Court Opinion

ID: 9353561
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-12 02:01:25.839606+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:08:03.187335
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court. ¶1. Ervin Isom was convicted of sexual assault on a child, adjudicated a habitual sex offender against children, and sentenced to an indeterminate term of forty years to life. We address the legality of Isom’s sentence, specifically whether the applicable sentencing statutes impose a maximum on the minimum end of indeterminate sentences for defendants adjudicated habitual sex offenders against children.1 We hold that to calculate the maximum permissible minimum end of an indeterminate sentence for a defendant sentenced as a habitual sex offender against children, trial courts must triple the maximum of the presumptive range for the offense and may then double the resulting figure if the court finds extraordinary aggravating circumstances under section 18-3-401(6), C.R.S. (2017). Hence, we affirm the court of appeals and conclude that the bottom end of Isom’s indeterminate sentence must be no lower than eighteen years, and may be extended up to thirty-six years if the trial court finds extraordinary aggravating circumstances.2 We thus vacate Isom’s sentence of forty years to life and remand for resentencing. I.Facts and Procedural History ¶2 A jury found Isom guilty of sexual assault on a child, which carries a maximum presumptive sentence of six years. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court found that Isom was a habitual sex offender against children and sentenced him under the habitual sex offender statute. Concluding that the bottom end of the enhanced sentence did not have a maximum, the trial court sentenced Isom to an indeterminate term of forty years to life on that charge. ¶3 Isom filed a direct appeal, raising a number of arguments unrelated to the issues now before us. The court of appeals rejected those arguments and affirmed his conviction and sentence. People v. Isom, 140 P.3d 100 (Colo. App. 2006). ¶4 Isom later filed a Crim. P. 36(a) motion, arguing that the forty-years-to-life sentence was ülegal because the maximum permissible sentence for his offense was eighteen years to life'. The court of appeals agreed with Isom that his sentence was illegal, but it concluded that thirty-six years to life was the maximum permissible sentence for his offense. People v. Isom, 2015 COA 89, ¶ 34, 410 P.3d 589. The court of appeals noted that the statute governing aggravated sentences for habitual sex offenders against children does not appear to impose a maximum for the bottom end of an enhanced, indeterminate sentence. Id. at ¶ 14. But it applied this court’s holding in Vensor v. People, 151 P.3d 1274 (Colo. 2007), to conclude that the felony sentencing statutory scheme as a whole limited Isom’s sentence to thirty-six years to life. Isom, ¶¶ 20-29. We granted certiorari and now affirm. II.Standard of Review  ¶5 Statutory interpretation is a question of law that this court reviews de novo. Hunsaker v. People, 2015 CO 46, ¶ 11, 351 P.3d 388, 391. III.Analysis  ¶6 Indeterminate sentencing for sex offenders in Colorado is governed by section 18-1.3-1004, C.R.S. (2017). The general sex offender sentencing provision in section 1004'(l)(a) (“the general sex offender statute:”) provides for a sentence of at least the minimum of the presumptive ■ range in the sentencing statute in section 18-1.3-401 (“the general sentencing statute”) and for a maximum of life. For sex offenders whose offense constitutes a crime of violence, section 1004(l)(b) provides for a sentence of at least the midpoint in the presumptive range for the level of offense committed and a maximum of life. And for offenders eligible for sentencing as habitual sex offenders as defined by section 18-3-412, C.R.S. (2017), the habitual sex offender provision in section 1004(l)(c) (“the habitual sex offender statute”) provides for a sentence of “at least” three times the presumptive maximum and a maximum of life. In this ease, we must determine the limits for the lower end of a sentence imposed under the habitual sex offender statute in section 1004(l)(c). ¶7 The parties agree that because the conviction at issue here is a sex offense, the trial court properly sentenced Isom to an indeterminate sentence with a maximum sentence of life. But they dispute whether the trial court properly set the minimum end of Isom’s indeterminate sentence at forty years. ¶8 The People argue that Isom’s sentence is proper because the statutory scheme allows a trial court to impose any minimum end equal to or greater than eighteen years. They assert that the habitual sex offender statute, section 1004(l)(c), requires only that the minimum sentence be “at least” triple the presumptive maximum — in this .case six years — and does not impose an upper limit. The People’s rationale is that the habitual sex offender statute is an entirely different sentencing scheme, not subject to limitations or conditions in the broader, sentencing framework. ¶9 Isom, on the other hand, argues that his sentence is illegal because the statutory scheme requires the trial court to set the minimum value of his sentence at eighteen years. He notes that the habitual sex offender statute sets the enhanced lower limit at thi’ee times the presumptive maximum, but the general felony sentencing statute, section 18-1.3-401, sets the enhanced lower limit at two times the presumptive maximum. Rather than sextupling the presumptive maximum, Isom argues that the habitual sex offender statute trumps the general sentencing statute’s limit and controls alone. In other words, since the habitual sex offender statute triples the minimum sentence, the general sentencing statute — which only allows a court to at most double the minimum sentence — is inapplicable. Therefore, Isom would have us set the lower bound of the indeterminate sentence