Court Opinion

ID: 9904832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 23:14:07.032573+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:31.923994
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

 JOSEPH A. LOIGA, an individual,
                                                    No. 85109-8-I
                        Appellant,
                                                    DIVISION ONE
                 v.
                                                    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 KING COUNTY, a governmental entity
 by and through KING COUNTY
 METRO and KING COUNTY
 DEPARTMENT OF
 TRANSPORTATION, governmental
 agencies; and ROXANNE
 DONALDSON, an individual,

                        Respondents.

          CHUNG, J. — While riding a King County Metro bus, Joseph Loiga fell out

of his seat and hit his head on a metal partition behind the driver’s seat. Loiga

sued King County and the bus driver for negligent operation. Applying the higher

standard of care owed by a common carrier, the trial court dismissed Loiga’s

claims on summary judgment. Because Loiga failed to provide evidence raising a

question of material fact on the issue of breach of the common carrier’s duty, we

affirm.

                                       FACTS

          On June 23, 2018, Joseph Loiga suffered a fall while riding King County
No. 85109-8-I/2

Metro bus route 166. 1 He was sitting behind the bus driver, in one of the three

adjoined seats parallel to the windows and facing the aisle. As the bus traveled

down 104th Avenue SE, the car in front of the bus was making a right turn, but

slammed on the brakes for a pedestrian crossing the street. Bus operator

Roxanne Donaldson applied the brakes and the bus came to a stop. Loiga fell off

his seat into the aisle and toward the front of the bus where he hit the top of his

head on the metal partition behind the driver’s seat.

        After the fall, Loiga initially told Donaldson that he was fine but then

requested medical assistance. The fire department dispatched an aid vehicle.

EMTs2 evaluated Loiga and reported that he “denied an [pain] on palp[ation] of

his neck but a little bit of [pain] on the back of his head with no obvious

deformities.” EMTs placed Loiga in a cervical collar as a precaution. Loiga was

eventually transferred by ambulance to Valley Medical Center. 3

        Loiga sued King County and Donaldson for negligent operation. 4 King

County moved for summary judgment, arguing Loiga had failed to produce

evidence of breach of any duty owed to him. The trial court granted summary

judgment and dismissed the claims.

        1 We note that Loiga fails to provide citations to the record as required under RAP

10.3(1)(5).
         2 Emergency Medical Technicians.
         3 In his opening brief, Loiga claims he continued to experience pain, and progressive

weakness, tingling, and numbness is his extremities and was diagnosed with “subacute C5-C6
cervical stenosis with cord flattening and signal change.” However, the record contains no
medical evidence after the ambulance transfer to Valley Medical Center.
         4 Loiga did not designate the complaint and the complaint is not in the record for review.

This omission violates RAP 9.6(b)(1)(C), which requires, at a minimum, that the designated
clerk’s papers include the complaint. Information about the claim is taken from King County’s
request for summary judgment.

                                                 2
No. 85109-8-I/3

       Loiga appeals.

                                    DISCUSSION

       We review orders on summary judgment de novo. Kim v. Lakeside Adult

Fam. Home, 185 Wn.2d 532, 547, 374 P.3d 121 (2016). Summary judgment is

appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party

is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658,

663, 958 P.2d 301 (1998) (citing CR 56(c)). We consider the evidence and

reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kim,

185 Wn.2d at 547.

       The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of an

issue of material fact. In re Est. of Black, 153 Wn.2d 152, 160-61, 102 P.3d 796

(2004). If the moving party meets this burden, the nonmoving party must set forth

specific facts to show a genuine issue for trial. Id. The facts must rebut the

moving party’s contentions and demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of

material fact. Citibank South Dakota N.A. v. Ryan, 160 Wn. App. 286, 289, 247

P.3d 778 (2011).

       Loiga contends the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on his

negligence claim against King County. To prove negligence, a plaintiff must show

(1) the existence of a duty, (2) breach of that duty, (3) resulting injury, and

(4) proximate cause. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Pierce County, 164 Wn.2d 545, 552,

192 P.3d 886 (2008). Generally, whether there has been negligence “is a jury

question, unless the facts are such that all reasonable persons must draw the

same conclusion from them, in which event the question is one of law for the

                                          3
No. 85109-8-I/4

courts.” Hough v. Ballard, 108 Wn. App. 272, 279, 31 P.3d 6 (2001). The

existence of a duty is a question of law. Degel v. Majestic Mobile Manor, Inc.,

129 Wn.2d 43, 48, 914 P.2d 728 (1996). Breach of duty, however, is ordinarily a

factual question, and “if there is any evidence tending to show that the carrier

failed to comply with the required standard of care, then the question of

negligence must be left to the jury.” Walker v. King County Metro, 126 Wn. App.

