Court Opinion

ID: 9894841
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-03 14:10:08.123281+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:10:51.042289
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: OCTOBER 27, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                   TO BE PUBLISHED

          Commonwealth of Kentucky
                 Court of Appeals
                   NO. 2022-CA-0170-MR

KENTUCKY OPEN GOVERNMENT
COALITION, INC.                                    APPELLANT

          APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.        HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 21-CI-00680

KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF FISH
AND WILDLIFE RESOURCES
COMMISSION                                          APPELLEE

AND

                   NO. 2022-CA-0192-MR

KENTUCKY DEPARTMENT OF FISH
AND WILDLIFE RESOURCES
COMMISSION                                 CROSS-APPELLANT

       CROSS-APPEAL FROM FRANKLIN CIRCUIT COURT
v.       HONORABLE THOMAS D. WINGATE, JUDGE
                 ACTION NO. 21-CI-00680

KENTUCKY OPEN GOVERNMENT
COALITION, INC.                             CROSS-APPELLEE
                            OPINION
              AFFIRMING IN PART, VACATING IN PART,
           AND REMANDING APPEAL NO. 2022-CA-0170-MR
         AND AFFIRMING CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2022-CA-0192-MR

                                  ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

TAYLOR, JUDGE: Kentucky Open Government Coalition, Inc. (Coalition)

brings Appeal No. 2022-CA-0170-MR from a January 25, 2022, Opinion and

Order of the Franklin Circuit Court adjudicating the Coalition’s entitlement to

certain records pursuant to the Kentucky Open Records Act, and the Kentucky

Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources Commission (Commission) brings

Cross-Appeal No. 2022-CA-0192-MR from the same January 25, 2022, Opinion

and Order of the Franklin Circuit Court. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and

remand Appeal No. 2022-CA-0170-MR, and we affirm Cross-Appeal No. 2022-

CA-0192-MR.

             On August 10, 2021, the Coalition submitted an open records request

to the records custodian of the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife. In

particular, the Coalition sought all emails and text messages sent between certain

present and past members of the Commission. This request was for the period of

time from June 1, 2020, to August 10, 2021. Most importantly, the request

specifically stated that it was “not limited to communications that took place on

government-owned email accounts and cell phones.” Open Records Request at 2.

                                        -2-
The request expressly embraced “public records . . . generated on private cell

phones [and] on private email services[.]” Open Records Request at 2. It also

explicitly excluded any “[c]ommunications of a purely personal nature unrelated to

any governmental function.” Open Records Request at 2.

             In response to the Coalition’s open records request, three responses

were furnished by the Commission on August 17, 2021; August 24, 2021; and

August 27, 2021. In the last response (August 27, 2021), the Commission stated:

             In re: Brian Mackey/Department of Fish and Wildlife,
             21-ORD-127 (2021) provides that documents solely in
             the possession of individuals on their personal devices
             are not owned by the Commonwealth and therefore are
             not “public records” within the scope of the open records
             act. See also KRS [Kentucky Revised Statutes] 61.870 et
             seq. Commission members were provided with a copy of
             your open records request, and were asked to produce
             any responsive documents which may be contained in
             their personal email. No such privately owned
             communications have been provided for the
             Department’s review or release. Further, members of the
             Fish and Wildlife Resources Commission can only
             conduct business when in a public meeting with a
             quorum. By definition there can be no “action taken” by
             individual commission members to make a final policy
             decision for the Department on their own, or otherwise
             conduct the business of the department outside of a
             public meeting. See KRS 61.805 and 61.810. Therefore,
             the personal emails/texts of Commission members are
             not considered public records to be retained by the
             Department.

                                        -3-
August 27, 2021, Open Records Request at 2. Thus, no records were produced that

were stored on the Commission members’ private email accounts or personal cell

phones.

            On September 3, 2021, the Coalition filed a complaint in the Franklin

Circuit Court against the Commission. Therein, the Coalition alleged:

            1.    The Kentucky Open Government Coalition, Inc.
            (“KOGC”) is a 501(c)(3) non-profit corporation with its
            principal office address at 612 S. Main St., Suite 203,
            Hopkinsville, KY 42240.

            2.     The Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife
            Commission (“Commission”) is a nine-member board
            established pursuant to KRS 150.022, with a principal
            office address of 1 Sportsman’s Lane, Frankfort, KY
            40601. Its volunteer members are appointed by the
            Governor. KRS 150.022(3). For purposes of the Open
            Records Act, the Commission meets the definition of
            “[p]ublic agency” contained in KRS 61.870(1).

            3.    This action is brought under KRS 61.882 to
            challenge the Commission’s partial denial of an open
            records request in violation of the Open Records Act
            submitted by KOGC.

            ....

            6.    Upon information and belief, Commissioners are
            not provided with government devices or email addresses
            to conduct official Commission business.

            7.   Indeed, the Commission’s website lists each
            Commissioner’s personal contact information, including
            non-governmental street and e-mail addresses and phone
            numbers. See Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife

                                       -4-
Resources, District Commission Members (attached
hereto as Exhibit 1).

