Court Opinion

ID: 9480794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:58:31.177564+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:54.569897
License: Public Domain

BRIGHT, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that the Federal Magistrates Act empowers magistrates to enter judgment in habeas cases with the consent of the parties. Unlike the majority, however, I would reach the issue of whether Orsini validly consented to the magistrate’s jurisdiction. Having reached the issue, I would hold that Orsini’s signature on the consent form, without more, did not constitute valid consent. Accordingly, I would remand to the district court and direct the court to consider Orsini’s claims more fully on remand.
I.
While as a general rule this court will not consider issues not raised prior to appeal, we need not and should not adhere to the rule in this case. In Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 121, 96 S.Ct. 2868, 2877, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976), the Supreme Court stated:
The matter of what questions may be taken up and resolved for the first time on appeal is one left primarily to the discretion of the courts of appeals, to be exercised on the facts of individual cases. We announce no general rule. Certainly there are circumstances in which a federal appellate court is justified in resolving an issue not passed on below....
See also Pfoutz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 527, 530 n. 3 (8th Cir.1988).
The circumstances of this case justify consideration of Orsini’s argument that her *484consent to the magistrate’s jurisdiction was invalid. Orsini filed this habeas petition pro se along with a request to proceed in forma pauperis. Shortly thereafter, the clerk’s office referred the petition to a magistrate. The magistrate’s docket coordinator then sent a letter to Orsini giving notice of the magistrate’s consent jurisdiction and enclosing Consent Form A. Orsini signed the consent form without consulting a lawyer and returned it to the clerk’s office. The magistrate denied the petition and entered judgment against Orsini. Or-sini appealed directly to this court.
This court granted Orsini’s motion to represent herself on appeal, but appointed counsel to file an amicus brief. Neither Orsini nor amicus counsel raised the issue of the lack of consent. After oral argument, this court sua sponte raised the issue of the magistrate’s jurisdiction and appointed new counsel to brief the issue. This second appointed counsel raised the validity of the consent for the first time.
Present counsel for Orsini concedes that, in general, the magistrate has jurisdiction to enter final judgment in a habeas case, but asserts that due process requires more than just Orsini’s uncounselled execution of a consent form to constitute valid waiver of the right to proceed before the district court. The majority rules that Orsini waived any defects in the consent by failing to raise the issue earlier.
But Orsini had no real opportunity to raise the issue earlier. She did not have legal counsel, except for amicus counsel,1 until this court appointed counsel to brief the issue of the magistrate’s jurisdiction. Moreover, neither the district court, the magistrate nor defense counsel bothered to ascertain whether she understood that she had a right to proceed before the district court.
Until the second appointed counsel raised the issue, Orsini did not know that she had waived her right and therefore could not assert this claim. Thus, on the unusual facts of this case, the general rule about issues not raised below automatically transforms Orsini’s lack of valid consent into waiver of her right to an appeal on the issue.
The question presented is an important one in federal law which will likely arise again with other habeas petitioners. Therefore, notwithstanding the general rule, I would reach the validity of Orsini’s consent.
Having reached the issue, I would rule that consent to the magistrate’s jurisdiction requires more than the unexplained signature of an uncounselled habeas petitioner. Constitutional considerations and the statute itself compel this result.
The statute provides:
(c) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary—
(2) If a magistrate is designated to exercise civil jurisdiction under paragraph (1) of this subsection, the clerk of court shall, at the time the action is filed, notify the parties of their right to consent to the exercise of such jurisdiction. The decision of the parties shall be communicated to the clerk of court. Thereafter, neither the district judge nor the magistrate shall attempt to persuade or induce any party to consent to reference of any civil matter to a magistrate. Rules of court for the reference of civil matters to magistrates shall include procedures to protect the voluntariness of the parties’ consent.
28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(2) (1988) (emphasis added).
The statutory language “procedures to protect the voluntariness of the parties’ *485consent” suggests something more than written or oral assent to the magistrate’s jurisdiction. Moreover, this statutory command should be applied most rigidly when the litigant is a habeas petitioner, because the personal liberty of the petitioner is at stake.2
18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1988), which governs the magistrate’s consent jurisdiction over minor crimes, provides an appropriate model of the type of procedure that should be followed to obtain a habeas petitioner’s consent to proceed before a magistrate. Section 3401(b) states:
The magistrate shall carefully explain to the defendant that he has a right to trial, judgment, and sentencing by a judge of the district court and that he may have a right to trial by jury before a district judge or magistrate. The magistrate shall not proceed to try the case unless the defendant, after such explanation, files a written consent to be tried before the magistrate that specifically waives trial, judgment, and sentencing by a judge of the district court.
A similar formulation for habeas petitioners would accord well with the purposes of the statute and eliminate constitutional concerns about involuntary waiver of rights.
Article III “serves both to protect ‘the role of the independent judiciary within the constitutional scheme of tripartite government,’ and to safeguard litigants’ ‘right to have claims decided before judges who are free from potential domination by other branches of government.’ ” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 848, 106 S.Ct. 3245, 3255, 92 L.Ed.2d 675 (1986) (citations omitted). Individual litigants thus have a right to Article III adjudication of lawsuits. Id. See also Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of America v. Instromedix, 725 F.2d 537, 541 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 824, 105 S.Ct. 100, 83 L.Ed.2d 45 (1984).
While the right to appear before an Article III judge may be waived, Schor, 478 U.S. at 848-49, 106 S.Ct. at 3255-56, the waiver of any constitutional right must be voluntary, knowing and intelligent, Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 749, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 1469, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970). The last sentence of section 636(c)(2) calls for procedures designed to implement this constitutional command.
The language of the statute and constitutional considerations thus mandate procedures designed to insure the voluntariness of consent to the magistrate’s jurisdiction. No such procedures are provided for in the local rules of court for the Eastern District of Arkansas3 and none were followed in this case.
Accordingly, I conclude that the magistrate did not have jurisdiction to enter final judgment. I would remand to the district court with directions to treat the magistrate’s opinion as a recommended disposition.
II.
It is apparent from reading the magistrate’s opinion and the record in this case that Orsini’s trial in the state court was anything but a model of fairness.
*486As noted by the majority, shortly before the trial either the prosecution or the defense deliberately leaked to the press Yankee Hall’s statement implicating Orsini in the murder. This statement combined with extensive publicity about the unsolved murder of Orsini’s husband (Orsini was the number one suspect)4 and contributed to a flood of publicity making it extremely difficult for Orsini to obtain a fair trial in Pulaski County. Indeed, the magistrate characterized the events leading to Orsini’s conviction as “more highly publicized than any other criminal trial in recent Arkansas history.” Memorandum Opinion at 38. Nevertheless, the trial court denied Orsini’s motions for a change of venue and for a continuance.
With respect to Orsini’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim, Orsini’s trial attorney admitted under oath that he had not interviewed any of the prosecution’s witnesses. Memorandum Opinion at 54. This admission lends powerful support to Orsi-ni’s numerous other allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.
The most serious of Orsini’s claims concern the prosecution’s actions in withholding numerous highly relevant pieces of evidence from the defense. As the majority notes, among other things, the prosecution withheld the statement of its principal witness, Yankee Hall, that he barely knew Orsini and that she had nothing to do with the murder. At trial, Hall testified directly to the contrary. The magistrate determined that the prosecution’s deliberate withholding of this statement did not prejudice Orsini.
Orsini asserts that the prosecution withheld details of a deal Sheriff Tommy Robinson struck with Yankee Hall. According to Orsini, Hall agreed to recant his original story and implicate Orsini. Again, the magistrate ruled that the prosecution’s withholding of this evidence did not prejudice Orsini.
These are just some of the incidents and allegations strongly supporting Orsini’s claims that the prosecutor and the sheriff deprived her of a fair trial. Orsini presented the merits of her petition to the magistrate and to this court without the assistance of counsel.5 Given these circumstances and the deliberate nature of the prosecutor’s and sheriff’s actions, I would direct the district court to consider the substance of Orsini’s claims more fully on remand and to open the record for additional evidence.
In particular, I would direct the district court to examine the facts surrounding the deliberate acts of withholding evidence and leaking information to the press on the part of the prosecution and Sheriff Tommy Robinson. In addition, I would permit the petitioner the opportunity to call Sheriff Robinson to the stand to testify about his knowledge of the deal struck with Hall and other alleged unlawful acts on his part. I recognize that he no longer holds the position of Sheriff and that he now serves as a Congressman from Arkansas. Nevertheless, Orsini’s liberty hangs in the balance and Sheriff Robinson’s conduct is highly relevant to the issues presented.
I dissent.

