Court Opinion

ID: 9868857
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-26 19:01:49.018388+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:22:30.101439
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13305    Document: 38-1      Date Filed: 09/26/2023   Page: 1 of 12

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13305
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
        versus
        MARTY EUGENE DAYS, JR.,

                                                   Defendant- Appellant.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cr-00023-JA-PRL-1
                           ____________________
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        2                         Opinion of the Court                      22-13305

        Before LAGOA, ABUDU, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges
        PER CURIAM:
                Marty Eugene Days, Jr. appeals his 27-month sentence for
        possession of ammunition by a felon. Days first argues that the
        district court improperly enhanced his offense level by considering
        his prior Florida conviction for attempted armed robbery a “crime
        of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) when it no longer
        qualifies as a predicate “crime of violence” in light of United States
        v. Taylor, 142 S. Ct. 2015 (2022), and United States v. Dupree, 57 F.4th
        1269 (11th Cir. 2023) (en banc). Next, he argues that his due process
        rights were violated when the district court imposed specific con-
        ditions of supervised release in its written judgment but did not
        pronounce those conditions in its oral sentence. The government
        concedes that Days is right as to his first argument. Because we
        agree with the parties that Days’ Florida conviction for attempted
        armed robbery is not a “crime of violence” under § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) 1,
        we vacate Days’ sentence and remand the case for resentencing un-
        der the proper Sentencing Guidelines calculation.
                                           I.
              In May 2022, a grand jury returned a single-count indictment
        charging Days with possession of ammunition by a felon, in

        1 In United States v. Metzler, No. 22-13759, 2023 WL 746643 (11th Cir. Sept. 6,

        2023), this Court also concluded that a prior conviction for attempted strong
        arm robbery in Florida is not a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing
        Guidelines.
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        22-13305              Opinion of the Court                        3

        violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). On June 26, 2022,
        Days entered a guilty plea to the indictment.
               Before sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presen-
        tence investigation report (“PSI”). The PSI assigned Days a base
        offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A) due to his prior
        conviction of attempted armed robbery in Florida in 2007. Partic-
        ularly, the PSI noted that Days “was adjudicated guilty of Attempt
        to Commit Robbery While Armed With a Deadly Weapon in Ala-
        chua County Circuit Court, under docket number 2007-CF-1050.”
        The PSI decreased his offense level by three for acceptance of re-
        sponsibility under §§ 3E1.1(a) and (b), resulting in a total offense
        level of 17.
               Days objected to the PSI’s base offense level calculation of
        20, arguing that his prior conviction for attempted armed robbery
        did not qualify as a “crime of violence” under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1
        based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Taylor. He argued that
        attempted armed robbery is not a “crime of violence” as defined by
        U.S.S.G § 4B1.2(a)(1) under the elements clause because the crime
        does “not categorically require the use, attempted use, or threat-
        ened use of force.” He also argued that attempted armed robbery
        is not a “crime of violence” as defined by U.S.S.G § 4B1.2(a)(2) un-
        der the enumerated-crimes clause because while robbery is enu-
        merated by the Sentencing Guidelines, attempted robbery is not.
        Finally, Days argued that a 12-month sentence was appropriate
        given the offense and circumstances.
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        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13305

                 At the sentencing hearing, the district court acknowledged
        that Supreme Court’s reasoning in Taylor appeared to mirror Days’
        argument that his prior conviction for attempted armed robbery
        was not a “crime of violence” under the Sentencing Guidelines.
        Still, the district court overruled Days’ objection, explaining that it
        was bound by precedent from the Eleventh Circuit and that this
        case was different from Taylor because Days’ case concerned the
        Sentencing Guidelines, while Taylor concerned the application of
        18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A). The district court found that Days had a
        total offense level of 17, a criminal history category of II, and an
        advisory guidelines sentence of 27 to 33 months’ imprisonment.
        After discussion, the district court sentenced Days to 27 months’
        imprisonment, followed by one year of supervised release. The
        district court also ordered that Days comply with the “mandatory
        and standard conditions adopted by the Court in the Middle Dis-
        trict of Florida” and other “special conditions.” The written judg-
        ment listed four mandatory conditions, thirteen standard condi-
        tions, and one additional condition of supervised release.
               Days timely appealed his sentence.
                                       II.
               We review the interpretation and application of the Sentenc-
        ing Guidelines de novo. Dupree, 57 F.4th at 1272. We also “review
        de novo whether a defendant’s prior conviction qualifies as a crime
        of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines.” United States v. Pal-
        omino Garcia, 606 F.3d 1317, 1326 (11th Cir. 2010) (quotation marks
        omitted). A concession of law is not binding on this Court. United
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        22-13305               Opinion of the Court                         5

