Court Opinion

ID: 9373128
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-22 16:02:55.094587+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:40.435495
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
                        MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

     YOLANDA D. COBIA,                               DOCKET NUMBER
                  Appellant,                         PH-0752-16-0283-X-1

                  v.

     DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS                          DATE: January 6, 2023
       AFFAIRS,
                 Agency.

             THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

           Yolanda D. Cobia, New Castle, Delaware, pro se.

           Stephen M. Pahides, Esquire, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for the agency.

                                           BEFORE

                               Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman
                                Raymond A. Limon, Member
                                 Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

                                       FINAL ORDER

¶1         This compliance proceeding was initiated by the appellant’s petition for
     enforcement of the Board’s September 30, 2016 decision in Cobia v. Department

     1
        A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add
     significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders,
     but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not
     required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a
     precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board
     as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c).
                                                                                       2

     of Veterans Affairs, MSPB Docket No. PH-0752-16-0283-I-1, in which the
     administrative judge accepted the parties’ settlement agreement into the record
     for enforcement purposes.      Cobia v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB
     Docket No. PH-0752-16-0283-I-1, Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 28, Initial
     Decision (ID). On August 14, 2017, the administrative judge issued a compliance
     initial decision finding the agency not in compliance with the Board’s
     September 30, 2016 decision. Cobia v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB
     Docket No. PH-0752-16-0283-C-1, Compliance File (CF), Tab 17, Compliance
     Initial Decision (CID). For the reasons discussed below, we find the agency in
     compliance and DISMISS the petition for enforcement.

        DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE ON COMPLIANCE
¶2           On April 25, 2016, the appellant filed an individual right of action (IRA)
     appeal alleging that her March 9, 2016 removal from the position of Voucher
     Examiner constituted reprisal for her whistleblower disclosures. IAF, Tab 1 at 2.
     On September 30, 2016, the administrative judge, pursuant to a settlement
     between the parties, issued an initial decision that dismissed the appeal as settled
     and accepted the settlement agreement into the record for enforcement purposes.
     ID at 1-2. In relevant part, the settlement agreement called for the agency to:
     (1) purge from appellant’s electronic Official Personnel File (eOPF) all
     references to her March 29, 2016 removal; and (2) retroactively restore her
     employment for the period of March 29 through July 23, 2016, along with
     providing her all pay, leave, and other benefits for that period of ti me.     IAF,
     Tab 27 at 5-6. The initial decision became the final decision of the Board on
     November 4, 2016, when neither party petitioned for administrative review. ID
     at 3.
¶3           On November 15 and December 9, 2016, the appellant filed two petitions
     for enforcement of the settlement agreement (in the same proceeding).           CF,
     Tabs 1, 4.    In her petitions, the appellant alleged that the agency had not yet
                                                                                        3

     purged all references to her removal from her eOPF and had not yet retroactively
     restored her employment and benefits.        CF, Tab 1 at 4-7, Tab 4 at 4-6.      On
     August 14, 2017, the administrative judge found the agency not in compliance
     with the settlement agreement. CID at 1-8. The administrative judge found that
     the agency had failed to issue a corrected Standard Form 50 (SF-50) or to restore
     the appellant’s benefits for the relevant time period.           CID at 6.       The
     administrative judge ordered the agency to “issue a corrected SF -50 and restore
     the appellant’s benefits for the relevant time period” within 30 days of th e date of
     the compliance initial decision. CID at 8.
¶4         On September 18, 2017, in response to the compliance initial decision, the
     agency submitted the declaration of an agency Human Resources Specialist, along
     with supporting documentation. Cobia v. Department of Veterans Affairs, MSPB
     Docket No. PH-0752-16-0283-X-1, Compliance Referral File (CRF), Tabs 1-3.
     The declaration and supporting documentation reflected that the agency had
     issued an SF-50 showing that the appellant resigned from her Voucher Examiner
     position effective July 23, 2016, and that the agency uploaded this SF -50 into the
     appellant’s eOPF. CRF, Tab 1 at 4, Tab 2 at 4. The declaration also generally
     referenced the appellant’s back pay for the period of March 29 through July 23,
     2016, and a “spreadsheet filed in the MSPB e-appeal system” pertaining to such
     back pay.    CRF, Tab 1 at 4.       However, it was unclear from the agency’s
     spreadsheets how the agency calculated the amount of back pay due to the
     appellant, the total amount of gross or net back pay that the agency determined
     was due to the appellant, and whether the agency actually provided the appellant
     with any back pay. CRF, Tab 3. Additionally, although the declaration generally
     referenced annual leave, sick leave, and Thrift Saving s Plan (TSP) contributions
     due to be restored to the appellant, the agency did not articulate the total amounts
     of annual leave, sick leave, and TSP contributions due to the appellant under the
     settlement agreement, did not set forth its methodology for ca lculating those
     amounts, and did not state whether it actually provided the leave and TSP
                                                                                      4

