Court Opinion

ID: 9909496
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-13 17:00:40.617902+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:49:30.034178
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-1361     Document: 010110967967      Date Filed: 12/13/2023   Page: 1
                                                                                 FILED
                                                                     United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                       December 13, 2023
                          _________________________________
                                                                        Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                            Clerk of Court
  JENNIFER L. COOPER; EUGENE
  DIXON; FRANCIS J. CIZMAR; ANNA
  PENNALA; KATHLEEN DAAVETTILA;
  CYNTHIA BRUNELL; KARYN
  CHOPJIAN; ABBIE HELMINEN,
  individually and on behalf of all others
  similarly situated,

        Plaintiffs - Appellants,                             No. 22-1361
                                                 (D.C. No. 1:21-CV-02672-PAB-STV)
  v.                                                          (D. Colo.)

  US DOMINION, INC.; DOMINION
  VOTING SYSTEMS, INC.; DOMINION
  VOTING SYSTEMS CORPORATION;
  HAMILTON PLACE STRATEGIES,
  LLC,

        Defendants - Appellees.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, MORITZ, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Plaintiffs Jennifer Cooper, Eugene Dixon, Francis Cizmar, Anna Pennala,

 Kathleen Daavettila, Cynthia Brunell, Karyn Chopjian, and Abbie Helminen filed

 this action against US Dominion, Inc., Dominion Voting Systems, Inc., Dominion

       *
         This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
 of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. But it may be cited for its
 persuasive value. See Fed. R. App. P. 32.1(a); 10th Cir. R. 32.1(A).
Appellate Case: 22-1361     Document: 010110967967       Date Filed: 12/13/2023     Page: 2

 Voting Systems Corporation (together, Dominion), and Dominion’s public-relations

 firm, Hamilton Place Strategies, LLC (HPS), asserting two 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims

 under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause, one claim under the

 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Practices Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968,

 and one claim under Colorado’s civil-conspiracy law. We affirm the district court’s

 dismissal of plaintiffs’ claims because they fail to allege—and in one instance,

 affirmatively waive—the concrete and imminent injuries necessary to establish

 constitutional standing.

                                      Background1

       Plaintiffs were poll watchers and challengers in Michigan during the

 November 2020 election. After witnessing irregularities at their polling stations, they

 each completed an affidavit affirming as much. None of their affidavits mentioned

 Dominion. But the affidavits did result in each plaintiff receiving a letter, between

 late December 2020 and early January 2021, from Dominion’s defamation law firm.2

       The subject line of the letters was “Notice of Obligation to Preserve

 Documents Related to Dominion,” and they provided:

             Our firm is defamation counsel to . . . Dominion . . . . We write to
       you regarding the ongoing misinformation campaigns falsely accusing

       1
            We take these facts from plaintiffs’ operative first amended complaint. See
 Baker v. USD 229 Blue Valley, 979 F.3d 866, 872 (10th Cir. 2020).
          2
            The complaint does not say how Dominion identified plaintiffs. But
 Dominion’s briefing in the district court and on appeal explains that Dominion
 learned about plaintiffs’ affidavits because they were “associated with and attached
 to . . . litigation filed by Sidney Powell.” Aplee. Br. 1; see also King v. Whitmer, 556
 F. Supp. 3d 680, 688–89 (E.D. Mich. 2021), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 71 F.4th 511
 (6th Cir. 2023).
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       Dominion of somehow rigging or otherwise improperly influencing the
       outcome of the November 2020 U.S. presidential election. In recent
       days we sent letters to Sidney Powell and various media entities
       demanding retraction of their myriad defamatory and conspiratorial
       claims about Dominion.

              Dominion is prepared to defend its good name and set the record
       straight. Litigation regarding these issues is imminent. This letter is
       your formal notice to cease and desist taking part in defaming Dominion
       and to preserve all documents and communications that may be relevant
       to Dominion’s pending legal claims.

 App. vol. 1, 19 (footnote omitted). Each letter included a footnote clarifying that it

 was “a retraction demand pursuant to relevant state statutes and applicable rules of

 court.” Id. at 19 n.2. The letters also detailed what information plaintiffs were

 expected to preserve and asked each plaintiff to confirm with the law firm that they

 received the letter and intended to preserve the requested information.

