Court Opinion

ID: 9542716
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:37:44.336706+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:08:46.170874
License: Public Domain

SPIESS, Chief Judge (concurring in part, dissenting in part). I concur in the view expressed by the ■majority that the trial court erred in imposing a second offender sentence upon defendant. I further agree with the majority that the judgment rendered by the trial court is subject to correction to the end that it conform with the verdict and that a remand for such a purpose is proper. ¡ I, however, see no material distinction between the facts in this case and those before the court in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 84 S.Ct. 1774, 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964). Consequently, in my opinion the Jackson-Denno rule is applicable in the present case and the defendant should be accorded a Jackson-Denno hearing, upon the voluntariness of his confession. In Jackson as in the present case a confession was admitted into evidence without objection. Neither demand .nor suggestion was made by defendant’s counsel for a preliminary hearing upon the voluntariness of the confession. In both Jackson and this case the presence of an issue relating to' voluntariness of the confession first appeared in the trial upon the direct examination of the defendant, after the prosecution had rested its case. In both Jacksorr. and the present case the issue further appeared upon cross-examination of a rebuttal witness called by the prosecution to counteract the defendant’s assertion as to the voluntariness of the confession. While the trial courts in both Jackson and the present case doubtless were aware that there was some question concerning the circumstances under which defendant’s testimony was given, the indication is that in each case the courts became aware of the actual issue of voluntariness at the time of cross-examination of the rebuttal witness. In each case the trial court, submitted the issue to the jury by substantially similar instructions. The following statement contained in the majority opinion to my .mind is not supported by the language in Jackson, .nor the-record in the present case. ■ “The instant case is distinguishable from Jackson, in that no question of voluntariness was; raised at the time of the admission of the confession, no suggestion was made during .the presentation of the defendant’s case that an independent hearing should be allowed by the court, and, actually, the court was not alerted to the problem until the time of the exchange above quoted.” (Cross-examination of the rebuttal witness). In the Jackson-Denno opinion at page 372 of 378 U.S., at page 1778 of 84 S.Ct., the following appears. “The statements made by Jackson, both at 2 and 3:55 A. M., were introduced in evidence without objection by Jackson’s counsel.” If, as stated by the majority a question of voluntariness was raised in Jackson at the time of the admission of the confession such question was clearly not in the form of an obj ection, nor does any other language contained in the Jackson-Denno opinion indicate that such a question was raised at the time of the admission of the statement into evidence. i It is clear from the opinion in Jackson page 374; of 378 U.S., 84 S.Ct. 1774, that voluntariness of the confession was questioned by defendant’s counsel at the time of .the cross-examination of the rebuttal witness. It is equally clear that in Jackson a preliminary hearing was not suggested during the presentation of defendant’s case. Testimony that defendant had received injections of demerol and other drugs alerted the trial court to the presence of an issue regarding the voluntariness of defendant’s confession in Jackson. Likewise, the trial judge in this case was .or should have been “alerted to the problem” after defendant testified that he had admitted making the sale only because the officer told him that he would hold defendant and his two small boys until he had answered all questions. I do not understand how the majority could find that an injection of demerol is sufficient to alert the trial judge to a problem in Jackson but that a threat to hold defendant and his two small boys is not sufficient to alert the trial judge in this case. The result of what the majority suggest would make a criminal defendant’s rights subject to what actually does alert the trial judge rather than what should have alerted the trial judge to an issue of voluntariness. The majority suggest that the court offered defendant a preliminary hearing upon the issue of voluntariness which was refused. The indication to my mind is that the hearing was offered the prosecution and not to the defendant and the prosecution declined the same. The majority further indicate that the procedure followed by the trial court accords with the Massachusetts procedure approved in Jackson v. Denno, basing their conclusion on “implicit” findings of voluntariness by the trial court. I think the procedure approved in this opinion is subject to the very pitfalls which the Supreme Court in Jackson denounced in the New York procedure. I find nothing in the record to indicate that the trial court here made the requisite determination regarding voluntariness of a confession as required by the Massachusetts procedure to which the majority gives only lip service. The recent holding of the United States Supreme Court in Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 88 S.Ct. 192, 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (1967), relied upon by the majority modifies Jackson v. Denno only in that it does not require the hearing as to voluntariness be held outside of the presence of the jury. It in no way diminishes or detracts from the trial court’s duty to require an adequate hearing as to voluntariness and particularly to make a determination as to whether the statement is voluntary or involuntary before admitting or excluding it from the jury’s consideration. I find no justification for concluding as the majority does that a finding by the trial court on the issue of voluntariness is “implicit” in the court’s offer to the prosecution together with subsequent submission of the issue to the jury with instructions. To my mind this state of facts is equally consistent with' the trial court making no independent determination of voluntariness but merely submitting the issue to the jury. Finally, the majority states that the opinion in Jackson makes it implicit that an objection must be made. They quote the following statement from the Jackson opinion in support of their assertion. “A defendant objecting to the admission of a confession is entitled to a fair hearing in which both the underlying factual issues and the voluntariness of his confession are actually and reliably determined.” The majority here apparently interpret the word “objecting” as a term of art which requires interposition of a formal objection to preserve error for review. The intent of the Supreme Court in their use of the term “objecting” should be derived from the opinion as a whole and not merely from an isolated statement taken out of context. Taken in that spirit the court’s statement could be appropriately paraphrased “a defendant protesting the admission of a confession, etc. * * *” In any case the Jackson opinion places no limitation as to when a defendant can object. The “objection” in Jackson was .raised by way of habeas corpus after his conviction had been affirmed on appeal. I accordingly respectfully dissent and would accord the defendant a JacksonDenno hearing.