Court Opinion

ID: 9762782
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 02:30:57.52569+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:37.425617
License: Public Domain

HUTCHINSON, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent from the outright reversal of Superior Court’s order. That court ordered a grant of post-trial conviction relief, based on appellant’s Fifth Amendment right to the advice of counsel, under federal case authority resulting from the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 101 S.Ct. 1880, 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981). Superior Court’s reversal of Common Pleas is based on its acceptance of the suppression court’s finding that appellee was in custody when he asked for counsel. I would remand this case to Common Pleas for reconsideration, based on the standards set out by the United States *522Supreme Court in Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976), and this Court in Commonwealth. v. McLaughlin, 475 Pa. 97, 379 A.2d 1056 (1977), of its finding that appellee was in fact in custody when he requested counsel. To my mind, the Common Pleas findings on custody are inconsistent and seem to reflect a presently invalid independent application of the Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964), focus of suspicion test. Such independent use of that test is inconsistent with the more objective standards of Beckwith and McLaughlin. See also Commonwealth v. Chacko, 500 Pa. 571, 459 A.2d 311 (1983). If Common Pleas reaffirms its factual finding of custody under these currently appropriate standards, I believe Superior Court’s holding that the police acted to violate appellee’s Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate himself is compelled by the binding authority of the United States Supreme Court in Edwards, supra, and Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). The interpretation of those cases in the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court contrarily misapplies the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (per curiam). Therefore, if Common Pleas, on remand, finds appellee gave his statement while in custody, I am reluctantly forced to conclude, as did Superior Court, that Edwards requires a new trial.
The opinion announcing the judgment of the Court states in its discussion of appellee’s right to counsel during his interrogation that:
the record does not establish that appellee “clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to counsel” so as to trigger Edwards’ prophylactic prohibition against all further police-initiated conversation.
509 Pa. at 505-506, 504 A.2d at 172 (emphasis in original). I believe that the record contains as clear an invocation of the right to counsel as could be envisioned. The record shows that appellee said “I want a lawyer.” R.R. at 113a. He *523followed that statement up with “I want a public defender.” Id.
I agree that not every vague reference to a lawyer requires the application of Edwards. However, that principle has no application to the facts of this case; appellee’s statement is clear and unambiguous. Indeed, I do not see how appellee could have done any more to invoke the Fifth Amendment right, which the United States Supreme Court has seen fit to afford him, to secure counsel’s advice before giving an in-custody statement. The opinion announcing the judgment of the Court attempts to justify its determination that this request is not clear enough to invoke Edwards by reference to the fact that appellee first called a private attorney, instead of the public defender, and finally his probation officer when the private attorney was unavailable. That opinion states he did not call the public defender after being encouraged to do so. That “encouragement” included the statement of the interrogators that they did not think the public defender would be available to him because he had not been arrested. See R.R. at 114a (quoted in opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, supra, 509 Pa. at 510-511, 504 A.2d at 173). That self-serving and potentially misleading statement supports a finding that appellee was not in custody, an opinion held by the police themselves and communicated to him. It does not support a finding that he was advised of his right to free counsel before giving a statement to police. It is on this “encouragement,” given after appellee’s unambiguous request for counsel, that the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court concludes appellee’s request was not clear because he did not follow up on it by calling the public defender.
Such an analysis is inconsistent with the recent United States Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Illinois, 469 U.S. 91, 105 S.Ct. 490, 83 L.Ed.2d 488 (1984) (per curiam). There the Court stated:
Where nothing about the request for counsel or the circumstances leading up to the request would render it *524ambiguous, all questioning must cease. In these circumstances, an accused’s subsequent statements are relevant only to the question whether the accused waived the right he had invoked.
We hold only that, under the clear logical force of settled precedent, an accused’s post-request responses to further interrogation may not be used to cast retrospective doubt on the clarity of the initial request itself. Such subsequent statements are relevant only to the distinct question of waiver.
105 S.Ct. at 494-95 (emphasis in original).
I agree that this case is controlled by Smith. However, its analysis of that case seems to me to stand Smith on its head. Here appellee clearly indicated that he wanted the assistance of counsel before he gave his statement. Even if the subsequent circumstances set out in the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court show an ambiguity in his request instead of his reliance on the police’s statement that the public defender could not help him because he was .not in custody, they are post-request irrelevancies on the issue of ambiguity, according to the teaching of the United States Supreme Court in Smith. Using them to cast doubt upon appellee’s initial request for counsel is against both the spirit and letter of Smith.
