Court Opinion

ID: 9947889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-05 20:18:29.212275+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:28:42.656080
License: Public Domain

Filed
                                                                                         Washington State
                                                                                         Court of Appeals
                                                                                          Division Two

                                                                                           March 5, 2024

     IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

                                         DIVISION II
 STATE OF WASHINGTON,                                                No. 57530-2-II

                                Respondent,

        v.

 JASHAWN DEMEATRUS MCGHEE,                                    UNPUBLISHED OPINION

                                Appellant.

       VELJACIC, J. — Jashawn Demeatrus McGhee shot Keith Rogers multiple times as a result

of an argument that ensued between the two in a parking lot. A jury found McGhee guilty of

attempted murder in the first degree and drive-by shooting. McGhee appeals his conviction and

sentence, alleging several errors at the trial court level. McGhee asks us to reverse the convictions

and remand for dismissal of the two counts, a new trial, or resentencing.

       We hold that the errors alleged are without merit and affirm McGhee’s conviction and

sentence.

                                              FACTS

I.     BACKGROUND

       In November, 2019, Keith Rogers went out drinking with friends at a bar. Rogers had been

arguing with his girlfriend, Crescenda (CiCi) Banks. According to testimony, Rogers was under

the impression that Banks was cheating on him, and he became angry. Rogers grabbed Banks’s

phone out of her hands so he could look at her texts and would not give it back to her. This set off

several altercations between Rogers and Banks in the parking lot outside the bar, some of which
57530-2-II

were captured on nearby surveillance videos. After the initial argument with Banks, Rogers went

to his car where he attempted to retrieve his unloaded handgun from under the seat. But, he

dropped it and left it under the seat.

        Later that evening, McGhee was on his break from work. He drove through the parking

lot of the bar trying to talk to women who were heading home after last call. McGhee engaged

Banks and her friend, Felicia Edwards, in conversation. After a few minutes, Edwards got in

Banks’s gray Chevy, and they left the parking lot. The women pulled over in the Domino’s parking

lot next door to wait for Rogers. McGhee, believing the women were interested in him, pulled up

beside them so that the driver’s side windows were across from each other. McGhee asked the

women to leave with him. Banks ignored him, calling out to Rogers, “Let’s go home.” 3 Rep. of

Proc. (RP) at 348.

        Rogers drove into the Domino’s parking lot where Banks was waiting for him and pulled

in behind McGhee’s car. Banks would later admit that she was concerned and knew that if she

talked to McGhee “it would set [Rogers] off even more.” 5 RP at 391-92.

        McGhee threatened to “pop off” on Rogers because he worried Rogers would interrupt his

conversation with Edwards and Banks.1 3 RP at 350. Banks interpreted this as a threat to shoot

Rogers, and responded: “You’re not going to do none of that.” 3 RP at 352. Edwards also

interpreted the statement as a threat to shoot, and testified that Rogers responded that he too had a

gun. Rogers testified he had not heard the verbal threat, but did see McGhee pull out a gun. In

response to McGhee pulling out a gun, Rogers said, “I got my [concealed pistol license] too.” 5

RP at 473.

1
  According to Banks, McGhee made this comment before Rogers arrived. Edwards, however,
thought McGhee had made the comment within earshot of Rogers.

                                                 2
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        The evidence as to what occurred next is conflicting. Rogers testified that at this point,

McGhee had pulled his car out, spun around, braked, and pointed his gun at Rogers. Rogers went

to his Jeep to get his own gun, and had just put his hand on it when McGhee started firing. Rogers

estimated that McGhee shot 10 or 11 times. Rogers was shot through the forearm and several

times in the torso, resulting in several injuries.

        McGhee fled. Soon after, he began to call and text Edwards repeatedly asking if she was

all right. McGhee then returned to work, clocking in at 1:52 AM. Later that day, the police came

to McGhee’s home and arrested him. He told the officers where his gun was located and gave a

statement at the police station. Police were able to restore the scratched off serial number and

determine the weapon was registered to McGhee’s wife. McGhee admitted the gun belonged to

him and that it was a gift from his wife.

        When interviewed by the police, McGhee claimed that Rogers had perceived him as a

sexual rival. He said that Rogers drove up, approached McGhee’s vehicle, and began an argument

with him. McGhee said he drove away but circled back immediately in order to try to talk Rogers

down. McGhee told the police that Rogers threatened to kill him and then began to walk back to

his Jeep, which is when McGhee opened fire. He explains that he did this to “stop the threat”

before Rogers could retrieve a gun from his car. Ex. 287, at 12.

        McGhee also told the police that he was afraid because of how Rogers drove up to him,

got out of his car, and approached him. McGhee told the officers “[he] thought [he] was gonna

get shot in the head . . . because how [Rogers] was walking to [McGhee’s] car,” Ex. 156B, at

29:11-29:16, and “was just scared [Rogers] was gonna f*** [him] up.” Ex. 156B, at 31:18-31:20.

He was also afraid Rogers would follow him to his home, which was around the corner.

                                                     3
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        Throughout their interrogation of McGhee, the detectives asked him why he did not just

leave the area, repeatedly offered that he had ways to leave, but chose to turn his car around and

pull his gun. One detective asked McGhee, “Why didn’t you leave? Why didn’t you just get the

f*** out of there? Why did you have to stay . . . and keep going.” Ex. 156B, at 18:30-18:35.

