Court Opinion

ID: 9376564
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-03 06:05:04.048013+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:07.576491
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                 revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                          STATE OF MICHIGAN

                           COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                    UNPUBLISHED
                                                                    March 2, 2023
               Plaintiff-Appellant,

V                                                                   No. 359817
                                                                    Oakland Circuit Court
CHARLES RAY SMITH,                                                  LC No. 2008-219454-FC

               Defendant-Appellee.

Before: RICK, P.J., and M. J. KELLY and RIORDAN, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

        In this appeal by leave granted,1 we consider whether the trial court abused its discretion
by granting defendant Charles Smith’s successive motion for relief from judgment. The trial court
determined that the prosecution withheld exculpatory, impeachment evidence in violation of Brady
v Maryland, 373 US 83, 87; 83 S Ct 1194; 10 L Ed 2d 215 (1963) because it did not disclose that
an investigation had substantiated that Lynne Helton, a DNA analyst, had taken proficiency tests
for her supervisor in 2003 and 2004. The court also concluded that under People v Cress, 468
Mich 678; 664 NW2d 174 (2003), an affidavit from Karl Reich, a defense expert, was newly,
discovered evidence. In his affidavit, Reich disagreed with the prosecution’s expert witnesses,
Melina Jackson and Lynne Helton, both of whom offered opinions estimating the time of
intercourse by reference to the semen DNA samples found on and in the condom. Reich opined
that such time-since-intercourse evidence amounted to “junk science.” For the reasons stated in
this opinion, we reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                        I. BASIC FACTS

       In the early morning hours of June 5, 2007, three men broke into the home of Cleveland
Brown and Maurice Threlkeld. Initially, only Brown and his girlfriend, MS, were present. The
men threatened to kill Brown and demanded that he give them crack cocaine. One of the men,

1
 People v Smith, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered April 7, 2022 (Docket No.
359817).

                                               -1-
whom MS identified as Jonathan Phlegm, entered the bedroom where she was and tied her hands
behind her back. A second man, whom MS identified as Steven Bard, entered the room holding a
gun and asked her about the drugs. The men pulled a pillowcase over her head.

        When Threlkeld returned to the home, he was assaulted by the intruders. Later, a third man
entered the bedroom where MS was tied up and turned off the lights. Although MS peeked from
under the pillowcase, she was unable to identify that man. She testified that he touched her
buttocks, pulled her pants and underwear off, and penetrated her vagina with his penis. She kept
telling him “no” and asked him to stop, but he did not. She described him covering her head with
a pillow, putting his finger in her vagina, and grabbing her neck so it felt like she would choke.
When one of the other men asked if her assailant was just going to “do it to her raw,” he responded,
“No, I do a condom.” He told MS that he would be “done in a second” and ejaculated. MS thought
that the rapist looked for the condom, but was unable to find it.

       After the rape, the intruders continued to ransack the house before forcibly removing
Brown and Threlkeld from the house. Brown and Threlkeld were shot dead. Their bodies were
discovered a day later in Brown’s vehicle.

        After the intruders left with Brown and Threlkeld, MS was able to get free of her bindings.
She was eventually able to call the police from a relative’s house. The police collected evidence
from the bedroom, including a used condom. A sexual assault nurse examined MS. During her
examination, she observed fresh bleeding that was consistent with a sexual assault, and she
collected DNA swabs from MS’s vagina. Smith’s DNA matched the DNA obtained from MS
during the sexual assault examination and from the condom found in the bedroom where the assault
took place.