8.    Upon information and belief, Commissioners send
and receive all agency-related communications, including
emails and text messages, on non-government devices
and accounts.

9.    Any communications sent or received by the
Commission members regarding their roles as
Commissioners constitute public records regardless of
the device or account from which they were sent or
received. See KRS 61.870(2), 61.878(1)(r).

....

30. On August 10, 2021, the Kentucky Open
Government Coalition submitted the Open Records
request attached hereto as Exhibit 2. That request
sought:

       All emails and text messages that were sent
       from 1 June 2020 to present time, between
       any 2 or more of the following individuals
       listed: Rich Storm (former Commissioner
       KDFWR), Brian Clark (deputy
       commissioner/acting commissione[r]
       KDFWR), KDFWR Commission Chairman-
       Karl Clinard, Jeff Eaton (past 6th district
       commissioner), KDFWR Commission
       members, Representative C. Ed Massey and
       Representative Matthew Koch.

31. The request was explicit that it “is not limited to
communications that took place on government-owned
email accounts and cell phones.” Id. (emphasis in
original). Rather, “[t]he scope of Coalition’s request
should additionally include all responsive public records
which were generated on private cell phones, on private
email services, or through other private communication

                           -5-
channels.” Id. “KRS 61.870(2) provides that records
which are prepared or used by a public agency are public
records subject to the Open Records Act, equal to those
which are owned or retained by a public agency.” Id.
“The only responsive records exempt from disclosure,
regardless of what kind of device they were sent from or
received on, are ‘[c]ommunications of a purely personal
nature unrelated to any governmental function.’” [Id.]
(quoting KRS 61.878(1)(r)).

32. On August 17, 2021, the Commission provided an
initial response to KOGC, including some of the
responsive records (“First Response”). The First
Response is attached hereto as Exhibit 3.

33. The First Response indicated that other documents
would be reviewed for redaction and be available by
August 24, 2021. It did not, however, state whether the
Commission would search the personal phones or email
accounts of any of the Commissioners named in the
request.

34. On August 24, 2021, the Commission provided
another response to KOGC (“Second Response”),
informing it that it would need more time to review the
responsive records for production and would not be
meeting its self-imposed deadline. The Second Response
is attached hereto as Exhibit 4.

35. As with the First Response, the Second Response
did not indicate whether the Commission was searching
the personal phones or email accounts of any of the
Commissioners named in the request.

36. The following day, KOGC emailed the
Commission, asking it to “confirm if your search for
responsive records includes emails sent or received
exclusively on private devices/addresses?” Aug. 25
Email (attached hereto as Exhibit 5). The email noted
that “[a]ll of the responsive records I have reviewed so

                            -6-
far have at least one email address that is government-
owned.”

37. The email went on to note that it was KOGC’s
“understanding that several commission members use
private email to conduct public business,” [which] would
make the documents “public records under the definition
set out in the Open Records Act.” Id. KOGC asked the
Commission to confirm “if emails that took place only on
private servers are being reviewed as part of my
request?”

38. On August 27, 2021, the Commission sent a third
and final response to KOGC (“Third Response”). The
Third Response is attached hereto as Exhibit 6.

39. The Third Response included a link where
additional documents were made available. It also made
clear that the Commission was not producing any emails
contained solely on Commissioners’ personal devices or
email accounts.

40. The Third Response stated that “[i]n response to
your email of August 25, 2021, In re: Brian
Mackey/Department of Fish and Wildlife, 21-ORD-127
(2021) provides that documents solely in the possession
of individuals on their personal devices are not owned by
the Commonwealth and therefore are not [‘]public
records[’] within the scope of the open records act.”

41. Although the Third Response stated that
“Commission members were provided with a copy of
your open records request, and were asked to produce
any responsive documents which may be contained in
their personal email,” it confirmed that “[n]o such
privately owned communications have been provided for
the Department’s review or release.” Id.

42. Thus, the Commission has failed to provide any
communications between and among the Commissioners

                           -7-
on their private devices or email accounts from which
they do all Commission business, relying on the legally
incorrect assertion that these are not “public records.”

43. The Third Response also advanced arguments
about the Open Meetings Act that are utterly irrelevant to
the question of whether the Commissioners’ emails are
public records within the meaning of KRS 61.870(2).
Namely, it argued:

       Further, members of the Fish and Wildlife
       Resources Commission can only conduct
       business when in a public meeting with a
       quorum. By definition there can be no
       “action taken” by individual commission
       members to make a final policy decision for
       the Department on their own, or otherwise
       conduct the business of the department
       outside of a public meeting. See KRS
       61.805 and 61.810. Therefore, the personal
       emails/texts of Commission members are
       not considered public records to be retained
       by the Department.

44. This argument is so patently deficient as to
constitute bad faith. Although the emails and texts might
well reveal a violation of the Open Meetings Act, the
Commissioners’ compliance with that statute has no
bearing on whether the emails and texts in question are
public records under the ORA. The Commission’s own
lawyers trained the Commissioners that all their
communications, regardless of device, are subject to the
ORA unless a specific exemption applies. See supra.

