Court Opinion

ID: 9784408
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 20:44:14.768288+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:54.303551
License: Public Domain

TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
While the majority’s opinion correctly explains the abuse of discretion standard that we employ when reviewing a trial court’s decision in a conservatorship appeal, the majority errs in applying that standard because the trial court’s decision to require Clayton to take three random alcohol tests per year within twelve hours of possessing Natalie is neither arbitrary nor unreasonable. See In re W.M., 172 S.W.3d 718, 724 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2005, no pet.) (explaining that the “trial court has wide latitude in determining the best interests of a minor child”). We must be cognizant that the trial court is in a better position to decide issues within custody cases because “it faced the parties and their witnesses, observed their demeanor, and had the opportunity to evaluate the claims made by each parent.” In re M.M.M., 307 S.W.3d 846, 849 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (quoting In re J.R.D., 169 S.W.3d 740, 743 (Tex.App.-Austin 2005, pet. denied)). An abuse of discretion does not occur as long as some evidence of substantive and probative character exists to support the decision. W.M., 172 S.W.3d at 725.
The best interests of the child must be the primary consideration of the trial court when determining issues of conservator-ship and possession of and access to a child. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.002 (Vernon 2008); 307 S.W.3d at 850.1 The trial court’s order requiring Clayton to submit to alcohol testing does not deny his possession of Natalie; it imposes restrictions on his right to possess her. The trial court asked Christina about the basis for her desire to require alcohol testing. She said, “Because I know from past experience living with him that he does have an issue with alcohol abuse. My daughter numerous times comes home from her weekends with him and state[s] that he drinks.” [Emphasis added.] The trial court could have determined that Christina’s present-tense explanation of Clayton’s alcohol consumption around Natalie weakened his credibility on the rest of his testimony concerning the nature of his alcohol consumption because he had previously testified that he would never drink around her.2 Although Clayton denied ever having an addiction to alcohol, he admitted that he has abused alcohol in the past. He further admitted that he still drinks alcohol. He conceded that he thought that it was fair for the court to enjoin both parents from drinking alcohol while in possession of Natalie or within twelve hours of that possession.
Clayton also has a history of drug addiction, including the use of heroin, cocaine, and marijuana. He admitted that he has stopped attending Narcotics Anonymous meetings because he does not own a vehicle. The trial court could have reasonably found that Clayton’s problem with drug abuse, including prior relapses and the use *725of drugs even after attending rehabilitation, justified also testing him for alcohol consumption, particularly because he admitted that he had abused alcohol in the past. Cf. In re Pierre, 50 S.W.3d 554, 559 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2001, orig. proceeding) (“[I]n the absence of any evidence of drug abuse ... the trial court abused its discretion by requiring Relator to submit to drug and alcohol testing and ordering him to pay for the same.”). I would hold that the trial court had sufficient information upon which to exercise its discretion and did not err in its application of that discretion by weighing evidence that produced conflicting inferences about Clayton’s extent of alcohol use (including use around Natalie) and the need for alcohol testing. See M.M.M., 307 S.W.3d at 849; W.M., 172 S.W.3d at 725.
Clayton also argues that because the alcohol testing ordered by the trial court requires screening for the preceding eighty-hour period even though he will not always have possession of Natalie during the entire eighty hours, he could test positive for alcohol yet not be in violation of the agreed injunction. Therefore, Clayton contends, the trial court cannot impose such a restriction. I find this argument unpersuasive. The trial court asked the parties whether there was a test available that would cover a lesser period of time. Christina’s counsel stated that she did not know of any such test (and Clayton did not offer to take such a test if one exists). Thus, the trial court decided to leave the eighty-hour test in place. The court could have reasonably determined that Natalie’s best interests required Clayton to refrain from consuming alcohol during or immediately before his possession of her, and Clayton conceded that it was fair that he not drink within twelve hours of possessing her. He did not, however, propose a means other than the eighty-hour test of ensuring that result while still allowing him to drink at times before his immediate possession of her. During a hearing on Clayton’s motion for new trial, the trial court offered such an alternative — to wear a device (at his expense) that would detect his alcohol consumption only while he possessed Natalie — but he did not choose to do so.
For these reasons, I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by including the provisions regarding alcohol testing in the judgment, and I would therefore affirm the judgment.
Finally, even if I agreed with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court abused its discretion, I would still dissent to the majority’s disposition of the appeal. The majority essentially holds that the trial court abused its discretion because the facts of this case are inappropriate and insufficient to show that Clayton’s random alcohol tests are in Natalie’s best interests. See Majority Op. at 722-23. In such a situation, unless the majority expressly holds that there was no evidence to support the trial court’s decision, it should remand, based . on factual insufficiency, rather than deleting the alcohol testing requirement. See Glover v. Tex. Gen. Indent. Co., 619 S.W.2d 400, 401-02 (Tex.1981) (holding that if a court of appeals sustains an issue or point because the evidence is factually insufficient, it must reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for new trial); In re T.D.C., 91 S.W.3d 865, 877 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) (op. on reh’g) (remanding a custody case based on a determination that the trial court abused its discretion because its decision was based on factually insufficient evidence); Enriquez v. Krueck, 887 S.W.2d 497, 503 (Tex.App.San Antonio 1994, no writ) (same); see also In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 347 (Tex.2009) (“[A] remand is ... the appropriate judgment when evidence is found to *726have been factually insufficient[.]”); Wilson v. Wilson, 132 S.W.3d 533, 534, 539 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (remanding a case regarding the division of a community estate because of an abuse of discretion based on factual insufficiency).3
For all of these reasons, I dissent to the majority’s opinion and judgment.

. Thus, I disagree with the majority’s statement that the trial court's ultimate goal is to minimize restrictions placed on a parent’s right of possession. See Majority Op. at 721. To the extent that this goal conflicts with the child’s best interests, the child’s best interests should predominate.

. Specifically, the trial court could have reasonably inferred from Natalie’s "numerous” statements to Christina that Clayton’s alcohol consumption was not as controlled as he had testified.

. The cases cited in footnote seven of the majority’s opinion are inapposite. See Majority Op. at 723 n. 7. In In re C.A.M.M., the appellate court removed a requirement of supervised visitation because the requirement had not been included in trial court’s original custody order and there was no argument made (and apparently no evidence presented) regarding visitation in the father’s motion for new trial. 243 S.W.3d 211, 222-23 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied). And in In re Pierre, the appellate court reformed an order to delete a drug testing requirement because there was an "absence of any evidence of drug abuse.” 50 S.W.3d at 559 (emphasis added).