Court Opinion

ID: 9403429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 06:09:57.361683+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:06.915563
License: Public Domain

Affirm in Part, Reverse and Remand in Part; Opinion Filed June 13, 2023

                                   S  In The
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                               No. 05-22-00493-CV

         PIONEER EMERALD POINTE, LLC, Appellant
                         V.
 TEXMENIAN CONTRACTORS, LLC D/B/A RED CARPET CLEANING,
                      Appellee

               On Appeal from the 160th Judicial District Court
                            Dallas County, Texas
                    Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-02983

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION
                   Before Justices Molberg, Carlyle, and Smith
                            Opinion by Justice Smith
      This suit arises from a dispute over whether appellee Texmenian Contractors,

LLC d/b/a Red Carpet Cleaning (Red Carpet) performed certain make-ready services

at an apartment complex owned by appellant Pioneer Emerald Pointe, LLC. In six

issues, Pioneer challenges the trial court’s judgment awarding damages, foreclosure

on a mechanic’s lien, and attorney’s fees in favor of Red Carpet. For the reasons

that follow, we reverse the award of attorney’s fees, remand to the trial court for a

determination of those fees, and, in all other respects, affirm the trial court’s

judgment.
                                   Background

      At all times relevant to this suit, Pioneer owned the Emerald Point Apartments

(the property) in Irving, Texas. Merge Property Management, LLC managed the

property for Pioneer. Pursuant to an Acknowledgement of Vendor Policy, Red

Carpet provided services, including painting, tape, bed and texture repairs, carpet

cleaning, resurfacing, and housekeeping, to ready units at the property for new

tenants.

      At issue in this case are forty-six invoices, with charges totaling $30,781.82,

which Red Carpet submitted to Merge for services performed during the period from

May 9, 2017 to August 1, 2017. On September 28, Red Carpet sent Merge a “final

notice” for payment of the past due invoices and advised that, if payment was not

made by October 5, Red Carpet would have to proceed to collect, which would

involve liens and court fees.

      On November 8, Merge’s president Beth Sickler sent a letter advising that

Merge found “many invoices included services not provided” and attaching a

spreadsheet showing that it disputed amounts charged in twenty-one of the invoices.

Merge delivered a check, which included a “paid in full” annotation, to Red Carpet

for $17,814.47, the amount charged that it did not dispute. Red Carpet marked

through the annotation and returned the check to Merge.

      Meanwhile, Red Carpet recorded an Affidavit Claiming Lien on the property

in the amount of $30,781.82. The affidavit named Emerald Point Apartments LLC,

                                        –2–
instead of Pioneer, as the owner of the property. Red Carpet mailed notice of the

affidavit’s filing to Merge and Daniel Crane, Pioneer’s manager. On March 1, 2018,

Red Carpet recorded an Amended Mechanic’s Lien Affidavit, which named Pioneer

as the property owner.

        Pioneer then brought this suit against Red Carpet, seeking a declaration that

Red Carpet’s mechanic’s lien was invalid and alleging violations of the Texas

Deceptive Trade Practices Act. In a counterclaim and third-party petition, Red

Carpet asserted claims for sworn account, breach of contract, and quantum meruit

against both Pioneer and Merge.1                Red Carpet also sought foreclosure of its

mechanic’s lien.

        Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment in Red Carpet’s

favor, finding that Pioneer “breached its contract with and was liable on a sworn

account and, in the alternative for, quantum merit to Red Carpet” and awarding

$30,781.82 in damages. The trial court further found that, based on the affidavit and

amended affidavit, Red Carpet had a valid mechanic’s lien against the property in

the sum of $30,781.82 and ordered the lien foreclosed. The judgment also awarded

Red Carpet attorney’s fees and court costs of $80,167.11 through trial, additional

contingent appellate attorney’s fees, and pre- and post-judgment interest. The

judgment ordered that Pioneer take nothing against Red Carpet by its claims and

   1
       The claims against Merge were resolved on summary judgment and are not at issue in this appeal.
                                                  –3–
dismissed those claims. The trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of

law in support of its judgment.

      Pioneer filed a motion to modify the judgment or for new trial, and the trial

court granted the motion to modify the judgment. Thereafter, the trial court entered

an amended final judgment and modified findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The amended judgment, however, was identical to the original judgment. The trial

court’s only modifications to the findings of fact and conclusions of law were to

delete (1) a finding that payment under the invoices was due within thirty days of

receipt and (2) a finding and conclusion that Pioneer had waived its disputes to the

outstanding invoices by not submitting any disputes in writing to Red Carpet within

thirty days of the date of the invoices. Pioneer moved to modify the amended final

judgment or for new trial. The motion was overruled by operation of law, and this

appeal followed.

                        Sworn Account/Breach of Contract

      In three issues, Pioneer challenges the trial court’s determination that Red

Carpet was entitled to prevail on its sworn account and breach of contract claims.

