Court Opinion

ID: 9960429
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-16 14:08:02.075788+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:19:27.779152
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
                               APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
        This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
     internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

                                                        SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
                                                        APPELLATE DIVISION
                                                        DOCKET NO. A-2503-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

          Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KIM A. CARTER, a/k/a
KIM CARTER, LA-HEEM,
and RA-HEEM,

     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________

                   Argued April 9, 2024 – Decided April 16, 2024

                   Before Judges Puglisi, Haas and Bergman.

                   On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
                   Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 19-02-
                   0269.

                   John V. Saykanic, Designated Counsel, argued the
                   cause for appellant (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public
                   Defender, attorney; John V. Saykanic, on the brief).

                   Nancy Anne Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the
                   cause for respondent (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex
                   County Prosecutor, attorney; Nancy Anne Hulett, of
                   counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM

      A Middlesex County grand jury charged defendant Kim A. Carter in a ten-

count superseding indictment with first-degree murder (count one); second-

degree unlawful possession of a weapon (count two); second-degree possession

of a weapon for an unlawful purpose (count three); third-degree possession of a

controlled dangerous substance (CDS) with intent to distribute (counts four and

seven); third-degree possession of a CDS with intent to distribute (counts five

and eight); third-degree possession of a CDS with intent to distribute within

1,000 feet of school property (counts six and nine); and third-degree financial

facilitation (count ten). Prior to trial, the court denied defendant's motion to

sever counts one through three from counts four through ten.

      Following a multi-day trial, the jury convicted defendant on six of the

drug charges (counts four through nine); acquitted him on count ten; and was

unable to return a verdict on the homicide and weapons charges resulting in a

mistrial on counts one through three. After appropriate mergers, the trial court

sentenced defendant to an extended ten-year term in prison with a five-year

period of parole ineligibility on count six, and to a concurrent five-year term on

count nine.

      On appeal, defendant raises the following contentions:

                                                                            A-2503-19
                                        2
POINT I

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SEVER
COUNTS [ONE], [TWO], AND [THREE] (RELATED
TO THE MOSES MURDER) FROM THE WHOLLY
UNRELATED CDS CHARGES (COUNTS [FOUR]
THROUGH      [TEN])       THEREBY DENYING
DEFENDANT HIS FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL[.] (U.S.
CONST. AMENDS. VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947)
ART. I, PARAS. 1, 9, 10).

[A.] THE RELEVANT LAW.

[B.] FACTS IN CARTER      MANDATING     A
     SEVERANCE.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING
DETECTIVE CELENTANO TO TESTIFY AS A) THE
STATE'S DRUG EXPERT AS THE STATE'S
EXPERT REPORT DID NOT MEET THE
REQUIREMENT OF AN EXPERT REPORT[;] B)
THE EXPERT IMPROPERLY TESTIFIED THAT
THE DRUGS DEFENDANT POSSESSED ON THE
DAY OF HIS ARREST WERE CONSISTENT WITH
DISTRIBUTION[;] C) IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED
THE     MARIJUANA      THAT    DEFENDANT
POSSESSED[;] D) IMPROPERLY TESTIFIED THAT
THE AMOUNT OF DRUGS DEFENDANT
POSSESSED WOULD RESULT IN AN OVERDOSE;
E) IMPROPER SPECULATION; AND F) IMPROPER
REFERENCE TO HEROIN (WHICH IS NOT IN THIS
CASE), IN VIOLATION OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL AND TO HIS SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT

                                             A-2503-19
                    3
TO CONFRONT WITNESSES AGAINST HIM. (U.S.
CONST. AMENDS. VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947)
ART. I, PARAS. 1, 9, 10).

A.   THE IMPROPER EXPERT REPORT.

B.   THE IMPROPER OPINION THAT THE
     DRUGS DEFENDANT POSSESSED WERE
     CONSISTENT WITH DISTRIBUTION.

C.   THE   IMPROPER      REFERENCE     TO
     MARIJUANA.

D.   THE IMPROPER TESTIMONY AS TO AN
     "OVERDOSE."

E.   THE EXPERT'S IMPROPER SPECULATION.

F.   THE EXPERT'S IMPROPER REFERENCE TO
     HEROIN.

POINT III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
MISTRIAL MOTION AS THE PROSECUTOR
DURING      HIS       OPENING STATEMENT
COMMITTED PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT
A) BY IMPROPERLY COMMENTING UPON
DEFENDANT'S        MARIJUANA  POSSESSION
(WHICH HE IS NOT CHARGED WITH IN THE
INDICTMENT) AND B) BY IMPROPERLY
STATING THAT A DETECTIVE SAW DEFENDANT
WEARING "THE EXACT SAME OUTFIT" AS THE
SHOOTER NEAR THE SCENE IN VIOLATION OF
DEFENDANT'S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. (U.S.
CONST. AMENDS. VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947)
ART. I, PARAS. 1, 9, 10).

                                             A-2503-19
                    4
A.   THE IMPROPER COMMENT              AS    TO
     MARIJUANA POSSESSION.

B.   THE IMPROPER COMMENT AS TO
     DEFENDANT WEARING "THE EXACT
     SAME OUTFIT" AS THE SHOOTER.

POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ADMITTING       OBJECTIONABLE         AUTOPSY
PHOTOGRAPHS IN VIOLATION OF THE
DEFENDANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT AND
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
RIGHT[S] AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO A FAIR TRIAL MANDATING A REVERSAL OF
HIS CONVICTIONS. (U.S. CONST. AMENDS. V,
VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947) ART. I, PARAS. 1, 9,
10).

POINT V

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
CHARGING FLIGHT OVER DEFENDANT'S
OBJECTION IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. (U.S. CONST. AMENDS.
V, VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947) ART. I, PARAS. 1,
9, 10).

