Court Opinion

ID: 9943149
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-22 19:03:41.128201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:46:14.352318
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/21/24 P. v. Rodriguez CA1/4
                NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been
certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

        IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                 FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                            DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                            A165060
 v.
                                                               (Humboldt County
 ULISSES RODRIGUEZ,                                            Super. Ct. No. CR1804051)
          Defendant and Appellant.

        After a jury found Ulisses Rodriguez guilty of murdering two people
and committing other felonies, the trial court sentenced him to prison. In
this appeal, Rodriguez challenges the court’s evidentiary rulings concerning
John Doe (an eyewitness to some of the charged conduct), argues the court
failed to conduct a sufficient inquiry before denying his post-verdict Marsden1
motion, and contends the court’s April 4, 2022 order imposing fines and fees
violated his right to be present at sentencing. We agree with Rodriguez’s
position concerning the fines and fees but reject his other claims. For those
reasons, we remand the matter for a hearing on fines and fees and otherwise
affirm the judgment.

        1 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).

                                                        1
                              BACKGROUND
      Rodriguez had a business relationship with Lenea Wilkes, who owned
land in the China Creek area in Humboldt County. Wilkes allowed
Rodriguez to grow marijuana there in exchange for a share of the plants or
proceeds when the harvest was ready. Wilkes had a similar arrangement
with Jose Sanchez, who grew marijuana on plots neighboring the ones used
by Rodriguez. Victims Jeremy K. and Tiffany E. (collectively, victims) lived
in their SUV on the lower part of the China Creek property and cared for
Rodriguez’s marijuana crop in exchange for either a portion of the harvest or
part of the profit.
      Doe was a prosecution witness and a friend of Sanchez. He testified at
the preliminary hearing that in August 2018, he was working on one of the
marijuana “grows” on Wilkes’s property when Rodriguez told him about a
dispute he had with the victims: Rodriguez said that “if they were gonna go
and take his bushes, he didn’t want to go and see them around there.”
Further, if Rodriguez were to come back and find them there, “he was gonna
hurt them or something bad was going to happen.” When Rodriguez returned
to the grow, Doe heard about five or six gunshots before Rodriguez
approached him, carrying a pistol in his hand. Rodriguez brought Doe to the
SUV, where Doe saw two victims lying dead. According to Rodriguez, “it was
gonna get bad” for Doe if he didn’t help Rodriguez dispose of the bodies.
      After the preliminary hearing, Rodriguez moved in limine to introduce
evidence of Doe’s November 2019 arrest for selling two ounces of
methamphetamine and the prosecution made a successful in limine motion
seeking to determine the admissibility of that (and other) evidence pursuant
to Evidence Code section 402 (undesignated statutory references are to this
code). The court ruled that Rodriguez could ask Doe about the arrest but

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denied the defense’s request to call the investigating officers to testify about
the details. At the section 402 hearing, in addition to examining Doe on the
arrest, Rodriguez asked about Doe’s application for a “U Visa”—a
“nonimmigrant status . . . set aside for victims of certain crimes” who “are
helpful to law enforcement . . . .” After concluding that Doe had little
familiarity with the U Visa process, the court ruled: “[A]s to the details or
how to do it, I think there would be a lack of foundation for any of that.”
      Rodriguez went to trial on an information charging two counts of
murder (Pen. Code, § 187, subd. (a)), one count of making criminal threats
(Pen. Code, § 422), and one count of committing arson (Pen. Code, § 451,
subd. (d)). The information also alleged that that Rodriguez had suffered
multiple murder convictions in the same case and personally used a firearm
(Pen. Code, § 12022.53, subd. (d)) in making the criminal threat and
committing both murders. The jury found him guilty as charged.
      Before the sentencing hearing, Rodriguez made an unsuccessful
Marsden motion. He was thereafter sentenced to prison. Three days later, on
April 4, 2022, and in Rodriguez’s absence, the court imposed fines and fees on
him by written order.
                                 DISCUSSION
   I. Rodriguez Forfeited His Claim of Error in the Trial Court’s
      Rulings Concerning Doe’s November 2019 Arrest
      Rodriguez first argues the trial court erred in its ruling on a defense
motion in limine concerning Doe’s arrest for selling methamphetamine.
      To place the issue in context, we provide the following additional
background information. After the preliminary hearing, Rodriguez moved in
limine to seek: (1) permission to inquire whether Doe was “currently facing
felony prosecution for drug trafficking of methamphetamine”; and

