Court Opinion

ID: 9727012
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:17:21.421238+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:32.869943
License: Public Domain

Cuerie, J.
(dissenting). It is apparent that the laudable objective of the learned trial court’s order of September 25, 1959, was to preserve the status quo in the disputed territory pending determination of the appeal in this court. *638It would be most disruptive.to have the administration of such territory changed from one municipality to the other, and then a few months later have it changed back because this court reversed the trial court’s determination.
The majority opinion addresses itself chiefly to the narrow issue that there can be no stay of execution of a declaratory judgment because it is self-executing. No consideration is given to the right of the trial court to invoke its inherent equitable powers.
Relief by declaratory judgment is sui generis, and while not strictly legal or equitable, its historical affinity is equity. Strype v. Lewis (1944), 352 Mo. 1004, 180 S. W. (2d) 688, 155 A. L. R. 99. As the New Jersey supreme court declared in an opinion by Chief Justice Vanderbilt in New Jersey Turnpike Authority v. Parsons (1949), 3 N. J. 235, 239, 69 Atl. (2d) 875, its Declaratory Judgments Act, which is similar to our own, “merely broadens the rationale of remedies long cognizable in equity.”
The general rule is that either the trial court or the appellate court has the inherent power, independent of statute, to grant a stay. 4A C. J. S., Appeal and Error, p. 444, sec. 634. Such a stay should be granted when necessary to preserve the status quo and also when, as in the instant case, the appeal presents debatable questions of law. Ibid., p. 453, sec. 636.
If the trial court possesses such inherent power to preserve the status quo pending an appeal by granting a stay, I can perceive no reason why it cannot do so by an order in the nature of an injunction in a situation, as here, where a stay would be ineffectual to accomplish such result. This should be especially true when the judgment is one which is equitable in nature, such as a declaratory judgment.
State v. Adelmeyer (1936), 221 Wis. 246, 265 N. W. 838, involved an action for a declaratory judgment to de*639termine the rights of the parties with respect to Horicon marsh. The trial court issued certain temporary orders directing the state to open the gates of a dam and otherwise to preserve the status quo pending the action. On appeal this court held that there was no merit to the state’s argument that such orders were void for want of jurisdiction. If there is jurisdiction to enjoin the status quo in an action for declaratory relief before judgment, there ought to be equal jurisdiction to do so coincident with the entry of judgment, such injunctive order to be effective pending determination of an appeal that the trial court has been advised will be taken.
In the school-segregation cases, in spite of the determination that segregated schools were unconstitutional and therefore illegal, the United States supreme court remanded the cases to the trial courts with the power to permit the school districts to gradually integrate their schools. Brown v. Board of Education (1955), 349 U. S. 294, 75 Sup. Ct. 753, 99 L. Ed. 1083. This is precedent for the principle argued for here, that a judgment once entered, which is equitable in nature even though it finally adjudicates legal rights, does not deprive the trial court from exercising its equitable powers to suspend the operation thereof for some temporary period when equitable considerations demand that this be done.
The instant order under attack is unfortunately worded. I would modify it so as to enjoin maintenance of the staUis quo upon the parties pending appeal, and affirm the order as so modified.