Court Opinion

ID: 9394239
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-12 20:00:12.309291+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:58.143133
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     NANCY J. SWICK,                                 DOCKET NUMBER
                   Appellant,                        DC-1221-17-0008-W-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE,                          DATE: May 12, 2023
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Earl Mitchell, Trafford, Pennsylvania, for the appellant.

           Anette H. Veldhuyzen, Esquire, Fort Belvoir, Virginia, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         The appellant has filed a petition for review of the initial decision, which
     dismissed for lack of jurisdiction her request for corrective action in an individual
     right of action (IRA) appeal. Generally, we grant petitions such as this one only
     in the following circumstances: the initial decision contains erroneous findings
     of material fact; the initial decision is based on an erroneous interpretation of

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                          2

     statute or regulation or the erroneous application of the law to the facts of the
     case; the administrative judge’s rulings during either the course of the appeal or
     the initial decision were not consistent with required procedures or involved an
     abuse of discretion, and the resulting error affected the outcome of the case; or
     new and material evidence or legal argument is available that, despite the
     petitioner’s due diligence, was not available when the record closed. Title 5 of
     the Code of Federal Regulations, section 1201.115 (5 C.F.R. § 1201.115). After
     fully considering the filings in this appeal, we conclude that the petitioner has not
     established any basis under section 1201.115 for granting the petition for review.
     Therefore, we DENY the petition for review except as expressly MODIFIED by
     this Final Order to find that the appellant was a permanent employee , but did not
     make a nonfrivolous allegation that her resignation was involuntary, and did not
     prove that she exhausted administrative remedies before the Office of Special
     Counsel (OSC), and we AFFIRM the initial decision.

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         Effective November 28, 2011, the agency appointed the appellant by
     reinstatement to a competitive-service position as a Nurse at the Fort Belvoir
     Community Hospital. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 11 at 53. The position was
     subject to completing a 1-year probationary period beginning on the date of her
     appointment. Id. On December 13, 2012, the appellant’s supervisor issued the
     appellant a memorandum detailing four complaints she had received about the
     appellant, and she informed the appellant that she was pursuing disciplinary
     action and would implement a performance improvement plan (PIP) as soon as
     possible. 2 IAF, Tab 6 at 85-86. On December 26, 2012, the appellant submitted a
     letter of resignation, effective January 4, 2013. IAF, Tab 11 at 51, Tab 13 at 14.

     2
       The memorandum at issue is dated December 18, 2012; however, the appellant alleges
     that her supervisor provided the memorandum to her on December 13, 2012, which the
     agency does not dispute. IAF, Tab 6 at 10, 85-86; Petition for Review File, Tab 4 at 6.
                                                                                       3

¶3         On February 11, 2016, the appellant filed a complaint with OSC in which
     she alleged that the agency had committed 18 prohibited personnel practices.
     IAF, Tab 6 at 21-67.        The alleged prohibited personnel practices included
     allegations that the agency had failed to provide the appellant with a performance
     plan and rating, issued a December 13, 2012 memorandum threatening to place
     her on a PIP and pursue disciplinary action against her, reassigned her patients
     and placed her on administrative duties, illegitimately renewed her nursing
     credentials, provided inaccurate information to an investigator with the
     Commonwealth of Virginia Board of Nursing, and ordered her to undergo a
     psychiatric examination. Id. at 26, 30-32. The appellant also alleged that she had
     suffered a constructive discharge. Id. at 32.
¶4         By letter dated June 29, 2016, the OSC Complaints Examining Unit notified
     the appellant that it had made a preliminary determination to close its inquiry into
     her complaint and provided her with an opportunity to respond within 13 days of
     the date of the letter.      Id. at 19-20.      On July 27, 2016, the appellant’s
     representative provided OSC with a declaration from the appellant and additional
     documentation referenced in the declaration in support of her request for OSC to
     reverse its preliminary determination. Id. at 69-84. By letter dated August 30,
     2016, the Complaints Examining Unit notified the appellant that it had received
     her July 27, 2016 response and had made a final determination to close its file.
     Id. at 18.
¶5         On October 4, 2016, the appellant filed this IRA appeal alleging that the
     agency’s prohibited personnel practices caused her to resign, and thus she was
     subjected to an involuntary removal.      IAF, Tab 1 at 5-17.     She requested a
     hearing.     Id. at 2.   The administrative judge issued an order notifying the
     appellant of the elements and burdens of proof, and directing her to file evidence
     and argument, to establish Board jurisdiction over her IRA appeal . IAF, Tab 3
     at 2-7. The appellant filed a response to the order in which she alleged that the
     agency perceived her as a whistleblower because she was “about to divulge acts
                                                                                      4

