Court Opinion

ID: 9961536
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 06:06:42.558635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:53.540580
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                  revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                       UNPUBLISHED
                                                                       April 18, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                      No. 364165
                                                                       Oceana Circuit Court
CHRISTIAN LEE MITCHELL,                                                LC No. 2022-015238-FH

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: BOONSTRA P.J., and FEENEY and YOUNG, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        Defendant appeals by right his jury conviction of third-degree criminal sexual conduct
(CSC-III), MCL 750.520d(1)(b) (sexual penetration by means of force or coercion). The trial court
sentenced defendant to 10 to 15 years in prison for his CSC-III conviction. Defendant now argues
on appeal that (1) he was denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel when
defense counsel failed to impeach the nurse practitioner witness or to object to the nurse
practitioner’s testimony; (2) he was denied his right to a fair trial because the prosecution misstated
facts during the trial and defense counsel failed to object; (3) the trial court was improperly exposed
to polygraph information in the presentence investigation report (PSIR) before it sentenced him,
and defense counsel failed to object and request that the information be stricken; and (4) he is
entitled to resentencing because the trial court violated his due-process rights by improperly
assigning him points under offense variable (OV) 1 and OV 10. We affirm defendant’s conviction
and sentence but remand to allow the trial court to remove the improper information from the
PSIR.

                                          I. BASIC FACTS

        This case arose from an incident when defendant sexually assaulted the victim. Just before
the assault, the victim drove defendant, with whom she had had a previous dating relationship, to
a park. Defendant had a pocketknife in his possession. An argument subsequently ensued, and
defendant accused the victim of sleeping with someone else. Defendant pulled the victim’s hair,
coerced her into the backseat of the vehicle, and forcibly engaged in oral, vaginal, and anal sex.
The victim stated that she felt a hard object pressed against her back during the assault, presumably

                                                 -1-
the pocketknife. After the assault, the victim drove back to her house without defendant and
reported the assault to the police. Police located defendant’s pocketknife on the back seat of the
victim’s vehicle. Police officers subsequently arrested defendant, and the prosecution charged him
with one count of CSC-III.

        During a pretrial conference, the trial court informed defendant of his right to engage in a
polygraph examination, and defense counsel confirmed that defendant preferred to exercise his
right to a polygraph examination. The parties then engaged in a two-day jury trial, and the jury
found defendant guilty of one count of CSC-III. On the basis of defendant’s prior criminal history
and the victim’s testimony, the trial court sentenced defendant to 10 to 15 years in prison.

       Defendant now appeals.

                               II. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE

      Defendant first argues that defense counsel was ineffective for several reasons, each of
which will be addressed in turn.

       Ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed issue of fact and constitutional law. People v
Jackson, 292 Mich App 583, 600; 808 NW2d 541 (2011). As a rule, we review a trial court’s
findings of fact for clear error and review de novo questions of law. People v Lane, 308 Mich App
38, 67-68; 862 NW2d 446 (2014). When the trial court has not conducted a hearing to determine
whether defense counsel was ineffective at trial, our review is limited to mistakes apparent on the
record. Id. at 68.1

        The United States Supreme Court has stated that, “[w]hether rooted directly in the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . or in the Compulsory Process or
Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, . . . the Constitution guarantees criminal
defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense.” Crane v Kentucky, 476 US
683, 690; 106 S Ct 2142; 90 L Ed 2d 636 (1986) (quotation marks and citation omitted). The
United States Supreme Court has stated that the right to assistance of counsel for defense is
“fundamental to our system of justice [and] is meant to assure fairness in the adversary criminal
process.” United States v Morrison, 449 US 361, 364; 101 S Ct 665; 66 L Ed 2d 564 (1981)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). The Michigan Supreme Court has likewise stated, “There
is no question that a criminal defendant has a state and federal constitutional right to present a
defense.” People v Hayes, 421 Mich 271, 278; 364 NW2d 635 (1984).

