Court Opinion

ID: 9731529
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 15:49:09.745967+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:19.265927
License: Public Domain

SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that *675regardless of whether all or part of the defendant’s testi-. mony is construed as exculpatory, the general rule governing lesser included offense instructions is applicable— the court gives lesser included offense instructions when evidence exists that provides a rational basis for an acquittal on the greater charge and a conviction on the lesser one.
I also agree with the majority’s decision to depart from its past practice of remanding the case to the court of appeals for that court to address issues not addressed in its original opinion although the issues had been briefed and could be decided by this court. See supra, pp. 666-674. As I have written previously, in the interest of judicial economy, speedy resolution of appeals, reduced costs to the litigants, and finality of decisions, if all the issues have been briefed I would have this court decide the entire case when it is before us on review.1
I write separately, however, because I conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the evidence warranted jury instructions on several lesser included offenses as requested by the defendant.
The standards for determining when an offense is “lesser included” are found in sec. 939.66, Stats. 1981-82. Sec. 939.66(2) provides a special rule for lesser included offenses applicable to homicide cases: all less serious types of criminal homicide are considered to be included within all more serious types of homicide. Thus manslaughter (imperfect self-defense), sec. 940.05(2),2 *676and homicide by reckless conduct, sec. 940.06, are lesser included offenses when the charge is second-degree murder as in this case.3
I conclude that the circuit court was required, for example, to instruct the jury on manslaughter (imperfect self-defense). To justify an instruction on manslaughter (imperfect self-defense) there must be evidence to afford grounds for a jury to find that the elements of second-degree murder have been established beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant committed the act causing the death believing that the act was necessary in self-defense, but that his belief was unreasonable under the circumstances. See Wis. J.I. — Cr. 1140 ;4 Dickey and Fullin, *677Modernizing Wisconsin’s Homicide Statutes, Jan. 1984 Wis. Bar Bull. 14.
To enable the jury to find the defendant guilty of second-degree murder under sec. 940.02(1), Stats. 1981-82, the state must prove three elements. The first statutory element is that the defendant caused the death of another human being. The second element is that the death was caused by “conduct imminently dangerous to another.” Conduct imminently dangerous to another has been defined by this court as “conduct that is dangerous in and of itself . . . inherently and consciously dangerous to life and not such as might casually produce death by misadventure.” Hogan v. State, 36 Wis. 226 (1874). See also Wis. J.I. — Cr. 1130.
*678The third statutory element of second-degree murder is that the conduct must evince “a depraved mind, regardless of human life.” In State v. Weso, 60 Wis. 2d 404, 411-12, 210 N.W.2d 442 (1973), the court described a depraved mind as follows:
“To constitute a depraved mind, more than a high degree of negligence or recklessness must exist. The mind must not only disregard the safety of another but be devoid of regard for the life of another. . . . The statute gives one element of a depraved mind, namely, a disregard for human life. ... A depraved mind has a general intent to do the acts and the consciousness of the nature of the acts and possible result but lacks the specific intent to do the harm.”
See also State v. Dolan, 44 Wis. 2d 68, 73-74 and n. 2, 170 N.W.23 822 (1969).
This court has also said that conduct which evinces a “depraved mind” lacks “justification or excuse.” Justification or excuse which bears a relationship to the conduct is inconsistent with the type of conduct which evinces a complete disregard for the life of another. See, e.g., State v. Dolan, supra, 44 Wis. 2d at 73-74, n. 2; State v. Weso, supra, 60 Wis. 2d at 412.
The majority must first ask whether the evidence in the case is sufficient to prove guilt of second degree murder. At this stage of the analysis all evidence relating to the justification or excuse of imperfect self-defense must be rejected. I agree with the majority that an instruction on second-degree murder, the greater offense, was required in this case.
The question then becomes whether an instruction on the lesser offense of manslaughter was required because there was sufficient evidence to establish both guilt of manslaughter and a reasonable ground for acquittal of second-degree murder. At this stage of the analysis the majority should look at the record to see if there is evi*679dence of imperfect self-defense; such evidence would be sufficient to establish guilt of manslaughter and a reasonable basis for acquittal of second-degree murder on the ground that the conduct did not evince a depraved mind. Without discussion or analysis of the defendant’s testimony and that of the other witnesses as to the defendant’s claim of self-defense, the majority opinion merely concludes that there is no evidence in the record that raises a reasonable doubt that the defendant’s conduct evinced a depraved mind. Swpra p. 666.
I conclude that the record contains sufficient evidence of justification or excuse to sustain a conviction of manslaughter (imperfect self-defense) and to leave reasonable doubt that the conduct evinced a depraved mind (second-degree murder).
The defendant testified that he feared the bartender would kill him. The defendant testified that he knew a gun was near the cash drawer. The bartender testified that he walked to the cash register in search of a gun that was kept there. The defendant admitted firing two shots toward the bartender. He denied shooting his pistol down the stairwell. The defendant testified that he did not know that the victim was following him. The defendant testified that he was concerned about the bartender and the patrons jeopardizing bis safety. Patrons of the bar testified that the defendant fired four shots, the last of which struck the victim, and that no one else appeared to have a gun. There was evidence that all the shots were fired in ten seconds or less.
When considering the evidence before it, the jury is not confined in its findings to matters that are directly set forth in the testimony, but may draw reasonable inferences from the testimony. The jury may, for example, base an inference of a lesser included offense on a reconstruction of events that is fairly inferable from the *680evidence, that is gleaned from putting together all the testimony and the jury’s own experiences.
The jury in this case could have reasonably concluded on the basis of all the evidence that the defendant was mistaken as to the number of shots he fired and that he had fired all the shots in the unreasonable belief that he had to defend himself against the bartender or a patron. The trial court instructed the jury on self-defense as to the defendant’s shooting the bartender. The evidence justifying the self-defense instruction coupled with the evidence that the defendant was afraid that other patrons of the bar would attack him would have supported a jury finding that the defendant’s shooting the victim, who was his friend and accomplice, was not conduct evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, but was a killing of an “innocent” third party under an unreasonable belief that the shooting was necessary in self-defense.
A similar analysis should have been employed by the trial court and the majority before concluding that the requested instructions on a lesser included offense were not required.
For the reasons set forth, I cannot join the result reached by the majority. I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals.

