Court Opinion

ID: 9915496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-05 16:05:12.983686+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:14:49.397966
License: Public Domain

No. 126,356

              IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

                                   STEPHEN ALAN MACOMBER,
                                          Appellant,

                                                   v.

         STATE OF KANSAS and JEFF ZMUDA, SECRETARY OF CORRECTIONS, et al.,
                                    Appellees.

                                  SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.
        An inmate's COVID-19 economic stimulus payments are not "government
benefits" exempt from a forced savings account under the Kansas Department of
Corrections' Internal Management Policy and Procedure (IMPP) 04-103A.

        Appeal from Shawnee District Court, LORI D. DOUGHERTY-BICHSEL, judge. Submitted without
oral argument. Opinion filed December 15, 2023. Affirmed.

        Stephen Alan Macomber, appellant pro se.

        Fred W. Phelps, Jr., deputy chief legal counsel, of Kansas Department of Corrections, for
appellees.

Before MALONE, P.J., GARDNER and CLINE, JJ.

        GARDNER, J.: In 2021, Stephen Alan Macomber, a prisoner at the El Dorado
Correctional Facility, was sent funds from the United States Department of the Treasury
under various COVID-19 pandemic relief acts passed by the United States Congress.
When the prison received those funds, it diverted one tenth of their amount into
Macomber's forced savings trust account which Macomber cannot access until he is
released from prison. Macomber then filed a pro se Petition to Remedy a Breach of Trust

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seeking to get those funds out of forced savings. The State of Kansas responded by
moving to dismiss the petition and the Shawnee County District Court granted that
motion, giving rise to this appeal. After careful review, we affirm the dismissal.

                        FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, the United States Congress enacted
three pieces of legislation aimed at blunting the pandemic's potential fallout. First, in
March 2020, it enacted the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act
(CARES), which provided funds up to $1,200 to all citizens, permanent residents, and
qualifying resident aliens. 26 U.S.C. § 6428(a)(1). Second, in December 2020, Congress
enacted the Consolidated Appropriations Act (CAA), which provided funds up to $600.
26 U.S.C. § 6428A(a)(1). Third, in March 2021, Congress passed the American Rescue
Plan Act (ARPA), which provided funds up to $1,400. 26 U.S.C. § 6428B(a), (b)(1). We
refer to these collectively as the COVID-19 economic stimulus payments. In 2021,
Macomber received two deposits totaling $3,200 from the United States Department of
the Treasury from these three COVID-19 relief acts.

       On behalf of Macomber and other inmates, the Kansas Department of Corrections
(KDOC) maintains "forced savings" accounts. These accounts are set up as a trust and are
regulated under the Kansas Uniform Trust Code, K.S.A. 58a-101 et seq. See K.S.A. 58a-
102; K.S.A. 75-5211(c)(1); IMPP 04-103A, p. 1. The KDOC's Internal Management
Policy and Procedure (IMPP) defines forced savings as a "savings account in which 10
percent of incoming monies less any outstanding obligations is deposited and maintained
until the resident's release from custody." IMPP 04-103A, p. 1. Under this forced savings
procedure, KDOC deposited $320 of the $3,200 that Macomber received from the
COVID-19 economic stimulus payments into Macomber's forced savings account.

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       Macomber filed grievances about this with the KDOC. When those failed, he filed
suit in the district court alleging a breach of trust under K.S.A. 58a-101 et seq., arguing
that the stimulus money was a "government benefit" exempt from forced savings under
IMPP 04-103A. The State responded by moving to dismiss Macomber's petition, arguing
that the COVID-19 economic stimulus payments were not exempt from forced savings.

       The district court held a hearing on the State's motion to dismiss. Although we
have no transcript of this hearing in the record on appeal, we see from the district court's
register of actions that the parties, including Macomber, appeared via Zoom and that the
May 2022 version of IMPP 04-103A was admitted into evidence. The parties agreed that
this IMPP was substantively the same as the version in effect when the forced savings of
Macomber's COVID-19 economic stimulus payments occurred.

       The district court granted the State's motion to dismiss Macomber's petition. It
held that the KDOC had the authority to withhold 10 percent of the COVID-19 economic
stimulus payments to Macomber because that money was an advanced tax credit and not
an exempt "government benefit." Additionally, the district court held that Macomber had
not lost the $320 because it would be returned to him under K.S.A. 58a-801 and K.S.A.
2022 Supp. 58a-802 upon his release from incarceration.

       Macomber timely appeals, raising solely a question of statutory interpretation and
no constitutional issues.

         DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN DISMISSING MACOMBER'S PETITION?

