Court Opinion

ID: 9840616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-19 17:05:28.35355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:38:10.781672
License: Public Domain

Filed 9/19/23 P. v. Gross CA4/1
                 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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                COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION ONE

                                         STATE OF CALIFORNIA

 THE PEOPLE,                                                          D080743

           Plaintiff and Respondent,

           v.                                                         (Super. Ct. No. SCE406399)

 ABRAHAM ELIEZER GROSS,

           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kathleen M. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed.
         Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Assistant Attorneys General, Steve Oetting and Michael Dolida,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
         Abraham Eliezer Gross pleaded guilty to a charge of unlawfully taking
and driving without the owner’s permission a vehicle valued over $950. (Veh.
Code, § 10851, subd. (a).) The court placed him on two years of probation. It
also imposed certain fines, fees and assessments, and several alcohol-related
probation conditions.
      Gross contends: (1) the court abused its discretion in ordering the fines
fees and assessments without considering his ability to pay under People v.
Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157 (Dueñas); and (2) his alcohol-related
probation conditions are invalid under People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481
(Lent). We affirm.
                                BACKGROUND
      According to the probation report, Gross took a vehicle from the victim.
When police recovered the vehicle from Gross, they found inside of it “a piece
of plastic which contained a black substance (.24 gross grams), a makeshift
dropper with a bottle cap containing .82 grams of a brown substance, and two
small clear plastic bags with a white substance (.24 and .70 gross grams).”
Gross said all the items in the vehicle belonged to him. He admitted using
“crystal” the previous day while he was in the vehicle, and identified the
substance in the plastic baggies as methamphetamine. He admitted to
having heroin in the vehicle as well.
      The prosecutor requested that Gross be placed in a residential
treatment program, pointing out he had walked away from such a treatment

facility before.1 The court permitted him to be released as requested.
      Over the defense objection that Gross was homeless and lacked the
ability to pay, the court ordered him to pay a total of $1194 as follows: an

1      The prosecutor told the court, “I don’t think credit for time served is
appropriate. I think [Gross] clearly still obviously has his issues that have
not been addressed since his [failure to appear]. So I do think [the court
should release] him directly to a program again. It makes no sense to me,
when that was what everybody wanted, that he get treatment, because he
[failed to appear] and walked away from a program[.]
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$820 fine for his vehicle theft conviction (Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a)), a
mandatory $40 court operations assessment (Pen. Code, § 1465.8), a
mandatory $30 court facilities assessment (Gov. Code, § 70373), a restitution
fine of $300 (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (b)), suspended until completion of
probation, and an emergency medical transportation fee of $4 (Gov. Code,
§ 76000). The court left undetermined the amount of restitution owed to the
victim.
      The court did not require Gross to begin payment immediately: “The
fines—right now I’ll extend the payment for approximately six months. But I
will set them at a minimum of $35 or more per month . . . [¶] . . . in hopes
that [Gross] will become employed.” The court confirmed with its clerk that
the six-month grace period extended until January 17, 2023. Immediately
afterwards the court stated, “I’ll reserve as far as restitution.”
      Defense counsel renewed his objection that under Dueñas, supra, 30
Cal.App.5th 1157, Gross was unable to pay the fines, fees and assessments
due to his homelessness and lack of employment. The court reiterated to
defense counsel that Gross could revisit this issue at an appropriate time:
“Well, how do I know if he does become employed? I mean, I have to find still
that there’s some kind of extraordinary circumstances. And—so I don’t think
that his being homeless right now means that he can’t possibly pay [$]35 or
more a month in the future. But I’ll leave it open for you to advise him that if
he[]—remains homeless, then it can be added on and readdressed.”
      Gross filed his notice of appeal on July 29, 2022, and his opening brief
on November 4, 2022.
                                I. Dueñas Claim
      We disagree with Gross’s claim the court was unaware of its discretion
to waive the assessments or reduce his base fine because it relied on the

