Court Opinion

ID: 9589079
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:41:21.967456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:00.876247
License: Public Domain

*101Justice Meyer
dissenting.
For the reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Fleming v. K-Mart Corp., 312 N.C. 547, 324 S.E. 2d 214 (1985), I dissent.
N.C.G.S. § 97-31 provides that scheduled injuries “shall be in lieu of all other compensation, including disfigurement.” The majority speculates that the General Assembly in enacting the “in lieu of’ clause, expressed an intent not to permit compensation for both loss and disfigurement of body parts, but did not preclude one entitled to scheduled benefits under N.C.G.S. § 97-31 from seeking, in the alternative, total disability benefits under N.C.G.S. § 97-29.
I fail to understand the majority’s reasoning in reaching this result. If, as the majority opinion suggests, the legislative object in amending the act to include the words quoted above was to eliminate double compensation for a scheduled loss and disfigurement, it would have been unnecessary to use the language “including disfigurement.” Had the General Assembly intended this to be the only object of the amendment, use of the words “all other compensation” would have been unnecessary. A plain reading of the statute suggests that the language used was carefully chosen to make scheduled benefits the exclusive form of benefit for persons sustaining scheduled injuries.
While it is difficult to ascertain the exact intent of the legislature in enacting the “in lieu of’ clause, a contemporaneous summary of the 1943 legislative session’s Workmen’s Compensation Act amendments states that the purpose of the amendment (1943 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 502) “probably was to provide for payments during the actual healing period, but in no event for less than the length of time specified in the schedule.” “Workmen’s Compensation Act,” Popular Government, June 1943, at 34. This is consistent with the theory that scheduled injuries are designed to replace all other forms of compensation and thus eliminate the need to determine the exact period or extent of disability.
I hasten to add that I would find no objection in the result reached if it resulted from legislation enacted by the General Assembly, rather than by the majority’s judicial legislation.