Court Opinion

ID: 9392548
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-05 14:05:50.330479+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:46.504216
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: APRIL 28, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                         Court of Appeals
                            NO. 2022-CA-0764-MR

ED WALTON                                                          APPELLANT

                APPEAL FROM KNOX CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE MICHAEL O. CAPERTON, JUDGE
                     ACTION NO. 04-CI-00148

CHARLENE SUE KING, AS THE
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF EARL CARTER; AND KNOX
COUNTY FISCAL COURT                                                APPELLEES

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; COMBS AND JONES, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Ed Walton appeals from the May 26, 2022 order of the Knox

Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of Knox County Fiscal Court

(“Knox County”) and Charlene King, as the Administratrix of the Estate of Earl

Carter (“King”). For the reasons more fully explained below, we affirm.
                    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             This action has been on the circuit court’s docket for nineteen years,

and this is the second appeal. In an unpublished opinion, a prior panel of this

Court summarized the relevant facts as follows:

                   A road in Knox County, commonly referred to as
             J. Goodin Branch Road, is at the heart of this dispute.
             The road clearly exists. It was originally constructed in
             the 1970s and originates at U.S. 25 in Knox County. The
             question is: where does J. Goodin Branch Road end?

                    In 2000, Knox County paved J. Goodin Branch
             Road, at least in part, starting at U.S. 25 and ending at a
             house belonging to Beulah and Bazel Smith, Earl
             Carter’s predecessors in title. The Smiths later sold the
             land to Carter in 2002 (Carter Tract). Today, there exists
             a gravel school bus turnaround where the paved road
             terminates on the Carter Tract. Beyond that point, the
             record suggests the alleged road is made up of dirt and
             grass.

                    Walton owns property adjacent to the Carter Tract
             (Walton Tract). He does not reside there. In fact, no one
             has lived on the Walton Tract since 1972. The only
             means of access to the Walton Tract, according to
             Walton, is J. Goodin Branch Road.

                    Walton has long proclaimed, since the early 1990s,
             in fact, that J. Goodin Branch Road is an official county
             road that extends through the Carter Tract all the way,
             and into, the Walton Tract. The Smiths, and later Carter,
             disagreed; at various times they blocked the road by
             means of a gate, preventing Walton from accessing his
             land. Carter claims, and before him the Smiths claimed,
             that the road terminates at the school bus turnaround
             point – where the paved portion ends.

                                         -2-
       Walton filed suit against Carter in 2004, requesting
that the circuit court find J. Goodin Branch Road is a
county road that passes across the Carter Tract and ends
at or on the Walton Tract. Walton amended his
complaint several times, adding additional defendants,
including Knox County, but his cause of action did not
change. The case lingered for several years, culminating
in a bench trial on September 21, 2011. At the close of
Walton’s case-in-chief, the circuit court allegedly issued
a verbal order dismissing Walton’s claim of a county
road. It also entered a written order dismissing Knox
County as a party.

      Then, for the first time, the issue of whether
Walton might be afforded access by way of an easement
by necessity arose. The circuit court granted Carter’s
motion to recess the trial to investigate the claim.

        Neither party requested that the trial recommence.
Instead, on January 18, 2012, Carter filed a motion for
summary judgment on the easement issue. The circuit
court granted his motion by order entered July 9, 2012,
finding no evidence of either unity of title of the two
tracts, or severance of that unity, if it indeed existed.

       Walton filed a [Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure
(“CR”)] 59.05 motion to alter or amend the judgment,
arguing he is entitled to access to his property as a matter
of right – not by means of an easement – by way of an
official county road, and the circuit court failed to
address the county-road issue in its judgment. By order
entered August 13, 2012, the circuit court overruled
Walton’s motion, stating:

      Following the Court’s oral rulings at the
      bench trial, the issue of the easement was
      the only remaining question to be ruled
      upon.

                            -3-
                   [Walton] contends that because the Court
                   did not specifically address the issue of
                   whether J. Goodin Branch Road extends to
                   his property in the prior order granting
                   judgment in favor of the [Estate], that the
                   issue was not addressed. However, this
                   issue was resolved following the admission
                   of evidence at trial in an oral ruling. The
                   Court sees no reason to disrupt that prior
                   ruling.

Walton v. Lawson, No. 2012-CA-001550-MR, 2016 WL 3661939, at *1-2 (Ky.

App. Jul. 1, 2016) (footnotes omitted).

            This Court affirmed the circuit court’s finding that there was no

easement of necessity but reversed and remanded for the circuit court to enter

“written findings of fact, legal conclusions, and a judgment related to Walton’s

claim that a county road extends to his land.” Id. at *4. On remand, the circuit

court allowed Walton to file an amended complaint, which brought Knox County

back into the lawsuit. Discovery commenced yet again and Walton propounded

requests for admissions upon Knox County on September 25, 2017. Knox County

filed its responses on December 13, 2017. There is no question the responses were

not filed within the thirty (30)-day time limit pursuant to CR 36.01. However,

Walton did not file a motion to compel, a motion to quash, or otherwise bring

Knox County’s untimeliness to the circuit court’s attention prior to filing a motion

for summary judgment.

                                          -4-
               In July 2019, King filed a motion for summary judgment. Both

Walton and Knox County filed similar motions in the months that followed. It was

at that point Walton argued for the first time that Knox County’s failure to timely

respond resulted in admissions pursuant to CR 36.01 (i.e., approximately two years

after the responses were filed). On May 26, 2022, the circuit court granted

summary judgment in favor of King and Knox County.1 This appeal followed.

                                 II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

               “Our standard of review in matters involving a trial court’s rulings on

evidentiary issues and discovery disputes is abuse of discretion.” Manus, Inc. v.

