Court Opinion

ID: 9402187
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-15 15:07:52.921394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:58.114602
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: JUNE 15, 2023
                                                          TO BE PUBLISHED

               Supreme Court of Kentucky
                               2021-SC-0281-DG

VIVIANE RENOT                                                       APPELLANT

                  ON REVIEW FROM COURT OF APPEALS
V.                  NOS. 2020-CA-0227 & 2020-CA-0541
                 FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT NO. 16-CI-01853

SECURA SUPREME INSURANCE                                             APPELLEE
COMPANY

              OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NICKELL

      AFFIRMING IN PART, REVERSING IN PART, AND REMANDING

      Viviane Renot was allegedly injured in a motor vehicle collision on

November 26, 2013, in Fayette County, Kentucky. She subsequently filed a

direct action against her underinsured motorists’ (“UIM”) carrier, Secura

Supreme Insurance Company (“Secura”). Following trial, the jury returned a

verdict in favor of Secura. Renot appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed.

We granted discretionary review. After a careful review, we affirm in part,

reverse in part, and remand for a new trial.

                    I.   FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      On the day of the collision, Renot was stopped at a red light in her 2011

Mini Cooper. Carolyn Price was behind Renot in her 2011 Mazda CX-9 SUV.

The pavement was wet and when Price attempted to stop, her vehicle began to
slide. She contacted the rear of Renot’s vehicle. Renot has a very slight

stature and sits close to the dashboard while driving to allow her to reach the

pedals. When she was rear-ended, her right knee struck the dash or steering

column. The impact caused slight damage to Renot’s vehicle and no

discernable damage to Price’s vehicle. Prior to trial the parties stipulated Price

was fully liable for the collision.

      After reporting no injuries at the scene of the collision, Renot first sought

medical treatment approximately six weeks later when she reported neck pain

she attributed to sleeping in an unusual position. No mention was made of the

collision. In early February of 2014—nearly ten weeks after the wreck—Renot

reported right knee pain, noting she felt a pop and sharp pain while at a

physical therapy session the previous day for her neck pain. Medical records

reflected a fall down some stairs in the weeks leading up to the February

appointment. Additional medical records revealed Renot had undergone a pre-

collision right knee arthroscopy and injection on October 3, 2013, to treat

preexisting arthritis.

      Over the following two years, Renot underwent numerous surgical

procedures on her knees.1 In March 2014, she had a right knee arthrotomy

with medial femoral condyle resurfacing. She developed an infection following

that procedure and underwent a right knee incision and drainage procedure

which required a lengthy hospital stay. In October 2014, Renot had a left knee

      1  Renot sought damages only for injuries to her right knee and made no claims
related to her left knee or neck.

                                         2
arthroscopy, debridement, meniscectomy, and chondroplasty. In March 2015,

a total unilateral right knee replacement was performed.

      Due to her ongoing knee problems, Renot incurred significant medical

expenses, missed a substantial amount of work, and was forced to retire early

from her position as a teacher in the Fayette County Public Schools. She

attributed all of the foregoing to the November 2013 collision. Her treating

orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Veronica Vasicek, opined the collision aggravated and

exacerbated Renot’s preexisting knee condition to the point where conservative

treatment was no longer an option, and ascribed causation for the entirety of

Renot’s subsequent medical treatment on the right knee to the collision.

      Renot filed the instant suit in May 2016 against Price and Secura as her

UIM carrier, claiming Price was uninsured or underinsured, and that she had

sustained in excess of $250,000 in damages related to the collision. Renot

settled her claims against Price. Her UIM claim proceeded to a four-day jury

trial commencing on November 18, 2019.

      At trial, Secura presented independent medical expert testimony from Dr.

Stacie Grossfeld, a physician, which contradicted the conclusions of Dr.

Vasicek that Renot’s post-collision surgeries were related to the accident. Dr.

Grossfeld testified Renot suffered a contusion in the collision which would not

necessitate the multiple surgeries which were subsequently performed. Rather,

Dr. Grossfeld believed the advancement of Renot’s preexisting osteoarthritis,

and not an acute contusion, was the sole factor predicating the need for total

knee replacement.

                                       3
      Secura also called biomechanical expert, David Porta, Ph.D., to testify

regarding his biomechanical and anatomical opinions relative to the

mechanism of injury in the collision. “Biomechanics is the application of

engineering principles and methods to the study and solution of problems

arising in biology and medicine.” Hallmark v. Eldridge, 189 P.3d 646, 648 (Nev.

