Court Opinion

ID: 9643639
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 20:36:09.979431+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:27:54.737894
License: Public Domain

NEWMAN, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority concludes that Appellant’s future dangerousness was at issue in the penalty phase, and, therefore, Appellant was entitled to a Simmons instruction. Because I disagree with this conclusion, I dissent. In addition, I note that this Court should continue to decline to extend Simmons to cases in which future dangerousness is not an issue.
During the penalty phase, the prosecutor offered no testimony concerning Appellant’s future dangerousness, and made only one passing remark in his argument that could in any *416way be construed as a reference to future dangerousness.1 I cannot agree that this single comment put the issue of future dangerousness before the jury to the extent that a Simmons instruction was necessary. Cf. Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 114 S.Ct. 2187, 129 L.Ed.2d 133 (prosecutor presented expert testimony regarding future dangerousness and argued the issue extensively).
Furthermore, the majority should not have advocated the view expressed in the concurring opinions in Commonwealth v. Clark, 551 Pa. 258, 710 A.2d 31 (Pa.1998). In Simmons, the United States Supreme Court held that where the prosecution argued the future dangerousness of the accused, the trial court had to inform the jury that a life sentence in South Carolina meant life without the possibility of parole. A minority of this Court has expressed the view that, in all capital cases, trial judges in Pennsylvania should instruct capital sentencing juries that life imprisonment means life without parole, even where the Commonwealth has not made future dangerousness an issue. See Commonwealth v. Robinson, 721 A.2d 344 (Flaherty, C.J., dissenting; Zappala, J., concurring); Clark, supra (Zappala, J., concurring; Nigro, J., concurring); Commonwealth v. May, 551 Pa. 286, 710 A.2d 44 (1998) (Zappala, J., concurring; Nigro, J., concurring). This contingent of the Court is concerned that capital sentencing juries will unlawfully elect a death sentence if they erroneously believe that a defendant may be paroled at a future date. Therefore, the theory goes, by giving the “life means life” instruction, trial judges will better ensure that the jury’s decision is a fully informed one.
In the first instance, the Clark concurrence is not the law of Pennsylvania, and an endorsement of it has no place in the majority’s opinion here. Likewise, Simmons does not require Pennsylvania to adopt such a rule, which is one of policy and not of constitutional law. Finally, the premise on which the Clark concurrence is based is, at best, highly questionable.
*417In Simmons, prosecutors argued at trial that the defendant would be dangerous in the future. In addition, the trial court instructed the jury that the term “life imprisonment” should be understood in its plain and ordinary meaning, but that they could not consider the issue of parole. The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the instruction was confusing to the jury and did not satisfy due process. The defendant could only deny or explain the showing of future dangerousness if the jury was fully aware of his ineligibility for parole. Therefore, the Court concluded, the defendant was entitled to have this information placed before the jury as a matter of due process. Arguing future dangerousness while simultaneously preventing the jury from knowing that the defendant would never be released on parole, the Court concluded, created a “false dilemma.” Simmons, 512 U.S. at 171, 114 S.Ct. at 2198.
Nothing in Simmons, however, requires, as a matter of constitutional law, a “life means life” instruction where a defendant’s future dangerousness is not at issue. Indeed, where future dangerousness is not at issue, the “false dilemma” that the Simmons plurality feared is not created. If the prosecution has not argued that a defendant will be a threat to society in the future, then the question of whether the defendant will be eligible for parole is irrelevant. Moreover, in that instance, the defendant’s due process right to rebut the prosecution’s theory is not implicated. As Justice O’Connor stated in her opinion concurring in the judgment, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, “if the prosecution does not argue future dangerousness, the State may appropriately decide that parole is not a proper issue for the jury’s consideration even if the only alternative sentence to death is life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.” Id. at 176-77, 114 S.Ct. at 2200 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
Additionally, as Justice Scalia explains in his Simmons dissent, the idea that capital sentencing juries impose the death penalty because they fear the defendant’s future dangerousness is “quite farfetched.” Simmons, 512 U.S. at 184, *418114 S.Ct. at 2204 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Instead, the imposition of the death penalty is more likely induced by the “sheer depravity of [the] crimes, rather than any specific fear for the future.” Id. at 181, 114 S.Ct. at 2202 (Scalia, J., dissenting). This is particularly true where the prosecution does not argue future dangerousness. When the crimes for which a defendant is convicted are especially heinous, it is unlikely that information regarding parole ineligibility will alter the jury’s decision to impose the death penalty.
Therefore, this Court’s current position is consistent with Simmons, which requires no more than that a court disclose to the jury information about parole where the prosecution argues future dangerousness and where state law precludes the possibility of parole from a life sentence. In addition, this Court’s current position is sound because it- limits the questionable presumption that the decisions of capital juries are based on future dangerousness. Neither the federal nor the state constitution requires more, and any extension of Simmons is a policy decision best left to the legislature. Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-2002 (representing the North Carolina General Assembly’s decision to require by statute a jury instruction that “life means life without parole”). This Court’s position is, and should continue to be, that unless the prosecutor makes an issue of the defendant’s future dangerousness, a “life means life” instruction is simply not warranted. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. May, 551 Pa. 286, 710 A.2d 44 (Pa.1998).
Nevertheless, in cases where Simmons would require a “life means life” instruction, I agree with Chief Justice Flaherty that the court should instruct the jury that the defendant’s sentence could be commuted. Where future dangerousness is at issue, the impossibility of parole and the possibility of commutation are equally relevant, so the court should inform the jury of both contingencies. Here, however, I do not believe that future dangerousness was at issue. Thus, I would affirm the trial court’s decision not to instruct the jury with respect to the possibility of parole or commutation.
Justice CASTILLE joins this dissenting opinion.

. The prosecutor asked the jury to impose the death penalty "to stop [Appellant] from ever hurting another woman again, to stop him from ever killing another woman again.” N.T., 5/5/95, at 18.