Court Opinion

ID: 9718565
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:27:16.405131+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:00.376941
License: Public Domain

*219DAVID GAULTNEY, Justice,
concurring.
While section 230 bars many causes of action, not every claim is barred. Specifically, the Act does not bar an intentional tort claim grounded on a defendant’s alleged malicious conduct.
Nevertheless, because the plaintiffs produced legally insufficient evidence to support their intentional tort claim, I concur in the affirmance of the trial court’s judgment. The record in this case establishes that the plaintiffs’ request to remove the material was not made until after the lawsuit was filed. The defendants were then relying on the advice of their trial attorney, and, in response to the no-evidence motion for summary judgment, the plaintiffs produced legally insufficient evidence to support their intentional tort claim. The trial court therefore did not err in granting summary judgment.
The GROUNDS for Summary Judgment
A procedural issue complicates our review and ruling. The trial court’s order granted summary judgment only on the no-evidence ground. The trial court did not rule on defendant’s traditional motion for summary judgment based on immunity under section 230. The majority opinion therefore addresses section 230 as applicable to the no-evidence motion for summary judgment, and concludes the no-evidence motion was properly granted based on section 230. I respectfully disagree with this approach. Immunity under section 230 is an affirmative defense on which the defendant has the burden, and therefore is an improper ground for a defendant’s no-evidence motion for summary judgment. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 166a(i); see also Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir.2003) (section 230 immunity as affirmative defense).
The defendants presented a traditional motion for summary judgment based on section 230. A defendant may properly file a traditional motion for summary judgment based on an affirmative defense. See Randall’s Food Mkts. v. Johnson, 891 S.W.2d 640, 644 (Tex.1995). When a trial court grants a final summary judgment disposing of all claims, an appellate court “may consider grounds that the trial court does not rule on in the interest of judicial economy.” Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623, 625 (Tex.1996). Although the trial court did not rule on the traditional motion, the parties address section 230 in their briefs to this Court. Many of plaintiffs’ claims are, as a matter of law, barred by section 230. In the interest of judicial economy, we may consider section 230, but not as the basis for the ruling on a defendant’s no-evidence motion. If we are to address only the no-evidence motion, as the majority opinion does, we must simply decide whether any evidence supports plaintiffs’ state law claims, without consideration of the affirmative defense of immunity; section 230 is irrelevant to the no-evidence motion.
There is some evidence to support plaintiffs’ defamation claim, so a no-evidence motion could not be granted on that claim. The defamation claim is barred under section 230, however, because the defamation claim treats the defendants as publishers of information provided by a third-party. We should therefore consider the traditional motion in the interest of judicial economy and rule directly on the section 230 issue.
Because section 230 does not bar an intentional tort claim based on alleged malicious conduct, the question remains whether any evidence supports that state law claim. It is with respect to that claim — a claim not barred by section 230— *220that the no-evidenee motion for summary judgment should be considered.
Analysis
Congress enacted the Communications Decency Act in part to encourage removal of objectionable postings from websites. See Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir.2008) (en banc). A malicious website operator — one who encourages anonymous postings and then intentionally and unreasonably refuses to remove a posting known to be defamatory and easily deleted — joins in the activity the Act was intended to discourage. “The Communications Decency Act was not meant to create a lawless no-man’s-land on the Internet.” Id. at 1164.
