Court Opinion

ID: 9702767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:23:02.378898+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:41.398860
License: Public Domain

DISSENTING OPINION BY
Judge McGINLEY.
I respectfully dissent to the Majority’s conclusion that “[bjecause Reliance [National Insurance Company] is in liquidation, the merits of Dr. [Mark T.] Allen’s [Dr. Allen] claim against Reliance and Yel-lowbird [Bus Company] can only be decided through the proof of claim process” and that “[t]he Praecipe to Enter Judgment violated this Court’s Rehabilitation Order. ...”
Paragraph 22 of this Court’s Rehabilitation Order of May 29, 2001 provides:
All actions currently pending against Reliance in the Courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or elsewhere are hereby stayed. All actions currently pending in the Courts of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or elsewhere against an insured of Reliance are stayed for 60 days or such additional time as the Rehabilitator may request. This Order shall not preclude any action from proceeding prior to the expiration of 60 days provided that the Re-habilitator and the parties to any such pending actions have agreed to proceed. (emphasis added).
Order of the Commonwealth Court, May 29, 2001, Paragraph 22 at 8.
Here, Dr. Allen filed a praecipe to enter judgment on June 4, 2001. See Paragraph 1 of the Motion to Vacate Money Judgment1, June 29, 2001, at 2; Reproduced Record (R.R.) at 88. On June 29, 2001, Reliance and Yellowbird (collectively, Appellants) petitioned to open/strike the money judgment and alleged:
1. The instant case arises out of a workers’ compensation claim relating to a work injury, which occurred on December 12, 1999, involving an injury to neck and low back pain.
15. [sic] The Administrative Decisions of February 9, 2001 and May 1, 2001 do not Order defendants Reliance National Insurance Company or Yellowbird Bus Company to make timely payments to Dr. Allen. The Administrative Decisions merely make a determination that the medical bills were untimely paid, and grant interest on the bills upon payment.
16. [sic] Dr. Allen does not have standing under the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act [Section 428 of the Act, 77 P.S. § 921] to seek judgment in the Court of Common Pleas....
Petition to Vacate Money Judgment, June 29, 2001, Paragraphs 1, 15 and 16 at 2 and 7; R.R. at 88a and 93a.
*658In the present controversy, Appellants never challenged the jurisdiction of the common pleas court based upon the issuance of this Court’s stay. It is evident that Appellants agreed to proceed with the pending action pursuant to Paragraph 22.2
Further, before this Court, although Appellants acknowledged that “Reliance Insurance has since gone into liquidation and the Estate is being administered by a Liquidator appointed by the Commissioner of Insurance” it chose not to raise the stay as an affirmative defense. See Brief for Appellants at 8 n. 3. As a result, I believe that there was no violation of the Rehabilitation Order and that the stay does not sua sponte divest this Court of jurisdiction to entertain the present appeal.
On appeal, Appellants contend that Dr. Allen lacked standing to seek a money judgment against Appellants pursuant to Section 428 of the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act)3, 77 P.S. § 921.
Section 428 of the Act provides:
Whenever the employer ... shall be in default in compensation payments for thirty days or more, the employe or dependents entitled to compensation thereunder may file a certified copy of the agreement and the order of the department approving the same or of the award or order with the prothonotary of the court of common pleas of any county, and the prothonotary shall enter the entire balance payable under the agreement, award, or order to be payable to the employe or his dependents, as a judgment against the employer or insurer liable under such agreement or award .... (emphasis added).
Section 428 of the Act clearly provides that a money judgment for the “entire balance” shall be entered in favor of the “employe” or “claimant” in “any county” where there has been an “order” entered by the Department. Here, there is no question that Dr. Allen is a medical provider and not an employe or claimant. Also, there was no “award” or “order” entered in this matter. To his praecipe to enter judgment4 Dr. Allen attached the administrative decisions5 of the Bureau.6 The Bureau’s decision did not order Appellants to make timely payments to Dr. Allen or pay the balance of the bills. These decisions were not tantamount to an order. Because Dr. Allen had no standing under the Act to seek a money judgment in the *659court of common pleas, the court erred as a matter of law when it failed to strike the judgment.
I would reverse and remand the present matter to the common pleas court to strike the judgment entered in favor of Dr. Allen.

. The trial court treated the "Motion to Vacate the Money Judgment” as a "Petition to Open the Judgment.”

. Also, there is no evidence of record that Dr. Allen had notice of the stay.

. Act of June 2, 1915, P.L. 736, as amended.

. The praecipe to enter judgment stated: “[t]o the Prothonotary ... [k]indly enter judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Mark T. Allen, M.D. and against defendants Reliance National Insurance Co. and Yellowbird Bus Co., in the amount of $74,200.00, in addition to interest on all unpaid sums at the rate of 10% annum, calculated from the date of payment on each bill due (i.e., 30 days after the bill and medical report were submitted for payment).'' (footnote omitted). Praecipe to Enter Judgment, June 4, 2001, at 1-2; R.R. at 6a-7a.

. The Bureau of Workers’ Compensation (Bureau) issued two administrative decisions in regards to Dr. Allen’s application for fee review filed pursuant to Section 306(f.1)(5) of the Act, 77 P.S. § 531(3)b. The Bureau determined that “[a]s a result of the investigation, the Medical Fee Review Section made the following administrative decisions: the insurer/employer has been untimely in its payment/denial of the medical bill(s) submitted for fee review." Administrative Decision, February 9, 2001, at 1 and May 1, 2001, at 1; R.R. at 10a and 79a.

.Although the common pleas court stated that Dr. Allen filed a certification of judgment and docket entries from Dauphin County, a review of the record indicates that it was the administrative decisions, and not any Dauphin County docket entries that were attached to the praecipe to enter judgment.