Court Opinion

ID: 9857170
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 13:52:41.548262+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:05.438963
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
dissenting.
If ever there was a case involving harmless error, this is it. Even if the trial court erred when it prevented defendant from making an offer of proof about Kopp’s prior arrest record and when it limited questioning regarding other controlled drug buys that the police were involved in, the record shows that defendant was allowed ample opportunity to ask questions and elicit testimony to establish his theories of bias and mistaken identity. Furthermore, any error was also harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of defendant’s guilt.
Although defendant was not allowed to ask Kopp whether he had ever been arrested, he was allowed to ask Kopp whether he had ever “received any favorable treatment from any arrests.” He was also allowed to ask questions “regarding [Kopp’s] past, or crimes, drug use, whether or not he was under the influence on that particular day.” Therefore, although the court prohibited defendant from asking one question about Kopp’s arrest record, it allowed a plethora of other questions about closely related matters that, depending on Kopp’s answers, might have allowed the jury to infer that he was offering favorable testimony “in return for a deal.” However, defendant did not avail himself of that opportunity. On cross-examination, he asked no questions about Kopp’s motives, perhaps due to Kopp’s unimpeachable *291responses to the district attorney’s questions on direct examination: “[A]re you, yourself, involved in using drugs or controlled substances of any sort?” “[W]ere you [at the time of the buy] under the influence of any controlled substances?” “[H]ave you ever used controlled substances?” “When did you use marijuana?” “[W]ere you at any time given any * * * [non-pecuniary] benefit for your work; were you at all, let’s say, given any leniency in criminal matters or had parking tickets dismissed or anything of that nature?” (Emphasis supplied.) The information that defendant sought to elicit was provided on direct examination and, although defendant could have questioned Kopp about those matters on cross-examination, he chose not to. He should not be allowed to complain on appeal that he was somehow prejudiced by his own failure, especially where the jury was given ample opportunity to assess the credibility of the state’s witness. State v. Hubbard, 297 Or 789, 800, 688 P2d 1311 (1984).
Defendant also argues that the trial court erred in ‘ ‘refusing to allow’ ’ him to cross-examine Kopp and the police officers about other controlled drug buys that they were involved in when they purchased from defendant. However, in page after page, the record shows that defendant was given considerable latitude in that regard, and was allowed to question the state’s witnesses extensively. Although he was prevented from asking Kopp to describe the physical appearance and names of the other drug sellers, that did not inhibit defendant’s attempts to show that there was confusion regarding the identity of the various sellers and that the witnesses had mistaken him for another person who matched his description.
Defendant asked Kopp numerous questions, including the following:
“Mr. Kopp, were you involved in more than one drug transaction on the 13th of October?”
“How many were you involved in?”
“Where did that take place?”
“Who were the officers involved at that time?”
“How long did you work for the Woodburn Police Department on the drug investigation?”
*292“How many drug buys were you involved in at the time you worked for the Woodburn Police Department?”
“And were all of the drug buys in the same general vicinity?”
“[W]ere there other individuals around who indicated a willingness to sell cocaine to you?”
“Of the ten buys that you indicated that you were involved with, how many of them involved the same person more than once?”
“[Have] you looked at the photographs from any of the other drug buys to compare people?”
“Is it fair to say you can’t tell us from your own memory that this is, in fact, the person you bought from on October 13th as opposed to October 12th or October 9th or some other time you were making purchases for the Woodburn Police Department?”
“You can’t tell [defendant] from any of the other five people you bought drugs from?”
“How is he different from the other five?”
“Do you have an independent recollection of which transaction took place on October 13th, the one you say involved my client or the one you say involved the other individual?”
“So you don’t know which one happened at 3:00 o’clock and which one happened at 6:00 o’clock, is that correct?”
“And is it also possible that you could be mistaken as to who it is on this particular case based on your recollection of the voice?”
“When you testified earlier that the substances that have been shown to you looked really similar, can you, of your own independent recollection, tell us if .they are, in fact, items that you received from my client as opposed to one of these other individuals?”
Kopp’s answers to those questions allowed defendant to establish that other controlled buys were taking place in the same location,, that Kopp had difficulty recalling how many people he had bought drugs from, that he had no independent recollection of the various sellers, that there were a number of people around him when the transactions took place and that more than one of those people had indicated a willingness to sell him cocaine.
*293On cross-examination of Collins, defendant was allowed to ask about another alleged drug seller whose name appeared on defendant’s police report but was scratched out. By questioning Collins, defendant was able to show that both he and the other suspect were described as Hispanic, male, 5 foot 10 and 150 pounds. When defendant tried to ask Collins if another drug purchase had been conducted at the same location and at the same time as the buy that involved defendant, the court sustained the state’s objection. However, defendant was allowed to ask other questions that showed that, on the same date and at the same time, Collins had met with Kopp and a second undercover agent for the purpose of making controlled narcotics buys in downtown Woodburn.
In short, the record does not support defendant’s claim that the trial court “refused to allow” him to question the state’s witnesses about other controlled drug buys. Neither does it show an improper limitation on defendant’s attempts to show confusion regarding the identity of the various sellers. His questions were curtailed only when they were irrelevant or would have confused the jury. Moreover, the question about other drug purchases at the same location and on the same day had already been answered by two other witnesses and was largely cumulative. State v. Hubbard, supra, 297 Or at 800.
Finally, even if the trial court erred in disallowing defendant’s question and his offer of proof, I would hold that the errors were not harmful. Kopp and two officers testified that Kopp had been searched on two occasions and given money for a drug buy, had made contact with defendant, had exchanged items with him and had returned with a bindle of cocaine. Kopp was constantly under surveillance by the officers, was wearing a body wire and was photographed during the drug buys. Defendant is depicted in the photographs; at trial he was wearing the same coat that he wore during the buys. Defendant testified that, in the photographs, he is not selling cocaine to Kopp, but is merely loaning him a quarter to make a telephone call. However, that testimony is refuted by the body wire tape recording.
Although we must carefully scrutinize any instance in which a trial court prevents a defendant in a criminal case *294from making an offer of proof, the error in this case was minor and harmless; it does not warrant reversal. Accordingly, I dissent.
Buttler, Deits and Riggs, JJ., join in this dissent.