Court Opinion

ID: 9958253
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-08 17:01:00.105248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:07.362766
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        APR 8 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHELLI R. NELSON-ROBERTS,                       No.    23-35076

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No. 3:22-cv-05316-BAT

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MARTIN J. O'MALLEY, Commissioner of
Social Security,

                Defendant-Appellee.

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Western District of Washington
                   Brian Tsuchida, Magistrate Judge, Presiding

                             Submitted April 4, 2024**
                                Portland, Oregon

Before: OWENS and FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judges, and RAYES,*** District
Judge.

      Shelli R. Nelson-Roberts appeals from the district court decision affirming

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
      ***
             The Honorable Douglas L. Rayes, United States District Judge for the
District of Arizona, sitting by designation.
the Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of her application for social security

disability insurance benefits. We affirm.

      We review de novo a district court’s order affirming a denial of social

security benefits. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 720 (9th Cir. 1998). We will

reverse only if the decision of the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) “was not

supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the

wrong legal standard.” Ahearn v. Saul, 988 F.3d 1111, 1115 (9th Cir. 2021)

(quoting Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 2012)).

      Nelson-Roberts argues that the revised regulations for evaluating the

opinions of treating providers are invalid, that the ALJ improperly discounted her

and her wife’s testimony, that the ALJ erred by failing to discuss the observations

of a Social Security Administration (“SSA”) field officer, and that the ALJ

erroneously evaluated certain medical opinions. She argues that these errors

resulted in an erroneous residual functioning capacity and disability determination.

      1. The revised regulations regarding the evaluation of treating and

examining physicians, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c, are valid under the Social Security

Act, and they are not arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure

Act. Cross v. O’Malley, 89 F.4th 1211, 1216-17 (9th Cir. 2024).

      2. The ALJ did not err in evaluating Nelson-Roberts’s testimony. Absent

evidence of malingering, an ALJ must provide “specific, clear, and convincing

                                            2
reasons” for discounting a claimant’s testimony about her symptoms. Ahearn, 988

F.3d at 1116 (quoting Smolen v. Chater, 80 F.3d 1273, 1281 (9th Cir. 1996)). That

standard is met here: The ALJ reasonably concluded that Nelson-Roberts’s

activities—including renovating her rental house, going to church, shopping,

engaging in metalwork, going on vacations, taking her children to various places,

and attending classes—undermined her testimony that her symptoms were

completely debilitating, that she lacked motivation or concentration, and that she

was unable to interact with others. The ALJ’s conclusion was further supported by

the statement from a previous therapist expressing concern about Nelson-Roberts’s

“manipulation,” as well as a concern that Nelson-Roberts was “looking for social

security [and] that this desire is interfering [with] treatment [and] making

progress.” For the same reasons, the ALJ did not err in rejecting the testimony of

Nelson-Roberts’s wife.

      3. The ALJ was not required to specifically articulate reasons for

discounting the observations of Grenier-Will, the SSA field officer. 20 C.F.R.

§ 404.1520c(d).

      4. The ALJ did not err in evaluating the medical opinions of Dr. Godbole,

Summers, and Eggsware that Nelson-Roberts’s symptoms would prevent her from

working. The ALJ’s conclusion that these opinions were inconsistent with Nelson-

Roberts’s activities of daily living is supported by substantial evidence.

                                          3
      5. The ALJ did not err in evaluating the opinions of Dr. Titus and Dr.

Solomon. Dr. Titus and Dr. Solomon opined that Nelson-Roberts had a fair ability

to function in an unskilled (one- to two-step) work environment. The ALJ

determined that these limitations were overly restrictive. Given Nelson-Roberts’s

daily activities, that conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.

      6. The ALJ’s residual functioning capacity determination is supported by

substantial evidence. The ALJ did not err in evaluating any of the evidence

discussed above, and Nelson-Roberts has not challenged any other aspect of that

determination.

      AFFIRMED.

                                          4