Court Opinion

ID: 9705564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:11:30.407006+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:12.294873
License: Public Domain

STUMBO, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I must dissent. The trial court abused its discretion when it failed to grant Appellant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence in the form of an admission by Brittany Gregory that she, and not Appellant, had shot one of the victims.
Although the general rule is that a new trial should not be granted if the newly discovered evidence is merely impeaching in nature, this rule should be applied cautiously, and if the evidence is compelling enough that it probably would have induced the jury to reach a different verdict, a new trial should be granted. Mullins v. Commomvealth, Ky., 375 S.W.2d 832, 834 (1964) (quoting McGregor v. Commonwealth, Ky., 253 S.W.2d 624, 625 (1952)).
In this case, the jury obviously believed that someone other than Appellant killed one of the victims as he was acquitted of one count of murder. Brittany Gregory’s statements to defense counsel put into serious doubt that Appellant was the person *456who shot Clifford Schell. The jury was entitled to hear this evidence, as it was probable that the admission would have induced the jury to believe that Brittany Gregory had shot Clifford Schell rather than Appellant. This Court has not hesitated to grant a new trial when the newly discovered evidence merely impeaches a witness if it appears that a miscarriage of justice may result. Id. I believe this is such an instance.
In addition, the prosecutor’s remarks during the penalty phase of trial asking the jury to consider the charges of which Appellant had been acquitted when imposing a sentence were prejudicial. The prosecutor asked the jury to consider that another man had been murdered that night, for which no one had been charged. The statements to this effect attempted to persuade the jury to impose the maximum sentence upon Appellant for crimes he had previously been acquitted, the implication being that Appellant had actually committed the crimes yet there was not enough evidence to convict Appellant, or that he fraternized with or possibly aided and abetted Mends who did commit the crimes, and thus should be punished for “running” with the wrong crowd. These statements were prejudicial and would at the very least require remand for a new sentencing hearing.