Court Opinion

ID: 9372762
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:00:19.701352+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:37.237209
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                      MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD
                                        2022 MSPB 37
                            Docket No. DC-1221-14-0364-W-1

                                    Mark Abernathy,
                                         Appellant,
                                               v.
                               Department of the Army,
                                          Agency.
                                    November 15, 2022

           Mark Abernathy, Hermitage, Tennessee, pro se.

           Tracy A. Allred, APO, AE, for the agency.

                                          BEFORE

                             Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                              Raymond A. Limon, Member
                               Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                 OPINION AND ORDER

¶1        The appellant has petitioned for review of an initial decision that dismissed
     his individual right of action (IRA) appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The agency
     has cross-petitioned for review.    For the reasons that follow, we GRANT the
     appellant’s petition for review, DENY the agency’s cross petition for review,
     VACATE the initial decision, and REMAND the appeal for further adjudication
     consistent with this Opinion and Order.
                                                                                       2

                                       BACKGROUND
¶2         The appellant worked for the agency as a contractor. Initial Appeal File
     (IAF), Tab 1 at 15. In August 2012, he filed a complaint with the agency’s Office
     of Inspector General (OIG) alleging that agency officials had misappropriated
     funds. IAF, Tab 6 at 3. Later in 2012, he learned that he was not being selected
     for a position with the agency. 1      IAF, Tab 1 at 15.      The appellant filed a
     complaint with the Office of Special Counsel (OSC) alleging that his nonselection
     was in reprisal for his protected disclosure to OIG. 2 Id. at 11-24. After OSC
     informed the appellant of the results of its investigation he filed this IRA appeal.
     IAF, Tab 1 at 1-5, 25-27.
¶3         In response to a show cause order issued by the administrative judge, the
     agency argued that the Board lacks jurisdiction over the appeal. IAF, Tab 10.
     The agency argued that the appellant’s disclosure was not protected under
     5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) because he was neither an employee, nor an applicant, at
     the time he made it. IAF, Tab 10 at 6. The agency also argued that the failure to
     refer the appellant to the selecting official for the position in question was not a
     “personnel action” that could form the basis of an IRA appeal. Id. at 7.
¶4         The administrative judge issued an initial decision dismissing the appeal for
     lack of jurisdiction.    IAF, Tab 11, Initial Decision (ID).        She rejected the
     agency’s argument regarding the nonreferral to the selecting official, finding that
     the appellant had alleged a failure to appoint him, which is a personnel action

     1
       Both the agency and the administrative judge stated that the open period for this
     vacancy announcement was in September 2014. IAF, Tab 10 at 6, Tab 11, Initial
     Decision at 3. However, this was a typographical error. The vacancy announcement
     reflects that it was actually open in September 2012. IAF, Tab 10 at 11.
     2
       The appellant indicated in his initial appeal that he filed his OSC complaint in
     April 2013, IAF, Tab 1 at 5, but it appears that he actually filed it in December 2012,
     see id. at 21-22 (OSC complaint form dated December 12, 2012), or January 2013, see
     id. at 25 (OSC letter indicating that the complaint was received on January 3, 2013).
     Nonetheless, the exact filing date has no bearing on our decision.
                                                                                     3

     under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a). ID at 5-6. However, she agreed with the agency that
     the appellant’s disclosure to OIG was not protected because he was not an
     employee or applicant at the time he made it. ID at 6.
¶5         The appellant has filed a timely petition for review of the initial decision.
     Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. He argues that the administrative judge’s
     interpretation of the statutory language, under which an individual must be
     an employee or applicant at the time of his disclosure to qualify for protection
     against reprisal, greatly limits the protections available to applicants.   Id. at 4.
     The agency has responded in opposition to the petition for review. PFR File,
     Tab 3.   The agency has also cross-petitioned for review, arguing that the
     administrative judge erred in finding that the appellant alleged a covered
     personnel action. Id. at 6.
¶6         After the close of the record on review, the Board invited interested parties
     to submit amicus briefs addressing whether disclosures made when an individual
     is neither a Federal employee, nor an applicant for Federal employment, are
     protected under the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989 (WPA) , Pub. L.
     No. 101-12, 103 Stat. 16, and the Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of
     2012 (WPEA), Pub. L. No. 112-199, 126 Stat. 1465. Notice of Opportunity to
     File Amicus Briefs, 81 Fed. Reg. 2913 (Jan. 19, 2016); PFR File, Tab 6. Four
     individuals and entities, including OSC, have filed briefs in res ponse. PFR File,
     Tabs 7-10. 3   OSC subsequently requested and received permission to file an
     additional pleading.   PFR File, Tabs 12, 14.    In its additional pleading, OSC
     argues that a provision of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
     Year 2018 (2018 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 115-91, 131 Stat. 1283, resolved the
     question on which the Board invited amicus briefs by specifically providing that a
     disclosure made before an individual was appointed to a position or applied for

     3
       Amicus briefs were received from OSC, the National Employment Lawyers
     Association, Walsh & Son, LLP, and Peter Broida.
                                                                                       4

     appointment may be protected. PFR File, Tab 15. The Board gave the parties an
     opportunity to respond to OSC’s additional pleading, PFR File, Tab 14, but
     neither party did so.

