Court Opinion

ID: 9478638
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 06:53:33.61021+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:31.714972
License: Public Domain

LAY, Chief Judge,
with whom HEANEY and McMILLIAN, Circuit Judges, join, dissenting.
The sole issue involved in this petition is whether or not the district court should be required to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Gerald Smith is legally competent at the present time to make a decision to abandon his appeal from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus entered by the district court on August 11, 1988. Smith is under sentence of death for capital murder. His sentence was scheduled to be carried out according to the order of the Supreme Court of Missouri on. October 4, 1988.
A panel of this court, on September 29, 1988, refused to stay the execution of Smith on the basis that Smith himself has written to this court stating that he does not wish to pursue an appeal of the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus; that he wants the appeal dismissed; and that he wants the sentence carried out without further review. The Missouri Public Defenders Commission and the Director of the State Public Defender filed a petition for a rehearing by the panel with the suggestion for rehearing en banc. On October 3, 1988, three judges of this court, myself, Judge Heaney and Judge McMillian, entered an order staying the execution pending our study of the record and the petition for rehearing en banc.
There can be little question that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Smith’s appointed counsel in the federal district court states substantial issues concerning the validity of Smith’s death sentence. There is little question that this court would grant a certificate of probable cause to allow the appeal to proceed on the grounds that the petition for writ of habeas corpus contains several arguable issues that would, if decided favorably to Smith, invalidate his death sentence rendered by the state court. Included in this challenge are substantial issues relating to alleged ineffective assistance of counsel Smith received during the trial, the constitutionality of the Missouri death penalty statute and death penalty proceedings, the constitutionality of the petit jury that rendered the death penalty, and the denial of due process in the trial itself. It is clear that this court would grant a certificate of probable cause for Smith to proceed to challenge the denial of the writ of habeas corpus and that the only issue now before us is whether Smith is competent to waive these rights and whether undue influence has been exercised on Smith in his weakened mental condition to cause Smith to waive these rights. We note this is the first and only appeal that has ever been filed on behalf of Smith in this habeas corpus proceeding.
The panel’s opinion relies upon the federal district court’s determination that Smith was competent and capable of making a rational decision. This decision was entered by the district court on April 5, 1986, and that determination was affirmed by the court in Smith v. Armontrout, 812 F.2d 1050 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 107 S.Ct. 3277, 97 L.Ed.2d 781 (1987). The panel found that the district court’s finding continued to be controlling and that there *1508was no evidence or reason suggesting that Smith’s mental condition has materially changed for the worse in the intervening time.
I would respectfully disagree with that finding. The determination by the district court was made some two and one-half years ago. Examination of that record reveals that there was substantial disparity between the psychiatric expert witnesses testifying for the state and the psychiatric expert witnesses produced by Smith. Furthermore, the Missouri Public Defender Commission’s petition for rehearing en banc contains affidavits of three psychiatrists who have given their opinion, within a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty, that based upon intervening events the evaluation of Smith that took place during the hearing in February, 1986, should not be used as the dispositive determination of Smith’s present mental condition to determine whether Smith is free from mental disease and defect and therefore capable of being executed under laws of Missouri and the Constitution of the United States.1
At the time that the state court first held a competency hearing to determine whether Smith was capable to waive the appeal of his death sentence and was legally competent to be executed in 1983, it is revealed in the petition for habeas corpus that pursuant to the statute in the State of Missouri, the warden of the Missouri Penitentiary in 1983 sought psychiatric opinions of three different psychiatrists. At the hearing before the St. Louis Circuit Court in 1983, the state produced only one of those psychiatric examinations, that being the expert opinion of Dr. Pettipiece. Not produced at the state court hearing and not disclosed to Smith’s trial counsel at that time were two other psychiatric reports, one being Dr. Daniel’s report dated June 13,1983, who at that time was a staff psychiatrist at the Mid-Missouri Mental Health Center at the University of Missouri School of Medicine, and the other being Dr. Bruce Harry’s report dated June 10, 1983, who was Assistant Professor of Psychiatry at the University of Missouri at Columbia. Both of these doctors would have testified that Smith was not competent to be executed in 1983. Yet these reports were not disclosed to the state court.
