Court Opinion

ID: 9965670
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-05-03 06:06:55.243867+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:25:26.552476
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                     FOR PUBLICATION
                                                                     May 2, 2024
               Plaintiff-Appellee,

v                                                                    No. 359376
                                                                     Eaton Circuit Court
ANTHONY LAMONT-DSHAWN BROWN,                                         LC No. 2020-020080-FC

               Defendant-Appellant.

Before: LETICA, P.J., and N. P. HOOD and MALDONADO, JJ.

N. P. HOOD, J. (concurring in part, dissenting in part.)

        I respectfully concur in the result. I agree with the majority’s analysis and conclusions in
Section IV regarding the missing-witness instruction. And I agree with the majority’s ultimate
conclusion that this Court should affirm defendant Anthony Lamont-Dshawn Brown’s conviction,
but I disagree with the majority’s Confrontation Clause analysis.

        I write separately because I would affirm on the basis that the masked witness’s testimony
was a plain error, but Brown cannot establish prejudice warranting reversal. It is apparent that a
Confrontation Clause violation occurred. See Crawford v Washington, 541 US 36, 61-63; 124 S
Ct 1354; 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004) (holding that the Confrontation Clause requires a face-to-face
encounter). See also People v Sammons, 191 Mich App 351, 363-366; 478 NW2d 901 (1992)
(holding that a witness testifying with a mask on violates the Confrontation Clause). The trial
court allowed a prosecution witness to testify while wearing a mask; this necessarily violated the
bright-line rule requiring a face-to-face confrontation. See Crawford, 541 US at 61-63, 67-68. See
also Sammons, 191 Mich App at 359-366. Even under the more flexible Confrontation Clause
precedent that predates Crawford, an error occurred because the trial court permitted the masked
testimony without making fact-findings or legal conclusions regarding the necessity of the
procedure (i.e., wearing a mask during testimony) or balancing the valid interest in the witness
testifying while wearing a mask (i.e., the witness’s health) against Brown’s confrontation rights,
including those that remained intact (i.e., oath, cross-examination). See Maryland v Craig, 497
US 836, 855-858; 110 S Ct 3157; 111 L Ed 2d 666 (1990) (outlining procedures for making
findings supporting a decision to use special procedures for witness testimony). See also United
States v Maynard, 90 F 4th 706, 710-712 (CA 4 2024) (affirming the district court application of

                                                -1-
Craig’s balancing test in the context of masked testimony during COVID-19).1 Despite this
obvious error occurring either under Crawford or Craig, Brown cannot establish prejudice, so his
claim fails the third prong of our plain-error analysis. See Coy v Iowa, 487 US 1012, 1021-1022;
108 S Ct 2798; 101 L Ed 2d 857 (1988); People v Jemison, 505 Mich 352, 355-357; 952 NW2d
394 (2020).

        Finally, I write separately because although both the Crawford line of precedent and Craig
line of precedent suggest Confrontation Clause violations are subject to review for prejudice, I
question our ability to adequately or consistently measure the prejudice resulting from such
violations, particularly when all indications suggest such violations concern an integral aspect of
criminal trials. See Jemison, 505 Mich at 362-365.

                                       I. BACKGROUND

         The majority accurately summarizes the factual background. Critically, Brown’s
codefendant, WF, testified against him at trial, describing Brown’s role in the murder. WF was 15
at the time of the offense and 17 at the time of trial. While testifying, WF, who was incarcerated
at the time, wore a face mask that apparently covered his nose and mouth. There was no discussion
of the necessity of the face covering prior to his testimony. At the start of his testimony, when the
prosecutor could not hear his initial answers, the prosecutor, trial judge, and witness had the
following exchange:

               Prosecutor: Does he have to have the mask on?

               Court: Do you wanna wear the mask?

               WF: Yes.

               Court: Yes.

               Prosecutor: Okay.

After some additional questions, defense counsel indicated that he, his co-counsel, and Brown
were having difficulty hearing WF’s testimony. The trial court then stated, “[C]an you speak up
or am I gonna have to rule that you’re not available as a witness . . . ?” Brown’s counsel then
suggested WF could take the mask off. The trial court replied, “He doesn’t want to [take off the
mask], he doesn’t have to. It’s Covid-19.” WF then refused counsel’s request to pull his mask up
so it did not touch his mouth and muffle his voice, replying, “Don’t feel comfortable doin’ that
during this pandemic.” Brown’s counsel never objected to this procedure as violative of the
Confrontation Clause. And the trial court never explicitly weighed Brown’s right to confrontation
against WF’s (or the public’s) interest in wearing a mask for health reasons.

