Court Opinion

ID: 9961246
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 15:06:05.260876+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:29.977557
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2024 Ark. 61
                  SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS
                                         No.   CR-22-670

                                                    Opinion Delivered: April 18, 2024

 DAMIEN ECHOLS
                                APPELLANT           APPEAL FROM THE CRITTENDEN
                                                    COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT
 V.                                                 [NO. 18CR-93-516]

 STATE OF ARKANSAS                                  HONORABLE TONYA ALEXANDER,
                                   APPELLEE         JUDGE

                                                    REVERSED AND REMANDED.

                              KAREN R. BAKER, Associate Justice

       Appellant, Damien Echols, appeals from an order entered by the Crittenden County

Circuit Court denying his Act 1780 petition for a lack of jurisdiction on the basis that Echols

was not in State custody. Echols presents two points on appeal: (1) the circuit court erred by

misinterpreting the plain and unambiguous language of Act 1780, which identifies who is

jurisdictionally entitled to make a motion for relief under that Act; or (2) alternatively, assuming

arguendo that the operative language of Act 1780 is ambiguous, the circuit court erred in failing

to apply established principles of statutory interpretation to accurately determine the meaning

of that language. We reverse and remand.

                                   I. Facts and Procedural History

       The appeal before us stems from Echols’s pursuit of exoneration. Echols has been before

this court in connection with the “West Memphis Three” case on numerous occasions. 1 In

       1
      See Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996); Echols v. State, 344 Ark. 513,
42 S.W.3d 467 (2001); Echols v. State, 354 Ark. 414, 125 S.W.3d 153 (2003); Echols v. State,
1993, three eight-year-old boys were found murdered in West Memphis. See Echols v. State,

326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996). Echols, Jason Baldwin, and Jessie Misskelley were

ultimately convicted of the murders, and Echols was sentenced to death. Id. In Echols’s

preceding appeal, we explained that

               In 2002, while his other petitions for postconviction relief were pending,
       Echols filed a motion in the circuit court for DNA testing under Arkansas Code
       Annotated section 16–112–202 (Supp. 2001). The circuit court entered a testing
       order on June 2, 2004, after the parties agreed to the terms of the order. On
       February 23, 2005, an amended order for DNA testing was entered. The DNA
       testing was conducted between December 2005 and September 2007.

               The results of the testing established that neither Echols, Baldwin, nor
       Misskelley was the source of any of the biological material tested, which included
       a foreign allele from a penile swab of victim Steven Branch; a hair from the
       ligature used to bind victim Michael Moore; and a hair recovered from a tree
       stump, near where the bodies were recovered. In addition, the DNA material
       from the hair found in the ligature used to bind Moore was found to be consistent
       with Terry Hobbs, Branch’s stepfather. The hair found on the tree stump was
       consistent with the DNA of David Jacoby, a friend of Terry Hobbs.

              On April 14, 2008, Echols filed a motion for a new trial pursuant to
       section 16-112-201 and 208(e)(3). On September 10, 2008, without holding an
       evidentiary hearing, the circuit court entered an order denying the motion for a
       new trial. Echols then filed a timely notice of appeal in this court.

Echols v. State, 2010 Ark. 417, at 3–4, 373 S.W.3d 892, 895–96 (footnote omitted).

       We reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing, holding that the circuit court had

erroneously interpreted Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-112-201 through -208 and

ordered the circuit court to reconsider Echols’s motion for a new trial in light of the proper

interpretation of the statutes. Id. at 15–16, 373 S.W.3d at 902. After the case was remanded, a

resolution was negotiated between the State, Echols, Baldwin, and Misskelley, pursuant to

354 Ark. 530, 127 S.W.3d 486 (2003); Echols v. State, 360 Ark. 332, 201 S.W.3d 890 (2006);
and Echols v. State, 2010 Ark. 417, 373 S.W.3d 892.

                                               2
which Echols and the other defendants would enter a plea in accordance with North Carolina v.

Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). On August 19, 2011, Echols entered an Alford plea and was released

from prison, receiving a time-served sentence plus an additional ten years’ suspended imposition

of sentence. In accordance with the Alford plea, Echols continued to maintain his innocence.

       Beginning in 2020, Echols engaged in communications with then-prosecutor Scott

Ellington regarding the prospect of performing additional DNA testing of certain evidence using

the M-Vac® wet-vacuum-based collection method (“M-Vac”), a new DNA-collection

method that was not available when DNA testing had previously been conducted in the case. 2

By 2021, no additional DNA testing had been conducted, and Keith Chrestman was appointed

to replace Ellington as the prosecutor for the Second Judicial District. Chrestman informed

Echols that Echols would have to petition the court for permission in order to move forward

with the DNA testing, but he assured Echols that he had asked the West Memphis Police

Department (“WMPD”) to catalogue the remaining evidence in the case. In 2021, Echols filed

a lawsuit against the WMPD under the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act after he had

learned that certain key evidence in the case might have been lost or destroyed. The ligatures

used to bind the victims were ultimately located at the WMPD.

       2
         According to an article in the Journal of Forensic Sciences, “[t]he wet-vacuum-based
collection system is designed for recovering DNA from porous substrates. The system consists
of a vacuum, a hand-held collection device, a sample collection bottle, and sterile solution. It
functions by dispensing the sterile solution onto a substrate while simultaneously vacuuming
cellular material into the sample collection bottle. The liquid contents of the bottle are then
filtered through a 0.45 µM polyethersulfone (PES) membrane in a two-stage filter unit, which
traps and concentrates cellular material on the filter. Lastly, the filter is cut from the unit and
processed for DNA extraction using common procedures.” Jessica M. McLamb, M.S., Lara D.
Adams, M.S. & Mark F. Kavlick, Ph.D., Comparison of the M-Vac® Wet-Vacuum-Based Collection
Method to a Wet-Swabbing Method for DNA Recovery on Diluted Bloodstained Substrates, 65 J.
Forensic Scis. 1828 (2020).

                                                3
       On January 24, 2022, Echols filed a petition to conduct additional DNA testing under

Act 1780 of 2001, as amended by Act 2250 of 2005 and codified at Arkansas Code Annotated

sections 16-112-201 to -208 (Repl. 2016) (hereinafter referred to collectively as “Act 1780”).

Specifically, Echols sought further forensic DNA testing of the ligatures using the new M-Vac

DNA-collection technology. Echols stated that the ligatures had yielded important biological

material in prior rounds of DNA testing and that this new technology could collect subsurface

DNA—which would not belong to Echols—that might serve to identify the true perpetrator(s)

in the case. The State responded, in pertinent part, that Echols was not entitled to relief under

Act 1780 because his petition was for a writ of habeas corpus, and when the State has no one

in custody to bring to court, habeas corpus is not an available remedy. Echols responded that

the plain language of Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-202 provides that a person

convicted of a crime may make a motion for the performance of forensic DNA testing, or other

tests that may become available through advances in technology, to demonstrate the person’s

actual innocence. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-202. Therefore, Echols argued, the legislature

worded the statute so that one’s ability to make a motion is triggered by being convicted of a

crime as opposed to being in State custody.

       On June 23, 2022, the circuit court held a hearing on Echols’s Act 1780 petition. The

circuit court framed the issue for the parties as follows: “[f]irst being, this is a Habeas Corpus

Statute. Habeas Corpus literally means, ‘Bring the Prisoner Forth.’ Can an individual who is

lawfully at liberty claim relief under a Habeas Corpus Statute, is the first hurdle that needs to be

cleared.” The circuit court reasoned that Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-112-201

through -208 involve habeas corpus relief because those statutes are codified in “Title 16,

Practice, Procedure, and Courts; Subtitle 7, Particular Proceedings and Remedies; Chapter 112,

