Court Opinion

ID: 9848630
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:23:46.752563+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:31.473141
License: Public Domain

BENHAM, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion which affirms the trial court’s award of fee simple title to McKibbon Hotel Group, the entity which purchased a 22-year-old right of redemption and exercised it against Alvin Washington, the individual who had purchased the property at a tax sale in 1990 and had maintained the .082-acre parcel and paid taxes on it for the ensuing 17 years.1
1. Appellant Washington claimed title to the property through *267his completion of a bar of redemption in 1992 and, alternatively, by his tax deed ripening by prescription into fee simple title pursuant to OCGA § 48-4-48 (b). Citing OCGA § 48-4-46 (d), the majority affirms the trial court’s 2 ruling that Washington’s claim of barment fails because the county real estate records do not contain an entry memorializing Washington’s successful completion of the foreclosure of the right of redemption. OCGA § 48-4-46 (d) does not require that the successful foreclosure of the right of redemption be filed in the real estate records; instead, it provides, using permissive rather than mandatory language, that the notices required by OCGA § 48-4-45 and the sheriffs entries on those notices, “may be filed and recorded. ...” This statutory provision does not mandate that the completion of the foreclosure process must be documented on the county real estate records. In the absence of a mandatory requirement that a party seeking to foreclose the right of redemption must obtain written documentation of the completion of that process and file that documentation in the real estate records, the lack of such filed documentation is not fatal to Washington’s claim of barment. Rather, the trial court must examine whether Washington completed the barment process, the only requirement of which is giving notice under OCGA § 48-4-45.
2. The trial court did turn its attention to the actions Washington took in his effort to foreclose the right of redemption, and found that Washington had “failed to set out all of the requisite requirements for a barment, such as notice to any occupants of the property and all persons with any interest of record.” The record shows the trial court erred in this determination.
The purchaser of property in a tax sale can foreclose the right to redeem from the sale by serving notice of such foreclosure on the person who lost the property in the tax sale; the occupant, if any, of the property; and all persons having of record in the county in which the land is located any right, title, interest in, or lien upon the property. OCGA § 48-4-45 (a) (1). The purchaser must also publish notice of the foreclosure of the right of redemption in a local paper for four consecutive weeks. OCGA § 48-4-45 (a) (1). A copy of the newspaper notice containing the dates of publication establishes the accomplishment of this requirement. GE Capital Mtg. Svc. v. Clack, 271 Ga. 82 (2) (b) (515 SE2d 619) (1999).
*268Washington testified at the hearing before the special master that he began the process to foreclose the right of redemption more than 12 months after the recording of the tax deed he received as a result of his tax-sale purchase. He presented the December 1992 receipt from the county sheriff acknowledging payment for service of notice “for Bar of Redemption on Johnnie Mae Shedrick,” the person who lost the property in the tax sale at which Washington purchased the property, and he presented a return of service on Ms. Shedrick showing the sheriff had tacked the bar of redemption process on the door of the premises on the property. See OCGA § 48-4-46 (b) (“Leaving a copy of the notice at the residence of any person required to be served with the notice shall be a sufficient service of the notice.”). Washington also presented evidence of the publication in the local paper of properly-timed notices of the foreclosure of the right of redemption (including a copy of the advertisement), addressed to Ms. Shedrick, her heirs, devisees, assigns, and to any and all persons, firms or corporations having a legal interest in the property. See OCGA §§ 48-4-45 (a) (3); 48-4-46 (c).
Contrary to the trial court’s finding of fact, the sheriffs return of service in the action entitled “Bar of Redemption” brought by Washington in December 1992 shows the officer tacked the affidavit and summons to the door of Ms. Shedrick’s last known address, the dwelling place on the contested property. The trial court also found fault with the failure to provide notice to the occupant of the property. However, OCGA § 48-4-45 requires service on “[t]he occupant, if any,” and there was unrefuted testimony that no one occupied the property after appellant purchased it in the 1990 tax sale. The trial court also took exception to Washington’s alleged failure to provide notice “to all persons with any interest of record.” Washington testified he did not know of any people other than Ms. Shedrick and did not serve them. However, OCGA § 48-4-45 (a) (2) provides that if persons having of record any right, title, or interest in or lien upon the property do not live in the county where the property is located, they are not required to be served with notice, but are entitled only to notice by registered or certified mail, and then only if their address is “reasonably ascertainable.” See H&C Development v. Bershader, 248 Ga. App. 546 (1) (546 SE2d 907) (2001) (whether an address in tax records was reasonably ascertainable was a jury issue). There was no evidence that this exception to the notice requirement was not pertinent in 1992, when Washington was attempting to foreclose the right of redemption.
3. As noted by the majority, even if the tax-sale purchaser does not give notice of the foreclosure of the right of redemption, the title under a tax deed properly executed in 1990 at a valid and legal sale *269ripens by prescription four years from the date of recordation of the tax deed and vests fee simple title in the grantee. OCGA § 48-4-48 (b)-(d). Washington testified he paid taxes on the parcel and maintained the parcel by mowing and raking it three or four times a year. City of Savannah personnel supplemented Washington’s periodic maintenance and demolished the dilapidated, unoccupied, one-room structure on the property. Washington presented evidence of the bills submitted to him by the city for its services and it was undisputed he had paid the bills.
The trial court found, and the majority agrees, that appellant did not establish that his possession of the property was public, continuous, exclusive, uninterrupted, and peaceable, noting there was no evidence Washington occupied the property or cultivated, fenced or used the property to provide notice of his interest in the property. I disagree. One claiming prescriptive title is not required to enclose the property claimed in order to sustain the claim. May v. Sorrell, 153 Ga. 47 (14) (111 SE 810) (1922); 7 Powell, Law of Real Property, pp. 91-74—91-76, § 1013[2][h][ii] (Rev. ed. 1995).
[T]o constitute an adverse possession, there need not be a fence, building, or other improvement made; and that it suffices, for this purpose, that visible and notorious acts of ownership are exercised over the premises in controversy, for the time limited by the Statute. That much depends upon the nature and situation of the property — the uses to which it can be applied or to which the owner or claimant may choose to apply it.
Royall v. Lisle, 15 Ga. 545, 547 (1854). The tax-sale purchaser must present evidence he “engaged in any act evidencing possession or claim of ownership.. . .” Blizzard v. Moniz, 271 Ga. 50, 53 (518 SE2d 407) (1999). See also Mark Turner Properties v. Evans, 274 Ga. 547 (2) (554 SE2d 492) (2001).
For the possession to be public
the physical evidences of it must be such as to notify all other claimants that the possessor is not merely trespassing on the land, but that he is intending to appropriate it to use and ownership. .. . [T]he acts of possession must be such as to indicate an intention to appropriate the land to some permanent use.
Powell, Actions for Land, p. 394, § 330 (Rev. ed.). Washington testified he maintained the property by occasionally cutting the grass and paid the city for maintenance services when he was not physi*270cally able to perform them. He also paid for the demolition and removal of the one-room structure on the wedge-shaped piece of property. If maintenance of an improvement on real property is evidence to others of one claimant’s appropriation of the land for that claimant’s use (see Seignious v. MARTA, 252 Ga. 69, 72-73 (311 SE2d 808) (1994)), so too is a claimant’s demolition of the single improvement on the property “an act evidencing possession or claim of ownership. . . .” Mark Turner Properties v. Evans, supra, 274 Ga. 547 (2). The property at issue, a wedge-shaped piece of urban real estate less than one-tenth of an acre in size, did not have utility service or a habitable dwelling upon it, so the lack of physical occupation is understandable. The small size of the lot and the fact that Washington did not live nearby made cultivation and fencing impractical. In light of “the nature and situation of the property,” i.e., its small size, its irregular shape, and Washington’s decision to demolish the lone improvement and do nothing with the property other than to maintain it as undeveloped land, Washington’s acts of maintaining the property and paying others to do so were “visible and notorious acts of ownership ... exercised over the premises in controversy” (Royall v. Lisle, supra, 15 Ga. at 547), and constituted acts “evidencing possession or ownership.” That conduct, when coupled with Washington’s payment of taxes on the property,3 amounts to adverse possession of the property.
Decided July 11, 2008
Reconsideration denied July 25, 2008.
Christy C. Balho, Lloyd D. Murray, for appellant.
Hunter, Maclean, Exley & Dunn, Robert B. Lovett, Timothy R. *271Walmsley, Gannam, Gnann & Steinmetz, J. Hamrick Gnann, Jr., for appellee.
*270“After the time fixed by the statute for redemption has expired, the right to redeem is gone, and there is no power even in a court of equity to authorize a redemption of the property in such cases.” Boroughs v. Lance, 213 Ga. 143 (1) (97 SE2d 357) (1957) (quoting Montford v. Allen, 111 Ga. 18, 24 (36 SE 305) (1900)). Because I believe the trial court erred when it concluded that Washington’s claim of barment failed due to a lack of documentation in the real estate records of the successful completion of that process, as well as when it concluded that Washington’s tax deed had not ripened by prescription into a fee-simple title over the 17 years since his purchase of the property at a tax sale in 1990,1 respectfully dissent.

