Court Opinion

ID: 9663044
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:26:36.991971+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:44.688516
License: Public Domain

Boyle, J.
I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the defendants’ convictions must be reversed because their detention under a "reverse writ” requires suppression of a statement and evidence obtained during the detention and because they were not permitted to accompany the jury to a view of the scene.
*252I. Reverse Writ and Delay in Arraignment
Although this Court has held that there is no lawful authority for the reverse writ detention proceeding, People v Casey, 411 Mich 179; 305 NW2d 247 (1981), this holding does not resolve the question whether where the reverse writ is employed suppression is automatically required. In Casey, we held only that the reverse writ had no effect on the legality of the detention. The real issue in this case is whether, regardless of the reverse writ, a 72-hour delay in the arraignment of the defendants following an arrest based on probable cause requires suppression of defendant Howard’s statement and evidence seized during the period of detention.1 Thus, I agree with the majority that resolution of this question turns upon whether violations of MCL 764.13; MSA 28.871(1) and MCL 764.26; MSA 28.885 require suppression of the challenged evidence.
The majority assumes, for purposes of analysis, that there was probable cause to arrest the defendants. I would hold that there was probable cause to arrest given my conclusion that there were "facts and circumstances 'sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the [suspect] had committed or was committing an offense.’ ” Gerstein v Pugh, 420 US 103, 111; 95 S Ct 854; 43 L Ed 2d 54 (1975).2
*253Given an arrest based on probable cause, the majority nevertheless concludes that defendant Howard’s statement and the physical evidence must be suppressed because they were obtained during a period of prearraignment delay. The majority states that "the state constitutional guarantee of due process of law requires an arrestee’s prompt arraignment.” The majority lists as purposes for these requirements: to advise the arrestee of constitutional rights and the nature of the charges, to ensure that those rights are not violated, to afford the arrestee an opportunity to have his right to liberty on bail determined and to make a statement in open court and, in the case where a person is arrested without a warrant, to have a prompt determination of probable cause. The analysis which follows demonstrates that the fundamental purposes of the statutory requirement have been satisfied, and that there is no reason in Michigan or federal constitutional precedent warranting the conclusion that an exclusionary rule should be applied in these circumstances.
Initially, I note that the prompt arraignment requirement is not a constitutional rule, but, rather, is a rule formulated by the United States Supreme Court "[i]n the exercise of its supervisory authority over the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts.” McNabb v United States, 318 US 332, 341; 63 S Ct 608; 87 L Ed 819 (1943).3 Properly stated, the constitutional require*254ment is a Fourth Amendment requirement of a judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to extended restraint of liberty following arrest. Gerstein v Pugh, supra. In this case a judicial determination of probable cause was made three days after arrest when the arrest warrants issued.
With respect to the statutory requirements for prompt arraignment, I agree with the majority’s observation that in the past the exclusionary rule has been employed as an appropriate remedy for a statutory violation "[o]nly when the delay has been employed as a tool to extract a statement.” People v White, 392 Mich 404, 424; 221 NW2d 357 (1974), cert den 420 US 912 (1975). I disagree with the majority’s expansion of this rule to require the suppression of physical evidence and with the conclusion that the detention in this case was used as a tool to obtain Howard’s statement and Mallory’s shoes.
The majority correctly states that one of the purposes for the prompt arraignment requirement is to advise the arrestee of his constitutional rights. The lower court record reveals, however, that Howard was twice advised of his constitutional rights prior to making his statement: once by a police officer and once by the judge at the reverse writ proceeding and that all defendants were also advised of the nature of the charges at the reverse writ proceeding.
Prompt arraignment assures that the accused is judicially advised of his constitutional rights, making submission to subsequent police interrogation less likely. See 1 Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure (2d ed), § 72. While the reverse writ procedure may not be used to justify an otherwise illegal detention, People v Casey, supra, it does not follow that advice of rights actually given should *255be similarly treated as a nullity, particularly where, as here, it cannot be successfully contended that the delay was for the purpose of obtaining a confession.4
Moreover, even if the defendants had not been advised of their constitutional rights, the circumstances of the police officer’s conversation did not consist of "words or actions on the part of the police . . . that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Rhode Island v Innis, 446 US 291, 301; 100 S Ct 1682; 64 L Ed 2d 297 (1980). The police officer’s comments were not particularly evocative, nor was there any suggestion that the defendant was particularly susceptible. There is no assertion that Howard was subjected to continuous interrogation up to the time he gave this statement. At the time Howard made this statement he was being transported to visit his sister. Thus, he was not given the impression that he would be held incommunicado until an incriminating statement was obtained.
With respect to the right afforded to the arrestee to have his right to liberty on bail determined, I note that the defendants had a constitutional5 and statutory6 right to bail "before conviction,” but neither provision has been interpreted to confer a right to an immediate bail determination. This conclusion is supported by the observation that in the case of misdemeanor prisoners, immediate bail is required by statute, MCL 780.581; MSA 28.872(1), a fact which implicitly suggests that immediate bond would not otherwise be required.7 Indeed, the bail statute allows a court to set bail *256only after due notice has been given to the prosecuting attorney. MCL 765.3; MSA 28.890.
Further support for this conclusion is drawn from the procedure for writs of habeas corpus which requires the physical production of the prisoner before a judge for a determination of the propriety of further detention. Pending determination of the lawful basis for the prisoner’s detention, he may be released on bail, remanded to jail, or brought before the court from time to time until the court determines whether or not it is proper to discharge him. People v McCager, 367 Mich 116; 116 NW2d 205 (1962). Thus, there is no right to immediate bond although the magistrate at the reverse writ proceeding certainly had the lawful authority to set bond, and defendants were afforded an opportunity by their appearance to have the issue of bond considered, and to make any statement they chose to.
While this Court is certainly free to interpret the Michigan Constitution to require a higher standard for the protection of our citizens than that which the United States Constitution grants to citizens by virtue of its commands, the procedure employed here not only met but exceeded constitutional commands under both the United States Constitution and the Michigan Constitution.
Application of an exclusionary rule in the instant case must be based on the conclusion that an accused’s right to formal arraignment is of such paramount importance to the integrity of our system that a voluntary statement made after Miranda warnings, as well as physical evidence which could have been seized pursuant to an arrest on probable cause, must be suppressed. I do not read the relevant constitutional and statutory provisions to require enforcement of a "right” to *257immediate arraignment through the exclusion of relevant evidence and of a voluntary statement given prior to the setting of bail.
I find particularly disturbing the majority’s extension of People v White, supra, to the physical evidence in question. Since this Court has never said that immediate arraignment after a probable cause arrest is required, and since the police were not holding defendants incommunicado, but were producing them at regular intervals before a judge, I can find no reason to punish them, or the people of this state for this delay. This result would apparently mean that all prisoners must be arraigned within 72 hours of their arrest on pain of loss of relevant evidence, regardless of whether that evidence has been discovered by coercive means or actual exploitation of the delay. While the majority couches its result in terms of evidence "directly” procured from a detainee, the fact of the matter is the evidence became known to the police because they discovered a witness who said he had seen defendants "stomping on the head” of the deceased. It was this witness’ statement which led to the seizure of the shoes, and the delay can only be relevant because "but for” its existence the shoes likely would have been beyond the ability of the police to reach.
Footnote 7 of the majority opinion discloses this analysis. The majority there notes that defendants were charged with felonious assault until the decedent died; therefore they might have been bailed out had they been arraigned and "[accordingly, the blood on the shoes might not have been discovered as it was.” Whether defendants would have been able to make bail and what it would have been are matters of pure supposition, but it is this speculation on which the exploitation argument rests; i.e., *258but for defendants being in custody, the shoes (and the blood) would never have been discovered.8
The majority’s suppression of physical evidence seized from defendant Mallory during the unlawful detention finds no support in the precedent of this Court. While this Court has. required the suppression of physical evidence obtained in violation of a defendant’s statutory right to immediate bail in cases of misdemeanor arrests, People v Dixon, 392 Mich 691; 222 NW2d 749 (1974), it has not extended that rule to physical evidence seized or identification obtained during a period of delay in arraignment following an arrest on probable cause for the commission of a felony.
A confession obtained during a period of unlawful delay before arraignment, even if it is voluntarily given, might never have been made by the defendant but for the lengthy detention. Thus, such a confession is inculpatory evidence that never would have existed but for the violation of the defendant’s statutory rights. In contrast, physical evidence or identification testimony exists independently of the defendant’s detention. While an unlawful detention may result in the police learning of the existence of the evidence or may facilitate the seizure of the evidence, the existence of the evidence does not result from the unlawful detention. See, e.g., Hancock v Nelson, 363 F2d 249, 254 (CA 1, 1966), cert den 386 US 984 (1967), *259which found no error in the failure to suppress evidence of a dead body and the defendant’s clothes seized during an unlawful detention of the defendant. The court explained:
"In the confession cases there might arguably, in certain situations, be a causal connection between the over-long detention and the confession. The impatience, frustration and confusion involved in the delay might have tended to induce the confession.
"When, as in the instant case, the evidence obtained during the delay is the body of a murdered man, the fact that his murderers were illegally detained in jail had no causal relation to the existence or location of the body. We have held above that at the time of the surrender by the appellees of their clothing, they were under lawful arrest and subject to constitutional search of their persons. But even if it were not so, and they were still under statutorily illegal detention when they surrendered their clothes, the fact of the detention had nothing whatever to do with the presence of blood and telltale bits of fabric and plastic on their clothes and shoes.”
The purpose of the exclusionary rule "is to deter —to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way — by removing the incentive to disregard it.” Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 656; 81 S Ct 1684; 6 L Ed 2d 1081 (1961), quoting Elkins v United States, 364 US 206, 217; 80 S Ct 1437; 4 L Ed 2d 1669 (1960). Even if I were writing on a clean slate, which the previously cited cases show clearly I am not, I would not create a rule requiring the suppression of this evidence. Simply stated, there is no constitutional guarantee which requires such result, and the statutory right to prompt arraignment should not be extended to require suppression where all of its purposes were met by the procedure employed.
Moreover, the "imperative of judicial integrity,” *260Elkins v United States, supra, p 222, does not require the creation of an exclusionary rule. In 1962, this Court held in People v McCager, 367 Mich 116; 116 NW2d 205 (1962) (opinion of Souris, J.), that when an accused was produced in court following arrest in response to a writ of habeas corpus, the accused’s continued detention became the exclusive responsibility of the judge who issued the writ and a confession thereafter made was not during a period of illegal detention. Thus, unlike the situation in Elkins, supra, p 223, there can be no legitimate argument that the court was "an accomplice[ ] in the willful disobedience” of the law.
The exclusionary rule is a " 'blunt instrument, conferring an altogether disproportionate reward not so much in the interest of the defendant as in that of society at large.’ ” United States v Burke, 517 F2d 377, 386 (CA 2, 1975) (Friendly, J., quoting United States v Dunnings, 425 F2d 836, 840 [CA 2, 1969], cert den 397 US 1002 [1970]). In deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule in a situation where the violation of FR Crim P 41 was not of constitutional magnitude, Judge Friendly examined (1) whether there was "prejudice” to the defendant in the sense that the search might not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the rule had been followed, and (2) whether there was evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a provision in the rule.
Examining these considerations in reverse order, I note that the conduct in question was not in deliberate disregard of the statutory prompt-arraignment requirement. See McCager, supra. Moreover, this Court can take judicial notice of the fact that a court order in effect at the time of the defendants’ arrest required the production of *261felony defendants within 12 hours of arrest.9 Insofar as "prejudice” is concerned, the police could have properly seized Mallory’s shoes upon his arrest, and the delay in arraignment did not render the seizure of the shoes invalid. See United States v Edwards, 415 US 800; 94 S Ct 1234; 39 L Ed 2d 771 (1974).10
Finally, while the interjection of the decedent’s terminal brain cancer was erroneous, I agree with the Court of Appeals resolution of this issue.
I, therefore, conclude that on the record and under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of defendant Mallory’s shoes, the blood tests performed on them, and the statement of defendant Howard. Accordingly, I would affirm the defendants’ convictions.
II. Jury View
Since a criminal defendant has a constitutional and statutory right to be present at trial, the threshold question in determining whether error requiring reversal resulted from the exclusion of the defendants from the jury view is whether a view is part of the trial.
We answer as follows: where the view is nothing more than a bare inspection of the scene of the crime, neither the constitution nor a statute requires a defendant’s presence.
The majority presents no rationale for the conclusion that a jury view is part of a trial. In my *262judgment, MCL 768.3; MSA 28.1026 must be assumed to assure protection of a right which the presence of the defendant would have protected. While the majority notes examples of benefits obtainable by defendant’s presence at a view, recitation of these benefits are policy reasons supporting a legislative judgment to require presence rather than an analysis of what the legislative guarantee was intended to provide.
