Court Opinion

ID: 9882691
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:18:35.534442+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:03:35.251556
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Monroe v. Monroe, 2023-Ohio-3332.]

            IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
                            SEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                               COLUMBIANA COUNTY

                                  JOHN JAMES MONROE,

                                        Plaintiff-Appellee,

                                                  v.

                                KIMBERLY ANN MONROE,

                                     Defendant-Appellant.

                       OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
                                       Case No. 22 CO 0035

                                   Civil Appeal from the
                    Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division
                               of Columbiana County, Ohio
                                  Case No. 2020 DR 393

                                         BEFORE:
                  Mark A. Hanni, Cheryl L. Waite, Carol Ann Robb, Judges.

                                              JUDGMENT:
                                                Affirmed.

Atty. Matthew C. Giannini, 1040 South Commons Place, Suite 200, Youngstown, Ohio
44514, for Plaintiff-Appellee and

Kimberly Ann Monroe, Pro se, 180 Ohio Avenue, Unit #1, Salem, Ohio 44460, Defendant-
Appellant.

                                   Dated: September 15, 2023
                                                                                     –2–

HANNI, J.

      {¶1}   Defendant-Appellant, Kimberly Ann Monroe, appeals from a Columbiana
County Common Pleas Court, Domestic Relations Division, decision overruling her
objections to the magistrate’s decision and granting a divorce to her and Plaintiff-
Appellee, John James Monroe.
      {¶2}   The parties were married on May 8, 2014. No children were born as issue
of the marriage. They separated on May 1, 2019. Appellant moved into a condo owned
by a friend and Appellee remained in the marital home for a brief time. By agreement,
the parties then sold the marital home. Prior to selling the house, many issues with the
house were remedied including replacing subflooring, repairing drywall, and fixing
electrical and plumbing issues. After paying off the mortgage and fees associated with
the sale, the parties received $60,862.97 from the sale.
      {¶3}   Appellee filed a complaint for divorce on September 24, 2020. The matter
proceeded to a trial before a magistrate.
      {¶4}   The magistrate found the parties were incompatible and granted a divorce.
Relevant to this appeal, the magistrate found that Charlene Monroe, Appellee’s mother,
had loaned the parties $19,500 for a down payment on the marital home. The magistrate
ordered that from the proceeds of the sale of the house, the first $27,638 was to be paid
to contractor John Smrek, who completed the repairs to house but had yet to be paid.
The next $19,500 was to be paid to Charlene Monroe. The next $2,998 was to be paid
to Appellant’s friend, Joe Armeni, as the parties agreed they owed him for various
appliances and some medical bills he had paid for them. The magistrate ordered the
remainder of the proceeds to be split equally between the parties.
      {¶5}   The trial court entered judgment that same day entering a decree of divorce
in accordance with the magistrate’s decision.
      {¶6}   Appellant, however, filed objections to the magistrate’s decision. Although
represented by counsel throughout the proceedings, Appellant filed her objections pro se.
Appellant objected to: (1) the award of $27,638 to Smrek (claiming it should have been
less); (2) the award of $19,500 to Appellee’s mother (claiming the money had been a gift);

