Court Opinion

ID: 9586581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:13:02.191019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:32:43.940832
License: Public Domain

HATHAWAY, Chief Judge
(dissenting) :
The State introduced a 1954 commitment form for a Robert Allen Norgard to the Arizona State Prison, No. 17917. I find no other evidence in the record connecting the defendant with the 1954 conviction. Attached to the 1954 commitment form were photographs and fingerprints taken at the Arizona State Prison of a Robert Allen Norgard in 1961, No. 23167. No photographs or fingerprints of Robert Allen Norgard admitted to the state prison in 1954 were introduced although the superintendent of the state prison is required to maintain “finger and thumbprints, photographs, identification data, modus operandi reports and criminal records of prisoners confined in the state prison * * A. R.S. § 13-1251. This statute was in effect in 1954 under the 1939 Code, § 45-209.
The State in no way attempted to explain why they had to use the photographs and fingerprints of the Robert Allen Norgard admitted in 1961 and could not use the photographs and fingerprints of Robert Allen Norgard admitted to the state prison in 1954. The State hoped to connect the 1954 commitment and the 1961 photographs and fingerprints to the defendant by the certificate of the secretary of the Arizona State Prison. I believe the majority lends too great credence to the certificate. The law requiring authentication of a copy of an *43official record, Rule 44(g) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
“1. An official record or any entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody.”
I believe the authentication by the secretary of the Arizona State Prison’s records represented only his verification that the photographs and fingerprints entered into evidence by the State were correct copies of the original photographs and fingerprints taken in 1961 of a Robert Allen Norgard; and, that the commitment form attached and admitted in evidence was a correct copy of the commitment form of a Robert Allen Norgard admitted in 1954. I do not believe, as the majority says, that:
“[Tjhere is necessarily implicit in this certificate the assertion that the ‘Robert A. Norgard,’ a copy of whose judgment and commitment of 1954 was attached to the certificate, is the same person as the ‘Robert A. Norgard’ whose fingerprints and picture were attached to the certificate, as taken on November 11, 1961.”
It is prejudicial to the defendant to show a 1954 commitment in conjunction with photographs and fingerprints taken in 1961 for a separate conviction with no further connecting evidence between the two commitment records. All evidence introduced concerning any 1961 commitment to the Arizona State Prison of a Robert A. Norgard was irrelevant and therefore inadmissible :
“ * * * where the facts offered consist of past misconduct, whether criminal or not, and being offered to show design, motive, intent, knowledge, or the like, are determined not to be relevant for any such purpose, it follows as of course, that they are also obnoxious to the character-rule and must be excluded. * * * Where they involved past misconduct, ‘they are not only irrelevant, but they do injury,’ because they prejudice the accused by invoking his character, ‘and for this additional reason they ought to be excluded.’ ” (Emphasis supplied)
1 Wigmore, Evidence (3d edition, 1940) p. 717.
The Pennye case cited by the majority, I respectfully submit, is strong authority for reversal here and has been misconstrued by the majority. For other Arizona cases in point see: State v. Cobb, 2 Ariz.App. 71, 406 P.2d 421 (1965); State v. Salazar, 3 Ariz.App. 114, 412 P.2d 289 (1966); and, State v. Miles, 3 Ariz.App. 377, 414 P.2d 765 (1966).
The trial court’s judgment should be reversed as to the prior conviction and the cause should be remanded for a new trial regarding the alleged prior conviction and for resentencing in accordance with the result.