Court Opinion

ID: 9396795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-23 18:08:16.189949+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:19.831174
License: Public Domain

J-S09015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

 IN THE INTEREST OF: D.S.M., A           :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
 MINOR                                   :          PENNSYLVANIA
                                         :
                   Appellant             :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :
                                         :     No. 612 WDA 2022

     Appeal from the Dispositional Review Order Entered May 20, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County Juvenile Division at No(s):
                         CP-25-JV0000069-2021,
                         CP-25-JV0000178-2021

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., BOWES, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                         FILED: MAY 23, 2023

      D.S.M. (“Appellant”), a minor, appeals from the dispositional review

order dated April 20, 2022, and entered on the docket in the Court of Common

Pleas of Erie County on May 20, 2022, which modified his placement after he

was adjudicated delinquent for multiple offenses. After careful review, we

affirm.

      The juvenile court provided the following procedural history and factual

background in its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion:

      [Appellant] was adjudicated delinquent on August 17, 2021, after
      previously admitting to several allegations, including criminal
      mischief, possession of a firearm by a minor, discharge of a
      firearm into an occupied structure, reckless endangerment, theft
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       by unlawful taking, and receiving stolen property.[1] The [c]ourt
       ordered that he be placed at Cornell Abraxas Academy
       [(“Abraxas”)] in Morgantown, Pennsylvania. His first four months
       at Abraxas were relatively positive, but unfortunately[,] by
       December [of that year], [Appellant’s] behavior declined. All told,
       12 physical interventions occurred at Abraxas between December
       14, 2021, and March 10, 2022. Despite [Appellant’s] escalating
       misconduct, Abraxas recommended at a review hearing[,] held in
       February of 2022[,] that he remain at the facility, believing it could
       still treat [Appellant’s] behavioral issues. After a few weeks,
       however, the facility was no longer so optimistic. On March 17,
       2022, Abraxas requested his removal, citing instances of
       aggression, such as attempting an assault on a peer, threatening
       to “jump” a staff member, and the breaking of a security camera
       and a large wooden table.

       At a disposition hearing held on April 20, 2022, the
       Commonwealth recommended placement at another secure
       facility. While counsel for [Appellant] agreed that “Abraxas just
       didn’t work” and “a change of scenery would work best for him[,]”
       he proposed “[g]etting him back home as a good alternate
       possibility.” [Appellant’s] mother proposed that he be released on
       probation to participate in a summer work experience program,
       and to engage in counseling with Dr. Parris Baker. Ultimately, the
       [c]ourt agreed with the Commonwealth’s recommendation,
       continuing the finding of delinquency and ordering him “relocated
       to a state secure juvenile facility with the first available bed.” The
       [c]ourt found this “to be the least restrictive means to address
       community protection, victim restoration, mental health and
       competency development.”

Juvenile Court Opinion (“JCO”), 7/27/22, at 1-2 (citations to record and

brackets in original omitted).
____________________________________________

1 Appellant’s adjudication of delinquency for criminal mischief (18 Pa.C.S. §
3304(a)(2)) was entered at docket no. CP-25-JV-0000069-2021 (“JV 69-
2021”). Appellant was adjudicated delinquent for the following offenses at
docket no. CP-25-JV-0000178-2021 (“JV 178-2021”): possession of a firearm
by a minor (18 Pa.C.S. § 6110.1(a)); discharge of a firearm into an occupied
structure (18 Pa.C.S. § 2707.1(a)); and recklessly endangering another
person (18 Pa.C.S. § 2705). The charges for theft by unlawful taking (18
Pa.C.S. § 3921(a)) and receiving stolen property (18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a)) were
withdrawn.

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      The juvenile court entered its April 20, 2022 dispositional review order

at both juvenile docket numbers (JV 69-2021 and JV 178-2021) on May 20,

2022. Appellant filed a single, timely notice of appeal on May 20, 2022, listing

both docket numbers from which he appeals, followed by a timely, court-

ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal. Appellant now presents the following issues for our review:

      A. Whether the [juvenile] court erred when it determined that
         Appellant needed further “treatment, rehabilitation and/or
         supervision” in a more restrictive facility instead of in a less
         restrictive setting such as a community type of setting (i.e.,
         formal probation with outpatient and/or wrap around services)
         and/or an independent living type of placement due to
         Appellant’s age and/or other factors considered by the [juvenile
         c]ourt[?]

