Court Opinion

ID: 9905367
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-29 15:01:54.632154+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:24.764231
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-13283    Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023   Page: 1 of 13

                                                    [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13283
                           Non-Argument Calendar
                           ____________________

        HARRY W. TOLLEY, JR.,
                                                       Plaintiﬀ-Appellant,
        versus
        MERCER UNIVERSITY,

                                                     Defendant-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                     for the Northern District of Georgia
                     D.C. Docket No. 1:20-cv-02453-VMC
                           ____________________
USCA11 Case: 22-13283      Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023     Page: 2 of 13

        2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13283

        Before NEWSOM, GRANT, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
        PER CURIAM:
               Dr. Harry W. Tolley, Jr., a white man, alleges that Mercer
        University racially discriminated against him by rejecting his
        application for an open position on the faculty of Mercer’s McAfee
        School of Theology in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
        Tolley has aired evidence tending to show that Mercer’s hiring
        process was infected with an invidious focus on the race of the
        candidates. But because he cannot show that the decisionmakers
        at Mercer ever knew Tolley’s race specifically, his discrimination
        claims cannot survive. We accordingly affirm the district court’s
        grant of summary judgment for Mercer.
                                          I.
                In 2018, a tenure track position for a professor of New
        Testament Studies opened at the McAfee School at Mercer after
        the incumbent, a black man, retired. At that time, McAfee served
        a student population that was approximately fifty percent black. By
        contrast, only two of McAfee’s twelve faculty members were black,
        including the retiring professor. McAfee’s accreditation agency
        had recently flagged this disparity and urged the school to close this
        gap by adding greater racial diversity to its faculty when
        conducting new hiring. The New Testament Studies position was
        the first opening on the faculty following this recommendation.
             To fill the position, the interim dean of McAfee, Gregory
        DeLoach, appointed three faculty members to serve on a search
USCA11 Case: 22-13283     Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023    Page: 3 of 13

        22-13283              Opinion of the Court                        3

        committee: Dr. Karen Massey, Dr. Dave Garber, and Dr. Nancy
        deClaissé-Walford. DeLoach himself attended the vast majority of
        the committee’s meetings and frequently contributed to its
        discussions, though he did not formally have a vote. This
        committee established qualifications for the position and posted a
        formal job description on Mercer’s HR website in September 2018.
        A total of 109 candidates applied, including Dr. Tolley.
               Tolley’s formal credentials for the position included a Ph.D.
        in the New Testament and Ancient Mediterranean history and
        archaeology, several publications, and multiple adjunct
        professorships. He was also distantly related to a current faculty
        member at McAfee, Dr. Loyd Allen. The two spoke over the
        phone about the open position. According to Tolley’s notes, Allen
        told him that he assumed that Tolley, whom he had never met,
        was a white man. Allen told Tolley that this fact would likely hurt
        Tolley’s candidacy because “being female and a person of color”
        were advantages for being hired by McAfee. He further admitted,
        per Tolley, that McAfee was intent on hiring a black person to
        replace the retiring black faculty member. Though Allen did not
        serve on the search committee, he promised to vouch for Tolley.
        He followed through by telling Garber, a committee member, that
        the two had spoken.
                To pare down the candidate pool, each committee member
        first individually reviewed the applications before convening as a
        group to discuss the standouts. Though Mercer’s HR department
        collected demographic data from applicants for statistical purposes,
USCA11 Case: 22-13283      Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023      Page: 4 of 13

        4                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13283

        this information was not passed along to the search committee.
        The applicant files that reached the committee thus did not
        systematically contain any information about the candidates’ race.
               In at least some cases, however, the committee was aware
        of—and considering—applicants’ race when reviewing their files.
        For example, some applicants explicitly self-identified their race in
        their cover letters. In one case, Dr. Walford emailed the other
        members of the committee flagging the application of “a really nice
        white guy” with whom she was personally familiar, but
        recommended against interviewing him, stating that she “like[d]
        him very much. But he is a white male . . . sigh!”
               Ultimately, the committee invited fourteen applicants to
        interview. Dr. Tolley was not one. No committee member could
        independently remember why he had not made the cut, but after
        re-reviewing his application during this litigation, they testified
        that, although Tolley had met the formal qualifications for the
        position, the committee members did not believe his research
        focus aligned with their pedagogical goals for the position, among
        other drawbacks. Tolley did not mention his race in his application
        materials, and all members of the committee submitted sworn
        affidavits in this litigation that they were not aware of his race when
        evaluating his candidacy.
               After conducting interviews, the committee narrowed their
        search down to three finalists, each of whom was invited to McAfee
        to deliver a guest lecture and meet with faculty and administration
        members. Following these visits, the search committee eliminated
USCA11 Case: 22-13283     Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 11/29/2023    Page: 5 of 13

