Court Opinion

ID: 9686293
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 15:39:55.66373+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:18:17.324649
License: Public Domain

SCHUDSON, J.
(concurring in part; dissenting in part). I agree with the majority's most significant conclusion in this case:
*79[T]hat the time limits established by § 51.15, STATS., are triggered when a person taken into custody under that provision is transported to any of the facilities designated by § 51.15(2), STATS., irrespective of whether the facility to which the person has been brought is one specifically chosen by the county for the receipt of persons taken into custody under § 51.15.
Majority op. at 78.1 disagree, however, with the majority's additional and inconsistent conclusion affirming the trial court's finding that St. Luke's "did not agree to detain" Delores M. See majority op. at 74.
The majority opinion does not quote the trial court's decision. To see the trial court's clearly erroneous reasoning, it is important to do so. The trial court's written decision states:
St. Luke's is an approved treatment facility but it does not become a "facility for detention" unless it "agrees to detain the individual." Here, there are contra-indications that St. Luke's agreed to detain [Delores M.].
First, if St. Luke's "agreed to detain" [Delores M.] under sec. 51.15(2)(d), it presumably would at least attempt to follow some of the detention procedures of sec. 51.15(4). The medical facility which makes a [sic] optional and voluntary decision to hold an individual in detention implicitly agrees to comply with the detention procedure. St. Luke's, however, did not follow any of the proscribed [sic] procedures. Second, St. Luke's considered [Delores M.] to be in police custody or under a "police hold" rather than its own detainee.... Third, if St. Luke's agreed to detain [Delores M.], no transfer to another approved facility would be necessary. [Delores M.] could have remained in St. Luke's "detention" until the conclusion of the involuntary commitment pro*80ceedings. [Delores M.] however was discharged as soon as she attained medical stability necessary for. transfer.
(Footnote omitted; emphasis in original.) The trial court's reasoning is circular.
First, and most apparently, the trial court's circular approach begins with its contention that "if St. Luke’s 'agreed to detain' [Delores M.] under sec. 51.15(2)(d), it presumably would at least attempt to follow some of the detention procedures of sec. 51.15(4)." The trial court then concludes that because St. Luke's did not follow the statutory detention procedures, St. Luke's did not agree to detain Delores M. Well, obviously, had St. Luke's followed the statutory detention procedures, Delores M. would have had no reason to complain or appeal.
It is precisely because St. Luke's did "agree[ ] to detain" Delores M. but did not follow the statutory detention procedures that this appeal has come about. What could be more clear? As the majority recounts, it is undisputed that the police detained Delores M. and brought her to St. Luke's pursuant to § 51.15(1), STATS. It is undisputed that St. Luke's admitted Delores M. Without her custodial status changing in any way, Delores M. remained at St. Luke's but was not afforded the rights guaranteed under the statutory detention procedures. Thus, regardless of whether any doctor, administrator, or other St. Luke's official explicitly "agree[d] to detain" Delores M., St. Luke's admitted her just as the police delivered her — in custody under § 51.15(1). Thus, regardless of whether St. Luke's then complied with the statutory detention procedures, it is inescapable that, as a matter of law, St. Luke's "agree[d] to detain" Delores M.
*81Second, the trial court states that "St. Luke's considered [Delores M.] to be in police custody or under a 'police hold' rather than its own detainee." That is exactly the point. Delores M. was in police custody when St. Luke's admitted her. St. Luke's could not admit Delores M. and, at the same time, divest her of her custodial status. As long as she remained at St. Luke's while in police custody pursuant to § 51.15(1), Stats., St. Luke's was obligated to comply with the statutory detention procedures.
Third, when the trial court states that "if St. Luke's agreed to detain [Delores M.], no transfer to another approved facility would be necessary," the trial court merely completes its circular explanation.
Simply and logically, Delores M.'s challenge to St. Luke's noncompliance with the statutory detention procedures cannot be refuted by the facts of St. Luke's reore compliance. Yet, that is exactly what the trial court's decision attempts to do.
The majority is correct: the statutory detention procedures "are triggered when a person taken into custody . . . under [§ 51.15, Stats.] is transported to a facility other than one designated by the County for that purpose." Majority op. at 76. The majority is incorrect and inconsistent in accepting the utterly circular trial court reasoning that, somehow, despite being "transported to" St. Luke's in police custody, Delores M. was not in a facility that "agree[d] to detain" her.