For purposes of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, the United States Supreme Court held long ago that a jury view without the presence of the defendant was not part of a trial. Snyder v Massachusetts, 291 US 97, 107-108; 54 S Ct 330; 78 L Ed 674 (1934). In so holding, the Court reasoned that "[s]o far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the presénce of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only.” The Court began its analysis by noting that if the view were nothing more than a bare inspection where nothing is said by anyone to direct the attention of the jury to one feature or another, there would be nothing the defendant could do if he were there, and almost nothing he could gain. Moreover, according to the Snyder Court, due process was not violated by the fact that counsel was permitted to point out particular features of the scene and to request the jury to observe them, reasoning that the difference between a view at which everyone is silent and a view accompanied by a request to note particular features is one of degree and nothing more. This conclusion rested on the centuries-old practice whereby "showers” were sworn to lead the jury to the view and to point out certain features, and the historic distinction between these views and trials.
*263The Snyder Court did not reach the issue whether the defendant’s exclusion from the view violated the Confrontation Clause since, at the time Snyder was decided, the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause had not been extended to the states. The Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses was made obligatory on the states in Pointer v Texas, 380 US 400; 85 S Ct 1065; 13 L Ed 2d 923 (1965). Clearly, "[o]ne of the most basic of the rights guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause is the accused’s right to be present in the courtroom at every stage of his trial.” Illinois v Allen, 397 US 337, 338; 90 S Ct 1057; 25 L Ed 2d 353 (1970). In determining whether a view is a stage of a defendant’s trial under the Confrontation Clause, we must consider the purpose of that constitutional provision.
The "literal right to 'confront’ the witness at the time of trial forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.” California v Green, 399 US 149, 157; 90 S Ct 1930; 26 L Ed 2d 489 (1970). The Green Court stated the purposes of confrontation thus:
"Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath — thus impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination, the 'greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth’; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant’s fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility.” 399 US 158.
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the primary interest secured by the Confrontation Clause is the right of cross-examination. Davis v Alaska, 415 US 308, 315; 94 S *264Ct 1105; 39 L Ed 2d 347 (1974). See also Pointer v Texas, 380 US 406-407. Also protected is the interest in exposing the witness’ motivation in testifying and in impeaching a witness. Davis, supra. Stated another way, the primary purpose of the Confrontation Clause is " 'to prevent depositions or ex parte affidavits . . . being used against the petitioner in lieu of a personal examination and cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting the conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.’ ” Douglas v Alabama, 380 US 415, 418-419; 85 S Ct 1074; 13 L Ed 2d 934 (1965), quoting Mattox v United States, 156 US 237; 15 S Ct 337; 39 L Ed 409 (1895).
The absence of a defendant from a jury view where no testimony is presented does not infringe this constitutional right. Plainly stated, there are no witnesses to confront, no recollections to test, and no demeanor to place before the jury. It is the testimonial evidence in court to which the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to confrontation applies. The scene of the crime is not, in and of itself, a witness. 6 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev), § 1803. Those jurisdictions that have considered whether exclusion from a jury view, where no evidence or testimony is presented, violates the Confrontation Clause of the federal or state constitutions have answered negatively. See, e.g., Jordan v State, 247 Ga 328; 276 SE2d 224 (1981); Commonwealth v Darcy, 362 Pa 259; 66 A2d 663 (1949), cert den 338 US 862 (1949); State v Perkins, 32 Wash 2d 810; 204 P2d 207 (1949). Those cases which held that a jury view was part of a trial did *265so because the jury received evidence at the view. See Anno: 90 ALR 597; Anno: 30 ALR 1357. Moreover, while People v Auerbach, 176 Mich 23; 141 NW 869 (1913), and People v Connor, 295 Mich 1; 294 NW 74 (1940), have been cited as holding that the defendant has a right to be present at a jury view,11 the only rule which can be gleaned from the Michigan cases regarding jury views is that nothing in the nature of testimony may be taken in the absence of the defendant. See People v Hull, 86 Mich 449; 49 NW 288 (1891); People v Auerbach, supra. I would hold that for purposes of the Confrontation Clause, a jury view where no evidence or testimony is presented is not a part of the trial at which the defendants have a right to be present.
