Court Opinion

ID: 9966295
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-06 17:03:54.423591+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:41.053030
License: Public Domain

The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado
                 2 East 14th Avenue • Denver, Colorado 80203

                                 2024 CO 24

                        Supreme Court Case No. 23SA167
                    Original Proceeding Pursuant to C.A.R. 21
        District Court, City and County of Denver, Case No. 22DR30403
                     Honorable Christine C. Antoun, Judge

                            In re the Marriage of

                                 Petitioner:

                         Barbara Henderson Green,

                                     and

                                Respondent:

                            Jeffry Howard Green.

                            Rule Made Absolute
                                  en banc
                                May 6, 2024

Attorneys for Barbara Henderson Green:
Epstein Patierno, LLP
Steven B. Epstein
      Denver, Colorado

Fox Rothschild LLP
Marsha M. Piccone
Risa B. Brown
      Denver, Colorado

Attorneys for Jeffry Howard Green:
Stahly Mehrtens LLC
Todd A. Stahly
J.P. Prentiss
       Denver, Colorado

CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD, JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART,
JUSTICE SAMOUR, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER joined.

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CHIEF JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1    In this dissolution of marriage case, Jeffry Howard Green appeals the trial

court’s ruling that he is subject to general personal jurisdiction in Colorado. We

hold that for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over an individual,

the individual must be domiciled within the state. Because Mr. Green is not

domiciled in Colorado, he is not subject to general personal jurisdiction here.1

Therefore, we make our rule to show cause absolute and remand for further

proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                       I. Facts and Procedural History

¶2    In 1982, Barbara and Jeffry Green were married in Connecticut. They had

three children and resided together in Nebraska for more than half of their

forty-year marriage.   In 2018, Mrs. Green moved to Colorado to assist their

youngest daughter during her pregnancy while Mr. Green continued to reside in

Nebraska.    To support this endeavor, the Greens purchased two houses in

Denver—one for themselves (“House A”), and one for their daughter and her

husband (“House B”).        From Nebraska, Mr. Green financially supported

Mrs. Green. After the Greens bought House B, they added their daughter and her

husband to the title in exchange for a portion of the list price. However, Mr. Green

1 The trial court determined that it did not have specific jurisdiction over Mr.

Green; we don’t address that issue.

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continued to list House B as an asset on his personal financial statements. The

Greens also own a third house in the Denver area (“House C”), purchased in 2015,

which has served as an investment property and an occasional home for

their children.

¶3    In 2021, Mr. Green took out a loan that was secured by a mortgage on

House A. On the loan application, Mr. Green stated that his home in Nebraska

was his former residence and that House A was his primary residence. Mr. Green

also indicated on the loan application that he was self-employed and listed

House A as his address of employment. Despite these representations, Mr. Green

continued to reside in Nebraska and never moved to Colorado.

¶4    Between 2018 and 2022, Mr. Green occasionally visited Colorado to see his

family and to attend to other matters, though he had no substantial business

interests here beyond the three real estate holdings. The handful of times he was

in Colorado during 2018 and 2019, Mr. Green stayed with Mrs. Green at House A.

Beginning in 2020, Mr. Green stayed with his youngest daughter and her family at

House B when visiting.

¶5    On April 25, 2022, both Mr. and Mrs. Green filed for divorce, albeit in

separate jurisdictions—Mrs. Green in Colorado, and Mr. Green in Nebraska.

Mr. Green moved to dismiss the Colorado case for lack of personal jurisdiction,

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arguing that he is not “at home” in Colorado. The Nebraska court stayed its

proceeding pending the Colorado court’s resolution of the jurisdictional challenge.

¶6    After a hearing on the merits of the jurisdictional challenge, the Colorado

trial court found that Mr. Green “engages in the requisite minimum contacts” to

be subject to general personal jurisdiction here.2 Specifically, the trial court’s

decision relied heavily on Mr. Green’s assertion that House A was his primary

residence when he applied for a loan to acquire property in the state, a

representation he made to secure more favorable terms. The court concluded that

Mr. Green’s continuing financial obligations in Colorado meant that he could

reasonably anticipate being haled into court here, and thus it denied his motion

to dismiss.

¶7    Mr. Green petitioned us to exercise our original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21,

and we issued a rule to show cause why the trial court didn’t err in denying his

motion to dismiss. Furthermore, we directed the parties to address:

      [H]ow the question of personal jurisdiction is to be determined in a
      dissolution of marriage proceeding when the parties are domiciled in
      different states, such that each party could potentially argue a lack of
      general personal jurisdiction if the proceeding is filed in the state in
      which the other party is domiciled.

2 The trial court found that it lacked specific jurisdiction over Mr. Green because

the litigation did not arise out of his forum-related contacts.