                                                 4
Habeas Corpus.” Echols argued that the statutes carve out an actual-innocence exception to

traditional habeas corpus relief that allows a person convicted of a crime the opportunity to

exonerate himself and that DNA evidence had been uncovered in the past that suggested

someone else was likely responsible for the murders in this case. Echols explained that he was

not asking for release in accordance with common law or traditional habeas corpus; rather, he

was seeking additional DNA testing under the exception set forth in sections 16-112-201

through -208. The State responded that the legislature had intended sections 16-112-201

through -208 to be a form of habeas corpus relief and that this court has said that habeas corpus

relief is not available to a person, such as Echols, that is not in State custody. The circuit court

orally denied Echols’s petition at the conclusion of the hearing, reasoning that “all of this falls

under Habeas. This court cannot carve out an exception that does not lawfully and legally

exist.” The circuit court further explained that habeas relief is intended for those who are not

at liberty and “the case law leads to this conclusion.”

        On June 28, 2022, the circuit court entered a written order denying Echols’s Act 1780

petition. The circuit court reasoned that

               [o]ur General Assembly did not make scientific testing based on new
        technology an independent form of post-conviction relief. Instead, the legislature
        amended statutory law to make scientific testing based on new technology a form
        of habeas corpus relief. Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-101-16-112-208 (codifying
        Act 1780 of 2001, §§ 3-9; Act 2250 of 2005, §§ 2-4).

        When a petitioner is not in custody, the circuit court does not have jurisdiction to grant

habeas corpus relief. Curtis v. Hobbs, 2015 Ark. 127, at 1; Branning v. Harmon, 2009 Ark. 533,

at 2.

        The Court finds that [Echols] is not in custody. So the Court has no jurisdiction to grant

him habeas corpus relief. Therefore, the Court must deny his Act 1780 habeas corpus request.

                                                 5
       This timely appeal followed.

                                       II. Points on Appeal

                                      A. Preliminary Issues

       Before we turn to the merits of Echols’s appeal, we take the opportunity to address three

procedural arguments raised by the State.

                                   1. Subject-matter jurisdiction

       We must first address the threshold issue of subject-matter jurisdiction. The State argues

that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over Echols’s petition, and as a result,

this court now lacks jurisdiction over this appeal. The State contends that Echols filed his

petition in the Crittenden County Circuit Court and the petition should therefore be dismissed

because, under Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-201(a), Echols was required to file

the petition in the Craighead County Circuit Court, the court in which the conviction was

entered. On February 21, 2023, the State filed a motion to dismiss on these same jurisdictional

grounds. On April 6, we unanimously denied the motion, and upon a review of the entire

record, we are not persuaded to reconsider this ruling. See Echols v. State, No. CR-22-670 (Ark.

Apr. 6, 2023) (motion to dismiss denied).

                                          2. Alford plea

       Next, the State contends, for the first time on appeal, that Echols is not entitled to relief

under Act 1780 because he pleaded guilty to the murders. 3 Specifically, the State argues that a

petitioner seeking DNA testing pursuant to Act 1780 must present a prima facie case establishing

       3
         The State acknowledges that it did not raise this argument below but nevertheless urges
us to affirm on this basis. See Foust v. Montez-Torres, 2015 Ark. 66, at 6, 456 S.W.3d 736, 739
(explaining that we may affirm for any reason that has been developed in the record).

                                                 6
that identity was an issue at trial. The State asserts that when a defendant enters a plea of guilty,

even by way of an Alford plea, he admits to the commission of the charged offenses and identity

is therefore no longer in question for purposes of the Act. Echols responds that an Alford plea is

not an admission of guilt sufficient to negate the issue of identity because such a plea is

predicated on the fact that the defendant expressly maintains his innocence in connection with

the charged offenses.

       Act 1780 provides that a writ of habeas corpus may be issued on the basis of new

scientific evidence proving a person actually innocent of the offense for which he was convicted.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201; see also McArty v. State, 2020 Ark. 68, at 3, 594 S.W.3d 54, 57.

Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-202 states that, in order to file a motion for testing

that may qualify for relief under Act 1780, a petitioner who requests relief and who seeks

scientific testing to provide the basis for that relief must meet specific criteria set out in the

statute and demonstrate in his or her motion that these predicate requirements have been met.

McArty, 2020 Ark. 68, at 4, 594 S.W.3d at 57. Relevant here, a petitioner seeking testing under

Act 1780 must present a prima facie case that identity was an issue at trial. Ark. Code Ann. §

16-112-202(7); see also Leach v. State, 2019 Ark. 238, 580 S.W.3d 871. When a defendant enters

a plea of guilty, the guilty plea is the trial. Id. We have held that, by entering a plea of guilty, a

defendant admits that he committed the offense and identity is therefore not in question. Id.

       Whether entering an Alford plea precludes a defendant from later challenging the

judgment on the grounds of actual innocence pursuant to Act 1780 is an issue that this court

left open in Davis v. State, 366 Ark. 401, 235 S.W.3d 902 (2006) (per curiam) (holding that

because appellant’s petition did not meet the requirements of the Act, this court need not reach

the issue of whether entering an Alford plea affords a defendant the opportunity to later challenge

                                                  7
the judgment on the grounds of actual innocence). In Alford, supra, the United States Supreme

Court explained that “while most pleas of guilty consist of both a waiver of trial and an express

admission of guilt, the latter element is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of

criminal penalty. An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and

understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable

to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime.” Alford, 400 U.S. at 37. Thus, under

Alford, a court may accept a guilty plea from a defendant who maintains his innocence, provided

the court finds an adequate factual basis for the plea of guilty. Martin v. State, 2015 Ark. 147, at

3, 460 S.W.3d 289, 292. We have observed that “[t]ypically, a criminal defendant will utilize

an Alford plea when he ‘intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea’

in light of strong evidence of actual guilt with the intention of limiting the penalty to be

imposed.” Id. (quoting Alford, 400 U.S. at 37–38) (internal citations omitted).

       Therefore, unlike a traditional guilty plea, an admission of guilt is not inherent in an

Alford plea. As such, we disagree with the State that Echols’s Alford plea precluded him from

later challenging his conviction on the grounds of actual innocence pursuant to Act 1780,

because such a plea does not negate the issue of identity for purposes of the Act. Accordingly,

we decline the State’s invitation to affirm the circuit court on this basis.

                                        3. Verification of petition

       Finally, the State contends, also for the first time on appeal, that we should affirm the

circuit court on the grounds that Echols’s Act 1780 petition does not contain any sort of

verification or supporting affidavit.

       A person convicted of a crime may file a petition under Act 1780 if he or she makes the

necessary claims “under penalty of perjury.” See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201(a). Section 16-

                                                    8
112-203, which sets forth the necessary contents of the petition states that “[t]he petition shall

be: (1) Verified by the petitioner or signed by the petitioner’s attorney[.]” Ark. Code Ann. §

16-112-203(c)(1) (emphasis added). Thus, the general requirement that the petitioner must

make the necessary claims under penalty of perjury may be satisfied either with verification by

the petitioner or the signature of the petitioner’s attorney. Here, Echols’s attorney signed the

petition. Therefore, we likewise decline to affirm the circuit court’s order on this basis.

                                 B. Plain Language of Act 1780

       Having determined that this case is properly before us, we turn to Echols’s arguments

on appeal. First, Echols contends that the circuit court misinterpreted the plain and

unambiguous language of Act 1780, which identifies who is jurisdictionally entitled to make a

motion for relief under that Act. This court does not reverse a denial of postconviction relief

unless the circuit court’s findings are clearly erroneous. McArty, 2020 Ark. 68, at 2, 594 S.W.3d

at 56. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support it, the appellate

court after reviewing the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been made. Id.

       Arkansas Code Annotated section 16-112-103 provides, in pertinent part, that

       (a)(1) The writ of habeas corpus shall be granted . . . to any person who shall
       apply for the writ by petition showing, by affidavit or other evidence, probable
       cause to believe he or she is detained without lawful authority, is imprisoned
       when by law he or she is entitled to bail, or who has alleged actual innocence of
       the offense or offenses for which the person was convicted.

