Court Opinion

ID: 9954709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 20:02:42.944641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:12:56.594882
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/26/24 (unmodified opn. attached)
                          CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

               IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                   THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                           (Sacramento)
                                                ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                       C095986

                  Plaintiff and Respondent,                (Super. Ct. No. 18FE015537)

          v.                                                 ORDER MODIFYING
                                                            OPINION AND DENYING
    OSCAR DERAN BARNER,                                          REHEARING
                                                                 [NO CHANGE IN
                  Defendant and Appellant.
                                                                   JUDGMENT]

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Alyson L.
Lewis, Judge. Affirmed as modified.

      Barbara A. Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.

       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Jessica C.
Leal, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

*       Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is
certified for publication with the exception of Part III of the Discussion.

                                                1
THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on March 12, 2024, be modified as follows:

The last paragraph of section I (C) of the discussion, starting at the bottom of page 16,
beginning “Accordingly, we conclude” is deleted and the following paragraph is inserted
in its place:

       Accordingly, we conclude that a new statement should be submitted with an
       amended order of commitment. The accompanying statement of calculation of the
       maximum term shall list the maximum term associated with each offense. This
       includes for count one: a 25 year-to-life term for assault with force likely to
       produce great bodily injury (§§ 245, subd. (a)(4), 667, subd. (e)(2), 667.5, subd.
       (c)(8), 1170.12, subds. (b)(1), (c)(2)(A)(ii)), with a three-year term for personal
       infliction of great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and two five-year prior
       conviction enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)). For count two: a four-year term for
       battery by force resulting in serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) plus two five-
       year prior conviction enhancements (§ 667, subd. (a)), stayed pursuant to section
       654. (See People v. Tua (2018) 18 Cal.App.5th 1136, 1143.) The order of
       commitment must be amended to reflect a maximum commitment term of life.

There is no change in the judgment.

Respondent’s petition for rehearing is denied.

BY THE COURT:

           /s/
EARL, P. J.

        /s/
KRAUSE, J.

      /s/
WISEMAN, J.*

*      Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                             2
Filed 3/12/24 (unmodified opinion)
                          CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*

              IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                     THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                            (Sacramento)
                                                 ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                       C095986

                  Plaintiff and Respondent,                (Super. Ct. No. 18FE015537)

         v.

    OSCAR DERAN BARNER,

                  Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Sacramento County, Alyson L.
Lewis, Judge. Affirmed as modified.

      Barbara A. Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.

       Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Julie A. Hokans and Jessica C.
Leal, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

*       Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, this opinion is
certified for publication with the exception of Part III of the Discussion.

                                                 1
       A jury found appellant Oscar Deran Barner not guilty by reason of insanity for
offenses Barner committed when he repeatedly punched his neighbor, breaking bones in
his neighbor’s face. Due to Barner’s status as a “three-strike” offender, the trial court
ordered him committed to the State Department of State Hospitals, setting a maximum
term of 25 years to life. Barner now raises several statutory and constitutional challenges
to the term of his commitment. We shall modify the judgment to reflect a maximum term
of commitment for life and order the trial court to issue an amended order of commitment
with a new accompanying statement relating to the calculation of the maximum term.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In light of the issues raised in this appeal, it is not necessary to provide a lengthy
discussion of the facts supporting the underlying offenses. It suffices to say that for no
apparent reason, Barner beat P.S.—a man with cerebral palsy with whom Barner had
previously been friendly—into unconsciousness. P.S. described Barner during the
incident as “a different person” from the one he knew, and that he “had a blank look in
his eyes.” P.S. suffered facial and orbital fractures, significant facial swelling, and
lacerations. Barner pleaded not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. As required
by statute, his trial was bifurcated into a guilt phase followed by a sanity phase. (See
Pen. Code, § 1026, subd. (a).)1
       A jury found Barner guilty of assault by means of force likely to produce great
bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count one) and battery by force resulting in serious
bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count two). The jury also found true two special
allegations: that Barner personally inflicted great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a);
count one) and serious bodily injury (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8); count two). At the sanity
phase, Barner introduced evidence that he was diagnosed with schizoaffective disorder,

1      Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                              2
which rendered him insane at the time of the offenses. The jury found Barner not guilty
by reason of insanity for both offenses. The court held a separate hearing on the
prosecution’s additional allegations that Barner had two prior strike convictions for
purposes of the “Three Strikes” law (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)) and allegations that each strike
qualified for a five-year enhancement to Barner’s sentence (§ 667, subd. (a)). The trial
court found true the allegations of the prior strike convictions.
       Subsequently, Barner requested the court strike his prior strikes under section
1385 and People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497 (Romero). He also
requested the court strike one or both five-year prior strike enhancements under section
1385. In doing so, defense counsel acknowledged that “It’s clear that if the Court doesn’t
strike the strike it’s a 25-to-life case.” The court “acknowledge[d] it ha[d] the discretion
to strike the strikes in order to take Mr. Barner out of indeterminate sentencing into
determinate sentencing,” but ultimately declined to do so. The court calculated an
indeterminate maximum term of commitment of 25 years to life on count one. The court
struck one of the five-year enhancements pursuant to sections 667 and 1385, calculating
only one five-year enhancement. The court ordered Barner committed to the State
Department of State Hospitals for a maximum term of 25 years to life on count one, plus
five years for the section 667 enhancement. Although earlier in the proceeding the court
referenced staying count two, the battery, it did not mention count two when pronouncing
the order of commitment. The minute order associated with that hearing indicates count
two is “stayed pending restoration to competency.” The order of commitment states the
maximum term of 25 years to life.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
                                State Hospital Commitment
       Barner raises several challenges to his state hospital commitment. He maintains
the trial court erred in holding a sentencing hearing, rather than a hearing to calculate his

                                              3
term of commitment. He further claims the court erred in applying the Three Strikes law
to set an indeterminate life term (“life-top” term) as the maximum term of commitment,
because the statute requires the court to use the upper term for the base offense in
calculating the commitment term. We disagree.
       A. Legal Background
       An insanity finding that follows a determination (by verdict or plea) that the
accused committed the criminal act charged establishes the accused was not criminally
responsible for the offense committed. (In re Moye (1978) 22 Cal.3d 457, 466,
superseded by statute as stated in Hudec v. Superior Court (2015) 60 Cal.4th 815, 822.)
Therefore, a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity does not result in a conviction.
(People v. Morrison (1984) 162 Cal.App.3d 995, 998; People v. Superior Court (Frezier)
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 652, 668.) When a criminal defendant is found not guilty by
reason of insanity, that person “is no longer a criminal defendant, but a person subject to
civil commitment.” (People v. Lara (2010) 48 Cal.4th 216, 222, fn. 5 (Lara).) If, as
here, the sanity of the defendant has not yet been recovered at the time of the verdict, the
court directs that the defendant either be committed to the State Department of State
Hospitals or placed on outpatient status. (§ 1026, subd. (b).)
       “The purpose of commitment following an insanity acquittal, like that of civil
commitment, is to treat the individual’s mental illness and protect him and society from
his potential dangerousness. The committed acquittee is entitled to release when he has
recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous.” (Jones v. United States (1983) 463 U.S.
354, 368 (Jones).) Upon a commitment to a state hospital, the medical director of the
facility submits semiannual reports to the court as to the person’s status and progress.
(§ 1026, subd. (f); see People v. Sword (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 614, 620.) “Release is
possible at any time following a mandatory, 180-day commitment period (§ 1026.2, subd.
(d)) if the defendant demonstrates his fitness for release, first by successfully completing
one year under supervision in a community mental health program and then in a sanity-

