Court Opinion

ID: 9956238
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-01 16:00:59.003031+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:15:03.150157
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 22-6214     Document: 010111024857        Date Filed: 04/01/2024    Page: 1
                                                                                   FILED
                                                                       United States Court of Appeals
                       UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit

                              FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                             April 1, 2024
                          _________________________________
                                                                           Christopher M. Wolpert
                                                                               Clerk of Court
  UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

        Plaintiff - Appellee,

  v.                                                          No. 22-6214
                                                     (D.C. Nos. 5:20-CV-00527-C &
  CURTIS ALLEN ANTHONY,                                   5:15-CR-00126-C-5)
                                                              (W.D. Okla.)
        Defendant - Appellant.
                       _________________________________

                              ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
                          _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, PHILLIPS, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
                   _________________________________

       Curtis Allen Anthony appeals from the district court’s denial of his amended

 motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

 § 1291, we affirm.

                                     I. Background

       The background of this case has been set out in several prior appeals and is not

 repeated here. See United States v. Anthony (Anthony I), 942 F.3d 955 (10th Cir.

       *
         After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
 unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
 argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
 submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
 except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
 may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellate Case: 22-6214    Document: 010111024857         Date Filed: 04/01/2024    Page: 2

 2019) (vacating restitution order and remanding for recalculation); United States v.

 Anthony (Anthony II), 22 F.4th 943 (10th Cir. 2022) (affirming recalculation of

 restitution); United States v. Anthony (Anthony III), 25 F.4th 792 (10th Cir. 2022)

 (reversing dismissal of § 2255 motion as untimely).

       Mr. Anthony was convicted by a jury of child-sex trafficking and conspiracy

 to commit child-sex trafficking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591(a)(1), (b)(2), (c)

 and 1594(c). The district court sentenced him to the statutory mandatory minimum of

 10 years’ imprisonment, plus five years’ supervised release, and ordered him to pay

 restitution. Mr. Anthony appealed, challenging only the requirement to pay

 restitution. See Anthony I, 942 F.3d at 959–60, 963. Following the disposition of the

 earlier appeals, Mr. Anthony, through counsel, filed the amended § 2255 motion that

 is now before us. He claims that although he directed his appointed trial counsel,

 Mr. Richard Stout, to appeal his conviction and prison sentence, Mr. Stout appealed

 only on the issue of restitution, depriving him of effective assistance of counsel. 1

       The district court held an evidentiary hearing on the amended § 2255 motion.

 At the hearing Mr. Anthony testified that he had wanted to appeal his conviction and

 his sentence, that he had met with Mr. Stout only once to discuss an appeal, after his

 conviction but before sentencing, and that he first learned his appeal was limited to

       1
          Mr. Anthony raised the same argument in a pro se § 2255 motion filed
 February 25, 2019, which the district court struck because his restitution appeal was
 still pending, and raised it again in another pro se § 2255 motion filed June 8, 2020,
 which is the motion held timely in Anthony III, 25 F.4th at 794. After Anthony III the
 district court granted him leave to file the amended motion at issue in this appeal.
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 restitution from his later-appointed appellate counsel, after Mr. Stout had withdrawn.

 Mr. Stout testified that he had more than one conversation with Mr. Anthony about

 his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, that Mr. Anthony had been more

 interested in appealing the restitution (which would deprive him of his retirement

 savings) than his conviction or prison term, that Mr. Anthony “appeared to be scared

 to come back in court because he’d received the [statutory] minimum [prison

 sentence] and didn’t want to chance anything else,” R. vol. III at 55–56, and that “he

 was adamant that he didn’t want to appeal the sentence,” id. at 56. Mr. Stout testified

 that Mr. Anthony instructed him to perfect an appeal only as to the issue of

 restitution, and that he was certain Mr. Anthony did not ask him to appeal his

 conviction or prison sentence.

       After the hearing the district court denied the motion in a written order, which

 found that Mr. Anthony “only sought to appeal the restitution issue.” R. vol. II at

 357. The court provided several explanations for this finding. It observed that

 Mr. Anthony’s allegations about his communications with Mr. Stout had changed

 over time, reciting that in an earlier pro se § 2255 motion he had “asserted that he

 was ‘not offered to appeal by counsel,’” while now he was claiming he did have a

 conversation with Mr. Stout about his right to appeal although Mr. Stout then filed

 the appeal only as to restitution. Id. at 356–57 (citation omitted). The court also said

 it had considered Mr. Stout’s billing records and found they “reflect [he and Mr.

 Anthony] met approximately twice a month in six months following the jury’s

 verdict.” Id. at 357 & n.*. As relevant here, the district court said that although the

                                             3
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 “time records were not submitted as evidence at the evidentiary hearing,” it “may

 consider the ‘files and records’ of the case in determining if relief is warranted.” Id.

 at 357, n.* (quoting § 2255(b)). 2 Further, the court thought that the alleged failure to

 grant Mr. Anthony’s request to appeal certain issues would be implausible, especially

 given that Mr. Stout had already represented Mr. Anthony in a pretrial appeal. It

 reasoned that “[i]t strains belief to find that trial counsel would appeal one aspect of

 the trial at [Mr. Anthony]’s request but not add in the additional aspects of which

 [Mr. Anthony] now complains,” id. at 357–58, and it concluded that the facts “strongly

 suggest that trial counsel would have appealed any issue requested by [Mr. Anthony],” id.

 at 358.

           The district court therefore found Mr. Anthony “lack[ed] credibility,” and it

 disregarded his testimony. Id. It found “the only logical conclusion . . . is that the

 restitution issue was the only issue [Mr. Anthony] requested be appealed.” Id. at 358.

