Court Opinion

ID: 9407786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-10 11:06:46.580148+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:40.244945
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued July 6, 2023

                                    In The

                              Court of Appeals
                                   For The

                         First District of Texas
                           ————————————
                              NO. 01-22-00073-CR
                          ———————————
                    MATTHEW CLEMENTS, Appellant
                                      V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                  On Appeal from the 182nd District Court
                          Harris County, Texas
                      Trial Court Case No. 1634159

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Matthew Clements was convicted of aggravated robbery. During the

punishment phase of the trial, Clements pleaded “true” to enhancement paragraph

one and “not true” to enhancement paragraph two. The jury found both enhancement

paragraphs “true,” and Clements was sentenced to 50 years’ confinement. Clements
complains that (1) there is insufficient evidence to support the conviction;

(2) evidence of extraneous offenses should not have been admitted during the

guilt-innocence phase of trial; (3) it was error to allow a jury instruction that

commented on the weight of the evidence; and (4) evidence of extraneous offenses

should not have been admitted during the punishment phase. Because there is

sufficient evidence to support Clements’s conviction, the evidence of extraneous

offenses was properly admitted, and the jury instruction was permissible, we affirm.

                                     Background

A.    Aggravated Robbery at Taco Cabana

      On May 29, 2019, T. Murray, the complainant, was working as a sales

associate at a Walmart located at the intersection of Tidwell and Highway 290.

During her break, she went to a Taco Cabana. She stopped in the Taco Cabana

parking lot to let a vehicle pass in front of her, but the vehicle stopped. A man inside

the vehicle pointed a gun at her and demanded money.

      Murray held her hands in the air and told him she had no money on her. The

man got angry and continued demanding money. The man was distracted by a family

leaving the Taco Cabana, giving Murray a chance to run behind her car. The vehicle

drove away. Murray tried to photograph the license plate with her phone, but she

was only able to get photos of the vehicle, not the license plate. Murray then called

911. Murray’s husband arrived while she was waiting for the police, so she went

                                           2
back to Walmart to tell her manager what happened. Murray also discussed the

incident with people at the Taco Cabana after she called the police.

      Officer J. Wright responded to the 911 call. Murray told Officer Wright about

the robbery and gave him her cell phone photos. Murray described the perpetrator

as a white unshaven male wearing glasses, a hat, and a dirty white shirt. The vehicle

was described as “a 90’s [sic] model white pickup truck that had black appeared to

be metal, headache rack[1] behind the rear windshield. It had silver running boards

with black steps. The back of the truck in the tailgate area was either lacking paint

or dirty.” No license plate number was provided because Murray’s photo showed

the vehicle had a paper license plate. The vehicle photo and description were

provided to officers in the area. Officer Wright also described the suspect as a white

male, unshaven, in his late 30s, with a chrome-colored firearm and black-rimmed

glasses.

      While still at Taco Cabana, Officer Wright received radio transmissions from

other units in the area that another robbery was occurring in Spring Branch. Officer

Wright and his partner went to that location. Meanwhile, Sgt. A. Miller was

responding to a call about a suspicious white male with a weapon at the 2901 block

1
      “A headache rack is a wall-like safety device installed behind the back of a truck’s
      cab that protects against cargo entering the cab and injuring its occupants if the
      brakes lock up.” Medina v. State, 411 S.W.3d 15, 18 n.2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
      Dist.] 2013, no pet.)
                                           3
of Bingle Road, near the Taco Cabana. The caller described the suspect’s vehicle as

a white, “old style” truck with paper license plates. The call was placed only 10 to

15 minutes after the police received the call about the Taco Cabana robbery. While

searching the area, Sgt. Miller saw a dirty white truck with a black headache rack

driven by a white man. Sgt. Miller notified Officer Wright, who was only a mile

away, that he had spotted the suspect’s vehicle. A pursuit of the truck began when

more backup units arrived.

      During the high-speed pursuit, a passenger, later identified as D. Landin,

bailed out of the truck and was detained without incident. Landin told the police that

he jumped out because Clements, the driver, was acting crazy. Officer Wright’s

pursuit of Clements ended when another patrol unit lost control and collided with

his vehicle. But Officer K. Rodas continued to pursue Clements until he reached a

dead-end street in a residential neighborhood. Clements exited the driver’s side of

the truck and fled on foot. An officer in a helicopter unit saw Clements trying to hide

underneath a silver truck. Soon after, Officer Rodas detained Clements. Officer

Rodas searched Clements and found a cell phone belonging to the victim of a

different robbery. Officer Rodas also found a firearm nearby along the same route

that Clements had fled. The gun had a brown slide, a black grip, and a chrome barrel.

A baseball cap was also retrieved from the back of Clements’s truck.

                                          4
      The next day, Murray met with Sgt. J. Delacruz who showed her a photo array

that included Clements’s photo. She narrowed it down to two photos before

ultimately selecting the photo of Clements as the perpetrator. Murray also identified

Clements at trial.

      While in jail, on a recorded call, Clements stated that he was on his way to

pick up a friend in Spring Branch when he decided to go on a “mission,” a term that

often refers to a robbery.2

B.    Extraneous Aggravated Robbery at Convenience Store

      At trial, the State presented evidence of Clements’s involvement in two other

aggravated robberies that occurred close in time and proximity to the charged

offense. J. Bautista-Mora testified that on May 29, 2019, he and his nine-year-old

daughter were buying ice at 2900 Bingle Road when a white man pointed a black

gun at them and ordered him to hand over his wallet. Bautista-Mora pulled out his

wallet and told the gunman to come closer to get it. The gunman continued to

demand that Bautista-Mora surrender his wallet, but he told the gunman he would

call the police. The gunman fled the scene in a dirty white pickup truck, and

Bautista-Mora called the police.

