Court Opinion

ID: 9859355
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 21:15:24.951734+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:40:10.623335
License: Public Domain

Confoed, P. J. A. D.,
Temporarily Assigned (concurring). I agree in principle with the result the Court reaches here, but I believe that doctrinal consistency in the Court requires greater emphasis on the now firmly established rule in this State that the remedy of the ultimate purchaser against the manufacturer for defective products is via the doctrine of strict liability in tort rather than through the sales chapter of the Uniform Commercial Code. The gloss recently applied in Heavner v. Uniroyal, Inc., 63 N. J. 130, 147-155 (1973) to the break-through decisions in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N. J. 358 (1960), and Santor v. A. & M. Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N. J. 52 (1965), leaves no doubt that the Court regards the Code technicalities as more or less irrelevant in this area and that the principle of strict liability in tort is as much applicable where the purchaser’s injury is only economic or as a loss of bargain as where injury to the person or to property results from the breach of the implied warranty of reasonable fitness for *14use postulated by the doctrine. Heavner, supra, 63 N. J., at 147.1
The foregoing comprehensive principle is subject to modification, in favor of the purchaser, if there is an express warranty from the manufacturer to him giving him more rights than would the doctrine of strict liability, see Collins v. Uniroyal, 64 N. J. 260 (1974); but the manufacturer cannot contract the purchaser’s rights by a “warranty” or document of that general description. Henningsen, supra, 32 N. J. at 404; Heavner, supra, 63 N. J. at 154-155.
Having these guiding principles in mind, I would approach the matter of plaintiff’s rights in this case without regard to his frequent shifts of theoretical position from court to court, but on the merits of the case reflected by application of the law to the facts. This approach would also subserve the interests of the commercial and consuming communities in understanding their rights and obligations in this area.
As to the express “warranty” in the booklet accompanying the camera, it could not cut down plaintiff’s right to a camera reasonably fit for use, under the authorities cited above. It was, however, effective to give him greater rights, i.e., to have the manufacturer make any needed repairs free within a year, whether or not the camera when sold was defective in the sense of the implied warranty of fitness which the law imposes under the rule of strict liability. Subject to the last statement, I agree with so much of the Court’s opinion as holds the writing did not, although so held by the Appellate Division, give plaintiff an express warranty, with accompanying Code remedies, other than what the doctrine of strict liability gives him. Both the defendant and the trial court’s judgment tendered plaintiff the free repair which the writing contemplates, and this Court in effect ratifies those offers. I *15concur, and for reasons hereinafter stated, think the plaintiff is entitled to no more (unless the repair is not effected).
Pinally, there is the question whether the occurrence of the jammed film-advance mechanism of the camera constituted a defect on sale violative of the implied warranty, or whether a fact-finder could so reasonably find. If this question were answered in the affirmative, the further inquiry would arise as to whether plaintiff would be entitled to return of his purchase price, or be remitted to proof of his loss of bargain. With respect to both of these questions, it seems to me that the Court is necessarily remitted to the law of contracts or sales, by analogy, rather than the law of torts. The first question implicates the matter of performance, an area cognate to contract or sales principles; the second question, the field of damages akin to breach of contract, rather than damages akin to tort liability for injury to the person or to property. See Santor, supra, which would have given return of purchase price to the disappointed purchaser, by way of analogy to the Sales Act remedy, but for his continued use of the property after knowledge of breach. He was allowed only his loss of bargain. 44 N. J. at 68-69.
I am in agreement with that portion of the Court’s opinion which holds that application of either the Code (N. J. S. A. 12A:2-608) or general contract principles precludes any right of rescission on the part of the purchaser and return of purchase price unless the alleged defect involves "substantial impairment of value” of the article sold. I would further hold that for purposes of the right of recovery for the purchase price, on the theory of a defect remediable under the doctrine of strict liability, a defect is not established unless there is a showing of such "substantial impairment of value.” Eor a defect of less substance I would allow only the cost of repair or remit the purchaser to a seller’s offer to repair, as here. This principle would be in harmony with the general expectation and understanding of the public in today’s society that mass-produced articles may be expected to develop minor, relatively easily remediable malfunctions which sellers or *16manufacturers routinely repair on demand during reasonable, stated periods of time.2
See Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa. Super. 120, 224 A. 2d 782, 784 (1966); Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 184 S. E. 2d 722, 725-726 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. of App. 1971); Adams v. Peter Tramontin Motor Sales, 42 N. J. Super. 313, 325 (App. Div. 1956). Compare the situation when the defect is substantial, even though repairable. Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N. J. Super. 441, 456-458 (Law Div. 1968). See Note, “Revocation of Acceptance: The Test for Substantial Impairment,” 32 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 439 (1971).
I conclude that plaintiff has not established such a defect here as entitles him to recovery of the purchase price under the doctrine of strict liability. I do determine, however, that a fact-finder reasonably could, and should, find that the development of the defect in the film-advance mechanism so soon after the purchase established a minor defect in the camera at the time of sale such that, if plaintiff accepts the Court’s judgment that the defendant repair the camera at its own expense and the defendant fails to do so satisfactorily within a reasonable time, the plaintiff ought to have judgment for the purchase price. Only to the latter extent would I modify the Court’s conclusion as to remedy.
Pashman, J., and Confoed, P. J. A. D., concurring in the result.
For reversal — Chief Justice Hughes, Justices Mountain, Sullivan, Pasi-iman, Clifford and Scheeiber and Judge Confoed — 7.
For affirmance — None.

The strong impact of Heavner lies not only in tbe deliberation with wbieb tbe Court addressed tbe issue, but in tbe fact that Henningsen, supra, was decided before adoption in New Jersey of tbe Uniform Commercial Code, and Heavner, after.

I am, of course, not implying any such limitation of liability when even a minor defect is a proximate cause of personal injury.