Court Opinion

ID: 9396622
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 13:12:14.476667+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:18.488451
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Humphreys, O’Brien and Chaney
UNPUBLISHED

              Argued at Lexington, Virginia

              JAMES EDWARD FULTZ, IV
                                                                            MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
              v.     Record No. 0189-22-3                                  JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
                                                                                  MAY 23, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF DANVILLE
                                             James J. Reynolds, Judge

                              Samantha Offutt Thames, Senior Appellate Counsel (Virginia
                              Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

                              Virginia B. Theisen, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Jason S.
                              Miyares, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     After a jury trial in the City of Danville Circuit Court, James Edward Fultz, IV, appeals

              his convictions of first-degree murder and robbery. Fultz argues that the circuit court erred in

              three ways: (1) in not dismissing a juror for cause, (2) in finding the evidence sufficient to

              establish premeditation as required for the first-degree murder charge, and (3) in finding the

              evidence sufficient to establish the temporal correlation between the violence or intimidation and

              the intent to steal to support the robbery conviction.

                                                       BACKGROUND

                                                    I. Voir Dire of the Jury

                     Fultz elected to be tried by a jury. During voir dire of the jury pool, defense counsel

              asked if anyone worked in law enforcement. Prospective juror number 10 (“Juror 10”) answered

              that he works at the juvenile detention home. Defense counsel and Juror 10 acknowledged that

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
they recognized each other from encounters at the juvenile detention home. Defense counsel

asked, “Do you think that that would affect your ability to be fair and impartial here today?”

Juror 10 replied, “Not really, I don’t think so.” Defense counsel continued, “You kind of waved

your head there. Are you uncertain?” Juror 10 answered, “I’m uncertain but it shouldn’t, no.”

Juror 10 was sent back to the jury room.

       As voir dire continued, defense counsel made a motion to strike Juror 10 for cause. The

court asked Juror 10 to return for more questioning. Defense counsel asked Juror 10 about the

length of his employment at the juvenile detention home, and Juror 10 replied that he had

worked there for twenty-five years. Defense counsel continued,

               And in that role, in that job, I think I asked you earlier, would that
               possibly affect your ability to make a fair and impartial decision
               here today, and you kind of shrugged or shook your head, and then
               I asked you, I followed up and you said you were uncertain, so I’ll
               repeat the question, given that you’ve worked at the detention
               facility for some time and, and that’s been your career, and you’ve
               had exposure to a lot of different circumstances there, do you
               believe that that may affect your ability to be fair and impartial in
               this jury today?

Juror 10 responded, “I’m still uncertain right now. I don’t, you know, I don’t want to say yes or

no for sure.” Asked why he feels uncertain, Juror 10 replied that he has encountered both the

prosecutor and defense counsel through his employment.

       The circuit court then stated that Juror 10 deals with pretrial and posttrial incarcerated

juveniles. The court asked, “tell me how, as you understand the process of being a juror, tell me

what you think your role is here in terms of evaluating the, the evidence.” Juror 10 replied, “To

seek the truth, basically. Seek the truth.” Then the court asked Juror 10 how his experience in

the criminal justice system would affect him in sitting as a juror. Juror 10 responded, “From my

experience, you know, in dealing with juveniles, those cases and everything, I might tend to be a

                                                -2-
little more judgmental on, on that part far as you know, whether the kid’s guilty or innocent, and

it might affect the, the case here. I’m not sure.”

       The prosecutor followed up, “When you say you may be more judgmental, I’m not quite

sure . . . what you mean by that.” The record indicates there was no audible response. The

prosecutor said,

               Let me ask you this, this way, can you set aside, I mean, whatever
               contact you may have had with juveniles, set aside their story, set
               aside their case, and set aside whatever you may know in reference
               to the system and just base your verdict on the evidence and the
               law you hear today?

To which Juror 10 responded, “I could, yes.” Juror 10 was then excused to the jury room.

       Defense counsel argued that Juror 10 should be struck for cause because “he said that he

would be judgmental.” “I think that shows that he may have some prejudice towards my client’s

case from the outset, and he’s been candid about that.” The circuit court stated, “being

judgmental doesn’t mean he’s inclined to be judgmental in favor of the Commonwealth.”