     contributions to the appellant. CRF, Tab 1 at 5. Finally, the declaration asserted
     that the agency had submitted a “Remedy Ticket” to the Defense Finance and
     Accounting Service (DFAS) inquiring why deductions for Federal Employees
     Health Benefits (FEHB) and Federal Employees Group Life Insurance (FEGLI)
     premiums were not taken from an unspecified “settlement amount” provided to
     the appellant and that the agency was awaiting a response from the DFAS. Id.
     at 5-6.
¶5         On January 18, 2018, the Clerk of the Board issued an order explaining that
     the agency’s response was insufficient to determine whether the agency was in
     compliance with the settlement agreement. CRF, Tab 5 at 4. The Clerk of the
     Board directed the agency to submit detailed narrative explanations setting for th
     how the agency calculated the appellant’s back pay and benefits. Id. at 4-6. The
     order specified that the detailed narrative explanations should include information
     regarding: (1) the total amount of gross and net back pay, annual and sick leave,
     and TSP contributions due to the appellant; (2) the total amount of any FEHB or
     FEGLI premiums that should have been deducted from payments due to the
     appellant under the settlement agreement; and (3) whether either the agency or
     the DFAS intended to seek to recover any overpayment to the appellant as a result
     of the failure to deduct the FEHB or FEGLI premiums from payments due to the
     appellant under the settlement agreement.     Id.   Finally, the order directed the
     agency to submit evidence that it had actually provided the appellant with the
     back pay and benefits referenced in the detailed narrative explanations and
     supporting documentation. Id. at 4-5.
¶6         On February 22, 2018, the agency submitted a response to the Clerk of the
     Board’s January 18, 2018 Order. CRF, Tab 8. The agency did not submit the
     detailed narrative explanations required by the order but, instead, referenced the
     previously submitted declaration and asserted that “a more detailed explanation is
     not possible unless produced by the original custodian of this information, namely
     the [DFAS].” Id. at 5. The agency also submitted several documents with its
                                                                                           5

     response, which it contended pertained to “new information” that was “recently
     obtained from [the] DFAS.” Id. (emphasis omitted). The agency submitted an
     attachment that it contended “show[ed] hours paid, PLUS each Leave and Earning
     statement for each pay period in question, showing all d eductions and benefits
     paid by the [G]overnment to the Appellant.” Id. However, the attachment did not
     include any leave and earnings statements. Id. at 8-13. Instead, it consisted of a
     spreadsheet pertaining to the appellant’s pay for various pay peri ods, which did
     not contain any entries for the majority of the relevant time period from March 29
     through July 23, 2016. 2 Id. at 8-13. The spreadsheet appeared identical to the
     spreadsheet that the agency submitted in response to the compliance initial
     decision on September 18, 2017. Compare CRF, Tab 3 at 4-9, with CRF, Tab 8
     at 8-13. Further, the total amount of gross and net pay due to the appellant under
     the settlement agreement was not clear, and the agency did not set forth its
     methodology for calculating those amounts. CRF, Tab 8 at 8-13.
¶7         The agency also submitted a spreadsheet pertaining to the appellant’s 2016
     leave balances, which appeared to reflect that the appellant accrued 6 hours of
     annual leave and 4 hours of sick leave during the relevant time period from March
     29 through July 23, 2016. CRF, Tab 8 at 14. This spreadsheet again appeared
     identical to a spreadsheet that the agency previously submitted during
     enforcement proceedings before the administrative judge. Compare CF, Tab 15
     at 11, with CRF, Tab 8 at 14. The spreadsheet did not, however, indicate how the
     agency calculated the annual or sick leave due to be restored to the appellant or
     the total amount of annual and sick leave that the agency restored to the
     appellant. 3 CRF, Tab 8 at 14. Finally, the agency’s response to the Clerk of the

