Court Opinion

ID: 9927625
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-29 17:01:42.209176+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:53.743798
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                           FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JAN 29 2024
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                           FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

CHARLES HAYES,                                  No.    23-15403

                Plaintiff-Appellant,            D.C. No.
                                                2:20-cv-02048-KJD-BNW
 v.

LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE  MEMORANDUM*
DEPARTMENT; DORIS HEARRINGTON;
JENNIFER WOOD,

                Defendants-Appellees,

and

JOSEPH LOMBARDO,

                Defendant.

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                            for the District of Nevada
                 Kent J. Dawson, Senior District Judge, Presiding

                           Submitted January 12, 2024**
                              Pasadena, California

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
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Before: BOGGS,*** RAWLINSON, and H.A. THOMAS, Circuit Judges.

         Appellant Charles Rico Hayes appeals the district court’s grant of summary

judgment to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (“LVMPD”) and two

of its employees, Doris Hearrington, and Jennifer Wood, on his 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 claims for (i) false arrest and false detention (against LVMPD, Hearrington

and Wood), (ii) Monell1 liability (against LVMPD), (iii) negligence (against

LVMPD, Hearrington, and Wood), and (iv) intentional infliction of emotional

distress (against LVMPD, Hearrington, and Wood). We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291. We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,

S.R. Nehad v. Browder, 929 F.3d 1125, 1132 (9th Cir. 2019), and may affirm on

any ground finding support in the record, M & T Bank v. SFR Invs. Pool 1, LLC,

963 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 2020). We affirm.2

         1. To establish a due process claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 predicated on

false arrest and detention due to mistaken identity, a plaintiff must show that the

defendant did not provide the “minimum due process appropriate to the

circumstances to ensure that his liberty was not arbitrarily abrogated.” Garcia v.

         ***
            The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
1
    Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
2
    Because the parties are familiar with the facts, we do not recount them here.
                                             2
Cnty. of Riverside, 817 F.3d 635, 638, 642 (9th Cir. 2016). Circumstances demand

further investigation where there are “significant differences between the arrestee

and the true warrant subject” alongside “repeated protests of innocence.” Id at 640.

      Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Hayes, the record shows that

Hearrington and Wood conducted a sufficient, good faith investigation into

Hayes’s identity. Hearrington emailed the Kern County Sheriff’s Office after

Hayes’s arrest to request verification that he was the correct subject and requested

photo comparisons. As to Wood, Hayes fails to show that her minimal role in the

events surrounding his detention and extradition actually or proximately caused

those events. Hayes was arrested in possession of Robinson’s California driver’s

license, which was the only form of identification he was carrying at that time.

Many of Hayes’s physical characteristics matched the fugitive warrant, and Hayes

did not object to his misidentification in court. Under these circumstances, Hayes

has failed to demonstrate that Hearrington’s and Wood’s actions were not taken in

good faith or that he was deprived of a constitutional right. And for the same

reason, LVMPD cannot be held liable under a Monell theory of liability. Mabe v.

San Bernardino Cnty., Dep’t of Pub. Soc. Servs., 237 F.3d 1101, 1110–11 (9th Cir.

2001).

      2. Under Nevada law, a negligence claim requires a showing that: (1) the

defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached that duty,

                                          3
(3) the breach was the legal cause of the plaintiff’s injuries, and (4) the plaintiff

suffered damages. DeBoer v. Sr. Bridges of Sparks Fam. Hosp., Inc., 128 Nev.

406, 412 (2012); see also Lawson v. Grubhub, Inc., 13 F.4th 908, 913 (9th Cir.

2021) (“In cases where state law applies, federal courts must ‘ascertain from all the

available data what the state law is and apply it.’”). The parties agree that officials

“have a duty to further reasonably investigate an arrestee’s identity when faced

with repeated complaints of innocence and facts objectively showing

dissimilarities between the detainee and wanted suspect.” Garcia, 817 F.3d at 642.

      Hayes’s negligence claims fail for the reasons stated above. There is no

evidence to suggest that the investigative techniques that Hearrington and Wood

undertook were unreasonable, or that they caused Hayes’s extradition and

detention. “Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at

whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person.” Baker

v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 (1979).

      3. A plaintiff claiming intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”)

must show that the defendant engaged in “extreme and outrageous conduct with

either the intention of, or reckless disregard for, causing emotional distress.”

Dillard Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Beckwith, 115 Nev. 372, 378 (1999). “Extreme and

outrageous conduct” is defined as “that which is outside all possible bounds of

decency” and is regarded as “utterly intolerable in a civilized community.”

                                            4
Maduike v. Agency Rent-A-Car, 114 Nev. 1, 4 (1998). Because Hearrington and

Wood made good faith efforts to investigate Hayes’s identity, their conduct cannot

be characterized as an “extreme abuse” of their positions. See Restatement

(Second) of Torts § 46 (1965) (describing standard for IIED claims); see also

Selsnick v. Horton, 96 Nev. 944, 946 (1980); Olivero v. Lowe, 116 Nev. 395, 400

(2000) (citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 as a relevant authority for

IIED claim).

      AFFIRMED.

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