POINT VI

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL
PURSUANT TO R. 3:18-1 AS THE STATE DID NOT
PROVE DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND A
REASONABLE       DOUBT;       DEFENDANT'S

                                                   A-2503-19
                       5
CONVICTIONS ARE CONTRARY TO THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW JERSEY STATE
CONSTITUTION. (U.S. CONST., AMENDS. V, VI,
XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947) ART. I, PARAS. 1, 9, 10).

POINT VII

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MISTRIAL MOTION AS THE JURY
HEARD      INADMISSIBLE     AND      HIGHLY
PREJUDICIAL    PRIOR     BAD    ACT    404(B)
MATERIAL IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.        (U.S. CONST.,
AMENDS. V, VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947) ART. I,
PARAS. 1, 10).

POINT VIII

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MISTRIAL MOTION AS THE
PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY
IMPROPERLY QUESTIONING THE WITNESS
BERRY AS TO DEFENDANT'S RAP VIDEOS THAT
"TALK ABOUT SHOOTING PEOPLE" IN
VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL. (U.S. CONST., AMENDS. V, VI, XIV; N.J.
CONST. (1947) ART. I, PARAS. 1, 10).

POINT IX

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S MISTRIAL MOTION AS THE
PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT BY
IMPROPERLY QUESTIONING THE STATE'S

                                                    A-2503-19
                       6
WITNESSES DETECTIVE[S] GREGUS AND
AMBROMAITIS      IN     A    MANNER   THAT
SUGGESTED DEFENDANT WAS IDENTIFIED AS
THE SHOOTER IN A SURVEILLANCE VIDEO, IN
VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR
TRIAL. (U.S. CONST., AMENDS. V, VI, XIV; N.J.
CONST. (1947) ART. I, PARAS. 1, 10).

POINT X

THE PROSECUTOR COMMITTED MISCONDUCT
A) DUE TO THE IMPROPER QUESTIONING OF
THE DEFENSE WITNESS CASSANDRA MILLS AS
TO DEFENDANT'S UNEMPLOYMENT[;] B) BY
IMPROPERLY      CHARACTERIZING         MILLS'
POLICE STATEMENT THAT DEFENDANT SELLS
DRUGS; C) BY IMPROPERLY SUGGESTING
DEFENDANT ENDANGERED MILLS' CHILDREN
WITH DRUG DEALING IN THE HOUSE; AND D)
BY IMPROPERLY QUESTIONING MILLS AS TO
HER FAILURE TO MAKE A COMPLAINT TO THE
POLICE, IN VIOLATION OF DEFENDANT'S
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.        (U.S. CONST.,
AMENDS. V, VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947) ART. I,
PARAS. 1, 10).

A.   IMPROPERLY QUESTIONING          AS    TO
     UNEMPLOYMENT.

B.   IMPROPER    CHARACTERIZATION          OF
     POLICE STATEMENT.

C.   IMPROPER QUESTIONING AS TO DRUG
     DEALING AND CHILDREN.

                                                 A-2503-19
                      7
            D.    THE IMPROPER QUESTIONING AS TO
                  MILLS' FAILURE TO MAKE A COMPLAINT
                  AGAINST THE POLICE.

            POINT XI

            THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY RE-
            INSTRUCTED        THE  JURY       WITH     AN
            IMPERMISSIBLE REFERENCE TO THE CIVIL
            STANDARD OF PROOF IN VIOLATION OF
            DEFENDANT'S FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
            DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. (U.S.
            CONST., AMENDS. V, VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947)
            ART. I, PARAS. 1, 10).

            POINT XII

            THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE
            MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL UNDER R. 3:20-1 AS
            THE VERDICTS WERE AGAINST THE WEIGHT
            OF THE EVIDENCE. (U.S. CONST., AMENDS. V,
            VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947) ART. I, PARAS. 1, 9,
            10).

            POINT XIII

            THE NUMEROUS LEGAL ERRORS COMMITTED
            BY THE TRIAL COURT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT
            OF HIS FIFTH, SIXTH AND FOURTEENTH
            AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO A FAIR
            TRIAL AND NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONAL
            RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL.        (U.S. CONST.,
            AMENDS. V, VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. (1947) ART. I,
            PARAS. 1, 9, 10).

      Having considered defendant's contentions in light of the record and the

applicable law, we affirm.

                                                                        A-2503-19
                                      8
                                       I.

      The salient facts are as follows. At approximately 8:30 p.m. on November

17, 2017, the police responded to the scene of a shooting in New Brunswick,

where they found the body of Tawan Moses. A subsequent autopsy confirmed

that Moses had been shot numerous times in his head and torso.

      Based upon surveillance footage of the shooting which showed the shooter

running away from the scene, and various witness statements including one from

Tonya Denson who had witnessed an altercation between defendant and Moses

two days before the shooting, police obtained an arrest warrant for defendant.

Shortly before 7:00 p.m. on November 21, 2017, officers spotted defendant

standing on a street near the scene of the shooting. They subsequently arrested

defendant while he was in the company of a former girlfriend at a location on

the same street.

      While processing defendant at the police station, Officer Sean Freeman

noticed an odor of raw marijuana emanating from defendant's crotch area.

Freeman ran his hands up defendant's left leg and felt a plastic bag underneath

his pants. Freeman ordered defendant to strip and, as defendant removed his

clothing, a bag of what Freeman believed to be narcotics fell out of defendant's

underpants. Later testing confirmed that the bag contained a separate bag of

                                                                          A-2503-19
                                       9
marijuana, fifteen small plastic baggies containing crack cocaine, and twenty

packets of fentanyl, a synthetic form of heroin. Officers also found $540 in cash

in defendant's right pants pocket. Freeman testified that an elementary school

was located within 1,000 feet of the scene of defendant's arrest.

      At trial, Detective Joseph Celentano testified as an expert in illegal CDS

and street-level drug trafficking. He stated that drug addicts did not typically

buy their drugs in bulk as they lacked the resources to do so. Rather they

purchased "smaller quantities" in cash which they used "day by day." In his

experience, drug addicts were only concerned with their next immediate high,

as opposed to planning for long-term usage.

