Court Opinion

ID: 9482620
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:55:43.061098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:05.796779
License: Public Domain

EBEL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
In my opinion, the district court appropriately applied sentencing guideline 2D1.1 to the violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(d). However, I believe the district court erred in calculating Mr. Voss’ sentence for conspiring to possess listed chemicals with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine without considering the quantity of methamphetamine producible from the chemicals seized in Oklahoma.
An examination of the sentencing guidelines reveals that the district court appropriately sentenced Mr. Voss in accordance with section 2D 1.1. The statutory index appended to the Guidelines, which determines “the guideline section or sections ordinarily applicable to the statute of conviction,” clearly cross-references 21 U.S.C. § 841(d) and Guidelines section 2D1.1. U.S.S.G.App. A at A.1, A.19 (Nov.1989).1 The majority correctly points out that this index is only a guide designed to assist the sentencing court in its determination. Opinion at 1009 (citing Guideline lBl.l(a)). However, the sentencing court should disregard the guideline listed in the index only “in an atypical case” where the guideline “is inappropriate because of the particular conduct involved.” U.S.S.G.App. A at A.l (emphasis added). The plain language of the sentencing guidelines convinces me that 2D 1.1 is indeed appropriate for the conduct at issue. The conduct here is far from atypical; to the contrary, it is an all too common situation.
Mr. Voss was convicted of conspiring to possess listed chemicals with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. Both section 846 and sentencing guideline 2D1.4 provide that conspirators are to be punished as if the object of the conspiracy had been completed. Under section 846, “[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.” Under sentencing guideline 2D1.4, “[i]f a defendant is convicted of a conspiracy or an attempt to commit any offense involving a controlled substance, the offense level shall be the same as if the object of the conspiracy or attempt had been completed.” (emphasis added). Here, Mr. Voss’ objective was to violate section 841(d). Thus, Mr. Voss is to be treated as if he possessed listed chemicals with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine. Ultimately, of course, the objective was to manufacture illegal methamphetamine.
Section 2D1.1 clearly encompasses this offense. Its heading indicates that it governs “Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses).” The majority stated that “ ‘[possession with [ijntent’ in the title to the *1014Guideline refers to possession of illegal drugs, not listed chemicals.” Opinion at 1012. I do not infer such a limitation. The parenthetical in the heading modifies all of the activities that precede it, including “manufacturing.” Thus, “[possession with [ijntent” must also refer to possession of chemicals with intent to manufacture. To interpret the phrase as does the majority would limit its applicability regarding manufacturing to possession of illegal drugs with the intent to manufacture illegal drugs. That simply makes no sense.
Other circuits have determined that it is appropriate to apply section 2D1.1 in cases involving section 841(d). The Sixth Circuit appears to have been the first to do so in United States v. Kingston, 922 F.2d 1234, 1237-38 (6th Cir.1990). In Kingston, the appellant was convicted of possession of a listed chemical with the intent to manufacture and distribute methamphetamine. The court noted that “Congress intended to punish severely the possession of listed chemicals with the intent to manufacture controlled substances” and determined that “the Guidelines dictate [that § 2D 1.1] be followed in sentencing violators of § 841(d).” Id. at 1236.2
The Ninth Circuit followed suit in United States v. Cook, 938 F.2d 149 (9th Cir.1991). In Cook, the appellant pled guilty to possession of ephedrine with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine in violation of section 841(d)(1). The court determined that section 2D1.1 was applicable to possession of chemicals with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine in light of the language of its heading, reasoning as follows:
When the court sentences for a felony for which no guideline has been promulgated, the court “is required to determine if there is a sufficiently analogous offense guideline, and, if so, to apply the guideline that is most analogous.” U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1, Comment (backg’d.)- [Here], there was no need to invoke the principle of analogy. Guidelines, § 2D1.1 has the heading: “Unlawful Manufacturing, Importing, Exporting, or Trafficking (Including Possession with Intent to Commit These Offenses).” In other words, the Guidelines include possession with intent to commit manufacturing under unlawful manufacture. There is not a mere analogy but an identity of crimes and punishments. As a result of treating possession with intent to manufacture in the same way as actually manufacturing, the Guidelines have created a mandatory maximum which in fact exceeds what the statute provides. In those circumstances Guideline § 5Gl.l(a) comes into play and reduces the sentence to the statutory maximum.
Id. at 152 (citations omitted). Thus, the court found that section 2D1.1 expressly governs possession of chemicals with the intent to manufacture a controlled substance.
Even if section 2D1.1 did not expressly govern the situation at hand, it is certainly “the most analogous offense guideline” under section 2X5.1. See U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1 (if *1015no guideline has been expressly promulgated for an offense, apply “the most analogous offense guideline”; if no analogous guideline exists, apply 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)). When a defendant is convicted of conspiracy to possess precursor chemicals (and consequently sentenced as if he possessed those chemicals), it is analogous to look at the completed product given the defendant’s ultimate goal and Congress’ intention to punish such possession severely-
