Court Opinion

ID: 9402832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-17 06:10:24.21355+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:02.842373
License: Public Domain

Opinion filed June 15, 2023

                                       In The

        Eleventh Court of Appeals
                                    __________

                              No. 11-22-00321-CV
                                  __________

    GUARDIANSHIP OF SHEILA MCCONNELL WORKMAN,
             AN INCAPACITATED PERSON

                      On Appeal from the 90th District Court
                             Stephens County, Texas
                         Trial Court Cause No. CV33058

                                   OPINION
      Appellant, Mike Reilly, prepared and sent a letter to Phyllis Copeland and
Connie Wooten concerning the pending sale of their sister Sheila’s interest in a
family property. Reilly’s letter stated that the contract to sell Sheila’s interest was
“likely invalid” and that Sheila’s husband “was possibly, fraudulently induced” to
sign the agreement on her behalf. After they received the letter, Phyllis and Connie
filed a petition seeking a guardianship over Sheila. They also secured a temporary
restraining order, which halted the sale. Appellee, Texas Ranch Farm & Minerals,
LLC, the buyer, intervened in the guardianship proceeding and asserted causes of
action against Reilly for tortious interference with a contract and civil conspiracy.
      This appeal concerns the trial court’s denial of Reilly’s motion to dismiss
under the Texas Citizens’ Participation Act (the TCPA). TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
CODE ANN. § 27.001–.013 (West 2020 & Supp. 2022). In his motion, and on appeal,
Reilly maintains that the causes of action asserted by Texas Ranch intrude on his
right to encourage his fellow citizens to seek judicial review of civil disputes and
that Texas Ranch has failed to meet its prima facia burden as to each asserted cause
of action, as required by the TCPA.
      We hold that the causes of action asserted against Reilly by Texas Ranch
implicate Reilly’s right to petition under the TCPA. However, we also conclude that
Texas Ranch met its prima facie burden on its cause of action for tortious
interference with a contract. Therefore, we (1) affirm the trial court’s order denying
Reilly’s motion to dismiss in connection with Texas Ranch’s cause of action for
tortious interference with a contract but (2) reverse the trial court’s order denying
Reilly’s motion to dismiss with respect to Texas Ranch’s cause of action for civil
conspiracy, and we remand that claim to the trial court for a determination of Reilly’s
claims for attorneys’ fees and sanctions.
                            I. Factual Background
      Phyllis and Connie each own an undivided one-third interest in a 577-acre
property near Possum Kingdom Lake. The remaining one-third interest is owned by
the estate of Sheila McConnell Workman; Sheila passed away in late 2022. In
addition to their respective one-third interests, Connie, Phyllis, and the estate of
Sheila own a preferential option to purchase each other’s interests.

                                            2
        Prior to her death, Sheila was mentally and physically disabled. As such, her
affairs were managed by Edd Workman, her husband, under a durable power of
attorney.
        In February 2022, Edd entered into a Farm and Ranch Contract and agreed to
sell Sheila’s interest to Texas Ranch. 1 Shortly after Edd signed the agreement, Reilly
claims that he was approached by Melinda Harvey, who was Edd and Sheila’s
daughter. Because Melinda was concerned that Texas Ranch may have taken
advantage of Edd in negotiating the sale, she asked Reilly—a real estate agent—for
advice. Reilly spoke with Edd and reviewed several documents associated with the
transaction. Reilly then offered to arrange for the Workmans to meet and discuss
the situation with an attorney, Tim Mendolia. In fact, Reilly paid Mendolia an initial
retainer on their behalf.
        Reilly also prepared and sent a letter to Phyllis and Connie. Reilly’s letter
began by informing the sisters that Edd had signed a “purported contract” to sell
Sheila’s interest. The letter placed the word “contract” in scare quotes and stated
that the agreement was “likely invalid.” It further stated that Edd “was possibly,
fraudulently induced” to sign the contract.
        Reilly’s letter stated that he was trying to help Edd and Sheila based on his
conviction that his father—who employed Edd as a foreman on a family property in
the 1960s—would have done the same thing. Toward that end, the letter indicated
that Reilly had retained Mendolia to represent Edd and Sheila and that Mendolia
would formally notify them of their right to exercise their purchase options. The

