Court Opinion

ID: 9486680
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 11:56:11.997135+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:51:52.197716
License: Public Domain

MeWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge,
dissents.
I. Assistance of Counsel
The Assistance of Counsel issue was not raised in Selsor’s direct appeal of his convictions for felony murder and shooting with an intent to kill. Selsor v. State, 562 P.2d 926 (Okla.Crim.App.1977). In November, 1978, Selsor filed in the state district court in Tulsa, Oklahoma, an application for post-conviction relief pursuant to Okla.Stat.Ann. tit. 22, § 1080 (effective July 1, 1970). In that application, Selsor claimed that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to the Assistance of Counsel. So far as I can ascertain, that application is not a part of the record before us.1 The state district court denied that application. Again, I cannot find the order denying Selsor’s application for post-conviction relief in the record before us. The order of the district court was affirmed on appeal by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in an unpublished order entered on June 11, 1980. A copy of that order is in the record before us. In that order, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the order of the district court with the statement that “[ajfter careful review of the petition filed herein, we are of the opinion that the issues presented have been litigated previously.”
Nine years later, in July, 1989, Selsor filed a second application for post-conviction relief in the state district court in Tulsa, Oklahoma, alleging for the first time his claim of double jeopardy. The state district court denied that application. I do not find Selsor’s second application for post-conviction relief or the order of the district court denying that application in the record before us. However, on August 18, 1989, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the district court in an unpublished order, holding that all issues previously ruled upon were res *1037judicata and all issues not theretofore raised were waived. OMa.Stat.Ann. tit. 22, § 1086 (effective July 1, 1970).
Two years later, on October 21, 1991, Sel-sor filed his pro se petition for a -writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988) in the United States District Court for the Western District of OMahoma, naming as respondents Kaiser, as Warden of the institution where Selsor was confined, and the Attorney General of the State of OMahoma. In his petition, Selsor set forth two grounds for relief.2
As his first ground for relief, Selsor alleged as follows:
(A)(1) Ground One: Petitioner was denied a fair trial in that he was not provided with effective assistance of counsel where there was a conflict of interest with code-fendant’s confession being used as evidence against him in violation of the 5th, 6th, and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.
(2) Supporting Facts: (Without citing legal authority or argument state briefly the facts which support your claim)
Before trial and during trial Petitioner moved the trial court to either sever the two co-defendants’ cases or to grant outside counsel to one of the two co-defendants. This was necessary because of the conflicting nature of the defenses of each co-defendant and that the interlocMng confessions of each of the co-defendants could be used against the other as evidence of guilt without the other co-defendant being allowed to cross-examine.
At trial the confession of the co-defendant was introduced into evidence. This confession stated that the motive for the crime and the actual commission of the crime were perpetrated by the Petitioner. This confession worked very well for the co-defendant as he was acquitted on the murder charge and Petitioner was convicted and sentenced to death, which was modified on appeal.
This joint representation of the Petitioner and co-defendant put the attorney representing them into a position of representing one of the defendant’s confessions and not the other. Plus, trying to present to the jury two different defenses of each of the co-defendants, (emphasis Selsor’s)
Analyzing “Ground One” of Selsor’s § 2254 petition filed in federal district court, Selsor asserts that (1) he was denied a fair trial (2) because he was not provided with effective assistance of counsel (3) since his attorney had a “conflict of interest”; (4) which was the result of the fact that his co-defendant’s (Dodson’s) confession was going to be used at trial as evidence against him, in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
As a starting point, it is well established that “[rjequiring or permitting a single attorney to represent codefendants, often referred to as joint representation, is not per se viola-tive of constitutional guarantees of effective assistance of counsel.” See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 482, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 1177, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978).
In his petition, Selsor bases his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel because of what he characterizes as a conflict of interest solely on the fact that Dodson’s confession, which implicated him, was going to be used against him at the state trial. As indicated, both Dodson and Selsor made rather detailed confessions to the authorities in which each detailed his part in the felony murder and in so doing necessarily implicated the other. However, I fail to see just how such demonstrates that counsel had a conflict of interest when he represented both Selsor and Dodson. To me, it is a non sequitur in that the conclusion does not follow logically from the premise. When the government’s witnesses testified as to the details of Dodson’s confession, counsel was free to challenge the confession as it related to both Dodson and Selsor. Likewise when government witnesses testified as to Selsor’s confession, counsel *1038was perfectly free to challenge the confession as it related to both Selsor and Dodson.
This is not an instance where a co-defendant’s confession implicated a defendant who had not confessed. Hence, Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968) is inapplicable.3 In onr case, both Dodson and Selsor confessed in detail, and in the course of their own confession implicated the other. Such, however, does not show that counsel had a “conflict of interest.”
Although it is not mentioned in “Ground One,” in the “Supporting Facts” paragraph under “Ground One” there is mention of the fact that the two defendants had “conflicting defenses.” The petition does not identify the “conflicting defenses,” so we are left to speculate as to just what the inconsistent defenses were.
In this Court, counsel suggests that when Dodson at the start of the trial entered an additional plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the defendants at that point had inconsistent defenses which necessarily created a “conflict of interest.” I do not agree. In this regard, counsel had informed the state court that possibly Dodson would testify in his own defense and that his testimony would disadvantage Selsor. However, at trial Dodson did not testify, so the possibility perceived by counsel never materialized. No evidence of any insanity on the part of Dodson was introduced, and the jury was not instructed on the matter. Under such circumstance, the belated entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity by Dodson does not, in my view, show, or even tend to show, a “conflict of interest.” Rather, it suggests to me a last minute tactical move by counsel.
