Court Opinion

ID: 9740340
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:32:47.164222+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:17.566750
License: Public Domain

Bronson, P. J.
(dissenting). The use of character evidence, like prior convictions, for purposes of impeaching a defendant’s credibility while contradicting a proffered defense may well become the determinative factor in a criminal trial. The juris*686prudence of this state rejects the proposition that other crimes and misconduct are admissible to prove a defendant’s criminal disposition or propensity to commit the crime charged. Evidentiary exceptions which permit the admission of prior convictions and misconduct for limited purposes tread closely to the edge of this proposition. The courts of this state must be sensitive to the very real possibility that a defendant may be convicted by a jury for past crimes and guard against such injustice by carefully evaluating the propriety and permissible scope of the exceptions employed. I cannot agree with the majority opinion since the type of rebuttal evidence challenged neither falls within nor should fall within currently recognized exceptions.
The present appeal is based upon the following sequence of events. The prosecution, during its case in chief, offered defendant’s letter to his probation officer and two pretrial statements describing the altercation and homicide. Since the statement of November 20, 1970, contained ambiguous references to defendant’s involvement in homosexual conduct, defendant upon taking the stand denied being the solicitor and claimed to have been the victim on such occasions. During cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned defendant upon his alleged solicitation of homosexual relations with prison cellmates, which he denied. The prosecutor proceeded to offer the testimony of Kenneth Maxwell, one of defendant’s three cellmates during his pretrial confinement, for purposes of rebutting this denial and the defense that defendant did not initiate or solicit the deceased’s homosexual advance. The trial judge permitted defendant to secure the attendance of Leo Baker, one of the remaining cellmates during *687the same time, as a surrebuttal witness. The specific issue created by the prosecution’s proffered evidence may be stated as follows:

Are speciñc acts of homosexual conduct between defendant and a third person portraying defendant as the solicitor admissible to rebut a claim of self-defense portraying the deceased as the sexual aggressor?

