Court Opinion

ID: 9528720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 03:43:21.863259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:27:14.795749
License: Public Domain

BUTTLER, J.,
specially concurring in part; dissenting in part.
I agree with the trial judge that the officer did not have probable cause to seize the “paperfold”; he had a reasonable suspicion that it contained contraband, nothing more. Accordingly, I would affirm the suppression order and, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion to that extent.
Although I agree with much of the majority’s analysis of State v. Lowry, 295 Or 337, 667 P2d 996 (1983), I write separately, because I believe Lowry would permit the police to take possession of the paperfold on something less than probable cause and to detain it for a reasonable time in order to obtain a warrant.
I recognize that one may focus on specific language in Lowry to support different interpretations. My focus is on this language:
“In this case there is substantial dispute whether the officer himself reasonably believed the pill bottle to contain a controlled substance. When an officer in fact has reasonable cause for such a belief, he often will also face the practical need to retain the bottle or other container long enough for a magistrate to decide whether there is probable cause to seize and to test the unknown contents, unless the owner consents to an immediate test in order to recover his property. The exception from the warrant requirement extends to depriving the owner of possession as long as necessary to safeguard it and to obtain a speedy judicial decision. But unless the substance is volatile the practical need to proceed without a warrant normally extends no further.” 295 Or at 347.
Taking that language in the context of the court’s overall discussion of the problem presented, I understand the court to have suggested that an officer, with less than probable cause, may deprive the owner of possession of property for a long enough period to safeguard it and to obtain a magistrate’s determination of whether there is probable cause to seize and search it. If the magistrate determines that there is not, the property must be returned.
That analysis is analogous to Terry v. Ohio, 392 US 1, *11888 S Ct 1868, 20 L Ed 2d 889 (1968), and ORS 131.615, permitting police to stop a person on reasonable suspicion that he has committed a crime and to make reasonable inquiry concerning the immediate circumstances that aroused the suspicion. It seems to me that “seizing” a person, without probable cause, for a reasonable time is substantially more intrusive than is the temporary detention of property to assure its availability in the event a warrant is issued. See United States v. Place, 462 US 696, 103 S Ct 2637, 77 L Ed 2d 110 (1983). Both rules attempt to accommodate the interest of the police in investigating and preventing crime and that of a person’s right to be secure in his person, house, papers and effects. Or Const Art I, § 9.
Given my understanding of the thrust of Lowry on this point, two probable cause showings are not necessary, as State v. Flores, 68 Or App 617, 685 P2d 999 (1984), suggests. In this case, the police did not follow the prescribed procedure by seeking a warrant after taking possession of the paperfold. It may be that they could not have made a sufficient showing of probable cause to support the issuance of a warrant by a magistrate. That, I think, is one of the points in Lowry.