Court Opinion

ID: 9353517
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 01:00:19.130593+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:09:17.158451
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-50676     Document: 00516606905         Page: 1   Date Filed: 01/11/2023

           United States Court of Appeals
                for the Fifth Circuit                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                             Fifth Circuit

                                                                           FILED
                                                                    January 11, 2023
                                  No. 21-50676
                                                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                           Clerk
   United States of America,

                                                           Plaintiff—Appellee,

                                      versus

   Steven Melendez,

                                                        Defendant—Appellant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Western District of Texas
                            USDC No. 6:20-CR-67-3

   Before Higginbotham, Southwick, and Higginson, Circuit
   Judges.
   Patrick E. Higginbotham, Circuit Judge:
         Steven Melendez pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to
   distribute and to conspiracy to distribute over 500 grams of
   methamphetamine. He appeals, challenging his sentencing enhancement as
   lacking adequate record support. The argument fails, as the record plausibly
   supports the enhancement. We AFFIRM.
Case: 21-50676          Document: 00516606905              Page: 2       Date Filed: 01/11/2023

                                           No. 21-50676

                                                 I.
          Steven Melendez and several co-defendants were charged with
   conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and conspiracy to distribute no
   less than 500 grams of a mixture or substance containing methamphetamine
   in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. 1 Melendez pled guilty without a plea
   agreement.
          The Pre-Sentence Report assessed a base offense level of 34 under
   applicable sentencing guidelines as well as the Drug Quantity Table and
   assessed a two-level enhancement for recklessly creating a substantial risk of
   death or serious bodily injury to another person in the course of fleeing from
   a law enforcement officer. Although the PSR did not detail the factual
   support for this enhancement, all agree that it stems from a separate one-
   sentence paragraph from another section of the PSR, which reads: “[d]uring
   the investigation, Melendez was in a vehicle that evaded from [sic] DPS
   troopers and the interceptions reveal that he lost several ounces because he
   threw it out during the car chase.” This sentence is from the Factual Basis,2
   which includes a near-verbatim description of the pursuit and intelligence
   learned via wiretap. The PSR concluded that Melendez’s total offense level
   was 33 after applying a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
   Given Melendez’s criminal record merited a category VI criminal history,
   the PSR assessed a guidelines range of 235 to 293 months of imprisonment.
   Melendez did not object to the PSR prior to his sentencing or at the
   sentencing hearing.

          1
              The substantive offenses at issue are 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii).
          2
           A Factual Basis is a document that summarizes what the government would prove
   beyond a reasonable doubt if a defendant’s case were to proceed to trial absent a plea.
   Melendez stipulated to the facts in the Factual Basis.

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                                           No. 21-50676

           At sentencing, while the sentencing judge did not expressly orally
   adopt the PSR, the judge recited the same 235- to 293-month sentencing
   range after repeating that the total offense level was 33, reviewing
   Melendez’s criminal history, and noting the purity of the methamphetamine
   seized, all of which mimicked the PSR’s assessments. The district court then
   sentenced Melendez to 290 months of imprisonment, five years of
   supervised release, and a $1,000 fine. Melendez did not object.
           Melendez filed a timely notice of appeal of his sentence. He argues
   that the district court erred in imposing without a sufficient factual basis a
   two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2 for recklessly
   creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person
   while fleeing from a law enforcement officer.
                                                 II.
           “This Court reviews the district court’s ‘interpretation or application
   of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its factual findings for clear
   error.’” 3 “The standard of appellate review of a reckless endangerment
   finding is clear error, and the district court’s finding will be upheld if the
   finding is plausible in light of the record as a whole.” 4 And, “[w]here, as here,
   the defendant fails to object to his sentence during sentencing, we review the
   District Court’s sentencing decision for plain error.” 5

           3
              United States v. Sincleair, 16 F.4th 471, 474 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States
   v. Trujillo, 502 F.3d 353, 356 (5th Cir. 2007)); see also United States v. Blanco, 27 F.4th 375,
   382 (5th Cir. 2022) (adopting the same standard of review).
           4
            United States v. Kelley, 40 F.4th 276, 285 (5th Cir. 2022) (citing United States v.
   Gould, 529 F.3d 274, 276 (5th Cir. 2008)).
           5
            United States v. Ronquillo, 508 F.3d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 2007); see also United States
   v. Vargas, 21 F.4th 332, 334 (5th Cir. 2021) (applying the plain error standard where the

