Court Opinion

ID: 9632486
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:16:38.096889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:17.304208
License: Public Domain

SEA WELL, J., Dissenting.
I dissent.
I am of the view that the decision rendered by the District Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, Nourse, P. J., correctly states the law of the case and it cannot in principle be distinguished from Brown v. Shortlidge, 98 Cal. App. 352 [277 Pac. 134], Ales v. Ryan, 8 Cal. (2d) 82 [64 Cal. (2d) 409], Thomsen v. Burgeson, 26 Cal. App. (2d) 235 [79 Pac. (2d) 136], and Armstrong v. Wallace, 8 Cal. App. (2d) 429 [47 Pac. (2d) 740], and a number of the decisions of this court where the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been considered in its relation to kindred situations. The doctrine is not novel in its application to cases of this kind. It is applied in cases in which the person is charged with negligence by reason of his superior knowledge and exclusive control of the agency which caused the injury. All that the law requires, is that the defendant charged with negligence rebut the presumption of negligence by giving a reasonable explanation of the cause of injury. The application of the doctrine should not be arbitrarily limited to certain fields and extended to others when there is no good reason for making a distinction. It is difficult to understand why the cases cited herein can be regarded as stating the true principle if the doctrine, in the instant case, is sound.