Court Opinion

ID: 9945032
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 21:03:07.209787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:20.341520
License: Public Domain

Filed 2/26/24 P. v. Thurman CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C096267

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. 21FE000028)

           v.

    CORTNEY JACKSON THURMAN,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Between December 24, 2020, and December 30, 2020, defendant Cortney Jackson
Thurman committed multiple robberies (Pen. Code, § 211)1 and an attempted robbery
(§§ 664/211) at four separate locations. A jury found defendant guilty of five counts of
robbery and one count of attempted robbery. The jury also found true the aggravating
circumstances that defendant was armed or used a weapon in the commission of the

1        Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

                                                             1
offense (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(2))2 and the manner of the offense indicated
planning, sophistication, or professionalism (rule 4.421(a)(8)). The trial court sentenced
defendant to an aggregate term of 19 years in state prison, which included the imposition
of an upper term sentence on one of the robbery counts. On appeal, defendant contends
he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel did not argue that the low
term presumption under section 1170, subdivision (b)(6) applied to his sentence. We will
remand for resentencing and otherwise affirm the judgment.
                                    BACKGROUND
Count One
       On December 24, 2020, defendant went into a U.S. Bank branch after
unsuccessfully trying to withdraw money through the ATM from an account he had
opened the day before. Defendant went into the branch and Abraham Rahim-Boroujerdi,
a U.S. Bank client relation consultant, asked defendant if he needed help. Defendant
explained he was having trouble with the ATM and gave Rahim-Boroujerdi his ATM
card and driver’s license. Rahim-Boroujerdi verified the card was valid and the account
had sufficient funds for the withdrawal. He asked defendant to fill out a withdrawal slip,
got the money, and brought it back to his desk. As he tried to complete the transaction,
he received a notification on his computer that defendant’s account was being closed, due
to an issue with the social security number provided to the bank in opening the account.
Rahim-Boroujerdi tried to explain the situation to defendant. Defendant got quiet, stood
up, slid a note to Rahim-Boroujerdi, and walked around the desk toward Rahim-
Boroujerdi, cornering him. The note was written on receipt paper from the desk and said,
“Give me the money or you’re going to get hurt.” Defendant held his hand in his coat
pocket in a way that “had to have meant that he had a weapon” and Rahim-Boroujerdi
believed he did. Rahim-Boroujerdi told defendant to take the money from the desk.

2      Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.

                                             2
Defendant took the money and then told Rahim-Boroujerdi to “Lead me to the rest of it.”
Rahim-Boroujerdi understood this to mean defendant wanted him to take defendant to the
vault. As soon as Rahim-Boroujerdi was out of arm’s reach, he ran from defendant in an
effort to get his coworkers’ attention. Defendant chased after Rahim-Boroujerdi and then
ran out the front lobby door of the bank.
Count Two
       On December 28, 2020, defendant went into another U.S. Bank location. While
he waited in line, defendant became “antsy” and left the bank. He went back inside and
Lashea Dailey, a digital accelerator for the bank, told defendant she would be with him
shortly as she was still processing another customer’s deposits. He asked her if she had a
charger behind the counter. She answered she did not and asked him to step back.
Defendant left the bank again. Dailey finished the deposits and put the cash away.
Because she felt defendant might be casing the bank for a robbery, she removed any large
bundles of cash from her drawer to the vault. Defendant returned to the bank, started
digging in his jacket and pulled out an account slip, and said he wanted to withdraw
money from his account. As Dailey entered the information into her computer, defendant
jumped over the counter. Dailey was frightened and screamed. Defendant told Dailey, “I
want to get my money.” Defendant screamed to another person, “I want her to give me
my money. She won’t give me my money.” Then he left the bank.
Counts Four and Five
       On December 29, 2020, defendant went to a drug store. While cashier Rebecca
Vega was helping another customer, defendant pushed through a partition to the area
behind the register and pushed Vega to the side to get to the cash register drawer. She
“bumped back and closed the drawer.” Another employee, Mike Myers, came to the
register and told defendant to get out. Defendant slowly walked to the double doors,
stepped one foot out and turned back into the store, pulled a gun from the waistband of
his pants, pointed it at Vega, and told her to open the cash register drawer. Myers went to