       Plaintiffs describe these letters as “boilerplate directives meant to instill fear

 and intimidation.” Id. at 22. They allege feeling overwhelmed and experiencing a

 variety of negative emotions because of the letters, including “dread and fear,”

 confusion, concern, and nervousness. Id. at 28. Some responded by purchasing home

 security equipment.

       About nine months after receiving the letters, plaintiffs filed this class-action

 lawsuit for damages against Dominion and HPS, alleging that they each “sustained an

 actual injury in the form of damages to [their] property and violations of [their]

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 constitutionally protected rights” because of the letters.3 Id. at 29. Plaintiffs asserted

 two § 1983 claims against Dominion for violating their First Amendment and Equal

 Protection rights, as well as a RICO claim and a state-law civil-conspiracy claim

 against both Dominion and HPS.

        The district court dismissed plaintiffs’ complaint under Federal Rules of Civil

 Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). It first determined that plaintiffs lacked

 constitutional standing to assert their First Amendment, RICO, and civil-conspiracy

 claims because the complaint failed to adequately allege an injury for those claims.

 And although it held that plaintiffs had standing to assert their equal-protection

 claim, it nevertheless determined that they failed to state such a claim because the

 complaint did not plausibly allege that Dominion was a state actor at the time the

 letters were sent.

        Plaintiffs now appeal.

                                          Analysis

        We begin, as we must, with the threshold jurisdictional issue of standing,

 which we review de novo. Lupia v. Medicredit, Inc., 8 F.4th 1184, 1190 (10th Cir.

 2021). Standing doctrine derives from Article III of the Constitution, which limits the

 jurisdiction of federal courts to “[c]ases” and “[c]ontroversies.” Lujan v. Defenders of

        3
         According to plaintiffs, the letters were part of Dominion’s “illegal [l]awfare
 campaign,” a “coordinated campaign to intimidate Americans by waging and
 threatening to wage [l]awsuit [w]arfare . . . against anyone that speaks about anything
 negatively related to Dominion’s possible role in election integrity and security.”
 App. vol. 1, 16, 29.
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 Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 1). “Standing

 ‘ensures that a plaintiff has a sufficient personal stake in a dispute to ensure the

 existence of a live case or controversy which renders judicial resolution

 appropriate.’” Lupia, 8 F.4th at 1190 (quoting Tandy v. City of Wichita, 380 F.3d

 1277, 1283 (10th Cir. 2004)). A plaintiff seeking relief in federal court bears the

 burden of establishing Article III standing “on a claim-by-claim basis.” Id. (quoting

 Santa Fe All. for Pub. Health & Safety v. City of Santa Fe, 993 F.3d 802, 813 (10th

 Cir. 2021)). To do so, a plaintiff must show that they “(1) suffered an injury in fact,

 (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is

 likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v.

 Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016)).

        For standing purposes, an injury is “‘an invasion of a legally protected

 interest’ that is ‘concrete and particularized’ and ‘actual or imminent, not conjectural

 or hypothetical.’” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560). To be

 concrete, an injury must “be ‘real’ rather than ‘abstract.’” Lupia, 8 F.4th at 1190

 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340). But it need not be “tangible”—some intangible

 injuries will be sufficiently concrete for standing purposes. Id. (quoting Spokeo, 578

 U.S. at 340). And an injury is particularized if it “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal

 and individual way.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 n.1).

 As for imminence, “‘threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute

 injury in fact,’” meaning that “‘[a]llegations of possible future injury’ are not

 sufficient.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (alteration in

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 original) (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)).

       “At the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury resulting from the

 defendant’s conduct may suffice.” Kan. Nat. Res. Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 971

 F.3d 1222, 1231 (10th Cir. 2020) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561). But “[t]hreadbare

 recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

 statements, do not suffice.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting COPE v. Kan. State

 Bd. of Educ., 821 F.3d 1215, 1221 (10th Cir. 2016)). In short, “plaintiffs must

 adequately allege a plausible claim of injury.” COPE, 821 F.3d at 1221.

