Court Opinion

ID: 9571141
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 20:29:20.01764+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:28:41.807232
License: Public Domain

Pope, Senior Appellate Judge,
concurring specially.
I join fully in the majority opinion, but write separately to express my concerns about the current state of Batson in Georgia. I am of the opinion that the parties in litigation should be able to select the jurors of their choice absent purposeful discrimination. And when Batson v. Kentucky was decided in 1986, the U. S. Supreme Court set forth a fairly straightforward procedure for evaluating allegations of purposeful discrimination in the jury selection process: (1) first the challenging party establishes a prima facie case by pointing to facts and circumstances giving rise to an inference that the other party has used peremptory strikes in a discriminatory fashion; and (2) then the party exercising the strikes had the opportunity to rebut that inference by articulating “a neutral explanation related to the particular case to be tried.” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. 79, 97-98 (106 SC 1712, 90 LE2d 69) (1986).
*640Since that time, however, the courts have continued to refine thát process. First, the U. S. Supreme Court itself clarified that Bat-son's two-step analysis was actually the three-step process employed today. See, e.g., Hernandez v. New York, 500 U. S. 352 (111 SC 1859, 114 LE2d 395) (1991). Then the Court seemed to abandon the requirement that the neutral explanation for a strike be reasonably related to the case. See, e.g., Purkett v. Elem, 514 U. S. 765, 768 (115 SC 1769, 131 LE2d 834) (1995) (prosecutor’s explanation that he struck juror because he had unkempt hair, along with a beard and a mustache, which seemed suspicious was sufficient to survive second prong of Batson analysis).
Even with these refinements, however, the U. S. Supreme Court made clear that appellate courts are to give great deference to the trial judge’s determinations under Batson. Hernandez, 500 U. S. at 364-365. But in Georgia, the appellate courts have chipped away at that rule of deference by repeatedly stepping in to second-guess the trial judge on Batson analyses. See, e.g., Hinson v. State, 237 Ga. App. 366, 374, n. 4 (515 SE2d 203) (1999) (Eldridge, J., dissenting). The rule set out in Ayiteyfio v. State, 254 Ga. App. 1 (561 SE2d 157) (2002), is but another example of overreaching by the appellate courts. Although the dissent attempts to justify the “multiple reason” rule as a tool for a trial judge to determine when a juror is similarly situated, it is simply another encroachment upon the trial judge’s decision-making process.
Accordingly, I agree that Ayiteyfio must be overruled and urge that the appellate courts in this state continue to follow the spirit of Batson by balancing the purposes behind the Batson rule with deference to the trial courts. Our Supreme Court aptly described the appellate court’s role as follows:
In evaluating the trial court’s findings, this Court must keep in mind the unique perspective the trial court judge has in evaluating the rationale given by the [striking party]. A cold transcript cannot convey all of the subtle nuances of the process of jury selection. This [C]ourt gives the trial court’s findings great deference. This Court, however, will not subvert the policy of Batson by acting as a rubber stamp, accepting all nonracial explanations of the court without exception. The [striking party] must show that its peremptory strikes of jurors are neutral, related to the case to be tried, and clear and reasonably specific.
(Citations omitted.) Berry v. State, 263 Ga. 493, 494 (435 SE2d 433) (1993).