Court Opinion

ID: 9607528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:59:28.102571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:17.768922
License: Public Domain

CALLEY, Justice,
dissenting.
OCGA §§ 36-9-2 and 36-9-3 relate to the sale or disposition of county property generally. In my opinion, those statutes have no application where, as here, the county property was the subject of a tax levy and, thus, an analysis of this case must begin and end with a consideration of whether the 1982 tax sale was valid. Because I *459believe that that tax sale was valid, I respectfully dissent.
The County purchased the property in issue at a sale held by the County marshal under a general fi. fa. against Albert West, who is not related to Thomas West. However, it is important to note that this case does not involve mistaken assessments against the County or anyone other than the true owner. Compare Martin v. Clark, 190 Ga. 270, 272 (2) (9 SE2d 54) (1940); Nelson v. Brown, 174 Ga. 150, 154 (162 SE 276) (1932); Wiley v. Martin, 163 Ga. 381, 382 (2) (136 SE 151) (1926). The County tax commissioner properly assessed the property taxes for 1979-1981 against Albert West. Thus, the levy and sale in 1982 would certainly have been proper if Albert West still owned the property or if another private individual had acquired the property.
If it is true that the property is bound for the taxes, it makes very little difference who the owner of that property is, or how a tax execution describes it, so it is done with sufficient definiteness to enable the levying officer to ascertain the property.
Stokes v. State of Ga. & County of Lee, 46 Ga. 412, 413 (2) (1872).
It is not a fraud for the sheriff to sell for taxes, upon due levy and return to him by a constable, the same land which he had previously sold under a general fi. fa. against the same defendant; nor is it a fraud for any one to purchase at the tax sale though having full notice of the prior sale.
Wilson v. Boyd, 84 Ga. 34 (2) (10 SE 499) (1889).
Steele v. City of Waycross, 190 Ga. 816 (2) (10 SE2d 867) (1940) holds that, where property is subject to a lien for a special assessment and is sold to the City under an execution for general municipal taxes, the lien of the assessment is not extinguished and a purchaser from the City obtains title subject to the lien of such assessment. By analogy, the County’s acquisition of the property here did not extinguish the valid tax liens merely because a county does not owe itself taxes on its own property. Compare James v. Fla. Realty &c. Corp., 208 Ga. 652, 654 (2) (68 SE2d 601) (1952) (where the City acquired the property, not only before the tax sale and tax deed, but also before the years for which the relevant taxes were assessed). If the tax liens were not extinguished, then the County could still sell the property for taxes. It did so. Therefore, I submit that appellant has title to the property through the 1982 tax deed because it is undisputed that appellant properly complied with OCGA § 48-4-45, so that the right to redeem has been forever terminated and divested.
In my opinion, the equities in this case militate in appellant’s *460favor, under Wilson v. Boyd, supra. It was not a fraud for appellant to purchase the property at the tax sale, but it would be inequitable for the County to negate that valid sale through reliance upon the inapplicable provisions of OCGA §§ 36-9-2 and 36-9-3. Accordingly, I dissent to the judgment of affirmance.
Decided January 21, 1997.
Sam G. Dickson, for appellant.
Gandy, Rice & Sundberg, Leon S. Gandy, Jr., for appellee.