Court Opinion

ID: 9848555
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 04:22:14.276689+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:23.607321
License: Public Domain

MR. JUSTICE ERICKSON
dissenting:
*299I join Mr. Justice Groves in his dissent. In addition, I am of the opinion that the trial judge correctly ruled that the defendant had standing to file a motion to suppress. In my view, Simpson v. United States, 346 F.2d 291 (10th Cir. 1965), does not support the majority opinion. In Simpson, the court held that in order to establish standing to challenge a police search as violative of the Fourth Amendment, the defendant only had to allege that he had a “possessory or proprietary interest” in the thing searched. See Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 88 S.Ct. 2120, 20 L.Ed.2d 1154 (1968). The defendant’s presence inside a locked automobile with the ignition keys in his possession is a fact sufficient to constitute a “possessory interest.” By establishing that he had a possessory interest in the car, the defendant established his standing to challenge the legality of the search. Brown v. United States, supra; Simpson v. United States, supra.
In my view, the majority’s reasoning concerning the post-arrest automobile inventory search is also erroneous.1 In determining the validity of the inventory search, we must first determine whether the police lawfully impounded the car. The People argue that the impoundment in this case is routine procedure required by police department regulations and, therefore, met constitutional standards. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973), and Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967).
Assuming that the police regulation in issue is constitutional, I do not agree that an inventory search is allowable under the facts in this case in the absence of a search warrant. Relying primarily upon Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, as a statement of controlling constitutional law, the majority has *300concluded that the police, pursuant to an internal police department regulation, may conduct an inventory search of an impounded vehicle under virtually any circumstances without first obtaining a search warrant. Cady v. Dombrowski, supra, does not support such a broad holding. The “reasonableness” of the intrusion which was justified in Cady was premised upon “concern for the safety of the general public who might be endangered if an intruder removed the revolver from the trunk of the vehicle.” There are no such pressing concerns in this case. Cooper v. United States, supra. Cf. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 69 S.Ct. 191, 93 L.Ed.2d 153 (1948); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). There were no facts known to the police officers at the time they conducted their search, such as existed in Cady, which would have made an otherwise unreasonable search constitutionally valid.

The defendant was arrested outside of the automobile and, therefore, the search of the car’s trunk may not be justified under the doctrine of “search incident to arrest.” Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).