Court Opinion

ID: 9402010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 19:13:45.445163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:56.833499
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
                                   January 2023 Term                        FILED
                                      _______________                    June 14, 2023
                                                                            released at 3:00 p.m.

                                      No. 21-0726                       EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
                                                                        SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
                                    _______________                          OF WEST VIRGINIA

                       EVERETT FRAZIER, COMMISSIONER,
                                 WEST VIRGINIA
                         DIVISION OF MOTOR VEHICLES,
                            Petitioner Below, Petitioner,

                                           V.

                                 DAVID GAITHER, JR.,
                              Respondent Below, Respondent.

                _____________________________________________

                   Appeal from the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
                       The Honorable Jennifer F. Bailey, Judge
                             Civil Action No. 19-AA-176

                                 AFFIRMED
                _____________________________________________

                               Submitted: February 8, 2023
                                  Filed: June 14, 2023

Patrick Morrisey, Esq.                          David Gaither, Jr.
Attorney General                                Falling Waters, West Virginia
Elaine L. Skorich, Esq.                         No Appearance by the Respondent
Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorney for the Petitioner

JUSTICE BUNN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
                              SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

              1.     “Upon judicial review of a contested case under the West Virginia

Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 29A, Article 5, Section 4(g), the circuit court may

affirm the order or decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings. The

circuit court shall reverse, vacate or modify the order or decision of the agency if the

substantial rights of the petitioner or petitioners have been prejudiced because the

administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, decisions or order are: ‘(1) In violation of

constitutional or statutory provisions; or (2) In excess of the statutory authority or

jurisdiction of the agency; or (3) Made upon unlawful procedures; or (4) Affected by other

error of law; or (5) Clearly wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial evidence

on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion

or clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.’” Syllabus point 2, Shepherdstown Volunteer

Fire Department v. State ex rel. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 172 W. Va.

627, 309 S.E.2d 342 (1983).

              2.     “On appeal of an administrative order from a circuit court, this Court

is bound by the statutory standards contained in W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4[(g)] and reviews

questions of law presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative officer are

accorded deference unless the reviewing court believes the findings to be clearly wrong.”

Syllabus point 1, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W. Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996).

                                              i
             3.     “Evidentiary findings made at an administrative hearing should not be

reversed unless they are clearly wrong.” Syllabus point 1, Francis O. Day Co., Inc. v.

Director, Division of Environmental Protection, 191 W. Va. 134, 443 S.E.2d 602 (1994).

                                           ii
BUNN, Justice:

              Petitioner Everett Frazier, 1 Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of

Motor Vehicles (“DMV”), appeals from an order entered August 12, 2021, by the Circuit

Court of Kanawha County. The DMV complains that the circuit court erred by affirming

an order entered by the Office of Administrative Hearings (“OAH”) reinstating Respondent

David Gaither, Jr.’s, personal driver’s license and commercial driver’s license. This

reinstatement occurred after Mr. Gaither challenged the DMV’s finding that he drove under

the influence of alcohol. On appeal, the DMV contends that the record contains sufficient

evidence to support its earlier finding that Mr. Gaither drove a motor vehicle while under

the influence of alcohol. Mr. Gaither makes no appearance before this Court.

              We conclude that the DMV has not met its burden of proving by a

preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Gaither drove a motor vehicle while under the

influence of alcohol. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court’s August 12, 2021 order ruling

that the OAH’s reinstatement of Mr. Gaither’s licenses was proper.

              Since the DMV entered its orders of revocation and disqualification in this
              1

case, the Commissioner of the West Virginia Division of Motor Vehicles has changed.
Therefore, we have made the necessary substitution of parties pursuant to West Virginia
Rule of Appellate Procedure Rule 41(c).

                                             1
                                              I.

                     FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

              Mr. Gaither was involved in a single-vehicle accident in Jefferson County,

West Virginia, in the early morning hours of July 17, 2017. The exact time of the crash

was unclear from the record. Deputy Bryan McCusker arrived at the scene of the accident

around 3:30 a.m., after Mr. Gaither had abandoned his vehicle and left the scene. A witness

who had seen Mr. Gaither following the crash was still at the scene when the deputy

arrived. The witness stated that he stopped to render assistance after he observed a vehicle

that appeared to have crashed into a tree. The witness informed the deputy that he had

watched the driver gather his belongings from his vehicle; that the driver seemed

disoriented, appeared to have been injured, and had an odor of alcohol; and that the driver

left the accident scene on foot carrying a pair of boots and a pair of jeans. Additionally, the

witness described the driver’s appearance and stated that the driver had blood on his body

and his clothes. During his scene assessment, Deputy McCusker checked the vehicle’s

registration and determined that Mr. Gaither owned the vehicle involved in the crash. The

deputy did not report finding any evidence of alcohol consumption in or around Mr.

