Court Opinion

ID: 9675156
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:43:38.09505+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:15:24.190505
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Greenhill,
joined by Justices Smith, Culver and Norvell, dissenting.
The holding of the majority of this court is that there was no evidence to support the jury’s finding that there was no other employee,in the area who had done work similar to Griffin’s for substantially the whole of a year and that Griffin had failed to prove that it was impracticable to compute his wages under Sections 1 or 2 of the statute. That holding in turn is based *203on a statement from the witness stand by Griffin that he had made a diligent search for such a person and had been able to find one in a neighboring town; but such person could not be brought to the trial because he, the other person, was ill and under a doctor’s care. The Court treats this statement as a judicial admission on Griffin’s part which was absolutely binding upon him. The Court of Civil Appeals held further, in effect, that the voluntary payment for 22 weeks by the insurance carrier at the same rate resulting from the jury’s verdict was not binding on it and constituted no evidence to support the jury’s verdict under the “just and fair” section of the statute. The opinion of the majority does not reach this last point.
The term “admission” has been used without discrimination to cover two distinct situations. In one sense, it is treated as a “judiciary admission” and refers to a formal act, done in the course of a judicial proceeding', which dispenses with the production of evidence and takes the matter out of the domain of proof so that neither the court nor jury is required to make any finding in regard to it.1 The other sense in which “admission” is generally used is to authorize the receipt in evidence of statements or conduct of a party which is inconsistent with his present position. Instead of dispensing with evidence, these admissions form a part of the evidence and are admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule. McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence (2nd ed.) 24, section 1127; 9 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.) 586, section 2588 et seq. These and other authorities refer to the latter type of admission as “extra-judicial” or “quasi-admission.” The “judicial admission” is binding. The other, being but a part of the evidence, is not necessarily conclusive on the party against whom it is offered.
Testimony given by a party from the witness stand may be of such a nature and character as to constitute a judicial admission. That type of testimony may literally swear a party out of court. Because of the finality which results from this concept, it is the rule in this state that “the rule or doctrine should be applied with caution.” United Fidelity and Guaranty Company v. Carr (Texas Civ. App., 1951, writ refused), 242 S.W. 2d 224; 9 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.) 597, section 2594a. The Carr case says, “In Texas, 'the term ‘judicial admission’ has been defined as a ‘waiver of proof’ during the course of a judicial proceeding.” The inference is clear in the Carr case, based on state-*204merits in Wigmore, that if the party is simply giving-testimony as a witness to events not peculiarly within his own knowledge, the statement will not be regarded as a judicial admission. The Carr case quotes with approval from Alamo v. Del Rosario, 98 F. 2d 328 (which quotes from Wigmore) : “It is of the nature of an admission, plainly that it be by intention an act of waiver * * * ; in particular, a statement made for the purpose of giving testimony is not a judicial admission * * * . Mere testimony, though it comes from a party, is not by intention an act of waiver. A witness is not selling something or giving something away, but simply reporting something. The testimony of parties to a suit must be regarded as evidence, not as facts admitted.” (Quotation marks within the quotation omitted.)
Wigmore further says:
“* * * If a party’s testimony consists only of a narrative of events in which he participated or which he observed, there is an obvious possibility that he may be mistaken like any other witness. In such a situation, if other witnesses give a different version of the occurrence, his testimony must be weighed with theirs, and he will not be concluded by his own statements.” 9 Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.) 599, section 2594a.
I do not think, under all the facts and circumstances of this case, that the statement by Griffin from the stand that he had made a diligent search for men who were similarly employed for substantially the whole of a year and had found one over in O’Donnell, Texas, constitutes a judicial admission which took from the jury the right to determine the fact of whether there was in fact one such person.
First, Griffin had not been in the area for substantially the whole of a year. He could not have known of his own knowledge that the man had worked at O'Donnell substantially the whole of a year.
Second, Griffin was employed at a cotton gin. There is ample evidence that the operation of a gin is highly seasonal; that the ginning season only lasts three or four months. In between the ginning seasons, there is little for an employee to do with regard to the gin except to take care of it and make repairs. The substance of Griffin’s testimony is that, in general, people do not work at a gin all year. The substance of the testimony of Mr. Dempsey who was in charge of the operation of the gin was to the same effect: the work at the gin was highly seasonal. *205Griffin further testified that it would be very unusual to find an employee who worked at a gin the whole of a year; that locating a person who worked all year at a gin would be a hard thing to do, and that he’d made a diligent search to try to find such a person.