       Macomber argues that the KDOC mismanaged his trust account (his forced
savings account) under the Kansas Uniform Trust Code by subjecting an exempt
government benefit to forced savings under IMPP 04-103A. The Code places a duty on a
trustee to administer a trust "in good faith, in accordance with its terms and purposes and

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the interests of the beneficiaries, and in accordance with this code." K.S.A. 58a-801. The
Code further requires a trustee to "administer the trust consistent with the terms of the
trust and solely in the interests of the beneficiaries." K.S.A. 2022 Supp. 58a-802(a).

       Resolution of this substantive issue involves interpretation of several statutes,
which presents a question of law over which we have unlimited review. Nauheim v. City
of Topeka, 309 Kan. 145, 149, 432 P.3d 647 (2019). When interpreting statutes or
regulations, we apply the fundamental rule of statutory construction that the intent of the
Legislature governs if that intent can be determined. To ascertain legislative intent, we
give common words their ordinary meaning. John Doe v. M.J., 315 Kan. 310, 320, 508
P.3d 368 (2022). "Dictionary definitions are good sources for the 'ordinary,
contemporary, common' meanings of words." Midwest Crane & Rigging, LLC v. Kansas
Corporation Comm'n, 306 Kan. 845, 851, 397 P.3d 1205 (2017).

       And the procedural posture of the case compels a similar standard of review.
"Whether a district court erred by granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim
is a question of law subject to unlimited review." Jayhawk Racing Properties v. City of
Topeka, 313 Kan. 149, 154, 484 P.3d 250 (2021). We view the well-pleaded facts in a
light most favorable to the plaintiff and assume as true those facts and any inferences
reasonably drawn from them. If those facts and inferences state any claim upon which
relief can be granted, then dismissal is improper. Dismissal is proper only when the
allegations in the petition demonstrate the plaintiff does not have a claim. Kudlacik v.
Johnny's Shawnee, Inc., 309 Kan. 788, 790, 440 P.3d 576 (2019); see K.S.A. 2022 Supp.
60-212(b)(6).

       The Kansas Legislature authorized the Secretary of Corrections to implement a
forced savings account program for inmates' compensation. See K.S.A. 75-5211(b). That
statute provides that the Secretary "shall establish programs . . . for withdrawing amounts
from the compensation paid to inmates from all sources." K.S.A. 75-5211(b). Although

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the district court relied on this statute, the COVID-19 economic stimulus payments are
not "compensation," as Macomber did not receive them in return for services rendered.
See Black's Law Dictionary 354 (11th ed. 2019) (defining compensation as
"[r]emuneration and other benefits received in return for services rendered; esp., salary or
wages"). Neither party points to a statute authorizing the KDOC to withdraw any amount
from funds inmates receive that are not compensation.

       Instead, both parties rely on a regulation—IMPP 04-103A. Kansas has
promulgated regulations for its administration of the KDOC, and administrative
regulations adopted in accordance with the procedures set forth by the Legislature have
the force and effect of law. K.S.A. 77-425; Village Villa v. Kansas Health Policy
Authority, 296 Kan. 315, 320, 291 P.3d 1056 (2013). Neither party challenges the validity
of IMPP 04-103A, so we consider it to be valid.

       This regulation defines "Forced Savings" as "[a] savings account in which 10
percent of incoming monies less any outstanding obligations is deposited and maintained
until the resident's release from custody." IMPP 04-103A. The IMPP requires the prison
to divert 10 percent of all funds an inmate receives from outside the facility into forced
savings except for child support payments, government benefits, and money from certain
state property claims. IMPP 04-103A.VI.A.

       The parties tacitly agree that the COVID-19 payments were funds that inmate
Macomber received from outside the facility. The parties dispute only whether those
funds are "[g]overnment benefits." See IMPP 04-103A.VI.A. That term is not defined in
IMPP 04-103A.

       We find some guidance, however, in another regulation which prohibits certain
government benefits from being used to pay an inmate's fines, fees, or payments: "No
resident funds shall be subjected to collection for fines, fees or payments if those funds

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were accrued from any of the following sources: 1. Social security benefits; 2. Veterans'
Administration benefits; or, 3. Workers' compensation benefits paid to the resident
garnishee." IMPP 04-106A.II.D.

       Under this regulation, funds paid by social security, Veterans Administration, and
workers compensation are each stated to be "benefits," and since they are paid by the
government, they are "[g]overnment benefits." See IMPP 04-106A.II.D.; IMPP 04-
103A.VI.A. Thus those funds cannot be used for fines, fees, or payments. And because
those funds are government benefits, in addition to being exempt from being used to pay
an inmate's fines, fees, or payments under IMPP 04-106A, they are also exempt from
forced savings under IMPP 04-103A.

       We next look to the statutes that authorized Macomber's receipt of the COVID-19
economic stimulus payments to determine whether they are similarly "government
benefits." All three statutes style the COVID-19 economic stimulus payments as
advances of a credit toward income tax refunds. 26 U.S.C. § 6428(a)(1) states "[i]n the
case of an eligible individual, there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed
by subtitle A for the first taxable year beginning in 2020 an amount equal to the sum
of . . . $1,200." Likewise, 26 U.S.C. § 6428A(a)(1) states "in the case of an eligible
individual, there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by subtitle A for the
first taxable year beginning in 2020 an amount equal to the sum of . . . $600." Similarly,
26 U.S.C. § 6428B(a) states "there shall be allowed as a credit against the tax imposed by
subtitle A for the first taxable year beginning in 2021 an amount equal to the 2021 rebate
amount determined for such taxable year." 26 U.S.C. § 6428B(b)(1) elaborates, in
pertinent part, "the term '2021 rebate amount' means, with respect to any taxpayer for any
taxable year, the sum of . . . $1,400." The plain language of these statutes shows that the
disputed COVID-19 relief money is a tax credit.

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       So is a tax credit a "[g]overnment benefit" as that term is used in IMPP 04-
103A.VI.A.? A "tax credit" is "[a]n amount subtracted directly from one's total tax
liability, dollar for dollar, as opposed to a deduction from gross income." Black's Law
Dictionary 1762 (11th ed. 2019). Described differently, "[a] tax credit is the public sector
equivalent of a coupon; it reduces the amount that is otherwise owed." United States v.
Hoffman, 901 F.3d 523, 538 (5th Cir. 2018). On the other hand, a "benefit" is defined as
"[f]inancial assistance that is received from an employer, insurance, or a public program
(such as social security) in time of sickness, disability, or unemployment." Black's Law
Dictionary 194 (11th ed. 2019). See Government benefits, https://www.usa.gov/benefits
(including retirement benefits, TANF, food stamps, Medicaid and CHIP, and survivor
benefits).

       Arguably, the COVID-19 economic stimulus payments were financial assistance
from a public program in time of sickness or unemployment, within the broadest
definition of government benefits. But they were not funds sent to Macomber
individually to assist him with his sickness or unemployment, or after he qualified for
government financial assistance, unlike social security benefits, Veterans Administration
benefits, or workers compensation benefits. Rather, the COVID-19 economic stimulus
payments were paid to all qualifying citizens, permanent residents, and resident aliens,
and were paid regardless of that person's need or their qualification for assistance, as the
district court aptly explained:

       "A tax credit or advanced tax refund is arguably not the same as a benefit derived under,
       for example, the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) or Social Security
       Disability Insurance (SSDI) programs, which both maintain strict eligibility
       requirements. In contrast to these needs-based programs, stimulus monies were paid to all
       citizens, permanent residents, and qualifying resident aliens, according to the IRS. Those
       earning above a set threshold received less money, but they still maintained their
       eligibility. So, while typical government benefit programs are arguably aimed at shoring
       up a low-income or disabled person's safety net, stimulus payments are designed to

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      stimulate the economy. See In re Arthur, No. 09-04332-ALS7, 2010 WL 4674450, at *4
      (Bankr. S.D. Iowa Oct. 20, 2010) (primary motive for 2008 stimulus payment was to
      stimulate the economy during a recession); see also In re Wooldridge, 393 B.R. 721, 728
      (Bankr. D. Idaho 2008) (same)."

      We agree with this reasoned analysis. The COVID-19 economic stimulus
payments to Macomber are not "government benefits" as that term is used in IMPP 04-
103A.VI.A., or as included in IMPP 04-106A.II.D. Rather, they are tax credits designed
to stimulate the economy.

      "[T]he very name 'COVID-19 economic stimulus payments' suggests that the payments
      were intended to stimulate the economy by providing additional money for consumer
      spending rather than establish a government-sponsored program akin to public assistance.
      See Benjamin Curry, Korrena Bailie, What Is Fiscal Stimulus? How Does It Work?, Feb.
      19, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/advisor/personal-finance/fiscal-stimulus-packages
      ('Direct Subsidies—aka Stimulus Checks[:] Perhaps the most effective means of
      providing fiscal stimulus is via direct payments to citizens. Give a person money, and
      chances are they'll spend it on something, so the theory goes'). Indeed, '[o]ne of the
      cornerstones of the CARES Act were the much-lauded stimulus checks[.]' Id. While I
      recognize that many recipients used the COVID-19 economic stimulus payments on
      household expenses, that reality does not transform the stimulus payments into public
      assistance." Groff v. Groff, No. 956 MDA 2021, 2022 WL 1641002, at *11 (Pa. Super.
      Ct. 2022) (unpublished opinion) (Bowes, J., dissenting).

Thus, under the authority of IMPP 04-103A, KDOC properly deposited "10 percent of
incoming monies" from the COVID-19 economic stimulus payments into Macomber's
forced savings account and can maintain it until his release from custody.

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       Because the allegations in the petition demonstrate that Macomber does not have a
claim, we affirm the district court's decision to dismiss Macomber's petition.

       Affirmed.

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