Court Opinion

ID: 4063859
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-09-29 21:04:18.893347+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:31:48.230683
License: Public Domain

ACCEPTED
                                                                      03-14-00547-CR
                                                                             4853443
                                                            THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                       AUSTIN, TEXAS
                                                                 4/10/2015 8:14:38 PM
                                                                    JEFFREY D. KYLE
                                                                               CLERK
                        NO. 03-14-00547-CR

                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS             FILED IN
                                                3rd COURT OF APPEALS
                             FOR THE                AUSTIN, TEXAS
         THIRD SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF         TEXAS
                                                4/10/2015 8:14:38 PM
                            AT AUSTIN             JEFFREY D. KYLE
                                                        Clerk
__________________________________________________________________

                        NO. CR-12-0005

               IN THE 428TH DISTRICT COURT
                  OF HAYS COUNTY, TEXAS
__________________________________________________________________

                        STATE OF TEXAS,
                          APPELLANT

                                V.

                   BRYAN ROLAND CHANDLER,
                            APPELLEE
__________________________________________________________________

                        APPELLEE’S BRIEF
__________________________________________________________________
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED

                               LINDA ICENHAUER-RAMIREZ
                               ATTORNEY AT LAW
                               1103 NUECES
                               AUSTIN, TEXAS 78701
                               TELEPHONE:     512-477-7991
                               FACSIMILE 512-477-3580
                               EMAIL: LJIR@AOL.COM
                               SBN: 10382944

                                 ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
                                    TABLE OF CONTENTS

                                                                                                    PAGE

Parties to Trial Court’s Final Judgment...................................................... 3

Index of Authorities .................................................................................... 4

Statement of the Nature of the Case ........................................................... 6

Appellee’s Response to Point of Error Number One.................................. 8
     The Trial Court’s Action in Granting the Motion for a Judg-
     ment Nunc Pro Tunc Did Not Modify, Change or Alter the
     Effect of the Original Judgment and Thus Was Not Prohibited
     By the Expiration of the Court’s Plenary Power.

Appellee’s Response to Point of Error Number Four................................. 9
     The Trial Court’s Action in Granting the Motion for a Judg-
     ment Nunc Pro Tunc Was Proper in that the Action Was Made
     to Correct a Clerical Error and Did Not Involve Any Additional
     Judicial Reasoning

Appellee’s Response Point of Error Number Two ..................................... 15
     The Law is Clear That When a Defendant Enters a Plea to
     an Offense Involving a Deadly Weapon That the Trial Court’s
     Acceptance of That Guilty Plea is Not an Affirmative Finding
     of a Deadly Weapon as a Matter of Law or a De Facto Affirm-
     ative Finding of a Deadly Weapon

Appellee’s Response to Point of Error Number Three............................... 15
     Once a Trial Judge Accepts a Defendant’s Plea of Guilty to
     an Offense Involving a Deadly Weapon, the Trial Judge Still
     Retains Discretion on the Issue of Whether He Will Enter an
     Affirmative Finding of a Deadly Weapon

Prayer for Relief ......................................................................................... 19

Certificate of Compliance........................................................................... 20

Certificate of Service .................................................................................. 20

                                                       2
         PARTIES TO TRIAL COURT’S FINAL JUDGMENT

         In accordance with Tex.R.App.Proc. 38.1(a), Appellee certifies that

the following is a complete list of the parties and their counsel:

         (a) the State of Texas represented by:

             Mr. Brian Clarke Erskine, Asst. Dist. Att. – appellate attorney
             Hays County Criminal District Attorney's Office
             Hays County Government Center
             712 South Stagecoach Trail, Suite 2057
             San Marcos, TX 78666

             Ms. Amy Lockhart , Asst. Dist. Att. – trial attorney
             Hays County Criminal District Attorney's Office
             Hays County Government Center
             712 South Stagecoach Trail, Suite 2057
             San Marcos, TX 78666

       (b) Mr. Bryan Roland Chandler, represented by:

             Mr. Joseph A. Turner – trial attorney
             Attorney at Law
             1504 West Avenue
             Austin, Texas 78701