      Officers showed Bautista-Mora a photographic array, but he could not identify

the suspect because his face had been covered. At trial, he testified that he was sure

2
      Sgt. Delacruz testified that “mission” is a term commonly used to refer to a robbery.
                                            5
that the white truck in the photograph taken by Murray was the truck the suspect was

driving.

C.    Extraneous Aggravated Robbery at Mattress Store

      R. Reyes testified that on May 29, 2019, he witnessed a robbery at 2205

Bingle Road outside the mattress store owned by A. Delacruz, his brother-in-law.

Reyes and Delacruz were sitting in front of the store when a white man pulled up in

a dirty white truck. The man got out of the truck, pointed a black gun at Delacruz’s

head and said, “give me your fucking money.” Delacruz handed over his wallet and

cellphone, and the gunman fled in the truck.

      Reyes testified that the gunman was wearing a dirty white shirt. He identified

the truck in Murray’s photograph as the same truck used by the gunman. Delacruz’s

cellphone was later recovered and returned by the police.

                            Sufficiency of the Evidence

      Clements contends that the evidence is insufficient because the eyewitness

identification of him as the robber was unreliable and there is no other evidence

connecting him to the location or the offense. The State argues that Murray’s

testimony was sufficient.

A.    Standard of Review

      We review the legal sufficiency of the evidence by considering all the

evidence, in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, to determine whether any

                                         6
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a

reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318–19 (1979); Williams v.

State, 235 S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder to

fairly resolve conflicts in testimony, weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences

from the facts. Williams, 235 S.W.3d at 750; Cary v. State, 507 S.W.3d 761, 766

(Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Our role is that of a due process safeguard, and we consider

only whether the factfinder reached a rational decision. See Malbrough v. State, 612

S.W.3d 537, 559 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d); see also Morgan

v. State, 501 S.W.3d 84, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (the reviewing court’s role “is

restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when a fact finder does not act

rationally”).

      “In reviewing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, a court must consider both

direct and circumstantial evidence, and any reasonable inferences that may be drawn

from the evidence.” Malbrough, 612 S.W.3d at 559 (citing Clayton v. State, 235

S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)); Wise v. State, 364 S.W.3d 900, 903 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2012). Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally probative in

establishing the defendant’s guilt, and circumstantial evidence alone can be

sufficient. Malbrough, 612 S.W.3d at 559 (citing Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778). “For

evidence to be sufficient, the State need not disprove all reasonable alternative

hypotheses that are inconsistent with a defendant’s guilt.” Id. The appellate court

                                          7
“considers only whether the inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable

based on the cumulative force of all the evidence when considered in the light most

favorable to the jury’s verdict.” Id. (citing Wise, 364 S.W.3d at 903; Hooper v. State,

214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). We review factual sufficiency of the

evidence under the same standard of review as that for legal sufficiency. See

Edwards v. State, 497 S.W.3d 147, 156–57 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016,

pet. ref’d).

B.     Analysis

       To convict Clements of aggravated robbery, the State was required to prove

that (1) while committing theft of property owned by Murray, (2) with intent to

obtain or maintain control of the property, Clements (3) intentionally or knowingly

threatened her or placed her in fear of imminent bodily injury and death, and (4) used

or exhibited a deadly weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 29.02(a)(2), 29.03(a)(2). A

person commits theft if he “unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive

the owner of property.” Id. § 31.03(a).

       At trial, Murray explained that the robbery lasted about a minute and a half

and involved her and Clements having a back-and-forth conversation where he kept

demanding her money and she kept telling him that she had none. Murray testified

that she still remembered the perpetrator’s face when she was shown the photo array

by police the day after the incident. She was able to narrow down the photo array to

                                          8
two people before confidently selecting the photo of Clements as the perpetrator.

She also identified Clements at trial. Murray’s testimony alone is sufficient to

support the jury’s finding that Clements was the perpetrator. See Aguilar v. State,

468 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (testimony of single eyewitness was

sufficient to support jury’s verdict); see also Gibbs v. State, 555 S.W.3d 718, 728

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (“Identity may be established by the

testimony of a single eyewitness.”); Shah v. State, 414 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, pet. ref’d) (“It is well-established that the

testimony of a sole witness to an offense may constitute legally sufficient evidence

to support a conviction.”).

      Clements argues that Murray’s testimony was unreliable because it was

impeached by Dr. T. Terrell, an expert in the psychology of eyewitness memory and

identification. Dr. Terrell testified that the accuracy of an eyewitness’s identification

can be adversely affected by the presence of a weapon because it draws away the

witness’s attention. Dr. Terrell also explained that the risk of mistaken identification

increases when there is cross-racial identification, like Murray, a black female,

identifying Clements, a white male. Dr. Terrell speculated that Murray may have

misidentified Clements as the robber based on the length of time it took her to make

the identification and because she may have confused Clements with Landin, who

resembles Clements. But it is the jury’s role to evaluate the weight and credibility of

                                           9
a witness’s testimony. See Queeman v. State, 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App.

2017) (“The jury is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to

be given to their testimonies, and the reviewing court must not usurp this role by

substituting its own judgment for that of the jury.”) (citing Montgomery v. State, 369

S.W.3d 188, 192 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).

      Murray gave a detailed description of the vehicle’s sole occupant to Officer

Wright when he arrived, describing the robber as a white male with glasses, a “5

o’clock shadow,” and a hat on his head. Beyond Murray’s identification, she also

provided two photos of the robber’s vehicle. The vehicle was a dirty white truck with

a black headache rack covering the rear window, silver running boards with black

steps, and paper license plates. And she provided the police with two photos of the

robber’s vehicle with distinctive features. Using Murray’s description and photos,

the police found Clements driving a vehicle that matched the photo within four miles

of the initial robbery. Clements was then arrested after fleeing from the police.

Nearby Clements, a black and chrome-colored handgun was found that contained

his DNA on the trigger. The jury could infer guilt from both Clements’s flight and

disposal of the handgun. See Burks v. State, 876 S.W.2d 877, 903 (Tex. Crim. App.

