Court Opinion

ID: 9948692
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-07 18:02:20.392163+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:25:45.592214
License: Public Domain

Filed 3/7/24 P. v. Sanchez CA5

                  NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

           IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                                     FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

 THE PEOPLE,
                                                                                             F085926
           Plaintiff and Respondent,
                                                                            (Super. Ct. No. 22CRST000043)
                    v.

 ROBERT SANCHEZ,                                                                          OPINION
           Defendant and Appellant.

         APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Fresno County. Jonathan M.
Skiles, Judge.

         Cynthia L. Barnes, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
         Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney
General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Darren K. Indermill and Erin
Doering, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                                                        -ooOoo-
                                                INTRODUCTION
         Defendant Robert Sanchez appeals from the court’s order denying his 2022
petition filed pursuant to Penal Code section 290.5 to terminate his sex offender
registration requirement, which arose from a 1986 conviction for lewd and lascivious acts
with a child under the age of 14. (Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal
Code.) At the hearing on the petition, the parties agreed the evidence showed, following
his 1986 conviction defendant was repeatedly arrested for similar conduct, including as
recently as in 2018, but none of these charges resulted in convictions. The court denied
defendant’s petition based on its safety concerns in light of the number of subsequent
arrests for similar conduct, and it required defendant to continue to register for a period of
two years before he could again petition for termination of the registration requirement.
       On appeal, defendant argues the trial court abused its discretion in concluding
community safety would be appreciably increased by requiring defendant to continue to
register for two additional years. Rather, the prosecution failed to establish terminating
the registration requirement would raise the threat to society because he might reoffend.
       We affirm the court’s order denying defendant’s petition.
                  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
       In 1986, defendant was convicted of committing a lewd or lascivious act upon a
child who is under 14 years old, a violation of section 288, subdivision (a), in case
No. 0334416-5, which required him to register as a sex offender in Fresno County. On
June 1, 2022, defendant petitioned the superior court to terminate his sex offender
registration requirement arising from his 1986 conviction pursuant to section 290.5. He
asserted he was designated as “Tier 2,” had registered for at least 20 years, and had not
previously filed a section 290.5 petition. Accordingly, he believed he had “met the
requirements to register for the time period required by [his] tier designation as
determined by the Department of Justice.” Thereafter, the Fresno County Sheriff’s
Office filed a proof of defendant’s registration requirement and tier level as “Tier 2—
Adult.” It also filed a “Petition Checklist” in which it represented that defendant did not
have any pending charges against him that could extend the time to complete the
registration requirements of his tier or change his tier status (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(2)); he

                                              2.
was not on parole, probation or supervised release (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(2)); and he was not
in custody (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(2)). The Fresno County District Attorney’s Office filed an
objection to the granting of the petition on the grounds “[c]ommunity safety would be
significantly enhanced by the petitioner’s continued registration.”
       The court held a hearing on defendant’s petition on December 2, 2022. During the
hearing, the parties agreed defendant had suffered an arrest for three counts of similar
conduct in 1992. However, he was acquitted of the charges in 1993. In 1994, 2004,
2012, and 2018, defendant also suffered additional arrests, but the charges were
dismissed. The prosecutor affirmed the charges that were subsequently dismissed were
all “288 type charges,” and expressed a concern that defendant was still “getting those
arrests” in 2012 and 2018, noting the 2012 arrest was for the “same type of charges, 288”
and the 2018 arrest was for violations of sections 647.6 (annoying or molesting a child
under 18) and 288. The prosecutor explained, “at the time of the original conviction,
there w[ere] two separate reporting allegations” and “one of the cases went forward” with
a nine-year-old victim. “There was also a long time with another victim [who] said that
there w[ere] multiple events, penetration events,” but defendant was not convicted of that
charge. “So similar conduct but it was not pled and proven.”
       The court told defendant, though “those aren’t convictions, … it is concerning …
that you have been arrested multiple times since having to register for conduct that’s
similar to why you have to register.” The court noted, “[T]here’s a lot of different
reasons why those cases end up getting dismissed. Sometimes it’s because people don’t
cooperate with them. Sometimes it’s because there is just nothing to investigate. But
having one of those happen while you are registering is concerning, but … not unduly so.
Having three, four, or five of them, it starts causing concerns.” The court further stated,
“This is one of those rare type of procedures where it doesn’t necessarily have to be a
conviction for the Court to have a concern raised.”