                                              4
restoration trial. (§ 1026.2. subd. (e).)” (People v. Tilbury (1991) 54 Cal.3d 56, 63.)
Thus, a committed insanity acquittee is not always confined for the maximum term.
       On the other hand, the commitment may be extended in up to two-year increments
if, because “of a mental disease, defect, or disorder, [the person] represents a substantial
danger of physical harm to others.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1); see § 1026.5, subd. (b)(8).)
       In committing an insanity acquittee, the relevant statute provides: “[T]he court
shall state in the commitment order the maximum term of commitment, and the person
may not be kept in actual custody longer than the maximum term of commitment, except
as provided in this section. For the purposes of this section, ‘maximum term of
commitment’ shall mean the longest term of imprisonment which could have been
imposed for the offense or offenses of which the person was convicted, including the
upper term of the base offense and any additional terms for enhancements and
consecutive sentences which could have been imposed less any applicable credits . . . .”
(§ 1026.5, subd. (a)(1).)
       Whether the trial court had discretion to make certain sentencing choices in
calculating a maximum term of commitment presents a question of law, requiring this
court to ascertain the proper interpretation of the statutes governing the maximum term of
commitment after being found not guilty by reason of insanity. (See People v. Superior
Court (Frezier), supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 659; see also People v. Scott (1994)
9 Cal.4th 331, 354 [legal error resulting in an unauthorized sentence subject to de novo
review commonly occurs where the court violates mandatory provisions governing the
length of confinement].) Similarly, whether the Three Strikes law applies in setting a
maximum term of commitment under section 1026.5 involves a question of statutory
construction, which we review de novo. (People v. Tran (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1160, 1166.)
       “When interpreting a statute our primary task is to determine the Legislature’s
intent. [Citation.] In doing so we turn first to the statutory language, since the words the
Legislature chose are the best indicators of its intent.” (Freedom Newspapers, Inc. v.

                                              5
Orange County Employees Retirement System (1993) 6 Cal.4th 821, 826; see also People
v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 328.) “ ‘[W]e are bound to give effect to a statute
according to the usual and ordinary import of those words. [Citation.] We may not add
to or alter those words in order to accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face
of the statute or from its legislative history.’ ” (People v. Salcido (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th
1303, 1311.) “ ‘When used in a statute[,] words must be construed in context, keeping in
mind the nature and obvious purpose of the statute where they appear, and the various
parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or
section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘If
the statutory language is unambiguous, “we presume the Legislature meant what it said,
and the plain meaning of the statute governs.” ’ ” (Ibid.)
       B. Hearing Setting the Maximum Term of Commitment
       Barner contends that the trial court improperly held a sentencing hearing when it
calculated the term of his commitment. He claims that because he was found not guilty
by reason of insanity, he was never convicted of the charged offenses and, therefore,
cannot be sentenced on them. Nevertheless, he argues, the trial court’s use of
terminology associated with sentencing hearings as well as making discretionary choices
only available during actual sentencing, demonstrated that the trial court did not
understand the hearing was merely a calculation hearing, resulting in an unauthorized
sentence. It does appear the trial court conflated the commitment hearing with a
sentencing hearing. Indeed, after conducting a court trial on the allegations of the prior
convictions, the court stated: “[H]aving found the prior convictions proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, we’ll turn to the judgment and sentencing in this matter.” (Italics
added.) The court then asked defense counsel if he “waive[d] formal arraignment and
advisement of rights for judgment and sentencing?” (Italics added.) After a lengthy
colloquy on whether the trial court had discretion to strike Barner’s prior strike, the court
stated: “Do all parties submit for judgment and sentencing?” (Italics added.) The trial

                                              6
court denied Barner’s motion to strike one of his prior strikes alleged under section 667,
subdivision (e)(2), “imposed” the indeterminate sentence of 25 years to life, and then
granted his motion to strike one of the priors alleged as a five-year enhancement under
section 667, subdivision (a). The trial court indicated that such sentence would take him
to 91 years of age. Finally, at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court asked the
parties to stipulate that the appropriate sentence be carried out in the State Department of
State Hospitals.
       The People agree that an insanity acquittee may not be sentenced, but argue that
Barner was properly committed to the state hospital because, notwithstanding the parties’
use of language suited to a sentencing hearing in the trial court, Barner was never actually
sentenced. We agree. Despite the trial court’s perhaps ill-chosen language, the record
reflects the trial court ordered Barner committed to the state hospital for a maximum term
of 25 years to life. The record also reflects the trial court issued a state hospital
commitment order pursuant to section 1026, rather than an abstract of judgment
reflecting a sentence or prison commitment. Thus, despite the words employed by the
trial court, Barner ultimately was “committed” and not “sentenced.”
       We also reject Barner’s implicit contention that a commitment hearing under
section 1026.5 must be devoid of characteristics associated with sentencing hearings.
Case law instructs that because an insanity acquittee is relieved of responsibility for their
crimes, he or she is not convicted, and therefore may not be sentenced. However, if the
acquittee is subject to commitment in the state hospital, section 1026.5, subdivision (a)
requires the trial court to designate a maximum term for such a commitment. (§ 1026.5,
subd. (a).) The plain language of section 1026.5, subdivision (a)(1) requires that term to
be equal to “the longest term of imprisonment which could have been imposed” for the
crimes for which they were found guilty had the insanity acquittee been convicted and
sentenced rather than found not guilty by reason of insanity. (§ 1026.5, subd. (a); People
v. Hernandez (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1232, 1237 (Hernandez I).) “In other words, the