     2
      Most of the entries on the spreadsheet appeared to pertain to the appellant’s pay for
     pay periods after July 23, 2016, which is irrelevant because it post -dates the back pay
     period. CRF, Tab 8 at 8-13.
     3
      In a pleading submitted in response to the Clerk of the Board’s January 18, 2018
     Order, counsel for the agency represented that when the agency restored an unspecified
                                                                                            6

     Board’s January 18, 2018 Order did not address the appellant’s TSP
     contributions, employer retirement contributions, or FEHB and FEGLI premiums.
     CRF, Tab 8.
¶8         In a March 15, 2018 reply to the agency’s response, the appellant argued
     that the agency did not comply with the Clerk of the Board’s January 18, 2018
     Order and that the agency was also not in compliance with the settlement
     agreement.    CRF, Tab 9 at 4-8.         The appellant submitted a declaration under
     penalty of perjury, in which she asserted that she had received direct deposits
     from the agency, which she assumed were back pay, but that she did not know
     how the back pay was calculated or whether the agency had provided her with the
     correct amount of back pay. Id. at 10. The appellant also represented that she
     had “hours randomly added” to her pay stubs, which she assumed were restored
     leave, but that she did not know how the leave was calculated or whether the
     agency had provided her with the correct amount of leave. Id. In addition, the
     appellant asserted that, based on her review of her TSP statements, the agency did
     not restore her TSP benefits.      Id.     Finally, the appellant represented that, on
     February 23, 2018, she contacted her health insurance company and was informed
     that her coverage was terminated from April 2 through November 12, 2016, and
     that she was reenrolled from November 13, 2016, onwards, but not retroactively.
     Id.
¶9         On May 30, 2018, the Clerk of the Board issued an order ex plaining that the
     agency’s responses were still insufficient to determine whether the agency was in
     compliance with the settlement agreement. CRF, Tab 10 at 6. The Clerk of the
     Board again directed the agency to submit detailed narrative explanations of the

     amount of annual leave to the appellant on an unspecified date, 40.75 hours of the
     appellant’s annual leave was forfeited because she exceeded the 240 hour annual
     carry-over maximum. CRF, Tab 8 at 5. The agency submitted an attachment that
     appeared to reflect that the 40.75 hours of forfeited leave was restored to the appellant
     on May 28, 2017. Id. at 15-16.
                                                                                          7

      appellant’s back pay and benefits. Id. at 6-7. The Clerk of the Board further
      directed the agency to submit narrative explanations addressing: (1) whether the
      agency afforded the appellant an opportunity to elect retroactive reinstatement of
      her health insurance benefits for the period from March 29 through July 23, 2016,
      and if so, whether the appellant elected retroactive reinstatement of her health
      insurance benefits for this time period; (2) if the appellant elected retroactive
      reinstatement of her health insurance benefits for the period from March 29
      through July 23, 2016, the steps that the agency had taken to reinstate the
      appellant’s health insurance benefits for this time period, and whether those steps
      resulted in reinstatement of the appellant’s health insurance benefits; (3) whether
      the agency was obligated to afford the appellant the opportunity to elect
      retroactive reinstatement of her health insurance benefits for the period from July
      24 through November 12, 2016, and if so, why; (4) if the agency was obligated to
      afford the appellant the opportunity to elect retroactive reinstatement of her
      health insurance benefits for the period from July 24 through November 12, 2016,
      whether the appellant elected retroactive reinstatement of her heal th insurance
      benefits for this time period; and (5) if the appellant elected retroactive
      reinstatement of her health insurance benefits for the period from July 24 through
      November 12, 2016, the steps that the agency took to reinstate the appellant’s
      health insurance benefits for that time period and whether those steps resulted in
      reinstatement of the appellant’s health insurance benefits. Id. The Clerk of the
      Board also stated that, if the agency’s responsive submission did not address each
      of the aforementioned issues, the agency was required to submit biweekly status
      reports detailing its efforts to reach compliance and progress in doing so . Id. at 7.
      The Clerk of the Board stated that, to the extent the agency contended it needed
      to obtain information from the DFAS in order to respond, it must provide details
      of its efforts to obtain that information from the DFAS. Id. at 7-8.
¶10         On June 14, 2018, the agency submitted its first biweekly status report,
      pursuant to the May 30, 2018 Order. CRF, Tab 11 at 1. In its report, the agency
                                                                                           8

