Court Opinion

ID: 9761706
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:51:10.59414+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:23:16.315627
License: Public Domain

HALL, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent.
The plaintiff’s testimony in full regarding the nature and appearance of the object she slipped on is as follows:
“Q. Now, do you know for sure of your own personal knowledge what you stepped on?
“A. I couldn’t swear to it, but it looked like ... It was about that *345long and juicy. (Indicating). And I can’t think of anything that looked like that except a green onion top.
“Q. What color was it?
“A. Green.
“Q. Okay. And you’ve seen onion tops many times?
“A. Well, I’ve topped a-many of them, I know.
“Q. Okay. And what you saw, was there just one individual onion stalk?
“A. It was.
“Q. In other words, like you had taken an onion and cut off one little green leafy stalk from the top of it?
“A. It was a full grown one.
“Q. Okay. And how long would you say it was?
“A. About that long. (Indicating).
“Q. All right. You’re indicating what? About seven inches?
“A. (By plaintiff’s attorney) Seven or eight inches.
“Q. Okay. Did you see this, if it was an onion top, did you see it before you fell?
“A. No.
“Q. Okay. Did you ever, yourself, pick up or examine what looked to you like it was an onion top?
“A. The thing I slipped on?
“Q. Yes.
“A. Well, I didn’t have a chance.
“Q. Okay. So, you did not pick it up and look at it closely?
“A. No, sir. I didn’t.
“Q. Can you describe its appearance to me other than being, as you said, green and about seven or eight inches long and looking like a single onion stalk?
“A. Well, it was just like anybody stepped on it and mashed it, and the juice was out of it.
“Q. Okay. It appeared as though it had been stepped on?
“A. It had been.
“Q. Okay. Because you had stepped on it?
“A. I certainly did.
“Q. Okay. Did you have anything on your shoes or your clothing that you either then or later examined or inspected, and from which you could determine what it was that you had stepped on?
“A. No.
“Q. Okay. Do you, of your own personal knowledge, know or do you have any way of knowing how long it had been on the floor before you stepped on it?
“A. No, sir. I sure don’t.
“Q. Okay. And do you know or do you have any way of determining who may have dropped the onion stalk onto the floor?
“A. No, sir. I wouldn’t know that either.
“Q. Okay. Was there anything about the appearance of the onion top in the very brief period of time that you saw it, that could in any way tell you how long it had been on the floor?
“A. It couldn’t have been there too long or it would have been wilted looking.
“Q. Okay. And it was not?
“A. It was not.
“Q. Okay. Did you see any marks or anything on the floor that would indicate to you that it had been stepped on more than once or anything like that?
“A. Mister, I wasn’t looking for any marks. I was blacking out and coming to and blacking out again all that time. Now, I don’t know about that.
*346“Q. All right. So, I am assuming that you did not see anything like that on the floor?
“A. No, sir. I don’t remember anything.”
Clearly, this testimony cannot spawn the inference asserted by the majority that the stalk had been stepped on by others in the store before the plaintiff did so. But granted the inference arguendo, it does not establish any length of time — long, short, or momentary — the stalk was on the floor before the plaintiff’s fall. See, H. E. Butt Grocery Company v. Russell (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco, 1965, writ ref.), 391 S.W.2d 571, discussed infra. It does not, therefore, support the implied finding that the stalk was on the floor long enough to charge the defendant with constructive notice of its presence there. This finding is vital to the order in question.
The majority cites the testimony showing the area in the store where the fall occurred, the volume of customers in the store (shown only to be “not too many”), together with the showing of several employees in close proximity to the place of the accident at the time, and other recited circumstances, as supporting the finding, citing R. E. Cox Dry Goods Co. v. Kellog (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco, 1940, writ ref.), 145 S.W.2d 675; H. E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Johnson (Tex.Civ.App.—San Antonio, 1949, writ ref., n. r. e.), 226 S.W.2d 501; and S. H. Kress & Co. v. Selph (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont, 1952, writ ref., n. r. e.), 250 S.W.2d 883. While these facts, if connected with a showing of but a short period of time the stalk lay on the floor might be sufficient to support a finding that the defendant’s employees should have discovered and removed it, they are not proof of that critical period of time. They do not support the questioned finding. Insofar as they show, or the record as a whole shows, the stalk could have been dropped on the floor only moments before the plaintiff stepped on it.
