Court Opinion

ID: 9448029
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-03 23:20:25.075668+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:31:15.544236
License: Public Domain

On Petition for Rehearing
Appellant urges on petition for rehearing that the conviction of appellant on counts 21 and 22 — forgery—should be reversed on the ground the opinion of this court was in error in stating that there was no proof in writing that appéllant was authorized to endorse and collect the checks, and appellant cites Exhibit M — the power of attorney — as proof this court was wrong.
It would have been better for this court to have added the words “adequate and convincing” before the word “proof” (at page 592). We now amend our opinion of March 30, 1961, by such amendment. The sentence then reads:
“There being no adequate or convincing proof of such authority in *598writing, appellant must rest on an oral authority to sign as Trustee, and realize upon the cheeks.”
Exhibit M, on its face, authorizes “R. Milo Gilbert” to endorse and negotiate refund checks for income taxes. It nowhere purports to authorize “R. Mile Gilbert, Trustee” to so, or in any way, act.
Because the person named in a power of attorney as attorney in fact had some or all the obligations toward his principal of acting as a Trustee is required to act, does not make him a trustee in fact or law. Appellant had no authority, written or oral, to sign checks or otherwise act, as Trustee. He purported to so act, but could not do so by reason of any specific provision or authority granted by the power of attorney. If there were only evidence that appellant had acted solely in good faith and not fraudulently as Trustee, he might now be heard to claim his signing as Trustee was actually an act done pursuant to the power of attorney he held. But we cannot and do not so interpret his action, in view of the substantial evidence to support the fraudulent returns which were the basis of the refunds which resulted in the issuance of the checks upon which Counts 21 and 22 were based.
The foregoing is written upon the assumption that the written power of attorney was valid. As we pointed out in our opinion of March 30, 1961 (at page 591), the Bartfields denied that their signatures were notarized. Each admitted the signatures appeared to be theirs, but each denied ever having sworn to the jurat before any notary public. (Tr. p. 453-462.)
The notary public acknowledging the makers’ signatures was Ruth Gilbert. Who she may be does not appear in the record. She did not testify in the case. She apparently was related to appellant Gilbert (Tr. p. 461), but the exact relationship is not disclosed.
The case was tried on the theory that the transactions which originated the subsequent issuance of the checks claimed to have been endorsed fraudulently were all material. The nature of the returns and all documents connected with the refunds, whether fraudulent or not, were material in the appraisal of the subsequent endorsement of “R. Milo Gilbert, Trustee."
The court and jury might well have concluded, as we might, to support the verdict, that the jury found the power of attorney was (a) a forgery, or (b) unnotarized and incomplete before delivery, or (c) executed in blank, or (d) executed with no specific power to endorse checks (which provision had been inserted after the original drafting by use of a caret).
But it is unnecessary for us to decide what theory appealed to the jury. We reaffirm there existed “beyond question substantial evidence to support the conviction of appellant on Counts 21 and 22” — concerning which the evidence had been properly obtained.
With the addition of the three words hereinabove set forth to the opinion, it is reaffirmed, and the petition for rehearing is otherwise in all respects denied.