Court Opinion

ID: 9645303
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 21:20:06.075075+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:11:26.896589
License: Public Domain

GALLAGHER, Associate Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I concur in the result reached in the af-firmance of the convictions of appellant Davis.
I do not agree that there was a misjoin-der under Rule 8(b) as to appellant Warren and dissent from the reversal of his convictions. I believe the initial joinder was proper and therefore the denial of the motion to sever may be overturned by this court only if there has been an abuse of discretion. United States v. Wilson, 140 U.S.App.D.C. 220, 226, 434 F.2d 494, 500 (1970); United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 30 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042, 95 S.Ct. 2656, 45 L.Ed.2d 693 (1975). Rule 8(b) provides that joinder is proper when the defendants have participated in the same “series of acts or transactions.” I conclude that they were conducted in such a similar manner as to form a modus operandi and that although conspiracy was not alleged there was a continuing “common plan” in this series of rapes. See United States v. Scott, 413 F.2d 932 (7th Cir.1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006, 90 S.Ct. 560, 24 L.Ed.2d 498 (1970).
It is well-settled that joinder is improper when the crimes alleged are merely similar in character, see, e. g., United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 898 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924, 91 S.Ct. 883, 27 L.Ed.2d 828 (1971); C. Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure: Criminal § 144 (Supp.1975), but this case presents a series of rapes so similar in method that it cannot reasonably be said that they were simply separate criminal acts.1 Appellants were on a continuing predatory search for victims; rather than being seven separate acts, their rampage, conducted in the time span of slightly more than seven months with four of the rapes occurring in a two-week period, was a “series of acts” within the contemplation of Rule 8(b). Conspiracy need not be alleged for Rule 8(b) to apply. C. WRIGHT, supra at § 144.
Appellant alleges that he was prejudiced by being tried with a person who was indicted on seven counts of rape when appellant was only indicted on counts involving four women. The rule specifically provides, however, that “such defendants may be charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the defendants need not be charged in each count.” (Emphasis added.) Although there is always a certain amount of prejudice inherent in the joining of defendants,2 I do not find that there was substantial prejudice.3 Additionally, the trial judge informed the jury, *1272both at the beginning' of the trial and during the instructions, that they must consider the guilt or innocence of each defendant separately and that if they found one defendant guilty it should have no bearing upon the other defendant. I must assume that the jury heeded the instructions. Finally, the evidence against appellant Warren was extremely strong. There was considerable independent evidence of his guilt.
Furthermore, I believe there was no substantial prejudice on this record and, consequently, I see no reversible error. D.C. Code 1973, § 11-721 (e). I dissent from the reversal on appellant Warren.

. In addition to the similarities mentioned in the majority opinion there were other similarities in many of the rapes. Two of the victims were offered a ride by Davis and after accepting the ride Davis drove only a couple of blocks before picking up Warren, once indicating he was a hitchhiker and once indicating he was a friend. In the ease of another victim, Davis drove up and asked both Warren and the victim at the same time if they would like a ride. Also several of the victims were taken to either an abandoned building or construction site to be raped.

. King v. United, States, 355 F.2d 700, 704 (1st Cir. 1966).

. When no undue prejudice to the defendant is present and the original joinder was proper, *1272appellate courts are slow to overturn a trial court’s refusal to sever. E. g., United States v. Robinson, 139 U.S.App.D.C. 286, 432 F.2d 1348 (1970); Wiley v. United States, 277 F.2d 820 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 817, 81 S.Ct. 47, 5 L.Ed.2d 47 (1960). Even if the original joinder were incorrect as the majority asserts, .this circuit and others have held .that such misjoinder can be harmless error. Baker v. United States, 131 U.S.App.D.C. 7, 22-23, 401 F.2d 958, 973-74 (1968); United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879, 901 (9th Cir.1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924, 91 S.Ct. 883, 27 L.Ed.2d 828 (1971); United States v. Granello, 365 F.2d 990 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1019, 87 S.Ct. 1367, 18 L.Ed.2d 458 (1967). This is especially true when, as here, the government’s proof was very strong.