Court Opinion

ID: 9532484
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:21:47.18783+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:46.179262
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Knauss
dissenting:
I dissent. My brethren who constitute the majority apparently go on the assumption that the burden is upon the licensing authority to show why the applicant should not be granted a license to dispense intoxicating liquors at retail. This presupposes that every citizen is entitled to apply for a license and that the public official in charge of such matters must peradventure show why the applicant is NOT entitled to that which he seeks. In my opinion this has never been the law in this state. The granting or denial of an application for a liquor license is not the trial of a law suit. It is a request made to the local government for a privilege to do that which since the earliest days of this state has been within the sound discretion of the authority without whose consent no person, firm or corporation may dispense intoxicating liquors. By the majority opinion the court becomes the licensing authority. To say that the Manager of Safety in the instant case acted capriciously and arbitrarily is nothing more than the substitution of the ideas of the judges of this court for those of the individual who by law is charged with this function.
This case is one of four cases brought to this court *158from the Denver District Court by the Manager, who was ordered by the trial judge in the instant case to issue the licenses applied for, together with another which was decided by a District Judge who is now a member of this court. None of the other cases have been decided. This case was advanced on the docket of this court on application of the defendant in error, because he holds an option on the property where he desires to establish a restaurant and operate under a “three-way” license, which option he will exercise if he is granted a license.
No person may with impunity engage in the business of selling intoxicating liquor' without compliance with the license law. “No person has a vested right to have a license for the sale of intoxicating liquor issued to him.” 48 C.J.S. 134, p. 241.
The burden of establishing the facts necessary to authorize the granting of a license is not upon the licensing authority but upon the applicant.
In the exercise of his discretion the licensing authority may consider all circumstances known to him from whatever source the knowledge may have been derived. Lord v. Delaware Liq. Comm. (Del.) 2 Terry 154, 17 Atl. 2d 230.
A reviewing court may not substitute its judgment for that of the licensing authority. 48 C.J.S. p. 261.
The leading case in this state is MacArthur v. Presto, 122 Colo. 202, 221 P. (2d) 934. There this court said: “Such evidence shows the need of the applicant for a license, but not, convincingly, the requirement of the community for it.” There, as here, the applicant held a “two-way license,” that is, a license to dispense beer and wine. He desired to sell spirituous liquors. This court said: “Of a certainty, the evidence disclosed by the record contains no showing that the necessity for spirituous liquors with meals [as in the present case] was so urgent and immediate in that community that all reasonable men must agree that it required the service *159of such liquors at a location across the street from an eating place having such license * * *. All reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the licensing authority.” The license was refused in the Presto case and this decision has been followed in all subsequent cases in this court. In Board of County Commissioners v. Buckley, 121 Colo. 109, 213 P. (2d) 608, Mr. Justice Moore, speaking for this court, said: “We cannot say that reasonable men must of necessity conclude that the stated grounds of rejection are without merit. There is room for an honest difference of opinion among board members, equally conscientious in the discharge of their duty, as to whether the conditions existing would warrant a rejection of the application.” In the instant case there is no claim that the Manager of Safety was anything but “conscientious in the discharge of his duty.” This court may not substitute its opinion for that of the Manager of Safety for “there is room for an honest difference of opinion” among equally conscientious men in the “discharge of their duty.”
MacArthur v. Presto was approved in MacArthur v. Bucklen, 123 Colo. 41, 225 P. (2d) 58; MacArthur v. Sanzalone, 123 Colo. 166, 225 P. (2d) 1044; MacArthur v. Bishop, 123 Colo. 452, 230 P. (2d) 589; MacArthur v. Martelli, 127 Colo. 308, 255 P. (2d) 969, and Geer v. Susman, 134 Colo. 6, 298 P. (2d) 948.
The court will not weigh the evidence, but will consider it only to ascertain whether or not there is any legal evidence to support the ruling. 48 C.J.S. 270.
MacArthur v. Martelli, supra, was a case where Martelli, holding a liquor license, was having some trouble over his lease on the premises in which he conducted his business, and desired to move directly across Colfax Avenue to another location. The district court directed the issuance of the license to Martelli, and this court reversed the judgment. In the Martelli case the number of outlets in that section of the city would not be increased by permitting applicant to move across the *160street. There, this court said again: “As we have repeatedly ruled in the matter of issuing licenses, all reasonable doubt must be resolved in favor of the licensing authority.”
We cannot, in view of our holdings, surmise or conjecture that the existing outlets in the vicinity of the applicant’s premises, which he desires to purchase IF he gets a license, are of doubtful value, or do not render efficient and satisfactory service. Applicant does not now own or have a lease on the premises to which he says he will attract business. Nothing of the sort appears in this record, and as we are not the licensing authority, we should not indulge in tenuous inferences or exsufflate surmises about the other institutions in the neighborhood or the character of such establishments. In the Martelli case applicant advances the “economic advantage of the removal and enlarging of his business premises.” There this court said [citing the Presto case] with reference to evidence adduced by applicant: “Such evidence shows the need of the applicant for a license but not, convincingly the requirements of the community for it.”
The facts in MacArthur v. Bishop, supra, were identical with the facts in the instant case, except that there were a greater number of outlets within a radius of six blocks of the premises where Bishop had a bona fide restaurant and held a “two-way” license. He desired a “three-way” license, which was refused by the Manager of Safety, the district court on review directed the issuance of the requested license. The case was reversed in this court with Mr. Justice Holland dissenting. It was there announced: “The statute contains no requirement of formal findings, no jurisdictional or quasi-jurisdictional determination or finding was required, and no specific findings were requested and refused. We think none were here necessary.”
To justify reversal of the action of a licensing authority it must affirmatively appear that the conduct of the *161official making the decision was arbitrary or capricious, essentially synonymous terms. To come within the terms arbitrary and capricious the official charged with the duty must be shown to have acted “in violation of settled legal principles.” State v. Davidson, 116 N.J.L. 325, 184 A. 330; State v. Then, 114 N.J.L. 413, 177 A. 87. In the light of the several Colorado decisions herein cited, how can it be said that Plaintiff in Error acted contrary to the “settled legal principles” announced by this court, when he denied petitioner’s application for a license? In my opinion the Manager of Safety acted in accordance with the law as recorded in the Colorado cases, and exercised the discretion vested in him to act in the interest of the public. Counsel for Plaintiff in Error, in my humble opinion, had a perfect right to rely on the decisions of this court. Our pronouncements in cases of this kind should not be lightly brushed aside and held for naught, and I cannot for one moment admit that because the Manager refused the license a “stigma” attached to him, as stated in the majority opinion.