Court Opinion

ID: 9422197
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-02 23:01:36.90122+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:22:34.707595
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Black,
with whom
The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Douglas concur, dissenting.
We are once again called upon to consider the constitutionality of penalties imposed upon lawyers who refuse to testify before a secret inquiry being conducted by the State of New York into suspected unethical practices among members of the legal profession in and around New York City. In Anonymous v. Baker,1 a majority *132of this Court upheld the power of New York to conduct such a secret inquiry. Here, the majority upholds the disbarment of petitioner, a New York lawyer for thirty-nine years, solely because, in reliance upon an assertion of his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, he refused to testify before that inquiry. The theory upon which this order of disbarment was upheld by the New York Court of Appeals — a theory which the majority here embraces — is that although lawyers, as citizens, have a constitutional right not to incriminate themselves, they also have a special duty, as lawyers, to cooperate with the courts and that this “duty of co-operation” would become a “ ‘phrase without reality’... if a lawyer after refusing to answer pertinent questions about his professional conduct can retain his status and privileges as an officer of the court.”2 In my judgment, however, the majority is here approving a practice that makes the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination the “phrase without reality.”3
*133This almost magical obliteration of the privilege against self-incrimination represents a radical departure from the previously established practice in the State of New York. For, as pointed out in the dissent of Judge Fuld, the New York Court of Appeals had earlier condemned an attempt to introduce precisely the policy it here accepted, saying: “‘The constitutional privilege [not to incriminate one’s self] is a fundamental right and a measure of duty ; its exercise cannot be a breach of duty to the court.’ It follows that . . . the present disciplinary proceeding instituted against tjhe appellant, wherein the single offense charged is his refusal to yield a constitutional privilege, is unwarrantable.”4
In departing from its prior policy of fully protecting the privilege against compelled self-incrimination guaranteed by both the State and the Federal Constitutions, the New York court relied heavily on several of this Court’s recent cases.5 Those cases, I regret to say, do provide some support for New York’s partial nullification of the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. For those cases are a product of the recently emphasized constitutional philosophy under which no constitutional right is safe from being “balanced” out of existence whenever a majority of this Court thinks that the interests of the State “weigh more” than the particular constitutional guarantee involved.6 The product of the “bal*134ancing” here is the conclusion that the State’s interest in disbarring any lawyer suspected of “ambulance chasing” outweighs the value of those provisions of our Bill of Rights and the New York Constitution commanding government not to make people testify against themselves. This is a very dubious conclusion, at least to one like me who believes that our Bill of Rights guarantees are essential to individual liberty and that they state their own values leaving no room for courts to “weigh” them out of. the Constitution.7 The First Amendment freedoms have already suffered a tremendous shrinkage from “balancing,” 8 and here the Fifth Amendment once again suffers from the same process.9 I agree with Mr. Justice Douglas that the order here under review is in direct conflict with the mandate of the Fifth Amendment as made controlling upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment.10
*135In a less important area, I would be content to rest my dissent upon the single ground that a State may not penalize any person for invoking his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. But, as I see this case, it involves other constitutional problems that go far beyond the privilege against self-incrimination — problems that involve dangers which, though as yet largely peculiar to the members of the legal profession, are so important that they need to be discussed. And, as I understand the majority’s opinion, it disposes of those problems on a ground that, from the standpoint of the legal profession, is the most far-reaching possible — that lawyers have fewer constitutional rights than others. It thus places the stamp of approval upon a doctrine that, if permitted to grow, as doctrines have a habit of doing, can go far toward destroying the independence of the legal profession and thus toward rendering that profession largely incapable of performing the very kinds of services for the public that most justify its existence.
The unlimited reach of the doctrine being promulgated can best be shown by analysis of the issue before us as that issue was posed by the court below. In concluding that petitioner should be disbarred for reliance upon the privilege against self-incrimination, the New York Court of Appeals expressly recognized the right of every citizen, under New York law, to refuse to give self-incriminating testimony. “That right,” the court said, “was his [petitioner’s] as it would be the right of any citizen . . . .” But, the court reasoned, petitioner was more *136than an ordinary citizen. “[H]e stood before the inquiry and before the Appellate Division in another quite different capacity, also.”11 The capacity referred to was petitioner's capacity as a lawyer. In that “capacity,” the court concluded, petitioner could not properly avail himself of his rights as a citizen. Thus it is clear that the theory adopted by the court below and reaffirmed by the majority here is that lawyers may be separated into a special group upon which special burdens can be imposed even though such burdens are not and cannot be placed' upon other groups. Lawyers are thus to have their legal rights determined by something less than the “law of the land” as it is accorded to other people.
