Court Opinion

ID: 9556553
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-17 18:00:24.442011+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:09:47.742517
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-40104         Document: 00516861614               Page: 1      Date Filed: 08/17/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                                          United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                           Fifth Circuit
                                      ____________
                                                                                          FILED
                                                                                   August 17, 2023
                                       No. 22-40104
                                      ____________                                      Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                                             Clerk
   Michael L. Mark,

                                                                       Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                              versus

   Lee Ann Spears; Kevin R. Wheat; Balden O. Polk; Vickie
   Barrow; Jonathan Clark; Gina Bentley; Jennifer Smith;
   Billy Horton; Lanette Linthicum; LeAnn Irons-
   Rodriguez; Michael Greer; Texas Department of
   Criminal Justice,

                                               Defendants—Appellees.
                      ______________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                           for the Eastern District of Texas
                                USDC No. 6:18-CV-309
                      ______________________________

   Before Duncan and Wilson, Circuit Judges, and Mazzant*, District
   Judge.
   Per Curiam:**
         Plaintiff-Appellant Michael L. Mark, a pro se prisoner, filed a civil suit
   against Defendants-Appellees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of

         *
             District Judge of the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation.
         **
              This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-40104        Document: 00516861614              Page: 2      Date Filed: 08/17/2023

                                         No. 22-40104

   his constitutional rights. The district court dismissed Mark’s constitutional
   claims related to events that occurred in 2014, 2015, and 2016 with prejudice
   because it determined that those claims were time barred. The district court
   later dismissed Mark’s remaining claims for failure to state a claim upon
   which relief could be granted.
           Mark timely appealed and argues that the district court erred because
   he is entitled to equitable tolling on his claims and because he stated plausible
   claims for relief. We hold that the district court did not err and AFFIRM the
   district court’s judgment.
               I.     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
           On June 21, 2018, Plaintiff-Appellant Michael L. Mark, an inmate
   confined to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (“TDCJ”) and
   housed in the Powledge Unit in Protective Safe Keeping, filed the present
   suit against Lee Ann Spears, Kevin R. Wheat, Balden O. Polk, Vickie Barrow,
   Jonathan Clark, Gina Bentley, Jennifer Smith, Billy Horton, Lanette
   Linthicum, LeAnn Irons-Rodriguez, Michael Greer, and the TDCJ
   (collectively, “Appellees”).1 Mark alleges that each of the Appellees
   individually violated his constitutional rights and, as a whole, conspired to
   retaliate against and harass Mark in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.2 More
   specifically, Mark alleges that Appellees (1) denied him access to legal
   materials, documents, and storage containers, (2) accused him of being a

           1
             “Under the prison mailbox rule, a prisoner’s pleading is deemed to have been
   filed on the date that the pro se prisoner submits the pleading to prison authorities for
   mailing.” Stoot v. Cain, 570 F.3d 669, 671 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Causey v. Cain, 450 F.3d
   601, 604 (5th Cir. 2006); Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270–71 (1988)). In this case, the
   date that Mark submitted his pleading to prison authorities was June 21, 2018. Thus, the
   date Mark is considered to have filed his complaint is June 21, 2018.
           2
              After a preliminary review of Mark’s complaint, the magistrate judge ordered
   Mark to file an amended complaint fixing deficiencies pointed out by the magistrate judge
   in his pleadings. Mark filed an amended complaint but added few, if any, additional facts.

