Court Opinion

ID: 9764512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:25:08.061997+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:57.630020
License: Public Domain

ROBERT M. BELL, J.,
dissenting in which CHASANOW, J. concurs.
In each of these cases, the petitioners pled guilty to a charged offense pursuant to a plea agreement. In McElroy, the agreement called for the State to recommend “a sentence within the guidelines of four years to eight years”, the range computed on the basis of information available during the negotiations, and to nolle pros the remaining charges. The defendant was permitted “to argue for less.” In Jefferson, the plea agreement contemplated a sentence not to exceed 30 years. The State bound itself to make no recommendation as to length of sentence, while the defense could argue for a lesser sentence. Neither defendant was informed, by the trial court or anyone else, during the voluntariness inquiry, see Maryland Rule 4-242(c), that he could withdraw his plea in the event that the court did not accept either the State’s recommendation or if the State breached the plea agreement.
McElroy was sentenced, following a pre-sentence investigation. The guidelines range computed on the basis of the information developed during that investigation was different and, indeed, substantially higher, than that on the basis of which the plea was negotiated. McElroy was sentenced within the higher guidelines range.1 While he was twice advised by the court of the right to appeal and the limited issues he could raise on that appeal, at no time was McEl*153roy told that the right to appeal was not absolute, being dependent solely on the discretion of the intermediate appellate court. See Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.) § 12-302(e) of the Courts & Jud.Proc. Article; Md.Rule 8-204(f)(1)-(5). See also Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl. Vol.1992 Cum.Supp.) § 12-202(4) of the Courts & Jud.Proc. Article.2 McElroy was never told that the right he actually had was the right to file an application for leave to appeal. Nor was he told, moreover that he had to file the application and raise, in it, all possible issues justifying review and for reversal in order to preserve any issue for post conviction review.
Jefferson was also sentenced after a presentence investigation. At the sentencing hearing, after his counsel had argued for a lesser sentence than that recommended, the State, in apparent disregard of the agreement to make no recommendation of a specific sentence, stated:
“Only, Your Honor, that there is very little in the presentence report which would mitigate toward a lesser sentence than that which was agreed upon.”
The court sentenced Jefferson to 30 years imprisonment, noting in the process that “what the State’s Attorney just said seems to be utterly correct.” Both during the voluntariness inquiry and after sentence was imposed, Jefferson was advised that he could apply for leave to appeal. The court also told him that the probable consequences of such an application would be that it would be denied. Like McElroy, Jefferson was not informed that the consequences of not filing an application or of not including within it, all possible reversible error was to waive the right to post conviction relief as to all issues not raised.
*154Both petitioners subsequently filed petitions for post conviction relief, McElroy without having first sought leave to appeal from the guilty plea and Jefferson after his application for leave to appeal had been denied by the Court of Special Appeals. In each case the Court of Special Appeals granted leave to appeal the circuit court’s decision on the post conviction petition. In McElroy, the circuit court denied post conviction relief and in Jefferson, the lower court granted the relief. In each case, the intermediate appellate court held that the petitioners had “knowingly and intelligently waived their right to challenge the validity of the guilty plea proceedings in the lower court.”
The majority holds, as a matter of law, that failure to raise breach of the plea agreement by application for leave to appeal from a guilty plea, whether or not an application was, in fact, filed, is a “knowing and intelligent” waiver of the issue.3 According to the majority, where a petitioner who has pled guilty does not file an application for leave to appeal or, if he or she does file one, does not raise the issue presented in the post conviction proceeding, the presumption of waiver obviates the need for the trial court to make any factual determination whether the inaction or omission was knowing and intelligent. Unless the petitioner adduces evidence of special circumstances which would excuse his or her failure to file an application for leave to appeal, the issue conclusively is waived. In other words, the majority takes the position that the presumption of knowing and intelligent waiver, see Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 645A(c), though characterized as rebuttable is, in effect and in fact, conclusive; a defendant who fails to allege the issue on which post conviction relief is sought in an application for leave to appeal from a guilty plea, in the absence of the offer of affirmative evidence or proffer, can rebut the presumption only if he or she can establish special *155circumstances to excuse the failure to raise the issue. This is much like the argument that the State made, the Court of Special Appeals adopted, and we rejected, in Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 138-39, 395 A.2d 464, 468 (1978).4
I disagree most emphatically.5 The presumption of waiver is, by the very terms of the statute, a rebuttable one. *158The presumption may be rebutted, I believe by the circumstances evident on the record, not simply by offering testimony or other evidence, to the contrary.
In Jefferson, unlike in McElroy, the applicant filed an application for leave to appeal.6 He acted without benefit *159of counsel or even the transcript of the circuit court proceedings, however. That is not atypical.7 Presuming a knowing and intelligent waiver of an error under these circumstances—where the defendant is unrepresented by counsel and does not even have a transcript—is not only unfair, but is unrealistic as well.
To read the waiver provision as the majority does is to read certain key words out of the statute and to “virtually [do] away with the concept of ‘waiver’ as an intelligent and *160knowing failure to raise an issue.” Curtis, 284 Md. at 140, 395 A.2d at 469. Section 645A(c), in both of its paragraphs, speaks of an allegation of error that could have been, but was not made, intelligently and knowingly, in the various ways designated. It presupposes, therefore, that the applicant “was previously ‘aware of and understood the possible defense.’ ” Id., 395 A.2d at 469, quoting Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 507, 341 A.2d 388, 395 (1975). The majority assumes, and therefore, holds that a pro se defendant, who files an application for leave to appeal in a guilty plea proceeding without a transcript, has sufficient information and ability to raise in that application, all allegations of error on which a post conviction petition may be premised.
Under its rationale, the majority could just as easily require that, henceforth, all appeals from criminal convictions must be noted by defendants without benefit either of counsel or transcript and that any issue not raised in that appeal by the pro se defendant will be deemed waived, absent special circumstances. A typical defendant who has, at most, an high school education, but no knowledge of the law, and who has just been sentenced to imprisonment undoubtedly will not be able carefully and comprehensibly to prepare, draft and file an application for leave to appeal. It is safe to say that a significant number will not recognize the waiver effect of a failure carefully to craft and file this “discretionary” application with the Court of Special Appeals.
The majority also fails to distinguish between the defendant’s burden to establish the existence of “special circumstances” to excuse the failure to allege, in the application for leave to appeal, error sought to be raised on post conviction and his or her burden of rebutting the presumption of knowing and intelligent waiver. Those burdens are different and are triggered by different factors. Section 645A(c) separately addresses them; the explicit statement in the second paragraph is to the effect that the presumption is rebuttable, while the first explains how to handle “special circumstances” and when they become relevant. I read subsection (c) as this Court did in Curtis:
*161The first paragraph of subsection (c) declares that, for purposes of the Post Conviction Procedure Act, “an allegation of error shall be deemed to be waived when a petitioner could have made, but intelligently and knowingly failed to make, such allegation” in a prior proceeding. The test for “waiver” which the Legislature contemplated was clearly the “intelligent and knowing” failure to raise, not the failure of counsel or an unknowing petitioner to raise an issue. The first paragraph of subsection (c) goes on to provide that where there is a knowing and intelligent failure to raise an issue previously, the failure “shall be excused because of special circumstances,” with the burden being upon petitioner to prove the existence of special circumstances. Thus, the matter of “special circumstances” only becomes pertinent where there is an intelligent and knowing failure of the petitioner to previously raise an issue. Where the record affirmatively shows that there was not an intelligent and knowing failure to raise, there is nothing to “excuse,” and the presence or absence of “special circumstances” has no relevance.
The second paragraph of subsection (c) provides that where an allegation of error could have been made by a petitioner previously, “but was not in fact so made, there shall be a rebuttable presumption that said petitioner intelligently and knowingly failed to make such allegation.” (Emphasis supplied.) The statute does not speak in terms of a conclusive presumption of waiver, absent special circumstances, as viewed by the State and the Court of Special Appeals. Rather, it is a presumption of an intelligent and knowing failure to have raised an issue, which failure can be rebutted by evidence or stipulated facts showing that petitioner did not “intelligently and knowingly” fail to raise the issue previously.
Id., 289 Md. at 139, 395 A.2d at 468-69. Thus,
It is only where the petitioner in fact intelligently and knowingly failed to raise an issue, or where he is unable *162to rebut the presumption of an intelligent and knowing failure, that he must show “special circumstances” in order to excuse his failure.
Id. at 140, 395 A.2d at 469.
To be sure, one logically may assume that a defendant who enters into a plea agreement, whether it requires the State to remain silent as to the sentence or to make a specific sentencing recommendation, will know that the State has violated its agreement. It is, of course, true, and quite clear, that the proceeding itself will, in that circumstance, provide the defendant with all that he or she needs to allege the State’s breach of the plea agreement. It is neither clear nor necessarily true, however, that the defendant, not having been advised by counsel or the court of the consequences of the State’s violation, will know, or will appreciate, that the violation entitles him or her to relief, the nature of that relief or how to obtain it. It is also far from obvious, in the absence of advice to that effect, that the defendant’s sole avenue for relief is by raising the issue to be reviewed in an application for leave to appeal or that, by that failure to raise the issue in a discretionary application for leave to appeal, the right to a review of the merits is lost forever. The remedy for a plea agreement violation, unlike the fact of the violation, is far from obvious to a lay person.8
The situation is even more problematic when the defendant is improperly advised as to his or her post judgment *163rights. A defendant who is not advised that he or she may file an application for leave to appeal and, where appropriate, the possible bases upon which such application may be predicated, may not be held to be aware of the availability of that option. When, consequently, that defendant does not apply for leave to appeal, he or she may not reasonably be said knowingly and intelligently to have failed to allege an error which could have been raised in that application.
