Court Opinion

ID: 9617515
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 04:56:47.962127+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:04:10.873065
License: Public Domain

*476ORDER ON REHEARING

Per Curiam:

We granted a rehearing in order to invite the views of amici curiae and to reconsider three points: (1) is this case controlled by the decision in Riddle-Duckworth, Inc. v. Sullivan, 253 S. C. 411, 171 S. E. (2d) 486 (1969); (2) is this case controlled by the decision in Giles v. Lanford and Gibson, Inc., 285 S. C. 285, 328 S. E. (2d) 916 (Ct. App. 1985); and (3) in the absence of an express or implied undertaking to render expert advice, does an insurance agent have an affirmative duty at law to advise the insured concerning his insurance risks and coverages.
In order to address these points clearly, we must first focus on the exact claim Trotter advanced at trial.
Trotter contended that he went to State Farm’s agent, Ledford, to purchase liability insurance for a truck used in his business. He told Ledford he wanted “full protection” on the truck.1 Ledford wrote a commercial vehicle policy. The policy contained a standard exclusion for any injury to an “employee of the insured arising out of his or her employment.”
Ledford did not tell Trotter the policy contained this exclusion, nor did he advise Trotter that injuries to his employees could be covered by purchasing worker’s compensation insurance. Apparently, Trotter did not read the policy, so he was unaware of the exclusion for employee injuries. Trotter testified that when he went to Ledford, he did not wish to purchase worker’s compensation insurance, in part because another person had already advised him against it.
At trial, Trotter claimed Ledford was guilty of actionable negligence because he failed to tell Trotter about the exclusion and failed to recommend worker’s compensation insurance to cover the risk of employee injuries. He introduced no evidence that Ledford offered him “bad” advice about how to cover his business risks; or that he asked for a policy *477covering the risk of injury to his employees, which Ledford failed to procure; or that Ledford misrepresented the coverages of the policy by telling him it covered injuries to his employees. While in argument before this Court, Trotter has variously treated his action as if it were for (1) negligent (i.e., “bad”) advice, (2) negligent failure to procure insurance coverage, and (3) misrepresentation or fraud. His pleadings and proof establish that the action is for negligent failure to advise. As Trotter cannot argue new and different causes of action for the first time on appeal,2 we confine our review to the claim for negligent failure to advise.
I.
The first question is whether this case is controlled by Riddle-Duckworth, Inc. v. Sullivan, 253 S. C. 411, 171 S. E. (2d) 486 (1969). We hold it is not.
In Riddle-Duckworth, the insured purchased third party liability coverage for his place of business. The building contained an elevator which was used to lift goods and passengers to the second floor. The insurance agent physically inspected the premises, he saw the elevator, and he was informed about the uses made of it. The insured specifically asked the agent to procure a policy which covered the elevator. When the policy was issued, the insured read it and questioned whether it covered the elevator. In response to his specific inquiry about coverage for the elevator, the agent assured him the policy provided full coverage. As it happened, the policy did not cover the elevator, and the insurance company denied the insured’s claim when the elevator fell, injuring a third party.
On these facts, the Supreme Court held that the insurance agent was liable for the insured’s damages because he negligently failed to procure a policy covering the elevator. The agent had clearly undertaken to procure elevator coverage. This undertaking imposed on him the duty to exercise reasonable care and skill in procuring the correct coverage. Through the agent’s neglect, the policy did not provide the *478coverage. As a result, the insured suffered substantial damages for which the agent became liable.
Trotter’s case does not involve a failure to procure insurance. By his own admission, he did not go to Ledford to purchase insurance for work related injuries to his employees. He did not ask Ledford for such coverage. Ledford did not agree to procure such coverage. After Trotter received the policy, he did not ask if it covered injuries to his employees. Moreover, Ledford never told him the policy afforded such coverage. These facts readily distinguish Trotter’s case from Riddle-Duckworth.
II.
The next question is whether this case is controlled by Giles v. Lanford and Gibson, Inc., 285 S. C. 285, 328 S. E. (2d) 916 (Ct. App. 1985). We hold it is not.
In Giles, the insured purchased a partially destroyed house, which he intended to rebuild as his residence. In order to finance the purchase, he sought a mortgage loan from a bank. As a condition of the loan, the bank required him to obtain fire and extended coverage insurance on the house with a loss payable clause naming the bank as payee. The insured went to his insurance agent to obtain the insurance. He explained his situation and requested the agent to write a policy giving him immediate coverage on the house. Instead of writing a homeowner’s policy, the agent wrote a “Builder’s Risk” policy on the house. When the policy was delivered to the insured, the agent told him the policy covered him for the full face amount. Before the insured began construction on the house, it was totally destroyed by fire. The insurance company denied his claim, because the “Builder’s Risk” policy only covered losses after construction began. The insured sued the agent for constructive fraud based on the agent’s representation that the house was covered from the date the policy was written.
