Court Opinion

ID: 9657868
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:39:56.231463+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:49.031762
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting). I dissent from the March 10, 1992 order reinstating the integrated bar1 and granting the State Bar of Wisconsin's petition for the amendment of Supreme Court Rules (SCR) 10.03(5), 10.07(2), 10.08 and 10.13(1)2 for three reasons.3
*33First, I would not reinstitute a unified bar. I would keep the State Bar of Wisconsin a voluntary organization.
The two activities which, according to the United States Supreme Court, a unified bar may support with mandatory dues (namely, regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal service), are performed primarily by the Wisconsin supreme court and funded by annual assessments of all lawyers licensed to practice in this state. The merits of the unified bar have been debated for over 75 years. In that time no one has demonstrated that a unified bar has a better record of service to its members or to the public than a voluntary bar. Professor Ted Schneyer studied the State Bar of Wisconsin and concluded that its performance did not justify the claims for a unified bar.4 The disadvantages of a unified bar, such as the constitutional restrictions on expending mandatory dues and the unified bar's dependency on the court, outweigh any claimed advantages. I believe the values of the individual attorney's freedom of association and a bar association's freedom and independence from the court trump any claimed benefits of mandatory-membership.
Second, even if I agreed to a unified bar, I dissent from the amendments of the rules the court adopted which concentrate power in the Board of Governors and reduce the ability of individual members to participate in establishing Bar policy.
*34Third, even if I agreed to a unified bar, I dissent from the amendments of the rules the court adopted which provide that any pro rata dues reduction awarded by an arbitrator will be refunded only to those members who have requested arbitration.
HH
As the rules and the majority opinion recognize, the United States Supreme Court has limited the activities a unified bar may support with mandatory dues to expenditures "necessarily or reasonably incurred for the purposes of regulating the legal profession or 'improving the quality of legal service available to the people of the State.' " Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990) (quoting Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 843 (1961)).5
I would not reinstitute a unified bar because these two activities, regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal service, are performed primarily by the Wisconsin supreme court, not the State Bar of Wisconsin.6 To support these activities, the court *35annually sets assessments which all lawyers licensed to practice in this state are required to pay. In 1976, the court explicitly removed these responsibilities from the Bar and placed them under the court's supervision to assure the public that lawyer discipline, bar admission, and regulating competence through continuing legal education would be conducted for the benefit of the public, independent of elected bar officials.7
The court's annual mandatory assessment on the lawyers of the state, not the membership dues paid to the State Bar of Wisconsin, finances the Board of Attorneys Professional Responsibility (BAPR), the investigatory and prosecutorial arm of the court for regulating lawyers. The Bar itself plays no direct role in the grievance process.
The court's annual mandatory assessment on the lawyers of the state, not membership dues paid to the State Bar, finances the court's mandatory continuing legal education program for improving the quality of legal services available to the people of the state. The Board of Bar Examiners (BBE), an arm of the court, *36administers the bar examination and the mandatory continuing legal education program imposed by the court. The State Bar is one provider, among many, of continuing, legal education programs, but the Bar's continuing legal education programs are not funded by members' dues; they must be self-supporting. In re Regulation of the Bar, 81 Wis. 2d xxxv, xli (1977).8
Thus all lawyers licensed to practice in Wisconsin pay the court-mandated annual assessments to support the court-created and court-supervised boards primarily responsible, for regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal service available to the people of the state. There are no "free riders."9 We need not mandate membership in the State Bar to eliminate a problem with free riders when no such problem exists.
The State Bar of Wisconsin engages in many worthwhile activities, some of which are germane to regulating *37lawyers and improving the quality of legal services and some of which are not. For example, the State Bar keeps its members up-to-date on recent legal developments by publishing articles and distributing materials on legal issues, summaries of legislation and cases, and the texts of disciplinary matters; upon direction of the court it appoints lawyers and lay persons to district committees that work with BAPR; it distributes publications designed to inform the public about law and the administration of justice; it encourages lawyer participation in pro bono activities; it operates a telephone "hot line" providing legal advice; it proposes rules to this court about professional responsibility and legal education; it influences legislation; it issues ethical opinions to lawyers; and it provides assistance to alcoholic, ill and disabled lawyers in order to protect the public. Some Bar activities are supported by user fees; others are not. Voluntary bar associations across the country engage in similar activities to those of the State Bar of Wisconsin.10
The State Bar is not the only organization of lawyers that plays a valuable role in assisting the court in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services available to the people of Wisconsin. There are public interest law firms, legal service associations, and other organizations of lawyers, representing the diverse views of lawyers. Although the Bar asserts that a unified bar is much better equipped to speak for the profession with respect to important regulatory and *38other issues and to make appropriate recommendations to this court, the Bar does not explain why.
