Court Opinion

ID: 9631869
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:53:38.981678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:29:53.645365
License: Public Domain

TOOZE J.,
SPECIALLY CONCURRING.
I concur in the result reached by Justice Latotjrette, and also in most of his reasoning. However, I would go one step further and hold, without equivocation, that injunction is a proper remedy in this case, if not the most appropriate remedy. Being of that opinion, I feel that it is wholly unnecessary to adopt the theory that this is a proceeding for a declaratory judgment, with injunctive relief merely an incident. But I do not wish to be understood as questioning the propriety of a declaratory judgment proceeding as applied to the instant case.
At the outset, it might be stated that we all apparently seem to be in agreement upon the proposition that the attempted annexation in this case is void because of unreasonableness. The only real difference in opinion is a dispute as to the proper remedy available to test its illegality. Mr. Justice Ltjsk maintains that quo warranto in the name of the State is the ex-*167elusive remedy, and that injunction at the suit of a private person will not lie. For the reasons’ to be stated, I find myself unable to subscribe to the doctrine enunciated by my worthy associate.
It is the law that any person threatened with substantial injury by the enforcement of a void act of a municipal corporation has the right to protect himself by injunction. The exercise of this right is not dependent upon the consent of any other person, natural or artificial. If I correctly understand that which is said in the opinion of Justice Lijsk, he clearly concedes that that is the law. However, as I understand his position, it is that the alleged illegality of the questioned act must appear upon the face of the record before injunction will lie at the suit of a private individual, and that it cannot be established aliunde the record.
With this position, as applied to the instant case, I do not agree. It is crystal clear from the reasoning of Justice Lusk, as well as from the authorities he relies upon in support thereof, that if, in annexing territory, a municipal corporation omits to follow some jurisdictional requirement, such as to hold a proper election, its action is void and subject to attack in an injunction suit.
I am sure that we are united in our opinion that, in the annexation statute involved here, there is, by implication, written therein a requirement that a municipal corporation taking advantage thereof must act reasonably. This requirement of reasonableness is just as important and jurisdictional as the requirement that the land sought to be annexed be contiguous, or that an election be held to determine the question in the manner outlined in the statute. It is obvious that there might be many cases in which the fact of contiguity would not appear upon the face of the record, and *168where evidence would be required to establish the facts, whatever they might be. But the fact of noncontiguity, however established, would render the proceeding entirely void.
The contention of Justice Lusk that quo warranto is an exclusive remedy in a case of this kind is based upon the sole premise that we are here dealing with a de facto corporation. In such cases, he maintains, an injunction suit amounts to a collateral attack, and, under the law, that is not permissible. It would seem to follow, therefore, that if his original premise is wrong, his contention must fail. It is my opinion that his premise is erroneous.
It is the law that there cannot be a de facto corporation unless there should be possible a de jure corporation. 37 Am Jur, Municipal Corporations, 630, § 11; 62 CJS, Municipal Corporations, 106, § 30.
Webster defines “de facto” as follows:
“Actually; in fact; in reality; — distinguished from de jure. A de facto corporation, court, officer, or the like, must exist under a claim and color of right, which' requires that there should be possible a de jure corporation, court, officer, or the like. * * *” (Last italics ours.)
I am firmly of the opinion that under no circumstances whatever could the combined territory embraced within the corporate limits of the city of Estacada as heretofore established, and that sought to be annexed, become a de jure municipal corporation. There is no statutory or other authority which would authorize the creation of such a corporation. The vote taken was upon the whole of the proposed annexation, not upon separate parts thereof. It must, therefore, be considered as a whole. No court has the jurisdiction *169to divide it into parts. It either is all good, or it is all bad. Being unreasonable and, hence, invalid, there exists no statute to give it any support. Insofar as the particular situation now before this court is concerned, the effect must necessarily be the same as though there existed no annexation statute whatever. Also, aside from the question of reasonableness, property to be added to a city must be subject to annexation. Plaintiff’s property was not so subject.
Justice Lusk, in his opinion, makes the statement that “this is not want of jurisdiction, but the erroneous exercise of jurisdiction.” I disagree. In my opinion, the defendant city wholly lacked jurisdiction to incorporate into its limits the tract of land it sought to annex. There is absolutely nothing the city can or could do to make this proposed annexation, considered as a whole, a reasonable exercise of its power. It is beside the issue that it might lawfully have annexed a part of this tract. That it did not do, nor attempt to do. This particular attempted annexation never did and never could have the breath of life. It died “a hornin’ ”. In direct opposition to what Justice Lusk states, the question here does not involve a mere defect in the exercise of power; it is a total want of power to do the thing the city attempted to do. The organization of a de jure corporation was impossible.
Had the annexation proceeding been merely voidable, instead of being wholly void, there is much in the opinion of Justice Lusk with which I could agree. But it occurs to me that, where an act is void, it is void for all purposes, and it should be immaterial hbw the fact of invalidity is established. Manifestly, there are many situations which might arise where the void character of a proceeding would not appear on the face of the record, and it would require evidence to establish the *170fact; but that necessity does not render it less void. Is it logical to hold that a person threatened with immediate injury by the enforcement of such a void act is, nevertheless, deemed to be bound thereby until the state sees fit to move in setting it aside ? That his hands are so tied that he cannot act directly to protect himself? To me, such a proposition does not make sense. Why shouldn’t the real party in interest— he who is threatened with injury — have the right to move immediately in his own behalf ? Is anyone hurt because invalidity is established by evidence? As is so aptly pointed out by Justice Latourette, we sometimes concern ourselves overmuch with mere matters of form. If legal procedure is to successfully meet the challenge of an enlightened age, we should never sacrifice substance for mere form.
There is no disagreement among us upon the proposition that, if the proposed annexation is a nullity, injunction will lie. As indicated above, it is my opinion that it is an absolute nullity; the proposed new corporation never attained a de facto status.
The challenged annexation being void, plaintiff is entitled to its remedy by injunction.