                                             3.
       Defense counsel responded, “[T]he nature of having people register as sex
offenders” and having that information “publicly available on a website” is that neighbors
“don’t like it,” and allegations are taken “more seriously than they normally would by
police.” He asserted, “Ultimately, none of those ended up in a conviction,” and “[w]e
don’t have the facts of those before us.” He argued, “It is the People’s burden to show
that registration will assist in future crime prevention,” and there has not been a crime
sustained since defendant’s conviction. In response to questioning by the court,
defendant represented that he was 74 years old at the time of the hearing.
       The court initially stated it was going to grant the petition, but the prosecutor then
explained the subsequent arrests, including those in 2004, 2012, and two in 2018, were all
for section 288 type charges. The court asked defendant to “shed light” on those arrests,
and defendant stated he was “just there at the wrong time” and they were “false
accusations.” The court asked the prosecutor to pull the file regarding the 2018 arrests in
Fresno County to determine “what that was all about,” but the district attorney was
unable to provide much information. The court stated it wanted “to know a little bit of
background on these cases and why they were just arrests but weren’t sustained, whether
it was because the victim couldn’t be found.” The court asserted it was “factoring in the
fact that these are arrests, not convictions.” But, it explained, defendant was registering
for “a serious sex crime” and had “been arrested for ongoing serious sex crimes about
every two to three years.” Accordingly, the court continued the matter to permit the
parties to look into the circumstances of defendant’s prior arrests.
       The court held another hearing on February 24, 2023. At that hearing, the court
explained it was unaware of any convictions defendant had sustained, but it had
“significant concerns about the fact that there were multiple arrests for same or similar
conduct.” The People stated they confirmed “at some point cases [were] filed,” but there
was no further information as to why they were not pursued. Defense counsel again
asserted it was the People’s burden and they failed to meet it; so, “the petition must be

                                              4.
granted.” The court stated defendant’s “multiple arrests for similar offenses” provides a
basis for a “finding that he poses an ongoing risk even if they’re not convictions, given
that conduct even if it doesn’t result in a conviction.”
       Defense counsel agreed the court records showed defendant had been arrested, but
he argued the arrests should not be held against defendant, asserting there is “such a low
standard for initiation of a case.” He also asserted registration was not “protecting the
public … in any way, shape or form.” He again argued the People had not met their
burden as they had not provided any information.
       The court denied defendant’s petition to terminate his adult sex offender
registration requirement because it found “[c]ommunity safety would be significantly
enhanced by the petitioner’s continued registration.” It found the “multiple arrests while
registering for similar alleged conduct that he was registering for … provide[d] a basis …
to find that it will not be appropriate to terminate registration.” Rather, defendant “poses
an ongoing risk given the fact that, repeatedly, he’s being arrested for same or similar
conduct.” The court reasoned, “somebody can be arrested one time and it’s just bad luck
if somebody is arrested three, four times for a similar type of charge; that’s enough for
this Court to find that there’s a reason to have concerns about public safety going
forward.” The court ruled defendant could not file another petition for termination for
two years in order to see if he was arrested again for similar conduct.
                                       DISCUSSION
        The Court Did Not Err in Denying Defendant’s Section 290.5 Petition
       Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his petition to terminate his sex
offender registration requirement pursuant to section 290.5 from his 1986 conviction in
case No. 0334416-5. We disagree.

