Court Opinion

ID: 9582022
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:21:34.413343+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:23.933327
License: Public Domain

Banke, Judge,
concurring specially.
I concur fully in the judgment reached by the majority in both these appeals. However, I do not agree with the majority’s unqualified statement in Division 2 (a) that the denial of a traverse to a garnishment is not appealable in and of itself. Our decisions are in conflict on this point. In Herring v. Herring, 143 Ga. App. 286 (1) (238 SE2d 240) (1977), we held that such an order is appealable if it resolves all of the issues in the case and leaves the parties with no further recourse in the trial court. This conclusion was based on the language of Code Ann. § 6-701 (a) (1) (as amended through Ga. L. 1979, pp. 619, 620), which permits a direct appeal “[w]here the judgment is final — that is to say where the cause is no longer pending in the court below...” The same reasoning was followed in Caswell v. Caswell, 157 Ga. App. 710 (278 SE2d 452) (1981), wherein an order dismissing a complaint was held to have made a final judgment by the defendant’s later action in voluntarily dismissing his counterclaims. It was again followed in Theo v. D. O. T., 160 Ga. App. 518 (287 SE2d 333) (1981) (Case No. 62233, decided November 12,1981), wherein a judgment in a condemnation case was held to be final although no order had been entered allocating and distributing the funds among the various condemnees. The principle was held to be inapplicable in Mathews v. Saniway Distributors Service, 152 Ga. App. 286 (262 SE2d 494) (1979), a garnishment case wherein the trial court made its denial of the defendants’ traverse, conditional upon the substitution of the real party in interest for the named plaintiff. The line of cases cited by the majority, on the other hand, hold flatly that an appeal from an order denying a traverse in a garnishment action is always premature, regardless of whether the order resolves all of the issues in the case. See Marbut Co. v. Capital City Bank, 148 Ga. App. 664 (1) (252 SE2d 85) (1979); Knox v. Knox, 151 Ga. App. 144 (259 SE2d 150) (1979); Turner v. Wood, 159 Ga. App. 850 (285 SE2d 589) (1981).
In some garnishment cases, the denial of the defendant’s pleadings may not terminate the litigation in the trial court. For example, there might be more than one defendant involved, or the garnishee might also be contesting the action. However, in the more typical case, where the garnishee’s interest ends with his payment of the money into court, and there is only one defendant involved, the denial of that defendant’s pleadings effectively terminates the litigation. In such a situation, nothing constructive is accomplished *478by requiring the defendant to await the issuance of an order disbursing the funds before filing an appeal, particularly since the plaintiff may obtain such an order at his leisure, and the defendant may never even be notified of its issuance. I would hold that in any case where the trial court enters an order unconditionally disposing of the merits of the litigation and leaving nothing further to be done to give effect to the ruling save the performance of some ministerial act involving no judicial discretion, the order may be considered a final judgment for purposes of appeal. Accord 4 CJS Appeal and Error § 94; 9 Moore’s Fed. Practice ¶ 110.11. See generally Code Ann. § 6-905 (Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 40).