Court Opinion

ID: 9895752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 17:06:34.465473+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:08.430049
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-1764
                            Filed November 8, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

DAVID JAMES ROE,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

       Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Kevin McKeever,

Judge.

       The defendant challenges the denial of his motion to suppress following his

conviction for operating while intoxicated, second offense. AFFIRMED.

       Colin Murphy of Gourley Rehkemper Lindholm, P.L.C., West Des Moines,

for appellant.

       Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas J. Ogden, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

       Considered by Greer, P.J., and Schumacher and Ahlers, JJ.
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GREER, Presiding Judge.

       David Roe challenges the denial of his motion to suppress evidence

following his conviction for operating while intoxicated (OWI), second offense. On

appeal, Roe argues there was not probable cause of his impairment to support the

search warrant for a sample of his blood. Excluding the evidence that Roe’s

passenger had a drug pipe in her pocket, we find that there was a substantial basis

to determine probable cause existed based on the circumstances of the motorcycle

crash, the statements and observations of an eyewitness and persons responding

to the scene, and Roe’s previous OWI conviction, so we affirm.

I.     Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

       On June 21, 2020, around 7:19 p.m., Roe drove off the road and crashed

his motorcycle while driving in rural Johnson County. Based upon the dynamics

of the accident, it appeared Roe lost control of the motorcycle while negotiating a

curve in the road. As determined by a deputy accident reconstructionist, although

Roe attempted to brake, he likely was traveling at a high rate of speed and was

unable to navigate the turn while remaining on the road. Skid marks pointed

straight ahead rather than starting to curve with the turn in the road. In the area of

the skid, the pavement was clear and dry. After leaving the roadway, Roe and his

passenger fell off the motorcycle in the crash and were seriously injured. The

passenger was paralyzed as a result of the crash. A driver who was behind Roe

at the time called 911. Firefighters, Emergency Medical Technicians (EMTs), and

Johnson County Sheriff’s Deputies responded to the scene.

       Johnson County Sheriff’s Deputy Kyle Campbell was one of the deputies

who responded to the scene; after speaking with the firefighters, EMTs, and other
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deputies, he applied for a search warrant for a sample of Roe’s blood, urine, and/or

breath.   In the warrant application, Deputy Campbell wrote that he sought a

specimen of Roe’s blood, urine, and/or breath because “Officers have probable

cause to believe that a traffic violation under Iowa Code § 321J.2 has occurred

and this evidence is relevant to a criminal investigation into a violation of Iowa

Code § 321J.2.” The warrant application also contained a statement that a driver

in a vehicle behind Roe saw him lose control of his motorcycle and drive off the

road. The witness alerted officers that she watched Roe crash into the ditch, even

though the road was paved and dry that evening, although she thought he may

have hit gravel. The deputies found no loose gravel near where the skid marks

were found. In addition, Deputy Campbell wrote that Roe “told fire fighters he had

one alcoholic drink.” Because of the serious injuries from the accident, “deputies

on scene did not talk with [Roe] before he was taken to [University of Iowa

Hospitals and Clinics (UIHC)]. According to fire personnel on scene, he admitted

to drinking. [EMTs] also stated he had watery eyes . . . .” Deputy Campbell

checked the box next to “Judgment impaired” as another ground supporting his

warrant application as well as “drug paraphernalia observed at the scene” and an

explanation that the “injured passenger had drug equipment in her pocket . . . ,” in

particular a “one hitter.” Finally, Deputy Campbell noted Roe’s previous OWI

conviction at the end of the warrant application.

       A Johnson County magistrate issued the search warrant, and Deputy

Campbell obtained a sample of Roe’s blood through a nurse at UIHC. The blood

sample tested positive for methamphetamine. The State charged Roe via trial

information in September 2021 with serious injury by vehicle, a class “D” felony, in
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violation of Iowa Code section 707.6A(4) (2020), and OWI, second offense, an

aggravated misdemeanor, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(2)(b).

      Roe pled not guilty and moved to suppress any evidence of the blood test,

arguing that the warrant application was unsupported by probable cause and did

not assure the reliability of the named witness and the EMTs and firefighters. The

State resisted, and, following an unreported hearing in December 2021, the district

court denied the motion. In its June 2022 ruling, the district court explained that

there was a substantial basis for finding probable cause because there was no

clear external cause of the motorcycle accident, drug paraphernalia was recovered

from the scene, Roe admitted to drinking, and Roe had watery eyes.

