Court Opinion

ID: 9716597
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 06:45:36.330675+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:47.112254
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE McLAREN, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. This is an appeal from a sentence imposed upon a plea of guilty wherein the claimed defect was an excessive sentence of periodic imprisonment. No post-trial motion of any kind was filed by the defendant. The majority cites People v. Wilk (1988), 124 Ill. 2d 93, as standing for the proposition that since defendant is not seeking to withdraw her plea of guilty she need not file a “Rule 604(d) motion.” The majority has not seen fit to quote from that opinion. I shall. The Wilk majority opinion consists of 12 pages. On the last page of the majority opinion, the court said: “Because defendants Brown and Erickson were not appealing their guilty pleas, it was not neces- sary for them to file a Rule 604(d) motion.” (Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 110.) That sentence is the only source from which this majority can reasonably conclude that we have jurisdiction to consider this appeal. It appears to me, and apparently also to the unanimous panel in People v. Favelli (1988), 176 Ill. App. 3d 618, that, when objecting to the sentence only, Wilk requires the filing of a motion to reconsider before the appellate court’s jurisdiction is invoked. I base my conclusion upon an interpretation of the entire opinion of the Wilk case, especially pages 99, 109 and 110, and Supreme Court Rule 604(d), which reads in part: “No appeal from a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty shall be taken unless the defendant, within 30 days of the date on which sentence is imposed, files in the trial court a motion to *** vacate the judgment. The motion shall be in writing and shall state the grounds therefor.” (Emphasis added.) (107 Ill. 2d R. 604(d).) (Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 99, 109, 110.) Rule 604(d) requires the filing of a motion to vacate a judgment and/or a plea of guilty prior to appealing. “The final judgment in a criminal case is the sentence.” (People v. Partee (1988), 125 Ill. 2d 24, 32.) Therefore, a literal reading of Rule 604(d) would require a motion to be filed when objecting to a sentence imposed upon a plea of guilty. The court in Wilk stated: “Turning to the cases of Brown and Erickson, we note that the defendants did not challenge their guilty pleas, but instead appealed the trial court’s denial of their motion to reconsider their sentences. We distinguish these cases from those of Wilk and Wright in that the defendants here made their motions to reconsider the sentence prior [emphasis in original] to filing the notice of appeal. The trial court had the opportunity to reconsider the appropriateness of the sentence imposed and to correct errors made, if any. Consequently, [emphasis added] the appellate court can exercise its proper function of reviewing the trial court’s rulings on these motions. Because defendants Brown and Erickson were not appealing their guilty pleas, it was not necessary for them to file a Rule 604(d) motion. Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court’s decisions as to Brown and Erickson and remand these two cases to the appellate court for review of the sentences imposed.” (Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 109-10.) The court states its rationale in these six sentences. However, the court had previously set forth the context wherein it held that it was not necessary to file a Rule 604(d) motion as follows: “Each defendant has raised the issue that the appellate court erred in dismissing his appeal. Although these defendants individually raise issues peculiar to the facts of their own cases, they all claim that their attorneys’ failure to comply with Rule 604(d) amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel. They claim the appellate court should have granted their requests for remand to the trial court, to afford them the opportunity to comply with Rule 604(d), rather than dismiss their appeals.” (Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 99-100.) Such a request by the defendants was consistent with the ruling in People v. Stacey (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 261. Stacey required the defendant to move to withdraw his guilty plea even though he only sought reconsideration of the sentence. Justice Goldenhersh, dissenting in Stacey, concluded: “A much more intelligent interpretation of the rule, and one more likely to achieve its purpose, would be to construe Rule 604(d) to permit the filing of a motion to vacate the sentence without requiring that the defendant seek leave to withdraw the plea of guilty.” 68 Ill. 2d at 268 (Goldenhersh, J., dissenting). The supreme court in its last sentence in Wilk declared: “To the extent that Stacey is inconsistent with this opinion, the holding in that case is disavowed.” (Wilk, 124 Ill. 2d at 110.) The supreme court determined that the defendants, Brown and Erickson, had previously filed a motion to reconsider the sentence “prior” to filing a notice of appeal. Therefore, there was no need to remand the causes back to the trial court for the withdrawal of a plea of guilty when it was not sought originally, nor in the appeal. I believe the supreme court adopted Justice Goldenhersh’s suggested interpretation contained in Stacey. Neither Stacey nor Wilk is inconsistent or contradictory as regards the necessity to file a motion to reconsider the sentence prior to appellate jurisdiction arising. People v. Houck (1989), 185 Ill. App. 3d 585, 541 N.E.2d 813, cited by this majority, stands for the proposition that one need not move to withdraw a guilty plea if one is only contesting the sentence. It does not say that a motion to reconsider the defendant’s sentence is not required prior to appeal. The opinion is silent as to whether a motion to reconsider or vacate the judgment was made at the trial court level. There is mention that Rule 605(b) was the basis of giving the appellate court jurisdiction. However, Rule 605(b)(6) provides in part that “any issue or claim of error not raised in the motion to vacate the judgment *** shall be deemed waived.” (107 Ill. 2d. R. 605(b)(6).) Both Rules 604(d) and 605(b) require a motion to vacate the judgment if any issue or claim of error is to be considered by the appellate court. I believe the supreme court meant exactly that when it italicized the word “prior” in its opinion in Wilk with reference to re-considerations of sentences. Wilk and Houck stand for the proposition that one must file a motion to vacate the judgment but need not move to withdraw the plea of guilty unless such relief was intentionally sought by the defendant. Due to the confusion resulting under Rule 604(d) concerning appellate jurisdiction when a defendant seeks to contest only the sentence imposed as evidenced by the conflict between this majority’s opinion and Favelli, it would be beneficial for the supreme court to clarify its holding in Wilk by either an opinion in an appropriate case or by an amendment to Rules 604(d), 605(b), or any other rule deemed appropriate by the supreme court. In conclusion, I have determined that this court lacks jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the appeal and, accordingly, would dismiss this appeal.