Court Opinion

ID: 9891784
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-19 17:06:13.905365+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:59:41.424553
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/19/23 In re T.H. CA4/2

                     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
 California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
     publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for
                               publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                   FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION TWO

 In re T.H., a Person Coming Under the
 Juvenile Court Law.

 SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
 CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES,                                            E081103

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super.Ct.No. J289877)

 v.                                                                       OPINION

 D.B. et al.,

           Defendants and Appellants.

         APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Annemarie G.

Pace, Judge. Conditionally reversed.

         Christine E. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant

and Appellant D.B.

         Emily Uhre, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant T.W.

                                                              1
       Tom Bunton, County Counsel, Kristina M. Robb, Deputy County Counsel for

Plaintiff and Respondent.

       The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of D.B. (Mother) and T.W.

(Father; collectively, Parents) to their daughter, T.H. (Minor) (Welf. & Inst. Code,

§ 366.26, subd. (b)(1).)1 Parents contend a proper inquiry under the Indian2 Child

Welfare Act of 1978 (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.) (ICWA) was not conducted. We

conditionally reverse.

                                          FACTS

       A.     LOS ANGELES COUNTY

       In September 2019, Parents told the Los Angeles County Department of Children

and Family Services (DCFS) that they do not have Indian ancestry. DCFS had contact

with Father’s mother, V.S. (Paternal grandmother [PGM]); Father’s stepmother, M.H.;

Father’s father, E.H.; Father’s sister, L.H.; Father’s sister, D.H.; Father’s niece, B.S.;

Father’s stepbrother; Mother’s mother, R.J.; Mother’s Grandmother, J.J.; Mother’s

sister, E.H.; and Mother’s aunt, M.F. (Aunt). DCFS did not conduct an ICWA inquiry

with the relatives. One year later, in September 2020, Mother informed DCFS that she

moved to San Bernardino County. In July 2021, the Los Angeles County juvenile court

transferred the case to San Bernardino County.

       1 All subsequent statutory references will be to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise indicated.

       2 “[B]ecause ICWA uses the term ‘Indian,’ we do the same for consistency, even
though we recognize that other terms, such as ‘Native American’ or ‘indigenous,’ are
preferred by many.” (In re Benjamin M. (2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 739, fn. 1.)

                                              2
      B.     SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY

      The San Bernardino County juvenile court (the juvenile court) accepted the case

in August 2021. On October 26, 2022, the San Bernardino County Department of

Children and Family Services (the Department) contacted PGM to ask about Indian

ancestry. “[PGM] stated, ‘I have native American ancestry on my mom’s side of the

family. My mother and grandmother are Black Cherokee.’ ”3 That same day, the

Department called Parents to ask about Indian ancestry, but Mother did not return the

Department’s message and Father’s telephone was not in service.

      On November 11 or 22, 2022, the Department sent letters about the case to three

Cherokee tribes. The letters are not included in the record. On November 14, 2022, the

Department called Mother, Father, and Aunt. Mother and Aunt did not return the

Department’s messages. Father’s telephone remained out of service. The Department

again called Aunt on November 22, 2022, but Aunt did not return that message either.

      By February 2023, none of the three Cherokee tribes had responded to the

Department’s November letters. In April 2023, the juvenile court found “the

Department has met the burden of inquiry under ICWA” and that “ICWA does not

apply.” The juvenile court terminated Parents’ parental rights to Minor.

                                    DISCUSSION

      Parents contend the juvenile court erred by finding an adequate ICWA inquiry

was conducted.

      3 The family is African-American, so we infer that “Black Cherokee” means the
family’s African-American ancestors were part of the Cherokee Nation.

                                           3
       An “Indian child” is defined as an unmarried minor who is either a member of an

Indian tribe, or who is eligible for tribal membership and is the biological child of a

tribal member. (25 U.S.C.A. § 1903(4).) There are two points in a dependency case

where a child welfare agency may have a duty to inquire about whether a child is an

Indian child. The first duty can occur when there is no information about the child

possibly being an Indian child; that is the initial duty of inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (a).)

