Court Opinion

ID: 9772352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:15:09.163584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:43:10.719919
License: Public Domain

J-S29019-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  RIAN BELL, INDIVIDUALLY, AND                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  RIAN BELL, AS MEMBER AND ON                  :         PENNSYLVANIA
  BEHALF OF SIMPLY COUNTRY, LLC                :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
  HOLLY BELL, JOSHUA KIRK, AND                 :
  WILLOW AND WILDFIRE, LLC                     :
                                               :
                       Appellees               :       No. 95 MDA 2023

               Appeal from the Order Entered December 30, 2022
                 In the Court of Common Pleas of Perry County
                   Civil Division at No(s): CV-CV-2021-0295

BEFORE:      MURRAY, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.:                        FILED: AUGUST 29, 2023

       Appellant, Rian Bell, individually and as member and on behalf of Simply

Country, LLC, appeals from the order entered in the Perry County Court of

Common Pleas, which sustained the preliminary objections of Appellee, Holly

Bell, and dismissed Appellant’s complaint without prejudice. We reverse and

remand for further proceedings.

       The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.

Appellant Rian Bell and Appellee Holly Bell are married and in the midst of

contentious divorce proceedings. Appellant and Appellee Bell each own 50%

of Simply Country, LLC (“Simply Country”). Appellee Bell subsequently began

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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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dating Appellee Joshua Kirk, and the two formed Appellee Willow and Wildfire,

LLC (“W&W”).

          [Appellant] filed a Complaint and Petition for Preliminary
          Injunction in this matter against [Appellees] on May 5,
          2021.[1]    [Appellant] asserts in his Complaint, that
          [Appellees] breached a fiduciary duty that they had with
          both himself and with Simply Country, and that he has
          suffered damages as a result of these breaches.
          [Appellant’s] complaint also asserts that [Appellees] stole
          property from Simply Country, tortiously interfered with
          contracts, and knowingly gave false statements or refused
          [to] disclose business records, causing him to suffer
          financial damages.      [Appellee] Bell, promptly filed
          Preliminary Objections to the Complaint, and [Appellant]
          amended the Complaint. [Appellee] Bell filed Preliminary
          Objections to [Appellant’s] Amended Complaint on July
          1[9], 2021, and [Appellant] filed a Second Amended
          [C]omplaint on or about August [4], 2021. [Appellee] Bell
          filed Preliminary Objections to [Appellant’s] Second
          Amended Complaint, on September 7, 2021.

          [Appellee] Bell asserts in her Preliminary Objections that the
          claims made in [Appellant’s] Complaint are based on
          matters that are solely [within] the province of equitable
          distribution of the couples’ property that is being handled as
          part of the parties’ separate divorce action. [Appellee] Bell
          further argues that these claims should be dismissed until
          the marital assets have been divided through equitable
          distribution, as Simply Country and both parties’ equity in
          Simply County are marital assets and it would be impossible
          to determine whether [Appellant] suffered any damages at
          this time. [Appellee] Bell states, [Appellant’s] damages are
          only speculative at this time and therefore he does not have
          a cause of action.

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1 Regarding the request for a preliminary injunction, the court initially issued

a temporary injunction and held a hearing on June 17, 2021. Thereafter, the
court entered an order permitting Appellant to conduct an inventory of assets
and ordering Appellees to provide affidavits regarding inventory.        The
temporary relief expired on July 1, 2021.

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(Opinion in Support of Order, filed 12/30/22, at 1-2; R.R. at 26-27).

       The court held argument on Appellee Bell’s preliminary objections on

September 28, 2022, after which the court reserved making its decision. On

December 30, 2022, the court sustained the preliminary objections and

dismissed Appellant’s complaint “without prejudice.”         (See Order, filed

12/30/22, at 1; R.R. at 20). In doing so, the court explained:

          In this case, [Appellant] and [Appellee] Bell have a pending
          divorce action. The Bells each own fifty-percent equity in
          Simply Country[;] Simply Country and the equity that
          [Appellant] and [Appellee] Bell each have in Simply Country
          is a marital asset. This marital asset is subject to equitable
          distribution, and until the marital property has been
          distributed, [Appellant] does not have a cause of action.
          The trial court has the power to account for any devaluation
          of the company and the causes of that devaluation as part
          of the equitable distribution of the couples’ property within
          the pending divorce action. [Therefore, Appellant] cannot
          assert that he has suffered any losses or damages until the
          couples’ assets have been distributed as part of the divorce.