1
 Although not binding on state courts, federal circuit court decisions may be considered for their
persuasive value. Wilcox v Wheatley, 342 Mich App 551, 561 n 7; 995 NW2d 594 (2022).

                                                -2-
       The trial was in the summer of 2021. We may take judicial notice that this was during the
COVID-19 pandemic and between six and eight months after vaccines for COVID-19 became
available. The COVID-19 pandemic was particularly devastating for incarcerated individuals and
individuals working in prisons and jails.

                         II. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE VIOLATION

       Brown argues that the Confrontation Clause violation resulting from WF’s masked
testimony was a plain error warranting reversal. Like the majority, I disagree. Although an error
occurred and it was plain (which is to say obvious), Brown cannot establish an outcome-
determinative prejudice let alone an error warranting reversal under plain-error. See Jemison, 505
Mich at 355-357 (remanding for trial court to determine whether Confrontation Clause violation
was harmless). See also Coy, 487 US at 1021-1022 (denial of face-to-face confrontation is subject
to harmless-error review, similar to other types of violations of the Confrontation Clause).

        The majority correctly observes that because Brown’s counsel did not object to the
testimony at trial his claim is subject to plain-error analysis. See People v Carines, 460 Mich 750,
762 n 7 & 763; 597 NW2d 130 (1999); People v Davis, 509 Mich 52, 64-65; 983 NW2d 325
(2022). To obtain relief under the plain-error rule, a defendant must prove that (1) an error
occurred, (2) the error was plain, and (3) that the plain error affected substantial rights—in other
words, the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. People v Anderson, 341 Mich App 272,
280; 989 NW2d 832 (2022). If a defendant satisfies these three requirements, we must determine
whether the plain error warrants reversal, in other words, whether it seriously affected the fairness,
integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings independent of the defendant’s
innocence. Carines, 460 Mich at 763-764. Sometimes identified as a fourth prong of plain-error
analysis, this last step conceptually overlaps with the third prong. Davis, 509 Mich at 75-76.2

2
  This standard also applies to the rare category of constitutional errors identified as “structural
errors.” People v Cain, 498 Mich 108, 116; 869 NW2d 829 (2015). Structural errors are
“structural defects in the constitution of the trial mechanism, which defy analysis by ‘harmless-
error’ standards.” See Arizona v Fulminante, 499 US 279, 309; 111 S Ct 1246; 113 L Ed 2d 302
(1991) (holding that the use of coerced confession at trial was a structural error); Weaver v
Massachusetts, 582 US 286, 293-296; 137 S Ct 1899; 198 L Ed 2d 420 (2017) (holding that the
right to public trial is structural); United States v Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 US 140, 148-150; 126 S Ct
2557; 165 L Ed 2d 409 (2006) (holding that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel of one’s choice
is structural). Our Supreme Court recently explained that forfeited structural errors are also
“particularly ill-suited to an analysis of whether the error affected the outcome of the trial court
proceedings.” Davis, 509 Mich at 72. Therefore, “the existence of a forfeited structural error
alone satisfies the third prong of the plain-error standard, and a defendant need not also show the
occurrence of outcome-determinative prejudice.” Id. at 74. In other words, a forfeited structural
error automatically satisfies the third prong and creates a formal rebuttable presumption that a
defendant has satisfied the fourth prong. Id. at 73-75. As discussed in Section III, Brown has not
argued that a Confrontation Clause violation—or specifically that a violation of the face-to-face
encounter aspect of the Confrontation Clause—is plain error. We will not raise this issue for him.

