Court Opinion

ID: 9486954
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 12:04:38.140929+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:52:01.705993
License: Public Domain

HEANEY, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that no equal protection violation occurred and that there is no judicial review of Military Claims Act (MCA) determinations absent a constitutional claim. I conclude, however, that the MCA does confer an entitlement to a settlement upon a showing of negligence and therefore due process requires fair procedures to determine negligence. Absent such procedures, the promise of benefits to those who are injured by the negligence of the military is a sham.
*1334-1340The majority states that MCA provides an opportunity to file a complaint but that payment of a settlement is discretionary even if negligence is shown. Its analysis precludes any due process challenge no matter how arbitrarily or improperly the complaint has been handled or disposed of. I do not believe that this is the “opportunity” envisioned by Congress when it established the complaint procedure under the MCA, particularly given the fact that the MCA is the exclusive remedy for claimants. The MCA provides compensation to persons injured in the course of medical treatment if they can show that their injuries resulted from negligence by the physicians involved. Due process requires that claimants be afforded fair procedures for presenting their claims of negligence.
Cases from other circuits have acknowledged the possibility that review of an MCA claim is available when a failure of due process is implicated. The MCA “may well permit some limited review, for example where there has been a substantial departure from important procedural rights, a misconstruction of the governing legislation, or some like error going to the heart of the administrative determination.” Broadnax v. United States Army, 710 F.2d 865, 867 (D.C.Cir.1983) (quoting Scroggins v. United States, 397 F.2d 295, 297 (Ct.Cl.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 952, 89 S.Ct. 376, 21 L.Ed.2d 363 (1968)) (internal quotations omitted); see also Hata v. United States, 23 F.3d 230, 233-34 (9th Cir.1994) (noting Scroggins quoted in Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 791, 105 S.Ct. 1620, 1633, 84 L.Ed.2d 674 (1985)); Rodrigue v. United States, 968 F.2d 1430, 1432 (1st Cir.1992) (same); LaBash v. United States Dep’t of the Army, 668 F.2d 1153, 1156 (10th Cir.) (suggesting failure to comply with statutory process would constitute due process violation), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1008, 102 S.Ct. 2299, 73 L.Ed.2d 1303 (1982).
I believe that a substantial departure from important procedural rights has occurred in this case. I would agree that the Air Force may use a process that consists entirely of written submissions by the parties. If, however, the Air Force departs from the written process and interviews one of the actors, fairness requires that the claimant also be given an opportunity to question that person. According to the final letter denying the Schneiders’ appeal, the Air Force “extensively interviewed” Dr. Lund about the medical treatment received by Slaine Schneider and about the opinion of the Schneiders’ medical expert, Dr. Sisson, that such treatment was negligent. The Schneiders should have been provided an equal opportunity to question Dr. Lund to explore the basis of his opinion. This is particularly important given the fact that the Air Force is not a neutral or independent adjudicator but rather is investigating one of its own physicians. The Air Force deprived the Schneiders of due process when it failed to afford them that opportunity.