Court Opinion

ID: 9401911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 17:03:41.497777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:56.092191
License: Public Domain

Filed 6/14/23 P. v. Miranda CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                       B321437

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No. TA121782)
           v.

 JOSHUA MIRANDA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Tammy Chung Ryu, Judge. Affirmed.
      Sharon Fleming, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Chung L. Mar, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                  _____________________________
                        INTRODUCTION

       Joshua Miranda appeals from the superior court’s order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code former
section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6).1 He argues the court erred
in ruling he did not make a prima facie showing he was entitled
to relief under the statute. We affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

      In November 2012, in connection with the shooting death of
Daniel Harrison, the People charged Miranda with one count of
murder (§ 187, subd. (a)) and one count of possession of a firearm
by a felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)). On both counts the People
alleged that Miranda committed the offenses for the benefit of, at
the direction of, or in association with a criminal street gang,
with the specific intent to promote, further, or assist in criminal
conduct by gang members (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and that he had
a prior conviction for a felony that was a serious or violent felony
conviction within the meaning of the three strikes law (§§ 667,
subds. (b)-(j), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)) and a serious felony within
the meaning of section 667, subdivision (a)(1). On the murder
count the People alleged Miranda personally used a firearm
(§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), personally and intentionally discharged a
firearm (§12022.53, subd. (c)), and personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death
(§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).
      Pursuant to a negotiated disposition, the trial court
granted the People’s motion to add a count of voluntary

1     Statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and an allegation Miranda
personally used a firearm, within the meaning of section 12022.5,
subdivision (a). Miranda pleaded no contest to the voluntary
manslaughter count, admitted the new firearm-use allegation,
and admitted he had a prior conviction for a serious or violent
felony within the meaning of the three strikes law. The trial
court sentenced Miranda to a prison term of 26 years, consisting
of the upper term of 11 years, doubled under the three strikes
law, plus the middle term of four years for the firearm
enhancement. The court granted the People’s motion to dismiss
the remaining counts and allegations.
       In February 2022 Miranda filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, checking boxes on a form petition stating
he was eligible for relief and asking the court to appoint counsel
to represent him. The superior court appointed counsel, and the
People filed a written response to the petition. The People
argued Miranda failed to make a prima facie showing he was
entitled to relief under section 1172.6 because, on the voluntary
manslaughter count to which he pleaded no contest, he “was
being prosecuted as the actual killer,” not on “a felony murder or
a natural and probable consequences theory.” To support this
assertion, the People cited and attached a copy of the transcript
of the preliminary hearing, where they had presented evidence
Miranda shot Harrison during a fight between the two men at a
party. The People also submitted a copy of the transcript of the
plea hearing, where counsel for Miranda stipulated the
preliminary hearing transcript (and police reports) constituted a
factual basis for Miranda’s plea. Miranda did not file a written
reply to the People’s response.

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      The superior court held a hearing to determine whether
Miranda had made a prima facie showing he was entitled to relief
under section 1172.6. Miranda, though not present, was
represented by counsel, the same attorney who represented him
at the preliminary hearing, the plea hearing, and at sentencing.
Counsel for Miranda stated he did “not dispute . . . that the
People’s theory of the case against Mr. Miranda was always that
he was the actual shooter and that they were not proceeding on a
theory of felony murder or natural and probable consequences.”
Nevertheless, counsel argued, Miranda had “check[ed] all the
correct boxes and made the allegations necessary for the court to
issue an [order to show cause] and have [an evidentiary] hearing”
on the petition.
      Ruling Miranda had not made a prima facie showing, the
superior court denied the petition. The court stated that “there’s
no dispute about the theory on which the People proceeded or
could have proceeded in this case,” namely, Miranda was the
actual shooter and killer of Harrison; that “this was not a felony
murder or natural and probable consequence situation”; and that
there was therefore “no legal basis” for Miranda’s petition.
Miranda timely appealed.

                         DISCUSSION

      A.    Section 1172.6
      Effective 2019, the Legislature substantially modified the
law governing accomplice liability for murder, eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for finding
a defendant guilty of murder (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th
830, 842-843 (Gentile)) and significantly narrowing the felony-

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murder exception to the malice requirement for murder (§§ 188,
subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e); see People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th
698, 707-708 (Strong); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957
(Lewis)). Section 188, subdivision (a)(3), now prohibits imputing
malice based solely on an individual’s participation in a crime
and requires proof of malice to convict a principal of murder,
except under the revised felony-murder rule in section 189,
subdivision (e). The latter provision requires the People to prove
specific facts relating to the defendant’s culpability: The
defendant was the actual killer (§ 189, subd. (e)(1)); the
defendant, though not the actual killer, with the intent to kill
assisted in the commission of the murder (§ 189, subd. (e)(2)); or
the defendant was a major participant in a felony listed in section
189, subdivision (a), and acted with reckless indifference to
human life, “as described in subdivision (d) of Section 190.2,” the
felony-murder special-circumstance provision. (§ 189, subd. (e)(3);
see Strong, at p. 708; Gentile, at p. 842.)
      Section 1172.6 provides a procedure for vacating “a final
murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction that does
not comply with” these changes in the law. (People v. Duran
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 920, 927; see Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at
p. 708; Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 957; Gentile, supra,
10 Cal.5th at p. 843.) It authorizes a person convicted of one of
these crimes to petition the superior court to vacate the
conviction and be resentenced on any remaining counts if all the
following conditions apply: “(1) [a] complaint, information, or
indictment was filed against the petitioner that allowed the
prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine or other
theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on

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that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted murder under
the natural and probable consequences doctrine”; “(2) [t]he
petitioner was convicted of murder, attempted murder, or
manslaughter following a trial or accepted a plea offer in lieu of a
trial at which the petitioner could have been convicted of murder
or attempted murder”; and “(3) [t]he petitioner could not
presently be convicted of murder or attempted murder because of
changes to Section 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a).)
       If a section 1172.6 petition contains all the required
information, the court must appoint counsel to represent the
petitioner if requested. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 962-963;
see § 1172.6, subd. (b)(1)(A), (3).) The prosecutor must then file a
response to the petition, the petitioner may file a reply, and the
court must hold a hearing to determine whether the petitioner
has made a prima facie showing he or she is entitled to relief.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) “If the petition and record in the case
establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for relief,
the trial court may dismiss the petition.” (Strong, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) “The record of conviction will necessarily
inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry . . . , allowing the
court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless. This is consistent with the statute’s overall
purpose: to ensure that murder culpability is commensurate with
a person’s actions, while also ensuring that clearly meritless
petitions can be efficiently addressed as part of a single-step
prima facie review process.” (Lewis, at p. 971.) If the petitioner
makes the requisite prima facie showing he or she is entitled to
relief, the court must issue an order to show cause and hold an
evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate the murder,

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attempted murder, or manslaughter conviction and resentence
the petitioner on any remaining counts. (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(1);
see Strong, at p. 708.)
       On appeal from an order denying a petition under section
1172.6 on the ground the petitioner failed to make a prima facie
showing he or she was entitled to relief, we review de novo
whether the petitioner is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
(People v. Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 14; People v. Ervin
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 90, 101.) “A petitioner is ineligible for
resentencing as a matter of law if the record of conviction
conclusively establishes, with no factfinding, weighing of
evidence, or credibility determinations, that (1) the petitioner
was the actual killer, or (2) the petitioner was not the actual
killer, but, with the intent to kill, aided, abetted, counseled,
commanded, induced, solicited, requested, or assisted the actual
killer in the commission of murder in the first degree, (3) the
petitioner was a major participant in the underlying felony and
acted with reckless indifference to human life, or (4) the
petitioner acted with malice aforethought that was not imputed
based solely on participation in a crime.” (Lopez, at p. 14; see
§§ 188, subd. (a)(3), 189, subd. (e).)

      B.     The Superior Court Did Not Err in Denying
             Miranda’s Petition
       Miranda argues the superior court erred in ruling he failed
to make a prima facie showing under section 1172.6 because
nothing in the record of conviction established he is ineligible for
relief as a matter of law. He argues the court impermissibly
“relied on the preliminary hearing transcript to reach a

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conclusion that [Miranda] was the actual killer.”2 He also
suggests that, in determining he was the actual killer, the court
incorrectly relied on his admission (in his plea) that he personally
used a firearm within the meaning of section 12022.5, subdivision
(a).3
      The superior court, however, did not rely on these things.
Rather, the court relied on the concession by counsel for Miranda
that the People’s case against Miranda rested always and only on
the theory he was Harrison’s actual killer. On appeal Miranda
does not disavow or even comment on this concession, even
though the People emphasized it in their brief. Because there is
no dispute Miranda was convicted on the theory he was the
actual killer, not on any prohibited, no-longer-valid theory of
murder liability, he is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as
a matter of law. (See People v. Garcia (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 956,

2      Miranda argues “a preliminary hearing transcript cannot
be relied on to deny resentencing relief at the prima facie stage,”
a position the People dispute. In fact, “Courts of Appeal are split
on the import of the preliminary hearing transcript in
determining whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case for
resentencing under section 1170.95.” (People v. Flores (2022)
76 Cal.App.5th 974, 989.) Here, however, we do not need to reach
this issue.

3     It is true that, “in theory, a finding that a defendant
personally used a firearm does not in itself prove a defendant is
the actual killer.” (People v. Garrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 735,
743; see People v. Jones (2003) 30 Cal.4th 1084, 1120 [“If two
robbers display guns to intimidate robbery victims and one shoots
and kills a victim, both robbers could be found to have personally
used a gun . . . , even though only one is the actual killer.”].)
Again, however, we do not need to reach this issue.

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973 [“As a matter of law, resentencing relief under section 1172.6
is not available to an ‘actual killer.’”]; People v. Garrison (2021)
73 Cal.App.5th 735, 744 [a defendant who was the actual killer is
ineligible for resentencing under section 1172.6]; see also Gentile,
supra, 10 Cal.5th at p. 842 [the Legislature “‘amend[ed] the
felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is
not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer’”]; People v.
Flores (2022) 76 Cal.App.5th 974, 987 [in “the plea context,” even
where the charging document allowed the prosecution “to proceed
under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine, or another theory of imputed
malice,” a petitioner is ineligible for relief under section 1172.6 as
a matter of law if “the petitioner was not convicted under such a
theory”].) Therefore the superior court did not err in concluding
Miranda failed to make the requisite prima facie showing and
denying his petition.

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                        DISPOSITION

       The order denying Miranda’s petition under section 1172.6
is affirmed.

                                    SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

     FEUER, J.

     ESCALANTE, J.*

*     Judge of the Los Angeles County Superior Court, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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