Court Opinion

ID: 9733451
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:08:04.656458+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:41.652374
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE SPOMER, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. As reflected in the Illinois Supreme Court’s rare exercise of its supervisory authority over the circuit court, the trial judge’s order denying Bi-State’s motion to dismiss is a clear violation of the well-established doctrine of stare decisis. Although my colleagues recognize that under a vertical application of the doctrine “ ‘[i]t is the absolute duty of the circuit court to follow the decisions of the appellate court’ ” (In re R.C., 195 Ill. 2d 291, 297 (2001), quoting In re A.A., 181 Ill. 2d 32, 36 (1998)), for the following reasons, I find the majority disposition only compounds the error of the trial judge by its misapplication of horizontal stare decisis. In the end, the majority opinion eviscerates this cornerstone of American jurisprudence and turns the concept of precedent on its head. Twenty-three years ago, in the case of Grady v. Bi-State Development Agency, 151 Ill. App. 3d 748, 749 (1986), this court was asked to decide whether Bi-State is a “local public entity” within the purview of section 1 — 206 of the Local Governmental and Governmental Employees Tort Immunity Act (the Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 85, par. 1 — 206) for purposes of the previous requirement under section 8 — 102 of the Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 85, par. 8 — 102) that a plaintiff provide a defendant with notice of her claim within one year from the date that the injury was received or the cause of action accrued. Grady, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 749. Notwithstanding the plaintiffs arguments to the contrary, Grady is binding authority on the issue of whether Bi-State is a “local public entity.” This court’s holding in Grady that Bi-State is a “local public entity” is not dicta, because in order to determine whether Bi-State was entitled to notice, it was necessary to determine whether Bi-State was a “local public entity.” See American Country Insurance Co. v. Cline, 309 Ill. App. 3d 501, 510 (1999) (dicta is a matter on which a court offers an opinion that is not necessary to the disposition of the litigation). Although the notice requirement has been repealed and was replaced by a one-year statute of limitations, this change in the Act is irrelevant to the Grady analysis of whether Bi-State meets the definition of a “local public entity” set forth in section 1 — 206 of the Act. In addition, the amendments to section 1 — 206 of the Act that took place after the opinion in Grady had been filed do not diminish the precedential value of Grady. After this court’s decision in Grady, the definition of a “local public entity” was expanded. All of the language in the previous definition, under which this court analyzed Bi-State’s status in Grady, remains in the definition. Finally, as the majority recognizes, the false statements of fact and law made by counsel for Bi-State in the Grady appeal were not relied upon by the Grady court when it rendered its opinion. Although Bi-State’s brief in Grady states that Bi-State was formed pursuant to the Local Mass Transit District Act, the Grady opinion correctly states that Bi-State was formed pursuant to the Bi-State Development Compact Act. The Grady opinion makes no reference to the Metro-East Mass Transit District of St. Clair County as a division of Bi-State. For all of these reasons, there can be no doubt that Grady is binding precedent on the issue of whether Bi-State is a “local public entity.” The Illinois Supreme Court has held that “ ' “when a rule of law has once been settled, contravening no statute or constitutional principle, such rule ought to be followed unless it can be shown that serious detriment is thereby likely to arise prejudicial to public interests.” ’ ” People v. Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d 481, 520 (2005), quoting Vitro v. Mihelcic, 209 Ill. 2d 76, 82 (2004), quoting Maki v. Frelk, 40 Ill. 2d 193, 196 (1968). In accordance with this principle, this court has twice reaffirmed Bi-State’s status as a “local public entity” as defined in the Act. See Cooper v. Bi-State Development Agency, 158 Ill. App. 3d 19, 23 (1987); McClintock v. Bi-State Development Agency, 228 Ill. App. 3d 382, 385 (1992). “Considerations of stare decisis weigh heavily in the area of statutory construction, especially where the legislature is free to change the court’s interpretations of its legislation.” McClintock v. Bi-State Development Agency, 228 Ill. App. 3d 382, 385 (1992), citing Williams v. Crickman, 81 Ill. 2d 105, 111 (1980). Notwithstanding the foregoing, the majority cites Maki, 40 Ill. 2d at 196, as authority for its departure from the principles of horizontal stare decisis. However, my colleagues fail to show how the settled rule of law in this case contravenes any statute or constitutional principle or is likely to cause a serious detriment that is prejudicial to the public interests. See Maki, 40 Ill. 2d at 196. Furthermore, the majority fails to acknowledge that the Illinois Supreme Court in Maki declined to overturn established precedent, stating, “The rule of stare decisis is founded upon sound principles in the administration of justice, and rules long recognized as the law should not be departed from merely because the court is of the opinion that it might decide otherwise were the question a new one.” 40 Ill. 2d at 196-97. The majority’s analysis falls far short of explaining why the settled rule of law in this case should be overturned. Section 1 — 206 of the Act defines a “local public entity” very broadly to include “all other local governmental bodies.” 