Court Opinion

ID: 9585093
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:55:58.254932+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:27:34.649661
License: Public Domain

Garfield, J.
(dissenting) — I respectfully dissent.
I disagree with tbe majority holding that the State cannot *1336charge a defendant with first-degree murder but only with murder, that allegations of an indictment the murder was in the first degree must be disregarded as surplusage, that the “permissible forms” which Code section 773.34 says “may be used” in an indictment are exclusive and must be used.
No authority the majority cites supports its position and I think authority for it is not to be found. State v. Phillips and Brooks, 118 Iowa 660, 92 N.W. 876, cited by the majority, does not sustain its view but is contrary to it. The cited case holds the indictment properly charged first-degree murder and states (pages 665, 666 of 118 Iowa):
“The objection that the indictment does not state facts constituting murder in the first degree is not well taken.
“* * * it would be difficult to charge murder in the first degree in apter language than is here employed. Murder in the first degree is the willful, deliberate and premeditated killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Bach of the elements of this definition is contained in the charge made against the defendants * * *.
“* * * There was no error, therefore, in the holding of the district court that the indictment charged the crime of murder in the first degree.”
The majority’s holding “The 'first degree’ part of the charge in the indictment” must be discarded as surplusage also logically requires discarding other proper and pertinent allegations of the indictment (quoted in the majority opinion) that the crime charged is defined in section 690.2 (which refers solely to first-degree murder), allegations as to the manner of committing the crime and that it is contrary to the provisions of section 690.2. These allegations are all made proper by section 773.3. State v. Phillips and Brooks, supra, at page 665 of 118 Iowa, says: “* * * we must look to the facts set forth in the body of the instrument to ascertain the degree of the crime for which the accused may lawfully be placed upon trial.”
A great many decisions in our reports, both before and after the short-form indictment law, show the indictment was for *1337first-degree murder. I think it will be a shock to the profession to learn this may not be done.
Under the majority’s reasoning the State may not charge a defendant with robbery with aggravation as defined in section 711.2 by alleging he did something contrary to the provisions of that section. The only crime that could be charged would be robbery and the indictment could merely state “A.B. robbed C.D.” because that js the permissible form which section 773.34 says “may be used.” Numerous other examples of the far-reaching effect of the majority opinion might be mentioned.
The majority holding, for which no authority is cited, 'that “may” in Code section 773.30 must be read as “shall” is contrary to State v. Machovec, 236 Iowa 377, 381, 382, 17 N.W.2d 843, although that ease involves what is now section 777.15, rather than 773.30.
I also disagree with the majority’s holding that a plea of guilty to a charge of first-degree murder is no more than a plea of guilty to murder or manslaughter and that the trial court is bound to hear evidence to determine whether a defendant, represented by experienced counsel chosen by his parents and himself, is guilty of first-degree murder when he admits he is guilty of such degree.
This precise question was decided in State v. Harper, 220 Iowa 515, 258 N.W. 886, where the charge was first-degree murder accomplished by means of poisoning. Murder “perpetrated by means of poison” is only one kind of the “willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing” section 690.2 defines as first-degree murder. This is plain from the language of 690.2 itself: “All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or any other hind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate any arson, rape, robbery, mayhem, or burglary, is murder in the first degree * * (Italics added.)
In the Harper case the trial court held a hearing but incompetent, unsworn and hearsay evidence was received. Upon appeal it was contended the admission of such evidence was error and it did not appear defendant was guilty of murder in the first degree. We answered the contention by holding the necessity *1338for any bearing was obviated by defendant’s plea of guilty to first-degree murder and it was therefore unnecessary to consider the claimed errors committed at the hearing. The opinion plainly recognizes the question for decision in this language (page 518 of 220 Iowa) : “We are thus called upon to determine the nature of the hearing which the court is required to conduct in a case of this kind and the character and amount of evidence necessary to support a sentence.”
