Court Opinion

ID: 9947095
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-02 01:02:02.235243+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:46.719609
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/1/24 P. v. Lacerda CA6
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                      SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          H049690, H049749
                                                                      (Santa Clara County
           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  Super. Ct. Nos. C2013908, C2005357,
                                                                      C2104499, C2105945)
           v.

 PAUL LACERDA,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Paul Lacerda was convicted by a jury of various offenses in case
No. C2013908 (unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code): assault with a
deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); counts 1 and 5); making a criminal threat (§ 422,
subd. (a); count 2); felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1); counts 3 and 6); misdemeanor
vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(2)(A); count 4); vehicle theft (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a);
count 7); attempted robbery (§§ 212.5, subd. (c), 664; count 8); reckless driving (Veh.
Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a); count 9); two counts of hit-and-run (Veh. Code, § 20002,
subd. (a); counts 12, 15); petty theft (§ 488; count 17); battery on a person with whom
defendant had a dating relationship (§ 243, subd. (e)(1); count 18); infliction of corporal
injury on a person with whom defendant had a dating relationship (§ 273.5, subd. (a);
count 20); and seven counts of contempt of court (§ 166, subd. (c)(1); counts 10, 11, 13,
14, 16, 19 and 21). The charges in case No. C2013908 all stemmed from defendant’s
conduct toward a woman who was the subject of a protective order against him.
Defendant also resolved three trailing felony cases by negotiated disposition and was
sentenced to a term of five years eight months in prison.
       On appeal, defendant challenges certain convictions in case No. C2013908. He
contends his convictions on counts 1, 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 16, 17, 18, and 19 must be
reversed due to the erroneous admission of testimonial hearsay evidence under the
doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing. He contends his conviction on count 5 for assault
with a deadly weapon must be reversed due to instructional error, and his conviction on
count 2 for making a criminal threat must be reversed due to insufficient evidence. He
also raises various objections to his sentence. We will reverse the conviction for assault
with a deadly weapon due to prejudice from the instructional error. We will uphold
defendant’s remaining convictions, and remand for possible retrial on the reversed count
as well as resentencing.
                                    I.   BACKGROUND
       The charges in case No. C2013908 arose from seven separate incidents between
August 2020 and February 2021. We briefly summarize the trial testimony regarding
only two of the incidents, as the facts of the other five events are not directly relevant to
the issues raised on appeal (although we note that they included acts of domestic
violence).
   A. THE AUGUST INCIDENT
       According to evidence introduced at trial, defendant and his former girlfriend R.G.
were arguing at a hotel. They left the hotel and had a conversation in the parking lot.
Defendant asked R.G. to “ ‘take a drive up the mountain’ ” with him, but she refused, as
the last time they had driven up the mountain together, defendant drove so fast that she
thought he was trying to kill them both. She instead told defendant to leave her alone.
As she began to drive away from the hotel, defendant told her, “ ‘watch, I’m gonna make
sure I run you off the road and kill you.’ ” She initially thought “nothing of it” because
defendant had “said it before” but “never did anything like that.” But defendant
proceeded to follow her and drive his car into hers multiple times. She called 911 and

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told the dispatcher that defendant was “going crazy.” The 911 transcript indicates she
was crying as she explained that defendant had hit her car and she believed he had a gun.
       A bystander also called 911 to report seeing R.G.’s sedan leave the hotel parking
lot, followed by defendant’s large SUV which rammed into the rear of the sedan at a
speed of roughly 30 to 35 miles per hour, then again at roughly 20 to 25 miles per hour.
The SUV continued to follow the sedan down the street, and the witness also followed
the two cars but “lost view of them for a few minutes” until she saw the sedan parked in a
church parking lot. The SUV left the parking lot as the witness pulled in. The witness
parked and spoke to R.G., who seemed very upset and out of breath from crying. The
rear of the sedan “was just totally smashed in.” When the witness asked R.G. whether
she knew the driver of the SUV, R.G. replied that “it was her ex-boyfriend, and that he
was trying to kill her.”
