Court Opinion

ID: 9773145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:38:21.558001+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:50.380132
License: Public Domain

PEEPLES, Justice,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The majority’s treatment of this Almanza case is almost indistinguishable from the review of an ordinary appeal in which error was preserved. In my view, appellant has not shown egregious harm.
Because appellant did not object to the charge or ask for an accomplice instruction, we cannot reverse for failure to give that instruction unless he has established egregious harm, which means that a review of the entire record shows that he “has not had a fair and impartial trial.” Almanza v. State, 686 S.W.2d 157, 171-74 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (on reh’g). The record must show “actual, not just theoretical, harm to the accused.” Id. at 174. Moreover, we must consider the entire record, including the jury arguments, which appellant has not made part of our record:
In both situations [where error was preserved and where it was not] the actual degree of harm must be assayed in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the contested issues and weight of probative evidence, the argument of counsel and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the trial as a whole.
Id. at 171 (emphasis added).
I agree that the accomplice Woodley’s testimony was critical to the state’s case, but the real question is the strength of the evidence to corroborate his testimony. To carry his burden under Almanza appellant must show that there is a good chance that if the accomplice charge had been given the jury would have acquitted him on reasoning something like this: (1) Woodley’s testimony is not corroborated by other facts tending to connect appellant to the crime of conspiracy; (2) therefore we cannot consider Woodley’s testimony; (3) without Wood-ley’s testimony there is not enough evidence to convict; (4) therefore we must acquit. I cannot agree that appellant has suffered egregious harm — that he has been denied a fair and impartial trial — in view of the evidence corroborating Woodley’s testimony and connecting appellant to the offense. In other words appellant has not established step one in the above sequence. There is almost no likelihood that a jury would have found the evidence insufficient to corroborate Woodley’s testimony and to connect appellant to the offense of conspiracy to commit arson.
There is substantial evidence to corroborate Woodley’s testimony and connect appellant to the conspiracy. Woodley testified that appellant offered him $7,500 to burn down his house, but that he said no, that appellant then found someone else to do the burning and wanted Woodley to safeguard an arrowhead collection and an old gun at his house, and that in a day or two these items showed up in his garage. Woodley also testified that appellant later gave him a key to the house so that he could remove other irreplaceable possessions for safekeeping until after the fire: another old gun, a silver set, and a gold chain necklace. After the fire appellant and Woodley hid these items elsewhere, and eventually the police recovered them after Woodley revealed their location. Each of these items — two guns, silver set, necklace, and arrowhead collection — was recovered and introduced into evidence, providing tangible, visible corroboration for Woodley’s testimony and connecting appellant to the crime of conspiracy to commit arson. It is true that some of these items were ultimately found in appellant’s property, in his guest house, but that is where Woodley said they had been taken.
I stress that not all the property that Woodley held for appellant was found stored in appellant’s guest house. As the majority admits, some of the property that Woodley kept for appellant — part of the *98arrowhead collection and a carbine — was found with Woodley and had not been returned to appellant. In addition Woodley testified that he had kept a submachine gun for appellant, that appellant had reported that it had been lost in the fire, and then to keep the authorities from finding the gun he and appellant threw it into a tank behind appellant’s house. The subma-chine gun was later fished out of the tank by police scuba divers and introduced into evidence, providing further corroboration of Woodley’s testimony and connecting appellant to the conspiracy. These bits of evidence corroborate Woodley’s testimony so convincingly that I cannot see any likelihood that the jury would have found otherwise.
The majority errs in relying on Burns v. State, 703 S.W.2d 649 (Tex.Crim.App.1985), which plainly does not govern this case. In Bums the trial court gave an instruction on accomplice as a matter of fact; appellant preserved error and objected that an accomplice as a matter of law instruction should have been given. Because proper objection had been made, the court expressly said that under Almanza the lesser standard of review (“some harm”) controlled and that the egregious harm standard did not apply. Id. at 651.
Burns does suggest that Gonzales v. State, 441 S.W.2d 539 (Tex.Crim.App.1969), would be applied to Almanza fundamental error appeals, although that issue was not before the court. It is hard to believe that Bums .requires reversal for fundamental error simply because without the accomplice’s testimony there would be insufficient evidence to convict. If that were the law, verdicts would be overturned for un-preserved error even though there was overwhelming corroboration, simply because crucial elements of the state’s case rested entirely on the accomplice’s testimony. In the present case, for example, there is ample evidence corroborating Woodley’s testimony, and it is highly probable that the jury would have so found if there had been an accomplice instruction.
Certainly appellant has not established Almanza error on this incomplete record. On the contrary, the record contains several exhibits that convincingly and graphically corroborate Woodley’s testimony and connect appellant to the conspiracy.