Court Opinion

ID: 9409219
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-17 11:07:47.745699+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:49.251416
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued July 13, 2023

                                     In The

                               Court of Appeals
                                    For The

                         First District of Texas
                           ————————————
                               NO. 01-22-00716-CR
                          ———————————
           EX PARTE AMIR ABDULLAH RAHIM-PARTRIDGE

                  On Appeal from the 122nd District Court
                         Galveston County, Texas
                     Trial Court Case No. 22-CR-0204

                         MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Amir Abdullah Rahim-Partridge, appellant, appeals the trial court’s

September 27, 2022 order on his pretrial application for writ of habeas corpus

seeking release on personal bond pursuant to Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure, or alternatively for reduction of the bond “in an amount

sufficiently low enough” to “secure [his] release.” Rahim-Partridge’s habeas
application asserted that (1) the State was not ready for trial within 90 days of his

detention, and (2) he was entitled to be released on a personal bond because he could

not afford to post bond in any amount. The trial court’s order denied Rahim-

Partridge’s request for release on a personal bond but granted his application and

reduced his bail from $250,000 to $75,000. Because Article 17.151 mandates

release, we reverse and remand this matter to the trial court to set a bond that Rahim-

Partridge can afford.

                                    Background

      Rahim-Partridge applied for a writ of habeas corpus, seeking pretrial release

because the State was not ready for trial within 90 days of the commencement of his

detention as required by Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.151, § 1(1). The trial court held a hearing.

      At the hearing, the evidence showed that Rahim-Partridge had been

incarcerated since January 30, 2022 on two felony charges: aggravated kidnapping

with a deadly weapon and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. TEX. PENAL

CODE §§ 20.04(b), 22.02(a). The evidence also showed that Rahim-Partridge has

been held in jail continuously for more than 90 days, has previous convictions in

North Carolina, is on bond for cases there, and has limited financial means. Based

on these facts, Rahim-Partridge argued that because the State was not ready for trial,

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he was entitled to release on personal bond. The trial court granted the application

but only reduced Rahim-Partridge’s bail from $250,000 to $75,000.

                                   Article 17.151

      Rahim-Partridge argues that Article 17.151 mandates release after more than

90 days since his detention began and the State is not ready for trial.

A.    Standard of Review

      An applicant for a writ of habeas corpus bears the burden of proving facts

entitling him to relief. Ex parte Kimes, 872 S.W.2d 700, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).

On appeal, we review a trial court’s decision at a habeas proceeding on the reduction

of bail for an abuse of discretion. Ex parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d 425, 428 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2013); see Ex parte Ellis, 309 S.W.3d 71, 79 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (noting

that “pretrial habeas, followed by an interlocutory appeal, is an ‘extraordinary

remedy’”) (quoting Ex parte Doster, 303 S.W.3d 720, 724 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)).

“An abuse of discretion does not occur unless the trial court acts ‘arbitrarily or

unreasonably’ or ‘without reference to any guiding rules and principles,’” State v.

Hill, 499 S.W.3d 853, 865 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016) (quoting Montgomery v. State,

810 S.W.2d 372, 380 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990)), or unless the trial court’s decision

“falls outside the zone of reasonable disagreement,” Johnson v. State, 490 S.W.3d

895, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). A failure by the trial court to analyze or apply the

law correctly constitutes an abuse of discretion. In re Allstate Cnty. Mut. Ins. Co.,

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85 S.W.3d 193, 195 (Tex. 2002) (orig. proceeding). “In reviewing the trial court’s

decision, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling.” Ex parte

Craft, 301 S.W.3d 447, 448–49 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). “We afford

almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts supported

by the record, especially when the fact findings are based upon credibility and

demeanor.” Ex parte Estrada, 573 S.W.3d 884, 891 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]

2019, no pet.).

B.    Analysis

      Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides,

      A defendant who is detained in jail pending trial of an accusation
      against him must be released either on personal bond or by reducing the
      amount of bail required, if the state is not ready for trial of the criminal
      action for which he is being detained within:

      (1) 90 days from the commencement of his detention if he is accused
      of a felony[.]

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.151, § 1(1). “This Article preserves the presumption

of innocence by ensuring that ‘an accused as yet untried and unreleased on bond will

not suffer ‘the incidental punitive effect’ of incarceration during any further delay

attendant to prosecutorial exigency.’” Ex parte Smith, 486 S.W.3d 62, 65 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (quoting Jones v. State, 803 S.W.2d 712, 716 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1991).

