Court Opinion

ID: 8267611
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2022-10-16 19:12:28.454098+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:43:25.279390
License: Public Domain

*560The opinion c i“ the court was delivered by
Beasley, C. J.
I agree with the vice-chancellor in his settlement of the disputed facts in .'.his case, but it seems to me that an error has crept into the, decree with respect to the marshaling of the encumbrances. 1 These liens are of this character: the mortgage first in date is held by the appellant, Hoag; then comes a mortgage held by Frederick Fisher, one of the defendants, and lastly is the judgment of the defendant Sayre. This first mortgage was not recorded in the proper county, and therefore is subordinate to the judgment, but it is paramount to the second mortgage, which was taken with knowledge of the existence of this first lien. In this state of things, the decree places the judgment and the first mortgage, by way of preference, before the second mortgage. This, as it seems to me, is unjust and inadmissible.
Upon what possible principle is the result in this case to be justified ? Fisher, when he took his mortgage, knew that there was an antecedent mortgage on the same property, securing the sum of $2,150, with interest. He had his own mortgage duly recorded, so that it became incontestably the second legal lien; in this position of affairs this judgment is entered, and he at once finds himself, without any fault on his part, degraded from the position of a second encumbrancer to that of a third encum-brancer, and instead of the mortgaged property being subject to a claim prior to his own of but $2,150, it is subject to paramount claims which amount to the sum of $5,150. If such a principle be correct, it does not appear that any person, under any circumstances, can take a second or other subordinate mortgage upon property, without putting his interests in the utmost jeopardy. Under the prevalence of such a rule of law, a subsequent encum-brancer would be obliged to see that the status of the primary encumbrance was, in all respects, unexceptionable, under penalty, if a flaw should be undetected, of having his lien superseded by every judgment that might be entered at a later date. Such a rule would be as inexpedient as it would be unjust.
*561I cannot but think that any one' who will look carefully into the subject will perceive that no rule applicable to such a juncture as this can be admissible that is not founded on the theory of. leaving the second mortgagee in the position originally acquired by him, without respect to the neglects or shortcomings of the holder of the previous mortgage or the subsequent judgments of creditors. Viewed in this aspect, this would be the result: the judgment creditor would, in the marshaling of these liens, take priority over the first mortgage; as between the judgment and that mortgage, the former must be first paid. But with respect to the second mortgage, the judgment creditor, as such, has no claim to stand first, his only claim in that regard being his right to stand in the shoes of the first mortgagee, and assert all the privileges incident to that position. But he can exact nothing further than such privileges; he can legally say that he has the paramount lien on the property to the extent of the sum secured by the first mortgage; but he cannot legally say that, with respect to the second mortgagee, he has any paramount lien beyond this. No additional burthen can be put upon the land to the detriment of the second mortgagee. If the judgment be for a sum greater than that secured by the first mortgage, then, by right of representation, such judgment will constitute the first lien to the full extent, and no further, of the first mortgage; if it be for a less sum than the first mortgage, it will take precedence and consume the first mortgage to that extent only. It will be observed that by these adjustments the priority of the first mortgage, with regard to the second mortgage, will be exhausted, either partially or wholly, so that, to the extent of such exhaustion, it will be postponed to the second mortgage.
The doctrine thus propounded is but the development of the principle maintained and acted on in Clement v. Kaighn, 2 McCart 48. In that case there was a judgment without an execution ; then a mortgage, and then judgments on which executions had been taken out. These latter judgments were entitled to precedence over the first, but were subordinate to the mortgage. Chancellor Green decided that the first judgment on the mort*562gaged premises, by reason of the failure to sue out execution upon it, should be postponed to the encumbrance of the junior judgments, and, as an inevitable consequence, that it should be postponed to the mortgage which was prior to the junior judgments, and whose priority was not to be affected by any laches of the holder of such prior judgment.
In my opinion, the decree in this case should be modified so as to direct the payment of these encumbrances in this order, viz.: first, the judgment of Sayre to the amount secured by the first mortgage; second, the payment of the residue of such judgment and the second mortgage, pari passu, as they were concurrent liens, being entered on the same day; third, the payment of the first mortgage.