Court Opinion

ID: 9750721
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 15:27:11.590669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:07:38.244631
License: Public Domain

SPAETH, Judge,
dissenting:
This is an appeal from the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant challenges the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 19 P.S. § 1431, as denying due process and equal protection. The majority upholds the statute against these challenges; I should reverse on the basis of a denial of equal protection, without reaching the due process issue.
On September 17,1972, appellant was arrested in Philadelphia on a fugitive warrant based on a weapons offense in New Jersey. After 90 days he was discharged because New Jersey failed to procure a governor’s warrant as required by the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Act of July 8, 1941, P.L. 288, § 1, 19 P.S. § 191.1 et seq. In late 1973, appellant was rearrested on the same fugitive warrant but again was discharged after 90 days because no governor’s warrant was lodged. In May of 1976, however, appellant was sentenced to prison in Pennsylvania on a Pennsylvania conviction. New Jersey then again sought custody of appellant, this time under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, supra. Appellant petitioned the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas for a writ of habeas corpus. The denial of this petition is now before us.
The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, supra, and the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, supra, are both statutes under which another state may seek custody of someone in *289this Commonwealth in order to bring him to trial in the other state.1 Beyond that, the two statutes have few similarities.
First, the scope of the two statutes is different. The Detainers Act applies only to persons imprisoned in a party state. See 19 P.S. § 1431, art. I.2 The Extradition Act, however, applies to all persons “found” in the Commonwealth. 19 P.S. § 191.2.3 While the Act does not specifically say that it applies both to persons found at large and in a Pennsylvania prison, its application to prisoners may be inferred from 19 P.S. § 191.5,4 which allows the Common*290wealth to seek custody of prisoners in other states; the Act being a Uniform Act, and therefore reciprocal among those states that have enacted it, other states may seek custody of Pennsylvania prisoners under the Act as well. In addition, it may be noted that the Act has been applied to prisoners. See, e. g., Commonwealth ex rel. Knowles v. Lester, 456 Pa. 423, 321 A.2d 637 (1974); Commonwealth ex rel. Myers v. Case, 259 Pa.Super. 196, 393 A.2d 785 (1977).
Second, the two statutes provide different remedies to the person whose custody is being sought. Under the Extradition Act, the demanding state must fulfill the requirements for a governor’s warrant, 19 P.S. § 191.3,5 and then the person arrested on the warrant must be taken before a court:
No person arrested upon such warrant shall be delivered over to the agent whom the executive authority demanding him shall have appointed to receive him unless he shall first be taken forthwith before a judge of a court of record in this State who shall inform him of the demand made for his surrender and of the crime with which he is charged and that he has the right to demand and procure *291legal counsel, and, if the prisoner or his counsel shall state that he or they desire to test the legality of his arrest, the judge of such court of record shall fix a reasonable time to be allowed him within which to apply for a writ of habeas corpus. When such writ is applied for, notice thereof and of the time and place of hearing thereon shall be given to the prosecuting officer of the county in which the arrest is made and in which the accused is in custody and to the said agent of the demanding state.
19 P.S. § 191.10.
Under the Detainers Act, the prisoner is to be notified of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him, 19 P.S. § 1431, art. III(c)6; he also has the right to petition the governor of the state in which he is imprisoned (the “sending state”) to disapprove the “receiving state’s” request for custody (with 30 days allowed for this process), 19 P.S. § 1431, art. IV(a).7 While the official of the receiving state *292must present on demand (presumably by prison officials) identification and evidence of authority and a certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint under which the prisoner is sought, 19 P.S. § 1431, art. V(b),8 the prisoner has no right to be taken before a court before being delivered to the receiving state. Furthermore, although the governor of the sending state has the power to disapprove the receiving state’s request for custody, nowhere does the Act set out the criteria by which the governor is to be guided in making this decision, nor is there any provision for judicial review of the governor’s decision.
