Court Opinion

ID: 9539600
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:06:35.079796+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:59:00.797355
License: Public Domain

McInturff, J.
(dissenting)—I dissent from the majority's view regarding the affidavit of prejudice and conclude the motion should have been granted. RCW 4.12.0403 gives every party the right to a change of judge if the requirements of RCW 4.12.050 are satisfied. State ex rel. Mauer-man v. Superior Court, 44 Wn.2d 828, 830, 271 P.2d 435 (1954).
RCW 4.12.050 provides:
Any party . . . may establish such prejudice by motion, supported by affidavit . . . that he cannot, have a fair and impartial trial before such judge: Provided, That such motion and affidavit is filed and called to the attention of the judge before he shall have made any rul*764ing whatsoever in the case, either on the motion of the party making the affidavit, or on the motion of any other party to the action, of the hearing of which the party making the affidavit has been given notice, and before the judge presiding has made any order or ruling involving discretion, but the arrangement of the calendar . . . or . . . the arraignment of the accused in a criminal action . . . shall not be construed as a ruling or order involving discretion within the meaning of this proviso;
(Italics mine.)
The majority concludes the motion was not timely because (1) defense counsel knew before the day of trial which judge would preside at the trial;4 (2) the reason behind the motion was an attempt to secure a continuance of the trial date; and (3) the motion was disruptive of the Ferry County court system because defense counsel had failed to inform the court of the plan to file the motion and affidavit, causing inconvenience to the presiding judge, prospective jurors and the State's witnesses, who were all ready to proceed. Based on these reasons, the majority held granting the motion would have led to an "absurd result".
It is uncontroverted there had been no discretionary decision made in this case;5 neither is Ferry County a 1-judge county. RCW 2.08.065. In contrast to State v. Dixon, 74 Wn.2d 700, 702-03, 446 P.2d 329 (1968), Marine Power & Equip. Co. v. Department of Transp., 102 Wn.2d 457, 461, 687 P.2d 202 (1984) notes there are only two criteria which bring the statutory timeliness requirements into *765play: (1) whether there has been a discretionary ruling, and (2) whether the county is a 1-judge county. As interpreted in Marine Power, at 463, RCW 4.12.050 was intended to take away from the trial judge all discretion in determining prejudice:
The statute's history reflects an accommodation between two important, and at times competing, interests: a party's right to one change of judge without inquiry and the orderly administration of justice. This history also reflects a decision to accord greater weight to the party's right to a change of judge. The two timeliness criteria read into the statute by this court, and later incorporated by the Legislature, are well defined and permit little, if any, exercise of discretion by the trial judge. Cases decided before and after this last amendment also illustrate the right's predominate importance.
(Italics mine.)
Thus, the majority's reasoning is irrelevant in determining whether the affidavit should have been granted. It does not matter whether Mr. Hansen's attorney had been his counsel for 3 days, 3 weeks or 3 months; whether his counsel had appeared in court that morning on another matter, whether prospective jurors were waiting in the hall or whether the reason behind the motion was to secure a continuance. The only relevant factor was whether the court had made a discretionary decision. It had not.
To hold as the majority does would allow the judge in question to always have a colloquy with the attorney or party who filed the affidavit before deciding whether to acquire another judge to try the case. This defeats the purpose of RCW 4.12.050, i.e., to grant the motion without discretion once the timeliness requirements are satisfied:
The statute permits of no ulterior inquiry; it is enough to make timely the affidavit and motion, and however much the judge moved against may feel and know that the charge is unwarranted, he may not avoid the effect of the proceeding by holding it to be frivolous or capricious.
Marine Power, at 461 (quoting State ex rel. Talens v. Hol*766den, 96 Wash. 35, 40, 164 P. 595 (1917)).
Once a party has complied with the terms of the statute, the judge to whom a motion and affidavit of prejudice is directed is divested of authority to proceed further into the merits of the motion.6 Dixon, at 702. It is incumbent upon the presiding judge to recuse himself immediately upon the filing of the motion and affidavit without further discussion of the matter. Here, when the judge indicated to counsel it would be no problem to switch judges, he should have done just that, without further action by, or discussion with, defense counsel.
Lastly, because of the court's lack of authority, Mr. Hansen was not tried by a court of competent jurisdiction; the cause should be remanded to the court for retrial. State v. Cockrell, 102 Wn.2d 561, 567, 689 P.2d 32 (1984).
Review granted by Supreme Court May 6, 1986.

RCW 4.12.040 provides in part:
"No judge of a superior court of the state of Washington shall sit to hear or try any action or proceeding when it shall be established as hereinafter provided that said judge is prejudiced against any party or attorney, or the interest of any party or attorney appearing in such cause."

An affidavit submitted by the other judge of the county indicates:
(1) In 1983 it was his responsibility to schedule cases for both judges. The schedule was only tentative and was often changed.
(2) On or about September 21, 1983, he had a telephone conversation with the defendant's attorney and told him which judge was set to preside at Mr. Hansen's trial, then set for October 18, 1983.

I note on page 3 of the affidavit filed by the prosecutor he states the judge had ruled September 27 that the defendant had waived his right to a CrR 3.6 hearing by failing to appear. However, we are unable to substantiate this statement in the record.

My review of the report of proceedings discloses the following:
Page 6: Motion and affidavit of prejudice is filed.
Page 7: Court's initial ruling the motion is not timely.
Pages 7-36: The court and counsel discuss the motion, particularly with respect to Mr. Arnold's participation in the case.
Page 37: Mr. Arnold offers to withdraw the affidavit if the case is continued to the January term.
Pages 40-44: Ruling on motion.