Court Opinion

ID: 9403103
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-20 14:12:15.247818+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:04.501182
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 49

                  SUPREME COURT            OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2021AP809-CR

COMPLETE TITLE:        State of Wisconsin,
                                 Plaintiff-Respondent,
                            v.
                       Junior L. Williams-Holmes,
                                 Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

                          REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                          Reported at 404 Wis. 2d 88,978 N.W.2d 523
                              PDC No:2022 WI App 38 - Published

OPINION FILED:         June 20, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         February 23, 2023

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Kenosha
   JUDGE:              Bruce E. Schroeder

JUSTICES:
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROGGENSACK
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the defendant-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state public defender.
There was an oral argument by Dustin C. Haskell, assistant state
public defender.

       For the plaintiff-respondent, there was a brief filed by
John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general, with whom on the
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral
argument by John W. Kellis, assistant attorney general.

                                2
                                                                        2023 WI 49
                                                                NOTICE
                                                  This opinion is subject to further
                                                  editing and modification.   The final
                                                  version will appear in the bound
                                                  volume of the official reports.
No.     2021AP809-CR
(L.C. No.   2019CF687)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                            :            IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

            Plaintiff-Respondent,                                    FILED
       v.                                                       JUN 20, 2023
Junior L. Williams-Holmes,                                         Sheila T. Reiff
                                                                Clerk of Supreme Court
            Defendant-Appellant-Petitioner.

HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
ZIEGLER, C.J., filed a dissenting opinion in which ROGGENSACK
and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ., joined.

       REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.                 Reversed and

remanded.

       ¶1   BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.         This case concerns a challenge to

a     condition   of     extended     supervision      and     probation         that

prohibited Junior Williams-Holmes from living with any women or

unrelated     children     without     the   permission        of     the     Court.

Williams-Holmes      moved   for     postconviction      relief,      asking      the

circuit court to transfer the approval power from the circuit
court to the Department of Corrections (DOC).                The circuit court
                                                                             No.     2021AP809-CR

denied      the      motion,    and     suggested        that    it   had     the     power      to

supervise Williams-Holmes through case-by-case approval.

       ¶2       The question before us is whether the circuit court

had the authority to do so.                         Wisconsin law empowers circuit

courts      to       impose     conditions          of     extended     supervision             and

probation         and   to     modify       those    conditions        through        a    formal

statutory         process.        However,          actual      administration            of    the

sentence and conditions is entrusted to DOC.

       ¶3       In    this     case,    we    conclude       that     the     circuit          court

likely stepped over the line.                   It all but said it intended to

administer           Williams-Holmes'          condition           through         case-by-case

oversight, which it cannot do.                  Therefore, we reverse and remand

the cause to the circuit court for it to either clarify how the

condition imposed is consistent with the law or to modify its

order accordingly.

                                       I.    BACKGROUND

       ¶4       While on probation for a felony battery conviction,
Williams-Holmes physically assaulted his girlfriend.                                 The State

brought charges and he eventually pled guilty to two counts of

battery, one count of false imprisonment, and one count of bail

jumping, each as a repeat offender.                        On the battery charges, the

circuit court1 imposed consecutive sentences consisting of one

year       of     initial       confinement          and     one      year     of      extended

       The Honorable Bruce E. Schroeder of the Kenosha County
       1

Circuit Court presided.

                                                2
                                                                                      No.      2021AP809-CR

supervision.               The court withheld sentence on the bail jumping

and   false         imprisonment           charges,         ordering          probation         for   three

years to be served consecutive to his sentences on the battery

charges.2            On     both       the    extended            supervision          and      probation

periods,        the    court         imposed       a       condition      that        Williams-Holmes

could not live with any women or unrelated children without the

permission of the Court.3

      ¶5        Williams-Holmes moved for postconviction relief.                                         He

asked the circuit court to amend the judgment of conviction to

require     that           permission        to    reside          with       women       or    unrelated

children must come from DOC, not the court.

      ¶6        The        circuit      court      denied          the    motion.              The    court

explained           that    it      "was     the       practices         of    the     Department       of

Corrections which led me initially to impose the requirement for

my    approval            of     the       department's            practice          of      residential

placements of offenders with unrelated children."                                              To show an

example     of       what      it    saw     as    DOC's         past    "practice,"            the   court

attached        a    2019      email       exchange         between       a    DOC     probation        and
parole agent and the court.                             In the example, the court had

imposed     a       similar         condition      as       in    Williams-Holmes'              case——the

defendant could not "reside with children unless he received

      2The circuit court ordered probation for two years on the
bail-jumping count and three years on the false imprisonment
count concurrent to one other.
      3The Judgment of Conviction stated:    "Do not reside with
any person in any place in which children reside unless you are
related to them by blood w/o Court's permission. Not to reside
w/ anyone of the opposite sex w/o Court's permission."