2008) (quoting 46 Am. Jur. Trials 638-39 (1993)). The focus of biomechanics is

the study and evaluation of how various physical forces effect the human body.

      Prior to trial, the trial court partially granted Renot’s motion seeking to

exclude Dr. Porta’s testimony on the grounds he was not a medical doctor and

was not qualified to opine regarding medical causation of any of Renot’s

injuries. However, the trial court determined Dr. Porta was qualified to offer

expert testimony regarding forces, biomechanics, anatomy, and injury

causation. In sum, Dr. Porta would be allowed to testify whether the injuries

claimed by Renot were of the general type which could have been sustained in

the collision but could not opine whether Renot’s specific injuries were actually

caused by the wreck. Even so, in his trial testimony, Dr. Porta offered

relatively little information regarding biomechanical forces and generalized

injury potentialities, but instead was permitted to embark on a wide-ranging

review of Renot’s medical history and to express his opinion that Renot’s

injuries were unrelated to the collision.

      The jury returned a verdict in favor of Secura finding the collision had

not been a substantial factor in Renot’s injuries, including aggravation,

arousal, or exacerbation of any preexisting condition. The trial court entered a

                                            4
judgment conforming with the jury’s verdict and assessing costs against Renot.

Subsequent motions for a new trial, to alter, amend, or vacate the judgment

and for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict were denied. After the Court of

Appeals affirmed on Renot’s direct appeal, we granted her motion for

discretionary review. Additional facts will be developed as necessary.

      Renot raises the same four allegations of error she brought in the Court

of Appeals seeking reversal, all of which that court rejected. First, she

contends the trial court erroneously permitted Dr. Porta to testify about

medical questions beyond his qualifications. Second, Renot argues the trial

court erroneously prohibited her from introducing evidence of what she

believed were party admissions by Secura. For her final two allegations, Renot

challenges the trial court’s rulings related to juror selection and its failure to

correct a juror’s statement made during voir dire. We agree with Renot on her

first allegation of error and conclude reversal and remand for a new trial is

warranted. Because her second allegation of error may reoccur on remand, we

will discuss it briefly. Renot’s final two assertions are unlikely to reoccur and

warrant no discussion.

                                     II. Analysis

                     A. Dr. Porta’s Testimony Was Improper

      Renot asserts Dr. Porta was not qualified to testify because his opinions

failed to satisfy the requirements contained in Daubert v. Merrell Dow

                                          5
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993),2 and KRE3 702.4 We disagree but

nonetheless conclude his testimony went beyond the appropriate scope of his

credentialed expertise.

      Trial courts are charged to act as gatekeepers regarding expert opinions

in order to prevent the admission of pseudoscientific, unreliable evidence.

Garrett v. Commonwealth, 534 S.W.3d 217, 221 (Ky. 2017). To fulfill this role,

the trial court must undertake a two-part analysis wherein it must first assess

whether the methodology or reasoning underpinning the proposed expert

testimony has valid scientific reliability. Second, the trial court must

determine whether the expert’s testimony will assist the trier of fact to

understand a fact in issue. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.

      2   Although Daubert specifically applies to the application of Fed. R. Evid. 702 in
actions in federal courts, Kentucky adopted its reasoning and standards for
application of KRE 702, which contains language identical to its federal counterpart,
in state courts in Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100 (Ky. 1995) (overruled on
other grounds by Fugate v. Commonwealth 993 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Ky. 1999)).

      3   Kentucky Rules of Evidence.

      4   KRE 702 states:
      If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
      of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
      witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
      or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,
      if:

              (1) The testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data;

              (2) The testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods; and

              (3) The witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
                  facts of the case.
                                            6
      Appellate courts give great deference to trial court rulings related to

expert testimony, reversing only when an abuse of discretion is clear. Toyota

Motor Corp. v. Gregory, 136 S.W.3d 35, 39 (Ky. 2004). “The test for abuse of

discretion is whether the trial judge’s decision was arbitrary, unreasonable,

unfair, or unsupported by sound legal principles.” Commonwealth v. English,

993 S.W.2d 941, 945 (Ky. 1999). “An abuse of discretion exists only when we

are ‘firmly convinced that a mistake has been made.’” Rossi v. CSX Transp.,

Inc., 357 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Ky. App. 2010) (quoting Overstreet v. Overstreet,

144 S.W.3d 834, 838 (Ky. App. 2003)). “Even then, reversal is unwarranted

unless the error is not harmless; that is, unless corrected, the error would

prejudice the substantial rights of a party.” Id.

