Court Opinion

ID: 9839833
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-14 15:00:55.406234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:41:35.045961
License: Public Domain

20-1878
     Khatiwada v. Garland
                                                                                 BIA
                                                                          Vomacka, IJ
                                                                         A206 298 476

                            UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                  SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

 1        At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
 2   for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United
 3   States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,
 4   on the 14th day of September, two thousand twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT:
 7            JOSEPH F. BIANCO,
 8            BETH ROBINSON,
 9            MYRNA PÉREZ,
10                 Circuit Judges.
11   _____________________________________
12
13   BISHWAREKHA KHATIWADA,
14            Petitioner,
15
16                   v.                                          20-1878
17                                                               NAC
18   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
19   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
20            Respondent.
21   _____________________________________
22
23   FOR PETITIONER:                   Gary J. Yerman, Esq., New York,
24                                      NY.
25
26   FOR RESPONDENT:                   Brian Boynton, Acting Assistant
27                                     Attorney General; Keith I.
28                                     McManus, Assistant Director; Scott
 1                                      M. Marconda, Trial Attorney,
 2                                      Office of Immigration Litigation,
 3                                      United States Department of
 4                                      Justice, Washington, DC.
 5
 6          UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

 7   Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

 8   ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the petition for review

 9   is GRANTED.

10          Petitioner Bishwarekha Khatiwada, a native and citizen

11   of Nepal, seeks review of a May 27, 2020, decision of the BIA

12   affirming      a    May   18,    2018,       decision     of   an    Immigration

13   Judge (“IJ”)        denying     Khatiwada’s        application      for    asylum,

14   withholding        of   removal,   and       relief   under    the    Convention

15   Against Torture (“CAT”).            In re Bishwarekha Khatiwada, No.

16   A206 298 476 (B.I.A. May 27, 2020), aff’g No. A206 298 476

17   (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City May 18, 2018).                  We assume the parties’

18   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

19     I.     Standard of Review

20          Under   the      circumstances,        we   have   reviewed        the   IJ’s

21   decision as modified by the BIA, i.e., minus the grounds for

22   the adverse credibility determination that the BIA declined

23   to reach.          See Xue Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice,

                                              2
 1   426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d Cir. 2005). 1              The applicable standards

 2   of review are well established. See Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions,

 3   891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility

 4   determination under substantial evidence standard); Singh v.

 5   Garland,     11   F.4th   106,    115      (2d    Cir.     2021)   (reviewing

 6   reasonable        internal      relocation         determination          under

 7   substantial evidence standard).              Although we treat factual

 8   findings as “conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

 9   would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C.

10   § 1252(b)(4)(B), we do not “defer to unreasoned rulings, or

11   those based on legal error, faulty analysis, or misreadings

12   of    the   record,”   Dong     Gao   v.    BIA,     482    F.3d   122,    127

13   (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Li Zu Guan v. INS, 453 F.3d 129, 136

14   (2d Cir. 2006)).

15        II. The Adverse Credibility Determination

16          The BIA upheld multiple findings in support of the IJ’s

17   adverse     credibility      determination,       but    the   finding    that

18   Khatiwada was “unable to explain unusual aspects of [a]

19   newspaper article, submitted to corroborate past events” was

     1 Khatiwada’s challenge to the IJ’s inconsistency finding is
     unnecessary because the BIA did not rely on that finding to uphold
     the adverse credibility determination. See Xue Hong Yang, 426 F.3d
     at 522.

                                           3
 1   critical to both decisions.          Certified Admin. R. (“CAR”) at 3

 2   (describing       finding   as    the       “most    important[]”). 2         This

 3   predominating       finding       was       impermissibly          “based     upon

 4   speculation,” so it does not “merit substantial evidence

 5   deference.”         Cao     He    Lin       v.      U.S.   Dep’t     of     Just.,

 6   428 F.3d 391, 400 (2d Cir. 2005).

 7        In support of his application for relief, Khatiwada

 8   submitted    an    article,      purportedly         published     by   a   Nepali

 9   newspaper.    It recounted that Khatiwada, the secretary of a

10   local division of the Nepali Congress Party, had received

11   death threats from Maoist Party members and left his village,

12   and that the chairman of the local division of the Nepali

13   Congress Party had been killed three days earlier by “an armed

14   unknown group.”        CAR at 155.               Though the Department of

15   Homeland Security (“DHS”) did not challenge the authenticity

     2 The IJ explained that its other supportive findings were of
     lesser probative value.    See CAR at 54–55 (“[T]he Court is not
     claiming that . . . the demeanor issue . . . is a major, clear,
     black and white point that indicates the respondent cannot be
     considered credible.”); id. at 53 (“This Judge tries to avoid
     basing a decision mainly on a demeanor finding because demeanor is
     a subjective matter[] . . . [a]nd . . . not very well recorded in
     our system of oral recording of the hearing which does not show
     how the respondent acted, looked, et cetera during his
     testimony.”); id. at 60 (stating that it would not “deny
     [Khatiwada’s] application as a matter of discretion for th[e]
     reason” that he had used false documents to obtain a visa).

                                             4
 1   of the article and the IJ did not find it to have been

 2   fabricated, the IJ identified “several problems” with it:

 3   “First, it was supposedly written while [Khatiwada] was in

 4   hiding,” but includes his picture and “information about

 5   where [Khatiwada] is living in hiding, which certainly would

 6   be   information     [Khatiwada]       would    not    want    released,”

 7   id. at 55; and “[f]urther, . . . [the article] was not written

 8   in a natural way as we would expect it to be if it were a

 9   true newspaper story” because it buries the lede by discussing

10   the threats to Khatiwada before describing a more recent and

11   “more   significant”     killing   of     a    “higher      ranking    party

12   official,” id. at 55–56.

