Court Opinion

ID: 9918806
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-16 17:17:22.89261+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:05.245918
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Lincoln Fire Company,                     :
Non-Profit Corporation                           :
                                                 :   No. 479 C.D. 2022
Appeal of: Lincoln Fire Company                  :   Argued: December 4, 2023

BEFORE:         HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
                HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge
                HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge

OPINION
BY JUDGE FIZZANO CANNON                                             FILED: January 16, 2024

                Lincoln Fire Company (Lincoln or the Company) appeals from the
April 15, 2022, order (Trial Court Order) of the Orphans’ Court Division of the Court
of Common Pleas of Montgomery County (Trial Court) granting, in part, and
denying, in part, Lincoln’s “Petition for Approval of Asset Transfer Under 15
Pa.C.S. § 5547(b) and Petition for Voluntary Dissolution of Lincoln Fire Company”
(Petition), which sought the voluntary dissolution of Lincoln and the distribution of
Lincoln’s assets to Lincoln’s designated beneficiaries. Upon review, we affirm, in
part, reverse, in part, and remand the matter for further proceedings in accordance
with this opinion.
                         I. Factual and Procedural Background
                Lincoln, a volunteer firefighting company formed in 1929, is a
Pennsylvania 503(c)(3)1 nonprofit corporation that is exempt from federal taxation.

      1
          Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (Tax Code), 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3).
Trial Ct. Op., June 16, 2022 (Trial Ct. Op.), at 1. Lincoln’s Articles of Incorporation
from 1929 state that its purpose is “maintenance and support of a company for the
preservation of property in the Township of Whitemarsh, County of Montgomery
and State of Pennsylvania, and its vicinity, from destruction by fire.”2 Reproduced
Record (R.R.) at 3a & 61a. Relevant to this appeal, Lincoln’s by-laws state: “In any
dissolution of the Company, any surplus remaining after paying or providing for all
liabilities shall be distributed to a tax-exempt Volunteer Fire, Ambulance, or other
Emergency or Rescue Squad, by decision of the membership.” Id. at 57a.
                 On January 6, 2021, Lincoln filed the Petition with the Trial Court
requesting both its voluntary dissolution and the approval of its planned asset
transfer to designated recipients.             R.R. at 61a-64a.          The Petition stated that
Whitemarsh Township had previously decertified Lincoln and ceased dispatching
Lincoln to emergency incidents. Id. at 62a. Lincoln’s members had therefore voted
to dissolve the Company. Id. The Petition noted that, in 2019, Lincoln had sold its
equipment and property in Whitemarsh Township with the Trial Court’s approval
and that the proceeds totaling $377,447.93 were in the Company’s bank accounts.
Id. at 62a-63a. Lincoln’s membership had elected to distribute the bank accounts,
Lincoln’s sole remaining asset, in the following percentages:                        75% to the

       2
           Lincoln’s constitution likewise states that its objectives are:

                 To “maintain fire fighting equipment for the prevention and
                 extinguishment of fires, and maintain the necessary equipment for
                 the provision of [Quick Response Services] (QRS).

                 To safeguard life and property, promote fire prevention, provide
                 QRS response and work to advance the efficiency, cooperation and
                 cause of the Volunteer Fire and QRS personnel and their Volunteer
                 Organizations.

Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 45a.

                                                    2
Montgomery County Fire Academy (MCFA), an organization that trains firefighters
and emergency medical technicians (EMTs); and 25% to North Penn Goodwill
Services (Goodwill), an organization that provides meals and comfort services to
firefighters at fire scenes. Id. The Petition explained that MCFA trains fire
companies in the county “and therefore supports [Lincoln’s] general purpose of
preservation of property from destruction by fire” in Montgomery County and that
Goodwill “provides aid to those responding to and fighting fires.” Id. at 63a.
                Pursuant to Pennsylvania Orphans’ Court Rule 4.4, Lincoln sent a copy
of the Petition to the Charitable Trusts and Organizations section of the Office of
Attorney General (OAG), which has supervisory authority over nonprofits in
Pennsylvania and may intervene on behalf of the Commonwealth in any court action
involving those entities. R.R. at 80a; see also Section 204(c) of the Act of Oct. 15,
1980, P.L. 950, as amended, 71 P.S. § 732-204(c). Later that month, OAG filed the
“Answer of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to the Petition for Approval of
Asset Transfer Under 15 Pa.C.S. § 5547(b) and Petition for Voluntary Dissolution
of Lincoln Fire Company” (Answer) in its capacity as parens patriae. Id. at 82a-
86a. In the Answer, OAG asserted that the purposes of MCFA and Goodwill were
insufficiently similar to Lincoln’s and that the distribution of Lincoln’s assets to
those entities would therefore violate cy pres principles3 as incorporated into Section
7740.3(a)(3) of the Probate, Estates, and Fiduciaries Code.4 R.R. at 82a-86a; see
also 20 Pa.C.S. § 7740.3(a)(3) (stating that “if a particular charitable purpose

