Court Opinion

ID: 9372860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:01:10.703834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:38.095598
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                          MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     MITCH WINE,                                       DOCKET NUMBER
                           Appellant,                  DA-1221-16-0513-W-2

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,                       DATE: February 10, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Mitch Wine, Mountain View, Arkansas , pro se.

           Annette Tarnawsky, Esquire, and John Austin, Esquire, Knoxville,
             Tennessee, for the agency.

                                             BEFORE

                                 Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                   Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                    Tristan L. Leavitt, Member
                               Member Limon recused himself and
                       did not participate in the adjudication of this appeal.

                                         FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     denied his request for corrective action in this individual right of a ction appeal.

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                             2

     Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only in the following
     circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings of material fact;
     the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of statute or regulation
     or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the case; the administrative
     judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or the initial decision
     were not consistent with required procedures or involved an abuse of discretion,
     and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or new and material
     evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the petitioner’s due
     diligence, was not available when the record closed.           Title 5 of the Code of
     Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115).                 After fully
     considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition f or review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review. Except as expressly MODIFIED to
     clarify the applicable legal standards and supplement the administrative judge’s
     analysis of the agency’s burden of proof, we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                        BACKGROUND
¶2         The following facts, as further detailed in the initial decision and record,
     appear to be undisputed.       At all times relevant to this appeal, the appellant
     worked for the Department of the Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS).
     Wine v. Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-16-0513-W-2,
     Refiled Appeal File (RAF), Tab 6, Initial Decision (ID) at 2. 2 From June 2003 to
     October 2014, he worked as a Transportation Liaison wherein his duties included
     coordinating with the Arkansas Highway and Transportation Department

     2
        To accommodate scheduling conflicts, the administrative judge dismissed the
     appellant’s initial appeal without prejudice, for automatic refiling at a later date. Wine
     v. Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-16-0513-W-1, Initial Appeal
     File, Tab 114, Initial Decision. It was refiled on the appointed date as MSPB Docket
     No. DA-1221-16-0513-W-2.
                                                                                      3

     (AHTD), the Federal Highway Administration (FHA), and other entities to
     mitigate the environmental impact of transportation projects. Id.
¶3         In 2011, the appellant purchased a tract of land, and in the years that
     followed he sought out a Nationwide Permit (NWP) from the United States Army
     Corps of Engineers (USACE) to use that land as a mitigation bank —in his
     personal capacity, through a limited liability corporation he owned. ID at 2 -3;
     see, e.g., Wine v. Department of the Interior, MSPB Docket No. DA-1221-16-
     0513-W-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 41 at 23, Tab 45 at 4-10. The appellant
     has described mitigation banking in a succinct manner that is useful background
     information endorsed by the agency. Wine v. Department of the Interior, MSPB
     Docket No. DA-1221-16-0513-W-2, Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 7 at 7-8,
     Tab 15 at 6.   In short, mitigation is required for projects that will negatively
     impact the waters of the United States.        PFR File, Tab 7 at 7.       This is
     accomplished through various means, including compensation. Id. Compensation
     involves a system regulated by the USACE wherein an entity compensates for the
     damage it causes to one parcel through the repair of another. Id. In practice, this
     works as follows: If, for example, the AHTD is unable to avoid or minimize
     damage to a waterway during the construction of a highway, that damage is
     assigned a number of mitigation credits. Id. at 7-8. The AHTD then purchases a
     corresponding number of mitigation credits from a mitigation banker, i.e., a
     separate individual or entity that generated credits through restoration projects.
     Id.
¶4         In September 2013, the appellant sought and received agency approval to
     engage in outside employment—mitigation banking.         ID at 3-4; IAF, Tab 13
     at 125-27. A year later, in October 2014, the appellant left his Transportation
     Liaison position to become the agency’s Karst and Cave Biologist.         ID at 4.
     Despite this change in position, the appellant’s FWS work continued to involve
     the AHTD and other outside entities. For example, in his new role, the appellant
     assessed whether AHTD projects adversely affected the groundwater and
                                                                                       4

     endangered species in the Karst region. ID at 15. In October 2014, just after the
     change in his FWS position, the appellant received the NWP he had been seeking
     for his personal mitigation bank. ID at 3; IAF, Tab 46 at 5-6.
¶5         Between February and May 2015, the appellant reported what he believed
     were violations of the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and th e
     National Environmental Policy Act in connection with several AHTD projects, as
     well as a sewer project for the City of Centerton. ID at 4. Around this same
     period, the appellant actively solicited both the AHTD and the USACE regarding
     the mitigation credits he had to offer. ID at 5.
¶6         In June 2015, the USACE contacted the FWS, expressing ethics concerns
     about the appellant—concerns the USACE described as being shared by the
     AHTD and the FHA.          ID at 5-6.    Specifically, the USACE recounted the
     appellant’s “decreasingly professional demeanor” in the form of aggressive
     telephone calls and emails, as well as a perceived conflict of interest between the
     appellant’s FWS position and his mitigation banking. Id.; IAF, Tab 11 at 116-17.
     For example, the USACE official recounted how the appellant had, at times,
     called staff to discuss both his FWS work and mitigation banking work in the
     same lengthy telephone call. IAF, Tab 11 at 116. This USACE official also
     recounted how the appellant had essentially worked on certain AHTD projects in
     his FWS role, then claimed violations on those projects, and then hoped for or
     expected AHTD to resolve the matter by purchasing the mitigation credits he
     personally had available for sale. Id. at 116-17.
¶7         In August 2015, the appellant’s employing agency—FWS—hired an outside
     firm to investigate USACE’s allegations. ID at 6-7; see, e.g., IAF, Tab 11 at 73.
     Around that same time, the appellant completed a 2 -week detail assignment. ID
     at 35; see, e.g., IAF, Tab 11 at 126. After the conclusion of its investigation, the
     agency issued a January 2016 letter asking the appellant to either cease his
     mitigation banking or resign from his FWS position, effectively rescinding the
                                                                                              5

