Court Opinion

ID: 9675362
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:50:41.020796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:33.551820
License: Public Domain

LEIBSON, Justice,
dissenting.
Respectfully, I dissent.
The Majority Opinion recites that “[d]ur-ing the marriage, the corporation realized the proceeds of a $439,000 judgment on a cause of action for lease assignment royalties.” The Majority Opinion fails to note that this payment must be classified as money owed to the corporation on a cause of action preexisting the marriage. The corporate assets of the husband’s business before the marriage are nonmarital property. The fact that the husband caused the corporation to distribute a portion of that money ($129,298) to him as personal income does not change the character of the money *609from a distribution of a corporate asset, reducing the value of his nonmarital corporate property pro tanto, to a salary or other income that could be appropriately treated as marital property.
The uncontradicted evidence was that the value of the corporation had decreased from $955,000 at the time of the marriage to $568,200 (including the amount of the judgment) at the time of the divorce. Further, as the Court of Appeals noted (and our Majority Opinion omits), “only $18,-619.73” of what the husband “declared ... as income to himself” “was received during the marriage.” The balance was received after the marriage was dissolved, and could not be considered income even if our Majority Opinion was otherwise sound.
Our Opinion in Weakley v. Weakley, Ky., 731 S.W.2d 243 (1987) is squarely in point. In Weakley, we considered two eases, each involving a cause of action for personal injuries that accrued before the marriage where recovery was made thereafter. We held “the recovery is a compensation for a loss which existed before the marriage, one in which a future spouse is not entitled to share.” There is no demonstrable reason why this principle should not apply to the present case.
The Court of Appeals’ Opinion states: “We have reviewed the voluminous record in its entirety and cannot agree with the trial court that this is marital property. KRS 403.190(2)(e) excepts any ‘increase in value of property acquired before the marriage to the extent that such increase did not result from the efforts of the parties during marriage.’ This judgment was the recoupment of a loss that occurred prior to the marriage. As such, it was certainly not the result of any efforts, joint or otherwise, during the marriage.”
The Majority has erroneously reversed the Court of Appeals on this matter.
Next, the Majority Opinion has erroneously reversed both the trial court and the Court of Appeals with regard to the dwelling built on the nonmarital property in which the husband owned a life estate and his daughter by a previous marriage, Dan-na Sue Walters, owned the remainder.
The Court of Appeals affirmed “the award of the house to Danna Sue Walters,” and we should do likewise.
The trial court found that while the house was under construction, the stepdaughter informed Linda and Dan that she owned a remainder interest in the property upon which they were building. Linda cites no authority which provides for equitable reimbursement to one who knowingly builds on the property of another. The Court of Appeals also held that the record does not support Linda’s contention that proceeds from the sale of the parties’ former home was used to finance construction of the new home. Indeed, this was refuted by Linda’s own testimony that the money received from the sale was merely sufficient to pay off the encumbrance upon that house. In my view we have simply engaged in some inappropriate fact-finding, substituting our view of the evidence for that of the trial court. Once again, I would affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals in this matter.