Court Opinion

ID: 7827777
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-09-07 18:13:43.113067+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:30:54.812965
License: Public Domain

Jim Hannah, Chief Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part. I concur in part and dissent in part. I agree that the finding of civil contempt was proper. However, I disagree that the circuit court erred in mandating further actions by the Department of Human Services such as the written report on “future staffing issues.” While this appeal is framed in terms of contempt in the case concerning Tammy Briley and Charles Renley, contempt in the pending case is only part of what is at issue. Although the court was convinced that sufficient improvement had been achieved by Briley to warrant closing the present case on her child prosecuted under the juvenile code, the circuit court decided to address DHHS’s failure to adequately perform, a matter that is certainly relevant to the integrity of the proceedings before the court. The integrity of the proceedings is a matter that must be addressed by the circuit court whenever the issue arises to assure fair administration of justice both in this case and in the many other cases before the circuit court involving neglected children. This case presents an abject failure of DHHS to perform its statutory duties. It also involves a failure to comply with the circuit court’s orders. The circuit court has the inherent authority to control parties who appear before it, especially parties such as DHHS who appear repeatedly in court on many different cases. Further, Briley suffered as a consequence of DHHS’s failure to perform. She brought her concerns to the attention of the circuit court. Even though her case came to an end, Briley continued to pursue her complaints about DHHS’s failure to perform. There seems to be little doubt that Briley benefitted from the sanctions in knowing that DHHS would perform adequately in assisting others in the future. Further still, while one is certainly hopeful that Briley will not find herself back under court supervision with respect to her child, repetition in these matters is not uncommon. In that way as well Briley may benefit in knowing that in the future should she find herself back under court supervision, she will receive the assistance ordered by the court. The record in this case clearly shows that the circuit court was attempting to assure that all neglected children receive assistance from DHHS as ordered by the circuit court. Because the circuit court held the matter over for a hearing after closing the protective services case on appellees, it is apparent that what was at issue was more far-reaching than what had or had not occurred during the pendency of the action against Briley and Renley. The difficulties that the court experienced with DHHS in the present case were also being experienced in other dependency-neglect cases. The circuit court stated in its order that it “recognizes that the events of this case demonstrate an organizational failure to properly prepare for and respond to massive local department staff layoffs or leaving.” In other words, what the circuit court is concerned about is not only the events of the case involving Briley and Renley, but rather it is concerned about all cases in the judicial district involving DHHS. The circuit court went on in the order to state that “[t]he court finds this remedy is necessary to avoid the placing of clients in the precarious position of not receiving services, to avoid unnecessary delays that caused foster care placement at the outset.” Obviously, the circuit court was attempting to put in place a system designed to assure DHHS’s performance in future cases, which benefits all children over whom the court has jurisdiction rather than just the child at issue in this case. This is the court’s duty. Arkansas Code Annotated Section 9-27-302(1) (Repl. 2002) provides: This subchapter shall be liberally construed to the end that its purposes may be carried out: (1) To assure that all juveniles brought to the attention of the courts receive the guidance, care, and control, preferably in each juvenile’s own home when the juvenile’s health and safety are not at risk, which will best serve the emotional, mental, and physical welfare of the juvenile and the best interest of the state. . . . The courts hold the primary responsibility and supervisory control to see that the children of this state receive the assistance dictated by the statutes and the care and protection dictated by the judiciary’s inherent obligation to serve justice. If DHHS does not fulfill its duty under the statutes, the circuit court cannot fulfill its duty. In Arkansas Department of Human Services v. R.P., 333 Ark. 516, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1998), this court found that the circuit court is empowered to order family services, including ordering DHHS to fulfill its duty. In that case, this court affirmed an order that DHHS pay to restore utilities. As the court of appeals noted in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Gruber, 39 Ark. App. 112, 839 S.W.2d 543 (1992),1 it is DHHS’s duty to cooperate with, assist, and solicit the cooperation and assistance of all public or private agencies or organizations involved in or dedicated to providing services. The court of appeals further noted that the court cannot fulfill its statutory responsibility without DHHS’s full cooperation with the juvenile courts throughout the state. A circuit court has the inherent authority to protect the integrity of the court in actions before it. Valley v. Phillips County Election Comm’n, 357 Ark. 494, 970 S.W.2d 225 (1994). Moreover, the circuit court has the inherent authority to protect the integrity of the proceedings and to safeguard the rights of the litigants before it. City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 801 S.W.2d 275 (1990). I believe that the circuit court was within its inherent authority to order DHHS to provide assurance that it would and could carry out its obligations. Further, the use of the contempt power was appropriate. “A court’s contempt power may be wielded to preserve the court’s power and dignity, to punish disobedience of the court’s orders, and to preserve and enforce the parties’ rights.” Hart v. McChristian, 344 Ark. 656, 670, 42 S.W.3d 552, 562 (2001). Accordingly, the circuit court was also well within its authority to use the contempt power to assure compliance. Otherwise, a circuit court is left with no meaningful ability to assure that the children in need receive the attention and services the circuit court is bound to provide under the statutes. The courts have no staff available to provide the services the • statutes impose on DHHS. In light of DHHS’s apparent failure to perform its duties, I would affirm the circuit court’s decision to mandate that DHHS report to the circuit court its fitness to perform its statutorily required function. Gunter, J., joins.   While in Arkansas Department of Human Services v. Gruber, 39 Ark. App. 112, 839 S.W.2d 543 (1992), the issue concerned specifically youth services, the services due all children are naturally just as vital.