     pertaining to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)” and that agency management viewed her
     continued presence in her position as a threat because they feared that she might
     reveal to upper-level management the alleged prohibited personnel practices they
     had committed. IAF, Tab 10 at 5-19. She also alleged that the agency likely
     believed she knew about the alleged prohibited personnel practices when she
     stated during a December 13, 2012 counseling session that she would resign and
     did not return to work or respond to attempts to contact her after that date. Id.
     at 19. Finally, the appellant alleged that the agency had abused its authority by
     requiring that she work under illegal conditions and unachievable standards, or be
     fired, and she had no choice but to resign.     Id. at 18. The agency moved to
     dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction on the grounds that the appellant had
     failed to nonfrivolously allege that she made a protected disclosure, engaged in
     protected activity, or that the agency perceived her as having made protected
     disclosures, and that she had failed to nonfrivolously allege that her resignation
     was involuntary. IAF, Tab 13 at 9-12.
¶6        The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for
     lack of jurisdiction based on the written record. IAF, Tab 14, Initial Decision
     (ID). The administrative judge first found that the appellant resigned during her
     probationary period, and thus she was not an employee under 5 U.S.C. § 7511 and
     so she lacked standing to pursue an involuntary resignation appeal. ID at 2-3.
     The administrative judge then considered the appellant’s claims to the extent they
     alleged that the involuntary resignation and other events she identified were taken
     against her in retaliation for whistleblowing activity.         ID at 3-9.     The
     administrative judge assumed for the purposes of determining jurisdiction that the
     appellant had exhausted her administrative remedies before OSC, but he found
     that the appellant did not present a nonfrivolous allegation that she made a
     protected disclosure, engaged in protected activity, or was perceived as a
     whistleblower, and thus the Board lacked jurisdiction over her IRA appeal. Id.
                                                                                      5

¶7        The appellant has filed a petition for review in which she argues that the
     administrative judge erred in finding that she was a probationary employee and
     that she did not make a nonfrivolous allegation that she was perceived as a
     whistleblower. She further asserts that she has made a nonfrivolous allegation
     that her resignation was the product of misinformation and coerc ion. Petition for
     Review (PFR) File, Tab 1.      The agency has responded in opposition to the
     petition. PFR File, Tab 4. As set forth below, we find that the appellant was a
     tenured employee at the time of her resignation, but she has not made a
     nonfrivolous allegation that her resignation was involuntary. We also find that
     the administrative judge properly concluded that the appellant did not make a
     nonfrivolous allegation that she made a protected disclosure, engaged in protected
     activity, or was perceived as a whistleblower; moreover, we find that the
     appellant failed to exhaust her administrative remedies concerning her claim that
     she was perceived as a whistleblower.

                     DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW
     The administrative judge erred in finding that the appellant was a probationary
     employee.
¶8        On review, the appellant asserts that the administrative judge erred in
     finding that she was terminated during her probationary period , and thus lacked
     standing to pursue her claim of an involuntary resignation, because she had
     completed 1 year of current, continuous service. PFR File, Tab 1 at 11 -12. The
     agency has not disputed the appellant’s assertion. PFR File, Tab 4. The Board’s
     jurisdiction is limited to those matters over which it has been given jurisdiction
     by law, rule, or regulation. Maddox v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 759 F.2d
     9, 10 (Fed. Cir. 1985). To qualify as an “employee” with appeal rights under
     5 U.S.C. chapter 75, an individual in the competitive service, such as the
     appellant, must show that she either is not serving a probationary or trial pe riod
     under an initial appointment or has completed 1 year of current, continuous
     service under an appointment other than a temporary one limited to 1 year or less.
                                                                                          6

     5 U.S.C. § 7511(a)(1)(A); Dodson v. Department of the Navy, 111 M.S.P.R. 504,
     ¶ 4 (2009). The Standard Form 50 appointing the appellant to the Nurse position
     dictated that she was to complete a 1-year probationary period beginning on
     November 28, 2011. IAF, Tab 11 at 53. The appellant served continuously under
     this appointment until January 4, 2013, when she resigned. IAF, Tab 11 at 51,
     Tab 13 at 14.     When she resigned, the appellant had completed her 1-year
     probationary period and had completed 1 year of current, continuous service in a
     permanent position. 3    Id.   Accordingly, we find that the appellant was an
     employee within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. chapter 75 and had standing to
     challenge her alleged involuntary resignation.

     The appellant has not made a nonfrivolous allegation of Board jurisdiction over
     her involuntary resignation claim.
¶9         On review, the appellant argues that her resignation was involuntary
     because the agency threatened her with placement on a PIP and a disciplinary
     action, both of which could not be substantiated.         PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-11.
     Below, the administrative judge observed that the appellant had raised a claim
     that her resignation was involuntary but found that the appellant lacked standing
     to pursue the claim and did not address it further. ID at 2-3. The administrative
     judge did not notify the appellant of her burden of proof and the elements to make
     a nonfrivolous allegation that her removal was involuntary; however, this error