In R. E. Cox Dry Goods Co. v. Kellog, supra, the plaintiff stumbled and fell over a salesman’s sample case, 14 inches high, 8 inches wide, and 30 inches long, in a narrow aisle provided for customers, which the evidence shows had been in the aisle along with other sample cases “for the whole of the hour prior to the accident.” In H. E. Butt Grocery Co. v. Johnson, supra, the plaintiff slipped and fell in a wet place in front of a large ice box containing bottles of soft drinks, located near a busy exit of the store. The wet area was “about as big as the box,” contained broken pieces of a bottle, was “dusty, grimy, and muddy.” Upon learning of the accident, the store manager said, “I thought that had been taken care of.” In S. H. Kress & Co. v. Selph, supra, the plaintiff slipped and fell on a piece of candy. She testified that the candy “looked like it had been there for several days,” that it “had been mashed and swept over,” and that it “had the marks of a broom over it.” These cases are clearly distinguishable on their facts from our case. Each contains proof of a time span during which the defendant, if exercising ordinary care, would have discovered the foreign substance.
Our facts, on the question of how long the stalk was on the floor, are more like the facts in the cases of H. E. Butt Grocery Company v. Russell (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco, 1965, writ ref.), 391 S.W.2d 571, and Sherwood v. Medical & Surgical Group, Inc. (Tex.Civ.App.—Waco, 1960, writ ref.), 334 S.W.2d 520. In Russell, the plaintiff slipped on a lettuce leaf. The opinion recites these as the salient facts: “Defendant’s store manager testified he did not instruct any employees to inspect the area where plaintiff testified she slipped between 5:00 P.M. and 6:00 P.M., ‘a busy time.’ Plaintiff’s fall was near the checkout counter as she started with her purchases to the front door where there was heavy customer traffic, she testified. The piece of lettuce was larger than her hand. Her testimony was that she did not know how long it had been there, but it had dark spots and ‘had been stepped on by somebody else’s heel because it was mashed, you *347know, bruised on the other side.’ She did not see it before she stepped on it.” This court reversed a judgment on a verdict for the plaintiff and rendered judgment for the defendant, holding: “These circumstances did not raise an inference that the lettuce leaf had been on the floor for a sufficient time to impose constructive knowledge of its presence upon defendant. They are equally consistent with an inference the leaf had been dropped and stepped on a few seconds, or at any other arbitrary and unknown period of time before plaintiff slipped.” In Sherwood, the plaintiff “stepped in something real slippery” and fell about two feet from the receptionist’s desk as she walked through the reception hall in the defendant’s offices. She testified that after receiving attention from doctors, she came back to the place where she had fallen and noticed “smudge spots and smear spots, this way and that way. You could see where my foot had slid through this stuff on the floor. It was loose. What I would call it — it was either a floor dressing of some kind — it wasn’t buffed down or polished good.” After she got home she noticed there was a dry, “sparkly” substance around a hole in her hose at the knee. The same substance was smeared on her hand, arm, knee and cheek. It was later identified as being floor wax or floor polish. Affirming an instructed verdict, this court held the evidence did not show how long the slippery substance had been on the floor. See also, Swan v. Kroger Company (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont, 1970, writ ref., n. r. e.), 452 S.W.2d 793; Green v. J. Weingarten, Inc. (Tex.Civ.App.—Eastland, 1965, no writ hist.), 398 S.W.2d 447; Great Atlantic Pacific Tea Company v. Giles (Tex.Civ.App.—Dallas, 1962, writ ref., n. r. e.), 354 S.W.2d 410; O’Neal v. J. Weingarten, Inc. (Tex.Civ.App.—Beaumont, 1959, writ ref., n. r. e.), 328 S.W.2d 793.
