Court Opinion

ID: 9565172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:16:17.453765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:26.545388
License: Public Domain

HALL, Chief Justice
(dissenting):
I do not join the opinion of the Court because I remain unpersuaded of the existence of prejudicial error.
The majority concedes that the jury may well have concluded that Evan’s act of negligence in discarding his life jacket was a proximate cause of his death and, if so, the admission of evidence of his alcohol consumption would not constitute prejudicial error. Nevertheless, the Court overturns the jury verdict using a nebulous process of rationalization which overlooks the fact that there is a considerable amount of additional evidence of negligence on the part of Evan that amply supports the verdict of the jury.
The record reflects that Evan had slept very little during the thirty-six hours before his death; that he over-exerted himself by water skiing beyond reason; that he refused to stop skiing when requested to do so, notwithstanding the windy conditions; that he discarded one life preserver; that he failed to utilize the replacement life preserver; and that he left Kevin Wistisen behind during their effort to swim ashore. This evidence also supports the jury verdict on both the negligence and causation issues, all without the necessity of any reliance upon the alcohol consumption evidence.
Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of alcohol consumption, it was harmless error. In order to justify reversal, substantial and prejudicial error must be shown that would *496give rise to a reasonable likelihood that in the absence of error, the result would have been different.1 The facts of this case belie such a showing.
I also take a contrary view than does the Court in regard to the contention that the trial judge erred in refusing to give the jury an instruction on the vicarious liability of the owners of the boat.2
The majority expresses anxiety as to whether the jury understood that the defendant owners of the boat were liable for any negligence of Kevin Wistisen in his operation of the boat. However, a review of the record reveals that at the time counsel was taking exceptions to the court’s instructions to the jury, the court expressed its view that the substance of the verdict form had the effect of advising the jury, as a matter of law, of the vicarious liability of the owners of the boat. Although counsel for plaintiff took exception to the ruling, the record further reflects that in the presentation of his closing argument to the jury, counsel in fact accepted the court’s interpretation of the effect of the jury verdict. Counsel specifically advised the jury that “[i]f you entrust a boat, a motorboat, to a person under the age of eighteen years that the negligence, if any, of the operation of the boat is chargeable to the owner of the boat.... The court has instructed you as a matter of law that is the case.” It is therefore abundantly clear that the case was presented to the jury on plaintiff’s theory of the case.
The jury having found both defendants to have been negligent, and ample basis being in the record to support the jury verdict on the theory of vicarious liability, it is clear that the court did not err in its instructions to the jury.
I would affirm the jury verdict.
ZIMMERMAN, J., does not participate herein.

. Utah R.Civ.P. 61; Ortega v. Thomas, 14 Utah 2d 296, 300, 383 P.2d 406, 408 (1963).

. Vicarious liability was premised on the fact that the boat was entrusted to one under eighteen years of age.