Court Opinion

ID: 9735638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 18:26:37.337969+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:43:16.295096
License: Public Domain

STEPHENS, J.
By information defendant was charged with violation of section 11530.5 of the Health and Safety Code (possession of marijuana for sale) (count 1). He pleaded not guilty and waived trial by jury. After the trial, he was found guilty as charged. His motions for a new trial and probation were denied. Defendant was sentenced to state prison for the term prescribed by law. Appeal is from the judgment and the order denying his motion for a new trial.
Officer Warren of the Los Angeles Police Department was informed by his watch commander that a private citizen had phoned the police department and told the watch commander that a blue and white car was parked in the 1300 block of 5th Avenue; that the citizen had observed one of the three passengers of the vehicle, a male Negro wearing a T-shirt, get out of the car and hold conversations with persons passing on the sidewalk; that the male Negro was observed to go to the trunk of the car, open it and take out a cellophane-wrapped package which was exchanged for money with the persons. Officer Warren stated that this information “indicated to me there may be possibly a sale of narcotics from a vehicle parked on the street.” Accompanied by his partner, Officer Warren proceeded to the location to investigate. Upon arriving at the location, a vehicle and its passengers that matched the description forwarded by the watch commander were observed. Officer Warren requested that the passengers get out of the car, and they did. He then asked one of the passengers whose car it was, and the passenger replied that he did not know. Officer Warren then advised each of the persons who had gotten out of the vehicle of their constitutional rights. At this juncture there had been no arrest. The defendant was *18wearing a T-shirt. The officer asked the defendant to whom the car belonged, and he stated that he did not know. The three persons were then asked to go to the sidewalk and join a fourth person who had been on the sidewalk when the police unit arrived. This fourth person was likewise warned of his constitutional rights. The officer then asked the defendant where the car’s keys were. He stated they were in the car, and gave permission to the officer to search the ear for the keys. The officer checked the ignition for the keys and found that they were not there. Officer Warren then walked around to the other side of the car and observed the defendant throw a set of keys into the bushes in front of the adjacent building. The officer recovered the keys, and used them to open the trunk of the car. In the latticework on the underside of the trunk lid the officer found a brown paper bag in which were several waxed paper bags that contained marijuana.
The question presented is whether there was reasonable or probable cause for the search of the ear trunk and the seizure of the revealed contraband. The result of the search, if made without reasonable or probable cause, may not justify the search or subsequent arrest.
Defendant devotes a large part of his brief to arguing that the consent doctrine cannot be invoked to legitimatize this search. The Attorney General, on the other hand, wisely does not press this approach, since whatever limited consent to search might have been given, the act of throwing the keys away would certainly have indicated no further consent was given from that point on. (Castaneda v. Superior Court, 59 Cal.2d 439 [30 Cal.Rptr. 1, 380 P.2d 641].)  Rather, the Attorney General argues that probable cause for the arrest comes from the corroboration of the informer, or from circumstances justifying a belief that the car had been stolen by defendant. The warrantless search is then permitted, it is argued, as incident to the arrest.
We do not agree with the Attorney General. The first hurdle that the state must get itself over is the doctrine of People v. Harvey, 156 Cal.App.2d 516 [319 P.2d 689]. Briefly stated, this case stands for the proposition that the state cannot meet its burden of showing probable cause in a warrantless arrest situation merely by having the arresting officer testify that a fellow officer had directed him to make the arrest. The state must produce the officer who had obtained information giving probable cause so the basis of his conclusion can be examined in court. In this ease, the People never *19called the watch commander who received the information from the unidentified private citizen.
To raise the rule of Harvey, there must be an objection made in the trial court. (Cf. People v. Wohlleben, 261 Cal. App.2d 461, 465-467 [67 Cal.Rptr. 826].) Defense counsel objected to the introduction of the physical evidence on general search and seizure grounds. The thrust of his argument was that any consent given to search was limited, the limitation being made clear by the act of throwing away the keys, and that the combination of the data given the arresting officer and the corroborating facts did not amount to probable cause. We recognize that in criminal prosecutions, objections are generally liberally construed. (Witkin, Cal. Evidence (1966) § 1292.) We also recognize that an objection on hearsay grounds would not suffice, since hearsay can be used to establish probable cause. (Within, Cal. Evidence, § 111.) However, defense counsel must, by his objection or argument, indicate to opposing counsel and the trial court that he is objecting on the ground that the prosecution has not presented its ease for probable cause properly, not that he is merely objecting on the general ground that, given all the facts testified to, there is no probable cause. The objection must be specific in its reference to the defect. He may object on Harvey grounds because the fellow officer did not testify, or move to strike the testimony because the fellow officer did not testify. But in some manner he must direct the court’s and counsel’s attention to the nature of his objection to give an opportunity for the defect to be cured at the trial level. In the absence of such objection, the issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Successfully over the first hurdle, the Attorney General fails in his attempt to clear the second. This “second hurdle ’ ’ relates to the initial approach to the automobile; the questioning of its occupants, and the ordering of the occupants from the car. Where there are the requisite suspicious circumstances, such temporary detention, identification questions, and even in some instances ordering persons out of automobiles, are permissible. (People v. Mickelson, 59 Cal.2d 448 [30 Cal.Rptr. 18, 380 P.2d 658].) In the instant case we do not see the required suspicious circumstances. The information that came from the “ informer ’’ was totally devoid of anything that would indicate any criminal activity was involved. One does not reasonably assume that someone would be selling contraband, the possession of which is felonious, in *20broad daylight to passersby on the street without other knowledge of fact. The behavior described was consistent with totally innocent activity. (People v. Sanders, 46 Cal.2d 247 [294 P.2d 10] ; People v. Harvey, supra.) The record provides no testimony indicating that the officers had been investigating narcotics activity in the area. It does not show that the officer had had any experience in narcotics violations detection activities (People v. Wright, 236 Cal.App.2d 735, 738 [46 Cal.Rptr. 360]), or that he had been looking for someone answering the given description or modus operandi in connection with the sale of contraband, or even that this area was one of high narcotics trafficking. (People v. Brown, 147 Cal.App.2d 352, 356 [305 P.2d 126].) The officers did not observe any act by defendant or the others in or near the car upon which to justify any suspicion or to corroborate the fact that the trunk had been opened at all. Even the acts allegedly observed by the informant were not re-enacted in the view of the officers. It is clear that the initial detention was illegal. (People v. One 1960 Cadillac Coupe, 62 Cal.2d 92 [41 Cal.Rptr. 290, 396 P.2d 706]; People v. Hunt, 250 Cal.App.2d 311 [58 Cal.Rptr. 385].) It is not necessary to reach the problem of analyzing whether all the information the arresting officer had, including the act of throwing away the keys, gave probable cause for the arrest. This latter act was so tied to the initial illegal police contact that it was clearly the product of the initial illegal stop. No intervening event occurred to remove the initial taint. (Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 [9 L.Ed.2d 441, 83 S.Ct. 407] ; People v. Haven, 59 Cal.2d 713 [31 Cal.Rptr. 47, 381 P.2d 927] ; Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal.2d 269 [294 P.2d 23] ; Gascon v. Superior Court, 169 Cal.App.2d 356 [337 P.2d 201].) As such, cases allowing searches of an automobile without a search warrant and not incident to an arrest, but on probable cause are not in point. The determination of this issue makes it unnecessary to consider the ear theft theory put forth by the Attorney General to legitimate this search, though this argument appears more of an afterthought than factual.
The judgment is reversed.