Court Opinion

ID: 9904752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 19:03:33.503682+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:19.054220
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/27/23 P. v. Burnette CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                       (Siskiyou)
                                                            ----

    THE PEOPLE,                                                                                C095825

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                    (Super. Ct. No. SCCR-CRF-
                                                                                         2020-758-1)
           v.

    JEFFERY BURNETTE,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         Charged with several offenses, defendant Jeffery Burnette petitioned the trial court
for mental health diversion pursuant to Penal Code section 1001.36.1 At the hearing on

1        Undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.

        Section 1001.36 has been amended since defendant’s mental health diversion
hearing. (Stats. 2022, ch. 47, § 38 & ch. 735, § 1.) The parties do not address the effect
of this amendment, nor do we address it, because we conclude the amended language is
not determinative of the issues raised in this appeal. We cite throughout to the version of
section 1001.36 in effect at the time of the hearing. (See Stats. 2019, ch. 497, § 203.)

                                                             1
defendant’s petition, both expert witnesses testified that defendant suffered from a
number of qualifying mental disorders, including schizophrenia and alcoholism. The trial
court found defendant’s schizophrenia was not a significant factor in the commission of
the charged offenses and denied the petition.
       The trial court also noted that other mental disorders appeared to be involved but
declined to consider them at the hearing. Rather than seeking a ruling at the hearing as to
whether defendant was eligible for diversion based on his alcoholism, defense counsel
indicated she would file another petition to request diversion on that ground. Four
months later, defendant pleaded no contest to two of the charged offenses and was
sentenced to six years in state prison. Defense counsel never filed a second diversion
petition based on defendant’s alcoholism.
       Defendant contends: (1) the trial court’s denial of mental health diversion based
on defendant’s alcoholism was unsupported by substantial evidence, and (2) alternatively,
defense counsel performed ineffectively by failing to seek a ruling as to that specific
mental disorder.
        We conclude defense counsel performed ineffectively by not seeking a ruling on
mental health diversion based on defendant’s alcoholism. The only apparent tactical
reason for not doing so was defense counsel’s declared intent to file a later petition
focused on that mental disorder. But we see no tactical reason for failing to file that
second petition during the four months between the hearing and defendant’s plea. We
also conclude there is a reasonable probability the trial court would have found defendant
suitable for diversion had counsel sought a ruling based on his alcoholism. Accordingly,
we will conditionally reverse the judgment to give defendant the option to withdraw his
plea and seek mental health diversion for alcoholism.

                                              2
                                     BACKGROUND
       A.     Incident and Arrest
       During his mental health diversion assessment, defendant explained that in July
2020, he fled a COVID-19 surge in southern California and traveled north to Siskiyou
County. After arriving, defendant was living in a park and drinking alcohol for two or
three days prior to the incident because he did not know anyone in his new location and
his phone was not working. Defendant reported drinking four tall cans of high-alcohol
beer and one pint of whiskey on the day of the incident, July 7, 2020. According to the
police report, which served as the stipulated factual basis for defendant’s plea, defendant
was muttering to himself in a park and got into a confrontation with a young man.
Defendant tried to tackle the young man, who slammed defendant to the ground.
       A short time later, defendant was muttering to himself outside a grocery store and
began using racial slurs towards a man walking out of the store. When the man
confronted defendant, defendant pulled out a knife and began making stabbing motions
from approximately three feet away while saying he was going to stab the man. A
bystander defused the situation, and defendant walked off. When the police arrested
defendant, he was holding an open container of beer, had red watery eyes, was stumbling
and unsteady on his feet, and smelled strongly of alcohol.
       B.     Incarceration and Mental Health Evaluation
       In jail the following day, defendant reported feeling suicidal and sick from alcohol
withdrawal. Defendant saw a psychiatrist, Dr. William Lofthouse, the next day and
reported that he feared being attacked and still felt “kind of suicidal.” Dr. Lofthouse
diagnosed defendant with panic disorder, general anxiety disorder, depressive disorder,
and alcoholism. After hearing defendant had suffered delirium tremens in the past and
had a family history of alcoholism, Dr. Lofthouse noted: “Suspect a serious alcohol
disorder.” Defendant continued to report fear of being around other inmates and feeling
suicidal, so jail staff employed special safety protocols for defendant for four more days.

