Court Opinion

ID: 9467164
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 01:40:30.635237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:40:12.199441
License: Public Domain

ADAMS, Circuit Judge,
concurring.
While I agree that this matter should be remanded, I write separately for two reasons: first, in my view, an incorrect standard was applied in dismissing Bernard Jerry’s claims against Warden Francisco; second, Jerry’s motion to produce additional witnesses should be evaluated after a specific inquiry into the nature of the proffered testimony.
a.
Jerry complains that it was erroneous for his entire case to be dismissed, and also that his request for additional witnesses has never been considered. In finding for all the defendants on the ground that Jerry did not prove that they were responsible for or even aware of the alleged constitutional violations, the magistrate apparently did not distinguish between the guards and the warden. Nor did the magistrate separate Jerry’s complaints about prison conditions and general religious worship policies, on the one hand, from his contentions regarding practices directed at him individually, on the other. While personal involvement or actual knowledge by the defendants of the need for medical attention is a prerequisite for § 1983 liability predicated on inadequate medical care, Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1976), actual knowledge is not always required for other types of § 1983 violations. The liability of supervisory prison personnel under § 1983 turns on whether the prisoner complains about a sporadic incident, which may be beyond the control of a supervisor, or about general conditions and policies properly within the supervisory purview of the officer in charge of the prison.
While it may have been proper to find that the individual guards had no responsibility to Jerry for unsanitary or overcrowded conditions, it was not appropriate to *257dismiss Jerry’s claims against the warden on the ground that the warden was unaware of such conditions at the jail. Under Pennsylvania law, the warden is charged with taking care of the prisoners in a jail that is under his supervision, and he is also responsible for the daily operation of the facility.1 Consequently, a warden cannot escape liability under § 1983 for conditions that allegedly violate the eighth amendment simply by disclaiming awareness of the state of the jail.2 As Chief Judge Lord perceptively pointed out in Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 435 F.Supp. 136 (E.D.Pa. 1977), while concluding that inmates in a city detention center had stated a cause of action against the Mayor and the City Managing Director for allegedly unconstitutional conditions of confinement and treatment, the “existence of general policies and practices within the supervisor’s department can create constructive knowledge on his or her part of the alleged constitutional deprivation.” Id. at 152. In my view, these considerations indicate that on remand the magistrate should ascertain whether the conditions alleged by Jerry amount to a violation of the eighth amendment. If it is determined that they do constitute such a violation, the warden may be subject to liability under § 1983 by virtue of his responsibility for the operation of the jail.
On remand, I believe that the magistrate should also reevaluate Jerry’s first amendment claim. Jerry testified that a guard informed him that there were no arrangements for religious worship in the jail. The guard’s response suggests that there was an institution-wide practice in the facility of not providing religious outlets for the prisoners. Thus, supervisory personnel, such as the warden, may be held responsible in this regard even though they were not personally aware that Jerry had requested a religious advisor, for “reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise the religious freedom guaranteed by the First ... Amendment .... ” Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 1082, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972). It was also improper to dismiss Jerry’s first amendment claim on the ground that he had failed to request a specific religious advisor. When presented with the guard’s response that there were no provisions at the jail for religious observance, it is hardly surprising that an inmate would not press his inquiries by specifically requesting to see a particular person, b.
Remand is also in order because, upon explicit consideration of Jerry’s request for additional witnesses, it may appear that their testimony would remedy the defects in proof that warranted dismissal of plaintiff’s case. The magistrate found that the testimony submitted by Jerry failed, to support a cause of action because of a lack of evidence connecting the defendants with the alleged violations. As pointed out above, this would be a flaw warranting dismissal only with respect to the defendant guards, for whom personal knowledge is a prerequisite to liability. Therefore, in determining whether Jerry should be afforded an opportunity to present the testimony of the supplemental witnesses, the trial court should inquire whether, in this particular case, these witnesses are prepared to supply information bearing on the guard’s knowledge of the conditions at the jail or of Jerry’s physical ailments.
In explicitly ruling on Jerry’s motion for additional witnesses, the magistrate and the district court should be sensitive to the fact that because Jerry is proceeding pro se, his arguments should be construed liberally, rather than literally. The admonition of Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972), that pleadings by pro se plaintiffs should receive generous consideration, would seem to apply to Jerry’s attempts to offer evidence, as well. It does not appear that he fully comprehended his evidentiary burden, the relationship between his pleadings, which named individual defendants, and the need for proof at *258trial, or the specific substantive reasons for which he might need additional testimony. Accordingly, the magistrate and the district court on remand, as I see it, should not confine their examination to Jerry’s initial offer of proof, but rather should specifically inquire whether the witnesses could attest to knowledge by the defendant guards of the alleged transgressions. If Jerry indicates that the additional testimony could not furnish the crucial link, then denial of the motion for additional witnesses would appear to be in order, for he would not be able to surmount the first hurdle of proving an actionable claim against the guards.
Should Jerry be able to demonstrate that the additional witnesses may shed some light on the issue of defendants’ knowledge, the court should then inquire, I believe, whether the witnesses could offer testimony that would bolster the plaintiff’s substantive allegations. This is so because the magistrate also found that Jerry’s proof was insufficient to establish that constitutional violations had occurred, whether or not the guard defendants were aware of them. If it appears that the additional witnesses might remedy either of the specified deficiencies in the proof, the district court, in my view, should grant Jerry’s motion for the subpoenaing of such witnesses.

. Pa.Stat.Ann. tit. 61, § 409 (Purdon).

. See DiMarzo v. Cahill, 575 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1978); Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1977).