Court Opinion

ID: 9892359
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-23 17:11:59.468512+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:04:43.818661
License: Public Domain

J-A16029-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT OP 65.37

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
              v.                            :
                                            :
                                            :
 BRUCE JOSEPH PANATTIERI                    :
                                            :
                     Appellant              :   No. 257 MDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 14, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-40-CR-0002694-2019

 COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                            :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                            :
              v.                            :
                                            :
                                            :
 BRUCE JOSEPH PANATTIERI                    :
                                            :
                     Appellant              :   No. 258 MDA 2022

      Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 14, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at
                      No(s): CP-40-CR-0000198-2020

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and McCAFFERY, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                      FILED: OCTOBER 23, 2023

      Appellant, Bruce Joseph Panattieri, was convicted of several sexual

crimes against two young girls and received an aggregate sentence of one to

two years of incarceration, followed by four years’ probation. He challenges

the trial court’s denial of his motion for a bill of particulars and the grading of

his two corruption of minors charges. We affirm.
J-A16029-23

      On September 9, 2019, the Commonwealth filed a criminal information

docketed at 2694-2019, charging four counts relating to sexual incidents

against S.G., the sister of Appellant’s fiancée: indecent assault without

consent, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(1) (count one); indecent assault of a person

under thirteen, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7) (count two); indecent assault of

person less than sixteen, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(8) (count three); and

corruption of minors, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii) (count four).               The

information listed each incident date as occurring “on or about” September 1,

2016. S.G. was fourteen years old at the time of trial in September of 2021.

      The second information, docketed at 198-2020, was filed February 7,

2020, charging three counts relating to sexual incidents concerning A.L.G.,

who was also his fiancée’s sister: aggravated indecent assault without

consent, 18 Pa.C.S. § 3125(a)(1) (count one); corruption of minors, 18

Pa.C.S. § 6301(a)(1)(ii) (count two); and indecent assault, 18 Pa.C.S. §

3126(a)(1) (count three). The incident date was also listed as “on or about”

September 1, 2016. A.L.G. was twenty years old at the time of trial.

      Appellant filed a pre-trial motion pursuant to Rule of Criminal Procedure

572 at each docket requesting a bill of particulars to “adequately prepare for

trial, avoid surprise at trial, ascertain an alibi, and/or protect himself against

a violation of his rights against double jeopardy[.]”        Request for Bill of

Particulars, 9/14/20, at 1. Appellant requested, with respect to each count, a

court order requiring the Commonwealth to provide the following:

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      a. the exact date which any act or conduct giving rise to the
      alleged crime occurred;

      b. the exact place which any act or conduct giving rise to the
      alleged crime occurred;

      c. the exact time which any act or conduct giving rise to the
      alleged crime occurred;

      d. the specific act or conduct giving rise to the alleged crime.

See id. at 1-2.

      On September 8, 2021, the trial court held a hearing on a variety of

motions, including the Commonwealth’s motion to amend the criminal

informations. As the Commonwealth explained, “there was an inadvertent

issue with the time frames listed on both of the informations. It just listed

the start date and not the entirety of the time frame.” N.T. Pre-trial Hearing,

9/8/21, at 2.     As amended, the docket at 2694-2019 charged offenses

occurring from September 1, 2016, through June 9, 2019. The docket at 198-

2020 was amended to state that the crimes occurred between March 1, 2017,

and March 31, 2019.

      Appellant did not object to the amendments. The parties then discussed

the motion for a bill of particulars. The Commonwealth asserted that, “a lot

has happened” since the charges were filed, including testimony by the victims

at a habeas corpus proceeding and the fact “that discovery has been

provided.” Id. at 4. The Commonwealth argued that the request was “moot

at this point because [Appellant] know[s] exactly what conduct he’s charged

for.” Id.

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       While Appellant’s first item requested in the bill for particulars was for

an exact date on which the acts occurred, Appellant conceded that the

amendments addressed that issue. “If the Commonwealth is going to put on

their amended information a range of dates, that’s sufficient for me, Your

Honor.” Id. at 6. Appellant then stated that “the others are more important”

and argued that the Commonwealth attempted to “circumvent the rule just by

saying, well, you have it in discovery.”         Id.   Appellant argued that the

mechanism for a request for a bill of particulars would be superfluous if

discovery obligations satisfied any such request, and maintained that he

“need[ed] to know the three other things[,] … place, manner, act.” Id. The

court denied the motion.