      Here, after examining Dr. Porta’s credentials5 and a transcript of his

pretrial deposition, the trial court determined he was qualified to provide

biomechanical testimony regarding whether Renot’s diagnosed injuries were of

the type which might typically be expected to have arisen due to forces

produced by the collision. However, because it was uncontroverted Dr. Porta

was not a medical doctor and he was therefore unqualified to provide an

opinion regarding a medical diagnosis or the medical causation of Renot’s

      5  Dr. Porta is a professor at Bellarmine University, where he teaches anatomy
and physiology. He is a member of the collaborating research faculty at the Virginia
Tech-Wake Forest University Medical School Center for Injury Biomechanics. His
research focuses on trauma biomechanics and injury reconstruction, and he has
written numerous articles and abstracts on those subjects. He has authored five
medical textbook chapters. Dr. Porta owns a forensic consulting company and has
been retained as an expert witness in approximately 950 cases. Importantly, Dr. Porta
is not a medical doctor.

                                         7
injuries, the trial court ruled Dr. Porta was prohibited from providing such

testimony.

      Our review of the record reveals no error in the trial court’s conclusion

that Dr. Porta’s training and experience satisfied the requirements of KRE 702

to permit him to testify within his field of expertise—biomechanics. The topics

of Dr. Porta’s proposed testimony were scientific in nature, he was eminently

qualified in his field, and the testimony had the potential of assisting the jury

in understanding the types of forces experienced in motor vehicle collisions and

the potential effects on hypothetical occupants of the vehicles involved. Thus,

Dr. Porta could properly testify regarding the generalized mechanics of injury

causation related to Renot’s motor vehicle collision, limited to reviewing the

mechanisms and forces typically anticipated to produce a particular injury. We

likewise agree with the trial court’s determination Dr. Porta was not qualified to

offer medical causation testimony as he was not a medical doctor and his

expertise in biomechanics and anatomy did not qualify him to testify about the

medical cause of Renot’s specific injuries. Thus, there was no abuse of

discretion in the trial court’s pretrial determinations.

      Further, the trial court’s rulings are in conformity with Smelser v. Norfolk

Southern Ry. Co., 105 F.3d 299 (6th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds

by Morales v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 151 F.3d 500 (6th Cir. 1998), the

leading case involving biomechanical expert testimony. In Smelser, a

biomechanical expert was held to be qualified to provide an opinion regarding

the forces generated in a collision and the types of injuries typically resulting

                                         8
from those forces. Id. at 305. However, because biomechanical experts are not

medical doctors, it was held they “are qualified to determine what injury

causation forces are in general and can tell how a hypothetical person’s body

will respond to those forces, but are not qualified to render medical opinions

regarding the precise cause of a specific injury.” Id.

      Although Smelser dealt with a biomechanical engineer, we find its logic

persuasive and applicable to the instant matter, and hereby adopt its sound

reasoning as our own. We similarly hold a qualified biomechanical expert may

be utilized at trial to support or discredit a physician’s medical conclusions

concerning causation by offering objective, scientifically based testimony

regarding the likelihood or probability that a particular traumatic incident

could or would normally be expected to have produced or resulted in a specific

medical injury or condition. However, a biomechanical expert may not invade

the province of a physician’s absolute authority by conclusively opining

whether the traumatic incident at issue did or did not, in fact, cause the

medically diagnosed injury or condition of a particular plaintiff. Though a

biomechanical expert may possess the education and training necessary to

provide science-based data and statistical information tending to confirm or

impeach medical causation as determined by physicians, they are not qualified

nor authorized to reach a medical diagnosis or offer their own analogous or

antithetical medical conclusions regarding causation based on such

information.

      To be admissible, biomechanical opinions need to fall into a
      “Goldilocks zone” of their own. Attorneys seeking to offer the
                                        9
      testimony of an expert in the field of biomechanics who is not a
      physician must ensure that their expert’s proffer is not too specific,
      wandering into the realm of medical causation, or too general, not
      helping a lay jury. A biomechanical expert who is not a medical
      doctor must find the middle ground that is “just right” for the
      opinions to be admissible.

