Court Opinion

ID: 9743648
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 21:39:28.593796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:51.652526
License: Public Domain

Dissenting
DeBruler, J.
The appellant was charged by affidavit with two robberies, totaling $9.00. Appellant is a twenty-seven year old deaf-mute, blind in one eye, who has never been to any school and has only a rudimentary understanding of sign language. He can neither read nor write.
Two psychiatrists and a teacher from the State School for the Deaf interviewed appellant and testified at the hearing on his competence to stand trial. They all agreed that appellant could not comprehend the nature of the charges against him nor assist in his defense because he had a mental deficiency and also because he had almost no means of communication other than a few gestures and pantomines. They also agreed that there was almost no chance that appellant ever .could improve his understanding sufficiently to be tried, even if he could gain a means of communication. However, the interpreter from the School for the Deaf stated that he knew of no facilities in this State which could help this appellant. He *493also stated the School for the Deaf did not accept mentally-retarded persons. Thus, in effect, the commitment of appellant until he can comprehend the nature of the charges against him and assist in his defense is a commitment for life.
Burns’ Ind. Stat. Ann. §9-1706 (a) provides for the commitment to the Department of Mental Health of a criminal defendant who is incompetent to stand trial because he “has not comprehension to understand the proceedings and make his defense.” This .commitment is for the purpose of giving the psychiatrists a chance to determine what can be done to alleviate the defendant’s mental condition so that he can be tried, and a reasonable opportunity to achieve that goal. When the defendant’s “sanity” is restored the commitment comes to an end because the purpose of the commitment has been accomplished.
That this is the rationale of the statute can be seen from the statutory language which says:
“If the court shall find that the defendant has comprehension sufficient to understand the nature of the criminal action against him and the proceedings thereon and to make his defense, the trial shall not be delayed or continued on the ground of the alleged insanity of the defendant. If the court shall find that the defendant has not comprehension sufficient to understand the proceedings and make his defense, the trial shall be delayed or continued on the ground of the alleged insanity of the defendant. . . . Upon the return to court of any defendant so committed he or she shall then be placed upon trial for the criminal offense the same as if no delay or postponement had occurred by reason of defendant’s insanity.” Acts 1951, ch. 238, § 2, as last amended by Acts 1967, eh. 291, §2, Burns § 9-1706(a). (Emphasis added.)
The statute clearly contemplates a delay in the trial or a postponement, which implies that the commitment to the psychiatric institution is a temporary one.
When the defendant’s condition is permanent, as in this case and he cannot be helped by any known psychiatric technique, then the defendant cannot be committed under this *494statute because the purpose of the commitment cannot be accomplished.
What then is the purpose of the confinement of this appellant whose condition is permanent. Punitive? Protection of society? Protection of the appellant? Confinement to serve any of these purposes based merely on a trial court finding that appellant “has not comprehension to understand the proceedings and make his defense” in my opinion would violate the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellant has not been convicted of any crime, nor found to be dangerous to the community or himself. It has not been shown that he cannot continue to live in our society as he has for twenty-seven years. What conceivable basis is there for committing this appellant to a psychiatric institution for, what is in effect, life?
Clearly, the real basis for this commitment is the existence of the criminal charges against appellant. This is shown by the fact that if those charges were to be dismissed because another person confessed and plead guilty to those crimes, or the complainant admitted he had lied in making the charges, the commitment of appellant under Burns’ § 9-1706(a), supra, would obviously be ended. Thus, the existence of unproved criminal charges operates to keep appellant confined in a state institution for life. This is a blatant violation of the due process clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. For a case interpreting the federal statutes on this point see U. S. v. Curry (1969), 410 F. 2d 1372.
A permanent or open ended commitment under Burns’ § 9-1706 (a) would also violate the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. In order to civilly commit a mentally deficient person the court would have to find that the person, because of a “psychiatric disorder”, which includes mental deficiency, requires care, treatment, training or detention in the interest of the welfare of such person or the welfare of others of the community in *495which such persons reside. Burns’ §22-1201 (1) and (2). There has never been such a finding in this case and there is no rational basis for treating appellant differently than another person who is to be civilly committed. The existence of criminal charges against appellant is not a rational basis for such a discrimination. Buxtrom v. Herold (1966), 383 U. S. 107, 86 S. Ct. 760, 15 L. Ed. 2d 620; U. S. ex rel. Schuster v. Herold (1969), 410 F. 2d 1071.
The majority opinion, in effect, holds that this technique is within the State’s police power to provide for the safety, health and general welfare. I strongly dissent. The majority opinion’s summary disposition of this important federal question is not a correct resolution of this issue.
Note. — Reported in 255 N. E. 2d 515.