Court Opinion

ID: 991204
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-03 23:33:17.975071+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:10.784781
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.
                                                                    No. 96-4311
ANTHONY ALEXANDER WHETSTONE,
a/k/a Toot,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Orangeburg.
Charles E. Simons, Jr., Senior District Judge.
(CR-95-320)

Submitted: December 19, 1996

Decided: January 6, 1997

Before ERVIN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER,
Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Robert W. Mills, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. J. Rene
Josey, United States Attorney, Cameron Glenn Chandler, Assistant
United States Attorney, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellee.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Anthony Alexander Whetstone was convicted by a jury of conspir-
acy to possess cocaine and crack cocaine with intent to distribute, 21
U.S.C. § 846 (1994), and use of a telephone to facilitate a drug
offense, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1994). He appeals his 121-month sen-
tence on the grounds that the district court clearly erred in determin-
ing that the amount of crack attributable to him was more than 50
grams and abused its discretion by declining to continue the sentenc-
ing hearing. We affirm.

At Whetstone's trial, co-defendants Pamela Rogers and Jim Mc-
Leod testified that they sold crack to him. McLeod testified that he
gave Whetstone an ounce of crack (28.35 grams) in the fall of 1994,
for which he was not fully paid.* Rogers testified that she sold crack
to Whetstone from the summer of 1993 until her arrest in February
1995. She said she initially sold him three grams and then fronted him
another three grams for which she was never paid. Thereafter, he
bought crack from her for cash on a weekly basis in amounts ranging
from half a gram to three grams. The probation officer calculated that,
at a minimum, Whetstone bought 23 grams of crack from Rogers. The
minimum amount of crack attributed to Whetstone was 51 grams.

Whetstone disputed the crack amount and requested a continuance
of sentencing so that Rogers, who was out of state, could testify, argu-
ing that her trial testimony was too vague to establish the 23 grams.
Instead, the district court reviewed the transcript of Rogers' trial testi-
mony, found that the evidence established Whetstone's involvement
_________________________________________________________________
*McLeod also testified that he later fronted Whetstone another ounce
of crack for which he was never paid; however, the probation officer did
not include this amount in the offense level calculation and the district
court did not consider it.

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with over 50 grams of crack, and decided against continuing the sen-
tencing.

We find no merit in Whetstone's contention that Rogers was not
a credible witness because she admitted regularly smoking marijuana
and had entered into a plea agreement. The judge who sentenced
Whetstone had also presided over the trial and was able to judge Rog-
ers' credibility. We do not second-guess that decision. United States
v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1988). To the extent that Rog-
ers was uncertain of the total amount she sold to Whetstone, he was
given the benefit of every doubt. The district court did not clearly err
in finding that the government had proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that Whetstone was responsible for at least 50 grams of
crack. Because the transcript of Rogers' testimony was adequate to
resolve the issue, the district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying a continuance.

The sentence is therefore affirmed. We dispense with oral argu-
ment because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented
in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the deci-
sional process.

AFFIRMED

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