Court Opinion

ID: 9688881
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 18:10:30.90678+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:06:57.948151
License: Public Domain

Robert W. Hansen, J.
(dissenting). The state employment discrimination statutes 1 were amended in 1973 to provide for department awards for back pay where such discrimination is established.2 The plaintiff here brings a private civil action for such back pay, but for a period of time not covered by the 1973 amendment. *67Without such 1973 amendment, the majority opinion concedes, under our earlier holding in Ross,3 the statutory remedies as then provided were exclusive, and plaintiff could not mount a civil action to receive any additional relief. Likewise, the majority opinion concedes that the 1973 change in the statutes came too late to affect plaintiff’s rights before the department. However, the majority opinion holds that this court can now take cognizance of the change in legislative attitude, so as to permit the plaintiff to pursue a cause of action for lost wages.
A bridge is thus constructed, connecting the 1973 declaration of a right to back pay with the construction of the law as it existed prior to the 1973 amendment.4 The bridge cannot support the weight placed upon it — at either end.
At the 1957 end, as to finding anything by way of right or penalty that is not therein contained, the bridge-building encounters the firm holding, in Ross, that: “. . . Where the law gives a new remedy to meet a new situation, the remedy provided by the law is exclusive. ...” 5 Even if a right without penalty or remedy were to be located within the law as it then read, Ross makes *68clear that: “. . . But if such right was created we must look to the statute to see if the remedy or penalty for a violation is provided. If it is, that remedy is exclusive. ...” 6 If the remedy provided by the statute, at the time of Ross or following the 1957 amendment is indeed exclusive, there is no basis for either department order or private action for back pay. Collecting back pay is not among the remedies or penalties made available, and exclusively so, by the statute prior to the 1973 amendment. The majority opinion cites American Jurisprudence 2d to the effect that where there is an intent to impose liability, a private right of action may be predicated upon a statutory mandate even though such right is not given by the express terms of the statute.7 But Ross and Murphy found no such intent to impose liability for back pay in the statute involved. Also, the sentence preceding the quotation from American Jurisprudence 2d makes clear that: “. . . when a statute confers a right and a remedy where none existed before, its plain meaning must be given effect. ...” 8 That is what Ross found to be the situation, and that is what Ross insists must be done.
At the 1973 end, as to the 1973 amendment indicating what the legislative intention of an earlier legislature was at the time of the 1957 amendment, the bridge-building project encounters a long line of cases holding that, in this state, the construction placed on a statute by a different legislature than enacted it is not binding upon the court.9 The Wisconsin rule on this point has *69been well stated to be: . . However, the legislature by a later enactment cannot establish or affect the construction of a former act so as to have the same operate retroactively. . . .” 10 The majority opinion cites American Jurisprudence 2d to indicate that, where a new right is created, the statutory remedy is considered exclusive unless a contrary intention is demonstrated.11 The majority opinion then adds in a footnote: “. . . Here, the amendment of the statute [in 1973] to permit awarding of back pay constitutes a contrary intention.” The American Jurisprudence 2d statement quoted by the majority goes on to state: “A statute creates no liability unless it exposes an intention, express or implied, that from disregard of the statutory command, liability for damages arises which would not exist except for the statute.” 12 *70The “it” reference, italicized for emphasis, clearly refers to the single statute involved, not to an amendment to it.13 With the above Wisconsin cases left unreversed, the writer sees the conclusion compelled that what the legislature did in 1973 cannot reach back to establish or affect the construction of its earlier enactment in 1957.
It is clear that the plaintiff here, establishing the fact of employment discrimination based upon sex, does have the right to seek and secure back pay, in the federal courts,14 under the federal statute,15 for the times involved in this action. As to the time periods following the effective date of the 1973 amendment, she also has the right to seek and secure such back pay by department order under the state statute.16 However, as to the time period here involved, before the effective date of the 1973 amendment providing for back pay awards, the writer would hold that she has no cause of action for such back pay in the state courts under the state statute. So the writer would reverse, directing that the complaint of the plaintiff be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.

