Court Opinion

ID: 9492502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 14:42:35.150164+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:55:20.203694
License: Public Domain

ERVIN, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the judgment:
I concur only in the result announced today. I write separately to state that I do not join in the majority’s rejection of federal jurisdiction over properly-pled actions for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Natural Gas Act. See 15 U.S.C.A. § 717 (West 1997). I too would reverse the district court in this case, but only because the plaintiff, Columbia Gas, invoked federal jurisdiction solely under the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C.A. §§ 60101 — 60125 (West 1997 & Supp.1999), which does not authorize federal courts to adjudicate the dimensions of gas pipeline easements. On this ground I reluctantly conclude that Columbia’s complaint fails to allege a sufficient basis for federal jurisdiction.
Yet I part company with the majority over its characterization of Columbia’s action as a “quintessential state law claim.” In recognition of the broad public interest in the safe and efficient provision of natural gas to consumers, Congress enacted the Natural Gas Act, thereby establishing a comprehensive regulatory scheme to govern all aspects of “the transportation of natural gas and the sale thereof .... ” § 717(a). A key provision of the Natural Gas Act grants pipeline operators the right to bring eminent domain actions in the federal courts when the value of the property to be condemned exceeds $8,000. See § 717f(h). The Natural Gas Act also instructs that “any action or proceeding ... in the district court of the United States” for that purpose “shall conform as nearly as may be with the practice and procedure in similar action or proceeding in the courts of the State where the property is situated.... ” See id. These two provisions of the Natural Gas Act evidence Congress’ intent to create federal jurisdiction over matters related to the creation and scope of gas pipeline easements, including, as in this case, a district court’s determination of the width of a gas line easement created by express agreement.*
The majority concludes that Columbia’s federal cause of action is limited to a condemnation lawsuit. Yet even if Columbia were to accede to the majority’s wishes and file such an action, under the majority’s analysis the district court would face a conundrum: How could it determine the dimensions of any additional property that might be subject to condemnation when it lacks the power to determine the width of the original easement? Both determinations are necessary lest Columbia be forced to pay twice for the easement that it purchased from Drain’s predecessors-in-interestin 1950.
The majority also castigates Columbia Gas for its unwillingness to compensate Drain “for the loss of the productive use of her property.” This view of the facts presumes that Columbia Gas does not already own a fifty foot easement, despite uncon-troverted evidence in the record that state courts routinely uphold Columbia’s assertion of an easement of this width. Assuming that the majority is correct, however, under the reasoning adopted today Colum*561bia could not bring a condemnation suit in federal court to remove dangerous encroachments on its gas lines without first litigating a declaratory judgment action in the state courts. Surely Congress did not intend such a strained and paradoxical interpretation of its grant of federal jurisdiction under the Natural Gas Act.

 With the exception of easement disputes over property with a value of less than $3000. See § 717f(h).