Court Opinion

ID: 9401831
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-14 13:11:41.060182+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:19:55.509366
License: Public Domain

2023 WI 48

                  SUPREME COURT            OF   WISCONSIN
CASE NO.:              2021AP462-CR

COMPLETE TITLE:        State of Wisconsin,
                                 Plaintiff-Appellant,
                            v.
                       Michael K. Fermanich,
                                 Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.

                         REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
                         Reported at 402 Wis. 2d 309, 974 N.W.2d 895
                                    (2022 – unpublished)

OPINION FILED:         June 14, 2023
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:         December 12, 2022

SOURCE OF APPEAL:
   COURT:              Circuit
   COUNTY:             Langlade
   JUDGE:              John B. Rhode

JUSTICES:
HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ.,
joined. DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion. ZIEGLER, C.J.,
filed a dissenting opinion in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.,
joined.

NOT PARTICIPATING:

ATTORNEYS:

       For the defendant-respondent-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by Colleen Marion, assistant state public defender. There
was an oral argument by Colleen Marion, assistant state public
defender.

       For the plaintiff-appellant, there was a brief filed by
Jacob J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general, with whom on the
brief was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an oral
argument by Jacob J. Wittwer, assistant attorney general.

                                2
                                                                      2023 WI 48
                                                              NOTICE
                                                This opinion is subject to further
                                                editing and modification.   The final
                                                version will appear in the bound
                                                volume of the official reports.
No.   2021AP462-CR

(L.C. No.    2017CF313)

STATE OF WISCONSIN                          :            IN SUPREME COURT

State of Wisconsin,

             Plaintiff-Appellant,
                                                                   FILED
      v.                                                      JUN 14, 2023

Michael K. Fermanich,                                            Sheila T. Reiff
                                                              Clerk of Supreme Court

             Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner.

HAGEDORN, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, ROGGENSACK, DALLET, and KAROFSKY, JJ.,
joined. DALLET, J., filed a concurring opinion. ZIEGLER, C.J.,
filed a dissenting opinion in which REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.,
joined.

      REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals.              Reversed.

      ¶1     BRIAN HAGEDORN, J.      In the span of approximately two

hours,      Michael   Fermanich   stole   and   drove      three     trucks       in

Langlade County, eventually driving the third over the border

into Oneida County.       The State brought charges first in Oneida

County.      The Oneida County Circuit Court imposed cash bail that

Fermanich could not post, so he stayed in jail.                Several months
later, while Fermanich remained in the Oneida County Jail, the
                                                                            No.     2021AP462-CR

State brought charges in Langlade County.                            The Langlade County

Circuit Court imposed a signature bond.                              Ultimately, the two

cases were consolidated in Langlade County.                               Fermanich pled no

contest to three charges——one from Langlade County and two from

Oneida     County.         The    other      charges         from    both    counties       were

dismissed and read in.                  Fermanich was eventually sentenced to

concurrent terms on each of the three counts.

      ¶2     The     question       before         us    is     whether       Fermanich      is

entitled to sentence credit on his Langlade County charge for

time served in the Oneida County Jail.                          We conclude he is.            A

defendant     is     entitled           to    sentence         credit       for      pre-trial

confinement "for all days spent in custody in connection with

the course of conduct for which sentence was imposed," which

includes     "confinement          related      to      an    offense       for    which     the

offender is ultimately sentenced."                       Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a)

(2021-22).1        Under State v. Floyd, pre-trial confinement on a

dismissed and read-in charge relates to an offense for which the

offender     is    ultimately           sentenced.            2000        WI 14,    ¶32,     232

Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155, abrogated on other grounds by State

v.   Straszkowski,         2008    WI 65,      ¶¶89,     95,        310   Wis. 2d 259,       750

N.W.2d 835.        Three     of     Fermanich's         Oneida       County       charges——for

which he was confined pre-trial——were dismissed and read in at

sentencing    on     the    Langlade         County     charge.           Therefore,       under

Floyd, confinement on the dismissed and read-in Oneida County

charges     relates     to        the    Langlade        County       charge       for     which

      1All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2021-22 version.

                                               2
                                                                     No.     2021AP462-CR

Fermanich was ultimately sentenced.                  Accordingly, he is entitled

to credit on that charge.

