Court Opinion

ID: 9702365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:08:30.756675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:36.979372
License: Public Domain

OPINION
GOLDBERG, Justice.
The Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of certiorari filed by the petitioner, Mill Realty Associates (Mill Realty or petitioner), seeking review of a judgment of the Superior Court that affirmed the decision of the respondents, members of the Zoning Board of Review for the Town of Coventry (Coventry or respondents). This is Mill Realty’s second appearance before this Court, having previously sought relief from the requirement that it construct a paved road to provide access to a parcel of land on which it intends to construct a single-family dwelling.
In Mill Realty Associates v. Zoning Board of Review of Coventry, 721 A.2d 887 *670(R.I.1998) (Mill Realty I), this Court reviewed, on certiorari, the decision denying Mill Realty’s request for relief from the town’s subdivision regulation requiring it to construct a road to subdivision standards to obtain a building permit. Specifically, pursuant to G.L. 1956 chapter 23.1 of title 45, entitled “Mapped Streets,” Mill Realty sought relief by way of an exception from the requirement that it construct a road to subdivision standards to provide access to its land. Instead, petitioner proposed to construct a single-family dwelling on a platted but unimproved, so-called “paper” street by extending a “private driveway” some 1,600 feet in length and 15 feet in width on the unimproved street. The zoning board, pursuant to § 45-23.1-5, denied the relief and Mill Realty sought cer-tiorari, alleging that the mandate that it construct a road in accordance with the town’s construction standards was arbitrary, confiscatory and unlawful. Mill Realty argued that the denial of its requested relief amounted to a confiscatory taking of the lot by the town. The petitioner is now before us seeking to avoid the requirement that it connect this parcel to the public water system.
The parcel in question “appears on a map of house lots entitled Washington Villa Plat platted in 1893 and later recorded in the land records for the town of Coventry in 1896.” Mill Realty I, 721 A.2d at 890-91. As we noted in Mill Realty I, the petitioner purchased, at tax sale, a parcel of land “then depicted on the Coventry tax assessor’s plat No. 42, as lot No. 41 and shown as containing 25,000 square feet.” Id. at 889. This parcel originally consisted of five contiguous lots on the Washington Villa Plat and is located in an area zoned as R-20 Residential that provides for single-family dwellings with a minimum lot size of 20,000 square feet if the lot is serviced by a public water supply. If the lot is not serviced by a public water supply, the required minimum lot size for a single-family dwelling is 43,560 square feet. The availability of public water and Mill Realty’s contention that the lot size provisions of the zoning ordinance does not apply to Lot 41 are the seminal issues in this case.
In Mill Realty I, this Court held that in order to build and sell a single-family dwelling, petitioner was required to construct a road to serve the dwelling; however we relieved Mill Realty of the burden of constructing a paved road that met subdivision standards. Mill Realty I, 721 A.2d at 892. Instead, we directed that, in order to obtain a building permit, petitioner must construct a gravel road, the minimum established standard grade road permitted by the town’s subdivision regulation.1 Id. In so doing, we noted the strong “public interest in and necessity for proper street construction and future development in the plat as well as insuring adequate access into the plat by other plat lot owners[.]” Id. We issued that decision in 1998 and “for the expeditious interest of all parties,” we. remanded the case directly to the zoning board with directions to grant Mill Realty’s application for an exception based on its construction of a gravel roadway as defined in the ordinance. Id. However, this Court’s concern about the lot’s area deficiency is readily apparent in the decision. We specifically held:
*671“Upon remand, the zoning board shall not, however, be required to direct the building official to issue any building permit authorizing construction of the proposed residential dwelling upon Mill Realty’s lot unless and until the town building official and the zoning board are satisfied that the proposed construction on Mill Realty’s lot is in conformity with all applicable building and zoning requirements.” Id. at 893. (Emphasis added.)
Now, almost five years later, petitioner is back before the Court contending that its parcel of land is a single nonconforming lot of record pursuant to Article 8, Section 870-871 of the Coventry Zoning Ordinance and as such, petitioner is entitled to a building permit for a single-family residence without access to a public water supply, notwithstanding that the lot does not meet the minimum lot size requirement of 43,560 square feet. Coventry’s building official refused to issue a building permit, having concluded that public water was available to Lot 41 and the lot did not meet the minimum lot size requirement for a single-family dwelling without access to public water. The zoning board affirmed the decision of the building official and specifically declared that a building permit would be issued if access to the public water supply was accomplished.