                                                 -3-
        Regarding the first prong of the plain-error analysis, the trial court permitting WF’s masked
testimony was an error for two reasons. First, the partial face mask denied Brown the right to a
face-to-face confrontation. See Crawford, 541 US at 61-62, 67-68. See also Sammons, 191 Mich
App at 364-366. Second, the trial court permitted this abrogation of Brown’s Confrontation Clause
rights without making case-specific fact-findings and legal conclusions regarding its necessity.
See Craig, 497 US at 855. Such an abrogation may be permissible, but not without case-specific
fact-finding and legal conclusions. See id. The tension, or awkwardness, between these two
conclusions is directly tied to the unresolved conflict in the Supreme Court’s Confrontation Clause
precedent. Compare Crawford, 541 US 61-63 (holding that the Confrontation Clause’s
requirement of a face-to-face confrontation is absolute and rejecting balancing test approach) with
Craig, 497 US at 852 (holding that the Confrontation Clause’s requirement of a face-to-face
encounter is not absolute, permitting a balancing of interests and necessity for alternative
procedures). See also Jemison, 505 Mich at 360-366 (discussing the Crawford/Craig conflict,
noting that Crawford did not explicitly overrule Craig, and reconciling the two cases by limiting
Craig’s application to the specific facts in that case, but not directly addressing other cases holding
the same).

         The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, § 20 of the Michigan
Constitution guarantee criminal defendants the right to confront the witnesses against them. See
US Const, Am VI; Const 1963, art 1, § 20. A primary objective of the Confrontation Clause is to
compel witnesses to “ ‘stand face to face with the [fact-finder] in order that they may look at him,
and judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony whether
he is worthy of belief.’ ” People v Buie, 285 Mich App 401, 408; 775 NW2d 817 (2009), quoting
Mattox v United States, 156 US 237, 242-243; 15 S Ct 337; 39 L Ed 409 (1895). The right to
confrontation “ ‘is an essential and fundamental requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this
country’s constitutional goal.’ ” Buie, 285 Mich App at 408, quoting Barber v Page, 390 US 719,
721; 88 S Ct 1318; 20 L Ed 2d 255 (1968). The Confrontation Clause has four elements: (1)
physical presence, (2) an oath, (3) cross-examination, and (4) “observation of demeanor by the
trier of fact . . . .” Buie, 285 Mich App at 408 (quotation marks and citations omitted; alteration in
original). When combined, these elements ensure “that evidence admitted against an accused is
reliable and subject to . . . rigorous adversarial testing . . . .” Craig, 497 US at 846.3

        Although reliability had long been a touchstone of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, in
Crawford v Washington, the United States Supreme Court established a bright-line rule requiring
a face-to-face encounter for all testimonial evidence. Crawford, 541 US at 61-63. See also
Jemison, 505 Mich at 360-366 (reconciling Crawford with prior, narrower holding in Craig).
Crawford requires face-to-face cross-examination for testimonial evidence unless a witness is

3
  Our Supreme Court has interpreted the holding in Craig as limited to its specific facts in order to
reconcile that case with Crawford. See Jemison, 505 Mich at 355-357 (reconciling Crawford with
prior, narrower holding in Craig).

                                                 -4-
unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. Jemison, 505 Mich at
362, citing Crawford, 541 US at 68.4

        Here, that requirement was not satisfied because the witness testified behind a mask. See
Sammons, 191 Mich App at 351. In Sammons, we held that the defendant’s Confrontation Clause
right to a face-to-face encounter was violated when the trial court allowed a prosecution witness
to testify while wearing a mask (covering his face and head) and without disclosing his true
identity. Sammons, 191 Mich App at 359-366. In Sammons, the defendant was charged with drug
trafficking offenses. Id. at 354-356. At an entrapment hearing prior to trial, the defendant testified
that an informant identified as “Rick” pressured him into participating in the drug conspiracy. Id.
During the hearing, the trial court permitted “Rick,” the prosecution’s chief witness, to testify
while wearing a mask that covered his face and head, and instructed the defense that he could not
ask identifying questions of “Rick.” Id. at 355-357. The trial court justified these procedures on
the grounds that one of the defendants allegedly offered someone a quarter pound of cocaine to
kill and emasculate “Rick.” Id. at 358-359. See also id. at 359 n 2. This Court accepted that the
state had a valid interest in promoting the safety of witnesses, but relying on Craig and Coy,
concluded that the procedure (a full-face mask) failed to preserve sufficiently the court’s ability to
assess the witness’s credibility through observation of demeanor. Id.at 364-366. On that basis,
we remanded for a new entrapment hearing. Id. at 376.