Pioneer contends (1) the trial court erred in relying on a dispute waiver in Red

Carpet’s invoices; (2) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to sustain the

trial court’s judgment on the sworn account claim; and (3) the trial court erred in

finding alternatively that Pioneer breached any contract because there was legally

                                          –4–
insufficient evidence that Red Carpet performed all of the services it claimed and of

Pioneer’s breach and Red Carpet’s damages.

      1. Standard of Review

      We apply the same standards of review that apply to a jury’s verdict when

reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a trial court’s findings of fact.

See MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., L.P., 292 S.W.3d 660, 663 n.3

(Tex. 2009). When the appellate record contains a reporter’s record, as in this case,

findings of fact are not conclusive and are binding only if supported by the evidence.

Fulgham v. Fischer, 349 S.W.3d 153, 157 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.).

      An appellant challenging the legal sufficiency of an adverse finding on which

the appellant did not have the burden of proof must demonstrate there is no evidence

to support the finding. Wyde v. Francesconi, 566 S.W.3d 890, 894 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2018, no pet.). In evaluating legal sufficiency, we view the evidence in the

light most favorable to the challenged finding, indulging every reasonable inference

supporting it. See City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 822 (Tex. 2005). The

evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding if (a) there is “a complete

absence of evidence of a vital fact, (b) the court is barred by rules of law or evidence

from giving weight to the only evidence offered to prove a vital fact, (c) the evidence

offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a mere scintilla, or (d) the evidence

conclusively establishes the opposite of the vital fact.” Id. at 810 (citation omitted).

“When the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more than

                                          –5–
create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the evidence is no more than a

scintilla and, in legal effect, is no evidence.” Jelinek v. Casas, 328 S.W.3d 526, 532

(Tex. 2010) (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem. Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)).

      When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of the evidence pertaining to a

finding on which the party did not have the burden of proof, we may set aside the

finding only if, after considering all the evidence, it is so contrary to the

overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly wrong and unjust. Texas

Champps Americana, Inc. v. Comerica Bank, 643 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2022, pet. denied) (citing Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986) (per

curiam)). The amount of evidence needed to affirm a judgment is far less than the

amount necessary to reverse one. Id. (citing Harris Cnty. v. Coats, 607 S.W.3d 359,

380–81 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2020, no pet.)).

      This Court is not a factfinder. See Maritime Overseas Corp. v. Ellis, 971

S.W.2d 402, 407 (Tex. 1998). In a bench trial, the trial court is the sole judge of the

witnesses’ credibility and the testimony’s weight. Tate v. Commodore Cnty. Mut.

Ins. Co., 767 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1989, writ denied). The trial

court may believe one witness, disbelieve others, and resolve any inconsistencies in

a witness’s testimony. McGalliard v. Kuhlmann, 722 S.W.2d 694, 697 (Tex. 1986).

If evidence conflicts, we presume the trial court resolved the inconsistency in favor

of the challenged finding if a reasonable person could do so. See City of Keller, 168

S.W.3d at 821.

                                         –6–
      We review a trial court’s conclusions of law de novo to determine if the trial

court drew the correct legal conclusions from the facts. See BMC Software Belgium,

N.V. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002); Wright Grp. Architects–

Planners, P.L.L.C. v. Pierce, 343 S.W.3d 196, 199 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no

pet.). We uphold conclusions of law if any legal theory supported by the evidence

sustains the judgment. Wyde, 566 S.W.3d at 895. We will not reverse a trial court’s

judgment based on an incorrect legal conclusion if the controlling findings of fact

support the judgment on a correct legal theory. Id.; Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Purdue

Ave. Invs. LP, No. 05-15-00369-CV, 2016 WL 2941266, at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas

May 18, 2016, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

      2. Suit on Sworn Account

      A suit on a sworn account is a procedural device for proving certain contract

disputes. See Peerless Indem. Ins. Co. v. GLS Masonry, Inc., No. 05-16-00875-CV,

2018 WL 3491045, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 20, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citing Rizk v. Fin. Guardian Ins. Agency, Inc., 584 S.W.2d 860, 862 (Tex. 1979)).

When an action is based on an open account in which a systematic record has been

kept, a sworn account can constitute prima facie evidence of the claim. TEX. R. CIV.

P. 185. However, a defendant’s verified denial of the correctness of a plaintiff’s

sworn account forces the plaintiff to put on proof of its claim. Id.; Rizk, 584 S.W.2d

at 862; Woodhaven Partners, Ltd. v. Shamoun & Norman, L.L.P., 422 S.W.3d 821,

832–33 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, no pet.).

                                         –7–
        3. Analysis

        Pioneer timely filed a verified denial of the correctness of Red Carpet’s sworn

account. Red Carpet, therefore, could not rely on the sworn account as prima facie

evidence and was required to establish the following elements of its claim to recover

under the account: (1) a sale and delivery of merchandise or performance of

services; (2) the amount or prices were either charged in accordance with an

agreement or were customary and reasonable; and (3) the amount was unpaid.

Peerless Indem. Ins., 2018 WL 3491045, at *7; Parillo v. Kofahl Sheet Metal Works,

Inc., No. 05-15-01037-CV, 2016 WL 3547965, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 28,

2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).

