Court Opinion

ID: 9393135
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-09 16:00:32.898873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:51.276520
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 22-1243
                         ___________________________

                              United States of America

                         lllllllllllllllllllllPlaintiff - Appellee

                                            v.

                              Jeremiah Ezekiel Brown

                       lllllllllllllllllllllDefendant - Appellant
                                       ____________

                     Appeal from United States District Court
               for the Western District of Missouri - Jefferson City
                                 ____________

                             Submitted: January 9, 2023
                                Filed: May 9, 2023
                                  [Unpublished]
                                  ____________

Before SMITH, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.
                             ____________

PER CURIAM.

       A jury convicted Jeremiah Ezekiel Brown of being a felon in possession of a
firearm. Law enforcement discovered the firearm during a traffic stop of his vehicle.
Brown appeals the district court’s1 denial of his motion to suppress the weapon and
other evidence found during the traffic stop. He argues that the district court
erroneously denied his suppression motion because law enforcement lacked a
reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in criminal activity and lacked probable
cause to believe that he had committed a traffic violation. We affirm.

                                    I. Background
       Detective Chris Papineau of the Columbia Police Department (CPD) received
information from a reliable confidential informant (CI) that Bridget Hartley was
selling cocaine and marijuana at her place of employment, Parkade Plaza. The CI
alleged that Hartley kept the drugs in her black backpack and was associated with a
silver Chrysler Pacifica. A federal defendant corroborated the CI’s information,
stating that Hartley was selling drugs on Brown’s behalf.

      On November 23, 2020, Detective Papineau and other law enforcement officers
surveilled Brown and Hartley. They saw Hartley leave a residence carrying a black
backpack. Brown was with her. Brown and Hartley got into a silver Chrysler Pacifica.
The officers followed Brown and Hartley for about an hour and a half. The vehicle
made stops at Hartley’s mother’s house, an address associated with Brown, and a
convenience store.

       Instead of a normal license plate, the silver Chrysler Pacifica bore a dealer tag
registered to Royal Motors, a car dealership. Detective Papineau knew that a license
plate search conducted on November 19, 2020, had revealed that the license plate was
registered to Royal Motors. During his several days of surveillance, Detective
Papineau never saw Hartley or Brown return to Royal Motors.

      1
      The Honorable Nanette K. Laughrey, United States District Judge for the
Western District of Missouri.

                                          -2-
       Detective Papineau was aware of a an incident on October 4, 2020, involving
Brown and the then-owner of Royal Motors. In the incident, the CPD and the
Missouri State Highway Patrol were investigating a vehicle with stolen license plates
abandoned on the side of a highway. When the CPD arrived, Brown was at the scene.
The vehicle belonged to the then-owner of Royal Motors. The police spoke to Royal
Motors’s owner. He informed them that the vehicle was a personal vehicle without
plates that he had loaned to Brown. When asked why he did not put Brown in a
company vehicle, the owner expressed a lack of trust in Brown due to past history.
Detective Papineau had reviewed body camera footage showing the interview of the
Royal Motors owner. Detective Papineau also knew that the owner had subsequently
passed away.

       On November 24, 2020, Detective Papineau and other law enforcement officers
conducted surveillance at Parkade Plaza. They saw Hartley exit and reenter the
building multiple times over several hours. Each time, she carried her black backpack.
Brown collected Hartley from Parkade Plaza in the silver Chrysler Pacifica. Several
officers in both marked and unmarked vehicles followed the silver Chrysler Pacifica.
It was raining. Detective Papineau observed Brown driving the vehicle. Its windshield
wipers were on, but its headlights were not. Government surveillance footage
confirmed that the vehicle’s windshield wipers were on when it left Parkade Plaza.

      Detective Papineau suspected that the silver Chrysler Pacifica was unregistered
and that Brown was not using the Royal Motors dealer tags for business purposes. He
thought it unlikely that someone driving a vehicle with a dealer plate for several days
would be taking a test drive or transporting the vehicle for maintenance purposes.

       The law enforcement officers communicated to one another during the
surveillance about the lack of vehicle registration and headlights usage. Detective
Papineau instructed CPD Detective Bradley Overton, who was driving a marked
patrol car, to stop the silver Chrysler Pacifica. In his report, Detective Overton

                                         -3-
documented that Detective Papineau instructed him to stop the silver Chrysler
Pacifica because of a concern that it was not properly registered. Detective Overton
was driving a marked patrol vehicle, with Detective Michael Kile riding as a
passenger.

