Court Opinion

ID: 9900358
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-18 22:11:33.843322+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:04.769459
License: Public Domain

No. 488            September 20, 2023                  191

          IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
                  STATE OF OREGON

             In the Matter of A. R. T.,
                      a Child.
       DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
              Petitioner-Respondent,
                        and
    CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF WARM SPRINGS,
                    Respondent,
                         v.
                    A. C. S. G.,
                     Appellant.
           Benton County Circuit Court
           22JU01524; A179158 (Control)
             In the Matter of L. R. T.,
                      a Child.
       DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES,
              Petitioner-Respondent,
                        and
    CONFEDERATED TRIBES OF WARM SPRINGS,
                    Respondent,
                         v.
                    A. C. S. G.,
                     Appellant.
           Benton County Circuit Court
               22JU01525; A179159

  Locke A. Williams, Judge.
  Submitted May 31, 2023.
  Shannon Storey, Chief Defender, Juvenile Appellate
Section, and Sean Connor, Deputy Public Defender, Office of
Public Defense Services, filed the brief for appellant.
   Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, Benjamin Gutman,
Solicitor General, and Jon Zunkel-deCoursey, Assistant
192                 Dept. of Human Services v. A. C. S. G.

Attorney General, filed the brief for respondent Department
of Human Services.
   Sarah Monkton and Best Best & Krieger LLP filed the
brief for respondent Confederate Tribes of Warm Springs.
  Before Ortega, Presiding Judge, and Powers, Judge, and
Hellman, Judge.
  ORTEGA, P. J.
  Motion to dismiss appeal as moot denied; affirmed.
Cite as 328 Or App 191 (2023)                                             193

           ORTEGA, P. J.
         This is a consolidated juvenile dependency proceed-
ing concerning two children, A and L, both of whom are
Indian children within the meaning of the Oregon Indian
Child Welfare Act (ORICWA) and the federal Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA). See ORS 419B.600 - 419B.665; Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 USC §§ 1901 - 1963. Mother
appeals juvenile court orders denying her motions to inval-
idate the proceedings and dismiss the dependency peti-
tions and asks us to reverse those orders and to vacate the
court’s subsequent jurisdictional judgments.1 She assigns
six errors, and, in a combined argument, challenges the
court’s determinations that she received adequate ICWA
and ORICWA notice of the proceedings and that Oregon
Department of Human Services (DHS) made active efforts
to reunite her family.2 DHS has moved to dismiss, asserting
that mother’s appeal is moot because the juvenile court has
since dismissed jurisdiction over A and L and terminated
the wardship. DHS has not met its burden of persuasion,
so we deny its motion to dismiss. On the merits, however,
we conclude that the juvenile court did not err in any of
the ways asserted by mother and affirm the jurisdictional
judgments.
         We provide some background and recount those
facts necessary to explain our rulings. On April 1, 2022,
DHS petitioned the juvenile court to assert jurisdiction
over three-year-old A and two-year-old L after A suffered
a second-degree burn while in mother’s care. On that same
day, the juvenile court held a shelter hearing and, after
mother was unable to provide a reasonable explanation
for A’s injury, asserted temporary jurisdiction over A and

    1
      The children’s biological and presumed legal fathers were represented
by counsel in the lower proceedings but are not parties to this appeal. The
Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon, of which A and
L are members and which participated as a party below, filed a notice of intent
to participate in this appeal but declined to respond to mother’s assignments of
error, asserting that those raise no concerns of tribal jurisdiction.
    2
      For the purpose of mother’s arguments, the ICWA and the ORICWA
include similar requirements as to notice and active efforts. See ORS 419B.639;
ORS 419B.645; 25 USC § 1912(a), (d). We thus refer to those statutes as ICWA/
ORICWA throughout this opinion and point out any differences if those are rele-
vant to our analysis.
194                         Dept. of Human Services v. A. C. S. G.

