Court Opinion

ID: 9536381
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 06:58:44.576755+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:23.836777
License: Public Domain

WOLFE, Chief Justice.
I concur.
I agree that Mr. Taylor, having accepted the benefit of the trial court’s finding on the question of cause which was based largely, if not altogether, on the proceedings which took place in the Governor’s office on January 26, 1950, and which proceedings were certified to the court, is not now in position to assert that those proceedings were unauthorized. I can see some force in the position Taylor took on January 26, 1950, the day the hearing was held. Naturally, he might not want to submit to a hearing ostensibly to determine whether there was cause to discharge him when he had already been discharged, if the discharge was to be considered to be in effect from January 3rd to January 20th. That would be discharging a person and then holding a hearing to justify the discharge. But as things turned out, Taylor must be considered as having ratified the hearing of January 26th and adopted it as part of the proceedings held to determine whether he would be discharged — a nunc pro tunc idea. It is for this reason that I concur with that part of the opinion which holds that as far as Taylor is concerned the proceedings of January 26th must be considered as proper before the court even though he objected to them as invalid as a basis for the Governor’s action of January 3, 1950.
I reserve from my concurrence the statement that reads: *336‘We believe- the best rulé to be that if there is any evidence of a legal and substantial basis reasonably tending to support the-Governor’s., findings, then he has not been arbitrary and his decision should, be affirmed.” I am not reserving that statement from my concurrence because I think it wrong. I do not think it necessary to the decision and wish to express no opinion regarding such a test. It expresses the usual rule of. judicial action in the case of administrative bodies or agencies and may be applicable in cases of measuring the action of the Governor based on cause. Taken in connection with that phase of the opinion which treats of the standards of efficiency to which state officers may be held, there may be some doubt about it; -..Certainly, such officers should be held to a high standard, but situations may arise where the standard is held high for some officers and relaxed as to others. The question: of whether there was' an absence of good faith on the part -of- the removing officer may enter the picture. In cases where there was not gross or marked inefficiency an alleged lack of the highest standards, or some special instances of. conduct claimed to fall short of the removing officer’s standard might be used to oust an officer in order to supplant him for reasons, ostensibly of inefficiency, but actually for ulterior motives. Perhaps, if there is evidence which reasonably tends to support the removing officer’s finding on the question of efficiency, we should not go back of it. “Reasonably” is an accordion word and may take care of the issue of good faith or the lack of it in close cases, but I do not believe it necessary to consider those questions in this case and hence I withhold my concurrence to this phase.
• I think the procedure laid down by the opinion when “cause’’: ;is. required is correct and should be helpful. I further .think the analysis of the evidence of the transactions concerning the resolutions of the Board regarding *337the dealings in municipal bond issues signed by Taylor and the conclusions reached therein to be' strictly judicial and unassailable.