Court Opinion

ID: 9375523
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-27 23:00:21.161147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:59.424216
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                     MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

ANTHONY J. DAQUINO,                             DOCKET NUMBERS
             Appellant,                         DE-1221-12-0487-W-2
                                                DE-1221-13-0087-W-2
             v.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS
  AFFAIRS,                                      DATE: February 27, 2023
            Agency.

             THIS ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

      Eric L. Pines, Esquire, and Stephen Goldenzweig, Esquire, Houston, Texas,
        for the appellant.

      Mark S. Jaffe, Esquire, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the appellant.

      Steven Snortland, Esquire, Los Angeles, California, for the agency.

      Deanna Livingston, Albuquerque, New Mexico, for the agency.

                                       BEFORE

                          Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                           Raymond A. Limon, Member
                            Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                  Member Leavitt issues a separate dissenting opinion.

1
   A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

                                      REMAND ORDER

¶1        The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied his request for corrective action based on alleged whistleblower reprisal .
     For the reasons discussed below, we GRANT the appellant’s petition for rev iew.
     We AFFIRM the initial decision IN PART, VACATE the initial decision IN
     PART and REMAND the case to the Board’s field office for further adjudication
     in accordance with this Remand Order.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2        At all times relevant to this appeal, the appellant was employed as a nu rse
     in the gastrointestinal (GI) studies section at an agency medical center in
     Albuquerque, New Mexico. After joining the GI section in 2009, the appellant
     became concerned about some practices within the section.             The appellant
     initially reported those concerns within his chain of command at the Albuquerque
     facility, but after receiving what he considered inadequate responses to those
     complaints, he forwarded his complaints regarding the GI section in Albuquerque
     to the agency’s Chief Nurse Executive. MSPB Docket No. DE-1221-12-0487-
     W-2, Appeal File (0487W2 AF), Tab 105 at 145-46; January 13, 2014 Hearing
     Transcript (HT) (1/13/14 HT) at 59-61 (testimony of the appellant).
¶3        In response to the appellant’s complaints, the Chief Nurse Executive sent
     representatives   of   the   Veterans   Integrated   Service   Network   (VISN)   to
     Albuquerque. 1/13/14 HT at 65-66 (testimony of the appellant). The appellant’s
     supervisors understood that his complaints were the impetus for the VISN visit.
     January 14, 2014 HT (1/14/14 HT) at 93 (testimony of the proposing official);
     January 16, 2014 HT (1/16/14 HT) at 182-83 (testimony of the supervisor). In
     December 2009, after the VISN visit to Albuquerque, the Chief Nurse Executive
     sent the appellant a letter informing him that corrective actions would be taken in
     response to some of his complaints. 0487W2 AF, Tab 105 at 148. The appellant
     testified that he felt his supervisor began scrutinizing and criticizing his
                                                                                          3

     performance and giving him less favorable work assignments following t he VISN
     visit. 1/13/14 HT at 66-69 (testimony of the appellant).
¶4         In February 2010, in response to an anonymous complaint to the agency’s
     Inspector General (IG), the regional VISN manager requested that the Associate
     Director of Patient Care from another agency medical center visit the
     Albuquerque facility to conduct an inquiry. 0487W2 AF, Tab 105 at 151. The
     appellant was one of more than 50 employees who provided information as part
     of that inquiry, but the resulting report did not identify the appell ant, or any other
     employee, by name as the source of any particular complaint. Id. at 151-65.
¶5         Also in February 2010, the appellant’s immediate supervisor observed that
     he had violated privacy standards by leaving a computer unattended.                She
     testified that she warned the appellant that he would receive a written counseling
     if he did the same thing again. 1/16/14 HT at 152 (testimony of the supervisor).
¶6         The following month, a coworker of the appellant allegedly overheard a
     conversation among a group of GI section doctors and the appellant’s supervisor.
     According to the coworker, one of the doctors 2 asked, “Why don’t we get rid of
     him?”    The supervisor allegedly responded, “There is a thing called the
     Whistleblower Act.” 3       The coworker reported the incident in writing,
     0487W2 AF, Tab 106 at 18, which report the appellant provided to two senior
     officials at the Albuquerque facility, but no formal investigation of the alleged
     conversation took place. 1/13/14 HT at 83 (testimony of the appellant); 1/14/14
     HT at 10, 78 (testimony of the proposing official); 159 (testimony of the GI
     section chief). The appellant’s union subsequently filed a grievance on his behalf
     asserting that the agency failed to investigate the incident adequately. 1/13 /14
     HT at 103 (testimony of the appellant).

     2
      The coworker did not identify the person who made this statement, and he testified to
     not knowing whether it was a doctor. 1/13/14 HT at 19 (testimony of the coworker).
     3
       The supervisor denies that this conversation ever took place.     1/16/14 HT at 161
     (testimony of the supervisor).
                                                                                           4

¶7         A few weeks after the alleged conversation involving “the Whistleblower
     Act,” the appellant sent an email to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
     titled “Safety Concerns Regarding Middle Eastern Origin MDs at the
     [New Mexico] VA Hospital in Albuquerque.” 0487W2 AF, Tab 106 at 180-81.
     In the email, the appellant described his history of reporting safety concerns in
     the GI section before reporting the alleged conversation among the GI section
     doctors and his supervisor. Id. at 180. The appellant then noted that there were
     at least three GI doctors who were “of Middle Eastern origin,” and that one of
     them was a citizen of Syria (which, he noted, was on the list of state sponsors of
     terrorism).   However, he acknowledged that there was no particular reason to
     believe any of those three doctors was the person who asked “Why don’t we get
     rid of him?”    Id.   The appellant asked the FBI to investigate who asked that
     question, what was meant by it, and to whom it referred. Id. He indicated that he
     had struggled with whether to report this matter to the FBI, but explained that
     “the recent events at Fort Hood and the CIA compound in Afghanistan,” both of
     which were carried out by “Middle East Origin DOCTORS” (capitalization in
     original) 4 led him to report it. Id. at 180-81.
¶8         In March 2010, the supervisor observed that the appellant walked away
     from a computer to respond quickly to another nurse’s call for help, but in doing
     so he left unsecured a computer containing patient informa tion. The appellant
     received a written counseling for these actions on April 2, 2010, just over a
     month after the incident. 0487W2 AF, Tab 104 at 5.

