Court Opinion

ID: 9573075
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:47:37.217012+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:36:50.212293
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(dissenting):
The majority concludes that the trial court abused its discretion because it did not make adequate inquiry. Either the majority is requiring rehabilitative-like inquiry in all cases where there is only a question of potential bias, or it is holding for the first time that there is a per se inference of bias that must be rebutted whenever a prospective juror has previously been a victim of a similar crime. Both approaches are a departure from our established case law. I believe the trial court conducted adequate inquiry once the question of potential bias arose because there was no inference of bias or actual bias evidenced by prospective juror VanLeeuwen’s comments. Further, I believe that the defendant waived any objection to the extent or manner of voir dire conducted and has therefore not preserved that issue for appeal; alternatively, defendant has not satisfied his burden on appeal to demonstrate that VanLeeuwen could not have been impartial.
DEGREES OF “BIAS”
There are three degrees of “bias” that may surface during voir dire: a question of potential bias, an inference of bias, and actual bias. The extent of inquiry to be conducted by a trial court depends on which degree of bias surfaces. If a prospective juror has previously been the victim of a similar crime, there is a legitimate question as to whether that experience has caused the prospective juror to become biased. When such a question arises, the trial court must probe to determine whether the prospective juror is, in fact, impartial in spite of the past experience. Typically *449this is accomplished by the trial court simply asking if the juror can be impartial. See, e.g., State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct.App.) cert. denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990); Hornsby v. Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 758 P.2d 929, 932 (Utah Ct.App.1988). If after probing the prospective juror’s state of mind the trial court is satisfied that the prospective juror is nevertheless impartial, that is the end of the inquiry.
If, on the other hand, the prospective juror, in response to such probing, makes comments that “facially question a prospective juror's partiality or prejudice,” the court will infer bias as a matter of law. State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d 1123, 1126-28 (Utah 1989). Once an inference of bias occurs because of comments made by the prospective juror, the trial court must either remove the prospective juror or rebut the inference with further inquiry. Id. at 1126. See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 605 P.2d 765, 768 (Utah 1980) (trial court failed to remove or inquire further of prospective juror who stated that he would give greater weight to testimony of peace officer). An inference of bias is rebutted when the rehabilitative inquiry shows that a prospective juror is “willing to keep an open mind and apply the law as the court instruct[s].” Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1127.
Questions of bias and inferences of bias are not to be confused with actual bias as evidenced by a prospective juror’s “attitude of bias” or “strong feelings” that indicate the prospective juror has a closed mind. Once such strong feelings are revealed, a prospective juror may not sit, even if the prospective juror later asserts that he or she can render an impartial verdict. State v. Jones, 734 P.2d 473, 475 (Utah 1987) (prospective jurors knew the murder victim’s family and expressed strong feelings of bias); State v. Brooks, 631 P.2d 878, 884 (Utah 1981) (prior victims of crime expressed strong feelings of anger and frustration about their victimization); State v. Hewitt, 689 P.2d 22, 26-27 (Utah 1989) (prospective juror had strong and deep impressions and would not indicate that he could be impartial). Obviously, if a prospective juror’s comments indicate that he or she has a closed mind then he or she must be removed for cause and no amount of inquiry will be sufficient to rehabilitate. Jones, 734 P.2d at 475. Although no claim is made that VanLeeuwen was in fact biased, the majority nevertheless erroneously seeks to apply the actual bias analysis to the present case.
The majority opinion falters because it fails to recognize the differences between a “question of potential bias” that arises because of a fact situation, an “inference of bias” that arises because of a prospective juror’s comments, and “actual bias” that arises when a juror reveals strong and deep impressions of bias. A prospective juror who is found to be impartial following the general probing that occurs when a question of potential bias arises clearly does not need to go through rehabilitative inquiry in order to ensure that he or she will act impartially.
