Court Opinion

ID: 9397086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-24 15:05:40.82507+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:21.333176
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 22-0103
                               Filed May 24, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

MICHAEL DEAN ROBERSON JR.,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, Henry W. Latham II,

Judge.

      Michael Roberson Jr. appeals his convictions for second-degree kidnapping

while armed with a dangerous weapon and domestic abuse, third or subsequent

offense, with an habitual offender status. AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN

PART, AND REMANDED.

      Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie L. Knipfer, Assistant

Appellate Defender, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., Vaitheswaran, J., and Danilson, S.J.*

      *Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206

(2023).
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DANILSON, Senior Judge.

       Michael Roberson Jr. appeals his convictions for second-degree kidnapping

while armed with a dangerous weapon and domestic abuse assault, third or

subsequent offense, with an habitual offender status.           He challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence to support these convictions. We affirm in part, vacate

in part, and remand to the district court for dismissal of the domestic abuse assault

charge.

I.     Background Facts and Proceedings

       From the evidence presented at trial, the jury could have found the

following: Michael Roberson Jr. and M.I. were involved in a relationship with a

history of domestic violence precipitating the instant alleged kidnapping offense.

By early 2021, Roberson had assaulted and caused injuries to M.I. on at least

several occasions.

       On June 1 of that year, Roberson and M.I. were “out doinking around town”

in downtown Davenport. Roberson was driving, and M.I. sat in the passenger seat.

At some point, Roberson stopped to visit with an acquaintance for approximately

ten minutes.    Upon reentering the vehicle, Roberson became “upset” and

“agitated,” accusing M.I. of performing oral sex on someone else during his ten-

minute absence from the vehicle.        M.I. told Roberson the accusation was

“ridiculous,” and she “tried to calm him down” with no success.

       Instead of heading home as planned, Roberson drove past their apartment

and “kept going” toward the outskirts of town. M.I. was “scared.” She asked

Roberson “to pull over and let [her] out and he said no.” M.I. threatened to kick

and scream if he did not let her out, to no avail. Roberson grabbed M.I.’s seatbelt
                                          3

with his right hand to keep her “from getting out of the car,” while he used his left

hand to steer and hold a knife to “intimidate” her. M.I. “didn’t want to get beat up,”

and she “just wanted to get away.”

       Eventually, Roberson turned down a dead-end country road, a fifteen-

minute drive past their apartment. When he stopped the car to turn around, M.I.

“opened up the door and jumped out.” M.I. ran down the road to a farmhouse1;

she was “frightened,” “crying,” and “pounding on the door” “yelling that she had

been stabbed.” The homeowners let M.I. in and called 911. M.I. was not wearing

shoes, and she “had blood on her leg [from a stab wound] and blood on her toes”

from a bite mark.     Officers and medics arrived, and M.I. reported “she was

assaulted” by Roberson.

       The State filed a trial information charging Roberson with second-degree

kidnapping while armed with a dangerous weapon, assault while participating in a

kidnapping, attempted burglary, and five counts of domestic abuse assault, third

or subsequent offense. The case proceeded to trial. The jury found Roberson

guilty on the second-degree kidnapping count and three of the domestic abuse

assault counts,2 and not guilty on the remaining charges. Roberson appeals two

of his convictions.

1 As M.I. ran away, Roberson “turned around and left.”
2 Specifically, Roberson was found guilty on count 1 (second-degree kidnapping
on June 1, 2021), count 3 (domestic abuse assault against M.I. on June 1, 2021),
count 6 (domestic abuse assault against M.I. on May 7, 2021), and count 8
(domestic abuse assault against M.I. on January 24, 2021).
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II.      Standard of Review

         We review the sufficiency of the evidence for correction of errors at law.

See State v. Lacey, 968 N.W.2d 792, 800 (Iowa 2021). “Under this standard, the

court is highly deferential to the jury’s verdict. We will affirm the jury’s verdict when

the verdict is supported by substantial evidence.” Id. Evidence is substantial if it

may convince a rational person of the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable

doubt. Id. In making this determination, we view the evidence and all reasonable

inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the State. Id.

The question is whether the evidence supports the finding the jury made, not

whether it would support a different finding. Id.

III.     Sufficiency of the Evidence

         Roberson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his

convictions for second-degree kidnapping while armed with a dangerous weapon

and domestic abuse assault, third or subsequent offense, with an habitual offender

status. With regard to Roberson’s domestic abuse conviction, which stems from

an alleged assault on May 7, 2021, the State concedes “the evidence is insufficient

to support conviction for any assault on [that count].”3 Accordingly, we vacate

Roberson’s conviction for domestic abuse assault on May 7, 2021, and we remand

to the district court for dismissal of that charge with prejudice.