The Act should be read in the light of two cases that were decided before its enactment, because the Act was a response to the law at the time. See H.R.Rep. No. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf.Rep.) (“One of the specific purposes of [section 230] is to overrule [Stratton Oakmont ] and any other similar decisions which have treated [interactive computer service] providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.”) See Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Sens. Co., 1995 WL 323710, 1995 N.Y. Mise. LEXIS 229 (N.Y.Sup.Ct., May 24, 1995). In Cubby, Inc. v. CompuSene, Inc., 776 F.Supp. 135, 139 (S.D.N.Y.1991), CompuServe, an internet service provider, successfully argued that it was not a publisher of a third-party’s defamatory posting, but rather was merely a distributor, like a library or a book store. See id. at 140-41. However, another court subsequently rejected the argument that an internet service provider is simply a distributor and therefore not liable. See Stratton Oakmont, 1995 WL 323710, *2-3, 1995 N.Y. Mise. LEXIS 229, at *6-7. Unlike CompuSene, the court in Stratton Oak-mont reasoned that Prodigy’s voluntary efforts to remove objectionable postings from the internet meant it should be treated more like a newspaper than a library. See id. at *3, 1995 N.Y. Mise. LEXIS 229, at *7. Because of Prodigy’s efforts, the court treated Prodigy like a publisher of a third-party’s defamatory statement. See id. The two cases viewed together created a disincentive for providers to make any effort at removing defamatory material. Providers who did nothing were less likely to be held liable (treated as distributors) than providers who made good faith efforts to remove defamatory material (treated as publishers).
Congress responded with section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. See 47 U.S.C.A. § 230 (West 2001). The statute addresses the specific holding and the rationale in the Stratton Oakmont case by stating that
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.
Id. § 230(c)(1). This language, along with a provision that bars a state law “inconsistent with this section,” essentially nullified the holding in Stratton Oakmont. See id. § 230(c)(1),(e)(3).1
*221The language of section 230(c)(2)(A) of the Act excepts bad faith conduct from immunity. Section 230(c)(2)(A) provides:
Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be held liable on account of—
(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally protected!.]
Id. § 230(c)(2)(A) (emphasis added). This provision rejects the rationale applied in the Stratton Oakmont case. The Act essentially encourages a provider in a position like that of Prodigy to eliminate defamatory or otherwise objectionable material, and precludes civil liability for a provider’s good faith (successful or unsuccessful) attempt to restrict access.
The word “action” in section 230(c)(2)(A) necessarily includes a good faith, but unsuccessful effort to delete defamatory or other objectionable material. Otherwise, immunity would be granted for a good faith, successful deletion of defamatory material, and yet not granted for a good faith, but unsuccessful effort to delete other defamatory material. Essentially, that would permit the rationale of Stratton Oakmont to survive in section 230(c)(2)(A), and arguably permit civil liability to be imposed when a provider attempts in good faith to restrict access to objectionable material, but fails. That result would seem contrary to the purpose of section 230. The Act apparently was intended to provide protection for the provider’s good faith voluntary effort to remove a third-party’s defamatory statement.
By its terms, section 230(c)(2)(A) protects an action taken in “good faith” — that is, with an absence of malice. A provider that acts maliciously, and that would be held civilly liable under state law, does not enjoy federal immunity under section 230(c)(2)(A). The Act would not confer immunity on a provider who maliciously deleted the “not” in the statement “she is not a thief.” See generally Roommates, com, 521 F.3d at 1169 (applying section 230(c)(1)) (“[A] website operator who edits in a manner that contributes to the alleged illegality — such as by removing the word “not” from a user’s message reading ‘[Name] did not steal the artwork’ in order to transform an innocent message into a libelous one — is directly involved in the alleged illegality and thus not immune.”). Similarly, a malicious provider who intentionally and unreasonably chooses not to remove material that can easily be deleted, and that is known to be defamatory, should not be immune from civil liability under section 230(c)(2)(A). The statute expressly provides that “[n]othing in this section shall be construed to prevent any State from enforcing any State law that is consistent with this section.” 47 U.S.C.A. § 230(e)(3) (West 2001). A Texas law non-publisher claim based on malicious conduct therefore may be asserted consistently with section 230.
Plaintiffs pleaded an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. In my ■view, if a malicious website operator intentionally and unreasonably refuses to delete an anonymous third-party’s obviously defamatory statement, a claim based on an intentional tort may be asserted in the appropriate circumstances against the operator under Texas law. The specific claim plaintiffs assert in this case, however, is a very narrow remedy. See Tiller v. *222McLure, 121 S.W.3d 709, 713-15 (Tex.2003) (elements of claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).
