Court Opinion

ID: 9685782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:02:51.895028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:10.451865
License: Public Domain

SABERS, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent. The following facts raise jury questions under Wilson v. Great Northern Railway, 83 S.D. 207, 212, 157 N.W.2d 19, 21 (1968), and prevent summary judgment:
(1) the history of credit in this case;
*358(2) the affirmative duty on the part of the agent to notify the insured that credit can no longer be extended to her, (This duty would arise on the part of the agent — rather than the company — from a simple review of his own accounts.);
(3) the telephone call from the insured to the agent;
(4) the insured’s trip to the agent’s office;
(5) the telephone call from the insured concerning the appraisal of personal property;
(6) the delivery of the appraisal report by the insured to the agent’s office and no call back to the insured from the agent.
Reasonable minds can certainly differ as to each of the above matters. In addition, a factual dispute exists as to whether agent Montgomery’s prior permission to pay late (on credit) was express or implied. This is so because in prior years, Montgomery billed Heikes after the due dates of the insurance policy.
In summary judgment, “the successful movant must show by evidence of appropriate evidentiary quality, that every state of facts is excluded except that which entitled him to relief.” Sword v. Fox, 317 F.Supp. 1055 (D.C.Va.1970), reversed on merits 446 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir.1971). The trial court does not have discretion under SDCL 15-6-56 to resolve disputed factual issues on a summary judgment motion. The trial court has only the power to determine whether such issues exist. Having identified such issues, summary judgment is precluded. As stated in 10A Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2725, at 104-109 (1983):
When applying Rule 56(c) standard, the judge cannot summarily try the facts; his role is limited to applying the law to the facts that have been established by the litigants’ papers. Therefore, a party moving for summary judgment is not entitled to a judgment merely because the facts he offers seems more plausible than those tendered in opposition.... Therefore, if the evidence presented on the motion is subject to conflicting interpretations or reasonable men might differ as to its significance, summary judgment is improper.
Therefore, I would reverse and remand for a trial.