Court Opinion

ID: 9533299
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:30:16.546802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:00.242397
License: Public Domain

BRETT, Presiding Judge
(dissents).
As Presiding Judge of the Court for this appeal, I take this opportunity to express my thanks and appreciation for the assistance of the Honorable John R. Carle, and the Honorable James B. Miller, in bringing this matter to a conclusion. Notwithstanding, I must respectfully dissent to their majority opinion concerning this appeal.
Plaintiff in Error, Valdhe F. Pitman, was convicted in the District Court of Oklahoma County on October 19, 1967, for the crime of Perjury. He was tried by a jury which returned a verdict of guilty, and assessed his punishment at one (1) year under the direction and control of the State Department of Corrections. Judgment and sentence was imposed on November 2, 1967, and was suspended by the trial judge. Plaintiff in error, hereinafter referred to as defendant, perfected this appeal.
The facts briefly related are: Defendant is an attorney who entered a written “Memorandum Agreement” establishing a bail bond business with one, E. W. “Jeep” O’Neal. In the fourth paragraph of the agreement the following statement appears:
“* * *, it being understood and agreed that the properties used on said bonds are the properties of first party [defendant] and are held in trust by second party [O’Neal].”
In the fulfillment of the agreement, defendant transferred several pieces of real property to O’Neal; however, the first quit-claim deed describing Lots 29 and 30, Block 1, Bancroft Addition to Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, dated August 21, 1963, conveyed nothing to O’Neal, for the reasons that title to the property was vested in Paula J. Wilde, at that time Paula J. Pitman, defendant’s wife.
On August 27, 1963, O’Neal signed as surety on Freddie Garcia’s One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollar bail bond and listed the Bancroft Property as security. September 3, 1963, seven days later, defendant and his wife jointly executed a quit-claim deed to the same Bancroft Property, conveying the tract to O’Neal. That deed was recorded September 25, 1963. Another quitclaim deed to the Bancroft Property was produced by the prosecution dated October 12, 1964, conveying the prope'rty from O’Neal back to defendant. The date this deed was delivered to defendant was not shown to be other than asserted by defendant, as being delivered to him just *729prior to its being recorded. This deed was recorded January 15,1965.
On January 4, 1965, the District Attorney for Oklahoma County filed over one hundred Applications to Strengthen Bail Bonds, among which was the bond of Freddie Garcia listing the Bancroft Property as security. The number of applications filed was so numerous that the prosecutor duplicated a format for his applications and filled in the pertinent information for each application. On February 2, 1965, a hearing was had on some of those applications before the late Judge William L. Fogg. Unexpectedly defendant was called upon by the prosecutor to testify concerning the Garcia bond and the Bancroft Property.
This charge is premised upon the answers defendant gave in reply to certain questions asked by the Honorable Judge, as follows:
COURT: “What do you know about the property? Referring to the Bancroft Property.
WITNESS: “That is one of the pieces of property, Your Honor, that I signed over to Mr. O’Neal, without any deed or anything for return. It was his property to do with as he saw fit, anyway he saw fit, that just happens to be a duplex apartment house, and five room house on both of these.”
COURT: “So, based upon your knowledge, did Mr. O’Neal own that property at the time that bond was given?”
WITNESS: “Yes, he certainly did.”
Defendant was charged with the offense of perjury under 21 O.S.1961, § 491, which reads as follows:
“Every person who having taken an oath that he will testify, declare, depose or certify truly before any competent tribunal, officer, or person, in any of the cases in which such an oath may by law be administered, wilfully and contrary to such oath, states any material matter which he knows to be false, is guilty of perjury.”