       3
         “Cy pres” is “[t]he equitable doctrine under which a court reforms a written instrument
with a gift to charity as closely to the donor’s intention as possible, so that the gift does not fail.”
In re Est. of Ryerss, 987 A.2d 1231, 1237 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary
392 (7th ed. 1999)).

       4
           20 Pa.C.S. §§ 7701-7799.3.

                                                   3
becomes unlawful, impracticable or wasteful . . . the court shall apply cy pres to
fulfill as nearly as possible the settlor’s charitable intention, whether it be general or
specific”).   In addition to requesting the denial of the Petition, the Answer’s
Wherefore Clause further requested that the Trial Court “apply cy pres to fulfill as
nearly as possible [Lincoln’s] original charitable purpose of ‘maintenance and
support of a company for the preservation of property in the township of
Whitemarsh[,] County of Montgomery[,] and State of Pennsylvania, and its vicinity,
from destruction by fire.’” R.R. at 85a-86a.
              The Trial Court conducted a hearing on January 26, 2022. R.R. at 90a.
Donna Sesko (Sesko),5 Lincoln’s current financial officer, testified that, during her
years with Lincoln, she has been involved in multiple fundraising efforts where
members provided their time and donated supplies and that all proceeds went to the
Company. Id. at 96-98a. Sesko explained that, at the time of her testimony, Lincoln
had approximately $365,000 in the bank from the sale of its property and equipment,
most of the proceeds of which sales went to the costs of retiring outstanding loans
thereon. Id. at 100a-01a. Sesko further explained that donations received during the
Company’s winding down period had been returned to the donors. Id. at 101a.
              During cross-examination, Sesko acknowledged that Lincoln received
an annual allotment from Whitemarsh Township, which OAG counsel indicated
totaled $718,000 since 2009; the Whitemarsh Township allotment ceased in 2016,
when the Company began winding down. R.R. at 103a & 107a. While Lincoln was
operating, the Whitemarsh Township allotment furnished less than 25% of Lincoln’s

       5
         Sesko has been involved with Lincoln, which she describes as her “second family,” since
1987; she began as a firefighter and EMT, became part of the leadership board in 2015, and took
on financial duties in 2018 as Lincoln was winding down. R.R. at 94a-95a & 98a-99a.

                                               4
expenses necessary to maintain its property and equipment and to train personnel.
Id. at 107a. Sesko also stated that persons from outside Whitemarsh Township
attended and contributed to some of Lincoln’s fundraising activities and that donors
knew that their funds went to the Company. Id. at 108a-09a. Sesko did not know
how the money was originally raised to buy Lincoln’s property 75-80 years ago. Id.
at 105a.
               Jeff Fisher (Fisher), Lincoln’s current board secretary,6 testified that the
majority of the Company’s membership – 30 to 40 people – met in January 2019 to
discuss the disposition of Lincoln’s assets as it was winding down. R.R. at 115a.
The Company’s Board of Directors (Board) had come up with several suggested
destinations for the distribution of Lincoln’s assets and asked if any members had
suggestions. Id. at 116a. The Board suggested MCFA and Goodwill as asset
recipients because those groups serve the fire and EMT community of Whitemarsh
Township and environs and would “hopefully carry on Lincoln’s name a little bit.”
Id. at 117a. Lincoln’s membership discussed the various options and ultimately
agreed with the Board that MCFA and Goodwill were suitable recipients that would
help the fire and EMT community in Whitemarsh Township and surrounding areas.
Id. at 118a. The membership agreed that MCFA serves the entire area by training
firefighters and EMTs and that Goodwill serves area firefighters with on-site meals
and comfort support. Id. at 120a. MCFA and Goodwill had indicated to the Board
that they would use the funds for equipment upgrades and maintenance. Id.

       6
         Fisher’s family has been involved with the Company for four generations; he personally
started with Lincoln in 2000 as a firefighter and has held various positions on both the fire service
and leadership sides. R.R. at 11a-12a.