                                            3
the back of the store toward the pharmacy and told them to call 911. As Vega was trying
to open the drawer, defendant said something about “suicide to you” which Vega
interpreted as meaning he was willing to shoot her. Vega was afraid and trying to
quickly log on to the register to get the drawer open. She tried to open one register and
failed, so defendant told her to go to the next one. She could not get the second drawer
open, so defendant told her to go back to the first register. As she struggled to open the
drawers, defendant held the gun on her and continued to say, “Suicide to you, open it,
open the drawer. Suicide to you.” Vega finally succeeded in opening a drawer and
defendant took the money from the drawer, put it in a bag, and ran out of the store.
Counts Six, Seven, and Eight
       On December 30, 2020, Abraham Gruspe, Catherine Jane Alba, and Mohamed
Alaboosi were working at a U.S. Bank branch. That afternoon, bank employees received
an e-mail advising them to be careful, as an account holder might come in behaving
erratically, trying to withdraw money, and because the account is blocked and cannot be
accessed, the person will be very upset. The e-mail included a name and picture of the
person. Shortly before closing, Gruspe saw defendant walk into the branch, he was
“fidgety” and “kind of” matched the description of the person in the e-mail. Gruspe
called defendant over and asked if he could help. He also alerted his coworkers that the
person he was helping was the one in the e-mail. Alaboosi was at the window to
Gruspe’s left counting cash getting ready to close and Alba was working in the open
lobby at the new accounts desk.
       Defendant presented his identification to Gruspe and said he wanted to make a
withdrawal from his account. The name on the identification matched the name in the e-
mail. Gruspe looked up the account, saw it was blocked, and told defendant he could not
withdraw money. Defendant became irate, angry, and fidgety.
       Alba went to the door to the secured area and Alaboosi buzzed her in. As she
entered the secured area, defendant ran toward her, pushed her, and followed her in.

                                             4
Once in the secured area, defendant began to curse and ask for all their money, and told
them, “Don’t do anything. I have a gun. Don’t do anything.” He was angry. He said,
“This is because of the pandemic. This is because of the pandemic. Give me all your
money.” He also called it “COVID money.” Alba then pushed the security alert button.
       Alaboosi gave defendant the money he had been counting. Defendant told
Gruspe, “Don’t do anything. I’m watching you too.” Gruspe also gave defendant money
from his drawer. Defendant asked if that was all the money Gruspe had, then opened
another drawer himself and took the money from that drawer as well. Defendant then left
the secure area. The money defendant took from Gruspe’s drawer included “bait money”
with a GPS tracker in it. After taking the money, defendant ran out of the bank. Using
the GPS tracker information, law enforcement officers were able to locate defendant and
take him into custody.
       The People charged defendant with seven counts of robbery (§ 211 – counts one,
three, four, five, six, seven, and eight), one count of attempted robbery (§§ 664/211 –
count two), and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd.
(a)(1) – count nine). As to counts four and five, the People alleged defendant had
personally used a firearm. (§ 12022.53, subd. (b).) The People further alleged defendant
had suffered a prior serious felony conviction. (§ 667, subd. (a).) The People also
alleged a number of specific aggravating factors, including that the defendant was armed
with or used a weapon at the time of the offense (rule 4.421(a)(2)); the manner in which
the crime was committed indicated planning, sophistication, or professionalism (rule
4.421(a)(8)); and defendant was on parole at the time he committed the offense (rule
4.421(b)(4)).
       The jury found defendant guilty of five counts of robbery (counts one, four, six,
seven, and eight) and one count of attempted robbery (count two). The jury found
defendant not guilty on two counts of robbery (counts three and five) and could not reach
a verdict on being a felon in possession of a firearm (count nine) or on the firearm

                                             5
enhancement allegation attendant to count four. The jury also found true two aggravating
circumstances: that defendant was armed with or used a weapon in the commission of
the offense, and the manner in which the crime was committed indicated planning,
sophistication, or professionalism. In bifurcated proceedings, the trial court found true
the allegation that defendant suffered a prior serious and violent felony conviction for
robbery.
       The trial court sentenced defendant to the upper term of five years on count one,
doubled to 10 years pursuant to the strike, consecutive two-year terms (one-third the
midterm, doubled pursuant to the strike) on counts four, six, seven and eight, and a
consecutive one-year term (one-third the midterm, doubled pursuant to the strike) on
count two, for an aggregate sentence of 19 years.
                                       DISCUSSION
                                               I
       Defendant contends trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to argue defendant was entitled to the lower term sentence under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6). He argues the record contained evidence defendant experienced
psychological trauma that contributed to the commission of the offenses. We find the
record on appeal insufficient to assess the claim. The remedy, in accordance with the
principles discussed below, warrants remand to the trial court for resentencing.
A.     Section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A)
       Effective January 1, 2022, section 1170, subdivision (b) makes the middle term
the presumptive sentence for a term of imprisonment unless certain circumstances exist.
(People v. Flores (2022) 73 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1038.) As relevant here, section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6) provides that “unless the court finds that the aggravating circumstances
outweigh the mitigating circumstances that imposition of the lower term would be
contrary to the interests of justice, the court shall order imposition of the lower term if
any of the following was a contributing factor in the commission of the offense: (A) The

