Court Opinion

ID: 9720248
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:22:30.857234+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:38.106111
License: Public Domain

CURLEY, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent. The majority determined that the consumers "prevailed" in the underlying actions, thus entitling them to reasonable attorney fees per § 425.308, STATS. This conclusion was reached because, as the majority noted, the Harvell case mandates such a finding if a party prevails. Harvell defines "prevail" by stating that "a party has prevailed if he or she succeeds on any significant issue in litigation which achieves some of the benefit sought by bringing suit." Footville State Bank v. Harvell, 146 Wis. 2d 524, 539-40, 432 N.W.2d 122, 129-30. They further rely as authority on the dictate found in River Bank v. Fisher, 206 Wis. 2d 63, 66-67, 556 N.W.2d 324, 325 (1996), that "[i]f a violation [of the Wisconsin Consumer Act] is found to have occurred, attorney's fees under Wis. Stat. § 425.308 shall be awarded."
I believe, contrary to the majority's conclusion, that the reopening of these matters did not "halt all negative effects" because the reopening of the matters *778and their dismissal merely required the creditors to recommence these actions in the proper county. At best, any negative effects which were halted were halted temporarily. Thus, the consumers did not "achieve a significant benefit in the litigation."
Second, and more importantly, the majority's analysis of the venue statute misreads the venue statute and in doing so places the blame on the wrong party when it determined that the creditors violated the W CA.
Section 421.401, Stats., governing venue in a consumer credit transaction, is broadly written. It permits a claim to be brought,
(a) Where the customer resides or is personally served;
(b) Where collateral securing a consumer credit transaction is located; or
(c) Where the customer sought or acquired the property, services, money or credit which is the subject of the transaction or signed the document evidencing his or her obligation under the terms of the transaction.
Given the fluid nature of the statute, a county which was an appropriate county when the action was commenced may become inappropriate by the time of service. For example, at the commencement of an action, the only tie with a particular county may be that the collateral is there, or the party resides there. However, by the time of service, the collateral may have been moved to a different county or the customer may have relocated. As a consequence, the action may be venued in the wrong county through no fault of the creditor. Further, a high percentage of these small claims actions are brought and litigated by non-law*779yers who often are unable to easily determine what constitutes proper venue.
These problems were anticipated by the legislature when the legislature drafted the venue statute. This statute gives consumers an additional protection against improperly venued actions by requiring the trial court to act as a gatekeeper. Unlike other venue statutes, here the legislative scheme requires affirmative action by the court on venue issues. Evidence of this is found in the unusual wording of § 421.401(2) & (b), STATS., which provide:
(2) "When it appears from the return of service of the summons or otherwise that the county in which the action is pending under sub. (1) is not a proper place of trial for such action, unless the defendant appears and waives the improper venue, the court shall act as follows:
(b) If the action arises out of a consumer credit transaction, the court shall dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.
(Emphasis added.)
In every case involved in this appeal, the return of service, the corresponding summons and complaint, and the accompanying documentation all reveal that Milwaukee County is not "a proper place of trial for such action." Had the trial court followed the legislative scheme, it should have dismissed these actions rather than granting default judgments. It is the trial court, not the creditors, who are charged with reviewing the case for improper venue. Thus, it is not the creditors who violated the WCA.
In sum, I believe the decision not to ássess attorney fees was the correct one for two reasons. Since the *780creditors are free to start suit in the appropriate county, I fail to see how the consumers achieved a "significant benefit," a vital requirement to prevail in an action. Second, I do not believe the creditors violated any WCA provision because it was the trial court's duty to screen out improperly venued actions. For these reasons, I would affirm.