Court Opinion

ID: 9699169
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 20:12:10.404184+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:46.365569
License: Public Domain

Justice HOENS,
dissenting.
Today, a majority of this Court has chosen to adopt a new framework for deciding conflict of law disputes. Although stating *157that there is nothing novel in its approach, and although supporting that assertion with citations to parts of this Court’s prior opinions (both majorities and dissents) as proof that this Court has long used the analytical model embodied in the. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws (1971), in reality, the majority has substituted that test for our traditional one. At the same time, the majority has tossed aside our far more nuanced “governmental interest” approach, in which the factors identified by the Restatement (Second) were but an occasionally useful guide, and embraced in its place the Restatement (Secondfs “most-significant-relationship” test.
In doing so, the majority ignores the important differences between the two approaches, overlooks the essential focus of our traditional test, and misapplies the factors embodied in the Restatement (Second). At the same time, the majority has selected a test that has been criticized, by some of the same authorities1 that the majority cites for its separate purposes, as results oriented.
More to the point, in the process of adopting a new test more or less sub silentio, the majority ignores the remarkably strong interest that our Legislature has expressed about charitable immunity and substitutes the alternate view of a court in Pennsylvania that mirrors the approach this Court long ago attempted to embrace as more “enlightened.” Sadly, when the facts and issues are analyzed by weighing the competing interests of the two states in accordance with our traditional governmental interest approach, or even in accordance with that approach as informed by the Restatement (Second), this plainly sympathetic plaintiff has no *158avenue for relief. In adopting a new test, and in applying a test that provides a mechanism for relief, however, the majority creates consequences here in our State which our Legislature has repeatedly sought to prevent.
Because I cannot join in what I see as a majority of the Court substituting its view of an appropriate public policy for the public policy choice explicitly announced by our Legislature, I respectfully dissent.
I.
The majority traces the history of choice of law principles with a focus on its development in terms largely external to our own jurisprudence. To be sure, our method of analysis has not evolved in a vacuum. Instead, our analytical framework has changed both in tandem with and, at times, in stark divergence from, the path forged by the academics who seek to shape our thinking. There is no need to retrace the entirety of the development of this body of law either here in New Jersey or as it has been described in the scholarly literature. There is, however, a need to make plain the differences between our traditional analysis and the test set forth by the majority.
We abandoned the simplistic léx locus analysis of the first Restatement of Conflict of Laws,2 in favor of the more flexible governmental interest analysis because the “place of the wrong” test often led to harsh and unacceptable results. See Veazey v. Doremus, 103 N.J. 244, 247, 510 A.2d 1187 (1986) (citing Melik v. *159Sarahson, 49 N.J. 226, 228-29, 229 A.2d 625 (1967)). We therefore elected to abandon a rule that provided certainty, uniformity, and predictability, in favor of one that, in spite of its complexities, we were confident would be both fair to all of the litigants and faithful to the public policy of this State. Ibid.
The governmental interest analysis contemplates a two-step approach. In its traditional articulation, the court first determines whether there is a conflict between the laws of the various jurisdictions that have an interest in the matter. If a conflict of laws is found, the court then “identif[ies] the governmental policies underlying the law of each state” and determines “how those policies [were] affected by each state’s contacts to the litigation and to the parties.” Veazey, supra, 103 N.J. at 248, 510 A.2d 1187. After engaging in these two steps, the court must then “apply the law of the state with the greatest interest in governing the specific issue in the underlying litigation.” Fu v. Fu, 160 N.J. 108, 118, 733 A.2d 1133 (1999). That is, if an actual conflict exists, the second step “seeks to determine the interest that each state has in resolving the specific issue in dispute.” Gantes v. Kason Corp., 145 N.J. 478, 485, 679 A.2d 106 (1996). That requires the court to identify the governmental policies underlying the law of each state and determine whether “those policies are affected by each state’s contacts to the litigation and to the parties.” Veazey, supra, 103 N.J. at 248, 510 A.2d 1187; see Rowe v. Hoffman-La Roche, 189 N.J. 615, 621-22, 917 A.2d 767 (2007).
In 1999, however, we were confronted with the need to balance the “well articulated” public policy underlying a New York statute against the difficult to discern public policy bases for the common law pronouncements of this State’s courts. See Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 117, 733 A.2d 1133. It was only in that context that we turned to the factors set forth in the Restatement (Second), resorting to them only because they were helpful in identifying the relevant public policies and interests and, therefore, useful in performing our governmental interest analysis. Id. at 119-35, 733 A.2d 1133. In particular, we looked to a variety of factors drawn *160from sections 6 and 145 of the Restatement (Second), describing those factors as “guides.” Id. at 119, 733 A.2d 1133.
