Court Opinion

ID: 9558100
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 17:02:54.78903+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:08:19.560062
License: Public Domain

Green, J.
(dissenting)—The majority holds Mr. Taylor's guilty plea was not voluntary because the record established at the hearing on the plea failed to provide any factual basis upon which the judge could rely, other than the statement made by Mr. Taylor in his own words, which failed to set out the elements of the crime to which he pleaded guilty. I disagree.
In In re Keene, 95 Wn.2d 203, 210, 622 P.2d 360 (1980), the only information supplied to the judge for his determination as to whether a factual basis for the petitioner's guilty plea existed was the statement made by the petitioner in his own words as to what he did that resulted in his being charged with the crime. The purpose of the petitioner's statement in his own words is '"to aid the trial court in determining if a factual basis for the plea exists.'" In re Keene, supra at 210; State v. Newton, 87 Wn.2d 363, 371, 552 P.2d 682 (1976). Even though the court in Keene, supra at 208, stated the element of intent to injure or defraud is a "critical element" of the crime of forgery, the statement made by petitioner Keene did not contain anything regarding the element of intent.7 Yet, the Supreme *261Court affirmed the trial court's determination the petitioner's pleas of guilty on counts 2 and 3 were valid. Thus it appears from the Keene decision that the court may consider in making its "factual basis determination" not only the defendant's statement in his own words, but also any documents, including the information, made part of the record, incorporated by reference or otherwise, at the time the guilty plea is entered.
Furthermore, I believe the statement made by Mr. Taylor in his guilty plea—"I was directly involved in the planning, carrying out the plan, and aftermath of the murder of Myrtle Boston, which occurred July 4, 1977"—unlike the statement made by the defendant in State v. Powell, 29 Wn. App. 163, 627 P.2d 1337 (1981),* **8 is more than a mere conclusion of law; it is an admission of fact. RCW 9A.32-.030(1) provides:
A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when: (a) With a preméditated intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person;. . .
Mr. Taylor's statement admits to a preconceived plan to commit murder, which satisfies the element of premeditated intent. The remainder of Mr. Taylor's statement contains the other necessary elements of first degree murder. Consequently, in my view, Mr. Taylor's guilty plea is valid; I would affirm his judgment and sentence, and deny his petition.

"The Court has asked me to state briefly in my own words what I did that resulted in my being charged with the crime in the information. This is my statement: With respect to Count 1 on or about July 16, 1976 while my employer, Ron Lindh, of Capital Printing and Office Supply was on vacation cashed a check in a sum of $100.00 which my employer had left behind for emergency business expenditures. With respect to Count 2 I on or about July 20, 1976 cashed a check which had been drawn on the Pacific National Bank of Washington upon which check the name of my employer, Ron Lindh, had been forged, said check being for the amount of $200.00. With respect to Count 3 on or about July 28, 1976 I cashed *261a check drawn on the Pacific National Bank of Washington upon which check the name of Ron Lindh as drawer had been forged, said check being in the amount of $1,000.00.° In re Keene, supra at 209-10.

In State v. Powell, supra at 165, the defendant stated:
"'I did participate in the 1 [degree] murder of Charles Allison.'"