....

47. Emails and text messages between Commissioners
about the agency’s business are public records within the
meaning of KRS 61.870(2) because they were “prepared”

                            -8-
and “used” by the members of the Commission,
regardless of where they are stored.

48. If any Commissioners is [sic] the “sole possessor
of public records, the agency ‘is obligated to retrieve
them from [the employee] to facilitate public access to
the records.’” 17-ORD-273 (quoting 11-ORD-105).

49. The Commission willfully violated the Open
Records Act when it (1) disregarded the Act’s clear
statutory language to claim that records prepared and
used by Commission members were not “public records”;
(2) ignored the prior training that TAHC attorneys gave
Commissioners, which explained that even
communications on personal accounts and devices are
subject to the ORA if they pertain to their roles as
Commissioners; (3) refused to change course even after
KOGC pointed out the statutory language making clear
any record prepared or used by Commissioners in
performance of their duties are public records; (4) failed
to obtain responsive records from Commission members;
and (5) relied on inapplicable Open Meetings Act
provisions in an attempt to frustrate the public’s right to
learn what appointed Commissioners are communicating
with one another, perhaps in violation of that latter
statute.

50. Pursuant to KRS 61.882(2), the KOGC is entitled
to seek injunctive and other relief from the Commission’s
actions with respect to its Open Records request directly
from this Court without first seeking relief from the
Attorney General under KRS 61.880.

51. Pursuant to KRS 61.882(4), this action should take
precedence on this Court’s docket over all other actions
and should be assigned for hearing or trial at the earliest
practicable date.

52. Pursuant to KRS 61.882(5), the KOGA is entitled
to recover its costs, reasonable attorneys’ fees from this

                            -9-
             lawsuit, and statutory penalties because the Commission
             has willfully withheld the requested records in violation
             of the Open Records Act.

September 3, 2021, Complaint at 2, 3, and 9-14 (footnote omitted).

             The Commission filed an answer and, thereafter, filed a motion for

summary judgment. In the motion, the Commission initially explained that “[t]his

case presents an issue of first impression for this Court arising from contrasting

opinions of current and former Attorney Generals of the Commonwealth of

Kentucky.” October 29, 2021, motion for summary judgment at 1. Thereafter, the

Commission pointed out that the Commission members were volunteer members

and that their cell phones were in no part paid for by the Commission. Rather, the

Commission members paid for their own cell phones. Additionally, the

Commission emphasized that the Commission members did not possess official

email accounts but instead maintained private email accounts. The Commission

argued that records (text messages or emails) stored on privately owned devices

were not public records in the possession of the Commission under Kentucky

Revised Statutes (KRS) 61.870(2). The Commission also maintained that the text

messages and emails were exempt from disclosure under KRS 61.878, as

communications of a purely personal nature. And, the Commission averred that

the records request was so broad as to be unduly burdensome.

                                         -10-
             Thereafter, the Coalition also filed a motion for summary judgment.

The Coalition argued that “[a]ny communications sent or received by the

Commissioners regarding their role on the Fish and Wildlife Commission

constitute public records regardless of the device or account from which they were

sent or received.” Coalition’s October 29, 2021, motion for summary judgment at

9. The Coalition maintained that it only requested records or communications that

occurred between two or more members regarding their role as Commission

members. Also, the Coalition pointed out that it particularly excluded from the

request any documents of a purely personal nature. Citing to KRS 61.870(2), the

Coalition asserted that the requested records were clearly “prepared” or “used” by

the Commission members in relation to Commission business and, thus, were

public records subject to disclosure.

             By Opinion and Order entered January 25, 2022, the circuit court

granted in part and denied in part the motions for summary judgment filed by the

Commission and the Coalition. The circuit court determined that emails

concerning business of the Commission sent to or received via the Commission

members’ private email accounts were public records subject to disclosure. On the

other hand, the circuit court determined that text messages concerning Commission

business sent to or received on the Commission members’ private cell phones were

not subject to disclosure. In reaching this decision, the circuit court reasoned:

                                         -11-
[T]he issue really turns to the plain language of KRS
61.870(2). As written, the statute includes records
“which are prepared, owned, used, in the possession of or
retained by a public agency.” KRS § 61.870(2)
(emphasis added). The use of “or” clearly indicates that
the statute does not take a possession only approach.
Rather, as written, the statute encompasses records that
are either: prepared, owned, used, in the possession of,
or retained by an agency. Thus, as the KOGC offers,
records used or prepared by an agency fall within the
scope of the Open Records Act regardless of where the
record is stored. A possession only approach does not
comport with the plain language of KRS 61.870(2) or the
general purpose of the Open Records Act. . . .

      ....

[B]ecause the Commissioners lack state email accounts
and their personal email accounts are listed on the
Commission’s official website as the point of contact, it
seems logical that emails sent or received via the
Commissioners’ personal email accounts concerning
state business are “prepared” and “used” by the
Commission, therefore placing the emails at issue within
the purview of the Open Records Act, absent an
exception applying.

