Court Opinion

ID: 9927242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-01-26 16:09:55.503245+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:24:10.213631
License: Public Domain

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,           :
by and through the Philadelphia District    :
Attorney, Larry Krasner, and The            :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by and        :
through the Allegheny County District       :
Attorney, Stephen A. Zappala, Jr.,          :
                                            :
                         Petitioners        :
                                            :
                  v.                        : No. 283 M.D. 2022
                                            : Argued: October 12, 2022
The Attorney General of the                 :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,               :
McKesson Corp., Cardinal Health, Inc.,      :
AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., Johnson       :
& Johnson, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,   :
Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals,       :
Inc., and Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc.,      :
                                            :
                         Respondents        :

BEFORE:     HONORABLE RENÉE COHN JUBELIRER, President Judge
            HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
            HONORABLE ELLEN CEISLER, Judge
            HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
            HONORABLE STACY WALLACE, Judge

OPINION BY JUDGE WOJCIK                            FILED: January 26, 2024

            Before this Court, in our original jurisdiction, are the cross-
Applications for Summary Relief (ASRs) filed by the Petitioners, Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania, by and through Philadelphia District Attorney, Larry Krasner (DA
Krasner), and the Allegheny County District Attorney, Stephen A. Zappala, Jr. (DA
Zappala) (collectively, DAs); Respondent Attorney General of the Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania (Attorney General); and Respondents McKesson Corp., Cardinal
Health, Inc., AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp. (Settling Distributors), and Johnson &
Johnson, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., and Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc. (Settling Manufacturers) (collectively, Settling
Defendants). In this case of first impression, the parties seek a declaration on the
issue of whether the Attorney General has the authority to settle and release claims
brought by the DAs under Pennsylvania’s Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer
Protection Law (UTPCPL).1 Upon review, we grant summary relief in favor of the
Attorney General, deny the relief sought by the DAs, and dismiss the relief sought
by Settling Defendants as moot.

                                     I. Background
              This case involves a dispute of authority regarding the Attorney
General’s ability to settle and release claims brought by the DAs under the UTPCPL
against manufacturers and distributors of prescription opioid drugs as part of the
nationwide settlement with Settling Defendants.
              On May 17, 2022, the DAs filed a Petition for Review in the Nature of
a Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief (PFR). Therein, the DAs alleged
that they filed civil enforcement actions, as authorized by Section 4 of the UTPCPL,
73 P.S. §201-4, in the name of the Commonwealth, against certain manufacturers
and distributors of opioid drugs, including Settling Defendants, seeking to hold them
accountable for engaging in commercial activities that fueled the deadly opioid

       1
         Act of December 17, 1968, P.L. 1224, reenacted by the Act of November 24, 1976, P.L.
1166, as amended, 73 P.S. §§201-1 - 201-10.
                                             2
epidemic.2 Therein, the DAs similarly alleged that the manufacturers violated the
UTPCPL by using unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or
practices in the manufacture, sale, and promotion of prescription opioid products,
and that the distributors furthered the improper distribution of prescription opioid
drugs made and marketed by manufacturers. Both enforcement actions sought
injunctive relief and monetary remedies derived from the disgorgement of revenues.
See PFR, Exhibits C and D.
               The DAs were not alone in pursuing legal recourse against opioid
manufacturers and distributors. In Pennsylvania, district attorneys from various
counties including Berks, Bucks, Chester, Clearfield, Dauphin, Delaware, Erie,
Lehigh, Northampton, and Westmoreland, filed similar suits as did other states,
territories, and local governments.3 PFR, ¶34. On April 18, 2022, the Attorney
General filed two suits on behalf of the Commonwealth in this Court under the
UTPCPL, which this Court consolidated. See Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v.
Johnson & Johnson (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 243 & 244 M.D. 2022, consolidation order
filed May 9, 2022).
               During the pendency of these multiple enforcement actions, the
Attorney General, together with attorneys general from other states, negotiated two
nationwide settlement agreements (Settlement Agreements) with the Settling

       2
        DA Krasner filed an amended complaint on November 14, 2018, in the Philadelphia
County Court of Common Pleas; DA Zappala filed a complaint on February 3, 2021, in the
Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas.

