Court Opinion

ID: 9890010
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-11 21:03:43.874612+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:48:57.813983
License: Public Domain

Filed 10/11/23 P. v. Estupinan CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                        DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                             B321034

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                     (Los Angeles County
                                                                         Super. Ct. Nos.
           v.                                                            KA125016,
                                                                         KA124513)
 LEONEL FUNDORA ESTUPINAN,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David C. Brougham, Judge. Affirmed.
      Richard B. Lennon and Olivia Meme, under appointment
by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill and Kathy S.
Pomerantz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
                     ——————————
       The jury found Leonel Fundora Estupinan guilty of
multiple counts relating to two incidents of driving under the
influence of alcohol. He was sentenced to a total of four years
eight months in state prison. Estupinan was originally
represented by appointed counsel, but later invoked his right to
represent himself under Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806
(Faretta) and began representing himself. However, the trial
court subsequently revoked Estupinan’s pro. per. status and
appointed standby counsel to represent him going forward.
       On appeal, Estupinan challenges the revocation of his pro.
per. status. We conclude that Estupinan forfeited the issue by
failing to object in the trial court. We decline to exercise our
discretion to excuse forfeiture, and we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.

                        PROCEEDINGS

       Estupinan first requested to represent himself at a hearing
on June 8, 2021. His primary motivation was that appointed
counsel had too many cases and would not be able to devote
sufficient time to his case. Estupinan did not believe that
appointing new counsel would alleviate the problem. The trial
court discussed the pitfalls of self-representation and reviewed
Estupinan’s Faretta waiver with him at length, after which
Estupinan decided to continue with appointed counsel and renew
his request at the next hearing if necessary.
       At the next hearing, on July 1, 2021, Estupinan again
requested to represent himself. After advising Estupinan of the
rights that he would be waiving, the trial court granted the
motion.

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     Estupinan represented himself at the next five hearings, on
August 10, 2021, August 30, 2021, September 30, 2021,
November 9, 2021, and January 13, 2022.1 The trial court
reprimanded Estupinan for disrupting the proceedings multiple
times at these hearings. At the hearing on January 13, 2022, the
court revoked Estupinan’s pro. per. status and appointed standby
counsel as counsel for Estupinan. Estupinan did not object to
revocation of his status at the January 13, 2022 hearing or at any
time thereafter. Trial began on May 9, 2022. Counsel
represented Estupinan throughout the proceedings without
objection from Estupinan.

                          DISCUSSION

Legal Principles

       “Under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments, a criminal
defendant has two mutually exclusive rights at all critical stages
of a criminal prosecution—the right to counsel and the right to
self-representation.” (People v. Fedalizo (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th
98, 103.) “[T]he trial judge may terminate self-representation by
a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and
obstructionist misconduct.” (People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1,
8.) We review the trial court’s determination to revoke a
defendant’s pro. per. status for abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 12.)
An abuse of this discretion requires reversal. (Id. at p. 14.)

      1 The judge who revoked Estupinan’s pro. per. status
presided over all of these hearings except for the August 10, 2021
hearing, which was presided over by a different judge.

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       “[T]he right to self-representation can [also] be waived . . . .
That right may be waived expressly or impliedly through conduct
that is inconsistent with the assertion of the right. ([McKaskle v.
Wiggins (1984) 465 U.S. 168, 183] [“Once a pro se defendant
invites or agrees to any substantial participation by counsel,
subsequent appearances by counsel must be presumed to be with
the defendant’s acquiescence, at least until the defendant
expressly and unambiguously renews his request that standby
counsel be silenced”]; accord, People v. D’Arcy (2010) 48 Cal.4th
257, 285 [“a waiver or abandonment of the Faretta right to self-
representation may be inferred from a defendant’s conduct”];
People v. Rudd (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 620, 631 [“the Sixth
Amendment self-representation right does not exist when a
defendant prior to or during trial acquiesces in the assignment or
participation of counsel in the defense”].) (People v. Fedalizo,
supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at p. 104.)

Analysis

       Estupinan concedes that he failed to object to the trial
court’s revocation of his pro. per. status, and he acknowledges
that there is substantial authority that such a failure results in
forfeiture of the issue on appeal. He attempts to avoid forfeiture,
however, by contending that he did not have the opportunity to
object at the time of termination, and that objection would have
been futile in any event. Alternatively, Estupinan requests that
this court exercise its discretion to reach the merits of the issue
on the basis that forfeiture would affect his substantial rights.
None of Estupinan’s proffered grounds have merit: his failure to
object, both at the time his pro. per. status was revoked and

                                   4
afterwards to his representation by counsel, resulted in
forfeiture, and we decline to exercise our discretion to reach the
merits of his claim of error. (See People v. Rudd (1998) 63
Cal.App.4th 620, 629–630.)
       We reject Estupinan’s argument that he did not have the
opportunity to object. Even assuming that Estupinan did not
have an adequate opportunity to object at the time his status was
revoked, he had ample opportunity to do so before trial
commenced approximately four months later, during trial, and
following trial. There is no indication that Estupinan objected at
any time prior to his appeal to this court.
       We also reject Estupinan’s assertion that it would have
been futile for him to object in the trial court because of the
court’s attitude toward him. Estupinan argues that the court
revoked his status immediately after he stated that he felt
intimidated because the court told him he had to remain silent.
The record does not reflect that the court was unwilling to
entertain Estupinan’s objection. When Estupinan stated that he
was intimidated, the court questioned Estupinan regarding what
he meant; the court explained to him at length that the court was
not preventing him from speaking, but rather instructing him to
follow court rules and refrain from talking over the court,
opposing counsel, and the interpreter while they were speaking.
The trial court’s explanation apparently assuaged Estupinan,
because he continued to participate in the hearing—he advised
the court of his complaints regarding his investigator and moved
for appointment of a toxicologist. Only later in the hearing, after
Estupinan failed to follow the court’s instructions and disrupted
proceedings several times, did the court revoke Estupinan’s pro.
per. status. Before doing so, the court provided a thorough

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explanation of its reasons and reiterated that it did not wish to
intimidate Estupinan or to silence him. The court emphasized
that it afforded self-represented defendants significant leeway,
but concluded that “this disruption has raised [sic] to a level
where Mr. Estupinan is not being able to self-represent himself.”
In sum, the trial court emphasized that Estupinan could speak as
long as he did not talk over others, and Estupinan exercised his
right to speak immediately thereafter. Under the circumstances,
we cannot agree with Estupinan that an objection would have
been futile.
       Finally, Estupinan’s argument that his substantial rights
will be affected if we do not exercise our discretion to excuse
forfeiture lacks merit. Where a defendant acquiesces in
representation by defense counsel there is no Sixth Amendment
violation. (People v. Rudd, supra, 63 Cal.App.4th at p. 630.)
Estupinan was represented by defense counsel for the four
months prior to trial, as well as during and after trial. Estupinan
had no reason to believe that he could not object to defense
counsel’s representation—he had previously complained about
his investigator (the court appointed a new investigator) and his
appointed counsel (the court granted Estupinan’s request to
represent himself), but did not express any dissatisfaction with
defense counsel. On this record, Estupinan fails to meet the
burden of demonstrating that he did not acquiesce to counsel’s
representation. (See People v. Sanghera (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th
1567, 1573 [appellant has burden to affirmatively demonstrate
error].) Accordingly, his Sixth Amendment rights are not
implicated, and there is no basis for excusing forfeiture on that
ground.

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                        DISPOSITION

     We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
     NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

                                   MOOR, J.

We concur:

             BAKER, Acting P. J.

             KIM, J.

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