      Celentano related that street-level drug dealers usually had more than one

kind of drug available to sell. Per Celentano, street-level dealers typically sold

cocaine in tied-off plastic baggies containing a single gram each, and heroin and

fentanyl in wax paper folds/glassine packets, each containing a single .2 gram

dose. He explained that fentanyl was a synthetic opioid made from the same

type of opium as heroin, but fifty to one hundred times more potent than heroin

and much cheaper. According to Celentano, heroin/fentanyl folds were usually

stamped with a dealer logo and packed in bundles of ten tied with rubber bands.

                                                                            A-2503-19
                                       10
      Celentano testified that he examined the baggies containing cocaine and

the fentanyl folds stamped "Playboy" with a red bunny which were recovered

from defendant's person, and opined that the packaging was "typical for street -

level distribution." He stated that if someone were to ingest twenty folds of

fentanyl at one time, they would likely die.

      Berry testified she had known defendant her whole life and the two shared

a two-year-old child. Berry stated that, on November 21, 2017, she met up with

defendant at the arrest scene, which was outside the home of a friend, because

she needed to ask him for rent money. She confirmed that defendant was

involved with rap music and made music videos.

      Defendant did not testify at trial, but did present a single witness, his

current girlfriend Cassandra Mills with whom he had a daughter. Mills testified

that in 2017 defendant was staying with her at her home in New Brunswick.

Mills acknowledged that defendant did not work a steady job. Rather, he was

an entrepreneur who sold Jello shots, t-shirts, and ski masks, and was also

involved in rap and hip-hop music and made music videos. Miller noted that

defendant had a drug problem, specifically with crack cocaine and heroin.

      Mills reported that, on November 17, 2017, she returned home at 9:00 a.m.

after finishing her morning job as a school bus driver and she and defendant

                                                                          A-2503-19
                                      11
went to breakfast. According to Mills, defendant was "his regular jolly self."

Defendant left after breakfast and did not return until "[a]bout 3:00 a.m." They

also had breakfast as usual on November 18.

      Mills testified that defendant slept at her home each of the next three

nights. She denied that he was hiding out or that he asked her to dispose of

anything for him. On cross-examination, she confirmed that, upon searching

her home after defendant's arrest, police found a box containing a digital scale,

a plate, baggies and three razor blades. Mills denied that these items belonged

to her.

                                       II.

      In Point I of his brief, defendant contends that the trial court erred in

denying his motion for severance. We disagree.

      Generally, in deciding a motion for severance of charges, the trial court

enjoys "a wide range of discretion[.]" State v. Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. 273,

297 (App. Div. 1983). A denial of a motion for severance should not be reversed

"absent a mistaken exercise of that discretion." Ibid.

      "[W]here the evidence establishes that multiple offenses are linked as part

of the same transaction or series of transactions, a court should grant a motion

for severance only when [a] defendant has satisfied the court that prejudice

                                                                           A-2503-19
                                      12
would result." State v. Moore, 113 N.J. 239, 273 (1988). The courts have

recognized that any trial involving several charges "probably will involve some

potential of [prejudice], since the multiplicity alone may suggest to the jury a

propensity to criminal conduct." Coruzzi, 189 N.J. Super. at 297. However,

"other considerations, such as economy and judicial expediency, must be

weighed" when deciding a severance motion. Ibid. These interests may require

that charges remain joined, "so long as the defendant's right to a fair trial remains

unprejudiced." Id. at 298.

      The proper inquiry when deciding a motion for severance is whether, if

the crimes were tried separately, evidence of the severed offenses would be

admissible at the trial of the remaining charges. State v. Chenique-Puey, 145

N.J. 334, 341 (1996). If the evidence would be admissible at both trials, the trial

court should not sever the charges, because the defendant "will not suffer any

more prejudice in a joint trial than he would in separate trials." Coruzzi, 189

N.J. Super. at 299. To evaluate whether evidence of each crime would be

admissible at the trial of the others, and thus whether severance should be

denied, the trial court must utilize the same standard used to determine whether

other-crime evidence is admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b). Chenique-Puey, 145

N.J. at 341.

                                                                               A-2503-19
                                        13
      Our Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992), sets

forth the well-established test for deciding whether evidence is admissible under

this rule:

             1. The evidence of the other crime must be admissible
             as relevant to a material issue;

             2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in
             time to the offense charged;

             3. The evidence of the other crime must be clear and
             convincing; and

             4. The probative value of the evidence must not be
             outweighed by its apparent prejudice.

             [Id. at 338 (citation omitted).]

      The party seeking to admit other-crime evidence bears the burden to

establish each of the four prongs. See State v. J.M., 225 N.J. 146, 158-59 (2016).

A court's determination on the admissibility of other-crime evidence is "entitled

to deference" and is "reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." State v.

Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 266 (1987). "Only where there is a 'clear error of

judgment' should the 'trial court's conclusion with respect to [the] balancing test'

be disturbed." State v. Marrero, 148 N.J. 469, 483 (1997) (quoting State v.

DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 496-97 (1994)).

                                                                              A-2503-19
                                        14
      Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion to sever the counts pertaining to the

drugs offenses (counts four through ten) from the counts related to the murder

(counts one through three). At a hearing on the motion, defense counsel argued

that the murder charges and the drug charges had nothing to do with each other.

      The trial court denied the motion. In its oral decision, the court first

reviewed the facts in the case, highlighting that: (1) per Denson, on November

15, 2017, the victim allegedly approached defendant, pointed a gun at him and

told him that he could no longer sell drugs in New Brunswick; (2) Denson saw

defendant subsequently walk away and heard him mutter "you just messed up";

(3) the victim was shot two days later; and (4) at the time of his arrest defendant

was found in possession of fifteen bags of crack cocaine, twenty folds of heroin,

marijuana, and $540 in cash. The court noted that, according to the State's

theory of the case, defendant murdered the victim because of a dispute over drug

territory and the drugs found in his possession at the time of his arrest were

proof of his motive.

