Court Opinion

ID: 9845002
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:13:45.251765+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:49.655837
License: Public Domain

*221UPON A REHEARING EN BANC
McCLANAHAN, Judge.
The Lynchburg Division of Social Services (“DSS”) appeals a custody order granting custody of a child to her grandparents, James and Sandra Cook (the “Cooks”). DSS argues that because the child was placed in the custody of DSS pursuant to an emergency removal order alleging abuse and neglect, and then made subject to a foster care plan, the trial court erred in subsequently transferring custody to the Cooks pursuant to certain custody related statutes (Code §§ 16.1— 241(A)(3), 16.1-278.15, 20-124.2 and 20-124.3) separate and apart from the foster care statutory scheme (Code §§ 16.1-281 through -282.1). A panel majority of this Court agreed with DSS and reversed the decision of the trial court. We granted a petition for rehearing en banc and stayed the mandate of the panel decision. Upon rehearing en banc, we affirm the trial court.

BACKGROUND

On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the Cooks, the prevailing parties below, and grant to them all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 13 Va.App. 123, 128, 409 S.E.2d 460, 463 (1991). On April 7, 2004, DSS removed the child from her parents’ custody, based on allegations against the father, and placed her in foster care. The Juvenile and Domestic Relations District Court of the City of Lynch-burg (“JDR court”) entered an emergency removal order on April 8, 2004. On July 1, 2004, the JDR court entered an order transferring custody to DSS, and approving a foster care plan with the goal of “return to home.” On January 4, 2005, the JDR court approved a foster care plan with a new goal of “continued foster care,” and scheduled a permanency planning hearing to be held on May 27, 2005.1
*222In the meantime, three different parties filed petitions for custody of the child. On April 6, 2004, the child’s mother, Amy Cook (“mother”), filed for custody.2 On April 8, 2004, the Cooks and the child’s father, Jimmy Cook (“father”), filed separate petitions for custody. Each of the petitions specifically referenced the JDR court’s jurisdiction over custody matters under Code § 16.1-241(A)(3)3—separate and apart from the statutory scheme governing the pending foster care plan. On March 4 and March 11, 2005, the JDR court conducted hearings on the petitions. After finding it to be in the child’s best interest, pursuant to Code §§ 16.1-278.15, 20-124.2, and 20-124.3, the JDR court transferred custody from DSS to the Cooks, by order dated March 11, 2005. The custody order also allowed supervised visitation with the mother, and prohibited visitation with the father. The mother, father, and DSS appealed.
DSS filed a pre-trial motion in circuit court to suspend execution of the JDR court’s March 11, 2005 order pending a trial de novo. By order dated April 12, 2005, the circuit court denied the motion and incorporated the JDR court’s order into its own interlocutory order, with modifications expediting the Cooks’ visitation schedule with the child before she commenced residing with them, then set for no later than May 30, 2005.
On May 25, 2005, the circuit court heard argument on DSS’s motion to remand based on a procedural challenge to the JDR court’s March 11, 2005 custody order. DSS contended the JDR court “lacked jurisdiction” to hear the Cooks’ custody petition because of the pending foster care plan, and requested that the circuit court thus remand the case to the JDR court for a permanency planning hearing, pursuant to the *223foster care statutes. Noting that disposition of the child’s custody had proceeded in JDR court on “two track[s] ... at the same time,” the circuit court ruled there was no “procedural defect” in the JDR court, which had the statutory authority to award custody of the child to the Cooks apart from the foster care plan. Accordingly, the circuit court further ruled there was no requirement or need for a permanency planning hearing in JDR court. The circuit court also granted the mother certain periods of unsupervised visitation with the child.
After a two-day trial in October 2005, the circuit court, like the JDR court, transferred custody to the Cooks upon finding it to be in the child’s best interest, under Code §§ 20-124.2 and 20-124.3.4 In addition, the court allowed unsupervised visitation with the mother, and supervised visitation with the father, as long as both remained in counseling. The court denied the father’s petition for custody, and reserved the right to revisit the mother’s petition for custody at a later date. The court also held that DSS no longer “need[ed] to be involved” with the case. DSS then filed this appeal.

ANALYSIS

DSS argues both the JDR court and the circuit court “lacked jurisdiction” to consider the custody petitions filed by the Cooks and the child’s parents.5 Because the child was the subject of a foster care plan filed with the JDR court pursuant to Code § 16.1-281, DSS contends the disposition of the child *224could only be decided under the procedures set forth in the foster care statutes. Under those procedures, according to DSS, the JDR court was limited to either reviewing the child’s status, reviewing the foster care plan, or conducting a permanency planning hearing. DSS thus contends that neither the JDR court, nor the circuit court on appeal, had the authority to “deviate” from the foster care statutory scheme by entertaining the parties’ custody petitions filed pursuant to Code § 16.1-241(A)(3), and awarding custody to the Cooks.
As a corollary to this argument, DSS further argues that the courts below applied the wrong standard in determining what was in the child’s best interest, and thereby transferring custody to relatives and awarding visitation to both mother and father, pursuant to Code §§ 16.1-278.15(F), 20-124.2(B), and 20-124.3. Instead, according to DSS, the courts were limited to applying standards set forth in the foster care statutes regarding an abused or neglected child’s contact or reunification with a parent, or placement of the child with a relative, as a foster care parent, pursuant to Code §§ 16.1-281(C1), 16.1-282(D1), and 16.1-282.1(A1). We disagree.6
A. Custody Award
An issue of statutory construction, as here presented, is “a pure question of law which we review de novo ” on appeal. Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104, 639 S.E.2d 174, 178 (2007) (citations omitted). Under well established principles, “[w]hen the language of a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of that language.” Id. In those instances, we do not “resort to *225the rules of statutory interpretation.” Last v. Virginia State Bd. of Med., 14 Va.App. 906, 910, 421 S.E.2d 201, 205 (1992). In other words, “when the General Assembly has used words of a definite import, we cannot give those words a construction that amounts to holding that the General Assembly meant something other than that which it actually expressed.” Britt Constr., Inc. v. Magazzine Clean, LLC, 271 Va. 58, 62-63, 623 S.E.2d 886, 888 (2006) (citations omitted).
Title 16.1 of the Code provides several procedural means of obtaining child custody. Here, DSS initially obtained in the JDR court custody of the Cooks’ granddaughter for placement in foster care, pursuant to Code §§ 16.1-281 through -282.1. The day after the child was taken from her parents by DSS, the Cooks filed their own petition for custody of the child in JDR court and were ultimately awarded custody, pursuant to Code §§ 16.1-241(A)(3), 16.1-278.15, 20-124.2, and 20-124.3.
Code § 16.1-241 sets forth the JDR court’s subject matter jurisdiction, including, among other things, “[t]he custody, visitation, support, control or disposition of a child ... [which] is a subject of controversy or requires determination.”7 Code § 16.1-241(A)(3). This statute further plainly states, in dis-positive terms: “The authority of the juvenile court to consider a petition involving the custody of a child shall not be proscribed or limited where the child has previously been awarded to the custody of a local board of social services,” as in the instant case. Code § 16.1-241(A) (emphasis added).
Code § 16.1-278.15 then provides, in relevant part, that “[i]n cases involving the custody, visitation or support of a child pursuant to subdivision A 3 of § 16.1-241, the court may make any order of disposition to protect the welfare of the child and family as may be made by the circuit court.” Code § 16.1-278.15(A) (emphasis added). Specifically, the JDR court “may award custody upon petition to any party with a *226legitimate interest therein, including, but not limited to, grandparents.... ” Code § 16.1-278.15(B). This statute then reiterates verbatim that the JDR court’s authority to consider such a petition for child custody “shall not be proscribed or limited where the custody of the child has previously been awarded to a local board of social services.” Id. (emphasis added).
In filing the petition for custody of their granddaughter under this statutory scheme, the Cooks were not seeking to merely “step into the shoes” of a foster care parent under a foster care plan, and were not limited to such status upon their petition. Rather, pursuant to the express terms of these statutes, the Cooks were entitled to bring a direct, independent action seeking a change in the child’s custody from DSS to the Cooks, separate and apart from any foster care plan. And both the JDR court and the circuit court, upon appeal, were expressly authorized to adjudicate the Cooks’ petition and award them custody. In Code §§ 16.1-241(A) and 16.1-278.15(B), the General Assembly has stated unequivocally that the JDR court’s authority to consider such a petition is not “proscribed or limited” by the fact that “custody of the child has previously been awarded to [DSS].” Consequently, through these provisions, the General Assembly has made the foster care plan statutes subordinate to the statutes under which the Cooks were awarded custody of their granddaughter, and did not conflate the two statutory schemes.
Given that the courts below had the authority to adjudicate the Cooks’ petition and award them custody apart from the foster care plan, the courts also correctly applied the “best interest of the child” standard in making that award, pursuant to Code §§ 16.1-278.15(F), 20-124.2(B), and 20-124.3, rather than the standard for approving foster care parents, which did not apply.8 Under Code § 16.1-278.15(F), *227the court is directed “[i]n any case or proceeding involving the custody or visitation of a child” to “consider the best interest of the child, including the considerations for determining custody and visitation set forth in Chapter 6.1 (§ 20-124.1 et seq.) of Title 20.”
Code § '20-124.2, in turn, provides, in relevant part: that “[i]n any case in which custody or visitation of minor children is at issue, whether in a circuit court or district court, the court shall provide prompt adjudication, upon due consideration of all the facts, ... [including] custody and visitation arrangements ... that “[i]n determining custody, the court shall give primary consideration to the best interests of the child”; and that “[t]he court shall give due regard to the primacy of the parent-child relationship but may upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the best interest of the child would be served thereby award custody or visitation to any other person with a legitimate interest,” including grandparents, as set forth in Code § 20-124.1. Code § 20-124.2(A) and (B).
Code § 20-124.3 then sets forth ten factors the court shall consider “[i]n determining best interests of a child for purposes of determining custody.” Those factors include, among others, “[t]he needs of the child, giving due consideration to other important relationships of the child, including but not limited to ... extended family members;” “[a]ny history of family abuse ...;” and “[s]uch other factors as the court deems necessary and proper to the determination.” Id. Here, the circuit court, after noting its review of the factors under this statute and in determining that awarding custody to the Cooks was in the child’s best interest, specifically found, inter alia, that “the child’s doing well in [the Cooks’] home” and that the court had “every confidence that they’ll be able to provide [the child] good support.”
*228In sum, both the JDR court and the circuit court acted pursuant to express statutory authority in adjudicating the Cooks’ petition for custody of their granddaughter, and in awarding them custody, upon finding that to be in the child’s best interest.
B. Attorney’s Fees
The Cooks request costs and attorney’s fees associated with this appeal. We have recognized an award of attorney’s fees associated with an appeal in matters properly brought before the JDR court may be appropriate under Code § 16.1-278.19. See Cartwright v. Cartwright, 49 Va.App. 25, 31, 635 S.E.2d 691, 694 (2006). However, we cannot say DSS’s position in this case was unreasonable, see O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 23 Va.App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996), because “the litigation addressed appropriate and substantial issues[,]” Estate of Hackler v. Hackler, 44 Va.App. 51, 75, 602 S.E.2d 426, 438 (2004). Therefore, we do not award attorney’s fees associated with this appeal.

CONCLUSION

For these reasons, we affirm the decision of the circuit court.

Affirmed.

. The requirements for the foster care plan are provided in Code § 16.1-281, the foster care review hearing in Code § 16.1-282, and the permanency planning hearing in Code § 16.1-282.1.

. The mother filed her petition the day she purportedly separated from her husband, the child’s father. DSS removed the child from the home the following day.

. Code § 16.1—241 (A)(3) grants the JDR court jurisdiction over custody matters involving a child ’’[wjhose custody ... is a subject of controversy or requires determination.”

. The circuit court specifically noted its review of the factors required to be considered under Code § 20-124.3 when determining the best interest of the child and, in doing so, found inter alia, that “the child’s doing well in [the Cooks’] home” and that the court had "every confidence that they’ll be able to provide [the child] good support.”

. DSS does not actually argue that the lower courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction in granting the Cooks’ custody petition, but rather argues that the courts erred in their exercise of authority over the child’s custody by applying the wrong custody related statutes when awarding custody to the Cooks. See Nelson v. Warden, 262 Va. 276, 552 S.E.2d 73 (2001) (explaining the distinction between subject matter jurisdiction and the authority to exercise that jurisdiction).

. Because we decide it was appropriate for the lower courts to proceed under Code §§ 16.1-241(A)(3) and 16.1-278.15, the fact that the child was the subject of a foster care plan was not controlling and the related statutes were not applicable to the courts’ adjudication of the three custody petitions before them. Consequently, DSS’s other arguments, which are erroneously premised on mandatory application of that plan and related statutes in this case, are rendered moot and will not be considered. See Commonwealth v. Harley, 256 Va. 216, 219-20, 504 S.E.2d 852, 854 (1998) (noting that appellate courts do not consider moot issues).

. This jurisdictional authority is distinct from that granted to the JDR court under this same statute regarding "[t]he custody, visitation, support, control or disposition of a child ... [w]ho is alleged to be abused [or] neglected....” Code § 16.1-241(A)(1).

. In other words, the courts below were not compelled, as DSS contends, to apply the standards and make the findings required for placing a child with a relative as a foster care parent, pursuant to Code §§ 16.1-28KC1), 16.1-282(D1), and 16.1-282.1(A1). We note, howev*227er, that Code § 16.1-282(D) incorporates the "best interest of the child" standard as part of the court’s review of a foster care plan.