Court Opinion

ID: 9882707
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-05 22:18:50.512636+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:00:44.029027
License: Public Domain

[Cite as State v. Williams, 2023-Ohio-3625.]

                               COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

                              EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                 COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA

STATE OF OHIO,                                       :

                 Plaintiff-Appellee,                 :
                                                              No. 112148
                 v.                                  :

ADRIAN WILLIAMS,                                     :

                 Defendant-Appellant.                :

                                JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION

                 JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
                 RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: October 5, 2023

          Criminal Appeal from the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
                              Case No. CR-21-659036-A

                                               Appearances:

                 Michael C. O’Malley, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting
                 Attorney, and Amanda Bizub, Assistant Prosecuting
                 Attorney, for appellee.

                 Friedman Nemecek & Long L.L.C., Eric C. Nemecek, and
                 Mary K. Walsh, for appellant.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, P.J.:

                   Defendant-appellant Adrian Williams (“Williams”) appeals from his

convictions for rape and kidnapping. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Factual and Procedural History

               This case stems from events that occurred on May 20, 2013. The

victim, C.R., testified at trial in November 2022 to the following events as she

recalled them. At the time of the May 2013 incident, 15-year-old C.R. was living near

East 55th Street and Broadway Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio, and regularly attending

an after-school program at Esperanza, a nonprofit organization located at West 25th

Street and Clark Avenue in Cleveland.

               When C.R. was walking home from Esperanza1 on the evening of May

20, 2013, she was approached by two black men in a pickup truck. C.R. declined

their offer of a ride. The truck began to drive away and then turned around, drove

back to C.R., and both men got out of the truck. C.R. testified that the older of the

two men approached her, punched her in the face, knocking her out. Both men then

put her in the truck. The men stopped at a gas station near Steelyard Commons,

where one man stayed in the vehicle and the other man got fuel. The men then took

C.R. to a nearby apartment. C.R. testified that she did not remember how they got

to the apartment and was in and out of consciousness on the way there. She

described standing in the living room of the apartment, nervous and crying, and

testified that the men offered her alcohol. C.R. initially declined alcohol, but

      1 C.R. testified that the incident began when she was walking home from Esperanza

after school. A police report indicates that earlier in the day on May 20, 2013, C.R. was
involved in a domestic dispute at home and had fled the house, going to the Clark-Fulton
area (near Esperanza). C.R.’s family reported the domestic dispute to the police and
reported C.R. as a missing juvenile; C.R. was subsequently arrested. In her trial
testimony, C.R. acknowledged the domestic dispute but seemingly confused the timeline
of events.
eventually accepted alcohol from the men. The men then took C.R. to a bedroom,

where she claimed she was tied to a bed and orally and vaginally raped.

              C.R. testified that two days later, when the men had left C.R. in the

apartment, she used her feet to get a pocketknife from a nightstand and was

eventually able to cut herself free. C.R. tried to leave the apartment but found that

it was locked from the outside. Ultimately, C.R. jumped out of what she testified was

a “second floor or third floor” window. C.R. testified that she scraped her knees and

was limping afterwards but was otherwise uninjured from jumping out of the

window.

              C.R. quickly realized that she was not far from where she had been

kidnapped, so she decided to go to Esperanza, which was closer to her location than

her house. At Esperanza, C.R. encountered a security guard, William Wilson

(“Wilson”), who she knew and trusted. Wilson told her not to call the police

immediately and drove her home when his shift ended.

              Wilson testified at trial that he knew C.R. well because he had been

working at Esperanza since 2011 and saw her and her siblings on a regular basis.

Wilson testified that on May 22, 2013, C.R. hurried into the building in the middle

of the day. Wilson testified that C.R.’s demeanor was unusual, and she told him that

someone had grabbed her. Wilson then went to speak to two female staff members

about what had happened and came back downstairs, where C.R. asked him if he

would take her home. After getting permission from his supervisor, Wilson drove

C.R. home. When asked why he did not call the police, or instruct C.R. to call the
police, Wilson stated that C.R. “didn’t really tell me anything wrong at the time and

I figured when she got home she would explain that to her parents.”

              At trial, C.R. testified that she did not know either man, but at some

point she heard one of the men referred to as “Dre.” In the police report and sexual

assault nurse examiner (“SANE”) report, C.R. stated that the men called each other

“Adrian” and “Drew.”