        Pioneer challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the trial court’s

judgment on Red Carpet’s claim, asserting it is undisputed that Red Carpet did not

provide all of the invoiced services.2 Specifically, it challenges the legal and factual

sufficiency of the trial court’s findings of fact five through seven:

            5.       The charges reflected on [the] forty-six (46) invoices were
                     fair, reasonable and customary for carpet cleaning, painting,
                     housekeeping and apartment make-ready goods and services
                     in Dallas County, Texas;

    2
      In its third issue, Pioneer asserts that the trial court’s alternate award for breach of contract must be
reversed because Red Carpet (1) provided no personal knowledge that it performed all of the services it
claims; (2) could not establish that Pioneer breached the contract by tendering payment only for those
services actually performed; and (3) could not establish damages. Because Red Carpet’s sworn account
and breach of contract claim are one and the same, we need not address Pioneer’s third issue. See TEX. R.
APP. 47.1.
                                                     –8–
         6.     Red Carpet fully performed the carpet cleaning, painting,
                housekeeping and apartment make-ready services which were
                described on the forty-six (46) invoices; and

         7.     Red Carpet billed Pioneer only for services that it performed,
                and Red Carpet did not bill Pioneer for services that it did not
                perform.

Pioneer also challenges the legal sufficiency of conclusions of law three, four, six,

seven and eight:

         3.     The amount of Pioneer’s account is just;

         4.     The prices charged by Red Carpet are in accordance with an
                agreement or, in the absence of an agreement, are the usual,
                customary, and reasonable prices for the goods or services;

         6.     Pioneer has not put forth sufficient or proper evidence to
                negate Red Carpet’s sworn account claim;

         7.     The sum of money if paid now in cash that would fairly and
                reasonably compensate Red Carpet under a theory of sworn
                account for its injury and damages which were proximately
                caused by Pioneer’s failure to pay for the work it receives is
                $30,781.82; and

         8.     Red Carpet is entitled to judgment for sworn account against
                Pioneer in the principal amount of $30,781.82.

      Evidence of Red Carpet’s performance included the testimony of Red

Carpet’s president and owner Albert Carrizal, Red Carpet’s vice-president Meri

Davtyan, the disputed invoices, and other documentary evidence.

      Carrizal testified that Red Carpet provided services to more than 200

apartment complexes, most of which were ongoing, long-term clients. He served as

dispatcher and assigned work at the property to Liz Moreno, a Red Carpet sales and

                                        –9–
quality control employee, and contractors Manuel Suaste and Diego Godoy.

Carrizal had used Suaste and Godoy as supervisors for eighteen years or more.

Carrizal had no personal knowledge as to whether the disputed services were

completed or done properly and acknowledged that subcontractors make mistakes

and may do the wrong work. It was impossible for Carrizal to personally inspect

every apartment at every complex where Red Carpet worked, but Red Carpet had a

crew of supervisors who performed inspections when needed. If something needed

to be addressed, Red Carpet would receive a phone call or email, usually from an

on-site manager, maintenance worker, or leasing agent.3

        Davtyan testified that she was responsible for Red Carpet invoicing and

accounts receivable. Red Carpet retained contractors to perform the services it

scheduled. Those contractors made notes while they were working and sent them to

Red Carpet’s offices in writing or via email. Davtyan received the information,

examined it, and entered it into invoices. If there was an estimate, she would

determine whether the work matched the estimate and, if necessary, add any extra

work into the system. Depending on client preference, invoices were either emailed

the same day they were generated or sent by mail each Friday.

       Davtyan identified the invoices admitted at trial as invoices for Red Carpet

services at the property billed during the period from May 15, 2017 through August

   3
      There was evidence that Moreno, who supervised work at the property, was in contact with the
property manager and was not notified of any of the disputes.

                                              –10–
10, 2017. The invoices set out the service date, the apartment unit, a description of

work completed, the initials of the contractor who performed the work, and the

amount due. Davtyan understood that Red Carpet performed all of the services

described in the invoices and believed the account statement, which reflected an

open balance of $30,781.82, was accurate. Although she did not work in the field

or have personal knowledge regarding the work performed, Davtyan trusted and

relied on the Red Carpet contractors, who had worked for Red Carpet for many,

many years.

      Pioneer asserts that, because neither Carrizal nor Davtyan had personal

knowledge that each disputed service was actually delivered or delivered in the

manner charged, there is necessarily insufficient evidence that those services were

completed or performed properly. We disagree. The evidence shows that Carrizal

dispatched contractors to perform the work. The contractors kept notes of their

work, and Davtyan incorporated information from those notes, including a

description of the services performed, in the invoices. As business records, the

invoices substitute for the personal knowledge of a testifying witness and serve as

some evidence that the transactions they reflect took place. See Varel Mfg. Co. v.

Aceteylene Oxygen Co., 990 S.W.2d 486, 494–95 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-

Edinburg 1999, no pet.) (continuing balances reflected in invoices and statements

admitted into evidence supplied information showing delivery of cylinders); e.g.,

Collins v. Guinn, 102 S.W.3d 825, 836 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, pet. denied)

                                       –11–
(invoice for video services was evidence of videographer’s performance under

contract); Lexcon, Inc. v. Gray, 740 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1987, no

writ) (invoices were some evidence to support deliveries of materials to job site);

Marquis Const. Co., Inc. v. Johnson Masonry, 665 S.W.2d 514, 515–16 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1983, writ refused n.r.e.) (subcontractor’s invoices were

admissible and sufficient evidence to support judgment on quantum meruit theory

even though subcontractor owner was unable to personally verify all of the

information in the invoices, which was based on reports from foreman and notes and

other data that had been discarded); compare Tex. Man’s Shop, Inc. v. Nunn-Bush

Shoe Co., 401 S.W.2d 716, 717 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1966, no writ) (when

very few of appellee’s invoices specifically identified the goods allegedly sold and

delivered, the evidence was insufficient to show shipment of items relied on in the

account).

      To be sure, Pioneer put on evidence to show that Red Carpet did not provide

the disputed services. Sickler testified that she did not approve all of the invoices

for payment because discrepancies “raised a flag” and she directed Alma Salas to

inspect the apartment units to verify that Red Carpet actually completed the invoiced

services. Salas previously managed the property and, at the time, worked as an

assistant to Sickler. Based on Salas’s inspections, Sickler prepared the spreadsheet

identifying the disputed services on twenty-one invoices. Pioneer disputed: (1)

charges for excess square footage in four units; (2) charges for tape, bed, and texture

                                        –12–
repairs that were not performed in five units; (3) charges for resurfacing and make

ready work performed by other vendors or maintenance workers in two units and, in

two other units, not performed at all; (4) a charge for one unit that did not match Red

Carpet’s estimate; (5) a charge for excessive tile work in one unit; (6) a charge for a

disposal that was not repaired and painting a fireplace that did not exist in one unit;

(7) painting charges for ceilings in four units and cabinets in one unit that were not

painted; and (8) double-billing for work in two units.

      Salas testified that she had thirty years’ experience in the apartment business

and had inspected apartment units hundreds of time. She documented what she

found during her inspections and, referring to copies of invoices that she annotated,

a list she prepared, and Sickler’s spreadsheet, testified to the deficiencies she

observed.

      Salas, however, acknowledged that it would have been best to conduct the

inspections while the work was being performed. Although she believed she

inspected the units in September 2017, she had the invoices when she inspected the

units and the record contains several November 2017 emails in which she requested

copies of invoices from Davtyan. Further, Sickler acknowledged that she had not

reviewed the invoices until after she received the September 28, 2017 final notice

for payment. Sickler delayed reviewing the invoices because funds were not

available to pay them. In any event, both Sickler and Salas testified that the

inspections took place a month or more after new tenants had moved into units.

                                        –13–
Davtyan testified that, by the time she was made aware of the disputes, “[a]nybody

could have moved into the apartment, walked into the apartment, maintenance guys,

contractors; weather, leaks, rains” and “anything could have happened.” On this

record, the trial court was free to believe that, due to the delay, the inspection results

may have been unreliable.

      The trial court also appears to have resolved conflicts in the evidence in favor

of Red Carpet. For example, Salas testified to “lots of” tape and bed charges that

Red Carpet did not perform. Both Sickler and Salas testified that it would have been

easy to observe the disputed tape, bed, and texture repairs. However, Salas later

admitted that, had Red Carpet done a very good job, it would be difficult to see

whether the work had been performed. On cross-examination, Salas testified that

she did not know whether, as reflected on the spreadsheet, persons other than Red

Carpet contractors had actually performed certain disputed services or whether Red

Carpet had not repaired a disposal. She also acknowledged that there could be

administrative mistakes in her notes.        Finally, Salas testified that her vision

“fluctuates” and she experienced vision problems “somewhat” during her

investigation. As the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and the weight of their

testimony, the trial court was free to disbelieve Salas’s testimony disputing the

services.

      Viewing the evidence in the light favorable to the challenged findings and

indulging every reasonable inference supporting them, we conclude that the

                                          –14–
evidence to show that Red Carpet fully performed the services described in the forty-

six invoices and billed Pioneer only for services that it performed is not so weak as

to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence. And, having

also considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude the challenged

findings are not clearly wrong and unjust. We also conclude that the trial court drew

the correct legal conclusions from the facts and that Red Carpet was entitled to

recover the unpaid amounts under the account.

      Having so concluded, we necessarily disagree with Pioneer’s assertion that

the trial court could not have awarded the full amount of damages sought unless it

determined that a waiver clause on the invoices, which required all disputes to be

submitted in writing within thirty days of the date of the invoice, applied. Indeed,

the trial court demonstrated that it did not rely on the clause by modifying its findings

of fact and conclusions of law to delete (1) a finding that payment under the invoices

was due within thirty days of receipt and (2) a finding and conclusion that Pioneer

had waived its disputes to the outstanding invoices by not submitting any disputes

in writing to Red Carpet within thirty days of the date of the invoices.

      We overrule Pioneer’s first and second issues.

                                  Quantum Meruit

      In its fourth issue, Pioneer asserts that Red Carpet cannot recover on its

alternative claim for quantum meruit because its services were performed under an

express contract. Accordingly, Pioneer challenges the trial court’s conclusions of

                                         –15–
law thirteen through fifteen that: (13) it did not put forth sufficient or proper evidence

to negate the quantum meruit claim; (14) the sum of money that would fairly and

reasonably compensate Red Carpet under the quantum meruit theory is $30,781.82,

and (15) Red Carpet is entitled to judgment for quantum meruit in the alternative to

its claims for sworn account and breach of contract.

      Quantum meruit is an equitable theory of recovery based on an implied

agreement to pay for benefits received. Heldenfels Bros., Inc. v. City of Corpus

Christi, 832 S.W.2d 39, 41 (Tex. 1992). Generally, a party cannot recover under

quantum meruit when there is a valid contract covering the services or materials

furnished. Hill v. Shamoun & Norman, LLP, 544 S.W.3d 724, 733 (Tex. 2018). A

party may plead quantum meruit in the alternative to contractual claims, but recovery

may not be had on both. See generally Arias v. Brookstone, L.P., 265 S.W.3d 459,

469 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).               Because we have

concluded that the evidence is sufficient to support the trial court’s judgment that

Red Carpet is entitled to recover under the account, we need not address Pioneer’s

fourth issue on Red Carpet’s alternative quantum meruit claim. See TEX. R. APP. P.

47.1; Kaur-Gardner v. Keane Landscaping, Inc., No. 05-17-00230-CV, 2018 WL

2191925, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 14, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.); Fulgham,

349 S.W.3d at 162.

                                          –16–
                                       Foreclosure of Lien

        In its fifth issue, Pioneer asserts the trial court erred in denying its request to

declare the mechanic’s lien claimed on the property invalid and granting Red

Carpet’s request to foreclose on the lien. Pioneer again contends the record shows

Red Carpet did not provide all the services and goods claimed and also asserts that

it established the lien was invalid because (1) Red Carpet’s amended affidavit was

not timely filed and (2) the original affidavit lacked an averment or indicia of the

affiant’s personal knowledge and named the wrong property owner.4

        The Texas Property Code provides a statutory mechanic’s lien, which attaches

to real property to secure persons who have labored or provided material, machinery,

    4
      Pioneer challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of findings of fact twenty-two through twenty-
five that the debt owed to Red Carpet was valid and Red Carpet properly and timely recorded the original
and amended affidavits and provided notice of the affidavits in accordance with the Texas Property Code.
Pioneer also challenges the legal sufficiency of the following conclusions of law:

        25.     The debt owed by Pioneer to Red Carpet is valid;

        26.     The Amended Mechanic’s Lien was timely and properly filed against Pioneer;

        27.     Red Carpet substantially complied with the statutory requirements of the Texas
                Property Code for perfecting a lien;

        28.     Red Carpet filed a lawsuit and is entitled to judgment to foreclose on the Amended
                Mechanic’s Lien;

        29.     Red Carpet is entitled to recover damages in the amount of $30,781.20 through
                foreclosure;

        33.     Pioneer has not proven any of its claims for declaratory judgment against Red
                Carpet, and Red Carpet is entitled to a take-nothing judgment on this claim; and

        36.     Pioneer is not entitled to recover any damages against Red Carpet for its claims
                under the DTPA, Chapter 37 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, and
                the Texas Property Code.

                                                 –17–
fixtures, or tools to build or repair improvements on the property. TEX. PROP. CODE

ANN. §§ 53.001, 53.021; Moore v. Brenham Ready Mix, Inc., 463 S.W.3d 109, 118

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). To successfully foreclose on a

mechanic’s lien, the lienholder must prove that (1) it performed the labor and its debt

is valid, and (2) it substantially complied with the requirements for perfecting a lien

set out in chapter 53 of the property code. Crawford Servs., Inc. v. Skillman Intern.

Firm, L.L.C., 444 S.W.3d 265, 268 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2014, pet. dism’d); TEX.

PROP. CODE. § 53.051.

      In addressing Red Carpet’s contractual claim, we concluded that the evidence

was legally and factually sufficient to establish that Red Carpet fully performed the

services as charged. That evidence likewise supports the trial court’s conclusion of

law twenty-five that the debt owed by Pioneer to Red Carpet was valid.

      A person claiming a lien must timely file an affidavit with the county clerk.

See TEX. PROP. CODE § 53.052. Among other information, the affidavit must contain

the name and last known address of the owner or reputed owner. Id. § 53.054(a)(2).

The affidavit “must be signed by the person claiming the lien or by another person

on the claimant’s behalf . . . .” Id. § 53.054(a).

      We liberally construe chapter 53 to protect laborers and materialmen. Shojai

v. Morrell Masonry Supply, Inc., No. 01-18-00204-CV, 2020 WL 5552622, at *3

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 17, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing

Hayek v. W. Steel Co., 478 S.W.2d 786, 795 (Tex. 1972)); Truss World, Inc. v. ERJS,

                                         –18–
Inc., 284 S.W.3d 393, 395 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, pet. denied) (“Form

requirements for . . . lien affidavits are to be liberally construed”). To that end, a

party satisfies its statutory obligations by substantially complying with the

requirements for perfecting a lien. See LTF Real Estate Co., Inc. v. D & D Util.

Supply, LLC, No. 01-11-00244-CV, 2013 WL 1183300, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston

[1st Dist.] Mar. 21, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.); Mustang Tractor & Equip. Co. v.

Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 263 S.W.3d 437, 440–41 (Tex. App.—Austin

2008, pet. denied).    In addressing substantial-compliance issues, courts “have

distinguished between mere technical defects, which can be excused, and those

defects that are more substantive in nature and, if overlooked, would read a provision

out of the statute or prejudice another party.” Mustang Tractor, 263 S.W.3d at 441.

      There is no dispute that Red Carpet timely filed the original affidavit. Pioneer,

however, complains that the affidavit lacked an averment or indicia of affiant

Carrizal’s personal knowledge and incorrectly named Emerald Point Apartments

LLC, instead of Pioneer, as the owner of the property.

      As we have previously held, an affidavit does not necessarily have to state

that it is made on the personal knowledge of the affiant to substantially comply with

section 53. See Gill Sav. Ass’n v. Int’l Supply Co., 759 S.W.2d 697, 699–700 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied). Here, the affidavit stated that Carrizal, Red

Carpet’s owner, was authorized to make the affidavit on its behalf. Even though the

affidavit did not explicitly state that Carrizal had personal knowledge of the matters

                                        –19–
described therein, we conclude that it substantially complied with section 53.054.

See, e.g., Gill, 759 S.W.2d at 699–700 (lien affidavit signed and sworn to by attorney

for corporation was not invalid, even though affidavit did not state that attorney had

personal knowledge of the matters stated therein).

      We also conclude that the affidavit substantially complied with chapter 53

even though it incorrectly identified the owner as Emerald Point Apartments LLC.

Davtyan testified that she obtained the name from the Dallas Central Appraisal

District records, which identified the property owner as “Emerald Point Apartments,

LLC. Daniel Crane.” Sickler testified that there was confusion at Merge as to the

entity that owned the property. The evidence also shows that Salas, when managing

the property in 2016, identified Emerald Point, LLC as the owner in several emails

to Red Carpet and never told Red Carpet that the name was incorrect.

      In any event, Red Carpet sent notice of the affidavit’s filing to both Merge

and Crane. Sickler testified that there was no doubt that the lien was filed as to the

property and both Merge and the owner received notice of the lien. Crane testified

that he did not remember receiving the notice, but acknowledged that the notice was

addressed to him and testified that he could have received it. Because the misnomer

was a technical defect that did not mislead Pioneer or Merge to their prejudice, the

affidavit substantially complied with chapter 53’s requirements. See Marathon

Metallic Bldg. Co. v. Texas Nat’l Bank of Waco, 534 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. Civ.

App.—Waco 1976, no writ) (affidavit substantially complied despite incorrectly

                                        –20–
naming corporation as property owner when owners were stockholders and president

of corporation); Richardson v. Mid-Cities Drywall, Inc., 968 S.W.2d 512, 515 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 1998, no writ) (affidavit omitting claimant’s address substantially

complied when there was no allegation the omission created a lack of notice).

      Pioneer also complains that Red Carpet sought only to foreclose on the

amended affidavit, the amended affidavit was untimely, and the trial court’s

conclusion of law that the amended affidavit was timely and properly filed against

Pioneer is incorrect. We disagree.

      Red Carpet’s live pleading references both affidavits and pleads that it has

performed all conditions required of it to properly perfect its mechanic’s lien against

the property. Red Carpet recorded the amended affidavit when it learned that

Pioneer was the owner to correct the misnomer, which was not a defect in substance.

Compare Lyda Swinerton Builders, Inc. v. Cathay Bank, 409 S.W.3d 221, 239–240

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, pet. denied) (late-filed amended affidavits

that more than doubled builder’s lien on property were invalid); Conn, Sherrod &

Co., Inc. v. Tri-Electric Supply Co., Inc., 535 S.W.2d 31, 34–35 (Tex. Civ. App.—

Tyler 1976, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (appellant’s initial affidavit bore no jurat, a defect of

substance and not form; accordingly, an untimely-filed affidavit of correction could

not cure the defect).

      The trial court’s judgment recites that, based on both affidavits, Red Carpet

has a valid mechanic’s lien against the property. The trial court entered findings of

                                         –21–
fact that Red Carpet timely and properly recorded, and provided notice of, the

original affidavit. It entered conclusions of law that the debt owed by Pioneer to

Red Carpet is valid and Red Carpet substantially complied with the statutory

requirements for perfecting its lien. On this record, we conclude the evidence

supports these controlling findings of fact, and the conclusions of law are correct.

As a result, even if the trial court’s conclusions of law that the amended affidavit

was timely filed and Red Carpet was entitled to judgment to foreclose on the

Amended Mechanic’s Lien are incorrect, we must uphold the trial court’s judgment.

