Court Opinion

ID: 9712061
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 04:45:45.791476+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:23:09.586403
License: Public Domain

CHIEF JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: At issue in these two consolidated appeals is whether plaintiffs post-judgment motion was sufficient to toll the period for filing her notice of appeal following entry of summary judgment in favor of defendants. In an opinion filed last July, our court answered this question in the affirmative and upheld the appellate court’s judgment. Berg v. Allied Security, Inc., Nos. 85967, 85974 cons. (July 1, 1999). Subsequent to our decision, the defendants, Allied Security, Inc., and Podolsky & Associates, Inc., each petitioned our court for rehearing. Neither of their petitions raised any new matters, and our court properly voted to deny rehearing. Subsequent to that vote, however, Justice Freeman announced that he no longer agreed with the majority’s opinion in the case and believed that rehearing should be allowed. Once rehearing was allowed, Justice Freeman changed his position and joined the three original dissenters in the case. The result is today’s disposition. Those who believe I have been too critical of my colleague’s inconsistencies on the bench would do well to consider this case. Nearly a year after our original decision, the court has done a complete about face. Even though no new issues were raised and no changes in the law or facts occurred, the court today reaches exactly the opposite conclusion. This has become all too common. Above the front entrance to the United States Supreme Court is chiseled the phrase “Equal Justice Under Law.” A more suitable motto for Illinois might be “Here today, gone tomorrow.” Here is what the court held when it first decided the case and what we should continue to hold today: “Plaintiff, Joan Berg, filed a personal injury action against defendants, Allied Security, Inc., and Podolsky & Associates, Inc. On September 4, 1996, the circuit court of Cook County granted summary judgment in favor of both defendants. 735 ILCS 5/2 — 1005 (West 1996). Thirty days later, on October 4, plaintiff moved for reconsideration or, in the alternative, for leave to file an amended complaint. In an order filed October 15, the circuit court denied reconsideration and took the request for leave to amend under advisement. On November 21, leave to amend was denied. Five days later, on November 26, plaintiff filed her notice of appeal. In the appellate court, defendants argued that plaintiffs notice of appeal was untimely. Although it was filed less than a week after the circuit court had disposed of the last matter raised by plaintiffs post-judgment motion, defendants contended that plaintiffs motion was so deficient that it did not qualify as a post-judgment motion under section 2 — 1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1203 (West 1996)) and therefore did not operate to toll the 30-day appeal period under Rule 303(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)). Defendants’ theory was that because the 30-day period was not tolled by the pendency of the plaintiffs motion, the notice of appeal actually came too late, and the appellate court therefore lacked jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs appeal. The appellate court rejected defendants’ jurisdictional challenge and addressed plaintiffs appeal on the merits. It held that genuine issues of material fact existed and that summary judgment was therefore improper. Accordingly, it set aside the circuit court’s summary judgment in favor of defendants and remanded the cause to the circuit court for further proceedings. 297 Ill. App. 3d 891. Both defendants petitioned this court for leave to appeal (177 Ill. 2d R. 315). We granted those petitions and consolidated the appeals for hearing and disposition. In the proceedings before us, neither defendant takes issue with the appellate court’s handling of the substantive issues related to their motions for summary judgment. Defendants’ arguments are strictly procedural. They contend, as they did in the appellate court, that plaintiffs notice of appeal simply came too late to confer jurisdiction on the appellate court and that the appellate court therefore had no right to review the circuit court’s judgment on the merits. Accordingly, defendants assert that the appellate court’s judgment should be vacated for lack of jurisdiction and that plaintiff’s appeal should be dismissed. In addressing defendants’ claims, we begin with the familiar proposition that jurisdiction is conferred upon the appellate court only through the timely filing of a notice of appeal. Archer Daniels Midland Co. v. Barth, 103 Ill. 2d 536, 538 (1984); 155 Ill. 2d R. 301. Under Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (155 Ill. 2d R. 303(a)), a notice of appeal must be filed . ‘within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely post-trial motion directed against the judgment is filed, *** within 30 days after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending post-judgment motion.’ Although this rule utilizes language which makes its requirements appear mandatory, our court has recently recognized that the rule’s requirements may be relaxed. In an appropriate case, the appellate court may entertain an appeal even where the appellant has failed to comply with Rule 303. In re Marriage of Skahan, 178 Ill. 2d 577 (1998). There is no dispute that within 30 days of the circuit court’s entry of summary judgment in this case, plaintiff did file a post-trial motion directed against the judgment. As previously indicated, the sole issue raised by defendants is the sufficiency of that motion. Because the motion attacked a judgment entered by the court sitting without a jury, it was subject to section 2 — 1203 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2 — 1203 (West 1996)) and had to specifically request one or more of the types of relief specified in that provision, i.e., rehearing, retrial, modification of the judgment, vacating the judgment or other similar relief. Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 461 (1990); Fultz v. Haugan, 49 Ill. 2d 131, 135-36 (1971). Plaintiff’s motion here included such a request. It expressly asked the court to reconsider its entry of summary judgment and to reverse that judgment. Although plaintiff did not detail in the motion itself precisely why she thought the judgment was infirm, she was not required to do so under section 2 — 1203. In contrast to section 2 — 1202 of the Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2— 1202 (West 1996)), which governs post-trial motions in jury cases, section 2 — 1203 contains no requirement that the motion contain the points on which it is based or that it specify the grounds supporting it. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Jerome, 255 Ill. App. 3d 374, 389 (1994). The distinction between section 2 — 1203 and 2 — 1202, as the appellate court in this case correctly recognized (297 111. App. 3d at 895), reflects the different requirements for preserving error on review in jury and nonjury cases. Section 2 — 1202 mandates specificity in post-judgment motions injury cases because in such cases, the post-judgment motion defines the scope of review. In a jury case, “[a] party may not urge as error on review of the ruling on the party’s post-trial motion any point, ground, or relief not specified in the motion.” 155 Ill. 2d R 366(b)(2)(iii). If an issue is not raised in the post-trial motion, it is waived for review. See Majcher v. Laurel Motors, Inc., 287 Ill. App. 3d 719, 738 (1997). In nonjury cases, by contrast, post-trial motions are not required at all, and “[n] either the filing of nor the failure to file a post-judgment motion limits the scope of review” (155 Ill. 2d R. 366(b)(3)(ii)). As long as the issue sought to be contested on appeal is presented to the trial court at some point, the issue is not waived on appeal by failure to file post-judgment pleadings. See In re Marriage of Mohr, 260 Ill. App. 3d 98, 101 (1994). Post-judgment pleadings are not necessary to preserve the right to raise issues concerning entry of summary judgment even where the case involves additional matters which subsequently proceed to trial before a jury. Mohn v. Posegate, 184 Ill. 2d 540, 546-47 (1998). Notwithstanding these considerations, the appellate court has sometimes viewed the requirements for post-trial motions under section 2 — 1203 more stringently. Based on language this court used in Beck v. Stepp, 144 Ill. 2d 232, 241 (1991) and Andersen v. Resource Economics Corp., 133 Ill. 2d 342, 347 (1990), various appellate court decisions have held that motions filed under section 2 — 1203 are required to specify the grounds warranting the relief requested. See, e.g., J.D. Marshall, International, Inc. v. First National Bank, 272 Ill. App. 3d 883, 888 (1995); Sho-Deen, Inc. v. Michel, 263 Ill. App. 3d 288, 293 (1994). As the appellate court in this case correctly pointed out, however, the circumstances in Beck and Andersen were qualitatively different from those present here. In this case, the post-judgment motion was clearly identifiable as such, it was directed at the circuit court’s judgment, and it included an explicit request that the judgment be reconsidered and reversed, the type of relief contemplated by section 2 — 1203 of the Code. That was not true in either Beck or Andersen. In Beck, the only document submitted by counsel after entry of summary judgment was a