Court Opinion

ID: 9951070
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 16:00:50.754808+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:37:05.510754
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-9546     Document: 010111016432      Date Filed: 03/15/2024   Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                        March 15, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  FRANCISCO JAVIER
  BEDOLLA-TRUJILLO,

        Petitioner - Appellant,

  v.                                                         No. 23-9546
                                                         (Petition for Review)
  MERRICK B. GARLAND,
  United States Attorney General,

        Respondent - Appellee.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before TYMKOVICH, PHILLIPS, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

       An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied petitioner Francisco Javier

 Bedolla-Trujillo’s application for cancellation of removal and ordered him removed

 to Mexico. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision and

 denied Mr. Bedolla’s motion to administratively close his removal proceedings.1 He

       *
          After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
 this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
 precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
 estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
 Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
        1
          We refer to the petitioner as “Mr. Bedolla,” as this surname was used in the
 administrative proceedings.
Appellate Case: 23-9546    Document: 010111016432         Date Filed: 03/15/2024    Page: 2

 now petitions pro se for review of the BIA’s decision.2 We deny the petition for

 review in part and dismiss in part for lack of jurisdiction.

                                    BACKGROUND

       Mr. Bedolla is a native and citizen of Mexico who entered the United States

 without inspection in 2001. In 2018, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)

 served him with a Notice to Appear (NTA), charging him with being present in the

 United States without being admitted or paroled into this country. Mr. Bedolla

 admitted the allegations in the NTA and conceded his removability. He applied for

 cancellation of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).

       To be eligible for cancellation of removal, Mr. Bedolla had to establish

 that: (1) he had been “physically present in the United States for a continuous period

 of not less than [ten] years immediately preceding the date of [his] application”;

 (2) he had been “a person of good moral character during [that] period”; (3) he had

 not been convicted of certain criminal offenses; and (4) his “removal would result in

 exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” to a qualifying relative, i.e., a “spouse,

 parent, or child, who is a citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully admitted for

 permanent residence.” § 1229b(b)(1).

       The government stipulated that Mr. Bedolla’s son, D.B., who was 12 years old

 at the time of the hearing, was a qualifying relative. At the IJ hearing, Mr. Bedolla

 and his wife, Yadira Bedolla-Ramirez, testified about the harm D.B. would suffer if

       2
        We liberally construe Mr. Bedolla’s pro se filings but do not act as his
 advocate. See James v. Wadas, 724 F.3d 1312, 1315 (10th Cir. 2013).
                                             2
Appellate Case: 23-9546      Document: 010111016432        Date Filed: 03/15/2024    Page: 3

 Mr. Bedolla were removed to Mexico. Mr. Bedolla said that once D.B. learned that

 he had been arrested by the immigration authorities, D.B. had become depressed and

 his grades had suffered. He had stopped participating in school, socializing, and

 extracurricular activities; developed difficulties in communicating with his parents;

 and was in therapy. Mr. Bedolla testified that if he were removed from this country,

 it would destroy his children emotionally and his wife would not be able to support

 them.3

          Ms. Bedolla testified she was very concerned about D.B. and the drastic

 changes he had recently experienced. She seconded Mr. Bedolla’s testimony about

 D.B.’s academic, behavioral, and personal problems. She described D.B.’s therapy

 with a counselor. She stated that given these problems, she did not think she could

 take care of the children if Mr. Bedolla were removed.

          In addition to this testimony, Mr. Bedolla submitted several affidavits and

 letters concerning his family’s situation, mental health reports, and evidence of his

 good moral character. He also submitted other supporting documentation including

 articles about conditions in Mexico.

          In his decision, the IJ found that Mr. Bedolla met the first three requirements

 for cancellation, but he had not shown that D.B. would suffer exceptional and

 extremely unusual hardship if Mr. Bedolla were removed from the United States. He

 stated D.B.’s “emotional turmoil is an unfortunate yet common reaction to potential

          3
         Mr. Bedolla also has a non-qualifying daughter, who was 18 at the time of
 the hearing.
                                              3
Appellate Case: 23-9546    Document: 010111016432        Date Filed: 03/15/2024       Page: 4

 separation as a result of immigration proceedings.” R., Vol. II at 55. He noted

 D.B.’s family ties, counseling, government-provided medical coverage, and

 educational support system, all of which would remain intact even if Mr. Bedolla

 were removed. The IJ opined that the financial hardship the family would face, while

 real, was not uncommon in removal cases. Even considered in the aggregate, the IJ

 concluded, the hardships that would follow removal were not exceptional and

 extremely unusual. He therefore denied cancellation relief and ordered Mr. Bedolla

 removed to Mexico.

       Mr. Bedolla appealed to the BIA. In connection with the appeal, he filed a

 motion to administratively close his proceedings. In the motion, he again noted the

 hardship that would result to D.B. if he were removed, and argued his case was not a

 priority for the DHS because Mr. Bedolla did not pose a risk to national security,

 public safety, or border security. The DHS opposed the motion.

       The BIA dismissed Mr. Bedolla’s appeal. It adopted the IJ’s decision and

 concluded that for the reasons stated in that decision, “the factors presented are not

 sufficient to rise to the level of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship as

 required for cancellation of removal.” Id. at 4. The BIA also denied the motion to

 administratively close the proceedings, concluding Mr. Bedolla had not shown his

 entitlement to administrative closure and that prosecutorial discretion lay solely

 within the authorization of the DHS, not the IJ or the BIA.