Holly M. Polglase and Matthew E. Brown, BEYOND PORRIDGE The “Goldilocks

Zone” for Biomechanical Opinions, 61 No. 11 DRI For Def. 46 (2019).

Ultimately, of course, it is for the trier of fact to weigh medical opinions

expressed by qualified physicians to determine whether a specific traumatic

incident caused or contributed to a claimant’s physical condition.

      Based on the foregoing, we discern no error in the trial court’s pretrial

rulings. However, we hold the trial court erroneously allowed Dr. Porta’s trial

testimony to contravene its own pretrial rulings. Over multiple objections, Dr.

Porta was permitted to offer testimony on behalf of Secura regarding the cause

of Renot’s right knee condition. Such testimony crossed over into medical

causation testimony and impermissibly invaded the province of physicians.

      For example, on direct examination, citing no supportive scientific

studies or data regarding the effect of traumatic impacts on arthritic knees and

claiming no specialized knowledge, Dr. Porta offered numerous opinions

relating to Renot’s injuries and their etiology. In so doing, he specifically

disagreed with and discounted medical opinions expressed by licensed

physicians, instead opining Renot’s specific injuries could not have resulted

from the collision.

      More particularly, in addition to speculating Renot’s knee injury could

have been caused by a fall down some stairs and that neck injuries sustained
                                         10
in low-speed car collisions should resolve within five weeks, Dr. Porta was

erroneously allowed to testify that Renot’s:

   •   failure to request an ambulance or visit the emergency room immediately
       after the collision led him to conclude the knee injury was unrelated to
       the crash.

   •   delay of five weeks prior to seeking any treatment was “an awfully long
       time to go without treatment,” leading him to conclude the knee injury
       was not caused by the collision.

   •   inconsistent post-accident complaints convinced him the collision and
       knee injury were unrelated.

   •   “long history of knee issues” likely caused her current knee pain.

   •   genetics and advancing age made it “pretty clear” she is “one of those
       people unfortunately” suffering from accelerated osteoarthritis which
       preexisted the collision.

   •   medical records disclosed physical processes which “are not things that
       happen overnight” but develop “over a long time.”

       During his testimony, Dr. Porta used an exemplar knee to explain the

various knee conditions discussed in Renot’s medical records. Secura also

utilized Dr. Porta to admit medical records and explain Renot’s medical history.

None of this testimony referenced biomechanics or otherwise implicated Dr.

Porta’s expertise.

       Though admitting, “I’m no physician,” Dr. Porta did not hesitate to opine

“when I saw the first complaint was ten weeks later and there was no mention

of the accident, they did not appear related to me.” And while making a

cursory reference to a biomechanical absence of “sufficient force,” he provided

an unauthorized medical opinion regarding causation when he testified “I don’t

see any relation between this accident” and Renot’s physical condition. Dr.

                                       11
Porta proceeded to exclude any possibility of medical causation when he

testified that any bruising sustained in the collision was incapable of impacting

      any of the deeper structures, and certainly not the cartilage inside
      of here, what you’re seeing is bare bones [holding and pointing to
      exemplar knee], but there’s an awful lot of tissue still over top of
      this, there’s tendons we don’t see at all, there’s fat, there’s skin.
      So, bruise to the area, no problem, that’s certainly possible. But I
      don’t see any force for deeper tissue injury.

This testimony exceeded Dr. Porta’s well-established qualifications as a

biomechanical expert and erroneously invaded the exclusive province of

medical doctors in determining medical causation. Further, Secura

compounded the error in allowing Dr. Porta’s unqualified medical testimony

when it repeatedly heralded his opinions and testimony during closing,

essentially holding him out to be an “irrefutable causation master” whose

unqualified opinions should be held in a higher regard than those of the

medical professionals involved in this matter.

      On the contrary, Dr. Porta’s lack of appropriate medical credentials

should have prohibited him from testifying regarding the presence or absence

of any specific and concrete causal connection between the forces incurred in

the subject low speed rear-end collision and Renot’s medically diagnosed

conditions. Here, the trial court correctly so held prior to trial, but then

inexplicably and erroneously permitted such testimony at trial. This failure to

follow its own well-founded mandate constituted an abuse of discretion. The

biomechanical expert testimony regarding medical causation offered by Dr.

Porta should have been disallowed and the error cannot be deemed harmless.