(Opinion in Support of Order at 2; R.R. at 27).

       Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on January 17, 2023.      On

January 24, 2023, the court ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of

errors complained of on appeal per Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Appellant filed a Rule

1925(b) statement on February 16, 2023.2

____________________________________________

2 We note that Appellant’s Rule 1925(b) statement is an eleven (11) page
statement of errors to be raised on appeal, which reads much more like an
appellate brief. (See Rule 1925(b) Statement, filed 2/16/23, at unnumbered
pp. 1-11; R.R. at 4-14). Although we decline to find waiver here because the
trial court was able to adequately address Appellant’s claims in a responsive
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

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       Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:

          Did the trial court err when it dismissed the entire second
          amended complaint containing sixteen (16) counts against
          three (3) defendants, when the court held [Appellant] did
          not have a cause of action until the company was distributed
          by equitable distribution and that all issues were to be
          entirely resolved as part of the equitable distribution of a
          marital estate of [Appellant] and [Appellee Bell].

          Did the trial court err when it dismissed the entire second
          amended complaint when [Appellees] Joshua Kirk and
          [W&W] did not raise preliminary objections to the six (6)
          counts against those two (2) defendants.

(Appellant’s Brief at 5).

       As a preliminary matter, Appellee Bell claims that the order before us is

not reviewable because it is not a final order, where the court dismissed

Appellant’s complaint “without prejudice.” (See Appellee Bell’s Brief at 1, 3,

5). “The appealability of an order directly implicates the jurisdiction of the

court asked to review the order.” In re Estate of Considine v. Wachovia

Bank, 966 A.2d 1148, 1151 (Pa.Super. 2009). As a result, “this Court has

the power to inquire at any time, sua sponte, whether an order is appealable.”

Id. Generally, “[a]n appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or an order

____________________________________________

opinion, we caution counsel that the failure to present claims in a Rule 1925(b)
statement in a concise manner may result in waiver of the claims on appeal.
See generally Kanter v. Epstein, 866 A.2d 394 (Pa.Super. 2004), cert.
denied, 546 U.S. 1092, 126 S.Ct. 1048, 163 L.Ed.2d 858 (2006) (holding that
by raising outrageous number of issues in 15-page “concise” statements,
defendants deliberately circumvented meaning and purpose of Rule 1925(b)
and effectively precluded appellate review of issues they sought to raise on
appeal).

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certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an interlocutory order as of right

(Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an interlocutory order by permission (Pa.R.A.P. 312,

1311, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b)); or (4) a collateral order (Pa.R.A.P. 313).” In

re Estate of Cella, 12 A.3d 374, 377 (Pa.Super. 2010) (some internal

citations omitted).

      In support of her claim that we must quash this appeal, Appellee Bell

cites Mier v. Stewart, 683 A.2d 930 (Pa.Super. 1996). In that case, the

appellant filed a malpractice and breach of contract claim against his former

attorney. The trial court granted the appellee’s demurrer and dismissed the

malpractice count with prejudice.     The court also dismissed the breach of

contract count, but did so “without prejudice,” giving the appellant additional

time to file a more specific amended complaint on that count. Rather than

filing an amended complaint, the appellant appealed. On appeal, this Court

noted that Rule 341 only permits an appeal from a final order. This Court

then explained that “[b]y granting a party leave to amend, the trial court has

not finally disposed of the parties or their claims. For finality to occur, the

trial court must dismiss with prejudice the complaint in full.”      Id. at 930.

Accordingly, this Court quashed the appeal without prejudice to appeal once

a final order dismissing the breach of contract claim was entered on the

record. Id.