“And then you dumped on him while he was outside the car when even at that point you could

have just said this is stupid and drove off.” Ex. 156B, at 27:13-27:20. “But when you made that

initial turn to actually come back, if you would’ve just kept going, you would’ve driven right out

to Hipkins. You would’ve went right out, egressed and been gone. If you just said, ‘F*** it. I’m

out. It’s not worth it.’” Ex. 156B, at 31:01-31:13. Portions of this interview with police were

published to the jury at trial.

        On November 18, 2019, the State charged McGhee with attempted murder in the first

degree while armed with a firearm (count 1), assault in the first degree while armed with a firearm

(count 2), and drive-by shooting (count 3). The case was tried to a jury.

II.     PRETRIAL MOTION

        Prior to trial, McGhee moved in limine for the exclusion of “testimony that there was an

attempt at some point to obliterate the serial numbers on the firearm at issue.” Clerk’s Papers (CP)

at 37-38. The State argued that the attempt to obliterate the serial number was admissible as

consciousness of guilt. The defense did not object to the testimony that the serial number was

partially scratched off but objected to further testimony as to who did this and what their

motivations may have been, raising objections under ER 403, 602, and 801-804. The court ruled

that the State could introduce evidence that someone tried to obliterate the serial number and that

if a number is obliterated it makes it harder for law enforcement to trace the gun. The court also

ruled that the State could argue consciousness of guilt in closing argument but could not introduce

                                                 4
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testimony to that effect. In closing, the State argued “that filing off the serial number so it can’t

be traced is consciousness of guilt and not an act of self-defense.” 8 RP at 701. Defense counsel

did not object to this argument.

III.   AGGRESSOR INSTRUCTION

       The State proposed an aggressor instruction modeled on Washington Pattern Jury

Instruction 16.04. See 11 WASHINGTON PRACTICE: WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS:

CRIMINAL 16.04, at 241 (3d. ed. 2008) (WPIC). McGhee’s attorney objected to the instruction,

saying that the State was “proposing the standard WPIC, so it’s not the language of it” but rather

“the giving of it.” 8 RP at 675. The trial court noted the objection, ruling “I’m going to give it.”

8 RP at 675. The instruction was given to the jury as instruction 43, and provided:

               No person may, by any intentional act reasonably likely to provoke a
       belligerent response, create a necessity for acting in self-defense and thereupon kill
       or use force upon or toward another person. Therefore, if you find beyond a
       reasonable doubt that the defendant was the aggressor, and that defendant’s acts
       and conduct provoked or commenced the fight, then self-defense is not available as
       a defense.
               Words alone are not adequate provocation for the defendant to be the
       aggressor.

CP at 263.

IV.    TRIAL

       Banks testified at trial that McGhee said, “If [Rogers] comes over with that, I’m going to

pop off on him.” 3 RP at 349. The State asked if she knew what he meant by that, to which she

answered, “Yes, I did.” 3 RP at 351. Defense counsel then objected based on speculation. The

court allowed the response, stating, “She can testify to her impression.” 3 RP at 351. Banks

elaborated that “normally, when you say you’re going to pop off someone, that means you’re going

to shoot them.” 3 RP at 351.

                                                 5
57530-2-II

       Later, Edwards testified that she also heard McGhee say “he was going to pop one off on

[Rogers]” and that to her, the statement means that “you’re going to shoot somebody.” 5 RP at

416-17. Defense counsel did not object. Footage of the police detective’s interview with McGhee

was shown to the jury.

       In closing argument,2 the State focused on instruction 43, telling the jury:

       [Y]ou can’t chase after somebody with a knife in your hand and when that person
       turns around and shoots you claim self-defense. That kind of goes to the first
       aggressor portion.
               Ladies and gentlemen, it really starts and ends with this, and that is Jury
       Instruction No. 43. Self-defense is not available period if your act provokes a
       belligerent response, thus creating the necessity for you to act in self-defense. . . .
       Self-defense is not an available defense if you are the first aggressor in the state of
       Washington.

8 RP at 696-97.

       The jury returned verdicts of guilty on all counts. The court vacated the assault, finding it

merged with the attempted murder, and imposed a total of 270 months’ incarceration. The parties

agreed on the offender score. McGhee appeals.

                                           ANALYSIS

       Given the volume of arguments McGhee put forth, we organize them under five major

headings addressing in order the aggressor instruction, alleged evidentiary errors, alleged

prosecutorial misconduct, sufficiency of the evidence, and finally the offender score calculation.

2
 The State made several arguments in closing that are covered in more detail in the analysis below.
There were no objections made to these arguments.

                                                 6
57530-2-II

I.     AGGRESSOR JURY INSTRUCTION

       McGhee argues that the trial court erred by giving jury instruction 43, an “aggressor”

instruction. McGhee claims that the instruction was not supported by the evidence in this “unique

factual scenario,” and that it was unconstitutional because it undercut his right to use force to

defend himself. Br. of Appellant at 22. We hold that because there is conflicting evidence as to

whether McGhee’s conduct precipitated the fight, and viewing the evidence in the light most

favorable to the State (the requesting party), the facts support giving the instruction.

