Court Opinion

ID: 9857145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 13:51:50.101401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:03.987629
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, J.
I dissent. In essence the majority hold that " [r]egardless of whether Lyl’s order for Portland not to leave the studio was communicated to her or her authorized agent prior to the time she left, Portland’s act in leaving would not constitute grounds for [Lyl’s] terminating the contract" because "the trial court determined upon an abundance of evidence, that the order . . . was unreasonable under the circumstances." One reads in vain the trial court’s conclusion of law set forth verbatim by the majority immediately before such holding, in order to discover those words which, according to the majority express the determination of the court that "the order was unreasonable under the circumstances." Rather it appears that the court found1 that Productions, by their decision to replace Portland Mason during the lunch hour . . . acted unreasonably in not allowing Portland to go home during the lunch hour . . . without suffering the penalty of being replaced in the series and having her contract unilaterally terminated." (Italics added.) The only finding related to Mr. London’s order is that one which states that neither Portland nor her mother was directly informed *86prior to Portland's leaving2 that she would be replaced if she left the studio premises. Even assuming arguendo that the conclusion of law relied upon by the majority can be interpreted as a finding as to the unreasonableness of Mr. London's order, nevertheless, as will appear infra, such a finding is not determinative of the ease.
The majority’s position is basically untenable and without any support in the record because it completely ignores the material issues on which the ease was tried and appealed and attempts to dispose of the appeal on a question which is irrelevant and moot. I advert briefly to the real issues in the case. An examination of the pretrial conference order, as read in connection with the pretrial statements incorporated therein by reference, and of the balance of the record, clearly demonstrates that the only issue in the trial court was whether or not Portland breached her contract by leaving the studio and by not being present at afternoon rehearsals or whether Lyl breached the contract by wrongfully discharging her.3 The trial court made no findings on these issues.
On appeal defendant Lyl contends: (1) that there are no findings on the material issue of breach of contract and that the uncontradicted evidence and the findings of fact show that Portland committed two actual breaches of contract: (a) by disobeying London’s order not to leave the studio and (b) by failing to be present for the commencement of the afternoon rehearsals; and (2) if arguendo Portland did not commit an actual breach, the judgment must be reversed because it cannot be ascertained from the findings whether or not Portland committed an anticipatory breach. Nowhere in their opinion do the majority set forth, or discuss, let alone resolve, *87these crucial issues on appeal, which notably reflect the issues on which the case was tried.
Lyl’s contention that Portland breached the contract by disobeying London’s order not to leave the studio during the lunch hour must be rejected. London did not give this order to Portland personally or to any agent of hers authorized to receive it. As the uncontradicted evidence shows, and as the trial court found, this order was communicated to Portland’s maid, Miss Gower, out of Portland’s presence.4 But the record is devoid of any evidence showing, or from which it can be reasonably inferred, that Miss Gower was Portland’s agent in these matters or that she was at any time acting in the course and scope of any such agency. We do not have before us a case falling within the rule that the “ knowledge of . . . an agent acting within the scope of his authority, is knowledge of his principal.” (Vanciel v. Kumle (1945) 26 Cal.2d 732, 734 [160 P.2d 802]; see Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth (1948) 87 Cal.App.2d 620, 630 [197 P.2d 580].) Accordingly, neither Portland nor her mother had actual or constructive knowledge that Portland should not leave the studio. Indeed, such was the trial court’s finding. (See fn. 2 ante.) It necessarily follows that Portland could not have breached her contract by disobeying an order of which she had no knowledge.