These reports were later discovered by Smith’s trial counsel and were produced for expert witness to review at the competency hearing in 1986. The relevancy of the nondisclosure of these reports casts continued doubt regarding the full disclosure by the state as to Smith’s competency at the present time. It is clear that Smith has not ever had a valid competency hearing in the state court. But of equal significance is the revealing testimony of the state’s psychiatric and psychological experts who, while finding Smith to be competent at the 1986 hearing, were willing to concede that Smith did suffer from a mental disorder and that depending on the time, place, and circumstances under which Smith was examined, Smith’s mental stability fluctuated from various degrees of competency to severe degrees of depression and instability. For example, Dr. Clayton Pettipiece, psychiatrist at the United States Medical Center for Federal Prisoners in Springfield, Missouri, who had observed Smith in states of great depression, commented on what he considered Smith’s improved condition in early 1986:
Q. Now, in December of 1984, did Mr. Smith indicate to you that he was depressed?
A. No sir.
Q. Not at all?
A. He never talked about being depressed, no.
Q. But in your report you state — in the report you recently prepared dated February 13, you state: “Affect and Mood: Patient’s affect was appropriate at all *1509times. His mood was no longer despondent nor did he indicate any depression as he has previously.” Now, that seems to indicate that at one time he did tell you he was depressed.
A. He didn’t tell me he was depressed. He was in a better mood than he was previously so obviously he’s in a better mood at this time than he was previously-
Q. But you say in there that he did not indicate any depression as he had previously.
A. He did not indicate any — he never did tell me that he was depressed.
Q. Why did you use that particular phraseology that he did not indicate this time any depression where he had previously?
A. I guess I just don’t know how to use good English all the time. It’s just a poor sentence structure maybe.
Q. Well, how would you compose that sentence if you could recompose it?
A. I’d have to look at it and see.
Q. What would you want to say in that sentence?
A. I simply would like to say that he’s not as depressed — he feels better than he did on the time when we saw him previously.
Q. And you said that one of the results of a personality disorder like Mr. Smith has is that he’s unable to delay gratification.
A. That’s—
Q. He’s impatient.
A. That’s true.
Q. He’s impulsive.
A. I believe Mr. Smith has been impulsive in the past.
Q. And is that because he can’t tolerate the anxiety of delayed gratification?
A. I don’t know why, it’s just that that’s the way he does.
Q. Is Mr. Smith able to deal with his anxieties?
A. To some extent.
Q. Does he have a history of dealing with his anxieties in anything other than violent outbursts, suicide attempts?
A. Sure.
Q. And what is that history?
A. I’m sure he’s anxious right now and he’s not violent, he’s not outbursting, he’s not attempting suicide.
Competency Hrg. Transcript at 2-69 to -71.
Dr. David V. Foster, a psychologist at the facility in Springfield, while diagnosing Smith as competent, admitted that this issue was “hazy” and he was not certain of his position:
Now, a problem there for me is on the rational side. In the past some courts have interpreted that as an affective component that’s a lot more subjective. It could vary. If you had five different professionals sitting up here that could give you five different answers because it would be a professional opinion but it would be a very subjective professional opinion. On that level again in my determination, Mr. Smith is competent. Okay. But it’s a hazey [sic] area, it’s a fuzzy area. I’m not sure that person who is facing death, who is condemned to die, who experiences hopelessness anyway, who does have some lack in social skills, in terms of coping skills, I’m not sure that that allows a person to be “fully rational.” I don’t know what the standard is or what the ideal is there. That’s a gray area for me.
Id. at 2-118. Dr. Foster also noted a long history of severe depression as well as “self-damaging impulsity” and a “pattern of intense and unstable inter-personal relationships.” Id. at 2-114:
I’m not completely convinced given say for instance the borderline characteristics that Mr. Smith has, I’m not completely convinced how robust his capacity is as far as to make a rational decision in a number of areas. His impulsivity and potential for self destruction are clearly documented.
* * * # # *
[H]e’s also aware of the ups and downs and the potential length of time that the whole appellate procedure can be stretched out, even here in the federal courts. He’s cognitively aware. I don’t know how emotionally aware he really is.
*1510Id. at 2-120 to -121. As for the possibility of Smith’s susceptibility to undue influence, Dr. Foster stated:
A. In my opinion emotional pains are more severe than physical pains and in my opinion, yes, he does fear — with the people he’s already close with he doesn’t want to cause any more pain to himself or to them and to me it would make sense that one way he would do that is just to avoid the whole arena, tell them just leave me alone. That would be easier for him than the ongoing and periodic pain that he has no outlet for.
Q. Now in this ongoing and periodic pain I also assume that there may be some concern on Mr. Smith’s behalf that they might change his mind.
A. That’s feasible.
Q. And you know that that’s happened in the past.
A. He has changed his mind. I’m not going to — in my opinion Mr. Smith is responsible for that change. [H]e’s changed his mind. They might have greatly influenced it.