       However, the Court’s analysis does not stop there.
In the August 27, 2021, letter, the Commission stated:

      Commission members were provided with a
      copy of your open records request and were
      asked to produce any responsive documents
      which may be contained in their personal
      email. No such privately owned
      communications have been provided for the
      Department’s review or release.

The language used by the Commission to deny producing
the requested emails is confusing and leads the Court to

                          -12-
two (2) separate conclusions. First, if by the language
used in the August 27, 2021, letter, the Commission
means that the Commissioners were provided a copy of
the KOGC’s open records request and the
Commissioners searched their personal email accounts,
which they use for state business, and no responsive
records were found, then the Commission has acted in
accordance with the Open Records Act. An agency
cannot provide records which do not exist, and an agency
is not required to prove a negative when affirmatively
stating that records do not exist.

       But, if by the language used in the August 27,
2021, letter, the Commission means that the
Commissioners were provided a copy of the KOGC’s
open records request and the Commissioners declined to
search for responsive records or turn over any emails
from their personal email accounts, which they
admittedly use for state business, then the Commission
has violated the Open Records Act. Accordingly, the
Court REMANDS this matter to the Commission and the
Commission is ORDERED to obtain any emails from
the Commissioners’ personal email accounts that relate to
the KOGC’s open records request. The Commission
shall then analyze whether any records are subject to
being withheld under a specific exemption and outline
how the exemption applies to each withheld record.

      ....

      Despite the Court’s holding with respect to emails
on a private email account, the Court finds that text
messages and other forms of communication sent or
received on private devices are exempt from disclosure
under the Open Records Act pursuant to KRS 61.872(6)
and general personal privacy concerns. “‘Although the
general policy of the Open Records Act favors broad
availability of public records, that availability is not
unlimited.’ ‘Perhaps the main exception to the general
presumption that public records are subject to public

                          -13-
inspection is contained in KRS 61.872(6), which
provides that an otherwise valid open records request
may be denied if complying with it would cause ‘an
unreasonable burden[.]’” Department Of Kentucky State
Police v. Courier Journal, 601 S.W.3d 501, 505 (Ky. Ct.
App. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v. Chestnut, 250
S.W.3d 655, 664 (Ky. 2008)). Whether an open records
request falls within this exception is a highly fact-specific
determination and requires clear and convincing
evidence. Courier Journal, 601 S.W.3d at 505-06; KRS
§ 61.872(6).

      First, the Court cannot in good faith adopt the
KOGC’s desired ruling. Doing so would lead to
permitted fishing expeditions into the private cell phones
and private lives of state employees, officials, volunteers,
etc. There is no question that publicly funded cell phones
are subject to the Open Records Act because the purpose
of publicly funded cell phones is to conduct state
business. However, it is unfathomable for the
government to force state employees, officials, and
volunteers to hand over their privately-owned devices for
inspection of possible records.

       Realistically, it is impractical to subject private cell
phones to the Open Records Act. As noted, doing so will
likely lead to fishing expeditions and subject state
agencies, the Attorney General’s Office, and any
reviewing court to invasively review private data to
determine if any text messages or other private forms of
communication constitute a public record subject to
disclosure. This would create an unreasonable burden.
The substantial volume of records involved exacerbates
the difficulty of separating personal data from non-
personal data. Additionally, when considering the sheer
number of state employees, officials, volunteers, etc.
whose privately-owned cell phones would be subject to
open records requests, it would make responding to any
such open records request unmanageable for state
agencies.

                             -14-
       Moreover, the Court must state that requiring state
employees, officials, volunteers, etc. to hand over a
personal cell phone, for which no public funds were
spent, and thus is not traditionally used, nor should be
used, for official business, is highly invasive. State
employees, officials, and volunteers still possess a right
to privacy and the right to maintain personal lives free
from government overreach. Thus, the Court’s holding
goes to more than just the burden that sorting through
private cell phones would cause state agencies, the
Attorney General’s Office, and reviewing courts. The
Court is highly concerned about the government
overreach in forcing state employees, officials, and
volunteers to hand over their privately-owned devices for
the government to browse. State employees, officials,
volunteers, etc. are entitled to privacy and broadly
subjecting their privately-owned devices, which arguably
would then include their private social media accounts
and any other channels of communication, would
absolutely discourage any person from state employment,
running for public office, or accepting the honor of
serving on a state board.

       In the end, emails sent or received from a private
email account and text messages and other private forms
of communication are fundamentally different. Text
messages and other private forms of communication are
generally not accepted forms of communication for
government business. Subjecting text messages and
messages contained on other private channels of
communication to disclosure would serve no valid public
interest and would instead invade individuals’ privacy
interests. Further, text messages and other private forms
of communication are contained on cell phones, which
here are privately-owned. The ultimate responsibility in
curbing the use of private devices for public business
rests with state agencies. State agencies shall instruct
employees, officials, and volunteers not to conduct state
business on privately-owned devices. State agencies also
have the power to issue publicly funded cell phones for

                           -15-
             employees, officials, and volunteers to conduct state
             business. Again, the Court admonishes state employees,
             officials, volunteers, etc. from using privately-owned
             devices to conduct state business, but the Court firmly
             holds that subjecting text messages and other forms of
             communication contained on privately-owned devices to
             the Open Records Act would create an unreasonable
             burden on state agencies in producing records and would
             grossly encroach on the private lives of state employees,
             officials, and volunteers.