1994) (evidence of flight is admissible as circumstance from which inference of guilt

may be drawn); see also Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App.

                                         10
2004) (attempt to conceal evidence is probative of wrongful conduct and a

circumstance of guilt).

      There was also evidence that Clements implicated himself in the crime during

a recorded phone call from jail stating that he went on a “mission” while he was on

his way to pick up a friend. The jury heard testimony from Sgt. Delacruz that

“mission” is a term commonly used to refer to a robbery.

      Finally, there was the testimony of Bautista-Mora and Reyes, eyewitnesses of

similar aggravated robberies that occurred in the same area immediately after the

initial robbery. Bautista-Mora testified that he was robbed at gunpoint by a white

man whose face was covered. Bautista-Mora identified the truck driven by Clements

as the same dirty white truck used by the gunman in the extraneous robbery. Reyes

likewise testified that he saw a white man in a dirty white truck rob his brother-in-law

at gunpoint. Reyes identified Clements’s truck was the same truck used during the

aggravated robbery of his brother-in-law. And the cellphone stolen from Reyes’s

brother-in-law was found in Clements’s pocket.

      Ultimately, we defer to the factfinder to resolve any conflicts in testimony,

weigh evidence, and draw reasonable inferences from the facts. Williams, 235

S.W.3d at 750; Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (we

give great deference to the jury’s credibility determinations). In addition to Murray’s

direct testimony identifying Clements as the perpetrator, there was evidence of

                                          11
Clements’s flight, concealment of evidence, and others who identified Clements as

having committed similar crimes in a nearby area around the time of the incident.

See Temple v. State, 390 S.W.3d 341, 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (quoting Hooper

v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (circumstantial evidence as

probative as direct evidence in establishing guilt and can be sufficient alone in

establishing guilt)). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict,

the jury could have reasonably inferred that Clements committed the aggravated

robbery of Murray. See Adames v. State, 353 S.W.3d 854, 860 (Tex. Crim. App.

2011). We overrule Clements’s sufficiency issue.

                        Extraneous Acts: Guilt-Innocence

      Clements contends that the trial court erred by admitting testimony that

Clements committed extraneous aggravated robberies during the guilt-innocence

phase of his trial because the prejudicial effect of the evidence outweighed its

probative value. The State argues that the evidence was properly admitted because

Clements disputed identity and because the probative value outweighed any

prejudicial effect.

A.    Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse

of discretion. Henley v. State, 493 S.W.3d 77, 82–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016); Page

v. State, 137 S.W.3d 75, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (Rule 404(b) ruling is reviewed

                                         12
for an abuse of discretion); Jabari v. State, 273 S.W.3d 745, 751 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2008, no pet.) (same). A trial court abuses its discretion when its

decision falls outside the zone within which reasonable persons might disagree.

Henley, 493 S.W.3d at 83 (quoting Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2008)); Binnion v. State, 527 S.W.3d 536, 545 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2017, pet. ref’d). “A trial court’s ruling is generally within this zone if the evidence

shows that 1) an extraneous transaction is relevant to a material, non-propensity

issue, and 2) the probative value of that evidence is not substantially outweighed by

the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading of the jury.”

De La Paz v. State, 279 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The trial court’s

ruling will not be disturbed if supported by any legal applicable theory. Id. at 344

(citing Sewell v. State, 629 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)).

B.    Rules 404(b) and 403

      To be admissible under Rules 403 and 404(b), the evidence must be

(1) relevant, aside from its tendency to show conformity with character, and (2) the

probative value must substantially outweigh any prejudice, while not confusing the

issues or misleading the jury. See TEX. R. EVID. 403, 404(b); see also Page, 213

S.W.3d 332, 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); Johnston v. State, 145 S.W.3d 215, 220

(Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Relevant evidence, evidence that tends to make a fact of

consequence more or less probable, is admissible unless provided otherwise by law.

                                          13
TEX. R. EVID. 401, 402. Generally, evidence of a prior extraneous offense is not

admissible to prove a person’s character to show that, on a particular occasion, the

person acted in conformity with that character. TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). But

extraneous offense evidence may be admissible for a purpose other than character

conformity, such as proving “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” TEX. R. EVID.

404(b)(2); Page, 137 S.W.3d at 78.

      To support admission of extraneous offenses based on identity, identity must

be at issue. Page, 137 S.W.3d at 78; Lane v. State, 933 S.W.2d 504, 519 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1996). Identity can be raised by the defense on cross-examination of a witness.

Page, 137 S.W.3d at 78; Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 519. This occurs when the identifying

witness has been impeached about (1) a material detail of the identification; (2) the

conditions surrounding the charged offense and the witness’s identification of the

defendant in that situation; or (3) an earlier misidentification of the defendant.

Thomas v. State, 126 S.W.3d 138, 144 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet.

ref’d); see Robbins v. State, 88 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (vigorous

cross-examination can place at issue a permissible purpose under Rule 404(b)).

Identity may also be placed in dispute by the defendant’s opening statement, as well

as by affirmative defensive evidence. Segundo v. State, 270 S.W.3d 79, 86 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2008); Hudson v. State, 112 S.W.3d 794, 801 (Tex. App.—Houston

                                         14
[14th Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (“In raising a defensive theory, a defendant opens the

door for the State to offer rebuttal testimony concerning an extraneous offense if the

extraneous offense has characteristics common with the offense for which the

defendant is being tried.”). The trial court has considerable latitude in determining

that identity is disputed and that the extraneous offenses are relevant to the identity

issue. Page, 137 S.W.3d at 78; Segundo, 270 S.W.3d at 86.

