Court Opinion

ID: 9692093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 15:41:12.048914+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:31.066526
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Judge,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the majority. I write separately because I believe that before we can vacate the order of the trial court, we must respond to the argument raised by PHA that it cannot be held liable for a mere failure to act.
I agree with the majority that Dean v. Department of Transportation, 718 A.2d 374 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998) adequately addresses the issue of whether Commonwealth parties may be held hable for injuries of which they are a concurrent cause. However, Dean does not sufficiently address PHA’s argument that it cannot be liable for injuries where PHA’s negligence consists of a mere failure to act.
Fairly read, PHA’s argument is that even if PHA is concurrently negligent and its concurrent negligence was a proximate cause of the harm, it cannot be held liable for its mere failure to act. This argument must be addressed because, if PHA is correct, notwithstanding Dean, the trial court’s disposition would be correct and PHA would be entitled to summary judgment.
PHA asserts that it cannot be held liable for a mere failure to act. PHA argues that
PHA cannot be held jointly hable for a failure to act. Under Pennsylvania law, omissions cannot serve as the basis for imposing liability pursuant to the real property exception to the Sovereign Immunity Act. See Powell v. Drumheller, 539 Pa. 484, 653 A.2d 619 (1995)(“Crowell ... establishes the principle that for a governmental unit to be held liable, active fault that has a direct nexus to the Plaintiff is required on the part of the governmental unit to impose liability. Mere failure to act will not impose Jm&'iZ'%.”)(emphasis added [by PHA in its brief]).
PHA’s brief at pp. 23-24.1
In Powell v. Drumheller, 153 Pa.Cmwlth. 571, 621 A.2d 1197 (1993) (Drum-*177heller I), this court ruled that PennDOT was immune because the criminal actions of Drumheller constituted a superseding cause of Powell’s injuries, thus cutting off any potential liability of PennDOT. In Powell v. Drumheller, 539 Pa. 484, 653 A.2d 619 (1995)(Drumheller II), the Supreme Court reversed this court’s decision. The Supreme Court stated that
[w]e recognize that our decision in Crowell reaffirmed the principle of joint liability by concurrent causes in the context of our governmental immunity statute, but we find these principles equally, if not more so, applicable in this case involving sovereign immunity. Here, Powell alleges that her husband’s death was a result of the joint negligence of Drumheller and PENNDOT. Much like the situation in Crowell, Ms. Powell avers that the accident was caused by two concurring causes: (1) the negligent driving of Mr. Drumheller under the influence of alcohol and (2) the negligent design and maintenance of the Commonwealth highway which prevented Mr. Powell from taking action to avoid the accident.
Drumheller II, 539 Pa. at 491-92, 653 A.2d at 622-23 (emphasis added, footnote deleted). The negligent maintenance of the Commonwealth highway included Penn-DOT’s failure to place center-lines on the highway, and failure to place signs restricting passing. In addition, Powell’s allegation of negligent design is not so much that PennDOT engaged in “active” negligence by placing wrong signs, as for example was the case in Crowell, but rather in failing to place appropriate signs and in failing to paint traffic control lines. Thus, I believe that this Court’s distinction in Drumheller I between “active” negligence and mere failure to act was rejected by the Supreme Court in Drumheller II sub si-lentio.
It is not surprising that such a distinction between “active” negligence and “passive” negligence would be rejected, given that in traditional negligence analysis, it does not make much sense to distinguish between “active” and “passive” negligence. In order to establish a cause of action in negligence, a plaintiff must only prove 1) the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant; 2) a breach of that duty; 3) a causal connection between the breach and an injury to the plaintiff; and 4) actual damages. Talarico v. Bonham, 168 Pa.Cmwlth. 467, 650 A.2d 1192 (1994). Thus, the critical inquiry is whether a duty was breached. It matters not whether an immune party breached the duty by fading to act when it had an obligation to do so or whether the immune party acted in a manner in which it was obliged not to do so. The question of whether an immune party breached a duty must be distinguished from how the immune party breached the duty; the latter question having no relevance to a traditional tort analysis.
This court’s analysis in Drumheller I, based upon the distinction between “active” negligence and “passive” negligence or negligence by omission, relied in great part upon language in Crowell v. City of Philadelphia, 531 Pa. 400, 613 A.2d 1178 (1992). In Drumheller I, this court quoted from Crowell that “the right to indemnity ‘enures to the person who without active fault on his own part, has been compelled, by reason of some legal obligation, to pay damages occasioned by the initial negligence of another for which he is only secondary hable.’ ” (emphasis added by this court in Drumheller I). Drumheller *178I, 621 A.2d at 1202, quoting Crowell, 531 Pa. at 406, 613 A.2d at 1183. However, the language of “active fault” utilized by the Supreme Court in Crowell was not intended to be in distinction to “passive” negligence or negligence by omission. Crowell utilized the language of “active negligence” in the context of explaining the difference between vicarious liability on the one hand, where liability is premised upon the relationship between the vicariously hable party and the party who actually caused the harm and, on the other hand, joint tortfeasor liability where liability is premised upon two parties actually engaging in some negligence (whether by commission or by omission) whose negligence concurrently causes harm to the plaintiff. Thus, the use of the term “active negligence” by the Court in Crowell is to be understood as referring to a party’s actual negligence, necessary to impose joint liability, as opposed to merely imputed negligence in the situation where a non-negligent party is held liable for another’s negligence by virtue of that party’s relationship to the negligent other person under a theory of vicarious liability. The origin of this language “active fault” appears to have been the case of Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 325, 77 A.2d 368, 370 (1951) which used this language to also explain the difference between the theory of vicarious liability and the theory of joint tortfeasors.
Because I do not find support for the distinction between “active negligence” and “passive negligence” or negligence by omission, I would expressly reject PHA’s argument that it cannot be held liable for its negligence when its negligence constitutes merely a failure to act. A failure to act in the face of a duty to do so constitutes a breach of duty for purposes of negligence law even in the context of immunity. Byard v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 157 Pa.Cmwlth. 269, 629 A.2d 283, 286-87 (1993)(Lord, S.J., concurring), allocatur denied, 536 Pa. 618, 637 A.2d 278 (1993) (“It is, of course, settled law that the governmental agency or anyone else can be held to be a joint tortfeasor even if the negligence is based on a failure to act when a duty exists”).

. The material quoted by PHA within the parentheses after its citation to the Supreme Court case of Powell v. Drumheller, 539 Pa. 484, 653 A.2d 619 (1995)(Drumheller II) is not found in that opinion. Rather, the quoted material is found in this court's opinion in Powell v. Drumheller, 153 Pa.Cmwlth. 571, 621 A.2d 1197 (1993), rev’d, 539 Pa. 484, 653 A.2d 619 (1995)(Drumheller I).
In Drumheller, David Drumheller (Drum-heller), driving with a suspended license and *177under the influence of alcohol, steered his vehicle into oncoming traffic in order to pass another vehicle. As a result, Drumheller crashed headlong into Vincent Powell’s oncoming vehicle, killing Powell. Powell’s wife sued Drumheller and the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation (PennDOT). Mrs. Powell alleged that PennDOT was negligent in designing the road. She alleged that “the road where the crash occurred had no center-line designating the lanes of travel, no road markings or signs restricting passing and no shoulders or lateral clearance to provide room for emergency maneuvers.” Drumhel-ler II, 539 Pa. at 488-89, 653 A.2d at 621.