        The majority correctly observes that this case is different from Sammons, but it is not that
different. Admittedly, the face covering in Sammons was different. There, the masked covered
both the witness’s face and head (apparently a ski mask). Here, WF’s mask only covered his
face—specifically his nose and mouth (presumably a surgical mask). While such a covering
permits some assessment of a witness’s demeanor, I must conclude that it still implicates the right
to a face-to-face confrontation. Cf. Sammons, 191 Mich App at 359-366 (comparing the ski mask
in Sammons to the screen used in Craig). Though not as obvious or egregious as the violation in
Sammons, a mask covering a witness’s nose and mouth (be it a surgical mask, a neck gaiter, a
bandana, or a kerchief) still diminishes the face-to-face encounter and attendant assessment of
credibility, and I would conclude still amounts to a violation of the face-to-face confrontation

4
  In this respect, I read our Confrontation Clause precedent differently than the majority. Like our
Supreme Court in Jemison, 505 Mich at 360-366, I acknowledge a tension between Crawford’s
bright-line rule requiring a face-to-face encounter and the “open-ended balancing tests” in Craig.
See id. See also id. at 356 (“Crawford did not specifically overrule Craig, but it took out its legs”).
I understand Craig, Crawford, and Jemison as each involving the parameters of a defendant’s right
to a face-to-face confrontation. See Craig, 497 US at 850 (“face-to-face confrontation requirement
is not absolute . . .”); Crawford, 541 US at 42-50 (holding that a face-to-face meeting between an
accuser and the accused was an essential part of the confrontation right); Jemison, 505 Mich at
360-366. I am not alone in recognizing the vergence their holdings create. See United States v
Cox, 871 F3d 479, 492-495 (CA 6, 2017) (SUTTON, J., concurring); McAllister, The Disguised
Witness and Crawford’s Uneasy Tension with Craig: Bringing Uniformity to the Supreme Court’s
Confrontation Jurisprudence, 58 Drake L Rev 481, 507-512 (2010).

                                                 -5-
aspect of the Confrontation Clause. See Sammons, 191 Mich App at 359-366.5 Put simply,
testifying with a COVID mask puts this case closer to Sammons than it does to an individual
testifying without a mask at all. If we conclude otherwise, we must be prepared for every
prosecution witness, from informants to law enforcement officers, to elect to wear a surgical mask
when testifying.

         This brings us to the other difference between this case and Sammons: the reason for
wearing a mask. In Sammons, the witness testified with a mask to protect his identity due to
alleged threats. See Sammons, 191 Mich App at 357-358, 363-364. Here, WF testified with a
mask to protect his health, and potentially the health of others in the court and his detention facility
during the COVID-19 pandemic. But under Crawford, the reason for abandoning the face-to-face
encounter requirement of the Confrontation Clause does not matter. See Crawford, 547 US at 53-
56, 67-69. Confrontation is required, or there is a violation. See id. That is true whether an
individual is wearing a mask to protect their identity, or wearing a mask to protect their health. I
would conclude that wearing a mask (even a surgical mask) during adverse testimony at a criminal
jury trial is an obvious violation of the Confrontation Clause—at least under Crawford.

       Our Confrontation Clause precedent, however, is somewhat muddled. See Jemison, 505
Mich at 360-366. Crawford and its progeny established a bright-line rule requiring face-to-face
confrontation without exception. Jemison, 505 Mich at 356, citing Crawford, 541 US at 68. But
another line of cases—the precedent on which the majority relies—allows more flexibility and
balancing of interests to abrogate portions of a defendants Confrontation Clause rights. See, e.g.,
Craig, 497 US at 836; Coy, 487 US at 1021. But see Crawford, 541 US at 67-68.

5
  I acknowledge that in unpublished opinions, this Court has addressed other closely-related issues
involving face coverings at trial during COVID-19. See, e.g., People v Wilson, unpublished per
curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued January 19, 2023 (Docket No. 356825), p 9
(holding that the trial court requiring a defendant to wear a partial face mask at trial during the
COVID-19 pandemic did not violate the Confrontation Clause, the trial court instructed witnesses
to remove their face masks when testifying and other aspects of the Confrontation Clause were
preserved); Collins v Nizzi, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued
January 20, 2022 (Docket Nos. 354510, 354871), pp 1, 6-10 (rejecting the plaintiff’s argument
that he was denied a fair trial because jurors wore face masks that covered their mouth and nose
during voir dire and trial, and that certain witnesses wore face masks while testifying in plaintiff’s
no-fault trial). See also United States v Crittenden, unpublished order of the United States District
Court for the Middle District of Georgia, issued August 21, 2020 (Docket No. 4:20-CR-7)
(rejecting constitutional challenge to wearing a face mask and concluding that COVID-style masks
eliminate only two aspects of demeanor for the jury to consider: movement of the nose and mouth).
Although unpublished opinions are not binding, we may consider the rationale contained in an
unpublished opinion to be persuasive. People v Green, 260 Mich App 710, 720 n 5; 680 NW2d
477 (2004); MCR 7.215(C)(1). I am not persuaded. Most notably none of our unpublished
authorities deal with precisely this issue. And Crittenden appears to conflict with our existing
caselaw. Cf. Sammons, 191 Mich App at 363-366.