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(2) inclusion of testimony from two “Drug Task Force Agents” who had “been
subpoenaed to testify to the specifics of the investigation” that led to Doe’s
arrest on those charges in November 2019—more than a year after the events
of Rodriguez’s case. At the hearing on the motion, the trial court permitted
Rodriguez to ask John Doe if he is facing felony prosecution for drug
trafficking but denied the motion as to the proffered testimony of the two
investigating officers. According to the court, the latter testimony was
irrelevant.
      “Evidence of circumstances underlying a conviction is admissible to
impeach credibility if the proponent demonstrates that the evidence has ‘any
tendency in reason’ to disprove credibility.”2 (People v. Dalton (2019)
7 Cal.5th 166, 214.) In the trial court, Rodriguez failed to make any such
demonstration. In his written motion in limine, he offered one specific
rationale for the proffered evidence’s “tendency in reason to . . . disprove the
truthfulness of” Doe’s testimony: linking Doe to high levels of
methamphetamine in the victims’ bodies at the time of their death. (§ 780.)
According to Rodriguez, this would provide a motive for Doe “to kill the
decedents.” At the hearing on the motion, defense counsel repeated the same
speculative rationale, and no other. And it was for this sole purpose, as
advanced by Rodriguez, that the trial court found the details of Doe’s arrest
irrelevant.
      On appeal, Rodriguez argues for the first time that the trial court
should have granted the motion on the grounds that the details of Doe’s

      2 As Rodriguez notes (and the People do not dispute), the same

principle may apply to conduct that does not result in a conviction. (See
People v. Wheeler (1992) 4 Cal.4th 284, 297, fn. 7 [witness may be impeached
with conduct involving moral turpitude even though the witness was not
convicted].)

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arrest have a “ ‘tendency in reason’ to disprove credibility” because they
concern a crime of moral turpitude. (People v. Dalton, supra, 7 Cal.5th at
p. 214.) But below, only the prosecutor referred to moral turpitude while
conceding at the hearing that Doe could be questioned about the pending
charges—an inquiry the court’s ruling permitted. Rodriguez, on the other
hand, never argued (or even mentioned) moral turpitude in his motion or at
the hearing. “A party cannot argue the court erred in failing to conduct an
analysis it was not asked to conduct.” (People v. Partida (2005) 37 Cal.4th
428, 435.) We therefore conclude that Rodriguez has forfeited this claim on
appeal.
   II. Rodriguez Has Adduced No Error in the Trial Court’s Rulings
      Concerning Evidence of Doe’s Application for a U Visa
      Next, Rodriguez argues the trial court erred in excluding evidence that
“Doe had an application pending for a ‘U Visa.’ ” We disagree.
      At the same hearing in which the trial court ruled on Rodriguez’s
motion concerning Doe’s November 2019 arrest, the court also granted
without objection the prosecution’s in limine motion for a hearing on the
admissibility of any evidence the defense wished to present, excepting
Rodriguez’s own testimony. (§ 402.) Then, at the section 402 hearing,
Rodriguez questioned Doe about his application for a U Visa, and after
acknowledging that “getting help by law enforcement to stay in this country
. . . can be argued that it’s bias,” the court ruled: “So as far as that goes, he’s
applied. He’s established he’s applied. But as to the details or how to do it, I
think there would be a lack of foundation for any of that.”
      On appeal, Rodriguez challenges that ruling, arguing the trial “court’s
statements here, fairly read, was [sic] that there was to be no evidence as [to]
the U Visa criteria in the absence of an ‘expert’ or specialized witness.”

