Court Opinion

ID: 9892087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-20 15:07:42.061567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:07.544841
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: OCTOBER 13, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                     TO BE PUBLISHED

          Commonwealth of Kentucky
                  Court of Appeals

                     NO. 2023-CA-0005-MR

ELIZABETH BURCH                                      APPELLANT

           APPEAL FROM MADISON CIRCUIT COURT
v.         HONORABLE COLE ADAMS MAIER, JUDGE
                  ACTION NO. 21-CI-00329

LOUIS BERTRAND THOMAS III,
AND LAURA ELIZABETH THOMAS FRITZ,
INDIVIDUALLY AND AS CO-EXECUTORS
OF THE ESTATE OF LOUIS BERTRAND
THOMAS, JR.; MARY CAROL TATE;
MARGARET KATHLEEN CORNETT;
SAMUEL DELBERT FRITZ; LORI TILLET
THOMAS; KENNETH CHADWELL TATE;
CHARLES CHRISTOPHER TATE; AND
THOMAS J. SPALDING                                   APPELLEES

                          OPINION
                         AFFIRMING

                         ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: CETRULO, KAREM, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.
KAREM, JUDGE: Elizabeth Burch appeals from the Madison Circuit Court’s

order granting a declaratory judgment in favor of her sister’s heirs. Specifically,

Elizabeth Burch contends the circuit court misapplied the doctrine of merger

extinguishing any claim she may have to proceeds from a future sale of property.

We disagree and affirm the judgment of the circuit court.

              FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

             The parties agree as to the facts of this case and further agree that the

controversy is justiciable.

             On December 22, 1986, Elizabeth Murphy deeded property, by gift

intended as an early inheritance, to her daughters. The real estate, located at 818

Barnes Mill Road in Richmond, Kentucky (hereinafter “the property”) was

conveyed to her daughters, Elizabeth M. Spalding (now Burch) and Mary Ellen

Thomas and their respective spouses, Thomas Spalding, and Louis Bertrand

Thomas Jr., in equal shares to each couple. On that same date, Elizabeth Burch

(hereinafter “Burch”) and Thomas Spalding subsequently sold their 50% interest in

the property to the Thomases. The fair market value of the property at the time

was established to be $80,600. The Spaldings sold their interest to the Thomases

for $40,300. The Thomases executed a promissory note and mortgage to the

Spaldings in the principal amount of $40,300.

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              To memorialize this transaction, the parties executed a written

“Agreement of Sale of Real Property” (hereinafter “the agreement”). At issue in

the case is the provision of the agreement governing the future sale of the property,

entitled Article III – Future Sale and Proceeds, which provides as follows:

                     The PURCHASER agrees to fully account to the
              SELLER as to any future sale. In the event that the net
              proceeds exceed EIGHTY THOUSAND SIX
              HUNDRED DOLLARS ($80,600.00), the PURCHASER
              shall receive fifty (50%) percent of this excess subject to
              the provisions of Article IV. In the event that the net
              proceeds are less than EIGHTY THOUSAND SIX
              HUNDRED DOLLARS ($80,600.00), then the SELLER
              agrees to reduce the purchase price herein
              proportionately, subject to the provisions in Article IV.

              Notably, in 1991, the Spaldings divorced. Thomas Spalding

subsequently assigned his mortgage/note interest in the property to his ex-wife,

Burch:

                    ASSIGNMENT OF NOTE AND MORTGAGE

              ...

                     WITNESSETH, that for and in consideration of
              the terms of a Separation and Property Settlement and
              Decree of Dissolution entered in Madison Circuit Court,
              Civil Action File No. 91-CI-440, the party of the first
              part [Thomas J. Spalding] assigns, transfers and conveys
              unto the party of the second part, [Elizabeth Burch] all
              his right[s], title and interest in a certain note dated
              December 23, 1986,1 as secured by mortgage recorded

1
 The date identified by the parties for the sale between the siblings memorialized in the
agreement varies throughout the record. The parties use varying dates between December 22,

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              December 23, 1986, in Mortgage Book 328 at page 293,
              in the office of the Madison County Court Clerk[.]