      Here, defense counsel raised the issue of identity during her opening

statement. Defense counsel’s cross-examination of Murray also suggested that

Murray’s fear of being shot, her focus on the gun, the brief amount of time she

interacted with the perpetrator, the length of time it took for her to select a suspect

out of a photo array, and her description of the perpetrator not exactly matching the

suspect she selected show that the defense questioned the accuracy of her

identification.3 See Page, 213 S.W.3d at 336 (cross-examining complainant about

defendant’s weight was sufficient to raise identity); see also Page, 137 S.W.3d at 79

(“That the impeachment was not particularly damaging or effective in light of all the

evidence presented is not the question. The question is whether impeachment

3
      Identity was the primary focus of Clements’s closing argument. Defense counsel
      noted that multiple witnesses could identify the white truck, but not all the witnesses
      could identify Clements. Defense counsel discussed how all the witnesses stated
      that only one person robbed them, but there was evidence that two people were in
      Clements’s vehicle at some point. It was also raised that Landin and Clements both
      fit the description of the robber.
                                            15
occurred that raised the issue of identity. If so, Rule 404(b) permits the introduction

of extraneous offenses that are relevant to the issue of identity.”). Then, Clements’s

expert witness, Dr. Terrell, testified that Murray may have misidentified Clements

as the perpetrator due to the weapon and a cross-racial identification. Considering

the multiple ways Clements raised identity, the trial court did not abuse its discretion

in finding that identity was at issue. See Page, 137 S.W.3d at 78; Segundo, 270

S.W.3d at 86.

      But raising the issue of identity “does not automatically render evidence of an

extraneous offense admissible.” Jabari, 273 S.W.3d at 751 (citing Page, 213 S.W.3d

at 336). Such evidence must demonstrate a much higher degree of similarity to the

charged offense than extraneous offenses admitted for other purposes, such as intent.

Bishop v. State, 869 S.W.2d 342, 346 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). Without a high degree

of similarity, the probative value of the extraneous offense evidence is outweighed

by its prejudicial effect. Id. When reviewing a trial court’s decision to admit such

evidence, appellate courts should consider the specific characteristics of the offenses

and the time interval between them. Thomas v. State, 126 S.W.3d 138, 144 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d). Sufficient similarity can be shown by

proximity in time and place or by a common mode of committing the offenses. Lane,

933 S.W.2d at 519 (citing Ransom v. State, 503 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. Crim. App.

1974)).

                                          16
      Here, Murray described the robber as a white male, in his late 30s, unshaven,

with black-rimmed glasses, a ball cap, and a dirty white shirt. Murray explained that

the robber pointed a gun at her and demanded money. Murray photographed the

robber’s vehicle, and it was described by Officer Wright as a ’90s model, dirty,

white, pickup truck with a black steel headache rack behind the rear window, a dirty

tailgate, and chrome running boards with black steps. Her photograph of the truck

also showed that it had paper plates. Within ten minutes of Officer Wright’s arrival

at the Taco Cabana, while he was still speaking to Murray, the police received a call

about a second robbery.

      Sgt. Miller testified that the call for the second robbery at the convenience

store occurred about ten to twelve minutes after the initial robbery call. The suspect

in the second robbery was described as a white male, 39 to 40 years old, average

height, wearing a dirty white shirt and gray pants driving a white, old-style truck

with paper plates. The second robbery occurred about a mile-and-a-half from the

Taco Cabana. Sgt. Miller drove by the second robbery location and continued

southbound on Bingle Road in search of a truck matching the description of the

suspect’s vehicle. After driving about a quarter of a mile further south on Bingle

Road, he saw apparent victims of another robbery on the roadway waving their arms

to attract his attention. Sgt. Miller directed another patrol unit to respond to that

location while he continued southbound in search of the suspect.

                                         17
      Bautista-Mora testified that a white male driving a dirty, white, older-model

truck pointed a gun at him and demanded money. Bautista-Mora described how the

truck had “some kind of [an] iron on the back for a ladder, climbing.” While he did

not see the robber’s face, he recognized the truck in the photographs of the truck

involved in the Taco Cabana robbery.

      Reyes testified how he and Delacruz were in front of Delacruz’s mattress store

when a bearded white male wearing a dirty white shirt drove up in a white truck,

pointed a gun at Delacruz and demanded money. Reyes could not identify the robber

in a photo array, but he was confident that the truck in the photos from the Taco

Cabana robbery was the same truck as in the Delacruz robbery. Shortly after passing

Reyes’s location, Sgt. Miller saw an older, dirty, white truck, with a black metal

headache rack, chrome running boards, and paper plates. The driver of the truck was

a bald white male. Once the driver, Clements, was apprehended, police found a

cellphone belonging to Delacruz on him.

      Clements argues that two of the witnesses, Bautista-Mora and Reyes, could

not identify Clements as the robber, so there is no way that the evidence of the

extraneous offenses could help establish the robber’s identity. But all three robberies

shared specific characteristics. See Thomas, 126 S.W.3d at 144 (reviewing courts

should consider the specific characteristics of the offenses). Murray, Bautista-Mora,

and Reyes all provided evidence that the robber was a white male, wearing a dirty

                                          18
white shirt, who was driving a white truck with a metal fixture on the back with

paper plates, and pointed a gun at the person he demanded money from. Murray and

Reyes both described the robber as having facial hair. All three robberies occurred

close in time and place. See Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 519 (sufficient similarity can be

shown by proximity in time and place). And Clements was in possession of the

cellphone stolen from Delacruz.

      Thus here, the extraneous offenses share significant similarities with the

charged offense, and although there are some differences between the three

robberies, these differences do not outweigh the similarities. See Page, 213 S.W.3d

at 338 (“extraneous-offense evidence” does not need “to be completely identical to

the charged offense to be admissible to prove identity”); see also Hill v. State, No.

01-16-00595-CR, 2017 WL 2290201, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] May

25, 2017, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (extraneous offense

was sufficiently similar where robberies occurred within a day of each other, were

committed in the Houston metro area and “at a gas station with a convenience store,”

where robbers demanded money at gunpoint from the cashiers using a black

handgun, wearing dark hoodie, baseball cap, and black mask). We conclude the trial

court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the similarities between the

charged offense and the extraneous offenses are sufficient to prove identity.

                                         19
      The extraneous-offense evidence is prejudicial, but nearly all evidence

presented against a defendant is. See Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.3d 372, 378

(Tex. Crim. App. 1990); see also Pawlak v. State, 420 S.W.3d 807, 811 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013). Thus, our concern when considering Rules 403 and 404(b) is the unfair

prejudicial effect. Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 377–78. “Under Rule 403, it is

presumed that the probative value of relevant evidence exceeds any danger of unfair

prejudice. The rule envisions exclusion of evidence only when there is a clear

disparity between the degree of prejudice of the offered evidence and its probative

value.” Hammer v. State, 296 S.W.3d 555, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (cleaned up).

Rule 403 does not allow a trial court to exclude relevant evidence simply because it

is prejudicial. Pawlak, 420 S.W.3d at 811.

      When conducting a Rule 403 analysis, we balance: “(1) how probative the

evidence is; (2) the potential of the evidence to impress the jury in some irrational,

but nevertheless indelible way; (3) the time the proponent needs to develop the

evidence; and (4) the proponent’s need for the evidence.” Colone v. State, 573

S.W.3d 249, 266 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). The probative value refers to how much

the evidence makes the existence of a “fact of consequence” “more or less probable”

and to how much the proponent needs the evidence. Davis v. State, 329 S.W.3d 798,

806 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (quoting Casey v. State, 215 S.W.3d 870, 879 (Tex.

                                         20
Crim. App. 2007)). Unfair prejudice refers to how likely the evidence might cause

for a result made on an “improper basis,” including “an emotional one.” Id.

      First, considering how probative the evidence is, as previously stated, there

were significant similarities between the three robberies, and they occurred within

close time and physical proximity to each other. See Thomas, 126 S.W.3d at 144;

Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 519; see also Hill, 2017 WL 2290201, at *5. Moreover, the

evidence of the extraneous offenses was offered to prove a highly disputed fact: the

identity of the person who robbed Murray. Accordingly, the trial court could have

determined that the probative value of the extraneous offenses weighed in favor of

admission.

      As for whether the evidence would affect the jury in some irrational way,

Clements contends that the evidence of evading in a motor vehicle and two

additional aggravated robberies, with one alleging that he pointed a gun at a child,

was incredibly prejudicial. But the trial court instructed the jurors five separate times

that they could only consider the extraneous-offense evidence if they found that the

offense had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, and then only for the limited

purpose of determining the Taco Cabana robber’s identity. The written jury charge

also gave the same instruction. Limiting instructions have a mitigating effect on the

danger of unfair prejudice. See Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 520; Beam v. State, 447 S.W.3d

401, 405 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.) (noting that “the

                                           21
impermissible inference can be minimized through a limiting instruction”); see also

Resendiz v. State, 112 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (appellate courts

presume jury follows instructions).

      As for Clements’s argument that the extraneous offenses also introduced a

crime other than aggravated robbery, evading in a motor vehicle, the testimony on

the charged offense depicted a more serious offense than evasion because the

perpetrator pointed his gun at Murray while demanding money from her. The

evidence regarding the charged offense “likely overshadowed any inflammatory

response” the jury may have had to evidence of evading arrest. See Burke v. State,

371 S.W.3d 252, 258 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011, pet. ref’d). Therefore,

the trial court could have reasonably determined that the evidence would not impress

the jury in an irrational manner and that this factor weighed in favor of admission.

      Turning to the time needed to develop the extraneous-offense evidence, the

testimony of Bautista-Mora and Reyes was brief and focused on addressing identity.

Sgt. Delacruz, Officer Wright, and Sgt. Miller also gave limited testimony related to

the extraneous robberies discussing the proximity of the robberies to each other in

time and place, the descriptions of the perpetrator, and how they located, pursued,

and apprehended Clements. The guilt-innocence phase of the trial took three days,

and the record was over 500 pages long, while the extraneous-offense testimony was

about 100 minutes long. Therefore, the trial court could have reasonably determined

                                         22
that the time factor weighed in favor of admission. Compare Schiele v. State, No.

01-13-00299-CR, 2015 WL 730482, at *7–8 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb.

19, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (that evidence in

dispute spanned 50 pages of 118-page record and was also admitted through two

recordings weighed against admissibility because evidence consumed “not

insignificant” amount of time, but trial court did not abuse its discretion where half

of Rule 403 factors weighed in favor of admission), and McGregor v. State, 394

S.W.3d 90, 121–22 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d) (affirming

admission despite evidence of extraneous offenses constituting one third of trial

weighed against admissibility), with Russell v. State, 113 S.W.3d 530, 544–49 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d) (trial court erred by admitting evidence of

extraneous offenses where evidence was 30% of testimony, State did not need

evidence because it had ample evidence of intent, and extraneous offense was “more

heinous” than charged offense).

      Lastly, considering the State’s need for the evidence, courts should consider

whether the proponent had other evidence to establish the fact of consequence, how

strong the other evidence was, and whether the “fact of consequence related to an

issue that is in dispute.” See Erazo v. State, 144 S.W.3d 487, 495–96 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2004) (quoting Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 390). As previously discussed, the

non-extraneous offense evidence connecting Clements to the charged offense was

                                         23
(1) Murray’s identification of him from a photo array, (2) the weapon found near

Clements was like Murray’s description, and (3) the description and photos of the

truck matched the truck that Clements was found driving before his arrest. But

Clements also raised the issue of identity during defense counsel’s opening

statement and the cross-examination of the State’s witnesses. And he notified the

trial court that he planned to call an expert witness, Dr. Terrell, to testify on

eyewitness identification and brain memory retention. Accordingly, this factor

weighs in favor of admission. See Lane, 933 S.W.2d at 521 (holding that the need

for extraneous offense evidence is greatest when the evidence supports an element

of a “hotly contested issue”).

