Court Opinion

ID: 9471277
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 03:28:27.598248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:42:20.188261
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting:
I concur in the majority’s opinion except that, for the following reasons, I dissent from that part of the opinion adopting the district court’s opinion and order, 513 F.Supp. at 795-98, denying Burger’s petition for habeas corpus relief on the grounds that he was denied the right to effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments at both of his state court trials and on appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia. A review of the record reveals that Burger was denied the effective assistance of counsel both by his appointed counsel’s active representation of his co-indictee’s conflicting interest and by his counsel’s failure to present any evidence in mitigation at either of his two sentencing proceedings.
A review of the general principles applicable to all ineffective assistance of counsel claims is in order. The Sixth Amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right to “effective assistance of counsel, that is, counsel reasonably likely to render and rendering effective assistance.” Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243, 1250 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982) (en banc), cert. granted, - U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2451, 77 L.Ed.2d 1332 (1983). The appropriate methodology for determining whether there has been effective assistance of counsel is to examine the totality of circumstances in the record. Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d 391, 394 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). Although neither in capital nor in noncapital cases is defendant entitled to error-free counsel, the “number, nature and seriousness of the charges against the defendant are all part of the ‘totality of the circumstances in the entire record’ that must be considered in the effective assistance calculus.” Washington v. Watkins, 655 F.2d 1346, 1357 (5th Cir.1981).
Turning first to Burger’s conflict of interest claim, in order to establish the constitutional predicate for ineffective assistance *988Burger must show that his counsel actively represented actually conflicting interests. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-50, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718-19, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980); Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1499 (11th Cir.1983). Applying this standard to the facts of this case, the record is clear that Burger’s counsel was actively representing both Burger and his co-indictee Stevens and that an actual conflict of interest between the two violated Burger’s right to the effective assistance of counsel.1
First, it is apparent that Burger’s counsel actively represented both Burger and Stevens. Both Burger and Stevens were charged with and indicted for the murder of Roger Honeycutt. Both Burger and Stevens were appointed counsel by the trial court at approximately the same time, and within a few weeks after they had been charged with the crime. Burger’s appointed counsel, Leaphart, and Stevens’ appointed counsel, Smith, were partners in a two-partner law firm. At the federal habeas hearing, Leaphart testified that he interviewed both Burger and Stevens. Leaphart testified that he assisted Smith in the preparation of Stevens’ case and that Smith assisted him in the preparation of Burger’s case. Leaphart and Smith discussed the issues involved in each case and researched the law together. Smith sat at counsel table and assisted Leaphart during Burger’s trial. Although not physically present at Stevens’ trial, Leaphart testified that “I worked then with — discussed the issues with Bob [Smith]. We researched the law together.”2 Smith and Leaphart collaborated in preparing the briefs for both Burger and Stevens on each defendant’s first appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia; Leaphart testified that he “primarily” prepared the briefs for Burger and Stevens on the second appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia.3 The fee received by each attorney for representing each client was deposited in the law firm’s corporate account. At no time in his representation of Burger did Leaphart or the trial court ever inform Burger of a possible conflict of interest.
Whether analyzed as a situation where one attorney, Leaphart, represented both Burger and Stevens,4 or where one law firm represented both Burger and Stevens,5 the *989end result on these facts is the same: Leap-hart was actively involved in the defense of both to the extent that a conflict of interest was clearly established.
Although multiple representation is the paradigm context in which conflict of interest claims arise,6 a finding of multiple representation alone does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Foxworth v. Wainwright, 516 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir.1975). The conflict must be shown to be actual, not speculative, before it will cause representation to fail Sixth Amendment standards. Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d at 397. “An actual conflict of interest occurs when a defense attorney places himself in a situation ‘inherently conducive to divided loyalties.’ ” Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 439 (5th Cir.1979) (quoting Castillo v. Estelle, 504 F.2d 1243, 1245 (5th Cir.1974)); see also Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d at 397 (“[a]n actual conflict of interest exists if counsel’s introduction of probative evidence or plausible arguments that would significantly benefit one defendant would damage the defense of another defendant whom the same counsel is representing.”).
