Court Opinion

ID: 9369528
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-09 01:00:22.072618+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:15.703135
License: Public Domain

Case: 21-60587        Document: 00516639491             Page: 1      Date Filed: 02/08/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit                                 United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                 Fifth Circuit

                                                                               FILED
                                                                         February 8, 2023
                                       No. 21-60587
                                                                          Lyle W. Cayce
                                                                               Clerk
   Ruben Poghosyan,

                                                                                  Petitioner,

                                            versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                               Respondent.

                         Petition for Review of the Order of the
                             Board of Immigration Appeals
                                 BIA No. A203 600 862

   Before Dennis, Elrod, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Ruben Poghosyan, a native and citizen of Armenia, petitions for
   review from a Board of Immigration Appeals decision. He filed a motion to
   reopen the proceedings before the immigration court, alleging ineffective
   assistance of counsel. The immigration judge denied the motion. Poghosyan
   appealed that denial to the BIA and filed a second motion to reopen based on

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
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                                      No. 21-60587

   intervening precedent. The BIA denied the motion to reopen and dismissed
   the appeal. Because Poghosyan fails to show any reversible error, we DENY
   the petition for review.
                                           I
             Poghosyan sought admission into the United States in 2019 without
   an entry document. Shortly after, the Department of Homeland Security
   detained Poghosyan and issued a Notice to Appear. In response, Poghosyan
   filed applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under
   the Convention Against Torture.
             As support for his applications, Poghosyan recounted a number of
   attacks and threats he says he experienced in Armenia because of his political
   views and activities. For example, Poghosyan alleged that he was beaten and
   threatened by members of a political party for coordinating a campaign for an
   opposing political party. And he testified that “the police did nothing” when
   he reported the incident. He also recounted that members of the Armenian
   police threatened him “to force [him] to stop [his] activities in support of
   [the opposition party].” He further alleged that the police arrested and
   “severely beat[]” him shortly before he sought admission into the United
   States.
             Following his arrest and beating, Poghosyan filed a complaint against
   the officers with the Human Rights Defenders office, an Armenian
   governmental body responsible for the protection of human rights.
   According to Poghosyan, in response to his complaint, the police broke into
   his home and detained, interrogated, and threatened him over his support for
   the opposition party and his human rights complaint.                Poghosyan
   subsequently fled to seek asylum because, in his words, he felt that his “life
   was endangered” if he remained in Armenia. Poghosyan arrived in the

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   United States without an entry document, and the DHS detained him and
   issued a Notice to Appear.
          Prior to the merits hearing before the IJ, Poghosyan shared several
   documents with his counsel, including a medical document from a
   neuropathologist stating that Poghosyan has a diagnosis of “vegetative
   vascular dystonia (a psychological disorder marked by extreme fatigue,
   psychological vulnerability, anxiety and fear) with frequent hypertonic
   paroxysm (sudden attacks or violent expressions of emotion) and panic
   attacks.” The neuropathologist prescribed medications and determined that
   “[c]onstant supervision of a neurologist, therapist, and psychologist is
   needed.” The IJ was not aware of these documents prior to the merits
   hearing because Poghosyan’s counsel “did not raise any concerns [about the]
   diagnosis.”
          Following the merits hearing, the IJ found Poghosyan not credible and
   stated that he “would deny on the basis of credibility, as well as his failure to
   prove . . . [that it is] more likely than not [that he] would be persecuted or
   tortured if he was removed to Armenia.” The IJ then spoke to Poghosyan
   directly to explain the court’s decision.        During the exchange, the IJ
   questioned Poghosyan on whether his counsel had spoken to him regarding
   an appeal. The IJ explained the appeal process and noted that if Poghosyan
   waived his appeal, “[he] cannot change his mind at a later time.” The IJ
   offered Poghosyan time to confer on the issue with his attorney, reminded
   him that a waiver would be irrevocable, and asked if he wished to waive his
   appeal. Poghosyan responded, “I waive.” The IJ concluded that Poghosyan
   “knowingly and intelligently waived his right to appeal” and confirmed that
   counsel agreed.
          Poghosyan subsequently obtained new counsel and filed a motion to
   reopen, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel.        He alleged that his