       This Court has stated that, “[t]o establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must
show (1) that defense counsel’s performance was below an objective standard of reasonableness
under prevailing professional norms and (2) that there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s errors, a different outcome would have resulted.” Jackson, 292 Mich App at 600-601.

1
 Defendant filed a motion to remand with this Court requesting, in part, the opportunity to conduct
a hearing under People v Ginther, 390 Mich 436; 212 NW2d 922 (1973). That motion was denied.
People v Mitchell, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered June 13, 2023 (Docket No.
364165).

                                                -2-
Effective assistance of counsel is strongly presumed, and the party claiming ineffectiveness must
overcome this presumption. People v Horn, 279 Mich App 31, 48 n 2; 755 NW2d 212 (2008).
The United States Supreme Court has stated that, when examining the effectiveness of counsel,
reviewing courts must apply “a heavy measure of deference to counsel’s judgments.” Strickland
v Washington, 466 US 668, 691; 104 S Ct 2052; 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984).

                              A. CONTRADICTORY TESTIMONY

        Defendant argues that the details of defendant’s abuse against the victim contradict the
victim’s preliminary examination and trial testimonies, indicating that the sexual abuse nurse
examiner (SANE) who examined the victim and testified about her examination at trial was merely
offering her own interpretation of what happened. We disagree.

        Given that defendant was not present when the victim told the nurse what happened during
the abuse, defendant’s assertion appears to be nothing more than his own interpretation of the
nurse’s testimony. Although certain deviations existed among the victim’s various accounts of the
sexual assault, these deviations were relatively minor. Additionally, the facts indicate that defense
counsel’s failure to object was part of a deliberate strategy to cast the victim’s credibility into
doubt. Such a strategy is permissible under MRE 607, which states that “[t]he credibility of a
witness may be attacked by any party, including the party calling the witness.” Although
defendant’s strategy of allowing the jury to hear the inconsistencies in the accounts of the abuse
ultimately failed, a failed strategy does not constitute a deficient performance on the part of trial
counsel. See People v Kevorkian, 248 Mich App 373, 414-415; 639 NW2d 291 (2001).

                                   B. HEARSAY TESTIMONY

       Defendant also argues that the nurse’s testimony constituted inadmissible hearsay
evidence. We disagree.

        MRE 801(c) defines hearsay as a statement “other than the one made by the declarant while
testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.”2 The
nurse’s testimony, which included a detailed summary of defendant’s abuse of the victim, as told
to the nurse by the victim, clearly fits the statutory definition of hearsay. Nevertheless, the nurse’s
testimony was admissible as a statement of excited utterance, see MRE 803(2), and as a statement
made for purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis, see MRE 803(4).

       MRE 803(2) covers a hearsay statement “relating to a startling event or condition made
while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused by the event or condition.” An
excited utterance “must meet three criteria: (1) it must arise out of a startling occasion; (2) it must
be made before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent; and (3) it must relate to the
circumstances of the startling occasion.” People v Gee, 406 Mich 279, 283; 278 NW2d 304 (1979).
The nurse’s statement arose out of defendant’s sexual abuse of the victim and related to the

2
  The Michigan Rules of Evidence were substantially amended on September 20, 2023, effective
January 1, 2024. See ADM File No. 2021-10, 512 Mich lxiii (2023). This opinion relies on the
version of the rules in effect at the time of trial.

                                                  -3-
circumstances and details of the abuse. Therefore, the remaining question is whether enough time
had passed between the victim’s statement to the nurse and the abuse had passed for the victim to
contrive and misrepresent.

