Court Opinion

ID: 9911412
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-19 20:10:44.371445+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:57:43.562034
License: Public Domain

J-S36029-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  FRANCISCO VELEZ-ZARAGOZA                     :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2476 EDA 2022

     Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 21, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Criminal Division at
                       No(s): CP-09-CR-0000334-2021

BEFORE: BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and KING, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.:                          FILED DECEMBER 19, 2023

       Appellant Francisco Velez-Zaragoza appeals from the judgment of

sentence imposed after he pled guilty to rape of a child and related offenses.

Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by denying

Appellant’s request for public funding to hire a defense expert for the sexually

violent predator (SVP) hearing. We affirm.

       We adopt the trial court’s facts and procedural history. See Trial Ct.

Op., 11/16/22, at 1-2. Briefly, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to

rape of a child, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, and statutory sexual

assault on January 28, 2022.1           The Honorable Diane E. Gibbons deferred

sentencing for the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board (SOAB) to determine

whether Appellant was an SVP.

____________________________________________

1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3121(c), 3123(a)(7), and 3122.1(b), respectively.
J-S36029-23

      On June 1, 2022, Appellant filed a motion requesting that the trial court

provide $2,000 in public funds for Appellant to use to hire an expert witness

for the SVP hearing. In support of his request, Appellant made the following

assertions:

      4. [Appellant’s] family has been contacted requesting funds to
         hire a defense expert and various experts had been contacted
         for the purpose of retaining them.

      5. [Appellant’s c]ounsel has been able to procure an expert who
         will review the [SOAB] file, write a report, and testify for a fee
         of $4,000.

      6. [Appellant’s] family has gathered all available funds and [was]
         able to come up with $2,000 to cover the cost of the expert.

      7. [Appellant’s c]ounsel will be severely handicapped in cross
         examining the SOAB psychologist and presenting a defense to
         her finding if a defense expert cannot be retained.

Appellant’s Mot. for Public Funds, 6/1/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated).

      Appellant did not attach an affidavit describing his inability to pay the

proposed expert’s fee or any documentation regarding his financial status to

his motion. The Honorable Raymond F. McHugh denied Appellant’s motion for

public funds on July 25, 2022.

      The Honorable Charissa J. Liller conducted Appellant’s sentencing and

SVP hearing on September 21, 2022. Appellant objected to proceeding with

the SVP hearing that day because Judge McHugh had denied his motion for

public funds to hire an expert witness. The trial court overruled that objection.

The Commonwealth presented the testimony of SOAB member Veronique N.

Valliere, Psy.D., who concluded that Appellant met the criteria for an SVP

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pursuant to the Sexual Offenses Reporting and Notification Act 2 (SORNA II).

Appellant did not call any witnesses for the SVP hearing. Ultimately, the trial

court sentenced Appellant to the agreed-upon term of ten to twenty years’

incarceration pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement. The trial court also

concluded that Appellant was an SVP.

       Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Both Appellant and the trial

court3 complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

       On appeal, Appellant raises the following issue:

       Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s
       motion for funds for expert witness without a hearing?

Appellant’s Brief at 8 (formatting altered).4

       In his sole claim, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by denying

his motion for public funds to hire an expert for the SVP hearing. Id. at 11-

18. Appellant contends that as an indigent defendant, he had a right to a

public funds to hire an expert witness for the SVP hearing.        Id. at 11-14

(citing, inter alia, Commonwealth v. Curnutte, 871 A.2d 839 (Pa. Super.

____________________________________________

2 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.42.

3 Although Judge McHugh denied Appellant’s motion for public funds, Judge

Liller was the sole author of the trial court’s Rule 1925(a) opinion.

4 We note that in his Rule 1925(b) statement, Appellant also argued that
SORNA was unconstitutional.        See Rule 1925(b) Statement, 10/14/22.
Appellant has not raised this claim in his appellate brief; therefore, Appellant
has abandoned this issue on appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 2116(a), 2119(a); see
also Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014, 1018 n.6 (Pa. 2003) (finding
waiver where the appellant abandoned claim on appeal).

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2005)).   Appellant further claims that the trial court erred by denying his

motion without first holding a hearing to determine whether Appellant was

indigent. Id. at 15-17 (citing Commonwealth v. Cannon, 954 A.2d 1222

(Pa. Super. 2008)).

      This Court has explained that “the provision of public funds to hire

experts to assist in the defense against criminal charges is a decision vested

in the sound discretion of the court and a denial thereof will not be reversed

absent an abuse of that discretion.” Commonwealth v. Konias, 136 A.3d

1014, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2016) (quoting Cannon, 954 A.2d at 1226) (some

formatting altered).

