Court Opinion

ID: 9623586
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:37:01.853364+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:31.446449
License: Public Domain

Chief Judge VAUGHN
dissenting.
The amount to be awarded as attorney fees is within the sound discretion of the trial judge and is unappealable except for abuse of discretion. I cannot say that the amount awarded is so unreasonable as to constitute an abuse of discretion by Judge Hamrick. The judge made numerous findings of fact to which there is not a single exception. The majority refers to “facts” before the court. I must point out, however, that the matters recited by the court are not facts but only evidence tending to show facts. The court did not find them to be facts. The court made no findings as to the time and expense reasonably necessary in the defense of the action. Although defendant was entitled to meet plaintiff on equal terms, there is nothing in the record before us to distinguish this case from any other District Court domestic case except that plaintiff is a wealthy man. There is not a single exception to the Court’s failure to find any fact except its failure to find that the reasonable value of the legal services performed was $55,152.64. Where there are no exceptions to the findings of fact, the only question presented is whether the fact found supports the conclusions recorded by the court. Most *441likely, the judge not only considered the time spent on the case but also considered what he thought was reasonably necessary to have been spent. The jury found against defendant on every issue including findings that she committed adultery and offered such indignities to plaintiff as to render his condition intolerable. Certainly, the merits of a defendant’s cause is a factor the trial judge should consider, even though plaintiff is a wealthy man. The statute authorizing attorney fees was not designed to encourage litigation or generate a multitude of pleadings and discovery.
If we are to go behind the court’s findings of fact, which an appellate court should not do in the absence of an appropriate exception, I must note that some of counsel’s time is billed for a study of the equitable distribution laws. It may be that the trial judge gave some consideration to what might be coming to defendant from that source. I also note that an unusual amount of time billed appears to be for talking with the defendant. As all attorneys who are familiar with domestic relations cases know, clients in those cases will talk to you all day and most of the night if the attorney lets them and it isn’t costing them anything.
It may well be that, as a trial judge, I would have taxed plaintiff with a higher fee. It may be that the next trial judge will award more. I do not believe, however, that an appellate court should continue to remand the case until some trial judge sets a fee that suits our fancy.
On the record before me I can’t say that the judge abused his discretion. I, therefore, vote to affirm.