Court Opinion

ID: 9897210
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-14 19:08:40.810221+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:55.117055
License: Public Domain

IN THE

   Indiana Supreme Court
             Supreme Court Case No. 22S-CT-381

              Hoosier Contractors, LLC,                                    FILED
                    Appellant/Cross-Appellee,                         Jul 19 2023, 10:08 am

                                                                           CLERK
                                                                       Indiana Supreme Court
                                                                          Court of Appeals
                               –v–                                          and Tax Court

                       Sean Gardner,
                    Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

         Argued: January 26, 2023 | Decided: July 19, 2023

     Interlocutory Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court
                       29D02-1602-CT-1262
            The Honorable Jonathan M. Brown, Judge

    On Petition to Transfer from the Indiana Court of Appeals
                           21A-CT-1331

                  Opinion by Justice Slaughter
                Justices Massa and Molter concur.
Justice Goff concurs in the judgment with separate opinion in which
                     Chief Justice Rush joins.
Slaughter, Justice.

   Sean Gardner asked Hoosier Contractors, LLC, to inspect the roof of his
home. But before Hoosier did the inspection, it made Gardner sign a
contract for Hoosier to perform any needed work. Despite their contract,
Gardner refused to let Hoosier repair his roof. Hoosier sued for breach of
contract, prompting Gardner to file a counterclaim in which he alleged
that (1) the contract contained many violations of the Indiana Home
Improvement Contractors Act and (2) these violations were deceptive acts
under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act. Gardner made these
allegations on behalf of a class of Hoosier’s similarly situated customers.
Gardner alleged further that his reliance on these deceptive acts entitled
him and the class members to statutory damages. We hold that Gardner
did not prove he sustained any injury that would afford him standing to
pursue his counterclaim. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

                                               I

                                              A

   In December 2015, Gardner contacted Hoosier Contractors to request a
roof inspection and obtain an estimate for roof repairs at his Indianapolis
home. Two Hoosier representatives visited his home and, before agreeing
to inspect the roof, required Gardner to sign a contract entitled
“Replacement Work Agreement”. This contract required Gardner to hire
Hoosier to perform any needed repairs. The contract provided that, if
Gardner’s insurer would not pay for the repairs, it would be “null and
void”. And the contract included a liquidated-damages clause providing
for damages amounting to 20 percent of the contract price in case of
breach. Gardner signed the contract; Hoosier inspected the roof; and
Gardner submitted the claim to his insurer, Cincinnati Insurance, to cover
the proposed repairs.

    Cincinnati approved the claim and issued a “Scope of Work”
document to Hoosier and Gardner. The document itemized the work
Hoosier was to perform and the cost for each item, with the estimated
total bill exceeding $50,000. Gardner questioned whether some of the
repairs were necessary, and he hired Spartan Claims, LLC, to work with

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-381 | July 19, 2023         Page 2 of 13
Cincinnati to adjust the claim. Spartan and Cincinnati ultimately
produced an updated Scope of Work document, totaling nearly $60,000.
Although Hoosier tried to schedule the repairs, Gardner did not allow
Hoosier to complete them. Instead, Gardner hired a different company,
Caliber Construction, to do the requested repairs for about $18,000.

                                              B

   Hoosier filed a breach-of-contract claim against Gardner, who
responded by filing a counterclaim on behalf of a class alleging Hoosier’s
form contract violated the Home Improvement Contractors Act, Ind. Code
ch. 24-5-11. Gardner also alleged that Hoosier used these violations as part
of a “scheme, artifice, or device” to mislead Indiana residents into signing
home-improvement contracts, which constituted “incurable deceptive
acts” actionable under the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act, id. ch.
24-5-0.5. Gardner claimed that he and the other class members “relied
upon [the] deceptive acts perpetrated by Hoosier” and “suffered damages
as a result”.

    Hoosier moved for summary judgment on the counterclaim, which the
trial court denied. It found that “Hoosier’s contract appear[ed] to contain
at least two prima facie violations of HICA’s requirements”: failure to list a
price for the agreed home improvements (as required by Indiana Code
section 24-5-11-10(a)(8)), and failure to describe the agreed work (as
required by subsection 10(a)(4)).

   Gardner then moved to certify his proposed class, which the trial court
granted, defining the class as: “All persons who entered into a Home
Improvement Contract with Hoosier Contractors, LLC from February 12,
2014 until such time that Hoosier stopped utilizing said Contract(s) and
began utilizing a Home Improvement Contract that was in compliance
with the Indiana Home Improvement Contractors Act.”

    Hoosier later filed a second summary-judgment motion, alleging
Gardner and some of the class members lack standing under subsection
4(a) because they did not suffer an actual injury. Hoosier attached
deposition testimony and supporting affidavits to its motion. Hoosier’s
president, Joshua White, attested that Hoosier never performed the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-381 | July 19, 2023          Page 3 of 13
agreed-upon repairs, and Gardner’s deposition testimony proved he had
hired another company to do the repairs for around $18,000—a fraction of
Hoosier’s contract price. Gardner opposed this motion, claiming that class
members’ injury from the deceptive contract was their reliance on it: “As
people relying on Hoosier’s incurable deceptive acts, all members of the
class that signed Hoosier’s HICA-noncompliant contract suffered an
injury that yields statutory damages through Indiana Code 24-5-0.5-4.”
Gardner attached documents to his summary-judgment response brief,
including his affidavit and portions of his deposition. Gardner averred he
“told Hoosier that [he] would not be working with them due to what [he]
believed to be their dishonest business practices.” Gardner’s deposition
testimony was the same evidence cited by Hoosier and explained that he
had hired a different company to complete his roof repairs.

    Gardner also sought approval of a class-action notice, as well as a
motion for partial summary judgment, arguing the contract was null and
void and the liquidated-damages clause was an unenforceable penalty.
The trial court issued three separate, non-final orders denying each party’s
summary-judgment motion and amending the class-action notice. The
trial court certified the three orders for interlocutory appeal, and the court
of appeals accepted jurisdiction. On the merits, the appellate court
affirmed the denial of the summary-judgment motions and the order
concerning the class-action notice. Hoosier Contractors, LLC v. Gardner, 190
N.E.3d 359 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022). Both parties then sought transfer, which
we granted, 197 N.E.3d 829 (Ind. 2022), thus vacating the appellate
opinion, Ind. Appellate Rule 58(A).

                                              II

  The trial court ruled on three separate motions below: (1) it denied
Hoosier’s motion for summary judgment, which argued (among other
things) that Gardner and some class members lacked standing; (2) it
denied Gardner’s motion for partial summary judgment, which argued
that the contract was null and void and its liquidated-damages clause was
unenforceable; and (3) it issued an order amending Gardner’s class-action
notice and denying Hoosier’s motion to decertify the class. The aggrieved
parties appealed each of these three orders. We hold that Gardner, on

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-381 | July 19, 2023         Page 4 of 13
behalf of himself and as class representative, lacked standing to bring his
counterclaim against Hoosier—a disposition that moots the class-action
issues—and we summarily affirm sections 3 and 4 of the court of appeals’
opinion, 190 N.E.3d at 370–72, which affirmed the denial of Gardner’s
motion for partial summary judgment as to Hoosier’s breach-of-contract
claim. App. R. 58(A)(2).

                                              A

   “The threshold issue of standing determines whether a litigant is
entitled to have a court decide the substantive issues of a dispute.” Solarize
Ind., Inc. v. S. Ind. Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 216 (Ind. 2022). The
standing requirement “mandates that courts act in real cases, and eschew
action when called upon to engage only in abstract speculation.” Pence v.
State, 652 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ind. 1995). Whether a party has standing is a
legal question we review de novo. City of Gary v. Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d 349,
351 (Ind. 2022) (citing Holcomb v. Bray, 187 N.E.3d 1268, 1275 (Ind. 2022)).

                                              1

   Indiana’s constitution imposes structural limits on the exercise of
judicial power. Although our constitution lacks the “case or controversy”
requirement found in Article III of the United States Constitution, our
separation-of-powers clause, Ind. Const. art. 3, § 1, “fulfills a similar
function.” Pence, 652 N.E.2d at 488 (citing Ind. Dep't of Env’t Mgmt. v.
Chemical Waste Mgmt., Inc., 643 N.E.2d 331, 336–37 (Ind. 1994)). Standing is
a “significant restraint on the ability of Indiana courts to act, as it denies
the courts any jurisdiction absent an actual injured party participating in
the case.” Ibid. Indiana law is clear that standing requires an injury,
Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d at 351, which is met if the party shows it “ha[s]
suffered or [is] in immediate danger of suffering a direct injury as a result
of the complained-of conduct.” Solarize, 182 N.E.3d at 217 (quoting Bd. of
Comm'rs of Union Cnty. v. McGuinness, 80 N.E.3d 164, 168 (Ind. 2017)).

   Because standing under the Indiana Constitution is jurisdictional, it
must exist at all stages of litigation—not merely at the outset. In Solarize,
for example, we dismissed one of the parties for lack of standing, although
no one had objected to that party’s standing at any prior stage of the

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-381 | July 19, 2023            Page 5 of 13
litigation before other tribunals. Solarize, 182 N.E.3d at 216. It follows that
a party must likewise establish standing at each stage of litigation within
a given tribunal. It is not enough, in other words, for a claimant to
establish injury in its pleadings; it must do so at each successive stage of
the litigation. Standing, after all, is and remains an essential element of a
claimant’s case: “[E]ach element must be supported in the same way as
any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with
the manner and degree of evidence required at the successive stages of the
litigation.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992). Parties
asserting a counterclaim must likewise comport with these standing
requirements. See Madison Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs v. Town of Ingalls, 905
N.E.2d 1022, 1025–26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (dismissing counterclaim for
lack of standing), trans. denied.

    At the pleading stage, a claimant’s general factual allegations of injury
arising from the defendant’s conduct may suffice to satisfy standing. For
example, “[m]otions to dismiss for lack of standing may be brought under
Trial Rule 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim on which relief can be
granted.” Thomas v. Blackford Cnty. Area Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 907 N.E.2d
988, 990 (Ind. 2009) (citing Huffman v. Ind. Office of Env’t Adjudication, 811
N.E.2d 806, 813 (Ind. 2004)). When evaluating a Rule 12(B)(6) motion,
reviewing courts take the alleged facts to be true, consider the allegations
in the light most favorable to the non-movant, and draw every reasonable
inference in that party’s favor. Collins Asset Grp., LLC v. Alialy, 139 N.E.3d
712, 714 (Ind. 2020) (citing Bellwether Props., LLC v. Duke Energy Ind., Inc.,
87 N.E.3d 462, 466 (Ind. 2017) (cleaned up)).

   But such general factual allegations do not suffice at the summary-
judgment stage. Under Indiana’s prevailing summary-judgment standard,
the “initial burden is on the summary-judgment movant to ‘demonstrate[]
the absence of any genuine issue of fact as to a determinative issue,’ at
which point the burden shifts to the non-movant to ‘come forward with
contrary evidence’ showing an issue for the trier of fact.” Hughley v. State,
15 N.E.3d 1000, 1003 (Ind. 2014) (brackets in original) (quoting Williams v.
Tharp, 914 N.E.2d 756, 761–62 (Ind. 2009)). The non-movant cannot “rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading” but must “set forth”
by affidavit or other evidence “specific facts”, Ind. Trial Rule 56(E), that

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-381 | July 19, 2023          Page 6 of 13
for summary-judgment purposes will be taken as true. Scripture v. Roberts,
51 N.E.3d 248, 254 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (non-movant’s restatement of
denial in pleadings and failure to raise specific facts were insufficient to
raise genuine factual issue precluding summary judgment under
Hughley).

                                              2

    Hoosier’s summary-judgment motion proved the absence of a genuine
factual dispute on a determinative issue—that Gardner suffered no injury.
Hoosier attached deposition testimony and supporting affidavits showing
that it never performed the agreed-upon repairs, and that Gardner hired
another company to do the repairs for a fraction of the price. Once Hoosier
made this showing, the burden shifted to Gardner to set forth specific
evidence creating an issue of fact that he was injured by Hoosier’s
deceptive acts. See Hughley, 15 N.E.3d at 1003 (describing summary-
judgment burden shifting).