        In People v Smith, 456 Mich 543, 545; 581 NW2d 654 (1998), the Michigan Supreme
Court concluded that a hearsay statement made approximately 10 hours after an event may be
properly admitted at trial as an excited utterance. In Smith, 456 Mich at 547, the defendant told
the victim, a 16-year-old high school student, that the defendant would not allow the victim to
leave the defendant’s house and offered to involve the victim in a business venture if the victim
would allow the defendant “to perform fellatio on him.” The defendant then made threats
regarding the victim’s mother, hit the victim in the chest and leg, and made various other threats
before performing fellatio on the victim. Id. at 547, 548. The defendant drove the victim home at
about 1:45 a.m., the victim showered for an hour, paced the floor and eventually fell asleep until
11:00 a.m. Id. at 548, 549. At about that time, the victim started crying, and his mother asked him
why he was upset. Id. at 549. The victim’s mother testified at trial that the victim said, “Oh, mom,
I had to be sucked off last night before I can [sic] even come home.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
The Michigan Supreme Court stated that there was no evidence that the stress arising from the
sexual assault had abated, nor was there evidence that the accuracy of the victim’s confession was
undermined by his parents’ inquiries. Id. at 553, 554. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion by admitting the mother’s statement as an excited utterance. Id. at 554.

        In this case, the time span between the sexual assault and the victim’s examination with
the nurse at the hospital was relatively short; a few hours elapsed from the assault to meeting with
the SANE. See Smith, 456 Mich at 545. More importantly, the nurse affirmed that, during the
examination, the victim appeared extremely traumatized, she was visibly shaking, she was “crying
intermittently back and forth,” and appeared very upset. This indicates that the victim’s stress
arising from the sexual assault had not abated. See id. at 553, 554. According to the police
officers’ testimony, the victim’s trauma persisted from the time they arrived at the victim’s house
shortly after the abuse to the time of the nurse’s examination. For these reasons, the victim’s
statement to the nurse was admissible at trial as a statement of excited utterance.

        Moreover, portions of the victim’s statement was also admissible as a statement made for
purposes of medical treatment or diagnosis. MRE 803(4) covers “[s]tatements made for purposes
of medical treatment or medical diagnosis in connection with treatment and describing medical
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of
the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably necessary to such diagnosis and
treatment.” The justification underlying MRE 803(4) is the existence of “(1) the reasonable
necessity of the statement to the diagnosis and treatment of the patient, and (2) the declarant’s self-
interested motivation to speak the truth to treating physicians in order to receive proper medical
care.” People v Garland, 286 Mich App 1, 8-9; 777 NW2d 732 (2009).

        In Garland, 286 Mich App at 3, the defendant sexually molested the victim and was
charged with CSC. On the same morning of the assault, the victim was examined by a nurse who
also took the victim’s medical history. Id. at 9. The nurse subsequently testified at the trial. Id.
This Court concluded that “the victim had a self-interested motivation to speak the truth to the
nurse in order to obtain medical treatment.” Id. Moreover, the victim was over the age of 10, and,
accordingly, “there was a rebuttable presumption that she understood the need to tell the truth to

                                                 -4-
the nurse.” Id. The fact that the victim did not have any immediately apparent injuries did not
rebut this presumption. Id. This Court noted that the presence of sexually transmitted diseases is
often impossible to detect without additional diagnosis. Id. at 9, 10.

         In this case, like the nurse in Garland, the nurse examined the victim on the same day of
the sexual assault. See id. at 9. Unlike the Garland victim, the present victim had physical injuries
on her body, although the nurse could not conclusively determine that sexual abuse had occurred
on the basis of these injuries. Even so, the nurse clarified that her purpose was not to determine
whether sexual abuse occurred, but merely to record the victim’s words and collect evidence on
the basis of the victim’s story which is exactly what she did. Lastly, like the Garland victim, the
present victim was well over the age of 10, indicating that she presumably understood the need to
tell the nurse the truth. See id.

        For these reasons, the nurse’s testimony regarding the victim’s account of the abuse
constituted a statement of medical diagnosis or treatment and was admissible at trial.
Consequently, any objection raised by defense counsel would have been futile and would not have
altered the trial’s outcome. See People v Shaw, 315 Mich App 668, 674; 892 NW2d 15 (2016).
Likewise, for reasons already stated, defendant has failed to establish that impeaching the victim’s
testimony would have resulted in a different outcome at trial. Jackson, 292 Mich App at 600-601.

