Court Opinion

ID: 9961213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-18 14:02:51.167979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:28.132046
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-11106     Document: 58-1       Date Filed: 04/18/2024   Page: 1 of 26

                                                               [ PUBLISH]
                                      In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                          For the Eleventh Circuit

                            ____________________

                                   No. 22-11106
                            ____________________

        DUDLEY TEEL,
        as Personal Representative of the Estate of Susan Teel, deceased,
                                                         Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        DEPUTY SHERIFF JONATHAN LOZADA,
        in his individual capacity,
                                                       Defendant-Appellee,

        SHERIFF ERIC FLOWERS,
        in his oﬃcial capacity as the Sheriﬀ of Indian River County,
                                                       Defendant-Appellee.

                            ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-11106         Document: 58-1        Date Filed: 04/18/2024         Page: 2 of 26

        2                         Opinion of the Court                       22-11106

                    Appeal from the United States District Court
                        for the Southern District of Florida
                       D.C. Docket No. 2:18-cv-14367-DMM
                             ____________________

        Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
        LAGOA, Circuit Judge:
               Dr. Dudley Teel, Susan Teel’s husband and the personal rep-
        resentative of Susan Teel’s estate (“Estate”), appeals the district
        court’s grant of summary judgment in Defendants’ favor. This ap-
        peal stems from the events that led to Susan Teel’s death after her
        attempted suicide at her home.
               Dr. Teel—acting on behalf of Mrs. Teel’s Estate—sued Dep-
        uty Jonathan Lozada and the Sheriﬀ of Indian River County and
        alleged two claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: one for excessive force
        under the Fourth Amendment and another under Monell v. Depart-
        ment of Social Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 1
        The district court initially granted summary judgment in favor of
        Deputy Lozada and the Sheriﬀ, but we reversed in part and vacated
        in part in an earlier appeal. Teel v. Lozada, 826 F. App’x 880 (11th
        Cir. 2020) (“Teel I”). On remand, the district court granted sum-
        mary judgment as to the Estate’s Monell claim, but the excessive

        1 The Estate also alleged two Florida wrongful death claims but later volun-

        tarily dismissed them, so only the § 1983 claims remain relevant to this appeal.
USCA11 Case: 22-11106       Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024      Page: 3 of 26

        22-11106                Opinion of the Court                          3

        force claim proceeded to trial. At trial, the jury found that Deputy
        Lozada did not use excessive force in violation of the Fourth
        Amendment. The Estate now appeals the grant of summary judg-
        ment on the Monell claim, two of the district court’s jury instruc-
        tions, and one of the district court’s evidentiary rulings.
             After careful review, and with the beneﬁt of oral argument,
        we aﬃrm as to all issues.
            I.       FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
                On July 26, 2017, Susan Teel attempted suicide by cutting
        her wrists with a kitchen knife. Shortly after the attempt, her hus-
        band, Dr. Teel, discovered his wife getting out of their bathtub,
        which was ﬁlled with blood and water. Dr. Teel said that he was
        going to call 911, but Mrs. Teel responded, “No, you are not.”
        “Yes, I am,” he said. “I am not going. . . . [Y]ou are not calling 911,”
        she insisted. As Dr. Teel tried to call 911, Mrs. Teel repeatedly bat-
        ted at the phone to prevent him from calling for help. Dr. Teel told
        his wife that he was going to text their daughter, Sara Gordon, who,
        in turn, called 911.
                Deputies Lozada and Samuel Earman both responded to the
        911 call, but Deputy Lozada arrived ﬁrst. While Dr. Teel was with
        his wife, he heard Deputy Lozada knock on the front door. When
        Dr. Teel opened the door, Deputy Lozada observed blood on Dr.
        Teel’s shirt. Dr. Teel informed Deputy Lozada that his wife had
        been drinking, may have taken Ativan, had a knife, and had cut her
        wrists.
USCA11 Case: 22-11106      Document: 58-1     Date Filed: 04/18/2024     Page: 4 of 26

        4                      Opinion of the Court                22-11106

               Before Deputy Lozada ascended the stairs in search of Mrs.
        Teel, Dr. Teel warned him to “be careful.” Deputy Lozada in-
        tended to take Mrs. Teel into custody under Florida’s Baker Act, see
        Fla. Stat. § 394.463, and felt a sense of urgency because he knew
        that Mrs. Teel was injured and needed assistance. Deputy Lozada
        also knew that he would need to secure Mrs. Teel and take the knife
        away from her before EMS could treat her wounds.
               As Deputy Lozada proceeded up the stairway, he held his
        ﬁrearm in the ready position—tucking the ﬁrearm against his body
        with his left hand, covering it with his right hand, and pointing the
        muzzle down. When Deputy Lozada reached the top of the stairs,
        he did not see or hear anyone but noticed that the master bedroom
        light was on. He went to the master bedroom’s doorway and ob-
        served Mrs. Teel lying face up on the bed. Because Deputy Lozada
        knew that Mrs. Teel was armed with a knife, he said, “Hey, Susan,
        sheriﬀ’s oﬃce, let me see your hands.” Mrs. Teel arose, produced
        a thirteen-inch kitchen knife, raised the knife above her head,
        pointed the knife at Deputy Lozada, and said, “Fuck you, kill me.”
        As Deputy Lozada announced over the radio that Mrs. Teel had a
        knife, she started walking toward him. Believing he was in grave
        danger, Deputy Lozada uncovered his ﬁrearm and said, “Don’t
        come near me.” Mrs. Teel kept approaching until she was within
        three to ﬁve feet of Deputy Lozada. Deputy Lozada ﬁred one
        round and retreated, but Mrs. Teel kept coming toward him. Dep-
        uty Lozada ﬁred again and continued walking backward, but she
        kept advancing. Finally, as Deputy Lozada reached the threshold
        of the bedroom, he ﬁred a third shot, and Mrs. Teel collapsed.
USCA11 Case: 22-11106         Document: 58-1         Date Filed: 04/18/2024         Page: 5 of 26

