Court Opinion

ID: 9617087
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:51:53.598546+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:05.594314
License: Public Domain

Hill, Justice,
concurring.
The defendant, Ann Anderson Brown, was indicted on October 5, 1976, for involuntary manslaughter of County Commissioner Bobby Joe Whitworth which arose from a battery upon him on May 26, 1976. His death occurred on September 13, 1976, and Mrs. Brown was tried and found guilty in March, 1977.
On November 4, 1977, after indictment and before trial, the lawyer who appeared as special prosecutor at the trial wrote the defendant’s sister a letter reading in part as follows:
"As you are aware Bobby Joe Whitworth received injuries at the hands of your sister, Mrs. Ann Anderson Brown, who was acting as your agent at the time your *540sister Ann inflicted these injuries on Mr. Bobby Joe Whitworth.
"The medical, doctor, ambulance, emergency room and hospital expenses for treatment of these injuries Ann inflicted upon Bobby Joe Whitworth have run approximately $13,500.00 up through September 13, 1976 when Mr. Whitworth died as a result of referenced injuries. The burial and funeral expenses at Strickland Funeral Home came to $2,635.08. Mr. Bobby Joe Whitworth was totally disabled from May 26, 1976 until the time of his death September 13, 1976 and this gives rise to an item of special damages in the amount of $2,994.38 as loss of earnings during this period of total disability.
"Mrs. Sarah Sanders Whitworth was forced to stop work at Hart County Hospital from May 26,1976 up to the present time so that she could see after her injured husband. Her salary at the hospital was $112.00 per week and she lost a total of fifteen and one-half weeks. This gave rise to a loss of $1736.00 loss of earnings by Mrs. Whitworth.
"Mr. Whitworth suffered great pain of mind and body as a result of the injuries Ann inflicted upon him. Under Georgia Law the compensation for such is left to the enlightened conscience of fair and impartial jurors. Mrs. Sarah Sanders Whitworth has a civil action claim for the wrongful death of her late husband. . .
"I would suggest that you immediately notify your homeowner insurer as well as any other insurer affording liability insurance coverage that may be available to you or to Ann or to both of you. I will discuss settlement of these civil action claims with you or your representative.”
At the time of trial of the criminal case, this attorney was representing the deceased’s widow in her civil wrongful death claim against the defendant. Undoubtedly that civil representation was on a contingent fee basis as is customary in such cases. Anyone who has a feeling for such things knows that an acquittal would have adversely affected the civil claims whereas the conviction enhanced the value of those claims. Thus, indirectly, the special prosecutor had a financial interest in the outcome of the *541criminal case.
In the past, there was no prohibition on special prosecutors being employed by the victim’s family to assist the district attorney in the prosecution, so long as the special prosecutor was subject to the direction and control of the district attorney. Woods v. State, supra, cited in the main opinion.
However, after the trial in Woods, supra, and after the first trial in this case, the General Assembly enacted and the Governor approved Ga. L. 1977, pp. 1257-1266, which was a comprehensive revision of Code Chs. 24-29 relating to district attorneys. In addition to continuing the prohibition on district attorneys engaging in the private practice of law (Sec. 2; Code § 24-2905), the 1977 Act provided that attorneys employed by the district attorney and compensated from state funds shall not engage in the private practice of law (Sec. 8; Code § 24-2919 (4)) and provided that private attorneys acting as district attorneys pro tern appointed by the presiding judge shall be subject to all laws governing district attorneys (Sec. 7, Code § 24-2914). Now we should not expect that the law prohibiting private practice by district attorneys would prohibit a private attorney acting as district attorney pro tern from engaging in the private practice of law. However, we should apply the law so as to prohibit a private attorney acting as or assisting a district attorney from engaging in the private practice in the very case in which he is acting as or assisting the district attorney. In my view, the 1977 law changes the rules as to special prosecutors as to trials after its enactment.
The duty of a prosecutor is to seek justice, not merely to convict. EC 7-13, 238 Ga. 792. His duties, differ from those of the private practitioner. EC 7-13, supra. He has a duty to make disclosures to the defendant in a criminal case which are not constitutionally required in a civil case. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U. S. 97 (96 SC 2392, 49 LE2d 342) (1976). If we do not interpret our 1977 law as suggested above, I foresee that we may see challenges based upon the proposition that fee paid prosecutors violate due process just as fee- paid judges violate due process. See Connally v. Georgia, 429 U. S. 245 (97 SC *542546, 50 LE2d 444) (1977).
Because this case was tried the first time before the 1977 Act became law, I concur in the judgment.