Court Opinion

ID: 9551130
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:48:09.956905+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:23:06.322547
License: Public Domain

BIVINS, Judge (specially concurring). I agree with the majority that substantial evidence supports a reduced partial disability of 15%, and agree with the attorney fee discussion. I also agree with the result as to the reimbursement issue, but not the reasoning. The majority holds that NMSA 1978, Section 52-l-56(A) which provides that, “the compensation of the workman as previously awarded shall continue while the hearing is pending” conflicts with NMSA 1978, Section 52-l-47(C) that “in no case shall compensation benefits for disability continue after the disability ends or after the death of the injured workman.” According to the majority, the “manifest intent” of Section 52-l-47(C) prevails over any contradictory statutory provision (Section 52 — 1—56(A)), since it represents a later declaration of legislative intent and effectively repeals by implication the earlier conflicting legislative language. Because the two provisions can be read together in harmony in order to ascertain the legislative intent, Allen v. McClellan, 75 N.M. 400, 405 P.2d 405 (1965), I find no conflict, and, therefore, disagree with the approach taken by the majority. Section 52-l-56(A) provides the machinery for increasing, reducing or terminating compensation “as the facts may warrant.” Hearings for these purposes may not be held more frequently than at six-month intervals. And the compensation previously awarded shall continue while the hearing is pending. Section 52-1-47 simply sets general limitations on compensation benefits, and does not, in my opinion, conflict with or alter the statutory scheme for increasing, reducing or terminating compensation as covered by Section 52-l-56(A). While Section 52-l-56(A) does not expressly provide for retroactive application and, given the short intervals when applications for changes in compensation may be made, such would not ordinarily be contemplated; nevertheless, equitable principles may warrant retroactive application in an appropriate case. See Anaya v. City of Santa Fe, 80 N.M. 54, 451 P.2d 303 (1969) (holding courts may consider equitable principles in worker’s compensation proceedings). Here, defendants claim fraud and unjust enrichment. Because of the language in Section 52-l-56(A) requiring continuation of compensation while the hearing is pending, the trial court apparently believed it lacked authority to make a retroactive determination. I agree with the majority that the trial court can make such a determination and would remand for that purpose. For the reasons stated, however, I do not believe it necessary to hold the language of Section 52-l-56(A) repealed in order to reach this result.