Court Opinion

ID: 9442350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 18:44:33.974173+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:28:52.662707
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing.
PER CURIAM.
The very earnest motion for rehearing of the appellant presents nothing new except that for the first time the proviso in F.S.A. § 320.46 is urged as relieving the railroad company from responsibility for the absence from the crossing signs of reflectors for night warning in that the trial judge held the section to be inapplicable and “there was a likely valid ground for his ruling, namely, that counsel for the plaintiffs admitted in his conference with the court (R. 296) that the state road department had erected a sign at the crossing”, and that the court’s charge shows that this was the theory on which the case was tried. If the sign was erected by the state road department the railroad company is not responsible for its deficiency as we held in Ouzts v. Powell, 5 Cir., 125 F.2d 768. But we find in the record no such admission by counsel. In the charge of the court Section 320.46 or its proviso is not mentioned. The court tells the jury that the primary question is whether the greater weight of the evidence convinces them that the defendant was negligent in the operation of its' train and that negligence was a proximate 'cause of the accident. There was likewise instruction as to the negligence of the driver of the car, and if it was the sole cause of the injury recovery was barred, but if the negligence of both contributed proximately to the injury a recovery proportionally diminished would be proper. There was also a charge that “You cannot predicate any negligence on the part of the *114railroad company by any failure to provide a watchman, flagman, signal lights, reflector lights, gates or alarms at the crossing. The failure to provide any such warning signals would not of itself constitute negligence, but the test is whether the train was negligently operated taking into consideration all the surrounding circumstances including the lack of. guards, flagman, warning signals, etc.” The jury were told also to consider the absence of such in determining whether the car driver was negligent in a way that contributed to cause the accident. The -charge was not objected to and we are not passing on its correctness. It does tend to show that the judge did not consider section 320.46 as applicable. It hardly shows that plaintiffs’ counsel made any admission about it.
If however we take the charge as correct, and that the absence of reflectors is not in itself a ground of negligence in the railroad company but is to be considered only as a part of the situation at the crossing of which the company was aware, and as throwing light on the conduct of the driver of the car in approaching the crossing, we are of opinion that the issues were for the jury as to negligence and as to proximate cause. Among the great mass of crossing cases cited as to the contrary, both from the Supreme Court of Florida, and from this court in cases from Florida, no one can be put forward as controlling this. Many involved collisions in daylight when the driver knew he was approaching the crossing and took an evident risk, or without excuse failed to use his senses. In others, where the collision occurred at night, in fog, or smoke, the driver ran into a train already on the crossing, because the driver was going at such a speed that he could not' stop within the range of his vision, and knew he could not. Thus in our case of Good v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 5 Cir., 142 F.2d 46, Good was driving on a foggy night.and “was unable to see more than 15 to 18 feet in front of the car. He was driving at a speed of approximately 20 miles per hour and could not stop within the range of his vision. * * * Good was well acquainted with the crossing, having passed over it many times in going to * * * his places of business”. The train was standing across the crossing. Good could not recover. In Van Allen v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 5 Cir., 109 F.2d 780, 782, the accident was at night. The car driver was familiar with the crossing but inattentive to it. He could have seen the train had he looked. The court said: “Upon the undisputed -evidence, the proximate cause was the driving onto the tracks without stopping, looking or making any effort whatever, to ascertain if a train was approaching. * * * We have here an injury solely caused by the reckless conduct of the driver of an automobile going onto a track with full knowledge of its existence, without taking any precautions to look out for an oncoming train.” The cases from the Florida’ court are similar.
Here, under the evidence favorable to the plaintiffs, the night was dark, but clear; the driver was a stranger in the neighborhood, but had passed along the highway a few weeks preceding twice in daylight and knew there was a railroad to be crossed, but did not know -he was near the crossing on this night. He could not see the crossing itself because the rails were flush with the pavement. He heard no train signals if given, saw a light down a road to his right but did not think it was from a train, and looking ahead did not know he was near a railroad track till too late. His failure to see an unilluminated crossing sign as -he passed it, and perhaps too much speed, is the fault chargeable to him. The jury could well conclude this negligence was not the sole proximate cause of the accident if the train was also at fault in approaching the crossing. The train crew knew the crossing was there, and its condition. They did not have to run fast, but the contrary, for they were in yard limits where the railroad rules required that speed be such that they could stop in half the range of vision, and a railroad station and the crossing of another railroad track was only 125 or 150 yards ahead. The company, though not charged with putting night reflectors on the crossing signs, knew there were none, and that since the rails were flush with *115the pavement it was difficult for travellers to see the crossing at night, and they were liable not to take precautions because they did not perceive there was a crossing there. The train speed, on conflicting evidence, might be taken at 30 miles per hour, half a mile per minute, about 44 feet per second. The fireman, on the side from which the car was approaching, saw its light, but assumed at first it would stop, but when he saw it was not going to, he says everything happened like a snap of the fingers. He testifies positively that under the rules of the railroad “That highway crossing has a speed limit of 15 miles per hour over it”, and again he says, “Fifteen miles over the crossing”. Q. “Over that crossing?” A. “The highway crossing at New-berry.” He says they were running at that speed there that night, but his statement that things happened like the snap of the fingers, and the evidence as to how far the train ran before it could be stopped and of the speed indicated thereby, discredit his estimate of his speed. Without further details, we hold that the negligence of each party was for the jury; as also whether there was concurring contributing negligence, or whether that of the driver was the sole proximate cause of the injury.
Motion denied.
WALLER, Circuit Judge, dissenting.