                                             3
Even after defendant was removed from the safety protocols, behavioral health staff
reported that he had made a low severity plan to hang himself.
       At the initial visit, Dr. Lofthouse prescribed three medications: Zoloft, Remeron,
and Clonazepam. Four days later, however, behavioral health staff at the jail reported
that they had given defendant Zoloft and Lorazepam. Defendant’s case was initially set
for trial to begin on September 28, 2020, but was continued nine times due to
complications caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and once due to difficulty serving a
subpoena on a witness.
       During this time, the county behavioral health team monitored defendant, and Dr.
Lofthouse met with defendant approximately once a month. On November 11, 2020,
defendant was written up for “mutual combat” with another inmate, which was sparked
by a verbal altercation. The other inmate was part of a therapy group at the jail. On
December 5, 2020, defendant was written up for speaking disrespectfully to jail staff. On
December 17, 2020, defendant was written up for shredding his shirt by using it to clean
up water when a toilet overflowed. On January 7, 2021, defendant was written up after
he criticized another inmate for stealing candy bars from a third inmate, which eventually
resulted in a brief scuffle. On January 20, 2021, defendant was again written up for
fighting after a verbal altercation. On March 21, 2021, defendant was written up for
possessing a piece of a broken razor. Once defendant became more engaged in
therapeutic counseling in the spring of 2021, there were no further incidents resulting in
discipline at the jail.
       On May 7, 2021, William Thompson, a therapist who works for Siskiyou County
Behavioral Health, performed a mental health diversion assessment of defendant. In this
assessment, Thompson diagnosed defendant with schizophrenia. Thompson concluded
defendant was not eligible for diversion because his schizophrenia did not impair his
functioning and was not a factor in his commission of the charged offenses. Thompson

                                             4
concluded instead that the offenses defendant had been charged with were directly related
to alcohol intoxication.
       In June 2021, defendant’s counsel determined, based on evolving case law, that
defendant was a suitable candidate for mental health diversion and filed the petition at
issue in this appeal.
       C.     Mental Health Diversion Hearing
       Both Thompson and Dr. Lofthouse testified at the hearing on defendant’s petition
for mental health diversion held on September 23, 2021. Thompson testified that after he
performed the initial assessment, he began meeting with defendant for therapy on an
ongoing basis, approximately 10 times in five months. Through those sessions,
Thompson concluded that defendant’s schizophrenia and anxiety also had a significant
effect on his commission of the charged offenses because he was suffering fear and
anxiety caused by those disorders and relapsed into alcoholism to reduce those
symptoms. Thompson believed treatment would resolve the symptoms that led to the
actions for which defendant had been charged. Defendant had already responded well
once he became more involved in therapeutic counseling, “monitoring and maintaining
himself in a much more appropriate way,” which had prevented any further disciplinary
incidents in the jail. Thompson emphasized the need for substance use treatment
evaluation and for defendant to avoid alcohol. Thompson also testified that defendant
had consented to mental health treatment and agreed to comply with treatment.
       On cross-examination, the prosecution questioned Thompson extensively about
defendant’s history of alcoholism. Defendant reported that he began drinking at age 14
and had suffered delirium tremens in the past, a very serious medical condition caused by
alcohol withdrawal. In response to the prosecution’s questioning, Thompson reaffirmed
his belief that defendant’s history of alcoholism and his alcohol use prior to the incident
substantially contributed to the commission of the charged offenses.

                                             5
       The second expert, Dr. Lofthouse, diagnosed defendant with panic disorder,
general anxiety disorder, depressive disorder, and alcoholism, all disorders identified in
the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
(DSM-5). Dr. Lofthouse did not diagnose defendant with schizophrenia but noted that
many people keep the symptoms private. Dr. Lofthouse concurred that defendant would
benefit from the mental health diversion program. He also recommended a “strong focus
on an alcohol disorder” because “[i]f you don’t have control of your alcohol disorder no
matter what your other psychiatric medications whether it’s schizophrenia or major
depression it will undercut it, it will make it ineffective.” Dr. Lofthouse noted that
psychosis and hallucinations could be caused by alcohol, which was one reason he was
hesitant to diagnose defendant with schizophrenia. He added, “I am really very
concerned about his alcohol abuse.” As part of defendant’s mental health treatment, Dr.
Lofthouse recommended “medical assistive treatment for alcoholism.”
       On cross-examination, the prosecution confirmed with Dr. Lofthouse that
“alcoholism is one of the primary issues for [defendant]” and “caused a psychotic
episode” that resulted in the incident for which defendant was charged.
       At the close of testimony, defense counsel argued defendant’s diagnosed mental
disorders, “including alcoholism, including schizophrenia, including depression,
including anxiety,” made defendant eligible for diversion. She also argued defendant was
suitable for diversion because the experts indicated his disorders were treatable in the
community and “[t]he People have not put on any evidence that [defendant] is likely to
cause or participate in super strike behavior which is the level of dangerousness that the
statute requests the Court to consider.”
       The prosecution responded that: (1) the schizophrenia diagnosis was
“questionable” because Dr. Lofthouse never made that diagnosis ; (2) the Siskiyou
County mental health diversion program could not address defendant’s needs, contrary to
the experts’ testimony; and (3) the charged offenses were caused by alcohol use, not

                                              6
schizophrenia. The prosecution emphasized the experts’ testimony about defendant’s
alcohol use and claimed that alcoholism did not qualify for mental health diversion.
       The trial court found that defendant had been diagnosed with schizophrenia, which
was a qualifying mental disorder under the diversion statute. But the trial court found
that no specific evidence tied defendant’s schizophrenia to the charged offenses. While
explaining its reasoning, the court commented to defense counsel, “[I]t seems you were
expanding the petition to include any number of potential diagnoses,” but the court
denied the petition without ruling on whether defendant was eligible or suitable for
mental health diversion based on any of his other diagnoses.
       Rather than seek a ruling as to any of defendant’s other diagnoses, defense counsel
asked that the trial court’s ruling be without prejudice to addressing defendant’s
alcoholism at a later time. The trial court responded, “Well, you can file whatever you
deem appropriate in the future.”
       D.     Subsequent Proceedings
       At the conclusion of the mental health diversion hearing, defendant’s case was set
for trial on November 15, 2021. The trial date was then continued three more times due
to complications caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. On January 25, 2022, four months
after the mental health diversion hearing, defendant pled no contest to two of the charged
offenses. Defense counsel did not file another mental health diversion petition.
       The trial court sentenced defendant to six years in prison. The court struck one of
defendant’s prior serious felony convictions in the interests of justice because the
conviction was old and in light of defendant’s mental health issues. Defendant timely
appealed from the judgment, and the trial court granted a certificate of probable cause to
challenge the denial of defendant’s mental health diversion petition.

                                             7
                                       DISCUSSION
                                              I
               Denial of Defendant’s Petition for Mental Health Diversion
       Defendant first argues the trial court’s denial of mental health diversion based on
defendant’s alcoholism was unsupported by substantial evidence. The People respond
that the trial court did not and was not required to make a ruling with respect to
alcoholism because defendant did not properly raise alcoholism in his petition. We
conclude defendant’s petition provided sufficient notice that he was seeking mental
health diversion in part for his alcoholism. But when the trial court declined to rule on
defendant’s eligibility based on alcoholism, defense counsel indicated a preference to file
a subsequent petition rather than seek a ruling at the hearing. We cannot conclude the
trial court abused its discretion in acceding to counsel’s indicated preference.
       A.     Sufficient Notice
       We first address the People’s argument that defendant provided insufficient notice
to the prosecution that he was seeking mental health diversion in part based on his
alcoholism. We disagree.
       As the People concede, section 1001.36 does not set forth specific pleading
requirements and permits an informal showing of eligibility and suitability for mental
health diversion. (§ 1001.36, former subd. (b)(3).) Defendant’s petition stated: (1) he
was a recovering alcoholic; (2) he had multiple DSM-5 diagnoses; (3) his alleged conduct
was caused in part by alcohol use; (4) Thompson’s opinion that alcohol was a factor in
defendant’s conduct; and (5) defendant needed assessment and treatment for his
alcoholism. In the materials submitted with defendant’s petition, both expert witnesses
identified defendant’s serious problems with alcohol, including a history of delirium
tremens and a family history of alcoholism. Dr. Lofthouse specifically diagnosed
defendant with alcoholism the day after the incident. This is more than sufficient to meet
the informal standard of section 1001.36.