The fact that a prospective juror was previously a victim of a similar crime raises a question about potential bias which requires general probing into the prospective juror’s state of mind in light of that experience. However, unless the prospective juror makes comments that facially bring into question his or her impartiality, there is no inference of bias raised, see, e.g., Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25-26, nor is there actual bias shown, see, e.g., Jones, 734 P.2d at 475. The trial court must find any inference of bias, or determine that actual bias exists, “based upon the juror’s expressed feelings, attitudes, and opinions.” Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884 (emphasis added). Because the trial court did not find an inference of bias in this case, there was obviously no need for it to conduct further inquiry to rebut such an inference.
In State v. Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1126, a prospective juror indicated that she was acquainted with the prosecutor. The revelation of this fact raised a question of potential bias that required additional probing. The probing revealed that she had known him fifteen years earlier when he was a senior in high school. He had been friends with her daughter and the two families had belonged to the same church group. When asked if her association with *450the prosecutor would have caused her to be swayed to his side, she responded that it would not. The supreme court held that the trial court did not err in refusing to dismiss the prospective juror for cause because the prospective juror’s answers revealed that her acquaintance with the prosecutor “was not the type of relationship that would warrant an inference of bias.” Id. (emphasis added).
In the present case, the trial court asked the prospective jurors to raise a hand if they could not try the case based only on the evidence they heard. No hands were raised. The trial court also asked the panel members to raise a hand if there were any reasons they could not be impartial in deciding defendant’s guilt or innocence. None of the jurors did. The trial court then questioned whether the jurors, if placed in the position of either the defendant or the State, would be satisfied by being tried by a juror of the panel member’s frame of mind or attitude toward the case. Once again, none of the jurors gave any response indicating potential bias.
After the trial court had concluded its own voir dire, it invited counsel to ask their own questions, directed through the court. Defense counsel requested that the prospective jurors be asked if they had ever been victims of crimes similar to that of which the defendant was accused. Three answered in the affirmative. The experiences of each prospective juror were briefly related. The trial court then asked all three prior victims whether they could set aside their prior experiences and act in a fair and impartial manner.
Those three of you who have responded, recognizing that this is a different time and place and circumstance, would that experience, having been the victim of that type of a crime, affect your ability to be fair and impartial in this case, that is, would you be unable to set aside that experience and hear the evidence in this case and rule on the evidence based upon what you hear and the credibility of the witnesses? If you would not be able to do so, I want you to raise your hand. (Emphasis added.)
None of those questioned raised a hand.
The only fault the majority finds in this case is that the trial court did not ask enough questions before concluding that VanLeeuwen was impartial.1 Once the trial court is satisfied that a prospective juror is impartial, however, there is no reason for it to continue with unnecessary questioning. The scope of the inquiry is left to the sound discretion of the trial court because only the trial court knows when it is satisfied that the prospective jurors are impartial. See Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932. See also State v. Gotshall, 782 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 1989); Jonas, 793 P.2d at 906.2 The determination of whether or not a prospective juror is impartial is a factual determination made from the “advantaged posi*451tion” of the trial court to determine “which persons would be fair and impartial jurors.” Jenkins v. Parrish, 627 P.2d 533, 536 (Utah 1981). The majority therefore faults the procedure used by the trial court in reaching its factual finding. I, on the other hand, believe the inquiry was procedurally sufficient.
The single question asked by the trial court once it had heard the experiences of the three prior victims is similar to that asked in Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 931-932, wherein the trial court inquired:
Are there any of you who feel that you would have trouble being an impartial juror because of feelings you may have either pro or con with regard to the L.D.S. Church that you think might affect your ability to be a fair and impartial juror in this case? If so, I’d like you to raise your hand.
Id. at 931 (emphasis added).
As in the present case, none of the prospective jurors raised a hand. We recognized in Hornsby that one of the purposes of voir dire is the “detection of bias sufficient to challenge for cause.” Id. at 932. We then held that “the question asked by the trial court was sufficient to detect any actual subjective bias to warrant a challenge for cause under subsection (6) [of Rule 47(f), Utah R.Civ.P.].” Id. (emphasis added).3 The majority asserts that one question was not sufficient and relies upon Bailey, 605 P.2d at 768 and Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884. Bailey and Brooks, however, apply only when there is a strong inference of bias, and that is not the case before us.
