Court Opinion

ID: 9954560
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 16:11:18.214802+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:53.405941
License: Public Domain

J-A28021-23

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  THEIN T. TRAN                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 3001 EDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered October 24, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
               Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0006983-2018

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  THEIN T. TRAN                                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 3168 EDA 2022

                Appeal from the Order Entered December 9, 2022
              In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
               Criminal Division at No: CP-51-CR-0006983-2018

BEFORE:      OLSON, J., STABILE, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                             FILED MARCH 26, 2024

       Appellant, Thein T. Tran, appeals from the orders entered in the Court

of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County, denying his petition under the Post

Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Upon review, we

affirm.

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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      On September 20, 2019, following a bench trial, Appellant was convicted

of three sexual offenses for assaulting a woman at a nightclub. Specifically,

      [f]irst [Appellant] repeatedly groped [victim]’s behind on a club’s
      dance floor near the bar area, although she repeatedly pushed his
      hands away; at least once, [Appellant] groped through [victim]’s
      clothes and touched her skin near her vagina. This was indecent
      assault. Second, [Appellant] followed [victim] into the women’s
      bathroom and pushed his way into her bathroom stall, pulled down
      her pants, and began to perform oral sex on her. She quickly
      pushed his head away.          This was sexual assault.        Third,
      [Appellant] informed [victim], “It’s too late,” and shoved his finger
      inside of her vagina. This was aggravated indecent assault.

Trial Court Letter, 1/13/23, at 1-2 (footnotes omitted).

      The trial court found that Appellant’s conduct constituted three separate

criminal acts within the same criminal episode. Accordingly, on February 25,

2020, the trial court sentenced Appellant in absentia to consecutive terms of

6 to 12 months in prison for indecent assault, 4½ to 9 years for sexual assault,

and 4½ to 9 years for aggravated indecent assault. Appellant did not file a

direct appeal.

      On February 23, 2021, Appellant filed a counseled timely petition for

post-conviction relief, claiming that trial counsel was ineffective for: (1) not

moving for a mistrial when a witness testified about defendant’s prior

conviction, (2) agreeing to sentencing in absentia, and (3) not presenting

certain eyewitness testimony. The PCRA court denied the petition. Appellant

appealed, but later discontinued that appeal on February 7, 2022.

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       On July 21, 2022, defendant filed the underlying petition, which he

styled as a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that his convictions

should have merged for sentencing purposes. The trial court denied the

petition.1 This appeal followed.

       On appeal, Appellant argues that his sentence is illegal because the trial

court failed to merge his sentences for sexual assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3124.1,

____________________________________________

1 The trial court first denied the July 21, 2022 by order docketed on October

24, 2022. There is no written order, however, in the certified record for the
October 24, 2022 docket entry. On November 16, 2022, Appellant filed a
notice of appeal (3031 EDA 2022) from the order denying Appellant’s July 21,
2022 “Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence.”

On December 9, 2022, the trial court entered again an order denying the July
21, 2022 motion. A written copy of the order is included in the certified record.
On December 12, 2022, Appellant filed a notice of appeal (3168 EDA 2022)
from the order denying Appellant’s July 21, 2022 “Motion to Correct Illegal
Sentence.”

On March 28, 2022, in 3168 EDA 2022, this Court issued a rule to show cause
why the appeal at 3168 EDA 2022 should not be dismissed as duplicative of
3001 EDA 2022. Appellant responded, asking this Court not to dismiss either
appeal and to grant his prior January 4, 2023 application to consolidate the
appeals.

On May 8, 2023, in 3168 EDA 2022, this Court discharged the show cause
Order to the merits panel for review. On the same date, in both appeals, this
Court entered a separate order denying Appellant’s application to consolidate
the appeals and directed this Court’s Prothonotary to list both appeals
consecutively.

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and aggravated indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3125(a), (a)(1).              We

disagree.2

       Before we can address the merits of the claim, we must determine

whether the underlying PCRA petition is timely. Upon review, for the reasons

stated below, we conclude that the underlying petition is untimely, and as

such, we are prevented from reviewing the merits.

____________________________________________

2 When reviewing the propriety of an order pertaining to PCRA relief,

       we consider the record in the light most favorable to the prevailing
       party at the PCRA level. This Court is limited to determining
       whether the evidence of record supports the conclusions of the
       PCRA court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. We grant
       great deference to the PCRA court’s findings that are supported in
       the record and will not disturb them unless they have no support
       in the certified record. However, we afford no such deference to
       the post-conviction court’s legal conclusions. We thus apply a de
       novo standard of review to the PCRA [c]ourt’s legal conclusions.

Commonwealth v. Diaz, 183 A.3d 417, 421 (Pa. Super. 2018) (internal
citations and quotations omitted).

All PCRA petitions, “including a second or subsequent petition, shall be filed
within one year of the date the judgment becomes final” unless an exception
to timeliness exists. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). The one-year time limitation
can be overcome if a petitioner (1) alleges and proves one of the three
exceptions set forth in Section 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) of the PCRA, and (2) files a
petition raising this exception within one year of the date the claim could have
been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). “The PCRA’s time restrictions
are jurisdictional in nature. Thus, if a PCRA petition is untimely, neither this
Court nor the [PCRA] court has jurisdiction over the petition. Without
jurisdiction, we simply do not have the legal authority to address the
substantive claims.” Commonwealth v. Chester, 895 A.2d 520, 522 (Pa.
2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (overruled on other
grounds by Commonwealth v. Small, 238 A.3d 1267 (Pa. 2020)).

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      Appellant filed the underlying petition, styled as a motion to correct an

illegal sentence, on July 21, 2022. The lower court addressed the merits of

the “motion,” despite being “filed more than two years after his sentence was

imposed,” Trial Court Letter, 1/13/23, at 1, on the erroneous belief that the

claim raised by Appellant was a “nonwaivable issue.” While we agree with the

lower court that Appellant is not entitled to relief, we disagree with the basis

upon which the court dismissed Appellant’s petition.

      First, the lower court erred in not recognizing that, generally, once a

judgment of sentence is final, the only way to challenge the judgment of

sentence is through a PCRA petition. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Taylor,

65 A.3d 462, 465-66 (Pa. Super. 2013). Generally, any filings filed after the

judgment of sentence is final are treated as PCRA petitions. Id.

      The claim raised here (merger/legality of the sentence), regardless of

how it was styled, falls within the purview of the PCRA, and it should have

been treated as a PCRA petition. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Fahy, 737

A.2d 214, 223 (Pa. 1999); Taylor, supra; Commonwealth v. Jackson, 30

A.3d 516, 521 (Pa. Super. 2011) (defendant’s motion to correct his illegal

sentence was properly addressed as a PCRA petition, stating broadly, “any

petition filed after the judgment of sentence becomes final will be treated as

a PCRA petition”).

      In turn, the first error resulted in additional errors by the lower court.

Indeed, the lower court failed to establish that the filing was a second PCRA

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petition and, therefore, subject to the PCRA’s time limitations rules.      See,

e.g., Fahy, supra. Finally, the lower court failed to recognize that “[a]lthough

legality of sentence is always subject to review within the PCRA, claims must

still first satisfy the PCRA's time limits or one of the exceptions thereto.” Id.

at 223.

       Here, it is undisputed that the claim is facially untimely.3 Appellant,

therefore, had to plead and prove the applicability of the exceptions to the

PCRA’s time-bar. Appellant does not address any of the exceptions to the

PCRA time bar rules, whether in the underlying petition or on appeal.          He

merely argues that the legality of sentence claim cannot be waived and is not

subject to the timeliness restrictions of the PCRA.4      Appellant’s Brief at 2.

There is no statute or case that supports Appellant’s claim. Yet, Appellant

believes that Commonwealth v. Adams, 504 A.2d 1264, 1269 (Pa. 1986)

(cited for the proposition that illegality can be raised at any time) supports his

claim. Even a cursory reading of Adams would have easily disclosed that

Adams does not involve a collateral proceeding. Notably, Appellant did not

____________________________________________

3 Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final at the expiration of the time

to file a direct appeal with the Superior Court, which, in the instant matter
was March 25, 2020. Appellant had one year from that date to file a timely
PCRA (i.e., by March 25, 2021). The underlying petition, which was filed on
July 21, 2022, is over a year late.

4 Appellant does not contend that the legality of sentence is a challenge
outside the purview of the PCRA.

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attempt to explain why Adams would apply in PCRA situations or even

acknowledging the differences in raising a challenge to the legality of the

sentence on direct appeal as opposed to collateral proceedings.5

       Because Appellant failed to plead and prove the timeliness of his July

21, 2022 petition, we are constrained to conclude that the petition is untimely,

and not subject to further review.

       To the extent the petition can be deemed timely, we agree with the

lower court’s assessment of Appellant’s claim.     As noted, Appellant argues

that, for sentencing purposes, his sexual assault conviction merged with the

aggravated indecent assault.6

       Merger is governed by 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765, which provides:

       No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unless the crimes
       arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory elements
       of one offense are included in the statutory elements of the other
       offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing purposes, the court
       may sentence the defendant only on the higher graded offense.

42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9765 (Merger of sentences).

____________________________________________

5 Additionally, Appellant alleges that merger error complained herein qualifies

as a “patent mistake,” Appellant’s Brief at 2, and that it triggered the trial
court power to correct patent and obvious mistakes. Yet, Appellant fails to
share with us how he reached such a bold conclusion. To this end, we note
that analyzing the alleged patent mistake in light, inter alia, of
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 933 A.2d 57 (Pa. 2007), would have been very
helpful.

6 Appellant does not argue that his indecent assault conviction for groping the

victim on the dance floor merged with any other conviction.

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       The statute’s mandate is clear. It prohibits merger unless two distinct

facts are present: 1) the crimes arise from a single criminal act, and 2) all the

statutory elements of one of the offenses are included in the statutory

elements of the other. See Commonwealth v. Baldwin, 985 A.2d 830, 833

(Pa. 2009).

       Appellant cannot meet either of the requirements for merger. First, as

noted by the trial court,7 his crimes did not arise from a single act.

       When considering whether there is a single criminal act or multiple
       criminal acts, the question is not whether there was a break in the
       chain of criminal activity. Th[e] issue is whether the actor commits
       multiple criminal acts beyond that which is necessary to establish
       the bare elements of the additional crime, [and if so,] then the
       actor will be guilty of multiple crimes which do not merge for
       sentencing purposes.

Commonwealth v. Pettersen, 49 A.3d 903, 912 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal

denied, 63 A.3d 776 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations and quotation marks

omitted).

       Here, relative to the issue on appeal, Appellant committed two separate

assaults.   Specifically, Appellant performed nonconsensual oral sex on the

victim after following her in the bathroom (sexual assault), and subsequently

digitally penetrated her vagina (aggravated indecent assault). While these

assaults occurred in rapid sequence, they were separate acts that did not

merge. See id.

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7 See Trial Court Letter, 1/13/23, at 1-2.

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      Appellant also argues that the assaults constituted a single criminal act

as the conduct involved the same orifice. The claim is meritless.

      As noted by the Commonwealth, “[t]o the contrary, the different

methods of assault here plainly separate the offenses.” Commonwealth’s Brief

at 7 (citing Commonwealth v. Dove, 301 A.3d 427, 435 (Pa. Super. 2023)

(the Commonwealth alleged “digital penetration, to support a charge of

aggravated indecent assault of a child, that were distinct and delineated from

the conduct supporting the rape of a child charges”), Commonwealth v.

Loucks, 2023 WL 3167877, at *3 (Pa. Super. May 1, 2023) (“the record

reflects that Louck’s crimes did not arise from a single criminal act, as Loucks

digitally penetrated A.M.C.’s vagina prior to inserting his penis into her

vagina”)).

      Second, sexual assault and aggravated indecent assault do not merge

because the statutory elements of the offenses are different.            Digital

penetration is not an element of sexual assault, but it is an element of

aggravated indecent assault.     See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3124.1, 3125(a)(1);

Commonwealth v. Kelley, 801 A.2d 551, 558 (Pa. 2002). Likewise, sexual

intercourse is an element of sexual assault, but it is not an element of

aggravated indecent assault.    Id.; Dove, 301 A.3d at 433-34. Therefore,

because Appellant’s convictions arose from different separate criminal acts

and both offenses contain an element that the other lacks, they do not merge

for sentencing purposes. Baldwin, supra.

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      In conclusion, Appellant is not entitled to relief because the underlying

petition is untimely.     To the extent it can be deemed timely, the

merger/legality of sentence claim raised therein is meritless. Accordingly, we

affirm the order of the lower court denying Appellant’s petition.

      Order affirmed.

Date: 3/26/2024

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