Court Opinion

ID: 9724057
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:42:45.031848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:54.846782
License: Public Domain

*491SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority opinion that the defendant's question, "Do you think I need a lawyer?" was an ambiguous request for an attorney. I also agree with the majority opinion that, when a defendant makes an ambiguous comment about consulting an attorney, the police must stop all questioning.
The circuit court, adhering to our prior cases,1 treated this ambiguous request as an unambiguous invocation of counsel and suppressed the confession because the questioning did not cease. Departing from our prior cases, the majority opinion adopts a "clarification rule" and concludes that an ambiguous request for counsel puts a stop to interrogation "until the ambiguity is resolved." Majority opinion at 480. Accordingly,, after an ambiguous request for counsel the police may not use any statement made by a suspect unless the suspect makes clear that an attorney is not wanted.
I write separately to make three points. First, I do not agree with the majority's conclusion that the defendant's ambiguous request for counsel was clarified in *492this case. Rather, I would propose a single approach for law enforcement officers to take when a suspect makes an ambiguous request for counsel. Second, I conclude that this court needs to explain how law enforcement officers and courts can identify an ambiguous request for counsel. Third, I reject the bright line rule that an ambiguous statement about counsel should be treated in all respects as an invocation of the right to counsel.
HH
I disagree with the majority's conclusion that the defendant's ambiguous request for counsel was clarified in this case. What needed to be clarified was whether the defendant wanted an attorney. The police officer's response to the defendant, that the decision to have an attorney was hers, was correct but it did not illuminate her intent with respect to counsel. Clarification must come from the suspect.
The majority opinion remedies this deficiency by holding that the interrogator's non-committal response to the defendant's question, coupled with her act of signing the waiver form, "resolved all ambiguity with respect to whether [she] was requesting an attorney." Majority opinion at 487.
I conclude that merely signing the waiver form did not clarify the defendant's wishes with respect to an attorney. My reasoning is as follows: If the defendant had expressly invoked her right to counsel, the officer could not have asked her to sign a waiver form; questioning could have continued only at her initiative. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484 (1981). The Supreme Court has referred to Edwards as establishing a "rigid prophylactic rule." Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 95 (1984). The United States Supreme Court adopted this prophylactic rule because "the presump*493tion raised by a suspect's request for counsel [is] that he considers himself unable to deal with the pressures of custodial interrogation without legal assistance...." Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 683 (1988). The rule in Miranda was based on the Court's awareness "that the lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal system because of his [or her] unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation " Fare v, Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 719 (1979).
In this case, however, the defendant's ambiguous comment about consulting an attorney fell short of an express invocation of the right to counsel. When a suspect, as here, appears unsure about asserting her right to counsel or is not clear whether she is asserting her right to counsel, her confidence in her own ability to undergo custodial interrogation without counsel is in doubt. Because the right to counsel is so fundamental, an ambiguous assertion of the right to counsel should, until proven otherwise, be interpreted as a possible invocation of that right. (The majority's requirement that all questioning cease shows implicit agreement with this position.)2 Here the defendant's possible intent to invoke the right to counsel, combined with the principles of Miranda, Edwards and their progeny, lead to the conclusion that the officer should not have asked the suspect to sign the waiver form. Only an express statement that she did not want an attorney could have enabled him to do so. Since the defendant *494made no such statement, her waiver is invalid as a matter of law. Minnick v. Mississippi, 111 S. Ct. 486 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).3
If, as I have concluded, a request that a suspect sign a waiver form is not a valid clarification of the suspect's wishes with respect to counsel, law enforcement officers may rightly ask how they should proceed to clarify her wishes.
I conclude that, in the face of an ambiguous request for counsel, the police must first, as the majority requires, cease questioning the suspect about the crime. After responding to a question in a neutral manner, as was done here, the police must then directly focus on determining whether the suspect is invoking the right to counsel. In other words, the police must inform the suspect of the consequences of the ambiguous statement and ask the suspect to decide whether to assert the right to counsel. I would suggest that the officer administer a warning to such a suspect, substantially as follows:
"I have to stop questioning you now because I am not sure whether you want a lawyer. You have a right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer present during questioning.4 If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you.5 You will not be punished for deciding not to speak with me now, and *495you will not be rewarded for talking with me now.6 If you talk with me now, anything you say can be used against you in court.7 Do you want a lawyer?"
If, after hearing this warning, the suspect unambiguously requests counsel, the questioning must stop, unless and until it is reinitiated by the suspect. If, on the other hand, the suspect unambiguously agrees to questioning without counsel, the questioning can continue.
If, after hearing the warning, the suspect does not respond or continues to vacillate, the questioning must stop. The suspect should not be subjected to repeated requests to decide about counsel. Insistent police efforts imply a lack of respect for the individual's need for time to decide and could be viewed as placing improper pressure on the suspect.
I recognize that no one can foresee the great variety of fact patterns that are likely to unfold in custodial interrogations across Wisconsin. Individual suspects will demonstrate different levels of comprehension and clarity. Courts have not attempted to suggest that law enforcement officers adopt a single approach in these situations, but I have found that my suggested language could have been used effectively in diverse situations presented in numerous cases. Moreover, the language I suggest can be modified to fit individual situations as long as the modification comports with the goals to be accomplished: Tell the suspect the consequences of the ambiguous reference to consulting an *496attorney (questioning stops); give the warnings about the right to counsel during interrogation; ask the suspect whether an attorney is wanted.
On the surface, the approach I suggest may appear similar to the options suggested by the majority.8 However, I believe my approach is meaningfully different.
First, unlike the majority, I offer law enforcement officers a single, simple approach to clarifying a suspect's wishes with respect to an attorney. Second, having a police officer advise the suspect specifically about the consequences of the suspect's ambiguous reference to a lawyer and the suspect's right to counsel acknowledges the uncertain character of the suspect's statement and gives the suspect an opportunity to make a decision. A waiver form simply ignores the ambiguous comment. The waiver form would have been used in interrogation even if a suspect made no reference to a lawyer. In contrast, a warning of the type I suggest focuses on the suspect's reference to an attorney.9 Third, asking the police to give this warning *497orally counteracts some of the pressures inherent in custodial interrogation.
