Court Opinion

ID: 9367997
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-02 17:08:05.546522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:04.994364
License: Public Domain

J-A26007-22

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    RICARDO T. DATTS, II                       :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    ALEXANDER LITTLE                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 1919 EDA 2021

              Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 7, 2021
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                               No(s): 171101814

BEFORE:      BOWES, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                             FILED FEBRUARY 02, 2023

        Alexander Little appeals from the judgment of $34,867 entered against

him and in favor of Ricardo T. Datts, II.1 We affirm.

        The pertinent underlying facts are as follows. Mr. Datts and Mr. Little

are first cousins who entered into a landlord-tenant relationship in 2015.

Specifically, Mr. Datts and David Bradley, his business partner for a

documentary film, rented space in Mr. Little’s home for themselves and their

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 Mr. Little purported to appeal from the September 13, 2021 order that
granted Mr. Datts’s motion to correct the record. However, no judgment had
been entered on the docket in accordance with that order prior to the filing of
the notice of appeal. Mr. Little subsequently filed a praecipe for judgment in
accordance with this Court’s order, and we have amended the caption
accordingly. See Pa.R.A.P. 905(a)(5) (“A notice of appeal filed after the
announcement of a determination but before the entry of an appealable order
shall be treated as filed after such entry and on the day thereof.”).
J-A26007-22

equipment. When Mr. Datts refused Mr. Little’s entreaties to be included in

the venture, Mr. Little attempted to raise the monthly rent and ultimately

locked Mr. Datts out of the residence and retained Mr. Datts’s equipment and

personal property. As the trial court explained, “[t]he saga has expanded out

to involve multiple family members and acquaintances[, including Mr. Datts’s

mother (“Mrs. Datts”)], and has resulted in several criminal prosecutions and

protection from abuse proceedings.”      Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/21, at 3.

      Mr. Datts initiated the instant action against Mr. Little and prevailed in

the Philadelphia Municipal Court. Mr. Little appealed, and Mr. Datts prevailed

before a panel of arbitrators. Mr. Little again appealed, and a trial de novo

was held before the trial court, resulting in another verdict in favor of Mr.

Datts. That verdict was vacated upon the grant of Mr. Little’s post-trial motion

and the case was tried anew before a different judge of the trial court. Over

the course of the two-day trial, at which both parties proceeded pro se, Mr.

Datts introduced an itemized list of equipment, clothing, and other items that

he contended were converted by Mr. Little, totaling $34,876. See N.T. Trial,

2/24/20 (Morning), at 28-29, Exhibit P-1. The court also heard evidence that

Mr. Little admitted to locking Mr. Datts out of the house and saw video of Mr.

Little and Mr. Bradley following and attacking Mr. Datts and Mrs. Datts

following one of the prior proceedings. At the conclusion of the proceedings,

the court announced its verdict as follows:

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     THE COURT: I will make a number of findings, factual findings that
     usually are unnecessary, but they’re made necessary in this
     instance.

     Hopefully there won’t be a use for them in the future, but if there
     is, I hope it helps. And also for Mr. Little’s edification.

     This court finds that the evidence overwhelmingly and by the
     defendant’s own admission, that the plaintiff was unlawfully
     evicted, even if that admission waffles in the way that’s not at all
     logical or persuasive. The record amply shows that he unlawfully
     evicted Mr. Datts,

     The court also finds that the record amply shows that the
     defendant unlawfully retained possession of the plaintiffs
     property.

     I do give credence to the plaintiff’s testimony regarding both the
     eviction and the property. I find in favor of plaintiff.

           ....

     Overall, this Court finds that the defendant is utterly uncredible.
     And this is based not only on his own contradictions here speaking
     under oath, but also in light of other evidence and things that are
     irreconcilable, no matter how hard we tried, with other things that
     he’s saying.

     I got to tell you, Mr. Little, it’s very disturbing that someone would
     use misstatements to bring so much grief to anyone, let alone a
     cousin. It’s really - it’s mind blowing. I hope you reconsider, I
     hope you reconsider and you stop doing that.

     MR. LITTLE: Yes, your Honor.

     THE COURT: I will issue a stay away order enjoining you from
     contacting directly or indirectly Mr. Datts or Mrs. Datts.
     Unfortunately, I cannot issue an order enjoining you from making
     a criminal complaint, but let me tell you, if somehow that gets into
     court, you will have a lot of trouble.

     Part of the reason that I’m making these specific findings is
     because I want the world to know just how you have repeatedly
     and blatantly misstated facts for your own use.

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      MR. LITTLE: Yes, your Honor.

      THE COURT: It’s unkind and really, really troubling, and it’s illegal.
      I really hope you stop.

N.T. Trial, 2/25/20, at 83-85 (cleaned up).

      A February 25, 2020 docket entry reflects the verdict “in favor of [Mr.

Datts] and against [Mr. Little] entirely,” and an order prohibiting Mr. Little

from having any contact with Mr. Datts or Mrs. Datts. However, no amount

of damages was stated on the docket or the trial worksheet that was made

part of the record, and no judgment was entered on the verdict.

