Court Opinion

ID: 9621971
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:10:18.724961+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:34:05.910704
License: Public Domain

Scholfield, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent. There is no basis in the evidence to support a finding as to Billups' purpose in speaking to the two girls. It follows that there is a lack of evidence to support the conclusion reached in the majority opinion that he intended to kidnap them. In so concluding, the opinion does not address adequately and realistically the statutory requirements for an attempted kidnapping in the second degree.
The crime of kidnapping in the second degree is defined as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of kidnapping in the second degree if he intentionally abducts another person under circumstances not amounting to kidnapping in the first degree.
RCW 9A.40.030(1).
A key element of kidnapping in the second degree is intentional abduction. The word "abduct" is defined in RCW 9A.40.010 as follows:
*132(2) "Abduct" means to restrain a person by either (a) secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely to be found, or (b) using or threatening to use deadly force;
The word "restrain" is also defined in RCW 9A.40.010:
(1) "Restrain" means to restrict a person's movements without consent and without legal authority in a manner which interferes substantially with his liberty. Restraint is "without consent" if it is accomplished by (a) physical force, intimidation, or deception, or (b) any means including acquiescence of the victim, if he is a child less than sixteen years old or an incompetent person and if the parent, guardian, or other person or institution having lawful control or custody of him has not acquiesced.
Criminal attempt is defined in RCW 9A.28.020 as follows:
(1) A person is guilty of an attempt to commit crime if, with intent to commit a specific crime, he does any act which is a substantial step toward the commission of that crime.
An intent to abduct is a specific intent. RCW 9A.28.020, in defining a criminal intent, requires that the substantial step be taken "with intent to commit a specific crime". The specific crime involved here is kidnapping, and the required intent is the intent to abduct. While a finding of a specific intent can be inferred, it can only be inferred from "conduct where it is plainly indicated as a matter of logical probability." State v. Delmarter, 94 Wn.2d 634, 638, 618 P.2d 99 (1980).
Billups' conduct of inviting the girls to get into his van does not plainly indicate any specific intent. While one may be suspicious of his motives, the suspicion is only general. His purpose is unknown, and if he had a specific intent, it is also unknown. One must engage in one supposition after another in order to reach the conclusion that he had an intent to restrain the girls by secreting or holding them in a place where they were not likely to be found.
Billups' purpose in inviting the girls into his van could have been innocent, in the sense that no criminal act was contemplated. If a criminal intent was present, it could *133have been other than an intent to kidnap. A fact pattern of this general nature does not meet the requirements for permissive inferences.
A permissive inference is valid when there is a "rational connection" between the proven fact and the inferred fact, and the inferred fact flows "more likely than not" from the proven fact.
State v. Ratliff, 46 Wn. App. 325, 330-31, 730 P.2d 716 (1986), review denied, 108 Wn.2d 1002 (1987).
The evidence must support a finding of an intent to restrain the girls by secreting or holding them in a place where they were not likely to be found. There is no suggestion in the facts of this case of use or threatened use of deadly force. The State argues that Billups had two knives in the truck. However, there is no evidence he ever picked up one of the knives or that the girls ever saw the knives.
The convictions for attempted kidnapping must be reversed because the evidence does not support a finding of an intent to abduct. The evidence in this case goes no further than to show an effort by Billups to entice the girls into his van. He did nothing more than speak to them. As a result, they ran away. He did not pursue them.
The majority opinion reasons that if the girls had responded by getting into the van, their movements would have been restrained by their presence in the van. Mere presence in the vehicle does not amount to restraint. Had the girls elected to leave the van and been permitted to do so, there would be no restraint. There would be no restriction of movement and no acquiescence under RCW 9A.40.010(l)(b). There is no evidence that upon request the girls would not have been permitted to leave the van. Pure supposition is needed to support the conclusion that once they were in the van, their movements would have been restrained.
The majority opinion then states that once restraint is shown, the element of secreting or holding the girls in a place where they are not likely to be found has also been *134satisfied. Additional facts are necessary to satisfy this element. However, in this case, no additional facts are present because the girls never entered the van. Even had the girls entered the van and been driven to Shilshole Bay, it would be very doubtful that this could be held to be an attempt to hold them in a place where they were not likely to be found. All of the activity involved would have occurred on public streets and at public places in the middle of a July day.
If we assume for the sake of discussion that had the girls entered the van they would have been restrained in the van for some unknown period of time, the element of intent to abduct would still be missing. Unlawful imprisonment is an entirely separate offense from kidnapping. It requires nothing more than knowingly restraining another person. RCW 9A.40.040. If we construe Billups' invitation to the girls as an attempted unlawful imprisonment, the evidence to support a finding of intent to abduct would still be lacking.
In the findings of fact entered by the trial court, there are no findings relative to the critical issue of intent to abduct. Conclusion of law 3 entered by the trial court states in part:
The words in conjunction with the surrounding circumstances constitute a substantial step toward the commission of kidnapping in the second degree.
Nothing in the findings or in this conclusion of law provides a basis for finding an intent to abduct. The State's evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction for attempted kidnapping in the second degree.
I would reverse and dismiss.