Court Opinion

ID: 9639329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 16:12:41.098232+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:18.287221
License: Public Domain

*313Dissenting Opinion by
Me. Justice Bell:
The cases are universally agreed that in a malicious prosecution suit plaintiff must prove both want of probable cause and malice. The majority opinion has confused malice with probable cause, and acquittal of the crime with want of probable cause, i.e., lack of reasonable grounds to believe plaintiff was guilty of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, even though plaintiff (1) admitted his eyes were bloodshot when he was arrested and examined, and (2) admitted that he had been drinking whiskey and beer, and (3) (a) did not deny that he had zigzagged, or (b) that he had the odor of alcohol on his breath, or (4) that a doctor and four witnesses testified that he was intoxicated.
The basic mistakes of the majority opinion are three fold: (1) It changes the well established law of Pennsylvania as to the test for and the determination of probable cause, which is the first and most indispensable requisite in malicious prosecution cases; (2) it makes the evidence as to defendant’s guilt or innocence the real test of probable cause and holds that a finding of want of probable cause by a jury or trial judge raises only a question of abuse of discretion; and (3) it confuses malice (which is usually a question for the jury) with probable cause which (in all cases such as the instant one) is a question of law for the Court.
Expressed in another way, the majority opinion (a) substitutes the innocence of the person arrested for the reasonable and justifiable ground for the belief of the arresting officer in the guilt of the person arrested, and (b) impliedly overrules many recent decisions of this Court,* and (c) changes the function *314of the Court when the testimony of the witnesses for the defendant clearly shows probable cause and such, testimony is not denied or controverted by the plaintiff,* and (d) by subjecting officers to large civil damages when a person arrested for a criminal offense is acquitted of the crime, it realistically restricts police arrests of actual criminals and (reasonably) suspected criminals and gravely jeopardises law enforcement and the protection and safety of law-abiding citizens.
The law up to now has been clearly settled by a myriad of cases that when a defendant in a malicious prosecution action clearly shows by oral testimony or evidence, or when plaintiffs evidence shows, “probable cause” for the arrest and prosecution of the civil plaintiff, probable cause or lack of it is a matter which is exclusively within the province of the court.* All authorities agree that “probable cause” does not depend on the innocence or guilt of the person arrested but upon whether reasonable grounds existed for the arrester’s belief that the arrested is guilty of the crime for which he was arrested or indicted: Miller v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 371 Pa. 308, 89 A. 2d 809; Simpson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 354 Pa. 87, 46 A. 2d 674; Altman v. Standard Refrigerator Co., 315 Pa. 465, 173 A. 411; Werner v. Bowers, 318 Pa. 518, 178 A. 831; McClafferty v. Philp, 151 Pa. 86, 24 A. 1042.
*315In Miller v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., supra, the Court entered judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto although plaintiff had testified (1) that he was previously of good repute; (2) that he was acquitted of the crime charged; (3) that he protested his innocence from the time of his arrest and throughout the entire proceedings; (4) that the stolen goods were not found in his home or in his possession; (5) that Captain Monaghan stated that if plaintiff were innocent he should fight the charge the whole way; and (6) that none of his testimony was disputed nor was any issue of fact raised concerning the same. The Court said (page 314): “‘The question of want of probable cause is exclusively for the court. . . .’
“Plaintiff has the burden of proving want of probable cause: Simpson v. Montgomery Ward & Company, 354 Pa. 87, 46 A. 2d 674. Probable cause has been defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinary prudent man in the same situation in believing that the party is guilty of the offense: Altman v. Standard Refrigerator Company, Inc., 315 Pa. 465, 173 A. 411.”
The reason for holding that probable cause or lack of it is a matter exclusively for the Court has been recognized for centuries and has been reiterated in many decisions of this Court during the last decade. In Simpson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 354 Pa., supra, the Court said (pages 92-93) : “. . . It has been immemorially held that the public interest requires that the legally trained mind of the judge and not the more or less emotional minds of jurors, decide whether or not there was probable cause for the initiation of the prosecution. Jurors are likely to confuse the issue of the guilt or innocence of the defendant in the criminal ease out of which the civil action originated with the basic issue whose determination de*316cides the civil action. That basic issue is the want of probable cause for the criminal prosecution. Blackstone’s Vol. 3, Sec. 127 says: 'It would be a very great discouragement to the public justice of the kingdom if prosecutors who had a tolerable ground of suspicion were liable to be sued at law [for malicious prosecution] whenever their indictments miscarried . . - Any probable cause for proving it [the charge] is sufficient to justify the defendant’. ... In Bryant v. Kuntz, 25 Pa. Superior Ct. 102, judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff was reversed without a venire. Judge Orladx said: 'The inquiry as to the probable cause goes back to the commencement of the prosecution, and it relates to the facts then known and as they then appeared. It is not confined to the truth of the matters that lead to the prosecution, but extends to their appearance as indicating the guilt or innocence of the accused. If probable cause is shown, it matters not whether the motive of the prosecutor be praiseworthy or malicious;....’”
