Court Opinion

ID: 9883861
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:23:22.698889+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:32.466197
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, RUSSELL A., Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. In my view, with certain exceptions, a waiver of appellate rights following the perfection of an appeal from a judgment of conviction, review of the transcript and records by appellate counsel and the filing of an appellate brief is valid so long as procedural protections are in place to ensure that the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. In this case, those procedural protections were absent. Consequently, I would affirm the determination that post-trial, post-sentence appeal rights may be waived, but I would remand the matter to the district court for a more comprehensive inquiry as to the validity of Spann’s waiver of those rights.
In the context of plea bargaining, criminal defendants may waive fundamental constitutional rights, as long as they do so voluntarily and understandingly, with knowledge of the general nature and consequences of the waiver. See Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 275, 63 S.Ct. 236, 87 L.Ed. 268 (1942) (discussing waiver of right to jury trial); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-67, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 82 L.Ed. 1461 (1938) (discussing waiver of right to counsel). For four decades, plea bargaining has been the predominate method of obtaining criminal convictions in the United States. Corinna Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where it Matters: Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 Wash. U. L.Q. 1 (2001) (stating that the plea bargaining rate in criminal cases has been around 90% since the 1960s). While most rights may be waived, there are some rights that are not waivable. See, e.g., United States v. Mezzanatto, 513 U.S. 196, 204, 115 S.Ct. 797, 130 L.Ed.2d 697 (1995) (suggesting that while most protections are presumptively waivable, there may be some, such as the right to conflict-free counsel, that cannot be waived); United States v. Rosa-Ortiz, 348 F.3d 33, 36 (1st Cir.2003) (holding that guilty plea could not serve as waiver of claim on appeal that defendant had been imprisoned for conduct that Congress did not proscribe in the crime charged).
In that a defendant may waive constitutional rights as part of a plea agreement, it follows that a defendant may also waive statutory rights, including the right to appeal. Every circuit that has considered the issue has reached this conclusion. United States v. Andis, 333 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir.2003) (“Given that the Supreme Court has allowed a defendant to waive constitutional rights, we would be hard-pressed to find a reason to prohibit a defendant from waiving a purely statutory right.”); United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 559-63 (3d Cir.2001); United States v. Teeter, 257 F.3d 14, 21-27 (1st Cir.2001); United States v. Hernandez, 242 F.3d 110,113-14 (2d Cir.2001); United States v. Fleming, 239 F.3d 761, 763-64 (6th Cir.2001); United States v. Jemison, 237 F.3d 911, 916-18 (7th Cir.2001); United States v. Nguyen, 235 F.3d 1179, 1182-84 (9th Cir.2000); United States v. Brown, 232 F.3d 399, 402-06 (4th Cir.2000); United States v. Rubio, 231 F.3d 709, 711-12 *496(10th Cir.2000); United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166, 1168-69 (11th Cir.1999); United States v. Melancon, 972 F.2d 566, 567 (5th Cir.1992).
Among the policy reasons in support of plea-agreement appeal waivers is the need for finality in the process:
The chief virtues of plea agreements are speed, economy, and finality. Waivers of appeal in plea agreements preserve the finality of judgments and sentences imposed pursuant to valid pleas of guilty. We also note that plea agreements are of value to the accused in order to gain concessions from the government.
United States v. Rutan, 956 F.2d 827, 829 (8th Cir.1992) (internal citations omitted).
The majority asserts that plea-agreement appeal waivers are fundamentally different from post-trial/post-sentence waivers, the latter implicating broader institutional concerns related to the integrity of the conviction. But the institutional concerns related to the integrity of a conviction obtained by plea agreement or by trial are equally important; and courts are required to conduct a Rule 15 inquiry to ensure that a plea is “accurate, voluntary, and intelligent (i.e., knowingly and understandingly made).” Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn.1997); see Minn.R.Crim. P. 15.01.
I recognize that there is a trend in the circuits of instituting a greater level of scrutiny of plea-bargain appeal waivers. See, e.cj., Andis, 338 F.3d at 890-91 (excepting from appeal waivers claims of illegal sentences, breach of the plea agreement and ineffective assistance of counsel); Teeter, 257 F.3d at 25, nn. 9 & 10 (stating that appeal waivers would not preclude sentencing claims based on constitutionally impermissible factors or sentences in excess of the maximum penalty allowed by law); Brown, 232 F.3d at 405-06 (expressing concern about an inartfully drafted appeal waiver permitting appeals based on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct but precluding appeals from a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum); United States v. Rosa, 123 F.3d 94, 101 (2d Cir.1997) (holding that appellate court oversight permits review of appeal waivers on a case-by-case basis).
I also understand that commentators have expressed much concern over plea-bargain appeal waivers. See, e.g., ._, Plea Bargain Waivers Reconsidered: A Legal Pragmatist’s Guide to Loss, Abandonment and Alienation, 68 Fordham L.Rev.2011, 2085-95 (2000) (proposing a new approach for analyzing plea-bargain waivers and arguing for re-evaluation of appeal waivers); Joseph A. Colquitt, Ad Hoc Plea Bargaining, 75 Tul. L.Rev. 695, 749 (2001) (calling for the retention of a process for review of “inappropriate, unethical, or illegal plea bargains”); Robert K. Calhoun, Waiver of the Right to Appeal, 23 Hastings Const. L.Q. 127, 211-15 (1995) (exploring public policy issues and arguing that appeal waivers should either be disapproved or given very restricted scope).
These concerns, however, have little application in a post-trial/post-sentence waiver of appellate rights following an appeal and submission of an appellate brief by legal counsel on a defendant’s behalf. When a bargain is made for a specific sentence within the presumptive range of a guidelines system, “the policies underlying the right to appeal have less force * * *.” Calhoun, supra 210. But those rights that go to the very center of the validity of the appeal waiver, including effective assistance of counsel and the requirement that the waiver be voluntary and intelligent, are unwaivable. Because of our holding in State v. Misquadace, 644 N.W.2d 65, 71-72 *497(Minn.2002), a defendant should also not be able to waive claims of sentencing error. Additionally, I would except claims based on prosecutorial misconduct from any waiver.
In the context of a post-trial/post-sentence waiver, the court should conduct an inquiry of the defendant, similar to Minn. R.Crim. P. 15.01, to ensure the validity of the waiver. See Butala v. State, 664 N.W.2d 333, 339 (Minn.2003). The inquiry for an appeal waiver agreement should involve similar questions and also include an explanation by the court as to the scope and requirements of the agreement. In that no similar inquiry was conducted in this case and Spann asserted ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the appeal waiver, I would remand for a comprehensive inquiry by the district court.