Court Opinion

ID: 9769280
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 14:43:11.27069+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:36:40.850371
License: Public Domain

OPINION ON STATE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING

MANSFIELD, Judge.
Richard Brimage, Jr., appellant, was convicted of capital murder — murder committed in the course of committing or attempting to commit a kidnapping — under TexJPenal Code 19.03(a)(2) (1985). The jury answered the special issues under Tex.Code Crim.Proc. 37.071(b) (1985) in the affirmative, and punishment was assessed at death in accordance with Tex.Code Crim.Proc. 37.071(e) (1985).
Automatic appeal was made to this Court which, on September 21, 1994, reversed the judgment of the trial court and remanded the cause for a new trial. The State’s motion for rehearing was granted on February 8, 1995. We now affirm the judgment of the trial court, and will proceed to address appellant’s twelve points of error.
I. Facts
During the morning of October 5, 1987, appellant telephoned Mary Beth Kunkel, the complainant in this matter. Appellant knew complainant because his supervisor at the Lockheed plant where he worked was her boyfriend. Complainant’s mother initially answered the phone and appellant said his name was “George.”
Appellant asked complainant to come by his house on West Richard Street in Kings-ville to pick up some drafting tools belonging to her boyfriend. He told her not to tell her mother where she was going. Complainant left her home about 8:00 a.m. and was observed turning her car onto West Richard Street (appellant lived at 1135 West Richard Street) at that time. Her mother testified that at the time complainant left, she was wearing a red shirt or blouse, a turtleneck and green walking shorts.
The house at 1135 West Richard Street was owned by appellant’s parents. Appellant had his own room and had keys to the house and to his parents’ cars. At the time the events described herein occurred, appellant’s parents were out of town on an extended vacation.
Later on October 5, complainant’s boyfriend, Michael Beagley, noticed her car parked at Texas A & I University with her purse inside the ear. As the car was unlocked and parked on a part of the Texas A & I campus where complainant never parked, Beagley became concerned about her safety. It is not clear from the record exactly when the police were notified as to the concern about complainant’s whereabouts, but Captain George Gomez of the Kingsville Police Department testified that he became aware of a missing persons report concerning complainant during the morning of October 6. He commenced an investigation that afternoon.
On Wednesday, October 7, friends of complainant began circulating fliers with her picture calling attention to her disappearance. The police investigation soon uncovered information that appellant might be involved, i.e., he had quit his job without informing his employer, he knew complainant, her car was parked on the part of the Texas A & I campus near his residence, and inability on the part of either the police or his employer to contact him.1 That morning, the police went to appellant’s residence. No one responded to their knocks on the door. After finding all the doors and windows locked and the lights out, the police concluded no one was home and left.
Captain Gomez contacted Roy Turcotte, an attorney and relative of appellant. He told Turcotte he had reason to suspect appellant *496in the disappearance of complainant and asked for permission to search appellant’s residence. Turcotte stated he would try to contact appellant’s parents, but that he did not have authority to give consent to a search of the residence.
Later that day, Gomez went to the Rode-way Plaza Inn in response to a phone call, and was informed that appellant had stayed in Room 119 the night before and had not been seen since. Testimony at a pretrial hearing showed that between 9:00 p.m. and 9:30 p.m. on October 6, appellant paid cash for a one-night stay. Adelfa Flores, who was employed as a maid, testified that she entered Room 119 at 11:55 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on October 7 in order to clean the room, and found a suitcase and lots of papers. Based on instructions from the desk clerk, she returned at 3:00 p.m. and, finding the room in the same state as before, placed everything (the papers) in the suitcase, closed the suit-ease, and brought it to the front desk pursuant to the desk clerk’s instructions. She also testified she saw appellant several times on October 6 but never saw him on October 7. Checkout time at the Rodeway Plaza Inn for a guest paying for a one-night stay for the night of October 6-7 would be 12:00 p.m. on October 7.
Gomez stated that he went to the Rodeway Plaza Inn at about 8:30 p.m. on the 7th following a phone call from the motel. He opened the suitcase and found “a pair of scissors, a piece of red knit material that had been cut and appeared to have been cut with the scissors that were in the suitcase because the edges had red lint on them, and long strands of hair and some other — and—and the red piece of cloth had what appeared to be a dried bloodstain on it, sir.” Gomez concluded that the items in the suitcase were connected to complainant’s disappearance.
Gomez returned to the police station and met with Attorney Turcotte and State District Judge Max Bennett, appellant’s maternal uncle. He then proceeded to appellant’s residence with several police officers where they were met by Turcotte and Judge Bennett. Turcotte and Judge Bennett let them in the house and a search commenced.
The master bedroom was littered with clothing and other items. (Note: Appellant’s father testified at trial that the house was clean and tidy at the time they left on vacation.) There was a sheet covering the window even though it was already screened by both drapes and blinds. Part of the bottom of the window was broken. Some of the clothing was cut up and there were several bloodstains around the room. A pair of green shorts were found on the floor, along with a cut up bra, in plain view near the laundry basket.
Captain Gomez then proceeded to the garage, which was attached to the house and had room for two cars. A yellow Cadillac was parked in the garage. As Gomez approached the car, he saw what appeared to be bloodstains on the left rear quarter panel and smelled “the odor of something that was dead.” He opened the trunk and observed complainant’s body, with much of her clothing cut away. Less than 48 hours had elapsed between the time the police had been notified of complainant’s disappearance and discovery of her body.
Gomez testified that her wrists were bound, her legs were bent back behind her and tied to her elbows with shoelaces, and there was a ligature around her throat. He also testified there was something jammed down her throat and there were remnants of a red blouse on her.
The police remained at the house after discovery of complainant’s body and gathered more evidence. They secured the house at about 2:00 a.m. on October 8 and returned later that day to collect additional evidence. No search warrant was obtained prior to these searches.