L under ICWA/ORICWA. ORS 419B.627(4); 25 USC § 1922.
The court made active-efforts findings and scheduled a
jurisdictional and disposition hearing for May, almost eight
weeks later.
         On April 22, the tribe dismissed jurisdiction over
A.3 DHS then mailed mother and other interested parties
via certified mail a notice of intent to initiate foster care
proceedings and establish wardship, which mother received
on May 2. That notice provided that the court had scheduled
a jurisdictional and disposition hearing for May 25, more
than 10 days from the date that mother received the notice.
         On May 20, during a second shelter hearing, mother
requested an additional 20 days to prepare for the custody
proceedings. The court granted mother’s motion, renewed
its emergency proceedings findings—including active-efforts
findings—and scheduled a third shelter hearing for a week
later—May 27—to comply with ORICWA,ORS 419B.185(5)(d).
         During the third shelter hearing, the court sched-
uled the jurisdictional trial for June 13, and multiple wit-
nesses testified, including DHS child abuse investigator
Mark Davis, who spoke about his investigation of A’s injury,
DHS’s visitation plan, and DHS’s request that mother take
a violence assessment to evaluate which services she needed
to safely parent A and L. According to Davis, mother had
had one in-person visit with L and an audio visit with A in
the weeks since the children had been removed; he reported
that more visits had not been possible due to the 12- to
14-hour drive to the clinic where mother was residing and
the fact that members of the clinic staff were not qualified
to supervise visits. Davis’s affidavits regarding the investi-
gation were received as exhibits.
         On June 9, a few days before the date of the juris-
dictional trial, mother moved under ICWA and ORICWA to
dismiss the proceedings as to each child on two grounds.
She argued that she received insufficient notice of the
June 13 jurisdictional trial and that, as of June 8, DHS had
failed to make active efforts to reunify her family.
    3
      Although the tribe’s order terminating the wardship—as observed in the
record—concerns A alone, neither mother nor the tribe has raised any jurisdic-
tional challenge as to L in that respect. We therefore assume that there is none.
Cite as 328 Or App 191 (2023)                             195

          During the June 13 jurisdictional trial, the court
orally denied mother’s motions and subsequently issued a
written order finding that notice “was proper and prompt”
as statutorily required and that DHS had made “active
efforts during the course of [the] proceedings.” Prior to that,
the court had found that Davis’s testimony and affidavits
showed that DHS had made active efforts even if the efforts
were not “wholly successful.” In addition to the facts above,
Davis’s affidavit and testimony indicated that four days
after DHS’s petition for jurisdiction over A and L, Davis left
a voice-mail message with the tribe, “attempt[ing] to set up
a visit” and two days later—on April 6—spoke with the tribe
for the same purpose. The tribe agreed to supervise a visit
with both parents, and a visit was set up for mother with
A and L on that same day. DHS provided gas assistance to
transport mother to the visit, which was canceled because
mother was arrested and a No Contact Order was issued.
On May 7, mother was authorized to have contact with L, so
Davis emailed mother’s attorney attempting to schedule a
visit. The next day, Davis spoke to mother and learned that
she was going to participate in the treatment program that
was 12 to 14 hours away. Mother “asked to wait on visits
until she [could] get[ ]” settled into the program. The juve-
nile court determined that A and L were within its jurisdic-
tion and entered jurisdictional judgments.
         Mother appeals, maintaining that DHS failed to
provide ICWA/ORICWA-compliant notice of the June 13
jurisdictional trial and to make “active efforts” before the
foster placement of A and L to prevent the breakup of her
family.
        After the parties filed their appellate briefs, the
juvenile court dismissed jurisdiction and wardship as
to both children. DHS argues that this case is now moot.
Mother contends that we should reject DHS’s argument
because reversing the juvenile court’s rulings, including
the ruling that A and L were endangered based on the fact
that A was seriously injured while in mother’s care, would
affect mother’s rights. According to mother, those rulings,
unchallenged, would disadvantage her in future child wel-
fare matters.
196                     Dept. of Human Services v. A. C. S. G.