Defense counsel replied, “[T]he way I took what he expressed was to mean that he would be

judgmental in favor of the Commonwealth . . . .”

       The circuit court pointed out that Juror 10’s responses to the Commonwealth’s leading

questions don’t necessarily “make the grade” in rehabilitating the juror. However, the court

denied defense counsel’s motion to strike, stating,

               [N]ot being sure about being able to set aside, I don’t think is
               grounds to be struck for cause. If you say I can’t be fair, that’s
               grounds for cause. . . . I think [Juror 10] is, is being candid. I
               don’t think that he has expressed anything that the Court views as
               bias either towards or against either side and based on how I view
               his demeanor . . . and in response to the questions I asked him I
               believe he can be fair and . . . I don’t believe there’s a basis to
               strike him for cause . . . .

Defense counsel used a peremptory strike to exclude Juror 10 from the jury pool.

                                                -3-
                                       II. Evidence at Trial

       On Sunday, January 10, 2021, late in the afternoon, Fultz visited Rhonda Graham at her

home, located at 503 Gay Street in Danville, Virginia.1 Elbert McCain showed up while Fultz

was there. Graham and McCain walked to a store to buy beer. Fultz was still at the house when

Graham and McCain returned about thirty minutes later. Then, Delando Rodgers also arrived at

Graham’s house. According to Fultz, these associates wanted him to find some drugs from local

dealers he knew. Rodgers found a phone number for a taxicab company, and Fultz called for a

cab. Soon thereafter, Graham heard a horn honk, looked out the window, and saw a cab. She

told Fultz his cab had arrived. Prior to leaving Graham’s house, Fultz asked Graham if she had a

pair of sweatpants he could put on. He left the house by himself, wearing a beige jacket and

sweatpants pulled over his blue jeans. Graham testified that Fultz did not return to the house that

evening.

       James Calloway was working as a dispatcher for Yellow Cab taxicab company on the

evening of January 10. That evening Calloway answered a call to the Yellow Cab phone

number, and the caller requested a pickup at 503 Gay Street. Calloway called cab driver Wendy

Harris on her cell phone and dispatched her to 503 Gay Street.

       About thirty minutes to one hour after dispatching Wendy, Calloway answered a call

coming from Wendy’s phone. Over the phone, Calloway heard a male voice talking to Wendy—

it was the same male voice he spoke with earlier in the evening, requesting a cab at 503 Gay

Street. Calloway heard the man say he wasn’t “trying to do nothing crazy . . . or trying to hurt no

one.” The man also said he was waiting for people to “bring the money out the house.”

Calloway heard Wendy respond, “Why did you try to take my keys then . . . ?” The man said,

“So you won’t go nowhere.” The phone call ended.

       1
           Graham was a friend of Fultz’s sister and had known Fultz for many years.
                                                 -4-
       Calloway tried to call Wendy back several times. About five minutes later, his call was

answered. No one was talking to Calloway, but he could hear Wendy and the same male voice

talking. He heard Wendy say, “don’t be hanging up my phone,” and the man said, “she tripping,

she tripping.” Calloway called Wendy’s name over the phone, but Wendy did not speak to him.

The phone call ended. Calloway tried to call back, but no one answered. Calloway left his home

in a cab to find out what was going on. About ten minutes after his last call to Wendy ended,

Calloway spotted Wendy’s cab at the intersection of Gay Street and Valley Street.2 Calloway

pulled up beside Wendy’s cab and noticed her head was leaning against the glass of the driver’s

side door. Calloway drove a short distance away and called 911.

       At 8:56 p.m. Officer J.C. Thornton of the Danville Police Department received a dispatch

to 503 Gay Street. When he arrived, he found the Yellow Cab van and he could see that the

driver of the van was slumped over in the seat and had multiple injuries. He opened the driver’s

door and checked the victim for a pulse; she had no pulse.

