Court Opinion

ID: 9952124
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-19 19:18:56.872209+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:38:06.012448
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                     Washington State
                                                                                     Court of Appeals
                                                                                      Division Two

                                                                                      March 19, 2024

    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
 MICHAEL DENTON,                                                 No. 57792-5-II

                               Appellant,

        v.

 STATE OF WASHINGTON; WASHINGTON                           UNPUBLISHED OPINION
 STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS;
 TIM THRASHER; DR. KARIE RAINER;
 LINDSEY     MCINTYRE;       KEITH
 GOODENOUGH; JAMIE DAVIS; OFFICER
 RICHARD SCHOLL; LT. SHELDON
 MOORE; LT. WILLIAM FLETCHER; LT.
 DANIEL BAYER; ROBERT HERZOG;
 DAVID MCKINNEY; and SCOTT RUSSELL,

                               Respondents.

       VELJACIC, J. — Michael Denton previously filed a federal suit against several individuals

working at the Department of Corrections (DOC), alleging violations of his constitutional rights

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The federal court dismissed all but one of Denton’s claims on summary

judgment. The singular surviving claim was later dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative

remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). 42 U.S.C. § 1997(e). Before this

dismissal, Denton filed the instant action against the State of Washington and the same DOC

employees, alleging various state law tort claims.
57792-5-II

       Defendants in the state action moved for summary judgment, arguing the suit was barred

by res judicata. At the same time, Denton moved to amend his complaint. The superior court

denied Denton’s motion for leave to amend and granted the Defendants’ motion for summary

judgment, ruling that the action was barred by res judicata.

       Denton appeals, arguing that because his federal case was dismissed for failure to exhaust

and was dismissed without prejudice, the dismissal was not a final judgment on the merits for res

judicata purposes. Denton also argues that because the Eleventh Amendment to the United States

Constitution would have prevented him from filing his claims against the State of Washington and

DOC in federal court, the superior court erred in dismissing those state claims on res judicata.

Finally, Denton argues that the superior court abused its discretion in denying his motion for leave

to amend.

       We hold that (1) the federal court’s dismissal for failure to exhaust was not a final judgment

on the merits to warrant application of res judicata, and therefore granting summary judgment in

the Defendants’ favor on that basis was in error; and (2) the remaining state claims that were

dismissed on summary judgment are not barred by res judicata because they do not share an

identity in cause of action with the federal claims dismissed by the federal court. Accordingly,

we reverse the summary judgment order dismissing Denton’s claims based on res judicata and,

because the trial court denied the motion to amend the complaint based on its res judicata ruling,

we remand for the trial court to consider anew the motion to amend the complaint.

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                                              FACTS

I.     BACKGROUND

       Denton is currently incarcerated by the State of Washington. In his original and amended

complaints in a federal court action, Denton claimed his previous jailors at the Washington State

Correctional Facility in Walla Walla violated his constitutional rights on several occasions. The

claim surviving the federal court dismissal that we review here relates to a grievance Denton filed

on January 1, 2018, asserting that on December 31, 2017, prison officials failed to appropriately

respond to him self-harming while he was on suicide watch.1 After that incident, while strapped

to a restraint bed, Denton asked the corrections officer who was observing him at the time to

transcribe three separate grievances for him. The officer transcribed one grievance for Denton,

which Denton indicated was to be filed as an emergency grievance.2

1
  The parties are in dispute over the facts of the incident. However, the factual details need not be
resolved in order to determine the issues in this case.
2
  In an order by the federal court that concluded Denton had not exhausted his administrative
remedies, the district court judge explained the process as follows:

                When an inmate files an emergency grievance, the grievance coordinator or
       designee is supposed to immediately determine whether the complaint meets the
       criteria of an emergency. If the complaint is deemed non-emergent, the coordinator
       or designee must respond to the inmate, in writing, within one hour to inform him
       that the grievance is being considered non-emergent. The non-emergent complaint
       then proceeds through the normal grievance process. While a medical complaint
       response must list the name of the staff member and if possible, his/her signature,
       date, and time of the resolution, the same is not required for responses to complaints
       deemed non-emergent. Prison officials have five working days to respond to a non-
       emergent complaint.

