Court Opinion

ID: 9529921
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:55:30.287456+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:57.275864
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE McGLOON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision, and would reverse the conviction and remand the cause for a new trial. I cannot agree with either the majority’s finding of harmless error in the use of the codefendant’s statement, or the holding that this defendant could be impeached with a prior conviction for misdemeanor theft. I. White’s repudiated confession inculpated defendant Rudolph. The law provides that the prosecution could properly impeach White with his prior confession, mentioning Rudolph, so long as White testified and was available for Rudolph’s cross-examination. I wish to first state my disagreement with the prosecution’s concept of the current state of the law because the possibility of harmful prejudice to the non-confessing defendant is overwhelming, notwithstanding his counsel’s timely protestations and the trial court’s cautionary instructions. The American Bar Association Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance, section 2.3(a), as approved 1968, provide what I believe to be a fair rule: “Severance of defendants. (a) When a defendant moves for a severance because an out-of-court statement of a codefendant makes reference to him but is not admissible against him, the court should determine whether the prosecution intends to offer the statement in evidence at the trial. If so, the court should require the prosecuting attorney to elect one of the following courses: (i) a joint trial at which the statement is not admitted into evidence; (ii) a joint trial at which the statement is admitted into evidence only after all references to the moving defendant have been deleted, provided that, as deleted, the confession will not prejudice the moving defendant; or (iii) severance of the moving defendant.” The commentary to the tentative draft (1967) states: “The standard recommended here by the Advisory Committee rests upon the fundamental assumption that it is unrealistic to expect jurors to ignore completely the damaging evidence against the defendant in the codefendant’s statement.” In the instant case, the prosecutor embarked upon a course precisely to the contrary of that recommended in section 2.3(a). When Rudolph’s counsel moved for severance on the grounds of White’s statement, the prosecutor initially promised that there would be no further inferences or references whatsoever to Rudolph, with the limitation that if White testified, the whole statement would be used. The motion was denied. Rudolph subsequently moved for a reconsideration of the ruling, asking the court to take cognizance of the ABA standard above quoted. The prosecutor then made the following statement: “Your Honor, we would agree with the rules that are apparently being laid down by the American Bar Association that is recommended in the course to follow certain procedures as previously indicated to your Honor, electing to proceed with the second alternative that [defense counsel] has mentioned, that being excision. We will endeavor, make every effort, and no reference will be made whatsoever to defendant Rudolph; as a matter of fact, Judge, we will not seek, I believe, at the conclusion of this trial to present that written document to the jury, assuming of course that the defendant White does not testify. If he does testify, of course, we don’t have the problem, so there won’t be any reference whatsoever in the statement, Judge, to defendant Rudolph.” Rudolph’s counsel immediately responded in protest: “Your Honor, if I may only take issue with [the prosecutor’s] last statement that if Mr. White does not testify, we will still not have the problem. If Mr. White does testify, inasmuch as your Honor has ruled that that confession was a voluntary confession, that confession will certainly be able to be used by the state as impeaching against Mr. White; * # # if in fact Mr. White does take the stand and that statement can be used to impeach him, the harm that will be done to my client will be irreparable, and no instruction, no matter how well phrased by your Honor, could possibly cure the harm that would be done.” The motion for reconsideration was denied. As foreseen by defense counsel, prejudicial error certainly resulted. The prosecutor did not excise any mention of Rudolph from White’s statement. The prosecutor’s comments reflect what I believe is an unreasonably short-sighted approach to the situation. It was agreed that, if White did not testify, the statement would have been sanitized, because of the resultant prejudice. If White testified, the prosecutor said that he could use the entire statement, apparently on the grounds that Rudolph could cross-examine White and thereby protect himself. This approach ignores the unfair prejudice injected into the case which not only may never be cured, but which is so scrupulously avoided if the nonconfessing defendant does not testify. To avoid this prejudice, I feel that if section 2.3(a) were followed, the prejudice in the instant case would have been avoided. I further disagree with the majority’s holding that the error in the prosecution’s use of White’s statement was harmless. The Doctrine of Harmless Error is often invoked by this court, and properly so, for it is in the interest of law and justice that convictions should not be reversed solely upon technical errors. There are, however, incidents of error which should never be categorized as harmless. The prosecution committed error by exceeding the