clinic

and was taking distributions in excess of its income to pay taxes and fund the parties’ lifestyle.

       {¶15} Husband’s expert cited the foregoing problems as evidence supporting his much

lower valuation determination. He noted the Clinic had experienced declining revenues and

increased competition in the area and practice field. Further, he noted the Clinic had seen a

decrease in revenue and caseload volume which he attributed to other factors such as the passage

of the Affordable Care Act and the Electronic Medical Records Mandate. He ultimately valued

the Clinic at an amount that was less than half the amount cited by Wife’s expert and rejected the

notion that the Clinic would rebound to pre-2012 revenue levels.

       {¶16} In choosing not to average Husband’s distribution income from the Clinic, the trial

court specifically noted that it found the report of Husband’s valuation expert more credible than

the report of Wife’s valuation expert. The court cited evidence that the Clinic’s revenue had

continued to decline and that it was operating in a “tougher competitive environment[.]” The court

refused to exclude the Clinic distributions entirely as nonrecurring or unsustainable income, see

R.C. 3119.05(B)(12)(e), because the evidence showed Husband continued to take distributions
                                                7

from the Clinic despite its losing money. Nevertheless, the trial court found averaging the

distribution income from the Clinic would be inappropriate under the circumstances.             In

calculating Husband’s gross income, the trial court decided to only consider the most recent

distribution income from 2014, which was also the Clinic’s worst year for revenue up to that date.2

       {¶17} Wife argues the trial court erred when it refused to average Husband’s distribution

income from the Clinic because the evidence did not support his claim the Clinic was failing. She

notes Husband still had more than $170,000 in retained earnings at the end of 2014. Further, she

notes Husband took multiple vacations a year and used funds from the Clinic to pay other debts

such as expenses due on the parties’ commercial building and personal cell phone bills. Wife also

points to a personal financial statement Husband submitted to a lender in 2018, wherein he listed

assets in excess of $1 million. According to Wife, the trial court should have averaged Husband’s

distribution income from the Clinic in 2012, 2013, and 2014 to arrive at a figure of $42,248.22

rather than a figure of $28,601.

       {¶18} Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion

when it chose not to average Husband’s distribution income from the Clinic. See Morrow, 2012-

Ohio-3875, at ¶ 37. The child support statute permits a trial court to average income over a

reasonable period of years “when appropriate[.]” R.C. 3119.05(H). The trial court specifically

2
  Notably, the hearing on remand took place in 2018, so the parties also presented financial
information that post-dated 2014. The magistrate nevertheless chose to rely on Husband’s 2014
gross income figures. She did so because the evidence showed his wages had remained the same,
and she questioned the impact the divorce proceedings had had on his distributions. Although
Husband only took $6,866 in distributions from the Clinic in 2016, the magistrate noted Husband
had taken that distribution while this matter was pending. The magistrate considered the 2014
figure to be a more accurate reflection of Husband’s distribution income under the circumstances,
and the trial court entered judgment on the magistrate’s decision and income determinations.
Neither party has challenged the lower court’s decision to rely on the older income distribution
figures. Accordingly, this Court also relies on those figures in analyzing Wife’s argument.
                                                 8

explained why it felt it would not be appropriate to average Husband’s distribution income from

the Clinic. There was evidence the Clinic’s revenues had continued to decline, zero growth was

projected, and competition in the field and area had increased. While Wife offered competing

valuation testimony, her own expert agreed the Clinic’s revenue trends had declined and zero

growth was projected. Her expert also acknowledged Husband was incurring debt and taking

distributions that exceeded the Clinic’s income. The trial court specifically found Husband’s

expert more credible than Wife’s, and the record does not reflect that decision was unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unconscionable. See Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219.

       {¶19} To the extent Wife cites an asset statement Husband completed in 2018 in support

of her argument, that evidence falls well outside the date range the trial court used to calculate

Husband’s gross income (i.e., 2012 through 2014). Moreover, Wife never suggested Husband was

purposely acquiring assets to lower his income, see In re Orecchio, 7th Dist. Jefferson No. 09 JE

37, 2010-Ohio-2849, ¶ 31-32, or was voluntarily underemployed such that his assets might be

considered potential income, see Musci v. Musci, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23088, 2008-Ohio-5882,

¶ 12. The decision whether to average Husband’s distribution income from the Clinic was a matter

left to the sound discretion of the trial court. Morrow, 2012-Ohio-3875, at ¶ 37. This Court will

not second-guess the trial court’s determination that it would be inappropriate to average

Husband’s distribution income based on the evidence presented herein. See Pons, 66 Ohio St.3d

at 621. Upon review, Wife has not shown the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to average

Husband’s distribution income from the Clinic. Thus, her first assignment of error is overruled.

