Court Opinion

ID: 9776118
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 19:19:07.42537+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:32:34.520310
License: Public Domain

JOHN C. HOLSTEIN, Judge,
concurring.
I concur in the principal opinion but write separately to express my reasons for reject-*264mg the dissenting view. The dissent is wrong on at least two counts.
I.
First is the dissent’s claim that under fixed grammatical rules, which are not cited, a prepositional phrase preceding a compound sentence only applies to the first independent clause. Neither of the cases cited in the dissent on this point support this rule of grammar. See Union Electric Co. v. Morris, 359 Mo. 564, 222 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Mo. banc 1949); and McDermott v. Carnahan, 934 S.W.2d 285, 287 (Mo. banc 1996) (both cases cite various rules of statutory construction). Unless some ambiguity appears in section 610.027.3, there is no reason to rummage among the rules of statutory construction. State ex rel. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Koehr, 853 S.W.2d 925, 926 (Mo. banc 1993). Correct application of grammatical rules demonstrates an absence of ambiguity.
For a correct grammatical exposition similar to the statutory text here, one need look no further than our own pattern jury instructions. Those instructions are designed to be correct, complete, concise and “stated in language the average juror can understand.”MAI (1996), p. LIII. The standard verdict directing instruction begins with the conditional phrase “If you believe”, followed by a series of independent clauses usually conjoined by the word “and.” MAI 17.01. In the pattern instructions, the conditional phrase is applicable to all conjoined independent clauses. Applying that rule here, the prepositional phrase beginning with “Upon a finding ...” applies to both independent clauses of section 610.027(3).
Grammatical hairsplitting aside, the dissent is wrong in claiming that applying the first phrase of section 610.027(3) to its second clause renders its concluding phrase redundant and meaningless. A careful reading discloses no redundancy. In the first phrase, the statutory sections referred to are sections 610.010 to 610.027. By contrast, the concluding phrase references sections 610.010 to 610.026, thereby narrowing the class of litigants eligible to recover costs and attorney fees. Only one who has established a purposeful violation of sections 610.010 through 610.026 may obtain attorney fees. The introductory phrase articulates the predicate evidentiary standard and mental state. The concluding phrase identifies and narrows those who may recover attorney fees.
The provision permitting recovery of attorney fees “to any party successfully establishing a violation of section 610.010 to 610.026” is significant. It denies recovery of any portion of the fees associated with unrelated claims raised in the same action, such as Counts I and II in this case. In addition, one who has incurred attorney fees relating to a purposeful violation of the open meetings law but who was not a party to a proceeding to enforce sections 610.010 to 610.026 may not recover those fees based on the successful prosecution of the same unlawful conduct by another. Giving full effect to both the introductory phrase and the concluding phrase does not render either meaningless or redundant.
Another unusual aspect of the dissent is its statement that section 610.027(3) is not ambiguous while simultaneously resorting to the canons of statutory construction to explain the statute’s meaning. This is a striking departure from precedent. Where the language of the statute is unambiguous, there is no room for construction. Jones v. Director of Revenue, 832 S.W.2d 516, 517 (Mo. banc 1992). In any event, the statutory rule of liberal construction in favor of open meetings does not mean that words such as “purposely violated” or “preponderance of the evidence” be disregarded when the words create an obstacle to an open meetings claim.
II.
I take even stronger issue with the assertion that the council members’ conduct was necessarily a purposeful violation of the open meetings law. In order to support its view that defendants purposely violated the open meetings law, the dissent takes the liberty of putting its own gloss on the facts.
This Court does not perform a de novo review in a court-tried case. The judgment of the trial court will be sustained by the appellate court unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, unless it is against the *265weight of the evidence, unless it erroneously declares the law, or unless it erroneously applies the law. Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976). Moreover, appellate courts should exercise the power to set aside a judgment on the grounds that it is “against the weight of the evidence” with caution and only with the firm belief that the decree or judgment is wrong. Id. In reviewing the facts, deference is accorded the trial court’s superior opportunity -to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Rule 73.01(c)(2). The dissent departs from these well-worn standards of review by putting its own spin on the evidence.
The evidence of what occurred at the thirteen meetings is sketchy, at best. Most of what we know about the meetings is derived from a secretary or clerk’s minutes. Though the closed meetings occurred over a period of months from May of 1994 to February of 1995, the record discloses no complaint about the closure until this suit was filed in April of 1995. Most of the meetings appear to have been informational updates from private investors regarding their efforts to raise capital and to contract for property to lease to the city for a golf course. It is not wholly unreasonable to anticipate that public discussion of the development of a proposed site would drive up land prices in that area by creating “holdout” or “free rider” problems in land acquisitions. Such market changes could have increased the “legal consideration” necessary to obtain the lease to the city or subverted the transaction altogether. A nonlawyer reading the exception in section 610.021(2) might well conclude that the leasing provision justified a closed meeting. To say there is “no way” public disclosure could affect legal consideration for the lease is to ignore fundamental rules of economics.
The same sunshine that disinfects can also cause cancer. That is precisely why there are exceptions to the sunshine law. In the present ease there may well have been economic factors detrimental to the city that justified closed meetings, though we cannot reach that conclusion because the process followed was so clumsy.
The fact that meetings were closed is not necessarily indicative of a conscious design to violate the law. The closure is equally indicative of a desire to let normal market processes control the cost of land and the ultimate cost to the city of its lease. Neither is the council’s failure to seek legal advice or its failure to generate a record justifying the closed meetings necessarily indicative of a scheme to violate the law. Rather, it is more likely indicative of sloppy practices by the secretary, clerk, mayor or others who may well have been negligent or ignorant of the need to make a record that adequately justified closure under the statute or the consequences of failing to do so. In any event, the trial judge is in a far superior position to judge the motives of council members regarding why the meeting was closed. Regardless of my own assessment of these facts, I feel bound to affirm the decision of the trial judge because a reasonable person could have found as he did. In the face of his contrary ruling, I hesitate to ascribe improper motives to persons known to me only through the printed pages of a less than conclusive legal record.
I have no information by which to evaluate the dissent’s suggestion that only a few “wealthy gadflies and caring media barons” will remain to enforce the statute after this decision. My sense, however, is that there are ample social, political and economic interests at work to ensure a steady supply of real estate dealers, land developers, local journalists, concerned citizens, and hungry lawyers to keep most city officials in compliance with the law.
For all these reasons, I cannot join the dissent.