Court Opinion

ID: 9523422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:41:52.216714+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:05:31.957010
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE CRAVEN, dissenting: As I view this record, the verdict of the jury amounts to a compromise upon the issue of liability and damages or else the result is a verdict for damages that is inadequate as a matter of law. I would reverse and remand this case for a new trial upon the issue of damages only. The jury found that the defendant Lockwood was liable and that his liability was predicated upon willful and wanton misconduct of his employee. The employee was the father of the decedent. The issue of liability is now settled since there was no cross appeal upon this issue. A verdict in a wrongful death case in the amount of $2000 for the death of an 18-year-old leaving lineal and collateral descendants, when the record shows the decedent to be in good health, when it shows that he was employable, when it' shows that he contributed some $20 a week to the family for support, is inadequate as a matter of law. The jury in this case was properly instructed that there was a presumption of substantial pecuniary loss by reason of the death. The Flynn case cited in the majority opinion and Anthony v. New York Central R.R. Co., 61 Ill.App.2d 466, 209 N.E.2d 686, are authority for the proposition that the presumption of substantial pecuniary loss is rebuttable and that the presumption is weighed with other evidence. The judgment in this case is inadequate not because of a rejection of the presumption, but because the affirmative evidence, even if not presented in model form, commands a higher verdict. The decedent’s life expectancy was not established; however, the decedent was shown to be in good health, was employable, and this court can, as the defendant candidly conceded at oral argument, take note of a life expectancy that clearly shows this award to be inadequate as a matter of law. Here, as in Keel v. Compton, 120 Ill.App.2d 248, 256 N.E.2d 848, the verdict of the jury bears no reasonable relationship to the damage. The affirmance of this inadequate award in this wrongful death action comes at a time when our supreme court has expanded the compensable element of damage in a wrongful death case so as to include pain and suffering. (Murphy v. Martin Oil Co., 56 Ill.2d 423, 308 N.E.2d 583.) The supreme court of South Dakota likewise expanded the compensable items under its wrongful death action in Anderson v. Lale, 42 L.W. 2522. Our supreme court in Murphy concluded that “To say that there can be recovery only for his wrongful death is to provide an obviously inadequate justice. * * * It is obvious that in order to have a fuU liability and a full recovery there must be an action aHowed for damages up to the time of death, as well as thereafter.” (56 Ill.2d at 437.) In this case, as I view this record, the liability is clear and the damages amount to inadequate justice.