Court Opinion

ID: 9594326
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:28:57.79147+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:36:02.738485
License: Public Domain

Smith, Justice,
concurring specially.
I concur in the judgment but would do so on the basis of criminal strict liability.
*253This case involves a regulatory statute, preventive rather than punitive in nature. The penalty imposed upon conviction is not great. Damage to the reputation upon conviction under the statute is not grave. The proscribed conduct “[results] in no direct or immediate injury to person or property,” but creates potential for the harm that the statute means to prevent. Morissette v. United States, 342 U. S. 246, 256 (77 SC 240, 96 LE 288) (1951).
The United States Supreme Court has determined that the states might, in enacting this type of statute to prevent this type of conduct, eliminate intent and knowledge as elements of the crime. See United States v. Balint, 258 U. S. 250 (42 SC 301, 66 LE 604) (1922); United States v. Behrman, 258 U. S. 280 (42 SC 303, 66 LE 619) (1922); Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 Colum.L.Rev. 55 (1933). Game and fish regulations may often be particularly well-suited for use of “public welfare offense” statutes. Here, where the purpose of the statute is to preserve a natural resource, the possible punishment is light, and a conviction will not affect reputation, the statute should be seen as a “public welfare offense,” and the court should not read a knowledge or intent requirement into the statute. See OCGA § 27-1-34.