Court Opinion

ID: 9831035
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:44:36.058395+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:29.895814
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
In their petition appellees allege that the publication of the said libelous article by appellant injured Ernest O. Wegner, Sr., in his reputation, caused him to suffer pain, anguish, and distress, both mental and physical, and that the same greatly impaired and injured his health, and prayed for $10,000 actual and $10,000 special, and $10,000 exemplary, damages. The court instructed the jury: (1) That the publication complained of by appellees was libelous per se, and that plaintiffs were entitled to recover such general compensatory damages as the jury *50should find Ernest C. Wegner, Sr., suffered by reason of said publication to Ms character or reputation, and for such, damages as he suffered by reason of mental pain, if any, as the result of said publication; (2) that if the jury should find that by reason of said publication E. 0. Wegner, Sr., was injured and impaired in health, that plaintiffs were further entitled to recover such special damages as the jury might find from the evidence said Wegner, Sr., so suffered by reason of injury and impairment of his health, thus separating the alleged items of damages into two classes. Under this charge the jury found general damages in the sum of $10,000 and special damages in the sum of $2,500.
While appellees have alleged injury to the character and reputation, the mental and physical suffering, and impairment of the health, of said Ernest C. Wegner, Sr., by reason of said publication, and have prayed for both general and special damages, there is no allegation alleging special damages; and as the entire recovery to which appellees were entitled under their pleading could and should have been recovered under a charge submitting the question of general damages only, we held in the main opinion that the learned trial court erred in his charge in separating the different alleged items of damages into two classes, i. e., general damages and special damages, and in authorizing a recovery of general damages for a part of the alleged items of damage, and the recovery of special damages for another item of said alleged damage. But as it is clear that double damage was not authorized by such charge, and could not have been given by virtue of the court’s charge, the mere fact that recovery was permitted for the alleged items separately, when such recovery could have been had under a charge submitting all the items conjunctively, should not be cause for a reversal of the judgment of the trial court, especially so as this court has required a remittitur of $5,000.
Counsel for appellant has filed a motion for rehearing, in which he vigorously and earnestly attacks the holding of the court -referred to, and insists that said charge of the court authorized double damages, and that such double or excessive damages as was probably found by the jury by reason of said erroneous charge cannot be mathematically determined, and therefore the judgment cannot be legally cured by a remittitur of $5,000, or any other sum less than the whole. We think such contention untenable. Suppose the court had added to the items named in the first portion of his charge the further item of “physical pain resulting in the impairment of health,”' which was submitted in the second part of said charge as an element of special damages; would any one insist that it would have been possible that such addition would or could have had the effect to decrease the amount found by the jury as general damages? On the other hand, would not such addition have tended to furnish further reason for the jury to find $10,000 general damages, the full amount prayed for as general damages, as they did find? We think so, and, so believing, we think we can to a mathematical certainty say that such erroneous charge could not have increased and did not increase the amount of recovery found by the jury in any sum in excess of $2,500, and therefore a re-mittitur of $5,000 clearly rendered such charge harmless.
[12] After a review of the cases cited by counsel in support of the motion we have concluded that they are not applicable to the facts in the present case. We are of opinion that when an error has been committed by the trial court which has probably, or perhaps even possibly, caused the rendition of an excessive verdict, and that it is impossible for the appellate court to mathematically determine the sum of such excess erroneously found by reason of such error, article 1631, Revised Statutes, would not apply, and the entire judgment should be reversed, and the cause remanded for another trial. Railway v. Wesch, 85 Tex. 593, 22 S. W. 957; Nunnally v. Taliaferro, 82 Tex. 286, 18 S. W. 149; Electric Co. v. Green, 48 Tex. Civ. App. 242, 106 S. W. 463; Railway Co. v. Bird, 48 S. W. 756.
[13] But when it can be determined by the appellate court what excessive amount had been erroneously found by the jury by reason of an erroneous instruction, as in this case, the court is authorized to cure such error by requiring a remittitur. Railway v. Trawick, 80 Tex. 275, 15 S. W. 568, 18 S. W. 948; Railway v. Bellew, 22 Tex. Civ. App. 264, 54 S. W. 1079; Railway Co. v. Keel Grain Co., 132 S. W. 837; Petroleum Co. v. Townsite Co., 48 Tex. Civ. App. 555, 107 S. W. 609; Old River Irrigation Co. v. Stubbs, 137 S. W. 154. The case of Railway Co. v. Keel Grain Co., supra is one in which the court first ordered a reversal because of erroneous charge, but on motion for rehearing the judgment was affirmed upon appellee’s filing a remittitur, thereby rendering such charge harmless.
After a careful review and consideration of all the assignments in appellant’s motion, and the authorities cited in support thereof, we conclude that the motion should be refused; and it is so ordered.