Court Opinion

ID: 9963454
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-25 16:01:45.254166+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:24:51.368979
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-12369   Document: 34-1    Date Filed: 04/25/2024   Page: 1 of 10

                                                 [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-12369
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

        WASEEM DAKER,
                                                    Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        COMMISSIONER, GEORGIA DEPARTMENT OF
        CORRECTIONS,
        JACK KOONS,
        Facilities Director,
        ROBERT TOOLE,
        Field Operations Director,
        AHMAD HOLT,
        Deputy Field Operations Director,
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        2                       Opinion of the Court              22-12369

        ADRIAN NELSON,
        Statewide Tier Coordinator, et al.,

                                                    Defendants-Appellees.

                               ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Georgia
                   D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-00003-JRH-CLR
                           ____________________

                               ____________________

                                    No. 23-11445
                               Non-Argument Calendar
                               ____________________

        WASEEM DAKER,
                                                        Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        TIMOTHY WARD,
        Commissioner,
        JACK KOON,
        Facilities Director,
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        22-12369                Opinion of the Court                          3

        ROBERT TOOLE,
        Field Operations Director,
        AHMAD HOLT,
        Deputy Field Operations Director,
        ADRIAN NELSON,
        Statewide Tier Coordinator, et al.,

                                                       Defendants-Appellees.

                             ____________________

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Southern District of Georgia
                    D.C. Docket No. 6:21-cv-00003-JRH-CLR
                            ____________________

        Before JORDAN, NEWSOM, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Waseem Daker, a Georgia prisoner proceeding pro se, ap-
        peals (a) the district court’s sua sponte dismissal of his first amended
        complaint raising claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Religious
        Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and (b)
        the district court’s denial of his post-judgment motions pursuant to
        Rules 59(e) and 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. With
        respect to the dismissal order, he argues that the district court
        abused its discretion by sua sponte dismissing his first amended
        complaint for failure to comply with a court order. With respect
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        4                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12369

        to the denial of his post-trial motions, he argues that the district
        court abused its discretion by not letting him file a post-judgment
        second amended complaint and by not vacating its previous order
        denying his motion for a preliminary injunction.
               Following a review of the record and Mr. Daker’s brief, we
        affirm.
                                           I
                We review for abuse of discretion the dismissal of an action
        for failure to comply with the rules or orders of the district court.
        See Betty K Agencies, Ltd. v. M/V Monada, 432 F.3d 1333, 1337 (11th
        Cir. 2005). “Discretion means the district court has a ‘range of
        choice, and that its decision will not be disturbed as long as it stays
        within that range and is not influenced by any mistake of law.” Id.
        (citation omitted).
                                           A
                 Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides
        that “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with [the Rules
        of Civil Procedure] or a court order, a defendant may move to dis-
        miss the action or any claim against it.” A district court may sua
        sponte dismiss a case under the authority of either (1) Rule 41(b), or
        (2) its “inherent power to manage its docket.” Betty K Agencies, Ltd.,
        432 F.3d at 1337.
               Unless the district court specifies otherwise, a Rule 41(b) dis-
        missal acts as an adjudication upon the merits: “Unless the dismis-
        sal order states otherwise, a dismissal under this subdivision (b) and
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        22-12369                Opinion of the Court                           5

        any dismissal not under this rule--except one for lack of jurisdiction,
        improper venue, or failure to join a party under Rule 19--operates
        as an adjudication on the merits.” An adjudication on the merits
        is, in turn, presumed to operate as a dismissal with prejudice unless
        the district court specifies otherwise. See Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed
        Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 505 (2001) (“an ‘adjudication upon the
        merits’ is the opposite of a ‘dismissal without prejudice’”).
               We have held that “[t]he severe sanction of dismissal with
        prejudice . . . can be imposed only in the face of a clear record of
        delay or contumacious conduct by the plaintiff.” Morewitz v. W. of
        Eng. Ship Owners Mut. Protection & Indem. Ass’n (Luxembourg), 62
        F.3d 1356, 1366 (11th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). “Dismissal with
        prejudice is a sanction of last resort that is to be utilized only in
        extreme situations.” Id. “While dismissal is an extraordinary rem-
        edy, dismissal upon disregard of an order, especially where the liti-
        gant has been forewarned, generally is not an abuse of discretion.”
        Moon v. Newsome, 863 F.2d 835, 837 (11th Cir. 1989). This is so even
        when “less drastic sanctions are available.” Phillips v. Ins. Co. of N.
        Am., 633 F.2d 1165, 1168 (5th Cir. 1981).
                                           B
               In August of 2020, the district court for the Northern District
        of Georgia entered a permanent injunction against Mr. Daker after
        finding that his extensive, abusive, and vexatious litigation history
        had improperly burdened the court. Among other things, the per-
        manent injunction required that Mr. Daker file a copy of the in-
        junction order with every lawsuit that he filed in any federal court,
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-12369

        along with a list of every case he had filed in federal court and its
        disposition. The injunction also warned Mr. Daker that if he did
        not comply with its terms, his complaint could be “summarily dis-
        missed.” Mr. Daker appealed the permanent injunction, but we
        affirmed. See Daker v. Governor, No. 20-13602, 2022 WL 1102015, at
        *1-*2 (11th Cir. April 13, 2022).
               When he filed his 86-page initial complaint in this case, in
        the Southern District of Georgia, Mr. Daker sought a preliminary
        injunction compelling the defendants to provide him with access
        to photocopies for his litigation. He said that he needed to copy
        documents he was going to file with the court or serve on opposing
        counsel so that he could keep a copy for himself. But he never as-
        serted that he needed to make copies of the permanent injunction
        that had been entered against him in the Northern District of Geor-
        gia. See generally D.E. 3 at 1-14; D.E. 4 at 1-17.
              The magistrate judge issued a report recommending denial
        of Mr. Daker’s motion for a preliminary injunction. See D.E. 7.
        Over Mr. Daker’s objection, the district court adopted the report
        and denied the motion. See D.E. 15.
               Then the magistrate judge issued another report recom-
        mending that Mr. Daker’s complaint be dismissed without preju-
        dice in its entirety. See D.E. 24. Mr. Daker objected to the report,
        see D.E. 28, but also filed a 100-page first amended complaint.
        Though he listed his litigation history in the first amended com-
        plaint, he did not attach a copy of the permanent injunction from
        the Northern District of Georgia. See D.E. 30.
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        22-12369               Opinion of the Court                        7

                The district court concluded that the first amended com-
        plaint superseded the initial complaint and rendered the magistrate
        judge’s report and recommendation moot. See D.E. 38. The dis-
        trict court ruled that the allegations in the first amended complaint
        against the Georgia Department of Corrections defendants were
        malicious, duplicative, and precluded by his prior lawsuits, and as
        a result dismissed the claims against those defendants with preju-
        dice. See id. at 4-17, 24. As for the allegations against the Smith
        State Prison defendants, the district court concluded that they con-
        stituted a shotgun pleading and dismissed the claims against those
        defendants without prejudice. See id. at 17-24.
               Alternatively, the district court concluded that the case
        should be dismissed because Mr. Daker had failed to comply with
        a court order, i.e., he had not attached a copy of the permanent
        injunction order from the Northern District of Georgia to the first
        amended complaint. See id. at 23-24. The district court did not
        specify whether the dismissal for this failure to comply was with or
        without prejudice, but as noted it acted as an adjudication on the
        merits pursuant to the text of Rule 41(b).
                Contrary to Mr. Daker’s argument, the district court did not
        abuse its discretion by sua sponte dismissing his first amended com-
        plaint for failure to comply with a court order. The permanent in-
        junction issued by the district court for the Northern District of
        Georgia warned Mr. Daker that his complaint would be “summar-
        ily dismissed” if he did not comply with its terms. And it is clear,
        from Mr. Daker’s appeal of that permanent injunction, that he was
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-12369

