Court Opinion

ID: 9683726
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:35:50.655052+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:49.916085
License: Public Domain

Dissenting Opinion by
Justice WINTERSHEIMER.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because this Court does not have authority to amend statutes of limitations adopted by the legislature regarding all pro se filings.
Initially, Robertson was convicted of five counts of sexual abuse. He was sentenced to one hundred years in prison and his conviction was affirmed by this Court in 1999. In 2002, Robertson, pro se, mailed a motion to vacate the judgment pursuant to RCr 11.42.. Although the pleadings were mailed according to the procedures of the institution and recorded in the mail log for February 5, 2002, ,the pleadings were not marked filed by the Nelson Circuit Clerk until February 25, 2002, more than 20 days after the mail was deposited and more than three years after the conviction was final. The trial judge ruled against Robertson, holding that the three-year time limit was jurisdictional and required strict compliance. The last day to file for RCr 11.42 relief was February 11, 2002.
Robertson relies upon the so-called mailbox rule endorsed by the United States Supreme Court in Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 108 S.Ct. 2379, 101 L.Ed.2d 245 (1988). The applicable federal statute in this type of situation only provides for a one-year limitation which is different from the three-year period of time allowed under RCr 11.42(10). The Kentucky rule *797provides three times as much time to a prisoner as the federal rule. There is really no reason to allow a pro se prisoner to circumvent clearly established rules and statutes.
Clearly, relaxation of the rules regarding statutes of limitations and the appropriate time for the submission of filings directly lead to additional delays in the judicial system. They afford no benefit to the orderly process of justice in our system. To favor a pro se prisoner over a prisoner who is represented by counsel would be obviously unfair. The dilution of reasonable rules by judicial decision is unacceptable.
Justice Antonin Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Renquist and Justices Kennedy and O’Connor, in dissent of Houston, sums up the arguments as follows:
Today’s decision obliterates the line between textual construction and textual enactment. It would be within the realm of normal judicial creativity (though in my view wrong) to interpret the phrase “filed with the clerk” to mean “mailed to the clerk,” or even “mailed to the clerk or given to a person bearing an obligation to mail to the clerk.” But interpreting it to mean “delivered to the clerk or, if you are a prisoner, delivered to your warden” is no more acceptable than any of an infinite number of variants .... Like these other examples, the Court’s rule makes a good deal of sense. I dissent only because it is not the rule we have promulgated ....
Recognizing the differences that exist between the state and federal statutes and rules, I must agree.
It is of interest to note that a rule change which would mirror the arguments of Robertson in this case was unanimously rejected by this Court in 2004. Here, Robertson was not diligent and thus should not be allowed to use the appellate process to circumvent clearly established rules. The decision could easily result in a flood of overdue and tardy motions.