                                                  -6-
        As the majority observes, under that line of cases, the rule requiring a face-to-face
encounter is not absolute. People v Johnson, 315 Mich App 163, 184; 889 NW2d 513 (2016),
quoting Craig, 497 US at 847. But see Jemison, 505 Mich 360-366 (reconciling Craig and
Crawford by limited the holding in Craig to its facts); Crawford, 541 US at 67-68 (rejecting “open-
ended balancing tests” and holding that the right to confrontation for testimonial evidence is
absolute). In fact, this strand of precedent states that face-to-face encounters are not a requirement
so much as a “preference.” Craig, 497 US at 849. This line of cases has never been explicitly
overruled. See Jemison, 505 Mich at 363; Maynard, 90 F 4th at 711 (reconciling Craig and
Crawford by limited the holding in Crawford to its facts). This case exposes that tension between
these two strands of precedent.

       Nonetheless, even under this older and more malleable interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause, an error occurred. The trial court failed to make findings of fact or legal conclusions about
the necessity of WF wearing a mask while testifying, the legitimate interests supporting it, and
what of Brown’s other confrontation rights (i.e., oath, cross-examination) remained. See Craig,
497 US at 855-856.

       Under Craig, the requirement of (or preference for) a face-to-face confrontation “must
occasionally give way to considerations of public policy and the necessities of the case.” Craig,
497 US at 848. Although this line of precedent held that the right is not absolute, the United States
Supreme Court noted that it cannot be easily dispensed. Id. at 852. To that end, the United States
Supreme Court previously identified procedures for finding a case-specific necessity before
dispensing with the face-to-face confrontation requirement. See id. at 855-856. See also Johnson,
315 Mich App at 525-530 (discussing with approval the broad application of this framework to
other modifications of witness testimony, including abrogation of confrontation rights and the
presence of witness support persons).

        In Maryland v Craig, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s decision
to allow a witness to testify via one-way close-circuit television after making findings and
conclusions supporting the abrogation of the defendant’s confrontation rights. See id. at 852-856.
There, the defendant was charged with physically and sexually abusing a six-year-old who
attended the defendant’s kindergarten. Id. at 840. The prosecution requested the court allow the
child victim-witness to testify via one-way close-circuit television. Id. The trial court permitted
the use of the procedure after receiving evidence and making a finding, pursuant to an existing
statute, that the child witness would suffer serious emotional distress to the extent that the child
would not be able to reasonably communicate. Id. at 842-843. The United States Supreme Court
held that the procedure did not violate the defendant’s right to confrontation. Id. at 847. It was in
this context that the Court concluded, as the majority observes, that the Confrontation Clause does
not require “an actual face-to-face encounter at trial in every instance in which testimony is
admitted against a defendant.” Id. at 847 (emphasis in original). See also Coy, 487 US at 1021
(holding, two years earlier, that there may be exceptions to the Confrontation Clause, but those
exceptions “would surely be allowed only when necessary to further an important public policy.”).
But the Court also clarified that a trial court may only use a special procedure when the prosecution
shows that it is “necessary to further an important state interest.” Craig, 497 US at 852 (holding
that there was a “compelling” state interest “in the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from
further trauma and embarrassment”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, there are two
requirements: (1) a legitimate state interest; and (2) an adequate showing of necessity. See id. at

                                                 -7-
855. See also Johnson, 315 Mich App at 184-185. Regarding the findings of necessity to justify
the use of a special procedure, the Supreme Court stated:

                The requisite finding of necessity must of course be a case-specific one: The
       trial court must hear evidence and determine whether use of the one-way closed
       circuit television procedure is necessary to protect the welfare of the particular child
       witness who seeks to testify. The trial court must also find that the child witness
       would be traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the presence of the
       defendant. Denial of face-to-face confrontation is not needed to further the state
       interest in protecting the child witness from trauma unless it is the presence of the
       defendant that causes the trauma. In other words, if the state interest were merely
       the interest in protecting child witnesses from courtroom trauma generally, denial
       of face-to-face confrontation would be unnecessary because the child could be
       permitted to testify in less intimidating surroundings, albeit with the defendant
       present. Finally, the trial court must find that the emotional distress suffered by the
       child witness in the presence of the defendant is more than de minimis, i.e., more
       than “mere nervousness or excitement or some reluctance to testify[.]” [Craig, 497
       US at 855-856 (citations omitted).]

