Court Opinion

ID: 9376025
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-01 17:07:06.734146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:03.871225
License: Public Domain

J-S04035-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

    TENTH PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
                                               :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                v.                             :
                                               :
                                               :
    PHILIP SNYDER                              :
                                               :
                       Appellant               :   No. 2580 EDA 2022

              Appeal from the Order Entered September 20, 2022
      In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Civil Division at
                              No(s): 190703016

BEFORE: MURRAY, J., KING, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.:                            FILED MARCH 1, 2023

        This case returns to us a third time in an ongoing dispute involving Philip

Snyder (Snyder) and his protests of his former church, Tenth Presbyterian

Church (the Church). In our most recent remand, we directed the Court of

Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) to explain why its distance

restriction of 1,000 feet was “the least necessary distance to protect Church

property, permit the congregants’ and Church employees access to the Church

and to hold services without distraction, with the least possible impingement

on Snyder's constitutional right to convey his dissatisfaction with the Church

and its leadership on public streets and sidewalks.” On remand, the trial court

____________________________________________

*   Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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shortened the distance requirement to 500 feet and made several factual

findings in support of the new restriction.

      Snyder now appeals from the most recent order and asserts that the

trial court’s new distance requirement is still not the least necessary distance

to protect the Church’s property and congregants while also not impinging on

his constitutional right to protest. After review, we are constrained to reverse

the trial court’s distance requirement and remand again with instructions.

                                       I.

                                       A.

      We have previously summarized the facts and procedural history of this

dispute as follows:

            The Church owns several properties in Philadelphia. The
      Church’s primary facility is located at 1701 Delancey Street (“the
      Property”). Snyder moved to Philadelphia in 2008, after which he
      joined the Church, where he remained a member until the Church
      excommunicated Snyder in August 2016. Snyder thereafter
      began picketing at the Property regarding his excommunication
      and the conduct of certain current and prior Church officials.
      Snyder brought a defamation action against individual members
      of the Church, but ultimately, a jury tendered a verdict against
      Snyder.

            After the verdict in the defamation action, Snyder protested
      outside of the Property every Sunday, before and after Church
      services. On July 24, 2019, the Church filed a Complaint for an
      injunction and an Emergency Motion for Injunctive Relief for a
      preliminary injunction. The Church sought to restrict Snyder from
      coming within 1,000 feet of all properties owned by the Church.
      Following oral argument, Snyder temporarily agreed to the
      Church's requested relief.

           The trial court subsequently conducted a hearing on the
      Church’s Motion for a preliminary injunction on January 30, 2020,

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     and February 10, 2020. The trial court described the evidence
     presented at that hearing as follows:

        Snyder testified that he began picketing outside of the
        Property after the March 22, 2019, jury verdict more
        frequently, with a sign that contained the phrase “naked
        beatings,” “lying,” and “rape,” because he was displeased
        with the results of the case. Snyder further testified that
        he had protested while wearing a body camera and filmed
        congregants outside of the Property. Snyder testified that
        a trial court Order and subsequent Opinion in the
        defamation case misrepresented the truth. Douglas Baker
        (Baker), the Church’s former administrator, testified that
        Snyder frequently wore a visibly “concealed” firearm to
        church services when he was a member, and that he
        continued the practice while picketing with the sign and
        body camera. Baker testified that Snyder would verbally
        harass and yell at congregants outside the Property and
        then post body camera videos on a blog. Dr. William
        Goligher (Dr. Goligher), senior minister for the Church,
        testified that Snyder called him the “son of Satan” and a
        liar.   Dr. Goligher testified that Snyder had verbally
        disparaged Snyder’s own family for not committing to his
        protest and not being faithful, including referring to
        Snyder’s wife as Job’s wife ... Dr. Goligher also testified
        that Snyder seemed preoccupied with safety and firearms,
        such that he would stand beside Dr. Goligher and point out
        individuals whom he thought were carrying firearms.
        Snyder’s fixation on security and policing, even minor
        behaviors of the Church congregants, went on for years
        and included concerns about stolen phones, money, and
        immigrants. Snyder himself provided testimony that he
        has been the only individual telling the truth, that he has
        mailed 100 pages of material to 200 members of the
        Church, that he will never stop any of his behaviors until
        the Church’s leadership has resigned in full, and that the
        Church was trying to poison him and hire a hitman to
        assassinate him. Susan Elzey (Ms. Elzey), a congregant,
        testified that outside of Church services on June 16, 2019,
        Snyder told her he was an instrument of God, similar to a
        prophet, and that only Snyder knows the true nature of Dr.
        Goligher’s soul. Snyder went on to tell Ms. Elzey that Dr.
        Goligher was a son of Satan, and that any congregants who
        support Dr. Goligher are doing Satan’s work. Snyder also

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          told Ms. Elzey that he was unhappy with his wife, described
          her as Job’s wife because she did not support him, and that
          his oath to remove Dr. Goligher from the Church was more
          important to him than his family.