The Harper opinion then carefully considers what is now section 690.4 (then section 12913, Code, 1935), quoted by the majority, and holds with regard to it (page 520 of 220 Iowa): “In other words, while the statute requires the determination of the degree by the jury in the ease of a plea of not guilty and a determination of the degree by the court in case there is a plea of guilty, the statute finds no proper application in any case except in a case where the qu,estion of the degree is in issue. * * * We do not believe that in the instant case there was any question of degree to be determined. That question was effectively determined by the information and the plea. Any attempt by the court to determine the degree from the examination of witnesses in such a case would'be an idle ceremony.” (Italics added.)
State v. Harper then goes on to consider what is now section 690.5 (then section 12914, Code, 1935), also set out by the majority, quotes at length from State v. Hortman, 122 Iowa 104, 108, 97 N.W. 981, 982 (decided in 1904), and holds with regard to 690.5 (page 522 of 220 Iowa): “This much, however, seems clear-, that the latter enactment deals exclusively with first-degree murder; that it authorizes a plea of guilty to first-degree murder; that it provides that where such a plea is entered, the court has only to determine whether the penalty should be death or life imprisonment; and that there is no requirement in the statute in such cases as to how the court shall inform itself so as to determine between the two penalties provided.” (Italics added.)
It is obvious the pronouncements above-quoted are not dicta, as the majority contends, merely because in the Harper ease a hearing was held. They are no more dicta than is a holding that *1339errors upon tbe trial of which a plaintiff complains upon appeal are not prejudicial because defendant was entitled to a directed verdict in any event. Indeed such a decision bears a close analogy to that in State v. Harper.
More obviously without merit is the majority’s attempt to discredit the Harper opinion as expressing only the views of its writer. As the majority well knows, those views are the views of this court speaking through the writer of the opinion.
State v. Harper, supra, is followed and reaffirmed in the concurring opinion of Justice Hays in State v. Bruntlett, 240 Iowa 338, 348, 36 N.W.2d 450, 456, concurred in by five other justices. Bruntlett pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and his death sentence was affirmed. According to the court’s opinion in the Bruntlett case (at page 339 of 240 Iowa): “The court thereafter heard evidence for the purpose of ascertaining what the punishment should be.” (Italics added.) Apparently such hearing was not held for the purpose of determining the degree of murder committed.
The concurring opinion of the six justices speaking through Justice Hays in the Bruntlett case states (page 348 of 240 Iowa, page 456 of 36 N.W.2d): “The indictment specifically charges first-degree murder, under section 690.2, Code of 1946. Appellant, after being fully advised, entered a plea of guilty thereto. * * * Under such a plea no hearing is necessary as section 690.4, Code of-1946 is not applicable. State v. Harper, 220 Iowa 515, 258 N.W. 886.”
It may also be noted that the dissenting opinion of Justice Bliss in State v. Bruntlett, joined in by two other justices, cites State v. Hortman, 122 Iowa 104, 109, 97 N.W. 981, and State v. Harper, 220 Iowa 515, 523, 258 N.W. 886, for the proposition “that the trial court may act upon any information from any source which satisfies its conscience and sense of duty * * (Page 378 of 240 Iowa, page 472 of 36 N.W.2d.)
In view of the Harper and Bruntlett -eases, not to mention State v. Hortman, all supra, it is not surprising that defendant’s present counsel concedes in argument “the law in Iowa now is that upon a plea of guilty to murder in the first degree, no hearing to determine the degree need be had.”
*1340What is conceded to be dicta in State v. Grattan, 222 Iowa 172, 175, 268 N.W. 489, and State v. Breeding, 220 Iowa 605, 607, 262 N.W. 467, quoted by the majority, are casual statements without the citation of supporting authority. They are entitled to much less weight than the more carefully considered pronouncements in the Hortman, Harper and Bruntlett cases which are supported by authority. The Hórtman case has stood for nearly forty-nine years. I see no occasion to overrule these pronouncements.
The majority quotes a statement from 24 C. J. S., Criminal Law, section 1563b(l), page 25, that is not applicable here. The portion of the same text (page 26) that does apply, which the majority should have quoted, is: “* * * but, where accused pleads guilty to a certain degree of an offense, the question of degree is not for the determination of the court, and no substantial right is invaded by the court’s failure to conduct a hearing for the purpose of such determination.”
