Court Opinion

ID: 9564089
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 18:54:13.124969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:13.572363
License: Public Domain

HALL, Justice:
K. K. H. appeals the adjudication of the Juvenile Court of Weber County that she was within its jurisdiction:1 The Decree of the court was based upon a finding that K. K. H. caused the death of one Paul Wilson by operating a motor vehicle in a negligent manner, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.2
This appeal basically consists of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Specifically, four points are raised: (1) that the findings of the Juvenile Court are not clothed with the presumption of verity, and that this Court must therefore review the record de novo; (2) that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings; (3) that the blood alcohol test result was erroneously received in evidence; and (4) that the said test was not reliable. The contentions raised are deemed to be without merit and the judgment below is affirmed.
The following facts are abstracted from the record: K. K. H., a girl of 17 years, transported herself and a friend, Juli, from Provo to Salt Lake City in her father's automobile. Enroute, they arranged the purchase of a six-pack of beer which they partially consumed. Arriving at State Street in Salt Lake City, they encountered three boys who purchased them more beer. One of the boys, Paul Wilson, got in the automobile with K. K. H., and Juli got in the truck with the other two boys, and they proceeded to a rest room. Thereafter, Wilson persuaded the girls to drive him to Ogden (the three of them sitting abreast on the automobile’s two bucket seats). They drove on through Ogden to a cabin of a friend of Wilson’s in Ogden Canyon. They found no one there, and then, admittedly lightheaded and having to concentrate to drive, K. K. H. drove them to the Hermitage Inn, and again used the rest room. She then drove back to the cabin, remembered walking down stairs, but remembered nothing thereafter. Her explanation was that she must have fainted. Some time later, on the way down the canyon, the automobile collided rather head-on with an off-road abutment. Wilson sustained massive head injuries and was killed; K. K. H. suffered lacerations, a contusion to her shoulder and a broken right leg; and Juli suffered head and chest injuries. The first persons on the scene of the accident removed K. K. H. from the driver’s side of the automobile and identified her as the driver. The investigating officers removed Juli from her position midway between the bucket seats, one buttock on one seat and one on the other. The automobile was extensively damaged in the front end and the steering wheel was considerably deformed. At the hospital, K. K. H. admitted that she was the driver and a test of her blood reflected a blood alcohol content of 0.12%.3 Neither K. K. H. nor Juli claim to have any *851recollection as to who was driving at the time of the accident, but in any event, there is no contention that it was Wilson and the physical evidence supports the conclusion that he was not. However, K. K. H. theorized that Juli was the driver, contending that her chest injuries were only consistent with a driver impacting upon the steering wheel of the automobile. On the other hand, the theory adopted by the court below was that K. K. H. drove, Juli sat in the middle, and Wilson sat on the right side, just as they had been seated on the trip from Salt Lake City to Ogden.
In support of her initial contention that this Court must review the record de novo K. K. H. cites cases decided by three of our sister states,4 but in doing so ignores the Utah statutory law on the matter. U.C.A., 1953, 78-3a-51 provides in pertinent part as follows:
An appeal to the Supreme Court may be taken from any order, decree, or judgment of the juvenile court. Such appeal shall be taken in the same manner in which appeals are taken from judgments or decrees of the district courts. [Emphasis added.]
The Constitution of Utah5 governs appeals from the district courts and provides that they are to be upon the record made in the court below. In cases at law, the appeal is limited to questions of law only, while in equity cases, the appeal may be on questions of law and fact.
Consistent with the aforementioned statutory and constitutional provisions, the decisional law of Utah has firmly established the standard of appellate review in equity cases. That standard is aptly stated in Del Porto v. Nicolo,6 as follows:
It is true, as plaintiff asserts, that this action ... is one in equity upon which this court has both the prerogative and the duty to review and weigh the evidence, and to determine the facts. However, in the practical application of that rule it is well established in our decisional law that due to the advantaged .position of the trial court, in close proximity to the parties and the witnesses, there is indulged a presumption of correctness of his findings and judgment, with the burden upon the appellant to show they were in error; and where the evidence is in conflict, we do not upset his findings merely because we may have reviewed the matter differently, but do so only if evidence clearly preponderates against them. [Citations omitted.]
and in Hatch v. Bastian,7 as follows:
Even though we may review the evidence, the proposition is well grounded in our law that due to the advantaged position of the trial court, we indulge considerable deference to his findings and do not interfere with them unless the evidence so clearly preponderates against them that this court is convinced that a manifest injustice has been done. [Citation omitted.] On the basis of what has been said above concerning the dispute in the evidence and the burdens of proof, we are not persuaded that the findings and judgment should be overturned.
Specifically in regard to the review on appeal of the equitable proceedings before the juvenile court, in State In Interest of K_B_,8 this Court stated the matter as follows:
. [I]t is well to have in mind the basic rules applicable to this review. The statute provides that appeals from the juvenile court shall be, “in the same manner . as . appeals from judgments ... of the district court . . .” Hearings in the juve*852nile court involving questions as to the custody of children are equitable. Due to the extreme concern of courts for the welfare of children, proceedings in their interest are sometimes stated to be equitable in the highest degree, because th.e most careful consideration will be given such matters. In equity proceedings we are charged with the responsibility of reviewing the evidence; and it is the established rule that we will not disturb the findings and determination made unless they are clearly against the weight of the evidence, or the court has abused its discretion. [Citations omitted.]
Also, in In Re Tanner,9 it was stated:
. [W]hen the juvenile court has made its determination through proper procedure, this court will accord its findings and judgment the traditional presumptions of verity; and will not disturb them unless the appellant has sustained its burden of showing that they are in error. [Citation omitted.]
K. K. H. makes an attempt to distinguish Tanner,10 and although able to do so on its facts, Tanner is not distinguishable on the point of law which it espouses, and which is controlling.
In regard to the second point on appeal, that of the sufficiency of the evidence, the rule is as was stated in State in the Interest of R. G. B::11
It is the prerogative of the jury to judge the weight of the evidence, the credibility of the witnesses, and the facts to be found therefrom. For a defendant to prevail upon a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his conviction, it must appear that viewing the evidence and all inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury, reasonable minds could not believe him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. To set aside a verdict it must appear that the evidence was so inconclusive or unsatisfactory that reasonable minds acting fairly must have entertained reasonable doubt that defendant committed the crime. Unless the evidence compels such conclusion as a matter of law, the verdict must be sustained.
The foregoing rule is the same whether a judge or jury sits as the fact-finder, and its application in the instant case obligates us to view the facts in the light most favorable to the ruling below. In so doing, it is seen that K. K. H.’s contentions do not compel the conclusion that reasonable minds could not believe her to have been the driver of the automobile.
The record contains substantial, credible evidence, coupled with the admission of K. K. H., that she was driving the automobile. This is so, although the record also reflects the various theories of innocence advanced by K. K. H., the principal one being that her lack of chest injuries was wholly inconsistent with having been the driver, while Juli’s chest injuries were only consistent with having been the driver impacting with the steering wheel and causing it to deform. This theory is obviously fraught with frailties, not the least of which is that its adoption requires considerable speculation on the part of the fact-finder.
In any event, it was the function of the court below to evaluate the theories advanced by K. K. H. and to test them in the light of all of the evidence, and it is not within the prerogative of this Court to substitute its judgment for that of the trial court where, as here, it is substantially supported by the evidence.
The last two points raised on appeal have to do with the admissibility and reliability of the blood alcohol test of K. K. H.’s blood, and we therefore address them together.
We observe at the outset that there is substantial evidence in the record, independent of the blood alcohol test, to support *853the finding below that K. K. H. was intoxicated. Furthermore, K. K. H. concedes on this appeal that she was intoxicated. She also contends that she “fainted” and thus implies that she could not have been driving at the time of the accident. Thus it is seen that evidence of the alcohol content of her blood was only cumulative and, hence, even if erroneously admitted in evidence, it would not constitute reversible error.12
Irrespective of the foregoing observations, K. K. H. contends (1) that she did not consent to the blood alcohol test, and (2) that in any event, she was incapable of consenting or refusing. We are unpersuaded by either argument for the reason that actual consent is unnecessary in the taking of a blood sample under such circumstances.13 If K. K. H. was in fact incapable of consenting or refusing, the Utah statute nevertheless permits the taking of a blood sample by one so authorized.14 It necessarily follows that the blood alcohol test result was admissible in evidence and that the court did not err in so ruling.
K. K. H.’s assertion that the test result is unreliable is based upon a contention that the accuracy of such a test need be corroborated by an additional test, and cites the following language from the Washington ease of State v. Baker15 as supportive of that proposition: “ . . that the test be given by a qualified operator and in the proper manner.”
We deem the reliance upon Baker to be faulty for two reasons. First, the foregoing language therefrom does not represent a standard other than was followed in the instant case. This is so, for it is undisputed that the operator was in all respects qualified and that all required testing procedures were followed. Secondly, our own analysis of Baker convinces us that it does not extend the standard further so as to require the performance of a series of confirming tests.
We accord the traditional presumption of verity to the proceedings of the Juvenile Court below and thereby affirm its Decree.
CROCKETT, C. J., and WILKINS, J., concur.