                                         5
“Perhaps the most fundamental rule of appellate law is that the judgment
challenged on appeal is presumed correct, and it is the appellant’s burden to
affirmatively demonstrate error.” (People v. Sanghera (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573.) Here, it is not clear that Rodriguez’s
purportedly fair reading accurately construes the court’s ruling, or that the
ruling even excluded the evidence he claims was excluded. For example,
nothing in the trial court’s ruling prevented Rodriguez from asking Doe
whether he applied for a U Visa, so there could not have been any erroneous
exclusion of evidence in that respect.
      Nor is it clear that the trial court excluded evidence as to the details of
the U Visa process, if that evidence came from witnesses other than Doe.
Before making its ruling, when the court asked defense counsel whether she
was going to call “an expert or someone who can explain to the jury” the
U Visa process, counsel averred that she “was likely going to discuss that
with other witnesses that investigated,” and the trial court replied, “Okay.”
Then, the court shifted its focus to Doe’s apparent lack of understanding as to
the U Visa process and made its ruling immediately thereafter. In context,
then, the trial court’s ruling appears only to have prevented Doe from giving
detailed testimony about the U Visa process—Rodriguez might have been
allowed to elicit those details from other witnesses. Thus, Rodriguez has
failed to affirmatively demonstrate error as to potential testimony from other
witnesses because he has failed in the first instance to demonstrate that the
court’s ruling actually excluded such evidence. (People v. Sanghera, supra,
139 Cal.App.4th at p. 1573.) For that reason, we reject Rodriguez’s claim
concerning evidence as to the U Visa criteria or process in general.
      Still, even if Rodriguez might have been allowed to question other
witnesses about the details of the U Visa process, the trial court did

                                         6
apparently prevent Rodriguez from eliciting testimony about those details
from Doe. But an “appellate contention that the erroneous admission or
exclusion of evidence violated a constitutional right is not preserved in the
absence of an objection on that ground below.” (People v. Daniels (2009)
176 Cal.App.4th 304, 320, fn. 10.) Here, with respect to potential testimony
from Doe regarding details of the U Visa process, Rodriguez’s counsel not
only failed to object to the exclusion—she also agreed with the reasoning
underlying it, conceding that Doe did not “understand[] the U Visa process.”
Consequently, to whatever extent Rodriguez argues the trial court erred in
excluding Doe’s testimony about that process, we conclude the claim is
forfeited.3
      Since we have reached “only one” claim of error that Rodriguez might
have “properly preserved for appeal, we need not address [his] contention
that cumulative error at trial requires reversal.” (People v. Richie (1994)
28 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1364 & fn. 6.) And having concluded that these claims
of error are either meritless or forfeited, we do not reach the Attorney
General’s contention that any such errors were harmless.

      3 Thus, in addition to forfeiting his first claim concerning Doe’s drug

trafficking arrest, Rodriguez has also forfeited any claim respecting the
exclusion of Doe’s potential testimony about the U Visa process, and he has
failed to demonstrate that the trial court actually excluded such U Visa
testimony from other witnesses. For those reasons, his case is readily
distinguishable from People v. Castaneda-Prado (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 1260,
whose application Rodriguez urges in a supplemental brief. In that case, the
trial court unambiguously “exclude[d] evidence about U Visas” and the
defendant’s attorney “ ‘made a fairly long record’ ” about the U Visa issue
during in limine motions before asking the court to reconsider its ruling prior
to the relevant witness’s testimony at trial. (Id. at pp. 1275–1276.)

