Court Opinion

ID: 9717029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:56:20.352276+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:50.746863
License: Public Domain

PAUL M. SPINDEN, Judge,
dissenting.
William Jones, Jr., is being released from his duty to report Justin Hazlett’s corpse to authorities because he merely kicked the corpse. Had he dragged it, even a few inches — say, to Hazlett’s front porch — he suddenly would have had a duty to report the corpse’s location. This fine-haired distinction makes little sense in terms of public policy, and, more importantly, it is contrary to the General Assembly’s intent in § 194.425.1, RSMo 2000, *459which the Supreme Court has declared to be “commonly understood.” State v. Bratina, 73 S.W.3d 625, 628 (Mo. banc 2002).
I have no quandary concerning whether or not § 194.425.1 imposed a duty on Jones to report the location of Hazlett’s corpse to county authorities. The Supreme Court resolved the only ambiguity in the statute’s language. Id. Applying the Supreme Court’s teaching in Bratina along with the cardinal rule of statutory construction — that we discern the legislature’s intent by applying the plain and ordinary meaning of the words that it uses in its statute — leads me to the certain conclusion that we should affirm the circuit court’s judgment convicting Jones of abandoning Hazlett’s corpse.
The teaching of Bratina is clear. We glean the underlying concept of abandonment of a corpse from the terms that the General Assembly used in § 194.425.1: “abandons, disposes, deserts, or leaves.” Although “abandons,” “deserts,” and “leaves” are synonyms, the Supreme Court concluded that “leaves” was ambiguous because it is amenable to describing one’s happening upon a body as well as a mortician’s leaving a corpse on a nonpaying client’s porch. Id. at 627. It concluded that “abandons,” “disposes,” and “deserts” all required “a person[’s] having an interest in, or duty with respect to, the body,” and that “leaves,” therefore, should, too. Id. The Supreme Court resolved the ambiguity presented by “leaves” by declaring that, consistent with “abandons,” “disposes,” and “deserts,” one can commit the crime of abandonment of a corpse by leaving it only if he has an interest in, or duty with respect to, the corpse.
The Supreme Court does not tell us how much interest one must have in a corpse to be deemed to have committed the crime of abandoning a corpse. Does he have to put or to place the corpse at the location before leaving it? We, however, are not left in a quandary on this matter. We can readily find the answer by employing the same dictionary that the Supreme Court used in Bratina.
The dictionary makes clear that one can abandon a corpse by “withdraw[ing] one’s protection, support, or help from [it.]” WEBSTER’S THIRD New INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY of the English Language UnaBRIdged 2 (1993). When one takes steps to lend protection, support, or help, withdrawal of it constitutes abandonment. Significantly, under this definition, one need not have placed an object in a location to be deemed to have abandoned it. The same is true of “desert” and “dispose.” One can desert a corpse by “turnfing] away from (what has previously engaged [him]) especially] by withdrawing support or disrupting bonds of attachment or duty” or by “abandon[ing it] ... :[by] breaking] away from or breaking] off association with [it.]” Id. at 610. One can dispose a corpse by “assigning it] to a particular place or position[.]” Id. at 654. In the same way, one leaves a corpse by “withdrawing] ... [him]self from [it] whether temporarily or permanently: [by] go[ing] away or departing] from [it] ... :[by] put[ting], placing], depositing], or delivering it] before or in the process of departing or withdrawing [from it] ... :[by] deseRt[ing], abandon[ing], FORSAK[lNG it] ... :[by] terminating] association with [it]:[by] quitting] the service of [it.]” Id. at 1287.
Jones did not remain afar from and uninvolved with Hazlett’s corpse. He walked up to it and got involved with it, trying to determine why his friend was lying out on the ground in the cold of winter. He kicked Hazlett to try to arouse him. After deciding that Hazlett was dead, Jones withdrew his voluntarily extended support and help — as minimal as it *460was — by walking away and instructing his girlfriend to lie to police about their encounter with Hazlett’s body. In the plain and ordinary sense of “leaves” — understood in a sense consistent with “abandons,” “disposes,” and “deserts” — Jones abandoned Hazlett’s corpse.