     4
       “Fort Hood” is an apparent reference to a November 2009 mass shooting carried out in
     Texas by an Army psychiatrist. See History, Army major kills 13 people in Fort Hood
     shooting      spree,    https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/army-major-kills-13-
     people-in-fort-hood-shooting-spree (last visited Feb. 27, 2023). “The CIA compound in
     Afghanistan” is an apparent reference to a December 2009 suicide bombing carried out
     by a Jordanian physician. See CNN, Jordanian doctor called double agent behind CIA
     attack, http://www.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/01/05/jordan.cia.bombing/index.html
     (last visited Feb. 27, 2023).
                                                                                        5

¶9          During a staff meeting on April 15, 2010, the appellant made comments that
      largely mirrored the substance of his March 2010 email to the FBI, including a
      reference to state-sponsored terrorism. While the substance of the appellant’s
      comments at the staff meeting were not generally in dispute, there were
      conflicting accounts of the manner in which he made them.            One attendee
      described the appellant’s comments as an “outburst,” 1/14/14 HT at 162
      (testimony of the GI section chief), while the appellant claimed they were made
      in a “passive informational tone,” 1/13/14 HT at 205 (testimony of the appellant).
      Later the same day, the appellant’s supervisor gave him a letter recommending
      that he contact the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) because of “deficiencies
      in your performance and/or conduct.”         1/13/14 HT at 97 (testimony of the
      appellant); 0487W2 AF, Tab 106 at 20. The date on the letter was April 13, 2010,
      2 days before the staff meeting. 0487W2 AF, Tab 106 at 20.
¶10         On May 25, 2010, the appellant received a letter proposing to admonish him
      for disrespectful conduct during the April 15, 2010 staff meeting. 0487W2 AF,
      Tab 104 at 7-8.    The appellant filed a written response to the proposal, with
      attachments that included statements of support from coworkers. 0487W2 AF,
      Tab 105 at 5-26. In a decision letter delivered to the appellant on July 12, 2010,
      the   deciding   official sustained   the   charge but   mitigated the proposed
      admonishment to a written counseling. Id. at 28-29.
¶11         The appellant testified that during the remainder of 2010 and early 2011, he
      received increasingly unfavorable work assignments.           1/13 /14 HT at 127
      (testimony of the appellant). On September 15, 2011, the appellant’s counsel sent
      a letter to agency counsel detailing what the appellant believed to be a pattern of
      intimidation and retaliation against him. 0487W2 AF, Tabs 102-03.
¶12         On October 31, 2011, the appellant had a conversation with a coworker (a
      staff nurse) near the beginning of his shift. Although the exact words they used
      are in dispute, both testified that the staff nurse asked the appellant why he
      looked so upset, and the appellant replied that he had been having thoughts about
                                                                                           6

      harming or killing his supervisor and that he would be taking leav e starting the
      following day to seek medical care.       1/13/14 HT at 131-32 (testimony of the
      appellant); 1/16/14 HT at 75-76, 84-85 (testimony of the staff nurse).
¶13         The staff nurse did not immediately report the appellant’s comments to
      management or law enforcement. She testified that she did not feel the appellant
      was an immediate threat, although she did feel “his emotions were getting o ut of
      control, and it needed to be addressed.” 1/16/14 HT at 79 (testimony of the staff
      nurse). Within the hour, she asked a registered nurse whom she considered a
      mentor, whose opinion she sought in part because he was a veteran like the
      appellant, whether she should take the appellant’s comment seriously and whether
      she should report it. Id. at 96. The registered nurse advised her to report the
      comment, although he agreed that it did not seem to represent an immediate
      threat. Id. at 97. About an hour later, she told a GI nurse that she was planning
      to report the comment but did not think she needed to do so immediately. Id.
      The GI nurse testified that she felt that anyone aware of the appellant’s comments
      was obliged to report them, repeatedly urged the staff nurse to do so, and
      eventually, reported the comments herself.         Id. at 117-18 (testimony of the
      GI nurse).
¶14         The supervisor learned of the appellant’s comments from the GI nurse a few
      hours after the appellant spoke to the staff nurse. 1/16/14 HT at 169 (testimony
      of the supervisor). The supervisor’s understanding was that the appellant told the
      staff nurse he had been thinking “a lot” about killing her. 5         The supervisor
      reported the matter to agency police.       0487W2 AF, Tab 106 at 30.          As the
      appellant was leaving at the end of his regular shift that day, the supervisor gave
      the appellant an EAP letter. 6 1/16/14 HT at 172 (testimony of the supervisor).

      5
       The staff nurse does not recall the appellant saying he had been having those thoughts
      “a lot.” 1/16/14 HT at 93 (testimony of the staff nurse).
      6
       The supervisor was instructed by human resources to give EAP letters to not only the
      appellant, but also to the staff nurse, the registered nurse, and the GI nurse, the
                                                                                         7

      She said he was not angry or disrespectful when she gave him the letter, and he
      did not make her feel unsafe. Id. at 224.
¶15        The appellant did not report to work the following day because he had
      approved leave. Effective November 1, 2011, the agency placed the appellant in
      a paid nonduty status pending an investigation into the even ts of the previous day.
      0487W2 AF, Tab 105 at 57. The agency also barred the appellant from entering
      the grounds of the Albuquerque facility during his authorized absence, except as
      necessary to seek medical care or under other specified conditions.        Id.   The
      appellant learned of his status when he telephoned his supervisor on November 2,
      2011. 1/13/14 HT at 138 (testimony of the appellant).
¶16        On November 22, 2011, the Director of the Albuquerque facility appointed
      three employees to an Administrative Investigative Board (AIB) to ascertain the
      veracity of reports that the appellant stated his intention to harm his supe rvisor.
      0487W2 AF, Tab 131 at 1. The Director also asked the AIB “to report whether
      other such statements or related statements have been made that w ould potentially
      constitute a danger to employee safety.” Id. The Director also instructed the AIB
      to address the following question: “Whether a nurse assigned to the GI clinic
      represents a danger to the safety of the GI clinic supervisor or other staff .” Id.
      The AIB was not specifically directed to recommend what discipline, if any, the
      appellant should receive for his comments. January 15, 2014 HT (1/15/14 HT)
      at 189 (testimony of the AIB investigation chair).
¶17        During its investigation, the AIB reviewed a number of documents and
      interviewed 20 agency employees. 0487W2 AF, Tab 106 at 126. In its report
      dated March 19, 2012, the AIB made findings regarding the appellant’s
      conversations on October 31, 2011, with the staff nurse and a separate
      conversation later the same morning with the registered nurse to whom the
      appellant allegedly stated that he had written the supervisor’s name on fruit,

      colleagues who were aware of the appellant’s comments earlier that day. 1/16/14 HT
      at 172 (testimony of the supervisor).
                                                                                          8

