Court Opinion

ID: 9352491
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-06 19:00:24.729028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:37.540397
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-30091     Document: 00516600580       Page: 1    Date Filed: 01/06/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                         United States Court of Appeals
                                                                       Fifth Circuit

                              _____________                          FILED
                                                               January 6, 2023
                              No. 22-30091                       Lyle W. Cayce
                           consolidated with                          Clerk
                              No. 22-30559
                             _____________

   New Orleans Association of Cemetery Tour Guides and
   Companies,

                                                         Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                     versus

   New Orleans Archdiocesan Cemeteries, doing business as
   New Orleans Catholic Cemeteries; Cemetery Tours
   NOLA, L.L.C.,

                                                       Defendants—Appellees.

                 Appeals from the United States District Court
                     for the Eastern District of Louisiana
                           USDC No. 2:21-CV-2051

   Before King, Stewart, and Haynes, Circuit Judges.
   King, Circuit Judge:
         Plaintiff-Appellant ACTGC brought federal antitrust and various
   state law claims in a suit concerning tours of two New Orleans cemeteries.
   ACTGC also requested injunctive relief, which the district court denied and
   ACTGC first appealed. The district court then dismissed ACTGC’s federal
   antitrust and state law claims, which ACTGC also appealed. Defendant-
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   Appellee NOAC then moved to dismiss the first appeal as moot. We
   GRANT NOAC’s motion, DISMISS the first appeal, and AFFIRM the
   judgment of the district court on all issues in the second appeal.
                                               I.
                                  A. Factual Background
          The St. Louis No. 1 and No. 2 (“No. 1” and “No. 2,” respectively)
   cemeteries near New Orleans’s French Quarter attract numerous visitors
   and guided cemetery tours. Plaintiff-Appellant Association of Cemetery
   Tour Guides and Companies L3C d.b.a. New Orleans Association of
   Cemetery Tour Guides and Companies (“ACTGC”) is a low-profit limited
   liability company comprised of tour companies and guides offering cemetery
   tours in the New Orleans area.1 Defendant-Appellee New Orleans
   Archdiocesan Cemeteries d.b.a. New Orleans Catholic Cemeteries
   (“NOAC”) is a cemetery authority that operates New Orleans-area
   cemeteries, including Nos. 1 and 2. Defendant-Appellee Cemetery Tours
   NOLA LLC (“CTN”) is a tour company.2
          The operative complaint3 alleges the following facts. In 2015, NOAC
   closed No. 1 to all visitors except family members of the interred and visitors
   willing to pay a fee. Companies wishing to conduct tours also had to make
   payments to NOAC. In 2020, with the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic,
   NOAC closed Nos. 1 and 2 to everyone except the immediate family of the

          1
           The original plaintiff in the underlying action was Witches Brew Tours LLC.
   From the first amended complaint onwards, Witches Brew Tours LLC was replaced by
   ACTGC, which was formed after the filing of the original complaint.
          2
           For brevity, the two Defendants-Appellees are collectively referred to as NOAC
   throughout.
          3
              This is the second amended complaint filed on February 11, 2022.

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   interred. As of November 2021, the cemeteries remained closed, but
   ACTGC represented that No. 1 was subsequently opened for tours. At some
   point, NOAC awarded a contract to CTN to manage tours in No. 1 under
   terms dictated by NOAC. Although it is unclear whether CTN is currently
   conducting these tours, these terms state that:
          (1) all tour narratives and routes must be approved by NOAC;
          (2) only tour guides from CTN are allowed to conduct tours;
          (3) local company tour guides may escort tour groups, but may
          not offer commentary; and (4) prices will be fixed at $25.00 for
          adults and $18.00 for tour wholesalers.
                             B. Procedural Background
          The underlying dispute in this case generated two separate appeals.
   The first appeal was calendared in this court as No. 22-30091 (the “First
   Appeal”) and the second as No. 22-30559 (the “Second Appeal”). These
   appeals were later consolidated. This section proceeds in four stages
   summarizing events in (1) the district court before the First Appeal; (2) the
   First Appeal; (3) the district court after the First Appeal; and (4) the Second
   Appeal.
             1. The Underlying District Court Case (Before the First Appeal)
          On November 5, 2021, Witches Brew Tours LLC (“Witches Brew”)
   filed a complaint against NOAC and CTN seeking, inter alia, a temporary
   restraining order and a preliminary injunction. This complaint asserted five
   theories of liability under federal antitrust acts, Louisiana competition law,
   and Louisiana property law; these counts generally alleged that the NOAC-
   CTN business plan violates antitrust law and impermissibly excludes
   ACTGC’s members from visiting or providing their tour services at Nos. 1

