Court Opinion

ID: 9865244
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-25 16:28:34.529146+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:38:05.064666
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Bouck,
dissenting.
The majority opinion herein summarily changes the attitude which this court had steadily kept for over half a century toward tax exemptions established by our Constitution and our statutes in favor of religious, charitable *282and educational institutions. An unbroken line of our decisions is discarded—not expressly, but by implication ■—-and the fundamental principle underlying such exemptions is entirely overlooked. Interpretations which under universally accepted rules had become imbedded in the constitutional and statutory definitions and terms are suddenly cast aside.
In McGlone v. Baptist Church, 97 Colo. 427, 430, 50 P. (2d) 547, 548, Mr. Justice Young, the spokesman of the four justices constituting the majority in the case at bar, wrote the opinion which, ably marshaling the law as existing up to that time, sustained the claim of exemption there asserted. I hardly need do more than quote from his opinion, and refer for further argument to the opinion itself. A careful perusal of our former decisions there approved and relied upon calls for sustaining the exemption claimed here.
In the present case I call attention to the fact that the district court duly made its findings from evidence before it, and on this evidence, in the light of all our previous decisions, properly concluded that the exemption was lawfully claimed. No reason is apparent for not accepting the findings of the trial court as the binding conclusions of a fact-finding body. It was for that court to ascertain whether there was, in good faith, a continuing- intention to execute the highly benevolent plan of the organization. This is the. sole issue on which the plaintiffs in error requested and obtained a reopening of the case. Having thus framed the issue, they are bound by the adverse decision thereon. We have no right to usurp these fact-finding functions of the trial court in relation to issues which constitute the theory whereon the case was tried below.
Now to quote from McGlone v. Baptist Church, supra:
"There are two distinct lines of authorities on the construction of tax exemption provisions in constitutions and statutes-; one line construing them strictly, the other giving them a liberal construction. In a recent case this court *283said: ‘The courts of some of the states interpret such provisions strictly and others liberally. Our own decisions unquestionably are liberal * * * (Citing cases). The argument of counsel for the defendants in error, which, in substance, is a plea for the adoption by this court of the strict rule of construction, which, if approved, would be contrary to our previous decisions on this important subject, does not meet with our approval, and we are not disposed to depart from such decisions upon the controlling question involved in this case. ’ El Jebel Ass’n v. McGlone, 93 Colo. 334, 26 P. (2d) 108. This rule of liberal construction was again approved in Kemp v. Pillar of Fire, 94 Colo. 41, 27 P. (2d) 1036.
“In a very recent case, this court used the following language: ‘With the wisdom or unwisdom of provisions establishing tax exemptions, this court has, of course, nothing to do. It must deal with constitutional and statutory provisions as it finds them.’ Colorado Tax Commission v. Denver Bible Institute, 94 Colo. 402, 30 P. (2d) 870. In dealing with such constitutional and statutory provisions, this court must take into consideration its former decisions construing them, and so long as such decisions stand as the pronouncements of this court, cases arising under the above quoted sections of our Constitution and statutes should be determined in accordance with the rules and principles of law laid down in those cases.
“It will be observed that under the constitutional, provision with reference to exemptions, it is expressly provided that the property therein exempted, ‘shall be exempt from taxation, unless otherwise provided by general law,’ thus leaving it absolutely within the power of the legislature to limit, modify or abolish the exemptions provided by the Constitution. The statute with reference to exemptions is practically in the same words as the constitutional provision. It has not been materially changed over a course of many years, from which fact it seems logical to conclude that the people of the state have approved the liberal rule of construction adopted by the *284courts; otherwise they would have taken action through the legislature to further limit the conditions under which property of religious, charitable and educational institutions may be exempt. ’ ’
If the doctrines thus clearly laid down in the foregoing quotations are, as they should be, applied in the case at bar, the judgment below must be affirmed in its entirety.
For the reasons stated I respectfully dissent.
Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Holland concur in this opinion.