Court Opinion

ID: 9793752
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:52:21.624035+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:06:43.723375
License: Public Domain

LUCAS, J.
I respectfully dissent. In the face of evidence disclosing “very serious incidents” of violence occurring in or near the chapel, including “gang confrontations, escapes, sexual attacks on younger, weaker wards, and various contraband problems,” and a conceded “objectively reasonable” concern for security in Youth Authority (YA) chapels (ante, pp. 696-697), the majority nonetheless effectively requires the YA to dismantle and remove its chapel security monitoring system. The majority, acknowledging its own *706obvious lack of expertise in the area, offers the YA no reasonable and effective alternatives to the monitoring system presently employed, other than to suggest the “partial solution” of a beeper alarm, coupled with increased use of guards or other YA personnel.1 (Ante, at p. 699.) In my view, such a holding approaches an act of judicial irresponsibility, unnecessarily placing the lives of YA wards and personnel at risk merely because of a remotely possible “chilling effect” upon the conduct of religious services or consultations within the chapel if the sound system is permitted to remain.
In a nutshell, the majority holds that the YA has failed to carry the burden of proving that its sound monitoring system is both “necessary” to preserve reasonable security (see Pen. Code, § 2600) and that the system affords the “least restrictive means” of maintaining that security (ante, pp. 697-698). According to the majority, the YA should have made a “more substantial showing that [it] has explored the effectiveness of less intrusive alternatives and found them to be ineffective.” (Ante, p. 700.) I see many serious problems with this analysis.2
First, Penal Code section 2600 deals generally with the civil rights of prisoners, and not with the subject of the exercise of religious freedom by YA wards. That specific topic is governed by section 1705 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which offers such wards “reasonable opportunities to exercise religious freedom.” As the majority acknowledges, this language probably derived from Cruz v. Beto (1972) 405 U.S. 319 [31 L.Ed.2d 263, 92 S.Ct. 1079], wherein the court held that “reasonable opportunities must be afforded to all prisoners to exercise . . . religious freedom . . . .” (P. 322, fn. 2 [31 L.Ed.2d at p. 268].) The majority likewise concedes that the Legislature rejected language which would have granted to YA wards the right to observe religious practices “except as it may become reasonably necessary to enforce reasonable, proper, and lawful security measures.” (Italics added; see ante, p. 684.)
In my view, whatever the phrase “reasonable opportunities” means, it does not mean an absolute guarantee of unmonitored activity unless the YA proves a particular security measure is both “necessary” and affords the *707“least intrusive means” of preserving security. Whatever “reasonable opportunities” are, they were certainly afforded by the YA in the present case.
Factually, this is a poor case to choose as a vehicle for outlawing sound monitoring systems in YA chapels. Here, extensive evidentiary hearings were held, culminating with the trial court’s ruling upholding the YA’s use of its security system. The People submitted evidence of prior acts of violence by YA wards upon teachers, including the 1975 classroom murder of Marie Romero at El Paso de Robles School, and the 1976 brutal assaults upon Tabiri Tabasuri and Gary Cauble, culminating in a riot and $85,000 in property damage. As a result of these incidents, YA employees demanded increased safety and security measures, including more reliable alarm and monitoring systems, and threatened to withhold their services until these measures were carried out.
Not only was there ample evidence introduced of the necessity for sound monitoring, based on prior incidents of violence occurring in or near the chapel, and the inadequacy of a beeper system, but the record also strongly indicates that any interference with, or “chilling effect” upon, religious practices would be minimal. The record shows that no “spying” on religious services or practices, public or private, was involved; the content of private conversations or consultations would not be invaded. The sound system was designed merely to activate when unusually loud sounds occurred, signalling a possible security problem and allowing a rapid response thereto by YA authorities. As R. N. Ristad, president of the Associated Chaplains in State Service, attested: “[T]he electronic sound security system in the chapels at Karl Holton [school] strikes the proper balance between the security needs of the institution and the wards’ rights to religious freedom and privacy.”
As Presiding Justice Puglia observed in his opinion for the Court of Appeal in this case, “There was evidence in the superior court hearing that the electronic sound system was incapable of monitoring the content of normal conversation conducted in the chaplain’s office with the door closed. The superior court impliedly credited such evidence, a factual determination to which we accord great weight in this proceeding [citation]. In any event, respondent [YA] is not constitutionally bound to exempt any particular area of the institution, such as the chaplain’s office, from security surveillance. Rather respondent’s obligation is to afford petitioners reasonable opportunities to exercise their religious freedom (Cruz v. Beto, supra, 405 U.S. at p. 322, fn. 2 [31 L.Ed.2d at p. 268, fn. 2]; Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1705). In respect to participation in confessionals and other private religious activities, any area of the chapel is available for such purposes when the sound system is not operating. Since the sound system can be turned off at the *708chaplain’s request [subject to the approval of YA authorities] and can thereafter be reactivated only at the chapel, the sanctity of private worship is assured.
“Respondent disavows any intention or desire to deny wards reasonable opportunities to speak in confidence with a religious advisor, and indeed no intrusions upon the privacy of such activities have been alleged or proved. We are satisfied that the electronic monitoring system as proposed will accommodate both institutional security needs and reasonable opportunities for wards to engage in private communications with their religious advisors.”
As indicated above, the majority asserts that “it is not this court’s job to design security systems . . . .” (Ante, p. 700.) Neither, I submit, is it our job to second-guess the YA’s decision to install a particular security system, in the absence of any showing of a substantial interference with the practice of religion. Certainly, as discussed below, the burden of proving that there are less intrusive alternatives capable of effectively preserving chapel security should be placed on the opponent of the present system, not on the YA. In the absence of some showing that the YA’s facially reasonable security device can be effectively replaced with some other system, we should defer to the YA’s choice for, indeed, it is not our job to make such decisions.
The majority, assigning to the YA the burden of proof, cites no prison security cases so holding, but merely asserts that “This is consistent with established principles of constitutional law, since fundamental rights of individuals cannot be abridged unless the state shows the abridgement is ‘necessary’ to further a compelling governmental interest.” (Ante, p. 697, fn. 34.) First, no “abridgement” is involved here; as indicated above, the sound system will not preclude “reasonable opportunities” (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 1705) to exercise religious freedom. Second, assuming the burden is YA’s, it has indeed proven that its system is “necessary” in light of incidents of violence in or near the chapel which demand increased security measures. Finally, the majority overlooks controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court which completely undermine its unfair assignment of the proof burden to the YA.
In Bell v. Wolfish (1979) 441 U.S. 520 [60 L.Ed.2d 447, 99 S.Ct. 1861], the high court upheld a prison ban on receipt by inmates of hardbound books unless mailed directly from the publisher or bookstore. Rejecting a claim that the restriction unduly burdened First Amendment rights of the inmates, the court first observed that the “limited restriction is a rational response by prison officials to an obvious security problem.” (P. 550 [60 L.Ed.2d *709at p. 476].) With respect to the burden of proof question, the court noted that “There is simply no evidence in the record to indicate that [prison] officials have exaggerated their response to this security problem and to the administrative difficulties posed by the necessity of carefully inspecting each book mailed from unidentified sources. Therefore, the considered judgment of these experts must control in the absence of prohibitions far more sweeping than those involved here. [Citations.] [11] Our conclusion that this limited restriction on receipt of hardback books does not infringe the First Amendment rights of . . . inmates is influenced by several other factors. The rule operates in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression .... And there are alternative means of obtaining reading material that have not been shown to be burdensome or insufficient.” (Id., at p. 551 [60 L.Ed.2d at p. 476], italics added; see also Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union (1977) 433 U.S. 119, 128 [53 L.Ed.2d 629, 640, 97 S.Ct. 2532]; Pell v. Procunier (1974) 417 U.S. 817, 827-828 [41 L.Ed.2d 495, 504-505, 94 S.Ct. 2800].)
Thus, in Bell, a prison’s limited infringement upon a First Amendment right was deemed a rational response to an obvious security problem, in the absence of proof by the inmates that the response was “exaggerated” (i.e., was not the least intrusive means reasonably available). In my view, Bell and its predecessors are controlling here. The majority, describing the foregoing United States Supreme Court precedent as “a few federal cases,” rejects that precedent because it would “merely” require prison officials to show that chosen security measures are rationally related to security concerns, rather than proving that such measures provide the “least drastic means of addressing those concerns.” (Ante, p. 691.) But as I have explained, nowhere in the applicable constitutional or statutory provisions is such an unrealistic burden imposed on prison officials.
The majority concludes that “to remain true to the legislative intent of [Penal Code] section 2600, the balancing analysis must begin with a discussion of the rights of nonconfined citizens. [Citations.]” (Ante, p. 691, fn. omitted.) But YA wards, like prisoners, are not “nonconfined citizens,” and cases discussing the scope of First Amendment or other fundamental rights in the context of a free and open society are simply inapposite.
As the United States Supreme Court stated in Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union, supra, 433 U.S. at pages 132-133, footnote 9 [53 L.Ed.2d at p. 643] “informed discretion of prison officials that there is a potential danger may be sufficient for limiting rights even though this showing might be ‘unimpressive if . . . submitted as justification for governmental restriction of personal communication among members of the general public.’” As stated by Justice Richardson in his opinion in In re Cummings (1982) *71030 Cal.3d 870, 873 [180 Cal.Rptr. 826,640 P.2d 1101,29 A.L.R.4th 1207], “Rights of privacy, like associational rights, are necessarily and substantially abridged in a prison setting.” Nothing in the majority opinion, or in the language of the applicable statutes, indicates that the exercise of religious freedom must be treated any differently.
For all the foregoing reasons, I dissent from the majority opinion and would not order the YA to remove its electronic sound system.
Mosk, J., concurred.

Use of an FM beeper system had been considered and rejected as inadequate by YA authorities because, among other things, the beeper would not provide information regarding the disturbance nor permit the wearer to communicate with YA staff. Moreover, wards would be unprotected by the beeper unless a staff member happened to be in the vicinity when a problem arose. Thus, the majority’s suggestion of a beeper system concededly would also require increased use of guards or other YA personnel.

For the reasons stated in part I of the concurring and dissenting opinion of Justice Grodin, I agree that the YA’s new monitoring system does not violate Penal Code section 636.