Court Opinion

ID: 9601898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:50:39.716523+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:59.829111
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
On motion for rehearing, appellee Chatham argues stridently that we (1) misconstrued the cases cited in the opinion; (2) failed to recognize the trend and the logical result of these cases which would permit compensation for psychic injury arising out of psychic cause; (3) misinterpreted Code Ann. § 114-102 in holding that an injury must arise “naturally and unavoidably” from some discernible physical occurrence, in contradiction to Maryland Cas. Co. v. Dixon, 83 Ga. App. 172 (63 SE2d 272) and to the broad definition of “accident” in Home Ins. Co. v. McEachin, 151 Ga. App. 567, 568 (260 SE2d 560), where we said “if the employment contributes to the aggravation of the pre-existing injury, it is an accident under our compensation law”; (4) created illogic in denying such claims while permitting compensation for heart attack victims; (5) erred in failing *131to follow the clear majority rule in other jurisdictions; (6) based our decision on unfounded fears of spurious claims and other potential mischief inherent in permitting such compensation; (7) erred in failing to distinguish this case from Brady, supra, “which was decided at a time when psychiatry had far less powers of diagnosis.”
To these contentions we say: (1) the cases were correctly construed on their facts and in not one of them did we evince any inclination to compensate emotional or mental disability caused by emotional or mental impetus. Wherever language was used from which appellee infers such inclination (except Sawyer v. Pacific Indemnity Co., 141 Ga. App. 298 (233 SE2d 227) where we approved compensation only for an “occupational disease”), there was in fact some physical occurrence or manifestation. See, e. g., Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Loftis, 103 Ga. App. 749 (120 SE2d 655) at pp. 749, 751. (2) Inasmuch as we have never approved compensation for mental or emotional injury arising from mental or emotional cause, but have repeatedly required some physical impetus or cause (see Sawyer, supra at p. 301; Indemnity Ins. Co. v. Loftis, supra, p. 752), the trend and logic of these cases and the effect of Brady, supra, and the actual holding of Sawyer, supra, is to deny such compensation in this state. (3) Our holding that to be compensable a psychic trauma must arise naturally and unavoidably from some discernible physical occurrence is in keeping with Code Ann. § 114-102 and with all Georgia cases we have seen. It will be noticed that we deliberately refrained from defining “accident” as a physical blow or impact, because of cases like McEachin, supra, where the aggravation of a pre-existing injury is not truly accidental nor impactive, but is nevertheless physical; and because of unfortunate cases like Brady, where we loosely and unnecessarily denied compensation for emotional injury because the emotional argument which precipitated it was “in no way accidental,” when we should have merely said the cause was not a physical occurrence or injury. If we are compelled to say so, we do not believe the legislature intended the word “accident” in Code Ann. § 114-102 to mean anything except a physical occurrence, and we have found no case which, no matter what its language, has indicated otherwise. (4) There is no inconsistency or illogic in denying claims for emotional or mental injury precipitated by emotional or mental cause, while permitting compensation for heart attack victims, because a heart attack is a physical injury or occurrence for which, moreover, Code Ann. § 114-102 specifically gives compensation. Indeed, the legislature’s care in prescribing what shall be compensable, from diseases “in any form” arising “naturally and unavoidably” from the accident to heart attacks when attributable to the work, alcoholism not at all and drug addiction only *132in precise circumstances, convinces us that if mental or emotional illnesses arising out of mental and emotional causes were intended to be compensable, the legislature would have been very careful to say so. (5) We are not impressed by the alleged majority rule in other jurisdictions and are not bound to follow it. (6) Whether actual “mischief’ would result from compensating those claims is irrelevant since they are not authorized by our law. (7) And finally, we do not find that our decision in Brady is outmoded because, as appellee says, “it was decided at a time when psychiatry had far less powers of diagnosis.” This is a conclusion of counsel for appellee only.

Motion for rehearing denied.