Court Opinion

ID: 9409250
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 16:00:58.693201+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.747217
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 21-13894    Document: 34-1     Date Filed: 07/17/2023   Page: 1 of 20

                                                           [PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                No. 21-13894
                           ____________________

        RUBY GREEN,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        HOWARD FINKELSTEIN,
        individually, in his capacity as Public Defender for Broward
        County,
        THE OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER FOR BROWARD
        COUNTY,

                                                  Defendants-Appellees.

                           ____________________
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        2                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13894

                   Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Southern District of Florida
                       D.C. Docket No. 0:20-cv-62160-BB
                            ____________________

        Before WILSON, JORDAN, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
        BRASHER, Circuit Judge:
                This appeal requires us to consider whether the First
        Amendment protects a public employee’s statements attacking her
        supervisor during a political campaign to replace him. Ruby Green
        argues that former Broward County Public Defender Howard
        Finkelstein fired her from her position as a public defender in vio-
        lation of her First Amendment rights. Finkelstein fired Green after
        she made public comments during her campaign to replace Finkel-
        stein, who was not seeking reelection. Specifically, Green claimed
        on a political podcast that Finkelstein played golf rather than work,
        did not hire racial minorities or support black social justice organi-
        zations, and had used illegal drugs while practicing law earlier in
        his career. Based on these comments, Finkelstein terminated
        Green’s employment after the primary election, which Green had
        lost to another employee of the office.
                The district court granted summary judgment to Finkel-
        stein. It concluded that many of Green’s statements about Finkel-
        stein were eligible for First Amendment protection because they
        were made on matters of public concern. But, balancing Green’s
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        21-13894               Opinion of the Court                          3

        interests against her employer’s interests, the district court con-
        cluded that her interest in making these statements did not out-
        weigh the government’s interest in the effective management of
        the public defender’s office.
                We have yet to consider whether and how a public em-
        ployee’s political campaign to replace her supervisor impacts her
        interest in criticizing that supervisor. Although we recognize that
        an employee seeking public office has a strong interest in criticizing
        the elected official currently holding that position, we believe the
        employer’s interest in effective management outweighs the em-
        ployee’s interest when the employee’s criticisms are likely to frus-
        trate the employer’s mission. Because we conclude that Green’s
        criticisms of Finkelstein fit this mold, we conclude that her termi-
        nation cannot support a claim for retaliation in violation of the First
        Amendment. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district
        court.
                                       I.

               During his fourth term as Broward County Public Defender,
        Howard Finkelstein announced that he was retiring and would not
        be running for reelection in the November 2020 primary. Ruby
        Green, a Broward County Assistant Public Defender, later an-
        nounced her candidacy to replace him. Before Green declared her
        candidacy, Gordon Weekes, who served as one of three executive
        chiefs at the office, entered the race and received Finkelstein’s en-
        dorsement. Finkelstein is white; both Green and Weekes are black.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                 21-13894

                Office policy permitted Green and Weekes to run for office
        while remaining employed so long as they “follow[ed] campaign
        laws, submit[ted] vacation requests for any campaigning during
        working hours, and refrain[ed] from using office computers or sup-
        plies for any campaign purpose.” Finkelstein also emailed Green
        and Weekes, reiterating this campaign policy, and explaining that
        their campaigns “have the potential of pulling the office apart and
        distracting our employees from our very important mission.”
        Finkelstein stressed that he “worked too hard to de-politicize [the]
        office to allow it to devolve into chaos before [he] retires” and that
        he trusted both Green and Weekes would “conduct [themselves]
        professionally” during the campaign.
                As part of her campaign, Green appeared as a guest on a pub-
        licly disseminated podcast that discusses political issues in South
        Florida. On the podcast, she discussed her candidacy as well as
        what she believed to be issues with how Finkelstein either ran the
        office or conducted himself as public defender. Green’s statements
        on the podcast fall broadly into three categories: (1) Finkelstein’s
        present performance as a lawyer or supervisor; (2) Finkelstein’s hir-
        ing of minority employees and attitudes towards social justice is-
        sues; and (3) Finkelstein’s alleged drug use earlier in his career.
               As for the first category, Green claimed Finkelstein told her
        “not to go to the courtroom, not to train [the Office’s] attorneys.”
        She claimed that Finkelstein “c[ame] to work maybe once or twice
        a week for maybe an hour or two” and did not “know people’s
        names.” Additionally, Green claimed that Finkelstein “hasn’t had
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        21-13894                 Opinion of the Court                            5

