Court Opinion

ID: 9905732
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-30 00:03:50.535208+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:23:52.309643
License: Public Domain

Filed 11/29/23 P. v. Trejo CA2/3
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                  DIVISION THREE

  THE PEOPLE,                                                         B320712

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                                  (Los Angeles County
                                                                      Super. Ct. No. BA420112)
           v.

  MANUEL TREJO,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Frederick N. Wapner, Judge. Affirmed as
modified.
      Susan Morrow Maxwell, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                   _________________________
       Manuel Trejo contends that his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance by failing to ask for a pretrial diversion
eligibility hearing under Penal Code1 section 1001.36. We
conclude that the record fails to establish his counsel provided
ineffective assistance. However, we modify the judgment to
correct custody credits.
                         BACKGROUND
        This case arose from Trejo’s robbery of a store. Our
Division described the events in People v. Trejo (Sept. 11, 2017,
B271528) [nonpub. opn.] (Trejo I):
        “Ana Cisneros worked at the Family Dollar Store. At
approximately 6:15 p.m. on December 15, 2013, Trejo, wearing a
scarf over his mouth and nose, was in the store. It being cold
outside, Cisneros initially thought nothing of Trejo’s attire. But,
as Cisneros walked toward the cash registers, Trejo told Cisneros
to ‘listen.’ He showed Cisneros something wrapped in a black
stocking. Although Cisneros could see only a metal handle, it
appeared to be a gun. Another witness, however, saw Trejo lift
his shirt to reveal a gun. Trejo took $108 from a cash register.
When Cisneros told Trejo she could not open another cash
register without the code, he ‘backed away.’ Trejo took a handful
of beef jerky before leaving.
        “Almost two hours later, Deputy Sheriff Eva Robles saw
Trejo driving a car that had been connected to a domestic
violence investigation. Robles activated her car’s lights and
sirens, but Trejo did not yield. Instead, Trejo’s car continued
through intersections and stop signs at approximately 40 miles

1
     All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.

                                 2
per hour. Trejo’s car crashed into a parked vehicle, but he
continued on, eventually stopping. Robles found Jack Link’s beef
sticks in Trejo’s car.” (Trejo I, supra, B271528.)
        In 2015, Trejo pleaded guilty to second degree robbery
(§ 211) with a gun (§ 12022.53, subd. (b)), and to evading an
officer, willful disregard (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)). Trejo
also admitted having two prior robbery convictions within the
meaning of the Three Strikes law, three prior prison terms
(§ 667.5, subd. (b)), and two prior convictions of a serious felony
(§ 667, subd. (a)(1)).
       At his original sentencing hearing in 2016, the trial court
denied Trejo’s Romero2 motion but nonetheless said that Trejo
seemed “like a decent enough guy,” and the trial court would
have liked to have done something for him. The trial court also
referred to Trejo’s “documented history of mental illness” for
which he had been previously treated and gone to Patton State
Hospital. Still, medication was controlling Trejo’s mental illness,
although the trial court had “no doubt” it contributed to his
crime. The trial court then sentenced Trejo to “46 years and four
months” in prison.
       This Division affirmed Trejo’s judgment of conviction,
rejecting his argument that the trial court erred in denying his
Romero motion. (Trejo I, supra, B271528.) After granting
review, the California Supreme Court transferred the matter to
us with the direction to vacate our decision and reconsider the
matter in light of Senate Bill No. 620, which gave trial courts
discretion to strike certain firearm enhancements. We
accordingly remanded the matter to the trial court to reconsider

2
      People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.

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the sentence. (People v. Trejo (Mar. 19, 2018, B271528) [nonpub.
opn.] (Trejo II).)
       At the March 2019 resentencing hearing, the trial court
referred to psychiatric reports that had been submitted at the
original sentencing hearing. The trial court described the case as
unusual and observed that during the robbery, Trejo had held a
door open for a female customer, “So he’s an armed robber; but
he’s a nice armed robber, and he was polite. And he was nice in
court. And he had been doing well on parole for the short time.
And so even though his record is terrible, he’s going to get, in any
event, a severe sentence.” The trial court struck a 10-year term
under section 12022.53, subdivision (b), and resentenced Trejo to
“36 years and four months.” Trejo’s trial counsel did not request
pretrial diversion.
       Trejo appealed again, this time contending that the matter
should be remanded so that the trial court could exercise its
discretion to strike or to dismiss the section 667, subdivision
(a)(1), enhancements, in light of Senate Bill No. 1393, which had
just become effective. This Division agreed and remanded the
matter for reconsideration of Trejo’s sentence. (People v. Trejo
(Feb. 7, 2020, B297172) [nonpub. opn.] (Trejo III).)3 At the March
16, 2022 resentencing hearing, the trial court struck the two 5-
year priors, thus resentencing Trejo to 25 years to life on count 1
and 16 months on count 2. Trejo’s counsel again did not raise
pretrial diversion under section 1001.36.

3
      At Trejo’s request, we take judicial notice of the records in
Trejo I, Trejo II, and Trejo III. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

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                           DISCUSSION
I.    Pretrial diversion
       Trejo contends his trial counsel provided ineffective
assistance by failing to request pretrial diversion under section
1001.36. We disagree.
       Section 1001.36 became effective in 2018 (stats. 2018,
ch. 34, § 24), and it applies retroactively to judgments not final
when it became effective (People v. Frahs (2020) 9 Cal.5th 618,
624). Under it, defendants with qualifying mental disorders may
be eligible for a pretrial diversion program. (See generally Frahs,
at p. 626.) “ ‘Pretrial diversion’ means the postponement of
prosecution, either temporarily or permanently, at any point in
the judicial process from the point at which the accused is
charged until adjudication, to allow the defendant to undergo
mental health treatment.”4 (§ 1001.36, subd. (f)(1).) A defendant
is eligible for pretrial diversion if two criteria are met. First, the
defendant has been diagnosed with a mental disorder identified
in the most recent edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, and defense counsel has provided
evidence of that disorder, including a diagnosis within the last

4
       While this matter was pending on appeal, our California
Supreme Court held that a diversion request must be made
before jeopardy attaches at trial or the entry of a guilty or no
contest plea, whichever occurs first. (People v. Braden (2023)
14 Cal.5th 791, 799.) Here, Trejo entered his plea in 2015, before
section 1001.36 became effective. Since entering his plea, the
judgment has yet to become final due to the ongoing appellate
proceedings. We need not decide what, if any, impact Braden has
on this matter, as we ultimately conclude Trejo has not shown
entitlement to relief on appeal.

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five years by a qualified mental health expert. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (b)(1).) Second, the defendant’s disorder was a significant
factor in the commission of the charged offense. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (b)(2).) If the defendant has been diagnosed with a
disorder, then a court shall find that the disorder was a
significant factor in the commission of the offense unless there is
clear and convincing evidence it was not a motivating, causal or
contributing factor to the defendant’s involvement in the alleged
offense. (Ibid.)
       If a defendant satisfies the eligibility requirements, then
the court must consider the defendant’s suitability for pretrial
diversion, which requires meeting four criteria. (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c).) First, a mental health expert has found that the
defendant’s disorder would respond to mental health treatment.
(§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1).) Second, the defendant consents to
treatment. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(2).) Third, the defendant agrees
to comply with treatment as a condition of diversion, unless the
defendant is incompetent to consent. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(3).)
Fourth, the defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety. (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
       Trejo concedes that his trial counsel never asked for
pretrial diversion. He therefore contends that his counsel
provided ineffective assistance. To establish a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel, a defendant must establish both that
(1) counsel’s performance was deficient, falling below an objective
standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,
and (2) prejudice, meaning a reasonable probability that but for
counsel’s deficient performance the outcome would have been
different. (See generally Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466
U.S. 668; People v. Bell (2019) 7 Cal.5th 70, 125.) When an

                                 6
ineffective assistance of counsel claim is raised on direct appeal,
the record must affirmatively establish that counsel had no
rational tactical reason for the challenged act or omission,
counsel failed to provide a reason, or there could be no
satisfactory explanation. (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986,
1009.) Otherwise, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are
better resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding. (Ibid.)
       The record here of Trejo’s mental health condition is
limited. To be sure, the record alludes to a mental illness; for
example, at the original sentencing hearing in 2016, the trial
court referred to Trejo’s documented mental illness that
medication was controlling; psychiatric reports were apparently
submitted at the 2016 sentencing hearing; and Trejo’s probation
report notes he had been previously classified as mentally
disturbed while incarcerated and was admitted to Patton State
Hospital in 1995. Still, the record does not state the precise
nature of Trejo’s mental illness, that any diagnosis remained
valid in 2016, and that Trejo would have agreed to diversion and
to treatment.5 While the trial court did suggest at the 2016
sentencing hearing that Trejo’s mental illness contributed to his
crime, it did not consider the precise issue whether it was a

5
      Although we have taken judicial notice of the records in
Trejo I, II, and III, Trejo has not cited anything in those records
to support his argument, and we have found no supporting
documents that, for example, show what Trejo’s disorder is.
Instead, in his declaration in support of the Romero motion,
Trejo’s trial counsel vaguely referred to Trejo’s “long history of
drug abuse and mental illness” and that Trejo had been deemed
incompetent under section 1368 but was later found to be
competent to stand trial after an evaluation. The file relating to
the competency proceedings was “not accessible.”

                                 7
“significant factor” in its commission. Nor does the record
contain an explanation from trial counsel why he did not request
pretrial diversion in 2019, when the matter was remanded for
resentencing. We therefore conclude that the record does not
establish that Trejo’s trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.
      However, if there is evidence outside this appellate record
that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to seek diversion
under section 1001.36, then Trejo may pursue any such claim
through a writ of habeas corpus. (People v. Mai, supra, 57
Cal.4th at p. 1009.)
II.   Custody credits
      A defendant convicted of a felony or misdemeanor shall be
credited for all days in custody. (§ 2900.5, subd. (a); People v.
Rajanayagam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 42, 48.) Days in custody
include the day of arrest through and including the day of
sentencing. (Rajanayagam, at p. 48.) Trejo was arrested on
December 16, 2013 and was most recently resentenced on March
16, 2022. He is therefore entitled to 3,013 actual days of custody
credit and 127 days of presentence custody credits, instead of the
2,165 actual days of custody credit and zero days of presentence
custody credits the trial court awarded.

                                 8
                         DISPOSITION
       The judgment is modified to reflect that Manuel Trejo is
entitled to 3,013 actual days of custody credit and 127 days of
presentence custody credit. In all other respects, the judgment is
affirmed. The clerk of the superior court is ordered to prepare an
amended abstract of judgment reflecting the corrected custody
credits and to forward it to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.

    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

                                          EDMON, P. J.

We concur:

                        LAVIN, J.

                        ADAMS, J.

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