Court Opinion

ID: 9893584
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-27 19:03:30.016376+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:35.191539
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/27/23 Nelson v. Wells CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

CHRIS NELSON,                                                      B320223

         Plaintiff and Appellant,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                   Super. Ct. No.
         v.                                                        20STCV48299)

NOEL WELLS,

         Defendant and Respondent.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Gregory Wilson Alarcon, Judge. Reversed.
     Clark Hill, Bradford G. Hughes, Richard H. Nakamura, Jr.
and Tiffany B. Hunter for Plaintiff and Appellant.
     Liang Ly, Jason L. Liang and John K. Ly for Defendant and
Respondent.
           ________________________________________
       A record producer sued a singer/songwriter for defamation.
The dispute arose when respondent Noel Wells sent an e-mail to
a music group about her experience while working on an album,
two years earlier, with appellant Chris Nelson. Wells used the
word “predatory” to describe Nelson’s conduct.
       Wells moved to strike Nelson’s complaint as a Strategic
Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP). The anti-SLAPP
law allows courts to strike claims arising from a defendant’s First
Amendment activity “in connection with a public issue” unless
the court determines that there is a probability that the plaintiff
will prevail on the claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16, subd.
(b)(1).)1 The trial court granted Wells’s motion.
       On de novo review, we conclude that Nelson’s lawsuit does
not fall within the anti-SLAPP law. Wells’s private e-mail about
Nelson is not “speech in connection with a public issue or an issue
of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) Nor is it “artistic
speech.” Because Wells did not establish a prima facie case,
Nelson did not have to show a reasonable probability of
prevailing on the merits. We reverse.
            FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                        Nelson’s Complaint
       Nelson “is a well-established record producer, musician,
and businessman.” He owns a Los Angeles recording studio
frequented by “well-known artists and musicians” who work with
him or use his recording equipment. Nelson strives to promote
diversity in music by working with “all musicians regardless of
race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation.”

      1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.

                                2
       In 2020, Wells contacted music manager Tom Wironen,
with whom Nelson had a professional relationship. Wells said
Nelson was “predatory” toward her and other young female
musicians. Nelson alleges that this false statement about him
was “intended to interfere with and damage [his] business and
working relationship with the music manager.”
       Nelson’s complaint asserts causes of action for defamation;
false light; intentional infliction of emotional distress; intentional
and negligent interference with prospective economic relations;
and seeks injunctive relief.
                    Wells’s Anti-SLAPP Motion
       Wells moved to strike Nelson’s complaint as a SLAPP,
asserting that she was sued for exercising her right to free
speech. Wells declared that she knew Nelson for seven years. In
2018, he offered his studio to record her first album, free of
charge, and donated his services as producer; she only had to pay
for a studio engineer. After they began, Nelson suggested
recording more songs for a longer album on the same terms—free
studio time and free producer services.
       While Wells was recording, Nelson allowed other artists to
interfere with her studio time. When she objected, he proposed
changing their agreement, seeking 50 percent of the song-writing
credit and 50 percent of the royalties. Wells was shocked. She
felt Nelson’s request was “unusual and out of line with industry
norms, but it was also predatory and designed to take advantage
of my naivete with the music industry.”
       When Wells confronted Nelson, he claimed his proposal
was within industry standards. Disbelieving, she stopped
recording with him. He ceased communication and refused to
return the songs she recorded in his studio, which delayed the

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release of her album. Nelson returned the recordings to Wells
after she hired a lawyer. Wells was traumatized by her
experience with Nelson.
       Two years later, Wells saw an Instagram posting by one of
her favorite bands, Big Thief, showing them in Nelson’s studio.
Big Thief asked people to recommend places “to create in” near
Los Angeles. Wells decided to “shar[e] my experience working
with Plaintiff” in a private message she sent to Big Thief.
       In an e-mail entitled, “Los Angeles recording space/Chris
Nelson,” Wells wrote that she saw “a photograph of you recording
in Chris Nelson’s space,” saying “I feel it’s important as a creative
to let you know about that recording environment and what
happened to me in case it informs your recording situation in the
future.” Nelson “brought me into his orbit by claiming to let me
use his space for free.” Later, “I began to realize that he was
slowly changing the terms of our agreement which eventually
ended with him trying to pull an incredibly predatory move on
me. Once I realized he was making these moves in bad faith, I
attempted to end working with him and he [with]held my music
from me . . . while refusing to communicate at all.”
       The e-mail continues, “I also witnessed incredibly
predatory behavior from him toward young females including
young female musicians, and I felt like because I had a slightly
higher profile, he was using working with me to try and lure in
other more naïve women into his orbit.” Noting Big Thief’s
popularity, Wells opined that “promoting [Nelson] and his space
may invite other younger women to work with [him] who may not
have the same protections in place as you have.” She closed by
expressing hope that “there are some good safe spaces for you to
be able to use while you visit Los Angeles.”