       Officer G.B. Mayhew also arrived on the scene and spoke with Calloway who was

waiting nearby in his car for the police to arrive. Sergeant S.C. Bray then approached 503 Gay

Street and spoke with Graham, McCain, and Rodgers. A K-9 unit arrived on the scene. The dog

tracked from the van to the porch of 503 Gay Street two times but did not alert on the front door,

which would be expected to follow a scent of someone who entered through the door.

       Around midnight, police contacted Shelby Holbert, Fultz’s girlfriend. Police met Holbert

at a business parking lot in Danville. An officer placed his cell phone in Holbert’s vehicle, and

several officers followed Holbert in a vehicle as she drove to meet Fultz. Holbert picked up

Fultz, and the officers listened to Holbert and Fultz’s conversation using another cell phone in

       2
        Wendy’s Yellow Cab van was parked on the corner of the intersection which was one
house away from 503 Gay Street.
                                         -5-
their vehicle. An officer recorded the conversation with a body camera. Over the cell phone, the

officers heard Fultz say, two to three times, “I killed someone tonight.” Holbert drove a little

farther and then pulled her car over to the side of the road. The interior lights came on; Fultz

exited the passenger side of the vehicle and ran. Several officers chased Fultz on foot and

arrested him in a nearby yard. Officers backtracked on Fultz’s path to see if he had thrown

anything, and they only found a Dodge van owner’s manual.

       Officers investigating the crime scene found a clipboard splattered with blood in the back

seat of the Yellow Cab van. They also found a kitchen knife on a grassy hill next to Valley

Street. The Dodge owner’s manual, the clipboard, and the knife all had Wendy’s blood on them.

No cash was found on Wendy’s person or in the van.

       The knife belonged to Rhonda Graham; she testified that it came from her house. The

knife’s blade was about seven inches long. The medical examiner who performed the autopsy on

Wendy concluded that the cause of her death was six stab wounds. One stab wound to the

posterior right shoulder area was seven inches deep and injured the vertebral column, softening

the spinal cord itself. This nerve damage may have prevented nerve signals from getting to her

diaphragm and impaired her breathing. Another stab wound behind Wendy’s right ear was five

inches deep and also injured her vertebral column and likely injured her spinal cord. In Wendy’s

neck, a stab wound measured four inches deep and injured some ligaments on her vertebral

column. Near Wendy’s right shoulder, a stab wound was seven inches deep, and on the front of

her chest another stab wound was two inches deep. She also had an incision wound to her face

that “went through the entire thickness of her cheek and into her mouth.”

       Calloway testified that the paper on the clipboard found in the van was Wendy’s Yellow

Cab manifest. He testified that Yellow Cab drivers keep one manifest per shift and record their

trips on the manifest. The cab drivers log how much money was charged for each trip on the

                                                -6-
right-hand column. The company only accepts cash as payment for fares. At the end of the

shift, the cab driver goes to the boss’s house and there the cash is divided between the boss and

the cab driver. Calloway testified that on January 10 he had dispatched Wendy to other calls

before dispatching her to 503 Gay Street. Based on Wendy’s manifest, she would have had cash

from payments for trips that Calloway dispatched her to earlier in the evening. Totaling the

night’s fares listed on the manifest, Wendy should have had $30.75 in cash with her when she

first arrived at 503 Gay Street.3

       Defense counsel moved to strike the evidence. First, he argued that the first-degree

murder charge should be reduced to second-degree murder, because the Commonwealth did not

prove premeditation. Second, as to the robbery charge, he argued that there was no evidence that

anything was taken from her person, and regarding the possible taking of the cab manual, the

sequence of events is not clear and it would be speculation “as far as the robbery with taking the

property of another by use of force.”

       After the circuit court denied the motion to strike, Fultz testified. He stated that he was

trying to find drugs for the people at Graham’s house. After he returned to Graham’s house in

the Yellow Cab van, he went inside Graham’s house to get money. He came back out to speak

with Wendy and to tell her he was still waiting on someone to bring him money. He saw the van

manual on the ground and picked it up. He knocked on the van window and saw Wendy who did

not respond; he saw blood and the van in disarray. Then he panicked and ran. He testified that

he told Holbert that he killed Wendy because he felt responsible because she was killed while

waiting for him to get money. He said he ran from the police because he does not trust them.