                                                 5
             Fisher   further    testified       that   the   Company’s   membership
“overwhelmingly” voted against the distribution of Lincoln’s assets to Whitemarsh
Township’s two remaining volunteer fire companies – Spring Mill Fire Company
No. 1 (Spring Mill) and Barren Hill Fire Company (Barren Hill) – because, when
Lincoln faced decertification by Whitemarsh Township, those fire companies had
not helped, but had instead, it was believed, surreptitiously contributed to Lincoln’s
demise. R.R. at 119a. Fisher acknowledged a rivalry between Lincoln and the local
fire companies existed in past years, but explained that Lincoln’s membership
believed the other companies’ members had acted in a manner not befitting the
“brotherhood” ethos of firefighters during the process of Lincoln’s decertification.
Id.
             On cross-examination, Fisher confirmed that Lincoln’s by-laws state
that, in the event of a dissolution, Lincoln’s assets would go to a “tax-exempt
volunteer fire, ambulance, or other emergency or rescue squad.” R.R. at 121a.
Fisher acknowledged that MCFA does not fit that description and that Goodwill may
not either. Id. at 122a. He also acknowledged that neither entity is solely focused
on Whitemarsh Township. Id. Fisher maintained, however, that these entities served
Lincoln’s general constitutional purposes of safeguarding life and property,
promoting fire prevention, and advancing the efficiency, cooperation, and cause of
volunteer firefighting and EMT services. Id. at 123a-24a.
             Thomas Garrity (Garrity), MCFA’s director, testified that MCFA is
located about a mile outside of Whitemarsh Township, in Conshohocken. R.R. at
126a. Garrity explained that MCFA’s mission is to train volunteer firefighters and
EMTs throughout Montgomery County to national standards. Id. at 127a-28a.
Garrity testified that MCFA is tax-exempt and funded by Montgomery County, but

                                             6
does receive occasional donations, the funds from which are deposited with
Montgomery County, but available for MCFA’s use, as needed. Id. at 129a-31a.
Garrity explained that MCFA intends to use Lincoln’s contribution to upgrade its
auditorium and kitchen, which serves lunch to students during classes and that a
plaque with Lincoln’s name will be put up in the facility to commemorate the
contribution. Id. at 130a-31a. Garrity further testified that, while MCFA charges
for its training, it operates at a loss; training tuition brings in only about $200,000 of
a total $1.4 million operating budget, with Montgomery County making up the
difference. Id. at 132a-34a. Garrity did not believe that he could restrict funds from
Lincoln to be directed solely to training Whitemarsh firefighters and EMTs. Id. at
135a.
             Goodwill’s president, James Thomas (Thomas), testified that Goodwill
is a “canteen service” that provides food and comfort services free of charge to
firefighters and EMTs at fire and/or emergency sites. R.R. at 139a. Thomas
explained that Goodwill is located and operates in Montgomery County, but also
serves nearly all areas surrounding Philadelphia, including southern New Jersey. Id.
at 140a & 142a-43a.        All of Goodwill’s funding comes from donations and
fundraisers. Id. at 140a. Thomas stated that Goodwill intends to use the funds
received from Lincoln to upgrade its facilities, buy another service truck, and pay
down the financing on another recently purchased truck. Id. at 141a-42a. Thomas
confirmed that Goodwill is not a firefighting or rescue entity but stated that Goodwill
helps such entities indirectly by supporting firefighters and EMTs at fire, emergency,
and disaster scenes. Id. at 143a-45a.

                                            7
               OAG presented the testimony of Barren Hill’s Chief, Christopher
Schwartz (Schwartz).7 R.R. at 149a.8 Schwartz testified that Barren Hill is a
charitable, 503(c)(3) volunteer fire company located at 647 Germantown Pike,
Whitemarsh Township, Montgomery County. Id. at 154a & 157a-58a. He explained
that Barren Hill provides all facets of firefighting and rescue services from
approximately the 2200 block north through Pennsylvania Avenue in Whitemarsh
Township and provides mutual aid to other first responders in every municipality
bordering Whitemarsh Township. Id. at 154a. He explained that Barren Hill
participates in education programs in local schools and throughout the community.
Id. at 154a-55a. According to Schwartz, Barren Hill handles approximately 40 to
50 fire and emergency calls per month, with the majority of the calls originating in
Whitemarsh Township. Id. at 155a. Schwartz further explained that, in 2016 when
it decided to decertify Lincoln, Whitemarsh Township requested that Barren Hill
add certain geographic areas amounting to approximately 15-20% of Lincoln’s
coverage area to Barren Hill’s coverage area. Id. at 156a-57a. Barren Hill agreed
and has been covering the requested areas since that time. Id. at 157a. Schwartz

