Court Opinion

ID: 9635392
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 13:49:52.160377+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:09:26.470607
License: Public Domain

DEL SOLE, Judge,
dissenting:
Appellant raised allegations in his Motion for a New Trial that the jury had knowledge of, and possibly considered, his involvement in an unrelated civil matter wherein the Appellant was found liable for police brutality, malicious prosecution and related charges. These averments are set forth in Appellant’s motion for a new trial as follows:
1. Following the conclusion of the trial of the Defendant in the above referenced matter and the return of the jury’s verdict, it has been learned by defense counsel that certain member(s) of the jury had prior knowledge of the *511defendant’s involvement in a civil matter concerning Kyle Hallam wherein a civil judgment was returnéd against the defendant, among others, on the liability theory of police brutality, malicious prosecution and related charges.
2. The defendant believes, and therefore avers, that the knowledge of this matter by various jury member(s) would taint and/or prejudice the jury against the defendant.
3. During voir dire, each member of the jury was asked if they had any knowledge of any of the parties in this action having been involved in any litigation. This question was directed to the matter of the Hallam case. Each jury member answered in the negative, however defendant believes, and therefore avers, that certain members of the jury were aware of the civil litigation outcome.
I would require further support for the Appellant’s charge of improper conduct than these allegation's. Merely alleging the consideration of an outside matter which may have influenced the jury’s decision is not sufficient to warrant an evidentiary hearing. There are no affidavits from'jurors; there is nothing in the record to support the charges.
The courts of this Commonwealth have long held that a juror may not impeach his or her verdict after the jury has been discharged. Commonwealth v. Sero, 478 Pa. 440, 447, 387 A.2d 63 (1978); Commonwealth v. Pierce, 453 Pa. 319, 322, 309 A.2d 371 (1973). There is a narrow exception to the “no impeachment” rule: jurors may be competent to testify as to the improper conduct of a third party whose actions may have tended to affect their verdict and deliberations. Commonwealth v. Zlatovich, 440 Pa. 388, 269 A.2d 469 (1970). This exception is inapplicable to. the present case. But even in these unusual cases when an evidentiary hearing is held, allegations of third party misconduct have been supported by jurors’ affidavits prior to the hearing. *512See Zlatovich, supra; Welshire v. Bruaw, 331 Pa. 392, 393, 200 A.67 (1938).
Based on the foregoing, I respectfully dissent.