It could also be contended that denying the defendants’ attendance at the jury view infringes the defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel in that the defendants’ presence is necessary to enable them to confer with counsel. Not every restriction on counsel’s time or opportunity to consult with his client violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. See, e.g., Morris v Slappy, 461 US 1; 103 S Ct 1610; 75 L Ed 2d 610 (1983). A defendant’s Sixth Amendment right is to assistance of counsel. The Sixth Amendment does not give the defendant a right to have counsel present at proceedings at which the defendant does not have a right to be present, United States v Ash, 413 US 300; 93 S Ct 2568; 37 L Ed 2d 619 (1973), although counsel’s presence at the view may be essential, under some circumstances, to protect the defendant’s other constitutional rights, e.g., preventing the admission of evidence or jury misconduct. Of course, *266there could be no claim here that the defendants were denied assistance of counsel at the view, but only that they were denied an opportunity to confer with counsel at the jury view. Clearly, a direct restriction on defendants’ opportunity to consult with counsel would be unconstitutional, Geders v United States, 425 US 80; 96 S Ct 1330; 47 L Ed 2d 592 (1976); but the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel should not be translated into a right to be present at counsel’s side wherever and whenever instantaneous consultation may be helpful to the defense. See Commonwealth v Curry, 368 Mass 195; 330 NE2d 819 (1975).
An examination of the purpose of a jury view further supports the conclusion that the presence of the defendant is not constitutionally or statutorily mandated. The view may properly be described as a "scene view,” rather than an "evidentiary view” (a view of evidence so large or affixed that it cannot be brought into the courtroom). See Jordan v State, 247 Ga 328; 276 SE2d 224 (1981). A jury view of the scene is not evidence. Rather, the purpose of a scene view is to enable the jurors to understand the testimony they have heard in court. Valenti v Mayer, 301 Mich 551; 4 NW2d 5 (1942). The purpose of a jury view emphasizes that the view is not a situation in which the defendant is confronted with evidence against him. This conclusion is further supported by the observation that a jury view can take place after the proofs are closed and while the jury is deliberating. See People v Pizzino, 313 Mich 97; 20 NW2d 824 (1945). In short, neither due process, the right to confrontation, the right to effective assistance of counsel, nor the purposes of a jury view support the conclusion that MCL 768.3; MSA 28.1026 can properly be interpreted as a legislative directive *267requiring defendant’s presence at a jury view. To hold otherwise is to substitute our policy preference for that of the Legislature.
Moreover, were I to hold that a jury view was part of a trial, that conclusion would not automatically require reversal of the defendants’ convictions. In People v Morgan, 400 Mich 527; 255 NW2d 603 (1977), cert den 434 US 967 (1977), this Court rejected the rule of People v Medcoff, 344 Mich 108; 73 NW2d 537 (1955), that injury is conclusively presumed from a defendant’s every absence during the course of a trial.12 Instead, this Court adopted the standard of Wade v United States, 142 US App DC 356, 360; 441 F2d 1046 (1971), i.e., whether there is any reasonable possibility of prejudice.
My review of the record persuades me that the trial court prevented a reasonable possibility of prejudice through careful instruction of the jury. See, e.g., People v Devin, 93 Ill 2d 326; 444 NE2d 102 (1982) (no error to have jury view without defendant where trial judge gave carefully detailed instructions concerning the manner in which the view was to be conducted and defense counsel said he would be present). Moreover, the only purpose of the view was to observe the line of sight of one of the witnesses that had testified, and the jury was instructed this was the purpose of the view.13 Because the scope of the view was so limited, defense counsel could have easily described to the defendants the line of sight observed by the jurors *268and consulted with the defendants regarding what they knew about it. Furthermore, defense counsel was present at the view and could have noted on the record if the jurors deviated from the trial judge’s careful instructions.
Finally, were this Court free to incorporate its policy preferences into the jurisprudence of this state, I would not hold as a matter of policy that a criminal defendant has a right per se to be present at a jury view. Many, perhaps most, trial courts have inadequate staff to assure that jurors remain together and free of taint from the receipt of other evidence, such as overhearing conversation of participants or citizens at the scene. To impose on this reality a rule which makes mandatory the defendant’s presence, with the attendant problems of assuring the security of an incarcerated defendant while also preventing prejudice to the defendant from the jury’s knowledge of that fact may well produce the result that views will simply not be held. In my judgment any rule which deprives a jury of what may, in a given situation, be a useful aid to their evaluation of the evidence is justified only by a superior competing policy. The determination whether or not there is a necessity for a jury view and whether it is feasible for the defendant to attend should be left to the discretion of the trial judge. See Jordan v State, 247 Ga 328; 276 SE2d 224 (1981); Commonwealth v Curry, 368 Mass 195; 330 NE2d 819 (1975).
In making this determination the trial court must balance the possible benefits to the defendant from attendance at the view, possible security problems if the defendant attends, if there are security problems, whether the defendant will be unduly prejudiced by having the jury see him or her in handcuffs or shackles, and whether this prejudice outweighs any benefit of having the *269defendant present. In the instant case, defendants did not present to the court any particularized statement of benefit to the defense, and on this record I find no error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s request.14

