Court Opinion

ID: 9946827
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-01 16:01:02.417878+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:41.389842
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-11186    Document: 28-1     Date Filed: 03/01/2024   Page: 1 of 5

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-11186
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       ERNEST JENKINS,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                    for the Northern District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket No. 2:20-cr-00273-LSC-JHE-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-11186       Document: 28-1      Date Filed: 03/01/2024      Page: 2 of 5

       2                       Opinion of the Court                   23-11186

       Before ROSENBAUM, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Ernest Jenkins appeals his sentence of 33 months’ imprison-
       ment, an upward variance from the guideline range of 4 to
       10 months, imposed following the revocation of his probation. Jen-
       kins argues that the district court abused its discretion in imposing
       the sentence because it is greater than necessary to serve the rele-
       vant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors considering Jenkins’s personal mit-
       igating characteristics, including his health issues.
               We generally review sentences imposed upon revocation of
       probation for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Mitsven,
       452 F.3d 1264, 1266 & n.1 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting that this is the
       standard of review for a sentence imposed upon revocation of su-
       pervised release, which we treat “essentially the same” as a sen-
       tence imposed upon probation revocation). An appellant generally
       preserves a substantive reasonableness challenge for appeal by ad-
       vocating for a lesser sentence than what the district court imposed,
       which is suﬃcient to bring to the district court’s attention his view
       that a longer sentence is greater than necessary. Holguin-Hernandez
       v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 762, 766-67 (2020). The party who chal-
       lenges the sentence bears the burden of showing that it is unrea-
       sonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the
       § 3553(a) factors. United States v. Trailer, 827 F.3d 933, 936 (11th Cir.
       2016).
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       23-11186               Opinion of the Court                          3

              If a defendant violates a condition of probation, the district
       court may, after a hearing and consideration of the § 3553(a) factors
       to the extent that they are applicable, continue the defendant on
       probation or revoke probation and resentence him. 18 U.S.C.
       § 3565. The “overarching” instruction to sentencing courts in
       18 U.S.C. § 3553 is that any sentence, whether within the guideline
       range or through a variance, must be suﬃcient but not greater than
       necessary to comply with the purposes listed in § 3553(a)(2). Kim-
       brough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a);
       see Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (stating that whether
       a sentence falls inside or outside the guideline range, the district
       court must consider the § 3553(a) factors). The proper factors as
       set out in § 3553(a) include the nature and circumstances of the of-
       fense, the personal history and characteristics of the defendant, the
       seriousness of the crime, the promotion of respect for the law, just
       punishment, adequate deterrence, and protection of the public
       from further crimes of the defendant. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)-(2).
       The court must also consider the applicable guideline range, any
       pertinent policy statements from the Sentencing Commission, the
       need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities between similarly
       situated defendants, and the need to provide restitution to any of
       the defendant’s victims. Id. § 3553(a)(1), (3)-(7).
             A court imposes a substantively unreasonable sentence only
       when it (1) fails to consider relevant factors that were due signiﬁ-
       cant weight, (2) gives an improper or irrelevant factor signiﬁcant
       weight, or (3) commits a clear error of judgment by balancing the
       proper factors unreasonably. United States v. Rosales-Bruno, 789 F.3d
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                  23-11186

       1249, 1256 (11th Cir. 2015). A district court must evaluate all the
       § 3553(a) factors, but the weight accorded to each factor is within
       the sound discretion of the district court. United States v.
       Ramirez-Gonzalez, 755 F.3d 1267, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2014). Under
       the abuse-of-discretion standard, even as to a substantial variance,
       we will not reverse a sentence unless we are “left with the deﬁnite
       and ﬁrm conviction that the district court committed a clear error
       of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors by arriving at a sen-
       tence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated
       by the facts of the case.” United States v. Johnson, 803 F.3d 610,
       618-19 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation marks omitted).
              The Supreme Court has speciﬁcally rejected the idea that an
       extraordinary justiﬁcation is required for a sentence outside the
       guideline range. Gall, 552 U.S. at 47. But “a major variance does
       require a more signiﬁcant justiﬁcation than a minor one—the re-
       quirement is that the justiﬁcation be suﬃciently compelling to sup-
       port the degree of the variance.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160,
       1196 (11th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (quotation marks omitted).
              The Sentencing Guidelines provide that a sentence imposed
       upon revocation of probation should sanction primarily the de-
       fendant’s “breach of trust” for failing to abide by the conditions of
       the court ordered supervision, while also accounting for, “to a lim-
       ited degree, the seriousness of the underlying violation and the
       criminal history of the violator.” U.S.S.G. Ch. 7, Pt. A, intro. com-
       ment. 3(b). We, however, have “consistently held that the policy
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       23-11186                Opinion of the Court                          5

       statements of Chapter 7 are merely advisory and not binding.”
       United States v. Silva, 443 F.3d 795, 799 (11th Cir. 2006).
               Here, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
       discretion in varying upward to a 33-month sentence because it was
       within its discretion to give greater weight to the nature and cir-
       cumstances of Jenkins’s violations, including his claim that he was
       not complying with his electronic monitoring requirements be-
       cause he had to supervise his minor son and that this claim was
       discovered to be false. Additionally, it was within the district court’s
       discretion to determine that the upward sentence was necessary to
       sanction Jenkins’s breach of the court’s trust. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 7,
       Pt. A, intro. comment. 3(b); 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1); Ramirez-Gonza-
       lez, 755 F.3d at 1272-73.
            Accordingly, we aﬃrm the district court’s sentence of 33
       months’ imprisonment.
              AFFIRMED.