                                          ANALYSIS
¶7         To establish the Board’s jurisdiction over this IRA appeal, the appellant
     must have exhausted his administrative remedies before OSC and make
     nonfrivolous allegations that: (1) he made a disclosure protected under 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8); and (2) the disclosure was a contributing factor in the agency’s
     decision to take or fail to take a personnel action as defined by 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(a). Rusin v. Department of the Treasury, 92 M.S.P.R. 298, ¶ 12 (2002). 4
     There is no dispute that the appellant exhausted his administrative r emedies
     before OSC. IAF, Tab 1 at 11-27. For the reasons set forth below, we find that
     the appellant has also made the required nonfrivolous allegations to establish
     jurisdiction over his IRA appeal.

     The appellant has nonfrivolously alleged that he made a protected disclosure
     under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
¶8         At the time all of the material events in this matter occurred, 5 U.S.C.
     § 2302(b)(8) protected:
           (A) any disclosure of information by an employee or applicant which
           the employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences —
               (i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or
               (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
               authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health
               or safety,

     4
       All of the material events in this matter occurred before the expansion of IRA appeal
     rights in the WPEA took effect on December 27, 2012. WPEA, Pub. L. No. 112-199,
     § 202, 126 Stat. 1465, 1476; Colbert v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 121 M.S.P.R.
     677, ¶ 6 (2014). Thus, in this case, we will apply the pre-WPEA standards concerning
     the scope of an IRA appeal. See Scoggins v. Department of the Army, 123 M.S.P.R.
     592, ¶ 7 (2016); Colbert, 121 M.S.P.R. 677, ¶¶ 6-7.
                                                                                       5

           if such disclosure is not specifically prohibited by law and if such
           information is not specifically required by Executive order to be kept
           secret in the interest of national defense or the conduct of foreign
           affairs; or
           (B) any disclosure to the Special Counsel, or to the Inspector
           General of an agency or another employee designated by the head of
           the agency to receive such disclosures, of information which the
           employee or applicant reasonably believes evidences—
               (i) a violation of any law, rule, or regulation, or
               (ii) gross mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
               authority, or a substantial and specific danger to public health
               or safety[.]
     5 U.S.C.A. § 2302(b)(8) (2008). 5 The question before us is whether, under that
     provision, the Board may have jurisdiction to consider the appellant’s
     whistleblower reprisal claim even though he was not a Federal employee or
     applicant for employment at the time he made his disclosure.
¶9         In Greenup v. Department of Agriculture, 106 M.S.P.R. 202, ¶¶ 8-9 (2007),
     the Board found that it had jurisdiction over the appellant’s claim that the agency
     failed to select her for a position in retaliation for disclosures she made when she
     was neither an employee nor an applicant. The Board in Greenup quoted the
     language of 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A), including the reference to a “disclosure of
     information by an employee or applicant,” but nevertheless found that the statute
     does not specify that the disclosure must have been made when the individual
     seeking protection was either an employee or an applicant for employment.
     Greenup, 106 M.S.P.R. 202, ¶ 8.        In Weed v. Social Security Administration,
     113 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶¶ 8-12 (2010), the Board again held that, at the time of

     5
       The WPEA amended the definition at 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(A)(i) by striking “a
     violation” and inserting “any violation,” and it amended 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8)(B)(i) by
     striking “a violation” and inserting “any violation (other than a violation of this
     section).” WPEA, Pub. L. No. 112-199, § 101(a)(1), 126 Stat. 1465. We find that these
     amendments do not change the result in this case. See Mudd v. Department of Veterans
     Affairs, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 5 n.3 (2013).
                                                                                            6

      making a disclosure, an individual need not be an employee or applicant for
      employment at the agency that took the alleged retaliatory action in order to
      qualify for protection under the WPA as a whistleblower. The Board cited its
      prior holding in Greenup in support of its holding in Weed. Id., ¶ 12.
¶10        In this case, the Board requested amicus briefs addressing whether it should
      reconsider its precedent in light of an apparent conflict with three nonprecedential
      cases by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit). 6
      The amici unanimously urged the Board to follow its existing precedent.
      PFR File, Tab 7 at 2-3, Tab 8 at 7-16, Tab 9 at 4-6, Tab 10 at 22.                Having
      considered the submissions of the parties and amici, we see no re ason to overrule
      our precedent in Greenup and Weed.            Under that precedent, the appellant’s
      disclosures are not excluded from whistleblower protection simply because
      he was neither a Federal employee, nor an applicant for employment, when he
      made them. We stress that this holding is not limited to Federal contractors, but