      The trial court then applied the four-prong Cofield analysis to determine

whether proof of the drug offenses would be admissible in a separate trial of the

murder charges. The court deemed prong one satisfied because:

                  In this case, the other act evidence is defendant
            being found in possession of drugs four days after the

                                                                              A-2503-19
                                       15
            victim's murder. Given that . . . the evidence recovered
            in this case suggests the defendant was selling drugs
            and given the State's assertion that defendant murdered
            the victim, because the victim threatened defendant and
            told defendant that he can no longer sell drugs in New
            Brunswick, the drug charges are . . . related to the . . .
            homicide charges.

                  The drug . . . charges here . . . bear on . . . a
            material issue in dispute, because it provides motive for
            the murder.

      Next, the court found that: (1) prong two was not applicable; and (2)

prong three was satisfied because the State intended to present testimony from

the officers who discovered the drugs on defendant's person after his arrest. As

to prong four, the court found that the probative value of the drug offense

evidence was not significantly outweighed by its inflammatory potential

because the evidence clearly supported motive and was integral to the State's

proof. Thus, as all relevant prongs of the Cofield analysis were satisfied, the

court ruled that severance was not warranted.

      We discern no basis for disturbing the trial court's well-reasoned

determination. As the court noted, the State's theory of the case, which was

predicated upon Denson's statement regarding the interaction between defendant

and the victim two days before the shooting, was that the shooting was the result

of a turf dispute between two drug dealers. The discovery of significant amounts

                                                                           A-2503-19
                                       16
of drugs and cash on defendant's person at the time of his arrest supported the

State's contention that he was a drug dealer with a motive to eliminate the

challenging interloper, Moses. Under these circumstances, the court did not

abuse its discretion by denying defendant's severance motion.

                                       III.

      Defendant contends in Point II that the trial court erred by permitting

Celentano to testify because the prosecutor provided a deficient and erroneous

summary of his intended testimony during discovery. Defendant also contends

that he was denied a fair trial when Celentano improperly: (1) testified that the

packaging of the cocaine defendant possessed was consistent with distribution;

(2) referenced the marijuana possessed by defendant; (3) testified that the

amount of cocaine defendant possessed would result in an overdose; (4)

speculated as to whether drug addicts typically had the resources to buy drugs

in large quantities; and (5) referenced heroin. Again, we disagree.

      We defer to a trial court's evidentiary ruling absent an abuse of discretion.

State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 430 (2021). We will not substitute our judgment

unless the evidentiary ruling is "so wide of the mark" that it constitutes "a clear

error in judgment." Id. at 430 (quoting State v. Medina, 242 N.J. 397, 412

                                                                             A-2503-19
                                       17
(2020)). Reversal of a conviction is only warranted when a mistaken evidentiary

ruling has the "clear capacity to cause an unjust result." Ibid.

      Pursuant to N.J.R.E. 703, an expert opinion must be grounded in facts or

data derived from: "(1) the expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence

admitted at the trial, or (3) data relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily

admissible in evidence but which is the type of data normally relied upon by

experts." An expert must "'give the why and wherefore' that supports the

opinion, 'rather than a mere conclusion.'" Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, 210

N.J. 395, 410 (2014) (quoting Pomerantz Paper Corp. v. New Comm. Corp., 207

N.J. 344, 372 (2010).      An expert is not permitted to express "speculative

opinions" or "personal views" that are either unfounded in the record or that

contradict the record. Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 55 (2015).

      Experts in drug distribution cases are permitted to offer necessary insight

into matters that are not commonly understood by the average juror, such as the

significance of drug packaging and weight, the function of drug paraphernalia

such as scales, baggies and cutting agents, the meaning of drug logos, the value

of the drugs and how low-level drug transactions are arranged and carried out.

State v. Cain, 224 N.J. 410, 413-14 (2016).

                                                                               A-2503-19
                                        18
      However, once apprised of the peculiar characteristics of a drug-

distribution scheme, it is left to the jury to decide whether a defendant possessed

the requisite mental state to commit a particular drug offense. Id. at 414, 426-

27. The expert may not intrude on the jury's exclusive domain as factfinder by

offering "ultimate-issue testimony" either directly or by way of answers to

loaded hypothetical questions that "may be viewed as an expert's quasi -

pronouncement of guilt." Id. at 427. It is for the jury to sort through the

evidence and use its "common sense to make simple logical deductions." Ibid.

      Defendant begins his contentions on this point by asserting that the

prosecutor did not provide an adequate summary of Celentano's proposed expert

testimony under Rule 3:13-3(b)(I). This rule allows the prosecutor to provide

to the defense a "statement of the facts and opinions to which the expert is

expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion" in lieu of an

expert-authored formal report. The prosecutor's letter stated:

                   The State anticipates calling Det. Celentano to
            testify as an expert in the above-referenced trial. The
            expert testimony will explain to the jury how cocaine,
            heroin and marijuana are processed and packaged, the
            value of these drugs, and how these drugs are generally
            distributed. He will also discuss the different methods
            of ingesting heroin, cocaine and marijuana, the
            paraphernalia most commonly possessed by drug users
            for ingestion of these particular drugs, and the
            quantities of heroin, cocaine and marijuana normally

                                                                             A-2503-19
                                       19
            purchased and ingested by users. This testimony will
            be based upon his training and experience as reflected
            in his curriculum vitae enclosed herein.

      Ten months after defense counsel received this summary, he objected to

it by claiming it was too "generic." The trial court ruled that the objection was

untimely as counsel had had ten months to seek any needed clarification , and

the summary, while sparse, satisfied Rule 3:13-3.

      During Celentano's testimony, defense counsel renewed his objection,

noting that the summary referenced heroin, not fentanyl.        The prosecutor

responded that an updated discovery letter may have been sent to defense

counsel after defendant's arraignment on the superseding indictment, 1 but that,

in any event, fentanyl was a synthetic form of heroin and was packaged the same

way as heroin for street-level distribution. The trial court overruled defense

counsel's objection.