This malicious prosecution suit arose out of a criminal case in which the present plaintiff was arrested and indicted for, but acquitted of, the charge of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The jury ultimately returned a verdict in plaintiff’s favor in the instant case for $4,000.
Plaintiff testified that he was arrested by defendant, a city detective, because they had an argument following a collision of their cars in the early evening of June 4, 1955; that he was not intoxicated; that he was beaten up at the station house by a policeman other* than the defendant; and that he was *317acquitted of the crime of which he was charged. The verbal clash between plaintiff and defendant at the time or shortly after the collision of their automobiles might tend to prove malice upon the part of the defendant but, as we shall see, cannot possibly prove lack of probable cause — probable cause was clearly established by defendant and his witnesses. Furthermore, plaintiff admitted that when he was arrested and before any controverted fight, his eyes were bloodshot and he had drunk two glasses of whiskey and two beers that morning, approximately 5 hours prior to his arrest.
Defendant testified that no collision occurred between their cars and his testimony on the point of collision was corroborated by the testimony of a disinterested witness, viz., that no scratches or other visible evidence of a collision or damage appeared on defendant’s automobile. However, all of this, as we shall see, was irrelevant on the question of probable cause.
Furthermore, plaintiff must prove both lack of probable cause and malice. While malice is a question which is generally for the jury, unless plaintiff proved that there was a lack of probable cause malice is immaterial and irrelevant: Werner v. Bowers, 318 Pa., supra; McCoy v. Kalbach, 242 Pa. 123, 88 A. 879; Dietz v. Langfitt, 63 Pa. 234; Roessing v. Pittsburg Railways Company, 226 Pa. 523, 526, 527, 75 A. 724; McClafferty v. Philp, 151 Pa. 86, 24 A. 1042; Simpson v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 354 Pa., supra.
In Werner v. Bowers, 318 Pa., supra, the Court reversed a verdict and judgment for plaintiff and, *318speaking through Mr. Justice (later Chief Justice) Schaffer, said (pages 521, 521-522), where probable cause appears: “ ‘. . . the court must so declare, and direct a verdict for defendant’: Taylor v. American International Shipbuilding Corp., 275 Pa. 229, 231; and this is so even if maKce is shown:* Roessing v. Pgh. Rys. Co., 226 Pa. 523. ‘The burden is upon the plaintiff to prove affirmatively, by circumstances or otherwise, as he may be able, that the defendant had no reasonable or probable ground for instituting the original proceedings’: Altman v. Standard Refrigerator Co., Inc., 315 Pa. 465, 477. See also Groda v. American Stores Co., 315 Pa. 484.
“. . . ‘Where a defendant in an action for malicious prosecution shows probable cause, his motives in instituting the prosecution are of no consequence, become immaterial and cannot be taken into consideration by court and jury. ... If there be reasonable or probable cause, no malice, however distinctly proved, will make defendant liable’: McCoy v. Kalbach, 242 Pa. 123, 127; Dietz v. Langfitt, 63 Pa. 234.”
In the light of the aforesaid authorities, we shall consider the evidence. We have summarized herein-above plaintiff’s testimony. On the other hand, two police officers, and a police sergeant, and a police doctor who examined plaintiff one and a half hours after his arrest, and this detective-defendant — four laymen and a doctor — testified that the present plaintiff was intoxicated and the fact that they so testified was not denied or controverted by plaintiff. Defendant also testified and plaintiff did not deny that plaintiff’s car zig-zagged, and that he had the smell of alcohol on his breath. If that evidence isn’t sufficient to show “probable cause” for an indictment, then there is no such thing as “probable cause”. Furthermore, it is *319important although unnecessary to note that plaintiff was held, for Court by a magistrate and indicted by a grand jury. “It is everywhere held that the actions of each of these judicial bodies are affirmative evidence of probable cause: Restatement, Torts, §§663(2) and 664(2)”: Miller v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 371 Pa., supra, page 317.
Upon such a record it is clear as crystal, under all the aforesaid authorities, although indeed no authority is necessary, that defendant had a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficient to warrant an ordinary prudent man in believing that the plaintiff was guilty of the offense of driving while intoxicated, and the Court should hold as a matter of law that probable cause existed.
The danger and the foolishness of changing the law and allowing this plaintiff to recover in the face of the aforesaid testimony at both the criminal and civil trials which demonstrated reasonable grounds for Jacobs’ belief in the present plaintiffs guilt lies in the inescapable fact that it will inevitably seriously restrict the arrest by policemen of actual and reasonably suspected criminals and it will gravely and greatly jeopardize the protection of the public against the terrific crime wave which is sweeping our City, State and Country.

 The proof of the pudding is in the eating. See cases herein cited and also 19 eases which are listed in Miller v. Pennsylvania *314Railroad Co., 371 Pa. 329, 330, in which a nonsuit, binding instructions or judgment non obstante veredicto were entered for defendant.

 The proof of the pudding is in the eating. See eases herein cited and also 19 cases which are listed in Miller v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 371 Pa. 329, 330, in which a nonsuit, binding instructions or judgment non obstante veredicto were entered for defendant.

 If a sergeant subsequently smashed Neczypor in tbe face, as Neczypor testified, but tbe sergeant denied, Neczypor bad an adequate remedy, namely, to arrest tbe sergeant for assault and bat*317tery and. also bring a civil suit against bim for damages. However, tbe sergeant’s alleged assault would not and could not justify a suit against Jacobs for malicious prosecution. See cases, infra.

 Italics throughout, ours.