Court Opinion

ID: 9532685
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:23:59.483798+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:48.643340
License: Public Domain

*1146KAUGER, Chief Justice,
with whom SUMMERS, V.C.J. and WATT, J., join concurring:
¶ 1 It has been over eight years since we addressed the question of whether a city’s economic development plan serves a legitimate public purpose for which public funds may be expended.1 This case offers a contemporary opportunity to construe the public purpose requirements of the Okla. Const, art. 10, §§ 14, 17.2 Whether a sufficient public purpose exists .behind a city’s expenditure of a public money for an economic development plan should be measured by contemporary economic challenges faced by municipalities.3 Today’s competitive economic environment may require that a city facilitate public and private cooperation to simulate and stabilize the locality’s economy.
¶ 2 The City’s expenditure was appropriated out of its general budget. Consequently, if the expenditure results in a public use or purpose, it is not prohibited by §§ 14 and 17 of art. 10.4 The term “public purpose” as used in § 14, art. 10 is not to be construed in a narrow and restricted sense.5 Although the term public purpose is incapable of exact definition, it is a fluid concept which should be broadly construed to comport with new developments and with changing conditions of the time.6
¶ 3 The Oklahoma Constitution authorizes the expenditures of public funds for economic development.7 While there have been few, recent occasions to construe the specific limitations imposed by the Okla. Const, art. 10, §§ 14, 17,8 it is deeply rooted *1147in Oklahoma law that economic development is a legitimate public purpose for which public funds may be expended.9 We most recently addressed the public purpose requirements of the Okla. Const, art. 10, §§ 14 and 17, in Burkhardt v. City of Enid, 1989 OK 45, 771 P.2d 608, 611-612, where we held that a city ordinance providing for the expenditure of public funds to acquire a private university’s campus and lease it back to the university for a sum below market rate did not violate §§14 and 17, of art. 10. In doing so, the Court focused on two principles to determine whether the municipal plan was constitutional: 1) whether the activity benefitted the public, as opposed to special interests or persons; and 2) whether consideration was given.
¶4 Other courts construing public purpose requirements have applied similar tests to determine if an economic development plan was permissible. For example, in Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 467 S.E.2d 615, 620 (1996), the Supreme Court of North Carolina, faced with the question of whether the development plans of local governments authorized by statute to make economic development incentive grants to private corporations constituted a valid public purpose examined: 1) whether the' public benefits were in common and not for particular persons, interests, or estates; and 2)whether the ultimate net gain or advantage must be in the public’s interest rather than that of an individual or private entity. The Supreme Court of New Jersey, in Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834, 841 (1964), when determining the constitutionality of a redevelopment act which facilitated development of certain economically depressed areas, inquired into the object sought to be accomplished and the degree and manner in which it affects public welfare. In Rice v. Ashcroft, 831 S.W.2d 206, 209-210 (Mo.App.1991), the court, reviewing an agreement to lease a new stadium from the regional sports authority, decided that if the primary effect of the public expenditure was to serve a public municipal purpose rather than to promote some private end, the expenditure was legal.
• ¶ 5 Determinative of whether a city’s economic development plan is constitutional are the several different principles which were the focus of Burkhardt and these cases. Several different factors should be considered before deciding whether the expenditure meets the public purpose requirements of the Oklahoma Constitution:
1) the way in which the public benefits compare to the way in which private parties may benefit;
2) the overall primary effect of the public expenditure;
3) the consideration given for the expenditure;
4) the location or site improvement of a particular project;
5) the creation of employment opportunities;
6) the comparison of private dollars involved in a project to the number of public dollars;
7) increased tax and/or other revenues; and
8) competition with other localities.10
¶ 6 Here, applying these factors, Warr Acres’ economic development plan benefits the public in many direct and indirect ways. The record reflects that sales revenues were projected to be over $400,000.00 annually, but in actuality the relocation of the Wal-Mart increased the sales tax revenues by $650,000.00 annually. It is readily apparent that additional employment opportunities arose within Warr Acres with the addition of *1148such a large retail facility, and that the tax base for the public school system expanded. Locating the new Wal-Mart on an otherwise vacant lot, undoubtedly stimulated other business growth within the locality’s limits as well.
¶ 7 The public expenditure appears to be relatively low, when it is compared to the retailer’s costs of building a facility and leasing the land for 20 years. This' plan gave Warr Acres a method of competing with neighboring cities to attract economic opportunities and jobs within its locality. The increased revenues also allow the City to enhance and increase the. services it provides to its citizens. These factors reflect that the City obtained consideration for its expenditure because it gained specific economic benefits for its investment, and it retained the ability to recoup its investment in the event a retail business did not lease the land beyond the primary term of the lease.
¶ 8 Nothing in the record shows that any member of the City Council personally bene-fitted from the plan, or that any one of its members was motivated by a personal interest in approving the plan. Although the retailer and private property owners benefit-ted from the plan, these benefits are incidental compared to all of the public benefits. It clearly appears that the primary object of Warr Acres’ expenditure was to serve a public municipal purpose. Accordingly, the plan meets the two primary principles set forth in Burkhardt v. City of Enid, 1989 OK 45, 771 P.2d 608, 611-612, withstanding constitutional scrutiny.
¶ 9 Municipalities today compete on a nation-wide level to attract new industry into their locality. A city cannot compete with other cities or even other states if other cities and states are competing with inducements devised under contemporary economic development plans like Warr Acres’. This has been recognized in other states, as courts have construed public purpose requirements for the expenditure of public funds to encompass ever changing public needs and adapt to the ever increasing competition for industry development. Economic development plans devised to provide gainful employment, improve living conditions, attract industry and advance the economy, like the plan at issue here, in which the public benefits greatly outweigh the incidental benefit to a private person or corporation have been upheld. Dworman v. Mayor & Board of Aldermen Governing Body of Town of Morristown, 370 F.Supp. 1056, 1072 (D.N.J.1974) (city’s agreement to build parking garage under shopping mall upheld because it replaced an economically depressed area with an active business, created new jobs, and provided substantial additional tax revenues for the town); Maready v. City of Winstonr-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 467 S.E.2d 615, 627 (1996) (local governments authorized by statute to make economic development incentive grants to private corporations upheld as a valid public purpose); Witcher v. Canon City, 716 P.2d 445, 454-455 (Colo.1986) (city’s amendment to lease with private company in which city agreed to reduce share of bridge tolls served a valid public purpose); Wolper v. City Council of the City of Charleston, 287 S.C. 209, 336 S.E.2d 871, 875 (1985) (tax increment financing law authorizing cities to incur indebtedness to revitalize blighted and deteriorating areas were public purpose even though private individuals incidently benefitted); R.E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 339 (Minn.1978) (city’s construction of parking facility to induce developer to construct hotel and trade mart complex was permissible); State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. LaPlante, 58 Wis.2d 32, 205 N.W.2d 784, 799 (1973) (statue authorizing municipalities to issue revenue bonds to finance industrial projects was valid because development of projects would place state on competitive basis with neighboring states); Dennis v. City of Raleigh, 253 N.C. 400, 116 S.E.2d 923, 926 (1960) (city may pay, from available surplus funds which were not derived from taxes, a private corporation for advertising advantages of city in effort to secure location of new industry within city); City of Glendale v. White, 67 Ariz. 231, 194 P.2d 435, 441 (1948) (expenditure of funds for city to pay dues in private municipal league was sufficient public puipose); Rice v. Ashcroft, 831 S.W.2d 206, 209-210 (Mo.App.1991) (agreement to lease new stadium from regional sports authority upheld because the primary *1149effects benefitted the public); Marshall Field & Co. v. Village of South Barrington, 92 Ill.App.3d 360, 47 Ill.Dec. 964, 968-69, 415 N.E.2d 1277, 1281-1282 (1981) (issuance of revenue bonds to finance construction of retail facilities served public purpose because courts look to the goals sought by and the actual effects of the expenditure of the public funds in deciding the issue). These cases are just a few of the prime examples of the variety of cases which reflect a trend toward broadening the scope of what constitutes a valid public purpose which permits a city’s expenditure of public revenues.
¶ 10 The sufficiency of a public purpose behind a municipalities’ economic development plan should be measured by considering primarily the goal and effect of the plan, as well as the public benefit of the plan compared to any private or individual benefits, the consideration given for the expenditure of public funds, the location or site improvement of a particular project, the creation of employment opportunities, the comparison of private dollars involved in a project to the number of public dollars, increased tax and/or other revenues, and competition with other localities. Under these factors, the economic development plan used by the City of Warr Acres is constitutional.

. Burkhardt v. City of Enid, 1989 OK 45, 771 P.2d 608, 611-612.

. The Okla. Const, art. 10, § 14 provides:
"Taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws, and for public purposes only, except that taxes may be levied when necessary to carry into effect Section thirty one of the Bill of Rights. Except as required by the Enabling Act, the State shall not assume the debt of any, county, municipal corporation, or political subdivision of the State, unless such debt shall have been contracted to defend itself in time of war, to repel invasion, or to suppress insurrection.”
The Okla. Const, art. 10, § 17 provides:
"The Legislature shall not authorize any county or subdivision thereof, city, town, or incorporated district, to become a stockholder in any company, association, or corporation, or to obtain or appropriate money for, or levy any tax for, or to loan its credit to any corporation, association, or individual.”

. R.E. Short Co. v. City of Minneapolis, 269 N.W.2d 331, 337 (Minn.1978); State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. LaPlante, 58 Wis.2d 32, 205 N.W.2d 784, 797 (1973); City of Glendale v. White, 67 Ariz. 231, 194 P.2d 435, 438 (1948).

. Okla. Const, art. 10, § 14, see note 2, supra. Okla. Const, art. 10, § 17, see note 2, supra. Willow Wind, Inc. v. City of Midwest City, 1989 OK 171, 790 P.2d 1067, 1070; Sublett v. City of Tulsa, 1965 OK 78, 405 P.2d 185, 197; Lawrence v. Schellstede, 1960 OK 10, 348 P.2d 1078, 1080.

. Burkhardt v. City of Enid, supra, note 1 at 610; Way v. Grand Lake Association, Inc., 635 P.2d 1010, 1015 (Okla.1981); Helm v. Childers, 181 Okla. 535, 75 P.2d 398, 399 (1938).

. R.E. Short Company v. City of Minneapolis, see note 3, supra; State ex rel. Hammermill Paper Co. v. Plante, see note 3, supra; City of Glendale v. White, see note 3, supra.

. The Okla. Const. Art. 10, § 35(a) provides:
"Any incorporated town and any county may issue, by and with the consent of the majority of the registered voters of said municipality or county voting on the question at an election held for the purpose, bonds in sums provided by such majority at such election for the purpose of securing and developing industry within or near the said municipality or county holding the election.”
The Okla. Const, art 10, § 15(b) provides in pertinent part:
"... Pursuant to authority of and subject to requirements of law and according to professional norms established nationally in similar activities, the Oklahoma Center for the Advancement of Science and Technology or its successor may be authorized to use public funds in order to promote economic development by purchase or ownership of stock or to make investments in private enterprises ...”
See also, the Okla. Const, art. 10, § 42 (authorizing the Oklahoma Development Finance Authority to issue bonds to provide an economic development credit enhancement reserve fund).

. See, e.g., Burkhardt v. City of Enid, note 1, supra (expenditure of public funds to acquire private university campus and lease it back to university); Way v. Grand Lake Association, Inc., see note 5, supra (expenditures to public and/or private multicounty organizations in cooperation with attracting tourism and recreation to state); Sublett v. City of Tulsa, supra, note 4 at 194-195 (development and improvement of harbors and ports notwithstanding that parts are leased for *1147use of private persons or corporations); Lawrence v. Schellstede, supra, note 4 at 1081 (city’s membership in mutual insurance company).-

. Burkhardt v. City of Enid, see note 1, supra; Way v. Grand Lake Association, Inc., see note 5, supra; In re Southern Oklahoma Development Trust,. 1970 OK 118, 470 P.2d 572, 574-575; Sublett v. City of Tulsa, supra, note 4 at 194-195; Lawrence v. Schellstede, supra, note 4 at 1081.

. Burkhardt v. City of Enid, see note 1, supra; Maready v. City of Winston-Salem, 342 N.C. 708, 467 S.E.2d 615, 620 (1996); Roe v. Kervick, 42 N.J. 191, 199 A.2d 834, 841 (1964); Rice v. Ashcroft, 831 S.W.2d 206, 209-210 (Mo.App.q991); See also, Gold, Economic Development Projects: A Perspective, 19 Urb. Law. 193 (1987) for other factors which may also be considered when undertaking an economic development project.