                                              5.
       A.       Standard of Review and Applicable Law
       California law requires persons convicted of specified sex crimes against a child,
including violations of section 288, to register as a sex offender while they live, work, or
attend school in California. (§ 290, subds. (b), (c); People v. Mosley (2015) 60 Cal.4th
1044, 1048.) “For many years, California took a one-size-fits all approach to sex
offender registration: If registration was required, registration was always for life. (Stats.
1947, ch. 1124, § 1, p. 2562.)” (People v. Franco (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th 184, 190.)
However, commencing January 1, 2021, Senate Bill No. 384 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
restructured the sex offender registration requirement, establishing three tiers of
registration for sex offenders, primarily based on the offense of conviction, for periods of
at least 10 years (tier one), at least 20 years (tier two), and life (tier three). (Stats. 2017,
ch. 541, § 2.5; see § 290, subd. (d).) Defendant is a tier two sex offender subject to the
20-year registration requirement. (§ 290, subd. (d)(2); see § 290.5, subds. (a), (b).)
Commencing July 1, 2021, Senate Bill 384 also established procedures for a person to
seek termination from the sex offender registry if the person meets certain criteria,
including completion of the mandated minimum registration period. (§ 290.5, subds. (a)–
(c); People v. Thai (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 427, 432.) Pursuant to the statute, the
prosecution may request a hearing and present evidence to establish “community safety
would be significantly enhanced by requiring continued registration.” (§ 290.5, subd.
(a)(2), (3).)
       Section 290.5 does not define the phrase “community safety would be
significantly enhanced.” (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(2); People v. Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at
p. 432.) The purpose of section 290 is to ensure police can surveil sex offenders at all
times because they pose a “‘“‘continuing threat to society.’”’” (People v. Sorden (2005)
36 Cal.4th 65, 73.) In the absence of a statutory definition, words should be given their
usual and ordinary meanings. (Roberts v. City of Palmdale (1993) 5 Cal.4th 363, 376.)
“‘Significant’ is defined as ‘having or likely to have influence or effect: deserving to be

                                                6.
considered: important, weighty, notable.’ (Webster’s 3d New Internat. Dict. (1981) p.
2116, col. 2, capitalization omitted.)” (People v. Thai, supra, at p. 432.) “‘Enhanced’ is
defined as to raise or lift. ([Webster’s, supra,] p. 753, col. 3.)” (Thai, at p. 432.) Thus,
the prosecution must produce evidence establishing that requiring continued registration
appreciably increased society’s safety. (Ibid.)
       In making this determination, the trial court must consider: “the nature and facts
of the registerable offense; the age and number of victims; whether any victim was a
stranger at the time of the offense (known to the offender for less than 24 hours); criminal
and relevant noncriminal behavior before and after conviction for the registerable
offense; the time period during which the person has not reoffended; successful
completion, if any, of a Sex Offender Management Board-certified sex offender
treatment program; and the person’s current risk of sexual or violent reoffense, including
the person’s risk levels on SARATSO static, dynamic, and violence risk assessment
instruments, if available.” (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3); People v. Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 432–433.) The parties may submit, and the court may base its decision upon,
affidavits, declarations, police reports or any other “reliable, material, and relevant”
evidence. (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(3).) If the court denies the petition, it must set the time
period—one to five years, after which the petitioner can repetition for termination—and
state its reasons. (§ 290.5, subd. (a)(4).)
       An appellate court reviews the trial court’s ruling on a petition for termination
from the sex offender registry for abuse of discretion. (Lewis v. Superior Court (2008)
169 Cal.App.4th 70, 79; People v. Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 433; accord, People
v. Franco, supra, 99 Cal.App.5th at p. 192 [explaining whether defendant’s “‘continued
registration appreciably increase[s] society’s safety’” after weighing statutorily
enumerated factors is a “predominantly factual inquiry”].) To establish an abuse of
discretion, a defendant must demonstrate the trial court’s decision fell outside the bounds

                                              7.
of reason, i.e., was arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd. (People v. Johnson (2022)
12 Cal.5th 544, 605–606.)
       “‘The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls
for varies according to the aspect of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s
findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed
de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and
capricious.’” (People v. Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 433; see Haraguchi v. Superior
Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712, fns. omitted.) A trial court abuses its discretion
when its factual findings are not supported by the evidence, or its decision is based on an
incorrect legal standard. (People v. Thai, supra, at p. 433.)
       B.     Analysis
       Defendant asserts the prosecution failed to meet its burden to present “reasonable,
credible, and solid evidence” that “community safety would be significantly enhanced”
by requiring him to register for an additional two years, noting he was 74 at the time of
the hearing. He argues he had not sustained a conviction for a sex offense or failed to
register as a sex offender since he was convicted of the offenses that required him to
register as a sex offender. Accordingly, the court abused its discretion in denying his
petition and its order should be reversed. The People respond that defendant’s “pattern of
arrests for lewd and lascivious conduct inherently suggests that the reason for the
dismissals here was not because [defendant] did not engage in any of the sexual
misconduct.” They contend the court appropriately considered defendant’s pattern of
arrests here, as a sentencing court may consider arrests that do not result in conviction in
making sentencing decisions. We agree with the People; we cannot conclude the court
abused its broad discretion in concluding community safety would be significantly
enhanced by requiring defendant to continue registering as a sex offender for at least two

