Court Opinion

ID: 9883952
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 02:27:39.640269+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:33.852128
License: Public Domain

MEYERS, Judge,
concurring.
I agree with the majority that Relator is not entitled to mandamus relief because he has an adequate remedy at law. The majority distinguishes Chapman v. Evans, 744 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.Crim.App.1988), from the instant case on the ground that the relator there sought to compel the district court to either dismiss his indictment or set the case for trial. Smith v. Gohmert, 962 S.W.2d 590, 593 n. 7 (Tex.Crim.App.1998). Here, relator only seeks dismissal of the indictment. In my view, Chapman is not so much distinguishable, as it is simply bad law.
Mandamus relief will lie only when two criteria are shown: (1) relator has no other adequate remedy at law; and (2) relator seeks to compel a “ministerial” act. An act is “ministerial” if it is a task that does not involve any discretion:
*594[A] “ministerial” act is one which is accomplished without the exercise of discretion or judgment. If there is any discretion or judicial determination attendant to the act, it is not ministerial in nature. Nor is a ministerial act implicated if the trial court must weigh conflicting claims or collateral matters which require legal resolution.
Examples are helpful in making clear the distinction between ministerial and discretionary acts. Vacating an order is ministerial, as is forwarding the notice of appeal. Issuing process under the direction of a judge is ministerial. Also, issuing or executing capias after mandate has issued is ministerial in nature. Last, consideration of a motion properly filed and before the court is ministerial.
Deciding how to rule after considering a motion to dismiss, however, is not a ministerial act. Determining whether to grant an application for probation is considered discretionary, and thus beyond the scope of extraordinary relief. Although the court may be compelled to consider a motion, mandamus or prohibition is not available to require that the judge rule a certain way on that motion.
Curry v. Gray, 726 S.W.2d 125, 128 (Tex.Crim.App.1987) (citations omitted)(emphasis added). In Curry v. Gray, the State sought a writ of mandamus to compel the trial court to vacate a pretrial order in which it had ruled that the State was collaterally estopped from trying a criminal defendant for capital murder. We held the trial court’s ruling on the motion was not a ministerial act. While a trial court may not have discretion whether to rule or act on a motion, a trial court has discretion in deciding how to rule. A trial court cannot be compelled to rule “correctly” on a matter involving discretion:
Jurisdiction, it is agreed, includes the power to determine either rightfully or wrongfully. It can make no difference how erroneous the decision may be. If a trial judge has jurisdiction over a particular issue, he is empowered to decide that issue in any way he has authority to do so; however, he cannot be required, by extraordinary writ of mandamus or prohibition, to decide that issue “correctly.” This is one reason why extraordinary relief is not available to compel a particular outcome where deciding that outcome involves a discretionary or judicial act. The law confers the authority to decide upon the judge, and the correctness of his or her decision may not be supervised at every step by appellate courts.
The question is not whether respondent made an incorrect decision regarding the motion. The question is did respondent have the authority to rule in any way he believed proper. In the case before us, respondent had the jurisdiction and the complete authority to consider and rule upon the motion presented by Battie regarding collateral estoppel, regardless of the propriety of the actual ruling made.
Id. at 128-29 (citations omitted).
In Chapman, the relator brought a mandamus action to compel the district court to either set for trial or dismiss a pending indictment, on the basis of his right to a speedy trial. Without discussing whether relator had an adequate remedy at law or whether the act sought was ministerial, this Court applied the “difficult and sensitive balancing process” established by the Supreme Court for assessing whether a defendant’s right to a speedy trial had been violated:
... As previously stated, we must engage in a balancing process of the four factors enunciated in Barker [v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 38 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)] to determine whether the defendant’s right to a speedy trial must yield to a reasonable delay in the commencement of trial for justifiable reasons. In this case, the balance is clearly in favor of the relator’s right to a speedy trial.
Chapman, 744 S.W.2d at 137-38. It is not altogether clear whether the Court held the relator’s right to a speedy trial had been violated or was about to be violated, but at any rate, we warned that a writ of mandamus would issue compelling the trial court to set the case for trial if it did not do so within thirty days. The inconsistency between Curry and Chapman is painfully obvious. See GEORGE E. DIX AND ROBERT 0. DAWSON, 43 TEXAS PRACTICE, CRIMINAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE *595§ 46.51 at 535 (West 1995)(“[w]hy the analysis necessary in Curry was such as to bar relief while that required in Chapman was not simply defies explanation”). How can a legal determination characterized as a “difficult and sensitive balancing process” involving consideration and weighing of four factors by any stretch be an act that is not discretionary? While a trial court may not have discretion on whether or not to hold a hearing on a defendant’s motion for a speedy trial, that court surely has discretion in how to rule on such motion. Chapman was wrong to the extent it could be construed as holding that the trial court was compelled to rule in favor of applicant on his motion for speedy trial.
Relator has an adequate remedy at law from an adverse ruling on a motion for speedy trial. Moreover, deciding how to rule on a motion for speedy trial is not ministerial. With these comments, I concur in the judgment of the Court.
WOMACK, J., joins.