Court Opinion

ID: 9940386
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 07:11:59.678544+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:48.877558
License: Public Domain

Reversed and Remanded and Opinion Filed February 6, 2024

                                     S  In The
                             Court of Appeals
                      Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                No. 05-22-00113-CR

                    DAVION VAN QUINN SCOTT, Appellant
                                  V.
                      THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                 On Appeal from the 265th Judicial District Court
                              Dallas County, Texas
                      Trial Court Cause No. F-2075064-R

                          MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before Justices Carlyle, Goldstein, and Kennedy
                            Opinion by Justice Goldstein
         Appellant Davion Van Quinn Scott was convicted of murder by a jury, see

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02, and sentenced to forty years’ confinement by the

trial court. In two issues, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by (1) excluding

evidence he offered in support of his self-defense theory and (2) overruling his

objection to the self-defense portion of the court’s jury charge. We do not reach the

first issue, as we conclude that the trial court erred in its jury charge and such error

resulted in egregious harm. We therefore reverse and remand this cause for a new

trial.
                                 BACKGROUND

      On January 11, 2020, appellant was staying at a motel in Dallas, Texas, and

had several guests over. Appellant and one of the guests, Urian Dickerson, got into

an argument, and the two men agreed to go “fight” off hotel property. Appellant and

Dickerson continued to argue outside the motel room and on to the shopping center

across the street. The argument drew attention from people in the shopping center,

including Andre Menefee, a drug dealer. Menefee attempted to diffuse the argument,

telling the two men to “chill out” because they were “making the block hot”; that is,

potentially drawing unwanted attention by police. Dickerson and appellant walked

away from each other but continued arguing, with Menefee standing to the side

watching.

      Surveillance footage from multiple cameras at the shopping center captured

what happened next from various angles. As he was walking away, appellant turned

and yelled something toward Dickerson. Appellant then turned and continued

walking away, at which point Menefee started approaching him. Appellant turned to

face Menefee, who continued approaching appellant. The surveillance footage

contains no audio, and the evidence conflicts as to what Menefee said to appellant

as he approached. Appellant pulled a gun from his back pocket and shot Menefee.

Appellant is seen on surveillance running through the shopping center. Bystanders

called 911, and police and paramedics were dispatched to the scene. Menefee was

                                        –2–
transported to a hospital and pronounced dead. A Dallas County medical examiner

determined that Menefee died as a result of gunshot wounds.

       Appellant was indicted for murder and tried by jury. At the close of evidence,

the trial court held a charge conference outside the presence of the jury. Appellant’s

only objection to the charge was that it lacked an instruction regarding the

presumption under section 9.31(a). The trial court denied the request thus overruling

the instruction. Defense counsel confirmed there was no other objection to the

Court’s charge.

        In the presence of the jury, the trial court read the charge, and both sides

presented closing argument. Before the jury began its deliberation,1 the trial court

excused the jury to consider an objection by appellant to the charge, initially

presented as a typographical error, asserting “that paragraph should end with the jury

being instructed that, if they find those things true that are contained in that

paragraph, then they would be compelled to find the defendant not guilty of the

offense of murder.” (emphasis added). Appellant argued that the such error in the

charge constituted a misstatement of the law urging “that the law in self-defense is

very clear that a self -- that a reasonable doubt about self-defense would mean that

the -- the jury shall acquit the defendant.” The trial court overruled the objection.

The jury returned a guilty verdict and, after the punishment phase, the trial court

   1
      In light of the COVID-19 pandemic, the trial court explained to the jurors that they would conduct
their deliberations in the courtroom so that they would have space to socially distance from each other.
Thus, the jury had not yet begun its deliberation when appellant made this objection.
                                                 –3–
entered a judgment of guilty and sentenced appellant to forty years’ confinement.

This appeal followed.

                                     DISCUSSION

      Appellant raises two issues on appeal. We address only the second issue, as

its resolution is dispositive. Appellant contends that the trial court’s charge to the

jury was erroneous because it instructed the jury to convict, rather than acquit, if the

jury had a reasonable doubt whether appellant was justified in using deadly force.

