Court Opinion

ID: 9390621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-28 00:02:27.417533+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:35.782321
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-70006      Document: 00516729651         Page: 1     Date Filed: 04/27/2023

            United States Court of Appeals
                 for the Fifth Circuit
                                 ____________                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                         Fifth Circuit

                                                                       FILED
                                  No. 22-70006                     April 27, 2023
                                 ____________
                                                                  Lyle W. Cayce
   Brent Ray Brewer,                                                   Clerk

                                                            Petitioner—Appellant,

                                       versus

   Bobby Lumpkin, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
   Correctional Institutions Division,

                                             Respondent—Appellee.
                   ______________________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Northern District of Texas
                             USDC No. 2:15-CV-50
                   ______________________________

   Before Jones, Oldham, and Wilson, Circuit Judges.
   Edith H. Jones, Circuit Judge:
          Brent Ray Brewer was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
   death by a Texas court in 1991. The United States Supreme Court ordered
   Brewer resentenced in 2007. After he was sentenced to death a second time,
   Brewer exhausted his state remedies and then petitioned for federal habeas
   relief. The district court denied his petition and did not certify any questions
   for appellate review.     Brewer now seeks a certificate of appealability
   (“COA”) under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). For the following reasons, we
   DENY his application for a COA.
Case: 22-70006       Document: 00516729651         Page: 2   Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                    No. 22-70006

                                 I. Background
            On April 26, 1990, then 19-year-old Brent Brewer and his girlfriend,
   Kristie Nystrom, approached Robert Laminack outside his flooring store in
   Amarillo, Texas and asked for a ride to the Salvation Army. Laminack invited
   the young couple to get in his truck; Nystrom took the front seat, and Brewer
   sat in the back. While en route, Brewer grabbed Laminack and began to stab
   him in the neck with a butterfly knife. Laminack begged for his life while
   obeying Brewer’s demand to hand over his keys and wallet. He was wounded
   in the carotid artery and jugular vein. After losing consciousness, he bled to
   death.
            In 1991, Brewer was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to
   death. A multi-year saga of direct and collateral challenges to his conviction
   and sentence ended in 2007 when the United States Supreme Court, ruling
   on the adequacy of jury instructions for the sentencing phase, ordered that
   Brewer be resentenced. See Brewer v. Quarterman, 550 U.S. 286, 127 S. Ct.
   1706 (2007).
            In a 2009 retrial of the sentencing, the state presented many of the
   same witnesses and evidence as it had at Brewer’s first capital murder trial.
   These included: Robert Laminack’s widow and daughter; numerous crime
   scene photographs; blood spatter testimony and other physical evidence,
   such as Brewer’s bloody fingerprint on the butterfly knife found at the crime
   scene; testimony that Brewer “smirked and giggled” when describing to a
   witness how Laminack begged for his life; testimony that Brewer told a
   former cellmate that Laminack pleaded “please don’t kill me, Boy” as
   Brewer stabbed him; and a photograph of Brewer “shooting the finger” while
   exiting the courthouse around the time of his arraignment for Laminack’s
   murder. Dr. Richard Coons, a forensic psychiatrist, testified that there was

                                          2
Case: 22-70006      Document: 00516729651          Page: 3    Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                    No. 22-70006

