Court Opinion

ID: 9851477
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:13:34.579831+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:57.531602
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Chief Justice.
In 2005, a Harris County jury convicted Sean David Cleveland of methamphetamine possession and related crimes. The trial court sentenced him to twenty years in prison with ten years to serve, and Cleveland filed a motion for new trial and amended motion for new *143trial. The trial court denied the motion, rejecting Cleveland’s claim that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel because he would have accepted a plea offer but for his counsel’s deficient performance. The Court of Appeals affirmed.1 We granted certiorari to decide whether the Court of Appeals properly applied our decision in Lloyd v. State.2 As explained below, the Court of Appeals correctly applied Lloyd, and we therefore affirm.
Cleveland was pulled over in Harris County on July 7, 2004, and arrested for driving on a suspended license. While conducting an inventory of the vehicle prior to its being towed, the officer found six individual bags of methamphetamine, a bottle containing red powder, digital scales, a glass smoking device, a straw with methamphetamine residue in it, and a garden hose with a smaller hose inside. The officer called Cleveland’s residence to get someone to come and pick up Cleveland’s dog. Two men came and were also arrested when methamphetamine was found in their vehicle.
On July 9, 2004, a search warrant was executed for Cleveland’s home. Officers found items commonly used in connection with the manufacture of methamphetamine: a bottle of pure ephedrine, burn piles, empty cold medicine packages, strike plates from match books, and security cameras located around the premises. During the search, Cleveland, who was out of jail on bond, returned home and was informed that a search was being performed pursuant to a warrant.
Cleveland was indicted for possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, criminal attempt to commit trafficking in methamphetamine, driving on a suspended license, and no proof of insurance. Cleveland was offered and rejected a plea bargain for probation and a fine. Trial commenced on November 28, 2005. During jury selection, defense counsel learned for the first time that the State’s evidence included items seized in the house search. Counsel filed a motion to suppress, which was denied, and the trial proceeded. Cleveland was convicted of possession with intent to distribute, criminal attempt to commit trafficking, and no proof of insurance. He was sentenced to twenty years in prison with ten years to serve.
At the hearing on the motion for new trial, defense counsel admitted that he failed to review the State’s file as allowed under the prosecutor’s “open file” policy, so he did not realize evidence gathered at the home would be used at trial. Cleveland testified that had he known evidence obtained from his home would be used *144against him at trial, he would have accepted the State’s offer of a plea bargain. The trial court denied the motion for new trial, and Cleveland appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel.
The Court of Appeals found that although counsel’s performance was objectively unreasonable, Cleveland was not prejudiced, and the convictions should therefore stand. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the evidence supports a finding, implicit in the trial court’s ruling, that Cleveland failed to show a reasonable probability that he would have pled guilty but for counsel’s errors. We granted certiorari to review the Court of Appeals’ application of the decision in Lloyd.
In Lloyd, we recognized, based on governing United States Supreme Court precedent, that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant’s right to competent counsel performing to the standards of the legal profession in deciding whether or not to plead guilty.3 The Supreme Court held over sixty years ago that “[pjrior to trial an accused is entitled to rely upon his counsel to make an independent examination of the facts, circumstances, pleadings and laws involved and then to offer his informed opinion as to what plea should be entered.”4 The plea bargaining process is a critical stage of criminal proceedings where an attorney’s involvement is crucial because “[alvailable defenses may be as irretrievably lost, if not then and there asserted.”5 “Indeed, with plea bargaining the norm and trial the exception, for most criminal defendants [the plea process] is the critical stage of their prosecution.”6
The two-part test of Strickland v. Washington ordinarily applies to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in the plea process.7 Thus, to prevail on such a claim, the defendant must demonstrate both that trial counsel’s performance was unprofessional, and that but for counsel’s errors, the outcome of the proceedings would have been different.8 Where, as here, the defendant demonstrates that counsel’s representation in the plea process “fell below an objective *145standard of reasonableness,”9 the inquiry turns to whether the defendant has demonstrated the required prejudice.10
The district attorney contends that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the prejudice prong of the Strickland test. According to the district attorney, the Court of Appeals should have focused its prejudice inquiry on whether the outcome of the trial would have been different but for counsel’s deficient representation, not whether Cleveland would have pled guilty but for his attorney’s errors. However, this argument is foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision in Hill v. Lockhart and our own holding in Lloyd.
In Hill, the Supreme Court held as follows:
In the context of guilty pleas, the . . . second, or “prejudice,” requirement . . . focuses on whether counsel’s constitutionally ineffective performance affected the outcome of the plea process. In other words, in order to satisfy the “prejudice” requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.11
In Lloyd, we held that the same analysis governs in the converse situation, i.e., where the defendant’s complaint is that he went to trial instead of pleading guilty because of counsel’s deficient representation.12 We did so despite our recognition that “[t]here is a vast difference between what happens to a defendant when he pleads guilty as opposed to what occurs when a plea agreement is rejected,” and that “[t]he rejection of a plea agreement, in most instances, will result in the defendant going to trial with all of the concomitant constitutional safeguards that are part and parcel of our judicial process” while accepting a plea agreement “waives many of these protections.”13 Thus, the proper question at the prejudice step is whether Cleveland demonstrated that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, there is a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the State’s plea offer.14
