Court Opinion

ID: 9374071
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:17:03.659195+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:44.485123
License: Public Domain

NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule
23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28,
as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties
and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's
decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire
court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case.
A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25,
2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted
above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260
n.4 (2008).

                       COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS

                                 APPEALS COURT

                                                  22-P-104

                                  COMMONWEALTH

                                       vs.

                          WILLIAM A. ROGERS, THIRD.

               MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0

       After a jury trial, the defendant, William Rogers, was

 convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence

 of alcohol, see G. L. c. 90, § 24 (1) (a) (1).1             On appeal, he

 challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the admissibility

 of statements of a percipient witness, and urges us to reverse

 his conviction based on an error in the prosecutor's closing

 argument.    We affirm.

       1.    Sufficiency.    The defendant contends that the evidence

 was insufficient to show that he was operating under the

 influence of alcohol.       To prove that he was operating under the

 influence, "[t]he Commonwealth need not prove that the defendant

 1 Charges of operating with a revoked license as a habitual
 offender under G. L. c. 90, § 23, and of disguising to obstruct
 justice under G. L. c. 268, § 34, were dismissed.
actually drove in an unsafe or erratic manner, but it must prove

a diminished capacity to operate safely."     Commonwealth v.

Connolly, 394 Mass. 169, 173 (1985).

     A McDonald's restaurant patron going through the drive-

through discovered a running vehicle blocking the way.2    The

driver approached the driver's side of the vehicle and saw the

defendant, who was unresponsive, "slouched over" the steering

wheel, and holding a cigarette that had burned down to the

filter.    The driver called the police.   It took the driver's

fiancée, a nurse, forty-five seconds to rouse the defendant and

confirm he was awake.

     The responding officer approached the driver's side of the

vehicle.   He had to knock on the window twice and yell to get

the defendant's attention.     The defendant was "slumped over at

the neck, appeared to be sleeping" and had a McDonald's

hamburger in his lap.    The officer noticed that the defendant

had red, bloodshot, and glossy eyes, and slurred speech.        When

the officer asked him if he knew where he was, the defendant

responded, "Here."    When asked for a license, the defendant said

he didn't have one.     The defendant also said that he had one

beer earlier in the evening.

2 It was parallel parked running across the exit from the drive-
through.

                                  2
    The defendant agreed to complete roadside assessments, and

after struggling to get out of the vehicle on his own, failed to

complete all three assessments to the officer's satisfaction.

The officer concluded that the defendant was impaired and placed

him under arrest.

    These facts are sufficient to show that the driver suffered

from a diminished capacity to drive safely.    See Connolly, 394

Mass. at 173.   He was unable to stay awake, he was parked in a

manner that blocked oncoming drivers and suggested he was

unaware of the surroundings, he was difficult to rouse, he could

not provide clear answers to simple questions, and, according to

the officer on the scene, he was slurring his speech.     See

Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 91 Mass. App. Ct. 385, 392-393

(2017).   In addition, he was unable to complete the field

assessments to the officer's satisfaction.     Id.   The verdict was

supported by the evidence.

    2.    "Hearsay."   On direct examination, the driver who

attempted to assist the defendant testified that the defendant

slurred his words.     On cross-examination it emerged that the

driver's fiancée was speaking with the defendant while the

driver was on the telephone, and that the driver could not hear

the words spoken but could hear that the defendant was mumbling.

Although no objection was lodged at the time, the defendant now

                                  3
argues that the reference to slurred speech was inadmissible

hearsay.

    The difficulty with this argument is that, at the time the

testimony was heard on direct examination, it emerged as a

proper answer to a proper question.       The possibility that the

speaker lacked first-hand knowledge, or may have repeated what

he heard from his fiancée, materialized only on cross-

examination.   However, at this juncture there was no objection

or motion to strike.   See Commonwealth v. Grady, 474 Mass. 715,

720-721 (2016) (motion to strike required where question proper

but answer was not).   We therefore review for error, and if

there was error, for a substantial risk of a miscarriage of

justice.

    We are not persuaded that the testimony on cross-

examination fatally undermined the testimony on direct

examination.   The witness could hear the defendant's voice.     Nor

are we persuaded that the distinction between "slurred" and

"mumbled" rises to the level of evidentiary error, or that if it

did, such an error led to a substantial risk of a miscarriage of

justice.   The responding officer also testified that the

defendant's speech was slurred.       The evidence of the defendant's

inert and unresponsive physical condition was compelling, and

the evidence was otherwise strong.

                                  4
    3.    Closing argument.    When summarizing the evidence during

closing argument, the prosecutor said, "I told you at the

beginning of this trial that the case would be simple.      You

would hear from two witnesses who will tell you -– who testified

that the defendant was operating under the influence of alcohol

on that evening."    While the prosecutor was permitted to argue

in summation that the Commonwealth had proven that the defendant

was operating under the influence, this statement was marginally

in error for two reasons.      First, the testimony was that the

defendant was impaired, not that he was driving under the

influence.   For this reason, the prosecutor's summation did not

accurately describe the evidence.      See Mass. G. Evid. § 1113

note, subsection (b)(2) (2022).     Cf Commonwealth v. Perez, 444

Mass. 143, 150-151 (2005), and cases cited.      Second, any such

testimony regarding the ultimate issue in the case would have

been improper.   See Commonwealth v. Canty, 466 Mass. 535, 544

(2013).   However, the jury were instructed to take their own

recollection of the evidence, and that closing arguments were

not evidence.    We presume that the jury followed those

instructions.    Id. at 545.

    Moreover, there was no objection to the summation, and for

the reasons stated in Canty, 466 Mass. at 545, we discern no

substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.      The evidence was

strong, and the prosecutor was entitled to argue that the

                                   5
Commonwealth had proven that the defendant was operating under

the influence of alcohol.    The prosecutor's error in attributing

testimony to the witnesses, rather than making the same point in

argument, was a misstep, but she was entitled to urge on the

jury a finding of guilt.    We may attribute to the jury a measure

of common sense and sophistication that would permit them to

separate facts from overstatement.     See Commonwealth v. Silva,

455 Mass. 503, 515 (2009) ("The jury are assumed to possess

sufficient sophistication in sorting out excessive claims").

                                      Judgment affirmed.

                                      By the Court (Sullivan,
                                        Shin & Hodgens, JJ.3),

                                      Clerk

Entered:    February 10, 2023.

3   The panelists are listed in order of seniority.

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