Court Opinion

ID: 3608834
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2016-07-05 23:53:32.685264+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:07:30.623107
License: Public Domain

It seems to me that the admission of the evidence given by the witness Pottle was error. There is not *Page 467 
room for much discussion in regard to the general principle upon which evidence that proves or tends to prove the prisoner guilty of other felonies or misdemeanors is admitted. It is conceded on all sides that the admission of such testimony forms an exception, and a very material and important exception, to the general rule of evidence. The general rule is that when a man is put upon trial for one offense, he is to be convicted, if at all, by evidence which shows that he is guilty of that offense alone, and that, under ordinary circumstances, proof of his guilt of one or a score of other offenses in his lifetime is wholly excluded. But for the purpose of showing guilt of the offense for which the prisoner is on trial, as also for the purpose where that is important of showing the motive or intent with which an act claimed to be a crime was committed, evidence which is material upon such issues is admitted, although it may also tend to show, or even directly prove, the guilt of the accused of some other felony or misdemeanor. Whether the evidence in any particular case comes within the well-known exceptions to the general rule, is often the difficult question to solve, and not as to what the rule itself really is. Thus, there is a class of cases in which evidence is admitted where it is material to show guilty knowledge of the character of the act committed by the prisoner. A good illustration of this class of cases is in the trial of an indictment for passing counterfeit money. Evidence of the passage of like money within a reasonable time before or after the commission of the offense for which the prisoner is on trial, is admitted for the purpose of showing that when he passed the money in question it was not through ignorance of its character. A man might think the money he passed was good, and he might be mistaken once, or even twice; but the presumption of mistake lessens with every repetition of the act of passing money really counterfeit. Hence, evidence of such repetition bears directly and materially upon the issue before the jury. To this same class would belong the case of an indictment for shooting an individual. For the purpose of proving that the shooting was not accidental, where such a fact is claimed, *Page 468 
evidence may given of efforts, or even threats, made by the defendant to shoot the same individual on prior occasions. Thus the probability of the shooting being accidental is lessened by showing prior efforts or threats to accomplish the same act for which the prisoner is on trial. Cases of embezzlement and of obtaining money or other property by false pretenses come under the same general rule. A man indicted for the embezzlement of funds by false entries might claim, with some degree of plausibility perhaps, that the entry was a mistake, but the probability of such mistake would be greatly lessened by proof that other false entries of the same kind had been made at or about the same time by the same person.
Then there is another class of cases in which the facts show the commission of two crimes, and that the individual who committed the other crime also committed the one for which the defendant is on trial. Evidence is then permitted to show that the defendant was the person who committed the other crime, because in so doing under the circumstances and from the connection of the defendant with the other crime, the evidence of his guilt of such other crime is direct evidence of his guilt of the crime for which he is on trial. Another class in which evidence of this nature is admissible is where it is proper for the purpose of showing a motive for the commission of the main crime.
It is claimed in this case that the evidence was admissible on the ground that it showed or tended to show the intent on the part of the prisoner in paying the money to Fullgraff after proof had been received that money was given him, and also upon the ground that it tended to show the motive of the defendant for the commission of the crime. If this evidence did materially and directly tend to show either such intent or motive, and if it were not too remote in point of time, and if it logically connected the fact to be proved with the main transaction, then it may well be that it was admissible, even though it tended to prove the defendant guilty of another and separate offense. The admission of the evidence of Pottle seems to me, however, to carry the principle further and to a *Page 469 
much more dangerous extent than any other case that has come under my observation.
Upon the question of the intent with which the money was paid to Fullgraff, the evidence I think falls far short of such logical and close connection therewith, as is necessary to render it admissible. The fact being established that such payment was made, and that the defendant was connected with its payment, the intent could not be a matter of any real doubt. That it was paid to obtain the vote of Fullgraff as an alderman for granting the franchise to the Broadway surface railroad could not be made a subject of honest discussion. All the evidence was to that effect, and there was absolutely no evidence to the contrary, and to offer evidence of the commission of another crime for the avowed purpose of thereby showing the intent with which this money was paid to Fullgraff would have made to my mind a clear case of offeringit on a colorable issue, and using it for another and wholly inadmissible purpose. However that may be the evidence was not admissible even on the question of intent.
