Court Opinion

ID: 9384618
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-04 16:00:32.922158+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:55.202542
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                             For the Eighth Circuit
                         ___________________________

                                 No. 22-1558
                         ___________________________

                             United States of America

                                       Plaintiff - Appellee

                                         v.

     Christopher Covey Dale Truax, also known as Christopher Dale Sinchak

                                    Defendant - Appellant
                                  ____________

                      Appeal from United States District Court
                     for the District of South Dakota - Western
                                    ____________

                          Submitted: December 16, 2022
                              Filed: April 4, 2023
                                 ____________

Before LOKEN, ERICKSON, and KOBES, Circuit Judges.
                           ____________

ERICKSON, Circuit Judge.

       A jury convicted Christopher Truax of attempted enticement of a minor using
the internet, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). Truax appeals, asserting three
claims: the district court1 (1) abused its discretion when it allowed the prosecution

      1
       The Honorable Jeffrey L. Viken, United States District Judge for the District
of South Dakota.
to impeach him using evidence not disclosed prior to trial; (2) committed plain error
when it allowed the prosecutor to attack his credibility during rebuttal closing
argument; and (3) imposed a substantively unreasonable sentence. We affirm.

I.    BACKGROUND

       During the summer of 2020, law enforcement conducted an undercover
operation targeting child exploitation during an annual motorcycle rally held in
Sturgis, South Dakota. As part of the operation, Rapid City Police Detective Elliott
Harding posed as “Cassie Mae” on Tinder, an internet dating app. The profile
created by Detective Harding described Cassie Mae as 19 years old. On August 11,
2020, Truax messaged Cassie Mae through Tinder, and the pair eventually moved
their discussion to text messages outside the app. Between August 11 and August
13, Cassie Mae and Truax shared a series of photographs and messages, including a
message in which Cassie Mae informed Truax that she was 13 years old and had
misrepresented her age on her Tinder profile. Truax told Cassie Mae that he was
“okay with [her] age.”

       Ultimately, Truax agreed to pick Cassie Mae up at a middle school, describing
in detail the sexual contact he intended to have with her. When Truax arrived in the
vicinity of the school on August 13 at the agreed upon time, he was arrested. A
search of Truax’s van revealed a handgun, items used during sexual activity, and
Truax’s cell phone containing the messages he exchanged with Cassie Mae. Truax
later explained to the officers that he lived in his van.

        Truax was indicted on two charges: (1) attempted enticement of a minor using
the internet, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b); and (2) possession of a firearm by
a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The case
proceeded to a jury trial on the enticement count and Truax chose to testify. Truax
testified that he was depressed and suicidal at the time of his arrest, that he knew
officers conducted an annual undercover operation during Rally Week, and that he
believed Cassie Mae was an undercover agent when he texted her. He asserted that
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his conversations with the agent were intended to set up a suicide by cop. During
direct examination, defense counsel observed Truax having a “physical reaction.”
Following a short break, defense counsel sought and was granted an overnight recess
to determine whether Truax could continue testifying.

       Truax’s testimony resumed the following day. On cross examination, the
prosecutor asked Truax whether he remembered a jail phone call with his aunt on
October 2, 2021, which was approximately one month prior to trial. The defense
objected and a discussion was held at sidebar. The defense claimed surprise,
asserting the prosecution had failed to disclose any phone calls during discovery. In
response, the prosecutor explained the evidence had been disclosed that morning
because she had only learned of the phone call the night before when an officer told
her that Truax had a phone conversation with his aunt asking for three books. The
books included Win Your Case: How to Present, Persuade, and Prevail-Every Place,
Every Time by Gerry Spence (the “Spence Book”). The prosecutor indicated that jail
records showed the Spence Book was received by Truax on October 11.

      The prosecution concluded the Spence Book was appropriate for
impeachment because it taught that to prevail at trial, a defendant must make himself
vulnerable, talk about his fears, and generally use theatrics to persuade the jurors.
The prosecutor argued the book was relevant because she believed Truax was
following the strategies outlined in the book. The district court ruled that using
limited excerpts from the Spence Book was appropriate for impeachment if Truax
had received and read the book. No questioning was allowed on the phone call.
When cross examination resumed, Truax admitted receiving and reading the Spence
Book, testifying that he had read it “cover to cover,” including the chapter about
preparing for cross examination. The prosecutor recounted excerpts from the book,
some of which Truax recalled and some of which he did not.

      Truax’s claim that he arrived at the meeting location planning to commit
suicide by cop was called into question by Special Agent Brent Gromer’s testimony.
Agent Gromer testified that Truax’s claim of suicidal intention was inconsistent with
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his behavior at the time of arrest. Agent Gromer believed that Truax’s driving
behavior suggested he was engaging in “counter surveillance” to determine whether
any police were present at the scene before parking his van. In addition, at the time
of arrest, Truax asked law enforcement not to point a firearm at him.

       During closing argument, the prosecutor discounted Truax’s claim that he had
a suicidal intention when he drove to meet Cassie Mae. The prosecutor argued the
only evidence of depression was from Truax’s own testimony, and Truax’s actions
at the scene did not demonstrate a person who intended to commit suicide by cop.
The prosecutor asked the jury to consider each witness’s motive for testifying and
whether Truax’s testimony was “theatrics.” On rebuttal, the prosecutor stated, “[O]n
the stand, having been coached by Gerry Spence, [Truax] knew exactly how to try
to play on your emotions. Voice fear. Cry. Show them your heart. It’s a pounding
heart. Ladies and gentlemen, that was a show. That wasn’t fact. That was theatrics
to play on your emotions.”