                                              8
       The People’s argument also is belied by the prosecution questioning the experts at
the hearing about defendant’s alcoholism and arguing to the trial court that defendant’s
alleged offenses were due to alcohol use and not schizophrenia. Any lack of opposition
to defendant’s eligibility based on alcoholism appears to be due instead to the
prosecution’s mistaken assumption that alcoholism is not a qualifying mental disorder.
The prosecution was mistaken because any mental disorder “identified in the most recent
edition of the [DSM-5],” with exclusions not relevant here, qualifies for mental health
diversion. (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(1).) As Dr. Lofthouse testified, alcoholism is one such
mental disorder. The prosecution attached an excerpt from the DSM-5 to its opposition
to defendant’s petition, so it obviously had the capability to make this determination prior
to the hearing. The prosecution also had the ability to question the expert witnesses
during the two months between the filing of the petition and the hearing.
       In these circumstances, we see no basis for concluding the prosecution lacked
proper notice that defendant was seeking diversion based in part on his alcoholism.
       B.     Trial Court’s Ruling
       Nevertheless, the trial court did not rule on whether defendant’s alcoholism made
him eligible for diversion. The trial court explained to defense counsel that it understood
schizophrenia to be the basis for defendant’s petition. It then noted the experts and
defense counsel had mentioned other mental disorders, but indicated it was only
addressing schizophrenia.
       At that point, defendant’s attorney had the opportunity to seek a ruling with
respect to alcoholism. Instead, counsel stated: “Your Honor, I hope that the denial is
without prejudice. I do believe we made connection in the petition itself and I would like
the opportunity to draw the symptoms—I think it is both that the use of alcohol explained
by both Dr. Lofthouse and Mr. Thompson laid out in the petition is laid out in the
documents attached to the petition. [¶] So I would like to address that more particularly
for the Court perhaps at a later time.”

                                             9
       We cannot conclude the trial court abused its discretion by not granting diversion
for alcoholism when defense counsel expressly declined to ask the trial court to do so.
“Since the trial court was not asked to exercise its discretion in this manner, it could not
have abused its discretion as defendant claims.” (People v. Spirlin (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th
119, 128; accord, Agricultural Labor Relations Bd. v. Laflin & Laflin (1979)
89 Cal.App.3d 651, 666, fn. 16 [“It would be both inappropriate and futile for us to
attempt to review for abuse a discretion the court was never requested to exercise and did
not purport to exercise”]; Samaniego v. Empire Today, LLC (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th
1138, 1149 [“[The defendant] did not ask the trial court to exercise that discretion, so it
cannot now complain the court’s decision was erroneous”].) This leads us to defendant’s
next argument, i.e., that defense counsel performed ineffectively by failing to seek a
ruling as to whether he was eligible for mental health diversion based on his alcoholism.
                                              II
                             Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
       Defendant contends, “there was no tactical reason for [defense] counsel not timely
notifying the court and prosecution that [defendant] sought diversion based on his
. . . [alcoholism]” and there is a reasonable probability the trial court would have granted
a petition based on alcoholism. The People contend defense counsel had a tactical reason
for not seeking diversion based on alcoholism, and any ineffective assistance was not
prejudicial because defendant was not suitable for mental health diversion, even if he was
eligible. We agree with defendant.
       A.     Reason for not Seeking Diversion for Alcoholism
       To establish the first prong of the test for constitutionally inadequate
representation, a defendant must demonstrate counsel’s representation “fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” (People v.
Samayoa (1997) 15 Cal.4th 795, 845; see Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668,
687-688 [80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693].) “The defendant may establish the first prong of an

