Court Opinion

ID: 9849427
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:40:02.973619+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:23.755039
License: Public Domain

SAND, Justice,
concurring with limited reservations.
I concur in the result. This state has traditionally, and rightfully so, followed the rule of law that in a rape case the victim’s testimony need not be corroborated to sustain a conviction. The very nature of the crime is such that, generally, only the participating parties are present without witnesses. The pool table rape case recently in the news is an exception.
I am concerned that if the victim’s testimony is required to be corroborated, the victim may even refuse or avoid talking about the case or file a complaint if this requirement is to become the rule of law.
The testimony of Oasheim’s sister and a friend placed the defendant at his room at home around 12:30 a.m. The precise time of the alleged crime was not established but was to have occurred at midnight. This then placed the trial court in a difficult position of believing one party or the other. I have reservations that our rule of law contemplates that this kind of weighing is permitted but, if it is permitted, then shouldn’t the interests and relationship of the witnesses also be considered? Some, or limited, weighing is permissible.
The trial court, in its memorandum opinion, relied upon State v. Holy Bull, 238 N.W.2d 52 (N.D.1975), as justification for granting a new trial on insufficient evidence. I authored that opinion and I must say that the United States Supreme Court since then has ruled in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1, 98 S.Ct. 2141, 57 L.Ed.2d 1 (1978), that insufficient evidence is not a valid basis for a new trial and, if granted on such conditions, would constitute double jeopardy in violation of the Constitution.
I also have reservations in giving Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 102 S.Ct. 2211, 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982), a broad application. In Tibbs, the United States Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the Florida court in which a death penalty was imposed and the Florida court was obligated by statute to review the evidence to determine if the interests of justice require a new trial, whether sufficiency of the evidence is a ground of appeal or not. Our Supreme Court, at one time, heard appeals de novo on the record but, with the repeal of the statutory authority, such review is no longer the situation. I am not aware of any statute or rule of law which grants the trial court the authority to weigh the credibility of witnesses in a jury case and disagree with the jury. In effect, the judge would be substituting his judgment for that of the jury. In my opinion the Tibbs case has limited application to those issues where the appellate court or trial court is obligated to review the evidence, such as was the case in Florida. Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court was in a real bind. It was either required to rule as it did or allow a killer to go free. Such decisions do not make good law.
Under Rule 33, NDRCrimP, the court may grant a new trial to the defendant if required in the interest of justice. Our case law is abundant with the legal principle that a motion for a new trial is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. I cannot say that the interests of justice may not be served, or were not served, by granting a new trial and, thus, the trial judge has not abused his discretion, but I cannot agree that a judge can sit as a juror in a jury trial.
In this instance both defendants were tried together. Conceivably, if separate trials were held, the jury might have reached different verdicts. The jury might have been confused as to what evidence applies to which defendant. In my opinion this constitutes a basis for granting a new trial. I am not suggesting that joint or common trials are to be avoided or are a basis for a new trial. The circumstances and facts of each case will determine what action is proper. However, in this instance, it is conceivable that the jury inadvertently *297misapplied the same facts (some of which were negative as to one but not to the other) to both defendants. This, in my opinion, constituted a basis for a new trial.