Court Opinion

ID: 9847277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:57:03.238885+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:05.502015
License: Public Domain

TYSON, Judge
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority’s opinion holds the trial court: (1) properly activated defendant’s suspended sentences and changed the sentences to run consecutively, instead of concurrently as originally imposed, and (2) erred when it entered a substantially different written judgment outside of defendant’s presence. I concur to vacate and remand on entering the substantially different judgment outside of defendant’s presence. I disagree with the majority’s holding to affirm the consecutive sentences. I vote to reverse and respectfully dissent.
I. Probation Revocation
The majority opinion fails to include all relevant portions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d) in its analysis. The more relevant portion of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d) (2005) states:
If a convicted defendant violates a condition of probation at any time prior to the expiration or termination of the period of probation, the court, in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 15A-1345, may continue him on probation, with or without modifying the conditions, may place the defendant on special probation as provided in subsection (e), or, if continuation, modification, or special probation is not appropriate, may revoke the probation and activate the suspended sentence imposed at the *143time of initial sentencing, if any, or may order that charges as to which prosecution has been deferred be brought to trial; provided that probation may not be revoked solely for conviction of a Class 3 misdemeanor.
(Emphasis supplied).
The majority incorrectly extends and misapplies this Court’s reasoning in State v. Paige. 90 N.C. App. 142, 369 S.E.2d 606 (1988). In Paige, this Court held N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d) gave the trial court “authority to order defendant’s sentence for felonious breaking and entering to be served consecutively to his sentence for possession of stolen goods.” 90 N.C. App. at 143, 369 S.E.2d at 606. The facts of Paige are far different than and distinguishable from those at bar. Id. at 142, 369 S.E.2d at 606. In Paige, the defendant’s sentences were entered in different proceedings more than two months apart and resulted in separate judgments that suspended the sentences and placed the defendant on probation for one and five year terms respectively. Id. at 142-43, 369 S.E.2d at 606.
Here, defendant’s concurrent sentences were all entered on the same day as result of a plea agreement and defendant was sentenced to one probationary term of five years. The trial court activated defendant’s suspended sentences ordered to to run concurrently by the judge who imposed the sentences. “[0]rdinarily one judge may not modify, overrule, or change the judgment of another Superior Court judge previously made in the same action.” State v. Woolridge, 357 N.C. 544, 549, 592 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2003) (quoting Calloway v. Ford Motor Co., 281 N.C. 496, 501, 189 S.E.2d 484, 488 (1972)).
The Rule of Lenity prevents courts from interpreting a criminal statute in a manner that would impose a penalty possibly greater than that intended by the General Assembly. State v. Boykin, 78 N.C. App. 572, 577, 337 S.E.2d 678, 681-82 (1985); see also Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 67 L. Ed. 2d 275 (1981) (“This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” (Quotation omitted)).
Under the plain and unambiguous language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d) the trial court was only authorized to “revoke the probation and activate the suspended sentence imposed at the time of initial sentencing . . . .” (Emphasis supplied). The trial court erred *144when it altered defendant’s original sentence and sentenced defendant to eight consecutive terms of imprisonment rather than five as imposed in the suspended judgment.
I vote to reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand to specify defendant’s sentences run consecutively as imposed “at the time of [defendant’s] initial sentencing . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d). Under this analysis, it is unnecessary to reach defendant’s second assignment of error. However, I concur with the majority’s decision to vacate and remand for entering a substantially different judgment outside of defendant’s presence.
II. Conclusion
The majority’s opinion fails to analyze controlling statutory provisions and incorrectly extends and misapplies N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(d) and this Court’s reasoning in Paige, 90 N.C. App. at 142, 369 S.E.2d at 606. I vote to reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for re-sentencing and activation of the original concurrent sentences exactly as imposed at the time of defendant’s initial sentencing.
Under the express language of the statute and the facts of this case, the trial court was without authority to re-sentence defendant contrary to his plea agreement and the suspended sentences in the judgment originally imposed. Id. Our holding in Paige is inapplicable to the facts in this case. Id. I respectfully dissent.