       3
         Similar complaints were filed against retail pharmacies for their role in the opioid crisis.
See, e.g., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. RiteAid Corporation (Pa. Cmwlth., No.
215 M.D. 2022). In addition, private parties filed actions under Section 9.2 of the UTPCPL, added
by the Act of November 24, 1976, as amended, 73 P.S. §201-9.2. This case, however, does not
concern claims against retail pharmacies or any private UTPCPL claim, only claims against the
Settling Defendants.
                                                 3
Defendants to resolve claims against those defendants for their role in contributing
to the opioid crisis.4        The Settling Defendants agreed to pay a total of
$26,000,000,000 to the states and their “Subdivisions,” which included
$1,000,000,000 for Pennsylvania. In Pennsylvania, 333 of 356 eligible municipal
entities voluntarily agreed to join the Settlement Agreements, including all 67
counties, 256 of 277 municipalities, and 10 of 12 district attorneys. The City of
Philadelphia and Allegheny County were among the municipalities that joined the
Settlement Agreements, but their DAs refused to discontinue their UTPCPL claims.
On behalf of the Commonwealth, the Attorney General and Settling Defendants then
filed a Joint Motion to Enter Final Consent Judgments with this Court to approve
both Settlement Agreements, which this Court entered on July 12, 2022 (Consent
Judgments). PFR, Exhibits G and H; see Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v. Johnson
& Johnson (Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 243 & 244 M.D. 2022, filed July 12, 2022).
              As part of the settlement, the Attorney General, acting on behalf of the
Commonwealth, agreed to settle and release all claims against the Settling
Defendants, including those previously filed by the DAs.                  In the Settlement
Agreements, the Attorney General represented and warranted that he had “the
authority to settle and release” all claims.5 PFR, Exhibit A, Distributor Settlement
Agreement at 48, ¶XI(G); Exhibit B, Janssen Settlement Agreement at 17, ¶IV(E).
As to whether the Attorney General had such power, the parties agreed that disputes

       4
         One Settlement Agreement resolved claims against the Settling Manufacturers, identified
as “Janssen Settlement Agreement”; the other resolved claims against the Settling Distributors,
identified as “Distributor Settlement Agreement.” PFR, Exhibits A & B.

       5
          This was further confirmed in a memorandum of understanding between the settling
parties. See Commonwealth Application for Summary Relief, Exhibit B, ¶2. Therein, the Attorney
General agreed to take all necessary steps to secure the dismissal with finality of the released
claims, including those of the DAs. Id., ¶6.
                                               4
regarding the Attorney General’s “authority under the state law, including the extent
of the authority to release claims” would be resolved in state court. PFR, Exhibit A,
Distributor Settlement Agreement at 36, ¶VI(F)(1)(b)(iv); id., Exhibit B, Janssen
Settlement Agreement at 44, ¶XII(F)(2)(d). The issue of the Attorney General’s
authority is the precise issue now before this Court.
                By filing the PFR, the DAs seek declaratory and injunctive relief on the
basis that the Attorney General lacks the authority to extinguish their UTPCPL
claims. In response to the DAs’ PFR, both the Attorney General and Settling
Defendants filed answers and new matters, including counterclaims seeking
declaratory relief that the Attorney General has the authority to release all UTPCPL
claims against the Settling Defendants on behalf of the Commonwealth, including
the DAs’ claims. As there are no factual issues in dispute, the DAs, Attorney
General, and Settling Defendants have each moved for summary relief by filing
cross-ASRs.6

       6
           As this Court has explained:

                An [ASR] may be granted if a party’s right to judgment is clear and
                no material issues of fact are in dispute. Pa.R.A.P. 1532(b);
                Jubelirer v. Rendell,[] 953 A.2d 514, 521 ([Pa. ]2008); Eleven
                Eleven Pennsylvania, LLC v. Commonwealth, 169 A.3d 141, 145
                (Pa. Cmwlth. 2017). When ruling on an application for summary
                relief, “‘we must view the evidence of record in the light most
                favorable to the non-moving party and enter judgment only if there
                is no genuine issue as to any material facts and the right to judgment
                is clear as a matter of law.’” Eleven Eleven, 169 A.3d at 145
                (quoting Markham v. Wolf, 147 A.3d 1259, 1270 (Pa. Cmwlth.
                2016) (citation omitted)).

Gregory v. Pennsylvania State Police, 185 A.3d 1202, 1205 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
                                                  5
                                           II. Issue
               The crux of the matter is whether the Attorney General, who has
concurrent authority with the DAs to bring a UTPCPL enforcement action in the
name of the Commonwealth, may supersede or override the DAs’ statutory
enforcement authority by settling or releasing the DAs’ previously-filed
enforcement actions under the UTPCPL over the DAs’ objections.

                                       III. Discussion
                                       A. Contentions
                                            1. DAs
               The DAs argue that the Attorney General lacks the authority to settle
their ongoing, previously-filed UTPCPL claims. First, the UTPCPL gives both the
Attorney General and DAs concurrent authority to bring independent claims on
behalf of the Commonwealth and does not provide that the Attorney General may
usurp and settle a claim brought by a district attorney.                  Second, no other
Pennsylvania law—including the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Commonwealth
Attorneys Act (CAA)7—empowers the Attorney General to supersede an elected
district attorney in a civil case and release his claims, let alone the ongoing,
previously-filed UTPCPL claims at issue in this case. Because the Attorney General
did not have the authority to release the DAs’ UTPCPL claims, those claims were
not released by the Settlement Agreements or the Consent Judgments and may
proceed.

