Court Opinion

ID: 9401519
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-13 14:14:15.735961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:53.217663
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED

              Present: Judges AtLee, Causey and Callins

              AUSTIN E. KERSEY
                                                                               MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.       Record No. 1065-22-1                                        PER CURIAM
                                                                                   JUNE 13, 2023
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                   FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NORFOLK
                                               Everett A. Martin, Jr., Judge

                                (J. Barry McCracken, Assistant Public Defender, on brief), for
                                appellant.

                                (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Susan Hallie Hovey-Murray,
                                Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                       Austin E. Kersey appeals from the decision of the Circuit Court of the City of Norfolk

              revoking a portion of his previously suspended sentence. Kersey contends that the trial court

              abused its discretion by imposing a total of one year and four months’ incarceration because it

              “focused on incapacitation” and failed to give proper weight to his mitigating evidence, including

              his desire to overcome his drug addiction, his active sentence for his new misdemeanor offenses,

              and his opportunity to receive inpatient therapeutic treatment. After examining the briefs and record

              in this case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is

              wholly without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). We affirm the decision of the trial

              court.

                       *
                           This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413.
                                         BACKGROUND

       “On appeal, ‘[w]e “view the evidence received at [a] revocation hearing in the light most

favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party, including all reasonable and legitimate

inferences that may properly be drawn from it.”’” Green v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 69, 76

(2022) (alterations in original) (quoting Johnson v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 266, 274 (2018)).

“[T]he trial court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed unless there is a clear

showing of abuse of discretion.’” Id. (quoting Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 61 Va. App. 529, 535

(2013)).

       In September 2020, the trial court convicted Kersey of strangulation under a written plea

agreement. The court sentenced Kersey to five years’ imprisonment with four years and five

months suspended, conditioned upon good behavior and the successful completion of five years’

supervised probation. In addition, the trial court ordered Kersey to “have no contact” with the

victim. In May 2021, the trial court revoked and resuspended Kersey’s sentence, in part.

       Kersey finished his term of active incarceration and began supervised probation in May

2021. In October 2021, Kersey’s probation officer reported that Kersey’s adjustment to supervised

probation was “poor” because Kersey had incurred new convictions for violation of protective

orders, destruction of property, and trespassing. In addition, he had incurred new charges for assault

and battery of a family member and misdemeanor failure to appear. The trial court issued a capias

on October 8, 2021, which was served on Kersey on January 9, 2022. In an addendum, Kersey’s

probation officer reported that Kersey had been convicted of assault and battery of a family

member.1 Kersey received a total of 20 months and 90 days of active incarceration for his new

convictions.

       1
         Kersey’s pending charge for misdemeanor failure to appear was dismissed. In addition,
other charges for assault and battery of a family member, strangulation, and abduction by force
were nolle prossed.
                                                -2-
        At the revocation hearing, Kersey admitted that he had violated the terms and conditions of

his previously suspended sentence. Sarah Soyars testified that she was in a “romantic” relationship

with Kersey for “the past year or two.” Soyars contended that Kersey was a “good person who

made mistakes” and had had a “rough upbringing.” According to Soyars, Kersey was not

aggressive or violent except when he used drugs. Soyars had submitted an application to an

inpatient treatment facility where Kersey would receive the “foundation and tools he need[ed] to

succeed” in his drug addiction recovery. After Kersey completed the inpatient treatment, he would

be transferred to “sober living.”

        Soyars acknowledged that she was the victim of Kersey’s most recent conviction for assault

and battery of a family member. She was also the recipient of the protective order that Kersey had

violated on three separate occasions. Soyars explained, however, that she had since had the

protective order dissolved.

        Kersey proffered that he was raised in a “broken home” and, at 14 years old, started

smoking crack cocaine with his addicted mother. Kersey contended that he often maintained his

sobriety but, at other times, was “overcome by his addiction.” Kersey had completed a “jail-based”

substance abuse treatment program and wanted to “take his sobriety skills to the next level.” Kersey

acknowledged that he needed additional treatment but noted that he could not participate in an

inpatient substance abuse treatment program if he was incarcerated. Thus, Kersey asked the trial

court to impose a sentence that would allow him to attend inpatient therapy because the jail did not

offer any other programs that would help him.

                                                -3-
        The Commonwealth asked the trial court to impose a sentence at the high end of the

sentencing guidelines.2 The Commonwealth argued that Kersey had been convicted in 2017 and

2018 for assault and battery against a different woman and he continued to assault women. The

Commonwealth acknowledged that Kersey was working toward sobriety but noted that this was

Kersey’s second probation violation and he had incurred “multiple” new misdemeanor convictions

that were similar to his underlying offenses.

        In rebuttal, Kersey stressed that his substance abuse was the “root of [his] problem” and the

trial court could not “incarcerate someone into sobriety.” Kersey noted that when he was released

from incarceration, he would be in the “same position” that he was in now because he would not

receive the “benefit of inpatient rehab and sober living.” Kersey argued that rehabilitation and sober

living were his “best chance” to transition from an “institutionalized lifestyle and back into the

community.” In Kersey’s view, incarceration would prove a “disservice” to him and “these young

women” because incarceration did not address the “root cause of the problem.”

