Court Opinion

ID: 9623722
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:41:42.267033+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:58.233425
License: Public Domain

Rosellini, J.
(dissenting) — The majority of this court perceives that the Consumer Protection Act (RCW 19.86) has an appropriate place in the regulation of the practice of law. I believe the correct rule of law would prohibit application of the Consumer Protection Act to the practice of law, as it intrudes upon the judiciary's exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the practice of law.
The majority apparently takes the position that this court's exclusive authority to regulate the practice of law is limited to regulating admission to and suspension from the bar. However, all of the conduct here complained of is regulated by this court in order to protect the public interest. Although the majority has not disputed the court's inherent authority to regulate the practice of law by promulgating and enforcing the Code of Professional Responsibility and disciplinary rules, it apparently does not believe that the authority for such regulation is exclusively the province of this court. Instead, the majority finds that the conduct of attorneys in representing their clients may be regulated by the Legislature through statutes such as the Consumer Protection Act, thus thereby permitting some sort of vague dual existence between regulation by the Legislature and by this court.
This court rejected just this type of dual regulation in State ex rel. Schwab v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 80 Wn.2d 266, 493 P.2d 1237 (1972). In Schwab, we held the State Bar Act, RCW 2.48, to be merely advisory in nature, and therefore not impinging upon the court's exclusive authority to regulate the legal profession. We found that this court's exclusive and constitutional authority to regulate the practice of law left no room for the "vague dual existence" of conditions for the practice of law.
*73First, we have held repeatedly that only the Supreme Court has the power to suspend one from the practice of law or to take other disciplinary action. In re Bruen, 102 Wash. 472, 172 P. 1152 (1918); In re Ballou, 48 Wn.2d 539, 295 P.2d 316 (1956); In re Simmons, 59 Wn.2d 689, 369 P.2d 947 (1962); see also Clark v. Washington, 366 F.2d 678 (9th Cir. 1966).
Second, RCW 2.48.060 provides generally that the board of governors has the power to prescribe rules, establish procedures and to carry out the investigation, prosecution and hearing of all cases involving discipline, disbarment, suspension, or reinstatement. It also provides that the board may make recommendations thereon to the Supreme Court. However, all such power is specifically made subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
The foregoing statute and our past decisions make it evident that this court does not share the power of discipline, disbarment, suspension or reinstatement with either the legislature or the state bar association. The ultimate constitutional power clearly lies within the sole jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. This point is conceded in the brief of the respondent bar association.
Such constitutional concept leaves no room for the notion that a lawyer's authority to practice law is subject to some vague dual existence, one part of which may be terminated by the bar's suspension of his membership while the other (i.e., his authority to practice law before the courts) is subject to control of the Supreme Court. In short, membership in the state bar association and authorization to continue in the practice of law coexist under the aegis of one authority, the Supreme Court.
Schwab, at 269.
Likewise, the court's exclusive authority to discipline lawyers leaves no room for joint control by the Legislature. The Code of Professional Responsibility establishes the standard to be met by lawyers, and the disciplinary rules the method of enforcement. In re Steinberg, 44 Wn.2d 707, 715, 269 P.2d 970 (1954). The disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility, not the Consumer Protection Act, must govern the profession's conduct. This our rules adequately, efficiently and justly do.
*74The disciplinary rules prohibit the alleged conduct at issue in this action. Petitioner's answer and counterclaim set forth, in essence, allegations concerning misrepresentations, excessive fees, threatened withdrawal of representation, and neglect. Such alleged improprieties by an attorney in the conduct of his representation of a client are closely regulated by the disciplinary rules.
CPR DR 1-102 prohibits misrepresentation of any kind by an attorney. It provides, in part:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(4) Engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation.
CPR DR 2-106 regulates in detail the amount of a fee which may be charged by an attorney. That rule provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect an illegal or clearly excessive fee.
(B) A fee is clearly excessive when, after a review of the facts, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with a definite and firm conviction that the fee is in excess of a reasonable fee. Factors to be considered as guides in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) The time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly.
(2) The likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer.
(3) The fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services.
(4) The amount involved and the results obtained.
(5) The time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances.
(6) The nature and length of the professional relationship with the client.
(7) The experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services.
(8) Whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
CPR DR 2-110 regulates in detail the circumstances under which an attorney is permitted to withdraw his rep-*75reservation of a client. It provides, in part:
(C) Permissive Withdrawal. If [DR 2-110(B)] is not applicable, a lawyer may not request permission to withdraw in matters pending before a tribunal, and may not withdraw in other matters, unless such request or such withdrawal is because:
(1) His client:
(d) By other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the lawyer to carry out his employment effectively.
(e) Insists, in a matter not pending before a tribunal, that the lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice of the lawyer but not prohibited under the disciplinary rules.
(f) Deliberately disregards an agreement or obligation to the lawyer as to expenses or fees.
CPR DR 6-101 regulates the neglect by a lawyer of a matter entrusted to him. That rule provides:
(A) A lawyer shall not:
(1) Handle a legal matter which he knows or should know that he is not competent to handle, without associating with him a lawyer who is competent to handle it.
(2) Handle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circumstances.
(3) Neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
Finally, CPR DR 2-102 (B) and (C) have been interpreted to establish a primary obligation of lawyers associated in practice not to mislead the client as to who is responsible to the client. Koehler v. Wales, 16 Wn. App. 304, 309, 556 P.2d 233 (1976).
As the purpose of regulation of the conduct of attorneys by this court is to protect the public interest, Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Great W. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 91 Wn.2d 48, 60-61, 586 P.2d 870 (1978), violation of any of the disciplinary rules may result in suspension or censure. See, e.g., In re Loomos, 90 Wn.2d 98, 579 P.2d 350 (1978). Moreover, all conduct which violates these rules is expected to result in disciplinary proceedings. In re Droker, 59 Wn.2d 707, 720, 370 P.2d 242 (1962). If proceedings are not *76brought when proper, a petition may be brought to compel proceedings. Dodd v. Bannister, 86 Wn.2d 176, 543 P.2d 237 (1975).
The majority asserts that the Consumer Protection Act does not regulate attorneys at all, but merely creates a private damage action for consumers. This position is untenable in at least two respects. First, it is obvious that legal culpability for acts within the practice of law affects the way lawyers will operate their practice. As noted above, this power lies exclusively with the Supreme Court. Second, this court has held that the Consumer Protection Act is more akin to a regulatory statute than a private remedy statute. The majority's position conflicts with this view of the Consumer Protection Act, because an action may not be maintained unless a public interest has been demonstrated. Thus, it is fiction to view the Consumer Protection Act's application to lawyers as nonregulatory.
The majority relies primarily on Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 190 Conn. 510, 461 A.2d 938 (1983). In that case, however, the court misana-lyzed the purpose of regulation of the practice of law by the judiciary. In Heslin, the Connecticut Commissioner of Consumer Protection issued an investigative demand to the defendant law clinic as part of an official investigation of actions alleged to violate the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). The demand requested production of information relative to an investigation by the commissioner of practices alleged to violate CUTPA. The allegedly unfair practices included use of the terms "clinic" and "law clinic" in the clinic's advertising, misrepresentations as to fees, and referrals of clients which resulted in clients paying higher than the advertised fees. The clinic refused to comply with the investigative demand, and the commissioner sought a court order compelling compliance. The trial court found that the regulation of attorney conduct is a matter exclusively within the control of the judiciary and dismissed the commissioner's application. The Supreme Court of Connecticut reversed. In doing so, however, it employed *77fallacious and unsound reasoning of a type this court can and, I respectfully submit, should avoid.
The Connecticut court’s reasoning rests upon a distinction between the "ethical and regulatory" function of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the "pragmatic concerns of the public" which are the concern of CUTPA. Heslin, 190 Conn. at 525. In its analysis, the court conceded that CUTPA "unquestionably deals with subject matter that is within the judicial power." Heslin, 190 Conn. at 523. It also acknowledged that
[sjince attorney advertising, referrals by attorneys to other legal practitioners, and fee arrangements between attorneys and clients are regulated by the disciplinary rules of the code[,] . . . enforcement of the code may provide sanctions for wrongful practices which also violate CUTPA.
Heslin, 190 Conn. at 523-24. Moreover, the court admitted that attorneys have a "special relationship with the judiciary" because of their "unique position as officers and commissioners of the court”. Heslin, 190 Conn, at 524. But the Connecticut Supreme Court then proceeded to ignore all of these valid and important factors in favor of a spurious distinction between the purpose of the code and the purpose of the Consumer Protection Act:
We should not permit the special relationship of attorneys to the judiciary to blind us to the fundamental importance of the relationship of attorneys to their clients. Although the canons of ethics and the disciplinary rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility purport to govern both the official and the private aspects of the practice of law, the code's emphasis is consistently ethical and regulatory. CUTPA, by contrast, is primarily addressed to the pragmatic concerns of the public; it emphasizes prevention of injury to the consumer of legal services and redress to those injured by attorney misconduct.
Heslin, 190 Conn. at 525. The Connecticut court's own statements demonstrate the fallacy of the distinction drawn. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not deal solely with aspects of the practice of law which may be *78considered purely ethical. It deals in concrete and specific ways with pragmatic and practical aspects of the relationship between attorneys and clients. It deals with legal fees, with suits to collect those fees, with referrals from one attorney to another, with advertising, and with numerous other practical concerns.
While the Connecticut court suggested that the matters dealt with by the code can somehow be divided between those which may also be regulated by consumer protection statutes and those which cannot, this is not the case. The code deals with each aspect of the relationship between an attorney and his or her client. It cannot be artificially divided. No basis exists for distinguishing between "ethical" and "pragmatic" concerns of the code. Consequently, the reasoning of Heslin is fundamentally unsound and should be rejected by this court.
Furthermore, the Heslin court views the purpose of the Connecticut Code of Professional Responsibility differently than have we. Unlike Connecticut, we have unequivocally held that the sole purpose of the code is to protect the public. Washington State Bar Ass'n v. Great W. Union Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, supra. Because RCW 19.86.020 applies only to conduct which impacts the public interest, when the Consumer Protection Act is applied to the conduct of lawyers in the private representation of a client, it intrudes upon this court's protection of the public interest through the regulation of the practice of law.
Our constitution prohibits this result. Const, art. 4, § 1 provides: "The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme court . . .". Inherent in this constitutionally granted power is this court's inviolate authority to regulate the practice of law. Seattle v. Ratliff, 100 Wn.2d 212, 215, 667 P.2d 630 (1983). This power to regulate the practice of law is solely within the province of the judiciary. Hagan & Van Camp, P.S. v. Kassler Escrow, Inc., 96 Wn.2d 443, 453, 635 P.2d 730 (1981). Judicial formation of rules and regulations governing the practice of law must proceed— unhampered — by encroachment from other branches of *79government. Graham v. Washington State Bar Ass'n, 86 Wn.2d 624, 548 P.2d 310 (1976). Finally, the exercise of this power is necessary for the protection of the court and the proper administration of justice, and serves the public good by protecting the clients. Ratliff, at 215.
For these reasons, I would hold that application of the Consumer Protection Act to the practice of law is an unconstitutional infringement upon the exclusive jurisdiction of this court to regulate the practice of law.