        22-11106                   Opinion of the Court                                5

        Deputy Lozada immediately radioed for EMS, but Mrs. Teel died a
        few minutes later.
                On September 10, 2018, the Estate brought a four-count
        complaint against Deputy Lozada, in his individual capacity, and
        Sheriﬀ Loar, in his oﬃcial capacity as the Sheriﬀ of Indian River
        County (collectively, “Defendants”). 2 In Count 1, the Estate
        brought a § 1983 claim against Deputy Lozada alleging excessive
        force under the Fourth Amendment. In Count 2, the Estate
        brought a § 1983 claim alleging that the Sheriﬀ is liable under Mo-
        nell, 436 U.S. 658, because he failed to properly train, discipline, and
        supervise Deputy Lozada. And in Counts 3 and 4, the Estate
        brought two state law claims for wrongful death, against the Sher-
        iﬀ and Lozada, respectively. Because the Estate voluntarily dis-
        missed the state law claims, only the § 1983 claims remain relevant
        to this appeal.
                Initially, the district court granted summary judgment in fa-
        vor of Deputy Lozada and the Sheriff, but we reversed in part and
        vacated in part in an earlier appeal. Teel I, 826 F. App’x 880. Fol-
        lowing our remand, the district court granted summary judgment
        in favor of the Sheriff on the Estate’s Monell claim. To prove a Mo-
        nell claim, “a plaintiff must show: (1) that his constitutional rights
        were violated; (2) that the municipality had a custom or policy that
        constituted deliberate indifference to that constitutional right; and

        2 Eric Flowers, in his official capacity, is now substituted as a party Defendant

        for Deryl Loar because Flowers is Loar’s successor as the Sheriff of Indian
        River County.
USCA11 Case: 22-11106       Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024      Page: 6 of 26

        6                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11106

        (3) that the policy or custom caused the violation.” McDowell v.
        Brown, 392 F.3d 1283, 1289 (11th Cir. 2004). Before the first appeal,
        the district court granted summary judgment because it found that
        the Estate failed to demonstrate a genuine dispute as to whether
        Mrs. Teel’s Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive
        force was violated. After we reversed that ruling, the Sheriff
        moved for reconsideration of summary judgment based on the lat-
        ter two Monell elements. The district court granted the motion,
        finding that the Estate failed to show that there was a genuine dis-
        pute as to whether the Sheriff’s Office had a custom or policy of
        deliberate indifference toward Fourth Amendment rights.
              The Estate’s excessive force claim against Deputy Lozada
        proceeded to trial, and the jury found that Deputy Lozada did not
        use excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. (DE
        196.) Following the jury’s verdict, the district court entered final
        judgment in favor of the Defendants and this timely appeal ensued.
                      II.       STANDARDS OF REVIEW
                “[W]e review jury instructions de novo to determine whether
        they misstate the law or mislead the jury.” Caradigm USA LLC v.
        PruittHealth, Inc., 964 F.3d 1259, 1277 n.12 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting
        Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299, 1310 (11th Cir. 2012)). As to the
        phrasing of jury instructions, we review for an abuse of discretion,
        recognizing that district courts have “wide discretion as to the style
        and wording employed” in its instructions. Id.; accord Farley v. Na-
        tionwide Mut. Ins. Co., 197 F.3d 1322, 1329 (11th Cir. 1999). “If the
        district court errs in its jury instructions, we will ‘consider the jury
USCA11 Case: 22-11106      Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024      Page: 7 of 26

        22-11106               Opinion of the Court                          7

        instructions as a whole’ to determine whether the error was re-
        versible and ‘will not overturn a jury verdict because of an errone-
        ous jury instruction unless there is also a showing of prejudice.’”
        Caradigm, 964 F.3d at 1277 n.12 (quoting Oladeinde v. City of Bir-
        mingham, 230 F.3d 1275, 1295–96 (11th Cir. 2000)); accord MidlevelU,
        Inc. v. ACI Info. Grp., 989 F.3d 1205, 1215 (11th Cir. 2021); Conroy v.
        Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 375 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2004).
               If a party timely objects to the admissibility of certain evi-
        dence, we review the district court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse
        of discretion. Rosenberg v. DVI Receivables XIV, LLC, 818 F.3d 1283,
        1292 (11th Cir. 2016). But we will not reverse where an error is
        harmless. 28 U.S.C. § 2111; Fed. R. Civ. P. 61. And if a party fails to
        timely object to the admissibility of evidence, we will deem the
        party’s objection waived unless the district court plainly erred.
        Watkins v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1352 n.16 (11th Cir. 1997).
               “We review a district court’s decision on summary judgment
        de novo and apply the same legal standard used by the district court,
        drawing all inferences in the light most favorable to the non-mov-
        ing party and recognizing that summary judgment is appropriate
        only where there are no genuine issues of material fact.” Smith v.
        Owens, 848 F.3d 975, 978 (11th Cir. 2017). “We may aﬃrm the judg-
        ment below on any ground supported by the record, regardless of
        whether it was relied on by the district court.” Statton v. Fla. Fed.
        Jud. Nominating Comm’n, 959 F.3d 1061, 1065 (11th Cir. 2020).
                              III.       ANALYSIS
USCA11 Case: 22-11106       Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024      Page: 8 of 26

