Court Opinion

ID: 9962342
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-23 15:19:30.210019+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:39.726264
License: Public Domain

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

              Present: Judges Athey, Causey and Callins
UNPUBLISHED

              DARRELL VINCENT DUNKUM
                                                                             MEMORANDUM OPINION*
              v.     Record No. 0198-23-2                                        PER CURIAM
                                                                                 APRIL 23, 2024
              COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

                                FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BUCKINGHAM COUNTY
                                           James S. Yoffy, Judge Designate

                              (Aaron M. Vandenbrook; Reinhardt, Vandenbrook, P.L.L.C., on
                              brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.

                              (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Ken J. Baldassari, Assistant
                              Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

                     Following a bench trial, the Circuit Court of Buckingham County (“trial court”) convicted

              Darrell Dunkum (“Dunkum”) on two counts of assault and battery of a law enforcement officer and

              two counts of brandishing a firearm, a third or subsequent offense. Dunkum contends on appeal

              that the evidence was insufficient to convict him of brandishing a firearm because the

              Commonwealth failed to prove that the two police officers present during his arrest reasonably

              feared him.1 After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously holds that

              oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” Code

              § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). Thus, for the following reasons, we affirm the trial court.

                     *
                         This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A).
                     1
                       Although Dunkum designated additional assignments of error challenging his
              convictions for assault and battery of a law enforcement officer, he did not address them in his
              brief. Accordingly, those assignments are waived. See Rule 5A:20(e).
                                            I. BACKGROUND

        On February 18, 2022, Buckingham County Sheriff’s Office Sergeant J.C. Bryant

(“Sergeant”) and Deputy Sheriff Clay Naff (“Deputy”) responded to a dispatcher’s call concerning a

domestic disturbance at Dunkum’s residence. Upon arrival, Dunkum advised the officers that

“everything was fine.” Dunkum’s wife advised the officers that she and Dunkum “had been

arguing” but he had not “physically assault[ed]” her.

        As the officers prepared to leave, they spoke with Dunkum in the driveway near his pickup

truck. Dunkum “was upset” and told the officers that “he didn’t call [them] and [that they] had no

reason to be at his house” because “[they] could only come [if] he called [them].” He then

“[y]ell[ed]” and “cuss[ed]” at the officers, telling them to “[g]et the fuck off [his] property.” It

appeared to the officers that Dunkum “had been drinking,” and they smelled a strong odor of

alcohol on his person. In his conversation with the officers, Dunkum admitted he had been

“drinking throughout the day” to cope with “problems with his wife.”

        While Dunkum was yelling and cursing at the officers, he reached into the bed of his truck,

grabbed a .22 caliber rifle by the stock, and pointed it in the air. At trial, Sergeant estimated that he

and Deputy were five to eight feet from Dunkum when he grabbed the rifle. When Sergeant saw

Dunkum take the rifle, he further testified that he feared that he or Deputy were “going to get shot,”

because Dunkum “was already yelling and cussing at [them] to get off his property.”2 Deputy also

testified that he “was fearful for [his] life when” Dunkum picked up the rifle. The officers

subsequently took Dunkum to the ground, “forcibly rip[ped the rifle] out of his hand,” and arrested

him.3

        2
         Sergeant stated that Dunkum did not “say anything about firing” the rifle or “perform
any action . . . [to] indicate that he was preparing to fire it.”
        3
         The Commonwealth presented evidence at trial that Dunkum had two previous
convictions for brandishing.
                                          -2-
       After the presentation of the Commonwealth’s case-in-chief and at the conclusion of all the

evidence, Dunkum moved to strike the evidence related to his brandishing charges, arguing that the

officers’ fear was not reasonable. The trial court denied his motion to strike and renewed motion to

strike, finding that the evidence that Dunkum was cursing, yelling, and screaming, and shouted for

police to “get the fuck off [his] property” during the incident, was sufficient evidence of “reasonably

induce[d] fear” that supported a brandishing conviction. The trial court then convicted Dunkum of

brandishing. Dunkum appealed.

                                            II. ANALYSIS

                                       A. Standard of Review

       “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, ‘[t]he judgment of the trial court is

presumed correct and will not be disturbed unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to

support it.’” McGowan v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 513, 521 (2020) (alteration in original)

(quoting Smith v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 450, 460 (2018)). “In such cases, ‘[t]he Court does

not ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Secret v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 204,

228 (2018)). “Rather, the relevant question is whether ‘any rational trier of fact could have

found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Vasquez v.

