Court Opinion

ID: 9368345
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-03 20:04:06.547522+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:07.172335
License: Public Domain

2023 IL App (1st) 1211434-U

                                                                            FIFTH DIVISION
                                                                            FEBRUARY 3, 2023

                                          No. 1-21-1434

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and may not be cited as precedent
by any party except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

______________________________________________________________________________

                                    IN THE
                        APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
                           FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT
______________________________________________________________________________

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,            )     Appeal from the
                                                )     Circuit Court of
                  Plaintiff-Appellee,           )     Cook County.
                                                )
          v.                                    )     No. 00 CR 24940
                                                )
TERE MAGEE,                                     )     Honorable
                                                )     James B. Linn,
                  Defendant-Appellant,          )     Judge Presiding.
______________________________________________________________________________

       JUSTICE LYLE delivered the judgment of the court.
       Presiding Justice Delort and Justice Mitchell concurred in the judgment.

                                            ORDER

¶1     Held: The trial court did not err by dismissing the defendant’s postconviction petition at
             the second stage.

¶2     On January 2, 2013, the defendant-appellant, Tere Magee, filed a pro se postconviction

petition in the circuit court of Cook County following his convictions for aggravated criminal

sexual assault and armed robbery. On May 10, 2016, the postconviction petition advanced to the

second stage. On December 18, 2019, Mr. Magee filed a supplemental postconviction petition.

The State filed a motion to dismiss the supplemental postconviction petition, which the trial court
No. 1-21-1434

granted. On appeal, Mr. Magee contends that the trial court erred in dismissing his petition because

it presented a substantial showing of a violation of the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois

Constitution. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm the ruling of the circuit court of Cook

County.

¶3                                        BACKGROUND

¶4     In May 2007, following a bench trial, the trial court found Mr. Magee guilty of five counts

of armed robbery, two counts of aggravated criminal sexual assault, and three counts of aggravated

criminal sexual abuse. Each count arose from acts that Mr. Magee committed against several

women within a Chicago beauty salon in August 2000. Mr. Magee was sentenced to five

concurrent 10-year terms on the armed robbery counts, to be served consecutively to five

concurrent 20-year terms on the aggravated criminal sexual assault and aggravated criminal sexual

abuse counts. He received an aggregate sentence of 30 years’ imprisonment, which would run

consecutively to a sentence of 50 years’ imprisonment previously imposed in a separate case.

¶5     In a direct appeal, Mr. Magee argued, and the State conceded, that there was insufficient

evidence for his convictions for aggravated criminal sexual abuse, and that one of his two

convictions for aggravated criminal sexual assault should be vacated because it violated the one-

act, one-crime doctrine. Thus, in a summary order, we vacated the convictions on the three

aggravated criminal sexual abuse counts and directed the trial court to determine which of the two

aggravated criminal sexual assault counts was “more serious” and which counts should be vacated.

People v. Magee, No. 1-09-3229 (order filed March 31, 2011; modified order filed May 17, 2011).

We also acknowledged that, while the legislature created a mandatory firearm enhancement for

aggravated criminal sexual assault involving a firearm, which was declared unconstitutional, it

was clear that the firearm enhancement was not applied to Mr. Magee’s sentence. Accordingly,
                                                  2
No. 1-21-1434

we otherwise affirmed the remaining convictions. On remand, Mr. Magee was sentenced on

October 24, 20121 to five concurrent 10-year terms for armed robbery, to be served consecutively

to a 20-year sentence for a single count of aggravated criminal sexual assault with a firearm,

resulting in an aggregate sentence of 30 years.

