Court Opinion

ID: 5454229
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-01-08 19:51:27.214045+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:32:34.417970
License: Public Domain

PER CURIAM.
The plaintiff, as the executrix of the last will of E. F. Spence, deceased, brought this action to have canceled and set aside a certain conveyance made on January 22, 1889, by said E. F. Spence to M. M. Bovard, E. F. Spence, H. Sinsabaugh, J. P. Widney, P. M. Green and R. M. Widney, “as trustees of an express trust,” upon the ground that the conveyance was void from the beginning, and the further ground that the purposes for which it was made had been abandoned, and the trusts thereby created had become impossible of execution. The court below found the facts and gave judgment as prayed for, from which, and from an order denying a new trial, the defendants appeal.
The conveyance was of certain lots of land in the city of Los Angeles, to be held in trust as follows: “To sell and con*518vey or mortgage the same at such time and for such price and on such terms as said second parties, or any four'of them, may deem best. The proceeds to be used in purchasing and setting up in first-class working condition the best set of astronomical instruments and telescope that can be purchased with said funds, to be used and known as the ‘ Spence Observatory of the University of Southern California,’ to be owned, controlled, and managed by said university. The rents, income, and profits of said property prior to sale shall be received and collected by M. M. Bovard, one of said trustees, and from same he shall pay taxes, insurance, and such other expenses as may occur in the care and management of said premises, and interest on any mortgage that may be placed thereon. The surplus of said income shall be the property of said M. M. Bovard for his own use and benefit for his services herein. Said observatory to be located on what is known as ‘Wilson’s Peak, ’ in the county of" Los Angeles, state of California, or some other suitable site in the mountains of the Sierra Madre range, to be selected by the consent and approval of E. P. Spence. In case said property, or the proceeds thereof, shall not be used as herein stated, the said proceeds (except the rents as hereinbefore provided) shall revert to and vest in the said grantor, or his legal representatives.” The trust thus created was accepted by all of the six trustees and by the University of Southern California. On April 8, 1889, the six trustees, in writing, authorized Alvin Clark & Sons, of Boston, to contract with M. Mantois, of Paris, for the purchase and delivery of lenses for a forty-inch telescope, at the price of 80,000 francs, to be paid as follows: 20,000 francs to be paid when the first lens should be delivered to and accepted by Clark & Sons in Boston; 20,000 francs more when the second lens should be delivered to and accepted by them; and the remaining 40,000 francs one year after the second payment is due; and it was stipulated that there should be no extra allowance for shortening the time on the work, as the trustees preferred that the work should not be hurried.
The first lens was constructed and sent on to Clark & Sons in Boston, and, for the purpose of raising money to make the first payment, the trustees borrowed from the State Loan and Trust Company of Los Angeles the sum of $5,500, for which they gave their promissory note, and a mortgage on the trust property to secure payment of the same. Of the money so *519raised 20,000 francs were sent on to Paris to meet the first payment. Subsequently the second lens was completed and sent on to Clark & Sons, and a demand for the second payment was made. There was no money in the hands of the trustees to make that payment, and, to determine what should be done, Dr. J. P. Widney, who was then the president of the university, held a consultation with Mr. Spence. After discussing the matter, and considering the difficulty of then raising more money, it was agreed that the lenses were more expensive than was contemplated by the deed of trust, and that it would be better to sell them, and commence over again, and make such contract as the trust property would carry out. Accordingly, with the advice and consent of Mr. Spence, Dr. Widney notified Mr. Clark that they would not go on with those lenses, but would sell them, and purchase afterward such lenses as the property would pay for. Shortly after this arrangement, on September 19, 1892, Mr. Spence died, and prior to his death two of the other trustees, M. M. Bovard and H. Sinsabaugh, had died. The three surviving trustees, on November 19, 1892, sold the lenses to the University of Chicago for a considerable sum over what had been expended for them, and with the money received they paid, among other things, the note and mortgage to the State Loan and Trust Company. During the lifetime of Bovard and Spence the business of the trust was managed largely by them, but mainly by Bovard. After the death of Spence the surviving trustees continued in possession of and cared for the trust property, paying taxes and insurance, and awaiting a favorable opportunity to sell it to the best advantage before taking steps to contract for new lenses and otherwise carry out the trust. On September 7, 1893, the plaintiff commenced this action against the three surviving trustees and the University of Southern California. At that time the places of the deceased trustees had not been filled, the trust property had not been sold, and no definite site for the location of the observatory had been selected. The case was tried in March, 1894, and the court found, among other things, “that the accomplishment of the objects set forth in said trust deed had become impossible, and that said objects and purposes have long since been abandoned, and nothing whatever has been done toward the execution of the said trust for more than three years.” It is upon this finding that the judgment rests. This finding *520is assailed as not justified by the evidence, and whether it is so justified or not is the prin "pal question presented for decision.
