Court Opinion

ID: 9698651
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:56:33.022354+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:42.208909
License: Public Domain

ELDRIDGE, Judge,
dissenting:
I disagree with the majority’s decision to dismiss this appeal. The majority determines that there is no proper party-appellant because Alston, who is both the personal representative and an heir at law, described herself as personal representative in the order of appeal and failed to note specifically on the order her individual capacity. I believe that the Court’s holding is neither mandated by Maryland law nor consistent with the better reasoned cases from other jurisdictions.
The majority is correct in stating that “only an ‘aggrieved party’ may appeal from an order of the Orphans’ Court adjudicating an estate.” I also agree that, unless the Orphans’ Court’s order is unfavorable to the estate, the *170personal representative is not an “aggrieved party.” Nevertheless, when the record shows that the personal representative is also an heir at law and, as such, is clearly aggrieved by the order appealed from, it is elevating form over substance to dismiss the appeal because the order of appeal failed to note that the appellant was an individual.
As indicated previously, and as the majority seems to acknowledge, the cases in this Court do not require the result reached by the majority. In Webster v. Larmore, 270 Md. 351, 311 A.2d 405 (1973), and Surratt v. Knight, 162 Md. 14, 158 A. 1 (1932), the representatives were not heirs at law; those cases did not address the situation where the personal representative is in fact also an heir at law.1 In Gray v. Harriet Lane Home, 192 Md. 251, 64 A.2d 102 (1949), cited by the majority, the Court did not address the issue of the capacity or capacities, in which the appellant appealed, stating only that since she participated in the proceedings in the court below, she satisfied the statutory requirements to appeal. 192 Md. at 263, 64 A.2d 102. In Wlodarek v. Wlodarek, 167 Md. 556, 175 A. 455 (1934), and Hammersley v. Bell, 134 Md. 172, 106 A. 339 (1919), also cited by the majority, each appellant happened to note the appeal in his dual capacity, but the Court never even intimated that such was necessary.
I recognize that a majority of cases elsewhere appear to support the technical rule adopted by the Court in the present case. See, e.g., In re Estate of McCabe, 11 Ariz. App. 555, 466 P.2d 774 (1970); Wiley v. Wiley, 69 Ind.App. 431, 122 N.E. 25 (1919); Dickey v. Herbin, 250 N.C. 321, 108 S.E.2d 632 (1959); In re Estate of Ristman, 208 Or. *171234, 300 P.2d 408 (1956). There is, however, a minority view. See, e.g., In re Verbeck’s Estate, 114 Ohio App. 155, 180 N.E.2d 615 (1961); In re Donsavage’s Estate, 420 Pa. 587, 218 A.2d 112 (1966). The Court of Appeals of Ohio, which had formerly followed the majority rule, explained its embracing of the minority approach in Verbeck, supra, as follows (180 N.E.2d at 619-620):
“Probate Court proceedings, in the general administration of an estate, are relatively informal, particularly as applied to parties____
“The legal device or concept of treating one person as having several capacities or entities, and considering that person as if he were two or more persons, is in many respects a desirable, perhaps a necessary, development in our law. The rigidity with which the law views the differentiation between a person acting for himself and in a fiduciary capacity varies____ The concept of differing capacities must not become a procedural device to defeat the unwary. That sort of practice is too analogous to the notorious technicalities of common-law pleading.
“We believe that the [Ohio] Supreme Court [has indicated that it] does not consider a rigid differentiation of capacity to be a desirable rule in every area of the law. We are not disposed to extend such a technical doctrine into the area of notices of appeal. Verbeck is a 'person.’ That person has filed a notice of appeal. Specification of the particular nature of the errors claimed is to be, and has here been, provided by the assignment of errors. Under Section 2505.05, Revised Code, the purpose of the notice of appeal is basically a statement of the intent to appeal and not a specification of the grounds. We, therefore, hold that Robert K. Verbeck has sufficiently perfected his appeal to give this court jurisdiction, and the notice of appeal may be amended to clarify the capacities of the appellants.”
This view is the better reasoned one. Its common sense approach comports with the modern trend of relaxing the *172formalities of pleading. It is designed to promote justice over technicality.
It is clear from the record in the present case that the appellant is not only the personal representative of the contested estate, but is the decedent’s sister, and would take as an heir at law if the illegitimate child were not entitled to the estate. For this reason, I would not dismiss the appeal.
Judge COLE has authorized me to state that he concurs with the views expressed herein.

. In Buchwald v. Buchwald, 175 Md. 103, 199 A. 795 (1938), the executor did have an interest in the contested will, and did appeal in his dual capacity. The Court dismissed the appeal brought in the representative capacity because the decision of the lower court was not unfavorable to the estate. It then dismissed the appeal brought in the appellant’s individual capacity because the clauses of the contested will which contained the appellant's interest were not the clauses at issue on appeal.