Court Opinion

ID: 7818410
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:44:55.331319+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:40.035184
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, concurring. I concur in the result. I think there was error in giving the instruction submitting the issue of the railroad’s failure to comply with the lookout statute, but I do not think appellants have any standing to raise the question. In my opinion, the undisputed evidence eliminated the lookout question entirely. The train consisted of 89 cars and 4 diesel power units. It was equipped with air braking system. At least one-half to three-fourths of a second is required for one operating the engine to perceive danger and three-fourths to one second for reaction and movement to the emergency system. Six seconds would then elapse before the lead unit develops brake cylinder pressure. The air pressure is then propagated to the rear at the rate of approximately 930 feet per second. Six or seven additional seconds will elapse before the emergency application of the brakes is effective for the entire length of this train. At least 12 seconds will elapse before there is any retardation of the train. If the train were traveling at the rate of 50 miles per hour, as the engine crew estimated, it would move at least 800 feet before there is any perceptive slowing down of the train. In the opinion of appellant’s road foreman of engines, from 3,000 to 3,300 feet would be a normal stopping distance for this train traveling slightly upgrade, as it was. When the train stopped, it blocked the' crossing. The front of the train stopped at a distance of not more than 1,900 feet (54 cars and 4 power units) beyond the crossing. The engineer in charge of the train was acting as fireman and was seated on the left-hand side of the first power unit, as was the brakeman, who sat just to his rear. This was the side from which Ellison approached in his truck. The firéman, who was acting as engineer, was seated on the right-hand side. All had many years of experience in their respective jobs. Each had an unobstructed view. Engineer Wilson (the acting fireman) testified that he saw Ellison’s truck approaching on Neely Street when the train was 1,400 to 1,500 feet from the crossing. The truck was then passing the Jones warehouse. Engineer Armstrong saw it when the train was 1,300 to 1,400 feet from the crossing. Brakeman Utley estimated the distance from the crossing at the time he saw the truck at 1,500 feet. Wilson and Utley estimated the truck’s speed at 20 to 25 miles per hour when they first saw it. All the engine crew testified that the truck speed constantly decreased as it approached the crossing as if it would stop before reaching the tracks. Armstrong said that the truck was moving so slowly when it was 20 to 25 feet from the crossing, it appeared that it would stop at any point. As soon as he realized that it would not, he put the brake into emergency position at about the same time that Wilson and the brakeman called out to him to do so. He saw Ellison’s truck ease down to the west rail of the track on which the train was traveling and stop with the front wheels on the rail. Wilson also said the truck finally stopped on. this rail before it was struck by the train. Wilson said that the front of the train was 200 to 250 feet from the crossing when it became apparent that the truck would not be stopped. Ellison’s testimony does not really contradict that of the train crew in this regard. Ellison said that he approached the tracks, stopped, and seeing nothing eased across the switch tracks toward the track on which the train was traveling without seeing or hearing anything. He said that he was traveling pretty slow in low gear and estimated his speed at 2 or 3 miles per hour. He confirmed the fact that, when he stopped, just the front of his truck was on the rail. The testimony of witnesses called by appellees tends to corroborate the engine crew. Warren Long was on the loading dock at Masonite about 100 yards from the crossing. He first saw Ellison approaching the crossing when his truck was about even with the Jones mill at a distance he estimated at 50 yards from the switch tracks. It seemed to him that Ellison stopped at these tracks and then proceeded after which Long heard the impact. Barnie Jernigan was standing on the back porch at Arkansas Face Veneer, about 150 yards from the crossing. He saw the truck emerge from behind a building and proceed toward the crossing and then stop suddenly about the time of the impact. When he first saw them, the truck was a little over 200 feet and the train about 150 yards from the crossing. Scotty Smith was on the dock at Masonite, at a distance of 75 to 100 yards from the crossing. He saw the truck approach the crossing and saw the front end decline when the driver applied his air brakes. As Smith turned to resume his work the truck was near the spur track. He heard the impact almost immediately. There was' every indication to everyone who saw the truck that it would stop before proceeding onto the track ahead of the train. Under similar circumstances we have held that the testimony of the train crew cannot be disregarded and that the lookout issue should not be submitted to the jury as a possible proximate cause. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Rd. Co. v. Gipson, 246 Ark. 296, 439 S. W. 2d 931; St. Louis-San Francisco Railway Company v. Spencer, 231 Ark. 221, 328 S. W. 2d 858; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Cole, 181 Ark. 780, 27 S. W. 2d 992; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Thurman, 213 Ark. 840, 213 S. W. 2d 362; St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co. v. Williams, 180 Ark. 413, 21 S. W. 2d 611; Kansas City Southern Railway Company v. Shane, 225 Ark. 80, 279 S. W. 2d 284. Whatever may be said about the inaccuracy of the train crew's original estimate of the distance of the truck from the crossing, it is obvious that it would have been impossible to have stopped the train before reaching the crossing after it became apparent that the truck would proceed onto the crossing rather than stop, as it gave every indication of doing. The truck’s distance from the crossing was wholly immaterial and insignificant. Under similar circumstances, we have said that failure to keep a lookout could not have contributed to cause the collision. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Yarbrough, 229 Ark. 308, 315 S. W. 2d 897. Language used there is pertinent: Certainly if the trainmen saw the appellee with his truck standing still near the track they would not be required to anticipate that he was going to start the truck up and attempt to cross, when to do so would make a collision almost inevitable. In Missouri Pacific R. R. Co. v. Doyle, 203 Ark. 1111, 160 S. W. 2d 856, the court quoted from Blytheville, L. & A. So. Ry. Co. v. Gessell, 158 Ark. 569, 250 S. W. 881, as follows [203 Ark. 1111, 160 S. W. 2d 858]: “ ‘The operatives of trains have the right to assume that a traveler or a pedestrian approaching a railroad track will act in response to the dictates of ordinary prudence and the instinct of self-preservation and will, in fact, stop before placing himself in peril, and the duty of the railroad employees to take precautions begins only when it becomes apparent that the traveler at a crossing will not do so.’ ” In spite of the absence of an issue under the lookout statute, there was a fact issue on the question of the giving of the statutory signals. Consequently, appellant was not entitled to a directed verdict. It is in no position to complain because, as pointed out in the majority opinion, appellant requested the same instruction as that given at appellees’ request. A defendant cannot complain, on appeal, of the giving of an erroneous instruction at the request of a plaintiff when it is the same, in effect, as an instruction requested by defendant. Dunnington v. Frick Co., 60 Ark. 250, 30 S. W. 212. Where the evidence is sufficient to support a verdiet upon one of several allegations of negligence so that there was no error in failure to direct a verdict for a defendant, the defendant is in no attitude to complain of an instruction submitting an issue of negligence not justified by the evidence, when he asked an instruction submitting the same issue. L. J. Smith Const. Co. v. Tate, 151 Ark. 278, 257 S. W. 83. An alleged error in giving an instruction on- an issue not raised by the evidence is harmless where both sides request an instruction on that issue. Keatts v. McAllister, 222 Ark. 658, 262 S. W. 2d 136. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Smith, 94 Ark. 524, 127 S. W. 715, is analogous. There the appellant contended that a pedestrian struck by its train was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, so that an instruction submitting the question whether the pedestrian was guilty of negligence in failing to look, listen and discover the approach of the train was erroneous under the uncontroverted evidence. This court agreed but said: We think, however,, that the defendant waived that particular error by requesting instruction containing the same error. By such action it invited the error. “Appellant cannot complain of an error in instructions asked by his opponent if the same error was repeated in instructions asked by himself.” Choctaw, O. & G. R. Co. v. Hickey, 81 Ark. 579, 99 S. W. 839; Railway Co. v. Dodd, 59 Ark. 317, 27 S. W. 227; St. L., I. M. & U. S. R. Co. v. Baker, 67 Ark. 531, 55 S. W. 941; L. R. & M. R. Co. v. Russell, 88 Ark. 172, 113 S. W. 1021; St. L., I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Carter, 93 Ark. 589, 126 S. W. 99. The case of Missouri Pacific Railroad Company v. Yarbrough, 229 Ark. 308, 315 S. W. 2d 897, might appear at first blush to be contra. Upon analysis, however, it appears that the trial judge had read all the requests for instructions by both parties and decided which would be given and which refused before the appellant had any opportunity to move for a directed verdict at the conclusion of all the evidence or to object to submission of the issue of keeping a lookout, both of which appellant did. Furthermore, appellant’s requested instruction no. 3, refused by the court, would have instructed the jury not to consider the allegation of failure to keep a lookout. The trial judge decided to and did give appellant’s instruction request no. 19, dealing with the lookout question, instead of appellee’s requested instruction on that point. Appellant objected to the giving of its own requested instruction on the point. Of course, under these circumstances, we found that appellant did have standing to raise the question. We have no such record here, so I would affirm the judgment.