Court Opinion

ID: 9698521
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 19:52:31.873064+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:41.552999
License: Public Domain

LARSEN, Justice,
dissenting.
The majority has sanctioned the courtroom misconduct of an assistant district attorney under the guise of trial advocacy. Because I cannot agree with such a resolution of this case, I dissent.
It is well established that the invalidity of a court order is not a defense to a contempt conviction. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 87 S.Ct. 1824, 18 L.Ed.2d 1210 (1967). Thus, even if Judge Kremer’s order were invalid, that invalidity would not be grounds for reversing appellant’s conviction. In any event, I believe that Judge Kremer’s order was valid and that appellant’s violation of that order constituted criminal contempt.
While it is certainly proper for a judge to allow the prosecutor to present information to the court for sentencing purposes,1 there is no authority for affording the prose*12cutor an absolute right to speak his mind at sentencing. The facts in this case reveal that although appellant had agreed to present the court, prior to sentencing, with documents and a written report concerning defendant Moffatt’s criminal record, appellant failed to make these documents available for the court’s consideration. I would hold that this lack of cooperation on the part of appellant was justification for the court’s order denying appellant further opportunity to speak on the issue of sentencing.
Because I believe that the court’s order to appellant was entirely proper, the only issue remaining is the sufficiency of the evidence supporting appellant’s conviction. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4131 allows summary punishment for contempt when there is
(2) Disobedience or neglect by officers, parties, jurors or witnesses of or to the lawful process of the court. We have held that
[cjontempt under subsection II is justified only if the contemnor had notice of the specific order or decree, . . . the act constituting the violation was volitional, . . . and the contemnor acted with wrongful intent. . . . [T]his Court has adopted the standard of intent prevailing in the federal courts that the contemnor “knows or should reasonably be aware that his conduct is wrongful.” (Citations omitted.)
Commonwealth v. Garrison, 478 Pa. 356, 369, 386 A.2d 971, 977-78 (1978).
In the instant case, all the elements of the crime of contempt are present. It is undisputed that appellant had notice that the court wished him to remain silent during the remainder of the sentencing proceeding; he initially excepted twice to the court’s order. Appellant’s violation of this *13order was volitional; he renewed his attempt to participate in the sentencing even after he had acquiesced in the court’s request to remain silent and he attempted to speak yet again after the court warned that it would adjudge him in contempt. Finally, appellant’s intent in violating the order was also wrongful; every assistant district attorney knows or should reasonably be aware that he has no right to ignore a court order that concerns the conduct of a case before the court.
Since there is sufficient evidence to support appellant’s conviction of contempt, I dissent from the majority’s reversal of that conviction.
FLAHERTY, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

. Rule 1405(a), Pa.R.Crim.P. provides in pertinent part:
At the time of sentencing, the judge shall ... afford counsel for both parties an opportunity to present argument and information relative to sentencing.
Section 6.2 of the A.B.A. Standards Relating to the Prosecution
Function provides:
*12The prosecutor should assist the court in basing its sentence on complete and accurate information for use in its presentence report. He should disclose to the court any information in his files relevant to the sentence. If incompleteness or inaccurateness in the presentence report comes to his attention, he should take steps to present the complete and correct information to the court and to defense counsel.