 Ch. 111, subch. II, secs. 111.31 to 111.37, Stats., prohibiting employment discrimination.

 Ch. 268, Laws of 1973, creating sec. 111.36 (3) (b), Stats.

 Ross v. Ebert (1957), 275 Wis. 523, 532, 82 N. W. 2d 315, this court denying injunctive relief and holding: “. . . that the measures already taken by the industrial commission provide the entire remedy given by law in the premises [violation of Fair Employment Code, sec. 111.31 to see. 111.36, Stats.] and their complaint did not state a cause of action which the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain.” See also: Murphy v. Industrial Comm. (1968), 37 Wis. 2d 704; 712a, 155 N. W. 2d 545, 157 N. W. 2d 568, holding that the ILHR department “. . . has no authority under the Wisconsin Fair Employment Practices Act, eh. Ill, subchapter II, of the Wisconsin Statutes, secs. 111.31 to 111.37, either during or after conciliation or after hearing, to award back pay to parties discriminated against on account of their sex in the wages paid them. . . .”

 Ch. 266, Laws of 1957, creating sec. 111.36 (3), Stats.

 Ross v. Ebert, supra, at page 528, citing In re Jeness (1935), 218 Wis. 447, 450, 261 N. W. 415.

 Id. at page 528, citing State ex rel. Russell v. Board of Appeals (1947), 250 Wis. 394, 397, 27 N. W. 2d 378; LeFevre v. Goodland (1945), 247 Wis. 512, 516, 517, 19 N. W. 2d 884.

 See: 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Actions, p. 601, sec. 73.

 Id. at page 601.

 See: State ex rel. Thompson v. Nash (1965), 27 Wis. 2d 183, 190, 133 N. W. 2d 769, citing State ex rel. Larson v. Giessel (1954), 266 Wis. 547, 555, 64 N. W. 2d 421, where this court held: “. . . *69It is clear that a subsequent legislature cannot by a later act declare the construction which was intended by a former enactment so as to make such construction binding upon a court faced with making a construction of the earlier act. . . .”

 Green Bay Drop Forge Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1953), 265 Wis. 38, 51b, 60 N. W. 2d 409, 61 N. W. 2d 847, citing Northern Trust Co. v. Snyder (1902), 113 Wis. 516, 530, 89 N. W. 460, this court there holding: “. . . It is too elementary to justify us in referring to authority on the question, that a legislative body is not permitted under any circumstances to declare what its intention was on a former occasion so as to affect past transactions. . . .” See also: Dodge County v. Kaiser (1943), 243 Wis. 551, 557, 11 N. W. 2d 348, this court holding: “. . . The power conferred upon the county board by ch. 392, Laws of 1943, can have no weight in a construction of the statute as it existed before the amendment. . . .” See also: Maus v. Bloss (1954), 265 Wis. 627, 634, 62 N. W. 2d 708, this court holding: “. . . it is quite generally held that the legislature cannot by a later act establish or affect the construction of a former act. . . .” And: Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Industrial Comm. (1942), 241 Wis. 200, 208, 5 N. W. 2d 743, this court holding: “. . . Legislatures by a later act cannot establish or affect the construction of a former act. . . .”

 Referring to 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Actions, p. 601, sec. 73.

 Id. at pages 601, 602. (Emphasis supplied.)

 See: 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Statutes, p. 382, sec. 178, stating: “. . . The legislative intent that controls in the construction of a statute has reference to the legislature which enacted the act.
“In any event, a later statute not declaratory in its terms may not be relied upon for the purpose of giving a construction to an earlier act plain in its terms. . .

 Murphy v. Miller Brewing Co. (E. D. Wis. 1969), 307 Fed. Supp. 829, affirmed in Hodgson v. Miller Brewing Co. (7th Cir. 1972), 467 Fed. 2d 221.

 29 U. S. Code, sec. 216 (b).

 Ch. 268, Laws of 1973, creating see. 111.36 (3) (b), Stats., effective June 16, 1974.