      It is well-established that indigent defendants have a right to
      access the same resources as non-indigent defendants in criminal
      proceedings. The state has an affirmative duty to furnish indigent
      defendants the same protections accorded those financially able
      to obtain them. Procedural due process guarantees that a
      defendant has the right to present competent evidence in his
      defense, and the state must ensure that an indigent defendant
      has fair opportunity to present his defense.

Id. (citations omitted and some formatting altered).

      However, “the Commonwealth is not obligated to pay for the services of

an expert simply because a defendant requests one.” Id. at 1020-21 (quoting

Curnutte, 871 A.2d at 842) (some formatting altered).         This Court has

explained that when it reviews a trial court’s exercise of discretion in

determining “indigency for the purpose of appointing an expert . . . we look

for guidance to principles established for assessing indigency in determining

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whether a party may proceed in forma pauperis, or is entitled to the

appointment of counsel.” Id. at 1020 (citing Cannon, 954 A.2d at 1226).

      [A] party seeking to proceed in forma pauperis is required to file
      a petition and an affidavit describing in detail the inability to pay
      the costs of litigation, including the information from the applicant
      regarding, present or past salary and wages, other types of
      income within the preceding year, other contributions for
      household support, property owned, available assets, debts and
      obligations, and persons dependent for support. . . .

      [When considering whether a defendant is indigent for the
      purposes of appointment of counsel, a]mong other factors that
      may be relevant to a defendant’s financial ability to hire private
      counsel are the probable cost of representation for the crime
      charged and the defendant’s liabilities.

                                  *    *    *

      [M]erely retaining private counsel does not, in itself, establish
      [that the defendant] was not indigent.

Id. at 1020-21 (citations omitted and formatting altered).

      Additionally, “[a] mere averment of indigency and inability to pay is not

sufficient to trigger the necessity for a hearing under Cannon. The defendant

must make some specific showing of a financial hardship for the court to afford

relief.” Id. at 1021. Because the defendant in Konias failed “to supply the

trial court with, at a minimum, any financial information substantiating his

inability to pay[]” for an expert, this Court affirmed the trial court’s order

denying the defendant’s motion for public funds to hire experts. Id.

      Here, after reviewing the record, the parties’ briefs, and the well-

reasoned conclusions of the trial court, we affirm on the basis of the trial

court’s opinion. See Trial Ct. Op. at 3-5. Specifically, we agree with the trial

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court’s conclusion that Appellant’s motion for public funds presented “a mere

averment of indigency” and Appellant failed to support his claim of indigency

with specific facts and documentation. See id. at 4-5. Therefore, the trial

court did not abuse its discretion and Appellant is not entitled to relief. See

Konias, 136 A.3d at 1019.

      For these reasons, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.

      Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 12/19/2023

                                     -6-
                                                                               Circulated 11/20/2023 03:00 PM

    IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BUCKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
                        CRIMINAL DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH OF

PENNSYLVANIA                                               No. CP-09-CR-0000334-2021

        v.

FRANCISCO VELEZ ZARAGOZA

                                            OPINION
       Francisco Velez Zaragoza (Appellant") appeals to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania

from this Court's denial of his June 6, 2022 Motion for Funds and his September 21, 2022 Motion

to Adjourn/Dismiss the Sexually Violent Predator Hearing. Pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of

Appellate Procedure 1925(a), this Court files this Opinion in support of this Court's ruling.

       I.      FACTUAL HISTORY

       In June of 2020, Bristol Township Police Department received a report that alleged a 14-

year old girl ("Victim") had been sexually abused for several years by Appellant. Affidavit of

Probable Cause. Appellant is Victim's step-grandfather. Victim reported that from when she was

in the 5" grade to the present Appellant had sexually assaulted her "more times than she could

remember" in an escalating manner. Id. Victim reported that it began with Appellant rubbing her

genitals when she was in the 5" grade. Id. The conduct escalated over time. Id. Ultimately

Appellant digitally and orally penetrated the Victim's genitals. Id
                -r,

            0C

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           II.      PROCEDURAL HISTORY

           On February 1, 2022, Appellant entered into a negotiated guilty plea as to Rape of a Child, 1

Involuntary Deviate Sexual Intercourse with a Person Less Than 16 Years of Age, and Statutory

Sexual Assault of a Person 11 Years or Older' before The Honorable Diane E. Gibbons. Appellant

was also designated as a Tier III offender pursuant to the Sexual Offender Registration and

Notification Act ("SORNA"). Sentencing was deferred at that time to allow for the completion of

an assessment by the Sexual Offenders Assessment Board to determine if Appellant met the

criteria for classification as a Sexually Violent Predator (SVP). On June 1, 2022, Appellant filed a

Motion for Funds for Expert Witness. On July 25, 2022, The Honorable Raymond F. McHugh

denied Appellant's Motion for Funds for Expert Witness. At his sentencing and SVP hearing,

which took place on September 21, 2022, Appellant was represented by Sara Webster, Esq. ("Mrs.

