Court Opinion

ID: 9841428
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 14:05:52.201936+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:28.407243
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 15, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                           Court of Appeals
                              NO. 2022-CA-1223-MR

MICHAEL SMITH, JR.                                                  APPELLANT

                    APPEAL FROM CLAY CIRCUIT COURT
v.                      FAMILY COURT DIVISION
                    HONORABLE CLINT J. HARRIS, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 21-CI-00172

CARLA ASHER                                                           APPELLEE

                                    OPINION
                                   AFFIRMING

                                   ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; GOODWINE AND TAYLOR,
JUDGES.

GOODWINE, JUDGE: Michael Smith, Jr. (“Smith”) appeals from the decree of

custody entered by the Clay Circuit Court, Family Division on May 26, 2022.

After careful review of the record, finding no error, we affirm.

             Carla Asher (“Asher”) gave birth to the parties’ minor child on March

4, 2021. The parties were unmarried and not in a relationship when the child was

born. In a separate action, a judgment establishing Smith’s paternity was entered
on July 21, 2021. Smith petitioned for sole custody of the child on August 5, 2021.

A hearing on the petition occurred on December 15, 2021. Both parties appeared.

Counsel represented Smith. Asher, who appeared virtually, was unrepresented by

counsel. The court heard testimony from the parties, a nurse practitioner who had

treated the child, Smith’s wife, and a Cabinet for Health and Family Services

caseworker.

              After the hearing, Smith’s counsel tendered a proposed decree of

custody. The family court entered the tendered decree but marked out several

proposed findings of fact, including some related to Asher’s criminal history.

However, the court specifically found that Asher was arrested on charges of

alcohol intoxication, resisting arrest, disorderly conduct in the second degree, and

two counts of wanton endangerment in the first degree on November 14, 2021.

The court found that Asher was released from incarceration for inpatient substance

abuse treatment but did not complete the program. In its findings, the court took

judicial notice of Asher’s criminal history, the paternity action, and a dependency,

neglect, and abuse (“DNA”) action regarding the child.1

1
  Although the record in the DNA action has not been made part of the record in this matter, it
appears a petition was filed by the Cabinet on July 22, 2021. Both Smith and Asher were parties
to the action. The caseworker testified the petition was filed due to Asher’s substance use. At
disposition in the DNA action, the family court ordered the child remain in the home.

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                Considering the best interest factors listed in KRS2 403.270(2), the

family court awarded Smith and Asher joint custody and granted Asher no

timesharing. Smith timely moved to alter, amend, or vacate the decree. He argued

that the family court improperly marked out his proposed findings related to

Asher’s criminal history and should have taken judicial notice of her criminal

history under KRE3 201. The court denied the motion.

                This appeal followed.

                Before we reach the merits of Smith’s appeal, we must address

Asher’s failure to file a brief.

                If the appellee’s brief has not been filed within the time
                allowed, the court may: (a) accept the appellant’s
                statement of the facts and issues as correct; (b) reverse
                the judgment if appellant’s brief reasonably appears to
                sustain such action, or (c) regard the appellee’s failure as
                a confession of error and reverse the judgment without
                considering the merits of the case.
RAP4 31(H)(3) (emphasis added). It is within the discretion of this Court to

determine whether to exercise any of these options, and we decline to do so here.

See Roberts v. Bucci, 218 S.W.3d 395, 396 (Ky. App. 2007)). Asher has chosen to

forgo her opportunity to bring to our attention any disagreements she may have had

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.
3
    Kentucky Rules of Evidence.
4
    Kentucky Rules of Appellate Procedure.

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with Smith’s recitation of the facts and alleged issues. Despite this, we have

conducted a thorough review of the record and relevant law and will now review

the merits of Smith’s appeal.

             We review a family court’s findings of fact in a custody matter for

clear error. Maxwell v. Maxwell, 382 S.W.3d 892, 895 (Ky. App. 2012) (citation

omitted). A finding is not clearly erroneous where it is supported by substantial

evidence. Id. We cannot reverse a decision simply because we may have reached

a different conclusion. Id. We may only reverse where a court has misapplied the

law or abused its discretion. Id.

             We also review evidentiary rulings for abuse of discretion. Anderson

v. Commonwealth, 231 S.W.3d 117, 119 (Ky. 2007) (footnote omitted).

             On appeal, Smith argues: (1) the family court erred by failing to take

judicial notice of Asher’s criminal history; (2) the court abused its discretion by

failing to properly consider the parties’ mental and physical health under KRS

403.270(2)(f); (3) the court was required to determine Asher’s fitness and should

have found her unfit to have custody of the child; and (4) the court’s decision to

award joint custody but grant Asher no timesharing was procedurally improper.

             First, Smith’s argument that the family court failed to take judicial

notice of Asher’s criminal history is directly refuted by the court’s findings in the

custody decree. The decree includes a finding that “[t]he court took judicial notice

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of [Asher’s] criminal history.” Record (“R.”) at 99. Smith contends that judicial

notice of her criminal history required an award of sole custody in his favor.

However, the mere existence of Asher’s criminal record is not determinative of

custody.

             The court must determine what is in the child’s best interest by

considering all relevant factors, including those listed in KRS 403.270(2). It is

within the family court’s “exclusive province” to weigh the evidence presented by

the parties. Moore v. Asente, 110 S.W.3d 336, 354 (Ky. 2003) (footnote omitted).

Even where judicial notice is taken, the weight given to evidence depends upon the

context of the proceedings. See Polley v. Allen, 132 S.W.3d 223, 226 (Ky. App.

2004). Here, the family court took judicial notice of Asher’s criminal history,

considered it in the context of the requirements of KRS 403.270(2), and awarded

joint custody to the parties. This was not an abuse of the court’s discretion.

             Furthermore, the family court considered the factors listed in KRS

403.270(2), including the parties’ mental and physical health. Although Smith

does not specify what aspect of Asher’s mental or physical health the court failed

to consider, we can assume from the facts that he is referring to her history of

substance abuse. The court made multiple findings about Asher’s substance use

and unsuccessful completion of inpatient treatment. These findings indicate the

court’s consideration of KRS 403.270(2)(f).

                                         -5-
             Next, the family court was not required to determine Asher’s fitness to

parent. Smith cites Davis v. Collinsworth, 771 S.W.2d 329 (Ky. 1989), and

Forester v. Forester, 979 S.W.2d 928 (Ky. App. 1998), supporting his argument.

Neither case applies to this matter. In both Davis and Forester, a nonparent sought

custody of minor children. Parents have “fundamental, basic and constitutionally

protected rights” to their children. Davis, 771 S.W.2d at 330 (citing Santosky v.

Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 71 L. Ed. 2d 599 (1982); Stanley v.

Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 92 S. Ct. 1208, 31 L. Ed. 2d 551 (1972)). Because of the

constitutional significance of awarding custody to a nonparent, the nonparent must

meet the higher standard of proving the parent’s unfitness. Id. Smith and Asher

are the child’s parents, and the family court was not required to determine Asher’s

fitness to parent the child.

             Finally, it was not procedurally improper for the court to award joint

custody without giving Asher any timesharing. Custody and timesharing are

distinct determinations. Although many understand custody to mean physical

possession of the child, this is legally inaccurate. See Pennington v. Marcum, 266

S.W.3d 759, 676 (Ky. 2008). Custody refers to the authority to make decisions

regarding the child, and timesharing is the time the child spends with each parent.

Id. “[D]ecision-making is either vested in one parent or in both and how often the

child’s physical residence changes or the amount of time spent with each parent

                                         -6-
does not change this.” Id. at 767. Smith cites to nothing in the law that prevents a

court from awarding joint custody while denying one parent timesharing.

             Practically speaking, under the court’s decree, while joint custody

gives Asher an equal right to make decisions regarding the child alongside Smith,

she may not have the child in her physical possession so long as the current

timesharing order is in place.

             Based on the foregoing, the May 26, 2022 custody decree of the Clay

Circuit Court, Family Division, is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      NO BRIEF FILED FOR APPELLEE.

Stella B. House
Manchester, Kentucky

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