precisely at three times the presumptive maximum and set the upper bound at life. ¶10 To determine Isom’s range, we first look to the range for the underlying sexual-assault-on-a-child offense: two to six years. §§ 18-3-405(2), 18-1.3-401(l)(d)(V)(A), C.R.S. (2017). We then apply the habitual sex offender sentencing statute, which directs the trial court to sentence the defendant to-at least three times the maximum of the presumptive range. In this case, that is six years multiplied by three; therefore, the sentence is “at least” eighteen years to life. The statute, however, does not specify a maximum bottom end to the indeterminate sentence. Hence, we must now determine whether there is a maximum permissible bottom end of the indeterminate sentence for the charge. Simply stated, what does “at least”- mean in this context? ¶11 Our analysis of this issue is guided by our prior decision in Vensor, where we examined a similar question regarding the general .sex offender sentencing statute. That section of the sentencing statute, 10()4(l)(a), is structured much the same way as the habitual sex offender statute, section 1004(l)(c), as it requires an indeterminate sentence with an upper bound of life. Specifically, section 1004(l)(a) modifies and enhances the presumptive minimum and maximum limits applicable to non-violent; non-habitual cases by providing for “an indeterminate term of at least the minimum of the presumptivé range specified in section 18-1.3-401 for the level of offense committed and a maximum of the sex offender’s natural life.” § 18-1.3-1004(l)(a) (emphasis added). In Vensor, we deemed this language ambiguous because ■ it raised the same question we face today: Is the lower bound of a sex offender’s indeterminate sentence upwardly variable, and if so, to what extent? See Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1277 (“[T]fe language of the statute itself is far from clear about the precise limitations intended for the lower term of an indeterminate sex offender’s sentence.”). ¶12 The court of appeals in Vensor found as the People would have us find here: That there is no upper limit on the minimum sentence, See People v. Vensor, 116 P.3d 1240, 1242 (Colo. App. 2005). We rejected that argument in Vensor, concluding that “[s]uch a cramped reading would effectively render the imposition of an indeterminate sentence discretionary with the sentencing court. Simply by imposing a sentence with an extremely long lower term, the sentencing court could collapse an ostensibly indeterminate sentence into a determinate.one of.life imprisonment....” Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1278. We determined that such a construction .was not only logically inconsistent, but that it was also contrary to the legislative intent “to provide for treatment and extended supervision, rather than to punish sex offenders with terms,- of incarceration longer than those of other felons of the same class.” Id. ¶13 In Vensor, we also considered whether the enhanced minimum had to be imposed as the bottom end of the range without any judicial discretion — the argument that Isom makes in the present ease. We concluded that was also contrary to legislative intent because it would deprive the sentencing courts of any discretion whatsoever. Id. We rejected such a reading because it would “transfer all discretion in sentencing from the courts to the parole board.” Id. If the lower limit can be neither boundless nor fixed, the Vensor court reasoned, there must be a limiting principle. See id. at 1279. ¶14 To find an upper limit for the minimum end of the sentence, we reasoned that the enhanced sentencing range was still subject to the broader statutory framework governing sentencing. Id. at 1279 (“[I]t would be extraordinary ... to understand words limiting the court’s discretion at the lower, end of the sentencing range to implicitly eliminate all other sentencing constraints, [and] there is particular reason to believe this was not intended of sex offender sentencing”). Those particular reasons were that the relevant legislative history strongly indicated that the General Assembly did not intend to more fundamentally alter, the sentencing landscape for sex offenses. Id. (“Testifying before the House Judiciary Committee, Representative Norma Anderson, the Act’s sponsor, emphasized three separate times that the Act was not intended to change the sentencing guidelines already in place under Colorado law.”(citation omitted)). Having determined that the enhanced penalties were subject to other sentencing limits and procedures, we then examined these other provisions. ¶15 We looked to the “fundamental mechanism for felony sentencing,” section 18-1.3-401. Vensor, 151 P.3d at 1279; see also id. at 1280 (“[T]he lower term of a sex offender’s indeterminate sentence must be fixed according to the provisions of the determinate sentencing scheme of section 18-1.3-401.”). Section 401(6) states that even when the court finds extraordinary aggravating circumstances, “in no 'case 'shall the term of sentence be greater than twice the maximum ... authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of the offense.” The Vensor court concluded that the minimum end of an enhanced sentence for a general sex offense was subject to a hard cap of twice the enhanced sentence. Id. ¶16 In this case, we follow Vensor and read the habitual sex offender statute, section 1004(l)(c), similarly. Section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c) is structured much the same as (l)(a), the general sex offender statute at issue in Ven-sor. It enhances the presumptive sentence to “an indeterminate term of at least three times the upper limit of the presumptive range for the level of offense committed and a maximum of the sex offender’s natural life.” We read the first phrase — “at least three times the upper limit of the presumptive range” — as referring to the minimum length of time -in a habitual offender’s indeterminate sentence. We read the second phrase — “and a maximum of the sex offender’s natural life” — as setting the maximum length of time in the indeterminate sentence. ¶17 The People’s position here would lead to incongruous results because, as the Vensor court noted, a sentencing court could set the minimum to any length of time up to the defendant’s natural life — a sentence of “life to life” which operates as a determinate sentence. See 151 P.3d at 1278. That would be contrary to the legislative scheme. It would punish sex offenders more harshly than other felons who have committed the same class of felony, and it would eliminate the role of the parole board. Similarly, Isom’s position, where the court would have no discretion regarding the sentence, would be contrary to the legislative scheme allowing sentencing courts to consider particular aggravating or mitigating circumstances. Therefore, as in Vensor, we deem ambiguous the minimum sentence under the habitual sex offender statute, section 1004(l)(c), and we look to the broader sentencing framework for guidance. ¶18 As we did in Vensor, we focus on the generally applicable sentencing scheme in subsection 401 for guidance. Specifically, we focus on section 18-1.3-401(6), which gives a court the authority to enhance a sentence if it finds extraordinary aggravating circumstances: If the court finds such extraordinary mitigating or aggravating circumstances, it may impose a sentence which- is lesser or greater than the presumptive range; except that in no case shall the term of sentence be greater than twice the maximum nor less than one-half the minimum term authorized in the presumptive range for the punishment of the offense. 18-1.3-401(6), C.R.S. (2017) (emphases added). We conclude that this provision limits the minimum end of a sex offender’s indeterminate sentence to twice the presumptive maximum as already enhanced by the habitual sex offender statute, section 1004(l)(c). Because the enhanced minimum sentence of a habitual offender’s indeterminate sentencing range is three times the presumptive maximum, twice that is six times the presumptive maximum. Therefore, upon a finding of extraordinary aggravating circumstances, a sentencing court may set the minimum end of a habitual sex offender’s indeterminate sentence at any point between three and six times the presumptive maximum. Without a finding of extraordinary aggravating circumstances, the trial court must set the lower end of the sentence at triple the presumptive maximum only. ¶19 In conclusion, we hold that to calculate the maximum permissible term for the bottom end of an indeterminate sentence for a habitual sex offender, a trial court must triple the maximum of the presumptive range for the offense, pursuant to section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c), and then may double the resulting figure pursuant to section 18-3-401(6) if the court finds extraordinary aggravating circumstances. In that instance, the trial court retains discretion to impose a minimum sentence between the minimum tripling and the maximum sextupling of the presumptive maximum. In so doing, we give meaning to the phrase “at least” in section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c). ' ¶20 The sentencing statutes for sex offenders have been repeatedly amended over the years. Our decision today is an attempt to give effect to the legislative scheme while remaining consistent with general principles of statutory construction and sentencing. IV. Application ¶21 Isom was convicted of sexual assault on a child, a class four felony with a presumptive range of two to six years; and was adjudicated a habitual sex offender against children. Section 18-1.3-1004(l)(c) requires trial courts to sentence habitual sex offenders against children to at least three times the maximum of the presumptive range; in this case, three times six is eighteen years. Applying section 18-1.3-401(6)’s language limiting aggravated sentences to twice the maximum of the authorized presumptive range, the maximum of the bottom end of a habitual-offender-enhaneed indeterminate sentence shall not be greater than two times triple the presumptive maximum found in section 401; in this case, two times three times six equals thirty-six years. Therefore, the bottom end of Isom’s indeterminate sentence is eighteen years. Upon resentencing, if the court makes a finding of extraordinary aggravating circumstances, the bottom end may be enhanced up to thirty-six years. V. Conclusion ¶22 We affirm the judgment of the court.of appeals, and we remand this case to that court with instructions to return the case to the trial court for resentencing consistent with this opinion. JUSTICE .MÁRQUEZ dissents.  . We granted certiorari to review the following issues: 1. Whether section 18-3-412(2), C.R.S. (2014) and section . 18-1.3-1004(l)(c), C.R.S. (2014) authorize a court to sentence an habitual sex offender against children to an indeterminate prison sentence with a lower term of up to six times the maximum in the presumptive range if the court finds extraordinary aggravating circumstances under section 18-1.3-401, C.R.S. (2014). 2. Whether the court of appeals > erred in reading the habitual sex offender against children sentencing provisions to: create a sentencing range for the lower term of the indeterminate sentence of three times the maximum of the presumptive range to six times the presumptive maximum; and require a finding of extraordinary aggravating circumstances before a trial court may impose a sentence with a lower term greater than three times the maximum of the presumptive range.   . The steps for calculating the maximum permissible bottom end of a habitual offender’s indeterminate sentence can be expressed by the following equation: presumptive maximum (6 years) multiplied by the habitual offender multiplier (3) times the maximum aggravating circumstances factor (2) equals 36.