                                             10
ineffectiveness claim by showing there could be no satisfactory explanation for counsel’s
act or omission.” (People v. Peyton (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 642, 652.)
       The People contend such a satisfactory explanation exists for defense counsel’s
failure to seek a ruling with respect to alcoholism. Specifically, defense counsel did not
seek a ruling as to defendant’s alcoholism because “rather than object, counsel asked the
court to deny the petition without prejudice to provide appellant . . . with possible
opportunity to file an additional petition without it being summarily denied as a
repetitious filing.” Had defense counsel filed a subsequent petition directed specifically
towards defendant’s alcoholism, we could consider her deferral at the hearing a tactical
decision. But we see no tactical reason—nor do the People suggest one—for defense
counsel to decline to seek a ruling at the hearing and then also decline to file the
contemplated subsequent petition during the ensuing four months before defendant’s
plea. The transcripts from these hearings indicate the parties were not actively working
towards resolution of the case during most of this time, nor did defendant bargain away
his right to appeal the denial of mental health diversion. Given how favorable the
evidence introduced at the hearing was for defendant, and how little work remained to be
done to seek a ruling, we conclude counsel performed unreasonably by not filing the
planned petition seeking diversion for alcoholism.
       B.     Prejudice
       The People contend that “even if the trial court had found that [defendant] was
eligible for diversion based on [alcoholism], or other potential diagnoses, it is not
reasonably probable that the court would have found appellant suitable for diversion.”
(Italics added.) The People offer three reasons: (1) the experts’ opinions were based on
incomplete information; (2) defendant had disciplinary issues while in jail; and
(3) defendant’s criminal history demonstrates he is unsuitable for diversion. We see no
merit to these arguments.

                                             11
        To establish the second prong of the test for constitutionally inadequate
representation, a defendant must demonstrate that “there is a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s failings, the result would have been more favorable to the defendant.”
(People v. Samayoa, supra, 15 Cal.4th at p. 845; see Strickland v. Washington, supra,
466 U.S. at p. 694.) The People get this test backwards when they contend, “it is
reasonably probable the trial court would have denied diversion.” Rather, we must
determine whether there is a reasonable probability the trial court would have granted
mental health diversion had counsel sought diversion for alcoholism. “A ‘reasonable
probability’ is not a showing that ‘counsel’s conduct more likely than not altered the
outcome in the case,’ but simply ‘a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.’ ” (In re Cordero (1988) 46 Cal.3d 161, 180.)
        To grant mental health diversion, the trial court must determine the defendant is
both eligible and suitable for diversion. (§ 1001.36, former subd. (b)(3); see also
§ 1001.36, subds. (b)-(c) [explicitly splitting the criteria into eligibility and suitability
criteria].)
               1.     Eligibility
        Section 1001.36, former subdivision (b)(1) contains two eligibility requirements:
(A) the defendant must have been diagnosed with a qualifying mental disorder, and (B)
the defendant’s mental disorder must have been “a significant factor in the commission of
the charged offense.” (§ 1001.36, former subd. (b)(1)(A)-(B).)
        As we have noted, alcoholism is a qualifying mental disorder. The People’s
argument that the expert’s diagnoses were based on incomplete information fails to cast
any serious doubt on the expert’s testimony, and, in any event, is inconsistent with the
statute, which permits experts to rely on any of a variety of types of relevant evidence
when making a diagnosis. (§ 1001.36, former subd. (b)(1)(A).)
        As we have also noted, the prosecution argued defendant’s commission of the
charged offense was due to his alcohol intoxication, not his schizophrenia, and

                                               12
highlighted his history of alcoholism and delirium tremens. It seems unlikely the trial
court would disagree with both parties and both experts and conclude alcoholism was not
a significant factor in defendant’s conduct. Accordingly, we conclude there is a
reasonable probability the trial court would find defendant meets these eligibility criteria
for diversion for alcoholism.
                  2.   Suitability
       An eligible defendant must also meet four criteria that demonstrate “that the
defendant and the offense are suitable for diversion” (§ 1001.36, former subd. (b)(3)):
(1) the “symptoms of the mental disorder motivating the criminal behavior would
respond to mental health treatment”; (2) the defendant consents to diversion and waives
the right to a speedy trial; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment as a
condition of diversion; and (4) “[t]he defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community.”
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c).) The People’s arguments essentially challenge the first and last of
these criteria.
       Regarding defendant’s symptoms responding to treatment, both experts testified
that treatment would resolve the symptoms that led to the incident for which defendant
was charged. Defendant had already responded well once he became more involved in
therapeutic counseling, “monitoring and maintaining himself in a much more appropriate
way,” which had prevented any further disciplinary incidents in the jail. The People
contradict both experts and assert that defendant’s history demonstrates that his
symptoms do not respond to treatment. We see no evidence in the record to support the
People’s position.
       Specifically, the People argue that: (1) years earlier, defendant was ordered to
engage in mental health services as a term of probation, yet he went on to commit further
crimes; (2) defendant was receiving psychiatric care in jail yet continued to engage in
assaultive behavior; and (3) defendant refused his medication once, early in his jail stay.

