Court Opinion

ID: 9946292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-29 17:04:53.987952+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:40.134471
License: Public Domain

IN THE

      Court of Appeals of Indiana
             Connie Davis-Brumley, as Mother of Decedent,                         FILED
                                    Appellant-Plaintiff,                      Feb 29 2024, 8:50 am

                                                                                  CLERK
                                                                              Indiana Supreme Court
                                               v.                                Court of Appeals
                                                                                   and Tax Court

       Fair Oaks Farms, LLC; Fair Oaks Hospitality, LLC, and
                    Farmhouse Restaurant, LLC,
                                  Appellants-Defendants.

                                  February 29, 2024
                               Court of Appeals Case No.
                                     23A-CT-1610
                         Appeal from the Lake Superior Court
                   The Honorable Rehana R. Adat-Lopez, Judge
                                  Trial Court Cause No.
                                   45D10-2210-CT-982

                           Opinion by Judge Tavitas
                     Judges Mathias and Weissmann concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1610 | February 29, 2024   Page 1 of 12
      Tavitas, Judge.

      Case Summary
[1]   Connie Davis-Brumley filed a wrongful death action against Fair Oaks Farms,

      LLC; Fair Oaks Hospitality, LLC; Farmhouse Restaurant, LLC (collectively

      “Fair Oaks”); and Samantha Kunkel (all collectively “Defendants”) based on

      the death of her son, Justin M. Davis (“Justin”). Davis-Brumley originally filed

      the action as natural mother of Justin, and she petitioned the probate court to

      be appointed as special administratrix of Justin’s estate (“the Estate”) the same

      day that she filed her wrongful death complaint. The next day, one day after

      the two-year period for the filing of the wrongful death action elapsed, the

      probate court granted Davis-Brumley’s petition to be appointed as special

      administratrix. Thereafter, in the wrongful death action, Davis-Brumley filed a

      motion to substitute the Estate as plaintiff. Fair Oaks then filed a motion to

      dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the wrongful death action was not

      brought by the personal representative of the Estate within the statutory two-

      year filing period of the Wrongful Death Act.

[2]   The trial court entered an order granting the motion to dismiss and denying the

      motion to substitute. Davis-Brumley appeals and argues: (1) the wrongful

      death action was timely filed because Davis-Brumley petitioned to be appointed

      as special administratrix of the Estate within the two-year filing period, and

      therefore, the trial court erred by granting the motion to dismiss; and (2) the

      trial court erred by denying the motion to substitute because the trial court’s

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1610 | February 29, 2024     Page 2 of 12
      ruling thereon was based on its allegedly erroneous ruling on the motion to

      dismiss. We are not persuaded by these arguments. Accordingly, we affirm.

      Issue
[3]   Davis-Brumley raises two issues on appeal, which we consolidate and restate as

      whether Davis-Brumley’s wrongful death action was timely filed when she

      petitioned to be appointed as special administratrix of the Estate within the two-

      year filing period of the Wrongful Death Act but the petition was not granted

      until after that period elapsed.

      Facts
[4]   On October 3, 2020, Justin was involved in an automobile accident with

      Kunkel in Lake County. Justin died as a result of the accident, and Kunkel was

      seriously injured. In June 2021, a supervised estate was opened for the limited

      purpose of accepting service of Kunkel’s claims against the Estate, and an

      employee of Kunkel’s attorney was named as the special administratrix at that

      time. Kunkel then filed a personal injury lawsuit against the Estate and Fair

      Oaks.

[5]   On October 3, 2022, Davis-Brumley filed a wrongful death action against

      Defendants “as natural mother of” Justin. Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 11.

      According to the complaint, on October 3, 2020, Justin was a “visitor,

      customer, and/or business invitee” of Fair Oaks, and Fair Oaks “knew or

      should have known that [Justin] was intoxicated, furnished him alcoholic
      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1610 | February 29, 2024    Page 3 of 12
      beverages, and allowed him to operate a motor vehicle leaving the premises.”

      Id. at 12-13. The complaint alleged that Fair Oaks’s conduct caused Justin to

      be involved in the accident with Kunkel later that evening. 1

[6]   On the same day that Davis-Brumley filed her wrongful death action, she filed a

      petition in the probate court seeking to be appointed as special administratrix of

      the Estate and seeking leave to pursue the wrongful death action in the Estate’s

      name. The next day, October 4, 2022, the probate court granted Davis-

      Brumley’s petition.

[7]   On October 23, 2022, Davis-Brumley filed a motion to substitute the Estate for

      Davis-Brumley as the plaintiff in the wrongful death action. Then, on

      December 13, 2022, Fair Oaks filed a motion to dismiss the wrongful death

      complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Trial Rule 12(B)(6). 2 Fair

      Oaks argued that the complaint failed to state a claim because Davis-Brumley

      did not obtain status as special administratrix of the Estate until October 4,

      2022; and thus, pursuant to the Wrongful Death Act, the complaint was not

      1
       The complaint also alleged a count of negligence against Kunkel, which Davis-Brumley later moved to
      dismiss.
      2
        Fair Oaks previously filed a motion to dismiss on December 8, 2022; however, that motion was dismissed
      for failure to comply with the local rule requiring the separate filing of supporting briefs.

      Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1610 | February 29, 2024                         Page 4 of 12
       brought by the “personal representative” of the Estate within two years of

       Justin’s death. Id. at 34.

[8]    Davis-Brumley objected to the motion and argued that the wrongful death

       action was timely filed because her appointment as special administratrix

       “relate[s] back” to the date that she petitioned for this status, October 3, 2022.

       Id. at 58. Fair Oaks filed a reply and argued that the relation-back doctrine was

       inapplicable.

[9]    The trial court held a hearing on the motion to dismiss and motion to substitute

       on May 25, 2023. After taking the matter under advisement, the trial court, on

       June 14, 2023, issued an order granting the motion to dismiss and denying the

       motion to substitute. Davis-Brumley now appeals.

       Discussion and Decision
[10]   Davis-Brumley argues that the trial court erred by: (1) dismissing the wrongful

       death complaint; and (2) denying the motion to substitute. We conclude that

       Davis-Brumley has not carried her burden of persuasion.

[11]   Our standard of review regarding a motion to dismiss is as follows:

               “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim tests the legal
               sufficiency of the claim, not the facts supporting it.” Babes
               Showclub, Jaba, Inc. v. Lair, 918 N.E.2d 308, 310 (Ind. 2009).
               Review of a trial court’s grant or denial of a motion based on
               a Trial Rule 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is therefore de
               novo. Id. When reviewing a motion to dismiss, we view the

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1610 | February 29, 2024       Page 5 of 12
                 pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
                 with every reasonable inference construed in the nonmovant’s
                 favor. Id. In ruling on such a motion to dismiss, a court is
                 required to take as true all allegations upon the face of the
                 complaint and may only dismiss if the plaintiff would not be
                 entitled to recover under any set of facts admissible under the
                 allegations of the complaint. Meyers v. Meyers, 861 N.E.2d 704,
                 705 (Ind. 2007).

       Parsley v. MGA Fam. Grp., Inc., 103 N.E.3d 651, 654 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), reh’g

       denied.

[12]   The Wrongful Death Act provides, in relevant part: “[W]hen the death of one is

       caused by the wrongful act or omission of another, the action shall be

       commenced by the personal representative of the decedent within two (2)

       years.” Ind. Code § 34-23-1-1. Two aspects of this statute are critical in the

       case before us. The first aspect is rather straightforward: “the only proper

       plaintiff” in an action under the Wrongful Death Act is the “personal

       representative” of the decedent. Robertson v. Gene B. Glick Co., Inc., 960 N.E.2d

       179, 184 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citing Gen. Motors Corp. v. Arnett, 418 N.E.2d

       546, 548 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)), trans. denied. “‘A special administratrix is a type

       of personal representative who is appointed for a special purpose with limited

       powers and duties.’” In re Estate of Hutman, 705 N.E.2d 1060, 1063 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 1999) (citing Pope ex rel. Smith v. Pope, 701 N.E.2d 587, 589 (Ind. Ct. App.

       1998)). A special administratrix may pursue a wrongful death action if

       appointed for that purpose. Id. at 1064 (citing Pope ex rel. Smith v. Pope, 701

       N.E.2d 587, 590 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)); see also Ind. Code § 29-1-10-15(a)(5)

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1610 | February 29, 2024       Page 6 of 12
       (authorizing the appointment of a special administrator to pursue “damages for

       a decedent’s wrongful death”).

[13]   The second relevant aspect of the Wrongful Death Act concerns the time frame

       in which to bring an action thereunder. The action must be brought by the

       personal representative of the decedent’s estate within the prescribed two-year

       filing period, otherwise “‘no enforceable right of action is created.’” Brugh v.

       Milestone Contractors, LP, 202 N.E.3d 1091, 1095 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023) (quoting

       Blackford v. Welborn Clinic, 172 N.E.3d 1219, 1224 (Ind. 2021)), trans. denied.

       This is because the Wrongful Death Act is a “non-claim statute,” as the right to

       bring a wrongful death action is “purely statutory” and did not exist under the

       common law. Id. (citing Blackford, 172 N.E.3d at 1224; Arnett, 418 N.E.2d at

       548).

[14]   Unlike statutes of limitation, which “‘create defenses that must be pleaded and

       may be waived,’ a non-claim statute is self-executing and ‘imposes a condition

       precedent to the enforcement of a right of action.’” Id. (quoting Blackford, 172

       N.E.3d at 1224). Because filing within the statutory period is a condition

       precedent to the enforcement of a non-claim statute, “‘[n]on-claim statutes

       generally are not subject to equitable exceptions.’” Id. (quoting Blackford, 172

       N.E.3d at 1224) (brackets in original); see also Mann v. Arnos, 186 N.E.3d 105,

       116 n.5 (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) (“A ‘nonclaim statute creates a right of action if

       commenced within the statutory period, whereas a statute of limitation creates

       a defense to an action brought after the expiration of the statutory period.’”

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1610 | February 29, 2024     Page 7 of 12
       (quoting Biedron v. Anonymous Physician 1, 106 N.E.3d 1079, 1089 n.6 (Ind. Ct.

       App. 2018), trans. denied)), trans. denied.

[15]   Here, Davis-Brumley did not file her wrongful death action as special

       administratrix of the Estate within the Wrongful Death Act’s two-year filing

       period. Although Davis-Brumley filed the wrongful death action on October 3,

       2022, two years to the day after Justin’s death, Davis-Brumley was not the

       special administratrix of the Estate at the time. Davis-Brumley did petition to

       be appointed as special administratrix of the Estate on the same day that she

       filed the wrongful death action; however, the probate court did not grant that

       petition until the following day, October 4, 2022, which was after the filing

       period elapsed. Davis-Brumley then filed a motion to substitute the Estate for

       Davis-Brumley as the plaintiff in the wrongful death action on October 23,

       2022. On June 14, 2023, the trial court entered its order dismissing the

       wrongful death complaint and denying the motion to substitute.

[16]   Davis-Brumley argues that she timely filed the wrongful death action because

       she petitioned to be appointed as special administratrix within the two-year

       filing period, regardless of when that petition was ultimately granted. Our cases

       do not appear to have addressed this exact argument. We have, however,

       emphasized that, if the person filing the wrongful death action is not the

       personal representative of the decedent’s estate, the person must obtain “the

       legal status of personal representative . . . within the two-year timeframe” for

       the claim to be actionable. Brugh, 202 N.E.3d at 1097 (citing Rogers v. Grunden,

       589 N.E.2d 248 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992, trans. denied); Faris v. AC and S., Inc., 842

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1610 | February 29, 2024      Page 8 of 12
       N.E.2d 870 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), reh’g denied). Davis-Brumley did not do so

       here.

[17]   We addressed an argument similar to Davis-Brumley’s in General Motors

       Corporation v. Arnett, 418 N.E.2d 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981). In Arnett, the

       decedent’s wife filed an action under the Wrongful Death Act within two years

       of the decedent’s death; however, the wife did not obtain status as personal

       representative of the decedent’s estate until four months after the filing period

       elapsed. 418 N.E.2d at 547-48. The trial court, accordingly, dismissed the

       complaint. Id.

[18]   On appeal, the wife argued, in part, that Trial Rule 15(C) 3 “allow[ed] her

       belated appointment as personal representative to relate back to the date on

       which she filed her complaint.” Id. at 548. A panel of this Court first stated

       that Trial Rule 15(C) did not apply because the wife did not amend her

       complaint, “rather it was her legal status which was altered.” Id. at 548. The

       Court further declined to exercise equity and apply the “rationale” of Trial Rule

       3
           Trial Rule 15(C) provides, in relevant part:

                Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
                transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the
                amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading. An amendment changing the party
                against whom a claim is asserted relates back if the foregoing provision is satisfied and, within
                one hundred and twenty (120) days of commencement of the action, the party to be brought in
                by amendment:
                  (1) has received such notice of the institution of the action that he will not be prejudiced in
                  maintaining his defense on the merits; and
                  (2) knew or should have known that but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper
                  party, the action would have been brought against him.

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1610 | February 29, 2024                                   Page 9 of 12
       15(C) to allow the “appointment [as personal representative] itself [to] relate

       back” because the Wrongful Death Act’s two-year filing period is a “condition

       precedent” to the right to an action thereunder and not merely a statute of

       limitation. Id. Accordingly, this Court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

       Id.; see also Hosler ex rel. Hosler v. Caterpillar, Inc., 710 N.E.2d 193, 197-98 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 1999) (following Arnett and holding that Trial Rule 15(C) “may not be

       used to save [a] wrongful death claim from dismissal” when the plaintiff fails to

       timely file the action as personal representative of the decedent’s estate), trans.

       denied.

[19]   Davis-Brumley, however, relies on Magic Circle v. Schoolcraft, 4 N.E.3d 768 (Ind.

       Ct. App. 2014), aff’d sub nom, Camoplast Crocker, LLC v. Schoolcraft, 12 N.E.3d

       251 (Ind. 2014), which we find distinguishable. In that case, the personal

       representative timely filed a wrongful death action and, before the filing period

       elapsed, moved to amend the complaint to add new defendants. Magic Circle, 4

       N.E.3d at 769. The trial court, however, did not grant the motion until after the

       filing period elapsed, and the new defendants subsequently moved to dismiss

       the claims against them as untimely. Id. On appeal, a panel of this Court held

       that the claims were timely filed under Trial Rule 15(C) because the date that

       the motion to amend was filed was the controlling date rather than the date of

       the trial court’s ruling thereon. Id. at 771-72.

[20]   Davis-Brumley argues that we should expand our holding in Magic Circle to

       hold that the wrongful death action was timely filed because she petitioned to

       be appointed as special administratrix of the Estate before the Wrongful Death

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1610 | February 29, 2024         Page 10 of 12
       Act’s filing period elapsed. For the reasons articulated in Arnett, we decline to

       extend Magic Circle here. Magic Circle concerned Trial Rule 15(C), which is

       inapplicable here because Davis-Brumley seeks to relate back her legal status as

       special administratrix, not her underlying claims. Furthermore, the Wrongful

       Death Act’s filing period cannot be tolled in the equitable spirit of Trial Rule

       15(C) because the two-year filing period is a “condition precedent” to an action

       under the Act. Brugh, 202 N.E.3d at 1095. And, although Davis-Brumley seeks

       to have her status as special administratrix relate back to the date that she

       petitioned for this status rather than the date that she filed her complaint, that

       distinction makes little difference based on the principles Arnett announced. See

       id. (“Non-claim statutes generally are not subject to equitable exceptions.”

       (quotation omitted)).

[21]   Davis-Brumley cites no other authority which would permit her status as

       special administratrix to relate back to an earlier date. She also does not argue

       that any of the recognized tolling exceptions to the Wrongful Death Act’s two-

       year filing period apply. See, e.g., Alldredge v. Good Samaritan Home, Inc., 9

       N.E.3d 1257, 1264-65 (Ind. 2014) (fraudulent concealment); Brugh, 202 N.E.3d

       at 1097-98 (Covid-19 tolling orders).

[22]   We are, therefore, constrained to follow the general rule that the two-year filing

       period for an action under the Wrongful Death Act cannot be tolled. Because

       Davis-Brumley did not file her wrongful death action as special administratrix

       or personal representative of the Estate within two years of Justin’s death, her

       complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly,

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1610 | February 29, 2024     Page 11 of 12
       the trial court did not err by dismissing the wrongful death complaint or by

       denying the motion to substitute the Estate as the plaintiff in the action.

       Conclusion
[23]   The trial court did not err by dismissing the wrongful death complaint, nor did

       it err by denying the motion to substitute. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment

       of the trial court.

[24]   Affirmed.

       Mathias, J., and Weissmann, J., concur.

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
       Arman G. Sarkisian
       Sarkisian, Sarkisian, & Associates, P.C.
       Portage, Indiana

       ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
       Philip F. Cuevas
       Litchfield Cavo LLP
       Chicago, Illinois

       Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 23A-CT-1610 | February 29, 2024    Page 12 of 12