Court Opinion

ID: 9791389
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:10:08.67638+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:35.886419
License: Public Domain

Utter, J.
(concurring) — I concur with the majority. I do not, however, join in its unnecessary rejection of the rule of Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912 (1968). Since we hold that appellant is able to recover on a theory of the tort of outrage, and thus that his complaint does state a cause of action, we need not and should not comment on the Dillon rule in this case.
Were the Dillon rule necessarily at issue in this case, I would follow it. The reasons for rejecting it seem to me to echo those advanced for refusing to allow recovery for the tort of outrage. As the majority finds, neither are persuasive considering the established ability of trial courts to define causation and foreseeability on a case-by-case basis. *61The Supreme Court of Hawaii has recently recognized the vitality of the Dillon rule and applied and extended it in a case where a 10-year-old boy allegedly suffered severe mental distress when he witnessed the death of his step-grandmother who was struck by a car in a crosswalk. Leong v. Takasaki, __ Hawaii__, 520 P.2d 758 (1974). As the court there noted, courts in Rhode Island, Virginia and Michigan have also recently followed California’s lead. D’Ambra v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 810 (D.R.I. 1973), modified on other grounds, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir. 1973); Hughes v. Moore, 214 Va. 27, 34, 197 S.E.2d 214, 219 (1973); Toms v. McConnell, 45 Mich. App. 647, 657, 207 N.W.2d 140 (1973).