¶6      On January 2, 2013, Mr. Magee, acting pro se, filed a postconviction petition, asserting

that his sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault with a firearm violated the proportionate

penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. In particular, Mr. Magee’s petition stated that, pursuant

to section 3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) of the Unified Code of Corrections (Unified Code), often referred to as a

“truth-in-sentencing” provision, a person convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault must

serve at least 85% of his sentence. 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West 2012). More specifically, it

stated that a person convicted of certain specified offenses may “receive no more than 4.5 days of

sentence credit for each month of his or her sentence of imprisonment.” 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii)

(West 2012). He argued, on the other hand, a person convicted of armed violence with a category

I weapon predicated on criminal sexual assault—which has “identical elements” to the offense of

aggravated criminal sexual assault would be eligible for day-for-day good time credit, unless the

court has made a finding that the victim has suffered great bodily harm2, (see 730 ILCS 5/3-6-

3(a)(2)(iii), (a)(2.1) (West 2012)). In essence, Mr. Magee would only be required to serve 50% of

his sentence if he received the day-for-day good time credit and would be eligible for release from

prison earlier. Mr. Magee’s postconviction petition asserted that these provisions resulted in

        1
          On August 1, 2011, the trial court issued a new sentencing order that vacated one of the
aggravated criminal sexual assault counts, but failed to vacate the three counts of criminal sexual
abuse in compliance with this court’s summary order. The defendant subsequently moved to
correct the mittimus, and the trial court issued a corrected sentencing order on October 24, 2012.
        2
          Notably, a finding of great bodily harm was not made in this case.
                                                   3
No. 1-21-1434

different penalties for offenses with identical elements in violation of the proportionate penalties

clause.

¶7        On February 7, 2013, the trial court summarily dismissed Mr. Magee’s postconviction

petition at the first stage of postconviction proceedings. Mr. Magee appealed the decision, and this

court reversed and remanded the case for a second stage postconviction proceeding. People v.

Magee, 2015 IL App (1st) 130982-U. This court found that the issue raised had arguable merit and

was not frivolous, meeting the low threshold at the first stage of postconviction proceedings.

¶8        On December 18, 2019, Mr. Magee filed a supplemental postconviction petition, which

alleged the same arguments as his previous postconviction petition. The State filed a motion to

dismiss, arguing that Mr. Magee failed to make a substantial showing that his sentence violated

the proportionate penalties clause. On October 27, 2021, the trial court denied Mr. Magee’s

postconviction petition stating that his petition violated the principles of res judicata since the

appellate court stated on direct appeal that the firearm enhancement was unconstitutional, pursuant

to the proportionate penalties clause, but it did not appear that the firearm enhancement was

applied. On the date of the trial court’s dismissal, Mr. Magee filed his notice of appeal.

¶9                                           ANALYSIS

¶ 10      We first note that we have jurisdiction in this case because Mr. Magee filed a notice of

appeal within 30 days from the trial court’s October 27, 2021, denial of his postconviction petition.

See Ill. S. Ct. R. 651 (eff. July 1, 2017); Ill. S. Ct. R. 606(b) (eff. Mar. 12, 2021).

¶ 11      Mr. Magee asserts that his sentence violates the proportionate penalties clause because his

sentence for the aggravated criminal sexual assault conviction must be served at 85%, which

conflicts with the sentence he would have received for a conviction of armed violence with the

                                                   4
No. 1-21-1434

underlying offense of criminal sexual assault, which would be served at 50%. The State argues his

postconviction claim is barred by res judicata.

¶ 12   The Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2018)) provides

a criminal defendant with a mechanism, where he or she can argue that his or her conviction and

sentence were the result of a substantial denial of his or her constitutional rights under the United

States Constitution, Illinois Constitution, or both. People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 21. A

postconviction proceeding is not an appeal from the judgment, but rather, it is a collateral attack

on the trial court proceedings. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 21. To receive postconviction relief, a

defendant must show a substantial deprivation of his or her federal or state constitutional rights in

the trial court proceedings, which produced the challenged judgment. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶

21. The purpose of a postconviction proceeding is to allow a defendant to raise constitutional

issues that were not, and could not have been, decided on direct appeal. People v. Davis, 2022 IL

App (1st) 200467, ¶ 85. As a result, issues that were decided on direct appeal are barred

as res judicata and issues that could have been raised on direct appeal but were not, are forfeited.