It seems to me equally incorrect to state that even if appellee’s request was sufficient to invoke his right to counsel he waived it by initiating the events that led up to his confession. The evidence on this record is insufficient to establish a waiver of the right to counsel which the United States Supreme Court gave this appellee in Edwards, supra. Edwards stated that once the right to counsel has been invoked it cannot be waived by later uncounseled interrogation unless the defendant initiates the communication. See also Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 103 S.Ct. 2830, 77 L.Ed.2d 405 (1983); Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 103 S.Ct. 394, 74 L.Ed.2d 214 (1982) (per *525curiam); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980). Edwards stated:
[W]hen an accused has invoked his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation, a valid waiver of that right cannot be established by showing only that he responded to further police-initiated custodial interrogation even if he has been advised of his rights. We further hold that an accused, ... having expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel, is not subject to further interrogation by the authorities until counsel has been made available to him, unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police.
451 U.S. at 484-85, 101 S.Ct. at 1884-85. This record reveals that subsequent uncounseled interrogation was initiated, not by appellee, but by the police. The opinion announcing the judgment of the Court attempts to construct a subsequent initiation of communication by appellee by the bald statement that:
appellee initiated the events which lead to his inculpatory statement, since the prior interview had ended and appellee and Mrs. Hubble were in the process of leaving the barracks when appellee requested to stay and talk with his wife privately. These circumstances leading up to and surrounding appellee’s requests to call “a lawyer”, then Mr. Felix and Mr. McCool do not present the situation or type of police conduct condemned in Edwards v. Arizona.
Supra, at 509 (emphasis in original). This conclusion is a non-sequitur on this record. Appellee’s request to speak with his wife was not an initiation of further communication with the police. A request to speak to one’s spouse, albeit in a police station, is not an initiation of a communication with the police which they have an option to convert into a knowing, voluntary and intelligent waiver of appellee’s Fifth Amendment right to counsel. It may be true that if appellee had not asked to speak to his wife before leaving he would not have confessed later on. However, such a *526“but for” analysis does not lead to the conclusion that he initiated the conversation with the police which led to his confession. On the contrary, the record shows that the police came into the room where the Hubbles were speaking and directly asked appellee if he had committed the crime:
TROOPER SHIMKO: Sergeant Peterson and I went into the office. Again we could see that [appellee] was visibly upset. Sergeant Peterson talked to [appellee] approximately five minutes and he asked a simple question, “Now Dave, were you or weren’t you in the house?” And at that time Dave broke down and stated that he was.
R.R. at 128a. Appellee did not ask to speak to the police. He asked to speak to his wife. The police interrupted them and directly interrogated him in the absence of counsel, after counsel was requested. Appellee’s confession followed direct questioning subsequent to his clear invocation of his right to counsel. Under Miranda, if appellee was in fact in custody, under the Beckwith standards, all interrogation must cease after that invocation.
Whether he was in custody is, as stated, a factual issue which I cannot resolve on this record because of the ambiguities in Common Pleas’ opinion. In order to clear up those ambiguities, it seems to me Common Pleas must demonstrate its understanding of the current legal standards for determining the fact of custody. In fairness to Common Pleas, however, I note that those standards had not been clearly set forth in this Commonwealth when Common Pleas considered this case.1
To aid Common Pleas in its task, I believe it is necessary to set forth the ambiguities I see in the Common Pleas’ custody finding and the development of the law with re*527spect to custody interrogation. To my mind, the suppression court’s findings appear so heavily influenced by the well-documented official concentration on appellee as a prime suspect that they imply independent application of the “focus of the investigation” test. This test was originally used by the United States Supreme Court in Escobedo, Miranda’s harbinger, and we adopted it in Commonwealth v. Feldman, 432 Pa. 428, 248 A.2d 1 (1968). The United States Supreme Court subsequently held in Beckwith that the focus test is not alone sufficient to invoke Miranda. One year later, we suggested that we would follow Beck-with in Commonwealth v. McLaughlin, 475 Pa. 97, 379 A.2d 1056 (1977). However, our subsequent cases were not as clear on the subject. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Horner, 497 Pa. 565, 442 A.2d 682 (1982); Commonwealth v. Meyer, 488 Pa. 297, 412 A.2d 517 (1980); Commonwealth v. Patterson, 488 Pa. 227, 412 A.2d 481 (1980). We should repudiate the implications in these later cases and expressly follow the Beckwith holding that the focus test, while still a relevant factor in determining custody, is not independently sufficient to trigger Miranda. See Commonwealth v. Holcomb, 508 Pa. 425, 498 A.2d 833 (1985) (opinion announcing the judgment of the Court).