          By Order dated February 10, 2020, the trial court granted
          the Church’s Motion and enjoined Snyder from appearing
          within five thousand (5,000) feet of the Church’s
          properties located at (1) 1701 Delancey Street; (2) 1700
          Spruce Street; (3) 315 S. 17th Street; (4) 1710 Spruce
          Street; and (5) 1716 Spruce Street.

      Trial Court Opinion, 8/21/20, at 1-5 (emphasis added).

Tenth Presbyterian Church v. Snyder, 2021 WL 4839339, at *1-2 (Pa.

Super. filed October 18, 2021) (unpublished memorandum) (brackets and

some quotation marks omitted; emphasis in original).

      Snyder timely appealed the trial court’s order granting the Church’s

motion. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court's order in part, reversed in

part, and remanded for further proceedings. First, we affirmed the trial court’s

determination as to the propriety of the preliminary injunction because

“Snyder engaged in aggressive and agitated behavior that frightened and

agitated Church members inside and outside of the Property.” Id. at *8. We

reversed, however, the 5,000-foot distance requirement against Snyder as far

exceeding the appropriate scope of relief. Accordingly, we remanded for the

trial court “to fashion a limitation that achieves the specific needs of this case,

i.e., a distance that is sufficient to protect congregants’ access to the Church

and its services, yet continues to uphold Snyder's constitutional right to

convey his dissatisfaction with the Church and its leadership.” Id.

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       As for the Church’s initial request for a uniform 1,000-foot prohibition

on Snyder’s protests at all of the properties, we noted: “the Church broadly

requested a one-thousand-foot prohibition on Snyder’s protests.             The

Complaint couches the requested relief in the broadest terms but does not

afford Snyder his constitutional right to protest the Church and its leadership.

Any preliminary injunction must be narrowly tailored to address the physical

realities of each Church property, while balancing Snyder’s federal and state

right to free speech.” Id. at *7 n.3 (citing Santoro v. Morse, 781 A.2d 1220,

1230 (Pa. Super. 2001)).1

                                               B.

       On November 10, 2021, in accordance with our remand directive, the

trial court issued an order vacating the terms of its initial injunction and

granting the Church’s emergency motion for injunctive relief. The trial court

decreased the distance requirement against Snyder from 5,000 to 1,000 feet,

applicable to all Church-owned properties and reads in relevant part:

       The Defendant Philip Snyder is ENJOINED from:

       1. Distributing, picketing, leafleting, harassing, intimidating,
       placing in fear, threatening or otherwise communicating to Church
       members within one thousand (1,000) feet of the church located
       at 1701 Delancey Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103 on Sundays;

____________________________________________

1   Snyder petitioned for allowance of appeal to the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, which denied his petition on May 3, 2022. Snyder went on to
file a petition for writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court, which
denied his petition.

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      2. Appearing within one thousand (1,000) feet of all property
      owned and/or occupied by Tenth Presbyterian Church, including
      but not necessarily: 1700 Spruce Street, 1701 Delancey Street,
      315 S. 17th Street; 1710 Spruce Street, and 1716 Spruce Street,
      Philadelphia, PA 19103.

Order, 11/10/21, at 1.

      After Snyder timely appealed, the trial court explained its reasoning for

the 1,000-foot restriction, as it acknowledged that “the content of [Snyder’s]

speech is protected as his subjective opinion,” and determined that a 1,000-

foot distance requirement “is narrowly tailored because [Snyder] is free to

protest and distribute material more than 1000 feet from [the Church’s]

properties.” Trial Court Opinion, 4/7/22, at 12-13. The trial court stated that

it “couched [the injunction] in the narrowest terms possible because it is a

restriction that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective of protecting

Appellee’s leadership and congregants while they worship,” and noted the

parties’ litigious history and Snyder’s “threat of potentially violent behavior”

as reasons for its decision.   Id. at 13.

      On appeal, Snyder argued that the injunction was not narrowly tailored

to address the harm alleged by the Church and that the 1,000-foot distance

restriction applicable to all Church owned and/or occupied properties must be

vacated.   He further argued that the distance requirement prohibiting him

from appearing/protesting within the specified boundary deprived him of his

right to engage in constitutionally protected expressive conduct without

leaving open ample alternative methods of communication.