       The jury found Truax guilty. At sentencing, the district court calculated an
adjusted Sentencing Guidelines range of 135 to 168 months. After considering the
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and noting that Truax had a prior conviction for a sex
offense involving a child—which suggested a risk of recidivism—and Truax’s
“roving van” lifestyle that would complicate supervised release, the district court
imposed a 168-month term of imprisonment and lifetime supervision.

II.   ANALYSIS

       Truax asserts, over his objections at trial, the district court erred by allowing
the government to use the Spence Book to impeach him because it was not timely
disclosed during discovery. We review a decision declining to exclude evidence for
a violation of Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for abuse of
discretion, and the court’s subsidiary factual findings for clear error. United States
v. Crumble, 965 F.3d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 2020).

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       While the parties spend much time arguing the parameters of Rule 16(a), that
issue is immaterial. At no point did the district court receive any recorded statement
of the defendant. The only testimony in the record is that Truax was asked if he had
a phone conversation with his aunt on October 2, 2021. Truax stated he had no
specific recollection of the call, at which time the defense objected. While the
government inquired about the phone call, neither it nor its contents were ever
presented to the jury. No statement by Truax was ever elicited or even sought to be
elicited. Rather, the contentious issue involves a failure to disclose, before trial, the
Spence Book and whether it was appropriate for impeachment purposes. Here, the
government only became aware of the Spence Book the evening before its disclosure
when an officer told the prosecutor that Truax had received a copy of it while in jail
awaiting trial. Because the Spence Book was in the possession and knowledge of
Truax, the government was under no burden to produce it—it already being in
Truax’s personal possession.

       The district court’s ruling prohibited any further discussion about recorded
phone calls but allowed cross examination on the Spence Book if the prosecution
established Truax had received the book and read it. After the proper foundation
was laid, the examination, with excerpts from the Spence Book, was appropriate for
use as impeachment. But, even if the Spence Book had not been in Truax’s
possession, the prosecution did not know of the book’s relevance until Truax took
the stand and testified. The book was then promptly disclosed by the prosecution as
soon as its relevance was discovered. There is no evidence in this record of an
intentional delay or bad faith by the government. Under these circumstances, the
district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the limited inquiries.

      Even if the evidence should have been excluded, any error was harmless
because it neither affected Truax’s substantial rights nor had more than a slight
influence on the verdict. See United States v. Eason, 829 F.3d 633, 638 (8th Cir.
2016). Attempted enticement of a minor requires that Truax knowingly use a means
or facility of interstate or foreign commerce to persuade, induce, or entice an
individual under age 18 to engage in sexual activity, knowing the individual was
                                          -5-
under 18, and if the sexual activity had occurred, Truax could have been charged
with a criminal offense under South Dakota law. See 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). The
uncontroverted evidence established that Truax used his cell phone to send Tinder
and text messages to what he believed was an underage girl. Truax’s presence in the
vicinity of the pre-arranged meeting place, the graphic nature of the messages, and
the items found in Truax’s van, demonstrated that he intended to engage in sexual
activity with a girl he understood to be 13 years old. Without the Spence Book
evidence, there was abundant evidence from which the jury could conclude beyond
a reasonable doubt that Truax committed the offense of attempted enticement of a
minor using the internet.

       Truax next argues the district court erred when it permitted the prosecutor to
state during rebuttal closing argument that Truax’s testimony was uncorroborated
and not based on facts, and that his behavior while testifying was a “show” and
“theatrics.” Under plain error review, the burden rests on Truax to show there is a
reasonable probability the outcome would have been different in the absence of the
alleged error. United States v. Darden, 688 F.3d 382, 388 (8th Cir. 2012). Reversal
is appropriate only if: “(1) the prosecutor’s remarks were improper, and (2) such
remarks prejudiced the defendant’s rights in obtaining a fair trial.” United States v.
Herbst, 668 F.3d 580, 586 (8th Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted).

      While a prosecutor may not express a personal opinion about a defendant’s
credibility, it is not improper for a prosecutor to suggest the jury should not believe
a defendant’s testimony, so long as the suggestion is based on evidence contrary to
the defendant’s testimony. See United States v. Jones, 865 F.2d 188, 191 (8th Cir.
1989) (noting it is permissible for a prosecutor to make arguments that fairly
characterize uncontroverted evidence). Here, the prosecutor argued that Agent
Gromer’s testimony refuted Truax’s claim that his conduct was an attempt to commit
suicide by cop. That said, the prosecutor’s florid language in the rebuttal argument
presents a close question related to propriety. Even assuming the argument was
improper, there is no reasonable probability that Truax would have been acquitted
without the statements. Given the overwhelming evidence against Truax, he cannot
                                         -6-
show the remarks were clearly injurious, or that prejudice resulted. Moses v. Union
Pacific R.R., 64 F.3d 413, 417 (8th Cir. 1995).

       Finally, Truax challenges the substantive reasonableness of his sentence,
which we review for abuse of discretion. United States v. Staten, 990 F.3d 631, 636
(8th Cir. 2021). After considering and weighing the § 3553(a) factors, the district
court imposed a within-Guidelines sentence, which is presumed to be reasonable.
See United States v. Deegan, 605 F.3d 625, 634 (8th Cir. 2010). Truax believes the
district court should have weighed the factors differently, but this type of
disagreement is not a ground for reversal, particularly when, as here, the district
court gave a “reasoned basis” for the sentence imposed. United States v. Bridges,
569 F.3d 374, 379 (8th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted).

III.   CONCLUSION

       For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
                       ______________________________

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