Court Opinion

ID: 9953611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 15:05:50.226029+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:02:26.334521
License: Public Domain

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION

                                             No. 125,888

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                          STATE OF KANSAS,
                                              Appellee,

                                                    v.

                                    OURAY MARCEAUX GRAY,
                                          Appellant.

                                   MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appeal from Barton District Court; CAREY L. HIPP, judge. Submitted without oral argument.
Opinion filed March 22, 2024. Affirmed.

       James M. Latta, of Kansas Appellate Defender Office, for appellant.

       Ryan J. Ott, assistant solicitor general, and Kris W. Kobach, attorney general, for appellee.

Before SCHROEDER, P.J., ISHERWOOD and PICKERING, JJ.

       PER CURIAM: Ouray Marceaux Gray entered a global plea agreement to resolve
multiple cases. Gray now timely appeals the denial of his presentence motion to withdraw
guilty plea. Gray primarily argues his plea counsel failed to advise him the weight of the
methamphetamine, as determined by the Kansas Bureau of Investigations (KBI) lab,
could change and lower the severity level of one of the crimes to which he was entering a
plea. Finding no error by the district court, we affirm.

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                        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       The facts underlying Gray's convictions and sentences for possession with intent
to distribute methamphetamine and possession with intent to distribute marijuana are well
known to the parties and were fully set forth by a prior panel of this court in State v.
Gray, No. 123,730, 2022 WL 879744, at *1 (Kan. App. 2022) (unpublished opinion), rev.
denied 317 Kan. 760 (2022). Relevant to this appeal, Gray pled guilty to one count of
possession with intent to distribute marijuana and one count of possession with intent to
distribute methamphetamine, both severity level 3 drug felonies. The factual basis for
Gray's plea to possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine was set forth in the
State's complaint, which alleged Gray possessed three bags containing a total of
approximately 2 grams of methamphetamine.

       Prior to sentencing, a KBI lab report was sent to the parties, reflecting the total
amount of methamphetamine in two of the three bags was .42 grams. The KBI did not
test the third bag but concluded the total amount in all three bags was less than 1 gram.
Based on this report, Gray filed a presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea, arguing he
felt forced to take the plea and the KBI report undermined the factual basis for his plea.
The district court did not appoint new counsel for Gray and denied his motion following
his plea counsel's arguments at sentencing. Gray was sentenced on both counts to a total
term of imprisonment of 108 months.

       In Gray's first appeal, another panel of this court remanded the case to the district
court with instructions to appoint Gray conflict-free counsel and conduct a new hearing
on his presentence motion to withdraw guilty plea if requested. 2022 WL 879744, at *7.
The district court appointed new counsel, who filed a supplemental motion to withdraw
plea, incorporating Gray's previous arguments and asserting Gray's plea counsel provided
ineffective representation by failing to discuss the effect the lab results could have on the
severity of the charges.

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       At the hearing for Gray's motion, both Gray and his original plea counsel testified.
Gray's new counsel clarified he was seeking to withdraw both of Gray's pleas, and the
State stipulated that the amount of methamphetamine was less than 1 gram.

       Plea counsel testified he had represented Gray in eight different cases and
admitted he did not advise Gray in this case the KBI lab reports might show a lesser
amount of methamphetamine than alleged in the charging documents. However, he had
advised Gray in previous cases how the weight could affect the severity level of the
offenses. Plea counsel also did not think the weight would become an issue in this case
because the affidavit said it would be over 2 grams. Plea counsel received the KBI lab
report approximately 70 days after Gray entered his pleas and advised Gray he may be
able to withdraw his pleas based on insufficient evidence. But plea counsel testified he
still would recommend the plea agreement because it was more advantageous than Gray
withdrawing his pleas, given the benefit of the global plea agreement to resolve so many
other cases.

       Gray testified plea counsel never discussed waiting for the lab reports before
entering his pleas. Gray further testified there was an unwritten condition of the plea
agreement that he successfully act as a confidential informant (CI), in exchange for which
the State would recommend probation. However, Gray did not become a CI because he
was later arrested on new drug charges. Gray said Detective Joel Hamlin was his contact
as a CI, and Hamlin made threats toward Gray and his family if Gray did not agree to a
plea and act as a CI. Hamlin testified he never made any such threats.

       The district court denied Gray's motion to withdraw guilty plea. It credited
Hamlin's testimony and found Gray was not coerced into entering his pleas. The district
court further noted the plea agreement was highly advantageous, resulting in the
dismissal of three charges in this case, the State declining to refile charges in another
case, and the dismissal of four probation violations. It found Gray was aware of what was

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happening, took into account the totality of the circumstances before entering his pleas,
and understood the effect the weight of the drugs had on the severity of the charges. In
particular, the district court noted plea counsel testified he explained the effect of the
weight of the drugs in a case that was dismissed six months before Gray entered his pleas
in this case. The district court further noted the charging documents for the two drug
possession offenses charged in this case reflected the severity level depended on the
weight, and Gray was aware of this fact because he had been charged with a severity
level 2 drug felony in a prior case based on a different weight. The district court found
there was no good cause to allow Gray to withdraw his pleas before sentencing.
Additional facts are set forth as necessary.

                                           ANALYSIS

Standard of Review and Applicable Legal Principles

       Generally, we review a district court's decision to deny a presentencing motion to
withdraw a plea for an abuse of discretion. "A judicial action constitutes an abuse of
discretion if (1) it is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable; (2) it is based on an error of law;
or (3) it is based on an error of fact." State v. Frazier, 311 Kan. 378, 381, 461 P.3d 43
(2020). "The movant bears the burden to prove the district court erred in denying the
motion." State v. Hutto, 313 Kan. 741, 745, 490 P.3d 43 (2021). In reviewing the district
court's good cause determination, we do not reweigh evidence or make credibility
determinations. State v. Bilbrey, 317 Kan. 57, 63, 523 P.3d 1078 (2023).