Numerous lawyers and scholars across the country have compared the virtues of unified and voluntary bars. Although many claims are made for a unified bar, no one has demonstrated that a unified bar has a better record for service to its members or to the public than a voluntary bar. Neither the Bar's petition nor the court's per curiam opinion gives any reason for concluding that the Bar's operation has been hindered by its voluntary status for the past four years or that the Bar's operation would be significantly improved by a mandatory membership requirement.
The State Bar of Wisconsin has operated well during the four fiscal years since the court made membership voluntary in May 1988. Over 80 percent of lawyers licensed to practice in Wisconsin voluntarily joined the Bar during this period; out-of-state practitioners constitute the largest block of lawyers who did not join. When out-of-state lawyers are omitted from the statistics, the percentage of Wisconsin practitioners who voluntarily joined the Bar rises to 90 percent. This large percentage of Wisconsin attorneys who have voluntarily joined the Bar is a forceful argument for leaving the voluntary status undisturbed.11
The Bar's voluntary status has resulted, I believe, in the Bar's greater responsiveness to the needs and wishes *39of the members in efforts to attract members and keep them enrolled. It also appears that the Bar has worked harder during its voluntary period to include women, minorities and government lawyers in committees and activities in an effort to encourage participation and membership among these sometimes alienated groups.12
The Bar's brief asserts that a mandatory bar is less likely to come under the control of discrete elements of the profession and that "it is particularly important that young lawyers, government lawyers, women and minority lawyers and lawyers who practice in rural areas have a strong voice in an integrated bar." Bar's Brief in Support of Petition, at 16. The Bar does not explain how its new structure as a unified bar will accomplish these goals. More about this later.
I wrote in 1983 that I was not persuaded that a unified bar is inherently better , than a voluntary bar in *40performing the services the State Bar ascribes to itself.13 I am now persuaded that the disadvantages of a unified bar outweigh any claimed advantages.
Our legal system and our fundamental liberties rest to a large extent on an independent bar and an independent judiciary. The bench and bar should, I believe, strive for amicable relations, but the public interest requires that each be independent of the other. It is important for bar organizations to be free to take positions not favored by the bench, and for the bench to regulate the practice of law in the public interest (which may pot necessarily be in the interest of individual lawyers or a bar organization). The unified State Bar of Wisconsin, controlled as it is by this court,14 cannot be independent, as many lawyers have openly acknowledged.15 That's not good.
*41A unified bar is handicapped in speaking out about legislative and public policy issues because of the limitations placed on it by the constitution and the Keller decision.16
The dividing line between expenditures chargeable and not chargeable to mandatory dues is still unclear. For instance what does "improving the 'quality of legal services' " mean? As the United States Supreme Court wrote, "precisely where the line falls . . . will not always be easy to discern." Keller, 496 U.S. at 15. The Court concluded that only "the extreme ends of the spectrum are clear." Keller, 496 U.S. at 15. Professor David Luban concludes that the Keller opinion "leaves unanswered the question of how much of the bar's narrow law reform mission the Court has pared away. Even though the Court may believe it is finally through with the issue, the issue is probably not through with the Court." David Luban, The Disengagement of the Legal Profession: Keller v. State Bar of California, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 163, 185. Mandatory dues spent on legislative or other activities will raise legitimate questions about the proper clas*42sification of the activities. Discord and disagreement among members of the State Bar about which activities may be supported by mandatory dues will be a continuing issue.17
I agree with Professor Luban that the Keller decision may very well cause a unified bar to refrain from engaging in law reform. This will eliminate the bar association as an important forum for lawyers to discuss these matters and as a key entity working for the public interest. David Luban, The Disengagement of the Legal Profession: Keller v. State Bar of California, 1990 Sup. Ct. Rev. 163, 202.
A debate has raged across the country this past 75 years about the merits of a unified bar.18 Opinions have *43been and remain divided. For 75 years no one has resolved the issue of what activities are appropriate for a unified bar association, or whether a unified bar is better than a voluntary one. The arguments in favor of a unified bar are based on the public interest, lawyers' self interest, and the interests of the bar association. Professor Ted Schneyer studied the State Bar of Wisconsin and concluded that its performance did not justify the claims for a unified bar. Professor Schneyer summed it up perfectly when he wrote: "The unified bar's problem lies in its inherently confused legal and political status-which has trapped the institution in a crossfire of values. Sixty years after the beginning of unified bars, lawyers, judges and legislators still cannot figure out how the institution fits into our political scheme. They are unsure whether, or when, to regard a unified bar as a private voluntary association, á public agency or a compulsory membership organization. They are therefore unable to decide with any consistency which of the three corresponding policies should predominate in unified bar affairs — association autonomy, public accountability or *44the protection of captive members."19
The United States Supreme Court has held that a unified bar with limited functions funded by mandatory dues does not violate constitutional rights. Nevertheless when there is serious doubt across the state and across the country about the merits of a unified bar, and when there is no demonstrated need for a unified bar in Wisconsin, I believe the values of attorneys' freedom of association and a bar association's freedom and independence from the court trump any claimed benefits of mandatory membership. I believe Wisconsin should have the best of both worlds — a voluntary, .independent, statewide general-purpose bar association and court-mandated annual assessments on lawyers to finance the court-supervised boards that carry out essential programs for regulating lawyers and improving the quality of legal services.