       In 2008, following a jury trial, Smith was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder,
MCL 750.316(1)(a) and (b), two counts of assault with intent to rob while armed, MCL 750.89,
one count of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(1)(c), one count of conspiracy
to commit armed robbery, MCL 750.157a, one count of first-degree home invasion, MCL
750.110a(2), and two counts of unlawful imprisonment, MCL 750.349b. Smith filed a claim of
appeal as of right, and we affirmed his convictions and sentences.2

        In March 2012, Smith moved for relief from judgment. He amended his motion in 2013
and again in 2015. Smith argued that his trial lawyer provided ineffective assistance by failing to
investigate and call known and available witnesses; that the prosecution had withheld exculpatory
information in violation of Brady; that the prosecution committed misconduct by not correcting
false testimony; that the state failed to preserve DNA evidence; that there was new evidence of
innocence in the form of impeachment evidence against one witness and a prior inconsistent
statement by another witness; and that Smith’s appellate lawyer had provided ineffective
assistance. The trial court denied Smith’s motion for relief from judgment. Smith applied for

2
 People v Smith, unpublished per curiam opinion of the Court of Appeals, issued July 8, 2010
(Docket Nos. 288595, 288622, and 288626); unpub op at 2.

                                                -2-
leave to appeal that determination, but this Court denied his application.3 Smith then applied for
leave to appeal in our Supreme Court. That application was also denied.4

        Thereafter, Smith filed a petition for habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Michigan. Smith raised the following grounds for relief: (1) ineffective
assistance by both his trial and appellate lawyers; (2) that the state intentionally suppressed
material exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady, (3) that the state presented false testimony
and failed to correct testimony during trial; (4) that the state failed to preserve exculpatory DNA
evidence in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; and (5) that he had new evidence and
witnesses supporting that he is actually innocent of the crimes for which he was convicted. The
federal district court considered his petition, rejected his arguments, and denied relief. 5 He
appealed the denial of his petition for habeas corpus relief to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit, which also denied him relief.6

         Subsequently, nearly fourteen years after being convicted, Smith filed a successive motion
for relief from judgment, arguing that he is entitled to a new trial based on an affidavit from Reich
that time-since-intercourse evidence is “junk science” and evidence that the prosecution did not
disclose exculpatory evidence that could have been used to impeach Helton. As noted above, the
trial court agreed with Smith and granted his successive motion for relief from judgment.

                                 II. RELIEF FROM JUDGMENT

                                  A. STANDARD OF REVIEW

        The prosecution argues that the trial court abused its discretion by granting Smith’s
successive motion for relief from judgment. This Court reviews for an abuse of discretion a trial
court’s grant of relief from judgment. People v McSwain, 259 Mich App 654, 681; 676 NW2d
236 (2003). Review of the court’s factual findings is for clear error. Id.

                                           B. ANALYSIS

                             1. NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE

       “[A] trial court many not grant relief to a defendant if the motion [for relief from judgment]
alleges grounds for relief that could have been previously raised, unless the defendant
demonstrates both good cause for failing to raise such grounds earlier as well as actual prejudice.”
People v Johnson, 502 Mich 541, 565; 918 NW2d 676 (2018); MCR 6.508(D)(3). Additionally,

3
 People v Smith, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered July 25, 2016 (Docket No.
331547).
4
    People v Smith, 501 Mich 907 (2017).
5
 Smith v Rewerts, unpublished opinion of the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan, issued September 27, 2018 (Case No. 17-CV-13614).
6
  Smith v Rewerts, unpublished opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
issued January 6, 2020 (Case No. 19-1421).

                                                 -3-
relief may only be granted on a successive motion for relief from judgment if there is “a claim of
new evidence that was not discovered before the first such motion.” MCR 6.502(G)(2). Generally,
courts are reluctant to grant new trials on the basis of newly discovered evidence. People v
Grissom, 492 Mich 296, 312; 821 NW2d 50 (2012). “This policy is consistent with requiring
parties to use care, diligence, and valiance in securing and presenting evidence.” Id. (quotation
marks and citation omitted).

        Our Supreme Court has articulated a four-part test to determine when newly discovered
evidence will warrant a new trial. Cress, 468 Mich at 692. The defendant bears the burden of
establishing: “(1) the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, was newly discovered; (2) the
newly discovered evidence was not cumulative; (3) the party could not, using reasonable diligence,
have discovered and produced the evidence at trial; and (4) the new evidence makes a different
result probable on retrial.” Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted).

