Court Opinion

ID: 9699579
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:34:28.841764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:53.428144
License: Public Domain

OPINION OF THE COURT
JONES, Chief Justice.
Appellant, manufacturer of large over-the-road tractors, was held liable under Section 402A of Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) for the injuries sustained by the appellee in a one-vehicle accident. The Superior Court affirmed and we granted allocatur limited to the issue of the availability of contributory negligence as a defense to a 402A action.
*15Appellee was injured while driving a tractor manufactured by appellant. The design of the steering mechanism of the tractor made the vehicle unusually difficult to maneuver. Specifically, twelve to fifteen percent more mechanical effort than that normally expended had to be applied to the steering wheel to accomplish any given turn. Appellee, after driving the vehicle for several hours, stopped for an equipment check on the blacktopped shoulder of the Pennsylvania Turnpike. After completing the inspection the appellee proceeded to reenter the Turnpike.
Unrelated to any steering difficulty appellee struck a guardrail adjoining the shoulder with the right front tire of the tractor. This collision caused the steering wheel to spin rapidly in the direction opposite to the turn. The spokes of the spinning steering wheel struck appellee’s right arm, fracturing his wrist and forearm. Evidence adduced at trial indicated that the force and speed of the steering wheel’s counterrotation were directly related to the design of the steering mechanism.
For the purposes of this appeal appellant concedes the defect in the steering system’s design, but argues that appellee’s contributory negligence in colliding with the guardrail should at least be considered in determining appellee’s recovery. We disagree and affirm.
In Webb v. Zern, 422 Pa. 424, 220 A.2d 853. (1966), this Court adopted Section 402A of the Restatement and in Ferraro v. Ford Motor Co., 423 Pa. 324, 223 A.2d 746 (1966), permitted the assertion of assumption of the risk as a defense to a 402A action, citing with approval comment n to Section 402A. Today, we complete our acceptance of the principles delineated in comment n1 by re*16jecting contributory negligence as an available defense in 402A cases.2
Appellant’s position that contributory negligence should affect 402A liability could have two possible applications. Either contributory negligence should serve to diminish any recovery in an amount adjudged equal to a plaintiff’s lack of care, or as in most other tort actions, contributory negligence should be available as a complete defense to liability.
Acceptance of the appellant’s first alternative would create a system of comparative assessment of damages for 402A actions. Neither the General Assembly by statute nor this Court by case law has established such a scheme of comparative negligence in other areas of tort law. Without considering the relative merits of comparative negligence, we think it unwise to embrace the theory in the context of an appeal involving Section 402A.3
Adoption of contributory negligence as a complete defense in 402A actions would defeat one theoretical basis for our acceptance of Section 402A.4 “Our courts have determined that a manufacturer by marketing and advertising his products impliedly represents that it is safe for its intended use.” Salvador v. Atlantic Steel Boiler Co., 457 Pa. 24, 32, 319 A.2d 903, 907 (1974). Based on that implied representation is the consumer’s assumption that a manufacturer’s goods are safe. Recognition of consumer negligence as a defense to a 402A action would *17contradict this normal expectation of product safety. One does not inspect a product for defects or guard against the possibility of product defects when one assumes the item to be safe. The law should not require such inspection or caution when it has accepted as reasonable the consumer’s anticipation of safety. We reject contributory negligence as a defense to actions grounded in Section 402A.5
Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice ROBERTS did not participate in the consideration or decision of this case.
Mr. Justice POMEROY filed a concurring opinion.

. The portion of comment n relevant to this opinion is as follows:
“Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence.”

. Recently, we did suggest our rejection of contributory negligence as a defense to 402A liability in Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893, (filed May 13, 1975), per Mr. Chief Justice Jones with Mr. Justice Eagen, Mr. Justice O’Brien and Mr. Justice Manderino concurring in the result and Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Pomeroy filing separate concurring opinions.

. To initially apply a theory of comparative negligence to an area of the law in which liability is not premised on negligence seems particularly inappropriate.

. See Kassab v. Central Soya Co., 432 Pa. 217, 230 n. 6, 246 A.2d 848, 854 n. 6 (1968).

. Cf. Federoff v. Harrison Construction Co., 362 Pa. 181, 86 A.2d 817 (1949), wherein we adopted Section 519 of the Restatement of Torts (1938), which excluded contributory negligence as a defense to an action involving ultrahazardous activity. See also Lobozzo v. Adam Eidemiller Co., 437 Pa. 360, 263 A.2d 432 (1970); Section 484, Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965), and Annot., 46 A.L.R. 3d 240 (1972).