Court Opinion

ID: 9964636
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-30 16:00:42.46829+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:38.298089
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1369     Document: 010111040625      Date Filed: 04/30/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                  FILED
                                                                      United States Court of Appeals
                                          PUBLISH                             Tenth Circuit

                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        April 30, 2024

                                                                         Christopher M. Wolpert
                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                          Clerk of Court
                          _________________________________

  JOHN DOE, through his mother and next
  friend Jane Doe,

        Plaintiff - Appellant,

  v.                                                          No. 22-1369

  ROCKY MOUNTAIN CLASSICAL
  ACADEMY; NICOLE BLANC,
  individually and in her official capacity as
  Dean of Students of Rocky Mountain
  Classical Academy; CULLEN
  MCDOWELL, individually and in his
  official capacity as Executive Principal of
  Rocky Mountain Classical Academy,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                      Appeal from the United States District Court
                              for the District of Colorado
                         (D.C. No. 1:19-CV-03530-DDD-STV)
                        _________________________________

 Igor Raykin, Kishinevsky & Raykin, Attorneys at Law, Aurora, Colorado (Michael Nolt,
 Kishinevsky & Raykin, Attorneys at Law, Aurora, Colorado, with him on the briefs) for
 Plaintiff-Appellant.

 Eric V. Hall, Sparks Willson, P.C., Colorado Springs, Colorado for Defendants-
 Appellees.
                         _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, McHUGH, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

 CARSON, Circuit Judge.
Appellate Case: 22-1369     Document: 010111040625       Date Filed: 04/30/2024     Page: 2

        For the last forty-seven years, the Supreme Court has recognized only one test

 for determining whether a sex-based classification violates the right to equal

 protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. In this case, a Colorado charter school

 urges us to replace that test with another. We decline the invitation.

        Like many schools, Rocky Mountain Classical Academy (“RMCA”) maintains

 a dress code. Some provisions of this dress code apply only to boys; some only to

 girls. Plaintiff John Doe claims RMCA unlawfully discriminates on the basis of sex

 by prohibiting boys from wearing earrings. Plaintiff also contends that RMCA

 violated Title IX by retaliating against him for complaining of sex discrimination.

 Borrowing principles of Title VII law, the district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims

 because the dress code imposes comparable burdens on boys and girls. But by

 applying the comparable burdens test instead of intermediate scrutiny, the district

 court departed from the unambiguous directive of the Supreme Court. We therefore

 exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reverse the district court’s dismissal

 of Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claims. We affirm the dismissal of Plaintiff’s

 retaliation claim.

                                            I.

        RMCA is a public charter school serving students in grades K–8 in Colorado

 Springs. Consistent with a Colorado law requiring that all public schools establish a

 dress code, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 22-32-109.1(2)(a)(J), RMCA adopted a comprehensive

 dress code that applies to all students.

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       Plaintiff enrolled in RMCA’s kindergarten. While attending, Plaintiff wore

 small, blue stud earrings, prompting Plaintiff’s teacher to remind Plaintiff’s mother

 that, “per our dress code, boys [cannot] wear earrings at school.” The teacher was

 correct. Because Plaintiff is a boy, his earrings violated RMCA’s dress code:

       Tattoos and body piercings, other than girls’ earrings, are not
       allowed. Earrings must be limited to one earring per ear. Large, dangling,
       or hoop-type earrings are not allowed. Jewelry other than watches for
       boys or girls, and small earrings on girls, may not be worn. This
       includes bracelets. Bracelets are not allowed. Official RMCA bracelets
       are allowed to be worn.

 (emphasis added). Having received this notice, Plaintiff’s mother emailed members

 of the RMCA Board and suggested that the dress code constituted unlawful sex

 discrimination. But the Board disagreed, and because Plaintiff continued to wear

 earrings, RMCA suspended and disenrolled Plaintiff.