        any cases. Hasn’t had any . . . jail visits . . . any jail calls, [or] any-
        thing like that.” Instead, she told the host, Finkelstein “just get[s]
        to go home and play golf.” Finally, she stated that Finkelstein
        treated his employees “like trash.”
               As for the second category of statements, Green made sev-
        eral comments related to race and Finkelstein’s treatment of racial
        issues. Green implied that Finkelstein did “not want to hire people
        who look . . . like the people that are filling the boxes.” Further, she
        claimed that Finkelstein “t[old] the entire office that [the employ-
        ees] can’t march in solidarity with Black Lives Matter.” Finally,
        Green claimed that Finkelstein refused to “donate or come to an
        event that was, you know, of blackness, . . . because . . . he was mad
        that some of the people in that organization called him racist.”
               Finally, as for the third category, Green implied that Finkel-
        stein had used drugs earlier in his career. Comparing herself to
        Finkelstein, Green said, “[i]f we were drug addicts and we used to
        come to court with cocaine on their noses, you know, would we
        be able to be in a position that he would be able to be in?”
               When he learned about the podcast, Finkelstein determined
        that Green made a series of statements that were “untruthful, per-
        sonally and professionally offensive, and which had the ability to
        undermine and inhibit the Office relations and ability of the Office
        to accomplish its Mission.” Finkelstein told Renee Dadowski, a su-
        pervisor in the office, and Weekes that Green had “attacked [him]
        professionally and personally, the office and fellow pds,” and that
        Green’s statements “ha[d] the ability to inhibit the ability to do [his]
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13894

        job[].” Finally, he explained that he took specific offense because
        Green “lied and said [the Office] wouldn’t allow people in the office
        to be involved with marching for [Black Lives Matter].”
                Five days later, Finkelstein emailed Dadowski and Weekes
        outlining his plan to terminate Green. In that email, he cited
        Green’s “disrespect for [him] personally and for the office and its
        lawyers.” He also stated that Green’s comments “[i]nhibit[] [the Of-
        fice in its] ability to do [its] job,” and that the comments “bring[]
        disrepute down on [the office] and [its] clients.” Finally, Finkelstein
        stated that Green’s “lack of truthfulness should prevent her from
        being a lawyer [a]s well but that is another issue for others[.]”
               A few days later, on August 19, 2020, the morning after
        Green lost the primary election, Finkelstein terminated Green.
        That same day, Finkelstein told the South Florida Sun Sentinel that
        Green was terminated because of her “unprofessional” and
        “[un]truthful” statements on the podcast.
               Green sued Finkelstein both in his personal and official ca-
        pacity in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida.
        During their respective depositions, both Finkelstein and Green
        discussed Green’s statements on the podcast and her termination
        at length. Regarding her comments about Finkelstein’s work
        schedule, Green testified she did not actually know what Finkel-
        stein did outside of work or his work hours. Regarding Finkelstein’s
        rationale for terminating Green, he testified that he believed her
        comments “created a split in the office” based on race that he be-
        lieved could cause lawyers in the office to avoid working with and
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        21-13894               Opinion of the Court                          7

        consulting the leadership of the office. Ultimately, he believed
        keeping Green on board after her comments would be like “a dis-
        ease in the office.” And as for the personal attacks, Finkelstein ex-
        plained that there was “no way [he] could have [Green] be on [his]
        staff working for [him] because of the contempt [and] hatred” he
        believed she had for him after her statements, which included
        “call[ing him] an old racist that doesn’t care.”
               After discovery, the parties filed their summary judgment
        motions. Finkelstein moved for summary judgment of the entire
        action, and Green filed a partial motion for summary judgment
        with respect to liability only. The district court concluded that
        three of Green’s eight statements involved matters of public con-
        cern. But it concluded that the government’s interest in the effi-
        cient administration of the office outweighed Green’s interest in
        making the statements. Accordingly, the court denied Green’s mo-
        tion and granted Finkelstein’s.
               Green timely appealed.
                                       II.