As is very well said by Mr. Justice AGNEW in The State v.Lapage (57 N.H. 245-295), "it should also be remarked that this being a matter of judgment it is quite likely that courts would not all agree, and that some courts might see a logical connection where others could not. But however extreme the case may be, I think it will be found that the courts have always professed to put the admissibility of the testimony on the ground that there was some logical connection between the crime proposed to be proved other than the tendency to commit one crime as manifested by the tendency to commit the other."
Judge EARL, in the case of the People v. Shulman, reported in a note to Mayer v. People (80 N.Y. 364, at 376), states as follows: "But there is one general rule which must apply to all such cases. There must be in the transaction thus sought to be proved some relation to or connection with the main transaction. That is they must show a commou motive or intent running through all the transactions or they must be such as in their nature to show guilty knowledge at the time *Page 470 
of the main transaction." And in the case of Mayer v. People
(supra), which was the case of an indictment for obtaining goods by false pretenses, RAPALLO, J., in speaking of the admissibility of testimony of this nature upon the question of intent, said: "That when the representations, their falsity and the knowledge of the accused that they were false is established by competent testimony, the allegation that they were made with intent to defraud may be supported by proof of dealings by the accused with parties other than the complainant, which tend to show a fraudulent scheme to obtain property by devices similar to those practiced upon him, provided the dealings are sufficiently connected in point of time and character to authorize an inference that the purchase from the complainant was made in pursuance of the same general transaction."
Under such conditions and guided by such rules, it does not seem to me that this evidence by Pottle was so connected legitimately with the main transaction, that of the alleged bribery of Fullgraff, as in any way to characterize the intent with which the money was alleged to have been paid Fullgraff, in any other sense than the evidence tends to show capacity upon the part of the defendant to commit the crime because he had months before attempted to commit one of a similar nature with another person for the purpose of accomplishing another act.
It is a very general and extremely broad, and I think a dangerous ground, upon which to claim the admissibility of evidence of this character, to say that it tends to show that the prisoner was so desirous of obtaining a railroad on Broadway that he was willing to commit a crime for the purpose of securing his object. It seems to me this is nothing more than an attempt to show that the defendant was capable of committing the crime alleged in the indictment, because he had been willing to commit a similar crime long before, at another place and for the purpose of accomplishing the commission of another act by a different person. To adopt so broad a ground for the purpose of letting in evidence of the commission of *Page 471 
another crime is, I think, of a very dangerous tendency. It tends necessarily and directly to load the prisoner down with separate and distinct charges of past crime, which it cannot be supposed he is or will be in proper condition to meet or explain, and which necessarily tend to very gravely prejudice him in the minds of the jury upon the question of his guilt or innocence. I do not think that evidence of the kind in question, and in such a case as is here presented, legitimately tends to enlighten a jury upon the subject of the intent with which money was paid many months thereafter to another person, at a different place and to accomplish the commission of another act. It throws light upon that intent only, as it tends to show a moral capacity to commit a crime. It gives, under the circumstances, entirely too wide an opportunity for the conviction of an accused person by prejudice instead of by evidence showing the actual commission of the crime for which the defendant is on trial.
Upon the question of motive, using that word in the sense of a reason why the prisoner should commit the crime, I do not see that it has the least materiality or bearing. It shows and tends to show no such reason. It only tends to show that the prisoner took an interest in the inclusion of Broadway in the bill permitting railroad tracks to be laid in the streets of cities. It might be argued, therefore, that he took an interest in or had a desire for a railroad in that street. As a reason or motive for such desire the evidence in no aspect tends to enlighten us. By the passage of the act of 1883, the prisoner would have had no greater right than any one else to obtain the road. Others could compete for it as well as a corporation in which he was interested. No reason for any interest in this question is shown by this evidence. It is the simple, bald and naked proposition which the evidence is claimed to prove, viz., the interest of the prisoner, and this interest is to be established by proof of the commission of a crime under the circumstances detailed, and months before the commission of the one charged in the indictment. This cannot be said to prove or tend to prove a motive for the *Page 472 
commission of the crime in question within the meaning of the law, while upon the question of mere interest or desire the evidence is too remote and too dangerous to be permitted.
