Court Opinion

ID: 9851992
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:22:46.653281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:20.917260
License: Public Domain

BOOCHEVER, Chief Justice,
with whom RABINOWITZ, Justice, joins, dissenting.
Mr. Barton alleges that he was injured as the result of a violation of AS 04.15.020(a) which makes it unlawful to serve liquor to an intoxicated person. AS 04.10.180 states unequivocally that “[t]he licensee is solely responsible for the lawful conduct of the business licensed under this title except as provided in this title.” Since according to the allegations in the complaint Mr. Barton was injured because the beverage dispensary was not lawfully conducted, the statute would seem to make the licensees responsible. Mr. Schultz and Elsie Lund are admittedly licensees, but seek to escape responsibility for Mr. Barton’s injury by contending that AS 04.10.180 applies only to criminal sanctions. The majority would read into the language in question that the licensee is solely responsible under criminal law, alone, for the lawful conduct of the business. No such restriction is to be found in the statute.
While it is true that specific criminal penalties are prescribed for violation of AS 04.15.020,1 there is nothing set forth in that section or in the Alaska Alcohol Beverage Control Act which indicates an intent on the part of the legislature to exclude civil liability.
I agree with the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 287 (1965) that:
A provision for a penalty in a legislative enactment . . . has no effect upon liability for negligence unless the penalty is found to be intended to exclude it.
In Vance v. United States, 355 F.Supp. 756 (D. Alaska 1973), Judge Plummer held that a violation of AS 04.15.020 could be a basis for imposing civil liability. He found that “the statute unquestionably is designed at least in part to protect against personal injuries caused by intoxication.” 355 F.Supp. at 759. While Vance did not deal with the vicarious liability of a licensee presented by AS 04.15.180, I see no more reason to limit this latter section to criminal sanctions than the section making it unlawful to sell liquor to minors or intoxicated persons.
Nor do I find that the case of Sabre Jet Room, Inc. v. K & L Distributors, Inc., 384 P.2d 952 (Alaska 1963), requires a contrary holding. In that case, the court was concerned merely with contractual liability. The evidence indicated that wholesale liquor concerns extended credit to the operator of the beverage dispensary after being advised that the corporate licensee would not be responsible for his bills. Sabre Jet *879Boom cannot be regarded as authority for denial of civil liability for tort arising out of the unlawful operation of a beverage dispensary. There was no contention in Sabre Jet Boom of an unlawful operation. Thus, AS 04.10.180 specifying responsibility of the licensee “for the lawful conduct of the business” was not applicable.
Although in Morris v. City of Soldotna, 553 P.2d 474, 477 (Alaska 1977), we concluded that it was inappropriate to undertake judicial expansion of the Safe Place to Work Act or the General Safety Code so as to provide for an action for civil damages to an injured workman for harm resulting from breaches of the Act or Code, we stated:
However, nowhere in either the statute or the regulations can there be found authorization for a claim for relief and award of civil damages to an injured workman for harm resulting from the breach of the Act or General Safety Code. Of course, the fact that a private tort remedy is not specifically created by the terms of the Act is not, by itself, disposi-tive. In some instances a court may conclude that the legislature has impliedly authorized a private remedy, or that a civil action sounding in tort is necessary to protect fully the person for whose benefit the legislation was enacted, (citations omitted)
The Safe Place to Work Act and General Safety Code do not have language similar to that in AS 04.10.180 specifying responsibility of the licensee.
It seems to me that the general framework of the alcohol beverage legislation gives no grounds for a restrictive non-literal construction of the provision which makes the licensee responsible for lawful conduct of the business. The conduct of a beverage dispensary affects a substantial public interest. Much of Alaska’s crime and physical injury results from improper use of alcoholic beverages.2 Under these circumstances, it seems more logical that the state intended what it said in enacting AS 04.10.180, namely to make licensees responsible for unlawful conduct of the business. It is quite likely that a licensee may be the only financially solvent person to whom an injured person may look for recovery. The statute should not be construed so as to permit a licensee to stand behind the shield of some arrangement whereby a third person is given management of the business.
In Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d 133, 138-43 (Alaska 1972), we discussed what we believed to be the philosophical basis for vicarious liability. Although we were commenting on common law rather than statutory liability, we believe that the considerations which we enunciated in Fruit are particularly applicable in indicating a literal construction of AS 04.10.180:
“Scope of employment” as a test for application of respondeat superior would be insufficient if it failed to encompass the duty of every enterprise to the social community which gives it life and contributes to its prosperity. . . . The basis of respondeat superior has been correctly stated as “the desire to include in the costs of operation inevitable losses to third persons incident to carrying on an enterprise, and thus distribute the burden among those benefited by the enterprise.” (citation omitted)3
The licensee, whether a landlord or otherwise, is benefited by the enterprise. He is able to protect himself from liability by means of insurance, and the extra cost of doing business may be reflected in the price of the product. It seems to me that the legislature intended the licensee to assume responsibility for injuries resulting from unlawful conduct of the business rather than to place that burden on the injured person in the event that the manager of the business lacks financial responsibility. I, therefore, would reverse the summary judgment, granted in favor of the licensees by the trial court.

. AS 04.15.100 specifies:
Penalties for violation of title or municipal ordinance, (a) A person who violates any provision of this title other than § 80 of this chapter is guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction is punishable by imprisonment of not more than one year, or by a fine of not more than $500. Each violation is a separate offense.
(b) Upon conviction of a licensee for a violation under (a) of this section, or for violation of a municipal ordinance adopted by a municipality in conformity with § 70 of this chapter, the judge having jurisdiction shall send a notification of conviction together with a certified copy of the record of conviction to the board. The board may, upon the direction of a majority of its members, thereupon suspend the license as hereinafter provided for the first and second violations and upon a third violation may revoke the license and declare the bond forfeited. For the purpose of this section, the terms “second violation” and “third violation” include only those violations which occur within five years of the first violation, but are not limited to repeated violations of the same statutory provision or municipal ordinance.
(1) First violation. The license of the' premises involved may be suspended for not less than 10 nor more than 45 days.
(2) Second violation. The license of the premises involved may be suspended for a period of not less than 30 days nor more than 90 days.

. See Peter v. State, 531 P.2d 1263, 1268-69 (Alaska 1975).

. Fruit v. Schreiner, 502 P.2d at 140-41.