The State produced seven witnesses to prove this charge. Mr. W. H. Reigan a Deputy Court Clerk identified various items which had been filed in the Court Clerk’s Office. Mr. Aubrey Crisp, a Certified Court Reporter, was called to identify the transcript of evidence which he recorded at the hearing to strengthen bail bonds on February 2, 1965, out of which this charge arose. The defense stipulated that the witness was the court reporter who reported the hearing; that the transcript was a true and correct copy — identified as State’s Exhibit No. & — and over defendant’s objections, pages 49 and 50 were admitted into evidence. It was that portion of defendant’s alleged testimony upon which this charge was premised.
The third witness was Mr. Curtis Harris, the Chief Prosecutor, who became a witness to identify a copy of the original Application to Strengthen Bonds, because the original filed in the Court Clerk’s Office could not be located; however, before the trial ended, the original was located. Mr. Harris related, that he dictated the application; filed it and “way over a hundred” others; and that he conducted the hearing had before Judge Fogg. The Assistant Prosecutor asked Mr. Harris: “And in connection with strengthening the bonds, what importance, if any, did those questions that were asked on pages 49 and 50, have to do with the hearing that was taking place?” Mr. Harris answered: “To determine if the property listed on the bonds and the person who signed the bond owned that property, and to determine if a bond was sufficient, and the person who signed the bonds, and the bond, whether or not they were — met the qualifications to sign such a bond.” Defendant’s objections to the answer was sustained. The witness testified further that he was present at O’Neal’s trial1 and heard the testimony given by defendant at that trial.
*730Mrs. Ruby Jewell Rodgers was the fourth witness. She had been defendant’s secretary and witnessed the Memorandum Agreement (State’s Exhibit No. 10) when it was executed; and she stated she was the Notary Public for the execution of the quit-claim deed to O’Neal signed by defendant and his wife. That deed was admitted as State’s Exhibit No. 12. The fifth witness was Mr. Bryan Beatty, Deputy Clerk in the County Clerk’s Office, who identified State’s Exhibits Nos. 11, 12, and 13, as being true copies of the quit-claim deeds on file in the County Clerk’s Office. He also identified the photostatic copy of the warranty deed which conveyed the Bancroft Property to Paula J. Wilde, Exhibit No. 14. He testified also that the Memorandum Agreement could not be filed of record, because the signatures had not been acknowledged by a Notary Public.
Mr. Harvey Dowdy, Assistant Manager of the Bookkeeping Department at Liberty National Bank was the sixth witness. He identified the bank account established for the bail bond business and certain instruments which passed through his bank. The last witness was Mary O’Leary, the Court Reporter for District Judge Clarence Mills. She identified the transcript of defendant’s testimony given at E. W. “JeeP” O’Neal’s trial on October 25, 1965, introduced as Exhibit No. 62, over defendant’s objections. The State then introduced Exhibits numbered 15 through 22, which were other bail bonds on which O’Neal had listed the Bancroft Property as security. These exhibits were admitted over defendant’s objections.
Defendant demurred to the evidence asserting that the State had failed to prove the material elements of the charge contained in the information; and that the State failed to prove any corrupt intent, or that the statements of defendant were made with the knowledge that they were false. The demurrer was overruled and defendant set forth his defense for the jury. Defendant’s demurrer should have been sustained, as I view the record.
When defendant rested his case, the prosecutor was called a second time to testify. He was qualified as an expert in title examination, and was asked by his Assistant Prosecutor:
“Now in your examination of titles, if any instrument such as State’s Exhibit No. 10, which has been introduced in evidence, had been filed of record in a county against a particular person and naming those persons, as in this case, Valdhe F. Pitman, and E. W. O’Neal, and this instrument had appeared of record wherein its stated purpose that the properties used on the bonds that were to be made by Mr. O’Neal are held in trust by Mr. O’Neal for Valdhe F. Pitman, if you had been examining a piece of property along those lines, would you have approved the title as far as being owned by E. W. O’Neal.” (Emphasis added)
The witness answered:
“I would not.”
He then went on to state in answer to the next question that O’Neal was not entitled to list the Bancroft Property on the bond. Even though defendant failed to object to the question, it is of such fundamental nature, being premised upon a false basis, intended to mislead the jury, the complaint now is not waived. The State’s own witness testified that the agreement could not be recorded, because the signatures were not acknowledged. See: 16 O.S.1961, § 26.2
I.