Denton v. Thrasher, No. 3:18-cv-05017-BHS, 2022 WL 1095030, at *1 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 18,
2022) (court order) (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted), aff'd, No. 22-
35290, 2023 WL 2707384 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2023) (court order).

                                                 3
57792-5-II

       Denton claims he did not receive timely notice regarding his January 1, 2018 grievance.

Prison officials claim they timely explained to Denton that his grievance was being considered

non-emergent, which follows a different timeline from emergency grievances.

II.    PROCEDURAL HISTORY

       A.      Federal Lawsuit

       In 2018, Denton filed a pro se action in the United States District Court of the Western

District of Washington against several DOC individuals under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his

jailors failed to provide him adequate medical and mental health treatment, deprived him of access

to magazines, retaliated against him for filing grievances, housed him in observation cells that

lacked toilets and running water, failed to prevent him from self-harming, and punished him for

his mental health.3 The claims for relief were made under “42 U.S.C. § 1983—Deliberate

Indifference,” “First Amendment Violation Section 1983 liability,” and “42 U.S.C. § 1983—

Eighth Amendment—Cruel and Unusual Punishment—Failure to Protect.” Clerk’s Papers (CP)

at 584, 586, 587. The individual defendants named in the complaint were: Tim Thrasher, Dr. Karie

Rainer, Lindsey McIntyre, Keith Goodenough, Jamie Davis, Officer Richard Scholl, Lieutenant

Sheldon Moore, Lieutenant William Fletcher, Lieutenant Daniel Bayer, David McKinney, Scott

Russell, Lieutenant Officer O’Reilly.4

       Denton and all Defendants moved for summary judgment. A United States Magistrate

Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (R&R) recommending that the court deny Denton’s

motion and grant Defendants’ motion. The court adopted the R&R in part, dismissing most of

3
 Denton ultimately retained counsel and then amended the complaint to add an Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act (RA) claim against the State.
4
 Robert Herzog was also named as a defendant, but Denton did not make any allegations against
him and the court declined to consider any claims against him.

                                                4
57792-5-II

Denton’s claims on summary judgment, including the claims against the State, DOC, Scott Russell,

Rob Herzog, Keith Goodenough, David McKinney, Tim Thrasher, Lindsey McIntyre, Dr. Karie

Rainer, and Jamie Davis. Denton v. Thrasher, No. C18-5017-BHS, 2020 WL 5512169 (W.D.

Wash. Sept. 14, 2020) (court order). However, the court disagreed with the R&R on the issue of

exhaustion as it related to the events of December 31, 2017, finding that Denton had established a

question of fact as to whether any administrative process was available to him, and requested

additional briefing on whether Denton could have appealed the allegedly unreturned grievance.

Denton, 2020 WL 5512169. The surviving claims were against defendants Fletcher, Moore,

Bayer, and Scholl. Denton, 2020 WL 5512169.

          The court held an evidentiary hearing on the exhaustion issue and concluded that Denton

failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him for the December 31, 2017

grievance. Denton v. Thrasher, No. 3:18-cv-05017-BHS, 2022 WL 1095030 (W.D. Wash. Mar.

18, 2022) (court order). Denton appealed and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Denton did

not complete all the required steps of the grievance process, rendering the grievance unexhausted.

Denton v. Thrasher, No. 22-35290, 2023 WL 2707384, at *2 (9th Cir. Mar. 30, 2023) (court order).

          B.     State Lawsuit

          On February 21, 2020, before the federal case was decided, Denton filed a state court

action, alleging tort claims against the State of Washington, DOC, and several employees: Tim

Thrasher; Dr. Karie Rainer; Lindsey McIntyre; Keith Goodenough; Jamie Davis; Officer Richard

Scholl; Lieutenant Sheldon Moore; Lieutenant William Fletcher; Lieutenant Daniel Bayer, Robert

Herzog; David McKinney; and Scott Russell.5 The causes of action alleged in the complaint were

for intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, false

5
    The exact same defendants listed in the State lawsuit were also named in the federal lawsuit.

                                                  5
57792-5-II

imprisonment, battery, and negligent supervision and training of DOC staff. The State and the

individual defendants answered with defenses of collateral estoppel and res judicata.