In this case, the fundamental issue, as perceived by counsel, was not that of guilt, but of culpability. Upon the habeas corpus hearing Leaphart testified at length concerning the evidence supporting Burger’s lesser degree of culpability for the. murder as compared to Stevens’.7 Summarized, the evidence was that at the time the crime was committed Burger was seventeen; Stevens was twenty. Burger has an I.Q. of 82 and possible brain damage. Stevens appeared to be the leader in their relationship; Burger the follower. Stevens planned and initiated the robbery of the victim; Burger followed his instructions. Stevens actually committed the robbery; Stevens made the victim undress; Stevens forced the victim to perform oral sodomy on Stevens; Stevens anally sodomized the victim; Stevens tied the victim up and forced him to get in the trunk of the cab. Stevens told Burger they would have to kill him; Burger said he didn’t want to kill him. Stevens told Burger they would have to get rid of the cab by driving it into the pond; Stevens ordered Burger to drive the cab with the victim locked in the trunk into the pond. Burger drove the cab and the victim into the pond. In short, the essence of Burger’s defense was that he was less culpable than Stevens.
In such a situation, any evidence or arguments made by counsel in Burger’s behalf would, by the very nature of Burger’s defense, damage Stevens. An actual conflict of interest between Burger and Stevens is thus apparent. Stated differently, Burger’s interests were drastically adverse to those of Stevens.
If a defense attorney owes duties to a party whose interests are adverse to those of the defendant, then an actual conflict of interest exists. The interests of the other client and the defendant are sufficiently adverse if it is shown that the attorney owes a duty to the defendant to take some action that could be detrimental to his other client.
Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d at 439.
The course of Burger’s state court proceedings illuminates the duty owed him by Leaphart to take actions that could be detrimental to Stevens. First, Leaphart did not at any time in his representation of *990Burger offer Burger’s testimony against Stevens in exchange for a sentence less than the death penalty for Burger.8 See Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d at 397 n. 12 (“[pjlea bargains are perhaps the most obvious example of the manifest effects of a conflict of interest at pretrial proceedings.”); see also Fleming v. State, 246 Ga. 90, 270 S.E.2d 185, 189 (1980) (Bowles, J., concurring) (“[n]o two defendants share equal responsibility for a crime. Usually one is more culpable than the other or for any number of reasons has a greater degree of responsibility for what occurred. One may also be more entitled to leniency based on such factors as age, intelligence, motive, background, previous conduct or record, etc. Common counsel eliminates any practical possibility of plea bargaining.”). Second, at Burger’s trial Stevens was not called as a witness by the defense. If Stevens had been called by the state, Leaphart would have been placed in the untenable position of cross-examining his own client. Finally, Leaphart prepared the briefs for both Burger and Stevens on each defendant’s second appeal to the Supreme Court of Georgia. In Burger’s brief, Leaphart does not argue that he was the less culpable party, although the scope of the Supreme Court of Georgia’s appellate review in capital cases includes a consideration of whether the “sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.” O.C.G.A. § 17-10-35(c)(3) (1982), formerly Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2537(c)(3) (1933).
Once an actual conflict of interest is shown, without further inquiry, prejudice to the defendant is presumed. Westbrook v. Zant, 704 F.2d 1487, 1499 (11th Cir.1983). “It is well established that when counsel is confronted with an actual conflict of interest, prejudice must be presumed, and except under the most extraordinary circumstances, the error cannot be considered harmless.” Baty v. Balkcom, 661 F.2d at 395 (quoting Turnquest v. Wainwright, 651 F.2d 331, 334 (5th Cir.1981)). The rationale for dispensing with the requirement of a showing of prejudice in conflict of interest cases “becomes apparent when one considers the nigh impossible task of making a meaningful qualitative analysis of trial counsel proficiency, in a case involving divided loyalties, from an examination of the transcript alone.” Johnson v. Hopper, 639 F.2d 236, 239 (5th Cir. Unit B 1981). The degree to which counsel’s strategic decisions and performance throughout the course of his representation are affected by an actual conflict of interest subtly pervading the whole of the defense may not be manifested in his conduct at trial alone. “[T]he sixth amendment requires that a defendant may not be represented by counsel who might be tempted to dampen the ardor of his defense in order to placate his other client. The fact that a particular lawyer may actually resist the temptation is of no moment.” Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d at 440.
In light of this precedent it is clear that the presumption of prejudice arising from an actual conflict of interest cannot be overcome by evidence that counsel did, in fact, vigorously pursue one client’s defense to the detriment of the other at trial. Although the factual content of the extraordinary circumstances in which the error of representing actually conflicting interests is considered harmless has not been delineated by this Court, it is apparent that a showing *991of no adverse effect upon counsel’s performance at trial or no impairment of his client’s defense does not constitute such a circumstance.
Thus, accepting the district court’s findings, those findings having been adopted by the majority in this case, that Leaphart “in no way tailored his strategy toward protecting Stevens” at Burger’s trial, and that the trial record “shows considerable effort to gain mercy for petitioner by portraying Stevens as the chief architect of the crime,” the presumption of prejudice from the actual conflict of interest between Burger and Stevens remains. Further, the actual conflict of interest between Stevens and Burger was not limited to Burger’s trial, but permeated the entire course of Burger’s state court proceedings. Once Burger established that an actual conflict of interest was present, whether at pretrial plea negotiations, trial or on appeal, and that his counsel actively represented both interests, his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel was complete.
