Court Opinion

ID: 9652420
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 17:23:32.965439+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:12:51.236806
License: Public Domain

dissenting.
In this appeal the Commonwealth challenges the Superior Court’s order and opinion which treads upon the trial *145court’s sentencing powers by vacating a lawful sentence of incarceration and directing that the trial court’s sentence must be reduced simply because the Superior Court, under the circumstances, would have entered a more lenient sentence. The majority, in quashing this appeal, sanctions the Superior Court’s abuse of discretion. I dissent.
The appellee, Charles R.T. Jones, pleaded guilty to twenty counts of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse, 18 Pa.C. S.A. § 3123(5), twenty-one counts of sexual abuse of children, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6312(b), and twenty counts of obscene and other sexual materials, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5903(a) & (c), a total of sixty-one counts, all of which were perpetrated from June through November of 1984 and involved fourteen young boys between the ages of four and fifteen. The various episodes of depravity involved sodomy, masturbation, showing and using sexual aids, showing and using pornographic films, involuntary sexual acts, videotaping of the appellee performing sexual acts with the young boys and the videotaping of the youngsters performing sexual acts with one another. The maximum sentence that could have been imposed for the multiple counts to which the appellee pleaded guilty was 710 years of imprisonment. Judge Mellenberg of the Lehigh County Common Pleas Court exhibited some degree of restraint in sentencing the appellee to a term of 50 to 100 years imprisonment.
The majority acknowledges that “there is no question as to the legality of the sentence imposed.” Nonetheless, the majority quashes the Commonwealth’s appeal and in doing so lets stand the Superior Court’s order which vacated the trial court’s lawful sentence as “manifestly excessive” and remanded for imposition of a sentence that conforms to the Superior Court’s view of what a proper sentence should be in this case.
It is well settled that the imposition of sentence is within the sound discretion of the sentencing judge and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. Commonwealth v. Plank, 498 Pa. 144, 445 A2d 491 (1982); Commonwealth v. Edrington, 490 Pa. *146251, 416 A2d 455 (1980). An abuse of discretion has been described as the overlooking of pertinent facts, disregard of the force of evidence, commitment of an error of law, or imposition of a sentence exceeding that prescribed by statute. Commonwealth v. Townsend, 497 Pa. 604, 443 A2d 1139 (1982); Commonwealth v. Edrington, supra. The trial court must weigh the defendant’s character against the circumstances of the offense, Commonwealth v. Edrington, supra; must give due consideration to the statutory guidelines, Commonwealth v. Green, 494 Pa. 406, 431 A2d 918 (1981); and must impose a sentence which is ‘consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant.’ 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). See Commonwealth v. Tomasso, 506 Pa. 344, 485 A2d 395 (1984) (per curiam, Larsen, J. dissenting). All of these functions comprise the discretionary aspects of sentencing and are within the bailiwick of the sentencing court, not the appellate court, (emphasis in original)
Commonwealth v. Parrish, 515 Pa. 297, 301, 528 A.2d 151, 153 (1987) (per curiam, Larsen J. dissenting).
Contrary to the Superior Court’s observations, the sentencing judge did give proper consideration to the gravity of the offenses for which the appellee stands convicted, along with the needs of the public for protection, and the rehabilitative needs of the appellee. At the sentencing hearing the trial judge observed that he was cognizant and recognized the psychological and psychiatric disturbances testified to by Dr. Rotenberg, appellee’s expert witness. (Rec., pps 124-27 & 131) Dr. Rotenberg testified, inter alia, that the appellee was a pedophile; that he had difficulty dealing with his own feelings in relation to others, but he was not psychotic, nor was he out of touch with reality; that at the time of the incidents in question his sexual urges were out of control; and that he was possessed of a long-term personality disorder involving a lifestyle in which he had poor relations with others. Additionally, the trial judge *147considered a letter written by Dr. Caggione, one of the appellee’s physicians in New York and letters from counselors, and a church written on behalf of the appellee and accepted into evidence at the sentencing hearing. After considering all of this information presented by the appellee pertaining to his background, physical, mental and emotional condition, and his rehabilitative needs, along with the nature of the crimes and the needs of society, the trial judge determined that a sentence of imprisonment for a term of 50 to 100 years was appropriate. I find no error.
Further, the majority misreads the Superior Court Opinion in stating that:
“Nothing in the order of the Superior Court would preclude the trial court from reinstituting the same sentence if indeed that court did weigh those factors [relating to the appellee] in arriving at the sentence imposed.” (Majority Opinion at p. 735.)
Technically, and reading the Superior Court’s order in isolation, the majority may be correct. Such a reading, however, ignores the clear signal given by the Superior Court’s Memorandum opinion which, in part, states:
“The lower court may not totally ignore evidence which suggests that appellant, in a reasonable period of time and under proper treatment, may return to society as a contributing member” (Citation omitted)
We remand to the lower court for correction of its manifestly excessive sentence.” (emphasis supplied)
Further, in a footnote, the Superior Court observed:
“While we express no opinion as to the sentence the lower court should impose, we note that even a sentence half as long as that imposed, i.e., twenty-five year minimum, would not expire until the [appellee] is sixty-three years old.”
These directions and comments contained in the Superior Court opinion make it reasonably evident that it is that court’s view that this appellee should receive a sentence much more lenient than the lawful one imposed by the trial court. Clearly, this is an abusive usurpation of the sentenc*148ing power of the trial judge and should not be allowed to stand. What I said in my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Parrish, supra applies with equal force here.
Review of Section 9781(f) cases is not beyond our jurisdiction where, as here, the trial court imposes a sentence within the statutory guidelines after full consideration of all relevant circumstances under the Sentencing Code and all criteria established by case law to guide sentencing decisions. Superior Court, in substituting its notion of the appropriate sentence for that of the trial judge, improperly ‘tinkered’ with the lawfully imposed sentence, (footnote omitted) We are not without the inherent authority to correct Superior Court’s manifest error, notwithstanding the apparent limitations of Section 9781(f).
528 A.2d at 155.
I would reverse the order of the Superior Court and reinstate the sentence imposed by the trial judge.