               We review de novo the resolution of cross-motions for sum-
        mary judgment. Am. Bankers Ins. Grp. v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328,
        1331 (11th Cir. 2005). We “apply[] the same legal standards as those
        that control the district court.” Jackson v. State of Ala. State Tenure
        Comm’n, 405 F.3d 1276, 1289 (11th Cir. 2005). To succeed on a sum-
        mary judgment motion, the movant must show he is entitled to
        prevail on questions of law, and “that there are no genuine issues
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        8                       Opinion of the Court                    21-13894

        of material fact pertinent to those questions of law.” Rich v. Dollar,
        841 F.2d 1558, 1562 (11th Cir. 1988).
                                         III.

               A citizen does not surrender her First Amendment rights by
        accepting a position as a public employee, but a public employee’s
        right to speak as a private citizen is not absolute. Determining
        whether the First Amendment protects the speech of a public em-
        ployee requires “a careful balance ‘between the interests of the
        [employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public
        concern and the interest of . . . an employer[] in promoting the ef-
        ficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.’”
        Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 231 (2014) (first alteration in original)
        (quoting Pickering v. Bd. of Ed. of Twp. High Sch. Dist. 205, Will Cnty.,
        391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968)).
                Applying this test, we have held that, to prevail on a First
        Amendment claim of unlawful retaliation, an employee must make
        three showings. See Bryson v. City of Waycross, 888 F.2d 1562, 1565–
        66 (11th Cir. 1989). First, the employee must show that the speech
        was made as a citizen on a matter of public concern. Id. Second, the
        employee’s free speech interest must outweigh the employer’s in-
        terest in effective and efficient fulfillment of its responsibilities. Id.
        And third, the speech must have played a substantial part in the
        adverse employment action. Id. The first two inquiries are ques-
        tions of law for the court. See Moss v. City of Pembroke Pines, 782 F.3d
        613, 617-18 (11th Cir. 2015).
USCA11 Case: 21-13894       Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 07/17/2023      Page: 9 of 20

        21-13894                Opinion of the Court                          9

                Here, it is undisputed that Finkelstein fired Green because
        of her speech. But the parties dispute which of Green’s statements,
        if any, involved matters of public concern and whether Green’s in-
        terest in making those statements outweighed Finkelstein’s inter-
        est in promoting the effective fulfillment of the public defender’s
        responsibilities.
                                        A.

                Turning to the first disputed issue, we must determine
        which of Green’s statements, if any, are eligible for First Amend-
        ment protection. An employee’s speech is protected only when
        made as a citizen and “when it can ‘be fairly considered as relating
        to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the commu-
        nity,’ or when it ‘is a subject of legitimate news interest.’” Snyder v.
        Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 453 (2011) (citations omitted). To determine
        whether speech is made as a citizen on a matter of public concern,
        we must examine “the content, form, and context of a given state-
        ment.” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).
               As an initial matter, there is no dispute that Green was
        speaking as a citizen, not an employee, when she was critical of
        Finkelstein and the office. When an employee makes “statements
        pursuant to [her] official duties,” the First Amendment “does not
        insulate [her] communications from employer discipline.” Battle v.
        Bd. of Regents for Ga., 468 F.3d 755, 760 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotation
        omitted) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006)). But
        “the mere fact that a citizen’s speech concerns information ac-
        quired by virtue of [her] public employment does not transform
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13894

