Court Opinion

ID: 9856629
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 06:52:33.400896+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:10.273183
License: Public Domain

WEISBERG, Judge,
concurring.
I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the trial court properly admitted expert testimony describing the subject DNA samples as “identical” and “matched completely.” Notwithstanding, because the admission of this testimony was harmless error, I concur in the result.
Admissibility of Expert Testimony
In State v. Bible, 175 Ariz. 549, 858 P.2d 1152 (1993), cert. denied, — U.S.-, 114 S.Ct. 1578, 128 L.Ed.2d 221 (1994), the Arizona Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of DNA evidence. The court first clarified that Arizona would continue to follow the Frye14 test in determining the admissibility of scientific testimony, rather than the relevancy standard enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., — U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 2786, 2794, 125 L.Ed.2d 469 (1993). The court then applied the Frye test to the three step analysis15 required to interpret DNA evidence. The court concluded that step #3, the random match probability calculation, was not grounded on generally accepted scientific theory, and was therefore inadmissible. Bible, 175 Ariz. at 586-87, 858 P.2d at 1189-90. While the court acknowledged that the probability favoring a random match is the “telling and crucial bottom line of DNA evidence,” id. at 582, 858 P.2d at 1185, it candidly admitted being unable to foresee what technological advances and explanatory evidence might subsequently be available. It therefore left open the question whether other types of testimony regarding the existence of a “match” would be admissible.
In State v. Hummert, 183 Ariz. 484, 905 P.2d 493 (App.1994), a different panel of this court held that expert testimony of the rarity of a match between questioned and known DNA samples was inadmissible because “‘[t]o say that two patterns match, without providing any specifically valid estimate (or, at least, an upper bound) of the frequency with which such matches might occur by chance, is meaningless.’” Id. at 487, 905 P.2d at 496 (quoting National Research Counsel, DNA Technology in Forensic Science 9 (1992)). In Hummert, the expert had testified that the DNA samples matched and that such a “rare” event “uniquely identified” the defendant. The court found the intro*516duction of this testimony even more damaging to the defendant than the random match probability statistics not allowed by Bible, because the expert was not merely “giving the odds” of a meaningless (or random) match, but was in fact eliminating any possibility of error by stating that the match was conclusive of identity. Id.
The expert testimony in the instant case mirrors that presented in Hummert. Here, the expert testified that the DNA sample from the PV-30 tree and the samples from the pods found in defendant’s truck bed “were identical” and “matched completely.” Testimony that there is at least a slight chance of error, whether the odds are 1 in 1.1 million or 1 in 136,000, certainly is less prejudicial than the conclusion that the samples are identical and originate from the same tree. The admission of this testimony runs counter to our supreme court’s decision in Bible to limit the introduction of such evidence until its validity is established within the scientific community. Since, without the random match probability calculations, the jury does not know “ “whether the [matching] patterns are as common as a picture with two eyes or as unique as the Mona Lisa,’ ” Bible, 175 Ariz. at 581, 858 P.2d at 1184 (quoting. United States v. Yee, 134 F.R.D. 161, 181 (N.D. Ohio 1991)), the admission of the expert’s unsupported conclusions miscommunicates the true significance of the match to the jury and allows in through the back door the evidence that was found inadmissible in Bible. Accordingly, the expert testimony should not have been admitted.
Of course, the majority disagrees with Hummert, and concludes that expert testimony is admissible because such testimony is relevant, and because they do not think that “a tenuous distinction between molecular genetics and other scientific disciplines” should cause DNA opinion evidence to be treated differently from other opinion testimony that is customarily allowed to support other kinds of scientific evidence. Op. at 522. While their opinion is well-reasoned, I believe that there are several important distinctions between DNA evidence and fingerprint, shoe track, bite mark, or ballistic evidence.
First, most scientific evidence does not carry DNA’s aura of infallibility. As our supreme court has cautioned, there is a substantial risk of the overweighting of scientific evidence by the jury “ ‘[b]ecause ‘science’ is often accepted in our society as synonymous with truth.’” Bible, 175 Ariz. at 578, 858 P.2d at 1181 (quoting Morris K. Udall, et al., Arizona Practice—Law of Evidence § 102, at 212 (3d ed. 1991)).
Second, the non-DNA comparisons alluded to by the majority are demonstrable in the courtroom and involve principles and procedures that are comprehensible to a jury. Since fingerprint, shoe track, bite mark and ballistic evidence are all physical comparisons, a Frye hearing might not even be necessary because the jury can see for itself whether the samples “match”—they do not need to rely completely on scientific interpretations. See, e.g., State v. Richards, 166 Ariz. 576, 578, 804 P.2d 109, 111 (App.1990) (Frye hearing not required where presentation is of comparative evidence by an expert).
