Court Opinion

ID: 9940429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-14 15:13:40.739031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:44:51.294125
License: Public Domain

RECORD IMPOUNDED

                                NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-1350-22

C.A.,1

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

B.M.,

     Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________

                   Submitted November 28, 2023 – Decided February 14, 2024

                   Before Judges Smith and Perez Friscia.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
                   Chancery Division, Family Part, Morris County,
                   Docket No. FV-14-0412-23.

                   Fox Rothschild LLP, attorneys for appellant (Sandra C.
                   Fava and Kory A. Crichton, on the brief).

                   Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

1
  We use initials in this domestic violence case to protect the identities of the
parties. R. 1:38-3(b)(12).
      After a trial, defendant B.M. appeals from a final restraining order (FRO)

issued in favor of plaintiff C.A. under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act

(PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. On appeal, defendant argues that the trial

court violated his due process rights by failing to advise him of his right to retain

legal counsel and failing to inform him of the consequences if an FRO were

entered against him. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent

with this opinion.

      Plaintiff and defendant had been in a dating relationship for four years.

They had resided together for two years prior to ending their relationship in May

2022. After the relationship ended, the parties remained in contact, because they

shared two dogs. On October 8, 2022, the parties attended a friend's wedding

together.   At the wedding, defendant learned plaintiff was dating others.

Defendant, who was intoxicated, became upset and threw multiple drinks on

plaintiff. Plaintiff testified at trial that he felt "humiliated" by the experience.

Despite their altercation, after the wedding they drove to defendant's home

together, where plaintiff advised he wanted no further contact with defendant.

      Two days later, defendant began texting plaintiff, who in turn blocked

defendant from his phone and social media accounts. On October 21, defendant

sent multiple video clips to plaintiff's family and friends, including one video

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depicting defendant outside plaintiff's home at 1:18 a.m. Plaintiff then applied

for a temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant.

      The following Tuesday, October 25, an FRO hearing was conducted by

the trial court. Neither party retained counsel, nor requested an adjournment.

The court began the hearing by asking if the parties were ready to proceed.

Defendant stated he wished to obtain "an FRO against [plaintiff] and three TROs

against [plaintiff's] family and friends for intimidating [him]." After a brief

introduction and some preliminary discussion about defendant's unsuccessful

attempts to get a restraining order, the court, apparently satisfied the parties were

prepared to proceed, placed them under oath and commenced questioning the

parties about their history, the alleged harassment, and other relevant

information.

      At this point, no preliminary instructions had been provided to the parties

explaining their respective rights and the consequences of the proceeding.

During the hearing, defendant asked the court if his counsel—who had not

entered an appearance in the matter and, as such, was not present—could

introduce certain video evidence because he was "about to have a panic attack

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. . ." In response, the court stated, "[o]kay. Well, I asked you if you were ready

to proceed, and you told me you were." Defendant responded that he was "ready

to proceed . . . with the truth."

       Later in the hearing, defendant told the court he had an appointment with

his attorney at 5:00 p.m. Each of defendant's comments reflecting his lack of

readiness to proceed went unaddressed by the court. Throughout the hearing

defendant continually requested a TRO against plaintiff and members of

plaintiff's family, although defendant had no complaint pending against

plaintiff.

       As to plaintiff's complaint against defendant, the court made findings,

including that defendant had engaged in "harassing conduct . . . designed to

annoy, embarrass, or harass." The court also found defendant violated the TRO

by messaging plaintiff through a social media app.         Even after the court

concluded on the record that the facts warranted issuance of an FRO against

defendant, defendant was under the clear misimpression that the hearing could

result in the award of an FRO in his favor.

             COURT: . . . So[,] I am going to enter [an FRO] in
             favor of [p]laintiff against the defendant. So—

             DEFENDANT: Your Honor?

             COURT: Yes?

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            DEFENDANT: May I say one more thing?

            COURT: Sure.

                  ....

            DEFENDANT: I already mentioned to Your Honor that
            I will go ahead and talk to [my attorney], so I would
            beg of Your Honor to please give me the FRO . . . .