       3
         On the same day as Wendy’s murder, Fultz messaged a friend on Facebook saying that
he was in trouble and he did not have any money.
                                             -7-
       Defense counsel again moved to strike the evidence, incorporating his earlier argument.

The circuit court denied his motion, and the jury found Fultz guilty of first-degree murder and

robbery.

                                            ANALYSIS

                                      I. Challenge to Juror 10

       Fultz argues that “[t]he trial court erred in not striking juror 10 for cause.” “It is

prejudicial error for the trial court to force a defendant to use peremptory strikes to exclude a

venireman from the jury panel if that person is not free from exception.” Townsend v.

Commonwealth, 270 Va. 325, 329 (2005) (citing Breeden v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 297, 300

(1976)).

       “Juror impartiality is a question of fact, and a trial court’s decision to seat a juror is

entitled to great deference on appeal.” Lovos-Rivas v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 55, 61

(2011) (internal citations omitted). “Whether a venireman can lay aside a preconceived opinion

and render a verdict solely on the evidence is a mixed question of law and fact. Resolution of the

question rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Calhoun v. Commonwealth, 226

Va. 256, 258 (1983). This Court “must give deference to the circuit court’s determination

whether to exclude a prospective juror because that court was able to see and hear each member

of the venire respond to questions posed.” Green v. Commonwealth, 262 Va. 105, 115 (2001).

“The circuit court is in a superior position to determine whether a prospective juror’s responses

during voir dire indicate that the juror would be prevented from or impaired in performing the

duties of a juror as required by the court’s instructions and the juror’s oath.” Id. “[T]he trial

court must weigh the meaning of the answers given in light of the phrasing of the questions

posed, the inflections, tone, and tenor of the dialogue, and the general demeanor of the

                                                 -8-
prospective juror.” Taylor v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 448, 455 (2017) (alteration in

original) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 455, 464-65 (1978)).

               [B]ecause the trial judge has the opportunity, which we lack, to
               observe and evaluate the apparent sincerity, conscientiousness,
               intelligence, and demeanor of prospective jurors first hand, the trial
               court’s exercise of judicial discretion in deciding challenges for
               cause will not be disturbed on appeal, unless manifest error
               appears in the record.

Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 191 (2004) (quoting Pope v. Commonwealth, 234 Va.

114, 123-24 (1987)). “A manifest error occurs when the record shows that a prospective juror

cannot or will not lay aside his or her preconceived opinion.” Taylor, 67 Va. App. at 456.

       “It is the duty of the trial court through the legal machinery provided for that purpose to

procure an impartial jury to try every case.” Justus v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 971, 976 (1980)

(quoting Slade v. Commonwealth, 155 Va. 1099, 1106 (1931)). Code § 8.01-358 provides that

the court and counsel for either party have the right to ask prospective jurors “any relevant

question to ascertain whether he is related to either party, or has any interest in the cause, or has

expressed or formed any opinion, or is sensible of any bias or prejudice therein;” and “if it shall

appear to the court that the juror does not stand indifferent in the cause, another shall be drawn or

called and placed in his stead for the trial of that case.” “The issue of who is, or is not, a

competent juror is one for the trial court to decide, and in making its decision the court may

exercise a reasonable discretion. Ordinarily, if that discretion has not been abused the trial

court’s decision on that matter is final.” Justus, 220 Va. at 976 (quoting Slade, 155 Va. at 1106).

       “The opinion entertained by a juror, which disqualifies him, is an opinion of that fixed

character which repels the presumption of innocence in a criminal case, and in whose mind the

accused stands condemned already.” Id. (quoting Slade, 155 Va. at 1106). “To hold that the

mere existence of any preconceived notion as to the guilt or innocence of an accused, without

more, is sufficient to rebut the presumption of a prospective juror’s impartiality would be to
                                                 -9-
establish an impossible standard.” Briley v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 180, 186 (1981) (quoting

Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 723 (1961)) (providing examples of jurors’ fixed opinions or

partiality requiring strike for cause). “It is not uncommon to discover during voir dire that

prospective jurors have preconceived notions, opinions, or misconceptions about the criminal

justice system, criminal trials and procedure, or about the particular case.” Griffin v.