Case No. 22 CO 0035
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and (3) the award of $2,998 to Armeni (claiming it should have been more). Appellee
filed a response in opposition to the objections. Appellant then filed a reply in support of
her objections. To this reply, Appellant attached numerous documents and receipts,
which she claimed supported her objections.
       {¶7}   The trial court overruled Appellant’s objections. It noted that none of the
documents Appellant attached to the reply were part of the record and, therefore, the
court could not consider them. The court pointed out that the majority of the marital assets
were the profits that resulted from the sale of the marital home. And it noted that after the
marital debts were paid, the court divided the remainder equally between the parties. The
court then adopted the magistrate’s decision.
       {¶8}   Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal on September 16, 2022. Still
proceeding pro se, Appellant now raises four assignments of error for our review.
       {¶9}   Appellant’s assignments of error deal with various marital debts and weight
of the evidence issues.
       {¶10} An appellate court reviews matters involving property division in domestic
relations cases for abuse of discretion. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 218,
450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). An abuse of discretion implies a decision that is unreasonable,
arbitrary, or unconscionable. Id. at 219.
       {¶11} Marital debt is any debt incurred during the marriage for the joint benefit of
the parties or for a valid marital purpose. Ketchum v. Ketchum, 7th Dist. Columbiana No.
01 CO 60, 2003-Ohio-2559, ¶ 47, citing Turner, Equitable Distribution of Property (2
Ed.1994, Supp.2002) 455, Section 6.29. Debts the parties incur during the marriage are
presumed to be marital unless it is proved that they are not. Vergitz v. Vergitz, 7th Dist.
Jefferson No. 05 JE 52, 2007-Ohio-1395, ¶ 12, citing Knox v. Knox, 7th Dist. Jefferson
No. 04 JE 24, 2006-Ohio-1154, ¶ 25-26.
       {¶12} Judgments supported by some competent, credible evidence going to all
the material elements of the case must not be reversed as being against the manifest
weight of the evidence. C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Constr. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279, 376
N.E.2d 578, syllabus (1978). See, also, Gerijo, Inc. v. Fairfield, 70 Ohio St.3d 223, 226,
638 N.E.2d 533 (1994). Reviewing courts must oblige every reasonable presumption in
favor of the lower court's judgment and finding of facts. Gerijo, 70 Ohio St.3d at 226

Case No. 22 CO 0035
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(citing Seasons Coal Co. v. Cleveland, 10 Ohio St.3d 77, 461 N.E.2d 1273 [1984]). In
the event the evidence is susceptible to more than one interpretation, we must construe
it consistently with the lower court's judgment. Id. In addition, the weight to be given the
evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are primarily for the trier of the facts. Kalain
v. Smith, 25 Ohio St.3d 157, 162, 495 N.E.2d 572 (1986). “A finding of an error of law is
a legitimate ground for reversal, but a difference of opinion on credibility of witnesses and
evidence is not.” Seasons Coal, 10 Ohio St.3d at 81.
       {¶13} It is with these standards in mind that we now turn to Appellant’s
assignments of error.
       {¶14} Appellant’s first assignment of error states:

       THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT AWARDED
       JOHN SMREK, THE CONTRACTOR $27,638.00, ON THE BASIS OF A
       WRITTEN “PROPOSAL” ONLY AND WITH NO SUPPORTING EVIDENCE
       OF TIME OR MATERIALS OR THE REASONABLENESS THEREOF. IN
       THE TRIAL COURT’S FINIDINGS OF FACTS, THE TRIAL COURT
       MAKES REFERENCE TO THE “PROPOSAL” EXHIBIT 5, AND THAT THE
       CONTRACTOR TESTIFIED THAT HE SPENT 25 TO 30 DAYS WORKING
       ON THE HOUSE? [sic]

       {¶15} Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 is titled a “Proposal.” It states it was submitted to
Appellee and it was signed by Smrek. It is an estimate for labor and materials for
improvements to the marital home. It includes replacing, repairing/installing subfloors;
repairing the front door; installing a new window; replacing water-damaged drywall;
replacing a toilet; repairing the porch railing; rebuilding the back porch; repairing/replacing
bathroom tile; and repairing wiring. It provides a cost of $27,638 to be paid 30 days after
closing on the house.
       {¶16} Appellant argues the evidence does not support the trial court’s award of
$27,638 to Smrek. She asserts the court should not have relied on Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5
because it is not dated, it does not include her name, it is not signed by Appellee, and it
does not include a breakdown regarding labor and materials. Appellant also contends
that Smrek’s testimony was inconsistent and unreliable.