Based on the evidence obtained at appellant’s residence, the Kingsville Police obtained an arrest warrant for appellant on October 8. Appellant was arrested the next morning at the King’s Inn in Corpus Christi and was confined in the Corpus Christi jail pending transfer to Kingsville.2 Appellant *497was interviewed in the Corpus Christi jail by Adan Munoz, an investigator from the District Attorney’s office for Kleberg, Nueces and Kenedy Counties. After being given the required written warnings by Munoz, appellant proceeded to give a written confession which describes in detail the last hours of complainant’s life. The confession was admitted as State’s Exhibit 235 and was taken by Adan Munoz and witnessed by Captain Gomez. Each page of the confession is headed by the written statements of rights required under Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Art. 38.22, § 2(a), and appellant acknowledged in writing by initialing, in each appropriate place, that he understood his rights and that he wanted to give up his rights and make a statement.
The confession in its entirety, reads as follows:
My name is Richard Lewis Brimage, Jr. I am 31 years old and I live at 1135 W. Richard, Kingsville, Texas. Last Thursday, October 1, 1987, I started trying to pick up some girls and party with, [sic] This went on through the weekend. On Monday, October 5, 1987 early at about 6 AM or 7 AM I called Mary Beth Kunkel at home. Her mother answered and I asked for Mary Beth. She came to the telephone and I told her I had some engineering tools for a gift for her boyfriend Mike. I knew if I told her they were for Mike she would come over to my house. She agreed to come over. She came over and I took her to the back bedroom where the tools were. As she looked at [sic] tools I grabbed her and she said, what Richard, what. I was standing behind her and grabbed her by the shoulders. She struggled and started screaming and I forced her into the master bedroom. She continued screaming and I kept hitting her and choking her. I wanted her sexually real bad and that is why I lured her to my house. We wrestled for a while and when she would not stop screaming, I finally choked her with my hands. I wasn’t sure she was dead, so I started to tie her up [sic] so she would not struggle anymore. I got some nylons and pulled her feet behind her back. I tied her hands to her feet where she was bent out of shape. I remember seeing blood on her face and blood on my pants. I want to say that during this time another guy was with me. His name is Leo Molina. Leo had been with me for the past three or four days. I woke him up to tell him Mary Beth was coming over. I told him to wait in the back bedroom where all the struggle took place. While she was screaming we decided to inject her with some cocaine to stop her from screaming. We managed to do so. She kept going wild, trying to escape. I kept telling [sic] to stop screaming. Leo, I remember was trying to feel up her shorts and touch her between her legs. After I was certain she was dead, tied up, I took off her shorts, so I could admire her body. Before this I told Leo to take her car from in front of my house and park it at the college campus somewhere. While Leo was gone I picked up Mary Beth and put her in the trunk of my parents’ car. I had already told Leo to walk down Richard Street and I would come pick him up in my car. I saw him walking and I picked him up. I then drove to Alice, Texas and Leo was with me. We got a motel room and we stayed there until late Monday afternoon. I sat in the motel room until 5 or 6 in the afternoon. Leo had left the room to supposedly look for a cousin and find a way to get rid of the body and car. I now realized he had left me alone with the body and car. I first made a phone call to my neighbor, Mr. Robbins, pretended to be my dad and told Mrs. Robbins that I wanted someone to check the house, because the phone was busy. Mrs. Robbins told me that the garage door was up, my truck was in the garage and no signs of anyone in the house. I now decide to drive back to Kingsville.
On the way back I turned towards Bena-vides and stopped to look at the body. I wanted to touch her, but could not [sic] it. I then drove back to my house. It’s still daylight and I park the car back in the garage and shut the garage door. I was also the one that wrote out a note to use for a reference while I talked to her on the telephone. By her I mean Mary Beth. I did use the name George when I talked to *498her. I also remember cutting her blouse ■with a pair of scissors because I could not take it off, because she was tied up. When I returned from Alice I took off in my truck and went to look for Leo. I found him at his house and got some more cocaine. I had gone to the Motel 6 in Kings-ville, first, registered first though and then looked for Leo. I want to correct this, it was the Best Western, Kingsville, not Motel 6. I know that by calling Mary Beth and Luring her to the house was wrong, and I really wanted to have her sexually and when she did not do so I killed her.
I’m giving this statement of my own free will, with no promises in return for this statement. I’m fully aware of my actions now and will voluntarily sign this statement.
The case received a massive amount of publicity in the greater Corpus Christi area, including coverage on both English and Spanish language radio stations, television and in local newspapers. The trial court, concerned about this pretrial publicity, on its own motion transferred the case from Kle-berg County to Comal County, after conducting a hearing on December 4,1987.
Leo Molina, the individual referred to in appellant’s confession, testified at appellant’s trial. Molina’s version of the events that transpired on the morning of October 5 differed substantially from appellant’s version. Molina testified that he saw appellant drag the screaming complainant into the back bedroom.3 He then testified he observed appellant hitting complainant and observed him injecting her with cocaine. Molina testified he left the room while the struggle was still going on. Molina also testified he sold appellant cocaine on several occasions prior to October 5, 1987 and saw appellant inject himself with cocaine on several occasions. Molina denied any role in the death of complainant other than “holding her feet down with his foot” momentarily. Molina admitted he was convicted of a felony involving selling marihuana in 1977 and he received a ten-year term for aggravated robbery in 1981 (he was released in May of 1984).
Molina testified he agreed to plead guilty to the offense of murder and agreed to accept a sentence of fifty years for the death of complainant. He testified further he agreed to testify against appellant and he would be granted immunity with respect to that testimony.
Joseph Rupp, M.D., Medical Examiner for Nueces County since 1970 performed the autopsy on complainant’s body. He testified complainant could have died from any one of three causes: (1) ligature strangulation; (2) manual strangulation; and (3) asphyxiation by the sock obstructing her airway. He testified that he could not determine at what point during appellant’s attack complainant died. He testified further that it was likely the sock was stuffed down her throat after manual strangulation, when she was unconscious, and that appellant may not have known she was likely dead at that point. He testified the ligature in and of itself was sufficient to kill her and was placed around her neck after she was already dead.