        1
         In June 2021, Edd attempted to transfer Sheila’s interest in the property to himself under a Gift
Special Warranty Deed. Phyllis and Connie maintain that this transfer was ineffective, because the power
of attorney did not authorize Edd to make gifts. See TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 751.032 (West 2020).
However, regardless of whether the Gift Special Warranty Deed was valid, the Farm and Ranch Contract
also purports to sell any interest that Edd owned in the property.
                                                      3
letter concluded with a request for a meeting with Phyllis and Connie to “discuss
various options to move forward.”
        The record contains no direct evidence that Reilly subsequently met with
Phyllis and Connie as the letter suggested, and Reilly specifically denies that such a
meeting took place. However, on April 12, 2022, Phyllis and Connie filed an
application to have Phyllis appointed as guardian over Sheila, alleging that Edd was
not providing appropriate care for Sheila. In their petition, Phyllis and Connie point
to Reilly’s letter as evidence of Sheila’s inability to care for herself; a copy of the
letter was attached to their application. Shortly after the guardianship application
was filed, the trial court signed a temporary restraining order, which prohibited Edd
from undertaking any actions to transfer or dispose of Sheila’s real or personal
property. 2 Thereafter, Edd, Connie, and Phyllis entered into a letter agreement to
keep the restraining order in effect until an Attorney Ad Litem had investigated the
matters in dispute.
        Texas Ranch intervened in the guardianship proceeding and filed a third-party
action against Reilly, Melinda, and James A. Thompkins, who is alleged to be
Melinda’s boyfriend. The intervention asserts causes of action against Reilly for
tortious interference with a contract and civil conspiracy.
                                            II. Analysis
        Reilly filed this appeal after the trial court denied his TCPA motion to
dismiss. 3 One purpose of the TCPA is to protect citizens from retaliatory lawsuits
that are meant to intimidate or silence them on matters of public concern. Dallas

        2
         A copy of the temporary restraining order was included in the appendix to Reilly’s brief, but it
does not appear in the clerk’s record. The parties do not dispute its general nature and effect.

        3
         An interlocutory appeal may be taken from the denial of a motion to dismiss under the TCPA.
See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 51.014(12).
                                                  4
Morning News, Inc. v. Hall, 579 S.W.3d 370, 376 (Tex. 2019); In re Lipsky, 460
S.W.3d 579, 584 (Tex. 2015) (orig. proceeding). The Legislature enacted the TCPA
“to safeguard ‘the constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate
freely, and otherwise participate in government to the maximum extent permitted by
law’” while, at the same time, protecting a person’s right “to file meritorious lawsuits
for demonstrable injury.” Kinder Morgan SACROC, LP v. Scurry Cnty., 622 S.W.3d
845, 847 (Tex. 2021) (quoting CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.002).
      To effectuate this dual purpose, the TCPA employs a three-step process to
determine whether a lawsuit or claim is subject to dismissal. Montelongo v. Abrea,
622 S.W.3d 290, 296 (Tex. 2021). First, the movant must demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that a legal action is based on, or in response to, the
movant’s exercise of one of three rights protected by the statute: (1) the right of free
speech, (2) the right to petition, or (3) the right of association. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§§ 27.003(a), .005(b); see also Montelongo, 622 S.W.3d at 296. Next, if the movant
makes this showing, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to establish by “clear and
specific evidence” a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in
question. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(c); Montelongo, 622 S.W.3d at 296. Finally,
even if the nonmovant meets that burden, the trial court is required to dismiss the
legal action if the movant establishes an affirmative defense or other grounds on
which the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.005(d).
      Reilly raises two issues, in which he asserts that the trial court’s rulings did
not comply with the first two steps of the process. We review de novo the trial
court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. Rossa v. Mahaffey, 594 S.W.3d 618, 624
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, no pet.). Further, whether the TCPA applies to a

