Court Opinion

ID: 9898808
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 09:09:20.692935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:16.034262
License: Public Domain

In the
              Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

                   No. 06-23-00068-CR

        STEVEN EUGENE WOODEN, Appellant

                            V.

           THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

         On Appeal from the 102nd District Court
                 Bowie County, Texas
             Trial Court No. 20F1322-102

      Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
       Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
                                     MEMORANDUM OPINION

        The trial court revoked Steven Eugene Wooden’s community supervision and sentenced

him to twenty-four months’ confinement in a state jail facility. Wooden appeals the trial court’s

ruling and judgment, claiming the trial court abused its discretion in finding that Wooden

violated several terms of his community supervision.1 Upon review of the record and applicable

law, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. We affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

I.      Background

        A.       Wooden’s Community Supervision

        Pursuant to a plea agreement, on December 17, 2020, Wooden pled guilty to criminal

mischief, $2,500.00 or more but less than $30,000.00.2                    Wooden’s sentence of two years’

confinement was suspended, and standard terms and conditions of community supervision were

imposed. On October 13, 2022, the State moved to revoke Wooden’s supervision and amended

its motion on January 10, 2023. The State raised the following allegations of violations:

        •        Wooden violated the supervision condition that he not commit any new offenses
                 against the laws of Texas, another state, the United States, or any other country;

1
 Wooden’s points of error challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s findings that Wooden
(1) committed new offenses, (2) used methamphetamine, and (3) failed to report to community supervision in
certain months. Because we find the evidence sufficient to support the trial court’s finding that Wooden committed
new offenses, we will not address the second and third points of error.
2
 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 28.03(b)(4) (Supp.). Wooden was assessed a fine of $2,000.00, restitution of
$2,800.00, and court costs of $290.00. He was also ordered to complete 240 hours of community supervision,
undergo a substance abuse evaluation, and participate in any subsequent recommended treatment. The trial court’s
judgment revoking Wooden’s community supervision and sentencing included the financial obligations.
                                                         2
           •       Wooden failed to “avoid injurious or vicious habits” and “abstain from the use of
                   alcoholic beverages” and “narcotic or habit-forming drugs without a doctor’s
                   prescription”; and

           •       Wooden failed to report to his community supervision officer monthly “or as
                   otherwise directed by the Supervision Officer in charge of the case.”

           The State alleged Wooden violated those terms as follows:

           •       Wooden committed the offenses of failure to identify as a fugitive from justice3
                   and evading arrest or detention4 on or about November 26, 2022, in Morris
                   County, Texas;

           •       Wooden used and admitted to using methamphetamine on or about April 26,
                   2022; and

           •       Wooden failed to report to his community supervision officer in the months of
                   June, July, and October 2022.

           B.      The Revocation Hearing

           The trial court conducted Wooden’s revocation hearing on March 13, 2023, and Wooden

pled not true to all allegations. At the revocation hearing, Wooden’s community supervision

officer, Andrea Davis, testified that she received information that Wooden had been arrested in

Morris County for the offenses of failure to identify and evading arrest or detention.5 She

verified that Wooden was the same person arrested by comparing Wooden’s date of birth with

that of the person arrested in Morris County. Davis also testified that she had confirmed

Wooden was convicted of both offenses, though the State offered no judgments of conviction.

3
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.02(d).
4
    See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04.
5
 Davis testified that she received a “hit confirmation” through the National Crime Information Center database. See
Wells v. State, 611 S.W.3d 396, 403 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); State v. Cruz, 461 S.W.3d 531, 533 (Tex. Crim. App.
2015).
                                                        3
When Wooden testified, he admitted that he had pled guilty to committing both offenses in

Morris County on November 26, 2022.6

         Davis also testified that Wooden submitted a drug test with a positive result and that he

signed a notarized statement admitting that, on or about April 26, 2022, he “consumed by

ingesting or abusing” amphetamines.7 Wooden acknowledged his signature, dated May 6, 2022,

on that form. However, he testified that he did not remember signing that document because he

had been electrocuted sometime around Halloween that year and had difficulty remembering

events that predated that event.8

         Regarding the allegations that Wooden did not report as required in certain months, Davis

testified that she began supervising Wooden on September 1, 2022. She testified that he did not

report as required in June, July, August, September, and October of 2022.                                  On cross-

examination, she admitted that she did not have personal knowledge of his failure to report in

June and July.

II.      Standard of Review

         “We will review the trial court’s decision to revoke community supervision for an abuse

of discretion.” Lively v. State, 338 S.W.3d 140, 143 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2011, no pet.)

