Court Opinion

ID: 9388195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-04-19 21:01:20.326687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:18:18.775111
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 22-1910

        JAMIE LUSKIN,

                             Plaintiff - Appellant,

                     v.

        UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND, COLLEGE PARK, MARYLAND,

                            Defendant - Appellee.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
        Paula Xinis, District Judge. (8:20-cv-02393-PX)

        Argued: March 8, 2023                                             Decided: April 18, 2023

        Before WILKINSON and THACKER, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ARGUED: Rignal Woodward Baldwin, V, BALDWIN SERAINA, LLC, Baltimore,
        Maryland, for Appellant. Kathryn Joyce Bradley, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY
        GENERAL OF MARYLAND, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Brian E.
        Frosh, Attorney General, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MARYLAND,
        Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               This case concerns Jamie Luskin’s (“Appellant”) contention that the University of

        Maryland, College Park (“University of Maryland”) failed to adequately respond to her

        complaints of student-on-student sexual harassment. Specifically, Appellant maintains

        that she was denied equal access to educational opportunities in violation of Title IX of the

        Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX), 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq, as a result of the

        University of Maryland’s deliberate indifference to her complaints of sexual harassment.

               The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the University of

        Maryland. Because Appellant failed to present evidence sufficient to create a genuine

        dispute of material fact as to whether the University of Maryland acted with deliberate

        indifference to the harassment, we affirm.

                                                     I.

               In 2017, Appellant enrolled in the University of Maryland’s Doctor of Philosophy

        (“Ph.D.”) degree program in chemical physics. As part of the program, Appellant joined

        a cohort of five classmates, one of which was “C.H.,” the student who harassed Appellant.

        The harassment that formed the basis of Appellant’s complaints spanned four separate

        instances in 2018. First, in February 2018, C.H. approached a group of students, including

        Appellant, who were laughing at an image on Appellant’s computer. During that incident,

        C.H. punched a wall and began “screaming vulgarities at the group, demanding to know

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        why they were laughing.” J.A. 533. 1 One of the students in the group, Eli Mizrachi

        (“Mizrachi”), reported the incident to the University of Maryland’s Behavior Evaluation

        and Threat Assessment (“BETA”) team. The BETA team “contacted C.H.’s professors to

        learn whether [he] had behaved strangely in other contexts.” Id. at 534. But because there

        were no prior issues in C.H.’s record at that time, the BETA team “concluded it would

        monitor the situation for any potential escalation.” Id.

               Next, in April 2018, C.H. confronted Appellant in their shared office and asked

        “why she was excluding him from their cohort.” J.A. 534 (internal quotation marks

        omitted). C.H. was “very angry” during this incident and was “fixating on the notion that

        [Appellant’s] exclusion of him was intentional.” Id. The encounter lasted only a few

        minutes, and afterward, “C.H. texted Appellant to ask that she not share this exchange with

        any other student.” Id. Mizrachi also reported this incident to the BETA team, expressing

        his concern that “C.H. appear[ed] to irrationally think we’ve formed a high-school like

        clique where we make fun of him.” Id. at 535 (original alteration adopted). The BETA

        team contacted Appellant to see if her office could be moved, but Appellant had already

        relocated into a new office so that she did not have to share an office with C.H. In any

        event, the BETA team referred Appellant’s complaint to the University of Maryland’s

        police department and again reached out to C.H.’s professors to determine if there were

                  1
                      Citations to the “J.A.” refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the parties in this
        appeal.

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        any issues or concerns with C.H. No concerns were reported, but one professor did note,

        “C.H. was shy, stubborn, and got frustrated under pressure.” Id. at 78.

              The next incident involved a text message conversation between C.H. and Appellant

        that took place in May 2018. During that conversation, C.H. questioned Appellant about

        why she had been “standoffish” and had “excluded” him from the cohort group. J.A. 12.

        Appellant responded by explaining that she had not meant to ignore C.H. and that she did

        not know how to handle C.H.’s obvious anger toward her. After clearing the air, C.H.

        asked Appellant why she wore a ring on her index finger -- the same finger on which C.H.

        consistently wore a ring. C.H. claimed it could not be a coincidence as she must have seen

        how he wore his ring. Appellant responded that the ring only fit her index finger.