             Ms. S. Lynn Peach – attorney for judgment nunc pro tunc
             Attorney at Law
             P.O. Box 512
             San Marcos, Texas 78667

             Ms. Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez - appellate attorney
             Attorney at Law
             1103 Nueces
             Austin, Texas 78701

                                       3
                                  INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES                                                                                                 PAGE

Alvarez v. State, 605 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex.Cr.App. 1980) ...................... 13

Banks v. State, 29 S.W.3d 642, 646 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th]
     2000, pet. ref.)................................................................................... 17

Barstow v. State, 2011 Tex.App.LEXIS 3236 (Tex.App.-Austin
      2011, no pet.) .................................................................................... 9

Chaney v. State, 494 S.W.2d 813, 814 n. 1 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973) ............... 13

Ex parte Dopps, 723 S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986)....................... 13

Ex parte McDonald, 2015 Tex. Crim. App. Unpub.
      LEXIS 210 (Tex.Cr.App. 2015, No. WR-82,533-01,
      delivered March 25, 2015)................................................................ 15

Ex parte Poe, 751 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex.Cr.App. 1988) ........................... 13

Hatley v. State, 206 S.W.3d 710, 718 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006,
      no pet.) .............................................................................................. 18

Hoang v. State, 2004 Tex.App.LEXIS 5890 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2004,
     no pet.) .............................................................................................. 17

Hooks v. State 860 S.W.2d 110, 113-114 (Tex.Cr.App. 1993).................. 17
Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.Cr.App. 1990).................................. 8

Perkins v Court of Appeals for the Third Supreme Judicial District
      of Texas, 738 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987)........................ 18

State v. Aguilera, 165 S.W.3d 695 (Tex.Cr.App. 2005)............................. 8

State v. Bates, 889 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex.Cr.App. 1994).......................... 8
Wilson v. State, 677 S.W.2d 518, 521 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984) ................ 13

                                                        4
Villarreal v. State, 590 S.W.2d 938, 939 (Tex.Cr.App. 1979) ................... 13

STATUTES

Art. 42.014, V.A.C.C.P............................................................................... 9

Art. 42.12, Sec 3g, V.A.C.C.P.................................................................... 16

COURT RULES

Tex.R.App.Proc. 23.1 .................................................................................8

Tex.R.App.Proc. 34.6 .................................................................................10

Tex.R.App.Proc. 38.1(a).............................................................................3

                                                    5
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGES OF SAID COURT:

        COMES NOW Bryan Roland Chandler, appellee in this cause, by and

through his attorney and files this his brief on original appeal.

            STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE

        Appellee was charged by indictment in this cause on January 18,

2012.    The indictment alleged that appellant committed the offense of

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (family violence).           (C.R. 5)

On February 23, 2012, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the offense of

aggravated assault, a second degree felony.     (C.R. 7-13)    On February 23,

2012, pursuant to the plea bargain agreement, the court assessed appellant’s

punishment at ten (10) years imprisonment.            (C.R. 14-15)   The trial

court’s certification of defendant’s right to appeal was filed on February 23,

2012.    (C.R. 16-17)     On March 23, 2014, the trial court signed a nunc

pro tunc judgment of conviction correcting appellee’s backtime credit.

(C.R. 18-19)    On April 17, 2014, appellee filed a motion for judgment nunc

pro tunc asking that the affirmative finding of a deadly weapon be deleted in

accordance with the plea proceedings.       (C.R. 20-35)    A hearing was held

on the motion on August 7, 2014 with the judge granting the motion for

judgment nunc pro tunc.        (R.R. I, pp. 4-9)     On August 7, 2014, the

                                        6
assistant district attorney filed a notice of appeal.   (C.R. 36-37, 38-39)

The Nunc Pro Tunc Judgment of Conviction by Court – Waiver of Jury Trial

which deleted the affirmative finding of a deadly was signed by the trial

court on October 2, 2014.   (C.R. 49-50)

                                      7
   APPELLEE’S REPLY TO POINT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
THE TRIAL COURT’S ACTION IN GRANTING THE MOTION
FOR A JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC DID NOT MODIFY,
CHANGE OR ALTER THE EFFECT OF THE ORIGINAL
JUDGMENT AND THUS WAS NOT PROHIBITED BY THE
EXPIRATION OF THE COURT’S PLENARY POWER.

