Court Opinion

ID: 9627264
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:41:07.706866+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:44.222933
License: Public Domain

Ott, J.
(dissenting) — I dissent for two reasons: First, there are four methods by which a city of the first class may amend its charter. Two of these methods are defined in the constitution. A third method is established by Laws of 1895, chapter 27, p. 42, as amended by Laws of 1925, Ex. Ses., chapter 137, p. 344. A fourth method is that provided by Laws of 1903, chapter 186, p. 393, as amended by Laws of 1949, chapter 233, p. 868 (hereinafter referred to as the act of 1903). The 1903 act for the first time established a direct or initiative procedure which the legislature expressly provided should be a concurrent and additional method.
The published notice requirements in Art. XI, § 10, of the constitution, and in Laws of 1895, chapter 27, § 3, p. 43, as amended by Laws of 1925, Ex. Ses., chapter 137, § 3, p. 345 (hereinafter referred to as RCW 35.22.170), are not a part of or applicable to the “concurrent and additional” method established by the act of 1903.
Secondly, even if we were to engage in “judicial legislation,” by judicially amending the act of 1903 to include the notice requirement of RCW 35.22.170, the notice which was given in the instant case was substantial compliance with the “judicial enactment.”
The majority opinion states:
“Counsel for the respondent argues that no publication of the proposed amendment is required by Laws of 1903, chapter 186, but this overlooks entirely Laws of 1895, chapter 27, § 3 [RCW 35.22.170], . . . which requires precisely the same publication as is prescribed in the constitution.”
*816The majority disregard the fact that there are four methods by which a city charter amendment may be accomplished. Because the legislature required a published notice in the 1895 method, and the framers of the constitution provided for a published notice in the two constitutional methods, the majority decide that the only acceptable notice is one that is published.
In 1903, the legislature determined that, when a city charter amendment is initiated by fifteen per cent of the people who voted at the last general state election, a published notice is not required. This determination was solely within the discretion of the legislature. Nor is there any merit in the contention of the majority that the notice required in the other three methods was, by inference, included in the method established by the act of 1903, for the reason that, in 1949, the legislature again considered the 1903 act and amended it (in a particular not material here), but still did not see fit to require a published notice.
Chapter 137, Laws of 1925, Ex. Ses. (of which RCW 35-.22.170 is a part), amended the 1895 act only and made no reference whatsoever to the 1903 act. By the statement above quoted, the majority infer that RCW 35.22.170 was enacted as a part of the 1903 act, when the fact is that it is a part of the 1895 act only (as amended by the 1925 act).
In deference to the majority’s conclusion in this regard, it may be that they are relying upon the doctrine of pari materia, by which prior statutes dealing with the same subject matter may be resorted to in order to resolve ambiguities. This doctrine has no application here.
“The rule of in pari materia does not permit the use of a previous statute to control by way of former policy the plain language of subsequent statutes, or to add a restriction thereto found in the earlier statute qnd excluded from the later statute; nor has the rule any application in construing an act intended to he complete in itself. In other words, the rule of construction may not be applied to narrow the compass of one statute by reference to another non-conflicting and nonrepealing act, and restrictions placed on a power in one instance cannot be extended to another case *817for which they were not intended and for which another provision is made.” (Italics mine.) 82 C. J. S. 814, § 366.
Since the provisions of RCW 35.22.170 apply only to the 1895 act, and the doctrine of pari materia is not applicable, the majority’s position can be sustained only by “judicial legislation.” We have repeatedly held that we will leave the matter of legislation to that branch of the government whose duty it is to legislate. Fix v. Fix, 33 Wn. (2d) 229, 231, 204 P. (2d) 1066 (1949); Eggert v. Ford, 21 Wn. (2d) 152, 160, 150 P. (2d) 719 (1944).
In the instant case, all of the provisions of the act of 1903 with reference to procedure and notice were complied with fully. The majority do not hold that the act of 1903 is unconstitutional. They reverse upon the single ground that the published notice was three days short of the notice requirements for the methods provided by the constitution and by the act of 1895, as amended by Laws of 1925, Ex. Ses.
I cannot agree with the majority’s contention that the adoption of the charter amendment was void because of the failure to meet the constitutional requirement relating to the publishing of the proposed amendment, and the publication requirement of the act of 1895, as amended by the 1925 act.
I agree with the majority that the constitutional requirements with reference to notice are mandatory. The mandatory provisions, however, are applicable only when a city charter is to be amended by either of the constitutional methods. Likewise, the published notice requirement of RCW 35.22.170 is applicable only to the additional method established by Laws of 1895, as amended by the 1925 act. The people of Yakima, in attempting to amend their charter, admittedly did not pursue either of the constitutional methods or that provided by the act of 1895, but followed precisely the method provided in the act of 1903.