The narrow tort remedy plaintiffs assert may not be available, simply because the remedy is considered a “gap-filler” in Texas and the availability of another remedy “leaves no gap to fill.” See Creditwatch, Inc. v. Jackson, 157 S.W.3d 814, 816 (Tex.2005). Other remedies may exist under Texas law. Under certain circumstances, for example, a property owner may be held liable for defamatory material on his property that injures persons outside of the property. See Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 364(c) (1965); § 577 cmt. p (1977). The Restatement explains the basis of civil liability of a property owner under appropriate circumstances as follows:
The basis of the liability is his duty not to permit the use of his land or chattels for a purpose damaging to others outside of the land. Something of an analogy may be found in ... the duty to use reasonable care to remedy a condition upon the defendant’s land created by another, which involves unreasonable danger to those outside of the land.
Restatement (Second) of ToRts § 577 cmt. p. The Comment makes clear that liability is imposed on the property owner only for an intentional and unreasonable failure to remove material that may be easily removed, and that is known to be defamatory. See id. There may be circumstances under which the provider need do nothing to remove the third-party’s defamatory statement; the property owner need not take “steps that are unreasonable if the burden of the measures outweighs the harm to the plaintiff.” Id. But because the liability of a website operator for intentional action that injures another may be based on, and also limited by, the operator’s control over the website material, the availability in Texas of a tort claim like that described in the Restatement may preclude the exceptional “gap-filler” type remedy plaintiffs assert here. See generally Creditwatch, Inc., 157 S.W.3d at 816 (“[Ijntentional infliction of emotional distress is a ‘gap-filler’ tort never intended to supplant or duplicate existing statutory or common-law remedies.”).
The record demonstrates another — and in this case dispositive — restriction on the narrow claim plaintiffs assert in this case. The plaintiffs pleaded a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress; although the claim is not barred by section 230 (because it is consistent with the Act), plaintiffs were required nevertheless to present evidence to support that claim in response to defendants’ no-evidence motion for summary judgment. If a plaintiff proves that a website owner engaged in “extreme and outrageous conduct” that proximately caused plaintiffs severe emotional distress, and that no alternative remedy for the severe emotional distress exists, the website owner could be held liable under Texas law for the damages he causes. See generally id. (elements of claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress). To establish an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim under Texas law, however, a plaintiff must show the defendant’s conduct was ‘“so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.’ ” See Tiller, 121 S.W.3d at 713 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. d (1965)). In moving for summary judgment, defendants asserted plaintiffs had no evidence to support their claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs responded that the defendants failed to remove known defamatory material after plaintiffs requested the statements be taken down. Plaintiffs did not make their removal request until after the *223lawsuit was filed, however. In response to the motion, plaintiffs presented the deposition testimony of one of the defendants acknowledging that, upon the advice of his trial attorney, he had not “retracted any of those statements[J” Other than reliance on the trial lawyer’s advice, no other specific evidence was presented explaining the reason for the failure to promptly remove the statements. Even should a court admit to a disagreement with the soundness of trial counsel’s advice, reliance on that advice, by itself and without more, seems unlikely to be labeled “extreme and outrageous” conduct.
Because plaintiffs offered no legally sufficient evidence to support an intentional tort claim not otherwise barred by section 230, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment. Although I cannot join the majority opinion, I concur in this Court’s affirmance of the judgment.

. Some courts have read the word "publisher” in section 230(c)(1) to include a "distributor.” See Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So.2d 1010, 1017 (Fla.2001); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 332 (4th Cir.1997); see Samuel J. Morley, Article: How Broad Is Web Publisher Immunity Under § 230 of the Communications Decency Act of 1996?, 84 Fla. B.J. 8 (Feb.2010). In my view, Doe and Zeran over-read section 230(c)(1), and do not give sufficient weight to the distinction between "publisher” (in a narrow sense) and "distrib*221utor” described in the Stratton Oakmont case. Because that case inspired the language used in the Act, the case should inform a court's reading of the Act.