In my judgment, the theory so casually but enthusiastically adopted by the majority constitutes nothing less than a denial to lawyers of both due process and equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. For I have always believed that those guarantees, taken together, mean at least as much as Daniel Webster told this Court was meant by due process of law, or the “law of the land,” in his famous argument in the Dartmouth College case: “By the law of the land is most clearly intended the general law .... The meaning is, that every citizen shall hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities, under the protection of the general rules which govern society.”12 I think it is clear that the opin*137ion of the majority in this case says unequivocally that lawyers may not avail themselves of “the general rules which govern society.”
The majority recognizes, as indeed it must, that New York is depriving lawyers, because they are lawyers, of the full benefit of a constitutional privilege available to other people. But, instead of reaching the natural and, I think, obvious conclusion that such a singling out of one particular group13 for special disabilities with regard to the basic privileges of individuals is in direct conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment,14 it chooses to defend this patent discrimination against lawyers on the theory that there are no protections guaranteed to every man who, in the words of Magna Charta, is being “anywise destroyed” by the Government. The “law of the land” is therefore, in the view of the majority, an accordion-like protection that can be withdrawn from any person or group of persons whenever the Government might prefer “procedures resulting in greater preventive certainty” if it can show some “reasonable” basis for that *138preference. The majority then proceeds to find such a “reasonable” basis on two grounds: first, that lawyers occupy a high position in our society “affording special opportunities for deleterious conduct” and can, by virtue of that position, be compelled to forego rights that are accorded to other groups; and, secondly, that the powers here exercised over petitioner by the courts of New York are no different than those exercised over lawyers by the courts of England several hundred years ago. In my judgment, neither of these grounds provides the slightest justification for the refusal of the State of New York to allow lawyers to avail themselves of “the general rules which govern society.”
I heartily agree with the view expressed by the majority that lawyers occupy an important position in our society, .for I recognize that they have a great deal to do with the administration, the enforcement, the interpretation, and frequently even with the making of the Constitution and the other laws that govern us. But I do not agree with the majority that the importance of their position in any way justifies a discrimination against them with regard to their basic rights as individuals. Quite the contrary, I would think that the important role that lawyers are called upon to play in our society would make it all the more imperative that they not be discriminated against with regard to the basic freedoms that are designed to protect the individual against the tyrannical exertion of governmental power. For, in my judgment, one of the great purposes underlying the grant of those freedoms was to give independence to those who must discharge important public responsibilities. The legal profession, with responsibilities as great as those placed upon any group in our society, must have that independence. If it is denied them, they are likely to become nothing more than parrots of the views of whatever group wields governmental power at the moment. Wherever that has happened in the *139world, the lawyer, as properly so called and respected, has ceased to perform the highest duty of his calling and has lost the affection and even the respect of thé people.
Nor do I believe, as the majority asserts, that the discrimination here practiced is justified by virtue of the fact that the courts of England have for centuries exercised disciplinary powers “over members of the bar, incident to their broader responsibility for keeping the administration of justice and the standards of professional conduct unsullied.” The rights of lawyers in this country are not, I hope, to be limited to the rights that English rulers chose to accord to their barristers hundreds of years ago'. For it is certainly true that the courts of England could have then, as the majority points out, made “short shrift” of any barrister who refused to “co-operate” with the King’s courts. Indeed, those courts did sometimes make “short shrift” of lawyers whose greatest crime was to dare to defend unpopular causes.15 And in much the same manner, these same courts were at this same time using their “inherent” powers to make “short shrift” of juries that returned the wrong verdict.16 History, I think, records *140that it was this willingness on the part of the courts of England to make “short shrift” of unpopular and uncooperative groups that led, first, to the colonization of this country, later, to the war that won its independence, and, finally to the. Bill of Rights.17
When the Founders of this Nation drew up our Constitution, they were uneasily aware of this English practice, both as it had prevailed in that country and as it had been experienced in the colonies prior to the Revolution. Particularly fresh in their minds was the treatment that had been accorded the lawyers who had sought to defend John Peter Zenger against a charge of seditious libel before a royal court in New York in 1735.18 These two *141lawyers had been summarily disbarred by the judges presiding at that trial for “having presumed, (notwithstanding they were forewarned by the Court of their displeasure, if they should do it) to sign, and having actually signed, and put into court, Exceptions, in the name of John Peter Zenger; thereby denying the legality of the judges their commissions . . .19 It is to the lasting credit and renown of the colonial bar that Andrew Hamilton, a lawyer of Philadelphia, defied the hostility of the judges, defended and brought about the acquittal of Zenger.20
