Court Opinion

ID: 9554543
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-09 15:05:19.981161+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:35:01.894587
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                         Opinion filed August 9, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-1384
                     Lower Tribunal No. 20-23761 CC
                           ________________

                       Jose Ramos Rodriguez,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

          The Responsive Auto Insurance Company,
                                  Appellee.

      An appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Lawrence
D. King, Judge.

     Christian Carrazana, P.A., and Christian Carrazana, for appellant.

      The Vaccaro Law Firm, P.A., and Charles L. Vaccaro (Davie), for
appellee.

Before EMAS, MILLER, and LOBREE, JJ.

     MILLER, J.
      Appellant, Jose Ramos Rodriguez, challenges a final summary

judgment rendered on the basis that appellee, The Responsive Auto

Insurance Company, properly rescinded his insurance policy because his

application contained material misrepresentations. On appeal, Rodriguez

contends Responsive was estopped from relying upon the falsity of his

answers to avoid liability because the agent preparing the application

completed the relevant fields without first eliciting his input. Adhering to the

seminal Florida Supreme Court decision in All Florida Surety Co. v. Coker,

88 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1956), along with other supporting authorities, we affirm

the well-reasoned decision under review.

                                BACKGROUND

      Rodriguez, a Lyft driver, applied for an automobile insurance policy

from Responsive. The application contained a section entitled, “NOTICE TO

APPLICANT: READ THIS SECTION CAREFULLY,” which required answers

to the following questions:

      Is (are) any vehicle(s) listed on this application used for hire (taxi,
      limo, etc.), commercial or business purposes, delivery (pizza,
      newspaper, etc.), or used in the course or scope of your
      employment other than traveling to and from work?

      Are you or any drivers or residents employed in the livery,
      delivery, limousine or taxi service, including operators employed
      to transport nursery or school children, migrant workers,
      hotel/motel guests, patients or members of a van pool?

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Both questions were answered in the negative, and, elsewhere in the

application,     Rodriguez   omitted    his   occupational     and    employment

information. He then electronically signed and dated the application. In

doing so, he certified:

      I have read each of the questions . . . and answered all questions
      truthfully. I realize that any incorrect information may constitute
      a material misrepresentation, which may result in my Insurance
      coverage being voided or my claim being denied.

               ....

             . . . The applicant(s) represents the statements and
      answers made in this application to be true, complete and correct
      and agrees that any policy may be issued or renewed in reliance
      upon the truth, completeness and correctness of such
      statements and answers. The applicant(s) further understands
      that falsity, incompleteness, or incorrectness may jeopardize the
      coverage under such policy so issued or renewed in accordance
      with Section 627.409, [Florida Statutes].

               ....

             . . . I hereby state that each vehicle listed on this application
      and any vehicle endorsed to my policy at a later date is not and
      will not be used for business or commercial purposes. Including,
      traveling to multiple job location[s] in a single day, transporting
      patients, clients, merchandise, supplies, tools or employees or
      making deliveries or pickups. I further state that I am not paid
      mileage, gas, maintenance, insurance nor do I receive any
      reimbursement or compensation from my employer and do not
      claim a tax deduction for business use of any vehicle listed on
      this policy. During the policy term, if I begin using any of the
      insured vehicles for business purpose[s] I will notify the company
      within 14 days. Business use represents an unacceptable risk in
      our private passenger auto program.

                                         3
     Responsive issued an insurance policy, and the following month,

Rodriguez was involved in an automobile accident. After obtaining medical

treatment, he executed an assignment of benefits in favor of his medical

provider.   The medical provider then submitted a claim for benefits to

Responsive on his behalf.

     While investigating the claim, Responsive learned Rodriguez was a

Lyft driver, and he used his vehicle for business purposes. Responsive

refused to pay the claim, rescinded the policy, and refunded all premium

payments and policy fees.

     The medical provider filed a declaratory action against Responsive.

Litigation commenced, and Rodriguez was substituted as party plaintiff. The

parties subsequently filed competing motions for summary judgment.

Relying upon the inaccuracies in the application, Responsive sought to avoid

liability on material misrepresentation grounds. Rodriguez, in turn, argued

that Responsive was estopped from avoiding liability because the preparing

agent completed the relevant fields on her own initiative.1 The trial court

conducted a hearing on the motions, at the conclusion of which it granted

1
 The agent attested she translated the entire application and transcribed
Rodriguez’s answers verbatim.

                                     4
summary judgment in favor of Responsive by way of a carefully crafted

thirteen-page final summary judgment order. The instant appeal ensued.