Webster"). Mrs. Webster orally motioned this Court to Adjourn/Dismiss the Sexually Violent

Predator Heating. This Court denied that motion. On that date Appellant was designated an SVP,

after a hearing for the matter. Appellant was then sentenced to a period of ten to twenty years

imprisonment at a state correctional institution on the Rape of a Child charge with no further

penalty imposed on the other charges. 4 Appellate was given credit for time-served between

October 26, 2020 (his initial date of incarnation) through September 21, 2022 (the date of his

sentencing).

           Appellant filed a Notice of this Appeal on September 28, 2022. On September 29, 2022,

this Court filed an Order for a Concise Statement. Appellant filed his Concise Statement of Errors

Complained on Appeal on October 14, 2022.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 312l(c).

    18 Pa.C.S. § 3123(a)(7).
3
    18 Pa.C.S. § 3122(b).
4   This was a negotiation entered into between the Commonwealth and the Defendant, which this Court accoptcd.

                                                         2
         III.     STATEMENT OF ERRORS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL

         On October 14, 2022, in accordance with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure

l 925(b), Appellant filed his Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, reproduced verbatim

below:

         1.       Court erred in denying defendant's motion for funds to hire an expert
                  witness to refute the Opinion of the SOAB psychologist with respect to the
                  Sexual Violent Predator determination.

         2.       Court erred in denying the defendant's Motion to Adjourn/dismiss the SVP
                  hearing on the grounds that SORNA is unconstitutional in that, inter alia, it
                  is punitive in nature, offends Alleyne & Apprendi, results in criminal
                  sentence in excess of the statutory maximums, violates Federal and States
                  prohibitions against cruel and unusual punishment and breaches the
                  separation of powers.

         IV.      DISCUSSION

              A. This Court Did Not Err in Denying Appellant's Motion for Funds because
                 Appellant Failed to Establish Indigency.

         Appellant's first issue on appeal concerns this Court's denial of his Motion for Funds to

Hire an Expert. The standard of review regarding the appointment of an expert witness in criminal

matters is "vested in the sound discretion" of the trial court. Commonwealth v. Cannon, 2008 PA

Super 178,954 A.2d 1222, 1226 (Pa. Super. 2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 743, 964 A.2d 893 (Pa.

2009). The decision to deny funds to hire an expert witness to assist in a Defendant's defense

against criminal charges will not be overturned absent abuse of discretion. Id

         In Commonwealth v. Konias the Court established "guiding principles" which may be

considered when assessing indigency for the purpose of appointing an expert. 2016 PA Super 68,

136 A.3d 1014, 1021. The Court also held that a hearing was not a requisite for the trial to deny a

                                                    3
defendant's motion for funds for an expert because "Any financial information Appellant wished

to produce at a hearing was available at the time of filing of those motion" Id. Pennsylvania courts

have repeatedly held, "[t]he Commonwealth is not obligated to pay for the services of an expert

simply because a defendant requests one." Commonwealth v. Curnutte, 2005 PA Super 109, 871

A.2d 839, 842 (Pa.Super. 2005). Rather, a defendant is obligated to "provide[] some reliable

information as to his inability to pay." Konias at 1020. "A mere averment of indigency and inability

to pay is not sufficient" to meet this burden. Id. Examples of relevant information a defendant

could provide the court when petitioning for funds include: "present or past salary and wages, other

types of income within the preceding year, other contributions for household support, property

owned, available assets, debts and obligations, and persons dependent for support." Id. citing

Commonwealth v. Cannon, 2008 PA Super 178,954 A.2d 1222, 1226 (Pa.Super. 2008). A court

may also consider "factors that may be. relevant to a defendant's financial ability to hire private

counsel are the probable cost of representation for the crime charged and the defendant's

liabilities." Id. citing Cannon at 1226-27. It should be noted that "merely retaining private counsel

does not, in itself, establish [lack of indigency]." Id. at 1021.

        This Court denied Appellants Motion for Funds for Expert Witness without a hearing. The

only facts Appellant averred in his motion that pertained to his financial status were:

                              f

        1. "The defendant's family has been contacted requesting funds to hire a defense

             expert..." 44.

        2.   "The family has gathered all available funds and being able to come up with only

             $2,000 to cover the cost of the expert." 4.7.

                                                   4
Appellant stated nothing further and attached no exhibits to this motion. Appellant's statements

clearly constitute a "mere averment of indigeney," which the Court has held is not enough to

require the Commonwealth provide expert funds. Additionally, this simple statement that the

Appellant was unable to pay was not supported with any facts or reliable documentation. Appellant

could have provided "present or past salary and wages, other types of income within the preceding

year, other contributions for household support, property owned, available assets, debts and

obligations, and persons dependent for support," or any other relevant documentation for this Court

to consider.

