Court Opinion

ID: 9633732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 11:58:30.87777+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:08:41.310506
License: Public Domain

Young, J.,
dissenting:
I believe that the district court properly granted respondents’ summary judgment motion after determining that forfeiture under NRS 179.121(2) cannot be premised on a juvenile’s “delinquent act.” The language of NRS 179.121(2) unequivocally requires the commission of a felony prior to the maintenance of a forfeiture action against a vehicle.
The City of Sparks argues that forfeiture actions under NRS Chapter 179 are civil in nature and that the action proceeds “in rem” against the property and not its owner, thus making it immaterial whether the vehicle was used by an adult in the commission of a felony or by a juvenile in the course of a delinquent act.
*205In reversing, the majority concurs in what it acknowledges as a “legal fiction.” I cannot join in this interpretation. “The proper use of a legal fiction is to prevent injustice, according to the maxim ‘in fictione juris semper equitas existat.’ ” Union Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 208 (1905), quoted in Graves v. Elliot, 307 U.S. 383, 390 (1939) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting). Holmes stated, “[Fjiction always is a poor ground for changing substantial rights.” Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562, 630 (1906). Blackstone criticized forfeiture based on the guilt of the property itself as a “superstition” inherited from the “blind days” of feudalism. 1 W. Blackstone Commentaries *300. I believe that characterization of a forfeiture action as civil or “in rem” has no bearing upon the NRS 179.121 prerequisite that a felony must be committed. Here, at all times, the perpetrator stood accused of merely a delinquent act.
In the absence of any statutory authority for extending forfeiture actions to juveniles accused of delinquent acts, the district court’s dismissal under NRCP 12(b)(5) for failure to state a claim was proper. The majority opinion usurps a prerogative of the legislature that could be easily accomplished by the addition of the words “or delinquent act” to NRS 179.121(2) following the word “felony.” Until the legislature takes such action, this court should not extend the scope of the forfeiture statutes.
We have stated on numerous occasions that statutes imposing forfeiture should be strictly construed. One 1978 Chev. v. County of Churchill, 97 Nev. 510, 512, 634 P.2d 1208, 1209 (1981); Wilshire Insur. Co. v. State, 94 Nev. 546, 550, 582 P.2d 372, 375 (1978). I believe the majority’s departure from this tenet is incorrect and, accordingly, would uphold the district court’s dismissal.