   For Gardner to show injury under the deceptive consumer sales act, he
needed to show that he relied to his detriment on a deceptive act by
Hoosier: “A person relying upon an uncured or incurable deceptive act
may bring an action for the damages actually suffered as a consumer as a
result of the deceptive act or five hundred dollars ($500), whichever is
greater.” I.C. § 24-5-0.5-4(a) (emphasis added). We have previously
explained that “[a] prerequisite for obtaining damages [under this statute]
is that the claimant relied on the deception.” Rainbow Realty Grp., Inc. v.
Carter, 131 N.E.3d 168, 178 (Ind. 2019) (emphasis added). Consumers who
relied on a deceptive act may bring an action “for the damages actually
suffered . . . as a result”. I.C. § 24-5-0.5-4(a). A claimant’s “damages
actually suffered” is defined as “[a]n amount awarded to a complainant to
compensate for a proven injury or loss; damages that repay actual losses.”
Actual Damages, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). Relevant here,
subsection 4(b), which governs class actions, requires the named class
representative—Gardner—to be “damaged” by the deceptive act:

        Any person who is entitled to bring an action under
        subsection (a) on the person’s own behalf against a supplier
        for damages for a deceptive act may bring a class action

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-381 | July 19, 2023        Page 7 of 13
        against such supplier on behalf of any class of persons of
        which that person is a member and which has been
        damaged by such deceptive act.

 I.C. § 24-5-0.5-4(b) (emphasis added). Thus, the Act requires that every
class member must suffer damages derived from actual injuries.

    Elsewhere, the Act confirms that the consumer must suffer an actual
injury due to his reliance on a deceptive act. Subsection 2(a)(6) says that an
“‘offer to cure’ as applied to a deceptive act” must be “reasonably
calculated to remedy a loss claimed by the consumer”. I.C. § 24-5-0.5-
2(a)(6)(A) (emphasis added). Such “loss” presumes that the consumer
must suffer actual damages to sue under subsection 4(a). There can be no
“loss” without actual damages arising from an actual injury. Thus, the Act
requires consumers to rely on the deceptive act and suffer injury as a
result—known as detrimental reliance: “Reliance by one party on the acts
or representations of another, causing a worsening of the first party’s
position.” Detrimental Reliance, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).

    Courts interpreting analogous federal consumer-protection statutes
likewise hold that a separate injury, apart from the procedural violation, is
required to maintain an action. In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016),
Robins, a consumer, tried to maintain an action against Spokeo, Inc. under
the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. Id. at 333.
The Act allows consumers to sue consumer-reporting agencies for
statutory damages if they willfully violated any requirement of the Act,
including maintaining false information on a consumer. Id. at 335. Robins
learned that Spokeo made an inaccurate credit report about him, and he
sued on his own behalf and on behalf of all similarly situated persons
alleging that inaccuracies in their reports violated the Act. Id. at 336. The
Supreme Court concluded that “Congress’ role in identifying and
elevating intangible harms does not mean that a plaintiff automatically
satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person
a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate
that right.” Id. at 341. A consumer cannot allege a “bare procedural
violation” sufficient to confer standing, the Court held, without also
alleging the violation caused him injury. Ibid. See also Pearce v. Am. Def.

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-381 | July 19, 2023          Page 8 of 13
Life Ins., 343 S.E.2d 174, 180 (N.C. 1986) (consumer must show he suffered
an actual injury as a proximate result of defendant’s deceptive statement
or misrepresentation to bring claim under consumer-protection statute);
Flores v. Rawlings Co., 177 P.3d 341, 358 (Haw. 2008) (granting summary
judgment under consumer-protection statute because claimants did not
“demonstrate[] that they were injured as a result of [business’s] violation”
of the statute).

   Likewise, in Casillas v. Madison Avenue Associates, Inc., in an opinion by
then-Judge Barrett, the Seventh Circuit concluded that because a violation
of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act did not actually harm the
plaintiff/claimant, there was no standing. 926 F.3d 329, 332 (7th Cir. 2019)
(Barrett, J.). The Act requires debt collectors to notify consumers about the
statutory process for verifying a debt. Id. at 331. One of Casillas’s creditors
sent her a dunning letter that did not notify her that she had to respond to
the debt collector in writing to trigger the statutory protections. Ibid.
Casillas filed a class action against the debt collector alleging that her only
harm was her receipt of a non-compliant letter, and she sought statutory
damages. Id. at 331–32. The court emphasized that just because “Congress
has authorized a plaintiff to sue a debt collector who ‘fails to comply with
any requirement [of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act],’ 15 U.S.C. §
1692k(a), does not mean that [the plaintiff] has standing.” Id. at 333 (citing
Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341). Because the debt collector’s mistake “didn’t put
Casillas in harm’s way, it was nothing more than a ‘bare procedural
violation’” that could not, by itself, satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement
necessary to confer standing. Id. at 334 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341).

