Court Opinion

ID: 9499335
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 17:45:01.702556+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:59:25.880258
License: Public Domain

McCONNELL, Circuit Judge,
dissenting in part.
The majority holds that serial drunk driving is a violent felony for purposes of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e). As a result, it finds that the defendant was properly sentenced to over fifteen years in prison for a crime that otherwise would entail a Guidelines range of 41-51 months. I respectfully dissent.
The case arose when Mr. Larry Begay, a 44-year-old Navajo, threatened family members with an unloaded rifle and later pled guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Based on an offense level of 15 and a criminal history category of VI, the ordinary Guidelines range for this offense would be 41-51 months, which is a very substantial sentence. But that is not the end of the story. Mr. Begay has a long history of drinking and driving, though fortunately he has never injured anyone. Under New Mexico law, the first three convictions for driving while intoxicated (DWI) are misdemeanors, but subsequent DWIs are classified as fourth-degree felonies, punishable by a term of eighteen months or, upon a fifth conviction, of two years. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-102(G)-(J). Mr. Begay has been convicted of DWI in New Mexico twelve times, which means that he has committed more than three felonies. Under the ACCA, any person convicted of unlawful possession of a firearm who has three previous convictions for *978a “violent felony” is subject to a mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years and a Guidelines range of 188-235 months. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g); U.S.S.G. § 4B1.4. The district court concluded that serial DWI is a “violent felony,” and sentenced Mr. Be-gay to a term of 188 months in prison.
The ACCA defines a “violent felony” as: any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such term if committed by an adult, that — ■
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another;
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). The majority joins with the two other courts of appeals that have held felony DWI to be a “violent felony” within the meaning of this statute.1 See United States v. McCall, 439 F.3d 967 (8th Cir.2006) (en banc); United States v. Sperberg, 432 F.3d 706 (7th Cir.2005).2 It is with the greatest hesitation that I part company with these decisions. But I am convinced that to treat drunk driving convictions, however numerous, as “violent felonies” is unwarranted by the language of the ACCA and is contrary to the intent of Congress.
In interpreting the term “crime of violence” in another portion of the criminal code, a unanimous Supreme Court recently observed that the “ordinary meaning of this term ... suggests a category of violent, active crimes that cannot be said naturally to include DUI offenses.” Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 11, 125 S.Ct. 377, 160 L.Ed.2d 271 (2004). To be sure, that holding does not directly apply to this case, which involves a different statute with slightly different wording (though the Court’s reliance on the “ordinary meaning” of the defined term would seem equally applicable here). But in reaching its inter*979pretation in Leocal, the Court quoted from an earlier First Circuit decision, written by then-Circuit Judge Stephen Breyer, which interpreted the term “violent felony” in our statute, the ACCA, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e), as “calling] to mind a tradition of crimes that involve the possibility of more closely related, active violence.” Id. at 11, 125 S.Ct. 377 (quoting United States v. Doe, 960 F.2d 221, 225 (1st Cir.1992)). The Supreme Court also cited this Court’s observation in United States v. Lucio-Lucio, 347 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (10th Cir.2003), in connection with yet another subsection of the ACCA, that interpreting the term “crime of violence” to encompass accidental or negligent conduct, such as drunk driving, “would blur the distinction between the ‘violent’ crimes Congress sought to distinguish for heightened punishment and other crimes.” Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11, 125 S.Ct. 377. These comments and citations strongly suggest that the Supreme Court does not view drunk driving as within the “violent” category of crimes Congress singled out for heightened punishment, under any of these similar but not identical statutes.
Mr. Begay argues that felony drunk driving does not fall within the meaning of the statutory term “violent felony,” and that interpretation of the statute to include felony drunk driving is contrary to the purpose of the statute, its legislative history, and several hoary canons of statutory interpretation. The en banc Eighth Circuit and the concurrence in this case resist resort to legislative intent and canons of interpretation on the ground that the language of the statute is “plain.” McCall, 439 F.3d at 971 (“we must construe the provision consistent with its plain language”); id. (“When a statute’s plain language is this clear, it is controlling, without regard to contrary hints in the legislative history and without the need to refer to the canons of noscitur a sociis and ejus-dem generis”); Concur. Op. 977 (“the wording that Congress chose is clear”). The opinion for the Court does not appear to agree that the language is “plain,” but instead looks to legislative history and other outside indications of congressional meaning.
