Court Opinion

ID: 9659702
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 21:53:04.457758+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:10.783461
License: Public Domain

LeGRAND, Justice
(dissenting).
This case of first impression involves an interpretation of chapter 321A, the Code, with reference to its effect on the omnibus clause in insurance policies issued before an insured has been involved in an accident. The question is this: Must such policies be drawn to comply with chapter 321A or does that chapter become effective only in futuro after an accident has occurred ?
There are two lines of authorities, and I believe the majority has chosen the one which, though numerically superior, had nothing else to recommend it, leading as it does to a result which is both unjustified and unfair.
The majority distinguishes between financial responsibility statutes and compulsory insurance laws. It is said our chapter 321A is a financial responsibility statute which requires nothing of an owner of an automobile until he has been involved in an accident. Only then must he furnish evidence of financial responsibility. By following this one step further, the majority finds insurance policies issued to those who have not yet met with misfortune need not comply with chapter 321 A.
The case at hand involves a claim against the owner of an automobile whose car was being driven by a person under 25 years of age. The omnibus clause of the owner’s policy excluded coverage for young drivers unless related to the insured. There is no relationship here. If chapter 321A applies, this exclusion is void because it is not consistent with the provisions of section 321A.21(2) (b); if it does not, the defense raised is good and there is no insurance coverage for the owner, driver, or, more important, the accident victims.
I believe the result reached by the majority is frustrative of the legislative intent in the enactment of chapter 321A and it fails to recognize the overriding purpose of that legislation — to protect the public from financial loss resulting from traffic accidents. See Motor Vehicle Casualty Company v. LeMars Mutual Insurance Company, 254 Iowa 68, 76, 116 N.W.2d 434, 439 (1962). It seems incredible that this legislative intent can be accomplished only after every motorist in this state, both present and future, has had one “free” accident.
*895The majority professes “regret” at reaching this “required” result. I do not believe it is “required.” Other courts have not found it so. See Jenkins v. Mayflower Insurance Exchange (1963), 93 Ariz. 287, 380 P.2d 145, 147 and Wildman v. Government Employees’ Insurance Company (1957), 48 Cal.2d 31, 307 P.2d 359; Selected Risks Insurance Company v. Zullo, 48 N.J. 362, 225 A.2d 570, 575, 576 (1966); Winterton v. Van Zandt (Missouri 1961), 351 S.W.2d 696, 700.
I have no quarrel with the authorities cited in the majority opinion. They say what the majority says they say. See An-not. at 8 A.L.R.3d 388 (1966). I simply urge the adoption of the minority rule.
In construing statutes we are committed to the principle that we should take into consideration the purpose sought to be achieved, the mischief to be remedied, and whether the particular interpretation will lead to impractical or absurd results. I think the majority violates each of these precepts. See Cedar Memorial Park Cemetery Association v. Personnel Associates, Inc., 178 N.W.2d 343, 347 (Iowa 1970); State v. Charlson, 261 Iowa 497, 154 N.W.2d 829, 831, 832 (1969); State v. Bishop, 257 Iowa 336, 340, 132 N.W.2d 455, 457 (1965); Monroe Community School District v. Marion County Bd. of Ed., 251 Iowa 992, 998, 103 N.W.2d 746, 749 (1960).
The majority opinion rests largely upon the delicate and tenuous distinction between an automobile liability policy as that term is used in section 321A.5 and a motor vehicle liability policy as that term is used in 321A.21(2). It does so despite the fact that in section 321A.1, “motor vehicle” and “automobile” are held to be synonymous terms. If they are synonymous, there is no reason for making any distinction between a motor vehicle liability insurance policy and an automobile liability insurance policy.
The argument that the two mean the same except when referring to insurance coverage is specious and contrary to all accepted rules of statutory construction. The statute contains no exception. Several of the cases above cited make this very point. Even more important is the fact that the majority’s interpretation of chapter 321A permits not only a “first bite” but makes is possible to avoid complying with the provisions of the Safety Responsibility Act indefinitely. Section 321A.5 holds the provisions as to cancellation and suspension do not apply at all to those who at the time of the first accident are covered by an automobile liability insurance policy. Unless this means that such a policy must conform to the requirements of section 321A.21(2), the legislature has set up a self-defeating procedure by which motorists can avoid complying with the Safety Responsibility Act even after their “free” accident. The only logical explanation for the provision in section 321A.5 excepting those who had an automobile liability policy from the operation of the act is that they had already complied with it; and this is true only if the omnibus clause of the automobile liability policy meets the requirements of section 321A.21(2).
This was pointed out in Standard Accident Insurance Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, 72 N.J.Super. 402, 178 A.2d 358, 364 (1962) in the following language:
“Today the statutory omnibus clause is only required to be included in a policy ‘furnished as proof of financial responsibility’ * * *. As noted, the security section of [the New Jersey Financial Responsibility Act] is not applicable if there is in effect ‘an automobile liability policy with respect to the motor vehicle involved in such accident.’ Although there is no explicit statutory requirement that such a policy, in order to relieve the insured from the security provision, must conform to the requirement of [the New Jersey Financial Responsibility Act], it would be anomalous to say that the statute does not require such insurance to conform to the coverage specified in [such act] — i. e., coverage which insures hot only the named insured but ‘any oth*896er person using or responsible for the use of any such motor vehicle with the express or implied consent of the insured.’ If this were not so, an owner, by taking out a policy covering the automobile only when he was driving, could avoid the impact of the Security-Responsibility Law * * *. Remedial legislation should not be so interpreted.”
I agree with the Supreme Court of Arizona, which said when faced with a similar problem in Jenkins v. Mayflower Insurance Exchange, supra, 380 P.2d at page 147:
“ * * * We cannot constitutionally allow artful distinctions between ‘motor vehicle liability policy,’ ‘automobile liability policy’, or ‘policy of insurance’ to defeat the purpose of the [Financial Responsibility] act.”
I believe that should be our conclusion, too. Sometimes courts complain that stare decisis prevents a result they might have otherwise reached. We have no such excuse here. When we are taking our first look at a statute of such widespread importance, embodying, as it does, the announcement of a public policy touching the every-day lives of virtually all citizens, we should be guided by something more than a head-count of other jurisdictions. We are in the advantageous position of being able to choose from two lines of respectable authority. Our choice should be that which is best, not that which is most.
The determinative circumstance to me is the conflict between section 321A.5 (which excuses one who has an automobile liability policy from the suspension provisions of the Act) and section 321A.21 (which the majority says applies only to policies written after the occurrence of the first accident). I have already mentioned the anomaly which results from this interpretation. When we face the claim — as some day we will — that a motorist need not have a policy which conforms to section 321A.-21(2), even though he has been involved in an accident, because he had previously complied with section 321A.S, I do not doubt our resourcefulness in finding an escape from such an unacceptable result. But that only points up today’s dilemma. Instead of waiting for that argument and disposing of it then by some judicial legerdemain, we should put an interpretation on this chapter noiv which gives life to the public policy there expressed.
Perhaps it is unnecessary to add that I would affirm the trial court.
MASON, REYNOLDSON and Mc-CORMICK, JJ., join in this dissent.