         Additionally, all other factors outlined in Cannon do not support the finding that the

Appellant was indigent or unable to afford an expert without funds from the Commonwealth.

Appellant hired Mrs. Webster, a private defense attorney to assist in his defense. Although this

factor alone is not conclusive, it is still relevant in this Court's analysis. Another factor weighing

heavily against finding the Appellant was unable to afford an expert is the fact that the Appellant

was pleading guilty. Appellant was not going to trial and thus the overall probable cost of his

defense was relatively low.

         Accordingly, this Court's denial of Appellant's Motion for Expert Funds is consistent with

the established law. Given the pleadings, factors, and circumstances presented for this Court's

consideration, it was well within the purview of the Court to deny Appellant's motion for Expert

Funds.

                                                  5
          B. This Court Did Not Err in Denying Appellant's Motion to Adjourn/Dismiss the
             SVP Hearing because SORNA is presently constitutional.

       Appellant's second issue on appeal concerns this Court's denial of his Motion to

Adjourn/Dismiss the SVP Hearing.

       In December 20, 2012, the Pennsylvania Legislature enacted SORNA I, which required

Tier III offenders to register for life and to verify their information and be photographed quarterly.

42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.15(a)(3), (e)(3). The aforementioned registry is available to the public online.

42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.28. However, in 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that SORNA I

violated ex post facto principles when applied to individuals who committed a sexual offense

before December 20, 2012, and that its registration requirements were "punitive in effect."

Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1193-1218 (Pa. 2017).

       Furthermore, in Commonwealth v. Butler, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court declared a:

provision in SORNA I, which identified the trial court as factfinder and specified a clear and

convincing evidence burden of proof to designate a defendant an SVP, as unconstitutional. 2017

PA Super 344, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017) [Butler I], rev 'd226 A.3d 972 (Pa. 2020);

See Butler I, 173 A.3d at 1217-18 (applyingApprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000),

and Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), based on Muniz's holding that SORNA I was

punitive). Subsequently, in 2018, SORNA I was amended to SORNA II, which presently divides

sex offender registrants into two distinctsubchapters-Subchapter Hand Subchapter I. Subchapter

H includes individuals who were convicted for an offense that occurred on or after December 20,

2012, and whose registration requirements had not yet expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.1 l(c). The

Constitutionality of SORNA II has repeatedly been challenged as well. In Commonwealth v. Butler

[Butler 2], the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found, "requirements applicable to SVPs do not

                                                  6
constitute criminal punishment" and thus SORNA H's requirements do not violate "Apprendi or

Alleyne." Commonwealth v. Butler, 226 A.3d 972, 993 (Pa. 2020) These are the exact cases

Appellant cites on Appeal.

       The current reason this matter is not settled, is because in 2018 a Chester County Trial

Court issued an opinion that SORNA II was unconstitutional. See Commonwealth v. Torsilieri,

232 A.3d 567 (Pa. 2020). However, when reviewed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Court

once again refused to hold SORNA II unconstitutional. Id. Rather, the Pennsylvania Supreme

Court issued an inconclusive decision regarding whether the SVP designation process is

constitutional. Id. This decision remanded the case to the Chester County Court of Common Pleas

so that the Commonwealth could present more evidence. Id. On August 23, 2022, Chester County

Court of Common Pleas issued its Opinion on Remand and concluded for a second time that

"SORNA is unconstitutional as a legislative scheme in both its use of a constitutionality infirm

irrebuttable presumption and the punitive effects of its registration and notification provisions[.]"

Commonwealth v. Torsilieri, No. 15-CR-0001570-2016, p. 27 (Pa. Ct. Comm. PL Aug. 23, 2022).

The Commonwealth appealed this decision, and this case is awaiting a decision from the

Pennsylvania Supreme Court for a second time.

       In a recent matter before the Pennsylvania Superior Court, an appellant sought to go beyond

the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's holding in Torsilieri and conclude. that the SORNA registration

statutes "are, as a matter oflaw, unconstitutional on their face." Commonwealth v. Wolf, 276 A.3d

805, 814 (Pa. Super. 2022). The Superior Court declined to do so, as under the current state of the

law, SORNA is presently constitutional. Unless and until Torsilieri is affirmed by our Supreme

Court, this Court remains bound by the precedent set before it. See Commonwealth v. Reed, l 07

A.2d 137, 143 (Pa. Super. 2014). As such, this Appeal has no merit.

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        CONCLUSION

        For the aforementioned reasons, this Court believes that the issues which Appellant has

complained of in his Concise Statement are without merit. Accordingly, this Court respectfully

submits that the that Appellant's Appeal be denied.

                                                      BY THE COURT:

DATE:                                                 CHARISSA

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