      On the other hand, Appellant relies on Pugar v. Greco, 483 Pa. 68, 394

A.2d 542 (1978), to support his proposition that the appeal is properly before

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us. In that case, our Supreme Court explained that “[i]n determining what

constitutes a final order…we look to ‘a practical rather than technical

construction’ of an order.”        Id. at 73, 394 A.2d at 545 (internal citation

omitted). In other words, “if the practical consequence of the order by the

trial court is effectively to put an appellant ‘out of court’ the order will be

treated as final.     Similarly, an order is ‘final’ if it precludes a party from

presenting the merits of his claim to the [trial] court.” Id. (internal citation

omitted).

       Recently, in Rosenbaum and Associates, P.C. v. Scheff, No. 1604

EDA 2021, 2022 WL 15065527 (Pa.Super. filed Oct. 27, 2022) (unpublished

memorandum),3 appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 2023 WL 4879871 (Pa. filed Aug.

1, 2023), this Court considered the practical effect of an order that sustained

preliminary objections and dismissed a complaint without prejudice. In that

case, the appellants filed a complaint against the appellees on March 24, 2021,

asserting a claim for aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty.

Thereafter, the appellees filed preliminary objections. Subsequently, the trial

court sustained the preliminary objections and dismissed the appellants’

complaint “without prejudice.” Id. at *4. In doing so, the trial court stated:

          Since the alleged, threatened, aiding and abetting breach of
          fiduciary duty has not yet occurred, [the a]pellants are not
          presently able to allege that they sustained damages as a
          result of [the a]pellees’ threatened conduct, rather than, or
____________________________________________

3 See Pa.R.A.P. 126(b) (stating we may rely on unpublished decisions of this

Court filed after May 1, 2019 for their persuasive value).

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         in addition to, the conduct of [the a]ppellees’ clients, who
         are the defendants in the related action.

Id.   The court added that “if additional information revealed in discovery

shows that [the a]ppellees caused [the a]ppellants to suffer any harm other

than that caused by [the a]ppellees’ clients, then [the a]ppellants may file a

new complaint against [the a]ppellees.” Id. The appellants appealed.

      On appeal, this Court initially addressed whether it had jurisdiction to

hear the appeal, where this Court acknowledged that “an order dismissing a

complaint without prejudice is generally considered interlocutory.” Id. at *6

(citing Mier, supra). Nevertheless, this Court explained that “because the

trial court did not grant [the a]ppellants leave to amend while dismissing their

complaint without prejudice, and instead directed that [the a]ppellants could

only file a new complaint if additional information comes to light, we will

consider the trial court’s order as final.” Id. (collecting cases which stand for

proposition of law that this Court will consider practical ramifications of order

when deciding whether order on appeal is “final”).      Accordingly, this Court

proceeded to review the merits of the issues on appeal. See id. See also

Jones v. McGreevy, 270 A.3d 1, 11 n.12 (Pa.Super. 2022) (allowing appeal

to proceed on merits even though court sustained preliminary objections and

dismissed complaint “without prejudice” where court predicated appellant’s

ability to refile complaint on reversal of non-jury verdict in separate

garnishment action; court’s order effectively placed appellant “out of court”).

      Instantly, the record makes clear that the court sustained Appellee Bell’s

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preliminary objections to the second amended complaint and dismissed the

complaint “without prejudice.” (See Order, filed 12/30/22, at 1; R.R. at 20).

Notwithstanding the court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint “without

prejudice,” the trial court essentially placed Appellant “out of court”

concerning the breach of fiduciary duty and related claims raised in the

complaint, unless and until Appellant prevailed in the equitable distribution

matter. (See Opinion in Support of Order at 2; R.R. at 27). Further, the

court’s dismissal order did not give Appellant an opportunity to amend the

complaint. Compare Mier, supra. Under these circumstances, we will treat

the order on appeal as final and proceed to our review of Appellant’s claims.

See Jones, supra; Rosenbaum, supra.

      In his first issue, Appellant argues that to bar one action based on the

pendency of a prior action, the prior case must be the same, the parties must

be the same, and the relief requested must be the same. Appellant initially

asserts that the court should not have considered the separate divorce action

at all because Appellee Bell failed to attach a copy of the divorce complaint to

her preliminary objections. On this basis, Appellant contends that there was

no evidence presented regarding the case, parties, or relief requested in the

divorce action.

