Court Opinion

ID: 9748117
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 15:52:42.0879+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:31.760809
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by BELL, Chief Judge.
In this case, the majority holds, responding to the questions presented by the petitioner, William J. Blondell, Jr., that the respondent, Diane M. Littlepage,
*128“did not breach the express or implied terms of the contract in question [for joint representation and fee-sharing, to which she was a party with the petitioner], that the fee sharing agreement in issue, as a matter of law, did not give rise to an actionable tort duty of consultation and disclosure between Littlepage and Blondell, and finally, that Littlepage could not tortiously interfere with a contractual or economic relationship to which she was a party.”
Blondell v. Littlepage, 413 Md. 96, 101, 991 A.2d 80, 83 (2010). I am not at all sure that any one of the majority’s answers to the questions is correct,1 although I am particularly troubled by its final response, which I will address, albeit briefly.
The gravamen of Blondell’s intentional interference with contract or economic relationship claim is that Littlepage “poisoned” his relationship with the client. In support of that characterization, he offered evidence that Littlepage “stated [to the clients] her opinion that Blondell unnecessarily delayed filing their claim, thus creating an arguable limitations defense that diminished the value of their claim,” Blondell v. Littlepage, 185 Md.App. 123, 131, 968 A.2d 678, 682 (2009), advised the clients of the right to proceed against Blondell in a malpractice action and, in fact recommended, with names of possible lawyers for the purpose, that they do so, and the clients, on Littlepage’s recommendation, settled the action for *129significantly less than the amount sued for. Emphasizing that she was party to the attorney client relationship to which Blondell also was party, Littlepage rejoined and maintained that the cause of action simply does not lie.
The majority sided with Littlepage. Blondell, 413 Md. at 126, 991 A.2d at 98. It reasoned:
“In the present case, the Corbins, Blondell and Littlepage were parties to the fee sharing agreement. Littlepage agreed to undertake ‘primary responsibility’ for the representation and to fee share with Blondell; Blondell, in turn, agreed to perform services ‘as requested’ by Littlepage. Littlepage, then, under well established principles, could not intentionally interfere with a contractual or economic relationship to which she was a party under well-established principles.”
Id. To reach this result—indeed the only factual scenario in which this analysis would apply—the majority had to treat the “attorney” part of the attorney-client relationship, notwithstanding that it consisted of two professionally non-related or unaffiliated attorneys, as a single, indivisible unit, in which the relationship of one of the two professionally non-related or unaffiliated attorneys with the clients defined and, in fact, prescribed the limits of the relationship of the other with the clients.2 That comports neither with reality nor common sense. A co-counsel relationship does not, in my view, negate or foreclose a separate, consistent relationship between each one of the attorneys and the clients. Were the situation *130reversed, I can not imagine that the clients would be restricted to an action against both attorneys as a unit or that the viability of the clients’ cause of action against their attorneys would be made to depend on the relationship they had with one of the co-counsel and the actions of that co-counsel, without any regard to any relationship they may have had with the other or any actions he or she may have engaged in. Moreover, and to me, more important, if the majority is correct, an attorney, without fear of consequences and with impunity, may undermine his or her co-counsel’s relationship ■with the clients and denigrate, without fear of retribution, not simply his or her legal competence but any other attribute or quality upon which a client reasonably relies and without which the client is not likely to be willing to trust. This would be a troubling outcome, especially in a profession where an attorney’s livelihood largely rests upon his reputation.

. There can be no doubt that the parties had a contractual relationship. Blondell was retained by the client and, in turn, sought and, as evidenced by the Acknowledgment And Consent To Fee-Sharing Agreement, contracted for the assistance of Littlepage as co-counsel, having the "primary responsibility” for prosecuting the claim. That the memorialization of the parties’ co-counsel and fee-sharing arrangement also involved and included the client and the terms of the relationship between counsel were not anywhere expressly enumerated, never mind clearly so, does not change the fact that the parties entered into a contract. To me, it is equally clear that, as to that relationship, there was, and necessarily so, an implied obligation on the part of each to deal fairly, honestly and in good faith with the other. If it were otherwise, as this case illustrates, either co-counsel could, with impunity and without fear of consequence, disparage, undermine, and worse, his or her co-counsel. That does not meet the test of common sense or any reasoned jurisprudential approach.

. Courts do not, as a matter of course, view co-counsel representation as a single, indivisible unit. For example, when it has been determined that one of the unaffiliated attorneys representing a single client must be disqualified for a conflict of interest, courts do not find automatically that all of the attorneys are disqualified, that they are a single, indivisible unit, and, therefore, must relinquish representation of the client, i.e. impute to them the conflict. Under the majority's holding, however, that is precisely what must logically occur. In reality and in fact, it is quite common for the non-interested counsel to continue the representation, with the interested attorney being relieved of the responsibility. This is so, I believe, because each attorney has a separate relationship with the clients.