Court Opinion

ID: 9749843
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 13:57:11.148983+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:58.157779
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
Although the majority finds, after a “careful reading of the pathologist’s testimony,” that the photographs introduced at appellant’s trial “were but of marginal relevance” and that “. . . [t]he stab wounds inflicted post mortem [and gruesomely obvious in the *350photographs] were by hypothesis of no evidentia/ry value to establish the manner or cause of death under the theory of murder advanced by the Commonwealth,” it nonetheless holds their introduction to be non-reversible error. (Parenthetical and emphasis added.) I must dissent.
The majority advances two theories, both unfounded in law or reason, in support of its determination. First, the majority theorizes that because the photographs were exhibited for only three-four minutes during the course of a six and one-half-day trial, their impact was minimized. When viewed even briefly, the sight of these pictures shocks and haunts the memory for a period of time which clearly extends beyond the actual viewing period. It is sheer speculation to assume that the prejudice which flowed from the jury’s exposure to these photographs only lasted but a brief period. A quick glimpse at these pictures clearly refutes the majority’s unsupported conclusion.
Secondly, the majority states that these irrelevant and prejudicial photographs were of aid to appellant in that the “. . . chances were enhanced that the jury would consider such mutilation [a young lady stabbed fifteen times, after she had already been strangled to death] as possible only to a deranged mind.” (Parenthetical and emphasis added.) This assertion, too, is untenable since defense counsel, the one in control of and most conscious of the defense’s case, objected to the introduction of these photographs. It was obviously his considered opinion that these pictures were irrelevant and prejudicial rather than, as the majority assumes, helpful.
The law is well settled in this Commonwealth that “. . . the admission of photographs exhibiting the body of a deceased in homicide cases is primarily within the discretion of the trial judge. Unless there is a flagrant abuse of discretion, this Court has been loath to con-*351elude that reversible error exists.” Commonwealth v. Powell, 428 Pa. 275, 278, 241 A. 2d 119, 121 (1968), and the cases cited therein. See also Commonwealth v. Eckhart, 430 Pa. 311, 242 A. 2d 271 (1968).
In determining whether such a “flagrant abuse of discretion” occurred, the test, as set out in Powell, supra at 278-79, 241 A. 2d at 121, to be applied is “. . . whether or not the photographs me of such essential evidentiary value that their need clemly outweighs the likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors(Emphasis added.)
Clearly, on this record, where even the majority concedes that the pictures had little or no relevance, there was no “essential evidentiary value” which “outweighed the likelihood of inflaming the minds and passions of the jurors.” As the majority correctly notes, the photographs, depicting a nude three-day-old corpse, which had been stabbed fifteen times after death had occurred, has no relevancy in proving, as the Commonwealth argued, that the victim’s death resulted from strangulation. The pathologist’s testimony was more than adequate to establish this fact, which was not contested at trial.
Moreover, the majority is in error in its pronouncement that the existence of cautionary instructions should be considered in determining the severity of the prejudice caused by the improper introduction of the photographs. As this Court stated in Powell, supra : “The fact that the trial judge specifically informed the jury that the photographs were not being shown for prejudicial or inflammatory purposes, but only to aid in the presentation of medical testimony, is of no consequence and could not remedy the error which already had been committed428 Pa. at 279 n. 1, 241 A. 2d at 121 n. 1 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, applying the Powell standard, supra, it must be concluded that the photographs should have *352been excluded. As we did in Powell, supra, and Eckhart, supra, a new trial should be granted.
Mr. Justice Nix joins in this dissenting opinion.