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   previous counsel failed to seek a competency hearing and failed to preserve
   his right of appeal. Poghosyan also alleged a violation of his due process
   rights because some of the testimony was inaudible on the audio recording of
   the removal hearing. Without a clear audio recording, he contended, his
   competency at the hearing cannot be assessed properly.
            The IJ denied the motion to reopen, and Poghosyan appealed to the
   BIA. Poghosyan then filed a second motion to reopen, this time with the BIA,
   seeking remand to the IJ to consider asylum in light of a new precedent
   vacating an agency rule that the IJ cited. The BIA denied reopening and
   dismissed the appeal. Poghosyan timely filed a petition for review in this
   court.
            On petition for review, Poghosyan raises three issues. First, he argues
   that the BIA erred in dismissing his appeal of the IJ’s denial of his motion to
   reopen based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Second, he argues that the
   BIA erred in denying his motion to reopen based on intervening precedent.
   Finally, he argues that the BIA erred in finding no violation of Poghosyan’s
   due process rights.
                                           II
            This court reviews the denial of a motion to reopen or a motion for
   reconsideration under a “highly deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.”
   Lowe v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 713, 715 (5th Cir. 2017) (quoting Singh v. Gonzales,
   436 F.3d 484, 487 (5th Cir. 2006)). Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo,
   Barrios-Cantarero v. Holder, 772 F.3d 1019, 1021 (5th Cir. 2014), whereas
   “the agency’s factual findings” are reviewed “for substantial evidence,
   meaning that [this court] may not overturn the [agency’s] factual findings
   unless the evidence compels a contrary conclusion,” Maradia v. Garland, 18
   F.4th 458, 461 (5th Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks and citation
   omitted).

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                                        III
          To warrant reopening the case due to ineffective assistance of counsel,
   Poghosyan     must    demonstrate     that      counsel’s   performance   was
   “constitutionally deficient” and that he was “prejudiced” by the counsel’s
   actions. Diaz v. Sessions, 894 F.3d 222, 228 (5th Cir. 2018). A showing of
   prejudice requires “that there was a reasonable probability that, but for
   counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
   different.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
                                         A
          Poghosyan argues that his former counsel provided ineffective
   assistance because he “failed to inform the Court of the significant
   competency issues present in this case, . . . and did not ask the IJ to accept
   testimony under safeguards to ensure [his] right to a fair trial.” Poghosyan
   points out that he “provided [his attorney] with his medical documents
   months before the merits hearing.” And yet, his attorney failed to alert the
   IJ of his mental condition. He argues that “[h]ad the IJ [been] on notice
   [about] the mental health concern,” the IJ could have taken that into account
   when assessing Poghosyan’s reliability.
          But even though Poghosyan submitted documents showing a mental
   health diagnosis, that diagnosis alone is insufficient to cast doubt on his
   competency. See Matter of M-A-M-, 25 I. & N. Dec. 474, 477 (BIA 2011). On
   the contrary, the IJ found that Poghosyan was “coherent, appeared to
   understand the nature of the proceedings, and was able to answer questions”
   from counsel and the IJ. Similarly, the BIA determined that Poghosyan failed
   to show that he lacked competence at the merits hearing or that he was
   prejudiced by the absence of a competency hearing. The record of the
   hearing demonstrates that Poghosyan was able to recapitulate the alleged
   incidents that led to his seeking of asylum, and his testimony was largely

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   consistent with the record. Thus, under the deferential substantial-evidence
   standard, we are compelled to affirm the BIA’s conclusion that Poghosyan
   failed to show that he was prejudiced due to his former counsel’s decision
   not to seek a competency hearing.
                                          B
            Poghosyan also argues that his counsel rendered ineffective assistance
   by advising him to waive his right to appeal. He contends that because of his
   former counsel’s failure to provide meaningful explanation, he did not
   understand “what right he was giving up and the consequences of the same,”
   especially given his psychological limitations. He argues that “but for [his
   former counsel’s] failure,” he “would have had the chance to . . . request the
   higher courts to review the IJ’s determination.”
            But Poghosyan never denied that he informed his counsel that he did
   not wish to remain in custody for several months during an appeal. As the
   BIA noted, a decision in favor of a particular strategy rarely provides the basis
   for a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Matter of B-B-, 22 I .& N.
   Dec. 309, 310 (1998); De Zavala v. Ashcroft, 385 F.3d 879, 884 (5th Cir.
   2004).
            Furthermore, Poghosyan’s counsel was not the only one who ensured
   that he understood the consequence of the waiver. Following the hearing,
   the IJ noted the affirmative steps required to lodge an appeal and explained
   to Poghosyan multiple times that a waiver of his right to appeal would be
   irrevocable. The IJ explained the appeal process and noted that if Poghosyan
   waived his appeal, “[he] cannot change his mind at a later time.” The IJ
   offered Poghosyan time to confer on the issue with his attorney, reminded
   him again that a waiver would be irrevocable, and asked if Poghosyan wished
   to waive his appeal. Poghosyan responded, “I waive.” Under the deferential
   substantial-evidence standard, the record evidence does not warrant reversal

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   of the BIA’s conclusion that Poghosyan knowingly waived his right to appeal
   and is thus not prejudiced by any alleged ineffective assistance.
                                         IV
          Poghosyan also filed a motion to reopen based on intervening
   precedent. Poghosyan argues that his case should be reopened in light of an
   intervening decision by the United States District Court for the District of
   Columbia, which vacated an interim final rule that the IJ cited. Capital Area
   Immigrants’ Rights Coalition v. Trump, 471 F. Supp. 3d 25 (D.D.C. 2020);
   Citing that rule, the IJ denied Poghosyan’s application for asylum because he
   had not applied for protection in any country en route to the United States.
   Poghosyan argues that because the rule has now been vacated, the BIA should
   have granted his motion to reopen.
          Because the motion relied solely on a change in law, we construe the
   motion as a motion for reconsideration. Cardona-Franco v. Garland, 35 F.4th
   359, 365 n.4 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Gonzalez Hernandez v. Garland, 9 F.4th
   278, 283 (5th Cir. 2021)) (observing that “motions to reopen are reserved for
   new evidence,” while “[m]otions to reconsider are limited to ‘errors of law
   or fact in the previous order.’”). According to the applicable statute,
   motions for reconsideration “must be filed within 30 days of the date of entry
   of a final administrative order of removal.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(6)(B). And
   as the BIA noted, the motion is untimely because it “was filed more than 90
   days after the Immigration Judge denied the respondent’s applications for
   relief.” In response, Poghosyan seeks equitable tolling.
          The BIA determined that even assuming arguendo that equitable
   tolling is available, Poghosyan’s challenge is unavailing because the IJ’s
   adverse credibility finding can serve as an independent basis for denying
   Poghosyan’s asylum claim. See Avelar-Oliva v. Barr, 954 F.3d 757, 762 (5th
   Cir. 2020). As the BIA observed, the IJ denied Poghosyan’s applications for

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   relief based on the IJ’s adverse credibility finding, “and [Poghosyan] did not
   appeal this determination, which remains final.” Because he failed to appeal
   the adverse credibility finding, which was the IJ’s basis for denying relief, the
   BIA held that Poghosyan “has not adequately explained how he is statutorily
   eligible for asylum.” Reviewing the BIA’s denial under a “highly deferential
   abuse-of-discretion standard,” we hold that the BIA did not abuse its
   discretion in denying Poghosyan’s motion to reconsider. Lowe, 872 F.3d at
   715 (quoting Singh, 436 F.3d at 487).
                                           V
          Poghosyan also contends that his due process rights were violated
   because the transcript and recording of the hearing fail to reflect the complete
   testimony. He thus argues that he was deprived of a meaningful review
   because of the transcription failure. But “a mere failure of transcription, by
   itself, does not rise to a due process violation.” Kheireddine v. Gonzales, 427
   F.3d 80, 85 (1st Cir. 2005). Rather, “[d]ue process challenges to deportation
   proceedings require an initial showing of substantial prejudice.” Maniar v.
   Garland, 998 F.3d 235, 241 (5th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
          As the BIA observed, Poghosyan “has not proffered what the missing
   testimony was or what it would have proved, and has not demonstrated that
   the outcome of the proceedings would have been different had there been no
   alleged due process violation.” Nor does Poghosyan make that showing here.
   Thus, the BIA did not err in determining that Poghosyan failed to
   “demonstrate that the outcome of the proceedings would have been different
   had there been no alleged due process violation.”              And given that
   determination, the BIA did not err in rejecting Poghosyan’s due process
   argument. See Maniar, 998 F.3d at 241–42 (rejecting a due process challenge
   based on missing transcripts because the alien “fails to demonstrate any
   prejudice, let alone substantial prejudice”).

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                               *        *         *
         Accordingly, the petition for review is DENIED.

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