Court Opinion

ID: 9846342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:39:37.16804+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:28.213916
License: Public Domain

KLEINSCHMIDT, Judge,
dissenting.
¶ 46 I respectfully dissent because, in my opinion, the possibility of having to pay fees and costs to a teacher who prevails in a termination proceeding builds a constitutionally unacceptable bias into the process. I agree with the majority in all other respects.
¶ 47 It is safe to assume that school boards put a priority on their core function of providing the essentials necessary to educate children and that underfunded districts have difficulty in meeting this goal. See Roosevelt Elem. Sch. Dist. v. Bishop, 179 Ariz. 233, 877 P.2d 806 (1994). It follows that school boards look with a sharp and disapproving eye on expenditures that do not relate directly to their mission of educating children. In this respect, I would distinguish them from federal agencies, like the one involved in a case the majority cites, Marshall v. Jerrico, *158Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 100 S.Ct. 1610, 64 L.Ed.2d 182 (1980). The funding of a large federal agency is probably less restricted and its activities are certainly less subject to local interest and scrutiny than the funding and activities of a school board.
¶ 48 While $12,000, which the majority assumes might be the fees and costs for a case like this one, may be a relatively small sum in terms of the District’s budget, in absolute terms, it is still a considerable amount of money. Pavlik, in his response to the brief of Amici, points out that $12,000 would represent nearly fifty percent of the District’s actual expenditures for the gifted program for grades 9 through 12; twice the amount actually spent for children with orthopedic impairments; more than jé of the amount budgeted for children with hearing impairments; more than jé of the amount budgeted for children with multiple disabilities; more than jé of the amount budgeted for children with visual impairments or pre-school children with speech and language delay; and more than jé of the amount budgeted for preschool children with severe developmental delays.
¶49 I believe the statutory process for terminating teachers is constitutional, in all respects other than the fee payment provision. Generally, if an unconstitutional provision is removed from the statute and the statute still provides a comprehensive treatment of a particular subject, it is presumed that the legislative intent would be to leave the remaining statute in effect. Republic Inv. Fund I v. Town of Surprise, 166 Ariz. 143, 151, 800 P.2d 1251, 1259 (1990). I think the general rule applies here, and I would remand the case for a new hearing. The practical problem of presenting the case to the same board that has already heard the matter can be partially ameliorated by referring the case to a hearing officer as provided for A.R.S. section 15-541, which went into effect after the Board heard this case.