        States v. Colston, 4 F.4th 1179, 1187 (11th Cir. 2021). Likewise, we
        need not accept the government’s concession of error “when the
        law and record do not justify it.” United States v. Linville, 228 F.3d
        1330, 1331 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000).
                                       III.
              On appeal, Days argues that his attempted Florida armed
        robbery conviction is not a “crime of violence” post-Taylor and
        Dupree. The government concedes this point and similarly recom-
        mends vacatur of Days’ sentence and remand for resentencing.
               Under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(A), a defendant is assigned a
        Base Offense Level of 20 if he “committed any part of the instant
        offense subsequent to sustaining one felony conviction of either a
        crime of violence or a controlled substance offense.” The Com-
        mentary to § 2K2.1 provides that “crime of violence” has the mean-
        ing given that term in § 4B1.2(a) and Application Note 1 of the
        Commentary to § 4B1.2. U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, comment. n.1. Section
        4B1.2(a), in turn, defines a “crime of violence” as any offense under
        federal or state law punishable by at least one-year imprisonment
        that:
               (1) has as an element the use, attempted use, or
                   threatened use of physical force against the person
                   of another, or

               (2) is murder, voluntary manslaughter, kidnapping,
                   aggravated assault, a forcible sex oﬀense, robbery,
                   arson, extortion, or the use or unlawful possession
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        6                         Opinion of the Court               22-13305

                   of a ﬁrearm described in 26 U.S.C. § 5845(a) or ex-
                   plosive material as deﬁned in 18 U.S.C. § 841(c).

        Id. § 4B1.2(a)(1)-(2). The first clause is known as the “elements
        clause,” and the second is known as the “enumerated crimes”
        clause. United States v. Fritts, 841 F.3d 937, 939 (11th Cir. 2016). An
        offense punishable by at least one-year imprisonment is a “crime of
        violence” when it satisfies either the elements clause or the enu-
        merated crimes clause. Id.
               Under Florida law, robbery is defined as:
               the taking of money or other property which may be
               the subject of larceny from the person or custody of
               another, with intent to either permanently or tempo-
               rarily deprive the person or the owner of the money
               or other property, when in the course of the taking
               there is the use of force, violence, assault, or putting
               in fear.

        Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1).
              Florida’s attempt statute states that “[a] person who at-
        tempts to commit an offense prohibited by law and in such attempt
        does any act toward the commission of such offense, but fails in the
        perpetration or is intercepted or prevented in the execution
        thereof, commits the offense of criminal attempt.” Id. § 777.04(1).
               To support a conviction for attempted robbery under Flor-
        ida law, “the State must show that the accused formed the intent
        to take the victim’s property and committed some overt act to ac-
        complish that goal.” Fornier v. State, 827 S.2d 399, 400-01 (Fla. Dist.
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        22-13305               Opinion of the Court                         7