Commonwealth, 19 Va. App. 619, 621 (1995). “Even though a prospective juror may hold

preconceived views, opinions, or misconceptions, the test of impartiality is whether the

venireperson can lay aside the preconceived views and render a verdict based solely on the law

and evidence presented at trial.” Id. “A prospective juror who is biased, prejudiced, or who

‘persists in a misapprehension of law that will render him incapable of abiding [by] the court’s

instructions and applying the law, must be excluded for cause’ because such a juror cannot be

impartial.” Id. (quoting Sizemore v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 208, 211 (1990)).

       On one hand “a casual impression” does not necessarily disqualify a prospective juror,

while on the other hand, “a fixed and abiding conviction” must disqualify a prospective juror.

See Huguely v. Commonwealth, 63 Va. App. 92, 123 (2014) (quoting Briley, 222 Va. at 185). A

“prospective juror’s entire voir dire must be considered—not just isolated portions,” id. at 123—

to determine the juror’s mental attitude, Bausell v. Commonwealth, 165 Va. 669, 676 (1935).

       Fultz and the dissent rely on the case of Brown v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 199

(1999), to support their position that Juror 10 was not impartial. Brown moved the trial court to

strike three prospective jurors for cause, and the trial court denied his motion. Id. at 202. Brown

was on trial for attempted rape and abduction, among other charges. Id. During voir dire, “Juror

No. 1 stated that she had been a victim of an attempted abduction and a possible attempted

sexual assault . . . .” Id. at 203-04. When asked if her experience would give her “a bias in this

case either for or against,” she replied, “I don’t honestly know. I would hope not.” Id. at 204.

                                               - 10 -
Asked if she would keep an open mind and decide the case based solely on the evidence, she

replied, “We would all try to do that.” Id. Other responses included, “I think that I would be fair

as a juror. That’s the best that I can respond.” Id. at 205. Then she said she was not sure and

didn’t see how she could be sure because she was “not clairvoyant.” Id. After a question of

whether she would consider only the evidence and completely put out of her mind her personal

experience, she said, “I think that I would. I would do my best to. I mean I’ve never been in that

situation before . . . there may be feelings there that would not influence me, but there might be

feelings there nonetheless.” Id. “I would hope that I would do my duty and really look at the

evidence.” Id.

       This Court noted that the prospective juror “expressed numerous reservations about her

ability to serve impartially on the jury in light of her personal experiences,” and “[n]early all of

[her] responses contained the phrases, ‘I think,’ ‘I don’t know,’ and ‘I would try.’” Id. at 208.

This Court found that the trial court erred in refusing to strike the prospective juror for cause

because her responses indicated a great degree of equivocation and created reasonable doubt

about her fitness to serve as a juror, and such doubt “must be resolved in favor of the accused.”

Id.

       The Commonwealth points us to Weeks v. Commonwealth, 248 Va. 460 (1994), where

the Supreme Court concluded that the circuit court was justified in finding that the potential juror

could be impartial during trial. Id. at 475. The defendant, on trial for murdering a police officer,

argued that the juror should be struck for cause because the juror stated that he is affected by the

fact that his close family member who was a police officer was killed in a drug shootout. Id. at

474. The Court noted that the juror answered many questions that “reflected his ability to serve

as an impartial juror.” Id. at 475. And when asked by the prosecutor whether he could set aside

anything in the past and be fair to both parties in this matter, the juror answered, “I think so.” Id.

                                                - 11 -
The Court stated its duty was “to defer to the trial judge” to interpret the juror’s answer based on

the emphasis he placed on the words as he answered. Id. “On appeal, we must presume he

emphasized ‘so.’” Id.