     approval for outside activity that had been granted 2 years e arlier. 3 ID at 7; IAF,
     Tab 11 at 20-22. The agency subsequently issued a March 2016 memorandum of
     expectations that, among other things, prohibited him from communicating with
     USACE or AHTD on official time, with some exceptions, and reassigned some of
     his duties. ID at 7-8; IAF, Tab 10 at 60-61.
¶8         The appellant filed two complaints with the Office of Special Counsel
     (OSC), alleging that the agency had subjected him to whistleblower reprisal. ID
     at 8-9. He later filed the instant IRA appeal alleging the same. IAF, Tab 1.
¶9         After developing the record and holding the requested hearing, the
     administrative judge denied the appellant’s request for corrective action. ID at 2.
     She first found that the appellant met his burden of proving that he made
     protected disclosures, which generally pertained to violations of environmental
     laws, and those protected disclosures were a contributing factor in 4 alleged
     personnel actions:      the 2-week detail assignment (Personnel Action 1); the
     decision to rescind his approval to engage in outside activity (Personnel
     Action 3); the restriction on his communications with USACE and AHTD
     (Personnel Action 4); and the reassignment of certain duties (Personnel
     Action 5). 4 ID at 13-20, 22-32. Although the appellant alleged that the agency’s
     investigation (Personnel Action 2) constituted another covered personnel action,
     the administrative judge found otherwise. ID at 20 -22. Because she found that
     the appellant established a prima facie case of reprisal, the administrative judge
     shifted the burden and found that the agency proved that it would have taken the

     3
        In the initial decision, the administrative judge identified this letter as dated
     December 2015, but the associated citation and description corresponds to a letter dated
     January 2016. Compare ID at 7, with IAF, Tab 11 at 20-22. The appellant has also, at
     times, referred to this memorandum as being dated December 2015. PFR File, Tab 7
     at 30. For the sake of clarity, our decision will exclusively refer to the January 2016
     date.
     4
      For the sake of clarity, we will utilize the same identifying descriptors from the initial
     decision—Personnel Actions 1-5.
                                                                                        6

      same actions in the absence of the appellant’s protected whistleblowing.        ID
      at 32-55.
¶10        The appellant has filed a petition for review. PFR File, Tab 7. The agency
      has filed a response, and the appellant has replied. PFR File, Tabs 15, 18. The
      appellant has since filed three motions. PFR File, Tabs 19-20, 27. In the first,
      the appellant’s attorney requested oral argument before the Board, simply citing
      “the complexity of the matter.” PFR File, Tab 19. That request is denied. See
      New v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 99 M.S.P.R. 404, ¶ 13 (2005) (denying a
      request for oral argument where the appellant failed to indicate what would be
      presented at oral argument or show that such argument would add to the
      proceedings); Social Security Administration v. Harty, 96 M.S.P.R. 65, ¶ 13
      (2004) (same).    In the second, filed by the appellant himself because he
      terminated his representative, the appellant requests leave to submit additional
      arguments and evidence.     PFR File, Tab 20 at 4, Tab 23 at 2.        The agency
      presented an argument in opposition, after the Clerk of the Board denied the
      agency’s attempt to submit evidence in opposition. PFR File, Tabs 22, 24. It
      seems that the basis for the appellant’s request, which the agency opposes, is a
      combination of dissatisfaction with his attorney’s choices, documents from 2016
      that he recently discovered, and a new legal theory. PFR File, Tab 20 at 4-6. The
      appellant’s request is denied. See, e.g., 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(a) (recognizing the
      pleadings allowed on review); Banks v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R.
      268, 271 (1980) (the Board will not consider an argument raised for the first time
      in a petition for review absent a showing that it is based on new and mate rial
      evidence not previously available despite the party’s due diligence); Avansino v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 3 M.S.P.R. 211, 214 (1980) (the Board will not consider
      evidence submitted for the first time with the petition for review absent a showing
      that it was unavailable before the record was closed despite the party’s due
      diligence); see also Grassell v. Department of Transportation, 40 M.S.P.R. 554,
      564 (1989) (to constitute new and material evidence, the information contained in
                                                                                         7

      the documents, not just the documents themselves, must have been unavailable
      despite due diligence when the record closed). For the same reasons, we also
      deny the appellant’s third motion, which also seeks an opportunity to present
      additional arguments and evidence, this time regarding what the appellant
      describes as medical evidence proving that he was harmed by agency reprisal.
      PFR File, Tab 27.

