Court Opinion

ID: 9901296
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-21 17:01:23.243513+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:30.231693
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11884    Document: 33-1     Date Filed: 11/21/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11884
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       KEANO DONALD ALTIERI,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 0:22-cr-60182-RS-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11884         Document: 33-1         Date Filed: 11/21/2023         Page: 2 of 7

       2                          Opinion of the Court                       23-11884

       Before JORDAN, ROSENBAUM, and GRANT, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Keano Donald Altieri appeals his conviction for possessing a
       postal service key, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1704, and possessing
       stolen mail, in violation of U.S.C. § 1708. Mr. Altieri argues that
       the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress the postal
       key and stolen mail evidence seized after police arrested him for
       prowling, in violation of Florida Statute § 856.021 (“the prowling
       statute”). 1

       1 The statute reads as follows: “(1) It is unlawful for any person to loiter or

       prowl in a place, at a time or in a manner not usual for law-abiding individuals,
       under circumstances that warrant a justifiable and reasonable alarm or imme-
       diate concern for the safety of persons or property in the vicinity. (2) Among
       the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such
       alarm or immediate concern is warranted is the fact that the person takes flight
       upon appearance of a law enforcement officer, refuses to identify himself or
       herself, or manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or herself or any object.
       Unless flight by the person or other circumstance makes it impracticable, a law
       enforcement officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this section,
       afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm or immediate concern
       which would otherwise be warranted by requesting the person to identify
       himself or herself and explain his or her presence and conduct. No person shall
       be convicted of an offense under this section if the law enforcement officer did
       not comply with this procedure or if it appears at trial that the explanation
       given by the person is true and, if believed by the officer at the time, would
       have dispelled the alarm or immediate concern. (3) Any person violating the
       provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the second de-
       gree, punishable as provided in § 775.082 or § 775.083.”
USCA11 Case: 23-11884     Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 11/21/2023    Page: 3 of 7

       23-11884               Opinion of the Court                        3

                                         I
              On March 28, 2022, at approximately 1:25 a.m., Officer
       Shannon noticed a car parked on Nova Drive, alongside a college,
       in Davie, Florida. Two males exited the vehicle dressed in all black
       and wearing black masks. Mr. Altieri—one of the two men—car-
       ried a plastic garbage bag and at least one of the two wore latex
       gloves. The two began to run across Nova Drive—toward a row
       of warehouses—but before they could complete the crossing, Of-
       ficer Shannon intercepted them in his marked vehicle.
              Officer Shannon exited his car, identified himself as police,
       drew his gun, and commanded the men to the ground. The two
       men stopped and complied. Officer Shannon handcuffed both and
       took them into custody. While searching the men, Officer Shan-
       non found unopened mail in the garbage bag that Mr. Altieri was
       carrying and a postal service key on his person.
              In August of 2022, a grand jury returned an indictment
       charging Mr. Altieri with possession of a postal service key, in vio-
       lation of 18 U.S.C. § 1704, and with possession of stolen mail, in
       violation of U.S.C. § 1708.
               Mr. Altieri moved to suppress evidence of the postal service
       key and the stolen mail seized after his arrest. In his motion, Mr.
       Altieri argued that Officer Shannon lacked probable cause to arrest
       him for violating the prowling statute. Mr. Altieri asserted that be-
       cause he had not fled, refused to identify himself, or attempted to
       conceal himself, the government could not satisfy the statute’s
       prima facie elements. Mr. Altieri also maintained that Florida
USCA11 Case: 23-11884     Document: 33-1     Date Filed: 11/21/2023   Page: 4 of 7

       4                     Opinion of the Court                23-11884

       courts had found probable cause lacking in “much more suspi-
       cious” circumstances and that his act of running across a street at
       1:25 a.m. should not have alarmed Officer Shannon because Nova
       Drive was a busy intersection with 24-hour businesses and bus
       stops. See D.E. 12 at 6.
               In response, the government argued that probable cause
       was not lacking. As support, the government pointed out that both
       men wore gloves and hooded shirts; both men pulled masks over
       their faces before crossing Nova Drive; both men refused to answer
       when asked to explain their conduct; and the car that had driven
       Mr. Altieri and the other suspect to the scene fled when the police
       officer approached. The government argued that Officer Shannon
       thus had probable cause to arrest Mr. Altieri for prowling because
       the two men were engaged in suspicious conduct and had failed to
       quell Officer Shannon’s concerns when given the opportunity.
              The magistrate judge to whom the case was referred found
       that Officer Shannon had probable cause to arrest Mr. Altieri be-
       cause the circumstances leading up to the arrest, when “viewed
       from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,”
       supported the conclusion that he was “loitering or prowling in a
       place and at a time and manner not usual for law-abiding citizens.”
       D.E. 19. at 6. The magistrate judge also concluded that the cases
       cited by Mr. Altieri were “factually distinguishable” from the cir-
       cumstances in the case at hand. See id. at 6. Accordingly, the mag-
       istrate judge concluded that Officer Shannon “had reasonable
       alarm or immediate concern for the persons and property in the
USCA11 Case: 23-11884      Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 11/21/2023     Page: 5 of 7