Unlike the majority today, however, the Founders were singularly unimpressed by the long history of such English practices. They drew up a Constitution with provisions that were intended to preclude for all time in this country the practice of making “short shrift” of anyone— whether he be lawyer, doctor, plumber or thief. Thus, it was provided that in this country, the basic “law of the land” must include, among others, freedom from bills of attainder, from ex post facto laws and from compulsory self-incrimination, and rights to trial by jury after indictment by grand jury and to assistance of counsel.21 To make certain that these rights and freedoms would be accorded equally to everyone, it was also provided: “No person shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”22 (Emphasis supplied.) *142The majority is holding, however, that lawyers are not entitled to the full sweep of due process protections because they had no such protections against judges or their fellow lawyers in England. But I see no reason why this generation of Americans should be deprived of a part of its Bill of Rights on the basis of medieval English practices that our Forefathers left England, fought a revolution and wrote a Constitution to get rid of.23 This Court should say here with respect to due process and self-incrimination what it said with respect to the freedoms of speech and press in Bridges v. California: “[T]o assume that English common law in this field became ours is to deny the generally accepted historical belief that ‘one of the objects of the Revolution was to get rid of the English common law on liberty of speech and of the press.’ ”24
Instead of applying the reasoning of the Bridges case to protect the right of lawyers to avail themselves of the privilege against self-incrimination, the majority departs from that reasoning in an opinion that threatens also to restrict the freedoms of speech, press and association. For, in addition to the bare holding that a lawyer may not avail *143himself of the “law of the land” with respect to the privilege against self-incrimination, the opinion carries the plain implication that a lawyer is not to have the protection of the First Amendment with regard to his private beliefs and associations whenever his exercise of those freedoms'might interfere with his duty to “co-operate” with a judge.25 It is, of course, possible that the majority will allow this process to go no further — that it will not disturb the few remaining constitutional safeguards of the lawyer’s independence. But I find no such promise in the majority’s opinion. On the contrary, I find in that opinion a willingness to give overriding effect to the lawyer’s duty of “co-operation,” even to the destruction of constitutional safeguards, and I cannot know how many constitutional safeguards would be sacrificed to this doctrine. Could a lawyer who refused to “co-operate” now be subjected to an unlawful search in an' attempt to find evidence that he is guilty of something that a judge might later find to constitute “shady practices”?26 Could the court peremptorily confine a lawyer in jail for contempt until he agreed to “co-operate” with the court by foregoing his privilege against self-incrimination — or renouncing his freedom of speech?27 Or can American courts now emu*144late the one-time practice of English courts of sending lawyers to jail for the “crime” of publicly advocating the repeal of laws that require people to incriminate themselves?28 If the requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws are observed, we know that the answers to these questions would be, no. But who knows how short “short shrift” can get?
The majority says that some of the evil practices I have referred to do not exist today and that they would now be held unconstitutional. The Court does not mean, of course, that the people of this country have an “absolute” right not to be subjected to such practices.29 It means rather that a majority of this Court, as presently constituted, thinks that such practices are not “justified on balance.” But only 10 years ago, a different majority of this Court upheld summary imprisonment of the defense counsel in Dennis v. United States,30 on a record which indicated that the primary reason for that imprisonment was the imputation to the lawyers of what the trial judge conceived of as the unpatriotic and treasonable designs of their clients.31 Even more recently, a *145bare 5-4 majority of this Court prevented the temporary disbarment of a lawyer whose only “crime” lay in criticizing the manner in which the federal courts conduct trials for sedition.32 And today, this Court is upholding the refusal of two States to admit lawyers to their respective Bars solely because those lawyers would not renounce their rights under the First Amendment.33 The sad truth is that the majority is being unduly optimistic in thinking the practices I have mentioned do not exist today. They may have been disguised by description in different language but the practices themselves have not changed.
It seems to me that the majority takes a fundamentally unsound position when it endorses a practice based upon the artificial notion that rights and privileges can be stripped from a man in his capacity as a lawyer without affecting the rights and privileges of that man as a man. It is beyond dispute that one of the important ends served by the practice of law is that it provides a means of livelihood for the lawyer and those dependent upon him for support. That means of earning a livelihood is not one that has been conferred upon the lawyer as a gift from the State. Quite the contrary, it represents a substantial investment in time, money and energy on the part of the person who prepares himself to go into the legal profession. Moreover, even after a lawyer has been admitted to practice, a further substantial investment must be made to enable the lawyer to build up the sort of goodwill that lies at the root of any successful practice. Young lawyers must and do take on cases in which their ultimate fee is only a fraction of the real value of the work they *146put into the case in order to build up this sort of goodwill. The lawyer’s abilities, acquired through long and expensive education, and the goodwill attached to his practice, acquired in part through uncompensated services, are capital assets that belong to the lawyer — both as a lawyer and as a man, assuming that such a conceptualistic distinction can be drawn.
