Court Opinion

ID: 9388737
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-21 16:07:30.79492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:22.274338
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Calo, 2023-Ohio-1289.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                   :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,             :
                                                            No. 111958
                 v.                              :

DENNIS CALO,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellant.            :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: April 20, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-83-186387-B

                                           Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Katherine E. Mullin, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Dennis Calo, pro se.

SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J.:

                   Dennis Calo appeals the judgment denying a motion to vacate his

1984 convictions stemming from the aggravated murder of Thomas Kowal and Kim
Shusta. State v. Calo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga Nos. 49159 and 49215, 1985 Ohio App.

LEXIS 8032, 1 (June 13, 1985).1 There is no merit to this appeal.

               The facts of the underlying convictions are largely irrelevant to the

procedural posture of this appeal. It suffices that Calo and an accomplice, who was

tried separately, shot and killed Kowal and Shusta at the time of a drug transaction.

The state originally charged Calo with the murders in 1978, but upon the state’s

request, the charges were nolled. In general terms, a “nolle prosequi is merely a

withdrawal of the indictment, which if done before jeopardy has attached, does not

prohibit reindictment.” State v. Holden, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 53786, 1987 Ohio

App. LEXIS 9158, 2 (Oct. 15, 1987), quoting State v. Dixon, 14 Ohio App.3d 396,

397, 471 N.E.2d 864 (8th Dist.1984). As a result of that general proposition, in 1983

Calo was indicted with the aggravated murder charges mirroring those that were

previously nolled. Throughout the underlying proceedings, Calo maintained that

the second prosecution violated his speedy trial rights based on the five-year delay

between cases. No court found in his favor. See Calo.

               Thirty-five years after his conviction, Calo filed a motion to vacate his

“illegal convictions,” claiming that the indictment issued in 1983 violated the Fifth

and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Calo contends that the first case

      1 This is not Calo’s first attempt to challenge his convictions following his direct
appeal. See, e.g., State v. Calo, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 62980, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS
4489, 1 (Sept. 23, 1993); State ex rel. Finnerty v. Custodian of Records, 96 Ohio App.3d
569, 570, 645 N.E.2d 780 (8th Dist.1994); State ex rel. Richard v. Mohr, 10th Dist.
Franklin No. 11AP-780, 2012-Ohio-4413; Richard v. Mohr, S.D.Ohio No. 2:13-cv-1013,
2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8322 (Jan. 23, 2014).
was effectively dismissed with prejudice, barring all later proceedings arising from

the facts and circumstances of his murdering Kowal and Shusta. In furtherance of

that claim, Calo essentially claimed that his trial attorney rendered ineffective

assistance by not preserving this constitutional challenge. Calo’s motion to vacate

his convictions, however, did not include any discussion regarding whether the trial

court possessed jurisdiction to consider the merits of the arguments advanced

therein.

              “Once a final judgment has been issued pursuant to Crim.R. 32, the

trial court’s jurisdiction ends.” State v. Gilbert, 143 Ohio St.3d 150, 2014-Ohio-

4562, 35 N.E.3d 493, ¶ 9.        That court’s continuing jurisdiction to act in

postconviction proceedings is, therefore, limited. State v. Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d

480, 2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, ¶ 30; State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420,

2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, ¶ 23; State ex rel. Cruzado v. Zaleski, 111 Ohio

St.3d 353, 2006-Ohio-5795, 856 N.E.2d 263, ¶ 19. There must be a jurisdictional

basis for the trial court to act or to decide the issue being presented following the

exhaustion of appellate remedies in a criminal proceeding. State v. Apanovitch, 155

Ohio St.3d 358, 2018-Ohio-4744, 121 N.E.3d 351, ¶ 38-39; State v. Parker, 157 Ohio

St.3d 460, 2019-Ohio-3848, 137 N.E.3d 1151. If a trial court lacks jurisdiction to

consider postconviction motions, “any ruling on such a motion is a nullity.” State

ex rel. Dobson v. Handwork, 159 Ohio St.3d 442, 2020-Ohio-1069, 151 N.E.3d 613,

¶ 16, citing State v. Dix, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 101007, 2014-Ohio-3330, ¶ 3; State
v. Ford, 9th Dist. Summit No. 26466, 2012-Ohio-5050, ¶ 8-10; State v. Wilson, 10th

Dist. Franklin Nos. 05AP-939, 05AP-940, and 05AP-941, 2006-Ohio-2750, ¶ 9.

               If the trial court lacks continuing jurisdiction to consider the

constitutional validity of the final entry of conviction, an appellate court will likewise

be unable to address the merits of the constitutional question advanced because

appellate review is limited to reviewing whether the trial court properly assessed its

jurisdiction. State v. Gamble, 2021-Ohio-1810, 173 N.E.3d 132, ¶ 14 (8th Dist.).

Accordingly, the first step in this analysis is to properly frame Calo’s postconviction

motion to determine whether the trial court maintains continuing jurisdiction to

consider the merits of the arguments.

               A defendant can invoke the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction

following the issuance of a final sentencing entry in several ways; for example,

through the (1) filing a motion to correct a void judgment; (2) filing a timely or

successive petition for postconviction relief under R.C. 2953.21; (3) filing a motion

for a new trial under Crim.R. 33; or (4) filing a post-sentence motion to withdraw a

plea under Crim.R. 32.1. Although Calo captioned his motion as one seeking to

vacate an illegal conviction, the state recasts Calo’s motion as a petition for

postconviction relief based on the fact that Calo has not claimed, much less

demonstrated, that his conviction is void. According to the state, Calo’s sole

argument is that his conviction is voidable based on his trial counsel’s purported

ineffectiveness for the failure to timely raise a double jeopardy argument against the

proceeding that resulted in Calo’s final convictions.
               The state’s framing of the motion is accurate. Calo is not claiming

that his conviction is void as contemplated under Harper, 160 Ohio St.3d 480,

2020-Ohio-2913, 159 N.E.3d 248, at ¶ 30, in that the trial court lacked subject-

matter jurisdiction over the criminal proceedings, for the purposes of invoking the

trial court’s inherent authority to vacate a void conviction. The Ohio Supreme Court,

albeit through a fractured opinion, has held the constitutional challenges do not

render a conviction void such that the trial court inherently maintains continuing

jurisdiction to consider challenges to conviction during the offender’s continued

incarceration. See generally Parker, 157 Ohio St.3d 460, 2019-Ohio-3848, 137

N.E.3d 1151 (the separate opinions all agreed that a rule-based or statutory

mechanism must be used to invoke the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction in

postconviction proceedings with only one dissenting justice claiming the

constitutional challenge belatedly advanced would have rendered the conviction

void for the purposes of invoking the trial court’s continuing jurisdiction). The

conviction is potentially voidable based on the newly found constitutional argument,

but that argument must be advanced through the proper invocation of the trial

court’s continuing jurisdiction over a final conviction. Id.

               When faced with the potential miscaptioning of a postconviction

motion, “[c]ourts may recast irregular motions into whatever category necessary to

identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be judged.” Parker at

¶ 16, quoting State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431,

¶ 2. Without recasting his motion as a petition for postconviction relief, the inquiry
would be at its end; the trial court lacked jurisdiction to vacate the convictions that

were merely voidable based on the constitutional arguments presented.2                 See

generally Harper; Parker. Although captioned incorrectly, Calo’s motion must be

construed as a petition for postconviction relief for the purposes of determining

whether the trial court possessed jurisdiction to consider the merits of Calo’s

arguments.

               The crux of his latest motion focuses on whether Calo’s trial counsel

rendered ineffective assistance by failing to preserve an argument to dismiss the

second prosecution based on double jeopardy principles. In statutory context, his

claim focuses on the alleged denial or infringement of his rights that would render

his conviction voidable under the Ohio or federal Constitutions.                      R.C.

2953.21(A)(1)(a)(i). “[W]hether a trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to

entertain an untimely, second, or successive petition for postconviction relief is a

question of law,” which is reviewed de novo. State v. Hatton, Slip Opinion No. 2022-

Ohio-3991, ¶ 38, citing Apanovitch, 155 Ohio St.3d 358, 2018-Ohio-4744, 121

N.E.3d 351, at ¶ 24.

               Calo’s postconviction motion, filed 35 years following his convictions,

is definitively late. Hatton at ¶ 37; R.C. 2953.21(A)(2). As a result, Calo must

      2  The absence of a timely objection to the subsequent prosecution constitutes
waiver of the double jeopardy defense in that proceeding. Peretz v. United States, 501
U.S. 923, 936, 111 S.Ct. 2661, 115 L.Ed.2d 808 (1991), citing United States v. Bascaro, 742
F.2d 1335, 1365 (11th Cir.1984). Thus, the proper mechanism to advance the failure to
timely preserve the forfeited argument is through an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim through Ohio’s postconviction relief statutory scheme.
demonstrate that he was unavoidably prevented from the discovery of the facts upon

which his relief relies or is based on a new federal or state right as recognized by the

United States Supreme Court. R.C. 2953.23(A)(1). He must also demonstrate by

clear and convincing evidence that but for the error at trial, no reasonable factfinder

would have found him guilty. Id.

               Based on the arguments presented, Calo has not demonstrated that

his motion satisfies the statutory criteria necessary to invoking the trial court’s

continuing jurisdiction to review the merits of the belated or successive petition for

postconviction relief. Instead, Calo focuses on the merits of his argument without

demonstrating the existence of a newly identified state or federal right recognized

by the United States Supreme Court or any new facts from which his claim arises.

Without establishing that the trial court maintained continuing jurisdiction to

review the motion, construed as a belated or successive petition for postconviction

relief based on the arguments presented, the trial court had no authority to do

anything but deny the postconviction motion for the want of jurisdiction. There is

no error.

               The decision of the trial court is affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.             The defendant’s
conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

______________________
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, JUDGE

FRANK DANIEL CELEBREZZE, III, P.J., and
MARY J. BOYLE, J., CONCUR