Court Opinion

ID: 9381844
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-24 00:00:29.719348+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:34.799441
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-50737        Document: 00516687186             Page: 1      Date Filed: 03/23/2023

             United States Court of Appeals
                  for the Fifth Circuit
                                                                               United States Court of Appeals
                                                                                        Fifth Circuit
                                      No. 22-50737
                                    Summary Calendar                                  FILED
                                                                                March 23, 2023
                                                                                 Lyle W. Cayce
   Keith Eubanks,                                                                     Clerk

                                                                    Plaintiff—Appellant,

                                            versus

   Endeavor Energy Resources, L.P.,

                                                                   Defendant—Appellee.

                     Appeal from the United States District Court
                          for the Western District of Texas
                                USDC No. 7:21-CV-61

   Before King, Higginson, and Willett, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam:*
         Keith Eubanks brings a Texas Labor Code and ADA retaliation claim
   against Endeavor, his former employer. The district court granted summary
   judgment for Endeavor because Eubanks had not shown a material factual
   dispute concerning whether Endeavor’s stated reasons were a pretext for
   retaliation. Eubanks appeals. We AFFIRM.

         *
             This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.
Case: 22-50737        Document: 00516687186              Page: 2       Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                                          No. 22-50737

           On February 21, 2020, Plaintiff-Appellant Keith Eubanks was
   terminated from his employment with Defendant-Appellee Endeavor Energy
   Resources, L.P. (“Endeavor”) by his supervisor, Mark Webster. On April 8,
   2021, Eubanks filed a complaint alleging his termination was retaliatory and
   in violation of Chapter 21 of the Texas Labor Code 1 and the Americans with
   Disabilities Act (“ADA”). 2 Specifically, Eubanks alleged that Endeavor
   terminated his employment because he “complained of discrimination,
   and/or . . . engag[ed] in protected activity.” In a subsequent filing, Eubanks
   clarified that the allegedly discriminatory events at issue included Webster’s
   comments regarding an employee’s colorblindness, Eubanks’s hearing loss,
   and another employee’s obesity. Eubanks’s alleged protected activity was
   asking Webster to stop making these comments on January 24, 2020, roughly
   one month prior to his February 21 termination.
           On July 16, 2022, the district court granted Endeavor’s motion for
   summary judgment. It held that Eubanks had established a prima facie case of
   retaliation, that Endeavor had put forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory
   reason for its actions, and that Eubanks had failed to meet his burden of
   showing a genuine dispute of material fact about whether Endeavor’s stated
   reasons for his termination were pretexts for retaliation. Eubanks timely
   appeals.
           We review de novo a grant of summary judgment and apply the same
   standards as the district court. Yogi Metals Grp., Inc. v. Garland, 38 F.4th 455,

           1
              On appeal, Eubanks does not pursue reversal of summary judgment on his
   retaliation claim as it arises under the Texas Labor Code.
           2
             Additionally, because the same burden-shifting framework is applicable to claims
   under both Title VII and the ADA, we cite cases involving Title VII claims when analyzing
   claims under either statute where relevant and applicable. See Feist v. La., Dep’t of Just.,
   Off. of the Att’y Gen., 730 F.3d 450, 454 (5th Cir. 2013) (citing both Title VII and ADA
   cases when discussing a claim of retaliation under the ADA).

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                                          No. 22-50737

   458 (5th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine
   dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
   matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). We view the evidence and draw all
   inferences in a light most favorable to the nonmovant; however,
   “[u]nsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported
   speculation are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.”
   Brown v. City of Hous., 337 F.3d 539, 541 (5th Cir. 2003).
           “The ADA prohibits an employer from ‘discriminat[ing] against any
   individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made
   unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual made a charge, testified,
   assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
   hearing under [the ADA].’” Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964 F.3d 298,
   303–04 (5th Cir. 2020) (alterations in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C.
   § 12203(a)). When a plaintiff, as here, presents indirect evidence of
   retaliation, 3 we apply the burden-shifting framework from McDonnell Douglas
   Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Under this framework,
           [t]o establish a prima facie case of unlawful retaliation under
           the ADA, the plaintiff must show that: (1) she engaged in an
           activity protected by the ADA, (2) she suffered an adverse
           employment action, and (3) there is a causal connection
           between the protected activity and the adverse action. If the

           3
              Eubanks argues on appeal that Webster’s February 11, 2020 comment that
   Webster would “always be on guard, and this is no way to work” constitutes direct
   evidence that Eubanks’s termination was motivated by retaliation. But this argument was
   not raised in the district court, and it is thus waived. See State Indus. Prods. Corp. v. Beta
   Tech., Inc., 575 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2009).
           Eubanks unpersuasively argues this argument was not waived. Although he did
   mention these comments in a filing, they were mentioned as part of Webster’s list of
   complaints about Eubanks’s job performance. Eubanks did not clearly argue that these
   comments were direct evidence of retaliation, and none of the direct evidence-related
   authorities cited in his appellant brief were cited in his arguments in the district court.