13        The IJ’s “strong impression that this newspaper story,

14   if it was ever published in a newspaper, was written to be

15   beneficial to the respondent,” id. at 56, was speculative in

16   the absence of any challenge to the evidence by DHS.                  In Jin

17   Chen v. United States Department of Justice, we remanded after

18   rejecting   the    agency’s   determination          that    corroborating

19   evidence    “appeared    fabricated”      as    “grounded      solely     on

20   speculation    and      conjecture.”           426     F.3d     104,    115

21   (2d Cir. 2005).      There, “the Government was in possession of

22   these documents for months prior to the merits hearing, and

                                        5
 1   had ample opportunity to procure evidence to impeach them,”

 2   but “procured none.”         Id.     Though the IJ raised skepticism

 3   regarding aspects of the evidence, the Court found that

 4   because the applicant’s testimony “was not implausible,” the

 5   IJ’s    determination      necessarily      relied   upon   impermissible

 6   speculation because “the Government . . . failed to create a

 7   sufficient record to support the IJ’s adverse finding.”              Id.

 8   Similarly, DHS here made no submission before the hearing,

 9   did not challenge the article’s authenticity, conducted no

10   cross-examination on it, raised no “objections to any of the

11   evidence    that    was    filed,”    and    offered   “[no]thing   [it]

12   want[ed]    to     point    out    about     [Khatiwada’s]    evidence.”

13   CAR at 141–42.

14          Further, the IJ’s perception that the newspaper article

15   “was not written in a natural way as we would expect it to be

16   if it were a true newspaper story published for general news

17   purposes,” id. at 55 (emphasis added), was also speculative,

18   reflecting the application of the IJ’s unsupported beliefs of

19   how a Nepalese journalist would have written the article.

20   While inferences based on “known practices . . . in the United

21   States” are plausible in “domestic case[s],” such a “basis is

22   lacking” where “[w]e have no knowledge about . . . and the

                                           6
 1   record does not reflect that the IJ knew anything about . . .

 2   practices in” a foreign country. Cao He Lin, 428 F.3d at 405.

 3   To the extent the IJ faulted Khatiwada for his inability to

 4   explain the journalist’s choices, “an applicant’s failure to

 5   explain     third-party      omissions         is      less      probative      of

 6   credibility than an applicant’s failure to explain his or her

 7   omissions.”       Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 81.            At bottom, the IJ

 8   presumed, without basis, how a Nepali newspaper article about

 9   this    subject     matter      should      have    been      written,     which

10   necessarily required speculation as to journalistic practices

11   in Nepal, information known to the journalist, and whether

12   facts    had   or   had   not    been       reported    previously       in    the

13   newspaper.

14          Because the agency’s predominating finding in support of

15   its     adverse     credibility     determination          was     based      upon

16   speculation and was unsupported by substantial evidence, we

17   vacate the adverse credibility determination because “we are

18   not certain that the agency would have reached the same

19   conclusion as to [Khatiwada’s] credibility in the absence of

20   the errors it made.”             Gurung v. Barr, 929 F.3d 56, 58

21   (2d Cir. 2019); see also Cao He Lin, 428 F.3d at 395.

                                             7
 1     III. The   Purported               Reasonable        Internal         Relocation
 2          Determination

 3         The    BIA    interpreted           that,    “apart     from    the    adverse

 4   credibility        finding,      the       Immigration        Judge    found     the

 5   respondent could relocate to Kat[h]mandu, where he had lived

 6   for   9     months,”     CAR    at    4,     and    affirmed     the    denial    of

 7   Khatiwada’s application for relief on that independent basis

 8   because Khatiwada failed to challenge the IJ’s purported

 9   finding.     Though the IJ made some factual findings that could

10   bear on a reasonable internal relocation analysis, it made no

11   legally sufficient finding that Khatiwada could reasonably

12   relocate in Nepal.         Indeed, the IJ never used any derivation

13   of the words “reasonable,” “internal,” or “relocate.”                            See

14   Cao He Lin, 428 F.3d at 401 (requiring “explicit” finding).

15   Thus, it is not surprising that Khatiwada failed to appeal to

16   the BIA a purported finding that did not explicitly appear in

17   the IJ’s decision.             Moreover, if the IJ intended to deny

18   Khatiwada’s application on this basis, its cursory findings

19   failed      to   apply     the       relevant       factors.     See    8    C.F.R.

20   § 1208.13(b)(3);         Kone        v.    Holder,     596     F.3d     141,     148

21   (2d Cir. 2010)         (remanding          where    IJ’s     “cursory       analysis

22   neglect[ed] to make the specific finding required by the

23   regulations         of . . . the                possibility      of         internal

                                                 8
 1   relocation”).   Accordingly, to the extent the IJ intended to

 2   render a reasonable internal relocation determination, we

 3   vacate it. See Dong Gao, 482 F.3d at 127.

 4                            *    *    *

 5       For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

 6   GRANTED, the agency’s decisions are VACATED, and the case is

 7   REMANDED.   All pending motions and applications are DENIED

 8   and stays VACATED.

 9                                FOR THE COURT:
10                                Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
11                                Clerk of Court

                                   9