Court Opinion

ID: 9850196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:53:17.135834+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:20:32.934578
License: Public Domain

*349MR. JUSTICE WEBER,
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion of the majority that the Montana Scaffolding Act applies to the facts of this case. As pointed out in the majority opinion, the essential portion of the Act is codified in Section 50-77-101, MCA, which, as pertinent to this case, states:
“All scaffolds erected in this state for use in the erection
...
of buildings shall be well and safely supported, of sufficient width, and properly secured so as to ensure the safety of persons working on them . . . and to prevent them from falling . . .”
The statute was enacted in 1909. There is no general statement of legislative purpose for this chapter, which also refers to temporary floors in certain buildings, guarding of scaffolds and stair openings, temporary toilets, building inspector enforcement, and penalties of $100 to $200 for each offense.
The majority cites the purpose of the Act as stated in Pollard v. Todd (1966), 148 Mont. 171, 418 P.2d 869, 873. Pollard states that the purpose of the Act is to impose absolute statutory liability to protect workmen and others from the “extraordinary hazards associated with scaffolds.” Pollard was a case in which ladders were placed on both sides of a door at a distance of about 15 feet apart, each ladder was fitted with metal hooks called ladder jacks which are devices commonly used in the building trades to support a plank, and a wooden plank 18 to 20 feet long was positioned on the ladder jacks. While standing on this plank platform, the plaintiff fell 12 feet to the ground after the plank broke near the center. I agree with the conclusion in Pollard that a combination of ladders, ladder jacks and plank constitutes a scaffold under the Act.
That is a different question than is presented here. In essence, our question is: Is a ladder a scaffold under this Act? From the background of the Pollard case, the majority opinion moves to the conclusion that a scaffold is a struc*350ture for support in an elevated place, as defined in Webster’s, and that any temporary apparatus providing footing above ground for workmen is a scaffold as held by the courts of Illinois. The majority does point out that the Illinois Act uses the phrase “all mechanical contrivances” instead of “scaffolds.” The Court then suggests that because the purposes of the two acts are identical, it is appropriate to conclude that any mechanical contrivance is a scaffold. I find no reasoned basis for that conclusion.
The majority cites cases from other jurisdictions describing the types of structures or devices which have been classed as scaffolds. A review of these cases does indicate a broad variety in the types of structures which have been classed as scaffolds. However, none of the cases have concluded that a mere ladder is the equivalent of a scaffold. I find little support in those cases for the majority conclusion.
The majority opinion then adopts the analysis of the Illinois Court which has held that the inquiry is not limited to the identity of the object, but rather “how it was being utilized at the time of injury.” That analysis is appropriate under the Illinois Act which is intended to include all mechanical contrivances. Obviously that phrase can properly include a ladder or a footstool. However, I find it of no assistance in determining what our legislature meant by using the term “scaffolds.” Finally, the majority opinion concludes that “scaffolds” includes “any device utilized by workmen to allow them to work where a fall might result in serious injury,” and then concludes that a 16-foot ladder meets that definition.
Notwithstanding that extended analysis, a 16-foot ladder does not appear to fall within the statutory provision relating to “all scaffolds erected in this state.” If a ladder meets the statutory definition, then a step-ladder, saw-horse, chair, or anything else from which a workman could fall and be hurt also meets the definition. I cannot conclude that the legislature intended that all these devices are to be *351classed as scaffolds erected in Montana.
It may well be that our statute should be modernized after 75 years so that it covers all mechanical contrivances as in Illinois. That amendment should be left to our legislature.
MR. JUSTICE GULBRANDSON concurs in the foregoing dissent.
MR. JUSTICE HARRISON concurs with MR. JUSTICE WEBER’S dissent, but finds in addition no factual or legal reason to keep Rice Motors in the lawsuit, and I would dismiss the same in this lawsuit.