Mill Realty appealed to the Superior Court, which sustained the decision of the board. The trial justice found that petitioner’s parcel was a conforming lot because it met the 20,000-square-foot requirement for lots with access to a public water supply. She further declared that Article 6 of the Coventry Zoning Ordinance was permissive because it provided that a “lot or parcel of land having a lot width or area which is less than required by Article 6 may be considered buildable for [s]ingle [family] residential purposes * * (Emphasis added.) According to the trial justice, the zoning board is vested with discretion to determine whether an undersized lot is buildable as a single-family dwelling. Noting that Article 2, Section 200-201(C) of the Coventry Zoning Ordinance defines the term “may” as permissive rather than mandatory, the trial court found that this express language provided the zoning board with discretion to grant or deny the petition.
The trial justice also addressed petitioner’s contention that Coventry has selectively enforced the lot size requirement relative to lots that were not serviced by public water. Mill Realty alleged that the board was guilty of arbitrary and capricious selective enforcement of its zoning provision. Although acknowledging petitioner’s contentions, the trial justice rejected this argument, concluding that a selective enforcement argument is more commonly raised in cases alleging a denial of due process or equal protection of the laws and did not apply to the facts in this case. The trial justice found that Coventry did not selectively enforce its zoning ordinance because each zoning application is reviewed individually in accordance with its broad grant of statutory authority.2
The petitioner sought review in this Court by writ of certiorari and has assigned as error the trial justice’s construction of portions of the zoning ordinance. The petitioner also alleges that the decision of the zoning board was arbitrary and *672capricious, again arguing that respondent is guilty of selective enforcement of its zoning ordinance in light of its “long record of granting building permits for single family houses serviced by wells on lots of less than one acre in size.” The petitioner faults the trial justice for confining her decision to the issue of selective enforcement and not addressing its larger concern that Coventry’s decision was arbitrary and capricious.
In passing upon a decision of a zoning board of review, the Superior Court may not substitute its judgment for the zoning board of review concerning the weight of the evidence on questions of fact. G.L.1956 § 45-24-69(d). It is the function of the Superior Court to “examine the entire record to determine whether ‘substantial’ evidence exists to support the board’s findings.” DeStefano v. Zoning Board of Review of Warwick, 122 R.I. 241, 245, 405 A.2d 1167, 1170 (1979) (citing Apostolou v. Genovesi, 120 R.I. 501, 508, 388 A.2d 821, 824-25 (1978)). Substantial evidence has been defined “as more than a scintilla but less than a preponderance.” Apostolou, 120 R.I. at 508, 388 A.2d at 824-25. The trial justice may not “substitute [his or her] judgment for that of the zoning board if [he or she] can conscientiously find that the board’s decision was supported by substantial evidence in the whole record.” Id. at 509, 388 A.2d at 825. On certiorari, this Court must “scrutinize the record as a whole to determine ‘whether legally competent evidence exists to support the findings of the court below.’ ” Caswell v. George Sherman Sand & Gravel Co., 424 A.2d 646, 648 (R.I.1981) (quoting Toohey v. Kilday, 415 A.2d 732, 735 (R.I.1980)). After a careful review of the record in the case before us, we are satisfied that petitioner has failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate its allegations and that the trial justice correctly found that substantial evidence supports respondent’s decision.
The record discloses that Mill Realty has not yet constructed the gravel road as required in Mill Realty I, but has acknowledged that constructing a gravel road in accordance with this Court’s decision is a condition precedent to the issuance of a building permit. Although conceding that it must construct a road that is twenty-four feet wide and cleared, excavated and filled to a depth of twelve inches (see note 1, supra), Mill Realty contends that it is exempt from installing a waterline in the same road at the same time. Despite our holding in Mill Realty I that the lot is “18,560 square feet short of meeting the minimum lot size required to permit construction of a single-family dwelling” without public water, Mill Realty contends that its lot is “grandfathered” and is not required to supply public water to the parcel, nor is it required to seek relief from the lot size requirements of the zoning ordinance.