These cases, and many others, are simply restatements of the fundamental law of this State that a storekeeper is not an insurer of the safety of his invited guests, and that the mere presence of some foreign substance on the floor is insufficient to warrant an inference that it had been there long enough to enable the storekeeper to discover and correct or remove it by the exercise of ordinary care. See, J. Weingarten, Inc., v. Razey (Tex.Sup., 1968), 426 S.W.2d 538, 539; Monfort v. West Texas Hotel Co. (Tex.Civ.App.— El Paso, 1938, writ ref.), 117 S.W.2d 811, 813; Dill v. Holt’s Sporting Goods Store (Tex.Civ.App.—Hou. 1st, 1959, no writ hist.), 323 S.W.2d 644, 649; Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Company v. Giles, supra, at 354 S.W.2d 414.
Finally, the majority’s reliance upon the presumptions raised by the defendant’s destruction of evidence and its failure to come forward with proof is, in my opinion, misplaced.
The willful suppression or destruction of relevant evidence by a party, or his failure to produce relevant evidence which he could have produced, can, under proper circumstances, raise presumptions that the evidence, if available or if offered, would have been unfavorable to him and would not have supported his contentions. 1 McCormick & Ray 135, Texas Law Of Evidence (2nd ed., 1956), §§ 100, 103; Missouri Pac. R. Co. v. Sparks (Tex.Civ.App.—Hou. 14th, 1968, writ ref., n. r. e.), 424 S.W.2d 12, 17. Presumptions of this nature not only strengthen the probative force of the adverse party’s proof on the issue to which they relate, but are of themselves clothed with some probative force thereon. State v. Gray, 141 Tex. 604, 175 S.W.2d 224, 226 (1943). But these presumptions have no application until the party to whose benefit they would accrue has established a prima facie case. They do not, per se, establish vital elements of his case. This is not only the Texas rule, it is universal. Turner v. Texas Company, 138 Tex. 380, 159 S.W.2d 112, 117 (1942); 1 McCormick & Ray, supra, pp. 137-38; 31A C.J.S. Evidence § 153, pp. 388-90; 29 Am.Jur.2d 220-21, Evidence, § 177. It is set forth by our Supreme Court in the Turner case as follows:
*348“The fact that the record contains no evidence tending to prove that Hagan was the driver of the automobile that struck plaintiff’s truck or that he was present at or near the place of the collision fully answers the contention that plaintiff’s case can be aided by the failure of the defendants to produce Hagan’s testimony. But even if it were assumed that Hagan was the driver of the automobile, a presumption that his testimony would be favorable to the plaintiff would not relieve the plaintiff from proving his case. The rule is that such presumption does not arise until the party upon whom the burden of proof rests has made a prima facie case. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Shoemaker, 98 Tex. 451, 456, 84 S.W. 1049; Pullman Palace Car Co. v. Nelson, 22 Tex.Civ.App. 223, 54 S.W. 624, 626; Wichita Falls, R. & Ft. W. Ry. Co. v. Emberlin, Tex.Civ.App., 255 S.W. 796, 805; Texas Unity Oil Co. v. Dolman, Tex. Civ.App., 8 S.W.2d 815; Schumacher v. Missouri Pacific Transp. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 116 S.W.2d 1136; Railroad Commission v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., Tex.Civ.App., 123 S.W.2d 423; McCormick and Ray’s Texas Law of Evidence, pp. 108-111, Sec. 59. The burden was upon the plaintiff to prove all of the three elements of discovered peril. His evidence did not make a prima facie case.”
In summary, there is no evidence in the record before us showing the length of time the onion stalk lay on the floor before the plaintiff slipped on it. Was it an hour? Several minutes? Only moments? Any one of these conjectures is as valid as the others. The time is unknown. The presumptions relied upon by the majority cannot and do not supply this proof. This proof is critical to the implied finding upon which the judgment hangs. Without it, the finding must be set aside and the judgment must fall.
The deposition of the plaintiff was the only evidence offered on the trial. Under the authority of Jackson v. Hall, 147 Tex. 245, 214 S.W.2d 458 (1948), I would reverse the judgment and remand the case to the trial court for possible further development.