          (2) The procedures for persons who allege actual innocence shall be in
          accordance with § 16-112-201 et seq.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1)–(2) (Repl. 2016).

                                                9
       As discussed above, Act 1780 provides that a writ of habeas corpus may be issued on the

basis of new scientific evidence proving a person actually innocent of the offense for which he

was convicted. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201; see also McArty, 2020 Ark. 68, at 3, 594 S.W.3d

at 57. Section 16-112-201 provides that

       (a) Except when direct appeal is available, a person convicted of a crime may
       commence a proceeding to secure relief by filing a petition in the court in which
       the conviction was entered to vacate and set aside the judgment and to discharge
       the petitioner or to resentence the petitioner or grant a new trial or correct the
       sentence or make other disposition as may be appropriate, if the person claims
       under penalty of perjury that:

           (1) Scientific evidence not available at trial establishes the petitioner’s actual
           innocence; or

           (2) The scientific predicate for the claim could not have been previously
           discovered through the exercise of due diligence and the facts underlying the
           claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be
           sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable fact-
           finder would find the petitioner guilty of the underlying offense.

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201(a)(1)–(2).

       Section 16-112-202, which sets forth the requirements for the form of the petition,

similarly provides that, “[e]xcept when direct appeal is available, a person convicted of a crime

may make a motion for the performance of fingerprinting, forensic deoxyribonucleic acid

(DNA) testing, or other tests which may become available through advances in technology to

demonstrate the person’s actual innocence” if certain criteria are met. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-

112-202.

       Echols argues that the plain language found in Act 1780 expressly allows a person

convicted of a crime to petition for the performance of additional DNA testing that may

become available through advances in technology to demonstrate the person’s actual innocence.

Echols contends that he is “a person convicted of a crime” within the meaning of sections 16-

                                                 10
112-201 and -202 and that the circuit court was without authority to rewrite the statutes to

provide relief only to those petitioners who are in prison. The State omits discussion of the

plain language at issue, arguing instead that the legislature consciously legislated against the

backdrop of the habeas framework when enacting these postconviction DNA-testing

procedures and that habeas relief has always been limited to those petitioners who are in State

custody.

       We review issues involving statutory construction de novo, as it is for this court to decide

the meaning of a statute. Magness v. State, 2012 Ark. 16, at 3, 386 S.W.3d 390, 393. When

reviewing issues of statutory interpretation, the first rule in considering the meaning and effect

of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted

meaning in common language. Id. at 3–4, 386 S.W.3d at 393. When the language is plain and

unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction, and the analysis need

go no further. Treat v. State, 2019 Ark. 326, at 5, 588 S.W.3d 10, 13. A statute is ambiguous

only when it is open to two or more constructions, or when it is of such obscure or doubtful

meaning that reasonable minds might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning. Magness, 2012

Ark. 16, at 3, 386 S.W.3d at 393. When a statute is clear, however, it is given its plain meaning,

and this court will not search for legislative intent; that intent must be gathered from the plain

meaning of the language used. Id. at 4, 386 S.W.3d at 393. This court will not interpret a

legislative act in a manner contrary to its express language unless it is clear that a drafting error

or omission has circumvented legislative intent. Id. If possible, we construe statutes relating to

the same subject matter together and in harmony. Id. Furthermore, we will not read into a

statute language that was not included by the legislature. Ark. Dep’t of Corr. v. Shults, 2018 Ark.

94, at 4–5, 541 S.W.3d 410, 412.