        The trial court determined that Reich’s opinion that the time-since-intercourse testimony
was “junk science” and was “fraudulent” was newly discovered evidence that warranted a new
trial under Cress. On appeal, the prosecution argues that Reich’s opinion is not newly discovered
evidence and that, even if it is, a different result is not probable on retrial.

        We first address whether Reich’s testimony was newly discovered evidence. In People v
Rao, 491 Mich 271, 283-284; 815 NW2d 105 (2012), our Supreme Court explained that newly
discovered evidence is evidence that was “unknown to the defendant or his counsel at the time of
trial.” Here, the trial court found that Reich’s opinion was unknown to Smith and his lawyer at
the time of trial. That does not end our inquiry, however. MCR 6.502(G)(2)(b) provides that a
successive motion for relief from judgment may be based upon “a claim of new evidence that was
not discovered before the first such motion was filed.” (Emphasis added). In turn, MCR
6.502(G)(3) expressly states that new evidence includes “new scientific evidence.” (Emphasis
added). The court rule states that new scientific evidence:

       includes, but is not limited to, shifts in science entailing changes:

              (a) in a field of scientific knowledge, including shifts in scientific
       consensus;

               (b) in a testifying expert’s own scientific knowledge and opinions, or

              (c) in a scientific method on which the relevant scientific evidence at trial
       was based.

In this case, there have been no shifts in the science supporting or refuting the time-since-
intercourse evidence. Reich’s affidavit indicates that at the time of Smith’s trial in 2008, time-
since-intercourse evidence was already based upon “junk science.” Thus, the information to refute
the prosecution’s time-since-intercourse testimony existed in its current form at the time of Smith’s
trial. As a result, the only difference between the time of trial and Smith’s motion for relief from
judgment is his retention of an expert witness who has opined that, based upon the facts existing
at the time of trial, the time-since-intercourse evidence is junk science. The argument is, therefore,
nothing more than an argument that the materiality of the evidence is newly discovered. Because

                                                 -4-
the evidence itself, not merely its materiality, must be newly discovered, we conclude that the trial
court erred by finding that Reich’s opinion was newly discovered evidence. See People v Clark,
363 Mich 643, 647; 110 NW2d 638 (1961) (“[I]t must be shown that the evidence itself, not merely
its materiality, was newly discovered[.]”).

        Moreover, even if the evidence could be considered newly discovered, the defense cannot
satisfy the third element of Cress. That element requires a finding that, “using reasonable
diligence, the [defendant] could not have discovered and produced the evidence at trial.” Cress,
468 Mich at 692. “What constitutes reasonable diligence in producing evidence at trial depends
on the circumstances of the case.” Rao, 491 Mich at 283-284.

        The trial court concluded that this element was satisfied because if Smith had requested
funding for a second DNA expert to proffer an opinion regarding time-since-intercourse evidence,
it would have denied the request. Yet, there is nothing on the record suggesting that a second
expert was, in fact, necessary. The defense engaged a DNA expert who opined that the DNA
analysis had been properly conducted. The record does not show what, if any, opinion the defense
expert had—at the time of trial—on the time-since-intercourse evidence. The trial court assumed
that a second expert would be necessary. However, because the burden is on Smith to prove that
he could not discover and produce the evidence at trial, the fact that the record is silent as to (1)
whether he asked his expert questions related to time-since-intercourse and (2) what answers his
expert would have given, it is equally likely that he could have discovered the problems with time-
since-intercourse evidence prior to trial. On this record, Smith cannot establish that he could not
have discovered and produced the evidence at trial. Accordingly, he cannot satisfy the third
element of Cress.

       Finally, we address whether the trial court erred by finding that Reich’s opinion evidence
makes a different result probable on retrial. The new evidence from Reich suggested that Helton’s
and Jackson’s opinions regarding time-since-intercourse had “no scientific foundation.” Reich
averred that “[a]ny suggestion that such a time frame could be estimated, guessed, calculated, or
defined from the observation of submitted forensic evidence (swabs or stains on fabric) is pure
junk science, or put another way, fraudulent.” Reich’s opinion evidence was impeachment
evidence. “[N]ewly discovered impeachment evidence ordinarily will not justify the grant of a
new trial.” Grissom, 492 Mich at 317-318. “It will be the rare case in which (1) the necessary
exculpatory connection exists between the heart of the witness’s testimony at trial and the new
impeachment evidence and (2) a different result is probable on retrial.” Id. at 318. “Newly
discovered impeachment evidence concerning immaterial or collateral matters cannot satisfy
Cress.” Id. at 321.

        MS testified that she could not identify the man who raped her because her head was
covered by a pillowcase. Accordingly, the only evidence identifying her assailant was the DNA
evidence collected from her and from the condom recovered from the bedroom where she was
raped. According to Helton’s expert testimony, Smith’s DNA was present in the samples collected
from MS and the samples collected from the condom. Smith did not dispute that fact at trial, nor
does Reich’s criticism of the time-since-intercourse evidence suggest that Helton’s DNA analysis
was erroneous. Rather, at trial, Smith relied upon Helton’s DNA analysis, which, in addition to
identifying his DNA in MS and on the condom, identified an unknown male contributor on the
sample collected from the condom. Smith’s defense was that he had consensual sexual relations

                                                -5-
with MS prior to her being raped by the unknown contributor to the sample collected from the
condom. MS, however, testified that she had never had a relationship with Smith and that she did
not have consensual sex with him. He presented no testimony at trial to refute her testimony.

        The time-since-intercourse evidence corroborated the prosecution’s theory of the case.
Jackson opined that, based on its quantity and quality, the sperm in the samples collected from MS
and the condom had been deposited less than 12 hours, or possibly up to 24 hours, before the
sample was collected. Similarly, Helton testified that the sperm had been deposited less than 12
hours before the samples were collected, but that they could have been deposited from up to 18
hours before collection. She added that, although some literature suggested that sperm cells could
survive in the vaginal canal for up to 72 hours, it could not survive for that long in the amounts
that she detected on the samples. It is undisputed that MS was raped within that timeframe.
However, at trial, the defense was also that the allegedly consensual sex between Smith and MS
also occurred within that same timeframe. Smith also agreed that someone else had raped MS in
that same timeframe. Thus, the defense’s theory was also corroborated by the time-since-
intercourse testimony. As a result, even with Reich’s opinion evidence impeaching the time-since-
intercourse evidence, a different result would not be probable on retrial. Stated differently, there
is not an exculpatory connection between Reich’s testimony and the testimony presented at trial.
With or without the time-since-intercourse testimony, the jury heard unrefuted testimony that MS
was sexually assaulted, DNA samples were collected from her and from a condom located in the
bedroom, Smith’s DNA was identified to be present in the samples from MS and from the condom,
and MS denied having consensual sexual relations with Smith. Reich’s testimony that the time-
since-intercourse testimony was junk science, therefore, would not have made a different result
probable on retrial.

        We recognize that the trial court was also obliged to consider other evidence that might be
introduced on retrial. As we will discuss further below, the defense could attempt to impeach
Helton’s credibility with newly discovered evidence about her having completed her supervisor’s
proficiency testing in his place. Yet, the defense maintained that Smith had had consensual sex
with MS and, therefore, it did not dispute Helton’s conclusions that Smith’s DNA was recovered
from MS and the condom recovered from the scene. In fact, the defense relied on Helton’s
testimony that there were three contributors to the sample. The defense argued that MS and Smith
were contributors as a result of consensual sex, and that the unidentified donor was the assailant.
Impeaching Helton would be counterproductive when relying on her testimony to suggest that
someone else was the assailant.7

