Court Opinion

ID: 9686446
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:48:16.867839+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:18.977536
License: Public Domain

*107SNELL, Judge
(dissenting).
As I cannot agree with the majority’s analysis of a dispositive issue raised by this appeal, I am constrained to dissent.
I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that sufficient evidence supports the jury’s resolution of the consent issue. Our courts have long held, in cases involving this statute and its predecessors, that consent within the statute’s meaning need not be express but, rather, may be implied. Eg., Sexton v. Lauman, 244 Iowa 570, 579, 57 N.W.2d 200, 205 (1953). I find the following comprehensive discussion dealing with proof of the consent issue to be particularly instructive:
We have frequently said the defense of nonconsent is one which can be easily made, with little'probability it can be met with direct refutation. It is not necessary plaintiff adduce such direct testimony. When ownership of the motor vehicle is admitted, as it is here, a prima facie case is made on this issue by plaintiff, or as it is sometimes expressed an inference, or a presumption is created that the vehicle was being operated with consent of the owner, and there must be sufficient showing to the contrary if the owner would avoid that finding. Plaintiff may aid this inference of law by direct evidence and by proof of facts and circumstances from which inferences may be drawn. As we have said, this inference is not a strong one, and it in no way changes the burden of proof. The owner may oppose the inference by such admissible testimony as may be available to him. But such testimony, though positive and direct, is not necessarily conclusive. It may be weakened or rebutted by facts and circumstances, or by its own inherent weakness or unreasonable character. The weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses depend upon facts and conditions as shown by the record in each case. This particular issue, as it comes before the courts, is one which the average jury is peculiarly well fitted to pass upon and arrive at a correct conclusion.
McKirchy v. Ness, 256 Iowa 744, 747, 128 N.W.2d 910, 912 (1964). Daggett and Woods both testified that no express consent to operate the truck had been given. The issue accordingly becomes whether Daggett’s evidence was sufficient as a matter of law to overcome the above-mentioned inference as aided by the remainder of facts and circumstances demonstrated at trial so that no question was presented to the jury. See Anderson v. Lehner, 243 Iowa 851, 854-56, 52 N.W.2d 513, 515-16 (1952). I believe it was.
Our courts have stated that the only purpose of the “weak” inference of consent which accompanies the admission of ownership is “to compel the owner to identify those operating the vehicle and explain by what authority, if not his own, it was being driven.” Hunter v. Irwin, 220 Iowa 693, 698, 263 N.W. 34, 37 (1935). As noted above, it does not alter the burden of proof. McKirchy, 256 Iowa at 747, 128 N.W.2d at 912. In addition, the inference “does not require that every case shall go to the jury, where tbe undisputed and uncontroverted evidence establishes the facts so conclusively that the inference is overcome.” Curry v. Bickley, 196 Iowa 827, 832, 195 N.W. 617, 619 (1923).
In the case at bar, both Daggett and Woods stated that no consent was given. In addition to his statement that no express consent was given, Woods stated that he did not feel he had Daggett’s permission to operate the truck. Woods is Daggett’s fifteen-year-old nephew who was living with Daggett’s parents at the time of the collision. He did not have a driver’s license. He stated he had never driven the truck or any vehicle belonging to Daggett prior to the accident. Daggett testified that he purchased the truck from a neighbor three days prior to the collision. Two days prior to the collision, according to Daggett, he had denied Woods’s request to steer or guide the newly-purchased truck as it was pushed into a garage. Daggett testified that he was not aware of a spare key in the truck’s glove compartment and that, when he left Woods in the truck, he, Daggett, took with him what he thought to be the only key — that from the ignition.
*108None of the above facts were contradicted by direct testimony. De Bolt was entitled, of course, to rebut this testimony by direct evidence or by inferences from facts and circumstances. Hunter, 220 Iowa at 699, 263 N.W. at 37. She relies on the following facts and circumstances upon which she claims the jury might rightfully base an inference that Daggett consented to the operation of the truck notwithstanding the testimony of Daggett and Woods to the contrary: .(1) Des Moines Police Officer Dennis Baker, who was one of the officers investigating the collision, testified that he interviewed Daggett at the scene and that Daggett never mentioned that Woods did not have consent to operate the truck; (2) Daggett did not inform any officer at the scene that Woods had found spare keys in the glove compartment with which he started the truck; and (3) Woods never mentioned in his sworn statements that he had found the spare keys in the glove compartment.
Officer Baker’s testimony is properly referred to as “negative evidence.” Such testimony is that which states that a fact did not exist or that a thing was not done or did not take place. 30 Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 1092 at p. 252. The weight of such evidence is conditioned on a demonstration that the testifying witness was so situated that had the statement been made the witness would have heard it. See Roll v. Manatt’s Transp. Co., 253 N.W.2d 265, 271 (Iowa 1977). In the present case, Dag-gett testified that he had told an officer, other than Officer Baker, at the scene that Woods lacked consent to operate the truck. The record demonstrates that six or eight officers were present at the collision scene and that several of these had been present prior to Baker’s arrival. Moreover, Baker did not testify that he had asked Daggett during the interview about Woods’s consent, or lack of same, to use the truck. Consequently, I do not believe that Officer Baker’s negative testimony supports, in any way, the jury’s finding of consent.
A similar logic flaws De Bolt’s inferential contention that because Daggett did not inform any officer at the scene that Woods used a spare key from the glove compartment to start the truck, the saga of the spare key is a ruse contrived after the fact in order to hide the fact that Daggett had left the keys in the ignition. De Bolt maintains this inferential contention that the keys were left in the ignition supports a finding of implied consent. His argument, however, overlooks a crucial fact revealed by the record: Daggett’s testimony that he did not know of the existence of the spare key until Woods informed him of it the day after the collision. This testimony is not rebutted, or even met, by any record evidence. Although reasonable inferences drawn from affirmatively proven facts constitute evidence for the purpose of supporting a jury verdict, e.g., Stickling v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co., 215 Iowa 1312, 1315, 247 N.W. 642, 644 (1933), there are no facts in this record which would support the inference that De Bolt seeks to draw. De Bolt’s argument is nothing more than “presumptions built upon other presumptions,” id., and, as such, lends no support to a finding of consent.
Likewise, I do not believe the jury finding is supported by the fact that Woods’s statements make no mention of his finding the spare key in the truck’s glove compartment. The two statements are short verbatim records of Woods being interviewed in a question-and-answer format by two separate investigators. At no time during the interviews was Woods asked about the key used to start the truck’s engine. In light of the interviews’ question-and-answer formats, I cannot allocate substantial weight to the absence of an answer to a question which was never asked.
In earlier cases tried under predecessors to section 321.493, our supreme court dealt with the quantum of proof necessary to take the issue of consent to the jury. In Hunter v. Irwin, 220 Iowa 693, 701, 263 N.W. 34, 38 (1935), the court found error in the trial court’s denial of defendant’s directed verdict motion, stating that “the evidence was not sufficient to warrant such a finding [of consent] by the jury, because ‘verdicts must have evidence to support them, and must not be founded on mere theory or conjecture.’ ” (quoting Boeck v. *109Modern Woodmen, 162 Iowa 159, 165, 143 N.W. 999, 1002 (1913)). Cf. Omaha Indian Tribe, Treaty of 1854 with U.S. v. Wilson, 575 F.2d 620, 642 (8th Cir.1978) (substantial evidence cannot be based upon inference drawn from facts which are uncertain or speculative and which raise only conjecture or possibility), vacated in part on other grounds, 442 U.S. 653, 99 S.Ct. 2529, 61 L.Ed.2d 153 (1979); Elliot v. Iowa Dept. of Transp., Motor Vehicle Div., 377 N.W.2d 250, 356 (Iowa App.1985) (mere scintilla does not constitute substantial evidence). In Anderson v. Lehner, 243 Iowa 851, 855-56, 52 N.W.2d 513, 516 (1952), the court summarized the pertinent state of that case’s record in the following manner:
Here [the vehicle owner’s testimony denying consent] is not rebutted by any facts or circumstances in the record. It is entirely consistent with usual and ordinary conduct. There is no testimony of [the driver’s] prior use of the car under circumstances which would indicate [the owner’s] knowledge of such use. There is nothing on which a jury could base an inference of consent. There is nothing in this ease that indicates the testimony of lack of consent was improbable.
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Here there is nothing that rebuts the [owner’s] testimony. There is nothing but the original inference of consent. Were we to hold a jury question was presented by the record here it would mean the inference alone is sufficient to generate a jury question. The trial court was right in directing the verdict for the owner, for the only evidence in the record was the evidence of nonconsent. When such evidence stands uncontradict-ed and unrebutted by any facts or circumstances indicating consent there is nothing for the court to do but direct the verdict.
Similarly here, the only evidence produced at trial was that of nonconsent. I do not think the mere fact that Daggett left Woods alone in the truck supports a finding of consent. Cf. Gibbs v. Wilmeth, 261 Iowa 1015, 1026, 157 N.W.2d 93, 100 (1968) (mere presence in vehicle and momentary interference with another's control thereof held insufficient to establish one as vehicle’s driver). This fact is particularly nonprobative of consent given that Dag-gett had no choice in the matter: Woods, a minor, could not accompany Daggett into his momentary destination, a tavern. I think the consent contemplated by the statute is an informed consent; it implies knowledge on the part of the person granting it. See Hunter, 220 Iowa at 701, 263 N.W. at 38; McClellan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 247 A.2d 58, 60-61 (D.C.1968) (construing similar statute). There is no evidence of such consent being given in the present case. As was the case in Hunter, 220 Iowa at 701, 263 N.W. at 38, plaintiff’s evidence here when “[c]onsidered in its most favorable light ... laid down only a foundation for conjecture as to [the vehicle owner’s] knowledge or consent.” This is not enough. I think the district court erred in denying Daggett’s motions for directed verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Accordingly, I would reverse the district court’s judgment against Dag-gett.
DONIELSON, J., joins this dissent.