Court Opinion

ID: 9965800
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 15:01:52.520323+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:40.342064
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-1227     Document: 109    Page: 1   Filed: 05/03/2024

    United States Court of Appeals
        for the Federal Circuit
                    ______________________

                      IOENGINE, LLC,
                         Appellant

                              v.

                      INGENICO INC.,
                         Appellee

   KATHERINE K. VIDAL, UNDER SECRETARY OF
   COMMERCE FOR INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
     AND DIRECTOR OF THE UNITED STATES
       PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE,
                   Intervenor
             ______________________

                2021-1227, 2021-1331, 2021-1332
                    ______________________

     Appeals from the United States Patent and Trademark
 Office, Patent Trial and Appeal Board in Nos. IPR2019-
 00416, IPR2019-00879, IPR2019-00929.
                  ______________________

                     Decided: May 3, 2024
                    ______________________

     NOAH LEIBOWITZ, Dechert LLP, New York, NY, argued
 for appellant. Also represented by GREGORY CHUEBON;
 ROBERT W. ASHBROOK, JR., DEREK J. BRADER, MICHAEL A.
 FISHER, Philadelphia, PA; MICHAEL JOSHI, Palo Alto, CA.

     LAWRENCE M. GREEN, Sunstein LLP, Boston, MA,
Case: 21-1227    Document: 109     Page: 2    Filed: 05/03/2024

 2                             IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.

 argued for appellee. Also represented by ROBERT M.
 ASHER, KEVIN R. MOSIER, SHARONA STERNBERG, KERRY L.
 TIMBERS; TIMOTHY MICHAEL MURPHY, Nutter McClennen &
 Fisher, LLP, Boston, MA.

     MICHAEL S. FORMAN, Office of the Solicitor, United
 States Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for
 intervenor. Also represented by FARHEENA YASMEEN
 RASHEED.
                 ______________________

      Before LOURIE, CHEN, and STOLL, Circuit Judges.
 CHEN, Circuit Judge.
     Appellant IOENGINE, LLC (IOENGINE) appeals a se-
 ries of Final Written Decisions of the United States Patent
 and Trademark Office’s Patent Trial and Appeal Board
 (Board) finding unpatentable certain claims of U.S. Patent
 Nos. 8,539,047 (’047 patent), 9,059,969 (’969 patent), and
 9,774,703 (’703 patent) (collectively, the Challenged Pa-
 tents) during inter partes review (IPR). The Board deter-
 mined claims 1–21, 23–25, 27, and 28 of the ’047 patent,
 claims 1, 2, 4–8, 13–16, 19–21, 24, 25, and 27–29 of the ’969
 patent, and claims 55, 57–63, 67–72, 74, 77, 78, 81–87, 89,
 92–98, 100, 103, 104, 106–112, 116–121, 123, and 126–129
 of the ’703 patent to be unpatentable. We reverse the
 Board’s unpatentability determinations as to claims 4 and
 7 of the ’969 patent and claims 61–62 and 110–11 of the
 ’703 patent because the Board erred in its application of the
 printed matter doctrine. We affirm the Board’s unpatent-
 ability determinations as to all other claims.
                        BACKGROUND
     The Challenged Patents share an ancestor, written de-
 scription, and title—“Apparatus, Method and System for a
 Tunneling Client Access Point.” The written description
 discloses a tunneling client access point (TCAP) that is a
 “highly secure, portable, power efficient storage and data
Case: 21-1227    Document: 109      Page: 3     Filed: 05/03/2024

 IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.                                 3

 processing device” (i.e., a “portable device” as recited in the
 claims). ’047 patent Abstract. 1 The TCAP, upon plugging
 in to an access terminal (e.g., any existing desktop or laptop
 computer) may make use of the terminal’s traditional user
 interface and input/output peripherals, while the TCAP it-
 self provides storage, execution, and/or processing re-
 sources. ’047 patent col. 2 ll. 39–46. The TCAP thereby
 “tunnels” data through the access terminal by allowing
 data to be provided through the access terminal’s in-
 put/output facilities for the user to observe without the
 data actually residing on the access terminal. ’047 patent
 col. 4 ll. 26–28. The TCAP may also tunnel data through
 an access terminal across a communications network to ac-
 cess remote servers without requiring its own more compli-
 cated set of peripherals and input/output facilities. Id. col.
 4 ll. 28–31.
     The Challenged Patents claim a “portable device” (the
 TCAP) configured to communicate with a terminal. The
 claims recite a memory, on either the portable device or
 terminal, that stores first program code which, when exe-
 cuted, presents an interactive user interface. Also stored
 in memory are second, third, and fourth program code that
 are configured in various ways to facilitate communica-
 tions, including with a communications network node.
     Claim 1 of the ’969 patent is illustrative, and recites:
     1. A portable device configured to communicate
     with a terminal comprising a processor, an input
     component, an output component, a network com-
     munication interface, and a memory configured to
     store executable program code, including first pro-
     gram code which, when executed by the terminal

     1    Given the overlap between the specifications of the
 Challenged Patents, we cite only to the ’047 patent for sim-
 plicity.
Case: 21-1227    Document: 109    Page: 4    Filed: 05/03/2024

 4                            IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.

     processor, is configured to present an interactive
     user interface on the terminal output component,
     and second program code which, when executed by
     the terminal processor, is configured to provide a
     communications node on the terminal to facilitate
     communications to the portable device and to a
     communications network node through the termi-
     nal network communication interface, the portable
     device comprising:
     (a) an external communication interface configured
     to enable the transmission of communications be-
     tween the portable device and the terminal;
     (b) a processor; and
     (c) a memory having executable program code
     stored thereon, including:
          (1) third program code which, when executed
     by the portable device processor, is configured to
     provide a communications node on the portable de-
     vice to coordinate with the communications node
     on the terminal and establish a communications
     link between the portable device and the terminal,
     and facilitate communications to the terminal and
     to a communications network node through the ter-
     minal network communication interface; and
         (2) fourth program code which is configured to
     be executed by the portable device processor in re-
     sponse to a communication received by the portable
     device resulting from user interaction with the in-
     teractive user interface; wherein the portable de-
     vice is configured to facilitate communications
     through the communication node on the terminal
     and the terminal network interface to a communi-
     cations network node.
 ’969 patent at claim 1 (emphasis added).
Case: 21-1227     Document: 109       Page: 5    Filed: 05/03/2024

 IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.                                 5

      Appellee Ingenico Inc. (Ingenico) filed three petitions
 for IPR of the Challenged Patents. The Board issued Final
 Written Decisions finding certain claims of the Challenged
 Patents unpatentable. IOENGINE appeals, arguing that
 the Board incorrectly construed the claim term “interactive
 user interface,” incorrectly applied the printed matter doc-
 trine, and otherwise erred in its anticipation and obvious-
 ness analysis. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
 § 1295(a)(4)(A).
                          DISCUSSION
                                I
      IOENGINE contends that the Board erroneously con-
 strued the claim term “interactive user interface” to mean
 “a display containing interface elements with which a user
 may interact to result in a computer taking action respon-
 sively.”    In each of its Patent Owner Responses,
 IOENGINE requested that the Board construe “interactive
 user interface” to mean “a display containing interface ele-
 ments with which a user may interact to result in the ter-
 minal taking action responsively by responding to the
 user.” On appeal, however, IOENGINE proposes a new
 claim construction that it never proffered to the Board: “a
 presentation containing interface elements with which a
 user may interact to result in the device executing code to
 present / affect the presentation taking action responsively
 by modifying what is presented.” In contrast to its position
 during the IPRs, IOENGINE argues on appeal that the
 claims encompass either the terminal or the portable device
 taking responsive action. Compare J.A. 581–82 (“[T]he Pe-
 tition actually agrees with Patent Owner that it is the ter-
 minal that must take action in response to the user
 interaction . . . .”), with Appellant’s Br. at 23 (“[I]f the ter-
 minal processor executes code to present the IUI, an ‘inter-
 active’ user interface means that the terminal responds to
 the user; if the portable device processor executes code to
 present the IUI, an ‘interactive’ user interface means that
Case: 21-1227     Document: 109      Page: 6    Filed: 05/03/2024