On the facts stated, this Court held that the agent was liable for the misrepresentation as to coverage. We rejected the argument that the insured had no right to rely on the misrepresentation, noting (1) in view of the agent’s superior experience and knowledge regarding different types of insurance, it was reasonable for the insured to assume the truthfulness of any representations the agent made about *479the coverage; and (2) the language of the “Builder’s Risk” policy was so unintelligible that the insured could not have discovered the falsity of the misrepresentation by reading the policy.
In Trotter’s case, Ledford made no misrepresentations regarding the coverages of the policy. Moreover, the policy expressly excluded coverage for injuries to an employee of the insured in language that was intelligible to a person of common experience and understanding. See Doub v. Weathersby-Breeland Insurance Agency, 268 S. C. 319, 233 S. E. (2d) 111 (1977) (where there is nothing in the exclusion that is ambiguous or difficult to understand, it is effective notwithstanding insured’s claim he would not have understood it if he had read it). Unlike the agent in Giles, Ledford gave his insured no reason to believe the policy afforded a coverage which in fact it did not. Thus, Ledford cannot be liable under the holding in Giles.
III.
Finally, we address the contention that an insurance agent has an affirmative duty, apart from any undertaking on his part, to explain all risks and coverages the insured should consider when purchasing a policy of insurance.
Generally, an insured’s claim must be based on the terms of the policy as issued. Carolina Bank & Trust Company v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Company, 279 S. C. 576, 310 S. E. (2d) 163 (Ct. App. 1983). Only if the insurer or the insurance agent voluntarily assumes a duty to advise the insured, may liability arise for failure to exercise reasonable skill and care in explaining the policy or otherwise counseling the insured. Id. Coverage cannot be imposed after the fact simply because the insured claims, in retrospect, that he should have been sold a different policy. Cf. Crosby v. Protective Life Insurance Company, 293 S. C. 203, 359 S. E. (2d) (Ct. App. 1987).
At trial, Trotter produced a parade of opinion witnesses who testified that a good insurance agent should explain risks, coverages, and policy exclusions to the insured. They expressed the view that an agent who does not render such advice fails to give proper service to his client.
*480This opinion testimony could not create a duty to advise which does not exist at law. The judge correctly charged the jury that an insurance agent normally has no duty to advise a customer or to warn him of provisions contained in the insurance policy.3 The opinion testimony regarding an agent’s responsibilities was largely irrelevant and may have confused the jury as to the legal duty of care. In any event, it did not relieve Trotter of the burden of proving a special undertaking by Ledford to render advice.
On rehearing, Trotter asserts there is evidence of an implied undertaking by Ledford to advise him about his insurance coverage.
He cites his own testimony that he asked Ledford for “full protection” and also that on one occasion Led-ford advised him to increase his third party liability limits on the truck. While this testimony is in the record, it does not prove an undertaking by Ledford. A request for “full protection” does not place an insurance agent under a duty to advise the insured about coverage or to use his discretion and expertise to determine what coverage the insured should purchase. Ethridge v. Associated Mutuals, Inc., 160 Ga. App. 687, 288 S. E. (2d) 58 (1981). Likewise, an agent’s simple recommendation that the insured raise his liability limits upon renewal of the insurance does not amount to a general undertaking to advise the insured about the policy. Neither is it evidence of a course of dealing from which such an undertaking can be implied. This is especially true where, as here, no change of policies or coverages was either made or recommended.
Trotter also cites Ledford’s testimony, claiming that Led-ford admitted giving him insurance advice.4 However, a careful reading of the transcript shows that Ledford made no such admission.5 Thus, Trotter is still faced with a lack of proof as to the undertaking.
*481For the reasons stated, we adhere to our original opinion in this case. After rehearing the appeal, the Court is unable to discern that any material fact or principle of law has been either overlooked or misapprehended. Accordingly, the stay of remittitur, heretofore in effect, is revoked and the judgment of this Court shall be remitted forthwith to the court of common pleas.
And it is so ordered.

 Ledford categorically denied that Trotter asked for “full protection.” For purposes of appellate review, we are bound to accept Trotter’s testimony rather than Ledford’s.

 See Rental Uniform Service of Greenville, S. C., Inc. v. K & M Tool & Die, Inc., 292 S. C. 571, 357 S. E. (2d) 722 (Ct. App. 1987) (the Court of Appeals will not address a question not raised in and passed on by the trial court).

 Trotter did not object to this charge at trial.

 Trotter’s cause of action, it should again be noted, rests on the claim that Ledford did not give him advice, although he was under an alleged duty to do so.

 The testimony in question reads as follows:
Q. And to the extent you or your employees gave any advice concerning *481insurance to Mr. Trotter or Mrs. Trotter, you were giving that advice as his or her agent? Is that correct?
A. That’s right.
Q. And you, of course, concede that when you give advice, it needs to be good advice. Is that correct?
A. I give the best advice I can about what I’m talking about. Yes. The line of questions is purely rhetorical or hypothetical. None of Ledford’s answers is a statement that he actually gave Trotter advice or was under a duty to do so. Ledford merely agrees with the abstract proposition that an insurance agent who gives advice should give good advice.