According to petitioner, because the five lots that comprise the parcel in question were recorded in 1896, the land is exempt from the minimum lot size requirements of the zoning ordinance. Specifically, Mill Realty contends that Article 8, Section 870-871, controls the result in this case. The ordinance provides as follows:
“870 — Single Nonconforming Lots of Record:
871 — A lot or parcel of land having a lot width or area which is less than required by Article 6 may be considered buildable for single family residential purposes regardless of the lot width or area, provided such lot or parcel of land was duly recorded prior to the effective date of this Ordinance, and further provided that at the time of the recording said lot or parcel of land so created conformed in all respects to the minimum requirements *673of the Zoning Ordinance in effect at the time of such recording, and did not adjoin other land of the same owner on the effective date of this Ordinance or at any time after such lot or parcel of land was rendered substandard by the provisions of any prior Zoning, Ordinance. Any lot meeting the requirements of a single non-conforming lot of record for single family purposes shall be governed by the requirements of Section 890 for determination of setbacks for principle structures.”
It is petitioner’s contention that its parcel meets the requirements of Section 870-871 and is therefore buildable for single-family residential purposes “regardless of the lot width or area” and need not satisfy the one-acre requirement for lots not serviced by public water. However, Mill Realty ignores the fact that its lot meets the requirements of an R-20 zone for a lot with access to public water as found by the zoning board and affirmed by the hearing justice.
The Superior Court hearing justice specifically found, inter alia, that Lot 41 is not a nonconforming lot of record because it meets the 20,000-square-foot size required for a single-family dwelling in an R-20 zone.3 As such, the hearing justice declared that Mill Realty “must obtain access to public water or obtain a dimensional variance to construct a private well on an undersized lot.” Significantly, with the exception of petitioner’s bald assertion that this “property has no feasible access to Coventry[’s] public water [supply],” there is no evidence in the record that the construction of a water line could not reasonably be accomplished. Indeed, there is not a scintilla of evidence that supports this contention as contrasted with the unequivocal and uncontradicted testimony of the zoning enforcement officer that this parcel was located in an area with access to public water and that it was feasible for petitioner to connect to the public water supply. The record discloses that the closest public water line is 1,600 feet from Lot 41, at Club House Road, the nearest improved and accessible road and the road that will intersect with Columbus Avenue, the road that petitioner must construct as a condition precedent to a budding permit.
The petitioner failed to present any expert testimony or engineering studies concerning the projected costs associated with installing a water line or any potential difficulty anticipated by its construction. Nor was any evidence introduced comparing the cost of a water line to the expense of installing a well. Because the undisputed evidence is that a connection to the water supply can be accomplished and that Columbus Avenue must be constructed from the point where the water line already is in place, the decision of the board that a building permit would be issued if Mill Realty connected to the water line was supported by substantial evidence. Both the building official and the zoning board have concluded that public water is available to this lot, albeit at a greater expense than if a water line were already in place in front of the parcel. Further, Coventry has argued that all other lots in *674the Washington Villa Plat subdivision are subject to the requirement of public water as part of the town’s “orderly planning for the future residents of this subdivision.” We agree with this conclusion.
In reaching this determination, we are mindful that this home will be marketed and will be inhabited by future residents of the Town of Coventry. Maintaining a public water supply and requiring that builders construct extensions to the town’s public water system falls squarely within Coventry’s police power. See Munroe v. Town of East Greenwich, 733 A.2d 703, 710 (R.I.1999) (“[z]oning, land development and subdivision regulations constitute a valid exercise of [a municipality’s] police power”). We also note that both the hearing justice and Coventry agree that petitioner is not without a remedy. Because the ordinance permits construction of a single-family dwelling on a lot without access to public water, Mill Realty may seek dimensional relief from the town’s minimum lot size requirements. Should Mill Realty elect to seek dimensional relief, it is incumbent upon petitioner to demonstrate that public water is unavailable or is in fact prohibited by the cost of extending the water line from Club House Road.
Selective Enforcement
The petitioner has also raised the issue of selective enforcement of the town’s zoning ordinance. Mill Realty contends that the decision of the Zoning Board of Review was arbitrary and capricious because previously the town has issued building permits for lots that, petitioner alleges, were similarly situated. According to Mill Realty, Coventry has a “long record of granting building permits for single family houses serviced by wells on lots of less than one acre in size.” According to Mill Realty its evidence included building permit applications for homes in Coventry that, it contends, support this conclusion. However, the zoning enforcement officer disputed petitioner’s assertion and testified that the evidence petitioner submitted related to existing dwellings for which a building permit was issued for reconstruction or requests for permits in areas where public water is not available and, according to the zoning official, will not be made available. The zoning enforcement officer testified that with respect to some of the applications introduced by petitioner, “the [t]own has taken the position that water is not available and for the most part will not be available” to those areas. However, with respect to the Mill Realty property, she testified that water is available from the water line on Club House Road.
