Court Opinion

ID: 9961512
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-19 05:07:22.664927+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:20:51.351947
License: Public Domain

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
                   revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

                           STATE OF MICHIGAN

                            COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,                                      UNPUBLISHED
                                                                      April 18, 2024
                Plaintiff-Appellant,

v                                                                     No. 367901
                                                                      Wayne Circuit Court
MARK DAVID WOOLLEY,                                                   LC No. 22-007747-01-FC

                Defendant-Appellee.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and O’BRIEN and MALDONADO, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

       In this interlocutory appeal, the prosecution appeals by leave granted1 the trial court’s order
granting defendant’s motion to suppress statements he made to law enforcement during two
custodial interviews and a polygraph examination. Defendant was charged with six counts of first-
degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520b(2)(b) (victim less than 13 years old) and two
counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct, MCL 750.520c(2)(b) (victim less than 13 years
old). We reverse with respect to the first interview but otherwise affirm.

                                        I. BACKGROUND

        Defendant was arrested following disclosures of sexual abuse made by his grandchild.
Following his arrest, defendant was interviewed by police, and the next day he submitted to a
polygraph examination. Later that day, a second interview was conducted, and during the second
interview, defendant confessed to engaging in sexual contact with the complainant on numerous
occasions while the complainant was between the ages of 9 and 12. Specifically, defendant
described masturbating on the complainant’s buttocks, performing fellatio on the complainant, and
making the complainant perform fellatio on him. Defendant moved for suppression of these
inculpatory statements, asserting that he was questioned in violation of his Miranda2 rights because

1
  People v Woolley, unpublished order of the Court of Appeals, entered November 15, 2023
(Docket No. 367901).
2
    Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436; 86 S Ct 1602;16 L Ed2d 694 (1966).

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he asserted his right to an attorney. The trial court agreed with defendant, and his statements were
suppressed. This appeal followed.

                                         II. DISCUSSION

        The prosecution argues that the trial court erred by finding that defendant unequivocally
invoked his right to counsel. With the exception of defendant’s statement early in the first
interview, we disagree.

        This Court reviews “de novo a trial court’s ultimate decision on a motion to suppress on
the basis of an alleged constitutional violation.” People v Gingrich, 307 Mich App 656, 661; 862
NW2d 432 (2014). This Court reviews for clear error a trial court’s findings of fact from a
suppression hearing. Id. “A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if, after a review of the entire
record, an appellate court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”
Id. 661 (quotation marks and citation omitted). This Court reviews de novo “[a]ny ancillary
questions of law relevant to the motion to suppress . . . .” Id.

        “The right against self-incrimination is guaranteed by both the United States Constitution
and the Michigan Constitution.” People v Tierney, 266 Mich App 687, 707; 703 NW2d 204
(2005), citing US Const, Am V; Const 1963, art 1, § 17. Thus, “[a] criminal defendant enjoys
safeguards against involuntary self-incrimination during custodial interrogations.” People v Henry
(After Remand), 305 Mich App 127, 145; 854 NW2d 114 (2014). Among these safeguards is the
right to have counsel present during a custodial interrogation “because the presence of counsel at
custodial interrogation is one way in which to insure that statements made in the government-
established atmosphere are not the product of compulsion.” People v Elliott, 494 Mich 292, 301;
833 NW2d 284 (2013) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Before a person may be subjected
to custodial interrogation, “the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence
of an attorney, either retained or appointed.” Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct
1602;16 L Ed2d 694 (1966). When a suspect invokes his right to counsel, the police must
immediately cease questioning the suspect and cannot resume questioning until counsel is present.
Tierney, 266 Mich App at 710-711.

         “However, the defendant’s invocation of his right to counsel must be unequivocal.” Id. at
711. A suspect’s assertion of his or her right to counsel is unequivocal if the assertion is
unambiguous. See, e.g., Henry (After Remand), 305 Mich App at 147. Police are not required to
immediately cease questioning “if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or
equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only
that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel . . . .” Davis v US, 512 US 452, 459; 114 S
Ct 2350; 129 L Ed 2d 362 (1994). A suspect who has properly invoked his right to counsel can
later waive his right to counsel without the presence of an attorney. People v Harris, 261 Mich
App 44, 54; 680 NW2d 17 (2004). When a defendant asserts his right to counsel but later
reinitiates a conversation with police, “the proper inquiry is whether the defendant reinitiated a
conversation on the subject matter of the investigation and whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel . . . .” People
v Clark, 330 Mich App 392, 418; 948 NW2d 604 (2019).