In any event, Selsor made no real showing of any “conflict of interest” which would justify the rather sweeping mandate of the majority ordering the federal district court to inquire into matters occurring in the state court over 18 years ago, even predating Holloway v. Arkansas, supra.
II. Double Jeopardy
In resolving the double jeopardy issue, the ultimate question is whether requiring a state prisoner to serve a 25-year sentence which violates the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution, Amendment V, constitutes a fundamental miscarriage of justice: To me, at least, the answer thereto is rather obvious. In my best judgment, to require Selsor to serve a 25-year sentence which is unconstitutional is a classic example of a miscarriage of justice.
Selsor did not raise his double jeopardy claim in the Oklahoma courts until his second application for state post-conviction relief. The Oklahoma courts refused to consider Selsor’s claim of double jeopardy on its merits because it had not previously been raised and was therefore, under Oklahoma law, deemed to have been waived.
In such circumstance, Selsor cannot thereafter raise his double jeopardy claim in a federal habeas corpus proceeding because of his “procedural default” in the Oklahoma courts, unless he can show “cause and prejudice” for his default or “demonstrate that failure to consider the claim[ ] [in our ease, a claim of double jeopardy] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, -, 111 S.Ct. 2546, 2565, 115 L.Ed.2d 640 (1991). If he can show either, then he can raise his procedurally defaulted claim.
In the instant case, we are not concerned with the “cause and prejudice” exception to the “procedural default” rule, but we are concerned with the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception to that rule. The federal district court, and the majority of the panel, have held that the failure to hear Selsor’s double jeopardy claim on its merits does not result in a “fundamental miscarriage of justice.” I cannot agree.
In this connection, it should be emphasized that the State of Oklahoma and the federal district court agree that the 25-year sentence imposed on the robbery conviction vio*1039lates the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution since Selsor was also sentenced to life imprisonment on his felony-murder conviction. So, should we get to the merits of Selsor’s double jeopardy claim, he would prevail. Hence, the real issue is whether Selsor is barred from raising the double jeopardy issue in federal courts because of his procedural default in Oklahoma courts, or does he come within an exception to that rule?
More specifically: It is my understanding that where a state prisoner challenges his conviction in a federal habeas corpus proceeding on a constitutional ground not raised in state court, he is in procedural default and the federal courts will not consider the petition on its merits, unless there be “cause and prejudice,” or the failure to hear the petition on its merits would constitute “a miscarriage of justice.” In Sawyer v. Whitley, — U.S. -, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992), the Supreme Court at-, 112 S.Ct. at 2519 spoke as follows:
A prototypical example of “actual innocence” in a colloquial sense is the case where the State has convicted the wrong person of the crime.
However, it is also my understanding that where a state prisoner challenges in a federal habeas corpus proceeding the sentence imposed by a state court on constitutional grounds, which is our case, he need not show actual innocence of the crime in order to come within the “miscarriage of justice” exception to the procedural default rule, and that to come within the exception he need only show that he was “actually innocent” of the sentence imposed.
So, in Sawyer v. Whitley, — U.S.-, 112 S.Ct. 2514, 120 L.Ed.2d 269 (1992), the state prisoner was actually guilty of the crime of murder and did not claim actual innocence of that offense, but the Supreme Court nonetheless went on to consider, and reject, on its merits his claim that there was constitutional error in the sentencing phase of his case which constituted a miscarriage of justice.
In Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 106 S.Ct. 2661, 91 L.Ed.2d 434 (1986), the state prisoner was actually guilty of murder and did not claim actual innocence of that offense, but only complained about constitutional error in his sentencing. In that case, the Supreme Court considered, but rejected on its merits the petitioner’s claim that the death sentence constituted a miscarriage of justice.4
Juxtaposing Smith and Sawyer, the Supreme Court in Sawyer in defining “actual innocence” in the sentencing phasé of a capital case, spoke as follows at p.-, 112 S.Ct. at p. 2521:
Considering Louisiana law as an example, then, there are three possible ways in which “actual innocence” might be defined. The strictest definition would be to limit any showing to the elements of the crime which the State has made a capital offense. The showing would have to negate an essential element of that offense. The Solicitor General, filing as amicus curiae in support of respondent, urges the Court to adopt this standard. We reject this submission as too narrow, because it is contrary to the statement in Smith that the concept of “actual innocence” could be applied to mean “innocent” of .the death penalty. 477 U.S., at 537, 106 S.Ct., at 2668. This statement suggested a more expansive meaning to the term of “actual inno*1040cence” in a capital case than simply innocence of the capital offense itself.
(emphasis added).
In Steele v. Young, 11 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir.1993), our Court spoke about “factual innocence,” but nonetheless went on to consider, and reject on its merits, the petitioner’s claim that his sentences violated the double jeopardy clause.5 So, this Court in Young, as the Supreme Court did in Sawyer and Smith, referred to the “actual innocence” (“factual innocence” in Young) test, but nonetheless went on to consider, and reject, on its merits the petitioner’s claim that failure to hear his proeedurally barred claim would result in a miscarriage of justice. It would seem to me that if the Supreme Court in Sawyer and Smith had found a miscarriage of justice it would have fashioned some sort of a remedy.
This Court held in Young that there was no double jeopardy violation, since there were multiple assaults, a holding with which I am in complete accord.6 However, I would assume that had this Court in Young found a double jeopardy violation, it might well have equated such with a miscarriage of justice and fashioned a remedy therefor. Otherwise, why consider the matter?
In any event, in our case all agree that the 25-year sentence on the robbery charge violates the double jeopardy clause, and I still believe that to require Selsor to serve an unconstitutional 25-year sentence is a miscarriage of justice. A 25-year sentence is not de minimis, and to hold that Selsor must serve that sentence is, in my view, a “prototypical example” of a miscarriage of justice.
In sum, failure to hear on its merits Sel-sor’s claim of double jeopardy will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, and accordingly, Selsor comes within the exception to the procedural default rule. Considering, then, Selsor’s claim of double jeopardy on its merits, all agree that the 25-year sentence on the robbery conviction violates the double jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution.

. We are advised that the record of the state court proceedings was damaged, to some degree, as the result of a fire.

. The second ground relates to Selsor’s claim of double jeopardy as concerns his sentence for armed robbery.

. In Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972), the Supreme Court held that a violation of the Bruton rule was subject to the "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” exception where there was overwhelming evidence of guilt which included the defendant's own confession.

. As indicated, the Supreme Court has considered the "fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception to the "procedural default” rule in capital cases involving both a challenge to the conviction and a challenge only to the sentence. We find nothing in those cases to indicate that the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception applies to capital cases only. We perceive no logical reason why the same rule should not apply to non-capital cases. A "fundamental miscarriage of justice” is as likely to occur in a non-capital case as in a capital case. And, though the consequences of a miscarriage of justice in a capital case may be more dire, and permanent, than in a non-capital case, still 25 years imprisonment is not a trifle. For cases considering the “fundamental miscarriage of justice” exception to.the "procedural default” rule in non-capital cases, see Mills v. Jordan, 979 F.2d 1273, 1279 (7th Cir.1992); Smith v. Collins, 977 F.2d 951, 959 (5th Cir.1992), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 97, 126 L.Ed.2d 64 (1993); and Jones v. Arkansas, 929 F.2d 375, 381 (8th Cir.1991).

. In Young, which involved a constitutional challenge to petitioner’s sentences, we quoted language from Herrera v. Collins, - U.S. -, -, 113 S.Ct. 853, 862, 122 L.Ed.2d 203 (1993), which involved a constitutional challenge to petitioner's conviction, to the effect that "[t]he fundamental miscarriage of justice exception is available ‘only where the prisoner supplements his constitutional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence.' " (quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986)) (emphasis added by Herrera). Herrera, in turn, was based on Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454, 106 S.Ct. 2616, 2627, 91 L.Ed.2d 364 (1986), where the petitioner had also challenged his conviction on constitutional grounds.

. In Young, the petitioner claimed that it was double jeopardy to convict him under Oklahoma's statutes on assault and battery with a dangerous weapon and assault and battery with a deadly weapon with an intent to kill, and then sentence him to separate and consecutive sentences on two convictions. As indicated, we held in Young that since there were numerous assaults, not just one, there was no double jeopardy violation. We note that we did not dispose of Young on the basis that the "actual innocence of the sentence" concept applies only where a capital offense is involved in the claim of double jeopardy.