Court Opinion

ID: 9754276
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:53:28.830658+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:51.531103
License: Public Domain

STEADMAN, Associate Judge,
dissenting in part:
I agree that the jury award of damages cannot stand, but I would remand for a new trial on that issue. While the case was indeed tried on the theory that the October 19 agreement formed the basis of Vector’s suit, the question still remains: exactly what, in the final analysis, was that agreement? 1
I cannot agree with the assertion that even the language of the October 19 agreement is susceptible to only one construction. The agreement reads: “Vector has earned a real estate brokerage commission due and payable on the following terms and conditions: [$617,462.31 total commission]. Manufacturers and Cafritz will split payments of the fees equally.” Which is controlling, the dollar amount or the equality of fee payments? Further, the October agreement may have been modified or otherwise affected by the oral discount agreement which was formalized in a November letter agreement between Manufacturers and Vector after Caf-ritz signed the October letter, but before Manufacturers signed it.
One interpretation would lead to damages of $239,739.11; the other to damages of $188,501.55. There was ample evidence at trial of the entire course of dealing between the parties on the fee issue. “[I]f a contract is ambiguous, and the evidence supports more than one reasonable interpretation, the interpretation is a question of fact for the jury.” Morgan v. American Univ., 534 A.2d 323, 329 (D.C.1987) (quoting Howard Univ. v. Best, 484 A.2d 958, 966-67 (D.C.1984)). Accordingly, I would remand for a new trial on the issue of damages.

. While this certainly was not Cafritz’s principal point at trial — it sought complete nullification of the agreement — I think the argument was sufficiently made to warrant the trial court’s recognition that the agreement's terms were in dispute.