Unlike the concurrence, I find the language of § 924(e) anything but “plain,” and in light of evidence of legislative intent and canons of construction, I believe the language favors the defendant. The ACCA defines “violent felony” as including any crime punishable by more than one year in prison that either “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” or “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). The question is whether felony drunk driving qualifies under the second of these definitions.
This definition is susceptible to two linguistically plausible interpretations. The first, favored by the government, has been dubbed the “all crimes” interpretation. See McCall, 439 F.3d at 977 n. 8 (Lay, J., dissenting). Under this interpretation, a violent felony is any crime, regardless of its nature, that involves conduct presenting a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. The examples that precede the “otherwise involves” clause, under this interpretation, do not limit or narrow the scope of the definition, but rather are listed to make sure that the crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes using explosives are categorically included.
The second, favored by the defense, has been dubbed the “similar crimes” interpretation. Id. at 977 n. 9. Under this interpretation, the general phrase “otherwise *980involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another” is limited to crimes of a nature similar to the enumerated crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes using explosives. Each of these enumerated crimes involves violent, aggressive conduct; each is characteristic of the armed career criminal, the eponym of the statute. In the words of the First Circuit in Doe, 960 F.2d at 225, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court in Leocal, 543 U.S. at 11, 125 S.Ct. 377, these are “crimes that involve the possibility of more closely related, active violence.” Moreover, each of the enumerated crimes is potentially more dangerous when firearms are involved, which is evidently the reason Congress imposed so severe a penalty on persons who have committed these crimes who later are found in possession of a firearm. Both sides appear to agree that drunk driving is not of this nature. Although it undoubtedly entails risk of physical injury to others, drunk driving is a crime of negligence or recklessness, rather than violence or aggression; it is not characteristic of career criminals; and its dangers are unrelated to the presence or use of firearms. The question in this case therefore comes down to which interpretation of the statute is correct. If the “all crimes” interpretation is correct, drunk driving is included; if the “similar crimes” interpretation is correct, drunk driving is not included.
Looking first at the language chosen by Congress, I consider the “similar crimes” interpretation more persuasive. The key is Congress’s use of the term “otherwise.” Under the “all crimes” interpretation adopted by the majority, the word “otherwise” is surplusage. The statute is interpreted as if Congress had defined “violent felony” as any felony that “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or ... involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (omitting the word “otherwise”). That is not the statute Congress wrote. By using the word “otherwise,” Congress indicated a substantive connection between the enumerated crimes and the general phrase. Rather than covering all felonies involving “conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another,” Congress limited coverage to felonies that “otherwise” involve such a risk-in other words, felonies that, while not identical to burglary, arson, extortion, or explosives offenses, impose a similar sort of risk.
Other indicia of meaning support this interpretation. The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “ ‘[i]n expounding a statute, we must not be guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the whole law, and to its object and policy.’ ” U.S. Nat. Bank of Ore. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of Am., Inc., 508 U.S. 439, 455, 113 S.Ct. 2173, 124 L.Ed.2d 402 (1993) (quoting United States v. Heirs of Boisdore, 8 How. 113, 122, 12 L.Ed. 1009 (1850)); see also Dole v. Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26, 35, 110 S.Ct. 929, 108 L.Ed.2d 23 (1990). Given the history and purpose of the ACCA, as well as the context of the “otherwise” clause in the statute, felony driving while intoxicated simply does not fit with the other crimes enumerated and contemplated by § 924(e).