                                               7
trial court at first removes the not guilty by reason of insanity issue from the equation in
calculating the maximum term of commitment to the state hospital.” (Hernandez I, at
p. 1238.) This naturally implies that elements associated with sentencing hearings will be
present during a commitment term calculation hearing.
       C. Maximum Term of Commitment Calculation
       Barner takes issue with his life-top commitment term. He acknowledges that the
plain language of the statute reasonably allows for life-top commitment terms for insanity
acquittees who commit offenses, such as murder, punishable by life imprisonment. He
claims, however, that the offenses of which the jury found him guilty, assault by means
of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4); count one) and battery
by force resulting in serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d); count two), are not as a
matter of law life-top offenses, and the trial court erred in transforming his offense of
assault with infliction of great bodily injury into a life-top term by incorporating the
Three Strikes law into the calculation of the maximum term of commitment set forth in
section 1026.5. He argues that the Three Strikes law emphasizes punishment, is
inconsistent with the goals of treatment pursuant to section 1026, and expressly applies to
imprisonment, not commitment to a state hospital. (See §§ 667, subd. (c)(4) [“There
shall not be a commitment to any other facility other than the state prison”], 1170.12,
subd. (a)(4) [same].)
       The People disagree the court erred in applying the Three Strikes law. According
to the People, the real error occurred when the court failed to consider the great bodily
injury and additional prior conviction enhancements in calculating the maximum term of
commitment. The People request this court to order an amended order of commitment,
reflecting the maximum term as 38 years to life rather than 25 years to life. We conclude
that the Three Strikes law applies to the calculation method set forth in section 1026.5,
subdivision (a)(1) and that the minimum term in this case is irrelevant. The relevant term
is the maximum term of commitment, which, in this case, is life.

                                              8
       In clear and unambiguous language, the statute requires the trial court to calculate
as the commitment term the “longest term of imprisonment which could have been
imposed for the offense or offenses of which the person was convicted, including the
upper term of the base offense and any additional terms for enhancements and
consecutive sentences which could have been imposed.” (§ 1026.5, subd. (a).) As
Barner concedes, life-top terms are possible. (See People v. Endsley (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 93, 101 [the longest term of commitment for first degree murder is
imprisonment for life]; cf. Lara, supra, 48 Cal.4th at pp. 221-222 [recognizing that in
calculating the maximum term of commitment under the relevant subdivision of
§ 1026.5, the patient “thus fell under the indeterminate sentencing law”].) Application of
the Three Strikes law has also been used in calculating the maximum term of
commitment. (See, e.g., People v. Chavez (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 882, 886, fn. 4 [the
Three Strikes law required doubling the terms]; People v. Dobson (2016)
245 Cal.App.4th 310, 315-316 (Dobson I) [noting the acquittee, who had four prior
strikes, would receive an indeterminate term under the Three Strikes law], superseded by
Assem. Bill No. 103 (2017-2018) [observing that nothing in the text or history of
Prop. 36 suggests that it applies to not guilty by reason of insanity committees];
§ 1170.127 [provision allowing insanity acquittees with an indeterminate term under the
Three Strikes law to petition for a new commitment term commensurate with Prop. 36].)
       Critically, the statute permits the use of all upper terms and enhancements in the
calculation and does not distinguish between potential sentences based on criminal
conduct or status as a recidivist. (See People v. Coronado (1995) 12 Cal.4th 145, 158-
159 [conduct and status enhancements are used differently for sentencing purposes].)
Indeed, the language demonstrates the Legislature intended courts to set the lengthiest
term otherwise warranted by the acquittee’s offenses. Based on Barner’s offenses, the
longest term warranted is calculated through the alternative sentencing scheme of the
Three Strikes law. (Romero, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 527.) Nothing in section 1026.5

                                             9
suggests the alternative sentencing scheme of the Three Strikes law is outside the
confines of the statute. Similarly, nothing in the Three Strikes law suggests that its
sentencing provisions were not intended to apply to a determination of the maximum
term of commitment under section 1026.5, subdivision (a)(1). (See generally §§ 667;
1170.12.)
       Barner argues that because the Three Strikes law does not specifically refer to or
incorporate section 1026 or 1026.5, the Three Strikes law does not apply. In support,
Barner points to the provisions in the Three Strikes law that list dispositions that “shall
not affect the determination that a prior conviction” is a strike, which does not include
adjudications of guilt for insanity acquittees under section 1026. (See §§ 667, subd.
(d)(1), 1170.12, subd. (b)(1).) The failure to include insanity acquittals in the list of
dispositions having no impact on the determination of a prior strike does not mean that
the instant adjudication is not a qualifying offense or that sentencing provisions of the
Three Strikes law are inapplicable during the calculation of the maximum commitment
term. Rather, these “no impact” provisions potentially address the future impact of
Barner’s instant adjudication of guilt for assault with infliction of great bodily injury as a
prior strike conviction for purposes of the Three Strikes law, should Barner commit a
subsequent qualifying serious or violent felony.2
       Nor are we persuaded that the provision in the Three Strikes law, which states
“[t]here shall not be a commitment to any other facility other than the state prison,” was
meant to exclude the Three Strikes law from consideration while calculating the
maximum term of commitment under section 1026.5. (See §§ 667, subd. (c)(4), 1170.12,

2      The People argue this section of the Three Strikes law merely prohibits future
consideration of Barner’s adjudication as a prior strike. In light of the fact that Barner
was not convicted of the instant offense of assault with infliction of great bodily injury,
such an exclusion is logical. However, this question is not before us.

                                              10
subd. (a)(4).) As an insanity acquittee, Barner was not sentenced under the Three Strikes
law. Rather, the Three Strikes law was simply used to calculate the longest term legally
applicable to him had he been convicted and sentenced.
       If the Legislature had wanted to provide some relief from a Three Strikes
indeterminate term in setting a maximum term of commitment under section 1026.5, it
could have done so when it last passed legislation relating to an insanity acquittee’s
maximum term of commitment, in light of changes to the Three Strikes law through
Proposition 36, the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012.3 In 2017, the Legislature passed
Assembly Bill No. 103 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), which created section 1170.127. Section
1170.127 allows insanity committees to petition the court for a reduction of their
maximum term of commitment by arguing the nature of their instant adjudication, under
the new law, only subjects them to a term commensurate with a second striker. (See
People v. Steward (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 895, 899 [noting that Prop. 36 changed the
length of prison sentences under the Three Strikes law for criminal defendants and, to
allow insanity committees to take advantage of that change vis-a-vis their maximum term
of commitment, the Legislature enacted Assem. Bill No. 103 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)].)
If successful in obtaining a reduced maximum term of commitment under section
1170.127, “the new term of confinement must provide opportunity to meet requirements
provided in subdivision (b) of Section 1026.5” as prescribed by the statute. (§ 1170.127,

3      The Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012 amended sections 667 and 1170.12 and
changed the requirements for sentencing a third strike offender to an indeterminate term
of 25 years to life imprisonment. “Under the original version of the three strikes law a
recidivist with two or more prior strikes who is convicted of any new felony is subject to
an indeterminate life sentence. The Act diluted the three strikes law by reserving the life
sentence for cases where the current crime is a serious or violent felony or the
prosecution has pled and proved an enumerated disqualifying factor. In all other cases,
the recidivist will be sentenced as a second strike offender. (§§ 667, 1170.12.)” (People
v. Yearwood (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 161, 167-168.)

