Court Opinion

ID: 9902552
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-27 15:19:55.122236+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:54.481446
License: Public Domain

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
                STATE OF FLORIDA
                 _____________________________

                      Case No. 5D23-1888
                   LT Case No. 2020-CF-6115
                 _____________________________

DAMIEN O. CALDWELL,

    Appellant,

    v.

STATE OF FLORIDA,

    Appellee.
                 _____________________________

3.850 Appeal from the Circuit Court for Duval County.
R. Anthony Salem, Judge.

Damien Caldwell, Lake City, pro se.

No Appearance for Appellee.

                        October 20, 2023

PER CURIAM.

     Damien O. Caldwell appeals the summary denial of his
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 amended motion for
postconviction relief, in which he raised two grounds. We affirm
the postconviction court’s denial of ground one of the amended
motion on the merits without further discussion. For the following
reasons, we reverse the denial of ground two and remand for
further consideration.
     Caldwell is presently serving a prison sentence in this case
following his guilty plea to one count of armed robbery, committed
when he was sixteen years old. Caldwell did not appeal his
judgment and sentence, but he did timely file the subject rule 3.850
motion for postconviction relief, initially raising a single ground in
his motion. The court dismissed Caldwell’s motion under rule
3.850(f)(2) for being facially insufficient but did so without
prejudice to Caldwell filing an amended motion within sixty days
of the order.

     Caldwell timely filed his amended motion. In the motion,
Caldwell raised a second ground for relief, not previously made, in
which he essentially attempted to assert that his counsel was
ineffective for not having him evaluated for competency to proceed
or understand the process. In the order now on review, the
postconviction court denied this ground as “unauthorized,”
explaining that its prior nonfinal order dismissing Caldwell’s
original motion provided that no new claims could be added to the
motion without leave of court.

     We hold that the postconviction court erred in doing so. When,
as here, the two-year filing requirement under rule 3.850 had not
yet expired and the court had not issued a final order on the rule
3.850 motion, it must consider any additional claims raised in the
amended motion. See Gaskin v. State, 737 So. 2d 509, 517–18 (Fla.
1999) (holding that the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s
rule 3.850 amended motion for postconviction relief on the ground
that the new claims raised in the amended motion were
procedurally barred, when the motion was filed within the time
limit under the rule and before the trial court had ruled on the
original motion), receded from in part on other grounds, Nelson v.
State, 875 So. 2d 579, 582–83 (Fla. 2004); Padro-Guerrero v. State,
123 So. 3d 670, 671 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013) (“As long as the two-year
limitation period [of rule 3.850] has not expired, the trial court
must consider any additional claims raised prior to the court’s final
order on a rule 3.850 motion.”).

     In a footnote contained in its denial order, the court also
separately observed that ground two of Caldwell’s amended motion
“lack[ed] specific supporting facts,” but that since Caldwell had

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already been given leave to amend his original motion, he was “not
entitled to another.”

     When an amended motion filed under rule 3.850 remains
facially insufficient, as ground two was here, the postconviction
court, in its discretion, may either permit the defendant an
additional opportunity to amend the motion or enter a final order
summarily denying the motion with prejudice. Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.850(f)(2); see also Spera v. State, 971 So. 2d 754, 761 (Fla. 2007)
(holding that a trial court’s striking of further amendments that
are insufficiently pled “is subject to an abuse of discretion standard
that depends on the circumstances of each case”). As it is unclear
from its order and the circumstances whether the postconviction
court fully understood that it possessed the discretion to allow
Caldwell to amend his second ground for relief, we reverse that
aspect of the order and remand for further consideration.

      AFFIRMED, in part; REVERSED, in part; and REMANDED.

HARRIS and MACIVER, JJ., concur.
LAMBERT, J., concurs specially, with opinion.

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LAMBERT, J., concurring specially.

      I concur with the majority’s summary denial of ground one
and its reversal on ground two. Under the circumstances of this
case—specifically, (1) Caldwell being sixteen years old when he
committed the crime, (2) Caldwell being seventeen years old when
he pleaded guilty, (3) ground two raising the issue of Caldwell’s
competency when he pled, (4) ground two having not previously
been amended, and (5) the expiration of the two-year filing
requirement under rule 3.850 since Caldwell filed his amended
motion—I believe that it was an abuse of discretion for the
postconviction court to not have allowed Caldwell an opportunity
to amend his deficiently-pled ground two claim, assuming that he
can do so in good faith. That said, the majority opinion provides
the postconviction court with the opportunity to do exactly that.

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