In fact, Mr. Voss himself acknowledged that a sentencing court may appropriately look to the end product when dealing with precursor chemicals when he accepted the fact that his sentence for conspiracy to possess listed chemicals with the intent to manufacture methamphetamine was based upon the uncharged 1.5 pounds of the completed drug that was seized from his laboratory.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court appropriately applied section 2D1.1 to the underlying conduct in this case. I remain unconvinced by Mr. Voss’ argument that application of section 2D 1.1 is inappropriate because the appendix cross-referencing section 841(d) to section 2D1.1 was written before the current version of 841(d) was enacted. The fact that the reference in the appendix remained in effect after the current version of section 841(d) was enacted seems to me to be more indicative of the Sentencing Commission’s intent.
Nor am I persuaded by Mr. Voss’ argument that the recent amendments to the Guidelines, which establish a base offense schedule for possession of listed chemicals, see U.S.S.G. § 2Dl.ll(d) (Nov.1991), illustrate that the previous versions of the Guidelines did not address this conduct. “The Sentencing Commissions’ post hoc clarification of its intent does not invalidate our pre-amendment interpretation of the guideline.” United States v. Saucedo, 950 F.2d 1508, 1515 (10th Cir.1991). Furthermore, the existence of the amendment is immaterial for conduct predating the amendment because section 2X5.1 was designed precisely for the situation in which the conduct at issue was not expressly covered. If the amendment is an acknowledgment that the previous version of the guidelines did not expressly address possession of precursor chemicals, we are then referred by section 2X5.1 to “the most analogous offense guideline.” As discussed supra, section 2D1.1 is the most analogous guideline and would thus still be applicable.3
For the above reasons, the district court did not err by applying section 2D1.1.4 I agree with the government’s argument, however, that the district court did err in not considering the quantity of methamphetamine producible from the chemicals seized in Oklahoma, as required by the law within our Circuit and others.
Application Note 2 to section 2D1.4 states that “[w]here there is no drug seizure or the amount seized does not reflect the scale of the offense, the sentencing judge shall approximate the quantity of the controlled substance.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4, comment, (n.2) (emphasis added).5 See also United States v. Havens, 910 F.2d 703, 704 (10th Cir.1990) (“In cases where the amount of drugs seized does not reflect the scale of the offense, the commentary to the Guidelines requires the trial judge to approximate the quantity of the controlled substance.”) (emphasis added). “In making this determination, the judge may con*1016sider ... the size or capability of any laboratory involved.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.4, comment. (n.2).
DEA agents found only one-quarter ounce of methamphetamine at the time of Mr. Voss’ arrest and 1.5 pounds of methamphetamine during a later search of his laboratory. However, a California Department of Justice chemist estimated that the chemicals seized at the time of Mr. Voss’ arrest had the potential to produce a minimum of eighty pounds of methamphetamine. In light of this potential, the amount of drugs seized clearly does not reflect the scale of Mr. Voss’ offense. Thus, the mandatory language of section 2D1.4 requires the sentencing court to approximate the quantity of methamphetamine producible from the chemicals possessed.
In Kingston, the Sixth Circuit recognized the dilemma posed in cases of this nature: “The crux of the problem is this: violators of § 841(d) have not sold or made any controlled substances, but § 2D1.1, which the Guidelines dictate be followed in sentencing violators of § 841(d), fixes sentences based solely by the amount of controlled substance involved in the offense.” Id. at 1236 (citation omitted). The court reasoned that “basing the sentence on the amount of the controlled substance that would have been involved in the crime had the scheme advanced[] is the fairest way to reconcile § 841(d) and U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1.” Id. at 1237. This method is “more in line with the spirit of the laws” because Congress intended to punish severely possession of listed chemicals with intent to manufacture controlled substances. Id. at 1236-37.
As the majority acknowledges, subsequent cases permit district courts to consider the amount of drugs that the defendant could have produced with the chemicals in his possession in order to determine the defendant’s base offense level under section 2D1.1. See Opinion at 1011. In Havens, this Circuit held that “[i]n cases where the amount of drugs seized does not reflect the scale of the offense, the commentary to the Guidelines requires the trial judge to approximate the quantity of the controlled substance.” 910 F.2d at 704. When only small amounts of the completed drug were found with the large amounts of precursor chemicals “the trial court, upon proper testimony, may estimate the ultimate quantity of produceable drugs.” Id. at 704-05. In United States v. Macklin, 927 F.2d 1272 (2d Cir.1991), the Second Circuit similarly found that a sentence based upon an estimate of the total producible amount was proper when precursor chemicals were seized prior to any effort to manufacture controlled substances. Id. at 1281; see also United States v. Smallwood, 920 F.2d 1231, 1237 (5th Cir.1991) (sentence based upon estimate of production capabilities proper when defendant was sentenced only for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine).
The holding of this Circuit in Havens, 910 F.2d at 704, is clear. When the amount of finished product seized does not reflect the scale of the offense, the plain language of Application Note 2 to section 2D1.4 requires the district court to consider the amount of drugs that would have been produced had the defendant’s scheme come to its fruition.
According to the California Department of Justice chemist, the chemicals seized from Mr. Voss had the potential to produce at least eighty pounds of methamphetamine. Under the Drug Quantity Table, this amount results in a base offense level of 38, for which the sentencing range is 235 to 293 months. Because Mr. Voss’ sentence cannot exceed the statutory maximum,6 however, he should be sentenced to ten years in prison.
For the foregoing reasons, I believe that section 2D 1.1 is applicable to violations of 21 U.S.C. § 841(d). However, I would vacate the sentence and remand for resen-*1017tencing based upon the quantity of methamphetamine producible from the chemicals seized in Oklahoma. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent.

