Court Opinion

ID: 9751280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 16:19:48.00669+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:26:42.229335
License: Public Domain

Larrow, J.
(concurring in result). I concur generally with the views expressed in the majority opinion, and with the entry order reflecting those views. Although I am not completely convinced that the permit granted by the District Commission received the same impartial review by the Environmental Board that it would have received in Superior Court, this is probably not completely curable where an agency is a party to hearings before a board under its own jurisdiction. And, as the majority points out, we have no obligation to search the record for errors not adequately briefed or referenced.
I would go further, however, than the majority does in striking down the Board’s conclusion of undue air pollution on procedural grounds, although I agree those grounds are valid.' We will undoubtedly be faced again with the general issue here presented, in other cases if not in this one, since as I read the findings, the Board considers itself justified in refusing a permit when air contamination will result from the emissions of customer automobiles coming to the proposed project.
Unreasonable highway congestion from a development is a ground for permit refusal, with the burden of proof as to this issue on the objectors. 10 V.S.A. § 6085(a)(5); 10 V.S.A. § 6088 (b). Air pollution is a similar ground, with the burden of proof on the applicant. 10 V.S.A. § 6085 (a) (1); 10 V.S.A. § 6088(a). Standards for automobile exhaust emissions are, however, entrusted by statute! to the Secretary of Environmental Conservation and the Department of Motor Vehicles. 10 V.S.A. § 567. The Environmental Board evidently construes its powers as broad enough to prohibit operation of motor vehicles in the vicinity of a proposed development even though they are equipped with all required emission devices. If, sub silentio, the majority opinion concurs in this view, I would *522disagree, even though concurring in the result reached. The “unreasonable highway congestion” made a statutory ground for permit rejection does not, in my view, encompass auto emissions as well as traffic movement. This is important, because undue air pollution, standing alone, can justify permit refusal, but unreasonable highway congestion, standing alone, cannot. 10 V.S.A. § 6087(b). The undue air pollution which justifies permit refusal must come, in my opinion, from the project, and not just from traffic approaching it. One small donkey engine was found below to be the only air pollutant source involved in the development itself, and I would hold as a matter of law that the applicant had sustained its burden as to undue air pollution.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Justice Billings concurs in this opinion.