My analysis of this complex evidentiary issue begins with a recognition of the general underlying evidentiary proposition that misconduct on other occasions is inadmissible to show that a person had a greater propensity to commit the crime charged. People v Wright, 294 Mich 20 (1940); People v Riddle, 322 Mich 199 (1948); People v Askar, 8 Mich App 95 (1967); People v Heiss, 30 Mich App 126 (1971); People v Insley, 36 Mich App 593 (1971).1 A number of limited exceptions have been created by the Legislature and judiciary. I have carefully scrutinized each exception in an attempt to place the issue raised in the appropriate category for disposition. Since the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence was clearly offered to discredit defendant’s allegations, it appears to fall within the general concept of impeachment. Not finding one of the traditionally recognized impeachment procedures2 applicable, I have employed the analogous concept of impeachment by "contradiction”.
Impeachment by "contradiction” is described by McCormick, in his treatise on evidence, to be a process where a witness’ statements on a specific *688matter are contradicted by the contrary testimony of a second witness.3 The impeaching value of this approach is that:
"It merely tends to show—for Witness One may be right and Witness Two may be mistaken—that Witness One has erred or falsified as to certain particular facts, and therefore is capable of error or lying, and this should be considered negatively in weighing his other statements.”4
To prevent prejudicial misuse a safeguarding corollary should be employed which precludes contradiction upon collateral matters. McCormick delineates two kinds of facts not considered collateral which are relevant to our problem: (1) facts relevant to the substantive issue in the case and (2) facts used "to pull out the linchpin of the [witness’s] story”. This latter concept is defined as "the contradiction of any part of the witness’s account of the background and circumstances of a material transaction”.5 (Emphasis added.) This test is neces*689sarily vague since "it must meet an indefinite variety of situations”. Although the evidence at issue satisfies the contradiction concept, its admissibility depends upon the scope of these two approaches used to determine whether it involves a "collateral” issue.
This question may be answered by reference to two analogies. The first analogy is provided by rape cases in which the prosecutrix’ consent is at issue. The type of evidence which is admissible to contradict the claim of no consent by impeaching the character of the prosecutrix has been delineated by our courts. In People v McLean, 71 Mich 309, 312 (1888), the Court was confronted with an attempt to impeach the prosecutrix by evidence of her prior sexual relations with a third person. The McLean Court recognized the general rule permitting the character of the prosecutrix for chastity to be impeached, stating:
"Evidence that the prosecutrix is a common prostitute, or that her character for chastity is bad, is admissible, and particular acts of unchastity or sexual intercourse with the defendant may be shown; but evidence of such acts with a third person is not admissible.” (Citation omitted.) (Emphasis added.)
This admission of evidence of prior sexual relations between the parties is relevant to the issue of consent and should not be deemed collateral.6 Such acts showing "opportunity, disposition of the parties and intimate relations tending to break down self-respect”7 have a higher degree of reliability *690enabling the balance to shift from a prejudicial effect to probative value.
The McLean Court’s exclusion of specific acts of misconduct with third persons represents a realistic appraisal of the reliability of the proffered evidence. There are an unspecified number of reasons why the prosecutrix may consent to sexual relations with a third person but refuse defendant. The totality of the circumstances becomes significantly dissimilar so that a continuance of consensual behavior becomes unreliable. For this reason the misconduct with others may be deemed to raise a collateral issue.*8 General reputation evidence of misconduct may be admitted as being consistent with a policy permitting the impeachment of character. People v Ryno, 148 Mich 137 (1907).9
The second analogy is provided by homicide and assault cases in which self-defense is at issue. The admissibility of a party’s violent conduct on prior occasions to contradict his defense that he was not the aggressor has been determined by our courts. Similar to sex offenses, testimony regarding the prior relations between the parties, including threats, has been admitted for this purpose. Brownell v People, 38 Mich 732 (1878); People v Durham, 170 Mich 598 (1912); People v Griner, 30 Mich App 612 (1971).10 Likewise, the Brownell *691Court excluded evidence of defendant’s act of violence upon another person at a different time and place.11 The Court in People v Farrell, 137 Mich 127 (1904), affirmed this approach but found the deceased’s general reputation for violence to be admissible.12 This rationale is equally applicable to defendant’s general reputation for violence. Whether or not the acts of misconduct constitute a separate crime, their inadmissibility is based upon the conclusion that they are collateral matters.13
In the present case defendant relied upon the claim of self-defense and injected the issue of homosexuality by imputing sexually aggressive conduct to the deceased. Applying the above analogies to the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence, I cannot conclude that it falls within the purview of either category of facts not considered collateral by McCormick. The question of who initiated or solicited the homosexual relations between the parties is a substantive issue in the case. The question of whether defendant or his cellmate solicited the homosexual relations at a time subsequent to the crime charged embodies a distinct issue which is insubstantial by comparison. Neither can this evidence "pull out the linchpin of the story” because it presents a number of inferences upon which the jury must speculate. The jury must accept defendant’s involvement in homosexual conduct, find him to be the solicitor on prior or subsequent occasions, and conclude that he was the solicitor on the day in question.
*692Similar to rape cases involving the issue of consent, evidence of homosexual conduct with third persons is not sufficiently reliable to counterbalance its prejudicial effect. The same conclusion is reached by a comparison with homicide and assault cases excluding acts of violence upon third persons. Since the alleged conduct between defendant and his cellmate is an indictable offense,14 the admission of separate offenses for which defendant has not been tried, even though similar, causes me grave concern.15
The majority opinion reaches a contrary conclusion by adopting California decisions permitting the prosecution to prove defendant’s bad character by proof of other bad acts. People v Westek, 31 Cal 2d 469; 190 P2d 9 (1948), and its progeny represent several limited exceptions to California’s adherence to the principle that prior misconduct is not admissible to prove defendant’s criminal disposition or propensity to commit the crime charged. In Westek, defendant was charged with lewd and lascivious conduct with several young boys, and upon taking the stand, testified that he had never "at any time” committed any act of sodomy, or any lewdness "in any other county” upon any boy. The Westek Court found that such a complete denial upon direct examination which tended to place defendant in an especially favorable light with the jury opened the door for the admission of the rebuttal testimony of other persons. The Wes-tek Court distinguished its case from cases rejecting the admission of evidence when presented affirmatively by the' prosecution during its case in chief.
*693A secondary basis for admitting the rebuttal evidence at issue was found by the Westek Court. Since defendant admitted touching the complainant but denied a lewd intent, this Court found that he injected the issue of intent into the case and the challenged testimony was admissible for the limited purpose of proving such intent. Upon this background California courts have established the following exceptions justifying the admissibility of defendant’s misconduct with third persons: (1) defendant opened the door for rebuttal evidence by an all-inclusive denial16 or (2) the evidence establishes the defendant’s identity, intent, motive, common plan, or scheme.17
I cannot agree that these cases justify the admission of the rebuttal evidence at issue or that the proffered defense opened the door as wide as the majority believes. The defense that the deceased was the sexual aggressor, at best, opened the door for the admission of prior acts involving the parties. Unlike Westek, defendant did not offer an all-inclusive denial regarding his solicitation of homosexual relations on direct examination. The references to defendant’s homosexual conduct with others was initiated by the prosecutor’s admission of defendant’s pre-trial statement. The prosecutor should not be permitted to broaden the scope of defendant’s denials in this matter so as to create a need for rebuttal evidence. I have difficulty applying the California cases to the present situation since they rely in part on the principle that de*694fendant’s conduct with third persons is admissible to prove intent, motive, common plan, or scheme. Michigan’s expressed rejection of this principle18 vis-a-vis sex-related offenses renders their application dubious.
Assuming arguendo the California cases are directly applicable, I would challenge their adoption as unsound. Unlike the majority of California decisions in which the admitted offenses are similar to the charged offense, the present charge of murder is completely dissimilar from defendant’s alleged solicitation of homosexual conduct with a cellmate. This difference is critical since defendant was forced to defend two trials simultaneously: one for murder and one for homosexual misconduct. The disruption of the primary trial by the submission of rebuttal and surrebuttal witnesses on this secondary issue for the avowed purpose of proving that defendant was a liar undermines the orderly administration of justice and was highly prejudicial. The single related and relevant issue created by the proffered defense was the prior relationship between the parties, if any.
The prosecution is not left defenseless and precluded from exposing defendants who attempt to hide behind fabrications. The technique of cross-examination offers a tool which may be skillfully used to expose hesitation, indifference, improbability, and the telltale contradictions in defendant’s story. The prosecutor may similarly challenge defendant’s general reputation. However, the admission of defendant’s misconduct with third persons *695creates an inquisition into his character which is inconsistent with the precedent governing the scope of rebuttal evidence and analogous areas of the law.19 The guarantee that a defendant will be provided with a fair and impartial trial upon the offense charged cannot be fulfilled by the admission of evidence upon collateral issues. Upon the foregoing analysis I would reverse defendant’s conviction.