      B. Whether the [juvenile] court erred when it determined that
         Appellant’s best placement option was Commit to State
         Placement ([Youth Development Center (“YDC”)]) (first bed
         available), which is further from [Appellant’s] home county
         than other placements that could accomplish the same
         “treatment, supervision and rehabilitation” goals that focus on
         education and/or personal safety instead of a less restrictive
         setting such as a community type of setting (i.e., formal
         probation with outpatient and/or wrap around services) and/or
         an independent living type of placement due to Appellant[’s]
         age and/or other factors considered by the [juvenile c]ourt[?]

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

      Before delving into the merits of Appellant’s claims, there are several

preliminary matters that demand our attention.       First, we must determine

whether quashal of this appeal is required, due to Appellant’s failure to follow

the proper practice under Rule 341(a) of filing separate appeals from an order

that resolves issues arising on more than one docket. See Pa.R.A.P. 341,

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Official Note (“Where … one or more orders resolves issues arising on more

than one docket or relating to more than one judgment, separate notices of

appeal must be filed.”); Commonwealth v. Walker, 185 A.3d 969, 977 (Pa.

2018) (requiring quashal of an appeal where the appellant fails to file separate

notices of appeal when appealing from a single order that resolves issues

arising on more than one trial docket), overruled in part, Commonwealth

v. Young, 265 A.3d 462 (Pa. 2022) (reaffirming Walker, but determining

that Pa.R.A.P. 902 permits the appellate court, in its discretion, to allow

correction of the error where appropriate).

      Exceptions to Walker’s bright-line quashal rule have been established,

such as where a breakdown of court operations has occurred.                  In

Commonwealth v. Stansbury, 219 A.3d 157 (Pa. Super. 2019), the PCRA

court advised the appellant that he could appeal from its order dismissing his

PCRA petition pending at two separate docket numbers by filing within thirty

days “a written notice of appeal[.]” Id. at 160 (emphasis in original). The

lower court also utilized the singular in advising him where to file “[s]aid

notice of appeal[.]”    Id. (emphasis in original).    “Hence, while Walker

required that [the a]ppellant file separate notices of appeal at each docket

number, the PCRA court informed [him] that he could pursue appellate review

by filing a single notice of appeal.” Id. We concluded that such misstatements

regarding the manner in which an appeal could be effectuated amounted to

“a breakdown in court operations” such that we could overlook the defective

nature of the timely notice of appeal. Id. We, therefore, declined to quash

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pursuant to Walker and addressed the substance of the appeal. Id. See

also Commonwealth v. Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 352-54 (Pa. Super. 2020)

(en banc) (reaffirming Stansbury and concluding that a breakdown in the

court system occurred where the lower court advised Larkin that he had “thirty

(30) days … to file an appeal” from an order appearing on two dockets)

(emphasis is original).

      Similarly, in Interest of K.M.W., 238 A.3d 465 (Pa. Super. 2020), the

mother filed a timely single notice of appeal from a decree that involuntarily

terminated her parental rights to her minor child on the adoption docket and

changed the child’s permanency goal to adoption on the dependency docket.

Id. at 468. The mother listed both lower court docket numbers on her single

notice of appeal.   Id. at 468-69.   Notably, the trial court indicated to the

mother that she could seek relief by filing a singular appeal from multiple

lower court docket numbers.      See id. at 470 (“This order shall become

absolute as of course if no appeal is taken, within thirty (30) days, pursuant

to Pa.R.A.P. 341.”) (emphasis added).      We concluded that the trial court’s

misstatement constituted a breakdown in court operations and, accordingly,

declined to quash the appeal. Id.

      In the matter sub judice, Appellant was notified of his right to file “a

direct appeal[,]” as well as the time constraints for filing such an “appeal” in

a written post-dispositional rights colloquy signed by Appellant and his counsel

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on the date of the dispositional review hearing.     See Pa.R.J.C.P. 610(D).2

Throughout the two-paged colloquy, all references to Appellant’s right to an

appeal were consistently made in the singular. There is no indication in the

record that the juvenile court ever instructed Appellant to file two separate

notices of appeal from its dispositional order which appears on both docket

nos. JV 69-2021 and JV 178-2021. We believe the juvenile court’s failure to

inform Appellant that separate notices of appeal were required to comply with

Rule 341(a) and Walker constituted a breakdown in court operations.