      7
          Act of October 15, 1980, P.L. 950, as amended, 71 P.S. §§732-101 - 732-506.
                                               6
                                2. Attorney General
               The Attorney General counters that, although the UTPCPL allows both
the Attorney General and any district attorney to bring a claim on behalf of the
Commonwealth, this case concerns what happens when two parallel litigations
diverge into mutually exclusive tracks, forcing a determination about which
official—the     Attorney   General   or a district    attorney—can decide the
Commonwealth’s position. In this situation, it must be the Attorney General who
decides what is in the Commonwealth’s best interest and who ultimately controls the
direction of its UTPCPL claim. First, the Attorney General’s broad authority in civil
matters empowers him to supersede the authority of a district attorney under the
UTPCPL. Although the statutory language does not expressly say what happens
when the Attorney General and a district attorney pursue distinct claims, at the time
the UTPCPL was drafted, the established law provided that the Attorney General
had broad, common law power to supersede a district attorney. Based on the canons
of statutory construction, that understanding was grafted into the text of the
UTPCPL. Second, changes in the Pennsylvania Constitution and the adoption of the
CAA after the UTPCPL was enacted unequivocally give the Attorney General—and
not a district attorney—the power to pursue civil litigation on behalf of the
Commonwealth. This further solidifies the legal principle that the Attorney General
is the final voice for the Commonwealth. Third, as a matter of public policy, any
uncertainty or inconsistency about the Commonwealth’s position in separate
litigations should result in deference to the Attorney General. The Attorney General,
as a statewide elected official, is in the best position to determine the
Commonwealth’s interest. The Attorney General has concluded that the Settlement
Agreements are in the best interest of the Commonwealth because they provide

                                         7
industry changes and monetary relief immediately and with certainty. Finally, even
if the DAs’ actions were permitted to proceed, there is nothing left to attain. The
settlements have achieved all of the remedies available for a public UTPCPL claim,
including injunctive relief, restitution for victims, and civil penalties.

                                3. Settling Defendants
             The Settling Defendants similarly argue that the Attorney General, in
his capacity as the Commonwealth’s chief law officer, has the constitutional and
statutory authority to release UTPCPL claims on behalf of the Commonwealth. The
Attorney General has exercised this authority via the Settlement Agreements and
Consent Judgments. The Settlement Agreements and Consent Judgments require
dismissal of the claims asserted by the DAs against Settling Defendants for three
reasons. First, the releases provided by the Attorney General in the Settlement
Agreements bar the claims brought by the DAs. There is no dispute that those
releases, by their express terms, cover the UTPCPL claims brought by the DAs
against Settling Defendants. Under the Pennsylvania Constitution and the CAA, the
Attorney General has the ultimate authority over all civil litigation brought in the
name of the Commonwealth. Accordingly, the Attorney General has the authority
to release UTPCPL claims maintained in the name of the Commonwealth, including
in circumstances where those claims were first initiated by subordinate law officers,
such as local district attorneys. Such a reading is supported by traditional canons of
statutory interpretation as well as by sound public policy. Second, the Consent
Judgments are res judicata. It is undisputed that the now-final Consent Judgments,
which incorporate the terms of the Settlement Agreements, resolve the same
UTPCPL claims as those asserted by the DAs. The two sets of claims involve the

                                            8
same parties or their privies as both are asserted on behalf of the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania. Third, the Commonwealth, the City of Philadelphia, and Allegheny
County have all released their claims against Settling Defendants and disavowed any
entitlement to further relief from the Settling Defendants. Consequently, there are
no non-releasing parties left for the DAs to represent. The DAs nonetheless purport
to seek relief for those very entities. The fact that the DAs’ lawsuits are brought in
a purely representative capacity, coupled with the fact that further pursuit of the
lawsuits has been expressly disclaimed by the very entities that the DAs purport to
represent, compels dismissal of the DAs’ UTPCPL claims.

                                     B. Analysis
             Section 4 of the UTPCPL provides:

             Whenever the Attorney General or a District Attorney has
             reason to believe that any person is using or is about to use
             any method, act or practice declared by section 3 of this
             act[, 73 P.S. §201-3,] to be unlawful, and that proceedings
             would be in the public interest, he may bring an action in
             the name of the Commonwealth against such person to
             restrain by temporary or permanent injunction the use of
             such method, act or practice.
73 P.S. §201-4 (emphasis added). Section 3 of the UTPCPL declares as unlawful
“[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce.” 73 P.S. §201-3. The remedies available under
the UTPCPL are temporary or permanent injunctive relief, the payment of costs and
restitution, and civil penalties. Id.; Section 4.1 of the UTPCPL, added by the Act of
November 24, 1976, P.L. 1166, 73 P.S. §201-4.1; Section 8(b) of the UTPCPL,
73 P.S. §201-8(b).