              A SANE nurse, Molly Heinrich (“Heinrich”), examined C.R. and

collected a rape kit containing buccal, vaginal, and anal swabs from C.R. C.R. was

also treated by Dr. Jerri Rose (“Dr. Rose”), an attending physician, and interviewed

by a social worker. Dr. Rose testified at trial. The following exchange took place

during Dr. Rose’s direct examination:

      ASSISTANT PROSECUTING ATTORNEY (“APA”): Do you guys note,
      outside of injuries, emotional appearance?

      DR. ROSE: We do sometimes in the general examination, we might
      make a note of a patient’s general appearance, which could include
      emotional affect.

      APA: Here did you — did your resident note an emotional affect?

      DR. ROSE: The resident documented that the patient had what she
      documented as a flat affect.

      APA: Okay. And can you explain to the jury what a flat affect means in
      a medical term?

      DR. ROSE: You know, in lay terms it would just mean that the patient’s
      demeanor was just very flat, not very emotional, kind of detached,
      might be a term that you would use as a synonym.

      APA: In the [emergency department], you see a lot of people who have
      gone through different types of trauma, is this something that you
      usually see after trauma?
        DR. ROSE: It’s something that we can commonly see. Often it’s
        difficult to know if the patient has had any sleep, and if they’re rested
        after a traumatic event. It is absolutely not uncommon to have patients
        who are just almost detached because of the trauma that they have been
        through.

Defense counsel objected, and after a brief sidebar, the court overruled the

objection.

                 Dr. Rose went on to testify that as a result of C.R.’s medical

examinations, it was documented that she had a left eye contusion and a reported

sexual assault. Dr. Rose also read from Heinrich’s report, which noted that C.R.’s

vaginal area had a small amount of blood and the area was very sore during the

SANE examination.

                 Cleveland Police Officer Scott Aldridge (“Aldridge”) testified at trial

that he was detailed to the Sex Crimes Unit in 2013. Aldridge retrieved C.R.’s rape

kit from University Hospitals, checked that it was sealed, and sent it to the Third

District. Subsequently, the kit was stored in the Third District property room.

                 The case was initially assigned to Detective James Butler (“Detective

Butler”). In the initial investigation, Williams’s DNA was identified in the rape kit,

but Detective Butler determined that Williams did not match the description of the

assailant provided by C.R.          Based on this conclusion, and other perceived

inconsistencies,2 the investigation was closed. Detective Butler has since passed

away.

        2 The initial police report identifies the following discrepancies: C.R. stated she was

hit in the eye but no injuries were noted; C.R. stated she was taken to an apartment
building behind Target in Steelyard Commons but there is not an apartment building at
                 Inexplicably, eight years later, in 2021, Investigator Gene Kulp

(“Kulp”) of the Cuyahoga County Prosecutor’s Office was assigned this case by the

assistant prosecuting attorney in charge of the cold case unit. Kulp testified that he

reviewed the case and saw that the police had an investigative lead to Williams in

2013. Kulp testified that based on C.R.’s description of her assailant as a dark-

skinned black man, approximately 5'10'' and 180 pounds, with a mustache, he

believed that Williams matched this description.

                 Kulp testified that he arranged for a blind administrator to present a

photo array of six men, including Williams, to C.R., and she identified Williams as

her assailant.    C.R. stated that she recognized Williams by his mustache and

identified him as the man who had driven the pickup truck. Kulp also prepared a

second photo array of six men, including Andre Bush, a relative of Williams who

matched C.R.’s description of the second assailant. C.R. did not identify Bush in the

second photo array. Kulp testified that as part of his investigation, he contacted

C.R.’s mother, but she was unable to remember the incident because she suffers

from dementia.

                 As a result of his investigation, Kulp obtained a search warrant to

collect buccal swabs from Williams. Kulp was also able to determine that in 2013,

Williams owned a tan pickup truck that matched C.R.’s description of the vehicle

that was registered to Williams at apartment 226 at the Crestview Apartments, 1400

that location; C.R. stated she jumped out of a fourth-story window to escape but did not
sustain any injuries as a result; and the same day that C.R. stated she was abducted, she
was arrested by Cleveland police for domestic violence.
Crestline Avenue, Cleveland, Ohio. Kulp identified this apartment building and C.R.

subsequently identified photos of the apartment building as the place she had been

held captive. Lisa Lindsay (“Lindsay”) of the Cuyahoga Metropolitan Housing

Authority testified that Williams leased a unit at Crestview Apartments on Crestline

Avenue in Cleveland, Ohio. This apartment building is approximately one mile

south of Steelyard Commons.