       7
         A police officer since 2003, Schwartz is currently a detective sergeant with the Plymouth
Township Police, Montgomery County. R.R. at 153a. He has been a volunteer firefighter at
Barren Hill since 1998. Id. Schwartz was a Barren Hill lieutenant in the mid-2000s before being
elected Chief in 2008. Id. at 153a-54a. He has in the past held the position of Barren Hill’s
treasurer and also served on its board of trustees for a three-year period. Id. at 154a.

       8
          We observe that at the beginning of Schwartz’s testimony, Lincoln’s counsel objected to
the testimony as irrelevant, as the hearing was “not a cy pres proceeding,” but instead solely for
the purpose of presenting Lincoln’s wishes in the Petition regarding the distribution of its assets.
R.R. at 149a-50a. As such, Lincoln argued that, if the Trial Court denied Lincoln’s proposed
distribution, then Lincoln should have the opportunity to select alternative recipients and present
them at a future proceeding focused specifically on cy pres matters. Id. The Trial Court declined
to bifurcate the proceedings at that time and allowed Schwartz to testify. Id. at 151a-52a.

                                                 8
further explained that Barren Hill would employ any money awarded from Lincoln’s
assets to further Barren Hill’s mission9 with respect to operational and prevention
services provided to Whitemarsh Township. Id. at 158a. He also repeatedly
explained that no discussion of merging fire companies ever occurred between
Barren Hill and Lincoln during the process of Lincoln’s decertification by
Whitemarsh Township. Id. at 162a-64a & 166a-67a.
                 OAG also presented the testimony of Spring Mill Chief Wayne
Masters10 before the Trial Court. Masters testified that Spring Mill is a tax-exempt
503(c)(4)11 organization located at 1210 East Hector Street, Conshohocken, which
is situated within Whitemarsh Township. R.R. at 170a & 173a-74a. Masters
explained that Spring Mill provides the southeastern portion of Whitemarsh

       9
        Schwartz testified that Article II, Section 1 of Barren Hill’s by-laws accurately describes
Barren Hill’s purpose and mission. R.R. at 156a. Article II, Section 1 of those by-laws provides:

                 [Barren Hill’s] purpose shall be for the acquisition, support and
                 maintenance of fire apparatus and other pertinent equipment for the
                 prevention, control and extinguishment of fires and for other
                 emergencies in Whitemarsh Township and other areas where
                 needed. The organization is organized exclusively for charitable,
                 educational, or scientific purposes under section 501(c)(3) of the
                 Internal Revenue Code, or corresponding section of any future tax
                 code.

R.R. at 156a; see also Barren Hill By-Laws, R.R. at 9a.

       10
          Masters is vice president of sales for 911 Marketing and current fire chief of Spring Mill.
R.R. at 169a. He joined Spring Mill in 1998. R.R. at 169a. In addition to service as Chief, Masters
held the positions of lieutenant, captain, assistant chief, deputy chief, and president. R.R. at 169a.
He also has served on Spring Mill’s board of directors for multiple years. Id.

       11
            Section 501(c)(4) of the Tax Code, 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4).

                                                  9
Township with fire, rescue, water rescue, and EMS services.12 Id. at 170a. Spring
Mill averages approximately 20 calls per month. Id. at 171a. Masters further
explained that, when it decided to decertify Lincoln in 2016, Whitemarsh Township
requested that Spring Mill add certain geographic areas amounting to approximately
75% of Lincoln’s coverage area to Spring Mill’s coverage area, and Spring Mill
agreed. Id. at 172a-73a. Masters explained that, if awarded a portion of Lincoln’s
assets, Spring Mill would use the funds to manage significant debt resulting from
the maintenance of its building and equipment purchases as well as helping to
manage operating expenses. Id. at 174a. Masters further testified that no attempts
were made by either Spring Mill or Lincoln to merge operations when Whitemarsh
Township decertified Lincoln. Id. at 176a.
               By order dated April 15, 2022, the Trial Court granted the Petition to
the extent it sought Lincoln’s voluntary dissolution, denied the Petition to the extent
it requested approval to transfer Lincoln’s assets to MCFA and Goodwill, and
directed the distribution of Lincoln’s assets instead to Barren Hill and Spring Mill,
in accordance with the recommendation of the OAG on behalf of the Commonwealth
as parens patriae. Lincoln filed a Motion for Reconsideration on April 25, 2022, to

       12
         Masters explained that Spring Mills’ constitution accurately describes its purpose and
mission as:

               The object for which this [c]ompany is formed is the maintenance
               of a society for the protection of life and property, the prevention
               and extinguishment of fires and any other emergencies that may
               require our assistance along with taking such steps in investigation
               thereof as may be deemed advisable, as well as the business
               functions of the organization.

