Court Opinion

ID: 9604062
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:13:47.033057+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:19:21.310593
License: Public Domain

ROSE, Justice
(specially concurring in majority opinion).
I think we get into huge trouble when we undertake to look outside the issues of this case in order to point accusing fingers at problems and persons not in or parties to the action in an effort to justify or accommodate a result, whether it be a justification of the majority opinion or the dissent.
The cold facts are that the defendant could not have purchased the ranch at the price it did unless it had arranged to pay the plaintiff $30,000 and obtain a release of any claim that the plaintiff had against the estate. Whether it was right or wrong for the executor of the estate to lay on this condition before he would sell to the defendant is a matter between the executor and the defendant or it may be of concern to the heirs — or a problem of some other court in another case. If there are professional people whose ethics are in question, this might properly become a problem for resolve with the appropriate authority of the Wyoming State Bar — or ultimately this Court. But, in my judgment, at this juncture, these ancillary inquiries are totally outside the issues of this case.
In order to acquire the ranch properties and upon acknowledging that the plaintiff had performed valuable services in behalf of the estate, the defendant agreed to pay the plaintiff’s fee in consideration of the plaintiff renouncing his claim. The purchase price of the property was fixed depending upon the defendant’s discharging this obligation. Now that the defendant has the ranch it wants to renege on that promise. For me this constitutes a precise and accurate framing of the problem.
The defendant would not have been able to come by the properties at the price it paid if the plaintiff had not given up his claimed right of action. Whether the plaintiff could have proven employment and services rendered is not for us to here decide. He did in fact give up his right of action against the estate in return for the defendant’s promise to pay $30,000. This was a settlement for which there was consideration running to both parties to this lawsuit.
I would say that the defendant has placed itself in a position where it may not now deny the debt. The plaintiff, in good faith and to his detriment, relied on the promise of the defendant when he released his claim. This concept enables me to reach my concurrence with the results of the majority opinion. Like the Chief Justice, I have some problems with the majority’s third-party-beneficiary theory.
Whether the claim was good — bad—or indifferent, it was never alleged to have been fraudulent and it seems to me that we are treating this case as though the issue were fraud. The parties did not allege or prove or rely upon this theory of law (even though they probably should have), and I, at the appellate level, would not go outside the issues or in search of other parties in an effort to bring fraud into the case.
I can relate to the outrage of the Chief Justice when the inferences and the in-nuendoes of these transparent shenanigans are considered, but my outrage comes out of apparent wrongdoing that is really not before us either for decision or rectification. It may be that these matters should have been before us here or should be before us in another action — but I do not believe that sins or wrongs which are not within the four corners of the lawsuit should be given our accounting.
All whose conscience troubles them should feel our anger but our anger should not cloud our judgment.
I would concur in the result of the majority opinion.