 6                               IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.

 the portable device responds to the user.”). Furthermore,
 IOENGINE’s new construction requires the responsive ac-
 tion to be “modifying what is presented,” rather than “re-
 sponding to the user,” as IOENGINE proposed in its Patent
 Owner Response during IPR. 2
     IOENGINE forfeited its proposed claim construction
 by not presenting it to the Board during IPR. See Monsanto
 Tech. LLC v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 878 F.3d 1336,
 1342 n.8 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (concluding patent owner waived
 new claim construction argument where the construction
 was not proffered to the Board in inter partes reexamina-
 tion proceedings). While we retain case-by-case discretion
 over whether to apply waiver, 3 we have held that a party
 waives an argument that it failed to present to the Board
 because it deprives the court of the benefit of the Board’s
 informed judgment. In re Nuvasive, Inc., 842 F.3d 1376,

     2    IOENGINE’s proposed construction in its Patent
 Owner’s Preliminary Response included “the terminal tak-
 ing action responsively by modifying what is presented.”
 However, following the Board’s institution decision,
 IOENGINE’s Patent Owner Response switched its con-
 struction to require “the terminal taking action respon-
 sively by responding to the user.” IOENGINE’s choice
 before the Board to drop its argument for “modifying what
 is presented” and pivot to “responding to the user” seems
 to be a clear abandonment of “modifying what is pre-
 sented.”
      3   “By and large, in reviewing this court’s precedent,
 it is evident that the court mainly uses the term ‘waiver’
 when applying the doctrine of ‘forfeiture.’” In re Google
 Tech. Holdings LLC, 980 F.3d 858, 862 (Fed. Cir. 2020).
 “Though previous cases may have used the term ‘waiver’
 instead of ‘forfeiture,’ their holdings are good law for a case,
 like this one, involving the issue of forfeiture.” Id. at 862
 n.8.
Case: 21-1227    Document: 109     Page: 7    Filed: 05/03/2024

 IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.                             7

 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citing Harris Corp. v. Ericsson Inc.,
 417 F.3d 1241, 1251 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Watts, 354 F.3d
 1362, 1367–68 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
      IOENGINE argues that it did not forfeit its proposed
 construction because, in IOENGINE’s view, its construc-
 tions before the Board and this Court embody the same
 concepts. Appellant’s Reply Br. at 9–10 (citing Gaus v.
 Conair Corp., 363 F.3d 1284, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). We
 disagree. Requiring a terminal to take responsive action
 differs meaningfully from requiring either the terminal or
 the portable device to take responsive action. Requiring
 the responsive action to respond to the user also differs
 meaningfully from requiring the responsive action to mod-
 ify what is presented. We accordingly find that IOENGINE
 forfeited its proposed claim construction.
                              II
     We next address IOENGINE’s challenges to the
 Board’s anticipation determinations. “[A]nticipation is a
 question of fact subject to substantial evidence review.”
 Microsoft Corp. v. Biscotti, Inc., 878 F.3d 1052, 1068 (Fed.
 Cir. 2017). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence
 as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
 a conclusion.’” In re Applied Materials, Inc., 692 F.3d 1289,
 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB,
 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
     IOENGINE contends that the Board erred in conclud-
 ing that U.S. Patent Application Pub. No. 2003/0020813A1
 (Iida) anticipates certain challenged claims of the ’969 and
 ’703 patents. According to IOENGINE, Iida fails to dis-
 close an interactive user interface even under the Board’s
 construction, on the grounds that the “menus” of Iida are
 static images that provide no interactivity because they
 lack “clickable elements, checkboxes, or pointer events,”
 “positional feedback,” or any “other way to engage.” Appel-
 lant’s Br. 30. IOENGINE also argues that Iida’s disclosure
Case: 21-1227    Document: 109      Page: 8    Filed: 05/03/2024

