Court Opinion

ID: 9782669
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 19:04:29.230742+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:02.604335
License: Public Domain

Filed 8/30/23 P. v. Pintor CA4/3

                      NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                                 DIVISION THREE

 THE PEOPLE,

      Plaintiff and Respondent,                                        G062067

           v.                                                          (Super. Ct. No. 10NF1124)

 RAFAEL PINTOR,                                                        OPINION

      Defendant and Appellant.

                   Appeal from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
David A. Hoffer, Judge. Affirmed.
                   Siri Shetty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
                   No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                             *               *               *
              A jury convicted defendant Rafael Pintor of two counts of attempted
murder with premeditation and deliberation (Pen. Code, §§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 2
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and 3) and active participation in a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (a); count 4).
The jury also found true allegations that counts 2 and 3 were committed for the benefit of
or to promote a criminal street gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)) and defendant vicariously
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury to promote, further, and assist in
criminal conduct by gang members with regard to count 2 (§§ 12022.53, subds. (d),
(e)(1), 186.22, subd. (b)). Defendant admitted a prior serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (a)(1)) and prior strike conviction (§§ 667, subds. (d), (e)(1), 1170.12, subds. (b),
(c)(1)).
              The court sentenced defendant to an indeterminate term of 39 years to life,
plus a determinate term of five years for the prior serious felony. In 2015, another panel
of this court affirmed a modified judgment. (People v. Pintor (Sept. 16, 2011, G049653)
[nonpub. opn.].)
              In August 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing under former
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section 1170.95 (now § 1172.6). The trial court summarily denied defendant’s petition
for resentencing. Defendant timely filed a notice of appeal. His appointed counsel
advised the court he was unable to find an issue to argue on defendant’s behalf and
requests that we review the entire record. (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436.)
Consistent with Anders v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 738, appointed counsel also
identified the following issue to assist in our independent review: whether the trial court
1
              All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
              The court granted the prosecution’s motion to dismiss one count of
conspiracy to commit murder (§ 182, subd. (a)(1), 187, subd. (a); count 1). To avoid any
confusion, we refer to the counts as they were alleged and numbered in the information.
3
             Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered section 1172.6,
with no change in text (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10).

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prejudicially erred by determining defendant was ineligible for resentencing relief as a
matter of law. Defendant was given the opportunity to file written argument on his own
behalf, but he has not done so. Although defendant has not filed a supplemental brief, we
exercise our discretion to conduct an independent review of the record and appointed
counsel’s Wende brief. (People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 232.)
              We have examined the entire record and have not found an arguable issue
on appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the postjudgment order.

                                          FACTS
              In August 2022, defendant filed a petition for resentencing. In his petition,
defendant averred: “1. A complaint, information, or indictment was filed against me that
allowed the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony murder, murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine or other theory under which malice is
imputed to a person based solely on that person’s participation in a crime, or attempted
murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine. [Citation.] [¶] 2. I was
convicted of murder, attempted murder, or manslaughter following a trial or I accepted a
plea offer in lieu of a trial at which I could have been convicted of murder or attempted
murder. [Citation.] [¶] 3. I could not presently be convicted of murder or attempted
murder because of changes made to Penal Code §§ 188 and 189, effective January 1,
2019.”
              The court appointed counsel for defendant, received additional briefing
from the prosecution, and conducted a prima facie hearing. The court then denied
defendant’s petition for resentencing. The court held the jury instructions and verdict
forms established defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law. The court noted
defendant “presented a self-defense theory at trial based on the jury’s receipt of
CALCRIM [No.] 505.” The court also indicated the jury received CALCRIM No. 625
regarding voluntary intoxication but emphasized the jury did not receive any instructions

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regarding vicarious liability, conspiracy, or natural and probable consequences. Instead,
the jury was given instructions pertaining to aiding and abetting liability (CALCRIM
Nos. 400, 401) and attempted murder (CALCRIM Nos. 600, 601) “which required that
the jury find [defendant] acted with intent to kill in order to convict him of attempted
murder as either the direct perpetrator or direct aider and abettor.” The court concluded,
“The jury’s guilty verdict thus necessarily establishes that it found [defendant] acted with
specific intent to kill when he committed the attempted murders.”

                                       DISCUSSION
              Relief under section 1172.6 is restricted to those convicted of murder
“under a theory of felony murder, murder under the natural and probable consequences
doctrine or other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that
person’s participation in a crime . . . .” (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(1).) Effective January 1,
2022, Senate Bill No. 775 amended section 1172.6 to expand resentencing eligibility to
persons convicted of attempted murder. (Stats. 2021, ch. 551, § 2.) In determining
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief under section 1172.6, the
trial court may rely on the record of conviction. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952,
970-971.) The record of conviction includes the court’s own documents, including “the
trial evidence, the jury instructions, and closing arguments of counsel.” (People v.
Lopez (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 1, 13.) As our Supreme Court explained, “The record of
conviction will necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry . . . allowing the
court to distinguish petitions with potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.”
(Lewis, at p. 971.)
              Here, defendant’s petition lacks merit because the record of conviction
establishes he was not convicted of attempted murder under a natural and probable
consequences theory. The information alleges defendant “did unlawfully, and with the
specific intent to kill, attempt to murder” the victims. It further alleges defendant did so

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“willfully, deliberately and with premeditation.” There is no mention of “natural and
probable consequences.” The jury also was never instructed on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine. Instead, the jury received instructions pertaining to aiding and
abetting liability (CALCRIM Nos. 400 & 401). The court did not instruct on aiding and
abetting based upon natural and probable consequences (CALCRIM Nos. 402 & 403).
The jury was further instructed it could find the deliberation and premeditation allegation
on the attempted murder counts true if defendant “intended to kill,” “carefully weighed
the considerations for and against [his] choice and, knowing the consequences, decided to
kill,” and “decided to kill before acting.” (CALCRIM No. 601.) The record accordingly
demonstrates defendant was not convicted based upon the natural and probable
consequences theory.

                                      DISPOSITION
              The postjudgment order is affirmed.

                                                 SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’LEARY, P. J.

MOORE, J.

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