Court Opinion

ID: 9641424
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 17:31:30.401303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:10:37.110039
License: Public Domain

*379MARTIN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I would affirm the judgment. The majority opinion, as I conceive, correctly states that the record contains substantial evidence that the appellant railroad company was operating its train in a negligent manner, and that this negligence was the proximate cause of the accident.
But it is held that the district judge should have directed a verdict in favor of the appellant on the issue of contributory negligence, primarily upon the authority of the pronouncement in Detroit, T. & I. R. Co. v. Rohrs, 114 Ohio St. 493, 503, 151 N.E. 714, 717, that the appellee was under definite duty to look as well as listen, “and that he must look from a point and at a time that will make the looking effective to apprise him whether danger is near or not.” This doctrine, as is stated, was approved and applied in Patton v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 136 Ohio St. 159, 24 N.E.2d 717. In the circumstances of each of these cases, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that the trial court should have directed a verdict for the defendant.
To my thinking, the facts of each of the cited cases present a much stronger showing of contributory negligence on the part of the respective plaintiffs than the evidence reveals upon the part of the plaintiff in the case at bar. Without entering upon a long factual discussion m a dissenting opinion, I desire merely to comment that, in the Patton case, the opinion asserts that under the undisputed facts the plaintiff’s decedent, when he. reached a point 65 feet south of the tracks, had a clear view of the headlight of the engine for 582 feet east of the crossing and that, when he was at a point 40 feet south of the tracks, he could have seen the headlight at an even greater distance. So, the deduction was drawn that unquestionably he could have seen the headlight of the approaching train, and was chargeable with having seen what could have been seen. In the Rohrs case, the plaintiff had lived for more than three years within about 100 feet of the railroad crossing and, on the clear morning of the accident, had started from that distance driving toward the crossing in low gear at a speed not in excess of 5 or 6 miles per hour; and, after passing a point 20 feet west of the railroad track, had even slowed down from that speed. The locomotive which struck the automobile was backing north toward the crossing at a speed of not more than 8 miles an hour, “and probably not more than half of that at the time of the collision.” The Supreme Court of Ohio asserted that “the record shows conclusively that the engine could not have been more than 50 or 75 feet away at any time after the driver of the automobile had passed the point on the highway 20 feet west of the railroad track.”
In the case at bar, the train which struck appellee’s automobile at the railroad crossing was traveling within city limits at a speed estimated as between 30 and 40 miles per hour. That it was traveling fast is established by the undisputed testimony that the automobile was caught on the front of the engine and was carried in that position about 500 feet before the train was stopped. Moreover, the automobile was destroyed by the collision. Two disinterested witnesses, though very close to the scene of the accident, heard no whistle blow or bell ring. A pile of earth covered by weeds, partly on the railroad right-of-way, obstructed a traveler’s view so that, according to several witnesses, a person traveling in an automobile would be required to come within 5 or 10 feet of the railroad track before he could obtain a clear view of the track to the west.
The appellee testified positively that he stopped his car about 8 or 10 feet from the track, looked both ways and listened, and neither saw nor heard an approaching train before he started across the intersection in second gear; and that he was in the middle of the track when he discovered the train 3 feet to the west. Obviously the jury believed his testimony, and the able and experienced trial judge, learned in Ohio law, who saw and heard the witnesses, upheld the verdict.
Upon these facts, I cannot join in the opinion that different minds may not reasonably arrive at different conclusions as to whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence which con*380tributed as a proximate cause to bring about his injury. The issue of contributory negligence was, in my view, plainly a question of fact for the jury, to be submitted under appropriate and correct instructions.
I do not construe the statement in the Rohrs case with respect to making looking “effective” as implying absolutism. If the word “effective” be construed in an absolute sense, every motorist who exercises due care in looking, but fails to see an approaching train, would be barred from recovering in any case where his car was struck at a railroad crossing. Surely such could riot have been the intent of the Supreme Court of Ohio, because such an interpretation would fly in the face of its many adjudications to the contrary. A railroad company does not have the exclusive right of way at a street crossing. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Cody, 166 U.S. 606, 17 S.Ct. 703, 41 L.Ed. 1132; 44 Am.Jur., section 493.
In Robinson v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 117 Ohio St. 43, 58, 158 N.E. 83, 88, decided after the Rohrs case, Judge Allen, now of this court, writing then for the Supreme Court of Ohio, in upholding a verdict-for the plaintiff in an action based upon a collision between a railroad train and an automobile at a grade crossing, said: “While an automobile driver rests under the duty of looking and listening before he crosses a railroad track of whose existence he is aware, it is not as a matter of law his absolute and unqualified duty to stop before he goes upon such railroad track unless his looking or listening discloses the presence of a moving train.”
