Court Opinion

ID: 9730578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:16:14.22052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:07.541977
License: Public Domain

WILLIAMSON, Chief Justice
(dissenting)-
On March 3, 1967 the defendant was defaulted for failure to appear and to plead and judgment by default was entered by the Clerk. By motion dated March 7 the defendant sought “Permission of Late Entry * * * for excusable neglect on the part of (defendant’s attorney).” Notice was given plaintiff’s attorney that the defendant’s attorney would bring the motion on for hearing on April 4, 1967 at nine o’clock “or as soon thereafter as counsel can be heard.” The presiding Justice on April 4 ordered “Defendant not appearing, the motion is denied.”
On April 7 execution for the default judgment in No. 1452 issued. On April 10 plaintiff sued defendant on the judgment in case No. 1572. The defendant answered on April 25.
On April 25 the defendant moved to strike the default and the execution for the reasons (1) that the defendant filed a motion for late entry to answer the. complaint; (2) that defendant was advised that he would be notified of time and place of hearing; (3) that without notice, “this matter was set for hearing, was defaulted and an Execution issue.”
The defendant asked the Court that his motion for late entry be heard and the default execution stricken.
In July 1967, following hearing in June 1967, “the Court in the exercise of its discretion grants the motion of the Defendant requesting that the Default Judgment be set aside.” The plaintiff has appealed.
The defendant seeks an opportunity in No. 1452 to answer the complaint and to defend on the merits. To accomplish this end, he must first destroy the default judgment, thus reopening No. 1452 and ending No. 1572.
The motion for late entry, it seems to me, was a sufficient vehicle to carry the destruction or striking of the default judgment. It would have been a useless act to have granted a late entry in face of a default judgment in the process of or ready for collection. The motion was inartis-tically drawn, but this should not deprive the defendant of his day in Court.
No ruling has been made, as I read the record, on the issue of excusable neglect raised by the defendant as the ground for an order granting time to answer late and as well to appear in No. 1452.
The motion to strike default dated April 25 was an attempt by the defendant (1) to reopen the denial in April of his late entry motion of March, and (2) to strike the default execution (and of course with it the default judgment) from the record. In my view, only the first request was open to the defendant. He contends that his failure to appear for hearing in April was excusable. This issue was found in his favor by the Court. On the record I would hold that this finding was implicit in the decision and was within the Court’s discretion. The Court was entitled to accept the statement of defendant’s counsel in the *544letter forming part of the record, as follows:
“The Plaintiff (sic) was advised by the Clerk of Court that the Motion would be placed on the Motion List for hearing and that notice would be sent to the Attorneys on both sides, as was the usual procedure followed by the Court.
“The matter was not placed on the Motion List, nor was any notice of hearing sent to either counsel. The Plaintiff appeared on the return day of the April term of Court and Defaulted the Defendant for not being present.”
In short, the defendant says, (1) that he made an excusable error in not answering and appearing in March, to which he pleads excusable neglect, and (2) that he failed to appear on April 4 for the hearing in reliance on the action of the Clerk of Courts. The denial of the March motion for late entry must first be stricken to enable him to proceed to hearing thereon on the merits of “excusable neglect.”
The record is unsatisfactory and confusing, and led, I believe, to a misunderstanding of the relief available to the defendant. It was not prepared in accordance with then Rule 75(m), now Rule 74(n) M.R.C.P. See Gibson v. McMillin, 157 Me. 239, 170 A.2d 414 (1961), relating to appeals when no stenographic report was made. I would sustain the appeal and remand for order striking the denial of the March motion from the record and for hearing of the March motion on the merits.
The issue of excusable neglect for failure to appear and plead as a ground for striking the default judgment would in such event be heard for the first time by the Court. The defendant must establish his excusable neglect; and this he has not yet done.