Court Opinion

ID: 9544646
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 16:58:36.95426+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:13:21.870417
License: Public Domain

*899NESBETT, Chief Justice
(dissenting-).
I dissent.
In Peters v. Benson 1 this court said:
The trial court has a wide discretion in determining whether a mistrial should be declared. As in other instances where discretionary authority is exercised, we decline to interfere other than in exceptional circumstances and to prevent a miscarriage of justice. (Emphasis supplied.)
This was a good rule for it gave the., trial judge sufficient latitude to insure that a fair and just trial was had by both sides. This court would not interfere with the trial court’s discretionary action except to prevent a miscarriage of justice. In Selman v. State 2 we said:
When a defendant creates the situation whereby he is removed from jeopardy he thereby waives his right to plead former jeopardy at another trial of the case. (Emphasis supplied.)
This was likewise a good and fair rule, based on reason and respectable authority. If a defendant by his own action or conduct created the situation which resulted in removing him from j eopardy then it was only logical that he should not be permitted to take advantage of the situation of his own creation to completely free himself of the charge. If the misconduct of the defendant or his counsel during trial created a. situation which, in the opinion of the trial judge, made it unfair to require the state to proceed with the trial before that jury, the trial judge had sufficient latitude in the exercise of his discretion to declare a mistrial and require the defendant to defend against the charges in. a subsequent trial. The Federal and Kentucky constitutional decisions on double jeopardy, originating for the most part in capital cases where the accused’s life was at stake, were not binding on Alaska’s courts until made so today by the majority opinion.
The rule of Selman has now been changed. The defendant or his counsel, or both, may now create the situation which results in a mistrial and then plead double jeopardy to obtain an acquittal. ’ Misconduct on the part of the defendant or his counsel, no matter how prejudicial to the state, cannot be the basis for declaring a mistrial without acquitting the defendant of the charge. The exception seems to be misconduct which reaches the “very vitals of the trial itself,” such as tampering with the jury.
The' protection originally intended to be provided by the concept of double jeopardy was prevention of the harassment of an accused by successive prosecutions or by the declaration of a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict.3 I am certain that the Alaska Constitutional Convention never intended that the right would be so construed as to permit an accused to parlay his own misconduct or that of his counsel into an acquittal of the charge; nor to permit the accused to create the situation whereby he was removed from jeopardy and then take advantage of his own act to obtain an acquittal. A right which was originated to protect an accused from the state has been so refined and amplified by court decision that it now affords unwarranted protection to the accused to the detriment of the state.
In holding that the trial judge abused his discretion in declaring a mistrial the majority was presumably acting “to prevent a miscarriage of justice” under the rule of Peters, supra. In my opinion the effect of the majority holding is to interfere with the orderly administration of justice.
Appellant was a registered Alaska big game guide and was charged with unlawfully using an aircraft as an aid in taking a brown bear. Two protection agents of the Alaska Department of Fish and Game *900gave strong testimony in support of the state’s case. Appellant’s testimony was that while he was piloting his aircraft near Aniakchak Crater on the Alaska Peninsula accompanied by his hunter-client, a Mr. Ascroft of Berkley, Michigan, Mr. Ascroft became ill. Appellant thereupon landed his aircraft on a cinder patch near the snow line on the volcano crater. While they were on the cinder patch appellant spotted a bear. After a stalk which lasted approximately one hour and a half the bear was intercepted by appellant and Ascroft and shot by Ascroft.
While still under direct examination appellant was asked by his attorney whether Mr. Ascroft would be a witness at the trial that day and answered, “No, I don’t think so.” His attorney then asked him, “Why not?” Appellant then gave the inaccurate, unresponsive, and self-serving answer which created the basis for the state’s motion for a mistrial, to wit: “Well, we tried to get a deposition, but the District Attorney wouldn’t allow it.” The District Attorney immediately objected stating, “Yes, and I think its highly prejudicial and I think defense counsel knew it was going to be.”
The jury was excused and counsel were heard on the motion for a mistrial. Counsel for appellant insisted that he had a right to ask the question to let the jury know why Mr. Ascroft would not be present to testify. The judge then pointed out that if the testimony were admitted it would then become relevant for the state to show that although the complaint was filed on May 1, no effort was made to take the deposition of the witness in Michigan until August 15 which was one week before the trial date. The District Attorney then pointed out that it would also be relevant to show that the reason Mr. Ascroft was not present was “because he’s been tried on the same charge and jumped bond and left the state.” The judge denied the motion for mistrial, but reconsidered at the request of the District Attorney and granted it, stating:
I think it is prejudicial, there’s no question about it that the comment that he made, unsolicited comment that the District Attorney objected had nothing to do with it. The Court denied the motion, not the District Attorney and you have I think a prejudice [sic] statement and I think I could possibly correct it, but rather than have everyone unhappy which both of you appear to be, I will grant the motion for a mistrial. * * *
The facts lend considerable credence to the District Attorney’s claim that the answer was purposeful. Appellant was asked why Mr. Ascroft would not be present. Instead of stating why Ascroft would not be present, appellant gave what has the appearance of a rehearsed answer. Whether rehearsed or not, it was unresponsive, inaccurate, self-serving, and prejudicial. Appellant’s improper answer resulted in the declaration of mistrial. There is no question but that appellant “created the situa7 tion,” under the rule of Selman, which he later used to obtain an acquittal of the charge.
The majority holds that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting a mistrial. The improper answer was obviously prejudicial to the state. In my opinion the trial judge was in the best position to determine whether, in the context of the occurrence, a mistrial should have been granted. For this reason I agree with the comment of Superior Court Judge Lewis made upon affirming the action of the District Judge:
Without necessarily agreeing that I would have done the same thing in the same circumstances, I find no abuse of discretion here. The court, in acting upon the prosecution’s motion for mistrial had to consider the manner in which the response was elicited, the conduct of the defendant at the time he made the statement, and this court, as the reviewing court, feels that it is wise to leave discretion in such matters to the judge who hears the case, absent a showing of clear abuse.
*901The majority feels that since Peters v. Benson was a civil case the rule of that decision cannot apply in a criminal case. This is not a valid distinction. Many of the rules laid down by decisions of this court apply to criminal cases as well as to civil cases. The test should be whether the rule of the decision is such that fairness to both sides will result from its application.
The rules of Peters and Selman were flexible enough to permit the court to protect the state’s right to a fair trial against acts of the defendant or his counsel without violating any constitutional right of the defendant. Federal court decisions interpreting the double jeopardy provisions of the United States Constitution were not binding on this court in interpreting the double jeopardy provision of its own constitution. The fact that, as the majority states, “different criteria are applicable,” is because the majority has chosen to adopt a criterion different from that previously announced in Selman.
I would affirm.

. 425 P.2d 149, 152 (Alaska 1967)' (Footnote omitted).

. 406 P.2d 181, 187 (Alaska 1965).

.Downum v. United States, 372 U.S. 734, 736, 83 S.Ct. 1033, 10 L.Ed.2d 100, 102-103 (1963).