Court Opinion

ID: 9553713
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 19:33:45.729144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:32:06.979816
License: Public Domain

RABINO WITZ, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the court’s holding that section 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA), 25 U.S.C. § 476, bars the City of Nome from foreclosing on the three lots owned by the Nome Eskimo Community.
*369As this court noted in Native Village of Stevens v. Alaska Management & Planning, 757 P.2d 32, 39-40 (Alaska 1988):
When the IRA was initially passed in 1934, section 16 but not section 17 was applicable to Alaska. Since section 16 was limited to a tribe or tribes residing on a reservation and Alaska had few reservations, its applicability was quite limited. This was changed by the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act, 49 Stat. 1250 (1936), which in section 1 extended section 17 and some other sections of the IRA to Alaska with the following proviso:
PROVIDED, That groups of Indians in Alaska are not recognized prior to May 1,1936 as bands or tribes, but having a common bond of occupation, or association, or residence within a well-defined neighborhood, community or rural district, may organize to adopt constitutions and by-laws and to receive charters of incorporation and federal loans under §§ 10, 16, and 17 ... of the [IRA].
The proviso language of section 1 of the Alaska Indian Reorganization Act “assumed that Alaska Natives were not members of federally recognized Indian Tribes_” It was thus an express congressional statement applicable to most Native groups in Alaska that they had not been recognized as tribes.
(Footnotes and citation omitted.)
In 1939 the Nome Eskimo Community was organized under section 16 of the IRA and the proviso of section 1 of the Alaska IRA. In its decision in the instant case the superior court found that “The Community did not then form a corporation under Section 17 of the Act, ... and instead became a non-profit corporation under the State laws of Alaska.” In the late 1970’s and early 80’s the Nome Eskimo Community purchased three lots in fee simple within the city boundaries of Nome. As to these lots the superior court specifically found that “[t]he Nome Eskimo Community purchased the above properties and owned them in fee simple. Title to the properties was not taken in the name of the United States, nor in trust for the Nome Eskimo Community under the provisions of Federal Law.” The superior court additionally observed that it was “questionable whether it [the three lots] were conveyed to the Nome Eskimo Community as a nonprofit corporation under State law or whether it was conveyed to them under Section 16 of the IRA.”1
One of the three lots is devoted to the operation of a commercial freezer plant and cold storage facility, “where people rent freezer space and there’s a butchering room.” The other two lots form a parcel which is the situs of the Nome Eskimo Community’s “administrative offices, meeting halls, and workshop.” The Community also conducts Bingo games from the premises. The superior court further found that both the freezer plant and the Bingo hall are open to the public.
It is against this background that we are asked to decide whether Congress, in enacting section 16 of the IRA and the proviso portion of section 1 of the Alaska IRA, intended to prohibit valid foreclosure proceedings under state law against IRA tribal assets. Looking first to the text of section 16 of the IRA, it is not at all clear that the language “to prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interest in lands or other tribal assets without consent of the tribe” is reflective of an intent on Congress’ part to immunize entities such as the Nome Eskimo Community from state-authorized foreclosure proceedings. Analysis of the legislative history of section 16, which is set forth in the majority’s opinion, persuades me that in enacting section 16 Congress entertained a specific, narrow purpose — to stop the then prevalent Indian Service practice of appropriating tribal lands or selling tribal assets to pay the Indian Service’s routine administrative costs.2
In short, there is nó evidence that the authorization contained in section 16 to
*370IRA tribes and tribal councils to “prevent the sale, disposition, lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interest in lands, or other tribal assets without consent of the tribe” was intended by Congress to immunize such lands and assets from execution pursuant to state law.
Although I fully subscribe to the canon of construction that all ambiguities in federal legislation pertaining to Native Americans should be resolved in favor of the Native American, I think the majority’s construction of section 16 is incorrect in light of the relevant legislative history.3 Given this conclusion on my part I believe the court should address the remaining significant legal points which have been advanced by the Nome Eskimo Community *371for reversal of the superior court’s judgment.

. I assume for purposes of this dissent that the lots in question were conveyed to, and held by, the Nome Eskimo Community under section 16 of the IRA.