       In 2022, all of the Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that the state

court lawsuit was barred by collateral estoppel and res judicata. Denton filed a motion in

opposition, primarily arguing that there was no final judgment on the merits in the federal case to

warrant the application of res judicata. Denton included language from the district court’s order

on a motion he filed to retax costs, for the purpose of illustrating that the district court did not

intend for this to be a final judgment on the merits, and the dismissal was without prejudice:

               Although the Court ultimately agreed that Denton failed to administratively
       exhaust his claims, and it acknowledges that his claims faced other procedural
       hurdles, he did present incontrovertible evidence that corrections officers allowed
       him to repeatedly self-harm. See, e.g., Dkt. 120-6 at 167– 68 (log notes stating that
       “Shift Sgt. Bayer wants no staff interaction with Offender Denton . . . until self-
       harm results in copious amounts of blood or active bleeding.”) (cleaned up); id. at
       159–61 (log notes documenting that Denton was permitted to continuously cut
       himself and hit his head against the door for nearly three hours). While the Court
       does not reach any conclusions about whether these instances or any other instances
       amounted to constitutional violations, the facts of this case are concerning and are
       certainly not frivolous.

CP at 931.

       The superior court issued an order granting partial summary judgment to Defendants. The

court reasoned that it was proper to dismiss the claims that were substantively addressed by the

federal court:

       5. The subject matter in both actions is the alleged deprivation of constitutional
       rights and denial of due process. Specifically, the claims for relief in this case are:
               a. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, specifically housing Plaintiff
       in solitary confinement for years at a time with no method of release. This claim
       was addressed in the Personal Restraint Petition and by the Federal District Court.
               b. Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress is also a claim that was
       addressed by the Federal District Court.
               c. False Imprisonment was addressed by the Federal District Court.
               d. Battery allegations regarding allowing a confined inmate to self-harm
       was addressed by the Federal District Court.

                                                 6
57792-5-II

                 e. Negligent Supervision and Training against the State of Washington was
          addressed by the Federal District Court.

CP at 965. The order stipulated that claims against DOC, Herzog, Russell, Rainer, Goodenough,

Davis, Bayer, and Moore, were all dismissed on the merits and therefore barred by res judicata.6

          Defendants subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration and/or clarification of the

summary judgment ruling, asserting that the order did not explicitly address claims against all

Defendants and did not address whether all of Denton’s claims were barred by res judicata.

Defendants specifically wanted to know if any part of their motion was denied. Denton also moved

to amend the complaint to clarify that he was alleging institutional negligence as an alternate

theory.

          The superior court granted Defendants’ motion for reconsideration and/or clarification. In

its order on that motion, the court elaborated that all of Denton’s claims7 were dismissed with

prejudice based on res judicata. The superior court also denied Denton’s leave to amend, citing

undue delay.

          Denton filed this appeal from the dismissal of his claims.

6
  At the hearing for the motion on summary judgment, McKinney and Goodenough had not yet
been served. The order granting partial summary judgment required that the Denton should serve
McKinney and Goodenough with the summons and complaint within 30 days of the date of the
order. Ultimately, because these two defendants were never served and “all of [Denton’s] claims
[were] barred by the doctrine of res judicata” in the superior court’s order on summary judgment,
the claims against McKinney and Goodenough were dismissed. CP at 1027.
7
  Except for those against McKinney and Goodenough, which were dismissed after the court issued
its order on the motion for reconsideration and/or clarification.