       Therefore, defense counsel’s failure to object to the nurse’s testimony did not fall below
an objective standard of reasonableness.

                     C. REFERENCE TO POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION

        Defendant argues that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the trial
court’s exposure to the polygraph information in the PSIR at sentencing or for failing to request
that the information be stricken from the PSIR. We disagree.

        Regarding the use of polygraph information at trial, MCL 600.2955(2) states, “A novel
methodology or form of scientific evidence may be admitted into evidence only if its proponent
establishes that it has achieved general scientific acceptance among impartial and disinterested
experts in the field.” This statute constitutes a codification of the Davis-Frye test,3 which “allows
the admission of expert testimony regarding novel scientific evidence only if the evidence has
gained general acceptance among scientific experts in the field.” Clerc v Chippewa Co War Mem
Hosp, 267 Mich App 597, 607 n 1; 705 NW2d 703 (2005). To date, polygraph tests have not
received such a degree of acceptance or standardization amongst the scientific community. See
People v Ray, 431 Mich 260, 265; 430 NW2d 626 (1988). Although the results from a polygraph
test may not be considered with regard to the truth or falsity of a witness, they may be considered
with regard to the witness’s general credibility. People v Roberts, 292 Mich App 492, 505-506;
NW2d 290 (2011).

3
 See People v Davis, 343 Mich 348; 72 NW2d 269 (1955); Frye v United States, 54 App DC 46;
293 F 1013 (1923).

                                                -5-
        The question of whether it was error for counsel to not request that defendant’s polygraph
results be removed from PSIR is a unique one, however. In People v Newsum, 105 Mich App 755,
759-760; 307 NW2d 412 (1981), the defendant entered into a plea agreement that involved his
testimony against codefendants and taking a polygraph examination. During the polygraph, "he
admitted to knowledge of and/or participation in approximately 100 larcenies and 20 B & Es,” but
did so only because “he was assured by the officer administering the examination that those
admissions were confidential and would not be made available to the sentencing judge. The officer
who gave the examination did not recall making any assurances to that effect and stated that he
would not have done so in any event.” Id. at 759. This Court agreed that the defendant was entitled
to resentencing before a different judge “and that a new presentence report is to be prepared, which
report shall not contain any reference to defendants admissions regarding involvement in
numerous larcenies and breakings and enterings made during the polygraph examination,” finding
that it was unclear whether the defendant was fully aware of the consequences of admitting to
those crimes or he made those admissions voluntarily or without inducement. Id. at 759-760.

       In People v Liddell, 63 Mich App 491, 494-495; 234 NW3d 669 (1975), this Court
discussed the inclusion of polygraph information being presented at a criminal competency
hearing:

       Michigan courts have a consistent history of ruling polygraph examinations and
       opinion testimony based thereon to be inadmissible evidence. In addition to
       criminal trials, polygraph evidence has been ruled inadmissible in presentence
       reports, consideration for a motion for a new trial, during sentencing proceedings
       and in civil and administrative proceedings. Considering the statements and
       preparations by the trial court prior to his order for the defendant to submit to the
       examination, and considering the inculpatory results of the test, we cannot say that
       the consideration of the polygraph testimony constituted harmless error.

        In the present case, the polygraph-examination results4 were not mentioned at trial or at
sentencing. Consequently, the jury was never exposed to the results. However, the results were
listed and very briefly discussed in a single paragraph in the PSIR, indicating that the trial judge
had been briefly exposed to them. That paragraph reads as follows on the bottom of page 3:

       A polygraph exam for Christian was scheduled for 06/22/2022 at the Oceana
       County Sheriff’s office. The test results were that Christian was deceptive on all
       questions. Christian admitted [the victim] told him “No” during the sexual
       encounter. The polygraph report is available for review.

There is no evidence, however, that is paragraph or the results were called to the court’s attention
or that the trial court’s exposure to the paragraph created an unacceptable atmosphere or
environment that would require resentencing. The key question for us to consider is whether the

4
 We also take note of the fact that defendant, not the trial judge or the prosecution, requested that
he be allowed to participate in a polygraph test. See People v Allen, 49 Mich App 148, 151-152;
211 NW2d 533 (1973).

