Court Opinion

ID: 9737883
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:36:26.021264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:02.344447
License: Public Domain

STATON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The plain language of the contract at issue reveals that Smart intended to preclude Grider from competing against Smart anywhere in the United States. By means of the blue pencil doctrine, the Majority interprets this unreasonable geographical limitation as including only Indiana. To do so impermissibly rewrites the parties' contract. It is well settled that this court may not use the guise of interpretation to create a reasonable restriction from an otherwise unreasonable one; doing so subjects the parties to an agreement that they did not make. Licocci v. Cardinal Associates, Inc. (1983), Ind., 445 N.E.2d 556, 561, reh. denied.
As the Majority states, our courts have created the blue peneil doctrine so that those reasonable contract terms that are clearly divisible from any unreasonable terms may be enforced, thus giving effect to the parties' intentions. Op. at 83-84, citing Seach v. Richards, Dieterle & Co. (1982), Ind.App., 439 N.E.2d 208, 215. However, the plain language of the instant contract indicates that Smart, a corporation doing business on a nationwide basis, intended to eliminate Gri-der from competing with it anywhere it does business, ie. nationwide. The fact that the limitation imposed by Smart is unreasonable under Indiana law does nothing to change Smart's intention in imposing it.
By redrafting the contract provision at issue, the Majority is assuming the needs and requirements of the parties as they entered into the agreement. For example, Smart's Indiana representatives may be based in metropolitan areas bordering other states, such as Hammond or Gary, and would thus very likely serve clients in Ilinois and Michigan. The same would hold true for a sales representative in South Bend, Fort Wayne, Richmond or Evansville Smart's intent to preclude Grider from competing on a nationwide basis, and not just in Indiana, may have been a poorly-drafted attempt to avoid this very problem. However, the role of this court is not to second-guess such considerations, which are exelusively within the province of the contracting parties. By striking the geographical limitation expressed in the contract and creating a legally reasonable limitation where one does not exist, the Majority in effect has become a party to the contract. See IAicocci, supra.
*86The non-compete provision at issue contains an unreasonable geographical restriction that cannot be stricken without altering the essence of the original agreement. The trial court correctly determined that the provision is unenforceable, and its decision should be affirmed. For this reason, I dissent.