The question asked in the present case cannot be distinguished from that asked in Hornsby. The majority fails to show any defect at all in the question asked.4 Nor does it put forth any additional questions that should have been asked.5 Instead, it relies only upon the total number of questions asked in the cases that it cites as support without any analysis of the sub*452stance of those questions.6 An examination of many of those cases reveals that the higher number of questions resulted not from rehabilitative questioning, but from the prospective jurors giving equivocal answers when asked if they could be impartial.7
In the present case, the prospective jurors’ answers were unequivocal and therefore did not require any additional inquiry. Absent some explanation as to why the inquiry conducted by the trial court was insufficient, we may not say that the trial court abused its discretion in not inquiring further. We certainly may not declare the trial court’s finding to be clearly erroneous simply because it did not first ask a magical number of questions.
Another distinction that should be drawn between the present case and the cases relied upon by the majority is that in many of those cases counsel, not the trial court, conducted the extended inquiry. See, e.g., State v. Julian, 771 P.2d 1061, 1065-66 (Utah 1989) (defense counsel asked the twenty questions referred to by the majority, not the trial court). Rule 18(b) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides counsel an opportunity to ask additional questions with leave of the trial court. Defense counsel in the present case requested the question regarding prior victimization, but did not request any additional probing once the victimization question and the trial court’s follow-up question regarding impartiality were asked. Defendant’s failure to *453object to the extent of the voir dire conducted by the trial court “constitutes a waiver and bars inquiry into the bias question.” State v. DeMille, 756 P.2d 81, 83 (Utah 1988) (defendant’s evidence of juror bias discovered post-trial was properly refused by trial court in motion for new trial when “quite foreseeable” issue of potential bias was not raised by defendant during voir dire). See also State v. Miller, 674 P.2d 130, 131 (Utah 1983) (trial court failed to inquire of jurors whether there would be prejudice in their minds because the case involved a motorcycle club; defense counsel’s failure to object, to remind the judge of the oversight, to make a new request, or to ask personally to voir dire the jury, effectively waived the error). Defendant has therefore not preserved the issue for appeal.8 See Doe v. Hafen, 772 P.2d 456, 458 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (plaintiff waived any objection at trial when it did not attempt to call the court’s attention to a specific question it desired the court to ask on voir dire and thereby did not preserve the issue for appeal).
Even if defendant had preserved the issue for appeal, he failed to meet his burden of proof on appeal. “Defendant did not demonstrate on the trial record, or on appeal, that [the prospective juror] could not act in a fair and impartial manner.” Layton City v. Bennett, 741 P.2d 965, 967 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (citing Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884). See also Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 2277, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988) (defendant “failed to establish that the jury was not impartial”). Nor has defendant demonstrated that he was not “afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate” VanLeeuwen. Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932. “The trial court abuses its discretion when, ‘considering the totality of the questioning, counsel [is not] afforded an adequate opportunity to gain the information necessary to evaluate jurors.’ ” Id. (quoting Bishop, 753 P.2d at 448). Defendant has simply failed to show how VanLeeuwen was partial, or how he was prevented in any way from gaining sufficient information about VanLeeuwen to know whether he was partial.
The majority cannot say that the trial court did not conduct adequate inquiry simply because it might have conducted more. Once the trial court was satisfied that the prospective jurors were impartial, it did not need to probe any further. If defense counsel was not satisfied that the prior victims were impartial, then it should have requested additional probing.9 The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in asking only one question when the ques*454tion asked was “sufficient to detect any actual subjective bias to warrant a challenge for cause.” Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932 (emphasis added).
PER SE INFERENCE OF BIAS
