Court Opinion

ID: 9682959
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:20:10.630977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:43.557840
License: Public Domain

HUDSON, Justice,
dissenting.
It is well-established that evidence of a person’s character is not admissible at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial to prove that he acted in conformity therewith. See Tex.R.Crim. Evid. 404. Here, the State elicited testimony regarding appellant’s affiliation with the Brown and Proud Gang. Appellant objected on the theory that such testimony constitutes evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts that improperly establish his bad character. See TexR.Crim. Evid. 404(b).
To some degree, any evidence tending to show the commission of an offense will reflect poorly upon a defendant’s character, and to this extent, his character is under attack from the moment the State commences to prove its case-in-chief. Therefore, not all evidence reflecting upon a defendant’s character is inadmissible. If this were so, the State could never prove its case. Rather, evidence of extraneous acts and offenses is admissible if it has relevance apart from supporting the conclusion that the defendant acted in conformity with his character. Santellan v. State, 939 S.W.2d 155, 168 (Tex.Crim.App.1997). Thus, where the evidence is relevant to show motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, it is admissible even if it collaterally reflects upon the defendant’s character. See TexR.CRIM. Evid. 404(b).
Street gangs have earned a very nasty reputation. In fact, “gang activity” has become virtually synonymous with “violent crime.”1 Gangs generally arouse negative connotations and often invoke images of criminal activity and deviant behavior. See United States v. Irvin, 87 F.3d 860, 865 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 259, 136 L.Ed.2d 184 (1996). The danger exists, therefore, that a jury may attach a propensity for committing crimes to defendants who are affiliated with gangs, and guilt by association is a genuine concern whenever gang evidence is admitted. Id. However, like other extraneous acts, gang membership may be admissible if it is relevant for some purpose other than showing the defendant’s bad character and its probative value is not substantially outweighed by its prejudicial effect. Gang membership, for example, may be admissible to show a conspiracy,2 bias,3 motive,4 intent,5 or opportunity to commit the crime.6 Membership may also be admissible if its exclusion would leave a chronological or conceptual void in the story,7 such as explaining the meaning of gang graffiti.8 It is also *342commonly admissible to refute a defensive theory.9
Here, the record reflects that four members of the Brown and Proud Gang, as well as one non-member, spied the complainant walking down the street just as they were concluding an all-night party.10 Appellant, who was a member of the gang, assaulted the complainant and attempted to rob him, but was prevented from doing so by Edward Cantu, one of the gang leaders. Later, when Cantu was no longer present, Roger Vidales, another member of the gang, produced a pipe wrench for the purpose of hitting the complainant in the head. Miguel Mendez, who was not a member, took the wrench away from Vidales. A short time later, appellant said, “Let’s roll him,” or “Let’s gang him.” Vidales struck the complainant with his fist, and appellant searched his pockets. Vidales and appellant then began kicking the complainant. Jesse Montoya and Mendez did not initially participate in the beating. However, Vidales and appellant began calling Montoya names and suggesting that he should be “down” with them, ie., an involved participant in the crime. Only then did Montoya join in kicking the complainant. • The three gang members then dropped the complainant off a high bridge onto a concrete surface.
Shortly after the murder, appellant reported to Cantu what he and the other gang members had done to the complainant. Vi-dales, Montoya, and appellant also told Mendez not to say anything about what he had witnessed. Mendez did not report the murder to the police for fear of retaliation. When he was later contacted by police, Mendez cooperated with police, but did not initially implicate Montoya in the killing. When questioned on cross-examination about this omission, Mendez testified that he tried to protect Montoya because he felt Montoya had been forced to participate. When appellant’s counsel asked Mendez why he had not been pressured to participate, Mendez explained that, unlike Montoya, he was not a member of the gang.
Later, appellant’s counsel suggested during his cross-examination of Mendez that gangs have their own “language” and that when appellant said, “Let’s gang him,” he might have been talking about assaulting the complainant, rather than robbing him. Similarly, appellant’s counsel argued to the jury that Mendez could not have known what Vidales and appellant intended because he could not understand their coded gang language. Counsel also reminded the jury that Cantu was not the leader of a Boy Scout troop, but the leader of a gang, and that his testimony should be disregarded for that reason alone.
Edward Cantu was a significant witness because appellant admitted to him shortly after the crime that he had killed the complainant. However, without the contextual knowledge that Cantu was a leader of the Brown and Proud Gang, appellant’s spontaneous confession seems oddly inconsistent with normal human behavior. Moreover, without knowledge of the gang relationships, it is hard to explain why Montoya, but not Mendez, was pressured to participate in the murder. Finally, Mendez was a key witness whose credibility was strongly attacked by appellant’s counsel. Accordingly, his failure to report the murder to police was explained in large measure by his fear of gang retaliation.
Thus, the State and defense had difficulty establishing the facts without reference to the gang relationship between appellant, Cantu, Montoya, and Vidales. Appellant’s gang membership falls under the “same transaction contextual evidence” exception to Rule 404(b) as evidence necessary to the jury’s understanding of the charged offense. See Nelson v. State, 864 S.W.2d 496, 498 (Tex.Crim.App.1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1215, 114 S.Ct. 1338, 127 L.Ed.2d 686 (1994). Under the record before us, I do not believe the trial court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of gang membership.
*343Moreover, even if appellant’s participation in the Brown and Proud Gang was not contextually related to the offense, its admission was utterly harmless under the facts presented here. First, appellant made no objection when the State’s attorney first advised the jury in his opening statement that the case involved members of the Brown and Proud Gang. Second, appellant’s conviction was supported by the testimony of an eyewitness to the crime who was not a member of the gang. Third, no evidence was admitted to show that one aspect of the Brown and Proud Gang was that its membership should commit violent criminal acts. In fact, the record demonstrates that the leader of the gang opposed any assault upon the complainant, and appellant was fearful that Cantu would be angry when he later learned of the murder. Thus, there is little likelihood under these facts that the jury would find appellant guilty by association with the Brown and Proud Gang.
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent.

. “In the 1992 [National Institute of Justice] survey, 82.9 percent of the 70 largest U.S. city police departments with an official gang definition reported violent crime as a part of their definition.” G. David Curry, Gang-Related Violence, 28 Clearinghouse Rev. 443, 445 (1994). The legislature has defined criminal street gangs as three or more persons having a common identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable leadership who continuously or regularly associate in the commission of criminal activities. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 71.01 (Supp.1998) (emphasis added).

. See United States v. Thomas, 86 F.3d 647, 652 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 117 S.Ct. 392, 136 L.Ed.2d 307 (1996).

. See United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 105 S.Ct. 465, 83 L.Ed.2d 450 (1984).

. See Stern v. State, 922 S.W.2d 282 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd).

. See United States v. Sargent, 98 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir.1996).

. See United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 221 (6th Cir.1996).

. See United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 118 S.Ct. 643, -, L.Ed.2d - (1997).

. See United States v. Sills, 120 F.3d 917, 920 (8th Cir.1997).

. Sargent, 98 F.3d at 328.

. The record reflects that Edward Cantu, Roger Vidales, Jesse Montoya, and the appellant were members of the gang. Miguel Mendez was not a member.