When confronted with another question regarding the interpretation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) — the meaning of “burglary” — the Supreme Court took its bearings from a detailed examination of the history and purposes of the provision. Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 581-90, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990). The Court concluded that “Congress focused its efforts on career offenders — those who commit a large number of fairly serious crimes as their means of livelihood, and who, because they possess weapons, pres*981ent at least a potential threat of harm to persons.” Id. at 587-88, 110 S.Ct. 2143. The Court interpreted the statutory term “burglary” in terms of that general purpose. See id. at 590, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (“These observations about the purpose and general approach of the enhancement provision enable us to narrow the range of possible meanings of the term ‘burglary.’ ”). Applying the same method here, it seems beyond question that drunk drivers fall outside any reasonable understanding of Congress’s definition of an “armed career criminal.” Drunk drivers do not drive drunk “as their means of livelihood,” and the threat they pose to other persons has nothing to do with whether they possess weapons.3
More specific legislative history confirms the “similar crimes” interpretation. The first version of the ACCA sentencing enhancement, enacted by Congress in 1984, applied to any convicted felon found guilty of possession of a firearm who had three previous convictions for robbery or burglary. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 581, 110 S.Ct. 2143. In 1986, Congress debated two proposals for expanding the reach of the enhancement. The broader proposal would have included any felony that “by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.” Id. at 583, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (quoting S. 2312, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); H.R. 4639, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)). If enacted, this enhancement would have included crimes, such as vandalism, that involve the use of physical force against property even if there was no substantial risk of injury to a person. The narrower proposal would have applied the enhancement to “any State or Federal felony that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another.” Id. (quoting H.R. 4768, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)). If enacted, this bill would have excluded burglary and arson, which do not contain as an element the use of force against a person. The bill that ultimately was enacted was a compromise: it extended the definition of “violent felony” to those not involving the use of physical force against a person if there was “serious risk of physical injury to another.” Id. at 586. The House Committee on the Judiciary explained:
[One] major question involved in these hearings was as to what violent felonies involving physical force against property should be included in the definition of ‘violent’ felony. The Subcommittee agreed to add the crimes punishable for a term exceeding one year that involve conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to others. This will add State and Federal crimes against property such as burglary, arson, extortion, use of explosives and similar crimes as predicate offenses where the conduct involved presents a serious risk of injury to a person.
Id. at 587 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 99-849 (1986) (first emphasis in original, second *982emphasis added)). This legislative history makes clear that Congress intended the expanded definition to cover only “similar crimes” — that is, crimes “similar” to burglary, arson, extortion, and use of explosives. For reasons already explained, that does not include drunk driving.
The McCall decision’s contrary interpretation of the legislative history is based on the notion that the “otherwise involves” clause of § 924(e)(2)(B) was drafted first, and that the enumerated crimes were “add-ons”:
[T]he enumerated crimes and the word “otherwise” were added to the “involves conduct” language. The form of the addition made the “otherwise involves” provision look like a catchall when in fact it was initially the operative provision. Adding the enumerated crimes served the obvious purpose of including all prior convictions for those crimes (burglary, arson, extortion, use of explosives), regardless of whether they present a serious potential risk of physical injury. Given this drafting sequence, it is wrong to infer that Congress intended to limit the “otherwise involves” provision to offenses that are similar to the enumerated add-ons.
McCall, 439 F.3d at 971 (internal citations omitted). With all respect, I think this is a misleading interpretation. To be sure, the version of the amendment immediately prior to the addition of the “otherwise involves” language did not enumerate the crimes of burglary, arson, extortion, and use of explosives, but this has to be viewed in a broader context. Congress was amending the 1984 version of the statute, which applied explicitly to robbery and burglary, and only to those crimes. These were not “enumerated add-ons,” as the McCall opinion calls them, but were the statutory foundation on which the congressional deliberations were based. The entire thrust of the 1986 debates was to expand the statute to encompass other crimes that warranted the same treatment already given to robbery and burglary. The only question was how far to go. In answering that question, we need not “infer” that Congress intended to limit the provision to “offenses that are similar to the enumerated [crimes],” as the McCall opinion states. Id. The House Judiciary Committee report explicitly tells us: “This will add State and Federal crimes against property such as burglary, arson, extortion, use of explosives and similar crimes as predicate offenses where the conduct involved presents a serious risk of injury to a person.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 587, 110 S.Ct. 2143 (quoting H.R.Rep. No. 99-849 (1986) (emphasis added)).