       "A plea of guilty or nolo contendere, for good cause shown and within the
discretion of the court, may be withdrawn at any time before sentence is adjudged."
K.S.A. 22-3210(d)(1). When determining whether a defendant has demonstrated good
cause to withdraw a plea, a district court generally looks to the following three factors
from State v. Edgar, 281 Kan. 30, 36, 127 P.3d 986 (2006): (1) whether the defendant

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was represented by competent counsel; (2) whether the defendant was misled, coerced,
mistreated, or unfairly taken advantage of; and (3) whether the plea was fairly and
understandingly made. Frazier, 311 Kan. at 381. These factors should not "be applied
mechanically and to the exclusion of other factors." State v. Fritz, 299 Kan. 153, 154, 321
P.3d 763 (2014). Rather, they establish "'viable benchmarks'" for the district court when
exercising its discretion, but the "court should not ignore other factors that might exist in
a particular case." State v. Schaefer, 305 Kan. 581, 588, 385 P.3d 918 (2016); see
Frazier, 311 Kan. at 381.

       In showing good cause to withdraw a plea before sentencing, the defendant is not
required to show his counsel was unconstitutionally ineffective; rather, the defendant may
rely on "'lackluster advocacy'" to support good cause under the first Edgar factor. State v.
Herring, 312 Kan. 192, 198, 474 P.3d 285 (2020). "[N]o caselaw supplies an exact
meaning of lackluster advocacy." 312 Kan. at 201. However, "the dictionary definition of
'"lackluster"' means '"lacking energy or vitality; boring, unimaginative, etc."'" 312 Kan. at
201.

Discussion

       The district court soundly concluded Gray failed to show good cause to withdraw
his pleas. Gray primarily complains his plea counsel erred in failing to advise him the
KBI lab reports might show a lesser amount of methamphetamine than alleged in the
State's complaint. He asserts he should be allowed to withdraw his pleas to both
possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute and possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute. Yet, he points to nothing reflecting there was an error in the
factual basis underlying the possession of marijuana with intent to distribute charge or
how plea counsel improperly advised him in relation to the same. To the extent he intends
to argue he should be allowed to withdraw his plea on that charge, we find the point

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waived or abandoned due to insufficient briefing. See State v. Gallegos, 313 Kan. 262,
277, 485 P.3d 622 (2021).

       Turning to his plea to possession of methamphetamine, Gray is effectively asking
us to pigeonhole the various Edgar and non-Edgar factors without considering the
totality of the circumstances surrounding his pleas. While plea counsel did not
specifically advise Gray the lab reports might show the actual amount of
methamphetamine was less than alleged in the charging documents, plea counsel had
represented Gray in several other drug-related cases and had previously advised him of
that possibility in those cases. Further, Gray's decision to move quickly and enter a plea
was motivated by his desire to get out of jail to help with his ailing grandfather pending
sentencing. Gray knew at the time of his pleas the lab analysis had not been completed. In
other words, Gray's overarching desire to quickly resolve the matter impacted the timing
of his pleas. Moreover, plea counsel had no particular reason to suspect the lab analysis
would reflect an amount of methamphetamine lowering the severity level of the crime
because the 2 grams alleged in the charging document were well in excess of the
threshold for a drug severity level 3 felony. See K.S.A. 21-5705(d)(3)(B) (possession of
methamphetamine between 1 gram and 3.5 grams is severity level 3 drug felony).

       In working on Gray's plea agreement, plea counsel obtained the dismissal of other
charges in this case, the State's agreement not to refile charges in another case, and the
State's dismissal of four probation violations in other cases. These various charges and
probation violations could have resulted in Gray serving a significant amount of
additional prison time—up to 23 months for the three charges dismissed in this case, 111
months for the charges not refiled in a separate case, and 32 months for the pending
probation violations. Additionally, Gray was released after entering his pleas pending
sentencing—a condition he bargained for with his plea agreement.

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       While plea counsel could have specifically advised Gray of the potential pitfalls of
entering into a plea agreement before the lab results were available, plea counsel's
representation did not amount to lackluster advocacy. The district court explicitly
credited plea counsel's testimony he advised Gray in previous cases the weight of the
drugs could change the severity level of the offense and found Gray was aware of this
fact. This is not Gray's first rodeo with the court system. Gray is now asking us to
reweigh the evidence or make our own factual findings regarding his knowledge of the
relevant facts and circumstances—something we cannot do. See Bilbrey, 317 Kan. at 63.
Gray also makes an incidental and conclusory argument he was coerced by Hamlin into
entering a plea. The district court rejected Gray's testimony on this point, and we cannot
disturb the district court's credibility determinations. See 317 Kan. at 63.

       Finally, the State correctly points out Gray's argument is largely speculative as it
assumes the same plea deal, or a better one, would have been offered had the original
possession of methamphetamine with the intent to distribute count been charged as only
possession of methamphetamine, a lesser severe crime. Here, the plea agreement resolved
numerous other charges and cases involving a potential for significantly more prison
time; thus, Gray received what he bargained for even though he does not like it now. As
the prior panel pointed out, the plea-bargaining process involves several considerations
by both parties to secure an overall benefit. Gray, 2022 WL 879744, at *5-6. Gray has
not met his burden to show the district court abused its discretion in finding no good
cause to support withdrawal of his bargained-for pleas. The district court did not err in
denying his motion to withdraw guilty plea.

       Affirmed.

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