. I am of the further view that Senator O'Maho-*370ney's interpretation of the section is questionable since there is nothing in the relevant legislative history of section 16 to indicate that there was a possibility or problem of individuals selling tribal assets. Nor does Senator O’Maho-ney’s interpretation justify a broad immunity from execution of money judgments.

. In regard to construction of our statutes we said the following in State v. Alex, 646 P.2d 203, 208 n. 4 (Alaska 1982):
In a long line of cases prior to 1978 this court had reaffirmed its reliance on the "plain meaning” rule in interpreting enacted law. Poulin v. Zartman, 542 P.2d 251, 270 (Alaska 1975) on rehearing, 548 P.2d 1299; Roderick v. Sullivan, 528 P.2d 450, 453-55 (Alaska 1974); Alaska Public Employees Ass’n v. State, 525 P.2d 12, 14, 15 (Alaska 1974); State v. City of Anchorage, 513 P.2d 1104, 1109 (Alaska 1973); Homer Electric Ass’n v. City of Kenai, 423 P.2d 285, 289 n. 22 (Alaska 1967); Application of Babcock, 387 P.2d 694, 696 (Alaska 1963); Alaska Mines & Minerals, Inc. v. Alaska Indus. Bd., 354 P.2d 376, 379 (Alaska 1960). The rule stated, "[wjhere the meaning of a statute is apparent, there is no need to resort to methods of statutory construction.” White v. Alaska Ins. Guaranty Ass’n, 592 P.2d 367, 369 (Alaska 1979).
However, in the recent case of North Slope Borough v. Sohio Petroleum Corp„ 585 P.2d 534, 540 n. 7 (Alaska 1978), we expressly "rejected] the so-called ‘plain meaning’ rule as a strict exclusionary rule." We then went on to draw an analogy between the use of the plain meaning rule in the interpretation of enacted law and the former rule for the interpretation of contracts where a preliminary finding of ambiguity was required before extrinsic sources could be consulted. Id.
Despite the North Slope decision, several of our subsequent cases have nevertheless applied the mechanical plain meaning rule. Horowitz v. Alaska Bar Ass’n, 609 P.2d 39, 41 (Alaska 1980); City & Borough of Juneau v. Thibodeau, 595 P.2d 626, 635 (Alaska 1979); White v. Alaska Ins. Guaranty Ass’n, 592 P.2d 367, 369 (Alaska 1979); Hafling v. Inland Boatmen’s Union of the Pacific, 585 P.2d 870, 872 (Alaska 1978).
The true issue in interpreting enacted law is the conflict between the meaning the enacting body intended and the meaning conveyed to others. 2A Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 48.02, at 18-5 (4th ed. 1973). The conflict is between what the sender meant and what the receiver understands. Id. § 45.08, at 22. The "plain meaning” rule has its basis in this conflict. Obviously, there are elements of unfairness where legislative intent is used to vary the apparent meaning of statutory words. Id. § 48.02, at 185-86. This has' led some members of the judiciary to reject completely the consideration of legislative intent. Justice Holmes once remarked that “we do not inquire what the legislature meant; we ask only what the statute means." Id. § 45.07, at 20. On the other hand, most decisions speak in terms of legislative intent as if nothing else mattered in interpretation. Id.
Neither extreme expressed above provides a realistic and workable approach to the reconciliation of the intent and meaning approaches to the interpretation of enacted law. Part of the problem stems from ambiguity being a relative concept. Words have no intrinsic meaning; what is clear to one person is ambiguous and obscure to another. Id § 45.02, at 4-5. As one court stated: "We think the statute is plain on its face, but since words are necessarily inexact and ambiguity is a relative concept, we now turn to the legislative history, mindful that the plainer the language, the more convincing contrary legislative history must be.” United States v. United States Steel Corp., 482 F.2d 439, 444 (7th Cir.1973), cert, denied 414 U.S. 909, 94 S.Ct. 229, 38 L.Ed.2d 147. In our recent decision of State v. City of Haines, 627 P.2d 1047, 1049 n. 6 (Alaska 1981), we interpreted North Slope as having adopted just such a sliding scale approach as articulated in United States Steel. Our cases listed above are therefore no longer authoritative to the extent that they hold for a mechanical application of the plain meaning rule.
See also: City of Homer v. Gang!, 650 P.2d 396, 400 n. 4 (Alaska 1982).