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                           II. Original Jurisdiction

¶8    The exercise of our original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 is an extraordinary

remedy limited “both in its purpose and availability” and rests within our sole

discretion. People v. Tafoya, 2019 CO 13, ¶ 13, 434 P.3d 1193, 1195. We generally

exercise our jurisdiction when an appellate remedy would be inadequate, a party

would suffer irreparable harm, or the petition raises issues of first impression that

are of significant public importance. People v. Kilgore, 2020 CO 6, ¶ 8, 455 P.3d 746,

748; Magill v. Ford Motor Co., 2016 CO 57, ¶ 9, 379 P.3d 1033, 1036. We may elect

to hear challenges to the exercise of personal jurisdiction over out-of-state parties

because they “raise[] the question [of] whether it is unfair to force such a party to

defend here at all.” Keefe v. Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, P.C., 40 P.3d 1267, 1270

(Colo. 2002).

¶9    We exercise jurisdiction here for two reasons. First, this case presents an

important and novel question concerning how the concept of general personal

jurisdiction applies to individuals in Colorado. Our ruling in Magill clarified the

scope of general personal jurisdiction over nonresident corporate defendants, but

we have yet to face a similar question regarding individuals.

¶10   Second, this case presents an important question regarding where personal

jurisdiction applies when divorcing parties are domiciled in different states. No

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relevant Colorado or Supreme Court case directly addresses this particular issue.

As such, we find it necessary to provide guidance.

                                   III. Analysis

¶11   First, we set forth the relevant standard of review. Then, we take a detailed

look at the law of general personal jurisdiction as it applies to both corporations

and individuals. Finally, we conclude that the trial court lacks general personal

jurisdiction over Mr. Green because he is not domiciled in Colorado.

                             A. Standard of Review

¶12   Whether a court may exercise general personal jurisdiction over a

nonresident defendant is a question of law, which we review de novo. Magill,

¶ 11, 379 P.3d at 1036. We also review de novo whether Mrs. Green established

the prima facie case necessary to show jurisdiction and defeat Mr. Green’s

C.R.C.P. 12(b)(2) motion. Archangel Diamond Corp. v. Lukoil, 123 P.3d 1187, 1192

(Colo. 2005).

                       B. General Personal Jurisdiction

¶13   Colorado’s long-arm statute confers “the maximum jurisdiction permitted

by the due process clause of the United States and Colorado constitutions.”

Archangel, 123 P.3d at 1193 (citing Keefe, 40 P.3d at 1270); see also § 13-1-124, C.R.S.

(2023).   Accordingly, to determine whether Colorado has jurisdiction over a

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nonresident defendant, courts engage in a constitutional due process analysis.

Magill, ¶ 14, 379 P.3d at 1037.

¶14   To determine whether an exercise of jurisdiction is consistent with due

process, courts apply the “minimum contacts” test set forth in International Shoe

Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 207

(1977). States may exercise personal jurisdiction if nonresident defendants have

“certain minimum contacts . . . such that the maintenance of the suit does not

offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S.

at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). “The quantity and

nature of the minimum contacts required depends on whether the plaintiff alleges

specific or general jurisdiction.” Archangel, 123 P.3d at 1194.

¶15   As noted earlier, this case solely concerns the exercise of general personal

jurisdiction over an individual. General personal jurisdiction, often referred to as

“all-purpose” jurisdiction, allows a court to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant

for any claim or cause of action arising from any of a defendant’s activities, even

if they didn’t occur in the forum state. Magill, ¶ 16, 379 P.3d at 1037. However,

“only a limited set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable

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to all-purpose jurisdiction” in a particular forum. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.

117, 137 (2014).3

¶16   We have held that a state may exercise general personal jurisdiction over a

nonresident corporate defendant where the corporation is “at home.” Magill, ¶ 22,

379 P.3d at 1039; see also Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S.

915, 924 (2011) (holding that the paradigmatic forum for corporate defendants is

where the corporation is “fairly regarded as at home”).          This interpretation

guarantees that there is at least one forum to file any suit against a corporation.

Magill, ¶ 16, 379 P.3d at 1037. In addition, states may exercise general personal

jurisdiction over nonresident corporations which have contacts that are so

“‘continuous and systematic’ as to render them essentially at home in the forum

state.” Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 919. However, this standard is applied strictly, and a

nonresident corporate defendant’s contacts rarely justify the exercise of general

jurisdiction. Daimler, 571 U.S. at 132–33; Magill, ¶ 17, 379 P.3d at 1037.

¶17   Unique here, the case before us concerns the exercise of general personal

jurisdiction over an individual. We have never directly addressed this particular

question, but the Supreme Court has suggested that the inquiry for general

3 This is a distinct inquiry from that of specific jurisdiction, which applies when

the suit “aris[es] out of or relate[s] to the defendant’s contacts with the forum.”
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984).

