Court Opinion

ID: 9945406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-27 20:04:06.664549+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:28.531116
License: Public Domain

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

KEVIN L. HINES,                         )
                                        )
               Plaintiff,               )
                                        )
         v.                             )      C.A. No.: N23C-04-166 SPL
                                        )
TED SAMMONS, LUVENIA                    )
ERVIN, CHARLENE STREGLES,               )
and GAUDENZIA                           )
REHABILITATION FACILITY,                )
                                        )
               Defendants.              )

                                 Upon Plaintiff’s Motion
                             for the Appointment of Counsel
                                        DENIED

                                       ORDER

         This 26th day of February 2024, upon consideration of Plaintiff’s, Kevin L.

Hines (“Hines”) “Motion for the Appointment of Counsel,”1 it appears to the Court

that:

         1.    Hines filed his complaint in this Court on April 20, 2023, alleging

claims of negligence, assault, medical malpractice, and sexual assault.2

1
    D.I. 42.
2
    D.I. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 36, 37, 39.
          2.    On May 12, 2023, the Court granted Hines’ application to proceed in

forma pauperis.3

          3.    On August 24, 2023, the Court dismissed Hines federal claims.4

Defendants answered Hines’ complaint,5 and discovery commenced.6 On February

19, 2024, the Court directed the parties to confer on the status of discovery and to

inform the Court of any disputes.7

          4.    On February 21, 2024, Hines filed the “Motion for the Appointment of

Counsel” presently before the Court.8 He contends that: (1) he “is unable to afford

counsel;” (2) “the issues involved in this case are complex;” and (3) as an

incarcerated inmate he has limited access to the law library.9

          5.    “Indigent persons who are charged with a criminal offense have a right

to be represented at trial by an attorney provided at public expense.”10 “Courts have

been reluctant, however, to extend that right to indigent plaintiffs in civil cases, and

3
    D.I. 9.
4
    D.I. 25.
5
    D.I. 26.
6
    D.I. 27, 28, 30, 32, 26.
7
    D.I. 41.
8
    D.I. 42.
9
    Id.
10
  Potter v. State, 547 A.2d 595 (Del. 1988) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 342-45 (1963)).
have almost universally declined to do so.” 11 Delaware Courts consider “Motions

for Appointment of Counsel under the more narrow framework of the 14 th

Amendment Due Process Clause.”12                   Absent “special and compelling

circumstances,” the Constitution does not require the appointment of counsel in civil

litigation.13 This Court applies “the three-prong due process analysis set forth by the

United States Supreme Court in Matthews v. Eldridge.”14 Under this analysis, this

Court must balance “(1) the private interests at stake, (2) the government’s interest

and (3) the risk that the procedure without counsel would lead to erroneous

results.”15

           6.   The private interest at stake here is Hines’ right to meaningful access to

the Courts. “Meaningful access has been interpreted to mean either access to an

adequate law library or legal assistance in the preparation of complaints, appeals,

petitions, etc., though the State is vested with discretion to select the method by

which to implement this Constitutional guarantee.”16 Hines does not contend that

his access to the Court has been restricted. In fact, he filed his complaint and has

11
   Miller v. Taylor, 2010 WL 1731853, at *1 (Del. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2010) (internal
citations omitted).
12
     Id.
13
     Id.
14
     Id. (citing Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321 (1976)).
15
     Id. (internal citations omitted).
16
     Id. (cleaned up).
diligently pursed discovery. It is evident that Hines can comply with Court rules and

procedures and that the appointment of counsel is not necessary to ensure his

meaningful access.17

           7.     As to the second Matthews factor, the government’s interest, the Court

must consider the State’s “strong interest” in “maintaining order and discipline in its

penal institutions.”18 “This strong interest, when considered in the context of the

extraordinary remedy Plaintiff seeks, means that Plaintiff must make a very strong

showing that his private interest in meaningful access outweighs this strong and

well-recognized State interest.”19 Hines fails to make such a showing here; there is

nothing that distinguishes his case from the volume of cases brought in this Court

by unrepresented litigants.20

           8.     As to the third Matthews factor, the risk of erroneous results in the

absence of counsel, the alleged “complexity of the matter and the risk of a wrong

outcome do not overcome the State’s strong interest in maintaining order and

discipline in its penal institutions.”21 Importantly, as evidenced by his diligent

engagement in the discovery process, Hines is capable of advancing his claims.

17
     Id.
18
     Id. (cleaned up).
19
     Id. (internal citation omitted).
20
     Id.
21
     Id. at *2.
     9.   For the foregoing reasons, Hines’ Motion for the Appointment of

Counsel is DENIED.

                                      IT IS SO ORDERED.

                                      ____________________________
                                      Sean P. Lugg, Judge