   a probability that Brewer would commit criminal acts of violence in the
   future, as he had opined before at Brewer’s 1991 trial.
           Unlike in 1991, Kristie Nystrom, Brewer’s former girlfriend and
   accomplice in the murder of Robert Laminack, agreed to testify in order to
   obtain a favorable parole consideration. Nystrom gave a chilling firsthand
   account of the killing, which contained details the 1991 jury did not hear, such
   as that Brewer began to stab Laminack before asking for his wallet or truck
   keys.
           The defense presented testimony from Brewer’s mother and sister,
   who described Brewer’s childhood and teenage years, and numerous
   correctional officers, who testified that Brewer had been an exemplary inmate
   for nearly two decades both on and off death row. The defense also used
   Dr. John Edens, a forensic psychologist, to attack Dr. Coons’s methodology
   as having no basis in legitimate science. Finally, in order to counter the
   state’s aggravating evidence and show Brewer’s remorse, the defense put
   Brewer on the stand. He described his childhood, his former relationship
   with Kristie Nystrom, and the murder of Robert Laminack. He said he was
   sorry for what he had done to Laminack and his family.
           A unanimous jury again found beyond a reasonable doubt that there
   was a probability that Brewer would commit criminal acts of violence that
   would constitute a continuing threat to society. The jury also found that the
   mitigating evidence presented by defense counsel was insufficient to merit a
   life sentence. The trial court resentenced Brewer to death.
           The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals (“TCCA”) affirmed Brewer’s
   sentence. See Brewer v. State, 2011 WL 5881612 (Tex. Crim. App. Nov. 23,
   2011). Brewer then sought state habeas corpus review. The state trial court
   held an evidentiary hearing and received testimony from Dr. Coons and
   Brewer’s two 2009 trial counsel: Anthony Odiorne and Edward Keith, Jr.

                                          3
Case: 22-70006        Document: 00516729651              Page: 4      Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                         No. 22-70006

   The court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommendation
   that the TCCA deny habeas relief.                      The TCCA adopted that
   recommendation in large part and denied relief. 1 See Ex parte Brewer,
   2014 WL 5388114 (Tex. Crim. App. Sept. 17, 2014).
           In March 2020, nearly thirty years after he murdered Robert
   Laminack, Brewer filed his second amended petition for a writ of habeas
   corpus in federal district court, asserting fourteen claims for relief. 2
   The district court adopted and supplemented the magistrate judge’s
   extensive findings, conclusions, and recommendations, denied all claims for
   relief, and declined to grant Brewer’s request for a COA. Brewer renews his
   application for a COA in this court.
           II. Standard for Certificate of Appealability
           Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
   (“AEDPA”), a state court prisoner must obtain a COA before appealing a
   federal district court’s denial of habeas relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A).
   This is warranted upon a “substantial showing of the denial of a
   constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). In Miller-El v. Cockrell, the Supreme
   Court clarified: “The petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists
   would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims
   debatable or wrong.” 537 U.S. 322, 338, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 1040 (2003).
   As held by the Supreme Court, the grant or denial of a COA turns not on the
           _____________________
           1
            The TCCA did not adopt two paragraphs of legal conclusions pertaining to a
   disputed autopsy report, which is not at issue in this petition.
           2
             In 2018, Brewer filed a petition for habeas relief in federal district court and
   moved to hold his case in abeyance while he returned to state court to exhaust state habeas
   remedies on new claims. Brewer v. Davis, 2018 WL 4585357 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2018).
   The district court granted the motion, and the TCCA subsequently dismissed Brewer’s
   new claims under state writ-abuse principles without considering the merits. Ex parte
   Brewer, 2019 WL 5420444 (Tex. Crim. App. Oct. 23, 2019).

                                               4
Case: 22-70006      Document: 00516729651           Page: 5    Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                     No. 22-70006

   ultimate merits of a petitioner’s claims but on whether “a threshold inquiry
   into [their] underlying merit” finds the claims “debatable.” Id. at 327, 336,
   123 S. Ct. at 1034, 1039; see also Buck v. Davis, 580 U.S. 100, 114–16,
   137 S. Ct. 759, 773–74 (2017). Accordingly, this court has made a “general
   assessment” of Brewer’s claims. Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336, 123 S. Ct. at
   1039.
           And in doing so, this court nevertheless “must be mindful of the
   deferential standard of review the district court applied to [the habeas
   petition] as required by . . . AEDPA.” Williams v. Stephens, 761 F.3d 561, 566
   (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting Miniel v. Cockrell, 339 F.3d 331, 336 (5th Cir. 2003))
   (alteration in original). That standard requires that state-court decisions “be
   given the benefit of the doubt.” Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773, 130 S. Ct.
   1855, 1862 (2010).       To prevail, the petitioner must prove that the
   adjudication by the state court “resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
   or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,
   as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a
   decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
   of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”             28 U.S.C.
   § 2254(d). Thus, a “state prisoner must show that the state court’s ruling
   . . . was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and
   comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded
   disagreement.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103, 131 S. Ct. 786–87
   (2011). Further, “the federal court may review the claim based solely on the
   state-court record.”     Shinn v. Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. 1718, 1732 (2022).
   “The petitioner carries the burden of proof” to overcome this standard,
   known as “AEDPA deference,” which is “difficult to meet” by design.
   Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).