       Appellant proceeded to a jury trial. Immediately before S.G. testified,

Appellant moved for an offer of proof.                 Appellant noted   that the

Commonwealth had originally filed a count of involuntary deviate sexual

intercourse (IDSI) predicated on alleged vaginal licking, which had been

dismissed at the preliminary hearing, and sought to bar the admission of any

testimony pertaining to that allegation. The Commonwealth replied that S.G.

did not testify at the preliminary hearing1 and “the judge did not feel [the

testimony] was sufficient to bind that charge over because he didn’t feel that

it met all the elements of an IDSI.” N.T., 9/29/21, at 37. The Commonwealth

argued that S.G. could still testify about those behaviors because it would
____________________________________________

1  The Commonwealth had called an officer who witnessed the forensic
interview.

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satisfy indecent assault.        The Commonwealth noted that there were no

“specific acts alleged in the information. It’s a general count.” Id. at 38. The

trial court overruled Appellant’s request.

       Appellant was convicted of all counts at both dockets except aggravated

indecent assault. Appellant moved for extraordinary relief concerning the two

counts of corruption of minors, which the trial court denied. Appellant filed

timely notices of appeal2 and complied with the trial court’s order to file a

concise statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). We now review Appellant’s two

claims:

       I. Whether the trial court’s refusal to order the Commonwealth to
       file a bill of particulars, which then resulted in admission of
       evidence of dismissed conduct and uncharged “bad acts[,”]
       constitutes an abuse of discretion requiring reversal.

       II. Whether increasing the sentence for “corruption of minors /
       course of conduct” when there was no jury finding of specific acts
       constituting such “course” constitutes illegal sentence.

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

       Appellant’s first claim challenges the trial court’s failure to grant his

motion for a bill of particulars. He reiterates the position advanced at the pre-

trial hearing, namely, that providing discovery is not a substitute for granting

a request for a bill of particulars. Appellant describes the charges listed in the

criminal informations as containing “broad language mirroring the statutory

text of the charges alleged.            Specific dates are absent[,] as are any

reference[s] to specific conduct on the part of [Appellant].” Id. at 13 (citation
____________________________________________

2 We sua sponte consolidated the appeals by order of February 25, 2022.

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to record omitted). Appellant argues that the trial court erred by treating the

“concept of the bill of particulars as a discovery tool.” Id. at 16.

      Appellant further contends that the failure to grant the motion led to the

admission of the testimony regarding “alleged vaginal contact by [Appellant,]

… which had been part of the Commonwealth’s original complaint, but this

charge did not survive the preliminary hearing….” Id. Additionally, A.L.G.

testified “regarding [Appellant]’s alleged video recording” of her, but the

criminal informations do not specify that behavior. Id. As to the effect of the

trial court’s purported error, Appellant maintains that the ruling “requires

reversal given the contours of the present matters.” Id. at 18.

      The Commonwealth maintains that the trial court properly denied the

motion as it supplied all relevant discovery, and Appellant was aware of the

charges and the evidence the Commonwealth intended to use to support

them. Thus, the Commonwealth says that “Appellant was not surprised in any

way by the Commonwealth’s evidence; therefore, the trial court did not err

when it denied his motion to compel….” Commonwealth’s Brief at 10.

      Rule of Criminal Procedure 572 establishes the mechanism for seeking

a bill of particulars:

      (A) A request for a bill of particulars shall be served in writing by
      the defendant upon the attorney for the Commonwealth within 7
      days following arraignment. The request shall promptly be filed
      and served as provided in Rule 576.

      (B) The request shall set forth the specific particulars sought by
      the defendant, and the reasons why the particulars are requested.

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      (C) Upon failure or refusal of the attorney for the Commonwealth
      to furnish a bill of particulars after service of a request, the
      defendant may make written motion for relief to the court within
      7 days after such failure or refusal. If further particulars are
      desired after an original bill of particulars has been furnished, a
      motion therefor may be made to the court within 5 days after the
      original bill is furnished.

      (D) When a motion for relief is made, the court may make such
      order as it deems necessary in the interests of justice.

Pa.R.Crim.P. 572. We review a ruling on a motion for a bill of particulars for

an abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Libengood, 152 A.3d 1057, 1059

(Pa. Super. 2016).

      We begin our analysis by noting that Appellant concedes that the

general purpose of a bill of particulars is “to seek more specific allegations so

as to protect his or her due process rights and ensure a fair trial.” Appellant’s

Brief at 13.   Thus, Appellant agrees that the bill of particulars serves the

specific function of assisting a defendant in preparing for trial.      However,

Appellant maintains that while a bill of particulars does act as a notice

provision, he posits that “[r]esting on this limited understanding of the bill

would tend to suggest that it serves only a ‘notice’ or ‘discovery’ function.”