                                              6
person has experienced psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not
limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence.” While at least one court has
concluded “psychological trauma based on mental illness may be a circumstance
qualifying for the lower term presumption in section 1170, subdivision (b)(6),” that court
also emphasized that mental illness alone did not qualify for the lower term presumption.
(People v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 241 [“Psychological trauma must attend
the illness, and that trauma must contribute to the crime under section 1170, subdivision
(b)(6)”; italics in original].)
       To warrant consideration of the statute, a defendant must be able to demonstrate
the source of trauma and that the trauma contributed to the commission of the offense.
Defendant’s eligibility for the ameliorative statute is unclear from the trial court record,
which stands silent on whether application of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) to
defendant was considered and rejected, or if it was overlooked.
B.     The Silent Record
       At sentencing, the trial court referenced factors in aggravation and mitigation and
the “new law.” The trial court stated, “The Court has also considered Rule 4.423 and
4.421, specifically Mr. Thurman was on parole at the time of the offenses committed in
this case.So, pursuant to the new law, we have the jury having found two specific
circumstances in aggravation, there are ones that, even under the new law, the Court isn’t
able to make its own decision, and the Court is focusing on Mr. Thurman’s parole status
for another 211, as justification and in reasoning for both the upper termand the
consecutive sentences to be served.”
       Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) became effective January 1, 2022,
approximately four months prior to defendant’s sentencing. While we presume the trial
court was aware of changes to section 1170 when sentencing defendant (People v.
Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1354, 1390 [“Absent evidence to the contrary, we presume
that the trial court knew and applied the governing law”]), the trial court’s limited

                                              7
reference to the “new law” in the context of jury findings on aggravating circumstances
makes the record unclear on whether the trial court found the portion of the new law,
requiring a presumption of the low term, applied to defendant but found that an upper
term was warranted, or that the trial court ruled out application of section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6)(A) to defendant altogether.
       A reviewing court may presume from a clear record how a trial court would have
acted if an omitted argument, or a law of which it was not aware or which was not in
place, had been addressed at the time of sentencing. But to do so, the record must be
clear. The recent decision in People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416 emphasizes that
when the record is not clear, the proper remedy on appeal is to remand the matter for
resentencing.
       Distinguishing the long-standing rule in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818,
836, that reversal is warranted only where it is reasonably probable that a more favorable
outcome will result therefrom, the Salazar court noted that the decision in Watson does
not take into consideration the “ ‘more speculative inquiry’ ” of what choice the trial
court is likely to make in the first instance when there has been a substantive change in
the law after sentencing, and in such a situation it is almost always speculative for a
reviewing court to say what the trial court would have done if it was aware of the scope
of its discretionary powers. And in that situation, Salazar noted the appropriate remedy
is to remand for resentencing unless the “record ‘clearly indicate[s]’ that the trial court
would have reached the same conclusion ‘even if it had been aware that it had such
discretion.’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 58 Cal.4th at p. 1391, italics added for emphasis; People
v. Banner (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 226, 242; People v. Gerson (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th
1067, 1096; People v. Fuller (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 394, 400, review granted Nov. 22,
2022, S276762.)
       Here, we note the distinction that the new law had been in effect for four months
prior to sentencing, and the trial court referenced the “new law.” But the limited

                                              8
reference by the trial court does not clearly indicate that the court was including
consideration of section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A). The court’s comment on the “new
law” addressed only one aspect of the section (aggravating circumstances) and expressed
a limitation on the court’s discretion. And, this limited comment does not clearly
indicate the trial court was aware of the scope of its discretionary powers, i.e., to decide
whether section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) applied to defendant, and if so, whether the
low term presumption was overcome. With the record not clearly indicating the trial
court would have reached the same conclusion had section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A)
been addressed at sentencing, the appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing.
C.     Defendant’s Claim of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Is Moot
       Defendant contends trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance of counsel by
failing to argue defendant was entitled to the lower term sentence under section 1170,
subdivision (b)(6). He argues the record contained evidence defendant experienced
psychological trauma that contributed to the commission of the offenses. With the
remand of this matter to the trial court for resentencing, defendant’s claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, for failure to raise section 1170, subdivision (b)(6)(A) at
sentencing, is moot.
                                              II
       Although not raised by the parties, our review of the record reveals a clerical error
in the abstract of judgment that must be corrected. (People v. Mitchell (2001) 26 Cal.4th
181, 185 [appellate court may correct clerical errors in abstract of judgment and minute
orders that do not accurately reflect the oral pronouncement of judgment by a sentencing
court].) Given defendant’s prior strike conviction, the trial court doubled each term
imposed on counts one, two, four, six, seven, and eight during sentencing. The abstract
of judgment reflects the five-year term on count one, the one-year terms on counts four,
six, seven, and eight, as well as the six-month term for count two, but fails to reflect that
those terms each were doubled for defendant’s prior strike. (§§ 667, 1170.12.) Our

                                              9
disposition here, with a remand to the trial court for resentencing, resolves these
discrepancies. We express no opinion on the appropriate sentence after remand.
                                      DISPOSITION
       The case is remanded to the trial court for a resentencing hearing. The judgment is
otherwise affirmed.

                                                   /s/
                                                  Keithley, J.

We concur:

 /s/
Hull, Acting P. J.

 /s/
Duarte, J.

       Judge of the Butte County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant
to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

                                             10