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   “snitch” in front of other inmates and officers, (3) impeded his access to the
   courts by interfering with his legal mail, (4) retaliated against him for filing
   administrative grievances, (5) acted with deliberate indifference to his
   request to have an outside dentist fix his teeth, and (6) subjected him to
   excessive strip searches.
          In the lower court, Appellees filed three motions to dismiss. Relevant
   here, Appellees argued that Mark is time barred from pursuing claims that
   arose prior to June 21, 2016, because they are barred by the two-year statute
   of limitations. Appellees further argued that Mark cannot utilize the doctrine
   of equitable tolling to revive his time-barred claims. The magistrate judge
   agreed that all of Mark’s claims were barred by the relevant statute of
   limitations and recommended that the district court dismiss Mark’s claims.
   Mark objected to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation,
   pointing out that his complaint also contained allegations that arose in 2017
   and 2018. After reviewing the report and recommendation and Mark’s
   objections, the district court determined that the magistrate judge was
   correct insofar as she recommended dismissal of Mark’s time-barred claims.
   However, the district court limited the dismissal to those claims that arose in
   2014, 2015, and 2016. Accordingly, the district court partially adopted the
   report and recommendation, dismissing Mark’s claims that accrued more
   than two years before he filed the present lawsuit.
          Later, Appellees Barrow and Smith filed a motion for summary
   judgment, arguing that Mark’s claims against them should be dismissed
   because Mark did not exhaust his administrative remedies. The magistrate
   judge disagreed. However, the magistrate judge nonetheless recommended
   dismissal of Mark’s remaining claims because he failed to state a claim upon
   which relief could be granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). After
   dismissing the remaining claims, the district court entered a final judgment,

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   dismissing Mark’s lawsuit with prejudice as time barred and because he failed
   to state a claim.
          On appeal, Mark argues that the district court erred when it dismissed
   his claims. As to the dismissal of his time-barred claims, Mark argues that we
   should reverse the district court because it should have applied equitable
   tolling principles. And, as to his other claims, Mark argues that we should
   reverse the district court’s dismissal because he alleged facts in his amended
   complaint that sufficiently stated plausible claims for relief.
          We conclude that the district court did not err in dismissing any of
   Mark’s claims.
                        II.   STANDARD OF REVIEW
          We review the dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo,
   accepting all well-pleaded facts as true and viewing those facts in the light
   most favorable to the plaintiffs. Spiller v. City of Tex. City, Police Dep’t, 130
   F.3d 162, 164 (5th Cir. 1997); Gonzalez v. Kay, 577 F.3d 600, 603 (5th Cir.
   2009). We also review dismissal of a complaint under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) de
   novo under the same standard applied to dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6).
          “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
   factual matter, accepted as true, ‘to state a claim to relief that is plausible on
   its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). The
   plaintiff must allege facts that suggest liability and are more than consistent
   with unlawful conduct. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 563 (2007).
   “A motion to dismiss may be granted on a statute of limitations defense
   where it is evident from the pleadings that the action is time barred, and the
   pleadings fail to raise some basis for tolling.” Taylor v. Bailey Tool Mfg. Co.,
   744 F.3d 944, 946 (5th Cir. 2014).
                                III. ANALYSIS

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          In his appeal, Mark argues that the district court erred in dismissing
   his claims because (1) his claims should not be time barred, and (2) he did not
   fail to state a claim upon which relief could be granted for his remaining
   claims. We address both arguments in turn.
          A. Section 1983 Statute of Limitations and Equitable Tolling
          Section 1983 does not prescribe a statute of limitations. Instead,
   “[t]he statute of limitations for a suit brought under § 1983 is determined by
   the general statute of limitations governing personal injuries in the forum
   state.” Piotrowski v. City of Hous., 237 F.3d 567, 576 (5th Cir. 2001); see also
   Owens v. Okure, 488 U.S. 235, 249–50 (1989) (“[W]here state law provides
   multiple statutes of limitations for personal injury actions, courts considering
   § 1983 claims should borrow the general or residual statute for personal
   injury actions.”). As such, Texas’s two-year statute of limitations for
   personal injury claims applies in this case. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
   § 16.003(a); Piotrowski, 237 F.3d at 576. When the claim accrues, however, is
   governed by federal law. Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989)
   (“While the limitations period is determined by reference to state law, the
   standard governing the accrual of a cause of action under section 1983 is
   determined by federal law.”). Under Fifth Circuit law, the limitations period
   begins to run when the plaintiff “knows or has reason to know of the injury
   which is the basis of the action.” Id. (citations omitted).
          In some instances, “[t]he doctrine of equitable tolling preserves a
   plaintiff’s claims when strict application of the statute of limitations would
   be inequitable.” Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296, 298 (5th Cir. 1995)
   (citing Burnett v. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 380 U.S. 424, 428 (1965)). The plaintiff
   bears the burden of establishing that equitable tolling applies. Rotella v.
   Pederson, 144 F.3d 892 (5th Cir. 1998). As we pointed out in Lambert,
   equitable tolling may apply in the following circumstances:

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          [A] claimant has received inadequate notice; or where a motion
          for appointment of counsel is pending and equity would justify
          tolling the statutory period until the motion is acted upon; or
          where the court has led the plaintiff to believe that she has done
          everything required of her.
   Lambert, 44 F.3d at 299 (quoting Baldwin Cnty. Welcome Ctr. v. Brown, 466
   U.S. 147, 151 (1984)); see also Ramirez v. City of San Antonio, 312 F.3d 178,
   183 (5th Cir. 2002) (“We have found that equitable tolling may be
   appropriate when ‘the plaintiff is actively misled by the defendant about the
   cause of action or is prevented in some extraordinary way from asserting his
   rights.’” (quoting Teemac v. Henderson, 298 F.3d 452, 457 (5th Cir. 2002)).
   “Traditional equitable principles preclude a court from invoking equitable
   tolling, however, when the party seeking relief has an adequate legal or
   statutory remedy to avoid the consequences of the statute of limitations.”
   Lambert, 44 F.3d at 299. For example, equitable tolling generally does not
   apply when a plaintiff’s initial suit is dismissed without prejudice. Id. Instead,
   the plaintiff is left in the same position as if the first suit had never been filed.
   Id. That is, a plaintiff’s claims are not tolled for statute of limitation purposes
   until he or she refiles the lawsuit.
          Mark filed his complaint in the present action on June 21, 2018. As
   such, the two-year statute of limitations bars Mark from bringing claims
   related to injuries that he knew of or had reason to know of before June 21,
   2016. Mark does not dispute that the statute of limitations on those claims
   has run. Rather, on appeal, Mark complains that the district court erred when
   it did not apply the doctrine of equitable tolling such that he may bring claims
   that accrued before June 21, 2016. Mark’s argument is twofold.
          First, Mark argues that the Appellees conspired to or actually did
   interfere with his access to the courts, legal materials, and communications
   with attorneys and legal organizations. Courts “do not apply the doctrine of

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   equitable tolling based solely on a plaintiff’s subjective impressions” though.
   Ramirez, 312 F.3d at 184. Rather, courts “examine ‘whether the defendant’s
   conduct, innocent or not, reasonably induced the plaintiff not to file suit
   within the limitations period.’” Id. (cleaned up). A defendant’s affirmative
   acts must mislead the plaintiff before a court may apply the doctrine of
   equitable tolling. Id. Mark’s general allegations that the Appellees misled
   him, standing alone, are insufficient to support equitable tolling. See id.
   (holding that equitable tolling did not apply where a plaintiff provided little
   to no detail about how he was misled). Indeed, Mark offers nothing more than
   conclusory allegations. Mark did not produce sufficient evidence to
   demonstrate that he was misled by Appellees; thus, Mark’s first argument is
   unavailing.
          Second, Mark argues that the severance order in a previous case
   provides grounds for equitable tolling. Mark’s argument, however, is based
   on a misunderstanding of what occurred in that case. See generally Mark v.
   Spears, 722 F. App’x 362 (5th Cir. 2018). Mark contends that he was actively
   disputing an order of the district court and, instead of responding to Mark’s
   dispute, the district court simply dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice.
   That is not what transpired. Rather, the district court dismissed Mark’s first
   suit without prejudice because the magistrate judge repeatedly ordered Mark
   to file an amended complaint and he failed to do so. Id. Equitable tolling is
   inapplicable under these circumstances. Lambert, 44 F.3d at 300 (affirming a
   district court’s decision not to apply equitable tolling after a plaintiff’s case
   was dismissed without prejudice because the plaintiff had express legal
   remedies available that would have allowed him or her to avoid dismissal); see
   also Williams v. Cook, No. 00-41271, 2001 WL 822777, at *1 (5th Cir. June 29,
   2001) (affirming a district court’s refusal to apply equitable tolling after a pro
   se litigant’s first lawsuit was dismissed without prejudice).