      6
       Specifically, the Board observed that Greenup and Weed appear to conflict with the
      Federal Circuit’s decisions in Nasuti v. Merit Systems Protection Board, 376 F. App’x
      29, 33-34 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Guzman v. Office of Personnel Management, 53 F. App’x
      927, 929 (Fed. Cir. 2002); and Amarille v. Office of Personnel Management,
      28 F. App’x 931, 933 (Fed. Cir. 2001). However, nonprecedential decisions of the
      Federal Circuit are not binding on the Board. Weed v. Social Security Administration,
      110 M.S.P.R. 468, ¶ 11 (2009). Further, under 5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(1)(B):
            A petition to review a final order or final decision of the Board that raises
            no challenge to the Board’s disposition of allegations of a prohibited
            personnel practice described in section 2302(b) other than practices
            described in section 2302(b)(8), or (b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D) shall be
            filed in the [Federal Circuit] or any court of appeals of competent
            jurisdiction.
      Thus, it is possible that the Board’s decision in such a case would be reviewed not by
      the Federal Circuit, but instead by a different court of appeals.          Chambers v.
      Department of Homeland Security, 2022 MSPB 8, ¶ 10 n.6.
                                                                                         7

      applies to any individual who makes a whistleblowing disclosure at any time
      before becoming a Federal employee or applicant for employment. 7
¶11        In its additional pleading, OSC argues that a provision in the NDAA for
      Fiscal Year 2018 (2018 NDAA), Pub. L. No. 115-91, § 1097(c)(1)(B)(i)(III),
      131 Stat. 1283, 1618 (2017), which went into effect after the close of the record
      on review, should be applied in this case. PFR File, Tab 15.          That provision
      states that a disclosure shall not be excluded from protection under 5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(b)(8) because “the disclosure was made before the date on which the
      individual was appointed or applied for appointment to a position.”          5 U.S.C.
      § 2302(f)(1)(F). OSC argues that this provision clarifies existing law and should
      therefore be applied to all pending cases. PFR File, Tab 15 at 2-3.
¶12        The new statutory language confirms the Board’s interpretation of the prior
      statutory language, as set forth in Greenup, and therefore the result is the same

      7
        Employees of contractors have additional whistleblower protections under 41 U.S.C.
      § 4712, which provides:
            An employee of a contractor, subcontractor, grantee, or subgrantee or
            personal services contractor may not be discharged, demoted, or otherwise
            discriminated against as a reprisal for disclosing to a person or body
            described in paragraph (2) information that the employee reasonably
            believes is evidence of gross mismanagement of a Federal contract or
            grant, a gross waste of Federal funds, an abuse of authority relating to a
            Federal contract or grant, a substantial and specific danger to public
            health or safety, or a violation of law, rule or regulation related to a
            Federal contract (including the competition for or negotiation of a
            contract) or grant.
      41 U.S.C. § 4712(a)(1). The recourse for such a violation is to submit a complaint to
      the Inspector General of the relevant agency, who will either determine that the
      complaint does not warrant investigation or investigate the complaint and submit a
      report to the head of the agency. 42 U.S.C. § 4712(b)(1)-(2). The head of the agency
      will then determine whether there is a sufficient basis to conclude that reprisal for
      whistleblowing took place, and issue an order denying or granting relief accordingly.
      42 U.S.C. § 4712(c)(1). Upon exhaustion of remedies with the head of the agency, the
      aggrieved employee may appeal the matter to Federal district court. 42 U.S.C.
      § 4712(c)(2).
                                                                                    8

      regardless of whether we apply the new statutory language. Under both Greenup
      and the 2018 NDAA, the appellant’s disclosure to OIG before he was an applicant
      for employment may be protected whistleblowing if it other wise meets the
      requirements of 5 U.S.C.     § 2302(b)(8).    Therefore, we need not determine
      whether to apply this particular 2018 NDAA provision to this or any other
      pending cases.
¶13         At the jurisdictional stage, the appellant is burdened only with making a
      nonfrivolous allegation that he reasonably believed that his disclosure evidenced
      a violation of one of the circumstances described in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8).
      Schoenig v. Department of Justice, 120 M.S.P.R. 318, ¶ 8 (2013). The proper test
      for determining whether an individual had a reasonable belief that his disclosures
      were protected is whether a disinterested observer with knowledge of the
      essential facts known to and readily ascertainable by the individual coul d
      reasonably conclude that the actions evidenced a violation of law, rule, or
      regulation, or one of the other conditions set forth in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8). See
      Schoenig, 120 M.S.P.R. 318, ¶ 8. The appellant’s disclosure to OIG involved the
      purchase of video equipment with funds designated for Overseas Contingency
      Operations (OCO). IAF, Tab 1 at 25, Tab 6 at 3. The appellant believed that the
      purchase violated acquisition regulations because the equipment was to be used
      for purposes other than OCO. IAF, Tab 6 at 3. We find that the appellant has
      nonfrivolously alleged that he reasonably believed he was disclosing a violation
      of a regulation.   See Kutty v. Department of Housing & Urban Development,
      96 M.S.P.R. 590, ¶¶ 7-11 (2004) (finding a nonfrivolous allegation of a protected
      disclosure when the appellant disclosed her belief that her supervisor had violated
      acquisition regulations).