 See 1 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), § 446, p 549; McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 42, p 82.

 See 1 Gillespie, Michigan Criminal Law & Procedure (2d ed), §§436, 437, and 438, pp 534-542; MCLA 600.2158; MSA 27A.2158; People v Dellabonda, 265 Mich 486 (1933).

 McCormick, Evidence (2d ed), § 47, pp 97-100.

 Id, pp 97-98.

 Acceptance of this approach is found in Michigan authorities under the label "rebuttal evidence”. This case law is limited to evidence employed to rebut certain facts involving the crime which were relied upon by defendant and does not include evidence of other offenses or misconduct. See, e.g., People v DeFrance, 104 Mich 563 (1895) (where the Court admitted the testimony of a witness that defendant was in St. Paul on April 11, 1892, to rebut defendant’s claim that he was elsewhere on that date indorsing a promissory note); People v Row, 135 Mich 505 (1904) (where the Court found error in the trial judge’s exclusion of a witness’ testimony offered to rebut the testimony of defendant’s doctor and support defendant’s alibi); Strudgeon v Village of Sand Beach, 107 Mich 496 (1895) (where the Court permitted a witness’ denial of his conversation with a third person regarding the cause of plaintiffs injury to be rebutted by the testimony of that person); People v Weems, 15 Mich App 22 (1968) (where the Court admitted the testimony of a witness’ mother to rebut the witness’ denial of a conversation in which she admitted being uncertain of her identification of defendant). Contrast People v Joseph Barbara, Jr., 23 Mich App 540 (1970). The extension of this approach to include the evidence at issue is rejected for the reasons stated herein.