        The trial court found appellant in violation of the terms and conditions of his probation,

noting that incarcerating Kersey would be “doing women somewhat a favor” by protecting them. In

allocution, Kersey stated that he was raised in a “domestic situation” and watched his mother suffer

physical abuse. As he grew older, Kersey claimed that he became a “body guard, a shield” for his

mother. When he was released from prison, Kersey was “on the right path” but, when his sister and

her child died, he fell into addiction. Kersey apologized for hurting the victims, stating that he felt

“bad” for his actions; he contended that he loved the victims. He acknowledged that he treated the

victims the same way he “grew up watching” his mother being treated. He stressed that he wanted

to “break the cycle” of abuse, “separat[e] from drugs,” and give himself a “chance.”

        2
        The discretionary sentencing guidelines recommended a sentencing range of three
months to one year imprisonment.
                                             -4-
       Having found appellant in violation, the trial court revoked his previously suspended

sentence and resuspended three years. Thus, the trial court imposed a total of one year and four

months’ active incarceration. Kersey appeals.

                                            ANALYSIS

       After suspending a sentence, a trial court “may revoke the suspension of sentence for any

cause the court deems sufficient that occurred at any time within the probation period, or within the

period of suspension fixed by the court.” Code § 19.2-306(A). “If the court, after hearing, finds

good cause to believe that the defendant has violated the terms of suspension, then the court may

revoke the suspension and impose a sentence in accordance with the provisions of § 19.2-306.1.”

Code § 19.2-306(C). “The court may again suspend all or any part of this sentence for a period up

to the statutory maximum period for which the defendant might originally have been sentenced to

be imprisoned, less any time already served, and may place the defendant upon terms and

conditions or probation.” Id.

       Kersey does not contend that the trial court did not have sufficient cause to revoke his

suspended sentence. Indeed, he admitted that he was in violation. Rather, Kersey argues that the

trial court abused its sentencing discretion because it “focused on [his] incapacitation” and failed

to give proper weight to his mitigating evidence. He asserts that his addiction was the “primary

source” of his issues and the trial court should have tailored a sentence that allowed him to pursue

his desire to overcome his addiction through inpatient therapeutic treatment. He also argues that his

active incarceration on the new misdemeanor offenses was “adequate” and further incarceration was

unnecessary. Kersey concludes that a sentence that allowed him to receive treatment would have

benefited him and society by ensuring his “future compliance with social norms.”

       Relevant to Kersey’s claim, Code § 19.2-306.1(B) provides that “[i]f the court finds the

basis of a violation of the terms and conditions of a suspended sentence or probation is that the

                                                 -5-
defendant was convicted of a criminal offense that was committed after the date of the

suspension, . . . then the court may revoke the suspension and impose or resuspend any or all of

that period previously suspended.” (Emphasis added). The record demonstrates that Kersey

suffered several new criminal convictions during the suspension period. Thus, it was within the

trial court’s discretion to “impose or resuspend any or all” of the previously suspended sentence.

Id.

       It was equally within the trial court’s purview to weigh any mitigating factors Kersey

presented, such as his active sentence on his new convictions, addiction, and desire to receive

inpatient therapeutic treatment. See Keselica v. Commonwealth, 34 Va. App. 31, 36 (2000).

Balanced against that mitigating evidence, however, were significant facts in aggravation.

Indeed, Kersey incurred “several” new misdemeanor convictions of the same nature as his

underlying offense while on probation.

       “The statutes dealing with probation and suspension are remedial and intended to give the

trial court valuable tools to help rehabilitate an offender through the use of probation, suspension of

all or part of a sentence, and/or restitution payments.” Howell v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 737, 740

(2007). Kersey’s convictions for new offenses support the trial court’s conclusion that he was not

amenable to rehabilitation. “When coupled with a suspended sentence, probation represents ‘an act

of grace on the part of the Commonwealth to one who has been convicted and sentenced to a term

of confinement.’” Hunter v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 582, 587 (2010) (quoting Price v.

Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 443, 448 (2008)). Kersey failed to make productive use of the grace

that had been extended to him and instead incurred new convictions “of the same nature” as his

underlying offense. Accordingly, we hold that the sentence the trial court imposed represents a

proper exercise of its sentencing discretion. See Alsberry v. Commonwealth, 39 Va. App. 314,

321-22 (2002) (finding the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the defendant’s previously

                                                 -6-
suspended sentence in its entirety “in light of the grievous nature of [the defendant’s] . . . offenses

and his continuing criminal activity”).3

                                            CONCLUSION

        Finding no abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                                                               Affirmed.

        3
         To the extent Kersey argues that his sentence was disproportionate to his probation
violation, it is well established that we will not engage in a proportionality review in cases that
do not involve life sentences without the possibility of parole. Cole v. Commonwealth, 58
Va. App. 642, 653-54 (2011). We noted in Cole that the Supreme Court of the United States
“has never found a non-life ‘sentence for a term of years within the limits authorized by statute
to be, by itself, a cruel and unusual punishment’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at
653 (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 372 (1982) (per curiam)); cf. Vasquez v.
Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 243 (2016) (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to 133-year
active sentence because the sentence was imposed for “eighteen separate crimes”).
                                                  -7-