     3
        In this case, the agency appointed the appellant by reinstatement to a
     competitive-service position. IAF, Tab 11 at 53. The appellant would not be required
     to serve a probationary period under her most recent appointment if she was reinstated
     pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 315.401 and “during any period of service which affords a
     current basis for reinstatement, [she] completed a probat ionary period or served with
     competitive status under an appointment which did not require a probationary period.”
     5 C.F.R. § 315.801(a)(2); Dodson, 111 M.S.P.R. 504, ¶ 9. Although the appellant
     previously may have completed such a period of service, she has not provided proof of
     it. However, we need not ascertain whether she completed such a period of service
     because we find that she completed both her 1-year probationary period and 1 year of
     current, continuous service under the appointment at issue and is thus an employee with
     appeal rights.
                                                                                      7

      was not prejudicial to the appellant’s substantive rights because the agency’s
      jurisdictional response was sufficient to place the appellant on notice of the
      elements and burdens of proof of such a claim so as to afford her the opportunity
      to meet her burden for the first time on review. IAF, Tab 13 at 11; see Yost v.
      Department of Health and Human Services, 85 M.S.P.R. 273, 277 (2000) (holding
      that the administrative judge’s failure to properly inform an appellant of the
      Board’s jurisdictional requirements may not be prejudicial when the appellant is
      put on notice by the agency’s motion to dismiss of what he must allege to
      establish jurisdiction), aff’d, 4 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2001). Accordingly, we
      address the appellant’s argument that her resignation was involuntary but find
      that she has not made a nonfrivolous allegation that the Board has jurisdiction
      over the action.
¶10         An employee-initiated action, such as a resignation, is presumed to be
      voluntary and thus outside the Board’s jurisdiction.    Searcy v. Department of
      Commerce, 114 M.S.P.R. 281, ¶ 12 (2010). An involuntary resignation, however,
      is tantamount to a removal and is thus within the Board’s jurisdiction. Adams v.
      U.S. Postal Service, 108 M.S.P.R. 250, ¶ 9 (2008), aff’d, 309 F. App’x 413 (Fed.
      Cir. 2009).   An appellant may overcome the presumption of voluntariness by
      presenting sufficient evidence to establish that the action was obtained through
      duress or coercion or show that a reasonable person would have been misled by
      the agency. Searcy, 114 M.S.P.R. 281, ¶ 12.
¶11         If an appellant makes a nonfrivolous allegation casting doubt on the
      presumption of voluntariness, she is entitled to a hearing at which she must prove
      jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.       Garcia v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 437 F.3d 1322, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc). To meet the
      nonfrivolous standard, an appellant need only plead allegations of fact that, if
      proven, could show jurisdiction.    Pariseau v. Department of the Air Force,
      113 M.S.P.R. 370, ¶ 14 (2010). Mere pro forma allegations are insufficient to
      meet the standard.    Id.   In determining whether the appellant has made a
                                                                                          8

      nonfrivolous allegation, the administrative judge may consider the agency’s
      documentary submissions. Id. However, to the extent that the agency’s evidence
      constitutes mere factual contradiction of the appellant’s otherwise adequate prima
      facie showing of jurisdiction, the administrative judge may not weigh evidence
      and resolve conflicting assertions of the parties, and the agency’s evidence may
      not be dispositive. Id.
¶12         On review, the appellant contends that her supervisor misinformed her when
      she threatened the appellant in the December 13, 2012 memorandum and
      accompanying meeting with a PIP and disciplinary action that could not be
      substantiated, and she resigned to avoid the threatened PIP and disciplinary
      action. PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-11. Although the appellant’s argument appears to be
      premised on allegations of coercion rather than misinformation, to the extent she
      intended to allege that her resignation was the result of the agency’s
      misinformation, we find that the appellant has not made a nonfrivolous allegation
      that her resignation was involuntary due to misinformation.       An appellant who
      claims that an involuntary action resulted from misinformation must show that the
      agency made misleading statements, and that she reasonably relied on the
      misinformation to her detriment.        Aldridge v. Department of Agriculture,
      111 M.S.P.R. 670, ¶ 8 (2009). The appellant need not show that the agency was
      intentionally misleading. Id. However, an agency is required to provide accurate
      information to permit the appellant to make an informed, and thus voluntary,
      decision regarding resignation. Id.
¶13         Although the appellant argues that the threatened PIP and disciplinary
      action could not be substantiated, she has not alleged that the factual information
      provided to her by her supervisor in the December 13, 2012 meeting and
      memorandum was inaccurate.         PFR File, Tab 1 at 5-11.         Specifically, the
      appellant has not alleged that the agency threatened to place her on a PIP and
      with disciplinary action but did not in fact intend to take either of the actions. Id.
      The appellant contends that she did not have an opportunity to exam ine or
                                                                                       9