The Court of Appeals erred in holding otherwise.
                                        12
      Just as in Rossi, the separation between “injury causation” and “medical

causation” must be maintained and biomechanical experts must, by necessity,

be required to limit their testimony only to their field of expertise. 357 S.W.3d

at 514 (holding although an expert may have impressive and uncontroverted

credentials on risk factors for developing an injury, lack of a medical degree

prohibits the expert from giving causation testimony). In cases involving

biomechanical experts who are not medical doctors, such testimony should be

limited to the forces generated by the subject collision, the generally

anticipated response of a hypothetical person’s body to those forces, and the

range of typical injuries resulting from such forces. Testimony regarding

diagnosis of a specific medical condition associated with a traumatic injury

sustained by a plaintiff or whether the trauma actually caused or exacerbated

a plaintiff’s injuries must be reserved for a medical doctor.

      To be clear, while biomechanical experts may be qualified to testify about

a typical or expected range of potential physical or medical outcomes resulting

from the forces incurred in a collision or accident, they may not venture into

the territory of medical causation, a province whose dominion is reserved to

medical doctors alone. Reversal and remand for a new trial free from improper

testimony are required.

             B. Exclusion of Alleged Party Admissions Was Proper

      For her second allegation of error, Renot asserts the trial court

erroneously granted Secura’s motion in limine prohibiting any questioning or

introduction of evidence regarding coverage or payments of personal injury

                                        13
protection (PIP) or basic reparations benefits. She argues the ruling was in

error because Secura’s payment of PIP benefits operated as an admission or

concession of a causative connection between the collision and her medical

bills. Given that Secura subsequently “changed its mind” and contested her

knee injury was not related to the collision, Renot contends she was entitled to

introduce evidence of the prior concession. Alternatively, she asserts Secura

“opened the door” to such testimony by claiming it had only paid for damages

related to the accident. She contends the Court of Appeals erroneously

rejected her arguments. We disagree.

      As correctly noted by the Court of Appeals, payments of claims under a

PIP policy differ significantly from those made under a UIM policy. PIP benefits

are payable “without regard to fault.” KRS6 304.39-040(1). Moreover, “[t]here

is a statutory presumption that any medical bill submitted [by a PIP claimant]

is reasonable.” State Auto Mut. Ins. Co. v. Outlaw, 575 S.W.2d 489, 493 (Ky.

App. 1978) (citing KRS 304.39-020(5)(a)). PIP benefits are the exclusive remedy

for the first $10,000 in medical expenses or lost wages which are incurred by a

no-fault plaintiff. See Drury v. Spalding, 812 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Ky. 1991). The

General Assembly clearly intended PIP coverage

      to provide a remedy to automobile accident victims that could not
      be impinged upon by any means whatsoever. This was the victim’s
      reward for sacrificing traditional tort rights. . . . It is remedial in
      nature and thus will be broadly construed to carry out its
      beneficial purpose of providing compensation for persons injured
      by automobiles.

      6   Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                        14
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, Inc. v. Baxter, 713 S.W.2d 478, 480 (Ky. App. 1986)

(citations omitted).

      Conversely, UIM benefits are provided as additional coverage under

which an insurance company

      agrees to pay its own insured for such uncompensated damages as
      he may recover on account of injury due to a motor vehicle
      accident because the judgment recovered against the owner of the
      other vehicle exceeds the liability policy limits thereon, to the
      extent of the underinsurance policy limits on the vehicle of the
      party recovering.

KRS 304.39-320(2). This “allow[s] an insured to purchase additional coverage

so as to be fully compensated for damages when injured by the fault of another

individual.” Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hatfield, 122 S.W.3d 36, 40 (Ky. 2003).

Claimed medical expenses do not enjoy the presumption of reasonableness for

UIM purposes as do those claimed under a PIP policy. Entitlement to UIM

benefits requires the claimant to prove another motorist is a tortfeasor, the

amount of damages sustained because of the tortfeasor’s actions, and the

extent of the tortfeasor’s liability. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Riggs, 484

S.W.3d 724, 729 (Ky. 2016).

      From the foregoing, it is clear PIP and UIM claims are separate and

independent. They are not overlapping, nor do they provide duplicative

coverage benefits for the same loss. Further, because PIP payments are made

without regard to fault, such payments cannot be equated with an admission of

a causal connection between an automobile collision and a claimed injury.

Thus, as the Court of Appeals noted, evidence concerning PIP coverage or

payments is simply irrelevant to any issue raised in this UIM action and is
                                        15
therefore inadmissible. See KRE 401. Renot’s assertions to the contrary are

without merit.

