Court Opinion

ID: 9885541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:07:06.306729+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:53.705632
License: Public Domain

Fuld, J.
(dissenting). When charges were first filed against him in the City Court of the City of Glen Cove," defendant was represented by an attorney. When arraigned several weeks later, he appeared by another attorney, and the first one was permitted to “withdraw”. Then, after defendant’s new' counsel had attacked the regularity of the proceedings, the other asked the judge presiding to allow him to “ intervene as a friend of the Court ”, because, as he expressed it, “ his conduct had been put in question ” by defendant. The court granted the request, despite the fact that it was clear from his statement that he wanted to remain in the case, not to assist defendant, but to vindicate some supposed right of his own, and despite the further fact that he had already taken a position, if not adverse *241to defendant, certainly not helpful to him, by insisting upon the burdensome and unusual requirement ‘ ‘ that all the defenses and challenges [by defendant] be made in writing and sworn to.” And while it is true, as the court notes in its opinion, that the record fails to show that the displaced attorney was present on April 28th, the day on which the trial proper was held, the fact seems to be — asserted by defense counsel, and acknowledged by the assistant district attorney, on the argument before us upon this appeal — that he conferred with the prosecutor during the course of the trial.
One accused of crime has an absolute and unqualified rigiii to have counsel of his own choosing, and that, of course, encompasses the right to relieve himself of an attorney formerly retained. (See, e.g., People v. Koch, 299 N. Y. 378, 381; People v. McLaughlin, 291 N. Y. 480; People v. Price, 262 N. Y. 410, 412; Glasser v. United States, 315 U. S. 60.) That right existing, a court may not curtail it or render it illusory by permitting a discharged, and perhaps disgruntled, lawyer to continue in the ease. Quite apart from other considerations, a defendant should not be forced to run the risk of even an unwitting and innocent disclosure of some privileged or confidential communication. Potentially dangerous, instinct with prejudice and harm, the practice of permitting a discharged attorney to intervene in a criminal prosecution, even under the ambiguous title of “ friend of the court”, is as inherently wrong and indefensible as, concededly, it is unwarranted.
It may well be that there is no proof in this ease that the displaced attorney violated any confidence of his former client or that his intervention in the case influenced any ruling or judicial act of the judge or affected the outcome of the trial. But that does not mean that we may disregard the asserted impropriety as technical or harmless. (Code Crim. Pro., § 542; cf. People v. Mleczko, 298 N. Y. 153, 162.) In a case where a constitutional right has been violated (see, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U. S. 97, 116) or where, as here, the ruling or conduct complained of offends against basic principles, a court cannot be satisfied that defendant’s rights were not affected. “ We may disregard errors which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties, but we must be satisfied that these rights are not affected. The possibility that they may not *242be is insufficient.” (People v. Doran, 246 N. Y. 409, 428, per Andrews, J., concurring.) We will not speculate as to the impact of the error upon defendant’s rights or “ indulge in nice calculations as to the amount of prejudice arising ” therefrom. (Glasser v. United States, supra, 315 U. S. 60, 76.)
The conviction should be reversed, and a new trial ordered.
Conway, Dye and Froessel, JJ., concur with Lewis, J.; Fuld, J., dissents in opinion in which Loughran, Ch. J., and Desmond, J., concur.
Judgment affirmed.