        22-13283              Opinion of the Court                       5

        one finalist from contention due to her relative inexperience, then
        presented the others—a black woman and a white man who had
        just finished a two-year teaching fellowship at McAfee—to the full
        faculty for discussion and a vote. According to the committee
        members, both candidates had impressed during their visits.
               Around this time, a faculty member not on the search
        committee emailed Dean DeLoach about diversity issues at the
        school. This professor exhorted DeLoach to “invest in radical
        change on the racial front at McAfee” by strategically maneuvering
        incumbent faculty into early retirements so that McAfee could
        “hire not just one but a critical mass (2-4) of black faculty” to
        replace them.        DeLoach thanked this professor for his
        “impassioned and important note,” responding that “all things
        being equal a person of color would be preferred” for the open
        position. He also noted that, though the search committee
        preferred to hire the black finalist, the situation was
        “extraordinarily complicated” because students at McAfee—
        including, DeLoach specifically noted, several black students—had
        circulated petitions supporting the white finalist.
                Two votes of the McAfee faculty were held. After the first,
        which was inconclusive, the faculty held a discussion about the two
        finalists before voting again. Dean DeLoach’s notes from this
        meeting reflect that race featured prominently in multiple faculty
        members’ judgments. One professor said of the black finalist, “her
        race is a plus.” Another noted that her being black would help
        connect McAfee with local “black churches” and that she would be
USCA11 Case: 22-13283      Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023    Page: 6 of 13

        6                      Opinion of the Court                22-13283

        a good complement to the only other black member of McAfee’s
        faculty. The discussion of the white finalist’s race was much more
        equivocal. While student comments defended him as a “white guy
        that gets it” and as “working on his whiteness,” some faculty
        members derided him as the “embodiment of white” which “may
        be problematic” and noted that McAfee “need[s] more diversity.”
        The faculty also discussed McAfee’s accreditor’s recommendation
        that McAfee hire more black faculty to better match its student
        body demographics.
              In the end, the black finalist won the second vote
        overwhelmingly and was offered the position. Contrary to
        Mercer’s document retention policy, which requires employees to
        maintain all job search related materials for three years, Dr. Massey
        and Dr. Walford prematurely destroyed the handwritten notes
        they had accumulated during their service on the search
        committee.
               Tolley sued Mercer under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
        alleging that McAfee had rejected his application for the
        professorship because he was white. After discovery, the district
        court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation that Mercer
        be granted summary judgment. This appeal follows.
                                         II.
               We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de
        novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
        nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in their
        favor. Sutton v. Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, 64 F.4th 1166, 1168 (11th
USCA11 Case: 22-13283          Document: 31-1         Date Filed: 11/29/2023          Page: 7 of 13

        22-13283                   Opinion of the Court                                  7

        Cir. 2023). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no
        genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled
        to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
                                               III.
               Tolley argues that Mercer discriminated against him on the
        basis of race in violation of Title VII under both a single-motive and
        mixed-motive theory. 1 Under a single-motive theory, a plaintiff
        typically proves discrimination through circumstantial evidence
        using the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. To
        succeed, the plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of
        discrimination. See Patterson v. Georgia Pac., LLC, 38 F.4th 1336,
        1344–45 (11th Cir. 2022). In a traditional failure-to-hire case, the
        plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating that: (1) he
        was a member of a protected class; (2) he applied and was qualified
        for a position for which the employer was accepting applications;
        (3) despite his qualifications, he was not hired; and (4) the position
        remained open or was filled by another person outside of his
        protected class. EEOC v. Joe’s Stone Crabs, Inc., 296 F.3d 1265, 1273
        (11th Cir. 2002).
              By establishing a prima facie case, the plaintiff creates a
        rebuttable presumption that the employer unlawfully

        1 Tolley also argues that Mercer discriminated against him in violation of

        § 1981. Because discrimination claims under § 1981 are analyzed using the
        same analytical framework as single-motive Title VII discrimination claims,
        our analysis under that statute applies equally to both. See Lewis v. City of Union
        City, 918 F.3d 1213, 1220 & n.5 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc).
USCA11 Case: 22-13283      Document: 31-1     Date Filed: 11/29/2023     Page: 8 of 13