Similarly, in Erny v. Merola, 171 N.J. 86, 792 A.2d 1208 (2002), we found the Restatement (Second) factors to be a useful tool. There we considered conflicting statutes of this State and New York, which included clear expressions of policy, but did not on initial review lend themselves to the proper application of the governmental interest analysis. We therefore turned again to the Restatement (Second) factors, concluding that they were helpful in identifying the interests that the application of each statute would serve. Erny, supra, 171 N.J. at 94, 792 A.2d 1208. Neither in Fu nor in Emy did we abandon the governmental interest analysis in favor of a wholesale embrace of the Restatement (Second) test. Indeed, suggesting, as the majority does, see ante at 142-43, 962 A.2d at 460, that in Emy we applied only the Restatement (Second) test is simply inaccurate; the governmental interest analysis pervades that opinion and fully supports its conclusion. That we have not abandoned the governmental interest analysis for the Restatement (Second) framework could not be plainer than a cursory reading of Rowe, our most recent choice of law decision. Although that decision is largely overlooked by the majority, we there found resort to the guidance afforded by the Restatement (Second) to be unnecessary. See Rowe, supra, 189 N.J. at 622, 917 A.2d 767.
Nor is the governmental interest test the same kind of an inquiry as the most significant relationship test. Merely putting the names of the two tests side by side makes it plain that they are not the same, but have a different focus entirely. Indeed, the latter, with its focus on contacts with each state, often devolves into a curious throwback to lex locus, a shortcoming that is abundantly apparent from its application in this case. In contrast, the governmental interest approach looks at contacts with each state, but also seeks to evaluate the policies that underlie the law of each state and to weigh how the application of that law will advance or frustrate the policy choices that each has made.
*161That is not to imply that the Restatement (Second) factors are irrelevant or that they are, when applied as a separate analytical framework, inadequate. In actuality, the majority has overlooked both the way in which this Court has, since Fu, appropriately utilized those factors and the manner in which the correct application of the Restatement (Second) test would support a result entirely consistent with our traditional governmental interest methodology.
As this Court has explained, the most important factor in deciding a conflict of laws issue is the evaluation of the competing interests of the states. In undertaking this part of our analysis, we examine the policies the Legislature “intended to protect by having [its] law apply to wholly domestic concerns” and then determine “whether those concerns will be furthered by applying that law to the multi-state situation.” Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 125, 733 A.2d 1133 (quoting Pfizer, Inc. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 154 N.J. 187, 198, 712 A.2d 634 (1998)). That is to say, once the court has identified the policies that underlie each state’s law, it must then consider the effect that applying the law of each state to the particular litigation would have on the policies of each of those states.
As we commented recently:
[I]f a particular policy is designed to enhance a specific group and that group is neither a party to nor potentially affected by the litigation, then that state’s interest is not aligned with its policy and it would be unlikely that that state would have the strongest governmental interest in deciding the issue.
[Rowe, supra, 189 N.J. at 623, 917 A.2d 767 (citing White v. Smith, 398 F.Supp. 130, 134 (D.N.J.1975)).]
Conversely, however, if a policy is designed for the protection of a particular group and that group will be affected by the litigation, then that state’s interest in applying its policy will be strong.
Our approach to conflict of laws has therefore evolved beyond the long-abandoned lex locus test in which only the place of the wrong was considered. That, however, is not to say that the place of the wrong is irrelevant to our analysis, for as we have recognized previously, the location of a tort is often of particular *162importance. Indeed, both in Fu and again in Emy, this Court specifically pointed to the importance of a confluence between the place of the "wrong and of the injury. In each case, we noted that, if both conduct and injury occur in the same state, the local law of that state will be applied with “rare exceptions,” Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 125-26, 733 A.2d 1133, or except in “rare instances,” Erny, supra, 171 N.J. at 103, 792 A.2d 1208.
In each of those decisions, that expression about the importance of the place where conduct and injury occurred was indeed derived from the analysis of the Restatement (Second) factors; in neither of those decisions, however, did the inquiry end there. Instead, in both, the Court engaged in the far more complex, nuanced evaluation of governmental interests, counting the interest of the jurisdiction where conduct and injury coincide as one, albeit an important one, of those factors. See Erny, supra, 171 N.J. at 103, 792 A.2d 1208; Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 125-26, 733 A.2d 1133. More to the point, we have been willing to reject the law of the locus of the injury if a strong interest of the competing jurisdiction dictates otherwise. See Veazey, supra, 103 N.J. at 248-51, 510 A.2d 1187 (applying Florida law to Florida domiciliaries who were injured in automobile accident in New Jersey).
