Court Opinion

ID: 9790016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 01:45:13.396772+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:35:25.368859
License: Public Domain

Mr. Justice Doyle
dissenting:
I would affirm the judgment of the trial court but would do so on a much narrower basis than that set forth in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frantz.
This case, in my opinion, does not call for a determination as to whether or not the doctrine of sovereign immunity applicable to the state, the municipal corporation, *17the school district and other governmental agencies should be “repealed” by judicial decision. If I were of the opinion that the activity in question should be classified as governmental, I would vote for reversal because my view is that this deeply embedded body of law cannot be changed by a simple judicial decree — that it rests on policy considerations and that it is for the legislature to determine questions of policy. Thus I agree with the comment of the majority opinion that “This is a function of the legislature and in a particular area the legislature has performed its function by changing the rule.” The majority is there referring to the 1949 statute which waived immunity with respect to injuries caused by emergency vehicles. Session Laws of 1948, p. 268.
My disagreement with the majority opinion stems from the fact that it blindly adheres to precedent. In effect its position is that regardless of the legal or historical soundness of the conclusion that the activity here in question is properly classified as governmental we are powerless to examine it against recognized standards and redefine it. To my mind, the judicial process involves a case by case analysis and the common law evolves in this manner, and it is thus within our province to reexamine the categories with which we are here dealing. They are not closed ones which can never be modified even though the circumstances which gave rise to them have changed.
In order to adequately show my viewpoint, it is necessary to review the history of the immunity rule and to examine the basis for it, its basis as applied to municipal corporations, and to show the standards which properly apply to solution of the problem here raised.
The immunity of governments from liability for torts originated in the idea that “the King can do no wrong.” It extends to the governments of the United States and each state with statuory modifications. Though still applied, it has become discredited and owes its continued existence and vitality to various policy considerations. *18Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 Yale L.J. 1, 39. The rule is said to have been extended to municipal corporations and other governmental subdivisions by a misapplication of the early English decision in Russell v. Men of Devon (1788), 100 Eng. Rep. 359. This misinterpretation occurred in Mower v. Leicester (1812), 9 Mass. 247. See Borchard, 34 Yale L.J. 129. Although some early American decisions at first refused to extend immunity to municipal corporations it became firmly established as part of our law as a result of the decision in Bailey v. New York, 3 Hill (N.Y.) 531, 38 Am. Dec. 669 (1842). Ironically enough, the rule of immunity of public hospitals has been long since abandoned in the land of its birth, England, and also in Canada. Hillyer v. St. Bartholomew’s Hospital (1909), 2 K.B. 820; Gold v. Essex County Council (1942), 2 K.B. 292, 2 All Eng. 237; Cassidy v. Ministry of Health (1951), 2 K.B. 343; Nyberg v. Provost Municipal Hospital Board (1927), Can. Sup. Ct. 226.
At present, although universally condemned by courts and text writers alike, the doctrine is consistently applied (in tort cases at least) except to the extent that immunity has been waived by statute or constitutional amendment, and except where courts have taken a more critical look at the traditional “governmental” and “proprietary” classifications and have redefined and narrowed the former group. See Prosser, Torts, 774, 775; Rhyne, Municipal Law, 730, etc.; Harper & James, Torts, 1619, Sec. 29.6, etc.; 75 A.L.R. at page 1196, 120 A.L.R. at page 1377, 25 A.L.R. (2d) at pages 207-209. Borchard, Governmental Liability in Tort; 34 Yale L.J. 1, 129 and 229; and Governmental Responsibility in Tort; 36 Yale L.J. 1, 757, and 1039; Fuller and Casner, Municipality Tort Liability in Operation; 54 Harv. L. Rev., 437. See also the concurring opinion of Peters, P.J. and the dissent of Carter, J. in Madison v. San Francisco, 106 Cal. (2d) 253, 236 P. (2d) 141.
This Court has repudiated the doctrine of sovereign *19immunity in actions sounding in contract. Colorado Racing Commission v. Brush Racing Assn., 136 Colo. 279, 316 P. (2d) 582; Ace Flying Service v. Colorado Dept. of Agriculture, 136 Colo. 19, 314 P. (2d) 278, and Stone v. Currigan, 138 Colo. 442, 334 P. (2d) 740. In the latter case Mr. Justice Hall relegated “the doctrine of sovereignty ... to limbo, only the memory lingers on,” but something more than memory exists in tort actions. In this field immunity has never departed, and notwithstanding there is almost universal agreement among courts and text writers that the sovereign immunity doctrine is ill-founded, illogical and unjust, it is so deeply imbedded, and with all of its corollaries is such a large body of law, as to be not subject to judicial uprooting. It is generally agreed that where immunity exists, it can be waived only by legislative action. On this Prosser, supra, has said at p. 775:
“ * * * The courts are so far bound, however, by precedent and existing classifications that any real reform of the law must come by statutes, * * * ”
See also Harper & James, supra, 1613, Borchard, 34 Yale L.J. 137. Since the immunity of the state is not subject to waiver or consent at the hands of the judiciary the narrow question here is whether the treatment of the indigent sick is a governmental activity clothed with the claimed immunity.