                                          9
               Although both the Attorney General and a district attorney may bring
concurrent enforcement actions under the UTPCPL, the UTPCPL does not make it
clear whether the Attorney General may override or supersede a district attorney
when conflict in representation of the Commonwealth occurs. Discerning the
meaning of the UTPCPL is a question of statutory interpretation.8 In all matters of
statutory interpretation, we are guided by the Statutory Construction Act of 1972
(SCA), 1 Pa. C.S. §§1501-1991.
               “The object of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to
ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly. Every statute shall
be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its provisions.” 1 Pa. C.S. §1921(a).
“To accomplish that goal, we should not interpret statutory words in isolation, but
must read them with reference to the context in which they appear.” O’Rourke v.
Commonwealth, 778 A.2d 1194, 1201 (Pa. 2001).
               “When the words of a statute are clear and free from all ambiguity, the
letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”
1 Pa. C.S. §1921(b). The “plain language of a statute generally provides the best
indication of legislative intent.”         Commonwealth v. Lehman, 243 A.3d 7, 16
(Pa. 2020). However, when a statute’s language is not clear and unambiguous, we
may discern legislative intent by considering:

               (1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.

               (2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.

               (3) The mischief to be remedied.

       8
         “An issue of statutory construction presents a pure question of law[,] and our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Spahn v. Zoning Board of Adjustment,
977 A.2d 1132, 1142 (Pa. 2009).
                                               10
             (4) The object to be attained.

             (5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon
             the same or similar subjects.

             (6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.

             (7) The contemporaneous legislative history.

             (8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such
             statute.
1 Pa. C.S. §1921; see Klar v. Dairy Farmers of America, Inc., 300 A.3d 361, 372
n.56 (Pa. 2023).
             We are also mindful that we must presume that “the General Assembly
does not intend to violate the Constitution of the United States or this
Commonwealth.” 1 Pa. C.S. §1922. “[If] a statute is susceptible of two reasonable
constructions, one of which would raise constitutional difficulties and the other of
which would not, we adopt the latter construction.” Commonwealth v. Herman,
161 A.3d 194, 212 (Pa. 2017).
             Finally, we apply the in pari materia rule, which provides:

             (a) Statutes or parts of statutes are in pari materia when
             they relate to the same persons or things or to the same
             class of persons or things.

             (b) Statutes in pari materia shall be construed together, if
             possible, as one statute.
1 Pa. C.S. §1932.
             With these principles in mind, we first examine the context of the
UTPCPL. By its own terms, actions brought under Section 4 of the UTPCPL must
be in the “public interest,” rather than any private or personal interest. 73 P.S. §201-
4. Although district attorneys may bring suit under the UTPCPL, the true party in
interest is the Commonwealth, and not the local jurisdiction. 73 P.S. §201-4. The
                                          11
action is filed in the name of the Commonwealth and must be in the “public interest.”
Id.
             Next, we turn to the Pennsylvania Constitution and the CAA for
guidance as they both relate to the authority of the Attorney General and district
attorneys and must be read in pari materia with the UTPCPL. 1 Pa. C.S. §1932.
The Attorney General’s office was established by the 1968 Constitution of
Pennsylvania, article IV, section 1, Pa. Const. art. IV, §1, and is included within the
executive branch of State government. The Attorney General is the “chief law
officer of the Commonwealth and shall exercise such powers and perform such
duties as may be imposed by law.” Pa. Const. art. IV, §4.1 (emphasis added). As
our Supreme Court recently opined: “[T]he Pennsylvania Constitution designates
the Attorney General as the ‘chief law officer’ for the Commonwealth as a whole,
accountable directly to the Pennsylvania voters, and independent of the Governor
and the Commonwealth agencies. Pa. Const. art. IV, §4.1.” Synthes USA HQ, Inc.
v. Commonwealth, 289 A.3d 846, 859 (Pa. 2023). “Prior to the adoption of [a]rticle
[IV], section 4.1, the Attorney General was appointed by the Governor, and served
at his pleasure as a member of his cabinet.” Commonwealth v. Carsia, 517 A.2d
956, 957 (Pa. 1986) (footnotes omitted).
             Although the present-day office of the Attorney General is now
constitutionally established, the Attorney General’s powers are derived from statutes
as enacted by the General Assembly. Carsia, 517 A.2d at 957. Our Supreme Court
has interpreted the constitutional language “as may be imposed by law” as requiring
the General Assembly to “statutorily define and regulate the powers and duties of
the Attorney General.” Id. at 958 (quoting Pa. Const., art. IV, §4.1).