Almost in the identical language of the Supreme Court of Ohio in the Rohrs case and in the Robinson case, the trial judge in the instant case incorporated into his charge to the jury the pertinent principles declared in the two cases thus: “It was the duty also of plaintiff, as he was about to cross over the railroad tracks, to exercise his senses of sight and hearing to discover whether a train was approaching the crossing and also about to pass over it and it was his duty to make such observation at such time and place as to be effective for that purpose. On the other hand, while an automobile driver rests under the duty of looking and listening before he crosses a railroad track of whose existence he is aware, as was the plaintiff in this case, it is not as a matter of law his absolute and unqualified duty to stop before he goes upon such track, unless his looking or listening disclosed the presence of a moving train.” The district judge charged further: “If you find that defendant has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that plaintiff himself was guilty of negligence directly and proximately contributing to his own injury or injuries in the manner alleged by defendant in its answer then plaintiff cannot recover damages in this case and under such circumstances your verdict should be for the defendant.” The court charged also: “If you find that the injuries of which plaintiff complains were brought about as the result of the sole negligence of the defendant, and that such negligence on the part of the defendant was the direct and proximate cause of such injury or injuries without any negligence of the plaintiff having contributed directly or proximately thereto, then in such case, your verdict should be for plaintiff herein and it would be necessary for you to assess or determine the damages.” The court had carefully and correctly explained to the jury that proximate cause, in relation to either the plaintiff’s negligence or the defendant’s negligence, is a cause without which "the accident would not have happened and which did in the natural course of events and without other efficient and independent cause bring about the injuries of the plaintiff.
In my judgment, the charge was correct, and the court pursued the correct course in submitting to the jury the issue of contributory negligence, instead of pursuing a course of absolutism in taking the case from the jury and deciding that issue of fact against the direct testimony 6f the plaintiff. It is my view that' the district judge, well aware of all the Ohio authorities cited in the majority opinion, including the Rohrs and Patton cases, acted in *381consonance with these authorities in submitting the issue of contributory negligence to the jury.
In Glasco v. Mendelman, 143 Ohio St. 649, 655, 656, 56 N.E.2d 210, 213, decided July 26, 1944, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the holding of the Court of Appeals of that state that, as a matter -of law, “the negligence of the plaintiff contributed to the proximate cause, and prevented recovery.” The opinion stated: “That court [the Court of Appeals], on appeal on questions of law alone, has authority to determine the question of proximate cause as a matter of law where the evidence is such that reasonable' minds can arrive at but one conclusion. However, where the evidence is such that reasonable minds can arrive at different conclusions upon that question then it is one of fact for determination by the jury.” The language of Judge Allen in Trentman v. Cox, 118 Ohio St. 247, 160 N.E. 715, 716, quoting from Huddy on Automobiles (8th Ed.) 611, section 576, was quoted: “‘Not only may one cross a street in front of a moving vehicle without his negligence being conclusively established, but it is also held that he need not, as a matter of law, constantly watch the vehicle.’ ” Moreover, in the Glaseo case, the State Supreme Court said: “In Knapp v. Barrett, supra (216 N.Y. 226, 110 N.E. [428], 429), Judge Cardozo said the law does not even say that because a pedestrian ‘sees a wagon approaching, he must stop till it has passed. He may go forward unless it is close upon him; and whether he is negligent in going forward will be a question for the jury. If he has -used his eyes, and has miscalculated the danger, he may still be free from fault.’ That statement is in line with the weight of authority upon this subject and is the established law of Ohio. See Trentman v. Cox, supra, and Smith v. Zone Cabs, supra [135 Ohio St. 415, 21 N.E.2d 336], Under the evidence in the instant case reasonable minds might well have arrived at different conclusions upon the question of proximate cause and therefore it was a question of fact for the jury.” [Italics supplied.]
