Court Opinion

ID: 9804793
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 17:12:08.665112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:09:46.747526
License: Public Domain

Acosta and Gische, JJ.,
dissent in a memorandum by Gische, *469J., as follows: I respectfully dissent and would reverse the motion court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants Simon and Parry on the issue of application of the homeowners’ exemption under Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6).*
Defendants own a single family home that was undergoing renovation at the time plaintiff, a workman, was injured. It is undisputed that after Simon acquired ownership of the house through inheritance, neither he nor Parry, nor any other member of their family, lived there. No one lived in the residence during the course of renovation. After the renovation was completed, the residence was rented out to a third party and used solely for commercial purposes.
Labor Law §§ 240 (1) and 241 (6) provide reasonable and adequate protection for workers employed at construction sites by imposing a nondelegable duty on owners, contractors, and their agents to take necessary safety precautions. Both sections 240 (1) and 241 (6) exempt from liability “owners of one and two-family dwellings who contract for but do not direct or control the work” (Khela v Neiger, 85 NY2d 333, 336 [1995]). The exemption is inapplicable, however, to homeowners who use a one or two family house solely for commercial purposes (Lombardi v Stout, 80 NY2d 290 [1992]). The exemption is also inapposite where the purpose in making renovations is to prepare the property for commercial rental (Lombardi, 80 NY2d at 297). The burden rests on the party claiming the benefit of the exemption to show that it applies (id.).
In establishing their prima facie case, defendants asserted that at the time of accident in 2005, they had no intention of using the property commercially. While it is defendants’ intended use at the time of the accident that controls the outcome of this inquiry (Davis v Maloney, 49 AD3d 385, 386 [1st Dept 2008]), there are sufficient facts in the record from which a trier of fact could conclude that defendants’ stated intention is not credible.
To ascertain whether defendants are entitled to the homeowners’ exemption necessarily requires looking into operation of defendants’ thought and decision-making processes. They freely admit that at some point during the renovation they formulated an intent to use the property commercially, but claim that such intent crystalized only after plaintiffs accident. This issue, which necessarily implicates defendants’ state of mind, is not readily determinable on a motion for summary judgment *470(Credit Suisse First Boston v Utrecht-America Fin. Co., 80 AD3d 485, 487 [1st Dept 2011]). Common sense suggests that credibility determinations on issues of subjective intent are more appropriately resolved at trial (Coan v Estate of Chapin, 156 AD2d 318, 319 [1st Dept 1989]).
The record contains evidence calling into question defendants’ intent on the date of the accident, thereby warranting the denial of summary judgment. Since inheriting the property in 2001, defendants have never resided there and it has been used exclusively for commercial purposes. After acquiring ownership, defendants undertook an extensive renovation project on their Manhattan apartment, which remained their only residence. Their deposition testimony concerning their future plans for the property was tentative, speculating that they might live there once their grade school age children were entering high school. Defendants admittedly consulted realtors, considered setting up a “dba” or corporation to hold the property, and purchased a book about renting property, all while the renovation was ongoing, although they could not say when these events actually occurred.
The defendants had numerous discussions with one another about the prospect of renting out the property, but were unable to pinpoint when these conversations began taking place. Defendants were unable to consistently state when they actually formulated the intent to rent out the property. Initially, they claimed they were unsure, but later testified that the decision was made in the spring of 2007. Although defendants cited the unanticipated construction costs as the primary motivation for the decision to rent, written notes and spreadsheets demonstrated that their estimated costs of the renovation were near to the actual costs. All of these facts create a disputed issue regarding defendants’ subjective intent, which should be decided at trial.

 I agree with the majority’s conclusion concerning the inapplicability of Labor Law § 200 and common law negligence.