                                                       3
                                                                         No.        2021AP809-CR

permission from the Court."                The agent emailed the court to ask

if it would allow the defendant to live at his girlfriend's

residence with her and several of her family members, including

her young son.            In an email response, the court said no.                           It

explained that it "would not approve the placement which DOC is

proposing without more information" because of the defendant's

history of violence and drug use.                    This email chain illustrated

why the court believed DOC's practices were "incompatible with

the 'program of probation envisioned by the court.'"                                Therefore,

the    court      declined       to     transfer     the     authority         to     regulate

Williams-Holmes' residential placements to DOC.

       ¶7     Williams-Holmes           appealed.       In    a    thoughtful          opinion

with which we largely agree, the court of appeals observed that

the circuit court's condition could be administered in one of

two ways.          State v. Williams-Holmes, 2022 WI App 38, ¶¶17-18,

404    Wis. 2d 88,         978    N.W.2d 523.          The        condition         could    be

effectuated                      "through                    the                     informal,

oversight/'regulation'/'supervision'                       procedure           that         the
[circuit] court appears to have utilized" in the past.                                      Id.,

¶17.    This would not be lawful, however.                         Id.     Alternatively,

the    condition         could   be     effectuated    consistent          with       the   law

through the statutorily authorized modification process.                                    Id.,

¶18.        The   court     of   appeals     then    construed       the    condition        as

referring         only    to     the     statutory    modification             process      and

affirmed      the    circuit      court's     decision       on    the     postconviction

motion on that basis.                  Id., ¶23.     We granted Williams-Holmes'
petition for review.
                                             4
                                                                            No.      2021AP809-CR

                                        II.    DISCUSSION

       ¶8      Circuit         courts    are    granted     broad       authority       to    hold

those       convicted       of     crimes      accountable         for     their       actions——

including          discretion           to     impose      conditions           on     extended

supervision and probation.                    Wis. Stat. §§ 973.01(5) (2021-22);4

973.09(1)(a);             State     v.        Oakley,      2001        WI 103,       ¶12,      245

Wis. 2d 447,         629       N.W.2d 200.           The    question       in      this      case,

however, is whether the circuit court's condition transgressed

DOC's statutory authority to administer extended supervision and

probation.          Statutory interpretation is "a question of law we

review independently."                   Doubek v. Kaul, 2022 WI 31, ¶3, 401

Wis. 2d 575, 973 N.W.2d 756.

       ¶9      When a defendant is sentenced to probation, Wis. Stat.

§ 973.10(1) states that this has "the effect of placing the

defendant in the custody of" DOC, and the defendant is under the

"the control of the department under conditions set by the court

and    rules       and    regulations         established        by"    DOC.         Under    this

statutory structure, then, the court can impose probation and
place conditions upon it, but control over the defendant and

administration of the terms of probation are carried out by DOC.

       ¶10     A circuit court may also sentence someone to prison,

which       includes       a     mandatory      period      of     extended        supervision

following confinement.              Wis. Stat. § 973.01.                 As with probation,

"the       court    may    impose       conditions      upon      the    term     of    extended

       All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
       4

the 2021-22 version.

                                                 5
                                                                       No.     2021AP809-CR

supervision."         § 973.01(5).        And DOC "may not discharge a person

who is serving a bifurcated sentence from custody, control and

supervision until the person has served the entire bifurcated

sentence."          § 973.01(7).        The structure here also places the

power to sentence with the court, but supervision, custody, and

control thereafter belongs to DOC.

       ¶11    The broad statutory authority given to DOC in Wis.

Stat.        ch.      301      confirms        this.           It      is      DOC     that

"shall . . . Administer"               extended       supervision      and     probation.

Wis.       Stat.    § 301.03(3).          The     legislature       chose      its    words

carefully.           "Administer"      means     to    "have   charge       of;    manage."

Administer,         The     American    Heritage       Dictionary     of     the     English

Language      22     (3d     ed.   1992).        This    naturally      and       logically

includes not just administering DOC's own rules and conditions,5

but those set by the circuit court as well.

       ¶12    While the circuit court is not involved in the day-to-

day    administration         of   probation      or    extended      supervision,       its

role is not necessarily extinguished.                    The statutes also provide
that       conditions        imposed    by      the    court    for     both       extended

supervision and probation are not set in stone; they can be

modified.          See Wis. Stat. §§ 302.113(7m)(a); 973.09(3)(a).                      This

       DOC has established standard rules all defendants on
       5

extended supervision or probation must comply with.   See Wis.
Admin. Code § DOC 328.04(3) (Oct. 2019).         For example,
defendants must obtain permission from a probation agent prior
to changing their residence or place of employment, traveling
out of state, purchasing a car, or borrowing money.      § DOC
328.04(3)(h)-(k).

