Court Opinion

ID: 997307
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2013-07-04 16:54:11.976823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:25:48.695093
License: Public Domain

UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

ROGER L. WATKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.
                                                                     No. 97-2714
CHARLES VOTAW; SHIRLEY VOTAW,
his wife; OUTER BEACHES REALTY,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Elizabeth City.
Terrence W. Boyle, Chief District Judge.
(CA-96-26-3-BO)

Submitted: October 30, 1998

Decided: November 30, 1998

Before MURNAGHAN and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges, and
BUTZNER, Senior Circuit Judge.

_________________________________________________________________

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

_________________________________________________________________

COUNSEL

Kenneth Donald Cooper, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, for Appellant.
Charles M. Lollar, HEILIG, MCKENRY, FRAIM & LOLLAR, P.C.,
Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellees Votaw. James Miller Stanley, Jr.,
Jennefer Jane Cross, STANLEY & RHODES, L.L.P., Greenville,
North Carolina, for Appellee Outer Beaches.

_________________________________________________________________
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See
Local Rule 36(c).

_________________________________________________________________

OPINION

PER CURIAM:

Appellant Roger L. Watkins brought this diversity action for dam-
ages after a bedroom window in a house owned by Defendants
Charles and Shirley Votaw and managed by Defendant Outer Beaches
Realty slammed shut on his hand, severing one of his fingers. The dis-
trict court granted the Defendants' summary judgment motions, con-
cluding that Defendants satisfied their duty to warn of any latent
defects by posting a warning sign and sealing the window. We affirm.

We consider the facts in this case in the light most favorable to
Watkins, the nonmovant.1 Transatlantic Builders, Inc. (TBI), a sub-
contractor for Hatteras Island Construction (HIC), hired Watkins in
April 1994 to assist in repairing structures damaged by a recent hurri-
cane. As housing for Watkins and other temporary employees, HIC
rented the Votaws' house from their rental agency, Outer Beaches. In
1993, the Votaws informed Outer Beaches that one of the bedroom
windows was broken and would not stay open. Instead of repairing
the damaged window, the Votaws sealed the window with tape and
posted a sign in a prominent place, warning not to open the window.
An agent of TBI inspected the property prior to taking possession and
observed the warning sign.

Watkins consumed several beers at a local bar before moving into
the house. When Watkins moved his belongings into his room, he
attempted to open the broken window. Once opened, the window
slammed shut on Watkins's hand. He alleges he had never been in
that bedroom before and that there was no warning sign posted on the
window.
_________________________________________________________________

1 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986).

                    2
Under North Carolina law, Watkins has no stronger rights as an
employee of TBI against Defendants than TBI has as the tenant.2 Gen-
erally, for landlord-tenant disputes, North Carolina applies the doc-
trine of caveat emptor with one narrow exception: if the landlord
knows of and conceals a latent defect that involves a menace or dan-
ger which the tenant does not know or could not have reasonably
discovered.3

Here, we find that Defendants did not conceal the latent defect.
When TBI leased the premises, the prominently located sign warning
not to open the window put TBI on notice of the defective window.
Since there is no evidence of an agreement between the landlord and
the tenant that Defendants would repair the window, Defendants were
under no obligation to do so.4 Thus, we find Defendants satisfied any
duty owed to TBI and to Watkins and affirm the district court's order
granting them summary judgment.

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal conten-
tions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
_________________________________________________________________
2 See Phillips v. Stowe Mills, Inc., 167 S.E.2d 817, 820 (N.C. App.
1969).
3 See Harrill v. Sinclair Ref. Co. , 35 S.E.2d 240, 242-43 (N.C. 1945).
4 Id. at 242.

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