Court Opinion

ID: 9606662
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 02:51:32.001736+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:58:17.364765
License: Public Domain

SEARS, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I agree with the majority to the extent it affirms the grant of mandamus relief and the award of attorney fees to Mountain Creek Estates (“Mountain Creek”). However, for the reasons that follow, I dissent to the majority’s holding that Mountain Creek was not entitled to damages.
1. The majority reverses the jury’s award of damages to Mountain Creek on the ground that Mountain Creek failed to assert a viable claim for inverse condemnation. I disagree with this conclusion.
(a) Contrary to the majority’s ruling, the jury’s award of damages for inverse condemnation is consistent with our holding in Duffield v. DeKalh County.7 In that case, we held that if a government interferes with an owner’s right to enjoy his property, the owner can assert a claim for inverse condemnation. We defined property as the “rights of the owner in relation to land,” including the “right of a person to possess, use, enjoy and dispose of it.”8
An examination of the evidence and the jury’s findings clearly demonstrates how Rabun County’s actions in this case interfered *862with Mountain Creek’s right to use and dispose of its property. Here, as the majority concludes, the evidence supports the jury’s determination that Mountain Creek complied with the objective requirements of Rabun County’s ordinance for the acceptance of roads. Moreover, the jury specifically found that Rabun County unreasonably withheld its approval and acceptance of the roads, and that finding is supported by the record. Thus, absent Rabun County’s unreasonable conduct, Mountain Creek would have had the right to market and dispose of its subdivision lots based on their having access to public roads. Unfortunately for Mountain Creek, Rabun County’s conduct prohibited it from doing so, forcing Mountain Creek to sell 22 of its lots at a reduced value.9 The county’s improper refusal to accept the roads thus interfered with Mountain Creek’s right to use, enjoy, and dispose of its property and indisputably harmed Mountain Creek. Mountain Creek, therefore, should be entitled to damages.
The majority’s assertion that Rabun County has done nothing with regard to Mountain Creek’s property and has simply maintained the original condition of Mountain Creek’s roads as private roads puts form over substance. The ordinance did not give Rabun County the right to maintain the status quo, and its violation of its duty to accept the roads harmed Mountain Creek. Moreover, in the nuisance cases on which the majority relies, there was no “taking” of property for a public purpose that caused a nuisance. There was an existing public use, such as a sewer system,10 that, over time, became a nuisance, interfering with the property owner’s right to use and enjoy his land.11 Here, as outlined above, Rabun County has interfered with Mountain Creek’s right to use and enjoy its land, and Mountain Creek should be, as were the plaintiffs in the nuisance cases, permitted to recover damages.
(b) Moreover, Mountain Creek’s claim of inverse condemnation was valid under a regulatory takings analysis. In this regard, courts have held that a claim for inverse condemnation may be presented even when, as in the present case, a property owner is not denied all economically viable use of his property by a government regulation.
*863Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors including the regulation’s economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government action.12
This Court has recognized the validity of the Palazzolo analysis,13 and relying on that analysis, some courts have engaged in case-specific inquiries regarding whether a claim for inverse condemnation is presented.14 For instance, in Alaska, the courts consider “four factors: (1) the character of the governmental action; (2) its economic impact; (3) its interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations; and (4) the legitimacy of the interest advanced by the regulation or land-use decision.”15
Balancing factors such as those noted in the foregoing cases, I conclude that Mountain Creek has a valid claim for inverse condemnation. First, a government frequently will have an important interest underlying its regulation, such as the protection of environmentally sensitive lands. Here, no such overarching interest is present. In fact, based on the jury’s finding, which is supported by the record, that Mountain Creek complied with the county’s requirements for building subdivision roads, the county had no legitimate governmental interest in refusing to accept the roads. In my view, this factor weighs significantly in favor of finding in favor of Mountain Creek. Moreover, the county’s decision not to accept the roads has had a significant economic impact on Mountain Creek, a small developer, and Mountain Creek certainly had reasonable investment-backed expectations that if it complied with the county’s ordinance, the county would accept the roads.
In addition to the foregoing theory, in City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes,16 a case in which the City of Monterey repeatedly rejected the reasonable development plans of a developer, the Court recognized that a viable inverse condemnation claim was presented if the city’s decisions to deny the developer’s plans did not bear a reasonable relationship to the city’s proffered justifications.17 In this *864regard, the Supreme Court noted (and did not disagree with) the fact that both the district court and the Court of Appeals had ruled that the developer presented a valid claim of inverse condemnation if it made the above showing regardless of the issue of whether the developer was denied all economically viable use of its property.18
Decided July 6, 2006
Reconsideration denied July 28, 2006.
O’Quinn & Cronin, Donald A. Cronin, Jr., for appellant.
Cummings & Dillard, Michael H. Cummings II, Alston & Bird, T. Michael Tennant, A. McCampbell Gibson, Christina H. Eikhoff, Paul J. Kaplan, for appellee.
In the present case, because the record supports the jury’s findings that Mountain Creek’s roads complied with Rabun County’s ordinance and that Rabun County unreasonably withheld approval of the roads, I would find that the county’s refusal to accept Mountain Creek’s roads did not bear a reasonable relationship to the city’s proffered justifications for that refusal, and that Mountain Creek therefore asserted a valid claim of inverse condemnation.
(c) Finally, Mountain Creek’s claim for damages for inverse condemnation is not defeated by the availability of mandamus relief. This Court has repeatedly permitted a property owner to recover damages for past harm to his property, as well as extraordinary relief, such as mandamus relief or injunctive relief, to prevent future harm.19 Similarly, here, Mountain Creek should be entitled to damages for the harm caused to it before trial, and should be entitled to mandamus relief to prevent a future harm, as mandamus relief is the superior remedy to future damages.
2. For the foregoing reasons, in Case No. S06A0042,1 dissent to the part of the majority opinion reversing the jury’s award of damages to Mountain Creek, but I join the majority to the extent it affirms the award of mandamus relief. In Case No. S06A0043,1 join the majority’s affirmance of the award of attorney fees to Mountain Creek.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Justice Hunstein and Justice Hines join in this concurrence in part and dissent in part.