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   and 2.4 On November 8, 2021, the district court denied the temporary
   restraining order on the grounds that Witches Brew had not sufficiently
   established irreparable harm.
           Plaintiff-Appellant ACTGC—having replaced Witches Brew as the
   plaintiff—then filed its first amended complaint containing primarily the
   same theories of liability as the original complaint. ACTGC also filed an
   amended motion for a preliminary injunction. In its first amended
   memorandum in support of a preliminary injunction, ACTGC requested
   injunctive relief because Defendants were “violating the public’s right to free
   and reasonable access to public cemeteries” and because ACTGC’s
   members would risk losing large portions of their business income during the
   closure of No. 1.
           NOAC responded with two motions. First, NOAC filed a motion to
   dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing that the district court lacked subject
   matter jurisdiction because ACTGC lacked standing and because the
   Sherman and Clayton Acts were inapplicable for lack of the required nexus
   to interstate commerce. Second, NOAC filed a brief in opposition to
   ACTGC’s motion for a preliminary injunction. In this brief, NOAC
   principally argued that ACTGC could not show a likelihood of success on the

           4
             Specifically, the five asserted theories of liability were (1) unlawful price fixing in
   violation of 15 U.S.C. § 1 (the Sherman Act); (2) monopolization by means of unlawful
   market allocation or exclusion of competition, in violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2 (the Sherman
   Act); (3) unlawful restraint of trade, in violation of LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:122; (4) unfair and
   unreasonable monopoly, in violation of LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:123; and (5) unlawful
   exclusion of extended relatives and friends from religious cemeteries. ACTGC claims
   elsewhere in this complaint that “[t]his is an action under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
   Act and Clayton Act,” but the claims do not specifically identify the relevant sections of
   the Clayton Act.

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   merits because, as relevant here, ACTGC mischaracterized the test for
   adjudicating the Sherman and Clayton Act claims.
          On January 27, 2022, the district court issued a ruling on ACTGC’s
   motion for a preliminary injunction and NOAC’s motion to dismiss. The
   district court denied the preliminary injunction because ACTGC failed to
   show any evidence of irreparable harm and granted NOAC’s motion to
   dismiss because ACTGC had not shown the requisite nexus to interstate
   commerce required to successfully allege a claim under the Sherman Act.
   The district court then granted ACTGC leave to file another amended
   complaint to cure its pleading deficiencies. ACTGC did so and filed the
   operative second amended complaint on February 11, 2022. ACTGC then
   moved to appeal the denial of the preliminary injunction. This created the
   First Appeal. During the pendency of the First Appeal, the district court
   proceedings continued in parallel.
                                    2. The First Appeal
          The First Appeal is an interlocutory appeal of the district court’s
   denial of a preliminary injunction. Both issues on appeal concern whether the
   district court properly denied ACTGC injunctive relief; namely, whether the
   district court (1) abused its discretion in holding that ACTGC failed to
   establish irreparable harm and (2) otherwise erred in denying ACTGC
   injunctive relief.
              3. The Underlying District Court Case (After the First Appeal)
          In district court, the parties continued to litigate the claims in the
   second amended complaint.5 In March, NOAC and CTN filed substantively-

          5
             Although the district court and NOAC reference ACTGC’s Clayton Act claims
   at various stages of the litigation, ACTGC ceased pursuing such claims in the operative
   second amended complaint, which does not reference the Clayton Act.

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   identical Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. In support, NOAC argued that
   ACTGC had not stated a claim under the federal antitrust laws because it had
   failed to define the “relevant market” as required to state a claim under the
   Sherman and Clayton Acts.6 NOAC argued that ACTGC had too narrowly
   defined both components of the relevant market, i.e., the product market and
   the geographic market. Assuming arguendo that ACTGC had properly
   characterized the relevant market, NOAC argued in the alternative that the
   NOAC-CTN agreement was not an unreasonable restraint on trade. 7 In
   response, ACTGC argued it had appropriately defined the relevant market
   and adequately pleaded an unreasonable restraint on trade.
           In May, some six months after Witches Brew filed the initial
   complaint, ACTGC moved to amend the second amended complaint to add
   six affidavits from the interim manager of ACTGC and five tour guides.
   These affidavits primarily discuss the economic and emotional consequences
   faced by these tour guides. NOAC opposed this motion, arguing that adding
   the affidavits would be futile as related to the Sherman Act claims and that
   the affidavits failed to establish non-monetary harm.
           In June, a magistrate judge denied ACTGC’s motion to amend its
   complaint to add these affidavits. ACTGC moved for review of this order by
   the district court. In August, the district court denied ACTGC’s motion and
   affirmed the magistrate judge’s decision. The district court found that
   ACTGC acted with “undue delay in seeking to attach this evidence [i.e., the

           6
            NOAC also argued that the state competition law claims should fail for the same
   reasons, as the state statutes track “almost verbatim” the language of the Sherman and
   Clayton Acts and Louisiana courts have thus used federal antitrust jurisprudence to analyze
   the Louisiana state laws.
           7
            On the state property law claims, NOAC argued that Nos. 1 and 2 are not public
   property and that ACTGC had no possessory interest in the cemeteries. ACTGC argued
   in response that the cemeteries were dedicated for public use.

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   affidavits] to the active complaint” by attempting to amend six months after
   the initial complaint. It also noted that ACTGC had failed to show irreparable
   harm at the preliminary injunction evidentiary hearing and that “manifest
   prejudice would result to Defendants if the proposed ‘amendment’ were
   allowed.” Finally, the district court held that allowing the proposed
   amendment would be futile, as nothing in the affidavits cured the lack of
   irreparable harm or supported ACTGC’s antitrust and possessory claims.
          In August, the district court granted NOAC’s and CTN’s 12(b)(6)
   motions to dismiss because ACTGC’s “failure to plead a legally sufficient
   definition of either the product market or the geographic market warrants
   dismissal of its antitrust claims.”8 ACTGC appealed, creating the Second
   Appeal.
                                 4. The Second Appeal
          ACTGC raises two issues in the Second Appeal. First, it argues that
   the district court abused its discretion in denying ACTGC’s motion for
   review of the magistrate judge’s order denying ACTGC’s motion to add six
   affidavits to its complaint. Second, it argues that ACTGC’s second amended
   complaint stated a claim for relief from a monopolistic price-fixing scheme.
          After the Second Appeal was calendared, NOAC filed a motion to
   dismiss the First Appeal. In this motion, NOAC argues that this panel should
   dismiss the entirety of the First Appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Specifically,
   NOAC asserts that the First Appeal is moot because, as relevant, the
   complaint underlying ACTGC’s request for a preliminary injunction in that

          8
            The district court declined to exercise supplementary jurisdiction over the
   remaining state law claims.

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   appeal was superseded by a subsequently amended complaint. We carried
   this motion with the case and consolidated the First and Second Appeals.
                                         II.
          First, we consider the outstanding motion to dismiss the First Appeal
   for lack of jurisdiction as moot. Mootness is related to the constitutional
   prohibition against exercising jurisdiction absent a case or controversy. U.S.
   Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Federal courts are “without power to decide
   questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.”
   North Carolina v. Rice, 404 U.S. 244, 246 (1971) (per curiam). Because a moot
   case does not affect the rights of its litigants, i.e., there is no case or
   controversy, it is beyond the purview of a federal court to decide. Id. “Events
   both before and after the filing of a claim may render a claimant’s case moot.”
   Baccus v. Parrish, 45 F.3d 958, 961 (5th Cir. 1995).
          In its motion, NOAC argues that the First Appeal is moot because the
   underlying complaint in that appeal has been superseded by the second
   amended complaint. NOAC argues that the district court’s preliminary
   injunction analysis was predicated on ACTGC’s first amended complaint;
   consequently, any opinion ruling on the correctness of this analysis would be
   relevant only to a complaint that is no longer operative and thus purely
   advisory.
          We agree with NOAC. The first amended complaint is a legal nullity
   because it was not incorporated by the subsequent second amended
   complaint. “An amended complaint supersedes the original complaint and
   renders it of no legal effect unless the amended complaint specifically refers
   to and adopts or incorporates by reference the earlier pleading.” King v.
   Dogan, 31 F.3d 344, 346 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam). And incorporation by
   reference must be “with a degree of specificity and clarity which would
   enable the responding party to easily determine the nature and extent of the

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   incorporation.” Carroll v. Fort James Corp., 470 F.3d 1171, 1176 (5th Cir.
   2006). The operative second amended complaint does not even mention,
   much less successfully incorporate, the first amended complaint.9 ACTGC
   thus failed to incorporate the first amended complaint, and this prior
   complaint has no legal effect. King, 31 F.3d at 346.
           Because the first amended complaint is nullified, we cannot
   consider—and thus must dismiss—an appeal of a denial of injunctive relief
   stemming from said complaint. See Tripathy v. McClowski, 2022 WL
   2069228, at *2 (2d Cir. June 9, 2022) (amendment “rendered [Plaintiff’s]
   original complaint inoperative and his appeal of the district court’s denial of
   a preliminary injunction that he requested in the original complaint moot”);
   Falck N. Cal. Corp. v. Scott Griffith Collaborative Sols., LLC, 25 F.4th 763, 766
   (9th Cir. 2022) (dismissing as moot an appeal premised on a superseded
   complaint).
           ACTGC’s arguments to the contrary lack merit. This court’s
   precedents make clear that failure to adopt or incorporate by reference a prior
   complaint nullifies that document. See, e.g., King, 31 F.3d at 346. ACTGC
   argues that we can hear the First Appeal because the nullified and amended
   complaints are sufficiently similar, but this argument does not address
   ACTGC’s failure to incorporate by reference the earlier complaint. See
   Falck, 25 F.4th at 766 (stating that “the complaint challenged on appeal is a
   legal nullity even if much like the operative complaint”). This failure
   nullified the first amended complaint as a matter of law. To hear an appeal
   on a nullified, legally inoperative document is to impermissibly adjudicate a
   moot case, i.e., one where “the parties do not have a legally cognizable

           9
              The only incorporations of other documents present in the second amended
   complaint are in the discussions of standing, but these incorporations reference a response
   filed in opposition to a motion to dismiss, not the original complaint.

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   interest in the outcome.” Baccus, 45 F.3d at 961. Accordingly, we grant
   NOAC’s outstanding motion to dismiss the First Appeal for lack of
   jurisdiction and dismiss the First Appeal.
                                        III.
          Next, we consider the issues in the Second Appeal. We begin with the
   denial of ACTGC’s motion to amend its complaint to add the affidavits. This
   court reviews a denial of a motion for leave to amend a complaint for abuse
   of discretion. Parish v. Frazier, 195 F.3d 761, 763 (5th Cir. 1999). Decisions
   concerning motions to amend are “entrusted to the sound discretion of the
   district court.” Smith v. EMC Corp., 393 F.3d 590, 595 (5th Cir. 2004)
   (quoting Quintanilla v. Tex. Television, Inc., 139 F.3d 494, 499 (5th Cir.
   1998)). “The district court properly exercises its discretion . . . when it
   denies leave to amend for a substantial reason.” U.S. ex rel. Spicer v.
   Westbrook, 751 F.3d 354, 367 (5th Cir. 2014). This court “examines five
   considerations to determine whether to grant a party leave to amend a
   complaint: 1) undue delay, 2) bad faith or dilatory motive, 3) repeated failure
   to cure deficiencies by previous amendments, 4) undue prejudice to the
   opposing party, and 5) futility of the amendment.” Smith, 393 F.3d at 595.
   The existence of one of these factors is sufficient to deny leave. See id.
   (“Absent any of these factors, the leave sought should be ‘freely given.’”
   (quoting Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962))).
          The district court properly denied ACTGC’s motion to amend
   because any such amendment would be futile for two reasons. First, the
   district court correctly noted that amendment would “be futile because [the
   affidavits] ‘add nothing to the case,’ ‘do not specify injuries that cannot be
   remediated by money damages,’ and ‘fail to allege that the affiants are unable
   to offer tours of [Nos. 1 and 2].’” ACTGC argues that affiant Christie
   Tomlinson’s affidavit shows she had to close her business and was deprived

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   of her ability to visit various gravesites. But, as correctly noted by the district
   court, these facts specify injuries that are remediable through monetary
   damages.
           Second, the district court correctly noted that the affidavits add
   nothing to support ACTGC’s antitrust or possessory claims. ACTGC does
   not address this argument in its briefing, which focuses exclusively on how
   the affidavits allegedly establish irreparable harm. As such, this argument is
   forfeited. See Rollins v. Home Depot USA, 8 F.4th 393, 397 (5th Cir. 2021).10
           In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying
   ACTGC leave to amend its complaint to add affidavits that do not add
   additional evidence of irreparable harm and do not address the pleading
   deficiencies of its federal law claims.
                                               IV.
           Finally, we consider whether ACTGC failed to state a claim for relief
   from a monopolistic price-fixing scheme under the Sherman Act. We review
   a grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion de novo. Huynh v. Walmart Inc., 30 F.4th
   448, 453 (5th Cir. 2022). To survive such a motion, a complaint must allege
   enough facts that, when accepted as true, “state a claim to relief that is
   plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
   “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
   allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable

           10
             ACTGC’s additional arguments to the contrary are unavailing. Although it
   argues that “the Affidavits were ignored” and that the district court’s findings were
   “demonstrably false,” these statements lack support in the record and in the briefing.
   ACTGC’s arguments that the district court “ignored” facts in the complaint at an
   “unnecessary evidentiary hearing” are similarly unsupported and, more to the point, do
   not provide any reason for why the district court erred in denying the addition of affidavits
   to the complaint.

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   for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
   Although “detailed factual allegations” are not required, the complaint must
   include “factual allegations that when assumed to be true ‘raise a right to
   relief above the speculative level.’” Cuvillier v. Taylor, 503 F.3d 397, 401 (5th
   Cir. 2007) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
           ACTGC fails to state a claim for relief because it does not define a
   legally sufficient relevant market as required by both sections 1 and 2 of the
   Sherman Act.11 ACTGC argues it does not need to meet this requirement
   because the restraint in question is a horizontal agreement; as such, ACTGC
   argues, the NOAC-CTN agreement is presumptively illegal under the per se
   rule. ACTGC is incorrect. Horizontal agreements are price-fixing
   agreements between competitors. See Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5
   (2006). Vertical agreements are those between entities at different levels of
   distribution. See MM Steel, L.P. v. JSW Steel (USA) Inc., 806 F.3d 835, 849
   (5th Cir. 2015) (“[A] distinction exists between agreements that are made
   between competitors (horizontal agreements) and agreements between
   manufacturers and customers (vertical agreements).”). Antitrust law is
   generally more skeptical of horizontal agreements and restraints. See Arizona
   v. Maricopa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 n.18 (1982) (noting that
   “horizontal restraints are generally less defensible than vertical restraints”);
   see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886

           11
               A claim for violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act requires ACTGC to show,
   inter alia, that “trade was restrained in the relevant market.” Wampler v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co.,
   597 F.3d 741, 744 (5th Cir. 2010). The “first step in this analysis is determining the relevant
   market.” Id. To state a claim for violation of section 2, ACTGC must similarly show, inter
   alia, “the possession of monopoly power in the relevant market.” Eastman Kodak Co. v.
   Image Tech. Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 481 (1992) (quoting United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
   384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966)).

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   (2007) (stating that horizontal agreements are per se illegal); id. at 907
   (holding that vertical agreements are not per se illegal).
           The NOAC-CTN agreement at issue is a vertical agreement because
   NOAC is a cemetery authority, and CTN is a cemetery tour provider. They
   do not directly compete in the market for cemetery tours because, of the two
   parties, only CTN is in the business of providing tour services (i.e., the
   product). Because NOAC and CTN operate at different levels of the
   provision of cemetery tour services, their agreement for CTN to exclusively
   provide tours is a vertical agreement. See 8 Phillip E. Areeda &
   Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law ¶ 1600, at 3 (4th ed. 2017)
   (“Separate firms operating at different levels of production are said to have
   ‘vertical’ dealings with each other.”).12
           Thus, because the restriction in question is a vertical agreement,
   alleging a violation of the relevant sections of the Sherman Act requires
   ACTGC to define a “relevant market.”13 Shah v. VHS San Antonio Partners,

           12
               ACTGC argues that NOAC and CTN are in a horizontal price-fixing
   relationship because they are business partners. This argument misses the mark because it
   incorrectly assumes, without justification or reasoning, that business partners are
   competitors. ACTGC does not cite any legal authority indicating that an agreement
   between NOAC and CTN as business partners necessarily should be characterized as a
   horizontal restraint between competitors. ACTGC’s arguments are unsupported in antitrust
   jurisprudence. Many business agreements are agreements between business partners, and
   many of those agreements (e.g., sales contracts) state a particular price for goods or
   services. Characterizing any such agreement between two business partners as a price-
   fixing horizontal agreement between two competitors, then, incorrectly conflates business
   partners with competitors and could expand antitrust law to cover routine business
   arrangements.
           13
              ACTGC also argues that this market definition requirement does not apply when
   there is “direct evidence of likely or actual effects on prices or output.” The single case
   ACTGC cites for this proposition is FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447
   (1986). ACTGC’s argument is unavailing for two reasons. First, Indiana Federation of
   Dentists involved a horizontal agreement, not the vertical agreement at issue here. See 476
   U.S. at 459 (stating that the relevant “policy takes the form of a horizontal agreement”).

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   L.L.C., 985 F.3d 450, 453–54 (5th Cir. 2021); Apani Sw., Inc. v. Coca–Cola
   Enters., Inc., 300 F.3d 620, 627 (5th Cir. 2002); accord Campfield v. State
   Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 532 F.3d 1111, 1120 (10th Cir. 2008) (failure to
   allege a relevant market requires dismissal when the two cooperating parties
   are not competitors). The two components of the relevant market are (1) the
   product market and (2) the geographic market. Shah, 985 F.3d at 454. A
   legally cognizable product market must “include all ‘commodities
   reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes,’” id
   (quoting PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 417
   (5th Cir. 2010)), and consider “interchangeability and cross-elasticity of
   demand,” Apani, 300 F.3d at 625. A district court can dismiss Sherman Act
   claims for failure to properly define the relevant market. Id. at 628.
           We hold that ACTGC has failed to plead a legally sufficient product
   market. Because the product market is a necessary component of the relevant
   market, ACTGC’s failure to plead a legally sufficient product market means
   that we do not need to analyze its proffered geographic market. See Shah, 985
   F.3d at 454 (the product market is a required component of the relevant
   market); Apani, 300 F.3d at 628 (failure to properly define the relevant
   market is grounds for dismissal); cf. Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond, 309 F.3d
   at 840 (affirming the dismissal of antitrust claims for failure to properly

   Indeed, this court has been skeptical of applying Indiana Federation of Dentists to cases
   involving vertical agreements. See Surgical Care Ctr. of Hammond, L.C. v. Hosp. Serv. Dist.
   No. 1 of Tangipahoa Par., 309 F.3d 836, 840 (5th Cir. 2002) (rejecting plaintiff’s similar
   argument because plaintiff did not show that Indiana Federation of Dentists is applicable to
   vertical restraints). ACTGC does not provide any reasoning as to why we should extend
   Indiana Federation of Dentists to vertical restraints. Second, subsequent Supreme Court
   precedent has clarified that even when parties present direct evidence of anticompetitive
   effects, a market definition inquiry is necessary. See Ohio v. Am. Express Co., 138 S. Ct. 2274,
   2284–85 (2018) (“Here, the plaintiffs rely exclusively on direct evidence to
   prove . . . anticompetitive effects in the credit-card market. To assess this evidence, we
   must first define the relevant market.”).

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   define a geographic market). Nevertheless, we will assume arguendo that
   ACTGC has correctly pleaded the geographic market as New Orleans, as
   such an assumption makes our product market discussion more concrete.
          ACTGC’s pleadings are somewhat ambiguous as to which product we
   should use to define the product market. In some places, it states that the
   “cemetery tour industry” is the product market. But most of ACTGC’s
   arguments in the complaint, motions, and briefing concern only tours of Nos.
   1 and 2, i.e., not the entire cemetery tour market; for example, it argues that
   Nos. 1 and 2 are unique in their historical and cultural significance compared
   to other cemeteries. Such language could be read as ACTGC’s arguing that
   cemetery tours of Nos. 1 and 2 are the relevant product for purposes of
   relevant market definition. Nevertheless, because both of ACTGC’s possible
   product market definitions fail as a matter of law, we need not and do not
   decipher which product market definition ACTGC has pleaded. Instead, we
   analyze the failings of each possible definition in turn.
          First, a product market consisting of cemetery tours fails because
   ACTGC has not defined the product market to include interchangeable
   substitutes. In Shah, an organization of anesthesiologists signed an agreement
   to exclusively provide anesthesiology services in a local hospital system. 985
   F.3d at 452–53. The organization then terminated its relationship with the
   plaintiff (a pediatric anesthesiologist), who was then barred from practicing
   within the local hospital system. Id. at 453. Despite the plaintiff’s attempts to
   define the product market as “pediatric anesthesiologists,” this court held
   that this definition did not encompass all interchangeable substitutes, in part
   because the plaintiff did not “attempt to identify . . . ‘where people could
   practicably go’ for pediatric anesthesia services within [the geographic
   market] . . . . [The plaintiff] did not even specify individual pediatric
   anesthesiologists from whom patients could practicably obtain health care

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   services.” Id. at 455. The court then ruled that this market definition was
   insufficient as a matter of law. Id.
          Applying Shah, ACTGC’s “cemetery tours” product market is
   similarly insufficiently pleaded because it fails to identify reasonable
   substitutes within the proffered New Orleans geographic area. ACTGC’s
   primary argument concerning the cemetery tours product market is that
   nothing is interchangeable with a cemetery and that “cemeteries are
   distinctive socially and legally” for, among other reasons, “their historical,
   spiritual, religious, architectural, or genealogical value.” But ACTGC
   misunderstands the relevant inquiry. The product at issue is cemetery tours,
   not cemeteries generally. Thus, interchangeability for purposes of the market
   definition analysis requires us to consider whether there are reasonable
   substitutes for cemetery tours.
          Such reasonable substitutes exist. Accordingly, a product market
   limited to cemetery tours alone does not rise to the level of plausibility
   required to survive a motion to dismiss. See Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Even
   accepting arguendo that cemeteries are special places, tourists take cemetery
   tours for different reasons than the reasons they might have for visiting
   cemeteries more generally. Namely, cemetery tour participants are often
   interested in the broader history and culture of New Orleans and its many
   other historical sites. Such a conclusion can be drawn from ACTGC’s own
   filings noting that, prior to No. 1’s closure, some of its members offered a
   “combined tour of the French Quarter, Voodoo sites, and No. 1.” The
   existence of such combined tours indicates that many would-be cemetery
   tourgoers are also interested in tours of other historical areas. This suggests
   that other New Orleans historical site tours are reasonably interchangeable
   substitutes for cemetery tours. ACTGC’s failure to include these substitutes
   in its product market definition thus makes its proffered product market
   unduly narrow and legally insufficient.

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          Second, ACTGC fares no better in pleading a product market of
   cemetery tours of Nos. 1 and 2. At the outset, ACTGC faces the same issue
   dooming a “cemetery tours” product market because it fails to include any
   interchangeable substitutes to Nos. 1 and 2 within this product market. See
   Shah, 985 F.3d at 455. As previously noted, instead of defining the product
   market to include reasonably interchangeable substitutes (e.g., other
   cemeteries in New Orleans), ACTGC instead implies that tours of Nos. 1 and
   2 are the product market because these cemeteries have such unique
   significance that no substitutes exist.
          Even assuming arguendo that this proffered product market includes
   all interchangeable substitutes, our precedent clearly precludes ACTGC’s
   attempt to define such a narrow product market. In Domed Stadium Hotel,
   Inc. v. Holiday Inns, Inc., 732 F.2d 480 (5th Cir. 1984), this court considered
   an antitrust claim brought by the Superdome Hotel, a Holiday Inn franchisee,
   against Holiday Inns. See id. at 483. After Holiday Inns incorporated another
   nearby hotel as a Holiday Inn, the Superdome Hotel brought an antitrust
   claim. Id. at 483–84. This court rejected a product market defined as Holiday
   Inn hotel rooms in New Orleans. Id. at 488. Instead, this court held that the
   proper market was hotel rooms in New Orleans more generally. Id. at 489. In
   doing so, the court noted that “one brand in a market of competing brands
   cannot constitute a relevant product market” and that “[t]he fact that a
   company limits its competitive activity to a single firm’s products (and at
   only one competitive level) cannot control the definition of the relevant
   market.” Id. at 488 (quoting Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc.,
   575 F.2d 256, 282 (5th Cir. 1978)).
          The situation here is analogous. ACTGC acknowledges that New
   Orleans contains other cemeteries and other cemetery tours. Similarly, the
   two Holiday Inn hotels in New Orleans were only part of a larger hotel room
   market. See Domed Stadium Hotel, 732 F.2d at 483–84 (identifying two

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   company-owned Holiday Inn hotels that together gave Holiday Inns only four
   percent of the New Orleans hotel room market). Accordingly, much like the
   Domed Stadium Hotel product market could not definitionally include only
   Holiday Inn hotel rooms, ACTGC’s product market cannot consist only of
   cemetery tours of two cemeteries. In arguing to the contrary, ACTGC
   misunderstands the nature of the product market inquiry. ACTGC
   consistently emphasizes how much of the relevant (cemetery tour) market
   Nos. 1 and 2 make up. But such a fact, even when taken as true, answers a
   different question, namely how much of the market the putative monopolist
   holds. This market share inquiry is an analytically separate inquiry from the
   relevant market definition. See id. at 489 (defining the relevant market as
   hotel rooms, not Holiday Inn hotel rooms, while stating that the market
   share inquiry “requires that the defendant dominate the relevant market”);
   see also 2B Phillip E. Areeda et al., Antitrust Law ¶ 531, at 245
   (4th ed. 2014) (“[W]e still need market definition in order to see a particular
   firm’s market share.”). ACTGC conflates these two inquiries. To adopt
   ACTGC’s approach of defining the product market as solely consisting of
   the products that the alleged monopolist controls would, as the district court
   put it, “swallow[]” “the rule of reasonable interchangeability and cross-
   elasticity of demand.” Such an approach would make the separate market
   share inquiry pointless, as almost every firm has a monopoly on its own
   products. See Spectrofuge Corp., 575 F.2d at 282.
          In sum, ACTGC has not pleaded a legally sufficient product market
   under either of its proffered definitions. If the relevant product market is
   cemetery tours, it has not identified or included reasonably interchangeable
   substitutes. And if the product market is cemetery tours of Nos. 1 and 2, such
   a market is unduly narrow. ACTGC has thus not properly defined the
   relevant market as required to bring its claims under the Sherman Act, and
   the district court correctly dismissed these claims.

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                                         V.
         For the foregoing reasons, we GRANT the motion to dismiss the
   First Appeal as moot, DISMISS the First Appeal (No. 22-30091), and
   AFFIRM the judgment of the district court on all issues in the Second
   Appeal (No. 22-30559).

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