Court Opinion

ID: 9885790
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 14:06:16.362617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:23:16.436701
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 29, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                  Commonwealth of Kentucky
                             Court of Appeals
                                 NO. 2023-CA-0058-MR

MICHAEL D. JOHNSON                                                           APPELLANT

                  APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v.                 HONORABLE ANN BAILEY SMITH, JUDGE
                          ACTION NO. 19-CI-001116

ULYSSES GOBER AND VERNON
WILLIAMS1                                                                    APPELLEES

                                        OPINION
                                       AFFIRMING

                                      ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; CETRULO AND COMBS, JUDGES.

COMBS, JUDGE: In this appeal, Michael D. Johnson, Jr., challenges the

summary judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court entered in favor of Ulysses

Gober and Vernon Williams, who were employed by the Jefferson County Public

Schools as security monitors. After our review, we affirm.

1
 The court documents attached to the record indicate “Ullysses” and “Ulyseses.” However, the
Notice of Appeal indicates “Ulysses,” the spelling that we have adopted in this Opinion.
             In March 2018, while he was a student at Atherton High School in

Louisville, Johnson suffered injuries when K.V., a fellow student, threw a stick at

him. The stick lodged in Johnson’s face near his eye.

             In February 2019, Johnson’s mother filed this personal injury action

on his behalf. Named as defendants were: the Jefferson County Board of

Education; Jefferson County Public Schools; Dr. Thomas Aberli, the former

principal at Atherton; Dr. Martin Pollio, the superintendent of the Jefferson County

Board of Education; and “Unknown Defendants.”

            She amended the complaint to include Louisville Metro Police

Department and Louisville-Jefferson County Metro Government as additional

defendants. The amended complaint included more factual allegations and stated

new claims for alleged negligent hiring, retention, training, and supervision.

Louisville Metro Police Department and Louisville-Jefferson County Metro

Government were dismissed by the trial court on immunity grounds.

            Johnson’s mother filed for leave to file a second amended complaint,

which was granted. The parties proceeded with discovery.

             In June 2020, the Jefferson County Board of Education, Jefferson

County Public Schools, Dr. Aberli, and Dr. Pollio filed a joint motion for summary

judgment. They argued that they were shielded from liability by absolute

immunity and/or qualified official immunity. Ms. Johnson responded with a

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motion for leave to file a third amended complaint in which she named Gober and

Williams as additional defendants. The trial court granted the motion for summary

judgment, and it also granted Johnson’s motion for leave to file the third amended

complaint.

             In December 2021, Ms. Johnson filed a motion for leave to file a

fourth amended complaint in which Michael Johnson was substituted as plaintiff.

The complaint largely restated the earlier factual allegations and re-asserted

negligence claims against both Gober and Williams in their capacity as “teacher[s]

and or School Resource Officer[s].” Johnson alleged that Gober and Williams

were negligent by failing to prevent him from suffering foreseeable harm.

             In May 2022, Gober and Williams filed a motion for summary

judgment in which they contended that summary judgment should be entered on

multiple grounds. They noted that Johnson had sued them in their representative

capacity and had not asserted claims against either of them in an individual

capacity. They argued that as employees of the public school system, they were

entitled to assert the absolute immunity afforded the state. In the alternative, they

argued that they were entitled to qualified official immunity or that Johnson could

not make out a prima facie case of negligence. After a period of additional

discovery, the trial court granted the motion for summary judgment. The court

concluded that Johnson had sued Gober and Williams only in their official

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capacities and that Gober and Williams were entitled to absolute immunity. This

appeal followed.

               On appeal, Johnson does not challenge the court’s conclusion that

Gober and Williams are immune from liability for the allegedly negligent actions

taken in their representative (official) capacities. Instead, he argues that “the only

issue this Court needs to decide” is whether Johnson’s complaint “state[s] a claim

against [Gober and Williams] individually.” Johnson explains that the issue

involves “pleading standards” and contends that the court misconstrued the

allegations contained in his complaint. Johnson asks: “what does a plaintiff have

to do to plead a case against a government employee in their individual

capacity[?]”

