Court Opinion

ID: 9658254
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:53:01.907824+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:53.182939
License: Public Domain

Cynar, P.J.
(dissenting). I am compelled to dissent from the majority’s finding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant relief from the property settlement provisions of the divorce judgment pursuant to GCR 1963, 528.3(6). I would affirm. The decision to grant or deny relief from a final judgment under GCR 1963, 528.3 rests within the trial court’s discretion. Cooper v Automotive Finishes, Inc, 109 Mich App 530, 533-534; 311 NW2d 414 (1981).
In Postill v Postill, 116 Mich App 578; 323 NW2d 491 (1982), this Court affirmed the trial court’s ruling which denied the plaintiff’s motion pursuant to GCR 1963, 528.3(6) for relief from the judgment of divorce. At the time of the parties’ divorce, the defendant’s libel action was pending. Following the divorce, the defendant was awarded $200,000 in the libel action. This Court observed that the motion for relief from judgment was not made within a reasonable time. The motion in Postill was made three years and eight months after the divorce judgment was entered, and hence was not timely made.
It is not disputed that the settlement agreement and release in the present case is dated November 5, 1981, and the stipulation to dismiss is dated November 6, 1981. It is reasonable to presume that the negotiation between the parties involved in the settlement had to take place some time before November 5, 1981. A petition was filed on December 4, 1981, on behalf of defendant to require plaintiff to disclose the amount of recovery obtained in the accident case and for modification of the property distribution provision of the divorce judgment. The motion for modification was made *401within a reasonable time under the facts of this case.
I have considered whether any substantial rights of plaintiff and intervening plaintiff would be adversely affected by relief from judgment. Plaintiff did invest the tort settlement proceeds in real estate, but did so several months after defendant had filed her petition to modify the divorce judgment. Had plaintiff followed the more prudent course of waiting until the modification petition had been resolved, any inconvenience would have been spared. This fact also affects my consideration of intervening plaintiff’s rights.
Intervening plaintiff’s interest in the property was acquired within several weeks following her marriage, was purchased with settlement proceeds acquired by plaintiff several months prior to the marriage, and obtained at a time when defendant’s petition for modification was pending. While the trial court was certainly obligated to consider intervening plaintiff’s interest, it was not compelled to ignore the circumstances under which it was acquired. Our facts merit comparison with those of Carlisle v Carlisle, 96 Mich 128; 55 NW 673 (1893), cited in support of intervening plaintiff’s argument; there the Court stated:
"In any case where a petition is filed after such a lapse of time, it should affirmatively appear what change, if any, has taken place in the status of the parties, and, when a decree has been followed by the marriage of one of the parties, the court should see to it that the interests of the innocent third party are fully protected * * *.” (Emphasis in original.) Carlisle, supra, p 134.
The petition in Carlisle, however, was filed more than four years following the divorce decree; our *402case does not involve "such a lapse of time”. Moreover, intervening plaintiff did not marry plaintiff or acquire her property interest until after defendant’s petition was filed. Upon due consideration of the facts, I would not find the second condition for operation of GCR 1963, 528.3(6) to be a barrier to relief from judgment. I have given attention to the requirement of "extraordinary circumstances”.
In Kaleal v Kaleal, 73 Mich App 181; 250 NW2d 799 (1977), this Court found "extraordinary circumstances” justifying relief from a judgment of divorce because of a "unique factual context”. In Kaleal, the plaintiff husband had assured the defendant wife that the sole reason for the divorce was his parents’ desire that he marry his cousin so that his cousin and her family could come to America. The plaintiff had assured the defendant that the arrangement was temporary, that he would remarry the defendant, and that there was no need for her to protect her property or alimony rights. Finally, the defendant was not represented by counsel in the divorce proceedings. Kaleal, supra, p 186.
This case provides a less unique factual setting than that involved in Kaleal; nonetheless, I would find the requisite extraordinary circumstances under these facts. In Banner v Banner, 45 Mich App 148, 152; 206 NW2d 234 (1973), we observed that "[n]ot every error or irregularity in the proceedings which resulted in a judgment, even if sufficient to warrant reversal on direct appeal, may be urged in support of a motion to be relieved from that judgment. Were it otherwise, no judgment would be final”. Where, however, a clear legal error creates the potential for a serious inequity, the trial court’s decision to afford relief should not be disturbed.
*403This was a marriage of some ten years. Two children were born of the marriage. The total net assets disclosed in the divorce trial consisted of a family residence with an indebtedness thereon of $35,000, a parcel of vacant land, some household furniture and effects, and vehicles at a value of $9,000. Compare to this the size of plaintiff’s settlement, and it becomes readily apparent that the trial court’s initial ruling excluded from consideration the preeminent asset. I would conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in holding that the circumstances merited relief from judgment, per GCR 1963, 528.3(6). However, it should be noted, I would not express any opinion as to what portion if any, defendant is entitled to share in plaintiff’s personal injury cause of action which is a marital asset subject to division. Heilman v Heilman, 95 Mich App 728; 291 NW2d 183 (1980).