Although my approach is different, it does not introduce any new concepts into the interrogation process. The language I suggest builds on both the Miranda warnings and the waiver form that is generally used, as it was in this case. Majority opinion at 487.
The approach has several advantages. It informs the police exactly how to respond to a suspect who ambiguously asserts the right to counsel and assists law enforcement officers in assuring that any subsequent waiver was voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly made.
It also takes into account the nature and circumstances of custodial interrogation upon which Miranda is premised. The Miranda Court acknowledged that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive. Indeed, custodial interrogation is designed to enhance the authority and trustworthiness of the interrogator in an effort to erode the suspect's will to resist.10 It is not surprising, then, that the defendant in the case at bar apparently asked her interrogator if he thought she needed a lawyer. Like Miranda and its progeny, my approach attempts to give suspects a fair opportunity to protect their own rights.
In addition, the approach I suggest helps ease the conflict of interest posed to the officer by an ambiguous request for counsel. The interrogating officer wants the
*498interrogation to proceed without counsel present. See, e.g., State v. Hanson, 136 Wis. 2d 195,401 N.W.2d 771 (1987). It is not in the officer's interest for the suspect to consult an attorney, who in all probability will advise the suspect not to speak with the police unless the attorney is present. By explaining clearly how the police are to proceed when a suspect appears uncertain about invoking the right to counsel, the conflict of interest is alleviated.
Finally, this approach would maintain Miranda's balance between the needs of law enforcement and the rights of the individual. As the United States Supreme Court recently observed, "[b]oth waiver of rights and admission of guilt are consistent with the affirmation of individual responsibility that is a principle of the criminal justice system. It does not detract from this principle, however, to insist that neither admissions nor waivers are effective unless there are both particular and systematic assurances that the coercive pressures of custody were not the inducing cause." Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 155, 111 S. Ct. 486, 492 (1990).
The majority fails to explain how law enforcement officers and courts can recognize an ambiguous request for counsel. This case clearly demonstrates why such an explanation is necessary.
The state's first line of argument in this case is that the defendant "did not even make an ambiguous or equivocal request for counsel." State's Brief, p. 27; see also State's Brief, p. 36. According to the state, the defendant merely made an inquiry. Yet the majority opinion assumes, without discussion, that the defen*499dant's statement was an ambiguous request for counsel.11
As the majority opinion explains, the officer was unable to remember the defendant's exact language. However, even if the defendant asked the officer whether he thought she needed a lawyer in those very words, courts across the country are divided over whether that particular question amounts to an unequivocal request for counsel, an ambiguous request for counsel, or no request for counsel at all.12 If the defen*500dant had in fact used a slightly different phrase, such as "Maybe I need a lawyer" or "I think I might need a lawyer," courts again have differed as to what type of request for counsel, if any, these remarks constitute.13 However, although it may be difficult to draw functional distinctions among these phrases, it is clear from each of them that the thought of having a lawyer has crossed the suspect's mind.
I conclude, as other courts have concluded, that when a suspect fails to assert unambiguously the right to counsel, but nonetheless makes a statement or asks a question that evinces a possible desire to exercise *501that right,14 the suspect has made an ambiguous request for counsel.
Law enforcement officers and the court are required "to give a broad rather than a narrow interpretation to a defendant's request for counsel." Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 633 (1986). A generous construction of what constitutes an ambiguous reference to counsel recognizes the fact that ordinary citizens do not choose their words with lawyer-like precision and ensures that the right to counsel is equally available to all citizens. Modern scholarship in the field of linguistics demonstrates that not. all people express themselves using direct and unqualified language; in everyday speech many of us tend to soften direct assertions. Empirical research on patterns of speech suggests that the dynamics of custodial interrogation accentuate the tendency of women, minorities, and people from lower socioeconomic groups to equivocate or use less assertive forms of communication.15 According to this research, the greater the imbalance of power in the conversation, the greater is the tendency of the less powerful speaker to equivocate, reply with an *502interrogative, or use other non-assertive language.16 Assertive people should not be accorded a higher level of constitutional protection than people who speak in a less direct, less confident manner. Although the suspect has the burden of making his or her wishes about counsel known, that burden must be viewed in light of the pressures created by a custodial setting and in light of the fact that not all suspects can clearly articulate their wishes.
h-l hH
In pondering this case, I initially favored a bright line rule prohibiting any and all conversation between an interrogating officer and a suspect once the suspect had made a statement or asked a question appearing to contemplate invocation of the right to counsel. Questioning would resume only at the suspect's request. This bright line rule would, I thought, follow Miranda's command that if a suspect indicated "in any manner and at any stage of the process that he [wished] to consult with an attorney before speaking there [could] be no questioning." Miranda, 384 U.S. 436, 444-445 (1966). It would avoid the litigation that is bound to be encouraged by the majority's approach to clarification and would avoid the danger of interpreting unambigu*503ous invocations of counsel as ambiguous. And it would accord people who speak in less than a clear manner the same protection afforded to the assertive. This approach has merit. I worry that reliance on ambiguity and clarification puts courts on the proverbial slippery slope.
On reflection, however, I became concerned that it may be unrealistic to expect all communication between the interrogating officer and the suspect to stop upon a suspect's ambiguous assertion of the right to counsel. Indeed, unlike the clearly assertive suspect, the equivocal suspect might not want counsel and might not understand why the officer was ending the interrogation precipitously. If anything, abruptly ending the interrogation without explanation might frighten a suspect, arousing concern that the police officer was angry, and thus increasing the coerciveness of the situation. This result would defeat the purposes of Miranda. Equally important, it is claimed that a bright line rule would not adequately preserve Miranda's balance between the needs of law enforcement and the right of the individual to decide whether to exercise a constitutional right.
Abandoning the bright line rule but finding the majority solution wanting, I now conclude that the officer should advise the suspect of the consequences of the ambiguous request, specifically restate the right to counsel, and explicitly ask the suspect to state whether the suspect wants a lawyer.
"Do you think I need an attorney?" the defendant asked. Everyone but the defendant who is being asked to waive fundamental constitutional rights knows the answer to her question. The honest and correct answer is, without doubt, yes. The police officer cannot, however, be called upon to give the suspect legal advice. *504But Miranda requires that suspects be given a fair opportunity to exercise their constitutional right to counsel. I believe my approach provides interrogating officers with a simple and clear method to follow while protecting the precious constitutionally guaranteed rights of individuals.
For the réasons set forth, I write separately.