                                                   7
57792-5-II

                                           ANALYSIS

I.     Standard of Review

       We review an order of summary judgment de novo, engaging in the same inquiry as the

superior court. Osborn v. Mason County, 157 Wn.2d 18, 22, 134 P.3d 197 (2006); Marincovich

v. Tarabochia, 114 Wn.2d 271, 274, 787 P.2d 562 (1990). An order of summary judgment is

proper when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment

as a matter of law. Marincovich, 114 Wn.2d at 274; Mihaila v. Troth, 21 Wn. App. 2d 227, 231,

505 P.3d 163 (2022). The court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the

nonmoving party, and the motion should be granted only if, from all the evidence, reasonable

persons could reach but one conclusion. Marincovich, 114 Wn.2d at 274; Mihaila, 21 Wn. App.

2d at 231.

II.    Res Judicata

       A.      Legal Principles

       Whether res judicata bars an action is a question of law we review de novo. Ensley v.

Pitcher, 152 Wn. App. 891, 899, 222 P.3d 99 (2009). “‘Filing two separate lawsuits based on the

same event . . . is precluded’” under Washington law. Id. at 898-99 (quoting Landry v. Luscher,

95 Wn. App. 779, 780, 976 P.2d 1274 (1999)). Res judicata is a doctrine of claim preclusion that

bars relitigation of a claim that has been determined by a final judgment. Storti v. Univ. of Wash.,

181 Wn.2d 28, 40-41, 330 P.3d 159 (2014). “Res judicata applies to matters that were actually

litigated and those that ‘could have been raised, and in the exercise of reasonable diligence should

                                                 8
57792-5-II

have been raised, in the prior proceeding.’” DeYoung v. Cenex Ltd., 100 Wn. App. 885, 891-92,

1 P.3d 587 (2000) (quoting Kelly–Hansen v. Kelly–Hansen, 87 Wn. App. 320, 328-29, 941 P.2d

1108 (1997)). Res judicata is intended to prevent piecemeal litigation and to ensure the finality of

judgments. Spokane Rsch. & Def. Fund v. City of Spokane, 155 Wn.2d 89, 99, 117 P.3d 1117

(2005).

          The threshold requirement of res judicata is a valid and final judgment on the merits in a

prior suit. Emeson v. Dep’t of Corr., 194 Wn. App. 617, 626, 376 P.3d 430 (2016). Additionally,

our Supreme Court has enumerated that for res judicata to apply, there must be a concurrence of

identity in these four requirements: (1) subject matter, (2) cause of action, (3) persons or parties,

and (4) quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made. Williams v. Leone & Keeble,

Inc., 171 Wn.2d 726, 730, 254 P.3d 818 (2011). Where there has been a final judgment on the

merits and a concurrence of identity in those four requirements, res judicata applies and bars the

subsequent action. DeYoung, 100 Wn. App. at 891.

          B.     The Dismissal for Failure to Exhaust was Not a Final Judgment on the Merits
                 Warranting Application of Res Judicata

          The parties first dispute whether there was a final judgment on the merits. Denton argues

that because his federal claims were dismissed for failure to exhaust, the dismissal was without

prejudice, and was therefore not a final judgment on the merits. On the other hand, Defendants

argue that the dismissal on exhaustion in the federal case is sufficiently final and on the merits for

purposes of res judicata because Denton could not have cured his failure to exhaust. Because we

are analyzing whether a federal court issued a final judgment on the merits, we first ask whether

federal courts would have considered the dismissal of Denton’s case a final judgment on the merits.

                                                  9
57792-5-II

       If there is an exhaustion issue in a PLRA case, exhaustion should be resolved before

reaching the merits of the case. Albino v. Baca, 747 F.3d 1162, 1170 (9th Cir. 2014). Failure to

exhaust is an affirmative defense that the defendant in a PLRA case must plead and prove. Id. at

1171. The defendant must “prove that there was an available administrative remedy, and that the

prisoner did not exhaust that available remedy.” Id. at 1172. “[T]he ultimate burden of proof

remains with the defendant.” Id.