      Moreover, Appellant maintains that the two parties to the divorce action

(Appellant and Appellee Bell) are not the same as the parties to the instant

action. Appellant complains that the divorce action is also different than the

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current case. Specifically, Appellant avers that the instant case is not simply

“a dispute over ownership of a business after the dissolution of a partnership,”

as suggested by the trial court, but “it is about seeking justice against the co-

conspirators who worked in concert to steal assets and potential profits from

Appellant.” (Appellant’s Brief at 13). Appellant emphasizes that the current

case sets out four counts of breach of fiduciary duty related to the operation

of a business, three tort claims against Appellee Bell, one quasi-contract claim

against Appellee Bell, two tort claims against Appellee Kirk, one tort claim

against Appellee W&W, and three counts of civil conspiracy against the three

defendants; none of these claims are asserted in the divorce action.

       Appellant also insists that the relief requested in the current action is

different than that sought in the divorce action.4 Appellant contends that the

trial judge in the divorce action would lack authority to impose punitive

damages as sought in the instant case on a non-party to the divorce action.

Thus, Appellant claims that Kirk and W&W would escape liability for their

actions. Appellant also insists that his claim for damages in the instant matter

was not speculative where he set forth in his complaint an identifiable amount

of the assets that Appellees illegally transferred to W&W. Appellant concludes

the court erred by sustaining Appellee Bell’s preliminary objections based on

____________________________________________

4 Appellant reiterates that the court could not even consider what relief was

sought in the divorce action (i.e., equitable distribution) because Appellee Bell
did not attach a copy of the divorce complaint to her preliminary objections.

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the pendency of the divorce action, and this Court must reverse and remand

for further proceedings. We agree relief is due.

     Initially we observe:

        When considering the appropriateness of a ruling on
        preliminary objections, the appellate court must apply the
        same standard as the trial court.

        Preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer test the
        legal sufficiency of the complaint.          When considering
        preliminary objections, all material facts set forth in the
        challenged pleadings are admitted as true, as well as all
        inferences reasonably deducible therefrom. Preliminary
        objections which seek the dismissal of a cause of action
        should be sustained only in cases in which it is clear and free
        from doubt that the pleader will be unable to prove facts
        legally sufficient to establish the right to relief. If any doubt
        exists as to whether a demurrer should be sustained, it
        should be resolved in favor of overruling the preliminary
        objections.

Richmond v. McHale, 35 A.3d 779, 783 (Pa.Super. 2012) (quoting Feingold

v. Hendrzak, 15 A.3d 937, 941 (Pa.Super. 2011)).

     Under Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(6), preliminary objections may be filed based

on the pendency of a prior action.     Pa.R.C.P. 1028(a)(6).      To successfully

object based on the pendency of a prior action (also known as the defense of

lis pendens), “it must be shown that the prior case is the same, the parties

are the same, and the relief requested is the same.” Richner v. McCance,

13 A.3d 950, 958 (Pa.Super. 2011) (internal citation and quotations omitted).

“This three-pronged identity test must be strictly applied when a party is

seeking to dismiss a claim under the doctrine of lis pendens.” Norristown

Auto. Co., Inc. v. Hand, 562 A.2d 902, 904 (Pa.Super. 1989). “Thus, this

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[C]ourt has refused to dismiss causes of action under the doctrine of lis

pendens in cases where the later cause of action derived from the same

contract or events that formed the basis of the prior action but the right

asserted and/or the relief sought in the two actions were not the same.” Id.

(holding that facts of case did not meet strict identity requirements for

dismissal under doctrine of lis pendens where rights asserted and relief sought

were different in two actions, even though parties and key events underlying

both actions were same; reversing and remanding for further proceedings).

“Under Pennsylvania law, the question of a pending prior action is purely a

question of law determinable from an inspection of the pleadings.” Richner,

supra at 958.    “Therefore, as to application of the doctrine, our scope of

review is plenary.” Barren v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 74 A.3d

250, 253 (Pa.Super. 2013).

