Court Opinion

ID: 9810213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:43:40.256572+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:29.303199
License: Public Domain

Stacy, C. J\,
dissenting: The disposition about to be made of this case is not warranted by the record. Much of the law discussed is inapplicable.
In the first place, the question of nonsuit was not and could not have been presented on the former appeal as the plaintiffs were then appealing from a judgment rendered on a verdict, and a new trial was awarded for error in the charge. All that was there said about an issue of fact for the jury was addressed to the motion for judgment on the pleadings; and hence it cannot be the “law of the case” on the present appeal which is from a judgment of nonsuit. It is a far cry from allegation to proof.
Secondly, it is the law of the case that plaintiffs are not entitled to judgment on the pleadings, as this question was directly presented and decided. 212 N. C., 801.
It is not alleged, and cannot be as the fact is otherwise, that the relation of creditor and debtor existed between the parties at the time of the execution and delivery of the instruments here in question, and plaintiffs admitted upon the hearing, in open court, “that they are not seeking any relief on the grounds of fraud, mutual mistake, and are not seeking to reform the instruments mentioned in the pleadings upon the grounds of ignorance, mistake, fraud, or undue influence,” or other like matter. (R., p. 20.) Any suggestion of oppression or overreaching was specifically disclaimed, and the plaintiffs were careful to refrain from any characterization. This narrowed the case to a question of law. See Perry v. Surety Co., 190 N. C., 284, 129 S. E., 721; Williamson v. Rabon, 177 N. C., 302, 98 S. E., 830; Ray v. Patterson, 165 N. C., 512, 81 S. E., 773; Porter v. White, 128 N. C., 42, 38 S. E., 24; Watkins *735v. Williams, 123 N. C., 170, 31 S. E., 388. Tbe admission accords with, the pleadings and is binding on the plaintiffs. S. v. Lueders, ante, 558.
There is neither allegation nor proof sufficient to invoke the principle often referred to in this jurisdiction as the “doctrine of McLeod v. Bullard.,” 84 N. C., 515, approved on rehearing, 86 N. C., 210, upon which the case was argued, and apparently has been decided. Harrelson v. Cox, 207 N. C., 651, 178 S. E., 361; Murphy v. Taylor, ante, 393. The law imputes a wrong or legal fraud only to prevent some imposition. Hinton v. West, 207 N. C., 708, 178 S. E., 551; S. c., 210 N. C., 712, 188 S. E., 410. Where all oppression is disclaimed, as here, there is no occasion for any imputation. The decision in Robinson v. Willoughby, 65 N. C., 520, is inapposite.
The parties were strangers. They voluntarily entered into the agreements and had them reduced to writing by eminent counsel who were familiar with our decisions. See Annotation L. E. A., 1916B, p. 101. The instruments are plain and unambiguous. Potato Co. v. Jenette, 172 N. C., 1, 89 S. E., 791. They speak for themselves. Cole v. Fibre Co., 200 N. C., 484, 157 S. E., 857. The case presents only a question of law for the court. Patton v. Lamber Co., 179 N. C., 103, 101 S. E., 613; Mining Co. v. Smelting Co., 122 N. C., 542, 29 S. E., 940.
Speaking to the subject in Young v. Jeffreys, 20 N. C., 357, Gaston, J., delivering the opinion of the Court, said: “The effect of a contract is a question of law. Where a contract is wholly in writing, and the intention of the framers is, by law, to be collected from the document itself, there the entire construction of the contract, that is, the ascertainment of the intention of the parties as well as the effect of that intention, is a pure question of law.” And in Festerman v. Parker, 32 N. C., 477, Hash, J., remarked that “if there be no dispute as to the terms, and they be precise and explicit, it is for the court to declare their effect.” See Spragins v. White, 108 N. C., 449, 13 S. E., 171.
To abandon these principles on the facts of the present record would be, not only to impair the sanctity of contracts, but also to jar the practice of drafting legal instruments by counsel. Cf., Smith v. Land Bank, 212 N. C., 79, 192 S. E., 866. The plaintiffs concede that the transactions were bona fide. They suggest nothing else. It is certain they have proved nothing else. Both sides were represented by counsel, and what was done was done under the advice of counsel. Everything was open and aboveboard. There was nothing concealed, strange or hidden. The action is to recover on the instruments as written, notwithstanding the expiration of plaintiffs’ option. The plaintiffs say, in law and in equity, they constitute a mortgage. The defendant says not. The allegation of the amended complaint is “that the two instruments *736taken together constitute in law and equity a conveyance of said property as a security for the payment of a debt.” The denial of this central allegation raises no issue of fact. It is either true or not true as a matter of law. What is there for a jury to determine? Perry v. Surety Co., supra. The case is unlike Streator v. Jones, 10 N. C., 423, and cases following, e.g., Newbern v. Newbern, 118 N. C., 3, 100 S. E., 77, where it was alleged that the writing did not contain the whole agreement. Here, both sides are predicating their case on the written word, yet the Court says its meaning is for the jury. This is new law in North Carolina.
If there be any imposition in the instant case, it has come from the plaintiffs and this costly litigation. At no time has the situation been of the defendant’s seeking, and she is not now denying to the plaintiffs any right which they have. With disarming candor she comes into court and says: “Here is the memorial of our understanding and what we did. It contains the whole agreement. If it does not mean what it says, then let the court tell us what it means. But let there be no charge of mistake or fraud, for none has been committed. We were strangers, all sui juris, and acted upon the advice of counsel.” Recognizing the soundness of this position and that the facts would support no other, the plaintiffs, in open court, accepted the gauge of battle as thus stated by the defendant, and there is no occasion for the Court to abdicate its functions. What was said in Potato Co. v. Jenette, supra, is very much in point.
Relying on the fairness of the contract, the sanctity of the written word and the stability of our decisions, the defendant has paid $7,000 for the property in question, plus $2,816.47 in back taxes, and after the expiration of plaintiffs’ option, she executed a deed of trust on the property to secure a loan of $8,000. Evidently counsel who examined the title at the time of this loan thought it was good.
The plaintiffs did not elect to exercise their option within the year as they had a right to do. If they have lost anything by this neglect, it is attributable to their own default and not to the defendant’s.
The case should be decided on the record, from which the majority opinion departs. My vote is for an affirmance, it having heretofore been determined that plaintiffs are not entitled to judgment on the pleadings.
WiNBORNE, J., concurs in this dissent.