R.R. 171a-72a; see also Spring Mill constitution, R.R. at 23a.

                                               10
which OAG filed an Answer on May 9, 2022, and which the Trial Court denied by
order dated May 10, 2022. See R.R. at 221a-32a. Lincoln appealed to this Court.
                                            II. Issues
                On appeal,13 Lincoln claims the Trial Court erred by denying, through
the application of cy pres, the transfer of Lincoln’s assets upon dissolution to its
chosen beneficiaries. See Lincoln Br. at 6 & 11-14. Lincoln argues that cy pres is
inapplicable to the instant matter and was not before the Trial Court where the
Petition did not assert cy pres. See id. at 6 & 15-22. Finally, Lincoln argues that, if
cy pres was applicable, the Trial Court erred by failing to provide Lincoln an
opportunity to present additional evidence and/or alternative beneficiary
suggestions. See id. at 6-7 & 22-24.
                                         III. Discussion
                Section 5547(b) of the Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation Law of
198814 provides that

                [p]roperty committed to charitable purposes shall not, by
                any proceeding under Chapter 3 (relating to entity
                transactions) or 59 (relating to amendments, sale of assets
                and dissolution) or otherwise, be diverted from the objects
                to which it was donated, granted or devised, unless and
                until the board of directors or other body obtains from the
                court an order under 20 Pa.C.S. Ch. 77 (relating to trusts)
                specifying the disposition of the property.

       13
          “This Court’s standard of review is limited to considering whether the trial court, sitting
as a chancellor in equity, committed an error of law or abused its discretion.” Williams Twp. Bd.
of Supervisors v. Williams Twp. Emergency Co., 986 A.2d 914, 920 n.4 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2009).

       14
            15 Pa.C.S. §§ 5101-6146.

                                                11
15 Pa.C.S. § 5547(b). Regarding the distribution of assets of dissolved charities,
Section 7740.3 of Pennsylvania’s Uniform Trust Act15 provides, in relevant part:

                 (a) General rule.--Except as otherwise provided in
                 subsection (b),[16] if a particular charitable purpose
                 becomes unlawful, impracticable or wasteful:

                      (1) the trust does not fail, in whole or in part;

                      (2) the trust property does not revert to the settlor
                      or the settlor’s successors in interest; and

                      (3) the court shall apply cy pres to fulfill as nearly
                      as possible the settlor’s charitable intention,
                      whether it be general or specific.

20 Pa.C.S. § 7740.3(a).17 As this Court has observed:

                 Application of the doctrine of cy pres requires a court to
                 exercise its discretion in such manner as to award funds to
                 charity, which most resembles the one that settlor intended
                 to benefit, and, thus, it is necessary to examine [1] the
                 purposes and objects of that charity, [2] the locality that
                 charity intended to serve, and [3] the nature of the

        15
             20 Pa.C.S. §§ 7701-7799.3.

        16
          Subsection (b) of Section 7740.3 provides an exception not in effect in the instant matter
whereby the specific terms of a charitable trust may allow for distribution of trust assets to a
noncharitable beneficiary in lieu of a court’s application of cy pres as directed in subsection
7740.3(a)(3). See 20 Pa.C.S. § 7740.3(b) (noting an exception to 20 Pa.C.S. § 7740.3(a) where
“[a] provision in the terms of a charitable trust that would result in distribution of the trust property
to a noncharitable beneficiary prevails over the power of the court under subsection (a) to apply
cy pres.”).

        17
          As the Comment to Section 7740.3 explains, “[t]he doctrine of cy pres is applied not
only to trusts, but also to other types of charitable dispositions, including those to charitable
corporations.” 20 Pa.C.S. § 7740.3, Comment.

                                                  12
            population that was the intended object of the charitable
            gift.