 See, e.g., Soquet v. Soquet, 117 Wis. 2d 553, 561, 345 N.W.2d 401 (1984) (Abrahamson, J., concurring); Shopper Advertiser v. Department of Rev., 117 Wis. 2d 223, 236, 344 N.W.2d 115 (1984) (Abrahamson, J., concurring and dissenting); Radtke v. City of Milwaukee, 116 Wis. 2d 550, 558, 342 N.W.2d 435 (1984) (Abra-hamson, J., concurring and dissenting); Crown Life Ins. Co. v. LaBonte, 111 Wis. 2d 26, 45, 330 N.W.2d 201 (1983) (Abraham-son, J., concurring and dissenting).

 Manslaughter under sec. 940.05(2), Stats. 1981-82, requires causing the death of a human being “unnecessarily, in the exercise of his privilege of self-defense or defense of others. . . .”

 Homicide by reckless conduct under sec. 940.06(2), Stats. 1981-82, requires “an act which creates a situation oí unreasonable risk and high probability of death or great bodily harm to another. . . .”

 Wis. J.I. — Cr. 1140 reads as follows:
“MANSLAUGHTER: CAUSING DEATH OF ANOTHER UNNECESSARILY IN THE EXERCISE OF SELF-DEFENSE: FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE MURDER SUBMITTED
“Manslaughter, as defined in section 940.05(2) of the Criminal Code of Wisconsin, is committed by one who causes the death of another human being unnecessarily, in the exercise of his privilege of self-defense.
“Before the defendant may be found guilty of manslaughter for causing the death of another unnecessarily, in the exercise of his privilege of self-defense, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that there were present the following three elements of this offense:
“First, there must exist all of the elements of either first or second degree murder as I have defined them to you;
“Second, the killing must not have been privileged under the law of self-defense as I have defined that privilege for you;
“Third, the defendant must have killed .. believing that his act was necessary in self-defense but his belief was unreasonable under the circumstances. In other words he believed that his action was necessary in the exercise of his privilege of self-defense but actually his belief was unreasonable *677because a reasonable person would not have believed that he was privileged at all to use force under the circumstances or a reasonable person would not have used as much force as was used by the defendant. In determining whether the defendant’s belief was reasonable, you must consider the question from the standpoint of the defendant at the time of his actions and not from the viewpoint of the jury now.
“The standard you must apply is what a person of ordinary intelligence and prudence would have done in the position of the defendant under the circumstances existing at the time of the alleged offense. In applying this standard, you must consider whether a reasonable person would have believed that he was privileged to act in self-defense and whether he would have believed that the amount of force used was proper under the circumstances.
“If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence in this case that the defendant caused the death of .... . in a manner constituting murder in the first or second degree, hut you find that the defendant committed the act causing .’s death believing that his act was necessary in self-defense but that his belief was unreasonable under the circumstances, then you should find defendant guilty of manslaughter.
“If, however, you are not so satisfied, then you must find the defendant (not guilty) (not guilty of manslaughter).”