Court Opinion

ID: 9452990
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 17:59:03.359214+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:33:27.123142
License: Public Domain

RIVES, Circuit Judge
(dissenting):
As indicated in my special concurrence to the original decision, I had thought the law was clear that what Crume was required to do in the line up did not violate his privilege against self-incrimination, and that that, insofar as here pertinent, was all that the district court had decided. The majority, however, considers that the question to be decided on appeal is: “Was Ernest Crume, the petitioner, accorded due process of law in the procedures leading to his pre-trial identification as one who had committed a robbery?” The majority continues: “We have resolved our nagging doubts in favor of affirming the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus.” If that were the question, I would feel called upon to discuss some of the majority’s factual conclusions with which I do not agree and would probably vote for reversal. However, I am firm in the view that that question should first be considered in a trial court, state or federal, and that to make the original decision here is to depart from our function as a court of appeals.
The majority does, however, consider and decide that broad issue, and thus, to some extent, prejudices any future presentation of that issue to a trial court. To me that issue seems so close and of such complexity and difficulty that due process required that Crume’s persistent requests for counsel be granted both in the district court and on appeal.1
I therefore respectfully dissent.

. Dillon v. United States, 9 Cir. 1962, 307 F.2d 445, 446, 447; United States v. Wilkins, 2 Cir. 1964, 338 F.2d 404, 406; La Clair v. United States, 7 Cir. 1967, 374 F.2d 486, 488, 489.