       In general, the federal rule is that dismissal of an action on the ground of failure to exhaust

administrative remedies is not on the merits. See id. at 1171-72. Furthermore, a dismissal for

failure to exhaust is a dismissal without prejudice. Wyatt v. Terhune, 315 F.3d 1108, 1120 (9th

Cir. 2003) (“If the district court concludes that the prisoner has not exhausted nonjudicial remedies,

the proper remedy is dismissal of the claim without prejudice.”), overruled on other grounds by

Albino, 747 F.3d 1162; Carea v. California, 551 F. App’x 368, 369 (9th Cir. 2014) (court order)

(remanding for the entry of dismissal without prejudice because the proper remedy for non-

exhaustion is dismissal without prejudice); McKinney v. Carey, 311 F.3d 1198, 1200-01 (9th Cir.

2002) (“[r]equiring dismissal without prejudice when there is no presuit exhaustion provides a

strong incentive that will further these congressional objectives; permitting exhaustion pendente

lite will inevitably undermine attainment of them.” (Emphasis in original.)). Dismissal without

prejudice is a dismissal that does not operate as an adjudication upon the merits, and thus does not

have a res judicata effect. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 396, 110 S. Ct. 2447,

110 L. Ed. 2d 359 (1990).

       Here, Defendants brought a motion for summary judgment on the federal claims, asserting

in part that Denton failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies as to his December 31,

2017 grievance. The summary judgment motion was granted as to all issues except the exhaustion

                                                 10
57792-5-II

issue, and the district court held an evidentiary hearing to decide whether Denton had exhausted

his administrative remedies. Denton, 2020 WL 5512169. After the evidentiary hearing, the court

concluded that Denton failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, and dismissed the claims

relating to that grievance. Denton, 2022 WL 1095030. Those claims were against Fletcher,

Moore, Bayer, and Scholl. See id.

       Because, consistent with the principle in Albino, the district court dismissal was based

entirely on exhaustion, it is not considered “on the merits” and therefore did not have a res judicata

effect. Also, as discussed above, the PLRA requirements must be met before the court can even

reach the merits of a claim; one cannot bring a lawsuit without first exhausting administrative

remedies. Albino, 747 F.3d at 1170. Because exhaustion is a prerequisite to a PLRA claim,

dismissal on the basis that Denton failed to exhaust his administrative remedies necessarily means

that the court was prevented from reaching the merits of that claim.

       Further, in an order denying the Defendants’ costs in the federal lawsuit, the district court

indicated in a footnote that it had not reached the merits of the claims relating to December 31,

2017: “While the Court does not reach any conclusions about whether these instances or any other

instances amounted to constitutional violations, the facts of this case are concerning and are

certainly not frivolous.” CP at 863 (emphasis added). This order was entered by the same district

court judge after the dismissal based on exhaustion. See Denton, 2022 WL 1095030.

       Defendants contend that the prior federal lawsuit should preclude the current claims

because the prior federal lawsuit precluded some claims in a third federal lawsuit. See Denton v.

Rainer, No. C19-5743 BHS-TLF, 2022 WL 4482650, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 27, 2022) (court

order). Defendants’ cite to an order addressing Denton’s request to amend his complaint in another

federal lawsuit. See id. However, this is an oversimplification of the res judicata discussion in

                                                 11
57792-5-II

that order. The court in that opinion also explained that it “has never ruled, in this case or in any

of Denton’s other cases, on whether Defendants’ [claims are] a constitutional violation. All of the

claims in Thrasher were dismissed for other reasons; his final claims were dismissed because he

failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.”8 Id. The district court recognized that there was

no ruling on constitutional violations, and thereby no judgment on the merits. The Rainer opinion

further supports the notion that there has not been an adjudication on the merits in the instant

matter. Denton, 2022 WL 4482650, at *4.

       Defendants somewhat confusingly argue that under these facts, res judicata precludes

litigation of the claims previously dismissed for failure to exhaust because Denton could have

litigated his federal claims if he had properly exhausted his administrative remedies. But aside

from this solitary assertion, Defendants provide no authority or analysis as to how this principle

precludes litigation of the current claims under the doctrine of res judicata. Because Defendants

do not provide further argument or authority on this point, we do not reach it. Cowiche Canyon

Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992).

