Court Opinion

ID: 9677593
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 05:56:00.687117+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:57.000663
License: Public Domain

Wendell L. Griffen, Judge, concurring. As best as I can determine, there exists no case nationwide that specifically addresses the issue at hand, namely what constitutes a change in custody within the context of an adoption proceeding, ■particularly where the natural mother remains in the residence of the adopting grandparents. I write this concurring opinion to emphasize the difference between custody within the adoption context and custody in the child-support context. In the context of an adoption statute, we should not place undue weight on decisions dealing with custody in the divorce context. Questions of custody in the divorce context do not involve abolition of the parental relationship. See, e.g., J. T. v. Arkansas Dep’t of Human Servs., 329 Ark. 243, 947 S.W.2d 761 (1997). Rather, they focus on which of the parents should exercise the legal right of physical control and responsibility for the child. See, e.g., Wilson v. Wilson, 67 Ark. App. 48, 991 S.W.2d 647 (1999). In contrast, questions of custody in the adoption context do involve abolition of the parental relationship. See, e.g., Vice v. Andrews, 328 Ark. 573, 945 S.W.2d 914 (1997); see also Brown v. Johnson, 10 Ark. App. 110, 661 S.W.2d 443 (1983) (Glaze, J., dissenting) (discussing that appellate courts should not treat adoption . cases as though they were custody actions because in custody cases, the law recognizes the importance of the existing family relationship, whereas in adoption proceedings, existing family ties are severed). Potential adoptive parents as well as their legal counsel should understand that adoption law operates to create real and lasting relationships of a parent to a child where previously no such relationship existed. If the petitioners are unwilling to conduct themselves consistent with the relationship they petition the law to recognize, they have no relationship deserving of protection. In the present case, physical control is not the real issue. In fact, merely focusing on physical control confuses analysis. For instance, appellants clearly exercised physical control over W.W. when they refused to allow appellee to have her daughter following the disagreement over unpaid bills allegedly owed by the grandmother-appellant. However, despite physical control, the grandmother acknowledged that she did not rely on the adoption decree in seeking to regain control of W.W. Instead, the grandmother continued to acknowledge that appellee is W.W.’s mother, as stated in the majority opinion. Appellants should have engaged in conduct consistent with the meaning of custody within the adoption context. At a minimum, this means that they should have treated W.W. as their child, not their granddaughter. They should have insisted that others, including appellee, treat W.W. as their child. Appellants should have resisted any efforts by appellee to dispute a parent-child relationship between themselves and W.W., no matter where appellee resided and with whom. If appellants had insisted, for instance, that appellee and the rest of the relevant community treat W.W. as her sister following the adoption decree, that course of conduct would have been consistent with a finding that appellants had taken custody of W.W. even with appellee remaining in the residence. Instead, as stated supra, appellants treated W.W. as their granddaughter and appellee as W.W.’s mother. For all practical purposes insofar as their dealings with W.W. were concerned, they treated the adoption proceeding as a fiction, if not a farce. Consequently, they forfeit the protection afforded by the statutory limitations period contained in our adoption statute, which was plainly enacted to create finality and stability to the new parent-child relationship. By refusing to validate the kind of conduct engaged in by appellants in this case, our decision preserves the integrity of our adoption statute. Finally, I am unimpressed by the argument that appellee was defrauded by appellants. As far as I can establish from reviewing the. record, appellee knowingly consented to the ruse whereby appellants would appear to adopt W.W. in order to defeat the child custody and visitation rights of the child’s father after their marriage failed. Appellee was disappointed by appellants, but they did not defraud her. Even her sister told her that the adoption ruse was a mistake. I join the decision to affirm the trial court because appellants did not take custody within the meaning of the adoption context so as to consummate the decree they sought. Had they done so, the parent-child relationship between appellee and W.W. would have been objectively abolished and replaced by a new relationship in which appellants would be parents, W.W. would be their child, and appellee would be the sister of W.W., no matter where the child lived or who owed whatever to whom.