Court Opinion

ID: 9565408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:20:29.560374+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:37.291386
License: Public Domain

Littlejohn, Justice
(dissenting) :
Being of the opinion that payment or tender of a monthly installment of the option cost on or before March 1, 1975, was not a necessary condition for exercising the renewal option, I respectfully dissent. . •
The letter from appellant tó the respondents, dated February 13, 1975, which gives notice of appellant’s desire “to exerice our option as per our contract under Article XXXII, to reserve the expansion, space until such time as we do expand,” .was legally sufficient to renew the option. Essentially, this letter constituted an ' “acceptance” of the respondents’ “offer” to renew the option. Thus, upon receipt of the letter, a bilateral contract was formed between appellant and respondents. Appellant obligated itself to the respondents to pay the option cost monthly during the three (3) year extended period in accordance with the language of the option. Respondents were correspondingly obligated to perform by providing the space, etc.
■ Since the contract was bilateral, both parties were obligated and protected. If, as the majority finds, payment of the *659option fee was so critical, the respondents need only have notified appellant as to its payment delinquency as the first step in protecting their rights under the contract. However, the respondents chose to remain silent for approximately three and one-half months, then notified appellant that the option had been extinguished and thus could not be renewed.
In discussing the importance of appellant’s letter of February 13, 1975, the majority has found that “the fact that the defendant gave notice prior to March 1, 1975, that it wished to extend the primary option is completely irrelevant.” I do not agree. It should be noted that the present case and those cases cited by the majority as controlling differ greatly. In Tuxbury Lumber Co. v. Byrd, 131 S. C. 32, 127 S. E. 267 (1925), Minshew v. Atlantic Coast Lumber Corp., 98 S. C. 8, 81 S. E. 1027 (1914), and Dargan v. Page, 222 S. C. 520, 73 S. E. (2d) 705 (1962), the optionor never received notice of the optionee’s intention to renew or extend the option until after the expiration date had passed. The court in those cases had only to deal with the late tender of payment of the option cost.
This is not the situation here. Appellant’s intentions to renew the option were clearly expressed to the respondents well in advance of the option date.
Had there been no contact between appellant and the respondents by letter, payment, or otherwise, until after the expiration date, I would agree with the majority that any attempt to extend the option would be invalid. This was not the case and, under the facts as they are given to us, a bilateral contract was formed between the parties under which they should both be bound.
Lewis, C. J., concurs.