The second duty can occur when there is information about the child possibly being an

Indian child, i.e., there is a “reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a

proceeding”; that is the duty of further inquiry. (§ 224.2, subd. (e).)

       There is a reason to believe that an Indian child is involved in a proceeding when

the court or social worker has information “suggesting” that the child may be eligible

for membership in an Indian tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1) [italics added].) “Courts have

broadly construed the reason to believe standard.” (In re I.F. (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th

152, 163.) “ ‘Synonyms for the term [“]suggest[“] include “imply,” “hint,” “intimate”

and “insinuate.” ’ ” (Ibid.) “The duty of further inquiry existed in In re T.G.[4] where

the mother believed she had Cherokee ancestry through her mother and possible Native

American ancestry through her paternal grandfather.” (Ibid.) “[T]he court in In re

D.F.[5] found that a mother’s statement ‘that she may have Indian heritage from a tribe

in New Mexico’ was sufficient to trigger further inquiry.” (Id. at p. 164.)

       4 In re T.G. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 275, 283-285, 292, 297.

       5 In re Dominic F. (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 558, 569.

                                              4
       In In re I.F., the “mother’s statements that she had been told by her paternal

grandmother that she had Native American ancestry through her paternal grandfather,

coupled with the maternal grandfather’s statements that his father told him the family

had Native American ancestry in Minnesota, established a reason to believe [the

children] are Indian children and thus triggered the duty of further inquiry under

California law.” (In re I.F., supra, 77 Cal.App.5th at p. 164, fn. omitted.)

       In the instant case, PGM claimed that her “ ‘mother and grandmother are Black

Cherokee.’ ” PGM’s claim that her relatives “ ‘are Black Cherokee,’ ” could mean that

they are tribal members. Thus, PGM’s statement suggests that Minor could be eligible

for membership in a Cherokee tribe. (§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) As a result, the duty of

further inquiry was triggered.

       The Department asserts PGM’s statement that her “ ‘mother and grandmother are

Black Cherokee’ ” does not satisfy the statutorily enumerated circumstances that

suggest tribal membership eligibility. (§ 224.2, subds. (d)(1) & (e)(1).) The

Department’s argument is not persuasive because the statutorily enumerated

circumstances are not an exhaustive list. The statute provides, “Information suggesting

membership or eligibility for membership includes, but is not limited to, information

that indicates, but does not establish, the existence of one or more of the grounds for

reason to know enumerated in paragraphs (1) to (6), inclusive, of subdivision (d).”

(§ 224.2, subd. (e)(1).) The enumerated list of circumstances suggesting tribal

membership is merely a starting point.

                                             5
       The Department relies on In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, in which the

mother told the child welfare agency “that she ‘may have Indian ancestry’ and had been

‘told that [her] mother had Cherokee [ancestry],’ ” and the mother’s aunt said “that she

‘may have had Cherokee heritage.’ ” (Id. at p. 888.) The appellate court explained that

tribal membership “depends ‘on the child’s political affiliation with a federally

recognized Indian Tribe,’ not the child’s ancestry.” (Id. at pp. 888-889.) Therefore,

“Indian ancestry, without more, does not provide a reason to believe that a child is a

member of a tribe or is the biological child of a member.” (Id. at p. 889.)

       The instant case is distinguishable from In re Austin J. because PGM’s statement

that her “ ‘mother and grandmother are Black Cherokee,’ ” was not an equivocal claim

of ancestry like those in In re Austin J. In other words, PGM did not say she may,

might, or could have Cherokee ancestry. Instead, she said that her mother and

grandmother are Cherokee, which can be understood as suggesting they are members of

the Cherokee Nation. Thus, PGM’s claim differs from the claims of possible ancestry

that were made in In re Austin J.

