Court Opinion

ID: 9831195
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-01 20:54:05.877807+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:43:32.350200
License: Public Domain

On Rehearing.
[4] The ruling made in the original opinion as to general moral character for “hon*324esty and fair dealing” is founded upon tile established rule that unless the pleadings or testimony introduced constitutes an attack upon tbe character of a party to the suit (whether plaintiff or defendant) for “honesty,” such party to the suit cannot offer testimony sustaining his general moral character “for honesty.” The rule is not modified by the cases cited, and it is not necessary to discuss all of thorn. In the case of Sheppard v. Love (Tex. Civ. App.) 71 S. W. 67, especially noted, the court said:
“Appellees introduced testimony which constituted an attack upon the character of the witness for truth and honesty, and testimony supporting his character was competent.”
The opinion does not set out the “testimony” referred to. And in the case of Schaff, receiver, v. Ida H. Beale, 250 S. W. 757, decided by this court, the defendant’s pleadings charged the plaintiff with gross fraud, viz.:
“And that the allegations * * * in plaintiff’s pleadings as to her injuries were an afterthought, inspired by plaintiff’s resentment and indignation because she was not shown such courtesies as were shown to white ladies riding in said car.”
As seen, these two cases as do others, go no further in the ruling than to say that “the evidence” introduced and “the pleadings” constituted such an attack on the character of a party to a suit as to authorize the introduction of sustaining evidence of general character for honesty and fair dealing. It is stated in M., K. & T. Ry. Co. v. Creason, 101 Tex. 335, 107 S. W. 527, that—
“At an early date in the history of this court it was settled that in the impeachment of a witness the inquiry should be confined to his general reputation for truth and that it should not extend to his general moral character.” Boon v. Weathered, 23 Tex. 675; Ayres v. Duprey, 27 Tex. 594; Kennedy v. Upshaw, 66 Tex. 452.
In the last case cited, Judge Stay ton quoted the rule as above stated from Boon v. Weathered, and said:
“ ‘This is in accordance with the great weight of authority.’ Boon v. Weathered has been followed by this court in all subsequent decisions and has in no sense been modified in its application to impeachment of witnesses.”
In Timmony v. Burns (Tex. Civ. App.) 42 S. W. 133, it is said:
“Evidence of the character or reputation of the parties [plaintiff or defendant] is not relevant in civil cases unless the nature of the action is such that general character is involved.” ,
In the instant case the defendant filed only a general denial, and there was no evidence offered constituting an attack on the character of the appellee. Under the general denial the defendant had the legal right, and without constitution an attack on the character of the appellee for honesty, to offer evidence to prove: (1) That the condition of the grabiron was not that alleged by the appellee: and (2) that the appellee did not fall as result of its condition; or (3) that appellee did not fall at all; or (4) that if appellee felt he received no personal injuries; or (5) that if ap-pellee did receive injuries they were not of the nature or severity alleged; and (6) that the physical maladies claimed by appellee to be the result of injuries received in the fall did not, in fact, have their origin in the fall, but resulted from other causes such as diseases which the appellee had before the fall. Any evidence of this nature was legal and admissible as bearing directly on the issues raised by the pleadings and did not constitute an attack upon the character of the ap-pellee for “honesty.” Necessarily the appel-lee’s evidence as to the extent of his injuries, and as to whether the physical ills and suffering claimed by him were the result of injuries due to a fall from the car, was, at last, but the expression of his opinion.
The special charge requested by appellant and given by the court was not permissible, and should not have been given. The giving of that charge, though, does not make harmless the error respecting the introduction of the sustaining evidence of general moral character. That error is to be measured by the pleadings and evidence offered and not by a subsequent charge invited through the admission of evidence objected to as illegal.
The motion is denied.