      challenge the complaints contained in the December 13, 2012 memorandum, but
      she does not allege that the complaints are inaccurate. Id. We thus conclude that
      the appellant has not made a nonfrivolous allegation that the agency made
      misleading statements that led to her purportedly involuntary resignation.
¶14        The appellant’s argument that the agency threatened her with a PIP and a
      disciplinary action that could not be substantiated, which we interpret to allege
      that the agency coerced her resignation, is also unpersuasive.        To establish
      involuntariness on the basis of coercion, an employee must show that the agency
      effectively imposed the terms of her resignation, she had no realistic alternative
      but to resign, and her resignation was the result of improper acts by the agency.
      Brown v. U.S. Postal Service, 115 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 10, aff’d, 469 F. App’x 852
      (Fed. Cir. 2011). If an employee’s working conditions are so intolerable that she
      is forced to resign, her resignation is involuntary and constitutes a constructive
      removal. Id. Thus, the Board must determine whether, considering the totality of
      the circumstances, the employee’s working conditions were made so difficult that
      a reasonable person in her position would have felt compelled to resign. Id.
¶15        An appellant may show that a resignation was based on coercion when the
      resignation is induced by a threat to take an adverse or performance-based action
      that the agency knows could not be substantiated or when the agency takes steps
      against an employee “not for any legitimate agency purpose but simply to force
      the employee to quit.” Staats v. U.S. Postal Service, 99 F.3d 1120, 1124 (Fed.
      Cir. 1996) (holding that an example of an involuntary resignation based on
      coercion is a resignation induced by a threat to take disciplinary action that the
      agency knows could not be substantiated); Barthel v. Department of the Army,
      38 M.S.P.R. 245, 251 (1988) (holding that, if the appellant could show that the
      agency knew that the reasons for the proposed 5 U.S.C. chapter 43 removal could
      not be substantiated, the proposed action would be purely coercive and would
                                                                                             10

      render his resulting retirement involuntary). 4 However, the doctrine of coerced
      involuntariness is “a narrow one.” Staats, 99 F.3d at 1124. It does not apply if
      the employee resigns because [s]he “does not want to accept [measures] that the
      agency is authorized to adopt, even if those measures make continuation in the
      job so unpleasant . . . that [s]he feels that [s]he has no realistic option but to
      leave.” Id. Likewise, “the fact that an employee is faced with an unpleasant
      situation or that h[er] choice is limited to two unattractive options does not make
      [her] decision any less voluntary.” Id.
¶16         Here, the agency’s December 13, 2012 memorandum informed the appellant
      of four complaints lodged against her about her patient care during November and
      December 2012 and informed her that disciplinary action and a PIP would be
      forthcoming. IAF, Tab 6 at 85-86. The appellant does not assert that the agency
      proposed any disciplinary action or issued her a PIP prior to her resignation .
      Although a PIP is a precursor to a performance-based action, it is not itself a
      performance-based action. 5       See 5 C.F.R. § 432.104 (providing that if an

      4
        We recognize that the agency never proposed a separation action against the appellant,
      but it is reasonable to conclude that, in light of the discussion of a potential PIP, any
      such action could have been proposed pursuant to chapter 43. See 5 C.F.R. §§ 432.104,
      432.105. In the past, the Board has held that there is no requirement that an agency
      establish the unacceptability of pre-PIP performance in analyzing a performance-based
      action under chapter 43. See, e.g., Thompson v. Department of the Navy, 89 M.S.P.R.
      188, ¶ 19 (2001).        However, in Santos v. National Aeronautics and Space
      Administration, 990 F.3d 1355, 1360-61 (Fed. Cir. 2021), the U.S. Court of Appeals for
      the Federal Circuit held that, to support an advers e action under chapter 43, an agency
      “must justify institution of a PIP” by showing that the employee’s performance was
      unacceptable before the PIP. We emphasize that, here, the issue before the Board is not
      whether the agency could substantiate a potential chapter 43 action, but, rather, whether
      the appellant nonfrivolously alleged that her resignation was involuntary. Thus, as set
      forth above, the appellant’s allegation that any proposed PIP could not be substantiated
      should be and is considered here only as it relates to the issue of voluntariness. As
      explained above in greater detail, we find that the appellant’s allegations concerning the
      justifications for a potential PIP do not amount to a nonfrivolous allegation that her
      resignation was involuntary. See infra ¶¶ 17-20.
      5
        The appellant asserts that Gonzales v. Department of Housing and Urban
      Development, 64 M.S.P.R. 314 (1994), supports her contention that the threat to place
                                                                                          11

      employee’s performance is determined to be unacceptable in one or more critical
      elements, the agency shall, inter alia, notify the employee that unless her
      performance in the critical elements improves and is sustained at an acceptable
      level, she may be reduced in grade or removed, and provide her with a reasonable
      opportunity to demonstrate acceptable performance); see also Shores v.
      Department of the Air Force, 4 F. App’x 911, 913 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
      (nonprecedential) (explaining that the threat of a PIP would not support a finding
      of coercion because it is not itself a disciplinary action) . 6 Because the agency did
      not propose an adverse or performance-based action at the time of the appellant’s
      resignation, and because we are not adjudicating a chapter 43 action, we need not
      determine whether any such action could be substantiated. See supra ¶ 15 n.4.
¶17         Nevertheless, we have considered whether the totality of the circumstances
      surrounding the appellant’s resignation would support a finding that the agency
      coerced her resignation, including whether the agency took any actions without a
      legitimate purpose to force her to quit. See Staats, 99 F.3d at 1124. Below, the
      appellant contended that her resignation was based solely on her supervisor’s
      threats during their meeting on December 13, 2012. IAF, Tab 10 at 15-16. The
      appellant alleged that on that date, in addition to her supervisor’s issuing the
      memorandum threatening disciplinary action and a PIP, her supervisor gave her a
      performance plan with absolute standards. Id. at 15. Additionally, the appellant
      alleged that at the end of the meeting, she asked her supervisor “if she was going
      to be fired” and her supervisor said, “[Y]es, if you keep making mistakes.” Id.
      at 53. The appellant then informed her supervisor that she was resigning; her