        8                       Opinion of the Court                  22-11106

               On appeal, the Estate argues that the district court commit-
        ted reversible error through its jury instructions, evidentiary rul-
        ing, and summary judgment order on the Estate’s Monell claim. We
        address these arguments in turn.
                                  A. Jury Instructions
                The Estate appeals two of the district court’s jury instruc-
        tions: the Graham excessive force instruction and the Baker Act in-
        struction. In response, Deputy Lozada argues that Dr. Teel waived
        the objections he now advances on appeal and that the district
        court’s Graham and Baker Act instructions were correct, or alterna-
        tively, not prejudicial.
               At trial, the parties proposed different jury instructions on
        Graham v. Connor’s test for excessive force under the Fourth
        Amendment. See 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989). The Estate proposed
        that the district court use this Court’s pattern Graham instruction,
        which directs jurors to weigh “factors such as the crime’s severity,
        whether a suspect poses an immediate violent threat to others,
        whether the suspect resists or flees, the need for application of force,
        the relationship between the need for force and the amount of
        force used, and the extent of the injury inflicted.” 11th Cir. Civ.
        Pattern Jury Instr. 5.4 (emphases added). Deputy Lozada proposed
        an alternative Graham instruction—one that was tailored to the use
        of force in medical emergencies, not criminal arrests. Because at-
        tempted suicide is not a crime in Florida and because Mrs. Teel was
        not under arrest at the time of the shooting, the district court con-
        cluded that factors such as “the crime’s severity” and “whether the
USCA11 Case: 22-11106      Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024     Page: 9 of 26

        22-11106               Opinion of the Court                         9

        suspect resists or flees” would needlessly confuse the jury. To re-
        duce confusion, the district court instructed the jury to consider
        “the severity of the risk of harm” instead of “the crime’s severity,”
        and removed language instructing the jury to consider whether
        “the suspect resists or flees.”
               With regard to the Baker Act instruction, Deputy Lozada re-
        quested an instruction on the procedure for involuntary examina-
        tion under Florida’s Baker Act. The Estate contended that the dis-
        trict court should modify Deputy Lozada’s proposed instruction
        because the instruction failed to provide a fulsome recitation of the
        Baker Act’s criteria. The district court rejected the Estate’s conten-
        tion and instead provided an instruction quoting one of the Baker
        Act’s criteria, see Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1)(b)(2), but omitting other
        conditions for involuntary examination, see id. § 394.463(1)(a). We
        turn ﬁrst to Deputy Lozada’s waiver argument.
                Deputy Lozada argues that the Estate waived its objections
        to the district court’s Graham instruction and Baker Act instruction
        by failing to clearly object to both instructions in a timely manner.
        Speciﬁcally, Lozada claims that the Estate failed to renew its objec-
        tion to the ﬁnal version of the jury instructions on the last day of
        trial. The Estate replies that it timely raised both objections and
        that once the district court ruled, it did not need to reraise the ob-
        jections again on the morning of closing arguments.
               Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 51(c)(2) provides that an ob-
        jection to jury instructions is timely if “a party objects at the op-
        portunity provided under Rule 51(b)(2).” Federal Rule of Civil
USCA11 Case: 22-11106      Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024     Page: 10 of 26

        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-11106

        Procedure 51(b)(2) provides that the district court “must give the
        parties an opportunity to object on the record and out of the jury’s
        hearing before the instructions and arguments are delivered.” “We
        interpret Rule 51 strictly, and require a party to object to a jury in-
        struction or jury verdict form prior to jury deliberations in order to
        preserve the issue on appeal.” Farley, 197 F.3d at 1329. “This re-
        quirement ensures that a trial judge has an opportunity to correct
        any error before a jury has begun its deliberations.” Id. “There are
        two exceptions to this rule: ‘ﬁrst, where a party has made its posi-
        tion clear to the court previously and further objection would be
        futile; and second, where it is necessary to correct a fundamental
        error or prevent a miscarriage of justice.’” Parker v. Scrap Metal Pro-
        cessors, Inc., 386 F.3d 993, 1018 (11th Cir. 2004) (quoting Farley, 197
        F.3d at 1329 (internal quotation omitted)).
                We hold that the Estate’s objections to the Graham instruc-
        tion and the Baker Act instruction were timely because the Estate
        timely objected under Rule 51(c)(2). The distinction between the
        Estate’s and Deputy Lozada’s separate Graham instructions is evi-
        dent from the parties’ proposed jury instructions. The Estate rec-
        ommended adopting this Court’s pattern Graham instruction while
        Deputy Lozada sought to introduce a variation of the Graham in-
        struction and argued in support of that variation in both a memo-
        randum and a trial brief. At the end of the ﬁrst day of trial, the
        parties discussed their dispute over the Graham factors with the dis-
        trict court, and Dr. Teel clearly stated his objection to the modiﬁed
        Graham factors. Then, after the defense rested its case in chief, the
        district court held a charge conference and considered which
USCA11 Case: 22-11106      Document: 58-1       Date Filed: 04/18/2024      Page: 11 of 26

        22-11106                Opinion of the Court                          11

        Graham instruction to adopt. The district court explained that the
        usual Graham instruction did not ﬁt well because this case did not
        involve a traditional arrest for a crime. After trial, the district court
        issued a supplemental order explaining why its Graham instruction
        varied from our pattern Graham instruction. The supplemental or-
        der explained that the parties disputed the proper Graham instruc-
        tion and never stated that the Estate’s objection to the variation was
        untimely. Thus, the record shows that the Estate objected to the
        Graham instruction at the time provided under Rule 51(b)(2) and
        that the district court considered and resolved the issue in favor of
        Deputy Lozada before the case was submitted to the jury.
                The Estate also objected to the district court’s Baker Act in-
        struction. At the charge conference, the Estate argued that the dis-
        trict court’s Baker Act instruction failed to describe the complete
        criteria that an oﬃcer must account for before subjecting a person
        to involuntary examination. In particular, the Estate’s counsel ar-
        gued before the district court “that what your Honor is putting into
        that instruction is just a part of the involuntary examination stat-
        ute, which . . . does not give a fulsome recitation of Florida law.”
        This is the same argument that the Estate advances on appeal. We
        thus reject Deputy Lozada’s waiver argument and now proceed to
        the merits.
                               1. The Graham Instruction
               We turn ﬁrst to the Graham jury instruction. Under Graham
        v. Connor, objectively unreasonable uses of force violate the Fourth
        Amendment. See 490 U.S. at 397. “Determining whether the force
USCA11 Case: 22-11106      Document: 58-1       Date Filed: 04/18/2024        Page: 12 of 26

        12                      Opinion of the Court                    22-11106

        used to eﬀect a particular seizure is ‘reasonable’ under the Fourth
        Amendment requires a careful balancing of ‘the nature and quality
        of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment interests’
        against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.” Id. at
        396 (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985)). The test for
        objective reasonableness “depends on the ‘facts and circumstances
        of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue,
        whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
        oﬃcers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or at-
        tempting to evade arrest by ﬂight.’” Helm v. Rainbow City, 989 F.3d
        1265, 1273 (11th Cir. 2021) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396). We
        have also highlighted other factors for consideration, including:
        “the need for application of force, the relationship between the
        need and amount of force used, and the extent of the injury in-
        ﬂicted by the arresting oﬃcer.” Id.
                This Court’s Pattern Jury Instruction 5.4 illustrates how dis-
        trict courts should generally instruct juries under the Graham test.
        At the time of the trial, Pattern Instruction 5.4 stated, in relevant
        part:
               When making a lawful arrest, an oﬃcer has the right to
               use reasonably necessary force to complete the arrest.
               Whether a speciﬁc use of force is excessive or unrea-
               sonable depends on factors such as the crime’s severity,
               whether a suspect poses an immediate violent threat
               to others, whether the suspect resists or ﬂees, the need for
               application of force, the relationship between the
               need for force and the amount of force used, and the
               extent of the injury inﬂicted.
USCA11 Case: 22-11106     Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024    Page: 13 of 26

        22-11106               Opinion of the Court                       13

        11th Cir. Civ. Pattern Jury Instr. 5.4 (emphases added). The Estate’s
        proposed instruction mirrored this Court’s pattern instruction.
        But Deputy Lozada proposed an instruction that deviated from the
        pattern instruction:
              When making a lawful detention, an oﬃcer has the
              right to use reasonably necessary force to complete
              the detention. Whether a speciﬁc use of force is ex-
              cessive or unreasonable depends on factors such as
              whether Susan Teel was incapable of making a ra-
              tional decision under the circumstances that posed an
              immediate threat of serious bodily harm to Lozada,
              whether some degree of force was reasonably neces-
              sary to avoid the immediate threat, the nature of the
              injury inﬂicted and whether the force used was more
              than reasonably necessary under the circumstances
              known to Lozada.
        Deputy Lozada’s memorandum on the proposed instruction ar-
        gued that the pattern instruction was inadequate because it was de-
        signed for cases involving uses of force when an oﬃcer makes a
        criminal arrest. Here, Deputy Lozada was responding to a Baker
        Act call, not making a criminal arrest. The district court agreed
        that, in a case not involving a criminal arrest, this Court’s pattern
        instruction would confuse the jury. But the district court declined
        to adopt Deputy Lozada’s proposed instruction; instead, the district
        court slightly modiﬁed Pattern Instruction 5.4. The district court’s
        modiﬁed instruction stated:
              When taking a person into custody pursuant to the Baker
              Act or making an arrest, an oﬃcer has the right to use
USCA11 Case: 22-11106     Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024      Page: 14 of 26

        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-11106

              reasonably necessary force. Whether a speciﬁc use of
              force is excessive or unreasonable depends on factors
              such as the severity of the risk of harm, whether the
              subject poses an immediate violent threat of force to
              others or herself, the need for the application of force,
              the relationship between the need for the force and
              the amount of force used, and the extent of the injury
              inﬂicted.
        (Emphasis added to note alterations to the pattern instruction).
               On appeal, the Estate challenges these alterations, arguing
        that the district court committed reversible error by removing ref-
        erences to “the crime’s severity” and “whether the suspect resists”
        arrest. The Estate acknowledges that attempted suicide is not a
        crime and that Deputy Lozada was not attempting to arrest Mrs.
        Teel. But the Estate notes that in Teel I, we held that “‘because
        Florida does not recognize attempted suicide as a crime,’” the ﬁrst
        Graham factor “weighs in favor of Dr. Teel.” Teel I, 826 F. App’x at
        886 (quoting Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th
        Cir. 2005)).
               We conclude that the Estate’s challenge to the district
        court’s Graham instruction fails for several reasons. First, the Gra-
        ham factors are ﬂexible—the touchstone of the Graham test is “rea-
        sonableness,” which “requires” balancing of “the nature and qual-
        ity of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth Amendment inter-
        ests against the countervailing governmental interests at stake.”
        490 U.S. at 396 (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 8). Although Graham
        enumerated factors that courts may consider, see id., the Supreme
USCA11 Case: 22-11106       Document: 58-1       Date Filed: 04/18/2024       Page: 15 of 26

        22-11106                 Opinion of the Court                           15

        Court reaﬃrmed that “the test of reasonableness under the Fourth
        Amendment is not capable of precise deﬁnition or mechanical ap-
        plication.” Id. (alteration adopted) (quoting Bell v. Wolﬁsh, 441 U.S.
        520, 559 (1979)).
               In Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015), the Supreme
        Court recognized that pretrial detainees may advance claims of ex-
        cessive force under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
        Amendment. In Kingsley, the Court relied on Graham to articulate
        what constitutes a reasonable use of force. Id. at 397. Importantly
        here, Kingsley modiﬁed the “severity of the crime” factor and rela-
        beled it, “the severity of the security problem at issue.” Id. That
        adjustment makes more sense in the context of a pretrial detention.
        Further, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Graham factors
        are not “exclusive”: “[w]e mention these factors only to illustrate
        the types of objective circumstances potentially relevant to a deter-
        mination of excessive force.” Id. (emphasis added).
                The Sixth Circuit also recognized Graham’s ﬂexibility in Es-
        tate of Hill ex rel. Hill v. Miracle, 853 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2017). In Mir-
        acle, a police oﬃcer tased an individual who was ﬁghting paramed-
        ics but in need of urgent medical attention. Id. at 310–11. Because
        of the police oﬃcer’s use of force, the individual became subdued
        and received the medical care that he needed. Id. at 311. The Sixth
        Circuit held that the district court erred by applying the traditional
        Graham factors and denying summary judgment to the oﬃcer. Id.
        at 313 (“The key problem is that the district court tried to apply the
        Graham factors to a completely diﬀerent factual situation—a
USCA11 Case: 22-11106          Document: 58-1       Date Filed: 04/18/2024         Page: 16 of 26

        16                           Opinion of the Court                    22-11106

        medical emergency—where there was no crime, no resisting of ar-
        rest, and no direct threat to the law-enforcement oﬃcer.”). The
        court recognized an alternative test 3 for medical emergencies,
        which was better aimed “towards the ultimate goal of determining
        ‘whether the oﬃcers’ actions are objectively reasonable in light of
        the facts and circumstances confronting them.’” Id. at 314 (quoting
        Graham, 490 U.S. at 397). And in Helm v. Rainbow City, we recog-
        nized that Estate of Hill articulates “a test to determine whether
        force is objectively reasonable under Graham when an oﬃcer is re-
        sponding to a medical emergency, rather than making an arrest.”
        989 F.3d at 1273 (citing Est. of Hill, 853 F.3d at 313–14).
              Here, the district court declined Deputy Lozada’s invitation
        to adopt Estate of Hill’s test word-for-word. Instead, the district

        3 The Sixth Circuit’s modified test provides:

                Where a situation does not fit within the Graham test because
                the person in question has not committed a crime, is not re-
                sisting arrest, and is not directly threatening the officer, the
                court should ask:
                (1) Was the person experiencing a medical emergency that
                rendered him incapable of making a rational decision under
                circumstances that posed an immediate threat of serious harm
                to himself or others?
                (2) Was some degree of force reasonably necessary to amelio-
                rate the immediate threat?
                (3) Was the force used more than reasonably necessary under
                the circumstances (i.e., was it excessive)?
        Est. of Hill, 853 F.3d at 314.
USCA11 Case: 22-11106     Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024     Page: 17 of 26

        22-11106               Opinion of the Court                        17

        court cited Estate of Hill for the correct proposition that the Graham
        test is ﬂexible depending on the nature of the scenario that the of-
        ﬁcer encounters. The district court’s slight alterations to the pat-
        tern instruction appropriately tailored the Graham instruction to
        the scenario that Deputy Lozada encountered.
               Second, we conclude that the district court had discretion to
        adjust the language of the pattern instruction to ensure that it was
        understandable for the jury. In Teel I, we reviewed the district
        court’s resolution of this case at the summary-judgment stage. Teel
        I, 826 F. App’x at 881. At the summary-judgment stage, the appli-
        cation of the Graham test was a question of law. Scott v. Harris, 550
        U.S. 372, 381 n.8 (2007). We concluded that there was a material
        dispute of fact regarding whether Deputy Lozada employed exces-
        sive force. Teel I, 826 F. App’x at 889. Following remand for a trial,
        the jury was not bound to conclude—as a factual matter—that
        Deputy Lozada’s use of force was excessive. Indeed, the entire
        point of our prior holding was that a jury should decide whether
        the force was excessive. See id.
                Because the jury must understand how to apply the Graham
        test, the district court modiﬁed the test’s language to make it un-
        derstandable for laypeople based on the facts presented at trial.
        This case involved a Baker Act call after an attempted suicide, not
        a criminal arrest, and thus the district court determined that factors
        relevant only to a criminal arrest would needlessly confuse the jury.
        The district court therefore altered our pattern instruction’s lan-
        guage about “the crime’s severity” and “whether the suspect resists
USCA11 Case: 22-11106     Document: 58-1       Date Filed: 04/18/2024        Page: 18 of 26

        18                     Opinion of the Court                    22-11106

        or ﬂees” arrest. Cf, 11th Cir. Civ. Pattern Jury Instr. 5.4. We con-
        clude that the district court had “wide discretion” to modify the
        instructions as long as the instructions “accurately reﬂect[ed] the
        law.” Conroy, 375 F.3d at 1233. Here, the Graham instruction re-
        quired jurors to consider “severity of the risk of harm,” “whether
        the subject poses an immediate violent threat of force to others or
        herself,” “the need for the application of force,” “the relationship
        between the need for the force and the amount of force used,” and
        “the extent of the injury inﬂicted.” The instruction also empha-
        sized that the Graham test required the jury to consider what a “rea-
        sonable and prudent law enforcement oﬃcer” would have done un-
        der the same circumstances. Because the Graham instruction was
        an appropriate summary of the law, we aﬃrm as to this issue.
                              2. The Baker Act Instruction
               We now turn to the Baker Act Instruction. At Deputy
        Lozada’s request, the district court instructed the jury on the pro-
        cess for an involuntary mental examination under Florida’s Baker
        Act. The Baker Act instruction provided:
              Florida’s Mental Health Act, frequently known as the
              Baker Act, provides that people suﬀering from men-
              tal health issues may be subject to an involuntary ex-
              amination if they meet certain criteria. One of those
              criteria is as follows: if “[t]here is a substantial likeli-
              hood that without care or treatment the person will
              cause bodily harm to himself or herself or others in
              the near future, as evidenced by recent behavior.”
              There are several means by which an involuntary
USCA11 Case: 22-11106      Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024     Page: 19 of 26

        22-11106               Opinion of the Court                         19

               examination may be initiated under the Baker Act, in-
               cluding by action of law enforcement oﬃcers. The
               Baker Act states that a law enforcement oﬃcer “shall
               take a person who appears to meet the criteria for in-
               voluntary examination into custody and deliver the
               person or have him delivered to” a receiving facility.
        Of the four criteria that the Baker Act lists for involuntary exami-
        nation in Florida Statute § 394.463(1), this instruction informed the
        jury about § 394.463(1)(b)(2) only. Although the instruction is clear
        that it details only “one” of the criteria, it does not inform the jury
        that some of the other criteria are necessary conditions preceding
        involuntary examination. In full, § 394.463(1) of the Baker Act pro-
        vides:
               (1) Criteria.—A person may be taken to a receiving facility
               for involuntary examination if there is reason to believe that
               the person has a mental illness and because of his or her
               mental illness:
               (a) 1. The person has refused voluntary examination after
               conscientious explanation and disclosure of the purpose of
               the examination; or
               2. The person is unable to determine for himself or herself
               whether examination is necessary; and
               (b) 1. Without care or treatment, the person is likely to suﬀer
               from neglect or refuse to care for himself or herself; such
               neglect or refusal poses a real and present threat of substan-
               tial harm to his or her well-being; and it is not apparent that
               such harm may be avoided through the help of willing fam-
               ily members or friends or the provision of other services; or
USCA11 Case: 22-11106      Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024      Page: 20 of 26

        20                      Opinion of the Court                  22-11106

               2. There is a substantial likelihood that without care or treat-
               ment the person will cause serious bodily harm to himself
               or herself or others in the near future, as evidenced by recent
               behavior.
        Fla. Stat. § 394.463(1) (eﬀ. July 1, 2017, to March 8, 2018) (emphasis
        added). The Estate objects to the district court’s instruction be-
        cause it was an incomplete description of the criteria for involun-
        tary examination.
               We agree that the language of the Baker Act instruction con-
        tained error. The text of the Baker Act provides that a person may
        become subject to involuntary examination only if both §
        394.463(1)(a) “and” § 394.463(1)(b) are satisﬁed. See id. The district
        court, however, informed the jury of only one criterion for invol-
        untary examination under § 394.463(1). And the district court did
        not instruct the jury that before an oﬃcer subjects a person to in-
        voluntary examination, the oﬃcer must determine that
        § 394.463(1)(b)(2) “and” one of the § 394.463(1)(a) criteria are ful-
        ﬁlled.
               Although the jury instruction was erroneous, we conclude
        that this error is not reversible. We “will not disturb a jury’s verdict
        unless the charge, taken as a whole, is erroneous and prejudicial.”
        SEC v. Yun, 327 F.3d 1263, 1281 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting Mosher v.
        Speedstar Div. of AMCA Int’l Inc., 979 F.2d 823, 824 (11th Cir. 1992))
        (emphasis added); accord Watkins v. City of Montgomery, 775 F.3d
        1280, 1289–90 (11th Cir. 2014). The Estate argues that it desired a
        complete recitation of the Baker Act because it wanted to highlight
        that Deputy Lozada never provided Mrs. Teel with an opportunity
USCA11 Case: 22-11106     Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024    Page: 21 of 26

