Court Opinion

ID: 9379176
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-14 21:02:27.853377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:51.009127
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/14/23 Robertson v. Guitar Center, Inc. CA2/8
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION EIGHT

JAN ROBERTSON,                                                  B311513

         Plaintiff and Respondent,                              Los Angeles County
                                                                Super. Ct. No. 19STCV41746
         v.

GUITAR CENTER, INC.,

         Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Stuart M. Rice, Judge. Affirmed.
      Littler Mendelson, Jim E. Hart, James P. Van, Robert W.
Conti and Charles Cannizarro for Defendant and Appellant.
      Lavi & Ebrahimian, N. Nick Ebrahimian, Jordan D. Bello
and Tielle Shu for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                      ____________________
       Guitar Center, Inc. appeals an order denying its bid to
arbitrate a dispute with a former employee. Because the
company failed to establish this former employee assented to its
agreement, we affirm.
                                  I
       Jan Robertson started working for Guitar Center in May
2012. She claims the company discriminated against her because
of a disability and wrongfully terminated her in November 2018.
Thereafter she sued.
       Guitar Center moved to compel the dispute to arbitration.
It argued there was a valid arbitration agreement between the
parties covering the dispute, the agreement is not
unconscionable, and the arbitrator should decide gateway issues
of arbitrability.
       In support, Guitar Center filed the declaration of its
Director of Human Resources as of April 2020, Kristin Jaramillo.
The declaration never says when Jaramillo assumed this role.
But later filings show she joined the company in 2017, and
Guitar Center does not deny this.
       Jaramillo briefly discussed Guitar Center’s online
management system used for employee training and for
“acknowledgment of Company policies and procedures.” She
explained employees first access this system by setting up an
individual account using their unique employee identification
number and a password of choice. Jaramillo declared no other
employee had access to Robertson’s password (or any reset
password) during Robertson’s employment.
       According to Jaramillo, business records show Robertson
completed an “Arbitration Program Agreement Module” through

                               2
the company’s system on December 15, 2015. Jaramillo says the
module prompted Robertson to review slides about the
arbitration agreement before reviewing the agreement.
       The declaration then states:
       “8. At the conclusion of the module, Plaintiff then
reviewed the Arbitration Program Agreement (‘Arbitration
Agreement’). Employees are provided as much time as they
would like to review or ask questions about the Arbitration
Agreement. Plaintiff then acknowledged her receipt and
understanding of the Arbitration Agreement by selecting the ‘I
Agree and Accept’ option from a drop down menu, and
electronically signing the Arbitration Agreement by typing her
employee username and unique password.
       “9. A true and correct copy of screenshots demonstrating
Plaintiff successfully completed the Arbitration Program
Agreement Module and electronically signed the Arbitration
agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit B.”
       The declaration goes on to describe or quote parts of the
arbitration agreement.
       Jaramillo’s declaration states she reviewed “certain
personnel records” for Robertson. But it does not explain how
Jaramillo acquired knowledge regarding specific acts Robertson
took in 2015 (before Jaramillo joined the company) or regarding
company policies and procedures from this period. Nor does it
explain whether other people at the company could access
Robertson’s account or alter information about Robertson in
Guitar Center’s management system.
       The declaration purports to attach the arbitration
agreement between Guitar Center and Robertson. The document
is a three-page form with no signature and no signature line.

                               3
The form shows it was revised in November 2015 but is otherwise
undated. There is nothing on the document tying it to Robertson
or showing anyone electronically signed it.
       Jaramillo’s declaration also attaches slides from an
arbitration training module, screenshots, and a certificate.
       The last slide states: “You have completed the module
portion of this course and will now need to complete the sign-off
portion. To do this, after closing this module by clicking the exit
button, you will need to launch the ‘Arbitration Program
Agreement’ PDF which is the next activity in this course. [¶]
After reading the PDF and closing it, you will be asked if you
understand the information and be prompted for your
eSignature. This course will remain incomplete until the
‘Arbitration Program Agreement’ PDF activity is completed,
and your eSignature is collected.”
       The screenshots show the completion status for the
arbitration agreement modules for Robertson as “Successful.”
They show each “Lesson” was “Completed” or “Passed,” the date
the lesson was accessed last (December 15, 2015), and the time
spent on it. Jaramillo’s declaration does not explain the
screenshots. Instead, it simply concludes they demonstrate
Robertson successfully completed the module and electronically
signed the agreement.
       Finally, the “Certificate of Achievement” for “Arbitration
Information and Sign Off Course” bears Robertson’s printed
name but no date. Jaramillo’s declaration does not mention the
certificate.
       Robertson opposed Guitar Center’s motion. She argued,
among other things, the company failed to establish she had
accepted or electronically signed the arbitration agreement and