State v. Harper, supra, is one of the cases cited in support of the text just quoted. A number of additional citations are found in the 1952 cumulative pocket part. Among them are State v. Bruntlett, supra, 240 Iowa 338, 36 N.W.2d 450, and People v. Grillo, 319 Mich. 586, 588, 30 N.W.2d 284, 285, where the statute was much like our section 690.4. There Grillo, charged with murder, “entered his plea of guilty to second-degree murder.” The opinion states, “nor did the trial judge examine witnesses ‘to determine the degree of the crime’ before rendering judgment. See * * * Stat. Ann., section 28.550.” Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment and upon appeal complained of the “failure to take the testimony of witnesses as to the degree of the crime.”
The court holds (pages 589, 590 of 319 Mich., page 286 of 30 N.W.2d):
“However, when Grillo pleaded guilty to second-degree murder, and it was determined that his plea was made freely and without undue influence, nothing else remained to be determined. There was no necessity to examine witnesses in order to determine the degree of his crime.
“The rule applicable to such a situation is stated in 24 *1341C. J. S., Criminal Law, section 1563, as follows: ‘Under statutes in some jurisdictions, * * * but, where accused pleads guilty to a certain degree of an offense, the question of degree is not for tbe determination of the court, and no substantial right is invaded by the court’s failure to conduct a hearing for the purpose of such determination.’ State v. Harper, 220 Iowa 515, 258 N.W. 886; Brandon v. Webb, 23 Wash.2d 155, 160 P.2d 529; Ex parte Haase, 5 Cal. App. 541, 90 P. 946.
“Appellant further argues that notwithstanding the foregoing, such examination is necessary because manslaughter is a degree of the crime of murder. * * *
“The statute, supra, on which appellant relies, does not require a determination of whether the accused is guilty of manslaughter. [Citations.]”
The majority cites Casey v. State, 116 Fla. 3, 156 So. 282, and Cole v. State, 105 Neb. 371, 180 N.W. 564. Casey v. State and earlier reviews of Cole v. State (In re Cole, 103 Neb. 802, 807, 174 N.W. 509, 848) were cited and considered in State v. Harper, supra, at pages 518, 519 of 220 Iowa. Nothing in 15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, section 519, supports the majority opinion.
I must also express disagreement with the majority’s statement by way of dictum, unsupported by authority, “that the duty placed upon the court by section 690.4, supra, is mandatory, and it cannot be avoided by any waiver, even by the defendant himself.” (Italics added.)
14 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, section 119, states, “In fact, the trend of modern authority is in favor of the doctrine that a party in a criminal case may waive irregularities and rights, whether constitutional or statutory, very much the same as in a civil case.” Id., section 188, says, “The right to be confronted by witnesses against him is a personal privilege of which every defendant may avail himself, or which he may waive, as he may see fit.”
State v. Moore, 217 Iowa 872, 878-880, 251 N.W. 737, is in line with the above quotations from American Jurisprudence. The Moore case holds the right to a separate trial may be waived and cites with approval State v. Olds, 106 Iowa 110, 114, 76 *1342N.W. 644, where it is held the right to be confronted by witnesses may be waived and their written testimony received.
People v. Pennington, 267 Ill. 45, 49, 107 N.E. 871, 872, holds: “That part of section 4 of division 13 of the Criminal Code making it the duty of the court to examine witnesses as to the aggravation and mitigation of the offense in cases where the party pleads guilty is mandatory, and it is necessary for the court to make such examination when requested or desired either on the part of the People or of the defendant. This is a privilege which may be waived by the parties and some other method of supplying the court with the necessary information be substituted in its stead.” This holding is quoted with approval in People v. Popescue, 345 Ill. 142, 151, 177 N.E. 739, 743, 77 A. L. R. 1199, 1206, which affirms a death sentence' for murder.
Even under thé majority’s construction of sections 690.4 and 690.5 I see no reason why this defendant, represented as he was by experienced counsel selected by himself and his parents, could not have consented that the degree of the crime be determined by the court from an examination of the indictment, minutes of the testimony thereto attached and the exhibits. In effect this would merely be a waiver of the right to be confronted by witnesses.
WenneRSTRUM and Mantz, JJ., join in this dissent.