Court Opinion

ID: 9843836
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:43:49.061559+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:15:14.538875
License: Public Domain

MARING, Justice,
dissenting.
[¶ 34] I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[¶ 35] The majority, without one citation, has reversed the decision of the trial court even though the trial court’s decision follows the majority of jurisdictions in this country that have addressed the issue presented. See Dotts v. Taressa J.A., 182 W.Va. 586, 390 S.E.2d 568, 572 (1990); Johnny Parker, The Wacky World of Collision and Comprehensive Coverages: Intentional Injury and Illegal Activity Exclusions, 79 Neb. L.Rev. 75, 96 n. 76 (2000). Not even Grinnell advocates the reasoning used by the majority opinion. *537Grinnell argues the intentional acts exclusion is valid against all “insureds.” The majority imposes its own notion of public policy, and in doing so, refuses to acknowledge the public policy enunciated by our legislature in enacting the North Dakota Financial Responsibility Laws. The result of the majority opinion is the potential for one class of “insureds” under the mandated liability coverage to be insured for intentional acts and another class of “insureds” under the same mandatory coverage to be excluded for intentional acts without any policy language requiring such a distinction.
[¶ 36] The Financial Responsibility Laws in North Dakota provide that all motor vehicle liability policies, which means all owner’s or operator’s policies of liability insurance “[m]ust insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicles....” N.D.C.C. § 39-16.1-ll(2)(b). Our Court has interpreted this language and concluded that a policy of insurance must contain the same omnibus coverage defined by the Financial Responsibility Laws. Hughes v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 236 N.W.2d 870, 884 (N.D.1975). We have said that the mandatory omnibus clause coverage is a clear legislative expression of public policy. Id.
[¶ 37] The first step of the analysis is to determine whether the Grinnell policy contains the coverage mandated by the Financial Responsibility Laws. The policy language is different from the statutory language. “Part A — Liability Coverage” of the policy states:
A. We will pay damages for “bodily injury” or “property damage” for which any “insured” becomes legally responsible because of an auto accident. Damages include prejudgment interest awarded against the “insured”. We will settle or defend, as we consider appropriate, any claim or suit asking for these damages. In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay all defense costs we incur. Our duty to settle or defend ends when our limit of liability for this coverage has been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements. We have no duty to defend any suit or settle any claim for “bodily injury” or “property damage” not covered under this policy.
(Emphasis added.) Under N.D.C.C. § 39-16.1 — ll(2)(b):
2. Such owner’s policy of liability insurance ...
b. Must insure the person named therein and any other person, as insured, using such motor vehicle or motor vehicles with the express or implied permission of such named insured, against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicles ....
(Emphasis added.) By the terms of the policy’s conformity clause, the policy is conformed to comply with the state’s Financial Responsibility Laws. Richard v. Fliflet, 370 N.W.2d 528, 535 (N.D.1985). “The Financial Responsibility Act is read into, and forms part of, a policy of insurance required thereby.” Lee R. Russ, Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 109:59 (3d ed. 2005). The Grinnell policy must therefore be modified to read:
A. We will pay for loss from the liability imposed by law on any “insured” for damages arising out of the owner*538ship, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicles.
[¶38] Once the policy complies with the statutory coverage, we look to the policy to determine who is an “insured.” The majority correctly concludes that Shelly Thompson is an “insured.” The Grinnell policy “Part A-Liability Coverage” defines an “insured” to include the named insured’s “family member” and thus Norman Thompson’s spouse, Shelly Thompson.
[¶ 39] Grinnell argues that Shelly Thompson was not a permissive user and therefore she has no mandatory liability coverage. However, if we look to the terms of the policy, we find that Grinnell extended the mandatory liability coverage to a “family member” using the named insured’s auto even if without permission. The policy under “Part A — Liability Coverage” “Exclusions” states:
A. We do not provide Liability Coverage for any “insured”:
[[Image here]]
8. Using a vehicle without a reasonable belief that that “insured” is entitled to do so. This Exclusion (A.8) does not apply to a “family member” using “your covered auto” which is owned by you.
Our Court has held that an auto policy can provide broader coverage than required by our statutes. See DeCoteau v. Nodak Mutual Ins. Co., 2000 ND 3, ¶ 22, 603 N.W.2d 906; Grinnell Mutual Reinsurance Co., v. Farm, & City Ins. Co., 2000 ND 163, ¶¶ 15-16, 616 N.W.2d 353 (holding that the statute required coverage if a person is using the vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured, but the policy provided broader coverage by providing coverage if a person uses the vehicle with sufficient reason to believe that the use is with permission). The majority is correct that our statutes do not mandate liability coverage for a nonper-missive user, but in this case, Grinnell’s policy specifically excepted Shelly Thompson from its exclusion from liability coverage and covered Shelly Thompson as a nonpermissive user.
