Court Opinion

ID: 9809898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:31:23.541677+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:39:05.905748
License: Public Domain

BbowN, J.,
dissenting: The defendant admits the contract sued upon and the amount of the indebtedness, but alleges that the execution of the contract was procured by the fraudulent and false representations of the plaintiff’s agent, Massey. His Honor held that there was no sufficient evidence to support the *15defendant’s plea. In this ruling I concur, as I am of opinion that the evidence of fraud is entirely too shadowy.
The defendant Bullo.ck testified that the agent, Massey, said that there was a large territory in this and the adjoining counties that machines could be handled'in; that he asked Massey if Kittrell of Oxford had not been handling these machines. Massey said that Kittrell had been handling them, but he was not going to handle them any longer; and that he did not intend to sell any more machines to Kittrell; that Kittrell had only two or three machines on hand.
The witness testified that in consequence of this conversation, he signed the order for the machines and that they were shipped to him from Cleveland; that he put his men to selling them, and finding out that Kittrell was selling the same machine, he stopped his men and notified the plaintiff that the machines were subject to their order.
The only real misstatement that I can see is in reference to the number of machines Kittrell had on hand. Massey stated he had two or three. It turned out afterwards that Kittrell had on hand fifty or sixty. There is nothing to show that Massey made an intentional false statement.
The agency of Kittrell was not continued, as the correspondence shows, and the fact that Kittrell had more machines than had been stated by plaintiff was scarcely a determining factor in the defendant’s decision. In so large a territory fifty additional machines would make but little difference.
It is in evidence that Oreedmoor, where the plaintiffs did business, is only 18 miles from Oxford, where Kittrell was established, and that the two places were connected by daily mail, telephone, and telegraph.
I am of opinion that the representations relied upon to establish fraud do, not come up to the general definition of a misrepresentation of a subsisting fact. Hill v. Gettys, 135 N. C., 375. They appear to me to be “promissory representations,” looking to the future, and to be entirely void of any fraudulent purpose.
The circumstances surrounding the parties were such that the plaintiffs had every opportunity to make inquiry at any mo*16ment of Kittrell, as to bis future intentions in regard to band-ling tbe machines., as well as to tbe number wbicb be bad on band.
It is a general principle tbat if tbe means of knowledge be at band and equally available to both parties, and tbe subject-matter be. open to inquiry of both alike, and there be no' fiduciary relation, and no warranty of tbe facts, tbe party complaining must show tbat be has availed himself of tbe existing means of information at tbe time of the transaction. Greenleaf v. Gerald, 94 Me., 91. If the circumstances attending tbe transaction are such as would put a reasonable person on inquiry, tbe law will not presume deceit. Champion v. Woods, 19 Cal., 17.
As is said by Mr. Justice Field in Slaughter v. Gerson, 13 Wallace, 379:
“Where tbe means of knowledge are at band and equally available to both parties, if tbe purchaser does not avail himself of these means, be will not be beard to say tbat be has been deceived by tbe vendor’s misrepresentations. If, having eyes, be will not see matters directly before them where no concealment is made or attempted, be will not be entitled to favorable consideration when be complains that be has suffered from bis own voluntary blindness and been misled by overconfidence in tbe statements of another. Tbe reason for this doctrine is based upon tbe ground tbat public policy requires people to exercise at least ordinary prudence in their business dealings instead of calling on tbe courts to relieve them from tbe consequences of their inattention and negligence.”
To rescind tbe contract for fraud in procuring it, this Court has said tbat tbe injured party must act promptly and within reasonable time after be should have discovered tbe fraud by due diligence, and be is not allowed to rescind in part and affirm in part. May v. Loomis, 140 N. C., 352.
Tbe vendee is not permitted to be culpably negligent in cases where be ought to have informed himself of'tbe facts, and to fall back upon an alleged reliance upon tbe vendor’s representations. Ramsey v. Wallace, 100 N. C., 82; 14 A. and E., 117.
*17In addition' to tbe fact tbat tbe representations in tbis case are largely of a promissory character (Cash Register v. Townsend, 137 N. C., 655), it appears to be undisputed tbat tbe plaintiff bad every opportunity to make inquiry of Kittrell, and tbat be delayed a most unreasonable time. He signed tbe order, sent it to Cleveland, 0., received tbe machines after they were shipped to him, put bis men on tbe road to sell them, and sold a number of them without making any inquiry whatever of Kittrell.
As be bad every opportunity to inform himself in advance, without any sort of inconvenience or delay, it was tbe defendant’s negligence tbat be failed to do so. '
MR. Justice Allen concurs in tbis opinion.