       Other avenues for cross-examination of witnesses, including MS and Johnny Hodges, were
also unlikely to make a different result probable on retrial, individually or collectively. The trial
court noted that, after trial, Hodges’s credibility had been undercut with evidence that he perjured
himself when testifying at another criminal trial. Therefore, if he were called to testify again about
seeing Smith with one of his codefendants several times, his credibility could be impeached. But

7
  For this same reason, Smith’s contention that there was still more newly discovered evidence
from a prior case that could have been used to impeach Helton, which the trial court did not
consider, would not have made a difference on retrial.

                                                 -6-
even if Hodges did not testify, or were effectively impeached, other evidence nevertheless would
tie Smith to the victims, including testimony from Threlkeld’s mother, who recalled Smith looking
for her son in April 2007.

         The trial court also noted that, on retrial, Smith’s lawyer could cross-examine MS further
about her conversation with a former boyfriend, who was in jail, during which the boyfriend
accused a man not involved with the case of being the perpetrator of the sexual assault. The court
concluded that such cross-examination was speculative. We agree that any additional cross-
examination would not have been material to the defense, because MS’s former boyfriend was not
at the scene to identify the assailant, and MS consistently maintained at trial, and on the phone
call, that she did not see the perpetrator.

        In sum, the trial court clearly erred by finding that Smith was entitled to a new trial on the
basis of the newly discovered evidence from Reich. The evidence’s materiality, not the evidence
itself, was newly discovered. Moreover, Smith failed to establish that he could not, using
reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence for trial. Finally, although newly
discovered evidence can establish good cause for failing to bring claims in a prior motion, MCR
6.508(D)(3), Smith failed to establish actual prejudice. Contrary to the trial court’s conclusion,
Smith would not have had a reasonably likely chance of acquittal with the benefit of Reich’s
expertise. See MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(i)(A). Moreover, Smith was allowed one DNA expert at trial,
who ultimately did not challenge the opinions of the prosecution experts. Because additional
expert testimony about the timing of the allegedly consensual sex would have been of questionable
relevance, and possibly harmful, to the defense, Smith could not establish that the absence of expert
testimony from Reich “was so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that the
conviction should not be allowed to stand regardless of its effect on the outcome of the case.”
MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iii). For these reasons, the trial court erred when it granted relief from
judgment on the basis of Reich’s proposed expert testimony.

                                     2. BRADY VIOLATION

         The prosecution next argues that the trial court erred by concluding that Smith was entitled
to relief from judgment over a Brady violation, on the ground that the prosecution failed to turn
over information about Helton’s proficiency testing in place of her supervisor and the investigation
that followed. To establish a Brady violation, a defendant must show that “(1) the prosecution has
suppressed evidence; (2) that is favorable to the accused; and (3) that is material.” People v
Chenault, 495 Mich 142, 150; 845 NW2d 731 (2014).

        The prosecution concedes the first prong of the Brady test, noting that, even though the
assistant prosecutor handling the case was not aware of the proficiency-testing issue, another
prosecuting attorney in the office was aware of the information.

        The prosecution argues, however, that the proficiency-testing issue was not favorable to
the defense. The record shows that, pursuant to her supervisor’s directions, Helton performed her
supervisor’s proficiency testing in 2003 and 2004 and signed his initials to the testing results.
Helton’s actions were inconsistent with policies requiring transparency regarding collaborative
participation on tests. Although human resources recommended termination, Helton was not disci-
plined. Rather, the proceedings involving falsification of a report and the failure to report it were

                                                 -7-
“set aside.” The Forensic Science Division Commander wrote, “As a result of our investigation,
we are confident Ms. Helton’s tests were completed on her own. Any assistance she provided to
[her supervisor] was as a result of inappropriate directives or misleading and false information
given to her by her supervisor . . . .” The prosecution places significant weight on Helton’s having
acted upon her supervisor’s directives and receiving no discipline in the matter. But Helton’s
decision to sign her supervisor’s initials is an act that bears on her credibility. “Evidence is
favorable to the defense when it is either exculpatory or impeaching.” People v Abcumby-Blair,
335 Mich App 210, 217-218; 966 NW2d 437, 442-443 (2020) (quotation marks and citations
omitted).