Accordingly, we decline to quash this appeal. See Int. of K.M.W., supra,

Larkin, supra, and Stansbury, supra.3
____________________________________________

2 Chapter 6, Part B of the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure
governs the procedures for modifications and reviews of dispositional orders.
Rule 610(D) provides that “[a] colloquy and inquiry of post-dispositional rights
shall be conducted when a juvenile is aggrieved by a modification of the
dispositional order.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 610(D).

3 The Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure dictate that “[a]fter
entering disposition on the record, the court shall ensure that an attorney has
reviewed the post-dispositional rights colloquy with the juvenile … and conduct
an independent inquiry to determine whether the juvenile understands: (a)
the right to file a post-dispositional motion; (b) the right to file an appeal;
[and] (c) the time limits for filing a post-dispositional motion and appeal….”
Pa.R.J.C.P. 512(C)(1)(a)-(c) (emphasis added). See also Pa.R.J.C.P. 610,
Comment (“For the colloquy and inquiry of post-dispositional rights, see Rule
512(C).”). We note that, in the instant matter, the juvenile court asked
Appellant’s counsel at the beginning of the review hearing whether he went
over Appellant’s post-dispositional rights with Appellant, to which counsel
answered in the affirmative. N.T. Hearing, 4/20/22, at 2. The court then
proceeded to ask Appellant, in a general manner, whether he “understood
those rights[,]” and whether he had “any questions for [the court] concerning
them?” Id. No further inquiry regarding Appellant’s understanding of his
appellate rights took place on the record. We are not convinced that the

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       Next, we must determine whether the order from which Appellant

appealed is appealable, because appealability implicates our jurisdiction.

Interest of J.M., 219 A.3d 645, 650 (Pa. Super. 2019). See also Kulp v.

Hrivnak, 765 A.2d 796, 798 (Pa. Super. 2000) (“[S]ince we lack jurisdiction

over an unappealable order[,] it is incumbent on us to determine, sua sponte

when necessary, whether the appeal is taken from an appealable order.”). It

is clear that an initial order of disposition is a final order from which a juvenile

may appeal as of right. See In re M.D., 839 A.2d 1116, 1118 (Pa. Super.

2003). We have also established that this right to appeal does not extend to

review orders that simply maintain the status quo. Id. at 1121 (“We hold …

that a committed juvenile does not have the right to appeal from a review

order that continues his commitment in the same manner and place and that

maintains the status quo.”). However, we have permitted appeals from review

orders in cases where the order modifies the status quo. See In the Matter

of R.B., 765 A.2d 396 (Pa. Super. 2000) (determining a dispositional review

order that continued the juvenile’s placement and ordered him to submit to a

medical evaluation was appealable due to the additional requirement of a

medical evaluation, as it modified the original dispositional order). See also

In re J.E.D., 879 A.2d 288, 291 (Pa. Super. 2005) (concluding that an order

modifying the amount of restitution is appealable). Instantly, the order from
____________________________________________

juvenile court complied with the mandates of Rules 610 and 512(C) here;
however, due to our declining to quash on another basis, we need not reach
a determination as to whether the court’s failure to strictly comply with Rules
610 and 512(C) also constitutes a breakdown of court operations.

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which Appellant appeals terminates his placement at Abraxas and orders his

transfer to a more secure, state juvenile facility, which is a clear modification

of the manner and place of Appellant’s commitment. Hence, we deem this

order to be appealable.

      Additionally, we question whether the passage of time has rendered this

appeal moot.

      As a general rule, an actual case or controversy must exist at all
      stages of the judicial process, or a case will be dismissed as moot.
      An issue can become moot during the pendency of an appeal due
      to an intervening change in the facts of the case or due to an
      intervening change in the applicable law. In that case, an opinion
      of this Court is rendered advisory in nature. An issue before a
      court is moot if in ruling upon the issue the court cannot enter an
      order that has any legal force or effect.

In re J.A., 107 A.3d 799, 811-12 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting In re D.A., 801

A.2d 614, 616 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en banc) (internal citations and quotations

omitted)).