                           STANDARD OF REVIEW

        We conduct a de novo review of a final summary judgment. Feldman

v. Schocket, 47 Fla. L. Weekly D1930, D1930–31 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 21,

2022).     This analysis is guided by Florida’s so-called “new” summary

judgment standard, under which the trial court should only deny summary

judgment where there is a genuine dispute as to a “material fact” and “the

evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the

nonmoving party.” In re Amends. to Fla. Rule of Civ. Proc. 1.510, 317 So.

3d 72, 75 (Fla. 2021) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

248 (1986)).

                                   ANALYSIS

        “Florida law . . . gives an insurer the unilateral right to rescind its

insurance policy on the basis of misrepresentation in the application of

insurance.” Gonzalez v. Eagle Ins. Co., 948 So. 2d 1, 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).

To this end, section 627.409, Florida Statutes (2020), provides, in relevant

part:

        (1) Any statement or description made by or on behalf of an
        insured or annuitant in an application for an insurance policy or
        annuity contract, or in negotiations for a policy or contract, is a
        representation and not a warranty. Except as provided in

                                        5
     subsection (3), a misrepresentation, omission, concealment of
     fact, or incorrect statement may prevent recovery under the
     contract or policy only if any of the following apply:

     (a) The misrepresentation, omission, concealment, or statement
     is fraudulent or is material to the acceptance of the risk or to the
     hazard assumed by the insurer.

     (b) If the true facts had been known to the insurer pursuant to a
     policy requirement or other requirement, the insurer in good faith
     would not have issued the policy or contract, would not have
     issued it at the same premium rate, would not have issued a
     policy or contract in as large an amount, or would not have
     provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the
     loss.

Under this statutory provision, a misstatement or omission need not be

intentional. It “must only be material.” Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.

Kramer, 725 So. 2d 1141, 1142 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998). “This . . . is consistent

with the general principle in contract law that, to obtain rescission of a

contract, based upon misrepresentation, it is not necessary that ‘the party

making the misrepresentation should have known that it was false.’”

Universal Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 114 So. 3d 1031, 1035 (Fla. 1st

DCA 2013) (quoting 27 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 69:49 (4th

ed. 2023)). A misrepresentation will be deemed material “if it does not

enable a reasonable insurer to adequately estimate the nature of the risk in

determining whether to assume the risk.” Singer v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins.

Co., 512 So. 2d 1125, 1128–29 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).

                                      6
     The relationship between an insured and insurer is contractual in

nature, and the courts of this state have long held that a signatory is bound

by a written contract. See Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Fischer, 166 So. 2d 129, 130

(Fla. 1964); see also Kramer, 725 So. 2d at 1143; Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp.

v. Eur. Woodcraft & Mica Design, Inc., 49 So. 3d 774, 778 (Fla. 4th DCA

2010); Qubty v. Nagda, 817 So. 2d 952, 958 (Fla. 5th DCA 2002); Allied Van

Lines, Inc. v. Bratton, 351 So. 2d 344, 347–48 (Fla. 1977).

     Nearly seventy years ago, the Florida Supreme Court explained the

limited exceptions engrafted on the general rule in All Florida Surety Co. v.

Coker, 88 So. 2d 508 (Fla. 1956):

     [A] person who, having the capacity and an opportunity to read a
     contract, is not misled as to its contents and who sustains no
     confidential relationship to the other party cannot avoid the
     contract on the ground of mistake if he signs it without reading it,
     at least in the absence of special circumstances excusing his
     failure to read it.

Id. at 510–11. The Coker court further observed that a party “cannot defend

against . . . enforcement [of the contract] on the ground that he signed it

without reading it, unless he aver[s] facts showing circumstances which

prevented his reading the paper, or was induced by the statements of the

other parties to desist from reading it.” Id. at 510 (citing Morgan v. Mengel

Co., 242 S.W. 860, 862 (Ky. 1922)). In doing so, it reasoned, “[t]he courts

will not ordinarily protect those who with full opportunity to do so will not

                                      7
protect themselves.” Coker, 88 So. 2d at 510. In other words, “[i]f a man acts

negligently and in such a way as to justify others in supposing that the writing

is assented to by him, he will be bound both by law and in equity, even though

he supposes the writing is an instrument of an entirely different character.”

Id.

      The principles espoused in Coker endure today. “Florida law has

never excused a party from a contract simply because it failed to read the

contract terms.” Paul Gottlieb & Co. v. Alps S. Corp., 985 So. 2d 1, 7 (Fla.

2d DCA 2007). Consistent with this adage, this court and others have

determined that lack of linguistic proficiency or literacy, standing alone, are

not legal bases to avoid enforcement of a contract. See Kendall Imps., LLC

v. Diaz, 215 So. 3d 95, 101 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) (“[T]he burden squarely

rested on [the signatory] to seek clarification of the terms of these

documents” prior to signing); see also Rivero v. Rivero, 963 So. 2d 934, 938

(Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (quoting Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.

