Court Opinion

ID: 9567274
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:51:39.190833+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:00:30.165605
License: Public Domain

CALLISTER, Justice
(dissenting).
In Holland v. Brown1 this court opined that:
The court must be particularly cautious in granting a judgment n. o. v. in favor' of a plaintiff where the jury is not convinced that he has met his burden of proof as to- the facts necessary to entitle him to recover. * * *
In Helman v. Sacred Heart Hospital2 it was stated:
In ruling on a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, and all material evidence favorable to the contention of the party benefited by the verdict must be taken as true. If there is substantial evidence supporting the verdict of the jury, as distinguished from a mere scintilla of evidence, the verdict must stand. By "substantial evidence” is meant that character of evidence which would convince an unprejudiced, thinking mind of the truth of the fact to which the evidence is directed.
The majority opinion does disservice to- and disregards the foregoing principle. Either the lower court erred in granting the judgment n. o. v. or it did not. If the former, the jury verdict should stand. If the latter, the lower court’s decision should be sustained. To send this case back for a new trial on all issues is an anomaly. The jury has spoken and so has the trial judge. In the situation at hand,3 the jury and the judge cannot both be wrong or right at the same time — yet, this is what the majority opinion implies. In effect, it holds that the trial court erred in granting the motion *139of a judgment n. o. v. but, that the jury verdict was also erroneous. In other words, they were both wrong!
Assuming that the principles of Holland v. Brown, quoted above, still apply, let us apply them to the instant case. Let us view the evidence in the “light most favorable” to the defendant and consider that “all material evidence favorable [to it] must be taken as true.” That evidence may be summarized as follows :4
The plaintiff’s present physical impairment is in the form of acute prostatitis. This condition could be the result of several different causes or factors, such as: (a) the presence of an indwelling catheter for a number of days; (b) enlargement of the median lobe of the prostate gland; (c) infection in the other parts of the urinary tract; (d) infection from another part of the body; and, (e) trauma to the urethra.
Plaintiff, of course, has based his claim on (e) above, contending that the defendant’s orderly improperly inserted and ejected the indwelling catheter. The jury could have concluded that plaintiff’s condition was the result of factors (a), (b), (c) or (d), in which event a verdict for the defendant would be justified, or, if they found (e) to be the causative factor, but that the plaintiff was responsible for the trauma.5
In the instant case, after a careful review of the record, it cannot be said that as a matter of law, there is no reasonable basis in the evidence to justify the verdict of the jury.6
However, the majority opinion, contrary to the guidelines set forth in Holland v. Brown7 and numerous other decisions of this court, views the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. It has to do so in order to grant a new trial on all issues. If the jury did not have “substantial evidence” to support its verdict, then the judgment notwithstanding the verdict should be sustained.
The majority opinion contains fine statements regarding the discretion of a trial court in granting or denying motions for new trial. It says nothing about this court’s prerogative in that regard.8 We have before us the question as to whether or not the lower court erred in granting a judgment n. o. v. (not a new trial). It is my *140opinion, following the dictates of Holland v. Brown, supra, that it did.
HENRIOD, J., concurs in the dissenting opinion of CALLISTER, J.
ELLETT, J., being disqualified, did not participate herein.

. 15 Utah 2d 422, 394 P.2d 77 (1964).

. 62 Wash.2d 136, 381 P.2d 605, 96 A.L.R. 2d 1193; see also 2B, Barron & Holtzoff, Fed.Prac. & Proc. § 1075, pp. 381-385.

. The majority opinion does not base its decision upon any error committed in the trial or in instructions to the jury.

. Most of which was adduced from competent medical witnesses.

. There was substantial, believable evidence that the plaintiff had compulsively pulled the catheter out.

. Schow v. Guardstone, 18 Utah 2d 135, 417 P.2d 643 (1966).

. Footnote 1, supra.

.It ignores Rule 50(e) (1), U.R.C.P. Under this rule, if the majority is dissatisfied with the n. o. v. judgment, they should remand the case to the trial court for it to rule upon plaintiff’s alternate motion for a new trial. Hampton v. Magnolia Towing Co., 338 F.2d 303 (C.A.5th 1964).