      Roe moved to reconsider or enlarge the ruling, which the State resisted,

and the district court overruled. In this motion, Roe argued that the EMTs and

firefighters that observed Roe were confidential informants and were not

determined to be credible. Roe waived his right to a jury trial and stipulated to a

trial on the minutes of testimony. As part of the agreement to stipulate, the State

dismissed the serious-injury-by-vehicle charge. Following a trial on the minutes in

August 2022, the district court found Roe guilty of OWI, second offense. The

district court sentenced Roe to 365 days in jail with all but ninety of those days

suspended. Roe now appeals.

II.   Standard of Review.

      We review constitutional issues, such as this challenge to the validity of the

search warrant, de novo. State v. Bracy, 971 N.W.2d 563, 567 (Iowa 2022). “A

search warrant must be supported by probable cause.”          State v. Baker, 925

N.W.2d 602, 613 (Iowa 2019) (citing Iowa Const. art. I, § 8); see also U.S. Const.
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amend. IV. “The test for probable cause is ‘whether a person of reasonable

prudence would believe a crime was committed on the premises to be searched

or evidence of a crime could be located there.’” Baker, 925 N.W.2d at 613 (quoting

State v. Gogg, 561 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 1997)).

III.   Analysis.

       Arguing the evidence presented to the magistrate only showed Roe lost

control of his motorcycle, Roe maintains there was not probable cause to support

issuing a search warrant.       Specifically, Roe reduces his challenge to the

suppression ruling on these points: (1) no officer presented any objective

observations of impairment to the issuing judge; (2) the credibility of the informant

and EMTs and firefighters on scene was not established and (3) the drug pipe

found on the passenger could not support probable cause of Roe’s impairment.

       When examining challenges to probable cause to support a warrant, we “do

not make an independent determination of probable cause.” State v. McNeal, 867

N.W.2d 91, 99 (Iowa 2015). Instead, we merely determine “whether the issuing

judge had a substantial basis for concluding probable cause existed.” Id. (quoting

Gogg, 561 N.W.2d at 363). We review the information as it was presented to the

judge and “do not strictly scrutinize the sufficiency of the underlying affidavit.”

Bracy, 971 N.W.2d at 567 (quoting McNeal, 867 N.W.2d at 99). In this analysis,

we look only to “that information, reduced to writing, which was actually presented

to the [magistrate judge] at the time the application for warrant was made.”

McNeal, 867 N.W.2d at 100 (citation omitted).          “[W]e draw all reasonable

inferences to support the judge’s finding of probable cause and give great

deference to the judge’s finding”—“[c]lose cases are decided in favor of upholding
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the validity of the warrant.” Id. (first alteration in original) (quoting Gogg, 561

N.W.2d at 364); accord State v. Wenzel, 987 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Iowa Ct. App.

2022) (“Our preference is to uphold warrants and construe them in a common-

sense manner so that we resolve doubtful cases in favor of their validity.”).

       On Roe’s challenge to the magistrate’s reliance on the drug pipe found on

the passenger, not Roe’s person, we agree that that observation, standing alone,

does not establish a substantial basis to find probable cause that Roe was

impaired while driving. “A search or seizure of a person must be supported by

probable cause particularized with respect to the person.” State v. Stevens, 970

N.W.2d 598, 605 (Iowa 2002) (quoting Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1999)).

In addition, “[t]his requirement cannot be undercut or avoided by simply pointing to

the fact that coincidentally there exists probable cause to search or seize another

or to search the premises where the person may happen to be.” Gogg, 561 N.W.2d

at 368 (quoting Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 91). But while the drug pipe in the passenger’s

pocket does not lend support for probable cause that Roe was operating while

intoxicated, excluding this evidence from consideration is not fatal to the warrant

as Roe’s other arguments on the lack of probable cause are unconvincing.

