Court Opinion

ID: 9376768
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 19:02:55.128644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:09.062501
License: Public Domain

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                                                         Electronically Filed
                                                         Supreme Court
                                                         SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX
                                                         03-MAR-2023
                                                         08:13 AM
                                                         Dkt. 7 OP

           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF HAWAI‘I

                               ---o0o---

                         STATE OF HAWAI‘I,
                Plaintiff-Appellee/Cross-Appellant,

                                  vs.

                      DAVID JOHN MICHAELEDES,
                Defendant-Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

                           SCAP-XX-XXXXXXX

       APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
 (CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX and CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX; CASE NO. 5CPC-XX-XXXXXXX)

                            MARCH 3, 2023

  RECKTENWALD, C.J., NAKAYAMA, McKENNA, WILSON, AND EDDINS, JJ.

             OPINION OF THE COURT BY RECKTENWALD, C.J.

                          I.   INTRODUCTION

          David John Michaeledes was charged with several counts

arising from an alleged hit and run.       The Circuit Court of the

Fifth Circuit dismissed the charging document as insufficient.

The State appealed to the Intermediate Court of Appeals (“ICA”)

and simultaneously recharged Michaeledes via a second “Felony
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Information and Non-Felony Complaint,” which attempted to

correct the inadequacies in the first charging document

identified by the circuit court.       The circuit court dismissed

the second charging document for lack of jurisdiction while the

first charging document remained pending on appeal before the

ICA.   We hold that the filing of the notice of appeal in the

first case did not divest the circuit court of jurisdiction over

the second case recharging Michaeledes for the same criminal

conduct.

                           II.   BACKGROUND

            On December 28, 2020, Michaeledes was charged in Case

No. 5CPC-XX-XXXXXXX via “Felony Information and Non-Felony

Complaint” with three criminal counts for Reckless Driving of

Vehicle, Hawai‘i Revised Statutes (“HRS”) § 291-2 (2020); Assault

in the Second Degree, HRS § 707-711(1)(a) and/or (d) (2014); and

Accidents Involving Substantial Bodily Injury, HRS § 291C-12.5

(2020).    Michaeledes moved to dismiss the charges, arguing the

charging language was fatally insufficient.       The State

subsequently moved to amend its original “Felony Information and

Non-Felony Complaint” and Michaeledes opposed that motion,

arguing that a felony information may not be amended over a

defendant’s objection under Hawaiʻi Rules of Penal Procedure

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(HRPP) Rule 7(f)(1) (2018) 1 and HRS § 806-9 (2014). 2          The circuit

court agreed with Michaeledes and, on August 10, 2021, entered

written orders denying the State leave to amend and granting

Michaeledes’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. 3           On August

17, 2021, the State appealed the circuit court’s August 10

orders. 4

            Shortly thereafter, on August 31, 2021, the State

recharged Michaeledes in Case No. 5CPC-XX-XXXXXXX by way of a

second “Felony Information and Non-Felony Complaint,” this time

alleging statutory definitions and elements omitted in the first

“Felony Information and Non-Felony Complaint.”           The counts in

      1     HRPP Rule 7(f)(1) provides: “The court may permit a charge other
than an indictment to be amended at any time before trial commences if
substantial rights of the defendant are not prejudiced.”

      2     HRS § 806-9 provides:

            All provisions of law applying to prosecutions upon
            indictments, to writs and process therein, and the issuing
            and service thereof, to motions, pleadings, trials, and
            punishments, or the passing or execution of any sentence,
            and to all proceedings in cases of indictment, whether in
            the court of original or appellate jurisdiction, shall in
            the same manner and to the same extent as near as may be,
            apply to information and all prosecutions and proceedings
            thereon.