      stated that it had assigned a subject matter expert (SME) to review the matter on
      behalf of the agency. Id.
¶11         On June 21, 2018, the Clerk of the Board issued an order acknowledging the
      agency’s first biweekly status report. CRF, Tab 12 at 1 -2. The Clerk of the
      Board noted that the agency’s report did not provide any information describing
      the agency’s efforts toward obtaining the required detailed narrative explanations
      and supporting documentation prior to retaining the SME and did not address any
      efforts by the agency towards obtaining evidence and information from the DFAS
      prior, or in addition, to retaining the SME. Id. The Clerk of the Board ordered
      the agency to continue to comply with the May 30, 2018 Order, and to submit
      either the detailed narrative explanations and supporting documentation required
      by the order or biweekly status reports detailing the agency’s progress and efforts
      to do so. Id. at 2. In the event the agency chose to file another biweekly status
      report, the Clerk of the Board further ordered the agency to address in the report:
      (1) the date that the agency anticipated that the SME Man agement Analyst would
      complete the audit referenced in the June 14, 2018 biweekly status report; (2) the
      agency’s efforts towards obtaining the required detailed narrative explanations
      and supporting documentation prior to retaining the SME Management Anal yst;
      and (3) the agency’s efforts towards obtaining evidence and information from the
      DFAS prior to retaining the SME Management Analyst. Id.
¶12         On June 28, 2018, the agency submitted its second biweekly status report.
      CRF, Tab 13.      In the status report, the agency provided additional details
      regarding its attempts to reach compliance, including details of its efforts to
      obtain necessary information from the DFAS. 4 Id. at 4-6. The agency stated in

      4
        In the report, the agency asserted that disclosure of the name of the individual
      completing an audit of its compliance attempt was protected by the deliberative process
      privilege. CRF, Tab 13 at 4. Because we find the agency to be in complia nce, we do
      not address the agency’s contention regarding privilege.
                                                                                          9

      the report that it anticipated its audit of its complianc e efforts could take as long
      as 10 weeks. Id. at 5.
¶13         Between July 12 and December 14, 2018, the agency submitted multiple
      biweekly status reports in which it only stated it had “nothing significant to
      report” regarding its attempts to reach compliance.         CRF, Tabs 14-25.       On
      April 12, 2019, the agency submitted its 15th status report, indicating that it had
      been engaged in mediation with the appellant regarding its compliance issues.
      CRF, Tab 26 at 4.
¶14         On May 8, 2019, the agency submitted its 16th biweekly status report.
      CRF, Tab 27.      In the report, the agency reported that its audit revealed a
      discrepancy of 40.75 annual leave hours for the appellant and provided details
      regarding the origin of the discrepancy. Id. at 4-5. The agency indicated that it
      spoke with the appellant’s representative about the discrepancy and that the
      appellant’s representative indicated the appellant wanted those annual leave hours
      added to her current leave record. Id. at 5.
¶15         On July 16, 2019, the agency submitted its 17th status report. CRF, Tab 28.
      In the report, the agency provided additional narrative details of its compliance
      audit received from the DFAS. Id. at 4-5. The agency explained that the errors in
      the appellant’s benefits arose out of coding errors and that those coding errors
      were corrected upon discovery of the errors. Id. The agency further explained
      that, due to the coding errors, the appellant was not able to contribute to her TSP
      account. Id. at 5. The agency stated that an inquiry was made to the appellant as
      to whether she desired to make up her missed TSP contributions, but the appellant
      did not respond to the inquiry, so no TSP contributions were withheld for her. Id.
      Finally, the agency stated that, because the appellant expressed a desire to make
      up her missed FEHB payments, a debt for the missed contributions was created,
      and a debt letter was mailed to the appellant. Id.
¶16         On March 13, 2020, the agency submitted its 18th status report.           CRF,
      Tab 29. This report contained a full narrative description of the appellant’s back
                                                                                       10

      pay and benefits received pursuant to the settlement.      Id. at 4-7.   The report
      detailed the amount of funds received by appellant for the back pay period
      pursuant to the settlement agreement and further explained the deductions taken
      from the funds. Id. at 5-6. The report also explained the results of the agency’s
      compliance audit and detailed how the agency corrected the errors from its prior
      attempts to reach compliance, including the previously mentioned restoration of
      40.75 annual leave hours and the creation of a debt to account for the missed
      FEHB payments. Id. at 6-7.
¶17        On March 25, 2021, the appellant responded to the agency’s last status
      report. CRF, Tab 30. The appellant indicated in her response that she agreed
      with the agency’s assertion that it had finally fully complied with its requirements
      under the settlement agreement. Id. at 4.

                                         ANALYSIS
¶18        A settlement agreement is a contract and, as such, will be enforced in
      accordance with contract law.        Burke v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
      121 M.S.P.R. 299, ¶ 8 (2014). The Board will enforce a settlement agreement
      that has been entered into the record in the same manner as a final Board decision
      or order.   Id.   When the appellant alleges noncompliance with a settlement
      agreement, the agency must produce relevant material evidence of its compliance
      with the agreement or show that there was good cause for noncompliance.          Id.
      The ultimate burden, however, remains with the appellant to prove breach by a
      preponderance of the evidence. Id.
¶19        The agency’s outstanding compliance issues were its obligations to:
      (1) purge from appellant’s eOPF all references to her March 29, 2016 removal;
      and (2) retroactively restore her employment and benefits for the period of
      March 29, 2016, through July 23, 2016.       CID at 6-7.    The agency’s multiple
      submissions demonstrate that it has now met all of its obligations.             The
      September 18, 2017 submission established that the agency finally issued a
                                                                                       11

      corrected SF-50, which accurately reflected the appellant’s resignati on date.
      CRF, Tab 1 at 4, Tab 2 at 4. The same September 18, 2017 submission indicated
      that the agency also provided the appellant with the requisite back pay for the
      relevant time period. Id. And while that submission lacked the necessary details
      and narrative explanation of the retroactive back pay and benefits, the agency
      sufficiently explained the details of the back pay and benefits and its corrections
      to its original errors regarding the back pay and benefits in its 16 th, 17th, and
      18th status reports. CRF, Tabs 27-29. Moreover, the appellant’s March 25, 2021
      submission indicates that she agrees that the agency has met all of its outstanding
      compliance obligations. CRF, Tab 30 at 4.
¶20        Accordingly, in light of the agency’s evidence of co mpliance and the
      appellant’s statements of satisfaction, the Board finds the agency in compliance
      and dismisses the petition for enforcement. This is the final decision of the Merit
      Systems Protection Board in this compliance proceeding. Title 5 of the C ode of
      Federal Regulations, section 1201.183(c)(1) (5 C.F.R. § 1201.183(c)(1)).

                        NOTICE TO THE APPELLANT REGARDING
                              YOUR RIGHT TO REQUEST
                             ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS
            You may be entitled to be paid by the agency for your reasonable attorney
      fees and costs. To be paid, you must meet the requirements set out at Title 5 of
      the United States Code (5 U.S.C.), sections 7701(g), 1221(g), or 1214(g). The
      regulations may be found at 5 C.F.R. §§ 1201.201, 1201.202, and 1201.203. If
      you believe you meet these requirements, you must file a motion for attorney fees
      WITHIN 60 CALENDAR DAYS OF THE DATE OF THIS DECISION.                          You
      must file your attorney fees motion with the office that issued the initial decision
      on your appeal.
                                                                                       12

                           NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS 5
      You may obtain review of this final decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(a)(1). By
statute, the nature of your claims determines the time limit for seeking such
review and the appropriate forum with which to file.               5 U.S.C. § 7703(b).
Although we offer the following summary of available appeal rights, the Merit
Systems Protection Board does not provide legal advice on which option is most
appropriate for your situation and the rights described below do not represent a
statement of how courts will rule regarding which cases fall within their
jurisdiction.   If you wish to seek review of this final decision, you should
immediately review the law applicable to your claims and carefully follow all
filing time limits and requirements. Failure to file within the applicable time
limit may result in the dismissal of your case by your chosen forum.
      Please read carefully each of the three main possible choices of review
below to decide which one applies to your particular case. If you have questions
about whether a particular forum is the appropriate one to review your case, you
should contact that forum for more information.

      (1) Judicial review in general. As a general rule, an appellant seeking
judicial review of a final Board order must file a petition for review with the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which must be received by the court
within 60 calendar days of the date of issuance of this decision.                5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(A).
      If you submit a petition for review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Federal   Circuit,   you    must   submit   your   petition   to   the   court    at   the
following address:

5
  Since the issuance of the initial decision in this matter, the Board may have updated
the notice of review rights included in final decisions. As indicated in the notice, the
Board cannot advise which option is most appropriate in any matter.
                                                                                    13

                             U.S. Court of Appeals
                             for the Federal Circuit
                            717 Madison Place, N.W.
                            Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The
Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.