In my opinion, the presumption of knowing and intelligent waiver was adequately rebutted by the circumstances in both these cases. That Jefferson proceeded pro se and without assistance of counsel or the aid of the transcript of the circuit court proceedings when he filed his application for leave to appeal are matters of which the post conviction court was obviously entitled to take notice. Moreover, the court could have considered, as it obviously did, the nature of the violation alleged. Another factor, of course, is whether the State even alleged a waiver.9
Whether the defendant could have, but did not, raise the issue of the State’s violation of the plea agreement in an application for leave to appeal from a guilty plea is a question of fact, which depends upon the knowledge possessed by the defendant. It is significant, therefore, that in neither of these cases did the trial judge find waiver. In McElroy, the trial judge determined, albeit implicitly, that the defendant did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to post conviction review; only after having considered evidence bearing on the voluntariness of the plea and the failure of the State to abide by the plea agreement did the court deny McElroy’s petition for post conviction relief. *164The trial judge in Jefferson, as we have seen, expressly held that the petitioner did not waive the State’s breach of the plea agreement.
Nevertheless, without even addressing whether those findings are clearly erroneous or considering whether the defendant could have, but did not, raise the issue, the majority decides, as a matter of law, that the presumption of knowing and intelligent waiver was not rebutted despite express or implied findings of non-waiver by the trial judge. The majority’s position apparently is that a defendant, in all cases, must adduce, beyond what reasonably may be gleaned from the record of the case, affirmative evidence, or make a proffer, to rebut the presumption or to show special circumstances. Neither Curtis nor any other case cited by the majority supports that conclusion. Curtis simply requires that the presumption be rebutted by evidence and noted that a proffer was an acceptable method of producing that evidence. Curtis did not even suggest that the evidence to rebut the presumption must be extrinsic to the record. The issue of special circumstances, as we have shown and Curtis holds, arises after the factual determination of waiver has been made. The majority approach, because of its restrictive view of how the presumption may be rebutted, in effect, merges the two determinations.
While it would have been wise for the petitioners to have explained why they did not proceed by application for leave to appeal, thereby covering that base, it is my submission that they were not required to do so since either the State did not contest their right to a post conviction hearing or the court found the State’s objections lacking in merit. The court below was not erroneous in expressly or impliedly finding non-waiver.
The knowing and intelligent waiver of an allegation of error is implicated whenever a defendant files an application for leave to appeal. When he or she does not include within the application the allegations later sought to be raised on post conviction, the post conviction statute presumes that it was done knowingly and intelligently. The *165strength of that presumption, and, hence, the nature and quality of the evidence necessary to rebut it depends upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the application and its filing. Where it is apparent that the application is filed by a defendant, pro se, acting without counsel, the presumption is not particularly strong. It is weaker still when the application is filed without benefit of a transcript of the guilty plea proceeding.10 The defendant’s educational and literacy level, as indicated by the record and the application,11 are additional significant factors to be considered. The evidence necessary to rebut the presumption will differ, necessarily, depending upon the strength of the presumption. When the record reflects an application for leave to appeal filed by a pro se defendant, of minimal intelligence and literacy and without benefit of a transcript of the proceedings, a post conviction court could very well conclude that those very same factors sufficiently rebutted the presumption of knowing and intelligent waiver. The *166situation is different when the record reveals that the application was filed by counsel. Because it may be inferred that counsel informed the defendant of the options available to him or her, and the consequences of a failure to pursue them, a greater level of knowledge may be attributed to the defendant. And, for that reason, the court may require different and more exacting evidence to rebut the presumption, the court may require affirmative evidence of the defendant’s lack of knowledge of the need to have earlier raised the issue. In short, a finding of waiver does not automatically flow from the fact that a presumption of waiver is triggered. This is especially so where the personal attributes of the defendant, as revealed by the record, are such as to undermine the presumption. In that case, whether or not the defendant has adduced additional affirmative testimony or offered evidence extrinsic to the record, to prove non-waiver, the trial court could determine that presumption was rebutted.
In both cases, the post conviction court determined, in McElroy, implicitly and in Jefferson, explicitly, that the defendant did not waive the allegation of error pertaining to the State’s violation of the plea agreement. An appellate court is required to defer to such findings on review unless clearly erroneous. Neither finding by the post conviction court was clearly erroneous. Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals in each case and remand to that court for consideration of the merits.12
Judge Chasanow has authorized me to state that he concurs in the views expressed herein.

