Court Opinion

ID: 9522687
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 02:30:52.429059+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:03:37.954502
License: Public Domain

*614SULLIVAN, Judge,
dissenting.
Dr. Beckerman appeals not only from the denial of his Motion for Summary Judgment. He also appeals the dismissal or striking of his defense based upon the Good Samaritan Law, LC. 84-4-12-1. The latter contention is of import in light of my view that although the denial of Dr. Beck-erman's Motion for Summary Judgment was correct, he should have been permitted to assert the Good Samaritan defense by presenting it to the trier of fact. In other words, I do not agree that, as a matter of law, the Good Samaritan defense is unavailable to Dr. Beckerman. There are genuine issues as to material facts; or at a minimum, there are differing inferences which might reasonably be drawn from the undisputed facts.
Were it not for definitions of "accident" contained in numerous Indiana case decisions, I might find the majority's analysis of the legislative history of our statute more persuasive. By deleting "casualty or disaster" from the statute, it might appear, as opined by the majority, that the General Assembly did not intend that every rendering of emergency care should cloak the actor with the protection of the Good Samaritan defense. The fact remains, however, that "emergency" and "accident'", as correctly observed by the majority, are not synonymous; but neither do I perceive, as does the majority, that Dr. Beckerman's argument requests of us to equate the two.
The word "emergency" describes the nature of the care administered in the particular situation, while "accident" describes the occurrence which brings about the necessity for that care. In order for the Good Samaritan defense to be available, the care must be of an emergency nature and in addition, that care must be required or indicated as a result of an "accident'". An "accident", in its normal and common connotation, may be deemed to be "any mishap or untoward event not expected or designed." E. Rauh & Sons Fertilizer Co. v. Adkins (1955) 126 Ind.App. 251, 129 N.E.2d 358, 360. See also Miller v. Alvey (1965) 246 Ind. 560, 207 N.E.2d 633, 636 (accident is a "usually sudden event or change"); Kilmer v. Galbreth (1966) 139 Ind.App. 252, 218 N.E.2d 361 (accident is an un-looked for or unforeseen event).
However, the unexpectedness of the event (here, Mary Ann Gordon's heart attack) must be viewed from the perspective of the victim and not from the perspective of the reasonable person. In other words, the fact that we know from experience that heart attacks are not uncommon and are to be considered as a normal everyday occurrence in our society, is not the criteria. As to the individual concerned, his or her specific attack is usually not anticipated or expected-at least with regard to one's first experience with a heart attack. The test is purely subjective from the perspective of the victim. Inland Steel Co. v. Almodovar (1977) 2d Dist., 172 Ind.App. 556, 361 N.E.2d 181, 187, trans. denied, 266 Ind. 638, 366 N.E.2d 169; Estey Piano Corp. v. Steffen (1975) 2d Dist., 164 Ind.App. 239, 328 N.E.2d 240. In this sense, then, "accident" focuses upon the injury, ie., the result of the event or occurrence. Ellis v. Hubbell Metals Inc. (1977) 1st Dist., 174 Ind.App. 86, 366 N.E.2d 207. In this regard, I am in agreement with the views of Judge Ratliff and Justice DeBru-ler as respectively set forth in Kerchner v. Kingsley Furniture Company, Inc. (1985) 1st Dist.Ind.App., 478 N.E.2d 74, trans. denied, (Ratliff, J., concurring), and Calhoun v. Hillenbrand Industries, Inc. (1978) 269 Ind. 507, 381 N.E.2d 1242, 1245 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
When the focus is upon such issues as involved in casualty insurance coverage cases, it is wholly appropriate to construe "accident" as descriptive of the event itself under an objective standard. Where, as here, however, as in Workers Compensation cases, the issue focuses upon the injured party or the victim of the event, the "accident" must be viewed from the perspective of that person.
The majority here may be correct in its conclusion that our legislature "did not intend any changes in the common law beyond those expressed in the statute". Slip Opinion at 7. On the other hand, the legislature may not have intended the "event"*615oriented definition to be the referent of the Good Samaritan statute. Had it intended, the General Assembly could have provided a definition of "accident". It did not do so.
Here, Dr. Beckerman clearly and unmistakably was responding to a ery for help, literally "in the night". Mrs. Gordon was not his patient until he arrived and began his diagnostic procedure. The relationship was not different from that of a doctor who responds to the medical needs of a golf partner who suddenly keels over or one who assists a stranger along the side of the road.
An "accident" does not require a victim trapped in, or thrown from, a vehicle crushed at a collision site. It does not describe only a situation which exists as upon an unexplained collapse of a construction scaffold causing serious injury. "Acei-dent" clearly and accurately would describe an intentional terrorist bombing of a New York Trade Center office complex resulting in many injuries. An intentional terrorist attack is not an "accident" except as to those who are innocent injured victims and as to those who volunteer to treat or assist the victims. To hold otherwise is to encourage medically trained persons to ignore the need for such assistance in order to avoid "becoming involved".
By my dissent, I do not imply that Dr. Beckerman will succeed in his Good Samaritan defense. I state merely that he should be permitted to present that defense before the trier of fact. There would appear to be various factual issues which must be resolved in consideration of the defense. The cause should be remanded so that the trier of fact might do so.