Court Opinion

ID: 9534094
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 04:36:46.690292+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:29:29.062702
License: Public Domain

OPALA, Vice Chief Justice,
with whom LAVENDER, Justice, joins, concurring in part and dissenting in' part.
In today’s opinion the court declares there is no implied obligation of good faith and fair dealing in any employment-at-will contract. The court additionally pronounces that an at-will employee may have an actionable tort claim if his discharge is “contrary to a clear mandate of public policy as articulated by constitutional, statu*30tory or decisional law.”1
Although I concur insofar as the court holds that there should be no contract or tort action for breach of good faith or fair dealing arising from dismissals of at-will employees, I cannot accede to the view that all terminations in breach of public policy should be actionable in tort. I would hold that an action for termination in breach of public policy lies in contract2 not tort. Yet, I would recognize a tort action for dismissal that is both contrary to public policy and accompanied by the employer’s malice, gross negligence or reckless indifference to the employee’s rights.
I
BREACH OF IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL COVENANT NOT TO DISCHARGE FOR REASONS CONTRAVENING PUBLIC POLICY
I recede from the notion that at-will employees, dismissed in violation of a constitutional, statutory or decisional law, are entitled to tort remedies, which would include punitive damages. Rather, contractual remedies would appear far more appropriate.
This view is currently espoused by the Wisconsin Supreme Court, whose opinion in Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet3 states:
“The most significant distinction in our view between the two causes of action [contract and tort] in wrongful discharge suits is in the damages that may be recovered_ We believe that reinstatement and backpay are the most appropriate remedies for public policy exception wrongful discharges since the primary concern in these actions is to make the wronged employee ‘whole.’ Therefore, we conclude that a contract action is most appropriate for wrongful discharges. The contract action is essentially predicated on the breach of an implied provision that an employer will not discharge an employee for refusing to perform an act that violates a clear mandate of public policy. Tort actions cannot be maintained. ”4 [Emphasis added.]
Although implied convenants5 are not generally favored in the law,6 public policy concerns may supply the basis for their recognition without regard to the contracting parties’ intentions.7 Today’s decision *31outlines several public policy considerations including, inter alia, potentially unequal bargaining positions and unchecked employer power. These concerns, considered together, supply ample basis for finding a constructive covenant which restricts the at-will masters’ ability to discharge their servants for reasons which violate a clear mandate of public policy.
This court has declared that “[a]n action is one ex contractu [not ex delicto ] when it arises from a breach of a promise implied in law.”8 Employers who breach an implied covenant should hence be liable for damages prescribed by contract law. Exemplary damages, which are improper in ex contractu suits, should not be recoverable absent an actionable tort claim.9
II
EMPLOYEE ACTIONS FOR TORTIOUS BREACH OF CONTRACT
I would not hold that an employer is liable in tort for all terminations in breach of public policy. Rather, in my view, a claim may be actionable in tort only when an aggrieved employee is able to show far more than mere dismissal in breach of some public policy.
A commercial lender’s gross recklessness may constitute a tortious breach of contract.10 I would extend today this settled norm to govern our jurisprudence in at-will employment breaches. A dismissed employee who proves that his employer acted with malice,11 gross negligence or reckless indifference should recover ex delicto.12 *32Absent such a showing, employees should be limited to contract remedies only.

. According to the majority, the plaintiff asserts two theories for imposing liability on the defendant — one in contract, the other in tort. Both theories are based on the plaintiffs belief that Oklahoma implies a covenant of good faith and fair dealing in at-will employment contracts. Because the court holds that Oklahoma implies no such covenant, any discussion of a tort based on public policy is neither necessary nor essential to the disposition of the questions certified for our consideration; the discussion is at best obiter dictum.

. Such an action is one for breach of an implied contractual covenant not to discharge for reasons contravening public policy.

. 113 Wis.2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834, 841 [1983].

. The Wisconsin Supreme Court subsequently refined its view in Bushko v. Miller Brewing Co., 134 Wis.2d 136, 396 N.W.2d 167, 171 [1986]. New Jersey also recognizes a similar, though not identical, view. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417 A.2d 505, 512 [1980] (where the court states: “An employee who is wrongfully discharged may maintain a cause of action in contract or tort or both. An action in contract may be predicate on the breach of an implied provision that an employer will not discharge an employee for refusing to perform an act that violates a clear mandate of public policy.... An action in tort may be based on the duty of an employer not to discharge an employee who refused to perform an act that is a violation of a clear mandate of public policy.’) [Emphasis supplied.]

