Court Opinion

ID: 9367618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-01 15:07:37.519793+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:01.653899
License: Public Domain

[Cite as Roth v. Tokar Tower Office Condominiums Unit Owners' Assn. Inc., 2023-Ohio-279.]

STATE OF OHIO                   )                        IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
                                )ss:                     NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN                )

RANDOLPH R. ROTH                                         C.A. No.        21CA011811

        Appellant

        v.                                               APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
                                                         ENTERED IN THE
TOKAR TOWER OFFICE                                       COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
CONDOMINIUMS UNIT OWNERS'                                COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
ASSOCIATION, INC.                                        CASE No.   16CV188367

        Appellee

                                DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY

Dated: January 31, 2023

        SUTTON, Judge.

        {¶1}    Plaintiff-Appellant Randolph R. Roth appeals from the judgment of the Lorain

County Court of Common Pleas. This Court affirms.

                                                    I.

        {¶2}    In February 2016, Mr. Roth filed this action against Tokar Tower Office

Condominiums Unit Owners’ Association, Inc., (“Tokar”). The following facts were alleged in

Mr. Roth’s complaint. Mr. Roth owned a unit in a condominium office building located at 124

Middle Avenue in Elyria, Ohio. The complaint alleged that on or about January 6, 2014, a suite

Mr. Roth owned in that office building, Unit 203, was flooded. Mr. Roth alleged the unit flooded

as a result of a burst pipe, and the burst pipe was a result of Tokar’s negligent maintenance of a

pipe located in the common area of the office building.
                                                  2

        {¶3}    The complaint alleged that since the date of the flooding, Unit 203 has been unfit

as an office or storage space. The complaint contained claims for relief seeking damages for

negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, violation of statutory duty imposed under

R.C. 5311.14, slander of title, and illegal certificate of lien. Punitive damages were also included

as a claim for relief.

        {¶4}    On March 4, 2019, Tokar filed a partial motion for summary judgment on the

claims of negligence, breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of R.C. 5311.14.

Mr. Roth filed a response in opposition to Tokar’s partial motion for summary judgment. On

October 21, 2019, the trial court granted Tokar’s partial motion for summary judgment.1

        {¶5}    Mr. Roth appealed the judgment of the trial court granting partial summary

judgment to Tokar, assigning one error for this Court’s review.

                                                  II.

                                   ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

        THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING [] TOKAR’S [] MOTION
        FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

        {¶6}    In his sole assignment of error, Mr. Roth argues that the trial court erred in granting

partial summary judgment in favor of Tokar on the counts of the complaint alleging negligence,

breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of statutory duty imposed under R.C.

5311.14. We disagree.

        1
          The dissent notes that the motion for summary judgment “did not include all of the
allegations or timeframes discussed in the complaint.” We note the reason for this is because
Tokar’s motion was a partial motion for summary judgment, and the remaining claims not
addressed in the motion for summary judgment were either dismissed by Mr. Roth or settled
between the parties.
                                                  3

                          Standard of Review for Summary Judgment

          {¶7}   Appellate review of an award or denial of summary judgment is de novo. Grafton

v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). As this Court has previously noted, “[a] de

novo review requires an independent review of the trial court’s decision without any deference to

the trial court’s determination.” (Emphasis added.) Goodrich Corp. v. PolyOne Corp., 9th Dist.

Summit No. 27691, 2016-Ohio-1068, ¶ 12, quoting State v. Ross, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26694,

2014-Ohio-2867, ¶ 33, quoting State v. Consilio, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27761, 2006-Ohio-649, ¶

4. See also State v. Trivette, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 10CA0048, 2011-Ohio-4297, ¶ 7. “Accordingly,

this Court stands in the shoes of the trial court and conducts an independent review of the record.”

McFarland v. Niekamp, Weisensell, Mutersbaugh & Mastrantonio, LLP, 9th Dist. Summit No.

28462, 2017-Ohio-8394, ¶ 14.

          {¶8}   Summary judgment is appropriate under Civ.R. 56 when: (1) no genuine issue as

to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law; and (3) viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the nonmoving party, reasonable

minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party.

Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977), citing Civ.R. 56(C). A court must

view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and must resolve any doubt in

favor of the nonmoving party. Murphy v. Reynoldsburg, 65 Ohio St.3d 356, 358-359 (1992). A

trial court does not have the liberty to choose among reasonable inferences in the context of

summary judgment, and all competing inferences and questions of credibility must be resolved in

the nonmoving party’s favor. Perez v. ScrippsHoward Broadcasting Co., 35 Ohio St.3d 215, 218

(1988).
                                                 4

         {¶9}   Summary judgment consists of a burden-shifting framework. The movant bears the

initial burden of demonstrating the absence of genuine issues of material fact concerning the

essential elements of the non-moving party's case. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996).

Specifically, the moving party must support the motion by pointing to some evidence in the record

of the type listed in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. at 292–293. Once the moving party satisfies this burden, the

non-moving party has a reciprocal burden to “set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine

issue for trial.” Id. at 293. The non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials

in his pleadings, but instead must submit evidence as outlined in Civ.R. 56(C). Id. at 293; Civ.R.

56(E). Evidence specified in Civ.R. 56 (C) is “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,

written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact.” Civ.R.

56(C).

                                     Deposition of Jay Tokar

         {¶10} Jay Tokar testified that he is the president and majority owner of the Tokar Tower

Office Condominiums Unit Owners’ Association.              Tokar has no employees and hires

subcontractors to carry out its contractual obligations to the owners in the association, namely the

repair and maintenance of the common elements or areas of the building. Mr. Tokar, as president

of the association and the majority owner, decides what repairs are made to the building.

         {¶11} Mr. Tokar’s deposition elucidates the relationship between Tokar and Simplified

Facilities. Mr. Tokar testified that Tokar entered into a contract with Simplified Facilities to

inspect the premises of the building and report any issues with the elements of the common area

to him. Mr. Tokar testified to the services Simplified Facilities provided, how often Simplified

Facilities was on the premises, the nature by which Simplified Facilities conducted its inspections,

and the process that was utilized to identify any problems noted by Simplified Facilities.
                                                  5

        {¶12} With regard to the pipe that burst, Mr. Tokar testified a standpipe runs through all

floors of the building, carrying water for the sprinkler system and the water pump in the basement.

That standpipe is considered a common element of the building. Additionally, the pipes to

bathrooms located on the third and sixth floors of the building are common elements. The pipes

within each of the individual units are not considered common elements of the building, and each

individual owner is responsible for the maintenance and repair of those pipes.

        {¶13} Mr. Tokar could not recall which pipe burst first on the day in question. Mr. Tokar

originally stated he thought a pipe burst on the fifth floor, but then said the second-floor pipe burst

first and the fifth-floor pipe burst second. He did concede the pipe that burst first was in a common

area of the building, and, therefore, Tokar would have been responsible for the maintenance of the

pipe that burst.

                                   Deposition of Randolph Roth

        {¶14} Mr. Roth is a practicing attorney who owned space inside of the Tokar office

building on both the second and sixth floors, including Unit 203. He testified he arrived at the

office on a very cold day in January of 2014 and discovered that Unit 203 was flooded. He

conceded the weather was very unusual at the time. He said he did not stick around because there

were people in the office building working on mitigating the damage caused by the burst pipe, and

that Jay Tokar told him the burst pipe was located on the fifth floor.

        {¶15} When asked how Tokar was negligent in its maintenance of the pipes, Mr. Roth

responded “[t]he only thing I know is that your client takes care of the pipes, the pipes got frozen

and there was a flood.” He later added, “[t]he pipes got frozen because there was bad weather,

and it was really cold, and they didn’t insulate the pipes.”
                                                 6

       {¶16} Mr. Roth also gave deposition testimony that indicated all of the damages he was

seeking pertained to losses and damage to his own unit within the Tokar office building, Unit 203.

                                        Negligence Claim

       {¶17} “In order to establish an actionable claim of negligence, a plaintiff must show the

existence of a duty, a breach of that duty, and an injury that was proximately caused by the breach.”

Reiger v. Giant Eagle, Inc., 157 Ohio St.3d 512, 2019-Ohio-3745, ¶ 10. “The failure to prove any

one of these elements is fatal to a claim of negligence.” Id. “The ‘proximate cause’ of a result is

that which in a natural and continued sequence contributes to produce the result, without which it

would not have happened.” Waugh v. Chakonas, 9th Dist. Summit No. 25417, 2011-Ohio-2764,

¶ 8, quoting Bell v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 9th Dist. Summit No. 15887, at *2 (Sept. 1, 1993),

quoting Piqua v. Morris, 98 Ohio St. 42, paragraph one of the syllabus (1918). In the absence of

“circumstances [that] clearly indicate an obvious cause and effect relationship,” “the issue of

proximate cause is ordinarily one for determination by the jury.” Id., citing Ornella v. Robertson,

14 Ohio St.2d 144, 151 (1968).

       {¶18} In its motion for summary judgment, Tokar argued the pipes bursting was an “act

of God” that exempted Tokar from liability, and further argued Tokar had maintained the duty it

owed to the owners in the association by contracting with Simplified Facilities, the company

contracted for site management. And because Simplified Facilities provided no notice to Tokar of

any problems with the pipes, or any notice that the pipes would be susceptible to bursting, Tokar

was not negligent in its duty owed to the association.

       {¶19} In response, Mr. Roth argued Tokar failed to exercise reasonable care and diligence,

therefore making the bursting of the pipes not excusable as an “act of God.” With his brief in

opposition to Tokar’s motion for summary judgment, Mr. Roth provided an affidavit in which he
                                                  7

alleged, among other things, that Tokar “did not fulfill its duty to provide heat or insulation to the

utility shaft or Suite 203 resulting in the pipes freezing” and as a result of this breach of duty, Mr.

Roth’s property was damaged. Mr. Roth did not point to any evidence to support his allegations.

       {¶20} A disaster, to be attributed to the act of God, must be due directly and exclusively

to a natural cause, without human intervention; if human agency cooperated with the violence of

nature or the force of the elements, it is not an act of God. Parasson Corp. v. Nicholas, 9th Dist.

Summit No. 8756, 1978 WL 215208, *3, citing City of Piqua v. Morris, 98 Ohio St. 42 (1918).

Further, to qualify as a an “act of God,” such disaster “could not have been reasonably anticipated,

guarded against or resisted.” Anderson v. Schar, 9th Dist. Wayne No. 97CA0004, 1997 WL

823970, *3. However, as this Court has previously noted, “[h]eavy snows and cold temperatures

during our winters are not unforeseeable.” Gauvreau v. Bosak, 9th Dist. Medina No. 847, 1979

WL 207651, *1 (May 31, 1979). Therefore, we find that Tokar is not entitled to summary

judgment on the grounds that the cold temperatures were an “act of God” because the cold

temperatures were not unforeseeable.

       {¶21} Alternatively, Tokar also argued in its motion for summary judgment that there was

no breach in its duty to maintain the common areas because Tokar contracted with a third-party,

Simplified Facilities, to periodically inspect the premises and report any issues to Tokar. In

support of its argument, Tokar points to the deposition of Jay Tokar, permissible evidence under

Civ.R. 56(C). Mr. Tokar testified that Simplified Facilities was on site several times a month to

make inspections, including inspections of the pipes in the building. Mr. Tokar also testified that

Simplified Facilities provided no prior notice to Tokar of any problems with the pipes before the

incident.
                                                8

       {¶22} Here, after Tokar met its initial burden under Civ.R. 56, Mr. Roth had the burden

of establishing that a genuine issue of material fact remained regarding whether Tokar had

breached its duty to maintain the common area. In his very brief response in opposition, Mr. Roth

executed and attached an affidavit in which he merely recited the claims he alleged in his

complaint. While a non-moving party may rely upon a self-serving affidavit to satisfy their

reciprocal burden under Dresher, the affidavit must “point[] to a genuine issue of material fact.”

Estate of Henderson v. Henderson, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 18CA011301, 2018-Ohio-5264, ¶ 9, citing

Carpenter v. New Age Logistics, 9th Dist. Summit No. 27689, 2016-Ohio-281, ¶ 22. Allowing a

non-moving party to avoid summary judgment by submitting an affidavit containing nothing more

than contradictions of the moving party’s claims, “could enable the nonmoving party to avoid

summary judgment in every case, crippling the use of Civ.R. 56 as a means to facilitate ‘the early

assessment of the merits of claims, pre-trial dismissal of meritless claims, and defining and

narrowing issues for trial.’” Belknap v. Vigorito, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2003-T-0147, 2004-

Ohio-7232, ¶ 27, quoting C.R. Witham Enterprises v. Maley, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 01 CA 54,

2002-Ohio-5056, ¶ 24.

       {¶23} On this record, we find that Tokar met its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 so as to

shift the burden to Mr. Roth, who then failed to meet his burden under Dresher to demonstrate that

a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether Tokar was negligent. Therefore, the trial

court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Tokar with regard to the negligence claim.