The constitution does not preclude the legislature from providing other methods of amending municipal charters. The constitution provides that “Such charter may be amended by proposals therefor submitted by the legislative *818authority of such city.” (Italics mine.) The word “may” is inconsistent with an intent that the method provided by the constitution shall be exclusive. Art. I, § 30, provides that “The enumeration in this Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny others retained by the people.”
We have often held that the state constitution is a limitation upon, rather than a grant of, power. State ex rel. O’Connell v. Meyers, ante p. 454, 465, 319 P. (2d) 828 (1957), and cases cited. The power of the legislature to enact laws is unrestrained, unless, expressly or by fair inference, it is prohibited by the state or Federal constitution. Gruen v. State Tax Commission, 35 Wn. (2d) 1, 7, 211 P. (2d) 651 (1949); State ex rel. New Washington Oyster Co. v. Meakim, 34 Wn. (2d) 131, 138, 208 P. (2d) 628 (1949); Union High School Dist. No. 1 v. Taxpayers of Union High School Dist. No. 1, 26 Wn. (2d) 1, 6, 172 P. (2d) 591 (1946); Sears v. Western Thrift Stores of Olympia, 10 Wn. (2d) 372, 116 P. (2d) 756 (1941).
The intent of the legislature to provide an additional method is clearly expressed in the act of 1903, § 3, p. 394, as follows:
“This act shall not be construed to deprive city councils from submitting proposed charter amendments to the voters as is now provided, but shall be held to afford a concurrent and additional method for proposing and submitting amendments to the charter of any municipality having a charter.” (Italics mine.)
The act of 1903 is a complete legislative enactment of an additional method by which a change in municipal government can be brought about by the electorate. The act of 1903 does not provide for a published notice such as is specifically provided by the three other methods. However, it does provide that notice be given as follows:
(1) The petition must be signed by a number equal to fifteen per cent of the total number of votes cast within the city at the last preceding general state election. These signers had notice of the proposal, as well as numerous others who had been solicited.
*819(2) The petition must be filed as a public record in the office of the clerk. The filing of such a document in a public office is notice to all the voters. Dowgialla v. Knevage, 48 Wn. (2d) 326, 335, 294 P. (2d) 393 (1956).
(3) The amendment can be voted upon only at a regular municipal election. The election laws require the city clerk to publish notice of all matters to be submitted to the electorate. RCW 29.27.060 [cf. Rem. Rev. Stat., § 5271],
The legislature, in the exercise of its discretion, could well have reasoned that it had provided for adequate notice to the electorate by compliance with the above notice requirements. The reasoning of the legislature had its desired result in the instant case. Prior to the election, the entire proposal was published in two daily newspapers for twenty-three consecutive publications (covering a period of twenty-seven days), and pamphlets were mailed to eleven thousand homes, covering substantially every address in the city. Radio and television announcements were made, and the issue was thoroughly debated and discussed at many service and social clubs. That the notice was effective is evidenced by the unusually large number who participated in the election.
The legislature did provide notice to the electorate in the act of 1903, and, in the instant case, there was full compliance with the statutory requirements. Even though we should assume that the notice requirement of the 1895 act must be read into the act of 1903, the notice which was given in the instant case was a substantial compliance with the statute. We have held that statutory procedural requirements are directory, and that where, as here, there has been in fact an abundance of notice, strict adherence to the statute is not required. In School Dist. No. 81 v. Taxpayers of School Dist. No. 81, 37 Wn. (2d) 669, 225 P. (2d) 1063 (1950), this court said:
“Through a long line of cases, this court has held that statutes . . . calling for the publication of election notices, are not mandatory and will be considered to have been substantially complied with when an attempt has been *820made to comply with the statute, and when wide publicity has been given the matter and the great body of the electors have had actual notice of the time and place of the holding of the election and of the question submitted, unless the statute provides that failure to observe the formalities shall render the election void. [Citing cases.]”
In the cited case, the applicable election law required a newspaper publication thirty days before the election. This court held that a publication only twelve days prior to the election was substantial compliance, in view of the wide newspaper publicity, citizen committee activity, and radio broadcasts. In the face of the cited case, the majority have determined that, in the instant case, a publication for twenty-seven of the allegedly required thirty days is fatally deficient.
The majority cite the cases of Wade v. Tacoma, 4 Wash. 85, 29 Pac. 983 (1892), and State ex rel. Linn v. Superior Court, 20 Wn. (2d) 138, 146 P. (2d) 543 (1944), as being controlling and conclusive of the issue here presented.
Wade v. Tacoma, supra, is not pertinent for two reasons: (1) The decision was rendered by this court in March, 1892. The act of 1903 was not passed until eleven years after the decision. The case has no application whatever to any interpretation of the act here in question.