I also dissent from the amendments of the rules the court adopted which concentrate power in the Board of Governors and reduce the ability of individual members to participate in establishing Bar policy. See SCR 10.03, 10.07, 10.08, 10.13. By approving these amendments the majority has dismantled the open forums for the robust exchange of ideas.
The former rules required that an assembly of the members of the Bar be held at each annual and midwinter meeting or upon petition of 200 active members. A policy matter suggested by at least 10 members had to be placed on the agenda of the meeting. Notice of the time, place and agenda of the assembly was given to each *45member by mail or publication in the Bar Bulletin. A quorum of at least 300 members present in person was required. The assembly could take binding action on any matter on the agenda. In addition, at each annual meeting, at a time and place stated in the printed program, the members had an opportunity to confer with the officers and executive committee and present any complaints or suggestions for the improvement of the State Bar. SCR 10.07 (1992).
Under the amended rules, effective July 1,1992, the two annual required assemblies of members will no longer take place. Under the new rules, an assembly of members may, but need not, be held at each annual and midwinter meeting; the purpose of the assembly is limited to "discussing any issue of association public policy." SCR 10.07(2), 166 Wis. 2d at xxiii.
Under the former rules, SCR 10.03 (5) (a) provided that any change in the Bar dues must be made by a vote of the membership at an annual or midwinter assembly or in a referendum. Review by the supreme court was available on petition of 25 Bar members. Under the amended rules, effective July 1, 1992, changes in the dues may be made by the Board of Governors alone. 166 Wis. 2d xxii-xxiii.
Under the former rules, SCR 10.13(1) provided that proposals for amendment of chapter 10 regulating the Bar could be presented to the supreme court by the Board of Governors or by petition approved by a vote of a majority of members present at two consecutive meetings of the Bar. The new SCR 10.13(1) provides that proposals for amendment of chapter 10 may be presented only by the Board of Governors or through the referendum procedure. 166 Wis. 2d xxvi.
The amended rules, effective July 1, 1992, further limit the rights of individual members or a minority *46group by making the referendum procedure more difficult. Under the old rule, 300 signatures were needed on a petition to submit a referendum to the members. Under the newly adopted rules, 1,000 signatures are heeded on such a petition, including at least 50 signatures from each of the State Bar's six districts. As if these restrictions were not sufficient to dissuade dissidents, the court adopted an additional requirement at the State Bar's request: the signatures must be obtained within the 90 days before the petition is filed.
Should a dissident group succeed in meeting these petition requirements, the 1,000 petitioners are still not assured that their issue will be brought before the membership for a vote. The amended rules give the executive director of the State Bar the power to determine whether the petition question is "properly the subject of a referendum." SCR 10.08(6). Any disputes concerning the executive director's decision are resolved by the Board of Governors. 166 Wis. 2d xxiii-xxvi.
Referendums will be conducted only once a year, simultaneous with the election of officers of the State Bar, namely in May. The petition of 1,000 members for a referendum has to be filed at the State Bar headquarters on the first business day in January to be on the May ballot. A referendum initiated by the Board of Governors need not, however, be authorized until February 28 to be on the ballot in May.
The Bar's brief in support of its petition for reinstatement of the unified bar stresses that a unified bar will be stronger than a voluntary bar because of the diversity of members and of opinion. The brief states: "Dissenting opinions on issues affecting the regulation of the legal profession are important in the formulation of policy. Encouragement of dissent in the integrated bar has prevented the Bar from becoming a sterile organiza*47tion in place of the innovative organization that most lawyers are proud to join." State Bar's Brief at 17.20 After the court ordered integration of the Bar, the State Bar sent a letter to each of its members stressing the value of diversity of opinion and dissent and pledging to be responsive to the members' needs and concerns. I applaud these efforts. I cannot help but note, however, that the Bar's proposed, amendments (which the court adopted verbatim) have eliminated forums in which members could express their views, including their disagreements with the Board of Governors, and have made it much more difficult for members to challenge the Board's and officers' decisions.
HH HH
To meet constitutional requirements and to address the use of compulsory dues for activities other than those allowed by the Keller decision, the State Bar proposed that an arbitration procedure be combined with dues reduction. The court adopted the Bar's proposal which distinguishes among groups of lawyers for purposes of refunding any dues reduction an arbitrator may award. Only those who request arbitration and those who are admitted to the State Bar after the date of the arbitrator's decision are eligible to receive refunds as a result of the arbitrator's award. SCR 10.03(5)(b)5. A member who withholds a pro rata portion of dues budgeted for activities that cannot be supported by compulsory dues but who does not demand arbitration does not get the benefit of the arbitration decision. In effect this *48rule permits the State Bar to spend compulsory dues on purposes an arbitrator determines to be improper. This result is troublesome.
I see no reason for requiring each member who chooses dues reduction to request and participate in arbitration, which may be a time consuming and costly effort. In 1987, the court asked the Bar to propose a dues reduction procedure whereby all members who had elected dues reduction would share in any additional reduction resulting from arbitration. The court at that time believed this approach to be "reasonable." In re Petition to Review Bar Amendments, 139 Wis. 2d 686, 693, 694, 407 N.W.2d 923 (1987). I still do. I would have adopted a rule providing that the arbitration awards be refunded to all attorneys who chose to pay only the mandatory portion of bar dues.
****
Although I would have preferred a voluntary bar association, I join the majority opinion in urging all lawyers to participate in the work of the State Bar. This will ensure that the Bar works in the public interest and truly represents the diversity of its members.

