Court Opinion

ID: 9536522
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 07:01:17.863457+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:54:38.382709
License: Public Domain

WOLFE, Chief Justice
(concurring specially).
There are two theories upon which plaintiff’s conduct in standing upon the platform in the front of the bus may have barred his recovery. One, he may have been considered negligent in being there because his presence distracted the driver’s attention and thus contributed to cause the collision. Second, his presence on the platform was most certainly a cause of his injuries but the jury must first have found that the reasonably prudent person would have realized that this was a known dangerous place in which to ride and that plaintiff was negligent in placing himself on the platform for such reason. A finding of negligence because he distracted the driver which caused the collision would bar plaintiff’s recovery, because the injuries were a result of the collision. There is testimony that the bus company prohibits passengers from standing in the front portion of the bus because they would obstruct the *226driver’s vision out the right hand front door, and of the rear-view mirror attached outside the bus on that side; also that talking with driver may distract him from his driving or standing too near may hamper his movements. But plaintiff’s presence in this case did not hamper the movements or interfere, or obstruct the vision of the driver in any manner. The record entirely negates any theory that plaintiff’s presence contributed in any way to cause the collision.
The evidence is skimpy concerning knowledge that the front of the bus is a known dangerous place in which to ride. My point is, that in legal theory the fact that plaintiff’s course of conduct in standing upon the platform might obstruct the driver’s vision or distract his attention or hamper his movements, cannot be the reason why he is negligent in being there insofar as such negligence is assigned as the proximate cause of his injuries (as distinguished from the collision). In determining whether plaintiff should be barred from recovering because his own negligence caused his injuries, the jury should consider only that evidence, if any, bearing upon the theory (second theory set out above) that the front platform of the bus is known by the reasonably prudent person to be an unsafe place in which to ride; that there is a likelihood of being injured because of his presence there (not that his presence might cause an accident between the bus and another vehicle). That his presence was the legal cause of his injuries seems quite obvious. That he was negligent in being there for this reason is comparatively difficult to determine. Be that as it may it was for the jury under proper instructions to determine whether plaintiff in placing himself where he did was contributorily negligent.
Turning then to the instructions we have the following:
“Instruction No. 8. Contributory negligence is any act or omission of the plaintiff which in any manner, however slight, proximately contributed to cause the injury or damage of which he complains. In other words, it is such an act which, while not the sole cause of the *227damage, is such a part of the occurrence or event that, without it, the event would not have occurred. One who is guilty of contributory negligence cannot recover for any damage which such contributory negligence helped to produce.”
“Instruction No. 9. Negligence means the failure to do what a reasonably prudent person would have done under the circumstances of the situation, or doing what such person under such existing circumstances would not have done. The essence of the fault may lie in acting or omitting to act. The duty is dictated and measured by the exigencies of the occasion.”
Since we do not in this jurisdiction recognize comparative or proportional negligence, we have somehow thought it proper to instruct the jury that a causal relationship, however slight, would suffice to bar recovery. I believe that we should eliminate this phrase from our instructions; those dealing with defendant’s as well as plaintiff’s negligence. A better statement of what constitutes legal cause is found in Restatement of Torts, Sections 431-433.
“The actor’s negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm.
The second reason given for holding Instruction No. 8 faulty is that the court did not instruct the jury that in order for the plaintiff to be guilty of contributory negligence he must be guilty of a negligent act or amission. Negligence was defined in Instruction No. 9. The two instructions read together adequately convey the meaning that contributory negligence is any act or omission of the plaintiff which a reasonably prudent person would not have done under such existing circumstances. Low intelligence must be ascribed to juries to assume that they must be instructed that negligence is a necessary element of contributory negligence.
*228As to the third reason for condemning Instruction No. 8, I concur in Mr. Justice Wade’s opinion that this instruction apparently defines contributory negligence as:
“In other words, it is such an act which, while not the sole cause of the damage, is such a part of the occurrence or event that, without it, the event would not have occurred.”
Contributory negligence, by this sentence does not depend upon the plaintiff’s breach of any duty, nor is it predicated upon any fault or blameworthy conduct. The test is stated to be whether the act or omission caused plaintiffs damage. In effect it says,
“if his act contributed to cause his injury or damage, then he is con-tributorily negligent.”
This is erroneous for which the case must be reversed. A plaintiff’s right to recover is not affected by his having contributed to his injury unless he was at fault in so doing. The instruction mixes the concepts of contributory negligence and proximate cause. It is susceptible of being construed by the jury as defining a test of contributory negligence in terms of the causal result. It invites the jury to decide that because plaintiff’s injuries would not have occurred were it not for his presence on the platform, it follows that he must have been negligent in being there and therefore he cannot recover.
The test of whether plaintiff was negligent correctly applied to the facts of this case is whether the plaintiff in view of all the facts and circumstances of this case acted as would a prudent person in leaving his seat and placing himself on the platform and stepwell and that must be determined not in view of what happened but in view of what a prudent man might have done at the time plaintiff left his seat and repaired to the platform.
As to Instructions Nos. 6 and 15, I have never been sure that there is any difference on the one hand between a concept which always uses the standard of ordinary care *229but under certain circumstances requires the content of such ordinary care to be of the highest quality, because care that would be ordinary under those circumstances must be of the highest quality, and on the other hand, the concept of different degrees of care — ordinary and utmost or highest. But if there is any doubt, let us use “ordinary” and “high” or “highest” or “utmost” as descriptive, not of the varying content of the ordinary care required but of the requirement of care in terms of degrees. This will eliminate a philosophic distinction which may not involve a difference.
HENRIOD, J., not participating.