Court Opinion

ID: 9483185
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:13:44.865528+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:28.741481
License: Public Domain

FERNANDEZ, Circuit Judge,
concurring:
I agree with most of what the majority says, and also agree with the result it reaches.
However, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that the United States Supreme Court has declared that a conviction will not be upheld if the prosecution proves the whole of the corpus delicti of a crime and the existence of a confession from the defendant. Quite the contrary, it is my opinion that the court has carefully preserved that possibility. In Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 93, 75 S.Ct. 158, 164, 99 L.Ed. 101 (1954), the Court did state that where there was a confession, “the corroborative evidence need not be sufficient, independent of the statements, to establish the corpus delicti.” The Court did not say that a conviction could not stand if the prosecution did show the corpus delicti independent of the statements.
In Smith v. United States, 348 U.S. 147, 153-54, 75 S.Ct. 194, 198, 99 L.Ed. 192 (1954), the Court described the normal corpus delicti rule. Far from holding that the rule was abolished, the Court established a still further rule that gave somewhat greater protection where, as the Court said, there was not a tangible corpus de-licti. In that sort of instance, one could not even show that there was a crime unless the accused was identified. In those eases the court required added corroboration of the identity of the accused. However, it did not abolish the general corpus delicti rule for other cases. In other words, in “tangible” crimes — murder, robbery, etc.— one can know that there was a crime without identifying the culprit. The self-identifying confession alone is then enough to convict the defendant. In “intangible” crimes — tax evasion, etc. — one cannot even know that there is a crime without identifying the culprit, so some corroboration of the self-identifying confession would be required in order to convict the- defendant.
Finally, in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 489 n. 15, 83 S.Ct. 407, 418 n. 15, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963), the Court specifically reiterated the rule that a corpus de-licti plus a confession was enough when there was a tangible'corpus delicti, but that additional corroborating evidence must also implicate the defendant where there was no tangible corpus delicti. .
There the law- stood until the majority issued its opinion.1 There it should stand. While my difference with the majority makes no difference in this case, it is far from a merely technical one. Henceforth, a conviction based only upon proof of the corpus delicti and a confession will be invalid, regardless of how ample and free of suspicious circumstances that proof may be. Indeed, the more widely known the details of the crime are — that is, in these times, the more its heinousness attracts public attention and press investigation— the less likely that the confession will meet the majority’s trustworthiness test. I would leave the majority’s concerns and the defendant’s recantations to the jury.
Thus, with this caveat, I concur.

. None of our cases cited in the majority opinion are to the contrary. In fact, one of them, Cutchlow v. United States, 301 F.2d 295 (9th Cir.1962), specifically confirms the continued existence of the corpus delicti rule. So, too, does United States v. Leavitt, 608 F.2d 1290 (9th Cir.1979).