        22-11106               Opinion of the Court                       21

        to refuse voluntary examination under § 394.463(1)(a)(1). How-
        ever, that criterion is not necessary to subject an individual to in-
        voluntary examination. Because of the word “or” in §
        394.463(1)(a), Deputy Lozada could have taken Mrs. Teel into cus-
        tody without providing her an opportunity to refuse voluntary ex-
        amination. An opportunity to refuse voluntary examination is thus
        unnecessary if the subject “is unable to determine for himself or
        herself whether examination is necessary.”                Fla. Stat.
        § 394.463(1)(a)(2). Here, the jury was presented with evidence
        showing that at the time of the incident, Mrs. Teel had just at-
        tempted suicide, was inebriated, was holding a knife, and had told
        Deputy Lozada to shoot her. We thus conclude that there was no
        prejudice to the Estate because, even if the jury had a fulsome ex-
        planation of the Baker Act, the jury would have readily concluded
        based on the evidence shown at trial that Deputy Lozada had am-
        ple justiﬁcation to conclude that Mrs. Teel was “unable to deter-
        mine for [] herself whether examination [wa]s necessary.” Id.
               More importantly, the Baker Act instruction did not preju-
        dice the Estate because the Baker Act instruction was not critical to
        the issue before the jury. At bottom, the trial was about whether
        Deputy Lozada used excessive force in violation of the Fourth
        Amendment. The Graham test—not the Baker Act—is the touch-
        stone for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. See Gra-
        ham, 490 U.S. 386. The Baker Act was relevant only insofar as it
        provided the jury with background and the criteria Deputy Lozada
        should have assessed in responding to a Baker Act call. Here the
        jury found that Deputy Lozada’s use of deadly force was not
USCA11 Case: 22-11106     Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024    Page: 22 of 26

        22                     Opinion of the Court                22-11106

        excessive given that Mrs. Teel was holding a knife, advanced toward
        him, and did not heed commands to stop. Thus, even though the
        Baker Act instruction was incomplete and therefore contained a
        misstatement, the misstatement did not prejudice the Estate such
        that a new trial is warranted. See Caradigm, 964 F.3d at 1277 n.12.
        Accordingly, we aﬃrm as to this issue.
                          B. The “Rough Patch” Evidence
               We now turn to the “rough patch” evidentiary issue raised
        by the Estate. Both before and during trial, the district court ex-
        cluded evidence and witness testimony about a “rough patch” that
        Deputy Lozada experienced in 2016 to 2017. During this so called
        “rough patch”, there were seven instances when Deputy Lozada
        violated policies of the Indian River County Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce. These
        violations ranged from a few traﬃc infractions to one instance
        when a suspect sustained a concussion while Deputy Lozada ap-
        prehended him at a gas station. And during a deposition, Deputy
        Lozada testiﬁed that, in 2016 and 2017, he was “young” and “irre-
        sponsible,” which contributed to his mistakes.
                Before trial, Deputy Lozada submitted a motion in limine to
        exclude evidence of other instances when he violated Sheriﬀ’s Of-
        ﬁce policies, and the district court granted his motion. The district
        court explained that the evidence was irrelevant and improper
        character evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1). The
        district court also noted that because it granted summary judg-
        ment as to Dr. Teel’s Monell claim, Deputy Lozada’s prior mishaps
        were irrelevant to the trial of the excessive force claim.
USCA11 Case: 22-11106      Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024     Page: 23 of 26

        22-11106               Opinion of the Court                         23

               Later, at trial, the Estate began eliciting testimony about
        Deputy Lozada’s so-called “rough patch.” Deputy Lozada ob-
        jected, and the district court sustained the objection, noting its pre-
        vious order on his motion in limine.
               “[T]he ‘reasonableness’ inquiry in an excessive force case is
        an objective one: the question is whether the oﬃcers’ actions are
        ‘objectively reasonable’ in light of the facts and circumstances con-
        fronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or moti-
        vation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (quoting Scott v. United States, 436
        U.S. 128, 137–39 (1978)); see also Helm, 989 F.3d at 1273 (“Because
        determining reasonableness is an objective test, we do not consider
        an oﬃcer’s intent or motivation.”). Whether Deputy Lozada acted
        unreasonably in prior instances not involving the use of deadly
        force has little bearing on whether he used objectively reasonable
        force when he shot Mrs. Teel, and we conclude that the district
        court did not abuse its discretion.
               The Estate argues that Deputy Lozada’s prior misconduct is
        relevant because it goes to his “state of mind” when he shot Mrs.
        Teel. The Estate relies on Kingsley, 576 U.S. at 395, for the proposi-
        tion that an oﬃcer’s state of mind is relevant in an excessive force
        case. But Kingsley explained that an oﬃcer’s intention is relevant
        only in a limited sense. True, the use of force must be an inten-
        tional act—in other words, Deputy Lozada must have intended to
        shoot Mrs. Teel. See id. Nonetheless, whether the use of force is
        reasonable is judged under an objective standard without regard to
        Deputy Lozada’s “state of mind.” Id. Because Deputy Lozada does
USCA11 Case: 22-11106         Document: 58-1         Date Filed: 04/18/2024         Page: 24 of 26

