Court Opinion

ID: 9728145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 13:59:40.752723+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:46.161033
License: Public Domain

ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring.
I agree that evidence of Appellant’s past sexual assaults of the victim is admissible under the facts of this case to establish a lack of consent. I write separately, however, to disassociate myself from that portion of the majority opinion which relies on Commonwealth v. Claypool, 508 Pa. 198, 495 A.2d 176 (1985), to reach that conclusion.
In Commonwealth v. Claypool, the defendant was convicted of rape, involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and simple assault. At trial, the defendant admitted to engaging in sexual acts but contended that the victim consented. The Commonwealth introduced evidence that the defendant placed the victim in fear during the assault by telling her that he had previously served time in jail for rape.1 Thus the evidentiary question was whether the defendant’s statement was admissible to establish the “threat of forcible compulsion” element of rape. We held that “when there is evidence that a statement about prior criminal activity was made by the defendant in order to threaten and intimidate his victim, and when force or threat of harm is an element of the crime for which the defendant is being tried, such evidence is admissible.” Id. at 205, 495 A.2d at 179.
Unlike Claypool, the instant case does not involve a statement made by the defendant to threaten or intimidate his victim. Instead, the victim testified regarding Appellant’s past criminal conduct, i.e., that he had previously sexually assaulted her.2 Accordingly, I find that reliance on Claypool is misplaced.
*515Notwithstanding this conclusion, I agree that evidence of Appellant’s prior sexual assaults of the victim was admissible. Generally, evidence of prior criminal activity is excluded because it is irrelevant and highly prejudicial. Here, the evidence is relevant to an element of the crime, that the sexual intercourse occurred through threat of forcible compulsion. The evidence was not being offered to establish a predisposition on the part of Appellant to commit a criminal act or as evidence that Appellant did in fact commit a prior criminal act. Under these circumstances, I am constrained to agree that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting such testimony.
FLAHERTY, C.J., and NIGRO, J., join this Concurring Opinion.

. Evidence was also presented that the defendant intimidated the victim by threatening her with a gun and by grabbing her and throwing her onto a bed.

. The majority summarily notes this distinction, op. at 466, but fails to recognize its significance.