The suppression court in the instant case found that appellee was the subject of custodial interrogation. Superi- or Court stated that this finding was “amply supported by the record.” 318 Pa.Superior Ct. at 83, 464 A.2d at 1240. This is true if the appropriate tests were applied by Common Pleas. However, I cannot tell on this record whether they were.
Many of the cases Superior Court cited are themselves based on Escobedo’s independent focus test. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. O’Shea, 456 Pa. 288, 318 A.2d 713, cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1092, 95 S.Ct. 686, 42 L.Ed.2d 685 (1974); Commonwealth v. D’Nicuola, 448 Pa. 54, 292 A.2d 333 (1972); Commonwealth v. Simala, 434 Pa. 219, 252 A.2d 575 (1969). We should repudiate their implication that *528Escobedo has continuing independent vitality in this Commonwealth.
Perhaps most important, the suppression court’s findings on the issue of custody are internally inconsistent if not based on an independent focus test. We stated in Chacho, supra, that a person is in custody when
he is physically deprived of his freedom in any significant way or is placed in a situation in which he reasonably believes that his freedom of action or movement is restricted by such interrogation.
Id. 500 Pa. at 577, 459 A.2d at 314 (citations omitted).
The inconsistency of the suppression court’s findings under the Chacho standard can be seen by comparing its finding no. 2 with nos. 13, 14 and 15. In its finding of fact no. 2 the suppression court says:
2. [Appellee] was the subject of a custodial interrogation throughout the day of July 12, 1977.
However, findings of fact nos. 13, 14 and 15 state:
13. At approximately 3:00 p.m. in the act of leaving the State Police Barracks [Appellee] said that he wanted to speak with his wife alone; they were ushered back to the same room as before and left by themselves.
14. [Appellee] and his wife were told one hour later they would be taken home if they wished.
15. [Appellee] gave his inculpatory statement to the State Police starting at or about 5:45 p.m., only after two separate conferences with his wife alone totaling a minimum of one and one half hours.
These later findings seem to imply that appellee was not in custody when interviewed on July 12. See Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 97 S.Ct. 711, 50 L.Ed.2d 714 (1977).
Because the suppression court had before it detailed evidence concerning the police investigation’s focus on appellee before the July 12, 1977 interrogation, see R.R. 54a-68a (testimony of Officer Shimko),2 the Escobedo test, *529then recently echoed in this jurisdiction by O’Shea, supra, D’Nicuola, supra, and Símala, supra, is a likely basis for its finding that appellee was the subject of custodial interrogation. Under that test, the focus on appellee would have been sufficient by itself to imply custody. The possibility that Common Pleas may have been relying exclusively on the focus test also appears from the following passage in the en banc opinion (Walter, J.) on post-trial motions. In it, the trial court says:
In light of the above, we find that, for Miranda purposes, [appellee] was the subject of a custodial interrogation throughout the day of July 12, 1977. Prior to July 12, 1977 [appellee] had been questioned three times and had undergone a polygraph examination. On July 12, 1977 [appellee] was subjected to another polygraph examination and further questioning. He remained at the station for approximately eight hours.
Trial ct. slip op. at 3 (en banc).
The lower court nowhere makes a finding that appellee reasonably believed his freedom was restricted by the police, the custody test Mr. Chief Justice, then Mr. Justice, Nix, speaking for our Court, set forth in Commonwealth v. Chacko, supra. On the contrary, the record shows appellee was told several times that he could go home. R.R. 121a, 125a. Further, appellee’s requests for coffee and permission to talk to his wife were always granted. R.R. 97a, 99a, 122a, 123a, 127a. Officer Shimko testified “[appellee and his wife] had freedom of the barracks____ We weren’t retaining them in any way.” R.R. at 181a. Indeed, the trial court itself noted these facts. See Findings of Fact nos. 13-16, R.R. at 382a-383a. Therefore, the trial court’s blanket finding of “custody” is, on the surface, inconsistent with these other findings unless based on the independent focus test in Escobedo, which the United States Supreme Court repudiated as a matter of federal law in Beckwith *530and which we should put to rest in Pennsylvania once and for all. Indeed, it is inconsistent with the express feelings of the police themselves, who told defendant they did not think he could get a public defender because he was not under arrest.
Although the record thus indicates that the suppression court incorrectly applied an independent focus test to the custody issue, there is also record evidence which would support a finding of custody under Beckwith and Chacko. Appellee was given a lie detector test and was questioned several times over an eight-hour period. During the suppression hearing, appellee said he was scared to ask about leaving and stated, “I thought I’d go to jail if I got up and walked away.” R.R. at 322. Appellee’s wife, who was also at the station, stated she thought they could not leave because her husband was read his Miranda rights. R.R. at 284. In addition, the fact that appellee was a suspect remains a relevant fact in determining the custody issue. Beckwith, supra. The suppression court therefore had a right to consider the suspicion the police had about appellee in evaluating all the conflicting evidence concerning his freedom to leave. Whether it incorrectly felt the focus on appellee is an independent basis in this Commonwealth for a finding of custody or merely one relevant piece of evidence which it considered in evaluating the whole suppression récord for the purpose of resolving the custody issue is not apparent. Since questions involving conflicting evidence, or inferences from it, are for the finder of fact, not an appellate court, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Penn, 497 Pa. 232, 439 A.2d 1154, cert. denied, 456 U.S. 980, 102 S.Ct. 2251, 72 L.Ed.2d 857 (1982); Commonwealth v. Whack, 482 Pa. 137, 393 A.2d 417 (1978); Commonwealth v. Richman, 458 Pa. 167, 320 A.2d 351 (1974), I believe we should remand for clarification on this point. Cf. Jasper v. Workmen’s Compensation Appeal Board, 498 Pa. 263, 445 A.2d 1212 (1982) (court should remand cases where findings of fact are internally inconsistent). In any event, Superior Court’s outright reversal of the suppression court’s ruling that the evidence was admissible seems to me incorrect under the *531standard governing the scope of appellate review of rulings by a suppression court:
When ruling on suppression motions, the suppression court is required to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether evidence was obtained in violation of the defendant’s constitutional rights. Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(i). The suppression court must determine whether the Commonwealth has established by a preponderance of the evidence that the challenged evidence is admissible. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 323(h). On review, our responsibility is “to determine whether the record supports the factual findings of the court below and the legitimacy of the inferences and legal conclusions drawn from those findings.” Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 460 Pa. 516, 521, 333 A.2d 892, 895 (1975).
If the suppression court has determined that the evidence is admissible, “this Court will consider only the evidence of the prosecution’s witnesses and so much of the evidence for the defense as, fairly read in the context of the record as a whole, remains uncontradicted.” Commonwealth v. Kichline, 468 Pa. 264, 280, 361 A.2d 282, 290 (1976); see Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 604, 81 S.Ct. 1860, 1878, 6 L.Ed.2d 1037 (1961) (Opinion of Frankfurter, J.).
Commonwealth v. Brown, 473 Pa. 562, 566, 375 A.2d 1260, 1262 (1977). See also Commonwealth v. Lark, 505 Pa. 126, 477 A.2d 857 (1984).
Thus, I would remand this case to Common Pleas for reconsideration of this custody question. However, if compelled to reach the question of appellee’s right to counsel, my reading of the United States Supreme Court’s opinions in Smith and Edwards, which are binding on us, seems to me to force us to affirm the grant of a new trial, contrary to the reasoning on this issue in the opinion announcing the judgment of the Court.

. The delay in processing appellee's appeals after the denial of his post-trial motions is shocking to me. Appellee was convicted on November 25, 1977. He filed post-trial motions on December 12, 1977. The court held its hearing on these motions on August 14, 1980, and denied them on October 15, 1980. Appellee filed his notice of appeal on January 14, 1981 and Superior Court issued its order on July 15, 1983.

. Trooper Shimko interviewed appellee about this case on April 7, 1977, July 6, 1977, July 7, 1977, July 8, 1977 and July 12, 1977. *529Appellee provided information about his brother’s involvement in the crime. The police questioned him in the station as well as during a drive around the crime scene.