    Moreover, the requirement that these consumer-protection statutes call
for an actual injury—beyond a mere procedural violation—does not
render their statutory-damages provisions a nullity or discourage injured
consumers from bringing these claims. “Generally, ‘statutory damages are
reserved for cases in which the damages caused by a violation are small or
difficult to ascertain.’” Meyers v. Nicolet Rest. of De Pere, LLC, 843 F.3d 724,
729 n.5 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Perrone v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 232
F.3d 433, 436 (5th Cir. 2000)). In future cases, claimants may still take
advantage of the statutory-damages provisions, provided they sustained
actual damages that are less than any statutory-damages threshold:

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-381 | July 19, 2023           Page 9 of 13
“[P]laintiff[s] may still seek statutory damages if the actual damages
caused by the violation are small or difficult to ascertain.” Ibid.

    As for subsection 4(a) of our own Act, so long as a claimant proves he
detrimentally relied on a deceptive act, he can sue under the statute and
recover statutory damages, even if his actual damages are “small or
difficult to ascertain.” Ibid. In this way, subsection 4(a) guarantees a
minimum amount of damages to encourage injured consumers to bring
these claims.

                                              B

    In his amended counterclaim, Gardner alleged he detrimentally relied
on Hoosier’s deceptive acts, as required under subsection 4(a). He claimed
that he and the other class members “relied upon [the] deceptive acts
perpetrated by Hoosier” and “suffered damages as a result of the
deceptive acts.” These injury allegations were sufficient to confer standing
at the litigation’s pleading stage. Collins Asset Grp., 139 N.E.3d at 714.

    But later, in his response to Hoosier’s motion for summary judgment,
Gardner again argued that he and other class members detrimentally
relied on Hoosier’s deceptive acts: “As people relying on Hoosier’s
incurable deceptive acts, all members of the class that signed Hoosier’s
HICA-noncompliant contract suffered an injury that yields statutory
damages through Indiana Code § 24-5-0.5-4.” But the summary-judgment
phase raises the threshold for proving an injury. Hoosier met its initial
burden of showing there was no genuine issue of material fact concerning
Gardner’s detrimental reliance. The burden then shifted to Gardner, who
could not rest on general allegations or the denials of his pleadings, but
had to designate specific evidence of his detrimental reliance on Hoosier’s
deceptive acts. Scripture, 51 N.E.3d at 252 (citing T.R. 56(E)). The problem
for Gardner is that the documents attached to his summary-judgment
response showed Hoosier’s deceptive acts did not harm him at all.

   Gardner’s affidavit detailed the procedural violations that Hoosier
committed, but also stated that he “told Hoosier that [he] would not be
working with them due to what [he] believed to be their dishonest
business practices.” In his deposition, Gardner explained that he hired a

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-381 | July 19, 2023       Page 10 of 13
different company to repair his roof for about $18,000, far below Hoosier’s
estimate of nearly $60,000. This evidence proves that Hoosier’s deceptive
acts did not “put [Gardener] in harm’s way”, Casillas, 926 F.3d at 334, or
leave him worse off than he would have been had Hoosier not violated
the Act. Detrimental Reliance, supra.

    At oral argument, Gardner underscored that his claimed injury—the
“detriment” he allegedly suffered—was indistinct from Hoosier’s
procedural violations of the Act: “the detriment, I think, is the deceptive
act itself.” Oral Argument at 25:31. But as we have emphasized, any such
violations are insufficient by themselves to confer standing. On this
record, Hoosier’s deceptive acts did not hoodwink Gardner. He paid
Hoosier nothing and hired a different company to repair his roof for less
than Hoosier would have charged him. A deceptive act that deceives no
one injures no one. If Hoosier’s deception had succeeded, the outcome
here would likely be different. For example, if Hoosier had duped
Gardner into completing the roof repairs for $60,000, that would have
amounted to detrimental reliance and damages of $42,000. But that is not
the record before us.

    Based on the evidence presented at summary judgment, Gardner did
not meet his burden to create a genuine factual issue that he was injured.
See Scripture, 51 N.E.3d at 252 (citing T.R. 56(E)). Because he failed to
prove injury consonant with our summary-judgment standard, Gardner
and the class members did not satisfy the injury requirement for standing.
I.C. § 24-5-0.5-4. Thus, dismissal of Gardner’s amended counterclaim
against Hoosier is warranted here. This holding moots any issue
concerning the class-action notice.

   Our disposition today does not mean that Hoosier necessarily escapes
legal liability for its business practices generally or even its practices as to
Gardner specifically. The attorney general retains enforcement authority
to seek any number of statutory remedies against those that violate the
Act, including obtaining injunctions and securing civil penalties. Id. §§ 24-
5-0.5-4(c), 24-5-0.5-8.

                                      *        *       *

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-381 | July 19, 2023           Page 11 of 13
  For these reasons, we reverse the trial court’s denial of Hoosier’s
motion for summary judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss
Gardner’s counterclaim for lack of standing. And we affirm the trial
court’s denial of Gardner’s motion for partial summary judgment.

Massa and Molter, JJ., concur.
Goff, J., concurs in the judgment with separate opinion in which
Rush, C.J., joins.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE HOOSIER
CONTRACTORS, LLC
William N. Riley
Russell B. Cate
Sundeep Singh
RileyCate, LLC
Fishers, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT SEAN GARDNER
Paul L. Jefferson
Bradley J. Buchheit
Scott A. Milkey
McNeelyLaw, LLP
Indianapolis, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR AMICUS CURIAE STATE OF INDIANA
Theodore E. Rokita
Attorney General of Indiana

Thomas M. Fisher
Solicitor General

James A. Barta
Deputy Solicitor General

Angela Sanchez
Chief Counsel, Appeals

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-381 | July 19, 2023   Page 12 of 13
Benjamin M.L. Jones
Assistant Section Chief, Civil Appeals

Julia C. Payne
Melinda R. Holmes
Abigail R. Recker
Deputy Attorneys General
Indianapolis, Indiana

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-381 | July 19, 2023   Page 13 of 13
Goff, J., concurring in the judgment.

   I agree with the Court that the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act
requires a plaintiff class to show actual damages were suffered in reliance
on a deceptive act. Based on my interpretation of the Act alone, I concur in
today’s judgment. I write separately, however, to express my concern that
the majority’s reliance on recent developments in federal standing
doctrine could do injury to Indiana law.

    I. Statutory interpretation resolves this appeal.
   As the opinion of the Court relates, Sean Gardner filed a counterclaim
“on behalf of a proposed class” against Hoosier Contractors. App. Vol. II,
p. 48. The counterclaim alleged reliance on incurably deceptive home
improvement contracts. Hoosier moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that Gardner, and some members of the class, had no standing to
sue because they had suffered “no compensable injury.” Id. at 70. In
response, Gardner asserted that “all members of the class that signed”
Hoosier’s contracts “suffered an injury that yields statutory damages.”
App. Vol. IV, p. 178.

   When the General Assembly enacts a statute that provides a right of
action, it may establish “standing requirements” limiting who is a “proper
person to invoke the court’s authority.” Solarize Indiana, Inc. v. S. Indiana
Gas & Elec. Co., 182 N.E.3d 212, 216–17 (Ind. 2022) (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Here, the Act provides that “[a] person relying upon an
uncured or incurable deceptive act may bring an action for the damages
actually suffered as a consumer as a result of the deceptive act or five
hundred dollars ($500), whichever is greater.” Ind. Code § 24-5-0.5-4(a)
(emphasis added). It further enables such a person to bring a class action
“on behalf of any class of persons of which that person is a member and
which has been damaged by such deceptive act.” I.C. § 24-5-0.5-4(b)
(emphases added). Conversely, the attorney general is authorized to
“bring an action to enjoin a deceptive act” in a subsection that makes no
mention of either reliance or damages. I.C. § 24-5-0.5-4(c). Considering the
“plain meaning” of the statutory text and “the structure of the statute as a

Indiana Supreme Court | Case No. 22S-CT-381 | July 19, 2023          Page 1 of 6
whole,” ESPN, Inc. v. Univ. of Notre Dame Police Dep’t, 62 N.E.3d 1192, 1195
(Ind. 2016), I conclude that an action may be brought on behalf of a class
who suffered damages in reliance on a defendant’s acts. The deceptive act
itself is not, therefore, a compensable loss in these circumstances. Here,
Gardner designated no evidence of loss, harm, or damage beyond the
alleged deceptive acts, and therefore Hoosier is entitled to summary
judgment.