      3     The Honorable Randal G.B. Valenciano presided.

      4     In its appeal of the dismissal of the first “Felony Information
and Non-Felony Complaint,” the State raises three arguments: (1) the Reckless
Driving charge was not defective for failing to allege Michaeledes operated a
vehicle on a public highway; (2) as a matter of law, a felony information may
be amended to allege statutory definitions or essential elements; and (3) the
circuit court abused its discretion by dismissing the case. This appeal,
which arises from the first “Felony Information and Non-Felony Complaint,”
was docketed as CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX. This appeal is not currently before this
court, and therefore we do not address the merits.

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the first “Felony Information and Non-Felony Complaint”

(hereinafter, the “first charging document”) are the same as

those alleged in the second “Felony Information and Non-Felony

Complaint” (hereinafter, the “second charging document”).

            Michaeledes moved to dismiss the second charging

document for lack of jurisdiction under State v. Ontiveros, 82

Hawai‘i 446, 923 P.2d 388 (1996), since the appeal of the first

charging document was pending before the ICA.           On September 20,

2021, the circuit court agreed with Michaeledes and orally

dismissed the second charging document, this time for lack of

jurisdiction. 5   The State moved to reopen the hearing to clarify

whether the dismissal was with or without prejudice.            On

September 30, 2021, the circuit court held a hearing on the

State’s Motion to Reopen Hearing at which Michaeledes was not

present.

            On October 1, 2021, the circuit court entered a

written order reopening the September 20, 2021 hearing on

Michaeledes’s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and

clarified that its dismissal of the second charging document was

without prejudice. 6    On October 7, 2021, the circuit court then

      5     The Honorable Randal G.B. Valenciano presided.

      6     In its October 1 order, the circuit court explained it “intended
that said dismissal would be WITHOUT prejudice” and “clarifie[d] that the
Felony Information and Non-Felony Complaint filed in the above-captioned case
is dismissed without prejudice.”
                                                             (continued . . .)

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entered a written order dismissing the second charging document. 7

Michaeledes appealed the October 1 order, arguing the complaint

should be dismissed with prejudice.         The State appealed the

October 7 order, arguing Ontiveros did not divest the circuit

court of jurisdiction to proceed against Michaeledes on the

second charging document.       The appeals of the October 1 and

October 7 orders, both arising from the second charging

document, were subsequently consolidated and are now before this

court. 8

                        III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW

A.    Jurisdiction

            Whether the circuit court had jurisdiction is reviewed

under the right/wrong standard.        Ontiveros, 82 Hawai‘i at 448,

923 P.2d at 390.

B.    Questions of Law

            “We review questions of law under the right/wrong

standard.”    State v. Hernandez, 143 Hawai‘i 501, 507, 431 P.3d

(continued . . .)

      7     In its October 7 order, the circuit court explained in a footnote
that during the September 30 hearing, it had orally granted the Stateʻs
Motion to Reopen Hearing and “clarified the order of dismissal was without
prejudice.”

      8     Michaeledes’s appeal arising from the October 1 order was
docketed as CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX. The State’s appeal arising from the October 7
order was docketed as CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX. The consolidated appeals were
docketed as CAAP-XX-XXXXXXX.

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1274, 1280 (2018) (citing State v. Gomez-Lobato, 130 Hawai‘i 465,

469, 312 P.3d 897, 901 (2013)).

C.   Interpretation of Court Rules

          “‘When interpreting rules promulgated by the court,

principles of statutory construction apply.’”      State v.

Thompson, 150 Hawai‘i 262, 266, 500 P.3d 447, 451 (2021) (quoting

State v. Baron, 80 Hawai‘i 107, 113, 905 P.2d 613, 619 (1995)).

“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which this

court reviews de novo.”    Id. (citing State v. Ruggiero, 114

Hawai‘i 227, 231, 160 P.3d 703, 707 (2007)).

                           IV.   DISCUSSION

          In its appeal of the October 7 order, the State argues

that the notice of appeal arising from the first charging

document did not divest the circuit court of jurisdiction over

the second case that was based on the second charging document.