                                 4
failed to meet its burden of establishing a valid agreement. She
noted Jaramillo started working for Guitar Center in 2017, so her
declaration lacked foundation and was based on speculation
about events and company procedures in 2015.
       Robertson’s declaration states she was told in December
2015 that she had to complete an arbitration training course to
receive her next paycheck but was not provided guidance on the
module or its contents. Robertson recalled viewing the
arbitration training module but “[did] not remember that the
arbitration agreement . . . was presented as part of the SABA
arbitration training module or that I specifically had to agree or
sign any document as part of the training module. The module
merely continued until it was completed.” Robertson declared
she “completed the module because I understood that it was
required to get my paycheck and to continue employment.”
       Robertson’s declaration goes on to say she would not have
completed the module or entered into any arbitration agreement
if given a choice and did not intend to agree to “this
arrangement” where her disputes would be decided by a person
paid by Guitar Center according to arbitration rules that were
not provided to her.
       Guitar Center filed a reply brief but no additional evidence.
       The trial court denied Guitar Center’s motion, concluding it
had failed to prove a binding arbitration agreement and
Jaramillo’s declaration and exhibits did not establish Robertson
had electronically signed the agreement. The court also
determined it had jurisdiction to decide these issues.
                                  II
       These rulings are correct.
       The parties dispute our standard of review.

                                 5
      Where the issue is a question of law or contract
interpretation, our review is independent. (Sandoval-Ryan v.
Oleander Holdings LLC (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 217, 222; Espejo v.
Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th
1047, 1056–1057 (Espejo).) Beyond this, some courts say we
review orders refusing arbitration for abuse of discretion. (Id.)
Some say the main issue of whether an arbitration agreement
exists is one we review for substantial evidence, where the facts
are disputed. (E.g., Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021)
64 Cal.App.5th 541, 544–545.) Still other courts say we decide
whether the trial court’s finding is erroneous as a matter of law.
(See id. at p. 545, fn. 1; Gamboa v. Northeast Community Clinic
(2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 166–167 (Gamboa).)
      Guitar Center contends we independently review all
aspects of the appeal because the facts are undisputed. Its
witness (Jaramillo) asserts Robertson electronically signed the
arbitration agreement after completing the module. Robertson
maintains she simply finished the module and implies she never
went on to see or sign an agreement. These are disputed facts.
      Nonetheless, we would affirm under any standard. Before
explaining why, we address the parties’ jurisdictional dispute.
                                  A
      Guitar Center incorrectly argues the main issue—whether
the parties entered into an agreement to arbitrate—was for the
arbitrator to decide, not the trial court. The court was correct to
reach this issue.
      Under the Federal Arbitration Act (the Act) and state law,
the court was required to reach this issue. Guitar Center
maintains the Act applies, and Robertson does not dispute this.

