Court Opinion

ID: 9918578
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-15 15:08:19.457695+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:30.697940
License: Public Domain

Opinion issued January 9, 2024

                                    In The

                             Court of Appeals
                                   For The

                         First District of Texas
                           ————————————
                            NO. 01-22-00643-CR
                          ———————————
                 JASON MICHAEL BADYRKA, Appellant
                                      V.
                     THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

                  On Appeal from the 405th District Court
                         Galveston County, Texas
                     Trial Court Case No. 20-CR-2912

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION

      Jason Michael Badyrka was arrested on a parole-violation warrant. In

connection with that arrest, the officer patted Badyrka down and found some

unprescribed medication. The officer then searched Badyrka’s vehicle and

discovered more illegal drugs. Badyrka moved to suppress the drugs found in his
vehicle, contending the vehicle search was not a valid (1) search incident to arrest or

(2) inventory search. After the trial court denied the motion to suppress, Badyrka

pleaded guilty to felony possession of a controlled substance.1 Consistent with

Badyrka’s agreement with the State, the trial court sentenced Badyrka to nine years’

imprisonment and certified his right to appeal the pretrial suppression ruling.

Because we conclude the trial court did not err by denying the motion to suppress,

we affirm.

                                    Background

      League City police officer S. Perez responded to a trespass complaint at a

rental house. The owner of the house reported that unauthorized vehicles were

parked in the driveway, including a truck owned by H. Harkey. Because Officer

Perez had responded to other calls at the residence, he was familiar with Harkey and

her vehicle and knew that a temporary order prohibited Harkey from being there.

      When Officer Perez arrived, he saw two vehicles in the driveway—Harkey’s

truck and a black GMC Yukon. A man who identified himself as Badyrka was

standing “right beside” the Yukon. Badyrka told Officer Perez that he and Harkey

had stayed the previous night at the residence, but Harkey had since left.

      Officer Perez asked Badyrka for his identification and discovered an active

warrant for Badyrka’s arrest because of a parole violation. Based on that warrant,

1
      See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 481.115(d).
                                          2
Officer Perez handcuffed and arrested Badyrka. Officer Perez did not give Badyrka

his Miranda2 warnings before asking him questions, including about the Yukon.

Badyrka responded that the Yukon was his.

      Before placing Badyrka in his patrol car, Officer Perez patted Badyrka down

and found a baggie containing pills that Badyrka said were Clonazepam. Badyrka

admitted that he did not have a prescription for the pills. Officer Perez warned

Badyrka that his vehicle would be searched and asked if there was “anything else in

the [Yukon].” Badyrka said, “Shit.” Then, when asked again, he answered that he

had thrown a black container with “fake Adderall or something like that” into the

Yukon’s left rear window when he saw Officer Perez’s patrol car pull up. While

explaining to Officer Perez how he got the Adderall, Badyrka also mentioned some

Fentanyl patches.

      With Badyrka restrained in his patrol car, Officer Perez and another officer

searched the Yukon. They found a backpack containing drug paraphernalia. They

also found Fentanyl patches and the black container Badyrka had disclosed to

Officer Perez, which contained pills. In total, the drugs found in the Yukon consisted

of “18 doses of amphetamine pills,” “one dose of Adderall,” six unidentified pills

described as “colorful” and “possibly MDMA,” and two Fentanyl patches.

2
      See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 441 (1966).
                                          3
      A grand jury indicted Badyrka for possession of between four and 200 grams

of a controlled substance. The indictment included nine enhancement paragraphs.

      Badyrka moved to suppress his unMirandized statements to Officer Perez. At

the hearing on his motion, Badyrka argued that the physical evidence found in the

Yukon should also be suppressed as “fruit of the poisonous tree.” He asserted there

was no legal basis for a warrantless search of the Yukon based on his arrest for parole

violations. The trial court suppressed Badyrka’s post-arrest statements but otherwise

denied the motion.

      Later, under a plea agreement, Badyrka pleaded guilty to the charged offense,

the State abandoned the enhancement allegations, and the trial court assessed the

agreed nine-year sentence. The trial court certified Badyrka’s right to appeal the

suppression ruling.

                                Standard of Review

      We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress using a bifurcated

standard of review. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).