On January 20, 1971, when this case was reargued, defendant asserted: That the elements of the crime of perjury were not proved; and that this Court had held the *731charge of perjury requires proof of two witnesses that the alleged statement was not true, or with one witness supported by sufficient circumstantial evidence. To support this contention he cited, Cameron v. State, Okl.Cr., 365 P.2d 576, 588 (1961), wherein this Court said the following:
“The rule concerning evidence necessary to sustain a conviction for perjury is stated in Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, 12th Ed., Vol. 3, § 956, n. 397 thusly:
‘It is generally held that to sustain a conviction for perjury there must be the testimony of two witnesses, or the testimony of one witness which is corroborated by other circumstances. * *
‘The corroborating evidence in perjury prosecutions must be clear, positive, and strong, so that, in connection with the evidence of the witness who testifies directly, it will convince the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
‘The corroboration must go beyond slight and indifferent particulars. It must tend to show the statements alleged to have been falsely sworn. Corroboration is required for the false testimony as a whole, but not for every constituent element of it. If the falsity of the defendant’s statement is proved beyond a reasonable doubt, there is sufficient ground to sustain a conviction.’ ”
As I review the record before this Court, defendant’s contention is well taken. None of the witnesses testified that the defendant’s statement was false; nor were circumstances sufficient to corroborate one witness had such testimony been offered. The prosecutor testified that the purpose for filing the applications to strengthen bonds was: To determine if the property listed on the bonds was owned by the person who signed it; to determine if the bond was sufficient; and whether or not the signer of the bonds met those qualifications.
II.
Referring to the Bancroft Property, and the questions raised by the prosecutor, I find that O’Neal did meet those requirements to list the property on bail bonds. Notwithstanding the fact that the first quit-claim deed conveyed nothing to O’Neal, the quit-claim deed executed by defendant and his wife, seven days after the Garcia bail bond was posted, corrected that deficiency, by operation of law. Title 16 O.S.1961, § 17 is the Statute setting forth the after-acquired title provisions which became applicable, under the circumstances involved herein.3
Under ordinary circumstances those provisions may not apply to quit-claim deeds ; however, under these circumstances the rule is made applicable, i. e., when the intent to convey is clear on the face of the deed; when the grantee expects to receive conveyance; and when the instrument contains sufficient words to convey title.4 See: Callahan v. Stewart, 231 F. Supp. 115, 121, (D.C.Okl.1964)
*732All of the quit-claim deeds were executed on “Manley Legal Form No. 280 AF” which contain sufficient words of conveyance to transfer title, i. e., “quitclaim, grant, bargain, sell and convey.”
Consequently, I find that the validity of the Bancroft Property pledged on the Garcia bond was sufficient; and it was likewise sufficient at the time of the hearing on the prosecutor’s applications to strengthen bail, notwithstanding the quitclaim deed from O’Neal to defendant, which was recorded on January IS, 1965. It was brought out by Judge Miller, when this matter was reargued before this Court, that the pledge of the Bancroft Property was in furtherance of the purpose of the memorandum agreement; and therefore, defendant would be estopped from subsequently denying any lien against the property as the result of bond foreclosure and judgment.
III.
In his brief, defendant asserts that the State failed to prove that defendant was administered an oath by one authorized to do so, at the hearing on the prosecutor’s applications. To support this contention he cites Dunkin v. State, S3 Okl.Cr. 115, 7 P.2d 912 (1932), wherein this Court recited :
"One of the important things to be established where a defendant is being tried on a charge of perjury is that an oath was administered, and the false testimony given by the defendant under oath, and that the oath was administered by some officer having authority to administer the oath.” [21 O.S.1961, § 491; R.L.1910, § 2211]
In Dunkin, supra, the Court stated that the conviction was reversed because, “There is no testimony showing that the defendant in this case was sworn before he gave testimony in the case. * * * ” An examination of the record before this Court reflects that there is absolutely no showing whatsoever that defendant was administered an oath, prior to giving his testimony. The burden is upon the State to prove all the elements of the crime. It is not sufficient to presume that whatever is required to be done, was done. See: Phillips v. State, Okl.Cr., 483 P.2d 1386 (1971).
