Court Opinion

ID: 9460365
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 21:48:06.353773+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:36:35.133076
License: Public Domain

GOLDBERG, Circuit Judge, with whom BROWN, Chief Judge, WISDOM, GODBOLD, MORGAN and RONEY, Circuit Judges, join (concurring in part and dissenting in part):
This Circuit has recently been much vexed with the problem of bringing finality to eases initially adjudicated by means of guilty pleas. Today, in an effort to stem the rising tide of such cases we follow the path chosen by several other courts similarly vexed — an expanded inquiry pursuant to Fed.R.Crim.Proc. 11, in which the district judge probes, for the record, the details of any plea negotiations that might have occurred.1 Believing as I do that the expanded Rule 11 proceeding promises to be a useful tool in constructing just, as well as, efficient resolutions to post-conviction attacks on guilty pleas allegedly based on broken bargains, I wholeheartedly concur in Part II of the majority opinion. I do not, however, recede one syllable from the original panel’s conclusion that petitioner Bryan should have received an evidentiary hearing on his claim of a broken plea bargain, and I therefore respectfully dissent from Part I of the majority opinion.
According to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970), a court facing a motion to vacate sentence must hold a hearing on the motion “[ujnless the motion and the files and record of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief .” As the majority recognizes, Bryan’s motion and supporting affidavit alleged facts which if true would entitle him to relief. Consequently, for the district court to determine that the motion, files, and record of the case conclusively show that Bryan is entitled to no relief, it had to conclude that the facts he alleged simply could not be true. The original panel opinion rested on the belief that the papers in the case would not support that conclusion with the certainty required by the statute.
The “files and record” in petitioner Bryan’s case contained three documents relevant to the claim of a broken bargain: the transcript of the Rule 11 proceeding when Bryan pleaded guilty to the escape charge; the transcript of Bryan’s allocution and sentencing; and Bryan’s own affidavit in support of his § 2255 motion.
The transcript of the taking of Bryan’s guilty plea reveals full and careful compliance with the requirements of Rule 11. It also reveals that both Bryan and his attorney denied that the plea was being entered in exchange for any promises. The Government in this ease argued that such full compliance with the requirements of Rule 11 should preclude later examination into the voluntariness of a guilty plea. In Fontaine v. United States, 1973, 411 U.S. 213, 93 S.Ct. 1461, 36 L.Ed.2d 169, however, the Supreme Court made it clear beyond cavil that under some circumstances a hearing must be granted to consider post-convictipn attacks on guilty pleas, notwithstanding a full Rule 11 transcript.
*783Of course there are factual differences between Fontaine and the case at bar; but in terms of the central proposition there established — that a Rule 11 transcript is not always conclusive for the purposes of determining the propriety of a § 2255 hearing — there are three key similarities in the two cases. There, as here, the record reflected complete compliance with the updated version of Rule 11; there, as here, the subsequent attack on the guilty plea necessarily incorporated allegations that directly conflicted with representations made at the time the guilty plea was entered; and there, as here, the subsequent attack focused on alleged incidents occurring de hors the record.2 Moreover, nothing in Fontaine suggests that its central proposition is to be limited to the precise facts of that case.
Bryan’s silence at sentencing in the face of what he alleges was the breaking of the bargain that induced his guilty plea, though certainly circumstantial evidence from which a finder of fact could infer that no deal was ever made, is not conclusive evidence justifying the denial of a § 2255 hearing.3 In both Fontaine and Machibroda v. United States, 1962, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473, the petitioners had voiced no objections at sentencing, yet their silence did not foreclose subsequent hearings on their claims. The logic behind this re-suit is clear and persuasive in the instant case:
If the judge, the prosecution, or the defense counsel makes a statement in open court that is contrary to what he has been led to believe, especially as to promises by the prosecutor or his defense counsel, . . . [the defendant] would no more challenge the statement in open court than he would challenge a clergyman’s sermon from the pulpit.
Walters v. Harris, supra note 2, 460 F.2d at 993, citing Trebach, the Rationing of Justice 159-60 (1964).