Id. at 16. Appellant argues that this “is not the true nor complete nature of

the bill of particulars. From its historic roots, it has long been understood that

the bill functions as ‘a pleading [which] limit[s] the proofs [the Commonwealth

may present] at the trial….’” Id. (citation omitted; bracketing in original).

      To the extent the trial court’s analysis could be read to establish a per

se rule that supplying discovery precludes a motion seeking a bill of

particulars, we agree that this would misconstrue the purpose of Rule 572.

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Yet, we do not view the trial court’s analysis as going so far, as we find that

the trial court determined that Appellant failed to meet his burden to establish

“reasons why the particulars are requested.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 572(B). Appellant,

both before the trial court and before this Court, has failed to offer a reason

for compelling the production of a bill of particulars. Logically, the “why these

particulars are being requested” component of the rule must relate back to

the purpose served by the mechanism for requesting a bill of particulars. “A

bill of particulars is intended to give notice to the accused of the offenses

charged in the indictment so that the accused may prepare a defense, avoid

a surprise, or intelligently raise pleas of double jeopardy and the statute of

limitations.” Commonwealth v. Mercado, 649 A.2d 946, 959 (Pa. Super.

1994). Appellant did not explain how the bill of particulars would assist in

preparing a defense, avoiding a surprise, or assessing double jeopardy

concerns.

      Appellant’s motion was boilerplate, and his argument at the hearing did

not meaningfully expand on his request. Indeed, it appears the real purpose

of the bill of particulars was not to assist in the preparation of his defense or

prevent a surprise at trial but rather an attempt to “lock” the Commonwealth

into a specific set of allegations. Appellant maintains that, “it has long been

the law in Pennsylvania that the Commonwealth is restricted to proving

what it has set forth in the bill.”          Appellant’s Brief at 17 (quoting

Commonwealth v. Simione, 291 A.2d 764, 766 (Pa. 1972)) (emphasis

supplied by Appellant).    As a general proposition, a variance between a

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criminal information and the proof at trial is not fatal. Commonwealth v.

Einhorn, 911 A.2d 960, 978 (Pa. Super. 2006) (“A variance is not fatal unless

it could mislead the defendant at trial, impairs a substantial right or involves

an element of surprise that would prejudice the defendant’s efforts to prepare

his defense.”). However, as quoted in Simione, a variance between the bill

of particulars and the proof at trial may be treated differently. As stated in

the Corpus Juris Secundum:

      A variance in the pleading and the proof with regard to the time
      of the commission of a crime does not constitute prejudicial error
      where time is not of the essence of the crime charged. In the
      absence of the specificity that may be obtained through a request
      for a bill of particulars, a time variance between the allegation in
      the indictment and the proof at trial is not fatal to a criminal
      conviction.

42 C.J.S. Indictments § 290.      The benefit to Appellant of restricting the

Commonwealth via a bill of particulars is obvious, but we do not agree that

the trial court is required to grant such a motion.

      We could arguably affirm on this basis alone. However, we will address

Appellant’s implicit claim that the two criminal informations were facially

insufficient to apprise him of the offenses, thereby justifying a bill of

particulars. This is a fact-specific question that must be analyzed by reference

to the specific case.

      A bill of particulars is an amplification or more particular
      specification of the matter set forth in the pleading. While it need
      not state more than the party furnishing it is bound to prove under
      the pleading, it must be as specific as the circumstances of
      the case will allow, and should fairly apprise the opposite party

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      and the court of the nature of the claim or defense made and the
      nature of the evidence….

Weedon v. Weedon, 34 Pa. Super. 358, 362 (Pa. Super. 1907) (emphasis

added).

      We briefly discuss precedents indirectly addressing the “specific as the

circumstances of the case will allow” concept referenced in Weedon with

respect to sexual assault cases. In Commonwealth v. Devlin, 333 A.2d 888

(Pa. 1975), William Devlin was accused of sodomizing a twenty-two-year-old

victim “who had the mental ability of a first or second grade child and the

emotional stability of an even younger child.” Id. at 889. Devlin worked for

a social agency and one of his roles was to supervise the victim’s earnings and

distribute them to the victim. This required the victim to visit Devlin’s home

twice a day for funds for lunch and dinner.          One evening, the victim

approached two police officers and stated “that acts of sodomy had been

perpetrated upon him” by Devlin. Id. This assault occurred on only one visit

to Devlin’s home. The victim, however, “could not give any indication as to

the time of year, the month, day, or date when the crime occurred.” Id. Our

Supreme Court discharged the conviction on the grounds that the failure to

prove the date with sufficient particularity denied Devlin his due process right

to an adequate opportunity to defend. See id. at 891.