                                           12
             In 1980, “[t]he General Assembly utilized that grant of constitutional
powers . . . and enacted the CAA.” Carsia, 517 A.2d at 958. The CAA “made it
clear that the powers of the state Attorney General are no longer an emanation from
some bed of common law precepts but are now strictly a matter of legislative
designation and enumeration.” Id.
             Consistent with the Pennsylvania Constitution, Section 206 of the CAA
states: “The Attorney General shall be the chief law enforcement officer of the
Commonwealth . . . .” 71 P.S. §732-206. The general powers and duties of the
Attorney General are set out in the CAA. Section 201(a) of the CAA declares:

             The Office of Attorney General shall be an independent
             department and shall be headed by the Attorney General.
             The Attorney General shall exercise such powers and
             perform such duties as are hereinafter set forth.
71 P.S. §732-201(a) (emphasis added). Our Supreme Court has interpreted this
provision as expressly stating “that the powers of the Attorney General are those
which are set forth in the [CAA] itself.” Carsia, 517 A.2d at 958. The Supreme
Court continued:

             If there is any doubt that the [CAA] is the sole source of
             the Attorney General’s powers, such doubt must be
             dispelled by the Final Report of the Joint State
             Government Commission Task Force on the Office of the
             Elected Attorney General. That report states that there
             was substantial consensus for the concept that
             “[l]egislation enacted by the General Assembly is the
             exclusive source of the powers and duties of the elected
             Attorney General pursuant to [a]rticle IV, [s]ection
             4.1. . . .
Id. (citation omitted).
             The CAA distinctly and separately describes the Attorney General’s
criminal authority and civil authority. The Attorney General’s criminal authority is

                                        13
limited. Section 205 of the CAA, 71 P.S. §732-205, governing criminal litigation,
empowers the Attorney General to prosecute only certain criminal cases in county
court. Section 205(a) of the CAA sets forth specific kinds of criminal cases over
which the Attorney General has prosecutorial authority. 71 P.S. §732-205(a). As to
three of those case types, the Attorney General shall have “concurrent prosecutorial
jurisdiction with the district attorney.”      71 P.S. §732-205(b).       Specifically,
concurrent jurisdiction extends to cases:      against State officials or employees
affecting public performance; involving corrupt organizations; or arising out of
enforcement provisions of a statute charging an agency with a duty to enforce its
provision. 71 P.S. §732-205(a)(1), (2) and (6).
             Under the CAA, the Attorney General’s authority to supersede a district
attorney in a particular criminal prosecution is circumscribed. See 71 P.S. §732-
205(a)(3)-(5). The Attorney General must be invited by a district attorney to step in
or “petition the court having jurisdiction over any criminal proceeding to permit the
Attorney General to supersede the district attorney in order to prosecute a criminal
action or to institute criminal proceedings.” 71 P.S. §732-205(a)(3), (4) (emphasis
added). To supersede by court petition, the Attorney General must establish “by a
preponderance of the evidence that the district attorney has failed or refused to
prosecute and such failure or refusal constitutes abuse of discretion.” 71 P.S. §732-
205(5); see Carter v. City of Philadelphia, 181 F.3d 339, 353 (3d Cir. 1999) (“The
Attorney General is permitted only a narrowly circumscribed power to supersede a
district attorney in a particular criminal prosecution subject to court authorization
under an abuse of discretion standard (or at the district attorney’s own invitation.”)).
             The Attorney General’s civil authority under the CAA is much broader.
Section 204(c) of the CAA provides that “the Attorney General shall represent the

                                          14
Commonwealth and all Commonwealth agencies . . . in any action brought by or
against the Commonwealth or its agencies, and may intervene in any other
action . . . .” 71 P.S. §732-204(c) (emphasis added). “This section unambiguously
gives the [Attorney General] the authority to represent . . . the Commonwealth” in
any civil litigation. Synthes USA HQ, 289 A.3d at 859-60.
             Section 204 of the CAA does not contain a similar supersedure
authority applicable to civil litigation. The DAs ask this Court to interpret such
omission as demonstrative that the Attorney General has no power to supersede the
DAs under the canon of statutory construction, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius,
“the expression or inclusion of one thing in a statute implies the exclusion of an
alternative.” Downs Racing, L.P. v. Commonwealth, 288 A.3d 542, 548 n.11 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2022) (internal citation and quotation omitted). We do not agree. A
comparative review of the history of the offices of Attorney General and district
attorney and the statutory division of authority between the two offices illustrate
why.
             “Prior to 1850, investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses in
Pennsylvania were exclusively the duty of the Attorney General of the
Commonwealth,” or his deputy. Commonwealth ex rel. Specter v. Bauer, 261 A.2d
573, 575 (Pa. 1970). In 1850, the General Assembly created the office of elective
district attorney. Id.; Section 1 of the Act of May 3, 1850, P.L. 654, 16 P.S. §7701.
“The elected [d]istrict [a]ttorney was to perform the function of local prosecutor
previously performed by the [d]eputy Attorney General.” Commonwealth v. Schab,
383 A.2d 819, 821 (Pa. 1978). The General Assembly defined the duties of the new
office as follows: “The officer so elected shall sign all bills of indictment, and
conduct in court all criminal and other prosecutions in the name of the