 8                              IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.

 of pressing a number on a separate keypad involves no in-
 teraction with interface elements.
     The Board considered these arguments and found them
 unpersuasive. Relying on testimony by the petitioner’s ex-
 pert Mr. James Geier, the Board reasonably found that
 Iida’s menu screens, which display choices that a user can
 select, disclose interactive interface elements, and that Iida
 also discloses taking action in response to user selections.
 J.A. 144–45. As to IOENGINE’s argument that Iida’s in-
 teraction with a separate keypad does not disclose interac-
 tion with interface elements, the Board “decline[d] to
 import a limitation requiring that user interaction be
 based on location and/or movement of a user’s point of in-
 teraction.” J.A. 145. We see no reason to disturb these
 findings by the Board.
     IOENGINE also argues that Iida fails to disclose “sec-
 ond program code” providing a “communications node” on
 the terminal and “third program code” providing a “com-
 munications node” on the portable device, as required by
 certain claims of the Challenged Patents. According to
 IOENGINE, the Board erred by relying on Mr. Geier’s tes-
 timony to infer a missing claim element not disclosed in
 Iida. But the Board’s findings relied on Mr. Geier’s testi-
 mony that (1) Iida’s control unit (the disclosed terminal)
 acts as a communications node by executing code to per-
 form configurations to enable the terminal to communicate
 over a network, and (2) Iida’s camera (the disclosed porta-
 ble device) establishes its own communications node to co-
 ordinate network communications. J.A. 138–39, 140–41;
 J.A. 233–34, 238–39. The Board also relied on disclosures
 in the Challenged Patents’ own written description that
 the terminal or portable device may itself act as a commu-
 nications node. Substantial evidence thus supported the
 Board’s finding that Iida discloses program code providing
 a “communications node.” We therefore affirm the Board’s
 anticipation determinations as to all claims aside from
Case: 21-1227    Document: 109      Page: 9    Filed: 05/03/2024

 IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.                              9

 claims 4 and 7 of the ’969 patent and claims 61–62 and
 110–11 of the ’703 patent, which we discuss next.
                              III
     We turn, then, to IOENGINE’s argument that the
 Board erred in applying the printed matter doctrine to de-
 termine that Iida anticipates claims 4 and 7 of the ’969 pa-
 tent and claims 61–62 and 110–11 of the ’703 patent. In
 particular, IOENGINE argues that the Board incorrectly
 applied the printed matter doctrine to accord no patentable
 weight to certain claim limitations that recite “encrypted
 communications” and “program code.”
      “This court and its predecessor have long recognized
 that certain ‘printed matter’ falls outside the scope of pa-
 tentable subject matter under U.S. patent law.” C R Bard
 Inc. v. AngioDynamics, Inc., 979 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir.
 2020) (citing AstraZeneca LP v. Apotex, Inc., 633 F.3d 1042,
 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2010); In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 157
 (CCPA 1976)). Although “printed matter” historically re-
 ferred to claim elements involving actual “printed” mate-
 rial, today the doctrine has expanded to include any
 information claimed for its communicative content, regard-
 less of medium. Id.
     We apply a two-step test to determine whether a limi-
 tation should be accorded patentable weight under the
 printed matter doctrine. First, we determine whether the
 limitation in question is directed toward printed matter. In
 re Distefano, 808 F.3d 845, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2015). A “limita-
 tion is printed matter only if it claims the content of infor-
 mation.” Id. Put another way, printed matter is “matter
 claimed for what it communicates.” Id. at 850. “Only if the
 limitation in question is determined to be printed matter”
 do we proceed to the second step, which asks “whether the
 printed matter nevertheless should be given patentable
Case: 21-1227    Document: 109      Page: 10    Filed: 05/03/2024