These assets should be no more subject to confiscation than his home or any other asset he may have acquired through his industry and initiative. If they are used in violation of an already-existing, clear requirement of the law which pronounces as the penalty for violation confiscation of the assets, and if the violation is established in a proceeding in which all the requirements of the “law of the land” are satisfied, that is one thing.34 But to confiscate the earning capacity that represents a large part of a lawyer’s lifetime achievements on the theory that no such asset exists is quite another. The theory that the practice of law is nothing more than a privilege conferred by the State which it can destroy whenever it *147can assert a “reasonable” justification for doing so seems to me to permit plain confiscation.
Even apart from the financial impact, the disbarment of a lawyer cannot help but have a tremendous effect upon that lawyer as a man. The dishonor occasioned by an official pronouncement that a man is no longer fit to follow his chosen profession cannot well be ignored. Such dishonor undoubtedly goes far toward destroying the reputation of the man upon whom it is heaped in the community in which he lives. And the suffering that results falls not only upon the disbarred lawyer but upon his family as well. Government certainly should not be allowed to do this to a man without according him the full benefit of the “law of the land,” both constitutional and statutory.
In view of all this, I can see no justification for the notion that membership in the bar is a mere privilege conferred by the State and is therefore subject to withdrawal for the “breach” of whatever vague and indefinite “duties” the courts and other lawyers may see fit to impose on a case-by-case basis.35 Nearly a century ago, an English judge observed, correctly I think, that “short of those heavy consequences which would attach to the greater and more heinous offences, I own I can conceive of no jurisdiction more serious than that by which a man may be deprived of his degree and status as a barrister, and which, in such a case — perhaps, after he has devoted the best years of his life to this arduous profession,- — deprives him of his position as a member of that profession, and throws him back upon the world to commence a new career as best he may, stamped with dishonour and disgrace.”36 *148But that is precisely what is happening here on the basis of nothing more than petitioner’s “failure to co-operate” with the courts by reliance upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. A man who has devoted thirty-nine years of his life to the practice of law and who, so far as this record shows, has never failed to perform those services faithfully and honorably is being dismissed from the profession in disgrace and is having his means of livelihood taken away from him at a point in his life when it seems highly unlikely that he will be able to find an adequate alternative means to support himself.
Quite differently from the majority, I think that the legal profession not only can but should endure what the majority refers to as the “disrespect which would result from the publicity, delay, and possible ineffectiveness in their exposure and eradication that might follow could miscreants only be dealt with through ordinary investigatory and prosecutorial processes.” (Emphasis supplied.) Indeed, I cannot understand how any man in this country can assume that “publicity,” “delay” and “ineffectiveness” brought on by observance of due process of law can ever be disrespectable. I am not at all certain, however, that the legal profession can survive in any form worthy of the respect we want it to have if its internal intergroup conflicts over professional ethics37 are not rigidly confined by just those “ordinary investigatory and prosecutorial processes” which, though belittled by the majority today, are enshrined in the concepts of equal protection and due process. For if the legal profession can, with the aid of those members of *149the profession who have become judges, exclude any member it wishes even though such exclusion could not be accomplished within the limits of the same kind of due process that is accorded to other people, how is any lawyer going to be able to take a position or defend a cause that is likely to incur the displeasure of the judges or whatever group of his fellow lawyers happens to have authority over him? 38 The answer is that in many cases he is not going to be able to take such a position or to defend such a cause and the public will be deprived of just those legal services that, in the past, have given lawyers their most bona fide claim to greatness.
It may be that petitioner has been guilty of some violation of law which if legally proved would justify his disbarment. It is only fair to say, however, that there is not one shred of evidence in this record to show such a violation. And petitioner is entitled to every presumption of innocence until and unless such a violation has been charged and proved in a proceeding in which he, like other citizens, is accorded the protection of all of the safeguards guaranteed by the requirements of equal protection and due process of law. This belief that lawyers too are. entitled to due process and equal protection of the laws will not, I hope, be regarded as too new or too novel.
The great importance of observing due process of law,though to some extent familiar to lawyers and laymen alike, is sometimes difficult for laymen to understand. Courts have often had to rely upon lawyers and their familiarity with the wisdom underlying these processes *150to explain the need for time-consuming procedures to impatient laymen. Such impatience is understandable when it comes from laymen — but it is regrettable to find it in lawyers. The respect for a rule of law administered through due process of law is the very hallmark of a lawyer — without it he cannot keep faith with his profession.