                                   Breach of Contract Claim

       {¶24} In order to establish an actionable claim for breach of contract, a party must

establish the following elements of a breach of contract: the existence of an agreement, that the

non-breaching party fulfilled its obligations under the agreement; a breach without legal
                                                9

justification; and damages to the non-breaching party. Niederst v. Niederst, 9th Dist. Summit No.

28846, 2018-Ohio-5320, ¶ 1.

       {¶25} The parties do not dispute that an agreement existed. The contract stated:

       Article XV: Repair and Maintenance by the Association

       15.01 Repair and Maintenance. The responsibilities of the Association for repair
       and maintenance of the Unit include:

       (a) All Common Areas, including exterior walls and windows of the Building,
       excluding air-conditioning and heating systems serving Units, and that portion of
       the Common Areas housing said air-conditioning and heating systems.

       (b) All portions of Units which contribute to support of the Building, including the
       foundation, the main bearing walls, but excluding painting, wallpaper, decoration
       or other work on the interior surfaces of walls ceiling and floors of Units.

       (c) All essential damage caused by work done by the Association.

(Emphasis added.)

       {¶26} In its motion for summary judgment, Tokar argued there was no evidence in the

record to support the conclusion that Tokar breached the contract. Tokar pointed to the deposition

of Jay Tokar’s testimony that Tokar fulfilled its contractual duty for the inspection and

maintenance of the common areas of the building by contracting with Simplified Facilities to

inspect the premises of the building and report any issues with the elements of the common area

to him. In his deposition, Mr. Tokar testified to the services Simplified Facilities provided, how

often Simplified Facilities was on the premises, the nature by which Simplified Facilities

conducted its inspections, and the process that was utilized to identify any problems noted by

Simplified Facilities.

       {¶27} Mr. Roth’s response in opposition to Tokar’s motion for summary judgment did

not rebut Tokar’s contention that it did not breach the contract because it contracted with

Simplified Facilities. Mr. Roth merely recited the language in the bylaws that required Tokar to
                                                10

repair and maintain the common areas. Additionally, Mr. Roth did not allege any failure by Tokar

to repair any common areas; rather, he only asserted damage to his own unit.

        {¶28} On this record, we find Tokar met its initial burden under Civ.R. 56. However, Mr.

Roth failed to then meet his reciprocal burden under Dresher to demonstrate that a genuine issue

of material fact existed as to whether Tokar breached the contract. Therefore, the trial court

properly granted summary judgment in favor of Tokar with regard to the breach of contract claim.

                 Claim for Violation of Statutory Duty under R.C. 5311.14(A)

        {¶29} R.C. 5311.14(A) states:

        Unless provided otherwise in the declaration, damage to or destruction of all or any
        part of the common elements of a condominium property shall be promptly repaired
        and restored by the board of directors of the unit owners association. The cost of
        the repairs and restoration shall be paid from the proceeds of insurance, if any,
        payable because of the damage or destruction, and the balance of that cost is a
        common expense.

        {¶30} In its motion for summary judgment, Tokar asserted that it timely made repairs to

all of the common areas damaged by the flood and noted that the damages Mr. Roth is seeking are

for damages to his property within his own unit. In support of this assertion, Tokar pointed to the

deposition testimony of Mr. Tokar, who in his deposition explained how he immediately called his

insurance company to report the burst pipe on the morning it happened, and that by the end of the

day a restoration company was on site remediating both the burst pipe and any damage water

caused to the common areas of the building.

        {¶31} In response, Mr. Roth did not point to any common areas of the building that Tokar

failed to promptly repair or restore. The affidavit Mr. Roth attached to his response in opposition

to Tokar’s summary judgment motion alleged damages to Mr. Roth’s own unit and his personal

property. It did not, however, point to any damage or destruction to the common areas that Tokar

failed to repair or restore.
                                                  11

       {¶32} On this record, we find Tokar met its initial burden, thus requiring Mr. Roth to

demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether or not Tokar violated R.C.

5311.14(A) by failing to restore or repair any damage or destroyed common areas of the building.

Mr. Roth did not meet that burden. Therefore, the trial court properly granted summary judgment

in favor of Tokar with regard to the claim for a violation of R.C. 5311.14(A).

                                     Breach of Fiduciary Duty

       {¶33} In order to prove a breach of fiduciary duty claim, the plaintiff must establish (1)

the existence of a duty arising from a fiduciary relationship; (2) a failure to observe the duty; and

(3) an injury resulting proximately therefrom. We begin by examining the nature of Tokar’s duty

to maintain the common areas of the property. First, Article XV of the office association bylaws

requires Tokar to provide for the maintenance and repair of all common areas of the building.