      “Additionally, an abeyance may be appropriate even where the

petitioner cannot strictly meet the above-referenced test if the two actions

would create a duplication of effort on the part of the parties and waste judicial

resources by requiring two courts of common pleas to litigate a matter that in

all likelihood could be fully addressed in one forum.” PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n

v. Bluestream Technology, Inc., 14 A.3d 831, 835 (Pa.Super. 2010). See

also Norristown Auto Co., supra (observing that party raising defense of

lis pendens can ask that action in which defense is being raised be abated,

that it be stayed pending outcome of prior litigation, or that actions be

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consolidated; noting that should appellee raise such issue on remand, trial

court may have to decide propriety of granting stay in instant matter to avoid

duplication of effort and waste of judicial resources that would result from

allowing both cases to proceed simultaneously).

      Instantly, we must first consider Appellant’s claim that the trial court

was precluded from even considering the pending divorce litigation where

Appellee Bell did not attach a copy of the divorce complaint to her preliminary

objections. The trial court explained that it properly considered the pending

divorce action between Appellant and Appellee Bell, reasoning:

         Appellant…argues that the trial court erred by considering
         evidence outside of the pleadings by considering the divorce
         because no copy of the divorce complaint was attached to
         the complaint or Appellee Bell’s Motion to Dismiss.
         Appellant…, however, admits in this complaint that the
         couple is married and a divorce litigation is pending between
         the two. Appellant…also states in his complaint that he and
         Appellee Bell were business partners in addition to being
         husband and wife.

         It is reasonable to conclude that two people in the middle of
         a divorce who are disputing the ownership of a business that
         qualifies as marital property would likely also be fighting
         over the business in the divorce.         …[A] fact-finder is
         expected to admit any insights that are reasonably deduced
         from the filings as true and weigh such reasonably deduced
         inferences in its final decision. Therefore, this court did not
         err because it used a reasonably deduced inference that the
         ownership of Simply Country and its assets was a matter for
         equitable distribution to reach the conclusion to grant
         Appellee Bell’s Motion to Dismiss.

(Rule 1925(a) Opinion, filed May 23, 2023, at unnumbered pp. 5-6).

      Our review of the record supports the court’s analysis. Here, Appellant

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admitted in his second amended complaint that he was married to Appellee

Bell and that they were involved in divorce litigation. (See Second Amended

Complaint, filed 8/4/21, at 4 n.2; R.R. at 104). Appellant further alleged that

he and Appellee Bell signed the operating agreement for Simply Country while

they were married, and each owned a 50% interest in Simply Country. (See

id. at ¶¶ 16-17; R.R. at 106). Appellee Bell also alleged in her preliminary

objections that Appellant and Appellee Bell each owned 50% of Simply

Country, which they started while they were married, and that Appellant and

Appellee Bell were in the midst of divorce proceedings.       (See Preliminary

Objections, filed 9/7/21, at ¶¶ 7, 9; R.R. at 59).

      As the trial court correctly stated, “[w]hen considering preliminary

objections, all material facts set forth in the challenged pleadings are admitted

as true, as well as all inferences reasonably deducible therefrom.” See

Richmond, supra (emphasis added). Based on the allegations set forth in

the relevant pleadings that Appellant was married to Appellee Bell when they

formed Simply Country, that they were co-owners of Simply County, and that

they were in the midst of a divorce action, it was reasonable for the court to

infer that equitable distribution would be at issue in the divorce proceedings.

See id.   Further, we observe that during the June 17, 2021 hearing on

Appellant’s request for a preliminary injunction, there were multiple

references to the divorce proceedings between Appellant and Appellee Bell,

and a valuation of Simply Country was ongoing in connection with the divorce.

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(See N.T. Hearing, 6/17/21, at 10, 11, 16, 49-50). Thus, the trial court was

free to reasonably infer that equitable distribution was an issue in the divorce

proceedings, even in the absence of reviewing the actual divorce complaint.

      Regarding the trial court’s decision to dismiss Appellant’s complaint

without prejudice based on the pendency of the divorce action, the court

explained:

         … The parties to the divorce are named in this action, the
         contract dispute arises out of the same series of transactions
         or occurrences as the divorce, and a major asset covered by
         the pre-existing divorce case, ownership of Simply Country
         and its assets, is here at issue. As noted above, the
         business is marital property and the dispute between
         Appellant…and Appellee Bell here is the same as the dispute
         over the company concurrently taking place in the divorce.
         It would therefore be unfair and a waste of judicial resources
         to determine in this case what can be better and more fairly
         decided in the pre-existing divorce case between
         Appellant…and Appellee Bell.