We held in Lloyd that in order to find prejudice in this type of situation, there must be “some indication that the defendant was *146amenable to the offer made by the state.”15 We rejected bright-line rules adopted by some courts for determining prejudice under similar circumstances, such as presuming the defendant would have accepted any plea offer more favorable than the eventual outcome of the trial, or requiring a defendant to show that he or she evinced an interest in pleading guilty prior to the verdict.16 Instead, we said that “[w]e prefer to examine the facts of each case and grant relief where there is at least an inference from the evidence that the defendant would have accepted the offer as made or something similar” and noted in passing that “[sjucb an inference could be drawn even where the evidence is disputed or unclear on this question.”17
According to Cleveland, the italicized language reveals this Court’s intent ‘‘to lower the evidentiary burden in showing prejudice by a defendant who has demonstrated that he received deficient performance in regards to a plea offer.” Cleveland argues that in Lloyd, we “did not require [the] defendant to make a showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he would have accepted the plea offer if he had been given effective assistance of counsel” and instead crafted a rule “essentially giving [the] defendant the benefit of the doubt where there is some evidence to support his assertion that he would have accepted a plea offer.” Cleveland explains that we did this because of “the difficulties faced by a defendant in trying to prove what he would have decided if properly advised in regards to a plea offer.”
The Court of Appeals rejected Cleveland’s interpretation of Lloyd, and so do we. In Lloyd, we merely noted that the evidence presented to show ineffective assistance of counsel failed to support even an “inference” that the defendant would have accepted the plea offer, much less amounted to the affirmative demonstration of prejudice required by the second prong of the Strickland test.18 We did not intend by this statement to lower the evidentiary burden for establishing Strickland prejudice in the plea bargain context. Thus, we agree with the Court of Appeals’ interpretation of Lloyd:
The above-quoted language should not be used to alter the well-established “clearly erroneous” standard of review for ineffective assistance of counsel. Simply because an inference “could be drawn even where the evidence is disputed or unclear on this question,” does not mean that a trial *147court is required to do so in cases where the evidence is disputed. . . . [W]e decline to apply this language from Lloyd to find prejudice in this case merely because the defendant testified after the fact that he would have accepted the State’s plea offer but for counsel’s ineffective assistance.19
The sum total of Cleveland’s evidence that he would have accepted the plea offer but for his counsel’s deficient performance is the following exchange between Cleveland and his new counsel at the motion for new trial hearing:
Q. . . . Now, why didn’t you take that offer?
A. Well — I guess, dumb.
Q. Well, did you know they were going to introduce evidence against you —
A. No, sir.
Q. — seized at — if you had known that they were going to introduce evidence that was seized from the house, would you have taken the plea offer?
A. Yes, sir. One year probation, thousand dollar fine. I’ve been down 16 months now.
Unsurprisingly, the trial court did not find Cleveland’s after-the-fact, self-serving assertion credible, just as the jury had rejected Cleveland’s false claims at trial that he had nothing to do with the extensive drug manufacturing materials found in his house and van.20 Decisions regarding credibility are uniquely the province of the trier of fact.21
The record supports the trial court’s finding that Cleveland failed to demonstrate, through his testimony at the motion for new trial hearing or otherwise, that but for his counsel’s failure to avail himself of the State’s open file policy, there is a reasonable probability that Cleveland would have accepted the State’s pretrial plea offer. Before, during, and after trial, Cleveland adamantly and consistently insisted that he had nothing to do with the drugs and other items that formed the basis for his convictions. After rejecting a pretrial *148plea deal in which he would have only received probation, Cleveland still chose to stand trial after he learned of the additional evidence seized from his house that would be used against him.22 Cleveland did not immediately suffer the potential consequences posed by this additional evidence, however, because the trial court briefly suspended the trial proceedings in order to give Cleveland’s counsel an opportunity to argue for the suppression of the evidence. After a full hearing on the motion to suppress with Cleveland in attendance, the motion was denied. Now armed with the knowledge that the evidence from the house would definitely be introduced at trial, Cleveland continued to maintain his steadfast insistence that he had nothing to do with any drugs. Cleveland took the stand in his own defense at trial and testified, with respect to any items found in the van and in his house, that he had nothing to do with them or with the manufacture of any methamphetamine. After being found guilty, Cleveland continued to argue his complete innocence, telling the jury “[y]ou guys are wrong. ... I had nothing to do with it, nothing at all.” Contrary to any indication that Cleveland would have pled guilty had he known about evidence from his house being used at his trial, Cleveland consistently indicated throughout the proceedings that no deal would have been appropriate, because he was completely innocent of any crime. In light of Cleveland’s steadfast denials in the face of all of the evidence presented against him, it strains credulity for him to assert that he would have ever pled guilty.
Cleveland failed to carry his burden of proving a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s deficient performance, he would have pled guilty. Accordingly, he failed to show Strickland prejudice, and the trial court was correct to deny his motion for new trial.