        that speech into employee—rather than citizen—speech.” Lane,
        573 U.S. at 240. Indeed, “speech by public employees on subject
        matter related to their employment holds special value [to the pub-
        lic] precisely because those employees gain knowledge of matters
        of public concern through their employment.” Id. Here, Green ap-
        peared on the podcast in her personal capacity, as a candidate for
        public office, and not as a representative of the public defender’s
        office or a lawyer representing a client. She was, therefore, speak-
        ing as a citizen, not a public employee, when she criticized Finkel-
        stein.
                We now turn to the content, form, and context of Green’s
        statements to determine whether they can be “fairly considered as
        relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the
        community,” or “a subject of legitimate news interest.” Snyder, 562
        U.S. at 453. Finkelstein argues that most of Green’s statements
        were “personal concerns of her own employment” and not on mat-
        ters of public concern. For its part, the district court held that three
        statements were directed to matters of public concern: that Finkel-
        stein (1) would not hire minority employees; (2) would not allow
        employees of the office to march in support of the Black Lives Mat-
        ter movement; and (3) did not support black organizations. But the
        district court concluded that five of Green’s statements are not on
        matters of public concern: (1) regarding the office not allowing her
        to “go to the courtroom” and “train attorneys”; (2) that Finkelstein
        treated employees like “trash”; (3) criticizing Finkelstein’s work
        schedule; (4) suggesting Finkelstein’s prior drug use, and (5) imply-
        ing that Finkelstein was not “in the trenches.”
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        21-13894               Opinion of the Court                         11

               We think all of Green’s statements were sufficiently directed
        to matters of public concern to warrant protection under the First
        Amendment. Although the content of some of Green’s statements
        may be akin to an employee grievance when read in isolation, we
        cannot ignore that these statements were made in the form of a
        publicly disseminated political podcast in the context of a campaign
        for elected office. In light of this form and context, we ultimately
        conclude that Green’s statements were made on matters of public
        concern.
                Starting with content, we have little trouble concluding that
        the content of at least some of these statements suggests they are
        on matters of public concern. Like the district court, we recognize
        that Green’s allegations that Finkelstein had racially discriminatory
        hiring practices and forbade employees from participating in race-
        related protests raise matters of public concern. Our law recognizes
        that public employers “must act in accordance with a ‘core purpose
        of the Fourteenth Amendment’ which is to ‘do away with all gov-
        ernmentally imposed discriminations based on race.’” Wygant v.
        Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 277 (1986) (quoting Palmore v. Si-
        doti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)). See also Title VII of the Civil Rights
        Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e17 (as amended); Unlawful
        Employment Practices, Fla. Stat. § 760.10(1)(a) (2023). Likewise,
        the Supreme Court has held that public employers cannot condi-
        tion employment on an employee’s political affiliation. Elrod v.
        Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980); see
        also Terry v. Cook, 866 F.2d 373, 377 (11th Cir. 1989). Green’s allega-
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 21-13894

        tions that Finkelstein was violating these constitutional and statu-
        tory commands—not only as to herself, but with respect to other
        members of the office—resemble allegations “[e]xposing govern-
        mental . . . misconduct,” which “is a matter of considerable signifi-
        cance” under the First Amendment. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 425.
                On the other hand, we agree with Finkelstein that the con-
        tent of many of Green’s other statements is more personal in na-
        ture. In particular, Finkelstein’s supposed instructions to Green not
        to train junior public defenders and her allegation that he treated
        office employees “like trash” are akin to private employee griev-
        ances. Although these statements have some public import be-
        cause Green was a government employee complaining about her
        elected boss, “a public employee may not transform a personal
        grievance into a matter of public concern by invoking a supposed
        popular interest in the way public institutions are run.” Ferrara v.
        Mills, 781 F.2d 1508, 1516 (11th Cir. 1986).
               Nonetheless, despite the content of these statements, we be-
        lieve their form and context establish that they addressed matters
        of public concern and legitimate news interest. Green made these
        statements on a political podcast (form) as a candidate campaigning
        for public office (context). Even if the content of some of her state-
        ments are not newsworthy when read in isolation, the form and
        context of these statements establish that they are eligible for First
        Amendment protection.
              Turning to the form of these statements, we cannot over-
        look that Green made these allegations during an interview on a
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        21-13894               Opinion of the Court                         13

