Court Opinion

ID: 9723129
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 10:03:07.8636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:44.998531
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE COOK, dissenting: In Caruth, this court held that a prisoner’s complaint for mandamus was barred by laches, stating that “[a] complaint for mandamus must be brought within six months unless there is a reasonable explanation for delay.” Caruth, 333 Ill. App. 3d at 99-100, 775 N.E.2d at 228, citing Richter, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 804, 423 N.E.2d at 552. Richter, however, held that “[p]assage of time by itself does not bar relief; and if a defendant does not establish that he has been materially prejudiced by the delay, the plaintiff is not guilty of laches.” Richter, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 804, 423 N.E.2d at 552. In this case, the majority opinion attempts to rehabilitate Caruth by creating a new rule of law that the State is presumed to be prejudiced when a prisoner files a complaint for mandamus more than six months after the completion of the DOC disciplinary hearings that are being challenged. I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that the State can be presumed to be prejudiced in every case where a prisoner filed a complaint for mandamus more than six months after the completion of the DOC disciplinary proceedings. This new rule is ostensibly based upon the holding in Condell that “where a detriment or inconvenience to the public will result,” prejudice is inherent. Condell, 224 Ill. at 598-99, 79 N.E. at 956. It is true that, in some circumstances, there is inherent prejudice to the public when a petitioner waits more than six months to challenge an administrative proceeding. In Condell, for example, the plaintiff was a discharged police officer. He filed a petition for a common law writ of certiorari to review the civil service proceedings that led to his discharge 1½ years after the proceedings ended. The plaintiff sought reinstatement and back pay. The court noted: “To restore appellee to his position would confer upon him the right to require the payment of his salary to the date of his restoration. Where such consequences must result to the public, a delay for the length of time that elapsed between appellee’s discharge and the date of filing his petition is unreasonable ***.” Condell, 224 Ill. at 599, 79 N.E. at 956. The court rightly held that when back pay is involved in a civil service case, the public is prejudiced by any delay in filing suit to challenge the dismissal. If the plaintiff prevails, the public ends up paying plaintiff for all the time he was discharged, without any work in return, and that is in addition to the salary being paid to whoever filled the plaintiffs position. The longer it takes the plaintiff to bring his suit, the more it costs the public. It is now well settled that “[defendants in civil service cases need not establish material prejudice from plaintiffs delay in bringing suit ‘because prejudice as a result of passage of time is inherent in cases such as this and need not be specially proved.’ ” Lee, 256 Ill. App. 3d at 197, 627 N.E.2d at 1259-60, quoting People ex rel. Sullivan v. Smith, 133 Ill. App. 2d 218, 220-21, 272 N.E.2d 755, 757 (1971). Prisoners, on the other hand, are not civil servants and do not potentially accumulate back pay while waiting to file their mandamus complaints challenging a disciplinary proceeding. The question then becomes whether the costs to the public of responding to a prisoner’s complaint for mandamus increase as time passes. Is it cheaper for the State to respond to a complaint for mandamus that is filed five months after a disciplinary proceeding than it is to respond to a complaint filed after seven months? The majority concludes there must be prejudice because “DOC houses over 42,000 adult inmates who have little disincentive to litigate over disciplinary proceedings.” 339 Ill. App. 3d at 739. The fact that inmate litigation is a problem does not mean that delay, even a short delay, is inherently prejudicial. The State is not prejudiced in every case where a prisoner delays in filing his complaint for mandamus, as proved by this case, where the State could not demonstrate any prejudice even after two years of delay. Since prejudice is not inherent, and the State did not demonstrate that it was prejudiced by Ashley’s delay in filing his complaint, his complaint is not barred by laches. See, e.g., Mid State Coal Co. v. Griffin, 263 Ill. App. 3d 339, 343, 636 N.E.2d 1072, 1074 (1994) (“A defendant must show prejudice or hardship, rather than the mere passage of time, and must demonstrate that the delay induced him to adversely change position in order for the defense of laches to apply”). Getting to the merits of plaintiffs complaint, he alleged that he was denied due process in the March 22, 1999, disciplinary hearing because defendants refused to interview his requested witnesses. The Supreme Court has held that prisoners are entitled to a certain amount of process in prison disciplinary hearings, including an opportunity to call witnesses when consistent with institutional safety and correctional goals. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 564-66, 41 L. Ed. 2d 935, 956-57, 94 S. Ct. 2963, 2979-80 (1974). DOC rules also require that prisoners receive process in disciplinary hearings consistent with those principles enunciated in Wolff. See 20 Ill. Adm. Code § 504.80 (Conway Greene CD-ROM April 2001). Mandamus is an appropriate remedy to compel DOC to conduct disciplinary hearings consistent with due process. See, e.g., Thompson v. Lane, 194 Ill. App. 3d 855, 864, 551 N.E.2d 731, 737 (1990) (affirming the trial court’s order issuing a writ of mandamus to compel DOC to conduct rehearing of inmates’ disciplinary reports consistent with due process or in the alternative to restore plaintiffs lost good-time credits and demotion in grade). The record is clear that plaintiffs requested witnesses were not contacted or interviewed and did not testify. The stated reason in the committee summary why the witnesses were not interviewed was simply “unable to contact witnesses.” One of these witnesses was a prisoner in DOC’s custody. DOC’s assertion that it could not find one of its own prisoners is not credible. Therefore, the failure to interview or call this prisoner witness violated plaintiffs due process rights. See, e.g., Miranda v. Coutee, 334 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 1060, 779 N.E.2d 929, 932 (2002) (rejecting as not credible DOC’s excuse for not interviewing or calling prisoner’s requested prisoner witness because it could not locate prisoner; DOC has duty to make reasonable effort to locate witness given plaintiffs important interest in the matter). Plaintiffs complaint raises a factual allegation that if proved true, would establish a violation of his due process rights. Specifically, at the March 22, 1999, disciplinary hearing, DOC denied plaintiff his right to request witnesses be interviewed and their testimony considered. Alleging a violation of due process rights and DOC rules in a prison disciplinary proceeding states a cause of action in mandamus. See, e.g., Thompson, 194 Ill. App. 3d at 864, 551 N.E.2d at 737. This claim should not have been dismissed pursuant to either section 2—615 or 2—619 because it states a cause of action on its face and it is not barred by laches.