Court Opinion

ID: 9949045
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-08 17:11:12.188147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:35.293540
License: Public Domain

J-S43026-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                       Appellee                :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  CORLYNN MCGEORGE PARKER                      :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :       No. 542 MDA 2023

       Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 9, 2023
               In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
            Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0004407-2020

BEFORE:      McLAUGHLIN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                                FILED: MARCH 8, 2024

       Appellant, Corlynn McGeorge Parker, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, following his

jury trial conviction for carrying a firearm without a license.1 We affirm and

grant counsel’s application to withdraw.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.

On September 29, 2020, Detective Kenneth Platt of the Swatara Township

Police Department was on duty with his partner, Detective Corkle.             At

approximately 1:50 p.m., the detectives entered the parking lot of a Howard

Johnson’s hotel as part of their patrol duties. The detectives knew that the

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).
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parking lot was a “high-crime area,” and narcotics trafficking at local hotels

had become “a problem.” (N.T. Trial, 7/20/21, at 20).

      As the detectives drove to the back of the hotel, they observed a silver

Mitsubishi SUV parked in the lot. Detective Platt checked the SUV’s license

plate number, which revealed that it was registered to Appellant’s mother.

The detectives drove closer to the SUV and saw Appellant standing next to the

driver’s side door, which was open. Another individual, Tamarion Brown, “was

leaning out of the” rear door on the passenger’s side. (Id. at 24). A third

person, Kioara Lifhred, was seated in the rear of the SUV on the driver’s side.

      Mr. Brown “had a cigar in his hand, and he was taking the tobacco

contents out of the cigar and shelling it out on … the ground there at the car

door.” (Id.) The detectives believed that Mr. Brown was preparing to smoke

marijuana, and they approached the SUV and its occupants. Detective Platt

immediately detected “the odor of burnt marijuana coming from the area of

the vehicle.” (Id. at 25). Detective Platt asked Mr. Brown to step out of the

SUV, and Mr. Brown complied. As Mr. Brown exited the SUV, Detective Platt

saw the magazine for a firearm and other ammunition on the floor of the

backseat. With Mr. Brown outside the SUV, Detective Platt saw “the back

strap of a firearm protruding from” underneath the driver’s seat. (Id.)

      Detective Platt notified Detective Corkle about the presence of the

firearm, and Detective Corkle detained Appellant. At that point, Ms. Lifhred

attempted to flee on foot. Detective Corkle gave chase and apprehended Ms.

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Lifhred inside the hotel.        Additional units responded to the scene, and

Detective Platt continued to look through “the open driver-side door” for

contraband in plain view. (Id. at 26). Detective Platt saw “another magazine

visible in the center cup holder of the vehicle,” and he also “observed a round

on the driver’s floor mat.” (Id.)

       Shortly thereafter, Appellant’s mother arrived at the scene and informed

the detectives that Appellant had been staying at the hotel with his friend,

Danielle Cruz. Police went to Appellant’s room and obtained verbal consent

from Ms. Cruz to conduct a search. Inside the room, police recovered more

ammunition.       The detectives subsequently interviewed Appellant.       After

receiving Miranda2 warnings, Appellant “said that the gun in the car is

mine[.]” (Id. at 43). Further investigation revealed that Appellant did not

have a license to carry the firearm.

       Following trial, a jury convicted Appellant of carrying a firearm without

a license. On February 9, 2023, the court sentenced Appellant to three and

one-half (3½) to seven (7) years’ imprisonment. On March 7, 2023, Appellant

filed a post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc. In it, Appellant explained that he

failed to file a timely post-sentence motion “due to a miscommunication” with

counsel. (Nunc Pro Tunc Motion, filed 3/7/23, at ¶4). Appellant also argued

that Detective Platt “lied on numerous occasions” during trial. (Id. at ¶6).

____________________________________________

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).

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Considering the purportedly false testimony, Appellant concluded that the

verdict was against the weight of the evidence. By order entered March 9,

2023, the court expressly permitted Appellant to seek nunc pro tunc relief.

Nevertheless, the court rejected Appellant’s challenge to the weight of the

evidence.

      On April 7, 2023, Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal. The court

ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors

complained of on appeal on April 18, 2023. Following an extension, counsel

filed a statement of intent to withdraw, pursuant to Rule 1925(c)(4). Counsel

subsequently filed an application to withdraw and an appellate brief pursuant

to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).

