Court Opinion

ID: 9680676
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:36:24.569418+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:02.844228
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, J.,
filed a dissenting opinion.
During the punishment phase of appellant’s trial, the trial court, at appellant’s request, omitted from the jury charge the “anti-parties” charge required by Tex. Code Ceim. Proc. art. 37.071, § 2(b)(2). Today the majority overrules this point of error on the basis of the doctrine of “invited error.” Ante, at 529-533.
As we have recognized on several occasions, art. 37.071 was enacted by our legislature as a response to Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-240, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2727, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (decided in conjunction with Branch v. Texas), in which the United States Supreme Court held that the prior Texas death penalty scheme was unconstitutional. See, e.g., Barefield v. State, 784 S.W.2d 38, 45 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), cert. denied, 497 U.S. 1011, 110 S.Ct. 3256, 111 L.Ed.2d 766 (1990); Mead v. State, 645 S.W.2d 279, 280-281 (Tex.Crim.App.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1041, 104 S.Ct. 1318, 79 L.Ed.2d 714 (1984); Staley v. State, 887 S.W.2d 885, 899 (Tex.Crim.App.1994) (Baird, J., concurring), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1020, 115 S.Ct. 1366, 131 L.Ed.2d 222 (1995). The legislature subsequently amended art. 37.071, including § 2(b)(2), in response to Penny v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S.Ct. 2934, 106 L.Ed.2d 256 (1989). See 42 GeoRge E. Dix & RobeRt O. Dawson, Texas Practice-. Criminal Practice and Procedure § 31.70 (1995). It is clear, then, that the legislature has set up a delicate scheme in order to accommodate concerns when there is the possibility that the “ultimate” punishment will be meted out: the taking of a defendant’s life.
Today, however, the majority helps to effectively dismantle this carefully enacted scheme, by relying on a decision from this court which is more than ninety years old, and which itself is based on a line of civil cases. Ante, at 531. Whether stated in terms of “waiver” or “invited error,” it defies common sense to allow the penalty of death to be imposed, despite the failure of the jury to determine the very issues which the legislature has mandated shall be answered in order for that punishment to be authorized. Given the circumstances under which our current capital sentencing scheme was enacted and the concerns addressed by that scheme, such a decision can only be described as reckless.
It is also curious that the majority chooses to ignore the state’s participation in the “invited error.” What is sauce for the gander is sauce for the goose. The statements of defense counsel as noted by the majority are found at S.F. vol. VI, at 181. The trial court agreed to delete special issue No. 2, without objection by the state (S.F., vol. VI, at 182). I am unable to discover anything in the record to support the majority’s statement that the trial court “[forbade] the State from asking the *547prospective jurors about [the anti-parties charge] in voir dire examination.”
During the punishment-charge conference, the following exchange took place:
THE COURT: Anything from the State as to any objections to the Court’s, proposed Court’s charge?
MS. SIEGLER: No, sir.
THE COURT: Any specially requested charges?
MS. SIEGLER: No, sir.
(S.F. vol. XXII, at 1275.) If appellant invited error, then the state is equally culpable in that invitation. If appellant must suffer the consequences of invited error, then so must the state. Because the state did not object to the deletion of the required instruction at the time the trial court agreed to delete it or when specifically queried by the trial court as to possible objections, I would hold that in not objecting to the error the state thereby elected to waive the death penalty, as it may do in any capital case. The appropriate resolution would then be for this Court to reform the sentence to life. I dissent.