[¶40] Shelly Thompson is clearly an insured under the Grinnell liability policy even if she did not have permission to drive the motor vehicle. This risk was covered by the mandatory liability policy from the day it was issued. Our Financial Responsibility Laws only mandate liability coverage for an insured who uses the motor vehicle with the express or implied permission of the named insured, but the Grinnell Mutual policy provided broader coverage by excepting a “family member” from the exclusion of nonpermissive users.
[¶ 41] The only other exclusion in the policy that applies to Shelly Thompson is found in “Part A — Liability Coverage” “Exclusions”:
A. We do not provide Liability Coverage for any “insured”:
1. Who intentionally causes “bodily injury” or “property damage”.
Whether the policy’s intentional acts exclusion is valid in light of North Dakota’s comprehensive Financial Responsibility Laws is the issue briefed to the trial court and to this Court. The majority concludes it may not be valid for insureds who are permissive users, but valid for Shelly Thompson because she was a nonpermis-sive user. The majority refuses to examine the issue briefed and dismisses it by stating, at ¶ 15: “Because Grinnell provides greater coverage in one area, it is not required to provide greater coverage than is required by the Financial Responsibility Laws under all circumstances.” The majority provides no support for this analysis. The majority, at ¶ 15, further announces without any support: “Because *539the Financial Responsibility Laws do not require a minimum level of coverage for Shelly Thompson, a nonpermissive operator, Grinnell can exclude coverage for her intentional collision with the semi-trailer.” This analysis is flawed and result-oriented. The coverage mandated by our laws was provided to Shelly Thompson in this case by the Grinnell policy. The policy excludes coverage for “any ‘insured’ ... [w]ho intentionally causes ‘bodily injury’ ”. Whether Shelly Thompson was a permissive user or not has nothing to do with the issue of whether the intentional acts exclusion of the Grinnell policy is valid or not for “any insured.” Shelly Thompson is “any insured” under the mandatory liability coverage of the Grinnell policy. The Grinnell policy provided coverage for a nonpermissive family member user under its mandatory liability coverage. Under the intentional acts exclusion, it did not distinguish between an insured who was a permissive user or nonpermissive user. It granted Shelly Thompson the full status of an “insured” under the mandatory liability coverage.
[¶ 42] The well-reasoned analysis of the Supreme Court of Utah addressing this issue is persuasive. See Speros v. Fricke, 2004 UT 69, 98 P.3d 28. In concluding as a matter of law that the intentional acts exclusion in a motor vehicle policy was invalid, the Court reviewed the legislative intent behind its motor vehicle liability coverage laws and stated:
The Utah legislature has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme mandating minimum liability coverage for motor vehicles. This legislative enactment reflects a public policy requiring vehicle owners to carry a minimum level of liability coverage to protect innocent victims of automobile accidents.
Id. at ¶ 42 (citation omitted). Our Court has said: “The basic purpose for the Legislature’s enactment of financial responsibility laws was to protect innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents from financial disaster.” Hughes, 236 N.W.2d at 882.2 The Utah statute requires that the policy insure “against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of these motor vehicles ...” Speros, at ¶ 42 (emphasis omitted). The language of our North Dakota statute reads the same. N.D.C.C. § 39 — 16.1—11 (2)(b). The Utah Supreme Court stated:
The statute recognizes no distinction between liability arising out of negligent acts and liability arising out of intentional acts; it simply requires coverage for all liabilities imposed by law. Because the law imposes liability for damages caused negligently and intentionally, we conclude that the statute requires coverage of liability arising out of intentional, as well as negligent acts.
Speros, at ¶ 43 (emphasis omitted). See also Lee R. Russ, Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on Insurance § 109:65 (3d ed. 2005) *540(“The coverage of a Financial Responsibility Act is not limited to harm from negligent operation, but includes harm resulting from willful misconduct, and it is not against public policy to so provide as the Financial Responsibility Law is itself a declaratory of public policy and supersedes any rule of public policy applicable to ordinary insurance law.”) The Utah Supreme Court recognized that “[o]ther courts have reached the same conclusion when analyzing similar statutory language.” Speros, at ¶ 48 n. 6. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tringali, 686 F.2d 821, 824 (9th Cir.1982); Wheeler v. O’Connell, 297 Mass. 549, 9 N.E.2d 544, 546 (1937); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 261 N.C. 285, 134 S.E.2d 654, 659 (1964); S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Mumford, 299 S.C. 14, 382 S.E.2d 11, 12-14 (S.C.Ct.App.1989); accord Hudson v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1168, 1169 (Del.1990); Martin v. Chicago Ins. Co., 184 Ga.App. 472, 361 S.E.2d 835, 837 (1987); Mosley v. West Am. Ins. Co., 743 S.W.2d 854, 855 (Ky.Ct. App.1987); Cannon v. Commerce Ins. Co., 18 Mass.App.Ct. 984, 470 N.E.2d 805, 806 (1984); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Wolbarst, 95 N.H. 40, 57 A.2d 151, 153-55 (1948); Dotts v. Taressa J.A., 182 W.Va. 586, 390 S.E.2d 568, 572-74 (1990); cf. Cotton States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Neese, 254 Ga. 335, 329 S.E.2d 136, 138-42 (1985) (determining that an insurance provision that excluded coverage for a person attempting to avoid apprehension or arrest was unenforceable as a matter of public policy to the extent of insurance required under Georgia’s compulsory insurance law).