                                                 11
       Here, the plain language in sections 16-112-201 and -202 unambiguously permits “a

person convicted of a crime” to petition for additional DNA testing to demonstrate the person’s

actual innocence pursuant to Act 1780. This language imposes no requirement that a petitioner

must be in State custody to seek relief pursuant to Act 1780, and we decline to read such a

requirement into the statutes. The circuit court and the State employ reasoning that hinges on

the legislative history and purpose underlying Act 1780 and our common-law interpretations

of traditional habeas relief; however, resorting to these tools of statutory construction is

unnecessary in the present case given the clear language of Act 1780.4 It is undisputed that

Echols has been convicted of a crime, and as a result, he is entitled to seek relief pursuant to

Act 1780. This reading of the plain language of sections 16-112-201 and -202 is consistent with

the plain language of section 16-112-103, as it is clear that “any person . . . who has alleged

actual innocence of the offense or offenses for which the person was convicted” is entitled to

petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-103(a)(1). Moreover, section

16-112-103(a)(2) directs such a person to pursue a writ on this basis in accordance with the

procedures set forth in “§ 16-112-201 et seq.[,]” a separate subchapter that codified Act 1780.

       4
        Absent from the dissenting opinion is any regard for the plain language of Arkansas
Code Annotated sections 16-112-201 and -202 despite the fact that the language is clear. We
have explained that “[t]he courts have no power to legislate or to construe a statute to mean
anything other than what it says, if it is plain and unambiguous.” Burrell v. State, 203 Ark. 1124,
1132, 160 S.W.2d 218, 221 (1942) (quoting Johnson v. Lowman, 193 Ark. 8, 975 S.W.2d 86
(1936)). Undeterred by this longstanding precedent, the dissent looks beyond the plain language
to the history and purpose underlying traditional habeas corpus relief, as well as the legislative
history of Act 1780 as it relates to Illinois law, in support of its position that “the majority has
decided to reimagine habeas relief as encompassing any ‘person convicted of a crime’ whether
or not they be in State custody.” To the contrary, it was the legislature that elected to permit
persons convicted of a crime to seek relief under Act 1780. See Ark. Code Ann. §§ 16-112-
103(a)(1); 16-112-201(a); and 16-112-202. The legislature imposed no threshold requirement
that a person must be in State custody to seek this relief, and we decline to read such a
requirement into the statutes.

                                                12
Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court misinterpreted the plain language of Act 1780

and, as a result, clearly erred when it dismissed Echols’s Act 1780 petition on the grounds that

he was not in State custody at the time it was filed. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.

       Having found that the circuit court’s erroneous interpretation and application of the

plain and unambiguous language of Act 1780 warrants reversal, we need not consider Echols’s

alternative argument on appeal that the circuit court erred in failing to apply established

principles of statutory interpretation to accurately determine the meaning of the language in the

Act.

       Reversed and remanded.

       Special Justice MARY CAROLE YOUNG joins in this opinion.

       WOMACK and WEBB, JJ., and Special Justice MARCIA HEARNSBERGER dissent.

       KEMP, C.J., and HILAND, J., not participating.

       BARBARA W. WEBB, Justice, dissenting. The majority’s decision obliterates any

sense of finality in our criminal justice system. Their interpretation of Act 1780 means anyone

who has ever been convicted of a crime––whether or not they be in State custody––can seek

DNA or other scientific testing even if such testing would not prove that individual’s innocence.

That is the case here. Echols’s first conviction did not rely on DNA evidence. Rather, the jury

was presented with evidence that Echols knew facts about the case that were not public

knowledge; fibers found on the victims’ clothes were microscopically similar to clothing found

in Echols’s home; multiple witnesses testified that Echols confessed to the murders; and multiple

witnesses placed him near the crime scene at the time of the murders. DNA testing therefore

cannot prove Echols’s innocence. For the reasons set forth below, I would hold that the circuit

court correctly found that Echols is not entitled to habeas relief. I dissent.

                                                 13
                                        I. Habeas Corpus

       The writ of habeas corpus is a foundational principle of Arkansas law dating back to

statehood itself. Recognizing the importance that a mechanism exist to free the unlawfully

detained, our founders included the writ in the Arkansas Constitution of 1836. See Ark. Const.

of 1836, art. II, § 16. From the outset, our court recognized that the writ could issue only for

a petitioner in State custody. See Kittrel ex parte, 20 Ark. 499, 505 (1859) (noting that the writ

of habeas corpus may issue in favor of any person committed to prison). When our current

constitution was adopted in 1874, the writ was again included in the declaration of rights. Ark.