 360 U. S. 287. The majority there held that witnesses before the inquiry could constitutionally be deprived of a public hearing and the assistance of counsel. But cf. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 237: “The determination to preserve an accused’s right to pro*132cedural due process sprang in large part from knowledge of the historical truth that the rights and liberties of people accused of crime could not be safely entrusted to secret inquisitorial processes.”

 Matter of Cohen, 7 N. Y. 2d 488, 495, 166 N. E. 2d 672, 675.

 In my judgment, petitioner’s reliance upon his federal privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments is sufficiently shown by this whole record to require the consideration of that question by this Court. As the majority points out, petitioner expressly asserted that privilege before the court conducting the inquiry. Since that time it is true that he has not always spelled out with meticulous specificity this self-incrimination claim under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, but he has consistently and repeatedly urged that his disbarment violates the Fourteenth Amendment. And the record shows throughout that the whole controversy has hinged around the question of the power of the State, under both the State and ,the Federal Constitutions, to force him to answer the questions he had been asked at the inquiry. Under these circumstances, I cannot allow to pass unnoticed the violation which I think has. occurred with respect to petitioner’s rights under the Fifth *133Amendment. Cf. Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U. S. 454, 457. While the Court seems to intimate an opposite view, its opinion appears to me actually to pass upon this federal contention.

 Matter of Grae, 282 N. Y. 428, 435, 26 N. E. 2d 963, 967.

 7 N. Y. 2d, at 496, 166 N. E. 2d, at 676. The cases relied upon were: Lerner v. Casey, 357 U. S. 468; Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U. S. 399; Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U. S. 1.

 The majority has not even bothered expressly to “strike a balance” in these cases apparently on the theory that the value of the privilege against self-incrimination is so small that it can be “outweighed” by *134any countervailing governmental interest. See, e. g., Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, supra, at 7-8: “Nor do we think that this discharge is vitiated by any deterrent effect that California’s law might have had on Globe’s exercise of his federal claim of privilege. The State may nevertheless legitimately predicate discharge on refusal to give information touching on the field of security.”

 My views of this “balancing” process have been set out at length in the companion cases, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, decided today, ante, p. 56, at 62-71, 75, and In re Anastaplo, decided today, ante, p. 97, at 109-113. See also the opinions cited at n. 10 in my dissenting opinion in Konigsberg.

 See, e. g., Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U. S. 399; Braden v. United States, 365 U. S. 431; Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U. S. 43; Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U. S. 388; Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U. S. 109; Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U. S. 72.

 It is true that some inroads have already been made into the Fifth Amendment, for both Lerner v. Casey, supra, and Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, supra, rested partly upon a willingness of a majority of this Court to “balance” away the full protection of that Amendment.

