Court Opinion

ID: 9446425
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 21:53:44.52641+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:30:38.432297
License: Public Domain

JAMES ALGER FEE, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
At the outset of every proceeding, this Court is bound to consider its own jurisdiction and the jurisdiction of the lower court. Once it appeared from the record that a claim could be made that Bridges did not completely understand to what indictment or to what counts he pleaded guilty, the trial court had jurisdiction of the sentences on both counts. It was mandatory that the question be determined. Complete lack of understanding could have been found if the record and the recollection of the judge justified the finding. On the other hand, the trial judge could have found and did find here fliat that court did “not accept the plea without first determining that the plea” was “made-voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge.” Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 U.S.C.A. The form of the motion, what Bridges prayed for, admitted or conceded, and the verbiage of the order of denial are immaterial.
The principle laid down in Crow v. United States, 9 Cir., 186 F.2d 704, and like cases arising under § 2255, is horn-book law.1 The series of eases above noted has, however, nothing to do with the situation here. The contention that the motion must be dismissed is not made by Bridges, but appears only in the dissent. The gravamen of the motion itself is based entirely upon irregularities or omissions in the transcript, which it is claimed shows on its face that Bridges utterly failed to comprehend the actual situation when he entered his pleas. It is contended the transcript shows Bridges did not know to what crime or to what charges he pleaded guilty. If Bridges pleaded guilty without understanding, the court would have had no jurisdiction to impose any sentence, and the present motion could be considered a petition for coram nobis.2 The same jurisdictional *619defect to impose any sentence relates to the whole transaction and may be dealt with under § 2255.3
The main opinion deals with two phases of the misunderstanding alleged to be shown by the cold transcript alone. The first phase is that Bridges did not know whether he pleaded guilty to Indictment 33,917 or Indictment 33,817. The second phase is that Bridges did not understand that he pleaded guilty to two counts of either indictment, but understood he was pleading only to one count.
If there was any misunderstanding upon either phase on the part of Bridges in entering the plea, the whole transaction should be set aside and defendant remanded to plead again. We accept the mandate of Rule 11, Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, completely.
The highly technical suggestion that Bridges prays only for relief as to the consecutive sentence, apparently in the belief that he has fulfilled the sentence on one count, should be dismissed without consideration.
Certainly, the sound principle first above set out should not be distorted to prevent an attack on a sentence by a prisoner who by accident or design, without understanding upon his part, has been sentenced upon two counts instead of one, as he has been led to believe. Bridges makes that exact claim here. It would be unjust for the District Court to deny consideration simply because he failed to ask for cancellation of the sentence on Count One, which he apparently thinks had expired.4 If he were without understanding of the transaction, he would not know whether he pleaded guilty to Count One or to Count Two. If the trial court had power to hear the claim of Bridges, it necessarily had the power to determine whether both of the sentences were valid or whether both were void. Both must stand or fall together.
The claim that Bridges never has pleaded to any count of Indictment 33,-917, upon which both sentences were imposed, is based upon the transcript alone. If Bridges pleaded guilty to Indictment 33,817 and not to Indictment 33,917, no sentence was valid. If Bridges, through lack of understanding, pleaded guilty to only one count of Indictment 33,917, instead of the two upon which he was adjudged guilty, the entire transaction and both sentences are void. The alleged lack of understanding upon the part of Bridges, which, if it existed, would avoid the sentence on Count Two, would necessarily avoid the sentence on Count One. No court would hold the contrary. If either of these situations appeared in the proceeding before the lower court, by the allegations of the motion that tribunal would be bound to pass thereon, whether or not Bridges raised them. Since both claims were inherent in the proceeding under § 2255, the lower court had jurisdiction to consider the validity of both sentences.
Jurisdiction is the power to hear and to determine. It is clear the trial court had presented to it the validity of the total sentence on both counts.5 Since juris*620diction was present, a refusal to determine the matter upon technical grounds would be improper. Bridges, who is seeking a determination, would find such a refusal peculiarly mystifying. This Court should not frustrate Bridges by the futile requirement that he file the identical petition tomorrow in order to receive the answer we can give him today.
The trial court had power to consider the validity of the total sentences. Our jurisdiction is likewise thus comprehensive. It is our duty to review the denial.
The learned judge who presided over the arraignment and who pronounced sentence in the exercise of this jurisdiction, heard the matter and determined Bridges thoroughly understood. It is true, since the judge was present himself, he reconstructed the proceeding from his recollection as refreshed by the transcript. This was the very purpose behind the enactment of § 2255. This Court cannot assume that he was thus attempting, with the aid of a reputable attorney who was also present, to justify himself or to railroad a victim.
By rationalization, it is possible to warp the cold record in a grotesque way. However, if the situation be viewed judicially, it is clear that Bridges understood he was pleading to Indictment 33,-917, which had five counts and which named Bridges as a defendant, rather than to Indictment 33,817, which had two counts and which did not name Bridges at all. Sentence had been passed on one Barbara Mae Martinelli upon Indictment 33,817 on November 24, 1953. It was not even pending before the court when Bridges was arraigned on May 26, 1954.
The record shows at the time Mr. Sullivan, counsel for Bridges, initiated the action, as follows:
“Mr. Sullivan. As far as this particular indictment is concerned, I desire to withdraw the plea of not guilty heretofore entered for the purpose of presenting a new and different plea as to the first two counts.
“The Court. The Court will accept the plea, there being no objection on your part ?
“Mr. Foster [Assistant United States Attorney]. No objection.
“The Clerk. In case 33817, Fred Bridges, do you withdraw your former plea of not guilty to counts one, two and three of this indictment?
“Defendant Bridges. Yes.”
Furthermore, not only were the arraignment, plea and sentence on two counts of Indictment 33,917 one transaction, but other circumstances were indivisibly woven into the whole. The colloquy regarding the plea did not stand alone. A month later, with defendant and his counsel present, the same judge, prior to sentencing, inquired directly of defendant : “Are you ready for sentence ?” Defendant answered: “Yes, Your Honor.” Bridges was then sentenced to five years on the first count charging a violation of the Harrison Narcotics Act in that Bridges sold heroin, and to a term of five years on the second count of the indictment charging the concealment of the heroin referred to in the first indictment, and the terms of imprisonment were ordered to run consecutively.
Neither defendant nor counsel made any comment or interposed any objection. The United States Attorney thereupon dismissed the remaining counts against Bridges of Indictment 33,917 and dismissed as to Bridges a separate Indictment 33,918, charging violations of 26 U.S.C. §§ 2553, 3557, 21 U.S.C. § 174 and 18 U.S.C. § 371. There is no claim by defendant that the action in these dismissals was due to any understanding. But this action was also part of the same transaction.
Beyond this, it is crystal clear that, since the dismissal pertained to the remaining counts of Indictment 33,917, the *621plea related to Counts One and Two of that indictment. The contention that this Court should rely upon a part of a cold record without attempt to recreate the situation in the courtroom is thus met by a logical view of the situation shown thereby as a whole.
However, the cold record, even with its apparent inaccuracies and failure to reflect the atmosphere of the courtroom and the attitude of the persons present, conclusively demonstrates that Bridges acted not only with complete understanding but with sagacity and cunning.
Bridges delayed his present attack upon the unified proceeding until he could not lose if the sentences on both counts were set aside. As a realist, he did not appeal at the time, and he did not claim •lack of understanding for almost three years. He thus assured himself that the statute of limitations would run before he could be reindicted on the charges which had been dismissed. Whether "this course of action was dictated by his native ability or legal advice, the result is the same. Which was to have been demonstrated. There is no gain in making a fetish out of the language of Rule 11. The cases in which it was properly applied to avoid pleas will not be discussed. Here the review of occurrences proves Bridges did not misunderstand, but that he understood only too well.
The denial of the motion was correct.