Davis, 2022 IL App (1st) 200467, ¶ 85.

¶ 13   A postconviction proceeding operates in three stages. People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 10

(2009). If a defendant’s postconviction petition survives the first stage, the proceedings advance

to a second stage where counsel is appointed and granted leave to amend the petition into an

appropriate legal form. People v. Turner, 187 Ill. 2d 406, 416-17 (1999). If the petition makes a

substantial showing of a constitutional violation, the matter advances to the third stage, which is

an evidentiary hearing to determine the validity of the petition’s factual allegations. People v.

Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 473 (2006). “[T]he well-pleaded allegations in the petition and

supporting documents will be accepted as true unless it is affirmatively demonstrated by the record
                                                  5
No. 1-21-1434

that a trier of fact could never accept their veracity.” People v. Robinson, 2020 IL 123849, ¶ 60.

At the second stage, “the court is concerned solely with determining whether the petition’s

allegations sufficiently demonstrate a constitutional infirmity which would necessitate relief under

the Act.” People v. Jones, 399 Ill. App. 3d 341, 357 (2010). “Factual disputes raised by the

pleadings require a determination of the truth or falsity of the supporting documents which cannot

be properly made at a dismissal hearing; they can only be resolved through a third-stage

evidentiary hearing.” Jones, 399 Ill. App. 3d at 357. A trial court’s dismissal of a postconviction

petition is reviewed de novo. People v. Richardson, 189 Ill. 2d 401, 408 (2000).

¶ 14   The State, though it cited to caselaw that res judicata should apply, did not make any

argument contending that res judicata is applicable to the matter and facts before us. Res judicata

“is an affirmative defense, which can be waived.” Roberts v. Burdick, 2021 IL App (5th) 190119,

¶ 43 (citing Village of Maywood Board of Fire & Police Commissioners v. Department of Human

Rights, 296 Ill. App. 3d 570, 578 (1998)). As a result of the State failing to argue res judicata, the

State has waived this contention, and we will address Mr. Magee’s postconviction petition on the

merits. People v. Smith, 2015 IL 116572, ¶ 22 (“Points not argued are waived”).

¶ 15   Mr. Magee’s postconviction petition in this case was dismissed at the second stage. Mr.

Magee asserts that his postconviction petition made a substantial showing that the “legislative

scheme,” which requires those convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault with a firearm to

serve at least 85% of their imposed sentencing term before they are eligible for release, violates

the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution. He contends that an individual

“sentenced for the identical offense of armed violence predicated on criminal sexual assault would

receive day-for-day credit,” and be eligible for release after serving at least 50% of his or her

sentence.
                                                  6
No. 1-21-1434

¶ 16   Mr. Magee relies on the proposition that the proportionate penalties clause forbids the

imposition of different penalties for offenses with identical elements. Specifically, “[t]he

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution declares that ‘[a]ll penalties shall be

determined *** according to the seriousness of the offense.’ ” People v. Toy, 2013 IL App (1st)

120580, ¶ 22 (quoting Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, § 11). Our supreme court has reasoned that “[i]f the

legislature determines that the exact same elements merit two different penalties, then one of these

penalties has not been set in accordance with the seriousness of the offenses.” People v. Sharpe,

216 Ill. 2d 481, 522 (2005)). Thus, “the proportionate penalties clause is violated where offenses

with identical elements are given different sentences.” Toy, 2013 IL App (1st) 120580, ¶ 22 (citing

Sharpe, 216 Ill. 2d at 521).

