Court Opinion

ID: 9591294
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:03:31.634333+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:09.377080
License: Public Domain

Weltner, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority reverses this, Fugitt’s second conviction and sen*525tence to death, principally upon the prior statements of one Frady.
Decided June 19, 1985 —
Rehearing denied July 2, 1985.
Philip L. Ruppert, for appellant.
Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, William L. McKinnon, Jr., Assistant District Attorney, Michael J. Bowers, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
It is this same Frady who was the cause for the first reversal, wherein we observed: “Here, there can be no doubt of any kind that Frady’s testimony in every material part is purest fabrication. It cannot be said, therefore, that the new evidence establishing his perjury is ‘merely impeaching.’ To the contrary, it goes to the heart of our system of criminal justice, and we find that a new trial must be ordered. ‘We do so because we cannot and will not approve corruption of the truth-seeking function of the trial process.’ Williams v. State, 250 Ga. 463, 466 (298 SE2d 492) (1983).” Fugitt v. State, 251 Ga. 451, 453 (307 SE2d 471) (1983).
Notwithstanding what we said there, Fugitt called this same Frady as his witness — not in rebuttal of any state’s evidence, but in an apparent effort to show prosecutorial misconduct. Having done so, Fugitt should not now be heard to complain of the state’s impeachment of Frady, nor of the admission of any prior statement of Frady which would serve that purpose.
It was Fugitt who seized this corrupt fruit. It was his knowing and intentional choice. He cannot now complain of its poison.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Marshall joins in this dissent.