Court Opinion

ID: 9583084
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:34:40.880166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:37:12.631399
License: Public Domain

ROSSMAN, J.,
concurring in part; dissenting in part.
The single issue in this case is how to interpret the phrase “mandatory minimum,” as used in ORS 161.620. We have previously held that that phrase refers to the type of statute that requires a judge to impose a minimum sentence. State v. Noble, 94 Or App 123, 126, 764 P2d 949 (1988), rev *176dismissed 307 Or 506, 770 P2d 57 (1989).1 Generally, mandatory minimum sentences cannot be imposed on remanded juveniles. ORS 161.620.
The sentencing procedures are spelled out quite clearly. Under some circumstances, the legislature has directed that a trial court “shall” (i.e., must) impose a minimum sentence. See, e.g., ORS 163.105; ORS 161.610(3); ORS 163.115(3)(b);2 Other statutes provide that a trial court may, in its discretion, impose a minimum sentence. See, e.g., ORS 163.115(3)(c).3 “Mandatory minimum,” then, refers not to the length of a sentence, but to the mandate that a minimum sentence be imposed by the court. Simply put, “mandatory mínimums” are those minimum sentences that a judge must impose. Discretionary mínimums are minimum sentences that a judge may impose. The majority seems to agree with those definitions, but for some reason does not apply them.
ORS 161.620 provides that “a sentence imposed [on a remanded juvenile] shall not include * * * imposition of any mandatory minimum sentence * * *.” (Emphasis supplied.) Nothing in that statute prohibits a court from imposing a discretionary minimum sentence when the circumstances warrant it. However, the majority does not believe that ORS 161.620 logically could forbid judges from sentencing remanded juveniles in accordance with mandatory minimum statutes, but then allow those same judges to impose even *177longer minimum sentences in the exercise of discretion. Accordingly, it decides to prohibit the imposition of any type of minimum prison term — mandatory or discretionary — except when the remanded juvenile has been convicted of aggravated murder. I believe that that is nothing less than judicial legislating. What makes the practice particularly offensive here is that the legislature has already established a rule opposite to that announced by the majority.
To me, the logic of ORS 161.620 is clear. By that statute, the legislature is saying that it does not want youthful offenders to be sentenced in the way that adults are. Specifically, it does not want judges to be required to sentence minors to a particular length of time in prison. When adult offenders commit certain crimes, judges must impose the minimum prison sentences that are required by statute, but when minors commit the same crimes, the legislature wanted judges to have the flexibility to impose only those sentences which are appropriate for the particular chüd. To accomplish that, the legislature removed the requirement that judges abide by “mandatory minimum” sentencing statutes when dealing with remanded juveniles and left them with the responsibility of sentencing juveniles in the proper exercise of judicial discretion. That discretion mirrors, to a limited extent, the discretion that a juvenile court would have had, had it decided to retain jurisdiction'instead of remanding the child to adult court.
A remand decision — to send a child from juvenile court to adult court — is a weighty and difficult one to make. After determining that the child was 15 years old at the time that he allegedly committed a Class A felony, a Class B felony, or one of a list of Class C felonies, ORS 419.533(1)(a) and (b), the juvenile court must then determine that the child “was of sufficient sophistication and maturity to appreciate the nature and quality of the conduct involved” and that retaining juvenile court jurisdiction “will not serve the best interests of the child and of society” because of several factors, including the child’s amenability to treatment and rehabilitation, the need to protect society from the child, the manner in which the offense was allegedly committed and the child’s history. ORS 419.533(1)(c) and (d).
*178Generally, a juvenile who is remanded for prosecution as an adult has engaged in serious criminal behavior over an extended period of time and is no longer acting as a “child.” For example, in the present case, defendant was 17 when he beat and stabbed a man to death. After the significant decision is made to treat a juvenile as an adult, the court to which the juvenile is remanded must have the authority to impose a minimum sentence of incarceration. Nothing in ORS 161.620 removes that authority from the sentencing judge.
Accordingly, I would affirm the discretionary minimum sentence, ORS 163.115(3)(c), and reverse the mandatory minimum sentence that was imposed under ORS 163.115(3)(b).
Deits and Riggs, JJ., join in this opinion.

 agree that the portion oiNoble that discusses the discretion of a parole board is overbroad. The decision should have been limited to the discretion of courts, alone. However, I do not agree that the opinion should be overruled in its entirety. The 1991 Legislature had the opportunity, but did not see fit, to change the language of ORS 161.620 in the light of Noble. We should not cursorily conclude that the underlying premise in that case — that “mandatory” refers to the lack of discretion that a trial judge has to impose a minimum sentence — was an incorrect interpretation of ORS 161.620.

 ORS 163.115(3)(b) provides:
“When a defendant is convicted of murder under this section, the court shall order that the defendant shall be confined for a minimum of 10 years without possibility of parole, release on work release or any form of temporary leave or employment at a forest or work camp.” (Emphasis supplied.)

 ORS 163.115(3)(c) provides:
“When a defendant is convicted of murder under this section, the court, in addition to the minimum required by paragraph (b) of this subsection, may order that the defendant shall be confined for a minimum term of up to an additional 15 years without possibility of parole, release on work release or any form of temporary leave or employment at a forest or work camp.” (Emphasis supplied.)