                                       7
  III. The Trial Court Conducted a Sufficient Inquiry Before Denying
      Rodriguez’s Marsden Motion
      On the day of his sentencing hearing, Rodriguez moved to replace his
court-appointed counsel pursuant to Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d 118. With the
prosecutor absent from the courtroom, the court conducted a confidential
hearing at which Rodriguez alleged that his counsel had misled him about
the likelihood of continuing the sentencing hearing, had insufficient contact
with him, failed to “investigate certain things” or file motions she told
Rodriguez she would file. Counsel responded that she elected not to file a
motion for new trial because her investigations into jury misconduct had not
borne fruit and she believed that other issues were better raised on appeal;
she also acknowledged that she had “anticipated” that the sentencing hearing
would be continued because she thought the probation officer’s report might
be delayed. After allowing Rodriguez to respond to counsel’s remarks, the
court denied the Marsden motion.
      Rodriguez now argues the court erred in failing to conduct an adequate
inquiry in response to that motion. We disagree.
      “Marsden motions are subject to the following well-established rules.
‘ “ ‘When a defendant seeks to discharge his appointed counsel and substitute
another attorney, and asserts inadequate representation, the trial court must
permit the defendant to explain the basis of his contention and to relate
specific instances of the attorney’s inadequate performance. [Citation.] A
defendant is entitled to relief if the record clearly shows that the first
appointed attorney is not providing adequate representation [citation] or that
defendant and counsel have become embroiled in such an irreconcilable
conflict that ineffective representation is likely to result.’ ” ’ ” (People v.
Barnett (1998) 17 Cal.4th 1044, 1085.)

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      On appeal, Rodriguez identifies six purported shortcomings in the
court’s Marsden inquiry but fails to adduce error in any of those respects.
      Rodriguez’s first three complaints concern the court’s alleged failure to
develop a record that would specify what Rodriguez meant when he used
three vague phrases: “a bunch of motions,” “a lot of things in trial,” and “to
investigate certain things.”4 But as the Attorney General persuasively
argues, Rodriguez cites “no authority for the proposition that the court is
required to go beyond the explanation actually offered by a defendant.”
Rodriguez’s citations to two cases, including People v. Ivans (1992)
2 Cal.App.4th 1654, do nothing to refute this contention. In Ivans, when the
defendant stated only “ ‘some of the grounds’ ” on which he sought
replacement of counsel, the “court was required to inquire into” the unstated
grounds as well. (Id. at pp. 1665–1666 & fn. 8.) But here, Rodriguez did not
imply that there were any unstated grounds, he simply failed to articulate his
stated grounds in sufficient detail, despite being given multiple opportunities
to do so. And although Marsden “has been interpreted as requiring a court
not only to listen to a defendant’s volunteered reasons. . . , but also to make
an active inquiry into those reasons,” the court here conducted that active
inquiry by asking defense counsel to address Rodriguez’s allegations and then
asking Rodriguez to respond in turn. (See People v. Stewart (1985)
171 Cal.App.3d 388, 398.)

      4 As the sentencing hearing commenced, defense counsel allowed

Rodriguez to speak directly to the judge to request a continuance of the
sentencing hearing for himself. In the colloquy that followed, and to explain
why he wanted “more time,” Rodriguez explained that he understood that
“me and her were going to sit down and talk about filing motions—one of
them being a motion for new trial.” The court gave Rodriguez and his counsel
time to speak. The Marsden hearing occurred after the court took a recess.

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      Nor did the trial court fail to inquire sufficiently into the “assurance”
counsel allegedly gave Rodriguez as to continuing the sentencing hearing, as
Rodriguez’s fourth complaint suggests.5 According to Rodriguez, counsel told
him that “she was going to push off sentencing for a couple months to give
her more time to do what she needed to do.” When the court asked counsel to
respond to that allegation, she said: “I did tell him that I anticipated that
this date would get pushed out because I believe I did not have the” probation
officer’s pre-sentence report. Rodriguez contends that the court should have
explored the “major difference between what counsel was saying about what
she had ‘anticipated’ and what . . . Rodriguez had said about an ‘assurance.’ ”
But to “the extent there was a credibility question between defendant and
counsel at the hearing, the court was ‘entitled to accept counsel’s
explanation.’ ” (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696.)
      Similarly, there was no error in what Rodriguez describes as the trial
court’s “position that its focus at this hearing was prospective only . . . .” The
“nature” of such a hearing is “prospective”—focused on whether “a proper
showing has been made that counsel can no longer provide effective
representation . . . .” (People v. Dennis (1986) 177 Cal.App.3d 863, 871, italics
added.) And contrary to Rodriguez’s last objection, the existence of an
irremediable “conflict” is not a discrete ground, distinct from ineffective
representation, for granting a Marsden motion; it is simply one way of