                                             11
subd. (b).) Thus, through section 1170.127, the Legislature specifically incorporated
insanity acquittees into the Three Strikes Reform Act of 2012.4
       The Legislature “is presumed to be aware of all laws in existence when it passes or
amends a statute. [Citations.] ‘ “The failure of the Legislature to change the law in a
particular respect when the subject is generally before it and changes in other respects are
made is indicative of an intent to leave the law as it stands in the aspects not
amended.” ’ ” (In re Greg F. (2012) 55 Cal.4th 393, 407.) Indeed, the very fact that the
Legislature created section 1170.127 to allow insanity acquittees to petition to be
committed for a term consistent with a second strike sentence as opposed to that of a third
strike is an acknowledgment that the Three Strikes law applies to the maximum term
calculation, sometimes resulting in a life-top commitment.
       Barner concedes that in calculating the “longest term of imprisonment” under
section 1026.5, the trial court is precluded from exercising any discretionary sentencing
choices. We agree. He next argues that applying the Three Strikes law constituted a
sentencing choice by the trial court, and was thus error. Here we must part ways. The
trial court here found, in a bifurcated trial, that Barner suffered two prior strike
convictions. Accordingly, “the Three Strikes scheme would have required indeterminate
life sentences.” (People v. Henderson (2022) 14 Cal.5th 34, 44-45; see §§ 667, subd.
(e)(2)(A); 667.5, subd. (c)(8); 1170.12, subds. (b)(1), (c)(2)(A).) “Romero clarified that a
sentencing court has discretion to dismiss findings as to prior convictions, in furtherance
of justice, under the authority of section 1385, subdivision (a). (See Romero, supra,
13 Cal.4th at pp. 507-532.) The result of such a dismissal is that a defendant with two or

4      As Barner notes, the Legislature (also) specifically included insanity acquittees
when it drafted section 1170.18, allowing the acquittees to petition a court to have certain
felony offenses reduced to misdemeanors, consistent with changes made to the law
through Proposition 47. (People v. K.P. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 331, 340.)

                                              12
more strike priors and a conviction for a new qualifying offense may be removed from
the strictures of the Three Strikes scheme altogether if all of his strike priors are
dismissed, or he may be sentenced as a ‘second striker’ if only one strike prior remains in
connection with a newly charged qualifying offense.” (Henderson, supra, at p. 45.)
Thus, the initial applicability of the Three Strikes law is mandatory; any discretion in
such application would stem from striking one or both prior strike convictions, which we
address below.
       We agree that section 1026.5 does not permit the sentencing court to make
discretionary choices in calculating the maximum term of commitment, as if the acquittee
were being sentenced. While the parties offer no definitive authority on the question, it
appears a bright line is forming among appellate courts distinguishing between the use of
mandatory sentencing laws (required) and discretionary choices (not allowed) in
calculating the maximum commitment term under section 1026.5. For example, in
People v. Superior Court (Frezier), supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at pages 667-668, the appellate
court concluded that section 1026.5, subdivision (a) requires the court to consider credit
calculation statutes in setting the maximum term of commitment. Likewise, in
Hernandez I, supra, 134 Cal.App.4th at pages 1237-1238, the appellate court held that
statutory limitations on sentences, such as section 654 and the determinate sentencing
law, apply equally to calculating maximum terms of commitment.5
       However, section 1026.5 is a commitment statute, not a sentencing law. (See
People v. Zapisek (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 1151, 1160.) The intent is to ensure that an
insanity acquittee is not confined by reason of the adjudication of not guilty by reason of
insanity any longer than an individual who is sane. (In re Moye, supra, 22 Cal.3d at

5       Because section 654 applies to maximum term commitments under section 1026.5,
subdivision (a)(1), the parties agree that count two, battery resulting in serious bodily
injury, was properly excluded from the term calculation.

                                              13
p. 460.) It does not provide that the court should speculate as to what sentence a court
might actually impose after conviction for the charged offenses. Rather, the maximum
term of commitment is the maximum possible term, using the upper term, consecutive
sentences, and all available enhancements without regard to any mitigating factors that
might come into play if the court actually imposed a sentence after conviction. (See
People v. K.P., supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at p. 340 [concluding that because an insanity
acquittee is not sentenced, a court’s discretion to strike a firearm enhancement pursuant
to § 12022.53 does not apply to a § 1026.5, subd. (a) calculation]; cf People v. Hernandez
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 512, 524 (Hernandez II) [“The only action that may be dismissed under
Penal Code section 1385, subdivision (a), is a criminal action or a part thereof”].)6
Section 1026.5 contemplates a simple arithmetic calculation with no exercise of
discretion. (See also § 1026, subd. (e)(2) [tasking the committing court with a
“computation or statement setting forth the maximum term of commitment in accordance
with Section 1026.5”].) Thus, mandating consideration of required sentencing laws but
disallowing consideration of discretionary sentencing choices in calculating the longest
possible term of commitment is consistent with the plain language of the statute and is
appropriate. The fact that the statute requires the court to select the upper term of the
base offense in arriving at “the longest term of imprisonment” offers further support for
our conclusion that the court, in making its commitment order under section 1026.5,
subdivision (a)(1), does not analyze the individual circumstances of the case as it would
were it called upon to impose a sentence.
       Contrary to Barner’s assertions, this does not lead to an absurd result, nor does it
lead to automatic confinement for life. The Legislature has reasonably determined that a
finding of not guilty by reason of insanity constitutes an adequate basis for hospitalizing

6      Here, in contrast, upon a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity, Barner “is no
longer a criminal defendant.” (Lara, supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 222, fn. 5.)