                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING A 70% DOWNWARD
       DEVIATION ON CHILD SUPPORT TO [HUSBAND].
                                                9

       {¶20} In her second assignment of error, Wife argues the trial court erred when it awarded

Husband a downward deviation in child support. We disagree.

       {¶21} As previously noted, this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard when

reviewing a trial court’s judgment on a magistrate’s decision and issues of child support. See

Barlow, 2009-Ohio-3788, at ¶ 5; Morrow, 2012-Ohio-3875, at ¶ 37. For parents with a combined

income exceeding $150,000 per year, former R.C. 3119.04(B)3 instructed trial courts to determine

child support obligations on a “case-by-case basis” with consideration of the “needs and the

standard of living of the children * * *.” The statute required trial courts to calculate support

according to the basic child support schedule and worksheet and use that figure as “the starting

point” in its analysis. Bajzer v. Bajzer, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25635, 2012-Ohio-252, ¶ 5. Any

downward deviation from that figure required a determination on the part of the trial

3
  R.C. 3119.04 was amended on March 28, 2019, during the pendency of this litigation. Because
the trial court applied former R.C. 3119.04 and neither party has challenged its reliance on that
statute, this Court likewise applies former R.C. 3119.04 in reviewing Wife’s argument on appeal.
                                                 10

court that the minimum figure “‘would be unjust or inappropriate and would not be in the best

interest of the child, obligor, or obligee to order that amount.’” Id., quoting R.C. 3119.04(B).

       {¶22} We begin by outlining the various child support orders the trial court entered in this

case. The parties reached an agreement regarding temporary orders in January 2015. Pursuant to

that agreement, Husband was ordered to pay Wife $2,200 per month with that entire sum being

treated as alimony for tax purposes. Husband agreed to be temporarily responsible for a significant

amount of the parties’ debts, including any debts associated with the marital residence. The parties

further agreed to shared parenting and to divide all ordinary day-to-day expenses associated with

the children “as agreed upon[.]” Although they prepared a child support guideline worksheet, the

parties agreed it would be unjust, inappropriate, and not in the best interest of the children to have

Husband pay any child support given their shared parenting arrangement, their agreement to share

the children’s expenses, and their current distribution of income and debt. The parties expressly

agreed “to a deviation of $0 per month in child support * * *.”

       {¶23} When the trial court issued its first judgment entry of divorce in October 2016, it

ordered Husband to pay Wife $400 per month in child support, plus an additional $201.92 in cash

medical support if health insurance was not provided. It further ordered the parties to divide

expenses for the children based on their income percentages, which it had calculated according to

the child support guideline worksheet. By virtue of that calculation, Husband would be responsible

for 65% of the expenses and Wife would be responsible for 35% of the expenses. While Husband

earned significantly more than Wife, the trial court found a 70% downward deviation from his

calculated guideline support obligation was warranted. That downward deviation was based on

multiple factors, all of which were outlined in the magistrate’s decision upon which the court

entered judgment. Those factors included the nearly equal division of parenting time the parties
                                                11

enjoyed under their shared parenting agreement, the 65%/35% division of expenses related to the

children, the fact that the court was ordering Husband to pay 100% of the children’s out-of-pocket

medical expenses, and the fact that Husband would be responsible for the payment of the marital

debt on the parties’ home and other items while Wife would “be leaving the marriage debt free.”

       {¶24} The trial court next entered a judgment on the issue of child support in May 2019,

following this Court’s remand in Suppan I.        By that time, both the parties’ children had

emancipated, with the CSEA initiating administrative proceedings to terminate support as to their

eldest child during the pendency of Wife’s first appeal. The trial court determined each party’s

gross income, resulting in an increase from its prior income determination due to Wife earning

slightly more wages per year and its inclusion of Husband’s distribution income from the Clinic.

