Court Opinion

ID: 9761887
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:58:01.379856+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:01.353668
License: Public Domain

*537DUNCAN, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
The majority opinion convinces me that the State did not show good cause in the trial court even when the record is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. I therefore concur, albeit reluctantly, in the majority’s judgment insofar as it reverses the trial court’s denial of relief. As the majority so aptly states, “[w]e must follow [article 32.01] or be derelict in our own duty.”1 But, having determined that the law requires reversal of the trial court’s order, I fail to see why it does not also require rendition in Lawson’s favor. I therefore respectfully dissent from the majority’s judgment insofar as it remands this case to the trial court for a second good cause hearing.
PERTINENT FACTS
At the hearing on Lawson’s application, the State proferred the testimony of Melissa Priest, and presented and filed the affidavit of Sarah J. Hinojosa, to “show good cause as to why the defendant was not indicted” before the March-April grand jury term. Following the hearing, both Lawson and the State filed trial briefs. In its brief, the State argued not only that Lawson’s application was moot under Wilkinson v. State, 899 S.W.2d 20 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1995, pet. refd), but also that it had established good cause for delay. Although the magistrate recommended that relief be denied with a citation to Wilkinson, the trial judge signed an order denying relief without stating a reason for his ruling.
Discussion
“When the judgment or decree of the court below shall be reversed, the court shall proceed to render such judgment or decree as the court below should have rendered, except when it is necessary to remand to the court below for further proceedings.” Tex.R.App. P. 81(c) (emphasis added). Whether Lawson is entitled to the rendition of judgment in her favor thus depends upon whether it is “nee-essary” to remand this case for a hearing on good cause. In my view, it is not.
The majority suggests that the State relied exclusively upon Wilkinson in the trial court and states that it is remanding so the State has “an opportunity to be heard on the issue of good cause for delay, if any....” It may well be that if the State had not been heard effectively on the good cause issue because, for instance, the State had relied exclusively upon the now-overruled Wilkinson or an incorrect statement of the standard by which good cause was reviewed, a remand for a good cause hearing under the appropriate standard would be “necessary.” Cf. United States v. Stricklin, 591 F.2d 1112, 1124-25 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 963, 100 S.Ct. 449, 62 L.Ed.2d 375 (1979) (remanding “so that the government has the opportunity to carry its burden and the District Court has the opportunity to apply the proper standards in resolving the defendant’s double jeopardy claims”). But neither of those possibilities, nor any similar event, has occurred in this case. As extensively discussed in the majority opinion, the State did not rest exclusively upon Wilkinson in the trial court; it also alleged and attempted to prove in an evidentiary hearing that there was good cause for not indicting Lawson before March 7, 1996. Nor have we changed the standard by which good cause is to be measured or otherwise deprived the State of an effective opportunity to be heard under the correct standard.
Conclusion
In short, the State has already had one good cause hearing under the appropriate standard, and there is no legitimate reason for this court to provide it with another. I would therefore reverse the judgment below and render judgment dismissing the indictment against Lawson with prejudice.

. The State has not challenged the constitutionality of article 32.01. Cf. Harris v. State, 827 S.W.2d 949 (Tex.Crhn.App.), cert. denied sub nom. Harris v. Texas, 506 U.S. 942, 113 S.Ct 381, 121 L.Ed.2d 292 (1992); Meshell v. State, 739 S.W.2d 246 (Tex.Crim.App. 1987).