Again, on May 9, 1945, the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the Court of Appeals, in Wilkeson, Adm’r v. Erskine & Son, Inc., 145 Ohio St. 218, 227, 228, 229, 61 N.E.2d 201, 206, in its holding by a divided court that prejudicial error had been committed by the trial court in overruling the defendant’s motion for a directed verdict. The opinion of the highest Ohio court declared it to be the settled law of the state that a motion for a directed verdict involves an admission of all the facts which the evidence tends to prove, construing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion is made; that where from the evidence reasonable minds may reach different conclusions upon any question of fact the issue is for the jury; and that “the test is not whether the trial judge would set aside a verdict on the weight of the evidence.” The statement: last quoted was credited to Hamden Lodge v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 189 N.E. 246. Liberal quotation from 39 Ohio Jurisprudence 799, sections 182 and 183, was made, including assertions that the trial judge, in ruling upon a motion for a directed verdict, should consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is made, “of which such evidence is susceptible”: and that the trial judge should indulge in every possible consideration in favor of submission of the case to the jury. The Wilkeson case is cited and quoted with approval in Hilleary v. Bromley, 146 Ohio St. 212, 221, 222, 64 N.E.2d 823, decided January 23, 1946. Compare Childe v. Street R. Co., 80 Ohio App. 128, decided February 17, 1947.
I desire to emphasize the following quotation from the opinion of the Ohio Supreme Court in the Wilkeson case, which expresses a viewpoint to which I have long adhered: “The fact that there was a difference of opinion among the members of the Court of Appeals, all of whom are experienced jurists, suggests at least that reasonable minds can reasonably come to more than one conclusion in respect of the evidence in this case.”'
I would add that the practical protection of the constitutional guarantee of trial by jury requires forbearance and restraint upon the part of both trial judges and appellate judges in setting aside the findings of juries upon issues of fact, upon the *382ground that reasonable minds could not differ upon the questions submitted under correct instructions as to the law. The combined experience, observation and intelligence of jurors — drawn as they are from many activities of life — may better equip them to decide controverted fact issues than would be possible on the part of the most able, intelligent and conscientious judge. At least, the framers of our Constitution thought so in their adoption of the Sixth and Seventh Amendments.
In Tennant, Adm’x v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 35, 64 S.Ct. 409, 88 L.Ed. 520, the Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which by a two to one vote decided one of the cases cited in the majority opinion [Moss v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 146 F.2d 673] said: “Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable.” [321 U.S. 29, 64 S.Ct. 412.] Moreover, in Lavender, Adm’r v. Kurn, 327 U.S. 645, 653, 66 S.Ct. 740, 744, 90 L.Ed. 916, the Supreme Court recently made this strong pronouncement: “Whenever facts are in dispute or the evidence is such that fair-minded men may draw different inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture is required on the part of those whose duty it is to settle to be the most reasonable inference. Only the dispute by choosing what seems to them when there is a complete absence of probative facts to support the conclusion reached does a reversible error appear. But where, as here, there is an evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict, the jury is free to discard or disbelieve whatever facts are inconsistent with its conclusion. And the appellate court’s function is exhausted when that evidentiary basis becomes apparent, it being immaterial that the court might draw a contrary inference or feel that another conclusion is more reasonable.”
In Highfill v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 6 Cir., 154 F.2d 874, this court applied the doctrine of the two last-cited opinions of the Supreme Court. This doctrine was later applied in Ellis v. Union Pac. R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 67 S.Ct. 598, 91 L.Ed. ___. In Wabash R. Co. v. Walczak, 6 Cir., 49 F.2d 763, the argument was rejected that mere failure to discover a train by which the automobile in which the plaintiff was riding was struck constituted proof positive that the occupants of the car failed to exercise the duty of continuing care in going upon a grade crossing in a city. Our court long ago recognized that in an action for damages for personal injuries, unless the inference to be drawn from the facts is so plain as to make it a legal conclusion that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, that issue must be left to the jury. See opinion of Judge Sanford, later a member of the Supreme Court of the United States, in Winters v. Baltimore & O. R. Co., 6 Cir., 177 F. 44. See also Chicago & E. R. Co. v. Ponn, 6 Cir., 191 F. 682, 689, 690, and the cases cited therein; Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. v. Howe, 6 Cir., 191 F. 776, 785, and the cases there cited. Compare Carolina, C. & O. R. Co. v. Stroup, 6 Cir., 239 F. 75, 78, 79.
More than 50 years ago, the Supreme Court demonstrated how plain must be the showing that a plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence before that issue could properly be withdrawn from the jury. Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Egeland, 163 U.S. 93, 16 S.Ct. 975, 41 L.Ed. 82. And, as has been shown, its most recent pronouncements are even stronger.
I have written this dissenting opinion at greater length than I should have desired for the reason lhat it is my firm conviction that the majority opinion constitutes a departure from the decisions of our court in many adjudicated cases in which the issue of what constitutes contributory negligence as a matter of law was reviewed.