Acknowledging that the procedure the Court outlined in Craig is tailored to the specifics of that
case, this Court has broadly applied this framework to other procedures that may abrogate (or
implicate) the right to confrontation. See Sammons, 191 Mich App at 351. See also Johnson, 315
Mich App at 183-188 (acknowledging the framework in the context of a witness support dog and
concluding that the use of a support dog did not implicate the Confrontation Clause).

        One year after the decision in Craig, our Court applied its framework in People v Sammons,
the primary case on which Brown relies. Sammons, 191 Mich App at 361-366. Though not
explicitly stated, in Sammons, this Court appears to have acknowledged that the trial court
considered the prosecution’s interest in protecting the informant witness when allowing him to
testify while wearing a mask. See id. at 357-358.

        Even if we accept that the trier of fact was still largely able to assess WF’s credibility, and
we accept that Brown largely had his opportunity to eyeball or stare down the witness, under more
recent precedent, we still must conclude that the trial court erred because it never considered
whether WF’s mask was necessary, or whether the state, WF, or someone else had a legitimate
interest in WF testifying with a mask. To underline this point, we appear to have accepted that
WF actually was afraid of getting infected with COVID-19. The reality is, aside from one
reference to the pandemic, there is no evidence supporting this conclusion. Obviously, the trial
court would have been equipped to make such findings. Even if WF was the only witness (or only
person during the trial, including the lawyers, judge, and jurors) who wore a mask, the trial court
could likely find a necessity for an incarcerated person in the summer of 2021 wearing a mask to
protect themselves against COVID-19. But the trial court bears the responsibility for making those
findings. And though our Supreme Court has limited the application of Craig to the facts of that
case, see Jemison, 505 Mich at 365, to the extent it is still good law, we have looked to the
procedures outlined in Craig for guidance in assessing whether to allow abrogation of the face-to-
face requirement. See Johnson, 315 Mich App at 182-186. It just did not happen here. This was
an obvious error under the Craig strand of precedent.

                                                 -8-
        Further, this error is what distinguishes this case from United States v Maynard, the
primary (and most persuasive) case on which the majority relies. There, the Fourth Circuit
affirmed the federal district court’s order, over the defendant’s objection, that everyone in the
courtroom during a criminal trial had to wear a face mask, including testifying witnesses. See
Maynard, 90 F 4th at 709-711. The trial court concluded that face masks were necessary in light
of the COVID-19 pandemic, and rejected the defendant’s plea to allow witnesses to wear
transparent face shields during testimony, finding them inadequate to protect the public health. Id.
The district court found that the defendant’s confrontation rights were not violated, and the Fourth
Circuit affirmed its findings and conclusions. Id. Here, however, there are no findings and
conclusions for us to affirm. Accepting that Craig, as illustrated in Maynard, provided a
mechanism for the trial court to allow masked testimony, the trial court was still obligated to follow
the procedure like the trial court did in Maynard. Its failure to do so is plain error.

         Nonetheless, although there was an obvious Confrontation Clause violation thus satisfying
the first two prongs of the plain-error analysis, Brown still cannot show that the error prejudiced
him. See Coy, 487 US at 1021-1022. Though the Crawford line of cases and Craig line of cases
require different analyses of whether a Confrontation Clause violation occurred, both strands of
precedent subject violations of the face-to-face encounter requirement to harmless-error review.
See Coy, 487 US at 1021-1022 (denial of face-to-face confrontation is subject to harmless-error
review, similar to other types of violations of the Confrontation Clause); Jemison, 505 Mich at
366-367 (finding a Confrontation Clause violation under Crawford and remanding to the trial court
to determine whether the violation was harmless). Admittedly, it remains unclear how exactly
courts should go about measuring prejudice stemming from Confrontation Clause violations,
particularly the requirement for an oath and face-to-face encounter, which unlike the right to cross-
examination, are not directly tied to eliciting evidence. The simplest method appears to be asking
whether a defendant has shown that the result would be different but for the violation. Here, Brown
has not shown that anything would be different if WF testified without a mask. It is not clear that
the jury would have reached a different conclusion if they could have seen WF’s face during his
testimony.6 Because Brown has failed to establish prejudice, I agree with the majority’s ultimate
conclusion affirming his conviction.