Commonwealth, 291 Va. 232, 248 (2016) (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193

(2009)). “If there is evidentiary support for the conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted

to substitute its own judgment, even if its opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by

the finder of fact at the trial.’” McGowan, 72 Va. App. at 521 (quoting Chavez v.

Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018)).

                                                 -3-
     B. The record contains sufficient evidence to support finding that the officers reasonably
        feared Dunkum.

        On appeal, Dunkum contends that the evidence was insufficient to support his brandishing

convictions, claiming that his actions would not have put a reasonable person in fear because he

“did not hold or otherwise display the firearm in a threatening manner” or explicitly threaten the

officers. We disagree.

        Code § 18.2-282(A) provides in pertinent part that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to

point, hold or brandish any firearm . . . in such manner as to reasonably induce fear in the mind of

another . . . .”4 Textually, this offense requires proof of two basic elements: “(1) pointing or

brandishing a firearm, and (2) doing so in such a manner as to reasonably induce fear in the mind of

a victim.” Huffman v. Commonwealth, 51 Va. App. 469, 472 (2008) (emphasis added) (quoting

Kelsoe v. Commonwealth, 226 Va. 197, 198 (1983)).

        Dunkum contests only the second element, conceding that “the only issue” is whether the

officers’ fear was reasonable. We have explained that fear, in the context of brandishing, “does not

so much mean ‘fright’ as it means ‘apprehension,’” as “one too brave to be frightened may yet be

apprehensive of bodily harm.” Dezfuli v. Commonwealth, 58 Va. App. 1, 9 (2011) (quoting

Huffman, 51 Va. App. at 472). “Whether a person’s apprehension is reasonable is a factual

determination that will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or unsupported by the

evidence.” Alston v. Commonwealth, 77 Va. App. 639, 651 (2023) (interpreting Code

§ 18.2-286.1).

        Here, the record supports the trial court’s finding that the officers’ fear was reasonable. In

essence, the facts, in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, reflect a man, who had been

        4
         To note, “[o]n a third or subsequent conviction of” brandishing, “where it is alleged” in the
indictment that the defendant “has been twice previously convicted” of certain enumerated firearm
offenses, and each such conviction occurred on a different date, the defendant “is guilty of a Class 6
felony.” Code § 18.2-311.2.
                                                -4-
both drinking all day and who was angry about the officers’ presence on his property, deliberately

grabbing a firearm while loudly demanding that they leave. When police encountered Dunkum,

they noticed a “pretty strong” odor of alcohol coming from his breath, glassy eyes, and “slightly

slurred” speech. Dunkum later admitted to them that he had been “drinking throughout the day” as

a means of coping with “problems with his wife.” Dunkum was “upset” with the officers’ presence

at the home, telling them that they “had no reason to be at his house” because he had not requested

them. Finally, in response to their presence, Dunkum cursed and yelled at police to “get the fuck off

[his] property” before grabbing the rifle by the stock, necessitating the officers’ actions to protect

their safety. At the time Dunkum grabbed the rifle, Sergeant testified that he and Deputy were five

to eight feet from him—being in close range of the firearm. Thus, there is ample evidence to

support the trial court’s factual finding that the officers’ apprehension was reasonable.

        The fact that Dunkum did not explicitly threaten the officers does not affect our analysis or

conclusion. When Deputy was asked what made him “concerned that [Dunkum] was going to use”

the rifle, he noted that “[t]he multiple times [Dunkum] was screaming for us to get off the property,”

“the anger coming from his voice,” and that “he picked up a weapon with those actions” caused

Deputy to believe “that [Dunkum] wanted to do harm towards” the officers. Hence, a rational

factfinder could conclude that it was reasonable for the officers to connect Dunkum’s grabbing the

firearm to his angry demands, even without a verbal threat. In sum, under the totality of the

circumstances, a rational trier of fact could find that the officers’ apprehension of bodily harm was

reasonable. As a consequence, the trial court properly convicted Dunkum of brandishing, his third

or subsequent offense.

                                           III. CONCLUSION

        For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

                                                                                               Affirmed.

                                                  -5-