                                                -6-
court’s limited exposure to a single improper polygraph reference warrants resentencing before a
different judge.

        In People v Anderson, 284 Mich App 11, 16; 722 NW2d 797 (2009), this Court observed
that “generally, a court may neither solicit nor consider polygraph-examination results for
sentencing, People v. Towns, 69 Mich App 475, 478; 245 NW2d 97 (1976), and the consideration
of polygraph-examination results is generally considered error that requires resentencing, People
v. Allen, 49 Mich App 148, 151–152; 211 NW2d 533 (1973).” Even though the trial court in
Anderson requested that the defendant take the polygraph for purposes of determining whether he
should register as a sex offender, this Court determined that the defendant was not entitled to
appellate relief. Anderson, 284 Mich App at 16. In People v Taylor, 69 Mich App 475, 478-479;
245 NW2d 97 (1976), this Court did remand for resentencing before a different judge when the
trial court compelled the defendant to take a polygraph prior to sentencing.

        Here, by comparison, defendant asked to submit to the polygraph; the court did not request
it. Additionally, there is no evidence that the trial court relied on the polygraph results when it
sentenced defendant. The trial court never mentioned the polygraph information during
sentencing. For these reasons, including the dearth of evidence that the trial court considered the
polygraph paragraph prior to sentencing, defendant’s due-process rights at trial were not violated,
and any objection raised by defense counsel would have been futile. See Shaw, 315 Mich App
at 674.

         For these reasons, defendant is not entitled to resentencing. Anderson, 284 Mich App at
16; cf. Taylor, 69 Mich app at 478-479. Nevertheless, given the importance of the sentencing stage
in the criminal process, we remand this case for the production of a corrected PSIR and the removal
of the reference to the polygraph examination. See People v Newsum, 105 Mich App 755, 760;
307 NW2d 412 (1981).

                                         D. PREJUDICE

       Even if defense counsel failed an objective standard of reasonableness, defendant has failed
to prove a reasonable probability that, but for the alleged errors, the case’s outcome would have
been different. See Jackson, 292 Mich App at 601.

        The jury heard a two-minute video which, according to the victim, accurately represented
what happened after the rape. The video included an audio of defendant and the victim arguing,
the victim crying, and the victim asking defendant why he did not stop after she asked him to stop.
Police officers testified that the victim was hysterical, crying, and struggling to speak when they
interviewed her at her apartment. The victim had bruises on her neck and arms and on her cervix.
Other police officers searched for defendant in the general area where the abuse occurred and
found him hiding underneath a fence line and tucked beneath a pine tree. Defendant admitted to
the arresting officers that he had intercourse with the victim, but he insisted that the intercourse
was consensual. Lastly, after his arrest, defendant met with a police detective and again admitted
that he had intercourse with the victim, but denied that it was coercive. Moreover, he admitted
that the intercourse was oral, vaginal, and anal. Defendant also admitted that he had a knife.

                                                -7-
       Because there was a significant amount of evidence that tended to prove defendant’s guilt,
defendant has failed to establish that, had it not been for defense counsel’s alleged errors, the case’s
outcome would have been different. Consequently, we deny defendant’s request for a new trial or
resentencing.

                             III. PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

       Defendant next argues that the prosecution engaged in prosecutorial misconduct that
required the trial court’s intervention or an objection from defense counsel. We disagree.