                                             6
                                                                                   No.    2021AP809-CR

occurs via a formal process.                           A party seeking "to modify any

conditions           of    extended        supervision            set    by    the       court"——and

modification can be requested by DOC or the person subject to

extended supervision——"may petition the sentencing court" to do

so.         § 302.113(7m)(a).                   The    statute        then    provides          various

processes, standards, and restrictions governing the sentencing

court's consideration of the petition.6                                 Ultimately, the court

can    grant         the       petition        only       "if    it     determines         that      the

modification would meet the needs of the department and the

public      and       would      be     consistent         with    the       objectives         of   the

person's sentence."                   § 302.113(7m)(c).            Similarly, a court "may

extend probation for a stated period or modify the terms and

conditions           thereof"          before    the      expiration          of    the    probation

period.         § 973.09(3)(a).            However, the extension or modification

of conditions can only occur "for cause and by order."                                     Id.

       ¶13      With this in view, we turn to the present dispute:

whether the circuit court lawfully imposed the condition that

Williams-Holmes                could    not     live      with    any     unrelated        women      or
children without the permission of the Court.                                        The court of

appeals acknowledged the possibility that this condition could

either refer to a type of supervision the statute entrusts to

DOC,       or   to     the       statutorily          permitted         modification           process.

Williams-Holmes, 404 Wis. 2d 88, ¶¶17-18.                               But to "harmonize the

statutes        and       do    so    in   a    manner     consistent         with       the   circuit

       For example, the statute makes provision for victim
       6

notification (Wis. Stat. § 302.113(7m)(b)) and a hearing on the
petition (§ 302.113(7m)(c)).

                                                      7
                                                                             No.   2021AP809-CR

court's probationary program," the court of appeals affirmed the

circuit      court      and    determined      that       Williams-Holmes           can    only

receive the permission of the circuit court through statutory

modification.           Id., ¶¶20, 23.

       ¶14    We take a different approach.                     While we agree with the

court of appeals' analysis of the statutory scheme, the record

strongly suggests the circuit court intended to administer this

condition of supervision itself, and not leave future permission

to a statutorily authorized modification.                         In its postconviction

explanation,         the      circuit     court      appears       to    have       envisaged

Williams-Holmes (or a probation or parole agent) communicating

with the court directly and as needed to obtain the necessary

approval for him to live with a woman or an unrelated child.

This       would         constitute        impermissible             supervision               and

administration          of    the   conditions       of    probation         by    the   court,

which the legislature has entrusted to DOC.                         The affirmation of

the condition by the court of appeals therefore seems at odds

with the circuit court's own explanation.7                        Therefore, we reverse
and    remand   the       cause     to   the   circuit      court       to    afford      it   an

opportunity        to    either     clarify        how    the    condition         imposed     is

consistent with the law or to modify its order accordingly.

       In the dissent's telling, the circuit court clearly
       7

intended for its "permission" to come only via statutory
modification.   Dissent, ¶¶15, 19.  Yet no one other than the
dissent reads the record that way.   The court of appeals does
not suggest this.     Even the State acknowledged during oral
argument it was unclear.      In any event, if the dissent's
interpretation of the condition is correct, our remand order
allows the circuit court to say so.

                                               8
                                                          No.   2021AP809-CR

    By   the   Court.—The   decision   of   the   court   of    appeals   is

reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court for

further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                  9
                                                                      No.   2021AP809-CR.akz

    ¶15     ANNETTE     KINGSLAND      ZIEGLER,          C.J.     (dissenting).               I

dissent because I would simply affirm the court of appeals'

well-reasoned decision.             It correctly interpreted the circuit

court's    condition    as    referring       to   the     statutory          modification

process.     Though the circuit court's use of the phrase "court

permission" in the conditions of extended supervision appears

ambiguous, the record shows that the court was referring to the

statutory modification process under Wis. Stat. §§ 973.09(3)(a)

and 302.113(7m), which involves a hearing and modification by

order.       The    circuit    court's        order      denying        post-conviction

relief, beyond citing § 973.09(3)(a), alludes to aspects of the

modification       process.        This   shows         that     the        circuit    court

intended for "court permission" to be effectuated through that

statutory    process.         Accordingly,         as     the     court        of     appeals

concluded,    the    circuit       court's    condition          is     lawful,       and   we

should affirm the court of appeals' decision.

