Court Opinion

ID: 9857116
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 07:16:14.099895+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:02.095242
License: Public Domain

RIGGS, J.,
dissenting.
I dissent. I would not disregard State v. Creson, 33 Or App 369, 576 P2d 814 (1978), as the lead opinion effectively does. Creson interpreted ORS 813.320 to contain a legislative intent to exclude evidence that is (1) obtained in violation of implied consent procedures and (2) is offered in a prosecution for DUII. That interpretation has stood for 14 years and has not been overruled or narrowed by the Supreme Court or the legislature. Since Creson was decided, ORS 813.320 has been modified only slightly to make it consistent with the renumbering of, and additions to, the Implied Consent Law. The legislature has not altered the substantive language of the statute. We must assume the legislature knows the interpretations the judiciary gives its enactments. When, over the course of several years and minor amendments, it chooses not to narrow or overrule an interpretation, we assume the legislature has accepted it. Cf. State v. Ford, 310 Or 623, 637 n 21, 801 P2d 754 (1990). That is especially true regarding Oregon’s Implied Consent Law, which the legislature has amended at least twice to overrule, or to avoid the effects of, judicial interpretations.
I also disagree with the characterizations given by the majority to the defendant’s request for counsel. I would hold that defendant did not make a request for an attorney for any purpose other than to be present during the breath test.
For these reasons, I dissent and concur with that portion of Judge Durham’s separate opinion dealing with the field sobriety tests.
Buttler and Durham, JJ., join in this dissent as to those portions dealing with the field sobriety tests.
Warren, J., joins in this dissent as to those portions dealing with the right to counsel.