Court Opinion

ID: 9680292
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:28:31.874379+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:27.370916
License: Public Domain

OPINION
MORRISON, Judge.
The offense is assault with intent to murder; the punishment, twenty-five years.
Appellant’s first ground of error relates to the introduction of the evidence, at the punishment stage of the trial, of prior convictions showing his prior criminal record as authorized by Section 3(a) of Article 37.07, V.A.C.C.P., as amended. His contention is that Article 3731a, V.A. C.S., was not complied with in that he was not given notice in advance of the trial that his prior convictions would be introduced, nor were copies of the same furnished appellant a reasonable time before the trial.
Prior to and since the 1965 revision of the Code, this Court has had several occasions to write on this question. Our opinion in Denham v. State, 428 S.W.2d 814, disposes of this contention. Spencer v. State, 164 Tex.Cr.R. 464, 300 S.W.2d 950, relied upon by appellant was involved in the prior convictions alleged in the indictment and was before the enactment of Article 37.07, Vernon’s Ann.C.C.P.
Appellant secondly contends that an exchange between the court and defense counsel constituted a discussion by the court on the weight of the evidence and a comment on the defendant’s failure to testify. Such contention appears to be farfetched. It appears that the court had held a hearing on the admissibility of certain evidence in the absence of the jury and upon the return of the jury gave these instructions to counsel “ * * * and I am instructing the State not to admit (sic) those things that I said shouldn’t be admitted and if the defendant, of course wants to admit them, in fact, part of the things admitted, you have the right to come back and offer the rest if you care to.”
From the above, we can perceive no assistance to the State and no injury to appellant and hence no reversible error.
Appellant further maintains that the court commented on the weight of the evidence in his ruling. Appellant’s brother had testified in the absence of the jury that for three days after the date alleged he had visited appellant in the hospital. In the presence of the jury, he was asked by the defense if he had tried to talk to appellant during the first three days of his confinement. The court sustained an objection and stated in part that to permit the witness to answer might be a conclusion. The court then stated that “those self serving declarations were objected to on that grounds and they should be and would be and I sustained it on that basis.” This was followed by an objection and the court then said: “I haven’t commented on the evidence; I said that the State objected to them being self serving and I *922sustain it on that grounds.” It appears that the court explained away any error he may have made, and no injury has been shown.
The next contention is that the Court refused to permit the witness to testify that appellant did not look like he knew what he was doing at the time of the affray.
In Volume II of McCormick and Ray, Texas Evidence, Section 1428 (Second Edition, 1956) we find the following:
“It is said that since one person cannot possibly know another’s state of mind, his testimony is necessarily based upon conjecture.”
The Court was careful to inform counsel that he might question his witnesses as to appellant’s “eyes, his nose, his mouth, his head, and whether * * * what he was doing, and let the jury determine whether or not he was dazed.”
It appears that the court was closely adhering to the rule set forth above and no error is shown.
Next, appellant asserts that the court erred in refusing to charge on the law of circumstantial evidence. Such a charge is not required where the accused is seen with a gun in his hand, it is heard to discharge, and the injured party sustains a bullet wound.
His next ground of error states that the court erred in failing to charge on a simple and aggravated assault. It is well established that such charges are not required where it is clear that the greater offense had been committed. Barton and Dutton v. State, 162 Tex.Cr.R. 75, 282 S.W.2d 237; Butler v. State, 160 Tex.Cr.R. 492, 272 S.W.2d 125.
He next asserts that the evidence is insufficient to show that appellant had the specific intent to kill with malice when he fired the pistol at the injured party. In Tapley v. State, 158 Tex.Cr.R. 495, 256 S.W.2d 583, we said the following:
“To say that even though an accused pointed a deadly weapon directly at the injured party and fired the same, but that in doing so he did not intend to kill, would be bordering on an absurdity.”
See also Dominguez v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 445 S.W.2d 729 (October 22, 1969).
Appellant’s next contention is that the evidence is insufficient to show that the shooting was done with malice. Proof that appellant voluntarily aimed his pistol at the injured party and fired the same is sufficient to show malice under the holdings of this Court in Griffith v. State, 430 S.W.2d 197; Gonzales v. State, 426 S.W.2d 859; Boatright v. State, 169 Tex. Cr.R. 280, 343 S.W.2d 707; Stewart v. State, 168 Tex.Cr.R. 166, 324 S.W.2d 228. See also 4 Branch’s Ann.P.C.2d, Article 1256, Section 2189.
Appellant’s next ground of error concludes that the court erred in failing to define the terms “intentionally” and “voluntary” in his charge. We find no objection to the charge and nothing is presented for review.
Appellant next contends that the State went outside the record in stating to the jury that appellant had subpoenaed certain hospital records (the contents of which are not shown). Upon objection, the court sustained appellant’s objection as to the statement. We are at a loss to ascertain how appellant could have been injured by this and nothing more. In Scitern v. State, 87 Tex.Cr.R. 112, 219 S.W. 833, upon which appellant relies, the court held that the “fact asked for by such question so objected to was the truth and that counsel for appellant knew it and did not want the truth to come out.” This is a far cry from the question here presented. We find no reversible error.
Appellant objected to the prosecutor bringing into the courtroom certain exhibits for the purpose of identification. The *923court deferred action on the objection until the exhibits were submitted to appellant’s counsel for examination. At this point the court retired the jury.
The appellant contends that the court erred in permitting the introduction of certain fingerprint cards, which were certified by the Texas Department of Corrections. No further predicate is required since the enactment of Article 3731a, V.A. C.S., as interpreted by this Court in Handy v. State, 160 Tex.Cr.R. 258, 268 S.W.2d 182; Mullican v. State, 167 Tex.Cr.R. 563, 322 S.W.2d 284. The cases relied upon by appellant antedated the enactment of the above article.
Appellant complains of the introduction, at the hearing on punishment, of the records of prior convictions. These were clearly admissible under the terms of Article 3731a, V.A.C.S., and Article 37.07, Section 3(a), V.A.C.C.P. The fact that the indictments in some of the prior convictions contained enhancement paragraphs would not render them inadmissible under the statute.
Finding no reversible error, the judgment is affirmed.
ONION, J., and WOODLEY, P. J., concur in the result.