                                              8.
more years to permit additional time to assess whether defendant remains arrest and
conviction free.
       Our state Supreme Court has acknowledged that, “[w]hile a record of arrests not
resulting in conviction is generally inadmissible at trial, it may serve significant functions
in both pretrial and post-trial proceedings.” (Loder v. Municipal Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d
859, 866.) The Loder court noted the particular value of an arrest record as an
investigative tool for the discovery of further evidence where the “prior arrest is not an
isolated event but one of a series of arrests of the same individual on the same or related
charges,” especially “when the crime in question is typically subject to recidivism, such
as … child molesting ….” (Id. at p. 865.) “In these circumstances a pattern may emerge
… which has independent significance as a basis for suspecting the arrestee if the crime
is committed again.” (Id. at pp. 865–866.) The Loder court also explained an arrest
record may be considered by the court in conjunction with all other relevant information
in deciding whether to release a defendant on recognizance or in fixing the appropriate
amount of bail. (Id. at p. 867.) It further noted that a court may also take a defendant’s
arrest record into account in determining whether and upon what conditions to grant
probation or when to release him on parole. (Id. at p. 868.) Notably, similar to an
assessment as to whether a registration requirement should be terminated under section
290.5, the relevant inquiry with regard to whether to permit release of an individual from
pretrial detention or on parole relates to an assessment of the risk the individual poses to
public safety. (See Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (f)(3) [“Public safety and the safety of
the victim shall be the primary considerations” in setting, reducing or denying bail]; In re
Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181, 1205 [“the Penal Code and corresponding regulations
establish that the fundamental consideration in parole decisions is public safety”]; see
also In re Humphrey (2021) 11 Cal.5th 135, 143 [noting in certain circumstances “the
need to protect community safety may conflict with the arrestee’s fundamental right to
pretrial liberty”].)

                                              9.
       Here, the People asserted, and the defense agreed, defendant had suffered
numerous arrests for conduct similar to that for which he sustained the 1986 conviction
requiring him to register as a sex offender. Indeed, the parties agreed defendant was
arrested as recently as 2018 on similar charges, which the court confirmed. The court
further acknowledged it was taking into account these were arrests and not convictions,
but it emphasized the nature, number, and recentness of the arrests in rendering its
decision. It also afforded defendant an opportunity to respond to the past arrests and
assessed his response in rendering its conclusion.
       Section 290.5 expressly permits the court to consider any reliable, material, and
relevant evidence related, in part, to a defendant’s criminal and relevant noncriminal
behavior after conviction for the registerable offense, the time period during which he
had not reoffended, and his current risk of sexual or violent reoffense in determining
whether a defendant’s continued registration “appreciably increased society’s safety.”
(See 290.5, subd. (b)(3); accord, Evid. Code, § 210 [evidence is relevant if it has “any
tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action”].) Additionally, as discussed, the California Supreme Court
has acknowledged the admissibility as well as the relevance and potential value of arrest
records in certain postconviction proceedings that involve an assessment of the potential
danger an individual poses to public safety. (See Loder v. Municipal Court, supra, 17
Cal.3d at pp. 866–868.)
       And, here, the prosecution produced evidence of undisputed facts—namely, that
defendant’s arrest record reflected numerous arrests over the course of three decades
related to child molestation since his 1986 conviction, including a 2018 arrest—
supporting the trial court’s conclusion that terminating defendant’s registration
requirement would considerably raise the threat to society because defendant is currently
likely to reoffend. (See generally People v. Thai, supra, 90 Cal.App.5th at p. 433 [noting
it is prosecution’s burden to produce evidence establishing terminating registration

                                            10.
requirement considerably raises threat to society because defendant is “currently likely to
reoffend”].) Thus, under the circumstances, we cannot conclude the court’s denial of
defendant’s petition to terminate his registration requirement pursuant to section 290.5
and its imposition of a two-year requirement before defendant can petition again
exceeded the bounds of reason. That is, the court’s factual finding that community safety
would be significantly enhanced by defendant’s continued registration was grounded in
the evidence presented at the hearing.
       Accordingly, we reject defendant’s contention.
                                     DISPOSITION
       The court’s order denying defendant’s petition is affirmed.

                                                                                   PEÑA, J.
WE CONCUR:

DETJEN, Acting P. J.

SMITH, J.

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