Court Opinion

ID: 9951183
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-15 18:10:31.963175+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:35:38.704024
License: Public Domain

J-S02038-24

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
  JESUS CHUITO PAGAN                           :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 868 EDA 2022

          Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered February 28, 2022
  In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
                     No(s): CP-51-CR-0003753-2014

BEFORE:      LAZARUS, P.J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:                         FILED MARCH 15, 2024

       Jesus Chuito Pagan appeals pro se from the February 28, 2022 order

dismissing his petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act

(“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. After careful review, we affirm.

       A detailed recitation of the factual background is not relevant to our

disposition and need not be reiterated in full here. In sum, Appellant shot the

decedent, Justin Carter, on the streets of Philadelphia, killing him. See notes

of testimony, 6/3/15 at 186-210.

       The PCRA court summarized the procedural history of this case as

follows:

              On June 11, 2015, a jury found [Appellant] guilty of
              first degree murder, possession of an instrument of
              crime (“PIC”), [firearms not to be carried without a
____________________________________________

* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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              license], and [carrying firearms on public streets or
              public property in Philadelphia].     [Appellant] was
              sentenced that same day to an aggregate sentence of
              life imprisonment without the possibility of parole plus
              8½ to 17 years state incarceration.

              On June 20, 2015, [Appellant] filed a post-sentence
              motion. On July 1, 2015, before the court could rule
              on the post-sentence motion or an order finalizing the
              judgment of sentence, [Appellant] filed a pro se
              notice of appeal to the Superior Court. On October 5,
              2015, the Superior Court entered an order to quash
              the    appeal     as    interlocutory   pursuant    to
              Commonwealth v. Borrero, 692 A.2d 158, 160
              (Pa.Super. 1997).

              On February 22, 2016, [Appellant] filed a pro se PCRA
              petition requesting the court to reinstate his appellate
              rights nunc pro tunc. On September 11, 2017,
              [Appellant] filed an Amended Petition. On February
              12, 2018, the parties agreed to reinstate [Appellant’s]
              appellate rights nunc pro tunc. The Superior Court
              affirmed [Appellant’s] judgment of sentence on May
              3, 2019. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied
              allocator on October 15, 2019.[1]

              On September 2, 2020, [Appellant] filed the instant
              timely PCRA petition alleging ineffective assistance of
              trial and appellate counsel as well as vague allegations
              of prosecutorial misconduct, trial court “abuse of
              discretion,”    erroneous    jury    instructions,   and
              unspecified violations of his constitutional rights. On
              December 23, 2020, Michael I. McDermott, Esquire
              [(hereinafter “PCRA counsel”)] was appointed as
              PCRA counsel. On January 24, 2022, [PCRA counsel]
              filed a [petition to withdraw and] “no-merit” letter

____________________________________________

1 See Commonwealth v. Pagan, 217 A.3d 366 (Pa.Super. 2019), appeal

denied, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa 2019).

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              pursuant to [Turner/Finley].[2] [PCRA counsel] filed
              an amended “no-merit” letter on January 26, 2022.

PCRA court opinion, 6/16/22 at 2 (extraneous capitalization omitted; some

citation formatting amended).

       On January 27, 2022, the PCRA court provided Appellant with notice of

its intention to dismiss his petition without a hearing, pursuant to

Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). Appellant filed a response to the PCRA court’s Rule 907

notice on February 28, 2022. That same day, the PCRA court granted PCRA

counsel permission to withdraw and dismissed Appellant’s petition.       This

timely pro se appeal followed on March 21, 2022.3

       Appellant raises only one issue for our review:

              1.     Does the PCRA court’s dismissal of [] Appellant’s
                     PCRA petition constitute clear legal error given
                     [] Appellant was denied his right to effective
                     assistance of counsel on his first PCRA requiring
                     remand to the lower court?

Appellant’s brief at 4 (extraneous capitalization omitted).

       Proper appellate review of a PCRA court’s dismissal of a PCRA petition

is limited to the examination of “whether the PCRA court’s determination is

supported by the record and free of legal error.” Commonwealth v. Miller,

102 A.3d 988, 992 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted). “This Court grants

____________________________________________

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988),                       and
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. 1988) (en banc).