Const. art. 2, § 11. But a new constitution did not change this court’s view on the custody

requirement, as it reaffirmed that the “object of the writ [of habeas corpus] is the liberation of

those who may be imprisoned without sufficient cause, and to deliver them from unlawful

custody.” State ex rel. Ark. Indus. v. Neel, 48 Ark. 283, 289, 3 S.W. 631, 633 (1887).

       The enabling legislation for the writ is found at Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-

112-101 et seq. Relief under our habeas statutes was traditionally limited to instances in which

a prisoner’s commitment was invalid on its face, or the committing court lacked jurisdiction.

E.g., Mackey v. Lockhart, 307 Ark. 321, 819 S.W.2d 70 (1991). However, in 2001, the General

Assembly adopted Act 1780, which expanded habeas relief to allow for scientific testing to

establish the actual innocence of a wrongly convicted person. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-201.

       Although Act 1780 expanded the scope of habeas relief, it did not alter this court’s

jurisprudence. For example, in Neely v. McCastlain, we affirmed the circuit court’s denial of

Neely’s habeas petition, noting that the fact that he was not in custody was dispositive. 2009

Ark. 189, at 6, 306 S.W.3d 424, 428. And in Green v. Kelley, we reiterated that “[t]he purpose

of a writ of habeas corpus is to remedy a detention of an illegal period of time.” 2019 Ark. 317,

                                               14
at 2. We presume the General Assembly is familiar with this court’s interpretation of its statutes,

and if it disagrees, it can amend the statutes. Tyson Poultry, Inc. v. Narvaiz, 2012 Ark. 118, 388

S.W.3d 16. Without such amendments, however, our interpretations of the habeas statutes

remain the law. See McCutchen v. City of Fort Smith, 2012 Ark. 452, 425 S.W.3d 671.

       Legislative history reinforces the conclusion that there remains a custody requirement–

–even for actual-innocence claims. Act 1780 was largely modeled after the Illinois DNA testing

law, which was created as a separate form of postconviction relief. Johnson v. State, 356 Ark.

534, 544, 157 S.W.3d 151, 160 (2004); see also 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/116-3 (West, Westlaw

through P.A. 103-585 of the 2024 Reg. Sess.). Illinois courts have found that section 116-3

does not require that a petitioner be incarcerated in order to seek forensic testing. People v.

Savory, 756 N.E.2d 804, 810 (Ill. 2001). Meanwhile, the Illinois habeas statute expressly requires

that a petitioner be in custody to obtain relief. 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/10-102 (West, Westlaw

through P.A. 103-585 of the 2024 Reg. Sess.). Presumably aware of these details, the General

Assembly nevertheless chose to establish DNA testing as a habeas claim, knowing full well this

court’s longstanding view that the writ may only issue to release those held in custody.

       Despite a common understanding of the writ that dates back nearly two hundred years,

the majority has decided to reimagine habeas relief as encompassing any “person convicted of a

crime” whether or not they be in State custody. This opens the doors for thousands of

individuals to file Act 1780 petitions, inundating our courts and exposing the State to significant

financial strain if it is to pay for scientific testing for any person ever convicted of a crime. This

absurd outcome is the result of the majority’s myopic thinking, which disregards any broader

context. As it is undisputed that Echols is no longer in custody, he is simply not entitled to

petition for a writ of habeas corpus.

                                                 15
                                         II. Guilty Plea

       An inmate who brings a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under Act 1780 must present

a prima facie case that identity was an issue at trial before a circuit court can order scientific

testing. Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-202(7). However, when a defendant enters a plea of guilty,

the plea is the trial, and he admits that he committed the offense. Graham v. State, 358 Ark. 296,

298, 188 S.W.3d 893, 895–96 (2004). Identity is thus not in question. Id. For this reason, a

challenge to a guilty plea is not cognizable in Act 1780 proceedings, even in those instances

where the inmate alleges that new scientific evidence is available. Barton v. State, 2014 Ark. 418,

at 2 n.1.

