Court Opinion

ID: 9791911
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:20:22.786214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:39.335936
License: Public Domain

Justice LOHR
dissenting:
This case involves the distribution of funds pursuant to a trust established by *370Margaret Collbran in 1970. Under the terms of the trust, upon Collbran’s death the remainder was to be divided equally and distributed to “the following organizations that are in existence at the time of [Collbran’s] death”: St. John’s Episcopal Cathedral, Dumb Friends League Animal Shelter, Metropolitan Opera Guild, Inc., and Bennett College, Collbran’s alma mater.
On October 14, 1977, Bennett College was adjudicated bankrupt. During the several months that followed, most of Bennett College’s assets were liquidated and the proceeds distributed to its creditors. Pace University subsequently assumed many of Bennett College’s administrative obligations, including administering student loans and scholarship funds, maintaining Bennett College records and raising funds for the Bennett College Foundation. Pace accepted all of the Bennett College students and hired many of the faculty and staff formerly employed by Bennett. Pace also allowed Bennett’s alumnae office to operate on its grounds. The Bennett College charter was never relinquished or revoked, and in 1986 Bennett College and Pace University were formally consolidated by the New York State Board of Regents.
Collbran died on February 22, 1986. The trustee petitioned the Denver Probate Court for instructions regarding Bennett College’s interest in the trust. The share at issue is valued at more than $7,000,000. The other three trust beneficiaries contended that Bennett College was no longer in existence. The three beneficiaries filed two motions for summary judgment seeking dismissal of the claim of Bennett College, Bennett College Foundation, Inc. and Pace University (referred to collectively as Bennett) to be beneficiaries of the Collbran trust. The moving parties contended that Bennett was both collaterally and judicially estopped from asserting that Bennett College was in existence at the time of Coll-bran’s death. The Denver Probate Court granted the motions for summary judgment and the Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed. The majority affirms the judgment of the court of appeals on the ground of collateral estoppel. I do not agree that collateral estoppel is applicable in this case.
The court of appeals held that Bennett was collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of Bennett College’s existence by the Gage Trust litigation, which occurred before a New York Supreme Court, a trial court. Margaret Gage created a trust with Bennett College named as the beneficiary. The Gage Trust provided in pertinent part:
In the event that the beneficiary herein-above named shall at any time cease to exist, whether by reason of dissolution, merger, consolidation or otherwise, I reserve to myself during my lifetime, and to my trustees after my decease, the right and privilege of substituting as beneficiary in the place and stead of the beneficiary hereinabove named, one or more religious, charitable, eleemosynary, educational or benevolent organizations or institutions wholly charitable in nature and purpose and not operated for profit.
In May 1979, the trustee of the Gage Trust filed an action in a Supreme Court of New York, seeking a ruling that Bennett College had ceased to exist, that the trustee need not continue disbursing trust funds to Bennett College and that the trustee could substitute a new beneficiary for Bennett College. The trial court issued an order to show cause why Bennett College had not ceased to exist. On July 2, 1979, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion granting the Gage trustee’s application to construe the trust to permit the trustee to substitute a new beneficiary for Bennett College, “which has ceased to exist.” On July 13, 1979, the trustee and the Bennett College bankruptcy trustee entered into a stipulation in which they agreed that Bennett College’s claim against the Gage Trust would be fully satisfied by a payment of $3,668.22, the amount of income accrued up to the date on which Bennett College was adjudicated bankrupt. On September 7, 1979, the court entered its final judgment, which repeated the rulings found in the memorandum decision and referred to the parties’ stipulation.
In order for the litigation of any issue to be barred by collateral estoppel, four conditions must be met: (1) the issue for which litigation is precluded must be identical to an issue actually determined in a prior pro-*371eeeding; (2) the party against whom preclusion is sought must have been a party to, or in privity with a party to, the prior proceeding; (3) there must have been a final judgment on the merits in the prior proceeding; and (4) the party against whom preclusion is sought must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding. City of Colorado Springs v. Industrial Commission, 749 P.2d 412, 414 (Colo.1988).
The first requirement, identity of issue, is not present in this case. In order for collateral estoppel to apply, “the same identical matter must have been in issue in the former suit, and the precise fact determined by the former judgment.” Hickey v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assoc., 36 Colo. 386, 389, 85 P. 838, 838 (1906).
The Gage Trust specified that the beneficiary, Bennett College, could “cease to exist” by such means as “dissolution, merger, consolidation or otherwise.” Under this expansive definition, the New York court found that after the sale of Bennett College’s assets and its subsequent consolidation with Pace University, Bennett College had ceased to exist.
The Collbran Trust, however, contains no definition of the term “existence.” It merely states that in order to benefit from the trust, Bennett College must have been “in existence” at the time of Collbran’s death. The meaning of the term “existence” in this context is not self-evident but is ambiguous. Cf. Pepcol Mfg. Co. v. Denver Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310, 1314 (Colo.1984) (whether an ambiguity exists is a question of law). Extrinsic evidence should be admissible, therefore, to determine its meaning. See, e.g., id. After a trial, a court might find that Collbran intended to leave money to Bennett only if it continued to operate as it had when she was a student. On the other hand, a court might determine that Collbran merely wanted to leave a portion of her estate to an educational institution that was closely tied with her alma mater by corporate consolidation. Whatever a trial court might find, it is evident that the resolution of whether Bennett College is in existence for purposes of the Collbran trust is not controlled by the New York court’s determination that it was not in existence under the definition controlling in the Gage Trust litigation. See Blue Cross of Western New York v. Bukulmez, 736 P.2d 834, 839 (Colo.1987) (“[sjummary judgment should not be granted where there appears to be any controversy concerning material facts”).
The majority reasons that the Gage Trust’s “definition of ‘exist’ — ‘dissolution, merger, consolidation or otherwise’ — is too broad to differentiate the Gage trust deed’s use of ‘exist’ from the Collbran trust instrument’s use of ‘existence.’ ” Maj. op. at 367. This reasoning misconstrues the terms of the Gage Trust. The Gage Trust does not define “exist” broadly. It defines the phrase “cease to exist” broadly and, therefore, by necessary implication defines “exist” very narrowly. The Collbran Trust does not define existence and it remains a disputed issue of material fact whether Collbran intended to employ the narrow concept of existence used in the Gage Trust.
Accordingly, I would reverse the court of appeals’ judgment that litigation regarding the issue of Bennett College’s existence was barred by collateral estoppel.
Justice KIRSHBAUM joins in this dissent.