Court Opinion

ID: 9854753
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:13:23.693051+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:20.097798
License: Public Domain

Bobbitt, J.,
concurring in result: The record contains findings that I.C. Form 21 and I.C. Form 26 were executed by the parties. However, these forms, executed or unexecuted, do not appear in the record. Upon approval thereof by the Commission, compensation payments were made by defendants to plaintiff in accordance therewith.
Presumably, the executed forms embodied stipulations to the effect that the relationship subsisting between the parties was that of employee-employer-carrier. Apart from these executed forms, there were no stipulations that such relationships existed.
Plaintiff, in challenging the jurisdiction of the Commission, moved that these agreements be set aside because executed by plaintiff “through mistake and lack of knowledge and understanding,” on the ground that in fact plaintiff was not an employee of Thomasville Motors, Inc. Confronted by this motion, defendants’ counsel stated: “Now, the defendants don’t take any position one way or the other about this. We are just leaving it up to the Commissioner, because we don’t contest it if he wants to set it aside. Doesn’t matter to us one way or the other.” Defendants’ position was that plaintiff was not entitled to a modification of the award under G.S. 97-47 otherwise than “on the grounds of a change of condition.”
In this setting, the inquiry proceeded; and, upon such inquiry, it appeared plainly from all the evidence that plaintiff was not an em*94ployee but an independent contractor. It is patent that the executed forms, if they contained stipulations that plaintiff was an employee, were executed by mistake. Therefore, I concur in the result.
In my view, we need go no further in the disposition of this appeal.
Whether the Commission has jurisdiction depends solely on the authority conferred on it by statute. If the case is not within its statutory jurisdiction, jurisdiction cannot be conferred by any agreement of the litigants, express or implied. Reaves v. Mill Co., 216 N.C. 462, 5 S.E. 2d 305. There is no disagreement as to this well established proposition.
If, however, facts are stipulated, and the facts so stipulated, if true, bring a case within the statutory jurisdiction of the Commission, the Commission is authorized to exercise jurisdiction unless and until such stipulated facts are set aside. If, later in the proceeding, any party undertakes to challenge before the Commission the stipulated facts upon which the Commission’s jurisdiction depends, Rule XV of the Commission, quoted in the Court’s opinion, seems to be a just and reasonable rule. And when stipulated facts, upon which jurisdiction depends, are challenged in the Superior Court, it seems to me that a like rule should apply. Litigants should not be permitted to challenge their stipulations of fact without first showing substantial grounds why they should not be bound thereby. In my view, there is a marked distinction between conferring jurisdiction by agreement and making stipulations of fact which, if true, bring the proceeding within the statutory jurisdiction of the Commission.
It is noted that in Reaves v. Mill Co., supra, the original stipulations, on the basis of which compensation was paid, did not include a stipulation to the effect that plaintiff was a resident of North Carolina when he received the injury. In the subsequent hearing, lack of jurisdiction was predicated on the then admitted fact that plaintiff at the time of injury was a citizen and resident of South Carolina. Hence, there was no conflict between the facts stipulated and the determinative jurisdictional fact established by plaintiff’s admission at the subsequent hearing.
Winborne, J., joins in this opinion.