Court Opinion

ID: 9723250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:08:38.327457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:45.964035
License: Public Domain

Coleman, J.
(concurring). I agree that plaintiff is entitled to a new trial, but for a reason different from the majority. The record does not support a finding that the judge failed to realize he had discretion to exclude the plaintiffs prior convictions. I also do not agree that the judge must announce on the record that he is exercising that discretion. Thousands of rulings are dependent upon the discretion of the judge. Should we require the judge in each instance to announce in advance whether he is using his discretion? Although I cannot foresee where the precedent will lead, I do see it as an ill-advised requirement by this Court and as demeaning to the trial judge.
In this civil case the convictions introduced to impeach the plaintiffs credibility were so stale that their prejudicial effect greatly outweighed their probative value. One conviction was 10 years old and six of them were more than 15 years old. A proper exercise of discretion would have barred the use of these ancient convictions.
Reversal in this case does not require a retroactive application of People v Jackson, 391 Mich 323; 217 NW2d 22 (1974), or the application of People v Farrar, 36 Mich App 294; 193 NW2d 363 (1971). It is a long-standing rule that "there must be a limit beyond which such inquiry should not go, and the trial judge must, in the exercise of a sound discre*106tion, determine when that limit is reached”. Helwig v Lascowski, 82 Mich 619, 621; 46 NW 1033 (1890). The limit was reached and breached in the case at bar.
The majority opinion says "[i]t does not appear that the judge recognized that he had a discretion to exclude the prior convictions”. This conclusion is made even though plaintiffs counsel objected and "[i]t appears that the matter was discussed at a side-bar conference, * * * and that the judge said he would permit the defendant to” continue the cross-examination.
In People v Cherry, 393 Mich 261-262; 224 NW2d 286 (1974), I said that not "many judges would say in effect, T have exercised my discretion and so overrule the objection’ ”. We should not demand the rote recitation of magic words. The judge should not have to say that he will, he is, he has exercised his discretion. That is mere form which provides neither a substitute for justice nor a guarantee of justice.
Ryan and Blair Moody, Jr., JJ., concurred with Coleman, J.