One of the cases cited upon this branch of the argument was that of Pierson v. People (79 N.Y. 424). There the prisoner was charged with murdering one Withey who was a married man. The prisoner was also a married man. Evidence had been given of intimate relations, though not necessarily criminal, between the prisoner and Withy's wife, before the death of the deceased. After the murder the prisoner took the widow and her sister to the house of a friend in the evening and came away with the widow late that night alone. A few days after the murder the prisoner disappeared from the neighborhood. It was then proved by a witness from Michigan, who was a clergyman, that the prisoner and the widow of Withey appeared before him and were married, and that the prisoner declared on oath before him that he kuew of no legal obstacle to his marriage with the woman and thereupon he married them. This evidence was objected to on the ground that it had no direct or material bearing upon the main question in the case, and that it simply tended to prejudice the prisoner by proving him guilty of another and separate felony. The evidence as to the murder was circumstantial, and this court held that the evidence in controversy was proper for the purpose of proving a motive for the murder. In that case the evidence showed a direct and logical connection between the murder of the deceased and its perpetration by the prisoner. It showed that the prisoner had a passion for the possession of the wife of the deceased, and that for the purpose of obtaining possession of her person he did commit the crimes of perjury and bigamy, and to accomplish this posession of the woman, the taking off of the woman's husband was an obvious necessity. The motive of the prisoner was the desire for the woman, and the strength of that desire, in other words the strength of the motive which impelled the murder was shown in this way.
The case of the People v. Wood (3 Parker's Cr. Rep. 681) *Page 473 
was also cited. That was a Special Term case, which arose upon an application to the learned justice who delivered the opinion, for a stay of proceedings upon the conviction of the defendant for murder. Evidence had been given of separate and distinct felonies committed by the prisoner for the purpose of showing motive on his part in the killing of the deceased. The learned court held that the evidence was admissible because it tended to show with other evidence that the felonies were parts of a single transaction, influenced by a single motive and design to accomplish a single object; that they were all connected by unity of plot and design, and if proved would tend to show the motive which actuated the prisoner in taking the life of the person stated in the indictment. In that case the evidence tended to show that each felonious act was a necessary one for the purpose of carrying out the main object which then existed in the mind of the prisoner, and that all of them formed but one transaction and were connected together as parts of one whole.
Now the evidence in the case at bar was of no such character. At the time of its alleged occurrence no law had been passed. It did not appear and could not appear that at that time any law ever would be passed. It was an act remote in point of time, different in purpose and of an entirely separate and distinct matter, forming no part of one main transaction and to my mind coming nowhere near the standard for the admissibility of such evidence, pronounced by all the cases which I have been able to find.
The case of the Stout v. People (4 Parker's Cr. Rep. 132) contains the same general principles. There, evidence was admitted to the effect that the prisoner was seen in bed with the wife of the man he was charged with murdering, although such wife was also the prisoner's sister, and it was admitted as furnishing a motive for the prisoner to get the husband out of the way. I have looked at the other cases referred to by the learned counsel for the prosecution, and find that they come under the designation of one or the other of the classes already referred to. Commonwealth v. Tuckerman (10 Gray, 173, *Page 474 
199) was a case of embezzlement and evidence of other embezzlements from the same party during a series of years and contained in a statement made by the prisoner was admitted.
Commonwealth v. McCarthy (119 Mass. 354), was an indictment for arson. To prove the intent of the prisoner evidence was received that on two prior occasions the prisoner had set fire to a shed ten feet distant from the building destroyed and connected therewith by a flight of stairs. This had a direct tendency to prove that the firing was not accidental but intentional and felonious.
Commonwealth v. Bradford (126 Mass. 42), was an indictment for arson, and the same class of evidence was received and for the same purpose.
Commonwealth v. Merriam (14 Pick, 518), was an indictment for adultery. Evidence of improper familiarity between the defendant and the same woman, shortly before the act in question was admitted. The evidence was admitted on the ground that intimacy aud these acts of familiarity with the same woman had a tendency to establish the fact of the adultery charged in the indictment. Evidence tending to show previous acts of indecent familiarity would have a tendency to prove, in the case of the same woman, of course, a breaking down of all the safeguards of self respect and modesty and hence a gradual preparation of the woman to lend herself to the commission of the crime.