      Considering all the factors together, we overrule Clements’s issue because the

trial court acted within the zone of reasonable disagreement when it determined that

the probative value of the extraneous-offense evidence was not substantially

outweighed by its prejudicial effect. See De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343; Lane, 933

S.W.2d at 519.

                                   Jury Charge

      Clements contends that the jury charge included an improper comment on the

weight of the evidence because an instruction implied that the trial judge believed

guilt had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt and the case would proceed to the

                                        24
punishment phase. The State responds that Clements’s argument is unsupported by

the law and the trial court provided the jury with a permissible jury charge.

A.    Standard of Review

      When reviewing for jury charge error, we apply a two-step procedure. See

Kirsch v. State, 357 S.W.3d 645, 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (citing Abdnor v. State,

871 S.W.2d 726, 731 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)). Step one requires the appellate court

to determine whether there is error in the charge. Id. If there is error, the appellate

court must conduct a harm analysis. Celis v. State, 416 S.W.3d 419, 423 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013). If there was error and a defendant timely objected, then reversal is

required if the defendant was harmed. Marshall v. State, 479 S.W.3d 840, 843 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2016). But if a defendant did not timely object, “then reversal is required

only if the error was so egregious and created such harm that the defendant did not

have a fair and impartial trial.” Id.

B.    Analysis

      The trial court must give a written charge to the jury that sets forth the

applicable law in the case. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 36.14. If the defendant

objected at trial, then he will obtain relief if the record shows that he suffered “some

harm.” Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing

Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) (op. on reh’g)). A

reviewing court must consider: (1) the entire jury charge, (2) counsel’s arguments,

                                          25
(3) all the evidence, and (4) any other relevant information revealed by the trial

record. Id. This standard requires the reviewing court to determine whether the

defendant suffered actual harm from the error and not merely theoretical harm.

Warner v. State, 245 S.W.3d 458, 462 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). In this situation,

neither party has a burden on appeal to show harm. Reeves, 420 S.W.3d at 816.

      Clements argues that the trial court improperly commented on the weight of

the evidence by instructing the jury that “[y]our sole duty at this time is to determine

the guilt or innocence of the defendant under indictment in this cause and restrict

your deliberations solely to the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant.”

Clements objected that the instruction constituted an improper comment on the

weight of the evidence because it suggested that “there’s going to be another

proceeding.” Clements requested that the trial court instruct the jury that its sole duty

was “to determine whether the State has proven each element of the offense beyond

a reasonable doubt.” The trial court overruled the objection.

      First, we must determine whether error occurred; if error did not occur, our

analysis ends. Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 649. Here, the charge did not improperly

comment on the weight of the evidence because it followed the statutory directive

of Article 37.07 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art.

37.07. Section 2(a) of Article 37.07 provides that “[i]n all criminal cases . . . which

are tried before a jury on a plea of not guilty, the judge shall, before argument begins,

                                           26
first submit to the jury the issue of guilt or innocence of the defendant of the offense

or offenses charged, without authorizing the jury to pass upon the punishment to be

imposed.” Id. art. 37.07 § 2(a). Additionally, the jury charge specifically instructed

the jury that “[a]ll persons are presumed innocent,” that the law does not require the

defendant to prove his innocence, and that it should acquit Clements unless it found

him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We follow the decisions of our sister courts

in determining that an instruction of this type is not erroneous. See Avila v. State, 15

S.W.3d 568, 576–77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet); Flores v.

State, 920 S.W.2d 347, 357 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, pet. dism’d); Barnes v.

State, 855 S.W.3d 173, 175 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref’d).

      Because there was no error in the jury charge, we overrule Clements’s jury

charge issue. See Kirsch, 357 S.W.3d at 649.

                           Extraneous Acts: Punishment

      Clements contends that the trial court should have excluded evidence of the

extraneous robberies presented during the punishment phase of the trial because the

witnesses could not identify the perpetrator, so the offenses were not relevant and

could not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The State contends that all the

challenged evidence was properly admitted, and even if there was error, Clements

was not harmed.

                                          27
A.    Standard of Review and Applicable Law

      We review a trial court’s ruling on the admissibility of extraneous offense

evidence for an abuse of discretion. Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010). If the trial court’s ruling was within the bounds of reasonable

disagreement, it should not be disturbed. Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 793

(Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

      Article 37.07, Section 3(a)(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure states that

during the sentencing phase, the State may offer evidence “as to any matter the court

deems relevant to sentencing.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 37.07 § 3(a)(1). This

includes “evidence of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a

reasonable doubt by evidence to have been committed by the defendant or for which

he could be held criminally responsible, regardless of whether he has previously

been charged with or finally convicted of the crime or act.” Id. “Relevant” is not

defined, but the statute also provides that evidence relevant to sentencing includes:

(1) the defendant’s criminal record; (2) the defendant’s general reputation; (3) the

defendant’s general character; (4) an opinion about the defendant’s character; (5) the

circumstances of the offense being tried; and (6) if admissible, any other evidence

of an extraneous crime or bad act that is shown beyond a reasonable doubt to have

been committed by the defendant or for which the defendant could be held criminally

responsible, no matter if the defendant has previously been charged with or finally

                                         28
convicted of the crime or act. Id. Determining relevance is a question of what helps

the jury in determining the appropriate sentence for a particular defendant in a

particular case. See Rogers v. State, 991 S.W.2d 263, 265 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).