I turn now to Burger’s claim that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to present any evidence in mitigation, or otherwise, at either of his two sentencing proceedings. In Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d 955, 962 (11th Cir.1983), this Court rejected a claim that failure to present any mitigating evidence at the sentencing proceeding in addition to that presented at the guilt phase of the trial constituted per se ineffective assistance of counsel. Although, unlike Stanley’s attorney, Burger’s attorney did not present any evidence during either the guilt or two sentencing phases, it is not necessary to articulate a per se rule of ineffectiveness in this case as “application of general principles governing effectiveness of counsel to the specific context of a capital sentencing proceeding,” id., demonstrates the ineffectiveness of Burger’s counsel.
Counsel’s duty of effective representation continues into the sentencing phase of his client’s trial. King v. Strickland, 714 F.2d 1481, at 1491 (11th Cir.1983).
The sentencing phase of any case regardless of the potential punishment, is ‘the time at which for many defendants the most important services of the entire proceedings can be performed.’ ABA Standard on Criminal Justice, Sentencing Alternatives and Procedures § 5.3(e). The special importance of the capital sentencing proceeding gives rise to a duty on the part of defense counsel to be prepared for that crucial phase of the trial. Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d at 963.
“At the heart of the duty of effective representation is the independent duty to investigate and prepare.” Goodwin v. Balk-com, 684 F.2d 794, 805 (11th Cir.1982). In Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d 1243 (5th Cir. Unit B 1982), the en banc court delineated the content of this duty to investigate:
A strategy chosen without the benefit of a reasonably substantial investigation into all plausible lines of defense is generally based upon counsel’s professional assumptions regarding the prospects for success offered by the various lines. The cases generally conform to a workable and sensible rule: when counsel’s assumptions are reasonable given the totality of the circumstances and when counsel’s strategy represents a reasonable choice based upon those assumptions counsel need not investigate lines of defense that he has chosen not to employ at trial.
In sum, an attorney who makes a strategic choice to channel his investigation into fewer than all plausible lines of defense is effective so long as the assumptions upon which he bases his strategy are reasonable and his choices on the basis of those assumptions are reasonable. Id. at 1255, 1256 (footnotes omitted).
“An attorney may proceed absent a reasonable investigation into all potential lines of defense, but he does so at his peril.” Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d at 966. Finally, once a showing of ineffective assistance of counsel due to counsel’s failure to investigate has been made, the second prong of Washington *992v. Strickland requires that prejudice from this error be demonstrated. Id. at 1258.
The district court found that Leaphart’s investigation into available mitigating evidence consisted solely of conversations with Burger’s mother. Although it is unclear what the content of those conversations, as relating to mitigating evidence concerning Burger’s background outside of Wayne County, Georgia, and the identity of possible character witnesses, was found to be, the district court concluded that Leaphart made “adequate if hardly ideal inquiries,” and that his “investigation appears to meet at least minimal professional standards.” Clearly by no stretch of the imagination could Leaphart’s investigation be characterized as reasonably substantial. Since Leap-hart failed to conduct a reasonably substantial investigation into available mitigating evidence, in order to be effective his choice not to investigate must have been a reasonable strategic decision based upon reasonable assumptions. Three reasonable assumptions on which Leaphart’s strategy not to substantially investigate available mitigating evidence have been proffered: 1) that Leaphart’s theory of defense, or strategy, was to make the state prove its case; 2) that, if mitigating evidence had been offered at Burger’s sentencing proceedings, Leaphart would have lost the right to opening and closing argument; and 3) that Leaphart chose to rely in closing on the argument that Burger had never been in trouble before, an argument which would have been undercut by an investigation into Burger’s background. None of these strategies, and the assumptions on which they are based, withstand scrutiny for reasonableness.
Leaphart testified concerning his strategy or theory of defense in Burger’s case:
Well, of course, my theory of defense was of course trying to make the District Attorney prove his case. And my theory of defense was to — well, that in effect, in essence what it was. And, use. whatever rules of evidence and to prevent him from doing so.9
And, specifically concerning the second trial solely on the issue of penalty, Leaphart again testified that he “[f]elt that case should have been tried on the facts and make the District Attorney — I say make him, use whatever rules of evidence to exclude those harmful facts.”10 The law provides that the state must prove its case, whether defense counsel is present or not. Relying on the state’s case is not a “strategy” for the defense, but instead reflects an abandonment of counsel’s obligation to develop a case for his client. This proffered strategy is tantamount to no strategy at all, and reliance on such a strategy, especially in the context of a capital sentencing proceeding, as an alternative to substantially investigating available mitigating evidence is patently unreasonable.
