Court Opinion

ID: 9768489
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 06:05:54.931848+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:30:41.332485
License: Public Domain

Dissent on Rehearing.
CRAMER, Justice.
;I find‘myself unable to agree with the disposition of this causé by the majority.
This suit-was:by Mrs!'.Sarah-M. Henne-berger-in h'er own behalf, against appellants herein, seeking among other relief not here material, recovery of certain United States Treasury Bonds, payable to-Bearer, of an aggregate face value of $49,000, a Highway Bond' 'issued by the State of Illinois,' pay1 able-to Bearer, of a face value of $350. A receiver'was appointed to take possés'áion and control of such securities and propérty, arid' all of the same were tendered intact' into the registry of the trial court. On' the 15th day of October, -1952, Mrs. Sarah-M. Henneberger was adjudged by the Probate1 Court'of St.'Louis County, Missouri, to- be a person of unsound mind, arid her 'sister, Mrs. Deborah'M. Sheahan,' wás'ap-pointed guardian 'of her-person' and of her estate. An ancillary áppóintme'nt of - the guardian was subsequently made by the Probate Court of .Dallas County, Texas, and .on November 2Í, 1952 Deborah" M. Sheahan, in.her. capacity as such guardian, was ordered substituted as plaintiff in this cause. Mrs.. Sheahan, in. such capacity, then continued the prosecution of such cause and filed both a first and a second aménded original petition."
■Briefly stated, the plaintiff (appellee herein), in her amended - pleadings, alleged the ownership and sought recovery of thé securities and personal property therein and *502hereinabove described, upon three' theories : First, that they were unlawfully converted by the defendants (appellants herein) ; second, that if the defendants were claiming' such property by virtue of transactions had with Mrs. Sarah M. Henne-berger, the said Mrs. Sarah M. Henne-berger was at such time or times of unsound mind and totally lacking in mental capacity sufficient to -Understand the náture, effect and consequences of her acts; or, third, Mrs. Sarah M. Henneberger was at such time or times unduly influenced by the words and acts of certain of such defendants.
In each of their answers, and in particular in their first amended original answer, upon which they proceeded to trial, all of the defendants alleged ownership of such properties by virtue of gifts made to them by Mrs. Saráh M. Henneberger on November 5, 1951, and on June 21, 1952.
The trial was concluded after two weeks of. testimony. The jury found Mrs. Sarah M. Henneberger did make the gifts in question, that she was not at such times unduly influenced, but that she did not at either of such times possess mental capacity sufficient to understand the nature and effect of her acts and the business she was transacting. On April 20, 1954 judgment was entered that the plaintiff, in- her capacity as guardian of the person and estate of Sarah M. Henneberger, have and recover from the appellants possession of and title to the securities and properties therein and hereinabove described. From that judgment this appeal has been duly perfected.
Points 1 and 7 will be considered together. They assert error (1) in entering judgment because the jury’s findings to issues 1 and 2 are in irreconcilable conflict; and (7) in submitting issue No. 2 because it is duplicitous and asks the same question as is submitted in issue No. 1. These points are countered that the judgment is supported by the finding to issue 2 which is consistent and not in conflict with the finding to issue No. 1 and, if con- . flicting, the issues are not in irreconcilable conflict and therefore not reversible error.
Issues 1 and 2 are as follows: “Special Issue No. 1. Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Mrs. Sarah M. Henneberger made a gift, as that term is hereinbefore defined, of the bonds involved in this lawsuit to Armin Henne-berger, Wayne Henneberger, Martha Ann Henke, Ruth Holmes and John Henneberger on June 21, 1952?” Answer: “She did make a gift.” Special Issue No. 2: “Do you find from a preponderance of the evidence that Mrs. Henneberger did not have the mental capacity, as that term is here-inbefore defined, on June 21, 1952 to make a gift, if any 'was made, of the bonds involved in this lawsuit?” Answer: “She did not have the mental capacity.”
The court in his charge defined a gift as follows: “A ‘gift’ as that word is used in these issues, means a voluntary transfer, of property from one person to another without any consideration or compensation therefor, coupled with the intention of the. donor to divest herself of the .title, dominion and control of the property at the very time of the gift and the delivery of possession of the property to the donee so that the donor can exercise no further act of dominion or control over it.” And defined mental capacity as follows: “ ‘Mental capacity’ as that term is used in these issues, means the ability to understand the nature and effect of the act in which a person is engaged, and the business she is transacting.”
Under the charge the jury found that Mrs. Sarah M. Henneberger made a gift, or, considering the trial court’s definition of gift, she made a voluntary transfer of the bonds involved to Armin Henneberger et al. on June 21, 1952, coupled with the intention of divesting herself of the title, dominion, etc., so that she could exercise no further act of dominion or control over them, and at that very time the jury also found that she did not have the ability to understand the nature and effect of her said act in making the gift.
*503A conflict exists when the answers of the jury to the issues are such that both cannot be true concerning the correct material effect thereof on the rights of the parties. As stated in Leopard v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W.2d 259, 260, syl. 5: “ ‘Intent’ of a contract is purpose formed in man’s mind.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 3rd Ed., defines “intent” as follows: “Purpose; formulated design; a resolve to do or forbear a particular act; aim; determination. In its literal sense, the stretching of the mind or will towards a particular object. ‘Intent’ expresses mental action at its most advanced point, or as it actually accompanies an outward, corporal act which has been determined on. Intent shows the presence of will in the act which consummates a crime. It is the exercise of intelligent will, the mind being fully aware of the nature and consequences of the act which is about to be done, and with such knowledge, and with full liberty of action, willing and electing to do it. Burrill, Circ.Ev. 284, and notes.”
The intention of Mrs. Henneberger to make a voluntary transfer of property and divest herself of the .title thereto in my opinion must be coupled with the mental capacity to understand the nature and effect of her act in making the transfer. The phrase ability to understand the nature and effect of an act, is but one element of the total question here. There is also the element of intention in making the gift, that is, the intention to divest herself of title and possession. Under the definition of gift contained in the court’s charge, this element is included.
Under such state of the record there is a conflict between issues 1 and 2, such as destroys the effect of both findings. McMichael v. Elliott, Tex.Civ.App., 235 S.W.2d 231; Harrison v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App., 58 S.W.2d 1025. Points 1 and 7 should have been sustained.
Point. 2 in substance is: Issues 4 and 5 are in irreconcilable conflict. This point is countered that the judgment is sustained by the finding to issue 5 and such finding is entirely consistent and in no way conflicts with the finding to issue 4, and if they do conflict, such conflict is not'irreconcilable and does not present reversible error.
By issue No. 4 the jury found that deceased made a gift on Nov. 5, 1951; and in issue No. 5, that on November 5, 1951, the saíne date, she did not have mental capacity to make the gift. Under the definitions contained in the charge heretofore set out, which were a part of the charge and controlling in the jury’s consideration of the issues, the findings. being in conflict for the reasons set out in points 1 and 7, they destroy each other. Point 2 should have been sustained.
Since there was, in my opinion, a conflict between the findings to issues 4 and 5, and also between issues 1 and 2, as set out in appellants’ points 1, 2, and 7, the judgment below should have been reversed and "remanded for a new trial.
For the reaso'ns stated, I respectfully dissent from the affirmance of the judgment of the trial court by the majority. ’