Court Opinion

ID: 9728598
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 14:12:25.539942+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:25:45.250130
License: Public Domain

SCOTT, J.
I dissent from that portion of the majority’s opinion reversing the jury’s sanity verdict.
As the majority acknowledges, a jury may find a defendant sane despite unanimous expert opinion to the contrary. (People v. Drew (1978) 22 *1128Cal.3d 333, 350 [149 Cal.Rptr. 275, 583 P.2d 1318], and cases cited therein.) ‘“To hold otherwise would be in effect to substitute a trial by “experts" for a trial by jury . . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Samuel (1981) 29 Cal.3d 489, 498 [174 Cal.Rptr. 684, 629 P.2d 485].) Moreover, a reviewing court must view the evidence with respect to a finding of sanity in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict. (Id., at p. 505.)
A defendant has the burden of proof on the issue of insanity, and if neither party presents credible evidence on the issue, the jury must find the defendant sane. Therefore the question for the reviewing court is not actually the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury’s finding of sanity; rather, the question is whether the evidence contrary to that finding is of such weight and character that the jury could not reasonably reject it. (People v. Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 351.) In other words, before an appellate court can overturn a jury’s finding of sanity on the ground that it is unsupported by the record, the court must find that the defendant is insane as a matter of law. (People v. McCarthy (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 296, 300 [167 Cal.Rptr. 772].) In this case, however, although the majority has not concluded that appellant is insane as a matter of law, it has still reversed the jury’s verdict. I cannot agree with that result.
The majority has concluded that there were no circumstances present allowing the jury to reject the unanimous expert opinion at the sanity phase of the trial that appellant was insane. I disagree. A jury may reasonably reject expert psychiatric opinion that a defendant is insane on the ground that the psychiatrist has not presented sufficient material and reasoning to justify that opinion. (People v. Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d at pp. 350-351.) First, the jurors in this case may well have rejected Dr. Morris’ testimony because they found his reasoning unpersuasive. During the guilt phase, it was Morris’ opinion that appellant was in partial remission at the time of the offense, and could form the intent to kill, premeditate, deliberate, and form malice aforethought. At the sanity phase, however, he testified that appellant’s disease caused the killing, and that appellant lacked substantial capacity to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law and to appreciate the criminality of his conduct. Morris testified that as he viewed it, his testimony was not inconsistent, but he failed to explain why. (See People v. Cruz (1980) 26 Cal.3d 233, 251-252 [162 Cal.Rptr. 1, 605 P.2d 830] [defense of diminished capacity “very close” to American Law Institute insanity test].) The majority itself describes Dr. Morris’ unexplained reversal of his opinion as “undoubtedly confusing.”
A reasonable jury may also have found Dr. Gudiksen’s testimony unpersuasive. The jury may well have been skeptical about the material upon which Dr. Gudiksen based her opinion that appellant had no choice but to *1129follow the orders of his voices, because her information about those voices had to come from appellant himself. Moreover, the jury may have believed that Gudiksen’s reasoning did not support her conclusions. For example, she believed that with respect to the shooting of Joiner, appellant was legally insane. However, she also testified that on the date of the shooting, appellant would have known it was wrong to commit a robbery or other crime against any individual who was not part of his delusional system, and would have been able to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law with respect to such an individual. She testified that appellant’s disease had been characterized by periods of partial remission, and that had he been in remission on the date of the offense, he might have been able both to appreciate the criminality of his conduct and conform to the requirements of the law with respect to Joiner. She testified that at times in the past he seemed to know better than to listen to his voices. She admitted that she did not know whether he was taking his medication at the time of the offense, and the evidence with respect to that fact was contradictory.
The jury may have found Dr. Boyse’s testimony unpersuasive for similar reasons. The jury may have been skeptical about appellant’s reports to Boyse about his hallucinations. As did Gudiksen, Boyse testified that while appellant would have known better than to commit a robbery, he did not appreciate the criminality of his conduct with respect to the shooting of Joiner; however, Boyse also failed to clarify why appellant’s disease would result in that narrowly limited incapacity.
Furthermore, in addition to evaluating all the psychiatric testimony, the jurors in this case were entitled to consider factors such as appellant’s apparent ability to devise and execute a deliberate plan, and the manner in which the crime was conceived and executed, all of which support the finding of sanity. (People v. Wolff (1964) 61 Cal.2d 795, 805 [40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959].) In its review of the record, the majority ignores that evidence. The majority has in fact simply reweighed all the evidence and has come to a different conclusion than the jury. Clearly the majority has departed from the proper standard of judicial review.
