Court Opinion

ID: 9713958
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:27:29.632154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:22.103819
License: Public Domain

PRESIDING JUSTICE HOLDRIDGE, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. When the question presented on interlocutory appeal is one of law, the reviewing court answers the question independently of the trial court and reviews the matter de novo. In re Lawrence M., 172 Ill. 2d 523 (1996). Here, we are asked to determine whether the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act applies to lessees. In order to answer that question we must, of course, look to the statute itself. Does the Act clearly and unambiguously, i.e., expressly, apply to lessees? A review of the Act shows that it is silent as to lessees. The Act states only that a “consumer” may bring suit under its authority: “(1) Subject to subsections (a)(3) and (e) of this section, a consumer who is damaged by the failure of a supplier, warrantor or service contractor to comply with any obligation under this chapter, or under a written warranty, implied warranty, or service contract, may bring suit for damages and other legal and equitable relief!.]” (Emphasis added.) 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d) (2000). When we look further into the Act, we find the term ‘consumer’ is defined under the Act as follows: “The term consumer means a buyer (other than for purposes of resale) of any consumer product, any person to whom such product is transferred during the duration of an implied or written warranty (or service contract) applicable to the product, and any other person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty (or service contract) or under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or service contract).” 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3) (2000). Further complicating the issue is the fact that embedded within the meaning of “consumer” is the term “written warranty.” The Act defines “written warranty” as: “(A) any written affirmation of fact or written promise made in connection with the sale of a consumer product by a supplier to a buyer which relates to the nature of the material or workmanship and affirms or promises that such material or workmanship is defect free or will meet a specified level of performance over a specified period of time, or (B) any undertaking in writing in connection with the sale by a supplier of a consumer product to refund, repair, replace, or take other remedial action with respect to such product in the event that such product fails to meet the specifications set forth in the undertaking, which written affirmation, promise, or undertaking becomes part of the basis of the bargain between a supplier and a buyer for purposes other than resale of such product.” 15 U.S.C. § 2301(6) (2000). In analyzing these definitions, we must be cognizant of the basic tenants of statutory interpretation. “ ‘The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to the true intent of the legislature. [Citation.]’ ” Schawk, Inc. v. Zehnder, 326 Ill. App. 3d 752, 755, 761 N.E.2d 192, 194 (2001). “ ‘The best evidence of legislative intent is the language used in the statute itself, which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. [Citation.]’ ” Schawk, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 755, 761 N.E.2d at 194. “ ‘The statute should be evaluated as a whole, with each provision construed in connection with every other section. [Citation.]’ ” Schawk, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 755, 761 N.E.2d at 194. “ ‘If legislative intent can be ascertained from the statute’s plain language, that intent must prevail without resort to other interpretive aids. [Citation.]’ ” Schawk, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 755, 761 N.E.2d at 194. However, a statute is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. In re B.C., 176 Ill. 2d 536, 543 (1997). Here, I would find that the statute at hand is ambiguous as to whether lessees may sue for breach of warranty. If the case law developing on this issue is any indication, the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act is most assuredly capable of more than one reasonable interpretation. Having found the statute ambiguous, I would then resort to standard rules of statutory construction in order to determine the intent of Congress on this issue. One such rule of statutory construction permits us to look to compare statutes that concern the same subject matter and to consider statutes on related subjects. Anderson v. City of Park Ridge, 396 Ill. 235, 244 (1947). Here, we have another consumer protection statute for comparison, the Truth in Lending Act (15 U.S.C. § 1638 et seq. (2000)) enacted seven years prior to Magnuson-Moss. In that statute, Congress expressly included lessees as consumers protected by that act. One would reasonably assume that, had Congress similarly intended Magnuson-Moss to protect lessees, it would certainly have included express language as contained in the Truth in Lending Act. I also note that when statutory language is ambiguous, it is appropriate to resort to extrinsic aids of construction such as an examination of legislative history. Kunkel v. Walton, 179 Ill. 2d 519, 534 (1997). Here, when we consider legislative history, it is clear that Congress was warned, in testimony by Professor David Leary, that lessees were not covered under the language as ultimately passed in the Act. Still Congress chose not to change the language of the Act in order to make it clear that lessees were covered under the Act. I would find this to be clear evidence of Congress’ intent NOT to include lessees within the protections of Magnuson-Moss. Because I would find Magnuson-Moss to be ambiguous as to the question of lessees, I would then resort to cardinal rules of statutory construction and find clear evidence that Congress did not intend the Act to cover lessees. I would, thus, answer the certified question in the negative and remand the cause for further proceedings consistent with this finding.