      Notably, Devlin stated that it could not “enunciate the exact degree of

specificity in the proof of the date of a crime which will be required or the

amount of latitude which will be acceptable. Certainly[,] the Commonwealth

need not always prove a single specific date of the crime.” Id. at 892. This

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observation was significant to our decision in Commonwealth v. Jette, 818

A.2d 533 (Pa. Super. 2003), where the Commonwealth’s evidence showed

that “Jette repeatedly raped and sexually assaulted the minor victim, who was

the son of his live-in girlfriend, during 1993 and 1994, starting when the victim

was eight years old.” Id. at 534 (footnote omitted). The acts “included anal

penetration and oral sex including ejaculating in [the victim’s] mouth….”. Id.

(bracketing in original).   The victim “told a police detective that Jette had

abused him almost daily during the two-year period,” and at trial, “described

four of the worst incidents, describing generally when they occurred by month

and generally what time of the year.” Id. at 535 (quoting trial court opinion).

      Jette was convicted of three counts: one count each of involuntary

deviate sexual intercourse, endangering the welfare of a child, and corrupting

the morals of a child. We held that the evidence was sufficient to convict, i.e.,

that the proof was sufficiently particular. We distinguished Devlin as follows:

      In considering a similar claim in Commonwealth v. Groff, … 548
      A.2d 1237 ([Pa. Super.] 1988), this Court noted that pursuant to
      … Devlin, … “the prosecution must fix the date when an alleged
      offenses occurred with reasonable certainty,” [id.] at 1240, but
      cautioned as well that “the Commonwealth must be allowed a
      reasonable measure of flexibility when faced with the special
      difficulties involved in ascertaining the date of an assault upon a
      young child.” Id. … at 1241.

Jette, 818 A.2d at 535.

      Neither Devlin nor Jette and the cases discussed therein are directly

on point, but they shed light on the central question here: to what degree is

the Commonwealth required to establish in the criminal information the

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specific details when dealing with sexual crimes occurring over a long period

of time?   “The criminal information ‘sets the stage for trial and what the

Commonwealth intends to prove.’” Commonwealth v. Martin, 297 A.3d

424, 432 (Pa. Super. 2023) (quoting Commonwealth v. King, 234 A.3d 549,

563 (Pa. 2020)).     The United States Supreme Court has summarized the

components of a valid charging instrument as follows:

      Our prior cases indicate that an indictment is sufficient if it, first,
      contains the elements of the offense charged and fairly informs a
      defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and,
      second, enables him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of
      future prosecutions for the same offense. It is generally sufficient
      that an indictment set forth the offense in the words of the statute
      itself, as long as those words of themselves fully, directly, and
      expressly, without any uncertainty or ambiguity, set forth all the
      elements necessary to constitute the offence intended to be
      punished. Undoubtedly the language of the statute may be used
      in the general description of an offence, but it must be
      accompanied with such a statement of the facts and
      circumstances as will inform the accused of the specific offence,
      coming under the general description, with which he is charged.

Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117–18 (1974) (cleaned up).

      Note the familiarity of the language describing the sufficiency of the

indictment: it must “fairly inform[] a defendant of the charge against which

he must defend, and, second, enable[] him to plead an acquittal or conviction

in bar of future prosecutions for the same offense.” Id. at 117. This language

is virtually identical to how courts describe the function of a bill of particulars.

Mercado, 649 A.2d at 959. Therefore, a bill of particulars is simply a request

for a more specific pleading, which by Rule places the burden on the

defendant. However, unlike a properly drawn indictment/information, a bill of

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particulars is not something to which a defendant is entitled. It is for this

reason that a bill of particulars cannot save a defective information, nor can a

defective bill of particulars defeat a valid information.

      A motion for a bill of particulars does not question the sufficiency
      of an indictment but rather assumes its validity. When filed, such
      bill of particulars does not become a part of the indictment. It
      therefore cannot remedy by way of amendment a fatal defect in
      an indictment which charges no offense under the law, and,
      similarly, an indictment good on its face is not rendered
      demurrable or subject to a motion to quash by a defective or
      inadequate bill of particulars.

Commonwealth v. Hershman, 90 A.2d 314, 317 (Pa. Super. 1952) (citation

omitted), aff’d, 97 A.2d 777 (Pa. 1953).

      Appellant maintains that the criminal information is too generic in the

sense it merely tracks the statutory language.        While that is an accurate

characterization, Appellant fails to show why, under the circumstances of the

charges and discovery known to him, more was needed.            The allegations

spanned events occurring over two plus years. Criminal acts occurring over a

long period of time, especially those involving young victims, are not

amenable to the type of precise accounting demanded by Appellant.            The

victims, unsurprisingly, could not recall exactly when the abuse occurred and

could not offer exact details for any given incident. This point is significant

when one considers that Appellant agreed at the pre-trial hearing that a

specific timeframe was not needed. However, Appellant now faults the trial

court for failing to force the Commonwealth to describe specific conduct and

acts in the indictment. We do not see how the two can be neatly separated.

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Appellant’s concession that the Commonwealth was not required to pin down

an exact date on which a specific incident of abuse occurred is difficult, if not

impossible, to reconcile with his present claim that the Commonwealth was

required to specify exactly how each incident of abuse occurred. It follows

that if the victims cannot be expected to remember the precise dates, they

cannot be expected to recall precise details.        Hence, the recitation of the

statutory language in conjunction with the discovery material, which placed

Appellant on notice of what the Commonwealth intended to offer as proof of

the crimes, fully justified the trial court’s decision.

      Finally, we briefly address a point of contention between the parties

regarding a comment in our Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v.

Champney, 832 A.2d 403, 412 (Pa. 2003), that the bill of particulars is “an

anachronism of past procedural rules[.]” Compare Commonwealth’s Brief at

8 (approvingly quoting Champney), with Appellant’s Reply Brief at 1-2

(noting that the observation is dictum). To reiterate, we agree with Appellant

that a bill of particulars serves a purpose. Notwithstanding, modern practice,

including the Commonwealth’s mandatory discovery obligations, play a role in

determining whether a bill of particulars is warranted.        The Corpus Juris

Secundum summarizes the circumstances relevant to determining whether a

bill of particulars should be compelled:

      A bill of particulars is required only when the charges of the
      indictment are so general that they do not advise the defendant
      of the specific acts of which he or she is accused.             The
      government, in a criminal prosecution, may not be compelled to
      provide a bill of particulars disclosing the manner in which it will

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       attempt to prove the charges, the precise manner in which the
       defendant committed the crimes charged, or a preview of the
       government’s evidence or legal theories.

       Among the factors considered in determining whether particulars
       are warranted are the complexity of the offense, the clarity of the
       indictment, and the discovery otherwise available to the
       defendant. An accentuated need exists for the State to furnish
       particulars where a crime charged may be committed in a number
       of different ways and when a crime involves not a single
       occurrence but a series of occurrences.

42 C.J.S. Indictments § 193 (footnotes omitted).

       Given the discovery available to Appellant, the recognized flexibility

afforded to the Commonwealth in establishing proof of sexual crimes occurring

over a long period of time and which did not involve a single occurrence, and

the fact that Appellant offers no complaint that the evidence at trial surprised

him,3 we agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the

motion.

       Appellant’s second issue challenges his felony convictions for corruption

of minors at both criminal informations. That statute codifies two separate

offenses, with the felony version requiring proof of a “course of conduct”:

       (a) Offense defined.--

____________________________________________

3 We are unpersuaded that the evidence introduced at trial concerning the
alleged vaginal licking, which was dismissed at the preliminary hearing stage,
as well as the references to Appellant’s videotaping A.L.G., are pertinent to
this claim. Appellant anticipatorily asked the trial judge to exclude evidence
of the alleged vaginal licking, and his brief does not challenge the trial court’s
ruling on that matter. Appellant cannot litigate a backdoor challenge to the
admissibility of that evidence by incorporating it into this claim. Likewise,
Appellant anticipatorily raised the videotaping issue prior to A.L.G.’s
testimony.

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      (1)(i) Except as provided in subparagraph (ii), whoever, being of
      the age of 18 years and upwards, by any act corrupts or tends to
      corrupt the morals of any minor less than 18 years of age, or who
      aids, abets, entices or encourages any such minor in the
      commission of any crime, or who knowingly assists or encourages
      such minor in violating his or her parole or any order of court,
      commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.

