Court Opinion

ID: 9676839
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:35:37.995623+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:51.690078
License: Public Domain

PEEPLES, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I would grant the writ as to most of the documents.
I agree with the majority that the lawyer-to-lawyer communications are privileged and that respondent’s order sustaining the crime-fraud exception to the privilege is absolutely unfounded.
I disagree with the majority’s apparent holding that there must be specific evidence that each person who read each document must be a representative. Under Weisel Enterprises, Inc. v. Curry, 718 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex.1986), a court may look at the documents themselves to see whether privilege has been established.
Several documents are revisions by lawyers of proposed business letters written by nonlawyers. In each instance, the non-lawyer drafted a letter and sent it to house counsel for comments. Counsel made several revisions and returned the letter to the nonlawyer. In these circumstances it is obvious that the nonlawyer was authorized to seek the legal advice. It is inconceivable that in-house attorneys revise letters and give this kind of legal advice to employees who are not authorized to ask for it. Under Weisel, I would hold that as to such documents the privilege was established.
It is likewise apparent from most of the other documents, such as discussions by participants about legal problems that surfaced in company meetings, that the recipients of legal memos were authorized to receive the legal thoughts of house coun*570sel. The recipients were obviously employees who had attended meetings where legal issues were discussed. Is there any company in the world that has its employees abandon the work at their desks and go sit through meetings about legal issues outside their field, and then sends them memos from counsel about the legal issues discussed at the meetings? The majority says implicitly that Cigna should have presented testimony or an affidavit about the company’s practice. That is nonsense.
The majority suggests that all the company needs to do is present testimony or affidavits. Undoubtedly, when businesses have read this opinion they will come to court with affidavits and testimony stating that each person who received a copy of each privileged document was authorized to obtain or act on the advice of the in-house lawyer. Trial courts will spend even more of their valuable time presiding over these hearings. Clients will pay their lawyers to be there. Litigants with cases to try on the merits will wait while the judge tries ever-lengthening discovery matters. The next appellate issue will be whether an appellate court must defer to a trial court’s refusal to believe the company’s evidence, even if it is uncontradicted. Thus, will our legal system continue to spin out of control, diverting scarce judicial resources to peripheral issues.
Concerning the trial court’s fraud finding, I note that the documents show only that CIGNA is defending itself against McCorkle’s fraud lawsuit, not that CIGNA sought legal advice to commit or plan a fraud.
The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege provides:
There is no privilege ... [i]f the services of the lawyer were sought or obtained to enable or aid anyone to commit or plan to commit what the client knew or reasonably should have known to be a crime or fraud.
Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 503(d)(1). This exception is carefully worded to apply to prospective crimes or frauds. It applies where the client, with actual or constructive knowledge that contemplated or ongoing conduct is a crime or fraud, consults an attorney on the matter, and the conduct takes place or continues thereafter. But the privilege “is absolute as to communications made with an attorney as to past transactions and offenses.” Helton v. State, 670 S.W.2d 644, 645-46 (Tex.Crim.App.1984), quoting Williams v. Williams, 108 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tex.Civ.App. — Amarillo 1937, no writ) (emphasis added); accord, Edward W. Cleary, McCormick’s Handbook of the Law of Evidence § 95, at 199 (2d ed.1972); 81 Am. Jur.2d Witnesses § 399, at 359 (rev. ed. 1992); 8 John H. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law § 2298 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); see also Anderson v. State, 98 Tex.Crim. 449, 266 S.W. 159, 162 (1924); Ott v. State, 87 Tex.Crim. 382, 222 S.W. 261, 262-63 (1920). Merely to defend a lawsuit that alleges fraud does not trigger the exception. If it did, plaintiffs and defendants alike could routinely discover attorney-client communications about the underlying transaction by simply alleging fraud, and the attorney-client privilege would be hollow indeed.
The documents do not suggest in any way that CIGNA’s in-house attorneys helped it to commit or plan a fraud in the future.
For the reasons stated, I would grant mandamus as to most of the documents.