              Then, in 1997, after receiving payment in full from the Thomases for

the $40,300, Burch executed a release discharging her interest in the subject

mortgage and note:

                                MORTGAGE RELEASE

                     IN CONSIDERATION of Bert Thomas and Mary
              Ellen Thomas, paying in full that certain Promissory
              Note in the original principal sum of $40,300.00, dated
              December 23, 1986 in favor of Thomas J. Spalding and
              Elizabeth M. Spalding, and assigned by Thomas J.
              Spalding to Elizabeth M. Spalding by Assignment of
              record in Miscellaneous Book 78, page 168, in the
              Madison County Clerk’s Office, the undersigned does
              hereby FULLY RELEASE and DISCHARGE that
              certain mortgage of record at Mortgage Book 328, page
              293, in the Madison County Clerk’s Office.

              In 2021, thirty-six years after the execution of the mortgage between

the siblings and twenty-five years following the extinguishment of the Thomases’

debt to the Spaldings, the Thomas heirs2 (hereinafter “heirs”) sought a declaratory

judgment to eliminate the risk of wrong action on their part following the future

sale of the property. The circuit court entered a declaratory judgment finding that

the agreement was neither unclear nor ambiguous. It interpreted the agreement to

1986 and December 26, 1986. However, it is clear all references to the agreement are to the
document entitled “Agreement of Sale of Real Property” recorded in Mortgage Book 328 at page
293, in the office of the Madison County Clerk.
2
 Both Mary Ellen Thomas and Louis Bertrand Thomas, Jr. had passed prior to the filing of this
action.

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conclude that the parties’ obligations under Article III were satisfied in 1997 when

the Thomases paid off the debt and the mortgage was released. Its order stated in

pertinent part as follows:

                    The language of Article III concerning the
             contingency of net proceeds of future sale being less than
             $80,600.00 causes the Court to believe that the
             agreement is limited in application. That language
             provides that in the event a future sale brings net
             proceeds less than $80,600.00, “then the seller agrees to
             reduce the purchase price herein proportionately . . . .”
             (emphasis added). The Court interprets this language to
             mean the reduction would apply, if at all, to the purchase
             price in the agreement, which in this case refers to the
             sale and purchase of the Spalding interest in the property
             for $40,300.00. It is the only purchase price specifically
             covered by the agreement. However, that debt was
             ultimately paid in full in 1997 and the Mortgage was
             released. The Court does not see that any reason existed
             for Article III to apply once the Thomases satisfied their
             underlying debt owed to the Spaldings. The Court finds
             that Article III applied to any future sale that might occur
             while the Thomas[es’] debt remained outstanding and the
             obligation to pay their mortgage continued. The
             obligations of the parties were satisfied under the
             agreement once the Thomases paid off the debt in 1997
             and the mortgage was released.

             This appeal by Burch followed.

                             STANDARD OF REVIEW

             The appellees argue that the circuit court in this case granted a

summary judgment in the declaratory judgment action and, in reliance on Ladd v.

Ladd, 323 S.W.3d 772, 776 (Ky. App. 2010), contend that the standard of review

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for a summary judgment should be applied. But the situation in Ladd v. Ladd is

distinguishable. In Ladd, the appellee filed a motion for declaratory relief, but in

subsequent filings identified the pending motion as one for summary judgment.

The trial court treated the motion as one for summary judgment and recited the

summary judgment standard in its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and

judgment. Id. at 776. In this case, however, the circuit court did not state that it

was granting summary judgment and plainly styled its order as one granting

declaratory judgment. “The standard of review on appeal from a declaratory

judgment is whether the judgment was clearly erroneous.” Public Service

Commission of Kentucky v. Metropolitan Housing Coalition, 652 S.W.3d 648, 651

(Ky. App. 2022), discretionary review denied (Oct. 12, 2022) (citing American

Interinsurance Exchange v. Norton, 631 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Ky. App. 1982)). A

trial court’s findings of fact are not clearly erroneous if supported by substantial

evidence. Hoskins v. Beatty, 343 S.W.3d 639, 641 (Ky. App. 2011) (citation

omitted); Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 52.01. As we have already

stated, the underlying facts are not in dispute; rather, Burch challenges the circuit

court’s conclusions of law, which are reviewed de novo. Hoskins, 343 S.W.3d at

641. Specifically, “[t]he construction and interpretation of a contract is a matter of

law and is reviewed under the de novo standard.” Cagata v. Cagata, 475 S.W.3d

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49, 56 (Ky. App. 2015), discretionary review denied (Dec. 10, 2015) (citations

omitted).

                                         ANALYSIS

               The heirs maintain that the doctrine of merger applies, and any

obligation outlined in the agreement regarding the future sale of the property was

extinguished upon the release of the mortgage. Burch disagrees and contends that

Article III of the agreement was a collateral agreement, separate and apart from the

mortgage and, as such, remains in effect in perpetuity.3 We agree with the heirs.