      5 In his briefs, Rodriguez refers repeatedly to such an “assurance”—in

quotation marks—but that word does not appear in the sealed transcript of
the Marsden hearing. To the contrary, Rodriguez’s statements at the hearing
acknowledge that his trial counsel told him she would ask the court to
postpone the sentencing hearing for two more months. “[The attorney] told
me not to worry, that there were still a bunch of things to be done and to not
worry about this court date because she was going to be able to push it off, or
she was going to ask to get it pushed off for two months. And I believed her . .
. and it didn’t happen like that.” (Italics added.)

                                        10
making the requisite showing “ ‘ “ ‘that ineffective representation is likely to
result.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Barnett, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 1085.)
       In sum, the trial court’s Marsden inquiry was sufficient.
 IV. Rodriguez Is Entitled to a Limited Remand on the Issue of Fines
       and Fees
       Rodriguez argues the trial court erred in imposing fines and fees—
including a $10,000 restitution fine—in a minute order amended three days
after a sentencing hearing that did not address those matters. We agree.
       Penal Code section 977, subdivision (b)(1), provides in relevant part:
“[I]n all cases in which a felony is charged, the accused shall be physically
present . . . at the time of the imposition of sentence.” “A criminal defendant
has a ‘constitutional and statutory right to be present at [a] sentence
modification hearing and imposition of sentence.’ ” (People v. Nieves (2021)
11 Cal.5th 404, 508.) Restitution fines are “ ‘a significant aspect of a criminal
sentence.’ [Citations.] And [our Supreme Court has] confirmed defendant’s
right to be present when the trial court imposes restitution.” (Ibid.)
       This is not what occurred in this case. Here, the trial court imposed a
$10,000 restitution fine, as well as other fines and fees, outside of Rodriguez’s
presence and in violation of his “constitutional and statutory right . . . .”
(People v. Nieves, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 508.) As Rodriguez notes, the court’s
order thus deprived him of the opportunity to “interpose ‘ability to pay’ or
other objections.” (See People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, 1164–
71.)
       We reject the Attorney General’s contention that this deprivation was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as in People v. Jones (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 1028, 1035. Jones is inapposite: Jones was present for the
imposition of $370 in fines and fees but was unable to take advantage of the

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ruling in People v. Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 1071 (requiring an
ability-to-pay determination before the imposition of fines) because that case
had not yet been decided. (People v. Jones, supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 1030.)
Here, various fines and fees were added to a minute order after the
sentencing hearing, depriving Rodriguez of the opportunity to object under
Dueñas or on any other ground. The record reflecting the imposition of more
than $10,000 in fines and fees in violation of his right to be present reveals no
reason to find that error harmless.
      Accordingly, we remand the matter to the trial court for a hearing on
the imposition of fines and fees, at which Rodriguez may exercise his right to
be present. (See People v. Castellano (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 485, 491.)
                                DISPOSITION
      The portion of the trial court’s April 4, 2022, order imposing fines and
fees is reversed, and the matter is remanded for a hearing limited to those
fines and fees, subject to the requirements of Penal Code section 977,
subdivision (b)(1). In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

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                                           SMILEY, J.*

We concur:

STREETER, ACTING P. J.

GOLDMAN, J.

People v. Rodriguez (A165060)

       * Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Alameda,

assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

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