Court Opinion

ID: 9483072
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 09:09:42.582907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:49:23.831631
License: Public Domain

*301WALLACE, Chief Judge,
with whom Circuit Judges Alarcon and T.G. Nelson, join, concurring in the result:
I concur in the result reached by the majority opinion. I agree that the district court erred by giving this jury instruction and that we have the authority to say so. However, I write separately to discuss the basis of our authority and its limits.
The majority opinion claims that the basis for our authority to hold the jury instruction error is our “supervisory power.” Majority Opinion at 298. The majority acknowledges that there is “some uncertainty over the source of that power,” and suggests that it may be based on 28 U.S.C. § 2106 or Article Three of the Constitution. Id. at 298 n. 6. I doubt that section 2106 provides either a basis for our supervisory power or is itself authority to overturn the jury instruction. It appears only to explain what it means to have appellate jurisdiction. I also doubt that Article Three alone provides a basis for our supervisory power. Indeed, the majority opinion fails to cite a single case in support of this proposition. See id. I am unable to discover any basis for our “supervisory power,” and therefore question its validity. However, the Supreme Court has said that we have such a power, see, e.g., Bank of Nova Scotia v. United States, 487 U.S. 250, 254, 108 S.Ct. 2369, 2373, 101 L.Ed.2d 228 (1988) (Nova Scotia), and we are bound by the Court’s authority.
Although we have supervisory power, the power is substantially limited. The Supreme Court has recognized only three legitimate objects for federal court’s exercise of supervisory power. United States v. Simpson, 927 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir.1991). We may do so: (1) to implement a remedy for violation of a recognized right; (2) to preserve judicial integrity by ensuring that a conviction rests on appropriate considerations validly before a jury; and (3) to deter future illegal conduct. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505, 103 S.Ct. 1974, 1978, 76 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983) (Hasting ). Even in these discrete areas, supervisory power is subject to further limitations. Our exercise of this power may not conflict with any statute, constitutional provision, or even Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(a). See Nova Scotia, 487 U.S. at 254, 108 S.Ct. at 2373. “To allow otherwise would confer on the judiciary discretionary power to disregard the considered limitations of the law it is charged with enforcing.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the Supreme Court counsels us to resort to the supervisory power with “caution” and “with a view toward balancing the interests involved.” Hasting, 461 U.S. at 506-07, 103 S.Ct. at 1979 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In the context of inferential jury instructions, we should be particularly cautious, because district courts have great discretion in wording jury instructions, see United States v. Lopez, 885 F.2d 1428, 1434 (9th Cir.1989), cert, denied, 493 U.S. 1032 (1990), and the Supreme Court has recognized the value of inference instructions, see Ulster County Court v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140, 156, 99 S.Ct. 2213, 2224, 60 L.Ed.2d 777 (1979) (“Inferences and presumptions are a staple of our adversary system of factfinding.”).
The importance of these limitations cannot be overemphasized. By its nature, supervisory power is exercised when there is no precedent from which to reason a conclusion. This power is the exception to our normal common law development built upon precedent. Thus, in spite of the developed limitations, the uncertain basis for the supervisory power encourages its abuse. It can entice judges to rule not according to the law, but outside it, and thus risks making our law uncertain and arbitrary. How can district judges, lawyers, and citizens make decisions if our law is to be determined by the chancellor’s foot? It is therefore vital that judges observe the limitations on the supervisory power developed by the Supreme Court, and do so with great care.
I join in the result of the majority decision, but not in its reasoning.