Court Opinion

ID: 9799710
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 07:29:54.7471+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:23.600511
License: Public Domain

Dooley, J.,
¶ 28. dissenting. This is a summary judgment proceeding, but the PCR court did not treat it as such. In particular, in deciding the prejudice question as a matter of law, the court ignored perhaps the most fundamental principle of the summary judgment standard: that the trial court must view the facts most favorably to the nonmoving party and afford that party — in this case petitioner — the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences. Here, the PCR court did exactly the opposite by viewing the facts favorably to the State and resolving all inferences and reasonable doubts in its favor. If the court had applied the correct standard, it would have been compelled to deny the State’s motion for the following reason. Based on the record before us, a reasonable judge, viewing the evidence and all inferences favorably to petitioner, could conclude that petitioner *510met his burden of showing a reasonable likelihood that his sentence would have been different had his attorney not engaged in what we must presume to be ineffective assistance of counsel.2 For this reason, the case should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
¶ 29. The PCR court did not state the summary judgment standard in rendering its decision, but that standard is well established. Summary judgment is authorized under Vermont Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”3 From the inception of the rule, courts, including this Court, have uniformly recognized that “the party opposing the summary judgment motion is to be given the benefit of all reasonable doubts and inferences in determining whether a genuine issue exists.” Braun v. Humiston, 140 Vt. 302, 306, 437 A.2d *5111388, 1389 (1981) (citing 10 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2727, at 526-28 (1973)), overruled on other grounds by Soucy v. Soucy Motors, Inc., 143 Vt. 615, 471 A.2d 224 (1983); see United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962) (“On summary judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts . . . must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion”). We have recently reiterated this principle in the context of a post-conviction-relief (PCR) case involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See In re Lowry, 2013 VT 85, ¶¶ 9-10, 195 Vt. 14, 84 A.3d 816 (reversing grant of summary judgment because PCR court accepted unsupported inference that petitioner directed allegedly ineffective trial strategy); see also O’Brien v. Synnott, 2013 VT 33, ¶ 14, 193 Vt. 546, 72 A.3d 331 (reversing grant of summary judgment on battery claim because it was dependent upon inferences unfavorable to nonmoving party).
¶ 30. As explained in a leading treatise:
The way in which [the summary judgment] test is applied at the appellate level is designed to give the party who defended [against] the motion the benefit of any doubt as to the propriety of granting summary judgment. . . . The message [from the U.S. Supreme Court] is clear; the party who defended against the motion for summary judgment will have the advantage of the court’s reading the record in the light most favorable to him, will have his allegations taken as true, and will receive the benefit of the doubt when his assertions conflict with those of the movant.
10A C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2716, at 274-77 (1998). “In sum, summary judgment will be granted only in clear cases.” Id. § 2725, at 428-29; cf. Toys, Inc. v. F.M. Burlington Co., 155 Vt. 44, 50, 582 A.2d 123, 127 (1990) (reversing summary judgment because, although basic facts were clear and undisputed, dispute did “not depend alone upon the specified facts found but also upon the reasonable inferences to be drawn from them” (quotation omitted)).
¶ 31. Thus, if the evidence presented on a motion for summary judgment “is subject to conflicting interpretations, or reasonable people might differ as to its significance, summary judgment is improper.” 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, § 2725, at 433-37 *512(citing federal and state cases); see Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty., Tenn., 555 U.S. 271, 277 n.2 (2009) (rejecting argument that plaintiffs undisputed responses to sexual advances suggested consent to those advances on ground that all reasonable inferences had to be viewed favorably to plaintiff at summary judgment stage). “Even where there is no dispute as to demonstrable historical facts, summary judgment cannot be granted if differing inferences can be drawn from those undisputed historical facts sufficient to create a material dispute of fact.” Macy v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 142, 145 (D. Md. 1974); see also Warrior Tombigbee Transp. Co. v. M/V Nan Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 1983) (“Summary judgment may be inappropriate even where the parties agree on the basic facts, but disagree about the factual inferences that should be drawn from these facts.”); Chenette v. Trs. of Iowa Coll., Grinnell, Iowa, 431 F.2d 49, 53 (8th Cir. 1970) (“Evaluative judgment between two rationally possible conclusions from facts cannot be engaged in on summary judgment.”); cf. Empire Elecs. Co. v. United States, 311 F.2d 175, 180 (2d Cir. 1962) (“Where only one inference could reasonably be drawn from the undisputed evidentiary facts, then summary judgment would be proper”).
¶ 32. Moreover, the trial court “has no discretion to enlarge its power to grant summary judgment beyond the limits prescribed by the rule.” 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, § 2728, at 517. “[S]ummary judgment cannot be granted merely because the court believes that the movant will prevail if the action is tried on the merits.” Id. § 2728, at 518-23. The court’s duty at the summary judgment stage is to determine whether a genuine dispute remains for trial — where the court can weigh the evidence. Id. §2728, at 524; see Vt. Envtl. Bd. v. Chickering, 155 Vt. 308, 319, 583 A.2d 607, 613-14 (1990) (“Summary judgment is not a substitute for a determination on the merits, so long as evidence has been presented which creates an issue of material fact, no matter what view the court may take of the relative weight of that evidence.”). Once the court determines that there is a triable issue, “the inquiry is at an end and summary judgment must be denied.” 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, supra, § 2728, at 524.
¶ 33. Plainly, the PCR court did not adhere to this standard here. To the contrary, the court weighed all reasonable doubts and inferences in favor of the State in granting the State’s motion for *513summary judgment on the issue of whether the facts supported a finding of prejudice. The majority appears to accept the above standard but states that “it is not reasonable to infer, given the evidence in the record, that simply because the [sentencing] court mentioned penetration in its recitation of the facts, it must have imposed a harsher sentence based on such finding.” Ante, ¶ 25.4 This is a gross understatement of what occurred at the sentencing hearing on the question of penetration.
¶ 34. After the completion of preliminary matters and the prosecutor’s statement, penetration was the first and only subject raised by the sentencing court. The court noted several references to penetration in the PSI report and asked the prosecutor if they were accurate. The prosecutor responded, after noting that the child “wouldn’t be able to testify whether [defendant] went inside or not,” that “the affidavit was replete and the interview was replete with that. It was initially charged as a sexual assault.” The court responded as follows:
Well, I understood that. And — and the plea, obviously, has limited the potential incarceration. . . . Title 13 says that the sentencing court is to consider the nature and circumstances of the crime. And the statements that are made by the adults who talked to the child later, are — are part of this record.
*514The prosecutor then added that “the use of the lubricant was pretty clear as to what the intent was,” to which the court replied: “Oh, all right. Well, you know, this is your point to argue and I’ll — I’ll certainly consider that.” The court then asked defense counsel to proceed with his statement.
¶ 35. In sum, the only subject on which the court questioned the prosecutor was penetration. When the prosecutor assured the court that there was plenty of evidence to support a finding of penetration, as indicated in the PSI report, the court noted that although the plea agreement limited the potential incarceration, it was authorized to consider “the nature and circumstances of the crime.” Then, after confirming that the evidence on penetration was part of the record through affidavits and statements of adults who spoke to the child, the court indicated that it would consider it.
¶ 36. This was far more than a mere mention of penetration in a recitation of facts, but there’s more. After defense counsel gave his statement and the court recused itself to deliberate, it returned to the courtroom and immediately stated that after “reviewing the presentence investigation and the defendant’s comments, the Court concludes that the description of the offense given by the child is reliable,” — including that “[h]is finger, as the child described it, was a little bit inside, but wasn’t in that far.” The court then went on to pronounce the sentence, noting the seriousness of the offense, the betrayal of the child, defendant’s failure to recognize the harm done, and other factors. The court’s apparent reliance on factors other than penetration does not demonstrate, however, that it did not rely upon the fact of penetration to enhance the sentence. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Welch v. Lane, 738 F.2d 863, 867 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding that sentencing court’s reliance on other allowable factors did not cure its reliance on inaccurate information); People v. Barnes, 875 N.Y.S.2d 545, 547 (App. Div. 2009) (stating that defendant need not establish that court enhanced sentence based “solely” on improper information, but rather only that court took improper information into account in making its determination).
¶ 37. Without question, based on this record, a PCR judge could reasonably infer that the sentencing court relied at least in part on the accuracy of the assertions of penetration to impose a harsher sentence on petitioner. Indeed, that is exactly what defense counsel believed occurred. As soon as the court finished *515pronouncing its sentence, defense counsel objected to the court sentencing defendant based on the State’s claim that it could prove penetration. Defense counsel noted that the allegations of penetration were never attested or probed and that the prosecutor had candidly admitted that the child would not be able to substantiate penetration. Rather than stating that the issue of penetration was not a significant consideration in its sentencing decision, the court responded, wrongly, that the prosecutor had only stated that it did not want to put the child through a trial. Again, a judge could reasonably infer that, after confirming the accuracy of the penetration statements in the PSI report, the sentencing court concluded that those statements could be relied upon in enhancing petitioner’s sentence.
¶ 38. Indeed, courts have found a reasonable likelihood of a different outcome on comparable, or even lesser, grounds. See State v. Cox, 147 Vt. 421, 426, 519 A.2d 1144, 1147 (1986) (concluding that sentencing court referenced, and thus relied upon, incriminating statements made by defendant after he had requested counsel); see also Lane, 738 F.2d at 866-67 (finding reliance where sentencing judge gave “specific consideration to the questionable information”); United States v. Stein, 544 F.2d 96, 102 (2d Cir. 1976) (stating that trial judge’s express reference “to these matters upon imposition of sentence indicates that she probably considered them to be material” or “otherwise there would not have been any point in her mentioning them”); People v. Samuels, 915 N.Y.S.2d 758, 759 (App. Div. 2011) (finding that sentencing court probably considered improper materials because it expressly mentioned them); State v. Anderson, 588 N.W.2d 75, 77-78 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998) (stating that sentencing court’s general comments at sentencing hearing concerning allegations of prior violations cited in PSI report indicated that court relied upon allegations of sexual assault that had been recanted); cf. State v. Koons, 2011 VT 22, ¶ 14, 189 Vt. 285, 20 A.3d 662 (holding that court’s statement at sentencing that victim was not first young girl defendant had had sex with palpably demonstrated its reliance upon sexual assault charge of which defendant had been acquitted); In re Carter, 2004 VT 21, ¶¶ 39-43, 176 Vt. 322, 848 A.2d 281 (concluding as matter of law that sentencing court relied upon defendant’s uncounseled statement to his probation officer denying crime for which he was convicted, where denial of crime was central to PSI recommendation, court explicitly stated that it *516relied upon PSI report, prosecutor argued for same sentence as one ultimately imposed based on same statements, and PCR court reasonably interpreted sentencing court’s statements).
¶ 39. Here, the PCR court concluded as a matter of law that petitioner could not show a reasonable probability that he would have received a lesser sentence but for his counsel’s failure to object to allegations of penetration because: (1) “[t]he bulk of the argument from the parties and the [sentencing] court’s explanation of the basis for its sentence contained no mention of penetration”; (2) “the [sentencing] court’s stated reason for th[e] description [of the crime as horrible] was that the crime was a betrayal of an innocent child” and that petitioner had failed to acknowledge the harm he had caused; (3) the sentencing court’s “stated reasons for [imposing a harsh sentence] had nothing to do with penetration”; (4) the eight-to-fifteen-year sentence imposed was less than the ten-to-fifteen-year sentence requested by the prosecution (but notably the same as the sentence recommended in the PSI containing the allegedly improper allegations); and (5) the explanation given by the court as “the basis for its sentence would support the sentence even without consideration of the statements in the PSI relating to penetration.”
¶ 40. Given the record as described above, the PCR court had to accord all reasonable doubts and inferences to the State to arrive at these conclusions. The court essentially ignored the penetration discussion and concluded that the other factors cited by the sentencing court were the primary factors that the sentencing court relied upon. As noted, the fact that the sentencing court may have relied upon other factors in making its decision does not demonstrate that it did not rely in part on the act of penetration. Viewing the record favorably to petitioner and according him all reasonable doubts and inferences, a judge could reasonably conclude that the sentencing court enhanced petitioner’s sentence based, at least in part, on its assumption that petitioner had committed aggravated sexual assault by penetrating the child victim. Accordingly, in my view, summary judgment was inappropriate, and the matter should be remanded for an evidentiary hearing on petitioner’s PCR petition.

 Petitioner argued that his trial attorney provided ineffective counsel by not objecting to facts in the presentence investigation (PSI) report concerning penetration. The State responded that, even assuming ineffective assistance based on the failure of petitioner’s counsel to challenge statements concerning penetration in the PSI report, petitioner could not, as a matter of law, prove prejudice. The PCR court determined that petitioner had made out a prima facie case on the ineffectiveness element, stating that, viewed in a light most favorable to petitioner, “there is sufficient evidence of ineffective assistance to require a fact-based decision after a hearing.” Therefore, we must assume ineffective assistance on appeal.
The majority notes petitioner’s admission during police questioning that he digitally penetrated the victim, a fact that could conceivably undercut a claim of ineffectiveness on the point raised by petitioner. It is only fair to point out the context of petitioner’s admission. As reported in the psychosexual evaluation of petitioner, he repeatedly denied penetration before stating, after the interrogating officer told him that he had “one more shot” to admit penetration so that he could get help and avoid throwing away thirty-two years of building his business: “I don’t believe that I did, but if she says I did, that’s as simple as that.” Moreover, at the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor stated that the child “wouldn’t be able to testify whether he went inside or not.”

 Vermont’s version of Rule 56 has always been “nearly identical to Federal Rule 56.” Reporter’s Notes, V.R.C.P. 56. Recently, the rule was amended and “replaced by a rule based almost entirely on the December 2010 amendments of Federal Rule 56.” Reporter’s Notes, 2012 Amendment. The recent amendment established “uniformity with the current federal rule,” but made no “significant changes in the standard for granting summary judgment.” Id. It did, however, substitute the phrase “dispute of material fact” for “issue of material fact” to better reflect “ ‘the focus of a summary judgment decision.’ ” Id. (quoting Federal Advisory Committee’s Note on 2010 Amendment, which can be found in 12A C. Wright, A. Miller, et al., Federal Practice and Procedure, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Appendices, App. C., Rule 56, at 492 (2013)).

 According to the majority, petitioner failed to show that, absent evidence of penetration, there was a “substantial likelihood” of a different result. Ante, ¶ 25. While the U.S. Supreme Court stated in a recent case that the likelihood of a different result must be “substantial” and “not just conceivable,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 112, 131 S. Ct. 770, 792 (2011), the Court reiterated in that same case the uniformly accepted standard: whether it is “reasonably likely” that the result would have been different. Id. at 111, 131 S. Ct. at 792. The Court expressly noted that the “reasonably likely” standard does not require a showing that counsel’s actions “more likely than not altered the outcome,” even though the difference between the two standards is slight. Id. at 111-12, 131 S. Ct. at 792 (quotations omitted). In other words, the majority’s use of the term “substantial likelihood” should not suggest a standard more rigorous than preponderance of the evidence. Indeed, it is a less rigorous standard than preponderance of the evidence. I agree with petitioner that the superior court in this case misstated the correct standard at one point in its decision when it concluded that “petitioner cannot show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the [sentencing] court would have imposed a lesser sentence if it had not considered those [penetration] statements.”