      Preliminarily, counsel seeks to withdraw representation pursuant to

Anders and Commonwealth v. Santiago, 602 Pa. 159, 978 A.2d 349

(2009). Anders and Santiago require counsel to: (1) petition the Court for

leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough review of the record,

counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are wholly frivolous; (2) file a

brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the

appeal; and (3) furnish a copy of the brief to the appellant and advise him of

his right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se brief to raise any additional

points the appellant deems worthy of review. Santiago, supra at 173-79,

978 A.2d at 358-61.     “Substantial compliance with these requirements is

sufficient.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 781 (Pa.Super. 2015).

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After establishing that counsel has met the antecedent requirements to

withdraw, this Court makes an independent review of the record to confirm

that the appeal is wholly frivolous. Commonwealth v. Palm, 903 A.2d 1244,

1246 (Pa.Super. 2006). See also Commonwealth v. Dempster, 187 A.3d

266 (Pa.Super. 2018) (en banc).

     In Santiago, supra, our Supreme Court addressed the briefing

requirements where court-appointed appellate counsel seeks to withdraw

representation:

        Neither Anders nor [Commonwealth v. McClendon, 495
        Pa. 467, 434 A.2d 1185 (1981)] requires that counsel’s brief
        provide an argument of any sort, let alone the type of
        argument that counsel develops in a merits brief. To repeat,
        what the brief must provide under Anders are references
        to anything in the record that might arguably support the
        appeal.

                                  *    *    *

        Under Anders, the right to counsel is vindicated by
        counsel’s examination and assessment of the record and
        counsel’s reference to anything in the record that arguably
        supports the appeal.

Santiago, supra at 176, 177, 978 A.2d at 359, 360. Thus, the Court held:

        [I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed
        counsel’s petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a
        summary of the procedural history and facts, with citations
        to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that
        counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth
        counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4)
        state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
        frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
        record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
        have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

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Id. at 178-79, 978 A.2d at 361.

      Instantly, Appellant’s counsel filed an application to withdraw.      The

application states that counsel reviewed the entire record and relevant law to

determine that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel also supplied Appellant with a

copy of the Anders brief and a letter explaining Appellant’s right to retain new

counsel or proceed pro se to raise any additional points Appellant deems

worthy of this Court’s attention.

      In the Anders brief, counsel provided a statement of facts and

procedural history of the case. The argument section of the brief refers to

relevant case law concerning Appellant’s issues, and it provides citations to

facts from the record. Counsel also provides the reasons for her conclusion

that the appeal is wholly frivolous.      Therefore, counsel has substantially

complied with the technical requirements of Anders and Santiago.

      Appellant has not responded to the Anders brief pro se or with newly

retained private counsel. Counsel raises the following issues on Appellant’s

behalf:

          Whether the trial court erred in accepting the jury’s verdict
          where the Commonwealth failed to present sufficient
          evidence … where [Appellant] was found in close proximity
          to the firearm.

          Whether the trial court erred in accepting the jury’s verdict
          which went against the weight of the evidence which
          established three individuals were in close proximity of the
          firearm.

(Anders Brief at 4) (footnote omitted).

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      On appeal, Appellant baldly asserts that the police witness lied at trial.

Appellant also insists that constructive possession of contraband may be found

in more than one person under certain circumstances.           Here, Appellant

emphasizes that two other people were inside the vehicle when the detectives

approached. One of the individuals was preparing to smoke marijuana, and

the other attempted to flee the scene. Moreover, Appellant reiterates that the

firearm was not on his person; rather, the detectives found it on the floor of

a vehicle that was registered to his mother.      Under these circumstances,

Appellant concludes that the Commonwealth presented insufficient evidence

to establish his possession of the firearm. Appellant also concludes that the

verdict was against the weight of the evidence. We disagree.

      In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, our standard

of review is as follows:

         As a general matter, our standard of review of sufficiency
         claims requires that we evaluate the record in the light most
         favorable to the verdict winner giving the prosecution the
         benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the
         evidence. Evidence will be deemed sufficient to support the
         verdict when it establishes each material element of the
         crime charged and the commission thereof by the accused,
         beyond a reasonable doubt.              Nevertheless, the
         Commonwealth need not establish guilt to a mathematical
         certainty. Any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to be
         resolved by the fact finder unless the evidence is so weak
         and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no probability of
         fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

         The Commonwealth may sustain its burden by means of
         wholly circumstantial evidence. Accordingly, [t]he fact that
         the evidence establishing a defendant’s participation in a
         crime is circumstantial does not preclude a conviction where

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          the evidence coupled with the reasonable inferences drawn
          therefrom overcomes the presumption of innocence.
          Significantly, we may not substitute our judgment for that
          of the fact finder; thus, so long as the evidence adduced,
          accepted in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
          demonstrates the respective elements of a defendant’s
          crimes beyond a reasonable doubt, the appellant’s
          convictions will be upheld.