  APPELLEE’S REPLY TO POINT OF ERROR NUMBER FOUR
THE TRIAL COURT’S ACTION IN GRANTING THE MOTION
FOR A JUDGMENT NUNC PRO TUNC WAS PROPER IN THAT
THE ACTION WAS MADE TO CORRECT A CLERICAL ERROR
AND DID NOT INVOLVE ANY ADDITIONAL JUDICIAL
REASONING.

      Absent a motion for new trial, a trial court’s plenary jurisdiction

expires thirty days from the date on which the defendant was sentenced in

open court.    State v. Aguilera, 165 S.W.3d 695, 697 n. 4 (Tex.Cr.App.

2005).   However, a trial court retains authority after the expiration of the

court’s plenary power to enter a judgment nunc pro tunc to correct clerical

errors in the judgment.   State v. Bates, 889 S.W.2d 306, 309 (Tex.Cr.App.

1994); Tex.R.App.Proc. 23.1.    The purpose of a judgment nunc pro tunc is

to correctly reflect from the records of the court the judgment actually

“rendered,” but which for some reason was not “entered” at the proper time.

Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 199 (Tex.Cr.App. 1990).        Before a judgment

nunc pro tunc may be entered, there must be proof that the proposed

judgment was actually rendered at an earlier time.   State v. Bates, supra.

      A review of the record in this case shows that the judgment nunc pro

                                      8
tunc ordered by the trial court on August 7, 2014 did correct a clerical error

in the cause.     During the hearing on August 7th, the trial court took judicial

notice of the plea forms entered into by appellee and the State.      (R.R. I, p.

4)   A review of those plea forms shows that appellee agreed to enter a plea

of guilty to the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (family

violence).      On the first page of the plea agreement form there is a set of

boxes to be checked when the parties agree that affirmative findings are to

be made by the trial court:       one for an affirmative finding of a deadly

weapon, one for an affirmative finding of family violence and one for an

affirmative finding of a hate crime under Art. 42.014, V.A.C.C.P.          None

of these boxes were checked.         This form was signed by appellee, the

attorney for the State and the attorney for the appellee.      (C.R. 6)     This

form alone is evidence that the agreement of the parties was that no

affirmative finding of a deadly weapon was to be made.

      In its brief on p. 4, the State cites to portions of the plea hearing (see

footnotes 23, 24, 25).      But appellee would point out that the reporter’s

record from the plea hearing is not a part of the appellate record before the

Third Court of Appeals.         The transcript of the plea hearing was not

admitted into evidence during the August 7th hearing and thus cannot be

considered as part of the appellate record.        See Barstow v. State, 2011

                                        9
Tex.App.LEXIS 3236 (Tex.App.-Austin 2011, no pet.).             Furthermore,

when the State filed a Request For the Court Reporter’s Record on

September 5, 2014, that request only asked that the August 7, 2014 hearing

on the motion for judgment nunc pro tunc be included as part of the

appellate record.   (C.R. 40-41)    The Reporter’s Record from that August

7th hearing is the only part of the Reporter’s Record that has been filed in

this cause in the Third Court of Appeals.    Thus the plea hearing is not part

of the appellate record and cannot be considered.      Tex.R.App.Proc. 34.6.

Just looking at the record that is properly before the Court of Appeals,

namely the clerk’s record and the record from the hearing held on August 7,

2014, all of the evidence shows that it was the parties’ intent that there

would be no affirmative finding of a deadly weapon.            The State has

produced no evidence showing otherwise, even though it had the opportunity

at the August 7th hearing.         Clearly, the State could have called the

prosecutor who handled the guilty plea to testify as to the intent of the

parties, but for some reason chose not to call her as a witness during the

August 7th hearing.    Thus the State has failed in its burden to show that

there was an agreement that the court would enter an affirmative finding of a

deadly weapon.

