Court Opinion

ID: 9712203
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:48:47.375214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:10.780881
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
White, J.
The fundamental juridical question before us on this motion is the extent to which courts should tolerate deviation by attorneys from established rules of procedure without penalizing the client for the deviation. Some procedural uniformity must be maintained in every court, else confusion will render adjudication impossible. But to require overly strict adherence to arbitrary rules often is merely to permit judges to close cases without deciding controversies.
Appellate tribunals must, and do, make two basic demands of litigants who seek to correct alleged errors of trial courts: 1) The appealing party must file a written statement setting forth what the court below did, or omitted, which was error and why it was error, and, 2) he must bring the appellate court a record which proves the act or omission complained of. We, like all courts of appeal, operate pursuant to rules which lay down more or less specific requirements for the various documents by means of which appellants must meet those basic demands. And sometimes we allow mere detail in those rules to become more important than the basic purposes they were designed to serve. Neglect of detail does not always defeat those purposes. Sloppy briefs are sometimes more cogent than other precisely correct tomes of redundant pedantry. Care should always be exercised to avoid penalizing litigants for procedural deviations which do not defeat the justifiable basic purpose of the rule violated.
In the case at bar, as the court’s opinion makes clear, the traditional procedure for making the evidence a part of the *491record has not been scrupulously followed. Pages 36 through 89 of the transcript of the record are what has obviously been intended to be a bill of exceptions containing all the evidence at the trial of this cause, but it is devoid of the usual “BE IT REMEMBERED” type of introductory statement or formal commencement sometimes deemed essential to such a bill. It begins with a page which appears to be the transcription of a colloquy between court and counsel commencing after plaintiff’s opening statement. That page concludes with these lines:
“25 Court: Well, that motion will be overruled. I think we’ll proceed 26 with the trial.”
This leaves me without doubt that what follows is the testimony of witnesses at the trial. The recitals in a court reporter’s certificate (which is page 86) confirm this belief and assure me that what I have seen on pages 35 through 85 “is a full, true and correct record of all of the evidence given upon the trial of said cause.” This is further confirmed on page 89 by what the court’s opinion calls the judge’s certificate and which I have no trouble accepting as such, even though appellees could not. It also certifies that the bill was filed with the clerk and the preceding page clearly indicates that the judge’s certificate was also filed as an order book entry. That page (page 88) concludes, as quoted in the Per Curiam opinion: “Bill of exceptions tendered and approved and ordered filed, as per WRITTEN ENTRY FURNISHED.”
The bill of exceptions also bears in several places the “Filed” stamp of the clerk. In Walner v. Capron (1946), 224 Ind. 267, 274, 66 N. E. 2d 64, the Supreme Court said:
“Rule 2-3 was made for the purpose of simplifying the filing of a bill of exceptions. It provides that the filing may be evidenced by an order book entry or by a certificate of the clerk. In the instant case it is shown by the clerk’s stamp, as having been filed with the clerk in open court on the date it was sealed and made a part of the record by the *492•judge. While this may not be the best way to show a filing with the clerk, we believe it is sufficient as it conclusively shows that it was delivered to the clerk for filing and by him filed in open court on the day it was settled and sealed by the judge.” (224 Ind. at 274.)
The clerk’s certificate to the transcript of the record is less specific in the case at bar, but it did certify that it contained “all papers and entries in said cause required by the . . . praecipe.” The praecipe for the transcript called on the clerk “to make a part thereof, without copying, the Bill of Exceptions containing the evidence given in this cause.”
The bill was signed by the judge and its filing with the clerk is shown by his file mark, as well as the judge’s certificate which became an order book entry. It is, therefore, a part of the record and we should consider it the transcript of the evidence at the trial unless its want of a formal commencement renders it so unintelligible as to be unreliable.
Admittedly, I would find it much easier to recognize this part of the transcript as a verbatim account of what happened at the trial if it commenced with some familiar label such as, “Bill of Exception” or “Transcript of the Evidence” followed by some introductory statement to the effect that what follows is a verbatim account of what happened at the trial of this case. But the want of that label and that introduction creates for me merely inconvenience — not uncertainty as to authenticity. Nor do I believe the majority of the court are beset by any more than a speculative or legalistic uncertainty that the transcript contains the evidence adduced at the trial. For instance, their opinion states that “[t]he summary statement of the evidence, which is contained in A9 pages in the transcript, has been condensed into 3 pages in the appellant’s brief.” (My emphasis.)
The court’s opinion acknowledges an awareness of recent decisions (which it cites) requiring an examination of the bill of exceptions as a whole. But the majority opinion fails to *493point out that in one of those cases, Morrow, Inc. v. Munson (1958), 129 Ind. App. 113, 117, 150 N. E. 2d 256, the bill of exceptions contained no “formal commencement or introductory statement of any kind.” (129 Ind. App. at 117.) Nevertheless the court, en banc, with only one dissent, found that “the bill of exceptions . . . examined as a whole is sufficient as a bill of exceptions containing the evidence.” (129 Ind. App. at 119.)
That conclusion was based on these facts:
“The record discloses that an order book entry made on the 30th day of July, 1956, recites that plaintiff’s bill of exceptions No. 1 containing the evidence was filed. The questioned bill then follows, and it bears the file mark of the Clerk of the trial court showing that it was filed on that date. The dates various witnesses testified appear in the bill and such dates correspond with the order book entries showing the dates of the trial. The testimony of witnesses is preceded by a statement as to who called the witness, the plaintiff or defendants and counter-claimants. Following the evidence is the statement, ‘and this was all the evidence given in said cause.’ The Reporter’s certificate bears the title of the case and the name of the court and certifies that the evidence preceding her certificate is a full, true and complete transcript of all the evidence given in said cause. The judge’s certificate is signed by the regular judge of the trial court and bears the title of the case and the name of the court and certifies that, ‘This Bill of Exceptions No. 1 correctly sets forth and contains all the evidence given in the trial of said cause.’ ” (129 Ind. App. at 117.)
Judge Pfaff’s opinion also quotes at length from Hayes Freight Lines v. Oestricher (1946), 117 Ind. App. 143, 68 N. E. 2d 792, in which also “ ‘the bill has neither formal commencement nor conclusion, nor in fact any introductory statement as to what it purports to be or to contain.’ ” (129 Ind. App. at 119.)
The court’s opinion herein also relies on alleged defects or deficiencies in appellant’s brief as an additional reason for refusing to hear this appeal on its merits. Two of the de-*494ficieneies (those pointed out in the motion) are, 1) a failure to summarize or set out the pleadings in the summary of the record and, 2) that forty-nine pages of evidence are condensed into three pages of summary. The court cited cases to support the assertions, 1) that “appellant’s brief must be prepared so that all questions can be determined . . . from . . . the brief without having to examine the record” and, 2) that absent “substantial compliance with . . . Rule 2-17 . . . the penalty” is affirmance without consideration of the merits. Yet neither appellee nor the majority point out how the omission of the pleadings or the omission of some of the details of the evidence in any way impedes a full understanding of the questions presented.
The majority has failed to cite West v. Indiana Insurance Company (1969), 143 Ind. 298, 247 N. E. 2d 90, 17 Ind. Dec. 347, in which the Supreme Court said that:
“two propositions may fairly be drawn from a literal interpretation of the new rule. [Now ‘old’ Rule 2-17.]
“(1) The appellant is only required to set forth a summary of the record which he believes to be pertinent to- the issues. This means that he is not required to set out even the pertinent parts of the record verbatim. Further, it is the appellant, not the Appellate Court, who determines what portion of the record is relevant to the issues. If the appellant summarizes that portion of the record which he believes is pertinent to the issues on appeal, at least this portion of his brief should be sufficiently adequate to prevent a dismissal of the appeal.
“(2) This summary statement of the record in the brief shall be taken to be accurate and sufficient unless the opposite party in his brief shall make the necessary corrections or additions. Thus, a dismissal would be entirely improper where the appellant had made a good faith attempt to comply with this rule and the appellee had not made substantial corrections or additions in his own brief.” (247 N. E. 2d at 93.)
The reference to “a good faith attempt” introduces some ambiguity into an otherwise succinct and useful interpretation of *495the rule.1 No objective criteria for determining the presence or absence of “good faith” is furnished, nor does West suggest to me that we should arbitrarily find a want of good faith merely because of a failure to mention the pleadings in the summary of the record or because forty-nine transcript pages of evidence are condensed into three pages of brief. For aught that we are told, all that has been omitted from each of these summaries may well be irrelevant to the issues which appellant is attempting to raise on this appeal.
And finally, the court’s opinion seems to assume that under the Supreme Court’s order of January 22, 1970, by which it was
“. . . ORDERED that this matter be remanded to the Appellate Court for an opinion setting forth the reasons for granting the motion to affirm,”
we can do no more or less than to defend our original order of affirmance by stating reasons for it. If that be true, I must confess that I was in error when I voted to affirm. I relied on a good faith (but mistaken) representation that the trial judge had not certified the bill of exceptions. If a majority of the judges should now entertain similar convictions of prior error, it seems to me unreasonable to assume that we would be without jurisdiction to rectify such error.
Since we entered our order of affirmance, the new rules of appellate procedure have become effective.2 Appellate Rule *49615 (M) relates to “Order or relief granted on appeal.” In pertinent part it provides:
“The court. .. may order: * * *, or ■
(6) grant any other appropriate relief, and make relief subject to conditions.”
Under Rule AP 15 (M) (6), as I understand it and believe it should be interpreted, we have the power to affirm on condition that specified defects in the record and/or the appellant’s brief have not been cured within a time specified (and to provide for the filing by appellee of its brief within thirty days after and if we further order that defects have been cured). Rule AP 7.2 (C) provides for correction of the record.3 Rule AP 8.4 (A) provides for amendment of briefs.4
In my opinion that is the appropriate relief for the defects the Per Curiam opinion finds to exist. If I were in agreement *497with the majority that we cannot, or should not, grant appellant any consideration of the merits of her appeal because of defects in the record and her brief, I would, nevertheless, not arbitrarily affirm. I would consider affirmance and unjustly harsh penalty to impose on the layman-client-appellant for what, at worst, can be called merely technical omissions of her attorney. For the client’s sake alone, application of procedural rules to defeat decisions on the merits should always be tempered with exercise of whatever power a court possesses to grant an opportunity to rectify mistakes. Rarely, if ever, will it constitute an injustice to an opposing party to refuse to dismiss or affirm on a technicality of procedure without first giving an appellant’s attorney an opportunity to bring his brief and the trial court’s record up to the standard we consider essential to our consideration of the appeal.
For the reasons stated I dissent from the Per Curiam opinion and from the affirmance on appellee’s motion. I would overrule the motion.
Sullivan, J., concurs.
Note. — Reported in 256 N. E. 2d 692.

. New rule AP 8.3(A) prescribes the contents and arrangement of the appellant’s brief. The nearest thing to a summary of the record or a summary of the evidence is:
“(4) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the court below, including a verbatim statement of the judgment.
“(5) A statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review, with appropriate references to the record.”
See also Fairwood Bluffs Conservancy District v. Imel (1970), 146 Ind. App. 352, 255 N.E.2d 674, 20 Ind. Dec. 362, footnote 1 and related text.

. Supreme Court order of July 29, 1969, “In the Matter of the Adoption of Buies of the Court.” That order reads, in part: “2. The current rules of the Supreme Court of Indiana shall remain in effect until midnight on the 31st day of December, 1969, when they shall be abrogated and superceded by the appended rules;”.

. Rule AP 7.2 (C) is somewhat changed by the Supreme Court from the wording in which it passed the Legislature as Rule 75 (d) [Acts 1969 at p. 677]. It still provides, however, in its first sentence that “ [i]f, on appeal, any differences as to whether the record truly discloses what occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by the trial court and the record made to conform to the truth.” It also retains this language from the original enactment:
“Any court on appeal shall have full power to compel any inferior court, board, or officer exercising judicial functions, or other person, to certify to such court a full and complete transcript of the records and proceedings of any such tribunal, board, officer or person, and the production of any paper, whenever it shall be necessary for the proper determination of any causes or proceeding pending before the court on appeal. The breach of any order may be punished as a contempt.”
We possess the powers granted to us hy Rule AP 7.2 (C) even though no one has asked us to exercise those powers. I see no valid basis for objction to our treating appellee’s motion under the old practice as an application under the new rule. If a majority of us doubt that pages 37 through 85 of the record now in our hands is a true and complete transcript of all the evidence given at the trial of the cause, we can send the record back to the trial court with an order that a transcript of all the evidence offered and received at the trial be included therein and the record made to show in clear, unequivocal, and unmistakable language that it does contain such transcript, specifying the pages thereof.

. “(A) Amendment of briefs. Upon notice to the adverse party, and the presentation of a verified application setting forth the proposed amendment and the reasons on which it is based, the court in its discretion may grant leave to amend briefs, upon such terms as it shall prescribe.