Court Opinion

ID: 9757642
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-28 22:50:49.75483+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:28:41.898980
License: Public Domain

Johnson, J.,
concurring: I concur in the result reached by the majority. Specifically, with respect to Snellings’ sentence for manufacturing methamphetamine, I agree that the identical offense sentencing doctrine is not applicable. On the record before us, we cannot say that methamphetamine is also a compound that contains any detectable quantity of ephedrine or pseudoephedrine, i.e., the facts of this case do not definitively establish an overlap in the provisions of K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4159(a) and K.S.A. 65-4164(a).
*168But I write separately to clarify that my vote to affirm Snellings’ sentence for the manufacture of methamphetamine does not rely in any way, shape, or form on our prior decision in State v. Cooper, 285 Kan. 964, 179 P.3d 439 (2008). In my view, Cooperaras simply wrong when it declared that nothing in the statute prohibiting die manufacture of methamphetamine, K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4159, “requires the State to prove that a defendant used paraphernalia to manufacture methamphetamine.” 285 Kan. at 967. The rationale supporting that statement went as follows:
“Although, as a factual matter, paraphernalia must have been used to manufacture methamphetamine, the State is not required to prove this fact. For example, the State could present a witness who would testify, ‘I watched the defendant manufacture methamphetamine.’ A defendant might also confess, ‘I manufactured methamphetamine.’ In either such case, the State would have established a prima facie case and would not be required to prove how that manufacturing occurred or that any paraphernalia was used in the process. Even if the evidence described the scientific process and circumstantially established that paraphernalia had been used in the process, the jury would not be instructed that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant possessed paraphernalia for the purpose of manufacturing the methamphetamine.” 285 Kan. at 967.
First, I would point out that the last sentence of the foregoing quote, as well as the majority opinion here, confuses the possessing of paraphernalia with intent to manufacture methamphetamine with tire using of paraphernalia to manufacture methamphetamine. The using of paraphernalia to manufacture connotes that an act is being performed, rather than an act that is being contemplated. That distinction is important because the crime proscribed by K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4159(a) is the manufacture, not the possession, of methamphetamine. Manufacturing also connotes that the actor is involved in a process. Indeed, as tire majority points out, the term “manufacture” is defined in K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4101(n), which states in relevant part:
“ ‘Manufacture’ means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, conversion or processing of a controlled substance either directly or indirectly or by extraction from substances of natural origin or independently by means of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis and includes any packaging or repackaging of the substance or labeling or relabeling of its container.”
*169So, for a jury to convict a defendant of manufacturing methamphetamine it has to find beyond a reasonable doubt that he or she performed one of the actions or functions described in K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4101(n). By necessity, the juiy could not make such a finding without concluding that the defendant used paraphernalia to “manufacture” the methamphetamine.
Coopers examples of how manufacturing can be proved without proving die use of paraphernalia to manufacture simply miss the mark. Although we permit a defendant to plead guilty, we do not imbue the defendant with the legal authority to make the determination of whether a crime has, in fact, been committed. Instead, we require that the judge taking the plea be “satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.” K.S.A. 22-3210(a)(4). In Coopers example, where a defendant admitted to the court that he or she manufactured methamphetamine, the court would need to be apprised of sufficient facts to satisfy itself that the defendant’s actions fit within the statutory definition of “manufacture,” i.e., that defendant used paraphernalia to engage in a manufacturing function. Likewise, a witness’ declaration that the defendant manufactured methamphetamine would not be competent evidence to support a conviction for violating K.S.A. 2007 Supp. 65-4159 unless there was the additional showing that the witness knew what it means to “manufacture.” Indeed, my first question to that witness would be, “How did you know you were watching methamphetamine being manufactured?”
In my view, Coopers concession that, factually, one cannot manufacture methamphetamine without using paraphernalia to manufacture methamphetamine is sufficient to establish an overlap in the two statutes. Cooper apparently construes the doctrine as requiring that the elements of two offenses must be semantically identical, i.e., stated in precisely identical terms. In other words, driving a vehicle recklessly would not be identical to an offense described as using a vehicle to drive recklessly. Likewise, under Coopers logic, to convict a defendant of digitally raping a victim the State would not be required to prove that the defendant used a finger to rape the victim if an eyewitness states that he or she saw the defendant rape the victim.
*170Besides being nonsensical, the legal fiction that manufacturing methamphetamine is different from using paraphernalia to manufacture methamphetamine creates due process concerns. I would malee the legal world match the real world so that ordinary citizens might know what conduct is proscribed and the accompanying penalty for violating that law.