The case of People v. O'Sullivan (104 N.Y. 481), forms no precedent for the admission of the evidence in this case. We simply held that upon the trial of the defendant for the crime of rape it was competent to prove that he had attempted to commit the same crime upon the same woman a short time prior thereto. It was put upon the ground that upon the trial of a person for a particular crime it is always comptent to show upon the question of his guilt that he had made an attempt at some prior time, not too remote, to commit the same offense. It was said further that it would be incompetent to prove that the defendant had committed or attempted to commit a rape upon any other woman. And it *Page 475 
was stated that upon the trial of a prisoner for murder it is competent to show that he had made previous attempts or threats to kill his victim, and hence upon the same principle it was held that when charged with rape it was competent to show that the defendant had previously declared his intention to commit the offense or made an unsuccessful attempt to do so.
In the case of Commonwealth v. Abbott (130 Mass. 472) upon an indictment for murder, proof was offered on the part of the prisoner of former ill feeling of the husband of the deceased toward the deceased. It was rejected as too remote and disconnected with the crime charged. Particularly as there was evidence of the parties living together on good terms long subsequent to the time of this alleged ill feeling. This is certainly no precedent for the admission of the evidence in question in the case at bar.
In Commonwealth v. Jackson (132 Mass. 16) the prisoner was indicted for selling property by false representations under the Massachusetts statute. Evidence of sales of other property of a like nature to other persons under representations proved false was admitted for the purpose of showing the intent with which the representations in question were made. The Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the evidence was inadmissible, and that for the error of its admission a new trial should be granted. The case is cited only for the purpose of quoting the opinion of the court upon the danger of this kind of evidence.
DEVENS, J., writing the opinion, said that, "the other statements made by the defendant at other times as to the other animals which he sold, might have been false, while those made in the case for which he was tried were not. The transactions formed no part of a single scheme or plan any more than the various robberies of a thief. They were entered upon as from time to time he might succeed in entrapping credulous or unwary persons. Even if they were transactions of the same general character, they differed in all their details, and the defendant was compelled to defend himself against three distinct charges in addition to the one for which alone *Page 476 
he was indicted. Evidence of the commission of other crimes by a defendant may deeply prejudice him with the jury, while it does not legally bear upon his case. It certainly would not be competent in order to show the intent with which one entered a house or took an article of personal property to prove that he had committed a burglary or larceny at another time." He further said in the same case, "the objections to the admission of evidence as to other transactions, whether amounting to indictable crimes or not, are very apparent. Such evidence compels the defendant to meet charges of which the indictment gives him no information, confuses him in his defense, raises a variety of issues and thus diverts the attention of the jury from the one immediately before it, and by showing the defendant to have been a knave on other occasions creates a prejudice which may cause injustice to be done him." I think the remarks are very pertinent in this case. The reasoning herein leads to the exclusion of evidence as to past offenses such as Pottle's evidence tends to prove, whether it is directed towards proving the bribery of clerks to committees or members of the legislature of 1883 or 1884.
Upon the same basis it is difficult to see the materiality or admissibility of the evidence that the prisoner, after the passage of the act of 1884, paid to Phelps the $50,000, as testified to by Phelps. The evidence, it can be seen, had a tendency to greatly prejudice the prisoner upon the issue of his guilt of bribing Fullgraff, while wholly inadmissible for any such purpose, and it would seem to be quite questionable to admit it for the purpose of proving an interest in a Broadway railroad, about which there could be and was no dispute or contradiction. We call attention to the question without absolutely deciding it.
We are quite clear that errors have been committed by the admission of evidence in this case, at war with the well-settled law on the subject. That law must protect all who come within its sphere, whether the person who invokes its protection seems to be sorely pressed by the weight of the inculpatory evidence in the case or not. It cannot alter, for the *Page 477 
purpose of securing the conviction of one who may be called or regarded as a great criminal, and yet be invoked for the purpose of sheltering an innocent man. In the eye of the law all are innocent until convicted in accordance with the forms of law and by a close adherence to its rules.
For the reasons above given, as well as upon all the grounds so well stated in the learned opinion of my brother DANFORTH, I am in favor of reversing this conviction and granting a new trial.
All concur.
Judgment reversed.