Second, R.C. 5311.14(A) indicates that “[u]nless provided otherwise in the declaration, damage to

or destruction of all or any part of the common areas and facilities of a condominium property

shall be promptly repaired and restored by the manager or board of managers.” Thus, by contract

and by statute, Tokar in the instant case was obligated to maintain and repair the common areas.

As Mr. Roth asserts, both the declaration and the statute impose a fiduciary duty on Tokar to act

in the best interests of the property owners. See Behm v. Victory Lane Unit Owners' Assn., Inc.,

133 Ohio App.3d 484, 487 (1st Dist.1999).

       {¶34} However, as stated above, Tokar, in its motion for summary judgment, pointed to

evidence in the record sufficient to meet its initial burden. It pointed to evidence that it contracted

with Simplified Facilities for the maintenance of the common areas, and by immediately

contacting its insurance company to repair the common areas once the pipes burst, and therefore
                                                  12

fulfilled its duty both under contract and statute. Mr. Roth did not point to evidence in the record

to rebut Tokar’s evidence that it met its duty.

       {¶35} Therefore, on this record, we find that Tokar met its initial burden, thus requiring

Mr. Roth to meet his burden under Dresher to demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact

existed as to whether Tokar violated the fiduciary duty Tokar owed him. Mr. Roth did not meet

that burden. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Tokar with regard to

the alleged breach of fiduciary duty.

       {¶36} Mr. Roth’s assignment of error is overruled.

                                                  III.

       {¶37} Mr. Roth’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County

Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

                                                                               Judgment affirmed.

       There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

       We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common

Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of

this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.

       Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of

judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period

for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to

mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the

docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
                                                 13

       Costs taxed to Appellant.

                                                      BETTY SUTTON
                                                      FOR THE COURT

TEODOSIO, P. J.
CONCURS.

CARR, J.
DISSENTING.

       {¶38} I respectfully dissent from the judgment of the majority. I agree that the trial court

did not err in concluding that Tokar was not entitled to summary judgment based upon the act-of-

God defense. However, the remainder of the trial court’s analysis evidences that it inappropriately

shifted the initial burden to the non-movant, Mr. Roth. The trial court stated:

       While Plaintiff alleges that Tokar’s failure to properly insulate the pipes or heat the
       utility shaft caused the pipes to break during the cold weather, Plaintiff has
       produced no expert report or other evidence of causation. Plaintiff has failed to
       produce any evidence that Tokar was aware of any problem with the pipes, that the
       pipes were not properly insulated, before they burst or that Simplified Facilities
       made any recommendations that Tokar failed to follow. Nether the deposition
       testimony submitted pursuant to Civ.R. 56 nor Plaintiff’s affidavit which generally
       recites the language of the Complaint demonstrate that there are issues of fact in
       dispute on his claims for negligence, breach of contract, violation of statutory duty
       R.C. 5311.14(A) and breach of fiduciary duty. Defendant Tokar’s motion for
       summary judgment is granted.

       {¶39} Given the foregoing, “the trial court failed to properly consider [the] motion for

summary judgment.” Lopez v. Hulburt, 9th Dist. Summit No. 28817, 2018-Ohio-2499, ¶ 9. I

would sustain Mr. Roth’s assignment of error and remand the matter for the trial court to properly

review the matter in the first instance. See id. at ¶ 10 (“This Court has repeatedly held that issues

raised in summary judgment motions, but not considered by the trial court will not be decided by
                                                14

this Court in the first instance.”) (Internal quotations and citations omitted). To do otherwise,

“effectively depriv[es] the non-prevailing party of appellate review.” (Internal quotations and

citations omitted.) Id. This is particularly important in this instance as the motion for summary

judgment was extremely brief, did not include all of the allegations or timeframes discussed in the

complaint,2 and did not extensively elucidate Tokar’s relationship between it and the company it

hired to do inspections or the extent of that company’s duties.

APPEARANCES:

RANDOLPH R. ROTH, Attorney at Law, pro se, for Appellant.

MATTHEW M. DUFFY, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.

MOLLY A. STEIBER HARBAUGH, Attorney at Law, for Appellee.

       2
          For example, in the motion for summary judgment, Tokar asserted that it did not violate
the duty in provision XX of the contract. However, the complaint alleged two provisions were
violated, Articles XV and XX.