Court Opinion

ID: 9849244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:36:46.356358+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:09.030342
License: Public Domain

McGregor, J.
On April 25, 1955, plaintiff, while an unskilled laborer, incurred a back injury arising out of and in the course of his employment at defendant’s plant. The last day he worked was May 26, 1955. Plaintiff had been earning $65 for a 40-hour *176week. Defendant voluntarily paid compensation to the plaintiff for most of the time until plaintiff went back to favored employment, on September 20, 1956, at a greater wage, as a plant guard. During the interval when he was not working, plaintiff underwent surgery on his back.
On December 28, 1963, defendant discharged the plaintiff for being under the influence of intoxicants while at work.
Plaintiff then made an application for hearing and adjustment of claim for compensation, contending that there was a causal relationship between his drinking problem and the original injury. After hearing the case, the hearing referee entered an award in favor of the plaintiff which was affirmed by the workmen’s compensation appeal board. On application for leave to appeal to this Court, the case was remanded to the appeal board to make a finding of fact as to the reason for plaintiff’s discharge. In response, the appeal board returned the following opinion:
“On January 28, 1966, the above entitled cause was remanded to this board for a finding of fact as to the reason plaintiff was discharged from employment with the defendant on December 28, 1963.
“In pursuance of said order of the Court of Appeals of the State of Michigan, this board finds as a matter of fact that plaintiff was discharged by defendant for being under the influence of intoxicating beverages while at work.
“The Appeal Board would like to bring to the attention of the Court the following testimony found on pages 14 and 15 of the record:
“,‘Q. Did you drink prior to your injury in 1955?
“ ‘A. Very seldom.
“ ‘Q. After your injury did you drink an increase in quantity?
“ ‘Mr. Wilcox: I will object to this on the ground that it is immaterial.
*177“ ‘Mr. Robinson: I think it might have some hearing.
“ ‘The Court [sic]: Go ahead.
“ ‘Q. Did yonr drinking increase in point of quantity and frequency after your injury?
“‘A. Yes.
“‘Q. Will you state your reason for the drinking?
“ ‘Mr. Wilcox: I will object — it’s not relevant.
“ ‘Mr. Robinson: I think it is.
“ ‘The Court [sic]: I’ll take it.
“‘Q. You may answer.
“ ‘A. I had a lot of pain during that time, and that’s the only way I could find to kill the pain.
“ ‘Q. Did this pain continue after your operation?
“ ‘A. Yes, it did.’
“This testimony demonstrates to our satisfaction that the disability originated with the personal injury. It is our firm conviction plaintiff has and continues to suffer a loss of wage-earning capacity due to a conceded job-incurred injury, which injury precipated the problem which led to his discharge.”
The record shows no contrary evidence.
Defendant appeals this ruling and contends that the appeals board finding that the plaintiff’s drunken condition originated with his earlier work-connected injury is not supported by the record.
The scope of review of a decision - of the workmen’s compensation appeal board on review is limited by CL 1948, § 413.12 (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.186):
“The findings of fact made by the compensation commission acting within its powers, shall, in' the absence of fraud, be conclusive, but the supreme court shall have power to review questions of law involved in any final decision or determination of said compensation commission.”
In the case at bar, there is no allegation of fraud and the only point defendant is disputing is the *178factual question of whether the alcoholic drinking problem of plaintiff was work-connected. It is clear that the prevailing trend in workmen’s compensation law is that once a causal connection between a drinking problem and a compensable injury is factually established, then the subsequent disability caused by the drinking problem is compensable.
“Several cases have held that, where drugs used in the treatment of a compensable injury led to narcotics addiction or alcoholism, the ensuing consequences were compensable.” 1 Larson, Workmen’s Compensation Law, §13.21, p 192.86 (1966).
“It may not be necessary to repeat what we have so frequently said that this Court does not review the findings of fact of the board, except to determine whether there is any evidence to support the award. The evidence may not be direct; it may be circumstantial. The board not only passes on the credibility of witnesses, but draws its inferences from the circumstances and the facts which it finds established. We may reverse awards for a failure of evidence to support them, but we are not the triers of the facts. With this view in mind, we approach the consideration of this case.” Thornton v. Luria-Dumes-Co-Venture (1956), 347 Mich 160, 162, quoting’ from Meyers v. Michigan Central R. Co. (1917), 199 Mich 134, 137, 138.
Appellant argues that Garrett v. Chrysler Corporation (1953), 337 Mich 192, in which compensation was denied after employee was discharged for repeated voluntary drunkenness following a compensable injury dictates that compensation should be denied in this case. In the Garrett case, however, there was no finding by the workmen’s compensation commission of a causal connection between the original injury and the subsequent intoxication.
*179“His voluntary drunkenness was the reason for his discharge, and not his physical condition resulting from his injuries. His several voluntary acts of drunkenness, indicating and caused by his moral turpitude, * * * were the efficient cause of the termination of his employment.” Garrett v. Chrysler Corporation, supra, at p 194.
In the instant case, the appeal board found that the job-incurred injury precipitated appellee’s drinking problem and that there was a direct causal connection between the injury, the drinking problem and the employee’s discharge.
Whether we like it or not, this statutory dilemma impales us upon one horn. If a different result is a better result, it is for the legislature to say. There being evidence to support the board’s findings of fact, this Court is required to and does affirm the decision of the appeals board. Costs to appellee.
Burns, J., concurred with McGregor, J.