Court Opinion

ID: 9705245
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 01:00:37.159185+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:22:09.182793
License: Public Domain

FORD ELLIOTT, Judge,
dissenting.
Although I might agree with the rationale and the result reached by the majority under different circumstances, I feel I am bound by the decision of another panel of this court on the very issue presented herein and on which the majority disposition rests. On January 10,1992, in the case of Jones v. Alper, No. 832 Philadelphia 1991, the panel of Cavanaugh, McEwen and Olszewski, JJ., filed a Memorandum decision in a companion case. In reviewing Judge Hill’s decision in the court below, which is referenced by the majority herein, the Jones panel determined that Odessa Jones was not an indispensable party to appellant’s personal tort claim for fraud. Upon reviewing the same factual question involving the same parties to the same real estate transaction, I consider myself bound by the prior panel’s decision. For explanatory purposes therefore, I incorporate *607and adopt the Memorandum decision of January 10,1992 as a part of this Dissenting Opinion.
MEMORANDUM:
Filed January 10, 1992
Appellant, Louis E. Jones, appeals from the order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas granting appellee, Alan Alper’s, motion for judgment n.o.v. On appeal, appellant contends the trial court erroneously concluded that appellant’s wife, Odessa Jones, was an indispensable party and appellant’s failure to join his wife as a party-plaintiff was a fatal defect justifying entry of judgment n.o.v. We agree with appellant that the trial court erred in granting judgment n.o.v.
In December of 1983, appellant and his wife entered into an agreement of sale with appellee to convey residential property, which they owned as tenants by the entireties. The real estate, located at 1857 Champlost Avenue in Philadelphia, includes a house and surrounding property occupied by appellant.1 The agreement of sale provided that conveyance was contingent on appellee’s successful stay of a sheriff’s sale. Other provisions of the agreement included appellee’s payment of $1 plus other debts secured by the property, appellant’s promise to make monthly rental payments, and appellant’s option to repurchase the property. At appellee’s request, appellant and his wife signed a blank deed which omitted the grantors’ names, the grantee’s name, the sales price and the description of the property.
Appellee successfully stayed the sheriff’s sale. Appellee then sold his interest in the agreement of sale with appellant to a third party, Charles DeCoatsworth. Appellee filled in the deed, which was blank except for the signatures of appellant and his wife, with names of the grantors as “LOUIS EDWARD JONES and ODESSA B. JONES, his *608wife, and ALPER ASSOCIATES, INC.” (Thus adding Al-per Associates, Inc. as a grantor to the deed and skipping the transaction in which appellee was the grantee in the sale from appellant to appellee, thereby avoiding payment of transfer tax on the sale.) Appellee also filled in the deed with the name of the grantee as Charles DeCoatsworth, a sales price of $10,000 and a description of the property.
On January 5, 1984, at a real estate settlement, the property was conveyed from appellant, his wife and appellee to DeCoatsworth. The deed was duly recorded the same day. Appellant and his wife did not attend the real estate settlement because appellee did not notify them of the scheduled date. Appellee failed to discharge all the debts secured by the property as promised in the agreement of sale with appellant and his wife. Appellant and his wife did not receive any money from the sale to DeCoatsworth. Appellant continued to live on the property but refused to pay rent.2
On December 31, 1985, appellant filed suit against appellee for fraud.3 During the trial, the court ordered appellant to join his wife as an indispensable party-plaintiff. Appellant failed to comply and the court deferred the matter until after trial. On June 20, 1990, following an eight day trial, the jury found appellee defrauded appellant and awarded appellant $1 in compensatory damages and $18,000 in punitive damages.
Appellee filed several post-trial motions, including a challenge to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction due to appel*609lant’s failure to join his wife as an indispensable party. The court granted appellee’s motion for judgment n.o.v. based on the court’s conclusion that the fraud was committed on the “entireties,” and thus, appellant’s wife was an indispensable party-plaintiff to appellant’s action.
On appeal, appellant contends transfer of the property to DeCoatsworth terminated the tenancy by the entireties and therefore, appellant was entitled to pursue his personal tort claim for fraud without joining his wife.
A judgment n.o.v. may be entered only in a clear case where the facts are such that no two reasonable persons could fail to agree that the verdict is improper, and should not be entered in cases where the evidence is conflicting upon material fact. Kearns v. Philadelphia Life Insurance Co., 401 Pa.Super. 292, 295, 585 A.2d 53, 54 (1991). On appeal from an order granting judgment n.o.v., a reviewing court is required to consider the evidence, together with all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Id., 401 Pa.Superior Ct. at 295, 585 A.2d at 54. Trans Canada Credit Corp. Ltd. v. Kosack, 404 Pa.Super. 401, 406-07, 590 A.2d 1295, 1298 (1991).
A tenancy by the entireties exists when real or personal property is held jointly by a husband and wife. Clingerman v. Sadowski, 513 Pa. 179, 183, 519 A.2d 378, 380 (1986). A husband and wife do not own separate interests in entireties property and may not independently sever the estate or appropriate property to the exclusion of the other spouse. Id., 513 Pa. at 181-84, 519 A.2d at 380-81.
A tenancy by the entireties is severed only in certain limited circumstances. Id., 513 Pa. at 183, 519 A.2d at 381. Stop 35, Inc. v. Haines, 374 Pa.Super. 604, 607, 543 A.2d 1133, 1135 (1988). During the lifetimes of the husband and wife, termination of an entireties estate occurs only by their joint acts. Estate of Matson, 374 Pa.Super. 61, 74, 542 A.2d 147, 153 (1988). While both husband and wife are alive, the parties can sever the entireties estate by joint conveyance, divorce, or agreement, express or implied. Clingerman, 513 Pa. at 183-84, 519 A.2d at 381. Stop 35, Inc., 374 *610Pa.Super. at 607, 543 A.2d at 1135. Fascione v. Fascione, 272 Pa.Super. 530, 535, 416 A.2d 1023, 1025 (1979).
Instantly, we conclude that appellant and his wife’s conveyance, as co-grantors, of the residential property to De-Coatsworth terminated their estate by the entireties. Appellant does not assert any claim in this action on his wife’s behalf. Appellant’s fraud action asserts only his personal tort claim against appellant. This action is not about setting aside the transfer or rescinding the agreement of sale to recover title to the property. Rather, appellant’s action admits the validity of the transfer and elects as a remedy recovery of damages. Silverman v. Bell Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 367 Pa.Super. 464, 475, 533 A.2d 110, 116 (1987). Since the parties’ joint conveyance severed the entireties estate and appellant does not request reinstatement of prior ownership rights, appellant’s wife is not an indispensable party to appellant’s personal tort claim for fraud.
At trial, appellant had the burden of proving appellee committed fraud or intent to defraud by clear, precise and convincing evidence. B.O. v. C.O., 404 Pa.Super. 127, 131, 590 A.2d 313, 315 (1991). The elements of fraud are: (1) a misrepresentation, (2) a fraudulent utterance thereof, (3) an intention by the maker that the recipient will thereby be induced to act, (4) justifiable reliance by the recipient upon the misrepresentation, and (5) damage to the recipient as the proximate result. Id. at 131, 590 A.2d at 315. Silver-man, at 367 Pa.Super. 470, 533 A.2d at 113 (1987). The jury found appellee defrauded appellant and awarded nominal compensatory and punitive damages. The trial court’s opinion concluded the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence despite its entry of judgment n.o.v.
A review of the evidence in the light most favorable to appellant, as verdict winner, reveals the court relied on an erroneous legal conclusion in support of its entry of judgment n.o.v. Since the conveyance terminated the estate by the entireties and appellant affirms the conveyance, we believe the court erred in concluding that the fraud was committed upon the entireties and that appellant’s wife is *611an indispensable party to appellant’s fraud action. Therefore, we conclude the court improperly entered judgment n.o.v. in favor of appellee.
Vacate the entry of judgment n.o.v., reinstate the jury verdict and direct the entry of judgment in favor of appellant.

. Appellant’s wife did not reside on the property with appellant when they executed the agreement of sale. Appellant and his wife had been separated at least 20 years at the time of transfer. Appellee paid appellant’s wife $1000 for her signature on the agreement of sale and the deed.

. In September of 1984, DeCoatsworth sued to evict appellant from the property. Appellant received $35,000 in damages on a counterclaim for fraud and retained possession of the property. On appeal to this Court, we affirmed in a memorandum decision, DeCoatsworth v. Jones, 394 Pa.Super. 635, 569 A.2d 1388 (1989) (Table).

. Appellant also filed suit against F. Russell Curtis, III, the notary public who acknowledged the signatures of appellant and his wife on the deed, the Frankford Abstract Company and its affiliate Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, which insured title. These parties settled their claims with appellant prior to trial. At trial, appellant withdrew additional counts alleging unconscionability of contract, and violations of the Installment Land Contract Law and the Federal Truth in Lending Act.