        Here, Juror 10 expressed some uncertainty about how his experiences in the criminal

justice system might affect his impartiality as a juror, but he did not indicate that he had fixed

opinions or biases that he would not lay aside. Fultz argues, and the dissent concludes, that Juror

10’s statement that he may be “a little more judgmental” meant that he would hold bias against

Fultz. Juror 10’s full statement was that he “might tend to be a little more judgmental . . . far as

[sic] . . . whether the kid’s guilty or innocent, and it might affect the . . . case here. I’m not sure.”

This statement on its face does not show bias against Fultz, but rather indicates Juror 10 planned

to judge whether Fultz was guilty or innocent. Furthermore, Juror 10 offered in his own words

that his role as a juror would be to seek the truth. The circuit court observed Juror 10’s

demeanor as he answered questions. This Court gives deference to the circuit court’s decision

regarding whether to strike a potential juror for cause. When viewed in the light most favorable

to the Commonwealth, Juror 10’s entire voir dire supports the circuit court’s conclusion that

Juror 10 did not express fixed bias either towards or against either party and that he could be

fair.4 On this record, the circuit court did not commit manifest error in refusing to strike Juror 10

for cause.

        4
          Fultz argues that Juror 10 demonstrated bias against him and was not properly
rehabilitated. He cites the principle that where a juror has declared a bias in favor of a party, the
evidence used to rehabilitate the juror must come from the juror; a juror’s mere assent to leading
questions will not suffice to rehabilitate the juror. David v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 77, 81
(1997). Because we find that Juror 10 did not declare a bias in favor of a party, we do not need
to address whether he was sufficiently rehabilitated.
                                                 - 12 -
                                   II. Sufficiency of the Evidence

        “When considering on appeal the sufficiency of the evidence presented below, we

‘presume the judgment of the trial court to be correct’ and reverse only if the trial court’s

decision is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Kelly v. Commonwealth, 41

Va. App. 250, 257 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 96, 99

(2002)). “Thus, we do not ‘substitute our judgment for that of the trier of fact.’” Id. (quoting

Wactor v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 375, 380 (2002)). “Instead, the relevant question is

whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.

(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). “This familiar standard gives full play

to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the

evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Id. at 257-58

(quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).

                                       A. First-Degree Murder

        Fultz argues that the evidence in his case was insufficient to prove premeditation.

Premeditated murder “contemplates: (1) a killing; (2) a reasoning process antecedent to the act of

killing, resulting in the formation of a specific intent to kill; and (3) the performance of that act

with malicious intent.” Rhodes v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 480, 486 (1989). “Premeditation and

formation of an intent to kill seldom can be proved by direct evidence. A combination of

circumstantial factors may be sufficient.” Id. “The intent to kill must come into existence at

some time before the killing; it need not exist for any particular length of time.” Epperly v.

Commonwealth, 224 Va. 214, 231 (1982) (quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 696, 700

(1980)). “A design to kill may be formed only a moment before the fatal act is committed,

provided the accused had time to think and did intend to kill.” Id. (quoting Giarratano v.

                                                 - 13 -
Commonwealth, 220 Va. 1064, 1074 (1980)). “[W]e will affirm a conviction of premeditated

murder . . . whenever we can say that the reasonable import of such evidence, considered as a

whole, is sufficient to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the criminal agent

and that he acted with a premediated intent to kill.” Rhodes, 238 Va. at 487.

       Fultz took a kitchen knife from Graham’s house with him when he entered the cab. It is a

fair inference that he took the knife to the cab with an intent to use it as a weapon—it would be

an unusual item to carry along otherwise. It is also a fair inference that Fultz was planning to

protect his clothes from a bloody mess when he asked Graham for some sweatpants he could put

on over his jeans before he went to the cab. Moreover, the six stab wounds inflicted on Wendy,

some seven inches deep, indicated a specific intent to kill. “[I]t is permissible for the fact finder

to infer that every person intends the natural, probable consequences of his or her actions.”

Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204, 229 (2018) (quoting Commonwealth v. Perkins, 295 Va.

323, 330 (2018)). The natural and probable consequences of Fultz’s actions—repeatedly and

severely stabbing Wendy in her head, on the front and back of her torso, and towards her spinal

column—was that Wendy would die. Based on the evidence, it was entirely rational for the jury

to find that Fultz had premeditated intent to kill Wendy. Thus, the circuit court did not err in

denying Fultz’s motion to strike the first-degree murder charge.

                                            B. Robbery

       Fultz argues that the evidence was insufficient to prove “the necessary temporal

correlation between the elements of the crime.” He asserts there is “no evidence that the taking

of the money, and/or the leather folder and car manual, was contemplated at or before the time of

the murder.”

       “The common-law crime of robbery is defined as the taking of the personal property of

another, with the intent to steal, from his person or in his presence, and against his will, by

                                                - 14 -
violence or intimidation.” Patterson v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 653, 664 (1981). “The

violence, in order to constitute an element of robbery, must precede or be concomitant with the

appropriation of the property from the person or presence of the owner.” Id.

       The evidence adduced at trial showed that on the day of Wendy’s murder, Fultz told a

friend on Facebook that he was in trouble and did not have any money. The circumstantial

evidence supports a finding that Wendy had cash in the van—she was driving a cab that only

collected cash for payment, she had driven other customers during that shift, and the company

practice was to settle money between the cab driver and boss at the end of the shift. Yet, no

money was found on Wendy or in the van. The jury could reasonably infer that Fultz, who

entered the van with a kitchen knife, had prepared to kill the cab driver to take any money he

could find in her presence. The evidence supports a finding that Fultz killed Wendy and

concomitantly took the cash she had collected in fares that evening. Therefore, the circuit court

did not err in denying Fultz’s motion to strike the robbery charge.

       For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

                                                                                         Affirmed.

                                               - 15 -
Chaney, J., dissenting.

        The jury that convicted appellant, James Edward Fultz, IV (defendant), was selected from a

venire that included a prospective juror (Juror 10) who was not free from partiality and prejudice

beyond a reasonable doubt, in violation of defendant’s constitutional right to a fair and impartial

jury. See U.S. Const. amend. VI; Va. Const. art. I, § 8.5 “[I]t is prejudicial error . . . to force a

defendant to use the peremptory strike . . . to exclude a venireman who is not free from exception.”

Brown v. Commonwealth, 29 Va. App. 199, 203 (1999) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 1

Va. App. 447, 451 (1986)). Because it was manifest error for the trial court to deny defendant’s

motion to strike Juror 10 for cause, I would reverse the convictions and remand to the trial court for

further proceedings. Therefore, I dissent from the majority’s opinion affirming defendant’s

convictions.

        “[A]ll doubts about the fitness of a juror to serve must be resolved in favor of the

accused . . . .” Id. at 208. Juror 10 raised reasonable doubts about his fitness as a juror when he

repeatedly expressed uncertainty about whether his experience in law enforcement—25 years

ongoing employment at an incarceration facility for juveniles—would affect his ability to be a fair

and impartial juror. When asked in voir dire whether his law enforcement experience would affect

his ability to be fair and impartial in defendant’s trial, Juror 10 initially answered, “Not really, I

don’t think so.” After observing, “You kind of waved your head there,” defendant’s counsel

inquired of Juror 10, “Are you uncertain?” Juror 10 responded, “I’m uncertain but it shouldn’t, no.”

        Juror 10’s additional responses during voir dire did not dispel the doubts raised about his

fitness to serve as a juror in defendant’s trial. After defendant moved to strike Juror 10 for cause,

Juror 10 was again asked whether his career working at an incarceration facility “may affect [his]

        5
          The constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury under the United States Constitution
and Virginia Constitution is reinforced by Code § 8.01-357 (“a [jury] panel free from exceptions
shall be obtained”), Code § 8.01-358, and Rule 3A:14(b).
                                                  - 16 -
ability to be fair and impartial in this jury today?” Juror 10 answered, “I’m still uncertain right now.