Benton, 467 So. 2d 311, 313 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985)) (“If a person cannot read

the instrument, it is as much his duty to procure some reliable person to read

and explain it to him, before he signs it, as it would be to read it before he

signed it if he were able to do so . . . .”).

                                          8
      Against this landscape, we examine the allegations in the instant case.

The summary judgment record established the application contained

multiple misrepresentations. The litigation adjuster attested Responsive was

unaware that Rodriguez was a Lyft driver or that the vehicle would be used

for business purposes. He further stated that “[i]f the true facts had been

known to the insurer pursuant to a policy requirement or other requirement,

the insurer in good faith would not have issued the policy.” § 627.409(1)(b),

Fla. Stat. His affidavit was undisputed and sufficiently satisfied the statutory

prerequisites necessary to succeed on a material misrepresentation

defense.

      Rodriguez conceded he certified and signed the application.           He

claimed, however, that the actions of the agent relieved him of the duty to

learn the contents of the application prior to affixing his signature. In this

vein, Rodriguez cited precedent for the proposition that an insured may be

absolved of wrongdoing if the agent actively concealed information or

otherwise induced an insured to supply incorrect facts. See, e.g., Mass.

Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Williams, 167 So. 12, 14 (Fla. 1936); Columbian Nat.

Life Ins. Co. v. Lanigan, 19 So. 2d 67, 70 (Fla. 1944); Nat’l Emblem Ins. Co.

v. Gillingham, 241 So. 2d 707, 710–11 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970).             A close

                                       9
examination of the summary judgment record renders this line of authority

inapposite. 2

      Here, Rodriguez claimed in his affidavit that the agent filled in blank

fields without obtaining sufficient information. He did not attest that he

apprised the agent of the correct information or was prevented or induced to

refrain from reading the application. Nor did he claim the factual inaccuracies

were obscured or the agent sought to deceive the insurer. See Allied Van

Lines, 351 So. 2d at 347–48.

      Under these circumstances, we conclude that the trial court correctly

found that the affidavit-based assertions, without more, were insufficient to

override Rodriguez’s duty to learn the contents of the application prior to

affixing his signature. See Addison v. Carballosa, 48 So. 3d 951, 954 (Fla.

3d DCA 2010) (“[I]t is generally the duty of a party to a contract to learn and

understand its contents before he signs it.”); Pepple v. Rogers, 140 So. 205,

208 (Fla. 1932) (“It is generally the duty of every party to learn and know the

contents of a contract before he signs and delivers it.”); Parham v. E. Bay

Raceway, 442 So. 2d 399, 400–01 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (“[I]t is generally the

2
 Williams, cited by Rodriguez is distinguishable from the case at hand. In
Williams, the insured argued he disclosed the material information, but the
agent failed to properly record his answer. Id. at 13–14. In this case,
Rodriguez did not assert he revealed his employment information, and the
application mandated disclosure in a myriad of places.

                                      10
duty of a party to learn and understand the contents of a proposed contract

before he signs it.”). Indeed, to hold otherwise would unleash upheaval in

the certainty of contracts. See Gainesville Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Weston,

857 So. 2d 278, 288 (Fla. 1st DCA 2003) (“To sanction such a result would

be to render contracts worthless as a tool of commerce.”). Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment in all respects. 3

      Affirmed.

3
  Our holding is consistent with decisions in several other jurisdictions. See,
e.g., Pedersen v. Chrysler Life Ins. Co., 677 F. Supp. 472, 475 (N.D. Miss.
1988) (“[U]nless a party was induced not to read the contract or have it read
to him by fraudulent representations made by another party, he will be
required to abide by its terms.”); Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Perry, 174
S.E.2d 570, 574 (Ga. Ct. App. 1970) (“It should be observed that the
applicant is bound by the answers recorded on the application, whether
written by him or by the agent, absent any fraud on the part of the agent in
deceiving him as to what was in fact written down as answers, or in
preventing him from reading and ascertaining what was written down.”);
Miller v. Plains Ins. Co., 409 S.W.2d 770, 772–73 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966)
(citations omitted) (“[Insured] was legally bound to know the contents of the
application she signed, whether she read it or not, and this is not affected by
the fact she relied upon or trusted the agent to prepare the application for
the policy.”); Parker v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 900 F.2d 772, 777–78 (4th
Cir. 1990) (quoting Peoples Life Ins. Co. v. Jerrell, 318 A.2d 519, 522 (Md.
1974) (“[F]ailure to disclose information is grounds for rescission only if the
application form was ‘reasonably designed to elicit from the applicant the
information which was material to the risk.’”); Barciak v. United of Omaha
Life Ins. Co., 777 F. Supp. 839, 844 (D. Colo. 1991) (“[Plaintiff’s] alleged lack
of English language proficiency does not vitiate his knowing concealment or
misrepresentation of material facts.”).

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