Court Opinion

ID: 9484299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:47:47.4329+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:50:09.130481
License: Public Domain

ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I join that portion of Judge Posner’s opinion that finds the evidence of a Lechuga-Pagan conspiracy sufficient to support Le-chuga’s conviction. Like Judge Flaum, I believe such a result properly defers to the jury’s determination of guilt. Although I agree that Lechuga’s conviction should be affirmed on this alternative ground, I am not entirely comfortable with the majority’s discussion of the primary issue presented in this appeal — the existence of a conspiracy between Lechuga and Pinto. I agree with the majority that the evidence is insufficient to establish a Lechuga-Pinto conspiracy because a conspiracy conviction cannot be sustained solely on the basis of a single large quantity sale. Yet, I find that the majority offers little practical guidance as to the additional evidence that would be required to support the inference of an agreement to distribute. The majority’s proposed standard — “proof of an agreement to commit a crime other than the crime that consists of the sale itself’ (Majority Op. at 347) — seems to me self evident, but it ultimately is of limited utility in considering the facts necessary to infer an agreement to distribute. (See Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, at 364 n. 9.) I find Judge Cudahy’s opinion more helpful in defining the types of evidence that would permit such an inference (see id. at 363-64), and I therefore join that portion of Judge Cudahy’s discussion.