Court Opinion

ID: 9825244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 12:22:55.697874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:40:36.319922
License: Public Domain

ON REHEARING.
On the submission of this cause, the appellant, in brief filed at the time, strenuously insisted that the indictment was fatally defective and subject to the demurrers interposed, because it did not state the time of the commission of the offense in such sort as to enable the court to determine from the record whether the prosecution was under section 6215 of the Code as it appears in Code 1907, or under that section as amended by Acts 1911, p. 548. In response to this contention of appellant, without any suggestion that the question was not raised on the record, the Attorney General filed a brief combating the position of appellant and contending that the change wrought by the amendment was not such as to make the time of the commission of the offense material. The court, in disposing of the question, treated the question as raised, as did the parties, holding that, the amendment'wrought such change as to make the time of the commission of the offense material.
In the application for rehearing the insistence is made that the question was not raised by the demurrers. This is clearly inconsistent with the position taken in brief and argument on submission, and the court will decline to re-examine the queetion on this theory. — Tygh v. Dolan, 95 Ala. 271, 10 South. 837; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Holland, 173 Ala. 675, 55 South. 1001; Travis v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 162 Ala. 605, 50 South. 308.
There was no suggestion, either in the court below or here on submission of this case, or in brief filed, that the act approved April 21, 1911, amending section 6215 of the Code, was uncon*491stitutional; and, to use the language of the Chief Justice, speaking for the court: “It is tardily suggested at the present time.” —State, ex rel. Martin v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 197 Ala. 204, 72 South. 497. However, conceding that the bill as originally introduced in the House was styled, “Be it enacted by the state of Alabama,” as contended by appellee, and was passed in this form, it was not only the right, but the duty, of the Legislature while in session to amend this clerical error by inserting in lieu of the word “state” the word “Legislature;” and this could be done by concurrent action of both houses, without resorting to the full routine of legislative action, introducing the bill anew, having it read on three separate days in each House, and referring it to regular committees thereof. — Brandon v. Askew, 172 Ala. 160, 54 South. 605; Ensley v. Simpson, 166 Ala. 386, 52 South. 61.
(1, 2) The foregoing expresses the views of the writer; but the majority of the court is of the opinion that the doctrine of estoppel above adverted to and applied in civil cases is not applicable to a criminal case, and that the state is not estopped by the manner in which the case was treated by the Attorney General; that it is the duty of the court to re-examine the record, and, having done so at the instance of the majority of the court, the entire court is of the opinion and holds that the demurrers do not point out the defects in the indictment noticed in the original opinion.
The application is therefore granted, the judgment of reversal set aside, and an affirmance ordered.
Application granted.
Brown, J., dissenting.