. A covenant implied-in-law — i.e., a constructive covenant — is presumed from the relation of the parties and the object to be achieved by the agreement. Mercury Inv. Co. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., Okl., 706 P.2d 523, 529, note 14 [1985].

. Mercury Inv. Co. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra note 5 at 530.

. Mercury Inv. Co. v. F. W. Woolworth Co., supra note 5 at 530, note 14. For other examples where this court implied contractual obligations, see Dieffenbach v. McIntyre, 208 Okl. 163, 254 P.2d 346, 348 [1953] (holding that leases contain an implied obligation to place the lessee in actual possession); and Wright v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, 176 Okl. 274, 54 P.2d 1084, 1087 [1936] (finding an implied cove*31nant in a construction contract, the court states: “ ‘A contract consists not only of the agreements which the parties have expressed in words, but also of the obligations that are reasonably implied.' ... 'Every contract contains [an] implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which will destroy or injure [the] other party’s right to receive [the] fruits of [his] contract.”’).

. Uptegraft v. Home Ins. Co., Okl., 662 P.2d 681, 684 [1983]; Anderson v. Copeland, Okl., 378 P.2d 1006, 1007 [1963]; Piggee v. Mercy Hospital, 199 Okl. 411, 186 P.2d 817, 818 [1947]; and First Nat. Bank v. Matlock, 99 Okl. 150, 226 P. 328, 331-332 [1924]. In Anderson, supra 378 P.2d at 1007, the court, quoting from Piggee, supra 186 P.2d at 818, states: "'Contracts implied by law, or more properly quasi or constructive contracts, are a class of obligations which are imposed or created by law without regard to the assent of the parties bound, on the ground that they are dictated by reason and justice, and may be enforced by an action ex contractu.' ” [Emphasis added.]
Additionally, actions based on a breach of a contract implied in law are subject to the three-year statute of limitations imposed on certain ex contractu actions by 12 O.S.1981 § 95. See T & S Inv. Co. v. Coury, Okl., 593 P.2d 503, 505 [1979].

. In Oklahoma a jury may allow exemplary damages only in actions for the breach of an obligation not arising from a contract. 23 O.S. Supp.1986 § 9(A). This statutory provision must be strictly construed. 23 O.S.Supp.1986 § 9(B).

. Rodgers v. Tecumseh Bank, Okl., 756 P.2d 1223, 1226 [1988]. Actions for tortious breach of contract — i.e. torts arising out of contractual relationships — lie in the gray area separating pure torts from contract cases. With respect to employment relationships, the conduct of an employer may be so disgraceful that exemplary damages are appropriate. See General Motors Corp. v. Piskor, 281 Md. 627, 381 A.2d 16, 22-23 [1977] (there, the Maryland court states: “[F]or an alleged wrong [on the part of an employer] to constitute a 'tort arising out of a contractual relationship,’ thereby necessitating proof of common law actual malice to permit recovery of punitive damages, we require that there be a direct nexus between the tortious act and performance or breach of the terms and conditions of the parties’ underlying contract.”) [Emphasis added.]

. In Oklahoma "malice" means "gross recklessness.” Wootan v. Shaw, 205 Okl. 283, 237 P.2d 442, 444 [1951].

. Punitive damages are allowable only where a defendant is culpable of "oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed_" 23 O.S.Supp. 1986 § 9(A). Caselaw construing this language recognizes that malicious or oppressive intent may be inferred from "complete indifference to consequences” or even “gross negligence.” Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co., Okl., 688 P.2d 42, 45, note 8 [1984]; and Wootan v. Shaw, supra note 11, 237 P.2d at 444. Gross negligence, sufficient for recovery of exemplary damages, is the equivalent of "positive misconduct” or a "conscious indifference to consequences.” Mitchell v. Ford Motor Credit Co., supra 668 P.2d at 46, note 9; Dayton Hudson Corp. v. American Mut. Lia. Ins., Okl., 621 P.2d 1155, 1161, note 24 [1980]; and Wootan v. Shaw, supra note 11, 237 P.2d at 444.