Court Opinion

ID: 9739463
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:15:26.724567+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:12.374207
License: Public Domain

SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I agree with the majority opinion that the trial court's granting of the motion to correct errors may not be affirmed because the "findings" made are wholly inadequate.
Nevertheless, I would not terminate our inquiry with that determination. Rather, based upon the evidence of record, I would reverse the ruling of the trial court and order reinstatement of the jury verdict and the judgment entered thereon.
In this regard, I believe it appropriate to state my strong reservations concerning the frequently misapplied application of the so-called "thirteenth juror" principle. In my view a trial court should utilize the principle only when a judgment has been entered upon a jury verdict which is contrary to law. Unlike Precision Screen Machines, Inc. v. Hixson, 711 N.E.2d 68 (Ind.Ct.App.1999), cited by the majority here, the jury verdict is not contrary to law. In Hixson, the matter of defendant's liability was not in issue, and the jury's zero damage award was "contrary to the uncontradicted evidence, clearly erroneous, and so inadequate as to establish that the jury was motivated by passion, prejudice or other improper motive." 711 N.E.2d at 71. See also Sherman v. Kluba, 734 N.E.2d 701 (Ind.Ct.App.2000), trans. denied, in which the jury found the defendant 100% at fault but as in Hixson rendered a damage award in an amount less than the undisputed medical expenses incurred. The court held that verdiet "clearly erroneous as contrary to the evidence." 734 N.E.2d at 704.
It is too facile and simplistic to rubber stamp a trial court's grant of a motion to correct errors upon the time-worn shibboleth that the verdict "is against the weight of the evidence." See Ind.Trial Rule 59(J)(7). Application of this principle is fraught with problems and is subject to abuse where the trial court merely disagrees with the wisdom of the jury verdict and wishes to reweigh the evidence.
My judicial concern with the "thirteenth juror" principle has not materially changed since my dissent in Collins v. Grabler, 147 Ind.App. 584, 263 N.E.2d 201 (1970). I would now merely reiterate the substance of what I said then. A jury verdiet should not be vacated by the trial court unless it is contrary to law. Accordingly, I would reverse the ruling of the trial court here and would remand with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict.