Court Opinion

ID: 9551927
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:02:11.160169+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:07.186775
License: Public Domain

ELLETT, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. This is the second appeal in this case. The facts were set out in the former opinion.1 In substance, they are these:
Mr. and Mrs. Painter ostensibly had a joint bank account. Beehive State Bank as judgment creditor of Mrs. Painter attached the funds, claiming all of it. Mrs. Painter died, and Mr. Painter interpleaded himself and moved for a summary judgment for a release of all the funds. This motion was by the trial court granted, and on. appeal we reversed, saying:
If the contract between the parties ostensibly creates a joint tenancy relationship with full right of survivorship, there arises a presumption that such is the case unless and until some interested party *76shows under equitable rules that the contract should be reformed to show some other agreement of the parties or that the contract is not enforceable because of fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity.
* * =¡= * * *
We are of the opinion that this case cannot be settled by a summary judgment based upon the undisputed evidence now before the court. The interest of lia R. Painter in and to the fund while she was alive, if any she had, should be applied toward the satisfaction of the appellant’s judgment against her.2
Pursuant to the remand another trial was had wherein Mr. Painter testified that he had deposited all of the funds in the account. The court thereupon signed a memorandum decision containing the following:
1. That the contract in the names of Fred L. Painter and lia R. Painter created a joint tenancy relationship.
2. That the Intervener presented no evidence that the joint deposit contract should be reformed or varied or that the same was unenforceable.
3. That a garnishee judgment should be entered in favor of the plaintiff for the full amount of the joint account.
Thereafter, findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment were duly signed and filed awarding all of the fund to the Beehive State Bank. Mr. Painter has appealed from that judgment.
We held in the prior decision that the fund could be attached and that the interest therein, if any, of Mrs. Painter could be applied to the satisfaction of judgment against her.
The court apparently thought that because Mrs. Painter had the authority to draw all of the money from the account at the time the garnishment was served, the entire fund could be applied pursuant to the garnishment to the judgment creditor’s account. This belief is not well founded. If a true joint tenancy relationship existed, as the court found it did, then there had to be four unities in existence between the joint tenants, viz.: unity of time, title, interest and possession. Each tenant must, therefore, have the same interest in and to the fund as do all other tenants therein.
In the former appeal we said that an ostensible joint tenancy relationship would be presumed to be just that unless the agreement could be reformed to show some other relationship or because of fraud, mistake, incapacity, or other infirmity which would prevent the enforcement of the agreement. Since there was no proof given at the trial which tended to show that the *77ostensible relationship of joint tenancy did not exist, it must be held that Mr. and Mrs. Painter were joint tenants, each having a one half interest in and to the funds. We think the following cases state the better rule of law as it applies to the instant matter:
In Dover Trust Co. v. Brooks, 111 N.J. Eq. 40, 160 A. 890 (N.J. Chancery 1932), court said:
* * * The service of the writ of attachment and the levy under execution worked a severance of Mr. and Mrs. Brooks’ joint ownership in the account in question and made them tenants in common thereof and terminated the right of survivorship. The question then is: What was the extent of Brooks’ interest as a tenant in common, taken under the attachment and execution? I do not think that the fact that the deposits and withdrawals made by Mr. and Mrs. Brooks were unequal in amount has any bearing in determining that question in this case, because by the form in which they opened and maintained the account for nine years, as each made a deposit in the account, he or she gave to the other an interest in such deposit co-extensive with the interest of the one making the deposit and each had equal rights with the other to draw against such deposits and to withdraw any part, or the whole of the account. I conclude that the attachment issued at Jones’ suit and the execution issued on the judgment entered therein effected a severance of Mr. and Mrs. Brooks’ joint interest in the account, and that they thereupon became tenants in common thereof in equal shares. The result is that one half of the fund in court should be ordered paid to Jones, or to the sheriff who holds the execution in his suit against Brooks, to apply on account of Jones’ judgment, and that the other half should be ordered paid to Mrs. Brooks.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey approved the ruling of the Dover Trust Company case in the case of Republic of China v. Pong-Tsu Mow, 15 N.J. 139, 104 A.2d 322, 326 (1954), and said:
The effect of an attachment or execution against the interest of two owners of a joint account makes the owners tenants in common, and under such attachment or execution the debtor’s interest in such an account may be seized. [Citation omitted.]
* * * The writ of attachment in this case has the effect of merely preserving the stahis q%io until the determination of their principal’s claim to ownership of the funds entrusted to them.
In American Oil Co. v. Falconer, 136 Pa. Super. 598, 8 A.2d 418, 421, 422 (1939), the court held:
It seems clear that the joint tenancy in this bank deposit is severable by the ac*78tion, voluntary or involuntary, of any one of the parties. The effect of the attachment execution is to sever the joint tenancy and to make William Falconer a tenant in common with his mother and sister, and the one-third of such deposit becomes liable to answer for the judgment of the plaintiff against the son. The plaintiff is entitled to a judgment against the garnishee for such sum not exceeding the one-third of the deposit as is necessary to satisfy its , judgment against William Falconer.
An attachment in aid of execution of a judgment lawfully issued against the interest of a joint tenant destroys the unity of possession of that tenant, as he is deprived of any right to possession o'f the fund. The depositors become tenants in common; and the death of one of them thereafter does not affect the title to the interest held under the writ of garnishment.
I, therefore, do not think this case should be remanded for further proceedings. The parties have had their day in court, and it is my opinion that the plaintiff, .Beehive State Bank, as judgment creditor of Mrs. Painter, is entitled to have one half of the fund applied to its judgment and Mr. Painter- is entitled to the other half. I would reverse the ruling of the trial court and direct it to enter judgment as indicated above. The appellant should be awarded his costs-. . . .

. Beehive State Bank v. Rosquist, 21 Utah 2d 17, 439 P.2d 468 (1968).

. 21 Utah 2d 17, 22, 439 P.2d 468, 471.