Court Opinion

ID: 9819192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 06:19:44.332101+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:38:19.111625
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE LEAVITT, dissenting: I would reverse and remand this matter for the court’s failure to afford defendant his right to a Franks hearing. The defendant in his motion for a Franks hearing asserts the complaint for search warrant submitted by Officer Graf contains untrue statements, which are deliberately misleading. The affidavit states in part: "The Cl stated to me that in the evining [sic] hours of 06Mar94, that he had gone to the address of 2955 N. Kolmar, Chicago, Cook County and that he was met at the front door to that single family residence by a subject known to him as Jimmy Arce. The Cl described Jimmy Arce asa M/WH 28 yoa, 5’11”, 160 lbs., light complexion. The Cl stated that Jimmy Arce allowed the Cl to enter the house and that Jimmy Arce opened the front closet door and showed the Cl a 9mm semi-automatic pistol. The Cl stated that the subject Jimmy Arce took the magazine out of the pistol and showed the Cl that it was loaded. The Cl stated to me that Jimmy Arce then placed the pistol into his waistband and at that time the Cl and Jimmy Arce waked [sic] down the street to the Burger King restaurant at Kolmar and Diversey. The Cl stated that Jimmy Arce left him at the restaurant, saying that he was going back home.” The defendant in his motion stated that the factual allegations found in the complaint are untrue because (1) he denies there was any confidential informant in his home on March 6, 1994; (2) he denies having a gun within his home on March 6, 1994, or displaying a weapon to anyone on that date — a matter confirmed by the subsequent search, which failed to produce a weapon; and (3) he denies walking with the confidential informant to the Burger King restaurant located at Kolmar and Diversey (2800 North), two blocks away from his home. In his motion defendant stated that on March 6, 1994, he was on early release from the Illinois Department of Corrections. He further stated he was on an electronic home monitoring unit on that date. He provided an affidavit from Michael Reeves, the president of Corn-guard Corporation, which has a contract with the Illinois Department of Corrections to provide monitoring of inmates who have been granted early release. In his affidavit, Reeves states that the defendant was on a monitor on March 6, 1994, and that the unit was functioning properly on that date. Finally, Reeves attests that there was no loss of radio frequency for the inmate’s monitor on March 6, 1994, confirming the defendant was at his residence on that date. The State also obtained an affidavit from Reeves in which he allowed that, should the defendant travel more than 100 feet from his home, he could remain undetected for up to five minutes. As the majority correctly states, a defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing only where he is able to make a "substantial preliminary showing” that the affiant, either knowingly and intentionally or in reckless disregard of the truth, included a false statement in the warrant affidavit and that, absent the false statement, no probable cause to issue the warrant otherwise exists. See People v. Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d 133, 147, 506 N.E.2d 1269 (1987). However, the supreme court has recognized that special considerations apply when a defendant offers an alibi-type defense in challenging a warrant based upon information supplied by a confidential informant. In such cases, the supreme court has cautioned that the rule stated by the majority should not be applied "so inflexibly as to make hearings unattainable.” Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 149. Given the fact that Grafs affidavit in support of a warrant in this case was based upon information supplied by a confidential informant and the fact that defendant offered corroborative evidence of what is essentially an alibi, I believe the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant a full Franks hearing. The supreme court in Lucente recognized the "inherent dilemma” faced by a defendant seeking a Franks hearing when the underlying warrant is based upon information supplied by a confidential informant. Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 149. As the Lucente court noted: "While it is true that the defendant’s ultimate burden is to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the affiant-officer made deliberate or reckless false statements, Franks does not require that the defendant disprove every other possibility at the preliminary stage. If an'informant’s identity — or very existence — is unknown, a defendant obviously lacks the very information necessary to determine the source of the false statements. If such a preliminary showing were demanded, no hearing could ever result in cases in which all the information to establish probable cause came from an unnamed informant. One need not be overly cynical to realize that such a rule would enable the police to insulate perjury from discovery by the simple expedient of a fabricated informant, and thereafter 'remain confident that the ploy was worthwhile’ [citation], *** [Such an inflexible application of Franks] would permit the very evisceration of the probable-cause requirement which Franks seeks to prevent.” Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 149-50. Accordingly, the Lucente court rejected the assertion that proof of an alibi alone will always be insufficient to justify a Franks hearing. Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 148. Rather, what is important in these cases is the "quantity and quality” of corroboration accompanying the offer of an alibi. See Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 148. Thus, a lone affidavit from the defendant himself may, in certain circumstances, justify a Franks hearing. See People v. Allen, 158 Ill. App. 3d 602, 606-07, 511 N.E.2d 824 (1987) (remanding for Franks hearing where the defendant was not the person named in the warrant and where the defendant submitted an affidavit stating she had been home alone on the night in question). The quality of the corroboration is equally as important. Affidavits from persons not biased in the defendant’s favor carry greater weight than those with obvious bias. See Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 154; People v. Phillips, 265 Ill. App. 3d 438, 445, 637 N.E.2d 715 (1994) (affirming trial court’s refusal to grant a Franks hearing where only affidavits in support of defendant’s alibi were from defendant, his mother, and his friend); People v. Tovar, 169 Ill. App. 3d 986, 992, 523 N.E.2d 1178 (1988) (affirming trial court’s refusal to grant a Franks hearing where only affidavits in support of defendant’s alibi were from defendant and his wife). The affidavits must be sufficiently detailed so as to subject the affiants to the penalties of perjury if untrue. See Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 154. Moreover, affidavits containing mere denials (the "I didn’t do it” type) are less persuasive than those that affirmatively establish the impossibility of the informant’s version of events. See Lucente, 116 Ill. 2d at 154; People v. Pearson, 271 Ill. App. 3d 640, 644, 648 N.E.2d 1024 (1995) (remanding for a Franks hearing where defendant alleged he was not on the premises at time of transaction with informant and defendant had otherwise "airtight” alibi); Phillips, 265 Ill. App. 3d at 445 (affirming trial court’s refusal to grant a Franks hearing where one of defendant’s alibi affiants swore only that he was asleep at the time and location of the alleged transaction, as transaction could have occurred while affiant was asleep); Tovar, 169 Ill. App. 3d at 992 (affirming trial court’s refusal to grant a Franks hearing where defendant admitted being home at the time of the informant’s alleged transaction and affidavit did not establish impossibility of the informant having access to the apartment). In the present case, defendant has essentially alleged an alibi, albeit an electronic one. Contrary to the majority’s assertion that defendant offered "nothing more than an opinion” regarding the defendant’s alleged trip to Burger King with the informant, the record shows specific facts that suggest the scenario recounted in Grafs affidavit was implausible. Graf stated that the confidential informant went to the defendant’s residence at 2955 North Kolmar and thereafter walked with him to the Burger King at Diversey and Kolmar. Defendant’s assertion in his motion that this is a distance of approximately two blocks is unchallenged. Reeves’ affidavit, which provides that defendant could have traveled 100 feet and then remained outside that range for up to five minutes without causing a loss of signal, allows little time to walk the four blocks to and from the Burger King. Time and distance are subject to objective measure. Reeves is not shown to be biased in favor of defendant in this case. Moreover, defendant has certainly supported his "alibi” with more than mere denials — Reeves’ affidavit strongly suggests, given the home monitoring technology involved, the alleged trip was not physically possible. The evidentiary burden on a defendant at such a preliminary stage is considerably less than the burden he will face should a full hearing eventually be granted. While a defendant’s mere denials will not suffice, a defendant need not present proof of the affiant’s perjury by a preponderance of the evidence at such an early stage. Pearson, 271 Ill. App. 3d at 643. It is uncontested here that, absent the allegedly false statements included in the warrant affidavit, no probable cause to issue the warrant existed. The trial judge’s in camera confirmation that an informant did, in fact, exist does not address the issue regarding the falsity of information claimed to be found in the complaint for the search warrant. Defendant made a substantial preliminary showing of an alibi corroborated by unbiased, sworn testimony, as required for a Franks hearing. For the foregoing reasons, I would remand this matter for a Franks hearing.