      Nevertheless, this Court will decide questions that otherwise have
      been rendered moot when one or more of the following exceptions
      to the mootness doctrine apply: 1) the case involves a question of
      great public importance, 2) the question presented is capable of
      repetition and apt to elude appellate review, or 3) a party to the
      controversy will suffer some detriment due to the decision of the
      trial court.

In re D.A., 801 A.2d at 616 (citations omitted).

      Instantly, Appellant asks us to reverse the May 20, 2022 dispositional

review order transferring him to a more restrictive state secure facility. Unlike

the criminal justice system, in which a criminal defendant’s judgment of

sentence continues without further involvement by the trial court unless

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overturned on appeal, a juvenile’s disposition “is subject to frequent,

mandatory review by the hearing court.” In re M.D., 839 A.2d at 1119. “[I]n

the event a judge enters a disposition order that provides for commitment,

the judge is required to review the propriety of that commitment every six

months and must also hold a disposition hearing at least every nine months.”

Id. (citing 42 Pa.C.S. § 6353) (emphasis in original).

      At the time this appeal was filed, Appellant was placed at the Edmund

L. Thomas Adolescent Center and was awaiting a bed to become available at

a state secured juvenile facility.     Appellant’s current placement status is

unknown. The certified record indicates that a review hearing was scheduled

for June 9, 2022, and because of the juvenile court’s obligation to hold periodic

reviews, it is likely that additional dispositional review hearings have been held

since that date. Arguably, therefore, our decision in this appeal may not have

any legal force or effect. See In re D.A., 801 A.2d at 616. Nevertheless, we

conclude that we are able to decide this appeal, as it presents questions that

are “capable of repetition and apt to elude appellate review,” and thus are

excepted from the mootness doctrine. See In re J.A., 107 A.3d at 811-12

(reviewing appeal rendered moot by trial court order entered after review

hearing conducted while appeal was pending).          We, therefore, proceed to

address the merits of this appeal.

      In   considering   Appellant’s   claims,   we   remain   mindful   that   “a

delinquent’s disposition is a duty vested in the discretion of the adjudicating

juvenile court.” In re Love, 646 A.2d 1233, 1238 (Pa. Super. 1994) (citing

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42 Pa.C.S. § 6352). “[T]he discretion of the [j]uvenile [c]ourt implementing

a disposition is broad, it is flexible[,] and the [j]uvenile [c]ourt has

considerable power to review and modify the commitment, taking into account

the rehabilitative progress or lack of it of the juvenile.    Without extreme

specificity as to the error by the court in imposing the commitment, there can

be no basis for setting aside the disposition.” Id. at 1238 n.5.

      We review “a juvenile court’s dispositional order directing out-of-home

placement for an abuse of discretion.” Interest of D.W., 220 A.3d 573, 576

(Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).      We will not disturb the disposition

implemented by the lower court absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In re

R.D., 44 A.3d 657, 681 (Pa. Super. 2012).        “It is well settled that, under

Pennsylvania law, an abuse of discretion occurs when the court has overridden

or misapplied the law, when its judgment is manifestly unreasonable, or when

there is insufficient evidence of record to support the court’s findings.”

Interest of D.W., 220 A.3d at 576 (internal brackets and citation omitted).

Moreover, we note that “in a juvenile proceeding, the hearing judge sits as

the finder of fact. The weight to be assigned the testimony of the witnesses

is within the exclusive province of the fact finder.” Id. (citation omitted).

      Here, Appellant contends that the juvenile court erred in terminating his

placement at Abraxas and ordering his transfer to the “first bed available” at

a state juvenile facility, which is a more restrictive setting. Appellant’s Brief

at 9. He believes that placement at any YDC was unnecessary for the following

reasons: Appellant turned 18 years old during his last placement; Appellant

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had an “excellent review” from Abraxas for the time period of August 2021

through December 2021; during the period of December 2021 through

February 2022, when the facility alleged Appellant’s behavior was “untenable,”

Appellant and/or his mother reported a number of complaints and/or

grievances regarding Appellant’s treatment; Appellant had an “excellent

review” from the Edmund L. Thomas Adolescent Center between March 2022

and May 2022; Appellant made substantial progress on the community service

hours, restitution, educational goals, and therapeutic goals ordered by the

juvenile court; Appellant substantially followed the safety plan implemented

by the placement facility; and it is in Appellant’s best interest for him to return

home to his community and supportive family. Id. at 10-11.