If, as seems to me indisputable, the transcripts of the Rule 11 proceeding and the sentencing might in some cases be inconclusive for determining whether a hearing is required on a § 2255 motion, the nature of the other documents and papers becomes crucial. A rule requiring something other than the petitioner’s own affidavit as a prerequisite to going behind the official transcripts has a certain surface attraction. Nothing in the statute commands such a rule and the realities of prison life suggest that a per se rule might unreasonably and unnecessarily restrict access to the § 2255 remedy. More important, Machi-broda seems clearly to allow a hearing on the strength of the petitioner’s own affidavit without supporting papers.
*784To be sure, in Machibroda the Government filed a memorandum in response to the § 2255 motion, attaching an affidavit in which the assistant U.S. Attorney-accused of making the alleged deal emphatically denied any promises or coercion, but did admit that the meeting at which the deal was allegedly made had occurred. The admission of the meeting might be taken as sufficient corroboration of some of the details in the petitioner’s affidavit to justify a hearing to explore the controverted facts. Here, on the other hand, the Government filed no response to Bryan’s petition.
There may well be cases in which the utterly frivolous nature of the allegations justifies silence on the part of the Government. See Raines v. United States, 4 Cir. 1970, 423 F.2d 526, 529. Office efficiency might also, in some cases, justify a failure to respond to every motion filed by a prisoner. I cannot, however, understand a rule that allows the Government to decide by its silence which § 2255 motions are entitled to an evidentiary hearing; that is a decision the statute places in the hands of the district courts. More important, I can think of no other context in which the silence of one party in the face of detailed, specific allegations by an opponent is construed against the party making the allegations, and can think of no reason to do so in § 2255 cases.
In Machibroda a controverting affidavit from the one accused of making the bargain was insufficient to preclude a hearing on the petitioner’s claim. I find it difficult to understand how the Government’s silence in this case could suffice. In Machibroda the prisoner alleged that only the Assistant U. S. Attorney knew of the bargain; here, Bryan alleged that his own attorney as well as other co-defendants knew of it. Presumably it would not have been too difficult for the Government to respond to Bryant’s petition with affidavits from the two attorneys, and perhaps from another putative witness. I concede that this course might be undesirable as a matter of economy of resources, and I do not mean to suggest that every § 2255 motion supported only by the petitioner’s own sworn affidavit merits a full evidentiary hearing. Quite apart from the serious burdens such a rule would impose on already overburdened district courts, the statute itself clearly permits disposition of some § 2255 motions without an evidentiary hearing. Yet I remain convinced that under the statute, whether the Government responds or not, the petitioner is entitled, for the purpose of deciding whether a hearing is required, to have some weight accorded his own affidavit.
The Supreme Court in Machibroda suggested some distinguishing factors to be used in identifying those situations in which a hearing should be granted on the strength of a petitioner’s affidavit alone. First, the Court explicitly referred on several occasions to the detailed and specific nature of the petitioner’s allegations. Moreover, though the Court rejected the Government’s attempt to rely on the “improbable and unbelievable” quality of the claim, it did suggest that a full hearing might not be required in a case of “palpably incredible” allegations by a prisoner. 368 U.S. at 495, 82 S.Ct. at 514, 7 L.Ed.2d at 479. The Court also recognized that since the case involved allegations that primarily concerned occurrences off the record, resort to the record alone might not cast much light on the claim. Finally, the Court noted that the “circumstances alleged” were not “of a kind that the District Judge could completely resolve by drawing on his own personal knowledge or recollection.” 368 U.S. at 495, 82 S.Ct. at 514, 7 L.Ed.2d at 479.4
*785There is no debating that petitioner Bryan’s allegations were both detailed and specific, not “vague” or “concluso-ry.” They also referred primarily to occurrences de hors the record. According to the en banc majority, however, two factors present in Machibroda but absent here do justify disposing of Bryan’s case without a hearing. First, the majority believes that the district judge below could completely resolve the case by drawing on his own personal recollections or knowledge. Secondly, the majority apparently thinks that Bryan’s allegations are “palpably incredible.”