       A.      Standard of Review

       “‘Jury instructions are sufficient if they permit each party to argue his theory of the case

and properly inform the jury of the applicable law.’” State v. Riley, 137 Wn.2d 904, 909, 976 P.2d

624 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bowerman, 115 Wn.2d 794, 809,

802 P.2d 116 (1990)). Whether there was sufficient evidence to justify a jury instruction is a

question of law that is reviewed de novo, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the

requesting party. State v. Sullivan, 196 Wn. App. 277, 289, 383 P.3d 574 (2016).

       When determining if the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the giving of an

instruction, we view the supporting evidence in the light most favorable to the party that requested

the instruction. State v. Fernandez-Medina, 141 Wn.2d 448, 455-56, 6 P.3d 1150 (2000). To

support an aggressor instruction, there must be evidence that the defendant engaged in an

intentional act, separate from the assaultive conduct, that precipitated the incident and was

reasonably likely to provoke a belligerent response. State v. Wasson, 54 Wn. App. 156, 159, 772

P.2d 1039 (1989).

                                                  7
57530-2-II

       B.       The Right to Self-Defense

       The use of force is lawful and justified where the defendant has a “subjective, reasonable

belief of imminent harm from the victim.” State v. LeFaber, 128 Wn.2d 896, 899, 913 P.2d 369

(1996), abrogated on other grounds by State v. O'Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 217 P.3d 756 (2009). “The

evidence of self-defense must be assessed from the standpoint of the reasonably prudent person

standing in the shoes of the defendant, knowing all the defendant knows and seeing all the

defendant sees.” Riley, 137 Wn.2d at 909. If the defendant meets the “initial burden of producing

some evidence that his or her actions occurred in circumstances amounting to self-defense,” then

the State has the burden to prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at

909, 910 n.2.

       However, the right of self-defense cannot be successfully invoked by an aggressor or one

who provokes an altercation. Id. at 909. “[T]he reason one generally cannot claim self-defense

when one is an aggressor is because ‘the aggressor’s victim, defending himself against the

aggressor, is using lawful, not unlawful, force; and the force defended against must be unlawful

force, for self-defense.’” Id. at 911 (quoting 1 Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr.,

Substantive Criminal Law § 5.7, at 657-58 (1986)). “[A]n aggressor instruction impacts a

defendant’s claim of self-defense,” so “courts should use care in giving an aggressor instruction.”

Id. at 910 n.2. However, aggressor instructions should be given where called for by the evidence.

Id.

                                                8
57530-2-II

       Where there is credible evidence from which a jury can reasonably determine that the

defendant provoked the need to act in self-defense, an aggressor instruction is appropriate.3 State

v. Hughes, 106 Wn.2d 176, 191-92, 721 P.2d 902 (1986). If there is credible evidence that the

defendant made the first move by drawing a weapon, the evidence supports the giving of an

aggressor instruction. State v. Thompson, 47 Wn. App. 1, 7, 733 P.2d 584 (1987).

       In addition to the above, Riley held that where there is credible evidence from which a jury

can reasonably determine that the defendant provoked the need to act in self-defense, an aggressor

instruction is appropriate. 137 Wn.2d at 909-10. In Riley, evidence at trial suggested that the

defendant drew his gun first and aimed it at the victim. Id. at 909. The court concluded that an

aggressor instruction was proper because it directed the jury to decide whether Riley’s conduct

precipitated a confrontation with the victim. Id. at 913-14. In allowing the instruction, the Riley

court approved the language of longstanding WPIC 16.04, the very instruction used in the case

before us. Id.

       The court in State v. Grott applied the Riley standard. 195 Wn.2d 256, 458 P.3d 750 (2020).

In that case, the defendant fired several shots before the victim realized the defendant was there.

Id. at 273. At trial, the jury was presented with credible evidence from which it could reasonably

determine that the defendant provoked the need to act in self-defense. Id. at 273. The court in

Grott determined that the Riley standard was met and the instruction was warranted, because there

was “substantial, conflicting” and “credible evidence from which a jury can reasonably determine

that the defendant provoked the need to act in self-defense.” Id. at 269, 273. Grott refined the

3
  Neither party discusses whether “credible evidence” is akin to “some evidence” as is the clarified
standard in other affirmative defense contexts. See State v. Arbogast, 199 Wn.2d 356, 371, 506
P.3d 1238 (2022).

                                                 9
57530-2-II

Riley standard, holding that where there is credible yet conflicting evidence as to what preceded

the incident in question, an aggressor instruction is proper. Id.

       C.      The Court Correctly Instructed the Jury as to the Law on Aggressors

       The evidence supported giving the aggressor instruction in this case. This is because there

is credible yet conflicting evidence as to whose behavior precipitated the fight. McGhee claims

“that when [he] pulled out his gun, he was acting in lawful self-defense against a violent, angry

and intoxicated person who was armed with his own gun” and “that when [Rogers] threatened him

and began reaching for his gun, McGhee again acted in self-defense and shot at Rogers before

Rogers could kill him.” Br. of Appellant at 22. On the other hand, there is evidence that Rogers

ran for his gun only after McGhee pointed a gun at him and began shooting. McGhee’s argument

details the conflicting facts regarding who the initial aggressor was. But ultimately, this is

precisely the point; rather than obviating the need for an aggressor instruction, McGhee’s argument

underscores that there was in fact conflicting evidence. The argument does not nullify the other

credible evidence in the record from which a jury could conclude McGhee was the aggressor. It

was proper to give the instruction.

