Court Opinion

ID: 9377811
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 20:00:37.737753+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:17.055535
License: Public Domain

USCA11 Case: 22-10918   Document: 23-1    Date Filed: 03/08/2023   Page: 1 of 7

                                                [DO NOT PUBLISH]
                                 In the
                United States Court of Appeals
                        For the Eleventh Circuit

                         ____________________

                              No. 22-10918
                         Non-Argument Calendar
                         ____________________

       GREGORY ALBERT DARST,
                                                   Plaintiff-Appellant,
       versus
       MARY S. SCRIVEN,
       DAVID J. SMITH,
       SCOTT HARRIS,
       CLARENCE THOMAS,
       ELIZABETH WARREN,

                                               Defendants-Appellees.

                         ____________________
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       2                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10918

                  Appeal from the United States District Court
                       for the Middle District of Florida
                    D.C. Docket No. 8:21-cv-02840-WFJ-JSS
                           ____________________

       Before WILSON, LAGOA, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.
       PER CURIAM:
               Gregory Darst, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
       dismissal of his amended complaint. He argues that the district
       court erroneously determined that Judge Mary Scriven was im-
       mune from suit because she committed criminal actions, under 18
       U.S.C. § 1001, and was, therefore, not covered by judicial immun-
       ity. He also argues that Scott Harris, the Clerk of the Supreme
       Court, and David Smith, the Clerk of our Court, were also not im-
       mune. He argues that Harris was allegedly acting under the orders
       of Justice Thomas and that Smith was allegedly acting without any
       judicial oversight.
              A district court’s sua sponte dismissal for failure to state a
       claim, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), is reviewed de novo, us-
       ing the same standards that govern Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) dismis-
       sals. Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1489-90 (11th Cir. 1997).
             We can affirm the judgment of the district court on any
       ground supported by the record, regardless of whether that ground
       was relied on or even considered by the district court. Kernel Rec-
       ords Oy v. Mosley, 694 F.3d 1294, 1309 (11th Cir. 2012). “Pro se
       pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than pleadings
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       22-10918                Opinion of the Court                           3

       drafted by attorneys and will, therefore, be liberally construed.”
       Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262, 1263 (11th Cir. 1998).
       Issues raised for the first time on appeal are deemed forfeited and
       we do not review them. Id.
               Issues not raised in an initial brief are forfeited and generally
       deemed abandoned. United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860, 871-
       72 (11th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 143 S. Ct. 95 (2022). An ap-
       pellant fails to brief a claim when he does not “plainly and promi-
       nently” raise it, such as by devoting a discrete section of his argu-
       ment to the claim. Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d
       678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks omitted). An appellant
       also abandons a claim when: (a) he makes only passing references
       to it, (b) he raises it in a perfunctory manner without supporting
       arguments and authority, (c) he refers to it only in the “statement
       of the case” or “summary of the argument,” (d) the references to
       the issue are mere background to the appellant’s main arguments
       or are buried within those arguments, or (e) he raises it for the first
       time in his reply brief. Id. at 681-83.
              To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a complaint
       must allege sufficient facts to state a claim that is plausible on its
       face. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “A claim has facial
       plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
       court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
       for the misconduct alleged.” Id. “[C]onclusory allegations, unwar-
       ranted deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as
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       4                      Opinion of the Court                 22-10918

       facts will not prevent dismissal.” Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd. v. Jaha-
       ris, 297 F.3d 1182, 1188 (11th Cir. 2002).
              The allegations in a pro se complaint are taken as true at the
       dismissal stage. Brown v. Jackson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1350 (11th Cir.
       2004). Pleadings should be construed “so as to do justice.” Fed. R.
       Civ. P. 8(e).
              Judges enjoy absolute judicial immunity when they act in
       their judicial capacity as long as they do not act “in the clear ab-
       sence of all jurisdiction.” Sibley v. Lando, 437 F.3d 1067, 1070 (11th
       Cir. 2005) (quotation marks omitted). This immunity even applies
       to conduct that “was in error, was done maliciously, or was in ex-
       cess of his authority.” Stevens v. Osuna, 877 F.3d 1293, 1301 (11th
       Cir. 2017) (quotation marks omitted). An act is “judicial” for pur-
       poses of immunity when it is typically performed by judges and the
       complaining party interacted with the judge in his judicial capacity.
       Id. at 1304. Whether an act is typically performed by judges is
       based on the nature and function of the act, not the factual circum-
       stances of the particular action at issue. Id. at 1305.
              Clerks of the court have absolute immunity for a narrow
       range of acts “they are specifically required to do under court order
       or at a judge’s direction, and only qualified immunity for all other
       actions for damages.” Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir.
       1981). Absolute quasi-judicial immunity extends to people who
       perform duties closely related to the judicial process, but only for
       actions taken within the scope of their authority. Roland v. Phil-
       lips, 19 F.3d 552, 555 (11th Cir. 1994). We determine whether
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       22-10918               Opinion of the Court                         5