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                                              No. 21-50676

           To establish plain error, a litigant “must show that (1) the district
   court erred; (2) the error was clear and obvious; and (3) the error affected his
   substantial rights.” 6 “Should he make such showings, we would have the
   discretion to correct the error if a failure to do so would seriously affect the
   fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the proceeding.” 7
                                                   III.
           Melendez argues that the two-level enhancement is inappropriate
   because its application, which rested on his having discarded drugs from a
   moving vehicle while engaged in a car chase, lacks an evidentiary basis to
   demonstrate recklessness. Melendez forwards several lines of argument.
   Only one is salient.
           First, Melendez argues that the PSR is unclear as to the type of
   discarded drugs, and given his documented daily use of marijuana, he could
   have discarded marijuana during the chase rather than methamphetamine.
   This argument strains the natural reading of the PSR and Factual Basis, both
   referencing only methamphetamine in the context of the drug distribution
   scheme, and only referring to marijuana as it pertains to Melendez’s personal
   usage or prior arrests. Moreover, that Melendez was arrested with
   methamphetamine in his car renders it plausible that the same drug was
   discarded amidst a car chase.
           Second, Melendez argues that he threw out such a “small” amount of
   methamphetamine that it fails to rise to the level of risk required for the
   enhancement. This contention is meritless: “Methamphetamine is used in

   defendant appealed his sentence having “failed to object” to the district court’s calculation
   of its guidelines methodologies).
           6
               Vargas, 21 F.4th at 334 (citing Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S. 129, 135 (2009)).
           7
               Id. (citing Puckett, 556 U.S. at 135).

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                                          No. 21-50676

   five to ten milligram doses,” 8 and even two ounces could produce thousands
   of lethal—or, at a minimum, deleterious—doses. 9 So, only discarding
   “several ounces” does not render his conduct, per se, riskless.
           Third, Melendez argues that he cannot be held responsible for the
   actions of the vehicle’s driver because there is no evidence that he was the
   driver. Conceding that the record is here ambiguous, the Government
   focuses on the discarding of drugs as the animating force behind the
   enhancement—the disposal of drugs amidst a police chase, in and of itself,
   creates a sufficient risk to support the enhancement. So, we too now home in
   on this query. 10 Assessing Melendez’s argument requires return to the record
   facts to determine whether they provide a plausible basis for the imposition
   of the enhancement.
                                               A.
           Much of the relevant guides are rote. “Generally, a PSR bears
   sufficient indicia of reliability to be considered as evidence by the sentencing
   judge in making factual determinations.” 11 A district court may adopt the
   facts in a PSR “without further inquiry if those facts have an adequate
   evidentiary basis with sufficient indicia of reliability and the defendant does
   not present rebuttal evidence or otherwise demonstrate that the information

           8
              United States v. Anguiano, 27 F.4th 1070, 1074 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting United
   States v. Dickey, 102 F.3d 157, 160 n.3 (5th Cir. 1996)).
           9
             See United States v. Stricklin, 290 F.3d 748, 749 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam)
   (noting the dangerousness of methamphetamine).
           10
             See United States v. Lima-Rivero, 971 F.3d 518, 520 (5th Cir. 2020) (foregoing
   consideration of whether the driver’s conduct could or should be imputed to the criminal
   defendant because conduct the defendant unquestionably undertook—namely throwing
   drugs out of a car window—alone sustained the enhancement).
           11
             United States v. Lucio, 985 F.3d 482, 485 (5th Cir.) (quoting United States v.
   Harris, 702 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir. 2012)), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 177 (2021).