See Wyde, 566 S.W.3d at 895 (appellate court may not reverse based on incorrect

legal conclusions if controlling findings of fact support judgment on correct legal

theory). For the same reason, we necessarily conclude that the trial court did not err

in denying Pioneer’s request for a declaration that the mechanic’s lien claimed on

the property invalid. 5

        We overrule Pioneer’s fifth issue.

    5
       Pioneer also asserts, challenging conclusions of law thirty-four and thirty-five, that the trial court
erred to the extent the court determined that the declaratory relief Pioneer sought was unavailable because
Pioneer failed to file a verified motion for summary removal of the lien. We note that neither the modified
findings of fact and conclusions of law nor the amended judgment indicate that the trial court specifically
decided Pioneer’s claim for declaratory relief on that basis. Further, we have concluded that Red Carpet
established that the lien was valid, it was entitled to foreclose on the lien, and, for that reason, Pioneer was
not entitled to a declaratory judgment that the lien was invalid. For the same reason, Pioneer’s challenge
to conclusion of law thirty-seven, which states that Pioneer is not entitled to recover attorney’s fees or costs
from Red Carpet related to its claim for declaratory relief, also lacks merit.
                                                    –22–
                                          Attorney’s Fees

        In its sixth issue, Pioneer asserts that the trial court erred in awarding Red

Carpet trial and appellate attorney’s fees without a legal basis and absent factually

or legally sufficient evidence. It challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the

trial court’s finding of fact twenty-six that Red Carpet incurred reasonable and

necessary attorney’s fees in the amount of $80,167.11 through trial and the legal

sufficiency of conclusion of law thirty-one that Red Carpet is entitled to recover

those fees and contingent appellate attorney’s fees.

        Pioneer first contends that Red Carpet was not entitled to recover attorney’s

fees related to its breach of contract, sworn account, and quantum meruit claims from

Pioneer, a limited liability company, under section 38.001 of the Texas Civil Practice

and Remedies Code. We agree. Under Texas law, “litigants may recover attorney’s

fees only if specifically provided for by statute or contract.” Epps v. Fowler, 351

S.W.3d 862, 865 (Tex. 2011). Although section 38.001 authorizes recovery of

attorney’s fees for claims arising out of written contracts, sworn accounts, or

quantum meruit, it did not permit recovery against a limited liability company when

this suit was filed.6 Phoneternet, LLC v. Drawbridge Design, No. 05-17-00890-CV,

2018 WL 3238001, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas July 3, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).

    6
      The legislature amended section 38.001, effective September 1, 2021, to permit recovery of attorney’s
fees from an individual or “organization,” as defined by section 1.002 of the Texas Business Organizations
Code. See Act of May 28, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 665, § 1, 2021 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 1393, 1393
(current version at TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 38.001). Because this suit was filed prior to the

                                                  –23–
        However, Red Carpet also sought attorney’s fees under section 53.156 of the

property code, which requires a trial court to award costs and attorney’s fees that it

deems “are equitable and just” in an action to foreclose a lien or declare a lien

invalid, and section 37.009 of the civil practice and remedies code, which gives the

court discretion in declaratory judgment actions to “award costs and reasonable and

necessary attorney’s fees as are equitable and just.” TEX. PROP. CODE § 53.156; TEX.

CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 37.009. Because Red Carpet prevailed on its claim

to foreclose on the lien and successfully defended against Pioneer’s claim for a

declaratory judgment that the lien was invalid, we conclude these statutes provided

a legal basis for the trial court’s award of attorney’s fees.7

        Pioneer next asserts that the attorney’s fee award must be reversed because

Red Carpet did not segregate and seek to recover only the fees it incurred that were

recoverable. Because attorney’s fees are recoverable only when provided for by

statute or contract, a claimant must segregate fees that are recoverable from those

that are not. Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 310–11 (Tex.

2006); Kinsel v. Lindsey, 526 S.W.3d 411, 427 (Tex. 2017). An exception exists

when “fees are based on claims arising out of the same transaction that are so

amendment taking effect, we apply the version that was in effect when this action was commenced. See
id. § 2.
    7
       During trial, Red Carpet moved to amend its pleadings to assert a counterclaim under the DTPA for
attorney’s fees, and the trial court granted the trial amendment. Because the trial court was authorized to
award attorney’s fees under either section 53.156 of the property code or section 37.009 of the civil practice
and remedies code, we need not address whether the award also was proper under the DTPA. See TEX. R.
APP. P. 47.1.
                                                   –24–
intertwined and inseparable as to make segregation impossible.” Kinsel, 526 S.W.3d

at 427. A claimant need not segregate fees for discrete legal services only when

those services “advance both a recoverable and unrecoverable claim that they are so

intertwined.” Tony Gullo Motors, 212 S.W.3d at 313–14. The fee claimant bears

the burden of proving segregation is not required. CA Partners v. Spears, 274

S.W.3d 51, 82 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. denied). Whether a

claimant needs to segregate attorney’s fees is a question of law; the extent to which

fees can or cannot be segregated among claims and parties is a mixed question of

law and fact. Tony Gullo Motors, 212 S.W.3d at 313; CA Partners, 274 S.W.3d at

81.