      Rain continued to fall when Detective Overton stopped the vehicle. Detective
Overton had his vehicle’s windshield wipers on, and oncoming vehicles had their
wipers and headlights on. Detective Michael Kile, who was riding as Detective
Overton’s passenger, observed that the silver Chrysler Pacifica’s taillights were off.
He surmised that the headlights must be off, too. Government surveillance footage
shows that the silver Chrysler Pacifica had its taillights off at Parkade Plaza.
Detective Overton’s dashcam video shows that the taillights were off until just before
Detective Overton activated his siren.

       Detective Overton activated his emergency lights and siren. Brown continued
driving for a short period before pulling over. Brown turned on the windshield wipers
as he pulled over for the traffic stop. The officers smelled marijuana when they got
out of their vehicles. Detective Overton got Brown out of the vehicle. Detective Kile
then frisked Brown and found a firearm in his waistband. Officers searched the
vehicle and found another firearm, marijuana, and cocaine.

      Detective Papineau contacted Royal Motors the day after the traffic stop. He
spoke with Amber Minton, the new owner. Minton told Detective Papineau that she
had given Brown permission to drive the vehicle. Minton provided Brown with the
Royal Motors dealer plates. Detective Papineau learned from Minton that Brown was
a Royal Motors employee.

       A federal grand jury indicted Brown on a charge of felon in possession of a
firearm. Brown moved to suppress evidence discovered during the traffic stop. He
challenged the constitutionality of the stop. He did not, however, challenge the

                                         -4-
subsequent frisk or vehicle search. Brown argued that law enforcement lacked “the
requisite suspicion of criminal activity” to initiate the stop because “[l]aw
enforcement did not observe Brown commit or engage in any criminal wrongdoing”
and “had no information that would warrant a prudent person to believe that a crime
was committed to justify the traffic stop.” R. Doc. 28, at 3–4. He also argued that
“there was no probable cause to stop the vehicle for a traffic violation for not utilizing
its headlights” because Detective Overton “made no mention of the Vehicle not
having on its headlights as a justification for the traffic stop” and “no rain could be
seen striking the Vehicle at the time of the traffic stop as documented by the officers’
body cameras.” Id. at 4.

        Following an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge concluded that “the
traffic stop was . . . supported by reasonable suspicion that Mr. Brown violated state
vehicle registration and license plate laws.” R. Doc. 55-1, at 7. The magistrate judge
found that Detective Papineau rationally inferred from the objective and
particularized facts that Brown could not lawfully operate a vehicle with Royal
Motors dealer tags. First, Detective Papineau knew “that the previous month, October
2020, Mr. Brown borrowed a vehicle from Royal Motors, the vehicle’s owner told
police the vehicle did not have license plates when he made the loan, and the vehicle
bore stolen license plates when Mr. Brown was found with it off of Highway 40.” Id.
Second, “Detective Papineau . . . knew the owner of Royal Motors had said he would
never allow Mr. Brown to drive a company vehicle.” Id. at 8. Third, “Detective
Papineau observed Mr. Brown driving the Chrysler on two consecutive days without
taking it to Royal Motors, other businesses, or a maintenance facility, but using it to
visit multiple residences, a convenience store, and Parkade Plaza.” Id.

      These facts, the magistrate judge concluded, showed that “Detective Papineau
made a rational inference that Mr. Brown borrowed a vehicle with dealer tags for
personal use or affixed dealer tags to a vehicle to which they did not belong.” Id.
Based on this inference, Detective Papineau could reasonably suspect “that Mr.

                                           -5-
Brown had violated Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 301.130(5) (requiring vehicle to display their
proper license plates), 301.020(1) (requiring owners to register their vehicles), or
301.560(7) (prohibiting the display of dealer plates on a vehicle loaned to others).”
Id. The magistrate judge determined that “[b]ecause Detective Papineau ordered the
traffic stop based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, what the officers who
conducted the stop observed or knew is immaterial to the reasonable suspicion
determination.” Id. at 8.

       Additionally, the magistrate judge determined that the stop was supported by
probable cause to believe that Brown violated Mo. Ann. Stat. § 307.020(9) (requiring
a driver to use headlights “any time the weather conditions require usage of the motor
vehicle’s windshield wipers to operate the vehicle in a careful and prudent manner”).
The magistrate judge found that “[t]he officers’ testimony and dashcam video
strongly indicate that Mr. Brown was . . . driving without headlights in the rain.”
R. Doc. 55-1, at 9. First, “Detective Papineau testified that he directly observed Mr.
Brown driving the silver Chrysler Pacifica in the rain without headlights.” Id. Second,
“Officer Overton’s dashcam video shows that it was raining when they tailed Mr.
Brown’s vehicle, they had their windshield wipers on, and oncoming vehicles had
their windshield wipers and headlights on.” Id. Third, “Detective Kile observed that
Mr. Brown’s taillights were off, from which he reasonably concluded that the
headlights were off.” Id. Fourth, “[s]urveillance footage substantiates that Mr.
Brown’s taillights were off when he left Parkade Plaza and when he was being tailed
by Detective Overton, until moments before Detective Overton activated his siren.”
Id.

       The district court adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation
to deny the motion to suppress. After the district court denied the suppression motion,
Brown proceeded to trial. The jury found him guilty of being a felon in possession of
a firearm.

                                          -6-
                                     II. Discussion
       Brown challenges the district court’s denial of his suppression motion. First,
he argues that law enforcement lacked reasonable suspicion that he was engaged in
criminal activity because he was lawfully operating the vehicle with a Royal Motors
dealer plate. Second, he argues that law enforcement lacked probable cause to believe
he committed a traffic violation because Missouri law did not require him to turn on
the vehicle’s headlights because he was not using its windshield wipers.

      A mixed standard of review applies to a district court’s denial of a suppression
motion: “We review factual findings for clear error, while we review de novo the
ultimate conclusion of whether the Fourth Amendment was violated.” United States
v. Brown, 60 F.4th 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 2023).

       “The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and seizures.
A traffic stop is a reasonable seizure if it is supported by probable cause or reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity.” Id. “It is well established that any traffic violation,
regardless of its perceived severity, provides an officer with probable cause to stop
the driver.” United States v. Holly, 983 F.3d 361, 364 (8th Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks omitted). An officer has reasonable suspicion “to initiate a brief
investigative traffic stop when he has a particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.” Kansas v. Glover, 140
S. Ct. 1183, 1187 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). An officer’s “mere
hunch” of criminal activity is insufficient to create reasonable suspicion. Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). But “the level of suspicion the standard requires is
considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence, and
obviously less than is necessary for probable cause.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). “The standard depends on the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.” Id.
at 1188 (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying this standard, courts “must
permit officers to make commonsense judgments and inferences about human

                                          -7-
behavior.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The standard takes into account
the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.” Id. at 1191 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Therefore, “we [must] look to the totality of the circumstances” “[i]n
analyzing whether an officer had reasonable suspicion.” Brown, 60 F.4th at 1182.
“Even an officer’s incomplete initial observations may give reasonable suspicion for
a traffic stop, and mistakes of law or fact, if objectively reasonable, may still justify
a valid stop.” Holly, 983 F.3d at 364 (cleaned up). Officers need not be perfect to be
reasonable, and the Fourth Amendment “allows for some mistakes on [their] part . . . ,
giving them fair leeway for enforcing the law in the community’s protection.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted).

       Under the “collective knowledge doctrine,” the “collective knowledge of law
enforcement officers conducting an investigation is sufficient to provide reasonable
suspicion, and the collective knowledge can be imputed to the individual officer who
initiated the traffic stop when there is some communication between the officers.”
United States v. Mosley, 878 F.3d 246, 254 (8th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v.
Thompson, 533 F.3d 964, 969 (8th Cir. 2008)).“The patrol officer himself need not
know the specific facts that caused the stop. Rather, the officer need only rely upon
an order that is founded on reasonable suspicion.” United States v. Jacobsen, 391
F.3d 904, 907 (8th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted) (affirming denial of a motion to
suppress because the agent who ordered the traffic stop had reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity).

       We have previously held that an officer’s “decision to stop [a vehicle] was
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, [where] it was supported by reasonable
suspicion to believe that the operator of the [vehicle] violated [a state’s] vehicle
registration statutes.” United States v. Sanchez, 572 F.3d 475, 478 (8th Cir. 2009).
Here, the district court determined that the detectives had reasonable suspicion to
believe that Brown was unlawfully operating a vehicle with a dealer license plate in
violation of Missouri law.

                                          -8-
        Under Missouri law, a car dealer need not register vehicles displaying dealer
plates. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 301.560.3 (“The issuance of [a] distinctive dealer license
number or certificate of number shall be in lieu of registering each motor vehicle
. . . dealt with by a . . . manufacturer, public motor vehicle auction, wholesale motor
vehicle dealer, wholesale motor vehicle auction or new or used motor vehicle
dealer.”). But Missouri law limits who can use vehicles with dealer plates and their
purposes when used. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 301.560.7. Dealer plates

      may be displayed on any motor vehicle . . . owned and held for resale by
      a motor vehicle dealer for use by a customer who is test driving the
      motor vehicle, for use by any customer while the customer’s vehicle is
      being serviced or repaired by the motor vehicle dealer, for use and
      display purposes during, but not limited to, parades, private events,
      charitable events, or for use by an employee or officer, but shall not be
      displayed on any motor vehicle or trailer hired or loaned to others or
      upon any regularly used service or wrecker vehicle.

Id. (emphasis added); see also Mo. Code Regs. Ann. tit. 12, § 10-26.060(3)–(6)
(2020). Missouri law authorizes police to seize dealer plates upon probable cause to
believe they are being misused. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 301.560.9 (“If any law enforcement
officer has probable cause to believe that any license plate or certificate of number
issued under subsection 3 or 6 of this section is being misused in violation of
subsection 7 or 8 of this section, the license plate or certificate of number may be
seized and surrendered to the department.”).

       At the time of the stop, Detective Papineau knew the following: (1) a little over
a month prior to the stop, the then-owner of Royal Motors loaned Brown a personal
vehicle without license plates, and the police had found stolen plates on that vehicle;
(2) the then-owner of Royal Motors told the police that he would not loan Brown a
company car to drive; (3) the owner of Royal Motors had subsequently passed away;
(4) during several days of surveillance, Brown did not drive the vehicle to or from the

                                          -9-
dealership, as would be expected of someone test driving a car; and (5) the license
plate on the vehicle was registered to Royal Motors.

       These facts known to Detective Papineau at the time of the traffic stop enabled
him to rationally infer that Brown was not lawfully operating a vehicle with Royal
Motors dealer plates based on what occurred the prior month; that is, Brown
borrowed a vehicle with dealer tags for personal use or affixed dealer tags to a vehicle
to which they did not belong. This conduct, in turn, could give rise to a reasonable
suspicion that Brown had violated Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 301.130(5) (requiring vehicles
to display their proper license plates), 301.020(1) (requiring owners to register their
vehicles), or 301.560(7) (prohibiting the display of dealer plates on a vehicle loaned
to others). In conducting the traffic stop of Brown, Detectives Overton and Kile
“rel[ied] upon [Detective Papineau’s] order that [was] founded on reasonable
suspicion.” Jacobsen, 391 F.3d at 907.

       On appeal, Brown asks the court to focus on facts not known to Detective
Papineau at the time of the stop: (1) Brown was an employee of Royal Motors, and
(2) the new owner of Royal Motors, Amber Minton, gave Brown permission to
operate the vehicle. But “[t]o determine if probable cause or reasonable suspicion
existed, we look at what the officers ‘reasonably knew at the time,’ rather than
looking back with the benefit of hindsight.” United States v. Hanel, 993 F.3d 540,
543 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Hollins, 685 F.3d 703, 706 (8th Cir.
2012)).

       As previously explained, “[m]istakes of law or fact, if objectively reasonable,
may still justify a valid stop.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hollins, 685 F.3d
at 706). Detective Papineau’s “subjective intent is not determinative in deciding
whether the stop was reasonable.” Id. (quoting United States v. Mallari, 334 F.3d
765, 767 (8th Cir. 2003)). “Even if [Detective Papineau] invoke[d] the wrong offense
at the time, probable cause may still support the stop if an officer has an objective

                                         -10-
basis to make it.” Id. at 544 (cleaned up). Furthermore, “[t]he reasonableness of the
officer’s decision to stop a suspect does not turn on the availability of less intrusive
investigatory techniques.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 11 (1989)
(explaining that “[s]uch a rule would unduly hamper the police’s ability to make
swift, on-the-spot decisions . . . and it would require courts to indulge in unrealistic
second-guessing” (internal quotation marks omitted)).

       Brown also argues that the traffic stop was unconstitutional because it was a
pretext to search the vehicle for drugs. Law enforcement was surveilling Brown’s
vehicle as part of a narcotics investigation. During the surveillance, an officer
reasonably believed he observed Brown commit a traffic violation. The traffic
violation gave law enforcement reasonable suspicion to conduct the traffic stop based
on knowledge and observations unrelated to the surveillance. See Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary,
probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis.”).

                                      III. Conclusion
        Accordingly, we hold that under the facts known to law enforcement at the time
of the traffic stop, they could have reasonably suspected Brown violated Missouri law
regulating display of license plates. Therefore, the traffic stop was objectively
reasonable.2 We affirm the judgment of the district court.3
                          ______________________________

      2
       Because we hold that law enforcement had reasonable suspicion to stop the
vehicle for the license plate display infraction, we need not address whether probable
cause existed to stop the vehicle for Brown’s failure to turn on his headlights.
      3
          We also deny Brown’s motion for appointment of new counsel.

                                         -11-