The order appears at 166 Wis. 2d xxix (1992).
On March 22-23, 1991, the Board of Governors voted 26-14 to file a petition to reinstate the integrated bar in Wisconsin. According to the Brief in Support of the Board of Governors Petition to Reinstate the State Bar of Wisconsin Mandatory Membership Rule, after the Board of Governors' vote, a drafting committee was appointed to prepare the petition for an integrated bar, taking into account the Keller decision and to recommend other changes to SCR Chapter 10, including review of a pending petition of the State Bar with the court concerning the governing structure of the Bar. The Executive Committee of the State Bar approved the submission of the integrated bar petition to this court on April 24, 1991. The petition was filed on May 16, 1991.

The amendments of the rules are in an order filed on March 13, 1992, and appear at 166 Wis. 2d xxi (1992). These rule changes were apparently not adopted by the Board of Governors in 1992. In August, 1987, the Board of Governors submitted a substantially similar proposal to the court for amending the rules relating to setting dues and the referendum procedure. The Court at that time received numerous communications from individual lawyers and one from the Racine County Bar Association objecting to one or more of these changes.

I previously dissented from an order refusing to open the decision-making conference on the State Bar's petition to reintegrate the bar. 166 Wis. 2d xv (1992). I believe the court should *33discuss and decide rule-making and administrative matters in open, public sessions.

Professor Schneyer spent the 1981-82 academic year as a visiting scholar at the American Bar Foundation researching the unified bar. His views are set forth in The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept, 1983 Am. Bar Found. Res. J. 1.