 See, e.g., Micale v. State, 76 Wis. 2d 370, 373, 251 N.W.2d 458 (1976) (questioning had to stop after defendant stated that he "couldn't afford an attorney"); Wentela v. State, 95 Wis. 2d 283, 292 (1980) (questioning had to stop after defendant said either "I think I need an attorney" or "I think I should see an attorney"); State v. Lampe, 119 Wis. 2d 206, 217, 349 N.W.2d 677 (1983) ("It is apparent that, in the face of the direct question, 'Do you think I ought to have an attorney,' the Miranda rule should have triggered an immediate cessation of the conversation even had there not been previous requests for a lawyer"); State v. Kunkel, 137 Wis. 2d 172, 182, 404 N.W.2d 69 (Ct. App. 1986) (defendant's statement that he could not afford counsel amounted to invocation of his right to counsel).

 One commentator interprets the "clarification cases" as creating a presumption that an equivocal reference to counsel is an invocation of the right to counsel. Charles R. Shrefiler, Jr., Judicial Approaches to the Ambiguous Request for Counsel Since Miranda v. Arizona, 62 Notre Dame Lawyer 460, 472 (1987).

 For a summary of this argument although the words used are different, see Judge Langhoffs decision quoted in my separate opinion in State v. Thiel, 183 Wis. 2d 505, 545, 515 N.W.2d 847 (1994).

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-472 (1966).

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 473 (1966).