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      “Under Article 17.151, the State has the initial burden to make a prima facie

showing that it was ready for trial within the applicable time period.” Ex parte

Ragston, 422 S.W.3d 904, 906–07 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.).

The State’s “readiness” refers to the prosecution’s preparedness for trial. Id. at 907;

see Santibanez v. State, 717 S.W.2d 326, 329 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). Readiness

may be shown “‘either by announcing within the allotted time that it is ready, or by

announcing retrospectively that it had been ready within the allotted time.’” Ex parte

Ragston, 422 S.W.3d at 907 (quoting Ex parte Jones, 803 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1991)). “Without an indictment, the State cannot be ready for trial under

Article 17.151.” Ex parte Lanclos, 624 S.W.3d 923, 927 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021).

      It was undisputed that Rahim-Partridge was arrested on January 30, 2022, and

remained incarcerated since his arrest. Given those facts, the State did not attempt

to claim that it had been ready for trial within the 90-day statutory time frame.

“Under [these] circumstances, the judge has only two options: either release

[defendant] on personal bond or reduce the required bail amount.” Id. (citing Ex

parte Gill, 413 S.W.3d at 429).

      But we cannot conclude that the trial court erred by failing to release Rahim-

Partridge on a personal bond. In 2020, Governor Greg Abbott issued an executive

order stating, “Article 17.151 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is hereby

suspended to the extent necessary to prevent any person’s automatic release on

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personal bond because the State is not ready for trial.” See The Governor of the State

of Tex., Exec. Order No. GA-13, 45 Tex. Reg. 2368, 2369 (2020). The Texas Court

of Criminal Appeals has held that this “executive order suspends Article 17.151 only

to the extent that it calls for releasing defendants on personal bond” and “does not

suspend Article 17.151’s release of defendants on bonds they can afford,” so the trial

court was required to reduce Rahim-Partridge’s bond amount. See Ex parte Lanclos,

624 S.W.3d at 927.1

      So now we must determine whether the trial court erred in failing to set bond

in an amount Rahim-Partridge could afford. See id. “If the court chooses to reduce

the amount of bail required, it must reduce it to an amount that the record reflects

the accused can make.” Id. (citing Rowe v. State, 853 S.W.2d 581, 582 n.1 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1993). The record shows that the extent of Rahim-Partridge’s assets were

81 cents at the time of the hearing. In its order, the trial court reduced Rahim-

Partridge’s bond from $250,000 to $75,000. But “Article 17.151 requires more than

coming up with a lower number. It mandates release.” Id. at 929. As a result, the

“habeas court abused its discretion in picking a number that frustrated Article

17.151’s mandate to release Appellant.” Id.

1
      Unless Section 2 of Article 17.151 applies. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 17.151,
      § 2. Before the trial court, the State argued that Sections 2(2) and 2(4) applied.
      Because the trial court granted Rahim-Partridge’s application, implicitly rejecting
      the State’s arguments, Rahim-Partridge’s appeal only concerns whether a personal
      bond or lower bond was required. See TEX. R. APP. 47.1.
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      Accordingly, the trial court failed to act within its discretion by simply

lowering the bail amount. See id. Rahim-Partridge’s continued incarceration reflects

the fact that he cannot afford the $75,000 bail that the trial court set.

                                      Conclusion

      Rahim-Partridge was detained in jail on felony charges for more than 90 days

and the State was not ready for trial within the statutory time frame. Thus, Rahim-

Partridge was entitled to release under Article 17.151. We reverse the trial court’s

order and remand the case to the trial court for Rahim-Partridge’s bond to be set in

an amount he can afford to pay. No motions for rehearing will be entertained. Id.

       We order the clerk of this court to issue the mandate immediately. See TEX.

R. APP. P. 2 (authority to suspend rules, including time frame for issuance of

mandate, to expedite decision); TEX. R. APP. P. 18.6 (appellate court may issue

mandate with its judgment in accelerated appeal); Ex parte Carson, 215 S.W.3d 921,

924 (Tex. App—Texarkana 2007, no pet.) (issuing mandate immediately in Article

17.151 case).

                                                Sarah Beth Landau
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Landau, and Rivas-Molloy.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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