Court Opinion

ID: 9698756
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:59:15.909435+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:30:03.071836
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The issue of Jason Cunningham’s right to confront his accuser was not raised in the juvenile court. In my view, the contention is waived. I would affirm the order of disposition placing Cunningham on two years’ probation.
*86All agree that the right to confront and cross-examine witnesses attaches to juvenile proceedings. 42 Pa.C.S. § 6338(a); In Re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30, 42-57, 87 S.Ct. 1428, 1445, 1441-1459, 18 L.Ed.2d 527, 547-548, 554-563 (1967); In Interest of Bonner, 301 Pa.Super. 431, 447 A.2d 1043 (1982). In the case here under review, the testimony of the victim was taken before a Juvenile Master in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 6305(b) on July 27, 1987. Present for the videotaped proceedings were an assistant district attorney and an assistant public defender. • The latter was representing Cunningham. The assistant public defender, Randa Clark, was afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the victim, but she declined. Videotaped Proceedings, July 27, 1987 at p. 22; R.R. 25a.
At the adjudication hearing held on August 24, 1987, the same opposing counsel as were present for the videotaped testimony of the victim one month earlier appeared before the same Juvenile Master. At this hearing, Cunningham was present, accompanied by his mother, Mrs. Susan Cunningham, and represented by his attorney, Randa Clark. Jason’s father, identified in the record only as Mr. Cunningham, was also present. The videotaped testimony of the victim was introduced into evidence by stipulation and the Commonwealth rested. N.T., August 24, 1987 at pp. 2-4, 23, 24, 25; R.R. 28a-30a, 48a, 49a, 50a.
On September 1, 1987, the Master recommended, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 6305(c), that Cunningham be adjudicated delinquent on a charge of indecent assault. The same day, the Honorable John H. Brydon adjudicated Cunningham delinquent. On November 23, 1987, a Motion for Rehearing was filed, consistent with § 6305(d). The only grounds set forth in support of the motion were (a) alleged insufficiency of the evidence, and (b) alleged incompetency of a four-year-old to testify. Judge Brydon did not affirm his earlier adjudication of delinquency until he had reviewed both the testimony and the videotape.
As the appellant concedes, the waiver doctrine is applicable in juvenile proceedings. Commonwealth v. Williams, *87504 Pa. 511, 475 A.2d 1283 (1984). Application of the totality of the circumstances analysis employed by our supreme court in Williams, 504 Pa. at 519, 475 A.2d at 1288, compels the conclusion in this appeal that waiver has occurred and due process has not been violated. Here, Cunningham’s attorney was present during the victim’s testimony and had every opportunity to cross-examine. A videotape transcript was made of the victim’s testimony. Cunningham surely knew the victim’s identity and was not prevented from advising Randa Clark, his attorney, of any factors which he thought would be useful in assisting Clark to effectively search out the truth. Both of Cunningham’s parents were present at the continued hearing where it was stated, on the record, that the videotaped testimony of the victim would be the entire case for the Commonwealth. No objection was raised at that time. Nor was the fact of Cunningham’s non-presence during the victim’s videotaping included in the reasons supporting the motion for rehearing.
Based on all of these facts, I conclude that the waiver of Cunningham’s right to be personally present with his attorney during the examination of the victim was knowingly and freely made. Commonwealth v. Williams, supra. On the same facts, I also conclude that a due process challenge would be unsuccessful. See Cruz v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Public Welfare, 80 Pa.Cmwlth. 360, 472 A.2d 725 (1984).
Since I find that the primary issue raised on this appeal has been waived, and since my review of the entire record does not disclose any fundamental unfairness, I dissent from the majority’s analysis and conclusion based upon claimed ineffectiveness of counsel. Such an analysis, in my view, is not appropriate in a juvenile proceeding. Matter of Smith, 393 Pa.Super. 39, 573 A.2d 1077 (Concurring and Dissenting Opinion by Johnson, J.).