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      After review, we agreed with Snyder and held that the trial court’s

uniform 1,000-foot restriction was not narrowly tailored to permit him to

effectively protest the Church and its leadership. As we explained:

            The trial court … has issued an order on remand that does
      not indicate it weighed the physical characteristics of each
      Property and tailored the distance requirement accordingly, as it
      broadly enjoins Snyder from “appearing” within 1,000 feet of any
      Church “owned and/or occupied” Property. Although the order
      prohibits active picketing only at the primary facility where
      congregants attend regular services on Sundays, Snyder’s mere
      presence within 1,000 feet of any Church Property is a violation of
      the order.

            Additionally, the injunction not only encompasses Property
      owned by the Church, but also includes any facilities the Church
      “occupies.” While the order lists the street addresses of five such
      properties, the restriction is “not necessarily” limited to those
      specified. This language is far from precise or narrow in scope, as
      it potentially captures unidentified locations that Snyder is
      unaware of.

             Furthermore, the injunction disregards our prior finding that
      the Church’s requested relief of a uniform 1,000-foot distance
      restriction is not sufficiently narrowly tailored to balance the
      congregants’ ability to access Church Properties with Snyder’s
      right to free speech.

Tenth Presbyterian Church v. Snyder, 2022 WL 4101153, at *4 (Pa.

Super. filed September 8, 2022) (unpublished memorandum) (citations

omitted).

      Thus, because the trial court’s distance requirement was not the

narrowest means possible to achieve its goal, we vacated the trial court’s

order and remanded the case a second time. In so doing, we emphasized that

the trial court, in fashioning its injunction, was obliged to use the “narrowest

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terms that will accomplish the pin-pointed objective” as framed by this Court

and tailor its relief “as precisely as possible to the exact needs” of this case in

a manner that imposes the least restraint on Snyder’s free speech, taking into

consideration the physical realities of each Church property. Id. at *4 (citing

Turner Const. v. Plumbers Local 690, 130 A.3d 47, 69 (Pa. Super. 2015)).

      Accordingly, we gave the trial court the following instructions:

             On remand, as well as considering its finding that Snyder
      engaged in aggressive and agitated behavior that frightened and
      agitated Church members inside and outside of the Property, the
      trial court should, in setting the distance requirement set forth
      expressly why the particular distance restriction is the least
      necessary to protect Church property, permit the congregants’
      and Church employees access to the Church and to hold services
      without distraction, with the least possible impingement on
      Snyder’s constitutional right to convey his dissatisfaction with the
      Church and its leadership on public streets and sidewalks.

Id. at *5.

                                        C.

      On September 20, 2022, the trial court entered a new order granting

the Church’s emergency motion for injunctive relief and, like it did before,

decreased its distance requirement, this time setting the distance requirement

at 500 feet. As a result, the trial court’s order read in relevant part:

      1. Distributing, picketing, leafleting, harassing, intimidating,
      placing in fear, threatening, or otherwise communicating to
      Church members within [500 feet] of the church located at 1701
      Delancey Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103 [] on Sundays;

      2. Appearing within [500 feet] of all property owned and/or
      occupied by [the Church], in the immediate vicinity of [the
      Church] including: 1700 Spruce Street, 1701 Delancey Street,

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      315 S. 17th Street, 1710 Spruce Street, and 1716 Spruce Street,
      Philadelphia, PA 19103[.]

Order, 9/20/22, at 1.

      The trial court then went on to make several factual findings in support

of its distance requirement. First, the trial court found that Snyder engaged

in “aggressive, threatening, and disruptive behavior” that was harassing to

the Church’s congregants and employees.

      Next, the trial court found that a 500-foot restriction was “the least

necessary to protect Church property and permit congregants as well as

employees’ access to both the Church and its services.” Id. at 2. In support,

the trial court gave this reasoning:

      According to reference.com operated by Ask Media Group, “a
      typical city block is from 310 to 323 feet in length.” As such, a
      [500 foot] restriction upon Snyder will permit Snyder to continue
      to exercise his constitutional right to free speech, while [at] the
      same time keep him sufficient distance away from Tenth
      Presbyterian Church property so as to prevent any egregious
      distraction, harassment or safety concerns by congregants,
      employees, or owners.

Id. at 2 n.2.

      Relatedly, the trial court also found that

      [t]he evidence shows that even with [Snyder’s] protest being
      located outside the church and more than [20 feet] away,
      congregants could still hear [Snyder’s] loud verbal criticisms as
      well as his protests upon entering the church building and
      attending services. The evidence also demonstrates that all of the
      properties subject to this injunction are actively used by Church
      congregants or employees and are located in close proximity to
      the area of where Mr. Snyder has engaged in his disruptive and
      harassing conduct.