‡ # ★ ♦ ♦
Q. And if you wanted to be destructive, would Mr. Smith be amenable to that kind of influence?
A. There’s that potential based on the quality of the relationship. I think he is influenceable as I think most people are, perhaps more influenceable than the average person, by a select few.
# * # * * *
A. I only said it could be consistent with some of my perception and interpretation of Mr. Smith’s behavior. I think that one of the things that Mr. Smith fears, as I said, is pain and the deepest kind of pain isn’t physical pain that he fears as much as emotional pain. I think it pains him to argue, to change his mind, to have them begging him perhaps to continue seeking to live, to continue seeking a quality of life and a length of life in so long as that’s in his power. I think for him that is painful. It’s painful to say no to them. It’s painful to be consistently reminded of those issues when he keeps swaying back and forth. I think he is attempting to escape the conditions there, not just the death row physical conditions, I’m talking [abo]ut the psychological and emotional climate as well. Death appears an option out for him.
Q. Is it your opinion or from your conversations with Mr. Smith that someone is attempting to influence Mr. Smith not to pursue his appeals.
A. That’s my conjecture.
Id. at 2-142, 2-144, 2-168.
Dr. Sadashiv Parwatikar, whose deposition was taken February 10, 1986, is a psychiatrist and an associate clinical professor at the University of Missouri, in Columbia. Dr. Parwatikar initially examined Smith in the early 1980’s:
A. My diagnosis at that time was he continued to have the borderline personality, but he was also suffering from mild depression.
Q. And could you give us the basis for that finding?
A. Mr. Smith, at this time, had changed his story and had stated to me that he indeed had killed this woman, and that he was — there’s—there’s no sense in living any further because he had a small child, and he did not want — want the small child to grow up knowing that he was a murderer, and that he wanted to get the death penalty because he did not want to live, and basically he had sort of lost hope with — with this case, and I felt that this was again a function of his borderline personality because borderline persons, can become depressed, and can become rather impulsive to the point that they sometimes don’t know what they’re trying to do * * *.
Parwatikar’s Dep. at 10. “[P]eople can change from — from month to month, year to year, but since I have seen him for four years, I believe that this man is borderline at — and at any given time, he could become impulsive, and become dangerous to himself, or others.” Id. at 21. Finally, Dr. Parwatikar summed up the typical conduct of an individual such as Smith:
*1511Q. Okay. Now, you said that — that one of the primary motivators, in terms of Mr. Smith’s character disorder, is that he has to have his own way?
A. That’s right.
Q. Okay. That would be somewhat similar to how a child sometimes reacts, when they don’t get their own way?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And that the impulsive behavior is often, if he doesn’t get his own way, he’s going to show you by doing something impulsive?
A. That’s correct.
Q. That may be dropping his appeals because he feels his family hasn’t paid enough attention to him, it may be hitting someone over the head because he’s mad [at] someone else?
A. That’s right.
Q. Okay. So that that kind of impulsive behavior, is very consistent with the characterological disorder that you found in Mr. Smith?
A. That’s correct.
* * # * * *
Q. * * * because he was a borderline personality disorder, he may or may not be acting on some — based on some psychosis?
A. That’s correct.
Q. And that a — it was appropriate to do another examination, or evaluation, to determine what was the basis for his decision, if any?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Okay. And in that particular document, you also indicated on Page 2, that psychological testing during the examination indicated that Mr. Smith’s ability to exercise rational judgement [sic] in practical situations, was in the mentally handicapped range, which would seriously] affect his decision making under stressful situations?
A. That’s correct.
Q. Okay. And I assume that living on death row itself, from what you — at least you understand it, obviously is a — is a stressful situation?
A. Yes, sir.
Id. at 33, 41-42.
Finally, Dr. Z.A. Ajans is a psychiatrist who is on the University of Missouri faculty and consultant to the state’s department of corrections. In his first visit, Dr. Ajans observed Smith in a severe state of depression. His next visit showed Smith much improved but Dr. Ajans nonetheless acknowledged his long history of unstable and self-destructive tendencies. Regarding Smith’s many attempts at suicide, Dr. Ajans stated:
A. * * * He’d had a total of five, three before his incarceration and two since his incarceration. I could not make any judgments about the nature of the suicide attempts before his incarceration but he gave me the impression that the ones since his incarceration were not genuine suicide attempts and I believed him.
Q. Okay. Now when you interviewed Mr. Smith you indicated that he oftentimes tries to tell you what he thinks you want to hear, the audience wants to hear.