Due to the emancipations that had occurred, the trial court issued its child support order based on

two distinct periods. From the time the trial court first entered its judgment of divorce (i.e.,

October 15, 2016) through the date of the eldest child’s emancipation, the trial court found

Husband was obligated to pay $576.25 per month in child support or $347.85 in support plus

$201.92 in cash medical support if private health insurance was not available. From the date of

the eldest child’s emancipation through the date of the youngest child’s emancipation, the trial

court found Husband was obligated to pay $420.67 per month in child support or $242.17 in

support plus $126.25 in cash medical if private health insurance was not available. For both

periods, the trial court found the continued downward deviation of 70% was appropriate. Again,

that deviation was based on multiple factors, including the shared parenting arrangement, the

65%/35% division of expenses related to the children, and the fact that the court was ordering

Husband to pay 100% of the children’s out-of-pocket medical expenses.
                                                  12

       {¶25} The trial court issued the judgment entry currently before this Court following our

remand in Suppan II. Because the trial court chose not to average Husband’s distribution income

from the Clinic, it found there was no change in his gross income. Thus, in issuing its judgment,

the trial court adopted and incorporated its child support orders from its 2019 judgment.

       {¶26} In her second assignment of error, Wife has not challenged any of the income

figures the trial court used in arriving at Husband’s child support obligation. Her only argument

is that the trial court erred when it found a 70% downward deviation from Husband’s calculated

guideline support obligation was warranted. According to Wife, the record does not support the

deviation the trial court ordered. First, she challenges the trial court’s finding that the parties

exercised equal parenting time. She cites her own testimony, during which she said the parties’

son lived with her most of the time once their daughter emancipated. Second, she claims the trial

court failed to fully consider her and her son’s standard of living. She cites evidence she

introduced, showing her monthly expenses exceeded the income she received from her job and

temporary support payments. Finally, she argues the trial court placed undue weight on the fact

that Husband was responsible for 100% of the children’s uninsured medical expenses, as those

expenses were minimal. Because she earned significantly less than Husband, had fewer assets,

cared for their son more often, and had difficulty covering her expenses, Wife argues, the record

does not support the trial court’s decision to award a downward deviation.

       {¶27} Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude the trial court went so far as to

abuse its discretion when it found a 70% downward deviation from guideline child support was

warranted under these particular facts and circumstances. See Bajzer, 2012-Ohio-252, at ¶ 5.

Notably, the trial court’s judgment on child support was relatively short-lived, as the parties’ eldest

child emancipated less than eight months after the court’s 2016 judgment and their youngest child
                                                  13

emancipated about 21 months after that same judgment. The parties also originally agreed to an

even larger deviation when stipulating to the temporary orders that remained in effect throughout

the proceedings. That agreed-upon deviation resulted in a child support award of $0 per month.

In stipulating to that deviation, the parties specifically agreed it would be unjust, inappropriate,

and not in the children’s best interest to order Husband to pay any child support given the

distribution of their income and debt and their agreement to share the children and the children’s

expenses. The 70% downward deviation the trial court ordered represented a significant increase

in Husband’s child support obligation when compared with his $0 obligation under the temporary

orders.

          {¶28} Although Wife testified the parties’ teenage son spent more time at her household

after their daughter’s emancipation, she does not dispute that there was a shared parenting

agreement in place calling for equal parenting time. Wife never pursued any modification to that

agreement. In fact, after their daughter emancipated, she sought to hold Husband in contempt for

not abiding by the terms of that agreement regarding her right of first refusal. Because the shared

parenting plan called for equal parenting time, it was not unreasonable for the trial court to consider

the plan in crafting its child support orders. Nor was it unreasonable for the court to consider

Husband’s responsibility for 100% of the children’s uninsured medical expenses. Wife insists the

trial court should not have given any weight to the uninsured medical expenses because the actual

cost of those expenses was known at the time of the remand hearing and was not significant. She

essentially argues for a retroactive recalculation of child support in her favor based on information

neither the parties, nor the trial court would have known during the period Husband’s child support

obligation was in effect. Yet, Wife has not set forth any authority authorizing that type of hindsight
                                                14

approach. See App.R. 16(A)(7). This Court will not create an argument on her behalf. See

Cardone v. Cardone, 9th Dist. Summit No. 18349, 1998 WL 224934, * 8 (May 6, 1998).

       {¶29} The record reflects that, in ordering a downward deviation, the trial court

considered all the evidence, including the distribution of income and debt, the division of the

expenses, and the terms of the shared parenting plan. To the extent Wife set forth evidence she

was living beyond her means, there also was evidence Husband was incurring significant debt and

borrowing against the Clinic to cover taxes, payments on the commercial building the parties

owned, and expenses. The trial court specifically found that, under the circumstances, a deviation

was reasonable, appropriate, and in the best interests of the children. Because Wife has not shown

the court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable, we reject her argument that

the court abused its discretion by ordering a 70% downward deviation. See Bajzer at ¶ 5. Wife’s

second assignment of error is overruled.

                                ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT MAKING CHILD SUPPORT
       RETROACTIVE TO DECEMBER 31, 2014.

       {¶30} In her third assignment of error, Wife argues the trial court erred when it failed

make its child support award retroactive to the de facto termination date of the parties’ marriage.

We disagree.

       {¶31} “When * * * parties to a divorce operate under a temporary order of support during

divorce proceedings without motions to modify being filed and ruled upon, a trial court cannot in

effect retroactively modify that order via the final divorce decree.” Ostmann v. Ostmann, 168

Ohio App.3d 59, 2006-Ohio-3617, ¶ 43-45 (9th Dist.). Doing so creates an immediate arrearage

that offends the due process rights of the obligor. Id. at ¶ 42-45. Absent a prior request for

modification, “any modification of the temporary support orders ‘may equitably be applied only
                                                15

prospectively from the date of the decree.’” Morrison v. Morrison, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27150,

2014-Ohio-2254, ¶ 23, quoting Ostmann at ¶ 45.

       {¶32} When the trial court first entered its judgment entry of divorce in October 2016, it

ordered Husband’s child support obligation to take effect October 15, 2016. The trial court

continued to rely on that date when it issued subsequent judgment entries in response to Suppan I

and Suppan II. Wife argues the trial court erred by not ordering Husband’s child support obligation

to take effect December 31, 2014 (i.e., the de facto termination date of the marriage). Though

Wife concedes temporary support orders were in effect during the pendency of the proceedings,

she insists she “never waived her right to seek retroactive child support at the final hearing, and

nothing in the temporary orders precluded her from doing so.”

       {¶33} As previously noted, the parties stipulated to temporary orders, and those orders

took effect on January 15, 2015. The temporary orders required Husband to pay Wife $2,200 per

month with that entire sum being treated as alimony. The parties agreed to a deviation of $0 per

month in child support.

       {¶34} The record reflects that Wife never moved to modify the temporary support orders

before the final hearing. At the final hearing, she repeatedly testified that she only agreed to the

temporary orders because she was desperate to leave the martial residence and needed funds to do

so. Husband’s counsel objected on the basis that the temporary orders were not subject to review.

In response to that objection, Wife’s attorney specifically indicated Wife was not seeking to rework

the temporary orders. Rather, Wife was offering testimony to support her contention that Husband

should not receive a downward deviation and should be ordered to pay at least guideline support

in the trial court’s final judgment of divorce. Wife’s argument, therefore, was consistent with a

request for a prospective change to Husband’s child support obligation.
                                                16

       {¶35} Absent a prior request for modification, any change the trial court made to

Husband’s child support obligation under the temporary orders had to be prospective in nature.

Morrison, 2014-Ohio-2254, at ¶ 23, quoting Ostmann, 2006-Ohio-3617, at ¶ 45. Wife was free to

seek a modification of the temporary orders, but never did so. Because the trial court could not

order Husband’s child support obligation to apply retroactively in contravention of the temporary

orders, we reject Wife’s argument to the contrary. Wife’s third assignment of error is overruled.

                                ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR IV

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY AWARDING [WIFE] ONLY $2,200 PER
       MONTH IN SPOUSAL SUPPORT.

       {¶36} In her fourth assignment of error, Wife argues the trial court erred in its spousal

support determination because its award was “unreasonably low.” For the following reasons, we

reject Wife’s argument.

       {¶37} As previously noted, a trial court’s decision to adopt a magistrate’s decision is

generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion but that review must be undertaken “with reference

to the nature of the underlying matter.” Tabatabai, 2009-Ohio-3139, at ¶ 18. Because awards of

spousal support generally fall within the sound discretion of the trial court, this Court likewise

reviews those decisions for an abuse of discretion. See Wells v. Wells, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25557,

2012-Ohio-1392, ¶ 22. An abuse of discretion will be found only if a trial court was unreasonable,

arbitrary, or unconscionable in its ruling. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d at 219. In applying that

standard, a reviewing court may not substitute its own judgment for that of the trial court. See

Pons, 66 Ohio St.3d at 621.

