Court Opinion

ID: 9719459
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:53:31.95615+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:24:09.973580
License: Public Domain

White, J.
(dissenting). I agree with the majority that the goal of judicial interpretation of statutes is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the Legislature and that the primary criterion in determining intent is the language of the statute. I also agree that criminal statutes must be strictly construed, with each word accorded its ordinary and common meaning. I dissent, however, because I conclude that the statutes at issue can be interpreted in a manner that gives effect to both their specific language and the apparent legislative intent.
MCL 257.617(1); MSA 9.2317(1) states that the driver of a vehicle who knows or who has reason to believe that the driver has been involved in an accident on public or private property that is open to public travel, resulting in serious injury or death, shall immediately stop at the scene and shall remain there until the requirements of MCL 257.619; MSA 9.2319 are fulfilled. MCL 257.619; MSA 9.2319 requires that the driver give his name, address, and other information to the person struck or the driver or occupants of any vehicle collided with. Here, the decedent was *625the person struck. The decedent was unable to take the information from defendant, and defendant failed to leave the information on the decedent’s person. Therefore, the requirements of MCL 257.619; MSA 9.2319 were not met, and defendant was required to remain at the scene under MCL 257.617(1); MSA 9.2317a).1

 The disposition of this case does not require consideration of the application of the statutes in circumstances where the driver remains at the scene until the authorities have departed. Here, the evidence showed that although defendant remained at the scene for a time, he left the scene well before the police departed, and without identifying himself.