Court Opinion

ID: 9628573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:25:00.565511+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:08.104935
License: Public Domain

BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the reasoning and conclusion of the lead opinion, but do so with reservations because the analysis and conclusion are based on a faulty precedential foundation. The majority has found that the district court erred in granting Scott Wynne habeas relief on the ground that the state court denied Wynne his constitutional right to present a defense. The state court refused under state evidentiary rule 404(b) to admit evidence that Wynne proffered to show that a third party committed the murder and framed Wynne for its commission. As the majority states, we cannot grant habeas relief solely because we disagree with a state court’s interpretation of its own evidentiary rules. Rather, in order to grant habeas in this case, we must find that the state court’s application of its evidentiary rules (1) were arbitrary and disproportionate to the purpose the state rule was designed to serve, and (2) deprived Wynne of his Sixth Amendment right to present a defense.1 Further, as the majority correctly points out, in United States v. Lucas, 357 F.3d 599, 606 (6th Cir.2004) we held that the identical 404(b) analysis engaged in by the Michigan state court also applies in this Court “generally ... in cases where such evidence is used with respect to an absent third party not charged with any crime.” Because it makes no sense to contend that it violates the Constitution for a state court to apply an evidentiary rule in a certain way but that a federal court can, I cannot dissent from the majority’s opinion.2 Thus, I must concur, but I do not like the result we reach.
However, I write separately because I believe that the Lucas opinion was wrongly decided. As was pointed out in the concurrence to the Lucas opinion, there is a split among the circuits regarding the appropriate standard to apply to reverse 404(b) admitted evidence. Lucas, 357 F.3d at 612. The majority of circuits have rightly held that Rule 404(b) primarily exists to protect a criminal defendant from the prejudice of propensity taint and *873should not be applied in cases where, as here, the defendant offers prior-act evidence of a third-party to prove some fact relevant to his defense.3 Only two other circuits have taken the approach of the Lucas majority, holding that the plain language of the rule, “[ejvidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith”, Fed. R.Evid. 404(b) (emphasis added), protects every person, not just the criminal defendant or a victim.
Rule 404(b) was born of the common law in an effort to protect parties from wrongful inferences derived from character evidence. The “reason for the inadmissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is that such evidence is irrelevant to prove the conduct in question.” 22 Charles A. Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure § 5239 (1st ed.1978) (noting that it “has long been accepted in our law ... [tjhat the doing of one act is in itself no evidence that the same or a like act was again done by the same person.” Charles Wigmore, Wig-more’s Code of the Rules of Evidence in Trials at Law § 192, p. 642 (3d ed.1940) (emphasis added)). Although this logic could theoretically apply equally to defendants, victims, or third parties, Wigmore points out that the common law rule barring prior bad act evidence existed to prevent the inference that a “defendant in a criminal case” perpetrated the “criminal act charged.” Charles Wigmore, Wigmore’s Code of the Rules of Evidence in Trials at Law §§ 355-56, p. 81. (3d ed.1942); See also United States v. Dudek, 560 F.2d 1288, 1295-96 (6th Cir.1977) (stating that Rule 404(b) restates the common law). Furthermore, history makes clear that the policy underlying the rule at common law sought to protect the criminal defendant See Wright & Graham, Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence § 5239, pp. 436-39 (1978). Moreover, although the 404(b) Advisory Committee Notes do not clarify the meaning of “a person”, they generally discuss prosecutorial use of propensity evidence against a defendant and the use of propensity evidence to show that a victim “had it coming.” The notes give no indication that *874they were intended to protect any other party.
We have summarized the policy concerns driving Rule 404(b), noting that “two concerns are expressed by the first sentence of Rule 404(b): (1) that the jury may convict a ‘bad man’ ... and (2) that the jury will infer that because the accused committed other crimes, he probably committed the crime charged.” United States v. Phillips, 599 F.2d 134, 136 (6th Cir. 1979) (emphasis added). In short, 404(b) deals with (a) concerns that a jury will make prejudicial inferences based upon someone being a “bad guy” and thus convict a defendant and (b) logically dubious inferences based upon an imagined connection between past acts and current ones.
Generally, the concern with dubious inferences applies to defendants and to third parties, as it is equally irrational to assume that, because either a defendant or third party committed a past bad act, he is somehow connected to a particular current bad act. Here, this concern seems equally applicable to both Wynne and Peckham.
However, the prejudice concern does not apply equally to a defendant and a third party not being tried for a crime. Specifically, a third party not on trial for a crime is in no danger whatsoever that the jury will convict him for being a “bad man.” Thus, here and in probably most reverse evidence cases, one of 404(b)’s two justifications would vanish completely. In such a situation, one wonders if, left with only one pillar to support it, the whole structure of 404(b) collapses under the weight of a defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense.4 Most circuits have found that it does. See supra n. 3. Given the great weight that our Constitution and society place on the right to present a defense, if the policy reasons driving 404(b) are considerably weakened — as they are in cases of reverse 404(b) evidence — in the majority of circumstances, the constitutional right to present a defense easily trumps the sole remaining 404(b) interest. This Court is clearly on the losing side of the equation. It is my hope that this Court and other courts will see the wisdom of distinguishing close cases involving important Sixth Amendment questions from Lucas and will admit 404(b) evidence under a simple relevancy-balancing test, thus erring on the side of allowing defendants to present their best defense.
Had this Court correctly decided the reverse 404(b) evidence question in Lucas, then we could have reached the question of whether the state court ran afoul of Wynne’s constitutional rights in applying its evidentiary rules to exclude some of his proffered evidence. Were I hearing this ease on direct appeal, I would have no *875difficulty — given the state’s greatly diminished evidentiary interest — in finding that the state court erred in not permitting Wynne to present some or all of the excluded evidence in crafting his defense. I recognize, however, that AEDPA requires a more exacting level of deference. Regardless, I believe that the same interest that would require admission of this evidence in a direct appeal case applies equally to Wynne’s habeas attack. The fact that, as a third party, there is no risk that Peekham would be unfairly convicted for being a “bad person” drastically reduces the need to exclude the questionable evidence, while Wynne’s need to present a defense remains just as weighty.5 Thus, sitting in habeas, but for Lucas, I would find that the evidence was excluded in violation of Wynne’s constitutional rights.
However, as this panel is bound by the decisions of a prior panel, no matter how illogical,61 must concur.