 See People v Dean, 110 Mich App 751; 313 NW2d 100 (1981); People v Antonio Johnson, 85 Mich App 247, 253-254; 271 NW2d 177 (1978) (Kaufman, J., concurring).

 Despite the fact that the majority assumes probable cause, it nevertheless relies on Dunaway v New York, 442 US 200; 99 S Ct 2248; 60 L Ed 2d 824 (1979), a case in which the prosecutor conceded that there was no probable cause to arrest the defendant. If the majority is suggesting that there was no probable cause to arrest the defendants, then I disagree with that finding. The testimony indicated that a police car was patrolling the area of East Canfield and Mt. Elliot in Detroit when the police saw a green Buick with a smashed-in *253rear end. Three black men were standing beside it. A few minutes earlier, a report came over the radio of a felonious assault that took place approximately two blocks away and less than one hour previously. The assailants were described as three black males in a green Buick with damage to the rear of the vehicle. I find that the police had probable cause to arrest the defendants on the basis of number of men observed, the similarity of the description of the car, and the proximity of the car to the scene of the crime.

 See, also, Mallory v United States, 354 US 449; 77 S Ct 1356; 1 L Ed 2d 1479 (1957).

 People v Hamilton, 359 Mich 410, 416; 102 NW2d 738 (1960).

 Const 1963, art 1, § 15.

 MCL 765.1 et seq.; MSA 28.888 et seq.

 See People v Dixon, 392 Mich 691; 222 NW2d 749 (1974).

 1 can see little distinction between this situation and that of an individual arrested on probable cause in an outstate county on a Friday, who while awaiting arraignment on Monday (or later) by a magistrate, is observed on Sunday evening to have blood on his shoes. In each situation "but for” the delay the shoes would not have been noticed and seized. Indeed, the only distinction between this hypothetical situation and the instant case is that the reverse writ procedure here employed benefited the defendants. I cannot agree that a statute passed in the context of conditions which then (and now in certain areas) did not assure the immediate presence of an arraigning judge was intended to exclude evidence under these circumstances.

 In the Matter of Detained Citizens, Interim Order of February 28, 1973 (Murphy, J.).

 People v Trudeau, 385 Mich 276; 187 NW2d 890 (1971), does not require a different result, since the holding in that case was based on the fact that there was no probable cause to believe that the defendant’s shoes seized from him while he was in jail were evidence of another crime.

 See 21A Am Jur 2d, Criminal Law, § 915, pp 379-380; United States v Walls, 443 F2d 1220 (CA 6, 1971).

 There is nothing in Morgan to suggest that this Court intended its decision to rest on federal grounds alone. Moreover, there is no meaningful distinction between the federal right to be present and the state right to be present.

 The trial judge instructed the jury that "the main observation that the court wants you to make will be from the windows at 6320, I think where Mr. Parker testified that he could look over towards the alley and see that.”

 There may be a situation where it is peculiarly necessary to have the defendant present at a view. Such a situation may arise where the defendant does not deny his presence at the scene at a relevant time and his line of vision is highly relevant to an issue in the case, thus, making his presence necessary to assure that the jury is making its observations from the proper place. Cf. People v Zakoura, 145 Kan 804; 68 P2d 11 (1937). The record in this case reveals that the trial judge gave due consideration to these concerns.