Court Opinion

ID: 9831256
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:58:18.284272+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:33.230161
License: Public Domain

On the Merits.
This is air appeal from purported judgments of the County Court of Andrews County. The parties hereto, will be designated by their surnames.
Ogden, as plaintiff, on the'24th day of April, 1945, filed -.suit against Pinkston in the County Court of Andrews County. A summary of the petition is, we think, necessary. Ogden’s petition alleged that Pinks-ton filed suit against Ogden in the Justice Court, Precinct No. 7, of Dallas County, to recover the sum of $89.09,' together with attorney’s fees and $15 collection fees; that on June 5, 1944, Ogden filed answer to suit; that on June 17, 1944, the .court entered judgment by default against Ogden in the sum of $119.09. Ogden alleges that he perfected an appeal from this judgment, to the County Court at Law of Dallas County, No. 2; that he likewise filed a bill of review in the justice court, further that Pinkston thereafter filed in said justice court a garnishment proceeding, No. 9767, based on the default judgment in cause No. 9443. It was also alleged that cause No. 9443 had been dismissed before the filing of the garnishment suit, but despite that fact the justice on the 21st day of April, 1945, entered judgment against the garnishee, the First National Bank of Midland, in the amount of the judgment in cause No. 9443. Judgment was sought enjoining W. E. Rich-berger, Justice of Peace, Precinct No. 7, Dallas Comity, from issuing any further execution order or garnishment proceeding *117based on the judgment in cause No. 9443; enjoining Pinkston from seeking to collect any money under either cause 9443 or cause No. 9767, and the First National Bank of Midland from paying into the Justice Court any moneys belonging to Ogden; enjoining F. E. Peacock, as Sheriff of Andrews County, from executing any writs or orders issuing in cause No. 9443.
On April 23, 1945, the Judge of the County Court of Andrews County issued a temporary restraining order substantially as sought against the bank and all of the above named persons, with an order to show cause on Pinkston why a temporary injunction be not issued, returnable on the 5th day of May. On May 7th, 1945, Ogden filed a controverting affidavit to this plea; on May 8, 1945, the court entered an order overruling a plea to jurisdiction, but continuing what was denominated as a temporary injunction in force until the plea of privilege was tried. On May 19, 1945, Pinkston filed an answer subject to his plea to the jurisdiction and plea of privilege. On May 21, 1945, the court entered an order overruling the plea of privilege, and on the same day entered final judgment granting to Ogden a permanent injunction against Pinkston and the other parties heretofore named herein, in substantially the same terms as that of the temporary restraining order. On May 25, 1945, Pinks-ton filed an appeal bond, describing the judgment appealed from as the order of May 5, 1945. On May 26, 1945, Pinkston filed in the cause notice of appeal as to the judgment order of May 21, 1945,- overruling the plea of privilege, and as to the order continuing the temporary injunction in effect.
From the orders entered it appears that while Pinkston had filed pleadings in all of the above named proceedings, he was not personally present or represented by counsel when any of the above orders were made. The case is before this court on the transcript alone. The caption to the transcript recites the proceedings took place at a special term of the county court of Andrews County, State of Texas, which began in said county on the 23rd day of April, 1945, and which terminated on the 21st day of May, 1945.
Ogden has filed a motion praying that the cause be dismissed, at the cost of Pinkston, on grounds that appeal has heretofore been taken from the judgment of the Dallas Justice Court to the County Court at Law of Dallas County, and by that court has been finally decided. This motion is not verified by affidavit. The photostatic copies of letters attached to the motion in no way tend to establish the fact allegation thereof. They purport to be photostatic' copies of two letters, the authenticity of which is not vouched for by any certificate. These would not constitute official documents if certified to. However, we think the final judgment in the cause should be reversed and the cause dismissed.
There is some doubt as to the jurisdiction of this court in the case. It is stated in the caption of the transcript that the proceedings were had at a special term of the county court. We know of no authority for a judge of the county court in civil or criminal matters to call a special term, in fact, the Supreme Court has. held that no such power exists. Ex parte Reeves, 100 Tex. 617, 103 S.W. 478; Murphy v. Boyt, 140 Tex. 382, 168 S.W.2d 631.
Article 5, Section 29 of the Constitution, Vernon’s Ann.St., provides for the terms of the county court. However, we shall presume that the Commissioners’ Court had lawfully provided for a term, of the county court commencing on the 23rd day of April and ending, on the' 21st day of May, 1945. It is noted that the final, judgment in this cause, was entered on the last day of the term, if such term there was.
The judgment the enforcement of which was sought to be enjoined was in a sum less than $200. Ogden plead that-.his damages were in the sum of $150. A county court has no original jurisdiction over a cause of action where less than $200 is involved. Constitution of Texas, art. 5, § 16; DeWitt County v. Wischkemper, 95 Tex. 435, 67 S.W. 882; Ripple v. McCoury, Tex.Civ.App., 29 S.W.2d 436; J. M. Radford Grocery Co. v. Weddle, Tex.Civ.App., 142 S.W.2d 313.
The County Court of Andrews County was without power to enter any judgment other than a dismissal in this cause. Whether we entertain jurisdiction or dismiss, the result will be the same, save as to the question of costs.
It is ordered that the judgment of the County Court rendered on the 21st day of May, 1945, granting a permanent injunction, be and the same is hereby reversed and the case dismissed; costs in the trial court and on appeal are taxed against Ogden.