Far, therefore, from the majority’s assertion that we have long used the Restatement (Second) test, we have merely used the factors and theories embodied in that test to “inform” our application of our governmental interest test. Nor is it accurate to suggest that the Restatement (Second) ’s factors are devoid of the recognition that the states whose laws might be applied to any dispute have interests to be evaluated and policies to be considered in what is essentially a weighing process. The guiding principles of the Restatement (Second) themselves require analysis of the “policies” of the states, see, e.g., § 6(2)(b) (“the relevant policies of the forum”); § 6(2)(c) (“the relevant policies of other interested states”); § 6(2)(e) (“the basic policies underlying the particular field of law”). In focusing narrowly on section 145, expressing the general principles for torts, and section 146, ex*163pressing factors relevant to personal injuries, the majority does not grapple with the directive that all of those factors be evaluated through the prism of the policies expressed by each state. Even section 146, with its apparently narrow reference to place of injury and conduct, demands a broader focus by requiring resort to a section 6 analysis to determine whether “some other state has a more significant relationship.” Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 146 (1971).
In the end, I part with the majority because this matter requires the Court to follow no different path than the governmental interest analysis that we have traditionally utilized. Fundamental to that approach, indeed, central to applying the factors identified by the Restatement (Second), is an analysis and a comparison of the public policies that give rise to the laws of the two jurisdictions that are in conflict. The underlying public policies that have led to the abolition of charitable immunity in Pennsylvania are plain in the decision of its highest court; the policies that have fueled its continued viability here are equally plain in the legislative history of our statute. We need look no further than those sources to inform our decision.
II.
Application of the governmental interest analysis requires a court to consider the policies that support the two different doctrines relating to charitable immunity that are in place in this State and in Pennsylvania.
A.
The inquiry must begin with the New Jersey Charitable Immunity Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:53-7 to -11, and the public policy behind that Act. The doctrine of charitable immunity found its earliest expression in New Jersey in a 1925 decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals, see D’Amato v. Orange Mem’l Hosp., 101 N.J.L. 61, 127 A. 340 (E. & A.1925), applying a public policy rationale derived from the common law. Id. at 64-65, 127 A. 340. In 1958, *164however, this Court rejected the doctrine in a trio of decisions in which plaintiffs sought to pursue negligence actions against three separate kinds of charities. See Benton v. Young Men’s Christian Ass’n, 27 N.J. 67, 69, 141 A.2d 298 (1958) (rejecting charitable immunity for YMCA branch); Collopy v. Newark Eye and Ear Infirmary, 27 N.J. 29, 47-48, 141 A.2d 276 (1958) (rejecting charitable immunity for hospital on public policy grounds); Dalton v. St. Luke’s Catholic Church, 27 N.J. 22, 24-25, 141 A.2d 273 (1958) (rejecting charitable immunity for church, based on reasons expressed in Collopy).
In particular, in Collopy, a case in which the plaintiff had been injured while he was a hospital patient, the Court listed its reasons for abrogating the doctrine of charitable immunity. Principally, the Court explained that the doctrine was merely a judicially-created one, see Collopy, supra, 27 N.J. at 31, 141 A.2d 276; that it had been eroded over time through court-sanctioned exceptions, id. at 31-32, 141 A.2d 276; that it had little historical basis as compared to other common law tort duties, id. at 32, 141 A.2d 276; that it had been increasingly criticized by courts of other states for its “lack of current utility or justification,” id. at 33, 141 A.2d 276; and that it had engendered “overwhelming[ ]” opposition in the “[pjrofessorial and student writings,” id. at 35, 141 A.2d 276. In particular, in rejecting the doctrine, the Court commented that it did so because it wanted to conform the law to what it perceived to be the “prevailing notions of public policy.” Id. at 39, 141 A.2d 276. Two members of the Court filed dissents attacking both the majority’s reliance on decisions from other states and commentators, id. at 61-67, 141 A.2d 276 (Burling, J., dissenting), as well as the theoretical underpinnings and the wisdom of the decision itself, id. at 48-61, 141 A.2d 276 (Heher, J., dissenting).
Our Legislature responded to this Court’s abrogation of the doctrine of charitable immunity swiftly and decisively. See, e.g., Schultz v. Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Newark, 95 N.J. 530, 533-37, 472 A.2d 531 (1984) (explaining statutory history). The initial version of the bill, passed shortly after this Court’s three *165decisions, included a sunset provision, providing that, unless reenacted, it would expire a year later. Assembly Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 204 (July 22,1958). It was intended to be a “stopgap” measure to return the State to its pre-Collopy status and afford the Legislature an opportunity to farther address the question of the usefulness of the doctrine and its limits. Governor Meyner, in signing the 1958 bill into law, explained that the one-year statute would allow time for “the will of the representatives of the people” to be made clear. See Governor’s Statement on Assembly Committee Substitute for Senate Bill No. 204 (July 22,1958).