        Ct. App. 2002). “The overt act necessary to fulfill the requirements
        of attempted robbery, or an attempt to commit a crime, must be
        adapted to effect the intent to commit the crime; it must be carried
        beyond mere preparation, but it must fall short of executing the
        ultimate design.” Mercer v. State, 347 So. 2d 733, 734 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
        App. 1977). As for attempted armed robbery, “the statutory ele-
        ment which enhances punishment for armed robbery is not the use
        of the deadly weapon, but the mere fact that a deadly weapon was
        carried by the perpetrator.” State v. Baker, 452 So. 2d 927, 929 (Fla.
        1984) (emphasis omitted).
               We previously held that attempted robbery in Florida is a
        crime of violence under both § 4B1.2(a)’s elements clause and enu-
        merated clause. Lockley, 632 F.3d at 1246. In Lockley, we held that
        Florida attempted robbery was a “crime of violence” within the
        meaning of the career offender enhancement in the Guidelines.
        632 F.3d 1238, 1246 (11th Cir. 2011). We concluded that robbery
        under Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1) also qualified as a crime of violence un-
        der the elements clause because it “requires either the use of force,
        violence, a threat of imminent force or violence coupled with ap-
        parent ability, or some act that puts the victim in fear of death or
        great bodily harm.” Id. at 1245. And we held that robbery under
        Fla. Stat. § 812.13(1) categorically qualified as a crime of violence
        under the enumerated crimes because it met the generic definition
        of robbery. Id. at 1242-45. Thus, we concluded that a prior convic-
        tion qualifies as a crime of violence if the defendant was convicted
        of attempting to commit an enumerated offense or if “the use,
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        8                         Opinion of the Court                      22-13305

        attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another
        was an element of the offense.” Id. at 1241.
                The government and Days argue that Lockley has been abro-
        gated by recent decisions. Under the prior panel precedent rule,
        we are bound by prior published decisions that have not been over-
        ruled by the Supreme Court or this Court en banc. United States v.
        Romo-Villalobos, 674 F.3d 1246, 1251 (11th Cir. 2012). A subsequent
        Supreme Court or en banc decision “must be clearly on point and
        must actually abrogate or directly conflict with, as opposed to
        merely weaken, the holding of the prior panel.” United States v.
        Gillis, 938 F.3d 1181, 1198 (11th Cir. 2019) (quotation marks omit-
        ted). Since Lockley, we have held that commentary to § 4B1.2 can-
        not expand the text when the guideline’s text is not “genuinely am-
        biguous.” See Dupree, 57 F.4th at 1274. Also, since Lockley, the Su-
        preme Court has held that a crime is only a “crime of violence”
        under the elements clause of the identically-worded Armed Career
        Criminal Act when the government must prove, as an element of
        its case, “the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.” Tay-
        lor, 142 S.Ct. at 2020. In Taylor, the Supreme Court held that at-
        tempted Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a predicate crime
        of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A)’s “elements clause.”2 Taylor, 142
        S. Ct. at 2019-21. At the outset, the Supreme Court noted that,

               2   Like the elements clause of § 4B1.2, the elements clause of
        § 924(c) provides that a crime of violence is a felony offense that “has as an
        element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the
        person or property of another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A).
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        22-13305               Opinion of the Court                         9

        under the applicable categorical approach, the facts of a particular
        defendant’s case are immaterial, because the “only relevant ques-
        tion is whether the federal felony at issue always requires the gov-
        ernment to prove—beyond a reasonable doubt, as an element of
        its case—the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force.” Id.
        at 2020.
                The Supreme Court then explained that, to prove attempted
        Hobbs Act robbery, the government must show that the defendant
        intended to unlawfully take or obtain personal property using ac-
        tual or threatened force and completed a “substantial step” toward
        that end. Id. But the Supreme Court noted that, while the govern-
        ment would have to show that the defendant took an “unequivo-
        cal” and “significant” step toward committing robbery, the govern-
        ment need not show that the defendant actually used, attempted
        to use, or even threatened to use force, as required by § 924(c). Id.
        at 2020–21. The Supreme Court stressed that “an intention to take
        property by force or threat, along with a substantial step toward
        achieving that object, . . . is just that, no more.” Id. at 2020. In a
        hypothetical, the Supreme Court stated that a defendant appre-
        hended before reaching his robbery victim could be convicted of
        attempted Hobbs Act robbery, even though he had not yet en-
        gaged in threatening conduct, so long as the government had other
        evidence of his intent and a substantial step. Id. at 2020–21. Ac-
        cordingly, the Supreme Court held that attempted Hobbs Act rob-
        bery was not a crime of violence under the text of § 924(c)(3)(A).
        Id. at 2021.
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        10                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13305

                The same analysis applies to Florida attempted armed rob-
        bery. The crime has three elements: (1) taking money or property
        from another; (2) “with intent to either permanently or temporar-
        ily deprive the owner” of it; (3) while using “force, violence, assault,
        or putting [the owner] in fear.” Fla. Stat. § 812.13. An attempted
        robbery occurs when a person “attempts to commit [the] offense .
        . . and in such attempt does any act toward the commission of [the]
        offense, but fails in the perpetration or is intercepted or prevented
        in the execution thereof.” Fla. Stat. § 777.04(1). Just like Hobbs Act
        attempted robbery, Florida attempted armed robbery requires
        only the formation of an intent to take money or property of an-
        other and an act taken toward that goal. And the carrying of a
        weapon, not the use, attempted use, or threatened use of that
        weapon, is the only requirement for the weapon enhancement for
        attempt. Baker, 452 So. 2d 927, 929. Because the crime does not
        require the use, attempted use, or threatened use of force, Florida
        attempted robbery cannot satisfy the elements clause.
               Second, Florida attempted armed robbery does not satisfy
        the enumerated clause. In Dupree, we held that the enumerated
        crimes clause in the Sentencing Guidelines’ related definition of a
        “controlled substance offense” did not include the inchoate of-
        fenses referenced in the Guidelines commentary. 57 F.4th at 1277–
        1280. We noted that the “[t]he commentary in Application Note 1
        to § 4B1.2 adds that the term ‘controlled substance offense in-
        clude[s] the offenses of aiding and abetting, conspiring, and at-
        tempting to commit such offenses.’” Id. at 1273 (quoting U.S.S.G.
        § 4B1.2(b) comment. n.1.). To determine whether courts are
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        22-13305               Opinion of the Court                         11

        bound by the commentary’s interpretation of the Sentencing
        Guidelines, we relied on Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019),
        which stated that a court only needed to afford deference to an
        agency’s interpretation of its own regulations if the language of the
        regulation is “genuinely ambiguous.” Id. at 1274. Kisor also in-
        structs that, before a court may determine that an ambiguity exists,
        it must use all the tools of statutory construction, and if uncertainty
        does not exist after applying those tools, deference cannot be
        granted to the commentary. Id. at 1274-75.
                Proceeding on that basis, we applied the traditional tools of
        statutory interpretation and concluded that “the plain language
        definition of ‘controlled substance offense’ in § 4B1.2 unambigu-
        ously excludes inchoate offenses.” Id. at 1277. We explained that
        “[t]he exclusion of inchoate crimes from the definition of what the
        term ‘means’ is a strong indicator that the term does not include
        those offenses.” Id. We noted that the Sentencing Guidelines de-
        fine a “crime of violence” as one including the use and attempted
        use of physical force and explained that the proximity of the crime
        of violence provision to the controlled substances provision evi-
        denced the Sentencing Commission’s intentional omission of in-
        choate offenses from the controlled substance offense provision.
        Id. at 1278. Accordingly, the enumerated crimes clause unambigu-
        ously covers only completed offenses. Without ambiguity in the
        text of the Sentencing Guidelines, we will not defer to the Sentenc-
        ing Commission’s contrary interpretation in the commentary. Be-
        cause the crime is not included in the enumerated list, Florida at-
        tempted armed robbery cannot satisfy the enumerated clause.
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        12                    Opinion of the Court                 22-13305

               In addition, our recent decision in United States v. Metzler,
        No. 22-13759, 2023 WL 5746643 (11th Cir. Sept. 6, 2023) is control-
        ling. In Metzler, we held that our Lockley decision was abrogated
        by the Supreme Court’s Taylor decision and our decision in Dupree.
        We thus conclude that the district court erred when it imposed an
        enhancement to Days’ Guidelines calculation because a prior Flor-
        ida conviction for attempted armed robbery does not qualify as a
        crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2’s elements clause or the
        enumerated crimes clause. Further, because the district court will
        be able to reconsider whether to impose certain conditions of su-
        pervised release after allowing Days an opportunity to be heard,
        we need not reach Days’ remaining argument on that point.
                                        IV.
              For these reasons, Days’ sentence is vacated, and this case is
        remanded for resentencing without a “crime of violence” enhance-
        ment.
              VACATED and REMANDED for resentencing.