Court Opinion

ID: 9299284
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-12-02 17:05:52.374049+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:13:37.261302
License: Public Domain

WASHINGTON, Circuit Justice
(charging jury). This court has always thought it right to hold agents to a strict account, in relation to the orders they receive, provided they are expressed in terms, plain and free from ambiguity; and in this respect, the same measure of justice has been dealt out to agents within the United States, acting for persons abroad, as to the foreign agents of citizens of the United States.
The first inquiry is, what is the meaning of the terms used in the letter of the plaintiff, in relation to the sale of this cargo? Prime or first cost, is in itself somewhat equivocal, as it may mean the price at which it was purchased, or the market price at the time it was shipped, or the invoice price, which is generally understood to correspond with the market price, although frequently this is not the case. But, when an agent abroad, is directed not to sell for less than the first cost and charges, and an invoice accompanies the letter, pricing the articles and stating the amount of the charges on the shipment, nothing can be *872more clear, than that the sum stated in the invoice, is the minimum by which the agent is to be governed. As to the actual cost of the articles, it is almost impossible that the agent should know any thing about it, and very improbable that he should know even the real market price, at the place of shipment; and it is not to be supposed, that the principal could intend to refer his agent to an uncertain standard, when the order carries with it one which is certain. The goods may have cost the shipper much more than they are really worth at the time of shipping, or much less; and of course, the invoice price, more especially when it is referred to, as in this case it was, as fixing the sum for which the insurance was effected, fixes the only rational standard, by which the agent can and ought to be governed.
2. The plaintiff’s bill did not authorize a breach of his orders, either in whole, or so far as to cover that bill. It was accepted before the defendant had notice of the shipment, upon the credit of the drawer and endorser; and even if it had been accepted afterwards, yet in either case, Bainbridge and Cartwright, if they accepted the consignment at all, it could only be upon the terms prescribed by the shipper. They might have refused to accept in the first instance, for want of advice or of funds; and might have done so even after the cargo was received, upon the ground, that they were restricted by the orders from selling, so as certainly to furnish funds for taking up the bill when it should become due. But it is entirely inadmissible for the defendant, to make their voluntary acceptance of the plaintiff’s bill, an excuse for a breach of his orders.
3. There is no doubt, but that a principal may ratify the act of one who has acted in his behalf, as his agent, though without authority, or who has transcended his powers; and in this way give validity to the act, as if it had been strictly authorized in the first instance. This ratification may take place, not only directly, but by collateral acts; as if the principal, knowing all circumstances, sue for, accept, or even demand the payment of the purchase money, in this way indicating his willingness to affirm the sale. But in this case, the plaintiff did not demand the amount of sales, or even intimate that he would be satisfied to receive them. He drew for £130, which he had certainly a right to do, and informed Bainbridge and Cartwright, that he shall, in a subsequent letter, write more fully to them, and will then give directions as to the application of the balance in their hands; so that he reserves the right of deciding as to his future conduct, until the time when he should write again. It is possible, that the plaintiff wished to obtain further information as to the circumstances under which the sale of his cotton had taken place, and at the moment, might even have inclined to submit to what had been done. But his letter of the 0th of October, certainly did not commit him so far, as to prevent his subsequent refusal to sanction the sale which had been made. Accordingly, in his next letter, dated the 6th of November, he informs the defendant that he shall bring suit, to recover a compensation for the damages he had sustained by the breach of his orders. What those damages should be, you, gentlemen, must decide.
Verdict for upwards of 3000 dollars.