              At trial, C.R. confirmed that she had made the identifications of

Williams and the apartment building. She also confirmed that the pocket knife the

state introduced into evidence was the knife she used to escape from the apartment.

              Marissa Esterline (“Esterline”), a forensic DNA analyst at the

Cuyahoga County Regional Forensic Science Laboratory, testified that someone in

her office initially analyzed C.R.’s rape kit in 2013, and that Esterline subsequently

analyzed C.R.’s rape kit in March 2021. Esterline testified that sperm found in C.R.’s

rape kit matched Williams’s DNA.

              On direct examination, C.R. testified that she was in the foster system

until she turned 18. She also testified that she dropped out of high school and

eventually earned her GED when she was 24 years old. C.R. testified that she gave

birth to her first child when she was 18, her second child when she was 21, and her

third child when she was 22. C.R. testified that her second child was murdered and

after the murder, her third child was placed in the custody of C.R.’s adoptive sister.

Defense counsel objected, arguing at a sidebar that this testimony was not relevant,

and the assistant prosecuting attorney responded that C.R. has been through trauma
and that it has affected her memory and what she remembers. The court sustained

the objection and asked defense counsel if they wanted the court to instruct the jury

to disregard what happened to C.R.’s second child. Defense counsel responded that

moving on would be the preferred course of action.

                  On June 1, 2021, a Cuyahoga County Grand Jury indicted Williams

on three counts of rape in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2), with sexually violent

predator specifications; two counts of kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(A)(4),

with sexual motivation specifications and sexually violent predator specifications;

and one count of kidnapping in violation of R.C. 2905.01(B)(2), with a sexual

motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification.

                  Williams initially pleaded not guilty to the indictment. The case

proceeded to a jury trial on August 9, 2022; the sexually violent predator

specifications were tried to the court. Williams was found guilty of all counts and

specifications.

                  On November 3, 2022, the trial court sentenced Williams to 30 years

to life.

                  Williams filed a timely notice of appeal and presents three

assignments of error for our review:

           I. The trial court erred in failing to merge Williams’s offenses under
           R.C. 2941.25.

           II. State misconduct during closing argument violated the protections
           afforded by the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
           States Constitution, as well as Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio
           Constitution.
      III. The trial court erred in permitting improper testimony which
      prejudiced Williams.

Law and Analysis

I. Merger

               In his first assignment of error, Williams argues that the trial court

erred by failing to merge his offenses under R.C. 2941.25. Specifically, Williams

argues that kidnapping and rape are allied offenses of similar import and should

have been sentenced separately.

               R.C. 2941.25 provides:

      (A) Where the same conduct by defendant can be construed to
      constitute two or more allied offenses of similar import, the indictment
      or information may contain counts for all such offenses, but the
      defendant may be convicted of only one.

      (B) Where the defendant’s conduct constitutes two or more offenses of
      dissimilar import, or where his conduct results in two or more offenses
      of the same or similar kind committed separately or with a separate
      animus as to each, the indictment or information may contain counts
      for all such offenses, and the defendant may be convicted of all of them.

               Generally, we review de novo whether certain offenses should be

merged as allied offenses under R.C. 2941.25. State v. Bailey, Slip Opinion No.

2022-Ohio-4407, ¶ 6, citing State v. Williams, 134 Ohio St.3d 482, 2012-Ohio-5699,

983 N.E.2d 1245, ¶ 1. “Although determining whether R.C. 2941.25 has been

properly applied is a legal question, it necessarily turns on an analysis of the facts,

which can lead to exceedingly fine distinctions.” Id. at ¶ 11. Specifically, when

determining whether offenses are allied offenses of similar import within the

meaning of R.C. 2941.25, we consider three questions: “‘“(1) Were the offenses
dissimilar in import or significance? (2) Were they committed separately? (3) Were

they committed with separate animus or motivation?”’” Bailey at ¶ 10, quoting State

v. Earley, 145 Ohio St.3d 281, 2015-Ohio-4615, 49 N.E.3d 266, ¶ 12, quoting State

v. Ruff, 143 Ohio St.3d 114, 2015-Ohio-995, 34 N.E.3d 892, ¶ 31. If the answer to

any of these questions is yes, separate convictions are permitted. Id.