If the remedies provided by the two statutes were substantially the same, no equal protection violation could occur. Commonwealth v. Webster 462 Pa. 125, 337 A.2d 914, cert. denied, Webster v. Pennsylvania, 423 U.S. 898, 96 S.Ct. 201, 46 L.Ed.2d 131 (1975). It is clear, however, that the remedies are not substantially the same, but that instead, from the prisoner’s point of view, the remedy provided by the Extradition Act is far superior to that provided by the Detainers Act. The petition to the governor provided by the Detainers Act will rarely result in relief. The prisoner has no way to ensure, as for example by a hearing or on judicial review, that the governor’s decision will be based on the facts. Thus relief may be denied either arbitrarily or on some mistaken basis. Moreover, if the governor simply fails to act on the petition for 30 days, delivery of the prisoner to the receiving state may proceed. 19 P.S. § 1431, art. IV(d).9 *293While it is trae th¿ it the habeas corpus hearing afforded the prisoner under thie Extradition Act is in some respects summary in nature,10 nevertheless, the prisoner is entitled to a hearing with the z vid of counsel, before a court the decision of which m ay be l'eviewed on appeal to this court, and perhaps to the Supn erne Court. At this hearing it must be shown that: the subject was charged with a crime in the demanding ¡state; th( s subject is a fugitive from that state; the subject was prese nt in the demanding state at the time of the commission of' the crime; the papers required by § 191.3 of the Act are 3 in order; and the person being held in the receiving state is in fact the person charged with the crime in the demanding v state. Commonwealth ex rel. Marshall v. Gedney, 478 Pa. 299, 386 A.2d 942 (1978); Commonwealth ex rel. Coades v. Gable, 437 Pa. 553, 264 A.2d 716 (1970). By no means a re these requirements always met. See, e. g., Commonwealth ex rel. Walker v. Hendrick, 434 Pa. 175, 253 A.2d 95 (1969); Commonwealth ex rel. Edgar v. Davis, 425 Pa, 133, 228 A.2d 742 (1967); Commonwealth ex rel. Lang v. Case, 257 Pa.Super. 486, 390 A.2d 1341 (1978). Indeed, in this case, the re cord shows that New Jersey twice was unable to lodge a govt '.rnor’s warrant against appellant, and although the record dot 5S not show why this was so, it is at least possible that if New Jersey had not finally been able to request appellant’s custo dy under the Detainers Act, it might never have been Bible to reach appellant at all.
Given this substantia] difiference in remedies, the issue arises whether the Commonwi lalth denies equal protection of *294the laws, under the fourteenth amendmei) it, by .affording far fewer safeguards to a prisoner whose custody is sought under the Detainers Act than to a prison .er who se custody is sought under the Extradition Act.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446-47, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1035, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972), the Uni ted States Supreme Court said:
“ ‘[T]he Fourteenth Amendment dot as not den y to States the power to treat different classes < of persons in different ways. [Citations omitted]. The Ecpial Protection Clause of that amendment does, howeve r, deny to States the power to legislate that different tr eatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into ( different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute. A classification “must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon som ie ground of difference having a fair and substantial rel; ition to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circunnstanced shall be treated alike.” Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415, 40 S.Ct. 560, 64 L.Ed. 989 (1920).’ ”11
Here, I can find no “reasonabl e, not arbitrary,” basis for any distinction between a prison' er sought under the; Extradition Act and a prisoner sough it under the Detainers Act. Nor has the Commonwealth s uggested any.12 Moreover, decisions by the United States Supreme Court are forceful authority that there is no sucl i basis. In Baxstrom v. He*295rold, 383 U.S. 107, 86 S.Ct. 760, 15 L.Ed.2d 620 (1966), the Court held that a state procedure for civil commitment upon the expiration of the prison term of a mentally ill person denied equal protection because it denied the jury determination of incompetency available to persons civilly committed under other statutes, and permitted commitment to one category of institution without the judicial determination of dangerousness afforded other civilly committed persons. The Court said:
It follows that the State, having made this substantial review proceeding generally available on this issue, may not, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, arbitrarily withhold it from some.
383 U.S. at 111, 86 S.Ct. at 762.
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 92 S.Ct. 1048, 31 L.Ed.2d 394 (1972), is to the same effect. It involved a state sex crimes statute that permitted commitment without the jury determination available under the state’s mental health statute. Citing Baxstrom v. Herold, supra, and remanding for an evidentiary hearing (the district court had dismissed the claim without a hearing), the unanimous Court said:
The equal protection claim would seem to be especially persuasive if it develops on remand that petitioner was deprived of a jury determination, or of other procedural protections, merely by the arbitrary decision of the State to seek his commitment under one statute rather than the other.
405 U.S. at 512, 92 S.Ct. at 1053 (footnote omitted; emphasis supplied).
See also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 92 S.Ct. 1845, 32 L.Ed.2d 435 (1972).
I therefore conclude that the use of the Detainers Act to deliver prisoners in the Commonwealth to another state, without affording substantially the same opportunity to contest the delivery as is afforded by the Extradition Act to *296a prisoner who wishes to contest extradition, represents a denial of the equal protection of the laws.13
The order of the lower court should be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

