Court Opinion

ID: 9477047
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:12:09.338646+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:45:39.388826
License: Public Domain

GIBBONS, Chief Judge,
dissenting, with whom Judges BECKER and MANSMANN, Circuit Judges join:
We are presented in this appeal with the unenviable task of predicting what intention the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania would attribute to the 1978 Pennsylvania legislature on a subject that legislature did not have in mind. Since two members of this court who join in the opinion of the court were members of the 1978 Pennsylvania legislature, and one of the two has a more than passing acquaintance with the thought processes of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, disagreeing with them may appear presumptuous. Neither judge, of course, contends that he can speak definitively with regard to the intent of other members of those institutions. I cannot conscientiously predict that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would interpret the 1978 legislation here in issue to be applicable to Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA). Thus while I join in Parts I, IV, V and VI of the majority’s analysis, I dissent from Parts II and III, and from the judgment affirming the reduction of the verdict from $1,000,000 to $250,000.
I.
In 1973 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court abolished governmental immunity. Ayala v. Philadelphia Board of Public Education, 453 Pa. 584. 305 A.2d 877 (1973). The court’s abrogation of sovereign immunity came a few years later in Mayle v. *470Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978). Following Mayle, in September of 1978, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted a limited statutory sovereign immunity scheme. Act of Sept. 28, 1978, P.L. 788, No. 152 (codified as amended at 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. Ann. §§ 8521-8528 (Purdon 1982)). In November of 1978 it enacted a governmental immunity statute. The Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act, Act of Nov. 26,1978, P.L. 1399, No. 330 (codified as amended at 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. §§ 8541-8564).
The 1978 Acts were repealed in 1980 and reenacted as amended by the Act of Oct. 5, 1980, P.L. 693, No. 142. The 1980 Act included a sovereign immunity provision and a governmental immunity provision, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. §§ 8501-8564 — both of which were substantially identical to the 1978 Acts. These statutes recreated the immunity that state and local entities had enjoyed prior to abrogation of common-law immunity, but allowed the recovery of compensatory damages in certain situations. Because the 1980 amendments reflect no substantive differences from the original 1978 enactments, unless otherwise stated, references in this opinion will be to the 1978 Act, as currently codified, throughout this opinion. ■
The 1978 Acts represented a direct reaction to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decisions in Ayala and Mayle. Ayala and Mayle specifically abrogated Pennsylvania’s long-standing doctrines of governmental and sovereign immunity. The statutes reinstated these doctrines; however, they also provided certain exceptions under which aggrieved parties might have limited recovery against the Commonwealth or governmental agencies. See 42 Pa.Cons. StatAnn. §§ 8522, 8542 (Purdon 1982).
Had the Ayala and Mayle decisions survived legislative scrutiny, they would have had important ramifications for those governmental agencies which had previously enjoyed absolute immunity from suit. In the case of SEPTA, however, the Ayala and Mayle decisions had no practical impact because, prior to their promulgation, SEPTA had always been fully subject to actions for compensatory damages.
The statute under which SEPTA operates specifically provides that it has the power “[t]o sue and be sued, implead and be impleaded, complain and defend in all courts_” Act of Aug. 14,1963, P.L. 984, No. 450 § 4(d)(2) (codified as amended at 55 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 600.303(d)(2) (Purdon Supp. 1987)). Moreover, the statute provides for the creation of a damage reserve fund:
The board shall withdraw from the gross receipts of the authority and charge to operating expenses such an amount of money as, in the opinion of the board, shall be sufficient to provide for the adjustment, defense and satisfaction of all suits, claims, demands, rights and causes of action, and the payment and satisfaction of all judgments entered against the authority for damage caused by injury to or death of any person and for damage to property resulting from the construction, maintenance, and operation of the transportation system, and the board shall deposit such moneys in a fund to be known and designated as damage reserve fund....
Act of Aug. 14, 1963, P.L. 984, No. 450, § 34 (codified as amended at 66 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 2034 (Purdon Supp.1975) (repealed 1980)), reenacted at 55 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 600.338 (Purdon Supp.1987).
These provisions obviously anticipated that SEPTA would be liable in tort actions. It is thus clear that SEPTA, from its inception, did not enjoy governmental or sovereign immunity. This conclusion is borne out by the judgments awarded against SEPTA prior to the abrogation of sovereign immunity by Mayle and the promulgation of the 1978 immunity statutes. See, e.g., Lebesco v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 251 Pa.Super. 415, 380 A.2d 848 (1977); Ottaviano v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 239 Pa.Super. 363, 361 A.2d 810 (1976); Wright v. Southeastern Pa. Trans. Auth., 239 Pa.Super. 165, 361 A.2d 389 (1976).
*471Consequently, the primary question addressed in this appeal is whether SEPTA’s undoubted amenability to suit in tort prior to Ayala and Mayle was eliminated by the legislative reaction to those decisions. In other words, did Pennsylvania’s 1978 immunity statutes merely reestablish the state of immunity that existed prior to Ayala and Mayle, or did the statutes extend the benefits of immunity to agencies like SEPTA which had never before enjoyed such protections? Only if the statutes are viewed as extending the ambit of immunity beyond its pre-Ayala/Mayle parameters can the district court’s decision be affirmed.