III. THE DIFFICULTY MEASURING PREJUDICE STEMMING FROM CONFRONTATION
                          CLAUSE VIOLATIONS

        The defense has not raised the issue of whether a Confrontation Clause violation (or more
specifically a violation of the Confrontation Clause’s requirement of a face-to-face encounter) is a
structural error. We will not raise that issue for them. Nonetheless, applying the plain-error
standard to a forfeited claim of a Confrontation Clause violation again forces us into the awkward
position of measuring the prejudice associated with an indispensable part of criminal jury trials.
See Crawford, 541 US at 61-62; Jemison, 505 Mich at 355-357.

6
 Further, as the majority acknowledges, the trial court stopped when trial participants could not
hear WF’s testimony, and the transcript of the trial is sufficiently clear.

                                                 -9-
        This Court, our Supreme Court, and the United States Supreme, have not yet held that a
violation of the Confrontation Clause is a structural error. See People v Walker, 273 Mich App
56, 67-68; 728 NW2d 902 (2006) (COOPER, J., concurring) (noting a gap in Confrontation Clause
precedent); Jemison, 505 Mich at 360-366. But see United States v Graham, 278 F App’x 538,
544 n 2 (CA 6, 2008) (holding that admission of evidence in violation of the Confrontation Clause
is not a structural error).7 But the principles and directions outlined in Crawford and more recent
Confrontation Clause precedent suggest that Confrontation Clause violations, particularly
violations of its procedural components (i.e., an oath, physical presence before the fact-finder, a
face-to-face encounter with the accused), are precisely what structural error contemplates:

       [The Confrontation Clause’s] ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but
       it is a procedural rather than a substantive guarantee. It commands, not that
       evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular manner: by
       testing in the crucible of cross-examination. The Clause thus reflects a judgment,
       not only about the desirability of reliable evidence (a point on which there could be
       little dissent), but about how reliability can best be determined.”). [Crawford, 541
       US at 61-62 (opinion by SCALIA, J.).]

See Jemison, 505 Mich at 361-363 (analyzing preserved Confrontation Clause error and explaining
that the Confrontation Clause “does not guarantee reliable evidence; it guarantees specific trial
procedures that were thought to assure reliable evidence, undeniably among which was ‘face-to-
face’ confrontation.”) (Quotation marks and citation omitted; emphasis in original).

        Had Brown raised this issue, we might be required to confront more directly the question
of how a defendant in his position could ever prove prejudice related to a violation of the face-to-
face requirement of the Confrontation Clause. Crawford and Jemison suggest that we should not
have to answer this question because confrontation rights are intrinsic and pervasive, and the harm
resulting from their denial is impossible to measure. See Crawford, 541 US at 61-62; Jemison,
505 Mich at 355-357. But see Jemison, 50 Mich at 366-367 (remanding for a determination of
whether the violation was harmless). The Confrontation Clause is not just about reliability; rather,
it establishes bright-line procedures that define the fundamentals of criminal proceedings. See
Crawford, 541 US at 61-62, 67-68; Jemison, 505 Mich at 355-357, 360-362. Had Brown argued
that the Confrontation Clause violation was a structural error, it undoubtedly would have affected
our plain-error analysis, and may have yielded a different outcome. This issue however is not
presently before us.

                                       IV. CONCLUSION

        For the reasons stated above, I concur in the result. A Confrontation Clause violation
occurred, but Brown cannot establish whether and how it affected the outcome. Nothing in this
opinion should be construed as diminishing the devastating impact of COVID-19 on criminal
courts and their various stakeholders, including incarcerated individuals. Our courts remain able

7
 Although not binding on state courts, federal circuit court decisions may be considered for their
persuasive value. Wilcox, 342 Mich App at 561 n 7.

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to protect the health and safety of court stakeholders and the constitutionally-mandated
components of criminal trials.

                                                      /s/ Noah P. Hood

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