Court Opinion

ID: 9890832
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-16 16:09:29.821273+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:31.248714
License: Public Domain

J-A19044-23

 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  ANGEL R. COLON                               :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 3167 EDA 2022

             Appeal from the Order Entered November 9, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-15-CR-0002033-2004,
                          CP-15-CR-0004401-2004

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                        FILED OCTOBER 16, 2023

       Angel R. Colon (Colon) appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas

of Chester County (trial court) which clarified an ambiguity as to whether he

received credit for time served at his sentencing. We affirm.

       In Colon’s related appeals concerning his sentence (2418 EDA 2021 and

2419 EDA 2021), we summarized the procedural history of the underlying

matter as follows:

       In 2005, Colon pleaded guilty to corrupt organizations at docket
       number 2033-04 and three counts of delivery of a controlled
       substance2 at docket number 4401-04. Colon later moved to
       withdraw his guilty plea. The trial court denied the motion and
       sentenced him to an aggregate of twenty to fifty years of
       imprisonment. This Court affirmed Colon’s judgment of sentence
       on direct appeal, and Colon did not petition for allowance of appeal
       with our Supreme Court. The trial court reinstated Colon’s right
____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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      to petition our Supreme Court for allowance of appeal following
      his first Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition, and our
      Supreme Court denied the petition on November 6, 2008. Colon
      filed several PCRA petitions between 2009 and 2015, all of which
      the PCRA court dismissed. In 2018, Colon filed a motion for time
      credit, which the court construed to be a PCRA petition and
      dismissed without a hearing.       This Court affirmed.      See
      Commonwealth v. Colon, 216 A.3d 409 (Pa. Super. Apr. 22,
      2019) (unpublished memorandum).

      On August 25, 2021, Colon filed a pro se “Petition for Clarification
      and/or Correction of the Sentence in the Nature of ‘Credit for Time
      Served’, [sic] Nunc Pro Tunc.” In his petition, Colon asked the
      trial court to correct the sentencing judge’s “non-calculation of
      credit time in custody.” Colon further alleged that his co-
      defendant, also originally sentenced in 2005, had received credit
      for time served following a similar petition in 2020. The trial court
      treated Colon’s petition as an untimely PCRA petition and,
      pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907, issued
      a notice of intent to dismiss the petition on September 23, 2021.
      Colon filed a response to the court’s Rule 907 notice, in which he
      maintained that, in his petition, he had “asked [the court] to
      clarify whether his time in custody would be credited toward his
      sentence[.]”     The trial court nevertheless concluded Colon’s
      petition was an untimely PCRA petition and dismissed it without a
      hearing on October 27, 2021.          The trial court declined to
      acknowledge Colon’s assertion that he was seeking a clarification
      of his sentence; nor did the court address Colon’s assertion that
      his co-defendant had recently filed the same petition and received
      relief. Colon filed timely notices of appeal, and both he and the
      trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure
      1925.

Commonwealth v. Colon, 2418 EDA 2021, 2419 EDA 2021, at *1 (Pa.

Super. October 13, 2022) (unpublished memorandum decision) (footnotes

and internal citations omitted).

      We granted Colon relief in the above appeals, remanding the case to the

trial court to “resolve the ambiguity in Colon’s sentence, namely, to determine

whether Colon’s sentence includes credit for time served in custody prior to

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sentencing.”     See id. at *4 (emphasis added).1      Significantly, Colon had

“conceded that should the court clarify that his sentence included no credit for

time served, he would be challenging the legality of his sentence.” Id. at *3

n.4.

       Following remand, the trial court conducted proceedings consistent with

our directive to clarify any ambiguity in Colon’s sentence.      In its order of

November 9, 2022, the trial court stated that it had “reviewed the transcript

of [Colon’s] sentencing and the applicable sentencing sheets, and the court

has found no indication that [Colon’s] sentence includes credit for time served

in custody prior to sentencing.” Trial Court Order, 11/9/2022, at 1.

       Despite that this clarification was the sole purpose of the remand of the

case to the trial court, Colon again appealed. In his brief, Colon claims that

the trial court erred because it “failed to acknowledge [or] address the

____________________________________________

1 “If . . . the alleged error is thought to be attributable toambiguity in the
sentence imposed by the trial court, then a writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum lies to the trial court for clarification and/or correction of the
sentence imposed.” Commonwealth v. Perry, 563 A.2d 511, 513 (Pa.
1989); see also Commonwealth v. Heredia, 97 A.3d 392, 394-95 (Pa.
Super. 2014). A request for clarification of a sentence is not subject to the
requirements of the Post-Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546
(PCRA). See Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 591 (Pa. Super.
2007).

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ambiguity as to why [Colon’s] co-defendant who had filed a similar petition in

2020 [was granted relief].” Appellant’s Brief, at 10.2

       Here, Colon has failed to establish that the trial court abused its

discretion.3 This case was remanded to the trial court for the sole purpose of

clarifying whether Colon was entitled to credit for time served. The trial court

did as we instructed, stating in its order that it had reviewed the relevant 2005

orders and transcripts and concluded that Colon had not been awarded such

credit.

       Colon suggests that he should have been or was awarded credit for time

served because his co-defendant received such credit.       However, that fact

alone is irrelevant. Their respective sentencing calculations hinged on several

factors, such as whether bail was posted and whether the person was in

custody while on a Board of Probation and Parole detainer. More succinctly,

an award of credit time to Colon’s co-defendant and the lack of credit time

awarded to Colon does not alone make Colon’s sentence ambiguous.

____________________________________________

2 We note that Colon does not provide the dates of the “time served” for which

he is entitled to credit.

3 “Our standard of review of a court’s order denying a petition for writ of
habeas corpus is limited to abuse of discretion. Thus, we may reverse the
court’s order where the court has misapplied the law or exercised its discretion
in a manner lacking reason.” Rivera v. Pa. Dept. of Corr., 837 A.2d 525,
528 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citations omitted). Whether the trial court has
authority to correct an alleged sentencing error is a pure question of law which
we review under a de novo standard. See Commonwealth v. Kremer, 206
A.3d 543, 547-48 (Pa. Super. 2019).

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       In addition, Colon does not identify any portion of the record which so

much as suggests that his judgment of sentence is unclear. Claims which are

not sufficiently developed will be deemed waived. See Pa.R.A.P. 2119; see

also Commonwealth v. Felder, 247 A.3d 14, 20 (Pa. Super. 2021) (citation

omitted) (“Also, an issue identified on appeal but not developed in the

appellant’s brief is abandoned and, therefore, waived.”).4

       In sum, the trial court had limited authority on remand to clarify the

terms of Colon’s sentence and the trial court did so. Colon challenges that

clarification, but he presents no cogent grounds for relief.   Thus, the trial

court’s order must stand.

       Order affirmed.

____________________________________________

4 Even had Colon been erroneously denied credit time when he was sentenced

(an issue which is not now before us), relief for such error would only be
available on direct appeal or by way of a post-conviction petition. See
Commonwealth v. Fowler, 930 A.2d 586, 591 (Pa. Super. 2007). Colon
has already unsuccessfully sought credit time in a prior appeal.           See
Commonwealth v. Colon, 216 A.3d 409 (Pa. Super. Apr. 22, 2019)
(unpublished memorandum). He has also filed numerous post-conviction
petitions. Accordingly, any challenge to the legality of Colon’s sentence would
be outside the purview of this appeal, as well as procedurally barred. See
Commonwealth v. Colon, 2418 EDA 2021, 2419 EDA 2021, at *1 (Pa.
Super. October 13, 2022) (unpublished memorandum decision).

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Date: 10/16/2023

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