Court Opinion

ID: 9841435
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-22 14:05:57.699743+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:52:29.343241
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: SEPTEMBER 15, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                Commonwealth of Kentucky
                          Court of Appeals
                             NO. 2022-CA-0440-MR

CHRISTOPHER MARK JOHNSON                                            APPELLANT

              APPEAL FROM MCCRACKEN CIRCUIT COURT
v.            HONORABLE TIMOTHY KALTENBACH, JUDGE
                       ACTION NO. 20-CR-00631

COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY                                              APPELLEE

                                   OPINION
                                  AFFIRMING

                                 ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: COMBS, MCNEILL, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: In 2020, Appellant, Christopher Johnson (Johnson), was

indicted by a McCracken County grand jury for second-degree assault. With the

advice of counsel, Johnson pleaded guilty to an amended charge of first-degree

wanton endangerment. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S. Ct. 1709, 23

L. Ed. 2d 274 (1969). Thereafter, he retained new counsel and filed a motion to

withdraw his guilty plea. An evidentiary hearing was conducted during which
multiple witnesses testified, including Johnson. Having carefully considered the

evidence, the trial court denied Johnson’s motion, and sentenced him to two-years’

imprisonment in accordance with his plea agreement. The court issued the

following written findings:

            a. [D]efendant discussed his case with at least two
            attorneys and an investigator at the Department of Public
            Advocacy prior to entering his plea. He and his counsel
            discussed his case both during a lengthy telephonic
            conference and in person.

            b. The defendant reviewed the evidence in his case
            provided in discovery with his attorney.

            c. His attorneys investigated whether entry of the plea
            would violate the terms of his probation and he was
            advised that entry of a guilty plea could result in
            violation of his probation.

            d. His attorneys were informed about the possibility of a
            video recording on the events leading to his charge and
            the defendant made an informed decision to accept a
            favorable plea without obtaining the video.

            3. The Court finds there was no coercion. No evidence
            of coercion was presented.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

            When determining whether a guilty plea was entered
            knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently, trial courts
            must consider the totality of the circumstances. This
            inquiry is inherently fact-sensitive and we review for
            clear error.

                                        -2-
Commonwealth v. Patton, 539 S.W.3d 651, 653 (Ky. 2018) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

             If, however, the trial court determines that the guilty plea
             was entered voluntarily, then it may grant or deny the
             motion to withdraw the plea at its discretion. This
             decision is reviewed under the abuse of discretion
             standard. A trial court abuses its discretion when it
             renders a decision which is arbitrary, unreasonable,
             unfair, or unsupported by legal principles.

Rigdon v. Commonwealth, 144 S.W.3d 283, 288 (Ky. App. 2004) (footnotes

omitted). In support of his argument on appeal, Johnson recites the allegations

raised in his motion to withdraw, and cites extensively to testimony presented

during the hearing. Johnson specifically alleges deficient performance of counsel

and that he “felt coerced into entering the plea.”

             To successfully establish the invalidity of a guilty plea
             based upon the allegedly deficient performance of
             defense counsel, the movant must satisfy both prongs of
             the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington,
             466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)
             and restated by this Court in Bronk v. Commonwealth, 58
             S.W.3d 482, 486-487 (Ky. 2001). The movant must
             demonstrate that: (1) defense counsel’s performance fell
             outside the wide range of professionally competent
             assistance; and that (2) a reasonable probability exists
             that, but for the deficient performance of counsel, the
             movant would not have pled guilty, but would have
             insisted on going to trial. In making that determination,
             the trial court must indulge the strong presumption that
             counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of
             reasonable professional assistance.

                                          -3-
Commonwealth v. Rank, 494 S.W.3d 476, 481 (Ky. 2016) (citing Strickland, 466

U.S. at 698, 104 S. Ct. at 2070.

             Having reviewed the arguments and record presented, Johnson’s

assertions either lack specificity, or are otherwise unpersuasive. In consideration

of the totality of the circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court

committed clear error, or that it ultimately abused its discretion in denying

Johnson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea. Therefore, we AFFIRM.

             ALL CONCUR.

 BRIEF FOR APPELLANT:                      BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

 Sarah D. Dailey                           Daniel Cameron
 Frankfort, Kentucky                       Attorney General of Kentucky

                                           Melissa A. Pile
                                           Assistant Attorney General
                                           Frankfort, Kentucky

                                         -4-