Court Opinion

ID: 9528773
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:43:48.690018+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:19.118401
License: Public Domain

Hamilton, J.
(dissenting) — I find myself constrained to disagree with the majority in its disposition of this case.
The principal basis upon which my dissent rests is that both appellant and the majority conveniently overlook and disregard the existence and impact of the state statute (RCW 9.76.010 n.l) which, with certain exceptions not here in issue, bans the Sunday sale of any personal property. Neither appellant nor the majority contend that the state statute does not apply to appellant’s general retail business, for obviously the state statute does apply to appellant just as much as it does to any other retailer. The fact that RCW 9.76.010 may or may not be fully enforced, may or may not be antiquated, and may or may not be repealed does not warrant or justify ignoring it in considering the validity of the challenged county ordinance. The unchallenged fact is that it does proscribe, in Spokane County and statewide, the Sunday sale of the articles here in question.
Since neither the constitutionality of the statute nor the fact that it proscribes the Sabbath merchandising of the articles interdicted by the county ordinance is questioned, it is difficult to fully rationalize preoccupation and distinctions between the sales of television sets and radios, furniture and fuel oil, or taxable and nontaxable personal property sales. This is so because the county ordinance does not purport to permit the sale of articles prohibited by the statute any more than it undertakes to prohibit the sale of articles permitted to be sold under the statute. In short, all the county ordinance in fact does is to supplement or aug*722ment the statute by providing a local penalty for the sale of that which is already forbidden. Thus, if the statute be constitutionally reasonable in its proscription of the sales in question, the majority opinion reduces itself to a holding that Spokane County may not exercise concurrent municipal jurisdiction over the same sales. And, if this be so, then the majority’s holding becomes merely a philosophical disagreement as to the wisdom or unwisdom of the particular county legislation — a form of disagreement which the majority rightfully proclaims we may not judicially entertain.
Whatever may be our personal views as to the modern-day suitability of RCW 9.76.010, the fact remains that we have held day-of-rest legislation, in varying contexts, including that of the state statute, to be a valid and constitutional exercise of legislative police power. State v. Nichols, 28 Wash. 628,69 Pac. 372 (1902); State v. Bergfeldt, 41 Wash. 234, 83 Pac. 177 (1905); State v. Herald, 47 Wash. 538, 92 Pac. 376 (1907); In re Donnellan, 49 Wash. 460, 95 Pac. 1085 (1908); In re Ferguson, 80 Wash. 102, 141 Pac. 322 (1914); Motor Car Dealers’ Ass’n of Seattle v. Fred S. Haines Co., 128 Wash. 267, 222 Pac. 611, 36 A.L.R. 493 (1924); Seattle v. Gervasi, 144 Wash. 429, 258 Pac. 328 (1927); State v. Gra-binski, 33 Wn.2d 603, 206 P.2d 1022 (1949).
In re Ferguson, supra, and Seattle v. Gervasi, supra, stand, in the day-of-rest arena, for the proposition that a county or municipality may enact concurrent ordinances in aid of or in addition to RCW 9.76.010, so long as their enactments are not in conflict with that statute and are not patently unreasonable. Neither case requires that the county or municipality enact the state statute in toto, and neither case suggests that the state has pre-empted the field of day-of-rest legislation.
This concurrent power upon the part of the county or municipality springs expressly and directly from our Const, art. 11, § 11, which provides:
Any county, city, town or township may make and enforce within its limits all such local police, sanitary and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.
*723It cannot be seriously contended that the ordinance here in question is in conflict with the statute, for it neither forbids nor permits more than the statute. And, it would seem logical to conclude that if the statute is deemed reasonable in its interdiction of all but certain items not here in issue, then Spokane County’s ordinance would be reasonable when it purports to interdict only a portion of the items included within the state restriction.