Since VanLeeuwen made no comments to call into question his impartiality, no inference of bias was raised under our traditional analysis. Bias is only inferred when the “comments ” of the prospective juror raise a facial question as to the prospective juror’s partiality. Cobb, 774 P.2d at 1126 (emphasis added). Accord Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25-26 (fact that prospective juror had prior involvement in drug abuse and distribution investigations did not create an inference of bias where no comments were made to call into question his impartiality).10 The majority’s ruling expressly requires trial courts to rebut an inference of bias whenever the court learns of prior victimization. The majority’s ruling therefore creates a per se inference of bias that attaches automatically whenever a prospective juror is a prior victim of a similar crime. The majority fails to provide any legal or public policy support for such a ruling. The majority’s approach, in fact, is contrary to our case law.11
A recent decision from this court indicates that prior victimization of a similar crime does not, per se, raise an inference of bias. In State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902 (Utah Ct.App.) cert. denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990), a prospective juror revealed during voir dire that she had recently been the victim of a theft involving approximately $13,000 worth of tools. When asked whether the previous theft would affect her impartiality, the prospective juror answered, “If it was tools, I might be a little influenced.” Id. at 906. She equivocated further by admitting that it was “a little hard to say” whether the prior incident would affect her ability to be impartial, but eventually affirmed her ability to remain impartial upon further questioning by the trial court. Id. This court held that no inference of bias was demonstrated by the voir dire questioning because, although the prospective juror expressed some equivocation, she ultimately manifested her ability to be impartial. Id. at 907. This court reasoned that since the case did not involve tools, “it could be inferred that the prior experience would not influence her at all.” Id. Such reasoning reveals that prior victimization does not automatically raise a per se inference of bias that must be rebutted. See State v. Rose, 121 Ariz. 131, 589 P.2d 5, 13-14 (1978); State v. Singletary, 80 N.J. 55, 402 A.2d 203, 207 (1979).
The majority summarily assumes, however, as a matter of law and in a technical fashion, that all prior victims are not indifferent to the ease before them. “ ‘Impartiality’ is not a technical conception but is a state of mind; it is a mental attitude of appropriate indifference.” State v. Brooks, 563 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah 1977). If the prior victimization of the prospective *455juror in Jonas did not prevent her from being indifferent, then there is no reason to assume that VanLeeuwen’s prior victimization prevented him from being indifferent. In general, prospective jurors who affirm their impartiality are presumed to be impartial unless proven otherwise. See State v. Dixon, 560 P.2d 318, 320 (Utah 1977) (when prospective jurors “gave their word that they had no such bias or prejudice but could act as fair jurors[,] [i]t is to be assumed that they were not swearing falsely and that they believed they could act as conscientious arbiters in the case.”).
Victimization of minor crimes is an unfortunate part of living in today’s society. I do not believe that the risk of universal bias among prior victims is so great that it warrants a per se inference of bias that must automatically be rebutted in each and every case. In a great majority of the eases, a general probing, such as the probing conducted by the trial court in this case, will be sufficient to reveal those prior victims who might not be impartial. The majority’s ruling will therefore create a significant burden upon our trial courts without creating’ any real benefit.
CONCLUSION
I respectfully dissent from the majority’s holding because it requires prospective jurors to be rehabilitated before any inference of bias has even been established. I view the trial court’s decision to have been a factual determination that VanLeeuwen was impartial and therefore was capable of sitting on the jury without any rehabilitative inquiry. Inasmuch as VanLeeuwen said nothing that would facially challenge his impartiality, we should give the trial court’s factual determination the deference it deserves.
The majority asserts that the approach recognized in this dissent would be difficult to administer. Let me summarize the approach in its simplest terms. When facts raise a question of whether a prospective juror may be biased, the trial court must probe until it is satisfied that the prospective juror is in fact impartial. If a prospective juror makes comments that show he or she is probably biased, then the trial court must ask questions to rebut that inference. If a prospective juror makes comments that reveal strong and deep impressions of bias, no rehabilitative inquiry is needed— that juror must be removed. I believe this approach is much simpler and gives more guidance to our trial courts than simply saying that the amount of inquiry needed will vary from case to case and in this case it just simply was not enough.
I also believe that this issue was not properly preserved for appeal and that, even if it was, defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing that VanLeeuwen could not have acted in a fair and impartial manner or that he was prevented from obtaining enough information to make that determination.12
I would therefore affirm.

