Court Opinion

ID: 9642905
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 18:12:04.993192+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:54.258694
License: Public Domain

OSBORN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I cannot agree with the majority holding that they “do not view this as a ‘non-use’ case.” It was pled as a “non-use” case. It was briefed as a “non-use” case. It was argued as a “non-use” case. It has now for the first time been viewed as not being a “non-use” case.
The first time the ambulance crew arrived at the home of James Louis Green, Jr., the attendants used a stethoscope to cheek lung functions and breathing sounds. They used a small flashlight to examine Mr. Green’s eyes and check his reaction to light. They used a sphygmomanometer to check his blood pressure and they also checked his pulse. There is no allegation that “some condition” of this equipment or “some use” of this equipment led to a misdiagnosis of Mr. Green’s actual condition and resulted in the crew not timely transporting him to a hospital. The holding in Salcedo v. El Paso Hospital District, 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex.1983), where the employee misread an electrocardiogram, has no application in this case. There is no allegation of any equipment failure or any misuse of the equipment which the ambulance attendants actually used.
The complaint in this case is that on the first visit the ambulance attendants (1) failed to use published protocols for pre-hospital emergency medical care; (2) failed to use the cardiac monitor; (3) failed to use the defibrillators; (4) failed to use cardiac drugs; (5) failed to use breathing apparatus; and (6) failed to use the ambulance to transport Mr. Green to a hospital. In answer to request for admissions, the City admitted that based on the original diagnosis, none of the equipment mentioned in the preceding sentence was used. Thus, the issue is not whether such equipment was improperly used or whether there was some misuse or malfunction of equipment — but in fact there was “no-use” of the equipment in question and that is the basis for this suit.
Appellant argues that we should “recognize an exception to governmental immunity even where there is a failure to use property.” He urges there should be no distinction between use and non-use of tangible property. He concludes:
It is illogical to allow recovery for one injured plaintiff because the defendant negligently used property and to wholly deny recovery to another injured plaintiff simply because the defendant negligently failed to use property.
We cannot disagree with such logic, but that is a policy matter which was decided by the legislature and we are obligated to apply that law as it was written and not as we conclude it should have been written.
In Salcedo, supra, the court set forth the requirement that “[t]he negligent conduct, however, must involve ‘some condition or some use’ of tangible property * * In this case, there is no allegation of negligence involving “some condition” or “some use” of tangible property. All of the allegations are about a “failure to use” certain specified property. To reverse the trial *571court we are required to rewrite Section 3 of the Texas Tort Claims Act and add the necessary words to provide that each unit of government in this state shall be liable for money damages for death or personal injuries so caused from some condition or some use or some failure to use tangible property under conditions where there would be private liability. I conclude that the decision concerning the adding of those new words is for the legislature and not this Court. I would affirm the summary judgment.