Case No. 22 CO 0035
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       {¶17} The parties in this case do not dispute that the improvements to the marital
house resulted in a marital debt. Appellant’s argument instead focuses on the amount of
the debt. The testimony regarding the money owed to contractor John Smrek was as
follows.
       {¶18} The parties purchased the house in 2014 for $67,000-$70,000. (Tr. 50,
111). They sold the house in 2020 for $120,000. (Tr. 48).
       {¶19} Appellee testified that prior to listing the house for sale, the parties hired
Smrek to complete renovations to the house. (Tr. 135). The work performed by Smrek
included repairing/installing subfloors; repairing the front door; installing a new window;
replacing water-damaged drywall; replacing a toilet; repairing the porch railing; rebuilding
the back porch; repairing/replacing bathroom tile; and repairing wiring. (Tr. 135; Plaintiff’s
Ex. 5). Appellee stated that Smrek worked on the house for approximately 15-20 days
and his bill totaled $27,638. (Tr. 136).
       {¶20} Smrek agreed with Appellee on the work he performed on the parties’
house. (Tr.158; Plaintiff’s Ex. 5). He also agreed that the parties owed him a total of
$27,683, which they were to pay him after they sold the house. (Tr. 159). The only
discrepancy was that Smrek stated he spent 25 to 30 days on the project. (Tr. 159).
       {¶21} Appellant acknowledged that the house required renovations before the
parties could list it for sale. (Tr. 49). She agreed that Smrek should be paid for the work
on the house.     (Tr. 77).    And she agreed that the house increased in value by
approximately $50,000 from 2014, when the parties purchased it, to 2020 after the
renovations were complete and the parties sold it. (Tr. 48-50).
       {¶22} This evidence supports the trial court’s decision. The parties agreed that
Smrek had yet to be paid for the work that he completed and that he should be paid. Both
Appellee and Smrek testified that Plaintiff’s Exhibit 5 was accurate. Appellant did not
dispute the facts that renovations had been completed, the value of the house had
increased, and Smrek remained unpaid for his work. And while Appellant contends the
amount the trial court found owing to Smrek is too high, she does not point to any
evidence of what she asserts the correct amount owed should be. In sum, there is no
indication that the trial court acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in finding
that the parties owed Smrek $27,638 for the renovations to the marital home.

Case No. 22 CO 0035
                                                                                       –6–

        {¶23} Accordingly, Appellant’s first assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
        {¶24} Appellant’s second assignment of error states:

        FURTHER, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS DISCRETION IN THE
        AWARD FROM THE PROCEEDS OF THE MARITAL PROPERTY TO
        JOHN MONROE’S MOTHER, CHARLENE MONROE, IN THE AMOUNT
        OF $19,500.00 FOR THE MONEY GIVEN TO THE PARTIES TO
        PURCHASE THE MARITAL RESIDENCE WITH NO DOCUMENTS TO
        SUPPORT THAT THE FUNDS GIVEN WERE A LOAN.

        {¶25} Here, Appellant claims the trial court erred in finding that Appellee’s mother
loaned the parties $19,500 towards the purchase of the marital home. She claims she
knew nothing of this loan and notes there are no documents to prove that the money was
not a gift.
        {¶26} Appellee testified his parents sold a car for $19,500, the proceeds of which
the parties used as a down payment on the marital home. (Tr. 111-113). Appellee stated
that he and Appellant discussed the matter at the time. (Tr. 113, 177). In support,
Appellee introduced Plaintiff’s Exhibit 3, which was a copy of a check dated June 25, 2014
in the amount of $19,500 made payable to him from his mother. (Tr. 112). Appellee
testified it was his understanding that they would pay the money back either when they
sold the house or when they otherwise had the money. (Tr. 178). He stated Appellant
was aware that the money was a loan. (Tr. 178).
        {¶27} Appellant acknowledged that Appellee’s parents had “helped” them
financially. (Tr. 26). She believed that Appellee’s parents had “helped” them for a sum
of $20,000 to $30,000. (Tr. 26). But she stated she did not specifically recall receiving
$19,500 from Appellee’s parents. (Tr. 29). Appellant also testified that she did not
remember how much money the parties borrowed to purchase the marital home. (Tr. 30-
31).
        {¶28} Appellee’s mother, Charlene Monroe, testified that she sold a car and the
parties used the proceeds of the sale for the down payment on their house. (Tr. 147).
She identified the check she issued to Appellee in the amount of $19,500. (Tr. 147;

