Court Opinion

ID: 9545709
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:18:00.160229+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:15:23.627642
License: Public Domain

Finley, J.
(dissenting) — Paul Handley, a nine-year-old minor, was struck and injured on February 23, 1945, by a tractor-trailer owned by Pacific Highway Transport, Inc., and operated by Charles Mortland. On June 14, 1945, his aunt, now his foster mother, was appointed guardian ad litem for the minor. Promptly on the same day, suit was filed by the guardian on behalf of the minor against Pacific Highway Transport, Inc., and Mortland. Judgment was entered on the same day, pursuant to a settlement agreement by the terms of which Paul Handley received $394.90.
In May, 1957, six months after he became twenty-one years of age, Paul Handley (now Paul Anderson by reason of adoption by his aunt, Hazel Anderson) filed a petition *498to vacate the ' aforementioned judgment. As grounds for vacation, Handley alleges: (1) That he was not properly represented in the original proceeding; (2) that the damages he recovered were grossly inadequate; and (3) that the parties made a mutual mistake of fact as to the nature and extent of his injuries. In substance, Handley’s petition alleges that the defendants’ insurance adjuster and his aunt, Hazel Anderson, reached an agreement prior to the appointment of the latter as his guardian ad litem; that, actually, no attorney really represented his interests in the original proceeding, since the attorney who appeared in his behalf was employed by the defendants, and that he never made an independent investigation of the facts for the purpose of determining whether the settlement, as it was worked out, was a fair one; that defendants prepared all of the papers for the action; that his aunt was appointed guardian ad litem, the suit was commenced, petition for authority to settle was filed and approved, and judgment was entered on the same day, ■ namely June 14, 1945; that the only testimony which was presented to the trial judge was that of his aunt, Hazel Anderson; that no medical testimony was offered; that the trial judge made no independent effort to determine whether the settlement was fair; that his known injuries consisted of a fractured skull and a fractured right clavicle; that the damages awarded were in the amount of his then accrued medical bills; that it was not then known that he had suffered brain and nerve damage, which later caused epilepsy from which he has not recovered and from which he is never likely to recover.
Defendants demurred to the petition on the grounds that it did not state facts sufficient to warrant vacation of the judgment. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the petition. Plaintiff has appealed.
On demurrer, all facts well pleaded and reasonable inferences therefrom are admitted to be true; this is so even when the petition pleads facts disputing the recitals in the judgment of the court, since the petition makes a direct *499attack upon the. judgment. In re Ellern (1945), 23 Wn. (2d) 219, 160 P. (2d) 639; Lakoduk v. Cruger (1955), 47 Wn. (2d) 286, 287 P. (2d) 338. No discretion is involved in ruling on a demurrer. It was a question of law for the trial judge to determine whether the petition stated sufficient facts to- establish a ground for vacating the judgment.
The petitioner specifically urged the trial judge to consider RCW 4.72.010(8) as authorizing vacation of the judgment on the basis of facts alleged by petitioner. Considering petitioner’s arguments, he-apparently mistakenly believed that subsection (8) of RCW 4.72.010 is a catch-all provision for the benefit of minors and other incompetents, which includes the grounds specified in the preceding subsections of the statute. Treating this reference to -RCW 4.72.010 (8) as superfluous, let us examine the petition to determine whether it states facts sufficient to vacate the judgment on any ground.
It is important to understand the nature of the action alleged to have been originally instituted relative to the minor’s personal injury claims. It was not the usual adversary personal injury lawsuit. The parties did not submit a dispute to the court for determination; rather, they submitted a settlement agreement for approval by the court and a consent judgment thereon. In other words, the parties went to court simply because a minor’s personal injury claims cannot be satisfactorily handled, compromised or released in any other manner. Absent a sufficient investigation to determine the wisdom of the settlement from the infant’s point of view, the judgment of the court is little more than a rubber stamp or seal of approval. Court decisions elsewhere have compared the resulting judgment to an agreement or a simple release signed by an adult. Elsen v. State Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. (1945), 219 Minn. 315, 17 N. W. (2d) 652; Union Sawmill Co. v. Langley (1933), 188 Ark. 316, 66 S. W. (2d) 300; Harvey v. Georgia (1933), 148 MisC. 633, 266 N. Y. S. 168; and see the annotation in 8 A. L. R. (2d), beginning at p. 460. The writer of the particular annotation states that there appears to *500be no sound reason for treating an infant differently from an adult where fraud, mistake, or nondisclosure is alleged as to a release simply because the minor’s release is incorporated in a court decree, whereas an adult signs a document of release. I am influenced by the compelling and realistic logic of this statement. It seems to me that these factors should be borne in mind in determining whether an infant has established a sufficient basis for vacating a judgment.2
When a minor has a legal guardian, RCW 11.92.060 prescribes a definite procedure to be followed in obtaining court approval of compromise settlements. In In re Phillips Estate (1955), 46 Wn. (2d) 1, 278 P. (2d) 627, we said that the policy of the statute is to “ . . . require that the court have sufficient information so that approval or disapproval of a settlement agreement would represent an informed opinion.” Unless that requirement of the statute is met, the compromise agreements approved under that statute are void. Grady v. Dashiell (1945), 24 Wn. (2d) 272, 163 P. (2d) 922.
It seems to me that basic policy considerations would be the same in any and all cases in which court approval is sought of compromise settlements involving minors. Certainly a court does not render an informed opinion when it does no more than approve as to form a settlement agreement.
RCW 4.72.010(3) provides:
“The superior court in which a judgment or final order has been rendered, or made, shall have power to vacate or modify such judgment or order:
“(3) For mistakes, neglect or omission of the clerk, or irregularity in obtaining a judgment or order.”
*501In National Bank of Commerce v. Kilsheimer & Co. (1910), 59 Wash. 460, 110 Pac. 15, the court said:
“It [the statute] provides for modification for mistakes —that is one ground for the modification; and we have no idea that it was the intention of the legislature to so narrowly restrict the words ‘mistakes or neglect’ as to make them apply only to mistakes or neglect of the clerk, but that they were to apply to any mistake or any neglect which in the judgment of the court would warrant a modification of the judgment in the furtherance of justice.”
Mutual mistake of a material fact has been recognized as a basis for rescinding a contract in the decisions of this court. See Austin v. Dunn (1934), 176 Wash. 453, 29 P. (2d) 740; Lindeberg v. Murray (1921), 117 Wash. 483, 201 Pac. 759. In other jurisdictions it has been recognized as a ground for vacating a judgment involving a minor. See Elsen v. State Farmers Mut. Ins. Co., supra; Wilson v. Davidson (1944), 219 Minn. 42, 17 N. W. (2d) 31; Harvey v. Georgia, supra.
In Wilson v. Davidson, supra, the Minnesota supreme court said:
“. . . If a showing is made indicating that an injustice will be done the minor if the approval is allowed to stand because of separate and distinct injuries sustained by him not contemplated by the parties or considered in the settlement, the court has the authority to exercise its discretion in vacating the order.” (Italics mine.)
This is very similar to the definition of “mistake” given by this court in National Bank of Commerce v. Kilsheimer & Co., supra.
I believe that the facts alleged in the petition indicate a mutual mistake of a material fact which, if established by proof, could constitute a ground for vacating the judgment against the minor “in the furtherance of justice.”
In Merritt v. Graves (1909), 52 Wash. 57, 100 Pac. 164, and In re Ellern, supra, the court adopted the following definition of “irregularity,” as used in RCW 4.72.010(3):
“ ‘An irregularity is defined to be the want of adherence to some prescribed rule or mode of proceeding; and it consists either in omitting to do something that is neces*502sary for the due and orderly conducting of a suit, or doing it in an unseasonable time or improper manner.’ ”
Where, as here, a minor’s petition for • vacation of a judgment alleges that (1) the proceedings were such that the approval of the court did not represent an informed opinion; (2) no' independent counsel evaluated his, claim and informed the court of its fairness, and (3) the settlement was agreed upon before the appointment of a guardian ad litem, I believe that the petition alleges sufficient facts to constitute an irregularity within the above definition as against a demurrer. It must be remembered that the instant case is here on demurrer. We must accept all facts well pleaded and all reasonable inference therefrom as true. Whether the allegations are subsequently proved involves another distinct and different legal problem, in case appellate review is occasioned.
Respondent contends that appellant, in his petition to vacate, has failed to allege a meritorious cause of action, and that under RCW 4.72.050 the demurrer was properly sustained on that ground alone. Because of the nature of the procedure involved heretofore in the cause, there may be some question as to whether the judgment as originally entered for appellant amounted to an adjudication of liability on the part of the respondent. In this connection, I shall only mention, in passing, an inconsistency which exists in the trial court’s order and findings. The order authorizing compromise and settlement states, in part, that
“. . . liability for said accident and resulting injuries to plaintiff is doubtful, uncertain and disputed, and that it is uncertain whether any legal liability or responsibility for said accident is attributable to the defendants,
The trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the judgment was of course based reads, in part:
“That said accident and resulting injuries to plaintiff were caused solely and proximately by the negligence of defendant. That said defendants were negligent in that *503the operator of said equipment failed to keep a proper lookout while operating said truck and trailer and in failing to keep the same under proper control. . . . ”
It is in fact not necessary to determine whether the entry of this judgment was an adjudication of liability. The original complaint filed in this action and the instant petition to vacate the judgment are both pleadings in the same cause. They bear the same superior court cause number and are both included in the transcript in the present appeal and, obviously, are now before this court in the present appeal. The reasoning of the court in Harringer v. Keenan, (1921), 117 Wash. 311, 201 Pac. 306, is decisive of the instant problem. In that case the court stated:
“The second contention under this head is that the application was not accompanied by a showing of a meritorious cause of action. But this is not necessary where a plaintiff seeks to be relieved from a default inadvertently entered against him. His cause of action appears in his complaint, and repetition thereof would in no manner enlighten the court. The cases cited in support of the point, namely, . . . [Citing cases.] are cases where a defendant sought relief from a judgment against him. In such instances the courts generally hold it necessary to show, in addition to the causes for vacating the judgment, that the applicant has a meritorious defense to the action in which the judgment against him was entered. This for the reason that it does not otherwise appear; a principle inapplicable to the plaintiff in an action.” (Italics mine.)
For the reasons indicated hereinbefore, it is my conviction that the judgment of the trial court should be reversed. I therefore, dissent.
Rosellini, Foster, and Hunter, JJ., concur with Finley, J.
October 8, 1959. Petition for rehearing denied.

 I am aware of the statement made by the court in Kromer v. Friday (1895), 10 Wash. 621, 39 Pac. 229:
“In the absence of fraud or collusion, minors properly represented are bound as fully as if they had been majors and personally cited.”
I am convinced the statement was dictum and was made in a completely different factual context. It is not persuasive in considering the-factual context of the instant case.