Court Opinion

ID: 9546093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:24:49.561427+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:59.186809
License: Public Domain

*98Herd, J.,
dissenting: There are two trial errors in this case. The first is the admission of the highway patrolman’s testimony to the effect that a vehicle passing another within 100 feet of an intersection was a mere technical violation of the traffic laws for which he would not cite the driver.
K.S.A. 8-1519 provides:
“(a) No vehicle shall be driven on the left side of the roadway under the following conditions:
“(2) When approaching within one hundred (100) feet of or traversing any intersection . . . .”
A highway patrolman has no authority to excuse a person from obeying the law nor can he qualify as an expert on interpretation of the law. Interpretation of the law is a function of the court.
Expert testimony may not be used to usurp the jury’s function. Here, the patrolman’s testimony was introduced to nullify the truck driver’s admitted violation of a statute. His testimony was not only irrelevant but goes to the ultimate question of fault.
It is not a function of the judiciary to admit evidence downgrading statutes which it deems foolish or unwise. The wisdom of a statute is a legislative prerogative. The court’s actions here could be interpreted as an attempt to nullify the statute.
The second trial error was the trial court’s ruling that Paxton National Insurance Company could not be identified as a defendant in the suit. The court based its decision on two points, both of which are in error. First, the trial court reasoned that under K.S.A. 60-258a, the comparative negligence law, the disclosure of the insurance company as a defendant is inconsistent with comparing fault and assessing damages since the insurance company’s fault is indirect, if at all. The adoption of comparative negligence did not change the law with regard to the liability of insurers of common carriers in tort under K.S.A. 66-1,128. The liability of the insurance company is vicarious as is that of the carrier. The driver committed the wrong but his principals, the carrier and the insurer, are responsible for his negligence and are proper parties to the suit and this relationship should be disclosed to the jury.
The trial court also ruled that disclosing Paxton as a party would be improper under K.S.A. 60-454. That statute bans mentioning insurance in tort actions to prove negligence or wrong*99doing. This statute is an example of the collateral source doctrine. We do not have that situation here. Under K.S.A. 66-1,128 the carrier’s insurance company is directly liable in tort for the negligent actions of the carrier and its agents. K.S.A. 60-454 is inapplicable where the insurance company is a party to the lawsuit pursuant to K.S.A. 66-1,128. The insurance company is by statute made a primary source. In Fitzgerald v. Thompson, 167 Kan. 87, 89-91, 204 P.2d 756 (1949), Chief Justice Harvey explained the meaning of K.S.A. 66-1,128:
“Our statute (G.S. 1935, 66-1,128) provides that no certificate or license shall be issued by the public service commission to any public or contract motor carrier of property or passengers, or private motor carrier, until and after an applicant therefor shall have filed with and the same has been approved by the public service commission, a liability insurance policy, ‘which liability insurance shall bind the obligors thereunder to pay compensation for injuries to persons and loss of or damage to property resulting from the negligent operation of such carrier.’
“In Dunn v. Jones, 143 Kan. 218, 53 P.2d 918, it was held that such policy when given indemnifies against ‘the condition of being liable,’ and that such obligation ‘rests on the insurer from the time of accident resulting in injury’ and ‘the obligation may be enforced by action brought directly against the insurer by the person sustaining injury.’
“The rule deducible from the above authorities is that the liability assumed by the insurer is neither a contract liability nor a statutory liability. It is a tort liability — the liability in tort which the insured has ‘from the negligent operation’ of his business under the permit. The fact that this tort liability is determined by the statute and by the insurance policy does not keep it from being a tort liability.
“If the petition states a cause of action in tort against the permit holder and alleges the filing and approval of the liability policy it states a cause of action against the insurer. This is the basis for the holdings of the court that one who sustains injury in his person or property by the negligent operation under the permit of the permit holder may sue both the permit holder and the insurer, or either one of them, and the action is in tort, not in contract.”
Fitzgerald has been consistently followed by the court. See Kirtland v. Tri-State Insurance Co., 220 Kan. 631, 633, 556 P.2d 199 (1976); Klein v. Wells, 194 Kan. 528, 536, 400 P.2d 1002 (1965); Hanson v. Zollars, 189 Kan. 699, 702, 371 P.2d 357 (1962); Streebin v. Capitol Truck Lines, 182 Kan. 527, 531, 322 P.2d 776 (1958). The majority opinion disregards this long line of authority.
I would hold the trial court committed reversible error in admitting the patrolman’s testimony and in excluding mention of Paxton National Insurance Company as a named defendant. We *100have held that an 'order of the district court made in direct violation of a statutory provision is not harmless error as a matter of law. Gardner v. Pereboom, 194 Kan. 231, 235, 398 P.2d 293 (1965). The trial court’s errors here are in direct violation of statutes and thus cannot be termed “harmless error.” I would reverse and remand for a new trial.