Court Opinion

ID: 9687899
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 16:52:48.480946+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:32.682175
License: Public Domain

O’Hara, J.
(concurring in result). While I may or may not disagree specifically with anything Judge Gillis has written, I regard it necessary to state with precision my reason for voting to reverse.
As I read the record and apply the Federal preemption doctrine in this case, I find a factual rather than a legal basis requiring me to vote as I do.
Plaintiff in this case readily concedes that with respect to the functions reserved by the NLRB1 to Flamegas the Federal holding controls.
What plaintiff here is arguing is that if some construction contractor wants to enter into a contract with plaintiff to do something separate and *310apart from what the NLRB found was the exclusive right of Flamegas to do, that is the business of plaintiff and the contractor. In this case the contractor agreed with plaintiff to have plaintiff "watch” the heaters after they were hooked up. Plaintiff specifically eschewed any right to hook up or service the heaters.
So if a contractor chooses to enter into another and different contract with plaintiff here which contract provides for services (even if unneeded) that is the right of that contractor and plaintiff herein.
I’m sure I do not know why any contractor would do this. But that’s none of my judicial business. The contractor with whom plaintiff made the additional contract is not complaining to us. The additional services (if any) take nothing from Flamegas which the Board held Flamegas was exclusively entitled to perform.
So whether Flamegas tortiously interfered with the contract between plaintiff and a construction contractor is a litigable question, and the proper subject matter of proofs in the circuit court.
On the foregoing ground alone, I concur in the result reached by Judge Gillis.
I too would award costs to appellant.

 National Labor Relations Board.