On the other hand, to understand DNA evidence, the jury must rely totally on an expert’s scientific interpretation. The highly complex nature of DNA evidence not only places it beyond the understanding of many laypersons, but, unlike other types of “matches,” a juror cannot make his or her own physical comparison of the DNA samples to determine whether a “match” exists. Therefore, if an error has occurred, it cannot be discovered by a juror.
Third, unlike footprint, shoe track, bite mark and ballistic evidence, what is being challenged is not the misapplication of a reliable theory by a particular expert, but rather the validity'of the underlying scientific technique itself. No one seriously challenges the scientific principles behind “matches” of fingerprints, shoe tracks, bite marks or ballistic evidence. Yet, here, concern regarding the validity of the population database used to determine the significance of a match is even more worrisome than in Bible, because, unlike human samples, “no DNA mapping has been done for most plant species, including palo verde trees.” Op. at 519. The expert’s testimony of the significance of a match was determined after testing only the 12 palo *517verde trees at the crime site and an additional 16 samples collected from floridum trees in various parts of Maricopa County. It is questionable whether the database in this case would allow an expert to make a reliable conclusion regarding a match.
Finally, even though the statistical possibility of a random match might not have been addressed in many cases involving physical types of matches, id. at 492, 905 P.2d at 501, such a challenge has been made to DNA random match probability calculations. See Bible, 175 Ariz. at 587, 858 P.2d at 1190 (random , match probability statistics are inadmissible); cf. State v. Garrison, 120 Ariz. 255, 258, 585 P.2d 563, 566 (1978) (expert testimony by dentist of 8 in 1,000,000 probability that bite marks were not defendant’s held admissible). The supreme court has ruled that this isolated step of DNA analysis is subject to a Frye test independent of the remainder of the DNA analysis. See Bible, 175 Ariz. at 582-87, 858 P.2d at 1185-90. Accordingly, we are not free to depart from the supreme court’s conclusion that DNA evidence is to be treated differently than other scientific disciplines. See In re Marriage of Thorlin, 155 Ariz. 357, 362, 746 P.2d 929, 934 (App.1987) (Court of Appeals may not disregard holding of Arizona Supreme Court on purported ground that analysis supporting it is incorrect or incomplete).
In sum, until DNA analysis of the significance of a match is found to be reliable and admissible, testimony regarding a match cannot go so far as to declare the samples identical. I would therefore hold the admission of the expert testimony in this case to be error.
Harmless Error
Although the admission of the DNA testimony was error, I conclude that error was harmless in light of the overwhelming weight of the balance of the evidence against defendant. While the state has the burden of showing that an error is harmless, Bible, 175 Ariz. at 588, 858 P.2d at 1191, an error is harmless if the reviewing court can be confident that, beyond a reasonable doubt, the error had no influence on the jury’s verdict. Id. Furthermore, our inquiry is not whether a jury would have rendered the same verdict after a trial that did not include the error, “ ‘but whether the guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the error.’ ” Id (quoting Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993)). We therefore consider the error in light of all the evidence presented at trial to determine if it was harmless. Id
The evidence against defendant included: (1) Chad Gilliam’s testimony that he saw a truck similar to defendant’s unusual truck leaving the proving grounds at 1:30 a.m. on the morning of the murder, which fit with defendant’s arrival back at his apartment soon thereafter; (2) defendant’s pager was found at the crime scene; (3) defendant admitted picking up a hitchhiker who appears to have been the victim; (4) defendant’s girlfriend, Rebecca Franklin, observed a braided metal wire with a ring attached in defendant’s truck and testified that the wire/ring found on the victim’s body was similar; (5) defendant initially lied about his activities on the night of the murder and was unable to give a detailed account of his whereabouts; (6) defendant’s face was scratched by the time he returned home in the early morning on May 3, 1992, and the victim’s fingernails were broken or bent back, indicating that she probably scratched her attacker; and (7) defendant’s truck contained palo verde pods, even if not DNA-matched pods.
As the supreme court found in Bible, despite the powerful impact of the DNA evidence, the other evidence properly admitted “points with unerring consistency to one inarguable conclusion: that [defendant killed the victim.” Id. Given this unequivocal evidence, independent of the contested DNA evidence, I conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the erroneous admission of the DNA evidence could have had no influence on the verdict of the jury in this case. Thus, the error in admitting the expert testimony on the “match” between DNA samples was harmless. I therefore agree that the verdict should be affirmed.

. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C.Cir.1923).

. 1) Creating a DNA "print” or “profile” of a sample;
2) Determining whether the prints or profiles of different samples match; and .
3) If samples match, computing the probability of a random match.
Bible, 175 Ariz. at 586, 858 P.2d at 1189.