              Appellant also made clear that she was in a serious relationship. In response to

        Appellant’s comment about her relationship status, C.H. stated, “[w]hoever he is, he must

        be an amazing guy.” J.A. 13. C.H. then asked a few additional questions about Appellant’s

        relationship, such as, “[d]id he get you something thoughtful for Valentine’s [D]ay?” and

        “[h]e must take you on really wonderful dates doesn’t he?” Id. Before signing off “good

        night,” C.H. said that he would have to “respect that” Appellant was in a relationship and

        that he wished he “could be that person for someone.” Id.

              Appellant met with the BETA team after the May 2018 text message incident. After

        listening to her concerns, Appellant’s case manager, Maria Lonsbury (“Lonsbury”), took

        Appellant to the counseling center as she was visibly upset. Lonsbury informed Appellant

        that the BETA team would reach out to C.H. to discuss her complaint. However, Appellant

        requested that the BETA team not contact C.H. until she filed a sexual misconduct report

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        against him with the Office of Civil Rights & Sexual Misconduct (“OCRSM”). Appellant

        filed a report with the OCRSM the next day.

               The OCRSM reviewed Appellant’s complaint and determined that because “the

        alleged misconduct did not present as something that was specific to her as a female or

        anything that was sex based,” C.H.’s actions “fell outside of the purview of Title IX.” J.A.

        537. Accordingly, the OCSRM concluded that the Office of Student Conduct (“OSC”)

        “remained the best suited department to deal with the complaint.” Id. However, despite

        concluding that this was not an incident of sex-based misconduct, the OCSRM

        “recommended to the OSC that it issue a no-contact order against C.H.” Id. The OSC

        issued a no-contact order two days after the incident occurred. The no-contact order

        indicated that failure to comply with the order would result in disciplinary action. The

        Director of OSC, Dr. Andrea Goodwin (“Goodwin”), met with C.H. to review the no-

        contact order and “talk about potential consequences for a violation of the no-contact

        directive.” Id. at 131. C.H. left campus a week after his meeting with Dr. Goodwin to

        study abroad in Spain and did not return to campus until August 2018.

               The final incident occurred two months later in October 2018, after C.H. returned

        to the country, when C.H. “burst into [Appellant’s] student office and confronted her about

        the no-contact order.” J.A. 538. C.H. was “angry, red in the face, [and had his] hands in

        his pockets.” Id. Appellant ran out of the office and reported the incident to the police and

        the OCRSM. At the OCRSM’s office, Appellant met with former Title IX Investigator,

        Mark Nelms (“Nelms”), who recommended that she file a peace order with the state court

        to secure protection both on and off campus. Appellant subsequently secured a peace order

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        from the state court that was valid for six months. The peace order prohibited C.H. from

        contacting Appellant.

               Additionally, Nelms filed a report with the OSC stating that C.H. violated the no-

        contact order. In the report, Nelms indicated that Appellant “did not feel safe in the same

        building as C.H.” and “would like for [C.H.] to be suspended and excluded from campus.”

        J.A. 539 (original alteration adopted and internal quotation marks omitted).            Upon

        receiving the report, Dr. Goodwin informed C.H. that he was “charged with violating the

        Code of Student Conduct for failing to comply with the no-contact order.” Id. As a result

        of his violation of the no-contact order, C.H. was barred from all classes for the rest of the

        week and was instructed to meet with Dr. Goodwin and campus police. At that meeting,

        C.H. admitted that he violated the no-contact order and agreed to undergo a psychiatric

        evaluation. C.H. was also transitioned to online classes for any classes that he had with

        Appellant, placed on disciplinary probation until the end of the semester, and barred from

        entering the Atlantic building -- the building where students in the program attended class

        and had laboratory space -- except through designated entrances and exits. In addition,

        C.H. was warned by Dr. Goodwin that “any violation of the no-contact or Peace Order

        could result in additional sanction, to include suspension or expulsion.” Id. at 540.

               At her deposition, Appellant testified that she switched from the Ph.D. program to

        the master’s degree track after the October 2018 incident because she felt like “[t]here

        really [was] no safety plan” that could ensure she and C.H. were kept “apart” and that

        staying at the University of Maryland was not a “sustainable plan.” J.A. 435. Appellant

        graduated from the University of Maryland in May 2019 with a master’s degree in chemical

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        physics. Toward the end of 2019, Appellant decided to re-enroll in the University of

        Maryland’s chemical physics Ph.D. program and work toward completing her degree

        remotely.