. The majority claims that the record does not support a finding that VanLeeuwen was a fair and impartial juror. The burden of challenging this factual finding, however, has not been met by defendant. "In the absence of a record or transcript supporting defendant’s factual contentions on appeal, and upon defendant’s failure to marshal evidence that shows the ruling to be clearly erroneous, we presume that the ruling is adequately supported by the clear weight of the evidence." State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 947 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (citations omitted).
Even if the defendant were to marshal the evidence in support of the trial court’s finding— which includes the four affirmative, unequivocal responses by VanLeeuwen that he could be impartial — there is no evidence of bias on the record to show that the trial court’s finding was clearly erroneous. The majority is therefore left to attack the procedure used by the trial court in order to show any abuse of discretion. In addition to its concerns about the extent of the inquiry, the majority indicates that it is bothered by the fact there was no individualized questioning of the three prospective jurors, but it offers no precedent or analysis to support its assertion that individualized questioning is required. In the past, this court has accepted collective questioning without comment. See, e.g., Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 931.

. Contrary to the majority’s assertion in its second footnote, there is a real distinction between the phraseology used in expressing the appropriate standard of review. If a matter is within the “sound discretion" of a trial court, then the appellate courts will give maximum deference to the trial court’s determination. The granting of only “some deference” is obviously a more searching review. The majority claims to be giving maximum deference when in fact it is granting only "some deference,” if that much, to the trial court’s determination of the appropriate scope of voir dire. Inasmuch as Gotschall is *451the most recent Utah Supreme Court case, I believe that the "sound discretion” standard enunciated therein governs our review in this case and that the majority’s departure therefrom is error.

. The majority erroneously describes this statement as dicta. At issue in Hornsby was whether the voir dire was sufficient with regards to the prospective jurors’ feelings toward the L.D.S. Church. Voir dire has two functions, "the detection of bias sufficient to challenge for cause," and "the collection of data to permit informed exercise of the peremptory challenge." State v. Taylor, 664 P.2d 439, 447 (Utah 1983). In Hornsby, we first reviewed the detection of bias issue and found that the single question was sufficient to detect bias for purposes of subsection (6) of Rule 47(f). We did not consider "whether the voir dire was sufficient to reveal circumstances or relationships that would warrant challenges for cause under other subsections of Rule 47(f),” because that issue was not necessary to the appeal. Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932 (emphasis added). Instead, we reversed the case because the voir dire was insufficient to permit the plaintiff an opportunity to collect data for the informed use of the peremptory challenge. The majority’s partial quote is therefore misleading because it implies that we did not make any decision relating to challenges for cause, when in fact we expressly made such a ruling under subsection (6).

. The majority attempts to distinguish Hornsby by pointing out that there were no affirmative responses to the general question asked in Hornsby while there were positive responses in the present case. The majority’s analysis, however, ignores the fact that the ultimate issue of impartiality addressed by one question in Hornsby was addressed by two questions in this case. The Hornsby court asked if the prospective jurors had any feelings toward the L.D.S. Church that would prevent them from being impartial. If the Hornsby court had broken this question into two parts and first asked, "does any prospective juror have feelings towards the L.D.S. Church," it probably would have received affirmative responses. Conversely, had the trial court in the present case asked the single question, "have any of you been the victim of a similar crime that would prevent you from being impartial,” it would not have received any affirmative responses. The intermediate positive response, that the majority claims distinguishes this case from Hornsby, simply is not determinative because the ultimate response was the same — the prospective jurors would be impartial.