              The Ohio Supreme Court has recognized that “‘implicit within every

forcible rape * * * is a kidnapping’ because the victim’s liberty is restrained during

the act of forcible rape.” State v. Brisbon, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105591, 2018-

Ohio-2303, ¶ 39, quoting State v. Logan, 60 Ohio St.2d 126, 130, 397 N.E.2d 1345

(1975). Logan provided the following guidelines for determining whether rape and

kidnapping are allied offenses that should merge for sentencing:

      (a) Where the restraint or movement of the victim is merely incidental
      to a separate underlying crime, there exists no separate animus
      sufficient to sustain separate convictions; however, where the restraint
      is prolonged, the confinement is secretive, or the movement is so
      substantial as to demonstrate a significance independent of the other
      offense, there exists a separate animus as to each offense sufficient to
      support separate convictions;

      (b) Where the asportation or restraint of the victim subjects the victim
      to a substantial increase in risk of harm separate and apart from that
      involved in the underlying crime, there exists a separate animus as to
      each offense sufficient to support separate convictions.

Logan at syllabus.

              Williams argues that because the state maintained that Williams

kidnapped C.R. solely for the purpose of repeatedly raping her, the kidnapping

therefore did not increase the risk of harm to the accuser. We are not persuaded by

Williams’s argument.
              As an initial matter, Williams’s characterization of the state’s theory

of the case is undermined by our review of the record.            Regardless of this

mischaracterization, the record reflects that the kidnapping and rape offenses in this

case were not allied offenses of similar import. The record reflects that Williams

punched C.R., with enough force to knock her out and result in a contusion to her

eye, in order to abduct her.      Williams then drove around with C.R. for an

undetermined amount of time before taking her to his apartment. At his apartment,

C.R. was tied to a bed and repeatedly raped and sexually assaulted over a two-day

period. These facts mirror those of State v. Grate, in which the Ohio Supreme Court

held that a separate animus existed for kidnapping and rape where the assailant tied

one of his victims to his bed and chair and repeatedly assaulted her over a two-day

period. State v. Grate, 164 Ohio St.3d 9, 2020-Ohio-5584, 172 N.E.3d 8, ¶ 110, citing

State v. Dalton, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 24953, 2012-Ohio-3386, ¶ 7, citing State

v. Griggs, 103 Ohio St.3d 85, 2004-Ohio-4415, 814 N.E.2d 51.

              In support of his argument, Williams cites cases in which there was

no increased risk of harm associated with the kidnapping apart from that of the

sexual assault, and the restraint of the victim “had no significance apart from

facilitating the rape.” State v. Asadi-Ousley, 2017-Ohio-2652, 90 N.E.3d 263, ¶ 46

(8th Dist.), State v. Mpanurwa, 2017-Ohio-8911, 102 N.E.3d 66 (2d Dist.). Unlike

those cases, C.R. sustained a physical injury as a result of the kidnapping and

endured an extended period of restraint, during which she was periodically sexually

assaulted. While the sexual assaults were ongoing, they took place in a fraction of
the period of time during which C.R.’s liberty was restrained. The restraint was

prolonged because it took place over several days, the confinement was secretive

because C.R. was placed into a private vehicle and then kept in a private apartment,

and the kidnapping resulted in an increased risk of harm to C.R. Furthermore,

Williams’s act of moving C.R. from her location on the street to his apartment was

significant and prolonged. Williams forced C.R. into his vehicle and drove her to an

entirely separate location. Therefore, “the ‘asportation of [C.R.] constituted a

separate crime for which [Williams] may be separately punished.’” State v. Lundy,

8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 105117, 2017-Ohio-9155, ¶ 30, quoting State v. Echols, 8th

Dist. Cuyahoga No. 102504, 2015-Ohio-5138, ¶ 40. For these reasons, the offenses

were not allied offenses of similar import. Therefore, the trial court did not err in

declining to merge the rape and kidnapping offenses for sentencing. Williams’s first

assignment of error is overruled.

