Court Opinion

ID: 9753961
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 19:36:13.510215+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:27:45.674772
License: Public Domain

Justice FLAHERTY,
with whom Justice INDEGLIA joins, dissenting in part and concurring in the result.
We write separately because we believe that this Court is passing on an opportunity to bring our jurisprudence in line with a substantial majority of jurisdictions in this country by announcing that statutes of limitations are procedural in nature and thus the law of the forum state controls.30 Such a pronouncement would eliminate the need for parties, trial courts, and this Court to conduct torturous interest-weighing tests on what are clearly procedural questions that inevitably lead to inconsistent and unpredictable results and undermine judicial efficiency.
I
The Interest-Weighing Approach in Rhode Island
When a claim originates in one state (the claim state) but is brought before a court of another state (the forum state), the forum state must conduct a thorough analysis to determine which state’s laws should govern the suit.31 At present, Rhode Island jurists perform this pains*536taking analysis on an ad hoc basis by employing the interest-weighing approach. The application of that analysis to determinations of which statute of limitations to apply somehow has morphed from the language used by this Court in its 1968 decision in Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917 (1968). In Woodward,, this Court abandoned its long adherence to the rule that the place of a tort shall govern the rights of the injured party.32 Id. at 299, 243 A.2d at 923. In lieu of that rule, the Court chose to adopt an interest-weighing approach whereby an action is separated into its various elements and each individual element or issue is governed by the law of the jurisdiction that has the most significant contacts relative thereto. Id. at 293, 243 A.2d at 919-20. The former approach (known as the lex loci delicti doctrine) was a subjective determination of whether a particular element was labeled as substantive or procedural that often controlled which law would be applied. Id. at 295, 243 A.2d at 920-21. Classifying an element as substantive or procedural was a subjective determination, in part, because “the guidelines used in making such determinations were not very often open to objective classification or criticism.” Id., 104 R.I. at 295, 243 A.2d at 921. The Woodward Court noted,
“when a court met a hard case in which it had to decide whether a particular matter was substantive or procedural— and there was a serious question raised as to which label to apply — the courts found that they had considerable latitude to characterize the matter as procedural and govern the case by the law of the forum.” Id. at 295, 243 A.2d at 921.
It is noteworthy, however, that the application of statutes of limitations cannot seriously be considered to be within the class of “hard cases” referred to by the Woodward Court because statutes of limitations historically have been viewed as procedural and are viewed as procedural today by a vast majority of states. See Part II, infra. Moreover, in adopting the interest-weighing approach, the Court in Woodward intimated the application of that approach would be limited to instances where the Court first had to determine whether the element in question was clearly not procedural. See id. at 298, 243 A.2d at 922. This is simply not the case with respect to statutes of limitations. Woodward,, therefore, did not in any way overturn the long-held application of the forum state’s statute of limitations adopted in Byron v. Great American Indemnity Co., 54 R.I. 405, 407-08, 173 A. 546, 547 (1934), and Staples v. Waite, 30 R.I. 516, 519, 76 A. 353, 354 (1910) (“[N]o rule is better settled than that the statute of limitations of the state in which the action is brought, is to prevail * * *.”). Indeed, in discussing the application of the theory to cases being litigated under common law (as opposed to statutory law) the Woodward Court held that “[ojnce a forum has established sufficient interests to warrant applying its own substantive laws to a given issue, * * * it follows that the forum is warranted in applying its own substantive laws whether those laws are based on common-law rights, or whether they depend totally upon statutory enactment for their existence.” Woodward, 104 R.I. at 298, 243 A.2d at 922 (emphasis added).
In 1997, this Court expanded the interest-weighing approach upon determining whether the Rhode Island or New Hamp*537shire statute of limitations controlled in Cribb v. Augustyn, 696 A.2d 285, 288 (R.I. 1997). In doing so, the Court summarily — and incorrectly in our opinion — concluded that the doctrine of lex loci delicti had been wholly abandoned in this jurisdiction without considering whether Woodward intended to limit the interest-weighing approach to cases where there was a serious question whether the issue was procedural or substantive. With all due respect, it is our opinion that the majority has extended the error in Cribb with its holding in this case.
II
Statutes of Limitations Are Clearly Procedural
In determining whether statutes of limitations are best described as procedural or substantive, the meaning of those terms is instructive. Black’s Law Dictionary 1567 (9th ed. 2009) defines substantive law as “[t]he part of the law that creates, defines, and regulates the rights, duties, and powers of parties.” On the other hand, procedural law is confined to those rules “that prescribe the steps for having a right or duty judicially enforced, as opposed to the law that defines the specific rights or duties themselves.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 1328. Black’s quotes John Sal-mond on the distinctions between the two, saying: “So far as the administration of justice is concerned with the application of remedies to violated rights, we may say that the substantive law defines the remedy and the right, while the law of procedure defines the modes and conditions of the application of the one to the other.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 1567 (quoting John Salmond, Jurisprudence 476 (Glan-ville L. Williams ed., 10th ed. 1947)).
Although its holdings are not controlling on this Court, we are persuaded by the logic of the United States Supreme Court in Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 108 S.Ct. 2117, 100 L.Ed.2d 743 (1988). In that case, the Court discussed whether the United States Constitution’s Full Faith and Credit Clause allowed states to employ their own choice of law rules to determine whether the forum state’s or the claim state’s statute of limitations applied in a given case. Id. at 722-30, 108 S.Ct. 2117. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court in Sun Oil Co., commented that viewing statutes of limitations as procedural (rather than as substantive) predates the Constitution itself. Id. at 723, 108 S.Ct. 2117.
“The historical record shows conclusively, we think, that the society which adopted the Constitution did not regard statutes of limitations as substantive provisions, akin to the rules governing the validity and effect of contracts, but rather as procedural restrictions fashioned by each jurisdiction for its own courts. As Chancellor Kent explained in his landmark work, 2 J. Kent, Commentaries on American Law 462-463 (2d ed. 1832): ‘The period sufficient to constitute a bar to the litigation of sta[l]e demands, is a question of municipal policy and regulation, and one which belongs to the discretion of every government, consulting its own interest and convenience.’ ” Sun Oil Co., 486 U.S. at 726,108 S.Ct. 2117.
In Sun Oil, the Court determined that if statutes of limitations were understood to be procedural, then the forum state could apply its own statute of limitations. In the course of that analysis the Court opined:
“Since the procedural rules of its courts are surely matters on which a State is competent to legislate, it follows that a State may apply its own procedural rules to actions litigated in its courts. The issue * * * can be characterized as whether a statute of limitations may be considered as a procedural matter for *538purposes of the Full Faith and Credit Clause.”33 Id. at 722-23, 108 S.Ct. 2117.
The Court went on to state:
“[The] view of statutes of limitations as procedural for purposes of choice of law followed quite logically from the manner in which they were treated for domestic-law purposes. At the time the Constitution was adopted the rule was already well established that suit would lie upon a promise to repay a debt barred by the statute of limitations — on the theory, as expressed by many courts, that the debt constitutes consideration for the promise, since the bar of the statute does not extinguish the underlying right but merely causes the remedy to be withheld.” Id. at 725,108 S.Ct. 2117.
In concluding that forum states were not required to apply the statute of limitations of claim states, the Court reasoned that because the statute of limitations “does not extinguish the underlying right but merely causes the remedy to be withheld,” it is procedural in nature. Id. at 725, 108 S.Ct. 2117 (citing Little v. Blunt, 26 Mass. 488, 492 (1830) and Wetzell v. Bussard, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 309, 311, 6 L.Ed. 481 (1826)). The Court went on to discuss Graves v. Graves’ Executors, 5 Ky. 207, 208-09 (1810), which held that “[t]he statute of limitations * * * does not destroy the right but withholds the remedy. It would seem to follow, therefore, that the lex fon, and not the lex loci was to prevail with respect to the time when the action should be commenced.”34 Thus, American jurisprudence long has understood that statutes of limitations are best categorized as procedural in nature.
Ill
A Majority of Other Jurisdictions Apply the Statute of Limitations of the Forum State
Finally, because serving the interests of judicial economy and predictability weigh strongly in favor of adopting an unclouded and simple rule on statutes of limitations, a majority of other states have decided that statutes of limitations are procedural, and therefore controlled by the law of the forum state.35 Most states have held that there simply is no need for courts to en*539gage in the harrowing multistep process of weighing the parties’ interests when the states have such compelling reasons to employ their own procedural rules.
Although states articulate the rule with some variations, there can be no serious argument that there is general consensus across the country that states should apply their own statutes of limitations because they are procedural in nature. Rhode Island should rejoin this overwhelming majority of jurisdictions and restore the centuries-old rule providing that because statutes of limitations are procedural, the law of the forum state controls. With enormous respect for the opinion of the majority, it is nonetheless our opinion that it missed the opportunity to do so in this case. We join in the opinion of the majority in all other respects.
Conclusion
For the reasons discussed above, we would announce a clear rule that because statutes of limitations are procedural, the law of the forum state should control.

