Court Opinion

ID: 9370361
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-13 09:09:59.685162+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:20.994092
License: Public Domain

In the
                  Court of Appeals
          Second Appellate District of Texas
                   at Fort Worth
                ___________________________

                     No. 02-21-00087-CR
                ___________________________

MARIAN MOLIKA CHAMBERS A/K/A MARIAN CHAMBERS, Appellant

                                V.

                     THE STATE OF TEXAS

             On Appeal from the 432nd District Court
                    Tarrant County, Texas
                  Trial Court No. 1521948D

            Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ.
          Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Sudderth
                           MEMORANDUM OPINION

       Appellant Marian Molika Chambers attempts to appeal her first-degree felony

conviction for injury to an elderly individual. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.04(a)(1),

(e). But she waived her right to appeal as part of her charge bargain with the State.

       Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 25.2 provides that, “[i]n a plea bargain

case[,] . . . a defendant may appeal only: (A) those matters that were raised by written

motion filed and ruled on before trial, (B) after getting the trial court’s permission to

appeal, or (C) where the specific appeal is expressly authorized by statute.” Tex. R.

App. P. 25.2(a)(2); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 44.02. The trial court must file

a certification of the defendant’s right to appeal, clarifying whether the case involves a

plea bargain and whether the defendant has a right to appeal. See Tex. R. App. P.

25.2(a)(2), (d).

       Here, Chambers pleaded guilty to Count Two of her indictment—injury to an

elderly individual—in exchange for the State’s agreement to waive Count One—

murder.1 See Tex. Penal Code Ann. §§ 19.02, 22.04. Such an exchange is a charge

bargain, which qualifies as a plea bargain under Rule 25.2. See Kennedy v. State, 297

S.W.3d 338, 342 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“Rule 25.2(a)(2) applies to charge-bargain

cases.”); Mayfield v. State, No. 02-19-00343-CR, 2019 WL 6335421, at *2 (Tex. App.—

       1
        Chambers’s written plea admonishments state that the plea recommendation
was “Open to the Court – waive [C]ount 1,” and the trial court’s judgment also
reflects the terms of the plea bargain as “OPEN TO THE COURT – WAIVE
COUNT 1.”

                                            2
Fort Worth Nov. 27, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(holding that State’s agreement to drop count one in exchange for defendant’s guilty

plea to count two qualified as a charge bargain). The trial court entered judgment in

accordance with the terms of Chambers’s charge bargain, and it signed an amended

certification confirming that this “is a plea-bargain case, and the defendant has NO

right of appeal.”2 See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d).

       Because a criminal appeal “must be dismissed if a certification that shows the

defendant has the right of appeal has not been made part of the record,” Tex. R. App.

P. 25.2(d), we warned Chambers that we could dismiss her appeal unless she showed

grounds for continuing it.      See Tex. R. App. P. 44.3.     Chambers responded by

indicating that, despite her charge bargain, “the question of a free and voluntary

judicial confession by Appellant is a viable fundamental [appellate] issue.”3 But a plea-

bargaining defendant cannot appeal the voluntariness of her plea absent a trial court’s

permission. Gray v. State, No. 02-17-00271-CR, 2017 WL 4296449, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Sept. 28, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(dismissing appeal and reiterating that “[a]bsent the trial court’s permission, appealing

       2
        The trial court initially signed a certification indicating that Chambers had a
right to appeal. But later, while the appeal was pending, the trial court supplemented
the record with an amended certification indicating that Chambers did not have a
right to appeal. Chambers was mailed multiple copies of the amended certification.
       3
        In her response, Chambers requested additional time to file a supplemental
brief on the jurisdictional issue. We granted her request, but Chambers failed to file a
supplemental brief.

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the voluntariness of a defendant’s plea is prohibited”); see Cooper v. State, 45 S.W.3d 77,

78–83 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (discussing 1977 amendment to Tex. Code Crim. Proc.

Ann. art. 44.02 and holding that a plea-bargaining defendant may not appeal the

voluntariness of her plea absent permission); cf. Griffin v. State, 145 S.W.3d 645, 648

(Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (discussing Cooper and extending logic to appeals of

jurisdictional defects). And the trial court’s amended certification reflects no such

permission.

      Accordingly, we dismiss Chambers’s appeal for want of jurisdiction. Tex. R.

App. P. 25.2(d), 43.2(f); see Pickett v. State, No. 02-22-00079-CR, 2022 WL 4272864, at

*1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Sept. 15, 2022, no pet.) (per curiam) (mem. op.)

(dismissing appeal for want of jurisdiction in charge-bargain case); Mayfield, 2019 WL

6335421, at *2 (similar).

                                                       /s/ Bonnie Sudderth

                                                       Bonnie Sudderth
                                                       Chief Justice

Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)

Delivered: February 9, 2023

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