                                 6
       The Act provides, with our emphasis: “If the making of the
arbitration agreement . . . be in issue, the court shall proceed
summarily to the trial thereof.” (9 U.S.C. § 4.) Similarly,
California law provides that “the court shall order the petitioner
and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines
that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists[.]” (Code Civ.
Proc., § 1281.2, italics added.)
       Guitar Center points to the arbitration rules incorporated
into its agreement. These rules, the American Arbitration
Association’s Employment Arbitration Rules, empower the
arbitrator to hear disputes regarding jurisdiction; they do not
require it. (See Nelson v. Dual Diagnosis Treatment Center, Inc.
(2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 643, 657 [not enough to find an agreement
provides arbitrators with power to decide their own jurisdiction].)
       Guitar Center notes its agreement covers “all disputes” (but
a handful) and on appeal only emphasizes the following language
in its agreement: “Except as provided above . . . , the arbitrator
exclusively will decide questions of enforceability and
arbitrability, as well as procedural questions arising out of the
dispute.” Assuming Guitar Center has not forfeited this point,
this language is not sufficient to strip away the trial court’s
power to determine whether the parties entered into an
agreement in the first place. This main issue of formation is
different from whether a particular grievance should go to
arbitration or whether an existing agreement should be enforced.
(See Trinity v. Life Insurance Co. of North America (2022) 78
Cal.App.5th 1111, 1122 (Trinity) [a court must consider a party’s
claim it never agreed to an arbitration clause “[n]otwithstanding
a provision that clearly and unmistakably delegates arbitrability
issues to the arbitrator”]; Mendoza v. Trans Valley

                                 7
Transportation (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 748, 774–776 [collecting
cases and stating: “courts have held that certain gateway issues
are for a court to decide, including whether the parties entered
into an agreement to arbitrate at all” despite the existence of a
broadly worded delegation clause].)
       This result makes sense as “[l]ogically, parties cannot be
compelled to go before an arbitrator without an independent
decision maker—the court—first deciding they have consented to
go before that decision maker.” (Sandquist v. Lebo Automotive,
Inc. (2016) 1 Cal.5th 233, 259; see also Ahlstrom v. DHI Mortgage
Co., Ltd., L.P. (9th Cir. 2021) 21 F.4th 631, 635 [“a court should
order arbitration only if it is convinced an agreement has been
formed. [Citations] [¶] . . . [¶] . . . If no agreement to arbitrate was
formed, then there is no basis upon which to compel
arbitration.”].)
       Guitar Center cites federal cases but fails to note the
United States Supreme Court recently addressed this issue
favorably to Robertson:
       This Court has consistently held that parties may
       delegate threshold arbitrability questions to the
       arbitrator, so long as the parties’ agreement does so
       by “clear and unmistakable” evidence. [Citations]
       To be sure, before referring a dispute to an arbitrator,
       the court determines whether a valid arbitration
       agreement exists. See 9 U.S.C. § 2. But if a valid
       agreement exists, and if the agreement delegates the
       arbitrability issue to an arbitrator, a court may not
       decide the arbitrability issue.
(Henry Schein, Inc. v. Archer & White Sales, Inc. (2019) ___ U.S.
___, ___ [139 S.Ct. 524, 530, 202 L.Ed.2d 480, italics added].) In

                                   8
other words, the court must decide whether the parties entered
into an arbitration agreement, no matter what.
       Other language in Guitar Center’s agreement bolsters our
conclusion the trial court properly reached the main issue. As
Robertson notes, the agreement carves out disputes involving
equitable relief as excluded from arbitration, and “[a] petition to
compel arbitration is a suit in equity seeking specific performance
of an arbitration agreement.” (Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1057.) As mentioned above, establishing an agreement exists
is a statutory prerequisite to compelling arbitration. (See 9
U.S.C. § 4; Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.2; Rosenthal v. Great Western
Financial Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 413.)
       Guitar Center’s position that the trial court lacked
jurisdiction to consider the main issue also contradicts its
position at the trial court, where it repeatedly told the court
Guitar Center’s burden was to prove an arbitration agreement
exists and the court’s duty was to determine whether an
agreement exists.
       We therefore proceed to the main issue.
                                   B
       The trial court’s ruling on this issue is correct.
       California law governs. (See Metters v. Ralphs Grocery Co.
(2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 696, 701 [federal policy favoring
arbitration not in play until a court has found the parties entered
into a valid contract under state law].)
       In California, the party seeking arbitration bears the
burden of proving the existence of an arbitration agreement.
(Ruiz v. Moss Brothers Auto Group (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 836,
842 (Ruiz).)

