Court Opinion

ID: 9733398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:06:11.859372+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:39.861477
License: Public Domain

Josnnsr, J.,
dissenting. The suspension order is based on the administrator’s finding that petitioner violated G. L. 1956, §3-5-23, which in pertinent part provides that a license may be suspended if the licensee permits his place of busi*386ness “to become disorderly so1 as to annoy and disturb the persons inhabiting or residing in the neighborhood thereof * * *.” (italics mine) The offense is alleged to have taken place on November 29, 1963.
The record discloses that petitioner allowed his premises to become disorderly on November 29, 1963, but there is no evidence that such conduct annoyed or disturbed his neighbors. It also contains testimony that on various occasions prior to November 29 patrons of petitioner immediately after leaving his place of business and while still in the vicinity thereof were disorderly, thereby causing annoyance and disturbance to those in the neighborhood.
If the majority finds that the disorderly conduct of November 29 coupled with the antecedent annoyance and disturbance of the neighbors constituted guilt of the offense charged within the legislative contemplation, then, with all respect for its opinion, I believe ft disregards what is clear and unambiguous and rewrites the statute to make it conform to an intention in nowise apparent from its language. The statute admits of no reasonable interpretation which warrants a finding of guilt of the offense charged unless the disorderly conduct resulted in annoyance and disturbance of the neighbors. The words of the statute “so as” have a meaning. They clearly import that there are two elements to the offense which are dependent on each other and that unless the annoyance and disturbance are a consequence of and result from the disorderly conduct there is no violation.
On the other hand the conclusion of guilt may be premised on the testimony that there was disorderly conduct prior to November 29 which disturbed and annoyed neighbors. The majority says petitioner by insisting on the inadmissibility of evidence of events which occurred other than on November 29 unduly relies on technical rules of pleading and evidence. With all due deference, this is not a question of calling into play technical rules, but is rather a *387question of the application of one of those fundamental principles which, we have frequently said are binding on tribunals which act quasi-judicially. Morgan v. Thomas, 98 R. I. 204, 200 A.2d 696; McCarthy v. Board of Aldermen, 38 R. I. 385. The liquor control administrator at hearings on suspensions of licenses acts in such a capacity, Burton v. Lefebvre, 72 R. I. 478, Clark v. Alcoholic Beverage Comm’n, 54 R. I. 126, and should apply the fundamental principle that testimony not conformable to the allegations is inadmissible. Leister v. State Alcoholic Beverage Control Board, 292 Ky. 705. If he had so acted there would have been nothing upon which to predicate a finding of guilt of the offense charged.
Grande & Grande, Aram K. Berberian, for petitioner.
J. Joseph Nugent, Attorney General, Joseph L. Breen, Chief Special Counsel, for respondent.
For these reasons I cannot agree with the majority, but such disagreement goes only to the narrow issue herein discussed.