Court Opinion

ID: 9577811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:38:23.846013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:21:18.420238
License: Public Domain

NIERENGARTEN, Judge,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s conclusion that appellant Jeffrey L. Larson was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
To determine whether the right to a speedy trial has been violated, four factors must be examined: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the reason for the delay; (3) whether defendant asserted his right; and (4) prejudice to the defendant. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972); State v. Corarito, 268 N.W.2d 79 (Minn.1978).
1. Length of Delay. The trial was not originally scheduled until July 5, over two months beyond the 60 day limit required by Minn.R.Crim.P. 6.06. Such a delay weighs against the State, but not as heavily as if there had been a deliberate delay to hamper the defense or harass the defendant. See State v. Brouillette, 286 N.W.2d 702, 706 (Minn.1979).
2. Reason for Delay. The delays here were primarily caused by the unavailability of one of the officers due to illness. This was not caused by the State’s. neglect or deliberate attempt to hamper the defense. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192; see State v. Gayles, 327 N.W.2d 1 (Minn.1982).
3. Defendant’s Assertion. The frequency and force of Larson’s speedy trial objections must be examined. Barker, 407 U.S. at 529, 92 S.Ct. at 2191. Here, Larson asserted his right only once, at the same time he requested a jury trial and an evi-dentiary hearing. He did not object to the two continuances and never reasserted the demand for speedy trial.
*326The majority attempts to give Larson’s one request “frequency and force” by observing that the record shows no inquiry by the trial court into a possible waiver of Larson when the State requested two continuances. First, there is no requirement that a court make such an inquiry. Second, the record does not show the actual request for the continuances; it is misleading to rely on the absence of an inquiry into possible waiver, for it is also true there is no showing the trial court did not inquire into a possible waiver.
4. Prejudice. Larson concedes there has been no pretrial incarceration or anxiety and concern about this matter. Rather, he claims one of his witnesses, by affidavit, indicated he had difficulty remembering “all the details concerning what Jeff Larson had to drink or how much.” The witness did not state he could not remember whether Larson was sober. Larson has failed to demonstrate such prejudice as would warrant dismissal of the charges. See State v. Corarito, 268 N.W.2d at 80 (Minn.1978).
I would affirm the decision of the trial court.