Court Opinion

ID: 9777741
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 20:22:14.007678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:33:00.556282
License: Public Domain

HILL, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent, because, under the totality of the circumstances, the action of the trial judge, in giving a supplemental instruction to encourage a unanimous verdict, when he knew that the jury was split 9-3 for conviction, was so inherently coercive as to deprive the appellant of his right to a fair and impartial jury trial as guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. United States v. Sae-Chua, 725 F.2d 530 (9th Cir.1984); Jones v. Norvell, 472 F.2d 1185 (6th Cir.1973); People v. Santiago, 108 Ill.App.3d 787, 64 Ill.Dec. 319, 439 N.E.2d 984 (1st Dist., 2nd Div. 1982).
The Supreme Court of California has stated that “[m]ost cases wherein adjurato-ry remarks of the court have been held coercive are those in which the court, either through its own questioning or through volunteered statements of jurors, has become informed not only as to the numerical division of the jury but also as to how many stand on each side of the ultimate issue of guilt_ The urging of agreement in such circumstances of course creates in the jury the impression that the court, which has also heard the testimony in the case, agrees with the majority of jurors. Coercion of the jurors in the minority clearly results.” People v. Carter, 68 Cal.2d 810, 69 Cal.Rptr. 297, 442 P.2d 353, 357 (1968).
The United States Supreme Court has held that even the inquiry as to the jury’s numerical split has a coercive tendency which affects the proper relations of the court to the jury, and that it is essential to the fair and impartial conduct of the trial that the inquiry by itself should be regarded as ground for reversal. Brasfield v. United States, 272 U.S. 448, 47 S.Ct. 135, 71 L.Ed. 345 (1926). However, as noted by the majority, most jurisdictions and most federal circuits have held that the rule in Brasfield is an administrative rule which is only applicable to federal courts, and is not applicable to the states through the Constitution. One of the cases cited by the majority is the case of U.S. ex rel. Kirk v. Director, Dept. of Correct., 678 F.2d 723 (7th Cir.1982), an opinion by the Seventh Circuit on Kirk’s application for writ of habeas corpus. The opinion by the Illinois Court of Appeals upon the affirmance of Kirk’s conviction argues that the reversal in Brasfield was probably not due to just the asking of the question, but was actually because of the combination of the circumstances of the inquiry as to jury division, coupled with an Allen charge. People v. Kirk, 76 Ill.App.3d 459, 31 Ill.Dec. 835, 394 N.E.2d 1212 (1st Dist., 4th Div.1979).
The majority cites two cases in which the conviction was affirmed although the judge had learned how the jury split and then had given the jury a supplemental instruction. These cases are Sanders v. United States, 415 F.2d 621 (5th Cir.1969) and United States v. Rao, 394 F.2d 354 (2nd Cir.1968). These cases are distinguishable from the case at bar in that neither case involved an inquiry by the trial judge as to the division *451of the jury; in both instances the jury volunteered the information in a note. Had the judge inquired as to the division of the jury in those cases, as he did in this one, the cases would have been reversed under the Brctsfield rule. If these cases are not distinguishable on this basis, I would differ with the holdings therein and would find, based on the authorities previously cited, that under the totality of the circumstances as outlined, the appellant was denied a fair and impartial jury trial, as guaranteed to him by the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. I would sustain ground of error number five and reverse and remand for trial.
ASHWORTH and BURDOCK, JJ., join.