Court Opinion

ID: 9948730
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 20:04:02.133935+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:48.496104
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/7/24 P. v. Garcia CA2/2
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION TWO

 THE PEOPLE,                                                  B321825

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                          (Los Angeles County
                                                              Super. Ct. No. TA036562)
           v.

 ERNESTO GARCIA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

     APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County. Sean D. Coen, Judge. Reversed and
remanded.

      Jason Szydlik, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Analee J. Brodie,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

                               ******
       The trial court in this case denied without prejudice a
petition filed by Ernesto Garcia (defendant) for vacatur and
resentencing of his attempted murder convictions (Pen. Code, §§
187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a))1 on the grounds that the petition
had “missing information” under section 1172.6, subdivision
(b)(2), but neglected to specify what information was missing.
This was error because defendant’s petition was not missing any
information. As a result, we reverse the denial of the petition
and remand for the trial court to appoint counsel and to proceed
in considering the petition. This conclusion obviates the need for
us to decide, as a matter of statutory construction, whether trial
courts must explain what information is missing from an
incomplete petition.
         FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I.     The Crime
       Defendant and another person were in a vehicle when they
fired gunshots into the victims’ vehicle. The driver of the victims’
vehicle was killed. Defendant was one of the people identified as
having fired into the car.
II.    The Conviction
       In 1997, a jury convicted defendant of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)) and two counts of attempted willful, deliberate,

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

                                 2
premeditated murder (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664, subd. (a)). The jury
also found true the firearm enhancements alleged under sections
12022.55 and 12022.5, subdivision (a). Defendant was sentenced
to a term of 25 years to life in state prison for the murder count;
the trial court also imposed consecutive sentences of life with the
possibility of parole for the two attempted murder counts. The
court imposed a six-year enhancement for each count, and
imposed but stayed a four-year enhancement for each count.
Later, pursuant to instructions from the appellate court, the trial
court struck the enhancements pursuant to section 12022.55 and
lifted the stay on the section 12022.5, subdivision (a),
enhancements.
III. The Petition for Resentencing
       On April 5, 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing
pursuant to former section 1170.95 challenging his convictions
for “Attempted Murder.”2 The trial court denied the petition
without prejudice on the ground that it was missing information,
but did not specify what information was missing.
       Defendant filed this timely appeal.
                            DISCUSSION
       In 2018, our Legislature amended the definition of the
crime of murder to “to ensure that murder liability is not imposed
on a person who is not the actual killer, did not act with the
intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the underlying
felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.”
(Stats. 2018, ch. 1015, § 1, subd. (f).) A few years later, our
Legislature amended the definition of the crime of attempted

2     Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).
For simplicity, we refer to the section by its new numbering.

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murder to preclude liability for that crime “under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine.” (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.)
       These amendments operate not only prospectively, but also
retroactively. Section 1172.6 is the “mechanism by which a
person convicted of murder [or attempted murder] under a
natural and probable consequences theory may be resentenced if
they could no longer be convicted of murder [or attempted
murder] because of the changes to section 188.” (People v. Vargas
(2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 950-951.)
       The first step in obtaining relief under section 1172.6 is for
the petitioner to file a facially sufficient petition with the trial
court. To be facially sufficient, a petition must “include” (1) “[a]
declaration by the petitioner that [he] is eligible for relief under
this section” because, as applicable here, (a) an “information . . .
was filed against [him] that allowed the prosecution to proceed
under a theory of . . . natural and probable consequences,” (b) he
“was convicted of . . . attempted murder . . . following a trial” or
plea, and (c) he “could not presently be convicted of . . . attempted
murder” under the amended definition of that crime; (2) “[t]he
superior court case number and year of the petitioner’s
conviction”; and (3) “[w]hether the petitioner requests the
appointment of counsel.” (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(1) & (a).)
       Where a petition is “missing” “required” “information” and
where that information “cannot be readily ascertained” by the
trial court, that court “may deny the petition without prejudice to
the filing of another petition and advise the petitioner that the
matter cannot be considered without the missing information.” (§
1172.6, subd. (b)(2).)
       Because it turns on statutory interpretation and the
application of the law to undisputed facts, we independently