II.
Neither SEPTA nor the majority opinion points to any legislative history of the 1978 statutes which suggests that the legislature had metropolitan regional transportation authorities in mind when it reinstated governmental and sovereign immunity. In fact, the limited available history of the 1978 immunity statutes supports the opposite conclusion — i.e., that these statutes were not intended to confer immunity on agencies which did not enjoy immunity pri- or to the Ayala and Mayle decisions. In signing the first post-Mayle immunity provision into law, Act of Sept. 28, 1978, P.L. 788, No. 152 (codified as amended at 42 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. §§ 8521-8528), Pennsylvania Governor Milton J. Shapp stated that he did not view the statutes as conferring immunity on agencies which did not enjoy immunity prior to Ayala and Mayle:
It is my intention in approving this act that [it] shall have general retroactive effect; and in particular it is the specific intent that:
... In all cases where the cause of action [does not fall within one of the exceptions to immunity enumerated herein], regardless of when it arose, the cause of action shall be barred and sovereign immunity shall continue as a defense: Provided, that an action that would not have been barred by the applicable statutory or decisional law as it existed [prior to the Mayle decision] shall not be barred ....
Governor’s Message in Approving Act of Sept. 28, 1978, P.L. 788, No. 152 (emphasis added).1 Certainly, this language does not support the position that the 1978 immunity provisions were intended to extend immunity beyond its pre-Mayle parameters. The majority urges that the Governor’s reference is to the statute of limitations, but before one gets to a time bar there must be a cause of action to be barred, and such causes of action are referred to. And while the remarks of Representative Berson quoted in footnote 10 of the majority opinion may have the limited significance attributed to them by Judge Garth, they certainly cannot be construed to support the proposition that the legislature intended to do more than overrule Ayala and Mayle.
The text of the 1978 statutes themselves also suggests that they were not intended to confer immunity on entities which did not enjoy immunity prior to the Ayala and Mayle decisions. The opening provision of the first act declares the legislative intent:
[I]t is hereby declared to be the intent of the General Assembly that the Commonwealth, and its officials and employees acting within the scope of their duties, shall continue to enjoy sovereign and official immunity and remain immune from suit except as the General Assembly shall specifically waive the immunity.
Act of Sept. 28, 1978, P.L. 788, No. 152, § 1 (emphasis added) (codified at 1 Pa.Cons. StatAnn. § 2310 (Purdon Supp.1987)). The use of the phrase “shall continue” indicates that the legislature intended to retroactively restore immunity to those entities which had been protected by immunity pri- or to the Mayle decision, not that it intended to confer immunity upon entities which had not previously enjoyed immunity. In *472addition, the legislature specifically provided:
Section 5. Construction and application, (a) This act is intended to specifically respond to and prescribe the limitations on the decision of Mayle v. Commonwealth, decided by the Supreme Court on July 14, 1978.
Act of Sept. 28, 1978, P.L. 788, No. 152, § 5, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 8522 note (Historical Note). Thus the legislature has instructed the courts to construe the Act, not simply the retroactivity provisions, as a response to the Mayle decision.
Other provisions of the statute are in conformity with this intent. In the section waiving sovereign immunity in certain instances, the legislature speaks of “damages [which] would be recoverable under the common law or a statute creating a cause of action if the injury were caused by a person not having available the defense of sovereign immunity.” 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. Ann. § 8522(a). Similarly, in the section waiving governmental immunity in certain instances, the legislature speaks of “damages [which] would be recoverable ... if the injury were caused by a person not having available a defense under section 8541 (relating to governmental immunity generally) or section 8546 (relating to defense of official immunity)-” 42 Pa. Cons.Stat.Ann. § 8542(a)(1) (Purdon 1982). The negative inference suggested by these passages is that the legislature intended to do no more than restore, in part, the sovereign immunity and governmental immunity which Commonwealth agencies and local agencies enjoyed prior to Ayala and Mayle, and that it did not intend to extend it to entities which never had either form of immunity.
The majority opinion reaches the contrary conclusion based almost exclusively on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in Feingold v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 512 Pa. 567, 517 A.2d 1270 (1986). Feingold, however, dealt only with the issue of SEPTA’s common law immune status with respect to the assessment of punitive damages. Although the Feingold court referred to SEPTA generally as a “Commonwealth agency,” it declined to decide the issue of SEPTA’s status for the purpose of Pennsylvania’s immunity statutes. See Feingold, 512 Pa. at 580 & n. 8, 517 A.2d at 1276-77 & n. 8.
