Court Opinion

ID: 7815547
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:34:51.778416+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:35.349598
License: Public Domain

Paul Ward, Associate Justice, dissenting. I do not agree with the result reached by the majority, nor do I agree with the reason assigned. The facts in this case are essentially as follows. In certain litigation in the Chancery Court of Sebastian County in which the issue was the ownership of certain oil and gas royalties, considerable oral testimony was taken on two different occasions. On December 17, 1958, the Chancery Court found contrary to the contentions of Mr. and Mrs. Tomlin, the appellants herein. The decree was entered on December 22, 1958, and on January 5, 1959, appellants gave notice of appeal. Following this the attorneys for appellants made a request for a transcription of the testimony in order to prepare for an appeal from the decree entered on December 22, 1958, and sent as an advance payment therefor the sum of $75.00 on February 13, 1959. The testimony at the two hearings was taken on a “dictaphone” or recording machine. On March 15, 1959, the reporter informed appellants to the effect that they were having difficulty in transcribing the testimony. Two days later the Chancellor extended the time for securing the record to May 7, 1959, but one day later appellants ’ attorneys were notified that it was impossible to transcribe the testimony. On April 14,1959, appellants filed a motion for a new trial on the ground that it was impossible to obtain the record. Thereafter, on April 22, 1959, the Chancellor extended the time for perfecting the appeal to June 17,1959 and later extended that time to July 17,1959. On July 14, 1959, the Chancery Court denied appellants’ motion for a new trial on the ground, among others, that appellants had not complied with Ark. Stats. Section 27-2127.11. This section in all parts material here provides that in the event no stenographic report of the evidence or proceedings at a trial is made, the appellant MAY prepare a statement of the evidence from the best possible means, including his recollection, for use instead of a stenographic transcript. This section also provides that the appellee MAY serve his objections or proposed amendments and that thereafter appellant’s statements and the proposed objections or amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval, and as settled and approved shall be included by the Clerk of the Court in the record on appeal. In appellants’ motion for a new trial it was stated that: “The issues in the case involved a direct controversy between interested witnesses. The exact testimony given by each witness is extremely important and the proper determination of the issues and at this late date it is impossible to accurately stipulate the testimony given.” The majority opinion rests on the proposition that Ark. Stats. Section 27-2127.11 is mandatory. I cannot agree with this conclusion for the following reasons. One. In the first place the wording of the statute itself strongly indicates that it is not mandatory. It seems to me if the Legislature meant for this section to be mandatory it would have used the words MUST or SHALL and not the word MAY. Two. It is easy to imagine many situations where grave injustices would result if said statute is held to be mandatory. Let’s consider a case, not unusual, where several days are consumed in the taking of testimony and further assume that the exact wording of the testimony is essential to a correct decision on the merits. Then assume that more than two months had elapsed, as in the case under consideration, before it is discovered that no stenographic record was made. In such a case it is unreasonable to expect that attorneys or the trial court to remember correctly what the witnesses said. In such a case the appellant would not have a fair chance to present his case to this court for review on its merits — a denial of his fundamental rights. Three. The majority, in the next to the last paragraph of the opinion, relies entirely upon the decision in the case of Mowery v. Coleman, 224 Ark. 979, 277 S. W. 2d 481. In this I submit that the majority are in error. In the Mowery case there was an appeal from the decree of the trial court on the merits. In the case under consideration there is no appeal from the decree on the merits but this appeal is taken from the order of the Chancellor denying a new trial. In the Mowery case there was no motion for a new trial as there is here, and this court merely decided that the trial court had a right to enter its original decree before the testimony taken by the reporter had been transcribed. It was not necessary to the opinion in the Moivery case for this court to mention Ark. Stats. 27-2127.11, and, therefore, I consider such reference as dictum only. However, regardless of whether the reference to the statute is considered dictum or essential to the opinion in the Moivery case, I think it is more important that we do not extend the effect of that decision any further than is necessary in view of the great injustices likely to result as heretofore pointed out. The majority opinion did not rely upon the manner in which the motion for a new trial was presented but it is intimated that appellants could not prevail here because such motion was not heard in due time. I do not agree with this intimation. In my opinion this case is governed by the rule announced in the case of Davies & Davies v. Patterson, 132 Ark. 484, 201 S. W. 504. At Page 494 of the Arkansas Report the court made this unqualified statement: “It follows that the error complained of appeared on the face of the record proper and, therefore, no motion for a new trial was necessary”. In the case under consideration it appears to me that the error complained of not only appears on the face of the record but that it actually constitutes the record. This appeal is solely for the purpose of pointing out the error — that the testimony oil the trial in chief could not be obtained. In addition to that under our new procedure (Act 555 of 1953, Section II) “no motion for a new trial and no assignment of error shall be necessary”. Since it was conclusively shown to the trial court that appellants will have no opportunity to present the merits of their case to this court for a review unless a new trial is granted, it can hardly be said that the court did not abuse its discretion. It is my conclusion, therefore, that this cause should be remanded for a new trial. Holt, J., joins in this dissent.