Court Opinion

ID: 9662126
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 23:00:02.879112+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:14:37.069124
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
concurring.
This matter is bogged down in a swamp of procedural semantics. Manifestly, on July 3, 1991, the trial judge intended to grant a new trial, mistakenly believing it could be limited to punishment only. Giving Article 44.01(a)(3), Y.A.C.C.P., a fair reading, the State was entitled to appeal the order under the rubric of the generic term “new trial.” However, it failed to give timely a notice of appeal. Thus the order effectively granting an unlimited new trial became final. As a matter of law the order “restores the case to its position before the former trial[.]” Tex. R.App.Pro., Rule 32. Therefore, subsequent proceedings on and after February 2, 1992, are in effect nullities, and I agree the judgment of the court of appeals must be reversed.
Accordingly, exercising power of this Court over procedural matters in criminal cases, Article V, § 5, Constitution of the State of Texas; Article 4.04, § 2; Articles 44.25, 44.33(a), Article 44.45(a), (b) and (c), V.A.C.C.P., to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals, the Court should not only remand this cause to the trial court but also remand appellant to the custody of the sheriff of Eastland County (if not presently in his custody) to answer the indictment in this cause.
For those reasons and with elaborations concerning “further proceedings” on remand, I join the judgment of the Court.