      (ii) Whoever, being of the age of 18 years and upwards, by any
      course of conduct in violation of Chapter 31 (relating to sexual
      offenses) corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor less
      than 18 years of age, or who aids, abets, entices or encourages
      any such minor in the commission of an offense under Chapter 31
      commits a felony of the third degree.

18 Pa.C.S. § 6301.

      Appellant challenges whether the offense was properly graded as a

felony of the third degree, asserting that this grading is triggered by the

finding that the actor engaged in a “course of conduct in violation of Chapter

31” and therefore implicates the Sixth Amendment right to a jury.           See

generally Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000); Commonwealth

v. Dixon, 255 A.3d 1258, 1264 (Pa. 2021) (“In the terminology used by the

Apprendi line of cases, … a fact other than a prior conviction which increases

the   punishment     beyond   the   otherwise-imposable   statutory   maximum

comprises an element of a distinct, higher-graded offense.”). Appellant did

not object to the jury instructions and therefore raises this claim as an illegal

sentencing claim. Accepting arguendo that this claim implicates the legality

of Appellant’s sentence as opposed to the sufficiency of the evidence to

convict, we find no illegality in the sentence.

      In Commonwealth v. Baker-Myers, 255 A.3d 223 (Pa. 2021), our

Supreme Court discharged a conviction under Section 6301(a)(1)(ii) where

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the jury acquitted Baker-Myers of all Chapter 31 sexual offenses charged in

the indictment.   The normal rule is that acquittals do not have dispositive

effect, as an acquittal may be due to an act of mercy. Commonwealth v.

Moore, 103 A.3d 1240, 1246 (Pa. 2014) (noting that “jury acquittals may not

be interpreted as specific factual findings with regard to the evidence, as an

acquittal does not definitively establish that the jury was not convinced of a

defendant’s guilt”).   However, there is an exception to this principle, as

discussed in Commonwealth v. Magliocco, 883 A.2d 479 (Pa. 2005). When

the fact-finder acquits of an offense where the commission of that offense is

an element of a separate crime, then the acquittal must be given special

effect. In Magliocco, the trial court convicted him of ethnic intimidation, 18

Pa.C.S. § 2710, while acquitting him of terroristic threats, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2706.

The ethnic intimidation statute contained, as an element of the crime, proof

that a “person … with malicious intention … commits an offense under any

other provision of this article….” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2710. As the only potential

offense at issue was the terroristic threat charge, the acquittal on that offense

precluded a conviction on the ethnic intimidation charge.

      The same general logic was applied in Baker-Myers.             There, the

Commonwealth charged Baker-Myers with rape, sexual assault, aggravated

indecent assault, indecent assault, and felony corruption of minors. The judge

instructed the jury as follows on the corruption of minors charge:

      Whoever being of the age of 18 and upwards by any course of
      conduct in violation of Chapter 31, relating to the other
      sexual offenses being rape, sexual assault, indecent

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       assault, corrupts or tends to corrupt the morals of any minor of
       less than 18 years of age or aids, abets, entices or encourages
       any such minor in the commission of an offense under Chapter
       31, again the sexual offenses[,] commits a felony of the third
       degree.

Baker-Myers, 255 A.3d at 226 (quoting trial transcript; emphasis in original).

       The jury found Baker-Myers guilty of the felony corruption of minors

charge but acquitted him of all the Chapter 31 sex offenses. The Court stated

that the key word in Section 6301(a)(1)(ii) was “violation”:

       [T]he phrase “in violation of” is not all that different from the
       phrase “commits an offense” as interpreted in Magliocco; both
       are aimed at some act that amounts to illegal conduct under the
       law. Thus, the most natural understanding of the phrase “in
       violation of Chapter 31,” as used in subsection (a)(1)(ii) of the
       corruption of minors statute, is that it operates to create — as an
       element of the offense — a requirement that the Commonwealth
       prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused engaged in a
       course of conduct involving a breach of some law or laws
       contained in Chapter 31 of the Crimes Code.

Id. at 234.

       Appellant argues that the same result should pertain here. He submits

that there was no ability for the jury to make a specific factual finding to

support the purportedly enhanced grading.4 Two key, and related, distinctions

____________________________________________

4 Appellant does not cite any published decision establishing that, when the

Commonwealth charges the felony corruption of minors, that claim is
reviewable under legality of sentence principles. Appellant relies in part on
the concurring memorandum authored by the Honorable Judith F. Olson in
Commonwealth v. McAllister, 23 WDA 2021 (Pa. Super. filed Jan. 11,
2022). See Appellant’s Brief at 25. Aside from the fact that the decision is
not precedential and therefore does not control, Judge Olson’s memorandum
does not support his position.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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exist between Baker-Myers and this case. Here, beginning with the charges

concerning A.L.G., the jury did not acquit Appellant of all the underlying

Chapter 31 offenses.         Instead, it acquitted Appellant of the aggravated

indecent assault charge while convicting him of the indecent assault charge.