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        With respect to what constitutes an unequivocal and unambiguous assertion of the right to
counsel, the Supreme Court in Davis concluded that the defendant did not unequivocally or
unambiguously assert his right to counsel when the defendant stated during a custodial interview,
“Maybe I should talk to a lawyer.” Davis, 512 US at 462. This Court has also previously
considered whether a defendant’s assertion of his right to counsel during a custodial interrogation
was unequivocal and unambiguous. In Tierney, this Court held that the defendant’s statements
that “[m]aybe I should talk to an attorney” and “I might want to talk to an attorney” were not
unequivocal assertions of the defendant’s right to counsel. Tierney, 266 Mich App at 711. This
Court has also held that a defendant did not unequivocally assert her right to counsel by asking
police, “Shouldn’t I have a lawyer?” McBride, 273 Mich App at 258-259.

                                     A. FIRST INTERVIEW

        The trial court erred by finding that defendant unequivocally and unambiguously asserted
his right to counsel by stating during the first interview on November 17, 2022, “I think I should
call my attorney,” because “a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have
understood only that [defendant] might be invoking the right to counsel . . . .” Davis, 512 US at
459. Defendant’s statement was similar to the equivocal statement of the defendant in Davis that
“[m]aybe I should talk to a lawyer.” Id. at 462. It is also similar to the equivocal statements of
the defendant in Tierney that “[m]aybe I should talk to an attorney” and “I might want to talk to
an attorney.” Tierney, 266 Mich App at 711. In both Davis and Tierney, the defendants’
statements expressed an uncertainty as to whether they wanted to speak with an attorney. Here,
defendant’s use of the phrase “I think” to preface his statement that “I should call my attorney”
expresses the same degree of uncertainty as the equivocal statements of the defendants in Davis
and Tierney. Further, suggesting that he should call an attorney is not the same as stating that he
will or that he wants to.

       Moreover, as argued by the prosecution, defendant’s statement that “I think I should call
my attorney” was not an unequivocal assertion of his right to counsel because defendant continued
to speak with police unprompted after making this statement. After stating that “I think I should
call my attorney,” defendant continued to discuss the subject matter of the investigation as follows:

       And then, also, I think I should call my attorney, right, and at least have—you know,
       I mean, the fact that [complainant] said something takes it beyond a point where
       it’s just my daughter trying to destroy me, I guess. And that was a thing we kept
       talking about as a family, is what is her end game here? Does she want money? I
       don’t [inaudible]. Does she want, you know, what is it? You know, and I can’t
       figure this out, you know, because—it just—the ball just kept—everything just kept
       changing. And then this is where it lands. And it’s so preposterous that it’s, you
       know—and then now to say that [complainant] is saying this, these things, when I
       know them not to be true. I’m—I can’t say it enough. I cannot say it enough. But
       I am—I will get information from my doctor, I will get, you know, whatever
       information you guys need to debunk this, I guess, for lack of a better term because
       I don’t know. Is this his way of wanting to get back home? I don’t know.

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In light of the uncertain nature of defendant’s statement that “I think I should call my attorney”
and the fact that defendant continued to discuss the subject matter of the investigation unprompted
after making this statement, a reasonable officer would understand only that defendant might want
to assert his right to counsel; thus, this statement was not an unequivocal assertion of defendant’s
right to counsel, and the police were not required to cease questioning defendant after this
statement.

                                        B. POLYGRAPH

       The prosecution next argues that defendant’s statement on November 17, 2022, regarding
wanting an attorney before taking the polygraph examination was not an ambiguous and
unequivocal assertion of his right to counsel. We disagree.

        As an initial matter, the trial court misconstrued Detective Wilson’s testimony regarding
when defendant made the statement that he wanted an attorney to ensure, as paraphrased by
Detective Wilson, that “no funny stuff” occurred during the polygraph examination. The trial
court found that

       the defense attorney, Mr. Matthews, states to Detective Wilson that he is going to
       call a criminal attorney and despite him saying that[,] Detective Wilson then returns
       to Mr. Woolley and discusses the polygraph examination and in discussing whether
       he wishes to take the polygraph[,] Mr. Woolley’s first statement is, “I want an
       attorney to make sure the polygraph is on par and for him to sit with me in the
       polygraph to make sure it is standard, no funny stuff[.]”