. Orsini should not be bound by the failure of amicus counsel to raise the lack of consent issue. Counsel apparently did little independent research. Indeed, the brief consists almost entirely of passages taken verbatim from the magistrate's memorandum opinion. Moreover, counsel adopted Orsini's statement of issues presented for review. Amicus Brief at 6. In light of counsel’s reliance on the memorandum opinion and Orsini’s statement of the issues, it is not surprising that counsel failed to raise an issue not presented before the magistrate. The brief of amicus counsel should not deprive Orsi-ni of her right to an appeal on the issue of lack of consent.

. I express no opinion about the procedures required under section 636(c)(2) for litigants other than habeas corpus petitioners.

. Section X of local rule 23 of the Eastern District of Arkansas provides:
CIVIL CONSENT JURISDICTION
A. Special Designation
The full-time Magistrates of both districts are specially designated by the District Court to conduct any or all proceedings in jury or non-jury civil matters upon the consent of the parties.
B. Reference
1. Notice. The Clerk shall give the plaintiff notice of the Magistrate's consent jurisdiction, in a form approved by the Court, when a civil suit is filed. The Clerk shall also attach the same notice to the summons for service on the defendant.
2. Consent. Any party may obtain a "Consent to Magistrate’s Jurisdiction” form from the Clerk's office.
Unless specifically requested by the party seeking the Consent form, the Clerk shall furnish the party with Consent Form A, which shall provide that any appeal in thé case shall be taken directly to the Circuit Court of Appeals. The Clerk will also have available Consent Form B, which shall provide for any appeal in the case to be taken to the District Court.

. Following Orsini’s conviction for the murder of Alice McArthur, the state tried and convicted her of the murder of her own husband. Memorandum Opinion at 36. The Arkansas Supreme Court subsequently overturned that conviction. Orsini v. State, 286 Ark. 283, 691 S.W.2d 175 (1985).

. As noted earlier, the brief of amicus counsel added nothing to Orsini's presentation of the issues and the second appointed counsel addressed only the issue of the magistrate’s jurisdiction.