Thus, employing the plain and ordinary meaning of § 194.425.1’s terms leads me to the certain conclusion that Jones left Ha-zlett’s corpse, and § 194.425.1 imposed on him a duty to report the corpse’s location to proper authorities. Indeed, when a statute uses a pedestrian word such as “leave,” the General Assembly has a right to expect that we will apply the word’s plain and ordinary meaning unless it makes clear that it intends a different meaning. Section 1.090, RSMo 2000. We have assured the legislature repeatedly that this is the cardinal rule of statutory construction. State v. Blocker, 133 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Mo. banc 2004).
After spending much time with the definitions of § 194.425.1’s terms, the Supreme Court noted in Bratina, in its discussion of whether or not the statute was vague, that § 194.425.1 “criminalizes conduct that is wrong in itself,” or malum in se. 73 S.W.3d at 628. This observation is significant in this case because, in a statute criminalizing conduct that is malum in se, “the evil that is being remedied is commonly understood.” Id. I would agree that, given the nature of corpses, the evil underlying § 194.425.1 is certainly commonly understood. Because of health risks involved with corpses, the inhumanity of leaving corpses lying around unattended, and the need for law enforcement authorities to investigate any criminal activity surrounding the corpse, authorities would want to know that Hazlett’s corpse was lying unattended in his front yard. I think that they would want to know of a mortician’s leaving a corpse on a nonpaying customer’s porch, and I think that they surely would want to know about the body that Huckleberry Finn and his friend Jim found.1
To interpret “leaves” as applying only when the defendant put or placed the corpse in the location thwarts these “commonly understood” purposes. And it has the effect of encouraging an individual who happens upon a body, kicks it and determines that the person is deceased, to walk away without reporting the incident to anyone. I am very doubtful that this is what the General Assembly intended when it enacted § 194.425.1. We must avoid interpretations that defeat a statute’s evident purpose. State ex rel. Nixon v. Quik-Trip Corporation, 133 S.W.3d 33, 37 (Mo. banc 2004); Ming v. General Motors Corporation, 130 S.W.3d 665, 668 (Mo.App.2004).
We have always gleaned legislative purpose from the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute’s words and always in consideration of “the object the legislature seeks to accomplish with an eye towards finding resolution to the problems addressed therein.” Gott v. Director of Revenue, 5 *461S.W.3d 155, 159 (Mo. banc 1999). For example, when the Supreme Court considered the purpose of § 589.400, RSMo, requiring sex offenders to register, it declared the “obvious legislative intent” to be protection of “children from violence at the hands of sex offenders.” J.S. v. Beaird, 28 S.W.3d 875, 876 (Mo. banc 2000) (emphasis added).
In light of the legislature’s use of common terms in a malum in se statute, we err in resorting to the rule of lenity, a tool that is applicable only when all other rales of statutory construction fail. The rule of lenity applies to interpretation of statute only if, after seizing everything from which aid can be derived, we can make no more than a guess as to what the legislature intended. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 499, 117 S.Ct. 921, 137 L.Ed.2d 107 (1997). The rale does not require that a statute be given the narrowest meaning, but “it is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with the manifest intent of the lawmakers.” United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 26, 68 S.Ct. 376, 92 L.Ed. 442 (1948).
Given the clear teaching of Bratina, we are not left to guess what the legislature intended in § 194.425.1. We merely need to give its words their fair meaning in accord with § 194.425.1’s commonly understood purpose. Doing so should result in our affirming the circuit court’s judgment convicting Jones of abandonment of a corpse.

. The Supreme Court’s extensive discussion of Huckleberry Finn is a bit confusing. The only point that I gleaned from its discussion of Mark Twain’s character was that "leaves” is ambiguous because it can describe both what Huckleberry Finn did and a mortician’s leaving a corpse on a nonpaying customer’s porch. Bratina, 73 S.W.3d at 627. Significantly, the Supreme Court never said that Huckleberry Finn did not leave the corpse or that § 194.425.1 would not apply to what he did. It merely raised, without answering it, the issue of whether or not he would face charges of abandoning a corpse were Huck Finn a real character living in Missouri today. To the extent that it somehow matters, it seems to me that Huck Finn could be prosecuted for abandoning a corpse under the plain and ordinary meaning of § 194.425.l's words.