January 25, 2022, Opinion and Order at 10-17 (footnotes omitted). The court also

concluded that the Commission did not willfully withhold public documents in

contravention of KRS 61.882.

             The Coalition filed Appeal No. 2022-CA-0170-MR and the

Commission filed Cross-Appeal No. 2022-CA-0192-MR from the January 25,

2022, Opinion and Order. We shall initially consider Appeal No. 2022-CA-0170-

MR and then Cross-Appeal No. 2022-CA-0192-MR.

             To begin, summary judgment is proper when there exists no genuine

issue as to any material fact and movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 56.03; Steelvest, Inc. v. Scansteel Service

Center, Inc., 807 S.W.2d 476 (Ky. 1991). All facts and inferences therefrom are

viewed in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Steelvest, 807 S.W.2d at

480. As there are no factual issues, our review looks to any questions of law, said

review being de novo. Brown v. Griffin, 505 S.W.3d 777, 781 (Ky. App. 2016).

Our review proceeds accordingly.

                                        -16-
                         APPEAL NO. 2022-CA-0170-MR

             The Coalition contends that the circuit court erroneously determined

that communications in the form of text messages concerning Commission

business sent from or stored upon the private personal devices (cell phones) of

Commission members were exempt from disclosure under KRS 61.872(6) or due

to privacy issues. Under the Open Records Act, the Coalition argues that public

records are simply documents prepared by or used by a public agency. KRS

61.870. The Coalition points out that the location of the public record is irrelevant.

Therefore, the Coalition maintains that text messages, concerning Commission

affairs, stored on the members’ private cell phones are public records. Moreover,

the Coalition argues that the Commission failed to introduce clear and convincing

evidence that disclosure of the text messages would be unduly burdensome per

KRS 61.872(6). And, the Coalition points out that its open records request

specifically excluded all personal text messages.

                        Open Records Act – Text Messages

             The Open Records Act is codified in KRS 61.870 to KRS 61.884.

Therein, the General Assembly boldly “declar[ed] that the basic policy of KRS

61.870 to 61.884 is that free and open examination of public records is in the

public interest[.]” KRS 61.871. The General Assembly understood that

government transparency and a well-informed citizenry are vital to the function

                                         -17-
and the survival of our democracy. So, in Kentucky, “[a]ll public records shall be

open for inspection[.]” KRS 61.872(1). To that end, the Kentucky Supreme Court

has recognized that the Open Records Act “generally favors disclosure.” Univ. of

Ky. v. Kernel Press, Inc., 620 S.W.3d 43, 52 (Ky. 2021). There are limited

exceptions or exclusions to disclosure of public records, but “the exceptions

provided for by KRS 61.878 or otherwise provided by law shall be strictly

construed[.]” KRS 61.871. When a public records request is denied, the response

by the agency must “include a statement of the specific exception authorizing the

withholding of the record and a brief explanation of how the exception applies to

the record withheld.” KRS 61.880(1).

             The Open Records Act defines “public record” as:

             (2) “Public record” means all books, papers, maps,
             photographs, cards, tapes, discs, diskettes, recordings,
             software, or other documentation regardless of physical
             form or characteristics, which are prepared, owned, used,
             in the possession of or retained by a public agency.
             “Public record” shall not include any records owned or
             maintained by or for a body referred to in subsection
             (1)(h) of this section that are not related to functions,
             activities, programs, or operations funded by state or
             local authority[.]

KRS 61.870(2). Also, public agency is defined as:

             (1) “Public agency” means:

                (a) Every state or local government officer;

                                        -18-
(b) Every state or local government department,
  division, bureau, board, commission, and authority;

(c) Every state or local legislative board, commission,
  committee, and officer;

(d) Every county and city governing body, council,
  school district board, special district board, and
  municipal corporation;

(e) Every state or local court or judicial agency;

(f) Every state or local government agency, including
  the policy-making board of an institution of
  education, created by or pursuant to state or local
  statute, executive order, ordinance, resolution, or
  other legislative act;

(g) Any body created by state or local authority in any
  branch of government;

(h) Any body which, within any fiscal year, derives at
  least twenty-five percent (25%) of its funds
  expended by it in the Commonwealth of Kentucky
  from state or local authority funds. However, any
  funds derived from a state or local authority in
  compensation for goods or services that are provided
  by a contract obtained through a public competitive
  procurement process shall not be included in the
  determination of whether a body is a public agency
  under this subsection;

(i) Any entity where the majority of its governing
  body is appointed by a public agency as defined in
  paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (j), or (k)
  of this subsection; by a member or employee of such
  a public agency; or by any combination thereof;

(j) Any board, commission, committee, subcommittee,
  ad hoc committee, advisory committee, council, or

                           -19-
                  agency, except for a committee of a hospital medical
                  staff, established, created, and controlled by a public
                  agency as defined in paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e),
                  (f), (g), (h), (i), or (k) of this subsection; and

                 (k) Any interagency body of two (2) or more public
                   agencies where each public agency is defined in
                   paragraph (a), (b), (c), (d), (e), (f), (g), (h), (i), or (j)
                   of this subsection[.]

