Court Opinion

ID: 9848110
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:13:05.279828+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:02.131590
License: Public Domain

RUSSELL, J.,
dissenting.
In my view, this case is controlled by Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188 (1966). The majority opinion labors diligently to distinguish that case, but it labors in vain.
Watkins was concerned with the enforcement of a Florida judgment in the Georgia courts. Although the Florida judgment was enforceable in Florida for 20 years, Georgia statutes provided that the enforcement of foreign judgments was barred after five years, domestic judgments after ten years. When the Florida creditor brought suit in a Georgia court five years and one day after the judgment had been rendered, his cause of action was held barred by Georgia law.
The Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion (Justice Douglas dissenting without opinion), noted that the creditor’s claim was “simply that Georgia has drawn an impermissible distinction between foreign and domestic judgments. [The creditor] argues that the statute is understandable solely as a reflection of Georgia’s desire to handicap out-of-state creditors.” Id. at 189. The Court gave no credence whatever to the distinction the majority opinion seeks to draw here: that foreign creditors and domestic creditors “are inherently different” and “are not similarly situated.” Rather, the Supreme Court, in Watkins, stated flatly: “If [the creditor’s] analysis of the purpose and effect of the statute were correct, we might well agree that it violates the Federal Constitution. For the decisions of this Court which [the debtor] relies upon do not justify the discriminatory application of a statute of limitations to foreign actions.” Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
The Court concluded, in Watkins, that the Georgia statute, as interpreted by the courts of Georgia over a period of a century, did not have a discriminatory effect. That conclusion was based on *175one factor alone: the Georgia cases held that the date which began the running of the five-year limitation period was not the date of rendition of the original foreign judgment, but rather, the date of its latest revival in the foreign state. Therefore, the Florida creditor need only return to Florida, revive his judgment, and bring a new action in Georgia within five years thereafter. As long as the enforceability of the foreign judgment could be maintained by periodic revivals, an action could be brought in Georgia to enforce it. For that reason alone, the Supreme Court upheld the Georgia statute. The message could hardly be more clear, but if further amplification is needed, the Court added that if the law of the rendering state did not provide for revival “we would be faced with a different case.” Id. at 191, note 4.
We, however, are not free to adopt an interpretation of our statute similar to that which the Georgia courts gave to theirs. Code § 8.01-252 expressly dates the beginning of the ten-year limitation period from the date the foreign judgment was “rendered.” Even if we were to look to the law of Florida for a determination whether Mrs. Carter’s judgment in this case was “rendered” in 1964 or 1977, we would reach the same result because Florida treats a revival as a mere continuation of the original action, not as a new judgment. Massey v. Pineapple Orange Co., 87 Fla. 374, 377, 100 So. 170, 171 (1924). Therefore, our situation is the reverse of that in Watkins: here, renewal makes no difference; a foreign judgment creditor is barred when a domestic creditor would not be barred. The conclusion is inescapable that our statute of limitations, whatever its purpose, has the effect of discriminating against foreign judgment creditors.
Consideration of the purpose of the statute, in the light of present-day reality, should give us no more comfort than consideration of its effect. The statute has been a part of our law, in substantially similar form, since 1836. No doubt it served a valid legislative purpose when it was adopted. In that period, travel was slow, difficult, and often dangerous. Communication was uncertain and expensive. Discovery was virtually unavailable. In many areas of the country, court records were far less permanent, secure, and accessible than they are today. Accordingly, a defendant sued on a foreign judgment who wished to defend on the ground that the foreign court had no jurisdiction over his person, or over the subject matter, faced formidable obstacles in obtaining evidence for his defense. That argument is still advanced in defense of a statu*176tory disparity between foreign and domestic judgment creditors, but it has little persuasive force in view of the rapid travel and communications facilities and the simple discovery provisions which exist today. The Supreme Court most assuredly gave no weight to any such argument in Watkins.
Because neither the effect nor the purpose of Code § 8.01-252 can withstand analysis in light of the Equal Protection Clause, I would reverse.
POFF and THOMAS, JJ., join in dissent.