  10                            IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.

  weight.” 4 Id. “Printed matter is given such weight if the
  claimed informational content has a functional or struc-
  tural relation to the substrate.” Id.
      Claims 4 and 7 of the ’969 patent, to which the Board
  applied the printed matter doctrine, both depend on claim
  2, which requires the “fourth program code [] when exe-
  cuted by the portable device processor, [to be] configured to
  cause a communication to be transmitted to the communi-
  cation network node.” Claim 4 of the ’969 patent recites
  “wherein the communication caused to be transmitted to
  the communication network node facilitates the transmis-
  sion of encrypted communications from the communication
  network node to the terminal.” In other words, claim 4 con-
  templates the portable device sending a communication to
  the communication network node, which in turn facilitates
  sending encrypted communications to the terminal. The
  Board determined that the term “‘encrypted communica-
  tions’ claims only communicative content, i.e. printed mat-
  ter” because it found “nothing in the claim that requires
  anything beyond sending and receiving data, even if the
  data is in an encrypted form.” J.A. 151. The Board further
  found that there was “no functional relationship of the en-
  crypted data to the communication carrying it” because
  nothing in the claims required “the data being used or ma-
  nipulated” or “any processing of encrypted data beyond the
  transmission of the same.” Id. The Board thus concluded
  that the limitation should be afforded no patentable
  weight.
       We disagree with the Board that the claimed “en-
  crypted communications” constitute printed matter. As
  discussed above, printed matter is matter that is claimed
  for its communicative content—i.e., the content specifically

       4  Giving a limitation “patentable weight” means it
  may be used as a basis for distinguishing prior art. Diste-
  fano, 808 F.3d at 848.
Case: 21-1227    Document: 109      Page: 11    Filed: 05/03/2024

  IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.                            11

  being communicated. The fact that there is a communica-
  tion itself is not content; content is what the communica-
  tion actually says. Nor is the form of a communication,
  such as whether the communication is encrypted, consid-
  ered to be content. Printed matter encompasses what is
  communicated—the content or information being commu-
  nicated—rather than the act of a communication itself.
      We have previously found that an FDA label providing
  dosage instructions for using a medical product is printed
  matter, that a label instructing a patient to take a drug
  with food is printed matter, that instructions on how to per-
  form a DNA test are printed matter, and that numbers
  printed on a wristband are printed matter. Distefano, 808
  F.3d at 849–50 (collecting cases). Unlike those examples,
  which claim communicative content such as medical in-
  structions or numbers, the encrypted communications here
  are not being claimed for any content that they are com-
  municating. We therefore find that the claimed “encrypted
  communications” do not constitute printed matter.
      The Board also declined to afford patentable weight to
  the “program code” limitation recited in claim 7 of the ’969
  patent and claims 61–62 and 110–11 of the ’703 patent.
  The relevant limitation in claim 7 of the ’969 patent recites
  “the communication caused to be transmitted to the com-
  munication network node facilitates the download of pro-
  gram code on the communication network node to the
  terminal.” That is, in claim 7, the communication to the
  communication network node facilitates the download of
  program code to the terminal, rather than the transmission
  of encrypted communications, as described above in claim
  4. Similarly, claims 61–62 and 110–11 of the ’703 patent
  recite “caus[ing] a communication to be transmitted to the
  communications network node to facilitate the download of
  program code from the communications network node to
  the” terminal or portable device. As to claim 7 of the ’969
  patent, the Board determined that “‘program code’ in claim
  7 is not entitled to patentable weight” because the “recital
Case: 21-1227    Document: 109     Page: 12    Filed: 05/03/2024

