Court Opinion

ID: 9571377
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:31:18.433863+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:22.405888
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen
(dissenting). In its opinion, the trial court said:
“But, as I assess credibility under the total factual situation exposed here, and there is some conflict of evidence — my resolution is that the facts here, as I interpret credibility, do not justify the exercise of the privilege of self-defense on the part of the defendant here. . . .”
The reference in the opinion to “credibility” and “conflict of evidence,” can refer only to the issue of who shot first, the tavern owner or the gun-toting defendant. There is no dispute as to the defendant coming into the tavern, armed with a gun; as to his ordering the tavern-keeper to turn over some money, which was handed over; or even as to his striking the tavern owner on the side of the head with the gun, all before the defendant started for the door.
The issue of credibility is as to the conflict of testimony as to who shot first. The tavern owner testified that he came from behind the bar, unarmed, saying, “Okay, buddy, you won’t get far,” and the defendant turned around and started shooting at the owner, a bullet striking the tavernkeeper in the abdomen. The defense testimony was that, after the defendant had secured the money at gunpoint, he was fired upon by the tavern-keeper, whereupon defendant turned around and fired back. The question of “credibility” and “conflict of *161evidence” which the trial court assessed were resolved in favor of the state and against the defendant. Credibility and conflict are for the trier of fact to determine. (State v. Christopher (1969), 44 Wis. 2d 120, 127, 170 N. W. 2d 803.)
So the writer would affirm without reaching what the majority phrases as the issue of “. . . whether the defendant, the initial aggressor, regained the privilege of acting in self-defense by withdrawing from the conflict and giving adequate notice . . .” But on that question, the writer would make clear that an armed holdup man does not “withdraw from the conflict” when he begins his exit, still armed with a dangerous weapon, from the scene of the robbery. Here defendant’s brief lists the defendant’s turning around and facing the street with his back to the bar and opening the front door as indicia that the defendant “had, in good faith, withdrawn from the conflict.” The brief asks, “what more effective way can a withdrawal be communicated than by a person’s actions?” Actions can speak louder than words, but remaining armed with a dangerous weapon was an action too. Withdrawal means abandoning the enterprise, not leaving the scene. The “what more” that could have been done to demonstrate “withdrawal” would, at the least, have to include tossing away the gun and perhaps raising the hands overhead in the traditional arm position that indicates evident inability, as well as lack of intention, to threaten or inflict further harm. The bank or tavern robber who backs up or turns and heads for the door, gun in one hand, loot in the other, is not “withdrawing from the conflict.” Rather, he is engaged in assuring its successful completion, and, while so engaged in a criminal enterprise, his role and rights do not change from that of an armed holdup man to that of a peaceful citizen on his way home from work. *162More than a few steps, or their direction, are required to turn Mr. Hyde back to Dr. Jekyll.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice E. Harold Hallows and Mr. Justice Leo B. Hanley join in this dissent.