Gaither’s vehicle, nor did his investigation reveal any other information establishing the

time of the crash, such as the vehicle still feeling warm from having recently been driven.

              Approximately two hours later, Deputy McCusker received a report of an

individual matching Mr. Gaither’s description walking along the road on which the

accident had occurred. At about 5:30 a.m., the deputy located Mr. Gaither, who was

                                               2
carrying a single boot and a pair of jeans. Five minutes 2 after encountering him, Deputy

McCusker gave Mr. Gaither a preliminary breath test, which indicated the presence of

alcohol in his blood. 3 The deputy did not administer any field sobriety tests. Deputy

McCusker also detected an odor of alcohol from Mr. Gaither and observed that he was

unsteady, had slurred speech and bloodshot eyes, and had blood on his body and clothes.

Given Mr. Gaither’s apparent injuries, the deputy requested assistance from emergency

medical personnel, but, upon their arrival, Mr. Gaither refused treatment. In response to

questioning, Mr. Gaither told Deputy McCusker that he had been at a friend’s house and

crashed his truck on his way to work; Mr. Gaither did not state whether he had consumed

alcohol prior to the accident. Another officer transported Mr. Gaither to a residence in

Charles Town.

             2
               A law enforcement officer is required to observe a motorist suspected of
driving under the influence of alcohol for at least fifteen minutes before administering a
preliminary breath test:

                     The preliminary alcohol breath analysis shall be
              administered after the law enforcement officer has a reasonable
              belief that the person has been driving while under the
              influence of alcohol. The law enforcement officer shall prohibit
              the person from drinking alcohol or smoking for at least fifteen
              minutes before conducting the test.

W. Va. C.S.R. § 64-10-5.2.a (emphasis added).
             3
                 At the time of the events giving rise to this appeal, the DMV could
administratively revoke a driver’s license if a secondary chemical test showed the motorist
had a blood alcohol concentration of 0.08%. Compare W. Va. Code § 17C-5A-1(c) (eff.
2008), and W. Va. Code § 17C-5A-1 (eff. 2020) (modifying role of DMV in license
revocation procedure). Deputy McCusker did not give Mr. Gaither a secondary chemical
test following the preliminary breath test he administered upon locating him.

                                             3
              Deputy McCusker consulted his supervisor before seeking a warrant for Mr.

Gaither for driving under the influence of alcohol and leaving the scene of an accident. Mr.

Gaither was arrested on those criminal charges. Although the charges were later dismissed,

the DMV revoked Mr. Gaither’s personal driver’s license and disqualified him from

holding a commercial driver’s license by separate orders entered August 16, 2017. Mr.

Gaither protested the revocation and disqualification orders and requested an

administrative hearing. Following the hearing, by order entered November 25, 2019, the

OAH rescinded the DMV’s revocation and disqualification orders. The OAH found the

DMV had not proven that Mr. Gaither drove a motor vehicle while under the influence of

alcohol, and it reinstated both of Mr. Gaither’s licenses. The DMV appealed to the Circuit

Court of Kanawha County, which affirmed the OAH’s rescission and reinstatement order.

The DMV now appeals to this Court.

                                            II.

                               STANDARD OF REVIEW

              This matter is before the Court following the DMV’s unsuccessful appeal

from the OAH to the circuit court. Because this case involves an administrative appeal,

both the circuit court’s and this Court’s review is governed by the West Virginia

Administrative Procedures Act. See generally W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4. The circuit court’s

review of the OAH’s order rescinding the DMV’s orders revoking Mr. Gaither’s personal

                                             4
driver’s license and disqualifying him from holding a commercial driver’s license was

governed by the following standard:

                      Upon judicial review of a contested case under the West
              Virginia Administrative Procedure Act, Chapter 29A, Article
              5, Section 4(g), the circuit court may affirm the order or
              decision of the agency or remand the case for further
              proceedings. The circuit court shall reverse, vacate or modify
              the order or decision of the agency if the substantial rights of
              the petitioner or petitioners have been prejudiced because the
              administrative findings, inferences, conclusions, decisions or
              order are: “(1) In violation of constitutional or statutory
              provisions; or (2) In excess of the statutory authority or
              jurisdiction of the agency; or (3) Made upon unlawful
              procedures; or (4) Affected by other error of law; or (5) Clearly
              wrong in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
              evidence on the whole record; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious or
              characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly unwarranted
              exercise of discretion.”