       quasi-judicial immunity exists “through a functional analysis of the
       action taken by the official in relation to the judicial process.” Id.
       Thus, absolute quasi-judicial immunity applies when clerks act pur-
       suant to court decrees or a judge’s explicit instructions, but not
       when they perform routine duties like entering court orders or no-
       tifying parties. Williams v. Wood, 612 F.2d 982, 984-85 (5th Cir.
       1980).
              Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, a person may be fined or imprisoned
       for knowingly and willfully making false statements in any matter
       before the executive, legislative, or judicial branch. 18 U.S.C.
       § 1001(a)(2). Statements made by a party in a judicial proceeding
       are exempt from this section. Id. § 1001(b).
              Here, as a preliminary matter, Darst raises the issue of Judge
       Jung’s recusal for the first time on appeal. He did not move for
       Judge Jung’s recusal during his district court proceedings and, ac-
       cordingly, has forfeited the issue of Judge Jung’s recusal on appeal.
       See Tannenbaum, 148 F.3d at 1263. Further, on appeal Darst only
       argues that the district court erred in determining that Judge
       Scriven, Smith, and Harris were subject to judicial immunity. Ac-
       cordingly, he has abandoned any challenge to the district court’s
       determination that Justice Thomas and Warren were judicially im-
       mune. Sapuppo, 739 F.3d at 680.
              As to the district court’s dismissal of his amended complaint,
       the district court properly concluded that Judge Scriven was enti-
       tled to judicial immunity. Darst’s allegations in his amended com-
       plaint pertained to Judge Scriven’s actions within her official
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       6                      Opinion of the Court               22-10918

       capacity when she construed Darst’s motion and later dismissed his
       case. Sibley, 437 F.3d at 1070. Darst tries to avoid the doctrine of
       judicial immunity by characterizing Judge Scriven’s actions as crim-
       inal. Darst alleges that Judge Scriven’s acts were criminal under 18
       U.S.C. § 1001, but it is unclear whether § 1001 applies to judges
       given that parties in judicial proceedings are exempt from the pen-
       alties under that section. 18 U.S.C. § 1001(b). Darst does not cite
       to any other criminal code section to support his allegation that
       Judge Scriven’s actions were criminal. Therefore, Judge Scriven, at
       most, exceeded her authority or acted maliciously when she con-
       verted Darst’s coram nobis motion to a § 2255 motion but would
       still be immune because immunity applies to erroneous actions,
       malicious actions, or actions that exceed authority. Stevens, 877
       F.3d at 1301.
               As to Harris, the district court properly determined that he
       was immune. Taking Darst’s complaint as true, Darst claims Har-
       ris was acting without the oversight of Justice Thomas because Jus-
       tice Thomas delegated discretionary duties regarding certiorari pe-
       titions to Harris. Brown, 387 F.3d at 1350. Based on Darst’s claims,
       Harris was allegedly acting pursuant to Justice Thomas’s instruc-
       tion that Harris handle the certiorari petitions and is protected by
       quasi-judicial immunity. Williams, 612 F.2d at 984 85.
              As to Smith, Darst failed to support his allegation with any
       plausible facts and so the district court properly dismissed this
       claim. Darst’s allegations that Smith exceeded his authority and
       violated Darst’s due process rights were merely conclusory and
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       22-10918               Opinion of the Court                       7

       devoid of factual support. Tarter, 646 F.2d at 1013. Darst did not
       provide a description of the order Smith allegedly issued nor did he
       provide any specifics of the order to show that Smith wrote the
       order without judicial oversight. Instead, Darst summarily con-
       cluded that Smith’s order was written in such a way that no judicial
       officer could have been involved in its adjudication because it only
       listed the standard for interlocutory orders and condoned the vio-
       lation of circuit precedent. Darst provided no other information to
       support his conclusion that Smith was acting without supervision
       of the judges or was acting outside of his authority. Based on his
       belief on what should have been addressed in the order, Darst
       simply concluded that Smith was acting without any judicial over-
       sight and such conclusions are not adequately pled so as to survive
       the initial pleading stage. Oxford Asset Mgmt., Ltd., 297 F.3d at
       1188. Accordingly, Darst failed to adequately plead any facts suffi-
       cient to show that Smith violated Darst’s rights, and this Court af-
       firms the district court’s dismissal on that ground.
             AFFIRMED.