Court Opinion

ID: 9693216
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 16:30:35.659293+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:42.836776
License: Public Domain

O’HERN, J.,
concurring.
I agree that the Tort Claims Act (TCA), N.J.S.A. 59:1-1 to 13-10, should govern the liability of a municipality that owns a public sidewalk. I disagree that the owner of a residential sidewalk, who is under governmental regulation to maintain the sidewalk, may sue a public body that neither owns nor maintains the sidewalk. Such a holding is as logical as it would be were plaintiff able to sue herself. Under our law, an abutting landowner’s “ ‘title [ ] goes to the middle of the street and [landowners] continue to retain considerable interest in and control over that portion of the sidewalk located on their land.’ ” Christmas v. City of Newark, 216 N.J.Super. 393, 400, 523 A.2d 1094 (App.Div.1987), certif. denied, 108 N.J. 193, 528 A.2d 19 (1987) (quoting Yanhko v. Fane, 70 N.J. 528, 540, 362 A.2d 1 (1976)). The public is merely afforded an easement of passage over sidewalks. Ibid. Angela Norris was injured by a defect in the curb situated in front of her own home. Thus, the incident occurred on her own property. The majority’s .finding that the sidewalk in question is public property subject to municipal liability is based on a finding that the municipality placed a cone at the site after the accident. That should not be enough to establish municipal ownership or control.
I.
Before liability under N.J.S.A. 59:4-2 can be imposed on a municipality for injuries sustained due to a property’s condition, that property must be deemed public. Christmas, supra, 216 N.J.Super. at 397, 523 A.2d 1094; Farias v. Township of Westfield, 297 N.J.Super. 395, 403, 688 A.2d 151 (App.Div.1997). There is “[n]othing in the legislative history [of the TCA] suggesting] *450that a public entity is liable for injuries sustained by virtue of a dangerous condition existing on the property of another.” Farias, supra, 297 N.J.Super. at 403, 688 A.2d 151 (quoting Ball v. New Jersey Bell Telephone Co., 207 N.J.Super. 100, 107, 504 A.2d 29 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 104 N.J. 383, 517 A.2d 391 (1986)). Public property is defined under N.J.S.A. 59:4-lc as “real or personal property owned or controlled by the public entity, but does not include easements, encroachments and other property that are located on the property of the public entity but are not owned or controlled by the public entity.” In order for the Court to impose liability on a municipality under the TCA for injuries sustained on a particular sidewalk, it must first establish that the sidewalk was either “owned or controlled” by the municipality.
“Indeed, property ‘controlled’ does not simply mean any property falling within the geographical boundaries of a municipality.” Christmas, supra, 216 N.J.Super. at 398, 523 A.2d 1094 (citing Brothers v. Borough of Highlands, 178 N.J.Super. 146, 150, 428 A.2d 528 (App.Div.1981); N.J.S.A 59:4-1). The imposition of liability under the TCA requires a showing of more than mere “incidental acts” of control by the public entity over the property. Farias, supra, 297 N.J.Super. at 403, 688 A.2d 151 (holding that removal of snow and placement of trash cans in area did not support assertion of control of public entity over sidewalk warranting liability); see also Christmas, supra, 216 N.J.Super. at 398-99, 523 A.2d 1094 (holding that sidewalk abutting commercial property, because of landlord’s maintenance and repair obligations, did not constitute public property within municipal control for which municipality is liable); Straus v. Borough of Chatham, 316 N.J.Super. 26, 719 A.2d 664 (App.Div.1998) (holding that requirement of repair permit for sidewalk did not transfer liability of commercial landowner to municipality); Tierney v. Gilde, 235 N.J.Super. 61, 65, 561 A.2d 638 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 117 N.J. 666, 569 A.2d 1357 (1989) (holding that shade tree commission ordinance evidenced enough control to impose liability on municipality “for injuries stemming from defective sidewalks caused by shade tree roots”). Before liability can be imposed on a public *451entity, there must be sufficient evidence to establish that the public entity either controlled or owned the property in question.
II.