       Further inquiry requires a child welfare agency to interview extended family

members to gather identifying information about a child’s parents, grandparents, and

great-grandparents, “including maiden, married, and former names or aliases, as well as

their current and former addresses, birth dates, places of birth and death, tribal

enrollment information of other direct lineal ancestors of the child, and any other

identifying information, if known.” (§§ 224.2, subd. (e)(2)(A), 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C);

see also Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4)(A).)

                                             6
       There is no indication that the Department tried to contact Father’s stepmother,

M.H.; Father’s father, E.H.; Father’s sister, L.H.; Father’s sister, D.H.; Mother’s

mother, R.J.; Mother’s Grandmother, J.J.; or Mother’s sister, E.H. to gather identifying

information that could help a tribe determine whether Minor is eligible for membership.

Due to the Department’s failure to comply with the further inquiry requirements, the

juvenile court erred by finding an adequate ICWA inquiry was conducted.

       An ICWA inquiry error is prejudicial “where the record indicates that there was

readily obtainable information that was likely to bear meaningfully upon whether the

child is an Indian child.” (In re Benjamin M., supra, 70 Cal.App.5th 735, 744.)

Father’s stepmother, father, and sisters; and Mother’s mother, grandmother, and sister,

are available to contact because DCFS spoke with them. Those relatives are also likely

to know the names, addresses, birthdates, and places of birth of Minor’s parents,

grandparents, and great-grandparents. Accordingly, there was readily obtainable

information that was likely to bear meaningfully on whether Minor is an Indian child.

Therefore, the juvenile court’s error is prejudicial, and we will conditionally reverse for

a proper ICWA inquiry.

       The Department contends the error is harmless because there is nothing in the

record indicating the paternal relatives have information about their family’s alleged

Indian ancestry. A further inquiry is about collecting identifying information (§§ 224.2,

subd. (e)(2)(A), 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C) [“identifying information”]), so the tribes can

determine if Minor is eligible for membership (§ 224.2, subd. (f) [tribes decide

membership eligibility]). The extended relatives are likely to know identifying

                                             7
information, such as birthdays and places of birth. Therefore, meaningful information is

readily available.

       The Department also contends the error is harmless because the maternal

relatives are unlikely to have information about the alleged Indian ancestry of the

paternal relatives. In a further inquiry, the Department is tasked with gathering

identifying information about Minor’s maternal and paternal relatives so the tribes can

determine whether Minor is eligible for membership. (§§ 224.2, subds. (e)(2)(A)

[gather information] & (f) [tribes decide membership eligibility], 224.3, subd. (a)(5)(C)

[“All names known of the Indian child’s biological parents, grandparents, and great-

grandparents”].) In other words, the Department needs to try to gather identifying

information for both sides of the family—not just the paternal side. In sum, the error

requires reversal.

                                      DISPOSITION

       The order terminating parental rights (§ 366.26) is conditionally reversed. The

juvenile court shall order, pursuant to ICWA and section 224.2, subdivision (e), that

within 30 days of the remittitur being issued that the Department perform a diligent

further inquiry. If adequate additional investigation is performed but yields no further

information that could assist the Bureau of Indian Affairs or a specific tribe or tribes in

determining whether Minor is an Indian child, then the juvenile court shall reinstate its

section 366.26 order. (§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) If, as a result of that inquiry, identifying

information is obtained that may assist the Bureau of Indian Affairs or a tribe in

determining whether Minor is an Indian child, then the Department shall provide the

                                              8
information to the relevant tribe(s) and the Bureau of Indian Affairs. (§ 224.2, subd.

(e)(2)(C).)

       In the event no tribe responds indicating Minor is an Indian child, or if no tribe

seeks to intervene, then the juvenile court shall reinstate its section 366.26 order.

(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(2).) If a tribe determines that Minor is eligible for membership and

seeks to intervene in the proceedings, then the juvenile court shall vacate its prior orders

and conduct all proceedings in accordance with ICWA and related California laws.

(§ 224.2, subd. (i)(1); In re Josiah T. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 388, 409.)

       NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

                                                        MILLER
                                                                                            J.

We concur:

McKINSTER
                        Acting P. J.

CODRINGTON
                                  J.

                                              9