II. Closing Arguments

              In Williams’s second assignment of error, he argues that state

misconduct during closing argument violated his constitutional rights. Specifically,

he argues that the assistant prosecuting attorneys expressed personal opinions as to

the veracity and credibility of witnesses. Williams points to several statements, in

which the state referred to C.R.’s testimony as “powerful, truthful, [and] honest,”

described Wilson as “very military,” and referred to defense counsel’s arguments as

“nonsense” and “ridiculous.”
               A prosecutor has considerable latitude during closing argument.

State v. Hunt, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 111892, 2023-Ohio-1977, ¶ 46, quoting State

v. Powell, 132 Ohio St.3d 233, 2012-Ohio-2577, 971 N.E.2d 865, ¶ 149. The test for

prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument is “‘whether the remarks were

improper and, if so, whether they prejudicially affected substantial rights of the

defendant.’” State v. Lee, 2016-Ohio-8324, 75 N.E.3d 956, ¶ 36 (8th Dist.), quoting

State v. Hessler, 90 Ohio St.3d 108, 125, 734 N.E.2d 1237 (2000), quoting State v.

Smith, 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 14, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984). It is improper for an attorney

to express his personal belief or opinion as to the credibility of a witness or as to the

guilt of the accused. Smith at 14. Further, prejudice is shown when there is a

reasonable probability that but for the improper remark by the prosecutor, the result

of the trial would have been different. Hunt at ¶ 46, citing State v. Stevens, 3d. Dist.

Allen No. 1-14-58, 2016-Ohio-446, 58 N.E.3d 584, ¶ 53.

               The state argues that the statements in question were not improper

because they did not state that the witness was “credible.” We are not necessarily

persuaded by the state’s attempt to draw an exceedingly fine distinction between

“truthful [and] honest” and “credible.” Even if the statements were improper,

however, there is not a reasonable probability that but for the statements, the result

of the trial would have been different. The state presented significant evidence,

including DNA evidence, that corroborated C.R.’s story. The inconsistencies in

C.R.’s story were fully litigated at trial and highlighted repeatedly by defense

counsel. The jury had the ultimate task of deciding C.R.’s credibility, and this was
emphasized by the state in its closing argument. For these reasons, we cannot say

that the state of Ohio committed prosecutorial misconduct that violated Williams’s

constitutional rights. Therefore, his second assignment of error is overruled.

III. Improper Testimony

              In his third assignment of error, Williams argues that the trial court

erred in permitting improper testimony that prejudiced Williams.            He refers

specifically to testimony from C.R. and Dr. Rose.

              With respect to C.R.’s testimony, Williams argues that the state

prompted testimony from C.R. regarding her deceased child and the related trauma

that was irrelevant and introduced only to elicit sympathy from the jury.

              A trial court has broad discretion in the admission or exclusion of

evidence, and unless it has clearly abused its discretion and the defendant has been

materially prejudiced thereby, an appellate court should be slow to interfere. State

v. Wagner, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 93432, 2010-Ohio-2221, ¶ 23, citing State v.

Hancock, 108 Ohio St.3d 57, 2006-Ohio-160, 840 N.E.2d 1032. Williams has made

no argument that the trial court’s admission of the aforementioned testimony from

C.R. was unreasonable, arbitrary, or unconscionable so as to amount to an abuse of

discretion. Our review of the record likewise reveals nothing to support a conclusion

that the admission of the testimony constituted an abuse of discretion.

              With respect to Dr. Rose’s testimony, Williams argues that Dr. Rose’s

testimony describing what “flat affect” meant in the context of the SANE nurse’s

report violated Crim.R. 16(K). Crim.R. 16(K) governs expert witnesses and reports
and provides that an expert witness “shall prepare a written report summarizing the

expert witness’s testimony, findings, analysis, conclusions, or opinion, and shall

include a summary of the expert’s qualifications.”

              Williams’s reliance on Crim.R. 16(K) is misplaced here.            The

testimony in question was a part of Dr. Rose’s testimony as a fact witness, testifying

as to both her observations and treatment of C.R. in this case and her experience

with sexual assault kits in general. The trial court did not err in permitting this

testimony. For these reasons, Williams’s third assignment of error is overruled.

              Judgment affirmed.

      It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.

      The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

      It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the

common pleas court to carry this judgment into execution.           The defendant’s

conviction having been affirmed, any bail pending appeal is terminated. Case

remanded to the trial court for execution of sentence.

      A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27

of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

MARY EILEEN KILBANE, PRESIDING JUDGE

MICHAEL JOHN RYAN, J., and
SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR