Court Opinion

ID: 9638000
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:29:08.357661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:58.446136
License: Public Domain

MATHEWS, Circuit Judge (concurring).
This suit was brought by appellant, John T. Kobilkin, against appellees, Warren H. Pillsbury, as Deputy Commissioner of the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission, and Matson Navigation Company, in the District Court of the United States for the Northern District of ‘ California, under § 21 (b) of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.1
The suit was brought in the right court, but on the wrong side of the court. It was brought in equity. It should have been brought in admiralty. The Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act is part of the maritime law of the United States. The jurisdiction conferred by § 21(b) is admiralty jurisdiction. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 36-65, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598;2 Crescent Wharf & Warehouse Co. v. Pillsbury, 9 Cir., 93 F.2d 761, 762. See, also, Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Pillsbury, 301 U. S. 174, 175, 57 S.Ct. 682, 81 L.Ed. 988.3 That the court may, in a suit under § 21(b), issue an injunction, mandatory *671or otherwise, does not make the court an equity court or the suit an equity suit. Injunctions may be issued in admiralty as well as in equity. Crowell v. Benson, supra, 285 U.S. page 49, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598. By providing for injunction proceedings, Congress “contemplated a suit as4, in equity” (Id., 285 U.S. page 63, 52 S.Ct. page 297, 76 L.Ed. 598), but it did not contemplate a suit in equity. It did contemplate a suit in admiralty.
Appellant’s libel — called a petition— alleges, in substance, that on June 7, 1935, while employed by appellee Matson Navigation Company in maritime employment upon navigable waters of the United States, appellant sustained an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of said employment and was thereby disabled; that appellant received compensation from said employer for two weeks ending June 28, 1935; that he did not discover the true nature of said injury until after January 19, 1937; that on February 24, 1937, he filed a claim for compensation for said injury; and that, after a hearing, appellee Pillsbury, as Deputy Commissioner, made a compensation order rejecting said claim.
Thus, from appellant’s own pleading, it appears that his claim was filed more than one year after the injury and more than one year after the date of the last payment of compensation and, therefore, was barred.5 The fact, if it be a fact, that he did not discover the true nature of the injury until after January 19, 1937, is immaterial.- As used in the Longshoremen’s and Harbors Workers’ Compensation Act (§ 13), the phrase “one year after the injury” means just that. It does not mean one year after the claimant’s discovery of the true nature of the injury. The Act says mothing about discovery.
Appellees excepted6 to the libel on the ground, among others, that the facts therein stated were not sufficient to entitle appellant to any relief. The exceptions were well founded, but, as a court of equity, the District Court was not empowered to sustain them. Attempting to do so, it erred.
The decree should be vacated, and the case should be remanded with directions to transfer it to the admiralty docket7 and to enter a decree in admiralty, sustaining the exceptions and dismissing the libel.

 44 Stat. 1436, 33 U.S.C.A. § 921(b).

 Reversing Pillsbury v. Alaska Packers Ass’n, 9 Cir., 78 F.2d 587; Id., 9 Cir., 85 F.2d 758.

 Emphasis supplied.

 Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, §§ 13, 19 (44 Stat. 1432, 1435, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 913, 919).

 The exceptions were eaUed motions to dismiss.

 Compare Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 37, 52 S.Ct. 285, 76 L.Ed. 598.