       23-11884               Opinion of the Court                          5

       area” and that after Mr. Altieri failed to dispel this concern, the of-
       ficer had probable cause to arrest him. Id.
              The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and
       recommendation and denied Mr. Altieri’s suppression motion. Mr.
       Altieri pled guilty to both counts pursuant to a conditional plea
       agreement and timely appealed to this Court.
                                         II
              We review a district court’s denial of a motion to suppress
       evidence under a mixed standard, reviewing the court’s factual
       findings for clear error and the application of the law to those facts
       de novo. See United States v. Smith, 459 F.3d 1276, 1290 (11th Cir.
       2006). The district court’s factual findings are construed in the light
       most favorable to the prevailing party. See id.
              The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable
       searches and seizures. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. Under the ex-
       clusionary rule, evidence generally cannot be used against a de-
       fendant in a criminal trial where that evidence was obtained via an
       encounter with police that violated the Fourth Amendment. See
       United States v. Perkins, 348 F.3d 965, 969 (11th Cir. 2003). But, “a
       warrantless arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth
       Amendment where there is probable cause to believe that a crimi-
       nal offense has been or is being committed.” Devenpeck v. Alford,
       543 U.S. 146, 152 (2004). “Whether probable cause exists depends
       upon the reasonable conclusion to be drawn from the facts known
       to the arresting officer at the time of the arrest.” Id.
USCA11 Case: 23-11884      Document: 33-1      Date Filed: 11/21/2023     Page: 6 of 7

       6                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11884

               We have interpreted Florida Statute § 856.021 as having two
       elements: “(1) the accused must be loitering or prowling at a place,
       at a time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding citizens; and (2)
       the loitering or prowling must be under circumstances that war-
       rant a reasonable fear for the safety of persons or property in the
       vicinity.” United States v. Gordon, 231 F.3d 750, 758 (11th Cir. 2000).
       These are some elements set out by the Florida courts. See, e.g.,
       P.R. v. State, 97 So. 3d 980, 982 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012).
              The statute lists several factors that may create the reasona-
       ble fear necessary for arrest, stating that reasonable fear is war-
       ranted if “the person takes flight upon appearance of a law enforce-
       ment officer, refuses to identify himself or herself, or manifestly en-
       deavors to conceal himself or herself or any object.” Fla. Stat.
       § 856.021(2). The statute further provides that “a law enforcement
       officer shall, prior to any arrest for an offense under this section,
       afford the person an opportunity to dispel any alarm or immediate
       concern which would otherwise be warranted by requesting the
       person to identify himself or herself and explain his or her presence
       and conduct.” Id.
               Probable cause requires “only a probability or substantial
       chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity.”
       District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S.Ct. 577, 586 (2018) (internal quo-
       tation marks and citation omitted). Here the district court did not
       err by denying the motion to suppress the postal service key and
       stolen mail evidence.
USCA11 Case: 23-11884      Document: 33-1          Date Filed: 11/21/2023   Page: 7 of 7

       23-11884                Opinion of the Court                          7

               The facts, known to Officer Shannon at the time of the ar-
       rest, based on his personal observations, see P.R., 97 So. 3d at
       982−93, establish that there was probable cause to believe that a
       criminal offense had been or was being committed. See Devenpeck,
       543 U.S. at 152. The facts establish that (1) Mr. Altieri and another
       male existed a vehicle at 1:25 a.m.; (2) that both men were wearing
       black clothing and masks; (3) that Mr. Altieri was carrying a plastic
       garbage bag; (4) that at least one of the two men was wearing
       gloves; (5) that the car which drove the two men to the scene fled
       when Officer Shannon confronted Mr. Altieri; and (6) that Mr. Al-
       tieri refused to communicate with Officer Shannon when asked to
       explain his conduct.
                                             III
              In sum, probable cause existed for Officer Shannon to con-
       clude that Mr. Altieri was “loitering or prowling at a place, at a
       time, or in a manner not usual for law-abiding citizens,” and that
       there was “reasonable fear for the safety of persons or property in
       the vicinity.” See Fla. Stat. § 856.021(2). The district court correctly
       denied Mr. Altieri’s motion to suppress.
              AFFIRMED.