          In his appeal of the October 1 order, Michaeledes

argues: (1) the circuit court erred when it granted the State’s

Motion to Reopen Hearing because the rule of lenity requires

otherwise; (2) even if the circuit court could reopen the

hearing, the circuit court failed to articulate its reasoning

for dismissing the case without prejudice; and (3) the circuit

court violated Michaeledes’s rights under HRPP Rule 43 (2018) by

hearing and ruling on the State’s Motion to Reopen Hearing

despite him not being present.

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           We address each argument in turn.

A.   The Notice of Appeal Divested the Circuit Court Only of
     Jurisdiction over the Appealed Case

           We first turn to the single point of error raised on

appeal raised by the State.    At issue is whether the State is

barred from prosecuting Michaeledes under a second charging

document alleging identical counts, while the State’s appeal of

the dismissal of the first charging document is pending before

the ICA.   Michaeledes argues that, under Ontiveros, the circuit

court properly dismissed the second charging document for lack

of jurisdiction.   The State counters that Ontiveros does not

apply because a “notice of appeal divests the trial court of

jurisdiction over the appealed case,” and thus a pending appeal

does not bar the State from re-charging Michaeledes in a second,

separate case.   82 Hawaiʻi at 448-49, 923 P.2d at 390-91

(emphasis added) (quoting Richardson v. Sport Shinko (Waikiki

Corp.), 76 Hawaiʻi 494, 500, 880 P.2d 169, 175 (1994)).       We

agree.

           We take this opportunity to clarify that the notice of

appeal divested the circuit court only of jurisdiction over the

appealed case and not the subsequent case, which was based on a

distinct charging document.

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     1.   The State’s appeal in the first case did not divest
          the circuit court of jurisdiction over the second case
          recharging Michaeledes with the same criminal conduct

          Our decisions in Ontiveros and Kalani inform our

reasoning here.   In Ontiveros, we explained “[t]he general rule

is that the filing of a notice of appeal divests the trial court

of jurisdiction over the appealed case.”      Id. (emphasis added).

Michaeledes argues the general rule in Ontiveros should govern

here, and that we should hold the circuit court was divested of

jurisdiction over the refiled case.     We disagree.   Because

recharging the defendant does not revive the original case, but

instead initiates a new case, the appeal of the first case does

not divest the trial court of jurisdiction over the second case.

See State v. Kalani, 87 Hawai‘i 260, 262, 953 P.2d 1358, 1360

(1998).   Ontiveros only “divests the trial court of jurisdiction

over the appealed case.”    82 Hawai‘i at 448-49, 923 P.2d at 390-

91 (emphasis added).

          In Ontiveros, the defendant was charged with multiple

counts arising from his failure to stop at a red light while

driving under the influence (DUI).     Id. at 447, 923 P.2d at 389.

The defendant moved to dismiss, alleging double jeopardy because

he was already subject to an administrative driver’s license

revocation as a result of his conduct, and the district court

denied the motion.   Id.   During a recess immediately following

the district court’s denial, the defendant filed a notice of

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appeal to this court of the ruling denying his motion to dismiss

under HRS § 641-17 (1993), 9 arguing lack of jurisdiction.            Id. at

447-48, 923 P.2d at 389-90.       When court reconvened and the

defendant notified the district court of his appeal, the

district court “concluded that the notice of appeal was a

nullity” because the supreme court lacked jurisdiction over

interlocutory appeals from district courts.           Id.   The district

court subsequently convicted the defendant on the DUI charges.

Id. at 448, 923 P.2d at 390.

            We held that because the denial of a motion to dismiss

is not immediately appealable, the notice of appeal was

jurisdictionally defective and therefore did not divest the

trial court of jurisdiction.        Id. at 451-52, 923 P.2d at 393-94.