In response to the first point I can say only that I do not read Bryan’s affidavit as necessarily implicating the district court in such a way that the judge could resolve the case from his own recollection or knowledge.5 Bryan alleged only that his attorney told him that the judge had agreed to the alleged bargain; at no point did he allege as a matter of first-hand knowledge that the judge was a party to the bargain. Assuming ar-guendo that Bryan’s attorney had made a bargain of some sort with the Government, it would not be unreasonable to tell Bryan that the judge was agreeable, as a way of ensuring his own agreement, particularly in light of Bryan’s alleged unwillingness to waive trial. Moreover, a comparison of Bryan’s affidavit with that in Machibroda demonstrates to me that Bryan alleged no more direct participation by the trial judge than did Machibroda. If Machi-broda was not a case that could be completely resolved by the district judge’s own knowledge and recollection, I do not see how this case can be so handled.
As to the second point, that the majority believes Bryan’s allegations to be “palpably incredible” is clear from the characterization of his claim as “the utterly incredible assertion that all the former official proceedings in his cause were no more than a stultifying charade in which justice was mocked by every participant — even the judge himself.” If I read Bryan’s affidavit as alleging first-hand knowledge of the judge’s participation, I might be inclined to agree with this characterization, but I have already indicated that I do not. Moreover, Bryan’s allegations do not strike me as any more “palpably incredible” than Maehibroda’s claim that an Assistant U. S. Attorney had promised a deal, but only if defendant did not reveal the details to his own attorney, and all conveniently done outside the presence of witnesses.6 More important, it seems to me that “palpable incredibility” cannot be measured in a vacuum, but rather must be determined in the light of common sense recognition of real world practices.
That the taking of a guilty plea could take on some aspects of a charade might be difficult to credit, and proving that a particular guilty plea proceeding was in fact a charade would surely be difficult, given the likely sanctions to be visited on an attorney, defense or prosecutor, who subsequently admitted participating. Yet the fact that the charade does occasionally occur is true beyond any reasonable doubt:
At the more formal part of the pleading process, the in-court appearance at which the defendant enters his plea, the parties typically act as if no prior negotiation had occurred. Trial. judges, although they are aware that negotiation for pleas is a common practice, routinely ask the defendant whether any promises have been made to him. Notwithstanding the fact *786that the plea has been the subject of negotiation, the defendant usually answers in the negative, and the prosecutor and defense counsel seldom indicate to the contrary. . . . As a result, the negotiation process remains largely invisible, informal, and not subject to any systematic control.
American Bar Association Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Pleas of Guilty 61 (Approved Draft 1968).7 Indeed, in Machibroda the Supreme Court held that although the prisoner claimed that he had participated in just such a charade, his allegations were not “palpably incredible.”
Of course, the fact that charades have occurred in the past does not prove that a charade did in fact occur in this case; but that, I think, goes to the decision on the merits. In determining if a hearing is required under the statutory “conclusively show” standard, whether incidents of the type alleged ever do occur, or whether instead they exceed “the outer bounds of credibility”8 is of some importance.
This brings me to the nub of my disagreement with both the district court and the en banc majority — that both have confused the decision on whether to grant a § 2255 hearing with the decision on the merits of the claim for relief. The original panel decided only that Bryan was, under the mandate of § 2255, entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claim. Nothing in that opinion was intended to imply that the panel believed Bryan’s allegations to be true, nor do I mean to imply that with what I say today. Indeed, I regard his allegations as highly improbable, and am certainly doubtful that he can or should prevail on the merits. But the Supreme Court in Machibroda explicitly rejected “improbable and unbelievable” as the test in passing on the need for an evidentiary hearing. That petitioner is unlikely to prevail on the merits is not, to me, a proper consideration in evaluating his right under § 2255 to a hearing on his claim.
I regard this case as a close one, and one that is very near “to the line” described in Machibroda. The command of § 2255, however, is that a hearing is to be granted unless it is “conclusively shown” that no relief is warranted, and that can only mean that district courts are supposed to break the close ones in favor of granting hearings. The Supreme Court in Fontaine could not, on the basis of the record before it, “conclude with the assurance required by the statutory standard ‘conclusively show’ that under no circumstances could the petitioner establish facts warranting relief under § 2255. ...” 411 U.S. at 215, 93 S.Ct. at 1463, 36 L.Ed.2d at 172. I find myself in the same position in this case.