Second, Leaphart testified that he made a decision not to offer any evidence in mitigation in order to preserve his right to opening and closing arguments. Again, the basic assumption on which this strategy was based is patently unreasonable. O.C.G.A. § 17-10-2(a) & (c) (1982), formerly Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2503(a) & (c) (1933), provide for the conduct of sentencing proceedings in capital cases: “The district attorney shall open and the defendant or his counsel shall conclude the argument.” The presentation of evidence by the defendant at a capital sentencing proceeding in no way affects this division of argument between the state and the defense. In fact, this procedure was followed at Burger’s sentencing proceedings: the district attorney opened and defense closed final arguments to the jury. Leaphart simply failed to inform himself of basic Georgia criminal procedure in sentencing proceedings. Cf. Young v. Zant, 677 F.2d 792 (11th Cir.1982). No strategy based on such a false assumption is reasonable. The district court clearly erred in concluding otherwise.
The district court found that Leaphart’s failure to substantially investigate available *993mitigating evidence was based on a strategic choice to rely in closing argument on the “major argument” in Burger’s behalf that he had no prior record of violent crime and had never been in trouble before. As it relates to Burger’s second sentencing proceeding, this finding is contradicted by the record: at no point in his closing argument did Leaphart mention the lack of evidence that Burger had a record or had been in trouble before. Instead, Leaphart’s closing argument at the second sentencing proceeding argued Burger’s lack of culpability as compared to Stevens’, and concluded with the plea for mercy. Neither argument would have been undercut by the presentation of humanizing evidence concerning Burger’s background.
In conclusion, Leaphart’s decision not to substantially investigate available mitigating evidence was not a reasonable strategic choice, and thus his failure to investigate constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
The inquiry does not end with a finding of ineffective assistance. Burger may prevail only if he shows both a denial of effective assistance and actual prejudice to the course of his defense. Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1258. Under any standard, in this case prejudice is apparent. See Douglas v. Wainwright, 714 F.2d 1532 at 1556-58 (11th Cir.1983).
At the federal habeas hearing, Burger offered the testimony of his mother and numerous affidavits concerning his troubled childhood and background. Summarized, this evidence was that Burger’s parents had been married when his mother was fourteen and his father was sixteen. His parents divorced when he was a child. Neither parent wanted Burger and his childhood was spent shuffled between the two. His father threw him out of the house; his mother sent him back to live with his father. Burger’s mother remarried. Burger’s stepfather beat Burger, and beat Burger’s mother in his presence; Burger’s stepfather involved him in drugs and alcohol when he was eleven years old. Burger’s mother and stepfather moved from Indiana to Florida. Burger was sent to live with his father. Burger’s father beat him and refused to have anything to do with him. Burger ran away and hitchhiked to Florida to live with his mother, selling his shoes to buy food along the way. When Burger arrived barefoot in Florida his stepfather told him he could not stay with them. Burger’s mother told the juvenile authorities that she didn’t want him, and to send him back to his father in Indiana. When Burger arrived in Indiana, his father locked him out of the house. Burger was taken in by a neighbor, as he had nowhere else to go. The clinical psychologist who examined Burger testified at a motion hearing that Burger had an I.Q. of 82 and possible brain damage.
It is absolutely astounding to me that none of this evidence was ever presented to Burger’s juries. The district court found that although the affidavits of the character witnesses supplied by Burger at the hearing do “contain references to a difficult childhood which might have created some sympathy for Mr. Burger,” they also contained references to drug abuse, juvenile probation and violence. However, the thrust of the character testimony offered by Burger was not what Leaphart assumed without investigating, that Burger was a good boy and went to church, but that Burger’s personality and motivation could be explained by his stormy and unhappy childhood. Although this is precisely the kind of humanizing evidence that “may make a critical difference, especially in a capital case,” Leaphart failed to make a substantial investigation into its use. Stanley v. Zant, 697 F.2d at 969. Leaphart testified that “[I] did not have any knowledge of any witnesses that — potential witnesses that I thought would have benefited him. Had I known or had knowledge of any, I would — certainly would have used them.”11 The prejudice to Burger from counsel’s failure to substantially investigate available mitigating evidence and present it *994at either of his capital sentencing proceedings lies in the alternative chosen by counsel: to present no evidence at all. On the basis of the state’s case alone, two sentencing juries recommended the death penalty.
Failure to present this substantial, available mitigating evidence meets the prejudice prong of Washington v. Strickland, 693 F.2d at 1263-62, showing that “the petitioner suffered actual and substantial detriment to the conduct of his defense.”
For these reasons, I would REVERSE the district court’s finding that Burger was afforded the effective assistance of counsel during his state court proceedings and REMAND this case to the state court for a trial with Burger being represented by conflict-free and competent counsel.