       Plaintiff sued Defendants in the District of Colorado and sought a preliminary

 injunction, alleging RMCA violated his Fourteenth Amendment equal protection

 rights and statutory rights under Title IX. The district court denied Plaintiff’s request

 for an injunction, and Defendants moved to dismiss. The district court granted

 Defendants’ motion, determining that Plaintiff did not state a plausible sex

 discrimination claim under either the Equal Protection Clause or Title IX and did not

 state a plausible Title IX retaliation claim. Plaintiff timely appealed.

                                            II.

       We review de novo a district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil

 Procedure 12(b)(6). Teigen v. Renfrow, 511 F.3d 1072, 1078 (10th Cir. 2007). In

                                             3
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 examining a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), we “disregard conclusory statements and

 look only to whether the remaining, factual allegations plausibly suggest the

 defendant is liable.”1 Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir.

 2012) (discussing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v.

 Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009)).

                                           III.

       On appeal, Plaintiff contends the district court erred by dismissing his 42

 U.S.C. § 1983 equal protection and 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) Title IX claims.

                                            A.

       For Plaintiff to prevail on his § 1983 equal protection claim, he must show

 “(1) deprivation of a federally protected right by (2) an actor acting under color of

 state law.” Schaffer v. Salt Lake City Corp., 814 F.3d 1151, 1155 (10th Cir. 2016)

 (citing D.T. ex rel. M.T. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 16, 894 F.2d 1176, 1186 (10th Cir.

 1990)). Both parties agree that RMCA is a state actor. So this issue hinges solely on

 whether Defendants deprived Plaintiff of a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth

 Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.2

       1
         Although a complaint’s sufficiency must generally rest on its contents alone,
 we may also consider “documents referred to in the complaint if the documents are
 central to the plaintiff’s claim and the parties do not dispute the documents’
 authenticity.” Jacobsen v. Deseret Book Co., 287 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 2002).
 Because the RMCA student handbook falls within this category, we also consider the
 RMCA student handbook.
       2
          Because of the agreement of the parties, we accept for this appeal that RMCA
 is a state actor. We express no opinion on whether a public charter school would

                                            4
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       The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides that no

 state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the

 laws.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. In considering whether a state actor violates

 the Equal Protection Clause, courts “apply different levels of scrutiny to different

 types of classifications.” Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988). For example,

 while all statutory classifications must be rationally related to a legitimate

 government purpose, classifications based on race or national origin—or affecting

 fundamental rights—are subject to strict scrutiny. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388

 U.S. 1, 11 (1967)). Between rational basis review and strict scrutiny “lies a level of

 intermediate scrutiny, which generally has been applied to discriminatory

 classifications based on sex.” Id. (citing Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S.

 718, 723–24, 724 n.9 (1982); Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982); Craig v.

 Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505–06 (1976)).

       Intermediate scrutiny is not a new standard, and its application is clear in both

 Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent: courts must evaluate sex-based

 classifications under intermediate scrutiny. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.

 515, 524 (1996) (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724); Free the Nipple-Fort Collins v. City

 otherwise qualify as a state actor for equal protection. See, e.g., 303 Creative LLC v.
 Elenis, 600 U.S. 570, 598 n.5 (2023) (accepting the parties’ stipulation on an otherwise
 unresolved issue of law).

                                             5
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 of Fort Collins, Colorado, 916 F.3d 792, 799 (10th Cir. 2019).3 To survive

 intermediate scrutiny, the Government must provide a justification for the sex-based

 classification that is “exceedingly persuasive,” and that classification must serve

 “important governmental objectives” through means “substantially related to”

 achieving those objectives. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524 (citing Hogan,

 458 U.S. at 724); accord Free the Nipple-Fort Collins, 916 F.3d at 799. RMCA

 employs a sex-based classification: girls can do something boys cannot.

 Accordingly, our established precedent required the district court to analyze the dress

 code’s constitutionality under the intermediate scrutiny framework.