      her on a PIP was tantamount to threatening an adverse action; however, Gonzales
      addresses whether a PIP is a personnel action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(a)(2)(A), not whether it is an action within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. chapters 43
      or 75. Gonzales, 64 M.S.P.R. at 319.
      6
        The Board may follow a nonprecedential decision of the Federal Circuit when, as here,
      it finds its reasoning persuasive. Morris v. Department of the Navy, 123 M.S.P.R. 662,
      ¶ 13 n.9 (2016).
                                                                                         12

      supervisor replied, “Well, why don’t you think about it, and stick around at least
      during the holidays.” Id. at 15, 53.
¶18         The appellant contends that the agency could not threaten to place her on a
      PIP because it did not place her on performance standards during her probationary
      period, and she did not receive an annual performance rating. PFR File, Tab 1
      at 7-8. It is true that if an agency determines an employee’s performance to be
      unacceptable in one or more critical elements, it must notify the employee of
      those critical elements, inform her of the performance requirements or standards
      that must be attained to demonstrate acceptable performance in the position, and
      afford her a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate performance. See 5 C.F.R.
      § 432.104. The appellant submitted evidence that the agency had implemented
      performance standards and had evaluated her performance throughout 2012,
      including a November 2012 performance assessment, and notified her of
      performance concerns as early as August 2012. IAF, Tab 7 at 32-43, 52. The
      appellant does not contend that these concerns were unwarranted.               In the
      performance plan implemented on December 13, 2012, portions of the critical
      elements do appear to contain absolute standards. There is no prohibition against
      absolute   performance    standards;   rather,   performance    standards   must   be
      reasonable, based on objective criteria, and communicated to the employee in
      advance. Guillebeau v. Department of the Navy, 362 F.3d 1329, 1337 (Fed. Cir.
      2004) (finding that the applicable statute “does not bar absolute performance
      standards”). The appellant does not contend that the performance standa rds in
      her December 13, 2012 performance plan were unreasonable or subjective , and
      she acknowledges receiving the plan.        IAF, Tab 10 at 15, Tab 11 at 41-47.
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant has not set forth facts that would show
      that the agency lacked a legitimate basis for notifying her of its intent to place her
      on a PIP or was otherwise improperly undermining her performance.
¶19         The appellant also contends that the agency could not substantiate a
      disciplinary action because she did not have an opportunity to challenge the
                                                                                              13

      complaints set forth in the December 13, 2012 memorandum, and imposing
      disciplinary action requires the results of a performance appraisal.           PFR File,
      Tab 1 at 8-11.     The agency had not proposed an adverse action against the
      appellant; therefore, she was not entitled to challenge the complaints, which she
      has not alleged are untrue. See 5 U.S.C. § 7513(b) (providing that an employee
      against whom an action is proposed is entitled to a reasonable time to answer).
      Additionally, although an employee’s performance may be considered in
      determining the penalty in an adverse action, there is no requirement that the
      agency complete a performance appraisal before taking such a n action. See, e.g.,
      Douglas v. Veterans Administration, 5 M.S.P.R. 280, 305 (1981) (providing that
      an employee’s past work record, including performance on the job, is relevant for
      consideration in determining the appropriateness of a penalty for discipline).
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant has not set forth facts that could show that
      the agency acted improperly or that she had no choice but to resign in the face of
      the forthcoming action.
¶20         Further, during the meeting between the appellant and her supervisor,
      although the supervisor stated that the appellant’s removal was a future
      possibility, she also indicated that the appellant had the opportunity to improve
      her performance and avoid such an action. IAF, Tab 10 at 53. Additionally,
      when the appellant informed her supervisor that she intended to resign, her
      supervisor asked her to take additional time to consider her decision and to
      continue working while she mulled over that decision. Id. at 15, 53. Although
      the conversation was undoubtedly an unpleasant one, there is no indication that
      the appellant had no alternative but to resign.         Instead of resigning based on
      speculation that she would be removed, the appellant could have contested an
      action she thought was invalid if it occurred. 7 See Brown, 115 M.S.P.R. 609, ¶ 15

      7
        Moreover, there is no indication that the appellant was under an unreasonable time
      constraint in deciding whether to resign. An appellant’s decision to resign may be
      considered involuntary if she did not have sufficient time to reflect about her alternative
                                                                                        14