                                9
       Robertson maintained Guitar Center failed to prove an
agreement, as it failed to establish she signed, or even saw, the
agreement. She is correct. Guitar Center did not carry its
burden. (See Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at pp. 164–165
[outlining the summary process for resolving motions to compel
arbitration].)
       Robertson sufficiently challenged the authenticity of the
agreement. (See Gamboa, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 168
[declaring one does not remember an arbitration agreement
suffices].) She admitted completing the arbitration training
module but denied any recollection of taking the next step:
accessing and signing an arbitration agreement. Guitar Center’s
slides show these steps were separate. Robertson’s position was
she did not go on to the next step. Instead of countering
Robertson, Guitar Center relied on the initial conclusory
statements of an employee who was not at the company when the
supposed agreement was made.
       The trial court did not err in giving little weight to
Jaramillo’s statements. The court’s conclusion the evidence
showed Robertson completed the module portion and nothing
more is consistent with Robertson’s declaration and is sound.
       While Jaramillo states she reviewed some of Robertson’s
personnel records, she outlines no basis for knowing about
Robertson’s specific acts in 2015 concerning the arbitration
training and agreement. Jaramillo’s brief statements regarding
these acts are conclusory: she states Robertson electronically
signed the agreement without explaining how she was able to
ascertain it was Robertson who signed. Her description of the
signature process is summary. Jaramillo says nothing about the
completion certificate attached to her declaration; and nothing

                               10
shows when and how this certificate or the screen shots were
generated or retrieved. She does not say whether she is familiar
with the company’s policies and procedures in 2015. She also
fails to address whether, in 2015 or later, other Guitar Center
employees could access and alter Robertson’s information in the
company’s management system or in Robertson’s account.
       The holes in Jaramillo’s declaration means Guitar Center’s
evidence does not settle the issue of whether Robertson
electronically signed the arbitration agreement. (See Ruiz,
supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 844 [relying on a company
declarant’s “unsupported assertion” the plaintiff was the person
who electronically signed an agreement is insufficient where the
plaintiff does not recall signing it]; Trinity, supra, 78 Cal.App.5th
at p. 1125 [company declarant failed to establish former employee
executed an acknowledgement form where the declarant “had no
understanding of how the acknowledgement records were
generated, stored or retrieved, including who had access to the
records and whether they could be manually created or altered”].)
       Contrary to Guitar Center’s arguments, the trial court was
minding these evidentiary holes, not ignoring evidence. And
Robertson did not admit to electronically signing the agreement,
as Guitar Center argues.
       Guitar Center faults the trial court for looking in vain for
an electronic signature and maintains the law does not require a
signature. But the trial court did this in response to Guitar
Center’s argument and Jaramillo’s statement that Robertson
electronically signed the company’s agreement. Guitar Center
argued it had authenticated Robertson’s electronic signature as
her “act” under the Civil Code. (See Civ. Code, § 1633.9, subd. (a)
[“An . . . electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was

                                 11
the act of the person.”].) One section of Guitar Center’s moving
papers bears this title: “Plaintiff’s Electronic Signature Must Be
Given Legal Effect.” The agreement in the record also
contemplates employees “ELECTRONICALLY AGREEING” and
“ACCEPTING ITS TERMS”—unlike the company, who “agrees to
be bound by its terms without signing it.”
       The trial court’s comments at the hearing make clear it was
not requiring a signature imprinted on the document, as Guitar
Center seems to argue. Rather, the court appropriately looked
for evidence of Robertson’s assent.
       The trial court properly concluded Jaramillo’s cursory
statements about Robertson’s acceptance and sign off were
insufficient to close the evidentiary gaps and to establish these
two parties agreed to arbitrate. (See Fabian v. Renovate
America, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1062, 1069–1070 [affirming
order denying arbitration where defendant left a “critical gap” in
its evidence by failing to provide specific details about the
circumstances surrounding the contract’s execution and to
explain how the electronic signature could only have been placed
on the contract by plaintiff].)
       This case is not analogous to Espejo and other cases Guitar
Center cites. Espejo, for example, involved multiple declarations
detailing the processes for reviewing and signing the company’s
agreement and authenticating the former employee’s electronic
signature, which appeared on the document along with date and
time stamps. (Espejo, supra, 246 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1052–1054,
1062.)
///

                               12
                        DISPOSITION
     We affirm the order denying Guitar Center’s motion and
award costs to Robertson.

                                       WILEY, J.

We concur:

             GRIMES, Acting P. J.

             VIRAMONTES, J.

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