      Red Carpet asserted claims against Pioneer and Merge for sworn account,

breach of contract, quantum meruit, and lien foreclosure and defended against

Pioneer’s declaratory judgment and DTPA claims against it. At trial, Red Carpet

introduced detailed and itemized billing statements from its attorneys showing the

legal services it provided. Red Carpet’s counsel testified generally that he identified

the types of legal services that he and his firm provided and considered, based on the

invoices, whether he could segregate the fees for those services as to different claims,

defenses, or parties. He concluded, “based on [his] having worked on the case that

all of the issues are inextricably intertwined because they all relate to billing and a

debt and whether the bills were accurate and the lien associated with that debt and

                                         –25–
defending claims if it wasn’t” and it would be “impossible” to segregate the fees out

to specific claims and defenses.

      In our review of the billing statements, however, we identified several charges

that we conclude were severable. As an example, there were a number of charges

in May 2019 for legal services related to responding to a successful summary

judgment motion filed by Merge.          At a minimum, Red Carpet should have

segregated its fees for legal services related solely to its claims against Merge.

Accordingly, we must reverse the fee award and remand the case to the trial court to

determine which fees are recoverable. See Tony Gullo Motors, 212 S.W.3d at 314;

e.g., Rapid Settlements, LTD. v. Settlement Funding, LLC, No. 14-09-00637-CV,

2010 WL 3504182, at *4–5 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 9, 2010, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (remand necessary for calculation of attorney’s fee award when obligee

failed to segregate fees attributed to litigation with obligor and litigation with third

party).

      Pioneer also argues the evidence was insufficient to support the award of

appellate attorney’s fees. We agree. To recover fees for contingent appellate

services, a party must “provide opinion testimony about the services it reasonably

believes will be necessary to defend the appeal and a reasonable hourly rate for those

services.” Yowell v. Granite Operating Co., 620 S.W.3d 335, 355 (Tex. 2020). With

respect to appellate attorney’s fees, Red Carpet’s counsel testified only to his

opinion, based on his experience as an attorney, that Red Carpet would incur

                                         –26–
reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees of $20,000 in defending against an

unsuccessful appeal by Pioneer, $10,000 in the event a petition for review is filed in

the Texas Supreme Court, and $25,000 in the event of an unsuccessful appeal to the

supreme court. Counsel provided no “opinion testimony about the services [he]

reasonably believe[d] will be necessary to defend the appeal.” Id. (emphasis added);

see also KBIDC Invs., LLC v. Zuru Toys, Inc., No. 05-19-00159-CV, 2020 WL

5988014, at *23–24 (Tex. App.—Dallas Oct. 9, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

Accordingly, we conclude the evidence is insufficient to support the award of

appellate attorney’s fees.

      Additionally, whether a party procures appellate attorney’s fees is contingent

on the party’s success on appeal. Ventling v. Johnson, 466 S.W.3d 143, 155 (Tex.

2015); Smith v. Smith, 757 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1988, writ denied).

If an appellant is partially successful, the appellee may recover fees only for work

performed on the issues where the appellant was unsuccessful. Desio v. Del Bosque,

No. 05-21-00022-CV, 2022 WL 500025, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 18, 2022,

no pet.) (mem. op.) (because “the Desios’ successfully appealed a portion of the

attorney’s fees award, Del Bosque is not entitled to appellate attorney’s fees for his

defense of that portion”). On remand, the appellee must segregate the recoverable

appellate attorney’s fees from the unrecoverable attorney’s fees. Id.

                                        –27–
      Because Red Carpet failed to segregate recoverable fees from those that were

not and the evidence is insufficient to support the award of appellate attorney’s fees,

we sustain Pioneer’s sixth issue in part.

                                     Conclusion

      We reverse that portion of the trial court’s amended final judgment awarding

$80,167.11 in attorney’s fees and costs through trial and contingent appellate

attorney’s fees of $55,000.00. We remand for the trial court to determine, consistent

with this opinion, the amount of reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees to be

awarded to Red Carpet. In all other respects, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

                                            /Craig Smith/
                                            CRAIG SMITH
                                            JUSTICE
220493F.P05

                                        –28–
                                    S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

PIONEER EMERALD POINTE,                        On Appeal from the 160th Judicial
LLC, Appellant                                 District Court, Dallas County, Texas
                                               Trial Court Cause No. DC-18-02983.
No. 05-22-00493-CV           V.                Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
                                               Justices Molberg and Carlyle
TEXMENIAN CONTRACTORS,                         participating.
LLC D/B/A RED CARPET
CLEANING, Appellee

       In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial
court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We REVERSE that portion
of the trial court’s judgment awarding $80,167.11 in attorney’s fees and costs
through trial and contingent appellate attorney’s fees of $55,000.00. In all other
respects, the trial court’s judgment is AFFIRMED. We REMAND this cause to
the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.

Judgment entered this 13th day of June 2023.

                                        –29–