    II. We should hesitate before following restrictive
       federal standing doctrine too far.
   Aside from the standing conferred by statute, a plaintiff must also
satisfy “the common-law standing rule, which derives from our state
constitution’s separation-of-powers clause.” Solarize, 182 N.E.3d at 216.
Plaintiffs must have “‘a personal stake in the outcome of the litigation’”
and must “‘show that they have suffered or were in immediate danger of
suffering a direct injury as a result of the complained-of conduct.’” Id. at
217 (quoting Bd. of Comm'rs of Union Cnty. v. McGuinness, 80 N.E.3d 164,
168 (Ind. 2017)). Without an injury, “there is no justiciable dispute.” City of
Gary v. Nicholson, 190 N.E.3d 349, 351 (Ind. 2022). A private right of action,
therefore, must contain “an injury requirement.” Id. This much is clear.
Rather more controversial is the question of who decides what constitutes
an injury—an issue the United States Supreme Court has recently spoken
on to guide the federal courts.

   In Nicholson, we found “instructive” an important case from the
Supreme Court. Id. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the Supreme Court
addressed the “citizen-suit” provision of the Endangered Species Act,
which enabled “any person” to sue to enjoin any other person, including
governmental entities, from violating the statute. 504 U.S. 555, 571–72
(1992) (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)). The Court acknowledged that standing
may derive entirely from the invasion of “statutes creating legal rights.”
Id. at 578 (citation and quotation marks omitted). However, Congress
could not by statute “convert the undifferentiated public interest in
executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ‘individual right’
vindicable in the courts.” Id. at 577. Otherwise, the federal courts would

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usurp the President’s duty to “‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed’” and thus violate the separation of powers. Id. at 577 (quoting
U.S. Const. art. II, § 3). Rejecting the notion of a “procedural injury” that
any person suffered whenever an official failed to follow “correct
consultative procedure” under the statute, id. at 571–72, the Court
required plaintiffs to show an “injury in fact,” id. at 560. Among other
requirements, this meant “an invasion of a legally protected interest”
which was “concrete and particularized.” Id. at 560. This rule of standing
limited Congress’s power to provide private rights of action without
concomitant private injuries. Lujan indicated, however, that Congress was
authorized to elevate “to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete,
de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law,” such as “an
individual’s personal interest in living in a racially integrated
community.” Id. at 578 (citation omitted).

   In 2016, the Supreme Court took its “concrete” injury requirement a
step further. In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Court addressed a provision of
the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) that permitted an individual to sue
a consumer-reporting agency for statutory damages over a violation of the
statute. 578 U.S. 330, 335 (2016) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a)). Robins sued
individually and on behalf of a class after he discovered that Spokeo was
publishing inaccurate personal information online. Id. at 336. Returning to
the issue of standing, the Court explained that a “concrete injury must be
de facto; that is, it must actually exist.” Id. at 340 (citation and quotation
marks omitted). Such an injury could well be “intangible.” Id. However, to
determine “whether an intangible harm constitutes injury in fact,” the
Court would consider not only “the judgment of Congress” but also
“whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm
that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in
English or American courts.” Id. at 340–41. The Court then decided for
itself that a “violation of one of the FCRA’s procedural requirements may
result in no harm.” Id. at 342. The Court ended up remanding the case
without deciding whether Robins had demonstrated sufficient
“concreteness.” Id. at 342–43. But the precedent had been set that the
Court would review a judgment made by Congress that a statutory

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violation bearing on an individual’s personal interests should be an
actionable injury.

   Today’s opinion of the Court draws, once again, from federal
precedents, discusses Spokeo, and specifically borrows the notion of a
“mere procedural violation.” Ante, at 8–9. I note that the opinion does not
expressly adopt federal standing law as Indiana law. I am concerned,
however, that continued reliance on the United States Supreme Court’s
standing doctrine could do harm to Indiana law, especially considering
where the Court has gone since Spokeo.

    In 2021, the Supreme Court took yet another step to restrict Congress’s
power to identify legal injuries in TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S.Ct.
2190 (2021). That case was brought by a plaintiff whose credit file had
inaccurately labeled him a potential terrorist or criminal based on his
name. Id. at 2201. Ramirez sought statutory damages for himself and a
class, alleging that TransUnion had violated the FCRA by failing to
reasonably ensure the accuracy of its information and by failing to
disclose complete information and adequate notices of consumers’ rights.
Id. at 2202. Some of the class members had inaccurate credit files that
were, however, never provided to potential creditors. Id. at 2209. The
Court held that the “mere presence of an inaccuracy in an internal credit
file, if it is not disclosed to a third party, causes no concrete harm.” Id. at
2210. Furthermore, although the inaccurate files posed a “risk of future
harm,” this could not confer standing to seek damages unless and until
the harm “materialized.” Id. at 2211. As to the disclosure claims, the Court
acknowledged that the requirements were “designed to protect
consumers’ interests in learning of any inaccuracies in their credit files.”
Id. at 2213. Yet TransUnion’s failings in this regard did not cause anything
like the harms “traditionally recognized” in American law. Id. The
Supreme Court thus undertook to reconsider Congress’s judgment that
defective credit files and information disclosures pose a risk of harm that
deserves to be legally actionable.

   The Supreme Court’s trajectory on standing is a departure from
longstanding jurisprudence, as powerfully expressed by Justice Thomas’s
dissent (joined by three other justices) in TransUnion. Under the common

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law, Justice Thomas explained, when an individual sued “for a violation
of his private rights,” the mere violation was enough to invoke a court’s
jurisdiction. Id. at 2217. This has long been the law in Indiana. A century
ago, our Court explained that, in a suit for trespass on land, the plaintiff
“may maintain an action against one who wrongfully invades his
possession” and “recover nominal damages, without proof of injury.”
Indiana Pipe Line Co. v. Christensen, 188 Ind. 400, 407–08, 123 N.E. 789, 792
(1919). Such remains the law today. See Reed v. Reid, 980 N.E.2d 277, 295
(Ind. 2012) (“damages are not an element of trespass”). The United States
Supreme Court went astray, Justice Thomas argued, when the rule of
Lujan, requiring “injury in fact” in a “citizen-suit cause of action” over a
“public right,” displaced the traditional rule in a case where a statute
“creates a private right and a cause of action.” TransUnion, 141 S.Ct. at
2220 (emphases added). The result of adopting this doctrine, he
continued, was to disable Congress from providing a cause of action to
protect “anything other than money, bodily integrity, and anything else
that this Court thinks looks close enough to rights existing at common
law.” Id. at 2221. “In the name of protecting the separation of powers,”
Justice Thomas concluded, “this Court has relieved the legislature of its
power to create and define rights.” Id. (citations omitted).

   It is indeed difficult to understand how the separation of powers is
imperiled by a court undertaking to “remedy private legal wrongs by
awarding relief when there has been a violation of a private right.” F.
Andrew Hessick, Standing, Injury In Fact, and Private Rights, 93 Cornell L.
Rev. 275, 319 (2008). To quote Justice Thomas once more, “where one
private party has alleged that another private party violated his private
rights, there is generally no danger that the private party’s suit is an
impermissible attempt to police the activity of the political branches.”
Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 347 (Thomas, J., concurring). Rather, it is the legislative
power which is put at risk as “the injury-in-fact test has turned into an
increasingly serious obstacle to congressional efforts to create new rights
and to give people causes of action to vindicate those rights.” C. R.
Sunstein, Injury In Fact, Transformed, 2021 Sup. Ct. Rev. 349, 374 (2021).

   Further reliance on cases like Spokeo could lead this Court down the
road of reviewing whether rights the General Assembly has decided to

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protect are sufficiently “concrete” to confer standing. This would be an
interference with the power of the legislature to define Hoosiers’ rights
and to provide remedies, including nominal or statutory damages, when
those rights are violated. For this reason, I concur only in today’s
judgment.

Rush, C.J., joins.

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