.The trial court had already asked three different questions designed to elicit any bias before the issue of prior victimization even arose in this case. Inasmuch as we must look at the "totality” of the voir dire in order to determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988), the majority errs in not considering the impact of these previous questions as well. When the totality of the voir dire is considered, it is clear *452that the three questions initially asked by the trial court, plus the question following the discovery of the prior victimization, were "sufficient to detect any actual subjective bias to warrant a challenge for cause.” Hornsby, 758 P.2d at 932.

. In general, the types of questions fall into three groups: (1) factual questions regarding the prospective juror’s experiences; (2) questions probing the prospective juror’s self-perceived state of mind and whether those experiences would affect his or her ability to act impartially; and (3) questions rebutting inferences of bias by inquiring whether the prospective juror understands his or her role and is willing to be impartial. The majority fails to consider whether the questions asked in the cases cited are factual, probing, or rehabilitative. Absent such analysis, the cases cited are useless in determining whether the trial court abused its discretion in the present case.

. The following voir dire colloquy between the trial court and a prospective juror in Jonas is a prime example of extended inquiry due to equivocal answers.
THE COURT: All right. I almost hate to ask this question, but I’m obligated to. Have any of you been the victims of a theft? And that, as I’ve indicated to you before what a theft really is, taking property of another with intent to permanently deprive them, or in receiving. Well, we’II take that first. I saw some hands go up in the jury box....
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: Yes, my husband had about |13,000 worth of tools stolen about a year and a half ago which we have never—
THE COURT: Did a criminal act result from that — or action?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: No, it was reported to the police, which they didn’t do anything about, and we still have never gotten—
THE COURT: They didn’t find it?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: (shook head from side to side)
THE COURT: How long ago was that?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: About a year and a half ago.
THE COURT: Keeping that incident in mind, as I indicated, there are different parties involved, but sometimes based on our experience we allow that to interfere with our thinking.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: It might be. If it was tools, I might be a little influenced.
THE COURT: Well, wait just a minute. Let me ask the questions and you just answer the question.
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: All right.
THE COURT: Bearing that in mind, do you believe that that incident would make it difficult for you to be fair and impartial, particularly to this Defendant, as well as the people of the state of Utah?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: It's a little hard to say.
THE COURT: Well, you just take time to think it over because we — you’re the one that—
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: It probably would, yes.
THE COURT: Let’s see. You’re Mrs.— PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: Smith, Donna Smith.
THE COURT: You don’t believe that you could set those facts aside and make a determination on the evidence that’s presented in this case?
PROSPECTIVE JUROR D. SMITH: I — well, yes, I believe I could be impartial.
Jonas, 793 P.2d at 905-06.

. Contrary to the majority’s assertion that the motion to strike was granted as to all three prior victims, and therefore defense counsel did not need to ask for further probing to preserve the issue, the record reveals that Hoyt and Tyler were removed, but that VanLeeuwen was never removed.
No record was made of the actual sidebar conference at which time defendant claims Van-Leeuwen was removed and reinstated, but the conference was later reconstructed on the record. We must therefore rely upon the subsequent reconstruction of that conference made on the record. State v. Suarez, 793 P.2d 934, 936 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1990). Defense counsel rehearsed how it had made a motion to remove Hoyt, Tyler and VanLeeuwen and then stated: "I believe at that- time the Court did strike the three individuals for cause_ Shortly thereafter the Court reinstated Mr. VanLeeuwen_” The trial court stated that it was the court’s view at the sidebar conference that all three prospective jurors could be fair and impartial and that the state’s objection to striking VanLeeuwen was particularly well taken because his experience occurred in a foreign country. The trial court then indicated that at sidebar it "determined based on his responses not to strike him.” (Emphasis added). Defense counsel did not make any protest to the trial court’s assertion that it did not strike VanLeeuwen.
Defense counsel's statement that VanLeeuwen was stricken and later reinstated is without any support in the transcript and is directly contrary to the trial court’s express declaration that it did not strike VanLeeuwen. Defense counsel therefore did not preserve the issues of insufficient inquiry or the alleged irregular "reinstatement" of VanLeeuwen. See id. The only issue properly preserved for appeal is the question of whether VanLeeuwen should have been dismissed for cause based on the answers given.