                                          5
Case: 22-70006       Document: 00516729651          Page: 6     Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                     No. 22-70006

                                 III. Discussion
          Brewer raises three ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in this
   court: first, that his 2009 counsel failed to properly challenge the state
   expert’s testimony on future dangerousness; second, that counsel neglected
   to develop and present a mitigation defense; and third, that counsel did not
   adequately investigate and rebut the state’s evidence of his prior bad acts.
          To establish that he was denied constitutionally effective assistance of
   counsel, Brewer must demonstrate that “(1) counsel’s representation fell
   below an objective standard of reasonableness and . . . (2) there is a
   reasonable probability that prejudice resulted.” Druery v. Thaler, 647 F.3d
   535, 538 (5th Cir. 2011) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694,
   104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984)). “Both of these prongs must be proven, and
   the failure to prove one of them will defeat the claim, making it unnecessary
   to examine the other prong.” Williams, 761 F.3d at 566–67 (citing Strickland,
   466 U.S. at 687–88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064–65). For the first prong, Brewer
   “must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
   challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.” Strickland,
   466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065 (internal quotation mark omitted).
   To show prejudice, Brewer “must show that there is a reasonable probability
   that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
   would have been different.” Id. at 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2068. This “requires a
   ‘substantial,’ not just ‘conceivable,’ likelihood of a different result.”
   Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 189, 131 S. Ct. at 1403 (quoting Richter, 562 U.S. at 112,
   131 S. Ct. at 791).
          A federal court’s review of a state court’s adjudication on the merits
   of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is “doubly deferential” because
   we “take a highly deferential look at counsel’s performance [under

                                           6
Case: 22-70006        Document: 00516729651              Page: 7       Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                         No. 22-70006

   Strickland] through the deferential lens of § 2254(d).” Id. at 190, 131 S. Ct.
   at 1403 (internal quotation marks omitted).
                    A. Expert Testimony on Future Dangerousness
           Brewer argues that his 2009 trial counsel were ineffective for failing to
   timely object to the expert testimony by Dr. Coons that he constituted a
   future threat to society. Brewer contends that because the TCCA later held
   Dr. Coons’s testimony inadmissible in Coble v. State, 330 S.W.3d 253 (Tex.
   Crim. App. 2010), it likely would have done the same in this case had a timely
   objection been made.
           The state habeas court found that although counsel failed to preserve
   an objection to Dr. Coons’s testimony for appellate review, counsel
   reasonably strategized to prevent Dr. Coons from testifying by attacking his
   methodology at an evidentiary hearing. 3 The court found further that
   counsel’s performance must be “measured against the law in effect at the
   time of trial,” and Coble was decided the year after Brewer’s 2009 retrial.
   By 2009, Dr. Coons had testified in at least sixteen Texas judicial
   proceedings on the special issue of future dangerousness, including Brewer’s
   1991 trial. Coble marked the first time that Dr. Coons’s testimony had been
   deemed inadmissible. 4