      Appellant asserts that any behavioral issues previously alleged by

Abraxas should not overshadow the “excellent reports” later received from the

same facility and from the Edmund L. Thomas Adolescent Center. Id. at 11.

He explains that his bad behavior was a result of abuse that he suffered from

the staff at Abraxas and that his grievances against the staff led to retaliation

in the form of more abuse towards Appellant. Id. “Appellant … lost faith and

focus in the staff and treatment goals as a result of that abuse.” Id. As soon

as he was removed from Abraxas, Appellant asserts that he had a “complete

and sudden” turnaround and that the trial court should have given this factor

stronger consideration. Id. Appellant seeks immediate release from any YDC

to formal probation with outpatient services and/or placement in an

independent living facility, as he believes this would provide him with the

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necessary treatment, supervision and rehabilitation, and would allow for him

to be closer geographically to his family. Id.

      Importantly, we note the following purposes, relevant to this appeal,

underlying the Juvenile Act (42 Pa.C.S. §§ 6301 – 6375):

      (2) Consistent with the protection of the public interest, to provide
      for children committing delinquent acts programs of supervision,
      care and rehabilitation which provide balanced attention to the
      protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for
      offenses committed and the development of competencies to
      enable children to become responsible and productive members
      of the community.

      (3) To achieve the foregoing purposes in a family environment
      whenever possible, separating the child from parents only when
      necessary for his welfare, safety or health or in the interests of
      public safety, by doing all of the following:

         (i) employing evidence-based practices whenever possible
         and, in the case of a delinquent child, by using the least
         restrictive intervention that is consistent with the protection
         of the community, the imposition of accountability for
         offenses committed and the rehabilitation, supervision and
         treatment needs of the child; and

         (ii) imposing confinement only if necessary and for the
         minimum amount of time that is consistent with the
         purposes under paragraphs (1), (1.1) and (2).

42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b).

      Our Supreme Court explained that the General Assembly incorporated

balanced and restorative justice (“BARJ”) into the Juvenile Act via Act 33 of

1995 to achieve these articulated goals. Interest of D.C.D., 171 A.3d 727,

738 (Pa. 2017).

      Historically, BARJ stemmed from the clashing methodologies of
      the retributive justice theory, which prioritizes punishment, and
      an individual treatment philosophy, which focuses on the

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      rehabilitation of offenders. BARJ was a compromise in this long
      debate which brought together aspects of both systems by
      requiring consideration of community protection, accountability,
      and competency development.

      First, community protection focuses on decreasing the risk to
      communities and providing communities with tools to manage the
      behaviors of juvenile offenders.          BARJ aims to maintain
      community safety through developing short-term and long-term
      goals of changing and controlling juvenile offender behavior while
      developing mutual respect of citizens within the community.
      Next, accountability recognizes that a combination of adhering to
      the rules of the legal system and accepting full responsibility for
      offensive behavior facilitates positive moral development. The
      accountability factor helps juvenile offenders to reduce their
      likelihood of re-offense through acknowledging that their behavior
      affects other people and creating opportunities for offenders to
      repair the harm. Finally, competency development allows for
      juvenile offenders to forge skills that will allow them to contribute
      positively to the well-being of a community and ultimately allow
      offenders to gain a sense of belonging in a community.

Id. at 738-39 (internal citations omitted).

      It is evident from the juvenile court’s opinion that it gave considerable

thought to these BARJ principles and the goals of the Juvenile Act in reaching

its determination regarding Appellant’s placement. In support of its decision

to transfer Appellant to a state facility, the court opined:

      First, placement on probation with restrictions or in an …
      independent-living facility would not have furthered the BARJ
      goals of community protection, accountability, and competency
      development.       Given [Appellant’s] increasingly belligerent
      behavior at Abraxas, which the [c]ourt found was “not sufficiently
      explained[,]” [placing Appellant] in an environment with less
      supervision would pose a substantial and unjustifiable risk to
      those around him, just as his behavior at Abraxas posed a
      substantial risk to both students and staff. While [Appellant] and
      his counsel may suggest that his inappropriate behavior was a
      result of factors unique to Abraxas[,] the [c]ourt was not willing
      to risk the safety of others on the hope that [Appellant] would be

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     more successful in a less restrictive environment, at least without
     a proven track record of good behavior….

