Court Opinion

ID: 9483742
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:30:27.089057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:49.001002
License: Public Domain

KENNEDY, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority that neither greed nor the danger to society from distribution of the narcotics in this case is a legitimate reason to depart upward. Both of these factors have already been taken into account in setting the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“U.S.S.G.” or “Guidelines”). Since each of these factors is involved in nearly all drug crimes, to allow either to serve as a justification for upward departure where the amount of narcotics, although large, is not unusual, would undermine the standardization of sentencing which is the very core purpose behind the Guidelines. I dissent, however, from the Panel’s ultimate conclusion that defendant’s sentence should be vacated and remanded for resentencing.
After setting out the framework for reviewing upward departures as set forth in United States v. Joan, 883 F.2d 491, 494 (6th Cir.1989), the majority fails to apply Joan’s three-step test. I believe in doing so it misstates the law of this Circuit as required by United States v. Rodriguez, 882 F.2d 1059 (6th Cir.1989). In Rodriguez, the Court was faced with an upward departure based in part on factors not permitted under the Guidelines. The district court in Rodriguez, in stating the reasons for departing upward, referred to the defendant’s national origin and inability to speak English. After recognizing the impermissibility of these factors and removing them from consideration, the Rodriguez panel then went on to apply the three-step test for reviewing departures, basing its review on the remaining, permissible factors. Finding that the remaining valid factors were sufficient to justify the upward departure, it affirmed.
Here, too, the District Court relied on both impermissible and permissible factors. After removing from consideration defendant’s greed and the danger to society from distribution of narcotics, I believe we should determine (1) whether the kind or degree of circumstances in the case justify a departure, (2) whether the District Court’s factual determinations with regard to those circumstances are not clearly erroneous, and (3) whether the direction and scope of the departure are reasonable. Joan, 883 F.2d at 494; Rodriguez, 882 F.2d at 1067.
Because no specific Guideline applies to the crime for which defendant was convicted, 21 U.S.C. § 863, the District Court followed the mandate of U.S.S.G. Appendix A, applying the next most analogous Guideline, section 2D1.7, unlawful sale of paraphernalia. As the Panel acknowledges, Application Note 1 to 2D1.7 states the typical case anticipated by the section involves “small-scale trafficking.” Application Note 1 then explicitly directs that in “a case involving a large-scale dealer, distributor, or manufacturer, an upward departure may be warranted.” From January 1990 to May 1991, defendant sold enough lidocaine to facilitate the distribution of over 100 kilograms of cocaine. His profit from these sales was at least 161,00o.1 Under the first prong of the Joan test, I would find that these circumstances — referred to by the District Court in sentencing as the seriousness of the offense — are of a kind and degree justifying a departure. Under the second prong, the record does not indicate that the District Court was clearly erroneous in the factual findings upon *1025which these circumstances are based. Finally, considering the magnitude of drug sales facilitated by defendant and the Application Note’s recognition that it may be inadequate for larger-scale sellers, I would find that the upward direction and the scope of the departure were both reasonable. As a result, I would affirm.

. I do not understand the significance of the statement in the majority opinion: "While Gray’s sales might constitute large scale’ trafficking, he did sell the lidocaine hydrochloride ‘from a retail establishment that also sells items that are not unlawful,’ and the $61,000 he made from the sales did span approximately seventeen months.” Defendant at plea admitted he had profits of $61,000 from lidocaine hydrochloride sales to one Decker and knew it was being used by Decker to prepare cocaine to be ingested into the human body.