Court Opinion

ID: 9460908
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 22:02:25.601064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:49.431349
License: Public Domain

WEBSTER, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
' Judge Henley ruled, and I believe correctly, against petitioner on the merits. Since the court today dismisses the petition without prejudice, it seems unlikely that either side will pursue the question which in my view remains to be resolved. That question is whether the United States, on full notice of petitioner’s claim, can enter its appearance and supply the needed jurisdiction without personal service upon a particular federal warden who happens not to be within the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
This case illustrates an anomaly which now exists between a § 2255 case and federal prisoner habeas cases outside the purview of § 2255. The respondent in a § 2255 action is the United States of America; the respondent in other federal prisoner cases is the warden of the institution having custody over petitioner. This seems to be so notwithstanding in this case it is the action of the United States Parole Board, and not the warden, which petitioner challenges.
In Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443 (1973), the Supreme Court rejected the argument that 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a)1 limited a district court’s habeas corpus jurisdiction to cases where the prisoner seeking relief is confined within its territorial jurisdiction. In so doing, it expressly rejected any implication in Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188, 68 S.Ct. 1443, 92 L.Ed. 1898 (1948), that the presence of the petitioner is required as an inflexible jurisdictional rule. The necessary ingredient, it held, was “jurisdiction over the custodian”. The Court said:
So long as the custodian can be reached by service of process, the court can issue a writ ‘within its jurisdiction’ requiring that the prisoner be brought before the court for a hearing on his claim, or requiring that he be released outright from custody, even if the prisoner himself is confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction.
410 U.S. at 495, 93 S.Ct. at 1130.
Since Braden, it seems clear that it is only necessary to obtain service of process upon the “custodian” in order for the district court to exercise jurisdiction. Thereafter, traditional principles of venue apply. Braden involved a state institution, state convictions and multiple sovereignties. Here we deal only with the federal penal system, and all of the related convictions are federal. The Bureau of Prisons and the Parole Board are national in scope. It seems to me that in a purely federal context the requirement of personal jurisdiction over the warden of the institution hangs by a very thin thread. It has been abandoned by statute in § 2255 cases.2 What public interest is served by requiring that the local “branch manager” be served before the court can consider a challenge to the action of the national board? Of what advantage is it to the system that this challenge be heard only in Indiana? In this case, I can see no advantage or disadvantage to either side if Judge Henley were permitted to deal with the merits of the case in Arkansas. A recent comment sums it up this way:
So long as the petitioner names as respondent a person or entity with *503power to release him, there is no reason to avoid reaching the merits of his petition. If he is confined by state judicial process or executive action of the state or federal government, he should be permitted to name as respondent either the government or the official holding him in custody.3
If we adhere to strict concepts of personal jurisdiction in a purely federal context, we leave in an orphaned state those habeas corpus claims of federal prisoners which do not fall strictly within § 2255.4 If on the other hand the problem is viewed as one of venue rather than jurisdiction, the balance of convenience could be satisfied by dismissal or transfer to another district where it might have been brought. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a),5 1406(a).6 This is exactly what was done in Wilkins v. Erickson, 484 F.2d 969 (8th Cir. 1973). And venue, unlike jurisdiction, may be waived.7
In this case, the United States entered its appearance and responded on the merits.8 In light of Braden, can it still be said that a federal district court cannot hear the case because the warden cannot be served within its district? I believe that future eases will make clear that the appearance of the United States supplied the needed persona! jurisdiction and that venue was waived.9 But because the weight of authority still appears to the contrary and the petitioner is plainly not prejudiced by our holding in this case, I concur.

. Writs of habeas coitus may be granted by the Supreme Court, any Justice thereof, the district courts and any circuit judge within their respective jurisdictions. The order of a circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had.

. In formulating a post conviction remedy for federal prisoners, Congress ignored the traditional rule regarding choice of a proper respondent. The district courts are responsible for giving notice to the government, and the United States is the respondent of record. Developments in the Law — Federal Habeas Corpus, 88 Harv.L.Rev. 1038, 1167 (1970).

. Id. at 116R. In military habeas cases, the Supreme Court has adopted a concept of “presence” through contacts in sustaining jurisdiction over superior officers outside the District. Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341, 92 S.Ct. 1693, 32 L.Ed.2d 141 (1972).

. If relief is possible under § 2255, it is the exclusive remedy and habeas corpus is barred for a federal prisoner. The writ [habeas corpus] may be used only by those who are not within the scope of § 2255, such as a person committed for mental incompetency, or one confined in prison without any judgment of court, or one who does not challenge his conviction or his sentence but claims he is being held after expiration of the sentence.
2 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 592, at 584-85 (1969) (emphasis added)

. For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought.

. The district court of a district in which is filed a case laying venue in the wrong division or district shall dismiss, or if it be in the interest of justice, transfer such ease to any district or division in which it could have been brought.

. 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1352 (1969), and cases cited therein.

. I realize that in other factual circumstances the United States may refuse to be named as respondent in a non-§ 2255 case. There may nonetheless be superiors to the warden amenable to the court’s jurisdiction in such cases.

. See, e. g., Hensley v. Municipal Court, San Jose-Milpitas Judicial District, Santa Clara County, 411 U.S. 345, 350, 93 S.Ct. 1571, 1574, 36 L.Ed.2d 294 (1973) :
Thus, we have consistently rejected interpretations of the habeas corpus statute that would suffocate the writ in stifling formalisms or hobble its effectiveness with the manacles of arcane and scholastic procedural requirements. The demand for speed, flexibility, and simplicity is clearly evident in our decisions concerning the exhaustion doctrine, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 [83 S.Ct. 822, 9 L.Ed.2d 837] (1963) ; Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 [73 S.Ct. 397, 97 L.Ed. 469] (1953) ; the criteria for relitigation of factual questions, Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 [83 S.Ct. 745, 9 L.Ed.2d 770] (1963) ; the prematurity doctrine, Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 [88 S.Ct. 1549, 20 L.Ed.2d 426] (1968) ; the choice of forum, Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 [93 S.Ct. 1123, 35 L.Ed.2d 443] (1973) ; Strait v. Laird, 406 U.S. 341 [92 S.Ct. 1693, 32 L.Ed.2d 141] (1972) ; and the procedural requirements of a habeas corpus hearing, Harris v. Nelson, supra [394 U.S. 286, 89 S.Ct. 1082, 22 L.Ed.2d 281].