Court Opinion

ID: 9689901
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:49:24.693241+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:50:41.667777
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, CHIEF JUSTICE
¶ 105. (concurring). I join all but Part IV of the majority opinion. I do not join Part IV because I do not agree with what the opinion identifies as the eviden-tiary error in the present case. The opinion concludes that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in finding Dr. Cacioli qualified to give expert testimony regarding glove safety.
¶ 106. An appellate court will uphold a circuit court's discretionary decision that an expert witness is qualified to answer a particular question if the circuit court "examined the facts of record, applied a proper *841legal standard, and, using a rational process, reached a reasonable conclusion."1
¶ 107. The majority sets forth two grounds for concluding that the circuit court's discretionary decision to admit Dr. Cacioli's testimony regarding glove safety was an erroneous exercise of discretion. First, Dr. Cacioli did not have the requisite qualifications to testify regarding glove safety because he "was not a medical doctor, had no formal experience, training, or education in latex allergy, and had no first-hand knowledge of how or why various protein levels affected individuals."2 Second, and "more importantly," Dr. Cacioli "specifically disclaimed any expertise" in glove safety by stating "I'm not an expert in that area" as part of his response to a question regarding the relative safety of high protein levels.3 Neither basis for concluding that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting Dr. Cacioli's testimony on glove safety follows from our case law.
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¶ 108. As to the first basis offered by the majority opinion, ample authority exists for the proposition that an individual may be qualified to give expert testimony based on association with and observation of professionals in a particular field.4 Additionally, I see no *842support in the case law for the majority's conclusion that Dr. Cacioli could not testify because he "was not a medical doctor";5 lacked "formal" experience, training, or education in latex allergy;6 and did not have "firsthand knowledge" of how latex proteins affect allergic individuals.7 Experience, not licensure, is the key. *843Expertise may be derived from experience working in a field of endeavor rather than from studies or diplomas.8 And Dr. Cacioli's experience, training, and education in latex are extensive.9 I am concerned that the majority's conclusion regarding Dr. Cacioli's qualifications raises the" bar in Wisconsin regarding who is qualified to testify as an expert witness.
¶ 109. As to the second basis offered by the majority opinion, I, unlike the majority opinion, would not give "great weight"10 to Cacioli's statement that "I am not an expert in that area," any more than I would give great weight to a witness's statement that "I am an expert in that area." What matters is not the witness's view of self. Rather, what matters is whether the circuit court determines in the exercise of its discretion that the witness has the requisite experience, training, and education to qualify as an expert in a court of law.11
¶ 110. I would conclude that the error in the present case lay in the circuit court's failure to submit to the jury Dr. Cacioli's statement that "I am not an expert in this area" and Dr. Cacioli's explanation about the state of knowledge on the safety issue, alongside his response to the questions regarding glove safety.12 *844Dr. Cacioli's statement and explanation go to the weight, not the admissibility, of his testimony. Like the majority opinion, however, I conclude that any error was harmless.13
HH HH
¶ 111. Finally, I wrote a concurrence on the issue of harmless error in In re the Termination of Parental Rights to Jayton S.: Evelyn C.R. v. Tykila S., 2001 WI 110 ¶¶ 37-42, 246 Wis. 2d 1;, 629 N.W.2d 768 (Abrahamson, C.J. concurring). My views on harmless error expressed in that concurrence apply to the present case as well. Rather than repeat the concurrence verbatim in the present case, I refer the reader to the Evelyn C.R. case.
¶ 112. For these reasons, I write separately.
¶ 113. I am authorized to state that Justice ANN WALSH BRADLEY joins Part I of this opinion.

 See majority op. at ¶ 89.

 See majority op. at ¶ 93.

 See majority op. at ¶ 94.

 Compare majority op. at ¶ 93 (Cacioli "culled his knowledge by associating with and observing medical doctors and others who had devoted their careers to the study of allergy and immunology") with Henning v. Ahearn, 230 Wis. 2d 149, 178-82, 601 N.W.2d 14 (Ct. App. 1999) (concluding that an *842attorney whose practice focused on business should not be precluded from testimony regarding the practice of business executives merely because he was not a business executive).

 Wisconsin case law has repeatedly stressed that a witness's "label" is not relevant to the determination of whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert on a given subject. See, e.g., Karl v. Employers Ins., 78 Wis. 2d 284, 297, 254 N.W.2d 255 (1977) ("law traditionally has permitted limited testimony of a medical nature by one not licensed as a medical doctor, if he is, in fact, qualified as an expert") (citation and quotation omitted); Wester v. Bruggink, 190 Wis. 2d 309, 319-20, 527 N.W.2d 373 (Ct. App. 1994) ("[W]hether a witness qualifies to testify as an expert depends on the witness's background, education, and experience rather than a particular label.") (citation omitted).

 The rule of evidence regarding the admission of expert testimony and the cases applying it speak only of "experience, training, and education" and not of "formal experience, education, and training," as the majority opinion does. See majority op. at ¶ 93; Wis. Stat. § 907.02; 7 Dan Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Wisconsin Evidence § 702.4, 489 (2d ed. 2001) ("Expertise, then, is a function of knowledge; it may be evidenced by academic degrees and licensure, but is not limited to these trappings.").

 See generally 7 Dan Blinka, Wisconsin Practice: Wisconsin Evidence § 702.601, 500-01 (2d ed. 2001) (suggesting that the law liberally allows experts to testify regarding knowledge that comes from interactions with others, as opposed to first-hand experience; concluding that "what distinguishes experts from lay witnesses, in part, is their ability to rely on hearsay sources").

 Black v. Gen. Elec. Co., 89 Wis. 2d 195, 212, 278 N.W.2d 224 (Ct. App. 1979).

 See majority op. at ¶¶ 90-91.

 See majority op. at ¶ 94.

 Compare majority op. at ¶¶ 94—95 with Leahy v. Kenosha Memorial, 118 Wis. 2d 441, 453, 348 N.W.2d 607 (Ct. App. 1984) (noting that the witness had admitted that she was not an expert in a particular field but listing this factor as one of many for the circuit court to consider in evaluating her qualifications as an expert).

 See majority op. at ¶ 99.

 See majority op. at ¶¶ 96-100.