      We detect no abuse of discretion in the court's ruling. As the court

observed, defense counsel had ample time to reach out to the prosecutor had he

really been in doubt as to the substance of Celentano's intended testimony, the

1
  The original indictment incorrectly listed heroin as the CDS involved in counts
four and five. The superseding indictment corrected this mistake by listing
fentanyl as the drug involved in the offenses.
                                                                           A-2503-19
                                      20
parameters of which were prescribed under Cain. Moreover, the summary was

sufficiently detailed to meet the requirements of Rule 3:13-3.

      Next, defendant contends that the trial court improperly permitted

Celentano to opine that defendant possessed the twenty baggies of cocaine for

distribution. This argument also lacks merit.

      During Celentano's testimony, the following colloquy occurred:

            [Prosecutor]: Twenty bags of crack cocaine, is that
            typical of a personal use quantity?

            [Celentano]: Twenty bags of cocaine?

            [Prosecutor]: Yes.

            [Celentano]: The way it's packaged right here?

            [Prosecutor]: Yes.

            [Celentano]: No, that's for distribution.

      At this point, defense counsel objected and requested a mistrial. The

prosecutor agreed that Celentano's last statement should be struck, but argued

that a mistrial was not warranted. The trial court sustained the objection and

ruled that it was going to strike both the question and the answer and give a

curative instruction. Thereafter, the court instructed the jury as follows:

                  All right. Ladies and gentlemen, I am . . . striking
            the last question and answer and directing you to
            disregard the question and the response. And what that

                                                                              A-2503-19
                                       21
            essentially means is that when you deliberate in this
            case, you are not to consider for any reason the question
            that . . . was posed and the response given by the
            detective.

                   And the reason why I am striking that question
            and answer is because whether the drugs in this case
            were possessed for personal use or for distribution is
            not to be made by the detective sitting here but by you.

                   All the detective can testify as an expert is to how
            drugs are packaged, how drugs are used on the street,
            how drugs are ingested, and things of that – things of
            that sort.

                   Whether these drugs were possessed for personal
            use or not or possessed for distribution is beyond the
            ken of his testimony, is beyond his expertise. It's for
            you to decide as a jury whether these drugs here were
            for personal use or for the purposes of giving it or
            selling it or distributing it to someone else.

      Because the court struck the testimony and issued a thorough curative

instruction, which we presume the jury followed, State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365,

409 (2012), there was no need for a mistrial.

      Next, defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial when Celentano

was permitted to comment upon the marijuana found in defendant's possession

despite the fact that defendant was not charged with marijuana possession.

However, it must be noted that, in the colloquy defendant highlights as

                                                                          A-2503-19
                                       22
prejudicial to him, Celentano spoke only in generalities based upon his

experience and defense counsel made no objection to his testimony:

           [Prosecutor]: Is it typical for people to have an appetite
           for one drug at a time?

           [Celentano]: Yes. Drug users, yes.

           [Prosecutor]: Is it – would it be uncommon or atypical
           for a person to have larger quantities of two different
           drugs simultaneously?

           [Celentano]: I've seen . . . users have marijuana and
           cocaine or marijuana and heroin. Marijuana seems like
           a wide drug that's commonly abused. But to have
           cocaine, heroin, and marijuana or Fentanyl, meth, and
           marijuana, that's not typical on the street for a user or a
           dealer to have.

           [Prosecutor]:   Do dealers deal to a wide variety of
           customers?

           [Celentano]: Yes.

           [Prosecutor]: Do dealers have heroin customers while
           at the same time having . . . cocaine customers or having
           marijuana customers?

           [Celentano]: Yes.

           [Prosecutor]: So is it typical for a dealer to have more
           than one drug available for purchase?

           [Celentano]: Absolutely.

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                                      23
      Given that this testimony fell within Celentano's purview as an expert in

street-level drug trafficking, we reject defendant's contention that it was

improper or prejudicial in any way.

      Next, defendant contends that he was denied a fair trial when Celentano

testified that ingesting twenty bags of crack cocaine at once would likely result

in an overdose. However, Celentano did not actually testify to this as defense

counsel objected before he could answer and the prosecutor did not subsequently

repeat his question. Rather, the prosecutor asked whether twenty bags of crack

cocaine was typical of personal use quantity.

      Celentano did testify, without defense objection, that if someone were to

ingest twenty folds of fentanyl they would probably die. While defendant is

correct that this case did not involve an overdose, we cannot overlook that

defendant's defense to the drug distribution charges was that he was an addict

guilty only of drug possession, not a dealer.      Defense counsel made this

argument to the jury in both his opening and closing statements. As such, the

prosecutor's exploration of whether the amount of drugs found on defendant's

person was consistent with reasonable personal usage was a proper response to

defense counsel's argument.

                                                                           A-2503-19
                                      24
       Next, defendant contends that Celentano improperly speculated that drug

addicts did not typically have the resources to buy large quantities of drugs at

one time.   However, as the trial court found in overruling defense counsel's

objection, this testimony was offered within the frame of Celentano's experience

in street-level drug trafficking and thus, was not improper speculation.

      Lastly, defendant contends he was denied a fair trial when Celentano was

permitted to testify regarding the packaging, pricing and usage of heroin when

this case did not involve heroin. However, Celentano explained that fentanyl

was a synthetic form of heroin and was packaged in the same manner for street-

level sale. The jury was well aware that no heroin was found on defendant's

person. Thus, we also reject this portion of defendant's argument.

                                      IV.

      In Point III, defendant argues that the trial court should have denied his

motion for a mistrial following the prosecutor's opening statement because the

prosecutor improperly commented upon defendant's possession of marijuana,

and that an officer observed defendant wearing "the exact same outfit" as the

shooter. We disagree.

      A motion for a mistrial should be granted only in those situations which

would otherwise result in manifest injustice. State v. DiRienzo, 53 N.J. 360,

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                                      25
383 (1969). The decision to deny a motion for a mistrial is within the sound

discretion of the trial judge, and will only be reversed on appeal for abuse of

this discretion. State v. Winter, 96 N.J. 640, 647 (1984).