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                                            No. 21-50676

   in the PSR is unreliable.” 12 Yet “mere inclusion in the PSR does not convert
   facts lacking an adequate evidentiary basis with sufficient indicia of reliability
   into facts a district court may rely upon at sentencing.” 13 As Melendez
   neither objected to the PSR nor presented rebuttal evidence regarding the
   PSR’s statements, including those describing the disposal of the drugs, the
   district court properly relied upon the PSR. 14 We turn, then, to whether the
   facts provide a plausible basis to uphold imposition of the enhancement.
                                                  B.
           Section 3C1.2 of the Sentencing Guidelines instructs district courts to
   impose a two-level enhancement “[i]f the defendant recklessly created a
   substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the
   course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” 15 The Guidelines explain
   that one acts recklessly when he is “aware of the risk created by his conduct
   and the risk was of such a nature and degree that to disregard that risk
   constituted a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable
   person would exercise in such a situation.” 16 And as the factor at issue is risk
   of harm rather than infliction of harm itself, “we have not limited the

           12
                Harris, 702 F.3d at 230 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
           13
                Id. at 230 n.2.
           14
              See United States v. Ollison, 555 F.3d 152, 164 (5th Cir. 2009) (“Generally, a PSR
   bears sufficient indicia of reliability to permit the sentencing court to rely on it at
   sentencing. The defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that the PSR is inaccurate;
   in the absence of rebuttal evidence, the sentencing court may properly rely on the PSR and
   adopt it.” (quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Carbajal, 290 F.3d 277, 287 (5th
   Cir. 2002) (“[I]nformation in the pre-sentence report is presumed reliable and may be
   adopted by the district court without further inquiry if the defendant fails to demonstrate
   by competent rebuttal evidence that the information is materially untrue, inaccurate or
   unreliable.” (quotation marks omitted)).
           15
                U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2.
           16
                Id. §§ 2A1.4, cmt. n.1; 3C1.2, cmt. n.2.

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                                            No. 21-50676

   application of the [recklessness-in-pursuit] enhancement to situations
   resulting in actual harm or manifesting extremely dangerous conduct by a
   defendant.” 17 We have indeed upheld the imposition of the enhancement
   where a defendant disposed of either drugs or a weapon amidst law
   enforcement pursuit without insistence upon the demonstration of discrete
   harms realized by such actions. 18
           A handful of cases bear resemblance to the case at bar. In United States
   v. Villanueva, the defendant “th[rew] a bag of methamphetamine onto a
   public sidewalk while fleeing from police,” which this Court held in an
   unpublished opinion justified the reckless-in-pursuit enhancement as he
   “endangered the community because anyone, including a child, could have
   picked up the methamphetamine and ingested it, . . . and the dangerousness
   of methamphetamine is well established.” 19 In United States v. Vasquez-
   Desiga, this Court affirmed in an unpublished opinion the application of the
   enhancement “on the basis that [the defendant] tossed bundles of marijuana
   from a moving vehicle toward oncoming traffic.” 20 And most recently, this
   Court adopted the Villanueva Court’s reasoning in United States v. Lima-
   Rivero, a published opinion, concluding that “throwing a large quantity of a

           17
                United States v. Jimenez, 323 F.3d 320, 323 (5th Cir. 2003).
           18
             See, e.g., Kelley, 40 F.4th at 285 (upholding the same enhancement where a
   criminal defendant “discarded a pistol with 21 rounds in the magazine in a public area while
   running from the police” notwithstanding the fact that, “[l]uckily, Kelley did not harm
   anyone else” as a result of his actions).
           19
             69 F. App’x 657, 657 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing United States v. Stricklin, 290 F.3d
   748, 749 n.1 (5th Cir. 2002)).
           20
                576 F. App’x 308, 308 (5th Cir. 2014).

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                                         No. 21-50676

   dangerous drug into a residential neighborhood supports the reckless
   endangerment enhancement.” 21
           In this case, the record, while scant, supports at least a plausible basis
   for this enhancement. Again, the Factual Basis and the PSR both make clear
   that Melendez “lost several ounces because he threw it out during the car
   chase.” Absent specific evidence that Melendez took steps to ensure that the
   discarded drugs could not be consumed and pose a danger to others, his
   spoliation during a police chase, alone, plausibly “create[d] a substantial risk
   of death or serious bodily injury to another person recklessly created a
   substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to another person in the
   course of fleeing from a law enforcement officer.” 22 And in the absence of an
   objection, that the district court did not take a more detailed inventory of the
   exact amount, location, or method of disposal does not preclude this Court
   from making such a finding, particularly given the dangerousness
   methamphetamine poses. 23
                                            ****
           We AFFIRM.

           21
                971 F.3d at 520.
           22
                U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2.
           23
            See Stricklin, 290 F.3d at 749 n.1 (noting the Department of Justice’s description
   of methamphetamine as “dangerous, sometimes lethal and unpredictable”).

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