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personal jurisdiction over an individual begins and ends with domicile. Goodyear,

564 U.S. at 924 (noting that “[f]or an individual, the paradigm forum for the

exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile”).4

¶18   Mrs. Green argues that the correct test for the exercise of general personal

jurisdiction should center on what she deems a “due process analysis.”

Mrs. Green characterizes this analysis as requiring a court to determine if a party

has established the requisite minimum contacts with a forum such that they could

anticipate being haled into court there. True enough, but she doesn’t indicate how

a court should make this determination; instead, she simply repeats the

overarching due process test. Thus, Mrs. Green argues that Colorado courts have

personal jurisdiction over Mr. Green without detailing exactly how that

jurisdiction attaches. We are not persuaded.

¶19   Instead, we hold that for a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction

over an individual, the individual must be domiciled within the state. We decline

to apply the Magill framework for corporations to individuals, preferring to keep

4 This idea evolved from Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 610

n.1 (1990), when the Court first proposed that the rule permitting the exercise of
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants by virtue of their continuous and
systematic contacts with the forum was likely only applicable to corporations.
See id. (“It may be that whatever special rule exists permitting ‘continuous and
systematic’     contacts . . . to support    jurisdiction . . . applies only    to
corporations . . . .”).

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them on separate jurisdictional playing fields.        At its core, general personal

jurisdiction is predicated on a direct relationship between the defendant and the

forum. And at a basic level, domicile creates a symbiotic relationship between

citizens and states, wherein citizens are afforded benefits and protections in

exchange for a state’s exercise of judicial and regulatory authority. See Milliken,

311 U.S. at 463–64 (reviewing the relationship that domicile creates between

citizens and states). Domicile is thus a unique affiliation with a forum that

inherently creates a fundamental basis for jurisdiction. And because domicile is

both direct and easily ascertainable, using it as a jurisdictional touchstone provides

clarity for litigants, empowers courts to compel appearances and enforce

judgments, and strengthens the reciprocal relationship between citizens and

states. See Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 Tex. L. Rev.

721, 728–33 (1988) (discussing domicile as the strongest basis for general personal

jurisdiction over individuals). Consequently, for a Colorado court to exert general

personal jurisdiction over an individual, the individual must be domiciled here,

full stop.

¶20    Applying our holding to this case, we conclude that the trial court lacks

general personal jurisdiction over Mr. Green because he isn’t domiciled here. In

Colorado, domicile is the place one actually resides and intends to remain

permanently or for an indefinite amount of time. See In re Marriage of Akins,

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932 P.2d 863, 868 (Colo. App. 1997). Once established in one place, a person

remains domiciled there until they clearly show intent to establish domicile

elsewhere. Lyons v. Egan, 132 P.2d 794, 798 (Colo. 1942). In this case, both parties

agree that Mr. Green has remained a Nebraska resident and has never resided in

Colorado. Even though Mr. Green owns several houses in the state, real estate

ownership doesn’t automatically equate to domicile, so financial obligations

related to Houses A, B, and C do not mean that Mr. Green is domiciled here. And

while we certainly do not condone Mr. Green’s misrepresentation of his domicile

to secure a favorable loan, this act alone does not make him a resident of the state

of Colorado. Accordingly, Mr. Green is not domiciled here, and thus is not subject

to general personal jurisdiction in Colorado.

¶21   In our rule to show cause, we asked the parties to address how general

personal jurisdiction is to be determined where parties seeking dissolution of a

marriage are domiciled in different states. We recognize that in such a scenario,

our holding could preclude both courts from exercising general personal

jurisdiction over the respective non-domiciled party (assuming both fora use the

domicile rule).   In our review, we found no straightforward answer to this

important question. However, this does not leave litigants without recourse.

¶22   There are four ways for a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over parties:

(1) general jurisdiction; (2) specific jurisdiction; (3) when service of process occurs

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within the boundaries of the forum state (often called “tag” jurisdiction); and

(4) when a party consents to the jurisdiction of the court. See Mallory v. Norfolk S.

Ry. Co., 600 U.S. 122, 128–40 (2023) (discussing the various personal jurisdiction

avenues available to courts). If general jurisdiction is not available, courts may

still be able to hear a dissolution of marriage proceeding through other

jurisdictional tools.5

                                IV. Conclusion

¶23   For a court to exercise general personal jurisdiction over an individual, the

individual must be domiciled within the state. In this case, Mr. Green is not

domiciled in Colorado, so he is not subject to general personal jurisdiction here.

For the foregoing reasons, we make the rule to show cause absolute and remand

for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

5 In rem jurisdiction—including in marital res—is not at issue here, and we decline

to address it. See In re Marriage of Lohman, 2015 COA 134, ¶ 29 n.7, 361 P.3d 1110,
1116 n.7 (discussing the different “jurisdictional requirements for the entry of a
decree of divorce (or dissolution of marriage under Colorado law) [versus
jurisdictional requirements for] the entry of financial orders associated with the
marriage”).

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