Moreover, the statutory language adopted by Congress contradicts the McCall opinion’s interpretation. According to McCall, “[a]dding the enumerated crimes served the obvious purpose of including all prior convictions for those crimes (burglary, arson, extortion, use of explosives), regardless of whether they present a serious potential risk of physical injury.” McCall, 439 F.3d at 971. But this interpretation is belied by Congress’s use of the word “otherwise.” Whatever else it may mean, the term “otherwise” unmistakably indicates that Congress believed the enumerated crimes do present a substantial potential risk of physical injury to others (presumably because burglary, arson, extortion, and explosives crimes frequently, even if not invariably, erupt into violence). It makes no sense to refer to crimes that “otherwise involve” such a risk if the previously listed crimes do not do so. The listed crimes were not “enumerated add-ons”; they were illustrative or even paradigmatic.
The opinion for the Court apparently favors the McCall opinion’s analysis of the *983legislative history, but ultimately places little or no weight on it. See Maj. Op. 974 (“I think the McCall majority view is the more plausible, but it is impossible to know. This ambiguous history is not particularly persuasive either way.”). The opinion for the Court instead emphasizes what it considers to be the “ordinary meaning” of the defined term, Maj. Op. 971, reenforced by an analysis of the statutory purpose. I have already explained why I consider the “similar crimes” interpretation the more plausible rendition of the statutory language. The Court’s analysis of statutory purpose warrants additional response.
The opinion for the Court notes that Congress used two different, though similar, terms — “crime of violence” and “violent felony” — in the same statutory section. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) (“crime of violence”) with § 924(e)(2)(B) (“violent felony”). The term “crime of violence” is defined in such a way that drunk driving is excluded. The opinion for the Court invites us to infer that the more ambiguous language of § 924(e)(2)(B) must lead to the opposite conclusion. The problem with this argument is that the definitions of the two terms vary in a number of different ways. In some respects, § 924(c)(3) is the broader provision, and in some respects it is the narrower. Section 924(c)(3) is broader, for example, in that it includes all crimes with a substantial risk of physical force against property, not just against persons; it is narrower in that it is confined to crimes involving the risk of the use of “force.” No doubt an intensive analysis could reveal the unifying rationale for all these differences, but it is not immediately apparent.
The opinion for the Court, however, offers a theory. According to that theory, the important distinction is that § 924(c)(3) defines a separate offense, while § 924(e)(2)(B) imposes an enhanced sentence for the present offense on those who have committed violent felonies in the past. Maj. Op. 972. That is true. But the fact that one provision creates a separate offense while the other imposes a higher sentence for the present offense does not cast much light on the question in this case, because it does not provide any general rationale for the differences between the provisions. If § 924(c)(1)(A) were narrower in all, or even most, respects, one might surmise that Congress was more circumspect in creating a new crime than in imposing an enhanced penalty; but that explanation does not meet these facts.
Nor is the Court’s more specific analysis of the statutory purpose of the two provisions more helpful. According to the Court:
The definition in § 924(c) was used to create a criminal offense. Under § 924(c)(1)(A), “any person who, during and in relation to any crime of violence ..., uses or carries a firearm, or who, in furtherance of any such crime, possesses a firearm” is subject to punishment for a separate offense with a minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment. In other words, when someone while committing a “crime of violence” uses or carries a firearm or possesses a firearm in furtherance of that crime, then that person has violated § 924(c). Undoubtedly, Congress defined crime of violence in this context to capture those crimes in which the danger is magnified by the firearm. It is not surprising that DWI is not a “crime of violence,” because a firearm in the car does not increase the danger from the DWI offense.