The State concedes that this portion of the charge was erroneous but argues that it

did not result in egregious harm, which the State contends is the appropriate standard

given appellant’s untimely objection to the charge.

      A.      Standard of Review

      Our review of the charge requires us first to determine whether there is error

in the jury charge. Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984),

superseded on other grounds by rule as stated in Rodriguez v. State, 758 S.W.2d

787 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988). If there is error, then we next determine whether “the

error in the charge was the subject of a timely objection in the trial court[.]” Id. If

the appellant raised a timely objection in the trial court to the error, then the appellate

court must reverse the trial court’s judgment if the error “is calculated to injure the

rights of the defendant.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.19; Almanza, 686

S.W.2d at 171. This standard requires proof of no more than “some harm to the

accused from the error.” Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171. If the appellant did not raise

                                           –4–
the error at trial, then the appellant can prevail “only if the error is so egregious and

created such harm that he ‘has not had a fair and impartial trial’—in short ‘egregious

harm.’ ” Id. “In both situations the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of

the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and

weight of the probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant

information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.” Id.

        B.      Charge Error

        Appellant contends that the charge improperly instructed the jury as to self-

defense. The State concedes the error. Although we are not bound by the State’s

concession,2 in this instance we agree that the charge contained an error.

        A person is justified in using force against another when and to the degree he

reasonably believes the force is immediately necessary to protect against the other’s

use or attempted use of unlawful force. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(a). A person

is justified in using deadly force against another if he would be justified in using

force, and he reasonably believes deadly force is immediately necessary to protect

himself against the other’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force. Id.

§ 9.32(a). The evidence does not have to show that the victim was actually using or

attempting to use unlawful deadly force because a person has the right to defend

himself from apparent danger as he reasonably apprehends it. Jordan v. State, 593

    2
      Hankston v. State, 656 S.W.3d 914, 918 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2022, pet. ref’d) (“[T]his
court is not bound by the State’s concession regarding an issue of law.”) (citing Oliva v. State, 548 S.W.3d
518, 520 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).
                                                   –5–
S.W.3d 340, 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020) (citing Hamel v. State, 916 S.W.2d 491,

493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)).

      A defendant has the burden of producing some evidence to support a claim of

self-defense. Zuliani v. State, 97 S.W.3d 589, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). The State

has the burden of persuasion in disproving self-defense. Saxton v. State, 804 S.W.2d

910, 913 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). This burden does not require the State to produce

evidence refuting the self-defense claim; rather, the burden requires the State to

prove the offense charged in its case-in-chief beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.

Regardless of the strength or credibility of the evidence, a defendant is entitled to an

instruction on any defensive issue that is raised by the evidence. Jordan, 593 S.W.3d

at 343; Hamel, 916 S.W.2d at 493. If the defendant shows entitlement to a jury

instruction on self-defense, “[t]he jury must be instructed to acquit the defendant if

they believe that he was acting in self-defense or have a reasonable doubt thereof.”

Russell v. State, 834 S.W.2d 79, 82 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1992, pet. ref’d) (emphasis

added).

      Here, the jury charge set forth the law of self-defense and, in two application

paragraphs, instructed the jury as follows:

      Now bearing in mind the foregoing definitions, instructions, [sic] if you
      believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
      is guilty of the offense defined in this charge, but you further find from
      the evidence, or have a reasonable doubt thereof, that the defendant
      reasonably believed that deadly force when and to the degree used, if it
      was, was immediately necessary to protect himself against the use or

                                          –6–
        attempted use of unlawful deadly force by [Menefee], if any, you will
        acquit the defendant and say by your verdict not guilty.

        If you are unable to agree, or if you have a reasonable doubt thereof,
        that the Defendant was justified in using deadly force against [Menefee]
        in self-defense then you will find the defendant guilty of the offense of
        murder, as charged in the indictment.