  12                            IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.

  of ‘downloading’ of program code in claim 7 is limited to
  downloading (sending or transmitting) the code, which is a
  communication, and no other function is recited in the
  claim.” J.A. 155. As to claims 61–62 and 110–11 of the ’703
  patent, the Board determined that “program code” “is
  ‘printed matter’ because it claims the content of the infor-
  mation that is downloaded,” J.A. 253, and that it is not en-
  titled to patentable weight because “the downloaded code
  is merely generic and has no functional relationship with
  either the portable device or the terminal,” J.A. 255.
      Here, too, we disagree with the Board. The “program
  code” is not claimed for its communicative content; no in-
  formational content is claimed. See Distefano, 808 F.3d at
  851 (“Although the selected web assets can and likely do
  communicate some information, the content of the infor-
  mation is not claimed.”). Indeed, the claim is altogether
  silent as to the contents of the claimed “program code.”
  That the code is being downloaded does not change the
  analysis. Because there is no particular content being
  claimed, the program code is not printed matter. To con-
  clude otherwise would impermissibly expand the printed
  matter doctrine far beyond its current scope.
      Because “encrypted communications” and “program
  code” are not being claimed here for the content they com-
  municate, they are not printed matter. The inquiry stops
  there; if the claim element is not printed matter, we need
  not consider whether it has a functional or structural rela-
  tion to its substrate.
      Finally, no remand is needed because Ingenico con-
  ceded at oral argument that it did not submit alternative
  grounds for invalidity, other than the printed matter doc-
  trine, with respect to the “encrypted communications” and
  “program code” limitations. Oral Arg. at 20:47–21:31
  (available at https://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov/de-
  fault.aspx?fl=21-1227_12072023.mp3). Accordingly, we re-
  verse the Board’s anticipation determinations as to claims
Case: 21-1227    Document: 109      Page: 13    Filed: 05/03/2024

  IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.                            13

  4 and 7 of the ’969 patent and claims 61–62 and 110–11 of
  the ’703 patent.
                               IV
      We next address IOENGINE’s challenges to the
  Board’s obviousness determinations. This court reviews
  the Board’s ultimate obviousness determinations de novo
  and its underlying factual findings for substantial evi-
  dence. Novartis AG v. Torrent Pharms. Ltd., 853 F.3d
  1316, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2017). “Motivation to combine is one
  of those underlying factual issues.” Id. (citing In re Gart-
  side, 203 F.3d 1305, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). “What a refer-
  ence teaches and the differences between the claimed
  invention and the prior art” are also questions of fact. In
  re Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1280
  (Fed. Cir. 2015).
      According to IOENGINE, a skilled artisan would not
  have been motivated to combine Iida with U.S. Patent Ap-
  plication Pub. No. 2002/0065872 (Genske) because
  “Genske’s computer-based GUI contradicts Iida’s core reli-
  ance on the camera to provide static images to ensure com-
  patibility with even the lowest-common-denominator
  phone.” Appellant’s Br. 44. IOENGINE also argues that
  the combination was based on hindsight, given certain
  gaps in Iida and Genske’s disclosures.          Id. at 45.
  IOENGINE further argues that the Board improperly
  mixed and matched embodiments disclosed in those refer-
  ences to arrive at the claimed invention. Id. at 47.
       We find each of these arguments to be unpersuasive.
  The Board relied on the petitioner’s expert testimony, as
  well as the disclosures in Iida and Genske themselves, to
  conclude that a skilled artisan would have been motivated
  to combine Iida and Genske. J.A. 41–48. Substantial evi-
  dence supported the Board’s finding. The Board also ad-
  dressed IOENGINE’s argument as to the purported gaps
  in Iida and Genske’s disclosures by noting that “‘[t]he ques-
  tion in an obviousness inquiry is whether it would have
Case: 21-1227    Document: 109      Page: 14    Filed: 05/03/2024

  14                            IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.

  been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to com-
  bine the relevant disclosures of the two references, not
  whether each individual reference discloses all of the nec-
  essary elements.’” J.A. 40 (quoting Game & Tech. Co., Ltd.
  v. Wargaming Grp. Ltd., 942 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir.
  2019)). We find that the Board appropriately combined rel-
  evant disclosures of the two references in its obviousness
  analysis, and that there was no impermissible “mixing and
  matching,” as IOENGINE contends.
       IOENGINE further argues that the Board erred in de-
  termining that Iida discloses certain claim limitations in
  the ’047 patent. First, IOENGINE contends that the Board
  erred in finding that Iida teaches the “second program
  code” which, when executed, “enables the portable device
  to . . . cause a communication to be sent,” as recited in
  claims 1, 24, and 27 of the ’047 patent. Appellant’s Br. 54
  (emphasis omitted). IOENGINE argues that claims 1 and
  24 expressly require the second program code to be stored
  in the memory of the portable device, but that Iida discloses
  the code being stored on the terminal. Appellant’s Br.
  54–55. The Board disagreed, finding that the petitioner
  sufficiently showed that “program code stored on Iida’s
  camera (portable device) performs the functions required
  in claim 1 for ‘second program code.’” J.A. 50–51 (citing
  Iida, J.A. 1229, at ¶¶ 54, 65; FIG. 4C). Moreover, the Board
  noted that “[n]othing in the claim language requires that
  all communication-related program code reside[] on the
  portable device, as opposed to the terminal.” J.A. 51. We
  find the Board’s analysis reasonable, and thus supported
  by substantial evidence.
      Second, IOENGINE contends that the Board erred in
  finding that Iida discloses the limitation reciting that “ex-
  ecuting the first program code . . . causes the terminal pro-
  cessor to present an interactive user interface on the first
  output component” in claim 25 of the ’047 patent. The
  Board considered and reasonably rejected this argument,
  noting that IOENGINE’s position is “premised on an
Case: 21-1227    Document: 109      Page: 15     Filed: 05/03/2024

  IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.                             15

  implicit claim construction” that “present an interactive
  user interface” refers to controlling and generating the con-
  tent of the interface. J.A. 68. The Board relied on “the ’047
  patent’s other uses of the word ‘present’” to conclude that
  “‘present’ simply refers to showing or displaying,” with no
  requirement that the presentation be generated by a cer-
  tain device. J.A. 69. From this, as well as Iida’s disclo-
  sures, the Board concluded that Iida discloses the disputed
  limitation of claim 25. We see no error in the Board’s un-
  derstanding of the claim term “present,” and thus find that
  substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion.
       Finally, IOENGINE argues that the Board erred in its
  determination that claims 74, 89, 100, and 123 of the ’703
  patent, which include the limitation “wherein the data
  stored on the portable device memory comprises a digital
  certificate,” are rendered obvious by Iida in combination
  with U.S. Patent No. 6,088,805 (Davis). IOENGINE al-
  leges that it would not have been obvious to substitute
  Iida’s username and password for Davis’s certificates be-
  cause the certificate in Davis is associated with a client de-
  vice, not a user. Appellant’s Br. 63. But the disclosure in
  Davis that the Board relied on expressly discusses individ-
  ual user HTTP-layer authentication that may be accom-
  plished via digital certificates. J.A. 274 (citing J.A. 14837
  col. 1 ll. 38–45). We find no error in the Board’s determi-
  nation that it would have been obvious to a skilled artisan
  to combine Iida and Davis to arrive at the claimed “digital
  certificate.”
      Based on the foregoing, we affirm the Board’s determi-
  nations as to all claims found to be obvious.
                          CONCLUSION
      We find none of IOENGINE’s remaining arguments
  persuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the
  Board’s determinations of unpatentability as to claims 4
  and 7 of the ’969 patent and claims 61–62 and 110–11 of
Case: 21-1227   Document: 109      Page: 16   Filed: 05/03/2024

  16                          IOENGINE, LLC v. INGENICO INC.

  the ’703 patent. We affirm the Board’s determinations of
  unpatentability as to all other claims.
       REVERSED-IN-PART, AFFIRMED-IN-PART
                           COSTS
  No costs.