Id. at 972-73. On the other hand, according to the opinion for the Court:
The definition in § 924(e)(2)(b) is to identify persons who should be sentenced to very long terms for their pres*984ent offense (possession of a firearm by a convicted felon) because of their criminal history. One may disagree with the choice, but it seems perfectly reasonable to include within the definition those who have a confirmed history of displaying contempt for human life or safety— those who, in the statutory language, have repeatedly committed felonies “involving] conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” From this perspective, there is nothing remarkable about including felony DWI as a “violent felony.”
Id. at 972. The opinion for the Court thus concludes that a “crime of violence” under § 924(c)(1)(A) is limited to “those crimes in which the danger is magnified by the firearm,” which does not include DWI, while “violent felony” under § 924(e)(2)(B) extends more broadly to “those who have a confirmed history of displaying contempt for human life or safety,” which does include DWI.
Neither half of this analysis is persuasive. While the Court’s interpretation of § 924(c)(1)(A) as focusing on “crimes in which the danger is magnified by the firearm” is eminently sensible, there is no reason not to apply the same logic to § 924(e)(2)(B). That section, after all, imposes its enhanced penalty only on those whose present offense involves the unlawful possession of a firearm. The Court’s surmise that “it seems perfectly reasonable to include within the definition [under § 924(e)(2)(B)] those who have a confirmed history of displaying contempt for human life or safety” substantially broadens the target of the statute, beyond anything in the language or legislative history of the statute. If that were the congressional purpose, why limit the enhanced penalty to those who commit firearms offenses?
The “similar crimes” interpretation is further supported by at least two established canons of statutory construction. The doctrine of noscitur a sociis, meaning “a word is known by the company it keeps,” is often applied to a general term that “is capable of multiple meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.” Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307, 81 S.Ct. 1579, 6 L.Ed.2d 859 (1961). Similarly, under the doctrine of ejusdem generis, “[w]here general words follow specific words in a statutory enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114-15, 121 S.Ct. 1302, 149 L.Ed.2d 234 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). Both canons confirm the “similar crimes” interpretation. The opinion for the Court reminds us that the Supreme Court “appears to reject [the canons’] application as often as it embraces them.” Maj. Op. 974. Even the case cited by the Court, however, acknowledges that use of ejusdem generis is “firmly established” when a statute’s meaning is uncertain. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 74, 105 S.Ct. 479, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984) (quoting United States v. Powell, 423 U.S. 87, 91, 96 S.Ct. 316, 46 L.Ed.2d 228 (1975)). Under these rules of construction, the ACCA’s “otherwise” clause should be restricted to violent, active crimes which, like burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving explosives, are typical of career criminals, and which are more dangerous when committed in conjunction with firearms.
The opinion for the Court also rejects the canons on the ground that it is not obvious that all burglaries — for example “opening an unlocked front door to a home for the purpose of committing larceny”— are “violent.” Maj. Op. 974. But this is just to quibble with Congress’s judgment *985that, in the typical case, burglary is a crime that is likely to explode into violence risking substantial injury to the householder. It is well established that whether a crime is a violent felony must be determined on a categorical basis, not on the specific facts of the case. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600-01, 110 S.Ct. 2143. I do not argue that Mr. Begay’s DWI offenses are not “violent felonies” because he did not hurt anyone (though he did not), but because, on a categorical basis, the crime of DWI does not have the typical attributes of a violent felony, as defined in the statute.