      (finding the appellant’s claims that she was apprehensive of the agency taking a
      disciplinary action against her after she stopped reporting to work to be
      insufficient to find that her retirement was involuntary, as she had th e option to
      contest a future action).     In considering the totality of the circumstances
      surrounding the appellant’s resignation, we find that she has not set forth facts
      that could show that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to resign.
      See, e.g., Baldwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 109 M.S.P.R. 392, ¶¶ 19-20
      (2008) (explaining that allegations of being assigned to onerous tasks, being
      unjustifiably threatened with discipline, and being subjected to unnecessary
      investigations did not suffice to make a nonfrivolous allegation of jurisdiction
      over an involuntary resignation based on coercion).
¶21        Finally, in considering the appellant’s resignation, we have reviewed her
      allegations that the agency retaliated against her by failing to provide her with a
      performance plan and rating, by issuing the December 13, 2012 memorandum
      threatening to pursue disciplinary action against her and place her on a PIP, by
      reassigning her patients and auditing her patient charts, and by ordering her to
      undergo a psychiatric examination, because it perceived her as a whistleblower.
      PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-16. When an appellant raises allegations of reprisal for
      whistleblowing activity in connection with a constructive removal claim,
      evidence    of   reprisal   goes   to   the    ultimate   question    of   coercion.
      Coufal v. Department of Justice, 98 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 24 (2004). As set forth below,
      we affirm the administrative judge’s finding that there is no evidence that the
      appellant made protected disclosures, engaged in protected activity, or was

      course of action before she was required to make her decis ion. See Soler-Minardo v.
      Department of Defense, 92 M.S.P.R. 100, ¶¶ 7, 9-10 (2002) (finding that the appellant
      was not under “extreme time pressure” when she accepted a demotion 10 days after the
      agency proposed the demotion). Here, the absence of a pending adverse action and the
      appellant’s supervisor’s urging the appellant to take additional time to consider her
      decision indicate that the appellant did not make her decision under an unreasonable
      time constraint and thus does not suggest the appellant felt compelled to resign.
      IAF, Tab 10 at 15, 53.
                                                                                          15

      perceived as a whistleblower; thus, we do not find that retaliation played a role in
      the appellant’s resignation. Accordingly, we conclude that the appellant has not
      made nonfrivolous allegations that cast doubt on the voluntariness of her
      resignation; therefore, the Board lacks jurisdiction over her resignation. We now
      turn to her IRA appeal. 8

      The appellant did not exhaust her administrative remed ies before OSC concerning
      her claim of whistleblower reprisal.
¶22         On review, the appellant appears to argue that she established the Board’s
      jurisdiction over her IRA appeal because she disclosed prohibited personnel
      practices in her OSC complaint and exhausted her administrative remedies before
      OSC regarding two actions that constituted reprisal for whistleblowing:            the
      agency’s order that she complete a psychiatric exam and failure to provide her
      with performance standards and a rating during her probationar y period. PFR
      File, Tab 1 at 12-13. She also argues for the first time on review that she was
      perceived as a whistleblower because one of her supervisors knew that the
      agency’s human resources department would ask the appellant whether she was
      provided with a performance plan and appraisal, and at that time, “the appellant
      would disclose all that she knew regarding the matter[.]” Id. at 13-14.
¶23         To establish Board jurisdiction over an IRA appeal brought pursuant to the
      Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2012 (WPEA), the appellant must
      exhaust her administrative remedies before OSC and make nonfrivolous

      8
        The appellant filed her OSC complaint on February 11, 2016, before filing her
      October 4, 2016 Board appeal. An appellant generally is limited to filing a Board
      appeal, a grievance, or a complaint with OSC under 5 U.S.C. § 7121(g). However, an
      appellant’s election is only binding if it was knowing and informed. Agoranos v.
      Department of Justice, 119 M.S.P.R. 498, ¶ 16 (2013). Here, the appellant was not
      advised that contesting her alleged constructive removal in an OSC complaint would
      preclude a chapter 75 appeal before the Board. See id., ¶ 18. Further, if jurisdiction
      never attached to the appellant's original choice, then it was not a true choice among
      viable alternatives and is not binding. Scalera v. Department of the Navy, 102 M.S.P.R.
      43, ¶ 9 (2006). Thus, the fact that the appellant filed a complaint with OSC does not
      preclude her from raising an involuntary resignation claim under chapter 75 .
                                                                                           16

      allegations that: (1) she made a protected disclosure described under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8) or engaged in protected activity as specified in 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D); and (2) the protected disclosure or activity
      was a contributing factor in the agency’s decision to take or fail to take a
      personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). 5 U.S.C. §§ 1214(a)(3), 1221;
      Salerno v. Department of the Interior, 123 M.S.P.R. 230, ¶ 5 (2016). Jurisdiction
      in an IRA appeal is determined based on the written record.             See Graves v.
      Department of Veterans Affairs, 123 M.S.P.R. 434, ¶ 22 (2016) (holding that an
      employee is not entitled to a jurisdictional hearing in an IRA appeal).
¶24         The Board’s jurisdictional inquiry generally begins by examining whether
      the appellant has shown that she exhausted her administrative remedies before
      OSC, as the Board’s jurisdiction over an IRA appeal is limited to those issues
      raised before OSC.       See Miller v. Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ,
      122 M.S.P.R. 3, ¶ 6 (2014) (“The first element of Board jurisdiction over an IRA
      appeal is exhaustion by the appellant of his administrative remedies before
      OSC”), aff’d, 626 F. App’x 261 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Under 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3),
      an appellant must seek corrective action from OSC before seeking corrective
      action from the Board in an IRA appeal.         Id., ¶ 6.   To satisfy the exhaustion
      requirement of 5 U.S.C. § 1214(a)(3), an appellant must provide OSC with a
      sufficient basis to pursue an investigation.           Chambers v. Department of
      Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶¶ 10-11 .9             The Board’s jurisdiction is
      limited to those issues that were previously raised with OSC.                However,
      appellants may give a more detailed account of their whistleblowing activities
      before the Board than they did to OSC.           Id.   Appellants may demonstrate
      exhaustion through their initial OSC complaint; evidence that they amended