                                           5
particular claim is a question of statutory construction that we also review de novo.
Youngkin v. Hines, 546 S.W.3d 675, 680 (Tex. 2018).
      1. Step One: Does the TCPA Apply?
      To invoke the protections of the TCPA, Reilly must show that the claims
asserted by Texas Ranch are “based on or in response to” his exercise of a protected
right. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.003(a). In assessing whether a protected right is at
issue, we consider the pleadings and affidavits that state the facts on which
liability is based to determine the true nature of the dispute. See CIV. PRAC. &
REM. § 27.006(a); David H. Arrington Oil & Gas Operating, LLC v. Wilshusen, 630
S.W.3d 184, 190 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2020, pet. denied); see also Clayton
Mountain, LLC v. Ruff, No. 11-20-00034-CV, 2021 WL 3414754, at *5 (Tex.
App.—Eastland Aug. 5, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.). The plaintiff’s pleading is the
“best and all-sufficient evidence of the nature of the action.” Hersh v. Tatum, 526
S.W.3d 462, 467 (Tex. 2017) (quoting Stockyards Nat’l Bank v. Maples, 95 S.W.2d
1300, 1302 (Tex. 1936)); Wilshusen, 630 S.W.3d at 190. Therefore, we determine
the TCPA’s applicability based on a holistic review of the pleadings. Adams v.
Starside Custom Builders, LLC, 547 S.W.3d 890, 897 (Tex. 2018).
      In this case, Reilly maintains that the facts alleged by Texas Ranch are based
on his protected “right to petition.” Under the TCPA, the right to petition includes,
among other things, “a communication that is reasonably likely to encourage
consideration or review of an issue by a . . . judicial . . . body.” CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.001(4)(C) (emphasis added). As such, we must ascertain whether Reilly’s
alleged communications with the sisters “encouraged” litigation and judicial
consideration or review of a disputed issue.
      Texas Ranch’s Second Amended Petition in Intervention alleges the following
regarding such communications:

                                          6
      • Reilly “intentionally joined in the effort to prevent the sale of the Property”
        to Texas Ranch.
      • Reilly “communicated with [Phyllis and Connie] with the intent to prevent
        the sale.”
      • Reilly “reported” to Phyllis and Connie that the contract was invalid, and
        that Edd “had been possibly, fraudulently induced” to sign the contract.
      • Based on his alleged actions, “it is obvious that Mr. Reilly . . . intended to
        stop the sale . . . and conspired . . . to prevent the sale.”
      • Reilly caused “actions to be taken based, in part, on [his] statements.”
      • Reilly “knew that [his statements] would interfere” with Texas Ranch’s
        rights, “just as he intended when he made the statements.”
When read as a whole, Texas Ranch’s pleadings suggest that Reilly attempted to
convince Phyllis and Connie to proceed with litigation, which would necessarily
invoke judicial consideration or review of the parties’ disputes, that would interfere
with the parties’ performance of the contract. Allegations of such intentionally
calculated statements are more than sufficient to satisfy the TCPA’s requirement for
communications that are “reasonably likely to encourage consideration or review of
an issue” by a judicial body. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(4)(C).
      Texas Ranch argues that Reilly’s alleged communication with Phyllis and
Connie is not a protected right under the TCPA because the sale of Sheila’s interest
in the property is a private transaction between private parties, not an issue of public
concern. However, the TCPA’s definition of “right to petition” that is central to the
disposition of this appeal does not explicitly require that the communication at issue
involve a matter of public concern. Despite this, Texas Ranch also maintains that
the purposes and legislative history of the TCPA mandate a showing of a public
concern in this instance.
      In support of its position, Texas Ranch relies on Jardin v. Marklund, 431
S.W.3d 765 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, no pet.), overuled on other
                                           7
grounds, Houston Tennis Ass’n, Inc. v. Thibodeaux, 602 S.W.3d 712, 719 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.). The court’s holding in Jardin did not
ultimately depend on a reading of the TCPA that a public concern requirement
should be imposed on all communications thereunder. See 431 S.W.3d at 773
(concluding that the TCPA was inapplicable because the claims asserted were not
“based on, relate[d] to, or . . . in response” to the communications of the movant, but
were rather based on the claims of the company where the movant served as an
officer) (quoting former CIV. PRAC & REM. § 27.005(b)). Nevertheless, Jardin
includes an extensive discussion of the Act’s purposes, and the court there appears
to conclude that a public concern requirement should always be associated with the
TCPA’s definitions of the three categories of protected rights. Id. at 772–73.
      We are not persuaded that the TCPA imposes a public concern requirement
on every claim that is brought under the statute, particularly in light of recent
statutory amendments. Since its inception in 2011, the TCPA has served to protect
three categories of rights: (1) the right of association, (2) the right of free speech,
and (3) the right to petition. Act of May 21, 2011, 82nd Leg., R.S., ch. 341, § 2,
sec. 27.005(b), (b)(1), 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws 961, 963 (amended 2013, 2019) (current
version at CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.005(b), (b)(1)). From the outset, the definition
of the right to free speech has required a “connection with a matter of public
concern.” Id., sec. 27.001(3), 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws at 961 (amended 2013, 2019)
(current version at CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001(3)). However, the “right of
association” definition and most of the “right to petition” definitions did not contain
such a requirement or language. Id., sec. 27.001(2), (4), 2011 Tex. Gen. Laws at
961 (current versions at CIV. PRAC. & REM. §§ 27.001(2), (4)).
      Following the enactment of the TCPA, courts were tasked with deciding
whether the right of association should include a public concern requirement, which