Appellant complains that these two sentences irreconcilably conflict with each other,

instructing the jury to simultaneously acquit and convict him if they have a

reasonable doubt as to whether he acted in self-defense. Appellant also argues that

the second instruction impermissibly shifts the burden to him to prove self-defense.

        We agree on both points. The two sentences are almost identical in meaning,

with the exception that the second sentence does not include the condition that the

jury must first have found appellant guilty of the charged offense of murder beyond

a reasonable doubt.3 Both sentences include the phrase “have a reasonable doubt

thereof,” qualifying defendant’s use of deadly force in self-defense.4 Although the

first sentence correctly instructed the jury, if after believing beyond a reasonable

doubt that defendant is guilty of the offense of murder, to acquit appellant if they

found from the evidence or had a reasonable doubt as to self-defense, the second

sentence incorrectly instructed the jury to convict if they are unable to agree or had

reasonable doubt that defendant was justified in using deadly force. See Russell, 834

    3
      As appellant does not assert on appeal that the jury charge is erroneous on the ground that the second
instruction lacks this condition, we do not address it here.
    4
      The first instruction couches self-defense in terms of appellant’s reasonable belief as to whether his
use of deadly force was immediately necessary, while the second instruction does so in terms of justification
in using deadly force. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 9.31, 9.32.
                                                    –7–
S.W.2d at 82. Moreover, the second sentence, by inartfully requiring conviction if

self-defense was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt, impermissibly shifted the

burden on the issue of self-defense from the State to appellant.

      We agree with the parties and conclude that the second application sentence

quoted above was an erroneous statement of the law regarding self-defense.

      C.     Harm

      Having found error in the charge, we now turn to the question of harm. As a

threshold issue, we must consider which standard of harm applies. Almanza, 686

S.W.2d at 171. Appellant argues that we must apply the “some harm” standard

because he objected to the charge in the trial court. The State argues that we must

apply the “egregious harm” standard because appellant’s objection was untimely.

We agree with the State. An objection to the jury charge is timely if it is made in

writing or on the record before the judge reads the charge to the jury. See TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 36.14–.15; Villarreal v. State, 429 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1968); Rojas v. State, 662 S.W.2d 466, 469 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–

Edinburg 1983, pet ref’d). Here, appellant lodged his objection after the charge was

read to the jury; therefore, the objection was untimely. We must therefore consider

whether appellant suffered egregious harm from the trial court’s erroneous charge.

      An egregious harm determination must be based on a finding of actual rather

than theoretical harm. Cosio v. State, 353 S.W.3d 766, 777 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).

For actual harm to be established, the error must affect the very basis of the case,

                                        –8–
deprive the defendant of a valuable right, or vitally affect a defensive theory. Cosio,

353 S.W.3d at 777; Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743–44 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

The degree of harm is determined “in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the

evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the

argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of

the trial as a whole.” See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171.

      We find instructive a recent case from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals.

Alcoser v State, 663 S.W.3d 160 (Tex. Crim. App. 2022). In Alcoser, the jury charge

      ‘required the jury to acquit appellant if they believed that he was acting
      in self-defense or the jury had a reasonable doubt thereof,’” and it
      contained instructions on the presumption of innocence, which we said,
      when viewed as a whole, properly places the burden on the State to
      show beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant was not acting in self-
      defense.

Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 169 (quoting Luck v. State, 588 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1979). However, the court explained:

      When self-defense is law applicable to the case, the trial court must
      inform the jury under what circumstances it should acquit a defendant
      of an offense based on self-defense. Here, there are no such instructions
      in the charge, nor any other instructions that would clarify the issue.

Id. (internal citations omitted) (citing Mendez v. State, 545 S.W.3d 548, 556 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2018); Barrera v. State, 982 S.W.2d 415, 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998);

Luck, 588 S.W.2d at 375; TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 2.03(d)).

      Although the procedural facts of Alcoser are similar to the case before us,

there are also critical distinctions. First are the conflicting application paragraphs.

