Court Opinion

ID: 7724794
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-07-30 19:34:48.979111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:27:15.351330
License: Public Domain

I dissent from the majority's holding in Part III of its unpublished memorandum. I joined Judge Long's dissent on rehearing in State v. Parker, 740 So.2d 421 (Ala.Cr.App. 1996), opinion on rehearing, 740 So.2d 424 (Ala.Cr.App. 1997). I agree with Judge Long's statement in his dissent in Parker that "the application of subsection 32-5A-191(f) [now subsection (h)]1 does not require a defendant's prior DUI convictions to be alleged in the charging instrument or proved to the jury and that, unless some exception is applicable in a particular case, evidence of the prior DUI convictions should not be presented to the jury." 740 So.2d at 429 (Long, P. J., dissenting).2
Although I am well aware that the majority has held otherwise, I nevertheless maintain that "subsection (f) [now (h)] is a sentence enhancement provision which requires that a defendant's prior DUI convictions be proven to the trial court at *Page 464 
sentencing — only after there has been a determination of guilt in the underlying offense." 740 So.2d at 429. Until the Alabama Supreme Court rules on this matter, I feel compelled to respectfully dissent from part III of the unpublished memorandum.
1 Subsection (f) (now (h)) provides in pertinent part: "On a fourth or subsequent conviction, a person convicted of violating this section shall be guilty of a Class C felony. . . ."
2 The present case was assigned to Judge Long; he is compelled to follow the majority decision in Parker. Parker's petition for certiorari review has been granted by the Alabama Supreme Court and review is pending in that Court.