Court Opinion

ID: 9771457
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 16:44:09.007096+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:31.634213
License: Public Domain

Paul Ward, Associate Justice, concurring. What I have to say hereafter is confined strictly to the question of punitive damages. I agree with the result reached by the majority for the reasons that the judgment in this case was rendered against all three of the defendants, for the reason that a separate judgment against each individual defendant was not requested, for the reason that the Gazette’s ability to pay was not shown, and for the reason that this court had no way of equitably dividing the judgment. Under these circumstances the court could do nothing except remit the judgment entirely. The majority, however, did not reach its decision on the above stated ground, and that is the reason for this concurrence. The majority opinion contains the following statement based on what it calls the majority rule: ‘ ‘ The right to recover (such) punitive damages is waived when two or more parties are made defendants in a case where punitive damages may be assessable. ’ ’ I do not agree with the so-called majority rule, and I do not think it was necessary to rely on such a rule in this ease. Since it was not necessary, I feel that the court should have waited until the specific question is raised and carefully briefed in this court. I see no logical or practical reason why separate judgments cannot, in the same case, be rendered against separate defendants. It must be conceded that the plaintiff can recover punitive damages against one person and then in a separate suit likewise recover against another person. In either event the court and the jury acted on precisely the same law and the same evidence. Not only would my view avoid a multiplicity of suits, but any other procedure might run afoul of Ark. Stats. § 27-814, which require a joinder of parties. The view which I have above set forth has been approved in the case of Charles E. Faroux, et al. v. H. H. Cornwell, et al., 40 Tex. Civ. App. 529, 90 S. W. 537; Walker, et al. v. Kellar, Tex. Civ. App., 226 S. W. 796; and St. Louis Southwestern Railway Company of Texas v. W. Z. Thompson, 102 Tex. 89, 113 S. W. 144. In the latter mentioned case the court had this to say: “If the defendants or either of them were actuated by malice in making the charges against Thompson or in procuring the same to be made and in prosecuting the same before the order, thereby procuring his expulsion, then the plaintiff may in the discretion of the jury recover exemplary damages against either or all of the said defendants, in such sum as the jury may believe should be assessed against the said defendants or either of them. It is not necessary, as in case of actual damages recovered, that all of the defendants should be subjected to the same verdict, because some of the defendants may have acted without malice, but in combination with others, and as to such defendants there would be no right to recover exemplary damages.”