Commonwealth by Kane v. New Founds., Inc., 182 A.3d 1059, 1073 n.8 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2018).
            The Trial Court found in the instant matter that Lincoln’s intended
beneficiaries of its assets upon dissolution were not appropriate. See Trial Ct. Op.
at 5-7. The Trial Court explained:

            It is uncontested that Lincoln’s operations have ceased,
            and it is no longer able to fulfill its stated charitable
            purpose. Contrary to its request for approval, however, the
            missions [of] the two entities to which it sought
            distribution, [MCFA] and [Goodwill], are not the closest
            possible fit to Lincoln’s charitable mission, and therefore,
            not appropriate.

            The mission of [MCFA] is materially different from
            Lincoln’s mission. While Lincoln’s mission is to provide
            a fire company that responds to and fights fires in
            Whitemarsh Township and surrounding areas, [MCFA’s
            mission] is to provide training for fire, rescue and
            emergency medical services in Montgomery County.
            Even a cursory review of Lincoln’s [b]y-[l]aws[]
            demonstrates that [MCFA], whose purpose is education
            and[,] therefore, much broader than that of Lincoln, is not
            an appropriate recipient. In relevant part, the dissolution
            clause of Lincoln’s [b]y-[l]aws expressly states that “[i]n
            any dissolution of the Company, any surplus remaining
            after payout or providing for all liabilities shall be
            distributed to a tax-exempt Volunteer Fire, Ambulance, or
            other Emergency or Rescue Squad . . . .”

            The mission of Lincoln’s other proposed distributee,
            [Goodwill], renders it a similarly inappropriate entity to
            receive Lincoln’s assets. [Goodwill’s] mission is [“]to
            provide hot food, hot and cold drinks, temporary shelter

                                        13
               from the elements, and a restroom facility to emergency
               workers including police, firefighters and rescue
               personnel.” It is uncontested that [Goodwill] does not
               fight fires or preserve property, but instead is limited to
               supporting those that do by providing food, beverages,
               shelter, and restroom accommodations.             As such,
               [Goodwill’s] mission [is] supportive, rather than dedicated
               to the front line fire fighting for which Lincoln existed.

               Contrary to Lincoln’s assertions, the record reflects that
               the entities to which it sought distribution of its assets do
               no[t] provide direct services to prevent the destruction of
               property by fire, and therefore were not appropriate.

Trial Ct. Op. at 5-6 (footnote omitted).
               We find no error of law or abuse of discretion in the Trial Court’s
determination that MCFA and Goodwill were not appropriate organizations to fulfill
Lincoln’s purpose of maintaining and supporting a fire company for the preservation
of property in Whitemarsh Township and its vicinity from destruction by fire. 18
MCFA is an educational outfit that provides training for fire, rescue, and emergency
medical services in Montgomery County.                  Goodwill is a canteen service that
supports fire companies. Neither is a fire company dedicated to preserving property
in Whitemarsh Township and its vicinity, the purpose stated in Lincoln’s Articles of

       18
           Our Supreme Court has explained that although a nonprofit corporation’s actions must
be related to its corporate purpose, that purpose and the corporation’s authority to take action under
it “must be construed in the least restrictive way possible, limiting the amount of court interference
and second-guessing . . . .” Zampogna v. Law Enforcement Health Benefits, Inc., 151 A.3d 1003,
1023 (Pa. 2016); see also In re Indep. Fire Co. No. 1 (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1489 C.D. 2018, filed Feb.
5, 2020), slip op. at 12 n.10 (quoting Zampogna in a case relating to the distribution of fire
company assets). Arguably, the Trial Court was unduly narrow in its construction of Lincoln’s
purpose and its authority to distribute its assets consistent with that purpose. However, we need
not decide that issue because, in any event, Lincoln’s by-laws expressly limit its distribution of
assets upon dissolution to a “tax-exempt volunteer fire company, ambulance, or other emergency
or rescue squad.” R.R. at 121a.

