Court Opinion

ID: 9746157
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 14:04:20.962738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:37:43.474792
License: Public Domain

FROEHLICH, Acting P. J., Dissenting.
The majority has accomplished able research into the question of what the Legislature meant when it included in its definition of instruments prohibited from possession on school grounds a “knife having a blade longer than two and one-half inches.” It has, in fact, plumbed the depth of authority on this somewhat narrow issue, having exhaustively researched both dictionary definitions (which have not resolved the matter) and legislative history (which did not help either). Having nowhere else to turn, the majority reaches its conclusion by its own perceptive reading of the statute.
I have no grounds for a conclusion on this issue other than those recited in the majority’s opinion. When required to resort simply to a commonsense *782approach, as indeed I construe to be the attempt of the majority, I come, however, to a contrary result.
It seems reasonable to me to think that when the Legislature was defining and describing the various weapons it did not want on school grounds its purpose was to preclude instruments which were capable of inflicting a certain degree of injury. Since knives with blades of less than two and one-half inches were excluded from preclusion, the Legislature obviously considered it desirable to permit certain knives to be possessed by school children. Divining legislative intent, happily unhindered by any legislative history or other authority, I would suppose that the socially conscious legislators had in mind the likes of Tom Sawyer or Huckleberry Finn, whiling away the tiresome school hours by whittling on sticks with their small pocket knives.
There is no need for a long knife for whittling, however, and obviously the longer the knife the greater the possibility of its use for some other than benign purpose. Accordingly, we get an arbitrary length—first three and one-half inches and then two and one-half inches. What, I ask, is the purpose of defining a length? Again without benefit of legislative advice, I would assume that the longer the knife the deeper the wound which can be created. The deeper the wound (again sans expert testimony) the more serious the injury. Hence, I would suppose that in deciding what the Legislature meant by its definition one should reflect upon those propensities of the instrument which govern the depth of the potential wound.
In this case we have a knife blade which, if plunged into flesh, would create a wound of greater than two and one-half inches. At the urging of counsel at oral argument we have taken the unusual, and arguably inappropriate, step in terms of strict appellate review of looking at the instrument in question. It is a very smart piece, obviously designed for expert work with leather. Aside from the legislative prohibition, it is the sort of thing that every school boy would like to have. That, however, is beside the point. There is nothing between the sharpened portion of the blade and the unsharpened portion which would prevent or inhibit the blade’s entering flesh, if so directed, the entire length of the blade. It seems to me, therefore, that if the Legislature had considered this matter it would have concluded that it intended to prohibit possession of knives which had the potential of inflicting a stab wound of greater than two and one-half inches. This knife has that potential and I think it comes within the legislative prohibition.
As a possibly unnecessary aside, I have trouble with the majority’s reliance upon the legislative inclusion in the prohibitions of “dirk” or “dagger,” and its suggestion that this somehow aids us in deciding what a *783“knife” is. The majority says that it assumes the Legislature intended “dirk” or “dagger” to mean something other than a knife, even though the definition quoted by the majority states that a dirk or dagger is indeed a “knife or other instrument. . . .” If we logically follow the majority’s lead and assume, as does the majority, that the Legislature had a clear view of its objective, then any instrument which otherwise could be classified as a “knife” becomes a dirk or dagger, regardless of its length, when it is capable of use as a “stabbing instrument.” The knife in question in this case was capable of use as a stabbing instrument, and hence even if it is not a “knife” as defined by the statute it is a “dirk” or “dagger” (and we thankfully need not now try to distinguish between the two) and therefore in any event is a prohibited tool.
I realize that deciding what statutes mean is a question of law and hence our review of the trial court’s decision is de novo. We probably are, notwithstanding my reservation noted above, entitled to look at this knife and make up our own minds as to whether it comes within the statutory prohibition. Nevertheless, I am troubled by our obsession with this small issue and the majority’s determination to reverse this minor trial court ruling. We have here a momentary lapse in conduct by an otherwise ordinary and law-abiding child, which results in juvenile court proceedings. The kid is convicted by a judge who knows children and deals with them every day, and who is familiar with the problems of knives on school grounds. The decision made by the judge is reasonable and the punishment not excessive (straight probation which, upon successful completion, will result in a dismissal of charges).1 In a situation like this it would be better, I respectfully counsel, for us to control our natural urge to treat every trial court ruling as monumental and appealable. We should let de minimis rulings lie, even if upon microscopic scrutiny keen judicial minds might find error.
Respondent’s petition for review by the Supreme Court was denied August 17, 1995. George, J., was of the opinion that the petition should be granted.
*784[[Image here]]

I would, however, if the judgment were to be affirmed, strike the probationary condition of drug testing, since there was no evidence in the record of a drug problem.