       Another witness was washing his car in the church parking lot when he saw the
sedan pull in. The SUV passed the church, reversed, and turned into the parking lot. As
the sedan attempted to leave the lot, the SUV collided with it from behind at a speed of
roughly 25 miles per hour. The SUV reversed, collided with the sedan again, and
continued moving forward with its tires screeching. It pushed the sedan forward a
distance of roughly 10 feet, “almost going on top of the” sedan at one point. The SUV
then left the parking lot and drove away at a high speed.
       As a result of the incident, defendant was charged with assault with a deadly
weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 1), making a criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a);
count 2), and contempt of court (§ 166, subd. (c)(1); count 10).
   B. THE DECEMBER 2020 INCIDENT
       R.G. called 911 while driving and told the dispatcher that defendant was following
her. She said defendant was “getting really close to” her car and “trying to hit” it. She
told the dispatcher she was afraid defendant was about to “whack” her car or throw
something at her window. Shortly after that, she said defendant was “hitting” her car and
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explained that he had “banged” it from behind with his car. She also told the dispatcher
that defendant had a large flashlight and she was “scared he will throw it at the window.”
Defendant threw the flashlight at the car, shattering the windshield.
       A police officer responded to R.G.’s 911 call and spoke to her. She told him she
went to visit defendant and they got into an argument. Defendant told her to return the
rental car she was driving, and he followed her to make sure she returned it. When
defendant realized she was not going to return the car, he “got next to” her car and yelled
at her to turn around. She turned around but again did not stop to return the car, at which
point defendant “banged the car. … [¶] … from the back.” In her words, defendant
“barely” hit her car and “didn’t do it that hard.” She kept driving, and defendant collided
with her car again from the side. Defendant pulled ahead of her, stopped, and got out of
his car. She stopped as well, and defendant approached her car with the flashlight that he
later threw at the windshield. The responding officer noticed “a smashed window on the
front windshield” of R.G.’s car, as well as damage to “the front left or driver’s side
corner panel and bumper” and “a small scratch on the rear bumper of the vehicle.”
       As a result of the incident, defendant was charged with assault with a deadly
weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1); count 5), felony vandalism (§ 594, subd. (b)(1); count 6),
contempt of court (§ 166, subd. (c)(1); count 14), and hit-and-run (Veh. Code, § 20002,
subd. (a); count 15).
   C. RECORDED JAIL CALLS
       Between March and August of 2021, while defendant was incarcerated, he made
numerous phone calls to R.G. and other women. In his conversations with R.G., he
repeatedly asked her not to cooperate with the prosecution. Defendant’s statements
included: “You’re not gonna show up for court, right baby?”; “Please don’t show up for
court, please, love?”; “You’re not gonna show up for court, right?”; “Don’t show up for
court, either, please”; “don’t come to court, okay?”; and “You get subpoenaed, you just
get, you just plead the Fifth.” He also told R.G. not to “fall off on” him. In April 2021,
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defendant told another woman that he did not trust R.G. and did not want to talk to her
but had to “fuckin’ stick to this bitch because of everything that’s going on in this court,
this, this shit, you know.” Defendant told the woman he wanted to marry her. Three
days later, he asked R.G. to marry him. On two occasions in May 2021, defendant told
another woman that he gave R.G. a car to keep her from showing up to court.
       The prosecution moved for a ruling that R.G.’s statements to police and 911
dispatchers were admissible under the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, as codified
in Evidence Code section 1390. The trial court granted the motion, basing its decision on
statements from the jail calls. In August 2021, the prosecution called R.G. as a witness at
defendant’s trial. She informed the court that she would be exercising her Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, at which point she was granted
immunity. The court explained to her that because she was granted immunity, she had to
answer questions and could be held in contempt of court if she refused to do so. She
nonetheless refused to answer the prosecutor’s questions. The court found her in
contempt of court, ruled she was unavailable under Evidence Code section 240, and
admitted her out-of-court statements into evidence.
   D. CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCE
       The jury found defendant guilty of all charges in case No. C2013908. Following
his trial, defendant pleaded no contest in case No. C2005357 to two counts of second
degree burglary (§ 460, subd. (b)), two counts of grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), and one
count of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)). In case No. C2104499, he pleaded
no contest to possessing a firearm as a convicted felon (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)) and
resisting a peace officer (§ 148, subd. (a)(1)). He also pleaded no contest to reckless
driving (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) in case No. 2105945.