First, we afford almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of the

historical facts. See Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

During a suppression hearing, the trial court is the sole trier of fact and judge of the

credibility of the witnesses. See Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447; Kinnett v. State, 623

S.W.3d 876, 912 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, pet. ref’d). The trial court

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is entitled to believe or disbelieve all or part of a witness’s testimony, even if

uncontroverted, because the trial court can observe the witness’s demeanor and

appearance. Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447; Kinnett, 623 S.W.3d at 912. When the

trial court does not make findings of fact, we view the evidence in the light most

favorable to the trial court’s ruling and assume the trial court made implied findings

that support its ruling if those findings are supported by the record. Valtierra, 310

S.W.3d at 447.

      Second, we review a trial court’s application of the law to the facts de novo.

Id. We will sustain the trial court’s ruling if the decision is reasonably supported by

the record and is correct on any theory of law applicable to the case. Id. at 447–48.

                                Motion to Suppress

      Badyrka argues that the trial court erred by not suppressing the physical

evidence found in the Yukon because there was no basis for the warrantless search.

The State responds that the search was lawful as a search incident to arrest, as an

inventory search, and under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement.

Because it is dispositive, we consider only the search incident to arrest exception.

See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.

      The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,

Section 9 of the Texas Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and

                                          5
seizures.3 U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; see Atkins v. State, 882

S.W.2d 910, 912 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, pet. ref’d). Warrantless

searches are per se unreasonable unless the State proves that the search was

conducted under a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. See Arizona v.

Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357

(1967)).

      Relevant here, officers may search a vehicle incident to arrest in two

situations: (1) when the arrestee is unsecured and the area of the vehicle is within his

immediate control, or (2) “when it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the

offense of arrest might be found in the vehicle.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 335; see Moskey

v. State, 333 S.W.3d 696, 702 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, no pet.). In the

second situation, officers are not limited to the original offense for which the person

was arrested. State v. Sanchez, 538 S.W.3d 545, 549 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (finding

argument that “officer is forever limited to [the original] offense for” search incident

to arrest purposes “inconsistent with the basic notion that . . . an officer’s conduct is

3
      When an appellant does not separately brief state and federal constitutional claims,
      we assume that he claims no greater protection under the state constitution than that
      provided by the federal constitution. See Reed v. State, 308 S.W.3d 417, 419 n.3
      (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.); Varnes v. State, 63 S.W.3d 824, 829 (Tex.
      App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). Therefore, we analyze Badyrka’s claims
      under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, following
      guidelines set by the United States Supreme Court in interpreting the Fourth
      Amendment. See State v. Guzman, 959 S.W.2d 631, 633 (Tex. Crim. App.1998).
                                            6
judged by all the information known to the officer at the time [they] act.”). When

there is probable cause to arrest a person for a newly discovered offense, and the

search occurs close in time to the person’s formal arrest, an officer may conduct a

search incident to arrest based on an offense discovered after formal arrest for a

different crime. Id. at 551; see State v. Sanchez, No. 13-15-00288-CR, 2018 WL

1633571, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg Apr. 5, 2018, no pet.) (mem.

op., not designated for publication) (“[T]he discovery of drugs on [defendant], after

he was arrested on traffic warrants but before his Jeep was searched, supplied a new

basis for arrest that justified a search incident to arrest of his Jeep.”).

       Badyrka asserts that the first situation justifying a search incident to arrest is

not implicated here. The State does not dispute that Badyrka was handcuffed, in the

patrol car, and not within reaching distance of the Yukon when it was searched. We

agree that because Badyrka was in police custody before and during the search of

the Yukon, officers could not have a reasonable belief that he could reach into the

Yukon to destroy evidence or grab a weapon. See McGee v. State, 105 S.W.3d 609,

615 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“A search incident to arrest permits officers to search

a defendant, or areas within the defendant’s immediate control, to prevent the

concealment or destruction of evidence.”).

                                             7
      Our concern is the second situation. As to it, Badyrka asserts that Officer

Perez could not have expected to find evidence of a crime in the Yukon after

arresting him for parole violations. On this point, we disagree.

      Badyrka cites two cases for support: Arizona v. Gant and Knowles v. Iowa. In

Gant, the defendant was arrested on a warrant for driving with a suspended license.

See 556 U.S. at 336. After the defendant was handcuffed and placed in the back of

a patrol car, the officers searched his vehicle and found cocaine in the pocket of a

jacket on the backseat. Id. In Knowles, the officer cited the defendant for speeding

rather than arresting him. See 525 U.S. 113, 114 (1998). The officer searched the

vehicle after issuing the citation, and under the driver’s seat he found a bag of

marijuana and a “pot pipe.” Id. The defendant was arrested and charged with

violation of state laws dealing with controlled substances. Id. Both cases are

distinguishable because the only offense known to the officers at the time of the

search were traffic violations. Probable cause to arrest the defendants for a newly

discovered offense was not discovered before the searches.