        8                      Opinion of the Court                22-13283

        discriminated against him. Id. at 1272. The burden then shifts to
        the employer to rebut this presumption by producing evidence that
        its action was taken for some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason.
        Id. If the employer meets its burden of production, the
        presumption of discrimination is rebutted, and the plaintiff must
        show that the proffered reason really is a pretext for unlawful
        discrimination. Id. at 1272–73.
               If the employer’s stated reason for its action is legitimate—
        in other words, if it might motivate a reasonable employer to act—
        then to show that it is pretextual, the plaintiff must address “that
        reason head on and rebut it.” Patterson, 38 F.4th at 1352 (quotation
        omitted). A plaintiff cannot rebut a reason “by simply quarreling
        with the wisdom of” it. Id. (quotation omitted). Instead, he must
        point to “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
        incoherencies, or contradictions” such that a reasonable factfinder
        could find the employer’s offered reasons “unworthy of credence.”
        Id. (quotation omitted).
               As an alternative to the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting
        framework, a plaintiff can also survive summary judgment on his
        single-motive discrimination claim if he presents a convincing
        mosaic of circumstantial evidence that would allow a jury to infer
        intentional discrimination. Smith v. Lockheed-Martin Corp., 644 F.3d
        1321, 1328 (11th Cir. 2011). While plaintiffs are not limited to
        particular forms of circumstantial evidence, our cases have
        identified three, nonexclusive categories that can raise a reasonable
        inference of unlawful conduct: (1) “evidence of suspicious timing,
USCA11 Case: 22-13283      Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023     Page: 9 of 13

        22-13283               Opinion of the Court                         9

        ambiguous statements, or other information from which unlawful
        intent may be inferred;” (2) “evidence of systematically better
        treatment of similarly situated employees;” or (3) “evidence that
        the employer’s justification for its action is pretextual.” Berry v.
        Crestwood Healthcare LP, 84 F.4th 1300, 2023 WL 7095309, at *6
        (11th Cir. 2023).
               Unlike with a single-motive discrimination claim, a claim of
        mixed-motive discrimination under Title VII requires a plaintiff to
        show that illegal bias was a “motivating factor for an adverse
        employment action, even though other factors also motivated the
        action.” Quigg v. Thomas Cnty. Sch. Dist., 814 F.3d 1227, 1235 (11th
        Cir. 2016) (quotation omitted). To survive summary judgment, a
        plaintiff must offer “evidence sufficient to convince a jury that: (1)
        the defendant took an adverse employment action against the
        plaintiff; and (2) a protected characteristic was a motivating factor
        for the defendant’s adverse employment action.” Id. at 1239
        (alteration adopted and quotation omitted).
              With respect to Tolley’s single-motive discrimination claim,
        the parties on appeal have briefed only the issue of pretext. In the
        McDonnell Douglas analysis, we therefore assume that Tolley stated
        a prima facie case of discrimination and that Mercer’s proffered
        explanation—namely, that Tolley’s research agenda did not fit
        McAfee’s vision for the position—adequately rebutted it. In the
        convincing mosaic analysis, we ask whether Tolley has presented
        enough evidence to permit a jury to infer intentional
USCA11 Case: 22-13283      Document: 31-1      Date Filed: 11/29/2023     Page: 10 of 13

        10                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13283

        discrimination. We focus, as the district court did, on the issue of
        Mercer’s knowledge of Tolley’s race.
                At the pretext stage, “our sole concern is whether unlawful
        discriminatory animus motivates a challenged employment
        decision.” Damon v. Fleming Supermarkets of Florida, Inc., 196 F.3d
        1354, 1361 (11th Cir. 1999). To show that the members of the
        search committee acted with the requisite discriminatory intent,
        Tolley must prove a threshold fact: that they actually knew what
        race he was when they decided not to hire him. Without that
        knowledge, Tolley cannot show that Mercer’s explanation for not
        hiring him was pretextual, because “racial discrimination is an
        intentional wrong” and an “empty head means no discrimination.”
        Silvera v. Orange Cnty. Sch. Bd., 244 F.3d 1253, 1262 (11th Cir. 2001)
        (alteration adopted and quotation omitted). Accordingly, “an
        employer cannot intentionally discriminate against an individual
        based on his [race] unless the employer knows the individual’s
        [race].” Lubetsky v. Applied Card Sys., Inc., 296 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th
        Cir. 2002).
               Tolley, unlike other candidates, did not voluntarily disclose
        his race on his application materials. Each of the three search
        committee members—Massey, Garber, and Walford—as well as
        Dean DeLoach submitted sworn affidavit testimony disclaiming
        any knowledge of Tolley’s race before they struck his application.
        To rebut the conclusion that the search committee was unaware
        of his race, Tolley submits that, after he spoke to Dr. Allen about
        his application, Allen then spoke to Garber, a committee member.
USCA11 Case: 22-13283        Document: 31-1         Date Filed: 11/29/2023        Page: 11 of 13