       The trial court sentenced defendant to five years eight months in prison.
Defendant’s sentence in case No. C2013908 included the upper term of four years for
assault with a deadly weapon (count 1), a concurrent upper term of four years for vehicle
                                              5
theft (count 7), and concurrent upper terms of three years for making a criminal threat,
felony vandalism, attempted robbery, and reckless driving (counts 2, 6, 8, 9). The court
sentenced defendant to concurrent middle terms in the trailing felony cases.
                                   II.   DISCUSSION
   A. ADMISSIBILITY OF THE VICTIM’S TESTIMONIAL STATEMENTS
       Defendant contends his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses against him
was violated by the admission of R.G.’s out-of-court statements under the doctrine of
forfeiture by wrongdoing. Under the Sixth Amendment’s confrontation clause,
testimonial hearsay generally cannot be introduced at trial unless the defendant has had
an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant. (Crawford v. Washington (2004)
541 U.S. 36, 68.) The doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing “extinguishes confrontation
claims on essentially equitable grounds” and has been accepted by the United States
Supreme Court as an exception to the general rule. (Id. at p. 62.) That doctrine, as set
forth in Evidence Code section 1390, allows for the admission of hearsay evidence
“against a party that has engaged, or aided and abetted, in the wrongdoing that was
intended to, and did, procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness.” (Evid.
Code, § 1390, subd. (a).)
       The trial court found R.G.’s statements admissible based on the “many jail calls”
between defendant and R.G., as well as “calls by defendant to other individuals when he
indicated his true feelings about the victim” and explained that actions and statements
“such as offering to marry her and giving her a car were done and said just to get her to
not appear in court.” Defendant does not appear to contest the trial court’s factual
findings regarding intent and causation, but argues he did not engage in conduct
sufficient to constitute “wrongdoing” as a matter of law. The Attorney General contends
defendant’s statements on the jail calls rose to the level of “wrongdoing” and,
alternatively, any error was harmless as to certain counts because certain out-of-court

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statements were also admitted as nontestimonial spontaneous statements under Evidence
Code section 1240. Finding no error, we need not reach the issue of prejudice.
       Both parties cite People v. Reneaux (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 852 (Reneaux), a case
in which the defendant’s statements to the victim in two jail calls made four months apart
were found sufficient to constitute wrongdoing. (Id. at p. 878.) Although Reneaux’s
statements “were not explicitly threatening or directive” (Id. at p. 868), the Reneaux court
reasoned that “in the context of domestic violence offenses and abusive relationships,
which typically include an element of inherent psychological coercion,” verbal conduct
may rise to the level of wrongdoing even if not explicitly threatening. (Ibid.) We agree
with that principle and find it applicable to defendant’s conduct. The record suggests that
defendant regularly contacted R.G. over a period of months and misled her about the
nature of his feelings toward her, for the purpose of keeping her entangled in their
relationship so that she would refuse to testify against him. He repeatedly asked her not
to come to court, instructed her to “plead the Fifth” instead of testifying, thanked her
when she described hanging up on a prosecutor calling about the case, and told her she
was doing a “good job” by not cooperating with the prosecution. On this record, we find
he engaged in wrongdoing.
       Defendant’s actions here go beyond those of the defendant in Reneaux, who
contacted the victim on only two occasions (Reneaux, supra, 50 Cal.App.5th at pp. 859–
860), and fall within the range of conduct that has been deemed wrongdoing in other
cases. (See Steele v. Taylor (6th Cir. 1982) 684 F.2d 1193, 1201, fn. 10.) “Wrongful
conduct obviously includes the use of force and threats, but it has also been held to
include persuasion and control by a defendant, the wrongful nondisclosure of
information, and a defendant’s direction to a witness to exercise the fifth amendment
privilege.” (Id. at p. 1201.) Although we acknowledge that Evidence Code section 1390
requires a finding of wrongdoing in addition to findings of intent and causation, that
threshold is met on this record by defendant’s persistent and manipulative
                                              7
communications to and about R.G. We express no opinion as to whether a different set
of facts might lead to a different conclusion.
   B. INHERENTLY DEADLY WEAPON INSTRUCTION
       Defendant was charged with two counts of assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245,
subd. (a)(1); counts 1, 5). With respect to those counts, the trial court instructed the jury
on the definition of a “deadly weapon” as follows: “A deadly weapon other than a
firearm is any object, instrument, or weapon that is inherently deadly or one that is used
in such a way that it is capable of causing and likely to cause death or great bodily
injury.” The parties correctly agree that the court’s instruction was erroneous under the
circumstances, as held by the California Supreme Court in People v. Aledamat (2019)
8 Cal.5th 1 (Aledamat), because the weapon defendant was accused of using (a car) is not
inherently deadly as a matter of law and constitutes a deadly weapon only if used as such.
Defendant contends the error was prejudicial as to count 5, without challenging his
conviction on count 1, while the Attorney General argues the error was harmless because
the jury could not have found defendant guilty without finding that he used the car in
such a way as to make it a deadly weapon.
       “Only a few items that are designed to be used as deadly weapons are inherently
deadly.” (Aledamat, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 8.) In cases involving other weapons, the
instruction given here is legally erroneous and requires reversal unless harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt. (Id. at pp. 7–9.) The jury in Aledamat received an additional
instruction, which applied to a special allegation rather than the charge of assault with a
deadly weapon: “ ‘In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all of the
surrounding circumstances including when and where the object was possessed and any
other evidence that indicates whether the object would be used for a dangerous rather
than a harmless purpose.’ ” (Id. at pp. 4–5.) On the basis of that additional instruction,
the Supreme Court found it unlikely that the jury would have found the weapon in
question (a box cutter) “inherently deadly” for purposes of the assault charge “without
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considering the circumstances, including how defendant used it.” (Id. at p. 14.) Here, the
jury was instructed: “In deciding whether an object is a deadly weapon, consider all the
surrounding circumstances.” But the jury was not specifically instructed to consider the
manner in which the object was used, and we are thus less confident than the Supreme
Court in Aledamat that the jury necessarily did so.
       Given the erroneous instruction and the facts of the December incident, the jury
could have found defendant guilty on count 5 based on the mistaken belief that his car
could be considered “inherently deadly” without finding that it was a deadly weapon as
used. There was relatively minor damage to R.G.’s car beyond that caused by the
flashlight, which was not alleged to be a deadly weapon, and she told police that
defendant “barely” hit her car and “didn’t do it that hard.” Under those facts, we cannot
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict,
because a properly instructed juror could entertain a doubt about whether defendant used
his car in a manner likely to cause death or great bodily injury. The jury was instructed
that an object can be “inherently deadly” even if not used in such a manner, and the jury
was not provided with the legal definition of “inherently deadly” weapon. As a result,
jurors could have relied on the known dangers associated with driving to determine that
defendant’s car was “inherently deadly.” Coupled with the factual uncertainty regarding
whether defendant used the car as a deadly weapon, we do not find the instructional error
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
   C. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE OF A CRIMINAL THREAT
       Defendant argues there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction for
making a criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a); count 2). “In assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence, we review the entire record in the light most favorable to the judgment to
determine whether it discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value
such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.” (People v. Bolin (1998) 18 Cal.4th 297, 331 (Bolin).) We presume the
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“existence of every fact that the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence”
to support the judgment. (People v. Medina (2009) 46 Cal.4th 913, 919.) To overturn a
conviction, “it must clearly appear that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient
substantial evidence to support it.” (People v. Redmond (1969) 71 Cal.2d 745, 755.)
       The crime of making a criminal threat has five elements, one of which is “that the
threat actually caused the person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for his or her own
safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety[.]’ ” (People v. Toledo (2001)
26 Cal.4th 221, 228, citing Bolin, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 337–340, fn. 13.) Defendant
asserts that the element of sustained fear was not proven in his case because his threat to
“ ‘run [R.G.] off the road and kill [her]’ ” did not actually cause her to fear for her own
safety, as evidenced by her statement to police that she thought “nothing of it” at first.