      The trial court makes threshold determinations on the admissibility of

extraneous offenses, but the factfinder ultimately decides whether the State carried

its burden with respect to those offenses. Mitchell, 931 S.W.2d at 953. Before the

jury can consider the evidence of extraneous offenses, it must be satisfied beyond a

reasonable doubt that the evidence is attributable to the defendant. But the offering

party does not have to “prove that the act was a criminal act or that the defendant

committed a crime.” Haley v. State, 173 S.W.3d 510, 515 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005);

see also Smith v. State, 577 S.W.3d 548, 551 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019). The burden

of proof applies “to a defendant’s involvement in the act itself, instead of the

elements of a crime necessary for a finding of guilt.” Id.; see also Thompson v. State,

425 S.W.3d 480, 491 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref’d).

      If the reviewing court determines that the admission of extraneous acts was

error, it must then determine whether the error was harmful. Jabari, 273 S.W.3d at

754. The erroneous admission of an extraneous offense is not constitutional error

and undergoes a harm analysis under Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 44.2(b).

Id.; see TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). Any error must be disregarded unless it affected the

appellant’s substantial rights. Jabari, 273 S.W.3d at 754; see TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b).

                                          29
An error affects a substantial right when it has a substantial and injurious effect or

influence on the jury’s verdict. Jabari, 273 S.W.3d at 754 (citing Morales v. State,

32 S.W.3d 862, 867 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). The reviewing court should not

overturn a conviction for non-constitutional error if, after considering the entire

record, it is assured that the error did not influence the jury or only had a slight effect.

See Motilla v. State, 78 S.W.3d 352, 355–56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

B.     Extraneous Acts Evidence

       The State introduced evidence from five more robberies, a determination that

Clements engaged in delinquent conduct as a juvenile, prior miscellaneous

convictions as an adult, and evidence that he had a weapon in jail. Clements only

complains of the evidence of the five robberies, so we only address that.

       1.     Aguilar Robbery

       M. Aguilar was never called to testify, but the evidence of this robbery was

offered through the testimony of Officer N. Alvarado. Officer Alvarado testified that

he responded to a robbery on May 29, 2019.4

       Clements objected to Officer Alvarado’s testimony because the complainant

of the extraneous aggravated robbery could not identify the perpetrator but described

him as a black male, and the State could not prove the offense beyond a reasonable

4
       Officer Alvarado testified that this incident occurred on May 29, 2019, but the
       ballistics report lists the offense date as May 30, 2019.
                                            30
doubt. The State responded that Clements’s identity as the perpetrator would be

established by evidence that a casing found at the crime scene was linked to the gun

recovered when police apprehended Clements for the charged offense. Clements

requested a hearing outside the presence of the jury, but the trial court indicated that

it would rule on the relevance of the evidence as it was developed.

      Officer Alvarado testified that he arrived at a residence with a fenced-in

driveway. He entered the fenced-in area and found Aguilar with a bloody gash above

his left eye and a gunshot wound to the lower leg. Aguilar’s white GMC truck was

stolen, and a nine-millimeter shell casing was recovered from the scene. Clements

objected to the testimony and State’s Exhibit 100 as irrelevant and violating his right

to confront the witness, but the trial court overruled the objection “subject . . . to [the

State] proving up relevancy.” State’s Exhibit 100 is the shell casing taken from the

scene that was submitted for ballistics testing. Clements objected pursuant to the

prior relevance and confrontation clause objections, but the trial court overruled the

objection “subject to relevancy.”

      M. Mally, a senior firearms examiner at the Houston Forensic Science Center,

testified that she examined State’s Exhibit 26, the nine-millimeter Luger Taurus

semiautomatic pistol recovered near Clements in connection with the charged

offense. She compared the spent casing from the Aguilar robbery with State’s

Exhibit 26 and stated that the spent casing was fired from that weapon.

                                            31
      2.     Villegas Robbery and Betancourt Robbery

      The J. Villegas robbery was in May 2019. While he was at a taco truck, J.

Villegas was robbed by three men who arrived in a green or blue-colored Dodge

Dakota truck. One man pointed at a gun at Villegas and demanded his possessions.

When he tried to fight back against his attackers, the man pistol-whipped him. A

bullet was fired during the altercation, but Villegas was not shot. One of the robbers

took his money and wallet, and the gunman got into his 1999 Chevy Silverado truck

and drove off. Then the robber driving the Dakota tried to run Villegas over. The

State offered a video of this incident, which Clements objected to. The trial court

asked the State “where [it] was going with this?” The State acknowledged that it was

calling witnesses out of order, and the witness that could establish the relevance of

Villegas’s testimony and State’s Exhibit 115 was on his way to testify. The court

then “[overruled] the objection . . . saying its [sic] subject to relevance with the other

witness,” and admonishing the State that the trial court “[didn’t] want to do that

again because I don’t want to—I rather this come in, let the jury hear all this, and

then at some point in time it becomes irrelevant, and then I got to instruct the jury to

disregard it all after they’ve heard it.”

      Villegas’s testimony was then paused so that the witness who could establish

the relevance of Villegas’s testimony could testify, after which Villegas would be

re-called to finish his testimony. The State then called two witnesses who testified

                                            32
on matters other than the robberies. Afterward, the State called J. Betancourt to

testify about the robbery that occurred in 2017. This was a robbery that Clements

had previously pleaded to and was disposed of.

      After Betancourt’s testimony, the State re-called Villegas. The State then

informed the court that Villegas “is going to testify to the fact that when his car was

stolen the license plate off his car, the paper tag, was then found on the recovered

vehicle in the evading, the white truck that’s already been admitted into evidence.

So the paper tag attaches the two cases together.” Clements then pointed out that

“[t]here’s still an identity issue and this witness couldn’t identify who robbed him.”

The court overruled the objection, anticipating that Villegas could identify the truck.

Villegas testified about the details of the robbery, and that the license plate was

stolen from his vehicle during the robbery. Villegas testified that he recognized the

license plate depicted in State’s Exhibit 18 as the license plate stolen from his truck.