1. After a careful inspection of the record, we are unable to find any evidence which, in our opinion, can be said to justify the finding that the accomplishment of the objects of the trust had become impossible. It is true that three of the six trustees were dead, and that the deed required the concurrent action of at least four. But sections 2288 and 2289 of the Civil Code provide that on the death of one of several cotrustees the trust survives to the others, and that the superior court of the county where the trust property is situated may appoint other trustees, and direct the execution of the trust. And section 2268 of the same code provides that, where there are several cotrustees, all must unite in any act to bind the trust property, unless the declaration of trust otherwise provides. Here the deed did provide that a less number than all might act, and when it was made the grantor must be presumed to have known the law, and also that some of the trustees named might die, and, if so, that their places would be filled by the court, with power in the new board to discharge the duties imposed on the original appointees. And in the provision of the deed we see nothing to indicate that the grantor intended to or did confer upon the trustees named by him any discretionary powers of such a personal character that they could not be exercised by trustees appointed by the court. And the fact that no steps had been taken to have new trustees appointed certainly does not show that the execution of the trust had become impossible. There does not appear to have been any immediate necessity for filling the vacancies, as the three remaining trustees were able to mahage and look after the property and were not then ready to sell or mortgage the same.
It is also true that the big lenses had been sold, and the trust property had not been sold, and no new lenses had been contracted for. It appears that the lenses were sold with the consent and approval of the trustor. No definite time was fixed for the sale of the property or the erection of the observatory, and, under the circumstances shown, the delay does not seem to have been unreasonable. So, too, it is true that the observatory had never been located on Wilson’s Peak, and no other site for it was ever selected “with the consent and *521approval of E. F. Spence,” and it does not appear that the trustees had acquired any right to establish an observatory on Wilson’s Peak, or on any suitable site in the mountains of the Sierra Madre range. But it does not follow that a suitable and desirable site for the observatory on Wilson’s Peak may not yet be selected, and the right thereto acquired. The suggestion of counsel for respondent that there is room enough on that peak for the establishment of “one hundred and fifty to five hundred observatories” only tends to show that there can be no great difficulty in acquiring a site. So the suggestion that, in the absence of a showing to the contrary, all the land on the peak must be presumed to be government land, is no valid argument in support of respondent’s position; for, if true, it would seem to be by no means impossible to acquire a site. But, assuming that the location cannot be made on Wilson’s Peak, still it does not follow that a suitable site cannot be selected and used on some one of the adjacent peaks. The fact that Spence died before the selection, and therefore it cannot be made with his consent and approval, will not defeat the execution of the trust. When a trust exists, and all the trustees are dead, the court will appoint other trustees, and direct the execution of the trust (section 2289, Civil Code), and in a case like this another site may be selected by the consent and approval of the court.