KRS 61.870(1).

             Under KRS 61.870(2), the ambit of what constitutes a public record is

expansive; it includes papers, books, recordings, or “other documentation

regardless of physical form or characteristics” that are prepared, used, in the

possession of, or retained by a public agency. Considering this unambiguous

definition, a public record may be prepared by or used by a public agency but not

necessarily in the possession of a public agency. Accordingly, a text message

stored on a cell phone would qualify as electronic documentation pursuant to KRS

61.870(2).

             Likewise, public agency is broadly defined as including every state

government officer, board, commission or any body created by state authority.

KRS 61.870(1). The Commission is created by KRS 150.022, and its members are

appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Kentucky Senate. The

Commission members are not paid employees and are required to take the

                                            -20-
constitutional oath of office. Considering the unambiguous language of KRS

61.870, the Commission and/or its members certainly qualify as public agencies.

             Based on our review of applicable law, we are of the opinion that text

messages stored on personal cell phones are public records when such messages

are prepared by or used by the members of the Commission and relate to or

concern Commission business. To hold otherwise would certainly defeat the

underlying purpose of the Open Records Act as public officials could easily evade

disclosure of public records by simply utilizing their personal cell phones.

Additionally, in this case, Commission members were not provided with official

email accounts or cell phones, thus necessitating the use of their personal phones

for Commission business.

             As to the text messages, both the Commission and its members have a

duty to produce public records within their “custody or control.” KRS 61.872(4).

It is beyond cavil that the Commission members have custody or control over text

messages stored on their personal cell phones, and as either agents of the

Commission or as officials thereof, the Commission members are bound by the

Open Records Act. See Edmondson v. Alig, 926 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Ky. App.

1996).

                                        -21-
             Therefore, we hold that text messages related to Commission business

and stored on personal cell phones of its members are public records generally

subject to disclosure under the Open Records Act absent an applicable exception.

                        Exceptions – Unreasonable Burden

             As set forth above, public records are generally subject to disclosure;

however, such public records may be excepted from disclosure “[i]f the application

places an unreasonable burden in producing public records” upon the public

agency. KRS 61.872(6). As to this exception, the Kentucky Supreme Court has

instructed that “a public agency refusing to comply with an open records request

on this unreasonable-burden basis faces a high proof threshold since the agency

must show the existence of the unreasonable burden ‘by clear and convincing

evidence.’” Commonwealth v. Chestnut, 250 S.W.3d 655, 664 (Ky. 2008) (quoting

KRS 61.872(6)). The initial determination of unreasonable burden is highly fact

specific and must be considered on a case-by-case basis. Dep’t of Ky. State Police

v. Courier Journal, 601 S.W.3d 501, 505-06 (Ky. App. 2020). As an appellate

court, we normally “review the circuit court’s factual findings for clear error, and

issues concerning the construction of the Open Records Act de novo.” Salinas v.

Correct Care Sols., LLC, 559 S.W.3d 853, 856 (Ky. App. 2018) (citation omitted).

             However, in this case, the circuit court rendered summary judgment,

triggering our review under CR 56 and whether there exists a genuine issue as to

                                         -22-
any material fact. In its Opinion and Order granting summary judgment, the circuit

court determined that the Coalition’s request for text messages constituted an

unreasonable burden on state agencies. As a basis for its decision, the circuit court

believed that “when considering the sheer number of state employees, officials,

volunteers, etc. whose privately-owned cell phones would be subject to open

records requests, it would make responding to any such open records request

unmanageable for state agencies.” Opinion and Order at 15. In so ruling, the

circuit court was concerned generally with “the sheer number” of open records

requests that could possibly flow from permitting disclosure of public records in

the form of text messages stored on personal cell phones of all public officials or

employees. However, the unreasonable burden inquiry must be considered on a

case-by-case basis. See Dep’t of Ky. State Police, 601 S.W.3d at 505-06 (“The

statute contemplates a case-specific approach[.]”); Chestnut, 250 S.W.3d at 665

(holding that “the DOC’s argument regarding the unreasonable burden of

complying with open records requests of inmates as a whole class of people misses

the mark because the unreasonable burden language in KRS 61.878(6) focuses on a

singular ‘application,’ not a group of applications from an entire class of

applicants.”). Therefore, the relevant inquiry is whether this particular open

records request by the Coalition constitutes an unreasonable burden upon the

Commission and its members considering the particular facts of this case. This

                                         -23-
question was left unanswered by the circuit court. We, thus, vacate the circuit

court’s determination of unreasonable burden, and upon remand, the circuit court

shall reconsider same based upon the particular facts of this case as pertains to the

requests submitted to the Commission.