Villegas was shown State’s Exhibit 17, a photograph of the truck used by Clements

during the commission of the charged offense. Villegas testified that his stolen

license plate was on the white truck in State’s Exhibit 17, but the white truck did not

belong to him.

      A video of the robbery, State’s Exhibit 115, was offered into evidence after

Villegas testified that it accurately depicts the robbery. Clements objected to the

admission of the video, arguing that it violated due process, the confrontation clause,

                                          33
and was not relevant because Villegas could not connect Clements to the scene of

the robbery. The trial court sustained the objection. Villegas then testified that he

was forced to jump in a ditch when the driver of the blue Dodge Dakota tried to run

over him and shot at him three times. Villegas identified two persons from a photo

array as the driver of the Dakota and as the person who struck him with a gun.

Neither person was Clements.

      The State again offered the surveillance video, State’s Exhibit 115, and argued

that it was relevant because the Villegas’s stolen license plate was found on the same

vehicle Clements used in the charged offense. The State also argued that one of the

suspects in the surveillance video physically resembles Clements. But, after a bench

conference. the State moved on to other witnesses before State’s Exhibit 115 was

admitted. The State later tried to get State’s Exhibit 115 admitted after it elicited

testimony from Villegas that the blue truck shown in the surveillance video had

stickers on the rear window in similar locations as the stickers on the rear window

of the blue truck shown in State’s Exhibit 806. Clements objected that the extraneous

offense had not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but the trial court overruled

the objection and admitted State’s Exhibit 115.

      3.     Holzer Robbery

      The State then called L. Holzer, another complainant in an extraneous

robbery, as its next witness. Clements objected to Holzer’s testimony because he

                                         34
could not identify the perpetrator and the State could not prove the extraneous

offense beyond a reasonable doubt. After a bench conference, the jury was released,

and trial was set to resume the following business day. The next day, the State moved

on to calling Detective G. Goodnight and C. Castaneda to testify about the Castaneda

robbery before returning to Holzer.

      Holzer testified, outside the presence of the jury, that he was robbed on May

25, 2019. He stated that he was walking down the street he lives on when he noticed

that a vehicle was following him. When he changed directions, the vehicle stopped,

and a man with a gun got out of the vehicle and threatened to shoot him. The gunman

stole his phone, car keys, and house keys. Holzer testified that State’s Exhibit 114,

a surveillance video, accurately depicted the robbery. Holzer acknowledged on

cross-examination that he could not identify the perpetrator in a photo array.

Clements objected to the admission of Holzer’s testimony and State’s Exhibit 114,

arguing that the State did not prove the extraneous offense beyond a reasonable

doubt, that it violated due process, and violated Rule 403 as prejudicial. The trial

court overruled the objection and admitted the testimony and video.

      Holzer then gave similar testimony before the jury that he was robbed on May

25, 2019 by a bald white male. The surveillance video shows a bald white male

driving a blue Dodge Dakota truck. He also testified that the blue truck shown in

                                         35
State’s Exhibit 806 appeared to be the same blue truck used during the commission

of the aggravated robbery.

      4.     Castaneda Robbery

      C. Castaneda testified that he was the victim of a theft at a gas station in either

March or April 2019. Castaneda was standing at the pump when he noticed that an

older green or blue model Dodge or Chevy truck parked next to him. The driver of

the truck exited the vehicle wearing a mask, approached him, and demanded money

at gunpoint. They struggled, and the robber’s mask slipped down, enabling

Castaneda to see his face. The man took his wallet and struck Castaneda in the head

with the gun.

      Castaneda was shown a photographic array in June 2019 by Detective G.

Goodnight, and he positively identified Clements as the robber. At trial, he testified

that the blue truck shown in State’s Exhibits 801 and 806 appeared to be the same

truck used by Clements during the robbery.

C.    Analysis

      We conclude that the trial court reasonably could have determined that the

extraneous acts were relevant, and that the State proved Clements was involved in

the extraneous acts. The extraneous aggravated robbery of Aguilar occurred on the

same date that Clements robbed Murray, Bautista-Mora, and Delacruz at gunpoint.

And the State elicited unchallenged evidence that the spent casing recovered from

                                          36
the crime scene was fired from the same handgun that had Clements’s DNA on it.

That gun was recovered only a short distance from Clements when he was

apprehended. Because Clements did not object to the ballistics evidence linking him

to the extraneous robbery, he cannot complain on appeal about its admission. See

Thompson v. State, 4 S.W.3d 884, 886–87 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999,

pet. ref’d) (defendant must object to preserve error in the admission of extraneous

offenses).

      Villegas was also robbed at gunpoint in May 2019. Villegas, Aguilar,

Castaneda, and Betancourt were all pistol-whipped during their robberies. There was

also evidence connecting the robbery of Villegas with other robberies where

Clements was identified as the perpetrator, such as the license plate that was on

Villegas’s stolen vehicle and later found on the white pickup truck used by Clements

during the charged offense. The State also elicited testimony from Villegas that the

blue Dodge Dakota used by the robbers looked like the same blue truck used during

the robbery of Castaneda, who positively identified Clements as the person who

robbed him at gunpoint. Holzer was also robbed at gunpoint on the same date that

Clements committed the charged offense. The surveillance video of the robbery

shows a bald white male in a blue Dodge Dakota truck. Although Holzer could not

identify the perpetrator, he testified that the photograph of the blue Dodge truck used

during the robbery of Castaneda appeared to be same truck used by the gunman.

                                          37
      Given the evidence linking Clements to similar robberies, the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in determining that the extraneous offense evidence was

relevant and that a rational jury could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the

extraneous offenses were attributable to Clements. See Haley, 173 S.W.3d at 515.

Because there was no error, we need not address whether Clements was harmed. See

TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1. We overrule Clements’s final issue.

                                   Conclusion

      Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                Sarah Beth Landau
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Landau, Countiss, and Guerra.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

                                           38