Court Opinion

ID: 9810632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:54:58.722028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:07.696777
License: Public Domain

MerriMON, J.,
(concurring). I concur fully in the opinion of the Court in this case, as delivered by the Chief Justice, and will say for myself, that it seems to me clear, that the rule as stated and applied by him, must, in the nature of the matter, be the true one.
The purpose of the statute is to raise the presumption of fact, that a bond, not paid within ten years next after the right of action upon it accrues, has been paid. But this presumption is not conclusive — on the contrary, it may be rebutted by any fact or facts that tend reasonably to show that it has not been paid. The statute is, indeed, one of repose, but its purpose is not to conclude the creditor, and prevent him from showing the truth — it simply puts upon him the burden of proving that the bond has not been paid, and this he may do by any proper evidence of facts, that are in their nature sufficient so destroy the presumption raised by the statute. These facts must be such as show that the creditor, or party in interest in the bond, had reasonable ground for failing to sue before the lapse of ten years. He must show that he has substantial reason for failing to sue within that time. In Dunlap v. Ball, 2 Cr., 80, Chief Justice MARSHALL said: “ The principle upon which the presumption of payment arises from lapse of time, is a reasonable principle, and may be rebutted by any facts which destroy the reason of the rule. In that case it was held, in order to create the pre*769sumption of payment of a bond, twenty years must have elapsed, exclusive of the period of the plaintiffs disability to sue. -They were during the war of the Revolution alien enemies, and the time during the war, was not treated as part of the twenty years necessary to raise the presumption.
In this ease, the right of action on the bond, accrued on the first day of July, 1868. The debtor obligor died in December, 1869. There was no administration of his estate until September 6th, 1882. This action was begun in about a month after that time.
Now is it not manifest, that the plaintiff could not sue, or collect his bond at all during the time there was no administrator of the deceased obligor? Did not the reason of the rule.of presumption of payment cease, when the creditor could not collect his bond? Was not such inability to sue, quite as strong, and as good a cause to destroy the presumption of payment, as that of the continued insolvency of a debtor, from the time the right of action accrued, until the end of ten years? The latter cause has always been held to be sufficient to repel the presumption.
It is said that the plaintiff might have sued the intestate of the defendant before his death, and so he might, but he was not bound to do so — no presumption of payment had arisen then, and as he did not sue, surely he ought not to loose his debt, because he could not for ten years afterwards! Such injustice is not the spirit of the rule of presumtion in question.
It is said also, that in such cases, when the time begins to run, nothing can interpose to prevent the continuance of such, lapse. I cannot accept this view as correct. The very nature of the principle of such presumption of payment contravenes it. The presumption itself implies, that it may be rebutted by any interposing fact, that destroys its reasonableness, and shows that it is unfounded in truth.
The presumption of payment arising from lapse of time, is in the respect mentioned, different from a statute of limitation. The *770latter is inflexible and unyielding — it ceases to operate only in the way and for the canse prescribed by the statute.
Error. . Reversed.