 This conclusion is reached primarily on the basis of agreement with the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Harlan in Twining v. New *135Jersey, 211 U. S. 78, 114-127. But even if that case were rightly decided, it would not provide support for the decision here. For the issue with regard to the privilege against self-incrimination here is quite different from the issue posed in the Twining case. In that case the only question before the Court was whether comment upon a defendant’s failure to take the stand in his own defense was constitutionally permissible.

 7 N. Y. 2d, at 495, 166 N. E. 2d, at 675.

 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 581. See also Vanzant v. Waddel, 2 Yerger 260, in which Judge Catron, later Mr. Justice Catron, speaking for the Supreme Court of Tennessee, observed: “The right to life, liberty and.property, of every individual, must stand or fall by the same rule or law that governs every other member of the body politic, or ‘land,’ under similar circumstances; and every partial or private law, which directly proposes to destroy or affect individual rights, or does the same thing by affording remedies leading to similar consequences, is unconstitutional and void.” Id., at 270. The views expressed by Webster and Judge Catron *137go back at least as far as 1215 and Magna Charta, in which it was provided: “No free man shall be taken or imprisoned, or disseised, or outlawed, or exiled, or anywise destroyed; nor shall we go upon him nor send upon him, but by the lawful judgment of his peers or by the law of the land.”

 I recognize, of course, that New York also singles out other groups for special treatment with regard to certain constitutional privileges. See Barsky v. Board of Regents, 347 U. S. 442. That practice, which I regard as also clearly unconstitutional (see my dissenting opinion in that case, id., at 456-467), does not affect the argument here. For discrimination against one group cannot be justified on the ground that it is also practiced against another.

 Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U. S. 12. In that case, we said: “In this tradition [the tradition of Magna Charta], our own constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection both call for procedures in criminal trials which allow no invidious discriminations between persons and different groups of persons.” Id., at 17.

 The following excerpt from Hallam, The Constitutional History of England, Vol. I (2d ed.), at 477, indicates the extent to which this sort of thing was done in seventeenth-century England: “Two puritans having been committed by the high-commission court, for refusing the oath ex-officio, employed Mr. Fuller, a bencher of Gray’s Inn, to move for their habeas corpus; which he did on the ground that the high commissioners were not empowered to commit any of his majesty’s subjects to prison. This being reckoned a heinous offence, he was himself committed, at Bancroft’s instigation, (whether by the king’s personal warrant, or that of the council-board, does not appear) and lay in gaol to the day of his death . . . .”

 Hallam, op. cit., supra, n. 15, at 316, makes the following observation with regard to the duty of cooperation imposed upon English juries: “There is no room for wonder at any verdict that could be returned by a jury, when we consider what means the government possessed of securing it. The sheriff returned a pannel, either *140according to express directions, of which we have proofs, or to what he judged himself of the crown’s intention and interest. If a verdict had gone against the prosecution in a matter of moment, the jurors must have laid their account with appearing before the star-chamber; lucky, if they should escape, on humble retractation, with sharp words, instead of enormous fines and indefinite imprisonment.”

 Judge Catron expressed the same point in Vanzant v. Waddel, supra: “The idea of a people through their representatives, making laws whereby are swept away the life, liberty and property of one or a few citizens, by which neither the representatives nor their other constituents are willing to be bound, is too odious to be tolerated in any government where freedom has a name. Such abuses resulted in the adoption of Magna Charta in England, securing the subject against odious exceptions, which is, and for centuries has been the foundation of English liberty. Its infraction was a leading cause why we separated from that country, and its value as a fundamental rule for the protection of the citizen against legislative usurpation, was the reason of its adoption as part of our constitution.” 2 Yerger, at 270-271.

 See the Trial of John Peter Zenger, 17 Howell’s State Trials 675. Zenger, a newspaper publisher, had seen fit to criticize the government and was being tried for printing “many things derogatory of the dignity of his majesty’s government, reflecting upon the legislature, upon the most considerable persons in the most distinguished stations in the province, and tending to raise seditions and tumults among the people thereof.” Id., at 678.

 Id., at 686-687. The judges there preferred the label of “contempt” to that of “failure to co-operate.”

 See Dictionary of American Biography, Vol. XX, at 648-649, for the story of Hamilton’s successful defense of Zenger.

 Cf. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U. S. 227, 235-241, especially at 237, n. 10.

 That command, of course, originally applied only to the Federal Government. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243. But with the adoption in 1868 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the same command, together with the related requirement of equal protection of the laws, became binding upon the States.

 The majority asserts that it is not only “the early beginning of the practice of judicial inquiry into attorney practices . . . [but also] the long life of that mode of procedure” that justifies its decision here. This argument — that constitutional rights are to be determined by long-standing practices rather than the words of the Constitution — is not, as the majority points out, a new one. It lay at the basis of two of this Court’s more renowned decisions — Dred Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 393, and Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U. S. 537. But cf. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483. The notion that a violation of the plain language of the Constitution can gain legal stature by long-continued practice is not one I can subscribe to. A majority group, as de Tocqueville observed, too often “claims the right not only of making the laws, but of breaking the laws it has made.” De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Vol. 1, at 261.

 314 U. S. 252, 264.

 This implication stems from the majority’s reliance upon its opinions in the companion cases, Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, ante, p. 36, and In re Anastaplo, ante, p. 82. If, as the majority says, there is no constitutional difference between admission and disbarment proceedings, it seems clear that lawyers may now be called in by a State and forced to disclose their political associations on a penalty of disbarment if they refuse to do so.

 The same point was persuasively urged by Mr. Justice Floyd of the Florida Supreme Court in a concurring opinion where that court refused to adopt the rule adopted by the New York court in this case. See Sheiner v. State, 82 So. 2d 657, 664.

 As shown in notes 15 and 16, supra, the same arguments used to justify the decision in this case would also be applicable to the supposed case for it certainly cannot be denied that such a practice had the “sanction” of English history.

 Hallam, op. cit., supra, n. 16, at 287, reports the following event in early seventeenth-century England: “The oath ex officio, binding the taker to answer all questions that should be put to him, inasmuch as it contravened the generous maxim of English law that no one is obliged to criminate himself, provoked very just animadversion. Morice, attorney of the court of wards, not only attacked its legality with arguments of no slight 'force, but introduced a bill to take it away. This was on the whole well received by the house; and sir Frahcis Knollys, the stanch enemy of episcopacy, though in high office, spoke in its favour. But the queen put a stop to the proceeding, and Morice lay some time in prison for his boldness.”

 This much is made indisputably clear in the majority opinion in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, supra, at 49-51.

 341 U. S. 494.

 See Sacher v. United States, 343 U. S. 1, 19 (dissenting opinion). In my judgment the Sacher case is not altogether unlike the case of the lawyer Fuller discussed in n. 15, supra.

 In re Sawyer, 360 U. S. 622. Cf. Trial of John Peter Zenger, supra.

 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, decided today, supra; In re Anastaplo, decided today, supra. The pressures being brought upon Konigsberg and Anastaplo are subtler than those brought upon such people as Morice (see note 28), but they are no less real.

 Thus, I am in complete agreement with the majority that, on a constitutional level, “[i]t is certainly not beyond the realm of permissible state concerns to conclude that too much attention to the business of getting clients may be incompatible with a sufficient devotion to duties which a lawyer owes to the court, or that the ‘payment of awards to persons bringing in, legal business’ is inconsistent with the personally disinterested position a lawyer should maintain.” But that state concern in preventing “ambulance chasing” is certainly no greater than the state concern in preventing any other activity which it has seen fit to make a crime. Suspected “ambulance chasers” should be no more subject to the deprivation of due process and equal protection that stems from “procedures resulting in greater preventive certainty” than are suspected murderers. Indeed, it seems to me that if the question is to be decided on the basis of “state concern,” there is no more justification for applying such summary procedures to “ambulance chasing” than for applying them to any other variety of crime.

 Cf. Barsky v. Board of Regents, supra, at 459, 472-474 (dissenting opinions).

 Hudson v. Slade, 3 Foster and Finlason (Q. B.) 390, 411.

 The true nature of the underlying controversy in this case, as a controversy between economically competing groups of lawyers, is shown by the fact that four different associations of attorneys filed briefs as amici curiae in the present proceeding — two favorable to petitioner and two favorable to respondent.

 The immense danger of departures from due process to lawyers who represent unpopular causes is dramatically illustrated in Sacher v. United States, supra. Cf. United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F. 2d 71, 82, for a discussion of another situation in which the independence of the lawyer may be crucial to his ability adequately to defend his client.