                                   Exceptions – Privacy

              Under the Open Records Act, public records may be excepted from

disclosure if the record contains “information of a personal nature where the public

disclosure thereof would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal

privacy[.]” KRS 61.878(1)(a). When determining whether a public record is

excepted, the Court “ ‘must balance the interest in personal privacy the General

Assembly meant to protect, on the one hand, against, on the other, the public

interest in disclosure.’ ” Univ. of Ky., 620 S.W.3d at 59 (quoting Kentucky New

Era, Inc. v. City of Hopkinsville, 415 S.W.3d 76, 82 (Ky. 2013)).

              In its Opinion and Order, the circuit court was concerned with the

privacy interests of state employees and officials in their personal cell phones. The

circuit court was “highly concerned about the government overreach in forcing

state employees, officials, and volunteers to hand over their privately-owned

devices for the government to browse” for public records.1 Opinion and Order at

1
  We note members of the Kentucky Department of Fish and Wildlife Resources Commission
(Commission) could simply search their cell phones for public records and transmit those public
records to the Commission.

                                             -24-
16. At the same time, the circuit court inexplicably “admonishe[d] state

employees, officials, volunteers, etc. from using privately-owned devices to

conduct state business[.]” Opinion and Order at 17.

             The Commission has also argued that its members possess privacy

interests in their personal cell phones that preclude disclosure of text messages

relating to Commission business under the Open Records Act. However, it is

incongruous for the Commission to argue that its members have such a privacy

interest in personal cell phones while not providing its members with cell phones,

thus necessitating the members use of private cell phones for official business.

             While public officials and employees certainly possess privacy

interests in their personal cell phones, public officials and employees’ privacy

interests in text messages that relate to official business are a different matter. The

Open Records Act recognizes a privacy exemption as to personal information

contained in public records. KRS 61.878(1)(a). Here, however, the Commission

has not demonstrated that the text messages sought in the open records request

contained personal information. In fact, information in text messages of a personal

nature was specifically excluded from the open records request by the Coalition.

             To categorically exclude all text messages on personal cell phones

from the scope of the Open Records Act would surely operate to encourage the use

of personal electronic devices and place vital public records beyond the reach of

                                         -25-
citizens. While this Court is mindful of the privacy interests of public officials and

employees, it also understands that open access to public records is an essential

check on the power of public officials and employees. Current events speak to the

necessity of holding public officials accountable and of the public’s right to know

whether public officials and agencies are properly performing their respective

official duties. Hence, we conclude that the circuit court erred by determining that

text messages stored upon personal cell phones of Commission members were not

subject to disclosure under the Open Records Act.

                                  Willful Violation

             The Coalition also argues that the circuit court erred by finding that

the Commission did not willfully violate the Open Records Act. In particular, the

Coalition maintains that the Commission acted in a conscious and deliberate

disregard for the Coalition’s rights by not producing public records on personal

cell phones and email accounts. The Coalition points out that the Commission did

not provide its members with cell phones or official email accounts, thus

necessitating the members use of private cell phones and email accounts. As a

result, according to the Coalition, public documents were necessarily stored on the

private devices and in the private email accounts of Commission members.

             As to a willful violation of the Open Records Act, KRS 61.882

provides, in relevant part:

                                         -26-
            Any person who prevails against any agency in any
            action in the courts regarding a violation of KRS
            61.870 to 61.884 may, upon a finding that the records
            were willfully withheld in violation of KRS
            61.870 to 61.884, be awarded costs, including reasonable
            attorney’s fees, incurred in connection with the legal
            action. If such person prevails in part, the court may in
            its discretion award him costs or an appropriate portion
            thereof. In addition, it shall be within the discretion of
            the court to award the person an amount not to exceed
            twenty-five dollars ($25) for each day that he was denied
            the right to inspect or copy said public record.
            Attorney’s fees, costs, and awards under this subsection
            shall be paid by the agency that the court determines is
            responsible for the violation.

KRS 61.882(5). Under KRS 61.882(5), the term “‘willful’ connotes that the

agency withheld requested records without plausible justification and with

conscious disregard of the requester’s rights.” City of Fort Thomas v. Cincinnati

Enquirer, 406 S.W.3d 842, 854 (Ky. 2013).

            In its Opinion and Order, the circuit court believed that the

Commission did not willfully fail to comply with the Coalition’s open records

request. And, upon the whole, we cannot conclude that the circuit court erred. In

fact, we recognize that Kentucky law surrounding the Coalition’s open records

request as to personal email accounts and text messages stored on personal cell

phones was unsettled. Consequently, we conclude that the circuit court properly

found that the Commission did not act willfully pursuant to KRS 61.882(5).

                                       -27-
             We view any remaining contentions of error raised by the Coalition to

be moot or without merit.

                    CROSS-APPEAL NO. 2022-CA-0192-MR

             The Commission argues on cross-appeal that the circuit court

erroneously concluded that emails concerning Commission business stored on

private email accounts of its members are public records subject to disclosure

under the Open Records Act.

             For the reasons set forth in Appeal No. 2022-CA-0170-MR, we,

likewise, conclude that emails concerning Commission business that are stored on

the members’ personal email accounts qualify as public records subject to

disclosure under the Open Records Act. Additionally, we reject the Commission’s

argument that official documents of the Commission may only be generated by a

quorum of members. As set forth in the above appeal, public records of a public

agency are not so narrowly defined under the Open Records Act.

             The Commission also asserts that the open records request by the

Coalition was overly broad and unreasonable burdensome under KRS 61.872(6).

However, the Commission failed to set forth particular facts demonstrating that the

Commission would be unreasonably burdened by complying with the open records

request by the Coalition. Instead, the Commission argues that the “possibility of

unfettered fishing expeditions into private emails and texts . . . places an undue

                                         -28-
burden on public agencies” and that with “nearly four hundred (400) boards and

commissions” in Kentucky, “[i]t would be manifestly unjust to force agencies and

individual board or commission members . . . to separate all personal emails from

agency emails, [and] turn over information from their private cell phones[.]”

Commission’s Brief at 19. These arguments concern the general effect of open

records requests possibly made in futuro upon Kentucky’s commissions, boards,

and members thereof. However, it is incumbent upon the Commission to

demonstrate with particular facts that the Commission’s compliance with the

instant open records request by the Coalition would be unreasonably burdensome.

Based on our review of the record, we conclude that the circuit court properly

rejected the Commission’s argument that disclosure of the emails was exempt from

disclosure under KRS 61.872(6).

            We view any remaining contentions of error as moot or without merit.

                                   SUMMARY

            In Appeal No. 2022-CA-0170-MR, we hold that text messages related

to Commission business and stored on personal cell phones of its members are

public records generally subject to disclosure under the Open Records Act. As to

the exemption of undue burden under KRS 61.872(6), we vacate the circuit court’s

determination of undue burden, and upon remand, the circuit court shall reconsider

same based upon the particular facts of this case as pertains to the Commission and

                                       -29-
its members only. We affirm the circuit court’s decision that the Commission’s

partial denial of the open records request by the Coalition was not willful per KRS

61.882(5).

                In Cross-Appeal 2022-CA-0192-MR, we affirm the circuit court’s

decision that emails concerning Commission business that are stored on the

members’ personal email accounts qualify as public records subject to disclosure

under the Open Records Act and are not exempt from disclosure under KRS

61.872(6).

                For the foregoing reasons, the Opinion and Order of the Franklin

Circuit Court is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for proceedings

consistent with this Opinion in Appeal No. 2022-CA-0170-MR, and is affirmed in

Cross-Appeal No. 2022-CA-0192-MR.

                COMBS, JUDGE, CONCURS.

                MCNEILL, JUDGE, CONCURS AND FILES SEPARATE
OPINION.

                MCNEILL, JUDGE, CONCURRING: In an opinion about texts and

emails, we must be sure to not send the wrong message. While I concur with the

majority’s Opinion, I write separately to assuage any concerns the Kentucky Open

Records Act2 (“the Act”) requires public agencies to turn over private cell phones

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) 61.870 to 61.884.

                                              -30-
or that today’s holding will impose an extreme burden on agencies to identify and

produce all public records generated on private cell phones or private email

accounts. Our Opinion merely holds that “text messages [or emails] related to

Commission business and stored on personal cell phones [or personal email

accounts] of its members are public records generally subject to disclosure under

the Open Records Act absent an applicable exception.” Majority Opinion at 22,

28 (emphasis added).

             Thus, only those public records not covered by an exemption would

be subject to disclosure. “KRS 61.878(1) provides fourteen categories of public

records that are [excluded from disclosure under the Act.]” University of Kentucky

v. Kernel Press, Inc., 620 S.W.3d 43, 52 (Ky. 2021). The majority Opinion rightly

limits itself to only those exclusions argued by the Commission below and on

appeal: undue burden (KRS 61.872(6)) and invasion of personal privacy (KRS

61.878(1)(a)).

             However, other exemptions could be especially relevant in the context

of (often informal) email and text message exchanges. KRS 61.878(1)(i) excludes

from disclosure “Preliminary drafts, notes, correspondence with private

individuals, other than correspondence which is intended to give notice of final

action of a public agency[,]” while KRS 61.878(1)(j) exempts “[p]reliminary

recommendations, and preliminary memoranda in which opinions are expressed or

                                        -31-
policies formulated or recommended[.]” In sum, the Act provides exceptions that

could limit, practically, the number of text messages or private emails an agency

would be required to produce in response to an open records request. However,

the Act also explicitly recognizes that “free and open examination of public

records . . . may cause inconvenience . . . to public officials or others.” KRS

61.871.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-                BRIEF FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-
APPELLEE:                                  APPELLANT:

Jon L. Fleischaker                         Jonathan D. Goldberg
Michael P. Abate                           Anthony R. Johnson
William R. Adams                           Jan M. West
Louisville, Kentucky                       Prospect, Kentucky

ORAL ARGUMENT FOR                          ORAL ARGUMENT FOR
APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE:                  APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT:

Michael P. Abate                           Jan M. West
Louisville, Kentucky                       Prospect, Kentucky

                                        -32-