      9
        The WPEA, which became effective on December 27, 2012, does not affect the
      relevant holding in the cited authority, nor does it affect the relevant holdings in the
      other authorities cited herein that were issued prior to the effective date of the WPEA.
      See Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465 (2012).
                                                                                    17

      the original complaint, including but not limited to OSC’s determination letter
      and other letters from OSC referencing any amended allegations; and, their
      written responses to OSC referencing the amended allegations. Id. Appellants
      also may establish exhaustion through other sufficiently reliable evidence,
      such as an affidavit or a declaration attesting that they raised with OSC the
      substance of the facts in the Board appeal. Id.
¶25        Here, the administrative judge observed that the appellant had not provided
      a copy of OSC’s notice that it had closed its inquiry, and he assumed that the
      appellant had exhausted her administrative remedies before OSC and proceeded
      to find that the appellant did not make a nonfrivolous allegation that she was
      perceived as a whistleblower, made a protected disclosure, or engaged in
      protected activity. ID at 6-9. However, the appellant submitted a copy of her
      OSC complaint and supporting documentation, a supplemental declaration
      submitted to OSC in support of her complaint, and OSC’s August 30, 2016 letter
      closing its file regarding her complaint; accordingly, we believe there was
      sufficient information to consider whether the appellant exhausted her
      administrative remedies before OSC. IAF, Tab 6 at 18-84.
¶26        We find that the appellant did not exhaust her administrative remedies
      because she did not allege whistleblower reprisal before OSC.      The appellant
      completed the section of OSC Form 11 pertaining to prohibited personnel
      practices but did not complete the section pertaining to whistleblower reprisal.
      IAF, Tab 6 at 23-49. The letter from the appellant’s representative referenced
      5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(1) and (12), which prohibit an employee who has the authority
      to take, or direct others to take, recommend, or approve any personnel action,
      from discriminating against an employee or applicant for employment, or from
      taking, or failing to take, a personnel action if it violates any law, rule, or
      regulation implementing or directly concerning merit systems principles,
      respectively. Id. at 21-22. In her complaint, the appellant only alleged that the
      agency discriminated against her on the basis of her disability and failed to
                                                                                       18

      manage her performance in violation of multiple Army regulations, Federal
      regulations, and statutes. Id. at 23-49. She did not allege in her complaint or
      supplemental correspondence with OSC that the agency had retaliated against her
      for whistleblowing. Id. at 23-84. Therefore, we find that the appellant did not
      prove that she exhausted her administrative remedies before OSC concerning her
      allegations of whistleblower reprisal.    See Finston v. Health Care Financing
      Administration, 83 M.S.P.R. 100, ¶ 9 (1999) (holding that the appellant’s OSC
      complaint did not give OSC a sufficient basis on which to pursue an investigatio n
      into a whistleblowing claim when his submissions to OSC did not mention
      whistleblowing or other related terms, and he asked OSC to investigate an alleged
      violation of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(4)).
¶27        In addition to her failure to raise a claim of whistleblower reprisal, the
      appellant did not allege any other facts that would give OSC a sufficient basis to
      pursue an investigation on the basis that the agency retaliated against her because
      an agency official perceived her as a whistleblower.        An individual who is
      perceived as a whistleblower is still entitled to the protections of the
      Whistleblower Protection Act, even if she has not made protected disclosures.
      Jensen v. Department of Agriculture, 104 M.S.P.R. 379, ¶ 11 n.3 (2007). While
      portions of the analysis in such a case differ from a case in which the appellant
      actually made a disclosure, the appellant must still establish that she exhausted
      her remedies with OSC on the issue of whether the agency perceived her as a
      whistleblower. Coufal, 98 M.S.P.R. 31, ¶ 18. Here, the appellant did not allege
      in her OSC complaint or supplemental correspondence with OSC that any agency
      official perceived her as a whistleblower, nor did she allege facts that wo uld give
      OSC a sufficient basis to pursue an investigation on this ground.       IAF, Tab 6
      at 23-84. At most, the appellant alleged before OSC that her supervisors covered
      up their mismanagement of her performance because they feared “reprisal” from
      their supervisors, but at no time did she allege that agency management viewed
      her as a potential source of a disclosure of this alleged mismanagement or
                                                                                      19

      otherwise perceived her as a whistleblower. Id. at 33. Accordingly, we find that
      she did not exhaust administrative remedies before OSC with respect to her claim
      that the agency perceived her as a whistleblower. See Coufal, 98 M.S.P.R. 31,
      ¶ 18 (finding that the Board lacked jurisdiction to consider the appellant’s
      argument that she was perceived as a whistleblower because she did not raise this
      argument in her complaint before OSC).