Also, in Smith v. United States, 363 F.2d 143 (C.A. 5th Cir. 1966), under a Federal Statute essentially the same as the Oklahoma Statute, the United States Court of Appeals held it to be reversible error, when the prosecution failed to prove that an oath was administered to the witness, by one authorized to administer such oath. In that case the transcript of defendant’s testimony in the District Court was introduced to prove that he had testified falsely. The court stated, with reference to the reporter’s prefatory statement reciting that the witness was duly sworn:
“The bare statement, 'Petitioner, Joe Smith, having been duly sworn, testified as follows * * *,’ does not even purport to be a transcription of the prior proceedings, but is rather a mere ex parte, unsworn conclusion by the reporter that appellant had been sworn.” (Emphasis not added)
In the record before this Court, not even the reporter’s prefatory statement is included. Instead, the alleged testimony is offered without any reference being made whatsoever that the witness was administered an oath, or even admonished *733that his testimony was being accepted on his oath as an attorney. The prosecutor merely offers the alleged testimony, without attempting to prove the essential element of the crime. The stipulation provided that the transcript was recorded by Mr. Aubrey Crisp, the Court Reporter, but nothing refers to the administration of an oath.
The definition of “testimony” recited in the majority opinion taken from Patterson v. State, 122 Ohio St. 96, 171 N.E. 26 (1930), pertained to testimony given at a Grand Jury hearing. On page 26 of the report the following appears:
“The transcript of Patterson’s testimony showed that he was ‘called as a witness’ before the grand jury, and ‘duly sworn’. * * * ” (Emphasis added)
However, nowhere in the record before this Court is there anything to even show that defendant was duly sworn, let alone proof of the same.
The definition of “testimony” in the majority opinion taken from Wyoming Loan and Trust Company v. W. H. Holliday Company, 3 Wyo. 386, 24 P. 193 (1890), was provided in a civil case concerning an action to recover a certain sum of money in 1890. The appeal presented a question pertaining to the overruling of a motion for new trial. The definition of the word “testimony” was offered to distinguish it from the word “evidence”. While the definition is correct, it is not sufficient to constitute proof required in a charge of perjury.
In a criminal trial all the elements of the offense must be proved. In this case the information charged that the testimony, was given under oath; consequently proof of the oath is an element of the offense and should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and should not be left to conjecture, or belief. In Smith v. United States, supra, the Court of Appeals stated with reference to proof of the charge of perjury:
“The error below, manifest upon the record, was the failure to prove an essential element of the crime of perjury— that is, that the acctised took an oath required by law."
Had the defendant in the instant case been a confirmed criminal, this appeal would have been reversed on that single proposition, as the Court of Appeals did in Smith v. United States, supra. It is this writer’s belief, that a member of the Bar Association is entitled to receive, at least, equal consideration and equal protection of the law as that afforded the confirmed criminal.
IV.
If for no other reason, this conviction is subject to reversal because of the denial of defendant’s right to fundamental fairness guaranteed by due process of law, as the result of the multiple role played by the prosecutor in defendant’s trial. Had Mr. Harris been the single prosecutor in his office, there might be some reasonable explanation for his action, but such is not the case. Considering also that he had at his side during the entire trial his first assistant, who is a most competent and capable prosecutor. Consequently, as I view the trial, it was not necessary; or required by circumstances; nor was it proper that he testify and conduct the defendant’s trial as was done.
