Court Opinion

ID: 9737208
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:18:57.790995+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:23:57.219400
License: Public Domain

WIEAND, Judge,
concurring:
In this case, it is the husband who seeks to invalidate an antenuptial agreement on grounds that his wife failed to make full and fair disclosure of her financial condition. Thus, it is now the husband who is attempting to take advantage of a legal principle which was adopted originally to protect women who were, in earlier times, presumed to be the “weaker” partner in marriage. In my judgment, the old rule should now be discarded as having outlived its usefulness, and the courts should apply to antenuptial agreements, irrespective of gender, traditional principles of contract law. Under traditional principles of contract law, a party is bound by the contents of his or her written agreement in the absence of fraud or mistake. I would decide the instant case consistently with suggestions made by Justice Flaherty in his Dissenting Opinion in In re Estate of Geyer, 516 Pa. 492, 533 A.2d 423 (1987), as follows:
Enlightened thinking has accorded equality between the sexes, and, with that equality, it has become inconsistent to preserve special protections that arose in response to perceived inequalities. Certainly, it is not surprising that persons may attempt to reap the benefits of being “equal,” while asserting the need for special protections in areas where it would be self-serving to assert certain limited inequalities. To enjoy the benefits of being equal, however, without sharing in the burdens thereof, would be unsupportable. In recognition of this, the law has accorded equal rights to all spouses, without reference to gender. In the context of the instant case, where the validity of an antenuptial agreement is at issue, there is *397no basis for allowing to stand an implicit presumption that spouses are of unequal status or not knowledgeable enough to understand the nature of the contracts they enter. If, in fact, there is fraud, misrepresentation, or overreaching, then traditional principles of contract law provide an adequate remedy.
[The majority applies a different rule.] Instead of applying the traditional rule of contract law that binds one to the contents of agreements entered, a contrary rule is applied, which, in effect, binds one only if it is determined that the terms, and effects, of the agreement were fully understood. This is a departure from longstanding, traditional principles of contract law. See Standard Venetian Blind Co. v. American Empire Insurance, 503 Pa. 300, 305, 469 A.2d 563, 566 (1983) (failure to read a contract does not warrant avoidance or nullification of its provisions); Estate of Brant, 463 Pa. 230, 235, 344 A.2d 806, 809 (1975); Bollinger v. Central Pennsylvania Quarry Stripping & Construction Co., 425 Pa. 430, 432, 229 A.2d 741, 742 (1967) (“Once a person enters into a written agreement he builds around himself a stone wall, from which he cannot escape by merely asserting he had not understood what he was signing.”); Montgomery v. Levy, 406 Pa. 547, 550, 177 A.2d 448, 450 (1962) (one is legally bound to know the terms of the contract entered). Based upon these principles, the terms of the instant antenuptial agreement should be regarded as binding, without inquiry into whether the significance of the agreement was understood by the party against whom enforcement is sought.
Id. 516 Pa. at 516-517, 533 A.2d at 435.
Until recently, the law was clear that an antenuptial agreement was valid and would be enforced unless there was both a failure to make reasonable provision for a spouse and a failure to make full and fair disclosure of a spouse’s financial condition. See: In re Hillegass Estate, 431 Pa. 144, 244 A.2d 672 (1968). In In re Estate of Geyer, supra, three justices opined that disclosure should include *398“both the general financial pictures of the parties involved, and evidence that the parties are aware of the statutory-rights which they are relinquishing.” Id., 516 Pa. at 506, 533 A.2d at 429-430 (footnote omitted). Because this was only a plurality view, it did not alter the prior law, as reviewed and articulated in Hillegass.
Despite the fact that Pennsylvania law was controlled by Hillegass, the majority of a panel of the Superior Court, in Simeone v. Simeone, 380 Pa.Super. 37, 551 A.2d 219 (1988), concluded that the Supreme Court had “expanded the concept of full and fair disclosure to encompass, not only disclosure of assets, but also, disclosure of statutory rights.” Id., 380 Pa.Superior Ct. at 43, 551 A.2d at 222. This, in my judgment, was erroneous. The majority in the instant case, although acknowledging that Geyer was a plurality opinion, concludes that the opinion by the Superior Court in Simeone is precedential and must be followed. I disagree. The law in Pennsylvania is that articulated by the Supreme Court in Hillegass. That law was not changed by the Supreme Court in Geyer and could not be changed by the Superior Court, an intermediate appellate court, in Simeone.
According to existing law, the antenuptial agreement in the instant case is valid if reasonable provision was made for appellant or, if not, execution of the agreement was preceded by a full and fair disclosure of his wife’s financial condition. It is clear that reasonable provision was not made for the husband. However, the trial court found that a full and fair disclosure had been made. This finding is supported by competent evidence; and, therefore, the record reveals no basis for disturbing the court’s finding.
For the foregoing reasons, I concur in the result. Whether one measures the antenuptial agreement according to traditional principles of contract law or by the law articulated in Hillegass Estate, supra, it passes muster. In either event, it is unnecessary to determine whether appellant was specifically advised of the statutory rights which he would otherwise have enjoyed in his wife’s estate.