. In this case, respondent, Warren Electric Corp., contends that the trial justice properly used the interest-weighing approach to determine whether Massachusetts’ or Rhode Island’s statute of limitations controlled, but further contends that the trial justice incorrectly concluded after weighing the interests that Rhode Island law applied. By contrast, Harodite Industries, Inc. asserts that Rhode Island should follow the "vast majority of states” that treat statutes of limitations as procedural and apply the forum state’s statute of limitations.

.The majority well and thoroughly describes the application of the interest-weighing approach. We need not repeat it here.

. In Woodward v. Stewart, 104 R.I. 290, 243 A.2d 917 (1968), the Court considered whether Rhode Island tort law, specifically the Wrongful Death Act, applied to a car accident between Rhode Island residents that occurred in Massachusetts.

. The Court earlier had articulated that statutes of limitations were procedural in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 778 n. 10, 104 S.Ct. 1473, 79 L.Ed.2d 790 (1984) ("Under traditional choice-of-law principles, the law of the forum State governs on matters of procedure”).

. In this way, statutes of limitations can be distinguished from statutes of repose. It is possible that statutes of repose might indeed be considered substantive for choice of law purposes because they
"limit[] the time within which an action may be brought and [are] not related to the accrual of any cause of action; the injury need not have occurred, much less have been discovered. Unlike an ordinary statute of limitations which begins running upon accrual of the claim, the period contained in a statute of repose begins when a specific event occurs, regardless of whether a cause of action has accrued or whether any injury has resulted.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1546 (9th ed. 2009) (quoting 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 4 at 20-21 (1987)).
Indeed, Black’s Law Dictionary defines statute of repose as "[a] statute barring any suit that is brought after a specified time since the defendant acted (such as by designing or manufacturing a product), even if this period ends before the plaintiff has suffered a resulting injury.” Black’s Law Dictionary at 1546.

.See, e.g., Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Foundation Health Services, Inc., 524 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir.2008) (interpreting Mississippi law); Mackey v. Judy’s Foods, Inc., 867 F.2d 325, 328 (6th Cir.1989) (interpreting Tennessee law); Sokolowski v. Flanzer, 769 F.2d 975, 978 (4th Cir.1985) (interpreting Maryland law); Player Pianette, Inc. v. Dale Electronics, Inc., 478 F.2d 336, 336-37 (8th Cir.1973) (interpreting Nebraska law); Mahalsky v. Salem Tool Co., 461 F.2d 581, *539585-86 (6th Cir.1972) (interpreting Ohio law); Association for the Preservation of Freedom of Choice, Inc. v. Simon, 299 F.2d 212, 214-15 (2nd Cir.1962) (interpreting New York law); Pinnacle Pizza Co. v. Little Caesar Enterprises, Inc., 560 F.Supp.2d 786, 794-95 (D.S.D.2008) (interpreting South Dakota law); Gaudreau v. American Promotional Events, Inc., 511 F.Supp.2d 152, 157 (D.D.C.2007) (interpreting the law of the District of Columbia); Norton v. Michonski, 368 F.Supp.2d 175, 179 (D.Conn.2005) (interpreting Connecticut law); Glover v. Merck & Co., 345 F.Supp.2d 994, 998-99 (D.Minn.2004) (interpreting Minnesota law); Bailey v. Skipperliner Industries, Inc., 278 F.Supp.2d 945, 952 (N.D.Ind.2003) (interpreting Indiana law); Eagle Nation, Inc. v. Market Force, Inc., 180 F.Supp.2d 752, 755 (E.D.N.C.2001) (interpreting North Carolina law); Graphic Technology, Inc. v. Pitney Bowes Inc., 968 F.Supp. 602, 605 n. 3 (D.Kan.1997) (interpreting Kansas law); Armor v. Michelin Tire Corp., 923 F.Supp. 103, 106-07 (S.D.W.Va.1996) (interpreting West Virginia law); Thornton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 703 F.Supp. 1228, 1230 (D.S.C.1988) (interpreting South Carolina law); AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Harris, 759 F.Supp. 1141, 1143 (E.D.Pa.1991) (interpreting Pennsylvania law); Hines v. Tenneco Chemicals, Inc., 546 F.Supp. 1229, 1232-33 (S.D.Tex.1982) (interpreting Texas law); Holdford v. Leonard, 355 F.Supp. 261, 263 (W.D.Va.1973) (interpreting Virginia law); White v. Fawcett Publications, 324 F.Supp. 403, 405 (W.D.Mo.1971) (interpreting Missouri law); Middleton v. Lockhart, 355 Ark. 434, 139 S.W.3d 500, 503 (2003) (Arkansas); Cossman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 108 Cal.App.4th 370, 133 Cal.Rptr.2d 376, 380 (2003) (California); Butts v. Thomas, 300 Ga.App. 639, 686 S.E.2d 262, 263 (2009) (Georgia); Newell Co. v. Petersen, 325 Ill.App.3d 661, 259 Ill.Dec. 495, 758 N.E.2d 903, 908 (2001) (Illinois); Hossler v. Barry, 403 A.2d 762, 765 (Maine 1979) (Maine); Gordon v. Gordon, 118 N.H. 356, 387 A.2d 339, 342 (1978) (New Hampshire); Nez v. Forney, 109 N.M. 161, 783 P.2d 471, 472, 473 (1989) (New Mexico); Consolidated Grain & Barge Co. v. Structural Systems, Inc., 212 P.3d 1168, 1171-78 (Okla.2009) (noting that Oklahoma recognizes the general rule though the state's borrowing statute has abrogated its application in many instances); Potomac Leasing Co. v. Dasco Technology Corp., 10 P.3d 972, 975 (Utah 2000) (Utah).