                                          ANALYSIS
¶11         Under the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA),
      Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465, the Board has jurisdiction over an IRA
      appeal if the appellant has exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC and
      makes nonfrivolous allegations that (1) he made a protected disclosure described
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity described under
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D), and (2) the disclosure or protected
      activity was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a
      personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A). Salerno v. Department
      of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016).       Once an appellant establishes
      jurisdiction over his IRA appeal, he is entitled to a hearing on the merits of his
      claim, which he must prove by preponderant evidence. Id.
¶12         If the appellant proves that his protected disclosure or activity was a
      contributing factor in a personnel action taken against him, the agency is given an
      opportunity to prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that it would have taken
      the same personnel action in the absence of the protected disclosure.        Id.   In
      determining whether the agency has met this burden, the Board will c onsider the
      following factors:   (1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its
      action; (2) the existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the
      agency officials involved in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency
      takes similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers, but who are
      otherwise similarly situated.   Carr v. Social Security Administration, 185 F.3d
                                                                                           8

      1318, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Board does not view these factors as discrete
      elements, each of which the agency must prove by clear and convincing evidence,
      but rather, the Board will weigh the factors together to determine whether the
      evidence is clear and convincing as a whole.             Phillips v. Department of
      Transportation, 113 M.S.P.R. 73, ¶ 11 (2010). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
      Federal Circuit has added that “[e]vidence only clearly and convincingly supports
      a conclusion when it does so in the aggregate considering all the pertinent
      evidence in the record, and despite the evidence that fairly detracts from that
      conclusion.” Whitmore v. Department of Labor, 680 F.3d 1353, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
      2012).

      The scope of this appeal is limited to the personnel actions that were identified in
      the prehearing summary.
¶13         There appears to be no dispute that the appellant met the exhaustion
      requirement regarding several alleged personnel actions. See, e.g., IAF, Tab 54
      at 45-46, 50-51. In his complaints to OSC, the appellant alleged that he disclosed
      violations of the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and the National
      Environmental Policy Act by the AHTD, USACE, and City of Centerton, IAF,
      Tab 4 at 38, 45-46, Tab 38 at 14-15, 21-22, after which FWS engaged in
      retaliation in the form of an investigation (Personnel Action 2), IAF, Tab 4 at 40,
      46, Tab 38 at 22, the decision to rescind his approval for outside activity
      (Personnel Action 3), IAF, Tab 4 at 40, 47, Tab 38 at 16, 22-23, the restriction on
      his communications with USACE and AHTD (Personnel Action 4), IAF, Tab 4
      at 40, 47-48, Tab 38 at 16, 23, and the reassignment of certain job duties
      (Personnel Action 5), IAF, Tab 4 at 47-48. 5
¶14         On review, the appellant suggests that the administrative judge erroneously
      limited the scope of his appeal to exclude two other alleged personnel actions:
      the agency’s January 2016 letter rescinding the approval for outside activity and

      5
       We will not address Personnel Action 1 in this decision, since neither party raised it
      on review and the appellant has seemingly abandoned the claim.
                                                                                        9

      its March 2016 memorandum of expectations.          He seems to suggest that the
      documents constitute additional personnel actions, above and beyond Personnel
      Actions 3-5, the personnel actions first identified within those documents. PFR
      File, Tab 7 at 30. He also alludes to a hostile work environment, as if that may
      have been yet another personnel action. Id. at 28. However, the appellant did not
      raise these as personnel actions below, in response to the administrative judge’s
      prehearing summary, which identified the only issues to be considered.        IAF,
      Tab 94 at 2-3. Accordingly, we will not consider them on review. See Crowe v.
      Small Business Administration, 53 M.S.P.R. 631, 634-35 (1992) (explaining that
      an issue is not properly before the Board when it is not included in the
      administrative judge’s memorandum summarizing the prehearing conference,
      which states that no other issues will be considered, unless either party objects);
      see also Durr v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 119 M.S.P.R. 195, ¶ 16 n.2
      (2013) (applying this principle in the context of a new theory of alleged
      whistleblower retaliation that was not among the issues considered before the
      administrative judge, even if that theory had been exhausted before OSC).

      The appellant is not entitled to corrective action for Personnel Action 2.
¶15        As mentioned above, there is no dispute that the appellant met his burden of
      proving exhaustion for the matters properly before us on review, including
      Personnel Actions 2-5. Supra ¶ 13. Similarly undisputed is the administrative
      judge’s finding that the appellant made protected disclosures.         ID at 13-19.
      Generally speaking, those disclosures involved his various reports of construction
      projects either causing environmental damage or failing to meet applicable
      standards in violation of the Endangered Species Act, the Clean Water Act, and
      the National Environmental Policy Act. ID at 13-15. For example, the appellant
      disclosed that the AHTD’s work on a particular project —Highway 5—had
      resulted in a nearby stream’s contamination, as demonstrated by his measurement
      of turbidity, which would adversely affect species in the region. ID at 14-15; see,
      e.g., IAF, Tab 4 at 53-56, Tab 14 at 130. The appellant made these disclosures to
                                                                                              10

      numerous officials or entities, including his chain of command, the Arkansas
      Department of Environmental Qualify (ADEQ), the USACE, and the U.S.
      Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of Arkansas. ID at 15-18. In fact, for
      the aforementioned example, ADEQ responded to the appellant’s disclosure by
      investigating and determining that the AHTD had failed to utilize proper controls
      to prevent contamination. ID at 15; IAF, Tab 4 at 51-52, 58-59. Further, the
      appellant’s first- and second-level supervisors both testified that they agreed with
      at least some of the appellant’s assessments of environmental violations, and his
      disclosures resulted in the remediation of multiple sites. 6 ID at 16-17.
¶16         It is also undisputed that the appellant’s protected disclosures were close
      enough     in   time    to   satisfy    the    contributing       factor    criterion   for
      Personnel Actions 2-5. ID at 30-32.        However, what is disputed on review is
      whether Personnel Action 2 constituted a covered personnel action and, if so,
      whether the agency proved that it would have taken the same action in the
      absence of the appellant’s whistleblowing. The administrative judge found that
      the appellant failed to meet his burden of presenting a prima facie case of
      whistleblower reprisal regarding the agency’s investigation, Personnel Action 2,
      because that investigation was not a covered personnel action.               ID at 20 -22.
      On review, the appellant reasserts that the agency’s investigation was a cove red
      personnel action, and it would not have occurred in the absence of his
      whistleblowing. PFR File, Tab 7 at 10-19.
¶17         A   “personnel    action”    is   defined   as   follows:       (i)   appointments;
      (ii) promotions; (iii) actions under 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 or other disciplin ary or

      6
        The administrative judge recognized that the appellant’s disclosures were “related to”
      his duties. ID at 12. However, she noted that the appellant’s supervisor provided
      testimony indicating that at least some of the appellant’s disclosures were outside his
      normal duties, and the agency does not appear to have argued otherwise. ID at 16; PFR
      File, Tab 15 at 10. Accordingly, this appeal does not appear to implicate 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(f)(2), the provision identifying a heightened legal burden in cases that involve a
      disclosure made in the normal course of duties of an employee.
                                                                                           11

      corrective actions; (iv) details, transfers, or reassignments; (v) reinstatements;
      (vi) restorations; (vii) reemployments; (viii) performance evaluations under
      5 U.S.C. chapter 43 or under Title 38; (ix) decisions regarding pay, benefits, or
      awards, or involving education or training if it reasonably may be expected to
      lead to an appointment, promotion, performance evaluation, or other action
      described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A); (x) decisions to order psychiatric testing
      or examination; (xi) implementations or enforcements of any nondisclosure
      policy, form, or agreement; and (xii) any other significant changes in duties,
      responsibilities, or working conditions.      5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A); Spivey v.
      Department of Justice, 2022 MSPB 24, ¶ 6.             In arguing that the agency’s
      investigation constitutes a covered personnel action, even though it is not
      specifically enumerated in section 2302(a)(2)(A), the appellant presents a
      two-fold argument about the law, followed by an argument about the facts. We
      will address each in turn.

           The Applicable Standard 7
¶18         The appellant first refers us to a change in the law between the
      Whistleblower Protection Act (WPA) and the WPEA. PFR File, Tab 7 at 10-11.
      Among other things, the latter added 5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(4) to the relevant
      statutory scheme. See WPEA § 104. That provision provides as follows: “Any
      corrective action ordered under this section to correct a prohibited personnel
      practice may include fees, costs, or damages reasonably incurred due to an agency

      7
         Though not raised by the appellant, we recognize that the National Defense
      Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018, Pub. L. No. 115 -91, 131 Stat. 1283, was signed
      into law on December 12, 2017, just after the issuance of the initial decision in the
      instant appeal. Spivey, 22 MSPB 24, ¶ 5 n.1. In particular, Congress added a provision
      to 5 U.S.C. § 1214 that allows OSC to petition the Board for corrective action
      concerning damages incurred by an employee due to an agency’s investigation of the
      employee if it was commenced, expanded, or extended in retaliation for protected
      whistleblowing activity. Id.; see 5 U.S.C. § 1214(i). Regardless of questions
      concerning retroactivity, the provision does not apply to the instant IRA appeal because
      OSC has not petitioned the Board for such relief. Spivey, 2022 MSPB 24, ¶ 5 n.1.
                                                                                       12

      investigation of the employee, if such investigation was commenced, expanded,
      or extended in retaliation for the disclosure or protected activity that formed the
      basis of the corrective action.”      5 U.S.C. § 1221(g)(4).     According to the
      appellant, the addition of section 1221(g)(4) shows that Congress intended to
      expand whistleblower protections to include retaliatory investigations as
      actionable personnel actions, on their own.      PFR File, Tab 7 at 10 -11.     We
      disagree.
¶19         Section 1221(g)(4) does not create a separate cause of action fo r retaliatory
      investigations. In fact, the legislative history shows that Congress considered and
      rejected the option of changing the standard developed under the WPA and Board
      precedent to recognize a retaliatory investigation as a personnel action because
      Congress wanted to avoid discouraging agencies from undertaking legitimate and
      necessary inquiries. See S. Rep. No. 112-155, at 20-22 (2012), as reprinted in
      2012 U.S.C.C.A.N. 589, 608-09 (referencing Russell v. Department of Justice,
      76 M.S.P.R. 317, 323-25 (1997)). Congress opted to instead authorize an award
      of consequential damages once an employee is able to prove a claim u nder the
      WPA, if the employee can further demonstrate that an investigation was
      undertaken in retaliation for the protected disclosure. Id. at 21-22; see 5 C.F.R.
      § 1201.202(b)(2).     Accordingly, the appellant’s first argument about his
      retaliation by investigation claim fails.
¶20         The appellant’s second argument, in the alternative, is that the agency’s
      investigation qualified as a covered personnel action, even before the WPEA’s
      addition of section 1221(g)(4).      PFR File, Tab 7 at 11.     He asserts that “a
      retaliatory investigation was considered a personnel action if it was a pretext for
      gathering evidence to retaliate.” Id. (citing Russell, 76 M.S.P.R. at 323-24). On
      this point, we again disagree.     The appellant appears to misunderstand Board
      precedent.
¶21         An investigation into an allegation of misconduct is not a personnel action
      per se. Spivey, 2022 MSPB 24, ¶ 10. Instead, the investigation must otherwise fit
                                                                                        13

      within one of the items listed under section 2302(a)(2)(A) to constitute a covered
      personnel action. See id. (discussing S. Rep. No. 112-155, at 20). However, even
      if the investigation does not constitute a significant change in working conditions
      or other personnel action enumerated in section 2302(a)(2)(A), the Board will
      consider evidence of the conduct of an agency investigation when it is so closely
      related to a personnel action that it could have been pretext for gathering
      evidence to retaliate.   Spivey, 2022 MSPB 24, ¶ 10; Russell, 76 M.S.P.R. at
      323-24. In considering such evidence, the Board looks at where the investigation
      had its beginnings. Russell, 76 M.S.P.R. at 324.
¶22        The Board’s decision in Mangano v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      109 M.S.P.R. 658 (2008), best illustrates how the appellant’s assertions about the
      applicable standard are mistaken.     The appellant in Mangano argued that the
      administrative judge erred by finding that two investigations—an Administrative
      Investigation Board (AIB) and a Quality Improvement Review (QIR) —were not
      personnel actions.   Id., ¶¶ 3, 36.   The Board did not adopt the appellant’s
      position, and the Board did not find that the agency’s investigations were covered
      personnel actions. Id., ¶¶ 36-44. Instead, the Board recognized that the AIB and
      QIR investigations were so closely related to the misconduct charge underlying
      the appellant’s removal that they could have been pretext for gathering evidence
      to use to retaliate for his whistleblowing.   Id., ¶ 44.   In doing so, the Board
      discussed how the QIR was convened by the subject of the employee’s
      whistleblowing and was conducted in an unusual manner, and the agency included
      the AIB results in its misconduct charge against the employee in a way that was
      inconsistent with the investigatory results. Id. Under those circumstances, the
      Board concluded that the appellant’s allegation of retaliation by investigation
      concerning the AIB and QIR should be considered on remand in determining the
      strength of the agency’s evidence supporting the appellant’s removal.       Id.   In
      other words, the alleged retaliation by investigation was not a separate personnel
      action subject to its own burden-shifting analysis.     Instead, the Board would
                                                                                       14

      consider the alleged retaliation by investigation as part of the burden -shifting
      analysis of a personnel action that is enumerated in section 2302(a)(2)(A).

           Applying the Applicable Standard to This Appeal
¶23        Turning back to the instant appeal, the administrative judge found that the
      appellant failed to establish that the investigation constituted a personnel action
      as defined in section 2302(a)(2)(A), or that the investigation was a pretext for
      gathering evidence to retaliate for his whistleblowing. ID at 20 -22. She further
      found that even if the appellant had met his burden regarding Personnel Action 2,
      the agency met its burden of proving that it would have conducted the
      investigation in the absence of the appellant’s whistleblowing activity.         ID
      at 36-46, 52-55.   We agree with the administrative judge’s findings of fact.
      However, we modify the initial decision to apply those findings of fact to the
      proper standards, which we just described.
¶24        Again, an investigation is not a personnel action, per se.        Supra ¶ 21.
      Furthermore, we found no substantive argument or evidence establishing that the
      investigation at issue in this appeal, which was conducted by an outside party,
      constituted a significant change in the appellant’s working conditions or other
      enumerated personnel action, as defined in section 2302(a)(2)(A).
¶25        The more relevant question is whether retaliation by investigation tainted
      any personnel action that is enumerated in section 2302(a)( 2)(A).       See supra
      ¶¶ 21-22. To the extent that the administrative judge applied the burden shifting
      framework to the appellant’s retaliation by investigation claim, as if it might be a
      separate personnel action, she erred.        ID at 36-46, 52-55; see Clarke v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R. 154, ¶ 19 n.10 (2014) (stating that
      the Board may not proceed to the clear and convincing evidence test unless it has
      first determined that the appellant established his prima facie case), aff’d,
      623 F. App’x 1016 (Fed. Cir. 2015).          Nevertheless, we find no basis for
      disturbing the underlying findings of fact about the legitimacy or nonretaliatory
      nature of the investigation, findings which are more appropriately considered in
                                                                                        15

      connection with whether the agency would have taken Personnel Actions 3-5 in
      the absence of the appellant’s whistleblowing. See Mangano, 109 M.S.P.R. 658,
      ¶ 44; supra ¶ 22.
¶26         Although the appellant reasserts that the investigation was a pre text for
      retaliation, PFR File, Tab 7 at 11, he has failed to present any persuasive basis for
      us to disturb the administrative judge’s findings to the contrary, which are largely
      based on hearing testimony and credibility determinations regarding several
      witnesses from multiple agencies, ID at 21-22, 36-46, 52-55; see Haebe v.
      Department of Justice, 288 F.3d 1288, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (recognizing that the
      Board must give deference to an administrative judge’s credibility determinations
      when they are based, explicitly or implicitly, on the observation of the demeanor
      of witnesses testifying at a hearing). The appellant suggests that the USACE
      complaint and ensuing investigation was a coordinated effort between officials at
      USACE and his management chain to stop his whistleblowing. PFR File, Tab 7
      at 11-13 (citing IAF, Tab 48 at 32). Yet the only evidence to which the appellant
      refers us is not supportive. IAF, Tab 48 at 32. Instead, that evidence merely
      shows that the appellant’s management chain was concerned about the precise
      matters raised in USACE’s complaint—the appellant’s tone and professionalism
      when dealing with outside entities and the propriety of his mitigation banking
      while employed at FWS. Id.
¶27         To the extent that they are relevant under the applicable standards, we have
      also considered the appellant’s follow-up arguments about whether the
      investigation would have occurred in the absence of his disclosures. PFR File,
      Tab 7 at 12-19.      Generally speaking, these arguments dispute some of the
      underlying allegations from the USACE complaint—the USACE complaint that
      precipitated the agency’s investigation.      Id.   For example, in response to
      USACE’s complaint that the appellant was blurring the line between his FWS
      work and personal mitigation banking work by conducting both in the same phone
      calls to USACE staff, IAF, Tab 11 at 116, the appellant suggests that he was
                                                                                           16

      entitled to multiple breaks each day, during which he was free to attend to his
      mitigation banking or any other personal matter, PFR File, Tab 7 at 14 -15. In
      response to USACE’s complaint about the possible conflict of interest between
      his mitigation banking and FWS work, which explicitly cited three sets of
      regulatory   provisions,   see    IAF,   Tab   11    at   116-17   (citing    5   C.F.R.
      §§-2635.401-.403     (governing     conflicting     financial   interests),   .501-.503
      (governing impartiality in performing official duties), .801 -.809 (governing
      outside activities)), the appellant attempts to show that one set of those
      regulations did not apply under the circumstances, PFR File, Tab 7 at 16 -17
      (citing 5 C.F.R. §§ 2635.401, .402 (governing conflicting financial interests)).
      We are not persuaded. Among other things, the administrative judge found that
      officials from multiple agencies had valid concerns about the propriety of the
      appellant’s actions and were not prompting the investigation as a pretext for
      retaliation—a conclusion based largely on credibility.          E.g., ID at 46.     The
      appellant’s arguments do not warrant a different conclusion. See Haebe, 288 F.3d
      at 1301.

      The appellant is not entitled to corrective action for Personnel Actions 3-5.
¶28        The only matter disputed on review for Personnel Actions 3-5 is whether
      the agency met its burden of proving that it would have taken the same actions in
      the absence of the appellant’s whistleblowing. PFR File, Tab 7 at 19 -29. Once
      again, in analyzing the agency’s burden, the Board will c onsider the following
      factors: (1) the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its action; (2) the
      existence and strength of any motive to retaliate on the part of the agency
      officials involved in the decision; and (3) any evidence that the agency takes
      similar actions against employees who are not whistleblowers, but who are
      otherwise similarly situated. Carr, 185 F.3d at 1323; supra ¶ 12.
                                                                                       17

           We modify the initial decision to clarify the applicable standards .
¶29        As a preliminary matter, we note that the administrative judge gave the
      parties proper notice of the burdens below, describing the Carr factors just as we
      have in both the jurisdictional order and a prehearing conference summary. IAF,
      Tab 3 at 6, Tab 94 at 2 n.3. However, she characterized the first Carr factor
      somewhat differently in the initial decision by referring to “whether the ag ency
      had legitimate reasons for the personnel action.” ID at 33. This is consistent
      with how the Board has described the first Carr factor, at times, when analyzing a
      personnel action that is not disciplinary.     ID at 33; see, e.g., Gonzales v.
      Department of the Navy, 101 M.S.P.R. 248, ¶ 12 (2006) (explaining that the first
      Carr factor did not apply straightforwardly to the agency’s imposition of a shift
      change, which was a covered personnel action but was not disciplinary and did
      not require evidence of misconduct, so it was appropriate to consider the broader
      question of whether the agency had legitimate reasons for the shift chang e). The
      administrative judge later described the first Carr factor as one of “independent
      causation” for the personnel actions. E.g., ID at 46, 48, 50. Though not raised by
      either party on review, we modify the initial decision to clarify any resulting
      confusion.   Despite the administrative judge’s different descriptions, the first
      Carr factor remains the strength of the agency’s evidence in support of its action.
      See Miller v. Department of Justice, 842 F.3d 1252, 1257, 1259 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
      (acknowledging that “independent causation” is another way the agency’s overall
      burden of proof has been described and recognizing that the first Carr factor is
      not a question of “whether the agency has put forward some evidence purporting
      to show independent causation, but instead . . . whether such evidence is strong”).
¶30        We also recognize that while the administrative judge initially characterized
      the Carr factors as part of the agency’s burden, ID at 32-33, her subsequent
      discussion of the second and third Carr factors suggested otherwise by finding
      that the appellant did not present any credible motive to retaliate on the part of
      pertinent agency officials and did not identify any similarly situated employees.
                                                                                       18

      ID at 54-55. The appellant has argued that these findings reflect an improper
      shifting of the burden to him. PFR File, Tab 7 at 29. To the extent that the initial
      decision could be interpreted as such, we clarify that it was the agency’s burden
      regarding each of the Carr factors, not the appellant’s, just as the administrative
      judge previously explained. Supra ¶ 12; ID at 32-33; IAF, Tab 3 at 6, Tab 94 at 2
      n.3.

             The agency met its burden.
¶31          Aside from the modifications explicitly identified below, we discern no
      basis for reaching a conclusion different than the administrative judge .       The
      agency met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that it would
      have taken Personnel Actions 3-5—the decision to rescind his approval to engage
      in outside activity, the restriction on his communications with USACE and
      AHTD, and the reassignment of certain duties—in the absence of the appellant’s
      whistleblowing. For the first Carr factor, the administrative judge’s extensive
      findings of fact reflect strong evidence in support of Personnel Actions 3-5,
      findings with which we agree. ID at 36-52. While we need not recount all of
      these findings, we will provide a brief summary.
¶32          Most relevant to Personnel Action 3, the administrative judge’s findings
      detail ample evidence of the appellant conducting personal work during business
      hours on days in which he was working for FWS, evidence that included the
      appellant’s own admissions. E.g., ID at 36-37. Even if we were to assume that
      he only did so during breaks, as the appellant asserts, the evidence shows that
      officials with the USACE, AHTD, and FHA all perceived his dual role as a
      conflict of interest, and they were routinely confused about which role the
      appellant was representing during their interactions. E.g., ID at 36-46. In fact,
      AHTD credited that conflict of interest for their rejection of the appellant’s
      mitigation banking bid on one particular project and denying permission eve n
      before the appellant bid on another.      ID at 44.    The administrative judge’s
      findings also detail how multiple FWS officials were involved in the approval of
                                                                                        19

      the appellant’s outside activity request, but they did so with limited information
      and ultimately regretted the decision as the conflict posed by the appellant’s dual
      role became more apparent. ID at 46-47.
¶33         Next, most relevant to Personnel Action 4, some of the same officials from
      the USACE and AHTD provided detailed descriptions of the appellant’s behavior,
      which they generally characterized as accusatory, aggressive, and threatening. ID
      at 38-43.   And when given a temporary restriction on his contact with these
      entities to investigate the same, the appellant flouted the restriction. ID at 48-50.
      Finally, most relevant to Personnel Action 5, the administrative judge detailed
      how the FWS had actually reassigned certain duties in response to the appellant’s
      own accommodations request for personal health reasons. ID at 50-52.
¶34         Turning to the second Carr factor, the administrative judge found little or
      no motive to retaliate on the part of relevant agency officials. ID at 52-54. If
      anything, it appears that FWS officials found disclosures like the appellant’s to be
      both expected and appreciated of an individual in his position, even if they did
      not agree with the manner in which the appellant conveyed some of his concerns.
      See, e.g., ID at 15-17, 52. The administrative judge also noted, inter alia, that the
      relevant agency officials gave the appellant positive performance reviews during
      the same period, they supported his request for a detail assignment, and they
      attempted to modify his job duties to alleviate work-related stress. ID at 52.
¶35         On review, the appellant suggests that the administrative judge should have
      considered whether FWS officials may have been motivated to retaliate based on
      his disclosures reflecting poorly on them or their relations with the USACE,
      AHTD, or other outside entities. PFR File, Tab 7 at 28. We agree that this is a
      relevant consideration and modify the initial decision accordingly. See Whitmore,
      680 F.3d at 1370 (recognizing that “[t]hose responsible for the agency’s
      performance overall may well be motivated to retaliate even if they are not
      directly implicated by the disclosures, and even if they do not know the
      whistleblower personally, as the criticism reflects on them in their capacities as
                                                                                       20

      managers and employees”).      However, the circumstances at hand are notably
      dissimilar to those in Whitmore, where the employee’s disclosures were highly
      critical of his employing agency and high-level managers, many high-level
      managers were aware of and concerned about the disclosures, and there was a
      years-long pattern of personnel actions taken against the employee following the
      disclosures. Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1371. In this case, the appellant’s disclosures
      implicated wrongdoing on the part of outside agencies or entities , not his
      employer—FWS.        While that could still create some motive to retaliate,
      especially if FWS officials perceived the appellant’s disclosures as damaging to
      interagency relationships, we are not aware of any evidence supporting a
      conclusion that this motive was significant. We discern no basis for concluding
      that the appellant’s protected disclosures caused notable tension between FWS
      and the outside agencies implicated by his disclosures beyond that which is
      inherent, given their respective missions, e.g., FWS’s protection of the
      environment and AHTD’s construction of highways.
¶36        For the third and final Carr factor, the administrative judge found no
      evidence of other employees who were not whistleblowers but were otherwise
      similarly situated. ID at 54-55. We modify the initial decision to recognize that,
      if anything, the absence of evidence concerning the third Carr factor “tends to cut
      slightly against the Government,” which the administrative judge failed to
      acknowledge. Miller, 842 F.3d at 1262.
¶37        Although the appellant presents several other arguments pertaining to
      Personnel Actions 3-5, each is unavailing. The majority of his arguments amount
      to little more than disagreement with the administrative judge’s well -reasoned
      analysis of hearing testimony as it concerns both the strength of the agency’s
      evidence, e.g., PFR File, Tab 7 at 20-21, and the motivations of relevant officials,
      e.g., id. at 21-25, which we will not disturb, see Haebe, 288 F.3d at 1301. For
      example, the appellant directs us to the transcript of a conversation he had with
      agency officials about whistleblower protections, which he apparently obtained
                                                                                       21

      by secret recording. PFR File, Tab 7 at 23-24 (referencing IAF, Tab 52 at 67, 70,
      76, 79, 82); see ID at 7. According to the appellant, portions of this conversation
      provide direct evidence of the agency’s retaliatory intent and a deliberate
      cover-up. PFR File, Tab 7 at 24. Yet the administrative judge found otherwise,
      based on a review of the transcript, the context of what these officials said, and
      the credibility of witnesses who testified about the convers ation. ID at 53-54.
      We see no reason to reach a different conclusion.
¶38         While the record includes strong evidence of FWS officials being concerned
      with the manner in which the appellant interacted with outside entities and a
      conflict of interest, the appellant has not presented any basis for concluding that
      they had a significant motive to retaliate for his disclosures, which s upported the
      agency’s mission. Separately, the appellant also asserts that the administrative
      judge ignored several pieces of evidence, such as evidence about his fall 2015
      superior performance appraisal. E.g., PFR File, Tab 7 at 26 (citing IAF, Tab 11
      at 34).   We have considered this evidence pursuant to our obligation under
      Whitmore, 680 F.3d at 1368. However, the appellant has not persuaded us that
      his performance appraisal covering the timeframe of October 1, 2014, through
      September 30, 2015, IAF, Tab 11 at 34, is relevant to the administrative judge’s
      analysis of the strength of the agency’s evidence concerning the personne l
      actions, including Personnel Action 4 (which occurred in March 2016), or her
      analysis of the motive to retaliate.
¶39         We have considered each of the appellant’s arguments, but agree with the
      administrative judge’s conclusion.     Weighing each of the Carr factors, and all
      relevant evidence, the agency met its burden of proving that it would have taken
      the same actions—Personnel Actions 3-5—in the absence of the appellant’s
      whistleblowing. See ID at 55.

      The appellant’s procedural arguments are unavailing.
¶40         The appellant presents a few additional arguments pertaining to the
      administrative judge’s handling of the appeal.         First, he argues that the
                                                                                      22

      administrative judge erred in allowing the agency to substitute one requested
      witness for another, just days before the scheduled hearing.     PFR File, Tab 7
      at 19-20. We disagree.
¶41         The agency initially requested, and the administrative judge approved, the
      agency’s current Ethics Counselor. IAF, Tab 50 at 9, Tab 94 at 4. A few days
      before the scheduled hearing, the agency submitted a motion indicating that it had
      located its former Ethics Counselor—the one who reviewed the appellant’s 2013
      request to engage in the outside activity of mitigation banking —and wanted to
      call him instead. IAF, Tab 104 at 1-2; see, e.g., IAF, Tab 13 at 125-26. The
      administrative judge granted the motion over the appellant’s objection, which was
      primarily based on the timing of the substitution. IAF, Tab 107 at 4. On review,
      the appellant describes the agency’s request as a “last minute, surpr ise change of
      witnesses” and describes the administrative judge’s decision on the matter as
      erroneous.   PFR File, Tab 7 at 19-20.       Given the former Ethics Counselor’s
      unique insight into the 2013 decision to grant the appellant’s outside activity
      request, the appellant has not presented any basis for us to conclude that the
      decision was an abuse of discretion. See Tisdell v. Department of the Air Force,
      94 M.S.P.R. 44, ¶ 13 (2003) (recognizing that an administrative judge has wide
      discretion to control the proceedings, to receive relevant evidence, and to ensure
      that the record on significant issues is fully developed).
¶42         The appellant next asserts that the administrative judge prejudicially
      interfered with his cross-examination by preventing him from using prior
      deposition testimony to impeach witnesses.       PFR File, Tab 7 at 31.   Yet, the
      appellant has failed to identify the witnesses, testimony, and impeachment
      evidence to which he is referring, so we are not persuaded by this conclusory
      argument. See generally Miller v. Department of Defense, 85 M.S.P.R. 310, ¶ 8
      (2000) (explaining that an administrative judge has wide discretion to control the
      proceedings, including authority to exclude testimony he believes would be
      irrelevant or immaterial).    We are also unpersuaded by the appellant’s final
                                                                                     23

argument—that the administrative judge did not similarly interfere with the
agency’s presentation of its case, reflecting a bias against the appellant and for
the agency.     PFR File, Tab 7 at 31; see Bieber v. Department of the Army,
287 F.3d 1358, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (stating that an administrative judge’s
conduct during the course of a Board proceeding warrants a new adjudication
only if her comments or actions evidence “a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism
that would make fair judgment impossible”) (quoting Liteky v. United States,
510 U.S.   540,    555   (1994));    Oliver    v.   Department    of   Transportation,
1 M.S.P.R. 382, 386 (1980) (observing that, in making a claim of bias or
prejudice against an administrative judge, a party must overcome the presumption
of honesty and integrity that accompanies administrative adjudicators).

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 8
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Order, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.        5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.     You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failur e to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.

8
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        24

      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
                                                                                25

were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).          If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                                                                                     26

                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant     to   the   Whistleblower       Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 9   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).

9
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                                27

      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our websi te at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.