       Defendants separately argue that the practical effect of the dismissal for failure to exhaust

in this circumstance is that of a final judgment. This is so, they argue, because Denton’s failure to

exhaust is incurable at this point, as the time for him to pursue those administrative remedies has

expired.     Moreover, because the PLRA exhaustion requirement is a precondition to suit,

Defendants reason that under the facts of this case where Denton cannot satisfy that precondition

and cure his failure to exhaust, the prior dismissal bars his claim.

8
 The reference to Thrasher in that case refers to the federal case being discussed in the case at bar.
See Denton, 2022 WL 1095030.

                                                 12
57792-5-II

       We disagree with the Defendants. Whether or not Denton can cure his failure to exhaust

if he refiles his grievance is not determinative of whether we should afford preclusive effect to the

prior dismissal. Denton’s inability to cure has no bearing on whether the judgment is final for

finality’s sake. The point remains that the district court did not reach the merits of Denton’s claim.

“[T]o determine the res judicata effect of a prior claim requires examination of ‘what was intended

by the first decision and what the logical consequences of that decision are.’” Marino v. Marino,

181 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting EFCO Corp. v.

U.W. Marx, Inc., 124 F.3d 394, 398 (2nd Cir. 1997)). The prior order issued by the district court,

where it specifically states that it reaches no conclusions on civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, demonstrate that it had not reached the merits of the claims before it. See, e.g., CP at 863

(“[w]hile the Court does not reach any conclusions about whether these instances or any other

instances amounted to constitutional violations, the facts of this case are concerning and are

certainly not frivolous.”); Denton, 2022 WL 4482650, at *4 (explaining that the court “has never

ruled, in this case or in any of Denton’s other cases, on whether Defendants’ [claims are] a

constitutional violation. All of the claims in Thrasher were dismissed for other reasons; his final

claims were dismissed because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.”). Clearly, the

question as to whether Denton has remaining administrative avenues has nothing to do with

whether the district court’s judgment was a final judgment for res judicata purposes.

       Preclusion principles developed under res judicata are designed to prevent repetitive

litigation of the same matters. See Storti, 181 Wn.2d at 40-41; DeYoung, 100 Wn. App. at 891-

92; Spokane Rsch. & Def. Fund, 155 Wn.2d at 99. Therefore, it follows that if the issues were

never litigated, there can be no preclusive effect. In searching the record, it is apparent that Denton

has not litigated the merits of his claim relating to December 31, 2017. We conclude that dismissal

                                                  13
57792-5-II

of an action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not on the merits, and in turn, we

agree with Denton that the threshold requirement for a res judicata finding, a final judgment on

the merits, has not been satisfied for the claims against Fletcher, Bayer, Moore, and Scholl relating

to the December 31, 2017 incident. These claims survive any application of the res judicata

doctrine.

       C.      The Remaining Claims are Not Barred by Res Judicata

       We next address claims that were dismissed with a final judgment on the merits, claims

against the State, DOC, Russell, Herzog, Goodenough, McKinney, Thrasher, McIntyre, Rainer,

and Davis.

       Denton’s state lawsuit raises claims against the same Defendants in the federal lawsuit.

For the claims that were not dismissed for failure to exhaust, but instead were dismissed by a final

judgment on the merits—against the State, DOC, Russell, Herzog, Goodenough, McKinney,

Thrasher, McIntyre, Rainer, and Davis—the inquiry advances to whether the elements of res

judicata are met. Those requirements are a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit, and

concurrence of identity in: (1) subject matter, (2) cause of action, (3) persons or parties, and (4)

quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made. Williams, 171 Wn.2d at 730. We

hold that the second element, identity in cause of action, is not met here, and therefore the claims

dismissed by the federal court on summary judgment are not barred by res judicata.

               1.      Final Judgment in a Prior Suit

       Here, the threshold requirement that there be a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit

is met. The federal court dismissed these claims on summary judgment, which is considered a

final judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata. DeYoung, 100 Wn. App. at 892.

                                                 14
57792-5-II

Therefore, there is a final judgment on the merits and we consider the remaining res judicata

requirements.