. Paradiso v. United States, 3 Cir. 1973, 482 F.2d 409, 413; Walters v. Harris, 4 Cir. 1972, 460 F.2d 988, 993, cert. denied, Wren v. United States, 409 U.S. 1129, 93 S.Ct. 947, 35 L.Ed.2d 262. At least two state supreme courts have also moved in the direction oí expanding the colloquy involved in taking a guilty plea in order to bring into the open the existence and nature of any bargains. See Paradiso v. United States, supra, 482 F.2d at 413 & 413 n. 1, citing People v. West, 3 Cal.3d 595, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409 (1970), and Rule 319(b), Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure, 19 P.S. Appendix. Recently the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, though critical of plea negotiation, recommended that until the practice can be eliminated, any agreement or bargain made should be presented in open court, on the record, for the judge’s acceptance or rejection. See Standard 3.2, in 14 Crim.L.Rptr. 3001, 3003 (Oct. 31, 1973).

. Machibroda v. United States, 1962, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473, is also factually distinguishable from the instant case, •since it occurred before the 1966 amendments to Rule 11 expanded the colloquy and the role of the court in the process of entering a guilty plea. In Machibroda most of the talking was done by the defense counsel, who according to the petitioner’s later claims was ignorant of the alleged bargain. Both in that case and in the case sub judice, however, the petitioner himself did initially assure the court that the plea was voluntary, only later to challenge both the voluntariness of the plea and the truth of his own initial statements. See 368 U.S. at 500, 82 S.Ct. at 516, 7 L.Ed.2d at 482 (Clark, J., dissenting); United States v. Machibroda, N.D.Ohio, 1959, 184 F.Supp. 881, 885. In Walters v. Harris, 4 Cir. 1972, 460 F.2d 988, 993, cert. denied, Wren v. United States, 409 U.S. 1129, 93 S.Ct. 947, 35 L.Ed.2d 262, the Fourth Circuit refused to make a full Rule 11 transcript, including explicit denials by the defendant that any bargain had been made, conclusive evidence that no bargain had occurred for the purpose of granting a hearing on the claim.

. Accord, United States v. Simpson, 1970, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 8, 436 F.2d 162, 165-166. Of course Bryan’s claim that part of the record was cut off doubtless falls close to the palpably incredible category, and is of some relevance in evaluating the other allegations in his petition. On the other hand, the fact that one frivolous claim is made does not prove conclusively that all the other claims are equally frivolous. What is at issue here is the propriety of granting a hearing on the claims, not the likelihood of success on the merits.

. The Court suggested a limitation on its holding by citing the portion of the statute that allows an evidentiary hearing to be held without the personal presence of the prisoner: “A court may entertain and determine such motion without requiring the production of the prisoner at the hearing.” 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970). Nothing in the original panel opinion in this case would have prevented the district court from determining that this was the kind *785of case that could be decided without requiring the presence of Bryan himself. See Walters v. Harris, supra, note 2, 460 F.2d at 992-993; Raines v. United States, supra, 423 F.2d at 529-531.

. The original panel did suggest that since Bryan alleged that the trial judge was a party to the bargain, the hearing should be held before a different judge. We did not mean to suggest that we read the affidavit as alleging first-hand knowledge of the judge’s participation but rather that for the judge’s sake and for the appearance of justice a different judge should conduct the hearing.

. See United States v. Simpson, 1970, 141 U.S.App.D.C. 8, 436 F.2d 162, 164-166.

. The ABA’s report only reaffirmed what other observers had discovered and reported. According to the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, the Challenge of Crime in a Free Society 135-36 (1967), “[u]nder existing practice the fact that [plea] negotiations have occurred is commonly denied on the record . . . .” A former Assistant U.S. Attorney with both trial and appellate criminal experience has written:
Because of doubts over the legality of the negotiated plea, prosecutors and defense counsel typically avoid all reference in court to the sentence to be imposed until after the plea has been tendered and accepted, and engage in the pious fraud of making a record that the i>lea was not induced by any promises.
Enker, Perspectives on Plea Bargaining, in the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report: the Courts App. A at 111 (1967).

. Raines v. United States, supra, 423 F.2d at 532 (Sobeloff, J., concurring and dissenting).