Court Opinion

ID: 9764727
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:38:06.919586+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:00.609842
License: Public Domain

Collins, J.,
delivered the following dissenting opinion.
In the majority opinion in this case it is stated that the appellees took the position that the burden of proof was on the appellant, while the appellant argued that the burden of proof was on the appellees. It is also stated: “As both sides preferred to argue doubtful inferences from facts not proved though available, rather than to prove the facts, the record was left in a very incomplete state.” (Italics supplied here). I cannot agree that the burden of proof was on the appellees in this case. Both the appellant and the appellees are claimants to a common fund. The appellant, as .well as the appellees, had records which were not produced *590in evidence. In this Court the appellees asked, if they did not prevail, that the case be remanded in order that they might offer proof to show that Mrs. Callis did not receive any of the borrowed money and therefore was an accommodation maker and thereby entitled to subrogation. The majority opinion denies them this privilege. It is true that there must be an end to litigation. However there appears to be no emergency requiring the final decision of the case at this time and no special reason why this request of the appellees should not be granted. There is a large sum of money here involved.
Code, 1951, Article 5, Section 42, provides in part: “If it shall appear or be shown to the court of appeals that the substantial merits of a cause will not be determined by the reversing or affirming of any decree or order that may have been passed by a court of equity, or that the purposes of justice will be advanced by permitting further proceedings in the cause, either through amendment of any of the pleadings or the introduction of further evidence, making additional parties, or otherwise, then the court of appeals, instead of passing a final decree or order, shall order the cause to be remanded to the court from whose decision the appeal was taken, and thereupon such further proceedings shall there be had by amendment of pleadings, or further testimony to be taken, or otherwise, as shall be necessary for determining the cause upon its merits, as if ho appeal had been taken in the cause, and the decree or order appealed from had not been passed, save only that the order or decree passed by the court of appeals shall be conclusive as to the points finally decided thereby. * * *” This Section has been followed in many cases by this Court. In Goldsborough v. County Trust Company of Maryland, 180 Md. 59, 22 A. 2d 920, decided in 1941, this Court followed this Section and remanded the case without affirmance or reversal. Chief Judge Bond Said in that case: “But the plaintiff must Show the necessity for his resorting to the remedy, and *591is permitted to seek only that which is necessary. The mere fact that he does not know the facts sought is not sufficient if they are available to him by his own efforts. He cannot invoke the aid of the Court to relieve him of the effort to provide it for himself. Becker v. Frederick W. Lipps Co., 131 Md. 301, 101 A. 783; Musch v. Underwood, 179 Md. 455, 19 A. 2d 699, decided May 1, 1941. * * * The court concludes that the ends of justice would be subserved by remanding the cause to give the plaintiff an opportunity to make by amendment to his bill the averments needed to restrict an accounting to information which the plaintiff himself cannot otherwise obtain.” In Cacy v. Slay, 127 Md. 493, at pages 500 and 501, 96 A. 690, 693, 1 A. L. R. 764, this Court said: “If such are the facts, legal evidence of them should be produced. * * * We have determined upon the course we will adopt in this case because we hope, to use the language of the statute, Section 38 of Article 5, that ‘the purposes of justice will be advanced by permitting further proceedings in the cause,’ * * *.” Among other cases which have been remanded in order that additional proof might be taken for the purposes of justice are: Stump v. Henry, 6 Md. 201, 210; Johnson v. Robertson, 31 Md. 476, 492; Bull v. Pyle, 41 Md. 419, 425; Brown v. Thomas, 46 Md. 636, 641; Hagerty v. Mann, 56 Md. 522, 529; Hoffman v. Hoffman, 66 Md. 568, 575, 8 A. 466; Barroll v. Forman, 88 Md. 188, 201, 40 A. 883; Dimpfel v. Wilson, 107 Md. 329, 341, 68 A. 561, 13 L. R. A., N. S., 1180; Meinhardt v. Meinhardt, 117 Md. 426, 429, 83 A. 715; Tobin v. Rogers, 121 Md. 249, 253, 88 A. 133; B. & O. R. R. Co. v. Silbereisen, 121 Md. 407, 88 A. 252, 89 A. 102; Peoples v. Ault, 125 Md. 698, 96 A. 398; Bliss v. Bliss, 133 Md. 61, 77, 104 A. 467; Farm Homes Corporation v. Adams, 171 Md. 212, 224, 188 A. 808; Young v. Weaver, 185 Md. 328, 335, 44 A. 2d 748. I am of opinion that “the purposes of justice will be advanced by permitting further proceedings in this cause” as requested by the appellees. I see no reason why this request should not be granted. I therefore dissent from the majority opinion.