Court Opinion

ID: 9577197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:32:38.303718+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:20:05.333476
License: Public Domain

Carley, Justice,
concurring.
I concur fully in the majority’s holding that, until the insurer has given proper notice of termination to the Public Service Commission (PSC), the motor carrier’s liability policy remains in effect and provides coverage for injuries resulting from an extraterritorial collision. I write separately to explain why, in my opinion, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeHart, 206 Ga. App. 858 (426 SE2d 592) (1992) does not compel the contrary result in this particular case.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeHart involved the same parties as this appeal and, in that case, the Court of Appeals held that former OCGA § 46-7-58 (e) did not authorize a direct cause of action against the motor carrier’s insurer if the injuries did not occur in Georgia. Under the “law of the case” rule, “any ruling by the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals in a case shall be binding in all subsequent proceedings in that case in the lower court and in the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals as the case may be.” OCGA § 9-11-60 (h). Even if the law subsequently changes, the appellate decision remains binding precedent as between the parties thereto. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Walker, 216 Ga. App. 786, 787 (1) (456 SE2d 97) (1995). Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals in Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeHart would be controlling in all subsequent proceedings in that case.
Although this appeal does involve the same parties as Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeHart, it arises in the context of separate litigation wherein a different question is presented for resolution. Here, there is no contention that the DeHarts have a statutory right to pursue a direct cause of action against the insurer prior to obtaining a judgment against the motor carrier. Indeed, they have already settled their claim against the alleged tortfeasor. In this case, the DeHarts brought a declaratory judgment action seeking to establish that Liberty Mutual Insurance Company provided coverage to the negligent motor carrier at the time the collision occurred in North Carolina. They do not rely upon former OCGA § 46-7-58 (e) or any other statute. The DeHarts’ claim is based upon the continuous coverage provision of the PSC’s rules. Clearly, this issue of coverage vel non is distinct from whether the DeHarts had a statutory right to bring a *388direct action against Liberty Mutual Insurance Company in the first instance. Thus, Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. DeHart does not constitute the law of this case, which is a separate declaratory judgment action “based on different grounds, even though the action is between the same parties.” Strauss v. Strauss, 231 Ga. 248, 249 (200 SE2d 878) (1973). Compare Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth. v. Walker, supra at 787 (1). The majority correctly resolves the merits of the DeHarts’ claim, holding that the PSC regulation benefits the public to the same extraterritorial extent as the motor carrier’s insurance policy and that a party injured in another state is, therefore, entitled to recover if the insurer failed to file with the PSC the proper form for terminating the policy.
Decided December 4, 1998 —
Reconsideration denied December 18,1998.
Winburn, Lewis & Barrow, Gene Mac Winburn, John J. Barrow, for appellants.
Carter & Ansley, Ben Kingree III, Patrick C. DiCarlo, for appellee.