Moreover, it has been authoritatively held that territorial uniformity within a state, in the application of day-of-rest legislation, is not a constitutional prerequisite to validity. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 6 L. Ed. 2d 393, 81 Sup. Ct. 1101 (1961). See, also, State v. Rogers, 105 N.H. 366, 200 A.2d 740 (1964); People’s Appliance & Furniture, Inc. v. City of Flint, 358 Mich. 34, 99 N.W.2d 522 (1959); West Orange v. Carr’s Dep’t Store, 53 N.J. Super. 237,147 A.2d 97 (1958). Likewise, it has been held that the fact greater penalties may be exacted for the sale of some items than for others, under a system of day-of-rest regulations, does not render the regulations invalid. Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 6 L. Ed. 2d 551, 81 Sup. Ct. 1135 (1961).
Therefore, the county or municipal exercise of a constitutional and concurrent police power, in a field and over a subject matter that has been judicially declared to be constitutionally open to appropriate legislation, should not be lightly cast aside simply because members of this court may choose to disagree with the legislative body’s choice of subject matter, their choice of language, their decision to partially augment a state statute, or the geographic reach of their jurisdiction. We have not done so in other fields, and we should not do so here. Cf. Bellingham v. Schampera, 57 Wn.2d 106, 356 P.2d 292 (1960), and examples cited therein.
Nevertheless, since the majority feels compelled to address itself extensively to the reasonableness issue, some further comment is required. This comment should, perhaps, be prefaced by the pertinent observation of Judge *724Hill, writing for the court in State v. Grabinski, supra, at 607, to the effect that:
No agreement is to be expected between different individuals as to what items should be sold on the day of rest, and it is generally held that the legislature has the right to designate the articles which can be legally sold on that day.
Recognizing the wisdom of this remark, it is appropriate, then, to again allude to the United States Supreme Court decision in Two Guys From Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, supra, for in that case the court was treating with the application of day-of-rest legislation as it affected a business operation somewhat analogous to that of appellant. In speaking of the issue of reasonableness and rationality of the there challenged legislation as related to purpose, the court stated, at 591:
It was within the power of the legislature to have concluded that these businesses were particularly disrupting the intended atmosphere of the day because of the great volume of motor traffic attracted, the danger of their competitors also opening on Sunday and their large number of employees. “Evils in the same field may be of different dimensions and proportions, requiring different remedies. ... Or the reform may take one step at a time, addressing itself to the phase of the problem which seems most acute to the legislative mind. . . . The legislature may select one phase of one field and apply a remedy there, neglecting the others.”
In the instant case, the main thrust of the ordinance is toward restricting the Sunday sale of major household furnishings and appliances. It is fairly common knowledge that these items, for the most part, are heavy and not easily moved except by truck or van; that because they are large items and occupy considerable floor and store space the trend is toward multiservice facilities; and that week-end “sales” of such furnishings are often held; all of which, when viewed through the local legislative eye, could tend to encourage undue and unfair competition as well as unusual and unnecessary Sunday urban traffic. Fair consideration being given to these factors, however one might otherwise quarrel *725with them, is it not realistically conceivable that the legislative body of Spokane County could have concluded that Sunday trade in the proscribed articles would not comport with the intended atmosphere of a day of rest, and that the local traffic situation as well as the potential threat of all like and related businesses being economically forced to remain open on Sunday fairly warranted and justified a local regulation and penalty superimposed upon the state statute?
Although I may or may not personally agree with the 1956 legislative determination of the Spokane County Commissioners, it seems to me there is discernible room for an honest difference of opinion, then and now, concerning the necessity, the desirability, and the advisability of their decision to augment the state statute. And, if in truth there be room for varying opinions upon the matter, then this court should be extremely chary in concluding that their legislative judgment is wholly unreasonable or that it has been exercised in a patently arbitrary and capricious fashion. We should be as vigilant and circumspect in avoiding judicial impingement upon legislative prerogatives as we are in guarding against legislative encroachments upon the judicial province.
I would, therefore, conclude, upon the basis of the present existence of our state statute, the import of Const, art. 11, § 11, our own prior decisions, the decisions of the United States Supreme Court, and the weight of authority upon the overall subject of the constitutionality of day-of-rest legislation, that the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of the pertinent legislative authority.
In my opinion, the judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
Hill, Donworth, and Ott, JJ., concur with Hamilton, J.