Court Opinion

ID: 9723502
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:18:12.542683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:49.260071
License: Public Domain

WIENER, J.
I respectfully dissent.
I have no quarrel with the general proposition that lawyers too are entitled to fair play and the preferable manner of resolving allegations of incompetence of counsel is by writ of habeas corpus. (In re Lower (1979) 100 Cal.App.3d 144, 152 [161 Cal.Rptr. 24].) Particularly where the criticism of counsel is directed to trial tactics, such as the failure to object to evidence, it is virtually impossible in a direct appeal to resolve whether counsel’s decision in the heat of trial was predicated on tactical considerations. (People v. Frierson (1979) 25 Cal.3d 142, 158 [158 Cal.Rptr. 281, 599 P.2d 587].) However, where the attack is directed to a pretrial motion to suppress evidence tactical considerations would appear to be irrelevant. If the motion is brought the worse that can happen is that it will be denied; the evidence, subject to other rules governing its admissibility, will then be available for trial. Under such circumstance the record itself is sufficient to determine whether trial counsel failed to meet the standards established in People v. Pope (1979) 23 Cal.3d 412, 424-425 [152 Cal.Rptr. 732, 590 P.2d 859].
A reasonably competent counsel acting in a diligent manner should surely attempt to suppress the evidence which forms the basis for the case against his client where there is some likelihood of success in an unsettled area of law and where the failure to do so prevents appellate review of that issue. (People v. Lilienthal (1978) 22 Cal.3d 891, 896 [150 Cal.Rptr. 910, 587 P.2d 706].)
Here counsel’s failure to renew his motion to suppress at the superior court resulted in the withdrawal of a potentially meritorious defense. Vehicle Code section 10751 does not expressly authorize a seizure of a vehicle with an altered or removed serial number. (Cf. People v. Woolsey (1979) 90 Cal.App.3d 994 [153 Cal.Rptr. 746]—a warrantless search under Vehicle Code section 2805 held constitutional.) Hughes v. Neth (1978) 80 Cal.App.3d 952 [146 Cal.Rptr. 37], does not hold to the contrary for the issue of “the constitutional propriety of the initial police seizure” of the vehicle (motorcycle) was neither raised nor addressed in that case (id. at p. 956). The impoundment of the car was not proper aside from the statute for the seizure was not necessary to *127preserve potential evidence. (See People v. Curley (1970) 12 Cal.App.3d 732, 747 [90 Cal.Rptr. 783].) Exigent circumstances were not established. The same police officer had observed the vehicle for over a year; nothing new had occurred to cause him to believe there was an increased likelihood the vehicle would be destroyed or would otherwise not be available to search after he obtained a search warrant.
I would reverse the judgment.
A petition for a rehearing was denied March 28, 1980, and appellant’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied May 8, 1980. Mosk, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.