On its face, this is not necessarily dispositive because the jury convicted him

of only one Chapter 31 offense. Accordingly, it could be said that there was

no “course of conduct” on the theory that this means there is only one singular
____________________________________________

      McAllister, like this case, involved a felony corruption of minor charge.
The key distinction is that the jury in McAllister was not given any instruction
concerning “course of conduct.” Id. at *1 (Olson, J., concurring) (stating that
“the trial court failed to instruct the jury as to course of conduct”). Judge
Olson pointed out that McAllister, unlike Appellant, did in fact properly
preserve a sufficiency of the evidence claim flowing from that failure.
“Following his conviction and sentence, [McAllister] filed a timely post-
sentence motion which included a claim that his conviction for corruption of
minors was insufficient as a matter of law.” Id. at *2 (Olson, J., concurring).
Judge Olson noted that, in his brief, McAllister then raised that issue as
implicating the legality of his sentence. Judge Olson disagreed with that
framing, opining:

       In my view, this is not a legality of sentence issue and should
       not be analyzed as such. Instead, the issue (which was preserved)
       is whether the fact of a “course of conduct” was presented to the
       jury properly such that the jury could make that factual finding
       beyond a reasonable doubt. If not, [McAllister’s] conviction for
       corruption of minors as a third-degree felony cannot stand.

Id. at *4 (footnote omitted; emphasis added).

      Judge Olson asserted that McAllister preserved a valid Apprendi claim,
but not in the legality of sentence sense. Instead, he preserved a claim that
the conviction could not stand “when all elements of the crime were not
submitted properly to the jury….” Id. at *6. Appellant’s argument here
actually appears to go to sufficiency as the jury was instructed on the “course
of conduct” element.

                                          - 19 -
J-A16029-23

act to support the corruption of minors. But the second distinction settles any

doubt on that point. The Baker-Myers Court noted that the jury instructions

were limited to the offenses charged:

      [C]ontrary to the Commonwealth’s suggestion — based on a
      selective quotation from the transcript — that the trial court did
      not instruct the jury it was required to find [Baker-Myers] actually
      committed one or more of the charged sexual offenses, a review
      of the court’s full instruction proves otherwise. Notably, the trial
      court instructed the jury that it was required to find “any course
      of conduct in violation of Chapter 31, relating to the other sexual
      offenses being rape, sexual assault, indecent assault[.]” In
      light of this clear instruction regarding the applicable predicate
      offenses, which was given in part at the prosecutor’s request, we
      are unpersuaded by the Commonwealth’s attempt to salvage
      [Baker-Myers]’s felony corruption of minors conviction.

Id. at 235 (citations omitted; emphasis in original).

      In contrast, the trial judge here instructed the jury as follows with

respect to that element of the offense:

      The second charge or second count as it pertains to [A.L.G.] is
      corruption of a minor. … To find the defendant guilty of this
      offense, you must find that each of the following three elements
      has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

                                      ***

      And third, that the defendant engaged in the course of conduct
      that constituted the following sexual offenses under the crimes
      code of Pennsylvania. And here it’s alleged to be indecent assault
      and/or aggravated indecent assault.

N.T., 9/29/21, at 433-34.

      To reiterate, the fact that the jury was explicitly instructed on an

element of the offense would tend to suggest that this is not an illegality of

sentencing claim and, as such, Appellant would have had to object to the jury

                                     - 20 -
J-A16029-23

instructions. See Commonwealth v. Smith, 206 A.3d 551, 565 (Pa. Super.

2019) (expressing same point of view but assuming, arguendo, that a

challenge to the validity of a conviction under this felony corruption of minors

statute constituted a non-waivable challenge to the legality of the sentence).5

Notwithstanding, accepting that we may review this claim despite a failure to

challenge the adequacy of the instruction, we must address the fact that this

instruction does reference two Chapter 31 offenses, one of which resulted in

an acquittal.

       As we have discussed at length supra, Appellant was alleged to have

committed several instances of indecent assault. Therefore, the guilty verdict

at one count is not incompatible with a finding that Appellant committed

several acts of indecent assault. Indeed, the Baker-Myers Court stated, “this

is not to say the Commonwealth must formally charge or obtain a conviction

on the Chapter 31 offense or offenses serving as the predicate for the felony

corruption of minors charge in order to sustain a conviction for corruption of

minors.” Baker-Myers, 255 A.3d at 234. This leaves open the possibility

that the Commonwealth could charge one count of felony corruption of minors,
____________________________________________

5 The Smith Court noted that we have “treated a similar challenge to the
grading of an offense as raising a question as to the legality of the sentence,
which is a non-waivable issue.”             Smith, 206 A.3d at 565 (citing
Commonwealth v. Popow, 844 A.2d 13, 16 (Pa. Super. 2004)). The statute
analyzed in Popow, unlike the statue here, does not separately codify the
“course of conduct” as a distinct crime. By submitting the actual element to
the jury, the Sixth Amendment concerns would seem to be eliminated because
the jury was, in fact, instructed to find the element. Accordingly, any question
of whether that instruction was sufficient would arguably have to be preserved
via objection.

                                          - 21 -
J-A16029-23

without charging any other Chapter 31 offense. Here, the Commonwealth

charged one count of indecent assault, and one count of aggravated indecent

assault. While the jury acquitted on the latter charge, it convicted on the

former. Because the former offense was not limited to one discrete incident,

we find that Baker-Myers is distinguishable.6

       Turning to S.G., the jury was instructed as follows:

       In … the fourth charge for your consideration as it pertains to
       [S.G.] is corruption of a minor. To find the defendant guilty of
       this offense you must find that each of the following three
       elements has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

                                      ***
       And third, that the defendant engaged in a course of conduct that
       constituted the following sexual offenses under the crimes code of
       Pennsylvania. And it’s alleged to be indecent assault. And that
       by that conduct, the defendant corrupted or tended to corrupt the
       morals of [a] minor.

N.T., 9/29/21, at 432.

       The underlying crime of indecent assault referenced in the jury

instruction is, unlike the corruption of minors charge, by default graded as a

misdemeanor of the first degree subject to several exceptions. One of these

is the commission of a course of conduct. Recall that, at count two, Appellant

was charged with a violation of 18 Pa.C.S. § 3126(a)(7), which criminalizes

“indecent contact … for the purpose of arousing sexual desire in the person or

the complainant and … the complainant is less than 13 years of age[.]” Per

the statute, that offense is graded as follows:

____________________________________________

6 The charges in Baker-Myers arose from a single incident.

                                          - 22 -
J-A16029-23

      (b) Grading.--Indecent assault shall be graded as follows:

                                      ***

            (3) An offense under subsection (a)(7) is a misdemeanor
            of the first degree unless any of the following apply, in
            which case it is a felony of the third degree:

               (i) It is a second or subsequent offense.

               (ii) There has been a course of conduct of
               indecent assault by the person.

               (iii) The indecent assault was committed by
               touching the complainant’s sexual or intimate parts
               with sexual or intimate parts of the person.

               (iv) The indecent assault is committed by touching
               the person’s sexual or intimate parts with the
               complainant’s sexual or intimate parts.

18 Pa.C.S. § 3126 (emphasis added).

      The jury was separately instructed on the charge of indecent assault

that it would have to find a course of conduct and, consistent with the grading

portion of the statute, asked to render a special finding on that point:

      If you find that these elements [of indecent assault] have been
      proven beyond a reasonable doubt you should find that the
      defendant [is] guilty. If you do so find, you should indicate on the
      verdict form whether you also find the following elements proven
      beyond a reasonable doubt. That there has been a course of
      conduct of indecent assault by the person.

      A course of conduct means a pattern of actions composed of more
      than one act over a period of time however short, evidencing a
      continuity of conduct.

N.T., 9/29/21, at 430.

      Thus, the jury found that Appellant was guilty of committing a course of

conduct, i.e., he committed multiple violations of indecent assault upon S.G.

while she was under thirteen years of age. Thus, even though we would find

                                     - 23 -
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pursuant to the foregoing analysis that the charge was properly graded as a

felony of the third degree, the fact that the jury found Appellant guilty of a

continuing course of conduct independently supports a conclusion that the

conviction was properly graded as a felony of the third degree.7 We therefore

find that Appellant has failed to establish that his sentence at either

information is illegal.

       Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 10/23/2023

____________________________________________

7 We do not suggest that the conviction at that count had preclusive effect,

but, rather, that there clearly existed a basis for the jury to again separately
find a “course of conduct” for purposes of the corruption of minors charge.

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