Terry Maxedon Hauling, Inc., 191 S.W.3d 4, 8 (Ky. App. 2006).

                                         III. ANALYSIS

               The issue before us on appeal is very narrow: Did the circuit court err

by not deeming Knox County to have admitted Walton’s requests for admissions

by virtue of the fact that Knox County did not submit its responses in a timely

manner? Of course, if we answer this question in the affirmative as Walton urges,

the implication is Knox County will have admitted the road at issue is a county

1
 In granting summary judgment on remand, the circuit court noted that the prior panel of this
Court “did not find that there was insufficient evidence in the record for [the circuit court] to
make a [summary judgment] ruling.”

                                                -5-
road that extends and permits access to, Walton’s property.2 However, we discern

no error.

              The circuit court found Walton’s argument was without merit. To wit,

              As previously noted herein, Knox County Attorney
              Gilbert Holland filed an Answer to Plaintiff’s Requests
              for Admissions in December 2017, wherein Knox
              County’s position that the county road at issue does not
              extend onto Walton’s property was reiterated. This was a
              reiteration of the county’s position throughout the fifteen-
              year history of this matter, a position which has not
              changed – as can also be said of [Walton] and the other
              parties in this matter.

              Accordingly, this Court does not find that [Walton’s]
              allegations are “deemed admitted” by [Knox County],
              and indeed notes that as our Kentucky Supreme Court
              has previously held, when a County has “otherwise
              defended” an action, default is improper. Lexington
              Fayette Co. Food & Bev. Ass’n v. Lexington Fayette
              Urban Co. Govt., 131 S.W.3d 745, [756-57] (Ky. 2004).
              Accordingly, the Court turns to an analysis of the
              substantive issue before it.

              The record before us shows Knox County has been a party to this

action since 2008.3 In January 2009, Knox County filed its answers to

interrogatories propounded by Walton. In doing so, it denied any plans to create

2
  “The penalty for failure to respond is that the matters are deemed admitted, not entry of
judgment against the non-responding party.” Brown v. Kentucky Lottery Corp., 891 S.W.2d 90,
91 (Ky. App. 1995).
3
  An order was entered on September 18, 2007, granting Walton’s motion to add Knox County
as a party; however, Walton did not follow through with service on Knox County until 2008.

                                            -6-
and maintain a county roadway on the Carter property and denied that it has ever

maintained a roadway beyond the gravel school bus turnaround on the Carter

property. This has been Knox County’s position throughout the underlying

litigation. It participated in the 2011 trial, and the directed verdict in its favor was

the basis of Walton’s first appeal. Upon remand from this Court in 2016, Knox

County’s position did not change, even though its responses to Walton’s requests

for admissions were filed outside of the 30-day time limit imposed by CR 36.01.

             CR 36.01(2) states, in relevant part, that “[e]ach matter of which an

admission is requested shall be separately set forth. The matter is admitted unless,

within 30 days after service of the request, or within such shorter or longer time as

the court may allow[.]” (Emphasis added.) In other words, “the trial court retains

wide discretion to permit a party’s response to a request for admissions to be filed

outside the 30 or 45-day time limit delineated by the rule.” Harris v. Stewart, 981

S.W.2d 122, 124 (Ky. App. 1998). Although Walton never filed a motion to

compel and Knox County never filed a motion asking for more time to file its

responses, the circuit court effectively granted Knox County an extension of time

and doing so was well within its discretion. Walton essentially argues the 30-day

limit is a bright line rule with no flexibility, but such a position is contrary not only

to the plain reading of the rule, but also to published caselaw. Moreover, Walton

has never argued that the delayed responses resulted in any prejudice to

                                           -7-
presentation of his case. Id. at 125.4 Indeed, as the circuit court noted, Knox

County has steadfastly maintained that the county road does not extend past the

Carter tract throughout this very long litigation. We do not appreciate any

prejudice to Walton in the presentation of his case by allowing Knox County to

answer the requests out of time. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the circuit

court abused its discretion over the discovery process when it refused to deem the

requests admitted based on the late responses.5

                                      IV. CONCLUSION

               For the reasons stated herein, the order of the Knox Circuit Court is

affirmed.

               ALL CONCUR.

4
  Interestingly, as King points out in her brief to this Court, Walton failed to respond to her
requests for admissions within thirty days pursuant to CR 36.01. If the circuit court followed the
rule as stringently as Walton insists is proper, King’s requests would be deemed admitted by
Walton, and in direct contradiction to what Walton argues was admitted by Knox County. “The
rule of law should, in the interest of justice and fairness, cut both ways since ‘what is sauce for
the goose is sauce for the gander.’” Borders Self-Storage & Rentals, LLC v. Transportation
Cabinet, Department of Highways, 636 S.W.3d 452, 456 (Ky. 2021).
5
  We appreciate the circuit court’s analogy to not granting a default judgment in an action the
government “otherwise defended” pursuant to Lexington Fayette County Food and Beverage
Ass’n, supra. However, the law cited by the circuit court was merely analogous and not on-
point. Nevertheless, an appellate court is permitted to “affirm a correct result upon any ground
supported by the record.” Wells v. Commonwealth, 512 S.W.3d 720, 722 (Ky. 2017).

                                                -8-
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:       BRIEF FOR APPELLEE KNOX
                           COUNTY FISCAL COURT:
Matthew J. Baker
Bowling Green, Kentucky    Jason E. Williams
                           London, Kentucky

                           BRIEF FOR APPELLEE
                           CHARLENE SUE KING:

                           John M. Gambrel
                           Pineville, Kentucky

                          -9-