     Indeed, at the hearing, the [c]ourt noted positively that it was
     impressed with [Appellant’s] ability to control his behavior at the
     Edmund L. Thomas Adolescent Center for the past 34 days, but
     given the repeated and serious instances of misconduct that
     occurred at Abraxas, that fact alone did not convince the [c]ourt
     that community protection (or other BARJ goals for that matter)
     were yet best served by a less restrictive placement.             If
     [Appellant] is correct that his errant behavior is the result of
     factors unique to Abraxas, then further time at a more secure
     facility will provide more reliable, empirical evidence from which
     to accurately assess whether [he] remains a threat to himself or
     others outside of that facility.

     That leads to the second BARJ purpose, accountability. From
     December 2021 through March of 2022, [Appellant] did not
     demonstrate an ability to adhere to the rules of the legal system
     or accept full responsibility for his offensive behavior. Abraxas –
     itself a controlled environment – proved inadequate to provide the
     necessary accountability.       During his time at Abraxas, his
     likelihood of re-offense increased, not decreased.         It defies
     common sense to believe a less secure environment than Abraxas
     could provide greater accountability where that facility could not.

     Counsel for [Appellant] asserted at the disposition hearing under
     review that release on probation would not be a “reward” because
     [Appellant] would be coming home with strict requirements. But
     it is difficult for the [c]ourt to conceive how it could be perceived
     by [Appellant] as anything other than a reward. In any event, it
     would not provide accountability for the misconduct that occurred
     at Abraxas. To be sure, punishment and reward in the retributive
     justice sense is not a goal of BARJ, yet the accountability factor
     recognizes that a placement is, in part, a test of whether the
     juvenile will reoffend in the real world and whether they have
     adequately acknowledged that their behavior affects others, as
     well as an opportunity to seek rehabilitative treatment.
     [Appellant] had not proven that he achieved these goals at
     Abraxas, and so, there was insufficient credible evidence to
     suggest a less restrictive environment would yield better results
     than the empirically proven treatments a secure state facility can
     offer.

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        As to the final BARJ purpose, competency, the [c]ourt noted at
        the hearing that [Appellant], “despite admonishment by the
        [c]ourt, continued in a significantly escalated fashion to engage in
        misconduct at the facility[,] establishing for the [c]ourt that he
        has, as [of] yet, failed to sufficiently incorporate into his life all of
        the things – especially aggression and anger, all of the things that
        [he’s] been taught to overcome those issues.” [It] further
        observed that “what’s concerning to the [c]ourt is [Appellant]
        doesn’t have great recollection and perceives the potential that he
        might have blacked out during one of these things indicating a
        level of aggression at a significant level.” [Appellant’s] testimony
        and the other evidence presented at the disposition hearing
        underscored the potential severity of his psychological trauma and
        established that he had yet to adequately address, from a
        therapeutic standpoint, the root causes of his aggression. A
        secure facility is better equipped to provide [Appellant] with the
        therapeutic tools he needs [to] further explore and put into
        practice these therapeutic goals.

        [Appellant’s] mother suggested [that] a summer work program
        and counseling from a professor with a Ph.D. and a background in
        social work would be able to satisfy [Appellant’s] therapeutic
        needs, but the [c]ourt found [that] the level of aggression
        exhibited by [Appellant] “would not be sufficiently addressed by
        the good-hearted efforts by Dr. Parris Baker and by Gary Horton
        through the UECDC Dream Build Live Program.” Rather, the
        [c]ourt found that a state placement program would employ better
        evidence-based programs and practices to meet [Appellant’s]
        significant psychological and behavioral needs. Moreover, a more
        traditional and empirically-proven academic setting was necessary
        given [Appellant’s] lackluster academic performance at Abraxas.

JCO at 5-7 (citations to record omitted).