The reasons appearing in the decisions supporting the doctrine of immunity of the state are generally reasons of public policy. These are summarized by Harper & James, supra, Sec. 29.3. The authors call attention to an often cited dictum of Justice Holmes in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 “[a] sovereign is exempt from suit, not because of any formal conception or obsolete theory, but on the logical and practical ground that there can be no legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right depends,” and note that the “absence of right” theory which is there expounded is not supported in history and is of no help *20“in solving the problem whether a modern democratic society should, as a matter of either morals or expediency, assume liability . . .” Other recognized reasons cited by the authors include: (1) since the sovereign can do no wrong it can not authorize a servant to commit a tort. As a consequence the servant’s tortious acts are ultra vires — the doctrine of respondeat superior never applies. (The City advances this concept — the same could be said of any master or principal), (2) funds of the sovereign are public and can not be devoted to private compensation, (3) the public service would be undermined and hindered and the public safety endangered if the state could be subjected to suit at the instance of every citizen, (4) governments would be embroiled in endless suits which would impair efficiency. Thus the judicial motivation for the rule appears as concern about interference with government activities and possible prevention of uninhibited government action, together with apprehension as to excessive cost.
Other underlying reasons given which are also here urged by the City to be applicable are: “ * * * that in the performance of such duties public officers are agents of the state and not of the corporation, so that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not apply; . . . and that it is unreasonable to hold the corporation liable for negligence in the performance of duties imposed upon it by the legislature, rather than voluntarily assumed under its general powers.” Prosser, Torts, 774 (2d Ed.)
Whether immunity should be extended to a particular activity has traditionally depended on whether it is held to be governmental or proprietary. Often this is determined arbitrarily and this categorical method has produced illogical results such as holding street maintenance to be proprietary and garbage collection to be governmental. Seavey, Keeton & Keeton, Cases on Torts, 52.
However, the criteria and tests which have been used by the courts for determining whether functions are governmental, are hardly more helpful than the arbi*21trary categorical approach. It is generally agreed that a municipal corporation has no inherent immunity — that it can be sued but that it enjoys immunity from liability to the extent that it acts as an agency of the state in the performance of duties which have been delegated to or which the state has authorized it to perform. Prosser, supra, Sec. 109, pp. 774, 775, 2 Harper & James, supra, 1623-1625. Other specific criteria most often invoked are said to be:
“ * * * (1) whether the function is allocated to the municipality for its profit or special advantage or whether for the purpose of carrying out the public functions of the state without special advantage to the city, and (2) whether the function is one historically performed by government. ‘ [I] t is only where the duty is a new one, and is such as is ordinarily performed by trading corporations, that an intention to give a private action for a neglect in its performance is to be presumed.’
“These criteria are elusive and unsatisfactory. All the functions of a municipality are — or should be — for the public benefit. They are none the less so because they serve directly and primarily only a limited segment of the public rather than all the people of the state. To the extent that cities are instrumentalities of the state, their main function is to serve the state’s purposes locally. The fact that the municipality makes a charge or a profit in connection with the service rendered has often been considered; but functions have been held governmental in spite of a charge, and functions have been held proprietary where there is neither charge nor profit. The historical test is a suggestive guide though a faltering one. Many of the functions now generally considered governmental were privately performed in the not very distant past. Little wonder that courts and commentators have despaired of finding a rational and consistent key to the distinction. * * * ” 2 Harper & James, 1621-1623.
At times the determination whether the City has im*22munity rests on whether the power or duty is mandatory or permissive. Thus, immunity exists if the duty is a mandatory one but is non-existent if it is discretionary. Other courts determine this question with reference to whether the act is discretionary or ministerial, recognizing immunity if it is discretionary. Other courts have distinguished between acts of misfeasance and acts of nonfeasance holding that a municipality is liable for active exposure to unreasonable risk of harm but not liable for its passive failure. Rhyne, supra, pp. 735, etc.