                                          8
resulted in conflicting decisions among the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Kawcak v.
Antero Res. Corp., 582 S.W.3d 566, 585 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2019, pet. denied)
(holding that the “common interest” component of the right of association requires
a public interest but recognizing that its holdings “arguably conflict with several
opinions from the Austin Court of Appeals”); Grant v. Pivot Tech. Sols., Ltd., 556
S.W.3d 865, 879 (Tex. App.—Austin 2018, pet. denied) (applying the right of
association to communications between defendants who joined together to pursue a
common interest in a private business matter).         Subsequently, the legislature
amended the “right of association” definition. Act of May 17, 2019, 86th Leg., R.S.,
ch. 378, § 1, 2019 Tex. Gen. Laws 684 (amending CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.001).
The amended definition provides that the pursuit of “common interests” in
connection with the right of association must relate to “a governmental proceeding
or a matter of public concern.” Id. Notably, however, the 2019 amendments did not
change any of the “right to petition” definitions, including the definition that is at
issue in this case. Id.
      When interpreting a statute, we “presume that the Legislature chooses a
statute’s language with care, including each word chosen for a purpose, while
purposefully omitting words not chosen.” TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. v. Combs,
340 S.W.3d 432, 439 (Tex. 2011). This principle is particularly applicable when, as
here, the Legislature has twice visited a dilemma: once to enact a statute and once to
amend it.     The Legislature clearly knows how and when a public concern
requirement should be incorporated into the definition of a TCPA right, and it did
not do so in connection with the definition of “right to petition” in the 2011 Act. The
Legislature also did not change the “right to petition” definition when it amended
the TCPA in 2019, even though the same amendments explicitly added a “public
concern” requirement to the right of association definition.

                                          9
        Our interpretation of subpart (4)(C) is consistent with the TCPA’s stated
purpose to encourage and safeguard the right to petition. CIV. PRAC. & REM.
§ 27.002. 4 The right to petition is not limited to litigation in the public sphere. The
right to petition the government for redress—even in matters of disputes that are
completely private in nature—is constitutionally protected under the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri,
564 U.S. 379, 394 (2011) (recognizing that “[t]he Petition Clause undoubtedly does
have force and application in the context of a personal grievance addressed to the
government”); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 531 (1945) (“The grievances for
redress of which the right of petition was insured, and with it the right of assembly,
are not solely religious or political ones.”).                Likewise, the Texas constitution
guarantees open courts to every citizen and a remedy by due course of law for “an
injury done [them] in [their] lands, goods, person or reputation.” TEX. CONST. art. I,
§ 13. The right to petition is of such importance that the United States Supreme
Court has extended it even to communications that relate to the potential assertion
of rights. Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5
(1964) (“[T]he right of the workers . . . to advise [each other] concerning the need
for legal assistance . . . is an inseparable part of [their] constitutionally guaranteed

