Court Opinion

ID: 9411270
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-07-26 15:04:38.062225+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:21:05.809832
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                          Opinion filed July 26, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D23-0657
                      Lower Tribunal No. F12-15851
                          ________________

                         Silvio Rojas Narvaez,
                                  Appellant,

                                     vs.

                         The State of Florida,
                                  Appellee.

      An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from
the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Zachary James, Judge.

     Silvio Rojas Narvaez, in proper person.

     Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.

Before LINDSEY, GORDO and LOBREE, JJ.

     LINDSEY, J.
      Pro se Appellant (Defendant below) Silvio Rojas Narvaez appeals from

the summary denial of his motion for postconviction DNA and fingerprint

testing of a Swiss Army knife, which was used during the commission of the

crime for which he was convicted. Because the record conclusively shows

that (1) there is no reasonable probability Defendant would have been

acquitted or received a lesser sentence if DNA evidence had been admitted

and (2) Defendant failed to show good cause for postconviction fingerprint

analysis, we affirm.

      In 2012, Defendant was charged with the murder of his girlfriend.

Defendant confessed to killing the victim in a post-Miranda police interview.

According to Defendant himself, he and the victim began arguing when he

came home from work.         The victim grabbed a Swiss Army knife and

threatened Defendant. He hit her twice in the face, causing her to drop the

knife. Defendant then picked up the knife and stabbed the victim in the

stomach. Moments later, Defendant used a large kitchen knife to cut the

victim’s neck, which ultimately resulted in her death.         Defendant also

admitted to using the kitchen knife to cut his own wrists because he felt guilty

for what he had done.

      A jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder, and he was

sentenced to life in prison. In November 2022, Defendant filed the underlying

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Motion for Postconviction DNA and Fingerprint Testing of the Swiss Army

knife. Defendant contends, contrary to his own confession, that DNA and

fingerprint evidence would show that the victim attacked Defendant with the

Swiss Army knife and used the knife to cut Defendant’s wrists and that

Defendant then used the kitchen knife to defend himself. The trial court

denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that “Defendant’s claims are clearly

refuted by the law and the record, and he is not entitled to an evidentiary

hearing.” Defendant appeals. 1

        We agree with the trial court that Defendant is not entitled to

postconviction discovery of DNA or fingerprint evidence.           Defendant’s

request for postconviction DNA testing is governed by Florida Rule of

Criminal Procedure 3.853. Under the rule, the trial court is required to make

certain findings when ruling on a motion for postconviction DNA testing.

Relevant here is 3.853(c)(5)(C), which is “[w]hether there is a reasonable

probability that the movant would have been acquitted or would have

received a lesser sentence if the DNA evidence had been admitted at trial.”

        Based on the record before us, we agree with the trial court that “there

is no reasonable probability that the Defendant would have been acquitted

1
    Defendant did not file an initial brief.
                                            3
or would have received a lesser sentence if the DNA evidence had been

admitted at trial.” As the trial court explained:

            [T]here is no issue as to identity or question as to who
            slashed the victim’s neck, and there is no question
            that both the victim and Defendant held the subject
            knife during the incident. The Defendant provided a
            confession excluding any other person from the
            scene, and he admitted to fatally slicing the victim’s
            neck and then inflicting knife wounds on himself. Any
            DNA analysis of the knife would not reveal anything
            relevant or material: It would not provide any
            information on who handled the knife first or last,
            precisely when it was used, or how it was used. The
            Defendant’s attorney did the best he could with the
            insurmountable evidence presented by the State
            against the Defendant, and the jury did not believe
            the defense’s theories that the victim’s death was the
            result of a mistake, accident, or mutual fray. There is
            no reasonable probability that DNA analysis of a
            knife admittedly held by both the victim and the
            Defendant would have resulted in the Defendant’s
            acquittal or lesser sentence.

(Record citations omitted).

      We also agree with the trial court that Defendant is not entitled to

postconviction fingerprint testing of the Swiss Army knife. With respect to

the scope and availability of postconviction discovery, our Supreme Court

has held that “it is within the trial judge’s inherent authority, rather than any

express authority found in the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to allow limited

discovery.” State v. Lewis, 656 So. 2d 1248, 1249 (Fla. 1994); see also

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Muhammad v. State, 132 So. 3d 176, 204 (Fla. 2013).            Moreover, the

following parameters apply:

            [T]he motion seeking discovery must set forth good
            reason; the court may grant limited discovery into
            matters which are relevant and material; the court
            may set limits on the sources and scope of such
            discovery; and on review of orders limiting or denying
            discovery, the moving party has the burden of
            showing an abuse of discretion.

Rodriguez v. State, 919 So. 2d 1252, 1279 (Fla. 2005), as revised on denial

of reh’g (Jan. 19, 2006).

      We have no trouble concluding that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion when it summarily denied Defendant’s request for postconviction

fingerprint testing. We agree with the trial court that given the record, any

fingerprint testing would be immaterial:

            Here, the uncontroverted facts are that the
            Defendant and victim resided together for years, and
            the Defendant’s own statements reveal that the
            subject knife was handled by both of them. The
            Defendant further revealed that he used the knife to
            stab the victim in the stomach and was the last to
            hold it. Any fingerprint analysis of the knife would be
            immaterial to any claims or defenses raised: Again, it
            would not provide any information on who handled
            the knife first or last, precisely when it was used, or
            how it was used.

(Record citations omitted).

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      Because the record conclusively shows that Defendant is not entitled

to postconviction DNA or fingerprint testing, we affirm.

      Affirmed.

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