       Here, the district court discerned several potential injuries from plaintiffs’

 complaint, including chilled speech, threatened litigation, and investment in home

 security systems, but it concluded that none of these supported standing for plaintiffs’

 First Amendment, RICO, or civil-conspiracy claims. Rather than challenging the

 district court’s reasoning on these points, plaintiffs now highlight six “intangible

 injuries that [they] clearly alleged they suffered upon receiving and reading the

 letters”: (1) intrusion upon seclusion; (2) confusion and emotional distress; (3) public

 disclosure of private facts; (4) deterred speech on nondefamatory matters;

 (5) violation of First Amendment rights; and (6) compulsion.4 According to plaintiffs,

       4
         Plaintiffs did not assert these injuries below. They defend their choice to
 assert new injuries on appeal by describing the briefing on standing below as
 “general,” Rep. Br. 8, and the district court’s interpretation of their complaint as
 “cramped” and “unduly blinkered,” Aplt. Br. 35–36. But they do not dispute that they
 did not argue or assert these six intangible injuries below. We could decline, as the
 concurrence would, to consider these newly raised arguments as forfeited below and
 waived on appeal due to the absence of a plain-error argument. See COPE, 821 F.3d

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 these six intangible injuries establish standing for their First Amendment, RICO, and

 civil-conspiracy claims. Plaintiffs additionally argue that their alleged equal-

 protection violation establishes standing not only for their equal-protection claim, but

 also for their three other claims. We consider each point in turn.

 I.    Intangible Injuries

       To determine “whether an intangible harm is sufficiently concrete to constitute

 an injury in fact, we look to both history and . . . the judgment of Congress.” Lupia, 8

 F.4th at 1191. In so doing, “we ‘afford due respect to Congress’s decision to impose

 a statutory prohibition or obligation on a defendant[] and to grant a plaintiff a cause

 of action to sue over the defendant’s violation of that statutory prohibition or

 obligation.’” Id. (quoting TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 141 S. Ct. 2190, 2204

 (2021)). And as to history, we consider “whether plaintiffs have identified a close

 historical or common-law analogue for their asserted injury.” Id. (quoting Spokeo,

 578 U.S. at 340–41). With these standards in mind, we analyze each of plaintiffs’ six

 asserted intangible injuries.

 at 1222 n.7 (finding several new-on-appeal arguments in favor of imminent injury
 waived); Tompkins v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 16 F.4th 733, 735 n.1 (10th Cir.
 2021) (explaining that principles of forfeiture and waiver apply “even as to
 arguments in favor of subject[-]matter jurisdiction a plaintiff-appellant failed to raise
 below”). But with one exception discussed later, see infra Section I.D, we exercise
 our discretion here to overlook this preservation issue and reach the merits of
 plaintiffs’ newly asserted injuries, doing so in part because Dominion does not argue
 this preservation problem in its response brief. See United States v. McGehee, 672
 F.3d 860, 873 n.5 (10th Cir. 2012).
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       A.     Intrusion Upon Seclusion

       Plaintiffs first contend that “the letters intruded on the[ir] privacy,” causing an

 injury “analogous to a common-law intrusion-upon-seclusion tort.” Aplt. Br. 22. And

 indeed, courts have “readily recognized a concrete injury arising from the tort of

 intrusion upon seclusion—a tort protecting against defendants who intrude into the

 private solitude of another.” Lupia, 8 F.4th at 1191; see also TransUnion, 141 S. Ct.

 at 2204 (recognizing that intrusion upon seclusion represents a “harm[] traditionally

 recognized as providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts”); Restatement

 (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. c. (Am. L. Inst. 1977) (explaining that liability exists

 “only when [the defendant] has intruded into a private place[] or has otherwise

 invaded a private seclusion that the plaintiff has thrown about his person or affairs”).