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          Strict application of the statute of limitations would not be inequitable
   in this case. To be sure, this is not a case where Mark had inadequate notice
   or where Mark was led to believe by the district court that he had done
   everything required of him. See Lambert, 44 F.3d at 299. Nor is this a case
   where some kind of affirmative misconduct by Appellees lulled Mark into
   inaction. See id. On the contrary, here, as in Lambert, Mark’s actions caused
   the district court to dismiss his first case and Mark had legal remedies
   available to him to remedy the dismissal.
          Many of Mark’s claims fall outside the statute of limitations period.
   Mark’s claims that he was denied dental care and called a “snitch” accrued
   in 2014, some of his claims that he was denied legal storage, mail, and
   dictionaries accrued in 2015, some of his claims that he was not given case
   citations accrued in May 2016, and Mark’s claim regarding excessive strip
   searches accrued in the beginning of June 2016. Thus, all of Mark’s claims
   regarding his dental care, being called a “snitch,” and the excessive strip
   searches fall outside the statute of limitations. Mark’s claims that he was
   denied legal storage, mail, dictionaries, and case citations that accrued before
   June 21, 2016, also fall outside the statute of limitations. It is evident from the
   pleadings that these claims are time barred, and the pleadings fail to raise any
   basis for tolling. Accordingly, it was proper for the district court to grant the
   motions to dismiss based on the statute of limitations.
          B. Failure to State a Claim
          Turning to Mark’s remaining claims, we further determine that the
   district court did not err in dismissing Mark’s timely claims for failing to state
   a claim upon which relief could be granted.
          A prisoner’s complaint against a governmental entity or an officer or
   employee of a governmental entity may be dismissed for failing to state a
   claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). “A

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   complaint lacks an arguable basis in fact if, after providing the plaintiff the
   opportunity to present additional facts when necessary, the facts alleged are
   clearly baseless.” Talib v. Gilley, 138 F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 1998).
          To start, we note that the magistrate judge pointed out deficiencies in
   Mark’s complaint and gave him the opportunity to amend his complaint and
   to fix those deficiencies. Mark nonetheless failed to allege additional facts
   that would support his claims. Thus, for the following reasons, we agree that
   the claims raised in Mark’s amended complaint lack an arguable basis in fact.
                 1. Access to the Courts
          Mark claims that Appellees impeded his right to access the courts in
   2017 and 2018 by preventing him from completing his legal research,
   purposely delaying or denying his requests for legal citations and books,
   opening or mishandling his legal mail without him present, and denying his
   outgoing mail to legal organizations. The magistrate judge determined, and
   the district court agreed, that Mark neither pleaded nor demonstrated actual
   injury or harm arising from these allegations because he did not identify or
   demonstrate how his status as a litigant was prejudiced. We agree with the
   lower court that Mark did not allege that he suffered any actual harm or injury
   because of the Appellees’ actions.
          Prisoners undoubtedly have a right of access to the courts. Brewer v.
   Wilkinson, 3 F.3d 816, 820 (5th Cir. 1993). This right encompasses a
   prisoner’s ability “to prepare and transmit a necessary legal document to a
   court.” Id. at 821. To prevail on an access-to-the-courts claim, however, a
   prisoner must show an actual injury. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349–51
   (1996). Such an injury is shown when the prisoner demonstrates that the
   policies or actions of prison officials have hindered his ability to file a
   nonfrivolous legal claim. Smith v. Collin Cnty. Jail, 548 F. App’x 132, 133 (5th
   Cir. 2013) (citing Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 414–22 (2002); Lewis,

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   518 U.S. at 351). Furthermore, insofar as a plaintiff alleges that his right to
   access the courts was impeded because of mail tampering, the plaintiff must
   show that his or her position as a litigant was prejudiced because of the mail
   tampering. Walker v. Navarro Cnty. Jail, 4 F.3d 410, 413 (5th Cir. 1993).
          Mark argues that the harm he suffered because he was denied access
   to the courts is obvious. However, Mark wholly fails to state how he was
   harmed. Mark does not specify what materials he was denied or how any
   denial impacted his ability to pursue his claims. And, while Mark alleges that
   his correspondence with legal organizations was interfered with, Mark does
   not identify any way in which his legal position suffered or any way in which
   he was prejudiced. Indeed, Mark was not prevented from filing a § 1983
   lawsuit against the Appellees because of their alleged actions. On the
   contrary, he was able to file two lawsuits. Simply put, Mark must do more
   than make a conclusory statement that he was harmed. See, e.g., Panda
   Brandywine Corp. v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 253 F.3d 865, 868 (5th Cir. 2001)
   (noting that a plaintiff may not rely on conclusory statements to survive a
   motion to dismiss). Accordingly, under these circumstances, Mark has not
   shown that the district court erred when it dismissed his claims that he was
   denied access to the courts.
                 2. Retaliation
          Mark further argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his
   First Amendment retaliation claim against Greer. Mark claims that Greer
   retaliated against him in violation of his First Amendment rights because,
   after Mark verbally reported Greer for failing to change the water coolers,
   Greer coughed up phlegm and spit it into Mark’s food. In other words, Mark
   alleges that Greer retaliated against him by causing him to miss a meal.
   “Under the First Amendment, a prison official may not harass or retaliate
   against an inmate ‘for . . . complaining to a supervisor about a guard’s
   misconduct.’” DeMarco v. Davis, 914 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting

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   Woods v. Smith, 60 F.3d 1161, 1164 (5th Cir. 1995)). “To prevail on a claim of
   retaliation, a prisoner must establish (1) a specific constitutional right, (2) the
   defendant’s intent to retaliate against the prisoner for his or her exercise of
   that right, (3) a retaliatory adverse act, and (4) causation.” Id. (internal
   citations omitted). As to the third prong, the retaliatory act must be more
   than de minimis. Bibbs v. Early, 541 F.3d 267, 270 (5th Cir. 2008).
   “Retaliation against a prisoner is actionable only if it is capable of deterring a
   person of ordinary firmness from further exercising his constitutional
   rights.” Id.; Morris v. Powell, 449 F.3d 682, 686 (5th Cir. 2006). And, as to
   the fourth prong, the prisoner must prove that “but for the retaliatory motive
   the complained of incident . . . would not have occurred.” McDonald v.
   Steward, 132 F.3d 225, 231 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Johnson v. Rodriguez, 110
   F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997)).
          Importantly, courts are required to carefully scrutinize First
   Amendment retaliation claims. Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166. Mere conclusory
   allegations are insufficient. Id. Instead, an inmate must “allege a chronology
   of events from which retaliation may plausibly be inferred.” Id. (internal
   citations omitted).
          We agree with Mark that the phlegm incident, which we accept as true
   at the pleading stage, is reprehensible. Mark did not establish in his pleadings,
   however, that Greer’s actions, even if motivated by retaliatory intent, rise to
   the level of First Amendment retaliation because (1) Greer’s retaliatory act
   was de minimis, and (2) Mark did not sufficiently allege that but for Greer’s
   retaliatory motive the phlegm incident would not have occurred.
          Taking these issues in reverse order, we start with the issues of intent
   and causation. Mark alleges in his amended complaint that “Greer’s direct
   retaliation was to cough up phlegm and mucus onto plaintiff’s breakfast tray”
   with the intent to “cause serious harm, sickness, or worse.” These
   allegations are insufficient to support that Greer had retaliatory intent or that

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   Greer’s allegedly retaliatory intent was causally connected to the phlegm
   incident. Mark alleges that Greer was ordered to start changing the water
   coolers after Mark’s report. However, Mark alleges no facts that Greer was
   aware that a prisoner reported him for failing to change the water coolers or,
   more importantly, that Greer was specifically aware that Mark reported him
   for failing to change the water coolers. An essential element of a retaliation
   claim is the ability to show causation, i.e., that the complained-of phlegm
   incident would not have occurred absent the retaliatory motive. See Johnson
   v. Rodriguez, 110 F.3d 299, 310 (5th Cir. 1997); Woods, 60 F.3d at 1166.
   Mark’s failure to allege any facts indicating that Greer was even aware of the
   verbal report provides, at best, a weak connection between any retaliatory
   motive and the retaliatory act. Mark was given the opportunity to amend his
   pleadings and provide additional facts but did not. Without more, Mark’s
   pleadings are insufficient to support the essential elements of a First
   Amendment retaliation claim.
          Now we turn to Greer’s retaliatory act. Mark’s claim that Greer
   committed a First Amendment retaliatory act against him when he deprived
   him of a meal must be viewed through the lens of the Eighth Amendment.
   The Eighth Amendment requires that inmates be provided “‘well-balanced
   meal[s], containing sufficient nutritional value to preserve health.’” Green v.
   Ferrell, 801 F.2d 765, 770 (5th Cir. 1986) (footnote omitted) (quoting Smith
   v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373, 380 (5th Cir. 1977)); see also Eason v. Thaler, 73 F.3d
   1322, 1327 (5th Cir. 1996) (per curiam) (“To comply with the Constitution,
   inmates must receive ‘reasonably adequate’ food.”). “The deprivation of
   food constitutes cruel and unusual punishment only if it denies a prisoner the
   ‘minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Talib, 138 F.3d at 214 n.3
   (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)) (internal quotations
   omitted). “Whether the deprivation of food falls below this threshold
   depends on the amount and duration of the deprivation.” Id. “The Eighth

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   Amendment does not require that prisoners receive three meals a day; rather,
   the Eighth Amendment requires that jails provide inmates with well-balanced
   meals, containing sufficient nutritional value to preserve health.” Grissom v.
   Patterson, No. 91-7137, 1993 WL 560256, at *4 (5th Cir. Dec. 27, 1993)
   (cleaned up) (citing Green, 801 F.2d at 770; Smith v. Sullivan, 553 F.2d 373,
   380 (5th Cir. 1977)).
          With these Eighth Amendment principles in mind, Greer’s retaliatory
   act—depriving Mark of a meal by spitting in it—is a de minimis act for First
   Amendment retaliation purposes because he only missed a single meal. See
   Green, 801 F.2d at 770–71 (holding that only providing prisoners two meals a
   day does not violate the Eighth Amendment); see also Talib, 138 F.3d at 214
   n.3 (holding that it is doubtful a prisoner was denied the “minimal measure
   of life’s necessities” when he missed fifty meals over the course of five
   months).
          While Mark undeniably exercised his First Amendment right to file
   grievances, he nonetheless fails to allege a chronology of events from which
   retaliation may be plausibly inferred. As such, the district court did not err in
   dismissing Mark’s retaliation claim against Greer for failure to state a claim.
                 3. Failure to Respond to Grievances
          Mark argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his claim
   that prison officials failed to respond to his grievances. However, “any
   alleged due process violation arising from the alleged failure to investigate [an
   inmate’s] grievances is indisputably meritless . . . .” Geiger v. Jowers, 404
   F.3d 371 374 (5th Cir. 2005). Accordingly, the district court did not err in
   dismissing Mark’s claim that prison officials failed to adequately respond to
   his grievances.
                 4. Conspiracy to Retaliate