               On August 18, 2020, Appellant filed suit against the University of Maryland

        alleging that she was denied equal access to educational opportunities in violation of Title

        IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681, et seq. On July 29, 2022, the district court granted the University of

        Maryland’s motion for summary judgment. In its summary judgment order, the district

        court first concluded that nothing in the record created a genuine dispute of material fact

        as to whether Appellant was denied access to educational opportunities. Second, the

        district court determined that even if Appellant was denied access to educational

        opportunities, liability could not be imputed to the University of Maryland because

        Appellant failed to establish that the University of Maryland was deliberately indifferent

        to the harassment. Appellant timely filed her notice of appeal.

                                                     II.

               “We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same

        standard as the district court.” Neal v. E. Carolina Univ., 53 F.4th 130, 144 (4th Cir. 2022).

        We “grant summary judgment only if, taking the facts in the best light for the nonmoving

        party, no material facts are disputed and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter

        of law.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

                                                     III.

               Appellant argues that the district court erred in finding she was not denied access to

        educational benefits and by determining the University of Maryland did not act with

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        deliberate indifference to the harassment she endured. To establish a Title IX claim based

        on student-on-student sexual harassment, a plaintiff must prove:

                      (1) they were a student at an educational institution receiving
                      federal funds; (2) they suffered sexual harassment that was so
                      severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive that it deprived
                      them of equal access to the educational opportunities or
                      benefits provided by their school; (3) the school, through an
                      official who has authority to address the alleged harassment
                      and to institute corrective measures, had actual notice or
                      knowledge of the alleged harassment; and (4) the school acted
                      with deliberate indifference to the alleged harassment.

        Doe v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 1 F.4th 257, 263–64 (4th Cir. 2021) (emphasis supplied).

        This dispute focuses on the second and fourth elements.

               As for the second element, the district court determined, “a reasonable juror could

        conclude that C.H.’s actions toward [Appellant] were harassment because of her sex.” J.A.

        543.   On this point the district court noted, “C.H. appeared to desperately seek

        [Appellant’s] attention, angrily demand it.” Id. Focusing on the April, May, and October

        incidents, the district court emphasized, “[a] factfinder could reasonably find these

        interactions, in total, give rise to the inference that C.H. wanted a romantic relationship

        with [Appellant] and thus targeted her because of her sex.” Id. at 544. After finding that

        the harassment was severe and pervasive, the district court ultimately concluded that

        Appellant failed to satisfy the second element because “she [could not] show physical

        exclusion or denial of access to her education,” nor could she “demonstrate a ‘concrete,

        negative effect’ on her ability to participate in her program.” Id. at 546.

               Moving to the fourth element, the district court held that “even if [Appellant] was

        somehow barred from accessing educational opportunities at the University [of Maryland],

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        no facts support a finding of liability against the institution.” J.A. 547. In reaching this

        conclusion, the district court noted, “an institution exhibits deliberate indifference when its

        response is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances,” id. (internal

        quotation marks omitted), and “[o]n this record, no reasonable factfinder could conclude

        that the University [of Maryland’s] response was clearly unreasonable,” id. at 548 (internal

        quotation marks omitted). The district court rejected Appellant’s argument that the

        deliberate indifference inquiry is ill-suited for resolution at the summary judgment stage,

        reasoning, “where . . . the record indisputably demonstrates that the defendant-institution

        took a series of reasonable and responsive steps to stop the harasser, the deliberate

        indifference inquiry is no less capable of resolution at summary judgment than any other

        element of the claim.” Id. (citing S.B. ex rel. A.L. v. Bd. of Educ. of Harford Cnty., 819

        F.3d 69, 77 (4th Cir. 2016)).

                                                     A.

               Starting with the second element, we agree with the district court that the harassment

        was as a result of Appellant’s sex and that it was severe and pervasive. However, we part

        ways with the district court’s conclusion that the harassment did not deprive Appellant of

        educational opportunities or benefits. Appellant cites our decision in Jennings v. Univ. of

        N.C., 482 F.3d 686 (4th Cir. 2007), to support her argument that C.H.’s sexual harassment

        caused a concrete, negative effect on her educational opportunities. Id. at 691. In Jennings,

        we determined that a collegiate women’s soccer coach’s sexual commentary and advances

        toward the student-athletes caused a negative effect on the student-plaintiff’s educational

        opportunities “because the hostile soccer environment made it difficult [for the student] to

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        focus on her studies.” Id. at 700. The student-plaintiff’s GPA in Jennings was barely

        above passing, ranging from a 1.96 to a 2.02. Id. Additionally, the Jennings court noted

        that a psychiatric opinion was presented indicating that the coach’s “destructive practice of

        verbal sexual abuse caused [the plaintiff] to suffer severe emotional distress.” Id. at 699.

