Court Opinion

ID: 9626620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:19:50.251114+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:07:25.208596
License: Public Domain

*569EDMONDS, J.
Defendant was charged with driving under the influence of intoxicants in violation of a city ordinance. He moved to suppress evidence obtained from the stop preceding his arrest on the ground that it was not based on a reasonable suspicion. ORS 131.615. The trial court granted his motion, and the state appeals. We reverse.
At the suppression hearing, the arresting officer testified that, when he arrived on the scene, defendant had already been stopped by Sergeant Martino. The trial court sustained defendant’s objection, on hearsay grounds, to any testimony by the arresting officer about events before he arrived. The state presented this testimony of the officer as an offer of proof:
“[Martino] said that he had observed [defendant] earlier at the first dispatch and that he had at that time — Sergeant Martino indicated that the subject was very visibly intoxicated. When he arrived at the second call at 7:52 p.m. he observed the subject driving the car and therefore stopped him. Waved him down. * * * And therefore he performed his stop. And then he turned him over to me.”
The state did not call Martino as a witness. The court concluded that the state did not carry its burden of proof that the stop was based on a reasonable suspicion, because it was “only able to produce non-admissible hearsay evidence on that issue.”
The state argues that the court erroneously excluded the evidence, because the Oregon Evidence Code does not apply to hearings on motions to suppress. OEC 104(1).1 Defendant contends that OEC does apply to hearings on motions to suppress, because such a motion is a “preliminary hearing” within the meaning of ORS 135.173:
“The Oregon Evidence Code shall apply in any preliminary hearing under this chapter, except that hearsay maybe admitted if the court determines that it would impose an unreasonable hardship on one of the parties or on a witness *570to require that the primary source of the evidence be produced at the hearing, and if the witness furnishes information bearing on the informant’s reliability and, as far as possible, the means by which the information was obtained. ’ ’ (Emphasis supplied.)
“Preliminary hearing” in ORS 135.173 refers to a hearing before a magistrate when the issue is whether there is reasonable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the defendant committed it. ORS 135.070 et seq. Hearings on motions to suppress under ORS chapter 135 are omnibus hearings authorized by ORS 135.037. When the legislature uses different language in similar statutory provisions, we presume that it intended the phrases to have different meanings. See State v. Crumal, 54 Or App 41, 45, 633 P2d 1313 (1981). If the legislature had intended the phrase “preliminary hearing” in ORS 135.173 to include an omnibus hearing, it would have said so.
The issue here is narrow: May a trial court rely on the hearsay statement of one police officer to another police officer to determine whether a stop was based on reasonable suspicion? Of course, reasonable suspicion can arise from evidence that may not meet the test for admissibility at trial. In United States v. Matlock, 415 US 164, 175, 94 S Ct 988, 39 L Ed 2d 242 (1974), the Court said:
“[T]he judge should receive the evidence and give it such weight as his judgment and experience counsel. However that may be, certainly there should be no automatic rule against the reception of hearsay evidence in such proceedings [where the admissibility of evidence is being considered].” (Footnote omitted.)
We agree. Even though the arresting officer’s testimony in the omnibus hearing was hearsay, the trial court should have considered it. See State v. Crawford, 91 Or App 597, 756 P2d 68 (1988).
Defendant argues that, even if the excluded evidence is admissible, the state did not carry its burden of proof in establishing reasonable suspicion. That is a decision that, in the first instance, must be made by the trial court in the light of the fact that it is required to determine the weight and credibility to be given to the arresting officer’s testimony.
*571The dissent says that, even if the trial court erred when it held that OEC applies to motions to suppress, the error is harmless because, as a matter of law, what Martino told the arresting officer were not “specific and articulable” facts sufficient to constitute reasonable suspicion under ORS 131.615. We agree with the dissent that the requirement of specific and articulable facts is to enable the reviewing court to determine whether the officer’s suspicion was, under the totality of the circumstances, reasonable. However, we disagree with the dissent’s assertion that what Martino reported does not constitute specific and articulable facts under State v. Valdez, 277 Or 621, 561 P2d 1006 (1972).
In Valdez, the court held that, in reviewing a stop under ORS 131.615:
“[T]he trial court must determine whether the standard of reasonable suspicion has been met by the objective test of observable facts, not by reliance on the special intuitions of the officer.” 277 Or at 629. (Emphasis supplied.)
Valdez says nothing about whether ultimate facts stated in the form of a conclusion2 about the existence of intoxication can demonstrate that the officer had a reasonable suspicion rather than a “hunch” or a “guess.”
Moreover, State v. Lichty, 110 Or App 294, 821 P2d 1114 (1991), on which the dissent relies, is inapposite. There, a store owner told the officer that she had observed “coke” in the defendant’s wallet. We held that the officer had no basis on which to rely on the owner’s information, because there was no showing that she could recognize cocaine. Therefore, because the officer had not seen the substance, he could not form a reasonable suspicion that it was cocaine. Martino’s statements were the product of his personal observations; their reliability is enhanced by the fact that they were communicated by one police officer to another during the course of an on-going investigation. We conclude that Martino’s statement that he had “observed” defendant to be “visibly intoxicated” is a communication of specific articulable facts that, as a matter of law, might suffice under ORS 131.615 to *572afford a basis for the trial court to find that Martino had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was under the influence.
Reversed and remanded.

 OEC 104(1) provides, in part:
“Preliminary questions concerning the * * * admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court * * *. In making its determination the court is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges.”

 Ultimate facts about a state of intoxication are admissible, even if they are expressed in the form of conclusions. See, e.g., State v. Rand, 166 Or 396, 401, 111 P2d 82, 112 P2d 1034 (1941); Guedon v. Rooney, 160 Or 621, 87 P2d 209 (1939).