Court Opinion

ID: 9712966
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:04:05.749317+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:15.504000
License: Public Domain

LIPEZ, Judge,
concurring:
Once again this court finds it necessary to grant a new trial because a prosecutor’s prejudicial comments coincided with the ineffectiveness of trial counsel in failing to make objection. Once again this double homicide, burglary, and robbery, occurring more that 9 years ago, already twice tried, and heard on appeal by the Supreme Court (See Commonwealth v. Hamilton, 460 Pa. 686, 343 A.2d 588 *355(1975)) and on habeas corpus by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania (See C.A. No. 76-543 (1976)) will begin to wend its weary way through the court processes; and all because the prosecutor had not learned his lessons from the decided cases. It is indeed appalling that our and other appellate courts have fpund it necessary to set aside so many convictions and grant new trials because of improper arguments and remarks. I therefore take this occasion to repeat what I said recently in a concurring opinion in Commonwealth v. Keith Barren, 273 Pa.Super. 492, 417 A.2d 1156 (1979) in the hope that in the future it will be helpful in reducing their number:
It is apparent that the adversary process in criminal trials, when left to the actions and judgment of trial counsel alone is not sufficient to protect the rights of both society and defendants.1 Time and again we see the sorry spectacle of the failure of defense counsel to object to improper remarks of the prosecuting attorney, which failure, though waived on direct appeal, finally comes back to háunt us on ineffectiveness of counsel contentions.
The trial judge, in jury cases, “is not a mere moderator, but is the governor of the trial for the purpose of assuring its proper conduct and of determining questions of law.” Querica v. United States, 289 U.S. 466, 53 S.Ct. 698, 699, 77 L.Ed. 1321, 1324 (1932). See also Commonwealth v. Claiborne, 175 Pa.Super. 42, 50, 102 A.2d 900 (1953). 75 Am.Jur.2d Trial S.87. It has long been recognized in this Commonwealth that the trial judge not only has the power, but in proper cases the duty as well to “supervise *356the addresses of counsel so far as may be necessary to protect prisoners or parties litigant from injurious misrepresentations and unfair attack, and the jiiry from being misled. When this power should be exercised must be left to the sound discretion of the judge and he should not hesitate to act where the fair administration of justice requires him to do so.”' Commonwealth v. Mudgett, 174 Pa. 211, 257, 34 A. 588, 592 (1896). “The trial judge may, and should, confine argument within the limitations of legitimate advocacy.” Commonwealth v. Ross, 190 Pa.Super. 145, 154, 152 A.2d 778 (1959). Commonwealth v. Phillips, 183 Pa.Super. 377, 385, 132 A.2d 733 (1957). See also Sadler, Criminal Procedure in Pennsylvania, 2d Ed. §§ 561, 562, 563. He should in my judgment take an active role in the trial process where the circumstances warrant it; and, when it is apparent to him that the remarks of counsel are improper or bordering on the improper, should sua sponte call counsel to side bar, caution him or her against the line of argument being pursued, and where necessary, give appropriate cautionary instructions.

. A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice, The Function of the Trial Judge 1.1 General Responsibility of the trial judge:
“(a) The trial judge has the responsibility for safeguarding both the rights of the accused and the interests of the public in the administration of criminal justice. The adversary nature of the proceedings does riot relieve the trial judge of the obligation of raising on his own initiative, at all appropriate times and in an appropriate manner, matters which may significantly promote a just determination of the trial. The only purpose of a criminal trial is to determine whether the prosecution has established the guilt of the accused as required by law, and the trial judge should not allow the proceedings to be used for any other purpose.”