        Additionally, the juvenile court noted that Appellant’s age should not

have any “talismanic bearing” on its determination regarding placement. Id.

at 7.     Appellant has not cited any caselaw indicating that out-of-home

placement is categorically less appropriate for a juvenile who attains the age

of 18.    Rather, as the juvenile court explained, “[o]ur Supreme Court has

eschewed such absolute rules, emphasizing ‘juvenile courts are granted broad

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discretion in weighing the BARJ factors as appropriate to the individual child.’”

Id. at 8 (quoting D.C.D., 171 A.3d at 742). Moreover, we acknowledge that

the juvenile court will retain jurisdiction over Appellant until the age of 21.

See 42 Pa.C.S. § 6302 (defining “child” as “an individual who … is under the

age of 21 years who committed an act of delinquency before reaching the age

of 18 years”).    Instantly, the court concluded that Appellant “has not yet

exhibited the requisite maturity to be released on any less restrictive

placement.” JCO at 8.

      In response to Appellant’s claim that the court’s disposition was

inconsistent with his supervision, rehabilitation, and welfare needs, and that

returning home is in Appellant’s best interest, the court stated: “Given his

behavior at Abraxas, [Appellant] is currently in need of more supervision, not

less, and a secure state facility is best equipped to provide such supervision.”

Id. It further emphasized that “such a facility is in the best position to provide

the   extensive   therapeutic   care    that    is   necessary   for   [Appellant’s]

rehabilitation. Thus, his overall welfare and well-being is best served in a

secure and structured facility for now.” Id.

      The juvenile court also specifically addressed Appellant’s contention that

he had complied with most of his education and/or counseling goals, noting

that it made contrary factual findings. Id.

      [Appellant] was in decline academically, getting grades as low as
      47% in both math and science and a 49% in reading. Nor were
      these grades the product of a good faith attempt at academic
      achievement. The [c]ourt found that, “other than art and gym,
      [Appellant] showed … little effort to engage in any way in the

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      academic programming.” Therapeutically, he fared little better.
      Although his counselor testified there was some progression, she
      also noted he only “sometimes” incorporated the coping skills
      discussed in therapy. That is a rather generous assessment
      considering the numerous instances of misconduct recorded at
      Abraxas since December of 2021. To reiterate, these instances of
      misconduct[] were not minor; they involved the breaking of a
      wooden table [and] a camera, the communication of threats, and
      several instances of physical restraint. In short, the assertion that
      [Appellant] was meeting his target education and therapeutic
      goals is belied by the factual record before the [c]ourt at the
      disposition hearing.

Id. at 8-9 (citations to record omitted).

      Finally, in response to Appellant’s contention that his regression was the

product of Abraxas staff and supervisors who allegedly harassed and bullied

him, and that his misbehavior should therefore not be held against him, the

juvenile court opined:

      The [c]ourt did not ignore these concerning allegations, either
      when they were first brought to the [c]ourt’s attention or at the
      disposition hearing under review.      As the [c]ourt reminded
      [Appellant’s] mother on the record, in a prior proceeding, it had
      taken the somewhat unprecedented step of admonishing Abraxas
      staff and ordering that certain individuals not have any direct
      contact with [Appellant]. That being said, the [c]ourt explained
      at the disposition hearing under review that, even accepting these
      allegations as true, [Appellant] nonetheless failed to abide by the
      [c]ourt’s admonishment to [Appellant] to stop such behaviors
      even after the problematic individuals were removed from the
      equation. On the contrary, the aggressive behavior continued to
      escalate.

      In failing to incorporate the therapeutic lessons he had learned in
      therapy, [Appellant] had shown that further and extensive
      treatment for his aggression and greater security measures were
      necessary for his supervision, rehabilitation, treatment, and
      welfare. It therefore was not an abuse of discretion to order
      placement at a secure facility even in light of the concerning
      allegations against employees at Abraxas. In terminating his
      placement at Abraxas, [Appellant] will have an opportunity at a

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      second chance to prove his maturity in a secure and safe
      environment that can meet his substantial academic and
      psychological needs.

Id. at 9 (citations to record omitted). We conclude that the juvenile court’s

findings are well-supported by the record, and we discern no abuse of

discretion in the court’s modification to Appellant’s placement.

      Accordingly, we affirm the dispositional review order entered by the

juvenile court on May 20, 2022.

      Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 5/23/2023

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