Court Opinion

ID: 9627694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 08:50:57.947003+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:06:49.245911
License: Public Domain

*223MOSK, J.
I dissent.
I agree with the majority that the time for bringing this action is governed by Code of Civil Procedure section 340, subdivision (3), the one-year limitations period for most torts, and not by the time for bringing actions under the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act (MICRA).1 (See § 340.5 [time for commencement of action “shall be three years after the date of injury or one year after the plaintiff discovers . . . the injury”].) I also agree that the injury in this action for equitable indemnity action occurred when Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Company (Preferred Risk) paid money to settle the underlying negligence action, not when the malpractice took place—over three years earlier.
I disagree, however, that we may import the notice provision under MICRA (§ 364) to toll the limitations period. As a majority determined in Western Steamship Lines, Inc. v. San Pedro Peninsula Hospital (1994) 8 Cal.4th 100, 114 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 263, 876 P.2d 1062], “for certain procedural purposes, such as statutes of limitations, an indemnity claim is an independent action.” (Italics added.) In my view, it is illogical to conclude that one MICRA statute, section 345.1, does not apply to establish the limitations period in this case but then to require notice under another MICRA statute, section 364, and apply its 90-day tolling provision to extend the time for filing an action beyond the limits for other equitable indemnity claims.
Like the Court of Appeal, I conclude that section 364 does not apply to a case which does not involve a claim for medical malpractice by an injured individual. I would adopt its analysis, in part, as set forth below.
“Section 364 applies to an ‘action based upon the health care provider’s professional negligence.’ (§ 364, subd. (a).) ‘Professional negligence’ is defined as a ‘negligent act or omission to act by a health care provider in the rendering of professional services, which ... is the proximate cause of a personal injury or wrongful death ....’(§ 364, subd. (f)(2).) In other words, section 364 applies to claims by a patient who has been injured by a practitioner’s medical malpractice, or that patient’s heirs in a wrongful death case.
“Preferred Risk argues that such an interpretation defeats the purpose of section 364, which is to ‘decrease the number of medical malpractice actions filed by establishing a procedure that encourages parties to negotiate “outside the structure and atmosphere of the formal litigation process.” ’ (Woods *224v. Young (1991) 53 Cal.3d 315, 320 [279 Cal.Rptr. 613, 807 P.2d 455].) The drafters of MICRA believed that a 90-day notice period would give doctors accused of professional negligence and their insurers an opportunity to negotiate with prospective plaintiffs and settle claims without costly litigation. (Id. at pp. 320-326.)
“These goals will not be met by extending the tolling provisions of section 364 to joint tortfeasors who file a claim for equitable indemnity against an allegedly negligent physician. Medical malpractice claims typically involve complex factual issues. If the 90-day period is effective in reducing the number of malpractice lawsuits, it will only be in those rare cases where liability is relatively clear one way or another. An indemnity action which involves multiple tortfeasors and requires the apportionment of fault between a negligent actor and a physician who treats the injuries flowing from that negligence is unlikely to be resolved in 90 days.
“Moreover, it will be a rare situation in which the party injured by medical malpractice will not file a direct claim against a negligent physician. In this case, for example, [the insured] filed a lawsuit against two of the respondent doctors on July 2, 1996 [more than six months before Preferred Risk settled the case]. [Fn. omitted.] Notices under section 364 are filed-by the injured party in such cases, making further notice by joint tortfeasors both unnecessary and ineffective in promoting early settlement.”
“[The majority opinion in] Western Steamship was careful to distinguish between the substantive and procedural aspects of MICRA. ‘[F]or certain procedural purposes, such as statutes of limitations, an indemnity claim is an independent action. ... As to matters of substantive law, however, it is wholly derivative and subject to whatever immunities or other limitations on liability would otherwise be available.’ (8 Cal.4th at pp. 114-115.)
“Section 364, unlike Civil Code section 3333.2, is a procedural statute. It does not thwart the stated goals of MICRA to limit its tolling provision to direct claims of medical malpractice by an injured patient or that patient’s heir. The Legislature specifically reduced the limitations period for medical malpractice actions when it enacted MICRA. To extend the applicable limitations period in an action for equitable indemnity which seeks apportionment based on a party’s alleged medical malpractice ‘is inconsistent with the spirit’ of that statutory scheme. (Noble v. Superior Court (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1189 [237 Cal.Rptr. 38]. 1193.)”
Ironically, although the majority assert that the application of MICRA procedural requirements to this equitable indemnity action will further the *225policies underlying MICRA, respondent doctors strongly urge a contrary result. They observe that in a case like this, when a patient has already sued, section 364 notice by the insurer in an equitable indemnity action is not only duplicative, it is meaningless; under no likely circumstances will it advance any relevant policy behind MICRA.
For these reasons, I would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeal.

Unless otherwise indicated, statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.