                                             13
Because the evidence from the diversion hearing fails to support the People’s position,
their argument fails to eliminate a reasonable probability the trial court would have
granted diversion for alcoholism.
       First, the prosecution was unable to substantiate whether defendant had previously
undergone any specific mental health treatment prior to the incident other than a brief
stay in a state hospital in 1989, where defendant was diagnosed with schizophrenia.
When attempting to question the experts about defendant’s history, the prosecution could
only speak in hypotheticals without evidence about whether defendant had participated in
any specific programs or what the conditions of those programs were. The experts,
accordingly, refused to agree with the prosecution’s position that defendant was not
amenable to treatment. To the contrary, Thompson testified that defendant had already
responded to treatment in jail once he became more involved in therapeutic counseling,
“monitoring and maintaining himself in a much more appropriate way,” which had
prevented any further disciplinary incidents in the jail. That improvement was despite the
clinicians seeing defendant on an irregular schedule due to their heavy patient loads and
jail staff apparently giving defendant different medication from those initially prescribed.
Simply put, all the evidence adduced at the hearing supports defendant’s symptoms
responding to treatment, while the People’s position is based on hypotheticals and
supposition.
       Regarding defendant posing “an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as
defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the community,” the People again rely on
defendant’s criminal history and disciplinary record while in jail. Section 1170.18
“defines ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ as ‘an unreasonable risk that the
petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of clause (iv) of
subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667.’ (§ 1170.18, subd.
(c).) The violent felonies encompassed in this definition ‘are known as “super strikes”
and include murder, attempted murder, solicitation to commit murder, assault with a

                                             14
machine gun on a police officer, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, and any
serious or violent felony punishable by death or life imprisonment.’ [Citation.] They
also include sexually violent offenses and sexual offenses committed against minors
under the age of 14. (See § 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).)” (People v. Moine (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 440, 449-450.)
       We agree with defense counsel, who argued at the diversion hearing that “[t]he
People have not put on any evidence that [defendant] is likely to cause or participate in
super strike behavior which is the level of dangerousness that the statute requests the
Court to consider.” Defendant’s prior felony convictions were for making criminal
threats in 1992 and 2015. These convictions do not rise to the level of “an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18.” Nor does defendant’s
history of mostly minor crimes over 30 years foreclose a reasonable probability that the
trial court would find defendant does not pose an unreasonable risk of committing a
“super strike” offense, especially given that the court struck the 1992 conviction at
sentencing in part because of defendant’s mental health issues.
       We conclude the evidence introduced at the diversion hearing creates a reasonable
probability that the trial court would have granted defendant mental health diversion
based on his alcoholism had defense counsel asked the trial court to do so. With both
prongs of the test established, we conclude defense counsel provided ineffective
assistance, so we will conditionally reverse the judgment.

                                            15
                                      DISPOSITION
       The judgment is conditionally reversed, and the matter is remanded for the trial
court to allow defendant, if he chooses, to withdraw his plea and seek pretrial mental
health diversion. If defendant does not move to withdraw his plea within 30 days, or if
the trial court again determines defendant should not be granted diversion, the trial court
shall reinstate the judgment.2

                                                       \s\                     ,
                                                  Krause, J.

We concur:

     \s\                    ,
Renner, Acting P. J.

     \s\                    ,
Boulware Eurie, J.

2      In light of the reversal due to ineffective assistance of counsel, the clerk of this
court is directed to give the required notice and a copy of this opinion to the State Bar of
California and to trial counsel. (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 6086.7, subd. (a)(2); Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 10.1017.)

                                             16