Court Opinion

ID: 9389121
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-24 18:02:35.843051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:25.292263
License: Public Domain

Filed 4/24/23 P. v. Arce CA2/4

           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

       California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
       not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(a). This opinion
       has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115(a).

       IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                              DIVISION FOUR

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          B320920

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. NA104936)
      v.

 IRVIN ARCE,

      Defendant and Appellant.

       APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County,
Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed.
       Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
       No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                               INTRODUCTION
      In 2019, defendant Irvin Arce was convicted by jury of a variety of
crimes, including premeditated attempted murder. After we affirmed the
judgment in his direct appeal, defendant filed a petition for writ of habeas
corpus, which the trial court treated as a petition for resentencing under
Penal Code former section 1170.95 (now section 1172.6), based on changes to
the law of murder made by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1437).1 The court found defendant ineligible for relief, and
defendant appeals from that order.
      Defendant’s appellate attorney filed a Wende2 brief in which she raised
no issues and asked us to review the record independently to determine
whether any arguable claims of error exist. Although defendant would not
normally be entitled to independent Wende review in this matter, a search of
our files indicates that we provided him with insufficient notice that his
appeal could be dismissed if he did not file a supplemental brief. Because of
this error, we exercise our discretion to review the record independently.
Nevertheless, our independent review of the record has revealed no arguable
appellate issues, and we affirm.

                                BACKGROUND
      According to our opinion in defendant’s direct appeal, of which we take
judicial notice, defendant cut the power to the apartment he shared with his
girlfriend—who had a 10-year domestic violence restraining order against
him—then repeatedly stabbed her aunt and the aunt’s boyfriend when they

1     All undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2     People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende).

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tried to come to her aid. (People v. Arce (Aug. 18, 2020, B296720) [nonpub.
opn.], pp. 3–5.) The aunt suffered “too many [stab wounds] to count,” which
caused a collapsed lung and liver damage. (Id. at pp. 5–6.) The boyfriend
suffered 17 stab wounds and a broken left arm; he required massive blood
transfusions to replace his entire blood volume. (Id. at p. 6.) Defendant fled
the state and had to be extradited from Oregon. (Id. at p. 5, fn. 3.)
      In 2019, after a jury trial at which he claimed self-defense, defendant
was convicted of two counts of attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a);
counts 1, 2), one count of cutting a utility line (§ 591; count 3), and one count
of disobeying a domestic relations court order (§ 273.6, subd. (a); count 4). As
to count 1, the jury found true the allegation that defendant attempted to
commit a willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder (§ 664, subd. (a)). As
to both counts of attempted murder, the jury found true the allegations that
defendant personally used a deadly and dangerous weapon, to wit, a knife,
and personally inflicted great bodily injury (§§ 12022, subd. (b)(1), 12022.7,
subd. (a)). In a bifurcated proceeding, defendant admitted he had been
convicted of robbery as a minor, which constituted a prior strike (§§ 667,
subd. (d), 1170.12, subd. (b)). The court denied defendant’s motion to strike
the juvenile conviction under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13
Cal.4th 497 and sentenced him to an aggregate prison term of 28 years four
months, plus 14 years to life. We affirmed by unpublished opinion. (People v.
Arce, supra, at p. 18.)
      Defendant next filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the trial
court. The court deemed that filing a petition for resentencing under former
section 1170.95, now section 1172.6, appointed counsel to represent
defendant, and received briefing. After a hearing at which defendant was not
present and defense counsel conceded that he was both the only participant

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and the person who did the actual stabbing, the court found defendant
ineligible for relief under former section 1170.95, subdivision (a).
      Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal, and we appointed counsel to
represent him. On December 19, 2022, appellate counsel filed a brief in
which she raised no issues and asked us to review the record independently
under Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436. The following day, we notified defendant
that his attorney had failed to find any arguable issues and that he could
submit by brief or letter any arguments he wanted this court to consider. We
have not received a response.

                                 DISCUSSION
      “Effective January 1, 2019, the Legislature passed Senate Bill 1437 ‘to
amend the felony murder rule and the natural and probable consequences
doctrine, as it relates to murder, to ensure that murder liability is not
imposed on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the intent to
kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying felony who acted with
reckless indifference to human life.’ [Citation.] In addition to substantively
amending sections 188 and 189 . . . , Senate Bill 1437 added [former] section
1170.95 [now section 1172.6], which provides a procedure for convicted
murderers who could not be convicted under the law as amended to
retroactively seek relief.” (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959.)
      Recently, our state Supreme Court held that there is no right to Wende
review in section 1172.6 appeals and established a procedural framework to
follow when appellate counsel finds no arguable issues. (People v. Delgadillo
(2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 221–222 (Delgadillo).) Under Delgadillo, if appointed
counsel files a no-issues brief in a section 1172.6 appeal, we must send the
defendant a copy of counsel’s brief along with a notice informing him of “the

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right to file a supplemental letter or brief and that if no letter or brief is filed
within 30 days, the court may dismiss the matter. [Citations.]” (Id. at
pp. 231–232.) Our subsequent actions depend on whether the defendant
responds.
      If the defendant “files a supplemental brief or letter,” we are “required
to evaluate the specific arguments presented in that brief and to issue a
written opinion.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 232.) We are not
required to conduct “an independent review of the entire record to identify
unraised issues.” (Ibid.) If the defendant does not file such a letter or brief,
however, we may treat the appeal as abandoned and dismiss it. (Ibid.)
      In this case, appointed counsel filed a no-issue brief under Wende,
supra, 25 Cal.3d 436 the same day that the Supreme Court issued Delgadillo,
supra, 14 Cal.5th 216. The next day, we sent defendant a notice indicating
that his counsel had filed a brief raising no arguable issues. We invited him
to file a supplemental brief under Wende. This notice was insufficient.
      As Delgadillo explained, defendant “reasonably could have concluded
from” the notice we sent him “that the Wende procedures would apply and
that [we] would conduct an independent review of the record, even absent a
supplemental brief. . . . The notice further did not inform [defendant] that
the appeal would be dismissed as abandoned if no supplemental brief or
letter were filed.” (Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233.) Because we
provided defendant with insufficient notice in this case, we exercise our
discretion to review the record independently under Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d
436. (Delgadillo, at p. 233 & fn. 6 [emphasizing “the decision to conduct
independent review is solely up to the discretion of the Courts of Appeal,” but
choosing to conduct such review where appellate court provided insufficient
notice].)

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      We have examined the entire record, and are satisfied appellate
counsel has fully complied with her responsibilities and no arguable issues
exist in the appeal before us. (Smith v. Robbins (2000) 528 U.S. 259, 278–
284; Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 442–443.)

                                  DISPOSITION

      The order is affirmed.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                          DAUM, J.*
      WE CONCUR:

      CURREY, Acting P. J.

      COLLINS, J.

*Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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