        Prosecutorial misconduct issues are generally reviewed de novo. People v Pfaffle, 246
Mich App 282, 288; 632 NW2d 162 (2001). This Court must examine the pertinent portion of the
record and evaluate the prosecutor’s remarks in context to determine whether the defendant was
denied a fair and impartial trial. People v McElhaney, 215 Mich App 269, 283; 545 NW2d 18
(1996). However, “[t]his Court reviews unpreserved constitutional errors for plain error affecting
substantial rights.” People v Gibbs, 299 Mich App 473, 482; 830 NW2d 821 (2013) (quotation
marks and citation omitted). An unpreserved claim of prosecutorial misconduct will not warrant
relief unless the prejudicial effect was so great that curative instructions would have been
ineffective. See People v Stanaway, 446 Mich 643, 687; 521 NW2d 557 (1994). “To avoid
forfeiture under the plain error rule, three requirements must be met: 1) error must have occurred,
2) the error was plain, i.e., clear or obvious, 3) and the plain error affected substantial rights.”
People v Carines, 460 Mich 750, 761, 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999). If a defendant satisfies all
three elements, he or she must show that the error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings independent of his or her innocence. Id. at 763, 764.

        The United States Supreme Court has stated that a prosecutor must “refrain from improper
methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction.” Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88; 55
S Ct 629; 79 L Ed 1314 (1935). Yet, it remains a prosecutor’s duty to use every legitimate means
to bring about a just outcome in a case. See id.

         The test of prosecutorial misconduct is whether a defendant was denied his or her
constitutional right to a fair and impartial trial. People v Brown, 279 Mich App 116, 134; 755
NW2d 664 (2008). See also Darden v Wainwright, 477 US 168, 181; 106 S Ct 2464; 91 L Ed 2d
144 (1986). A prosecutor may not vouch for a witness’s credibility “to the effect that he has some
special knowledge concerning a witness’ truthfulness.” See People v Bahoda, 448 Mich 261, 276;
531 NW2d 659 (1995). “A prosecutor may, however, argue from the facts that a witness is credible
or that the defendant or another witness is not worthy of belief.” People v Howard, 226 Mich App
528, 548; 575 NW2d 16 (1997). Consequently, remarks made in a prosecutor’s closing argument
regarding a defendant’s credibility do not necessarily constitute prosecutorial misconduct. Id. For
example, in Howard, this Court stated that the prosecutor’s comments in his closing argument
merely advanced his position “that various claims made by [the] defendant were not credible in
light of contradictory evidence adduced at trial.” Id. The prosecutor did not vouch for the
prosecution witness’s credibility, but merely argued that the facts and evidence demonstrated the
witness’ credibility. Id. Such remarks are not improper. See id.

        Defendant specifically takes issue with the prosecution’s assertions that defendant pulled
the victim’s hair to get her into the backseat of the vehicle and that defendant used his knife to put

                                                  -8-
the victim in a place of greater danger and fear. Defendant argues that, in her testimony, the victim
stated that the hair pulling occurred only while he kissed the victim. He insinuates that he did not
pull the victim’s hair for the purpose of getting her into the backseat of the vehicle. At the
prosecution’s request, the victim gave the jury a demonstration and said that defendant grabbed
her hair and pulled it. She indicated that this was the first time that defendant had been violent
with her. Given that defendant told the victim to get into the backseat of the vehicle immediately
after he pulled her hair, this strongly suggests that defendant pulled the victim’s hair with the
intention of forcing her into the backseat. In other words, the prosecutor’s assertion constituted a
reasonable argument made on the basis of facts offered into evidence at trial. See id. As such,
there is no evidence that the prosecution was vouching for the victim’s credibility. See id. The
prosecution merely offered a reasonable argument on the basis of the victim’s testimony.

        Regarding the pocketknife, defendant points out that the victim was uncertain as to whether
the hard object pressed against her back was, in fact, defendant’s knife. It is undisputed, however,
that the victim saw defendant’s pocketknife—an instrument that he frequently carried-- in his hand
before the sexual assault. Although defendant disputed that their intercourse constituted an assault,
he did not dispute that he had the knife in his possession during the intercourse; the victim testified
to the same.