        news and politics podcast. Our First Amendment retaliation prece-
        dents have not often delineated what differentiates the form of a
        public employee’s speech from its context. See, e.g., Lane, 573 U.S. at
        241 (simultaneously analyzing the form and context of the speech).
        But the most heavily emphasized factor when considering the form
        of a public employee’s speech has been whether, and how, the
        speech was disseminated to the public. See Abdur-Rahman v. Walker,
        567 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 2009) (“[P]ublic employees ‘retain
        some possibility of” constitutional protection when they “make
        public statements . . . .” (quoting Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 423–24)). In-
        deed, publicly disseminated speech lies at the very core of the right
        to openly criticize one’s employer that the Supreme Court recog-
        nized in Pickering.
                Although no direct analog exists in our precedents, we see
        no reason why statements made during an interview on a publicly
        disseminated podcast would not be afforded First Amendment pro-
        tection. See Lane, 573 U.S. at 240 (“The critical question . . . is
        whether the speech at issue is itself ordinarily within the scope of
        the employee’s duties, not whether it merely concerns those du-
        ties”). Appearing on a podcast is the modern-day equivalent of the
        letter-to-the-editor that the Supreme Court analyzed in Pickering.
        Compare Audio and Podcasting Fact Sheet, Pew Research Center
        (June 15, 2023) (showing the percentage of podcast listeners in-
        creasing by more than 100% since 2008) 1 with Newspapers Fact

        1 https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/audio-and-podcast-
        ing/ [https://perma.cc/F4RG-4VU4].
USCA11 Case: 21-13894      Document: 34-1      Date Filed: 07/17/2023      Page: 14 of 20

        14                      Opinion of the Court                  21-13894

        Sheet, Pew Research Center (June 29, 2021) (showing sharp de-
        clines in newspaper readership). 2 Green’s speech is comparable to
        cases in which a public employee “seek[s] to inform the public that
        [a government] office was not discharging its governmental re-
        sponsibilities,” or where the employee “seek[s] to bring to light ac-
        tual or potential wrongdoing or breach of public trust on the part
        of [a public official].” Connick, 461 U.S. at 148. See, e.g., Watters v.
        City of Philadelphia, 55 F.3d 886, 892-93 (3d Cir. 1995) (statements
        made to newspaper reporter, by director of police department’s
        employee assistance program, about lack of formal written policies
        was speech on a matter of public concern). Accordingly, the form
        of Green’s speech—an interview on a publicly disseminated news
        and politics podcast—supports a conclusion that her statements in-
        volve matters of public concern.
               Lastly and perhaps most importantly, the context of Green’s
        statements—a campaign for elected office in which she was a can-
        didate—underscores that her statements were of legitimate news
        interest. Under the context factor, we consider the constitutional
        protections afforded to the specific category of speech at issue. For
        instance, in Lane, the Supreme Court emphasized that the state-
        ments at issue were made in the context of a judicial proceeding,
        which may form the basis for government action and “affect[] the
        rights and liberties of others.” 573 U.S. at 238 (quoting United States
        v. Alvarez, 132 S.Ct. 2537, 2546 (2012) (plurality opinion)). Likewise,

        2 https://www.pewresearch.org/journalism/fact-sheet/newspapers/
        [https://perma.cc/7DZ6-3RKP].
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        21-13894               Opinion of the Court                         15