Significantly, a survey of extant Pennsylvania case law establishes that SEPTA’s status as a Commonwealth agency has historically depended on the particular statute or statutory scheme being considered. See Graffigna v. City of Philadelphia, 98 Pa. Commw. 624, 512 A.2d 91 (1986) (SEPTA is “government unit” for purposes of statute requiring written notice to any “government unit” of intent to sue for personal injuries); Fisher v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 60 Pa.Commw. 269, 431 A.2d 394 (1981) (SEPTA employees held not to be employees of the Commonwealth for purposes of 1935 statute providing compensation to Commonwealth employees for active duty of reservists of military); Scott v. Shapiro, 19 Pa.Commw. 479, 339 A.2d 597 (1975) (SEPTA not considered Commonwealth agency within meaning of jurisdictional provisions of Pennsylvania Sunshine law); Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth. v. Kohn, 18 Pa. Transp. Auth. v. Kohn, 18 Pa.Commw. 546, 336 A.2d 904 (1975) (SEPTA not Commonwealth agency for purposes of provision giving Commonwealth Court exclusive jurisdiction over statewide agencies or in-strumentalities of state government). Because the Feingold decision neither interprets a statutory scheme nor identifies SEPTA’s character for the purposes of such a scheme, it should not be considered controlling in the determination of SEPTA’s status under Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity statutes.
Nevertheless, the majority urges that “[w]hile Feingold did not deal directly with the question of SEPTA’s status under the immunity statute, the [Feingold ] court’s analysis recognized the fact that SEPTA as a Commonwealth agency, was no longer protected by common-law sovereign immunity against compensatory damages.” See maj. op. supra at 462 (citation omitted). The majority relies on the following language from Feingold:
*473Since the abolition of the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity, victims may now recover compensatory damages for injuries negligently caused by the Commonwealth and its agents. See Mayle v. Pennsylvania Department of Highways, 479 Pa. 384, 388 A.2d 709 (1978); 42 Pa.C.S. § 8501 et seq. Thus, we are not here faced with a situation where the person who has been injured will be left without recourse.
512 Pa. at 580, 517 A.2d at 1276-77 (footnote omitted). A plausible interpretation of this language, adopted by the majority, is that the Feingold court was hinting that Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity statutes actually delimit SEPTA’s potential liability for compensatory damages. Equally plausible, however, is the interpretation that the Feingold court was simply recognizing that SEPTA could be held liable for compensatory damages, but that the court chose not to determine whether such responsibility stems from SEPTA’s traditional liability at common law or from Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity statutes. In view of Feingold’s unspecific language, I believe this latter interpretation to be the more appropriate of the two.
This latter interpretation becomes truly compelling when one considers the majority’s dismissal of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Reilly v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 507 Pa. 204, 489 A.2d 1291 (1985). The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Reilly upheld a compensatory damage award of over $2,000,000 against SEPTA. At first blush, then, Reilly seems to support the view that SEPTA is not protected by the $250,000 cap on compensatory damages provided under Pennsylvania immunity statutes. See 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 8528(b). In Reilly, however, the cause of action accrued in February, 1978 — six months before Pennsylvania’s first immunity statute was adopted — and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has determined that the Commonwealth’s immunity statutes are not to be afforded retroactive application. See Gibson v. Commonwealth, 490 Pa. 156, 415 A.2d 80 (1980). Consequently, the majority concludes, quite properly I believe, that Reilly has no bearing on SEPTA’s potential liability under Pennsylvania’s immunity statutes. See maj. op. supra at 461, n. 12.
The significance of the majority’s treatment of Reilly is that it suggests that this court should also treat Feingold as non-precedential. In Feingold, as in Reilly, the cause of action accrued before any of Pennsylvania’s immunity statutes were adopted. Given the recognition that Pennsylvania’s immunity statutes are not to be applied retroactively, this court simply cannot conclude that Feingold was referring to SEPTA’s status under these statutes when it stated that the plaintiff there would have an avenue for recovering compensatory damages. Eather, the Feingold decision must have been referring to SEPTA’s long-recognized amenability to compensatory damage suits under Pennsylvania common law. If, as the majority urges, Reilly cannot be viewed as providing any guidance as to SEPTA’s immune status after Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity statutes were enacted, then Feingold, a case in which the cause of action accrued four years earlier than in Reilly, also cannot be seen as providing this court with relevant guidance. In sum, Feingold can only be read for the proposition that, under Pennsylvania common law, SEPTA was not liable for punitive damages either before or after the enactment of Pennsylvania’s sovereign immunity statutes. The majority’s reliance on Feingold for any alternate or additional proposition is misplaced.
When the question is presented to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, I predict that it will hold that the 1978 statute had no effect on SEPTA’s liability. Therefore, I would hold that SEPTA may not take advantage of the limitation of liability contained in either 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 8528(b) or 42 Pa.Cons.Stat.Ann. § 8553(b), and I would restore the $1,000,-000 verdict.

. While an executive’s statement is not determinative, his views upon approval of a bill are certainly relevant to the determination of a law's meaning. See, e.g., Berry v. Dept. of Justice, 733 F.2d 1343, 1349-50 (9th Cir.1984); Clifton Mayhew, Inc. v. Wirtz, 413 F.2d 658, 661-62 (4th Cir.1969).