Case No. 22 CO 0035
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Plaintiff’s Ex. 3). Charlene testified that the money was a loan. (Tr. 149). But she
admitted that she did not execute any loan documents. (Tr. 150).
       {¶29} This issue turns on credibility of the witnesses. The trier of fact occupies
the best position to watch the witnesses and observe their demeanor, gestures, and voice
inflections and to utilize these observations in weighing credibility. Seasons Coal Co.,
Inc., 10 Ohio St.3d at 80. Here, the magistrate was in the best position to observe
Appellant’s, Appellee’s, and Charlene’s testimony. The magistrate found Appellee’s and
Charlene’s testimony that the $19,500 was a loan to be more credible than Appellant’s
testimony that she was uncertain that Charlene had loaned the parties any money. And
Appellee submitted a copy of the check from Charlene to him documenting the $19,500.
Competent, credible evidence exists on the record to support the magistrate’s/trial court’s
finding. As an appellate court, we are not in a position to second-guess the magistrate’s
credibility determination. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining
that $19,500 from the proceeds of the house sale were owed to Charlene.
       {¶30} Accordingly, Appellant’s second assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
       {¶31} Appellant’s third assignment of error states:

       FURTHER, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IT’S [sic] DISCRETION TO
       AWARD ONLY $2,998.00 TO JOE ARMENI FOR MONIES PAID BY HIM
       FOR THE PARTIES. THE TRIAL COURT IN THE FINDINGS OF FACTS
       MAKES REFERENCE TO APPELLEE’S EXHIBIT 4 ONLY, WHEN
       APPELLANT’S EXHIBIT P SHOULD HAVE BEEN TAKEN INTO
       CONSIDERATION ALSO? [sic]

       {¶32} In this assignment of error, Appellant argues the court should have awarded
her friend, Joe Armeni, more than $2,998. She claims Armeni paid for various expenses
for the parties including veterinary bills and legal fees. She asserts her claim is supported
by Defendant’s Exhibit P.
       {¶33} Armeni is a close friend of Appellant. She testified that their relationship is
platonic and that Armeni is like a father figure to her. (Tr. 18, 280). Since the time the
parties separated, Appellant has given Armeni power of attorney to manage her finances.

Case No. 22 CO 0035
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(Tr. 281). Additionally, Armeni owns the condo where Appellant currently resides. (Tr.
11).
       {¶34} Exhibit P is a list Armeni compiled of all of the money he contended that the
parties owe him. The items on the list total approximately $16,000.
       {¶35} The parties were married on May 8, 2014. They separated on May 1, 2019.
Many of the items either pre-date the marriage, were incurred after the parties separated,
or are not identified by date. Armeni admitted as much. And Armeni did not provide
receipts for any items.
       {¶36} Armeni testified definitively that several of the items listed on Exhibit P pre-
dated the marriage: $300 for bail on February 22, 2013; $3,000 for Attorney Williams;
$780 for court costs; $1,500 for Attorney Benvenuto. (Tr. 343-347). He testified that
$1,250 for Attorney Macala dealt with Appellant’s child support in a case not involving
Appellee. (Tr. 321, 346-347). He testified that $1,600 for rent was incurred after the
parties separated. (Tr. 348). He could not say when the $297 for eyeglasses was
incurred. (Tr. 348-349). He could not say when the $134 for water bills was incurred.
(Tr. 327). Per Defendant’s Exhibit P, $221 for medical bills was incurred after the parties
separated.
       {¶37} Appellee admitted that the parties owed Armeni for certain items listed on
Defendant’s Exhibit P. He stated that the parties owed Armeni: $1,000 for a refrigerator;
$604 for fencing; $250 for a microwave; $250 for a washing machine; $673 for medical
bills; and $221 for medical bills. (Tr. 128-129; Defendant’s Ex. P). He also included these
items on a list he compiled of what he considered marital debt. (Plaintiff’s Ex. 4). These
items totaled $2,998, which is the amount the court ordered paid to Armeni from the
proceeds of the sale of the parties’ house.
       {¶38} The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Armeni was
owed $2,998 by the parties. Both parties and Armeni agreed these debts were owed.
The rest of the items on the list prepared by Armeni either predated the marriage, were
incurred after the parties’ separation, or it could not be established with any certainty
when the debts were incurred.
       {¶39} As was the case in the previous assignment of error, this is a matter of
witness credibility. The magistrate listened to Armeni describe the items he believed the