           _____________________
           3
            During the voir dire, Brewer’s counsel elicited admissions from Dr. Coons that
   he has a “different definition of criminal act of violence than other people in this field,”
   that he has never performed “any follow-up . . . to determine whether or not [the]
   predictions were accurate,” and that he had not interviewed Brewer in this particular case.
           4
             In fact, Coble’s counsel were ultimately unsuccessful, because the TCCA held
   the admission of Dr. Coons’s testimony there was harmless error. As an aside, the district
   court stated that the TCCA’s “primary reason” in Coble for holding Dr. Coons’s
   testimony inadmissible “was because Dr. Coons had not evaluated the defendant for 18
   years before he testified.” (citing Coble, 330 S.W.3d at 279–80). More completely
   considered, the TCCA found a number of additional significant deficiencies in Dr. Coons’s

                                                7
Case: 22-70006        Document: 00516729651              Page: 8       Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                         No. 22-70006

           Thus, the district court concluded that Brewer’s counsel cannot be
   faulted for lacking the “clairvoyance” “to follow the same strategy that had
   proved unsuccessful during Coble’s . . . retrial.” Of course, “[c]lairvoyance
   is not a required attribute of effective representation.” United States v. Fields,
   565 F.3d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 2009). Reasonable jurists could not debate the
   district court’s conclusion that the state courts did not act unreasonably in
   holding that trial counsel were not ineffective for failing to make what at that
   time would have been a futile objection to the introduction of Dr. Coons’s
   testimony.
           Brewer also alleges that his counsel were ineffective for failing to rebut
   Dr. Coons’s testimony with an alternative expert opinion on his future
   dangerousness. Specifically, Brewer argues that counsel should have enlisted
   Dr. Mark Cunningham, who had previously examined Brewer, or Dr. John
   Edens, the defense’s forensic psychologist, to evaluate Brewer afresh.
           The state habeas court found that Brewer’s counsel executed a
   “reasonable and plausible” strategy to counter Dr. Coons’s testimony: Trial
   counsel would “attack Dr. Coons’s testimony and methodology on cross-
   examination,” and Dr. Edens would “rebut Dr. Coons’s testimony on direct
   examination.” The court articulated several reasons supporting counsel’s
   decision to forego an independent expert evaluation of Brewer. These
   included: (1) the state would then have been entitled to have its own expert
   examine Brewer; (2) the state would likely have attacked the defense expert’s
   evaluation, “which would reflect poorly on [Brewer] and distract from the
   defense’s attack on Dr. Coons”; and (3) the jury may have viewed “the

           _____________________
   testimony, such as Dr. Coons’s failure to cite any “books, articles, journals, or even other
   forensic psychiatrists who practice in this area,” and the dearth of any “objective source
   material in [the] record to substantiate Dr. Coons’s methodology.” Coble, 330 S.W.3d at
   277.

                                                8
Case: 22-70006      Document: 00516729651          Page: 9     Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                    No. 22-70006

   defense expert in the same light as Dr. Coons” or “become lost in the
   science.” Ultimately, Brewer’s counsel opted to focus the jury’s attention
   on the fact that Brewer had not engaged in any violent criminal activity during
   his 18 years of incarceration on death row as the “best evidence” that Brewer
   “was not a future danger.”
          Finally, the state habeas court held that even if counsel’s strategy to
   challenge Dr. Coons’s testimony was unsound, and despite any error in
   preserving an objection for appeal, Brewer has not shown that he was likely
   prejudiced as a result. Specifically, the court concluded that the brutal facts
   of the capital murder offense, in addition to several violent episodes from
   Brewer’s adolescent and adult years, independently supported the jury’s
   verdict on the future dangerousness special issue. Importantly, the 2009 trial
   jury heard eyewitness testimony from both Brewer and Nystrom, who
   provided detailed and consistent accounts of the gruesome murder—
   evidence not presented at the 1991 trial.
          Additionally, the state court found that Dr. Coons’s testimony was
   “not particularly powerful, certain, or strong” because, among other things,
   Dr. Coons admitted before the jury that he had no “statistical data” or
   “research to support his opinion” and that he rarely, if ever, followed up “to
   determine if his predictions were accurate.”              Moreover, Dr. Edens
   “effectively rebutted and refuted” the methodological flaws underlying
   Dr. Coons’s conclusions regarding “predictions of future dangerousness.”
   Dr. Edens emphasized that the predictions are not borne out with any
   statistical significance in the behavior of death row inmates.        He also
   recounted his voluminous scholarship on the subject, as juxtaposed against
   Dr. Coons’s scant curriculum vitae. Thus, the court concluded that neither
   the absence of Dr. Coons’s testimony nor an independent expert evaluation
   submitted on Brewer’s behalf would likely have changed the result.