      which he then shot with a gun for target practice. Id. at 131. The AIB concluded,
      inter alia, that the appellant’s statements to the staff nurse and the registered
      nurse on October 31, 2011, violated the agency’s policy against “[b]ehavior that
      is hostile or of a volatile nature (e.g., verbal or physical aggression).” Id. at 134.
      The AIB found that, although it was not clear how credible a threat the appellant
      actually was to the supervisor, “[s]ignificant administrative action” was
      warranted for his comments. Id. at 136. 7
¶18         On June 8, 2012, the agency proposed to remove the appellant based on the
      AIB’s findings. 0487W2 AF, Tab 105 at 31. Specifically, the agency charged the
      appellant with “Inappropriate behavior causing disruption in the workplace” for
      his comments to the staff nurse about having thoughts of killing the supervisor.
      Id. The agency also charged the appellant with “Inappropriate behavior” for his
      comments to the registered nurse about writing the supervisor’s name on frui t he
      used for target practice. Id.
¶19         The appellant, through counsel, responded to the prop osed removal in
      writing on June 22, 2012. 0487W2 AF, Tab 105 at 72-121. On July 27, 2012, the
      appellant and his counsel met with the deciding official. During that meeting, the
      appellant informed the deciding official that he was going to retire. 1/13/14 HT
      at 146 (testimony of the appellant). The appellant retired effective July 31, 2012,
      before any final action was taken regarding his proposed removal. MSPB Docket
      No. DE-1221-12-0487-W-1, Appeal File (0487W1 AF), Tab 13 at 26.
¶20         The appellant filed a complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC)
      alleging whistleblower reprisal in August 2010 (almost 2 years before his
      proposed removal). 0487W1 AF, Tab 21. He filed his first individual right of
      action (IRA) appeal, MSPB Docket No. DE-1221-12-0487-W-1, with the Board in

      7
        The AIB faulted the agency for failing to respond more quickly to the appellant’s
      comments and for having the supervisor approach the appellant alone to give him the
      EAP letter later the same day. 0487W2 AF, Tab 106 at 134-35. The AIB also
      concluded that agency managers in the GI section “may have contributed to the
      atmosphere of tension and distrust” in the section. Id. at 136.
                                                                                              9

      August 2012 (about a month after he retired). 0487W1 AF, Tab 1. In his first
      IRA appeal, the appellant raised the April 2010 written reprimand, the May 2010
      letter of admonishment, and the June 2012 proposed removal as alleged
      retaliatory personnel actions.     0487W2 AF, Tab 23 at 5.          The appellant also
      alleged in his first IRA appeal that his retirement was involuntary, although it did
      not appear that he had exhausted that alleged personnel action before OSC prior
      to filing the first IRA appeal. 0487W1 AF, Tab 28 at 2. In November 2012, the
      appellant filed a second IRA appeal, MSPB Docket No. DE-1221-13-0087-W-1,
      in which he again alleged that his retirement was involuntary. MSPB Docket
      No. DE-1221-13-0087-W-1, Appeal File (0087W1 AF), Tab 1. He filed a second
      OSC complaint on November 25, 2012, in which he specifically raised his alleged
      involuntary retirement and the access restrictions. 0487W1 AF, Tab 23 at 37.
      Because the appellant’s second OSC complaint was pending, the administrative
      judge dismissed the second IRA appeal without                   prejudice   to refiling.
      0087W1 AF, Tab 9, Initial Decision. The administrative judge simultaneously
      dismissed the first IRA appeal without prejudice so that both appeals could be
      heard together. 0487W1 AF, Tab 28, Initial Decision. After both appeals were
      timely refiled, the administrative judge joined the two IRA appeals. 0487W2 AF,
      Tab 23. 8
¶21         After holding a hearing, the administrative judge issued an initial decision
      denying the appellant’s request for corrective action.         0487W2 AF, Tab 133,

      8
         The Board’s field office also docketed a chapter 75 appeal , MSPB Docket
      No. DE-0752-14-0122-I-1, to address the appellant’s involuntary retirement claim.
      However, it is undisputed that the appellant was appointed to his position under
      38 U.S.C. § 7401(1), and that he therefore does not have chapter 75 Board appeal
      rights. Accordingly, the administrative judge dismissed the chapter 75 appeal for lack
      of jurisdiction. 0487W2 AF, Tab 51. The appellant does not challenge that dismissal
      on petition for review. The Clerk of the Board initially docketed a petition for r eview
      regarding the chapter 75 appeal. However, the Clerk subsequently informed the parties
      that it was administrative error to docket a petition for review in the chapter 75 appeal,
      and that it was therefore rescinding the docketing of a petition for rev iew in MSPB
      Docket No. DE-0752-14-0122-I-1. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 3.
                                                                                            10

      Initial Decision (ID). The administrative judge found that the appellant made
      protected disclosures that were a contributing factor in (1) the April 2010 written
      counseling for leaving his computer unattended, (2) the May 2010 proposed
      admonishment—later mitigated to a written counseling—for his behavior at the
      April 15, 2010 staff meeting, and (3) his proposed removal. ID at 16-22. The
      administrative judge found, however, that the appellant failed to establish that hi s
      retirement was involuntary and therefore did not constitute a personnel action. ID
      at 19-21. 9 Finally, the administrative judge found that the agency proved by clear
      and convincing evidence that it would have issued the written counselings and the
      proposed removal in the absence of the appellant’s disclosures. ID at 22-29.
¶22         The appellant has filed a timely petition for review of the initial decision.
      Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.                The appellant challenges the
      administrative judge’s findings and credibility determinations in connection with
      the proposed removal.       Id. at 9-26.   He also argues that his retirement was
      involuntary at least in part because the agency denied him due process.               Id.
      at 26-27. The agency has not responded to the petition for review.

                       DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW

¶23         On petition for review, the appellant does not specifically challenge the
      administrative judge’s findings regarding the written counselings or the
      restrictions on entering the Albuquerque facility.          We hav e reviewed those

      9
        The appellant also had claimed as personnel actions (1) the restrictions placed on his
      access to the Albuquerque facility, and (2) a series of nonselections. The administrative
      judge found that the access restrictions were subsumed by the appellant’s pla cement on
      administrative leave (which he did not challenge before the Board) for the period prior
      to his retirement, and that, to the extent they remained in effect after the appellant’s
      retirement, they no longer constituted personnel actions. ID at 19. The appellant
      withdrew his claim regarding the nonselections during the hearing. 1/13/14 HT
      at 210-11 (testimony of the appellant). On petition for review, the appellant does not
      challenge the administrative judge’s resolution of the access restrictions or
      nonselections, and we see no reason to disturb them.
                                                                                           11

      findings, and we find no basis to disturb them. 10 For the reasons set forth below,
      however, we find that this appeal should be remanded for further consideration
      regarding the proposed removal and the alleged involuntary retirement.