. Although the majority holds that the State abided by its plea agreement, the record reflects that, to the extent it did, it was not unequivocal. While indeed recommending a sentence between four and eight years "because that is what is determined by the Guidelines to be," which it would "stick with,” the State did not miss an opportunity to point out what was quite obvious, that "the Guidelines determined by the presentence are twelve to twenty years."

. Section 12-202(4) prohibits the Court of Appeals from granting certiorari in a case in which the Court of Special Appeals has denied or granted leave to appeal from the judgment entered in a guilty plea proceeding. That prohibition extends only to the intermediate appellate court’s action in granting or denying the application. Williams v. State, 292 Md. 201, 207, 438 A.2d 1301, 1303 (1981). This Court may always review that court’s decision on the merits. Id.

. In each case, the petitioner had a valid argument that the State breached its plea agreement, which the majority holds they waived by failing to make the argument in an application for leave to appeal.

. As reported in that case:
The State maintains, as the Court of Special Appeals held, that under the above language, the mere failure to raise an issue results in a presumption of waiver, and only a finding of “special circumstances” will rebut the presumption or alleviate the effect of the waiver. Moreover, the State argues that facts such as those proffered and accepted in this case, showing that petitioner did not “intelligently and knowingly’ fail to previously raise the question of inadequacy of trial counsel, do not constitute “special circumstances” rebutting the presumption.
This interpretation of § 645A(c) by the State and the Court of Special Appeals is manifestly erroneous.

. Although I think the majority’s position is unsupportable and hence, for the sake of argument I will address only the issue it does, I think it appropriate to note that the argument advanced by petitioner McEIroy is properly before the Court. The majority declines to address whether the petitioner McElroy’s argument that the waiver provisions do not apply when the defendant does not seek leave to appeal from a guilty plea, holding that it was neither made in the Court of Special Appeals or in his petition for certiorari. In taking that position, the majority is simply wrong.
Whether McEIroy raised the issue on his own in the Court of Special Appeals is not dispositive. The intermediate appellate court's decision very clearly was premised upon its interpretation of the statutory scheme as requiring the filing of an application for leave to appeal as a prerequisite to review of the guilty plea judgment. McEIroy v. State, 90 Md.App. 48, 599 A.2d 1215, cert. granted, 326 Md. 435, 605 A.2d 137 (1992). In addition to noting how inappropriate it was for the petitioner to proceed by way of post conviction, rather than by filing an application for leave to appeal from the guilty plea, that court’s opinion acknowledged that the court, itself, asked the parties to brief two questions, each pertaining to, though not in specific terms, the construction of Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.) Art. 27, § 645A(c):
(a) Whether a defendant who was convicted on a plea of guilty and who desires appellate review of the conviction based on facts that would be apparent in the record of the guilty plea proceeding must seek such review by an Application for Leave to Appeal pursuant to Cts. & Jud.Proc. art. § 12-302(e); and
(b) Whether a claim of error in such a case that could have been raised by an Application for Leave to Appeal filed pursuant to § 12-*156302(e) is waived for purposes of subsequent review under the Post Conviction Procedure Act if it was not so when raised.
McElroy, 90 Md.App. at 53, 599 A.2d at 1217-18. The majority acknowledges that this is so. At 144. In point of fact, therefore, the issue was raised in, and also specifically decided by, the intermediate appellate court.
Moreover, in his certiorari petition, McElroy presented five questions. Questions 3 and 4 closely track the questions the Court of Special Appeals required the parties to address. They are:
3. Must a defendant who was convicted on a plea of guilty and who desires appellate review of the conviction based on facts that would be apparent in the record of the guilty plea proceeding seek such review by an Application for Leave to Appeal pursuant to CTS. & JUD.PROC.CODE ANN. §§ 12-302(e)?
4. Is a claim of error in such a case that could have been raised by an Application for Leave to Appeal filed pursuant to CTS. & JUD.PROC.CODE ANN. §§ 12-302(e) waived for purposes of subsequent review under the Post Conviction Procedure Act if it was not so raised?
Taken together, or even singly, they adequately raise the issue of the proper construction of § 645A(c); necessarily implicit in these questions is whether a defendant must seek application for leave to appeal in order to obtain post conviction proceedings review of an issue that could have been reviewed on application for leave to appeal. Indeed, McElroy’s question 5, which assumes, arguendo, that a claim of error ordinarily must be raised by application for leave to appeal from a guilty plea, also adequately presents the issue; having made that assumption, it asks whether waiver occurs even when the defendant is misadvised as to the nature and scope of the post trial review procedure. More fundamentally, summing up the reasons why this Court should grant certiorari, McElroy noted: "Petitioner’s case provides this Court with an unusual opportunity to construe the waiver provisions of the Uniform Post Conviction Act" and
"[t]he analysis of [the intermediate appellate court] in Petitioner’s case ... seems internally inconsistent, for it provides that a defendant waives a right to a remedy for not understanding his plea agreement because he fails to note an application for leave to appeal, despite the fact that this very lack of knowledge presumably means he will not know that he had any basis for requesting the appeal.”
Unless § 645A requires the filing of an application for leave to appeal to preserve an error alleged to have occurred in the proceedings pursuant to which the application is required, the petitioner McElroy, who did not file such an application, cannot be said to have waived the allegations of error presently before the Court. I believe that § 645A does not so require. I reach this conclusion by application of the ordinary rules of statutory construction.
Those rules require us to look no further than to the language the Legislature used to convey the meaning it wished the statute to be interpreted to have. When those words are clear and unambiguous, ordinarily we need not go any further, Mustafa v. State, 323 Md. 65, 73, 591 A.2d 481, 485 (1991); G. Heileman Brewing Co. v. Stroh *157Brewery Co., 308 Md. 746, 755, 521 A.2d 1225, 1230 (1987); In re Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 307 Md. 674, 685, 516 A.2d 976, 982 (1986); Comptroller of Treasury v. Fairchild Industries, Inc., 303 Md. 280, 284, 493 A.2d 341, 343 (1985), although, in the interest of completeness, we may look at the purpose of the statute and compare the result obtained by use of the plain language with the purpose of the statute. Sabatier v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 323 Md. 232, 250, 592 A.2d 1098, 1107 (1991); Mustafa, 323 Md. at 73, 591 A.2d at 485; Baltimore County Coalition Against Unfair Taxes v. Baltimore County, 321 Md. 184, 203, 582 A.2d 510, 519 (1990); Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989); Kazorowski v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 514-15, 525 A.2d 628, 632-33 (1987). We are also to give effect to the entire statute, neither adding, nor deleting, words in order to give it a meaning not otherwise evident by the words actually used. Bd. of Educ. of Garrett County v. Lendo, 295 Md. 55, 63, 453 A.2d 1185, 1189 (1982); Smelser v. Criterion Ins. Co., 293 Md. 384, 389, 444 A.2d 1024, 1027 (1982); Pappas v. Pappas, 287 Md. 455, 465, 413 A.2d 549, 553 (1980). Finally, we seek to give the statute a reasonable interpretation, not one that is illogical or incompatible with common sense. D &Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1990); Blandon v. State, 304 Md. 316, 319, 498 A.2d 1195, 1196 (1985); Ervin and Shafer, Inc. v. Pabst Brewing Co., 304 Md. 302, 315, 498 A.2d 1188, 1194 (1985).
When these rules of statutory construction are applied, it is clear that filing an application for leave to appeal, in which is included any and all allegations of error a defendant may have, is not a condition precedent to seeking post conviction relief.
Section 645A(c)(l) makes clear that, unlike in the case of direct appeal, a defendant does not waive an allegation of error that could have been raised by way of application for leave to appeal simply by not filing such an application. That section provides:
For the purposes of this subtitle, an allegation of error shall be deemed to be waived when a petitioner could have made, but intelligently and knowingly failed to make, such allegation before trial, at trial, on direct appeal (whether or not the petitioner actually took such an appeal), in an application for leave to appeal a conviction based on a guilty plea, in any habeas corpus or coram nobis proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, in a prior petition under this subtitle, or in any other proceeding actually instituted by said petitioner, unless the failure to make such allegation shall be excused because of special circumstances. The burden of proving the existence of such special circumstances shall be upon the petitioner. (Emphasis added).
Section 645A(c)(2), largely tracking the language of 645A(c)(l), is of similar effect. This difference in treatment of direct appeals and applications for leave to appeal clearly indicates that the Legislature intended that the presumption apply only in the case of direct appeals. To construe the statute any other way requires that language similar to that used in connection with direct appeals be added to the provision pertaining to applications for leave to appeal.
Moreover, § 645A(c)(l) and (2) were amended in 1988 to be consistent with legislation enacted in 1983, see Ch. 295, Acts of 1983, which *158added subsection (e) to Maryland Code (1980, 1983 Repl.Vol.) § 12-302 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article, and made judgments entered on guilty pleas subject to review only on application for leave to appeal. See also Ch. 726, Acts of 1988, the preamble to which provides:
FOR the purpose of clarifying that, if a person fails under certain circumstances to allege an error in an application for leave to appeal a certain conviction, the allegation is deemed to be waived for the purposes of a post conviction proceeding; clarifying a certain presumption relating to failure to make a certain allegation of error; and generally relating to waiver of allegations of error in a certain appeal.
When the amendment was effected, the parenthetical condition pertaining to direct appeals was already in the Code; nevertheless, the Legislature chose not to include such language with respect to the application for leave to appeal provision. Because the provision pertaining to direct appeals has been interpreted to mean that failure to raise an issue on direct appeal constitutes a waiver, whether or not a direct appeal was taken, see Kelly v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 243 Md. 717, 718-19, 222 A.2d 835, 836 (1966); Meadows v. Warden, Md. Penitentiary, 243 Md. 710, 713, 222 A.2d 249, 251 (1966); Austin v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 237 Md. 314, 316, 206 A.2d 145, 147 (1965), and the Legislature is presumed to have had knowledge of that interpretation when it added the language pertaining to applications for leave to appeal, it must have intended a different result in those cases involving applications for leave to appeal. Thus, the history of that provision also contradicts the holding of the intermediate appellate court.

. Not only did Jefferson apply for leave to appeal—at least his filings, captioned "Motion for an appeal pursuant to Maryland Rule 1311” and "Motion to Show Incompetence And Farce Representation," were so treated—but he raised the very point at issue here, although admittedly, not as artfully as it may have been done. In the application he alleged:
3. ) That the Petitioner Attorney didn’t see to [sic] that the Petitioner have a fair trial And Sentence!
4. ) That the Petitioner was Promise various Deal’s [sic] within the Petitioner Plea. Bargain Agreement with his Attorney!
******
6.) That the Honorable Judge never asked the Petitioner was he made any Promise by the State or His Attorney in which promise was made to the Petitioner in behalf of his Plea Bargain to Plea *159Guilty which the Petitioner Feel he is innocence [sic] of Second Degree Murder.
7.) That the State and the Defense Attorney talked and Agree to A 10 year's cap which was Promise to the Petitioner by His Attorney in exchange For A Plea Bargain of Guilty or all Charge’s agin’s the Petitioner!
These allegations taken together, are sufficient to convey to any interested reader that Jefferson was complaining about, inter alia, a breached plea agreement. That should be all that is required, considering that the petitioner was proceeding pro se, without aid of a transcript and, as his application graphically demonstrates, operating at a deficit intellectually. It is not enough for the majority, however. What it and the Court of Special Appeals require, as their holdings demonstrate, is that an applicant for leave to appeal meet an unmeetable burden: the applicant not only must raise all possible issues in the application, but he or she must do so artfully, as well.

. Maryland Rule 4-214(b) in pertinent part provides that "The representation of appointed counsel does not extend to the filing of subsequent discretionary proceedings including writ of certiorari petition to expunge records and petition for post conviction relief." A discretionary proceeding as used in this context means a proceeding in which the court has the discretion whether or not to grant relief. In an application for leave to appeal, like a writ of certiorari, see Walston v. Sun Cab Co., 267 Md. 559, 565-66, 298 A.2d 391, 395-96 (1973), the court has the discretion whether it will grant or deny the application, see Md.Rule 8-204(f)(l)-(5), and the applicant has no right to further review of that decision. See Maryland Code (1974, 1989 Repl.Vol.) § 12-202(4) of the Cts. & Jud.Proc. Article; Williams, 292 Md. at 207, 438 A.2d at 1303. Thus, the right to counsel does not extend to an application for leave to appeal.
The record on application for leave to appeal from a guilty plea proceeding consists of “all of the original papers and exhibits filed in the proceedings.” Md.Rule 8-204(c). It does not, as in the case of a direct appeal, See also Md.Rule 8-801, include the transcript of the proceedings. The Court of Special Appeals may, however, "require the clerk of the lower court to submit any portion by the stenographic transcript of the proceedings below____” Md.Rule 8-204(e).

. The holding in this case does, indeed, require more of the defendant who, without counsel, files an application for leave to appeal, seeking relief to which he or she is not absolutely, than it does of a defendant or an attorney filing a direct appeal. In the latter, the defendant or the attorney need only file a notice of appeal, Md.Rule 8-201, before being given the opportunity to study the record, including the transcript of the proceedings and before being required to specify the grants he or she wishes reviewed. By way of contrast, an applicant for leave to appeal must state in the application, within 30 days of the disposition “a concise statement of the reasons why the judgment should be reversed or modified and ... specify the errors allegedly committed by the lower court." Md.Rule 8-204(b)(2).

. In Jefferson, the State did argue waiver. The trial court rejected that argument because, in its view, "the State must demonstrate that Jefferson ‘was previously aware of and understood the possible [ground for relief].’ ” (Quoting State v. Torres, 86 Md.App. 560, 565, 587 A.2d 582, 584 (1991), quoting Curtis v. State, 284 Md. 132, 140, 395 A.2d 464, 469 (1978) and Jourdan v. State, 275 Md. 495, 507, 341 A.2d 388, 395 (1975)). The State neglected to raise the waiver issue in McElroy.

. Whether a defendant has a copy of the transcript or not is a fact that will appear in the record only by implication. An application for leave to appeal must be filed within 30 days of the entry of judgment on the guilty plea. See Maryland Rule 8-204(b)(l). Ordinarily this is an insufficient amount of time to permit the court reporter to prepare a transcript of the proceedings. In any event, because the proceeding is one from which a mandatory appeal is not allowed, unless otherwise ordered to do so, the court reporter ordinarily will not prepare a transcript. Accordingly, it may be assumed that a defendant seeking leave to appeal from a guilty plea proceeding, whether represented by counsel or not, will not have benefit of the transcript of the proceedings.

. The application for leave to appeal filed in the guilty plea proceeding ordinarily will be in the record of the post conviction proceeding. See Maryland Rule 4-402(a)(l). Should the defendant seek post conviction relief pro se, certainly the petition that he or she filed will be in the record. As sometimes occurs, the defendant will file additional documents, e.g. letters or motions. Perusal of the documents filed by the defendant will be quite instructive as to his or her mental acumen. It is also possible, as was the case in McElroy, that a transcript of the guilty plea proceeding will be filed with the Post Conviction Petition. In that event, the intellectual ability of the defendant may be revealed in the colloquy directed at determining whether the defendant’s plea was entered voluntarily.

. The same analysis would apply if one were to accept the majority’s conclusion that it is necessary to file an application for leave to appeal in order to preserve, for post conviction review, any allegation of error which could have been raised by way of application for leave to appeal.