Dr. Rupp testified there was no sign of injury to complainant’s vaginal or anal areas nor were any seminal fluids or pubic hairs not belonging to the complainant found. He also testified that the toxicology report indicated complainant’s urine tested positive for cocaine. He testified that while he could not pinpoint a time of death, it resulted rather quickly. Finally, he testified, “My opinion is that all three were calculated to cause death. The manual strangulation, the sock shoved all the way into the throat, and the ligature around the neck were all calculated to produce death.”
After the State and the defense concluded their presentations, the jury was instructed as to the statutory definitions of attempt, kidnap, restrain and abduct.4 The jury was charged as follows:
*499Now if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or about October 5,1987, in Kleberg County, Texas, that the defendant, Richard Brimage, Jr. did then and there intentionally cause the death of an individual, Mary Beth Kunkel, by strangling her with his hands or by strangling her with a ligature, or by suffocating her with a sock, in the course of committing or attempting to commit the kidnapping of Mary Beth Kunkel, then you will find the defendant guilty of capital murder as charged in the indictment.
The jury found appellant guilty of capital murder. During the punishment phase, the State called a woman who testified that on October 8, 1987 appellant offered women at the club she worked at money to come “party” with him. She also testified that he called her later that night to come to his motel room; she declined and never heard from him again.
A second woman, Susan May, who knew appellant and one of his sisters, testified appellant called her on September 21, 1987. She testified appellant told her he wanted her to come over to surprise his sister, who was returning from a trip. She agreed to come to appellant’s house. Once she was in the house, she testified appellant hit her from behind on the head with an object and then he jumped on top of her. She testified further that, after a minute or two, “something snapped,” he let her up and acted “more or less apologetic.” He asked her not to call the police. She left his house and, after making a couple of stops, went to the police station. She testified she reported what happened, but never filed formal charges. Finally she testified she had no further contact with the police concerning this matter prior to October 5,1987.
Evidence was introduced that appellant pled guilty in Washington to possession of stolen property on September 30, 1977 and successfully completed a two-year term of deferred adjudication for that offense. The offense arose out of a purse snatching involving an elderly lady; appellant did not snatch the purse but was found in possession of cash and jewelry taken from the purse.
On May 5, 1983, appellant pled guilty in Texas to the felony offense of forgery. Appellant’s father testified that appellant forged his parents’ signatures on checks drawn on their bank accounts to finance his drug habit. Appellant was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment, suspended, and was placed on probation for five years. About 2½ years later, appellant’s probation was revoked for failure to report to his probation officer and for failure to pay a supervisory fee required after his release from a drug rehabilitation program, Cenikor. Appellant was sentenced to two years in prison and was released in January of 1987.
Appellant called relatives and friends as witnesses, who testified that appellant would not be dangerous in the future. Lester Ewing, a detention officer for Kleberg County, testified that appellant had behaved himself during the three or four months he had been an inmate in the Kleberg County Jail from the time of arrest through the duration of his trial. Neither the State nor appellant offered any expert testimony on the issue of appellant’s future dangerousness.
The jury answered both special issues under Tex.Code Crim.Proe. Art. 37.071(b) (1985) in the affirmative. Appellant was sentenced to death in accordance with Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Art. 37.071(e) (1985).
II. Appellant’s Points of Error
In Point of Error Number One, appellant contends the trial court erred in ordering a transfer of venue from Kleberg County to Comal County on its own motion, over appellant’s timely objection. In Point of Error Two, appellant claims the trial court erred in admitting, over appellant’s timely objection, evidence and the fruits thereof which were obtained as a result of the search of appellant’s residence because the search violated both the United States and Texas Constitutions, as well as the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
Appellant claims, in Point of Error Number Four, the trial court erred in failing to grant appellant’s motion for new trial because its failure to control the conduct of the media dining pretrial proceedings and the *500trial itself resulted in appellant being denied due process of law.
In Point of Error Number Six, appellant argues because Ms confession was not voluntary, the trial court erred in failing to suppress the confession, over Ms timely objections. In a related Point of Error Number Seven, appellant contends the trial court erred in denying appellant’s request to make findings of facts and conclusions of law as to the voluntariness of appellant’s confession.
In Point of Error Number Eight, appellant contends the trial court erred in allowing the opimon testimony of Dr. Joseph Rupp on the ground that it was prejudicial.
Appellant contends, in Point of Error Number Nine, the trial court erred in failing to respond to appellant’s timely request to instruct the jury as to what to do if the jury could not answer unanimously a Special Issue “yes” or if less than ten jurors answer a Special Issue “no.”
In Point of Error Number Ten, appellant contends that the arrest of appellant was made pursuant to an unconstitutional arrest warrant and the trial court erred in overruling appellant’s timely motion to suppress the evidence of appellant’s arrest and the fruits thereof.
In Point of Error Number Eleven, appellant argues that the trial court erred in admitting in evidence certain articles found in appellant’s residence and motel room because such evidence was irrelevant and resulted in unfair prejudice to appellant.
Appellant contends, in Point of Error Number Twelve, the trial court erred in admitting evidence found during a search of Ms motel room and suitcase, over appellant’s timely objection.
On original submission, appellant raised twelve points of error. TMs Court addressed and overruled appellant’s Point of Error Number Three, in which he contended the trial court erred in not granting Ms motion for instructed verdict because the evidence was insufficient to show complainant was killed during a Mdnapping or attempted kidnapping as alleged in the indictment. TMs Court also addressed and overruled appellant’s Point of Error Number Five, in wMch he argued the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s affirmative answer to Special Issue number Two of the pumshment verdict, i.e., that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding beyond a reasonable doubt as to appellant’s future dangerousness.
Our disposition of Points of Error Numbers Three and Five is not disputed by the parties on rehearing and need not be readdressed.
TMs Court previously held that the search of appellant’s residence was illegal and evidence obtained in that search was admitted at trial in violation of Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Art. 38.23, and also held that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. In reversing appellant’s conviction for the above reason the Court agreed with appellant’s Point of Error Number Two. Accordingly, we will address appellant’s Point of Error Number Two first.