But defendant cites no authority supporting his position that the fear must be felt
immediately, and ample evidence supports the inference that events shortly following
defendant’s issuance of the threat caused R.G. to fear that defendant intended to act on
his statement to her.
       R.G. told police that, on one earlier occasion, defendant had driven so fast with her
in the car that she thought he was trying to kill them both. On the day of the charged
crime, defendant and R.G. argued at a hotel. As she left in her car, he told her, “ ‘watch,
I’m gonna make sure I run you off the road and kill you.’ ” He then immediately
followed her and drove his car into hers multiple times, causing serious damage to her car
and leading bystanders to fear for her safety. R.G. called 911 to report that defendant
was “going crazy” and hitting her car. The transcript states that she was crying, as did a
witness who spoke with her at the scene of the incident. The witness said R.G. seemed
extremely upset and told her that the other driver “was her ex-boyfriend, and that he was
trying to kill her.” A jury could reasonably conclude from the evidence that, even if
initially unalarmed by defendant’s threat, R.G. almost immediately came to fear that

                                             10
defendant would act on it. While it is possible for a victim’s fear to be so attenuated from
the alleged threat as to render it legally insufficient, that is not the case here.
   D. SENTENCING ISSUES
       The parties correctly agree that defendant’s sentences on counts 10, 11, 13, 14, 16,
19, and 21 should be stayed under section 654; the one-year sentences on the
misdemeanor counts 12, 15, and 17 were unauthorized as exceeding the six-month
maximum; and defendant’s parole period should be reduced from three years to two years
consistent with a legislative change that applies retroactively. We accept the Attorney
General’s concessions on those points, and the trial court will be required to resentence
defendant accordingly on remand.
       Defendant raises a fourth challenge to his sentence, which the Attorney General
contests. When the trial court sentenced defendant in December 2021, Senate Bill
No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.; eff. Jan. 1, 2022) was not yet in effect but it applies
retroactively to his case. Senate Bill No. 567 amended section 1170, subdivision (b) to
allow an aggravated prison term to be imposed only if the aggravating factors supporting
it are admitted by the defendant or found true by a jury. (Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3.)
Here, the parties identify two aggravating factors that were cited by the trial court as
grounds for defendant’s upper term sentence but were not admitted by defendant or found
true by the jury: that the “crime involved great violence, great bodily harm, threat of
great bodily harm, or other acts disclosing a high degree of cruelty, viciousness, or
callousness” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(1)) and that “defendant was armed with
or used a weapon at the time of the commission of the crime” (id., rule 4.421(a)(2)). The
parties agree that one of those factors, defendant’s use of a weapon, should not have been
used to impose an upper term for assault with a deadly weapon on count 1 because use of
a weapon is an element of that offense. (See id., rule 4.420(h).) Defendant urges us to
remand the matter for resentencing, while the Attorney General argues that remand is
unnecessary because the sentencing errors were harmless.
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       As we have explained, we will reverse defendant’s conviction on count 5 due to
instructional error, and the prosecution may retry that count on remand. (See People v.
Hallock (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 595, 607.) Even if the prosecution elects not to do so,
resentencing is appropriate. (See People v. Buycks (2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893.) We will
therefore remand the matter for possible retrial and resentencing, without considering
whether the trial court’s reliance on improper factors in sentencing defendant to an upper
term was prejudicial. On remand, the trial court will be required to resentence defendant
in accordance with all applicable law, including section 1170 as amended by Senate Bill
No. 567.
                                  III.   DISPOSITION
       The judgments are reversed, and the matter is remanded to the trial court with
instructions to vacate defendant’s conviction on count 5 in case No. C2013908.
Defendant may be retried on that count. Following retrial, or the prosecution’s election
not to proceed with retrial, the trial court shall resentence defendant in a manner
consistent with this opinion.

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                               ____________________________________
                               Grover, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________
Lie, J.

____________________________
Bromberg, J.

H049690, H049749
People v. Lacerda