Court Opinion

ID: 9829388
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 19:16:24.731095+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:00.676865
License: Public Domain

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING.
In disposing of this case at a former day of the term we overlooked the fact that after January 3, 1896, the day of which the F. A. Drew Glass Company gave the appellant Henry House notice of its claim, the latter paid to the contractors, Bonnell, Matthews & Harding, and for their account, the following sums of money in addition to those stated in the opinion of the court, to wit:
January 8. Estimate of architects in favor of Peden & Co., account of roofing............................ $350
January 11. Estimate for work on kitchen................... 400
Estimate for plastering........................3,000
February 5. Estimate favor of Christopher & Sampson........ 500
February 8. Estimate for work on kitchen.................. 400
These amounts were more than sufficient to cover the- claims of all the appellees whose liens were established by the judgment of the court below, but the appellant Henry House would not be liable on account of these payments for the claims- of which he had not received notice when they were made. Notice of the Brown-Harry Iron Company was given Feb*249ruary 2d. It was for the sum of $420.50. After February 2d, on February 8th the appellant Henry House paid the contractor’s estimate on kitchen $400 and by Burnes & Todd $50, as shown by the account attached to appellant’s answer, amounting to a sum more than sufficient to pay the claims of said Brown-Harry Iron Company. Notice of none oí the other claims was given before February 8th. From these facts it appears that House became liable for the payment of the claims of the F. A. Drew Glass Company and the Brown-Harry Iron Company in full, and that the verdict of the jury and the judgment of the court below as to them was correct.
But the other claims necessarily involve the correctness of the action of the court below in refusing the special instruction requested by House with reference to the payment of the claims which he had accepted before notice of the claims of the appellees who fixed their liens, because the record shows that no amounts were paid out to the contractors or for their account after notice of the first of these latter claims, to wit, that of Bar-den-Sheets Electrical Company, on February 18, except the items to E. M. Burke and Dunlay Hardware Company, which appellant contends he had become obligated to pay by acceptance thereof, and the judgment was properly reversed as to them, if there was evidence tending to show that House became so obligated, unless the appellant should not have had credit for the account of H. C. House. A verbal acceptance of an order will bind the acceptor. 4 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, 2 ed., p. 217. The order, however, in favor of E. M. Burke for $350, dated December 27, 1895, has an acceptance written thereon agreeing to deduct it from the architect’s estimate for the fourth floor. There was evidence sufficient to require the giving of the refused instruction. In order to have protected House in the subsequent payment, the acceptances must have been made prior to notice. Barden-Sheets Electrical Company gave notice February 18th; E. II. Burke, April 10th; G. Armandary, March 25th. House testified that he had accepted the orders in favor of Burke and Dunlay Hardware Company. There is some difficulty about fixing the dates of the acceptances. But it will be presumed where an acceptance is not dated that it was made before maturity, and within a reasonable time after the date of the bill. 4 Am. and Eng. Enc. of Law, 2 ed., 215.
It is shown by the certificate of the architects on the order of Bonnell, Matthews & Harding in favor of Dunlay Hardware Company for $500, dated January 14, 1896, to be paid out of the tenth estimate, that the tenth estimate was issued February 15th, from which it appears that the acceptance must have been made prior to .that date. It is not clear from the evidence when House became obligated to pay all these items, but there was sufficient evidence to have required the court to give the instruction. The refusal of the instruction was material error unless we should hold that the court erred in instructing the jury to give the appellant credit for the account of H. C. House, and thus let one error correct the other. That account for material alone and exclusive of the items for cash would be more than sufficient to cover the claims of the *250last three appellees, which aggregate only about $600. In our decision of the case we held that under the circumstances the charge was correct, but we have grave doubts whether the facts support the instruction. The facts about the account have not been fully developed, but there is evidence tending to show that H. C. House was a dealer in building material and sold to the contractors during the construction of the building lumber and other material for use in building the house, for which items appellant seeks credit. Such being the case, it was probably error for the court to instruct the jury to allow the account, and since the question of whether or not the account should have been allowed was for the jury under proper instructions, we can not say that it should be rejected from the credits allowed the appellants and thus affirm the judgment as to the three appellees whose notice was given subsequent to February 15th.
The motions for rehearing as to appellees the F. A. Drew Glass Company and the Brown-Harry Iron Company will be granted and the judgments in their favor affirmed, but as to the Barden-Sheets Electrical Construction Company and E. M. Burke, their motion will be overruled..

Ordered accordingly.

Writ of error refused.