A. Yes.
Q. And that would be true?
A. Especially, as I said, I think there was a definite change in attitude and his willingness and degree of cooperation. I felt that that was true more so during the 1984 examination than the 1986 examination.
Q. Okay. And at that time you said he appeared insecure and inadequate?
A. Yes, he has.
Q. Do you feel that he is no longer insecure?
A. I’m sure he was — part of the personality disorder we’re talking about there are — even though they act tough and they’re very hostile and aggressive, there are always feelings of insecurities in these people, so to that extent, yes, it’s correct even now.
Q. Would a borderline personality disorder necessarily improve or his condition improve with time?
A. Borderline personality disorders manifest — their symptomatology becomes worse during stressful situations. *1512But the basic personality makeup, the tendencies are unchanged.
Q. Okay. And they wouldn’t change with treatment or otherwise?
A. No, the basic tendencies.
Q. So that the borderline personality disorder that you found which was found by almost every psychiatrist who has dealt with him, would still exist.
A. That’s correct.
Q. And you don’t think that it’s gone?
A. I’m sorry.
Q. You don’t think that it’s dissipated or lessened in any way.
A. No sir.
Q. So then—
A. Other psychiatrists may disagree with me though, I mean, it’s just a matter of opinion regarding this examination but it’s my opinion that he did demonstrate the findings that were compatible with those personality disorders.
Q. Is his background one of inconsistency?
A. Inconsistency?
Q. Inconsistency.
A. Yes.
Q. Is his background one of erratic judgments?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Would you say that his ability to make judgments is influenced considerably by his personality disorders?
A. Yes sir.
Q. All right. And so that those mental disorders that you’re referring to would influence his ability to make judgments.
A. Yes sir.
Competency Hrg. Transcript at 2-195 to -197. Smith’s mental condition, according to Dr. Ajans, could have a substantial influence over his decision making powers:
Q. Now in the response to Ms. Mescher’s question you said that a personality disorder would interfere with someone’s judgment making capabilities, is that correct?
A. Judgment?
Q. Yes.
A. Yes sir.
Q. And when you say “interfere” I assume you also mean it would affect it.
A. Yes sir.
Q. And could affect it substantially.
A. Yes sir.
Id. at 2-211 to -212.
Smith has now filed an affidavit with this court asserting that he is competent to make his choice and that he now chooses to die. Smith is resentful of the Missouri Public Defender Commission and the judges of this court who seek another competency hearing. This affidavit is compatible with Smith’s declaration made over the past several years at the times when he wished to dismiss his appeal. It is inconsistent with the various occasions where he has changed his mind and has sought to make further challenge and attack upon the validity of his sentence. Over the course of time since Smith was sentenced to be executed, Smith has changed his mind on at least ten occasions as to whether or not he would challenge the state death sentence.
The clerk’s office has received reports from Smith’s wife stating that she has not exercised undue influence. The clerk’s office has also received a report allegedly made by a Deputy Attorney General of the State of Missouri that Smith’s wife has a contract to publish a story about Smith’s life when he is executed. These factors are not in the record but simply illustrate the need for further evidentiary exploration as to what influences have been injected in Smith’s alleged exercise of free will in dismissing his appeal.
Smith has been convicted in the state court of first degree murder. A competency hearing was thereafter held which was incomplete and which did not disclose all of the exculpatory information concerning Smith’s competency in the state proceedings. Three years later, in 1986, the federal court determined Smith was competent to waive his rights to appeal. This was two and one-half years ago, and now Smith has once again decided to abandon his appeal. A person of mental instability may be subject to all kinds of psychological stress and undue influence such that this *1513person can be easily influenced to make decisions which are not done of one’s own free will. It is fundamental that no person should be executed at the hands of the state unless they have been afforded due process of law and effective representation by counsel. Furthermore, a person who is not legally competent must not be executed. It is equally fundamental that a person who is not legally competent to exercise their free will in making a rational decision or who manifests a state of mental disorder or disease demonstrating mental instability should not be allowed to waive their legal rights; such a person cannot be allowed to waive the right to live or exercise the right to die.
Under these circumstances, in my judgment, it is and would be a denial of due process of law to dismiss Smith’s appeal without a further determination of Smith’s mental competency to exercise his own free will.

. In effect three judges have appraised the intervening events alleged, and have held as a matter of law these cannot change the legal determination of Smith’s competency found two and one-half years ago. Yet three distinguished psychiatrists, with their distinguished vitae attached to their opinion, have filed sworn statements that such events within a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty could have a material bearing on whether Smith is still competent to make a rational and competent decision.