letter to the trial judge noting that the judge’s order differed from counsel’s understanding of what the court told the parties it was going to do during a conference call. That letter did not constitute an application for judicial relief. It therefore could not qualify as any kind of motion, much less a post-trial motion under section 2 — 1203. In Andersen, plaintiffs counsel simply requested leave to file an additional amended complaint after three prior versions of the complaint were dismissed. The motion did not seek reconsideration of the previous dismissals. Unlike the case at bar, the propriety of the court’s prior rulings was not at issue. Counsel’s motion was based on the wholly separate theory that additional facts previously unknown to plaintiffs attorney had been discovered which would permit plaintiff to now plead a new theory of recovery substantively different from those previously advanced. Because neither Beck nor Andersen involved motions attacking the circuit court’s judgment and requesting the type of relief contemplated by section 2 — 1203, the issue of how much specificity is required by a proper section 2 — 1203 motion was not actually before the court. The court’s discussion of the specificity requirements should therefore not be construed as establishing a rule that is controlling where, as here, the post-judgment motion does attack the circuit court’s judgment and does request relief in accordance with section 2 — 1203. See Mendelson v. Ben A. Borenstein & Co., 240 Ill. App. 3d 605, 615 (1992). Proponents of greater specificity under section 2 — 1203 cite the need to afford the trial judge an opportunity to evaluate what exactly it is he is alleged to have done wrong so he can take appropriate corrective action. While this is a legitimate consideration, we note that the particulars of the movant’s claims can always be explored at the hearing on the motion. As far as the trial court’s deliberative process is concerned, having the specifics set out in the motion itself is not essential. A more compelling reason for requiring greater specificity in the motion is to give opposing counsel fair notice of the arguments he must be prepared to address once the hearing on the motion is convened. If opposing counsel cannot reasonably understand and prepare for movant’s arguments based on the text of the motion, however, that is a reason for denying the motion or granting counsel an additional opportunity to respond after the initial hearing is concluded. It is not a reason for holding that the motion does not even qualify as a motion. A lame horse, after all, is still a horse. Those who would graft additional requirements onto section 2 — 1203 forget that, as part of the Code of Civil Procedure, the statute is to be liberally construed. 735 ILCS 5/1 — 106 (West 1994). They also fail to heed the basic principle of statutory construction that where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, as the language of section 2 — 1203 is, we must give it effect as written, without reading into it exceptions, limitations, or conditions that the legislature did not, express. Garza v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., 172 Ill. 2d 373, 378 (1996). Because the post-judgment motion in this case was clearly identifiable as such, was directed at the circuit court’s judgment, and included an explicit request that the judgment be reconsidered and reversed, it met the requirements of section 2 — 1203 and operated to toll the period for filing a notice of appeal under our Rule 303(a). The appellate court was therefore correct in rejecting defendants’ challenge to its jurisdiction. Our conclusion that plaintiff’s notice of appeal was timely is not affected by the fact that the circuit court proceeded in stages, first refusing to reconsider the entry of summary judgment and then denying leave to file an amended complaint. Standing alone, a request for leave to amend a complaint after dismissal with prejudice does not extend the time for appeal or the time for filing other motions. Fultz v. Haugan, 49 Ill. 2d at 135-36. In this case, however, the prayer for leave to amend was submitted in tandem with plaintiffs request for reconsideration, and it was appropriate for plaintiff to wait until all matters raised by her post-trial motion were concluded before filing her notice of appeal. Rule 303 contemplates that parties will proceed in this fashion, rather than through piecemeal notices following each of the trial court’s post-trial rulings. To penalize plaintiff for proceeding as she did would require a hypertechnical application of the rule which would be manifestly unfair and would serve no legitimate purpose.” For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court should be affirmed. I therefore dissent.