Court Opinion

ID: 9555069
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-10 18:00:42.467958+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:41:05.931684
License: Public Domain

Case: 22-60198     Document: 00516853298         Page: 1     Date Filed: 08/10/2023

              United States Court of Appeals
                   for the Fifth Circuit                              United States Court of Appeals
                                                                               Fifth Circuit

                                    ____________                             FILED
                                                                       August 10, 2023
                                     No. 22-60198                       Lyle W. Cayce
                                    ____________                             Clerk

   Emmy Okafor Gabriel,

                                                                      Petitioner,

                                        versus

   Merrick Garland, U.S. Attorney General,

                                                                     Respondent.
                  ______________________________

                     Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals
                           Agency No. A078 563 990
                  ______________________________

   Before Richman, Chief Judge, and Jones and Ho, Circuit Judges.
   Per Curiam: *
          Emmy Gabriel petitions this court for review of an order of the Board
   of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) denying his motion for remand and
   dismissing his appeal from the denial of relief from removal as well as the
   denial of a motion for a continuance. For the following reasons, we DENY
   Gabriel’s petition for review.

          _____________________
          *
            Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
   opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
   circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 22-60198      Document: 00516853298          Page: 2   Date Filed: 08/10/2023

                                    No. 22-60198

                                I. Background
          In 2012, Gabriel, a native and citizen of Nigeria, was charged with
   being removable as an arriving alien without valid immigration documents.
   See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)(i)(I). In January 2013, Gabriel, represented by
   counsel K. Omari Fullerton, appeared before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”),
   who sustained the charge of removability and ordered that all applications for
   relief from removal be filed by his scheduled merits hearing in September
   2013. The hearing date was reset multiple times, and the case was eventually
   transferred to a different immigration court.
          At a November 2017 hearing before the new IJ, Fullerton advised that
   Gabriel was seeking cancellation of removal, asylum, and, in the alternative,
   voluntary departure. An individual hearing was set for February 2019, and
   the IJ stated that the filing deadline would be 30 days prior to the hearing.
   Two weeks before the deadline, Fullerton unsuccessfully moved for a
   continuance because of a scheduling conflict.
          At the February 2019 hearing, the IJ noted that no applications for
   relief from removal had been filed with the court. Fullerton explained that
   he had mistakenly filed the application for cancellation of removal with the
   agency rather than with the IJ and that he had a copy of the filing receipt but
   not the application. Fullerton requested a continuance, asserting that he had
   been sick and had gone through an operation and that the improper filing was
   a mishap. Noting that no applications had been filed “despite the almost
   decade-long period of time that [Gabriel] ha[d] been in proceedings,” the IJ
   denied a continuance for lack of good cause.
          Ultimately, the IJ denied as abandoned the applications for
   cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and protection
   under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), reasoning that Gabriel had

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   not provided a reasonable explanation for the failure to file those applications.
   The IJ granted Gabriel’s alternative request for voluntary departure.
          Gabriel, represented by new counsel, appealed to the BIA. He
   challenged the IJ’s denial of his motion for a continuance, and he moved for
   a remand on the ground that Fullerton rendered ineffective assistance of
   counsel that resulted in the agency’s failure to consider his request for
   cancellation of removal. He asserted that Fullerton’s ineffective assistance
   “completely prevented any consideration of the [requested] relief,” thus
   prejudicing him by depriving him of the opportunity to be heard.
          The BIA denied Gabriel’s motion to remand, dismissed his appeal,
   and declined to reinstate his voluntary departure period. The BIA affirmed
   both the IJ’s denial of a continuance based on Gabriel’s failure to meet the
   filing deadlines and the IJ’s denial of relief from removal as abandoned. With
   regard to the motion seeking remand for the consideration of Gabriel’s newly
   filed application for cancellation of removal, the BIA determined that Gabriel
   had not sufficiently complied with the requirements for raising an ineffective
   assistance claim as set forth in Matter of Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. 637 (BIA
   1988), and, further, that he had not shown that Fullerton’s actions prejudiced
   his case.
          Gabriel timely filed this petition for review.
                          II. Standard of Review
          This court reviews the BIA’s decision and considers the IJ’s decision
   only to the extent it influenced the BIA. Singh v. Sessions, 880 F.3d 220, 224
   (5th Cir. 2018). Questions of law, including constitutional challenges, are
   reviewed de novo. Nkenglefac v. Garland, 34 F.4th 422, 427 (5th Cir. 2022).
   Factual findings are reviewed under the substantial evidence test, meaning
   that this court may not overturn factual findings unless the evidence compels
   a contrary conclusion. Chun v. INS, 40 F.3d 76, 78 (5th Cir. 1994).

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                                    III. Discussion
           Gabriel challenges the BIA’s dismissal of his appeal from the IJ’s
   denial of his motion for a continuance. 1 He also contests the BIA’s denial of
   his motion to remand due to ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to
   his application for cancellation of removal. We address both arguments in
   turn.
                      A. Denial of the Motion for a Continuance
           This court has jurisdiction to review the agency’s denial of a
   continuance in removal proceedings. Ahmed v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 433, 437
   (5th Cir. 2006). “The grant of a continuance lies within the sound discretion
   of the IJ, who may grant a continuance for good cause shown.” Masih v.
   Mukasey, 536 F.3d 370, 373 (5th Cir. 2008); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.29
   (effective to Jan. 14, 2021). 2 This court thus reviews the grant or denial of a
   continuance for abuse of discretion. Masih, 536 F.3d at 373. Under that
   standard, this court will uphold the BIA’s decision unless it is “capricious,
   racially invidious, utterly without foundation in the evidence, or otherwise so
   aberrational that it is arbitrary rather than the result of any perceptible
   rational approach.” Cabral v. Holder, 632 F.3d 886, 889–90 & n.2 (5th Cir.
   2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
           Under the regulations in effect at the time of the IJ’s decision, an IJ
   “may set and extend time limits for the filing of applications and related

           _____________________
           1
             Gabriel implicitly acknowledges that, without a continuance for the filing of his
   applications for relief from removal, such applications were abandoned, as the IJ found and
   the BIA affirmed.
           2
              Approximately two years after the IJ’s decision, this regulation was amended so
   that an IJ now may not, “in the absence of exceptional circumstances,” grant a continuance
   that would cause the adjudication of an asylum application to exceed 180 days. 8 C.F.R.
   § 1003.29.

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                                    No. 22-60198

   documents” and, “[i]f an application or document is not filed within the time
   set by the [IJ], the opportunity to file that application or document shall be
   deemed waived.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.31(c) (effective to Jan. 14, 2021). As this
   court has explained, “[a]gency regulation provides a clear rule about missing
   deadlines set by the IJ,” and “[t]he BIA’s precedent has held parties to those
   deadlines.” Gonzalez-Castelan v. Garland, 858 F. App’x 780, 781 (5th Cir.
   2021) (citing Matter of Islam, 25 I & N Dec. 637, 642 (BIA 2011); Matter of R-
   R-, 20 I & N Dec. 547, 549 (BIA 1992)).
          In Gonzalez-Castelan, this court held the parties to the IJ’s filing
   deadlines. 858 F. App’x at 780-81. There, the alien’s counsel requested two
   weeks to file an application for cancellation of removal, and the IJ granted the
   request after “ma[king] an explicit warning to counsel about abandonment.”
   Id. at 781. Nevertheless, counsel filed the application eight days past the
   deadline and then requested at a hearing eleven days later that the IJ grant a
   post hoc motion for continuance and accept the late filing. Id. The IJ denied
   the continuance motion and pretermitted the late cancellation of removal
   application, and the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision. Id. at 780–81. This court
   denied the alien’s petition for review, explaining that “[t]he IJ’s decision
   [wa]s not arbitrary—to the contrary, it was reasonably based on counsel’s
   own request.” Id. at 781.
          Similarly, in this case, the first IJ ordered in open court the filing of
   any and all applications for relief from removal by September 16, 2013, and
   then, after the case was transferred, the new IJ imposed in open court a filing
   deadline of 30 days prior to the merits hearing on February 21, 2019.
   Fullerton willingly accepted these deadlines when they were imposed, and he
   did not object to them in any timely motion thereafter. Rather, two weeks
   after the second deadline expired, he filed an unsuccessful motion to
   continue the hearing due to a schedule conflict, and then, at the hearing, he

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   unsuccessfully moved for a continuance to allow him the opportunity to file
   a cancellation of removal application.
            While conceding that Fullerton was “undeserving of another chance
   to file what he had repeatedly failed to file,” Gabriel argues that he personally
   was deserving of a continuance because he is an innocent party and should
   not be penalized for his counsel’s failures. However, in Gonzalez-Castelan,
   858 F. App’x at 781, this court declined to overturn the denial of a
   continuance based on similar errors by the alien’s counsel, without any
   discussion of whether the alien himself erred. As the Supreme Court has
   explained, an attorney is his client’s agent, and the client is bound by his
   attorney’s negligent failure to meet a filing deadline. Maples v. Thomas,
   565 U.S. 266, 280–81 (2012). Accordingly, Gabriel has failed to show that
   the BIA abused its discretion in affirming the IJ’s denial of the requested
   continuance. See Cabral, 632 F.3d at 890.
                        B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
            Gabriel also contests the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand on the
   basis that his counsel was constitutionally deficient for failing to timely file
   his application for cancellation of removal. We have jurisdiction to review
   Gabriel’s constitutional claim on the merits. See Gutierrez-Morales v. Homan,
   461 F.3d 605, 609 (5th Cir. 2006); 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(D). “[B]ecause
   deportation hearings are considered civil in nature, there is no Sixth
   Amendment right to counsel.” Goonsuwan v. Ashcroft, 252 F.3d 383, 385 n.2
   (5th Cir. 2001). Nevertheless, we continue to assume “without deciding that
   an alien’s claim of ineffective assistance may implicate due process concerns
   under the Fifth Amendment.” Mai v. Gonzales, 473 F.3d 162, 165 (5th Cir.
   2006).
            However, Gabriel’s claim falters off the blocks because he has “no
   constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel in pursuing purely

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   discretionary relief such as cancellation of removal.” Flores-Moreno v. Barr,
   971 F.3d 541, 545 n.2 (5th Cir. 2020). This is because “the failure to receive
   relief that is purely discretionary in nature does not amount to a deprivation
   of a liberty interest” protected by the Due Process Clause. Assaad v. Ashcroft,
   378 F.3d 471, 475 (5th Cir. 2004). Thus, “when there is no due process right
   to the ultimate relief sought, there is no due process right to effective
   assistance of counsel in pursuit of that relief.” Gutierrez-Morales, 461 F.3d at
   609. 3
            Consequently, we hold that the BIA did not err in denying Gabriel’s
   motion to remand based on his counsel’s failure to timely file a cancellation
   of removal application.
            For the foregoing reasons, Gabriel’s petition for review is DENIED.

            _____________________
            3
                Additionally, Gabriel cursorily alleges that his removal proceedings were
   fundamentally unfair because he was deprived of his due process right to be heard. This
   claim fails as well because an “alien has no due process right to a hearing to determine his
   eligibility for relief that is purely discretionary.” Gutierrez-Morales, 461 F.3d at 610.

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