[¶ 43] The Utah Supreme Court examined the statutory scheme and concluded it supported the Court’s decision because it contemplates some exclusions from coverage but does not authorize exclusions from coverage for the intentional acts of otherwise covered persons. The North Dakota law has the same statutory exclusions mentioned by the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, noting that its statute specified certain exceptions to coverage, concluded that under the doctrine of “ ‘expressio uni-us est exclusio alterius’ (express mention of one thing implies exclusion of all others),” the legislature did not intend to exclude coverage for intentional acts. Dotts, 390 S.E.2d at 573. Our statute, N.D.C.C. § 39-16.1-11(5), recognizes policies need not insure any liability arising under workforce safety and insurance law, liability on a count of bodily injury to an employee of the insured while engaged in the employment of the insured, while engaged in the operation, maintenance, or repair of a motor vehicle, nor any liability for the damage to property owned by, rented to, in charge of, or transported by the insured.
[¶ 44] In addition, our past case law supports the invalidation of the intentional acts exclusion in light of the purpose of our Financial Responsibility Laws. In Richard v. Fliflet, our Court held an auto policy cannot be voided because of a misrepresentation of the insured in obtaining the coverage after the occurrence of the accident. 370 N.W.2d 528, 530 (N.D.1985). Under N.D.C.C. § 39-16.1-ll(6)(a), “[t]he liability of the insurance carrier with respect to the insurance required by this chapter becomes absolute whenever injury or damage covered by said motor vehicle liability policy occurs.” See Kambeitz v. Acuity Ins. Co., 2009 ND 166, ¶ 14, 772 N.W.2d 632. Under Hughes, our Court held the terms of a motor vehicle liability policy issued and delivered in North Dakota must provide at least the minimum coverage under our Financial Responsibility Laws, and the household or family exclusion clause was void as violative of public policy. Hughes, 236 N.W.2d at 885.
*541[¶ 45] The Supreme Court of Utah noted that many jurisdictions “ ‘interpret their mandatory insurance statutes to require liability insurance subject only to specific statutory exclusions and construe the legislative policy to require minimum coverage to victims of automobile accidents.’ ” Speros, 2004 UT 69, ¶ 46, 98 P.3d 28 (quoting Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, 712 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1985)).
[¶ 46] It is true that our Court has upheld an intentional acts exclusion in the context of a homeowner’s policy and others, but those cases are clearly distinguishable because there is no statutory scheme requiring minimum coverage. See Mead v. Farmers Union Mut. Ins. Co., 2000 ND 139, ¶¶ 7, 22, 613 N.W.2d 512 (holding the trial court did not err in determining a farm liability policy’s exclusion for intentional acts was valid); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Homer, 1998 ND 168, ¶¶ 1-2, 583 N.W.2d 804 (affirming a determination that the intentional acts exclusion applied to a homeowner’s policy); Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Clark, 1998 ND 153, ¶ 18, 583 N.W.2d 377 (holding a homeowner’s policy validly excluded coverage for an intentional act); Nodak Mut. Ins. Co. v. Heim, 1997 ND 36, ¶ 24, 559 N.W.2d 846 (determining a farm policy’s intentional acts exclusion barred coverage); Nat’l Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Kovash, 452 N.W.2d 307, 311 (N.D.1990) (holding a farm liability policy did not cover an intentional trespass under its intentional acts exclusion); Hins v. Heer, 259 N.W.2d 38, 40 (N.D.1977) (holding the homeowner’s policy excluded willful acts)3; see also Allstate Indemnity Co. v. Wise, 818 So.2d 524, 526 (Fla.Dist.Ct. App.2001) (distinguishing an automobile liability policy exclusion from a homeowner’s liability exclusion because under the Financial Responsibility Laws, Florida enforces minimum levels of automobile insurance to protect the public). The intentional acts exclusion in the Grinnell liability policy is contrary to our statutory scheme and the intent of our legislature to protect innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents. If our legislature is of the view that the mandatory liability coverage should not provide coverage to innocent victims when the tortfeasor acts intentionally, it can amend the statute to add the exclusion just as it has limited coverage for other circumstances. See N.D.C.C. § 39-16.1-11(5).