Our Legislature promptly did just that, enacting the Charitable Immunity Act before that first year expired, and without any sunset provision. L. 1959, c. 90, § 1 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7). When our Legislature spoke on the issue, it did so in stark contrast to the views expressed by this Court and the scholars on whom this Court had relied. Our Legislature also made its choice to reinstate the doctrine after the publication of two strongly-worded editorials in the New Jersey Law Journal that argued for a different course. The first applauded the Court’s wisdom, proclaiming that “[f]ew will quarrel with the conclusion of the majority that our principles of justice today require that even a charity must pay its just debts and obligations” and commenting on the “impressive array of the considered writings of legal scholars” which the Court found persuasive. See Justice Before Charity, 51 N.J.L.J. 4 (May 8, 1958). The second, printed as the stopgap bill was being considered, called upon the Legislature to join the “enlightened” jurisdictions that had abolished the doctrine. See The Senate Acts, 51 N.J.L.J. 4 (June 5,1958).
In spite of those strong expressions of opinion, the Legislature enacted a law that was explicit in its embrace of the doctrine of charitable immunity as an expression of the public policy of this State. See N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(a). Although the statute has been amended from time to time, it remains a forceful statement of the will of the citizens as expressed through our Legislature. The *166Act’s public policy underpinnings are simple and straightforward: namely, an intention to preserve the assets of the charities, specifically the dollars donated to those organizations by the people of our State, so as to devote them to the pursuit of the charities’ purposes rather than to permit those dollars to be expended for the payment of damage awards to a particular claimant.
In adopting the Charitable Immunity Act our Legislature essentially reinstated the common law doctrine,3 including its historically-recognized exceptions. Significantly, our Legislature incorporated the exception that permits an individual who is not a beneficiary of a charity to sue for damages. See Lindroth v. Christ Hosp., 21 N.J. 588, 592-93, 123 A.2d 10 (1956) (concluding that doctrine did not bar suit against charity by one who was not a beneficiary of its good works).
At the same time, it appears that the Legislature responded to the Collopy Court’s concern that hospitals being operated as nonprofit entities had far more in common with business ventures than they had with traditional charities. See Collopy, supra, 27 N.J. at 39-40, 141 A.2d 276. The Act therefore permitted suits by beneficiaries of charities operating exclusively as hospitals, albeit with a cap on damages. N.J.S.A 2A:53A-8. This balanced approach demonstrates that the Legislature weighed carefully its decision about whether, and how extensively, to embrace the doctrine of charitable immunity from the start.
In adopting the Act in 1959, the Legislature made clear its intentions about the manner in which the Act was to be construed. From its inception the statute has specifically provided:
This act shall be deemed to be remedial and shall be liberally construed so as to afford immunity to the said corporations, societies and associations from liability as provided herein in furtherance of the public policy for the protection of nonprofit *167corporations, societies and associations organized for religious, charitable, educational or hospital purposes.
[N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-10.]
This expression of the Legislature’s intent is unlike the ordinary language utilized to identify the purposes of remedial legislation. Most often, remedial legislation is interpreted so that it is applied liberally for the benefit of claimants. See, e.g., New Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A 10:5-1 to -49; Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A 34:19-1 to -8. The Charitable Immunity Act, however, specifies that it is to be “liberally construed” in favor of the protected entities, that is, the charitable institutions that the Legislature has chosen to shield, and against the interests of those who would make claims against them. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-10.
From time to time, our Legislature has amended the Charitable Immunity Act, but each time it has done so in response to a specific circumstance. More often than not, the amendments have served to broaden rather than to limit or dimmish the scope of the Act. For example, in 1987 the Act was amended so that it would extend the scope of immunity to include a variety of officers and volunteers working with charities. See L. 1987, c. 87 (Senate Bill No. 2705 codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7.1). The Statement of Assembly Insurance Committee that accompanied that bill expressed its reasoning as follows:
Nonpi-ofit organizations have recently experienced difficulty in attracting and keeping qualified individuals to serve as officers and on boards of directors of nonprofit and charitable associations because of the potential exposure to lawsuits which exists. Exposure to liability in these cases often means that the individual’s own assets are placed in jeopardy, and many individuals have been reluctant to subject themselves to this risk. By giving immunity to trustees, officers, directors, and other uncompensated volunteers, the bill’s purpose is to permit nonprofit and charitable organizations to continue to attract able people to serve in these capacities.
[Assembly Insurance Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 2705 (Feb. 5,1987).]
Even so, as its sponsor commented, the bill provided that officers and directors serving on such boards without compensation would not be protected if “their actions evidence a reckless disregard for their duties.” Sponsor’s Statement, Statement to *168Senate Bill No. 2705 (1986); see L. 1987, c. 87, § 1(a) (codified at N.J.S.A 2A:53A-7.1(a)). Similarly, in extending the Act’s protections to volunteers working on behalf of charities, the Legislature carefully excluded protection for their acts that are “willful, wanton or grossly negligent” or for “damage as the result of ... negligent operation of a motor vehicle.” L. 1987, c. 87, § 1(b) (codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7.1(b)).
In the following legislative session, the Act’s protective scope was extended twice more. First, immunity was afforded to “coaches, managers, or officials of sports teams which are organized under the auspices of or sponsored or funded by counties or municipalities.” See L. 1988, c. 87 (amending L. 1986, c. 13, and broadening Little League immunity); Assembly Insurance Committee, Statement to Senate Bill No. 1521 (May 23,1988). Shortly thereafter, the protections of the Act were extended to boards of directors and volunteers of nonprofit blood banks, see L. 1988, c. 179, § 1 (codified at N.J.S.A 2A:53A-7.2), in recognition of the challenges faced by those important entities and organizations as a result of the AIDS crisis. See Sponsor’s Statement, Statement to Senate Bill No. 1995 (Feb. 1,1988).
The 1989 legislative session brought three more extensions of the Act, as bills were enacted to include library trustees, unless reckless, see L. 1989, c. 171, § 1 (Senate Bill No. 577 codified at N.J.SA 2A:53A-7.3); officers and volunteers serving nonprofit cemetery corporations organized for the purpose of maintaining or operating burial places, see L. 1989, c. 249 (Senate Bill No. 1244 codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7.1), and persons serving without compensation on economic development boards, see L. 1989, c. 283 (Senate Bill No. 235 codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7.1).
In 1995, the Legislature again amended the Act, extending immunity to a broad class of persons in response to concerns that charities were having trouble finding qualified people who were willing to serve on their boards of directors or as volunteers. In doing so, the Legislature spoke loudly about its view of the charitable immunity doctrine in general. In particular, two as*169pects of the Sponsor’s Statement in support of the bill that was enacted as L. 1995, c. 183 (amending N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7) are significant. First, the Sponsor reiterated “the strongly held public policy of protecting charitable institutions against claims by its beneficiaries has been consistently reaffirmed and extended.” Statement to Assembly Bill No. 1775 (May 12, 1994); see also Assembly Insurance Committee, Statement to Assembly Bill No. 1775 (June 13,1994).
Second, that statement clearly identifies the public policies and the underlying purpose for the doctrine.
Given the purpose of the charitable immunity statute, to preserve the assets of the charity, it seems inconsistent with New Jersey public policy for the statute to preclude claims against the institution relating to the actions of its officers or employees, but permit claims directly against those officer's or employees who are acting within the scope of their employment and to which the institution answers financially.
[Sponsor’s Statement, Statement to Assembly Bill No. 1775 (May 12,1994).]
During that same time frame, however, the Legislature made it clear that the doctrine is not without limits. In 1991, as part of a more general reform of the health care industry, the cap limiting damages that could be recovered from charities operating exclusively as hospitals was greatly increased. See L. 1991, c. 187. Although that increase in a potential damage award was part of a larger reform effort that balanced a variety of health care and insurance interests, it suggests that the Legislature again struck a balance in favor of injured plaintiffs rather than the nonprofit hospitals that had long been viewed as more like corporations than charities. In 1995, the Legislature limited the protections afforded to hospitals again, replacing the broadly worded protection with a narrower one for nonprofit hospital corporations, excluding from its scope certain health care providers who were compensated professionals employed by or acting as agents or servants of an otherwise exempt charity. See L. 1995, c. 183 (codified at N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(b)).
Of particular significance to the issue now before this Court, the Legislature has not been silent about its view of the scope of *170immunity for charities faced with claims of sexual abuse. In fact, the 1995 amendment expressly clarifies that there is no immunity for any of the individuals otherwise protected by the Act if they “caus[e] damage by a willful, wanton or grossly negligent act of commission or omission, including sexual assault and other crimes of a sexual nature.” N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7(c). That amendment did not make the charity itself liable to a victim of sexual abuse; it did, however, strip immunity from employees, officers, and volunteers, who otherwise would be within the broad scope of the Act’s historically protective sweep.
Even so, the 1995 amendment to the Act demonstrates the Legislature’s intention to treat those victims somewhat differently from others. It still did not generally permit suits by beneficiaries, limiting relief to those with claims based on “a willful, wanton or grossly negligent act.” Ibid. Moreover, it still did not permit suits against the charities themselves, but it signaled a careful and thoughtful response by our Legislature to what was becoming an all-too-frequent occurrence.
The Legislature has since spoken further and has again considered the public policy behind charitable immunity in the face of repeated complaints relating to sexual abuse. In 2006, the Legislature amended the Act to remove immunity in cases involving claims that a charity engaged in negligent hiring and supervision when the negligence proximately caused the sexual molestation of a beneficiary of the charitable organization who was under the age of eighteen. N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-7.4 (enacting Senate Bill No. 540). This, too, has been a balanced and limited response. Although the Legislature, for the first time, has permitted a direct claim to be brought against a charity by a beneficiary, it has limited strictly both the nature of the claim that may be brought and the identity of the injured person on whose behalf such a claim may be made.
This lengthy series of enactments, spanning nearly half a century, demonstrates a consistent expression by our Legislature of its desired public policy as it relates to charities. Overwhelmingly, that policy is one of encouraging the operation of charities and *171protecting their assets for use in the pursuit of their charitable purposes. It is, as well, a policy of assisting charities in their work by helping them to attract volunteers to serve on their boards and in their endeavors. Moreover, it is a policy of protecting charities’ pools of donors who might otherwise decline to contribute to the charitable mission were their donated dollars at risk of diversion from that mission to either litigation or compensation of injured persons except in carefully defined and limited circumstances.
B.
Pennsylvania’s contrary policy as it relates to tort liability and charities is expressed, as the majority points out, in a 1965 decision of its highest court. Flagiello v. Pa. Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 208 A.2d 193 (1965). In Flagiello, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania traced the history of charitable immunity and concluded that “[i]f there was any justification for the charitable immunity doctrine when it was first announced, it has lost that justification today.” Id. at 197.
In discarding a doctrine that it concluded was archaic and lacking in sound reason, the Pennsylvania court was motivated by a number of considerations. First, the court relied heavily on the fact that the defendant in that matter was a hospital, an entity that had been transformed over time from a provider of free medical care for the needy into a large and well-funded “business institution.” Id. at 196-97. As such, the court considered the history of charities generally and the evolution of many of them into modern businesses. Relying heavily on that evolution, the court reasoned that there was no justification for providing such entities with immunity from suit. Id. at 204.
Second, the court relied on its belief that injured citizens of that state were entitled to be compensated. It reasoned that charitable immunity amounted to a denial of equal justice because a citizen injured by any other business would have recourse, but one injured by a hospital would not. Id. at 201. Third, the court *172pointed out that the doctrine was not absolute, leading to “paradoxical” results that appeared to weigh property interests more heavily than “interest in life and limb.” Id. at 203 (quoting E.H. Sehopler, Annotation, Immunity of Nongovernmental Charity From Liability For Damages In Tort, 25 A.L.R.2d 29, 40 (1952)). The court noted: “The immunity doctrine offends against fundamental justice and elementary logic in many ways. Thus, while it closes the doors of the courts to a person whose body has been injured, it opens them wide where inanimate property has been damaged through the hospital’s maintenance of a nuisance.” Ibid.
Similarly, as the court explained, the doctrine was not equally applied because that court had concluded, in a series of earlier decisions, that physicians who practiced in hospital settings could, under certain circumstances, be liable not only for their own negligence but for that of other hospital personnel as well. Ibid.; see Rockwell v. Kaplan, 404 Pa. 574, 173 A.2d 54, 57 (1961) (holding “that doctors are subject to the law of agency and may at the same time be agent both of another physician and of a hospital”); Yorston v. Pennell, 397 Pa. 28, 153 A.2d 255, 260-62 (1959) (same); McConnell v. Williams, 361 Pa. 355, 65 A.2d 243, 248 (1949) (holding physician liable to his private patient being treated at hospital, through principles of respondeat superior, for actual negligence of hospital staff intern). In evaluating the question of who or what was being protected by the immunity doctrine, as well as considering on whom the losses caused by negligence at hospitals fell, the court concluded that the doctrine had become “an instrument of injustice,” Flagiello, supra, 208 A.2d at 206, that could no longer be retained. Indeed, the court stated its justification in strong words: “where justice demands, reason dictates, equality enjoins and fair play decrees a change in judge-made law, courts will not lack in determination to establish that change.” Id. at 208.
Finally, when the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania abrogated the doctrine of charitable immunity in 1965, it announced that it chose *173that course in part because other courts had done likewise. Citing decisions from around the country, relying on scholarly pronouncements about what the law should be, and embracing the expressions of the “trend of judicial opinion” as articulated in scholarly commentaries, see id. at 197 (citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 402(2) cmt. d (1959), that court made its decision to change what had previously been a part of the fabric of its common law. That court’s opinion abrogating the doctrine of charitable immunity stands today as both its expression of the common law, and its evaluation of the underlying public policy interests, that apply to the citizens of that state.
C.
One can distill from these two diametrically opposite views on the question of charitable immunity several underlying policy considerations. First, the Pennsylvania court’s abrogation of charitable immunity in Flagiello arises from public policy considerations common to all torts. That court has elected to focus on the goals of compensating victims injured in circumstances where any other victim would be able to recover. It was guided in part by the emergence of hospitals as “big businesses” that are now far removed from their charitable origins. It considered the role of the courts in seeking to deter conduct that is negligent or careless by imposing a cost on the entity that engages in that conduct. It expressed its intention to align its policies with those of other states. Perhaps most significant, the Pennsylvania court made the protection of the citizens of its own state its primary focus. The values it expressed were virtually identical to the ones that motivated this Court when it decided Collopy and the other cases in the trilogy that abrogated the common law doctrine in this State.
On the other hand, our Legislature, in full recognition of those very values and considerations, as expressed in Collopy, has spoken clearly, decisively, and repeatedly with a contrary expression of public policy. In our Legislature’s view, charities are to be *174encouraged to operate and to perform their good works for the benefit of our citizens. Donations to those charities, not only in the form of dollars, but in terms of time and talents of volunteers who serve on their boards and as part of their mission, are to be protected. The purpose of that protection is not only to permit those charities to continue to serve, but to encourage more people to contribute their dollars, their time, and their talents so as to serve the greater public good. Over and over since 1958, our Legislature has both reaffirmed and, where appropriate, extended the scope of the Act to meet those oft-repeated purposes.
At the same time, our Legislature has been neither slavish nor shortsighted in its protection of charities. It has always allowed a limited right to proceed against nonprofit hospitals. It has embraced the common law notion that one who is not a beneficiary of the charity can maintain a cause of action. It has permitted suits to proceed against medical professionals whose connection with the charity is incidental and whose negligence will not be imputed to the charity. It has permitted suits for acts of employees of charities that are wanton, reckless, and grossly negligent. Most recently, it has permitted suits to be brought against the charities themselves on behalf of minors who have been the victims of sexual assault based on a claim that the charity’s negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of employees and others was the cause of that assault.
The approach that we have taken to engage in our choice of law analysis has varied with the circumstances, but it has never, until today, strayed from the governmental interest approach. At its core, that framework requires us to identify the public policies involved in each state’s statutory or common law and evaluate which jurisdiction has the greater interest in having its law applied to the dispute. In some cases, either the underlying policies or the interests of the states have been unclear and we have looked to the Restatement (Second) to inform us about the interests that might bear on the analysis. See Erny, supra, 171 N.J. at 101-04, 792 A.2d 1208; Fu, supra, 160 N.J. at 122-28, 733 *175A.2d 1133. In others, including most recently, the policies and competing interests that each state was seeking to serve have been readily apparent. See Rowe, supra, 189 N.J. at 622-23, 917 A.2d 767. In all circumstances, however, we have adhered to the governmental interest analysis, varying only with regard to the sources to which we look to identify and understand those governmental interests.
III.
Engaging in the governmental interest analysis in this matter is aided by the clear expressions of public policy that support our statute and by the thorough explanation of the public policy considerations included in the Pennsylvania court’s decision with its contrary views. The task of weighing each against the other requires a consideration of how the application of the two approaches would bear on the effectuation of the expressed public policies of each forum.
The sparse facts are only that P.V. is a New Jersey domiciliary who has Down Syndrome, and that while she was attending camp for her third time during August 2003, she was sexually assaulted by another camper, sought medical attention, and “suffered extreme mental anguish.” The only other facts included in the record are that defendant was incorporated as a New Jersey charity and has been in operation since 1975, has its administrative offices here, and operates the camp on property that it leases in Pennsylvania. Nothing in the record reflects where the campers other than P.V. are domiciled or where staff are recruited or trained.
Armed with only these few facts, however, we can engage in our traditional governmental interest analysis. Simply put, if we apply our Charitable Immunity Act to this matter, we will achieve the result that our Legislature has mandated be the litigation outcome for all citizens of our State. In light of the fact that both plaintiff and defendant are citizens of this State, we will have treated them no differently from any other person who is a *176beneficiary of one of the charities that operates within our borders. We will have done no more than subject both plaintiff and defendant to all of the benefits and burdens of their domicile. We will at the same time preserve the assets of the charity in a circumstance in which our Legislature has mandated that the entity and its assets be protected.
At the same time, application of our statute to this dispute will do nothing to undermine the common law of Pennsylvania or its goals. Because plaintiff is not a resident of that state, we will not prevent one of Pennsylvania’s citizens from recovering a damage award and will not create a distinction between those citizens of that state who may be .compensated and those who cannot. In terms of loss allocation or compensation, we will do nothing to offend or interfere with the policies of our sister state.
Were we to apply our law, we potentially would be sanctioning, at least to some extent, blameworthy conduct that occurred in another state. Thus, if we see tort law generally as a mechanism for conduct regulation, applying our law to conduct that took place in Pennsylvania might not serve that goal. Were this intentional conduct, or were it an act of an employee or agent of the charity, the conduct regulation goal would be significant. Indeed, if the conduct were the reckless or grossly negligent acts of an employee or volunteer, our own Act would lift the cloak of immunity as well.
Here, however, plaintiff makes no claim that any employee, agent, or servant of the charity assaulted her; she makes no claim that a volunteer working at the camp assaulted her. Instead she alleges that another camper, presumably one who was not being monitored or supervised sufficiently, did so. In that context, the conduct to be regulated through Pennsylvania’s common law is not sexual assault at all. The conduct, as it relates to the law and the governmental interest that it represents, must be some conduct of the charity. That is to say, the conduct must either be the charity’s choice of the other camper to be a participant in its program or its training of its volunteers or paid personnel at the *177camp who failed to monitor plaintiff and her free movements around the camp.
Although the injury occurred in Pennsylvania, it is not clear from this record that the conduct on the part of the charity also occurred there. If the charity’s conduct is defined as the failure to supervise plaintiff or the other camper, then it occurred principally in Pennsylvania. However, if the legally relevant conduct of the charity is its acts relating to hiring or training its staff, or in recruiting volunteers, or in selecting campers, or in designing the program itself, that conduct likely occurred in New Jersey. As grievous as an act of sexual assault is, the interest of Pennsylvania in regulating whatever conduct of the charity is alleged to have permitted it to occur is attenuated.
Nor would refusal to apply Pennsylvania’s policy prevent it from actually regulating the conduct it finds should be compensable. That state has adopted a variety of statutes and regulations governing the operation of camps. See 35 Pa. Stat. Ann. § 3002 (requiring camps to register with the Department of Health and pay annual registration fee to state treasury); 28 Pa.Code § 19.2 (requiring submission of camp building plans to Department of Health); 28 Pa.Code § 19.13 (authorizing Department of Health to issue one-year permits to camps that satisfy Department’s regulations); 28 Pa.Code § 17.11 (requiring local health departments to issue camp permits based on compliance with applicable rules and standards, and requiring regular inspections prior to issuing or renewing permits). Pennsylvania’s ability to ensure that camps are operating in accordance with its public policies about standards of care can continue to be addressed in that manner.
On the other hand, applying Pennsylvania’s common law to this dispute can and will thwart our Legislature’s expression of the will of the people. Charitable dollars, donated to a New Jersey charity for the benefit of this New Jersey resident, will be devoted to litigation and, should plaintiff prevail, to the payment of compensation. At the same time, nothing in this record suggests that this defendant is the sort of “big business” charity that the *178Pennsylvania court sought to regulate. Nor can we precisely evaluate the magnitude of the impact that a damage award might have on this charity or its other programs; but we can be certain that dollars that would otherwise be devoted to its charitable works will not be. Whether the dollars available for the charity’s other works merely will be reduced, or whether they perhaps will be eliminated through this litigation we cannot know. Whether the charity will conclude that it will no longer be able to operate the camp program we cannot forecast. As our Legislature has cautioned, however, the effect might also be that donors will cease supporting this and other charities, fearing a like fate for their contributions.
Moreover, by applying Pennsylvania’s common law to this matter, one New Jersey resident, this plaintiff, will be treated differently for purposes of tort liability from every other beneficiary of our charities, simply because of where she was when the injury occurred. Applying the law of Pennsylvania to this matter might serve that state’s general goals, expressed through its common law, of encouraging all who are within its borders to exercise more care, but it will not serve its larger policy goals by compensating a citizen of that state. Instead it will compensate a citizen of this State who, it would appear, did not choose to be in Pennsylvania for any particular protections that the state might offer.
Our traditional governmental interest analysis makes it apparent that the interests of our State, as expressed by our Legislature, will be significantly impaired by the application of Pennsylvania’s common law to these two New Jersey citizens. At the same time, Pennsylvania’s interests would not be significantly furthered by the application of its own law nor will they be hindered in any meaningful way by the refusal of this Court to apply its law to this dispute.
In embracing a new choice of law methodology and in its application, the majority has abandoned our usual, careful weighing of governmental interests and, in the process, ignored the strong public policy interests undergirding charitable immunity *179that have been repeatedly and forcefully expressed by our Legislature. I therefore respectfully dissent.
For affirmance and remandment — Chief Justice RABNER and Justices LONG, ALBIN and WALLACE — 4.
For reversal — Justices LaVECCHIA, RIVERA-SOTO and HOENS — 3.

 See, e.g., William L. Reynolds, The Silver Anniversary of the Second Conflicts Restatement: Legal Process and Choice of Law, 56 Md. L.Rev. 1371, 1388 (1997) ("criticizing] the Second Restatement for its lack of a system and ... consequential invitation to open-ended or indeterminate decisionmaking"); Patrick J. Borchers, Conflicts Pragmatism, 56 Alb. L.Rev. 883, 901-02 (1993) (describing effort of one academic to "convince the West Virginia Supreme Court to [embrace the Second Restatement] ... largely on the grounds that [it] has so much wiggle room”).

 One recent commentator has lamented the movement of courts away from the "clear, plausible answers” that the lex locus approach yielded, describing the more modem theories as "the destmction of rationality.” Earl M. Maltz, Do Modem Theories of Conflict of Laws Work? The New Jersey Experience, 36 Rutgers L.J. 527, 527 (2005). Although much might be said about the confusion that the various theories offered by commentators over the years has created for many courts, we need only comment on the unfair outcomes that the previous rigidity created to explain our preference for the more modem approach that we have adopted.

 The first version of the bill introduced in response to the Court's trilogy of decisions actually would have extended the scope of charitable immunity, as it would not have included the historical limitation that prohibited beneficiaries from bringing suit. See Senate Bill No. 204 (introduced May 5, 1958).