        22-13283                  Opinion of the Court                               11

        Allen testified that he “probably” mentioned to Garber that he and
        Tolley were distant familial relations—specifically, that Tolley was
        Allen’s cousin’s niece’s husband. From this, Tolley argues that
        Garber would then have assumed that Tolley, like Allen, must be
        white. 2
                Tolley’s argument fails in two respects. First, Tolley can
        only speculate that Garber would have assumed from the fact that
        Tolley and Allen were distantly related by marriage that Tolley and
        Allen were the same race. Such “unsupported speculation” will not
        defeat invocation of summary judgment against a plaintiff. Cordoba
        v. Dillard’s, Inc., 419 F.3d 1169, 1181 (11th Cir. 2005) (quotation
        omitted). Second, Tolley provides no evidence to support the
        inference that, even if Garber suspected Tolley was white, this
        information was then communicated to Massey and Walford, the
        other two decisionmakers on the committee. Absent evidence of
        actual knowledge, we cannot impute Garber’s suspicions about
        Tolley’s race to the committee as a whole. See Silvera, 244 F.3d at
        1261–62. 3

        2 Mercer argues that the committee had most likely already rejected Tolley’s

        application before he and Allen spoke, meaning that any statement by Allen
        to Garber played no role in the decision not to hire Tolley. The record is not
        definitive as to the timing of these events. Because we construe all ambiguities
        in Tolley’s favor when reviewing the district court’s summary judgment
        order, we assume that Allen’s conversations with Tolley and Garber occurred
        before the committee struck Tolley’s application.
        3 Tolley also argues that we should infer pretext from Dr. Massey and Dr.

        Walford prematurely destroying their handwritten notes about the search
        process. It is possible that those notes would have revealed actual knowledge
USCA11 Case: 22-13283        Document: 31-1        Date Filed: 11/29/2023        Page: 12 of 13

        12                        Opinion of the Court                      22-13283

               Tolley also points to other pieces of circumstantial evidence
        that McAfee was intent on hiring a black person for the position.
        Specifically, he flags recommendations by McAfee’s accreditor to
        diversify its faculty, an email from Walford characterizing a
        particular white applicant’s race as a negative, a statement by Dean
        DeLoach saying they “preferred” to hire a person of color for the
        position, and comments from the faculty vote on the two finalists
        indicating that race heavily influenced the outcome. But these
        pieces of evidence, which carry varying weight in the pretext
        analysis, go toward the question of whether McAfee discriminated
        against white candidates whose race they were aware of. Without
        more, this circumstantial evidence does not defeat the committee
        members’ sworn testimony disclaiming any knowledge of Tolley’s
        race before striking his application.
              Because Tolley cannot raise a triable issue of fact with
        respect to Mercer’s knowledge of his race, summary judgment for
        Mercer on his single-motive discrimination claim was appropriate.

        by Massey and Walford of Tolley’s race. Deviations from an employer’s
        standard procedures may serve as evidence of pretext. Hurlbert v. St. Mary’s
        Health Care Sys., Inc., 439 F.3d 1286, 1299 (11th Cir. 2006). But we generally
        will not draw adverse inferences from a party’s failure to preserve evidence
        unless absence of that evidence is predicated on bad faith. Bashir v. Amtrak,
        119 F.3d 929, 931 (11th Cir. 1997). Tolley has provided no evidence rebutting
        the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the professors destroyed their notes for
        non-nefarious reasons—essentially, spring cleaning. We are not obligated to
        make an adverse inference against Mercer about the content of these notes
        because Tolley has not presented any evidence that the notes were destroyed
        in bad faith, as opposed to out of mere negligence. Id.
USCA11 Case: 22-13283       Document: 31-1        Date Filed: 11/29/2023       Page: 13 of 13

        22-13283                 Opinion of the Court                            13

        So too with his mixed-motive discrimination claim: if Mercer never
        knew Tolley’s race, it cannot have been a motivating factor in
        Mercer’s decision not to hire him.
               We do not discount the evidence uncovered by Tolley
        during discovery of Mercer’s relentless focus on race. But whether
        the committee racially discriminated against other white
        applicants—indeed, whether they would have racially discriminated
        against Tolley had they known he was white—does not bear on
        whether the committee did unlawfully discriminate against him
        here. Employment discrimination “is about actual knowledge, and
        real intent, not constructive knowledge and assumed intent.”
        Silvera, 244 F.3d at 1262. 4
                                     *       *      *
             We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary
        judgment in favor of Mercer.

        4 Because we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Mercer

        on the ground that Mercer did not know Tolley’s race, we need not address
        the parties’ arguments as to whether the ministerial exception would apply
        here.