       {¶38} “A trial court must consider the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(a)-(n) ‘[i]n

determining whether spousal support is appropriate and reasonable,’ and in determining the nature,
                                                 17

amount, terms, and duration of a spousal support payment.” Lee v. Lee, 9th Dist. Lorain No.

17CA011235, 2019-Ohio-61, ¶ 9, quoting R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). Those factors include:

       (a) The income of the parties, from all sources * * *;

       (b) The relative earning abilities of the parties;

       (c) The ages and the physical, mental, and emotional conditions of the parties;

       (d) The retirement benefits of the parties;

       (e) The duration of the marriage;

       ***

       (g) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage;

       (h) The relative extent of education of the parties;

       (i) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties, including but not limited to any
       court-ordered payments by the parties;

       (j) The contribution of each party to the education, training, or earning ability of
       the other party, including, but not limited to, any party’s contribution to the
       acquisition of a professional degree of the other party;

       ***

       (l) The tax consequences, for each party, of an award of spousal support;

       (m) The lost income production capacity of either party that resulted from that
       party’s marital responsibilities;

       (n) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable.

R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). “[T]he trial court need not comment on each factor, but the record must

demonstrate that the court considered each factor in making its spousal support award.” Barlow

v. Barlow, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 08CA0055, 2009-Ohio-3788, ¶ 22.

       {¶39} The trial court originally ordered Husband to pay Wife $1,600 per month in spousal

support for 70 months effective October 15, 2016. Following this Court’s remands in Suppan I

and Suppan II, the trial court recalculated Husband’s gross income based on its inclusion of his
                                                18

distribution income from the Clinic. The trial court also recalculated Wife’s gross income based

on the passage of time. After considering those recalculations, the trial court ordered Husband to

pay Wife $2,200 per month in spousal support for 70 months. The court credited Husband with

21 payments based on his temporary support payments.

       {¶40} Wife argues the trial court abused its discretion in its spousal support determination

because the amount of support it imposed was not reasonable or appropriate. Consistent with her

first assignment of error, she argues that income averaging should have resulted in a higher gross

income for Husband, and thus, a higher support obligation. She notes Husband’s income and

assets far exceeded her own while she struggled to meet her monthly expenses. She also notes

Husband was a licensed podiatrist while she left the marriage with no marketable skills. Because

she should have been awarded at least enough spousal support to meet her monthly expenses, Wife

argues, the matter must be remanded for the trial court to award her a reasonable amount of spousal

support.

       {¶41} The trial court determined Husband had a gross income of $142,149 per year while

Wife had a gross income of $52,798 of per year. At the time of the final hearing, Husband was 46

years old, Wife was 40 years old, and both parties were in good health. Although the parties had

two children, both children emancipated by the time the trial court issued its 2019 judgment.

Accordingly, child care was not a factor in the court’s decision. The trial court recognized

Husband had a higher earning ability than Wife, given his degree and the fact that she did not work

outside the home for most of the marriage. The court also noted, however, that Wife had obtained

steady employment after receiving her certificate for medical coding. The parties were married

for 17.5 years and lived a very comfortable lifestyle. Substantial debts had accrued, however,

owing to the divorce proceedings, payments owed on the commercial building the parties owned,
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and other items such as medical bills. In dividing the assets and liabilities of the parties, the trial

court assigned the vast majority of the debt to Husband, including the mortgage on the marital

residence, an equity line of credit, hospital bills for Wife and the parties’ son, and the balance on

the marital credit card. Wife also received half the equity in the marital residence, half the marital

equity in the Clinic, half the equity in the shares from Wooster Ambulatory and Commerce

Parkway, and half of the equity in the commercial building the parties owned. Based on the

evidence presented and its consideration of the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1), the trial

court found a spousal support award of $2,200 per month to be reasonable and appropriate.

