Court Opinion

ID: 9479812
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:29:32.751515+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:47:17.585048
License: Public Domain

ALARCON, Circuit Judge,
concurring in the Judgment:
I concur in the majority’s conclusion that the district court erred in denying appellant’s motion to suppress. I write separately because I do not agree with my colleagues that the facts of this case present a close question.
The Supreme Court in United States v. Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. 1581 reiterated “one of the relatively simple concepts” that in reviewing the record to determine whether reasonable suspicion existed justifying a detention, “we must consider ‘the totality of the circumstances — the whole pic-ture....’” Id. 109 S.Ct. at 1585 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417, 101 S.Ct. 690, 694, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981)). In upholding the detention in Sokolow, the Court also relied on its prior holding in Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 100 S.Ct. 2752, 65 L.Ed.2d 890 (1980) (per curiam). In reversing a finding of reasonable suspicion in Reid v. Georgia, the Court concluded that the circumstances relied upon by the officer to justify a detention “describe a very large category of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually random seizures were the Court to conclude that as little foundation as there was in this case would justify a seizure.” Id. at 441, 100 S.Ct. at 2754.
The facts articulated by Agent Truty in this matter, to justify curtailing Hernandez-Alvarado’s liberty, describe a very large group of presumably innocent persons who live in or near Nogales, Arizona. At 8:00 a.m., Agent Truty saw a man, a woman, and a nine or ten-year-old child traveling in an automobile three days before Christmas on an interstate highway near Nogales, Arizona. This conduct appeared suspicious to Agent Truty because, in his opinion, drug smugglers travel at that time to blend in with the work force. Apparently, in the officer’s view of the Constitution, his suspicion would justify stopping all automobiles on the highway because one of them might possibly contain smugglers trying to blend into commuter traffic.
*1420Agent Truty was also suspicious because the automobile reduced its speed from the posted limit of 65 miles per hour to 55 miles per hour after the driver looked at the Border Patrol Agent's marked vehicle. Presumably, Agent Truty’s suspicions would also have been aroused if the vehicle increased its speed!
Agent Truty also noted that the driver turned away after seeing him and directed his attention to the road ahead. This conduct caused Agent Truty to follow the vehicle. I fail to see how compliance with an elementary rule of highway safety, i.e., keeping your eyes on the traffic ahead, can demonstrate reasonable suspicion of on-going criminal activity, especially at 55 miles per hour.
Agent Truty also observed that Hernandez-Alvarado’s vehicle had a “Best Deal Auto” license plate frame. According to Agent Truty, Border Patrol Agents in the Nogales area had seized marijuana from several vehicles bearing the “Best Deal Auto” license plate frames. The record shows that innocent, law-abiding citizens also purchased vehicles from Best Deal Auto. If this factor can justify a detention, then all purchasers of automobiles from Best Deal Auto would be subject to random searches without proof of any particularized suspicion that they were engaged in criminal activity.
Agent Truty testified that he took into consideration, in determining that he could stop Hernandez-Alvarado’s vehicle, that it had large trunk capacity capable of carrying contraband and a radio antenna protruding from the trunk lid. He also testified that drug smugglers use similar antennae to communicate with their confederates. No evidence was offered to show that the car in fact had a broadcasting unit or that Hernandez-Alvarado attempted to communicate with anyone prior to the stop.
The trunk space of Hernandez-Alvarado’s vehicle was apparently the same as that found on all Oldsmobiles of the same vintage. Clearly, it would be a violation of fourth amendment principles to permit random searches of all vehicles simply because they were manufactured with large trunk capacity.
Agent Truty’s check of the vehicle registration established that the owner, Guadalupe Hernandez-Ramos, lived in the Monte Carlo area of Nogales, Arizona. Agent Truty testified that this neighborhood was under investigation for narcotics activity. However, the owner’s address was not under investigation. Nevertheless, the fact that the owner of the car lived in that neighborhood was relied upon by Agent Truty to stop a vehicle, driven by a man who obviously was not the registered owner, without any evidence that the owner or the driver was suspected of on-going criminal activity. The fourth amendment does not contemplate the random search of all vehicles in a neighborhood because some of the residents are known criminals.
Agent Truty’s unparticularized suspicions proved accurate. A large quantity of marijuana was found in the trunk. It is of course black letter law that a search cannot be justified by the seizure of contraband. Long ago, in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968), the Supreme Court instructed that a detention cannot be justified by an officer’s “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch.’ ” Id. at 27, 88 S.Ct. at 1883. The Court reaffirmed this principle in Sokolow, 109 S.Ct. at 1585.
As noted by the majority, we have rejected the government’s suggestion in a number of other matters that similar lucky hunches justified a detention. Majority Opinion at 1416-17. Recently in United States v. Robert L., 874 F.2d 701, 703-05 (9th Cir.1989), we held that a Terry stop was not justified where the same Border Patrol Agent, Truty, testified that the defendant “glanced quickly” at the officer “and then returned his eyes to the road.” We concluded that this activity was normal under the circumstances. Id. at 703. We also observed that the fact that an older model Oldsmobile had a large trunk provided “scant support” where it did not appear to be heavily loaded and there were “no other distinguishing attributes.” Id. at 705. In the matter before this court, there *1421is no evidence that the Oldsmobile driven by Hernandez-Alvarado appeared to be heavily loaded or had been modified to carry contraband.
The majority correctly notes that we have required more particularized information in previous cases to support a finding of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify a Terry stop. Majority opinion at 1417-18; see also United States v. Woods, 720 F.2d 1022, 1026-27 (9th Cir.1983) (officers had reasonable suspicion of criminal activity where reliable informant told them a pregnant woman accompanied by a small child was going to meet a woman who would be arriving at the San Diego airport carrying cocaine and officers observed a woman fitting this description display the contents of a box to another woman); United States v. Perez-Esparza, 609 F.2d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir.1979) (officers had reasonable suspicion to stop defendant’s car where a reliable informant identified defendant’s car as one used to smuggle narcotics into the United States from Mexico).
In this matter, the district court upheld the detention of a Hispanic man who was driving an old car near the Mexican border, accompanied by his wife and ten-year-old child, in commuter traffic within the speed limit, based on testimony that (1) smugglers drive at that time to escape detection, (2) the car was purchased from a dealer who sells automobiles to drug traffickers and non-drug traffickers, and (3) it was registered to a person who lives in a neighborhood where other persons have been arrested for narcotics trafficking. The above facts describe a majority of the persons who live near our border with Mexico. To uphold the district court’s order, we would have to condone random detention and searches of a large number of American residents simply because they live in a depressed, crime ridden border area, drive old cars, when accompanied by their families, and look straight ahead after seeing a law enforcement vehicle.
Under Reid v. Georgia, and United States v. Sokolow, we are compelled to reverse the district court’s order upholding this detention of presumably innocent travelers.