Court Opinion

ID: 9586153
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:07:49.343977+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:24:21.554783
License: Public Domain

BENCH, Judge
(dissenting):
¶ 16 I see this case somewhat differently than do my colleagues. First, I disagree with the main opinion’s assertion that “[i]t is undisputed that the Division failed to present evidence that the officer here served Mabus with the statutorily required immediate notice of the Division’s intent to revoke, along with basic information on how to obtain a hearing.” Second, the main opinion ignores the impact of a de novo review of an informal agency proceeding under the Utah Administrative Procedures Act (UAPA).
I. Evidence of Notice
¶ 17 In the mid-1980s, the event that invoked the jurisdiction of the Division in implied-consent cases was the submission, within five days of arrest, of a report signed by the arresting officer. See Moore v. Schwendiman, 750 P.2d 204, 206-07 (Utah Ct.App. 1988). The main opinion asserts that, under the current statutory scheme, the event that initiates the revocation process is the “service of immediate notice and basic information.” Moore, however, indicates that the driver’s “written application for an administrative hearing within ten days after the date of arrest” is now the event that “begins the administrative hearing process.” Id. at 207 n. 1. Even assuming that providing notice and basic information to the driver is the triggering event, that requirement was met in this case.
¶ 18 In the district court proceedings, the Division called Officer Cardall to testify. Officer Cardall testified that he and Officer Mia gave the required admonition to Mabus. Officer Cardall also testified that Mabus refused to take the requested breath test. Ma-bus then took the stand and contended that he agreed to take a breath test, but refused a blood test because he “didn’t feel comfortable with them drawin’ blood.” On cross examination, Mabus was asked whether he recalled being read an admonition that if he did not submit to the requested test his driving privileges would be suspended. Mabus answered in the affirmative.
¶ 19 Furthermore, attached to Mabus’s petition for review in district court is a letter from the Division, dated February 11, 1998, which states as follows:
Recently, you were arrested for Driving Under the Influence and were served with a notice of this Department’s intention to suspend or revoke your Utah driving privileges as a result. In that notice you were informed that you have the right to request in uniting a hearing on this intended suspension. The notice specified your WRITTEN REQUEST must be sent to the Department WITHIN TEN (10) DAYS of the date of your arrest.
The Department has received your written request for a hearing in this matter. However, the postmark on your letter indicates that the request was not sent within the statutorily mandated 10-day period. Therefore, the Department must deny *1277your request for an administrative hearing on this matter. The suspension of your Utah driving privilege will automatically take place on the 30th day after the date of your arrest.
You have the right to file a petition for a hearing regarding this matter in a court of record in your county of residence. This petition must be filed within thirty days after the date of your suspension.
(Emphasis added.) Thus, contrary to the assertion in the main opinion, the only evidence in the record is that Mabus received the statutory notice.
¶20 The trial court reinstated Mabus’s license on the ground that the Division presented no evidence that the proceeding was properly initiated by filing a sworn report of the arresting officer within five days. In view of the current statutory scheme — regardless of whether the triggering event is the driver’s submitting a written request for an administrative hearing or the Division’s providing the'driver with basic information— the trial court’s ruling is erroneous. As to the alternate basis for affirmance relied upon by my colleagues, the record clearly reflects that Mabus received the notice to which he was entitled.
II. The Trial De Novo
¶ 21 My second concern is of an even more fundamental nature. When a trial de novo is held in district court, as in this case, errors committed by either Mabus or the Division at the administrative level are rendered immaterial and harmless. The majority’s reliance on Moore v. Schwendiman, 750 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct.App.1988), for definitive guidance in this case is misplaced because Moore predates UAPA.1 UAPA clearly controls in the instant case, making Moore irrelevant to our consideration of the effect of a trial court’s de novo review of an informal agency proceeding.
¶ 22 In this ease, the Division issued its final decision revoking Mabus’s license on February 10, 1998. In that order, he was informed — just as he was informed in the letter of February 11, 1998 — that he could “APPEAL THIS ACTION IN THE DISTRICT COURT IN THE COUNTY OF YOUR RESIDENCE WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS.” -Mabus petitioned for judicial review in district court, and received the trial de novo to which he was statutorily entitled. See Utah Code ' Ann. § 63-46b-15(l)(a) (Supp.1999) (stating “district courts have jurisdiction to review by trial de novo all final agency actions resulting from informal adjudicative proceedings”) (emphasis added).
¶ 23 Under UAPA, no prejudice occurs in an informal proceeding “because the litigant has an absolute right to a trial de novo before the district court.” Brinkerhoff v. Schwendiman, 790 P.2d 587, 590 (Utah Ct. App.1990) (emphasis added). Moreover, “pursuant to section 63-46b-15(1)(a), review by trial de novo means a new trial with no deference to the administrative proceedings below.” Archer v. Board of Lands and Forestry, 907 P.2d 1142, 1145 (Utah 1995) (emphasis added). Hence, in view of Mabus’s absolute right to a trial de novo, and its concomitant non-deferential nature, “the trial de novo cured any technical procedural errors occurring at the informal [agency proceeding].” Brinkerhoff, 790 P.2d at 590. Accordingly, whether Mabus received the statutory notice and whether he timely invoked his right to an administrative hearing are not material to the proceedings in district court.
CONCLUSION
¶24 In light of the foregoing, I would reverse the ruling of the district court and remand the case so the court can enter an order based on the evidence adduced at trial *1278as to whether Mabus refused to take the requested chemical test.

. The administrative decision in Moore was issued on October 4, 1984. UAPA was enacted in 1987. The transition procedures for UAPA, Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-22 (1997), provide that "all agency adjudicative proceedings commenced by or before an agency on or after January 1, 1988” are governed by UAPA procedures, and that all such actions filed before December 31, 1987 are not governed by UAPA, “even if those proceedings are still pending before an agency or a court on January 1, 1988.” Id.