                                  4
      Wells declared that she shared her experience to protect
Big Thief. An artist’s decision on who to work with and where to
record has an “impact in the music world” and “on the quality of
the music that is produced.” Wells believed that working with
Nelson would affect Big Thief’s creative process.
      Wells argued that her e-mail furthered “artistic speech”
because it could affect a band’s decision who to hire to create
music. It involved “an issue of public interest” because the
subject was someone in the public eye or could affect large
numbers of people; the activity occurred in the context of an
ongoing controversy, dispute, or discussion; or it affected a
community similar to that of a governmental entity.
      Wells asserted that Nelson cannot prevail on the merits.
Her statements are not defamatory–they are personal opinions—
and are privileged; she did not portray Nelson in a false light;
there was no outrageous and extreme conduct causing emotional
distress; Wells did not intend to contact Wironen; and there is no
proof she interfered with a business opportunity.
                       Nelson’s Opposition
      Nelson did not submit a declaration in support of his
opposition. He argued that Wells’s statements did not involve an
issue of public interest. He is a private individual and the subject
matter of her e-mail does not affect a broad segment of the
population. In any event, Wells acted with actual malice, sending
her e-mail before Big Thief requested studio recommendations on
Instagram. Wells’s statements were later posted on a site
created by Nelson’s ex-girlfriends as part of “a vengeance plot to
destroy [his] reputation.”
      Nelson argued that he is likely to prevail on his claims.
Wells’s statements are defamatory per se: They allege that he

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committed crimes and took advantage of female musicians or
impugn his character by accusing him of unethical and predatory
practices, without supporting evidence.
                           Wells’s Reply
       Wells replied that she engaged in protected acts furthering
artistic speech and concerning an ongoing, public discussion on
social media about Nelson, a person in the public eye. His
complaint alleges that he works with “numerous” artists, which
could affect a substantial number of people.
       Nelson did not show a probability of prevailing on his
claims. He did not address her claim of privilege. Nor did he
show with admissible evidence that she acted with malice or that
any artist or manager stopped working with him after Wells’s
e-mail about her personal experience.
                       The Court’s Ruling
       The court granted Wells’s motion to strike Nelson’s
complaint. It deemed the incident “straightforward,” involving
Wells’s e-mail to a music group advising it not to use Nelson’s
recording studio because he tried to change the terms of her
agreement in a “predatory” manner. The court found that Wells’s
e-mail did not involve an issue of public interest. Nelson is not in
the public eye; the e-mail was not shown to affect a substantial
number of people; and there was no “ongoing” public discussion.2
Her private e-mail did not enter the public sphere. Despite
finding no issue of public interest, the court found this is “artistic
speech” that advances or assists in the creation of music.

      2 The court noted that Wells sent her e-mail to Big Thief on
July 16, 2020; the band posted its request for input on places to
work the following day.

                                  6
       After finding a prima facie case to apply the anti-SLAPP
law, the court found that Nelson did not show a probability of
prevailing on the merits. He offered no declaration to establish
the elements of his claims. He did not show he was defamed,
placed in a false light, or suffered severe or extreme emotional
distress; he presented no evidence that the statements disrupted
any economic relationship or caused him harm.
                    Motion For Reconsideration
       Nelson sought reconsideration, citing a recent case
involving commercial speech. He declared, “I never pulled a
predatory move on defendant Wells,” who thanked him for his
work on her album. He offered 200 pages of new evidence, mostly
text messages from 2018. Wells objected that the evidence was
untimely and irrelevant, and the commercial speech case is
inapposite. The court “did not discern a material change in law
requiring reconsideration” and denied the motion.
                            DISCUSSION
       The anti-SLAPP law is construed broadly. (§ 425.16, subd.
(a).) It is “a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage,
meritless claims arising from protected activity” (Baral v. Schnitt
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384) “when those claims risk chilling
‘continued participation in matters of public significance.’ ”
(Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment (2022) 13 Cal.5th 859, 871.)
An order granting an anti-SLAPP motion is appealable. (§
425.16, subd. (i).) Our review is de novo. (Geiser v. Kuhns (2022)
13 Cal.5th 1238, 1250.)
       A two-step analysis applies. First, the moving defendant
must show that plaintiff’s claims arise from activity protected by
section 425.16. If protected activity is involved, the second step
shifts the burden to the plaintiff to show a probability of

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prevailing on the merits. (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at
pp. 384–385, 396; Olson v. Doe (2022) 12 Cal.5th 669, 678–679.)
       Wells’s E-mail Does Not Fall Within Section 425.16
         We focus on “the defendant’s activity that gives rise to his
or her asserted liability” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th
82, 92) and “whether the cause of action is based on the
defendant’s protected speech or petitioning activity.” (Id. at
p. 89.) An act in furtherance of a person’s constitutional rights
includes the exercise of the “right of free speech in connection
with a public issue or an issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16,
subd. (e)(4).)3 The parties and trial court applied the public
issue/public interest provision here.
         In applying this provision, “First, we ask what ‘public issue
or . . . issue of public interest’ the speech in question implicates—
a question we answer by looking to the content of the speech.
(§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4).) Second, we ask what functional
relationship exists between the speech and the public
conversation about some matter of public interest. It is at the
latter stage that context proves useful.” (FilmOn.com Inc. v.
DoubleVerify Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133, 149–150 (FilmOn), italics
added.) It “demands ‘some degree of closeness’ between the
challenged statements and the asserted public interest.” (Id. at
p. 150.)

      3 A defendant “must demonstrate activity qualifying for
protection” in one of the four categories listed in section 425.16,
subdivision (e). (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 871, 887–888 (Wilson).) This subdivision also shields
statements made in official proceedings or in public on matters of
public interest. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1)–(3).)

                                  8
       A public issue may be involved if “the subject of the speech
or activity ‘was a person or entity in the public eye’ or ‘could
affect large numbers of people beyond the direct participants’
[citation] . . . and whether the activity ‘occur[red] in the context of
an ongoing controversy, dispute or discussion’ [citation], or
‘affect[ed] a community in a manner similar to that of a
governmental entity’ [citation].” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp.
145–146.)
       Neither the complaint nor the evidence shows that Nelson
is in the public eye. He alleges he “is a well-established record
producer, musician, and businessman” whose studio is used by
“well-known artists and musicians.” Though Nelson’s clientele
may be in the public eye, Wells did not show that he sought or
obtained public attention. No evidence suggests that Wells’s
e-mail “ ‘could affect large numbers of people beyond the direct
participants.’ ” (FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 145.) Her e-mail
was private, sent directly to Big Thief to disparage Nelson’s
business practices.4
       The complaint and evidence do not show that Wells’s e-mail
was part of “ ‘an ongoing controversy, dispute or discussion.’ ”
(FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 145–146, italics added.) Wells
declares that she responded to Big Thief’s post; however, her
evidence belies the claim. Wells sent her e-mail on July 16, 2020;
Big Thief posted its request for input on creative workplaces on

      4 Wells’s e-mail was addressed to “Big Thief” but Nelson’s
pleading alleges that it was sent to “Tom Wironen.” The parties
do not explain the relationship, if any, between Wironen and Big
Thief. In any event, the e-mail was private, received by a music
manager or a few band members. The recipient does not affect
our analysis of the motion to strike.

                                  9
July 17, a day later. Wells’s e-mail about Nelson and his studio
was unsolicited, sent before Big Thief sought recommendations.
Her dispute with Nelson was not ongoing, having ended two
years earlier.
       Du Charme v. International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 107 (Du Charme) is instructive.
After Du Charme was terminated as a union manager, the union
posted on its Web site a defamatory statement saying he was
removed “ ‘for financial mismanagement.’ ” (Id. at pp. 110, 113.)
The trial court ruled that section 425.16 did not apply. The post
was not made in connection with an official proceeding nor was
the issue one of public interest. (Id. at p. 112.)
       The appellate court affirmed, finding that the union’s post
about Du Charme did not concern an issue of public interest. It
did not impact “ ‘a broad segment of society’ ” or affect a
community “ ‘in a manner similar to that of a governmental
entity.’ ” The court distinguished a case in which members of a
homeowner association with over 3,000 residents questioned the
performance and competence of their association’s general
manager, part of an ongoing controversy aimed at changing the
association’s governance. (Du Charme, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 115–116, 118, describing Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism
Club (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 468, 479–480.)
       Du Charme states that use of a Web site “should not turn
otherwise private information . . . into a matter of public
interest.” Statements must concern “a topic, person or entity of
widespread public interest.” (Du Charme, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th
at p. 117.) The union’s posting “was presumably of interest to the
membership . . . but unconnected to any discussion, debate or
controversy” because Du Charme’s termination “was a fait

                               10
accompli; its propriety was no longer at issue.” (Id. at p. 118.)
“To grant protection to mere informational statements, in this
context, would in no way further the statute’s purpose of
encouraging participation in matters of public significance.”
(Ibid.)
       Wells’s feeling of betrayal—when Nelson no longer wanted
to work for free—is not a public issue or matter of public interest.
The parties’ 2018 business deal is not an ongoing controversy,
dispute or discussion but a fait accompli occurring two years
before the e-mail, which did not address a matter of widespread
public significance. “[A]bsent unusual circumstances, a garden-
variety employment dispute concerning a nonpublic figure will
implicate no public issue.” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 901.)
Wells did not show that her e-mail “was made in connection with
a public issue or an issue of public interest within the meaning of
the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Du Charme, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at
p. 119.)
       The trial court found, as we do, that Wells’s e-mail did not
involve a public issue or matter of public interest. However, the
court mistakenly viewed artistic speech as an alternative to the
element of “public interest.” This was legal error. Application of
section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) is expressly limited to issues of
public interest. (Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1117.)
       Wells relies on “artistic speech” cases involving “casting
decisions” in an artistic endeavor. For example, a television
station acted “ in furtherance of the right of free speech’ ” when
selecting news anchors, which is “essentially casting decisions
regarding who was to report the news” (Hunter v. CBS
Broadcasting Inc. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1521), and news

                                11
reporting “is a matter of public interest.” (Id. at p. 1527.)
Likewise, “selection of a drummer is analogous to a ‘casting
decision[]’ regarding who is to perform music during a concert or
studio performance, and thus is ’an act in furtherance of the
exercise of free speech,’ ” where the defendant’s concerts “were of
interest to the public” to whom he “sold millions of records and
had hundreds of thousands” of followers on social media.
(Symmonds v. Mahoney (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 1096, 1106, 1109;
see also Tamkin v. CBS Broadcasting, Inc. (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 133, 144 [public interest in writing, casting, and
airing a popular show].) In Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pages
897–898, CNN’s action in firing an employee for plagiarism was
in furtherance of its speech rights because its broadcasts include
“extensive ‘speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of
public interest.’ ” Although “[c]reating a television show is an
exercise of constitutionally protected expression” (Musero v.
Creative Artists Agency, LLC (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 802, 816), the
private misappropriation of script ideas did not contribute to a
public conversation on a matter of public interest. (Id. at pp.
821–822; see also Li v. Jenkins (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 493, 501
[private decision to exclude plaintiff from compensation and
credit for a popular television show did not contribute to any
public discussion of the show or its themes].)
      Unlike the defendants in the cases cited above, Wells was
not creating music with Nelson or Big Thief when she sent her
disparaging e-mail. She was not taking constitutionally
protected steps to advance her artistic endeavors, nor was she
employed by Big Thief to help them create music. This is not
akin to a casting decision by a person or entity who is creating
and presenting shows to the public. Her unsolicited effort to

                                12
weigh in on Big Thief’s future workplace is not itself creative or
artistic speech. Her private message must meet the requirement
that it involve a public issue or matter of public interest as stated
in FilmOn, supra, 7 Cal.5th at page 149; however, the e-mail did
not contribute to any public debate of widespread interest.
       “FilmOn.com’s second inquiry requires us to determine
whether a functional relationship exists between the speech in
question and the public conversation about the issue of public
interest. It is not sufficient that the speech merely ‘ “refer to a
subject of widespread public interest; the statement must in some
manner itself contribute to the public debate.” ’ (FilmOn.com,
supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 150 [citation], italics added.) In conducting
this inquiry, we ‘must consider the particular context of the
speech, including the speaker’s identity; the “purpose” of the
speech; the nature of the audience and the intended audience;
and the “timing” and “location” of the communication.’ ” (Bishop
v. The Bishop’s School (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 893, 906; Geiser v.
Kuhns, supra, 13 Cal.5th at pp. 1249–1250 [the defendant’s
statement must contribute to public discussion about an issue of
public interest].)
       Wells’s e-mail about her recording agreement with Nelson
and her feelings of personal betrayal are not “a subject of
widespread public interest.” Nor did the e-mail contribute to any
ongoing public debate about recording contracts in general or
Nelson in particular. Its only purpose was to privately disparage
Nelson to a few people about an old, unhappy business deal.
      Nelson Need Not Show a Probability of Prevailing
       We have concluded that Wells’s e-mail did not satisfy the
criteria in section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4). It is unnecessary to

                                 13
determine the likelihood that Nelson would prevail on the merits.
(Du Charme, supra, 110 Cal.App.4th at p. 119.)5
                         DISPOSITION
     The order granting the special motion to strike is reversed.
Appellant is awarded costs on appeal.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                           KWAN, J.*
We concur:

      CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

      HOFFSTADT, J.

      5 Though we need not address the merits in this pretrial
anti-SLAPP motion, Wells may still challenge the substance of
Nelson’s claims on demurrer or in a motion for summary
judgment or summary adjudication.
      * Judge of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of
the California Constitution.

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