 At conflict in this case are two public policies applicable in cases involving the sale of real property in a tax sale. On one hand, because of the harsh procedure of collecting taxes through the sale of the property of the delinquent taxpayer, courts liberally construe statutory provisions permitting the taxpayer to redeem the property (see Wallace v. President Street, 263 Ga. 239 (1) (430 SE2d 1) (1993)); on the other hand, the courts have recognized the policy of the law to encourage free alienability of real property and certainty of title. See Moultrie v. Wright, 266 Ga. 30 (1) (464 SE2d 194) (1995) (applying 1949 law); Hinkel, Pindar’s Georgia Real Estate Law and Procedure, § 7-156 (6th ed.). In the case at bar, McKibbon invokes a 22-year-old right of redemption, which furthers the policy of allowing property owners (and their assignees) to redeem the property lost due to non-payment of taxes; however, an unlimited right of redemption of property sold at a tax sale acts as a restraint on the alienability of real property once sold in a tax sale. This Court endorsed the General Assembly’s enactment in 1949 of a period of repose with regard to the right of redemption in Stith v. Morris, 241 Ga. 247,250 (244 SE2d 817) (1978), opining that the legislative declaration that title ripened under a tax deed after a stated period of time had lapsed, without reference to adverse possession, “had the effect of making these titles certain and foreclosing inquiry into the legality of tax deeds made in the distant past.. . where the facts and circumstances pertaining to the tax sale would be almost impossible to ascertain. ’ ’ See also Moultrie v. Wright, supra, 266 Ga. at 31 (1) (“in the interest of the certainty of title and the free alienability of property, the General Assembly [by enacting the 1949 law] determined that ... the right to redeem may he foreclosed by the passage of time.”). Certainty of title suffered a blow when the General Assembly amended OCGA § 48-4-40 in 1978 to again provide for a period of adverse *267possession to pass before fee simple title vested in the holder of a tax deed (Ga. L. 1978, p. 309, § 2), and parties are again faced with the possibility of having to establish the validity and legality of a tax sale under OCGA § 48-4-48 many years after the fact.

 As noted by the majority, the findings were made by a special master who heard the case pursuant to OCGA § 23-3-63 and were adopted by the trial court.

 While payment of taxes alone is not sufficient to establish prescriptive title (Mark Turner Properties v. Evans, supra, 274 Ga. 547 (2)), it is an act “evidencing possession or claim of ownership.” Blizzard v. Moniz, supra, 271 Ga. at 53.