        Also, police officers discovered the pocketknife on the backseat of the victim’s vehicle
where the assault occurred. Once again, putting two and two together, the prosecution made a
reasonable argument on the basis of the victim’s testimony at trial. “A prosecutor may not make
a factual statement to the jury that is not supported by the evidence, but he or she is free to argue
the evidence and all reasonable inferences arising from it as they relate to his or her theory of the
case.” People v Dobek, 274 Mich App 58, 66; 732 NW2d 546 (2007) (citations omitted). The
evidence revealed that defendant used the knife to intimidate the victim. The knife’s mere presence
accomplished its purpose of intimidation. Defendant has failed to show that the prosecution’s
arguments constituted a misstatement of the facts or a vouching for the victim’s credibility. See
Howard, 226 Mich App at 548.

        Under the circumstances, there was no reason for defense counsel to object to the
prosecution’s closing argument or for the trial judge to intervene. See Jackson, 292 Mich App
at 601. Even if such a reason existed, defendant has failed to establish a reasonable probability
that the trial’s outcome would have been different had defense counsel objected. See id.
Moreover, defendant merely provides an unsupported cursory assertion that there was a reasonable
probability of a different outcome if defense counsel had objected at trial. An appellant “may not
merely announce his position and leave it to this Court to discover and rationalize the basis for his
claims, nor may he give only cursory treatment with little or no citation of supporting authority.”
People v Kelly, 231 Mich App 627, 640-641; 588 NW2d 480 (1998).

       For these reasons, defendant has failed to establish that he was denied his right to
due process or that defense counsel proved ineffective at trial. Defendant is not entitled to a new
trial.

                                                 -9-
                                        IV. SENTENCING

       Defendant lastly argues that the trial court clearly erred by assigning defendant 10 points
under OV 1 and by assigning defendant 10 points under OV 10. We disagree regarding OV 1, but
we agree regarding OV 10.

        We review de novo whether the trial court properly interpreted and applied the relevant
law to the facts. People v Clark, 330 Mich App 392, 415; 948 NW2d 604 (2019). We review for
clear error the trial court’s factual findings in support of a particular score under an OV. See
People v Dickinson, 321 Mich App 1, 20; 909 NW2d 24 (2017). A finding is clearly erroneous
when this Court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a trial court made a mistake. Id.
at 21.

       In 2015, the Michigan Supreme Court held that Michigan’s sentencing scheme violated the
Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution as it “allow[ed] judges to find by a
preponderance of the evidence facts that are then used to compel an increase in the mandatory
minimum punishment [that] a defendant receives . . . .” People v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358, 399;
870 NW2d 502 (2015). Therefore, the Court ruled that these guidelines are advisory, not
mandatory. Id. Still, the Court maintained that these guidelines “remain a highly relevant
consideration in a trial court’s exercise of sentencing discretion” and should be considered by trial
courts when sentencing defendants. Id. at 391.

                                             A. OV 1

        MCL 777.31(d) states that a trial court must assign a defendant 10 points under OV 1 when,
during a defendant’s aggravated use of a weapon, the victim “was touched by any other type of
weapon[.]” A defendant will be assigned five points when the weapon was merely displayed or
implied. MCL 777.31(e). The term “weapon” includes a broad variety of instruments. People v
Hutcheson, 308 Mich App 10, 14-16; 865 NW2d 44 (2014). The Legislature intended “to assess
points for the use of weapons across the broadest possible range of circumstances, consistent with
the goal of evaluating the appropriate sentence range for a particular defendant.” People v Lange,
251 Mich App 247, 257-258; 650 NW2d 691 (2002) (emphasis added).

        The Michigan Supreme Court has established that a victim does not need to see a weapon
touching him or her in order for the trial court to assign the defendant 10 points under OV 1. See
People v McCuller, 479 Mich 672, 678, 696; 739 NW2d 563 (2007). In McCuller, 479 Mich
at 678, the victim went outside and heard the defendant coming behind him. When the victim
turned around, he saw the defendant “swinging a blunt object that looked like a bat, a pipe, or a
club at his head.” Id. The jury convicted the defendant of assault with intent to do great bodily
harm less than murder and assigned him 10 points under OV 1. Id. at 678, 679. The Michigan
Supreme Court concluded that “the uncontroverted evidence showed that the victim was struck in
the head with a bat, pipe, or club.” Id. at 696. The type and severity of the injuries corroborated
the testimony that the attacker used a blunt object, and the defendant did not challenge the
testimony that he was armed or evidence pertaining to the type of weapon used in the assault. Id.

