Court Opinion

ID: 9714257
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:33:52.599248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:24.626841
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE TURNER, dissenting: I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the provisions of the Health Care Right of Conscience Act (Right of Conscience Act) and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act fail to make plaintiffs’ claims ripe for consideration. Therefore, I respectfully dissent. A. Right of Conscience Act Section 2 of the Right of Conscience Act provides, in part, as follows: “The General Assembly finds and declares that people and organizations hold different beliefs about whether certain health[-] care services are morally acceptable. It is the public policy of the State of Illinois to respect and protect the right, of conscience of all persons who *** are engaged in *** health[-]care services *** and to prohibit all forms of discrimination, disqualification, coercion, disability!,] or imposition of liability upon such persons or entities by reason of their refusing to act contrary to their conscience or conscientious convictions in refusing to obtain, receive, accept, deliver, pay for, or arrange for the payment of health[-]care services and medical care.” 745 ILCS 70/2 (West 2004). “Conscience” has been defined as “a sincerely held set of moral convictions arising from belief in and relation to God, or which, though not so derived, arises from a place in the life of its possessor parallel to that filled by God among adherents to religious faiths.” 745 ILCS 70/ 3(e) (West 2004). Section 5 prohibits public officials from discriminating against persons “in any manner” because of that person’s “conscientious refusal to *** participate in any way in any particular form of health[-]care services contrary to his or her conscience.” 745 ILCS 70/5 (West 2004). A person injured by any action prohibited by the Right of Conscience Act may commence an action therefor and recover damages. 745 ILCS 70/12 (West 2004). I would find plaintiffs have stated a compelling case under the Right of Conscience Act, one that is worthy of and ripe for consideration. In the case sub judice, plaintiff pharmacists are alleged to have moral and religious objections to dispensing emergency contraception pursuant to the Rule. The Right of Conscience Act purports to protect their beliefs and prevent “all forms” of coercion on the part of the government to alter those beliefs. Governor Blagojevich, however, has stated pharmacists “are not free to let [religious] beliefs stand in the way” of delivering emergency contraception to customers and “must fill prescriptions without making moral judgments.” Press Release, Office of the Governor, Statement of Gov. Rod Blagojevich in response to lawsuit filed by Pat Robertson’s American Center for Law and Justice challenging Governor’s emergency rule for pharmacies (April 13, 2005), available at http://www.illinois.gov/PressReleases/ PrintPressRelease.cfm? SubjectID=3&RecNum=3849. Further, the Governor has warned pharmacists that the State will “vigorously protect” the right of access to birth control and will take “any and all necessary steps to ensure a woman’s access to her health care.” Letter from Rod Blagojevich, Governor, State of Illinois, to Paul Caprio, Executive Director, Family-Pac (April 11, 2005). The intent of the Governor’s statements is clear and undeniable — either comply with the Rule or else. Plaintiffs allege, therefore, they must choose either to violate the Rule or their consciences, a form of coercion expressly prohibited by the Right of Conscience Act. The risk of the revocation of their professional licenses unless they comply with the Rule is the ultimate in government coercion, threatening their very livelihood in the workforce within the State of Illinois. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ claim the Right of Conscience Act offers them an avenue of relief is ripe for consideration. B. Religious Freedom Restoration Act Under section 10 of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, the General Assembly has found “[t]he free exercise of religion is an inherent, fundamental, and inalienable right secured by [a]rticle I, [s]ection 3[,] of the Constitution of the State of Illinois.” 775 ILCS 35/ 10(a)(1) (West 2004). One of the purposes of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is “[t]o provide a claim or defense to persons whose exercise of religion is substantially burdened by government.” 775 ILCS 35/10(b)(2) (West 2004). “Government may not substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person (i) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (ii) is the least[-]restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” 775 ILCS 35/15 (West 2004). Section 20 allows a person to raise a claim in a judicial proceeding and seek appropriate relief if his or her “exercise of religion has been burdened in violation” of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 775 ILCS 35/20 (West 2004). Based on the purposes and protections of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, I would find plaintiffs have standing to pursue their claims. Plaintiffs have alleged the Rule burdens their right to the free exercise of religion in violation of Illinois law. A forced choice between violating one’s religious beliefs and complying with the law can amount to a substantial burden within the meaning of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218, 32 L. Ed. 2d 15, 26, 92 S. Ct. 1526, 1534 (1972) (“[t]he impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents’ practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs”); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404, 10 L. Ed. 2d 965, 970, 83 S. Ct. 1790, 1794 (1963) (where the appellant’s declared ineligibility for benefits “force[d] her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand”). In this case, plaintiffs claim the Rule, along with the Governor’s edicts, has placed substantial pressure on them to modify or violate their religious beliefs or face the threat of government sanction. The alleged disregard here by the State’s Chief Executive of the fundamental constitutional rights of these Illinois citizens to the free exercise of their religious beliefs is sufficient to grant them standing under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Therefore, I would find plaintiffs have set forth a justiciable claim that the State has placed a substantial burden on their protected constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. As plaintiffs have established a compelling claim, their action is ripe for consideration.