745 ILCS 10/1 — 206 (West 2006). As recognized by this court in Grady, there can be no question that Bi-State was created to exercise public or governmental functions. Grady, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 750. Section 1 of the Bi-State Development Compact Act (45 ILCS 100/1 (West 2006)) provides that Bi-State “ ‘shall be a body corporate and politic.’ ” Grady, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 750. “[Bi-State’s] powers include: (1) planning, constructing, and maintaining bridges, airports, and terminal facilities; (2) making plans for the coordination of streets and highways; (3) charging and collecting fees; (4) issuing bonds; (5) receiving contributions from local, State, and Federal governments; and (6) exercising additional powers as shall be conferred on it by either State legislature.” Grady, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 750, citing Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 127, par. 63r — 1; see 45 ILCS 100/1 (West 2006). Having determined that Bi-State is a governmental entity, there can also be no doubt that Bi-State fits squarely within the definition of a “local public entity” within the meaning of the Act if it can properly be determined to be “local.” Article VII, section 1, of the Illinois Constitution of 1970 (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, §1) defines “units of local government” to include “units, designated as units of local government by law, which exercise limited governmental powers or powers in respect to limited governmental subjects.” Importantly, the Transportation Cooperation Act of 1971 (5 ILCS 225/2(e) (West 2006)) defines a “unit of local government” to include “any authority, commission!,] or other entity which by virtue of an interstate compact approved by Congress is authorized to provide mass transportation.” Section 1(1) of the Bi-State Development Powers Act (45 ILCS 110/ 1(1) (West 2006)), which sets forth additional powers of Bi-State, authorizes Bi-State to “operate *** passenger transportation facilities! ] and air, water, rail, motor vehicle!,] and other terminal or parking facilities.” Accordingly, Bi-State has been designated as a unit of local government by law. Thus, it fits squarely within the definition of a “local public entity” set forth in section 1 — 206 of the Act because it is a “local governmental body.” I find further support for the foregoing conclusion in the analysis of the United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit, in Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc. v. St. Louis Thermal Energy Corp., 948 E2d 1084, 1088 (8th Cir. 1991), which concluded that because, on balance, Bi-State is more like a local governmental entity than an arm of Missouri and Illinois, it is not entitled to sovereign immunity under the eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution. In so holding, the court explained as follows: “State law characterizes Bi-State as a local public body. Much like a county, Bi-State’s object is to plan, develop, and engage in proprietary functions in a defined region with local governance, for the common good of the communities within the region.” Barket, Levy & Fine, Inc., 948 E2d at 1088. The majority’s holding rests primarily on its determination that “[c]onstruing the Tort Immunity Act to include Bi-State within the definition of a ‘local public entity’ would include Bi-State within the purview of sections of the Tort Immunity Act that cannot validly apply to it.” 393 Ill. App. 3d at 1024. However, in so doing, I believe that the majority misinterprets article EX of the Act (745 ILCS 10/9 — 101 et seq. (West 2006)) and misconstrues the law as it relates to interstate compact agreements. Contrary to the majority’s assertions, there is nothing in article IX of the Act that is incongruent with the interstate compact which created Bi-State, and no section of article IX modifies Bi-State’s powers or imposes additional obligations on Bi-State. First, article IX in no way invests in Bi-State the power to levy taxes. Section 9 — 101(c) of the Act expressly recognizes that not all local public entities have the power to levy taxes when it defines a “local taxing entity” as “a local public entity that has the power to levy or have levied on its behalf taxes or assessments upon property within the territory of the entity.” (Emphasis added.) 745 ILCS 10/9 — 101(c) (West 2006). The interstate compact that created Bi-State specifically conveys on Bi-State the powers to have taxes levied on its behalf when it authorizes Bi-State in article III, paragraph 5, “[t]o receive for its lawful activities any contributions or moneys appropriated by municipalities, counties, state[,] or other political subdivisions or agencies.” 