Court Opinion

ID: 9468732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 02:22:19.608821+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:38:46.075530
License: Public Domain

ALDISERT, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority have concluded that the evidence before the district court presented a triable issue in this proceeding in which appellant seeks to translate an accident in a coal mine into a products liability case. I disagree. I will give appellant an A for effort, but, with the district court, I am of the view that, on this record, the appellant’s innovative theory cannot survive a motion for summary judgment.
Two major impediments prevent me from accepting appellant’s convoluted theory, presented to Judge Troutman in the district court and repeated before this court. Each impediment constitutes an independent ground for granting the manufacturer’s summary judgment motion.
I.
I first clear away the semantic underbrush. The thrust of the plaintiff’s case is that the manufacturer failed to equip the scooptram with a warning device. Appellant’s expert conceded that a constantly operating alarm would be undesirable and instead presented a vague specification for an ideal “automatic” alarm that would operate only when the scooptram driver could not see people in the vehicle’s path. Appellant’s expert could not describe how such a selectively actuated device would operate, but one must inevitably conclude that the driver would have to activate it manually.1 This being the sole theory to subrpit the 402A design defect to the jury, I have no difficulty concluding that the manufacturer met this requirement precisely.
Just, as one may not hang a sign that reads, “this is a horse,” around the neck of a cow and expect onlookers to regard the animal as anything other than a cow, neither should one expect others to be impressed by new labels for familiar pieces of machinery. The proposed quasi-automatic “warning device” — manually activated when circumstances so require — is nothing more than a horn,2 and the undisputed fact is that the manufacturer equipped the scooptram with a horn that was removed sometime before the day of the accident. I would affirm the grant of summary judgment on this ground alone.
II.
Even if this analysis is rejected on the theory that there is a difference between horns that are fully automatic, quasi-automatic, and purely manual, the uncontroverted facts show clearly that a warning device on the scooptram would not have prevented this unfortunate accident.
The purpose of a warning device is to alert those not already aware that a danger is present. Hollinger did not require warning: he had seen the scooptram coming toward him only seconds earlier. The operator testified that Hollinger saw the scoop-tram and, acknowledging its approach, signalled to the operator.3 During the short interval between that signal and the impact, the machine was effectively its own warning device, reminding anyone nearby *412of its presence. The operator characterized the scooptram as lit up like a Christmas tree and producing a noise like a diesel truck.
Nevertheless, because it is not clear why Hollinger failed to get out of the machine’s way, the appellant would let this case go to trial. It is one thing to proceed with trial because evidence in support of a summary judgment motion has been met by factual showings that raise a question of material fact; it is quite another to ask a jury to speculate what the decedent might have been thinking and whether a hypothetical alarm might have made him alter his actions. The scooptram operator’s testimony is the only evidence that can be adduced on the causation issue. Appellant did not offer any testimony to counter this in the district court, nor is there any suggestion that trial will produce additional evidence. Accordingly, I would hold that whether the alleged design defect was the proximate cause of the death of appellant’s decedent was not a question warranting trial.
III.
For these separate reasons, I would affirm Judge Troutman’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the manufacturer.

. Appellant’s lawyer advanced the same theory at oral argument:
JUDGE ALDISERT: The automatic [warning device] would be used under certain circumstances?
COUNSEL: Those circumstances where there was a deviation. You don’t have to run it all day.
JUDGE ALDISERT: The theory then is that you should have an automatic warning device that would be only used where the driver could not see in front of him?
COUNSEL: Absolutely and where he did not know where the people were.

. Even pre-schoolers understand that a horn on a vehicle is sounded to announce the approach of the vehicle. For those with a penchant for authority, the dictionary defines this type of horn as “c) a device sounded to give a warning.” Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American Language (2d College Ed.).

. In his deposition, the scooptram operator responded to questioning as follows:
Q. Is it or was it a practice in the mine for miners who were on foot, when a scooptram was approaching them, to turn their lights, [their] helmet lights in the direction of the scooptram?
A. Right, towards us.
Q. Is that what Mr. Hollinger did?
MR. SENESKY: Objection.
THE WITNESS: Yes. App. at 130.