      We are likewise unpersuaded by Renot’s assertion that Secura opened

the door to admission of evidence of its prior PIP payments. During voir dire,

Secura’s counsel erroneously informed the jury that Secura had paid Renot for

the damage to her vehicle when in actuality the total damage to Renot’s vehicle

did not reach the threshold of her deductible. When counsel was made aware

of the mistake, it was brought to the attention of the trial court and an

admonition was given to the jury. Subsequently, Renot argued that Secura’s

statements asserting it had paid for damage to her vehicle because “it was

related” to the collision and that it had only made payments “for things which

were related,” opened the door to introduction of the PIP payments. As a

result, she argued the PIP evidence became admissible as an admission or

concession that Secura believed Renot’s first surgery following the collision was

“related” to injuries sustained in the wreck. The trial court and Court of

Appeals correctly rejected her position.

      Property damage was a collateral and immaterial issue at trial. The

misstatement regarding payment for such damage was not inflammatory or

highly prejudicial. The trial court’s admonishment informed the jury the claim

was unpaid because it was insufficient to reach Renot’s deductible. Clearly,

the trial court did not want the jury to entertain a false belief Secura was

refusing to pay a claim for which it was obligated. Nothing about the property

damage claim was relevant to any other disputed issue at trial including Price’s

                                        16
negligence, coverage under the UIM policy, the extent of Renot’s injuries and

associated medical expenses, or a causal connection between the claimed

injuries and the collision. Secura simply did not open the door for entry of

such evidence and no improper inferences were placed before the jury

justifying the curative admissibility of the otherwise properly excluded evidence

of PIP coverage and payments. There was no error as the Court of Appeals

correctly held.

                               C. Remaining Issues

      As previously stated, because we are reversing and remanding for a new

trial, we need not comment on Renot’s allegations of error regarding jury

selection and the failure of the trial court to correct a misstatement by a

member of the venire. Such issues were limited to two specific members of the

prospective jury panel and are unlikely to reoccur on remand. Nevertheless,

we discern no error and affirm the Court of Appeals on those issues.

                                 III.   Conclusion

      For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding

Dr. Porta’s testimony is reversed, and the matter is remanded for a new trial

consistent with this opinion. The Court of Appeals is affirmed in all other

respects.

      Bisig, Conley, Keller, Lambert, Nickell, and Thompson, JJ., sitting. Bisig,

Conley, Keller, and Lambert, JJ., concur. Thompson, J., dissents by separate

opinion. VanMeter, C.J., not sitting.

                                        17
      THOMPSON, J., DISSENTING BY SEPARATE OPINION:

      I respectfully dissent. Following a viewing of Dr. Porta’s videotaped trial

testimony, I cannot agree that his testimony had a substantial effect, if any, on

the jury’s determination given the cumulative nature of much of his testimony

and the other evidence showing that Renot’s knee issues were not related to

the auto accident. Therefore, errors, if any, regarding the admission of

portions of Dr. Porta’s testimony were harmless.

      Much of Dr. Porta’s allegedly objectionable testimony (intruding into the

realm of medical opinion) was actually elicited during a rigorous cross-

examination. Dr. Porta himself actively resisted testifying outside of his realm

of expertise. Additionally, I conclude the portions of Dr. Porta’s testimony found

to be objectionable, to be merely cumulative to testimony already advanced by

Secura’s own medical expert and supported by the medical record.

      Viviane Renot suffered from preexisting osteoarthritis in her right knee.

She had already undergone an arthroscopy and injection of her right knee prior

to the low speed, minimal impact collision. She reported no injuries at the

scene. She did not seek medical attention for her knee until nearly ten weeks

after the auto accident and then reported falling down stairs in the weeks prior

to her appointment.

      With these facts, I do not believe Dr. Porta’s testimony influenced the

verdict and therefore dissent.

                                        18
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT:

Sandra M. Varellas
D. Todd Varelles
Preston P. Cahill
Varellas & Varellas

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE:

Ashley K. Brown
Graham D. Barth
Ward, Hocker & Thornton, PLLC

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE, KENTUCKY DEFENSE COUNSEL:
Charles A. Walker
Sewell & Neal, PLLC

COUNSEL FOR AMICUS CURIAE, KENTUCKY JUSTICE ASSOCIATION:
Kenneth Human
Hicks & Funfsinn, PLLC

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