Court Opinion

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Date Created: 2024-03-04 13:00:57.25191+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:26:16.707251
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                                                              [PUBLISH]
                                    In the
                 United States Court of Appeals
                         For the Eleventh Circuit

                           ____________________

                                 No. 22-13548
                           ____________________

        MICHAEL DAVID CARRUTH,
                                                     Petitioner-Appellant,
        versus
        COMMISSIONER, ALABAMA DEPARTMENT OF
        CORRECTIONS,

                                                   Respondent-Appellee.

                           ____________________

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                      for the Middle District of Alabama
                  D.C. Docket No. 2:14-cv-01107-WKW-SMD
                           ____________________
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        2                        Opinion of the Court                     22-13548

        Before WILSON, JILL PRYOR, and BRANCH, Circuit Judges.
        WILSON, Circuit Judge:
               Michael David Carruth was convicted by an Alabama jury
        on four counts of first-degree murder, one count of attempted mur-
        der, one count of first-degree burglary, and one count of first-de-
        gree robbery. 1 On December 3, 2003, he was sentenced to death.
                Carruth appeals the district court’s denial of his petition for
        a writ of habeas corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The dis-
        trict judge granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on six is-
        sues:
            1. Whether trial counsel were ineffective in failing to investi-
               gate and present mitigating evidence in the penalty phase;
            2. Whether the issue concerning trial counsel’s failure to pre-
               sent mitigating evidence in the penalty phase is procedurally
               barred;
            3. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to notify
               Carruth that the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
               (ACCA) had overruled an application for rehearing and to
               advise Carruth of further available appellate proceedings;
            4. Whether the issue concerning appellate counsel’s failure to
               notify Carruth that the ACCA had overruled an application
               for rehearing and to advise Carruth of further available ap-
               pellate options is procedurally barred;

        1 The first-degree burglary and robbery counts were later vacated by the Ala-

        bama Court of Criminal Appeals on direct appeal on double jeopardy grounds.
        Carruth v. State, 927 So. 2d 866, 878, 880 (Ala. Crim. App. 2005).
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        22-13548               Opinion of the Court                        3

           5. Whether appellate counsel was ineffective in failing to argue
              that the prosecution engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in
              the guilt/innocence closing argument by telling the jury that
              the punishments of life without the possibility of parole or
              death were the punishment options and that anything else
              did not have those options; and
           6. Whether Carruth was deprived of his right to an impartial
              jury and due process of law guaranteed him by the Sixth and
              Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution
              by premature jury deliberations.
                After thorough examination of all issues, and with the bene-
        fit of oral argument, we affirm.
                                I.     Background
               We first discuss the factual background underlying this case.
        Then, we separately discuss the complicated procedural history
        that led to this appeal.
           A. Factual Background
               In 2002, Carruth and his accomplice, Jimmy Lee Brooks Jr.,
        drove to the home of Forrest “Butch” Bowyer and his twelve-year-
        old son, William Brett Bowyer in Phenix City, Alabama. Carruth
        and Brooks handcuffed Butch and Brett and transported them to
        an empty construction site, hoping to extort thousands of dollars
        from Butch. Butch agreed to give them money from a box in his
        home closet, and all parties went back to the house to retrieve the
        money. Apparently, Carruth was irritated by the sum of money,
        and all parties went back to the construction site. Carruth then slit
        Butch’s throat, sat on his back, and told him to “be quiet and go to
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        4                         Opinion of the Court                      22-13548

        sleep.” Carruth and Brooks dug a shallow grave, and Carruth told
        Brooks, “I’ve done one, now you do one.” Brooks then shot Brett,
        who fell into the grave. Brooks proceeded to shoot Brett twice
        more, murdering him. Butch, still alive, played dead while Carruth
        and Brooks tossed Butch’s body on top of Brett’s and covered the
        grave. When Butch knew Carruth and Brooks had gone, he dug his
        way out, signaled a passing driver for help, and the driver called
        911. Butch’s testimony and accompanying evidence pointed to
        Carruth, who was subsequently indicted on four counts of capital
        murder. 2
               In May 2002, the court appointed two attorneys—Robert
        Lane and Jeremy Armstrong—to defend Carruth. Carruth pled not
        guilty, and the case proceeded to a three-day trial. During the pros-
        ecution’s closing argument, the prosecutor stated to the jury that
        the capital murder counts carry sentences of death or life without
        parole. His full statement was as follows:
               I’m going to ask you to convict this man of those cap-
               ital counts, the only punishments for which are life
               without parole or the death penalty, something that
               you’re not even considering now, but if you convict
               him of those capital counts, we’ll get to that phase

        2 One count because the murder was committed during a kidnapping; one

        count because the murder was committed during a robbery; one count be-
        cause the murder was committed during a burglary; and one count because
        the murder victim was less than fourteen years of age, in violation of sections
        of Ala. Code § 13A-5-40(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(4), and (a)(15).
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        22-13548                    Opinion of the Court                     5

                later. Any other charge other than those four capital
                counts does not carry that punishment.
        Defense counsel objected to this statement, to which the judge re-
        plied: “Noted.” Carruth was found guilty on all counts.
               The penalty phase began the following day. Carruth’s coun-
        sel received funds for a psychologist, which they ultimately did not
        hire, and an investigator, but were denied funds for a polling ex-
        pert. Carruth’s counsel did not request funds for a mitigation ex-
        pert. Armstrong later testified at the Rule 32 evidentiary hearing
        that Wiggins v. Smith 3 was published three months prior to trial, and
        he was not aware of Wiggins during Carruth’s case.
               Regarding mitigation efforts with his counsel, Carruth
        stated that he did not want his family involved, he had a great child-
        hood, and there was “nothing there” to help with mitigation. Ac-
        cordingly, his counsel did not seek mental health records but did
        arrange for three family members to provide character evidence.
        Due to the family members’ indicated cooperation, counsel did not
        subpoena them to appear at the penalty phase. However, at the last
        minute, family members refused to show up because they wanted
        to avoid the “media circus” of the trial. Consequently, Carruth’s
        counsel offered no witnesses or evidence during the penalty phase
        and waived opening argument. But counsel did argue that the lack
        of family members present to testify should be considered a miti-
        gating factor. The State also did not present any witnesses or

        3 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
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        6                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13548

        evidence at the penalty phase. Further, Carruth’s counsel read a
        stipulation into the record that Carruth had no significant prior
        criminal history and argued this should also be a mitigating factor.
        Counsel reiterated these points to the jury during closing argu-
        ments, and also emphasized that Carruth did not pull the trigger
        on the gun that killed Brett.
                Ultimately, the jury voted unanimously in favor of death. At
        sentencing, Carruth’s counsel again argued the above as mitigating
        circumstances, and contended that evidence was disputed as to
        whether Carruth had specific intent to kill anyone. Considering all
        before it, the state court found the existence of all four aggravating
        factors: the murder was committed during a (1) robbery, (2) bur-
        glary, (3) kidnapping, and (4) the murder was especially heinous,
        atrocious, or cruel. The trial court found one statutory mitigating
        factor—Carruth had no significant prior criminal history. With re-
        gard to non-statutory mitigation, the trial court found that the ab-
        sence of Carruth’s family at the trial proceedings did not constitute
        a mitigating circumstance. Similarly, the trial court found that the
        fact that Carruth did not procure or possess the murder weapon
        was not an additional mitigating circumstance, noting that the evi-
        dence at trial established that Carruth “told his accomplice, ‘I’ve
        done one, now you do one.’” Accordingly, the trial court deter-
        mined that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigat-
        ing circumstances, and Carruth was sentenced to death for the cap-
        ital crimes.
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        22-13548               Opinion of the Court                        7

           B. Procedural History
               For clarity, the procedural history is subdivided into five
        parts: (1) direct appeal, (2) first Rule 32 proceeding and appeals;
        (3) Rule 2(b) motion in the Alabama Supreme Court; (4) second
        Rule 32 proceeding and appeals; and (5) federal habeas proceed-
        ings.
           i.      Direct Appeal
               Appointed counsel, Stephen Guthrie, represented Carruth
        on appeal. Guthrie submitted an appeal to the ACCA regarding
        Carruth’s murder and attempted murder convictions, which was
        denied, and an application for rehearing, which was also denied.
        Guthrie failed to submit a certiorari petition to the Alabama Su-
        preme Court and the United States Supreme Court. Guthrie attrib-
        utes this failure to lack of notice—he moved offices and failed to
        inform both the ACCA and Carruth of his change of address.
               Once Carruth realized the avenue for appeal was officially
        foreclosed, he then filed a petition for post-conviction relief under
        Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. The procedural history
        becomes a bit thorny here, as (1) Carruth’s Rule 32 proceeding was
        bifurcated and, (2) within the timeframe of the two Rule 32 appeals,
        Carruth filed a Rule 2(b) motion under the Alabama Rules of Ap-
        pellate Procedure (ARAP) in the Alabama Supreme Court.
           ii.     First Rule 32 Proceeding and Appeals
                Carruth’s Rule 32 petition listed a myriad of grounds for re-
        lief. Pertinent to this appeal, he listed the following grounds for
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        8                          Opinion of the Court                         22-13548

        relief, among others: (1) he was entitled to an out-of-time appeal,
        since (a) his right to counsel under the Sixth and Fourteenth
        Amendments was violated and (b) Alabama Rule of Criminal Pro-
        cedure 32.1(f) 4 applied, which allowed him an avenue for appeal;
        (2) ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of the Fourth, Fifth,
        Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitu-
        tion; (3) prosecutorial misconduct; and (4) juror misconduct. The
        circuit court initially granted the out-of-time petition in a single
        page order. The order did not state which ground was meritorious
        and reserved ruling on the remaining Rule 32 issues until after the
        Alabama Supreme Court’s ruling on the certiorari petition. 5
               The State appealed the circuit court’s ruling and, while the
        appeal was pending, Carruth filed the Rule 2(b) motion, discussed
        below. The ACCA reversed the circuit court in May 2008, stating
        (1) certiorari was discretionary; (2) Rule 32.1(f) was inapplicable;
        and (3) no Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists for certiorari
        petitions. In Carruth’s petition for certiorari, he asked the Alabama
        Supreme Court to “affirm the circuit court’s order granting him an
        out-of-time petition for writ of certiorari in this Court.” He argued:

        4 “[A]ny defendant who has been convicted of a criminal offense may institute

        a proceeding in the court of original conviction to secure appropriate relief . . .
        [when t]he petitioner failed to appeal within the prescribed time from the con-
        viction or sentence itself . . . and that failure was without fault on the peti-
        tioner’s part.”
        5 The order stated the following: “To the extent this court has jurisdiction . . .

        Carruth is granted permission to file an Out of Time Petition for Writ of Cer-
        tiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court.”
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        22-13548               Opinion of the Court                          9

        (1) he was entitled to counsel under § 15-12-22 of the Alabama
        Code, and Rule 39(a)(2) under ARAP mandates counsel “shall” file
        for certiorari in death cases; (2) his Sixth Amendment right to effec-
        tive assistance of counsel was violated; and (3) he was entitled to
        an out-of-time appeal under Rule 32.1(f). The Alabama Supreme
        Court granted certiorari, then quashed the writ, holding (1) a Rule
        2(b) motion was the appropriate avenue to bring this request be-
        fore the court; (2) Carruth already brought the 2(b) motion, which,
        as we explain further below, was denied; and (3) bringing the issue
        through a Rule 32 petition could not provide the relief requested.
        Despite this, Carruth still filed a petition for certiorari in the U.S.
        Supreme Court, which was denied.
           iii.    Rule 2(b) Motion in Alabama Supreme Court
               In the Rule 2(b) motion, Carruth argued that his counsel vi-
        olated Rule 39(a)(2) of ARAP, that the Alabama Supreme Court
        could correct the violation by granting an extension of time under
        Rule 2(b), and that, under Rule 39(a)(2)(C), the court “may enlarge
        the time for filing the petition.” But Carruth did not argue ineffec-
        tiveness of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
        (1984). Therefore, no federal basis of relief was invoked. The Ala-
        bama Supreme Court denied the motion in February 2008.
           iv.     Second Rule 32 Proceeding and Appeals
                With the out-of-time issue exhausted, the circuit court lifted
        the stay of the Rule 32 proceeding and turned to the remaining is-
        sues, and the State filed a motion to summarily dismiss the petition
        in its entirety. The circuit court held a hearing on February 3, 2012,
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        10                        Opinion of the Court                 22-13548

        on the State’s motion to dismiss. Following the hearing, the circuit
        court summarily dismissed many of Carruth’s remaining Rule 32
        claims from his amended petition. Carruth was given deadlines to
        amend any claim not dismissed, and an evidentiary hearing was
        scheduled for September 17, 2012, to address the lingering claims.
                One of the remaining issues involved premature jury delib-
        erations. At the evidentiary hearing, three jurors—B.T., J.H., and
        R.M.—were brought in to testify. The jurors provided mixed testi-
        mony as to whether and to what extent they discussed Carruth’s
        guilt prior to the jury instructions being given. R.M. and J.H. testi-
        fied that they played Rummikub with other jurors at night after the
        trial activities for that day had concluded. 6 When asked if the jurors
        discussed facts about the case during Rummikub, R.M. testified:
        “Absolutely not. The judge told us not to discuss it. We did not.”
        R.M. was also asked about whether any premature deliberations
        occurred during breaks in the jury room, to which R.M. responded
        in the negative.
               J.H.’s testimony muddied the factual waters. During J.H.’s
        questioning, J.H. attested that J.H. and three other jurors played
        Rummikub. During Rummikub, J.H. and the other jurors did dis-
        cuss the case but “not in depth,” which included “mention[ing] that
        a piece of evidence was unusual or something we didn’t expect.”
        When asked if there was discussion regarding the effect of evidence
        presented on the ultimate issue of Carruth’s guilt, J.H. responded:

        6 The jury was sequestered during the trial.
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        22-13548               Opinion of the Court                         11

        “There was never a discussion of that to my knowledge.” J.H. was
        presented with a document purporting to be J.H.’s statement,
        which J.H. identified, that was admitted for impeachment purposes
        only. The document stated J.H. and other jurors talked about what
        sentence Carruth would receive when they talked about the trial.
        Yet during J.H.’s testimony, J.H. disavowed the statement. J.H.
        stated, “I gave the statement, but I don’t recall the discussion.” J.H.
        testified they had not made a final decision regarding Carruth’s
        guilt prior to all evidence being taken and the judge instructing the
        jury on the law. Later, on cross examination, J.H. attested any dis-
        cussions pre-deliberation were “just passing comments,” those dis-
        cussions did not compare to the deliberation jury room discussions,
        and the jurors applied the facts to the law to determine Carruth’s
        guilt.
               When B.T., an alternate juror, was questioned, B.T. stated
        that B.T. “really [did]n’t think there was any discussion about [the
        evidence]. Everybody was just so disturbed over the evidence.”
        And B.T. also said “If we ever discussed [the evidence], it was in the
        break room during the trial. We never communicated after we
        went back to the hotel.” B.T. stated the extent of any discussions
        was “I think Brooks was the one, Brooks did this. I never recall an-
        ytime anybody say that he was guilty, that he needs to be sentenced
        or anything to that effect.”
               Also considered at the evidentiary hearing was ineffective
        assistance of counsel at the penalty phase. Armstrong testified that
        he had multiple conversations with Carruth and family regarding
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        12                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13548

        investigation and mitigation efforts, and that the evidence against
        Carruth was “insurmountable.” When he asked Carruth about in-
        formation from his past that could help with mitigation, Carruth
        indicated that he had a good childhood and there would be nothing
        to find. While Armstrong conceded his investigation was probably
        deficient in light of Wiggins, he felt confident that Carruth was not
        prejudiced in light of the evidence presented at trial and lack of
        helpful mitigating evidence from Carruth’s past.
               Finally, Carruth sought to call Janann McInnis, a mitigation
        specialist, to present testimony as to what several individuals she
        interviewed as part of the postconviction investigation told her
        about Carruth. The State objected on hearsay grounds, and the
        Rule 32 court sustained the objection, but nevertheless allowed a
        proffer of her testimony.
                On December 26, 2012, the circuit court denied relief on the
        last issues, including juror misconduct. The court held that some
        jurors may have made “passing comments” regarding the evi-
        dence, but no comments judged Carruth’s guilt or innocence until
        after the official jury deliberations began. The court also denied the
        ineffective assistance at penalty phase claim, relying on Arm-
        strong’s testimony that Carruth indicated that nothing in his past
        would assist with mitigation.
               Carruth appealed to the ACCA, which affirmed and denied
        rehearing. As to the pre-deliberation juror statements, the ACCA
        stated the circuit court gave little weight to J.H.’s out-of-court
        statement and resolved contradictions in favor of J.H.’s in-court
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        22-13548               Opinion of the Court                        13

        testimony—a credibility determination that was entitled to defer-
        ence under Alabama law. This, the ACCA said, it did not find con-
        trary to the evidence, and the circuit court did not abuse its discre-
        tion. Regarding the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, the ACCA
        found that Carruth failed to allege the jury was affected by the pros-
        ecutor’s statement. Instead, Carruth’s claim was not sufficiently
        specific, and the ACCA stated the circuit court was correct to dis-
        miss the claim under Alabama Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.7(d).
        The Alabama Supreme Court denied certiorari.
           v.      Federal Habeas Proceedings
              Carruth filed his § 2254 petition in the Middle District of Al-
        abama, which the district court denied. Then the district court
        granted a certificate of appealability on the six issues identified
        above. Carruth timely appealed.
                                  II.    Analysis
                We review a court’s decision to deny a § 2254 petition de
        novo, applying a de novo standard to legal conclusions and a clear
        error standard to factual ﬁndings. Daniel v. Comm’r, Ala. Dep’t of
        Corr., 822 F.3d 1248, 1258 (11th Cir. 2016). This includes ineﬀective
        assistance claims, which are mixed questions of law and fact. Pye v.
        Warden, Ga. Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th 1025, 1034 (11th Cir. 2022)
        (en banc).
                When a state court has adjudicated a habeas petitioner’s
        claim on the merits, we review its decision under the Antiterrorism
        and Eﬀective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) “highly deferential
        standards.” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 269 (2015). Under AEDPA,
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        14                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13548

        a federal court can grant relief to a state prisoner only if he shows
        that the state court’s determination of his claim resulted in a obvi-
        ously wrong decision under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)–(2).
                                § 2254(d)(1) review
                We must decide whether the ACCA’s decision that Carruth
        was not deprived of an impartial jury was “‘contrary to, or involved
        an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
        determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.’” Borden v.
        Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 818 (11th Cir. 2011) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
        § 2254(d)(1)). An opinion is “contrary to” clearly established federal
        law if it makes a conclusion of law in opposition to the Supreme
        Court or “confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable
        from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a [diﬀer-
        ent] result.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). Our review
        is limited to the evidence produced in the state court proceedings,
        “both direct and collateral.” Frazier v. Bouchard, 661 F.3d 519, 532
        n.17 (11th Cir. 2011). “Overall, ‘a state court’s determination that a
        claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as fair-
        minded jurists could disagree on the correctness of the state court’s
        decision.’” Pye, 50 F.4th at 1034 (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562
        U.S. 86, 101 (2011)) (alteration adopted). In other words, to deem a
        state court’s application of Supreme Court precedent “unreasona-
        ble,” we must ﬁnd that the decision was not only “incorrect or er-
        roneous”—it must have been “objectively unreasonable.” Wiins,
        539 U.S. at 520–21. This standard is “diﬃcult to meet and . . . de-
        mands that state-court decisions be given the beneﬁt of the doubt.”
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        22-13548               Opinion of the Court                        15

        Raulerson v. Warden, 928 F.3d 987, 996 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quo-
        tation marks omitted).
                                § 2254(d)(2) review
               In the alternative, we grant a writ of habeas corpus if the
        claim “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable de-
        termination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
        State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). A state habeas
        court’s ﬁndings of fact are presumed to be correct and the peti-
        tioner bears “the burden of rebutting the presumption of correct-
        ness by clear and convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1).
               “Even if the state court made a clearly erroneous factual de-
        termination, that doesn’t necessarily mean the state court’s ‘deci-
        sion’ was ‘based on’ an ‘unreasonable determination of the facts in
        light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” Pye,
        50 F.4th at 1035 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2)). “Depending on the
        importance of the factual error to the state court’s ultimate deci-
        sion, that decision might still be reasonable even if some of the
        state court’s individual factual ﬁndings were erroneous—so long as
        the decision, taken as a whole, doesn’t constitute an unreasonable
        determination of the facts and isn’t based on any such determina-
        tion.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). Ultimately, Pye re-
        quires us to look at “the reasons for the state court’s decision” and
        then “consider any potential justiﬁcation for those reasons.” Id. at
        1036.
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        16                       Opinion of the Court                  22-13548

             A. Deprivation of an Impartial Jury
               Juror contact with evidence that does not “come from the
        witness stand in a public courtroom where there is full judicial pro-
        tection of the defendant’s right of confrontation, of cross-exami-
        nation, and of counsel” is presumptively prejudicial. Turner v. Loui-
        siana, 379 U.S. 466, 473 (1965); see also Remmer v. United States, 347
        U.S. 227, 229 (1954) (“In a criminal case, any private communica-
        tion, contact, or tampering directly or indirectly, with a juror dur-
        ing a trial about the matter pending before the jury is . . . deemed
        presumptively prejudicial.”). Yet the government can overcome this
        presumption if it shows that contact with the juror did not harm
        the defendant. Remmer, 347 U.S. at 229. The U.S. Supreme Court
        has not held that another juror’s opinion is extrinsic evidence
        within the scope of this rule.
                Carruth claims that the jurors’ pre-deliberation statements
        were presumptively prejudicial and that the State has not overcome
        the presumption of prejudice. The Commissioner relies on the dis-
        trict court’s determination that the juror misconduct claim “lacked
        merit,” stating this was not an unreasonable application of the law
        or determination of the facts below.
                Carruth’s claim does not survive AEDPA deference. Since
        the ACCA was the last state court to make a merits determination,
        AEDPA applies. Under § 2254(d)(1), Carruth fails to cite clearly es-
        tablished federal law that shows his claim merits relief. He relies on
        Irvin v. Dowd for the proposition that jurors can be removed for
        cause during jury selection if the juror forms an opinion on the
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        22-13548               Opinion of the Court                        17

        case before trial and cannot set aside that opinion. 366 U.S. 717, 723
        (1961). While acknowledging that the facts in Irvin dealt with ve-
        nire members, not the already-empaneled jury context, Carruth
        urges the state court unreasonably applied Supreme Court prece-
        dent by not applying the principle from Irvin to his case. Williams,
        529 U.S. at 407 (stating “an unreasonable application of [Supreme
        Court] precedent [occurs] if the state court . . . unreasonably re-
        fuses to extend that principle to a new context where it should ap-
        ply”). But Carruth’s extension argument is unpersuasive, and we
        decline to adopt it.
               Carruth’s claim also does not survive under a § 2254(d)(2)
        analysis. The Supreme Court has never held that a juror’s expressed
        opinion is oﬃcially extrinsic evidence. Even assuming arguendo that
        it were, testimony elicited at the evidentiary hearing suggests oth-
        erwise. Any elicited comments were brief, and the jurors did not
        opine on Carruth’s ultimate guilt or innocence. J.H.’s statement
        was introduced only to impeach, not as substantive evidence, and
        it was not objectively unreasonable for the court to determine that
        evidence was less persuasive than the testimony given in court. The
        adjudication of the juror misconduct claim did not run contrary to
        the limited applicable Supreme Court precedent in Remmer, and it
        was not based on an unreasonable determination of the facts con-
        sidering the evidence presented in the state court hearing.
              Carruth cannot show under § 2254 that the ACCA was un-
        reasonable as to its factual determinations or that it made a deter-
        mination contrary to law. Thus, his claim fails.
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        18                         Opinion of the Court                    22-13548

             B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Failure to File Certiorari Petition
                and Procedural Default
               Whether a petitioner has procedurally defaulted a particular
        claim is a mixed question of fact and law, which this Court reviews
        de novo. Judd v. Haley, 250 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001). “Only
        individual claims, and not the [petition] containing those claims,
        can be procedurally defaulted.” Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 9 (2000).
               As long as a State appellate process exists, follows “ﬁrmly es-
        tablished and regularly followed” rules, Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411,
        424 (1991), and is not “ineﬀective to protect the rights” of the peti-
        tioner, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii), the petitioner must navigate the
        State appellate process under the State’s rules. State prisoners must
        allow full review of constitutional issues by state courts “by invok-
        ing one complete round of the State’s established appellate review
        process” prior to federal habeas review. O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526
        U.S. 838, 845 (1999). Not adhering to a State’s procedural rules to
        present federal claims deprives the state courts of the opportunity
        to address those claims. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 732
        (1991). Therefore, when a habeas prisoner fails to present his claims
        to the state court in a timely and proper manner, and the state court
        refuses to address the merits based on state law, the federal habeas
        court is precluded from hearing the merits, absent a showing of
        cause for the failure to properly present the claim and actual preju-
        dice, or that the failure to consider the claim would result in a fun-
        damental miscarriage of justice. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72,
        81–88 (1977); Coleman, 501 U.S. at 749–50; Marek v. Singletary, 62
        F.3d 1295, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 1995).
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        22-13548               Opinion of the Court                        19

               Generally, procedural default can arise in two ways:
        (1) when the state court correctly applies a procedural default prin-
        ciple of state law and concludes that the petitioner’s federal claims
        are barred; or (2) when the petitioner “never raised a claim in state
        court, and it is obvious that the unexhausted claim would now be
        procedurally barred” in state court. Bailey v. Nagle, 172 F.3d 1299,
        1302–03 (11th Cir. 1999) (per curiam). In the ﬁrst instance, a federal
        court must determine “whether the last state court rendering judg-
        ment clearly and expressly stated that its judgment rested on a pro-
        cedural bar.” Id. at 1303. In the second instance, the federal court
        must determine whether any future attempt to exhaust state rem-
        edies would be futile under the state’s procedural default doctrine.
        Id.
               A procedural default can be overcome if the petitioner
        “demonstrate[s] cause for the default and actual prejudice as a re-
        sult of the alleged violation of federal law, or demonstrate[s] that
        failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscar-
        riage of justice.” Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. Fundamental miscar-
        riages of justice occur only when “a constitutional violation has
        probably resulted in the conviction of . . . [an] innocent [person].”
        Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 327 (1995) (quotation omitted). To de-
        termine if someone was actually innocent, petitioner must demon-
        strate “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would
        have found petitioner guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
              Attorney negligence is generally not good cause to excuse
        procedural default. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. Attorney performance
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        20                      Opinion of the Court                  22-13548

        is only relevant if the procedural default stems from constitutionally
        required counsel’s deﬁcient performance, see id. at 756, or “when a
        State requires a prisoner to raise an ineﬀective-assistance-of-trial-
        counsel claim in a collateral proceeding” but the prisoner did not
        have eﬀective counsel in his ﬁrst collateral proceeding. Martinez v.
        Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 14 (2012); see also Trevino v. Thaler, 569 U.S. 413,
        429 (2013).
               The right to appellate counsel is guaranteed for appeals
        taken by right. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356 (1963). But
        there is no federal constitutional right to counsel for discretionary
        appeals. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“Our cases
        establish that the right to appointed counsel extends to the ﬁrst ap-
        peal of right, and no further. Thus, we have rejected suggestions
        that we establish a right to counsel on discretionary appeals.”).
        During a discretionary appeal, the United States Constitution pro-
        vides no guarantee as to the quality of counsel, and the court must
        revert to the general rule: “[T]he attorney is the prisoner’s agent,
        [and] under well settled principles of agency law, the principal bears
        the risk of negligent conduct on the part of his agent.” Martinez,
        566 U.S. at 10 (quotations omitted).
               While the Supreme Court has required trial lawyers to fulﬁll
        certain closing duties under Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 480
        (2000), there has not been clear guidance on whether that extends
        to discretionary appeals. Many of our sister circuits have similarly
        held that the constitutional right to appellate counsel ends upon
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        22-13548                    Opinion of the Court                                  21

        the ﬁrst appeal as of right and, therefore, does not extend to discre-
        tionary appeals. 7
               Here, Carruth argues that his appellate counsel was ineﬀec-
        tive for failing to ﬁle a writ of certiorari to the Alabama Supreme
        Court and to advise him of further appellate options. The district
        court determined that this claim was unexhausted and procedur-
        ally defaulted. Further, Carruth argues that his ineﬀectiveness
        claim is not barred because he raised the ineﬀectiveness issue in the
        ﬁrst Rule 32 petition appeal, which was considered by the ACCA
        and the Alabama Supreme Court. He also claims that he raised the

        7 See Folkes v. Nelsen, 34 F.4th 258, 280 (4th Cir. 2022) (“Supreme Court case

        law thus supports the conclusion that the constitutional right to appellate
        counsel is satisfied in advance of the appellate court’s decision and that coun-
        sel’s role ends upon issuance of that decision.”), cert. denied 143 S. Ct. 736
        (2023); Ahumada v. United States, 994 F.3d 958, 960–61 (8th Cir. 2021) (holding
        that appellate counsel’s failure to notify the defendant of the deadline and pro-
        cess for a discretionary petition did not run afoul of the constitutional right to
        appellate counsel); Pena v. United States, 534 F.3d 92, 96 (2d Cir. 2008) (per cu-
        riam) (finding the defendant’s “claim that the filing of . . . a petition [for discre-
        tionary review] should be considered ‘the last step in his first appeal as of
        right—not the first step of the subsequent discretionary appeal’ [is] . . . . ‘in-
        genious, but wrong’” (citation omitted)); Jackson v. Johnson, 217 F.3d 360, 365
        (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that there is no right to counsel “after the appellate
        court has passed on the claims”); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1432 (9th Cir.
        1989) (holding that advising the defendant about discretionary review is not
        required because the “opportunity for direct appeal, and thus the defendant’s
        constitutional right to counsel, has come to an end”); but see Smith v. State of
        Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corr., 463 F.3d 426, 434–35 (6th Cir. 2006) (holding ap-
        pellate counsel is constitutionally required to provide closing duties to a de-
        fendant, including notifying the defendant of the outcome of the appeal).
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        22                         Opinion of the Court                        22-13548

        issue on a Rule 2(b) motion under ARAP directly to the Alabama
        Supreme Court, which was ultimately denied. Thus, he took every
        route for review, and his claims should not be procedurally barred
        or considered unexhausted.
               Carruth is mistaken on both the procedural default doctrine
        and the merits of his appellate ineﬀectiveness claim.8 Carruth’s in-
        eﬀectiveness claim regarding failing to ﬁle for certiorari and failure
        to counsel on appellate options is unexhausted and procedurally
        barred under the second prong of the procedural default analysis.
        While Carruth argued appellate ineﬀectiveness as grounds for an
        entitlement to a late certiorari petition both in his Rule 2 motion
        and ﬁrst Rule 32 appeal, he did not raise an independent issue of
        ineﬀective assistance of appellate counsel in the second Rule 32 ap-
        peal, which dealt with the merits of his Rule 32 claims. Thereby, his
        appellate ineﬀectiveness claim was not presented to the ACCA nor
        the Alabama Supreme Court on the merits. Further, Carruth
        staked his ineﬀectiveness claim in the ﬁrst Rule 32 appeal on ARAP
        and did not cite an independent federal basis for review. See Branan
        v. Booth, 861 F.2d 1507, 1508 (11th Cir. 1988) (explaining that a ha-
        beas petition grounded on issues of state law provides no basis for
        federal habeas relief ). Also, any future attempt to exhaust state
        remedies would be futile under the state’s procedural default

        8 As the circuit court did not address the substance of Carruth’s ineffectiveness

        claim for failing to file and advise, this claim is subject to de novo review. See
        Pye, 50 F.4th at 1034.
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        22-13548                    Opinion of the Court                                  23

        doctrine, which renders Carruth’s claim procedurally barred and
        unexhausted. 9
                The only way Carruth could overcome the default would be
        by demonstrating either (1) a fundamental miscarriage of justice,
        i.e., convicting an innocent person, will result without excusing the
        default, or (2) cause for the default. Here, it is unquestionable that
        the evidence produced at trial, including the graphic testimony of
        Butch Bowyer, clearly demonstrated Carruth’s guilt. As to cause,
        Carruth argues that his attorney’s negligence in ﬁling his certiorari
        petition fulﬁlls the exception. But attorney negligence is not gener-
        ally cause for default, especially when Carruth’s counsel at the dis-
        cretionary appeal level was not constitutionally required. Since pro-
        cedural default occurred and no exception applies, we aﬃrm the
        district court’s determination that the claim is procedurally
        barred. 10

        9 Carruth’s only way to raise the federal issue today would be to petition the

        Alabama Supreme Court for a rehearing on the Rule 2(b) motion. However,
        the time to file such a motion for rehearing expired two weeks after the ruling
        on the Rule 2(b) motion. See Ala. R. App. P. 40(c). Also, new arguments cannot
        be raised for the first time in a motion for rehearing. See Water Works & Sewer
        Bd. of City of Selma v. Randolph, 833 So. 2d 604, 608 (Ala. 2002).
        10 Even if these claims were not procedurally barred or unexhausted, Carruth

        would still lose on the substantive ineffectiveness claims under de novo review
        for (1) failing to file a certiorari petition and (2) failing to inform Carruth about
        the rehearing denial and counsel him about future appeals because there is no
        right to counsel for discretionary appeals. While Carruth indicates he desired
        to petition for certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court, the Constitution does
        not guarantee quality counsel, so the general rule applies: the principal bears
        the risk of negligent conduct on the part of his agent. Martinez, 566 U.S. at 10.
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        24                       Opinion of the Court                     22-13548

             C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel: Failure to Argue Prosecutorial
                Misconduct
                When due process is at issue, we must consider whether the
        prosecution’s conduct “so infected the trial with unfairness as to
        make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” Donnelly v.
        DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 643 (1974). We evaluate the trial record
        as a whole in making this determination. See Darden v. Wainwright,
        477 U.S. 168, 181–83 (1986); Cargill v. Turpin, 120 F.3d 1366, 1379
        (11th Cir. 1997) (“[I]solated or ambiguous or unintentional remarks
        must be viewed with lenity.” (quotation omitted)). Our circuit uti-
        lizes a two-part test in analyzing prosecutorial misconduct claims
        involving a state prosecutor’s closing argument, instructing district
        courts “to determine ﬁrst whether particular arguments by a pros-
        ecutor were improper and if so, to determine what the probable
        eﬀect of the improper argument was on the jury.” Wilson v. Kemp,
        777 F.2d 621, 623 (11th Cir. 1985). To determine the eﬀect on the
        jury, we ask “whether there was a reasonable probability that, in
        the absence of the oﬀending remarks, the . . . outcome would have
        been diﬀerent.” Tucker v. Kemp, 802 F.2d 1293, 1295 (11th Cir. 1986)
        (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted). “If a reviewing
        court is conﬁdent that, absent the improper remarks, the jury’s de-
        cision would have been no diﬀerent, the proceeding cannot be said
        to have been fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 1296.

        Lastly, Carruth has also failed to establish a reasonable probability that he
        would have succeeded on his appeal if certiorari were granted, and therefore
        his claim must fail.
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        22-13548               Opinion of the Court                         25

                Carruth argues that his appellate counsel was ineﬀective for
        failing to argue on direct appeal that prosecutorial misconduct oc-
        curred during closing arguments when the prosecutor informed
        the jury that only the capital counts carried the punishment of life
        without parole or death. He maintains that this statement was
        “highly prejudicial because the jury cannot consider punishment
        during the guilt/innocence phase.” In response, the State argues
        that this claim is unexhausted and procedurally defaulted because
        Carruth failed to include this claim in his application for discretion-
        ary review to the Alabama Supreme Court.
               Regarding mixed questions of procedural default and merits
        claims in the habeas context, we may sidestep addressing proce-
        dural bar issues when the substantive issue is easily decided against
        the petitioner:
               The Supreme Court has explained that the independ-
               ent and adequate state ground doctrine is not techni-
               cally jurisdictional when a federal court considers a
               state prisoner’s petition for habeas corpus pursuant to
               28 U.S.C. § 2254 . . . . [W]hen it appears that another
               issue is more easily resolvable against the habeas pe-
               titioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involves
               complicated issues of state law, a federal court may
               avoid the procedural bar issue.
        Muhammad v. Sec’y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 733 F.3d 1065, 1072 (11th Cir.
        2013) (quoting Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 522–25 (1997))
        (cleaned up) (emphasis added).
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        26                     Opinion of the Court                22-13548

              Because the procedural bar issue was not suﬃciently ad-
        dressed below and the substantive issue is easily decided against
        Carruth, we decline to engage in the procedural bar analysis.
                Evaluating the claim on the merits, Carruth still fails under
        AEDPA deference. We have held that denying relief under Rule
        32.7(d) is a merits determination. Williams v. Alabama, 791 F.3d
        1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 2015). As the ACCA noted, Carruth’s ineﬀec-
        tive assistance claim was denied under Rule 32.7(d). Therefore, we
        review this merits determination through the lens of AEDPA def-
        erence.
               Under § 2254(d)(1), this determination did not run contrary
        to federal law, and fairminded jurists could disagree. When assert-
        ing his claim, Carruth asserted misconduct by “telling the jury dur-
        ing his closing argument that death would not be a possible pun-
        ishment unless the jury convicted Mr. Carruth of capital murder.”
        Carruth argued that, although counsel raised an objection to that
        comment, they were ineﬀective for failing to obtain a ruling. Car-
        ruth contended that the prosecutor’s comment created a risk that
        the jury convicted Carruth of the capital oﬀenses “because they
        were worried that otherwise he would not be punished severely
        enough, rather than because they were convinced of his guilt be-
        yond a reasonable doubt.” Furthermore, Carruth argued that the
        statement was highly prejudicial “because the jury cannot consider
        punishment during the guilt/innocence phase.” Carruth made
        only a bare assertion that the prosecutor’s statements put undue
        pressure on the jury; he failed to plead any speciﬁc facts suggesting
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        22-13548                   Opinion of the Court                                27

        that the jury was actually inﬂuenced by this isolated comment. Ac-
        cordingly, Carruth failed to plead facts that, if true, would have en-
        titled him to relief under a prosecutorial misconduct theory or,
        necessarily, a connected ineﬀective assistance theory.
               The ACCA did not unreasonably apply Donnelly by ﬁnding
        that counsel did not ask the jury to consider punishment in the
        guilt-phase. The court could be giving heavy weight to counsel’s
        statement that the jury was “not even considering [the death pen-
        alty] now.” And because the facts supporting Carruth’s guilt were
        numerous and formidable, it cannot be said that one statement in-
        fected the entire trial. The jury was death-qualiﬁed and therefore
        aware of the potential penalties in this case.
               And while Carruth still asserts his appellate counsel was in-
        eﬀective for not raising an “apparent” meritorious claim, the law
        he references is not on point. Importantly, the case law Carruth
        cites addresses Batson claims—not what is at issue here, rendering
        it inapposite. 11 Further, the evidence against Carruth was likely in-
        surmountable: the money traced to him, a victim’s blood on his
        clothing, and testimony from Butch made the case against him
        overwhelmingly strong. Thus it cannot be said that, even if the

        11 The two cases cited by Carruth address Batson violations. See Davis v. Sec’y

        for Dep’t. of Corr., 341 F.3d 1310, 1315–17 (11th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (holding
        that making a Batson objection at trial, but failing to renew the objection to
        preserve it for appeal constituted ineffective assistance); Eagle v. Linahan, 279
        F.3d 926, 943 (11th Cir. 2001) (determining that not noticing and raising a mer-
        itorious Batson claim from the record constituted ineffective assistance).
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        28                      Opinion of the Court                 22-13548

        comment was improper, it “infected the trial with unfairness” so
        signiﬁcantly that Carruth was denied due process.
                Because the prosecutorial misconduct claim fails, the at-
        tached ineﬀective assistance of appellate counsel claim is also mer-
        itless; counsel could not have been ineﬀective for omitting a non-
        meritorious point from their argument and, similarly, their perfor-
        mance also could not have been prejudicial. United States v. Nyhuis,
        211 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Appellate counsel is not inef-
        fective for failing to raise claims reasonably considered to be with-
        out merit.” (quotations omitted)).
             D. Ineffective Assistance: Procedural Default & Failure to Present
                Mitigating Evidence
                Carruth argues that his counsel performed deﬁciently by
        failing to adequately investigate his background and failing to lo-
        cate and call supporting witnesses during the penalty phase. The
        Rule 32 court denied this claim on the merits, but Carruth’s counsel
        failed to appeal that denial to the ACCA. Carruth argues that the
        district court erred in concluding that this claim was procedurally
        defaulted because any procedural default should be excused due to
        his postconviction counsel’s ineﬀective assistance during the Rule
        32 proceedings by failing to appeal the denial of this claim.
               Ineﬀective assistance of counsel normally does not consti-
        tute cause for procedural default; cause must be traced to an out-
        side circumstance preventing counsel from presenting the claim.
        Coleman, 501 U.S. at 753. But the Supreme Court recognized a nar-
        row exception to this rule in Martinez: ineﬀective assistance of
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        22-13548                Opinion of the Court                         29

        counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause
        for procedural default of ineﬀective assistance at trial. 566 U.S. at 9.
        The defendant must show that his counsel was deﬁcient under
        Strickland and that the defaulted claim is “substantial,” i.e., likely
        meritorious. Id. at 14.
                Counsel in capital cases have an “obligation to conduct a
        thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.” Wiins,
        539 U.S. at 522 (quotation marks omitted). But counsel is not bound
        “to investigate every conceivable line of mitigating evidence no
        matter how unlikely the eﬀort would be to assist the defendant at
        sentencing.” Id. at 533. In addition, Strickland does not force coun-
        sel to oﬀer mitigating evidence in every case’s sentencing phase. Id.
        Instead, strategic choices made “after less than complete investiga-
        tion” will be deemed reasonable only to the extent that “reasonable
        professional judgments support the limitations on investigation.”
        Id. at 521. And reasonableness can be aﬀected by the defendant’s
        own statements or actions. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
               Ineﬀective assistance of trial counsel arises under the Sixth
        Amendment and is evaluated using the two-pronged analysis estab-
        lished in Strickland:
               First, the defendant must show that counsel’s perfor-
               mance was deﬁcient. This requires showing that
               counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
               functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defend-
               ant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant
               must show that the deﬁcient performance prejudiced
               the defense. This requires showing that counsel’s
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        30                     Opinion of the Court                 22-13548

               errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of
               a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.
        466 U.S. at 687. We are deferential to an attorney’s real-time deci-
        sions when examining their performance. Id. at 689. In determining
        any error’s prejudicial eﬀect, the petitioner bears the burden of
        showing more than “some conceivable adverse eﬀect on the de-
        fense from counsel’s errors.” Id. at 682. Instead, the defendant must
        show that, but-for the counsel’s errors, the proceeding’s outcome
        would have diﬀered. Id. at 694. Speciﬁcally, when a petitioner chal-
        lenges a death sentence, the inquiry turns on whether “‘there is a
        reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the sentencer . . .
        would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigat-
        ing circumstances did not warrant death.” Stewart v. Sec’y, Dep’t of
        Corr., 476 F.3d 1193, 1209 (11th Cir. 2007) (quoting Strickland, 466
        U.S. at 695). AEDPA provides an even higher standard petitioner
        must meet: “When § 2254(d) applies, the question is not whether
        counsel’s actions were reasonable. The question is whether there is
        any reasonable argument that counsel satisﬁed Strickland’s deferential
        standard.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105 (emphasis added).
                Carruth argues that his claim of ineﬀective assistance sur-
        vives procedural default due to the Martinez exception. He claims
        that counsel knew the State would object to the mitigation special-
        ist’s testimony as hearsay, and counsel should have had live wit-
        nesses or “request[ed] to bring them in later.” Carruth does not
        acknowledge that the mitigation specialist’s proﬀer consisted of a
        recitation of witnesses and documents mentioned in his amended
        Rule 32 petition and that the mitigation specialist received
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        22-13548               Opinion of the Court                        31

        conﬁrmation from the witnesses and documents what was alleged
        in the amendment was true.
                Claiming that he survives the procedural bar, Carruth fur-
        ther claims that his trial counsel was ineﬀective at the penalty phase
        by not introducing family testimony or other facts regarding his
        character and life experience, including, but not limited to, the fol-
        lowing: participating in Future Farmers of America, undergoing
        brain surgery as a toddler, having one leg that was shorter than the
        other, coming from a stable home, exhibiting high intelligence and
        graduating at the top of his high school class, being well-liked, ex-
        periencing a contentious divorce, and not involving himself much
        in his children’s lives. He asserts that, had these facts been consid-
        ered along with the stipulation of no signiﬁcant criminal history,
        there is a reasonable probability he would not have been sentenced
        to death.
               Under de novo review, Carruth’s claim is procedurally
        barred and, assuming arguendo it was not, his claim would still fail.
        As the district court found, Carruth did not preserve the ineﬀec-
        tiveness claim on appeal at the state level. Carruth only argued on
        appeal to the ACCA that the mitigation expert’s testimony should
        have been admitted under Alabama Rule of Evidence 102; he did
        not argue the merits of his penalty phase ineﬀective assistance
        claim that undergirded the necessity for the mitigation expert.
        Again, he abandoned the ineﬀectiveness claim in his petition for
        certiorari, where he instead focused on the mitigation expert’s tes-
        timony, claiming it was not hearsay. As such, Carruth did not
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        32                     Opinion of the Court                  22-13548

        invoke one complete round of the State’s established appellate re-
        view process prior to federal habeas review, violating O’Sullivan.
        526 U.S. at 845. And the Martinez exception does not apply in his
        case. Therefore, as the issue is procedurally barred and no excep-
        tion applies, we do not consider it.
                Because the ACCA did not rule speciﬁcally on the penalty
        phase ineﬀectiveness claim, de novo review of the district court’s
        ruling applies. Under de novo review, Carruth fails on the merits
        due, in part, to his own actions—his indication to counsel that there
        was nothing in his background to assist in mitigation eﬀorts. His
        counsel perhaps satisﬁed Strickland by not expending extra eﬀort
        into mitigation when Carruth indicated that such a search would
        be fruitless. See Newland v. Hall, 527 F.3d 1162, 1202 (11th Cir. 2008)
        (“In evaluating the reasonableness of a defense attorney’s investi-
        gation, we weigh heavily the information provided by the defend-
        ant.”). Furthermore, counsel arranged for witnesses to testify dur-
        ing the penalty phase, but was blindsided when Carruth’s family
        changed their minds at the last minute. Although Carruth faults
        counsel for not having subpoenaed them in advance of the penalty
        phase, there was nothing to indicate to counsel that subpoenas
        were needed because they had voluntarily agreed to attend.
               But, even if counsel’s performance was deﬁcient in failing to
        investigate further, there is little evidence that Carruth was preju-
        diced by the omission of his family’s testimony and other infor-
        mation regarding his upbringing. See Harrington, 562 U.S. at 112
        (“The likelihood of a diﬀerent result must be substantial, not just
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        22-13548               Opinion of the Court                         33

        conceivable.”). The mitigation evidence was minimal at best and
        paled in comparison to the brutal nature of the crime—the victim
        was a 12-year-old boy who was kidnapped from his home with his
        father over money and then was shot multiple times, killed, and
        thrown into a shallow grave—and the four statutory aggravating
        factors. The facts of this case are horriﬁc, and the jury was resolute
        on his punishment as they returned a unanimous recommendation
        of death. See Brooks, 719 F.3d at 1302–03 (holding no prejudice from
        counsel’s failure to present evidence that defendant was nice, good-
        natured, non-violent, and suﬀered from alcoholism, in light of the
        heinous nature of the crime); Boyd v. Allen, 592 F.3d 1274, 1303 (11th
        Cir. 2010) (ﬁnding no prejudice given “the overwhelming power of
        the aggravating evidence” when compared to the totality of the
        mitigation evidence). Since, even assuming deﬁcient performance,
        counsel’s actions were not prejudicial, Carruth’s claim must fail.
                                 III.   Conclusion
               For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s denial of Car-
        ruth’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
               AFFIRMED.