I now turn to Lyl’s contention that Portland breached the contract by failing to be present at the commencement of the afternoon rehearsals. It is beyond dispute that under the terms of her employment contract5 Portland was required to *88be on time for all rehearsals. Furthermore as an employee of Lyl she had a duty implied in law to comply substantially with all reasonable orders of Lyl (Lab. Code, § 2856; May v. New York Motion Picture Corp. (1920) 45 Cal.App. 396, 402-403 [187 P. 785]; 3A Corbin on Contracts (1960) §§ 677, 679; 9 Williston on Contracts (3d ed. 1967) §§ 1013B, 1013C). It is equally beyond dispute that Portland intentionally failed to be present when the afternoon rehearsals began;6 nor did she at any subsequent time appear or offer to appear. A wilful disobedience of a reasonable order is a violation of a duty which justifies discharge of the employee.7 (Story v. San Rafael Military Academy (1960) 179 Cal.App.2d 416, 417-418 [3 Cal.Rptr. 847]; May v. New York Motion Picture Corp., supra, 45 Cal.App. 396, 403-404; Bank of America v. Republic Productions, Inc. (1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 651, 654 [112 P.2d 972]; Goudal v. C. B. DeMille Pictures Corp. (1931) 118 Cal.App. 407, 411-414 [5 P.2d 432, 7 P.2d 174], Supreme Court approval withheld; 32 Cal.Jur.2d, Master and Servant, § § 23, 58; Lab. Code, §§2856, 2924.) Consequently Lyl was justified in discharging Portland for her wilful disobedience of the reasonable order to be present at the commencement of afternoon rehearsals.8
To avoid this result, however, Portland argues that before the afternoon rehearsals were scheduled to commence her employment contract already had been broken by Lyl when it *89discharged her during the lunch hour. However, the law is well settled that “A discharge cannot be effected by a secret, undisclosed intention on the part of the master. It must be done by some word or act communicated to the servant. ‘No set form of words is necessary; but any words or acts which show a clear intention on the part of the master to dispense with the servant’s services, and which are equivalent to a declaration to the servant that his services will be no longer accepted are sufficient.’ (26 Cyc. 987.)” (Percival v. National Drama Corp. (1919) 181 Cal. 631, 637 [185 P. 972]; Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Bumgarner (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 331, 353 [17 Cal.Rptr. 171]; Stroman v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co. (1958) 161 Cal.App.2d 151, 161 [326 P.2d 155]; Canavan v. College of Osteopathic Physicians & Surgeons (1946) 73 Cal.App.2d 511, 521 [166 P.2d 878]; 32 Cal.Jur.2d, Master and Servant, §55.) Consequently any unilateral decision to replace Portland made by Lyl during the lunch hour but not communicated to Portland could not as a matter of law have constituted a discharge.
As previously explained, Portland’s discharge was not effectuated by London’s statements to Miss Gower, the maid, who was not Portland’s agent. (Vanciel v. Kumle, supra, 26 Cal.2d 732, 734; Columbia Pictures Corp. v. DeToth, supra, 87 Cal.App.2d 620, 630.) Any contention that London’s efforts to obtain a replacement for Portland constituted a discharge also must be rejected. As noted in the majority opinion Celia Kay was not employed until after 4 p.m. on the day in question. Moreover, by the terms of Portland’s employment agreement Lyl was not contractually obligated to actually use Portland’s services.9 Finally, as we have explained, a discharge could not have been effective until Portland had notice of it. The plain answer to Portland’s argument is that she was not discharged during the lunch hour.
*90According to the trial court’s findings “somewhere between 2:00 p.m. and 2:30 p.m., Robert Shapiro, one of the William Morris agents, arrived on the set and was informed by Mr. London that Portland had been replaced in the series.” Portland now states in her brief: “Her duly appointed agent was Robert Shapiro of the William Morris Agency who was contacted by Mr. London of Productions and any message necessary to be imputed to Portland would have had to have been made through Mr. Shapiro.” Therefore, the record before us requires the conclusion that as a matter of law Portland was discharged only when Robert Shapiro, a person authorized to represent her, was so informed by Mr. London. (Vanciel v. Kumle, supra, 26 Cal.2d 732, 734; Percival v. National Drama Corp., supra, 181 Cal. 631, 637, and cases cited therewith ante.)
I would reverse the judgment as to those portions thereof appealed from.
Traynor, C. J., concurred.