 Accordingly, the district court rejected his claim that Mr. Stout had provided

 ineffective assistance and denied his § 2255 motion.

           On limited remand the district court denied a certificate of appealability

 (COA). This court then granted a COA as to (1) whether Mr. Anthony received

 ineffective assistance of counsel when Mr. Stout did not appeal his conviction and

         Before the hearing Mr. Anthony filed a motion for a subpoena to obtain
           2

 copies of Mr. Stout’s time records and billing vouchers. The district court denied this
 request because Mr. Anthony had not provided notice as required by Federal Rule of
 Civil Procedure 45(a)(4). Mr. Stout does not challenge that procedural ruling on
 appeal.
                                               4
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 sentence; and (2) whether the district court erred in its consideration of Mr. Stout’s

 time records. 3

                                      II. Discussion

        When reviewing the denial of a § 2255 motion, “we review the district court’s

 findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de novo.” United States v.

 Viera, 674 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 “To be clearly erroneous, a finding must be more than possibly or even probably

 wrong; the error must be pellucid to any objective observer.” United States v.

 Madrid, 713 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).

 “We will reverse the district court’s finding only if it is without factual support in the

 record or if, after reviewing all the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm

 conviction that a mistake has been made.” Id. at 1256–57 (brackets and internal

 quotation marks omitted).

        A. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

        A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must prove both that

 counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that

 the deficiency was prejudicial. See Garza v. Idaho, 139 S.Ct. 738, 744 (2019). But

        3
         Mr. Anthony’s amended § 2255 motion also argued he was denied effective
 assistance because Mr. Stout had a conflict of interest arising from his having “made
 sexual innuendos” to Mr. Anthony’s wife, and “‘hitting’ on her.” R. vol. II at 326.
 After hearing testimony from Mr. Anthony’s (now ex-) wife, the district court
 rejected the argument because she could remember only one ambiguous specific
 incident and there was no evidence of any effect on the performance of counsel. We
 did not grant a COA on this issue.
                                             5
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 “prejudice is presumed when counsel’s constitutionally deficient performance

 deprives a defendant of an appeal that he otherwise would have taken.” Id. at 744

 (internal quotation marks omitted).

       Here the district court denied Mr. Anthony relief based on its factual

 determination that he requested that his attorney appeal only as to restitution, making

 Mr. Stout’s performance objectively reasonable. Reviewing for clear error, we

 neither find the district court’s finding lacks factual support nor are we left with a

 conviction it made a mistake. See Madrid, 713 F.3d at 1256–57. Further, the district

 court’s ruling was based on its finding that Mr. Anthony lacked credibility and this

 court has “emphasize[d] that the district court is in the best position to make

 credibility determinations, and we are loath to usurp the role of factfinder.” United

 States v. Phillips, 71 F.4th 817, 824 (10th Cir. 2023) (citation and internal quotation

 marks omitted). Mr. Anthony argues different inferences that might have been drawn

 from the factual record, and he asks us to credit his testimony over Mr. Stout’s, but

 he does not show the district court’s finding was clearly erroneous.

       B. District Court’s Consideration of Time Records

       Turning to whether the district court erred in considering Mr. Stout’s time

 records, and how any error affects the ineffective-assistance ruling, we conclude that

 even if the district court erred, it was not reversible error that requires a remand.

                                             6
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        As the district court noted, the time records were not submitted as evidence at

 the hearing. Mr. Anthony states that he had not seen them before the district court

 ruled, thereby violating his right to due process. In granting a COA on this issue we

 directed the government to address whether the district court’s review of the time

 records was contrary to either § 2255(b) or Rule 7(c) of the Rules Governing Section

 2255 Proceedings.

        To begin with, although one sentence in Mr. Anthony’s briefs to this court

 asserts that he was “denied due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment,”

 Aplt. Br. at 34, that is the only hint in the briefs that he is raising a constitutional

 claim. Other than that reference to the Bill of Rights, he cites to no authority to

 support his assertion of a constitutional violation. This is wholly inadequate to

 preserve an issue in this court. In any event, Mr. Anthony clarifies in his Reply Brief

 that his due-process claim is not a constitutional one. After stating that Rule 7(c)

 “affords . . . due process” by giving the parties the right to challenge the correctness

 of additional materials outside the district-court record, he concludes by stating that

 he “was not afforded that opportunity in violation of his right to due process.” Reply

 Br. at 3. Therefore, we consider only a “due process” claim based on Rule 7.

                                               7
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           We need not, however, resolve the merits of his Rule 7 argument, because we

 conclude that even if the district court erred in considering the time records, any error

 was harmless. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111 (instructing appellate courts to give judgment

 “without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the

 parties”). The district court described the time records as being consistent with

 Mr. Stout’s testimony that he had more than one conversation with Mr. Anthony

 related to an appeal. Mr. Anthony’s testimony was to the contrary, but the district

 court did not believe him. Although the time records supported the finding that

 Mr. Anthony’s testimony was not credible, the other reasons for that finding were

 sufficiently compelling that we think it highly unlikely that the time records affected

 his substantial rights; the credibility finding would have been the same regardless.

           Moreover, Mr. Anthony’s sole objection to the district court’s consideration of

 the time records is that he did not get to see them before the court ruled. He does not

 claim that they were substantively inadmissible. His complaint is that he did not get

 to challenge them in some way or use them for his benefit. But he has not suggested

 how his cause could have been advanced by the records or why he could not have

 obtained access to them after the district court’s ruling (to enable him to show any

 error).

                                       III. Conclusion

           We affirm the district court’s denial of Mr. Anthony’s amended § 2255

 motion. His unopposed motion for leave to file his reply brief out of time is granted.

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                                        Entered for the Court

                                        Harris L Hartz
                                        Circuit Judge

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