                                         9
Case: 22-70006     Document: 00516729651             Page: 10     Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                     No. 22-70006

          Reviewing     these     findings     and     the      magistrate      judge’s
   recommendation, which it adopted, the district court held that the state court
   reasonably concluded that counsel’s 2009 trial strategy as to Dr. Coons was
   reasonable under Strickland. The district court alternatively found the state
   court’s rejection of prejudice to be reasonable under Strickland, especially
   considering the jury’s opportunity to assess Brewer’s credibility in light of
   the eyewitness description of the crime’s brutality. No reasonable jurist
   could find the district court’s assessment debatable or wrong. See Slack v.
   McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595, 1604 (2000).
                                B. Mitigating Evidence
          Brewer’s second ineffective assistance claim is based upon his
   counsel’s alleged failure to investigate potentially mitigating evidence or
   prepare an effective mitigation defense. The Supreme Court has interpreted
   the Sixth Amendment to require defense counsel “to make reasonable
   investigations [into potential mitigating evidence] or to make a reasonable
   decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.”               Wiggins v.
   Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521, 123 S. Ct. 2527, 2535 (2003) (quoting Strickland,
   466 U.S. at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066). Brewer argues that he likely would not
   have received the death penalty a second time if the jury had seen additional
   evidence of his troubled childhood coupled with the results of a mental health
   evaluation.
          Specifically, Brewer asserts that an adequate investigation would have
   produced additional mitigating evidence of neglect by his mother during his
   infancy, traumatic incidents of sex play with a male friend and sexual abuse
   by a babysitter, and the “full extent” of his biological father’s “violence and
   depravity.” He alleges further that his counsel should have submitted a
   mental health evaluation, like that performed on him in 1996 by
   Dr. Cunningham, to show that Brewer suffered from mental illness.

                                          10
Case: 22-70006     Document: 00516729651           Page: 11   Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                    No. 22-70006

   Brewer bolsters this claim with a new declaration from 2009 trial counsel
   Odiorne, in which Odiorne states “that the defense team did no investigation
   of Mr. Brewer’s mental health.”
          As an initial matter, neither Dr. Cunningham’s 1996 mental health
   evaluation nor Odiorne’s declaration were part of the state habeas record.
   Because this claim was adjudicated on the merits by the state court, this new
   evidence is barred from federal court consideration under Cullen v. Pinholster.
   563 U.S. at 181, 131 S. Ct. at 1398.       Further, the declaration is wholly
   inconsistent with Odiorne’s testimony before the state habeas court, and, as
   such, is “viewed . . . with extreme suspicion.” Summers v. Dretke, 431 F.3d
   861, 872 (5th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases).
          In rejecting Brewer’s claim, the state habeas court found that his 2009
   counsel properly investigated and presented strong mitigating evidence.
   With the assistance of in-house investigator Rob Cowie, counsel investigated
   and developed a mitigation defense by reviewing the 1991 trial transcript
   along with trial counsel’s notes and by traveling to Mississippi to interview
   Brewer’s mother and sister, both of whom testified.
          The court found that the jury heard evidence of Brewer’s troubled
   childhood. Specifically, counsel presented evidence that Brewer’s biological
   father, Albert Brewer, was absent during Brewer’s formative years. Brewer’s
   step-father, whom his mother married when Brewer was four years old,
   “would repeatedly beat him with an extension cord or a belt,” so Brewer
   “would often run away from home for months at a time in order to get away
   from his step-father.” The jury also learned that Brewer “was diagnosed
   with scoliosis” when he was eleven years old, which required extensive
   surgery, three weeks in the hospital, and eight weeks in a body brace. Because
   this condition prevented him from “playing his beloved sports,” he began
   “hanging out with ‘stoners’ and using drugs when he was about twelve years

                                         11
Case: 22-70006     Document: 00516729651           Page: 12   Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                    No. 22-70006

   old.” Counsel also presented evidence that Albert, who had rejoined the
   family when Brewer was fifteen, was “mean, violent, and abusive” to Brewer
   and his mother. Albert nearly broke Brewer’s nose with a piece of wood on
   one occasion, and Brewer beat Albert with a broom on another “to stop
   Albert from hurting” Brewer’s mother. Following “the broom incident,”
   Brewer moved cities to live with his grandmother and continued his drug and
   alcohol use. While with his grandmother, Brewer wrote a suicide note and
   was subsequently committed to a state hospital. The state court also found
   that Brewer’s counsel presented mitigating evidence to show that Brewer
   had been an exemplary inmate in jail and for eighteen years on death row.
          The habeas court concluded that the unoffered mitigating evidence
   would have been cumulative of the evidence already presented. United States
   v. Bernard, 762 F.3d 467, 476 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at
   687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064) (“A plea for ‘more of the same’ does not, in the
   circumstances of this case,” show that counsel “were not functioning as
   counsel guaranteed to [petitioner] by the Sixth Amendment.”). Thus,
   Brewer could not show how he was prejudiced by its absence. See Howard v.
   Davis, 959 F.3d 168, 173 (5th Cir. 2020) (“Cumulative testimony generally
   cannot be the basis” of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim.); Norman
   v. Stephens, 817 F.3d 226, 233 (5th Cir. 2016).
          The district court approved the state court’s implicit finding that
   counsel reasonably decided an expert mental health evaluation would have
   been unnecessary and even harmful to Brewer’s case. The same sound
   strategy undergirding counsel’s decision to forgo an expert examination on
   future dangerousness also supported the decision to refuse a mental health
   evaluation. Further, “[t]here is no suggestion in the record that Petitioner
   suffers from an intellectual disability or that he functions anywhere below the
   average range of intellectual functioning. Petitioner’s mental-health records
   . . . introduced during his 2009 retrial showed no mental-health referrals

                                         12
Case: 22-70006     Document: 00516729651           Page: 13    Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                    No. 22-70006

   despite his suicide attempt.” With regard to prejudice, the court emphasized
   that given the “graphic and grisly” testimony by Brewer and Nystrom, along
   with the state’s other evidence, there is not a “substantial likelihood” that a
   mental health evaluation or additional evidence from Brewer’s childhood
   would have influenced the jury’s balancing of the aggravating and mitigating
   factors. See Bernard, 762 F.3d at 476.
          Reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s conclusion
   that, as evidenced in extremely thorough opinions by the state court and
   magistrate judge, the state court reasonably applied Strickland in holding that
   trial counsel were not ineffective in preparing and presenting a mitigation
   defense.
                                 C. Prior Bad Acts
          Brewer’s final ineffective assistance claim is that his trial counsel
   failed to adequately investigate and rebut the state’s evidence of his future
   dangerousness. Brewer presented a similar claim in his subsequent state
   habeas application, which the TCCA dismissed as an abuse of the writ
   without considering the merits. Ex parte Brewer, 2019 WL 5420444 (Tex.
   Crim. Ap. Oct. 23, 2019). Thus, this claim, or portions of it, are barred by
   the doctrine of procedural default.         See Ramirez, 142 S. Ct. at 1732
   (“[F]ederal courts generally decline to hear any federal claim that was not
   presented to the state courts consistent with [the State’s] own procedural
   rules.” (internal quotation marks omitted, alteration in original)).
   Nevertheless, the district court “cut straight to the merits to deny his claim,”
   rather than decide whether Brewer could overcome his default. Murphy v.
   Davis, 901 F.3d 578, 589 n.4 (5th Cir. 2018).
          The Supreme Court has held that constitutionally deficient assistance
   can take the form of failing “adequately to investigate the State’s aggravating
   evidence, thereby foregoing critical opportunities to rebut the case in

                                          13
Case: 22-70006       Document: 00516729651              Page: 14      Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                         No. 22-70006

   aggravation.” Andrus v. Texas, 140 S. Ct. 1875, 1881–82 (2020); see also
   Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 385, 125 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2005). Brewer
   points to three “prior bad acts” from the state’s aggravation case: (1) an
   assault against his high school girlfriend that dislocated three discs in her
   spine and temporarily paralyzed her arm; (2) an arrest for possessing a
   concealed knife in Florida; and (3) the assault against Albert with a broom
   handle, which left the man bleeding from the nose, mouth, and side of the
   head, and led to his hospitalization. 5 Had his 2009 counsel interviewed the
   witnesses supplying this testimony, argues Brewer, counsel would have been
   able to garner the evidence needed to undermine the state’s case for future
   dangerousness. Brewer then would not have taken the stand.
           Brewer supports this claim with six new declarations, including one by
   defense investigator Cowie, another by trial counsel Odiorne, and his own
   affidavit. All of these are barred under Shinn v. Ramirez. 142 S. Ct. at 1734
   (“[U]nder § 2254(e)(2), a federal habeas court may not . . . consider
   evidence beyond the state-court record based on ineffective assistance of
   state postconviction counsel.”). Further, several should be viewed with
   “extreme suspicion” for containing statements that are inconsistent with
   previous testimony. Spence v. Johnson, 80 F.3d 989, 1003 (5th Cir. 1996).
           The district court found that Brewer’s counsel reasonably decided
   “to rely upon their interviews with him” and “on the sworn testimony of
   prosecution witnesses when deciding not to interview those witnesses prior
   to the 2009 trial.” The court noted that these witnesses testified at Brewer’s
           _____________________
           5
             Brewer also alleges that his counsel failed to investigate a fight he had with a
   former inmate, in which Brewer threatened to shove a pencil in the man’s eye. It does not
   appear that the state submitted any evidence of this fight at Brewer’s 2009 trial. If so,
   Brewer’s counsel cannot be faulted for failing to rebut aggravating evidence never seen by
   the jury. Regardless, the district court found that an interview with the inmate would not
   have softened the severity of Brewer’s threat.

                                              14
Case: 22-70006       Document: 00516729651          Page: 15   Date Filed: 04/27/2023

                                     No. 22-70006

   1991 trial and gave the same or very similar testimony at his 2009 trial, so the
   additional details that could have been gleaned from fresh interviews would
   have been minor. Taking them one by one, the district court found first that
   even if a new interview with Brewer’s high school girlfriend revealed that the
   assault was out of character and that he did not intend to hurt her, the
   testimony of the severe injury he inflicted upon her would remain unchanged.
   Next, any new evidence gleaned from an interview with the alleged owner of
   the knife for which Brewer was arrested in Florida would have been
   cumulative. Similarly, the district court found that additional evidence of
   Albert’s “violence and depravity” would have been cumulative.
            The district court then emphasized that the state’s case in aggravation
   was significantly stronger in 2009 than it was in 1991, given Nystrom’s
   eyewitness account of the murder. The district court concluded that the
   decision to put Brewer on the stand to show the jury his remorse, empathy,
   and non-violence during incarceration, rather than to quibble with minor
   details of the prosecution’s witnesses’ testimony, was an eminently
   reasonable one.
            “There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given
   case,” and the district court concluded that Brewer’s 2009 trial counsel
   found and employed one. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689, 104 S. Ct. at 2065.
   Reasonable jurists could not debate the district court’s assessment of this
   claim.
            For the foregoing reasons, Brewer’s request for a COA is DENIED.

                                           15