[¶ 47] I also agree with the Utah Supreme Court that:
“The principle that one should not be permitted to insure against his own intentional wrongdoing applies to voluntary insurance, not compulsory insurance. Where the Legislature makes coverage compulsory, instead of leaving it to the voluntary market, it has already balanced the public interest in prohibiting insurance for intentionally harmful acts against the public interest in compensating the victims of at fault motorists. By making coverage compulsory, it chooses to weigh the latter interest more heavily than the former. Once the Legislature has made that choice, there is no room for the courts to impose a different judgment based on their own notions of public policy.”
Speros, 2004 UT 69, ¶ 46 n. 9, 98 P.3d 28 (quoting Muntford, 299 S.C. 14, 382 S.E.2d 11, 14 (S.C.Ct.App.1989) (emphasis added)).
*542[¶ 48] Grinnell argues that the collision in this case is not an “accident” and that the North Dakota Financial Responsibility Laws only apply to “accidents” because the mandatory minimum limits of liability coverage are set out under N.D.C.C. § 39-16.1 — ll(2)(b) as “in any one accident.” The Financial Responsibility Laws do not define “accident,” and the Grinnell policy does not define “accident.” Grinnell argues the term does not include intentional acts. However, our Court construes statutes as a whole to determine the intent of the legislature. Rojas v. Workforce Safety and Ins., 2006 ND 221, ¶ 13, 723 N.W.2d 403. We construe statutes giving consideration to the context and the purpose for which they were enacted. Bragg v. Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co., 2009 ND 33, ¶ 18, 763 N.W.2d 481. An examination of the statutory language reveals that coverage is not limited to losses that are caused by “accident,” but rather coverage is mandated for “loss[es] from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of ownership, maintenance, or use of such motor vehicles.... ” N.D.C.C. § 39-16.1-ll(2)(b). As pointed out before, a majority of jurisdictions examining this language have concluded that the coverage mandated by the Financial Responsibility Laws is not limited to harm from negligent acts, but includes harm from intentional acts. It is clear that the term “accident” in this context is utilized only as a means of describing the minimum coverage requirement for any single auto collision. See Dotts, 390 S.E.2d at 573; Mumford, 382 S.E.2d at 14. In further support of this interpretation is the public policy and interest declared by our legislature in having innocent victims of automobile collisions compensated for their injuries. Although the insurer, Grinnell, will pay the damages assessed against Shelly Thompson, it can seek indemnification from her. See Continental Casualty Co. v. Kinsey, 499 N.W.2d 574, 581 (N.D.1993). When the insured is denied coverage under an intentional acts exclusion, the risk of loss is shifted to the innocent victim.
[¶ 49] In consideration of the clear statutory language mandating coverage “against loss from the liability imposed by law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use” of a motor vehicle, the public policy requiring minimum coverage to protect innocent victims of automobile accidents, and the legislature’s failure to authorize such intentional acts exclusion, I would hold the intentional acts exclusion is unenforceable against innocent victims up to the minimum liability limits prescribed by the Financial Responsibility Laws and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[¶ 50] MARY MUEHLEN MARING

. The concurrence in the result claims that my dissent has overstated the basic purpose of the financial responsibility laws. However, my position is simply that our laws mandate coverage for all owners of automobiles plus persons whom they permit to drive their automobiles. This is for the protection of innocent victims harmed by the actions of these drivers. Therefore, it is against public policy to exclude from coverage intentional acts of these owners and drivers. I see no reason not to apply this policy to any insured to whom the mandatory coverage extends.
The concurrence further states that I have made a sweeping statement of legislative policy, but I have only quoted our Court's majority holding in Hughes, which has been law since 1975. See Kambeitz v. Acuity Ins. Co., 2009 ND 166, ¶ 14, 772 N.W.2d 632; State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co. v. LaRoque, 486 N.W.2d 235, 239-41 (N.D. 1992); Richard v. Fliflet, 370 N.W.2d 528, 534 (N.D.1985).

. The concurrence states that my dissent fails to mention two pertinent statutes, N.D.C.C. §§ 26.1-32-04 and 9-08-02. Yet, a reading of the foregoing cases reveals discussion of these statutes in the analyses of the opinions of our Court. Section 26.1-32-04, N.D.C.C. is a general statute relating to insurance and any public policy therein must be considered against the specific public policy behind the enactment of the financial responsibility laws.