Court Opinion

ID: 9726145
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 12:34:27.558928+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:23.694933
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE HARRISON, dissenting: I respectfully dissent. In reviewing summary judgment on the Structural Work Act count, the majority finds defendant was not in charge of the work. The majority asks, “If defendant was present, and ‘in charge of’ the unloading, why did he not take charge?” While taking charge would have been evidence defendant was “in charge,” he did not have to “take charge” of the unloading, or even be in direct charge of that particular work to be liable. In Johnson v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1985), 133 Ill. App. 3d 472, 478, 478 N.E.2d 1057, 1061, the court stated: “[I]t is not necessary that a party be in direct charge of the particular operation from which the injury arose if it is in charge of the overall work for the project under construction. [Citation.] One or more parties can have charge of the overall work, and other parties can have charge of the phase of the work in connection with which an injury occurs. In that event, all of them would have charge of the work within the meaning of the Act.” Our supreme court, in the often cited case of Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co. (1965), 33 Ill. 2d 316, 322, 211 N.E.2d 247, 251, stated: “[W]hile the actual exercise of supervision and control over the work and the persons doing it, or the retention of the right to so supervise and control, may be factors bearing on the ultimate question of whether an owner is ‘in charge,’ they are not necessary or conclusive factors, nor is either made a sine qua non for liability under the statute.” We recently restated these principles in Simmons v. Union Electric Co. (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 743, 752, 460 N.E.2d 28, 34, aff’d (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 444, 473 N.E.2d 946. These cases indicate that Illinois courts have broadly construed the phrase “having charge of.” One result of this expansive construction is that persons who have no direct contact with the injury may be held liable for damages because of supervisory power in the general work area. Przybylski v. Perkins & Will Architects, Inc. (1981), 95 Ill. App. 3d 620, 622-23, 420 N.E.2d 524, 527. In determining whether a defendant has charge of the work, a court must consider the totality of the circumstances, with attention to numerous factors which are listed in Chance v. City of Collinsville (1983), 112 Ill. App. 3d 6, 11, 445 N.E.2d 39, 42. These factors are: (1) supervision and control of the work; (2) retention of the right to supervise and control the work; (3) constant participation in ongoing activities at the construction site; (4) supervision and coordination of subcontractors; (5) responsibility for taking safety precautions at the job site; (6) authority to issue change orders; (7) the right to stop the work; (8) ownership of the equipment used on the job site; (9) defendant’s familiarity with construction customs and practices; and (10) whether defendant was in a position to insure worker safety or alleviate equipment deficiencies or improper work habits. Here there was evidence defendant was involved in doing some of the labor himself. He was the one who called the plaintiff’s company to order the concrete blocks. He was apparently constantly participating in ongoing activities at the site. There was evidence defendant had experience as a journeyman carpenter. While defendant stated he did not have the right to stop the work plaintiff was doing, he did state that he felt he had the right to stop the work of certain other persons at the construction site. It could be inferred he at least retained the right to supervise and control the work. In Bishop v. Crowther (1980), 92 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11, 415 N.E.2d 599, 607, the court found that a homeowner was in charge of work done on his house. The court stated: “Although, in most instances, a homeowner will do nothing more than hire an independent contractor to do the work, the typical homeowner would not normally possess the high degree of knowledge of the construction industry demonstrated by [defendant].” The court refused to disturb the jury’s finding on this issue because defendant “was not liable because of mere ownership, but because of his supervision and control of the work.” (92 Ill. App. 3d 1, 11, 415 N.E.2d 599, 607.) While admittedly some of the factors to be considered under Chance support an- argument that defendant here was not in charge of the work, there is sufficient evidence in plaintiff’s favor to conclude that a genuine issue of material fact remains. The majority also finds defendant is entitled to summary judgment because plaintiff failed to show defendant’s violation of the Act caused the injury. The majority states: “There is no allegation *** that the unloading could only be accomplished under the wires.” However, the record shows the driveway plaintiff used was the only vehicle access point on defendant’s property, and that the wires hung over this driveway. I acknowledge plaintiff was the person who raised the hoist boom into the wires, but the sole inquiry under the Act is the defendant’s culpability and not the plaintiff’s conduct, and comparative negligence is not applied to limit a plaintiff’s recovery. Simmons v. Union Electric Co. (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 444, 459, 473 N.E.2d 946, 953. Nor can summary judgment for defendant be based upon any other element of a Structural Work Act claim. To recover under the Act, plaintiff must establish he was engaged in a structural activity covered under the Act. If his activities were connected with, and significantly furthered one of the activities enumerated in the Act, then plaintiff can recover. Plaintiff’s actions must be an integral part of the erection, alteration, removal, painting or cleaning of a structure. (Simmons v. Union Electric Co. (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 743, 751, 460 N.E.2d 28, 33, aff'd (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 444, 473 N.E.2d 946.) There is no dispute here that the house being built was a structure. The defendant argues that the act of delivering materials to a construction site is not an activity covered by the Act. Unloading building materials has been held to be a function covered by the Act when it is an integral part of an erection operation. (McNellis v. Combustion Engineering, Inc. (1974), 58 Ill. 2d 146, 151, 317 N.E.2d 573, 576.) There was evidence here that plaintiff would be placing the materials within the foundation so they would be close to the point where they would be used. Under these circumstances, plaintiff was engaged in an integral part of the erection of the house. Next, plaintiff argues that he was using a scaffold or mechanical device as required under the Act. The record shows plaintiff was operating a hoist boom to unload blocks from a truck. It has been held that the Act “is intended to cover support devices used on a construction site, whether their purpose is to support workmen or materials.” (Prange v. Kamar Construction Corp. (1982), 109 Ill. App. 3d 1125, 1130, 441 N.E.2d 889, 893.) The device here supported materials. Thus, summary judgment for defendant could not be based on this element. Nor could summary judgment for defendant be based upon the element requiring a defect in the construction or operation of the device. The defect here was in the use of the device as it lifted materials from the truck. See Burke v. Illinois Power Co. (1978), 57 Ill. App. 3d 498, 373 N.E.2d 1354 (where the court did not discuss but assumed liability under the Act where a crane came in contact with overhead electrical wires). The final element which must be proved under the Structural Work Act is that the violation was wilful. A wilful violation occurs when one having charge of the work knows that a dangerous condition exists or by the exercise of reasonable care could have discovered the existence of the dangerous condition. (Simmons v. Union Electric Co. (1984), 121 Ill. App. 3d 743, 754, 460 N.E.2d 28, 36, aff'd (1984), 104 Ill. 2d 444, 473 N.E.2d 946.) Defendant was the owner of the property and had allowed a driveway to be constructed under the wires. Whether defendant knew or should have known that the hoist boom might come in contact with the wires should be left to a finder of fact. In summary, defendant has failed to establish clearly and without doubt his right to summary judgment on the Structural Work Act count (see Motz v. Central National Bank (1983), 119 Ill. App. 3d 601, 605, 456 N.E.2d 958, 961), and thus I would reverse summary judgment on this count and remand for further proceedings. Turning then to the negligence count, I find I again cannot agree with the majority, but would reverse summary judgment on this count and remand. The majority finds defendant failed to establish the proximate cause element, repeating the misconception that plaintiff does not allege there was only one place from which he could unload. As I have noted, the record does show the wires ran above the only vehicle access point. The majority relies on the finding that the danger from the wires was obvious. Section 343 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts (1965) outlines the liability of a defendant in a case such as the one before us. This section states: “A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to his invitees by a condition on the land if, but only if, he (a) knows or by the exercise of reasonable care would discover the condition, and should realize that it involves an unreasonable risk of harm to such invitees, and (b) should expect that they will not discover or realize the danger, or will fail to protect themselves against it, and (c) fails to exercise reasonable care to protect them against the danger.” (Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 343, at 215 (1965).) Section 343 should be read in conjunction with section 343A(1): “(1) A possessor of land is not liable to his invitees for physi: cal harm caused to them by any activity or condition on the land whose danger is known or obvious to them, unless the possessor should anticipate the harm despite such knowledge or obviousness.” Restatement (Second) of Torts, sec. 343A(1), at 218 (1965). It is clear from reading sections 343 and 343A that a possessor of land will not automatically be free from liability whenever the danger is obvious. The defendant can be liable for an obvious danger if he should expect plaintiffs would not discover the condition or fail to protect themselves against it. Comment f to section 343A states: “Such reason to expect harm to the visitor from known or obvious dangers may arise, for example, where the possessor has reason to expect that the invitee’s attention may be distracted, so that he will not discover what is obvious, or will forget what he has discovered, or fail to protect himself against it. Such reason may also arise where the possessor has a reason to expect that the invitee will proceed to encounter the known or obvious danger because to a reasonable man in his position the advantages of doing so would outweigh the apparent risk. In such cases the fact that the danger is known, or is obvious, is important in determining whether the invitee is to be charged with contributory negligence, or assumption of risk. *** It is not, however, conclusive in determining the duty of the possessor, or whether he has acted reasonably under the circumstances.” (Restatement (Second) of Torts, comment f, sec. 343A, at 220 (1965).) In the present case, plaintiff admitted seeing the power lines and knowing the danger they posed. But a duty to protect remained regarding danger against which plaintiff reasonably would fail to protect himself, or forget about in the course of his work. The nature of plaintiff’s activity here would direct his attention to where the load was being lifted from the truck and to the location on the ground where the load was to be placed rather than toward. the overhead lines. I cannot say conclusively defendant did not breach this duty or that the breach was not a proximate cause of the injury. The fact the danger may have been obvious here would be important under the comparative negligence doctrine. However, I cannot agree with the majority’s conclusion that plaintiff was 100% responsible for his injury. Defendant has failed to show clearly and without doubt his right to summary judgment on the negligence count, and I would reverse the summary judgment entered on this count and remand for further proceedings, as I would on the Structural Work Act count.