      Further adjudication is required concerning the appellant’s claim that the agency
      proposed his removal in reprisal for his protected disclosures.
¶24         As our reviewing court has held, in determining whether the agency proved
      by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the same actions
      against the appellant, even absent any protected disclosures, the Board should
      consider the following factors:      (1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in
      support of its action; (2) the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on
      the part of agency officials involved in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the
      agency takes similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but
      who are otherwise similarly situated.      Carr v. Social Security Administration,
      185 F.3d 1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999); Schnell v. Department of the Army,
      114 M.S.P.R. 83, ¶ 23 (2010). 11 Our reviewing court has stated that “[e]vidence
      only clearly and convincingly supports a conclusion when it does so in the
      aggregate considering all the pertinent evidence in the record, and despite the
      evidence that fairly detracts from that conclusion.” Whitmore v. Department of
      Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2012). The court in Whitmore further
      stated that “[i]t is error for the [Board] to not evaluate all the pertinent evidence
      in determining whether an element of a claim or defense h as been proven
      adequately.”   Id.   Building on this directive from the court in Whitmore, the
      Board has held that a proper analysis of the clear and convincing evidence issue
      requires that all of the evidence be weighed together —both the evidence that

      10
         Similarly, although the agency has not filed a cross petition for review, we have
      reviewed the administrative judge’s finding that the appellant established a prima facie
      case of whistleblower reprisal, and we see no reason to disturb that finding.
      11
        We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
      and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal, nor does it affect
      the relevant holdings in the authorities cited herein.
                                                                                       12

      supports the agency’s case and the evidence that detracts from it.       Shibuya v.
      Department of Agriculture, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 37 (2013) (citing Whitmore,
      680 F.3d at 1368).
¶25          In assessing the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of the
      proposed removal, the administrative judge cited the AIB, witness statements
      provided to police, and the fact that the supervisor obtained a restraining order
      against the appellant. ID at 23. He also found that, because the agency did not
      specifically charge the appellant with making a threat against the supervisor, it
      did not need to prove that the appellant actually intended to threaten har m against
      her.   Id.   The administrative judge dismissed as “not material” an assessment
      performed by an agency psychiatrist 2 days after the October 31, 2011 comments.
      ID at 24.    In that assessment, the agency psychiatrist opined in part that the
      appellant “currently poses low risk of acting on his earlier state d [homicidal
      ideation],” 0487W2 AF, Tab 60 at 63, but that “[t]his could change rapidly should
      events change in a way to endanger his long term insurance/work at the
      [agency],” id. The administrative judge also dismissed as “not material” the fact
      that the agency allowed the appellant to work his entire shift and had the
      supervisor interact directly with him on the day he made the comments.           ID
      at 24-25.
¶26          On review, the appellant argues that the administrative judge failed to
      acknowledge the distinction between present threats of violence and past thoughts
      of violence.    PFR File, Tab 1 at 10-13.     He also argues that it was not his
      statements themselves, but rather their embellished retelling by othe rs, that
      caused any disruption in the workplace. Id. at 13-15.
¶27          We find that the administrative judge’s assessment of the first Carr factor
      in connection with the proposed removal requires further analysis in order to
      comply with Whitmore.          In particular, the administrative judge should
      acknowledge and weigh those factors that detract from the strength of the
      agency’s evidence, including those set forth below.
                                                                                             13

¶28         The proposing official testified that he did not read the AIB report or the
      supporting evidence before proposing the appellant’s removal, and that the Chief
      of Staff gave him an oral summary of the AIB’s recommendation, which he
      recalled to be “that [the appellant] posed a threat to a coworker and supervisor.”
      1/14/14 HT at 43-44 (testimony of the proposing official). He testified at one
      point that he could not remember whether the Chief of Staff informed him that the
      AIB had recommended the appellant’s termination, id. at 47, but he later testified
      that he “agreed with this recommendation to terminate,” id. at 126.                Under
      questioning from the administrative judge, the proposing official testified that the
      Chief of Staff informed him that the AIB had recommended “significant
      administrative action” be taken in response to the appellant’s statements about
      harming the supervisor, and he interpreted that phrase to mean termination. 12 Id.
      at 148.   In explaining his decision to propose the appellant’s removal, the
      proposing official described the appellant’s actions as “making a threat at the
      workplace to kill a coworker.” Id. at 127. He testified that there are really no
      options besides termination “[w]hen someone threatens to kill another person at
      work.” Id. at 150. He was not aware of an agency doctor’s assessment 2 days
      after the incident stating that the appellant posed a low risk of acting on his
      thoughts. Id. at 47. The proposing official also testified that he did not consider
      any mitigating factors or any alternatives to removal before writing the proposal.
      Id. at 47-48.
¶29         It appears that in proposing the removal, the proposing official relied almost
      entirely upon the AIB’s recommendation that “significant administrative action”
      be taken against the appellant. While there is nothing inherently improper about
      relying on such a recommendation, the fact that the proposing official proposed a
      removal without reviewing the underlying evidence weighs against the agency in

      12
        The Chief of Staff testified that she also did not read the AIB report or the supporting
      evidence, and that her understanding of the AIB’s findings came from her discussions
      with the Director. 1/14/14 HT at 366-67, 370 (testimony of the Chief of Staff).
                                                                                     14

      analyzing the first Carr factor. See Shibuya, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 33 (citing the
      proposing official’s failure to review the evidentiary package supporting a
      proposed action as a factor weighing against the agency in analyzing the first
      Carr factor). The administrative judge should consider this fact in analyzing the
      first Carr factor on remand.
¶30         The appellant cites Caronia v. Department of Justice, 78 M.S.P.R. 201
      (1998), overruled on other grounds by Carter v. Department of Justice,
      88 M.S.P.R. 641, ¶ 25 n.5 (2001), and Brott v. General Services Administration,
      116 M.S.P.R. 410, ¶ 13 n.* (2011), in support of his argument that the agency’s
      evidence in support of the proposed removal was weak. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11-12.
      The appellant in Caronia was on leave from work when he informed coworkers
      who inquired about his health that, before he went on leave, he had thoug hts of
      killing his supervisor. Caronia, 78 M.S.P.R. at 205. The agency removed the
      appellant based on charges including a charge of conduct unbecoming a law
      enforcement officer based on his comments to his coworkers while he was on
      leave. Id. at 206. The agency did not specifically charge the appellant in that
      case with making a threat. Id. at 206 n.1. In holding that the agency did not
      prove the conduct unbecoming charge, the Board in Caronia noted that the
      appellant’s comments did not appear to cause anxiety and disruption for the
      coworkers who heard them directly.        Id. at 208.   Rather, those coworkers
      understood the appellant’s comments to be about thoughts he had had in the past
      for which he had successfully sought treatment.     Id. Those coworkers did not
      understand the appellant’s comments to be a serious threat against his supervisor.
      Id. The Board found that any disruption and anxiety in the workplace occurred
      only after the appellant’s comments were relayed to another coworker, who then
      embellished them in such a way that the appellant’s supervisor understood them
      to be an actual threat. Id. at 208-09.
¶31         There are distinctions between the present case and Caronia. For example,
      the appellant in Caronia was already on leave at the time of his comments and
                                                                                         15