. All citations to the sentencing guidelines refer to the 1989 version unless otherwise indicated.

. The majority criticizes Kingston for failing to reconcile its application of section 2D 1.1 with "the manifest intention of Congress to punish section 841(d) violators less severely than violators of the other drug offense sections of 841.” Opinion at 1012. Applying section 2D1.1 to section 841(d) violations is not inconsistent with this intention, however. Section 841(d)'s ten-year cap on imprisonment will often result in less severe treatment for section 841(d) violations than for violations of completed drug transactions under section 841(a); without the cap, section 841(d) violators with an offense level of 42, for example, would be sentenced to thirty years to life. Furthermore, violators of section 841(d) are not automatically sentenced to ten years; they receive this maximum sentence only if quantities demand it. The facts of this case present a good example of the more lenient sentence accorded to a defendant for conspiracy to possess listed chemicals with intent to manufacture methamphetamine than the sentence that would apply had the defendant been successful in converting those chemicals into methamphetamine. In the latter situation, the guideline range would have been from 235 to 293 months with no limiting statutory cap. However, because this defendant was convicted of conspiracy, the statutory cap of 120 months limits his sentence to less than one-half the severity of what he would have received if the object of the conspiracy had been fully consummated.

. Additionally, although section 2D 1.11 is a more precise method of dealing with the situation of precursor chemicals, there is nothing in that amendment suggesting that the Commission believed that precursor chemicals were not covered in a more general way by reference to section 2D 1.1 prior to the amendment.

. I must conclude, with even greater conviction, that the district court did not commit "plain legal error” as the majority alleges. Opinion at 1009. Because Mr. Voss never challenged the applicability of section 2D 1.1 in the district court, the majority has to find not only error, but clear error, before it can reverse.

. This mandatory language contradicts the sentencing court’s statement that in its view the Sentencing Commission wanted to give the sentencing court discretion in evaluating the amount of drugs to be considered by the Court in applying the guidelines and in determining the scope of the guidelines. Tr. at 5.

. Section 841(d) provides in relevant part: “Any person who knowingly or intentionally — (1) possesses a listed chemical with intent to manufacture a controlled substance ... shall be fined in accordance with Title 18, or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both." (emphasis added).