The activities which have been generally recognized as governmental are summarized in 2 Harper & James, supra, 1623:
“ * * * So far as precedent goes, the following activities illustrate those which are generally held to be governmental: legislative activity (such as the passage or repeal of, or failure to pass, an ordinance); police activity; fire fighting; education; and public health. On the other hand the operation and maintenance of utilities (waterworks, sewer systems, gas or electric plants, street railways, airports) are generally regarded as proprietary functions. There is conflict among the authorities as to street cleaning, garbage collection, parks, swimming pools, and the erection and maintenance of public buildings. Streets and highways deserve separate treatment. * * * ”
Conclusions of the courts in these matters are often arrived at by generally referring to the classifications of the decided cases and by determining whether the activity in suit fits within one of such classifications. If this approach were used here, the result would be a holding that the present activity is public health and consequently governmental. The case noted in 25 A.L.R. (2d) 200, Schroeder v. St. Louis, 360 Mo. 293, 228 SW (2d) 677, 25 A.L.R (2d) 200, is typical of this type of mechanical method. Here it was said:
“ * * * The preservation and safeguarding of public health is within the police power of a city government. *23That is the generally recognized rule. See 62 CJS, Municipal Corporations, § 133, p. 278, and cases there cited. By the weight of authority the establishment and maintenance of a hospital by a city is considered a governmental activity, and hence the city is held not liable in tort actions. 63 CJS, Municipal Corporations, § 905, p. 311; 26 Am Jur 594, Sec. 13.
“A few states hold to the contrary as evidenced by cases cited by plaintiffs. They are: City of Miami v. Oates, 152 Fla 21, 10 So (2d) 721; City of Okmulgee v. Carlton, 180 Okl 605, 71 P. (2d) 722; City of Shawnee v. Roush, 101 Okl 60, 223 P. 354; Sanders v. City of Long Beach, 54 Cal App (2d) 651, 129 P. (2d) 511, loc cit 516 (9), citing Bloom v. City and County of San Francisco, 64 Cal. 503, 3 P. 129. In all of the above cases the courts held that a city was not performing a governmental function when operating a hospital. The cities were therefore held liable.”
This Court in Meek v. City of Loveland, 85 Colo. 346, 276 P. 30, failed to go even that far. The case was apparently decided by assumption of the premise that treatment of the sick is governmental. No clue to the court’s reasoning appears in the opinion. It merely declares that the trial court correctly sustained the city’s demurrer. Since this is the only semblance of a precedent on the particular point it should not be regarded as controlling and the subject is thus open to consideration and to acceptance or rejection of tendered tests and criteria.
A more specific and reasoned method is prescribed in Denver v. Davis, 37 Colo. 370, 86 P. 1027 and City and County of Denver v. Austria, 136 Colo. 454, 318 P. (2d) 1103. In the Davis case it was said:
“The rule which determines the liability or non-liability of a municipality in cases of this nature is the character of the duty performed rather than the department, officer, or agent of the corporation by whom the duty is performed. * * * We think that the evidence *24in this case clearly establishes the fact that the establishment and maintenance of this dumping ground was for the convenience and benefit of the inhabitants of the city, and as an adjunct to the street cleaning department of the city, and was not in the discharge of any public duty imposed upon the city by the state; that it was local and special in its character. * * * (Emphasis supplied.)
See also City and County of Denver v. Austria, supra, wherein the Court declared:
“ * * * As to the non-liability, as claimed by the city because it was acting in its governmental capacity, the general trend of decisions is to restrict the doctrine of governmental immunity and non-liability and construe the doctrine strictly against the city.”
* * *
“The contention of the city seems to be that because the statute requires the erection and maintenance of a courthouse that every activity connected with that courthouse is a governmental function. If the city sees fit to carry on other activities, not necessary in the performance of its governmental functions, then it assumes the risk of liability for its torts in the conduct or operation of such activities. * * * ”
The Davis and Austria cases teach us that more particular and careful analysis of the particular facts is demanded, and that we must apply such criteria as are available even though these are conceded to be imperfect.
Study of the cases collected in the annotation of 25 A.L.R. (2d) 229-230 shows that very often the decisions are made on the basis of whether or not the patient has paid a fee or whether the activity is conducted on a profit basis. Emphasis of this profit factor will almost invariably result in the conclusion that the conduct is governmental, and if this criterion were always applied few activities would be held to be non-governmental because municipalities seldom, if ever, conduct a profit *25producing business. It would seem, therefore, that this should be rejected as a controlling criterion.