            COURT: Done. Sit in the back. You got the FRO.
            Okay?

                  ....

            DEFENDANT: Thank you, thank you, Your Honor.

            COURT: You're welcome, guys.

      On appeal, defendant argues the trial court violated defendant's due

process rights by failing to inform him of his right to retain counsel and by

failing to advise defendant of the consequences of a FRO. As both issues

implicate defendant's due process rights in the FRO hearing context, we address

them together.

      Our scope of review of Family Part orders is limited. Cesare v. Cesare,

154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998). We owe substantial deference to the Family Part's

findings of fact because of its special expertise in family matters. Id. at 413. A

trial judge who observes, witnesses and listens to testimony is in the best

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position to "make first-hand credibility judgments about witnesses who appear

on the stand." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. V. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104

(2008). However, we do not accord such deference to legal conclusions, which

we review de novo. Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016).

      "[O]rdinary due process protections apply in the domestic violence

context, notwithstanding the shortened time frames for conducting a final

hearing." J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 478 (2011). To "ensur[e] that defendants

are not deprived of their due process rights requires our trial courts to recognize

both what those rights are and how they can be protected consistent with the

protective goals of the [PDVA]." Id. at 479. In this context, due process

requires that a "defendant is given a meaningful opportunity to defend against a

complaint" against them. D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 606 (App. Div.

2013).

      While this right does not guarantee the appointment of counsel, it does

require that defendants understand their "right to retain legal counsel" and that

they "receive[] a reasonable opportunity to retain an attorney." A.A.R. v. J.R.C.,

471 N.J. Super. 584, 588 (App. Div. 2022). However, these protections have

certain limitations. We need not apply the same extensive precautions necessary

to waive the right to counsel in an FRO context as we would in a criminal

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context, where the party's decision to waive their constitutional right "must be

knowing, intelligent, and voluntary." Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners'

Ass'n v. Khan, 210 N.J. 482, 505 (2021). Still, PDVA defendants must have

"the opportunity to seek legal representation, if requested," and whether they are

given such an opportunity is based on a "fact-sensitive" analysis. D.N., 429 N.J.

Super. at 606.

      Given the wide range of adverse outcomes which face defendants in

domestic violence proceedings, we must consider whether such defendants have

been made aware of the consequences which flow from entry of an FRO against

them. Certain mandatory sanctions are imposed upon an FRO's entry, such as

fingerprinting, N.J.S.A. 53:1-15 and inclusion in a central registry, N.J.S.A.

2C:25-34.    A defendant who has been restrained is also prevented from

"purchasing, owning, possessing or controlling a firearm." N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29.

In addition to mandatory sanctions, the issuing court has the discretion to impose

further conditions "impairing a defendant's interest in liberty and freedom in

order 'to prevent further abuse.'"   A.A.R., 471 N.J. Super. at 588 (quoting

Peterson v. Peterson, 374 N.J. Super 116, 124 (App. Div. 2005)). As such, "due

process also requires trial courts to apprise domestic violence defendants, in

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advance of trial, of the serious consequences should an FRO be entered against

them." Ibid.

      Here, defendant was denied the relevant due process protections required

by the PDVA. The court neglected to inform defendant of his right to retain

legal counsel and of the consequences that would follow the entry of an FRO

against him. More than once during the trial, defendant referenced his desire to

consult counsel. The trial court, for reasons that are unclear from the record,

did not adjourn the proceedings to afford defendant an opportunity to retain and

consult counsel.

      The record also reflects defendant's clear lack of understanding about the

purpose of the hearing. Defendant's statements showed that he believed he could

seek a restraining order against plaintiff, a belief he maintained until the

hearing's conclusion. We need not speculate whether defendant would have

waived his right to counsel had he been properly advised, as our review of the

record leads us to conclude he would likely have sought an adjournment and

representation. As a result, the hearing conducted by the trial court was fatally

flawed. We reverse the order granting plaintiff an FRO against defendant. We

remand to the trial court for a new FRO hearing consistent with the guidance set

forth in A.A.R., 471 N.J. Super. at 588.

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Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

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