The zoning enforcement officer recognized that construction of a water line to petitioner’s lot may be burdensome; however, she also noted that “the entire area [was] serviced by public water” and everyone who built in the area was required to provide access to public water notwithstanding this difficulty. Finally, the zoning enforcement officer testified that it would be “inappropriate to issue a building permit for one house lot that is being serviced by a well in an area that is entirely being serviced by public water.”
With respect to the issue of selective enforcement, petitioner has not raised any issues of constitutional dimension. Mill Realty has not asserted a violation of its right to substantive due process, see Brunette v. Town of South Kingstown, 700 A.2d 1075, 1084 (R.I.1997) (proof of a violation of substantive due process requires proof “that the government’s action was ‘clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare’”), nor has it asserted an equal protection violation, see Sweetman v. Town of Cumber*675land, 117 R.I. 134-151, 364 A.2d 1277, 1288 (1976) (municipal action that affects a “fundamental right” or sets up a suspect classification “will be invalidated on equal protection grounds only if the classification bears no reasonable relationship to the public health, safety, or welfare”). Rather, as it argued to the trial justice, petitioner contends that Coventry’s decision was arbitrary and capricious because there was no rational basis in the record for respondent’s disparate treatment of its application from other building permit applications it introduced at the hearing. We deem this argument without merit. The petitioner failed to establish that it was the victim of disparate or discriminatory treatment. The building official testified that Lot 41 was not similarly situated to the building permit applications introduced by petitioner. According to the witness, the applications submitted by petitioner were not similar because they related to existing structures or areas not serviced by town water. The zoning enforcement officer testified that public water was available to Lot 41. In holding that a building permit would be issued “if public water were brought to the subject property[,]” respondent reached the same conclusion. There is substantial evidence in the record to support this decision and no evidence that supports petitioner’s contentions.4
Additionally, the petitioner contends that its argument on this issue was broader than the question of selective enforcement and faults the trial justice for failing to consider whether the decision was arbitrary and capricious. We reject this contention. The argument advanced by the petitioner was that the town has selectively enforced “an inapplicable zoning ordinance” which is “an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority and abuse of discretion as a matter of law.” The petitioner argued that Coventry has selectively enforced the lot size requirement and that, in the absence of an ordinance that defines when water is available and unavailable, its decision was arbitrary and capricious. It makes the same argument to this Court. The petitioner also contends that the implicit finding that the availability of public water, which was the linchpin of the respondent’s decision, is “equally as arbitrary and capricious as was the zoning official’s.” This argument ignores the evidentiary failures in this case: that the petitioner failed to demonstrate it was the victim of disparate treatment and thus, failed to meet its burden of proof. Clearly, reliable and probative evidence was provided by the zoning enforcement officer that water is available to Lot 41 and there was no evidence to the contrary. As it was entitled to do, the board elected to rely on the testimony of the zoning enforcement officer. We discern no error in that determination.
Conclusion
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein we affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

. According to Section 15-51(b)(1) of the Coventry Code of Ordinances’s subdivision regulations, the minimum established standard grade road consists of a "twenty-four-foot-wide driving area that shall be stripped of all rocks, stumps and loam to a depth of twelve (12) inches and replaced with ten (10) inches of bank run gravel and two (2) inches of processed gravel."

. The petitioner also argued that Coventry impermissibly intruded upon the authority of the state Department of Environmental Management in passing upon the health and safety concerns inherent in the use of private wells. The trial justice rejected this argument. Because of our decision with respect to the availability of water to Lot 41, we need not address this issue.

. As noted, the trial justice also concluded that Article 6, Section 870-871 of the Coventry Zoning Ordinances is permissive because it provides a nonconforming lot of record and may be considered buildable if certain conditions precedent are met. In light of our holding that Lot 41 is a conforming lot of record provided there is access to public water, we need not reach this issue. Nor are we required to decide whether, because Lot 41 consisted of five contiguous lots of record on the date the Coventry Zoning Ordinance became effective, it was not a single lot and does not fall within the provisions of Section 870-871.

. Indeed, with respect to the building permit applications submitted by petitioner, when asked whether public water was available to a particular area of town, counsel responded, "[t]here is always city water available if you want to run a pipe from the Scituate Reservoir.”