       McGhee also suggests the aggressor instruction is improper because it is judicially created.

But McGhee stops short and fails to articulate what precisely about the instruction is improper.

His argument fails.

       D.      Constitutionality of Instruction

       McGhee argues that instruction 43 was unconstitutionally vague and diminished the State’s

burden of proof, violating McGhee’s right to defend himself. We disagree.

                                                  10
57530-2-II

       The State has the burden to prove the absence of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.

State v. Acosta, 101 Wn.2d 612, 615-23, 683 P.2d 1069 (1984). “‘Jury instructions must more

than adequately convey the law of self-defense.’” State v. Ackerman, 11 Wn. App. 2d 304, 313,

453 P.3d 749 (2019) (quoting State v. Corn, 95 Wn. App. 41, 52-53, 975 P.2d 520 (1999)). The

instructions “‘must make the relevant legal standard manifestly apparent to the average juror.’”

Id. (quoting Corn, 95 Wn. App. at 53). Additionally, we presume that the jurors followed the trial

court’s instructions and read the instructions as a whole to discern the relevant legal standard. State

v. Weaver, 198 Wn.2d 459, 467, 496 P.3d 1183 (2021).

       Instruction 43 reads in part, “if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was

the aggressor, and that defendant’s acts and conduct provoked or commenced the fight, then self-

defense is not available as a defense.” CP at 263.

       McGhee makes three arguments in his challenge to the wording of instruction 43: (1) the

instruction interfered with his statutory and constitutional rights to self-defense, (2) the instruction

allows lawful intentional acts to be considered those that are “likely to provoke a belligerent

response” and thereby make self-defense unavailable, and (3) the instruction’s language is

deficient because of the lack of a tie to the “to convict” instructions, or to the instructions setting

out when force is justifiable or lawful. Br. of Appellant at 35, 39.4 However, at trial, McGhee

lodged a non-specific objection to the standard first aggressor jury instruction. In fact, at trial,

4
 McGhee arguably makes other more difficult to differentiate arguments, but we do not list them
here due to our conclusion that any objection to the wording of the instruction was unpreserved.

                                                  11
57530-2-II

McGhee explicitly told the judge he was not objecting to the language of the aggressor

instruction.5, 6

         We decline to address these arguments because McGhee expressly objected to the giving

of the instruction, but only now on appeal takes issue with the wording thereof. He failed to

preserve for review any arguments regarding the language of the instruction.

         Moreover, McGhee does not make a persuasive argument under RAP 2.5 that would

nevertheless support our review of this unpreserved issue. Instead, he argues that the instruction

generally violates his due process rights because it “unconstitutionally diminished the State’s

burden of proof and violated [his] right to defend himself.” Br. of Appellant at 33. McGhee makes

a general assertion that the “practical and identifiable consequence on the trial by the vague

aggressor instruction” was “the lessening of the burden of proof and the interference with the right

to use self-defense.” Br. of Appellant at 41. But, even assuming constitutional error, his argument

does not overcome the reality that the jury instructions are read as a whole. Weaver, 198 Wn.2d

at 467. Here, the trial court instructed the jury at least four times of the State’s “beyond a

reasonable doubt” burden. See CP at 223, 258, 259, 263. The burden applied to the elements and

to the absence of self-defense for each offense. And the court instructed that self-defense only

becomes unavailable if the jury finds “beyond a reasonable doubt” that the defendant was the first

aggressor. CP at 263.

5
 In the report of proceedings, the discussion was as follows:
               MR. TRUJILLO: . . . They're proposing the standard WPIC, so it’s not the
       language of it.
               THE COURT: It’s the giving of it?
               MR. TRUJILLO: Yes.
8 RP at 675.
6
    Additionally, McGhee clarified at oral argument this was the case.

                                                 12
57530-2-II

       McGhee has not shown that the error was manifest and can be raised for the first time on

appeal under RAP 2.5(a)(3), and because arguments regarding the language of the instruction are

otherwise unpreserved, we decline to review this issue.

II.    ALLEGED EVIDENTIARY ERRORS

       McGhee appeals several evidentiary errors. Specifically, that the trial court erred by:

allowing evidence that McGhee’s gun had a partially obscured serial number, admitting testimony

as to what McGhee meant by the term “pop off,” and admitting improper opinion evidence by the

investigating police detectives. All of these arguments fail.

       A.      Standard of Review

       We review evidentiary errors under an abuse of discretion standard. Cox v. Spangler, 141

Wn.2d 431, 439, 5 P.3d 1265, 22 P.3d 791 (2001). “A trial court has ‘broad discretion in ruling

on evidentiary matters and will not be overturned absent manifest abuse of discretion.’” Id.

(quoting Sintra, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 131 Wn.2d 640, 662-63, 935 P.2d 555 (1997), abrogated

on other grounds by Yim v. City of Seattle, 194 Wn.2d 682, 451 P.3d 694)). “‘Discretion is abused

when the trial court’s decision is manifestly unreasonable, or is exercised on untenable grounds,

or for untenable reasons.’” State v. Slater, 197 Wn.2d 660, 667, 486 P.3d 873 (2021) (quoting

State v. Blackwell, 120 Wn.2d 822, 830, 845 P.2d 1017 (1993)). An abuse of discretion also occurs

when the trial court takes a view no reasonable person would take or applies the wrong legal

standard to an issue. Cox, 141 Wn.2d at 439.

       B.      Preservation of Issues on Appeal

       Evidentiary objections must be preserved if they are to be reviewed on appeal. State v.

Mason, 160 Wn.2d 910, 933, 162 P.3d 396 (2007) (an objection based on relevance does not

preserve an objection on grounds of prejudice); see also State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98-99,

                                                13
57530-2-II

217 P.3d 756 (2009) (the general rule that an assignment of error be preserved includes an

exception when the claimed error is a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right”).

       A party may assign evidentiary error on appeal only on a specific ground made at trial.

State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 926, 155 P.3d 125 (2007). ER 103(a)(1) provides that a party

cannot appeal an evidentiary ruling unless that party made a “timely objection or motion to strike”

at trial “stating the specific ground of [the] objection” if not apparent from context. State v.

Roosma, 19 Wn. App. 2d 941, 948, 498 P.3d 59 (2021).

       The purpose underlying the insistence on issue preservation is to encourage “the efficient

use of judicial resources.” State v. Scott, 110 Wn.2d 682, 685, 757 P.2d 492 (1988). Issue

preservation serves this purpose by ensuring that the trial court has the opportunity to correct any

errors, thereby avoiding unnecessary appeals. State v. Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292, 304-05, 253

P.3d 84 (2011). “For example, a trial court may strike testimony or provide a curative instruction

to the jury.” Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d at 926. However, a claim of error may be raised for the first

time on appeal if it is a manifest error affecting a constitutional right. RAP 2.5(a)(3); State v.

Walsh, 143 Wn.2d 1, 7, 17 P.3d 591 (2001).

       C.      Partially Obscured Serial Number

       McGhee argues that the trial court erred when it allowed the State to use evidence that

McGhee’s gun had a partially obscured serial number. The State argues that this was admissible

as to McGhee’s consciousness of guilt, and that McGhee did not preserve error as to this claim.

We hold that the issue is not preserved for appeal.

       Prior to trial, McGhee moved in limine for the exclusion of “testimony that there was an

attempt at some point to obliterate the serial numbers on the firearm at issue.” CP at 37.

Subsequently, McGhee appears to have withdrawn his motion, saying:

                                                14
57530-2-II

              My motion isn’t to conceal or to keep out the idea that the serial number
       was scratched. It was that someone had some kind of intent, an intent to obliterate,
       when that occurred.
              The State is free to argue what others observed saying: “I looked at the serial
       number. It’s scratched, or, apparently, obliterated.” It’s the testimony that someone
       made an attempt to do so because then there’s speculation as to what that person
       was doing or thinking as to who that person was.

2 RP at 176.

       McGhee maintained “you can’t talk about the intent of someone that you did not see [ ]

engaging in that activity.” 2 RP at 179. The court ruled that the State could introduce evidence

that someone tried to obliterate the serial number and that if a number is obliterated it makes it

harder for law enforcement to trace the gun. The court further allowed that the State could argue

that this suggested consciousness of guilt in closing argument but that the State could not introduce

testimony to that effect.

       Here, the defense did not object to the testimony that the serial number was partially

obliterated, but did object to further testimony as to who obliterated it and what their motivations

may have been, raising objections under ER 403, 602, and 801-04. The State did not introduce

testimony as to who obliterated it, but did make the argument in closing that the partially

obliterated number suggested consciousness of guilt as the trial court expressly allowed it to do.

McGhee did not object to the argument in closing. In fact, McGhee’s counsel also discussed the

serial number in closing argument.

       Because McGhee affirmatively withdrew his original motion and did not object to the

State’s comments in closing argument, the issue is not preserved for review here. However, we

may nevertheless address the issue if McGhee shows that allowing this argument is a “manifest

error affecting a constitutional right.” RAP 2.5(a)(3). To show a manifest error, the appellant

must identify a constitutional error and make a plausible showing that the asserted error had

                                                 15
57530-2-II

practical and identifiable consequences at trial. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d at 935. Exceptions to RAP

2.5(a) are to be construed narrowly. Id. McGhee has made no such showing, instead plainly

describing this as an evidentiary error. The issue is not preserved and we decline to reach it.

       D.      Testimony as to the Meaning of “Pop Off”

       McGhee argues that the trial court erred because it admitted speculation as to what he

meant by the term “pop off.” The State argues that the trial court properly permitted testimony as

to Banks’s and Edwards’s understanding about a conversation in which they participated. We

agree with the State.

       Assuming without deciding that the issue was preserved for appeal, the trial court properly

allowed the testimony.     Lay witnesses may give opinions or inferences based on rational

perceptions that help the jury understand the testimony and that are not based on scientific or

specialized knowledge. ER 701. A lay person’s observation of intoxication is an example of a

permissible lay opinion. State v. Montgomery, 163 Wn.2d 577, 591, 183 P.3d 267(2008). Banks

and Edward provided their own understanding of what the phrase “pop off” meant to them in the

context in which it was said. Their opinions are not “speculation” of what McGhee was thinking,

but rather their interpretation of a phrase in a conversation in which they were participants.

McGhee argues that the phrase “pop off” can have more than one meaning. Even assuming that

is true, the trial court properly allowed Banks and Edwards to testify to how they each perceived

the comment.

       The trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting the testimony.

       E.      Police Detective’s Opinions

       McGhee argues that the trial court erred when it admitted footage of his interview with

police that, according to McGhee, offered improper opinion testimony. McGhee’s claim fails.

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57530-2-II

         Assuming without deciding that this issue was preserved on appeal, this claim fails on the

merits. The detective did not make any direct comments or express an opinion as to McGhee’s

veracity or guilt. Rather, the detective asked a question in real time during the investigation: “Why

didn’t you leave? Why didn’t you just get the f*** out of there? Why did you have to stay . . .

and keep going” Ex. 156B, at 18:30-18:35. The detective did not proffer an opinion as to

McGhee’s guilt. McGhee has not identified impermissible opinion testimony. McGhee’s claim

fails.

III.     ALLEGED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT

         McGhee takes issue with several comments the State made at trial. 7           But, because

McGhee’s counsel failed to object to any of these comments, he waives the challenge on appeal.

7
 McGhee takes issue with the following comments:
• “The reason is because this chair is closest to you is because it’s where all of the evidence
    comes from. . . . You saw transcripts that were used. You had some during the Defendant’s
    testimony.” 8 RP at 688.
• “That’s not really in dispute that [Rogers] was shot. [McGhee] admitted to it in the interview.”
    8 RP at 689.
• “I suspect that the disagreement may come with the intent portion of it. So how do you know
    what someone is intending to do if they don’t tell you exactly?” 8 RP at 689.
• “It’s important to keep in mind that the Defendant has the right to a fair trial and that we have
    to prove every single element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, nothing less
    and nothing more. . . . The question that you need to ask yourself is do you have enough, not
    do you want more? You have enough.” 8 RP at 688, 728.
• “The State suggests that based upon the facts of the case, [McGhee] fails on all three prongs
    because there has to be a reasonable belief.” 8 RP at 695.
• “It fails on that one too because you can’t chase after somebody with a knife in your hand and
    when that person turns around and shoots you claim self-defense. That kind of goes to the first
    aggressor portion.” 8 RP at 696.
• “[W]hat that means is like, ‘Give me your money,’ but I don’t have a gun in my hand, so you
    weren’t really in any actual danger of being shot in hindsight, and you act in self-defense.
    That’s kind of what that’s talking about. It’s not, ‘Well, maybe I overreacted.’ That’s not what
    this jury instruction is talking about, where someone comes up to you with a knife and it’s just
    a prop knife. You’re not in actual danger of been stabbed, but that’s what that means.” 8 RP
    at 702.
Br. of Appellant at 63-66.

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Still, assuming without deciding that the comments were improper, they do not rise to the level of

being so flagrant and ill-intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the resulting prejudice,

and are therefore not grounds for reversal.

       A.      Legal Principles

       To establish prosecutorial misconduct, McGhee must prove that the prosecuting attorney’s

remarks were both improper and prejudicial. State v. Allen, 182 Wn.2d 364, 373, 341 P.3d 268

(2015). This determination is made in the context of the entire record and the circumstances at

trial. State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 810, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006). When a prosecuting attorney

misstates the law, this amounts to improper comment in the context of prosecutorial misconduct.

See Allen, 182 Wn.2d at 373; State v. Warren, 165 Wn.2d 17, 28, 195 P.3d 940 (2008).

       If we deem the remarks improper, we must then determine whether the defendant was

prejudiced under one of two standards of review. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 760, 278 P.3d

653 (2012). “If the defendant objected at trial, the defendant must show that the prosecutor’s

misconduct resulted in prejudice that had a substantial likelihood of affecting the jury’s verdict.”

Id. However, if the defendant failed to object, “the defendant is deemed to have waived any error,

unless the prosecutor’s misconduct was so flagrant and ill intentioned that an instruction could not

have cured the resulting prejudice.” Id. at 760-61. Here, McGhee challenges the prosecutor’s

closing argument for the first time on appeal. Therefore, if we determine that the comments were

improper, we must proceed under the heightened standard and ask whether the misconduct was so

flagrant and ill-intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the resulting prejudice.

       B.      The Comments Do Not Meet the Heightened Standard, so McGhee Waived Error

       Even if we assume without deciding that the comments were improper, the comments at

issue fail to reach this heightened standard, so McGhee has waived any error.

                                                  18
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       As stated previously, McGhee did not object to any of the above comments at the trial.

Therefore, McGhee has waived any error unless he can show that the comments were so flagrant

and ill-intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the resulting prejudice. Id. at 761.

McGhee has not made this showing.

       A reviewing court must consider what would likely have happened if the defendant had

timely objected. Id. at 763. Here, a misstatement of the evidence, an incorrect statement of the

defendant’s admission, minimizing the burden of proof, and misleading comments could have

been cured with a corrective instruction had McGhee made an objection, assuming they were

improper in the first place.

       Because McGhee failed to object at trial, and each comment could have been cured with

an instruction, McGhee waived his challenge by failing to object below.

IV.    SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION FOR ATTEMPTED MURDER IN THE
       FIRST DEGREE

       McGhee argues that there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for attempted

murder in the first degree. Specifically, McGhee asserts that the evidence of premeditation in this

case is insufficient to meet the requisite standard. We disagree.

       A.      Standard of Review

       The test for determining the sufficiency of the evidence is whether, after viewing the

evidence in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found guilt

beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).

       “A claim of insufficiency admits the truth of the State’s evidence and all inferences that

reasonably can be drawn therefrom.” Id. “[A]ll reasonable inferences from the evidence must be

drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant.” Id. A reviewing

                                                19
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court defers to the trier of fact on issues of conflicting testimony, witness credibility, and

persuasiveness of the evidence. State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).

       B.      There was Sufficient Evidence of Premeditation to Sustain a Conviction

       To convict McGhee of attempted murder in the first degree, the State had to prove he took

a substantial step toward causing the death of Rogers and acted with the premeditated intent to kill

Rogers. State v. Price, 103 Wn. App. 845, 851-52, 14 P.3d 841 (2000); RCW 9A.28.020(1); RCW

9A.32.030(1)(a). Premeditation requires proof of “‘the deliberate formation of and reflection upon

the intent to take a human life and involves the mental process of thinking beforehand, deliberation,

reflection, weighing or reasoning for a period of time, however short.’” State v. Hummel, 196 Wn.

App. 329, 354, 383 P.3d 592 (2016) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 116 Wn.2d 51, 82-83, 804 P.2d

577 (1991)).

       When viewed in the light most favorable to the State and taken as true, a rational trier of

fact could have found premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. McGhee told Edwards and Banks

that he was going to shoot Rogers if he came over. When Rogers came over, instead of leaving

the scene, McGhee repositioned his car so he could easily flee after shooting, and giving him a

better position from which to shoot. McGhee spun the vehicle around, slammed on the brakes and

shot multiple times, striking Rogers with four rounds in his midsection and arms, very nearly

killing him. Several of McGhee’s rounds also struck Rogers’s Jeep. Based on the foregoing, a

rational trier of fact could have found premeditation beyond a reasonable doubt. There was

sufficient evidence of premeditation; McGhee’s insufficiency of the evidence claim fails.

V.     CALCULATION OF OFFENDER SCORE

       McGhee argues that the trial court incorrectly calculated his offender score because under

the State’s theory, counts 1 and 3 constitute the same criminal conduct or double jeopardy.

                                                 20
57530-2-II

McGhee asserts that if counts 1 and 3 were the same criminal conduct or if separate convictions

violated double jeopardy, he would have had an offender score of 0 and the standard range for the

attempted murder would be 180-240 months (plus 60 months for the firearm), not 210 and 24

months on counts 1 and 3 (with a 60 month firearm enhancement). We disagree.

       Double jeopardy and same criminal conduct analyses are distinct and separate inquiries,

and are analyzed separately below. State v. French, 157 Wn.2d 593, 611, 141 P.3d 54 (2006).

       A.      Double Jeopardy

       The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the

Washington Constitution protect a defendant against multiple punishments for the same offense.

State v. Mutch, 171 Wn.2d 646, 661, 254 P.3d 803 (2011). A double jeopardy claim may be raised

for the first time on appeal. Id. We review double jeopardy claims de novo. Id. at 661-62; State

v. Sanford, 15 Wn. App. 2d 748, 752, 477 P.3d 72 (2020).

       In reviewing a double jeopardy claim, we first look to the language of the relevant statutes.

In re Pers. Restraint of Borrero, 161 Wn.2d 532, 536-37, 167 P.3d 1106 (2007). If the statutory

language does not disclose any legislative intent to impose multiple punishments for the offenses,

we apply the same evidence test, which asks whether the offenses are identical in fact and in law.

Id. “Under this test, double jeopardy principles are violated if the defendant is convicted of

offenses that are identical in fact and in law.” Id. at 537. But if each offense contains an element

not contained in the other, requiring proof of a fact that the other does not, the offenses are not the

same. Id.

                                                  21
57530-2-II

       McGhee argues that, where count 1 was only an attempt and not a completed crime, and

where the drive-by shooting was the act that constituted the substantial step, the two counts

constituted the same criminal conduct and conviction for both violates double jeopardy. McGhee

does not identify whether or not the statutory language suggests a legislative intent to impose

multiple punishments for the offenses.

       Applying the same evidence test to the charges and evidence in this case weighs against

concluding that double jeopardy prevents the multiple convictions. First, the elements are distinct.

A drive-by shooting requires the reckless discharge of a firearm. See RCW 9A.36.045 (A drive-

by shooting is committed when a person “recklessly discharges a firearm . . . in a manner which

creates a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person and the discharge is

. . . from a motor vehicle.”). Attempted murder requires specific intent. RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a);

RCW 9A.28.020(1).

       A drive-by shooting requires a shooting from a motor vehicle, attempted murder does not.

See RCW 9A.36.045; RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a); RCW 9A.28.020(1) Attempted murder requires a

substantial step, premeditation, and an intent to kill, while drive-by shooting does not. Id. There

is a possibility that a jury could convict a defendant of drive-by shooting but acquit them of

murder—or convict for murder and acquit for drive-by shooting. Thus, attempted murder and

drive-by shooting are not the same in law because each has at least one element not included in

the other. Borrero, 161 Wn.2d at 537.