         [Appellant’s] claims for statutory and punitive damages can
         also be resolved through the divorce action by identifying
         what, if any, assets were wrongfully transferred from Simply
         Country to Appellees Kirk and/or [W&W]. As this court
         noted in its original memorandum regarding its decision in
         this case, any alleged devaluation of a marital corporation
         is entirely speculative because no actual harm has yet
         occurred. Any assets that were sold or converted could be
         discovered and inventories by the parties through the
         normal process of equitable distribution so that each asset’s
         monetary value may be determined and added to the pot
         that would be equally split between husband and wife. This
         court therefore did not err by granting Appellee’s
         Preliminary Objections in order to prevent the confusion of
         ownership over the business and the waste of judicial
         resources that would necessarily follow the creation of
         duplicate concurrent cases.

                                  *     *      *

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         Appellant…argues that the trial court improperly dismissed
         the counts against Appellees Kirk and [W&W] because both
         parties failed to file their own preliminary objections before
         the time for filing objections expired. As this court has
         noted in this memorandum, the counts against the three
         appellees are inextricably linked to the divorce between
         Appellant…and Appellee Bell and inseparable from each
         other. It would, for example, be improper to dismiss the
         counts against Appellee Bell but then hear arguments
         against Appellee Kirk that he conspired with her to
         fraudulently convert the assets of Simply Country because
         it would be necessary for both co-conspirators to be joined
         as defendants in the case. It would similarly contradict
         reason for this court to dismiss the counts against Appellee
         Bell in order to avoid wasting judicial resources but then
         allow the same case to proceed against Appellees Kirk and
         [W&W]. This court reiterates its above-stated argument
         that the dismissal of the complaint is necessary to prevent
         duplicity and the waste of judicial resources. Therefore, this
         court did not err in dismissing the complaint in its entirety,
         including the counts against Appellees Kirk [and W&W].

(Rule 1925(a) Opinion at unnumbered pp. 4-7) (internal citations and

footnotes omitted).

      We cannot agree with this portion of the court’s analysis. The two cases

are not the same—the prior litigation at issue involves divorce (and, as

reasonably deduced from the pleadings, equitable distribution) while the

instant case involves claims of, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty and

conspiracy to convert over $80,000.00 worth of assets. The parties are not

the same—the prior litigation involves only Appellant and Appellee Bell while

the instant litigation involves Appellant (individually), Appellant (on behalf of

Simply Country), Appellee Bell, Kirk, and W&W.        And the relief sought is

different—the prior litigation seeks a divorce decree (and, as reasonably

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deduced from the pleadings, equitable distribution) while the instant case

seeks statutory damages, punitive damages, and attorney’s fees. Under a

strict application of the three-pronged test, Appellee Bell has failed to

demonstrate “that the prior case is the same, the parties are the same, and

the relief requested is the same.” See Richner, supra; Norristown Auto.

Co., supra.

       Although the court made clear in its analysis that it wanted to avoid the

duplication of effort or the waste of judicial resources (see PNC Bank, supra;

Norristown Auto. Co., supra), the court’s order dismissing Appellant’s

complaint without prejudice did not expressly stay the instant action pending

resolution of the divorce action.5 Therefore, upon remand, the trial court may

consider whether a stay or abeyance of the instant case is appropriate. See

Norristown Auto. Co., supra. Upon remand, the court may also consider

whether any other grounds alleged in Appellee Bell’s preliminary objections

warrant dismissal of the complaint.            Accordingly, we reverse the order

sustaining Appellee Bell’s preliminary objections and dismissing Appellant’s

complaint without prejudice, and remand for further proceedings.6

____________________________________________

5 See generally Williams Studio Div. of Photography by Tallas, Inc. v.

Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 550 A.2d 1333, 1335 (Pa.Super. 1988)
(explaining that statute of limitations is not tolled by filing of complaint
subsequently dismissed without prejudice).

6 Based on our disposition, we need not address Appellant’s second issue.

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     Order reversed. Case remanded. Jurisdiction is relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 8/29/2023

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