      But here, the officer discovered multiple offenses as the interaction

progressed: (1) the parole violation resulting in Badyrka’s arrest, (2) a second

offense discovered because of the unprescribed Clonazepam found on his person,

and (3) a third offense discovered in the search of the Yukon incident to arrest. See,

e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 481.115(d) (making it a second-degree felony

                                          8
to possess a controlled substance in an amount between four and 200 grams),

481.117(a) (making it an offense to possess a controlled substance listed in Penalty

Group 3 without a valid prescription); see also id. § 481.104(a)(2) (listing

Clonazepam as a Penalty Group 3 substance).

       For this reason, State v. Sanchez is more instructive. There, the officer

observed a Jeep parked on a grassy area next to a bar, with the driver’s door open

and the engine turned off. 538 S.W.3d at 546. The officer found the defendant asleep

in the driver’s seat. Id. After the officer woke the defendant up and checked his

identity, she discovered that he had several traffic warrants for his arrest. Id. She

arrested him on the traffic warrants. Id. During a search of the defendant’s person,

the officer discovered a cigarette box containing two small baggies of a white

powdery substance that, in her experience, appeared to be cocaine. Id. After

discovering the baggies, the officer searched the Jeep and found another baggie of

what appeared to be cocaine. Id. at 547. A field test for cocaine gave a positive

result. Id.

       The court of appeals concluded that the search of the defendant’s Jeep was

unreasonable because the traffic offenses for which there were outstanding warrants

were the “offense of arrest” for purposes of the search incident to arrest, not the

possession of cocaine. Id. at 548. But the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reached

a different conclusion. It held that “[a]s long as there is probable cause to arrest for

                                           9
the newly[] discovered offense, and the search occurs close in time to the defendant’s

formal arrest, an officer may conduct a search incident to arrest on the basis of an

offense discovered after formal arrest for a different crime.” Id. at 551.

       That is the situation here. Officer Perez arrested Badyrka after discovering his

warrant for parole violations. For safety reasons, Officer Perez searched Badyrka’s

person after taking him into custody but before placing him in the patrol car. That

search, which Badyrka does not contest, turned up a baggie of unprescribed

Clonazepam. See McGee, 105 S.W.3d at 615 (a person may be searched after a

lawful arrest). Badyrka’s possession of unprescribed Clonazepam gave rise to

another reason for Badyrka to be arrested. Thus, even if Officer Perez could not have

a reasonable belief that evidence of the parole violation could be found in the Yukon,

it was reasonable for Officer Perez to believe that the vehicle Badyrka admitted

belonged to him, which he was standing “right beside,” and which he admitted he

threw something into as Officer Perez arrived on scene, contained evidence of the

possession offense. See, e.g., Horton v. State, Nos. 14-08-00786-CR & 14-08-

00804-CR, 2010 WL 2195456, at *5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 3, 2010,

pet. ref’d).

       To the extent that Badyrka argues that we cannot consider his unwarned

statements in determining whether Officer Perez could reasonably believe that

evidence of the offense might be found in the Yukon, we note that argument relies

                                          10
on “the premise that a Miranda violation (a potential Fifth Amendment

violation) can lead to the exclusion of evidence—other than the unwarned

statements—under [the state exclusionary rule contained in Code of Criminal

Procedure] Article 38.23 or the Fourth Amendment.” Wells v. State, 611 S.W.3d

396, 406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); see also United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630,

636–37 (2004). The United States Supreme Court and the Texas Court of Criminal

Appeals have expressly rejected this avenue for relief. Patane, 542 U.S. at 636–37;

Wells, 611 S.W.3d at 406 (citing Baker v. State, 956 S.W.2d 19, 24 (Tex. Crim. App.

1997)). Further, even though a statement taken in violation of Miranda must be

suppressed at trial, other evidence later obtained because of that statement—the

“fruits” of the statement—need not be suppressed. Wells, 611 S.W.3d at 406. “The

fruits of a defendant’s statement need only be suppressed when the statement is

obtained through actual coercion,” which Badyrka has not alleged and we do not

discern from the record. Id.; Baker, 956 S.W.2d at 22.

      Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err by denying Badyrka’s

motion to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the Yukon. We overrule

Badyrka’s first issue.4

4
      Given this disposition, we need not reach Badyrka’s second issue challenging the
      search of his vehicle on an alternative basis. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.1.
                                         11
                                   Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                                Sarah Beth Landau
                                                Justice

Panel consists of Chief Justice Adams and Justices Landau and Rivas-Molloy.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

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