 For instance, in Lupia, we held that the plaintiff had standing to raise claims under

 the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) because the defendant debt collector

 “made an unwanted call and left her a voicemail about a debt, despite her having sent

 written notice disputing the debt and requesting that it cease telephone

 communications.” 8 F.4th at 1191 (emphasis added). And in Seale v. Peacock, we

 similarly found standing to assert a claim under the Stored Communications Act

 because the plaintiff alleged that the defendant, “without authorization, intentionally

 accessed his [electronic] account.” 32 F.4th 1011, 1021 (10th Cir. 2022) (emphasis

 added).

       Plaintiffs rely on Lupia to argue that receiving the letters intruded on their

 privacy, causing an injury, because “[r]eceiving a personally addressed letter is not

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 materially different than receiving an unanswered phone call.” Aplt. Br. 22. Yet

 plaintiffs’ proposition overlooks a crucial distinguishing fact between this case and

 Lupia. There, we recognized the intrusion because the plaintiff had prior contact with

 the defendant corporation and asked it not to call. See Lupia, 8 F.4th at 1191. Here,

 by contrast, plaintiffs do not allege that they had any prior contact with Dominion.

 And unlike the plaintiff in Lupia, who pointed to the FDCPA, plaintiffs here have

 identified no specific statute in which Congress chose to concretize a cause of action

 for the intangible injuries they allege. In this context, the district court correctly held

 that receipt of a single letter (even one that falsely accused plaintiffs of defaming

 Dominion) did not intrude on their privacy.

        B.     Confusion and Emotional Distress

        Plaintiffs next argue that the “confusion and emotional distress” they

 experienced after receiving letters “falsely charg[ing]” them with defamation is

 sufficient to establish standing. Aplt. Br. 22. In support, they first rely on

 TransUnion, which involved claims arising from incorrect formatting of reports that

 credit agencies must provide to individuals upon request. See 141 S. Ct. at 2213. The

 Supreme Court primarily held that all but one of the class members lacked standing

 to assert these claims because they presented no evidence that they had even opened

 the incorrectly formatted reports, let alone that they were confused or distressed by

 doing so. See id. In so holding, the Court noted in passing that both lower courts had

 concluded the named class representative had standing for these claims based on his

 allegations of being concerned after receiving the incorrectly formatted report. See id.

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  at 2201–02, 2213 n.8. The Court saw “no reason or basis to disturb” that conclusion

  because the defendant had “not meaningfully contested [the class representative’s]

  individual standing as to those two claims.” Id. at 2213 n.8. Thus, contrary to

  plaintiffs’ position, TransUnion does not stand for the proposition that the experience

  of confusion and emotional distress upon receiving an inaccurate mailing is a

  concrete injury sufficient for standing. Rather, the Court passed on that question,

  having no reason to consider it.5

        Moreover, as defendants highlight, we have held to the contrary. In Shields v.

  Professional Bureau of Collections of Maryland, Inc., the plaintiff asserted claims

  arising from receipt of three debt-collection letters that “did not indicate the debt

  balance could increase due to interest and fees from the date of the letters,” alleging

  that the letters confused her. 55 F.4th 823, 826 (10th Cir. 2022). We held that her

  allegations of “confusion and misunderstanding [we]re insufficient to confer

  standing.” Id. at 830. We also suggested that the absence of any allegations that “the

  letters caused her to do anything” weighed against a concrete injury, as did the fact

  that “it would be unreasonable for a debtor in [the plaintiff’s] position to believe that

        5
           Plaintiffs also invoke Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. v. Sutton, 868 F.2d
  352 (10th Cir. 1989). Using selective quoting, they assert that Southwest Forest
  stands for the proposition that “emotional distress from ‘being falsely accused of
  lying’ is sufficient injury to justify actual damages.” Aplt. Br. 23 (quoting S.W.
  Forest, 868 P.2d at 356). But plaintiffs inaccurately characterize Southwest Forest’s
  holding. That case held in relevant part that a damages award for emotional distress
  caused by a wrongful termination of employment was not excessive under Kansas
  law. See 868 F.2d at 356. “[B]eing falsely accused of lying” was merely part of the
  evidence supporting that emotional-distress award. Id. So Southwest Forest has no
  bearing whatsoever on the standing issue in this case.
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  her debt would not continue to accrue interest.” Id.

