Court Opinion

ID: 9547541
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 17:48:39.223911+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:17:50.668256
License: Public Domain

ROVIRA, Justice,
dissenting:
The opinion of the court in this case is a classic example of the exclusionary rule being applied without there being a sound basis for its application. The court in its analysis seems to forget, or perhaps ignores, that the exclusionary rule’s primary purpose is to deter police misconduct. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 94 S.Ct. 613, 38 L.Ed.2d 561 (1974). Keeping in mind that primary purpose, I believe that when it is applied to the facts of this case no showing of misconduct can be demonstrated.
What we have in this case is an example of a quick and lawful response by the police to an emergency. The majority opinion recognizes that there was a sound basis in fact to suspect that a crime had occurred and that the purpose of the stop was reasonable. However, it then determines that the scope and character of the stop was unreasonable as a result of the police confiscating the defendant’s possessions, handcuffing him, and returning him to the place where the chase started.
I agree with that part of the court’s opinion which finds that the police had a reasonable suspicion that a crime had occurred and the purpose of the stop was reasonable. I disagree with the conclusion that the scope and character of the stop was unreasonable because it was a “greater intrusion on the defendant’s person than necessary to detain him and inquire about his activities.” At 1072-1073.
Initially, the court condemns the police for confiscating the defendant’s possessions. The “possessions” referred to is the wad of money found in the defendant’s pocket which, a few minutes after the defendant was stopped, was identified by the *1074victim, Mr. Salas, as the money taken from the cash register in his barbershop.
The second ground for finding inappropriate police conduct was that the police handcuffed the defendant even after he was frisked, and no weapons were found. Officers Relf and Gutierrez testified concerning their reasons for putting handcuffs on the defendant and placing him over the hood of the police car. Relf stated that when suspects are placed in a police vehicle it is normal procedure to handcuff them because of past incidents where officers “were attacked or their weapons were taken from them .... ” In explaining why he placed the defendant over the hood of the car, Relf testified that after catching up with the defendant he was “getting tired and didn’t feel like another foot chase, so I placed him across the hood of the car to disable him from running.” Gutierrez testified that he handcuffed the defendant because, “I didn’t want this party from past experiences, breaking from us and running again.”
The majority opinion also finds fault with the police returning the defendant to Mr. Salas’ barbershop, the place where the chase started. Since witness identification at the scene of the crime is permissible in situations where immediate identification would permit either the release of the suspect or establish probable cause for arrest, People v. Mascarenas, 666 P.2d 101 (Colo. 1983), I believe that taking the defendant back to where the chase, started was reasonably related to the stop. While the act of returning the defendant could, from the defendant’s perspective, be characterized as a “greater intrusion on the defendant’s person than necessary,” I do not believe that it is an appropriate or correct characterization under the facts of this case.
The standard which I believe appropriate to apply is whether the police acted reasonably under the totality of the circumstances. My review of the record leads me to conclude that the police took reasonable steps to ensure their own safety and to prevent the defendant from escaping. Their acts were reasonable and did not constitute misconduct such as to mandate invoking the exclusionary rule. I would reverse the ruling of the trial court and allow the police officers to testify at trial and also allow the introduction of the evidence seized from the defendant.