Court Opinion

ID: 9566444
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:39:22.332874+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:37:32.602693
License: Public Domain

Smith, Judge.
Colonial Penn Life Insurance Company (Colonial Penn) brought suit against Market Planners Insurance Agency, Inc. and Jimmy Whited in the State Court of Fulton County. No timely answer was filed. When the defendants did file an answer, they simultaneously moved to open the pre-judgment default. The reason given for the failure to file an answer was their mistaken belief that the complaint in this case was precisely the same as a substantively identical com*563plaint filed by plaintiff in federal court in Texas.
Applying OCGA § 9-11-55 (b), the trial court found a proper case had been made to permit defendants to open their pre-judgment default and granted their motion. However, the order was certified by the trial court for immediate review, plaintiff’s application for interlocutory appeal was granted by this court, and this appeal from the order of the trial court opening appellees’ pre-judgment default followed.
With reference to this Code section and its predecessors, the Georgia Supreme Court has said, “the wording ... is such that it conveys very ample powers as to opening defaults; not only providential cause, which is broad, and excusable neglect, which is still broader, but finally, as if reaching out to take in every conceivable case where injustice might result if the default were not opened, the section goes on to say, where the judge from all the facts shall determine that a proper case has been made.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Axelroad v. Preston, 232 Ga. 836, 837 (1) (209 SE2d 178) (1974). Colonial Penn relies upon the case of Sanders v. American Liberty Ins. Co., 225 Ga. 796, 797 (171 SE2d 539) (1969), as authority for the proposition that a party’s mistaken belief that but one suit was represented by two complaints and that a second complaint need not be answered, “fall[s] short of making a case where the trial court would have a discretion [even under the ‘proper case’ standard to open the pre-judgment default]. [Cits.]”
We do not find Sanders to be controlling. The analysis employed there has been superseded by a broader statutory construction of the “proper case” prong of OCGA § 9-11-55 (b) applied by the Supreme Court and this court in subsequent decisions. In Houston v. Lowes of Savannah, 235 Ga. 201, 202-203 (219 SE2d 115) (1975), the Supreme Court declined to follow Sanders and other cases with similar holdings and adopted the reasoning in Axelroad, finding it to be “the most persuasive decision.” In doing so, the Supreme Court specifically overruled several of its earlier decisions, including Brucker v. O’Connor, 115 Ga. 95 (41 SE 245) (1902), which was the basis for the holding in Sanders. “If the record sustains the decision to open default under any of the three grounds noted in the statute (providential cause, excusable neglect, and a proper case), this court will affirm the trial court’s action. [Cit.]” P. H. L. Dev. Corp. v. Smith, 174 Ga. App. 328, 329 (1) (329 SE2d 545) (1985).
In this case, since defendants reasonably believed that they already had answered the same complaint, the trial court was authorized to conclude that their failure to file a timely answer was not a wilful disregard of all court process. Moreover, Colonial Penn has failed to show on appeal how it will be unfairly disadvantaged by a hearing on the merits. “[T]he trial court did not abuse its discretion, *564under the ‘proper case’ ground [of OCGA § 9-11-55 (b)], in granting [appellees’] motion to open the [pre-judgment] default. [Cits.]” Copeland v. Carter, 247 Ga. 542, 543 (1) (277 SE2d 500) (1981).

Judgment affirmed.

McMurray, P. J., Birdsong, P. J., Cooper and Andrews, JJ., concur. Beasley, P. J., concurs in the judgment only. Pope, C. J., and Blackburn, J., dissent. Johnson, J., not participating.