       {¶42} Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion

when it ordered Husband to pay $2,200 per month in spousal support. See Wells, 2012-Ohio-1392,

at ¶ 22. This Court previously rejected Wife’s argument that the trial court should have averaged

Husband’s distribution income from the Clinic to arrive at a higher gross income figure. See

Discussion of Assignment of Error One, supra. The record reflects the trial court considered the

factors set forth in R.C. 3105.18(C)(1). Although Husband earned more than Wife and had a

higher earning ability, other factors weighed in favor of a lower support award. Those factors

included Husband’s responsibility for a significant amount of the parties’ debt and the division of

the marital equity. See R.C. 3105.18(C)(1)(i), (n). Moreover, while Wife testified that she was

struggling to meet her expenses, Husband set forth similar evidence. There was evidence he was

borrowing against the Clinic and accruing credit card debt to satisfy the parties’ taxes obligations,

payments related to the commercial building, and his own expenses. Upon review, Wife has not

shown the trial court abused its discretion when it determined a monthly award of $2,200 in spousal

support was reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances.             See R.C. 3105.18(C)(1).

Accordingly, her fourth assignment of error is overruled.
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                                 ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR V

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY NOT AWARDING MS. SUPPAN
       ATTORNEY’S FEES[.]

       {¶43} In her fifth assignment of error, Wife argues the trial court erred when it failed to

award her attorney fees. We disagree.

       {¶44} R.C. 3105.73(A) allows a trial court in an action for divorce to

       award all or part of reasonable attorney’s fees and litigation expenses to either party
       if the court finds the award equitable. In determining whether an award is equitable,
       the court may consider the parties’ marital assets and income, any award of
       temporary spousal support, the conduct of the parties, and any other relevant factors
       the court deems appropriate.

“‘Because a court addresses an award of attorney[’s] fees through equitable considerations, a trial

court properly can consider the entire spectrum of a party’s actions, so long as those actions

impinge upon the course of the litigation.”’ Schoch v. Schoch, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 18CA011382,

2019-Ohio-1394, ¶ 10, quoting Padgett v. Padgett, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 08AP-269, 2008-Ohio-

6815, ¶ 17. “[A] trial court’s decision concerning whether an award of attorney fees is equitable

is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Weber v. Devanney, 9th Dist. Summit No. 29374, 2020-

Ohio-4450, ¶ 42.

       {¶45} Wife argues the trial court erred by not awarding her attorney fees because

Husband had a much higher income and access to financial resources than were unavailable to her.

For example, Wife notes Husband charged debt to the Clinic to pay a portion of his own attorney

fees. Wife also argues Husband repeatedly withheld information from her or was untruthful during

the course of the proceedings. She points to evidence that he failed to tell her about prospective

tenants to lease their commercial building, failed to immediately disclose certain assets, and falsely

indicated he had erased text messages from his cell phone when, in fact, he had saved some. Wife
                                                 21

argues the disparity in their income, combined with “[a]ll these falsehoods,” warranted an award

of attorney fees in her favor.

       {¶46} Having reviewed the record, we cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion

when it found any award of attorney fees would be inequitable. See Weber, 2020-Ohio-4450, at ¶

42. Husband’s gross income was substantially higher than Wife’s gross income. Yet, Husband

also was responsible for his court-ordered payments (i.e., spousal support and child support) and

a significant amount of debt the court assigned to him upon the parties’ divorce. There was

evidence the Clinic’s revenues had continued to decline. Moreover, there was evidence Husband

bore the brunt of the payments associated with the commercial building the parties owned. Issues

surrounding the lease and sale of the building were heavily litigated in the court below. The parties

eventually agreed Husband would undertake responsibility for all payments associated with the

building until Wife received her property settlement, at which point she would use those funds to

repay him for her court-ordered contribution. When Wife eventually received those funds,

however, she used that money to purchase a home and pay her attorney. The trial court specifically

found Wife in contempt for willfully and purposely failing to abide by its orders.

       {¶47} The record supports the conclusion this was a highly contested divorce with the

conduct of both parties contributing to the length and complexity of the proceedings. Upon review,

Wife has not shown that it was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable for the trial court to

refuse to award either party their attorney fees. Thus, her fifth assignment of error is overruled.

                                                III.

       {¶48} Wife’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Wayne County

Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, is affirmed.

                                                                                Judgment affirmed.
                                                22

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Wayne, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.

       Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                     THOMAS A. TEODOSIO
                                                     FOR THE COURT

CARR, J.
SUTTON, J.
CONCUR.

APPEARANCES:

PATRICK L. BROWN, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.

LON R. VINION, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.