                                         15
Commonwealth . . . which arise in the county for which he is elected, and perform
all duties which now by law are to be performed by deputy attorney generals . . . .”
Id. (emphasis added); accord Section 1402(a) of The County Code.9
                “In 1874, the district attorney was made a constitutional officer.
Pa. Const. [a]rt. XIV, [§]1 (1874), now in Pa. Const. [a]rt. IX, [§]4.” Schab, 383
A.2d at 821. Article IX, section 4 of the Pennsylvania Constitution states that
“[c]ounty officers shall consist of . . . district attorneys . . . .” Pa. Const. art. IX, §4.
                Consistent with Pennsylvania Constitution, Section 206 of the CAA
provides: “[t]he district attorney shall be the chief law enforcement officer for the
county in which he is elected.” 71 P.S. §732-206 (emphasis added). “[D]istrict
attorneys in this Commonwealth have the power-and the duty-to represent the
Commonwealth’s interests in the enforcement of its criminal laws.” Bauer, 261
A.2d at 575.          “[T]he [d]istrict [a]ttorney is statutorily and constitutionally
responsible for law enforcement at the local level . . . .” Schab, 383 A.2d at 824.
Thus, in criminal matters, the district attorneys are the primary authority for criminal
prosecution.
                As discussed above, the General Assembly carved out very specific
exceptions where the Attorney General may criminally prosecute despite the broad
delegation of authority to the district attorneys. 71 P.S. §732-205. Only in those
limited circumstances, as prescribed by statute, may the Attorney General interfere
with the district attorney’s principal authority in criminal matters. Schab, 383 A.2d
at 824. This limitation on the Attorney General’s ability to usurp the authority of
the district attorneys necessitated the supersession provisions. Id. “[T]he Attorney

       9
           Act of August 9, 1955, P.L. 423, as amended, 16 P.S. §1402.
                                               16
General must establish good cause for the supersession” because the Attorney
General is encroaching upon the district attorney’s statutory authority. Id.
              Such is not the case with civil matters.           The General Assembly
mandated that the Attorney General “shall represent” the Commonwealth in “any”
civil action brought by the Commonwealth without limitation. 71 P.S. §732-204(c);
Synthes USA HQ, 289 A.3d at 859-60. UTPCPL enforcement actions are civil in
nature. Gabriel v. O’Hara, 534 A.2d 488, 495 (Pa. Super. 1987). Although the
General Assembly delegated some authority to district attorneys to bring UTPCPL
claims in the name of the Commonwealth, it never limited the Attorney General’s
authority over UTPCPL matters or civil actions in general. Unlike with criminal
prosecutions, a supersession provision was not necessary in order for the Attorney
General to act on behalf of the Commonwealth to proceed in civil actions because
the Attorney General’s authority to pursue such claims was not altered.
              Notably, at the time the General Assembly enacted (1968) and
reenacted (1976) the UTPCPL, it was well established that the Attorney General
possessed common law powers to replace or supersede a district attorney. See
Commonwealth v. Fudeman, 152 A.2d 428, 430 (Pa. 1959); Matson v. Margiotti, 88
A.2d 892, 898 (Pa. 1952); Appeal of Margiotti, 75 A.2d 465, 466 (Pa. 1950); In Re
Investigation by Dauphin County Grand Jury, 2 A.2d 783, 789 (Pa. 1939);
Commonwealth ex rel. Minerd v. Margiotti, 188 A. 524, 531 (Pa. 1936).10 “[W]here

       10
          However, in Commonwealth v. Schab, 383 A.2d 819, 821 (Pa. 1978), the Supreme Court
rejected that holding explaining the line of reasoning was erroneous and not controlling. The
Schab Court explained that the underlying premise for common law authority was based on the
powers of the King’s Attorney in England, the precursor to the modern office of the Attorney
General. Id. The Court continued:

(Footnote continued on next page…)
                                             17
a common[ ]law principle is well established,” the courts may presume that the
legislative body “has legislated with an expectation that the principle will apply
except when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident.” Astoria Federal Savings
& Loan Associaton v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). Under the SCA, “an implication alone cannot be interpreted

                       The King’s attorney, appointed by the Crown, was the chief
              law enforcement officer in England. He managed all of the Crown’s
              legal affairs, including the prosecution of all suits, both criminal and
              civil, in which the Crown was interested. The King’s Attorney also
              had the right to appoint deputies, over which he had complete
              control and could replace at any time. The question as to the
              common law power of an Attorney General to supersede a District
              Attorney on his own motion never arose at common law for the
              simple reason that elected prosecuting officers were unknown to
              England’s political institutions.