Syl. pt. 2, Shepherdstown Volunteer Fire Dep’t v. State ex rel. W. Va. Hum. Rts. Comm’n,

172 W. Va. 627, 309 S.E.2d 342 (1983). This Court, in turn, similarly reviews the circuit

court’s consideration of an administrative order:

                      On appeal of an administrative order from a circuit
              court, this Court is bound by the statutory standards contained
              in W. Va. Code § 29A-5-4[(g)] and reviews questions of law
              presented de novo; findings of fact by the administrative
              officer are accorded deference unless the reviewing court
              believes the findings to be clearly wrong.

Syl. pt. 1, Muscatell v. Cline, 196 W. Va. 588, 474 S.E.2d 518 (1996). Accord Syl. pt. 1,

in part, Cahill v. Mercer Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 208 W. Va. 177, 539 S.E.2d 437 (2000) (“Since

a reviewing court is obligated to give deference to factual findings rendered by an

administrative law judge, a circuit court is not permitted to substitute its judgment for that

                                              5
of the hearing examiner with regard to factual determinations. Credibility determinations

made by an administrative law judge are similarly entitled to deference. Plenary review is

conducted as to the conclusions of law and application of law to the facts, which are

reviewed de novo.”).

                                            III.

                                      DISCUSSION

              The DMV contends that the circuit court erred by affirming the OAH’s ruling

that reinstated Mr. Gaither’s personal and commercial driver’s licenses. Specifically, the

OAH found that the DMV “did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that [Mr.

Gaither] drove a motor vehicle in this State while under the influence of alcohol, controlled

substances and/or drugs on July 17, 2017.” The circuit court affirmed the OAH’s ruling

stating,

              after considering the totality of the circumstances, the OAH did
              not err in concluding that the DMV did not prove by a
              preponderance of the evidence that [Mr. Gaither] drove a
              motor vehicle in this State while under the influence of alcohol,
              controlled substances and/or drugs on the date in question.

              Our consideration of the DMV’s assignment of error begins and ends with

the answer to the same query that was at issue in the administrative hearing: “The principal

question at the hearing shall be whether the person did drive a motor vehicle while under

the influence of alcohol, controlled substances or drugs[.]” W. Va. Code § 17C-5A-2(e)

                                              6
(eff. 2015). 4 The DMV has the burden of proof in such cases 5 and must prove these facts

by a preponderance of the evidence 6 to support an administrative license revocation for

driving under the influence. See also White v. Miller, 228 W. Va. 797, 802, 724 S.E.2d

768, 773 (2012) (recognizing that “preponderance of the evidence standard pertain[s] to

administrative revocation proceedings”). Additionally, Mr. Gaither’s qualification for his

commercial driver’s license depends on the validity of his personal driver’s license; thus,

revocation of Mr. Gaither’s personal driver’s license necessitated the contemporaneous

disqualification of his commercial driver’s license. See W. Va. Code § 17E-1-13(i) (eff.

2017) (providing that “a driver is disqualified from operating a commercial motor vehicle

for the duration of any suspension, revocation or cancellation of his or her driver’s license

or privilege to operate a motor vehicle by this state or by any other state or jurisdiction

until the driver complies with the terms and conditions for reinstatement set by this state

or by another state or jurisdiction”); cf. W. Va. Code § 17E-1-13 (eff. 2020) (statutory

language following legislative changes to driver’s license revocation procedure).

              4
                While this statute was in effect at the time of the events giving rise to this
appeal, the Legislature has recently repealed this provision as part of its statutory
amendments restructuring the role of the DMV in driver’s license revocation proceedings.
See Acts of the W. Va. Legislature, Reg. Sess. 2023, H.B. 2564 (eff. May 4, 2023).
              5
                  W. Va. Code § 17C-5C-4(d) (eff. 2010). See note 4, supra.
              6
                  W. Va. Code § 17C-5A-2(j). See note 4, supra.

                                              7
              To determine whether the DMV’s revocation and disqualification orders

were proper, we must determine whether the DMV established, by a preponderance of the

evidence, that Mr. Gaither drove a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol.

