Court Opinion

ID: 9638540
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:46:24.986873+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:07.614225
License: Public Domain

TEAGUE, Judge,
dissenting.
Appellant urges in his second motion for rehearing that this Court should reverse the conviction because the evidence is insufficient. To the Court’s failure to grant appellant leave to file the second motion for rehearing, reconsider the issue, and reverse the conviction for insufficiency of the evidence, I dissent.
I now find myself totally unable to agree with the last opinion of this Court, as to its version of the facts.
Crispin Martinez, who testified for the State, specifically testified that after he and appellant got in the automobile with the victim, L_C_, she specifically consented to have sexual intercourse with both appellant and Martinez, and thereafter they each had sexual intercourse with her. Therefore, the State had the burden of specifically rebutting the testimony of Martinez to prove the offense of rape under V.T.C.A., Penal Code, Sec. 21.02(b)(3). It did not, however, satisfy that burden.
This Court, in its last opinion, to reject the appellant’s claim that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury, stated in part that it was relying upon a statement in appellant’s confession, to-wit: “I don’t think she knew what was happening,” to establish that L_C_was incapable of consenting to have sexual intercourse with appellant and Martinez at the time Martinez said she agreed to have sexual intercourse with him and appellant. However, such a statement is just as consistent with an interpretation that appellant thought she was groggy, but still able to consent to the act of sexual intercourse. Especially is this true when one considers that L_C_ had previously engaged in sexual intercourse while she was intoxicated. Thus, appellant’s statement in his confession does not sufficiently rebut Martinez’ testimony that she had consented to the act of sexual intercourse prior to having sexual intercourse with him and appellant.
This Court in its last opinion, to reject the contention that the evidence is insufficient to sustain the verdict of the jury, also pointed in its opinion to testimony by Frank Enriquez that L_C_had passed out at some time prior to her entry into appellant’s automobile, and that because the appellant and Martinez had to carry her to the ear, this was evidence that L_C_ was incapable of having consented at the time that Martinez said she did. However, there is nothing in the record of appeal, which includes the testimony by a medical examiner, to indicate that a person suffering from acute diabetes mellitus, as L_C_was, would be unable to regain consciousness after having passed out, and thereafter consensually engage in sexual intercourse. Thus, Enriquez’ testimony does not preclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, an interpretation of the evidence that L_C_passed out, but thereafter regained consciousness in the automobile and was able and capable of giving the consent appellant presumably relied upon before he had sexual intercourse with her. I further point out for emphasis that nobody, including L-C-, knew she was suffering from acute diabetes milletus.
*625For the above reasons, I do not believe that the State has proved beyond a reasonable doubt, as required by State and Federal Constitutional law, that L_C_ did not consent before she became terminally unconscious. The State has not established beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense of rape was committed. Nor do I believe a rational and reasonable trier of fact would find the appellant guilty upon the evidence the State has presented.
Appellant’s motion should be granted and the cause reversed for insufficiency of the evidence, as well for the other reasons this Court has previously given in its former opinions related to this cause.