Court Opinion

ID: 9448192
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:25:08.924792+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:19.195708
License: Public Domain

FAHY, Circuit Judge
(concurring).
I concur in affirming but do so on the ground that under the NATO Agree*924ment,1
2considered in its several provisions which must if possible be given meaning as a consistent whole, the question whether the corporal was a member of the “force” of Belgium, and therefore whether the accident came within the purview of the Agreement, is a matter with respect to which the court may take no action in this case. Article XVI of the treaty provides:
“All differences between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation or application of this Agreement shall be settled by negotiation between them without recourse to any outside jurisdiction. Except where express provision is made to the contrary in this Agreement, differences which cannot be settled by direct negotiation shall be referred to the North Atlantic Council.” 3
It is true that the two governments have not disagreed as to the status of the corporal; on the contrary, both have concluded that he was not a member of the force at the time of the accident. This conclusion is not, however, an agreement within the terms of the proviso in Article I, paragraph 1(a); 3 it is rather the reaching of the same opinion as to the status of the corporal. The Embassy of Belgium advised our Department of State of Belgium’s interpretation of the situation, which is consistent with that of the Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State. He advised the Department of Justice in connection with the present litigation that the employment of the corporal at the Belgium Embassy, together with other factors regarding the corporal’s situation, “all demonstrate the understanding of the Embassy and the Department, as well as that of Corporal Van Handenhove himself, that he was not a member of the force as defined in Article I of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement.” The Acting Legal Adviser then gave the opinion of his Department that neither the Agreement nor the United States Code provision upon which the plaintiff relies is applicable.
When this accord between the two governments is considered with the provisions of Article XVI, above referred to, that all differences between the governments are to be settled by negotiation or referred to the North Atlantic Council, I think it must be given the effect of withholding from the jurisdiction of the courts any action with respect to the application of the Agreement to the corporal. For if differences of opinion between the contracting governments as to the application of the Agreement are withheld from the judiciary, to be settled by negotiation or referred to the North Atlantic Council, obviously it follows that accord of opinion on the part of the two governments withholds the matter from the judiciary when such accord is that the Agreement does not apply to an individual. This seems to me to be a necessary implication from the provisions of Article XVI, considered with the Agreement as a whole. Since, therefore, the court may not go into the question of the corporal's status there is no judicial relief available to the plaintiff.

. Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, June 19, 1951 [1953] 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. (Part 2) 1792, T.I.A.S. No. 2840.

. 4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. (Part 2) at 1818.

. 1. In this Agreement the expression — ■
(a) “force” means the personnel belonging to the land, sea or air armed services of one Contracting Party when in the territory of another Contracting Party in the North Atlantic Treaty area in connexion with their official duties, provided that the two Contracting Parties concerned may agree that certain individuals, units or formations shall not be regarded as constituting or included in a “force” for the purposes of the present Agreement.
4 U.S.T. & O.I.A. (Part 2) at 1794.