Court Opinion

ID: 9764287
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:18:12.313347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:55.487163
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING ON PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
W.C. DAVIS, Judge.
Upon original submission, this Court unanimously reversed appellant’s conviction for deadly assault on a court participant,1 upon the ground that the evidence adduced at appellant’s bond hearing pursuant to the previous capital murder indictment2 had been insufficient to meet the State’s burden to show probable cause to seize appellant and to search his automobile on the morning of the crime, and that the introduction at trial3 of the weapon used, which was found in that search, was therefore reversible error.
By its motion for rehearing, the State contends that the facts and inferences available to the three investigating officers and, through them, to their superior jointly *342and severally provided probable cause to believe at the time the BOLO was issued that appellant had committed the crime which, through the magic of hindsight and further investigation, it is now apparent he had done.
Our original opinion fairly and accurately sets out the facts and inferences available from the record.
Of the information shown to have been available to the police officers, surely the most damning is Lana Lee’s statement that appellant had slashed the victim’s automobile tires (as well as the tires of a date of the victim; there is no testimony as to the proximity in time of the slashings), that the victim was to testify against appellant the following month in proceedings based upon that event, and that appellant had threatened the victim in telephone calls in which he had attempted to persuade her to drop the charges for slashing. While it is true that the nature of the threats either was not communicated to the officers or was not elicited from them at the hearing, it was adduced that Lana Lee stated that the victim was “obviously” afraid for her life, that the victim had moved to Austin to get away from appellant, and that the most recent threat had come within the last week or two.
From all this we may infer that appellant had displayed a tendency toward violence aimed at the victim and those close to her and that he had a motive for murdering the victim, and for murdering her prior to April 1980. In this context, the threats, whatever their precise content, may be accorded some weight.
Lee’s statement that appellant had a criminal record and was known to be violent, and that he was now out of prison either on parole or on probation, was in and of itself of little effect. But that violence was corroborated by appellant’s specific acts of tire-slashing, and the criminal record provides further motive for avoiding a second conviction;4 whether on parole or probation, appellant, by a violation of law such as might be proved in the tire-slashing case, could face termination of his freedom more easily than might a person who was not on conditional release.
The State now contends that the mere existence of the diary strengthens the claim that the victim feared appellant. Much the same could be said of the entire boxful of personal effects linking the two. But Lee’s personal observation of the victim’s fear, combined with the move to Austin, the tire slashings and the threats amply establish the victim’s unfortunately well-founded fear. The diary provides nothing to further focus a reasonable suspicion upon appellant. Officer Persohn, the only officer to review the diary, testified as follows:
“A. Also, Officer Kornfuehrer had told me about a diary that she had kept. That Lana Lee had told him that she had kept this diary about some—about the ex boy friend threatening her or something. It wasn’t real clear at the time. It was just supposed to be a diary of his threats against her or property settlement or something. It’m not real sure what she said it was. And so I went upstairs with Officer Moxley, and we checked the—her bedroom for the diary with Lana Lee inside the closet where she thought it might have been kept. I pulled down a box from the top of the closet. As soon as I pulled it down, the top of it was kind of— she opened up the top. Lana Lee did. She said, ‘Here’s the diary.’ And it was on three or four pieces of legal pad paper. Long sized, yellow legal pad paper.
“Q. Did you read it?
“A. I didn’t read it in great detail. I glanced over it. From what I glanced over—from what I got out of it, she told mostly about splitting up property with him from Tyler, *343whatever that was over. It didn’t really go into specifics as far as I could tell.”
The diary itself was not offered in evidence, and it does not appear that an attempt was made to use it to refresh Per-sohn’s recollection.5
The disappearance of the victim’s date is of even less help. While we can appreciate the victim’s suspicion, given her relationship with appellant, that appellant was responsible, and while the further events reflected in the instant case do nothing to dispel that suspicion, we note that even Lee conceded that suspicion of appellant’s involvement was precisely that—mere suspicion.
Of course, no matter how strong appellant’s motive to murder the victim, if the circumstances surrounding the killing pointed strongly to another person or to another motive, no probable cause would exist to lead a person of reasonable caution and prudence to believe that the instrumentality of the crime would be found in appellant’s possession. See Barber v. State, 611 S.W.2d 67, 68 (Tex.Cr.App.1981). Thus, had the victim been murdered in circumstances pointing to, or perhaps even compatible with, e.g., rape or robbery, the inference that appellant was likely the assailant would have been vitiated. But the facts are quite to the contrary: knocks on the door, shots fired, the assailant vanishes without being seen or heard.
The circumstances point ineluctably to murder done solely for the sake of killing the victim. Under these circumstances, the threads of inference spun by the prior relationship between appellant and the victim weave a fabric which, while by no means watertight, begins to possess a strength which will support far more than “mere suspicion.”
Nonetheless, our prior opinion was quite correct in asserting that the Austin police were without probable cause when the statewide BOLO was issued. At that time, police had failed to find a trace of appellant in Austin; the Tyler police had not yet responded to Austin’s request for a check on appellant’s home. If appellant had been found at home in bed, or in Timbuktu, at that time, the reasonableness of suspecting that he carried with him an instrumentality of the crime would be nil.
But appellant was neither home in bed nor in Timbuktu, nor even in Las Vegas, where he had attempted to establish an alibi. He was found on a road leading from Austin, driving in a direction away from Austin; he had earlier been seen on the same road, traveling in the same direction. Appellant was found, some two hours after the killing, slightly more than ninety miles from the scene of the crime.6
It is this information which the Court, in deciding this case on original submission solely upon the basis of the information available to the Austin police at the time of the issuance of the BOLO, did not consider.
It is true that there is no showing in the record that the Austin police received the bulletin from La Grange which would have made them aware of appellant’s whereabouts before he was stopped; it is further true that news of the stopping of appellant in Columbus necessarily arrived in Austin after the stop itself. The questions raised, then, are whether the information known to the Austin police may be added to the *344information on appellant’s whereabouts known to the arresting officer in determining whether there was probable cause to stop appellant and to search his automobile, and, if so, whether the totality of the information did constitute such probable cause.
In Smith v. United States,7 the United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, speaking through Judge Burger, held that:
“... probable cause is to be evaluated by the courts on the basis of the collective information of the police rather than that of only the officer who performs the act of arrestings.

“_The correct test is whether a warrant if sought could have been obtained by law enforcement agency application which disclosed its corporate information, not whether any one particular officer could have obtained it on what information he individually possessed.” (Emphasis in original)
In Moreno-Vallejo v. United States, 414 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir.1969), it was stated that:
“... The courts have had occasion to recognize that effective police work in today’s highly mobile society requires cooperative utilization of police resources. They have, accordingly, asserted that knowledge in one sector of a police system can be availed of for action in another, assuming some degree of communication between the two. See, e.g., United States v. Pitt, 382 F.2d 322 (4th Cir.1967), where the court said (at p. 324) of a contention that the arresting officer must have personal knowledge of the facts constituting probable cause:
“ ‘... Probable cause, however, can rest upon the collective knowledge of other police, rather than solely on that of the officer who actually makes the arrest...’ (Emphasis supplied).” [Emphasis in original]
In Wood v. Crouse, 436 F.2d 1077, 1078 (10th Cir.); cert. den. sub. nom. Wood v. Gaffney, 402 U.S. 1010, 91 S.Ct. 2193, 29 L.Ed.2d 432 (1971), the court, citing Smith, supra, held that “[i]n determining whether probable cause existed we must evaluate the collective information of all the officers.” [Emphasis added.] Unlike Smith and Moreno-Vallejo, which involved in each case more than one officer from the same federal agency, Wood, like the instant case, involved members of different agencies in the same state.
We also note that Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 568, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 1037, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971), upon which, inter alia, we relied in reversing on original submission, states, in holding probable cause not to have been shown, that “[t]he arresting officer was not himself possessed of any factual data tending to corroborate the informer’s tip that Daley and Whitely committed the crime.” The clear implication is that such corroboration, if any, should be considered in determining whether probable cause exists.8
Although the decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals are not binding upon this Court, we find the decisions cited supra to be persuasive, especially in light of the Supreme Court’s clear indication in Whitely, supra, that the arresting officer’s information may be used to corroborate otherwise insufficient probable cause. We hold, therefore, that when there has been some cooperation between law enforcement agencies or between members of the same agency, the sum of the information known to the cooperating agencies or officers at the time of an arrest or search by any of the officers involved is to be considered in determining whether there was sufficient probable cause therefor.
That the place in which a suspect is found and the direction in which he is traveling can, taken in combination with strongly founded previous suspicion, lead *345to probable cause to arrest him and conduct a search of his automobile has been established at least since Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162, 45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925). In Carroll, the suspect, who had a reputation as a bootlegger, and who had earlier agreed to sell unlawful beverages to an undercover officer (but who had reneged on that deal), was seen by the officer and his partner driving along a road leading from Detroit to Grand Rapids. The Supreme Court, judicially noticing that Detroit was an active center for the importation of spiritous liquors, held that there was probable cause to stop and search the suspect’s automobile.
In Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949), probable cause was held to exist under facts similar to Carroll ’s: the suspect had previously been arrested for bootlegging by the same officer who spotted him driving his heavily-laden automobile “in a direction from a known source of liquor supply toward a probable illegal market, under circumstances indicating no other probable purpose than to carry on his illegal adventure.” 338 U.S. at 166, 69 S.Ct. at 1306.
It must be kept in mind in reviewing a question of sufficiency of probable cause that such a question is a quintessential example of the necessity for case-by-case determination based upon the facts and circumstances shown. In Smith, supra, the court stated:
“As we have often observed, probable cause is the sum total of layers of information and the synthesis of what the police have heard, what they know, and what they observe as trained officers. We weigh not individual layers but the ‘laminated’ total. It has often been repeated, but it bears repetition, that ‘In dealing with probable cause, ... as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.’ Brinegar v. United States, supra 338 U.S. at 175, 69 S.Ct. at 1310, 93 L.Ed. 1879. (Emphasis added)” [Emphasis in original] 358 F.2d at 837.
The Supreme Court, in Brinegar, set out, in the passage following that quoted in Smith, a standard for dealing with the case-by-case determination of probable cause with due consideration of both the individual rights and the collective right to protection of persons:
“... The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
“ ‘The substance of all the definitions of probable cause ‘is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt.’ McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa.St. 63, 69, quoted with approval in the Carroll opinion. 267 U.S. at 161 [45 S.Ct. at 288]. And this ‘means less than evidence which would justify condemnation’ or conviction, as Marshall, C.J., said for the Court more than a century ago in Locke v. United States, 7 Cranch 339, 348 [3 L.Ed. 364]. Since Marshall’s time, at any rate, it has come to mean more than bare suspicion: Probable cause exists where ‘the facts and circumstances within their [the officers’] knowledge and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that’ an offense has been or is being committed. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 [45 S.Ct. 280, 288, 69 L.Ed. 543].
“These long-prevailing standards seek to safeguard citizens from rash and unreasonable interferences with privacy and from unfounded charges of crime. They also seek to give fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection. Because many situations which confront officers in the course of executing their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed for some mistakes on their part. But the mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their conclusions of probability. The rule of probable cause is a practical, nontechnical conception affording the best compromise that has been found for accommodating these often opposing inter*346ests. Requiring more would unduly hamper law enforcement. To allow less would be to leave law-abiding citizens at the mercy of the officers’ whim or caprice.
“The troublesome line posed by the facts in the Carroll case and this case is one between mere suspicion and probable cause. That line necessarily must be drawn by an act of judgment formed in the light of the particular situation and with account taken of all the circumstances.” [Footnotes omitted] 338 U.S. at 175-176, 69 S.Ct. at 1310-11.
In light of those considerations, and of the facts and circumstances already discussed in our original opinion and in this opinion, including the circumstances of the crime itself, the prior relationship of the parties, and the time and location of the finding of appellant, we hold that, although the State’s presentation of matters relating to probable cause appears to leave substantial room for improvement, a minimal showing has been made that the facts and circumstances within the collective knowledge of the officers involved and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that appellant had committed an offense and that an instrumentality of the offense might be found in the automobile he drove.
Appellant also contends that, even assuming probable cause, the search of the automobile was improper without a showing of exigent circumstances preventing the timely procurement of a warrant. The court of appeals correctly overruled that contention, citing our decision in Sanchez v. State, 582 S.W.2d 813, 815 (Tex.Cr.App.1979), cert. den. 444 U.S. 1043, 100 S.Ct. 728, 62 L.Ed.2d 728 (1980), and the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). See, also, Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67, 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975).9
Appellant’s final contention is that the evidence failed to show that he knew, as alleged in the indictment, that the victim had been a witness before the grand jury.
Evidence was adduced which established that the victim had in fact been a witness before the grand jury and that her name had been endorsed as a witness upon the indictment served upon appellant in that cause. Further testimony revealed that only the names of witnesses before the grand jury, and not those of other potential trial witnesses, are so endorsed. But no evidence was offered that appellant had in fact been informed of the precise meaning of the endorsement.
Further evidence was adduced which showed that appellant was aware that the victim was the complaining witness and the sole witness known to appellant in the cause in which the victim did in fact appear before the grand jury. This evidence includes motions for discovery, continuance, and to take depositions, each signed or sworn to by appellant.10
Appellant contends that, while it is certain that the victim was in fact a witness before the grand jury, doubt exists whether appellant was aware of that fact. This picture of a guileless appellant is undermined somewhat by testimony describing appellant’s constant and often overwhelming attempts to discover the details of the victim’s personal life and whereabouts from their mutual acquaintances (who were themselves aware of the victim’s having appeared before the grand jury); at any rate, we believe the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to support the find*347ing that, in the circumstantial nexus here presented, the only reasonable inference is that appellant was aware of the victim’s appearance before the grand jury.
The contention is overruled.
The State’s motion for rehearing is granted; the judgment of conviction is affirmed.
ONION, P.J., and ODOM and CLINTON, JJ., dissent.

.V.A.P.C., Sec. 22.03(a)(2)(B) provides:
"(a) A person commits an offense if, with a firearm or a prohibited weapon, he intentionally or knowingly causes serious bodily injury:

"(2) to a participant in a court proceeding when he knows or has been informed that the person assaulted is a participant in a court proceeding:

“(B) in retaliation for or on account of the injured person’s having exercised an official power or performed an official duty as a participant in a court proceeding.”
V.A.P.C., Sec. 1.07(a)(37) defines “participant in a court proceeding” to include a witness.

. The chequered procedural history of what must seem to the lay person, and does seem to this writer, to be a straightforward case of murder is set forth in the Court’s original opinion, ante, at footnote one.

. When appellant renewed, at the opening of the trial, his motion to suppress the fruits of the search of his automobile, the State declined the opportunity to present further evidence upon the issue of probable cause, choosing instead to rely solely upon that evidence adduced at the bond hearing.

. In fact, appellant’s prior drug (a word which sounds much like "drunk”, see original opinion, n. 5, ante) conviction was used for enhancement purposes in the instant case.

. We cannot be certain of this because an instrument, marked State’s exhibit # 4, was shown to Persohn, who stated that he did not recognize it. No further mention of this exhibit appears in the record.

. No evidence was offered at the bond hearing to show the distance between Austin and Columbus or to show that any of the officers was aware of that distance. However, judicial notice may be taken of that distance. Norris v. State, 115 Tex.Cr.R. 57, 27 S.W.2d 246 (1930); Leahy v. State, 111 Tex.Cr.R. 570, 13 S.W.2d 874, 885 (opinion on rehearing) (1929). The arresting officer testified to his knowledge that highway 71, where appellant was stopped, passes through La Grange, where appellant was spotted at 5:15, and Austin; his testimony further shows his familiarity with Colorado County’s highways. It would verge on sophistry to argue that he, as well as all of the Austin investigators, might have had no idea whatsoever of the distance from Austin to Columbus.

. 358 F.2d 833, 835 (D.C.Cir.); cert. den. 386 U.S. 1008, 87 S.Ct. 1350, 18 L.Ed.2d 448 (1966).

. Whitely, like Crouse and the instant case, involved more than one law enforcement agency.

. We do not think it unreasonable, given that only two sheriffs deputies were on duty at that time in Colorado County, that the arresting officer performed the arrest, the transportation of the suspect to the sheriffs office, and the search of his car seriatim rather than simultaneously.

. No evidence was presented before the jury which would support the court of appeals’ reliance upon the attempts of appellant and his attorney to negotiate a withdrawal of the charges by the victim. Evidence of such attempts was presented at the bond hearing upon the issue of probable cause, but was not offered by the State at trial.