                2.    Identity in Subject Matter

       Next, the two actions must involve the same subject matter. Claims that are stated

differently may still involve the same subject matter. Kuhlman v. Thomas, 78 Wn. App. 115, 124,

897 P.2d 365 (1995). The federal action sought damages from several DOC employees for alleged

constitutional rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when Denton was retaliated against, his

incoming mail was rejected, he was denied adequate medical care related to his mental health

illness, and he was deprived of sanitation items and access to a toilet while housed in observation

cells. Denton also alleged his rights were violated pursuant to Title II of the ADA and the RA

based on his mental illness. The state action sought damages from the same DOC employees, the

State of Washington, and DOC, alleging several tort actions for their “failure to protect [Denton]

from physical and psychological harm.” CP at 2. Both actions involve impropriety in the same

setting under the same set of circumstances: improper action, by the same individuals, in a prison

setting, against Denton, specifically regarding his mental health illness. See Emeson, 194 Wn.

App. at 628. While the claims are stated differently, both suits nevertheless involve the same

subject matter, and this element of res judicata is met. Kuhlman, 78 Wn. App. at 124.

                3.    Identity in the Causes of Action

       The next res judicata element requires identity in cause of action. While there is no specific

test for determining such identity, the following factors should be considered:

       “(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be
       destroyed or impaired by the prosecution of the second action; (2) whether
       substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two
       suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out
       of the same transactional nucleus of facts.”

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57792-5-II

DeYoung, 100 Wn. App. at 892 (quoting Kuhlman, 78 Wn. App. at 122). The last of these factors

is the most important. Harris v. Jacobs, 621 F.2d 341, 343 (9th Cir. 1980). Our courts have

previously emphasized that the identity in causes of action “‘cannot be determined precisely by

mechanistic application of a simple test.’” Rains v. State, 100 Wn.2d 660, 663-64, 674 P.2d 165

(1983) (quoting Abramson v. Univ. of Hawaii, 594 F.2d 202, 206 (9th Cir. 1979)). Therefore,

these factors are considerations, and it is not necessary that all four factors be present to bar the

claim. Kuhlman, 78 Wn. App. at 122. Regarding this third factor, identity in cause of action, we

consider separately the four DeYoung factors.

                       i.      DeYoung Factors Two and Four are Satisfied.

       Here, two out of the four DeYoung factors are satisfied. The second and fourth factors are

easily met. The two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts: the facts alleged in

both claims are nearly identical. Denton has not set forth facts in the state action that differ from

the federal action. See Kuhlman, 78 Wn. App. at 123. Second, for the same reasons, the evidence

needed to support each action is identical. See Kuhlman, 78 Wn. App. at 122. That the second

and fourth DeYoung factors are met militates toward concluding there’s identity in cause of action,

especially because sharing a transactional nucleus of fact is considered the most important factor.

Jacobs, 621 F.2d at 343.

                       ii.     DeYoung Factor One.

       However, the first and third factor are not satisfied in this case. Under the first factor, the

court considers whether the rights and interests here established by the federal judgment would be

impaired by the state court suit if it were allowed to proceed. Emeson, 194 Wn. App. at 629. All

of Denton’s claims in the federal judgment were constitutional claims regarding various conditions

of his confinement and specific instances of mistreatment brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See

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57792-5-II

CP 577-92 (“42 U.S.C. § 1983—Deliberate Indifference,” “First Amendment Violation Section

1983 liability”, and “42 U.S.C. § 1983—Eighth Amendment—Cruel and Unusual Punishment—

Failure to Protect”). Other than the claims relating to the exhaustion issue, these claims were

dismissed on summary judgment for failure to establish personal participation by any named

defendants. Denton, 2022 WL 1095030.

       A judgment on Denton’s state law claims would not impair the rights and interests

established in the federal judgment if it were allowed to proceed. The judgment in the federal suit

only determined that Denton had not established personal participation by any named defendants,

and that his claims against them were too general. A judgment to the contrary on Denton’s state

tort claims would not impair the rights established in the federal case, because that dismissal did

not establish rights or interests. See Kuhlman, 78 Wn. App. at 123. It merely determined that it

was improper to sue the DOC and that the claims against the named defendants were too general.

