Court Opinion

ID: 9795300
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 03:24:48.336007+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:29:19.937195
License: Public Domain

ROBINSON, Judge (special concurrence). {27} I do not find comfort in Davis, which holds that a defendant’s refusal to submit to a field sobriety test gives rise to an inference that the defendant has a guilty conscience. I am convinced that there are other valid inferences, including that of innocence, fear of police, apprehension, and confusion that are equally reasonable, logical and realistic. {28} Furthermore, the line of cases supporting the “reasonable officer” standard for probable cause, as opposed to allowing the testimony of the officer on the scene to govern what constitutes probable cause for arrest, may be distinguishable. Almost all of those cases deal with a police officer who testifies that he did have probable cause to arrest. Here, the officer testified that he did not believe he had probable cause, and that is what sparked the controversy. {29} In this case there is enough evidence to find the Defendant not guilty. The problem with such a conclusion is that we would be substituting our own judgment for that of the trial judge, and that is not our job. We must resist the temptation to re-weigh the evidence on appeal. In this case, the temptation is great because the officer at the scene testified, on cross-examination by defense counsel, that he did not find probable cause for arrest until the Defendant refused to take the field sobriety test. If this testimony stood throughout the trial, I could not concur in the majority decision to affirm. However, the trial judge asked the officer what circumstances led him to believe that he had probable cause. At that time, the officer stated that it was not just the Defendant’s refusal to take the field sobriety test, but also the fact that the Defendant had watery, bloodshot eyes and an odor of alcohol on his breath. This testimony provides substantial evidence supporting the arrest and later the trial court’s finding of guilt. • {30} I, therefore, concur.