A. The Warrantless Search of Appellant’s Residence Was Valid Under the Emergency Doctrine
Both the Fourth Amendment to the Urnted States Constitution as well as Article I, Section 9 of the Texas Constitution forbid unreasonable searches and seizures. This Court has held that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable uMess they fall under one of a few exceptions. Kelly v. State, 669 S.W.2d 720 (Tex.Cr.App.), cert. denied 469 U.S. 963, 105 S.Ct. 362, 83 L.Ed.2d 298 (1984).
The Urnted States Supreme Court, other state courts and tMs Court have recognized that in very limited situations, an immediate search without a warrant is reasonable because of a risk of injury or death, a risk that would likely be magnified if the search was delayed due to the time involved in obtaining a warrant. See Bray v. State, 597 S.W.2d 763 (Tex.Cr.App.1980); Janicek v. State, 634 S.W.2d 687 (Tex.Cr.App.1982); Garcia v. State, 880 S.W.2d 189 (Tex.App.—Texarkana 1994) pet. ref. 9-21-94. The Emergency Doctrine (also known as the Exigent Circumstances Doctrine) has been formulated to allow immediate warrantless *501searches that would otherwise be illegal where there is reasonable cause to believe that, absent an immediate search, serious bodily harm or death may result. In Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 98 S.Ct. 2408, 57 L.Ed.2d 290 (1978), the Court held that “[njumerous state and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making warrant-less entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid. Similarly, when the police come upon the scene of a homicide they may make a prompt warrantless search of the area to see if there are other victims or if a killer is still on the premises.” Mincey, 437 U.S. at 392, 98 S.Ct. at 2413. The Court cited its ruling in Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978) in ruling further that “the police may seize any evidence that is in plain view during the course of their legitimate emergency activities.” Mincey, 437 U.S. at 393, 98 S.Ct. at 2413.5
The Emergency Doctrine has been construed to justify entry into a residence to try to locate an individual who has been reported as missing. People v. Wharton, 53 Cal.3d 522, 280 Cal.Rptr. 631, 809 P.2d 290 (1991), cert. denied 502 U.S. 1038, 112 S.Ct. 887, 116 L.Ed.2d 790 (1992). The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that a warrantless search of a dwelling to discover evidence that could reveal the location of an individual reported as missing is justified under the Emergency Doctrine. Chaney v. State, 612 P.2d 269, 277 (Okla.Crim.App.1980), cert. denied 450 U.S. 1025, 101 S.Ct. 1731, 68 L.Ed.2d 219 (1981). In United States v. Johnson, 9 F.3d 506 (6th Cir.1993), cert. denied - U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 2690, 129 L.Ed.2d 821 (1994), a warrantless search by police responding to a report of a burglary was found by the court to be justified on exigent circumstances grounds as they observed, upon arrival at the scene of the reported crime, broken windows and individuals moving around inside the residence who failed to identify themselves. A subsequent warrantless entry by the police bomb squad and federal law enforcement personnel was justified on the same grounds because the initial warrantless search discovered, in plain view, what appeared to be a pipe bomb plus items used to make a pipe bomb, and there was a good-faith reason for the officers to believe the potential presence of an explosive device represented a threat to public safety (the premises were located in a residential neighborhood).
The Seventh Circuit found a warrantless search of a crack house to be lawful as it was based on a report that a teenage girl might be there under circumstances indicating she was being held there against her will. United States v. Hughes, 993 F.2d 1313 (7th Cir.1991). Other courts have held warrant-less searches to be permissible under the Emergency Doctrine where the police had reason to believe kidnapped children were in defendant’s home and defendant had a rape record, State v. Stevens, 311 Or. 119, 806 P.2d 92 (1991); and where the police had reason to believe an injured woman was inside premises whose door was ajar and blood was on the floor near the entrance, Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 612 A.2d 258 (1992).
We have used an objective standard of reasonableness in determining whether a warrantless search is justified under the Emergency Doctrine. This objective standard of reasonableness used in evaluating the police’s conduct takes into account the facts and circumstances known to the police at the time of the search. Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937 (Tex.Cr.App.1992); Janicek, at 691. In the instant case, in order to determine whether the warrantless search by the Kingsville Police was reasonably based on a belief that an emergency existed, we must take into account the information then available to them.
When the officers decided to search appellant’s home without a warrant, the following facts were known to them:
(1) Complainant had been missing for over two days;
(2) Appellant was acquainted with complainant and her ear had been found, un*502locked and with her purse in plain view, parked near his residence in an area where she never parked according to her boyfriend;
(8) Complainant was observed on the morning of her disappearance driving near appellant’s residence;
(4) Six weeks earlier, another young lady reported to the police that appellant lured her to his house and attempted to assault her;
(5) Complainant was wearing a red blouse when last seen;
(6) A suitcase abandoned by appellant contained what appeared to be a piece cut from a red blouse which appeared to have a bloodstain on it as well as other cut-up women’s clothing, a pair of scissors and a piece cut from a pair of blue pajama pants.6
(7) A report from Judge Bennett who, on his own, entered appellant’s residence (Judge Bennett is appellant’s uncle) and who reported finding part of a pair of blue pajamas, other cut-up women’s clothing and evidence of a “violent struggle” in the master bedroom.
Captain Gomez testified that Judge Bennett told him “you need to get in there.” Captain Gomez was given no reason to believe Judge Bennett had conducted an exhaustive search of the house so as to exclude the possibility that complainant was somewhere on the premises.
Taking into account all of the above information, a reasonable police officer could conclude that an emergency existed and that there was a reasonable possibility that complainant was injured, in need of assistance, and possibly located somewhere in appellant’s residence (or information as to her whereabouts could reasonably be expected to be uncovered by a search of appellant’s residence). The police had no reason to believe complainant was already dead at that point in time, which would have eliminated the emergency.
At the suppression hearing, Captain Gomez testified as follows:
(Prosecutor) Okay. You weren’t looking for—What you went in and were looking for was a body, wasn’t it?
(Capt. Gomez) No. No, sir. I was not looking—I was hoping to find the young girl alive, sir.
Q. You were looking for a person.
A. I was looking for a person, yes, sir.
Captain Gomez then testified:
Q. I believe you noted in your reports, “I also saw several strands of hair, including a long single strand of brown hair.”
A. That’s correct.
Q. Well, did you feel that this was unusual?
A. Unusual, sir?
Q. Yes, sir. Why did you make note of it?
A. Because it was a single strand of long—well, I only found the one. I’m not sure of later the lab found any more. When I found that long strand of brown hair, because of the red cloth, the blood, the scissors, the address, the person who checked in the motel and now the long strands of brown hair, I had to find Richard Brimage, Jr., sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because I was afraid that if this girl was being held against her will, somewhere, she needed to get away or rescued. I didn’t know if she was in that house or not, sir.
In Alvarado v. State, 853 S.W.2d 17 (Tex.Cr.App.1993), this Court, citing Meek v. State, 790 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.Cr.App.1990), held: “At a suppression hearing, the trial judge is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight attributable to those witnesses. The judge may believe or disbelieve all or any part of a witness’s testimony. His findings should not be disturbed absent a clear abuse of discretion.” Alvarado, at 23.
Given the information known to the police at the time and based on the above excerpts from the testimony of Captain Gomez at the *503suppression hearing, there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find that the warrantless search of appellant’s residence was objectively reasonable under the Emergency Doctrine, the intent of the search being to locate complainant or, alternatively, to find evidence hopefully leading to the discovery of complainant at a different location.
Once the police officers entered appellant’s residence under the Emergency Doctrine to look for complainant or for evidence of her whereabouts, they were justified in opening the trunk of appellant’s parents’ car and seizing complainant’s body. Consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S.Ct. 2157, 72 L.Ed.2d 572 (1982), the search of the garage itself is lawful as it was attached to the residence—the search of which was lawful under the Emergency Doctrine—and thus part of the premises which could be searched pursuant to same.
This Court has held that the lawfulness of an emergency search terminates once the emergency ends. Bray v. State, 597 S.W.2d 763, 764 (Tex.Cr.App.1980). Thus, it is clear that the items of evidence discovered prior to location of complainant’s body were properly seized under the Emergency Doctrine. Furthermore, the police, upon discovering a potential homicide scene, may make a warrantless search of the premises to see if there are other victims or if the killer is somewhere on the premises. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. at 392, 98 S.Ct. at 2413.
In the present ease, the police continued to search appellant’s residence after finding complainant’s body. The record indicates the items seized and later admitted at trial—the cut up women’s clothing, the green shorts, the bloodstains—were in plain view of the police as they searched for complainant, or once her body was located, as they searched places where additional victims could have been hidden. We conclude, therefore, that complainant’s body and the evidence seized from appellant’s residence during the search for complainant (or for clues as to complainant’s whereabouts) or potential additional victims was lawfully seized under the Emergency Doctrine and thus the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ruling the evidence was admissible at trial. Point of Error Number Two is overruled.7’8
B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Finding Appellant’s Confession To Be Voluntary and Did Not Err in Not Making Findings of Fact And Conclusions of Law As to the Voluntariness of Appellant’s Confession
In Point of Error Number Six, appellant avers the trial court erred in failing to suppress, over his timely objection, appellant’s confession on the ground that it was not voluntary. In related Point of Error Number Seven, appellant claims the trial court erred in failing to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on the voluntariness of appellant’s confession despite appellant’s request that it do so.
The record shows appellant was arrested on October 9,1987 at about 4:00 a.m. Officer Cook testified he appeared to be calm, lucid and alert, and he was read his rights from a “Miranda Card” by Officer Cook. He was transported to the Nueces County Jail a few minutes later. He then became upset and made incriminating statements (no questions *504were asked) on his own initiative to jail counselor Kiki Rodriguez.
Investigator Munoz administered “Miranda” warnings to appellant again at 7:00 a.m. Appellant voluntarily gave his written confession, which, on each page, had at the top the statutory warnings (acknowledged in writing on each page by appellant) required under Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Art. 38.22, § 2(a) (1985). Appellant signed the statement, which was admitted as State’s Exhibit 235. Appellant was brought before a magistrate at 11:30 a.m. who found him to be calm and understood his rights. Appellant alleged at the suppression hearing that, due to his emotional state, his actions in deciding to make a statement were not voluntary.
The trial court found that “although defendant may have been upset at the time he was in custody, he was not so upset or otherwise disoriented that his actions in deciding to make a statement either [sic] to Mr. Munoz were not voluntary.” The court also found that appellant was not coerced, threatened or improperly induced to make a statement.
“Because the trial court is the sole trier of fact at a hearing on a motion to suppress, this Court is not at liberty to disturb any finding which is supported by the record ... we accordingly defer to those determinations.” Green v. State, 615 S.W.2d 700, 707 (Tex.Cr.App.1980), cert. denied 454 U.S. 952, 102 S.Ct. 490, 70 L.Ed.2d 258 (1981). See also Alvarado v. State, 853 S.W.2d 17 (Tex.Cr.App.1993); Smith v. State, 779 S.W.2d 417 (Tex.Cr.App.1989). Appellant fails to show any abuse of discretion by the trial court and the record amply supports its findings. Appellant fails to show he was prejudiced by not being brought before a magistrate prior to being interviewed by Investigator Munoz. Appellant fails to present evidence of any police misconduct or coercion related to his confession that would support his claim of involuntariness. Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). Appellant’s Point of Error Number Six is overruled.
The trial court made findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to appellant’s confession, and signed them on June 1, 1988. They are included as part of a supplemental transcript which was forwarded to this Court.
Appellant’s Point of Error Number Seven is overruled.
C. The Admission of the Opinion Testimony Of Dr. Rupp Was Not Error (Point of Error Number Eight)
Dr. Joseph Rupp testified at trial as the medical examiner who performed the autopsy on complainant’s body. During his testimony the prosecutor asked:
Prosecutor: When one has placed a sock that far down someone’s throat, does that indicate to you a conscious objective to cause death?
Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I’m going to object, that calls for a legal — ultimate legal conclusion by Dr. Rupp, and further it is not a proper question; it’s not within his area of expertise to speculate on what anyone’s conscious objective is.
The trial court overruled the objection and defense counsel noted an exception. Thereupon Dr. Rupp, after the jury was instructed they were free to accept or reject any opinion of his, gave the following answer: “My opinion is that all three were calculated to cause death. The manual strangulation, the sock shoved all the way into the — the throat, and the ligature around the neck were all calculated to produce death.” Defense counsel did not again challenge Dr. Rupp’s answer by either an objection or motion to strike.
Dr. Rupp did not answer the question to which the objection was made as his opinion related to all three causes of death. Dr. Rupp was clearly qualified to offer opinion testimony as to the cause of complainant’s death. Mays v. State, 563 S.W.2d 260 (Tex.Cr.App.1978). Appellant fails to show any harm or prejudice resulting from the trial court’s action allowing the State to ask the objeeted-to question which Dr. Rupp did not answer; appellant’s failure to object to the subsequent answer itself constitutes waiver as to any complaint as to its admissibility now.
Point of Error Number Eight is overruled.
*505D. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Failing to Respond To Appellant’s Timely Request to Instruct the Jury As to What To Do If It Could Not Unanimously Answer A Special Issue In the Affirmative or If Less Than Ten Jurors Answered A Special Issue in the Negative (Point of Error Number Nine)
Prior to submission of the charge on punishment to the jury, appellant requested that the following instruction be included: “If there is any special issue on which the vote of the jurors is not unanimously ‘yes,’ or not at least ten in favor of an answer of ‘no,’ then there shall be no answer for that special issue, and the presiding juror shall not sign his name to any answer for that special issue.” The trial court denied appellant’s request and overruled appellant’s objection to the punishment charge.
This Court has previously ruled that appellant’s requested instruction is not required. Ellis v. State, 726 S.W.2d 39 (Tex.Cr.App.1986), cert. denied 480 U.S. 926, 107 S.Ct. 1388, 94 L.Ed.2d 702 (1987). Appellant concedes this fact on page 38 of his Brief on Direct Appeal. Appellant does not present any compelling reasons for us to reexamine our holding in Ellis.
Point of Error Number Nine is overruled.
E. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Receiving Into Evidence Certain Items of a Sexual Nature, Nor Did Their Admission Result in Unfair Prejudice to Appellant
Appellant was originally indicted for capital murder alleged to have been committed during the course of an aggravated sexual assault and during the course of a kidnapping. The portion of the indictment relating to the allegation of aggravated sexual assault was struck on the first day of the trial and the State proceeded solely on the allegation that the murder occurred in the course of committing or attempting to commit kidnapping.
At trial, the State, over appellant’s objection, was permitted to introduce into evidence various items found in a motel room rented by appellant and from his residence. These items included: pornographic magazines, a cylindrical object, a jar of cold cream, a T-shirt and towel with semen stains, a razor and a can of shaving cream and a piece of leather with holes cut in it and pieces of clothing attached to it, described by the State as a sexual device. Appellant objected as each item was offered, on the grounds that they were not relevant and that their inflammatory nature outweighed their probative value. The trial court overruled appellant’s objections. In Point of Error Number Eleven, appellant contends these items were improperly admitted.
The complained of items were relevant with respect to the kidnapping element. Appellant’s own confession states: “I wanted her sexually real bad. And that is why I lured her to the house ... After I was certain she was dead, tied up, I took off her shorts so I could admire her body.” Appellant’s admissions clearly support the inference that he kidnapped complainant to force her to have sex with him and when she refused he killed her. The complained-of items tend to corroborate that appellant’s motive in kidnapping complainant was sexual in nature.
Tex.Rule Crim.Evid. 401 defines “relevant evidence” as “evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” The complained-of items are “relevant evidence” because they tend to show motive and therefore assisted the jury in drawing an inference that appellant had a motive for committing the kidnapping that was part of the offense of capital murder for which he was convicted. Calverley v. State, 511 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.Cr.App.1974), overruled on other grounds by Moosavi v. State, 711 S.W.2d 53 (Tex.Cr.App. 1986); Lassere v. State, 458 S.W.2d 81 (Tex.Cr.App.1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 920, 91 S.Ct. 906, 27 L.Ed.2d 822 (1971).
We have held that Tex.Rule Crim.Evid. 403 favors admission of relevant evidence and implies a presumption that relevant evidence will be more probative than prejudicial. McFarland v. State, 845 S.W.2d 824 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), cert. denied 508 U.S. *506963, 113 S.Ct. 2937, 124 L.Ed.2d 686 (1993). We have also held that Rule 403 requires exclusion of evidence only when there exists a clear disparity between the degree of prejudice of the offered evidence and its probative value. Joiner v. State, 825 S.W.2d 701 (Tex.Cr.App.1992), cert. denied — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 3044, 125 L.Ed.2d 729 (1993). Appellant does not offer any evidence to support his contention that the items described above were unduly prejudicial, inflamed the jury, or that their relevance was substantially outweighed by their prejudicial effect. We have also held that questions of admissibility of evidence under Tex.R.Crim.Evid., Rules 402-404, are assigned to the trial court and are reviewable on appeal only for abuse of discretion. Coffin v. State, 885 S.W.2d 140, 149 (Tex.Cr.App.1994). See also Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 429 (Tex.Crim.App.1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 975, 113 S.Ct. 1422, 122 L.Ed.2d 791. Appellant fails to show sueh an abuse of discretion. We overrule appellant’s Point of Error Number. Eleven.
F. The Evidence of the Arrest of Appellant, And the Fruits Thereof, Were Admissible As the Arrest Was Made Pursuant to a Constitutional Arrest Warrant Issued by a Neutral and Detached Magistrate
In Point of Error Number Ten, appellant asserts that the arrest of appellant was made pursuant to an unconstitutional arrest warrant and, therefore, the evidence of that arrest, and the fruits thereof, should have been suppressed by the trial court as per appellant’s motion to suppress.