      The administrative judge properly found that the appellant did not make a
      nonfrivolous allegation that she was perceived as a whistleblower, made a
      protected disclosure, or engaged in protected activity.
¶28        Although we find that the appellant failed to exhaust administrative
      remedies before OSC, had she met the exhaustion requirement, the administrative
      judge nevertheless properly found that the appellant did not make a nonfrivolous
      allegation that she was perceived as a whistleblower, made a protected disclosure,
      or engaged in protected activity.     ID at 6-9.   The appellant filed her OSC
      complaint well after she resigned from her position and did not allege that she
      made any disclosures during her employment with the agency.           IAF, Tab 6
      at 21-68. Rather, the appellant alleged throughout her jurisdictional response that
      she was perceived as a whistleblower because she was “about to divulge acts
      pertaining to 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)” and her supervisors feared that she would
      reveal their alleged prohibited personnel practices to upper management.
      IAF, Tab 10 at 5-19. The Board has found that a variety of fact patterns can
      support a finding that an individual was perceived as a whistleblower. King v.
      Department of the Army, 116 M.S.P.R. 689, ¶ 7 (2011). The appellant in the
      instant case appears to argue that certain agency officials believed that she made
      or intended to make disclosures that evidenced the type of wrongdoing set forth
      under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).       See Mausser v. Department of the Army,
      63 M.S.P.R. 41, 44 (1994) (finding that the appellant may have been perceived as
      a whistleblower because the agency knew about his list of “waste, fraud, and
                                                                                        20

      abuse,” “safety issues,” and violations of “government regulations,” and of his
      intention to disclose the list).
¶29         During the pendency of her appeal below, the appellant did not identify a
      particular agency official who believed she engaged in whistleblowing, and she
      did not provide any facts to support her allegation that her managers were afraid
      that she would disclose their alleged prohibited personnel practices. IAF, Tab 10
      at 5-20. For the first time on review, she alleges that a specific supervisor knew
      that on November 28, 2012, the date on which her probationary period would end,
      the human resources department would ask the appellant whether she had been
      provided performance standards and her annual appraisal, and that she then would
      disclose “all that she knew regarding the matter.”       PFR File, Tab 1 at 13-14.
      However, the appellant’s claim fails because she alleged below that the human
      resources department did not ask about her rating and performance plan on the
      date in question.      In addition, she provides no other facts to support her
      speculation that her supervisor may have believed that the human resources
      department would ask the appellant about her performance standards and
      appraisal on the date in question, or that the appellant would have intended to
      disclose her lack of performance standards and an appraisal to the human
      resources department. IAF, Tab 10 at 12-13.
¶30         The administrative judge also considered whether the appellant’s continued
      presence in her position could constitute a protected activity, and we agree th at
      the appellant failed to make a nonfrivolous allegation that she exercised her right
      to any appeal, complaint, or grievance right granted by any law, rule, or
      regulation; testified or otherwise lawfully assisted an individual in the exercise of
      such a right; cooperated with or disclosed information to the inspector general of
      an agency or to OSC; or refused to obey an order that would require her to violate
      a law, rule, or regulation. ID at 8; see 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), (D).
      Accordingly, we find that the appellant did not make a nonfrivolous allegation
      that the agency perceived her as a whistleblower, or that she made a protected
                                                                                     21

disclosure or engaged in protected activity. We conclude that the Board lacks
jurisdiction over the appellant’s request for corrective action in her IRA appeal
and affirm the administrative judge’s dismissal of the appeal . 10

                         NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 11
      The initial decision, as supplemented by this Final Ord er, constitutes the
Board’s final decision in this matter.      5 C.F.R. § 1201.113.      You may obtain
review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By statute, the nature of
your claims determines the time limit for seeking such review and the appropriate
forum with which to file. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b). Although we offer the following
summary of available appeal rights, the Merit Systems Protection Board does not
provide legal advice on which option is most appropriate for your situation an d
the rights described below do not represent a statement of how courts will rule
regarding which cases fall within their jurisdiction. If you wish to seek review of
this final decision, you should immediately review the law applicable to your
claims and carefully follow all filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file
within the applicable time limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your
chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.

10
  We have reviewed the relevant legislation enacted during the pendency of this appeal
and have concluded that it does not affect the outcome of the appeal.
11
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                        22

Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                 5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you   must   submit    your   petition    to   the   court    at   the
following address:
                              U.S. Court of Appeals
                              for the Federal Circuit
                             717 Madison Place, N.W.
                             Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or    EEOC    review     of   cases      involving   a   claim      of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.      5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. 420 (2017). If you have a representative in this case,
                                                                                23

and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the district court no later than 30 calendar days after your representative
receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling condition, you may be
entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and to waiver of any
requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security.        See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                               P.O. Box 77960
                          Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                         Office of Federal Operations
                  Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                              131 M Street, N.E.
                                Suite 5SW12G
                          Washington, D.C. 20507
                                                                                     24

      (3) Judicial    review     pursuant    to   the    Whistleblower      Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in
section 2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or
2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial
review either with the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir cuit or any court
of appeals of competent jurisdiction. 12 The court of appeals must receive your
petition for review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.
5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                                U.S. Court of Appeals
                                for the Federal Circuit
                               717 Madison Place, N.W.
                               Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.

12
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115 -195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                             25

      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                                    /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.