Court Opinion

ID: 9912974
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 16:37:56.637801+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:43.067496
License: Public Domain

134 Nev., Advance Opinion        IS
                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                   GLENN MILLER DOOLIN,                                  No. 73698-COA
                   Appellant,
                   vs.                                                          Fl            ,   D
                   THE STATE OF NEVADA
                   DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,                                   DEC
                   Respondent.                                                 ELI 7 P ■. .TH ' aTZCOMI
                                                                                                 •  rc; IRT

                               Pro se appeal from a district court order denying a
                   postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 1 Eighth Judicial District
                   Court, Clark County; Linda Marie Bell, Chief Judge.
                               Affirmed.

                   Glenn Miller Doolin, Indian Springs,
                   in Pro Se.

                   Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, and Jessica E Perlick, Deputy
                   Attorney General, Carson City,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE SILVER, C.J., TAO and GIBBONS, JJ.

                                                     OPINION
                   PER CURIAM:
                               The issue presented in this appeal is whether an offender may
                   have statutory credit earned pursuant to NRS 209.4465 applied to the

                       'This appeal has been submitted for decision without oral argument.
                   NRAP 34(0(3).
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                   offender's parole eligibility and minimum term for a sentence imposed
                   pursuant to NRS 207.010. We conclude that both the sentence and category
                   of conviction are enhanced when an offender is adjudicated a habitual
                   criminal pursuant to NRS 207.010. And because such an adjudication will
                   always enhance a conviction for a lower category felony to either a category
                   A or B felony, we hold NRS 209.4465(8)(d) precludes application of statutory
                   credit to an offender's parole eligibility and minimum term for a sentence
                   imposed pursuant to MRS 207.010. Because Glenn Miller Doolin was
                   adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant to MRS 207.010(1)(a), we conclude
                   the district court correctly determined Doolin was not entitled to the
                   application of credit to his parole eligibility and minimum term.
                   Accordingly, we affirm.
                                    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                               Doolin was convicted of grand larceny of a motor vehicle, a
                   category C felony, see NRS 205.228(2), and possession of burglary tools, a
                   gross misdemeanor, see NRS 205.080(1), for crimes he committed in 2012.
                   For the grand larceny of a motor vehicle count, the district court adjudicated
                   Doolin a habitual criminal and sentenced him, pursuant to the small
                   habitual criminal enhancement, to a prison term of 60 to 150 months. See
                   NRS 207.010(1)(a). The district court also sentenced Doolin to serve a
                   consecutive term of 12 months in the Clark County Detention Center for his
                   possession of burglary tools conviction.
                               Doolin filed a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus
                   and supplemental petition in which /he challenged the computation of time
                   served for his prison sentence. Doolin claimed the Nevada Department of
                   Corrections has failed to apply statutory credit toward his parole eligibility

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                    and minimum term. The district court concluded Doolin was not entitled to
                    relief and denied the petition. This appeal follows.
                                                        ANALYSIS
                                  Doolin claims the district court erred by finding he is not
                    entitled to have the statutory credit he has earned applied to his parole
                    eligibility and minimum term. He asserts the exclusion in NRS
                    209.4465(8)(d) does not apply to him because, although he was punished as
                    a category B felon under the habitual criminal statute, he was only
                    convicted of a category C felony.
                                  Doolin observes that NRS 209.4465(8)(d) excludes the
                    application of statutory credit to the parole eligibility and minimum term
                    for a sentence for an offender who is "convicted of: . . . [a] category A or B
                    felony" (emphasis added), but NRS 207.010(1)(a) states that an offender
                    who is adjudicated a habitual criminal "shall be punished for a category B
                    felony" (emphasis added). Doolin urges this court to conclude that the
                    Legislature's use of convicted in NRS 209.4465(8)(d) and punished in NRS
                    207.010(1)(a) indicate NRS 209.4465(8)(d) was not intended to preclude the
                    application of statutory credit to a sentence imposed pursuant to NRS
                    207.010. See Williams v. State Dep't of Corr., 133 Nev. „ 402 P.3d
                    1260, 1264 (2017) (stating courts "must presume that the variation in
                    language indicates a variation in meaning").
                                  Doolin asserts Howard v. State, 83 Nev. 53,422 P.2d 548 (1967),
                    and Parkerson v. State, 100 Nev. 222, 678 P.2d 1155 (1984), support such a
                    conclusion.      Howard and Parkerson state the habitual criminal
                    enhancement is not a separate offense and only acts to increase an
                    offender's punishment. Howard, 83 Nev. at 56, 422 P.2d at 550; Parkerson,
                    100 Nev. at 224, 678 P.2d at 1156. Doolin argues Howard and Parke rson