After he filed the information charging the offense of perjury, the prosecutor performed the following:
1. He testified “in chief” as a witness for the prosecution.
2. He became a “rebuttal witness” and was qualified as an expert witness, testifying on the basis of a false hypothetical proposition.
3. He interrogated all the witnesses but two, himself and Mr. Harvey Dowdy.
4. He made the closing argument for the State, when the case was submitted to the jury.
In Clark v. State, Okl.Cr. 370 P.2d 46 (1962), this Court stated; “that circum*734stances must be extraordinary for the prosecutor to become a competent witness.” I fail to find those extraordinary circumstances in this case.
In Robinson v. United States, 32 F.2d 505, 66 A.L.R. 468 (C.A. 8th Cir. 1929), the United States Court of Appeals stated in part:
“ * * * [T]he practice of acting as prosecutor and witness is not to be approved, and should not be indulged in, except under most extraordinary circumstances.”
In Adams v. State, 202 Miss. 68, 30 So.2d 593 (1947), the prosecutor was disqualified from testifying. In Jenkins v. State ex rel. Sweat, 242 Miss. 646, 136 So.2d 580 (1962), the prosecutor was not considered qualified to testify. See also: Bennett v. Commonwealth, 234 Ky. 333, 28 S.W.2d 24 (1930); and Frank v. State, 150 Neb. 745, 35 N.W.2d 816 (1949). The practice is held to be improper in the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Oklahoma Bar Association, Canons of Ethics,5 as well as in the Oklahoma Bar Association Advisory Opinions Numbers 9 and 114. In the Oklahoma Bar Association Advisory Opinion No. 9 of October 30, 1931, the syllabus recites:
“It constitutes unprofessional conduct for a county attorney or his assistant to testify as a witness for the state in a criminal case wherein they appear as counsel for the state, except as to merely formal matters.”
Also, in the Oklahoma Bar Association Advisory Opinion No. 114 of September 25, 1936, the second paragraph of the syllabus states:
“No member of the bar having a just conception of his true and proper position will unite the character of counsel and witness in the same case.”
In the body of that opinion the following is found:
“The language of the Supreme Court of Minnesota in Ferraro v. Taylor, 197 Minn. 5, 265 N.W. 829 is apposite:
‘The practice of attorneys of furnishing from their own lips and on their own oath the controlling testimony for their client is one not to be condoned by judicial silence * * *
The good name and deservedly high standing of the * * * bar requires that the practice be stopped, for nothing short of actual corruption can more surely discredit the profession.’ ”
When the appeal was reargued before this Court, the prosecutor was asked if he considered defendant’s trial met the requirements of fundamental fairness set forth by the United States Supreme Court, especially insofar as he testified twice and continued to serve as chief prosecutor throughout the trial. The prosecutor answered that he did consider those requirements were met and added, that he did not know that it would be necessary for him to be a witness and testify. But, counsel for defendant produced a copy of the Information filed in this case, which showed that the prosecutor was endorsed on the Information as one of the witnesses for the State.
Consequently, considering that almost two years had passed since the Garcia Bond was signed and the circumstances which existed at the time defendant testified before Judge Fogg, I believe Mr. Pit-man possessed no more intent to testify falsely before Judge Fogg, than the prosecutor intended to testify falsely on January 20, 1971, before the three Judges of this Court.
*735Defendant had transferred title to O’Neal for the purpose of listing the properties on bail bonds and O’Neal was sufficiently vested with title to the Bancroft Property to have transferred clear title to' that property to an innocent third party, because the quit-claim deed was silent concerning the memorandum agreement.6 Whether or not the Bancroft Property could have been disposed of by sale, in which instance the trustee could have retained the proceeds of sale in trust, the agreement does not provide, and that question is not before this Court; nonetheless, by the terms of the agreement O’Neal possessed the full power of a trustee; and he was possessed of full title to the Bancroft Property, even though as trustee.