Read carefully, the order did not rule on specific claims brought against the named defendants

because no such claims were made. Therefore, a judgment on Denton’s state law claims would

not impair rights or interests established in the federal judgment.

                       iii.    DeYoung Factor Three

       The third factor is also not satisfied in this case. This factor asks whether the suits involved

infringement of the same right. Denton’s claims in federal court were all constitutional, regarding

various conditions of his confinement and specific instances of mistreatment under 42 U.S.C. §

1983. The state claims allege various state law torts.

       Section 1983 imposes liability for violation of rights protected by the Constitution, not for

violations of duties of care as in our state tort law. Civil rights statutes providing liability for

deprivation of rights under color of law protect rights afforded by the constitution, whereas tort

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liability arises from violations of duties of care. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146, 99 S. Ct.

2689, 61 L. Ed. 2d 433 (1979). Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought in state court

under traditional tort law principles. Id. That these torts are alleged against state officials does

not establish that they sufficiently pass the threshold to maintain an action under § 1983.

        In highlighting the nature of this difference, the United States Supreme Court in Baker

wrote: “Just as ‘[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation merely because

the victim is a prisoner,’ . . . false imprisonment does not become a violation of the Fourteenth

Amendment merely because the defendant is a state official.” Id. (internal citation omitted)

(quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S. Ct. 285, 50 L. Ed. 2d 251 (1976)). Here,

Denton’s state tort claims do not automatically imply that his constitutional rights have been

violated just because he was a prisoner and the defendants were state officials. As such, the suits

do not involve infringement of the same right and the third factor is not satisfied.

        Because the DeYoung factors are not met, we conclude that there is not identity of cause

of action among the prior federal claims and the current state claims.

                4.      Identity of Persons and Parties

        Res judicata requires that both causes of action have identity in persons and parties.

Pederson v. Potter, 103 Wn. App. 62, 72, 11 P.3d 833 (2000). Here, the federal case and the state

case had the same named plaintiff and the same named defendants. Because the plaintiff and the

defendants in the federal court case are identical to those in the state court action, there is identity

in persons and parties. Id.

                5.      Identity in Quality of Persons For or Against Whom the Claim is Made

        Finally, the last element requires identity in the quality of persons for or against whom the

claim is made. This is simply a determination of which parties in the second suit are bound by the

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judgment in the first suit. Ensley, 152 Wn. App. at 905. Because the parties are identical, the

quality of the persons is also identical. See Rains, 100 Wn.2d at 664; see, e.g., DeYoung, 100 Wn.

App. at 893 (“Finally, the third and fourth factors—identity of the parties and persons against

whom the claims are made—are satisfied because the parties and persons in this appeal are

identical.”); Pederson, 103 Wn. App. at 73 (“Because the parties are identical, the quality of the

persons is also identical.”).

        We find that there is no concurrence of identity in causes of action because only two out

of the four factors are met. Accordingly, we hold that res judicata does not bar the claims dismissed

on summary judgment in the federal case.9

        D.      Motion to Amend

        Denton argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to amend his complaint.

Because our holding changes the circumstances of this case, on remand the trial court should

consider anew the motion to amend the complaint.

                                          CONCLUSION

        The dismissal for failure to exhaust was not a judgment on the merits, and the other claims

dismissed on summary judgment do not share an identity in cause of action. We reverse the

summary judgment order dismissing Denton’s claims based on res judicata and, because the trial

court denied the motion to amend the complaint based on its res judicata ruling, we remand for the

trial court to consider anew the motion to amend the complaint.

9
  Denton also argues that because the Eleventh Amendment would have prevented him from filing
his claims against the State of Washington and DOC in federal court, the superior court erred in
dismissing those claims on res judicata. Because we hold that Denton’s claims are not barred by
res judicata, we do not reach this issue.

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57792-5-II

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                            Veljacic, J.

We concur:

        Maxa, P.J.

        Lee, J.

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