Court Opinion

ID: 9579632
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 21:56:53.102822+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:35:38.321484
License: Public Domain

Judge TURSI
dissenting.*
I respectfully dissent.
In the first instance, I am unpersuaded by the majority’s avoidance of the standard of review of C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) determinations as required by Trinity Broadcasting of Denver, Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916 (Colo.1993).
It is plaintiffs contention that the trial court committed reversible error in determining that her injuries did not result from the operation of the bus. In support of this contention, she argues that, but for the bus driver’s decision that she exit at a non-designated stop, she would not have had to cross the street and, therefore, her injuries would not have subsequently occurred. I disagree.
Initially, I note that the sole issue before the supreme court in Bertrand v. Board of County Commissioners, 872 P.2d 223 (Colo.1994) was whether a road grader is a motor vehicle within the purview of § 24-10-106(l)(a). Further, I note that, as pertinent here, Bertrand held: “[0]ne of the purposes of the GIA [is] to allow persons injured by a motor vehicle ... to seek compensation.” Bertrand v. Board of County Commissioners, supra, 872 P.2d at 229 (emphasis added).
Hence, contrary to the majority’s contention, I conclude that, to fit within the exception to the GIA created by § 24-10-106(l)(a), there must be a substantially direct connection between the actual operation of the motor vehicle and the injury for which a claim is made. In other words, there must have been a nexus with the operation of the motor vehicle and the injury, rather than a mere nexus with the method in which the operation of the bus service was provided.
Finally, I reject plaintiffs contention that the term “operation” in § 24-10-106(l)(a) must be interpreted as broadly as the phrase “use of a vehicle” in the No-Fault Act. See Shandy v. Lunceford, 886 P.2d 319 (Colo.App.1994) (the No-Fault Act contains no provisions-which would permit the creation of an exception to the GIA’s limitations as to when public employees may be held accountable in tort).
Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment.

 Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of the Colo. Const, art. VI, Sec. 5(3), and § 24-51-1105, C.R.S. (1995 Cum.Supp.).