Court Opinion

ID: 9513848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-06 22:41:26.946804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:06:03.947658
License: Public Domain

SANDSTROM, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 24] I dissent. The record reflects that the district court included all the property in the marital estate. The district court’s rationale for the division of the property consistent with the Ruff-Fischer guidelines is apparent. ‘We view the trial court’s findings as presumptively correct, placing the burden on the complaining party to demonstrate on appeal that a finding *574is clearly erroneous.” Linrud v. Linrud, 1998 ND 55, ¶7, 574 N.W.2d 875. The majority has not adhered to this standard.
[¶ 25] This case is not a case in which young, previously unmarried adults with few assets married and then, at divorce, with one spouse having accumulated significantly more assets than the other, required that equitable property division be fairly equal lest the less wealthy spouse be disadvantaged. This case presents two mature, successful, and wealthy adults who married later in life, each having been married before. They chose to keep their assets separate, neither wanting to seek the assets of the other, until they divorced. The district court acknowledged these facts and found, in its opinion, the most equitable arrangement would be for the parties to leave the marriage with their own individual assets. Because the district court weighed all the evidence and came to what it concluded was the most equitable arrangement in light of those facts, the district court did not clearly err.
[¶ 26] The majority has erroneously concluded that the district court misapplied the law and did not sufficiently explain what the majority perceives to be a substantial disparity in the distribution of property.
I
[¶ 27] The majority argues the district court misapplied the law by not including all the property held by the parties in the marital estate. It says at ¶ 15:
In this case, it appears the district court misunderstood the law of this state and thus misapplied the law by concluding that not all the property held by the parties was marital property. The court apparently believed that property held by the parties could be considered non-marital property because the majority of the property was listed under individual names, rather than jointly held. This is an erroneous interpretation of our case-law.
This stretch by the majority is compounded by the fact that the appellant never argued that all of the property was not included in the marital estate. Further, the majority never tells us what marital property was not included in the marital estate. What marital property did the district court fail to distribute?
[¶ 28] In previous cases, this Court has specifically known what property or debt the district court did not include. See Brandner v. Brandner, 2005 ND 111, ¶ 10, 698 N.W.2d 259 (“The trial court erroneously treated Allan’s $659,771 business debts accumulated during the marriage as ‘non-marital debts.’ ”); Neidviecky v. Neidviecky, 2003 ND 29, ¶11, 657 N.W.2d 255 (“in finding the total marital debt was $17,078 the trial court only considered $4,700 as marital debt out of a total claimed loan of $14,800 from Justin’s parents”); Gaulrapp v. Gaulrapp, 510 N.W.2d 620, 622 (N.D.1994) (“the court’s decision reveals that it treated the gifts received by the Gaulrapps as separate property and excluded their value from the marital estate”); Heley v. Heley, 506 N.W.2d 715, 718 (N.D.1993) (“we agree with Vikki that the trial court erred in excluding from the marital estate, prior to distribution, Larry’s $7,000 worth of ‘pre-marital property’ ”); Anderson v. Anderson, 368 N.W.2d 566, 569 (N.D.1985) (the district court found “ ‘that the farm land and mineral interests which the defendant [Charles] inherited from his father is not a marital asset’ ”); Hoge v. Hoge, 281 N.W.2d 557, 561 (N.D.1979) (“Although there was sufficient evidence before the court from which to determine the value of the personal farm property, the findings reveal that the court based the property division solely on *575the value of the real property owned by the parties.”).
[If 29] In this case, however, the district court never said it was excluding property from the marital estate. The majority illogically assumes this must mean the district court excluded all of it. A district court’s findings of fact are presumptively correct, and the complaining party must demonstrate on appeal that the findings are clearly erroneous. Linrud, 1998 ND 55, ¶ 7, 574 N.W.2d 875. Under this true presumption, we should presume the district court included all the parties’ property in a marital estate. If the district court had not included all the property in the marital estate, how could it distribute the property? The district court knew it had to consider all the property. In its order it specifically said, “But our case law says that there should be an equitable distribution. And ‘equitable’ often means equal. Where it is not equal, it must be explained by the Rogue Judge.” Therefore, the more logical conclusion is that the district court included all the property in the marital estate and found the most equitable result would be for the parties each to take their own property.
II
[¶ 30] The majority argues the district court did not sufficiently explain the substantial disparity in the distribution of property. When making its findings, the district court must consider the Ruff-Fischer guidelines, which include the duration of the marriage and each party’s age, earning ability, conduct, station in life, necessities, health, and financial circumstances. Horner v. Horner, 2004 ND 165, ¶ 9, 686 N.W.2d 131. The district court must provide a rationale for its findings. Id. “Findings of fact are adequate if they provide this Court with an understanding of the district court’s factual basis used in reaching its determination.” State v. Bergstrom, 2006 ND 45, ¶ 15, 710 N.W.2d 407.
[¶ 31] The facts of this case are unusual. The parties married later in life, both having been married before. They were both highly educated and successful prior to marrying. Each owned substantial assets prior to the marriage. Each party presented evidence that they had decided to keep their property separate and that neither wanted the assets of the other. Each had substantial assets at the end of the marriage. This is not a case of disparity and inequality. Each party was older, financially secure, and in relatively good health, and they had conducted themselves as independent property owners during the marriage. The district court recognized these facts and found that the most equitable division in this unusual case would be for both parties to walk away with their own individual property. The district court’s findings clearly state the rationale for its decision: the conduct of the parties in keeping their substantial property separate contemplates that both should keep their own property after marriage. This decision may not be equal, but one cannot claim it is inequitable in light of the known facts. See Hoge, 281 N.W.2d at 561 (“There is no requirement that a property division be equal in order to be equitable.”). Therefore, the district court’s findings are not clearly erroneous.
Ill
[¶ 32] I would affirm the district court.
[¶ 33] Dale V. Sandstrom