bounds of legitimate impeachment and by using White’s repudiated statement as substantive evidence against defendant. The error' was compounded when the prosecutor argued to the jury from the substance of the statement which was to have been used only for impeachment purposes. The record discloses the following argument to the jury: “PROSECUTOR: You decide, you have to decide if Larry White is responsible for the conduct of Larry Rudolph and Larry Rudolph responsible for the conduct of Larry White. Whoever shot the gun, White told you it was Rudolph and Rudolph denies it. White gave a statement to the State’s Attorney and said Rudolph shot it, but now he denies it. You decide whoever shot that gun, both are responsible. Both of them were trying to commit a crime of armed robbery.” It is, I believe, fairly clear that the prosecution not only used the statement improperly as substantive evidence of Rudolph’s guilt, but also improperly argued to the jury from the substantive evidence admitted under the guise of impeachment. With all due respect to my colleagues, I cannot understand how the precedent of decisions in this jurisdiction could support a conclusion that the multiple errors in the use of White’s statement were harmless to Larry Rudolph. Our supreme court has taken a reasonably consistent stance as to the effect of such error. The fact that there was ample evidence of guilt was of little consequence in People v. Montgomery (1972), 51 Ill. 2d 198, 208, 282 N.E.2d 138, 143: “This court is reluctant to reverse a judgment supported by ample evidence but in our opinion the admission of the inflammatory testimony adduced in impeaching Allen deprived defendant of his constitutional right to a trial by a fair and impartial jury.” Montgomery was relied upon in People v. Bailey (1975), 60 Ill. 2d 37,322 N.E.2d 804, where the State’s similar improper tactics were held to have caused reversible error notwithstanding the prosecution’s strong case. The mystery of harmless error is elucidated somewhat by reference to the leading case, Chapman v. California (1967), 386 U.S. 18, 17 L. Ed. 2d 705, 710, 87 S. Ct. 824, which not only sets forth the harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt test, but also notes that “there are some constitutional rights so basic to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless error * (386 U.S. 18, 23.) If the Illinois Supreme Court believes that misuse of a codefendant’s repudiated statement has had the effect of depriving the defendant of his right to a fair trial in the face of ample evidence to convict, and the United States Supreme Court believes that the infraction of the right to a fair trial may never be harmless error, can the error in our case be as harmless as portrayed in the majority opinion? There are instances where profound and overwhelming evidence of guilt may justify a finding of error which is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In People v. Gill (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 357, 297 N.E.2d 135, for example, otherwise prejudicial error was deemed harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in the context of the absolutely overwhelming evidence of defendant’s violent criminal rampage. I believe that the overwhelming evidence of guilt rule of harmless error should be reserved only for the rare and occasional case, and not paraded regularly to affirm convictions. “A defendant, whether guilty or innocent, is entitled to a fair, orderly and impartial trial in accordance with our laws. Under our system of jurisprudence, there is not one form of trial for a guilty person, and a different form for an innocent person.” (People v. Cole (1971), 132 Ill. App. 2d 1041, 1047, 271 N.E.2d 385,390, revd (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 401,298 N.E.2d 705.) In the instant case, defendant Rudolph was entitled to a fair trial, without the introduction of exceptionally improper prejudicial evidence, notwithstanding that the evidence against him may have been indicative of his guilt. Without diligent preservation of the right to a fair trial, our system of laws may degenerate to a tyrannical farce in which courts rule only in accordance with the doctrine of harmless error. In the next instance, I also question whether the evidence against Rudolph was as overwhelming as portrayed by the majority. Although the majority beheves that the prosecution had such a strong case against Rudolph, the jury apparently felt otherwise, finding him not guüty of two counts of murder and one count of felony murder. As to the conviction for attempt armed robbery, the majority concedes that the issue was one of credibility which was within the jury’s function. This is not the usual hallmark of a case with overwhelming evidence of guilt. II. The majority believes that the Montgomery rule permits impeachment by a prior misdemeanor theft conviction. I disagree. The rule in People v. Montgomery (1971), 47 Ill. 2d 510, 268 N.E.2d 695, is the Illinois Supreme Court’s statement that Proposed Rule 609 adopted by the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States should be followed in future cases. Rule 609 was subsequently enacted into law as Rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. (Charlton v. Baker (1976), 36 Ill. App. 3d 427, 344 N.E.2d 25.) The rules vary (People v. Ray (1973), 54 Ill. 2d 377, 297 N.E.2d 168), but under whichever version of Rule 609 is preferred, a witness may be impeached by proof of a prior conviction which “involved dishonesty or false statement regardless of the punishment.” The majority herein holds as a matter of law that misdemeanor