                                             14
an acquittee as a dangerous and mentally ill person for an amount of time equal to the
term of imprisonment to which they would have been exposed had they been convicted
and sentenced. The difference is that an insanity acquittee subject to a life-top maximum
term of commitment is “entitled to release when he has recovered his sanity or is no
longer dangerous.” (Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 368.)
       When the trial court set the maximum term of commitment in this case, it
considered whether to strike prior strike convictions and the five-year enhancements for
prior convictions—discretionary choices that would have been available at sentencing.
(See People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375 [a defendant may “ ‘invite the
court’ ” to exercise its discretion to strike a prior conviction]; People v. Ponder (2023)
96 Cal.App.5th 1042, 1052 [dismissal of an enhancement is a discretionary determination
as to whether doing so is in the furtherance of justice], review granted Jan. 10, 2023,
S282925.) It ultimately struck one of Barner’s five-year enhancements. In addition, the
trial court did not include an otherwise mandatory three-year enhancement for the great
bodily injury allegation the jury found true under section 12022.7. (See People v.
Romero (2019) 44 Cal.App.5th 381, 390 [“The [great bodily injury] enhancement carries
a mandatory three-year sentence [citation] but a trial court also has the discretion to strike
the enhancement pursuant to section 1385”].) In doing so, the trial court erred in
calculating the “longest term of imprisonment” required by section 1026.5, subdivision
(a), by making discretionary choices reserved for an actual sentencing hearing. However,
ultimately, the trial court ordered Barner committed to a state hospital for an
indeterminate life term as the maximum term of commitment. As we shall explain, this
was the correct maximum term. Any errors in language the trial court made during the
commitment calculation were thus harmless.
       Finally, we reject, in part, the People’s invitation to correct the order of
commitment to account for the three-year great bodily injury and additional five-year
prior conviction enhancements not considered by the trial court in calculating the

                                              15
maximum commitment term. According to the People, the order of commitment should
be amended to reflect a 38 year-to-life term. Upon conviction, Barner would have been
subject to a maximum term of 38 years to life. It is well-established, however, that
indeterminate sentences such as 25 or 38 years to life, establish both a maximum term of
life and a minimum term of confinement before an indeterminate sentence becomes
eligible for parole consideration. (See In re Dannenberg (2005) 34 Cal.4th 1061, 1078;
People v. Jefferson (1999) 21 Cal.4th 86, 92-93.) Because Barner was not sentenced, he
is not subject to a minimum term of confinement prior to parole consideration and the
minimum sentence has no relevance. Barner’s commitment to the state hospital does not
depend on his serving a minimum term; he may be released from commitment should he
regain his sanity. (See § 1026.2; People v. Cross (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 63, 72
[acquittee committed for a term not to exceed life or until sanity is restored].)
       Nevertheless, all parties are entitled to an explanation of how the court arrived at
the maximum term. Indeed, the trial court was required to provide a statement setting
forth its calculation of the maximum possible term. (See § 1026, subd. (e)(2) [when
ordering a person committed to the state hospital, the court shall provide copies of, inter
alia, the commitment order and a “computation or statement setting forth the maximum
term of commitment”].) We conclude that, logically, this statement should include a list
of all terms to which the insanity acquittee would have been exposed, had he or she been
sentenced. In this case, the statement pursuant to section 1026, subdivision (e)(2) should
reflect the terms for counts one and two, as well as all associated enhancement terms and
alternative sentences, leading to the determination that the maximum term of
commitment is life.
       Accordingly, we conclude that a new statement should be submitted with an
amended order of commitment. The accompanying statement or calculation of the
maximum term shall list the maximum term associated with each offense. This includes
for count one: a 25 year-to-life term for assault with force likely to produce great bodily

                                             16
injury (§§ 245, subd. (a)(4), 667, subd. (e)(2), 667.5, subd. (c)(8), 1170.12, subds. (b)(1),
(c)(2)(A)(ii)), with a three-year term for personal infliction of great bodily injury
(§ 12022.7, subd. (a)), and a five-year prior conviction enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)).
For count two: a four-year term for battery by force resulting in serious bodily injury
(§ 243, subd. (d)), stayed pursuant to section 654, plus a five-year prior conviction
enhancement (§ 667, subd. (a)). The order of commitment must be amended to reflect a
maximum commitment term of life.
                                              II
              Constitutional Challenges to a Life-top Term of Commitment
       Barner claims that considering the Three Strikes law in setting the life-top term
violated his rights to due process and equal protection. He argues that while he is subject
to a commitment for life while he undergoes treatment, other insanity acquittees subject
to the same treatment for a determinate term may be released, unless the state
affirmatively proves that the acquittee is dangerous due to his or her mental disorder. We
see no constitutional error.
       A. Legal Background
       A finding of insanity is dispositive on the question of whether the accused is to be
held criminally responsible for committing the charged offense. (Hernandez II, supra,
22 Cal.4th at p. 529 (conc. opn. of Brown, J.); People v. Severance (2006)
138 Cal.App.4th 305, 318; People v. Jantz (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1295.) “The
acquittee has raised his mental illness as a defense to his criminal conduct and there has
been an adjudication that he committed a criminal act and was legally insane when he did
so.” (People v. Wilder (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 90, 105.) He “has demonstrated
dangerousness by committing a criminal offense” (ibid), but the commitment of the
defendant to a state hospital “is in lieu of criminal punishment and is for the purpose of
treatment, not punishment.” (People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1991)
233 Cal.App.3d 477, 485, disapproved of on other grounds in Hudec v. Superior Court,

                                              17
supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 828 & fn. 3.) “The purpose of committing an insanity acquittee is
two-fold: to treat his mental illness and to protect him and society from his potential
dangerousness. [Citation.]” (Wilder, supra, at p. 101.)
       A person may be released from a state hospital: (1) upon restoration of sanity
pursuant to the provisions of section 1026.2; (2) upon expiration of the maximum term of
commitment under section 1026.5, except as such term may be extended under the
provisions of subdivision (b) of section 1026.5; or (3) upon approval of outpatient status
pursuant to the provisions of section 1600 et seq. (§ 1026.1; see also People v. Sword,
supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 620).
       Outpatient status is a prerequisite to a finding that sanity has been restored.
(§ 1026.2, subd. (e).) “Subdivision (e) of section 1026.2 sets up a two-step process for
processing an application for release: first, a determination of whether the applicant
should be placed in a local program, and later, after a year in such a program, a
determination of whether the applicant’s sanity has been restored.” (Barnes v. Superior
Court (1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 969, 973; see People v. Tilbury, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 60
[no right to jury trial on outpatient placement].) At the end of one year, the trial court
may either discharge the defendant, order confinement in a treatment facility, or renew its
approval of outpatient status. (§ 1606.) In a restoration of sanity hearing, the applicant
has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that they are no longer a
danger to others due to mental defect, disease, or disorder. (§ 1026.2, subds. (e), (k); see
People v. Dobson (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1422, 1433 (Dobson II).)
       Under the second option, an insanity acquittee with a determinate maximum term
may be released at the end of that term, unless the district attorney successfully petitions
to extend the commitment because the patient presents a substantial danger of physical
harm to others because of a mental disease, defect, or disorder. (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(1).)
The patient is entitled to a jury trial on the petition (§ 1026.5, subd. (b)(3)), and section
1026.5, subdivision (b)(8) limits each extension of commitment to a two-year period. In

