Court Opinion

ID: 9709300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 03:44:23.7915+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:47.546860
License: Public Domain

Dethmers, C. J.
I concur in the view of Mr. Justice Boyles that the trial court was not in error in holding (1) that both defendants, Caswell and Holt, were guilty of negligence, (2) that plaintiffs were free from contributory negligence, (3) that defendant Caswell’s negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries, and (4) that there can be 2 or more proximate causes of a single injury. That holding, however, is not, in my opinion, completely dispositive of the case because it leaves unanswered 2 controlling questions with respect to the liability of defendant Holt, the second tort-feasor, i.e., (1) was there any competent evidence to be considered by the trier of the facts which tended to prove, inferentially or otherwise, that Holt’s negligence was a proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries or any part or aggravation of them, and (2) if so, is Holt liable for any greater proportion of plaintiffs’ damages than the evidence shows resulted from his negligence as determined by the trier of the facts ?
I agree with Mr. Justice Black that the questions of the second tort-feasor’s liability and of the extent thereof in this case are not settled by the quotation from Shearman & Redfield  nor are they by the holdings in such cases as Banzhof v. Roche, 228 Mich 36; Barkman v. Montague, 297 Mich 538; Gleason v. Hanafin, 308 Mich 31; and Brackins v. Olympia, Inc., 316 Mich 275 (168 ALR 890), to the effect that there may be 2 or more proximate causes of an injury *447and that recovery may be had for the full amount of plaintiff’s damages against either one or both of 2 tort-feasors whose concurrent or successive torts were proximate causes of a single indivisible injury. This is not a case in which 2 concurrent or successive torts combined to produce a single indivisible injury. In consequence, the rulé with respect to joint or concurrent negligence causing a single injury is inapplicable. Here an initial tort, resulting-in an automobile collision, caused plaintiffs’ injuries, of which the negligence of the first tort-feasor was the sole proximate cause, and was followed by a second tort, resulting in a second automobile collision, of which the second tort-feasor’s negligence was a proximate cause, which, depending on the proofs, may or may not have caused plaintiffs additional injuries. Applicable are Frye v. City of Detroit, 256 Mich 466; and DeWitt v. Gerard, 274 Mich 299. I am in accord with Mr. Justice Black that we should adhere to the rule announced in those cases that the second tort-feasor is liable only for the injuries caused by his negligence.
Undoubtedly, Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich 542; Gilbert v. Kennedy, 22 Mich 117; and Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 US 555 (51 S Ct 248, 75 L ed 544), are authority for the salutary rule that plaintiff’s right to recover will not be denied because of difficulty of accurately measuring his damages or ascertaining the amount thereof with certainty, that the law requires no more proof of the amount of plaintiff’s damages than the nature of the case will fairly permit, and that it is enough if the evidence shows the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, even though the result be only approximate, in which case it is competent for the jury or trier of the facts to form such reasonable and probable estimate of the damages' as in the exercise of good sense and *448sound judgment they shall think will produce ádequate compensation. These cases ought not to be construed, however, nor should we be understood to hold, that a jury or trier of the facts may speculate or guess whether plaintiff’s injuries, resulted in any part from the second tort-feasor’s negligence, absent any evidence proving it or.from which a reasonablé inference to that effect may be drawn. As said in Story (p 562):
“The rule which precludes the recovery of .uncertain damages applies to such as are not the certain result of the wrong, not to those damages'which are definitely attributable to the wrong and only uncertain in respect of their amount.” ■ (Italics supplied.)
If there is competent evidence showing, or from which a reasonable inference may be drawn, that the negligence .of the' second tort-feasor was. a proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries or any part or aggravation of them, that evidence; should go to the trier of the facts for determination, no matter how difficult, of that question of fact (DeWitt v. Gerard, supra) and, if it .finds in the affirmative, for determining which, or what part of them and fixing the amount of the damages. (Cases above cited.) If there is'no such evidence, the cáse should not go tó a jury to guess or speculate on the question, but, instead, the case should .be dismissed by the court as to the second tort-feasor. Frye v. Detroit, supra. Whether there is such evidence is not a.question of fact for the jury, but of law for the court. Druse v. Wheeler, 26 Mich 189; Curry v. Traver-Bird Co., 167 Mich 17, 21; Boudeman v. Arnold, 200 Mich 162 (8 ALR 789); American Insurance Co. of Newark v. Martinek, 216 Mich 421; Frye v. Detroit, supra. Furthermore, the question for the court is not merely whether there is literally no evidence, but whether .there is any upon which a jury can properly find *449a verdict for the party producing it upon whom the burden of proof is imposed. In re Potts’ Estate, 304 Mich 47. The situation in that regard is no different when the judge sits without a jury as trier of the facts. Hilliker v. Jewel Oil & Gas Co., 277 Mich 615; Reedy v. Goodin, 285 Mich 614.
The trial court here, found that the second tortfeasor was guilty of negligence 'which was a proximate cause of plaintiffs’ injuries. I Mo not agree with counsel for .the second tort-feasor-that,[.under Frye, we are constrained to hold that there Was no evidence proving or from which an inference could be drawn that his negligence caused some part or aggravation of plaintiffs’ injuries. In my view there was present here, as in DeWitt, evidence to go to the trier of the facts' upon which to make á determination of that,question. I concur, therefore,, with Mr. Justice Black in reversing judgments against defendant Holt, awarding him costs of appeal, and remanding for taking, further proofs, if necessary, and determining, in accord herewith, the amount and proportion, if any, of plaintiffs’ damages' proximately caused by defendant Holt’s negligence, and entering judgments against him accordingly. Authority for such apportioning of liability between 2 successive tort-feasors is to be found in Rodgers v. Canfield, 272 Mich 562.
Sharpe, Kelly, and Carr, JJ., concurred with Hethmérs, C. J.
Smith, J., did not sit. .
Edwards, J., took no part in the decision of this case.