        in O'Laughlin v. Palm Beach County, when examining the context of
        statements made during a union election, we recognized that
        “air[ing one’s] grievances in the run-up to [an] election,” “arguably
        strengthens” an employee’s First Amendment retaliation claim. 30
        F.4th 1045, 1052–53 (11th Cir. 2022). We reached this conclusion
        because “campaign-related speech exists at the very core of the
        First Amendment.” Id. at 1053 (citing McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
        Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346-47 (1995)).
                 Our reasoning in O’Laughlin applies equally here. Whatever
        their specific content, it is undisputed that Green made these state-
        ments to the public in the context of a campaign for elected office
        in which she was a candidate. And “the right of candidates for po-
        litical office to make their case to the American people” is among
        “the most fundamental First Amendment activities.” Fed. Election
        Comm’n v. Cruz, 142 S.Ct. 1638, 1654 (2022). It is difficult to imagine
        a context with a more direct implication for the public interest. Po-
        litical speech, especially a candidate’s statements on the campaign
        trail, “‘is the essence of self-government.’” Snyder, 562 U.S. at 452
        (quoting Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74–75 (1964)). These
        “expressive activities constituted the type of ‘classically political
        speech’ lying at the ‘core of the First Amendment.’” Carter v. City of
        Melbourne, 731 F.3d 1161, 1169 (11th Cir. 2013) (quoting Boos v.
        Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318 (1988)). To deny a candidate’s campaign-
        related statements any First Amendment protection would give
        public employers free rein to censor an employee’s political speech.
        But the Supreme Court has “never allowed the government to pro-
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        16                      Opinion of the Court                   21-13894

        hibit candidates from communicating relevant information to vot-
        ers during an election.” Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536
        U.S. 765, 782 (2002). We therefore decline Finkelstein’s invitation
        to declare most of Green’s campaign-related interview to be un-
        protected speech.
                In short, we believe all of Green’s statements on the podcast
        were made as a citizen on matters of public concern. The content
        of several of her statements—that the office’s hiring practices were
        racially discriminatory, for example—were clearly newsworthy. As
        for other statements, we believe the context and form—made by a
        candidate for elected office on a political podcast disseminated to
        the public during a campaign—make them newsworthy and ad-
        dressed to matters of public concern.
                                        B.

               Of course, our conclusion that Green’s statements are eligi-
        ble for First Amendment protection says nothing about the gov-
        ernment’s countervailing interest in terminating her. As both we
        and the Supreme Court have recognized, governments have im-
        portant interests that may justify precluding a public employee
        from campaigning or electioneering. See United Pub. Workers of Am.
        (C.I.O.) v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 96 (1947) (upholding the Hatch Act,
        5 U.S.C. § 7323, which restricts federal employees from participat-
        ing in political campaigns); see also Randall v. Scott, 610 F.3d 701, 714
        (11th Cir. 2010) (reasoning that running against a sitting district at-
        torney would qualify as a “good legal reason to discharge” a public
        employee “due to the state’s interest in office loyalty”). To that
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        21-13894               Opinion of the Court                       17

        end, Pickering requires us to balance “the interests of the [em-
        ployee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public con-
        cern and the interest of . . . an employer[] in promoting the effi-
        ciency of the public services it performs through its employees.”
        Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. The key question is “whether the relevant
        government entity had an adequate justification for treating the
        employee differently from any other member of the general pub-
        lic.” Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418.
               Finkelstein argues that Green’s termination was justified be-
        cause her statements were likely to impede the functioning of the
        public defender’s office. He testified that he believed keeping
        Green on board after her comments would be like “a disease in the
        office.” Green responds that there are genuine issues of material
        fact that preclude summary judgment. But we agree with Finkel-
        stein. We conclude that the government’s interests outweigh
        Green’s for three reasons.
                First, some of Green’s statements amount to baseless, un-
        founded, or demonstrably false attacks on Finkelstein and should
        be afforded little—if any—weight under Pickering. We have held
        that the “First Amendment does not require a public employer to
        tolerate an embarrassing, vulgar, vituperative, ad hominem attack,
        simply because the employee recently has waved a political sign.”
        Morris v. Crow, 117 F.3d 449, 458 (11th Cir. 1997). Likewise, the Su-
        preme Court has emphasized that “proof of false statements know-
        ingly or recklessly made by” a public employee can “furnish the
        basis for his dismissal from public employment.” Pickering, 391 U.S.
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        18                       Opinion of the Court                    21-13894

