Court Opinion

ID: 9572318
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:40:49.050611+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:32:26.058165
License: Public Domain

TIMMONS-GOODSON, Judge,
dissenting.
After a careful review of the record, I respectfully dissent. The majority concludes that summary judgment was inappropriate because of the proximate cause issue. This Court has previously stated that when a plaintiff has become aware that potential dangers have been created by the negligence of another, and then “ ‘by an independent act of negligence, brings about an accident,’ ” the defendant is relieved of liability, “ ‘because the condition created by [the defendant] was merely a circumstance of the accident and not its proximate cause.’ ” McNair v. Boyette, 15 N.C. App. 69, 73, 189 S.E.2d 590, 593, affirmed, 282 N.C. 230, 192 S.E.2d 457 (1972) (quoting Powers v. Sternberg, 213 N.C. 41, 44, 195 S.E. 88, 90 (1938)). I believe that defendant’s act of stopping his vehicle was merely a circumstance of the accident and not the proximate cause of plaintiff’s injuries.
In order to state a claim for negligence, “plaintiff must show (1) that there has been a failure to exercise proper care in the performance of some legal duty which defendant owed to plaintiff under the *625circumstances in which they were placed; and (2) that such negligent breach of duty was a proximate cause of the injury.” Hairston v. Alexander Tank & Equipment Co., 310 N.C. 227, 232, 311 S.E.2d 559, 564 (1984). Therefore, upon a showing that the defendant was negligent, there must also be a “showing or determination of proximate cause.” King v. Allred, 309 N.C. 113, 117, 305 S.E.2d 554, 557 (1983), disc. review denied, 315 N.C. 184, 337 S.E.2d 857 (1985). Proximate cause is defined as
a cause which in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any new and independent cause, produced the plaintiffs injuries, and without which the injuries would not have occurred, and one from which a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen that such a result, or consequences of a generally injurious nature, was probable under all the facts as they existed.
Hariston, 310 N.C. at 233, 311 S.E.2d at 565.
Here, the evidence fails to show that defendant was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injuries. During his deposition, plaintiff gave the following testimony:
Q: Tell me what happen[?]
A: ... I just know I applied my brakes and then made my move to go into that next-hand lane, which I did maneuver that. I don’t know whether I skidded on something or hit the reflector marker[.]
Q; —you did not intentionally lay your bike down in an attempt to slide. That wasn’t an intentional act.
A: I recall that it went down. I recall that ... I could make my maneuver because I had been scanning, and I believed that right lane to be open, ... I had sufficient time to make my move into that right-hand lane, apply my brakes, and make my swerve into that right-hand lane.
Q: How slow or how fast do you believe you were going when you hit that object which caused your bike to begin to skid?
A: ... I know I slowed down with the application of both the front and rear brakes. ... I just know that I slowed down. ... I slowed down to the point where I was able to make my swerve into the right-hand lane.
The majority contends that plaintiff made a “split-second” decision to avoid an impact with defendant’s vehicle and “began to skid *626for unknown reasons.” A review of plaintiff’s testimony clearly places responsibility for the accident on him either “skidding on something” or hitting a lane reflector. Moreover, plaintiffs testimony reveals that he was aware of the potential danger created by defendant’s accident, had sufficient time to apply his breaks, safely merge into a different lane, and in an independent act, failed to maintain control of his motorcycle. Therefore, it is clear that there was an independent cause, apart from defendant’s collision, which resulted in plaintiff sustaining injuries. Accordingly, I would affirm the order of the trial court.