In Yanhko, supra, the Court reaffirmed the common-law rule that a property owner is not liable for injuries sustained as a result of the natural deterioration of a sidewalk. 70 N.J. at 532, 362 A.2d 1. Since its holding in Yanhko twenty-three years ago, this Court has recognized only one exception imposing liability on commercial landowners for injuries sustained on a sidewalk not maintained in reasonably good condition. Stewart v. 104 Wallace Street, Inc., 87 N.J. 146, 152, 432 A.2d 881 (1981). The Court in Stewart expressly stated that this exception to Yanhko “is confined to owners of commercial property.” Id. at 159, 432 A.2d 881 (emphasis added); Brown v. St. Venantius School, 111 N.J. 325, 329, 544 A.2d 842 (1988); Christmas, supra, 216 N.J.Super. at 400, 523 A.2d 1094. The Appellate Division in Christmas emphasized that it was
satisfied that the Stewart Court clearly stated its intention to place the liability for negligence on commercial property owners____ Thus we do not interpret the [C]ourt’s holding in Stewart to mean that liability is shared by municipalities and commercial landowners but rather, the duty to maintain sidewalks is limited solely to owners of commercial property.
[ 216 N.J.Super. at 400, 523 A.2d 1094.]
The basis for the commercial-landowner exception is “expressly tied to the use and benefit derived from the sidewalk by the owner of the abutting ‘premises.’ ” Hollus v. Amtrack Northeast Corridor, 937 F.Supp. 1110, 1115 (D.N.J.1996) aff'd, 118 F.3d 1575 (3d Cir.1997) (citing Stewart, supra, 87 N.J. at 158, 432 A.2d 881). Stewart emphasized that the commercial-landowner exception to non-liability for the maintenance of sidewalks was because commercial landowners
retained] considerable interest in and rights to the use of the abutting sidewalks, including the right to prevent obstruction of the public’s view of the commercial property from the sidewalk, use of the sidewalk for “stoops ... and other domestic or trade conveniences” and the benefit of the sidewalk providing commercial *452owners with “easy access to their premises.... ” ... [And] sidewalks “increase the value of commercial property.”
[Chimiente v. Adam Corp., 221 N.J.Super. 580, 583, 535 A.2d 528 (App.Div.1987) (quoting Stewart, supra, 87 N.J. at 151-52, 432 A.2d 881).]
Angela Norris is suing the Borough for injuries that she sustained due to the deterioration of the curb situated in front of her own home. Unlike the commercial benefit that a sidewalk affords a proprietor, there is no benefit afforded to a municipality warranting a similar duty. Sims v. City of Newark, 244 N.J.Super. 32, 40, 581 A.2d 524 (Law Div.1990); Christmas, supra, 216 N.J.Super. at 396, 523 A.2d 1094.
The majority of municipalities “have within their bounds miles of sidewalks,” and it would be inconsistent with the Act to hold a municipality liable for injuries that result from the natural deterioration of those sidewalks. Christmas, supra, 216 N.J.Super. at 396, 523 A.2d 1094; Sims, supra, 244 N.J.Super. at 40, 581 A.2d 524. In enacting the TCA in 1972, the Legislature
recognized that while an entrepreneur may readily be held liable for negligence within the chosen ambit of his activity, the area in which government has the power to act for the public good is almost without limit and therefore the government should not have the duty to do everything that might need to be done.
[Christmas, supra, 216 N.J.Super. at 396, 523 A.2d 1094 (citing N.J.S.A 59:1-2).]
I might be willing to make the distinction that the majority makes between a sidewalk and a curb. Ante at 445-47, 734 A.2d at 772-73; see Levin v. Devoe, 221 N.J.Super. 61, 65, 533 A.2d 977 (App.Div.1987); MacGrath v. Levin Properties, 256 N.J.Super. 247, 252, 606 A.2d 1108 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 130 N.J. 19, 611 A.2d 656 (1992). On balance, I believe that the distinction would lead to too many disputes about where the sidewalk ends and the curb begins. What I cannot accept, however, is a holding that a municipality is generally hable for the condition of residential sidewalks. Although the Court has not held municipalities generally hable, it has allowed the property here to be “deemed public” on too slight a basis.
Justice GARIBALDI joins this opinion.