Court Opinion

ID: 9584878
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:53:33.222406+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:20:14.839021
License: Public Domain

Judge BECTON,
concurring in the result.
Plaintiff’s complaint “served up a veritable potpourri of [claims] that implicated virtually ever facet of the [Henderson County Jail’s] conditions and practices.” Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 526-27, 60 L.Ed. 2d 447, 461, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1868 (1979). Believing, however, that the breadth and sweep of plaintiff’s complaint does not require an equally broad and sweeping opinion, I write this concurring opinion.
The resolution of plaintiff’s appeal is made simple by emphasizing the following three facts: (1) plaintiff’s complaint was filed on 6 October 1980; (2) plaintiff was confined in the Henderson County Jail from 6 May 1980 until 30 June 1980 as a pre-trial detainee; and (3) plaintiff’s action is an individual action, not a class action, brought to secure declaratory relief and compensatory and punitive damages. Because this action is an individual *226action, rather than a class action, all claims seeking declaratory relief are moot since defendant is no longer housed in the Henderson County Jail. See Inmates v. Owens, 561 F. 2d 560, 562 (4th Cir. 1977). Even treating plaintiff’s pro se complaint less stringently than a complaint drafted by an attorney, plaintiff has not shown that he was injured or entitled to relief as a result of the acts of defendants. Consequently, he has failed to state a claim for relief regarding compensatory and punitive damages.
As indicated, I concur in the result reached by the majority, but I believe the majority has painted with too broad a brush. Specifically, with regard to plaintiff’s allegations that the jailer overheard his telephone conversations by monitoring them on an extension telephone and that the jailer censored plaintiff’s incoming mail, the majority states: “The intrusions were within that zone to which the constitution accords broad deference, since the intrustions were plausible administrative responses to the prison officials’ reasonable perception of security needs.” Ante, p. 7. First, Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 40 L.Ed. 2d 224, 94 S.Ct. 1800 (1974) will not allow censorship of all mail; mail censorship is permitted only in furtherance of security, order or rehabilitation. Second, there is no evidence, on this Rule 12(b)(6) motion, suggesting that defendants needed to monitor plaintiff’s telephone calls based on a perceived “security need.”
With regard to plaintiff’s allegations that in the course of — and after —his arrest, he was threatened, verbally and by use of a weapon by defendant Whitmire, the majority states: “The allegation fails to state a claim . . . since the alleged use of threats by the arresting defendant deputy Whitmire was within the bounds of permissible privilege accorded an officer making an arrest of a person reasonably believed to have committed a criminal offense.” Ante, p. 9. First, the majority’s statement, by its breadth, condones too much. According to plaintiff, defendant Whitmire yelled in a loud voice: “Danny, you God-damned son-of-a-bitch come out of the car or I’ll blow your Mother-Fucking head off.” Taking plaintiff’s allegations as true, as we are required to do on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, we should not lend our imprimatur to this sort of conduct by an officer. Second, the majority’s statement, by implication, does not cover defendant’s further allegation that while being transported to the jail after arrest “the defendant Whitmire continually verbally harassed and abused *227Plaintiff by cursing Plaintiff and threatening to shoot Plaintiff and throw him in the French Broad River. . . It is because plaintiff fails sufficiently to allege an injury that I concur in the majority’s disposition of this claim. To the extent the majority’s statement condones defendant Whitmire’s conduct, I divorce myself from it. The law does not tolerate all verbal abuse of pretrial detainees by jailers, guards or other prison officials. For example, if a threat is intended to intimidate a pre-trial detainee or an inmate from exercising a right, such as the right of access to court, a claim for relief has been stated. See Hudspeth v. Figgins, 584 F. 2d 1345 (4th Cir. 1978), cert. denied 441 U.S. 913, 60 L.Ed. 2d 386, 99 S.Ct. 2013 (1979).
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result.