                                         –9–
Second, there is no instruction that properly places the burden of proof on the State

to show beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant was not acting in self-defense. The

trial court failed to inform the jury, or gave conflicting instructions without

clarification, as to under what circumstances it should acquit the defendant of an

offense based on self-defense. In Alcoser, the Court concluded Alcoser was not

egregiously harmed as the erroneous jury charge did not vitally affect his defensive

theory because

      although the jury charge did not contain an instruction that it must
      acquit Appellant if it found he acted in self-defense, defense counsel
      argued that the jury should acquit Appellant based on self-defense, and
      the charge included instructions on the presumption of innocence and
      informed the jury that the State bore the burden of disproving self-
      defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Id. at 171; see also Torres v. State, No. 08-12-00096-CR, 2014 WL 4639401, at *5

(Tex. App.—El Paso Sept. 18, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for

publication). In Torres, the trial court instructed the jury that it should acquit the

defendant if it found by a preponderance of the evidence that he acted in self-defense.

See id. at *3. Our sister court concluded that “[w]hile the charge does not explicitly

place this burden of proof on Appellant, the only logical interpretation is that it was

Appellant’s burden.” The State in Torres pointed to other statements in the charge,

namely that the jury should acquit if it could not find defendant guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt based on all the evidence. Id. at *4. The Torres court concluded

that the statement “directly conflict[ed] with the application paragraph which

inform[ed] the jury that they should acquit if self-defense had been proven by a
                                      –10–
preponderance of the evidence.” Id. Turning to the question of egregious harm, the

court noted that although there was conflicting evidence as to self-defense, “[t]he

jury was required to determine the credibility of the witnesses and resolve these

conflicts in the evidence in light of the erroneous instruction which required the jury

to reject Appellant’s claim of self-defense if he failed to prove it by a preponderance

of the evidence.” Id. at *5 (emphasis added). The court further noted that the charge

“did not permit the jury to acquit Appellant if they had a reasonable doubt as to

whether he acted in self-defense.” Id. Thus, the court concluded that the appellant

had suffered egregious harm, reversed the appellant’s conviction, and remanded for

a new trial. Id.

       Based upon Alcoser and Torres, we conclude that on this record the

conflicting instructions in the jury charge as to self-defense are egregious as they

“vitally affect a defensive theory.” See Alcoser, 663 S.W.3d at 169; Torres, 2014

WL 4639401, at *5; see also Lowry v. State, 671 S.W.2d 601, 603 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 1984) (concluding that error in giving conflicting instructions was not

harmless because “[b]oth the State and appellant cannot carry the burden of proving

a single issue” and “[t]he presence of a correct instruction does not cure the error of

giving another inconsistent one”), rev’d in part on other grounds, 692 S.W.2d 86

(Tex. Crim. App. 1985).

       The State argues that appellant was not egregiously harmed because he was

not entitled to an instruction on self-defense in the first place. See Almanza, 686

                                        –11–
S.W.2d at 171 (requiring consideration of the state of the evidence); Allen v. State,

253 S.W.3d 260, 267–68 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“[I]n an egregious-harm analysis,

it is appropriate to consider the plausibility of the evidence raising the defense, as at

least one factor among others.”). In support, the State points to the testimony of

several witnesses who each testified that Menefee was trying to diffuse the situation

and prevent a fight. Such testimony covers the time period starting with the argument

between appellant and Dickerson at the motel and ending in the parking lot of the

shopping center before Menefee began approaching appellant moments before the

shooting. But the critical evidence we must consider is what happened next. The

surveillance footage shows appellant initially walking away from Dickerson and

Menefee but turning around to say something. Menefee, who was until this point

standing still by the store, began approaching appellant. There is conflicting

evidence as to what Menefee said as he approached. One witness, the owner of a

barber shop in the shopping center, testified that he heard Menefee say, as he

approached appellant, “if you’re going to shoot me, shoot me.” Another witness, a

friend of Menefee’s, testified that he did not hear Menefee say anything to appellant

as he approached. Appellant himself testified that Menefee said, “you’re not the only

one with a gun.”