 This language is substantially the same as that contained in the waiver form signed by the suspect in this case. The waiver form reads in part: "No promises or threats have been made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me."

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966).

 One option the majority provides is that the police simply ask the suspect whether he or she wants a lawyer. I believe that the only appropriate method of clarification and the only question that can be asked at this point would be "Do you want the assistance of a lawyer at this time?" See also Rhonda Y. Cline, Equivocal Requests for Counsel: A Balance of Competing Policy considerations, 55 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 767, 781-782 (1987). The warnings preceding this question (which I have set forth) focus the suspect's attention on the right to counsel and assist in assuring the validity of any subsequent waiver.

 The majority also suggests that a clarification would be accomplished through repeated Miranda warnings. Miranda warnings alone do not, in my opinion, clarify the suspect's intent and have the same pitfalls as the waiver. Law enforcement officers often give repeated Miranda warnings even when *497the suspect does not make an ambiguous comment about an attorney.

 Inbau, Reid & Buckley, Criminal Interrogations and Confessions (1986), chapters 3, 4, 6, 8 and the appendix. This is the third edition of one of the police interrogation manuals discussed in the Miranda opinion.

 The majority acknowledges, however, that if the defendant testifies in the suppression hearing on remand, facts may be found that would render the statement an unequivocal request for counsel or render the police officer's response inappropriate. Majority opinion at 490.

 The case law suggests three possible interpretations of a request for a police officer's opinion as to whether counsel is needed. Some courts have viewed such a question as equivocal. See e.g., Russell v. State, 727 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 856 (1987) (defendant's question as to whether interrogators thought the presence of an attorney was necessary held to be equivocal but subsequently properly clarified). Other courts have not seen such a question as an equivocal request for counsel. See e.g., Norman v. Durcharme, 871 F.2d 1483 (9th Cir. 1989) (defendant asked police if they thought he should get a lawyer; the officer gave no advice in response; the court held that the suspect's question did not rise to the level of even an equivocal request for counsel). Other courts have held that the question "do you think I need a lawyer" amounts to an unequivocal request for counsel. See e.g., State v. Doughty, 456 N.W.2d 445 (Minn. App. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 472 N.W.2d 299 (1991). For discussion of cases interpreting these various statements, see also, Cheryl M. Bailey and Jay M. Zit-ter, Annotation, What Constitutes Assertion of Right to Counsel Following Miranda Warnings — State Cases, 83 A.L.R. 4th 443 (1991).
*500For another approach to interpreting a suspect's statements, see James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in Confession Contexts, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 975, 1004-20 (1986).

 For a discussion of cases covering these possibilities, see Cheryl M. Bailey and Jay M. Zitter, What Constitutes Assertion of Right to Counsel Following Miranda Warnings — State Cases, 83 A.L.R. 4th 443 (1991). Among the permutations of requests for counsel that could be deemed ambiguous are the following: "Do you think I need a lawyer?"; "Should I have my lawyer?"; "Is it better for me to speak to my lawyer before I speak to you or speak to him and you together or whatever?"; "Maybe I should talk to my attorney"; "I think I need an attorney"; "I might need a lawyer"; "I might better talk to my lawyer before I give a statement"; "I think I might need an attorney"; "I feel like I ought to have an attorney around"; "I guess I'll need an attorney"; "I don't know whether I should have an attorney here or what."
It should be noted that the United States Supreme Court has evidently concluded that the response: "Maybe I should have an attorney," constitutes an ambiguous request for counsel. See "question presented" by Davis v. United States, pending in the United States Supreme Court, No. 92-1949.

 See, eg., United States v. March, 999 F.2d 456, 461 (10th Cir. 1993) ("proper focus is on whether a defendant's statement evinces a contemplation of exercising the right to have an attorney present, or merely seeks clarification of what his or her rights are"); Towne v. Dugger, 899 F.2d 1104, 1109 (11th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 498 U.S. 991 (1990) (a statement is ambiguous when it is "either in the form of an assertion or a question communicating a possible desire to exercise [the] right to have an attorney present during questioning").

 See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register: The Pragmatics of Powerlessness in Police Interrogation, 103 Yale L.J. 259 (1993).

 Janet E. Ainsworth, In a Different Register, 103 Yale L.J. 259, 287 (1993). See also People v. Randall, 464 P.2d 114, 118 (Cal. 1970), overruled on other grounds, People v. Cahill, 853 P.2d 1037 (Cal. 1993) ("To strictly limit the manner in which a suspect may assert the privilege, or to demand that it be invoked with unmistakable clarity. . .would subvert Miranda's prophylactic intent. Moreover, it would benefit if anyone, only the experienced criminal who, while most adept at learning effective means of coping with the police, is least likely to find incarceration and police interrogation unnerving.").