               Here, although Appellant’s academic record during her time at the University of

        Maryland was “consistently good,” she has nonetheless altered her academic pursuits as a

        result of C.H.’s harassment. J.A. 435. Like the plaintiff in Jennings who struggled to focus

        on her studies as a result of the coach’s harassment, Appellant testified that she decided to

        switch to the master’s degree program after realizing that completing her Ph.D. at the

        University of Maryland was not a “sustainable plan” because “[t]here really [was] no safety

        plan” that kept her apart from C.H. Id. While it is true that Appellant later got back on

        track toward obtaining her Ph.D. at the University of Maryland, the harassment interrupted

        her education and delayed her Ph.D. by at least one year. Moreover, the harassment

        deprived Appellant of the opportunity to complete her Ph.D. on campus as she originally

        planned. Instead, she will complete her degree while residing in California. All told, we

        conclude that Appellant has, at a minimum, provided sufficient evidence to create a

        genuine dispute of material fact as to whether she was deprived access to an educational

        benefit as a result of the harassment.

                                                    B.

               Turning to the fourth element, Appellant argues that the University of Maryland’s

        categorization of C.H.’s harassment as student misconduct rather than sexual harassment

        creates a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the University of Maryland was

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        deliberately indifferent to the harassment. Specifically, Appellant contends that if her

        complaints were channeled through the process required for sexual harassment complaints,

        the University of Maryland would have conducted a full Title IX investigation. The district

        court rejected this argument, reasoning that “[e]ven assuming the University [of Maryland]

        did not meet its own Title IX protocols, failing to strictly adhere to sexual harassment

        policies is not determinative.” J.A. 549 (original alterations adopted and internal quotation

        marks omitted). The district court also noted, “assuming the OCRSM should have deemed

        this a ‘sex-based’ harassment, this failure alone does not generate a genuine dispute of fact

        as to whether the University [of Maryland’s] response to the known threat was clearly

        unreasonable.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted and emphasis supplied).

               We agree with the district court. Here, the question is whether the University of

        Maryland’s response was “clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances.” S.B.

        ex rel. A.L, 819 F.3d at 77. The University of Maryland’s response was not clearly

        unreasonable because it: (1) swiftly responded to each incident; (2) contacted C.H.’s

        professors to determine if they had any concerns relative to C.H.’s behavior; (3) attempted 2

        to relocate Appellant to a new student office away from C.H.; (4) issued a no-contact order

        within two days of being notified of the text message incident; (5) transitioned C.H. to

        online classes after he violated the no-contact order; (6) placed C.H. on disciplinary

        probation until the end of the semester; (7) encouraged C.H. to undergo a psychiatric

               2
                We say “attempt” here because, as explained above, it appears that Appellant had
        already moved to a new office when the BETA team reached out to see if her office could
        be moved.

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        evaluation; and (8) barred C.H. from entering the building except through designated

        entrances and exits.    These actions are sufficient to establish that the University of

        Maryland took Appellant’s complaints seriously and responded in a reasonable manner.

               To the extent Appellant takes issue with the fact that C.H. was placed on probation

        instead of being suspended or expelled, we have made clear that this is insufficient to prove

        deliberate indifference because “it is not enough that a school has failed to eliminate

        student-on-student harassment, or to impose the disciplinary sanctions sought by a victim.”

        S.B. ex rel. A.L, 819 F.3d at 77 (emphasis supplied). Because the University of Maryland

        responded swiftly and reasonably to Appellant’s complaints of sexual harassment, we

        conclude that the district court properly determined that there is no evidence in the record

        which creates a genuine dispute of fact as to whether the University of Maryland was

        deliberately indifferent to the harassment.

               In sum, although Appellant presented sufficient evidence to overcome summary

        judgment as to the first three elements of her Title IX claim, because the University of

        Maryland’s response to Appellant’s complaints was not clearly unreasonable, we conclude

        that the district court did not err in granting University of Maryland’s motion for summary

        judgment.

                                                      IV.

                      Therefore, we affirm.

                                                                                        AFFIRMED

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