Court Opinion

ID: 9652600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:28:02.588267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:09:25.197514
License: Public Domain

STONE, Circuit Judge (dissenting).
I am constrained to dissent from the able opinion of Judge SANBORN for the reasons hereinafter stated.
If one were to say that a person was “engaging * * * in * * * aeronautic operations,” every one would understand that he was occupied with some phase of operation of airplanes. In ordinary parlance, “engaging * * • in * * * aeronautic operations” means activity in the field of aeronautics. Usually, “engaging” would convey the idea of continued or repeated action as opposed to a single instance of activity [First Nat. Bank v. Phoenix L. Ins. Co., 62 F.(2d) 681, 682 (C. C. A. 6); Head v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 43 F.(2d) 517 (C. C. A. 10); Gits v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 32 F.(2d) 7, 9 (C. C. A. 7); Peters v. Prudential Ins. Co., 133 Misc. 780, 233 N. Y. S. 500; Price v. Prudential Ins. Co., 98 Fla. 1044, 124 So. 817, 820; People v. Bright, 203 N. Y. 73, 96 N. E. 362, 364, Ann. Cas. 1913A, 771; White v. Sikes, 129 Ga. 508, 59 S. E. 228, 229, 121 Am. St. Rep. 228; State v. Roberson, 136 N. C. 587, 48 S. E. 595, 596; Guiltinan v. Met. L. Ins. Co., 69 Vt. 469, 38 A. 315], although it might refer to active participation ' in a single operation. Certain ly, a prime requisite of “engaging in” anything is a participation therein in some way and to some degree. Benham v. Am. Central L. Ins. Co., 140 Ark. 612, 617, 217 S. W. 462. A person who has no connection with aeronautics except to ride in- a plane as a passenger does not actively participate in the operation of that plane and has no connection with any other aeronautic operations. If he is “engaged” in anything, it is in riding in the plane. A railroad passenger is in no way engaged in. railroad operations in any usual sense of such words, and they would never carry that meaning in ordinary communication. But the policy in regard to this “engaging” states “as passenger or otherwise”; therefore, the final problem of construction is whether the additional words “as passenger or otherwise” would make it entire-' ly clear that “engaging * * * in * * * aeronautic operations” was intended to apply to a mere passenger who had no further connection with such operations than to ride in a plane. Obviously, the policy intended to exclude passengers engaging in aeronautic operations. Are all passengers so engaged, are any so engaged, or are only some so engaged? Appellant argues that all of the language of the policy provision is given full effect in accordance with its ordinary meaning if it be applied (as to passengers) to such as are occupied with airplane operations, whether they have anything to do with operation of the particular plane or not — such as executive officers of plane companies or others. The reason suggested by appellant why *277the insurance company might wish to except this class of passengers from ordinary passengers is that such would probably make frequent use of airplanes while the ordinary person would rarely do so, and the insurer might be willing to take the risk of a very rare airplane trip when it would he unwilling to chance the frequent airplane traveler. It seems to me this argument is entirely plausible. It has been judicially recognized as such in Gits v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 32 F.(2d) 7, 9 (C. C. A. 7). The words used are, without any explanation, incapable of construction aciiording to the ordinary meaning of all of them. They must either be explained or some of them must he warped from ordinary meaning if significance is to be given to all. In such a situation the expression is ambiguous. When this situation is clarified by a showing that there is a sensible meaning relating to the risk which will give full effect to every word used, the insured is re-enforced in his position that such must be the meaning intended. I must conclude, from the above, that the judgment should be reversed and the case remanded.