904, 908, 109 P.3d 836 (2005).

       Here, both parties agree that King County Metro bus is a common carrier.

“As a common carrier of passengers, a bus system owes the highest degree of

care toward its passengers commensurate with the practical operation of its

services at the time and place in question.” Price v. Kitsap Transit, 125 Wn.2d

456, 465, 886 P.2d 556 (1994). However, a common carrier’s duty of care is not

one of strict liability, nor is a common carrier the insurer of its passengers’ safety.

Walker, 126 Wn. App. at 908. “[N]egligence should not be presumed or inferred

from the mere happening of an accident.” Id. Specifically, a common carrier is not

liable for injuries received from “ordinary jolts and jerks necessarily incident to the

mode of transportation,” unless there is evidence from which operator negligence

can be reasonably be inferred. Id.

       In support of its motion for summary judgment, King County argues that

Loiga has not set forth any facts that provide for an inference of bus operator

negligence, and therefore, fails to meet his burden of demonstrating breach. In

her deposition, Donaldson, who had approximately 30 years of experience as a

bus driver, described her response to the car stopping quickly in front of her:

                                           4
No. 85109-8-I/5

        So I put my brakes on. Now, that wasn’t a slam of the brakes
        because I know what a hard brake is. I know what a medium, a soft
        brake. That was not a hard brake. That wasn’t a hard brake. That
        was just, you know, stopping . . . between a soft and a medium.

Internal surveillance video from the bus supports Donaldson’s report. When the

bus stopped, the other people on the bus show little movement and no reactions

of surprise or concern. Loiga, who was sitting on the edge of his seat facing the

aisle and speaking with the person across from him, is not holding on to any fixed

support in the bus and is the only one who falls. The evidence shows nothing

more than the normal “jolts and jerks” associated with riding a bus.

        A King County Metro Transit safety investigation into the incident

determined that Donaldson “was exercising every reasonable defensive driving

precaution to prevent this episode of a passenger fall.” The investigation

concluded the accident was “Non Preventable,” meaning “the driver in question

exercised every reasonable precaution to prevent the occurrence.” The

ambulance report notes that Loiga said “he was not ready for the stop,” and “it

was not the bus drivers [sic] fault but the driver in front of the bus.” This evidence

supports King County’s argument that Donaldson did not breach the common

carrier duty of care. 5

        5 King County also argues that Loiga’s three inconsistent answers to Interrogatory No. 5

(“Please give a concise statement of how the events giving rise to your lawsuit took place,
including but not limited to your departing location and expected destination at the time of the
INCIDENT alleged in your Complaint”) do not support the claim of unusual or extraordinary
braking by the driver. King County states that the first two answers are unsigned and the third is
signed. However, the record, including the attorney declaration attaching the different versions,
does not include evidence indicating whether any of the three versions were signed or unsigned.
Therefore, we will not consider these interrogatory responses in our review of the evidence.

                                                5
No. 85109-8-I/6

        In order to defeat summary judgment, Loiga must rebut the State’s

contentions that Loiga’s fall resulted from normal “jolts and jerks” and

demonstrate the existence of a genuine issue of material fact as to the bus

operator’s negligence. Ryan, 160 Wn. App. at 289.

        A. Alleged Admissions of Liability

        Loiga contends King County admitted liability in its response to his

requests for admission. Request for Admission No. 9 states, “Admit that the

plaintiff, Joseph Logia [sic], was without fault in causing the collision which is the

subject of this action.” King County responded, “Objection, as worded this

request for admission calls for a legal conclusion. Also, this request is vague

regarding ‘collision.’ Without waiving said objection, King County admits.” While

King County’s response does not explain which part of the statement it admits, it

explicitly objected to both the request for a legal conclusion on liability and the

unclear term “collision.” 6 The response does not admit liability.

        Similarly, Loiga asserts that Donaldson admitted liability in her deposition,

claiming “she slammed on her brakes to avoid a collision.” During the deposition,

Donaldson was asked, “didn’t you say in [the transit accident] report the vehicle

in front of the bus suddenly stopped which caused me to slam on my brakes

suddenly?” 7 Donaldson explained, “[w]hen I write my report, I don’t really get into

it say, okay, this was a soft slam. This was a medium slam. This was a hard

        6 On appeal, King County contends that because there was no collision, the word

“collision” “would be interpreted as meaning the reason for the vehicle stopping.”
          7 The record does not contain the transit accident report referenced in the deposition.

