Court Opinion

ID: 9902086
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-22 21:01:07.34216+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:21:44.787490
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 23-10413    Document: 28-1     Date Filed: 11/22/2023   Page: 1 of 6

                                                  [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                   In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                          ____________________

                                No. 23-10413
                          Non-Argument Calendar
                          ____________________

       UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                                                      Plaintiﬀ-Appellee,
       versus
       JACKIE BERNARD HARVEY,

                                                  Defendant-Appellant.

                          ____________________

                 Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Southern District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 1:18-cr-20222-FAM-1
                          ____________________
USCA11 Case: 23-10413     Document: 28-1      Date Filed: 11/22/2023    Page: 2 of 6

       2                      Opinion of the Court                23-10413

       Before ROSENBAUM, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
              Jackie Harvey appeals the district court’s reimposition of a
       special condition of his supervised release that prohibits him from
       possessing or exchanging visual depictions of sexually explicit con-
       duct involving adults. After careful review of the record and the
       parties’ briefs, we vacate the special condition and remand for fur-
       ther proceedings.
                                        I.
              In July 2018, Harvey was convicted in federal court of failing
       to register as a sex oﬀender, stemming from prior convictions for
       enticing a child for indecent purposes, and sentenced to 27 months
       in prison to be followed by a life term of supervised release. We
       aﬃrmed his sentence on appeal. United States v. Harvey, 824 F.
       App’x 889 (11th Cir. 2020). Harvey was released from prison in
       March 2020, and he began serving the life term of supervision.
              In February 2022, the district court revoked Harvey’s super-
       vised release and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment. The
       court also reimposed the life term of supervised release with the
       same conditions as previously imposed. In doing so, the court over-
       ruled Harvey’s objection to a special condition of supervised re-
       lease that prohibited him from possessing or exchanging any visual
       depictions of adults engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
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       23-10413               Opinion of the Court                        3

              Harvey appealed both his sentence and the adult-pornogra-
       phy special condition. We vacated the sentence and remanded for
       resentencing because the court appeared to base its choice of sen-
       tence in part on an erroneous interpretation of an underlying state
       statute. We declined to consider Harvey’s challenge to the special
       condition at that time. But we noted some ambiguity in the record
       about whether the court viewed the condition as necessary, inviting
       further explanation “should the court choose to reimpose that con-
       dition on remand.” United States v. Harvey, No. 22-10610, 2022 WL
       16646564, *4 (11th Cir. Nov. 3, 2022).
             The district court held a resentencing hearing on remand in
       January 2023. At the hearing, the government conceded that the
       condition was more intrusive than necessary in light of the other
       conditions of release, including internet restrictions. The proba-
       tion oﬃcer recommended that the condition remain imposed be-
       cause “defendants who are participating in sex oﬀender treatment
       agree to restrictions of viewing . . . sexually explicit material” as
       “part of the therapeutic process.” The government replied that
       Harvey would be required to comply with any conditions of his
       sex-oﬀender treatment, so a separate pornography condition was
       unnecessary.
             The district court asked for defense counsel’s views before
       quickly interjecting that it was “going to impose it” in light of the
       probation oﬃcer’s comments, stating that “[i]t’s just better to stay
       away from that, at least initially,” when undergoing treatment. The
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       4                         Opinion of the Court                     23-10413

       court indicated that Harvey “could always modify the lifetime su-
       pervised release or reduce it” in the future.
               Harvey objected that the special condition lacked a “suﬃ-
       cient nexus to the defendant and to the crime charged.” The dis-
       trict court disagreed, stating that probation was “correct in doing
       that and that’s why every other defendant waives it in order to get
       the treatment.” Accordingly, the court sentenced Harvey to 18
       months’ imprisonment and reimposed the same conditions of su-
       pervised release. This appeal followed.
                                            II.
              We review the imposition of a special condition of super-
       vised release for an abuse of discretion.1 United States v. Moran, 573
       F.3d 1132, 1137 (11th Cir. 2009). Generally, “we will reverse only if
       we have a deﬁnite and ﬁrm conviction that the district court com-
       mitted a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached.” Id.
       (cleaned up).

       1 The government’s argument for plain error review is unconvincing, and it

       has not adequately briefed an argument that Harvey’s challenge is barred by
       another doctrine or principle. Even if we agree there is a “difference between
       imposition and reimposition of a special condition,” the government cites no
       authority for its claim that Harvey forfeited his current challenge, which he
       raised and argued below, by failing to object when the condition was first im-
       posed at his original sentencing. As our mandate confirmed, the district court
       retained discretion to reimpose the adult-pornography special condition when
       resentencing Harvey, and the court exercised that discretion over Harvey’s
       objection. Because the issue was properly preserved below, we review for an
       abuse of that discretion.
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       23-10413                  Opinion of the Court                              5

              In sentencing a defendant, the district court may impose any
       condition of supervised release that (a) “is reasonably related” to
       the history and characteristics of the defendant and the sentencing
       goals of deterrence, protection of the public, and rehabilitation;
       (b) “involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably
       necessary” to accomplish those goals; and (c) is consistent with the
       Sentencing Commission’s policy statements.             18 U.S.C. §
       3583(d)(1)–(3); see 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (2)(B)–(D); U.S.S.G. §
       5D1.3(b). To be reasonably related, a condition need not be “sup-
       ported by each factor enumerated in § 3553(a),” which merit “in-
       dependent consideration.” United States v. Zinn, 321 F.3d 1084, 1089
       (11th Cir. 2003). And while “a condition of supervised release
       should not unduly restrict a defendant’s liberty, a condition is not
       invalid simply because it aﬀects a probationer’s ability to exercise
       constitutionally protected rights.” Id.
              Here, the district court abused its discretion in imposing the
       adult-pornography special condition. Apart from Harvey’s com-
       mission of child enticement in 1997, the court did not suggest there
       was anything particular about Harvey’s history and characteristics
       that warranted prohibiting his possession of legal pornography in-
       volving adults.2 Rather, the court imposed the condition because,
       according to the probation oﬃcer, “defendants who are

       2 Harvey was convicted in 1997 of exposing his penis to his nephews, ages

       seven and nine, and attempting to force them to perform oral sex on him. He
       also has convictions for failure to register as a sex offender. But the record
       does not indicate any connection between these offenses and pornography.
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       6                      Opinion of the Court                  23-10413

       participating in sex oﬀender treatment” as a component of their
       supervised release “agree to restrictions of viewing . . . sexually ex-
       plicit material” as “part of the therapeutic process.”
               However, the special condition as written goes well beyond
       prohibiting adult pornography insofar as such a ban remains a re-
       quirement of Harvey’s sex-oﬀender treatment. Instead, the condi-
       tion imposes a lifetime ban on such materials regardless of Har-
       vey’s treatment status, even if it remains subject to later modiﬁca-
       tion. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e). As the government noted below, Har-
       vey is already subject to severe restrictions on internet or computer
       access, and he would be required in any case to comply with any
       conditions of his court-ordered sex-oﬀender treatment, including
       any conditions restricting the viewing of legal pornography. And
       the district court identiﬁed no other reason warranting its lifetime
       ban on such materials.
              In sum, neither the district court’s reasoning nor the record
       more generally supports a conclusion that the adult-pornography
       condition as written “involves no greater deprivation of liberty
       than is reasonably necessary” for the purposes of sentencing. See
       18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2). We therefore vacate that condition and re-
       mand for further proceedings.
              VACATED AND REMANDED.