      already had sought treatment for the thoughts he expressed to his coworkers,
      whereas here the appellant was still in the workplace when he made his
      comments. Additionally, the statements made in Caronia were found to refer to
      that appellant’s thoughts in the past, whereas here it is not clear whether the
      appellant was still having thoughts about harming or killing the supervisor when
      he made his comments. Nevertheless, we find that the parallels between Caronia
      and the present case are sufficient to merit further consideration in assessing the
      strength of the agency’s evidence in support of the proposed removal.              In
      assessing the applicability of Caronia to the facts of the present case, the
      administrative judge may need to make additional findings and credibility
      determinations regarding the appellant’s comments, the effects those comments
      had on those to whom they were made, 13 and the extent to which those comments
      may have been embellished by those who did not hear them directly.
¶32        Regarding the second Carr factor, the existence and strength of any motive
      to retaliate, the administrative judge found that, although the appellant’s
      disclosures did not result in formal adverse consequences for any of the
      management officials involved in the decision to propose his removal, those
      officials were aware of, and resented, the appellant’s disclosures. ID at 25-27.
      The administrative judge therefore found that those officials had a motive to
      retaliate against the appellant, although he described that motive as “not as strong
      as the appellant suggests.”      Id.   On review, the appellant argues that the
      administrative judge failed to consider additional evidence bearing on the
      strength of the motive to retaliate. PFR File, Tab 1 at 16-17. We find nothing in
      the administrative judge’s analysis of the second Carr factor that itself would

      13
         The registered nurse, the individual to whom the appellant commented about putting
      his supervisor’s name on a fruit, was approved as a witness but was withdrawn by the
      agency at the hearing. 1/15/14 HT at 177 (statement of agency counsel). A different
      employee who reported the comment about the fruit also testified that he did not think
      the appellant would ever harm the supervisor. 1/14/14 HT at 223 (testimony of the
      health technician).
                                                                                        16

      require remand. Nevertheless, because we are remanding the appeal for further
      consideration of the other Carr factors, the administrative judge also may
      supplement his analysis of the second Carr factor on remand to address the
      appellant’s objections, should he choose to do so.
¶33         Regarding the third Carr factor—evidence that the agency takes similar
      actions against employees who are not whistleblowers but who are otherwise
      similarly situated—the administrative judge found that “[t]he agency has removed
      employees who made threats to kill others.” ID at 28. He acknowledged that the
      evidence showed the agency’s enforcement of its “zero tolerance” policy on
      workplace violence was “uneven,” but found that the agency had consistently
      removed employees who had threatened to kill another employee. ID at 29. On
      petition for review, the appellant argues that the comparators cited by the
      administrative judge were not similarly situated to him because of the nature of
      their misconduct and other factors. PFR File, Tab 1 at 18-21.
¶34         To the extent the appellant argues that the cited comparators are not
      similarly situated because the agency used different labels in charging them, see
      id. at 18-19, his argument is misplaced. See Aquino v. Department of Homeland
      Security, 121 M.S.P.R. 35, ¶ 30 (2014) (rejecting an agency’s assertion that the
      third Carr factor rests solely on a comparison of the charges’ labels of
      misconduct). The court in Whitmore warned that the “importance and utility [of
      the third Carr factor] should not be marginalized by reading it so narrowly as to
      eliminate it as a helpful analytical tool.” Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1374. Thus, the
      administrative judge properly considered the agency’s proffered comparators in
      assessing the third Carr factor. However, putting aside the labels assigned to
      their respective conduct, the appellant correctly notes that there are differences in
      the nature of the conduct alleged against him and that of the cited comparators.
      Specifically, one of the cited comparators was charged with telling coworkers,
      inter alia, “I will shoot everybody if I need to and I will blame it on” Post
      Traumatic Stress Disorder. 0487W2 AF, Tab 85 at 23. That comparator also was
                                                                                            17

      charged with disrespectful language toward coworkers and disrespectful
      comments of a sexual nature. Id. at 23-24. The second cited comparator was
      charged with making multiple statements in reference to his plan to kill a
      particular veteran patient, including telling his supervisor that he had brought a
      weapon to work on a day when he knew the veteran patient in quest ion had an
      appointment. 0487W2 AF, Tab 86 at 61. Thus, the cited comparators’ conduct
      appears to have involved more direct threats of violence against coworkers or
      patients than the comments the appellant made in the present case. Rather than
      acknowledging the differences between the appellant’s conduct and that of the
      cited comparators, the administrative judge simply grouped them all together
      under the category of “threats to kill others.” ID at 28. We find that Whitmore
      requires a more nuanced view of the evidence. On remand, the administrative
      judge should consider the differences between the appellant and the cited
      comparators, and determine whether, and to what extent, those differences affect
      the weight to be given to the comparator evidence.
¶35         Next, we find that the relevant evidence regarding the proposed removal
      must be re-weighed as a whole. We further find that the admini strative judge is
      in the best position to do so because he is the one who heard the live testimony
      and made credibility determinations. 14 See Shibuya, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 37. In
      conducting his analysis, the administrative judge should be mindful of the court’s
      decision in Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1368-72, and consider all the relevant evidence
      as a whole, including the evidence discussed above, supra ¶¶ 28-34, as well as

      14
         The appellant argues on review that the administrative judge’s ability to make
      credibility determinations was impaired due to the passage of more than 2 years
      between the hearing dates and the issuance of the initial decision. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 25.    We see no reason to discount the administrative judge’s credibility
      determinations on that basis alone. The administrative judge may have made his
      credibility determinations during or shortly after the hearing. Even if he did not do so,
      the administrative judge is still in a better position to make those determinations than
      the Board members, who did not have the opportunity to observe the witnesses.
      Because we are remanding the appeal, we need not address the appellant’s other
      challenges regarding credibility determinations at this st age.
                                                                                       18

      any other evidence he finds relevant.      See Shibuya, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 37.
      Because the clear and convincing evidence determination may require the
      administrative judge to make additional credibility and factual determinations, we
      leave it to the administrative judge to determine in the first instance whether to
      reconvene the hearing to take more testimony on this issue.
¶36        Our decision to remand this appeal should not be read as excusing or
      minimizing the appellant’s conduct that gave rise to his proposed removal. Th e
      comments attributed to the appellant are completely inappropriate and deserving
      of significant disciplinary action. Nor should our decision to remand this appeal
      be read as a suggestion that the appellant should ultimately prevail in this appeal.
      We are remanding the appeal to the administrative judge because further legal
      analysis is required, not because we believe the outcome of the appeal should
      necessarily change.

      The administrative judge should reconsider the appellant’s involuntary retirement
      claim in light of his findings concerning the proposed removal.
¶37        The administrative judge found that the appellant failed to prove that his
      retirement was involuntary. ID at 19-20. In doing so, the administrative judge
      found that the appellant (1) was not coerced into retiring by intolerable working
      conditions, and (2) did not retire after the agency threatened a removal action it
      knew or should have known could not be substantiated. ID at 20. Although we
      agree with the administrative judge’s analysis of the involuntary retirement claim,
      we nevertheless remand that claim for possible reconsideration in light of the
      administrative judge’s findings on remand regarding the proposed removal.
¶38        An employee-initiated action, such as a retirement, is presumed to be
      voluntary and therefore outside the Board’s jurisdiction. Vitale v. Department of
      Veterans Affairs, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 17 (2007). An involuntary retirement is
      tantamount to a removal, however, and it therefore is subject to the Board’s
      jurisdiction. Id. “[A]ll constructive adverse action claims . . . have two things in
      common: (1) the employee lacked a meaningful choice in the matter; and (2) it
                                                                                             19

      was the agency’s wrongful actions that deprived the employee of that choice.”
      Bean v. U.S. Postal Service, 120 M.S.P.R. 397, ¶ 8 (2013).
¶39         Intolerable working conditions may render an action involuntary if the
      employee demonstrates that the agency engaged in a course of action that made
      working conditions so difficult or unpleasant that a reasonable person in his
      position would have felt compelled to retire. Vitale, 107 M.S.P.R. 501, ¶ 20. We
      agree with the administrative judge that the appellant failed to establish that his
      working conditions were intolerable. In addition, because the appellant was on
      administrative leave for approximately 9 months before he retired, his working
      conditions are not particularly relevant to the voluntariness of his retirement. See
      Axsom v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 110 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 16 (2009) (finding
      that alleged incidents of harassment figured only tangentially into an appellant’s
      decision to resign, if at all, when they preceded the decision to resign by several
      months).    Rather, the key factor in the appellant’s decision to retire was the
      proposal to remove him, which came less than 2 months prior to his retirement.
¶40         To prove that a retirement in the face of a proposed adverse action was
      involuntary, the appellant must show that the agency knew or should have known
      that the action could not be substantiated, Schultz v. U.S. Navy, 810 F.2d 1133,
      1136-37 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Barthel v. Department of the Army, 38 M.S.P.R. 245,
      251 (1988), or that the agency lacked an arguable basis for the proposed action,
      see Garland v. Department of the Air Force, 44 M.S.P.R. 537, 540 (1990). While
      we recognize that there may be some weaknesses in the agency’s case for
      removing the appellant, see supra ¶¶ 28-31, we find that the appellant failed to
      establish that the agency knew or should have known that its proposed removal
      could not be substantiated or that the agency lacked an arguable basis for
      removing the appellant in light of his comments. 15

      15
        The appellant argues that his primary reason for retiring was the agency’s failure to
      provide him with the full AIB investigative file, and that the agency’s failure to provide
      that full file constituted denying him due process. PFR File, Tab 1 at 26-27. Pursuant
                                                                                          20

¶41         Nevertheless, further adjudication of the involuntary retirement claim may
      be required on remand. Allegations of reprisal for whistleblowing, when made in
      an IRA appeal in support of an assertion that an agency coerced an appellant’s
      resignation or retirement, should be considered for the limited purpose of
      determining whether they support a finding of coercion.          Heining v. General
      Services Administration, 61 M.S.P.R. 539, 551 (1994); Burke v. Department of
      the Treasury, 53 M.S.P.R. 434, 439 (1992).             If the administrative judge
      determines on remand that the agency failed to meet its burden by clear and
      convincing evidence regarding the proposed removal, and that the proposed
      removal was therefore retaliatory, he then should reconsider the voluntarine ss of
      the appellant’s retirement in light of that finding. See Diefenderfer v. Department
      of Transportation, 108 M.S.P.R. 651, ¶ 37 (2008) (remanding an IRA appeal for
      further consideration of an alleged involuntary resignation when that claim was
      intertwined with other claims that were being remanded).

      The administrative judge’s discovery rulings did not constitute an abuse of
      discretion.
¶42         The appellant argues that the administrative judge erred in denying his
      motion to compel documents and testimony relating to the VIS N investigation.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 25-26.       The administrative judge found that the agency
      properly withheld the documents as privileged under 38 U.S.C. § 5705, which
      prohibits disclosure of agency records and documents “created . . . as part of a
      medical quality-assurance program.” 38 U.S.C. § 5705(a). 0487W2 AF, Tab 52

      to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit’s decisions in Ward v. U.S. Postal
      Service, 634 F.3d 1274, 1279-80 (Fed. Cir. 2011), and Stone v. Federal Deposit
      Insurance Corporation, 179 F.3d 1368, 1376-77 (Fed. Cir. 1999), a deciding official
      violates an employee’s due process rights when he relies upon new and material
      ex parte information as a basis for his decisions on the merits of a proposed charge or
      the penalty to be imposed. See Norris v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 675 F.3d
      1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012). Absent a final decision on the proposed removal, we are
      unable to find a due process violation because we do not know what information the
      deciding official would have relied upon had he or she been given the opportunity to
      render a final decision.
                                                                                      21

      at 2-3. The administrative judge also denied the appellant’s request to depose
      VISN officials, finding that, although the statutory privilege applies only to
      “records and documents,” allowing the depositions would be contrary to the
      public policy concerns that led to the creation of the privilege.    Id. at 3. The
      appellant sought reconsideration of the administrative judge’s ruling denying his
      motion to compel, arguing that the documents in question do not fall under the
      statutory privilege. 0487W2 AF, Tab 54. The administrative judge denied the
      appellant’s motion for reconsideration, finding that the appellant was aware when
      he filed his motion to compel that the agency was asserting the statutory privilege
      as the basis for not producing the requested materials and that he therefore should
      have addressed the privilege issue in his initial motion. 0487W2 AF, Tab 111.
¶43        Under 5 C.F.R. § 1201.41(b)(4), an administrative judge has broad
      discretion in ruling on discovery matters and, absent an abuse of discretion, the
      Board will not find reversible error in such rulings. Wagner v. Environmental
      Protection Agency, 54 M.S.P.R. 447, 452 (1992), aff’d, 996 F.2d 1236 (Fed. Cir.
      1993) (Table).   The Board will not find reversible error in an administrative
      judge’s discovery rulings absent an abuse of discretion that prejudiced the
      appellant’s substantive rights. See Jones v. Department of Health and Human
      Services, 119 M.S.P.R. 355, ¶ 18, aff’d, 544 F. App’x 976 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
¶44        We find that the administrative judge acted within his discretion in denying
      both the appellant’s motion to compel and his motion to reconsider. Based on the
      submissions before him when he ruled on the motion, the administrative judge
      properly determined that the documents in question were subject to the statutory
      privilege and could therefore not be produced before the Board. Although the
      appellant acknowledged in his motion to compel that the agency had invoked the
      privilege, he did not address the applicability of the privilege in his argument in
      support of the motion. 0487W2 AF, Tab 43. Given the appellant’s failure to
      raise arguments regarding the privilege issue in his motion to compel, we find
      that the administrative judge acted properly within his discretion in denying the
                                                                                          22

      appellant an opportunity to raise those arguments for the first time on
      reconsideration.
¶45         The appellant also asked the administrative judge to draw an adverse
      inference against the agency as to the contents of the documents withheld
      pursuant to a claim of privilege. The administrative judge denied that request,
      finding that the agency properly withheld those documents as pri vileged and
      therefore the sanction of an adverse inference was not warranted. ID at 25 n.17.
      We agree with the administrative judge and find no abuse of discretion in his
      failure to draw an adverse inference. 16

                                            ORDER

¶46         For the reasons discussed above, we remand this case to the field office for
      further adjudication in accordance with this Remand Order. 17

      FOR THE BOARD:                                      /s/ for
                                                 Jennifer Everling
                                                 Acting Clerk of the Board
      Washington, D.C.

      16
         The primary remaining issue in this case is whether the agency proved by clear and
      convincing evidence that it would have proposed the appellant’s removal absent his
      disclosures. The documents in question may have assisted the agency in meeting that
      burden, and therefore the absence of those documents from the record due to a statutory
      privilege actually may disadvantage the agency.
      17
        The administrative judge should incorporate in the remand initial decision any of his
      earlier findings that have not been disturbed by the Board.
                        DISSENTING OPINION OF TRISTAN L. LEAVITT

                                                    in

                        Anthony J. Daquino v. Department of Veterans Affairs

                 MSPB Docket Nos. DE-1221-12-0487-W-2, DE-1221-13-0087-W-2

¶1             For the reasons set forth below, I respectfully dissent from the majority
       opinion in this case.
¶2             The majority makes the following findings of fact, which I discern no
     reason to disturb. On October 31, 2011, the appellant told a coworker “that he had
     been having thoughts about harming or killing his supervisor and that h e would be
     taking leave starting the following day to seek medical care.” Remand Order (RO),
     ¶ 12.       An   Administrative     Investigation   Board    (AIB)    was      convened     in
     November 2011. Id., ¶ 16. The AIB found the appellant made the aforementioned
     statement and had also told a different coworker that “he had written the
     supervisor’s name on fruit, which he then shot with a gun for target practice.” Id.,
     ¶ 17.    The AIB concluded the appellant’s comments to his coworkers violated
     agency policy and warranted significant administrative action.           Id.    The agency
     proposed the appellant’s removal based on two charges of Inappropriate Behavior —
     one for his comments to the staff nurse about having thoughts of killing his
     supervisor 1 and one for his comments to the other coworker about writing his
     supervisor’s name on fruit he then used for target practice. Id., ¶ 18. The appellant
     subsequently retired and, in his appeals, he alleged the proposed removal and his
     involuntary retirement were retaliatory based on protected whis tleblowing activity.
     Id., ¶¶ 18-20.
¶3             The majority finds the administrative judge’s assessment of the first Carr
       factor in connection with the proposed removal requires further analysis because

       1
           The agency asserted this inappropriate behavior caused disruption in the workplace.
                                                                                               2

     the proposing official proposed a removal without reviewing the underlying
     evidence, instead relying on an oral summary of the AIB’s recommendation,
     including that the AIB concluded the appellant posed a threat to other employees
     and recommended significant administrative action. Id., ¶¶ 27-29. The majority
     also discusses in detail Caronia v. Department of Justice, 78 M.S.P.R. 201
     (1998), overruled on other grounds by Carter v. Department of Justice,
     88 M.S.P.R. 641, ¶ 25 n.5 (June 25, 2001), and by Brott v. General Services
     Administration, 116 M.S.P.R. 410 (2011), and remands the appeal for the
     administrative judge to assess Caronia’s applicability “to the facts of the present
     case” and potentially make “additional findings and credibility determinations
     regarding the appellant’s comments, the effects those comments had on those to
     whom they were made, and the extent to which those comments may have been
     embellished by those who did not hear them directly.” 2 RO, ¶¶ 30-31.
¶4         In my view, Caronia is inapplicable in the instant individual right of action
     (IRA) appeal because it involved a removal action taken under chapter 75.
     Unlike in chapter 75 appeals, the Board lacks the authority in an IRA appeal to
     adjudicate the merits of the underlying personnel action; rather, the Board’s
     jurisdiction is limited to adjudicating the whistleblower allegations.                Lu v.
     Department of Homeland Security, 122 M.S.P.R. 335, ¶ 7 (2015); see also
     5 C.F.R. § 1209.2(c) (in an IRA appeal that concerns an adverse action under
     chapter 75, “the agency need not prove its charges”). The agency must show by
     clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the personnel action(s)
     even absent the appellant’s protected activity, which differs from other Board

     2
       In his petition for review, the appellant cited Caronia in support of his assertions that:
     (1) the agency “did not meet its burden of proof that Appellant had made a threat;”
     (2) the alleged threat needs to be analyzed with regard to whether the thoughts were
     present or past thoughts; and (3) the administrative judge should have analyzed whether
     the appellant’s comments “were the actual cause of the disruption in the workplace or
     whether the disruption was the result of embellishments on the Appellant’s comments
     by other coworkers and managers.” Petition for Review File, Tab 1 at 9-15.
                                                                                        3

     proceedings where agencies must prove the merits of their actions by
     preponderant evidence. Marren v. Department of Justice, 51 M.S.P.R. 632, 641
     (1991), aff’d, 980 F.2d 745 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Table), and modified on other
     grounds by Robinson v. U.S. Postal Service, 63 M.S.P.R. 307, 323 n.13 (1994).
¶5         The Carr factors are not discrete elements which the agency must prove by
     clear and convincing evidence.         See Phillips v. Department of Transportation,
     113 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶ 15 (2010). While the existence or lack of evidence supporting
     a charge is relevant to the agency’s overall burden on the clear and convincing
     evidence issue, the Board does not review the reasonableness of the penalty as it
     would in a chapter 75 appeal.          Aquino v. Department of Homeland Security,
     121 M.S.P.R. 35,    ¶ 29     (2014);     Shibuya v.   Department    of   Agriculture,
     119 M.S.P.R. 537,    ¶ 36     (2013);     Weaver v.   Department    of   Agriculture,
     55 M.S.P.R. 569, 575 (1992) (the appropriateness of the penalty imposed is not at
     issue in an IRA appeal); 5 C.F.R. § 1209.2(c) (“the Board may consider the
     strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its adverse action in determining
     whether the agency has demonstrated by clear and convincing evidence that it
     would have taken the same personnel action in the absence of the whistleblowi ng
     or other protected activity”). “[T]he relevant inquiry is not whether the appellant
     committed any actual misconduct, but whether the agency had strong evidence in
     support of its personnel action.”       Phillips, 113 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶ 15. Thus, even
     where an appellant is later found not to have engaged in misconduct as charged,
     the agency may nonetheless have had a legitimate basis for imposing a penalty at
     the time it acted.         See id.; cf. Redschlag v. Department of the Army,
     89 M.S.P.R. 589, ¶ 69 (2001) (“the proper perspective when weighing the gravity
     of the misconduct against the motive to retaliate is to view the gravity of the
     misconduct as it appeared to the deciding official at the time he took the removal
     action”).
¶6         The fact that the proposing official only relied on an oral summary of the
     AIB investigation, without reviewing the actual report himself, is not sufficient to
                                                                                           4

     find the agency did not have strong reasons for its action. 3            Notably, the
     information the proposing official received and relied on appears largely
     consistent with what is contained in the AIB report. The AIB investigation noted
     the appellant admitted he “fantasized about killing” his supervisor, which he
     disclosed to both his coworker and a police officer. MSPB Docket No. DE -1221-
     12-0487-W-2, Appeal File, Tab 106 at 134. The AIB concluded:
           Mr. Daquino has violated a basic tenet of professional conduct by
           verbalizing such physically threatening statements towards his nurse
           manager . . . returning Mr. Daquino to GI would not be in the best
           interests of the staff or patients of this clinical area. While it is
           unclear how credibly dangerous Mr. Daquino might be towards his
           manager, the fact is that no level of threat is to be tolerated and must
           be assumed to be actionable. Significant administrative action is
           warranted.
     Id. at 137. I would find the agency has presented strong evidence supporting its
     decision to propose the appellant’s removal for inappropriate behavior. I believe
     the appellant’s conduct, which is not substantially in dispute, was objectively
     inappropriate, as charged, regardless of any mitigating factors or the presence or
     absence of an actual threat.
¶7         Regarding    the   third   Carr   factor,   the   majority   suggests   that   the
     administrative judge did not properly assess whether proffered comparators were
     similarly situated to the appellant. RO, ¶¶ 33-34. The majority remands for the
     administrative judge to “consider the differences between the appellant and the
     cited comparators, and determine whether, and to what extent, thos e differences
     affect the weight to be given to the comparator evidence.” Id. In this case, the
     relevant question is whether the agency presented any evidence that it proposed

     3
       Indeed, in Shibuya, 119 M.S.P.R. 537, ¶ 33, which the majority cites, the proposing
     official’s failure to review the evidentiary package was just one of many factors
     supporting a finding that the agency failed to meet its clear and convincing burden. For
     instance, the proposing official also failed to order a customary case analysis and the
     deciding official lacked understanding of the evidence supporting the demotion at
     issue. Id.
                                                                                          5

     removal against similarly situated employees who did not engage in protected
     activity. I see no error in the administrative judge’s “group[ing]” the proffered
     comparators “all together under the category of ‘threats to kill others,’” as it
     relates to proposed discipline. See id., ¶ 34. The agency’s charges are based on
     the appellant’s statements concerning killing his supervisor, which I would find
     sufficiently similar to the proffered comparators for purposes of finding the
     agency has shown it has proposed removal in cases of similarly situated
     non-whistleblowers. 4
¶8         The majority also “agree[s] with the administrative judge’s analysis of the
     involuntary retirement claim” and his finding “that the appellant failed to
     establish that his working conditions were intolerable,” ultimately concluding
     “the appellant failed to establish that the agency knew or should have known that
     its proposed removal could not be substantiated or that the agency lacked an
     arguable basis for removing the appellant in light of his comments.”              RO,
     ¶¶ 37-40. I agree with the majority in this regard.
¶9         The majority goes on to remand the appellant’s involuntary retirement claim
     so that the administrative judge may reconsider the voluntariness of the
     appellant’s retirement in the event he finds, on remand, that the proposed removal
     was retaliatory. Id., ¶ 41. For the reasons previously stated, I do not agree with
     remanding this appeal and would instead affirm the initial decision. However, as
     the appeal is being remanded, I note that I would not require, on remand,
     additional analysis concerning the appellant’s involuntary retirement claim. The
     mere allegation that one was retaliated against for whistleblower activities is
     insufficient to demonstrate that working conditions were made so intolerable by
     the alleged retaliation as to render a retirement involunta ry by reason of coercion.

     4
      To the extent that none of the proffered comparators are similarly situated, given the
     agency’s strong evidence in support of proposing removal —namely, the appellant’s
     undisputed, objectively inappropriate comments—I would alternatively find the third
     Carr factor neutral and that the agency met its overall clear and convincing burden.
                                                                                  6

See Burke v. Department of the Treasury, 53 M.S.P.R. 434, 439 (1992). Evidence
of retaliation goes to the ultimate question of coercion—whether under all of the
circumstances working conditions were made so difficult by the agency that a
reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to retire.
See Markon v. Department of State, 71 M.S.P.R. 574, 577-80 (1996) (the fact that
the appellant made a prima facie case of age discrimination was not “in-and-of-
itself” relevant to the appellant’s burden of proof on the voluntariness issue); see
also Axsom v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 110 M.S.P.R. 605, ¶ 16 (2009)
(considering how the appellant’s claims of harassment, retaliation, and
discrimination figured into his decision to resign, including that he “had the
option to stand and fight the alleged discrimination, harassment, and retaliation
rather than resign”).   Accordingly, a finding that the proposed removal was
retaliatory would not require revising the aforementioned bases for finding the
agency did not coerce the appellant to retire.

/s/
Tristan L. Leavitt
Member