                     No analogy can rightly be drawn between that system, one
              of deputized attorneys general, and the system which has existed in
              Pennsylvania since the office of elective District Attorney was
              created by [Section 431 of] the Act of May 3, 1850, P.L. 654,
              [formerly] 16 P.S. §3431[, repealed by the Act of November 22,
              2011, P.L. 431] (now 16 P.S. §7701). The elected District Attorney
              was to perform the function of local prosecutor previously
              performed by the Deputy Attorney General.

                                                  ****

                      Simply because the Attorney General had the common law
              power to replace his own deputies does not justify the conclusion
              that he now has the right to supersede an elected District Attorney,
              an officer unknown to the common law. It would be incongruous to
              place the district attorney in the position of being responsible to the
              electorate for the performance of his duties while actual control over
              his performance was, in effect, in the Attorney General. To
              countenance such a separation of accountability and control
              undermines self-government and promotes centralization.

Id. at 822.
                                                18
as abrogating existing law. The legislature must affirmatively repeal existing law or
specifically preempt accepted common law for prior law to be disregarded.” In re
Rodriguez, 900 A.2d 341, 344 (Pa. 2003) (internal citation and quotation omitted).
The plain language of the UPTCPL did not abrogate this well-established common
law rule that existed. Although the common law has since changed, the changes in
the Pennsylvania Constitution and the adoption of the CAA after the UTPCPL did
not impinge the Attorney General’s foremost authority over civil litigation.11
              Furthermore, as a matter of public policy, any uncertainty or
inconsistency about the Commonwealth’s position in separate litigations must result
in deference to the Attorney General. The Attorney General is elected statewide and
is accountable to the broader electorate. The Attorney General represents the public
interests of the entire Commonwealth, including its municipalities and subdivisions.
The Attorney General is the chief law officer.
              Conversely, district attorneys are accountable to the voters of their
districts, not the statewide electorate. Although district attorneys may file suit in the
name of the Commonwealth, their enforcement powers extend only to such matters

       11
         Likewise, with respect to the Attorney General’s common law parens patriae powers,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court has recognized:

              Under [Section 7710(d) of the Uniform Trust Act], “[t]he Office of
              Attorney General has the rights of a charitable organization
              expressly named in the trust instrument to receive distributions from
              a trust having its situs in this Commonwealth and the right to notice
              of any proceeding or nonjudicial settlement agreement in which
              there is a charitable interest or purpose.” 20 Pa. C.S. §7710(d). The
              Attorney General must be made a party in all proceedings involving
              charitable trusts. See In re Pruner’s Estate, [136 A.2d 107, 110 (Pa.
              1957)] (discussing predecessor to present statute).

In re Jackson, 174 A.3d 14, 21 n.4 (Pa. Super. 2017).
                                              19
“which arise in the county for which the district attorney is elected.” 16 P.S.
§1402(a).    That jurisdictional limitation is reflected in the DAs’ UTPCPL
complaints. The DAs alleged that their actions, and those of other district attorneys,
were “limited to their respective jurisdictions,” as opposed to the Commonwealth at
large, and sought relief specific to their municipalities. See PFR ¶34; see id.,
Exhibits C & D. The DAs alleged how the opioid manufacturers and distributors
harmed their respective municipalities and sought specific relief to aid their
municipalities, but not the entire Commonwealth. See PFR, ¶7 and Exhibits C & D.
             Because the district attorneys of coordinate jurisdictions are of equal
rank, no single district attorney would have the legal or lawful authority to supersede
another district attorney in litigation or to settle another district attorney’s claims
under the UTPCPL. A district attorney in pursuit of his/her UTPCPL claim could
adopt a contrary position that is not shared by other district attorneys or the Attorney
General, which is not in the best interest of the Commonwealth. See Commonwealth
v. Wardlaw, 249 A.3d 937, 955 (Pa. 2021) (Dougherty, J., concurring) (expressing
concern for potential harm in the criminal context when a single district attorney,
answerable only to his/her county constituents, may “adopt a position that is not
shared by other district attorneys or the Attorney General”). The Attorney General,
as the “chief law officer,” outranks all district attorneys and is in the best position to
represent the “public interest” in pursuing and resolving the Commonwealth’s
UTPCPL claims against Settling Defendants particularly where, as here, a conflict
in representation exists.
             Finally, we note that even if the DAs’ UTPCPL actions were permitted
to proceed, there is nothing left for them to obtain. The Settlement Agreements have
achieved all remedies available for a public UTPCPL claim, including injunctive

