Court Opinion

ID: 9630590
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:15:05.911345+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:40.736851
License: Public Domain

NIGRO, Justice,
concurring.
I agree with the conclusion of the Opinion Announcing the Judgment of the Court (“Opinion Announcing the Judgment”) that the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to support Appellant’s convictions for first-degree murder. I further agree with the Opinion Announcing the Judgment that none of the claims of error raised by Appellant warrant relief. Thus, I join the Opinion Announcing the Judgmént in affirming the verdict and sentences of death imposed upon Appellant, and write separately merely to address the jury instruction given in this case regarding victim impact testimony.
For the reasons more fully explained in my dissenting opinion in Commonwealth v. Means, 565 Pa. 309, 773 A.2d 143, 162-67 (2001), I believe that Pennsylvania’s statutory provisions governing victim impact evidence in the penalty phase of capital cases, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9711(a)(2) & (c)(2), violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Despite my continuing belief that this statutory scheme is constitutionally infirm, I recognize that a majority of this Court has concluded that 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9711(a)(2) & (c)(2) are constitutionally valid. See Majority Opinion at. 351; Means, 773 A.2d at 148-57, 159 (Opinion Announcing the .Judgment of the Court and Saylor, J., concurring). I therefore am compelled to concur with the lead opinion’s conclusion that Appellant’s claims regarding victim impact evidence, including his constitutional challenge to 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9711(a)(2) & (c)(2), must fail.
*223In my dissent in Means, I set forth a series of procedural safeguards that would, in my view, prevent a jury from using-victim impact evidence in an arbitrary and capricious manner when deciding whether the death penalty is an appropriate sentence. Means, 773 A.2d at 165-66 (Nigro, J., dissenting). In doing so, I borrowed heavily from the procedures adopted by New Jersey for use in its capital sentencing scheme. Means, 773 A.2d at 165 (Nigro, J., dissenting); see N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3c(6); State v. Muhammad, 145 N.J. 23, 678 A.2d 164, 179-81 (1996). I also noted my belief that a jury instruction consistent with these proposed safeguards should be given to ensure the fundamental fairness of a capital sentencing proceeding. Means, 773 A.2d at 166 (Nigro, J., dissenting). In the instant case, the Opinion Announcing the Judgment finds that the jury instruction was based on New Jersey law rather than Pennsylvania law. Although the Opinion Announcing the Judgment ultimately concludes that the instruction was not prejudicial to Appellant, and finds no error for that reason, I would affirm the instruction on the basis that it was consistent with the scheme I suggested in Means.