Case No. 22 CO 0035
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parties owed him for. The magistrate also heard Appellant’s and Appellee’s testimony on
these matters. And the magistrate and the trial court examined Defendant’s Exhibit P.
Because there is competent, credible evidence to support the trial court’s decision and
because we must defer to the magistrate/trial court on matters of witness credibility, we
cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion in finding that the parties owed
Armeni the sum of $2,998.
       {¶40} Accordingly, Appellant’s third assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
       {¶41} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error states:

       FINALLY, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IT’S [sic] DISCRETION WHEN
       IT DID NOT ADDRESS THE FUNDS THAT WERE TAKEN OUT OF THE
       IOLTA ACCOUNT EXHIBIT 10 TO PAY FOR UTILITY EXPENSES
       INCURRED       BY   JOHN     MONROE       AFTER     KIMBERLY      MONROE
       SEPARATED AND MOVED OUT OF THE MARITAL RESIDENCE.

       {¶42} On January 8, 2021, the magistrate issued temporary orders agreed to by
the parties. The orders instructed Appellee to pay $400/month in temporary spousal
support to Appellant, instructed Appellee’s attorney to deposit the proceeds from the sale
of the marital home into his IOLTA account, and instructed Appellee’s attorney to pay two
utility bills from his IOLTA account upon receipt of proper documentation. The orders
also instructed that the balance of the parties’ funds was to remain in the IOLTA account
until the parties agreed on dispersal.
       {¶43} Appellant contends here that the trial court erred in failing to address
$1,375.13, which was taken out of the IOLTA account to pay for the utility debt she alleges
was incurred by Appellee at the marital residence after she moved out. She asks this
Court to address and resolve this issue.
       {¶44} This issue concerns the temporary orders in place prior to the divorce trial.
As to temporary orders in divorce cases, this Court has stated:

       Temporary orders typically merge into the final order and become moot. It
       has been explained, “In a domestic relations action, interlocutory orders are
       merged within the final decree, and the right to enforce an interlocutory

Case No. 22 CO 0035
                                                                                      – 10 –

       order does not extend beyond the decree, unless the interlocutory obligation
       has been reduced to a separate judgment or has been specifically referred
       to in the decree.” Cotter v. Cotter, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25656, 2011-Ohio-
       5629, ¶ 10, citing Colom v. Colom, 58 Ohio St.2d 245, 389 N.E.2d 856,
       syllabus (1979).

Dimmerling v. Dimmerling, 7th Dist. Noble No. 18 NO 0460, 2019-Ohio-2710, ¶ 140.
       {¶45} In this case, the temporary order regarding the payment of the utility bills
from the IOLTA account was not reduced to a separate judgment nor was it specifically
referred to in the divorce decree. Thus, the order merged into the final judgment and
became moot.
       {¶46} Moreover, Appellant did not raise this issue at trial. An appellant cannot
raise an issue on appeal for the first time that could have been raised and resolved in the
trial court. Quick v. Jenkins, 7th Dist. Columbiana No. 13 CO 4, 2013-Ohio-4371, ¶ 27.
Issues not raised to the trial court are deemed waived on appeal. Id.
       {¶47} Accordingly, Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is without merit and is
overruled.
       {¶48} For the reasons stated above, the trial court’s judgment is hereby affirmed.

Waite, J., concurs.

Robb, J., concurs.

Case No. 22 CO 0035
[Cite as Monroe v. Monroe, 2023-Ohio-3332.]

        For the reasons stated in the Opinion rendered herein, the assignments of error
are overruled and it is the final judgment and order of this Court that the judgment of the
Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Division, Columbiana County, Ohio, is
affirmed. Costs to be taxed against the Appellant.
        A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate in
this case pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. It is ordered that a
certified copy be sent by the clerk to the trial court to carry this judgment into execution.

                                      NOTICE TO COUNSEL

        This document constitutes a final judgment entry.