The statement of Griffin with regard to his search (his “judicial admission”) was simply a recital of the fact that he had found one such person at O’Donnell, Texas; but he couldn’t come to the trial because he was ill. He was simply reporting or testifying as a witness to what he found. Griffin did not testify, if indeed he knew, whether this person worked 200 or 350 days per year; what his particular job was; whether it was of maintenance and repair only or otherwise; or what his wage scale was. Under the circumstances, it was not conclusive that some employee of the same class did perform similar work to that of Griffin for substantially the whole of a year in the same vicinity and that there was some evidence to support the jury’s finding that there was no such employee. The sufficiency of that evidence is for the Court of Civil Appeals to pass upon.
I think there is other evidence that the correct rate of compensation was awarded Griffin. The insurance carrier, in its pleadings, stated (admitted) that it paid Griffin $35 per week for 22 weeks prior to trial. That is the same figure which resulted from the finding of the jury in this case. It did not plead that the payments were made by fraud, mistake, misrepresentation, or in an attempt to compromise the controversy. It is true that this Court held that the amount paid by the insurer was not conclusive on the insurer; i.e., that it was not a judicial admission in the strictest sense. Southern Underwriters v. Schoolcraft (1942), 138 Texas 323, 158 S.W. 2d 991.2 There was evidence in that case to support the jury’s finding of a lower wage rate upon which judgment was based. But the Schoolcraft case did not say that the voluntary payment of wages at a particular rate was not some evidence that it was a correct rate. It was held in Traders & General Insurance Company v. Harper (Texas Civ. App. 1940, writ refused), 140 S.W. 2d 593, that:
“In the absence of any evidence that the payments [of compensation by the insurance carrier to the injured employee] were made upon mistake or misrepresentation as to appellee’s [the workman’s] wage rate, or that he was entitled to a smaller compensation wage rate, we think that appellant’s admission in *206paying appellee [the workman] compensation for 18 weeks at the rate of $13.85 per week is sufficient to support the judgment awarding that rate.”
Similarly, in Southern Surety Co. v. Eppler, (1930, writ refused) 26 S.W. 2d 697, where the wage rate was fixed under section 3, the “just and fair” section of the statute, and the carrier had made four payments of $20 per week, the Court held through Judge McClendon that, “It does not seem unreasonable to construe this fact as in the nature of an admission for the purpose at least of a prima facie showing of wage.”
The opinion in the Harper case cited opinions by the Courts of Civil Appeals which hold that where the wage rate is fixed, or attempted to be fixed, under section 3 of the statute (the “just and fair” section), the payment by the carrier of compensation for a period of weeks of a particular amount “in the absence of a showing that it [the carrier] did so as a result of misrepresentation or mistake” will support a judgment for that amount. See for example Traders & General Ins. Co. v. Slusser (1937, writ dismissed, correct judgment), 110 S.W. 2d 598; and Fidelity and Casualty Co. of New York v. Ener (1936, no writ), 197 S.W. 2d 267, which held that the voluntary payment was, in effect, a judicial admission which would support the compensation rate under any of the three methods of computing it. To the same effect is Southern Underwriters v. Erwin (1939, no writ), 134 S.W. 2d 720.
After the Harper decision, there were likewise a number of opinions by the Courts of Civil Appeals which hold that such voluntary payment, in the absence of misrepresentation, fraud, or mistake, would support the jury’s findings. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Romero (1941, writ dismissed, correct judgment), 146 S.W. 2d 1096; Texas Employers Ins. Ass’n v. Hodnett (1949, writ refused, n.r.e.), 216 S.W. 2d 301; Employer’s Casualty Co. v. Smith (1949, writ refused, n.r.e.), 221 S.W. 2d 322; Texas Employers v. Grimes (1954, writ ref., n.r.e.) 268 S.W. 2d 786; Texas Employers Ins. Assn. v. Ewing, (1956, writ ref., n.r.e.), 285 S.W. 2d 880; Traders and General Ins. Co. v. Smith (1958, writ ref., n.r.e.) 311 S.W. 2d 91, at 93, and similar cases.
Under these authorities, it would appear to be the rule when a carrier voluntarily pays an employee at a particular rate over a period of time, and the is no pleading3 or proof of fraud, *207accident, mistake, misrepresentation or attempt to compromise the matter, such payment constitutes some evidence that the amount paid is a correct one.
I, therefore, conclude that there was some evidenec to support the jury’s finding of a wage rate under section 3, the “just and fair” portion and that the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Opinion delivered June 15,1960.

. — McCormick and Ray say that this includes facts admitted by pleadings, agreed statements of fact, .or other stipulations. 2 McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence (2nd ed.) 24, section 1127.

. — Followed in Davis v. Texas Employers’ Ins. Ass’n, 257 S.W. 2d 755 (1953, no writ), and in Brooks v. Lucky, 308 S.W. 2d 273 (1958, writ refused, n.r.e.)

. — The lack of pleading here pat - out of the case because the evidence as to Griffin’s wage rate went in witho"' Sbjection.