The fact that the activity benefits the entire community is inconclusive. Most every municipal activity affects directly or indirectly the entire community. Highway maintenance, for example, certainly has such an effect and yet anomalously it is often held to be proprietary. Borchard, 34 Yale L.J. 229.
Merely because the conduct occurs within the walls of a public hospital does not mark it as governmental. Denver v. Davis, supra, and City and County of Denver v. Austria, supra. Some such activity might be so classified. This might be true of hospital administration, public health activities such as planning, inspecting and carrying out the particular mandates of statutes and ordinances. For example, Schwalb v. Connely, 116 Colo. 195, 179 P. (2d) 667 recognizes that the performance of an autopsy is governmental and thus immune. This latter, however, is incidental to the state’s police function and is properly so classified.
A more realistic test and one which is in accord with the history of municipal immunity is whether the activity is being carried on as an agency of the state and under the mandate of state law. Where this is true it can be argued that the municipality in exercising the state’s power is entitled to the immunity which the state would have if it were performing the function itself. Immunity at the local level is conceded to be dependent upon existence of immunity at the state level and thus this criterion offers a more accurate gauge of whether the activity is governmental or non-governmental than the approach by category or the profit test. Cf. 2 Harper & James, supra, 1622, and the cases cited in note 21. See also Miami v. Oates (1942), 152 Fla. 21, 10 So. (2d) 721, and Tuengel v. City of Sitka (Alaska 1953), 118 F. Supp. 399.
In the Tuengel case, supra, the Court reasoned:
“ * * * Incidentally, it should be noted that the term *26‘rule,’ so often used in describing the immunity doctrine, is really a misnomer, for it is the general rule that one is liable for his negligence or tortious conduct, and hence all concepts of immunity are really exceptions to the rule. In the older cases liability of a municipality in the operation of a hospital turned on the character of the function as proprietary or governmental. Whether it is labeled as one or the other depends on distinctions that appear to be artificial and arbitrary, as a comparison of the authorities cited in 25 A.L.R. (2d) 211-213, with those cited on pages 213-214 will disclose. The rule that appears preferable and sound is the one prevailing in England and Canada which denies immunity and holds political subdivisions of the government liable for the negligence of their servants in the operation of a hospital to the same extent as private individuals, notwithstanding that they may act in the performance of public duties or eleemosynary and charitable functions, 25 A.L.R. (2d) 216. * * * ”
In the Miami case the Florida Court declared:
“The maintaining of hospitals for the benefit of the citizenry was not under the common law a function required to be performed by the government, nor a duty which the government would assume to owe to the citizenry.”
And in Hillyer v. Governors of St. Bartholomew’s Hospital (Eng. 1909), 2 K.B. 820, Farwell, L.J. said:
“It is now settled that a public body is liable for the negligence of its servants in the same way as private individuals would be liable under similar circumstances, notwithstanding that it is acting in the performance of public duties. * * * ”
Another test which seems more sensible is whether the activity is one which has been exclusively conducted by public authorities, and whether private business is liable in the same area. In Colorado a private hospital is liable for its torts. St. Luke’s Hospital v. Long, 125 Colo. 25, 240 P. (2d) 917.
*27Though the Denver General Hospital is conducted in accordance with state law, it is not operated under any statutory mandate. See C.R.S. ’53, 66-3-41. Furthermore, the care of indigent sick has been a local function in America and in Colorado from the earliest times and when a locality acts to perform this function for the benefit of its citizens it is impossible to conclude that it is doing so as an agency of the state and that it is therefore entitled to the immunity which the state enjoys in the performance of its governmental functions.
I am of the opinion, therefore, that the conduct here in question is primarily local. The City of Denver operates this hospital not as an agency of the state but rather for the benefit of its own citizens. Though phases of the hospital administration function may be governmental in the main, its treatment of the sick is the same type of activity that is performed by private corporations or private individuals. Therefore, I am unable to agree that it must be classified as governmental. In my opinion, it has more character as a non-governmental activity than as governmental. Consequently, the trial court was correct, in my opinion, in overruling the City’s contention and in submitting the case to the jury.
Finally, the injustice of holding as the majority holds that governmental immunity is in “limbo” as far as contract rights are concerned and that litigants can sue the state on claims ex contractu and at the same time to hold that in a personal injury case the litigant has no remedy is at once apparent. This comparison is well expressed in 25 A.L.R. 210:
“ * * * The shocking effect of the immunity doctrine is well illustrated by the fact that, in the view of some courts, no immunity attaches where property rights are violated by governmental action, but does attach where it is merely a matter of the life or limb of a human being. * * * ”
This judgment should be affirmed.