         An appeal is moot when a decision will no longer
“have a practical effect on the rights of the parties.” Dept.
of Human Services v. G. D. W., 353 Or 25, 32, 292 P3d 548
(2012). When a parent objects to a mootness argument by
identifying “any continuing practical effects or collateral
consequences that, in the parent’s view, render the appeal
justiciable[,]” DHS has the burden of persuading us that “the
effects or consequences that the parent identifies are either
legally insufficient or factually incorrect.” Dept. of Human
Services v. A. B., 362 Or 412, 426, 412 P3d 1169 (2018). Here,
DHS argues that there are no “probable adverse collateral
consequences” but offers no further explanation specific to
the adverse consequences that mother has identified. DHS
has failed to meet its burden of persuasion, and we deny
DHS’s motion to dismiss.
        We turn to the merits of mother’s arguments chal-
lenging the denial of her ICWA/ORICWA motions and, as we
explain below, conclude that the court did not err.
         In reviewing the denial of mother’s motions, we
review the court’s findings of fact regarding what DHS did
or did not do for any evidence. Dept. of Human Services v.
R. W., 277 Or App 37, 39, 370 P3d 543 (2016). We review
for legal error the court’s conclusions that the notice was
proper and that the historical facts of DHS’s efforts consti-
tute active efforts. Id.
       ORICWA provides that any state or local court of
competent jurisdiction,
   “shall vacate an order * * * involving an Indian child
   regarding jurisdiction [or] placement * * * if the court deter-
   mines that any provision of [ORS] 419B.639 (2), (3)(a) or (b)
   or (5)(a) * * * or, where required, [ORS] 419B.645 * * * has
   been violated and the court determines it is appropriate to
   vacate the order or judgment.”
ORS 419B.651(2)(a) (emphasis added); see also ORS
419B.639(2), (3)(a), (b), (5)(a) (requiring that for jurisdictional
proceedings involving an Indian child, prompt notice must
be sent to the parent by registered or certified mail and the
hearing “may not be held until at least 10 days after” receipt
of the notice, among other requirements); ORS 419B.645(2)
Cite as 328 Or App 191 (2023)                                                 197

(requiring the juvenile court to “determine whether active
efforts have been made to prevent the breakup of the fam-
ily”); ORS 419B.305(3)(b) (“The court may not schedule a
hearing on the petition, or enter an order on the petition,
unless the * * * notice requirements” under ORS 419B.639(2)
and “all relevant timelines have been followed.”).4
          Regarding notice, the record supports the court’s
conclusion that mother received proper ICWA/ORICWA
notice of the jurisdictional proceeding when DHS notified her
on May 2 by certified mail of its intent to initiate foster care
proceedings and establish wardship. See ORS 419B.639(2)(a)
(requiring DHS to “promptly send notice of the proceed-
ing” rather than notice of each hearing); see also 25 USC
§ 1912(a) (requiring notice “of the pending proceedings and of
[a parent’s] right of intervention”); Dept. of Human Services
v. C. M. H., 368 Or 96, 105, 486 P3d 772 (2021) (“proceed-
ings under [ORS chapter 419B] are commonly referred to as
‘dependency proceedings’ ”).
        Although the notice that mother received indi-
cated that the related hearing was scheduled for May 25,
the court rescheduled the jurisdictional trial for June 13 to
accommodate mother’s ICWA/ORICWA request for 20 addi-
tional days. That rescheduling did not require a renewed
ICWA/ORICWA notice. When a court grants a parent’s
20-day extension request, it is based on a parent having
already received ICWA/ORICWA-compliant notice of the
proceeding, which in this case occurred on May 2. See ORS
419B.639(5)(a) (“Upon request, the court shall grant the
Indian child’s parent * * * up to 20 additional days from the
date upon which [ORS 419B] notice was received * * * to pre-
pare for participation in the hearing.”); 25 USC § 1912(a)
(same). Thus, when the court granted mother’s request