                                              18
order for the confinement (based on a felony) to be extended, the prosecution must show
beyond a reasonable doubt that “by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder [the
person] represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others.” (§ 1026.5, subd.
(b)(1); see People v. Buttes (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 116, 125.) Two conclusions are
drawn from the plain language of section 1026.5, subdivision (b). The statute does not
primarily function as a release statute. Rather, it provides the government the ability to
involuntarily confine the individual past the maximum term, based on dangerousness
resulting from the individual’s mental disorder. Next, subdivision (b) of section 1026.5
does not apply to insanity acquittees subject to a life term of commitment.
       B. Due Process
       Citing to Ulster County Court v. Allen (1979) 442 U.S. 140, 157 and People v.
Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 313, Barner contends a life-top maximum term of
commitment violates his due process rights because use of his two prior strike
convictions to set a life-top term creates an irrational presumption that to protect the
public from him, he must be committed for life. Barner posits that he should be
considered for release on the same time frame as those who commit the same offenses
and receive a determinate term of commitment. He argues that his continued
commitment until he proves his sanity violates due process because the state is relieved
from having to prove the requirements under section 1026.5, subdivision (b), which it
must do for an insanity acquittee committed to a determinate term. We disagree.
       “A ‘root requirement’ of due process is that an individual be given an opportunity
for a hearing before being deprived of any significant liberty or property interest.” (Lara,
supra, 48 Cal.4th at p. 229.) Indeed, “ ‘commitment for any purpose constitutes a
significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection.’ ” (Jones, supra,
463 U.S. at p. 361, quoting Addington v. Texas (1979) 441 U.S. 418, 425.) However, due
process does not call for the same procedures in every situation. Instead, “ ‘[d]ue process

                                             19
is flexible and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.’ ”
(Jones, supra, at pp. 367-368, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer (1972) 408 U.S. 471, 481.)
       Barner’s due process challenge was essentially rejected by the United States
Supreme Court in Jones, supra, 463 U.S. 354. In that case, the court held that due
process is not violated when an insanity acquittee may be hospitalized for a period longer
than the determinate term otherwise associated with the appropriate sentence for his or
her offenses, even when compared to civil commitment procedures, which require proof
of the need for commitment under a higher burden. (Id. at pp. 366-368.) In Jones, the
Supreme Court upheld a District of Columbia statute that required a defendant who was
acquitted by reason of insanity, and committed to a mental institution, to prove that he
was no longer insane or dangerous by a preponderance of the evidence in order to be
released. In that case, the defendant was hospitalized for a longer period than he would
have served in prison if convicted. (Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 368.)
       The Supreme Court found that “a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity is a
sufficient foundation for commitment of an insanity acquittee for the purposes of
treatment and the protection of society.” (Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 366.) The fact of
conviction was also sufficient evidence that the defendant was dangerous. Under the
District of Columbia statute, as under ours, the defendant had the opportunity to show,
after a period of time, that he had recovered, and therefore should be released. (Id. at
pp. 364-366.)
       The high court next held that the preponderance of the evidence standard met due
process requirements, stating, “We hold that when a criminal defendant establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that he is not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity, the
Constitution permits the Government, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine
him to a mental institution until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a
danger to himself or society.” (Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at p. 370; cf. O’Connor v.

                                             20
Donaldson (1975) 422 U.S. 563, 575 [civil commitment requires both mental illness and
dangerousness].)
       Under Jones, California may use the findings in the criminal proceeding as the
basis for commitment on grounds that those findings show both insanity and
dangerousness. (§ 1026.) “[T]he fact of the criminal conviction provides a basis for
inferring that defendant is both mentally ill and dangerous, and may therefore be
committed” and “there is [also] a presumption of continued insanity.” (People v. Sword,
supra, 29 Cal.App.4th at p. 624.) This is a rebuttable presumption. Barner may prove his
sanity by showing, generally at the end of one year in an outpatient program, that he is no
longer a danger to the health and safety of others, due to mental defect, disease, or
disorder. (§ 1026.2, subd. (e); see Dobson II, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 1433; People
v. Endsley, supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 101 [restoration of sanity under § 1026.2 is the
only route to release where the longest term of imprisonment is for life].)
       In general, a mandatory rebuttable presumption tells the trier of fact that, if a
specified fact has been proven, then the trier of fact must find that a specified factual
element of the crime has also been proven, unless the defendant comes forward with
evidence to rebut the presumed connection between the two facts. (Ulster County Court
v. Allen, supra, 442 U.S. at p. 157.) Mandatory rebuttable presumptions raise due
process concerns in a criminal case “since the prosecution bears the burden of
establishing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. ([Ibid.]) The prosecution ‘may not rest its
case entirely on a [mandatory rebuttable] presumption unless the fact proved is sufficient
to support the inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ (Id. at p. 167.)” (People v.
McCall (2004) 32 Cal.4th 175, 183.)
       Here, the presumption of dangerousness is a consequence of Barner’s commission
of the offenses, rather than an evidentiary presumption to be considered during the guilt
phase, so it does not carry the same due process concerns as described in Ulster County
or Castro. (See People v. Castro, supra, 38 Cal.3d at p. 313 [due process demands that

                                             21
even inferences—not just presumptions—be based on a rational connection between the
fact proved and the fact to be inferred].) Instead, the presumption of ongoing insanity—
and therefore dangerousness—was created after the jury determined beyond a reasonable
doubt that Barner committed the acts of violence but, by a preponderance of the evidence,
he was legally insane when he did so.
       Barner’s contention is that this presumption should not continue indefinitely,
especially when other insanity acquittees, whose term is calculated as a determinate term,
may be released unless the state proves, beyond a reasonable doubt, that he or she is still
dangerous as a result of his or her mental illness. First, Jones rejected the notion that
there is a correlation between the length of the acquittee’s hypothetical criminal sentence
and the length of time necessary for his or her recovery. (Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at
p. 368.) Rather, Jones instructs that “[t]he committed acquittee is entitled to release
when he has recovered his sanity or is no longer dangerous.” (Ibid.; see also Lara, supra,
48 Cal.4th at p. 228 [cautioning that the expectation of release after the maximum term is
a “secondary benefit” not to be elevated “over the fundamental purposes of the [not guilty
by reason of insanity] provisions, to ensure that needed treatment is provided and the
public protected” as “such an interpretation would run counter to the very purposes of the
[not guilty by reason of insanity] statutes and the provision for extension of
commitment”]; cf. Foucha v. Louisiana (1992) 504 U.S. 71, 77 [an indefinite civil
commitment is consistent with due process if the statute provides fair and reasonable
procedures to ensure that the person is held “as long as he is both mentally ill and
dangerous, but no longer”].) Because it is impossible to predict whether, or how long it
will take for, an individual to recover his or her sanity, due process allows an
indeterminate term of commitment based on a finding of not guilty by reason of insanity
and subject to periodic review of the acquittee’s suitability for release. (Jones, supra, at
p. 368.)

                                             22
       Next, a third striker like Barner may rationally be presumed to be dangerous for a
longer period of time than someone who is not a third striker because he has
demonstrated his dangerousness with repeat commissions of serious and/or violent
felonies. This reasoning is consistent with case law. (See Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at
pp. 364, 366 [“The fact that a person has been found, beyond a reasonable doubt, to have
committed a criminal act certainly indicates dangerousness” and “[i]t comports with
common sense to conclude that someone whose mental illness was sufficient to lead him
to commit a criminal act is likely to remain ill and in need of treatment”]; see also People
v. Beck (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1676, 1684 [“an acquittal by reason of insanity entails a
finding that the defendant in fact committed a criminal offense,” and “commission of the
crime in turn supports an inference of potential dangerousness and possible continuing
mental illness [citation], which justifies the state in exercising great care in evaluating the
offender prior to release into the community”].)
       Here, Barner had a trial in two phases and stipulated, in a separate hearing, that
commitment to the state hospital was necessary due to his ongoing insanity. As he put
forth insanity as a defense and proved his criminal act was a product of his mental illness,
any concern as to the risk of error at this stage is diminished. (Jones, supra, 463 U.S. at
p. 367.) In addition, an indeterminate term of commitment bears a rational relation to the
purpose of treatment and restoration of sanity. (Id. at p. 368.) Thus, due process was
satisfied at the initial commitment. With respect to Barner’s ongoing commitment until
he can prove his sanity, we see no due process error. Although we cannot predict an
insanity acquittee’s recovery rate, the statute provides for periodic updates and an
opportunity for release upon restoration of sanity. Because there is assurance that every
acquittee has an opportunity to obtain release, due process is satisfied. (See Jones, supra,
at p. 366 [“The precise evidentiary force of the insanity acquittal, of course, may vary
from case to case” but due process does not demand classifications that fit every
individual with the same degree of relevance].)

                                              23
       We conclude an indeterminate life term of commitment does not violate due
process.
       C. Equal Protection
       Barner next asserts a life-top term of commitment deprives him of his right to
equal protection because he must remain in physical custody until his sanity is restored,
even if he does not represent “a substantial danger of physical harm to others” within the
meaning of 1026.5, subdivision (b)(1), whereas an insanity acquittee with a determinate
term of commitment may be released from physical custody at the termination of their
term if they does not represent a substantial danger to others. We disagree.
       First, Barner forfeited his equal protection claim by not asserting it in the trial
court. (See People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846, 880, fn. 14 [the defendant’s
failure to raise his equal protection claim in the trial court forfeited the argument]; People
v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th 826, 854 [holding as to equal protection and other
constitutional claims, the “defendant forfeited each of these claims by failing to raise
them at trial”]; People v. Dunley (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1447 [“an equal
protection claim may be forfeited if it is raised for the first time on appeal”].) Even if not
forfeited, it has no merit.
       “ ‘ “The equal protection guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment and the
California Constitution are substantially equivalent and analyzed in a similar fashion.” ’ ”
(People v. Noyan (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 657, 666.) “ ‘Equal protection requires the
state to treat similarly situated persons alike, with some exceptions in which the disparate
treatment is sufficiently related to the purpose of the [law] in question.’ [Citation.] The
equal protection clause applies to civil commitment statutes ‘to ensure that a particular
group of civil committees is not unfairly or arbitrarily subjected to greater burdens.’ ”
(People v. Bocklett (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 879, 892.)
       Our California Supreme Court has recognized that at its core, “ ‘equal protection
ensures that the government does not treat a group of people unequally without some

                                              24
justification.’ ” (People v. Hardin (Mar. 4, 2024, S277487) __ Cal.5th ___, ___
[2024 Cal. Lexis 1076, at *20-*21].) In light of this, the court recently modified our
equal protection analysis as follows: “[W]hen plaintiffs challenge laws drawing
distinctions between identifiable groups or classes of persons, on the basis that the
distinctions drawn are inconsistent with equal protection, courts no longer need to ask at
the threshold whether the two groups are similarly situated for purposes of the law in
question. The only pertinent inquiry is whether the challenged difference in treatment is
adequately justified under the applicable standard of review. The burden is on the party
challenging the law to show that it is not.” (Id. at p. *28.) The degree of justification
required to satisfy equal protection depends on the type of unequal treatment at issue.
When a challenged statute involves a suspect classification such as race, or a fundamental
right such as the right to vote, courts will apply a heightened scrutiny and will demand
greater justification for the differential treatment. (Id. at p. *21.) Where the challenged
statutes involve neither a suspect classification nor a fundamental right, the “ ‘general
rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.’ ” (Ibid., citing
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc. (1995) 473 U.S. 432, 440.) Here, Barner’s
equal protection challenge fails because there is a rational basis for different treatment
among insanity acquittees.
       Relying on People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, Barner argues that in
determining whether the differential treatment of insanity acquittees subject to life or
determinate terms of commitment is justified, we should apply the strict scrutiny standard
of review, under which “the state must first establish that it has a compelling interest
which justifies the law and then demonstrate that the distinctions drawn by the law are
necessary to further that purpose.” (Id. at p. 251, italics omitted.) He claims that strict
scrutiny is appropriate because applying the Three Strikes law to calculate a life-top term
of commitment affects his personal liberty—a fundamental interest. (See Olivas, at

                                               25
p. 251 [determining that personal liberty is a fundamental interest and that strict scrutiny
applied to the challenged classification].)
       The California Supreme Court has explained that People v. Olivas, supra,
17 Cal.3d 236 should not be read as requiring strict scrutiny review “whenever one
challenges upon equal protection grounds a penal statute or statutes that authorize
different sentences for comparable crimes.”7 (People v. Wilkinson (2004) 33 Cal.4th 821,
837; see People v. Flores (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 74, 88 [an appellant does not have a
fundamental interest in a specific term of imprisonment].) Rather, where the issue is not
whether a deprivation of an individual’s liberty will occur, but rather the duration of that
deprivation, rational basis review is appropriate because “ ‘ “ ‘the power to define crimes
and fix penalties is vested exclusively in the legislative branch.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Farley
(2009) 46 Cal.4th 1053, 1119.) Accordingly, we find that the rational basis standard
applies because the issue here is the duration of the commitment period, not whether
insanity acquittees will be deprived of their liberty.
       Under the rational basis standard, “ ‘equal protection of the law is denied only
where there is no “rational relationship between the disparity of treatment and some
legitimate governmental purpose.” ’ [Citation.] . . . To mount a successful rational basis
challenge, a party must ‘ “negative every conceivable basis” ’ that might support the
disputed statutory disparity. [Citations.] If a plausible basis exists for the disparity,
courts may not second-guess its ‘ “wisdom, fairness, or logic.” ’ ” (Johnson v.
Department of Justice (2015) 60 Cal.4th 871, 881.) Barner has not met his burden to
negate every conceivable basis for treating him, a recidivist offender, differently from
nonrecidivist offenders during committal under section 1026.5.

