Court Opinion

ID: 9471854
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:42:43.172311+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:36.669549
License: Public Domain

JOHN R. GIBSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting, joined by ROSS, FAGG and BOWMAN, Circuit Judges.
I respectfully dissent from the court’s opinion. The arbitrator’s award in this case alters and changes the terms of the collective bargaining agreement and therefore does not draw its essence from it. The award is also punitive in nature and is based on an unsupported factual assumption.
Section 21C of the collective bargaining agreement directs that “[t]he arbitrator’s decision shall be within the terms of this Agreement” and that “[h]e shall not add to, subtract from, alter, or change the terms.” The collective bargaining agreement specifically limits employee paid vacations. Section 11A provides as follows:
11A. Annual vacations with pay, subject to the provisions of this SECTION, will be granted to employees in accordance with the following schedule:
Employees with one year of service 5 days
Employees with two years of service 10 days
Employees with five years of service 12 days
Employees with eight years of service 15 days
Employees with fifteen years of service 20 days
Employees with twenty-five years of service 25 days
The arbitrator’s award has altered and changed the contract, and allows those employees who did not work during the inventory shutdown more paid vacation time than provided for in Section 11A. In so doing, the arbitrator reasoned that: “[T]o merely grant an unpaid week off for a summer vacation equates to imposing on the grievants what virtually amounts to a lay-off. No recognized principle of equity permits such a penalty on the prevailing party in a contractual dispute.” The arbitrator thus demonstrates his violation of Section 21C of the collective bargaining agreement, as well as the following command of United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1361, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960):
[A]n arbitrator is confined to interpretation and application of the collective bargaining agreement; he does not sit to *973dispense his own brand of industrial justice .... [H]is award is legitimate only so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitrator’s words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.
The arbitrator, in ignoring these limitations, manifested an infidelity to his obligation. His award thus did not draw its essence from the collective bargaining agreement and we should refuse enforcement of it.
The arbitrator has disregarded and modified the plain and unambiguous provisions of the collective bargaining agreement, ignoring the command that he simply interpret and apply it. See, e.g., Truck Drivers & Helpers Union, Local 784 v. Ulry-Talbert Co., 330 F.2d 562, 564-65 (8th Cir.1964); Monongahela Power Co. v. Local No. 2332, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 566 F.2d 1196, 1198-99 (4th Cir. 1976); Textile Workers Union of America, Local Union No. 1386 v. American Thread Co., 291 F.2d 894 (4th Cir.1961). A panel of this court recently applied similar principles in St. Louis Theatrical Co. v. St. Louis Theatrical Brotherhood Local 6, 715 F.2d 405 (8th Cir.1983), finding that an arbitrator violated his authority in setting aside a discharge and reducing the employee’s discipline to a thirty-day suspension without pay.
Given the limitation on paid vacation time contained in Section 11A of the collective bargaining agreement, the result of the arbitrator’s award is to give those who did not work during the inventory shutdown an extra week’s paid vacation. On this basis, the district court concluded that the arbitrator’s award was not compensatory but punitive. In the absence of a finding of willful conduct or authorization for a punitive award within the agreement, a court may vacate a labor arbitrator’s punitive award. See, e.g., Westinghouse Electric Corp., Aerospace Division v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No. 1805, 561 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1036, 98 S.Ct. 771, 54 L.Ed.2d 783 (1978).
The court today justifies its decision on the unsupported assumption that the award was compensatory because employees were forced to take their vacation during the inventory shutdown. The record reflects, however, that the employees who chose not to work during the inventory shutdown and thus used paid vacation time did so voluntarily. Counsel for the Union conceded as much, although grudgingly, at the oral argument before the panel. The arbitrator himself noted that “[mjost of [the employees] who had volunteered to assist in the inventory returned to scratch their names from the sign-up sheet.” If the affected employees had left their names on this sheet and had worked during the shutdown, they would have been able to preserve vacation time for later in the year. Litton assigned additional employees to work during the shutdown because an insufficient number volunteered. Thus, the Union cannot validly claim that employees were “forced” to use vacation time during the inventory shutdown.
The arbitrator’s award also rests on the premise that the employees were entitled to a fifty-two week payroll year. In reviewing this premise, the district court properly found:
Clearly, lay-offs are not prohibited by the contract. The exact timing of the inventory shutdown, only, is controlled. Additionally, employees are not guaranteed a 52-week pay period year. Those employees who neither work nor use paid vacation time during inventory shutdown in fact have a 51-week pay-period year. Thus, the granting of a week of paid vacation results in a windfall to those who neither worked nor used vacation time during the March 1981 inventory shutdown.
The arbitrator thus improperly assumed the existence of a fact that was central to the award which had no support and, under these circumstances, the award cannot stand. See Electronics Corp. of America v. International Union of Electrical, Radio & *974Machine Workers, Local 272, 492 F.2d 1255, 1257 (1st Cir.1974). Cf. Detroit Coil Co. v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local # 82, 594 F.2d 575, 580-81 (6th Cir.1979) (award cannot stand when arbitrators factual determinations are unsupported by record), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 840, 100 S.Ct. 79, 62 L.Ed.2d 52 (1979).
Our reasoning is further developed in the opinion of the panel. Local 1139, United Electrical Workers v. Litton Microwave Cooking Products, Litton Systems, Inc., 704 F.2d 393 (8th Cir.1983).
The court today does damage to established principles of the law of arbitration. The court mistakenly concludes that “the award draws its essence from the contract” and overlooks the other important teachings of the Steelworkers trilogy. This case, in tandem with Lackawanna Leather Co. v. District Union No. 271, United Food & Commercial Workers, 706 F.2d 228 (8th Cir. 1983) (en banc), effectively eliminates any judicial review over the concededly broad powers of arbitrators.