      (2) Judicial   or   EEOC     review   of   cases     involving    a   claim   of
discrimination. This option applies to you only if you have claimed that you
were affected by an action that is appealable to the Board and that such action
was based, in whole or in part, on unlawful discrimination. If so, you may obtain
judicial review of this decision—including a disposition of your discrimination
claims—by filing a civil action with an appropriate U.S. district court ( not the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit), within 30 calendar days after you
receive this decision.     5 U.S.C. § 7703(b)(2); see Perry v. Merit Systems
Protection Board, 582 U.S. ____ , 137 S. Ct. 1975 (2017).              If you have a
representative in this case, and your representative receives this decision before
you do, then you must file with the district court no later than 30 calendar days
after your representative receives this decision. If the action involves a claim of
discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or a disabling
condition, you may be entitled to representation by a court-appointed lawyer and
                                                                                14

to waiver of any requirement of prepayment of fees, costs, or other security. See
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) and 29 U.S.C. § 794a.
      Contact information for U.S. district courts can be found at their respective
websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.
      Alternatively, you may request review by the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) of your discrimination claims only, excluding
all other issues. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). You must file any such request with the
EEOC’s Office of Federal Operations within 30 calendar days after you receive
this decision. 5 U.S.C. § 7702(b)(1). If you have a representative in this case,
and your representative receives this decision before you do, then you must file
with the EEOC no later than 30 calendar days after your representative receives
this decision.
      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC by regular U.S. mail, the
address of the EEOC is:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                  P.O. Box 77960
                             Washington, D.C. 20013

      If you submit a request for review to the EEOC via commercial delivery or
by a method requiring a signature, it must be addressed to:
                            Office of Federal Operations
                     Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
                                 131 M Street, N.E.
                                   Suite 5SW12G
                             Washington, D.C. 20507

      (3) Judicial     review   pursuant   to   the   Whistleblower    Protection
Enhancement Act of 2012. This option applies to you only if you have raised
claims of reprisal for whistleblowing disclosures under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) or
other protected activities listed in 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(9)(A)(i), (B), (C), or (D).
If so, and your judicial petition for review “raises no challenge to the Board’s
                                                                                     15

disposition of allegations of a prohibited personnel practice described in section
2302(b) other than practices described in section 2302(b)(8), or 2302(b)(9)(A)(i),
(B), (C), or (D),” then you may file a petition for judicial review either with the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or any court of appeals of
competent jurisdiction. 6   The court of appeals must receive your petition for
review within 60 days of the date of issuance of this decision.               5 U.S.C.
§ 7703(b)(1)(B).
      If you submit a petition for judicial review to the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit, you must submit your petition to the court at the
following address:
                               U.S. Court of Appeals
                               for the Federal Circuit
                              717 Madison Place, N.W.
                              Washington, D.C. 20439

      Additional information about the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit is available at the court’s website, www.cafc.uscourts.gov. Of particular
relevance is the court’s “Guide for Pro Se Petitioners and Appellants,” which is
contained within the court’s Rules of Practice, and Forms 5, 6, 10, and 11.
      If you are interested in securing pro bono representation for an appeal to
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, you may visit our website at
http://www.mspb.gov/probono for information regarding pro bono representation
for Merit Systems Protection Board appellants before the Federal Circuit. The

6
   The original statutory provision that provided for judicial review of certain
whistleblower claims by any court of appeals of competent jurisdiction expired on
December 27, 2017. The All Circuit Review Act, signed into law by the President on
July 7, 2018, permanently allows appellants to file petitions for judicial review of
MSPB decisions in certain whistleblower reprisal cases with the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit or any other circuit court of appeals of competent jurisdiction.
The All Circuit Review Act is retroactive to November 26, 2017. Pub. L. No. 115-195,
132 Stat. 1510.
                                                                           16

Board neither endorses the services provided by any attorney nor warrants that
any attorney will accept representation in a given case.
      Contact information for the courts of appeals can be found at their
respective websites, which can be accessed through the link below:
      http://www.uscourts.gov/Court_Locator/CourtWebsites.aspx.

FOR THE BOARD:                            /s/ for
                                          Jennifer Everling
                                          Acting Clerk of the Board
Washington, D.C.