                                           20
relief, restitution for victims, and civil penalties. The authorized representatives of
the City of Philadelphia and Allegheny County have agreed to the terms of the
settlements.12

                                        IV. Conclusion
               Upon review, when the UTPCPL is examined within its context and
history, as well as in conjunction with other constitutional and statutory provisions
governing the authority of the Attorney General and district attorneys, the Attorney
General has the authority to supersede the DAs’ UTPCPL claims. The Attorney
General, as the statewide elected official, has the duty to serve the interests of the
public at large, whereas the district attorney serves the interests of his/her local

       12
           Notwithstanding, we conclude that the parties’ dispute is not moot. The doctrine of
mootness requires that an actual case or controversy be in existence “at all stages of review, not
merely at the time the complaint is filed.” In re Gross, 382 A.2d 116, 119 (Pa. 1978). “[A] legal
question can become moot on appeal as a result of an intervening change in the facts of the case.”
Id. at 119. There are limited exceptions to the mootness doctrine, namely, when (1) the conduct
complained of is capable of repetition yet evading review, or (2) involves questions important to
the public interest, or (3) will cause one party to suffer some detriment without the Court’s
decision.” Driscoll v. Zoning Board of Adjustment of City of Philadelphia, 201 A.3d 265, 269 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 2018) (internal citation and quotation omitted). The issue here is not only one of great
public importance, but it is capable of repetition yet likely to evade review. This Court previously
sustained preliminary objections and dismissed the DAs’ similar claims against the Attorney
General and Settling Defendants on the basis that the matter was not ripe because the Settlement
Agreements and Consent Judgments were contemplated but not yet executed. See Commonwealth
by and through The Philadelphia District Attorney v. The Attorney General of the Commonwealth
(Pa. Cmwlth., Nos. 233, 250, 260, and 261 M.D. 2021, filed February 4, 2022). We opined: “[T]he
DAs’ claims involve[] uncertain and contingent events that may not occur as anticipated or at all,
and any relief that this Court may grant is bound up in the facts as they relate to the terms of the
Settlement Agreement and Release that have yet to be finalized or executed.” Id., slip op. at 11
(internal quotations omitted). To conclude that those now ripe claims are moot would place the
DAs in an untenable catch-22 position of never having this issue resolved. Additionally, we note
that the Settlement Agreements directed final resolution of the issue in state court. PFR, Exhibit
A, Distributor Settlement Agreement at 36, ¶VI(F)(1)(b)(iv); Id., Exhibit B, Janssen Settlement
Agreement at 44, ¶XII(F)(2)(d).
                                                21
constituents. Although those interests may often align, where, as here, a conflict in
representation arises, the Attorney General has authority to control the litigation as
the “chief law officer.” That control permits the Attorney General to settle such
claims when he determines it is in the best interest of the Commonwealth to do so.
See 7 Am. Jur. 2d Attorney General §29 (2d ed. 2023). The concurrent authority of
the district attorneys to bring UTPCPL actions cannot be interpreted in such a way
that undermines the Attorney General’s authority to resolve such matters on behalf
of the Commonwealth for the common benefit. To conclude otherwise would
subvert the office of Attorney General to a position inferior to that of the district
attorneys, which runs afoul of both the Pennsylvania Constitution and the CAA.
             Accordingly, we grant judgment in favor of the Attorney General and
against the DAs and declare that the Settlements and Consent Judgments fully
release all of the Commonwealth’s UTPCPL claims against the Settling Defendants,
including those filed by the DAs. In light of this disposition, we dismiss the Settling
Defendants’ ASR as moot.

                                        MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge

Judge McCullough did not participate in the decision of this case.
Judge Covey did not participate in the decision of this case.
Judge Fizzano Cannon did not participate in the decision of this case.

                                          22
         IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,           :
by and through the Philadelphia District    :
Attorney, Larry Krasner, and The            :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, by and        :
through the Allegheny County District       :
Attorney, Stephen A. Zappala, Jr.,          :
                                            :
                         Petitioners        :
                                            :
                  v.                        : No. 283 M.D. 2022
                                            :
The Attorney General of the                 :
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,               :
McKesson Corp., Cardinal Health, Inc.,      :
AmerisourceBergen Drug Corp., Johnson       :
& Johnson, Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,   :
Ortho-McNeil-Janssen Pharmaceuticals,       :
Inc., and Janssen Pharmaceutica, Inc.,      :
                                            :
                         Respondents        :

                                   ORDER

            AND NOW, this 26th day of January, 2024, the Application for
Summary Relief (ASR) filed by Respondent Attorney General of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is GRANTED; the ASR filed by Petitioners is
DENIED; and the ASR filed by remaining Respondents is DISMISSED as moot in
accordance with the foregoing opinion.

                                       __________________________________
                                       MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge