Court Opinion

ID: 9672907
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 04:02:42.863303+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:16:19.152848
License: Public Domain

ABRAHAMSON, J.
(dissenting in part). The following evidence was introduced to prove that Peasley was guilty of the crime of possessing cocaine with intent to deliver:
1. Peasley possessed one-third of a gram of cocaine.
2. Various quantities of drugs other than cocaine were found at Peasley’s residence.
3. Scales, pipes, cigarette butts and small plastic baggies were found at Peasley’s residence.
4. On four occasions within a few months of the charge in issue Peasley sold LSD or amphetamines to a deputy sheriff.
The majority holds that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the conviction. I disagree. I would vacate the judgment and direct entry of a judgment of conviction of the offense of possession of cocaine.
The State in its brief concedes, and I agree, that evidence of possession of one-third of a gram of cocaine, standing alone, would be insufficient to support an in*234ference of possession of cocaine with intent to deliver. The State asserts that the other evidence described above is sufficient to permit the trial court, acting as fact-finder, to conclude that Peasley possessed the cocaine with intent to deliver.
“In summary, then, the state submits that the smallness of the quantity of cocaine involved here did not, in itself, preclude the conclusion that the defendant possessed such cocaine with intent to deliver. Concededly, such quantity also did not, in itself, establish intent to deliver. The amount of cocaine involved here was not inconsistent with possession for personal use. But the other facts and circumstances presented here, in particular, the defendant’s prior sales of two other controlled substances, and the discovery of the cocaine in the same refrigerator where a large quantity of one of those substances was stored, provided a solid foundation upon which the trial court could conclude, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the cocaine here was not for personal use, but rather was part of the defendant’s stock in trade in his drug business, and was possessed with intent to deliver.”
When the question of the sufficiency of the evidence is presented on appeal in a criminal case, the only question for the court is whether the evidence adduced, believed and rationally considered by the jury, was sufficient to prove the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Gauthier v. State, 28 Wis.2d 412, 416, 137 N.W.2d 101 (1965). The test is not whether this court or any of the members thereof are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether this court can conclude that the trier of facts could, acting reasonably, be convinced to the required degree of certitude by the evidence it had a right to believe and accept as true. The credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the evidence is for the trier of fact. Lock v. State, 31 Wis.2d 110, 114-115, 142 N.W.2d 183 (1966).
The evidence discussed in paragraphs 2, 3 and 4 is entirely circumstantial, and therefore the question as to *235its sufficiency is whether it is strong enough to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. Taylor v. State, 74 Wis.2d 255, 265, 266, 246 N.W.2d 516 (1970). The court has set forth the test as follows:
“[A] 11 the facts necessary to warrant a conviction on circumstantial evidence must be consistent with each other and with the main fact sought to be proved and the circumstances taken together must be of a conclusive nature leading on the whole to a satisfactory conclusion and producing in effect a reasonable and moral certainty that the accused and no other person committed the offense charged. The circumstantial evidence must, however, be sufficiently strong to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence, that is, the evidence must be inconsistent with any reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This is a question of probability, not possibility.” State v. Shaw, 58 Wis.2d 25, 29, 205 N.W.2d 132 (1973), quoted in Stewart v. State, ante, 185, 192, 265 N.W.2d 489 (1978).
The evidence described in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 can be characterized as “other conduct” evidence and was introduced as probative of an element of the crime in question, that is, “intent to deliver cocaine.” The majority concludes that “the record is replete with evidence from which the requisite intent may be reasonably inferred.” The majority disposes of the question of the probative value of this evidence by saying
“Moreover, the admissibility of evidence relating to the defendant’s prior sales activities as evidence of his intent to deliver the cocaine was permitted under sec. 161.41 (lm) and 904.04 (2), Stats.-, and its probative value is supported by the record. Therefore, the case of State v. Spraggin, 77 Wis.2d 89, 252 N.W.2d 94 (1977), on which the defendant relies, is distinguishable.”
The court’s analysis is circular. A closer examination of sec. 161.41 (lm) and sec. 904.02(2), Stats., lends doubt to the majority’s unexamined conclusion that Peasley’s *236prior sales activities are relevant (and thus admissible) to prove his intent to deliver cocaine.
The general rule is that all relevant evidence is admissible and that evidence which is not relevant is not admissible. Sec. 904.02, Rules of Evidence. Evidence is relevant if it has probative worth, i.e., if it has “any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Sec. 904.01, Rules of Evidence. Whether an item of evidence tends to prove the matter sought to be proved depends upon principles evolved by experience or science, applied logically to the situation at hand. James, Relevancy, Probability and the Law, 29 Calif. L. Rev. 689, 696, n. 15 (1941), in Selected Writings on Evidence and Trial, 610, 615, n. 15 (Foyer ed. 1957), cited in 59 Wis.2d R69.
Sec. 161.41 (lm), Stats., is part of Chapter 161, the “Uniform Controlled Substances Act.” Chapter 161 is substantially similar to the Uniform Controlled Substances Act appearing in 9 Uniform Laws Annotated (Master Edition). However, that part of sec. 161.41 (lm) (quoted in the majority opinion) which describes how intent may be demonstrated is not derived from the Uniform Act. This language appears to have been drafted by the Wisconsin Department of Justice because “most district attorneys wanted intent to be defined to create uniformity and certainty for them.” See Dangerous Substance Control Council, Minutes of Meeting, January 7, 1971 and February 11, 1971. Sec. 161.41 (lm) “merely lists evidence which the finder of fact may consider in order to infer intent.” State ex rel. Bena v. Hon. John J. Crosetto, 73 Wis.2d 261, 271-72, 243 N.W.2d 442 (1976). Sec. 161.41 (lm) can not be construed to authorize the finder of fact to consider evidence which is not relevant within the meaning of the rules of evidence.
*237Sec. 904.04(2), Stats., relied upon by the majority provides as follows:
“(2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he acted in conformity therewith. This subsection does not exclude the evidence when offered for other purposes, such as proof of. . . intent. . . .”
Because the majority fails to note that sec. 904.04(2) must be read in conjunction with sec. 904.02, it fails to meet the crucial issue in this case: Was the evidence of Peasley’s prior conduct relevant to prove his intent to deliver cocaine? If the disputed evidence is not relevant to prove intent, it cannot be relied upon to support the conviction. Sec. 904.02, Rules of Evidence.
This court has said that “evidence of prior acts is admissible when such evidence is particularly probative in showing the elements of the specific crime charged, including intent. . . . This type of evidence would not, however, be admissible merely ... to show that as a result of such prior activities he is more apt to commit the particular type of crime.” Hough v. State, 70 Wis.2d 807, 814, 235 N.W.2d 534 (1975). The admissibility of the other conduct evidence depends “upon its probative value which depends in part upon its nearness in time, place and circumstances to the alleged crime or element sought to be proved.” Whitty v. State, 34 Wis.2d 278, 294, 149 N.W.2d 557 (1967), cert. den. 390 U.S. 959. If the other conduct is “dissimilar in character and circumstances,” it falls “outside the test of relevancy as not tending in a reasonable degree to establish probability or improbability of a fact in issue.” State v. Watkins, 39 Wis.2d 718, 727, 159 N.W.2d 675 (1968). The other conduct must be similar, since it is the improbability of a like result being repeated by mere chance that carries probative weight. See State v. Spraggin, 77 *238Wis.2d 89, 97, 252 N.W.2d 94 (1977); 2 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 302 (3d ed. 1968).
It is this very requirement of similarity which leaves so much room for difference of opinion and accounts for the variances in the decisions on the issue of admissibility of evidence of prior conduct to prove an element of the crime charged.
Is the delivery of LSD and amphetamines similar to a sale of cocaine? Is the paraphernalia found in Peasley’s residence suitable for use in the sale of cocaine? Are consumers of LSD or amphetamines also consumers of cocaine? Are similar sales techniques utilized for all of these substances? Neither the majority opinion nor the trial court’s opinion discusses these issues. An analysis of the similarity of the evidence offered to the matter at hand is necessary to give the evidence probative value. 2 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 302 (3d ed. 1968).
Assuming arguendo the probative value of the evidence described in paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 to the issue of intent, I cannot conclude that evidence showing possession of one-third of a gram of cocaine, prior sales of LSD and amphetamines and possession of drugs and drug paraphernalia is sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Peasley possessed the cocaine with intent to deliver. Peasley is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the lesser included offense of possession of cocaine, and a judgment of conviction of this offense should be entered.