Court Opinion

ID: 9840413
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-18 15:00:34.129028+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T10:46:25.270036
License: Public Domain

21-6171
     Xinshui v. Garland
                                                                                           BIA
                                                                                      Kolbe, IJ
                                                                                   A208 418 047

                           UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                               FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

                                     SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY
ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY
ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL
APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY
CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY
COUNSEL.

 1         At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
 2   Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley
 3   Square, in the City of New York, on the 18th day of September, two thousand
 4   twenty-three.
 5
 6   PRESENT: REENA RAGGI,
 7                    RAYMOND J. LOHIER, JR.,
 8                    SUSAN L. CARNEY,
 9                            Circuit Judges.
10   ------------------------------------------------------------------
11   LI XINSHUI,
12                    Petitioner,
13
14                    v.                                                  No. 21-6171-ag
15
16   MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED
17   STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL,
18                    Respondent.
19   ------------------------------------------------------------------
20
21
 1   FOR PETITIONER:                       GARY J. YERMAN, New York, NY
 2
 3   FOR RESPONDENT:                       DUNCAN T. FULTON, Trial Attorney, Office of
 4                                         Immigration Litigation (Mary Jane Candaux,
 5                                         Assistant Director, on the brief), for Brian M.
 6                                         Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General,
 7                                         United States Department of Justice,
 8                                         Washington, DC
 9
10         UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a Board of

11   Immigration Appeals (BIA) decision, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND

12   DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

13         Petitioner Li Xinshui, a native and citizen of the People’s Republic of

14   China, seeks review of a March 2, 2021 decision of the BIA affirming an August

15   17, 2018 decision of an Immigration Judge (IJ), which denied his application for

16   asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against

17   Torture (CAT). In re Li Xinshui, No. A208 418 047 (B.I.A. Mar. 2, 2021), aff’g No.

18   A208 418 047 (Immigr. Ct. N.Y.C. Aug. 17, 2018). We assume the parties’

19   familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

20         In the circumstances of this case, where the BIA adopts the IJ's reasoning

21   and offers some additional commentary, we review both the BIA’s and IJ’s

22   opinions. See, e.g., Wei Sun v. Sessions, 883 F.3d 23, 27 (2d Cir. 2018); Yan Juan

23   Chen v. Holder, 658 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2011). “The testimony of the applicant

                                               2
 1   may be sufficient to sustain the applicant’s burden without corroboration, but

 2   only if the applicant satisfies the trier of fact that the applicant’s testimony is

 3   credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to demonstrate that

 4   the applicant is a refugee. . . . Where the trier of fact determines that the

 5   applicant should provide evidence that corroborates otherwise credible

 6   testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the applicant does not have

 7   the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” 8 U.S.C.

 8   § 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii). Under these circumstances, a lack of corroboration can be an

 9   independent basis for the denial of relief if the agency identifies reasonably

10   available evidence that should have been presented. See id.; Pinel-Gomez v.

11   Garland, 52 F.4th 523, 529 (2d Cir. 2022). In other words, “an applicant may be

12   generally credible but his testimony may not be sufficient to carry the burden of

13   persuading the fact finder of the accuracy of his claim of crucial facts if he fails to

14   put forth corroboration that should be readily available.” Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 28.

15         Before denying a claim solely on an applicant’s failure to provide

16   corroborating evidence, however, the IJ must, either in the decision or otherwise

17   in the record, “(1) point to specific pieces of missing evidence and show that it

18   was reasonably available, (2) give the applicant an opportunity to explain the

                                                3
 1   omission, and (3) assess any explanation given.” Id. at 31. Because the

 2   noncitizen “bears the ultimate burden of introducing such evidence without

 3   prompting from the IJ,” we do not “require an IJ to specify the points of

 4   testimony that require corroboration . . . prior to the IJ's disposition of the . . .

 5   claim.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Where the IJ has identified the missing

 6   evidence, we may reverse the agency’s decision that the applicant has not

 7   provided that evidence only if “a reasonable trier of fact is compelled to conclude

 8   that such corroborating evidence is unavailable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4); see Yan

 9   Juan Chen, 658 F.3d at 252–53.

10         The only issue before us that Li has exhausted and thus preserved for

11   judicial review is the agency’s ruling that the letter from Li’s cousin was

12   inadequate corroboration. See Ud Din v. Garland, 72 F.4th 411, 419–20 & n.2 (2d

13   Cir. 2023) (observing that issue exhaustion is a “mandatory” requirement where,

14   as here, government seeks dismissal on that ground); Foster v. INS, 376 F.3d 75,

15   78 (2d Cir. 2004) (requiring “[p]etitioner to raise issues to the BIA in order to

16   preserve them for judicial review”(quotation marks omitted)). 1 However, even

     1Neither the IJ’s nor the BIA’s decisions specifically referred to two other letters in the
     record — one from Li’s mother describing his religious activities before departing China
                                                 4
 1   assuming exhaustion, we find no error in the agency’s conclusion that Li failed to

 2   meet his burden of proof.

 3          First, the agency did not err in requiring corroboration because (1) Li had

 4   the “ultimate burden of introducing such evidence without prompting from the

 5   IJ,” Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 31 (quotation marks omitted); (2) the IJ could have

 6   required corroboration even of credible testimony, id. at 28; and (3) the record

 7   here supports the IJ’s determination that Li’s testimony was at times

 8   nonresponsive and vague, requiring corroboration.

 9         Second, the IJ identified the missing evidence that could corroborate Li’s

10   testimony, specifically, letters or testimony from friends who could attest to his

11   current practice of Christianity. Li’s explanations that those individuals either

12   did not want to submit a letter or had to work do not compel the conclusion that

13   the evidence was unavailable. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Guang Liang Li v. Bd.

     and the other from a fellow church member attesting to Li’s church attendance in the
     U.S. But, in his submissions to the BIA, Li challenged only the IJ’s determination that
     his cousin’s letter was entitled to little weight. He failed to argue that the other two
     letters singly or together corroborated his testimony. In any event, we “presume that an
     IJ has taken into account all of the evidence before him, unless the record compellingly
     suggests otherwise,” Xiao Ji Chan v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 434 F.3d 144, 159 n.13 (2d Cir.
     2006), and it was within the agency’s discretion to give “little evidentiary weight” to
     these “unsworn” letters, Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (quotation marks
     omitted).
                                                 5
 1   of Immigr. Appeals, 186 F. App’x 38, 39 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the petitioner’s

 2   explanation that potential witnesses were “too busy” to testify failed to

 3   compellingly show unavailability (quotation marks omitted)); cf. Majidi v.

 4   Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77, 80–81 (2d Cir. 2005) (requiring, in the credibility context,

 5   compelling rather than merely plausible explanation for inconsistencies).

 6         Third, in addition to identifying the missing evidence, the agency did not

 7   err in finding that the evidence Li provided was insufficient to corroborate that

 8   he was a practitioner and proselytizer of Christianity. It was not error for the IJ

 9   to give reduced weight to the letter from Li’s cousin attesting to petitioner’s

10   church attendance because the cousin had not attended church with him in the

11   two years preceding the hearing. See Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d 324, 332 (2d Cir.

12   2013) (“We generally defer to the agency’s evaluation of the weight to be

13   afforded an applicant’s documentary evidence.”).

14         Nor do we identify error in the IJ’s decision to accord minimal weight to a

15   letter from the church elder because it did not corroborate how frequently Li

16   attended services or the types of church activities in which he participated. See

17   id. Further, the IJ did not abuse her discretion in holding that the elder’s

18   obligations at the church were insufficient to explain why he could only appear

                                               6
 1   telephonically despite having received approximately one month’s notice of the

 2   hearing date. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(1) (granting the IJ authority over the receipt

 3   and examination of evidence); cf. Immigr. Ct. Practice Manual, Ch. 4.15(o)(iii)

 4   (“[W]itnesses may testify by telephone, at the [IJ]’s discretion.”).

 5         In sum, because the record does not compel a conclusion that evidence to

 6   corroborate Li’s church attendance and other activities was unavailable, or that

 7   the IJ erred in affording minimal weight to the corroborating evidence Li did

 8   provide, the agency did not err in finding that Li failed to satisfy his burden of

 9   proof. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1158(b)(1)(B)(ii), 1252(b)(4)(B); Wei Sun, 883 F.3d at 28.

10   That finding is dispositive of asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief

11   because all three forms of relief were based on the same factual predicate. See

12   Lecaj v. Holder, 616 F.3d 111, 119–20 (2d Cir. 2010).

13         For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is DENIED. All pending

14   motions and applications are DENIED and stays VACATED.

15                                           FOR THE COURT:
16                                           Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
17                                           Clerk of Court

                                               7