      As noted above, appellee’s previous lawyer, S. Lynn Peach, did attach

                                       10
a copy of the transcript from appellee’s guilty plea hearing which was held

on February 23, 2012 to her motion for judgment nunc pro tunc.              (C.R.

20-35)    Although this transcript was not introduced into evidence during

the August 7th hearing nor was designated as part of the appellate record by

the State and thus is not part of the appellate record before the Court and

should not be considered by the Court, appellee would assert that if the

Court of Appeals decides to consider it, it too shows that there was no

agreement of the parties that the trial court should enter an affirmative

finding of a deadly weapon.

     This transcript from the guilty plea hearing shows that the prosecutor

identified State’s Exhibit 1 as the plea bargain agreement between the

parties, offered it into evidence and then rested.        (Plea Transcript, p. 3)

State’s Exhibit 1 is the plea paperwork found in C.R. 6-13. Appellee then

entered a plea of guilty to the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon (family violence) and the trial court questioned him as to the typical

admonishments made during a guilty plea.                 After going over the

admonishments, the trial court accepted appellee’s guilty plea and found that

the evidence substantiated his guilt.        (Plea Transcript, p. 4-7)   The trial

court then announced the plea bargain agreement:

           “THE COURT: I understand that there is a plea bargain
      agreement which calls for the State to dismiss Cause No.

                                        11
      CR-12-0022 and they have agreed not to file pending
      violations.  But in Cause No. 12-0005 I understand that there
      is a recommended resolution of 10 years in the Texas
      Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division, that the
      defendant be given credit for time served as a result of this
      offense.” (Plea Transcript, p. 7)

The court then asked both parties if that was their understanding of the

agreement and both the prosecutor and appellee’s trial counsel replied

affirmatively.   (Plea Transcript, pp. 7-8)   At no point did the prosecutor

volunteer that the parties had agreed to an affirmative finding of a deadly

weapon or object in any way to the trial court’s failure to make an

affirmative finding of a deadly weapon.       The trial court then announced

that it would go along with the plea bargain agreement and sentenced

appellee to ten years in prison.   (Plea Transcript, p. 8)   Once again, the

State failed to object to the trial court’s failure to make an affirmative

finding of a deadly weapon.

      A reading of the appellate record and also the plea transcript shows

that there was no agreement by the parties that the trial court would make an

affirmative finding of a deadly weapon at appellee’s plea hearing.      Thus,

the court’s written judgment signed on February 23, 2012 did contain a

clerical error when it included an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon.

(C.R. 14-15)      The record reflects that a nunc pro tunc judgment,

correcting appellee’s backtime, was signed and entered on March 23, 2012.

                                      12
This nunc pro tunc judgment also erroneously contained an affirmative

finding of a deadly weapon.    (C.R. 18-19)    This too was a clerical error.

     A judgment nunc pro tunc is the appropriate avenue to make a

correction when the court's records do not mirror the judgment that was

actually rendered.   Alvarez v. State, 605 S.W.2d 615, 617 (Tex.Cr.App.

1980).   This means that a trial court can fix clerical errors in the record by a

nunc pro tunc order.     But only errors that were not the result of judicial

reasoning are considered clerical errors that can be fixed by a nunc pro tunc

order.   Ex parte Poe, 751 S.W.2d 873, 876 (Tex.Cr.App. 1988).         The trial

court cannot, through a judgment nunc pro tunc, change a court's records to

reflect what it believes should have been done.          Ex parte Dopps, 723
S.W.2d 669, 671 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986) (citing Chaney v. State, 494 S.W.2d
813, 814 n. 1 (Tex.Cr.App. 1973);     Villarreal v. State, 590 S.W.2d 938, 939

(Tex.Cr.App. 1979).     "Thus, before a judgment nunc pro tunc may be

entered, there must be proof that the proposed judgment was actually

rendered or pronounced at an earlier time."      Wilson v. State, 677 S.W.2d
518, 521 (Tex.Cr.App. 1984).

