Court Opinion

ID: 9950730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-14 17:03:51.07898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:36:16.284708
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/24 Adams v. Easley CA1/1
                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

          IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                   DIVISION ONE

 TYRONE L. ADAMS,                                                       A165441
             Plaintiff and Appellant,
                                                                      (San Francisco City
 v.                                                                & County
 CHARLES L. EASLEY et al.,                                            Super. Ct. No. CGC-
                                                                   11-512166)
             Defendants and Respondents.

                                       MEMORANDUM OPINION1
         Plaintiff and appellant Tyrone L. Adams has filed a 187-page opening
brief and a 220-page closing brief. Both are largely incomprehensible and
egregiously violate the California Rules of Court pertaining to civil appeals.
         For example, his opening brief commences with a 55-page “Table of
Contents,” which consists of a litany of points, under separate Roman
Numerals, each with a heading that commences with the statement the
“Standard of Review is De Novo Review.” (Some capitalization &
underscoring omitted.) The text under these headings consists largely of
multiple pages of string-cited cases. Sporadically interspersed within these
pages of string cites are assertions (usually a single sentence) that the trial

       This appeal is appropriately resolved by memorandum opinion in
         1

accordance with California Standards of Judicial Administration, section 8.1.

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court erred in some regard. None of these assertions of error is supported by
a citation to the record. At the end of a few (a very few) of these roman
numbered points there are blocks of record citations. For example, the
following block of record citations appears at the end of the first roman
numbered point in his opening brief: “See, AA, Vol. 8, p. 2008– p. 2025;
p. 2026– p. 2060; p. 2061–p. 2068; p. 2069– p. 2084; p. 2085– p. 2096;
p. 2097– p. 2106; p. 2107– p. 2108; p. 2109– p. 2116; p. 2117– p. 2133;
p. 2134– 2143; p. 2144– p. 2156; p. 2157– p. 2171; p. 2172– p. 2200; p. 2201–
p. 2209; p. 2210– p. 2225; p. 2226– p. 2229; p. 2230– p. 2251; p. 2252–p. 2275;
p. 2276– 2290; p. 2291– p. 2294; p. 2295– p. 2306; p. 2307– p. 2317; p. 2318–
p. 2342; p. 2343– p. 2360.” In other words, Adams provides what is
effectively a single citation to the record, namely pages 2008 to 2360 of the
appellant’s appendix. He follows this same approach in the “Statement of
Facts” in his opening brief, providing no record citations in support of any
sentence therein and a block of record citations at the end of the section.
(Some capitalization omitted.) This block of record citations is effectively
three citations—one to pages 2361–2537 of volume 10 of the appendix, one to
pages 1786–2948 of volume 8, and one to pages 2660–2948 of volume 11.
Adams’ closing brief is the same, no record citations within arguments,
themselves, and at the end of a few sections of the brief, a block of record
citations.
      “Rule 8.204(a)(1)(C) of the California Rules of Court requires all
appellate briefs to ‘[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a
citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter
appears.’ It is well established that ‘ “[i]f a party fails to support an
argument with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the argument [will
be] deemed to have been waived. [Citation.]” ’ [Citation.] This rule applies

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to matters referenced at any point in the brief, not just in the statement of
facts.” (Conservatorship of Kevin A. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1253;
accord, Shenouda v. Veterinary Medical Bd. (2018) 27 Cal.App.5th 500, 514
[“ ‘ “The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own
seeking error.” [Citation.] Thus, “[i]f a party fails to support an argument
with the necessary citations to the record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed
to have been waived” ’ ” (quoting Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229,
1246)].)
      Even if some sections of an appellate brief contain citations to the
record, those sections “do not cure the failure to cite evidence in [other
sections] of the brief. . . . To provide record citations for alleged facts at some
points in a brief, but not at others, frustrates the purpose of that rule, and
courts will decline to consider any factual assertion unsupported by record
citation at the point where it is asserted.” (Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund
Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 590, fn. 8, citing City of Lincoln v.
Barringer (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 1211, 1239, fn. 16.) Likewise, blocks of
record citations are of no assistance to the court and do not comply with the
applicable rules. (See Nazari v. Ayrapetyan (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 690, 694,
fn. 1 [a “single citation to a reporter’s transcript with block page references,
for example, ‘RT Vol 6, 2480–2501,’ frustrates [a] court’s ability to evaluate
which facts a party believes support his position” (italics omitted)].)
      These rules apply equally to parties represented by counsel and parties,
like Adams, who represent themselves on appeal. (See Burkes v. Robertson
(2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 334, 344–345 [“The same burdens are imposed
uniformly and equally on all appellants, and self-represented parties are
‘ “held to the same restrictive procedural rules as an attorney.” ’ ”]; Elena S.
v. Kroutik (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 570, 574 [“A self-represented party is to be

