Court Opinion

ID: 9809777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:27:08.777537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:22.873724
License: Public Domain

AlleN, J.,
concurring: I think the authorities establish the following principles, which are based on a sound public policy and on reason:
(1) That a common carrier is an insurer, and, without proof of negligence, is liable for all injuries to goods being trans*250ported, unless the injury is caused by the act of G-od, the public enemy, the negligence of the shipper, or by the inherent qualities of the goods.
(2) That the natural propensities of live stock are included in the term “inherent qualities.”
(3) That a private carrier for hire is not an insurer, but is a bailee, and is only liable for negligence.
(4) That the common carrier may limit its common-law liability as an insurer by contract which is reasonable and based on a valuable consideration, and when so limited it becomes a bailee for hire, and liable for negligence.
(5) That it cannot limit its liability for negligence.
The cases in our reports uniformly hold this doctrine, except Winslow v. R. R., 151 N. C., 250, which follows Jones v. R. R., 148 N. C., 580.
I do not think the Jones case was correctly decided, and believe it is wise to overrule it and the Winslow case. The learned judge who wrote the opinion in the Jones case cites, in support of the decision, four North Carolina cases: Selby v. R. R., 113 N. C., 588; Mitchell v. R. R., 124 N. C., 246; Gardner v. R. R., 127 N. C., 293, and Everett v. R. R., 138 N. C., 74, and quotes from the Gardiner case as follows: “In the Gardner case the law is summarized as follows: ‘A common carrier cañ make a valid agreement, fixing the value of shipments in case of loss by its negligence, if such agreement be reasonable or based upon a valuable consideration, and it must clearly appear that such was the intention of the parties.’ ”
I do not think these authorities sustain the decision.
In the Selby case the valuation clause in a bill of lading was not involved, and the only question raised was the reasonableness of a stipulation requiring the owner to give notice of injury to his stock before removal from possession of the carrier.
In the Mitchell case the bill of lading exempted the carrier from risks "not arising from negligence ” and the single question decided was whether, under such a bill of lading, the burden was on the plaintiff to prove negligence, or that a presumption of negligence arose from proof of injury while in possession of the carrier.
*251In the Gardner and Everett cases it was expressly held that the valuation clauses in those cases were not valid, and the owners were allowed to recover the amount of their losses.
The quotation from the Gardner case was taken from a headnote, and is not, I think, supported by the opinion.
It is said in that case: “It is a well-settled rule of law, practically of universal acceptance, that for reasons of public policy a common carrier is not permitted, even by express stipulation, to exempt itself from loss occasioned by its negligence.”
In the Everett case this is quoted with approval, as is the following from Hutchison on Carriers: “A majority of the authorities in the United States hold that it is contrary to public policy to permit the carrier to stipulate for exemption from the effects of the negligence of himself or his servants, and it is also held by a majority of the courts that a contract limiting the liability of the carrier to a certain sum in case of loss, that is, contracts designed to secure a partial exemption from liability, while valid and conclusive where the loss is occasioned by something other than the carrier’s negligence, cannot be allowed where the loss was occasioned by the negligence of himself or his servant, but that in such case the owner may recover the full value of the goods.”
I do not think Judge Ashe has been excelled for accuracy and clearness by any judge who has been a member of this Court, and in Capeheart v. R. R., 81 N. C., 443, speaking of the effect of stipulations in bills of lading limiting liability, he says: “Public policy demands that the right of the owner to absolute security against the negligence of the carrier and all persons engaged in performing his duty shall not be taken away by any reservation in his receipt, or by any arrangement between them and the performing company. . . . From an examination of the authorities on this subject, we conclude that a common carrier cannot, by special notice brought home to the knowledge of the owner of.the goods, much less by general notice, nor by contract even, exonerate himself from the duty to exercise ordinary care and prudence in the transportation of goods; and we deduce from the principles enunciated by them the following propositions: (1) That a common carrier being an insurer *252against all losses and damages, except those occurring from the act of God or the public enemy, may by special notice brought to the knowledge of the owner of goods delivered for transportation, or by contract, restrict his liability as an insurer, where there is no negligence on his part. (2) That he cannot by contract even limit his responsibility for loss or damage resulting from his want of the due exercise of ordinary care.”
In Cyc., vol. 6, 391, the author says: “The attempt on the part of carriers, to limit their liability as against their own negligence or that of their servants, has been particularly persistent where the contract of transportation is with reference to live stock, but such limitations have been uniformly held ineffectual.”
In this case the jury has found as a fact that the stock of the plaintiff was injured by the negligence of the defendant, under instructions to which there is no exception, and I, therefore, concur in the opinion that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the damages he sustained, notwithstanding the valuation clause in the bill of lading.