Court Opinion

ID: 9451903
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:26:52.087047+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:31.147402
License: Public Domain

J. JOSEPH SMITH, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
I dissent.
In my view it was error to refuse to compel disclosure of the identity of the informer. Russ’ defense was mistaken identity, and the informer was present at the transaction and conceivably could have testified that Russ was not the seller. Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 77 S.Ct. 623, 1 L.Ed.2d 639 (1957) teaches that disclosure must be compelled where the testimony would be “relevant and helpful to the defense.” 353 U.S. at 60-61, 77 S.Ct. at 628. While Roviaro has largely been followed only in eases where the defense is «fraud or entrapment, the defense of mistaken identity is properly within the doctrine, too. Indeed, the Court in Roviaro stated, at 64, 77 S.Ct. at 629, “[The informer] might have thrown doubt upon petitioner’s identity.” See also People v. Williams, 51 Cal.2d 355, 359-360, 333 P.2d 19 (1958), and People v. Lollis, 177 Cal.App.2d 665, 669, 2 Cal.Rept. 420 (1960) (dictum).
In United States v. Coke, 339 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1964), this court rejected an appeal such as Russ’ on the ground that the identity defense was first raised on appeal. Implicit in the decision was the view that if that ground had been timely asserted, disclosure would have become necessary. And quite apart from Roviaro, disclosure should have been compelled. Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963); compare Rugendorf v. United States, 376 U.S. 528, 534-535, 84 S.Ct. 825, 11 L.Ed.2d 887 (1964), and United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135 (2d Cir. 1964).
The majority stresses the strength of the evidence on the identification of Russ. I cannot agree that this is conclusive. Russ’ right to possibly relevant and helpful evidence is not dependent on the strength of the government’s ease, absent that evidence. It is to contradict that evidence that Russ seeks the name of the informant. It is enough that his claim, is not frivolous. There was here quite plainly an issue of identification, with but two witnesses produced and some discrepancies in their testimony. It was therefore quite reasonable for the defense to ask of the government the identity of any other known eyewitness to the transaction, informer or not, and the government, at least in the absence of a showing of danger of harm to the witness, should have been required to disclose it.
In my view the only close issue is whether appellant waived this ground for appeal by a failure to raise it on trial. It is true that the colloquy between the court and defense counsel was cryptic, and that counsel never explicitly asked for the informer’s name specifically on the ground that he was a witness as to identity. But defense counsel conducted a vigorous cross-examination of the Agents concerning their identification of Russ, and offered no defense, except to renew his request for the name of the informer.
In view of this, it would appear that Russ adequately informed the District Court of the basis of his claimed right to be told the name of the informer. Such a request, timely made, should have been granted. I would reverse for new trial.