Court Opinion

ID: 9482059
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 08:38:58.829226+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:48:44.289683
License: Public Domain

WIGGINS, Circuit Judge,
Dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the views of my colleagues. They conclude that the few random expressions of defense counsel during closing argument constituted a “betrayal of his client,” Maj. Op. p. 1076, sufficient to require a reversal without a showing of prejudice as permitted by United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 104 S.Ct. 2039, 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984). I disagree.
In my view, the majority is excessive in its condemnation of defense counsel. It accuses him of 1) causing a “breakdown in our adversarial system of justice,” Maj. Op. p. 1075; 2) “taintpng] the integrity of the trial”, id.; 3) “lessening the Government’s burden of persuading the jury that Swanson was the perpetrator of the bank robbery,” id.; and 4) engaging in an “abandonment of the defense of his client at a critical stage of the criminal proceeding.” Id. One would expect such powerful criticism to be justified by the grossest form of misbehavior by counsel. I fail to find it here.
Defense counsel found himself in a position that is perhaps all too familiar to the defense bar. His client had in fact engaged in the act for which he was indicted. The government had, and offered, the evidence necessary to prove it. Four bank employees identified Swanson as the robber. Two photographs of Swanson engaged in robbing the bank, taken by the bank’s surveillance camera, were admitted into evidence. Swanson’s fingerprints were found at the bank after the robbery. Swanson offered no defense witnesses and did not testify.
In these circumstances, the options available to defense counsel were exceedingly limited. His offer to establish that his *1080client was depressed and sought psychiatric help on the day of the robbery was denied prior to trial. Counsel’s only recourse was to cross-examine the government’s witnesses carefully. He did so, but was unable to cause any witness to express any uncertainty as to her identification of Swanson as the robber. When all was said and done, counsel was compelled to rely upon his argument to the jury. What was he to say? His client had offered no defense. His cross-examination of witnesses, which presented only minor inconsistencies on trivial matters, developed no holes in the government’s case. Under these circumstances, defense counsel, I think, did his best. The majority has helpfully reproduced the entire closing argument as an appendix to their opinion. Read carefully, it is apparent that counsel characterized the government’s evidence as “overwhelming” and not raising a “reasonable doubt” in certain particulars. There is no question that counsel was accurate in his characterizations. However, the majority condemns him for his statements and directs its opinion to the Arizona State Bar for appropriate disciplinary proceedings against counsel.
It is easy to condemn from our vantage point. We are not before the jury, empty handed, yet charged with the duty of providing an honest defense. We should, I believe, view counsel’s performance less critically. He did not concede that his client was guilty. He did, however, admit that there was no reasonable doubt that one element of the government’s case was true, namely, that the bank clerks were intimidated by the robber. Such an admission did not cause a collapse in the adversarial system, it did not taint the integrity of the trial, nor was it an abandonment by counsel of his client’s defense. If it was error at all, it was not of the fundamental sort necessary to trigger the Cronic exception.
Because I believe the rule in Cronic is inappropriate here, I would apply the analysis of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). Under Strickland’s prejudice prong, I would find that any error made by defense counsel was not prejudicial, and would therefore affirm Swanson’s conviction.1

. I have reviewed the trial and sentencing errors asserted by Swanson’s new counsel on appeal and find them to be without merit.