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          Next, Mark argues that the district court erred when it dismissed his
   conspiracy claims. Mark claims that Appellees conspired to retaliate against
   him when they interfered with his legal mail and right to access the courts.
   And, generally, Mark claims that there was a system-wide conspiracy to
   deny, deprive, harass, and retaliate against Mark for exposing alleged wrongs
   done to him. To establish a conspiracy under § 1983, “a prisoner must allege
   an actual violation of a right protected under § 1983 and that the defendants
   acted in concert with specific intent to violate that right.” McKinney v.
   McDuffie, 789 F. App’x 413, 416 (5th Cir. 2019) (internal citations omitted).
   Plaintiffs who assert conspiracy claims under civil rights statutes must plead
   the operative facts upon which their claim is based.” Young v. Biggers, 938
   F.2d 565, 569 (5th Cir. 1991). “‘Bald allegations’ of a conspiracy are not
   enough.” McKinney, 789 F. App’x at 416 (quoting Young, 938, F.2d at 569).
          Mark’s general conspiracy claim fails because Mark offers nothing
   more than conclusory, unsupported statements. As we just discussed, bald
   allegations of a conspiracy are insufficient to support a claim. See id. Thus,
   the district court did not err when it dismissed Mark’s conspiracy claims.
          As to Mark’s more specific claims that Appellees conspired to
   interfere with his legal mail and his right to access the courts, Mark’s claims
   fail for the same reasons that Mark’s non-conspiratorial legal mail and access
   claims fail. Mark does not allege facts that would support Mark suffered any
   injury or was harmed by the Appellees’ actions. Therefore, the district court
   did not err in dismissing these claims either.
                 5. Supervisory Liability
          Mark further argues that the district court erred by dismissing his
   claims of supervisory liability. Mark contends that Spears, Smith, Barrow,
   Polk, Clark, Horton, and Linthicum are supervisory officials that breached
   their duties under state law when they acted with deliberate indifference

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Case: 22-40104     Document: 00516861614            Page: 15   Date Filed: 08/17/2023

                                     No. 22-40104

   toward a resulting constitutional injury. “Section 1983 does not create
   supervisory or respondeat superior liability.” Oliver v. Scott, 276 F.3d 736,
   742 (5th Cir. 2002). “Rather, a plaintiff must show either [that] the
   supervisor personally was involved in the constitutional violation or that
   there is a ‘sufficient causal connection’ between the supervisor’s conduct
   and the constitutional violation.” Evett v. Deep E. Tex. Reg’l Narcotics
   Trafficking Task Force, 330 F.3d 681, 689 (5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Thompkins
   v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987)). “In order to establish supervisor
   liability for constitutional violations committed by subordinate employees,
   plaintiffs must show that the supervisor acted, or failed to act, with deliberate
   indifference to violations of others’ constitutional rights committed by their
   subordinates.” Porter v. Epps, 659 F.3d 440, 446 (5th Cir. 2011) (cleaned up)
   (quoting Gates v. Texas Dep’t of Prot. & Reg. Servs., 537 F.3d 404, 435 (5th
   Cir. 2008)).
          Mark does not sufficiently allege a supervisory retaliation claim. Mark
   fails to allege any plausible claims regarding the constitutional violations
   allegedly committed by Appellees. As such, Mark does not demonstrate a
   cognizable claim of supervisory liability under § 1983 and the district court
   did not err in dismissing Mark’s supervisory liability claims. See id.
                             IV.    CONCLUSION
          For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is
   AFFIRMED.

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