Court Opinion

ID: 9954604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-26 17:03:57.370994+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:11:58.455759
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/26/24 P. v. Lanford CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

               IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                       THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                        (Shasta)
                                                            ----

THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C097531

                   Plaintiff and Respondent,                                             (Super. Ct. No.
                                                                                        CRF180005975)
         v.

DANIEL CHOL LANFORD,

                   Defendant and Appellant.

         Defendant Daniel Chol Lanford pleaded no contest to possession of ammunition
by a felon. The trial court suspended imposition of sentence and placed defendant on
formal probation. Defendant violated probation resulting in multiple probation
revocation petitions. During one of the resulting probation revocation proceedings,
defendant admitted to several violations and stipulated to imposition of an upper term
sentence of three years with execution of the sentence suspended. After additional

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probation violations, the trial court revoked probation and executed the previously
imposed three-year upper term sentence. On appeal, defendant asserts the matter must be
remanded for resentencing following the amendment of Penal Code section 1170 by
Senate Bill No. 567 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill No. 567). (Statutory section
citations that follow are to the Penal Code unless otherwise stated.)

       We affirm the judgment.

                      FACTS AND HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
       On June 23, 2018, after supermarket employees suspected defendant was stealing
items. They attempted to stop defendant and a police officer detained him. The officer
searched defendant and found a box of Magtech ammunition containing 31 live rounds
and six or seven expended rounds.
       A criminal complaint charged defendant with a single count of possession of
ammunition by a felon. (§ 30305, subd. (a)(1); count 1.) On July 17, 2019, defendant
entered a plea of no contest to count 1 with a maximum exposure of three years in prison.
On August 21, 2019, the trial court stated imposition of sentence would be suspended
three years and admitted defendant to formal probation.
       On October 11, 2019, the prosecution filed a petition for revocation of probation,
alleging defendant committed two new offenses. Defendant admitted the violations and
the court revoked and reinstated probation.
       On June 19, 2020, the prosecution filed a second revocation petition, alleging
defendant committed two new offenses. On August 17, 2020, the prosecution filed a
third revocation petition, alleging defendant committed another new offense.
       On August 20, 2020, defendant appeared before Judge Beatty. The court proposed
that, if defendant admitted to the violations alleged, the court would impose a prison
sentence and suspend execution of the sentence and defendant would return to probation.
After consulting with defendant, defense counsel stated defendant would accept the

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proposal, and asked about the sentence to be imposed. The court responded, “it would be
the aggravated term, three years, and I won’t extend probation.” Defendant admitted the
violations and the court sentenced defendant to the upper term of three years, suspended
execution of the sentence, and reinstated probation.
       On September 18, 2020, the prosecution filed a fourth revocation petition, alleging
defendant committed two new offenses. On February 26, 2021, the prosecution filed a
fifth revocation petition, alleging defendant committed another new offense. On
October 12, 2022, the prosecution filed a sixth revocation petition, alleging defendant
failed to report. On October 13, 2022, defendant admitted to the violations alleged in
these three petitions.
       At proceedings on October 26, 2022, defendant’s attorney requested the court
impose sentence consistent with section 1170 as amended by Senate Bill No. 567, and the
prosecution requested the opportunity to brief the issue. At sentencing on November 23,
2022, believing the sentence previously imposed, execution suspended, was imposed in
compliance with section 1170, subdivision (b) as amended, the trial court stated, “I’m
bound by it. I do not think I have the discretion to pull it back and modify it unless I was
placing [defendant] back on a grant of probation.” The court revoked probation and
executed the previously imposed upper term three-year prison sentence.

                                       DISCUSSION

                                              I

                    Certificate of Probable Cause, Waiver, and Estoppel

       The People assert defendant is estopped from challenging his stipulated sentence
because he failed to obtain a certificate of probable cause. Defendant replies that he is
not challenging his plea as invalid when made but is seeking application of a later-
enacted sentencing provision, and therefore he does not need a certificate of probable
cause. We agree with the defendant.

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       “Generally speaking, under section 1237.5, a defendant may not bring an appeal
from a judgment of conviction entered after a . . . no contest plea . . . unless he or she has
first obtained from the superior court a certificate of probable cause.” (People v. Zuniga
(2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 1178, 1182, fn. omitted; see § 1237.5; see also Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.304(b).) One of the two types of issues that may be raised on appeal
without a certificate of probable cause come forward where a defendant has entered a
guilty or no-contest plea that involves “issues regarding proceedings held subsequent to
the plea for the purpose of determining the degree of the crime and the penalty to be
imposed.” (People v. Panizzon (1996) 13 Cal.4th 68, 74; accord, People v. Stamps (2020)
9 Cal.5th 685, 694.) “In determining whether section 1237.5 applies to a challenge of a
sentence imposed after a plea of guilty or no contest, courts must look to the substance of
the appeal: ‘the crucial issue is what the defendant is challenging, not the time or manner
in which the challenge is made.’ [Citation.] Hence, the critical inquiry is whether a
challenge to the sentence is in substance a challenge to the validity of the plea, thus
rendering the appeal subject to the requirements of section 1237.5.” (Panizzon, at p. 76;
accord, Stamps, at p. 694.) “Even when a defendant purports to challenge only the
sentence imposed, a certificate of probable cause is required if the challenge goes to an
aspect of the sentence to which the defendant agreed as an integral part of a plea
agreement.” (People v. Johnson (2009) 47 Cal.4th 668, 678; accord, Stamps, at p. 694.)
“ ‘[A] challenge to a negotiated sentence imposed as part of a plea bargain is properly
viewed as a challenge to the validity of the plea itself’ and thus requires a certificate of
probable cause.” (People v. Shelton (2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 766, quoting Panizzon, at
p. 79; see People v. Buttram (2003) 30 Cal.4th 773, 789 [“when the parties agree to a
specified sentence, any challenge to that sentence attacks a term, and thus the validity, of
the plea itself”].)
       Here, defendant is not estopped from pursuing his claim based on his failure to
obtain a certificate of probable cause because he is not challenging the validity of his plea

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or an aspect of the sentence to which he agreed at the time. As stated, pursuant to a
stipulation the trial court imposed the three-year upper term sentence on August 20, 2020,
before passage of Senate Bill No. 567 or its effective date, January 1, 2022. (Stats. 2021,
ch. 731, §§ 1.3, 3(c).) Under these circumstances, defendant is not challenging a part of
the plea to which he agreed. Defendant is seeking the retroactive application of a
subsequently enacted ameliorative provision. (Cf. People v. Stamps, supra, 9 Cal.5th at
p. 696 [certificate of probable cause not required because the defendant was not
challenging validity of plea but instead was seeking application of a later-enacted
sentencing provision].) No certificate of probable cause is required.
       For similar reasons, contrary to the People’s contentions, defendant did not waive
and is not otherwise estopped from raising his claim because he agreed to a specific
sentence. In People v. Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, on which the People rely, the
Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s acceptance of a plea bargain with a
stipulated sentence constituted implicit waiver of his claim pursuant to section 654.
(Hester, at p. 295.) However, the provisions of section 654 were in existence at time of
the defendant’s plea in Hester. Here, Senate Bill No. 567 did not become effective until
after defendant agreed to his sentence. As such, he did not waive the claim. (See
generally People v. Castellanos (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 267, 272 [waiver “is the
voluntary, intelligent, and intentional relinquishment of a known right or privilege”;
“ ‘ “[T]he valid waiver of a right presupposes an actual and demonstrable knowledge of
the very right being waived” ’ ”].)
       Estoppel is not the same as waiver, though the terms are sometimes used
“indiscriminately.” (DRG/Beverly Hills, Ltd. v. Chopstix Dim Sum Cafe & Takeout III,
Ltd. (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 54, 59.) Estoppel may apply to prevent a defendant from
“ ‘trifl[ing] with the courts.’ ” (In re Griffin (1967) 67 Cal.2d 343, 348.) Here, defendant
seeks only to benefit from a retroactively applicable ameliorative provision enacted by
the Legislature. We cannot say defendant is seeking to “trifle with the courts by

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attempting to better the bargain through the appellate process” (People v. Hester, supra,
22 Cal.4th at p. 295).

                                               II

                            Senate Bill No. 567 and Section 1170

       Defendant asserts the matter must be remanded for resentencing because the trial
court did not comply with the requirements of section 1170 as amended by Senate Bill
No. 567. Defendant contends no circumstance in aggravation was stipulated to by him or
found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.
       The People respond that, while the ameliorative amendments in Senate Bill No.
567 generally apply retroactively to nonfinal judgments, they do not apply in the context
of a stipulated sentence. According to the People, when a defendant violates the terms of
probation and the trial court executes the previously suspended sentence, “the trial court
‘exercises no discretion to decide between an upper, middle, or lower determinate term
and may not consider factors in mitigation and aggravation,’ ” and thus does not impose
sentence within the meaning of section 1170, subdivision (b).
       We conclude the ameliorative provisions of Senate Bill No. 567 do not apply to
defendant’s case.
       As amended by Senate Bill No. 567, section 1170, subdivision (b) now provides,
in pertinent part: “(1) When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and the statute
specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its sound discretion, order imposition of
a sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2).
[¶] (2) The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term, and the facts underlying those circumstances
have been stipulated to by the defendant, or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial. . . . [¶] (3) Notwithstanding

                                               6
paragraphs (1) and (2), the court may consider the defendant’s prior convictions in
determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without submitting the
prior convictions to a jury. This paragraph does not apply to enhancements imposed on
prior convictions.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1)-(3).)
       As a general matter, Senate Bill No. 567’s amendments to section 1170 do apply
retroactively to all nonfinal cases. (People v. Zabelle (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 1098, 1109.)
However, there is a split of authority among the Courts of Appeal as to whether these
amendments apply retroactively to sentences imposed pursuant to stipulated plea
agreements.
       In People v. Mitchell (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1051, review granted December 14,
2022, S277314 (Mitchell), the court stated that, in imposing a sentence as part of a
stipulated plea agreement, the trial court “had no opportunity to exercise any discretion in
deciding whether the imposition of the upper, middle, or lower term would best serve ‘the
interests of justice’ under former section 1170, subdivision (b).” (Mitchell at p. 1058,
review granted.) Rather, “when presented with a stipulated plea agreement, a trial court
may either accept or reject it.” (Ibid., review granted.) Section 1170 contemplates
imposition of sentence in the trial court’s “sound discretion.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(1).) The
court in Mitchell stated this “language indicates that the statute was not intended to apply
to sentences imposed pursuant to a stipulated plea agreement, as the trial court lacks
discretion to select the sentence in the first place.” (Mitchell, at p. 1058, review granted.)
       Defendant acknowledges Mitchell, but relies instead on People v. Todd (2023)
88 Cal.App.5th 373, review granted, April 26, 2023, S279154 (Todd). The Todd court
disagreed with Mitchell, concluding the defendant’s “sentence to the aggravated term as a
condition of his negotiated plea agreement does not negate the requirements imposed on
the court by amended section 1170, subdivision (b), which is retroactively applicable to
him.” (Id. at p. 381, review granted.) The court stated that section 1170 as amended
“prohibits the imposition of the upper-term sentence absent specific findings.” (Todd, at

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p. 378, review granted.) Thus, “the imposition of the aggravated term exceeds the court’s
authority unless the statutory prerequisites are met or waived because the aggravated term
cannot be imposed absent the court’s finding of those circumstances.” (Id. at p. 379,
review granted.) Additionally, the Todd court stated that adopting the reasoning in
Mitchell would improperly render the defendant’s plea bargain to a stipulated sentence
“the very waiver of ‘unknown future benefits of legislative enactments’ that the
Legislature has deemed void as against public policy because his entry of plea on those
terms was not ‘knowing and intelligent.’ ” (Id. at pp. 379-380, review granted, citing
§ 1016.8, subds. (a)(1) [plea agreements are deemed to incorporate the power of the state
to amend the law or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of public
policy; entering into plea agreement does not insulate parties from changes in the law the
Legislature intended to apply to them], (4) [“plea bargain that requires a defendant to
generally waive unknown future benefits of legislative enactments, initiatives, appellate
decisions, or other changes in the law that may occur after the date of the plea is not
knowing and intelligent”].)
       The Supreme Court will soon resolve this split of authority. Pending that
resolution, we find Mitchell’s analysis more persuasive. We conclude the trial court had
no opportunity to exercise its sentencing discretion when lifting the suspension on the
previously imposed stipulated upper term sentence. As such, we do not find that Senate
Bill No. 567’s amendments to section 1170 apply to defendant’s case.
       Addressing the Mitchell/Todd split, the People assert: “following appellant’s first
three violations of probation, the trial court selected an upper term sentence which was
imposed, but its execution stayed with the understanding that, in revoking and reinstating
probation, the stay would be lifted if appellant ‘mess[ed] up’ [citation] and violated
probation again by committing a new crime [citations]. This distinction renders the split
of authority reflected in Mitchell and Todd inapplicable.” Assuming the distinction to
which the People refer is that neither Mitchell nor Todd involved an imposed sentence the

                                             8
execution of which had been suspended, this does not render the issue addressed in
Mitchell and Todd inapplicable. The People elsewhere rely on the rule that, “if the court
has actually imposed sentence, and the defendant has begun a probation term
representing acceptance of that sentence, then the court has no authority, on revoking
probation, to impose a lesser sentence at the precommitment stage.” (People v. Howard
(1997) 16 Cal.4th 1081, 1095; id. at p. 1088 [on “revocation of probation, if the court
previously had imposed sentence, the sentencing judge must order that exact sentence
into effect”].)
       The Supreme Court in People v. Esquivel (2021) 11 Cal.5th 671 held that “a case
in which a defendant is placed on probation with execution of an imposed state prison
sentence suspended is not yet final” for purposes of In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740
retroactivity “if the defendant may still timely obtain direct review of an order revoking
probation and causing the state prison sentence to take effect.” (Esquivel, at p. 673.) The
Supreme Court noted “there are some constraints on a trial court’s ordinary discretion to
modify suspended execution sentences,” but further observed “those constraints are
statutory, and in any event, defendants entitled to the benefit of ameliorative legislation
may be able to obtain relief by other procedural means.” (Id. at p. 679.)
       As one court phrased it after reviewing Esquivel, the principles of In re Estrada
“underlying the presumption of retroactive application of ameliorative legislation
overcome the usual rule that a previously imposed execution suspended sentence cannot
be later modified when probation is revoked.” (People v. Achane (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th
1037, 1046, fn. omitted.) The court concluded: “Esquivel’s holding that the defendant
was entitled to retroactive application of the new legislation necessarily confirms that
trial courts have authority to act in accordance with Estrada’s presumption of
retroactivity when ameliorative legislation becomes effective after imposition of the
suspended execution sentence and prior to probation revocation proceedings.” (Achane,
at pp. 1046-1047.) Thus, the distinction that, unlike Mitchell and Todd, this case involved

                                              9
imposition of a sentence the execution of which had been suspended does not render the
issue addressed in Mitchell and Todd inapplicable.

                                       DISPOSITION
       The judgment is affirmed.

                                                  HULL, J.

We concur:

EARL, P. J.

WISEMAN, J.

 Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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