45 ILCS 100/1 (West 2006). Accordingly, section 9 — 107 of the Act (745 ILCS 10/9 — 107 (West 2006)) is in no way incongruent with the interstate compact when it provides that a local public entity may annually levy or have levied on its behalf property taxes in an amount sufficient to cover the costs of insurance and judgments against it. In addition, section 9 — 107 does not require local public entities to have those taxes levied but, like the interstate compact, simply gives them authority to do so. Moreover, section 9 — 106 of the Act is in no way inconsistent with the interstate compact that created Bi-State when it authorizes local public entities to set the rate for their services “in an amount sufficient to pay all [their] tort judgments and settlements.” 745 ILCS 10/9 — 106 (West 2006). To the contrary, article III, paragraph 3, of the interstate compact specifically authorizes Bi-State “[t]o charge and collect fees for use of the facilities owned and operated by it” (45 ILCS 100/1 (West 2006)) and in no way limits the amounts that Bi-State can charge and collect. Finally, section 9 — 104 of the Act (745 ILCS 10/9— 104 (West 2006)), which merely sets forth a procedure by which local public entities may pay judgments in installments over more than one fiscal year, does not in any way impose an additional power or obligation on Bi-State. For all of these reasons, I disagree with the majority’s use of article IX of the Act as a vehicle by which to dissolve the longstanding precedent set by Grady. It is simply wrong. Agencies that are created by interstate compacts do not exist in a vacuum. See Delaware River Port Authority v. Commonwealth, State Ethics Comm’n, 137 Pa. Commw. 170, 172, 585 A.2d 587, 588 (1991). “The key question *** is whether application of [the Act] constitutes [a] unilateral imposition of additional duties, powers[,] or responsibilities on [Bi-State]” (Delaware River Port Authority, 137 Pa. Commw. at 173, 585 A.2d at 588). The stated purpose of the Act is “to protect local public entities *** from liability arising from the operation of government. It grants only immunities and defenses.” 745 ILCS 10/ 1 — 101.1(a) (West 2006). It in no way burdens the compact and, thus, is distinguishable from the statutes found to be inapplicable to the similar compact agencies at issue in the other cases set forth by the majority. See Delaware River Port Authority, 137 Pa. Commw. at 174, 585 A.2d at 589 (requirement by one state that employees of the bistate agency file financial interest statements); see also Delaware River & Bay Authority v. New Jersey Public Employment Relations Comm’n, 112 N.J. Super. 160, 165-66, 270 A.2d 704, 707 (1970) (application of one state’s public-employee-relations statute to the bistate agency); see also C.T. Hellmuth & Associates, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 414 F. Supp. 408, 409 (D. Md. 1976) (applicability of one state’s freedom-of-information law to the bistate agency). Accordingly, I find the majority’s assertion that the Act somehow imposes a unilateral duty or power on Bi-State to be misplaced. Thus, I do not believe that the legislature’s decision to define a “local public entity” in such a way as to include Bi-State within the purview of the Act is in any way a violation of the interstate compact agreement. In addition, I find the majority’s discussion of the legislative history of the compact agreement to have no bearing on whether our legislature intended to include Bi-State within the definition of a “local public entity” as defined in the Act. I recognize that because Bi-State was created by an interstate compact between Missouri and Illinois, the states must pass identical legislation in order to amend the compact itself because it constitutes a contract between them. I further recognize that the states must obtain congressional approval pursuant to article I, section 10, clause 3, of the United States Constitution (U.S. Const., art. I, §10, cl. 3) in order to make such amendments to the compact. However, I find it to be a complete leap of logic to conclude, based upon the foregoing, that the two states must pass identical legislation defining Bi-State’s status as an entity entitled to the immunities afforded to local public entities within each state. The matter of the status to be afforded Bi-State in this regard is outside the scope of the contract between Illinois and Missouri. In fact, Missouri has unilaterally enacted its own legislation defining a “public entity” in its sovereign immunity law to include “any multistate compact agency created by a compact formed between this state and any other state which has been approved by the Congress of the United States.” Mo. Rev. Stat. §537.600(3) (2005). Again, this status, conferred upon Bi-State by both Illinois and Missouri, only grants an immunity or defense to Bi-State and in no way imposes a power or burden. The foregoing analysis illustrates that there is no good cause or compelling reason to depart from our holding in Grady. In accordance with well-established principles of stare decisis, I would therefore answer the certified question in the affirmative. Thus, I would find that the circuit court erred in denying Bi-State’s motion to dismiss on the basis that the plaintiffs complaint was filed outside of the statute of limitations applicable to suits against local public entities pursuant to section 8 — 101 of the Act (745 ILCS 10/8 — 101 (West 2006)). Accordingly, I would reverse the circuit court’s order denying Bi-State’s motion to dismiss and remand with directions that the circuit court dismiss this action.