Court Opinion

ID: 9772561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:22:19.842575+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:45.738070
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Walker,
joined by Justices Griffin and Hamilton, dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. None of the cases cited in the majority opinion involves a policy containing the severability of interests clause, and there seems to be only one prior decision which is squarely in point. The contract in General Aviation Supply Co. v. Insurance Co. of North America, 181 F. Supp. 380, did include such a provision, and it was held that the employee exclusion had no application to a claim asserted by an employee of the named insured against an additional or omnibus insured. After distinguishing Simpson v. American Automobile Insurance Co., Mo. App., 327 S.W. 2d 519, by pointing out that the policy in that case did not contain the severability clause, the court said:
“The logical theory for the employee exclusion is to prevent employees of the tort feasor from suing his (sic) employer for injuries received thru his employer’s negligence. A reason for this is that employees are usually covered by workmen’s com*103pensation and can recover from the employer, with or without negligence. When negligence is committed by other than his employer, the logic for the exclusion disappears. If the insurer wishes to further exclude its liability, it could clearly so state in its contract and its failure to do so should be strictly construed. Especially is this true when the policy contains a sever-ability clause, for there it can be implied that the insurer is actually recognizing a separate obligation to others, distinct and apart from the obligation it owes to the named insured. * * * .”
The majority also give considerable weight to American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. St. Paul-Mercury Indemnity Co., 5th Cir., 248 F. 2d 509, but the court there recognized that the severability clause may have been added to the policy for the purpose of giving each person insured thereby the protection which was not afforded by the earlier policies as construed by the decisions on which the majority now rely. It stated that no reason could be seen why an employee of the named insured was not an “employee of the insured” within the meaning of the exclusion in the policy there under consideration, and then went on to say:
“If as suggested by St. Paul, this has now all been changed by the 1955 addition of the ‘Severability Clause,’ * * * it merely re-enforces our conviction that meeting the insurance needs of the parties and indeed, at times, overcoming the effect of adverse or unsound court decisions, presents facts ‘to be assayed by underwriters whether they sit at Lloyd’s Coffee House’ * * * or elsewhere.”
What then does the severability clause mean? Why was it added to the policy? Unless these questions are considered and decided, I fail to see how it can be said with any assurance that the stipulation “cannot alter the holdings in the cases relied upon by Transport.” According to its provisions, “the term ‘the insured’ is used severally and not collectively, but the inclusion therein of more than one insured shall not operate to increase the limits of the company’s liability.” This states quite plainly that although the unqualified word “insured” includes the named insured and may also include one or more additional insured, a mention of “the insured” is not to be taken as a reference to all such insured persons. Instead the term is used-throughout the policy to refer to a particular insured as a separate and distinct individual, apart from any and every other person who may be entitled to protection thereunder. In other words, when a claim is asserted against one who is an “insured” *104under the policy, the latter is “the insured” for the purpose of determining the company’s obligations with respect to such claim. His rights are not to be affected or impaired by the fact that another person may also be an “insured,” except that the company’s liability cannot exceed the limits stipulated in the policy.
Even prior to 1955 there was respectable authority for the proposition that the rights of each insured under the policy are to be determined as if there were no other person protected thereby, and it seems clear to me that the severability clause was added for the purpose of removing any doubt as to the intention of the parties in that respect. Under the facts of the present case, “the insured” is respondent. Annis was not employed by respondent, and his suit does not involve an obligation for which respondent or any carrier as its insurer may be held liable under the workmen’s compensation law or any similar law. In my opinion the claim does not fall within the policy exclusions, and I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals. 324 S.W. 2d 331.
Opinion delivered June 22,1960.
Rehearing overruled July 27,1960.