               In his fourth amended complaint, Johnson sued both Gober and

Williams “in his official capacity as teacher and/or School Resource Officer at

Atherton High School and in his individual capacity at Atherton High School to

the extent this Defendant is not entitled to sovereign immunity as determined by the

facts and circumstances of this case.” (Emphasis added.) The trial court

concluded that Johnson had not pled claims against the defendants in their

individual capacity through this language but had, instead, specifically excluded

any claims of personal liability against them. The court rejected Johnson’s

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contention that a liberal construction of the language used in the complaint could

alter the plain substance of it.

             [Johnson] offers no explanation of his wording of [the
             disputed provision], and the Court knows of no authority
             that allows the Court to assume it was a mistake, even
             when construing the pleading liberally; after all, the same
             allegations are repeated in the amended complaint that
             added [Gober and Williams] as defendants. . . .

Citing the analysis undertaken by the Supreme Court of Kentucky in Calvert

Investments Inc., v. Louisville & Jefferson Co. Metropolitan Sewer District, 805

S.W.2d 133, 139 (Ky. 1991), the trial court determined that:

             “the failure to specify individual capacity in the heading,
             the lack of specificity in the body, and the failure to seek
             judgment against such individuals [in their individual
             capacity] in the concluding demand,” forces the
             conclusion “that the Complaint fails to state a separate
             cause of action for personal liability against any
             particular individual.”

             Johnson argues that the disputed language gave the defendants fair

notice of the claims against them and that the trial court erred by concluding that

Gober and Williams were entitled to judgment as a matter of law. We disagree.

             Summary judgment is properly granted where “the pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, stipulations, and admissions on file,

together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any

material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of

                                          -5-
law.” CR2 56.03. Because summary judgment involves only questions of law and

not the resolution of disputed material facts, we do not defer to the trial court’s

decision. Goldsmith v. Allied Building Components, Inc., 833 S.W.2d 378 (Ky.

1992). Instead, we review the decision de novo. Cumberland Valley Contrs., Inc.

v. Bell County Coal Corp., 238 S.W.3d 644 (Ky. 2007).

                A plaintiff is the master of his complaint and is solely responsible for

its content. Bradley v. Commonwealth ex. Rel Cameron, 653 S.W.3d 870 (Ky.

2022). The complaint must sufficiently allege a discernable cause of action.

Security Trust Co. v. Dabney, 372 S.W.2d 401 (Ky. 1963). Kentucky law requires

that allegations against a state actor in his individual capacity be made with

specificity. Calvert Investments, Inc., supra.

                The trial court concluded that the complaint did not state a separate

cause of action for personal liability against Gober and Williams, in part, because

by its language, it specifically excluded claims against them in their individual

capacities. From the beginning of this litigation, Johnson recited in his various

complaints that Gober and Williams were being sued in their representative

capacity and “in their individual capacity to the extent that they are not entitled to

sovereign immunity.” There is no dispute that Gober and Williams are, in fact,

entitled to absolute immunity from suit. Consequently, the internally contradictory

2
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

                                            -6-
and confusing language that Johnson crafted compels the conclusion that Gober

and Williams are being sued only in their official capacities and not in their

individual capacities.

             If we were to accept Johnson’s assertion that the limiting language

merely created an ambiguity with regard to the capacity in which Gober and

Williams were being sued, we would, nevertheless, be persuaded that the claims

were asserted against them only in their official capacity. Johnson’s complaint

specifically refers to Gober and Williams in their official capacities. The

complaint also refers to the obligation of state actors to maintain the school’s

premises in a safe condition; to the duty of state actors properly to train school

personnel; and to the alleged liability of state actors for the torts of their

employees.

             Accordingly, we conclude that Johnson’s complaint consistently

alleged claims against Gober and Williams in their official capacities only.

Because there is no dispute that they are cloaked with governmental immunity, we

conclude that the trial court did not err by granting the motion for summary

judgment.

             The judgment of the Jefferson Circuit Court is affirmed.

             ALL CONCUR.

                                           -7-
BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:    BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

John S. Friend           C. Tyson Gorman
Louisville, Kentucky     Jordan M. White
                         Matthew L. Bunnell
                         Louisville, Kentucky

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