Court Opinion

ID: 9395166
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-05-17 14:02:49.768398+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:06.020293
License: Public Domain

Cite as 2023 Ark. App. 290
                    ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS
                                         DIVISION I
                                         No. E-22-578

RAYMOND COLEMAN                                   Opinion Delivered   May 17, 2023
                                 APPELLANT
                                                  APPEAL FROM THE ARKANSAS
V.                                                BOARD OF REVIEW
                                                  [NO. 2022-BR-01477]
DIRECTOR, DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE SERVICES; AND T & C
AUTO CLINIC
                      APPELLEES                   AFFIRMED

                                  RITA W. GRUBER, Judge

        Appellant Raymond Coleman appeals the Arkansas Board of Review’s dismissal of

 his claim as untimely. We hold that there is substantial evidence to support the Board’s

 dismissal and affirm.

        To appeal a Department of Workforce Services (DWS) determination, a written

 notice of appeal must be filed with the Appeal Tribunal (Tribunal) or any office of DWS

 within twenty calendar days of the mailing date of the determination. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-

 10-524(a)(1) (Repl. 2021). If the appeal is not filed within the statutory time period, the

 appeal may still be considered timely if the late filing was the result of circumstances beyond

 the appealing party’s control. Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-524(a)(2).

        On May 26, 2021, DWS sent Coleman a notice of agency determination denying his

 claim for unemployment benefits, finding that he voluntarily left work without good cause
connected with the work, and informing him that he could file an appeal of that

determination within twenty calendar days after the mailing of the notice to his last known

address.

       Coleman filed a petition for appeal with the Tribunal, which is dated July 14, 2021,

and was received by the Tribunal on July 15. On July 23, DWS sent Coleman and T & C

Auto Clinic (collectively “the parties”) notice that an appeal had been filed; a telephone

hearing would be held on August 6; the primary issue for the hearing was whether the appeal

was timely filed and, if not, whether the untimely filing was a result of circumstances beyond

Coleman’s control; and the hearing would be the sole opportunity to present testimony and

evidence. On July 29, Coleman requested that the hearing be held in person rather than by

telephone, which was granted. On May 17, 2022, DWS sent notice to the parties setting the

in-person hearing for June 7 and notifying them once more that the primary issue for the

hearing was whether the appeal was timely filed and, if not, whether the untimely filing was

a result of circumstances beyond Coleman’s control; and the hearing would be the sole

opportunity to present testimony and evidence.

       The hearing was held on June 7, in part pursuant to Paulino v. Daniels, 269 Ark. 676,

559 S.W.2d 760 (Ark. App. 1980), to determine whether the untimely filing was due to

circumstances beyond Coleman’s control.1 Coleman was present with his “representative”

Frank W. Askew, Jr., as was Billy Todd, owner of T & C. At the hearing, Coleman was asked

       1
       The hearing was also held in reference to Coleman’s timely appeal of a separate
determination regarding overpayment, which is not before us.

                                              2
whether he received the eligibility determination, and he stated, “Not that I know of because

I got all my—I’ve got my paperwork, and I’ve got everything—right—right—right here on—on

my book, but I never did get an appeal for that.” The hearing officer confirmed that the

eligibility determination was mailed to his correct address, and Coleman testified that “if

[he] got it, it should be in there.” Coleman further testified as follows:

       I didn’t see it, no, ma’am, because if I did, I didn’t pay it much attention you know.
       That’s why I got him here now, you know, because ma’am, I—you know, I’m not a
       good reader, and everything that went on—my ex-wife was the one that did all the
       paperwork on it, and she’s dead now. She died with Covid last year, December the,
       you know, the 19th.

Coleman then testified, “I never—well, it’s there.” Coleman’s “representative” then stated:

       His wife—his wife was handling all the stuff. . . . All of the paperwork and things of
       that nature because of his inability to read and comprehend and understand what is
       going on, including when he—the paperwork was filled out as far as to receiving his
       unemployment benefits because of his termination. And his wife was handling all of
       that paperwork before she passed, so he wasn’t aware—. . . It was his ex-wife. He wasn’t
       aware of what was going on throughout—throughout all these procedures. He was not
       aware of even this letter about his appeal rights. Before—if it had been explained to
       him and made plain and brought to his attention, of course, he would’ve appealed it.

The hearing was then “closed” with respect to the timeliness issue.

       On June 13, 2022, the Tribunal mailed its decision in which it found that the

eligibility determination had been mailed to the correct address. The Tribunal reasoned that

the law presumes that a letter is received by the person to whom it is addressed, and Coleman

had not provided sufficient evidence to rebut that presumption, citing Skaggs v. State, 287

Ark. 259, 697 S.W.2d 913 (1985), and Moore v. State, 285 Ark. 321, 686 S.W.2d 790 (1985).

The Tribunal concluded that the untimely filing was not due to circumstances beyond

                                               3
Coleman’s control, and DWS’s determination of the denial of benefits would remain in

effect.

          On June 15, Coleman timely appealed the Tribunal’s decision to the Board,

requesting that it review the Tribunal’s decision and reopen the matter “in order to allow

[him] . . . his due process right/opportunity to be heard.” Coleman asserted in his notice of

appeal that he was not given the opportunity to present appropriate testimony and appeared

to take issue with the fact that the hearing was in person rather than by telephone.

          On October 27, 2022, the Board issued its decision in which it determined that the

record reflected that Coleman had a reasonable opportunity to present evidence before the

Tribunal. The Board found that, while Coleman did not recall receiving the eligibility

determination, he testified that he could have and paid it no attention because he does not

read very well and relied on his ex-wife to handle his paperwork at that time. The Board

further found that the determination most likely arrived at Coleman’s address, and if

Coleman or his ex-wife had difficulty understanding it, they could have contacted DWS for

assistance. The Board concluded that the Tribunal decision was correct and affirmed it.

Coleman timely petitioned this court for review.

          In appeals of unemployment-compensation cases, we review the evidence and all

reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the Board’s

findings. Term v. Dir., 2015 Ark. App. 144, at 2, 457 S.W.3d 291, 293. The Board’s findings

of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is such

evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Id. Even

                                              4
when there is evidence upon which the Board might have reached a different decision, the

scope of judicial review is limited to a determination of whether the Board could have

reasonably reached its decision based on the evidence before it. Id. at 2–3, 457 S.W.3d at

293. Credibility of witnesses and the weight to be afforded their testimony are matters for

the Board to determine. Id. at 3, 457 S.W.3d at 293. Reasons for late filing involve factual

issues to be determined by the Board and not this court on appeal. Id.

       The Board found that, while Coleman did not recall receiving the eligibility

determination, he testified that he could have and paid it no attention because he does not

read very well and relied on his ex-wife to handle his paperwork at that time. However, we

have held that where a claimant appoints a third party to act as his agent, the claimant is

bound by the third party’s actions in connection with the filing of his appeal. Springdale Mem.

Hosp. v. Dir. of Labor, 34 Ark. App. 266, 809 S.W.2d 588 (1991). Thus, Coleman’s reliance

on his late ex-wife does not constitute circumstances beyond his control. The Board further

found that if Coleman or his ex-wife had difficulty understanding it, they could have

contacted DWS for assistance. The record reflects that Coleman received every other mailing

from DWS at the same address to which the eligibility determination was sent, both before

and after the determination at issue, and acted accordingly. As such, substantial evidence

supports the Board’s decision that Coleman’s untimely appeal to the Tribunal was not due

to circumstances beyond his control.

       Coleman also contends on appeal that he “did not get full due process to testify or

have witnesses to support his claim.” The crux of his argument is that he was not given an

                                              5
opportunity to explain that he did not quit his employment but instead was fired. However,

the issue that was before the Tribunal, then the Board, and now this court is the timeliness

of his appeal to the Tribunal, not the underlying reasons for his separation from his

employment. Moreover, while the Board “may order another hearing for the taking of

additional evidence, this is discretionary with the Board and a second hearing is not required

so long as each side has notice of and a fair opportunity to rebut the evidence of the other

party.” Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. Dir. of Lab., 36 Ark. App. 243, 246, 821 S.W.2d 69, 71

(1992); Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-525(c) (Repl. 2012). The Due Process Clause does not

guarantee a party the right to unlimited process but rather guarantees that a party receives

the rudimentary elements of fair play. Bergman v. Dir., 2010 Ark. App. 729, at 6, 379 S.W.3d

625, 628. Generally, the concept of “rudimentary elements of fair play” has been interpreted

to mean reasonable notice of the specific charges; the right to employ counsel if so desired;

and the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses, to speak in one’s own defense, and to

call defense witnesses. Id.

       Here, Coleman received multiple notices regarding the hearing and its purpose, all

of which stated, “THIS HEARING is your opportunity to present ALL testimony and

evidence concerning the issues involved in this matter.” Coleman then received a Paulino

hearing before the Tribunal at which he could have entered exhibits into evidence or have

witnesses testify regarding the issue being heard by the Tribunal. He attended the hearing

with a representative and was given the opportunity to testify regarding the issues that were

being determined at that hearing. He had the opportunity to ask questions of any other

                                              6
witnesses as well. Moreover, his own testimony was that the only other person who could

testify regarding the untimeliness of his appeal was his ex-wife, who, according to him, is

deceased. Finally, Ark. Code Ann. § 11-10-529(c)(2)(A) (Supp. 2021) prohibits this court

from receiving any additional evidence. The evidence Coleman sought to have considered

was related to the reason he separated from his unemployment, not why his appeal to the

Tribunal was untimely. As such, the Board correctly determined that the record reflected

that Coleman had a reasonable opportunity to present evidence before the Tribunal.

Accordingly, we affirm.

      Affirmed.

      GLADWIN and KLAPPENBACH, JJ., agree.

      Raymond Coleman, pro se appellant.

      Cynthia L. Uhrynowycz, Associate General Counsel, for separate appellee director,

Division of Workforce Services.

                                            7