Thus, it appears that the trial court was under the misapprehension that defendant made this
statement on November 18, 2022, after meeting with Matthews. However, it appears that
Detective Wilson’s testimony regarding defendant’s comment about “no funny stuff” was a
paraphrasing of defendant’s statements at the end of the first interview on November 17, 2022,
that “I’d also like to contact my attorney so he can arrange for whatever, you know, kind of thing,”
and that “I want to ask [my attorney], like, you know—look, I’m being honest, I’m being up
front . . . and now, I will take a polygraph test. That’s not going to change my mind because, you
know, right now I’m very anxious.” Having clarified that the statement regarding “no funny stuff”
was made during the first interview on November 17, 2022, and not on November 18, 2022, we
will now address whether the trial court erred by finding these statements to be an unequivocal
and unambiguous assertion of defendant’s right to counsel.

        The trial court did not err by finding that defendant’s statements regarding speaking with
an attorney in advance of the polygraph examination were unambiguous and unequivocal
assertions of defendant’s right to counsel. Defendant clearly stated during the first interview, “I’d
also like to contact my attorney so he can arrange for whatever, you know, kind of thing.” This
statement by defendant clearly communicated his desire to assert his right to counsel. If Detective
Wilson was under any misapprehension that defendant was asserting his right to counsel, that
misapprehension was clarified by defendant when Detective Wilson asked if defendant wanted to
speak with his attorney before the polygraph examination and defendant responded that he would
take the polygraph examination, but he wanted to ask his attorney unspecified questions. The trial

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court did not clearly err by finding that these statements by defendant communicated that he
wanted to speak with an attorney in advance of the polygraph.

        The prosecution also argues that defendant’s statements on November 17, 2022, regarding
wanting an attorney before taking the polygraph examination were merely inquiries into the way
the process worked and, therefore, do not constitute unambiguous and unequivocal assertions of
the right to counsel. It is true that a defendant does not unequivocally assert the right to counsel
merely by inquiring into whether he or she may speak to an attorney during a custodial
interrogation. People v Adams, 245 Mich App 226, 238; 627 NW2d 623 (2001). In the instant
case, however, defendant’s statements were not inquiries into whether he was allowed to have an
attorney. Defendant told Detective Wilson that he wanted to contact his attorney “so [his attorney]
can arrange for whatever,” and indicated that he had questions that he wanted to ask his attorney.
Nothing about defendant’s statements suggests that he was merely asking Detective Wilson
whether he was entitled to have an attorney or how the polygraph examination process worked.
As the trial court found, defendant’s statements regarding his attorney and the polygraph
examination were unequivocal assertions of his right to counsel.

                              C. SUBSEQUENT QUESTIONING

       The prosecution argues that even if defendant unequivocally asserted his right to counsel
on November 17, 2022, he waived that right on November 18, 2022, by acknowledging and
waiving his Miranda rights before undergoing the polygraph examination and again before the
second interview with Detective Wilson and Detective McNamara. We disagree.

        It is true that a defendant who asserts the right to counsel can later waive the right to
counsel. Harris, 261 Mich App at 54. However, once a suspect unequivocally asserts the right to
counsel, police must immediately cease questioning the suspect until counsel is present, Tierney,
266 Mich App at 710-711, or until the defendant reinitiates a conversation with police about the
subject matter of the investigation and the defendant knowingly and intelligently waives the
previously asserted right to counsel, Clark, 330 Mich App at 419. It is undisputed that defendant’s
counsel was not present for the polygraph examination or postpolygraph interview with Detective
McNamara. It is also undisputed that defendant read and signed a Miranda waiver before
undergoing the polygraph examination. Thus, to determine whether defendant waived his
previously asserted right to counsel with respect to the polygraph examination and postpolygraph
interview, the proper inquiry is whether defendant reinitiated a conversation with police about the
subject matter of the investigation. Id.

