Court Opinion

ID: 9537052
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:11:53.746836+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:55:50.904158
License: Public Domain

BISTLINE, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority reverses the decision of the trial court and remands the case for “the entry of specific findings of fact determining [the facts and circumstances surrounding the events leading up to the defendant’s execution of the purported confessions].” The Court states that “[f]rom those findings, the district court is directed to conclude whether any waiver of rights or privileges was made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.” The Court cites no authority for its actions and indeed it cannot, since its disposition of this matter is wholly unprecedented. This Court has never heretofore required such specific findings of fact and circumstances; an opinion by the trial court *132setting forth the reasons for its decision has always been considered sufficient for purposes of appeal. See State v. Monroe, 101 Idaho 251, 611 P.2d 1036 (1980). The Court appears to be manufacturing a pretext for reversal so that the issue can be reconsidered — and by a new district judge, the district judge who originally considered this case having retired. Furthermore, the Court makes an issue of the standard to be applied in determining whether there was a voluntary and intelligent waiver of Miranda rights, holding that such a waiver must “be established by a preponderance of the evidence,” rather than beyond a reasonable doubt. However, neither party has contended anything more than a preponderance of the evidence was required. The State has not argued that the trial court applied an inappropriate standard, but has merely contended that it established that the. confession was voluntary. The trial court found otherwise and I agree.
The trial court in this case unequivocally resolved the issues of waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to counsel and the issue of the voluntariness of the confession in favor of the defendant. While the court’s findings were not separately numbered, they clearly reveal the court’s reasoning on these issues and they are certainly sufficient.
“This court cannot find a waiver of defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination and right to counsel. The State failed to prove that he was told what he was to be questioned about.
“Where waiver of rights upon the resumption of conversation after he asked for an attorney is concerned, the evidence as to exactly what was said and done at that time is in conflict. The court can find no basis to resolve this conflict. Consequently, the State, which has a heavy burden of proof on this point, must lose. A tape recording of the interrogation or a written waiver at that point most likely would have resolved this conflict.
“The evidence on the remaining issues, that is, whether the Miranda warnings were given, whether they were understood, and whether the confession was otherwise voluntary, is weak when considered with all the circumstances of the case and with regard to the great burden on the State.
“The court resolves these issues in favor of the defendant. It is not because of a lack of credibility on the part of the officers as compared to the defendant. It is because the law places a great burden of proof on the State which cannot in all cases be satisfied by the testimony of the officers conducting the interrogation alone.”
R., p. 48.
A review of the record demonstrates that the trial court’s decision was proper, revealing, among other things, that there was no signed waiver of Miranda rights (certainly not routine police procedure under the circumstances) and that the confession was written, not by the defendant, but by the chief of police. Furthermore, the majority concedes that the defendant made a statement which the police officers “believed might be a request for an attorney.” Since the defendant had requested an attorney, and the trial court found that the state had not met its burden of demonstrating that the defendant initiated further conversations with the police following this request, there is no need for redetermination of the matter. I join with the views expressed just one week ago by the Supreme Court of Arizona:
“The language of Edwards [v. Arizona] is unequivocal; an accused who has asserted his right to counsel ‘is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him.’ 451 U.S. at 485, 101 S.Ct. at 1885. The rule prohibits ‘further question.’ ...
“The assertion of the right to counsel is an expression by the accused that he is not competent to deal with the authorities without legal advice. See Edwards v. Arizona, supra. The resumption of questioning in the absence of an attorney after an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during police inter*133rogation strongly suggests to an accused that he has no choice but to answer. Thus, ‘a later decision at the authority’s insistence to make a statement without counsel’s presence may properly be viewed with skepticism.’ Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. [96] at 111, note 2, 96 S.Ct. [321] at 329 [46 L.Ed.2d 313] (White, J., concurring).
“We therefore hold that, after requesting counsel during the initial interrogation, the appellant should not have been subjected three days later to interrogation which he had not initiated without counsel having been made available to him.”
Arizona v. Routhier, 137 Ariz. 90, 669 P.2d 68 (Ariz.Sup.Ct.1983) (No. 5390, filed July 6, 1983). (Footnote omitted.).
See State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 660 P.2d 1336, 1345-52 (1982) (Bistline, J., dissenting).
As a final note I must add that it is well to see that the Court has finally given recognition to the statutes enacted by the Idaho legislature in response to the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), statutes about which I have written on several occasions. See, e.g., State v. Calegar, 104 Idaho 526, 661 P.2d 311 (1983) (Bistline, J., dissenting); State v. Mitchell, 104 Idaho 493, 660 P.2d 1336 (1983) (Bistline, J., dissenting). However, I believe that it borders on the absurd to suggest that there is any need for a determination on remand “whether the investigation had ‘focused’ on Culbertson.” Although Culbertson may have been in custody for other reasons, the record demonstrates that the investigation in this case most certainly had focused on him. Clearly, even the police officers who questioned Culbertson thought this to be the case, or there would have been no reason for them to give him the Miranda warnings which, as the Court acknowledges, both officers testified were orally given. I.C. § 19-854 clearly provides that information contained in the warnings to be given a defendant is effective only if it is “in writing or otherwise recorded” or if the person to whom the information is given “records his acknowledgment of receipt and time of receipt.” The statute is there and it should be followed. It clearly was not followed in this case.