Court Opinion

ID: 9695415
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:19:06.401501+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:12.170413
License: Public Domain

O’Hara, J.
(dissenting). My Brother’s opinion does not treat, as did the trial court’s, the question vigorously argued below, namely, spoliation and destruction of evidence by the defendant, namely, the offending slip. This issue cannot be separated from the trial judge’s reasoning in arriving at a directed verdict. I quote from his opinion:
“In my judgment, there is no competent evidence from which a jury could properly find, or reasonably infer that the slip in question was the cause of the skin irritation or dermatitis condition complained of.
“There is no competent evidence in the record from which the jury could find that the evidence in question, namely the slip, was suppressed, spoliated or destroyed by the defendant or its agents intentionally or otherwise.
“Rather, the facts show, and they’re uncontradicted, that the slip was taken back to the defendant and a receipt obtained, that no specific instructions were given by the plaintiff regarding the handling of the slip, that a portion of the slip was sent back *104to the manufacturer by the defendant’s insurer for examination and presumably for analysis, that thereafter a demand was made for the return of the slip by plaintiff’s counsel sometime in March of 1960, the 17th. * * *
“There is nothing in the record to suggest that thereafter, from then up until the time of trial, that plaintiff made any contention that he could not conduct any tests of any kind without the remainder of the slip. * * *
“So, it seems to me that in view of plaintiff’s position and in view of the [plaintiff’s] refusal of any continuance for the purpose of testing the material in question, it serves no useful purpose to point out that perhaps the defendant, or the defendant’s agents, or the defendant’s manufacturers should have produced this slip earlier. * * * He could have'taken it and had it analyzed if he wished, but he contended it would serve no purpose whatsoever, and chose to rely on a presumption which he said he was entitled to by virtue of Clark v. Tulare Lake Dredging Co., 14 Cal App 414 (112 P 564). * * *
“The only' thing that plaintiff’s witness said was that he would prefer to have the entire garment in the event there was some irritant in a localized area of the garment which he could only find by testing the entire garment, but he did concede other tests could be conducted. * * *
“In any event, instead of proceeding or producing any proofs supporting the claims in the declaration, which incidentally was filed May 25, 1960, which is certainly a long time before the supplement to the pretrial statement dictated March 20, 1963. Plaintiff dreio a declaration, made certain allegations of negligence and breach of warranty, and produced no proofs of any kind in support of those allegations. Nor are there any facts in evidence from which reasonable inferences supporting those allegations might be drawn.” (Emphasis supplied.)
*105Without any inference from the spoliation or destruction of evidence theory, there remain only these allegations and proofs in support thereof:
(1) Wearing the slip.
(2) Immediate subsequent attack of dermatitis.
(3) No atypical user conduct-pattern as to diet or other clothes worn that day.
This it seems to me is not under the present law of this State sufficient to make out a prima facie case under any view however favorable to plaintiff. To this point my Brother addresses himself briefly:
“We are aware that in the typical products-liability case, plaintiff’s counsel is usually able to produce some direct proof of defect and causal relationship between that proof and injury.”
I agree, but I am moved to disagree with Mr. Justice Smith when he says:
“Here, the trial court found no competent direct evidence and, without detailing what was presented, we agree. However, we are moved to disagree with the trial court’s direction of verdict at the close of plaintiffs’ proofs. We cannot say that reasonable minds could not differ as to what might be legitimately inferred therefrom, so that we find it error to have concluded, as a matter of law, that plaintiff did not establish a prima facie ease.”
It is my point that before the “reasonable men’s-minds-can-differ” test can be applied, there must be minimal proof in the record from which a permissible inference either way could be made. To be specific when the declaration (now complaint) alleges :
“That in truth and in fact the slip, the fabric, ingredients and chemicals therein were inherently dangerous and harmful to plaintiff’s health,” *106plaintiff is required, under favorable view, to adduce some proof of what those “ingredients and chemicals” were, and that in the view of someone competent to testify to it that they were “inherently dangerous and harmful to plaintiff’s health.”
If we are prepared to say now “use plus injury equals a prima facie case of liability,” we had best say so clearly in order that bench, bar, and public is so advised. I am not so prepared.
I would affirm the trial judge, with costs to appellee.
Dethmers and Kelly, JJ., concurred with O’Hara. J.