       First, Roe also argues on appeal that the magistrate should not have

accepted the reports of the EMTs and firefighters and the eyewitness to the

accident as credible. But the magistrate would have considered that the informant

was a person who witnessed the accident and the EMTs and firefighters were

called to the scene in an official capacity. Yet, Roe asserts that even accepting

the statements by the EMTs and firefighters and the eyewitness as true, there was

insufficient evidence to convince a reasonable person that Roe was committing a
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crime and thus there was not a substantial basis for the magistrate to conclude

that probable cause supported the warrant. Adding to this theory, Roe points out

that he did not participate in Standardized Field Sobriety Testing (SFSTs) and the

application failed to disclose any detailed observations made by the deputies of

impairment. In making this last point, Roe glosses over the serious motorcycle

crash that brought him to the attention of the witness and EMTs and firefighters in

the first place and that Roe’s hospitalization to assess his injuries prevented the

deputies from performing SFSTs or conducting interviews until much later. It also

ignores Roe’s previous OWI conviction. Applying our common-sense analysis,

after reviewing the application for a search warrant and the attachments, even if

we disregard the passenger’s drug pipe found on her person, we determine the

information contained in the warrant application constituted a substantial basis to

find probable cause.

       Here, the issuing magistrate considered the following information in the

application for a search warrant: on a clear evening in June 2022, while there were

no obvious external causes for it, Roe drove his motorcycle straight off of a dry

paved road rather than following the road as it curved. The deputy noted on the

application that Roe’s judgment was impaired, and the manner of his driving could

support that conclusion. Additionally, Roe told firefighters at the scene that he had

consumed an alcoholic drink, and the deputies were aware Roe had been

convicted of an OWI in the past. Finally, it was observed by EMTs that Roe had

watery eyes. As in Wenzel, an issuing judge could read the warrant application as

requesting a blood draw to investigate the cause of the impaired driving supported

by observations of watery eyes, impaired judgment, and poor driving. See 987
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N.W.2d at 483; see also, State v. McIver, 858 N.W.2d 699, 703 (Iowa 2015) (noting

aberrant driving can raise a suspicion of impairment).

       Regarding the eyewitness, given that she directly observed Roe fail to

control his motorcycle on the turn, she was a citizen informant. See State v.

Niehaus, 452 N.W.2d 184, 189 (Iowa 1990) (defining citizen informant as “a person

who is a witness to or victim of a crime”). Our supreme court “has adopted the

position that information imparted by a citizen informant is generally reliable.” Id.

We also consider “the very nature of the circumstances under which the

incriminating information became known.”          Id. (citing State v. Post, 286

N.W.2d 195, 200 (Iowa 1979)). Furthermore, “a named informant’s reliability is

enhanced where [they] directly witness the criminal activity . . . .” State v. Baker,

No. 01-1263, 2002 WL 986495, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. May 15, 2022). For these

reasons, we find the eyewitness’ description of the crash reliable, and the

magistrate properly factored it into the decision to issue a warrant.

       Roe attempts to categorize the firefighters and EMTs as confidential

informants, but their role as professionals called to the scene to assist as part of

their job duties affords them a presumption of credibility. And as noted above, a

citizen informant is a person who is a witness to or a victim of a crime, not a

professional responding to the accident by way of their duty. In their professional

roles, the fire fighters and EMTs had direct, firsthand observations of Roe’s watery

eyes and were told directly by Roe that he had consumed at least one alcoholic

beverage earlier that evening. They were trusted to provide first response and

medical care, and there is no evidence that they responded to the scene for any

reason other than to do so and within the scope of their role or employment. Thus,
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the magistrate also properly relied on their observations and report of Roe’s

disclosures in issuing the warrant.

      Lastly, Roe had a previous conviction for OWI that the magistrate also

properly considered in determining probable cause based on alleged impaired

driving to issue the search warrant for a sample of Roe’s blood, breath, and/or

urine. See McNeal, 867 N.W.2d at 102; State v. Hoskins, 711 N.W.2d 720, 727

(Iowa 2006) (considering an officer’s knowledge of suspect’s prior drug convictions

in determining whether there was probable cause to justify search); State v.

Poulin, 620 N.W.2d 287, 290 (Iowa 2000) (considering defendant’s prior conviction

in determining whether there was probable cause to support the issuance of a

search warrant).

IV.   Conclusion.

      Because the issuing magistrate properly relied on the dynamics of the

serious motorcycle crash—potentially caused by impaired judgment, the

statements by a citizen informant and EMTs and firefighters describing Roe’s

admission to drinking and watery eyes, and Roe’s past OWI conviction, there was

a substantial basis to conclude that probable cause supported the issuance of the

search warrant for a sample of Roe’s blood. Because the warrant was, therefore,

valid, we affirm the district court’s denial of Roe’s motion to suppress and his

conviction.

      AFFIRMED.