“‘Preponderance of the evidence’ is defined as that degree of evidence that is of greater

weight or more convincing than the evidence which is offered in opposition to it; that is,

evidence which as a whole shows the fact to be proved to be more probable than not.” Suhr

v. Okorn, 83 S.W.3d 119, 121 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002) (quotations and citation omitted).

              Although the preponderance of the evidence burden of proof is both well-

established by the statutes governing administrative license revocation proceedings and

well-defined by the common law, the DMV appears to have adopted a different view of

this evidentiary standard. The DMV’s argument in this case demonstrates the need for the

Court to clarify the burden the agency must carry to prove that a driver operated a motor

vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, and/or controlled substances and to

uphold an administrative license revocation on those grounds. 7

              7
                Similarly, in another case this term, which also involved the revocation of
a driver’s personal license and the disqualification of her commercial driver’s license,
questions arose as to the sufficiency of the evidence to support the DMV’s actions. See
Frazier v. Yoder, Nos. 21-0568 & 22-0112, 2023 WL 3750616 (W. Va. June 1, 2023)
(memorandum decision). Counsel for the DMV in that case proposed that, where the
weight of the evidence essentially amounts to a “coin toss,” the Court should rule in the
DMV’s favor, and the DMV’s decision to revoke a driver’s license for driving under the
influence of alcohol should be upheld. See id. at *7 n.15. Evidence amounting to a “coin
toss” does not satisfy the DMV’s evidentiary burden. “‘[A] fact that can only be decided
by a coin toss has not been proven by a preponderance of the evidence[.]’” Id. (alteration
in original; quoting Pineda v. Hamilton Cnty., Ohio, 977 F.3d 483, 491 (6th Cir. 2020)
(additional quotations and citation omitted)). In other words, “where the proof for a

                                             8
              A preponderance of the evidence means that the party with that burden must

prove its case by “greater weight.” 2 Louis J. Palmer, Jr., Handbook on Evidence for West

Virginia Lawyers § 1301.03[2], at 640 (7th ed. 2021). “This means merely that the party

who has the burden of proof must produce evidence tending to show the truth of such facts

that is more convincing . . . as worthy of belief, than that which is offered in opposition.”

Id. In other words, proof by a preponderance of the evidence contemplates evidence that

weighs more heavily in favor of one side than the other; thus, the evidentiary scale is not

balanced, but rather, tips at least slightly in favor of the party who bears the burden of

proof. “‘Where the evidence equally supports both sides, a party has not met its burden of

proof’” by a preponderance of the evidence. Darby v. Kanawha Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 227

W. Va. 525, 530, 711 S.E.2d 595, 600 (2011) (per curiam) (quoting hearing examiner’s

order).

              Courts—either as fact finders in the first instance or as reviewers of those

findings of fact—do not decide evidentiary matters based upon a mere coin flip. See

generally Miller v. Leonard, 588 So. 2d 79, 83-84 (La. 1991) (explaining role of court

when burden of proof is by a preponderance of the evidence but where evidence is

balanced). Rather, courts’ evidentiary decisions are guided by the respective parties’

burdens of proof and whether those burdens have been met. Applying the deferential

proposition is in ‘equipoise,’ it has not been established by a preponderance of the
evidence.” Lynn v. Amoco Oil Co., 459 F. Supp. 2d 1175, 1181 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (citation
omitted).

                                              9
standard of review, we agree with the OAH’s and the circuit court’s finding that the DMV

has failed to sustain its burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Mr.

Gaither drove a motor vehicle while he was under the influence of alcohol.

              While the DMV correctly argues on appeal that neither a secondary chemical

test nor a field sobriety test is essential to prove that an individual drove while under the

influence of alcohol, the record contains very little circumstantial evidence to establish Mr.

Gaither’s impairment at the time of the accident. See Reed v. Hill, 235 W. Va. 1, 9, 770

S.E.2d 501, 509 (2015) (“Neither the DUI [driving under the influence] statutes nor our

case law require a PBT [preliminary breath test] or any particular field sobriety test to

establish that a driver was under the influence for purposes of administrative revocation.”). 8

              The OAH summarized this lack of evidence to support the DMV’s revocation

and disqualification orders as follows:

              In the instant matter it is undisputed that [Mr. Gaither] was
              driving a motor vehicle on July 17, 2017[,] and was involved
              in a motor vehicle accident. . . . It is noted that when [Deputy

              8
                Accord Syl. pt. 1, Albrecht v. State, 173 W. Va. 268, 314 S.E.2d 859 (1984)
(“There are no provisions in either W. Va. Code, 17C-5-1 (1981), et seq., or W. Va. Code,
17C-5A-1 (1981), et seq., that require the administration of a chemical sobriety test in order
to prove that a motorist was driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs for purposes
of making an administrative revocation of his driver’s license.”). But see Syl. pt. 2,
Albrecht, 173 W. Va. 268, 314 S.E.2d 859 (“Where there is evidence reflecting that a driver
was operating a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway, exhibited symptoms of
intoxication, and had consumed alcoholic beverages, this is sufficient proof under a
preponderance of the evidence standard to warrant the administrative revocation of his
driver’s license for driving under the influence of alcohol.”).

