Court Opinion

ID: 9532199
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:19:05.202297+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:28:42.169552
License: Public Domain

MONTGOMERY, Judge,
concurring and dissenting:
I must respectfully dissent.
I agree with the majority that appellant should not be granted a new trial. I disagree, however, with the conclusion that appellant should be resentenced because the sentencing court considered a prior conviction that had been reversed on appeal.
In considering the prior conviction in the instant case, the sentencing judge stated:
... I read the decision myself. I think it was a 1975 decision. The defendant was found guilty of murdering another young boy by the use of a rifle, and I understand from reading the report that at the same time, or at the same incident, he paralyzed another boy by shooting him in the neck. Anyhow, it is my understanding from both the report Mr. Phipps sent and the case itself, he was *175seventeen at the time and he was arrested, interviewed, given Miranda warnings, and within a short time he made a statement implicating himself. He was tried before Judge Savitt, I think, and was found guilty of murder in the first degree and was given a life sentence. The Supreme Court reversed that decision, and the reason for the reversal was that the statement had not been made in the presence of an interested adult. Apparently the father arrived at or about the time that he was giving a written statement, and the Supreme Court suppressed the use of the statement and granted a new trial. At the second trial, he was found not guilty. I know that at the second trial the implicating statement would not have been used as evidence against him. TR. 3-4.
This court has consistently held that a sentencing court may properly consider prior arrests and concurrent charges (of which the defendant has been acquitted) as long as the court realizes that the defendant has not been convicted on those prior charges. Commonwealth v. Bryant, 312 Pa.Super. 379, 458 A.2d 1010 (1983); Commonwealth v. Craft, 304 Pa.Super. 494, 450 A.2d 1021 (1982); Commonwealth v. Tisdale, 233 Pa.Super. 77, 334 A.2d 722 (1975); cf. Commonwealth v. Knepp, 307 Pa.Super. 535, 453 A.2d 1016 (1982) (proper to consider that a defendant has been placed in A.R.D. program). It was this reasoning that led the sentencing judge in the instant case to consider appellant’s prior conviction. From the portion of the sentencing transcript quoted above, it is quite clear that the sentencing, judge was well aware that appellant’s prior conviction had been reversed and that on retrial he was found not guilty. He had read the Supreme Court opinion and accurately summarized the circumstances of the case.1 He did not consider the prior case as a conviction. It was one of the factors that led him to conclude that appellant was a danger to the community and that appellant had been “given an opportunity. He didn’t use it.” (Tr. 12) I do not believe *176that Commonwealth v. Calvert, 463 Pa. 211, 344 A.2d 797 (1975) mandates reversal under these circumstances.
In Calvert, the sentencing court considered prior convictions which, on appeal, were alleged to have been obtained in uncounseled proceedings. The convictions were considered as prior convictions. .There is no indication that these past convictions had been reversed; indeed, it appears that the issue of Calvert’s right to counsel in the prior cases was first raised in the proceeding at issue. Thus, the sentencing judge had considered as convictions prior convictions which apparently would have been reversed had appeals been taken. Our Supreme Court determined that this was improper and ordered resentencing without consideration of these convictions. I believe the remedy in Calvert must be confined to the particular facts of that case. Had Calvert appealed the prior convictions, received new trials with counsel, Commonwealth ex rel. Goodfellow v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 528, 204 A.2d 446 (1964), and been convicted on retrial, the sentencing judge could properly have considered that conviction as it would not have been constitutionally infirm. Since such was not possible, the remedy applied by the Supreme Court was the only feasible one. I do not believe Calvert stands for the proposition that a sentencing court can never consider a conviction which has been reversed, regardless of whether the sentencing court is aware of all the facts or not. Rather, I believe the authorities relied upon by the sentencing judge in the instant case and recited above are appropriate precedent for the action taken herein. Thus, I would permit consideration of the circumstances of the prior conviction as long as all of the facts are before the sentencing judge, as indeed they were here.2 I would therefore affirm the judgment of sentence.

. See, Commonwealth v. Hailey, 470 Pa. 488, 368 A.2d 1261 (1977).

. Although the distinction is not necessarily a part of my reasoning above, I would also note that appellant’s prior conviction was not reversed on constitutional grounds. It was reversed because of a violation of the "interested adult” rule of Commonwealth v. McCutchen, 463 Pa. 90, 343 A.2d 669 (1975), which rule has recently been abrogated by our Supreme Court. See, Commonwealth v. Williams, 504 Pa. 511, 475 A.2d 1283 (1984); Commonwealth v. Christmas, 502 Pa. 218, 465 A.2d 989 (1983).