Court Opinion

ID: 9738485
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 19:54:30.440349+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:06.474992
License: Public Domain

Murphy, P.J.
(concurring). I agree that summary disposition was appropriately granted to defendants, but write separately to explain how my analysis differs from that utilized by the majority.
*641The majority holding is based on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (rfra), 42 USC 2000bb et seq., enacted after this appeal was filed and never argued by the parties. Although the constitutionality of the rfra is not before us today, I question Congress’ authority to legislate the standard of judicial review applicable to a free exercise of religion claim.1 Unlike the majority, I find it unnecessary to consider the rfra’s application to the present case because I would hold that strict scrutiny is the proper standard of review of plaintiffs free exercise claim as established by the United States Supreme Court and the Michigan Supreme Court. Sherbert v Verner, 374 US 398; 83 S Ct 1790; 10 L Ed 2d 965 (1963); Dep’t of Social Services v Emmanuel Baptist Preschool, 434 Mich 380, 391-396, 430; 455 NW2d 1 (1990) (Cavanagh, J., concurring and Griffin, J., concurring in part).
It is argued that the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Employment Div, Dep’t of Human Resources v Smith, 494 US 872; 110 S Ct 1595; 108 L Ed 2d 876 (1990), would bar application of the strict scrutiny standard of review in analyzing a conflict between the Free Exercise *642Clause and the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2101 et seq.; MSA 3.548(101) et seq., in the context of the employment relationship of a teacher in a Catholic school.2 However, I do not find the Supreme Court’s holding in Smith to be applicable to plaintiffs free exercise of religion claim in this case. Instead, I agree with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which has held that Smith applies only to laws that punish criminal conduct. See American Friends Service Committee Corp v Thornburgh, 961 F2d 1405, 1407 (CA 9, 1991); NLRB v Hanna Boys Center, 940 F2d 1295, 1305 (CA 9, 1991). See also Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v Trustees of the Big Sandy Independent School Dist, 817 F Supp 1319 (ED Tex, 1993). In this case, the law whose constitutionality is in question, § 202(l)(a) of the Civil Rights Act, MCL 37.2202(l)(a); MSA 3.548(202)(l)(a), is not a criminal law, but a civil law, and, thus, Smith does not apply.
Because Smith is inapplicable to the present case, I would review plaintiffs free exercise challenge under the traditional strict scrutiny standard. Sherbert, supra; Emmanuel, supra. The strict scrutiny standard requires the state to prove that its actions are justified by a compelling interest and that there are no less drastic means to achieve that interest. Emmanuel, supra, 394-396. Section 202(1)(a) of the Civil Rights Act cannot withstand strict scrutiny in this case because it is not the least drastic means to achieve the state’s interest in prohibiting discrimination. There is a less drastic means to achieve the state’s interest in preventing discrimination, as exemplified by fed*643eral law as set forth in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which provides the following specific exemption for religious schools:
[I]t shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society. [42 USC 2000e-2(e)(2).]
As applied to defendants in this case, MCL 37.2202(1)(a); MSA 3.548(202)(1)(a) would be unconstitutional because it violates defendants’ First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion. However, the Legislature could remedy the constitutional defect by providing a specific exemption for religious schools similar to that found in the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 USC 2000e-2(e)(2). Such an exemption would permit the state to advance its interest in prohibiting religious discrimination without unconstitutionally interfering with defendants’ First Amendment right to the free exercise of religion.
For the reasons stated above, I concur in affirming the trial court’s grant of summary disposition for defendants.

 I echo the concerns of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Canedy v Boardman, 16 F3d 183, 186, n 2 (CA 7, 1994), where the court stated:
The constitutionality of [the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993] — surely not before us here — raises a number of questions involving the extent of Congress’s powers under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally Katzenbach v Morgan, 384 US 641; 86 S Ct 1717; 16 L Ed 2d 828 (1966); Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganic Marriage, 1969 S Ct Rev 81; Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U Cinn L Rev 199 (1971); William Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 Stan L Rev 603 (1975); Comment, When the Supreme Court Restricts Constitutional Rights, Can Congress Save Us? An Examination of Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 141 U Pa L Rev 1029 (1993).

 Smith was a case dealing with a criminal statute and essentially held that the Free Exercise Clause, US Const, Am I, does not bar the application of a neutral generally applicable law to religiously motivated conduct unless the Free Exercise Clause is in conjunction with other constitutional protections.