 242 Ga. 432 (249 SE2d 235) (1978).

 (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 433-434.

 The jury’s award of damages to Mountain Creek for the 30 lots that remained unsold at the time of trial is unsustainable. The award of mandamus relief will permit Mountain Creek to market those lots as having access to public roads, and the award of damages for those lots thus constitutes an impermissible double recovery.

 See Duffield, 242 Ga. at 432.

 As stated by then Justice Weltner (later Chief Justice Weltner), the nuisance-inverse condemnation cases do not involve a taking “of any kind - either direct or ‘inverse.’ ” He aptly stated that they simply involve a county creating a “ ‘nuisance,’ as that label has been understood over the centuries,” and a plaintiff being awarded damages for that nuisance. DeKalb County v. Orwig, 261 Ga. 137, 141 (402 SE2d 513) (1991) (Weltner, J., dissenting).

 Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U. S. 606, 617 (121 SC 2448, 150 LE2d 592) (2001).

 Mann v. State, 278 Ga. 442, 443 (603 SE2d 283) (2004).

 See, e.g., R & Y, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 34 P3d 289 (Alaska 2001); K & K Constr. v. Dept. of Environmental Quality, 267 Mich. App. 523 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005).

 R & Y, Inc. v. Municipality of Anchorage, 34 P3d at 293.

 526 U. S. 687, 721 (119 SC 1624, 143 LE2d 882) (1999).

 Id. at 702-707.

 Id. at 700-702.

 See, e.g., Dept. of Transp. v. Edwards, 267 Ga. 733, 738-739 (4) (482 SE2d 260) (1997) (property owner entitled to damages for the period of time before trial that the Department of Transportation had taken his land and for injunctive relief to require the DOT to convey the land back to him); Reid v. Gwinnett County, 242 Ga. 88 (249 SE2d 559) (1978) (property owner entitled to damages as well as injunctive relief for continuing nuisance).