Court Opinion

ID: 9791546
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:13:30.572644+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:37:36.840704
License: Public Domain

*339Batjer, J.,
concurring with the majority in the result:
I believe the district court committed error when it concluded as a matter of law that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the independent suit brought by the appellant or to hear the motion by her for an award of alimony. The original decree [judgment] entered on December 15, 1969, was not res judicata on the subject of alimony. Furthermore, alimony is a proper subject to be decided by the district court (NRS 125.150) and in these proceedings it had jurisdiction over both parties who were physically present and testified.
That part of the original decree providing that “no alimony is awarded to defendant” [Laura A. Cavell] is void. At the time it was entered the district court did not have the required in personam jurisdiction to reach any decision on the question of alimony, although it was raised in the original complaint. Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 418-419 (1957). Cf. Armstrong v. Armstrong, 350 U.S. 568 (1956).
Additionally, the district court erred when it concluded that the appellant had, without just cause, failed for an unreasonable period of time to seek relief with regard to the award of alimony or support. Laches is an affirmative defense which must be specially pleaded (NRCP 8(c)) and if not so pleaded it is waived. NRCP 12(b) and (h); Marschall v. City of Carson, 86 Nev. 107, 111, 464 P.2d 494 (1970); Coray v. Hom, 80 Nev. 39, 389 P.2d 76 (1964); Chisholm v. Redfield, 75 Nev. 502, 347 P.2d 523 (1959). Here, laches was not raised as an affirmative defense, moreover laches implies more than' the mere lapse of time. Where the statute of limitations has not run there must be some actual or presumed change of circumstances to render it inequitable to grant relief. Miller v. Walser, 42 Nev. 497, 181 P. 437 (1919); Cooney v. Pedroli, 49 Nev. 55, 63, 235 P. 637 (1925). The record reveals no such change in circumstances favoring the respondent, but only that he enjoyed a more successful and affluent medical career.
In spite of it's errors the district court proceeded to conduct a full hearing and appellant was allowed ample latitude to testify regarding her past, present and future financial situation. Only when she began to testify about her parents’ physical and financial status did the district court restrict her testimony. After the hearing the court specifically found appellant was not entitled to an award of alimony. Although I do not necessarily agree with that finding we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the trial court on conflicting evidence. Engleman v. Royal Insurance Co., 56 Nev. 319, 51 P.2d 417 (1935). Here, there is sufficient evidence in the record to support the district *340court’s finding and it should not be disturbed on appeal. Sala & Ruthe Realty, Inc. v. Deneen, 89 Nev. 98, 507 P.2d 140 (1973); Lyon v. Walker Boudwin Constr. Co., 88 Nev. 646, 503 P.2d 1219 (1972); Jensen v. Brooks, 88 Nev. 651, 503 P.2d 1224 (1972); Ormachea v. Ormachea, 67 Nev. 273, at 280, 217 P.2d 355 (1950); Thompson v. Tonopah Lumber Co., 37 Nev. 183, at 188, 141 P. 69 (1914).