Court Opinion

ID: 9781108
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:06:50.178727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:10:00.448751
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                  No. 22-1690
                             Filed August 30, 2023

CHRISTOPHER DEE NALL,
     Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA,
     Respondent-Appellee.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Celene Gogerty, Judge.

      The applicant appeals the district court’s denial of his request for

postconviction relief concerning his convictions for eluding and harassment.

AFFIRMED.

      Erin Carr of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Thomas E. Bakke and Aaron Rogers,

Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee State.

      Considered by Schumacher, P.J., and Chicchelly and Buller, JJ.
                                         2

SCHUMACHER, Presiding Judge.

      Christopher Nall appeals the district court’s denial of his request for

postconviction relief (PCR) concerning his convictions for eluding and harassment.

He claimed he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel permitted

him to plead guilty when his pleas were not knowing and voluntary. We conclude

Nall has not shown counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced

by counsel’s performance. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.

      I.     Background Facts & Proceedings

      Nall was charged in AGCR342423 with driving while barred, in violation of

Iowa Code section 321.561 (2021), as a habitual offender, and eluding, in violation

of section 321.279(2). He was charged in AGCR348827 with harassment in the

first degree, in violation of section 708.7(2). He was on probation for previous

convictions at the time of the new charges.

      Nall entered into a comprehensive plea agreement, pursuant to which he

pled guilty to first-degree harassment and eluding. He also stipulated that he

violated his probation. The charge of driving while barred was dismissed. The

written plea agreement provided:

      The sentences imposed on AGCR348827 and AGCR34[2]423[1]
      shall run consecutive to one another and consecutive to the
      sentences for which Defendant is currently on probation for a total
      aggregate sentence of 7 years across all matters.[2] All sentences
      will be suspended and the Defendant will be continued on probation.

1 This portion of the plea agreement mistakenly refers to AGCR343423, rather than

AGCR342423. The caption of the document refers to the correct case number.
This typographical error does not change any part of our analysis.
2 Nall was previously convicted of two domestic abuse assault cases, which carried

sentences of two years and one year. The convictions for first-degree harassment
and eluding each carried a sentence of two years. Nall was sentenced to
consecutive terms for a total of seven years.
                                          3

The plea agreement also states, “Consecutive means one disposition after another

for a longer term and concurrently means dispositions would run at the same time.”

      The court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced Nall in accordance

with the terms of the agreement. Subsequently, Nall signed a stipulation that he

violated his probation. The stipulation states the parties jointly recommended that

“[p]robation be revoked and original sentence be imposed 7 years in prison.” Nall

was sentenced to consecutive sentences, for a total term of imprisonment not to

exceed seven years.

      On February 10, 2022, Nall filed a PCR application. He claimed he received

ineffective assistance because defense counsel permitted him to plead guilty when

his plea was not knowing and voluntary.

      At the PCR hearing, Nall testified he did not know the difference between

concurrent and consecutive sentences at the time he signed the plea agreement.

He stated, however, that he knew the plea agreement was for seven years in

prison. He also testified that he thought he was going to a substance-abuse

treatment facility rather than prison. Nall claimed he would not have pled guilty if

he knew he would be spending seven years in prison.

      In a deposition, defense counsel stated Nall wanted to avoid going to prison

and the plea agreement accomplished that goal by giving him a suspended seven-

year sentence. Defense counsel testified:

              Q. And when he agreed to the seven years, was that 7
      consecutive sentencing or concurrent sentencing? A. Everything
      was consecutive.
              Q. Do you think he understood that? A. I’d imagine so. In
      reviewing my file, I note that I talked to him five times, which was—
      is frankly quite a lot for how many times I talk to my clients.
                                         4

               ....
               Q. Do your notes reflect whether you discussed the whole
       concurrent/consecutive issue with him? A. I don’t have notes from
       all the meetings. . . . The text of the plea was clear. The text of the
       stipulation that he signed was clear as to the sentence.

Defense counsel stated, “My ordinary practice would certainly be to discuss

consecutive and concurrent with him.”

       The district court denied Nall’s PCR application. The court found, “The

Petitioner claims he did not understand the word ‘consecutive.’ However, he

clearly understood when he pled guilty to AGCR342423 and AGCR348827, he

was agreeing to recommend a seven-year sentence.             He was sentenced in

accordance to his understanding.” The court determined Nall did not show counsel

breached an essential duty. The court also found Nall did not show he was

prejudiced, as he “was sentenced in a manner exactly as he requested.” Nall

appeals the denial of his PCR application.

       II.    Standard of Review

       We review de novo claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. State v.

Maxwell, 743 N.W.2d 185, 195 (Iowa 2008). To establish a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel, an applicant must prove: (1) counsel failed to perform an

essential duty and (2) the failure resulted in prejudice. State v. El-Amin, 952

N.W.2d 134, 138 (Iowa 2020). “We presume counsel performed competently

unless the claimant proves otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence.” State

v. Booth-Harris, 942 N.W.2d 562, 577 (Iowa 2020). When there has been a guilty

plea, to show prejudice an applicant must establish that “there is a reasonable

probability that, but for counsel’s error he or she would not have pleaded guilty and
                                         5

would have insisted on going to trial.” Horton v. State, 966 N.W.2d 663, 666 (Iowa

Ct. App. 2021) (citation omitted).

       III.   Ineffective Assistance

       Nall claims he received ineffective assistance because defense counsel did

not ensure that his guilty pleas were knowing and voluntary. He states defense

counsel should have fully explained the difference between concurrent and

consecutive sentences. Nall testified he would not have pled guilty and would have

gone to trial if he knew he would be sentenced to a seven-year term of

imprisonment.

       The district court found Nall’s claims were not credible. The court found

Nall’s “assertion is puzzling and contrary to all the evidence, including the

Petitioner’s own testimony.” The written plea agreement provided, “The sentences

imposed on AGCR348827 and AGCR34[2]423 shall run consecutive to one

another and consecutive to the sentences for which Defendant is currently on

probation for a total aggregate sentence of 7 years across all matters.” The

stipulation to probation violation, again signed by Nall, recommended the “original

sentence be imposed 7 years in prison.” At the PCR hearing, Nall testified he knew

his sentence would be for seven years.

       As part of the plea agreement, Nall agreed to consecutive sentences for a

total of seven years in prison. The written plea agreement also explained the

difference between consecutive and concurrent sentences. “Plea bargains are

akin to contracts.” State v. Beres, 943 N.W.2d 575, 582 (Iowa 2020).

       We agree with the district court’s conclusion that Nall’s claims that he did

not understand the terms of the written plea agreement are not credible. The terms
                                         6

of the written plea agreement are not ambiguous. Even if Nall did not entirely

understand the meaning of the word “consecutive,” he was aware the

recommendation was for a term of imprisonment not to exceed seven years.

       “[W]hen an applicant’s assertions concerning the knowing and intelligent

nature of a guilty plea are directly contradicted by the record, the applicant bears

a special burden to establish that the record is inaccurate.” See Arnold v. State,

540 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Iowa 1995). Nall has not met this burden. We conclude

Nall has not shown counsel’s performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced

by counsel’s performance. We affirm the decision of the district court.

       AFFIRMED.