Court Opinion

ID: 9376655
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 15:04:16.243692+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:08.070042
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: FEBRUARY 24, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                 Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-1193-ME

ADEL M. CHOUK                                                      APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE TRACI H. BRISLIN, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 22-D-00860-001

AMIRA N. CHOUK AND DANIEL J.
CAMERON, KENTUCKY
ATTORNEY GENERAL                                                    APPELLEES

                                     OPINION
                                    AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: ACREE, DIXON, AND JONES, JUDGES.

DIXON, JUDGE: Adel M. Chouk appeals the domestic violence order (DVO)

entered by the Fayette Circuit Court on September 8, 2022. After careful review of

the record, brief, and law, we affirm.
             BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

                 On July 2, 2022, Amira N. Chouk petitioned the Fayette Circuit Court

for a DVO against Adel, her father. Her petition was granted on September 8,

2022, following a hearing. In addition to restraining Adel from contact with

Amira, the resulting DVO provided that he was not to possess, purchase, or

attempt to possess, purchase, or obtain a firearm during the duration of the order.

Adel timely filed a notice of appeal.

                                      LEGAL ANALYSIS

                 A court may grant a DVO if, following a hearing, it “finds by a

preponderance of the evidence that domestic violence and abuse has occurred and

may again occur[.]” KRS1 403.740(1). Adel does not challenge the entry of the

DVO; rather, the sole issue raised on appeal is that 18 U.S.C.2 § 922(g)(8) violates

his rights pursuant to the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution.

As we conclude this issue is not properly before this Court, we do not reach the

merits of Adel’s contention.

                 Adel asserts the DVO expressly relied on 18 U.S.C. § 922 (2022),3 a

federal criminal statute, to restrict his right to possess a firearm; however, this is

1
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
2
    United States Code.
3
    18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8) instructs it is unlawful for a person who is subject to an order that:

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incorrect. Though the approved AOC-275.3 form DVO includes two general

warnings that a respondent’s possession of a firearm while the order is in effect

may constitute a federal violation and could result in penalties federally, the court

did not apply the disputed statute. Plainly, Adel was not charged with or convicted

of violating federal law. Further, pursuant to KRS 403.740(1)(c), a court may

issue a DVO “[d]irecting or prohibiting any other actions that [it] believes will be

of assistance in eliminating future acts of domestic violence and abuse[,]” and this

               (A) was issued after a hearing of which such person received
               actual notice, and at which such person had an opportunity to
               participate;

               (B) restrains such person from harassing, stalking, or threatening
               an intimate partner of such person or child of such intimate partner
               or person, or engaging in other conduct that would place an
               intimate partner in reasonable fear of bodily injury to the partner or
               child; and

               (C)(i) includes a finding that such person represents a credible
               threat to the physical safety of such intimate partner or child; or

               (ii) by its terms explicitly prohibits the use, attempted use, or
               threatened use of physical force against such intimate partner or
               child that would reasonably be expected to cause bodily injury[,]

               ...

               to ship or transport in interstate or foreign commerce, or possess in
               or affecting commerce, any firearm or ammunition; or to receive
               any firearm or ammunition which has been shipped or transported
               in interstate or foreign commerce.

Violators “shall be fined[,] imprisoned for not more than 15 years, or both.” 18 U.S.C. §
924(a)(8).

There is no equivalent Kentucky statute.

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Court has previously opined that this general authorization is sufficiently broad to

include restraining a respondent from possessing firearms. See Boyle v. Boyle, No.

2013-CA-000416-ME, 2014 WL 7205670 (Ky. App. Dec. 19, 2014).

              As the court did not rely on 18 U.S.C. § 922 for its entry of the terms

of the DVO, Adel’s constitutional claim arising thereunder is not ripe for our

review, and consequently, we are precluded from ruling on the merits thereof. See

Berger Family Real Estate, LLC v. City of Covington, 464 S.W.3d 160, 166 (Ky.

App. 2015).

                                  CONCLUSION

              Therefore, and for the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Fayette

Circuit Court is AFFIRMED.

              ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                       NO APPELLEE BRIEF FILED.

David R. Marshall
Lexington, Kentucky

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