       Mr. Bedolla filed a timely petition for review.

                                            4
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                                     DISCUSSION

       This case involves a single BIA member’s brief order under 8 C.F.R.

 § 1003.1(e)(5). We review that order as the final agency determination, “limit[ing]

 our review to issues specifically addressed therein.” Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d

 1274, 1279 (10th Cir. 2006). When the BIA adopts the IJ’s rationale by reference, as

 it did here, “[w]e may consult the IJ’s decision to give substance to the BIA’s

 reasoning.” Razkane v. Holder, 562 F.3d 1283, 1287 (10th Cir. 2009). “We review

 the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, and its findings of fact for substantial

 evidence.” Aguayo v. Garland, 78 F.4th 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2023).

       1. We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s hardship decision.

       We lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s discretionary decision concerning

 whether a petitioner’s qualifying relative will suffer an exceptional and extremely

 unusual hardship. Galeano-Romero v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1176, 1181 (10th Cir. 2020)

 (discussing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). But under “§ 1252(a)(2)(D), we retain

 jurisdiction over questions of law that arise from the [BIA’s] hardship

 determination.” Id. at 1184.

       Mr. Bedolla has not presented any reviewable issues of law concerning the

 hardship issue. Rather, he asks us to reweigh the evidence on that issue, which we

 lack jurisdiction to do. See id. We therefore dismiss his challenge to the BIA’s order

 adopting and affirming the IJ’s hardship determination.

                                            5
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       2. The BIA correctly concluded that it lacks the authority to exercise
 prosecutorial discretion on Mr. Bedolla’s behalf. In addition, we lack
 jurisdiction to review the agency’s failure to exercise its prosecutorial discretion.

       Mr. Bedolla also challenges the BIA’s conclusion that it lacked the ability to

 close his case as a matter of prosecutorial discretion. To the extent he has raised a

 reviewable legal issue, we deny review. The BIA correctly concluded as a matter of

 law that it lacks the authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion, which is committed

 exclusively to the DHS. See Veloz-Luvevano v. Lynch, 799 F.3d 1308, 1315 (10th

 Cir. 2015) (stating “neither an IJ nor the BIA has the authority to review the

 government’s prosecutorial discretion decisions”). And to the extent Mr. Bedolla

 attempts to challenge the refusal of the DHS to exercise prosecutorial discretion on

 his behalf, he has not shown we have jurisdiction to review that decision. See id.

 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)).4

       3. Mr. Bedolla has not developed a cognizable challenge to the BIA’s
 denial of his motion to administratively close his case.

        To the extent Mr. Bedolla is raising a challenge to the BIA’s denial of his

 motion to administratively close his case for reasons other than prosecutorial

 discretion, we also deny review. “Immigration Judges and the Board have the

 authority, in the exercise of independent judgment and discretion, to administratively

       4
          Mr. Bedlolla also contends that recent, more flexible guidelines adopted by
 the DHS for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion, which he claims have been
 affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, have made him a “candidate for
 cancellation of removal.” See Pet’r. Br. at 2. But to the extent this contention raises
 a legal issue, he has not explained how these guidelines have any effect on the BIA’s
 determinations that he did not meet the hardship requirement, was ineligible for
 cancellation relief, and did not show his entitlement to administrative closure.
                                            6
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 close proceedings.” Matter of Avetisyan, 25 I. & N. Dec. 688, 694 (BIA 2012).5

 Administrative closure “is used to temporarily remove a case from an Immigration

 Judge’s active calendar or from the Board’s docket . . . to await an action or event

 that is relevant to immigration proceedings but is outside the control of the parties or

 the court and may not occur for a significant or undetermined period of time.” Id. at

 692 (citation omitted).6

       The BIA denied Mr. Bedolla’s request for administrative closure because it

 determined (1) he had not given a valid reason for administrative closure; (2) the

 DHS stated a valid basis for opposing the motion; (3) the anticipated duration of the

 administrative closure was uncertain; and (4) the ultimate outcome of the proceedings

 would be unchanged from a removal order. Mr. Bedolla does not explain why any of

 the BIA’s reasons were incorrect, other than to reiterate his assertion that he qualifies

 for cancellation relief and the BIA should have exercised prosecutorial discretion on

 his behalf. For reasons we have already explained, we cannot review the agency’s

 discretionary determinations on those issues. We therefore lack any basis to review

 his challenge to the BIA’s failure to administratively close his case.

       5
          The Attorney General overruled Avetisyan in Matter of Castro-Tum, 27 I. &
 N. Dec. 271 (Atty. Gen. 2018). But Castro-Tum was itself later overruled by Matter
 of Cruz-Valdez, 28 I. & N. Dec. 326 (Atty. Gen. 2021), which held that “except when
 a court of appeals has held otherwise, immigration judges and the Board should apply
 the standard for administrative closure set out in Avetisyan.” Id. at 329.
        6
          Mr. Bedolla also asks this court to administratively close his case. He does
 not show we have any authority to do so.

                                             7
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                                    CONCLUSION

        We deny Mr. Bedolla’s petition for review in part and dismiss it in part for

 lack of jurisdiction.

                                            Entered for the Court

                                            Timothy M. Tymkovich
                                            Circuit Judge

                                            8