        at 574. See also Lane, 573 U.S. at 238 (emphasizing that “[t]ruthful
        testimony under oath by a public employee outside the scope of
        his ordinary job duties is” protected by the First Amendment (em-
        phasis added)).
                It is undisputed that several of Green’s statements are false
        or, at the very least, baseless. Green testified during her deposition
        that she did not know what Finkelstein did outside of work (i.e.,
        she was not aware if he was playing golf as she claimed), and her
        claims about his hours were based on how often she would person-
        ally see him at the office. The same can be said of Finkelstein’s sup-
        posedly discriminatory hiring practices. Green has not presented
        any evidence that that Finkelstein did “not want to hire people who
        look . . . like the people that are filling the boxes.” In fact, the record
        reflects that a portion of Finkelstein’s selected office leadership was
        black and Finkelstein, as public defender since 2004, hired a num-
        ber of minority attorneys—including Green herself. Although the
        hiring and promotion of minority attorneys does not necessarily
        establish that the office did not engage in any discriminatory hiring
        practices, we see little value in making a thoughtless charge of rac-
        ism against one’s supervisor.
               Second, as a lawyer, Green held a position of trust in the of-
        fice, and she lost that trust when she so harshly criticized the of-
        fice’s management. We have recognized that a “government em-
        ployer’s interest in staffing its offices with persons the employer
        fully trusts is given great weight when the pertinent employee
        helps make policy, handles confidential information or must speak
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        21-13894                Opinion of the Court                         19

        or act—for others to see—on the employer’s behalf.” Shahar v. Bow-
        ers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1103–04 (11th Cir. 1997). Put another way, the
        “First Amendment does not require that an official . . . nourish the
        viper in the nest.” Carver v. Dennis, 104 F.3d 847, 853 (6th Cir. 1997).
        As an attorney, Green was in a unique position in that she acted as
        both a representative of her client and the public defender’s office
        itself. An attorney’s perceived disloyalty provides “good legal rea-
        son to discharge” her “due to the [government’s] interest in office
        loyalty.” Randall, 610 F.3d at 714. Because of Green’s position as an
        attorney, Finkelstein’s contention that he had lost trust in Green
        because of her comments is an especially substantial justification
        for terminating her.
                Third, there is ample evidence in the record that Finkelstein
        terminated Green due to his concerns over office harmony. Finkel-
        stein’s emails to his colleagues rely on this rationale. Finkelstein
        also testified that Green’s statements “created a split in the office”
        based on race. When an employer determines that an employee’s
        speech has a “detrimental impact on close working relationships or
        destroys harmony among coworkers,” we must give “‘a wide de-
        gree of deference to the employer’s judgment.’” Morales v. Stier-
        heim, 848 F.2d 1145, 1149 (11th Cir. 1988) (quoting Connick, 461 U.S.
        at 151–52). Affording that deference, Finkelstein’s position strikes
        us as reasonable: publicly accusing a supervisor of being a lazy, rac-
        ist, former drug addict is likely to affect office harmony.
               For her part, Green argues that Finkelstein’s justification is
        insufficient because he could not identify any specific disruption
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        20                     Opinion of the Court                21-13894

        that her statements caused. We disagree. Both we and the Supreme
        Court “have given substantial weight to government employers’
        reasonable predictions of disruption, even when the speech involved
        is on a matter of public concern.” Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661,
        673 (1994) (emphasis added). It is not necessary “for an employer
        to allow events to unfold to the extent that the disruption of the
        office and the destruction of working relationships is manifest be-
        fore taking action.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 152. The obvious disrup-
        tive potential of Green’s statements, the fact that Finkelstein’s de-
        cision to terminate Green was based on these potential disruptions,
        and the deference our precedents require, all support a conclusion
        that the government’s interests outweigh Green’s.
                In short, we cannot say that Green’s interest in making these
        statements outweighs the government’s interest “in promoting the
        efficiency of the public services [the office] performs through its
        employees.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Because the undisputed facts
        warrant a conclusion that the government’s interest in terminating
        Green outweighed her interest in making the statements for which
        she was terminated, the district court did not err in denying
        Green’s motion for summary judgment and granting Finkelstein’s.
                                       IV.

              The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.