Following discovery of the body of complainant, Kleberg County Justice of the Peace Bigger was summoned to the crime scene. Judge Bigger commenced an inquest pursuant to Tex.Code Crim.Proe. Chapter 49 (1987), observed the crime scene, and took control of the premises and the investigation. Judge Bigger then issued an arrest warrant for the appellant for the offense of capital murder based on his investigation and an affidavit filed by the police.
Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Art. 49.19 (1987) provides:
(a) a justice of the peace who is conducting an inquest of a death under this subehap-ter may issue a warrant for the arrest of a person suspected of causing the death if:
(1) the justice has knowledge that the person caused the death of the deceased;
(2) the justice receives an affidavit stating that the person caused the death; or
(3) evidence is adduced at an inquest hearing that shows probable cause to believe the person caused the death.
Judge Bigger acted within the scope of his duties as a justice of the peace in performing duties imposed on him by Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Art. 49. Moreover, the record does not support appellant’s position that Judge Bigger was acting as a law enforcement officer or a prosecutor. Appellant’s reliance on Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971) is misplaced. In Coolidge, the attorney general of New Hampshire issued a search warrant in a homicide case in which he took charge of the entire investigation, including all police activities. He later served as chief prosecutor at the trial. Given this, the Supreme Court held that the attorney general was not a neutral and detached magistrate, rendering the search warrant constitutionally defective under the Fourth Amendment.
Judge Bigger did not direct the police investigation in the present case and had no role in its prosecution. Judge Bigger’s exposure to evidence of the murder did not limit his neutrality or detachment. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 350, 92 S.Ct. 2119, 2124, 32 L.Ed.2d 783 (1972). The trial court, in its order, found that, by implication, Judge Bigger possessed the necessary neutrality and detachment at the time he issued the arrest warrant to meet the requirements of the Texas and United States Constitutions. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court; the record shows Judge Bigger relied on both personal knowledge and the police affidavit in issuing the warrant for appellant’s arrest.
Point of Error Number Ten is overruled.9
*507G. Evidence Obtained as a Result of a Search of Appellant’s Motel Room and a Suitcase Found There Was Properly Admitted In Evidence Against Appellant as Abandoned Property.
In Point of Error Number Twelve, appellant avers the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress evidence found in a search of his room at the Rodeway Inn. The record shows that appellant cheeked into room 119 at the Rodeway Inn during the evening of October 6,1987. He paid cash for a one night stay. Check out time was noon. Appellant did not check out the next day. The maid found the room empty at 11:55 a.m. except for papers on the desk and a closed suitcase. The room key was on the dresser. The maid checked the room again at 2 p.m. and 3 p.m.; after the 3 p.m. check the front desk clerk instructed the maid to put the papers into the suitcase and bring it to the front desk. This was done. That evening, Captain Gomez of the Kingsville Police, received a message to go to the Rodeway Inn. He did so and, once there, proceeded to open the suitcase which he then knew belonged to appellant. There is no evidence appellant ever inquired as to the whereabouts of the suitcase or the papers at or after checkout time on October 7,1987.
At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, the trial court found appellant failed to establish standing to object to the search, finding that he had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the place searched and the items searched and seized. In effect, the trial court found he had abandoned the room and the contents therein.
We have held that an abandonment of property occurs if (1) the defendant intended to abandon the property and (2) his decision to abandon the property was not due to police misconduct. Comer v. State, 754 S.W.2d 656 (Tex.Cr.App.1988); Hawkins v. State, 758 S.W.2d 255 (Tex.Cr.App.1988). In United States v. Parizo, 514 F.2d 52 (3rd Cir.1975) the court held:
When the terms of a guest’s occupancy of a room expires, the guest loses his exclusive right to privacy in the room. The manager of a motel then has the right to enter the room and may consent to a search of the room and the seizure of the items there found.
Parizo at 54, citing United States v. Croft, 429 F.2d 884 (10th Cir.1970). While this Court is not bound by these two decisions, their logic is sound and should be applied to the present case.
As the record supports the trial court’s finding that appellant abandoned the motel room voluntarily and his decision was not due to any action by the police, we find no. abuse of discretion in the denial of appellant’s motion to suppress the items found in room 119.
Point of Error Number Twelve is overruled.
H. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Ordering a Transfer of Venue, On Its Own Motion, From Kleberg County To Comal County Over Appellant’s Objection. Furthermore, Appellant Does Not Show Error in the Trial Court’s Handling of Media Conduct During The Trial (Points of Error Numbers One and Four)
On November 18, 1987, the trial court, on its motion, ordered a hearing to consider a change of venue pursuant to Tex. Code Crim.Proc. Art. 31.01. The purpose of the hearing was to determine if a fair and impartial trial could be held in Kleberg County, or in the 105th Judicial District (the 105th Judicial District includes Nueces, Kle-berg and Kenedy Counties), or in any county in an adjoining judicial district, or to a county beyond an adjoining district. The notice of the hearing was given to both the State and appellant on November 18,1987.
The hearing was held on December 4, 1984. Eighteen witnesses, including several members of the Corpus Christi area print and electronic media, testified. Many exhibits were introduced into evidence showing the audience size and geographic areas covered by the English and Spanish language television and radio stations and the newspa*508pers, located in the Corpus Christi area. The testimony and the exhibits show that this case received intensive coverage from the media commencing at the time complainant was reported as missing.
The court found that a fair and impartial trial could not be held in Kleberg County, the 105th Judicial District or in an adjoining judicial district and ordered a transfer of this matter to Comal County, roughly 125 miles away. Appellant, it should be noted, did not demand to be tried in Kleberg County. The court also found that neither party had filed a motion objecting to a change of venue from Kleberg County within ten days of the November 18, 1987 notice of a hearing on whether a change of venue should be ordered, the period of time for filing such a motion pursuant to Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Art. 31.01.
Appellant filed written objections to the December 4 order transferring venue to Comal County. A hearing on these objections was held on December 19, 1987. The court overruled appellant’s objections, ruling, in effect, appellant’s evidence that he could receive a fair trial in an adjoining judicial district or the same judicial district was outweighed by evidence to the contrary introduced at the December 4, 1987 hearing.