¶ 17   In this case, there is no dispute that the two offenses, which form the basis of Mr. Magee’s

proportionate penalties argument, have identical elements. Our court has explicitly held that

“aggravated criminal sexual assault predicated upon the accused having been armed with a firearm

[citation] and armed violence with a category I weapon predicated upon criminal sexual assault

[citation] have identical elements.” People v. Pelo, 404 Ill. App. 3d 839, 883 (2010) (vacating

sentencing enhancements for aggravated criminal sexual assault as violating proportionate

penalties clause); see also People v. Hampton, 406 Ill. App. 3d 925, 942 (2010) (enhancements to

sentence for aggravated criminal sexual assault with a firearm violated the proportionate penalties

clause because they “ma[d]e the sentences disproportionate to the penalty for armed violence

predicated on criminal sexual assault [citation], which contains identical elements”). In this appeal,

the State concedes that “the offenses of aggravated criminal sexual assault with a firearm and

armed violence predicated on sexual assault share the same elements.”

                                                  7
No. 1-21-1434

¶ 18   The crux of Mr. Magee’s proportionate penalties challenge is premised on the different

treatment of these offenses under the truth-in-sentencing provisions of section 3-6-3 of the Unified

Code (730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West 2012)). Under section 3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) of the Unified Code,

a prisoner serving a sentence for certain enumerated offenses, including aggravated criminal sexual

assault, “shall receive no more than 4.5 days of sentence credit for each month of his or her

sentence of imprisonment.” 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii) (West 2012). That is, for the enumerated

crimes, section 3-6-3 mandates that the prisoner will serve, at the minimum, 85% of the imposed

term before being eligible for release.

¶ 19   In contrast, with respect to persons convicted of offenses not specifically enumerated in

section 3-6-3(a)(2)(ii), section 3-6-3(a)(2.1) of the Unified Code provides that “a prisoner *** shall

receive one day of sentence credit for each day of his or her sentence of imprisonment,” and “[e]ach

day of sentence credit shall reduce by one day the prisoner’s period of imprisonment.” 730 ILCS

5/3-6-3(a)(2.1) (West 2012). In other words, for those offenses not specifically subject to the 85%

mandatory minimum of section 3-6-3(a)(2), a prisoner may potentially serve as little as 50% of the

prison term imposed if he or she receives one day of sentence credit for each day served. Thus,

while section 3-6-3 requires a prisoner convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault (such as

Mr. Magee) to remain imprisoned for at least 85% of the sentence, that minimum is not applicable

to one convicted of armed violence predicated on sexual assault—an offense with identical

elements.

¶ 20   The State’s brief concedes that, had Mr. Magee been convicted of armed violence

predicated on sexual assault, rather than aggravated criminal sexual assault, he would not be

limited to 4.5 days of sentence credit for each month served pursuant to section 3-6-3(a)(2)(ii), but

would be eligible to receive day-for-day credit towards early release. Thus, the parties do not
                                                  8
No. 1-21-1434

dispute that, although Mr. Magee is required to serve at least 85% of his sentence for his aggravated

criminal sexual assault conviction, he would have been eligible for earlier release had he been

convicted of a different offense with identical elements.

¶ 21   Nevertheless, the State urges that Mr. Magee is not entitled to postconviction relief in this

appeal “as no court has concluded that the proportionate penalties clause is violated where truth-

in-sentencing applies to only one of two offenses sharing identical elements” and contends that

our court “has rejected this assertion outright in an analogous case,” People v. Harris, 2012 IL

App (1st) 092251. Thus, the State argues that Mr. Magee’s petition was properly dismissed in

accordance with Illinois law.

¶ 22   The State asserts that our decision in Harris, which rejected a similar proportionate

penalties argument, is dispositive in establishing that Mr. Magee’s petition failed to make a

substantial showing. In Harris, the defendant, who was convicted of armed robbery and aggravated

kidnapping while armed with a firearm, filed a postconviction petition raising several challenges

premised upon the proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution as well as the equal

protection clause of the United States Constitution. Harris, 2012 IL App (1st) 092251, ¶¶ 6-8.

