Court Opinion

ID: 9705611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:13:41.531369+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:12.936604
License: Public Domain

Jim Hannah, Justice, concurring. I concur with the result reached by the majority in this case; however, I write separately because I believe the majority has misstated our holding in Judkins v. Hoover, 351 Ark. 552, 95 S.W.3d 768 (2003). In discussing Judkins, supra, the majority states: “In that case, we held that the circuit court did not err in setting aside an oral order admitting a will to probate based on a will contest filed after the hearing probating the will.” This court made no such holding in Judkins. In that case, the circuit court heard evidence concerning the will after the will had been orally admitted to probate; however, the evidence was not in the form of a will contest. Rather, the evidence presented to the circuit court was evidence of a possible fraud upon the court. In addition, the majority states: “Our conclusion that section 28-40-113 was inapplicable because of a lack of a written order, however, was error.” The majority is simply wrong .Judkins did not hold section 28-40-113 was inapplicable because of a lack of a written order. In Judkins we stated: The oral ruling admitting the 1989 Will to probate was not reduced to writing and filed of record. Therefore, Ark. Code Ann. § 28-40-113(b) is not applicable because the circuit court never lost subject-matter jurisdiction and was free to hear additional evidence and to alter its decision upon further consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the 1989 Will. Also, Ark. Code Ann. § 28-1-115 (a) is not applicable because no written order was entered after the December 20, 2000, hearing and, thus, there was no order admitting a will to probate to set aside. The Judkins case is not in conflict with the majority’s opinion. In Judkins, the appellee filed a motion questioning the validity of the will and its operative effect upon her; however, the appellee subsequently withdrew her challenge to the validity of the will at a hearing before the circuit court. Thereafter, the circuit court orally admitted the will to probate. After the circuit court orally admitted the will to probate, the appellee filed a “report of possible irregularities of will admitted to probate,” in which she stated that approximately two weeks after the hearing in which the will was orally admitted to probate, she was approached by Heidi Levinson, the estranged daughter-in-law of the decedent’s sister. In a conversation with the appellee, as well as in a letter to the circuit court, Levinson alleged that the 1989 Will admitted to probate was actually only an unwitnessed draft found by the proponents of the will after the decedent’s death and that the proponents had thereafter secured witness signatures to the 1989 Will. In the “report of possible irregularities of will admitted to probate,” the appellee’s counsel stated: Counsel for Heather Judkins does not question the veracity or sincerity of Heidi Levinson in bringing these matters to the Court’s attention. Such judgments are best left for the Court’s review and determination. Counsel for Heather Judkins, however, believes that appropriate principles of professional ethics and duties as an Officer of the Court require the submission of this matter to the court for appropriate review and consideration. Thus, appellee’s counsel, in filing the “notice of possible irregularities of will admitted to probate” did not file a will contest. Appellee’s counsel took no position on the veracity or sincerity of the allegations, nor did appellee’s counsel argue that the will should be set aside. Instead, after learning of a possible fraud upon the circuit court, appellee’s counsel notified the circuit court of the possible fraud. Providing notice to the circuit court of a possible fraud upon the court is not the same as contesting the will. While the appellant in Judkins characterized the appellee’s counsel’s notification to the circuit court as a “will contest,” this court did not. Section 28-40-113(b) was inapplicable in Judkins because the appellee’s counsel was not objecting to the probate of the will; rather, appellee’s counsel was informing the circuit court of a possible fraud upon the court. The majority simply misunderstands Judkins.