                                                 14
Incorporation. Accordingly, we find no error in the Trial Court’s disapproval of
Lincoln’s designation of these entities as beneficiaries of Lincoln’s remaining assets.
             However, while the Trial Court did not err by denying distribution of
Lincoln’s remaining assets to its designated beneficiaries, this does not mean that
the Trial Court was authorized, in deciding the Petition, to direct the distribution of
Lincoln’s remaining assets to OAG’s suggested alternative beneficiaries. This is not
a traditional cy pres situation where a charitable organization is defunct or being
involuntarily dissolved pursuant to a petition filed by OAG. Instead, the instant
matter involves the determination of a petition filed by an extant fire company for
the approval of its designated beneficiaries as part of the process of the voluntary
dissolution of that fire company, the members of which are available and willing to
direct the distribution of the organization’s remaining assets prior to the completion
of the voluntary dissolution pursuant to the organization’s by-laws. Clearly, by
virtue of having voted upon intended beneficiary organizations and filing the instant
Petition, Lincoln’s members have a continuing desire to direct the distribution of
Lincoln’s assets and are taking appropriate steps to do so pursuant to procedures
outlined in Lincoln’s by-laws. Under such circumstances, the Trial Court need not
resort to the application of cy pres to distribute a charitable organization’s remaining
assets absent a showing that the organization is either unwilling or unable to identify
suitable recipients on its own accord. See Lacey Park Volunteer Fire Company No.
1 v. Board of Supervisors of Warminster Township, 365 A.2d 880 (Pa. Cmwlth.
1976) (noting that decertified fire company retained ownership of property in its
possession and had legal authority to determine the future of those assets); see also
In Re Merger of Universal Volunteer Fire Department Into Point Breeze Volunteer
Fire Association, 235 A.3d 415 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2020) (finding that fire company’s

                                          15
decertification did not trigger the application of the cy pres doctrine for the purpose
of distributing fire company’s remaining assets).
              Lincoln’s Articles of Incorporation clearly state that Lincoln’s purpose
is the maintenance and support of a fire company for the preservation of property in
Whitemarsh Township, and its vicinity, from destruction by fire. See R.R. at 3a &
61a. Additionally, Lincoln’s by-laws provide that, in the event of dissolution, the
distribution of Lincoln’s remaining assets shall be decided by Lincoln’s
membership. See R.R. at 57a. While the Trial Court maintains power under Section
5547(b) of the Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation Law of 1988, 15 Pa.C.S. § 5547(b),
and Section 7740.3 of the Uniform Trust Act, 20 Pa.C.S. § 7740.3(a), to review
Lincoln’s chosen intended beneficiaries to ensure that such beneficiaries sufficiently
comport with Lincoln’s stated charitable purpose, the Trial Court lacked the
authority to mandate, without further process, OAG’s alternative selections on the
membership of Lincoln, a still-extant charitable organization. In addition to OAG’s
proposed recipients (Spring Mill and Barren Hill), Lincoln identified six other area
fire companies that may be appropriate recipients of its remaining assets.19 See
Lincoln’s Br. at 23; see also Lincoln Fire Company’s Motion for Reconsideration,
R.R. at 224a. If Lincoln can prove that these fire companies are dedicated to the
protection of property from destruction by fire and are also “in the vicinity” of
Whitemarsh Township, then presumably any one of them would satisfy the
requirements of Lincoln’s Articles of Incorporation without need on the part of the
Trial Court to either resort to OAG’s suggested alternative beneficiaries or apply cy

       19
         The additional alternative fire companies listed by Lincoln include Conshohocken Fire
Company, Plymouth Fire Company, Harmonville Fire Company, Fort Washington Fire Company,
Flourtown Fire Company, and George Clay Fire Company. See Lincoln’s Br. at 23; see also
Lincoln Fire Company’s Motion for Reconsideration, R.R. at 224a.

                                             16
pres. Nothing in Lincoln’s by-laws indicate that its membership would only have
one shot to direct the distribution of its assets upon dissolution. Likewise, nothing
in either Section 5547(b) of the Pennsylvania Nonprofit Corporation Law of 1988,
15 Pa.C.S. § 5547(b), or Section 7740.3 of the Uniform Trust Act, 20 Pa.C.S. § 7740.3(a),
requires such a result or provides a trial court with authority to apply cy pres to
require an extant charitable organization to accept the asset distribution suggestions
of OAG without further opportunity to forward its own alternative asset distributees
following a denial of the charitable organization’s initial proposed asset distributees.
Determining otherwise would effectively allow a taking of Lincoln’s assets without
due process. See Lacey Park. There was no indication that Lincoln could not fulfill
its obligation to designate alternate, appropriate asset transferees in order to
complete its dissolution. Therefore, we find that the Trial Court erred by applying
cy pres principles and directing the distribution of Lincoln’s remaining assets to the
organizations suggested by OAG without providing Lincoln’s membership further
opportunity to identify and select a distributee or distributees on its own.
             We are also not convinced by the Trial Court’s suggestion that it was
authorized to apply cy pres to determine the distribution of Lincoln’s assets because
Lincoln was on notice of the applicability of the cy pres doctrine and had been
granted an opportunity to be heard thereon by virtue of the nature of the Petition and
OAG’s response thereto. See Trial Ct. Op. at 7-8. Lincoln’s Petition sought only
the Trial Court’s approval of Lincoln’s designated beneficiaries; it did not request
the Trial Court’s application of cy pres as an alternative in the event the Trial Court
disapproved of Lincoln’s intended beneficiaries. Further, while OAG specifically
denied in its Answer that Lincoln’s suggested beneficiaries were proper because
neither was a fire company dedicated to fighting fires in Whitemarsh Township,

