Court Opinion

ID: 9520209
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 01:33:29.269529+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:45:44.633870
License: Public Domain

Mr. JUSTICE TRAPP, dissenting: Here the attorney general directly prosecuted an alleged conspiracy for violation of the Illinois Antitrust Act following his official investigation, all as provided in the Illinois Antitrust Act (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1971, ch. 38, par. 60 — 1 et seq.). Defendants’ retained counsel were members of law firms which had one or more appointed and acting assistant Attorneys General. Throughout the proceeding, defendants’ counsel directly confronted the attorney general at every stage. The principal opinion progresses remarkably from a conclusion that we need not determine whether the record adequately shows that defendants’ counsel were, in fact or by association, duly appointed and acting special assistant Attorneys General to a determination that such appointees owed no duty which created a conflict of interest to his individual client, and continues to overrule the prior opinion of this court in People v. Cross (1975), 30 Ill. App. 3d 199, 331 N.E.2d 643. That opinion determined that where a defendant in a criminal proceedings was represented by retained counsel who was a special assistant Attorney General for inheritance tax matters there was a per se conflict of interest, albeit, such counsel tried the case vis-a-vis a State’s Attorney. I would conclude that the issue of conflict of interest is adequately presented in this record for the reason that defendants’ counsel have stated in this court in oral argument, that members of their respective law firms were duly appointed and acting special assistant Attorneys General for civil matters but with no responsibility in criminal prosecutions. The opinion in People v. Stoval (1968), 40 Ill. 2d 109, 111, 239 N.E.2d 441, 443 stated: “The right to the effective assistance of counsel is a fundamental right and entitles the person represented to the undivided loyalty of counsel.” In Stoval, counsel for a criminal defendant had as a client a jewelry business and its proprietor which defendant was alleged to have burgled. In stating its policy, the supreme court quoted from the opinion in United States ex rel. Miller v. Myers (E.D. Pa. 1966), 253 F. Supp. 55, 57, adopting the language: “This situation is too fraught with the dangers of prejudice, prejudice which the cold record might not indicate, that the mere existence of the conflict is sufficient to constitute a violation of relator’s rights whether or not it in fact influences the attorney or the outcome of the case.” 40 Ill. 2d 109, 113, 239 N.E.2d 441, 443. The policy announced by the supreme court is not framed in the context of a present “duty to the Attorney General in criminal matters” as is stated in the opinion here. Rather, it is stated that: “[S]ound policy disfavors the representation of an accused, especially when counsel is appointed, by an attorney with possible conflict of interests.” (Emphasis added.) (40 Ill. 2d 109, 113, 239 N.E.2d 441, 444.) This position is literally adopted by quotation in People v. Kester (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 162, 361 N.E.2d 569. In Kester, the court further stated: “The parties concur that a defendant’s fundamental right to effective assistance of counsel requires that his attorney not represent conflicting interests or undertake the discharge of inconsistent duties.” 66 Ill. 2d 162, 166, 361 N.E.2d 569, 571. By the use of the disjunctive, it appears that conflicting interests and inconsistent duties express different rather than synonymous alternatives. This seems confirmed by the statement in Kester that defendant’s counsel, a former assistant State’s Attorney “presumably had no continuing commitments to that office at the time he represented the defendant.” 66 Ill. 2d 162, 167, 361 N.E.2d 569, 571. That opinion noted, nevertheless: “But there is also the possibility that the attorney might be subject to subtle influences which could be viewed as adversely affecting his ability to defend his client in an independent and vigorous manner.” (Emphasis added.) 66 Ill. 2d 162, 167, 361 N.E.2d 569, 572. In People v. Pendleton (1977), 52 Ill. App. 3d 241, 367 N.E.2d 196, appeal denied (1977), 66 Ill. 2d 641, appointed defense counsel was then employed as an assistant Attorney General for the handling of but two cases of a civil nature. Upon the issue of effective assistance of counsel, the prosecution argued that the rule announced in Cross was too stringent and urged that the rule used in attorney discipline proceedings, i.e., an attorney who holds public office may not accept private employment in matters over which he may potentially have responsibility, as a public official, ought to be applied to the facts on a case-by-case basis. (Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 8 — 101(A)(5) (1970).) The court stated: “We believe the State misapprehends the question involved and the policy reasons upon which the conflicts rule is grounded.” 52 Ill. App. 3d 241, 246, 367 N.E.2d 196, 200. The court continued: “The controlling aspect is not whether he personally would ever be assigned to assist in the prosecution of a murder case, but whether he is presently accepting and perhaps seeking future assignments from an office which possesses an interest adverse to defendant’s; i.e., the duty to assist in the prosecution of criminal cases whenever the interests of the people require it.” 52 Ill. App. 3d 241, 247, 367 N.E.2d 196, 200. In sum, the court stated: “Moreover, we think that Kester, Meyers, and Stoval make it clear that, as a matter of sound judicial administration, lawyers who are committed to others with potentially adverse interests to those of defendant should not be appointed.” 52 Ill. App. 3d 241, 247, 367 N.E.2d 196, 201. An appointee of the Attorney General, albeit in a designated noncriminal portion of the business of that office, is for practical purposes as if upon a retainer by a private client. The Attorney General represents the people of this State. An appointee logically is responsible for the same representations. It is most doubtful that an attorney retained by a private client to do tax work or negotiate real estate contracts could properly undertake to sue that client in a personal injury case. The fact that the appointee is retained for a special category of practice does not alter the nature of an attorney-client relationship which establishes the commitment of the attorney to the interests of that client. The principal opinion suggests that the policy stated in Stoval and Cross is minimized by reason of the fact that here there is no present possibility that counsel for defendants would be required to cross-examine or undertake to impeach a personal client. There are other aspects of the problem. The opinion in Kester points out that the possibility of a conflict of interest might affect the performance of counsel: “[B]y a subliminal reluctance to attack pleadings or other actions and decisions by the prosecution ° ” *.” (66 Ill. 2d 162, 167, 361 N.E.2d 469, 572.) The same fault may arise upon the issues of admissibility of evidence. The supreme court has further given substantial weight to the fact that an attorney who may have served ably and vigorously with complete loyalty may nevertheless be subjected to embarrassing or unfounded charges of inadequate representation. Such complaints defy a rational explanation or resolution. By this statement of policy no inference is to be directed to counsel appearing here. Both this record and their prior appearances in this court have demonstrated that they exercise professional diligence and zeal in the representation of their clients. Rather, it is sought to avoid the necessity that a court of review speculate upon the constitutional issue of a client’s representation. A conflict of interest is rarely, if ever, clearly ascertainable in the roster of cases which present this particular question. The opinion appears to adopt a per se rule that an appointment as a special Attorney General in noncriminal matters does not create a possible conflict of interest when counsel appear in a criminal case. I cannot agree that this is sound policy. Upon this issue, the case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial.