Court Opinion

ID: 9811012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 22:06:05.62118+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:23.748330
License: Public Domain

Stacy, C. J.,
dissenting: One of the vital issues in the case was whether the defendant slew the deceased in cold blood or in the heat of passion, suddenly aroused by argument over the damage to his automobile. After correctly stating the elements of murder in the first degree to be the unlawful killing of a human being with malice and with premeditation and deliberation, the court then said: “And the court charges you that if the State has satisfied you from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant unlawfully killed Duck'LeGrand with malice, and has further satisfied you from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that prior to the time the defendant inflicted upon Duck LeGrand the fatal wound, the defendant had formed a fixed purpose in his mind to kill her, and that, pursuant to that purpose he did kill Duck LeGrand *284because of the purpose in his mind, and not because of any legal provocation given him, then the Court charges you that if the State has so satisfied you from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant would be guilty of murder in the first degree, and it would be your duty to so find.”
This charge as applied to the facts of the instant record fails to draw any distinction between a fixed purpose “deliberately formed” and one engendered from passion suddenly aroused. S. v. Thomas, 118 N. C., 1113, 24 S. E., 431; S. v. Walker, 173 N. C., 780, 92 S. E., 327. It sufficiently defines premeditation, but makes no reference to deliberation. S. v. Fuller, 114 N. C., 885, 19 S. E., 797. “Premeditation” imports prior consideration, “thought of beforehand,” while “deliberation” signifies reflection, “in a cool state of the blood.” S. v. Exum, 138 N. C., 601, 50 S. E., 283; S. v. Evans, 198 N. C., 82, 150 S. E., 678. It may not be necessary in every case to refer to the two terms separately, but both ideas are essential to a complete definition of the capital offense. S. v. Exum, supra; S. v. Spivey, 132 N. C., 989, 43 S. E., 475. This was so at common law, and our statute dividing murder into degrees denominates any “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing” as murder in the first degree. G. S., 14-17; S. v. Hawkins, 214 N. C., 326, 199 S. E., 284.
Had the instruction excluded the idea of a killing from anger presently incited, and conveyed only the thought of a homicide from a fixed determination previously formed after weighing the matter, it would have sufficed without separate definition of premeditation and deliberation. S. v. Coffey, 174 N. C., 814, 94 S. E., 416; S. v. Exum, supra. But this is hardly its significance. S. v. Thomas, supra. An unlawful killing with malice and with premeditation falls short of murder in the first degree. The additional element of deliberation is necessary to make out the capital offense. S. v. Payne, 213 N. C., 719, 197 S. E., 573; S. v. Miller, 197 N. C., 445, 149 S. E., 590; S. v. Benson, 183 N. C., 795, 111 S. E., 869; S. v. Thomas, supra. “Any unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought is murder; but if nothing further characterizes the offense, it is murder in the second degree — to' constitute the higher offense, there must be willfulness, deliberation, premeditation.” People v. Cox, 76 Cal., 285, quoted with approval in S. v. Fuller, supra.
True it is, in other portions of the charge both terms are correctly defined, but here the court was undertaking to sum up the whole matter in a single sentence or instruction, as was attempted in S. v. MeHaffey, 194 N. C., 28, 138 S. E., 337, which resulted in a new trial.
The case of S. v. McClure, 166 N. C., 321, 81 S. E., 458, is cited as a controlling authority. There, after some hesitancy and much contextual interpretation, a similar instruction was upheld as applicable to the *285facts of that case. A deputy sheriff had been killed while attempting to make an arrest, following a small “riot” and repeated threats on the part of the prisoner “that there was no G— d— s— o — • b— in the county who could arrest him; that he would kill any officer that undertook it.” The prisoner offered no testimony. Here, the evidence of a “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing” is not so clear, and the crucial facts are in dispute. The paucity of the instruction seems apparent.
-1 would remand the case for another hearing.
"WiNbobne, J., concurs in dissent.