Court Opinion

ID: 9371767
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-16 20:00:53.060357+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:30.292487
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10857   Document: 35-1    Date Filed: 02/16/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                               No. 22-10857
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       DAMMUON EPPS,
                                                   Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT
       OF HUMAN RESOURCES,
       as an officer within the Alabama Children's
       Policy Council,
       ZACHARY COLLINS,
       in his official capacity as Chairman of the
       Russell County Children's Policy Council
       for the State of Alabama and Russell County,
       BARBARA COOPER,
       in her official capacity, Secretary of the
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                22-10857

       Department of Early Childhood Education
       for the State ofAlabama and as Chairman
       of the Alabama Childrens Policy Council,
       GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF ALABAMA,
       Chairman of the State Board of Human
       Resources, and as an officer within the Alabama
       Children's Policy Council,,
       ALLISON BRYARS,
       in his official capacity as Director of the Russell
       County Department of Human Resources
       and as member of the Alabama Children's
       Policy Council,
       TOM PARKER,
       in his official capacity as Administrative
       Head of the Alabama Judicial System and in his
       capacity as Vice-Chairman of the Alabama
       Children's Policy Council,

                                                     Defendants-Appellees.

                            ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket No. 3:19-cv-00345-WKW-SMD
                           ____________________
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       22-10857                   Opinion of the Court                               3

       Before LAGOA, BRASHER, and EDMONDSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
             This appeal stems from a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil action filed
       by Dammuon Epps against several Alabama government officials.
       The appeal is from the district court’s dismissal of Epps’s post-judg-
       ment motions under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 and 60(b). Epps is proceed-
       ing pro se on appeal. * No reversible error has been shown; we
       affirm.
              In 2019, Epps filed pro se this civil action and applied for
       leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Briefly stated, Epps sought to
       challenge as unconstitutional certain Alabama statutes and proce-
       dures governing the removal of children from a parent’s custody.
             A magistrate judge reviewed sua sponte Epps’s complaint
       pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The magistrate judge determined
       that Epps’s complaint constituted an impermissible “shotgun
       pleading” and instructed Epps to amend his complaint.
              Epps filed an amended complaint against these defendants
       (in their official capacities): the Governor of Alabama, the Commis-
       sioner of the Alabama Department of Human Resources, the Sec-
       retary of the Department of Early Childhood Education, the Ad-
       ministrative Head of the Alabama Judicial System, the Chairman

       * We read liberally briefs filed by pro se litigants. See Timson v. Sampson, 518
       F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). We also construe liberally pro se pleadings. See
       Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
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       4                       Opinion of the Court                 22-10857

       of the Russell County Children’s Policy Council, and the Director
       of the Russell County Department of Human Resources. Each de-
       fendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint on various
       grounds, including for failure to comply with federal pleading
       standards under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
               A magistrate judge prepared a report and recommendation
       (“R&R”). The magistrate judge recommended that the district
       court dismiss Epps’s amended complaint as a “textbook shotgun
       pleading” that failed to comply with federal pleading standards.
       The magistrate judge recommended further that the complaint be
       dismissed without an additional opportunity to amend given
       Epps’s failure -- despite the magistrate judge’s detailed instructions
       -- to correct the deficiencies identified in Epps’s original complaint.
               Epps filed objections to the R&R: Epps objected only to the
       portion of the R&R that recommended that he be denied a second
       opportunity to amend. In an order dated 3 January 2022, the dis-
       trict court overruled Epps’s objection, adopted the R&R, granted
       the defendants’ motions to dismiss, and dismissed with prejudice
       Epps’s amended complaint.
              Epps then filed two post-judgment motions: (1) a motion
       under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) for relief from judgment, and (2) a mo-
       tion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 52 for the court to “submit findings of
       facts and conclusions of law with regard to the constitutionality of
       the application of” the challenged statutes. The district court de-
       nied both motions on 24 February 2022. This appeal followed.
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       22-10857                Opinion of the Court                          5

               Earlier in these appellate proceedings, we dismissed in part -
       - for lack of jurisdiction -- Epps’s appeal to the extent Epps seeks to
       challenge the district court’s 3 January 2022 final order of dismissal.
       We retain jurisdiction only to review the district court’s 24 Febru-
       ary 2022 order denying Epps’s post-judgment motions.
               Construing liberally Epps’s pro se initial appellate brief, we
       see no substantive arguments challenging the denial of Epps’s post-
       judgment motions. Epps has thus abandoned the argument that
       the district court erred in denying those motions. See Sapuppo v.
       Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (“[A]n
       appellant abandons a claim when he either makes only passing ref-
       erences to it or raises it in a perfunctory manner without support-
       ing arguments and authority.”); Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870,
       874 (11th Cir. 2008) (“While we read briefs filed by pro se litigants
       liberally, issues not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are
       deemed abandoned.” (citation omitted)). Nor will we consider ar-
       guments about the post-judgment motions raised for the first time
       in Epps’s reply brief. See Timson, 518 F.3d at 874 (“[W]e do not
       address arguments raised for the first time in a pro se litigant’s reply
       brief.”).
              Even if Epps had not abandoned arguments on appeal, we
       could not conclude that the district court abused its discretion in
       denying Epps’s post-judgment motions. Rule 52 is inapplicable to
       the district court’s dismissal order in this case. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
       52(a)(3) (“The court is not required to state findings or conclusions
       when ruling on a motion under Rule 12 . . ..”).
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       6                       Opinion of the Court                 22-10857

              Epps has also demonstrated no justification that would com-
       pel Rule 60(b) relief. See Maradiaga v. United States, 679 F.3d 1286,
       1291 (11th Cir. 2012) (explaining that a party appealing the denial
       of a Rule 60(b) motion “must demonstrate a justification for relief
       so compelling that the district court was required to grant the mo-
       tion” (brackets omitted)). Epps’s Rule 60(b) motion relied chiefly
       on arguments that Epps could have -- but failed to -- raise in his
       objections to the R&R. See id. at 1294 (“It is not an abuse of dis-
       cretion for the district court to deny a motion under Rule 60(b)
       when that motion is premised upon an argument that the movant
       could have, but did not, advance before the district court entered
       judgment.”).
               The district court also acted within its discretion by dismiss-
       ing Epps’s complaint without allowing Epps another chance to
       amend his complaint. We have said that a pro se plaintiff must
       generally be given “one chance to amend the complaint before the
       district court dismisses the action with prejudice.” See Bank v. Pitt,
       928 F.2d 1108, 1112 (11th Cir. 1991), overruled in part by Wagner
       v. Daewoo Heavy Indus. Am. Corp., 314 F.3d 541, 542 & n.1 (11th
       Cir. 2002) (en banc) (holding that the rule in Bank does not apply
       to counseled plaintiffs).
              AFFIRMED.