               Burch directs our attention to multiple cases to support her contention

that the language of Article III within the original agreement was a collateral

agreement, separate and distinct from the agreement for the purchase of the

property. She attempts to equate the facts and holding in Lawrence v. Bingham

Greenebaum Doll, L.L.P., 599 S.W.3d 813 (Ky. 2019), to her circumstances. In

Lawrence, a client negotiated a new payment plan with his attorney wherein he

would pay a flat fee of no less than $450,000 the principal not to exceed $650,000.

Lawrence, 599 S.W.3d at 819. The client “agreed to secure his payment with a

mortgage on real estate he owned, and he signed a promissory note evidencing his

3
  The record, through both oral and written arguments, acknowledges Elizabeth Burch executed
“AGREEMENT OF SALE OF REAL PROPERTY RELEASE” on May 7, 2021, releasing all
rights as satisfied to any proceeds from the future sale of the property. However, Elizabeth
Burch maintains she did not have the benefit of counsel at the time of signing and subsequently
revoked the release. No written revocation was presented to the court. It appears from the
record that the circuit court did not take the existence, or non-existence, of this release into
account in its ruling and neither shall we.

                                               -7-
debt.” Id. The property was later foreclosed upon and sold at judicial auction.

The client argued that a default judgment on the enforceability of the promissory

note that was entered in favor of the attorney precluded the attorney from asserting

a claim for enforceability of the mortgage. Id. at 821. The Kentucky Supreme

Court held that the attorney was not precluded from asserting the claim because

“[a] note and a mortgage given to secure it are separate instruments, executed for

different purposes, and an action for foreclosure of the mortgage and upon the note

are regarded and treated, in practice as separate and distinct causes of action,

although both may be pursued in a foreclosure suit.” Id. at 821.

             Lawrence is easily distinguishable from the case sub judice in that it

concerned two separate causes of action; one action for the promissory note

seeking payment of legal services and a second foreclosure action on the property

secured for payment of those services. Here two parties entered into one

agreement from which a dispute arose over the longevity or duration of the

conditions of that agreement.

             In this case, the court applied the doctrine of merger and found that

the condition in the agreement, specifically Article III, was extinguished when the

debt was paid in full, and the mortgage released. “The merger doctrine holds that

all prior statements and agreements, both written and oral, are merged into the deed

and the parties are bound by that instrument.” Borden v. Litchford, 619 S.W.2d

                                          -8-
715, 717 (Ky. App. 1981). “Under the merger doctrine, upon delivery and

acceptance of a deed the deed extinguishes or supersedes the provisions of the

underlying contract for the conveyance of the realty.” Drees Co. v. Osburg, 144

S.W.3d 831, 832 (Ky. App. 2003).

             Burch correctly points out that the court never used the term “merger

doctrine.” However, the court used the logic of the merger doctrine, whether

specifically identified as such or not. And, while Burch would have us use the

holding in Drees to find merger doesn’t apply, we are not persuaded by the

conclusory language of that opinion, which states that “[c]ovenants in the

antecedent contract that are not commonly incorporated in the deed, and that the

parties do not intend to be incorporated, are often referred to as collateral

agreements. The merger doctrine does not apply to collateral agreements.” Id. at

833. Instead, the more recent opinion of this Court, Harrodsburg Industrial

Warehousing, Inc. v. MIGS, LLC, 182 S.W.3d 529 (Ky. App. 2005), provides more

thoughtful insight into this doctrine. In Harrodsburg this Court held that a

purchase agreement merged into the deed, thus preventing the purchaser from

prevailing on a breach of contract claim. It set forth the following exceptions to

the merger doctrine: “[F]raud, mistake, or contractual agreement clearly not

intended to be merged into the deed.” Harrodsburg, 182 S.W.3d at 532 (citation

omitted). None of these apply in this case. Article III of the agreement was part

                                          -9-
and parcel of that agreement from the date of conveyance of the property. There

are no facts to suggest that Article III is a collateral agreement separate and

independent from the purchase agreement. As the circuit court stated, no reason

“existed for Article III to apply once the Thomases satisfied their underlying debt

owed to the Spaldings.” Thus, we conclude that the grant of declaratory judgment

in favor of the heirs was proper.

             For the foregoing reasons, the declaratory judgment of the Madison

Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Jimmy Dale Williams                        Michael S. Fore
Randy Martin O’Neal                        Isaac N. Claywell
Richmond, Kentucky                         Richmond, Kentucky

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