      A conviction may be reversed based on prosecutorial misconduct only

where the misconduct is so egregious in the context of the trial as a whole as to

deprive the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 435-38

(2007). Although a single instance of prosecutorial misconduct may not be so

prejudicial as to warrant reversal, the cumulative effect of several such instances

may create such prejudice. State v. Rodriguez, 365 N.J. Super. 38, 49 (App.

Div. 2003). When the alleged misconduct involves a particular remark, a court

should consider whether: (1) defense counsel objected in a timely and proper

fashion to the remark; (2) the remark was withdrawn promptly; and (3) the court

gave the jury a curative instruction. State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 403-04 (2012);

State v. Zola, 112 N.J. 384, 426, (1988).

      The scope of the State's opening statement is limited to the "facts he

intends in good faith to prove by competent evidence." State v. Hipplewith, 33

N.J. 300, 309 (1960). "'A prosecutor's opening statement should provide an

outline or roadmap . . . limited to a general recital of what the State expects, in

good faith, to prove by competent evidence.'" State v. Walden, 370 N.J. Super.

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                                       26
549, 558 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting State v. Torres, 328 N.J. Super. 77, 95 (App.

Div. 2000)). Reversal on the basis of a prosecutor's opening remarks is not

warranted unless the challenged remark is completely unsupported by the

evidence and there is a showing of prejudice to the defendant and bad faith by

the prosecutor. Hipplewith, 33 N.J. at 309.

      a. Marijuana possession

      During his opening statement, the prosecutor stated as follows:

                  Mr. Carter is arrested and he is found in
            possession of drugs. And ladies and gentlemen, I said
            to you from the outset this case was about drugs and
            about selling drugs and the control of selling drugs. Mr.
            Carter had 20 folds of fentanyl.

                   Now, you will hear from a witness in this case
            that fentanyl is a drug that is sold in lieu of heroin. It
            is a synthetic version of heroin and it is packaged the
            same way. [It] [i]s often sold for the same price and it
            was packaged for sale, 20 folds of it.

                  Also, there are 15 bags, small individualized bags
            for personal use of cocaine, one[]s that could be easily
            sold on the street. Mr. Carter also has a small bag of
            marijuana and has over $500 in cash.

            [(emphasis added).]

      Although defense counsel did not immediately object to the comment

about defendant's possession of marijuana, he moved for a mistrial at the

conclusion of the prosecutor's remarks arguing as follows:

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                                       27
[Defense counsel]:       Judge, I want to make an
application for a mistrial based upon the comments that
were made by [the prosecutor] dealing with my client
possessing marijuana.        He is not charged with
marijuana in this particular instance before this jury.
He has not been indicted for it and they shouldn't hear
about it. It's improper and I object to it.

[Prosecutor]: First of all, Judge, it was [disorderly
persons] weight of marijuana, so he couldn't be
indicted. Second, it's evidential because that's how the
officers did a search of Mr. Carter. It resulted in a strip
search of him and-

THE COURT: I'm sorry?

[Prosecutor]: It resulted in a strip search where they
had to remove all of his clothing. I don't want any
inference drawn that the police treated him cruelly and
they did this arbitrarily. The smell of marijuana is what
prompted them to say we need to do a search. They felt
something in his underwear. They smelled marijuana.

THE COURT: All right.

[Prosecutor]: Judge–

THE COURT: How is your client prejudiced?

[Defense counsel]: Judge, that is so disingenuous,
number one because they had an arrest warrant for Mr.
Carter.

THE COURT: All right, fine. How is he–

[Defense counsel]: Because they are just layering it on,
layer after layer. The jury has nothing to do or nothing
to hear with marijuana.

                                                              A-2503-19
                           28
                   ....

            [Defense counsel]: Judge, I made my record.

            THE COURT: You've made your objection.              The
            objection is overruled.

      We agree with the trial court that the comment did not prejudice

defendant. As the prosecutor noted, the odor of marijuana is what alerted the

processing officers to the possibility that defendant had drugs on his person and

prompted the strip search which confirmed that this was the case.

      b. Defendant's clothing

      In his opening statement, the prosecutor also told the jury that an

eyewitness to the shooting gave police a "very accurate" description of the

shooter, i.e., an "African-American male, camouflage jacket, gray hooded

sweatshirt, dark skin complexion." He related that police obtained surveillance

video showing the shooting and were able to isolate a photo of the shooter. The

prosecutor then stated that, upon being shown the photo, Officer Karlo

Sarmiento "immediately said that at 7:00 on the night of the murder, he saw

[defendant] wearing the exact same outfit about a block and a half away . . .

outside a liquor store."

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                                      29
      Defense counsel immediately objected, arguing that according to the

police reports, Sarmiento actually stated that defendant was wearing a "similar"

outfit when he saw him earlier. The prosecutor insisted that Sarmiento said that

defendant was "wearing the exact same clothes as the photograph he was

shown." The trial court ruled that it was going to remind the jury that what a

lawyer said in an opening statement was not evidence but what he expected the

evidence to show.    Although the prosecutor disputed the necessity of this

instruction given that he did not believe he had misspoken, defense counsel did

not have "any problem with [this] instruction."          The court, thereafter,

reinstructed the jury with this precept at the conclusion of the prosecutor's

opening statement.

      Although defendant again renews the objection on appeal, the trial court

committed no error. Our review of the record indicates that when shown the

photo of the shooter, Sarmiento stated he saw defendant wearing the same outfit

earlier. As such, and because the trial court repeated the cautionary instruction

sought by defense counsel over the prosecutor's objection, we reject this portion

of defendant's argument.

                                       V.

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                                      30
      In Point IV, defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion by

admitting certain autopsy photos into evidence. This argument lacks sufficient

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. See R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Based

upon our review of the record, including defendant's confidential appendix

containing the photos, we agree that this material was relevant to establish

defendant's criminal state of mind and, as the court found, the photos were not

particularly gruesome.

                                      VI.

      Defendant argues in Point V of his brief that the trial court abused its

discretion by instructing the jury on the permissible inference of consciousness

of guilt flowing from flight in connection with the murder count. However,

defendant was not convicted on this count or the related weapons offenses.

Because the flight charge had no capacity to prejudice defendant concerning the

drug charges, we reject defendant's contention on this point.

                                      VII.

      In Point VI, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his

motions for a judgment of acquittal at the end of the State's case and again

following the jury's verdict. This argument also lacks merit.

      The test to be applied on such a motion is

                                                                           A-2503-19
                                      31
            whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety, be
            that evidence direct or circumstantial, and giving the
            State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well
            as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably
            could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find
            guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.
            [State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967).]

      Here, the State provided ample evidence to support the court's denial of

defendant's motions. Specifically, lab tests confirmed that the drugs found in

defendant's possession were fentanyl and cocaine; Celentano's testimony

provided a basis for the jury to infer that defendant intended to distribute these

drugs; and there was testimony based on a certified school zone map that

defendant was within 1,000 feet of a school when he was arrested. Under these

circumstances, the court correctly denied defendant's motions.

                                      VIII.

      Defendant argues in Point VII that the trial court erred by denying his

mistrial motion after a redacted portion of Densen's recorded statement was

inadvertently played for the jury. However, this contention is not persuasive.

      During her statement to the police, Denson speculated that Moses may

have put pressure on defendant to stop selling drugs in the area because

defendant was "the big man . . . on the block right now." Defendant asked the

                                                                            A-2503-19
                                       32
court to order the State to redact this portion of the statement before playing it

for the jury, and the court agreed.

      At trial, the prosecutor gave the jury redacted transcripts of Denson's

statement, but mistakenly played the unredacted recording. However, all the

juror heard was the detective's question, "Okay, and what would be a reason to

go to [defendant]" because the prosecutor stopped the tape before the detective

completed the question and before Denson replied that defendant was the "big

man on the block."

      Nevertheless, defendant moved for a mistrial. The trial court denied the

motion because the jury had not heard the inadmissible portion of the tape. The

court solicited defense counsel's input in crafting a cautionary instruction , and

the court then instructed the jury as follows:

                   Now, when you were here we were at Page 6 on
            the transcript, and as it was being played . . . there was
            a question posed by the detective, and at that point [the
            prosecutor] stopped the recording. There's a reason for
            that, because this Court has made a determination as to
            what is evidence in this case and what is not evidence
            in this case. And as you can see on your transcript the
            bottom half has been cut out. And the reason it's cut
            out is because . . . that's not the evidence that you are to
            – that is not evidence in this case.

                  You are hearing a selection made by the Court of
            the recording of the statement that was given by Tonya
            Denson to the police. What you are hearing is what the

                                                                            A-2503-19
                                       33
            prosecutor, defense counsel and the Court have agreed
            is the appropriate evidence for your consideration in
            this case.

                  So keep in mind that what is evidential is – is
            what you hear on this tape. You're not to speculate
            about what you don't hear. You are not to speculate or
            wonder in any way about what you are not hearing on
            the audiotape. All right? Let's proceed.

      Thus, the jury never heard the remark that had been redacted. Because

the trial court also provided the jury with a strong curative instruction, defendant

was in no way prejudiced by the prosecutor's error. Therefore, we reject his

contention on this point.

                                        IX.

      Turning to Point VIII of defendant's brief, we also reject his argument that

the prosecutor improperly questioned Berry about defendant's rap videos. When

the prosecutor asked Berry if the videos "talk about shooting people," she

answered "no" and defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial. The trial

court denied this request, but gave the jury the following instruction:

                  All right, so ladies and gentlemen, the prosecutor
            asked this witness questions related to what she knows
            about defendant's life. And to that extent, he inquired
            about [defendant's] participation in the creation of rap
            music.

                 We all know and all have an understanding what
            rap music is all about is – is – is lyrics that – that – that

                                                                              A-2503-19
                                        34
            talk about the urban experience, the urban drug culture
            where they're shooting and where there's drugs.

                  Just because someone engages in and writes
            music and – and participates in the production of music
            related to rap music is not evidence that a person has
            committed an offense such as is charged in this
            indictment.

                  So to that extent, you are not to consider just
            because Mr. Carter may have participated in the
            production of rap music that he is in any – that that
            constitutes some sort of evidence that he committed any
            of these offenses.

We presume that the jury followed this instruction. Smith, 212 N.J. at 409.

      Contrary to defendant's contention, this case is plainly distinguishable

from State v. Skinner, 218 N.J. 496 (2014). In that case, our Supreme Court

reversed the defendant's convictions of a number of charges, including

attempted murder and aggravated assault, finding that he had been unduly

prejudiced by the admission at trial of graphically violent rap lyrics he had

written which "could be fairly viewed as demonstrative of a propensity toward

committing, or at the very least glorifying, violence and death." Id. at 499-500,

521. In so doing, the Court "reject[ed] the proposition that probative evidence

about a charged offense can be found in an individual's artistic endeavors absent

a strong nexus between specific details of the artistic composition and the

                                                                           A-2503-19
                                      35
circumstances of the offense for which the evidence is being adduced." Id. at

522.

       Here, not only were no violent lyrics (written by defendant or someone

else) introduced into evidence, but Berry denied that defendant's videos talked

about shooting people, and the court administered a curative instruction in

accordance with Skinner. Therefore, we reject defendant's contention that he

was unduly prejudiced and denied a fair trial as a result of the prosecutor's

questioning of Berry.

                                       X.

       In Point IX, defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his

motion for a mistrial after the prosecutor questioned Detectives Brandt Gregus

and David Abromaitis in a manner that defendant believes suggested he was

identified as the shooter in a surveillance video. This argument lacks sufficient

merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

       Our review of the record demonstrates that Gregus referred to defendant

by name rather than as the "suspect" when testifying about a photo of three

people taken from a surveillance video. However, the trial court struck the

testimony and gave the jurors an immediate curative instruction directing them

to disregard the remark. Thus, there was no basis for a mistrial.