The trial court found that "Prior to her departure, no one directly informed her, Portland, or Pamela that if Portland left the studio premises that she would be replaced." It further concluded that "Productions, by notifying only Lahoma Gower, a domestic servant of the Masons, that it was terminating said agreement, failed to notify the proper party to the contract, Portland Mason."

Portland’s contention as set forth in her pretrial statement was essentially "that she was wrongfully discharged from employment and that defendant thereby and otherwise breached its agreement with plaintiff." Lyl’s contention as set forth in its pretrial statement was essenially that "Plaintiff materially breached her employment contract . . . by leaving the studio . . . and not being present when afternoon rehearsals commenced at or about 2 P.M....." As the conclusions of law state, and the majority opinion notes, the parties stipulated in open court that neither Portland nor Lyl committed a breach concerning the furnishing or nonfumishing of wardrobe; this was withdrawn as an issue at trial.

Finding of fact No. IT states; “On Tuesday, July 24, 1962, sometime between 12:30 p.m. and 1:10 p.m., London informed Lahoma Gower again out of Portland’s presence, that if Portland were taken from the studio premises that she would be replaced in the show. Lahoma Gower replied to Mr. London that Mrs. Mason had instructed her to bring Portland home, that she would have to obey said instruction, whereupon, Mr. London requested that Lahoma Gower not inform Portland that she would be replaced, but that she, Lahoma Gower, should let Pamela Mason inform her daughter, Portland, of the anticipated replacement. ’ ’

Portland contracted “to promptly and faithfully comply with all directions, requests, rules and regulations made or issued by [Lyl]. ’ ’ Her contract provides that her “failure, refusal or neglect, otherwise than by reason of [illness or mental or physical disability, governmental decree or order, or any other cause other than her own wilful act] to report or to render services to the full limit of your ability, as, when and wherever required hereunder, is sometimes herein referred to as ‘default’ ’’ (original italics) and that Lyl “shall . . . have the right to terminate this agreement . . . if . . . [b]. An event of default shall occur. . . .” (Original italics.) '

It should be noted that the trial court made no finding as to when the afternoon rehearsal was scheduled to begin. Mr. London testified that the lunch break was called at 12:15 p.m. and the afternoon rehearsals were scheduled for 1:15 p.m., but the production report showed the break as having commenced at 12:30 and that afternoon rehearsals were called for 1:30 p.m. For the trial court’s pertinent findings see fn. 4 ante.

‘‘A ‘wilful’ disobedience is an intentional disobedience. It does not necessarily imply any evil intent on the part of the servant or malice toward his master. ... It amounts to nothing more than this: That the person knows what he is doing, intends to do what he is doing, and is a free agent. [Citations.]” (May v. New York Motion Picture Corp., supra, 45 Cal.App. 396, 404.)

The termination would be justified on this basis even if another ground for Portland’s dismissal had been given. ‘‘It is not necessary that an employer, in order to justify a dismissal, show that in dismissing his employee he in fact acted upon some proper ground, of dismissal. It is sufficient if a ground of dismissal existed at that time! ... Nor is it material that the employer assigned another ground as the cause of the employee’s dismissal.” (35 Am.Jur., Master and Servant, § 37, p. 471; see Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Lardner (9th Cir. 1954) 216 F.2d 844 [51 A.L.R.2d 728], cert. den. 348 U.S. 944 [99.L.Ed. 739, 75 S.Ct. 365], reh. den. 348 U.S. 965 [99 L.Ed. 753, 75 S.Ct. 522]; Corbin on Contracts, op.cit. supra, § 762, pp. 526-527; 12 Cal.Jur.2d, Contracts, § 200, p. 418; see also Earl v. Saks & Co. (1951) 36 Cal.2d 602, 609 [226 P.2d 340] (rescission).)

Paragraph 26 of Portland’s employment contract provides: “No Obligation to Use Services: Ton [Portland] agree that we shall have no obligation to actually use your services or any of the results and proceeds thereof, or to produce, release, distribute or exploit the program or any pictures thereof, or to continue such distribution or exploitation if commenced, and you release us from any liability for loss or damage suffered by you by reason of our failure to do any of the foregoing. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall relieve us of our obligation to pay to you the minimum compensation herein provided with respect to any pictures for which we are or become committed to you hereunder, unless our obligation in connection therewith is cancelled pursuant to any of the provisions of this agreement. You agree that, subject to the provisions of this paragraph, we may employ any other person or persons to portray the role to be portrayed by you hereunder, ’ ’