. Had defendant so requested, additional questions could have been posed to the three prospective jurors after defendant made its request to strike for cause and before the trial court ruled on the motion. See, e.g., Gotschall, 782 P.2d at 461; Salt Lake City v. Tuero, 745 P.2d 1281, 1283 (Utah Ct.App.1987).

. The majority misconstrues "comments” as meaning VanLeeuwen’s statement that he was a prior victim. Such an interpretation is clearly not consistent with the analysis of Brooks. "Whenever the voir dire evokes a strong emotional response, there is posed a warning that the juror may not have the appropriate indifference to the party or cause before the court.” Brooks, 631 P.2d at 884 (emphasis added). Van-Leeuwen’s response in this case obviously was not a "strong emotional response.”
The majority also misconstrues the language of Cobb by asserting that the inference that arises from prior victimization must be rebutted, but that the prospective juror need not necessarily be removed. Such an approach is a clear departure from Cobb, which requires the prospective juror to be removed if an inference of bias is not rebutted. Cobb, 744 P.2d at 1126.

. The majority’s approach is also contrary to our established rules of procedure. Fact situations that raise a concern serious enough to create a per se inference of bias are enumerated in rule 18(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Prior victimization is not one of those per se grounds. Rule 18(e)(4), for example, provides that the following fact situations automatically constitute grounds for removing a prospective juror:
the existence of any social, legal, business, fiduciary or other relationship between the prospective juror and any party, witness or person alleged to have been victimized or injured by the defendant, which relationship when viewed objectively, would suggest to reasonable minds that the prospective juror would be unable or unwilling to return a verdict which would be free of favoritism.

. The majority fails to adequately address an alternative basis for affirmance that has been properly raised and is before us. Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Utah 1988). VanLeeuwen did not sit as a juror, but was removed on a peremptory challenge by defendant. The law in this jurisdiction has historically been that it is prejudicial error for the trial court “to compel a party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a juror who should have been removed for cause.” Hewitt, 689 P.2d at 25. The State urges that if this court finds that VanLeeuwen should have been removed for cause, as the majority does, then we must reevaluate the Hewitt line of cases in light of the recent case of Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 108 S.Ct. 2273, 101 L.Ed.2d 80 (1988). The United States Supreme Court held therein that where a juror who should have been excused for cause was removed by defendant’s peremptory challenge, ”[a]ny claim that the jury was not impartial was required to focus, not on [the excused juror], but on the jurors who ultimately sat.” 108 S.Ct. at 2277. The Supreme Court reasoned that as long as the jury which actually sat for the case was impartial, it was unimportant that defendant was forced to use a peremptory challenge to excuse a prospective juror. 108 S.Ct. at 2278 (citing Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 436, 7 S.Ct. 614, 616, 30 L.Ed. 708 (1887)).
*456In view of the majority’s reversal, this alternative argument deserves discussion. The majority erroneously "assumes” that this issue has been considered by the Utah Supreme Court since it has decided two juror removal cases subsequent to the Ross decision being issued by the Supreme Court. Inasmuch as appellate courts are limited to the issues properly raised on appeal, the majority’s assumption is unfounded. Since the Utah Supreme Court has never addressed this issue directly, the majority’s ruling places it squarely before us now.