¶ 23   The Harris defendant, convicted of aggravated kidnapping, asserted a similar argument to

Mr. Magee, who was convicted of aggravated criminal sexual assault, in that the “application of

the truth-in-sentencing statute with regard to his conviction for aggravated kidnaping violates the

proportionate penalties clause of the Illinois Constitution” because it “require[d] him to serve 85%

of his sentence for aggravated kidnaping, while it would allow the Department of Corrections to

release him after serving only 50% of his sentence for the identical offense of armed violence

predicated on kidnaping.” Harris, 2012 IL App (1st) 092251, ¶ 19. In Harris, this court

acknowledged that “while the Unified Code of Corrections mandates that a defendant convicted
                                                 9
No. 1-21-1434

of aggravated kidnapping serve 85% of his sentence in every case,” “a defendant convicted of

armed violence could be eligible for early release after serving 50% of his prison sentence,” absent

a finding that his conduct resulted in great bodily harm. Harris, 2012 IL App (1st) 092251, ¶ 22

(citing 730 ILCS 5/3-6-3(a)(2)(ii-iii), (a)(2.1) (West 2006)). Although our decision acknowledged

the “difference between the rules for early release with regard to each offense,” our court

concluded that this was not a proportionate penalties violation because “that difference does not

pertain to the sentencing range of the two offenses.” Harris, 2012 IL App (1st) 092251, ¶ 23.

¶ 24   The Harris decision cited People v. Hawkins, 409 Ill. App. 3d 564, 572-73 (2011), holding

that “whether penalties for offenses with identical elements violate the proportionate penalties

clause depends only on whether they have different sentencing ranges, and not the manner in which

those sentences are carried out.” Harris, 2012 IL App (1st) 092251, ¶ 23. In Hawkins, this court

reasoned that “the mandatory consecutive sentencing structure *** affects only the manner by

which the sentence is carried out, and not the punishment itself.” (Emphasis in original). Hawkins,

409 Ill. App. 3d at 573-74.

¶ 25   The Harris decision further noted that in another case, “this court found that the truth-in-

sentencing provision requiring that [a] defendant serve 85% of his sentence does not change the

penalty for the underlying offense ***.” Harris, 2012 IL App (1st) 092251, ¶ 24 (citing People v.

Robinson, 383 Ill. App. 3d 1065, 1071 (2008) (holding that section 3-6-3(a)(2)’s requirement that

a defendant who inflicted “great bodily harm” must serve at least 85% of his sentence “does not

change the prescribed maximum penalty of the underlying offense”)). Thus, our court in Harris

rejected the argument that “the truth-in-sentencing law *** is tantamount to the imposition of a

harsher punishment than that which [the Harris defendant] would receive for the offense of armed

violence because it requires him to serve a higher percentage of his sentence.” Harris, 2012 IL
                                                10
No. 1-21-1434

App (1st) 092251, ¶ 25. The Harris court concluded that “since the truth-in-sentencing provision

does not affect the sentencing range imposed for the offense *** but only the manner in which the

sentence is carried out *** it does not violate the proportionate penalties clause.” Harris, 2012 IL

App (1st) 092251, ¶ 25 (citing Hawkins, 409 Ill. App. 3d at 574).

¶ 26   The law rejects Mr. Magee’s position that his sentence violated the proportionate penalties

clause of the Illinois Constitution. Rather, this court has held that “good-time credit” does not

affect the punishment itself, but only the manner it is carried out. Harris, 2012 IL App (1st)

092251, ¶ 23 (stating “whether penalties for offenses with identical elements violate the

proportionate penalties clause depends only on whether they have different sentencing ranges, and

not the manner in which those sentences are carried out”); See also Hawkins, 409 Ill. App. 3d at

573-74. Accordingly, Mr. Magee has failed to make a substantial showing that his sentence

violated the proportionate penalties clause. Therefore, we find that the trial court did not err by

dismissing the postconviction petition at the second stage.

¶ 27                                     CONCLUSION

¶ 28   For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

¶ 29   Affirmed.

                                                11