      Ordinarily, we would infer that the jury resolved this evidentiary conflict

against appellant based on the jury’s guilty verdict. See, e.g., Thompson v. State, No.

05–12–00259–CR, 2014 WL 1477676, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Apr. 14, 2014, no

                                         –12–
pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (where State presented evidence that

conflicted with the defendant’s version of the events, the jury was free to resolve any

conflicts in the evidence against the defendant and to reject the defendant’s claim of

self-defense). However, we cannot do so here because, as our sister court explained

in Torres, “[t]he jury was required to determine the credibility of the witnesses and

resolve these conflicts in the evidence in light of the erroneous instruction which

required the jury to reject Appellant’s claim of self-defense if he failed to prove it

by a preponderance of the evidence.” Torres, 2014 WL 4639401, at *5 (emphasis

added). It is impossible to say whether the jury convicted because it disbelieved

appellant’s version or alternatively because it believed appellant’s version but

concluded appellant failed to prove self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. We

therefore reject the State’s argument that the evidence weighs against a finding of

egregious harm.5

        The State next contends that arguments of counsel weigh against a finding of

egregious harm. See Almanza, 686 S.W.2d at 171 (requiring consideration of

arguments of counsel). The State cites several instances of defense counsel and

counsel for the State referring to the fact that the State has the burden to show guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. However, none of these statements refer to the burden

    5
     We also reject the State’s argument that, even if the jury could have believed appellant’s version,
appellant was still not entitled to a self-defense instruction because he used deadly force in response to
verbal provocation alone. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.31(b). A reasonable jury could have concluded
from the surveillance footage that appellant acted in self-defense not only in response to Menefee’s verbal
provocation, but also his approaching appellant.
                                                  –13–
to prove or disprove self-defense. That is the burden at issue, and the statements of

counsel regarding the burden to prove guilt do not explain why the jury charge places

the burden as to self-defense on appellant. We conclude that, at best, this factor is

neutral.

      Finally, the State points to the trial court’s admonishment to the jury during

voir dire as evidence against a finding of egregious harm. See id. (requiring

consideration of any other relevant information revealed by the record). Specifically,

during voir dire, a member of the venire panel stated that “if [appellant] doesn’t want

to testify, that’s his business. But at the same time, the defense has to prove that he

didn’t do what he’s being accused of.” The trial court responded:

      Oh, no they don’t. Now, I’ll tell you this, look, I say that they could sit
      here on their hands and not do anything. Are they going to do that?
      Probably not. But they could. So -- but the way you say it, I just want
      to make sure you understand that they do not have a burden of proof.
      They do not have to show that he didn’t do it. But I’ll tell you this, what
      I think maybe you’re thinking, if the State of Texas does their job, if
      they prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and then the defense
      just sits there and does nothing, that would be a problem. Right? . . . .
      So -- but I’m just saying that they don’t have a burden.

As with the previous factor, this statement is silent as to the burden to prove or

disprove self-defense and therefore does not weigh in favor or against a finding of

egregious harm.

      Having considered the Almanza factors, we conclude that the error in the jury

charge egregiously harmed appellant. See Torres, 2014 WL 4639401, at *5

                                        –14–
                                   CONCLUSION

      We sustain appellant’s second issue. We reverse the trial court’s judgment and

remand this cause to the trial court for a new trial.

                                             /Bonnie Lee Goldstein/
                                             BONNIE LEE GOLDSTEIN
                                             JUSTICE

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
220113F.U05

                                         –15–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

DAVION VAN QUINN SCOTT,                        On Appeal from the 265th Judicial
Appellant                                      District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. F-2075064-R.
No. 05-22-00113-CR           V.                Opinion delivered by Justice
                                               Goldstein. Justices Carlyle and
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee                   Kennedy participating.

       Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

Judgment entered this 6th day of February, 2024.

                                        –16–