Court Opinion

ID: 9687422
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:27:45.641104+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:27.154827
License: Public Domain

O’Hara, J.
(concurring in affirmance). I regret my inability to join in the opinion of either of my colleagues.
My disagreement with Justice Brennan results from his acceptance of the theory that there is no classification of “licensed” and “unlicensed” made in the statutes here under consideration. 
I agree rather with the statement in the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals (People v. Harper, 1 Mich App 480, 482):
“The precise question for decision is whether the classification ‘licensed’ and ‘unlicensed’ is reasonable.”
Justice Adams agrees that this is the issue in virtually identical language:
“Is the classification reasonable under the police power?”
.My disagreement with Justice Adams stems from •his negative answer to the posed question. I hold *451the classification made to be a reasonable exercise of the police power of the State, and, hence, not repugnant to the equal protection clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. (US Const, Am 14; Mich Const 1963, art 1, §2.)
I base my conclusion as to the Federal question upon the cited excerpt from McGowan v. Maryland, 366 US 420, 425 (81 S Ct 1101, 6 L ed 2d 393) :
“The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State’s objective.”
As correctly noted by the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals (p 484):
“The licensing act is aimed primarily at safeguarding and regulating legitimate trade of narcotics. The act under which defendant was convicted and sentenced is directed solely at suppressing illegal traffic in narcotics. The purpose of the two acts is entirely different.”
Certainly the classification made is eminently relevant to the State’s objective. No lengthy apologia therefor need be written. The social consequences of illicit narcotics traffic is not confined to the immediate dispensation of the concerned narcotic. A tidal wave of social evils follows in its wake. The problems of enforcement are fundamentally different in the licit and illicit trade. Appellant’s ingenious hypothet is untenable because it presents a problem with which this Court need not here concern itself. In a similar case involving the same type of claimed constitutional infirmities a hypothetical situation was presented to this Court and brought this succinct observation unanimously:
“The Court will not go out of its way to test the operation of a law under every conceivable set of circumstances. * * * Constitutional questions *452are not to be dealt with in the abstract.” General Motors Corporation v. Attorney General, 294 Mich 558, 568 (130 ALR 429).
If and when a licensee who may have taken to the streets as a pusher, or otherwise is alleged to have violated the terms of the statute under which defendant was convicted and sentenced, and introduces in defense thereof his license to dispense narcotics under the terms of the licensing act is the proper time to deal with appellant’s abstract contentions.
I would affirm the Court of Appeals.
Kelly, J., concurred with O’Hara, J.