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standard for determining restitution, or that it “refused to consider reducing
any part of the total amount imposed believing that it had to find ‘some kind
of extraordinary circumstances’ to do so.” Gross contends the court
erroneously relied on section 1202.4, subdivision (b), which states: “In every
case where a person is convicted of a crime, the court shall impose a separate
and additional restitution fine, unless it finds compelling and extraordinary
reasons for not doing so and states those reasons on the record.” He adds,
“contrary to its belief, the trial court had the discretion to waive the
assessments imposed in the amount of $74 and set the base fine to an amount
lower than the $820 recommended by probation.”
      We conclude that nothing in the record shows the court was mistaken
about its discretion, as it did not address the merits of the fines, fees and
assessments individually at the restitution hearing. Rather, the court made
it clear it would consider the Duenas request in six months. Also, understood
in context, the court’s reference to it needing to find “extraordinary reasons”
related to the standard for imposing restitution at the hearing it had already
postponed. We interpret the court’s remarks to mean that if Gross at a
future date pursued his inability to pay in a proper motion, then it would
address the issue in the context of the pending restitution matter. Gross
cites to no evidence in the record that he revisited the matter in the trial
court as he was invited to do, or that he remains homeless and unable to pay
the imposed fines, fees and assessments. We therefore have nothing to
review, and appeal of this issue is premature.
                   II. Alcohol-Related Probation Conditions
      Gross contends the trial court abused its discretion when it imposed
multiple probation conditions related to his use of alcohol. He argues the
conditions are improper because alcohol played no role in the underlying

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offense, alcohol is a legal substance, and there is no indication he ever abused
alcohol. He contends the alcohol-related conditions are unreasonable under
Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at page 486, because the underlying incident did not
involve alcohol use and the record does not suggest he ever abused alcohol.
      According to the probation report, Gross admitted using heroin three
times a day, methamphetamine twice a day, and marijuana daily. He also
admitted that he used “crystal” while inside of the vehicle he unlawfully took,
and that he had heroin and methamphetamine with him at that time. Gross
also admitted his addiction problem, referring to his heroin addiction as the
“monkey on [his] back.” Gross acknowledges the probation report also shows
he “suffered several drug-related convictions from 2005-2006 when he was
approximately 19 to 20 years old,” and that “[b]y the time he turned 32 in
2018, his drug use had consumed him: he no longer could work and began
engaging in drug-related, theft-type conduct.”
      At sentencing, Gross objected to all of the alcohol-related probation
conditions requiring that he: not knowingly use or possess alcohol if directed;
attend “[s]elf-help” meetings if directed; submit to testing; not be in places
where alcohol is the main item for sale; and use a continuous alcohol-
monitoring device if ordered.
      The court ruled: “I think that the alcohol conditions are a source of
abuse in addition to substances. So I think that it’s best at this point that he
not have any alcohol. So I am going to go ahead and impose those since he
will be in residential treatment. I think that would defeat the purpose. [¶]
And then he needs to enroll in and adhere to and complete a substance abuse
treatment and recovery services.”
      Trial courts have broad discretion to impose reasonable conditions of
probation that foster rehabilitation and protect the community. (Pen. Code,

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§ 1203.1 subds. (a), (j); People v. Carbajal (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114, 1120.)
“ ‘[A] reviewing court will disturb the trial court’s decision to impose a
particular condition of probation only if, under all the circumstances, that
choice is arbitrary and capricious and is wholly unreasonable.’ ” (People v.
Bryant (2021) 11 Cal.5th 976, 984.)
      In order to invalidate a probation condition under Lent, the defendant
must make three showings: 1) the condition has no relationship to the crime;
2) the condition is related to conduct that is not itself criminal; and 3) the
condition is not reasonably related to his or her future criminality. (Lent,
supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) “The Lent test ‘is conjunctive—all three prongs
must be satisfied before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.’ ”
(In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1113, 1118 (Ricardo P.).) The third prong
is at issue here.
      In Ricardo P., the California Supreme Court explained that the test of
reasonableness involves a balancing of factors. “Lent’s third prong requires
more than just an abstract or hypothetical relationship between the
probation condition and preventing future criminality.” (Ricardo P., supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 1121.) Specifically, a probation condition cannot be justified
solely on the basis that it enhances the effective supervision of the
probationer without regard for the burden it places on the probationer. (Id.
at pp. 1122, 1125.) Rather, the “requirement that a probation condition must
be ‘ “reasonably related to future criminality” ’ contemplates a degree of
proportionality between the burden imposed by the condition and the
legitimate interests it serves.” (Id. at p. 1122.)
      It may be appropriate to impose a probation condition that, although
not directly connected to the crime for which probation is granted, is related
to the probationer’s personal and criminal history. In Ricardo P., the