 Cf. People v Ayres, 195 Mich 274 (1917).

 This standard providing an exception for admissibility is found primarily in cases involving statutory rape. People v Davis, 175 Mich 594 (1913); People v Gengels, 218 Mich 632 (1922); People v Trzil, 235 Mich 469 (1926); People v DerMartzex, 29 Mich App 213 (1970), leave granted 387 Mich 759 (1972). See People v Thomas Smith, 388 Mich 93 (1972) (where the Court discusses these cases and finds admission *690of subsequent acts of intercourse between the parties justified upon the statutory exception of intent, motive, plan, or scheme).
Recently this standard has been extended to cases involving sodomy, gross indecency, and indecent liberties and is equally applicable to the remaining types of sexual offenses. People v Askar, 8 Mich App 95 (1967); People v Oaks, 24 Mich App 7 (1970); People v Heiss, 30 Mich App 126 (1971).

 Cf. People v Knapp, 42 Mich 267 (1879).

 Cf. Harris v Neal, 153 Mich 57 (1908).

 Cf. People v Mulvaney, 171 Mich 272 (1912); People v Reycraft, 156 Mich 451 (1908).

 Accord, People v Kenyon, 93 Mich 19 (1892); People v Cellura, 288 Mich 54 (1939); People v Wright, 294 Mich 20 (1940).

 Accord, People v Cellura, supra; People v Stallworth, 364 Mich 528 (1961); People v Burks, 30 Mich App 102 (1971); People v Redmond, 30 Mich App 117 (1971); People v Rapier, 43 Mich App 297 (1972).

 See People v Griffen, 36 Mich App 368, 379 (1971) (dissenting opinion by Judge Levin).

 MCLA 750.338; MSA 28.570 or MCLA 750.340; MSA 28.572.

 This reasoning has been utilized in cases involving sexual offenses to exclude defendant’s acts of sexual intercourse with another. People v Coston, 187 Mich 538, 545 (1915); People v Nelson, 227 Mich 552 (1924). But see People v Geanakopoulos, 320 Mich 430 (1948).

 People v Smith, 144 Cal App 2d 745; 301 P2d 609 (1956); People v Sylvia, 54 Cal 2d 115; 351 P2d 781; 4 Cal Rptr 509 (1960). Contrast, People v Baskett, 237 Cal App 2d 712; 47 Cal Rptr 274 (1965).

 People v Kelley, 66 Cal 2d 232; 424 P2d 947; 57 Cal Rptr 363 (1967); People v Cramer, 67 Cal 2d 126; 429 P2d 582; 60 Cal Rptr 230 (1967); People v Pierce, 269 Cal App 2d 193; 75 Cal Rptr 257 (1969); People v Wells, 13 Cal App 3d 265; 91 Cal Rptr 460 (1970).

 See, e.g., People v Askar, 8 Mich App 95 (1967) (sodomy case); People v Oaks, 24 Mich App 7 (1970) (indecent liberties case); People v Heiss, 30 Mich App 126 (1971) (gross indecency case). But see, People v Thomas Smith, 388 Mich 93 (1972) (where the Court admits subsequent acts between the parties as tending to prove defendant’s common plan, scheme, or system).

 See, e.g., People v Guzanich, 13 Mich App 634 (1968) (where the Court, speaking through a per curiam opinion, concluded that the cross-examination of defendant regarding a prior charge of sodomy in a judge trial upon a charge of indecent liberties with a minor male was error).