. The majority discusses the fact that this case involves a state court applying state evidentiary rules. It is true that Michigan has never adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence per se, but as the Michigan Rules of Evidence advisory notes state, "MRE 404(b) is identical with Rule 404b of the Federal Rules of Evidence except that the word 'plan' is replaced by the phrase 'scheme, plan, or system in doing an act,’ and there is added the phrase 'when the same is material, whether such other crime, wrongs, or acts are contemporaneous with, or prior or subsequent to the crime charged.' ” Mich. R. Evid. 404, 1978 advisory committee's note.

. The current case, while similar to Lucas in many respects, also differs in several substantive ways. Thus, I believe that, had this case been brought under federal law, it is easily distinguished from Lucas.

. The First, Second, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have determined that Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) is not applicable to evidence regarding acts of someone other than the defendant. See United States v. Morano, 697 F.2d 923, 926 (11th Cir.1983) (holding that "Rule 404(b) does not specifically apply to exclude ... evidence [that] involves an extraneous offense committed by someone other than the defendant [because] the evidence was not introduced to show that the defendant has a criminal disposition ... so the policies underlying Rule 404(b) are inapplicable.''); United States v. Gonzalez-Sanchez, 825 F.2d 572, 583 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that "Rule 404(b) does not exclude evidence of prior crimes of persons other than the defendant.”); United States v. Sepulveda, 710 F.2d 188, 189 (5th Cir.1983) (holding that Rule 404(b) only applies to acts by the defendant individually.); United States v. Stevens, 935 F.2d 1380, 1401-06 (3d Cir. 1991) (allowing a defendant to introduce "other crimes” evidence against a third-party under Rule 404(b) because "prejudice to the defendant is no longer a factor.”); United States v. Blum, 62 F.3d 63, 68 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that Rule 404(b) permits "admission against third parties of evidence of 'crimes, wrongs or acts’ if used to show 'motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity of absence of mistake or accident.’ ”) (quoting United States v. Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d 906, 911-12 (2d. Cir. 1984)); but see Agushi v. Duerr, 196 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that Rule 404(b) "does apply to third parties.”); United States v. McCourt, 925 F.2d 1229, 1232 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that, "because Rule 404(b) plainly proscribes other crimes evidence of a person, it cannot reasonably be construed as extending only to the accused.”) (internal citations and quotations omitted).

. The absence of prejudice in the context of reverse 404(b) evidence has been emphasized by other circuits. The Second Circuit has noted that:
[W]e believe that the standard of admissibility when a criminal defendant offers similar acts evidence as a shield need not be as restrictive as when the prosecutor uses such evidence as a sword.... [R]isks of prejudice are normally absent when the defendant offers similar acts evidence of a third-party to prove some fact pertinent in the defense. In such cases the only issue arising under 404(b) is whether the evidence is relevant to the existence or non-existence of some fact pertinent to the defense.
Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d at 911-12 (internal citations omitted). The Third Circuit makes similar observations:
[W]hen the defendant is offering [other crimes testimony], prejudice to the defendant is no longer a factor, and simple relevance to guilt or innocence should suffice as the standard of admissibility, since ordinarily, and subject to rules of competency, an accused in entitled to advance in his defense any evidence which may rationally tend to refute his guilt or buttress his innocence of the charge made.
Stevens, 935 F.2d at 1401 (citation omitted).

. It is true that Wynne was permitted to present some evidence regarding Peckham’s alleged scheme to murder. However, given that some of the excluded evidence would have helped Wynne show that Peekham had (1) suffered a mental breakdown, (2) declined psychologically since that time, (3) allegedly attempted to frame someone else for a crime he had committed in the past, and (4) other evidence tending to substantiate Wynne’s defense, its probative value was likely substantial.

. A published prior panel decision “remains controlling authority unless an inconsistent decision of the United States Supreme Court requires modification of the decision or this Court sitting en banc overrules the prior decision.” Rutherford v. Columbia Gas, 575 F.3d 616, 619 (6th Cir.2009) (citing Salmi v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 689 (6th Cir. 19 85)).