SCR 10.03(5)(b)l, 166 Wis. 2d at xxii; Majority opinion at 24-25.
SCR 10.03 (5) (b)l provides:
"The state bar may use compulsory dues only for activities reasonably intended for the purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the quality of legal services offered by members of the state bar. Other activities must be supported by voluntary dues, user fees or other sources of revenue.”

The court-appointed Kelly committee listed eight substantive professional activities that all licensed lawyers may be required to support. In Wisconsin, entities other than the Bar have primary responsibility for these activities. Patricia Heim, The Case for a Voluntary Bar, 64 Wis. Lawyer 10, 60 (Feb. 1991).
As the former executive director of the State Bar wrote to the *35court on February 14,1992: "Our bar has never sought to control the members in their practice or activities. It does things for lawyers, not to them."

In re Regulation of the Bar of Wisconsin, 74 Wis. 2d ix (1976); In re Regulation of the Bar of Wisconsin, 81 Wis. 2d xxxv, xliv (1976). See also Matter of Discontinuation of the Wisconsin State Bar, 93 Wis. 2d 385, 389-90, 286 N.W.2d 601 (1980) (Day and Callow, JJ., dissenting), and Report of Committee to Review the State Bar, 112 Wis. 2d xix, xxxvi, 334 N.W.2d 544 (1983) (Abrahamson, J., concurring).
See also Report of the Commission on Evaluation of Disciplinary Enforcement to the American Bar Association (May 1991) recommending that investigative, prosecutorial and adjudicative functions of lawyer discipline be independent of elected bar officials.

The court's mandatory assessment on the lawyers of the state also supports the Client Security Fund to protect the public.

The United States Supreme Court has defined "free riders" in the collective bargaining process as those who "refuse to contribute to the union while obtaining benefits of union representation that necessarily accrue to all employees." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 222 (1977).
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a unanimous court in Keller, wrote about free riders in the bar association context as follows: "It is entirely appropriate that all of the lawyers who benefit from the unique status of being among those admitted to practice before the courts should be called upon to pay a fair share of the cost of the professional involvement in this effort." Keller, 496 U.S. at 12. Chief Justice Rehnquist concluded that "Here the compelled association and integrated bar is justified by the State's interest in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. The State Bar may therefore constitutionally fund activities germane to those goals out of the mandatory dues of all members." 496 U.S. at 13-14.

Unified bars in other states differ from the State Bar of Wisconsin in their functions and in the degree of control by the judiciary. For a description of the California State Bar, see, e.g., Anthony Murray, The Unified Bar Serves the Public Interest, California Lawyer, May 1983, at 13.

The high rate of participation in the voluntary bar should be compared to the high percentage of lawyers who objected to the continuation of the unified bar. In 1979 after the Bar refused to hold a petitioned-for referendum relating to unification, several bar members financed an independent vote of the membership on the unification question. Sixty percent of those voting favored a voluntary bar. Matter of Discontinuation of Wisconsin State Bar, 93 Wis. 2d 385, 386, 286 N.W.2d 601 (1980).

In connection with the Bar's petition to reinstate the unified bar, Attorney Erica M. Eisinger, Chair, Special Committee oh the Participation of Women in the Bar, wrote Daniel W. Hildebrand, President of the State Bar of Wisconsin, on Feb. 11, 1992, as follows: "It is often contended that a unified bar will facilitate greater participation of women and minorities than a voluntary bar. The Special Committee on Participation in the Bar believes it would be helpful to the Court, the Bar, and the public to consider information on the participation of women and minorities in the Bar during a comparable period of time under each system." Mr. Hildebrand and Steve Smay, Executive Director of the Bar, furnished information to the court on the participation of women in the bar. See letters of Feb. 13 (Abrahamson, J.), 19 (Hildebrand), 26 (Smay), 27 (Abrahamson, J.), March 3 (Smay), March 6 (Smay), 9 (Hildebrand), 1992, all on file in In the Matter of Supreme Court Rules of Chapter 10: Regulation of the State Bar, Office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court, Madison, Wis.

Report of the Committee to Review the State Bar, 112 Wis. 2d at xxxiii (Abrahamson, J., concurring).