Judgment affirmed.

All the Justices concur, except Hunstein, P. J., who dissents.

 Cleveland v. State, 290 Ga. App. 835 (660 SE2d 777) (2008).

 Lloyd v. State, 258 Ga. 645 (373 SE2d 1) (1988).

 Lloyd, 258 Ga. at 646 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U. S. 52, 57-58 (106 SC 366, 88 LE2d 203) (1985)). See also McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 771 & n. 14 (90 SC 1441, 25 LE2d 763) (1970).

 Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U. S. 708, 721 (68 SC 316, 92 LE 309) (1948) (plurality opinion).

 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U. S. 52, 54 (82 SC 157, 7 LE2d 114) (1961).

 Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U. S. 120, 127 (128 SC 743, 169 LE2d 583) (2008) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (citation and punctuation omitted; emphasis supplied).

 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). See Wright, 552 U. S. at 124.

 Strickland, 466 U. S. at 687-696; Smith v. State, 284 Ga. 599, 601 (669 SE2d 98) (2008).

 Strickland, 466 U. S. at 688.

 See Hill, 474 U. S. at 57-58; Lloyd, 258 Ga. at 648-649.

 Hill, 474 U. S. at 58-59. Accord Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U. S. 470, 485 (120 SC 1029, 145 LE2d 985) (2000).

 Lloyd, 258 Ga. at 648-649.

 Lloyd, 258 Ga. at 646, n. 4 (quoting Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F2d 898, 900 (7th Cir. 1986)).

 See Roe, 528 U. S. at 484.

 Lloyd, 258 Ga. at 648.

 Lloyd, 258 Ga. at 648.

 Lloyd, 258 Ga. at 648 (emphasis supplied).

 Lloyd, 258 Ga. at 649.

 Cleveland, 290 Ga. App. at 840 (citations omitted).

 It is worth noting that even though Cleveland’s trial counsel testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial, he was never asked by Cleveland’s new attorney whether he would have advised Cleveland to accept the State’s plea offer had he known at the time that the evidence seized from the house would be used against Cleveland at trial.

 Lewis v. State, 283 Ga. 191, 192 (657 SE2d 854) (2008); Moore v. State, 283 Ga. 151, 153 (656 SE2d 796) (2008). See also Lessee of Ewing v. Burnet, 36 U. S. (11 Pet.) 41, 50-51 (9 LE 624) (1837) (“[I]t is the exclusive province of the [trier of fact] ... to judge . . . the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight of their testimony . . . .”).

 Although Cleveland claims that he did not know that this additional evidence would be used against him at trial, Cleveland did in fact know prior to rejecting the plea that the police had searched his house and found the very evidence that would later be used against him at trial. In fact, Cleveland arrived at the house while the search was actually taking place.