Court Opinion

ID: 9761589
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 01:46:30.091784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:24.789185
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting in part and concurring in part.
I dissent because Kentucky Constitution § 111(2) allows the Supreme Court to provide an alternative method of review in appeals from administrative agencies as an exception to the mandatory review in § 115.
I have no doubt but the present procedure enacted by statute, as supplemented by the Supreme Court rule, is what the drafters of § 111(2) had in mind when they stated that the Court of Appeals “may be authorized by rules of the Supreme Court to review directly decisions of administrative agencies of the Commonwealth.”
The General Assembly’s decision to modify the structure of the Workers’ Compensation Act as was done was a long-time coming, but was an idea in being at the time the Constitution was amended. The modification makes the Board the first appeal and the equal of a constitutional appeal under § 115. The idea that § 115 in these circumstances requires a second appeal exalts form over substance at the expense of the Constitution and the injured worker.
A workers’ compensation case is decided by an administrative law judge, and re*801viewed by appeal to the Workers’ Compensation Board. We have created a useless, unnecessary, counterproductive procedure by deciding that a second appellate review is necessary. Thus, I dissent.
However, I would grant discretionary review and reverse the Court of Appeals on the underlying substantive issues because the dependency findings by the Board were not clearly unreasonable. I agree that dependency should relate to the time of the “accident” causing injury, not time of death of the disabled worker. KRS 342.-075(2) applies.
Thus, substantively, I agree that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the Workers’ Compensation Board.