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Id. at 2-3 (footnotes with record citations omitted). Thus, in the trial court’s

view, a 500-foot restriction was the least possible impingement on Snyder’s

constitutional right to protest the Church and its leadership, while at the same

time allowing Church congregants and employees access to the Church and

“hold services without fear of harassment, distraction or safety concerns.” Id.

at 3.

        Snyder timely appealed, and both he and the trial court complied with

Pa.R.A.P. 1925. On appeal, Snyder raises a single issue for our review:

        Did the [trial court] commit an error of law and/or abuse its
        discretion by failing to narrowly tailor its injunction to address the
        alleged harms claimed by [the Church]?

Snyder’s Brief at 4.2

                                               II.

        We again set forth the general principles guiding our analysis of this

matter.     As this Court has explained, “[t]he purposes of a preliminary

injunction are to preserve the status quo and prevent imminent and

irreparable harm which might occur before the merits of the case can be heard

____________________________________________

2 “Appellate courts review a trial court order granting or denying a preliminary
injunction for an abuse of discretion.” Marcellus Shale Coal. v. Dep't of
Envtl. Prot. of Commonwealth, 185 A.3d 985, 995 (Pa. 2018) (citation
omitted). “Additionally, we do not inquire into the merits of the controversy,
but only examine the record to determine if there were any apparently
reasonable grounds for the action of the court below.” Id. (citation and
emphasis omitted). “Only if it is plain that no grounds exist to support the
decree or that the rule of law relied upon was palpably erroneous or misapplied
will we interfere with the decree.” Id. (citation omitted).

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and determined.” Constantakis v. Bryan Advisory Servs., LLC, 275 A.3d

998, 1016-17 (Pa. Super. 2022) (citation omitted). A petitioner seeking a

preliminary injunction must establish each of the following prerequisites:

        1) that the injunction is necessary to prevent immediate and
        irreparable harm that cannot be adequately compensated by
        damages; 2) that greater injury would result from refusing an
        injunction than from granting it, and concomitantly, that issuance
        of an injunction will not substantially harm other interested parties
        in the proceedings; 3) that a preliminary injunction will properly
        restore the parties to their status as it existed immediately prior
        to the alleged wrongful conduct; 4) that the activity it seeks to
        restrain is actionable, that its right to relief is clear, and that the
        wrong is manifest, or, in other words, must show that it is likely
        to prevail on the merits; 5) that the injunction it seeks is
        reasonably suited to abate the offending activity; and 6) that a
        preliminary injunction will not adversely affect the public interest.

Id. at 1022 (citations omitted).

        Additionally, “a preliminary injunction must be crafted so as to be no

broader than is necessary for the petitioner’s interim protection.” Santoro

v. Morse, 781 A.2d 1220, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted; emphasis

added). The United States Supreme Court has also directed that “an order

issued in the area of First Amendment rights must be couched in the narrowest

terms     that   will   accomplish   the   pin-pointed   objective   permitted    by

constitutional mandate and the essential needs of the public order.” Turner

Const., supra at 69 (citing Carroll v. President and Commissioners of

Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183, (1968)). Consequently, an injunction

that restrains free speech “must be tailored as precisely as possible to the

exact needs of the case.” Id.

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                                           III.

       Snyder first argues that the trial court ignored this Court’s remand

directive to consider the physical characteristics of the Church’s premises.

Snyder contends that apart from its finding that congregants could hear him

inside the church,3 the trial court gave no explanation for why any distance

shorter than 500 feet would not be appropriate. Even if he was audible beyond

20 feet from the church, Snyder asserts that the trial court failed to adequately

explain why a 500-foot restriction was the least distance necessary to protect

the Church’s congregants and employees.

       While it is not true that the trial court failed to explain its new distance

requirement, we agree with Snyder that its explanation failed to answer our

remand directive. As noted, we asked the trial court to set forth why its 1000-

foot restriction was the least necessary distance “to protect Church property,

permit the congregants’ and Church employees access to the Church and to

hold services without distraction, with the least possible impingement on

____________________________________________

3 Snyder contests with the trial court’s finding that he could be heard inside
the Church, arguing that it misinterpreted the testimony of Ms. Elzey, who
testified that she continued to hear Snyder as she entered the building. See
N.T., 1/30/20, at 72. Snyder argues that this testimony establishes only that
he could be heard while members entered the Church, not while they were
inside. However, as the Church points out, Ms. Elzey also testified that Snyder
was being loud enough that several other members already inside the Church
told her that they also heard him. Id. at 72-73. Thus, the trial court’s finding
that Church members could hear Snyder inside the Church rather than just
entering is supported by the evidence.