. Proceeding authorized by U.C.A., 1953, 78-3a-16.

. Designated by U.C.A., 1953, 76-5-207 as the offense of Automobile Homicide and punishable as a felony if committed by an adult.

.U.C.A., 1953, 41-6-44 establishes 0.08% or more by weight of alcohol in the blood as a *851presumption of being under the influence of intoxicants.

.Matter of Kent, 31 Or.App. 1219, 572 P.2d 1059 (1977); Templeton v. State, 202 Kan. 89, 447 P.2d 158 (1968); and In Re Hans, 174 Neb. 612, 119 N.W.2d 72 (1963).

. Article VIH, Section 9.

. 27 Utah 2d 286, 495 P.2d 811 (1972).

. Utah, 567 P.2d 1100 (1977).

. 7 Utah 2d 398, 326 P.2d 395 (1958).

. Utah, 549 P.2d 703 (1976).

. Id.

.Utah, 597 P.2d 1333 (1979), quoting State v. Mills, Utah, 530 P.2d 1272 (1975).

. Rule 61, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

. U.C.A., 1953, 41-6 — 44.10(a) implies consent.

. U.C.A., 1953, 41-6 — 44.10(c) permits the taking of blood from any person who is dead, unconscious, or in any other condition rendering him incapable of refusal to submit.

. 56 Wash.2d 846, 355 P.2d 806 (1960).