        24                         Opinion of the Court                        22-11106

        not dispute that he intentionally shot Mrs. Teel, his state of mind
        was not an issue at trial. The only question was “whether to inter-
        pret the defendant’s physical acts in the world as involving force
        that was ‘excessive,’” which is an objective question. Id.
                Additionally, we conclude that the district court did not
        abuse its discretion in ruling that evidence of Deputy Lozada’s
        “rough patch” constituted improper character evidence under Rule
        404(b)(1). “Evidence of any other crime, wrong, or act is not ad-
        missible to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a
        particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the char-
        acter.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(1). Although evidence of other bad
        acts is admissible if it goes to the defendant’s “intent,” Fed. R. Evid.
        404(b)(2), such evidence is not probative here because Graham is
        “objective” and does not allow us to “consider an oﬃcer’s intent or
        motivation.” Helm, 989 F.3d at 1273 (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397).
        We therefore aﬃrm on this issue. 4
                 C. Summary Judgment on the Estate’s Monell Claim

        4 For the first time on appeal, the Estate also argues that the “rough patch”

        evidence was admissible under the curative admissibility doctrine. The Estate
        argues that Deputy Lozada’s counsel opened the door to questioning about
        Deputy Lozada’s prior mishaps by asking him about his training, experience,
        and how he responded to the 911 call at the Teel residence. We decline to
        address this argument. The Estate failed to raise this argument below and thus
        waived the right to raise this argument on appeal “absent plain error.” United
        States v. Culver, 598 F.3d 740, 749 n.5 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v.
        Sentovich, 677 F.2d 834, 837 (11th Cir. 1982)). Indeed, the Estate neither ad-
        dresses the waiver nor explains why the district court’s ruling was “plain er-
        ror.”
USCA11 Case: 22-11106      Document: 58-1      Date Filed: 04/18/2024      Page: 25 of 26

        22-11106                Opinion of the Court                         25

               Lastly, we address the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment in favor of the Sheriﬀ on the Estate’s Monell claim. To
        impose liability under Monell, the Estate must prove three ele-
        ments: “(1) that [Mrs. Teel’s] constitutional rights were violated; (2)
        that the [Sheriﬀ’s Oﬃce] had a custom or policy that constituted
        deliberate indiﬀerence to that constitutional right; and (3) that the
        policy or custom caused the violation.” See McDowell, 392 F.3d at
        1289. The district court found that the Estate failed to demonstrate
        a genuine dispute of fact as to the second element.
               At oral argument, however, the Estate conceded that if we
        allow the jury’s verdict to stand, the Monell claim necessarily fails
        under the ﬁrst element. This concession is correct in light of con-
        trolling precedent. “[N]either Monell . . . , nor any other of our
        cases authorizes the award of damages against a municipal corpo-
        ration based on the actions of one of its oﬃcers when in fact the
        jury has concluded that the oﬃcer inﬂicted no constitutional
        harm.” City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986); see also
        Garczynski v. Bradshaw, 573 F.3d 1158, 1170–71 (11th Cir. 2009)
        (“Garczynski failed to show that any of the named individual police
        oﬃcers deprived him of his constitutional rights by using excessive
        or deadly force. Absent a constitutional violation, we need not ex-
        plore whether PBSO’s policies regarding crisis intervention training
        violated Garczynski’s constitutional rights.”); Rooney v. Watson, 101
        F.3d 1378, 1381 (11th Cir. 1996) (“Since we have determined that
        Deputy Watson’s conduct did not cause the Rooneys to suﬀer a
        constitutional deprivation, we need not inquire into Volusia
USCA11 Case: 22-11106     Document: 58-1     Date Filed: 04/18/2024    Page: 26 of 26

        26                    Opinion of the Court                 22-11106

        County’s policy and custom relating to patrol vehicle operation and
        training.”).
                To be clear, when the district court granted summary judg-
        ment to the Sheriﬀ after remand, it correctly refrained from grant-
        ing judgment under the ﬁrst element of Monell. At that time, we
        had determined on appeal that there was a material dispute of fact
        as to whether there was an underlying constitutional violation. See
        Teel I, 826 F. App’x at 889. But now, the jury has spoken, ﬁnding
        that Deputy Lozada did not violate the Fourth Amendment by
        shooting Mrs. Teel. Because there is no underlying constitutional
        violation, “[w]e may aﬃrm the judgment below on any ground
        supported by the record.” Statton, 959 F.3d at 1065. We thus aﬃrm
        the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the
        Sheriﬀ on the Estate’s Monell claim based on the ﬁrst element of
        Monell.
                            IV.    CONCLUSION
               For the reasons stated, we aﬃrm the district court’s jury in-
        structions, its exclusion of the “rough patch” evidence, and its
        grant of summary judgment in favor of the Sheriﬀ on the Estate’s
        Monell claim.
              AFFIRMED.