7      Although our high court refers to “sentencing,” because the maximum
commitment term is calculated as the longest term of imprisonment, the Supreme Court’s
caution applies in this context.

                                              26
       Moreover, Barner’s equal protection argument essentially duplicates his due
process argument. Jones instructs that if the due process clause does not require that an
insanity acquittee be given the particular procedural safeguards provided to a different set
of acquittees, then there necessarily is a rational basis for equal protection purposes for
distinguishing between civil commitment and commitment of insanity acquittees. (Jones,
supra, 463 U.S. at p. 363, fn. 10.) We conclude that the Legislature could rationally
distinguish between insanity acquittees who have demonstrated a higher degree of
dangerous antisocial behavior through recidivism with a life-top term and those
nonrecidivist acquittees with a determinate term of commitment. Accordingly, we
discern no equal protection violation. (Cf. People v. K.P., supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at
pp. 341-345 [finding a rational basis exists for the Legislature’s failure to apply
§ 12022.53 to insanity acquittees and thus no equal protection violation].)
                                              III
               Multiple Adjudications of Guilt Based on the Same Conduct
       Barner contends his adjudication of guilt on count one for assault with force likely
to cause great bodily injury must be reversed because it is a lesser included offense to
count two, battery causing serious bodily injury. We disagree.
       “Under section 954, as [the Supreme Court has] interpreted it, ‘a defendant
properly may be convicted of two offenses if neither offense is necessarily included in the
other, even though under section 654 he or she could not be punished for more than one
offense arising from the single act or indivisible course of conduct.’ ” (People v. Vidana
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 632, 637.) “ ‘The most reasonable construction of the language in
section 954 is that the statute authorizes multiple convictions for different or distinct
offenses, but does not permit multiple convictions for a different statement of the same
offense when it is based on the same act or course of conduct.’ ” (Id. at p. 650.) Thus,
section 954 permits multiple convictions based on the same conduct except when the
convictions rest on different statements of the same offense or when a statement of one

                                              27
offense is necessarily included within another. We review the application of section 954
de novo. (People v. Villegas (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 642, 646.)
       Barner contends that because battery is a consummated assault, the assault is
necessarily included in the battery. (See People v. Corning (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 83,
90 [“Felony battery is a consummated assault”].) However, the relationship of simple
assault and battery is not analogous to assault with force likely to produce great bodily
injury and battery inflicting serious bodily injury. The test for determining whether one
offense is necessarily included within another requires us to examine the statutory
elements of the offenses. “[I]f the statutory elements of the greater offense include all of
the statutory elements of the lesser offense, the latter is necessarily included in the
former.” (People v. Reed (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1224, 1227.) Enhancements may not be
considered for purposes of identifying lesser included offenses. (People v. Sloan (2007)
42 Cal.4th 110, 123.)
       The statutory elements of felony battery are: (1) a battery, that is, “any willful and
unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another” (§ 242); and (2) serious
bodily injury is inflicted on the person (§ 243, subd. (d)). (People v. Longoria (1995)
34 Cal.App.4th 12, 16.) The statutory elements of assault with force likely to produce
great bodily injury are: (1) an assault, that is, “an unlawful attempt, coupled with a
present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another” (§ 240); and (2)
committed “by any means of force likely to produce great bodily injury” (§ 245, subd.
(a)(4)). (People v. Murray (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 1133, 1139.)
       As stated in People v. Bertoldo (1978) 77 Cal.App.3d 627, the two offenses have
different elements. “Section 245, subdivision (a), specifically addresses the conduct of a
defendant by prohibiting an attack upon another person. In contrast, section 243
addresses the result of conduct . . . . Thus, one may conceivably commit a felony battery
without committing an aggravated assault. For example, a push that results in a fall and
concomitant serious injury may not be sufficient deadly force to permit successful

                                              28
prosecution under section 245, subdivision (a). However, it is triable as a felony battery.”
(Id. at pp. 633-634, italics added.) In short, because a battery inflicting serious bodily
injury does not require use of a weapon or force likely to cause such serious injury,
aggravated assault (a violation of § 245, subd. (a)) is not a lesser included offense of
battery causing serious injury (a violation of § 243, subd. (d).) (In re Ronnie N. (1985)
174 Cal.App.3d 731, 735; cf. People v. Corning, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 90
[rejecting the defendant’s sentencing challenge “because it erroneously assumes his
aggravated assault/great bodily injury offense is equivalent to felony battery”].)
       Indeed, as Barner acknowledges, existing case law has rejected his argument,
largely relying on the analysis explained above. (See In re Ronnie N., supra,
174 Cal.App.3d at pp. 733-735; In re Jose H. (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1090, 1095-1096;8
cf. People v. Hopkins (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 316, 319-320 [§§ 245 & 243 “do not cover
the same subject matter”]; People v. Bertoldo, supra, 77 Cal.App.3d at p. 633 [“one may
conceivably commit a felony battery without committing an aggravated assault”].) We
find these authorities persuasive and agree that “[a]ssault with force likely to produce
great bodily injury is not a lesser included offense of battery with serious bodily injury.”
(In re Jose H., supra, at pp. 1095-1096.) Accordingly, Barner was properly found guilty
of each offense.

8       We disagree that the reasoning in In re Jose H., supra, 77 Cal.App.4th 1090
should be disregarded because it relied upon the statement in Corning that “[f]elony
battery is a consummated assault,” yet reached a result inconsistent with that statement.
(People v. Corning, supra, 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 90.) In Corning, the court also disagreed
that aggravated assault and felony battery were equivalent offenses, even when
considering a great bodily injury finding attached to an aggravating assault conviction.
(Ibid.) Thus, we agree with the People that Corning provides support for the ultimate
conclusion in In re Jose H. Moreover, our Supreme Court has examined the reasoning of
In re Jose H., cited its conclusion with approval, and followed it to resolve a somewhat
different issue. (See People v. Sloan, supra, 42 Cal.4th at pp. 119-120.)

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                                     DISPOSITION
       The judgment is modified to reflect that Barner’s maximum term of commitment
is life. The trial court is directed to prepare an amended commitment to the state hospital
reflecting a maximum commitment of life. The statement or calculation of the maximum
term shall list the maximum term associated with each offense, consistent with this
opinion. In all other respects, the judgment is affirmed.

                                                     /s/
                                                 EARL, P. J.

We concur:

    /s/
KRAUSE, J.

    /s/
WISEMAN, J. *

*      Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned
by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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