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                                    No. 22-50737

          employee establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, the
          employer must come forward with a legitimate,
          nondiscriminatory reason for its action. If the employer meets
          its burden of production, the employee must then demonstrate
          that the proffered reason is a pretext for retaliation.
          “Ultimately, the employee must show that ‘but for’ the
          protected activity, the adverse employment action would not
          have occurred.”
   Lyons, 964 F.3d at 304 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Nall v. BNSF Ry. Co.,
   917 F.3d 335, 349 (5th Cir. 2019)).
          Eubanks has shown a prima facie case of retaliation when considering
   the evidence in a light most favorable to him. He opposed Webster’s
   comments regarding various employees’ disabilities, which is a protected
   activity, and his termination is an adverse employment action. See 42 U.S.C.
   § 12203 (prohibiting discrimination “against any individual because such
   individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or
   because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in
   any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [the ADA]”).
   The temporal proximity between the protected activity on January 24 and his
   termination on February 21 is close enough to establish causation. See Porter
   v. Houma Terrebonne Hous. Auth. Bd. of Comm’rs, 810 F.3d 940, 948–49 (5th
   Cir. 2015) (“[T]emporal proximity between protected activity and alleged
   retaliation is sometimes enough to establish causation at the prima facie
   stage. . . . Given this precedent, the six-and-a-half-week timeframe between
   Porter's testimony and the denial of her rescission is sufficient to satisfy the
   prima facie case of causation.”). Endeavor then came forward with a
   nondiscriminatory reason for Eubanks’s termination, i.e., his poor
   performance. The record shows that Eubanks, inter alia, did not “plan or
   communicate well” and failed to follow through on projects.

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                                       No. 22-50737

          Eubanks then has the burden of showing a genuine dispute of material
   fact as to whether Endeavor’s stated reason for termination was pretextual.
   He fails to meet this burden. He first argues that comments can constitute
   evidence of pretext if they indicate discriminatory animus and are made by
   the person responsible for termination. He argues that such bias or animus is
   present in Webster’s comments that he would “always be on guard,” that he
   wanted to get Eubanks “out of production,” and that he did not want to put
   Eubanks on a performance improvement plan. Eubanks argues that these
   comments show that Endeavor’s stated termination reason—performance
   issues—was pretextual. We disagree. In context, these comments are from
   Webster’s notes where he was primarily documenting various criticisms of
   Eubanks’s working style. These particular comments, read in their broader
   context, are straightforwardly related to Eubanks’s performance, and
   Eubanks does not present any analysis or additional evidence as to why these
   comments indicate the kind of improper bias, animus, or motive serving as
   improper pretext for retaliation.
          Next, Eubanks argues that he has shown a material factual dispute as
   to pretext because Endeavor’s specific method of termination failed to follow
   company policies. But the record demonstrates that Endeavor followed
   established policies in terminating Eubanks. Eubanks contends that
   Endeavor should have put him on a performance improvement plan (“PIP”),
   but Endeavor’s human resources department had previously stopped
   utilizing PIPs. And in any case, Endeavor’s employee handbook specifically
   allowed Endeavor to change the order of disciplinary actions, eliminate
   disciplinary steps, or implement new disciplinary measures.
          Eubanks’s other arguments concerning pretext are without merit.
   Eubanks avers that Webster only began to compile evidence of Eubanks’s
   poor performance after his January 2020 protected activity. But this
   contention is belied by the record, which shows Webster maintained records

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                                    No. 22-50737

   of various instances of Eubanks’s performance issues prior to Eubanks’s
   protected activity. Eubanks’s disagreements with how to interpret this
   evidence are insufficient to create a material factual dispute, Sandstad v. CB
   Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 899 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that “merely
   disputing” a performance assessment will not create a material factual
   dispute), and are not “of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-
   minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reach different
   conclusions.” Lindsey v. Bio-Med. Applications of La., L.L.C., 9 F.4th 317,
   325–26 (5th Cir. 2021) (quoting Watkins v. Tregre, 997 F.3d 275, 283–84 (5th
   Cir. 2021)). And despite the close temporal proximity between his protected
   activities and his termination, Eubanks has not proffered other significant
   evidence of pretext that would otherwise point to a material factual dispute.
          Ultimately, Eubanks has failed to create a genuine dispute of material
   fact as to whether his protected activities were the but-for cause of his
   termination. As noted above, Endeavor has provided ample evidence that
   Eubanks’s termination was motivated by numerous examples of less-than-
   stellar job performance. Without more, temporal proximity between
   Eubanks’s protected activities and his termination is insufficient to establish
   but-for causation. See Strong v. Univ. Healthcare Sys., L.L.C., 482 F.3d 802,
   808 (5th Cir. 2007) (rejecting “the notion that temporal proximity standing
   alone can be sufficient proof of but for causation”). Eubanks argues that his
   protected activities were the but-for cause of his termination because, in his
   annual evaluation with Webster (prior to Eubanks’s protected activity),
   Webster noted that Eubanks had shown improvement and suggested that
   Endeavor would continue to employ him. But this argument standing alone
   is insufficient to create a genuine material factual dispute concerning pretext
   in light of the extensive record of documented performance-related issues,
   both before and after this performance evaluation, that Endeavor credibly
   identifies as motivating its termination decision.

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Case: 22-50737   Document: 00516687186        Page: 7   Date Filed: 03/23/2023

                               No. 22-50737

         For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM.

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