      More than a year later, Mr. Datts filed a motion to correct the record to

include $34,867 as the amount of damages awarded to him. He also alleged

that Mr. Little had repeatedly violated the stay-away order. Mr. Little filed

responses denying the contempt allegations and suggesting that Mr. Datts’s

motion to correct the record be dismissed as an untimely post-trial motion,

and that the verdict should stand with no monetary damage award. The trial

court held a hearing on the matters on August 26, 2021, at the conclusion of

which it orally granted the motion to correct the record and denied the

contempt petition. Mr. Little filed a motion for reconsideration before the trial

court filed orders on September 13, 2021, denying contempt and granting the

correction of the record entering judgment in favor of Mr. Datts and against

Mr. Little in the amount of $34,867.      Mr. Little filed a notice of appeal on

September 22, 2021. The following day, the trial court dismissed Mr. Little’s

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reconsideration motion as prematurely filed, and Mr. Little filed a post-trial

motion.    The court subsequently denied Mr. Little’s post-trial motion and

judgment was entered.          Both Mr. Little and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       Mr. Little presents the following question for our consideration: “Does

the common pleas court trial division have jurisdiction over post trial motions

filed after the ten day limit established by Pennsylvania law[?]”2 Mr. Little’s

brief at 4 (cleaned up).        Mr. Little’s argument, stated in an inartful and

repetitive fashion in his brief, boils down to this: because Mr. Datts did not

file his motion to correct the record within ten days of the trial court’s final

order stating a verdict for the plaintiff with no monetary award, the trial court

lacked jurisdiction to grant the motion and instead should have denied it as

an untimely post-trial motion. See id. at 5-11.

       Mr. Little is correct that Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 provides that post-trial motions

must be filed within ten days of the filing of a non-jury decision. See Pa.R.C.P.

227.1(c)(2).      However, “the timeliness provision of Rule 227.1 is not

jurisdictional in nature.”      Linder v. City of Chester, 78 A.3d 694, 698

____________________________________________

2  In his Rule 1925(b) statement and at oral argument, Mr. Little also
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support the amount of the trial
court’s award. By not including the issue in his appellate brief, however, Mr.
Little waived it. See, e.g., Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a) (“No question will be considered
unless it is stated in the statement of questions involved or is fairly suggested
thereby.”). In any event, we discern no error in the trial court’s explanation
that Mr. Datts’s evidence was sufficient to establish the amount of damages.
See Trial Court Opinion, 12/27/21, at 6-8.

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(Pa.Cmwlth. 2013). Rather, “the trial court has the discretion to determine

whether it will consider the untimely post-trial motion.” Behar v. Frazier,

724 A.2d 943, 945 (Pa.Super. 1999).

      The rule of law implicating the trial court’s jurisdiction to modify its

decision is 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505, which provides that such modification is

permissible up until the time an appeal has been filed or the thirty-day window

for appealing has lapsed.    See 42 Pa.C.S. § 5505 (“Except as otherwise

provided or prescribed by law, a court upon notice to the parties may modify

or rescind any order within 30 days after its entry, notwithstanding the prior

termination of any term of court, if no appeal from such order has been taken

or allowed.”); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1701(a) (providing the general rule that a

court may not proceed further on a matter after an appeal is taken).

      After thirty days, a final trial court determination “can be opened or

vacated only upon a showing of extrinsic fraud, lack of jurisdiction over the

subject matter, a fatal defect apparent on the face of the record or some other

evidence of extraordinary cause justifying intervention by the court.”

Hayward v. Hayward, 808 A.2d 232, 235 (Pa.Super. 2002) (cleaned up).

Such extraordinary circumstances include “mistakes made by the court or its

officers.” Id. Stated differently, a trial court “has inherent powers to amend

its records, to correct mistakes of the clerk or other officer of the court,

inadvertencies of counsel, or supply defects or omissions in the record, even

after the lapse of the term.” In re K.R.B., 851 A.2d 914, 918 (Pa.Super.

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2004) (cleaned up).        Under these “limited circumstances, even where the

court would normally be divested of jurisdiction, a court may have the power

to correct patent and obvious mistakes.” Id. (cleaned up).

       Here, the trial court indicated that the record clearly reflected that it

credited Mr. Datts’s evidence concerning the property that Mr. Little retained,

and that its verdict was expressly for Mr. Datts “entirely.” See Trial Court

Opinion, 12/27/21, at 7-8.         The failure of the court to enter the amount of

damages reflected in Mr. Datts’s Exhibit P-1 was an oversight plain on the face

of the record. Id. at 9. Hence, it had the authority to correct the clerical error

and amend its verdict. Id. at 8 (citing Maize v. Atl. Ref. Co., 41 A.2d 850,

854 (Pa. 1945)3 (“Verdicts which are not technically correct in form but which

manifest a clear intent on the part of the factfinder may be corrected without

resort to the grant of a new trial.”)) (cleaned up).

       Mr. Little offers no authority to counter the trial court’s reasoning.

Indeed, the trial court’s jurisdiction to correct the omission from its order long

after thirty days is supported by the case law. See, e.g., Hayward, supra

at 236 (holding extraordinary circumstances existed to modify a qualified

domestic relations order six years after its entry where the order’s indication

of an improper coverture fraction was apparent from the face of the record).

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3 The Maize Court in turn cited with approval Cohn v. Scheuer, 8 A. 421,
422 (Pa. 1887), in which our Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge’s
amendment of the verdict weeks after trial to add the amount awarded where
the failure to include it originally was a mistake on the part of the court crier.

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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment entered upon the trial court’s September

13, 2021 order granting Mr. Datts’s motion to correct the record.

     Judgment affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 2/2/2023

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