                                               10
              McCusker] initially arrived at the scene [Mr. Gaither] had
              purportedly been injured but had walked away from the
              accident. There were subsequent reports of a man, covered
              with blood walking down the roadway in various locations in
              the area, however, [Deputy McCusker] did not locate [Mr.
              Gaither] for over two hours after the reported accident. No
              standardized field sobriety tests were administered, [Mr.
              Gaither] was not arrested at the time of the incident[,] and no
              secondary chemical test to determine the blood alcohol
              concentration of [Mr. Gaither’s] blood was performed.
              [Deputy McCusker’s] testimony regarding his observations of
              [Mr. Gaither’s] indicia of intoxication is credible, however,
              there was an excess of two (2) hours between the time [Deputy
              McCusker] investigated the crash, and the location of [Mr.
              Gaither] became known. The witness did not appear at the
              administrative [hearing] to offer testimony in regard to his
              observation of [Mr. Gaither] at the scene of the crash[,] and no
              evidence was presented to [establish] wh[at] . . . time the crash
              had occurred or the time period that had lapsed between the
              crash and the witness’s observations. Further, no evidence was
              presented to establish that [Mr. Gaither] consumed alcohol
              prior to the operation of his vehicle.

              The circuit court echoed these same concerns about the lack of evidence

presented by the DMV to prove that Mr. Gaither was driving under the influence at the

time of the accident when it affirmed the OAH’s decision. The circuit court also

emphasized that Deputy McCusker had failed to observe Mr. Gaither for fifteen minutes

before administering the preliminary breath test, and the lack of field sobriety or secondary

chemical tests. Finally, the circuit court found that the only evidence that Mr. Gaither drove

under the influence “put forth by the DMV . . . is the unsworn hearsay statement of the

alleged witness on the scene of the crash contained in [Deputy McCusker’s] narrative

attached to the criminal complaint.” The circuit court explained that even if the witness’s

                                              11
statement is considered despite its “questionable reliability,” “there is nothing in the

testimony below or the documentary evidence that establishes when the accident took place

or how long after the accident . . . the witness observed [Mr. Gaither] and noticed the scent

of alcohol coming from [Mr. Gaither’s] person.” The circuit court concluded by stating

that “simply smelling like alcohol is not enough to establish that [Mr. Gaither] drove a

vehicle in this [S]tate while impaired.”

              Despite these well-reasoned findings that the DMV failed to prove that Mr.

Gaither drove while under the influence, the DMV nevertheless asks this Court to reweigh

the evidence considered by the OAH and the circuit court, and the conclusions they

reached, to find in its favor. We decline this invitation because “[e]videntiary findings

made at an administrative hearing should not be reversed unless they are clearly wrong.”

Syl. pt. 1, Francis O. Day Co., Inc. v. Dir., Div. of Env’t Prot., 191 W. Va. 134, 443 S.E.2d

602 (1994). We find no clear error in either the OAH’s or the circuit court’s interpretations

of the evidence presented by the DMV in support of its revocation and disqualification

orders. We also agree with the conclusions reached by the OAH and the circuit court that

there are simply too many unknown facts to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that Mr. Gaither drove under the influence at the time of his accident. Because we find no

error in the OAH’s findings of fact or the circuit court’s consideration of those facts, we

affirm the circuit court’s order upholding the OAH’s reinstatement of Mr. Gaither’s

personal and commercial driver’s licenses.

                                              12
                                           IV.

                                    CONCLUSION

              For the foregoing reasons, we find that the DMV has not established by a

preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Gaither drove a motor vehicle while under the

influence of alcohol. Therefore, the August 12, 2021 order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha

County upholding the administrative order rescinding the license revocation and

disqualification and reinstating Mr. Gaither’s personal driver’s license and commercial

driver’s license is affirmed.

                                                                                Affirmed.

                                            13