       The third element of a Brady violation, however, requires a showing that the suppressed
evidence was material.

       To establish materiality, a defendant must show that there is a reasonable
       probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the
       proceeding would have been different. A “reasonable probability” is a probability
       sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. This standard “does not require
       demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the suppressed evidence would
       have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s acquittal . . . .” The question is whether,
       in the absence of the suppressed evidence, the defendant received a fair trial,
       understood as a trial resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. In assessing the
       materiality of the evidence, courts are to consider the suppressed evidence
       collectively, rather than piecemeal. [Chenault, 495 Mich at 142. (quotation marks
       and citations omitted).]

Here, the suppressed proficiency-testing evidence concerned an isolated occurrence from years
before trial. The evidence involved Helton’s honesty and susceptibility to being compromised in
the context of her department’s proficiency testing, not the processing of evidence in a criminal
case. Moreover, Helton acted only upon a supervisor’s direction, and there was no evidence of
similar pressure from any authority figure against Helton in Smith’s case. Additionally, Smith’s
own expert opined that Helton’s methodology was sound. Finally, Helton’s conclusion that
Smith’s DNA was recovered from the sperm samples was consistent with his defense that he had
had consensual sex with MS. As Smith’s lawyer testified during a posttrial evidentiary hearing,
his focus was not to impeach the DNA experts. Rather, he relied on their testimony to argue that
there were three DNA contributors, including MS, Smith, and the unidentified assailant.

        Other aspects that could change on retrial, such as testimony that might be elicited from
Hodges and MS, would not bring about a different result. Moreover, the missed opportunity for
impeaching Helton and Jackson regarding their time-since-intercourse opinions does little to
undermine confidence in the verdict, because the question whether MS and Smith had consensual
sex—not precisely when—was pivotal to the defense. These facts, on their own or combined,
would not make a different result probable on retrial. Therefore, the trial court clearly erred when
it concluded that the proficiency-testing evidence was material. Absent materiality, no Brady
violation occurred.

                                                -8-
        Because there is no Brady violation, Smith cannot establish the good cause and actual
prejudice required for his motion for relief from judgment. See MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(i)(A).
Moreover, because no Brady violation occurred, and the proficiency-testing impeachment
evidence was so disconnected from the case at hand, Smith could not establish an “irregularity . . .
so offensive to the maintenance of a sound judicial process that the conviction should not be
allowed to stand regardless of its effect on the outcome of the case.” MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iii).8
For these reasons, we conclude that the trial court erred by granting relief from judgment on the
basis of Helton’s performance of proficiency testing for her supervisor.9

       Reversed. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                               /s/ Michelle M. Rick
                                                               /s/ Michael J. Kelly
                                                               /s/ Michael J. Riordan

8
  The prosecution argues that the trial court did not adequately explain its finding of actual
prejudice under MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iii), which it characterizes as structural error. Defendant
responds that the prosecutor’s arguments related to MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iii) are not properly
before this Court because they were not raised in the application for leave to appeal. We
acknowledge that the prosecution did not cite MCR 6.508(D)(3)(b)(iii) in the application for leave
to appeal, and argued that the “easiest way” to resolve the arguments on appeal was under MCR
6.508(D)(3)(b)(i)(A). But the question whether relief from judgment was an abuse of discretion
was addressed more generally throughout. Accordingly, we will consider the argument.
9
 In light of our conclusion that the trial court erred by granting the motion for relief from judgment,
we decline to address the prosecution’s remaining argument.

                                                 -9-