                                           17
OAG did not file a cy pres petition in this matter.20 Accordingly, the only decision
before the Court during the hearing on this matter was the propriety of Lincoln’s
designated beneficiaries, not the identification or approval of other, alternative
beneficiaries. The application of cy pres to make such a determination required
OAG to file a petition for such a determination, which petition Lincoln would then
have had an opportunity to formally contest. See In re Independent Fire Company
No. 1 (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 1489 C.D. 2018, filed Feb. 5, 2020)21 (involving trial court
review of a petition filed by OAG seeking a fire company’s involuntary dissolution
and the distribution of the fire company’s remaining assets pursuant to the cy pres
doctrine). The Trial Court’s suggestion that the deprivation of Lincoln’s opportunity
to suggest alternative recipients resulted from Lincoln’s own litigation strategy,
which the Trial Court characterized as “turn[ing] a blind eye and forg[ing] ahead
despite the repeated attestations of the Commonwealth, as parens patriae, as to
Lincoln’s proffered distributes[,]” is simply incorrect. Trial Ct. Op. at 8. Lincoln
filed the Petition seeking approval of its designees. The OAG opposed those
designees in its Answer to the Petition and throughout the Petition hearing.
Although it would have been a sensible and logical subject of an OAG petition to be
filed following the Trial Court’s resolution/determination of the Petition, the

       20
           The OAG’s answer to the Petition recited the statutory cy pres provision and included a
conclusory cy pres request in its prayer for relief. However, that was insufficient to substitute for
an affirmative filing, such as a petition, which would have required the OAG to establish the
requisite conditions for the doctrine’s application. Notably, the OAG did not assert any facts that
arguably would have triggered the application of the cy pres doctrine, specifically Lincoln’s
inability to fulfill its charitable purpose by voting to designate a different fire company, ambulance,
or rescue squad as the transferee of its assets. The OAG likewise offered no such averments or
evidence at the hearing.
       21
           Pursuant to Commonwealth Court Internal Operating Procedure 414(a), 210 Pa. Code
§ 69.414(a), unreported panel decisions of this Court, issued after January 15, 2008, may be cited
for their persuasive value.
                                                 18
application of cy pres to distribute Lincoln’s assets in the event the Trial Court
disapproved of the beneficiaries put forth in the Petition was simply not an issue in
the prosecution of the Petition. The Trial Court erred by applying cy pres without a
pending petition seeking application of the same.
             Accordingly, for all of these reasons, we conclude that the cy pres
doctrine is not applicable in this case. Additionally, based on the above discussion,
we find the Trial Court’s grant of the Petition to the extent it requested Lincoln’s
voluntary dissolution to have been premature.
                                  IV. Conclusion
             For the above reasons, we affirm the Trial Court Order to the extent it
denied the distribution of Lincoln’s assets to MCFA and Goodwill but reverse the
Trial Court Order to the extent it granted Lincoln’s voluntary dissolution and
directed distribution of Lincoln’s remaining assets to Spring Mill and Barren Hill.
             The matter is remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.

                                       ___________________________________
                                       CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

                                         19
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

In re: Lincoln Fire Company,                  :
Non-Profit Corporation                        :
                                              :   No. 479 C.D. 2022
Appeal of: Lincoln Fire Company               :

                                       ORDER

               AND NOW, this 16th day of January, 2024, the April 15, 2022, order
(Trial Court Order) of the Orphans’ Court Division of the Court of Common Pleas
of Montgomery County (Trial Court) is AFFIRMED to the extent it denied the
distribution of Lincoln Fire Company’s (Lincoln) remaining assets to Montgomery
County Fire Academy and North Penn Goodwill Services. The Trial Court Order is
REVERSED to the extent it granted Lincoln’s voluntary dissolution and directed
distribution of Lincoln’s remaining assets to Spring Mill Fire Company No. 1 and
Barren Hill Fire Company. The matter is REMANDED to the Trial Court for further
proceedings.
               Jurisdiction relinquished.

                                            ___________________________________
                                            CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge