Court Opinion

ID: 9466378
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:13:58.924787+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:39:41.965503
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
Although I concur in the judgment reached by the Court, I write separately to emphasize that this case presents yet another example of the need for district judges to state the reasons for the sentences they impose. Had the judge in this case explained his decision to impose on Montoya a significantly heavier sentence than that given his co-conspirator Leo Mendez, Jr., there would be greater certitude in the determination that the prosecution’s characterization of Montoya as a “major trafficker” in cocaine did not enter into the sentencing calculus. An explanation also would have helped assure Montoya that the judge was not improperly influenced by the prosecution’s remarks, and might have obviated the need for an appeal on this issue. In the absence of such a statement by the sentencing judge, Montoya was left in a quandary, and with a nagging suspicion as to the reason he received a prison sentence of three years while his codefendant was given only a suspended sentence.
Elsewhere, I have set forth in detail the rationale behind a requirement that district judges explain the reasons for the sentences they impose. United States v. Del Piano, 593 F.2d 539, 540-43 (3rd Cir.) (per curiam) (Adams, J., concurring), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 944, 99 S.Ct. 2889, 61 L.Ed.2d 315 (1979); United States v. Bazzano, 570 F.2d 1120, 1130-38 (3rd Cir. 1977) (Adams, J., concurring), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 917, 98 S.Ct. 2262, 56 L.Ed.2d 757 (1978). Thus, there is no need today to discuss further the policies favoring the proposed rule. Nonetheless, it bears repeating that, “[i]n the present case, a statement of reasons for the sentence would have served as an opportunity to demonstrate to the defendant, his well-wishers, and the public, what undoubtedly was the fact, that the judge was not swayed by [improper considerations]; that, as characteristic of the judiciary, he regards the state-sanctioned deprivation of liberty to be a weighty matter; and that the criminal process is basically fair and legitimate. Inasmuch as the judiciary . . . can retain its legitimacy only so long as it is seen to be guided by a sense of justice, the importance of such an explanation should not be underestimated.” United States v. Del Piano, 593 F.2d at 543 (Adams, J., concurring).