Court Opinion

ID: 9728889
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:18:16.989738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:52.682897
License: Public Domain

Cotter, C. J.
(concurring). I cannot agree with the conclusion of the majority that the identification procedure employed by the state in the present ease was not unnecessarily suggestive.
*257In State v. Middleton, 170 Conn. 601, 604-605, 368 A.2d 66, the defendant was arrested by police within one hour after a robbery had taken place at a liquor store on the basis of a description provided by the proprietor of the store. Immediately following his arrest, he was taken to the store which had been robbed and was escorted inside, in handcuffs, to be identified by the proprietor. Id., 606. On the basis of those facts, this court stated: “ ‘We have no doubt that the identification procedure used by the police in this case was inherently suggestive, and significantly so. Without question, almost any one-to-one confrontation between a victim of crime and a person whom the police present to him as a suspect must convey the message that the police have reason to believe him guilty. The psychological factors that have been so thoroughly discussed by scholars and judges create a real risk of misidentification in such circumstances.’ United States ex rel. Kirby v. Sturges, 510 F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir.).” State v. Middleton, supra, 607-608.
In my view, the identification procedure used in the present case was at least as suggestive as that which we criticized in Middleton. Although the defendant apparently was not, as in Middleton, wearing handcuffs at the time of the confrontation, he was shown to the victim while seated in the rear seat of a locked police cruiser behind a screen in the car where suspects usually are detained while being transported. Prior to viewing the accused, the victim was told by one police officer that the police had found someone who fit the description given; and, according to the victim’s own testimony, one of his coaches “probably” told him that “they think they got him.” In addition, the victim admitted under cross-examination at the pretrial identifica*258tion hearing that, before looking at the defendant, he already believed, based on what he had been told, that the person in the police cruiser was his assailant.
The procedure employed in the present case was, in view of the available facts, also unnecessary because there was no emergency or exigent circumstance justifying such a procedure. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199.1 The majority States that since the confrontation occurred at eight o’clock in the evening, “there would necessarily have been a long delay in summoning counsel and setting up a formal lineup.” The defendant, who was not under arrest at the time, was not, however, entitled to counsel at a lineup prior to the onset of formal prosecutorial proceedings. Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689, 92 S. Ct. 1877, 32 L. Ed. 2d 411; State v. Middleton, supra, 609-610. Moreover, since the identification took place in the parking lot adjacent to the town hall where the police department is located, the delay brought about by moving inside to conduct a formal lineup would appear to be minimal. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, “[t]he practice of showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a lineup, has been widely condemned.” Stovall v. Denno, supra, 302; Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 104, 97 S. Ct. 2243, 53 L. Ed. 2d 140.
*259Although I would conclude that the identification procedure employed in the present case was unnecessarily suggestive, I nonetheless concur with the majority’s conclusion that, under the “totality of the circumstances,” the identification was reliable. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S. Ct. 375, 34 L. Ed. 2d 401. Weighing the factors to be considered in determining reliability as set forth in Biggers against “the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself,” I cannot say that under all the circumstances of this case there is “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.” Manson v. Brathwaite, supra, 114, 116. The unnecessarily suggestive procedure used in the present case, however, cannot be condoned since, under other circumstances, such actions will invariably lead to out-of-court identifications which are in fact unreliable.
In this concurring opinion, Peteks, J., concurred.

 In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199, the aecused was brought to a hospital where the victim’s wife, also wounded in the assault, was a patient. The witness was the only person who could possibly exonerate the accused and no one knew how long she might live. Since the witness was unable to visit the poliee station for a lineup, the court considered the immediate hospital confrontation “imperative.” Id., 302.