        aware of its existence and its terms. Under the circumstances, in-
        cluding Mr. Daker’s abusive litigation history, see Daker, 2022 WL
        1102015, at *1-*2, we cannot say that the district court committed
        a clear error of judgment in concluding that his contumacious be-
        havior warranted the severe penalty of dismissal with prejudice.
        See Betty K Agencies, Ltd., 432 F.3d at 1337; Moon, 863 F.2d at 837.
                                           II
                We review “the denial of a Rule 59 motion for abuse of dis-
        cretion.” Arthur v. King, 500 F.3d 1335, 1343 (11th Cir. 2007). “A
        motion to alter or amend a judgment must be filed no later than 28
        days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). “The
        only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are newly-discovered
        evidence or manifest errors of law or fact.” Arthur, 500 F.3d at 1343
        (citation omitted and alterations adopted). “A Rule 59(e) motion
        cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present
        evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judg-
        ment.” Id. And such a motion cannot be used to ask the court to
        reexamine an unfavorable ruling in the absence of a manifest error
        of law or fact. See Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Intl., Inc., 626 F.3d 1327,
        1344 (11th Cir. 2010). Generally speaking, if the district court did
        not err in dismissing the plaintiff’s complaint, “it necessarily fol-
        lows that it did not abuse its discretion in denying Rule 59(e) relief.”
        Id
              Here the district court did not abuse its discretion by deny-
        ing the Rule 59(e) motion because Mr. Daker did not point to
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        22-12369                Opinion of the Court                           9

        newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact. See
        Arthur, 500 F.3d at 1343.
                                           III
               We review the district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion
        for an abuse of discretion. See Cano v. Baker, 435 F.3d 1337, 1341-42
        (11th Cir. 2006). “An appeal of a ruling on a Rule 60(b) motion . . .
        is narrow in scope, addressing only the propriety of the denial or
        grant of relief and does not raise issues in the underlying judgment
        for review.” Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Nw. Nat. Ins. Co., 198 F.3d
        1332, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999).
                                           A
                “On motion and just terms, the district court may relieve a
        party from an order for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inad-
        vertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evi-
        dence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been discov-
        ered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud,
        whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic, misrepresentation,
        or misconduct by an opposing party; (4) the judgment is void; (5)
        the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based
        on an earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or apply-
        ing it prospectively is no longer equitable; or (6) any other reason
        that justifies relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The moving party must
        show extraordinary circumstances so compelling that the court
        needed to vacate its order, and “[e]ven then, whether to grant the
        requested relief is . . . a matter for the district court’s sound discre-
        tion.” Cano, 435 F.3d at 1342 (citation omitted).
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        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-12369

               The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the
        Rule 60(b) motion because Mr. Daker generally reiterated his argu-
        ments as to the merits of his motion for a preliminary injunction
        and did not point to any of the enumerated circumstances under
        Rule 60(b) that would grant him relief. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b);
        Cano, 435 F.3d at 1341-42; Nw. Nat. Ins. Co., 198 F.3d at 1338.
                                          B
                 “Post-judgment, the plaintiff may seek leave to amend if he
        is granted relief under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b)(6).” United States ex
        rel. Atkins v. McInteer, 470 F.3d 1350, 1361 n.22 (11th Cir. 2006). Be-
        cause the district court did not err in denying Mr. Daker’s Rule
        59(e) and Rule 60(b) motions, it did not err by declining to allow
        the filing of a post-judgment second amended complaint.
               That leaves Daker’s challenge to the denial of his motion for
        a preliminary injunction. Given that we have affirmed the dismis-
        sal of Mr. Daker’s first amended complaint, the appeal from the
        denial of preliminary injunctive relief is moot.
                                          IV
               The district court’s orders are affirmed.
               AFFIRMED.