       In this case, Echols was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his role

in the brutal murders of three eight-year-old boys in West Memphis. This court affirmed on

direct appeal. Echols v. State, 326 Ark. 917, 936 S.W.2d 509 (1996). The circuit court

subsequently entered an order for a new trial so that Echols could enter a guilty plea pursuant

to North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). The plea was therefore the trial for the purposes

of Echols’s present Act 1780 petition. Consequently, Echols is foreclosed from seeking habeas

relief under our clear precedent.

       The majority, however, finds that Echols may still challenge his conviction on the basis

of identity because his Alford plea allowed him to maintain his innocence. Yet if Echols wished

to contest identity, he could have proceeded to trial. But, as the plea-hearing transcript reveals,

he knowingly and intelligently waived that right, acknowledging that it was in his best interest

to avoid trial. By entering an Alford plea, Echols limited the penalty imposed in light of the

strong evidence of his guilt. Davis v. State, 366 Ark. 401, 402 n.1, 235 S.W.3d 902, 903 n.1

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(2006). Whether Echols maintains his innocence is immaterial because he accepted the State’s

case against him. This should have concluded the case.1

       Permitting Echols to pursue habeas relief allows him to have the best of both worlds, as

he was able to limit his penalty and yet still challenge the foundation of his conviction. The

majority sends a clear message to prosecutors and trial judges: there is no incentive to offer or

accept an Alford plea, as the judgment remains open to collateral attack.

                                       III. Actual Innocence

       Even if we bypass the threshold problems with Echols’s petition, he still is not entitled

to DNA testing. Act 1780 does not permit testing of evidence based on a mere assertion of

innocence or the theoretical possibility that additional testing might alter the outcome of a trial;

the statute was “not meant to do away with finality in judgments.” Martin v. State, 2018 Ark.

176, at 3, 545 S.W.3d 763, 765. Rather, the petitioner must identify how the requested testing

“would establish the actual innocence of the person in relation to the offense being challenged.”

Ark. Code Ann. § 16-112-202(6)(B).

       Here, additional DNA testing would not prove Echols’s innocence. Importantly,

Echols’s first conviction did not rest on DNA evidence, and no such evidence was presented at

a subsequent trial because he chose to enter a guilty plea. The jury was presented with evidence

that Echols knew facts about the case that were not public knowledge; fibers found on the

victims’ clothes were microscopically similar to clothing found in Echols’s home; multiple

witnesses testified that Echols confessed to the murders; and multiple witnesses placed him near

       1
         I note that Echols’s counsel represented to the circuit court that its acceptance of the
guilty plea would end proceedings in this matter.

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the crime scene at the time of the murders. Given this evidence, testing the ligatures for another

person’s DNA would not prove Echols’s innocence.

       In sum, Echols is not entitled to habeas relief for three reasons: (1) the writ cannot issue

because he is not in State custody; (2) his guilty plea constituted his trial, and his conviction is

not subject to collateral attack; and (3) DNA testing would not prove his innocence. I would

affirm the circuit court’s order denying Echols’s Act 1780 petition. In reaching its decision, the

majority ignores common sense and basic legal principles to embark on a fruitless endeavor to

exonerate a depraved murderer. Their decision only serves to reopen old wounds for the

victims’ families and the West Memphis community.

       I dissent.

       WOMACK, J., and Special Justice MARCIA HEARNSBERGER join.

       Conner & Winters, LLP, by: John R. Elrod and Kerri E. Kobbeman; Law Offices of Patrick J.

Benca, by: Patrick J. Benca; and Bracewell, LLP, by: Stephen L. Braga, of counsel, for appellant.

       Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Nicholas J. Bronni, Solicitor Gen.; Dylan L. Jacobs, Deputy

Solicitor Gen.; and Brooke Jackson Gasaway, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for apellee.

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