Commonwealth v. Sebolka, 205 A.3d 329, 336-37 (Pa.Super. 2019)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Franklin, 69 A.3d 719, 722-23 (Pa.Super.

2013)).

      Additionally,

             The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder
             of the fact who is free to believe all, part or none of
             the evidence and to determine the credibility of the
             witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute its
             judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we may
             only reverse the … verdict if it is so contrary to the
             evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice.

          Commonwealth v. Small, 559 Pa. 423, [435,] 741 A.2d
          666, 672-73 (1999). Moreover, where the trial court has
          ruled on the weight claim below, an appellant court’s role is
          not to consider the underlying question of whether the
          verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather,
          appellate review is limited to whether the trial court palpably
          abused its discretion in ruling on the weight claim.

Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 444, 832 A.2d 403, 408

(2003), cert denied, 542 U.S. 939, 124 S.Ct. 2906, 159 L.Ed.2d 816 (2004)

(most internal citations omitted).

      The Uniform Firearms Act provides, in relevant part, as follows:

          § 6106. Firearms not to be carried without a license

             (a)   Offense defined.—

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                 (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), any
            person who carries a firearm in any vehicle or any person
            who carries a firearm concealed on or about his person,
            except in his place of abode or fixed place of business,
            without a valid and lawfully issued license under this
            chapter commits a felony of the third degree.

18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).

      “When contraband is not found on the defendant’s person, the

Commonwealth must establish constructive possession….” Commonwealth

v. Jones, 874 A.2d 108, 121 (Pa.Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Haskins, 677 A.2d 328, 330 (Pa.Super. 1996)). “Constructive possession is

the ability to exercise conscious control or dominion over the illegal substance

and the intent to exercise that control.” Id. “The intent to exercise conscious

dominion can be inferred from the totality of the circumstances.”           Id.

“Constructive possession may be found in one or more actors where the item

in issue is in an area of joint control and equal access.” Commonwealth v.

Valette, 531 Pa. 384, 388, 613 A.2d 548, 550 (1992).

         It is well established that, as with any other element of a
         crime, constructive possession may be proven by
         circumstantial     evidence.      In   other   words,   the
         Commonwealth must establish facts from which the trier of
         fact can reasonably infer that the defendant exercised
         dominion and control over the contraband at issue.

Commonwealth v. Parrish, 191 A.3d 31, 36-37 (Pa.Super. 2018), appeal

denied, 651 Pa. 10, 202 A.3d 42 (2019) (internal citations and quotation

marks omitted).

      Instantly, the Commonwealth’s evidence established that Appellant was

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standing next to the driver’s side door of his mother’s SUV. The SUV was in

a hotel parking lot that was known to police as a high-crime area. When the

detectives observed Mr. Brown preparing to smoke marijuana in the back of

the SUV, they decided to investigate the matter further.          Detective Platt

approached the SUV and asked Mr. Brown to exit the vehicle. As Mr. Brown

exited, the detective saw a firearm and ammunition on the floor in the back

of the SUV. Subsequent investigation revealed additional ammunition inside

Appellant’s hotel room.     Later, Appellant provided a statement to police

indicating that the firearm belonged to him.

      Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth

as verdict winner, sufficient evidence supported the firearms conviction. See

Sebolka, supra. Despite Appellant’s bald assertion that Detective Platt lied

during the trial, it was reasonable for the jury to credit the testimony regarding

circumstantial evidence of constructive possession. Id. Under the totality of

these circumstances, the Commonwealth demonstrated Appellant’s conscious

control or dominion over the firearm. See Jones, supra. Moreover, the court

evaluated Appellant’s post-sentence motion nunc pro tunc and determined

that the verdict was not so contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense

of justice. We cannot say that the court abused its discretion in reaching this

conclusion. See Champney, supra. Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to

relief on his sufficiency and weight claims. Further, our independent review

of the record does not reveal any additional, non-frivolous issues preserved

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on appeal.    See Palm, supra.     Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of

sentence and grant counsel’s application to withdraw.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Application to withdraw is granted.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/8/2024

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