Court Opinion

ID: 9627369
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:42:45.380943+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:45.227007
License: Public Domain

THOMAS, Justice,
specially concurring.
I undertake a concurring opinion to an opinion of the court that I authored with a definite degree of trepidation. I have listened to the views of learned jurists with respect to the propriety of such an effort. Most found the concept unique, and beyond that their thoughts ranged from the position that it simply should not be permitted to the thought that at best it is a matter of bad form. I have concluded to press forward, however, on the premise that any other member of the Court who joined in the majority opinion could write separately if he so chose. I have concluded that the same prerogative should be available to the author.
The opinion of the court opts to reverse this case based upon trial error and remands for a new trial because the damage element of the cause of action for first-party bad faith articulated in State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813 (Wyo.1994), had not been promulgated at the time this case was tried. I feel that the Court needs to offer more leadership with respect to the concept of punitive damages in light of the reveille call sounded in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 134 L.Ed.2d 809 (1996). In BMW the *1054Supreme Court of the United States capped a series of cases addressing the onset of punitive damages by holding that the award of punitive damages was grossly excessive and went beyond the constitutional limit required by the due process clause of the Constitution of the United States.
The history of the treatment of this issue by the Supreme Court of the United States must be perceived as somewhat tortured, but in BMW the court articulated a majority opinion that shifted Justice O’Connor from her previous dissenting positions so that she could join in the majority opinion while also joining in the concurring opinion authored by Justice Breyer. I admit to building upon the opinion of the court in BMW, but the court, in my opinion, not only was articulating a demand for objective standards as distinguished from subjective standards, it was signaling a future requirement. In order for due process to be honored those objective standards should be given to the jury in the form of instructions. If they are not, then the invocation of the objective standard for purposes of review would seriously infringe upon the right of the parties to a jury trial. Trial by jury is a classic example of the set of rights that our system perceives as due process. Due process surely must .extend to the first stage of judicial proceedings that constitute the process for awarding punitive damages.
I find that the views of my dissenting brother on the Court and mine are quite consistent in this regard. The policy of the State of Wyoming with respect to the award of punitive damages is best addressed in the halls of the legislature. In the overall scheme of things, the better articulation of state policy relative to punitive damage awards could be achieved by legislative consideration. Certainly a broader evaluation of factors that impact state policy could be presented in the legislative forum without being limited to the issues between two parties or even two parties plus the several amici that might appear in our Court. In that regard, I call attention to the appendix to the dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsburg in the BMW case which I have reproduced as an appendix to this concurring opinion. Both my dissenting brother and I rely upon it in identifying our position.
For myself, I would favor the legislative adoption of an approach that would allocate punitive damages to the state coffers. This essentially is the same view advocated by the dissent. The present system is deftly compared to the proposed system in the remarks of a venireman in this case, who, when asked an attitudinal question about punitive damages, responded:
A. Well, I got strong feelings about a lot of, I guess, civilian people making big bucks on a case where they were unfortunate but end up getting rich off of it, I guess, from punitive damages. If there’s a lot of money to be made off of it it shouldn’t go to the person, it should go to the State or county government.
After affording some fair apportion to the party to the litigation, and some fair award for attorney’s fees, the balance of what must be perceived as a civil fine would flow to state coffers, perhaps to in some way redress the harmful situation that the punitive damages also address. That should be the first approach. Certainly there are ample legislative models to follow in achieving that purpose. Only if it became necessary in the future should a cap on punitive damages be sought. In Wyoming, there may well be a constitutional problem in that regard. Of course, we already have mandatory bifurcation of liability from punitive damages in the submission to the jury. ■
Until some additional reform occurs, however, the choices that confront this Court are to adhere to our historical methodology, which I believe would not satisfy the constitutional concerns of the' United States Supreme Court; invoke the factors found in Green Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So.2d 218, 228-24 (Ala.1989), in our review and reduce the punitive damages according to our judgment; apply some arbitrary multiplying ratio as a ceiling; or submit the Green Oil Co. factors to the jury to use in the first instance. In my opinion, this latter course best preserves the right of the parties to have the issue tried to the jury in a way that would satisfy the constitutional concerns of the United States Supreme Court. Examples of *1055the second and third options are to be found in the opinion of the Supreme Court of Alabama upon remand of BMW from the United States Supreme Court. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 701 So.2d 507 (Ala.1997). If the punitive damages award in this case were to be reviewed by that court, I believe it fair to say that it would be reduced to not more than $25,000.
Given the potential choices that I envision, I am satisfied that the majority opinion in this case correctly balances the right to a jury trial with the constitutional due process requirements with respect to punitive damages.
APPENDIX TO OPINION OF GINSBURG, J.
STATE LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY REGARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES
State legislatures have in the hopper or have enacted a variety of measures to curtail awards of punitive damages. At least one state legislature has prohibited punitive damages altogether, unless explicitly provided by statute. See N.H.Rev.Stat. Ann. § 507:16 (1994). We set out in this appendix some of the several controls enacted or under consideration in the States. The measures surveyed are: (1) caps on awards; (2) provisions for payment of sums to state agencies rather than to plaintiffs; and (8) mandatory bifurcated trials with separate proceedings for punitive damages determinations.
I. CAPS ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES AWARDS
• Colorado Colo.Rev.Stat. §§ 13-21-102(i )(a) and (8) (1987) (as a main rule, caps punitive damages at amount of actual damages).
• Connecticut Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-240b (1995) (caps punitive damages at twice compensatory damages in products liability cases).
• Delaware H.R. 237, 138th Gen. Ass. (introduced May 17, 1995) (would cap punitive damages at greater of three times compensatory damages, or $250,000).
• Florida Fla. Stat. §§ 768.73(i )(a) and (b) (Supp.1992) (in general, caps punitive damages at three times compensatory damages).
• Georgia Ga.Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp.1995) (caps punitive damages at $250,-000 in some tort actions; prohibits multiple awards stemming from the same predicate conduct in products liability actions).
• Illinois H. 20, 89th Gen. Ass.1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (enacted Mar. 9, 1995) (caps punitive damages at three times economic damages).
• Indiana H. 1741, 109th Reg. Sess. (enacted Apr. 26, 1995) (caps punitive damages at greater of three times compensatory damages, or $50,000).
• Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-3701(e) and (f) (1994) (in general, caps punitive damages at lesser of defendant’s annual gross income, or $5 million).
• Maryland S. 187, 1995 Leg. Sess. (introduced Jan. 27, 1995) (in general, would cap punitive damages at four times compensatory damages).
• Minnesota S. 489, 79th Leg. Sess., 1995 Reg. Sess. (introduced Feb. 16, 1995) (would require reasonable relationship between compensatory and punitive damages).
• Nevada Nev.Rev.Stat. § 42.005(£) (1993) (caps punitive damages at three times compensatory damages if compensatory damages equal $100,000 or more, and at $300,000 if the compensatory damages are less than $100,-000).
• New Jersey S. 1496, 206th Leg., 2d Ann. Sess. (1995) (caps punitive damages at greater of. five times compensatory-damages, or $350,000, in certain tort cases).
• North Dakota N.D. Cent.Code § 32-03.2-11(4) (Supp.1995) (caps punitive damages at greater of two times compensatory damages, or $250,000).
• Oklahoma Okla Stat., Tit. 23, §§ 9.1(B)-(D) (Supp.1996) (caps punitive damages at greater of $100,000, or actual damages, if jury finds defendant guilty of reckless disregard; and at greatest of $500,000, twice actual damages, or. the benefit accruing to defendant from the -injury-causing conduct, if jury *1056finds that defendant has acted intentionally and maliciously).
• Texas S. 25, 74th Reg. Sess. (enacted Apr. 20, 1995) (caps punitive damages at twice economic damages, plus up to $750,000 additional noneconomic damages).
• Virginia Va.Code Ann. § 8.01-38.1 (1992) (caps punitive damages at $350,000).
II. ALLOCATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES TO STATE AGENCIES
• Arizona H.R. 2279, 42d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (introduced Jan. 12, 1995) (would allocate punitive damages to a victims’ assistance fund, in specified circumstances).
• Florida Fla. Stat. §§ 768.73(2)(a)-(b) (Supp.1992) (allocates 35% of punitive damages to General Revenue Fund or Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund); see Gordon v. State, 585 So.2d 1033, 1035-1038 (Fla.App. 1991), affd, 608 So.2d 800 (Fla.1992) (upholding provision against due process challenge).
• Georgia Ga.Code Ann. § 51-12-5.1(e)(2) (Supp.1995) (allocates 75% of punitive damages, less a proportionate part of litigation costs, including counsel fees, to state treasury); see Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 263 Ga. 539, 540-543, 436 S.E.2d 635, 637-639 (Ga.1993) (upholding provision against constitutional challenge).