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Supreme Court reasoned “that ‘conditions of probation aimed at
rehabilitating the offender need not be so strictly tied to the offender’s precise
crime’ [citation] so long as they are ‘reasonably directed at curbing [the
defendant’s] future criminality.’ ” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1122.)
Indeed, the court noted that “courts may properly base probation conditions
upon information in a probation report that raises concerns about future
criminality unrelated to a prior offense.” (Ibid.)
      This Court stated in People v. Beal (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 84, 87: “It is
well documented that the use of alcohol lessens self-control and thus may
create a situation where the user has reduced ability to stay away from
drugs. [Citations.] Presumably for this very reason, the vast majority of
drug treatment programs . . . require abstinence from alcohol use.” (Ibid.)
We concluded that “alcohol use may lead to future criminality where the
defendant has a history of substance abuse.” (Ibid.)
      In People v. Cota (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 786, 788, 792, we also upheld a
probation condition restricting use or possession of alcohol where the
defendant, who pleaded guilty to carrying a concealed dirk or dagger,
admitted he was “a habitual user of methamphetamine and a daily user of
marijuana.” (Id. at pp. 788, 792.) Although the incident in Cota did not
involve alcohol, we stated that “alcohol is a drug—albeit a legal one” and
noted an empirical nexus between drugs and alcohol. (Ibid.) “It would make
little sense to deprive [a defendant’s] probation officer of the power to direct
[a defendant] away from alcohol as a substitute mind-altering substance
when his [or her] substance abuse history is so clearly demonstrated.” (Ibid.)
Given the defendant’s history of drug use, we concluded the imposition of
alcohol-related probation conditions was reasonably related to preventing
future crimes. (Ibid.)

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        Likewise here, Gross admitted using drugs the day before he was
arrested, and abusing illicit drugs on a weekly basis. He admitted the illicit
drugs found in the car were his. Consistent with People v. Beal, supra, 60
Cal.App.4th 84 and People v. Cota, supra, 45 Cal.App.5th 786, the court
found “the alcohol conditions are a source of abuse in addition to substances.”
The court also pointed to the fact it was releasing Gross to a residential
treatment program as a basis for imposing the alcohol-related conditions. We
agree with that reasoning, and conclude the court did not abuse its broad
discretion in imposing the challenged conditions.
        Gross relies on People v. Cruz (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 707 (Cruz) and
argues nothing in the record indicates he abuses alcohol or that alcohol
played any kind of role in his committing the crime; and, an adult may legally
use and possess alcohol. He adds that “he has never been accused of or
convicted of an alcohol-related offense, he does not currently suffer from an
alcohol abuse problem, and he has never had to undergo prior interventions
for alcohol-related abuse. His problem is drugs, not alcohol.”
        In Cruz, the court struck an alcohol-related probation condition after
finding “nothing in the record to indicate that appellant’s use of marijuana
played a role in his decision to steal the vehicle” or that “he was under the
influence of marijuana at the time of his arrest, while still in possession of
the vehicle.” (Cruz, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th at p. 712.) The court further relied
on the fact that marijuana is legal for adults (id. at p. 711) and that the
defendant “ ‘has never been accused of or convicted of’ a drug-related offense,
‘he does not currently suffer from a substance abuse problem,’ and he has
‘never had to undergo prior interventions’ for drug-related abuse.” (Id. at p.
712.)

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      This case is distinguishable from Cruz, supra, 54 Cal.App.5th 707, as
the probation report shows Gross has a long history of drug related offenses,
and he admitted to the probation department that he had a long history of
using alcohol and using and abusing other drugs, including prescription pain
pills, marijuana, methamphetamine and heroin. Further, Gross previously
started but failed to complete a residential treatment program. Cruz
provides no basis to invalidate Gross’s alcohol-related probation conditions.
                                DISPOSITION
      The judgment is affirmed.

                                                                O’ROURKE, J.

WE CONCUR:

McCONNELL, P. J.

IRION, J.

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