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treated like any other party and is entitled to the same, but no greater,
consideration than other litigants having attorneys.”].)
      Adams’ failure to provide appropriate citations to the record makes it
impossible for us to fully understand, much less assess, his arguments on
appeal. We therefore must base our understanding of the appeal on the
respondents’ brief which does comply with the rules of court and supplies
appropriate citations to the record.
      According to respondents, the instant action follows a “nearly identical”
civil action Adams filed against them in Sutter County Superior Court in
which they obtained summary judgment in 2013, and which judgment was
affirmed by the Third District Court of Appeal in 2015. Adams filed the
Sutter County civil action after he was denied “victim” restitution in 2013 in
a Sutter County criminal case that apparently was precipitated by
complaints Adams made to authorities about shoddy construction of a
residence he leased in 2009. The criminal case was resolved by way of a
negotiated disposition that resulted in an infraction judgment. In short, the
instant San Francisco Superior Court civil case is a second effort by Adams to
obtain the restitutionary damages he claims he was wrongfully denied more
than a decade ago in the Sutter County criminal case.
      Besides urging us to dismiss Adams’ appeal for failure to comply with
the California Rules of Court, respondents make two points: (1) Adams has
not appealed from any appealable order, and (2) the trial court properly
denied his motion to vacate because the court did not err in sustaining their
demurrer without leave to amend on the ground the judgment in the Sutter
County civil case bars the instant civil case under the doctrine of res judicata.

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      We agree the state of Adams’ briefing, alone, would warrant dismissal
of his appeal. However, even in light of Adams’ deficient briefing, it is readily
apparent his appeal is also procedurally defective.
      In his amended notice of appeal filed July 1, 2022, Adams identified the
following as the rulings being challenged on appeal: (1) “Order Denying
Tyrone Adams’ Motion For Restitution And Damages” entered by the Sutter
County Superior Court in Criminal Case No. CRM 10-2267 on November 22,
2013; (2) “Order After Hearing Sustaining Defendant’s Charles L. Easley,
Charleen Goodrich, Jack Bass, George Trefcer, Andrew Paulson, Pensco
Trust Company, Pensco, Inc., Chris Radich, Cynthia Weaver, Kelly
Rodriques, Tom Anderson, Homepointe Property Management, Robert
Machado, Ann Ford (erroneously sued as Ann Fisher) and Eileen Stearman
Demurrer Without Leave To Amend” entered by the San Francisco Superior
Court in the instant case on August 25, 2020; and (3) A minute order stating
in pertinent part that Adams’ “Motion Requesting Relief From Judgment
Sustaining Defendants’ Demurrer . . . Is Denied,” and “Motion Requesting
Relief From Judgment Denying Victim Restitution Is Denied” entered by the
San Francisco Superior Court in the instant case on April 12, 2022. (Some
capitalization omitted.)
      Putting aside other issues inherent in Adams’ attempt to appeal from a
November 2013 order issued in a Sutter County criminal case and an August
2020 order filed in the instant civil action sustaining respondents’ demurrer
without leave to amend, his appeal as to these orders is untimely. Adams
filed his original notice of appeal on June 10, 2022—far beyond the outside
180-day deadline to appeal either ruling. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.104(a)(1)(C).) This deadline is jurisdictional; once it expires, an appellate
court loses power to consider the appeal. (Reyes v. Kruger (2020)

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55 Cal.App.5th 58, 70 [“Jurisdictional time limits for appealable orders may
not be extended by estoppel, consent, waiver, agreement or acquiescence.”];
Marshall v. Webster (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 275, 279 [time to appeal is
jurisdictional].)
      “If a notice of appeal is filed late, the reviewing court must dismiss the
appeal.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(b).) Thus, regardless of the state of
Adams’ briefing, we have no jurisdiction to consider his purported appeal
from either the 2013 order denying his motion for victim restitution or the
2020 order sustaining respondents’ demurrer without leave to amend.
      Adams’ appeal from the April 2022 minute order denying his motion to
vacate the 2020 order sustaining the respondents’ demurrer without leave to
amend and the 2013 Sutter County order denying him restitution was,
however, timely filed. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(a)(1) [60 days from
notice of entry].) Nevertheless, it is beset with another difficulty.
      An order denying a statutory motion to vacate will lie if the underlying
ruling being challenged was a final judgment or an independently appealable
order. An order denying a nonstatutory motion to vacate, in contrast, is
never appealable absent some other basis of appealability. (See generally
Eisenberg et al., Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Appeals & Writs (The Rutter
Group 2023) ¶ 2:174.)
      However, we need not address whether the order sustaining
respondents’ demurrer was tantamount to a final judgment of dismissal and
whether the order denying Adam’s request for victim restitution was an
independently appealable order. Even assuming a statutory motion to vacate
would lie as to both orders, the only statutory motion that may be used to
attack an assertedly “void” judgment or order—which Adams claims is the
root problem with the 2013 order in the Sutter County criminal case denying

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him victim restitution, the 2013 summary judgment in the Sutter County
civil case, and the 2020 order sustaining respondents’ demurrer in the
instant civil case (i.e., that they are all “void” and of no legal effect)—is a
motion made pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d).
And, indeed, this was the code section referenced by the trial court in its
minute order denying Adams’ motion to vacate.2
      However, there is a procedural bar to bringing a Code of Civil
Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) motion to vacate more than six months
after the rendition of the challenged final judgment or appealable order.
After six months, a final judgment or appealable order can only be attacked if
it is void on its face, which means the defect in the judgment or order must be
evident from the judgment roll, itself. (See Pittman v. Beck Park Apartments
Ltd. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 1009, 1021 [“An order is considered void on its
face only when the invalidity is apparent from an inspection of the judgment
roll or court record. . . . If the invalidity can be shown only through
consideration of extrinsic evidence, such as declarations or testimony, the
order is not void on its face. Such an order must be challenged within the six-
month time limit prescribed by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 473,
subdivision (b), or by an independent action in equity.”]; Cruz v. Fagor
America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 496 [“Once six months have
elapsed since the entry of a judgment, ‘a trial court may grant a motion to set
aside that judgment as void only if the judgment is void on its face’ ” (quoting
Dill v. Berquist Construction Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1441)].)

      2 In his moving papers in the trial court, Adams also cited to Code of
Civil Procedure section 663. As respondents point out, a party seeking relief
under that section must file a notice of intent to vacate within 15 days after
notice of entry of the challenged final judgment or independently appealable
order, which Adams never filed.

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        Moreover, “voidness” in this context does not mean the trial court
committed a legal error in the challenged ruling; rather, it means the court
lacked fundamental adjudicatory authority to render the ruling. “ ‘ “A
judgment is void on its face if the court which rendered the judgment lacked
personal or subject matter jurisdiction or exceeded its jurisdiction in granting
relief which the court had no power to grant.” ’ ” (People v. Amaya (2015)
239 Cal.App.4th 379, 386, quoting Carr v. Kamins (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th
929, 933; see People v. American Contractors Indemnity Co. (2004) 33 Cal.4th
653, 660 [“When a court lacks jurisdiction in a fundamental sense, an
ensuing judgment is void, and ‘thus vulnerable to direct or collateral attack
at any time’ ” (quoting Barquis v. Merchants Collection Assn. (1972) 7 Cal.3d
94, 119)].)
        As we have discussed, Adams has not directed our attention to any
pertinent parts of the record on appeal, let alone to the judgment rolls
pertaining to the 2020 order in this case sustaining respondents’ demurrer
without leave to amend, the 2013 summary judgment in the Sutter County
civil case, or the 2013 order in the Sutter County criminal case denying his
claim for victim restitution. He has therefore failed to carry his burden on
appeal to establish one of the threshold requirements of a motion to vacate an
assertedly void final judgment or independently appealable order made more
than six months after rendition of the challenged ruling, namely that the
pertinent judgment roll demonstrates the judgment or order is void on its
face.
        “[T]he most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment [or
order] challenged on appeal is presumed to be correct,” and “it is the
appellant’s burden to affirmatively demonstrate error.” (People v. Sanghera
(2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) Adams has not done so.

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                               DISPOSITION
      To the extent Adams has purported to appeal from the August 2020
order in this case sustaining respondents’ demurrer without leave to amend
and the November 2013 order issued in the Sutter County criminal case
denying his claim for victim restitution, his appeal is untimely and is
therefore DISMISSED for lack of appellate jurisdiction. To the extent he has
appealed from the trial court’s April 2022 minute order denying his motion to
vacate the August 2020 order and November 2013 order, the order is
AFFIRMED. Respondents to recover costs on appeal.

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                                       _________________________
                                       Banke, J.

We concur:

_________________________
Humes, P. J.

_________________________
Langhorne Wilson, J.

A165441, Adams v. Easley et al.

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