Finally, it bears mention that the rule of lenity may apply. This Court has stated that “we will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended.” United States v. Diaz, 989 F.2d 391, 393 (10th Cir.1993) (internal citations omitted). See, e.g., United States v. Giles, 213 F.3d 1247 (10th Cir.2000) (using lenity to hold that “patches” are not “goods” under the law governing trafficking in counterfeit labels); United States v. Bazile, 209 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir.2000) (using lenity to overturn a mandatory life sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.4(a)); United States v. Wicklund, 114 F.3d 151 (10th Cir.1997) (invoking lenity to overturn the district court’s contrary interpretation of a murder-for-hire statute). To be sure, “a court must first consult ‘all available relevant materials,’ and invoke the rule of lenity only as a tie-breaker when ordinary means of discerning statutory meaning leave the issue in ‘equipoise.’ ” United States v. DeGasso, 369 F.3d 1139, 1149 (10th Cir.2004) (quoting United States v. Wilson, 10 F.3d 734, 736 (10th Cir.1993); United States v. Ruiz-Gea, 340 F.3d 1181, 1188 (10th Cir.2003)). I am inclined to think the rule of lenity is not needed in this case because the defendant should prevail under other approaches to statutory interpretation. But the opinion for the Court declines to find the language of § 924(e) “plain”; it finds the legislative history “not particularly persuasive either way” (Maj. Op. 974); it concludes that the canons of statutory interpretation are of little help (id. at 974); and it offers only speculation regarding congressional purpose (id. at 971-72). In such a case, the rule of lenity should tip the scales.
The “similar crimes” interpretation thus finds support in an impressive array of interpretive methods: ordinary meaning, avoidance of surplusage, consistency with general statutory purposes, specific legislative history, and two canons of construction, plus the rule of lenity. I therefore conclude that 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) should be given the “similar crimes” interpretation, and that under that interpretation, felony DWI is not a “violent felony.” I respectfully dissent from Part IIA of the opinion for the Court. I join Part IIB.

. This Court and four other courts of appeals have held that felony DWI is a crime of violence under the identical language of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). United States v. Moore, 420 F.3d 1218, 1220 (10th Cir.2005); United States v. DeSantiago-Gonzalez, 207 F.3d 261, 264 (5th Cir.2000); United States v. Veach, 455 F.3d 628 (6th Cir.2006); United States v. McGill, 450 F.3d 1276, 1280 (11th Cir.2006); United States v. Rutherford, 54 F.3d 370 (7th Cir.1995). I agree with the majority that these precedents are distinguishable, because the Sentencing Commission’s commentary to § 4B1.2(a)(2), which is ordinarily “binding on the federal courts,” Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 46, 113 S.Ct. 1913, 123 L.Ed.2d 598 (1993), employs a broader interpretation of § 4B1.2(a)(2) than is evident from the language of § 924(e). See Maj. Op. 969-70. We owe deference to the Sentencing Commission’s commentary notes interpreting the Commission's Guidelines, but do not owe deference to the Commission in interpreting acts of Congress, even when those acts contain wording identical to a Guideline. In effect, because the Guideline commentary note omits the key word "otherwise,” the cases interpreting U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2)) are not interpreting an identically worded provision.
An unpublished decision of this Court, United States v. Gwartney, 2006 WL 2640616 (10th Cir.2006), recently held that "Moore clearly binds the panel” in a case under the ACCA. This panel unanimously rejects the view that Moore is so controlling.

. The Seventh Circuit in Sperberg relied on its prior precedent in Rutherford, which was an interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2). See Sperberg, 432 F.3d at 708 (finding no distinction between an interpretation of USSG § 4B1.2(a)(2) and of 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)). Since the majority recognizes (correctly) that an interpretation of U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(2) is not controlling with respect to § 924(e), Maj. Op. 970, Sperberg can have no persuasive value here.

. The opinion for the Court would have us discount Congress's purpose of targeting career criminals, arguing that it would be “disrespectful to legislative drafting!] to let such a title override statutory language.'' Maj. Op. 971. Yet in Taylor, in determining the meaning of the statutory term “burglary,” the Supreme Court relied heavily on the connection between that term and the congressional object of heavily punishing "armed career criminals.” Taylor, 495 U.S. at 587-90, 110 S.Ct. 2143. It can hardly be improper for us to use the same interpretative approach here. Moreover, the legislative history, both originally and in the amendments relevant to this case, makes clear that the title. — the "Armed Career Criminal Act” — was not merely decorative. See H.R. Conf. Rep. 98-1159 (1984), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News 3710. .