Court Opinion

ID: 9673875
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:19:55.30248+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:24.458224
License: Public Domain

CONNOR T. HANSEN, J.
(dissenting). I respectfully dissent for the same reason I dissented in Chart v. General Motors Corp., 80 Wis.2d 91, 258 N.W.2d 680 (1977). Once again this court’s application of the law of strict liability comes perilously close to making a manufacturer an absolute insurer of its product.
In denominating this a “close case,” inappropriate for a directed verdict, the majority implies that a jury could have found, based on the evidence presented, that this machine was sold in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous. The facts here do not support such a conclusion and the court does a disservice to the parties in sending them through a new trial. If the same testimony is adduced in the subsequent trial the ultimate result must be the same; the manufacturer will again be absolved. The majority’s decision penalizes the manufacturer for requesting a directed verdict in a case which it had clearly won.
The court has frequently admonished trial courts that it is the better practice in close cases to reserve a ruling on a motion for a directed verdict until after the jury has considered the evidence and rendered a verdict. Samson v. Riesing, 62 Wis.2d 698, 704, 705, 215 N.W.2d 662 (1974). The majority’s decision has the effect of holding that this admonition is no longer a guideline appli*906cable only to close cases, but a mandatory rule of procedure applicable to even the clearest of cases. If the instant case cannot qualify as one which the trial court can take from the jury, trial judges are not safe in taking any products liability case from a jury.
In reviewing a directed verdict the question for this court is whether the trial court was clearly wrong. A trial court may direct a verdict against the plaintiff where the plaintiff’s evidence, giving it the most favorable construction it will reasonably bear, is insufficient to sustain a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor. Schuh v. Fox River Tractor Co., 63 Wis.2d 728, 733, 734, 218 N.W. 2d 279 (1974).
The plaintiff here had the burden of proving that the machine was sold in a defective condition, unreasonably dangerous. The plaintiff also had to rebut evidence that employee’s contributory negligence outweighed the manufacturer’s liability. Schuh, supra, at 744.
The plaintiff’s case contained the following evidence. The machine was purchased between 1943 and 1960. The accident occurred in 1974, when the machine was between fourteen and thirty-one years old. Through the facts of the accident itself the plaintiff was able to show that at full pressure with the cover off the 500 pound piston broke through the safety ring. The manufacturer had developed a safety valve in 1946 which would maintain the pressure at a maximum of 10 pounds while the cover was off. This valve'was made standard equipment in 1971. Personnel working at the plant in 1974 were unaware of the valve’s existence. The manufacturer’s instructions gave a procedure for testing the machine at full pressure, but did not indicate what pressure to use while cleaning the machine.
These facts simply do not make a case for defective condition, unreasonably dangerous on account of design defect or failure to warn. The majority has apparently agreed with plaintiff’s theory that unreasonable danger *907can be inferred from the fact that an accident occurred and the machine could have been made safer. I submit that if a jury so found on these facts it would be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to deny the defendant’s motion for directed verdict or,judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
The fact that an instrument is capable of being operated in such way as to inflict fatal injury does not make it unreasonably dangerous. The fact that an accident does result from such use is not proof that a defective condition existed. If these are the rules, car manufacturers should take heed and see to it that their products cannot be driven in excess of 55 m.p.h. The result in this case, together with the result in Chart, supra, leads inexorably to the conclusion that this court has adopted a rule of absolute liability of manufacturers for products that do not prevent the user from negligently injuring himself. It appears that all a plaintiff need do is show that the product is not as safe as it could be. The manufacturer’s liability will follow, unaffected by the plaintiff’s negligence in using the product.
In Vincer v. Esther Wms. All-Alum. S. Pool Co., 69 Wis.2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975), this court quoted the following definitions from the comments to sec. 402A, Restatement 2 Torts, 2d,
“ ‘g. Defective condition. . . in a condition not contemplated by the ultimate consumer, which will be unreasonably dangerous to him.’
“ ‘i. Unreasonably dangerous. . . The article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.'' . . .” Vincer, supra, at 330, 331.
Given the industrial context in which this machine was used and the training which its operators underwent, *908the machine was not unreasonably dangerous even though it could be fully pressurized with the cover off. The danger inherent in running the machine at full pressure with the cover off was obvious. In normal use the machine was operated with the cover on. The customary practice known to all those who operated the machine was to run the machine at low pressure while cleaning. Very specific procedures were set out in the instructions in order to conduct a high pressure test without the cover. No warning or safety device was necessary to put this machine in an acceptably safe condition.
“ ‘The duty to warn ... is a duty to give a warning which is adequate and appropriate under the circumstances.’ ....
“ ‘. . . the likelihood of an accident’s taking place and the seriousness of the consequences are always pertinent matters to be considered with respect to the duty to provide a sufficient warning label, . . .’ ” Schuh, supra, at 739.
In the absence of any indication that the machine was unreasonably dangerous without the safety valve, the manufacturer cannot be faulted for not making that valve standard equipment until 1971. Buyers were informed of the availability of the valve through ads, flyers and a boldface heading on the parts list. The majority’s opinion seems to suggest that a manufacturer must personally demand that a buyer install an optional safety device in order to protect itself when the buyer denies knowledge of a widely advertised safety device that has been available for twenty-eight years.
Furthermore, given the obviousness of the danger, the manufacturer’s negligence couldn’t, under any view, outweigh the employee’s. In Schuh, supra, this court sustained a directed verdict where it was evident that the plaintiff’s negligence was greater than the manufacturer’s as a matter of law. The employee in the in*909stant case had been employed to operate the machine for six years and was responsible for cleaning the eight machines in his area every day. The plant had well-established procedures for the cleaning operation which involved using only five to ten pounds of pressure to raise the piston. The employee knew of these procedures and also knew that this particular machine had been malfunctioning for over a year. It is undisputed that following the accident the machine was found to be set at full pressure. As a matter of law the employee’s contributory negligence was greater than any liability that could be assigned to the manufacturer.
The majority suggests that the legislature consider enacting a statute of limitations for products liability actions. This must mean that the majority considers it somewhat inequitable to hold a manufacturer strictly liable for a product that could be as much as thirty years old. I agree that a statute of limitations may be necessary to provide manufacturers with some protection against judicial expansion of their liability. Unfortunately, such limitations lack the flexibility of judicial decisions and must bar both good and bad claims. Properly applied, through evidence of state-of-the-art and industry practice, sec. 402A can take the age of a machine into account in determining whether the machine is unreasonably dangerous.
In view of the court’s concern for the time span involved here this may be a case suitable for the application of public policy reasons to cut off liability. Certainly allowance of recovery here will place too unreasonable a burden on the manufacturer and will enter a field that has no sensible or just stopping point. Coffey v. Milwaukee, 74 Wis.2d 526, 541, 247 N.W.2d 132 (1976).
In addition to the possibility of a legislative enactment of a statute of limitations as suggested by the majority, there are other possible solutions to this problem that *910could appropriately be considered by the legislature. These would include the creation of panels or administrative agencies to perform a fact-finding function. Thus the expertise necessary to evaluate the technical evidence in products liability cases could be developed by an independent fact-finding panel or agency. Unless the judiciary is able to define “a sensible and just stopping point in products liability actions some legislative solution is necessary.
I would affirm the order of the trial court directing the verdict for the defendants.