         Plaintiffs seek to distinguish Shields by highlighting that the letters here asked

  them to take various actions, such as responding, refraining from speaking, and

  preserving documents. But aside from alleging that one plaintiff tried to call

  Dominion’s defamation counsel, the complaint does not say that any plaintiff actually

  responded, refrained from speaking, or preserved documents. Thus, plaintiffs’

  asserted confusion and emotional distress is insufficient to establish an injury for

  Article III standing.

         C.     Public Disclosure of Private Facts

         Next, plaintiffs argue that they were injured when HPS shared their names and

  addresses with a national publication, causing harm similar to the tort of public

  disclosure of private facts. We have explained that this tort “occurs when a tortfeasor

  gives ‘publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another’ and ‘the matter

  publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and

  (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.’” Shields, 55 F.4th at 828 (quoting

  Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D (Am. L. Inst. 1977)). But critically, the

  publicity element “means the information is conveyed ‘to the public at large, or to so

  many persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become one

  of public knowledge.’” Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652D cmt. a).

  And here, there is no allegation that the publication disseminated plaintiffs’ names or

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  addresses to the public.6

         Plaintiffs nevertheless assert that Shields supports finding standing here

  because the publicity element requires only “disclosure to ‘someone likely to widely

  communicate’ the private information.” Rep. Br. 11 (quoting Shields, 55 F.4th at

  829). And perhaps the publication here would be more likely to disclose information

  to the public than the company at issue in Shields, which merely conducted mailings

  for debt-collection agencies. See Shields, 55 F.4th at 829 (noting that plaintiff’s

  “alleged harm was that one private entity (and, presumably, some of its employees)

  knew of her debt”). But the complaint is devoid of any allegations that the

  publication at issue here is substantially likely to actually disseminate plaintiffs’

  names and addresses (let alone that it actually did so). In sum, although plaintiffs

  need not “plead and prove the tort’s elements” to prevail on their standing argument,

  they “had to at least allege a similar harm.” Id. Because they have not done so, this

  asserted injury is insufficient for Article III standing.7

         D.     Deterred Speech on Nondefamatory Matters

         Next, plaintiffs contend that because they “never defamed Dominion yet

  received cease-and-desist letters anyway, Dominion’s demand deterred [them] . . .

         6
            Plaintiffs contend that whether the newspaper “published the names or not is
  a fact outside the complaint.” Rep. Br. 11 n.4. But it remains true that the complaint
  does not allege publication.
          7
            To the extent that plaintiffs mention other torts in passing, they do not
  adequately brief any argument that such torts provide analogues to the injuries they
  assert in this case, so we decline to consider such arguments. See Shields, 55 F.4th at
  829 (declining to consider inadequately briefed arguments for injuries related to other
  torts that plaintiff “thr[e]w[] out” but did not explain).
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  from engaging in further non[]defamatory speech.” Aplt. Br. 23 (citation omitted).

  This is an argument for standing based on chilled speech, a theory that the district

  court rejected. And critically, plaintiffs explicitly abandon this argument their reply

  brief, asserting that they “d[o] not allege ‘chilled’ speech as an injury-in-fact.” Rep.

  Br. 10 n.2. Given this express waiver, we decline to consider plaintiffs deterred- or

  chilled-speech argument for standing.

        E.     Violation of First Amendment Rights

        Plaintiffs relatedly assert that the alleged violation of their First Amendment

  rights is an injury sufficient for standing. See PeTA v. Rasmussen, 298 F.3d 1198,

  1203 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that plaintiff had concrete First Amendment injury

  based on allegations that defendant police officers threatened to arrest protestors “if

  they did not cease their demonstration”). In support, plaintiffs argue that we must

  assume they will prevail on their claim that Dominion’s letters constituted unlawful

  retaliation against plaintiffs’ exercise of free speech in writing the affidavits—and

  must likewise accept plaintiffs’ assertion of the necessary prerequisite for such a

  claim, that Dominion was a state actor when it sent the letters. See Gallagher v. “Neil

  Young Freedom Concert”, 49 F.3d 1442, 1447 (10th Cir. 1995) (explaining that “the

  only proper defendants in a [§] 1983 claim are those who ‘“represent [the state] in

  some capacity”’” (second alteration in original) (quoting Nat’l Collegiate Athletic

  Ass’n v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988))).

        For authority, plaintiffs invoke Initiative & Referendum Institute v. Walker, in

  which we stated that “[f]or purposes of standing, we must assume the [p]laintiffs’

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  claim has legal validity.” 450 F.3d 1082, 1093 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc); see also

  Day v. Bond, 500 F.3d 1127, 1137–38 (10th Cir. 2007) (“Practically speaking,

  Walker mandates that we assume, during the evaluation of the plaintiff’s standing,

  that the plaintiff will prevail on [the] merits argument—that is, that the defendant has

  violated the law.”). As an initial matter, this assumption only applies when “the

  merits of the plaintiffs’ claims mirror[] the alleged standing injury,” so plaintiffs’

  asserted First Amendment injury could only support standing for, at most, their First

  Amendment retaliation claim (and perhaps their civil-conspiracy claim, which

  appears to be premised on the First Amendment violations). Day, 500 F.3d at 1137–

  38. More critically, Walker itself acknowledged that an injury for standing purposes

  requires a plaintiff to have a “legally protected interest”—a term that “has

  independent force and meaning” outside the merits of the underlying claim. 450 F.3d

  at 1093; see also Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 339 (describing standing injury as “an invasion

  of a legally protected interest” (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560)). As examples of

  such independent force and meaning, Walker offered a nonexclusive list of situations

  in which courts would not recognize a legally protected interest when assessing

  standing, including when a plaintiff’s “claimed legal right is so preposterous as to be

  legally frivolous.” 450 F.3d at 1093.

        And here, plaintiffs’ allegations seeking to establish Dominion as a state actor

  meet that standard. That’s because under any of the four tests we use to decide

  whether a defendant’s challenged conduct constitutes state action, the focus is on the

  challenged conduct. See Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1447–48 (listing nexus, symbiotic-

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  relationship, joint-action, and public-function tests, all of which are “fact-specific”).

  The challenged conduct in this case is the sending of letters, which plaintiffs contend

  Dominion sent in retaliation for their affidavits. But as the district court recognized,

  plaintiffs’ state-actor allegations “are only based on Dominion’s role in supplying

  voting systems”; the complaint says nothing about how or why Dominion’s conduct

  in sending the letters constituted state action. App. vol. 7, 94.

         To be sure, the complaint includes conclusions about Dominion’s state-actor

  status: “Dominion was and is a state actor and[,] in that capacity[,] engaged in First

  Amendment retaliation by sending . . . [the l]etters.” App. vol. 1, 90. But even

  plaintiffs acknowledge that such assertions “have a conclusory feel.” Aplt. Br. 41.

  And although plaintiffs argue that facts alleged elsewhere in the complaint support

  those conclusory assertions, that section of their brief tellingly lacks any citations to

  or quotations from their complaint that support their claim. Plaintiffs’ allegations

  entirely fail to appreciate, recognize, or acknowledge the distinction between

  Dominion’s general business of supplying voting systems and the actual conduct

  challenged here: sending the letters. Plaintiffs’ claim to a legally protected First

  Amendment right is accordingly “legally frivolous,” and their alleged First

  Amendment injury is not sufficient for Article III standing. Walker, 450 F.3d at 1093.

         F.     Compulsion

         Plaintiffs’ last asserted intangible injury is compulsion, premised on

  allegations that the letters required them to retract any prior defamatory statements,

  review and preserve their documents and communications, and respond to

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  Dominion’s defamation counsel. But the cases plaintiffs rely on involved

  “[c]ompulsion by unwanted and unlawful government edict.” Nat’l Collegiate

  Athletic Ass’n v. Caifano, 622 F.2d 1382, 1389 (10th Cir. 1980) (emphasis added);

  see also United States v. Sup. Ct. of N.M., 839 F.3d 888, 900–03 (10th Cir. 2016)

  (holding that United States had standing to challenge state professional-conduct rule);

  Dias v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 567 F.3d 1169, 1178 (10th Cir. 2009) (concluding

  that plaintiffs had standing to seek retrospective relief based on injuries caused by

  city ordinance). And here, as with the asserted First Amendment injury, plaintiffs

  have failed to allege any government compulsion. Because their assertions on that

  point are “legally frivolous,” their alleged compulsion injury is not sufficient for

  Article III standing.8 Walker, 450 F.3d at 1093.

        In sum, none of plaintiffs’ six asserted intangible injuries—intrusion upon

  seclusion, confusion and emotional distress, public disclosure of private facts,

  deterred speech on nondefamatory matters, violation of First Amendment rights, and

  compulsion—are sufficiently concrete injuries for Article III standing on plaintiffs’

  First Amendment, RICO, and civil-conspiracy claims.

  II.   Equal Protection Injury

        We turn next to plaintiffs’ assertion that their alleged violation of equal

        8
          In their reply brief, plaintiffs suggest that Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
  Baseball Players Association, 208 F.3d 885 (10th Cir. 2000) (en banc), “shows that
  even a private party’s cease-and-desist demand comprises an injury[] sufficient for
  standing.” Rep. Br. 10. But Cardtoons did not address standing, so it provides no
  guidance here.
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  protection establishes standing for their equal-protection claim as well as their three

  other claims. The district court concluded that plaintiffs had standing for their equal-

  protection claim because “the Tenth Circuit has held that the ‘injury in fact’ in the

  equal[-]protection context ‘is the denial of equal treatment’ itself.” App. vol. 7, 91

  (quoting ACLU of N.M. v. Santillanes, 546 F.3d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir. 2008)). As an

  initial matter, this ruling ignores that an equal-protection claim under § 1983 (just

  like plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim under § 1983) requires state action. See

  Gallagher, 49 F.3d at 1446–47 (explaining that Fourteenth Amendment and § 1983

  both require governmental action and that private discriminatory conduct “is not

  subject to the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibitions”). Thus, our prior conclusion

  that plaintiffs lack a legally protected First Amendment interest because of their

  patently frivolous state-action allegations applies equally here and is sufficient reason

  to conclude that they lack Article III standing for their equal-protection claim. See

  Walker, 450 F.3d at 1093.

        Additionally, the district court erred in its application of Santillanes here. That

  case involved an equal-protection claim arising from a voter-identification law under

  which in-person voters like the plaintiffs would have to present identification to vote,

  whereas absentee voters would not have to present such identification. Id. To support

  our brief and unexplained conclusion that “[t]he injury . . . is the denial of equal

  treatment,” we cited Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated General

  Contractors of America v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656 (1993). There, faced

  with a challenge to an ordinance that gave preference to minority-owned business in

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  the award of city contracts, the Supreme Court held that the injury for standing

  purposes was the “inability to compete on an equal footing” for the benefit of a city

  contract, rather than the actual deprivation of city contracts. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. at

  666. It explained that in equal-protection cases involving a government benefit, a

  governmentally erected barrier “that makes it more difficult for members of one

  group to obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member of the

  former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not allege that he would have

  obtained the benefit but for the barrier” for purposes of standing. Id. Instead, the

  Court reasoned, the injury in that kind of equal-protection case “is the denial of equal

  treatment resulting from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to

  obtain the benefit.” Id. Thus, viewed as an extension of Jacksonville, our holding in

  Santillanes does not stand for the proposition that in all equal-protection claims, the

  alleged denial of equal protection suffices for standing purposes. Rather, that is true

  only for cases involving a denial of a benefit or opportunity. See Jacksonville, 508

  U.S. at 666 (explaining that this rule applies to “an equal[-]protection case of this

  variety” (emphasis added)).

        This is not such a case. The letters that plaintiffs received do not erect a barrier

  or hurdle between them and some benefit or opportunity. Instead, plaintiffs allege

  only that by sending the letters, “Dominion disfavored and discriminated against

  the[ir] conservative political viewpoints.” App. vol. 1, 88. There is no accompanying

  allegation that, for instance, Dominion’s letters denied plaintiffs the opportunity to

  obtain a benefit on equal terms with those who hold liberal political viewpoints. And

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  to the extent that plaintiffs assert being denied the opportunity to participate in

  national debate following the 2020 election, that is simply not the same kind of

  opportunity or benefit discussed in Santillanes and Jacksonville. Thus, the district

  court erred in determining that the alleged denial of equal treatment was an adequate

  standing injury for the type of equal-protection claim plaintiffs assert here. And

  because plaintiffs lack standing for their equal-protection claim, it can’t confer

  standing as to their other claims, either.9

                                         Conclusion

         Because plaintiffs affirmatively waive a chilled-speech injury and fail to allege

  any other concrete injury as to their claims, they lack standing. We therefore affirm

  the district court’s dismissal order, except to vacate that portion of the order

  dismissing the equal-protection claim with prejudice and remanding with instructions

  to instead dismiss that claim without prejudice. See Shields, 55 F.4th at 827, 831

  (holding that plaintiff lacked standing and affirming dismissal without prejudice).

                                                 Entered for the Court

                                                 Nancy L. Moritz
                                                 Circuit Judge

         9
          Given this holding, we need not consider whether any equal-protection injury
  could extend to support Article III standing for plaintiffs’ other claims. We also need
  not address any of defendants’ alternative arguments for affirming.
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  22-1361, Cooper v. U.S. Dominion, Inc.
  HARTZ, J. concurring.
         Plaintiffs may have been able to show standing in this case. For example, they

  may have been able to establish that a reasonable person in their position would be

  deterred from engaging in nondefamatory speech about the election because of

  Dominion’s threats. See Initiative and Referendum Inst. v. Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, 1087–

  97 (10th Cir. 2006) (en banc); Rio Grande Found. v. Oliver, 57 F.4th 1147, 1164 (10th

  Cir. 2023). And as for other potential grounds for standing, I have less confidence than

  the majority that Plaintiffs lack standing on all theories raised on appeal.

         In my view, however, Plaintiffs did not adequately present any theory of standing

  in district court. Their response to Defendants’ motions to dismiss addressed justiciability

  in only two pages. They first argued their claim is ripe. They then wrote:

         [T]he Complaint alleges damages from RICO violations, denial of equal
         protection, deprivation of First Amendment rights, and injuries arising from
         overt acts of a civil conspiracy, all of which flow from Defendants’
         coordinated Lawfare campaign directed against Plaintiffs and the proposed
         Class in order to silence a national debate over election security and voting
         system reliability. Defendants threatened to bring spurious defamation
         litigation in Letters and in a nationwide public relations campaign soon after
         the Election. These threats have already been made and caused concrete
         injury including property loss and economic damages to Plaintiffs and
         members of the proposed Class.

  Aplts. App., Vol VII at 49 (internal citations omitted). This discussion does not preserve

  any standing argument. In particular, with respect to chilled speech it is not enough to

  baldly assert that they have been deprived of First Amendment rights without describing
Appellate Case: 22-1361      Document: 010110967967          Date Filed: 12/13/2023       Page: 21

  the deprivation and why it supports standing.1 And although the passage does mention

  property loss and economic damages, it does not describe the loss or the damages or

  make any effort to explain why they would suffice for standing here.

         I therefore concur in dismissing this appeal for lack of jurisdiction. If Plaintiffs

  had argued on appeal that dismissal for lack of standing was plain error, we may have

  been able to review the unpreserved issue. But “[w]hen an appellant fails to preserve an

  issue and also fails to make a plain-error argument on appeal, we ordinarily deem the

  issue waived (rather than merely forfeited) and decline to review the issue at all—for

  plain error or otherwise.” United States v. Leffler, 942 F.3d 1192, 1196 (10th Cir. 2019).

         1
           Strangely, Plaintiffs’ district-court brief cites Walker, 450 F.3d 1082, which
  contains a thorough discussion of standing based on chilling; but it is cited only to
  support the proposition that “a claim is ripe for review when the plaintiff’s alleged injury
  is already occurring at the time the lawsuit is filed.” Aplts. App., Vol VII at 48.
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