theft involves dishonesty. While at first blush it may seem that a petty thief may be dishonest, I believe that the correct interpretation of Rule 609 as adopted in Illinois by Montgomery must lead to a different conclusion. The Editorial Comment to Rule 609(a), reflecting the direct intent of the rule’s drafters, states: “The phrase ‘dishonesty [or] false statement’ denotes crimes such as perjury or subornation of perjury, false statement, criminal fraud, embezzlement, of false pretense, or any other offense in the nature of crimen falsi the commission of which involves some element of deceit, untruthfulness, or falsification bearing on the accused’s propensity to testify truthfully.” (28 U.S.C.S. app. at 66, Federal Rules of Evidence, Editorial Comment §609.1 (1975).) It should be noted that Congress grappled with the meaning of “dishonesty or false statement” at great lengths, and the congressional debates contain explicit language that Congress intended “dishonesty” to be equated directly with crimen falsi and, further, that courts aided by the colloquy should know what Congress meant by “dishonesty” and would be able to apply the rule correctly. If, as I believe, “dishonesty” is intended to be crimen falsi, the issue is whether misdemeanor theft is included within crimen falsi. Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term as follows: “The term involves the element of falsehood, and includes everything which has a tendency to injuriously affect the administration of justice by the introduction of falsehood and fraud. A crime less than felony that by its nature tends to cast doubt on the veracity of one who commits it. This phrase is also used as a general designation of a class of offenses, including all such as involve deceit or falsification; e.g., forgery, counterfeiting, using false weights or measures, perjury, etc. Includes forgery, perjury, subornation of perjury, and offenses affecting the public administration of justice.” (Citations omitted.) In Illinois, crimen falsi has been expressly defined by our supreme court in Matzenbaugh v. People ex rel. Galloway (1901), 194 Ill. 108, 113: “Crimen falsi, according to the better opinion, does not include all offenses which involve a charge of untruthfulness, but only such as injuriously affect the administration of public justice, such as perjury, subornation of perjury, suppression of testimony by bribery or conspiracy to procure the absence of a witness, or to accuse one wrongfully of a crime, or barratry, or the like.” A logical conclusion is that misdemeanor theft is not included within crimen falsi. The same conclusion has been reached by the Third Circuit United States Court of Appeals in Virgin Islands v. Toto (3d Cir. 1976), 529 F.2d 278. The opinion in Toto adeptly notes that a conviction for petit larceny may be in the nature of crimen falsi if the offense involves false pretense. I believe that this observation should be well taken in any interpretation of Rule 609(a). For example, it is possible that a misdemeanor conviction under section 16 — 1(b) of our criminal code, theft by deception, may be considered to be included within “dishonesty or false statement.” The Illinois Supreme Court’s most recent ruling on Rule 609’s meaning, as interpreted initially in Montgomery, is the opinion in Knowles v. Panopoulos (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 585, where it is stated: “[T]he court must be more concerned with ascertaining the truth and should not allow into evidence a conviction which does not reasonably relate to testimonial deceit. Unfair prejudice results. Only if the crime bears a sentence of over one year or is a crime of dishonesty is it serious enough to assail the credibility of the witness.” (66 Ill. 2d 585, 589.) The court further stated that a conviction for the misdemeanor offense of criminal trespass to a vehicle is not a crime of dishonesty or false statement. I believe that misdemeanor criminality does not per se include dishonesty or false statement, as evidence by both the legislative and judicial history of Rule 609(a). The leading authority contrary to this position, cited by the majority opinion herein, is Gordon v. United States (D.C. Cir. 1967), 383 F.2d 936, which is readily distinguishable because it was decided without reference to and prior to the adoption of Rule 609. As explained above, Rule 609(a) employs the words of art “dishonesty or false statement” which are defined by official comment and congessional debates as being in the nature of crimen falsi. As a general proposition, a thief may be dishonest and Gordon was correctly decided under the prevailing law, but a different conclusion can be arrived at by a careful reading and understanding of Rule 609(a). In the instant case, defense counsel’s motion in limine to bar mention of defendant’s prior misdemeanor theft convictions was denied, with the trial court deciding that theft involves dishonesty. I believe that the trial court erred, thereby causing defense counsel to bring out the prior convictions at the outset of defendant’s direct testimony in an attempt to minimize the potential prejudice. I believe that improper prejudice resulted from the trial court’s erroneous ruling. III. Having discussed the various errors in this case, I believe that if each individual error is not considered prejudicial, certainly the totality of the errors should lead to a finding of prejudicial error. A defendant in a criminal case is entitled to a fair trial, as opposed to the type of trial afforded Larry Rudolph. I would reverse defendant’s conviction for attempt armed robbery and remand this cause for a new trial.