Court Opinion

ID: 9464439
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 23:33:05.17996+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:37.451370
License: Public Domain

HOLLOWAY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent.
To me, this is a compelling case for recovery in these tragic circumstances where proof of negligence by the BIA in designing and constructing the approach which washed out and the diversionary dike strongly supports Judge Anderson’s findings. I cannot agree that he erred in holding that Utah law on independent contractors does not absolve the Government of liability. And application of the discretionary function exception to bar recovery for these localized acts of negligence in designing and building the approach road and dike is an unwarranted expansion of the exception, in my judgment.
I turn first to the discretionary function exception because it is jurisdictional in nature. Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872, 875-76 (10th Cir.).
A

The discretionary function exception

The Federal Tort Claims Act makes two separate exceptions from the waiver of immunity granted by the statute. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) first provides an exception as to any claim “based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or regulation be valid . . .” Second, an exception is granted as to any claim “. . . based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 32-33, 73 S.Ct. 956, 959, 97 L.Ed. 1427.
The majority opinion holds that both exceptions of § 2680(a) apply here. First, the opinion says that the actions of the BIA in aiding Utah in the construction of the bridge and approach roads were clearly carried out “in the execution of a statute,” citing 23 U.S.C. § 208 which provides for use of funds to pay for construction and improvement of Indian reservation roads. I cannot agree that this first exception of § 2680(a) applies. This exception “deals with acts or omissions of government employees, exercising due care in carrying out statutes or regulations whether valid or not. It bars tests by tort action of the legality of statutes and regulations.” Dalehite v. United States, supra, 346 U.S. at 33, 73 S.Ct. at 966. This is not such a case because no challenge to 23 U.S.C. § 208 or any regulation is involved. Nor is this a case like Powell v. United States, 233 F.2d 851 (10th Cir.), challenging Governmental acts in issuing permits, allegedly to the wrong party, but which were acts done in furtherance of applicable statutes and an applicable regulation. As discussed below, I am convinced that the findings of negligence in this case should stand, and the first exception of § 2680(a) cannot apply since the Government agents were not “exercising due care” in the enforcement of federal law. Hatahley v. United States, 351 U.S. 173, 181, 76 S.Ct. 745, 100 L.Ed. 1065.
The principal discussion of § 2680(a) by the majority opinion focuses on the second part of the section dealing with the exercise of a discretionary function or duty. The opinion says that the exception covers de*160terminations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations, and that under the standards applied in Dalehite and other cases, the BIA was engaged in exercising a discretionary function in its activities in question so that the Government is immune from suit. I must disagree.
If the majority’s expansive interpretation is made of the exception and the Dalehite references to “plans, specifications or schedules of operations,” then it is hard to imagine an independent similar act by an engineer or other Government employee which would not be immunized from the possibility of relief under the Act. See Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1063-64 (3d Cir.); Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872, 877 (10th Cir.). In my opinion, this is contrary to the intent of the statute, the Dalehite case, and numerous well-reasoned decisions. It is true that Dalehite says that more than the initiation of programs comes within the exception and that it includes “determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations.” However, the opinion is clear in stating that it is “[wjhere there is room for policy judgment and decision [that] there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of subordinates in carrying out operations of government in accordance with official directions cannot be actionable.” Dalehite v. United States, supra, 346 U.S. at 36, 73 S.Ct. at 968.
Thus, for the exception to apply the acts in question must be steps directed by a planning-level policy decision. See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. United States, 473 F.2d 714, 716 (5th Cir.); Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136, 138 (9th Cir.); compare Boyce v. United States, 93 F.Supp. 866, 868-69 (S.D.Iowa). Under the Dalehite test it is only those plans which involve such policy considerations that are protected by the exception, Dalehite, supra, 346 U.S. at 35-36, 73 S.Ct. 956, and the “plans” involved here were not shown to have been of that type in any sense.
The burden was on the Government to establish such elements of the exception. Boyce v. United States, supra, 93 F.Supp. at 868. There was no showing of any weighing of considerations like those recognized in Dalehite as typically involved in policy judgments — the feasibility of a program balanced against present knowledge of the effect of procedures proposed, costs and delays against alternative safety measures, and the like. Dalehite, supra at 40-41, 73 S.Ct. 956. Absent such considerations, the Act intends the Government to be held accountable under the standard it adopted — that of liability of a private person to compensate victims of negligence. Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 68, 76 S.Ct. 122, 100 L.Ed. 48.
Furthermore, the Government did not demonstrate that any planning-level policy decision dictated the design and construction of the approach road and dike, the omission of riprap, or the use of loose materials in the approach and dike.1 The exception was applied in Dalehite because the Court concluded that “[e]ach of these acts looked upon as negligence was directed by this Plan.” Dalehite v. United States, supra, 346 U.S. at 39, 73 S.Ct. at 969. Unlike Dalehite, the decision to build the diversionary dike was made on the site by the BIA engineer who supervised the actual construction, and was not directed by any “plan.”2
*161Moreover, the broad interpretation of the discretionary function exception made by the majority runs counter to numerous well-reasoned decisions. We have held that failure to erect safety devices or warning signs near a dangerous thermal pool does not come within the exception. Smith v. United States, supra, 546 F.2d at 876-77. Failure to provide guard rails on a bridge crossing an irrigation ditch or a fence by the ditch was held not to be an exempt discretionary function. Foster v. United States, 183 F.Supp. 524, 527-28 (D.N.M.), affirmed on other grounds, 280 F.2d 431 (10th Cir.). Where decisions not to install appropriate warning devices, barriers, speed control devices or cross walks for the protection of pedestrians at an Air Force base were not shown to have been made at a planning level, summary judgment based on the exception was reversed. Driscoll v. United States, supra 525 F.2d at 138. And Government construction of a drainage ditch casting an unnatural concentration of water and mud on railroad property was also held not to be a discretionary policy-making function, but an operational one which the Government was obligated to perform in a non-negligent manner. Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. United States, supra, 473 F.2d at 716.3
The Seaboard case is of special importance not only because it involved negligent design by the Government, but also because of express approval of its holding by our court. In Jackson v. Kelly, 557 F.2d 735, 738 (10th Cir.), our recent, unanimous en banc opinion stated:
For example, negligence in the construction of a government facility is nondiscretionary and subjects the government to liability under the FTCA. See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. United States, 5 Cir., 473 F.2d 714.
We are reminded that “[t]he Federal Tort Claims Act waives the Government’s immunity from suit in sweeping language.” United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 547, 71 S.Ct. 399, 402, 95 L.Ed. 523. In interpreting the exceptions to the general grant of immunity, the courts include only those circumstances within the words and reason of the exception. Dalehite, supra, 346 U.S. at 31 n. 24, 73 S.Ct. 956; First National Bank in Albuquerque v. United States, 552 F.2d 370, 376 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. —, 98 S.Ct. 122, 54 L.Ed.2d 96. To apply the exception as broadly as the majority opinion does here is to allow the exception to swallow up the Act.
*162Therefore, I must dissent and would affirm the trial judge’s conclusion that the discretionary function exception does not apply.
B

The independent contractor defense

The Government relies heavily on the argument that it was in a position analogous to that of an independent contractor, that the project was accepted by the State and subsequently maintained by it, and that the Leininger Utah opinion, 404 P.2d 33, frees it of liability in these circumstances. (Brief for the Appellants, 23-26). The majority opinion agrees, stating that under Leininger the Government cannot be held liable.
First, the facts of the Leininger case and its limited holding are crucial. There an employee of Texas Zinc Minerals Corporation sought damages for injuries sustained during his work from the explosion of an exhaust fan he was dismantling. He sued Stearns-Roger Mfg. Co., a general contractor which built the plant and installed the fan almost four years earlier. Summary judgment for Stearns-Roger was affirmed, the Utah Court pointing out that Texas Zinc had contracted for the construction of the plant by Stearns-Roger as a general contractor, that the contract contemplated that Texas Zinc would specify certain equipment items and Texas Zinc did specify the fans in question, and that the contract stipulated that Stearns-Roger would have no responsibility for the adequacy of properly installed major items of equipment which were selected by Texas Zinc. The Utah Court concluded that the rule of non-liability of independent contractors applied. Among other things the Court emphasized that:
The defendant contractor, in the instant case, was a mere vehicle, a conduit through which the Durco fans passed; it did not design, sell or recommend the installation of such fans, and had no discretion in their selection; there was no claim of any act of negligence on defendant’s part in the placement of the fans in the laboratory of Texas-Zinc pursuant to specifications; . . . (Emphasis added). 404 P.2d at 36.
Finally, we note that the Utah Court stressed the fact that the fans were not the product of the defendant Stearns-Roger’s work and that when they were placed no one was aware of any hazard incident to their intended use. Id. at 38.
Our case is wholly different, in my opinion. We must remember that it was not the bridge but the approach road which washed out and caused this tragedy. The Government flatly admits that the State plans covered only the bridge itself and not the approach roads, that the approaches to the bridge were designed by the BIA, these plans however being later submitted to and approved by the State. (Brief of the Appellants, 5). The Government negligence found by the trial judge was dereliction when the BIA itself designed and built the approach road and diversionary dike. (Findings of Fact 4, 5 and 8, R. VIII, 160-61).4 Our case is thus unlike Leininger where the contractor Stearns-Roger did not design or choose the fans and was not even alleged to have been negligent in the placement of them. See 404 P.2d at 36. And in our case there is no contract provision freeing the Government from liability as a contractor, which was stipulated in the Leininger contract. Id. at 35. In fact, on this “force account” project there was no contract entered into by the BIA.
In view of these sharp contrasts it is understandable that the trial court held that the Leininger rule was inapplicable in our case, and I fully agree. Since the BIA itself did the designing and building of the approach road and the diversionary works, and since these functions were found to have been negligently performed, the reason for non-liability under the independent contractor rule and the Leininger case does not exist. L. H. Bell & Associates, Inc. v. Granger, 112 Ariz. 440, 543 P.2d 428, 433-34; see also Baker v. Fryar, 77 N.M. 257, *163421 P.2d 784, 786-87; Wright v. Creative Corp., 30 Colo.App. 575, 498 P.2d 1179, 1181-82; Totten v. Gruzen, 52 N.J. 202, 245 A.2d 1, 5.
L. H. Bell & Associates, Inc. v. Granger, supra, is of special significance because of its striking similarities to our case.5 Recovery was sought there for property damages due to negligence of the defendant in planning and designing approaches to a bridge without proper culverts and dikes. It was argued that the plans were accepted by the county so that the defendant was relieved of liability. The Arizona Court said that its general rule of non-liability of the contractor where work was completed and accepted did not apply; that the rule applies only where the contractor has no discretion and merely follows the plans and specifications provided by the employer; and that the fact of approval of the plans by the county did not relieve the designer, Bell, of liability for the inadequate approaches which caused the damages. 543 P.2d at 433-34. This same reasoning applies here.
This very question of the applicability of the rule of non-liability of independent contractors and the Leininger case was argued at length to Judge Anderson on essentially the same contentions presented to us. (R. VII, 1128-35). The trial judge rejected the argument that the non-liability rule applies. (Id. at 1135). Then later in his written conclusions of law the court held that “the State of Utah’s acceptance and maintenance of the highway system did not constitute independent, intervening causes which would break the chain of causation between the negligent acts of defendants’ agents and the deaths of the Fellars, and the injuries suffered by their son.” (Conclusion of Law No. 3, R. VIII, 164). In so ruling, the Court applied the same reasoning as that of the New Mexico Court in Baker v. Fryar, supra, 421 P.2d at 786-87.
In the Leininger case, the Utah Court noted that there are exceptions to the rule of non-liability after acceptance of an independent contractor’s work, and the Court stated that each case must be decided on its own facts. 404 P.2d at 36. Here, the trial court made just such a determination on these particular facts. When such a determination is made on the law of his State by a resident federal trial judge, his views are persuasive and are ordinarily accepted. Sade v. Northern Natural Gas Co., 483 F.2d 230, 234 (10th Cir.); Teague v. Grand River Dam Authority, 425 F.2d 130, 134 (10th Cir.); Parsons v. Amerada Hess Corp., 422 F.2d 610, 614 (10th Cir.) (a case involving the liability of independent contractors); Bartch v. United States, 330 F.2d 466, 467 (10th Cir.) (a decision under the Federal Tort Claims Act). A similar rule of deference is applied by the Supreme Court. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 346-47 n. 10, 96 S.Ct. 2074, 48 L.Ed.2d 684; Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 486-87, 69 S.Ct. 1333, 93 L.Ed. 1480. We cannot say that the trial judge was clearly wrong in his ruling here, in my opinion.
C

The trial court’s findings of negligence by the BIA

The majority opinion also reverses on the ground that the findings of negligence against the Government were clearly erroneous, and I must disagree.
It is important again to focus on how this accident occurred and the particular acts of negligence which the trial court found to have been a proximate cause of the tragedy. It is undisputed that, as the court found, in the darkness the Fellars family “drove their car and trailer off the end of the washed out approach road into the flood ...” (Finding of Fact 12, R. VIII, 163).6 Thus it was the washing out of the approach road and not a collapse of the bridge which caused the accident.
*164The court found that at the location of the bridge there was a broad flood plain with two evident stream channels, one used by low water flow and a wider curving channel that was evidently the course of the stream during flood periods; that the bridge was located across the low flow channel. (Findings of Fact 4, 5 and 6, id. at 160-61). The court then found that the Government was negligent and that its acts of negligence “were a proximate cause of the erosion and flood break-through of the entire approach road . . .”. (Finding of Fact 11, id. at 163).
The acts of negligence found were essentially that the approaches were made of loose, essentially finely grained material, with a minimal, inconsequential amount of rock, and no protective riprap to prevent erosion; that the construction focused the high water flow channel against the end of the approach road; that some effort was made by a diversionary dike to direct the flow of flood waters under the bridge but “it was poorly designed and constructed of loosely defined materials and had not been adequately maintained, and the diversionary works could not reasonably be expected to direct a flood of any serious proportions, such as this, under the bridge without threatening the security of the bridge approach where the primary force of the flood could be expected to strike.” (Findings of Fact 6, 7 and 8, R. VIII, 161).
The court further found that a reasonably prudent engineer would have constructed and placed the bridge, approaches and diversionary works so as to bridge the flood channel, or alternatively would have more efficiently shaped and built the diversionary works and substantially strengthened the materials and reinforced the approaches to avoid the type of breakthrough that happened. (Findings of Fact 9 and 10, id. at 162).
The majority opinion does not actually question any of these specific findings of negligence. Instead, the opinion reasons essentially that the ultimate finding of Government negligence7 is wrong and that the Government is absolved of liability because of other circumstances — (1) that the State of Utah designed the bridge and determined its location; (2) that the bridge design was based on a 25-year design frequency, which was all the State could justify spending funds for; (3) that the BIA was not negligent in designing the approach roads since the bridge design required that the approach roads be placed in the flood channel; and (4) that the approach plans were approved by the State and complied with FP-61 federal standards. In my judgment, none of these points can withstand analysis against this record.
As to point (1), regardless of where the State said the bridge would be or the nature of the bridge design, there was no reason why the approach road should not have been adequately designed and constructed with protective riprap and a proper diversionary dike built to protect the vulnerable approach.8 In fact, the State’s se*165lection of the bridge location underlined the necessity of those protective features.
As to point (2) and the 25-year design frequency of the bridge, the majority opinion notes that there was conflicting testimony on the frequency with which a storm of these proportions could be expected to recur. This made the reasonableness of preparations for storm possibilities a question of fact. L. H. Bell & Associates, Inc. v. Granger, supra, 543 P.2d at 433. In our case the trial court found that the expert testimony was in conflict with respect to the size of the flood and the scientific ability to reasonably predict the frequency of its recurrence; that the physical evidences were such as to serve notice that floods of significant proportions had occurred before; that the main channel of such floods was plainly visible; and that a prudent engineer would have been on reasonable notice of the prospect of a flood of the character in question as a defense. And, again, we must remember it was the approach and not the bridge which washed out.9
The claim of lack of State funds for more adequate designing is not persuasive,10 and in any event the part taken by the State in the project does not absolve the Government of its liability for concurrent negligence by its acts which were found to be “a proximate cause” of the washout of the approach. Under Utah law separate acts of negligence which do not occur simultaneously can both be proximate causes of an accident so long as the second act is not a supervening cause. Jacques v. Farrimond, 14 Utah 2d 166, 380 P.2d 133, 134; Toma v. Utah Power & Light Co., 12 Utah 2d 278, 365 P.2d 788, 794-95; Hillyard v. Utah By-Products Co., 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287, 289-90.11
As to point (3), the fact of state approval of the plans for the approach in no way relieves the Government of liability for its negligence in preparing the design and constructing the faulty approach road and diversionary dike. L. H. Bell & Associates, Inc. v. Granger, supra, 543 P.2d at 433. In fact, neither federal nor state “approval” sets the standard of care or insulates the Government from liability for negligence in designing and building the approach road and dike.
*166As to point (4), the Government argues that all the BIA construction “comported with the applicable federal specification requirements, namely FP-61,”12 (Brief for the Appellants, 5), citing some testimony touching on compaction tests and the slopes of the approach roads, but not dealing with the central problems of the use of loose, fine materials and the absence of. riprap. Moreover, the argument is not responsive to the finding that the manner of construction focused the high water flow channel against the end of the approach road. (Finding of Fact 7, R. VIII, 161).
In any event, the trial court found that loose material was used on the approach road with a minimal amount of rock and that there was no protective riprap to prevent erosion. He also found that loose material was used in the diversionary dike. (Findings of Fact 6 and 8, R. VIII, 161). These findings are clearly supported by the record, see note 5 supra, and thus the claim of compliance with FP-61 standards as they are stated is wholly untenable. (See FP-61, Sec. 510, “Loose Riprap”, pp. 334-35, specifying requirements for riprap content in terms of amount of given sizes of rock to be used, among other things).
In sum, to me the specific findings of negligence by the trial court are strongly supported by the record. Rejection of them by the majority’s process of generalization, and without demonstrating that any of the findings is clearly erroneous, is wholly unwarranted in my opinion. I am firmly convinced that the trial judge was on solid ground in awarding recovery for this tragedy under the Tort Claims Act — relief which was clearly intended by Congress in enacting this remedial statute. I cannot agree to set the judgment aside.

. Applying similar reasoning, in Bryant v. United States, 565 F.2d 650 (10th Cir.), we recently held that a decision not to have supervisory personnel outside on grounds of BIA schools was not caused by a policy to relax rigid militaristic practices. The failure to properly carry out outdoor supervisory duties was therefore not within the discretionary function exception.

. The record in no way establishes that a federal planning-level policy decision was handed down which directed doing the acts looked upon as negligence. Dalehite, supra at 36, 39, 73 S.Ct. 956. Mr. Gillam, a BIA engineer, served as the supervising contractor and contract inspector on the project. On such “force account projects,” the resident engineer is given quite a bit of leeway. (R.V. at 689, 701-02, 708, 710, 733-34, 751).
A brief history of the planning of the bridge also indicates an absence of policy judgment. Mr. Sargent, the chief structural engineer for the Utah Highway Department at the time, *161testified that the State of Utah completed plans and specifications for only the bridge proper, but not the approaches other than an oil surface. He said the Utah plans for the approach road were incomplete when turned over to the BIA. (Id. at 611-12). As noted below, the final BIA plans were later submitted to an engineer of the Utah Highway Department for his approval. (Id. at 634-35).
These plans included no item for riprap. (R. V 850). Mr. Giliam said the plans indicated that “fill” was to be used in construction of the approach embankment, that the specifications for the fill were to be determined under FP-61, but that he had discretion in choosing where the fill material was to be obtained.
The diversionary dike was added to attempt to direct the flow of water, which might rise out of the regular channel onto the broader flood plain, back under the bridge. However, the trial court found that the dike focused the high water flow channel against the end of the approach road and that the dike was poorly designed and constructed of loosely defined materials. (Findings of Fact 7 and 8, R. VIII 3).

. I cannot agree that Spillway Marina v. United States, 445 F.2d 876 (10th Cir.), or Irzyk v. United States, 412 F.2d 749 (10th Cir.), support the conclusions of the majority opinion. The Spillway Marina case involved property damage resulting from a drawndown of a reservoir. We held that the attainment of objectives of flood control and navigation required discretionary decisions on the storage and release of water and thus the manner of their exercise was within the exception, including failure to warn. No such policy objectives are shown to be involved here.
Irzyk involved property damages from flooding after seepage from a canal which was built by a subcontractor under a Government contract. However, the attack was on general contract provisions and specifications for all earthwork, which were held to be a discretionary function; there was no claim of negligence at the local operational level. See 412 F.2d at 751. The cases are thus both unlike our case which challenges specific engineering acts at this approach and dike.

. See Part C, infra.

. This is apparently a case arising out of the same storm occurring about September 4-6, 1970, as the instant case.

. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 2n and other exhibits are terribly impressive. They show graphically the gaping hole where the Fellars drove off the approach road in the dark, after its loose materials washed out.

. After making its specific findings of negligence, the trial court found that negligence of agents of the defendants was responsible for the deficiencies enumerated and that said acts of negligence were a proximate cause of the erosion and flood breakthrough of the entire approach road. (Finding of Fact 11, R. VIII, 162-63).

. The plaintiffs presented three civil engineers, two with a doctor’s degree and one with a master’s degree, who testified to the improper direction of the stream flow by the diversionary dike and to the need for riprap in the construction of the approaches and the dike. (R. III, 374-75; R. IV, 416-17; 426-28; 500-505; and 507-12).
The Government presented evidence that rocks were used in the construction of the dike and the approaches. Generally, the Government’s witness stated that most of the rocks were about 12 to 18 inches in size. (R. V, 686, 717, 774, 756, 761, 818). One Government witness testified the rocks were up to two feet in size and two said up to 3 or 4 feet in size. (Id. at 699, 717, 805). One Government witness testified that there were only “six or eight” three to four foot boulders. (Id. at 850). One Government witness on cross-examination stated that the rocks over 18 inches were not placed so as to protect the embankment against the flowing water, but were merely bulldozed into the road fill in order to “take them off the right-of-way. (Id. at 765). Another Government witness testified there was no *165effort to “tie” the boulders in the form of rip-rap. (Id. at 850).
The plaintiffs presented ample evidence to support the trial judge’s finding that materials used were inadequate. Six witnesses testified for the plaintiff that the approach road embankment and dike were loosely packed and that they did not observe any rocks over 12 inches in either the embankment of the approach road or the diversionary dike. (R. I, 13, 15, 22, 60-61, 62, 68, 73, 80; R. II, 118, 124, 145; R. III, 235, 264-65, 278). The plaintiffs’ witnesses also testified that the diversionary dike was washed away by the first “high flow” of the stream within three months after the project was completed. (R. I, 17, 87, 93; R. II, 118-119, 151; R. III, 234). One of the Government’s witnesses did state that he observed the dike was in place in 1969. (R. V, 801-804).

. Actually, there was testimony by a Government engineer that the approach was designed to wash out before the bridge. (R. V, 706). And it is clear that the bridge itself was still standing after the accident occurred. (See Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 10c through 10m).

. A witness for the plaintiff estimated that cost of installing riprap in the approach road embankment would have been “approximately $10,000.” (R. IV, 417).

. Insofar as the designation of the bridge location by Utah is concerned, that step could not be a “supervening cause” since it obviously preceded the designing and construction of the approach road and diversionary dike by the Government. Furthermore, the subsequent State acts cannot be said to be a supervening cause, freeing the Government of liability. After enumerating the BIA deficiencies in designing and constructing the approach road and diversionary dike the trial judge found (Finding of Fact II, R. VIII, 163):
That said deficiencies were integrated into the construction in such a way that the subsequent acceptance and maintenance of the bridge and approach road by the State of Utah did not break the chain of causation between the negligent acts and the erosion and breakthrough.
Where state law would impose liability on two parties as joint tort feasors, the Government may be held jointly and severally liable for its concurrent negligence: E. g., H. L. Properties, Inc. v. Aerojet-General Corp., et al., 331 F.Supp. 1006, 1009-1010 (S.D.Fla.), affirmed per curiam, 468 F.2d 1397 (5th Cir.).

. The Government has not demonstrated the weight that should be given to the federal “Standard Specifications” in this case where the general measure of liability is supplied by state law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b); Rayonier, Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 318, 77 S.Ct. 374, 1 L.Ed.2d 354. The trial judge used as a standard that of a “prudent engineer” and a “reasonably prudent engineer,” see Findings of Fact 9 and 10, R. VIII, 162, and this appears to be a proper standard.