                                     I.    BACKGROUND

    ¶3      On September 30, 2017, Michael Fermanich stole three

trucks in Langlade County, one after the other.                        After stealing

the third truck, he drove it from Langlade County into Oneida

County,    where      officers       eventually      arrested      him.      The    whole

affair lasted around two hours.

    ¶4      In October 2017, the State filed a five-count criminal

complaint against Fermanich in Oneida County:                             one count of

operating    a    motor    vehicle         without   the     owner's      consent;     two

counts of attempting to flee or elude an officer; one count of

obstructing      an   officer;       and    one   count     of   failure    to     obey   a

traffic officer/signal.              The Oneida County Circuit Court imposed

a $10,000 cash bond the same day.                    Fermanich did not post the

bond, so he was incarcerated in the Oneida County Jail where he

remained for 433 days.

    ¶5      In December 2017, the State filed a criminal complaint

in Langlade County with three counts:                   one count of operating a

motor   vehicle       without    the       owner's   consent——repeater;          and   two

counts of operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent—

—joyriding,      repeater.            In     February      2018,    while     Fermanich

remained    in     custody      in    Oneida      County,    the    Langlade       County

Circuit Court2 imposed a $10,000 signature bond.                       By signing the

    2   The Honorable John B. Rhode presided.

                                              3
                                                                 No.    2021AP462-CR

signature bond, Fermanich was free to go for purposes of the

Langlade County charges, but promised to pay the cash amount if

the bail conditions were not satisfied.                Again, through all of

this, he was incarcerated in the Oneida County Jail based on his

charges there.

      ¶6    In October 2018, Fermanich applied to consolidate the

two cases in Langlade County under Wis. Stat. § 971.09(1).                       Once

the Langlade County Circuit Court approved, the State filed an

amended information that combined all eight charges from both

counties.    This fused the two "independent and separate actions"

"into a single action."          State v. Rachwal, 159 Wis. 2d 494, 515,

465 N.W.2d 490 (1991).

      ¶7    Fermanich ultimately pled no contest to three charges:

Count 1, operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent——

repeater    (originally        brought    in    Langlade     County);    Count    4,

operating    a    motor        vehicle    without      the     owner's       consent

(originally brought in Oneida County); and Count 5, attempting

to   flee   or   elude    an    officer       (originally    brought    in   Oneida

County).     The State dismissed the other five charges and read

them in at the sentencing hearing.3              Three of those dismissed and

read-in charges were originally brought in Oneida County.                         In

the end, the circuit court withheld Fermanich's sentence and

placed him on probation for five years.

      3Read-in charges are charges that are not prosecuted but
can be considered by the circuit court during sentencing. State
v. Hinkle, 2019 WI 96, ¶10 n.10, 389 Wis. 2d 1, 935 N.W.2d 271.

                                          4
                                                              No.     2021AP462-CR

      ¶8    In 2019 and 2020, however, Fermanich committed several

probation     violations    and    spent   time   in   custody   on    probation

holds and alternative-to-revocation arrangements.                   As a result

of violating the conditions of his probation, the circuit court

imposed a sentence of 18 months of initial confinement and 24

months of extended supervision on all three charges, each to run

concurrently, meaning that they are served simultaneously.

      ¶9    In November 2020, Fermanich filed a motion to modify

the judgment of conviction, asking the circuit court to credit

him with 433 days for time spent in the Oneida County Jail for

all   three    charges.       At    that   hearing,     the   parties     agreed

Fermanich was entitled to 433 days of credit on the two Oneida

County charges.      But the parties disagreed on the credit owed

for the Langlade County charge because Fermanich was "free" on a

signature bond for that offense.              The circuit court awarded

Fermanich 433 days of credit on all three charges for time spent

in the Oneida County Jail.          The State appealed, and the court of

appeals reversed.          See State v. Fermanich, No. 2021AP462-CR,

unpublished slip op. (Wis. Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2022) (per curiam).

We granted Fermanich's petition for review.

