Court Opinion

ID: 9474116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 04:48:39.566486+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:43:54.975011
License: Public Domain

MERRITT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the panel opinion in all respects except the holding that the evidence of the defendant’s involvement in other crimes for profit is not admissible to prove the defendant’s predisposition to deal in firearms unless the other crimes are very similar to the charged crimes.
The panel’s approach of requiring substantial similarity between the other crimes and the charged crimes makes sense for some uses of the other crimes evidence. For example, if the other crimes evidence is introduced to show a common scheme or plan or to show absence of accident, the other crimes evidence has no probative value on these issues unless the similarity between the crimes is great. However, it does not follow that the same high degree of similarity between the other crimes and charged crimes should be required no matter what purpose the other crimes evidence serves. Although evidence of past dealings in stolen property may have very little probative value on the issue of whether a defendant had accidentally received an illegal firearm, evidence of past dealings in stolen property has a greater probative value on the issue of predisposition to illegally
deal in firearms. The panel’s approach, and that of the cases cited, applies a rule that is sound in other contexts to a situation in which the rule’s basis does not apply. Note that United States v. Ring, 513 F.2d 1001, 1005 (6th Cir.1975), which the panel cites in support of its substantial similarity requirement, and the cases cited by Ring, deal with uses of other crimes evidence other than to prove a defendant’s predisposition.
The starting point for analysis must be that “[A]ll relevant evidence is admissible,” except as otherwise restricted by the Federal Rules of Evidence. Fed.R.Evid. 402. When a criminal defendant pleads the defense of entrapment, he places his predisposition to commit the charged crime in issue. Thereafter, any evidence having any tendency to make the existence of his predisposition to commit the charged crime more probable than it would have been without the evidence, see Fed.R.Evid. 401, is relevant and therefore admissible unless limited by the evidence rules.
In the case at bar, the defendant is charged with the crimes of receiving and possessing a firearm while being a convicted felon and of illegally engaging in the business of dealing in firearms. The other crimes evidence consists of the defendant’s admissions that he had stolen lawn mowers and lumber and had received stolen tillers and of his solicitation of the ATF agents to commit burglary. The sole question to be asked in determining whether the other crimes evidence is relevant is: Does evidence that the defendant had received stolen property, stolen other property, and solicited others to steal property have any tendency to make the existence of his predisposition to receive and possess firearms and to engage in the business of illegally dealing in firearms any more probable than it would be without the evidence?
The other crimes evidence does have this effect. The evidence that the defendant would commit these other crimes for profit does have a tendency to support the idea that he would be predisposed to illegally deal in firearms for a profit. This evidence *743is not conclusive proof of predisposition, but it does have some probative value on the issue. Consequently, the other crimes evidence is admissible unless forbidden by some other provision of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The search of the evidence rules for a provision limiting the admissibility of this other crimes evidence must begin with Rule 404(b). The only limiting provision in Rule 404(b) is that “[ejvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith.” In the present case the other crimes evidence is not being admitted to prove that, in conformity with a bad character, the defendant committed the charged crimes. Indeed, he has never denied committing the crimes. Rather, its admission goes to his willingness to commit the crime — whether it resulted from the exercise of a free will. It goes to the question of predisposition, which the defendant himself has placed in issue.
There is a flaw in the panel’s logic in construing the meaning of Rule 404(b)’s limiting provision. The opinion states that "such evidence is not admissible to prove a predisposition to commit criminal acts generally. That would be proof of bad character for the purpose of showing that the defendant acted in accordance with such general criminal propensity in the instance charged.” United States v. Blankenship, 775 F.2d 735, 739 (6th Cir.1985). If, as the panel believes, Rule 404(b) forbids the use of other crimes evidence to show that when a defendant admittedly committed a crime he was acting in accordance with a general predisposition to commit crime, why, as the panel believes, would the rule allow the use of other crimes evidence to show that when a defendant committed a crime he was acting in accordance with a specific predisposition to commit the very crime involved? If the former is the impermissible use of evidence of bad character, the latter must also be an impermissible use of evidence of a specific trait of bad character. This inconsistency demonstrates the flaw in the panel’s relevancy argument.
The second rule that might bar the admission of this other crimes evidence is Rule 403. The pertinent limitation of Rule 403 is that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The probative value of other crimes evidence normally varies with the similarity of the other crimes to the charged crime. However, the probative value of the other crimes evidence on the issue of predisposition can be fairly great without the crimes being highly similar. The similarities between the other crimes and the charged crimes here are (1) both were nonviolent crimes engaged in for profit and (2) both were crimes dealing with possession of items that defendant was not allowed to possess. The probative value of this other crimes evidence on the issue of the defendant’s predisposition to commit the charged crimes is substantial.
On the other hand, the prejudicial effect of this evidence is not great. It does not substantially outweigh the evidence’s probative value, as is required for exclusion under Rule 403. The usual unfair prejudice of which evidence of other crimes creates a danger is not present here. Normally, the fear is that because the jury believes a defendant should be punished for his other crimes, it will find him guilty of the charged crime even if there is insufficient evidence that he committed the charged crime. In the case at bar, the defendant has admitted committing the charged crime.
I would hold that so long as the other crimes evidence shows a predisposition to commit nonviolent crime for profit it is admissible on the issue of entrapment to show a defendant’s predisposition to commit another nonviolent crime for profit. On other facts, Rule 403’s balance against possible prejudice might require the outcome reached by the panel, but in this case the analytical shortcomings of the panel’s approach cause a result that is not justified by the Federal Rules of Evidence.