         With regard to second-degree kidnapping, the jury was instructed the State

had to prove the following elements:

              1. On or about the 1st day of June, 2021, the defendant
         removed or confined [M.I].

3   This offense was charged under count 6 in the trial information.
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               2. The defendant did so with the specific intent to inflict serious
       injury upon [M.I.] or to secretly confine [M.I].
               3. The defendant knew he did not have the consent of [M.I.]
       to do so.
               4. The defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon at the
       time he removed or confined [M.I].

See Iowa Code §§ 710.1 (defining kidnapping), 710.3(1) (“Kidnapping . . . where

the kidnapper is armed with a dangerous weapon . . . is kidnapping in the second

degree.”), 902.7 (setting forth the dangerous-weapon sentencing enhancement).

       On appeal, Roberson challenges the first element—that he removed or

confined M.I. According to Roberson, “there was no showing” in this case that

“any confinement or removal” of M.I. substantially increased the risk of harm to

M.I., significantly lessened the risk of detection, or significantly facilitated his

escape, as required by Iowa case law.                  See State v. Albright, 925

N.W.2d 144, 152–53 (Iowa 2019) (citing State v. Rich, 305 N.W.2d 739, 745–46

(Iowa 1981)), abrogated on other grounds by State v. Crawford, 972 N.W.2d 189,

194 (Iowa 2022).      In other words, Roberson contends there was insufficient

evidence to prove his confinement of M.I. “exceeded that which was incidental to

the underlying offense.” See Rich, 305 N.W.2d at 742, 745; accord State v. Mead,

318 N.W.2d 440, 442, 445 (Iowa 1982).

       The jury was not fully instructed on the definition of confinement. The jury

was instructed, “an intent to secretly confine means more than restricting the

movement of [M.I]. It means an intent to conceal or hide [M.I.] or prevent her

discovery.” But this instruction did not contain or require the jury to find the Rich

“intensifiers” necessary to prove the confinement or removal element of

kidnapping.    See 305 N.W.2d at 745-46.           Roberson failed to object to the
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confinement instruction without the intensifiers or otherwise request such an

instruction, so the jury instruction is the law of the case. See State v. Canal, 773

N.W.2d 528, 530 (Iowa 2009); accord State v. Denson, No. 22-0139, 2023

WL 2906242, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2023).

       However, applying the Rich triparte test to the facts and circumstances of

this case,4 we conclude the jury was presented with evidence that Roberson’s

conduct substantially increased M.I.’s risk of harm and significantly lessened his

risk of detection. See State v. Holderness, 301 N.W.2d 733, 740 (Iowa 1981)

(“[W]e are convinced that the confinement and removal here was such that it could

not be considered merely incidental to the offense of sexual abuse. The victim

was transported by automobile a distance several miles, from Davenport out into

the countryside. This demonstrates the movement was calculated to detain her in

isolation and secret, and was not only a means to facilitate the commission of

sexual acts. Moreover, the asportation from the city to the country removed the

victim to a more isolated area, thus decreasing the likelihood of any passersby

coming upon the scene. The distance over which she was transported, along with

the length of the detention (approximately two hours) further bolster our conclusion

that the confinement and removal substantially increased the risk of harm to this

victim.”); see also State v. Hardin, 359 N.W.2d 185, 187, 190 (Iowa 1984)

(affirming kidnapping conviction where, after the victim drove the defendant home

from a bar, the defendant “hit the victim in the face, dragged her out of the vehicle,

and forced her inside where he raped her”); State v. Newman, 326

4“The failure of the instructions to further elucidate what that term means does not
prevent us from applying the correct law.” See Crawford, 974 N.W.2d at 521.
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N.W.2d 796, 801–02 (Iowa 1982) (concluding there was sufficient evidence of

confinement when a student walking home from a friend’s house was enticed into

the defendant’s truck, sexually assaulted, and then driven to a road where there

were no houses).

       Similarly, Roberson’s travel in the vehicle from downtown Davenport, past

the turn to their apartment, and to a dead-end road near the countryside, on a dark

night, provided the means to commit domestic assault in isolation and significantly

lessened the risk of detection. Roberson’s actions also detained M.I. contrary to

her demands. He refused to stop the vehicle and physically prevented M.I. from

exiting the vehicle by holding onto M.I.’s seatbelt until he stopped due to the dead-

end road. Approximately two miles before M.I. was able to escape, Roberson put

his knife in his hand. During M.I.’s effort to escape, Roberson stabbed her and bit

her foot. The confinement in the vehicle and removal from beyond the center of

the city substantially increased the risk of harm to M.I.

       Considering the totality of the facts in the light most favorable to jury’s

verdict, we find substantial evidence to support the second-degree kidnapping

conviction.

       AFFIRMED IN PART, VACATED IN PART, AND REMANDED.