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Snyder's constitutional right to convey his dissatisfaction with the Church and

its leadership on public streets and sidewalks.”

      On remand, the trial court, in setting its new distance requirement at

500 feet, did not cite any record evidence or receive any new evidence.

Instead, the trial court cited its own internet research that a “typical” city block

is 310 to 323 feet in length, seemingly concluding that keeping Snyder around

a block-and-a-half away from the Church was the only way to ensure that his

protest does not deter congregants and employees of the Church from

accessing its properties.

      The problem with this conclusion, however, is that it is not clear what

evidence the trial court is relying on for its finding that 500 feet is appropriate

under the facts of this case, taking into consideration the physical layout of

the Church’s properties and the surrounding neighborhood. Like it failed to

do before, there is no evidence that the trial court, in setting its distance

requirement, weighed the physical characteristics of the Church’s property

and then tailored its distance requirement so that Snyder could still

meaningfully protest the Church and its leadership. In the absence of such

evidence in this case, we are left to conclude that the trial court’s distance

requirement of 500 feet—which would be well over the length of a football

field—still puts Snyder’s protests well out of sight of the Church and, therefore,

effectively extinguishes his constitutional right to protest. Thus, like we did

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before, we are constrained to vacate the trial court’s order with respect to its

500-foot distance requirement.

      Next, Snyder also faults the trial court for not specifically identifying all

Church properties that would fall under its order. To recap, in its prior order,

the trial court enjoined Snyder from “appearing within one thousand (1,000)

feet of all property owned and/or occupied by Tenth Presbyterian Church,

including but not necessarily: 1700 Spruce Street, 1701 Delancey Street,

315 S. 17th Street, 1710 Spruce Street, and 1716 Spruce Street, Philadelphia,

PA 19103.” Order, 11/10/21, at 1 (emphasis added). While acknowledging

that the trial court listed specific properties, we observed that its restriction

was not necessarily limited to those properties. See Tenth Presbyterian

Church, 2022 WL 4101153, at *4. This language, we further noted, was “far

from precise or narrow in scope, as it potentially captures unidentified

locations that Snyder is unaware of.” Id.

      On remand, though, the trial court did not attempt to limit its order to

only those properties identified above.        Instead, the trial court enjoined

Snyder from “[a]ppearing within [500 feet] of all property owned and/or

occupied by [the Church], in the immediate vicinity of [the Church]

including: 1700 Spruce Street, 1701 Delancey Street, 315 S. 17th Street,

1710 Spruce Street, and 1716 Spruce Street, Philadelphia, PA 19103[.]”

Order, 9/20/22, at 1 (emphasis added). Thus, the trial court added the phrase

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“in the immediate vicinity” and removed the phrase “but not necessarily” and

kept everything else the same.

       Again, we are constrained to agree with Snyder that the trial court’s

revisions on remand did not address the concerns raised in our previous

decision. As our Supreme Court has recognized, “it is widely accepted that

general expressions such as ‘including,’ or ‘including but not limited to,’ that

precede a specific list of included items are to be considered as words of

enlargement and not limitation.” Dep’t of Envtl. Prot. v. Cumberland Coal

Res., LP, 102 A.3d 962, 976 (Pa. 2014).            Consequently, the trial court’s

elimination of the phrase “but not necessarily” did not restrict the Church’s

property to only those properties listed. Consequently, the trial court’s latest

order still suffers from the same defect as its preceding one because it possibly

still captures unidentified locations from which Snyder is enjoined from

appearing within 500 feet.4

       Accordingly, we are forced to remand again and to hold a new hearing

if it deems it necessary for the trial court to set forth expressly why its 500-

foot distance requirement is the least necessary to protect the Church’s

congregants and employees access to the Church and hold services without

____________________________________________

4 Snyder also attempts to reassert his argument that the trial court erred in
granting the Church’s motion and imposing an injunction enjoining him from
appearing within a set distance of the Church and its property. However, as
we have already affirmed those parts of the trial court’s order, we will not
revisit them here where the sole issue is the distance requirement.

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distraction, while also being the least possible infringement on Snyder's

constitutional right to protest the Church and its leadership in public. In doing

so, it should list what conduct of Snyder is causing the harm and why that

particular distance requirement is necessary to alleviate that harm.

Additionally, in setting forth its distance requirement, the trial court should

identify all properties that Snyder is enjoined from appearing.

      Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with

this Memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 3/01/2023

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