       But the district court did not analyze RMCA’s sex-based classification under

 the traditional intermediate scrutiny framework.4 Instead, the district court applied

       3
         As Defendants identify, our older jurisprudence includes cases in which we
 permitted schools to impose hair length requirements on male students. See, e.g.,
 Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971); New Rider v. Bd. of Ed., 480 F.2d
 693 (10th Cir. 1973); Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1974). These cases
 are not useful guides: only New Rider considered an equal protection claim, and we
 analyzed the claim under rational basis review as the Supreme Court had not yet
 declared sex a quasi-suspect classification requiring intermediate scrutiny. See Boren,
 429 U.S. at 197.
       4
          The Supreme Court has held that “the constitutional rights of students in
 public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
 settings.” Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 394 (2007) (quoting Bethel School Dist.
 No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)). Accordingly, Defendants argue that
 we should adopt a deferential approach to school dress codes. But the Supreme
 Court has already modeled what deference courts owe to a school’s sex-based
 classification: intermediate scrutiny. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524 (citing Hogan, 458
 U.S. at 724). Accordingly, courts should only defer to a school’s sex-based
 classification if it serves an “exceedingly persuasive justification” through means
 “substantially related to” achieving the objective. Id. (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at

                                            6
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 the “comparable burdens” test adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Hayden ex rel. A.H.

 v. Greensburg Cmty. Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 581 (7th Cir. 2014). According to

 the Seventh Circuit, employers may impose sex-specific dress codes—without

 violating Equal Protection—if the codes impose “comparable burdens on both males

 and females alike.” Id. Because the district court found RMCA’s dress code

 imposed comparable burdens, the district court determined it did not need to analyze

 RMCA’s sex-based classification under intermediate scrutiny.5 Doe v. Rocky

 Mountain Classical Acad., No. 1:19-CV-03530, 2022 WL 16556255, at *5 (D. Colo.

 Sept. 30, 2022).

       In reviewing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we examine whether the complaint states

 a claim upon which relief can be granted, accepting all allegations as true and

 construing all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Tellabs, Inc.

 v. Makor Issues & Rts., Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322 (2007). The district court concluded

 724). Insofar as the district court wished to defer to school policies, it needed to do
 so within the confines of intermediate scrutiny.
       5
           The district court determined:

                It is not entirely clear just how the ‘comparable burdens’ test
                applied in Hayden fits into the overarching intermediate
                scrutiny framework. . .. But the Court need not resolve these
                questions, because . . . the Court finds that RMCA’s
                prohibition on earrings for male students is part of a
                comprehensive school dress code that imposes comparable
                burdens on males and female students, and that it therefore
                does not constitute sex discrimination.

 Doe v. Rocky Mountain Classical Acad., No. 1:19-CV-03530, 2022 WL 16556255,
 at *5 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2022).
                                              7
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 it could not grant Plaintiff relief because RMCA imposed comparable burdens on

 girls and boys. Doe, 2022 WL 16556255, at *5. But viewing Plaintiff’s complaint

 through the proper lens of intermediate scrutiny, we hold that Plaintiff has stated a

 claim upon which relief can be granted because the Complaint does not establish that

 RMCA has an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for its sex-based classification

 or that its classification serves important governmental objectives through means

 substantially related to those objectives. Indeed, at the 12(b)(6) stage, RMCA never

 had the opportunity to make such a showing.

       We do not speculate about what the results might be of a properly conducted

 intermediate scrutiny analysis. Until RMCA provides a justification for their sex-

 based classification, we cannot evaluate whether RMCA’s justification is

 “exceedingly persuasive” or whether the dress code’s treatment of boys is

 “substantially related” to their—at this point unstated—objectives. Therefore, this

 issue was not sufficiently developed such that a court could resolve it in favor of

 RMCA on a 12(b)(6) motion.6 The only issue on this appeal is whether Plaintiff

 stated a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted. And with respect to his