                                                  6
No. 85109-8-I/7

slam.” Rather, she used “slam” when it was not “a regular just putting your

brakes on.” And, as quoted above, Donaldson stated that this incident did not

involve a “hard brake.” Donaldson’s deposition testimony is not an admission of

liability.

         B. Evidence of Violation of Driving Laws

         Loiga also attempts to argue breach of duty based on violation of two

driving laws. Under RCW 5.40.050, “[a] breach of a duty imposed by statute,

ordinance, or administrative rule shall not be considered negligence per se, but

may be considered by the trier of fact as evidence of negligence.” See Smith v.

Fourre, 71 Wn. App. 304, 309, 858 P.2d 276 (1993) (testimony that a truck

turned without brake lights or turn signal, a violation of RCW 46.37.070, supports

and inference of failure to use reasonable care).

         According to Loiga, the bus operator drove in an inattentive manner,

violating Kent Ordinance 9.36.020, which makes it unlawful for a person to

operate a motor vehicle in a “lax or slack manner.” 8 Loiga cites Donaldson’s

deposition testimony:

                And then there was a car that was making a right-hand turn.
         There was ‒ I didn’t realize it until he, you know, was making his ‒
         because he came to a stop. The light was – I’m trying to think if the
         light was green or if it was red, but he came ‒ he was making a
         right-hand turn, and I wasn’t close to him. I was within distance, but
         there was a person crossing. That’s why he slammed on his

         8 Kent Ordinance 9.36.020 provides:

         A. It is unlawful for any person to operate a motor vehicle in an inattentive
         manner upon any highway within the city or way open to the public within the city
         that is maintained primarily for public use and is adjacent to any highway.
         B. For the purpose of this section, inattentive means the operation of a vehicle in
         a lax or slack manner.

                                                  7
No. 85109-8-I/8

       brakes. He didn’t see the person crossing, so that’s what caused
       him to slam on his brakes because all of a sudden a person could
       be – you know, he wasn’t paying attention or whatever, and this
       person wants to cross, and all of a sudden, you slam on your
       brakes.
              So I put my brakes on.

Rather than prove that Donaldson operated the bus in a “lax or slack manner,” in

violation of the ordinance, these statements suggest the other driver was

inattentive because he did not see the person crossing the street. Loiga, himself,

stated to the responding ambulance personnel his own conclusion that the driver

in front of the bus was at fault. Moreover, Donaldson specifically addressed this

issue during her deposition, stating, “I was aware of the guy. I was aware of the

car that put his brakes on.” Considering the evidence in the light most favorable

to Loiga, the nonmoving party, no reasonable juror could conclude that

Donaldson drove in a lax or slack manner, and, therefore, Loiga cannot rely on a

purported violation of Kent Ordinance 9.36.020 as evidence of negligence.

       In addition to alleging inattentive driving, Loiga claims Donaldson was

driving too closely to the other vehicle in violation of RCW 46.61.145(1), which

states that “[t]he driver of a motor vehicle shall not follow another vehicle more

closely than is reasonable and prudent, having due regard for the speed of such

vehicles and the traffic upon and the condition of the highway.” According to

Loiga, “had the bus not been following too closely, the Operator would not have

needed to slam on her brakes.” This conclusory statement does not support that

Donaldson was following too closely. Her testimony shows that she was aware of

the vehicle in front of her and needed only between soft and medium braking to

                                          8
No. 85109-8-I/9

bring the bus to a stop. Given the lack of evidence in the record that Donaldson

was following the preceding vehicle unreasonably close, Loiga’s conclusory

statements to the contrary are insufficient to defeat summary judgment. See

Johnson v. Recreational Equip., Inc., 159 Wn. App. 939, 954, 247 P.3d 18

(2011).

       Loiga fails to raise a question of material fact as to any driving violation

that would amount to a breach of the common carrier’s standard of care. The

record does not support his claim that his fall occurred as a result of anything

more than the normal “jolts and jerks” experienced while riding a bus. Thus,

Loiga cannot demonstrate breach of the duty of care owed by a common carrier.

King County is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law, and the trial court

properly dismissed Loiga’s claim on summary judgment.

       Affirmed.

 WE CONCUR:

                                          9