. Further citation of authority is, of course, unnecessary.

. Shelton v. United States, 5 Cir., 246 F.2d 571. Prior proceedings in the Shelton case are reported in 242 F.2d 101. United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502, 74 S.Ct. 247, 254, 98 L.Ed. 248, recognized the validity of motions “in the nature of a writ of error coram nobis” in federal criminal practice. Earlier the Supreme Court had described the correctional jurisdiction of District Courts on coram nobis as “the power of the court * * * to vacate its judgments for errors of fact * * * in those cases where the errors were of the most funda*619mental, character; that is, such as rendered the proceeding itself irregular and invalid.” (Emphasis added.) United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 69, 35 S.Ct. 16, 19, 59 L.Ed. 129. This Court has also said: “It would seem reasonable that the court rendering the void judgment could set it aside at any time on direct applieatioyi for such an order * * *. Such an application by motion to the trial court is in the nature of an application for a writ of error eoram nobis.” (Emphasis added.) Robinson v. Johnston, 9 Cir., 118 F.2d 998, 1000.

. Compare United States v. Brown, 7 Cir., 207 F.2d 310; Mathis v. United States, 6 Cir., 200 F.2d 697; Lopez v. United States, 9 Cir., 186 F.2d 707. In the Lopez case, appellant was in custody under a “separate, distinct and unrelated sentence.”

. If the sentence on Count One has expired, of course, the question as to it would be moot.

. The fact that Bridges sought release in a previous proceeding on the ground that he was placed in double jeopardy, which was denied by the District Court, *620indicates that the attack was on the total sentence. His present motion, founded on the idea that the sentence on one count or the other has expired, seems to be an attempt to avoid the argument that a previous motion upon similar grounds has already been denied.