        4
          Section 27.002 provides that the stated purpose of the TCPA is to “encourage and safeguard the
constitutional rights of persons to petition, speak freely, associate freely, and otherwise participate in
government.” CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.002 (emphasis added). The Jardin court reasoned that the phrase
“otherwise participate in government” limits the scope of the TCPA to communications that are “analogous
to participating in government.” 431 S.W.3d at 771. It then equates “participation in government” with
the public interest, concluding that all communications under the TCPA must therefore involve a public
interest. Id. We find this reading of Section 27.002 to be overly restrictive. To be sure, the word
“otherwise” assumes that participation in government is an important component that is included within the
preceding list of rights. However, the phrase “otherwise participate in government” is preceded by the
word “and,” marking an intention to expand upon the enumeration of rights that precede it, rather than to
limit them.
                                                     10
right to assist and advise each other.”). A plain reading of subsection (4)(C)
demonstrates that the Legislature contemplated the right to communicate with
others’ legal rights when it extended the TCPA’s protection to communications that
encourage fellow citizens to seek judicial consideration of issues.
      Both Texas Ranch and the court in Jardin point to the legislative history of
the TCPA, arguing that—in implementing the Act—legislators were concerned
about threats to the free discussion of issues that were of public concern. 431 S.W.3d
at 772. From this history, Texas Ranch argues, and Jardin suggests, that a public
concern requirement should be imposed on all forms of communication under the
TCPA. Id. However, extrinsic aids such as legislative history commentary are only
applicable when the text of a statute is ambiguous. Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v.
Summers, 282 S.W.3d 433, 437 (Tex. 2009). Here, because the text of subsection
(4)(C) is abundantly clear, the text is also determinative of legislative intent. State v.
Shumake, 199 S.W.3d 279, 284 (Tex. 2006) (“when possible, we discern [legislative
intent] from the plain meaning of the words chosen”); see also Alex Sheshunoff
Mgmt. Servs., L.P. v. Johnson, 209 S.W.3d 644, 651–52 (Tex. 2006); Fitzgerald v.
Advanced Spine Fixation Sys., Inc., 996 S.W.2d 864, 866 (Tex. 1999) (“the words
[the Legislature] chooses should be the surest guide to legislative intent”).
      Texas Ranch also argues that the TCPA is inapplicable because Reilly’s letter
is analogous to a pre-suit demand, citing Levatino v. Apple Tree Café Touring, Inc.,
486 S.W.3d 724 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2016, pet. denied) and Chandni, Inc. v. Patel,
623 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019, pet. denied). According to Texas
Ranch, pre-suit demands are not protected communications under the TCPA.
However, Levatino and Chandni are distinguishable.
      In Levatino, a party that was sued after it sent a demand letter to the
nonmovant asserted that the letter they prepared was protected speech under

                                           11
subsection 4(C) because, as a consequence of the letter, they were “reasonably likely
to encourage consideration” of an issue by a judicial body. 486 S.W.3d at 729.
However, the Dallas Court of Appeals rejected this argument, holding that the letter
“sought to avoid judicial [consideration or] review of the dispute” rather than to
encourage it. Id.
       Although we do not construe Reilly’s letter to be a “demand letter” in a legal
sense, his letter does accuse a third-party of fraudulent conduct and seemingly urges
the sisters, and others, to pursue legal action against the purported bad actor.
Nevertheless, Reilly’s letter does not “demand” anything. Rather, the letter is
alleged to have been sent to the sisters based on Reilly’s intentional effort to spur
them on to pursue litigation. The intent of such a communication would logically
encourage one to seek and invoke the judicial process, not to avoid it. Chandni, on
the other hand, does not involve a claim that subsection 4(C) applies, and therefore
does not relate to Reilly’s TCPA assertion.
      Texas Ranch cannot have it both ways. Its central factual theory—that Reilly
interfered in the performance of the agreement when he prompted Phyllis and
Connie to take action—falls squarely within definition of the right to petition in
subsection 4(C). Contrary to Texas Ranch’s contention, a public concern component
is not required when the “right to petition” is raised under the TCPA. Further, by
sending his letter to the sisters, in addition to the overall gist of the letter, one could
also reasonably conclude that the “legal terminology” used by Reilly constitutes
communications that would likely encourage the consideration or review of this
dispute by a judicial body. And, in fact, it has.
      We hold that the protections of the TCPA extend to Reilly’s alleged
communication(s) that encouraged Phyllis and Connie to pursue claims in