3 Appellant and the PCRA court have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

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great deference to the findings of the PCRA court, and we will not disturb those

findings merely because the record could support a contrary holding.”

Commonwealth v. Patterson, 143 A.3d 394, 397 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citation

omitted). In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, a defendant must plead and

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence

arose from one or more of the errors listed at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2).

These issues must be neither previously litigated nor waived. 42 Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9543(a)(3).

      The crux of Appellant’s argument is that          the PCRA court erred in

permitting PCRA counsel to withdraw and dismissing his petition because (i)

PCRA counsel failed to comply with the technical mandates of Turner/Finley;

and (ii) was ineffective for filing a no-merit letter in lieu of providing effective

representation on his behalf. Appellant’s brief at 4, 8. We disagree.

      Preliminarily, we recognize that to prevail on a claim of ineffective

assistance of counsel under the PCRA, a petitioner must establish the following

three factors: “first[,] the underlying claim has arguable merit; second, that

counsel had no reasonable basis for his action or inaction; and third, that

Appellant was prejudiced.” Commonwealth v. Charleston, 94 A.3d 1012,

1020 (Pa.Super. 2014) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 523 (Pa.

2014).

            [A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he
            proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that his
            conviction or sentence resulted from the [i]neffective
            assistance of counsel which, in the circumstances of

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              the    particular   case,    so   undermined      the
              truth-determining     process   that   no    reliable
              adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
              place.

Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d 294, 311 (Pa. 2014) (internal quotation

marks    omitted;     some    brackets    in   original),   citing    42   Pa.C.S.A.

§ 9543(a)(2)(ii).

      Pursuant to Turner/Finley, an “[i]ndependent review of the record by

competent counsel is required before withdrawal [on collateral review] is

permitted.”    Commonwealth v. Widgins, 29 A.3d 816, 817 (Pa.Super.

2011) (citations omitted). In Widgins, a panel of this Court explained that

independent review requires proof of the following:

              1.    A “no merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel detailing
                    the nature and extent of his review;

              2.    The “no merit” letter by PC[R]A counsel listing
                    each issue the petitioner wished to have
                    reviewed;

              3.    The PC[R]A counsel's “explanation”, in the “no
                    merit” letter, of why the petitioner's issues were
                    meritless;

              4.    The PC[R]A court conducting its                  own
                    independent review of the record; and

              5.    The PC[R]A court agreeing with counsel that the
                    petition was meritless.

Id. at 818 (citations omitted; brackets in original).

      Additionally,

              Counsel must also send to the petitioner: (1) a copy
              of the “no merit” letter/brief; (2) a copy of counsel’s
              petition to withdraw; and (3) a statement advising

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            petitioner of the right to proceed pro se or by new
            counsel.

            ....

            Where counsel submits a petition and no-merit letter
            that   …    satisfy   the   technical   demands      of
            Turner/Finley, the court – trial court or this Court –
            must then conduct its own review of the merits of the
            case. If the court agrees with counsel that the claims
            are without merit, the court will permit counsel to
            withdraw and deny relief.

Commonwealth v. Muzzy, 141 A.3d 509, 511 (Pa.Super. 2016) (citations

omitted).

      Here, the record reflects that PCRA counsel has satisfied the demands

of Turner/Finley. PCRA counsel filed a petition to withdraw and “no-merit”

letter which stated the nature and extent of his review; listed the issues for

which Appellant sought review; explained why and how the issues lacked

merit; and requested permission to withdraw.       See Finley Letter/Petition,

1/24/22; Amended Finley Letter/Petition, 1/26/22. PCRA counsel also sent

Appellant a copy of the “no-merit” letter, a copy of the petition to withdraw,

and a statement advising Appellant of his right to proceed pro se or by

privately retained counsel. See id. Consequently, we are unpersuaded by

Appellant’s claim that PCRA counsel somehow rendered ineffective assistance

by electing to file a petition to withdraw and no-merit letter in accordance with

Turner/Finley.

                                      -6-
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     Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the PCRA court did not err in

dismissing Appellant’s PCRA petition and affirm the February 28, 2022 order

of the PCRA court.

     Order affirmed.

Date: 3/15/2024

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