       They are also not the same in fact, because each offense required proof of a fact the other

did not. Here, drive-by shooting required proof of use of a vehicle and discharge of a firearm from

within that vehicle. Not so for attempted murder; there are no specific requirements for the manner

of attack (e.g., from a vehicle), only requirements of a substantial step, premeditation, and an intent

                                                  22
57530-2-II

to kill. To satisfy these elements, witnesses testified that McGhee said just prior to the shooting

that he was going to “pop off” on Rogers. Witnesses also testified that they observed McGhee

reposition his vehicle for ease of escape and improved vantage point and shoot multiple times,

striking Rogers. These are not the same facts as would be required to prove discharging a firearm

from a motor vehicle, which is proved with the testimony that he fired from his car. The two

crimes are not the same in fact.

       Double jeopardy does not bar McGhee’s convictions for both drive-by shooting and

attempted murder.

       In his brief, McGhee relies on a case dealing with the merger doctrine, In re Personal

Restraint of Francis, 170 Wn.2d 517, 242 P.3d 866 (2010). In that case, our state Supreme Court

held that an assault in the second degree conviction merged into an attempted robbery conviction,

reasoning that the sole purpose of the assault in the second degree was to facilitate the attempted

robbery, and that the assault that followed was not separate and distinct from the attempted

robbery; it was incidental to it. Id. at 525. In other words, because the assault increased the degree

of the robbery, the crimes merged. Id.

       McGhee asserts that the same concepts apply here, because according to the State’s theory,

the sole purpose for the drive-by shooting was the attempted murder of Rogers. There was no

other separate and distinct purpose and the substantial step for the attempted murder was,

according to the State, shooting at Rogers. McGhee reasons that this means count 3 should be

vacated and the case should be remanded for resentencing.

       McGhee’s argument is not viable. Merger is a distinct concept from double jeopardy, and

Francis does not support his claims. Under the merger doctrine, when the degree of one offense

is elevated by conduct separately criminalized by the legislature, the court will presume the

                                                 23
57530-2-II

legislature intended to punish both offenses through a greater sentence for the greater crime. Id.;

see also State v. Vladovic, 99 Wn.2d 413, 419, 662 P.2d 853 (1983). Merger does not apply here.

Drive-by shooting did not elevate the attempted murder charge, nor did the attempted murder

elevate the drive-by shooting charge; the two crimes are not so linked.

       Double jeopardy does not bar McGhee’s conviction for both drive-by shooting and

attempted murder.

       B.      The Offenses Do Not Constitute the Same Criminal Conduct

       “[W]henever a person is to be sentenced for two or more current offenses, the sentence

range for each current offense shall be determined by using all other current and prior convictions

as if they were prior convictions for the purpose of the offender score.” RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a).

Crimes may not, however, be counted separately in the offender score calculation if they

encompass the “same criminal conduct.” RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). Same criminal conduct is “two

or more crimes that require the same criminal intent, are committed at the same time and place,

and involve the same victim.” RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). Unless all of these elements are present,

the criminal offenses must be counted separately. State v. Chenoweth, 185 Wn.2d 218, 220, 370

P.3d 6 (2016); State v. Bell, 26 Wn. App. 2d 821, 841, 529 P.3d 448 (2023).

       A trial court’s determination of whether multiple crimes constitute the same criminal

conduct is reviewed for abuse of discretion or misapplication of the law. State v. Graciano, 176

Wn.2d 531, 536-37, 295 P.3d 219 (2013). “[W]hen the record supports only one conclusion on

whether crimes constitute the ‘same criminal conduct,’ a sentencing court abuses its discretion in

arriving at a contrary result.” Id. at 537-38.

                                                 24
57530-2-II

       A defendant generally waives the right to argue on appeal that multiple convictions

constitute the “same criminal conduct” if not raised below unless the trial attorney’s failure to

argue same criminal conduct amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. See Bell, 26 Wn. App.

2d at 841. Presumably, McGhee argues ineffective assistance of counsel as the reason it was not

addressed at the trial court. To determine whether trial counsel was ineffective in not arguing same

criminal conduct, we must determine whether he would have been successful if it was raised, and

that requires addressing whether the crimes are same criminal conduct. McGhee cannot meet this

burden because, as addressed above, the two offenses do not encompass the same criminal conduct.

       The offenses do not encompass the same criminal conduct because they require proof of

different levels of intent. Drive-by shooting requires recklessness. See In re Pers. Restraint of

Bowman, 162 Wn.2d 325, 332, 172 P.3d 681 (2007); RCW 9A.36.045(1). On the other hand, the

crime of attempted murder requires specific, premeditated intent to cause the death of another.

RCW 9A.28.020(1); RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a). The two crimes do not have the same criminal intent,

so are not the same criminal conduct. RCW 9.94A.589(1)(a). McGhee’s counsel was not

ineffective for failing to raise the argument before the trial court because the argument would not

have been successful; McGhee fails to show prejudice as required for an ineffective assistance of

counsel claim. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d

674 (1984); State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334–35, 899 P.2d 1251 (1995).

       There was no error under either the double jeopardy prohibition or the same criminal

conduct statute; there was no sentencing error.

                                                  25
57530-2-II

                                        CONCLUSION

        We affirm McGhee’s conviction and sentence.

        A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,

it is so ordered.

                                                            Veljacic, J.

We concur:

        Glasgow, C.J.

        Price, J.

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