Court Opinion

ID: 9714652
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 05:42:16.16868+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:27.433740
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion
DeBruler, J.
I dissent from the majority opinion and would reverse the judgment of the trial court with instructions to grant appellant’s motion for new trial.
The appellant herein was stopped by police officers at approximately 2:30 a.m. for a traffic violation of running a stop sign. Officer Shaw testified that his purpose in stopping the appellant was to advise him that he had run a stop sign. While checking the appellant’s drivers’ license, the officer, remaining outside of the appellant’s car, probed the back seat by use of a flashlight. After noticing some Dolly Madison cakes, whiskey and cartons of cigarettes on the rear floor board, the officer placed appellant under arrest for running a stop sign. A passenger in appellant’s car was then ordered to get out of the car and was placed under arrest for permitting a violation in his presence.
The appellant moved to suppress the evidence seized as a result of this search and the motion was overruled. At trial, appellant again timely objected to the admission of the evidence, said objection being overruled. The overrulings of the motion to suppress and the objection to admission of the evidence constituted reversible error.
I find little doubt that the probing of the back seat and rear floor board of the car with a flashlight falls within the meaning of the word “search”.
The majority opinion, in quoting from the case of Marshall v. U. S., 422 F.2d 185 (5th Cir. 1970), states that:
“A search implies an examination of one’s premises or person with a view to the discovery of .contraband or evidence of guilt to be used in prosecution of a criminal action. *500The term implies exploratory investigation or quest. Haerr v. United States, 5 Cir. 1957, 240 F.2d 583, 535.”
Clearly, the actions of the arresting officer in the case at bar were in the nature of an exploratory quest or investigation. In the Marshall case, the arresting officer shined his flashlight into the car upon the request of a drive-in carhop to investigate a car which had been setting in the drive-in for more than one hour with the car lights burning and the occupant never having placed an order. The Fifth Circuit Court held as admissible a contraband sawed off shotgun seized as a result of the officers having seen it lying next to the accused who was lying asleep on the front seat. That court reasoned that the officer did not conduct a “search” as he was motivated by a desire to render assistance rather than an intent to uncover evidence of contraband or crime. No such altruistic motivation is present in the case at hand. The officer here was conducting an exploratory investigation, in short, a search.
The issue then is whether such a search is lawful when made incident to an arrest for a traffic violation.
This Court recently discussed at some length the permissible scope of a search incident to a lawful arrest for a traffic violation. Paxton v. State (1970), 255 Ind. 264, 263 N. E. 2d 636.
I believe the case at bar falls within the holding of the Paxton case. In that case we said, in accordance with the rule of Chimel v. California (1969), 395 U. S. 752, 89 S. Ct. 2034, 23 L. Ed. 2d 685:
“Thus, it would clearly be unreasonable to sanction a search incident to an arrest, absent other factors, where the arresting officer had no reason to suspect that he was in danger or where there was no probable cause to believe that there was destructible evidence relating to the crime within the suspect’s immediate control.” 263 N. E. 2d at 640.
Neither of these exigencies were present. Likewise an arrest for a traffic violation of running a stop sign does not give *501rise to a search of the automobile pursuant to Chambers v. Maroney (1970), 399 U. S. 42, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419, wherein the court held that an automobile might be searched without regard to the officer’s safety as possible destruction of evidence, provided there is probable cause to believe that seizable items are contained in the car. No such probable cause exists in the case at bar.
I believe, therefore, that the evidence was obtained as a result of an unlawful search and seizure and was improperly admitted.
Note.—Reported in 265 N. E. 2d 413.