     4
       ICWA includes similar requirements as to both formal notice and active
efforts. See 25 USC § 1912(a) (“the party seeking the foster care placement of
* * * an Indian child shall notify the parent * * * by registered mail with return
receipt requested, of the pending proceedings” requiring notice to the parent of
an Indian child); see also 25 USC § 1912(d) (“Any party seeking to effect a foster
care placement of * * * an Indian child under State law shall satisfy the court that
active efforts have been made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative
programs designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family and that these
efforts have proved unsuccessful.”); 25 USC § 1914 (allowing the court to vacate
the proceedings if those two requirements are not met).
198                         Dept. of Human Services v. A. C. S. G.

for an additional 20 days to prepare for the jurisdictional
hearing, after receiving proper notice of the proceedings,
DHS was not then required to send a new ICWA/ORICWA
notice incorporating the rescheduled June 13 hearing date.
Because there was no violation of the ICWA/ORICWA notice
requirements, the juvenile court did not err in refusing to
vacate the proceedings on that ground.
         We turn to mother’s active-efforts challenge under
ICWA/ORICWA. She argues that the court was required to
grant her motions because, as of the date of those motions,
DHS had failed to make “active efforts” to prevent the
breakup of her family by failing to provide regular visits with
A and L. We, however, are not persuaded by that argument.5
Under ORICWA—ORS 419B.651(2)(a)—a court is required
to vacate the proceedings upon a violation of a requirement
in ORS 419B.645. Here, the relevant ORS 419B.645 require-
ment was that a court hearing a dependency case involving
an Indian child must make an “active efforts” determina-
tion based on a higher than “reasonable efforts” standard.
See ORS 419B.645(2), (3). The record shows that the court
made the required active-efforts determination during each
shelter hearing, so there was no violation of ORICWA based
on failing to make the determination.
         Moreover, the evidence presented to the court sup-
ports its findings of fact and legal conclusion that DHS
made active efforts, despite mother not having regular vis-
its with her children. The court’s determination was based
on evidence that was “document[ed] in detail in writing
and on the record” and included Davis’s affidavits and tes-
timony regarding DHS’s efforts to contact representatives
of A’s and L’s tribe, provide a visitation plan, and identify
adequate services to mother; those efforts constitute active
efforts under ORICWA. See ORS 419B.645(4), (5) (listing
those actions as active efforts). The court’s determination
also considered evidence as to why some of those active
efforts were not successful, including evidence of scheduling
issues—that is, the 12- to 14-hour drive to the clinic where
mother was residing and the clinic’s lack of qualified staff
    5
      Mother’s active-efforts argument refers only to the three shelter hearings
prior to the June 13 jurisdictional trial, so we consider the timeline up to that
point.
Cite as 328 Or App 191 (2023)                           199

to supervise visits—that prevented A and L from visiting
mother more often. Accordingly, there was no violation of
the ORS 419B.645 active-efforts requirement and the court
was not required to grant mother’s motions on that ground.
         Our analysis of mother’s active-efforts argument
under ORICWA obviates the need to conduct a separate
analysis of that same argument under ICWA because the
relevant provisions under both ORICWA and ICWA are sim-
ilar. Compare ORS 419B.651(2)(a) (regarding vacation of the
proceedings upon a violation of ORS 419B.645) and ORS
419B.645(2), (3) (regarding active efforts requirements) with
25 USC § 1914(a) (regarding vacation of the proceedings
upon a violation of 25 USC § 1912) and 25 USC § 1912(d)
(requiring DHS to “satisfy the court that active efforts have
been made * * * to prevent the breakup of the Indian family
and that these efforts have proved unsuccessful”).
        Motion to dismiss appeal as moot denied; affirmed.