Court Opinion

ID: 9720242
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 08:22:20.473452+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:14.602885
License: Public Domain

Young, Jr., P.J.
(concurring). I concur in the majority’s opinion concerning the resolution of the constitutional claim. I write separately to indicate that I reach *620by a slightly different route the conclusion that the Parole Board may legally continue the practice of permitting two of three members of a Parole Board panel to decide parole eligibility without meeting for collegial discussion.
I agree with the majority that it is appropriate to address the Parole Board’s claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the Parole Board’s practice of deciding parole eligibility on the basis of a “noncollegial” vote of two members of a three-member panel was violative of MCL 791.206(2); MSA 28.2776(2) and 1996 AACS, R 791.7765. Although moot in this case, the legitimacy of this practice presents a recurring question that may evade appellate review. See In re Midland Publishing Co, Inc, 420 Mich 148, 152, n 2; 362 NW2d 580 (1984).
However, I conclude that the Parole Board’s practice is lawful solely because it is entirely consistent with the text of the relevant statute and administrative rule. Our role in considering such matters is to determine the legislative (or administrative) intent by construing the text and giving its words their reasonable meaning. Lorencz v Ford Motor Co, 439 Mich 370, 376-377; 483 NW2d 844 (1992). Once we have done so, and if we find the text unambiguous, our task in construing a statute is at an end and we must simply apply the statute to the situation at hand. Turner v Auto Club Ins Ass’n, 448 Mich 22, 27; 528 NW2d 681 (1995).
Nothing in the statute or administrative rule precludes the Parole Board’s stated practice. Consequently, I find it unnecessary to consider nontextual bases for reversing the trial court’s contrary decision and would reverse solely on the basis that the prac*621tice is allowed by the terms of the statute and implementing administrative rule.1

 The majority relies on “legislative history” in support of its conclusion. I have questioned elsewhere the folly of this approach to statutory construction. My criticism bears repeating here:
It has been observed in the federal context that resort to “legislative history” in the search for legislative intent is a perilous venture. Marposs Corp v Troy, 204 Mich App 156, 167-168, n 2; 514 NW2d 202 (1994) (Taylor, RJ., dissenting), quoting Address by Justice Antonin Scalia before the Attorney General’s Conference on Economic Liberties (June 14, 1986). This enterprise is doubly fraught with danger in Michigan which, unlike Congress, has failed to create an authoritative legislative record. Id. [People v Tolbert, 216 Mich App 353, 360, n 5; 549 NW2d 61 (1996).]
Moreover, I question whether the “practice” at issue constitutes an “interpretation” or “construction” of a regulatory statute to which we ordinarily give deference. To the contrary, I am unable to discern from the Parole Board chairman’s “affidavit” whether the Parole Board has actually considered the proper interpretation of MCL 791.206(2); MSA 28.2776(2).