       6
         The district court recognized that the Seventh Circuit incorporated the notion
 of comparable burdens into the intermediate scrutiny framework. See Hayden, 743
 F.3d at 581. RMCA has taken a different tack on appeal—asserting at oral argument
 that “comparable burdens lies between rational basis and intermediate scrutiny.” We
 reject RMCA’s argument in light of the Supreme Court’s clear directive to evaluate
 sex-based classifications under intermediate scrutiny. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 524
 (citing Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724). But in concluding that at the 12(b)(6) stage RMCA
 never had the opportunity to justify its sex-based classification, we need not—and
 therefore do not—address whether comparable burdens are relevant to a proper
 intermediate scrutiny analysis.
                                            8
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 § 1983 equal protection claim, Plaintiff did. We therefore reverse the district court’s

 dismissal of Plaintiff’s equal protection claim.

                                            B.

       We next consider Plaintiff’s Title IX sex discrimination and retaliation claims.

 Broadly, Title IX prohibits recipients of federal education funding from

 discriminating on the basis of sex.7 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).

                                            1.

       The parties agree that Plaintiff’s sex discrimination claim under Title IX is

 subject to the same analysis as Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection

 claim. So, for the same reasons we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s

 claim of sex discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal

 Protection Clause, we reverse the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Title IX sex

 discrimination claim.8

       7
         20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on
 the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
 subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
 Federal financial assistance.”
       8
         Defendants bring two additional, unpersuasive arguments. First, Defendants
 point out that Title IX enumerates certain contexts in which schools may discriminate
 on the basis of sex. Second, Defendants argue that we should defer to the school’s
 dress code as a matter of Chevron deference. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res.
 Def. Couns., 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984).
        We reject these arguments for three reasons. First, Defendants undermined
 these arguments by conceding that our decision under Title IX should mirror our
 decision under the Equal Protection Clause. Second, Defendants have not identified
 a provision of Title IX that permits their dress code. Finally, it is well-settled that
 courts should only apply Chevron deference where a “statute is ambiguous on the

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                                              2.

        Plaintiff also brings a Title IX retaliation claim. To state a Title IX retaliation

  claim, Plaintiff must allege that RMCA “retaliated against him because he

  complained of sex discrimination.” Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S.

  167, 184 (2005). Plaintiff argues his allegations permit an inference that RMCA

  escalated the severity of his school discipline because he (and his mother) challenged

  the dress code. The district court disagreed, determining that the complaint permitted

  only one inference: that the school took disciplinary actions because of Plaintiff’s

  dress code violations. We agree with the district court.

        Plaintiff’s complaint makes clear that each disciplinary action followed his

  wearing earrings in violation of RMCA’s dress code. Yet Plaintiff argues that a jury

  could infer the necessary causation through the proximity of the discipline to the

  stated concerns about the dress code. True, in other contexts, we have found a

  temporal nexus sufficient to state a causal connection. See, e.g., Williams v. W.D.

  Sports, N.M., Inc., 497 F.3d 1079, 1091 (10th Cir. 2007) (Title VII); Metzler v. Fed.

  Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1171 (10th Cir. 2006) (FMLA). But, in

  this case, the facts as Plaintiff alleged them state that he repeatedly violated the dress

  code, that he was repeatedly told that he needed to comply, and that, when he did not

  comply, his discipline increased. Simply stated, nothing in Plaintiff’s complaint

  ‘precise question at issue.’” Aposhian v. Barr, 958 F.3d 969, 984 (10th Cir. 2020)
  (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 842 (1984)). But Defendants have not identified
  any ambiguity in the text of Title IX.
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  permits an inference that RMCA sent home, suspended, or disenrolled Plaintiff for

  anything but his violation of the dress code. Plaintiff thus does not state a claim for

  retaliation under Title IX.

                                             IV.

        In sum, we REVERSE the district court’s order dismissing Plaintiff’s claims of

  sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and Title IX and

  REMAND for further proceedings. But we AFFIRM the district court’s order

  dismissing Plaintiff’s Title IX retaliation claim.

                                             11