      The appellant has nonfrivolously alleged that his disclosure was a contributing
      factor in a personnel action.
¶14         On cross petition for review, the agency argues that its failure to refer the
      appellant to the selecting official in connection with the position for which he
                                                                                     9

      applied is not a “personnel action” for purposes of the Board’s IRA jurisdiction.
      PFR File, Tab 3 at 6.     We disagree.      An appointment is among the personnel
      actions specifically enumerated in the statute. 5 U.S.C. § 2302(a)(2)(A)(i). We
      agree with the administrative judge that the appellant has made a nonfrivolous
      allegation that the agency’s failure to refer him to the selecting official
      constitutes the failure to appoint him for purposes of the Board’s jurisdiction over
      his IRA appeal. ID at 5-6; see Dorney v. Department of the Army, 117 M.S.P.R.
      480, ¶ 6 (2012) (stating that an allegation of a failure to appoint is an allegation
      of a failure to take a personnel action).
¶15         To satisfy the contributing factor criterion at the jurisdictional stage in an
      IRA appeal, an appellant need only raise a nonfrivolous allegation that the fact or
      content of the protected disclosure was one factor that tended to affect the
      personnel action in any way.       Mudd, 120 M.S.P.R. 365, ¶ 10.       One way to
      establish this criterion is the knowledge-timing test, under which an employee
      may nonfrivolously allege that the disclosure was a contributing factor in a
      personnel action through circumstantial evidence, such as evidence that the
      official taking the personnel action knew of the disclosure and that the personnel
      action occurred within a period of time such that a reasonable person could
      conclude that the disclosure was a contributing factor in the personnel action. Id.
      The Board has held that personnel actions occurring within 1 to 2 years after the
      protected disclosures are sufficient to meet the timing portion of the test.
      Wilson v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 2022 MSPB 7, ¶ 41. The knowledge
      portion of the knowledge-timing test can be met with allegations of either actual
      or constructive knowledge.      See Aquino v. Department of Homeland Security,
      121 M.S.P.R. 35, ¶ 19 (2014).          An appellant may establish an official’s
      constructive knowledge of a protected disclosure by demonstrating that
      an individual with actual knowledge of the disclosure influenced the official
      accused of taking the retaliatory action. Dorney, 117 M.S.P.R. 480, ¶ 11.
                                                                                        10

¶16         The appellant alleges that the Deputy Director, who was both one of the
      subjects of his disclosure and the selecting official for the position for which he
      had applied, informed the appellant in September 2012 that he was not going to
      select the appellant because he had become “too confrontational.” IAF, Tab 6
      at 3. This alleged conversation took place the month after the appellant made his
      disclosure to OIG. Id. The appellant alleges that he learned of his nonreferral
      3 days later. Id. We find that the appellant’s allegations are sufficient to meet
      the contributing factor criterion under the knowledge-timing test at the
      jurisdictional stage.

                                              ORDER
¶17         Having found that the appellant has met his jurisdictional burdens, we
      remand this case to the regional office for further adjudication 8 in accordance
      with this Opinion and Order.       If the appellant establishes the elements of his
      claim by preponderant evidence, the Board will order corrective action unless the
      agency demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken

      8
        The record reflects that the parties in this case are in Europe and the United States,
      and that the appellant did not request a hearing. The appellant, who is pro se, should be
      advised on remand that an in-person hearing is not required and that a hearing may be
      conducted by either video conferencing or by telephone. See 5 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1);
      Koehler v. Department of the Air Force, 99 M.S.P.R. 82, ¶¶ 6-13 (2005).
                                                                                  11

the same personnel action 9 absent the disclosure. Weed, 113 M.S.P.R. 221, ¶ 23.
The agency will have an opportunity to make that showing on remand.

FOR THE BOARD:

/s/
Jennifer Everling
Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.

9
  It appears that the appellant also raised three other vacancy announcements for which
he applied, and for which no selections were made, before OSC. IAF, Tab 1 at 26. It
is not entirely clear from the appellant’s submissions below whether he is attempting to
raise those nonselections as additional personnel actions in this IRA appeal. IAF,
Tab 6. On remand, the administrative judge should clarify whether the appellant is
raising additional personnel actions in addition to the nonreferral discussed herein.