Court Opinion

ID: 9719196
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 07:45:44.034617+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:24:05.126487
License: Public Domain

Concurring Opinion by
Mr. Justice Roberts :
I concur in the result and much of the majority opinion. I agree with the majority’s conclusion that this case is governed by our decision in Commonwealth v. Dell Pub., Inc., 427 Pa. 189, 233 A. 2d 840 (1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 948, 88 S. Ct. 1038 (1968), and that the controlling principles enunciated in Dell require that the judgment of sentence be reversed.
I disagree, however, Avith the dictum in the majority opinion which suggests that there is a different standard of proof applicable to cases involving “hard core pornography” as opposed to “mere obscenity.” The First Amendment simply does not recognize any such distinction. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 77 S. Ct. 1304 (1957); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 86 S. Ct. 975 (1966). Obviously, this Court is without power to do so.
The majority opinion correctly emphasizes that the challenged work can be declared obscene and constitutionally unprotected only if it fails to meet all three of the elements set forth in Roth v. United States, supra, and amplified by Memoirs v. Massachusetts, supra. See Commonwealth v. Dell Pub., Inc., 427 Pa. 189, 198-209, 233 A. 2d 840, 845-51 (1967). Any work whose “dominant theme . . . taken as a whole appeals to a prurient interest in sex”1 and whose “material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary *379community standards”2 and whose “material is utterly without redeeming social value”3 is by definition “hard core pornography.” But this determination can be made only after—not before—applying the Both-Memoirs test to the challenged work.
Accordingly, in every instance involving allegedly obscene material the burden must be on the Commonwealth, as it is in all criminal cases, to come forth and produce appropriate evidence, see Commonwealth v. Dell Pub., Inc., supra, that the challenged work fails to meet each of the separate elements set forth in Both and Memoirs and is therefore constitutionally obscene. This burden is not satisfied by the mere production of the allegedly obscene materials. The need for expert evidence to establish that the material is constitutionally unprotected under the Both-Memoirs test was specifically recognized by this Court in Duggan v. Guild Theatre, Inc., 436 Pa. 191, 258 A. 2d 858 (1969), where we observed: “The district attorney in his brief admits that he produced no expert testimony on this issue [contemporary standards], yet urges us to find that the movie affronts contemporary standards. This we cannot do. Courts of law are not capable of deciding what contemporary standards are, without the benefit of any evidence whatsoever.” Id. at 201, 258 A. 2d at 863; accord United States v. Klaw, 350 F. 2d 155, 167 (2d Cir. 1965); In Re Giannini, 69 C. 2d 563, 72 Cal. Rptr. 655, 446 P. 2d 535 (1968); House v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 121, 169 S.E. 2d 572 (1969).
If the challenged work is in fact “hard core pornography”, the Commonwealth should have no difficulty in sustaining its position. With this reservation, I concur in the result.

 Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413, 418, 86 S. Ct. 975, 977 (1966).

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