Court Opinion

ID: 9852509
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:31:57.595476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:28.861859
License: Public Domain

LEVINE, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent. If we were the fact-finders I might be less hesitant to join the majority. But we are not. On appeal we recognize the significance of the trial court’s opportunity to assess the credibility of witnesses by according great deference to its decision in suppression matters. State v. Ronngren, 361 N.W.2d 224 (N.D.1985). Consequently, we will reverse, after resolving conflicts in the testimony in favor of af-firmance, only when there is insufficient competent evidence fairly capable of supporting the trial court’s determination concerning the suppression of evidence. State v. Frank, 350 N.W.2d 596 (N.D.1984). Here there was sufficient competent evidence to support the suppression order.
The trial court found, supported by the record, that the officers entered the home hoping, and intending, to discover evidence of crimes unrelated to the subject of the search warrant. The trial court further determined that to accomplish this goal the officers conducted, in bad faith, a general exploratory search of the house without any reasonable suspicion that the property searched and ultimately seized was stolen.
Giving these factual findings appropriate deference, Ronngren, supra; Frank, supra, I cannot join the majority’s conclusion that the officers had a reasonable suspicion that the microwave had been stolen. Consequently, I cannot agree that the “immediately apparent” requirement needed for a valid plain view search was present in this case.
The requirement that the incriminating nature of property searched must be immediately apparent can be traced to language in Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), where the Supreme Court cautioned that a seizure based upon the plain view doctrine “is legitimate only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence before them; the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be, used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges.” 403 U.S. at 466, 91 S.Ct. at *8782038. The rationale for the “immediately apparent” limitation is based, in part, I believe, on the recognition that well trained, conscientious police officers, by virtue of that very training and occupation, can be reasonably expected to be suspicious of everyone and everything. Thus the “immediately apparent” rule is but another constraint imposed on an officer’s occupational skepticism to protect the right to privacy. Consequently, in order to deter general exploratory searches, the incriminating nature of property is deemed immediately apparent only if there is probable cause to associate the property with criminal activity. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502 (1983).
I read the majority opinion as holding that even if there were not probable cause to search the microwave, the officers’ “reasonable suspicion,” not amounting to probable cause, “justified the very minimal intrusion on privacy to check the serial number.” Then, upon learning via radio the microwave had been stolen, there was probable cause to justify seizing it as stolen property.
Even if all that is necessary to constitute a lawful search and seizure is a reasonable suspicion, not amounting to probable cause, that property in plain view is associated with criminal activity, so as to justify recording and checking a serial number via radio, State v. Noll, 116 Wis.2d 443, 343 N.W.2d 391 (1984), cert. den., 461 U.S. —, 105 S.Ct. 133, 83 L.Ed.2d 73 (1984); see generally 2 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure, § 4.11 (1978), the record in this case does not support the majority’s conclusion that the officers had reasonable suspicion that the microwave had been stolen.
The trial court found, supported by the record, that prior to running the computer check on the microwave serial number that the officers had no belief, reasonable or otherwise, that the microwave had been stolen. They merely had a generalized suspicion that Wayne Otto may have been involved in several burglaries. The microwave oven was not obviously contraband, contrary to the situation in Texas v. Brown, supra, where the incriminating nature of the type of balloon commonly known to carry drugs was immediately apparent to the trained officer. The mere fact that the microwave was sitting unplugged on a cooler was not suspicious in and of itself, given the ongoing remodeling of the basement kitchen, the portability of a microwave, or mere unorthodox housekeeping. Furthermore, there was not an unusual supply of microwaves or other property in the house to indicate that the premises were being used to store stolen goods. See contra Klenke v. State, 581 P.2d 1119 (Alaska 1978) (officers literally surrounded by property generally matching description of property known to be stolen); State v. Streitz, 258 N.W.2d 768 (Minn.1977) (inordinate amount of stereo equipment); State v. Legas, 20 Wash.App. 535, 581 P.2d 172 (1978) (unusually large supply of radio equipment). Nor was the serial number on the microwave obliterated or removed. See contra Com. v. Accaputo, 380 Mass. 435, 404 N.E.2d 1204 (1980); State v. Smith, 261 N.W.2d 349 (Minn.1977); State v. Legas, supra.
Viewing the situation as a whole, there simply was no sufficient nexus between the microwave and any criminal behavior to raise a reasonable suspicion that the microwave had been stolen. Consequently, the officers were not justified in picking up the microwave, scrutinizing its serial number, and running the computer check. This conduct, carried out in bad faith,1 constituted *879an unwarranted intrusion on privacy interests protected by the fourth amendment as made applicable to the State by the fourteenth amendment. See United States v. Clark, 531 F.2d 928 (8 Cir.1976); United States v. Gray, 484 F.2d 352 (6 Cir.1973), cert. den., 414 U.S. 1158, 94 S.Ct. 916, 39 L.Ed.2d 110 (1974); State v. Wilson, 279 Md. 189, 367 A.2d 1223 (Md.Ct.App.1977); State v. Murray, 84 Wash.2d 527, 527 P.2d 1303 (1974), cert. den., 421 U.S. 1004, 95 S.Ct. 2407, 44 L.Ed.2d 673 (1975).
Based upon the evidence and the law I would affirm the trial court’s suppression order.

. Bad faith, while not a sufficient cause or even a necessary one for finding illegality, is certainly relevant. See, e.g., Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 87 S.Ct. 785, 17 L.Ed.2d 690 (1967); Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 55 S.Ct. 340, 79 L.Ed. 791 (1935) (criminal convictions obtained by knowing use of false evidence cannot be tolerated). Here the trial court specifically found that the officers acted in bad faith by engaging in a general exploratory search, as evidenced by the great number of items not described in the warrant which were searched and seized. The finding of the officers’ improper motives, coupled with the lack of any objective reasonable suspicion that the microwave had been stolen, warrants affirming the suppression order.
*879The majority’s reliance on State v. Gelvin, 318 N.W.2d 302 (N.D. 1982), to support overruling the trial court’s finding of bad faith is troubling. In Gelvin this Court held that mere suspicion that contraband or evidence will be found will not invalidate an otherwise valid "inventory search conducted pursuant to standard jail house procedure." 318 N.W.2d at 307. Gelvin involved a standardized jail house inventory search, not a general search of a private residence. Gelvin’s legitimate expectation of privacy in such an environment was minimal. Thus such an inventory search is not governed by probable cause but rather by whether the intrusion was reasonable under all the circumstances. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96 S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976). In the case before us, there was no valid plain view search to negate any bad faith motives of the officers. Indeed, just the opposite scenario existed, bad faith motivating the officers to conduct an illegal search. Gelvin is clearly inapposite.