(2) The sole question presented in the cited case was whether the city of Tacoma had complied with the mandate of Art. XI, § 10, with reference to publication. The Wade case simply holds that, when a charter amendment is submitted by the city council (“the legislative authority”), being one of the constitutional methods, the constitutional mandate relating to notice must be complied with. We are not here concerned, however, with amending a city charter by either of the constitutional methods.
In State ex rel. Linn v. Superior Court, supra, a petition was presented for filing to the city clerk, but it did not contain an affidavit of a qualified voter relative to the genuineness of the signatures, as provided by the act of 1903, § 2, p. 394. The city council placed the petition on file, but refused to place the proposal on the ballot for the ensuing *821March 14th regular municipal election, for the reason that the petition did not contain the required certificate. On January 31st, an affidavit was filed with the city clerk which alleged, inter alia, that the affiant was a qualified voter in a Seattle precinct, and that he had
. . so far as is practicable, investigated and checked all of the signatures contained on the attached petitions . . . ; that from such investigation and checking he has reason to believe and therefore does believe that said signatures are genuine.”
The city council rejected, the petition, in so far as the ensuing March 14th election was concerned, as not having been timely filed. The lower court sustained the action of the city council. On appeal, this court stated [p. 142]:
“The question presented in the case at bar is, at this date, controlled by the section of our state constitution above [Art. XI, § 10], and, for this reason, consideration of the statutes above cited [Laws of 1903, chapter 186, and. Laws of 1921, chapter 61, as amended by Laws of 1923, chapter 53] is unnecessary. We accordingly leave any question which may arise under those statutes for determination when presented.” (Italics mine.)
The court specifically did not rule upon the effect of those statutes as they provide for any method of amending city charters other than that provided by the constitution. The cited case is not pertinent to the issue presented here.
The majority of the court, in the Linn case [p. 144], stated that
“Throughout the section of the constitution [Art. XI, § 10], the words legislative authority are employed without any restrictive words or phrases, and without definition. No specific type of legislative authority is mentioned.”
The court then concluded that any proposal initiated by the requisite number of qualified voters constituted an act by a legislative authority, as contemplated by Art. XI, § 10, of the constitution. This conclusion disregards the fact that the framers of the constitution, in Art. XI, § 10, used the words “the legislative authority.” (Italics mine.)
*822Constitutional provisions should be so construed that no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous, void or insignificant. Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound v. King County Medical Society, 39 Wn. (2d) 586, 637, 237 P. (2d) 737 (1951). It is settled law in this state that words used in a constitution must be construed in their usual and ordinary sense. Pacific Northwest Alloys v. State, 49 Wn. (2d) 702, 705, 306 P. (2d) 197 (1957), and cases cited; Gruen v. State Tax Commission, supra, p. 53, and cases cited.
The article “the” is defined in Webster’s New International Dictionary (2d ed.) as follows:
“A demonstrative adjective used chiefly before a noun to individualize, specialize, or generalize its meaning, having a force thus distinguished from the indefinite distributive force of a, an, and from the abstract force of the unqualified noun. Thus, the man points to a particular man, as distinguished from a man and from the generic man.”
The word “legislative,” when used as an adjective, denotes “Making, or having the power to make, a law or laws; . . . 2. Of or pert, to the making, of laws, or the body which makes the laws.”
.The noun “authority” is defined as the “Legal or rightful power; a right to command or to act; power exercised by a person in virtue of his office or trust.”
The plain and ordinary meaning, therefore, of the phrase “the legislative authority,” as used in Art. XI, § 10, is that particular body having the legal power to enact laws.
The Linn case did not specifically overrule Benton v. Seattle Electric Co., 50 Wash. 156, 161, 96 Pac. 1033 (1908), wherein we said:
“It is maintained that the expression ‘legislative authority of the city’ means the mayor and city council. This contention is doubtless correct. That expression as used in § 10, art. 11, of the state constitution and in numerous statutes of the legislature, undoubtedly means the mayor and council of the city.”
This interpretation was cited with approval in Neils v. Seattle, 185 Wash. 269, 53 P. (2d) 848 (1936).
*823Petitioners for a charter amendment are not “the legislative authority.” Such petitioners are simply vested with a franchise or power by which they can present a proposal to “the legislative authority,” as such, or to the voters, acting in their capacity as a legislative authority. The majority of the voters voting upon a proposal have legislative authority, when they exercise their right of franchise.
The intent of the framers of the constitution is clear that the duly elected municipal legislative body is “the legislative authority of such city,” as that term is used in Art. XI, § 10. We should specifically reaffirm the rules announced in the Benton and Neils decisions with reference thereto, and, in so far as the Linn case conflicts with this conclusion, it should be overruled.
For the reasons stated, the judgment should be affirmed.
Mallery, Finley, and Hunter, JJ., concur with Ott, J.