Court Opinion

ID: 9623694
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:40:45.360888+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:52:30.228036
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Presiding Justice,
dissenting.
Because I conclude that the provision in the trial court’s decree for a self-executing change of custody was permissible under Weaver v. Jones6 and Pearce v. Pearce,7 because I conclude that the provision is based on the best interests of the child, which is the overriding concern of Georgia’s custody laws, and because I conclude that the provision minimizes litigation and promotes a healthy relationship between both parents and their child, I dissent to the majority’s disap*378proval of such provisions.
To begin, in Weaver v. Jones,8 and Pearce v. Pearce,9 this Court approved self-executing modifications of child support and child custody in the context of agreements that had been incorporated into divorce decrees. In those cases, the decrees awarded custody of the parties’ child or children to the wife, but provided that if the parties’ child or children decided to live with the husband, the wife would begin paying child support to the husband. This Court held that the provisions regarding the changes in child custody and child support were self-executing. In addition, even though this Court recognized that child support and child custody provisions of a divorce decree generally cannot be modified without a subsequent court proceeding, the Court upheld the validity of such self-executing provisions for several reasons: The parties had agreed to the provisions and were thus bound by them;10 the original decree was simply being followed and not modified;11 the trial court had participated in and approved the custody and support provisions by incorporating the parties’ agreement into the original divorce decree;12 and such provisions promoted judicial economy.13
Contrary to the majority’s conclusion, Pearce and Weaver cannot be distinguished from the present case. First, the majority incorrectly states that Pearce is consistent with statutory law that permits a 14-year-old child to elect to live with a parent. This Court’s opinion in Pearce does not state that the children were age 14 or over, and a review of this Court’s records indicates that the children were under age 14 at the time of the divorce decree and at the time of the change of custody. Thus, Pearce supports the trial court’s action in this case, and undercuts the majority’s holding that no change of custody can occur for children under age 14 unless a trial court determines at the time of the change that the change is in the best interests of the children. Moreover, even though Weaver did involve a 14-year-old child’s decision to elect to live with the original non-custodial parent, changes of custody based on the child’s election could only be accomplished by a modification action before Weaver.14 Such modifications were deemed necessary, it appears, so that trial courts could exercise their supervisory powers to insure that a child has selected a fit par*379ent for custody15 and to insure that any visitation provisions are appropriate.16 These decisions are significant ones for children age 14 or over, and in Weaver, we authorized trial courts to place such provisions in divorce decrees and thus approved decisions on these issues to be made in advance of the actual change in custody. Moreover, one of this Court’s reasons for approving the provision in Weaver was that the trial court had “participated in the change by adopting the consent agreement. It had an opportunity at that time to review and reject the proposed arrangement for a change of custody at the child’s election, but chose to ratify it instead.”17 Similarly, in the present case, the trial court heard evidence from the child’s court-appointed guardian ad litem that a self-executing change of custody was in the best interests of the child, reviewed whether such a provision was appropriate, and chose to incorporate such a provision into its divorce decree. For the foregoing reasons, this Court’s decisions in Weaver and Pearce support the trial court’s decision in the present case.
In addition, I conclude that self-executing changes of custody imposed by a trial court are not against the public policy of this State, as they are primarily designed to promote the development of well-adjusted children. As an initial matter, there is nothing in this State’s modification statutes that expressly precludes self-executing changes of custody.18
Moreover, an initial award of custody between parents must be based on the child’s best interests,19 and it is clear that in some (although not all) instances, a self-executing change of custody premised on the child living in a certain location can be in the child’s best interests. For example, when the evidence at trial shows that a child has two parents equally fit to have custody and that the child has important ties to current friends, schools, and relatives, a trial court can conclude that the child’s best interests will be furthered by remaining in the child’s present location. In this regard, a trial court could find that if forced to move to a different county or state, a child may suffer lower academic performance or emotional difficulties based on the stress of adjusting to new friends, schools, and neighborhoods, as well as on the fact that his relationship with the noncustodial parent will be significantly disrupted. In addition, in certain instances, a trial court may find that the stress of travel, by air or otherwise, may harm the child and that the time spent traveling will, among other things, force the child to forego beneficial, age *380appropriate activities with peers. The court could also believe that the custodial parent would attempt to move the child primarily to interfere with the non-custodial parent’s relationship with the child, giving the child the impression that frequent contact with his noncustodial parent is expendable.
Furthermore, if no self-executing change of custody provision is included in a final decree, a trial court could find that the child’s best interests may be quickly and perhaps significantly damaged. For example, without a self-executing change of custody, a child may be moved by the custodial parent to a different state, and by the time the non-custodial parent files a modification action and has it ruled on by trial and appellate courts, what the initial trial court determined to have been the child’s best interest will already have been damaged.20
Significantly, permitting a trial court the flexibility to decide whether a self-executing change of custody is appropriate is consistent with the joint custody awards permitted under our statutes21 and with the express policy of this State to “encourage that a minor child has continuing contact with parents and grandparents who have shown the ability to act in the best interest of the child and to encourage parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of raising their children after such parents have separated or dissolved their marriage.”22 As has been stated, the foregoing statutes, which were added to our custody laws in the early 1990s, “evince a policy favoring equally shared parenting obligations and opportunities which places children first in the constellation of individual interests and desires. ... It thus is evident that the stated legislative policy abandons traditional biases and favors shared parenting rights and responsibilities.”23
Although the dispute is symbolized by a “versus” which signifies two adverse parties at opposite poles of a line, there is in fact a third party whose interests and rights make of the line a triangle. That person, the child who is not an official party to the lawsuit but whose well-being is in the eye of the *381controversy, has a right to shared parenting when both are equally suited to provide it. Inherent in the express public policy is a recognition of the child’s right to equal access and opportunity with both parents, the right to be guided and nurtured by both parents, [and] the right to have major decisions made by the application of both parents’ wisdom, judgment and experience. The child does not forfeit these rights when the parents divorce. Whether a parent forfeits his or her portion of the relationship or any part of it, or is incapable of performance, must be determined by the factfinder.24
It is in the best interests of children to have a close, loving relationship with fit and interested parents, and such a relationship is hard to foster without regular contact. Thus, trial courts ought to be able to craft these self-executing provisions based on the nature, quality, and duration of the child’s relationship with the noncustodial parent, as well as on the age, developmental state, and needs of the child. In this regard, although the majority relies on an article that promotes the goal of permitting the relocation of custodial parents,25 that article is premised, in part, on the authors’ conclusion that frequency of contact with both parents is not necessarily in the child’s best interests.26 That conclusion is clearly at odds with the stated public policy of this State.27
Finally, a parent with physical custody, such as Ms. Scott, will know well in advance the consequences of a move out of the area in which the trial court has found that it is in the child’s best interests to live. If the physical custodian believes that it is not in her child’s best interest to remain there, but to move with her, she may always petition the trial court for a modification of the child custody provisions of the final decree. Thus, because the trial court will have considered the child’s best interests in providing for a self-executing change of custody, and because the initial custodial parent may file for a modification of the self-executing provision, there is no danger, as alleged by Ms. Scott, that appropriate consideration will not be *382given to the child’s best interests if self-executing changes of custody-are permissible.
Decided March 27, 2003.
Browning & Tanksley, Thomas J. Browning, for appellant.
Dupree, Poole & King, Russell D. King, Patrick N Millsaps, for appellee.
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the case law and public policy of this State mandate the conclusion that the trial court did not err in including the self-executing provision in question in its final judgment. Accordingly, I dissent to the majority opinion.
I am authorized to state that Justice Carley joins in this dissent.

 260 Ga. 493 (396 SE2d 890) (1990).

 244 Ga. 69 (257 SE2d 904) (1979).

 260 Ga. at 494.

 244 Ga. at 70.

 Pearce, 244 Ga. at 70.

 Id.

 Weaver, 260 Ga. at 494.

 Id.

 See Worley v. Whidden, 261 Ga. 218 (403 SE2d 799) (1991); Hagan v. McCook, 256 Ga. 712 (353 SE2d 197) (1987).

 See Harbin v. Harbin, 238 Ga. 109 (230 SE2d 889) (1976).

 Worley, 261 Ga. at 218-219.

 Weaver, 260 Ga. at 494.

 See OCGA §§ 19-9-1 and 19-9-3.

 OCGA § 19-9-3 (a).

 Although the majority correctly notes that OCGA § 19-9-1 (c) provides for certain notices to be given the non-custodial parent if the custodial parent desires to change residences, nothing in § 19-9-1 (c) prohibits a custodial parent from moving from an area the trial court has determined that it is in the child’s best interest to live, and the 30-day time frame is hardly enough time for a non-custodial parent to contest such a move.

 OCGA §§ 19-9-3 (a) (5); 19-9-6.

 OCGA § 19-9-3 (d). See Baldwin v. Baldwin, 265 Ga. 465 (458 SE2d 126) (1995) (OCGA § 19-9-3 “indicate [s] a state policy favoring shared rights and responsibilities between both parents”).

 In the Interest A. R. B. 209 Ga. App. 324, 326 (433 SE2d 411) (1993).

 Id. at 327.

 Judith S. Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not To Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in the Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 Fam. L. Q. 305 (1996).

 Id. at 311-312. In this regard, Wallerstein and Tanke write that the “frequency of visiting or amount of time spent with the non-custodial parent over the child’s entire growing-up years is [not] significantly related” to the child’s psychological development. Id. at 312.

 See OCGA §§ 19-9-3 (a) (5), (d); 19-9-6; In the Interest of A. R. B., 209 Ga. App. at 326-327. Wallerstein and Tanke’s study has also come under criticism. See James, Custody Relocation Law in Pennsylvania: Time To Revisit and Revise Gruber v. Gruber, 107 Dick. L. Rev. 45, 56-60 (2002); Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children’s Best Interests in Relocation Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34 Fam. L. Q. 83, 84-87 (2000).