Court Opinion

ID: 9732624
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:28:24.733973+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:30.638681
License: Public Domain

CAVANAUGH, J.,
dissenting:
¶11 respectfully dissent from the result reached by the majority. I would hold that the “regularly used non-owned car” exclusion in appellees’ policy of insurance is not violative of public policy and should be applied as part of the policy of insurance under which the Burstein’s seek to recover underinsured motorist benefits.
¶ 2 It is important to observe at the outset that the present claim is asserted by the Bursteins under their own insurance policies and that therefore the exclusion under consideration is from an insurance contract that they themselves purchased for an agreed premium.
¶ 3 I note that the exclusion at issue is not challenged on any basis other than its application in consideration of public policy. The Bursteins do not contend that the language is unclear or ambiguous, or that the vehicle in which they were injured was not regularly used by one or both of them.
¶ 4 I further note that under the terms of the policy purchased by the Bursteins from Prudential, coverage is provided for bodily injury sustained by an insured who is “hit” by an underinsured motor vehicle while a pedestrian or who is injured while using a substitute car (one borrowed temporarily) or a non-owned car with the owner’s permission (not regularly used). Thus, our review is a narrow one pertaining to the legitimacy of the regularly used non-owned car exclusion in the context of an insurance policy which explicitly provides for underinsured motorist coverage in several specified instances.
¶ 5 The majority errs in its application of public policy by ignoring explicit pronouncements from the supreme court regarding public policy as it pertains to the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (MVFRL). There are not many, competing policies to be weighed and balanced against one another, but rather a single public policy which informs application of the MVFRL. By engaging in an analysis which posits the existence of numerous public policies, the majority transgresses the juridical precept that precedent created by the supreme court may not be disregarded by this court. See Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 557 Pa. 453, 460 n. 6, 734 A.2d 840 (1999); Commonwealth v. Randolph, 553 Pa. 224, 718 A.2d 1242 (1998).
¶ 6 “The legislative concern for the increasing cost of insurance is the public policy that is to be advanced by statutory interpretation of the MVFRL. This reflects the General Assembly’s departure from the principle of ‘maximum feasible restoration’ embodied in the now defunct No-Fault Act.” Paylor v. Hartford Ins. Co., 536 Pa. 583, 587, 640 A.2d 1234, 1235 (1994). Accord Rump v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 551 Pa. 339, 345, 710 A.2d 1093, 1096 (1998); Donnelly v. Bauer, 553 Pa. 596, 606, 720 A.2d 447, 452 (1998). Thus, the only proper consideration of public policy is whether an exclusion clause runs afoul of the legislative “concern for the spiraling consumer cost of automobile insurance and the resultant increase in the number of uninsured motorists driving on the public highways.” Id.
¶ 7 The purpose of protecting innocent victims from underinsured motorists who cannot adequately compensate the victims for their injuries does not rise to the level of public policy overriding every other consideration of contract construction. Ei*695chelman v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 551 Pa. 558, 566, 711 A.2d 1006, 1010 (1998) (emphasis supplied).17
¶8 The majority does not support its rationale by applying the sole public policy of cost containment of insurance premiums. Were it to properly confine its inquiry into public policy to the limited domain of cost containment, it, in all likelihood, would uphold the validity of the exclusion at issue.
¶ 9 There exists no public policy in favor of mandatory underinsured motorist coverage. The MVFRL requires, since the 1990 amendments, that such coverage be offered for sale, but it need not be purchased. The exclusion for regularly used non-owned cars was apparent on its face and clearly worded in the policy. The Bursteins knew, or should have known, that they were not paying for underin-sured motorist coverage for the automobile in which they were injured.
¶ 10 The concept of portability of under-insured motorist coverage is rooted in an interpretation of the particular insurance policy at issue. Here, the policy provides for limited portability to instances of an underinsured motorist hitting the insured while he is a pedestrian and while the insured is using a substitute or other non-owned car. This coverage was the subject of premiums paid for by the Bursteins. They did not pay a premium for underin-sured motor coverage for injury sustained by them while they occupied a regularly used non-owned car.
¶ 11 To require an insurer to cover a use which is subject to an unambiguous policy exclusion, may almost certainly be expected to give rise to an increase in the cost of automobile insurance. This is violative of public policy. This is the result reached by the majority. I am compelled, therefore, to dissent.
¶ 12 POPOVICH and JOHNSON, JJ„ join this Dissenting Opinion.

. See also Frazier v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 445 Pa.Super. 218, 665 A.2d 1 (1995) and Jeffrey v. Erie Ins. Exchange, 423 Pa.Super. 483, 621 A.2d 635 (1993)(en banc) (concept of "maximum feasible restoration” no longer exists in Pennsylvania jurisprudence applying the MVFRL).