Court Opinion

ID: 9490406
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 13:42:54.644022+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:54:05.185251
License: Public Domain

HARRY T. EDWARDS, Chief Judge, con-
curring in part and dissenting in part:
I dissent from the majority’s reversal of the jury finding of discrimination. Although a close question, there was sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to have concluded that Fatten Muchin intentionally discriminated against Mungin on the basis of race.
I agree, however, that there was insufficient evidence to support a finding of “constructive discharge.” The vast majority of Mungin’s time at Fatten Muchin was spent doing work for Mark Dombroffs and Patricia Gilmore’s clients. Dombroff and Gilmore left Fatten Muchin in July 1994 to form their own firm, and there was no record evidence to indicate that there was sufficient work in *1559the D.C. office after their departure to support Mungin’s continued employment. Indeed, four other associates lost their jobs at the same time as Mungin. As such, Mungin had no reasonable expectation of employment in the D.C. office after DombrofPs and Gilmore’s departure. In addition, Mungin turned down offers to move to Katten Mu-ehin’s Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles offices, and it is undisputed that there was bankruptcy work in the Chicago office. Thus, I would reverse on the basis that no reasonable jury could have found that Mun-gin was constructively discharged. Because the compensatory and punitive damages were based in part on this finding, I would remand the damage awards to the District Court.