In Cook v. State, 667 S.W.2d 520 (Tex.Cr.App.1984) we held: “When the Legislature modified the language of Article 560 in enacting Art. 31.01, its purpose was evidently to require a court, once satisfied that a fair trial cannot be had, to give notice to both parties of its intention to change venue and to hold a hearing allowing either party to offer evidence either in support of or against the court’s proposed change in venue. The statute does not require the court to offer evidence in support of its own motion, but rather merely offers the parties a chance to be heard on the matter. The court is only required to state in its order the grounds for its decision to change venue.” Cook at 522. In citing Spriggs v. State, 163 Tex.Crim. 167, 289 S.W.2d 272 (1956), we stated “[T]hat since the statute allows the court to satisfy itself from any cause that a fair trial cannot be had, ‘it would be difficult to envisage a state of facts by which this Court would be warranted in finding that an abuse of discretion has occurred.’ ” Cook at 523. See also Aranda v. State, 736 S.W.2d 702 (Tex.Cr.App.1987), cert. denied 487 U.S. 1241, 108 S.Ct. 2916, 101 L.Ed.2d 947 (1988), where we held the trial court, in a case also involving massive pretrial publicity, did not abuse its discretion ordering, after a hearing, a transfer of venue on its own motion. We have also held that the trial court’s decision on a change of venue may result in a reversal on appeal only for abuse of discretion. Narvaiz, supra, at 428.
In the present ease, the trial court balanced evidence of possible bias created by significant pretrial publicity in the 105th Judicial District and surrounding judicial districts with contrary evidence produced by appellant. Appellant fails to show that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering a change of venue, in effect, its giving more weight to the evidence introduced at the December 4 hearing. Appellant received his required notice and hearing provided him under Art. 31.01; he was entitled to no more. Point of Error Number One is overruled.
In Point of Error number Four, appellant claims the failure of the court to control the behavior of the media during pretrial proceedings and the trial itself resulted in denial of appellant’s due process rights under the United States and Texas Constitutions. The record does not reflect any motions by the appellant asking the court to curb or control media activities or citing any specific activities to which he objected. The record does show that counsel did report an attempt by an unnamed San Antonio reporter to interview a witness after he had been placed under the rule. Tex. Code Crim.Proc. Art. 36.06. It is not known whether this interview took place, but, in any event, appellant fails to show any harm resulted.
The record shows there was heavy media coverage of both the pretrial proceedings and the trial itself. The court itself recognized this when it, on its own motion, ordered a change of venue (paradoxically, appellant objected to the change of venue) to Comal *509County to escape the massive publicity generated in and around Corpus Christi. The incidents cited by appellant, however, are not shown by appellant to have tainted his trial. No evidence is presented that the media activity prejudiced the jury or any member of the jury against appellant. Appellant did not make a motion to sequester the jury to minimize its exposure to publicity concerning the trial. The record indicates the court corrected the problem concerning the potential interview of the witness who was under the rule.
The trial court, in its instructions to the jury panel at the beginning of trial, instructed the jury to avoid newspaper, radio and television coverage concerning the trial; indeed the court ordered the jury: “To play it safe, I again instruct you, do not read any newspaper, do not watch any TV news, do not listen to any radio news broadcasts. We do not want to declare a mistrial and try the case a second time because a juror learned something about the case by reading the newspaper or watching TV or listening to the radio.” No evidence that any juror violated these instructions was introduced during defendant’s motion for a new trial.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution places few limits on the right of the press — print or electronic — to cover public trials. We acknowledge that the media does not always behave or use restraint. See Bird v. State, 527 S.W.2d 891 (Tex.Cr.App.1975) (reversed due to improper comments of the prosecutor). We do not find the media’s behavior in the present case resulted in denial of appellant’s due process rights under either the United States or Texas Constitutions.
Point of Error Number Four is overruled.
Having found no reversible error, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
CLINTON, J., dissents for reasons given and disposition made in opinion, on original submission.
OVERSTREET, J., dissents.

. The police also had information that appellant had attempted to assault a woman, Susan May, a month earlier at his residence.

. Sergeant David Cook testified he read appellant his Miranda warnings at the time of arrest at 4:06 a.m. on October 9, in the company of several other officers.

. He also testified he heard her yell, "Please don't hit me. Don't hurt me. I’ll do anything."

. It should be noted that the indictment originally also charged appellant with intentionally causing complainant's death "while in the course of committing and attempting to commit the aggravated sexual assault of Mary Beth Kunkel.” The State struck this language from the indictment, with consent of the trial court, on the first day of trial.

. We have also held that if the police are already in a building pursuant to the Emergency Doctrine, evidence in plain view may be seized. Bass v. State, 732 S.W.2d 632 (Tex.Cr.App.1987).

. Appellant contends in point of Error Number 12, that the search and seizure of the suitcase was invalid. This contention is addressed later in this opinion.

. Because we find that the search of appellant’s residence was valid under the Emergency Doctrine, we need not address appellant’s claim that the items seized as a result of the search, the arrest warrant, appellant’s confession, and Leo Molina’s testimony should all be suppressed as fruits of an illegal search pursuant to the United States and Texas Constitutions, and Tex.Code Crim.Proc. Art. 38.23. As we have upheld the validity of the search of appellant’s residence under the Emergency Doctrine, we need not address whether the police reasonably relied on apparent authority when they conducted said search. Finally, we need not address, at this tíme, the State’s contention that the evidence seized at appellant’s residence would have, in any event, been admitted under the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine, and that we should review our plurality opinion in Garcia v. State, 829 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.Cr.App.1992).

. In his concurring opinion, Judge Baird cites our holding in Corbett v. State, 493 S.W.2d 940 (Tex.Crim.App.1973), as authority in support of our holding that the search of appellant’s residence was valid under the Emergency Doctrine. We agree.

. Because we find that the arrest was made pursuant to a valid arrest warrant, we need not *507address appellant’s argument that the “fruits” of the arrest were inadmissible in evidence against the appellant.