Court Opinion

ID: 7820028
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 17:50:45.611041+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:42.965020
License: Public Domain

John A. Fogleman, Justice, concurring in part, dissenting in part. I fully agree that Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1831 (Repl. 1966) is constitutional. I have reservations about the court’s construction of Ark. Stat. Ann. § 67-1826 (Supp. 1975) as permitting more than one twelve-month extension. It seems to me that the arguments favoring appellant’s construction are stronger than those favoring the construction given it by the majority. Appellant says that the act provides that, after failure of the recipient of a charter to commence business within six months, the Supervisor, upon a showing of good cause, shall grant a reasonable extension not to exceed twelve months. I suppose the matter is arguable, and I defer to the wisdom of the majority since it seems that, prior to the tenure of the Supervisor who acted in this case, Supervisors had construed the Act to permit successive extensions totalling more than twelve months. Of course, administrative construction is not controlling, only persuasive. Brawley School District v. Kight, 206 Ark. 87, 173 S.W. 2d 125. See also, International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 49 S. Ct. 108, 73 L. Ed. 318 (1928). I disagree with this court’s holding that the extension in this case should have been granted. This matter has not been considered by either the trial court or the Savings & Loan Association Board or even by the Supervisor. The showing of good cause for an extension certainly involves more than showing that efforts to obtain deposit insurance have been unsuccessful. It is a matter of common knowledge that changes can take place in conditions pertinent to the grant of a charter in a matter of a few months. There must be some latitude of discretion in the matter. Otherwise, a chartered association could interminably prolong efforts to obtain insurance and the Supervisor would be required to grant extension after extension. Clearly the legislature did not intend for this to happen. The Supervisor expressly stated that he did not reach the question whether there was good cause for the Association’s failure to commence business. The Board’s first order recited that the Supervisor, not the Board, was empowered to issue extensions, subject to appeal to the Board, but that there was no provision for a direct application to the Board for an extension, which the West Helena Association had made. The Board then, on appeal from the Supervisor, simply sustained the Supervisor’s holding that he had no authority to grant further extensions. The charter was cancelled later. The trial court sustained demurrers to jurisdiction on all orders except the order of cancellation by the Board. The circuit court retained jurisdiction over that order only. In his opinion, the circuit judge found it necessary to consider only one point, i.e., the constitutionality of the act. Consequently, this court is ruling on a question never considered by the Supervisor, the Board or the trial court. I would remand the case with directions to the circuit court to remand it for consideration by the Supervisor of extension of the charter in light of this decision.