                                                -10-
       Defendant argues that the evidence did not establish that the victim had been touched with
defendant’s pocketknife. Therefore, he argues, he should have been assigned only five points
under OV 1. We disagree.

        Like the victim in McCuller, the present victim saw the weapon in question before the
crime occurred. See id. at 678. Unlike the McCuller victim, however, the present victim
recognized and identified the pocketknife in defendant’s possession— the same pocketknife that
police officers discovered in the backseat of the victim’s vehicle. The victim had seen defendant
carry this pocket knife around with him on previous occasions. Also unlike in McCuller, there is
no clear evidence that the weapon in question injured the victim. See id. at 696. Nevertheless,
defendant admitted that he had a knife when he had intercourse with the victim. Notwithstanding
the lack of injuries, the evidence and testimony, taken together, strongly indicate that the knife was
the object that the victim felt pressed against her back during the crime. See id.

        Consequently, the trial court did not clearly err when it assigned defendant 10 points under
OV 1.

                                             B. OV 10

        MCL 777.40(1)(b) states that a trial court must assign a defendant 10 points under OV 10
when the defendant exploits a vulnerable victim’s “physical disability, mental disability, youth or
agedness, or a domestic relationship, or the offender abused his or her authority status[.]” If the
defendant did not exploit a victim’s vulnerability, the court must assign the defendant zero points.
MCL 777.40(1)(d). MCL 777.40(3)(b) states that “ ‘[e]xploit’ means to manipulate a victim for
selfish or unethical purposes.”

        MCL 777.40 does not define “domestic relationship.” See People v Jamison, 292 Mich
App 440, 445; 807 NW2d 427 (2011). However, this Court has stated that, for a dating relationship
to rise to the level of a domestic relationship, “there must be a familial or cohabitating
relationship.” Id. at 448. If the parties did not share a domicile and were unrelated, the dating
relationship cannot constitute a domestic relationship. See id. Moreover, a defendant can exploit
a prior relationship for purposes of assigning points under OV 10. See People v Wilson, 252 Mich
App 390, 395; 652 NW2d 488 (2002).

        Here, the victim testified that she met with defendant before the assault was to discuss their
prior relationship and to do drugs. Just before the assault occurred, defendant accused the victim
of sleeping with someone else. Under these circumstances, it appears that, like the defendant in
Wilson, defendant exploited his prior relationship with the victim. See id. Regardless, nothing in
the record indicates that the victim and defendant were in a domestic relationship. The victim said
that her relationship with defendant lasted about four months. Much of their relationship consisted
of hanging out, doing drugs, drinking, and sexual activities. There was no evidence that the victim
and defendant were related or that they lived together during their relationship, however.
Consequently, the victim’s relationship with defendant was not domestic. See Jamison, 292 Mich
App at 448. Therefore, the trial court clearly erred by assigning defendant 10 points pursuant to
OV 10.

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        Defendant’s total OV score was 60 points, which meant that he was scored at OV Level V.
See MCL 777.63. Subtracting the erroneously scored 10 points for OV 10 would lower
defendant’s total OV score to 50 points, which would still place him at OV Level V. See
MCL 777.63 (setting the point range for OV Level V at 50 to 74 points). Therefore, despite the
error, defendant’s sentencing guidelines are not affected, and he is not entitled to resentencing.
See People v Francisco, 474 Mich 82, 89 n 8; 711 NW2d 44 (2006) (When “a scoring error does
not alter the appropriate guidelines range, resentencing is not required”).

       Affirmed but remanded to allow the trial court to remove the improper information from
the PSIR. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                            /s/ Mark T. Boonstra
                                                            /s/ Kathleen A. Feeney
                                                            /s/ Adrienne N. Young

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