My colleagues cite no case in which an appellate court has upset a jury verdict that a defendant was sane when the crime was committed on the ground that the verdict lacked support in the trial record. Instead, they rely upon People v. Samuel, supra, 29 Cal.3d 489 in which the court set aside a jury’s finding of competence to stand trial because of “virtually uncontradicted” evidence of the defendant’s incompetence. Samuel, however, is readily distinguishable from this case. In Samuel, the court recognized that in the past it had called into question the value of expert opinion on the issue of legal sanity. It pointed out, however, that the experts who examined *1130the defendant were asked not to speculate about his state of mind at the moment a crime was committed, but to assess his present mental abilities on the basis of observation and examination continuing up to the very week of the competency hearing. {Id., at pp. 502-503.) The court also acknowledged the deference ordinarily due the findings of the trier of fact, but offered three reasons why it was less hesitant than usual to subject the jury verdict to close scrutiny. First, no constitutional right of the People or the defendant was involved, as the right to a jury in Penal Code section 1368 hearings is statutory. Second, there was no real conflict in the expert testimony; the question was not whose version of the facts to believe, but what to conclude from the undisputed facts. Finally, reversing the finding of competence did not necessarily affect the question of guilt or the penalty to be assessed. {Id., at pp. 505-506.)
Opposite considerations are present in this case. Here the experts were being asked to speculate about appellant’s state of mind and volitional capacity at a prior moment, not at the time of trial. This was not a proceeding in which the right of all the parties to a jury verdict was only statutory. (Cf. People v. Hill (1967) 67 Cal.2d 105, 114 [60 Cal.Rptr. 234, 429 P.2d 586].) The facts were not all undisputed; for example, the evidence as to whether appellant was taking Stelazine or other medication after his release from the hospital and at the time of the killing was contradictory and inconclusive. Moreover, disturbing the jury’s verdict in this case would directly affect the question of guilt and penalty. In short, Samuel is not at all similar to this case, and does not support the majority’s reversal of the sanity judgment.
The majority’s disposition of this appeal is subject to criticism for an additional reason. A defendant who prevails in his claim that the jury’s finding of sanity is not supported by the evidence is entitled to an order directing the trial court to find him insane. (People v. Drew, supra, 22 Cal.3d at p. 349.) Here, however, the majority reverses the judgment finding appellant sane, and remands, presumably for a new trial on the issue of sanity. The failure to direct the trial court to find appellant insane suggests that the majority is unable or unwilling to acknowledge the legal effect of its decision. The majority has in fact usurped the function of the jury, and its order reversing and remanding attempts to cloud the effect of its judgment.
I also cannot agree that the prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument require reversal of the sanity verdict. Read in context, the prosecutor’s comments were an attempt to explain the objections of the district attorney’s office to appellant’s 1979 release, not an appeal to the jury to find appellant sane despite the evidence in order to protect society.
*1131Appellant’s other complaints of prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct during the sanity phase of the trial are also without merit. First, appellant complains that the prosecutor improperly tried to question Dr. Boyse about whether he used a so-called “baby-fat test” on appellant, and then referred to the test again during argument to discredit Boyse. Appellant exaggerates the effect of the prosecutor’s conduct. The initial questioning of Boyse was not improper, as the prosecutor was entitled to cross-examine Boyse to determine the material upon which his opinion was based, and the reasons for his opinion. (See People v. Nye (1969) 71 Cal.2d 356, 374-375 [78 Cal.Rptr. 467, 455 P.2d 395], cert, den., 406 U.S. 972 [32 L.Ed.2d 672, 92 S.Ct. 2417].) When the prosecutor referred to the test during argument, defense counsel correctly pointed out that there was no evidence either of the nature of the test or of Boyse’s opinion of the test in the record. The court then stated that the jury was to determine what had been said and not said, and the references to baby fat ceased. Given the court’s admonition, I fail to see how appellant has been prejudiced by the prosecutor’s remarks.
Appellant contends the prosecutor committed other acts of misconduct by referring to matters not in evidence. As for the prosecutor’s reference to appellant’s use of drugs and to jail inmates’ attitudes about appellant, any harm was cured when the court sustained defense counsel’s objections to the comments. As for the prosecutor’s reference to Charles Manson, a timely objection and admonition would have cured any harm, but defense counsel did not object; therefore I would not consider that issue. (People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 34 [164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468].)
I would affirm the judgment in its entirety.
Respondent’s petition for a hearing by the Supreme Court was denied February 21, 1985. Mosk, J., Kaus, J., and Lucas, J., were of the opinion that the petition should be granted.