. The Detainers Act also provides a procedure under which a prisoner, on his own initiative, can waive delivery to the other state and force a speedy disposition of the charges there. See 19 P.S. § 1431, art. IV.

. Article I provides:
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions, produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of cooperative procedure. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide such cooperative procedures.

. § 191.2 provides:
Subject to the provisions of this act, the provisions of the Constitution of the United States controlling, and any and all acts of Congress enacted in pursuance thereof, it is the duty of the Governor of this State to have arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of any other state of the United States any person charged in that state with treason, felony or other crime, who has fled from justice and is found in this State.

. § 191.5 provides:
When it is desired to have returned to this State a person charged in this State with a crime, and such person is imprisoned or is held under criminal proceedings then pending against him in another state, the Governor of this State may agree with the executive authority of such other state for the extradition of such person before the conclusion of such proceedings or his term of sentence in such other state, upon condition that such person be
*290returned to such other state at the expense of this State as soon as the prosecution in this State is terminated.

. § 191.3 provides:
No demand for the extradition of a person charged with crime in another state shall be recognized by the Governor unless in writing, alleging, except in cases arising under section 6,1 that the accused was present in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the alleged crime and that thereafter he fled from the state, and accompanied by a copy of an indictment found or by information supported by affidavit in the state having jurisdiction of the crime or by a copy of an affidavit made before a magistrate there, together with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereupon or by a copy of a judgment of conviction or of a sentence imposed in execution thereof, together with a statement by the executive authority of the demanding state that the person claimed has escaped from confinement or has broken the terms of his bail, probation or parole. The indictment, information or affidavit made before the magistrate must substantially charge the person demanded with having committed a crime under the law of that state, and the copy of indictment, information, affidavit, judgment of conviction or sentence must be authenticated by the executive authority making the demand.

. Article III(c) provides:
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on which the detainer is based.
See also footnote 7, infra, with respect to the notice to be given the prisoner.

. Article IV(a) provides:
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with article V(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is incarcerated: Provided, That the court having jurisdiction of such indictment, information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmitted the request: And provided further, That there shall be a period of thirty days after receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner.
The lower court construed the Detainers Act to require notice to the prisoner of the right to petition the governor.

. Article V(b) provides:
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.

. Article IV(d) provides:
(d) Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to deprive any prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but *293such delivery may not be: oppos ed or denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sei iding state has not affirmatively consented to or ordered such de livery.

. No showing of probable cause is required. Commonwealth ex rel. Marshall v. Gedney, 478 Pa. 299, 386 A.2d 942 (1978). Guilt or innocence may not be inquired into. 19 P.S. 191.20. Hearsay is fully admissible. Commonwealth v. Kulp, 225 Pa.Super. 345, 310 A.2d 399 (1973), as are statements allegedly given in violation of constitutional rights, U. S. ex rel. Vitiello v. Flood, 374 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1967), and other illegally s seized evidt snce. Martin v. Maryland, 287 A.2d 823 (D.C.App.1972). Illegal am ?st and the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine are irrele vant. Commonwealth ex rel. Colcough v. Aytch, 227 Pa.Super. 527, 323 A.3d 359 (1974).

. If “suspect classifications”, su ich as race or alienage or “fundamental interests”, such as marré ige or travel, are involved, a different and stricter standard of revie' w applies. See Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 461 Pa. 68, 334 A.2d 636, appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 806, 96 S.Ct. 14, 46 L.Ed.2d 26 (1975); Stottlemyer v. Stottlemyer, 458 Pa. 503, 507, 329 A.2d 892, 894 (1974). Appellant does not allege that such scrut iny is req uired here.

. The Commonwealth argues i that there is a reasonable basis for affording more rights to per sons not incarcerated, and therefore covered by the Extradition i Vet, than t o prisoners covered by the Detainers Act, since those wf io are free 1 lave more to lose than those who would be in prison no matter what, the only question being where. This argument miss' as the point: the equal protection clause demands that the Commonv wealth justify ’ its differential treatment of prisoners under the two Ac ;ts.

. This conclusion has been reached in other jurisdictions. See McQueen v. Wyrick, 543 S.W.2d 778 (Mo., 1976); Moen v. Wilson, 536 P.2d 1129 (Colo. 1975); State ex rel. Garner v. Gray, 55 Wis.2d 574, 201 N.W.2d 163 (1972). But see State v. Thompson, 133 N.J.Super. 180, 336 A.2d 11 (1975) (Detainers Act upheld because of reasonable classification between persons at large under Extradition Act and prisoners under Detainers Act; this argument is discussed in note 12, supra); Hystad v. Rhay, 12 Wash.App. 872, 533 P.2d 409 (1975) (held: no unfair difference between two procedures); Wertheimer v. State, 294 Minn. 293, 201 N.W.2d 383 (1972) (reasonable to distinguish between persons at large and prisoners; see note 12, supra ).