Court Opinion

ID: 9682055
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 08:04:31.971046+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:37.244855
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
Appellees urge in their motion for rehearing, that they were not required to introduce their deed from the common source into evidence as a muniment of title, for the reason that appellants had pleaded this deed in connection with their plea to reform same. Appellees assert that since the execution of this deed was averred in appellants’ petition, there was no necessity for them to produce it in evidence. Lafield v. Maryland Casualty Co., 119 Tex. 466, 33 S.W.2d 187; Graham v. Henry, 17 Tex. 164; Jansen v. Kelley, Tex.Civ.App., 206 S.W.2d 856.
This rule has no application here, because the deed was not pleaded by appellants as a muniment of title in appellees, but for the express purpose of showing that the description of the property conveyed was in error and should be reformed. Our case is similar to that of Davis v. Gale, 160 Tex. 309, 330 S.W.2d 610, where the plaintiff pleaded that a described deed created a cloud on his title and sought to remove the cloud. The deed was not introduced as a muniment of title by the plaintiff, but only for the limited purpose of showing the cloud on his title. The Supreme Court held that the deed did not inure to the benefit of the defendant in proof of his title. Rule 798, Texas Rules of Civil Procedure; 41-A Tex.Jur. 710.
It is therefore our opinion that appellees failed to prove their title in the trespass to try title .action when they did not introduce their deed from the stipulated common source into evidence.
Appellees also urge that in the interest of justice the case should be remanded rather than rendered. It is the rule that where the ends of justice will be better sub-served by remand to the trial court for new trial, than by rendition, the Court should remand the case. Davis v. Gale, supra; Hicks v. Matthews, 153 Tex. 177, 266 S.W.2d 846. We have therefore reviewed the entire record in consideration of this point.
The primary dispute between the parties is over the accuracy of the survey made for appellees. Appellees agree that they are entitled to only forty acres, but assert that they have this amount in their survey. Appellants assert that the survey contains an excess of 10.97 acres. Neither party requested the court to appoint a surveyor, as provided in Rule 796, T.R.C.P. This dispute between the surveyors was not resolved by the jury. The jury found that the appellees’ survey contained more than forty acres. How much excess and where it is located is still unknown. The jury found that appellees’ surveyor correctly surveyed only to the cut bank of the river rather than to the water, as was done by appellants’ surveyor. The appellees asserted the ten-year statute of limitation in the trial court, but, despite favorable jury findings, now concede that they failed in this defense. These were the controverted issues in the trial court and both parties failed to prove their contentions.
Appellants pleaded a formal trespass to try title action in the alternative. Common source in appellants was stipulated. The record does not indicate why appellees failed to formally introduce their deed from ap*695pellants in evidence as a muniment of title. It is our opinion that justice will he better served by a remand of this case for new trial for determination of the correct west boundary line of appellees’ forty acres.
The motion for rehearing is therefore granted and our judgment of November 13, 1963, is set aside. The judgment of the trial court is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.