                                                                           A-2503-19
                                      36
      Similarly, the trial court later correctly denied defendant's motion for a

mistrial after Abromaitis stated that the "suspect" was depicted in photographs

he reviewed on the witness stand. Moreover, this remark was fleeting and

because defendant was not convicted of the murder and weapons charges that

were the subject of this testimony, he failed to demonstrate he was prejudiced

in any way by the remark.

                                        XI.

      In Point X of his brief, defendant asserts he was denied a fair trial when

the prosecutor (1) questioned Mills regarding defendant's unemployment; (2)

mischaracterized Mills's police statement; (3) suggested that defendant

endangered Mills's children through his drug activities; and (4) questioned Mills

as to her failure to make a complaint over her treatment by police. However, he

has not provided any legal argument supporting this contention other than his

point heading. See State v. Hyuang, 461 N.J. Super. 119, 125 (App. Div. 2018)

(an issue not briefed is deemed waived); see also State v. Hild, 148 N.J. Super.

294, 296 (App. Div. 1977) (stating that the "absence of any reference to the law"

in a brief "suggests a like paucity of authority helpful to the party.").

      In any event, we have reviewed each of the examples defendant cites and

find no impropriety on the prosecutor's part in his questioning of Mills. Contrary

                                                                            A-2503-19
                                        37
to defendant's contention, defense counsel opened the door to inquiries about

defendant's employment when he elicited testimony from Mills regarding

defendant's activities as an entrepreneur.            Moreover, the prosecutor

appropriately cross-examined Mills on defendant's drug use after she stated that

he "hustled" on the street.

      The trial court sustained defense counsel's objection to the prosecutor's

question asking Mills whether her children were present in the home during the

period in which the drug paraphernalia the police found in her home was there.

Mills never provided an answer to this question. Finally, we are satisfied the

trial court correctly overruled defense counsel's objection to the prosecutor's

question concerning why Mills did not complain to police about her treatment

by them during her interview with them.

                                       XII.

       In Point XI, argues that the trial court erred by referring the jurors to the

civil standard of proof while reinstructing them during deliberations. This

contention is meritless.

      The court gave this instruction to the jury in response to its request for

examples of "reasonable doubt" or a shorthand explanation of this term. After

consulting with counsel, the court first told the jurors where the definition of

                                                                              A-2503-19
                                        38
reasonable doubt could be found in the written instructions it had previously

provided to them. The court then instructed the jury as follows:

            The State must prove . . . every element of an offense
            beyond a reasonable doubt. So what's a reasonable
            doubt? Let's start with this.

                   As – as I told you, in a civil case the plaintiff has
            to prove the case by a standard of proof that we call a
            preponderance of the evidence. That means the greater
            weight of the evidence. In that case, imagine a scale of
            justice.    In order for a plaintiff to achieve a
            preponderance, he would have to tip the scale ever so
            slightly to his side.

                  In a criminal case, the burden of proof is higher.
            We call that burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
            Beyond a reasonable doubt is satisfied when you are
            firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. That is you
            don't harbor in your mind an honest and reasonable
            uncertainty about the guilt of the defendant after you
            have given full and impartial consideration to all of the
            evidence.

                  Now, of course, a doubt is one that leaves the
            reasonable person, after hearing the evidence, in doubt.
            Whether that doubt arises from the evidence itself or
            from a lack of evidence. The law – the law only
            requires that you be firmly convinced, because we
            cannot know most things with absolute certainty. So in
            criminal cases, the law does not require proof that
            overcomes every possible doubt.

                   If, based on your consideration of the evidence,
            you are firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of
            the crime charged you must find him guilty. If, on the
            other hand, you're not firmly convinced of the

                                                                           A-2503-19
                                       39
            defendant's guilt, you must give the defendant the
            benefit of the doubt and find him not guilty.

      Contrary to defendant's contentions, we discern no impropriety in the

court's instruction. Defendant does not explain how the court's explanation of

the reasonable doubt issue prejudiced him in the context of the entire charge.

See State v. Torres, 183 N.J. 554, 564 (2005) (A jury charge "must be read as a

whole in determining whether there was any error.").           The court clearly

explained that the civil standard of proof did not apply and that the criminal

standard was far more rigorous. In this context, the mere mention of the civil

standard, in order to emphasize the State's greater burden of proof in this

criminal case, does not mandate reversal.

                                      XIII.

      Prior to sentencing, defense counsel moved for a new trial, arguing that

the trial court had erred in: (1) denying the severance motion; (2) permitting the

prosecutor to reference defendant's possession of marijuana in his opening

statement; (3) admitting the identification of defendant by Gregus; (4) admitting

the identification of defendant by Abromaitis; (5) permitting Celentano to

testify; (6) admitting autopsy photos; (7) allowing the prosecutor to question

Berry regarding defendant's rap videos; (8) permitting the prosecutor to question

Mills as to why she had not complained of the abusive treatment of her by police;

                                                                            A-2503-19
                                       40
and (9) charging the jury on reasonable doubt. The trial court denied the motion

finding that:   (1) counsel's arguments were, in large measure, completely

unrelated to the counts dealing with the drug charges; (2) each issue had been

addressed by the court with ample reasons set forth on the record; an d (3)

nothing in counsel's arguments indicated that the issues had been wrongly

decided.

      In Point XII of his brief, defendant merely recites the same assertions he

made to the trial court without providing any additional legal argument, noting

that each has been raised in a separate point in his appellate brief. We have

already rejected all of defendant's contentions. Therefore, we are also satisfied

that the court's denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial was not "a

miscarriage of justice under the law." See R. 2:10-1; State v. Labrutto, 114 N.J.

187, 207 (1989).

                                        XIV.

      Finally, defendant asserts in Point XIII of his brief that the cumulative

prejudice of the errors he raises deprived him of a fair trial. Having rejected

defendant's argument that any reversible error occurred during his trial, we also

reject his cumulative error argument.

      Affirmed.

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                                        41