    ¶16     The majority provides a rather cursory interpretation

of the circuit court's order setting conditions for extended
supervision.        A more careful reading reveals that the court's

envisioned probationary program conforms to the law.                            The phrase

"court    permission"    in    the    conditions         of     extended       supervision

refers to the modification process.

    ¶17     We interpret a circuit court's order independently,

"look[ing] to the whole of the decision which was reduced to

judgment."         Schultz    v.    Schultz,       194    Wis. 2d 799,              806,    535

N.W.2d 116 (1995).       "A court interprets a judgment in the same
manner as other written instruments."                   Jacobson v. Jacobson, 177

                                          1
                                                                       No.   2021AP809-CR.akz

Wis. 2d 539, 546, 502 N.W.2d 869 (Ct. App. 1993).                                  "Only when

judgments are ambiguous is construction permitted, allowing the

court    to       consider      the    whole   record . . . ."                Id.     at     547.

"Ambiguity exists where the language of the written instrument

is subject to two or more reasonable interpretations, either on

its    face   or     as    applied     to    the    extrinsic        facts    to     which     it

refers."      Schultz, 194 Wis. 2d at 805-06.                    However, "[w]e defer

to a trial court's interpretation of its own ambiguous order as

long as it is a reasonable interpretation."                            Thorp v. Town of

Lebanon, 225 Wis. 2d 672, 683, 593 N.W.2d 878 (Ct. App. 1999).

       ¶18    The circuit court's order contains the condition, "Do

not reside with any person in any place in which children reside

unless    you      are     related     to    them    by    blood      [without]       Court's

permission."              The   order       also    restates         this    condition        as

follows:      "[n]ot       to   reside      with    anyone      of    the     opposite       sex

[without] Court's permission."                     The circuit court's order does

not clearly explain what "court permission" means.                                  At a high

level, it is plain that the condition prevents Williams-Holmes
from    residing         with    unrelated     women       or   children           unless    the

circuit      court       affirmatively       permits      him   to    do     so.      But     the

condition is silent as to what form this "court permission" must

take.        As    the    court   of     appeals      observed,       the     condition       is

ambiguous regarding whether "court permission" means "a type of

informal,         situation-by-situation            oversight        by     the     court"     or

"modifi[cation]            through       the        mechanisms         of     Wis.          Stat.

§§ 973.09(3)(a) and 302.113(7m)(a)."                      State v. Williams-Holmes,
2022 WI App 38, ¶16, 404 Wis. 2d 88, 978 N.W.2d 523.

                                               2
                                                                         No.    2021AP809-CR.akz

       ¶19     The       circuit    court's       order        denying      Williams-Holmes'

motion       for      post-conviction             relief       clarifies         that       "court

permission" refers to the statutory modification process.                                        For

background,          two     statutes       cover           modification        of       probation

conditions:          Wis.    Stat.      § 973.09(3)(a),             which      discusses         the

court's ability to modify conditions on its motion; and Wis.

Stat. § 302.113(7m), which discusses a defendant's ability to

petition      the     court       for   modification.               Under      § 973.09(3)(a),

"[p]rior to the expiration of any probation period, the court,

for cause and by order, may extend probation for a stated period

or    modify       the     terms    and     conditions          thereof."            A    criminal

defendant may also "petition the sentencing court to modify any

conditions         of       extended       supervision             set   by      the       court."

§ 302.113(7m)(a).             "The court may conduct a hearing to consider

the petition."             § 302.113(7m)(c).                The court may also "provide

notice of the petition to a victim of a crime committed by the

person who is the subject of the petition."                              § 302.113(7m)(b).

At the hearing, the court determines whether "modification would
meet   the     needs        of    the     [DOC]       and    the    public      and      would    be

consistent         with     the     objectives          of    the    person's         sentence."

§ 302.113(7m)(c).                If the defendant instead seeks modification

to the term of a bifurcated sentence, the defendant must prove

"by    the     greater           weight     of        the     credible       evidence"       that

modification would serve the public interest.                            § 302.113(9g)(e).

       ¶20     The       circuit     court's          order    denying        post-conviction

relief confirms that "court permission" refers to the statutory
modification process.                In fact, the order expressly references

                                                  3
                                                                          No.    2021AP809-CR.akz

the circuit court's ability to modify conditions by order.                                        It

cites our decision in State v. Gray, 225 Wis. 2d 39, 590 N.W.2d

918   (1999),      and    notes      that       decision        "held     'that       Wis.     Stat.

§ 973.09(3)(a)         allows       circuit       courts      to    modify       conditions       of

probation at any time'" (quoting                        id. at 69).               Additionally,

while     discussing          how     the        circuit      court        "began        to     cite

governmental       statistical           data     which      [the       court]    felt    clearly

justified these conditions," the court noted "the burden is on

the offender, not [the court], to prove the inaccuracy of the

information."         This burden the order references most reasonably

seems to be the defendant's burden of persuasion under Wis.

Stat. § 302.113(9g)(e) to prove that modification "would serve

the public interest."

      ¶21    The majority's conclusory assertion that "the record

strongly suggests the circuit court intended to . . . not leave

future      permission        to     a    statutorily-authorized                  modification"

appears to be based on an email the circuit court included in

its     order    to      illustrate        the        court's      displeasure         with     the
Department of Corrections ("DOC").                      Majority op., ¶¶7, 14.                  This

email    does      not    serve      as     an    example          of    the     procedure      for

obtaining       "court     permission"            the       circuit       court       envisioned.

Quite to the contrary, the circuit court disapproved of nearly

every aspect of the email.

      ¶22    The circuit court included the email in its order as

"one example of how [DOC] even now approaches this issue."                                       The

first    email     was     sent     from     DOC       to   the     circuit       court       asking
whether      the      court     "[w]ould . . . be               willing         to"    permit     a

                                                  4
                                                                            No.    2021AP809-CR.akz

defendant      serving           probation       to      live       with     the     defendant's

girlfriend     as     well        as    her    son      and       adult    sister.             In    its

response,      the        circuit        court        remarked       on     the     "substantial

information         gap        about"    the     defendant          and      said        the     court

"definitely         would       not     approve        the    placement           which        DOC   is

proposing without more information."                          The court further stated

it "would also want to hear the opinion of the child's father,

if   available,           so     [the    court        can     be     made]        sure     that      he

understands the history of the man living with his child."

     ¶23      The    circuit          court    hardly        offered       this    email        as   an

example of what it meant by "court permission."                                   The reason the

court included the email in its order was to demonstrate why the

court disapproved of DOC's practices.                              Its purpose was not to

demonstrate the form of "court permission" the court envisioned.

The majority reads far too much into the email's inclusion in

the order.      To the extent the email does reveal what the court

meant by "court permission," it shows that the circuit court

disapproved of how DOC raised the matter.                                 The circuit court's
stated concerns about needing "more information" and possibly

hearing from the child's father indicate that the court expected

to——and quite likely normally does——hold a hearing on whether to

grant    permission            consistent        with       the    statutory        modification

process.

     ¶24      Our process for interpreting a circuit court's order

yields    a   clear        result:        "court        permission"         as     used        in    the

conditions     of     extended           supervision          refers       to     the     statutory
modification process.                   But the majority eschews this task in

                                                  5
                                                                         No.    2021AP809-CR.akz

favor    of    remanding       with      direction      for       the    circuit     court    to

clarify       what    is    already      clear.         Not       only     is    this     remedy

inappropriate and unnecessary, but none of the parties requested

it.       Williams-Holmes            requested         reversal         "and     remand    with

instructions         that    the    judgment      of    conviction         be    modified     to

require       [Williams-Holmes]          to   obtain      agent         permission."         The

State asked that we affirm the court of appeals and, at oral

argument, pointed out that the circuit court could modify or

clarify the condition on its own motion anyway "without . . . a

needless remand."

      ¶25      By failing to interpret the circuit court's condition

and imposing a remedy nobody requested, the majority turns its

ruling into an advisory opinion.                   This court will normally not

"assume       various       hypothetical       states        of     fact       and   determine

[lawfulness] prospectively under each of these states of fact."

Waukesha Mem. Hosp., Inc. v. Baird, 45 Wis. 2d 629, 643, 173

N.W.2d 700 (1970).            That is exactly what the majority does here.

The opinion is unmoored from any concrete facts being declared
lawful or unlawful.                It abstractly declares the law and tells

the parties to go forth and apply it to whatever the facts may

be.     I would fully resolve the case at hand, which is what we

agreed to do when we accepted review.

      ¶26      The court of appeals got this case exactly right, but

the majority adds confusion to the law by reversing a decision

with which it agrees.                 The circuit court intended for "court

permission" to be effectuated through that statutory process,
which    both    the       court    of   appeals       and    the       majority     agree    is

                                              6
                                                 No.   2021AP809-CR.akz

lawful.     Accordingly, we should affirm the court of appeals'

decision.

    ¶27     For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.

    ¶28     I am authorized to state that Justices PATIENCE DRAKE

ROGGENSACK and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent.

                                  7
    No.   2021AP809-CR.akz

1