This court has the power to exercise control over the Bar and has used this power. Among other things, the court has ordered the State Bar to stop using a dues checkoff procedure to raise contributions for the Wisconsin Bar Foundation; voided a bar assessment to raise funds for an institutional advertising campaign; altered the Bar's governance structure giving the Assembly of Members additional powers; placed nonlawyers on the Board of Governors; and forbade the Bar to involve itself in the activities of a lawyers' political action committee.

Wisconsin attorney Steven Levine wrote that a comment he heard all too frequently in his years on the Wisconsin State Bar Board of Governors was " 'How will it play to the supreme court?' Whenever a controversial proposal was debated at a bar meeting, the supreme court's reaction was a prime consideration in whether the board went ahead with the action. A voluntary bar would be an independent. bar — independent to follow its own will." Steven Levine, Time to Move to a Voluntary Bar, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 213, 217.
*41The president of the voluntary New York State Bar Association wrote: "A further factor in the life of the unified bar is the existence of control and authority exercised by the highest court over the affairs of the association. One benefit, of course, is the state-action protection available in anti-trust actions. This, however, may be more than offset by the loss of unrestricted self-determination and the ever-present risk of disagreement with the supervising judiciary which must produce sobering, if not chilling, effects in the contemplation of action known to be out of favor or likely to cause conflicts." Alexander D. Forger, The President's Message, N.Y. St. B.J., June 1981, at 263.

For a discussion of the State Bar of Wisconsin's limited role in lobbying about medical malpractice reform, see Ted Schneyer, Sunset for the Unified Bar?, Sept./Oct. 1986 Bar Leader 20, 31.

See Matter of Discontinuation of the Wisconsin State Bar, 93 Wis. 2d at 391 (Day and Callow, JJ., dissenting); Matter of Amendment of State Bar Rules, 127 Wis. 2d at xiii (Abrahamson, J., dissenting); Patricia Heim, The Case for the Voluntary Bar, 64 Wis. Lawyer 10, 11 (Feb. 1991); News, What are the Big Savings?, A.B.A.J., March 1991, at 36.

Herbert Harley the founder of the American Judicature Society is generally credited with beginning the unification movement with a speech to the Lancaster County Bar Association in Lincoln, Nebraska on December 28,1914. Stephen E. Kalish, The Nebraska Supreme Court, the Practice of Law and the Regulation of Attorneys, 59 Neb. L. Rev. 555, 556 (1980).
For discussions of unified and voluntary bars, see, e.g., James K. Robinson, Meeting Keller's Challenge to the Future of Michigan's Integrated Bar, June 1991 Mich. B.J. 516; Patricia Heim, The Case for a Voluntary Bar, 64 Wis. Lawyer 10 (Feb. 1991); Irvin Chame, The Case for a Mandatory Bar, 64 Wis. Lawyer 10 (Feb. 1991); Steven Levine, Time to Move to a Voluntary Bar, 1990 Wis. L. Rev. 213, 217; Robert W. Webster, The Keller Decision, July 1990 Mich. B.J. 628; The Sun Still Shines, Sept./Oct. 1986 Bar Leader 19; Ted Schneyer, Sunset for the Unified Bar?, Sept./Oct. 1986 Bar Leader 20; Charles W. Sorenson, Jr., The *43Integrated Bar and the Freedom, of Nonassociation — Continuing Seige, 63 Neb. L. Rev. 33 (1983); Ted Schneyer, The Incoherence of the Unified Bar Concept: Generalizing from the Wisconsin Case, 1983 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 1; Edward D. Lascher, Dismantle the Unified Bar, May 1983 California Lawyer 12; Alexander D. Forger, The President's Message, June 1981 N.Y. St. B.J. 263; Special Project, Compelled Financial Support of a Bar Association and the Attorney's First Amendment Rights: A Theoretical Analysis, 66 Neb. L. Rev. 762 (1987); Note, Renovating the Bar after Keller v. State Bar of California: A Proposal for Strict Limits on Compulsory Fee Expenditure, 25 U. San. Fran. L. Rev. 681 (1991); Note, Beginnings: Integration Comes to Texas, Feb. 1989 Tex. B.J. 196.

Ted Schneyer, Sunset for the Unified Bar?, Sept./Oct. 1986 Bar Leader 20, 22.

The State Bar's brief explains that the integrated bar was not foisted upon unwilling members by current leadership but was subject to open debate, published views and informed member participation before a decision was made.