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review a denial of a petition due to the absence of information.
(Sitrick Group, LLC v. Vivera Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (2023) 89
Cal.App.5th 1059, 1064-1065.)
       The trial court here erred in denying defendant’s petition.
On its face, defendant’s petition alleges each piece of required
information with one possible exception—the year of his
attempted murder convictions. But that information was “readily
ascertainable” by the court because it is part of the court record
under the case number that defendant himself provided.
       Curiously, defendant asserts in his response to this court’s
request for supplemental briefing that his own petition was
missing information—namely, that the petition (1) challenged his
convictions “‘under a theory of Attempted Murder and or the
natural probable consequences doctrine,’” rather than
challenging his convictions “under a theory of ‘attempted murder
under the natural and probable consequences doctrine’” (italics in
original); and (2) did not specify which of his two attempted
murder convictions he was attacking. We do not see how
defendant’s use of “and or” rather than “under” renders his
petition facially deficient. Nor do we read his petition as deficient
because it does not specify which attempted murder conviction is
invalid when the allegation in his petition that a now-invalid
theory of criminal liability was used at his trial logically applies
to both convictions, even if his typo-laden pro se petition only
uses the singular when referring to his “conviction” for attempted
murder.3 The fact that defendant in his supplemental briefing
asks us to construe his pro se petition parsimoniously rather than

3     We agree with the People that defendant’s petition on its
face does not challenge his murder conviction.

                                 5
liberally is squarely at odds with the longstanding principle to
the contrary. (Haines v. Kerner (1972) 404 U.S. 519, 520-521; In
re Serna (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 1010, 1017, fn. 3.) In any event,
defendant can always amend or clarify on remand in the unlikely
event that he wishes to assail only one of his two attempted
murder convictions, but the petition as currently pled is not
facially deficient.
       As a result, the trial court erred in denying the petition
without prejudice. The appropriate remedy is reversal and a
remand for the trial court to appoint counsel and proceed in
considering the petition. (§ 1172.6, subd. (b)(3).)
       The parties’ initial briefing focused entirely on whether the
trial court erred in not disclosing what information was missing
from defendant’s petition, and went on to debate whether section
1172.6 obligates a trial court to spell out what is missing.
Because we conclude that there was no information missing or
not within the ready ascertainment of the trial court, we have no
occasion to address that issue and leave it for another day.

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                           DISPOSITION
      The order denying the petition without prejudice is
reversed, and the matter remanded for the appointment of
counsel and the further consideration of defendant’s section
1172.6 petition.
      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

                             _____________________, J.
                             HOFFSTADT

I concur:

________________________, P. J.
LUI

                                  7
People v. Garcia, B321825
ASHMANN-GERST, J., Dissenting.

       I respectfully dissent.
       Defendant Ernesto Garcia’s opening brief raised a single
issue: Did the trial court err by not specifying what information
was missing from the Penal Code section 1172.6 petition?1 The
answer to that narrow question is “no.”
       Section 1172.6, subdivision (b)(2), provides: “If any of the
information required by this subdivision is missing from the
petition and cannot be readily ascertained by the court, the court
may deny the petition without prejudice to the filing of another
petition and advise the petitioner that the matter cannot be
considered without the missing information.” That is exactly
what the trial court did here. It exercised its discretion to deny
defendant’s petition without prejudice pursuant to section 1172.6,
subdivision (b). Nothing in the statute required the trial court to
specifically identify for defendant what information was missing,
and defendant directs us to no legal authority to support his
broad interpretation of the statute. (People v. Stanley (1995)
10 Cal.4th 764, 793.) While it may have been helpful for the trial
court to do so (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 759), the
statute does not mandate that it must do so. And courts cannot
add or strike language in a statute to expand its application.
(Burden v. Snowden (1992) 2 Cal.4th 556, 562 [“Where the words
of the statute are clear, we may not add to or alter them to

1     All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
accomplish a purpose that does not appear on the face of the
statute or from its legislative history”].)
       The majority, however, does not reach this issue. Instead,
it sought supplemental briefing from the parties on the unbriefed
issue of whether defendant’s section 1172.6 petition was actually
missing any information that was not readily ascertainable by
the trial court.
       In his supplemental brief, defendant concedes that his
petition was missing such information. Whereas the majority
rejects defendant’s concession, I accept it. The petition failed to
specify which of the two attempted murder counts defendant was
challenging.2 As defendant acknowledges, this is not information
readily ascertainable by the trial court “without speculation.”
       Based on the foregoing, I would affirm the trial court’s
order denying defendant’s section 1172.6 petition without
prejudice.

                              __________________________, J.
                              ASHMANN-GERST

2     The petition refers to defendant’s attempted murder
conviction in the singular.

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