Court Opinion

ID: 9852175
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 05:26:07.511042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:22:23.814922
License: Public Domain

SCHULTZ, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in the majority opinion with the exception of the remand for a redetermination of punitive damages. I would allow plaintiffs to accept a remittitur of $25,000 in lieu of a new trial for punitive damages.
I realize that for many years our case law has followed the principle that no re-mittitur is permitted if punitive damages are found to be excessive, and the only remedy is to set aside the award. Nortkrup v. Miles Homes Inc. of Iowa, 204 N.W.2d 850, 861 (Iowa 1973); Claude v. Weaver Constr. Co., 261 Iowa 1225, 1233, 158 N.W.2d 139, 145 (1968); Boyle v. Bomholtz, 224 Iowa 90, 94, 275 N.W. 479, 482 (1937); Haines v. Welker & Co., 182 Iowa 431, 441, 165 N.W. 1027, 1030 (1918); Cain v. Osier, 168 Iowa 59, 68, 150 N.W. 17, 21 (1914); Ahrens v. Fenton, 138 Iowa 559, 562, 115 N.W. 233, 235 (1908). Most of these cases indicate that the amount of punitive damages is a matter of jury discretion. We have taken the position that an excessive verdict due to passion and prejudice vitiates the entire verdict and that the sole remedy is a new trial. Boyle, 224 Iowa at 94, 275 N.W. at 482. In Sergeant v. Watson Brothers Transportation Co., 244 Iowa 185, 199-200, 52 N.W.2d 86, 95 (1952), relied upon by the majority, our court not only granted a new trial on punitive damages but also rejected the trial court’s remittitur of the actual damages award and granted a new trial on this issue as well. To be consistent with Sergeant, the majority holding should also grant a new trial on the award of actual damages.
I would abandon our previous case law which prevents using Iowa Rule of Civil Procedure 250 to grant new trials subject to the acceptance of a remittitur of punitive damages. One authority criticizes our rule and states:
The prospect of requiring a successful and perhaps deserving plaintiff to undergo the costs, delays, and hazards of a new trial on all issues undoubtedly inhibits trial judges and appellate courts from interfering with a punitive damages award, even in cases where, absent such as constraint, justice would be better served by a lesser award.
[[Image here]]
The no-remittitur rule seems unduly restrictive of the courts’ power to control the jury in an area where guidance is minimal, the potential for awards of unjustified magnitude is great and a workable remedy is at hand.... Iowa courts have used remittitur to control jury discretion in the awarding of damages for intangible harms, such as pain and suffering, and there is no compelling reason to prevent them from using remittitur to control punitive damages.
Ellis, Punitive Damages in Iowa Law: A Critical Assessment, 66 Iowa L.Rev. 1005, 1058-59 (1981) (footnotes omitted).
I believe that simple economics and common sense support the professor’s observations. Our case law has evolved without careful reasoning and should be overturned. The vast majority of other jurisdictions allow remittitur of punitive damages awards. Iowa stands alone. K. Redden, Punitive Damages 111 (1980); Riley, Punitive Damages: The Doctrine of Just Enrichment, 27 Drake L.Rev. 195, 222 (1977-1978). We should abandon our minority view and our “all or nothing” approach.