         Our Supreme Court has previously considered under what circumstances a defendant
reinitiates contact with police with respect to a polygraph examination such that the defendant
validly waives the right to counsel. See People v Anderson, 446 Mich 392, 402-404; 521 NW2d
538 (1994). In Anderson, the Supreme Court held that the defendant did not reinitiate contact with
police such that he validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the defendant
requested a polygraph examination before he was arraigned but the examination was not offered

                                                -5-
or conducted until after he was arraigned.3 Id. at 403-404. The Court held that after the defendant
was arraigned and requested appointed counsel, his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was
invoked; thus “the general prohibition against further police interrogation was invoked, absent any
subsequent initiation and waiver by defendant.” Id. at 403 (footnotes omitted). Though the
polygraph examination was requested by the defendant before he invoked his right to counsel, the
Court held that the defendant did not reinitiate contact with police for the purposes of a waiver of
the right to counsel by undergoing the polygraph examination because the polygraph examination
was initiated by police contacting the defendant after he had invoked his right to counsel. Id. at
404.

        Similarly, this Court has held that police obtained inculpatory statements from a defendant
in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel when the inculpatory statements were made
following a polygraph examination that occurred after the defendant invoked his right to counsel.
People v Harrington, 258 Mich App 703, 706-707; 672 NW2d 344 (2003). In Harrington, police
discussed the possibility of taking a polygraph examination with the defendant prior to his
arraignment but did not contact the defendant to arrange and conduct the polygraph examination
until after the defendant’s arraignment when counsel was appointed and defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to counsel was invoked. Id. at 704-705. Thus, the Court held it was the police—
not the defendant—who reinitiated communications about the subject matter of the investigation
after the defendant invoked his right to counsel. This Court rejected the argument that the
defendant reinitiated communication with police by asking to speak with them after the polygraph
examination, thereby waiving his right to counsel, because “[t]he statements allegedly elicited
from defendant were obtained during the course of ongoing contact that was originally initiated by
the police.” Id. at 707.

         Defendant did not waive his previously asserted right to counsel with respect to the
polygraph examination and postpolygraph interview with Detective McNamara. Like the
defendants in Anderson and Harrington, defendant discussed with police the possibility of taking
a polygraph examination before he asserted his right to counsel. Further, as in Anderson and
Harrington, after defendant asserted his right to counsel, police reinitiated contact with defendant
for the purposes of arranging and administering a polygraph examination. In Anderson and
Harrington, the mere fact that the defendants underwent polygraph examinations did not constitute
reinitiating contact with police; rather, the point that contact was reinitiated in both cases was when
police contacted the defendants, after they invoked their rights to counsel, to arrange and
administer the polygraph examination. Anderson, 446 Mich at 403-404; Harrington, 258 Mich
App at 707. The same is true in the instant case: after defendant unequivocally asserted his right
to counsel on November 17, 2022, police reinitiated contact with defendant for the purposes of
arranging and administering the polygraph examination. Thus, with respect to the polygraph
examination and postpolygraph interview with Detective McNamara, defendant did not validly
waive his previously asserted right to counsel because defendant did not reinitiate the contact with

3
 Though the issue in Anderson involved the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel, our
Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he inquiry regarding waivers of Sixth Amendment rights
mirrors the inquiry of whether a defendant has validly waived his Fifth Amendment rights . . . .”
People v Williams, 470 Mich 634, 640; 683 NW2d 597 (2004).

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police. The trial court, therefore, did not err by suppressing defendant’s inculpatory statements
made during the postpolygraph interview with Detective McNamara.

        The trial court likewise did not err by suppressing defendant’s statements during the second
interview. Detective McNamara testified that after the polygraph examination and postpolygraph
interview, defendant asked to speak with Detective Wilson because “[h]e wanted to be truthful and
get what he told [Detective McNamara] off his chest.” Defendant and Detective McNamara
thereafter went to a different interview room where they were joined by Detective Wilson. This
is similar to Harrington because the second interview was part of a “course of ongoing contact
that was originally initiated by the police.” Harrington, 258 Mich App at 707. Indeed, the
interview took place the same day as the polygraph examination, and the purpose of the interview
was to follow up on the statements made during the examination.

        Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for additional proceedings consistent with
this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.

                                                             /s/ Michael J. Riordan
                                                             /s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
                                                             /s/ Allie Greenleaf Maldonado

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