                                            12
connection with the pending contract for the sale of Sheila’s interest in the property.
Accordingly, we sustain Appellant’s first issue on appeal.
      2. Step Two: Has Texas Ranch Established a Prima Facie Cause of Action
      Against Reilly?
      To satisfy its prima facie burden under the TCPA, Texas Ranch must produce
“clear and specific” evidence in support of each of its causes of action. CIV. PRAC.
& REM. § 27.005(c). The burden is not stringent. Under the Act, “prima facie” is
the “minimum quantum of evidence [that is] necessary to support a rational inference
that the allegation of fact is true.” USA Lending Grp., Inc. v. Winstead PC, No. 21-
0437, 2023 WL 3556701, at *2 (Tex. May 19, 2023) (citing S&S Emergency
Training Sols., Inc. v. Elliott, 564 S.W.3d 843, 847 (Tex. 2018) (quoting Lipsky, 460
S.W.3d at 590)). Evidence is considered to be “clear and specific” if it provides
sufficient detail to show the factual basis for the claim that is asserted. Id. (citing
Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590–91). Thus, Texas Ranch “‘must provide enough detail
to show the factual basis for its claim’ and must provide enough evidence ‘to support
a rational inference that the allegation of fact is true.’” Hall, 579 S.W.3d at 377
(quoting Lipsky, 460 S.W.3d at 590–91) (emphasis added); see also CIV. PRAC. &
REM. § 27.005(c); Stallion Oilfield Servs. Ltd. v. Gravity Oilfield Servs., LLC, 592
S.W.3d 205, 214 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. denied). In determining whether
a legal action should be dismissed, the TCPA requires that we consider the evidence
presented by the parties, as well as the pleadings. CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.006(a).
We are also mindful that a TCPA motion to dismiss is not a trial on the merits and
is not intended to be a substitute for either a trial or the summary judgment
proceeding established by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. Stallion, 592 S.W.3d
at 215.
      In its pleadings, Texas Ranch asserts causes of action against Reilly for
tortious interference with a contract and civil conspiracy. We hold that Texas Ranch
                                          13
has met its prima facie burden for the tortious interference with a contract cause of
action, but not for the civil conspiracy cause of action.
             A. Tortious Interference with a Contract
      The elements of a claim for tortious interference with a contract are (1) an
existing contract subject to interference, (2) a willful, intentional act of interference
with the contract, (3) that proximately caused the plaintiff’s injury, and (4) caused
actual damage or loss. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Fin. Review Servs., Inc., 29
S.W.3d 74, 77 (Tex. 2000); Davis v. Gulf Coast Auth., No. 11-19-00309-CV, 2020
WL 5491201, at *6 (Tex. App.—Eastland Sept. 11, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). For
this claim, Reilly asserts that Texas Ranch has failed to provide clear and specific
evidence of willful interference (element 2) and proximate cause (element 3).
      With respect to the element of willful interference, Reilly argues that because
the sisters were not a party to the contract, his communications with them do not
constitute interference, citing to our decision in Duncan v. Hindy, 590 S.W.3d 713
(Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. denied). In Duncan, we quoted the holding in
Funes v. Villatoro, 352 S.W.3d 200, 213 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011,
pet. denied) for the proposition that willful interference occurs when the defendant
induces “one of the contracting parties” to breach its obligations under an agreement.
590 S.W.3d at 726. Reilly argues that, in order to support a claim for tortious
interference with a contract, Duncan requires proof of direct communications
between the defendant and a party to the contract. We believe that this reading of
Duncan is overly restrictive.
       To be sure, Duncan and Funes are not the only cases that have expanded the
concept of willful interference by describing it as an inducement that is directed at a
party to the contract. See, e.g., Hart v. Manriquez Holdings, LLC, 661 S.W.3d 432,
439 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2023, no pet.); Reg’l Specialty Clinic, P.A. v.

                                           14
S.A. Randle & Assoc., P.C., 625 S.W.3d 895, 902 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2021, no pet.); W. Mktg., Inc. v. AEG Petroleum, LLC, 616 S.W.3d 903, 921 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2021), opinion modified on reh’g, 621 S.W.3d 88 (Tex. App.—
Amarillo 2021, pet. denied); All Am. Tel., Inc. v. USLD Commc’ns, Inc., 291 S.W.3d
518, 532 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2009, pet. denied). These formulations assume
the facts that most commonly give rise to tortious interference claims: a direct
communication between the alleged tortfeasor and the party being induced to breach.
         However, a cause of action for tortious interference with a contract
encompasses not only actual inducement of a breach of a contract but also other
invasions of contractual relations. Moore v. Bushman, 559 S.W.3d 645, 651 (Tex.
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.); Seelbach v. Clubb, 7 S.W.3d 749, 757
(Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, pet. denied); Bellefonte Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Brown, 663 S.W.2d 562, 573 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1983), aff’d in part,
rev’d in part on other grounds, 704 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1986). Thus, actionable
interference includes any act which retards, makes more difficult, or prevents
performance. Davis, 2020 WL 5491201, at *10; Moore, 559 S.W.3d at 551;
Seelbach, 7 S.W.3d at 757; Bellefonte, 663 S.W.2d at 573. For that reason, a direct
communication between Reilly and Edd is unnecessary to establish an actionable
claim.
         Reilly also maintains that his communications with Phyllis and Connie
encouraged them, at most, to consider exercising their options. He then argues that
his letter cannot be reasonably construed as encouraging them to pursue litigation
that would interfere with the performance of the contract, much less a request for a
guardianship. While this argument is compelling in connection with Texas Ranch’s
cause of action for civil conspiracy, we do not find it to be persuasive in connection
with the tortious interference with a contract cause of action.

                                          15
      Reilly’s letter to Phyllis and Connie does not merely mention their preferential
options to purchase the property. Instead, Reilly’s letter focuses on the contract and
he uses legal terminology to describe it—his letter states that he believes the contract
is “invalid” and that Edd was “possibly, fraudulently induced” to sign it, all the while
holding himself out as an individual with extensive experience in real estate
transactions. Further, Reilly suggests that he and the sisters should meet to “discuss
various options to move forward” (emphasis added). From this language, it could
be rationally inferred that Reilly was encouraging Phyllis and Connie to take action
to challenge and rectify the situation (to prevent the potential sale of Sheila’s interest
in the property) and that exercising their preferential options to purchase the property
was only one of several possibilities. See Hall, 579 S.W.3d at 377. While the letter
does not outline the specific litigation that Phyllis and Connie should and ultimately
did pursue, it can be rationally inferred that Reilly sent this letter because he hoped
the family would do something to prevent the performance of the agreement. Cmty.
Health Sys. Prof’l Servs. Corp. v. Hansen, 525 S.W.3d 671, 689 (Tex. 2017)
(intentional interference requires that “the actor desires to cause the consequences
of his act, or that he believes that the consequences are substantially certain to result
from it” (quoting Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. John Carlo Tex., Inc., 843 S.W.2d 470, 472
(Tex. 1992))).
      Because of similar reasons, we conclude that Texas Ranch has met its prima
facie burden with respect to the issue of proximate cause. The element of proximate
cause has two components: cause in fact and foreseeability. Univ. of Tex. M.D.
Anderson Cancer Ctr. v. McKenzie, 578 S.W.3d 506, 518 (Tex. 2019).
      For a negligent act or omission to have been a cause-in-fact of the harm, the
act or omission must have been a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and
absent the act or omission—i.e., but for the act or omission—the harm would not

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have occurred. Rodriguez-Escobar v. Goss, 392 S.W.3d 109, 113 (Tex. 2013). As
stated above, the petition that Phyllis and Connie filed specifically cited to and
attached Reilly’s letter as evidence in support of their request for a guardianship over
Sheila. Although the letter was not the only evidence that was referred to and cited
in the petition, it can be rationally inferred from the petition, as well as the letter
itself, that Reilly’s communications with Phyllis and Connie was a substantial factor
in motivating Phyllis and Connie to bring suit.
      Likewise, we conclude that Phyllis and Connie’s attempt to halt the
performance of the contract was a foreseeable consequence at the time that Reilly
transmitted the letter to them. In that regard, it is not necessary for Reilly to have
anticipated the exact litigation strategy that Phyllis and Connie would advance.
Rather, it is enough—for purposes of assessing proof under the TCPA—if it can be
rationally inferred that Reilly anticipated that some action would be taken to halt the
sale. “Foreseeability requires only that the general danger, not the exact sequence
of events that produced the harm, be foreseeable.” Walker v. Harris, 924 S.W.2d
375, 377 (Tex. 1996); see also M.D. Anderson, 578 S.W.3d at 519 (quoting Walker,
924 S.W.2d at 877). It does not require that a person must anticipate the precise
manner in which an injury will occur. M.D. Anderson, 578 S.W.3d at 519.
      We have concluded above that Reilly’s intention to interfere, or suggest that
the sisters interfere, with the sale can be rationally inferred from the contents of his
letter. For the same reasons, it can also be rationally inferred that Reilly could have
reasonably foreseen that Phyllis and Connie would do what he intended or
suggested—that is, undertake actions to challenge and interfere with the
performance of the agreement. As such, Texas Ranch has also met its prima facie
burden with respect to the issue of proximate cause. Direct evidence is not required

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to satisfy the “clear and specific” evidence threshold, as Appellant suggests; rational
inferences will suffice.
        Our determination that Texas Ranch has stated a prima facie cause of action
for actionable interference does not address, nor do we express any opinion on, the
question of whether Reilly had legal justification for his actions. Here, Reilly does
not rely on, nor has he raised, the defense of legal justification at this stage. See
Sterner v. Marathon Oil Co., 767 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. 1989) (making the issue of
legal justification an affirmative defense). Nevertheless, we note that should such a
defense be raised—either in a dispositive motion or at trial—it would encompass a
broad set of considerations,5 including the effect of an adverse judgment on Reilly’s
right to petition, as well as the social utility of communications that seek to prevent
perceived fraud or other wrongdoing.
                 B. Civil Conspiracy
        The elements of a civil conspiracy are: “(1) two or more persons; (2) an object
to be accomplished; (3) a meeting of minds on the object or course of action; (4) one
or more unlawful, overt acts; and (5) damages as the proximate result.” Agar Corp.,
Inc. v. Electro Circuits Int’l, LLC, 580 S.W.3d 136, 141 (Tex. 2019) (quoting
Massey v. Armco Steel Co., 652 S.W.2d 932, 934 (Tex. 1983); Baxsto, LLC v. Roxo

        5
          Whether a defendant’s interference with a contract is justified requires a consideration of: (1) the
nature of the defendant’s conduct; (2) the defendant’s motive if he claims to have exercised a colorable
legal right in good faith; (3) the plaintiff’s interests in his contract; (4) the interests sought to be advanced
by the defendant; (5) society’s interests in protecting the defendant’s freedom of action and the plaintiff’s
contractual interests; (6) the proximity or remoteness of the defendant’s conduct to the interference; and
(7) the relations between the plaintiff and the defendant. McCall v. Tana Oil & Gas Corp., 82 S.W.3d 337,
347 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001), rev’d in part, 104 S.W.3d 80 (Tex. 2003); see also Wal–Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Sturges, 52 S.W.3d 711, 714 (Tex. 2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 767 (AM. L. INST. 1979).

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Energy Co., LLC, No. 11-21-00183-CV, 2023 WL 3010965, at *22 (Tex. App.—
Eastland Apr. 20, 2023, no pet. h.).
      We conclude that Texas Ranch has failed to meet its prima facie burden with
respect to element 3 above—a meeting of the minds. While Reilly’s letter appears
to prompt action by Phyllis and Connie and even states that Reilly desired to meet
with the sisters to discuss their options, it does not propose that specific actions be
taken by them. Agar, 580 S.W.3d at 141. Indeed, if anything, it defers the discussion
of any specific actions for the future. Texas Ranch argues that a future meeting
likely took place based on the allegations contained in Phyllis and Connie’s
pleadings. However, even if the proposed meeting did occur, there is no evidence
in the record from which it can be rationally inferred that such a meeting resulted in
an agreement between Reilly, Phyllis, and Connie as to a particular course of action
that they should pursue.
      Further, while the letter appears to imply that Phyllis and Connie could
exercise their options as a means of preventing the sale, the sisters ultimately chose
a different course of action—filing a guardianship application and requesting a
temporary restraining order. This course of action was not mentioned in Reilly’s
letter, nor is there evidence of any other communication made by him in which he
suggested it. In short, there is no evidence from which it can be rationally inferred
that there was a meeting of the minds concerning the particular course of action that
was ultimately pursued by the sisters that impaired the performance of the
agreement. Schlumberger Well Surveying Corp. v. Nortex Oil & Gas Corp., 435
S.W.2d 854, 857 (Tex. 1968) (“there must be a preconceived plan and unity of
design and purpose, for the common design is of the essence of the conspiracy.”
(quoting 15A C.J.S. Conspiracy § 2 (1967))).

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      Based on the foregoing, we sustain in part, and overrule in part, Appellant’s
second issue. We sustain Appellant’s second issue with respect to Appellee’s cause
of action for civil conspiracy and we overrule Appellant’s second issue with respect
to Appellee’s cause of action for tortious interference with a contract.
                               III. This Court’s Ruling
      We hold that (1) the TCPA applies to the claims Texas Ranch has asserted
against Reilly, (2) Texas Ranch has successfully met its prima facie burden with
respect to its cause of action for tortious interference with a contract, and (3) Texas
Ranch has failed to meet its prima facie burden with respect to its cause of action for
civil conspiracy. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order in part, and we
reverse the order in part and remand Texas Ranch’s cause of action for civil
conspiracy to the trial court for a determination of Reilly’s claims for attorneys’ fees
and sanctions. See CIV. PRAC. & REM. § 27.009(a); D Magazine Partners, L.P. v.
Rosenthal, 529 S.W.3d 429, 442 (Tex. 2017). In all other respects, the trial court’s
order is affirmed.

                                               W. STACY TROTTER
                                               JUSTICE

June 15, 2023
Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J.,
Trotter, J., and Williams, J.

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