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                   thus imply that sentencing under the habitual criminal enhancement does
                   not equate to a conviction. He further argues that this, in turn, means
                   imposition of the habitual criminal enhancement does not alter the category
                   of felony he was convicted of committing, and he is entitled to application of
                   statutory credit toward his parole eligibility and minimum term as an
                   offender convicted of a category C felony.
                               The ultimate question we must answer is whether NRS
                   209.4465(8)(d) precludes an offender sentenced pursuant to NRS 207.010
                   from having statutory credit applied to his or her parole eligibility and
                   minimum term for that sentence. To answer this question, we must first
                   decide whether habitual criminal adjudication pursuant to NRS 207.010
                   enhances both the sentence and category of conviction, i.e., whether an
                   offender who is "punished for a category B felony" under NRS 207.010(1)(a)
                   is also convicted of a category B felony. The resolution of this issue is a
                   matter of statutory interpretation.
                                "Statutory interpretation is an issue of law subject to de novo
                   review." Hobbs v. State, 127 Nev. 234, 237, 251 P.3d 177, 179 (2011). The
                   goal of statutory interpretation "is to give effect to the Legislature's intent."
                   Id. To ascertain the Legislature's intent, we first focus our inquiry on the
                   statute's plain language, "avoid [ingi statutory interpretation that renders
                   language meaningless or superfluous." Id. "[Whenever possible, [we] will
                   interpret a rule or statute in harmony with other rules or statutes." Watson
                   Rounds v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 131 Nev. 783, 789, 358 P.3d 228, 232
                   (2015) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[W]hen a statute's language is
                   clear and unambiguous, the apparent intent must be given effect, as there
                   is no room for construction." Edgington v. Edgington, 119 Nev. 577, 582-83,
                   80 P.3d 1282, 1286 (2003).

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                               Doolin is correct in that the statutes he compares use different
                   language and the habitual criminal enhancement is not considered a
                   separate conviction apart from the underlying offense, see Howard, 83 Nev.
                   at 56, 422 P.2d at 550. However, Doolin's argument that habitual criminal
                   adjudication does not enhance the category of felony an offender is convicted
                   of fails to consider NRS Chapter 207's overall habitual criminal scheme and,
                   in particular, ignores a key provision that governs the imposition of the
                   habitual criminal enhancement.
                               Pursuant to NRS 207.010(1)(a), offenders sentenced under the
                   small habitual criminal enhancement are "punished for a category B
                   felony." Similarly, NRS 207.010(1)(b) states that offenders sentenced under
                   the large habitual criminal enhancement are "punished for a category A
                   felony." Although NRS 207.010 uses the word punished, NRS 207.016(1)
                   states "[al conviction pursuant to NRS 207.010 . . . operates only to
                   increase, not to reduce, the sentence otherwise provided by law for the
                   principal crime" (emphasis added). Thus, NRS 207.016(1) states an
                   offender who has been sentenced under NRS 207.010 has been convicted
                   under NRS 207.010. Reading NRS 207.010 and NRS 207.016(1) in
                   harmony, we conclude the plain language of those statutes demonstrates
                   the Legislature intended for both the sentence and category of conviction to
                   be enhanced when an offender is adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant
                   to NRS 207.010.
                               This conclusion is not contrary to, and does not alter, prior
                   decisions explaining that the habitual criminal enhancement is not a
                   separate offense, but rather a status that "allows enlarged punishment,"
                   Howard, 83 Nev. at 57, 422 P.2d at 550, because the enhancement of the
                   category of conviction does not change the elements of the underlying crime

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                   or create a new crime; rather, it only operates to increase the punishment
                   for a recidivist. This is consistent with the Legislature's approach to other
                   criminal enhancements that are based on prior convictions, such as the
                   enhancements for battery constituting domestic violence and driving under
                   the influence. For each of those crimes, an offender's sentence and category
                   of conviction may be enhanced following submission of evidence of the
                   offender's prior criminal convictions.     See NRS 200.485(1)(a)-(c); NRS
                   484C.400( 1)(a)-( c).
                                 Because we conclude the meaning of the statutory language in
                   NRS 207.010 and NRS 207.016 is plain, there is no need to look to legislative
                   history. See State v. Lucero, 127 Nev. 92, 95, 249 P.3d 1226, 1228 (2011)
                   (stating courts should look to legislative history when the statute is
                   ambiguous, i.e., "when the statutory language lends itself to two or more
                   reasonable interpretations" (internal quotation marks omitted)). We
                   nevertheless note the legislative history also supports this interpretation.
                                 NRS 207.010 was enacted in 1995 after approval of Senate Bill
                   416, which made "various changes regarding sentencing of persons
                   convicted of felonies," Hearing on S.B. 416 Before the Senate Comm. on
                   Judiciary, 68th Leg. (Nev., May 1, 1995).     See 1995 Nev. Stat., ch. 443,
                   §§ 180-81, at 1237-38. The legislative history for Senate Bill 416 includes a
                   crimes category chart that listed the small habitual criminal enhancement
                   with the category B felonies and the large habitual criminal enhancement
                   with the category A felonies. Hearing on S.B. 416 Before the Senate Comm.
                   on Judiciary, 68th Leg. (Nev., May 1, 1995) (Exhibit F). Given this chart, it
                   appears the Legislature did not intend for habitual criminal adjudication to
                   retain the category of felony of the underlying crime and only enhance the
                   range of punishment that may be imposed. Accordingly, we conclude the

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                   legislative history indicates that the Legislature intended for both the
                   sentence and category of conviction to be enhanced when an offender is
                   adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant to NRS 207.010. 2
                               For the reasons stated above, we conclude the plain language of
                   the statutes demonstrates that both the sentence and category of conviction
                   are enhanced when an offender is adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant
                   to NRS 207.010, and note this conclusion is also supported by legislative
                   history. Therefore, when an offender is adjudicated a habitual criminal
                   pursuant to NRS 207.010(1)(a), the conviction is enhanced and the offender
                   is convicted of a category B felony, and when an offender is adjudicated a
                   habitual criminal pursuant to NRS 207.010(1)(b), the conviction is
                   enhanced and the offender is convicted of a category A felony.
                               Turning to the application of statutory credit under NRS
                   209.4465, we note NRS 209.4465(8)(d) precludes the application of statutory
                   credit to an offender's parole eligibility and minimum term for a sentence
                   on a conviction for a category A or B felony. Because we conclude
                   adjudication as a habitual criminal pursuant to NRS 207.010 enhances both
                   the sentence and category of conviction, we hold that an offender who is
                   adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant to NRS 207.010 is not entitled to
                   have statutory credit applied to the eligibility for parole and minimum term
                   for that sentence.

                         2To the extent Doolin argues the rule of lenity requires resolution of
                   any ambiguity in his favor, this argument lacks merit. Because there is no
                   unresolved ambiguity, the rule of lenity does not apply. See Lucero, 127
                   Nev. at 99, 249 P.3d at 1230 ("Because ambiguity is the cornerstone of the
                   rule of lenity, the rule only applies when other statutory interpretation
                   methods, including the plain language, legislative history, reason, and
                   public policy, have failed to resolve a penal statute's ambiguity.").
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                                  Here, although grand larceny of a motor vehicle is a category C
                     felony, because Doolin was adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant to
                     NRS 207.010(1)(a), his category of conviction was enhanced to a category B
                     felony. Therefore, NRS 209.4465(8)(d) precludes application of statutory
                     credit to his parole eligibility and minimum term. Accordingly, we conclude
                     the district court did not err by denying Doolin's petition.
                                                    CONCLUSION
                                  We conclude habitual criminal adjudication pursuant to NRS
                     207.010 enhances both the sentence and category of conviction. Thus,
                     habitual criminal adjudication pursuant to NRS 207.010 will always
                     enhance a conviction for a lower category felony, and the offender will be
                     convicted of either a category A or B felony. We therefore hold that NRS
                     209.4465(8)(d) precludes application of statutory credit to an offender's
                     parole eligibility and minimum term for a sentence imposed pursuant to
                     NRS 207.010. Because Doolin was adjudicated a habitual criminal
                     pursuant to NRS 207.010(1)(a), NRS 209.4465(8)(d) precludes application
                     of statutory credit to his parole eligibility and minimum term. Accordingly,
                     we conclude the district court properly denied Doolin's petition. Therefore,
                     we affirm.

                                                                                        C.J.
                                                          Silver

                                                                    Akre"-              J.
                                                          Tao

                                                                                        J.
                                                          Gibbons
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