Court Opinion

ID: 9861011
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:39:04.864076+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:27:03.295272
License: Public Domain

*990GIVAN, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The majority has observed correctly that the Indiana statute does not violate the constitution of the United States. However, the majority finds that the statute does violate the "face-to-face" requirement of the constitution of Indiana.
I believe the majority opinion in the Court of Appeals correctly addressed this question. At the time our constitutions were written and the dictionary definitions of "face to face" were written, society did not have the benefit of the various electronic devices which now are available for the preservation and presentation of evidence.
There is no question that the "face-to-face" rule is an essential part of our judicial system and should be guarded carefully to assure due process. The Indiana statute, at issue here, demonstrates that the legislature was fully aware of this need and at the same time was addressing a very serious social problem of the extreme psychological impingement resulting from the requirement of in-court testimony of child victims of molestation.
The statute sets out guidelines and requires those guidelines to be implemented by the trial court before ordering the videotaping of a child. When those guidelines are followed, the accused has every opportunity, through his attorney, or by himself, if he is appearing pro se, to face his accuser and fully explore the possibilities that her version of the incident is not correct.
On the one hand, I can see little if any impairment to a defendant's ability to defend himself under the implementation of the statute. On the other hand, I see great potential harm to the psyche of the child witness if required to appear in open court. In some cases the harm might be so great as to cause a lifetime impairment.
In preserving the rights of a defendant, I do not think we should become so technically involved that we unnecessarily traumatize the victim. I believe the statute is drawn carefully and was implemented properly in this case.
I would affirm the trial court.
KRAHULIK, J., concurs.