     It is clear from the record of the trial court that the inclusion of an

affirmative finding of a deadly weapon in the original judgment and in the

first judgment nunc pro tunc was a clerical error that the August 7, 2014

                                       13
order for a judgment nunc pro tunc was correcting.

      The State is asserting that appellee was trying to modify his sentence

and thus because the trial court’s action in granting the motion for judgment

nunc pro tunc fell after the trial court’s plenary jurisdiction had expired, the

trial court’s order was wrong.      This case is clearly distinguishable from

those cases cited by the State where a trial court modified a defendant’s

sentence after it had lost jurisdiction over a defendant.     As shown above,

the trial court’s order of August 7, 2014, approving the entry of the judgment

nunc pro tunc was to make the judgment accurately reflect what had gone on

in the trial court during the appellee’s plea proceedings.     The terms of the

plea bargain agreed upon by the parties did not contain an affirmative

finding of a deadly weapon, the trial court never made an affirmative finding

of a deadly weapon and the judgment which reflected an affirmative finding

of a deadly weapon was erroneous.         Thus, the trial court acted properly in

granting the motion for the entry of the judgment nunc pro tunc.       Points of

error one and four should be overruled.

                                       14
   APPELLEE’S REPLY TO POINT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
THE LAW IS CLEAR THAT WHEN A DEFENDANT ENTERS A
PLEA TO AN OFFENSE INVOLVING A DEADLY WEAPON THAT
THE TRIAL COURT’S ACCEPTANCE OF THAT GUILTY PLEA IS
NOT AN AFFIRMATIVE FINDING OF A DEADLY WEAPON AS A
MATTER OF LAW OR A DE FACTO AFFIRMATIVE FINDING OF
A DEADLY WEAPON.

  APPELLEE’S REPLY TO POINT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE
ONCE A TRIAL JUDGE ACCEPTS A DEFENDANT’S PLEA OF
GUILTY TO AN OFFENSE INVOLVING A DEADLY WEAPON,
THE TRIAL JUDGE STILL RETAINS DISCRETION ON THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER HE WILL ENTER AN AFFIRMATIVE
FINDING OF A DEADLY WEAPON.

      The State asserts that because appellee entered a plea of guilty to the

offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (family violence) and

the trial court then found him guilty of that offense, that the acceptance of

appellee’s guilty plea either was an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon

as a matter of law or as a de facto finding.   This is not the law.   Recently

Judge Bert Richardson of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals wrote a

concurring opinion in the case of Ex parte McDonald, 2015 Tex. Crim. App.

Unpub. LEXIS 210 (Tex.Cr.App. 2015, No. WR-82,533-01, delivered

March 25, 2015) and discussed the offense of aggravated assault:

             “Yet, although it is labeled an ‘aggravated’ offense,
      Aggravated Assault under Section 22.02 does not fall under the
      list of ‘3g’ offenses in Article 42.12 of the Texas Code of
      Criminal Procedure unless there is an affirmative finding that a
      deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the commission of

                                      15
      the offense.”   (slip opinion, p. 2)

Clearly a finding of guilt for an offense in which a deadly weapon is used is

not the same as an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon as used in Art.

42.12, Sec 3g, V.A.C.C.P.

      The State also asserts that once a defendant is found guilty of using a

deadly weapon, a trial court must make an affirmative finding of a deadly

weapon.     The State asserts that a trial court never has the discretion to not

enter a deadly weapon finding in a final judgment.      The State clearly does

not understand the law with respect to affirmative findings of a deadly

weapon.

      The law is clear that even when a defendant pleads guilty to an

offense in which he or she used a deadly weapon the acceptance of the

defendant’s guilty plea to an offense involving a deadly weapon is not

equivalent to the court making an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon.

The defendant’s guilty plea - evidenced by his or her judicial confession -

stands alone on the issue of guilt. The affirmative judicial finding of a

deadly weapon has nothing to do with the defendant’s guilt.         Rather, the

affirmative finding of a deadly weapon relates solely to the issue of

punishment. Specifically, the finding relates to the ramifications of the

available punishment alternatives: an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon

                                       16
eliminates court-ordered probation as a possible punishment and        affects

parole eligibility.     See Hooks v. State 860 S.W.2d 110, 113-114

(Tex.Cr.App. 1993).       The trial court, as the trier of fact on punishment,

has the authority, but not the obligation, to make an affirmative finding of

the use of a deadly weapon.         Banks v. State, 29 S.W.3d 642, 646

(Tex.App.-Houston [14th] 2000, pet. ref.).

      In fact, it is a common and accepted practice for a plea bargain

involving an aggravated assault where a defendant used or exhibited a

deadly weapon to limit the trial court’s authority to enter a deadly weapon

finding.   The net result is that the defendant is found guilty of the

aggravated assault with a deadly weapon but the agreement is that the trial

court will not enter an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon.      The lack

of an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon has no impact whatsoever on

the finding of guilt as to the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly

weapon.       Rather, the affirmative finding impacts only the issue of

punishment.           See Hoang v. State, 2004 Tex.App.LEXIS 5890

(Tex.App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).

      In the instant case, there is no evidence that the agreement of the

parties called for the trial court to make an affirmative finding of a deadly

weapon.    Once again, the plea papers (State’s Exhibit 1) were silent as to

                                      17
an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon.         A review of the transcript

from the plea hearing shows that both the State and appellee’s attorney

agreed that the plea papers accurately reflected the terms of the plea bargain

agreement.    During the plea hearing, the State never objected when the trial

court failed to make an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon.

Furthermore, the State failed to produce any evidence whatsoever at the

hearing on appellee’s motion for judgment nunc pro tunc to show that the

parties had agreed to the imposition of an affirmative finding of a deadly

weapon.    The State could very easily have brought in the prosecutor who

participated in the plea hearing to testify about her understanding of the plea

bargain agreement.       It chose not to do so.       As a result, the record

contains no evidence supporting the State’s position.

      Once a trial court has accepted the plea agreement, the court has a

"ministerial, mandatory, and non-discretionary duty to specifically enforce"

the terms of the agreement.      Perkins v Court of Appeals for the Third

Supreme Judicial Dist. Of Texas, 738 S.W.2d 276, 285 (Tex.Cr.App. 1987).

In performing this duty, the trial court's "primary concern is to ascertain and

give effect to the parties' intentions as expressed in the instrument."   Hatley

v. State, 206 S.W.3d 710, 718 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, no pet.).         Here it

is clear that appellee entered a plea of guilty to the charged offense –

                                       18
aggravated assault with a deadly weapon (family violence) and the parties

agreed that the trial court would make no affirmative finding of a deadly

weapon.     The trial court followed the plea bargain agreement and did not

make such an affirmative finding of a deadly weapon.            Thus the written

judgment which erroneously reflected an affirmative finding of a deadly

weapon was properly corrected when the trial court ordered at the

conclusion of the August 7, 2014 hearing that a judgment nunc pro tunc

should be issued.     Points of error two and three should be overruled.

                                      PRAYER

      Appellee respectfully requests that this Honorable Court overrule

appellant’s points of error and affirm the action of the trial court.

                                         Respectfully submitted,

                                         /s/ Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez
                                         ______________________________
                                         LINDA ICENHAUER-RAMIREZ
                                         Attorney at Law
                                         1103 Nueces
                                         Austin, Texas 78701
                                         (512) 477-7991
                                         FAX: (512) 477-3580
                                         SBN: 10382944
                                         Email: ljir@aol.com

                                         ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE

                                        19
                   CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

      I hereby certify that this brief was computer generated and contains

3,782 words, as calculated by the word count function on my computer.

                                        /s/ Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez
                                        ____________________________
                                        LINDA ICENHAUER-RAMIREZ

                      CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

      I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of Appellee’s Brief on

Original Appeal was e-served to the Hays County District Attorney’s Office

on this the 10th day of April, 2015.

                                        /s/ Linda Icenhauer-Ramirez
                                        ______________________________
                                        LINDA ICENHAUER-RAMIREZ

                                       20