Thus, the district court had jurisdiction when it entered

      9     HRS § 641-17, which allowed direct appeals of criminal matters
from the circuit court to the supreme court, provided in relevant part:

            Interlocutory appeals from circuit courts, criminal
            matters. Upon application made within the time provided by
            the rules of the supreme court, an appeal in a criminal
            matter may be allowed to a defendant from the circuit court
            to the supreme court, subject to chapter 602, from a
            decision denying a motion to dismiss or from other
            interlocutory orders, decisions, or judgments, whenever the
            judge in the judge’s discretion may think the same
            advisable for a more speedy termination of the case. The
            refusal of the judge to allow an interlocutory appeal to
            the appellate court shall not be reviewable by any other
            court.

(Emphasis added).

            HRS § 641-17 was amended in 2004 to direct appeals to the ICA in
the first instance. 2004 Haw. Sess. Laws Act 202, § 71 at 945.

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judgment against the defendant and convicted him on the DUI

charge.    Id.

            In Kalani, the defendants were charged with assault in

the second degree for allegedly beating their child.       87 Hawai‘i

at 260, 953 P.2d at 1358.    When the circuit court granted the

defendants’ oral motion to dismiss without prejudice, the State

appealed the order to the ICA.     Id.   The ICA dismissed the

State’s appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction “because an

order of dismissal without prejudice is not a final appealable

order.”    Id.

            We held that because an order granting a motion to

dismiss terminates proceedings in the trial court, “an order

granting a motion to dismiss is final.”      Id. at 262, 593 P.2d at

1360.    Thus, the ICA improperly dismissed the appeal because it

had appellate jurisdiction to review the order granting the

motion to dismiss without prejudice.      Id.   We explained that

regardless of whether a dismissal is with or without prejudice,

it is a final order because refiling a new charging document

does not “revive the original case,” instead it “initiates a new

case.”    Id.

            Here, there is no dispute that the August 17, 2021

notice of appeal divested the circuit court of jurisdiction over

the first case arising from the first charging document.

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Instead, Michaeledes contends our rule in Ontiveros also

divested the circuit court of jurisdiction in the second case.

            We disagree because, as we explained in Kalani,

“recharging [the defendant] does not revive the original case.

Rather, recharging the defendant initiates a new case.”               87

Hawai‘i at 262, 953 P.2d at 1360.           The circuit court’s order

dismissing the first case without prejudice was a final order

terminating only that case.         See id. (explaining that a

“dismissal without prejudice is a final order” that “terminates

the current case”).

            The second charging document alleging the same three

counts initiated a second case, separate from the first case

arising from the first charging document.            Because the notice of

appeal only divested the circuit court of jurisdiction over the

first case on appeal, and because the second case is a new case,

separate and distinct from the first, the circuit court has

jurisdiction to hear the second case while the first case is

pending appeal before the ICA. 10

      10    Other   jurisdictions that have considered whether the State may
initiate a second   case based on the same underlying facts while the first
case is on appeal   have likewise found no jurisdictional barrier to the trial
court considering   the second case. In State v. Thayer, the Oregon Court of
Appeals held:

            We agree with the state. Certainly, filing the notice of
            appeal concerning the dismissal of the first information
            deprived the trial court - subject to exceptions not
            pertinent to this case - of jurisdiction to proceed with
            the prosecution of that case. State v. Stevens, 134 Or.
                                                             (continued . . .)

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      2.    Allowing the first case and second case to proceed
            simultaneously promotes judicial efficiency without
            risk of confusion

            As we explained in TSA Int’l Ltd. v. Shimizu Corp.,

the general rule identified in Ontiveros “is designed to avoid

the confusion and inefficiency that might flow from placing the

same issue before two courts at the same time.”           92 Hawai‘i 243,

265, 990 P.2d 713, 735 (1999) (citing 9 J. Moore, Moore’s

Federal Practice ¶ 203.11 at 5-50 (2d ed. 1996)).

            Here, allowing the appeal of the first case to proceed

concurrently with the second case is unlikely to result in

confusion because the two cases raise distinct legal issues.

(continued . . .)
            App. 1, 894 P.2d 1217 (1995). Nothing precluded the state
            from initiating a separate action by filing a second
            information, however. Defendant cites no authority for his
            contention that the state is precluded from doing just
            that; he merely complains that it presents the practical
            problem of requiring him to defend the dismissal of the
            case against him on two fronts. That may be so but such
            practical difficulties do not amount to a jurisdictional
            impediment.

974 P.2d 699, 701 (Or. Ct. App. 1999).

            Similarly, in Brown v. State, the Georgia Court of Appeals also
addressed whether the trial court could hear a case arising from a second
indictment when the first was on appeal as procedurally defective. 745
S.E.2d 699, 702 (Ga. Ct. App. 2013). The Georgia Court of Appeals concluded
the trial court could, explaining:

            The Second Indictment initiated a completely separate
            prosecution on the same charges, and no contention is
            raised that the Second Indictment suffered from the same
            infirmity as the First Indictment. Thus, the trial court’s
            acceptance of the Second Indictment had no effect on the
            issue of whether the First Indictment was valid, and the
            trial court thus had jurisdiction to consider the Second
            Indictment.

Id. (footnotes omitted).

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The appeal arising from the first charging document concerns the

narrower issue of whether the State may amend a felony

information and whether a Reckless Driving of Vehicle charge is

defective for failing to allege a defendant operated a vehicle

on a public highway.      The second case arising from the second

charging document more broadly concerns Michaeledes’s criminal

liability.    Because the appeal of the first case does not

concern the merits of the underlying charged offenses,

simultaneous or subsequent rulings in one of these cases are

unlikely to invalidate or supersede the other.

            Similarly, allowing both cases to proceed will not

result in undue inefficiency.        Rather, requiring the appeal of

the first case either be adjudicated or withdrawn prior to

allowing the State to pursue its prosecution of Michaeledes

would be less efficient than allowing the cases to proceed

concurrently, especially since doing so does not “plac[e] the

same issue before two courts at the same time.”           Id.   Allowing

both cases to proceed simultaneously most efficiently provides a

speedy determination of Michaeledes’s criminal liability while

also allowing the State to pursue the legal issues presented in

its appeal of the first case. 11

      11    We note, as the State argues, that jeopardy has not yet attached
to either case and as such, Michaeledes would not be subject to double
jeopardy by allowing both cases to proceed simultaneously. See State v.
Moriwake, 65 Haw. 47, 51, 647 P.2d 705, 709 (1982) (determining that the
                                                             (continued . . .)

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B.   Michaeledes’s Points of Error Lack Merit

           On appeal, Michaeledes argues: (1) the circuit court

erred when it granted the State’s Motion to Reopen Hearing

because the rule of lenity requires otherwise; (2) even if the

circuit court could reopen the hearing, the circuit court failed

to articulate a basis for dismissing the case without prejudice;

and (3) the circuit court violated Michaeledes’s rights under

HRPP Rule 43 by hearing and ruling on the State’s Motion to

Reopen Hearing despite him not being present.           We address each

argument in turn.

           First, Michaeledes argues that because the dismissal

of the second case for lack of jurisdiction did not specify it

was without prejudice, the rule of lenity requires it be

construed as a dismissal with prejudice.          This argument is

without merit.     The rule of lenity does not apply because the

dismissal was for lack of jurisdiction and does not involve a

question of statutory interpretation.         See State v. Guyton, 135

Hawaiʻi 372, 380, 351 P.3d 1138, 1146 (2015) (“This longstanding

(continued . . .)
“prohibition against double jeopardy is not implicated until jeopardy has
‘attached’” (quoting Serfass v. United States, 420 U.S. 377, 388 (1975))).
As we explained in State v. Quitog, “‘it is generally accepted that in jury
trials, jeopardy attaches when the jury is empaneled and sworn[.]’” 85
Hawai‘i 128, 141, 938 P.2d 559, 572 (1997) (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. Baranco, 77 Hawai‘i 351, 355, 884 P.2d 729, 733 (1994)). Both in the
first case arising from the first charging document and the second case
arising from the second charging document, a jury has not been impaneled or
sworn in.

