Court Opinion

ID: 9885616
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:08:07.164784+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:55.351412
License: Public Domain

Mahoney, P. J., and Mikoll, J.,
dissent and vote to reverse in the following
memorandum by Mahoney, P. J. Mahoney, P. J. (dissenting). We respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision since, in our view, two errors committed during the course of the trial require reversal of defendant’s conviction. The first error committed was the action taken by the trial court in dismissing two of the jurors after the trial had commenced. The majority correctly points out that the statutory ground for juror discharge contained in CPL 270.35 (“that a juror is grossly unqualified to serve in the case”) is satisfied when it becomes obvious that a particular juror possesses a state of mind which would prevent the rendering of an impartial verdict. However, we fail to find proof in the instant record supportive of such a finding with regard to the two jurors who were dismissed. In fact, after extensive questioning by the trial court and counsel for both sides, the two jurors involved unhesitatingly stated that, although bothered by certain mannerisms of the prosecutor and other distractions which occurred in the courtroom, those feelings would not prevent them from being “fully fair and fully impartial between the parties” and rendering a verdict based solely on the evidence and the law. Their statements did not evince a jaundiced view of the judicial system and it was entirely speculative and without any basis in the record for the trial court to conclude that “it would be impossible for [the two jurors] under the circumstances here to just render the verdict based solely on the evidence and the law”. It was therefore improper for the trial court to find that the two jurors were “grossly unqualified” and to dismiss them over defense counsel’s objection. The prejudice which resulted from those erroneous dismissals stems from defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial (NY Const, art I, § 2). This right does not guarantee a trial by any jury, but rather a particular jury chosen according to law in whose selection defendant has had a voice (Hildreth v City of Troy, 101 NY 234; People v Freistadt, 23 Misc 2d 534). The trial court may not itself select the jury, either directly or indirectly, by dismissing as incompetent jurors who the law declares are competent (Hildreth v City of Troy, supra, p 239). Additional *623error was committed by the trial court during cross-examination of defendant. A pretrial Sandoval ruling had indicated that defendant’s credibility could be impeached, should he decide to take the stand, by introducing evidence of defendant’s conviction of a felony in 1959 without mentioning the nature of the felony, which involved narcotics, or its underlying circumstances. The trial court went on to rule that the People could explore the nature of the 1959 conviction in the event that defendant denied, in an affirmative sense on direct examination, that he had ever been involved with drugs. When defendant did ultimately elect to take the stand in his own defense, the fact of the 1959 felony conviction was brought out by defense counsel on direct examination in a strategic attempt to minimize the damage that this fact would have on defendant’s credibility. Obviously aware of the trial court’s previous Sandoval ruling, however, defense counsel did not question defendant regarding whether he had ever been involved with drugs. On cross-examination, the trial court allowed the prosecution, over objection, to inquire into the circumstances underlying the 1959 conviction on a theory that such questioning was permissible under People v Molineux (168 NY 264) in that it was relevant on the issue of defendant’s intent as an element of the crime charged. As hinted by the majority, this ruling was erroneous. While it is certainly true that evidence of prior criminal conduct can be introduced when it is relevant to one of the elements of the specific crime charged and is not being introduced to show the defendant’s general propensity to commit crimes (see, e.g., People v Vails, 43 NY2d 364), this evidence will normally be introduced as part of the People’s case and cannot be explored on cross-examination of a defendant who has not raised the subject on his direct testimony. Defendant in this case, having obtained a Sandoval ruling regarding his 1959 conviction, had the right to rely on that ruling. His decision about whether to testify in his own behalf should have been made without fear that the particular details of that drug-related conviction would be brought out on cross-examination so long as he did not deny any involvement with drugs on direct examination. Contrary to the position taken by the majority, the trial court’s error in allowing this cross-examination was not rendered harmless by defendant’s subsequent denial of ever having sold heroin during his lifetime. Since this denial was made in answer to a question asked by the prosecutor on cross-examination, it cannot be said that defendant was attempting to use his Sandoval ruling as a sword. Thus, a review of the record in this case demonstrates that the prosecution was effectively able to circumvent the trial court’s Sandoval ruling by asking defendant about the particular details of his 1959 felony conviction. Even though the articulated reason for allowing this line of questioning was that it was relevant to the issue of intent as an element of the crime charged, the trial court compounded the error by instructing the jury on at least two different occasions that the circumstances underlying the 1959 conviction could be considered with respect to the issue of intent to sell and defendant’s credibility. Assuming, arguendo, that the testimony elicited from defendant on cross-examination was probative of the crime charged, the trial court’s instructions that the jury could use that evidence in weighing defendant’s credibility was erroneous, extremely prejudicial and in direct contradiction to that court’s prior Sandoval ruling. Accordingly, it is our view that the errors committed during the trial require reversal of defendant’s conviction and a new trial.