Court Opinion

ID: 9856952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 07:08:12.233779+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:35.560098
License: Public Domain

Halt., Presiding Judge.
The defendant appeals from his conviction for the offense of burglary.
1. The defendant’s contention that the court erred in charging as to the meaning of reasonable doubt is without merit. The identical charge was approved in Deering v. State, 123 Ga. App. 223 (3) (180 SE2d 245) and Bruster v. State, 228 Ga. 651 (2) (187 SE2d 297).
2. Defendant also contends that the court erred in charging "and you further find beyond a reasonable doubt that recently after the commission of the offense the stolen goods were found in the possession of the defendant, that fact would authorize the jury to infer the accused was guilty, unless he explains his possession to your satisfaction.” This charge was approved in Horton v. State, 228 Ga. 690, 691 (187 SE2d 677).
3. Defendant further contends that the following colloquy between the trial court and the jury foreman implies prejudice on the part of the trial judge and denies him the right to a fair trial: "The jury has raised the question as to whether or not the jury could have made available to it any past record of the defendant regarding any previous offense of this nature. This we didn’t know, sir.” After the judge had re-charged on reasonable doubt and recent possession but without referring to this portion of the foreman’s request, the foreman stated: "The one remaining question that one or two members of the jury raised is whether or not there was any prior record.” To this the judge answered: "I cannot address you with regard to this in any way at this time.”
It is important for appellate judges to remember that "A defendant is entitled to a fair trial but not a perfect one, for there are no perfect trials.” Lutwak v. United States, 344 U. S. 604, 619 (73 SC 481, 97 LE 593); Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123, 135 (88 SC 1620, 20 LE2d 476); Brown v. United States, 411 U. S. 223 (36 LE2d 208). The work of a trial judge in a criminal trial is not an easy one. His language in colloquies with counsel, witnesses or jurors should not be judged by the hindsight of appellate judges after weeks of academic deliberation but by the practical difficulties and circumstances faced by the trial judge at the time of the trial.
The transcript shows that the judge first tried to ignore that part of the foreman’s request about whether or not the accused had *338a past record and charged on the other matters — reasonable doubt and recent possession. The foreman again said: "The one remaining question that one or two members of the jury raised is whether or not there was any prior record.” To this the judge finally said: "I cannot address you with regard to this in any way at this time.” This was a reasonable reply under the circumstances. He could not, at that time, reveal to the jury whether the defendant did or did not have a record. Our law so provides; he could do so later in the event of a conviction.
Argued April 5, 1973
Decided June 29, 1973.
John Thomas Chason, for appellant.
Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Carter Goode, James H. Mobley, Jr., Morris H. Rosenberg, for appellee.
The defendant contends that this reply should be given an unfavorable inference, that the accused has a record but he could not tell them about it at that time. Another inference is just as logical, that the accused has no record but he could not tell them about it at that time. It is basic that after a verdict of guilty the appellate courts must draw every inference and presumption in favor of the verdict. Taylor v. State, 128 Ga. App. 13 (195 SE2d 294); Ryder v. State, 121 Ga. App. 796 (3) (175 SE2d 882). It should also be noted that after the colloquy defendant’s counsel commented about the charge on recent possession but made no objection or motion for mistrial as to the judge’s answer to the foreman.
In our opinion the defendant received a fair trial.

Judgment affirmed.

Bell, C. J., Eberhardt, P. J., Deen and Stolz, JJ., concur. Pannell, J., concurs in the judgment. Quillian, Evans and Clark, JJ., dissent.