I don’t, you know, I don’t want—to say yes or no for sure.” (Emphasis added). In response to the

trial court’s subsequent questions, Juror 10 acknowledged that a juror’s role in evaluating the

evidence was “to seek the truth,” “to weigh the testimony that they hear,” and “decide . . . whether

the Commonwealth has proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt.” Then the trial court asked

Juror 10 how he would be affected in performing the role of juror given his “background

information in terms of experience . . . about the criminal justice system . . . .” Juror 10 answered:

                From my experience, you know, in dealing with juveniles, those
                cases and everything, I might tend to be a little more judgmental on,
                on that part far as you know, whether the kid’s guilty or innocent,
                and it might affect the, the case here. I’m not sure.

(Emphasis added). After Juror 10 admitted that the trial might be affected by his possible tendency

to be more judgmental about whether an incarcerated juvenile is guilty or innocent, the

Commonwealth’s attorney attempted to rehabilitate Juror 10 by asking the following leading

question:

                [C]an you set aside, I mean, whatever contact you may have had with
                juveniles, set aside their story, set aside their case, and set aside
                whatever you may know in reference to the system and just base
                your verdict on the evidence and the law you hear today?

Juror 10 answered, “I could, yes.” But such “mere assent to leading questions” is insufficient to

rehabilitate a prospective juror whose “responses during voir dire created a reasonable doubt as to

[his] qualification to serve as a fair and impartial juror.” DeLeon v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App.

409, 413 (2002). “The evidence used to show the requisite qualifications must emanate from the

juror [him]self, unsuggested by leading questions posed to [him].” Id. (quoting David v.

Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 77, 81 (1997)). As the trial court acknowledged on the record, “the

case law is replete with . . . a juror who answers in response to a leading question and says yes, that

doesn’t necessarily make the grade.”

                                                 - 17 -
        Considering the entire voir dire, Juror 10’s responses during voir dire failed to establish

beyond a reasonable doubt that he could serve as a fair and impartial juror in defendant’s case.

Juror 10 repeatedly stated that he was “uncertain” or “not sure” whether his law enforcement

experience would affect his ability to be a fair and impartial juror. In contrast, Juror 10 definitively

responded that he would not be affected at all by his expectation of post-trial interactions with the

parties’ attorneys. Juror 10 also admitted that his possible tendency to be judgmental about the

incarcerated juveniles at his workplace might affect defendant’s case. As the trial court

acknowledged, Juror 10’s last answer in voir dire—affirming that he could set aside his work

experience and knowledge of the criminal justice system and base his verdict on the evidence and

the law—was mere assent to the Commonwealth’s leading question. Considering all of Juror 10’s

responses in voir dire, Juror 10’s own lack of certainty and confidence in his ability to be a fair and

impartial juror raised a reasonable doubt about whether he could be free from partiality and

prejudice in determining whether the Commonwealth proved all the elements of the charged

offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.

        The trial court erred in finding no grounds to strike Juror 10 for cause, notwithstanding the

court’s finding that Juror 10 was unsure whether his law enforcement experience affected his ability

to be a fair and impartial juror in defendant’s case. The trial court ruled “not being sure about being

able to set aside [his law enforcement experience], I don’t think is grounds to be struck for cause. If

you say I can’t be fair, that’s grounds for cause.” However, contrary to the trial court’s ruling, Juror

10’s uncertainty about his ability to be fair was cause to exclude him from the jury because it raised

reasonable doubt about his qualification to serve as a fair and impartial juror. See Brown, 29

Va. App. at 208 (holding that a prospective juror’s own “reservations about her ability to serve

impartially on the jury in light of her personal experiences . . . created reasonable doubt about her

fitness as a juror”). Such “reasonable doubt regarding the prospective juror’s ability to give the

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accused a fair and impartial trial must be resolved in favor of the accused.” Id. at 203 (quoting

Gosling v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 642, 645 (1989)). Therefore, it was manifest error for the

trial court to deny defendant’s motion to strike Juror 10 for cause. See DeLeon, 38 Va. App. at 413

(“hold[ing] that the trial court’s refusal to grant appellant’s motion to strike [a prospective juror] for

cause constituted manifest error” where her “responses during voir dire created a reasonable doubt

as to her qualification to serve as a fair and impartial juror”). Because such error is not harmless,

defendant’s convictions should be reversed. See id.

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