2. The next question is, Had the objects and purposes of the trust been abandoned? We find no evidence in the record tending to show that they had. Under our code “a trustee must fulfill the purpose of the trust, as declared at its creation, and must follow all the directions of the trustor given at that time, except as modified by the consent of all parties interested”: Civ. Code, sec. 2258. And, as such trustee, he has no power to abandon a trust, except as declared therein, for he is “a general agent for the trust property,” and “his acts, within the scope of his authority, bind the trust property to the same extent as the acts of an agent bind his principal” (section 2267); and every act of the trustee, in contravention of the trust, is absolutely void: Sec. 870. “A trust cannot be revoked by the trustor after its acceptance, actual or presumed, by the trustee and beneficiaries, unless the declaration of trust reserves a power of revocation to the trustor, and in that ease the power must be strictly pursued”: Sec. 2280. The law seems, therefore, to be well settled that a trustee can*522not abandon a trust without the consent of the cestui que trust, for, as said in Perry on Trusts (section 268, fourth edition): “If a person has once accepted the office, either expressly or by implication, it is conclusive; and he cannot afterward, by disclaimer or renunciation, avoid its duties and responsibilities.” Aside from the fact that the trustees had sold the large lenses which were first made, and had delayed to select a site for the location of the observatory and to contract for other lenses, there is no evidence showing that they ever intended to or did abandon the trust. On the contrary, the evidence is clear and undisputed that they had at all times intended to go ahead with the work, and were waiting only for a favorable time and circumstances to accomplish the end proposed. So, also, there is no evidence showing that the university, as beneficiary, ever consented to the abandonment of the trust. On the contrary, the only evidence introduced upon the subject is that it never did so consent, but insisted and relied upon its execution, and that when this action was commenced it employed counsel to defend it.
3. Respondent contends that the deed is void ab initio, because the trust created thereby is a mere private trust for the benefit of a corporation, and not a trust for charity. It is well established that a trust for the promotion of education or science, such as the establishment of a school or a chair in a university, is a trust for charity, as that term has been interpreted in modern jurisprudence: Jackson v. Phillips, 14 Allen, 539; Perry on Trusts, sec. 687; Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 1023. This does not embrace, however, trusts for the benefit of such institutions as are strictly private, and conducted for mere private gain (Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, sec. 1023); but the institution must be public, or for the benefit of some portion of the public (Attorney General v. Soule, 28 Mich. 153). In this case the trust is tp establish with the proceeds of the trust property an observatory, “to be used and known as the ‘Spence Observatory of the University of Southern California, ’ to be owned, controlled, and managed by said university.” But there is an entire absence from the pleadings, and findings as well, of anything to indicate the character or purposes of the beneficiary, other than that to be inferred from its name, excepting only the fact that it is a corporation duly incorporated under the laws of the state. Whether it is a school or educational institution, *523and, if so, whether it is for the benefit of the public, or run for mere private ends, nowhere expressly appears. That it was such an institution as would support the trust seems to have been tacitly conceded in the court below, and the point that it is not such is made here for the first time. But, as there is nothing in the record from which the fact is made to appear, and as we are aware of no presumption for or against the competency of the beneficiary to take the use, the question of the validity of the deed in this respect cannot be determined upon this record. The question, however, being one upon which the validity of the deed may turn, it will be the duty of the court below upon another trial to find expressly upon the fact. Since trusts are not favored in the law, the burden will be upon the party seeking to sustain the trust to show that it is within the exception of the statute.
4. The further contention that the deed is void because the accomplishment of the trust would require the creation of a perpetuity, is fully met, if the beneficiary shall be found to be a charity, by the decision in Re Hinckley's Estate, 58 Cal. 457, where it was held that trusts for perpetual charitable uses are not in conflict with the constitution of the state, nor with those provisions of the Civil Code which prohibit perpetuities; and, further, that perpetuities prohibited by the common law do not include trusts for charitable uses. And see In re Robinson's Estate, 63 Cal. 620; People v. Cogswell, 113 Cal. 129, 35 L. R. A. 259, 45 Pac. 270.
The judgment and order are reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.
Beatty, C. J"., not participating.