6
 Davis testified that Wooden was arrested and convicted of “failure to ID.” On cross-examination, the State asked
Wooden if he had “ple[]d guilty to failure . . . to ID [as] a fugitive in Morris County, Texas,” and Wooden answered,
“Yes.”
7
 Davis did not identify the substance for which Wooden tested positive. The admission document had a check-mark
next to “Amphetamines.” Davis testified that Wooden provided two other positive test results and admitted
“narcotic” use on those occasions as well. Only the document of use on April 26 was admitted into evidence, after
Wooden objected that it was the only narcotic use alleged in the revocation motions. As noted above, the motion to
revoke and amended motion to revoke alleged Wooden used methamphetamine.
8
 Wooden testified that he offered to take a hair-follicle drug test, but Davis did not recall that offer, and there is no
indication one was ever performed.
                                                           4
(citing Rickels v. State, 202 S.W.3d 759, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); In re T.R.S., 115 S.W.3d

318, 320 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.)). “The trial court does not abuse its discretion if

the order revoking community supervision is supported by a preponderance of the evidence; in

other words, the greater weight of the credible evidence would create a reasonable belief that the

defendant has violated a condition of his or her community supervision.” Id. (citing Rickels, 202

S.W.3d at 763–64; In re T.R.S., 115 S.W.3d at 320). “In conducting our review, we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling.” Id. (citing Cardona v. State, 665

S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); In re T.R.S., 115 S.W.3d at 321). “If a single ground

for revocation is supported by a preponderance of the evidence and is otherwise valid, then an

abuse of discretion is not shown.” Id. (citing Sanchez v. State, 603 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex. Crim.

App. [Panel Op.] 1980); In re T.R.S., 115 S.W.3d at 321).

III.   Sufficient Evidence that Wooden Committed New Offenses Supports the Trial
       Court’s Ruling

       Viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, the court heard evidence that

(1) Wooden had been arrested for failure to identify as a fugitive and evading arrest or detention

in Morris County (testimony from community supervision officer Davis), (2) Wooden had been

convicted of those charges (also from Davis’s testimony), and (3) Wooden admitted pleading

guilty to both charges. From that testimony, the trial court could have found that Wooden had

committed new offenses in violation of the terms and conditions of his community supervision.

See Gamble v. State, 484 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972) (“[A]ppellant’s own

admission that he was knowingly driving without a driver’s license in violation of the law during

the probationary period would be sufficient evidence, standing alone, to justify revocation.”).
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“[O]ne sufficient ground for revocation will support the court’s order to revoke probation.”

Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1980).9

        Wooden complains in his brief that his in-court testimony that he pled guilty to the two

Morris County offenses was “a confession made outside the revocation proceeding that was not

corroborated.” In support of this argument, he quotes Hacker v. State, 389 S.W.3d 860 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2013).           “[I]n the probation-revocation context, controlled by the lesser,

‘preponderance of the evidence’ burden of proof, an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession may

be sufficient to support revocation.” Id. at 866 (citing Bush v. State, 506 S.W.2d 603, 605 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1974)). We do not find that Hacker supports Wooden’s argument.

        Hacker was on community supervision, and one of the terms of his community

supervision was that he not contact his wife except for purposes of arranging custody of their

children. Id. at 863. Hacker stayed with his brother, but when his wife was out of town or

worked an overnight shift, he would stay at the family home, i.e., the wife’s residence, and

supervise the couple’s children. Id. at 863–64. Hacker’s community supervision officer testified

that Hacker told her that

        he talked to [his wife] on a daily basis about his children, whom he would pick up
        from school. He said that he would call his wife to arrange a time to pick up the
        children and take them to her home. He would then stay with them at the
        residence until she would call him and tell him that she was on her way home. He
        would then leave before his wife arrived.

Id. at 863. Those conversations were the basis for the trial court and court of appeals findings

that Hacker violated the term of his community supervision. See id. at 864.

9
 In 1993, the statutory term for probation was changed to “community supervision.” See Ivey v. State, 277 S.W.3d
43, 51 n.48 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).
                                                       6
           However, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals disagreed. Hacker’s “admission that he

talked to his wife on the telephone frequently for the purpose of child custody was not an

admission that he engaged in conduct that violated his probation.” Id. at 866. Wooden’s

quotation and reliance on Hacker—i.e., that “an uncorroborated extrajudicial confession may be

sufficient to support revocation”10—is misplaced vis-à-vis Wooden’s situation.

           Wooden’s statement that he pled guilty to the two Morris County charges was not

extrajudicial.11 It was testimony under oath before the trial court. So, Hacker’s language is not

relevant to the situation at bar. Further, Wooden does not explain or offer authority as to why his

testimony, along with Davis’s, is not sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling.12

           There was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find Wooden violated the condition of

his community supervision that required him to not commit any new criminal offenses. The trial

court’s ruling was not an abuse of discretion.

10
     Hacker, 389 S.W.3d at 866.

 “Outside court; outside the functioning of the court system.” Extrajudicial, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
11

2019). An extrajudicial statement is “[a]ny utterance made outside court.” Extrajudicial statement, BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
12
  Woodson’s brief, in part, reads, “During the [revocation] hearing, Wooden admitted that he . . . plead [sic] guilty
in Morris County to ‘failure to ID a fugitive’ and ‘evading arrest or detention.’ . . . However, the evidence that
Appellant plead [sic] guilty is a confession made outside the revocation proceeding that was not corroborated.” We
can only interpret this as referring to evidence offered at the Morris County proceedings. Again, he does not offer
any explanation why his testimony at the instant revocation hearing was not substantive evidence for the trial court’s
consideration.
                                                          7
IV.    Conclusion

       Having found a sufficient basis for the trial court’s revocation of Wooden’s community

supervision, it is unnecessary for us to address his remaining two points of error. We affirm the

trial court’s judgment.

                                                Charles van Cleef
                                                Justice

Date Submitted:           October 25, 2023
Date Decided:             November 8, 2023

Do Not Publish

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