Court Opinion

ID: 9707441
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 02:11:49.859129+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:32.840338
License: Public Domain

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
Crumpacker, J.
— In our initial opinion herein we held that the action of the Marshall County Board of Review, wherein it concluded that the aggregate assessment of all lands and improvements thereon in the entire county as fixed by the township assessors was too high and reduced the same “across the board” by 10 percent, was void as the procedure followed was not in meticulous conformity with that required by Burns’ Stat., §§64-1201 and 64-1205. State Board of Tax Comm. v. McDaniel (1928), 199 Ind. 708, 160 N. E. 347; Hyland, Auditor v. The Brazil Block Coal Com*72pany (1891), 128 Ind. 335, 26 N. E. 672. Such being the situation we held that injunctions will not lie where, if granted, it will render effective an illegal act. 43 C. J. S., Injunctions, §33, p. 467.
In their petition for a rehearing the appellees contend that the controversial order involved is valid because (1) it was agreed upon unanimously by the board of review and the township assessors and, even if the assessors had no authority to cast their votes on the question, their participation did no harm but on the contrary manifested their approval of the “cut” and thus the spirit and purpose, if not the letter, of §64-1205, supra, was satisfied; and (2) said “cut” was made under the authority of Acts of 1949, Ch. 225, §5, p. 724, Burns’ Stat., §64-1019, note, 1951 Replacement, which provides as follows:
“The taxing officials of any county may adopt such lower rate of assessment as they shall deem just and proper for such county, subject, however, to equalization by the State Board of Tax Commissioners in the event a state property tax is levied and collected. Before any such lower rate is adopted, the county assessor shall call and hold a meeting of the County Board of Review and all township assessors and such lower rate shall be approved by a majority thereof.”
While we disagree with the appellees on their first proposition, there is merit in the contention that township assessors have a voice, under the Reassessment Act of 1949, in reducing the aggregate assessed valuation of property in the county in which they officiate and, if, in the present instance, the board of review had the power to act on March 14, 1950, their order of that date is effective.
The appellees’ complaint alleges, and the evidence indicates, “that the County Board of Review of Mar*73shall County was in continuous session during the period provided by law from April 1, 1950, to July 5, 1950.” By this we presume that notice of the time, place and purpose of such session was given as provided by Burns’ Stat., §64-1201, and that the “period provided by law” began on April 1, 1950, and continued until July 5, 1950. Sec. 9 of the Reassessment Act of 1949, Burns’ Stat., §64-1019, note, 1951 Replacement provides as follows:
“The duties of the county assessors, county boards of review, and State Board of Tax Commissioners in respect to such reassessment shall be as now provided by law and shall be performed in the year 1950 at the times or within the periods now specified by law, in order that the tax levies for the year 1951 may be estimated and based thereon; provided, however, that in the year 1950 the county board of review in each county shall begin its session not later than April 1.” (Emphasis supplied.)
The undisputed evidence shows that the assessment “cut” of 10 percent, which our initial opinion held invalid, was made at a special meeting of the Marshall County Board of Review on March 14, 1950, 17 days before the first day of its 1950 session. Thus it appears that the powers granted the county board of review by §5 of the Act were not exercised “at the times or within the periods now specified by law” as required by §9 of said Act. The law contemplates “one continuous session, to begin and end as provided. Once started, the time continued to run and the time limited’ by the statute constituted the term during which the board could act.” (Emphasis supplied.) McCreery v. Ijams (1945), 115 Ind. App. 631, 59 N. E. 2d 133. In speaking of the session of a county board of review the Supreme Court said: “It is like a *74term of court, the duration of which is fixed by law, in which case the court has no authority to act after the expiration of the time limited.” The State, ex rel. Evans, Auditor of State, v. McGinnis, Auditor of Marion Co. (1870), 34 Ind. 452. Analogy indicates that a county board of review is as powerless to act before a given term begins as it is after such term expires.
Rehearing denied.
Note. — Reported in 106 N. E. 2d 812.