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precept of statutory interpretation states that ‘[w]here a

criminal statute is ambiguous . . . the statute must be strictly

construed against the government and in favor of the accused.’”

(emphasis added) (ellipses in original) (quoting State v.

Shimabukuro, 100 Hawaiʻi 324, 327, 60 P.3d 274, 277 (2002)).

          Second, Michaeledes argues that the circuit court

failed to articulate a basis for its order to dismiss without

prejudice.   Michaeledes relies on State v. Estencion, which

requires trial courts to consider various factors and articulate

written reasoning for dismissing a case with or without

prejudice in the speedy trial context under HRPP Rule 48 (2018).

63 Haw. 264, 268-69, 625 P.2d 1040, 1043-44 (1981).          Estencion

and its progeny are irrelevant because Michaeledes moved to

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under HRPP Rule 12(b)(1)

(2018), 12 not under HRPP Rule 48 for a speedy trial violation.

Michaeledes cites no applicable authority for his contention

that trial courts must provide a basis for dismissing a case

without prejudice when that dismissal is for lack of

jurisdiction.   Even were Michaeledes to point to such an

     12   HRPP Rule 12(b)(1) provides:

                (b) Pretrial Motions. Any defense, objection, or
          request which is capable of determination without the trial
          of the general issue may be raised before trial by motion.
          Motions may be written or oral at the discretion of the
          judge. The following must be raised prior to trial:
                (1) defenses and objections based on defects in the
          institution of the prosecution[.]

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authority, it does not appear that a dismissal with prejudice

would be appropriate given the circumstances of this case

because the jurisdictional defect was curable.           Put another way,

since the basis for the jurisdictional defect would be

eliminated once the first appeal is resolved, it would make no

sense to preclude the State from returning to court once that

condition had been satisfied.

            Third, Michaeledes argues the circuit court violated

his rights under HRPP Rule 43 13 by hearing and ruling on the

State’s Motion to Reopen Hearing despite Michaeledes’s absence.

While HRPP Rule 43 requires the defendant “at pretrial

evidentiary hearings” and “at every stage of the trial,” the

      13    HRPP Rule 43 provides in relevant part:

            Rule 43. Presence of the Defendant.
                  (a) Presence required. The defendant shall be
            present at the arraignment, at the time of the plea, at
            evidentiary pretrial hearings, at every stage of the trial
            including the impaneling of the jury and the return of the
            verdict, and at the imposition of sentence, except as
            otherwise provided by this Rule.

            . . .

                  (c) Presence not required. A defendant need not be
            present either physically or by video conference if:
                  (1) the defendant is a corporation and appears by
            counsel; or
                  (2) the proceeding is a conference or argument upon a
            question of law; or
                  (3) the proceeding is a reduction of sentence under
            Rule 35.

(Emphases added).

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defendant’s presence is not required if “the proceeding is a

conference or argument upon a question of law,” as it was here.

                           V.   CONCLUSION

          For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court erred in

dismissing Case No. 5CPC-XX-XXXXXXX for lack of jurisdiction.

Accordingly, we reverse: (1) the circuit court’s October 1, 2021

order to the extent it dismissed the case for lack of

jurisdiction; and (2) the circuit court’s October 7, 2021 order

dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.      The case is

remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Rebecca Vogt Like                      /s/ Mark E. Recktenwald
Tracy J. Murakami
for Plaintiff-Appellee/                /s/ Paula A. Nakayama
Cross-Appellant
                                       /s/ Sabrina S. McKenna
Emmanuel G. Guerrero
for Defendant-Appellant/               /s/ Michael D. Wilson
Cross-Appellee
                                       /s/ Todd W. Eddins

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