Court Opinion

ID: 9732078
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 16:06:52.302907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:23.031391
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE KILBRIDE, specially concurring: For the reasons set forth in my special concurrence in Jackson v. South Holland Dodge, Inc., 197 Ill. 2d 39, 58-60 (2001) (Kilbride, J., specially concurring), I agree with the majority’s judgment in this case but disagree with the majority’s reasoning. The majority correctly concludes plaintiffs have not sufficiently plead a cause of action under the Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Act) (815 ILCS 505/1 et seq. (West 1994)) against the holder of the lease, Gold Key Lease, Inc. I respectfully contend, however, that the majority has again overextended our holding in Lanier. In Lanier, we noted that section 10b (1) of the Act provides that it does not apply to “ ‘[ajctions or transactions specifically authorized by laws administered by any regulatory body or officer acting under statutory authority of this State or the United States.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Lanier, 114 Ill. 2d at 17, quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 121V2, par. 270b(l) (now 815 ILCS 505/10b(l) (West 2000)). Lanier thus limited exemptions from liability to conduct that is directly required by TILA and not to conduct that does not violate TILA. In this case, the majority has again misapplied Lanier by holding that if there is no technical violation of TILA, then the conduct is specifically authorized by TILA. The accurate rule under Lanier is that, unless there is a patent TILA violation (see 15 U.S.C. § 1641(a) (1994)) or unless a plaintiff can show active and direct, preassignment fraud on the part of the assignee, a plaintiff cannot maintain a cause of action against an assignee. For these reasons, I respectfully concur only in the judgment and I do not endorse the reasoning employed by the majority to reach that judgment.