And lastly, I believe the manner in which the prosecution used defendant’s earlier uncontested divorce, which was granted on the grounds of adultery because of his wife’s religious convictions, was “unfairly” done. Defendant was cut-off by the court when he tried to explain the divorce action. Likewise, defendant should have been permitted to explain the circumstances of a misdemeanor conviction for drunk driving, sustained when he was a college student, but he was not permitted to do so. Both matters were allegedly entered into for the purpose of challenging defendant’s moral character. In People v. Matthews, 33 A.D.2d 679, 305 N.Y.S.2d 919, S.Ct.App.Div. 1st Div., the New York Court recited:
“We reiterate that it is as much the function of the prosecutor as it is of the court to assure a fair trial to a defendant. ‘Even in cases of clearest guilt * * * it is the duty of the district attorney to refrain from over-zealous advocacy. (People v. Slover, 232 N.Y. 264, 267, 133 N.E. 633, 634.)’.”
As I view the record, all of these violations of fundamental fairness precluded the defendant from receiving a fair trial in accordance with due process of law, guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, and the Constitution of the State of Oklahoma. The proper administration of justice demands that appellate review treat fundamental questions, when prejudice is caused the defendant. The least this defendant is entitled to receive is a new trial.
I respect the views of my fellow judges in this matter, but I also feel compelled to state my view of this appeal in detail. Appellate review is not so much concerned with the innocence or guilt of the one convicted, as it is with whether or not the defendant’s constitutional rights were protected; and whether or not he received a fair trial according to due process of law. I would reverse and remand this conviction, for the reasons stated.

. O’Neal v. State, Okl.Cr., 468 P.2d 69 (1970).

. “No deed, mortgage or other instrument affecting the real estate, shall be received for record or recorded unless executed and acknowledged in substantial compliance with this chapter; and the recording of any such instrument not so executed and acknowledged shall not be effective for any purpose.” R.L.1910, § 1169.

. That statute reads: “All rights of a mortgagor or grantor in and to the premises described in the instrument and existing at the time or subsequently accruing, shall accrue to the benefit of the mortgagee or grantee, and be covered by his mortgage or conveyed by his deed, as the case may be.”

. Patton On Titles, (2d Ed. 1957) Vol. 1, § 216, p. 512 states: “ * * * At common law the doctrine applied only to conveyances which contained a covenant of warranty. Now, however, any of the title covenants may produce the necessary estoppel. In fact, it is now generally held that if a deed, either expressly or by necessary implication, shows that the grantor intended to convey, and that the grantee expected to acquire, an estate of a particular kind, the deed is a foundation for the doctrine, even if it contains no technical covenants whatever. Several Legislatures have made a statutory statement of the doctrine in still broader terms to the effect that, whenever a deed purports to convey a greater estate than the grantor owns, any after-acquired interest of such grant- or, to the extent of that which the deed purports to convey, inures to the benefit of the grantee. The effect of such stat*732utes, so far as after-acquired title is concerned, is to read into all deeds, purporting to convey a fee title, full covenants of warranty. Usually, therefore, they bring conveyances by quit-claim deed within the operation of the rule, though this is not always the case.
* * * But the rule does apply if the deed bears upon its face evidence that the grantor intended to convey, and the grantee expected to receive, an estate of a particular character — under such circumstances, the grantor and those claiming under him will be as effectively es-topped to assert an after-acquired title to the extent of the estate embraced in the conveyance as would be the case if a formal covenant to that effect had been inserted.”

. American Bar Association Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, Code of Professional Responsibility, “Ethical Consideration” EC 5-9, p. 59; “Disciplinary Rule,” DR 5-102, [eff. Jan. 1, 1970]. “Canons, Professional Ethics,” 5 O.S.1961, Ch. 1, App. 3, Canon 19, p. 138 [adopted Oct. 6, 1958]. ABA Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the Oklahoma State Supreme Court on “Rules Creating and Controlling the Oklahoma Bar Association,” 41 O.B.J. 180, 188.

. See: 60 O.S.1961, § 156, and § 175.7.