• Illinois Ill. Comp. Stat. ch. 735, § 5/2-1207 (1994) (permits court to apportion punitive damages among plaintiff, plaintiffs attorney, and Illinois Department of Rehabilitation Services).
• Indiana H. 1741, 109th Reg. Sess. (enacted Apr. 26, 1995) (subject to statutory exceptions, allocates 75% of punitive damages to a compensation fund for violent crime victims).
• Iowa Iowa Code § 668A.l(2)(b) (1987) (in described circumstances, allocates 75% of punitive damages, after payment of costs and counsel fees, to a civil reparations trust fund); see Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assoc., Inc., 473 N.W.2d 612, 619 (Iowa 1991) (upholding provision against constitutional challenge).
• Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3402(e) (1994) (allocates 50% of punitive damages in medical malpractice cases to state treasury).
• Missouri Mo.Rev.Stat. § 537.675 (1994) (allocates 50% of punitive damages, after payment of expenses and counsel fees, to Tort Victims’ Compensation Fund).
• Montana H. 71, 54th Leg. Sess. (introduced Jan. 2, 1995) (would allocate 48% of punitive damages to state university system and 12% to school for the deaf and blind).
• New Jersey S. 291, 206th Leg., 1994-1995 1st Reg. Sess. (introduced Jan. 18, 1994); A. 148, 206th Leg., 1994-1995 1st Reg. Sess. (introduced Jan. 11, 1994) (would allocate 75% of punitive damages to New Jersey Health Care Trust Fund).
• New Mexico H. 1017, 42d Leg., 1st Sess. (introduced Feb. 16, 1995) (would allocate punitive damages to Low-Income. Attorney Services Fund).
• Oregon S. 482, 68th Leg. Ass. (enacted July 19, 1995) (amending Ore.Rev.Stat. §§ 18.540 and 30.925, and repealing Ore.Rev. Stat. § 41.315) (allocates 60% of punitive damages to Criminal Injuries Compensation Account).
• Utah Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(3) (1992) (allocates 50% of punitive damages in excess of $20,000 to state treasury).
III. MANDATORY BIFURCATION OF LIABILITY AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES DETERMINATIONS
• California Cal. Civ.Code Ann. § 3295(d) (West Supp.1995) (requires bifurcation, on application of defendant, of liability and damages phases of trials in which punitive damages are requested).
• Delaware H.R. 237, 138th Gen. Ass. (introduced May 17, 1995) (would require, at request of any party, a separate proceeding for determination of punitive damages).
• Georgia Ga.Code Ann. § 51-12-5. 1(d) (Supp.1995) (in all cases in which punitive damages are claimed, liability for punitive *1057damages is tried first, then amount of punitive damages).
• Illinois H. 20, 89th Gen. Ass., 1995-1996 Reg. Sess. (enacted Mar. 9, 1995) (mandates, upon defendant’s request, separate proceeding for determination of punitive damages).
• Kansas Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-3701(a) and (b) (1994) (trier of fact determines defendant’s liability for punitive damages, then court determines amount of such damages).
• Missouri Mo.Rev.Stat. §§ 510.263(¿) and (3) (1994) (mandates bifurcated proceedings, on request of any party, for jury to determine first whether defendant is hable for punitive damages, then amount of punitive damages).
• Montana Mont.Code Ann. § 27-1-221(7) (1995) (upon finding defendant liable for punitive damages, jury determines the amount in separate proceeding).
• Nevada Nev.Rev.Stat. § 42.005(3) (1993) (if jury determines that punitive damages will be awarded, jury then determines amount in separate proceeding).
• New Jersey N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:58C-5(b) and (d) (West 1987) (mandates separate proceedings for determination of compensatory and punitive damages).
• North Dakota N.D. Cent.Code § 32.03.2-11(2) (Supp.1995) (upon request of either party, trier of fact determines whether compensatory damages will be awarded before determining punitive damages liability and amount).
• Oklahoma Okla. Stat., Tit. 23, §§ 9.1(B)-(D) (Supp.1995-1996) (requires separate jury proceedings for punitive damages); S. 443, 45th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (introduced Jan. 31, 1995) (would require courts to strike requests for punitive damages before trial, unless plaintiff presents prima facie evidence at least 30 days before trial to sustain such damages; provide for bifurcated jury trial on request of defendant; and permit punitive damages only if compensatory damages are awarded).
• Virginia H. 1070, 1994-1995 Reg. Sess. (introduced Jan. 25, 1994) (would require separate proceedings in which court determines that punitive damages are appropriate and trier of fact determines amount of punitive damages).