. The Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective assistance of counsel necessarily includes the guarantee of conflict-free counsel. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70, 62 S.Ct. 457, 464-65, 86 L.Ed. 680 (1942); United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir.1978).

. Transcript of Federal Habeas Corpus Hearing (“THC”) at 18.

. THC at 40-41.

. The warden-appellant argues that the conflict of interest cases relied upon by Burger are inapposite as involving the representation of multiple defendants by one attorney. Here, appellant contends, Burger and Stevens were represented by “separate” attorneys. This argument is contrary to the facts as reflected by the record. Leaving aside the fact that Leap-hart and Smith were partners in the practice of law, the attorneys here were each active in the defense of the other’s client and “seem to have viewed themselves as a defense ‘team’ acting on behalf of [both] of the accused.” United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 593 F.2d 512, 515 (3d Cir.1979), rev’d on other grounds, Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 100 S.Ct. 1708, 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). Leaphart consulted confidentially with Stevens, aided in preparing his case for trial, and prepared the briefs for both of his appeals. “Whatever may have been the extent of each attorney’s participation in the trial of the ... defendants, we are satisfied that it was sufficient to establish that both attorneys represented [both] defendants.” Id.

. “The same principles [governing Sixth Amendment conflict of interest claims] apply where the joint representation is by two members of the same firm.” Ross v. Heyne, 638 F.2d 979, 983 (7th Cir.1980) (quoting United States v. Helton, 471 F.Supp. 397, 399 n. 1 (S.D.N.Y.1979)); see also United States v. Donahue, 560 F.2d 1039, 1042 (1st Cir.1977) (“[t]he same rule applies with equal force to representation of two or more defendants by members of the same law firm.”). Cf. Zuck v. Alabama, 588 F.2d 436, 438 (5th Cir.1979) (ineffective assistance found where “[t]he law firm which served as counsel to Zuck in his murder trial also represented, in an unrelated civil matter, the state prosecutor who tried Zuck.”); Fed.R.Crim.Pro. 44(c) (“[w]henever two or more defendants have been jointly charged ... and are represented by ... retained or appointed counsel who are associated in the practice of law, the court shall promptly inquire with respect to such joint representation and shall personally advise each defendant of his right to the effective assistance of counsel, including *989separate representation.”), construed in Ross v. Heyne, 638 F.2d at 983 (“[t]he Supreme Court’s proposal of this rule indicates its recognition that the potential constitutional problems attendant to multiple representation are present when different attorneys from the same legal partnership represent co-defendants with conflicting interests.”); ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 5-105(D). Further, the Supreme Court of Georgia, exercising its supervisory role over the Bar, has adopted a mandatory rule in death penalty cases that co-defendants must be provided with separate and independent counsel. Fleming v. State, 264 Ga. 90, 270 S.E.2d 185 (1980). This rule applies with equal force to representation by a single attorney or by members of the same law firm. Id. at 188 n. 7.

. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. at 348, 100 S.Ct. at 1718 (“[a] possible conflict of interest inheres in almost every instance of multiple representation”); United States v. Alvarez, 580 F.2d 1251, 1254 (5th Cir.1978).

. THC at 20-23.

. At the federal habeas hearing, Leaphart testified that he had not, at any time during his representation of Burger, discussed with the district attorney the possibility of Burger’s testifying against Stevens in return for a lighter sentence. THC at 38-39. When further questioned about plea negotiations in Burger’s case, Leaphart testified that he had engaged in plea negotiations, but that “during the fírst trial [the district attorney] refused to discuss it in any terms.” THC at 65 (emphasis supplied). From this account, it appears that plea negotiations were entered into in this case; that Leaphart never offered Burger’s testimony against Stevens; and that, after Burger’s first trial had begun, the district attorney refused to discuss a plea on whatever terms Leaphart had offered, presumably not the terms of Burger’s testifying against Stevens since Leaphart testified he did not at any time make such an offer. Thus, appellant’s argument that no pretrial conflict of interest could have arisen due to the district attorney’s refusal to plea bargain is contradicted by the record.

. THC at 18.

. THC at 52.

. THC at 44.