Court Opinion

ID: 9694792
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:54:56.421776+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:05.362550
License: Public Domain

*147PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, J.
¶ 105. {concurring). Although I agree that the court of appeals decision should be affirmed because Hambly's statements were given after he had invoked and then waived his Fifth Amendment right to counsel,1 I write separately for two reasons: (1) a test that the lead opinion establishes to invoke the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is contrary to the requirements of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); and (2) that test, i.e., that "a suspect may effectively invoke his or her Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel by requesting counsel when a reasonable person in the suspect's position would believe that interrogation is imminent,"2 blurs Miranda's bright-line rule that law enforcement is to follow in fulfilling its obligations to a suspect who is in custody and unequivocally asks to see a lawyer.
I. BACKGROUND
¶ 106. Scott Hambly requested the assistance of counsel after he was arrested, handcuffed and led to a squad ear for transport to jail. There is no question that he was in custody when he asked to see a lawyer before speaking to law enforcement any further. However, instead of simply concluding that Hambly effectively invoked his Fifth Amendment right to counsel because he was in custody and had made an unequivocal request to speak with an attorney, the lead opinion creates a test wherein "a suspect may effectively invoke his or her Fifth Amendment Miranda right to counsel by requesting counsel when a reasonable person in the suspect's *148position would believe that interrogation is imminent."3 The majority opinion remarks that another "possible standard" is that any time a suspect is in custody and unequivocally requests counsel, even before Miranda warnings, the suspect invokes his or her Fifth Amendment right to counsel.4 In my view, this alternative standard is not a "possible standard." It is the standard required by Miranda. Simply stated, any time a suspect is in custody, whether before or after Miranda warnings are given, whether before or after questioning is imminent or impending, an unambiguous request for counsel is always effective to invoke a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to counsel.5
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
¶ 107. The facts before us are undisputed. With undisputed facts, we independently review whether a suspect has effectively invoked his right to counsel, as a question of constitutional fact. State v. Jennings, 2002 WI 44, ¶ 20, 252 Wis. 2d 228, 647 N.W.2d 142.
B. Conditions on Timeliness of Invocation
1. Conflict with Miranda
¶ 108. The lead opinion sets out restrictions on the timeliness of a suspect's invocation of his or her *149Fifth Amendment right to counsel that I conclude are inconsistent with the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miranda.6
¶ 109. The right to counsel pursuant to the Fifth Amendment was first described in Miranda. There, the United States Supreme Court reviewed statements obtained from Miranda, who was subjected to custodial police interrogation. The Court examined the procedures that it concluded would be necessary to accord Miranda his Fifth Amendment privilege7 against compelled self-incrimination. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439. The Court concluded that this Fifth Amendment privilege could be protected only when the suspect "is guaranteed the right 'to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will.'" Id. at 460 (quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964)).
¶ 110. In order to "guarantee" the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, the Court in Miranda reasoned that the consequences that could follow custodial interrogation must be explained to a defendant before any questioning could commence. Id. at 471. It also determined that only by according a suspect the opportunity to request the assistance of counsel could the intimidating atmosphere of custodial interrogation conform to the Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination. Id. at 466. In so concluding, the Court relied on an earlier decision, Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964). Miranda, 384 U.S. at 46-66.
¶ 111. Escobedo is relevant to the case before us for at least two reasons: (1) the request for counsel in *150Escobedo was made before questioning was begun, before indictment, but after Escobedo was in custody, Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479, 485;8 and (2) Miranda relied on the constitutional concerns expressed in Escobedo for the development of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, Miranda, 384 U.S. at 464-66.
¶ 112. Escobedo was arrested and taken into custody as a suspect in a homicide case. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 479. When the arresting officer told Escobedo that "they had us pretty well, up pretty tight, and we might as well admit to this crime," Escobedo said, "I am sorry but I would like to have advice from my lawyer." Id. However, no lawyer was provided until after Escobedo had incriminated himself. Id. Based on his request, the Supreme Court concluded that Escobedo had been denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id. at 490-91.
¶ 113. Escobedo's reasoning underlies Miranda's establishment of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 464-66. The same concerns about the vulnerability of a defendant in custodial interrogation underlie both Miranda and Escobedo. Escobedo used the Sixth Amendment to accord Escobedo the right to counsel because the Supreme Court had not yet *151established a Fifth Amendment right to counsel in order to protect the Fifth Amendment's proscription against compelled self-incrimination. However, there was no hint that Escobedo's invocation of the right to counsel was premature because he exercised it when he was being taken to the police station, rather than when questioning was about to begin. As the Court explained:
[Wjhere.. . the suspect has been taken into police custody, the police carry out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, the suspect has requested and been denied an opportunity to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his absolute constitutional right to remain silent, the accused has been denied "the Assistance of Counsel" in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution as "made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment,"... and that no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used against him at a criminal trial.
Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 490-91 (quoted citations omitted).
¶ 114. The protections accorded to Escobedo were clear and unambiguous. That clarity was echoed in Miranda where the Fifth Amendment right to counsel was first explained as being necessary to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The Court stated, "Our holding ... is this: The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. The Court went on to explain that prior to any questioning, a defendant must be warned that he has the right to remain silent; that any statement he makes *152may be used against him; and that he has the right to have an attorney present during the time that he is questioned. Id.
¶ 115. The requirements Miranda outlined formed a bright-line rule. It was not conditioned on the qualities of the individual suspect who was then the subject of a police investigation. As the Court in Miranda explained:
The Fifth Amendment privilege is so fundamental to our system of constitutional rule and the expedient of giving an adequate warning as to the availability of the privilege so simple, we will not pause to inquire in individual cases whether the defendant was aware of his rights without a warning being given. Assessments of the knowledge the defendant possessed, based on information as to his age, education, intelligence, or prior contact with authorities, can never be more than speculation.
Id. at 468-69 (emphasis added).
¶ 116. Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91 (1984), supports my conclusion about the requirements of Miranda. In Smith, the State attempted to cast doubt on the validity of Smith's post-custody, pre-arrest request for counsel through his responses to questioning after he requested counsel. Id. at 92-93. In overturning Smith's conviction, the Supreme Court concluded:
An accused in custody, "having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him," unless he validly waives his earlier request for the assistance of counsel.
Id. at 94-95 (quoting Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981)). The Supreme Court in Smith then described the requirement for counsel as a " 'rigid' *153prophylactic rule" necessary to prevent compelled self-incrimination. Id. at 95. The Supreme Court permitted no further condition on Smith's in-custody request for counsel. It was effective when made and must be honored. Id. at 94-95. This is consistent with my view that an unequivocal request for counsel made while in custody effectively invokes the Fifth Amendment right to counsel.
¶ 117. The lead opinion places conditions on a suspect's request for counsel by establishing a time before which the invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel may not be effective. The lead opinion asserts that it is possible that invocation may not be effective until "a reasonable person in the suspect's position would [have] believe[d] that interrogation [was] imminent."9 Conditioning the right to counsel as the lead opinion has done is contrary to the express statement in Miranda: "An individual need not make a pre-interrogation request for a lawyer. While such request affirmatively secures his right to have one, his failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver." Id. at 470 (emphasis added). Accordingly, I conclude that the lead opinion's conditions on the timeliness of an invocation of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel is in direct conflict with Miranda and is therefore an impermissible interpretation of the rights accorded under the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
2. Blurring Miranda's bright-line rule
¶ 118. It is beyond dispute that Miranda attempted to "give concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow." Arizona *154v. Roberson, 486 U.S. 675, 680 (1988) (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 441-42). As the Supreme Court has "stressed on numerous occasions, '[o]ne of the principal advantages' of Miranda is the ease and clarity of its application." Id. (citations omitted). The requirements of Miranda are a prophylactic to ward off violations of a suspect's constitutional right to remain silent. McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 176 (1991). Factors that condition the use of a prophylactic necessarily undermine its effectiveness. Statements in our opinions that are contrary to what the Supreme Court has instructed inject uncertainty into the law.10
¶ 119. In addition, I do not know how a "reasonable person in the suspect's position" would know that "interrogation is imminent."11 Do the prior personal experiences of the suspect affect that test? Does his or her age, education or intelligence inform whether he or she would believe that "interrogation is imminent or impending"? Miranda teaches that such conditions are mere speculation and have no place in assuring that constitutional guarantees will be protected. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468-69.
¶ 120. The teaching of Miranda is simple: once a suspect is in custody and makes an unequivocal request to speak with a lawyer, he or she has effectively invoked the Fifth Amendment right to counsel for the purpose of responding to police questioning. Nothing more or less is needed. A test that the lead opinion *155suggests blurs the bright-line rule that Miranda provides. In addition, that test will be difficult to apply, thereby generating occasions when a suspect who is in custody and unequivocally asks for a lawyer will be denied that assistance by law enforcement who may rightly believe that questioning is not "imminent or impending."
¶ 121. Accordingly, because I cannot join the conditions the lead opinion would permit to be placed on the constitutional right against compelled self-incrimination, I respectfully concur.
¶ 122. I am authorized to state that Justice DAVID T. PROSSER joins in this concurrence and that Justice LOUIS B. BUTLER, JR. joins in this concurrence, with the exception of its discussion of Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).

 i refer to an in-custody request for counsel invoked to protect the Fifth Amendment's right against compelled self-incrimination as the Fifth Amendment right to counsel.

 Lead op., ¶ 29.

 Id.

 Id., ¶ 30.

 In my view, the court of appeals correctly applied Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), in State v. Collins, 122 Wis. 2d 320, 363 N.W.2d 229 (Ct. App. 1984), when it concluded that Collins "invoked his right to counsel while at his home, immediately upon being arrested." Id. at 328.

 Lead op., ¶ 29.

 The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part: "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself...

 The lead opinion states that Escobedo's request for counsel came during, not before, police interrogation. Lead op., ¶ 22 n.14. While, as the lead opinion points out, Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), established that statements, as well as questions, may constitute police interrogation, this view of interrogation was not contemplated by the Escobedo decision because Escobedo antedated the Innis decision by 16 years. Therefore, according to the way in which the Supreme Court defined "interrogation" at the time Escobedo was decided, interrogation had not yet commenced when Escobedo first requested counsel.

 Lead op., ¶ 29.

 In my view, the conditions the lead opinion adds onto the way in which Miranda chose to protect the Fifth Amendment's right to remain silent provide no benefit for the State, for suspects in custody or for law enforcement. They simply add uncertainty to what the Supreme Court expected would be clear.

 Lead op., ¶ 29.