                              II.    DISCUSSION

      ¶10   Wisconsin's sentence credit statute requires circuit

courts to give defendants credit for time spent in custody.                   See

Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).         It provides:

      A convicted offender shall be given credit toward the
      service of his or her sentence for all days spent in

                                       5
                                                                     No.    2021AP462-CR

      custody in connection with the course of conduct for
      which sentence was imposed.        As used in this
      subsection, "actual days spent in custody" includes,
      without limitation by enumeration, confinement related
      to an offense for which the offender is ultimately
      sentenced, or for any other sentence arising out of
      the same course of conduct . . . .
Id.     Application of § 973.155(1)(a) "to a particular set of

facts   presents    a   question      of       law   we     review   independently."

State   v.   Kontny,    2020     WI App 30,          ¶6,    392   Wis. 2d 311,      943

N.W.2d 923.

      ¶11    Fermanich argues his crime spree constituted a "course

of conduct" under Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)(a), entitling him to

credit on the Langlade County charge.                     He also argues that our

decision in State v. Floyd applies because the confinement on

his dismissed and read-in charges relates to "an offense for

which the offender is ultimately sentenced," here, the Langlade

County charge.      232 Wis. 2d 767, ¶32.             We agree with the latter,

and therefore need not reach Fermanich's first argument.

      ¶12    In Floyd, the defendant was charged with recklessly

endangering safety while armed with a dangerous weapon (among

other   charges).       Id.,    ¶2.    While         free    on   bond,    the   police
arrested the defendant for armed robbery.                    Id., ¶3.      He remained

in custody for several months.                 Id.    Eventually, the defendant

pled guilty to the reckless endangerment charge——the charge on

which he posted bond.          Id., ¶4.        As part of the plea, the State

agreed to dismiss and read in the armed robbery charge for which

he spent time in custody.             Id.       The court then sentenced the

defendant to five years on the reckless endangerment charge.
Id., ¶6.      However, the court declined to grant the defendant

                                           6
                                                                           No.     2021AP462-CR

credit for the time he spent in custody on the armed robbery

charge.      Id., ¶7.

       ¶13   Before      us,    the        defendant    made    two        arguments,         the

second of which is relevant to this case.                           Id., ¶¶14, 18.             His

argument      concerned         the        second      sentence          of      Wis.     Stat.

§ 973.155(1)(a), which says that "'actual days spent in custody'

includes . . . confinement related to an offense for which the

offender      is    ultimately        sentenced."            Id.,        ¶¶13,     18.         The

defendant maintained that because the sentencing court took his

dismissed and read-in armed robbery charge into account when

sentencing him for reckless endangerment, his confinement on the

armed robbery charge "was related to an offense for which he was

ultimately sentenced."           Id., ¶18.          We agreed.       Id., ¶32.

       ¶14   We initially found the statute ambiguous because it

could be read to include either dismissed and read-in charges

broadly or only the charge on which a defendant is convicted.

Id.,   ¶¶18-19.         To    resolve       that     ambiguity,      we       turned     to   the

statute's history and purpose.                     Id., ¶¶20-23.         We observed that

the    statute      provided     "sentence          credit     in    a     wide     range      of

situations" and "was 'designed to afford fairness' and ensure

'that a person not serve more time than he is sentenced.'"                                    Id.,

¶23 (quoting another source).                  We also consulted the nature of

read-in      charges.          Id.,        ¶¶24-27.       At    the        time,       read-ins

constituted        "admissions        by    the     defendant       to    those     charges."

Id., ¶25.      That made them different from other types of charges

considered         by   the    sentencing           court——such          as      unproven      or

                                               7
                                                              No.     2021AP462-CR

acquitted offenses——because more weight would be placed on them.

Id., ¶27.       The "unique nature of read-in charges" coupled with

the        legislative    history     and     purpose    of         Wis.      Stat.

§ 973.155(1)(a) led us to conclude that the legislature intended

the    statute     to    provide    credit   for   read-ins.          Id.,     ¶31.

Therefore, we unanimously held that "pre-trial confinement on a

dismissed charge that is read in at sentencing relates to 'an

offense for which the offender is ultimately sentenced.'"                      Id.,

¶32.       This meant the defendant was entitled to credit.4            Id.

       ¶15     Applying our decision in Floyd, Fermanich is entitled

to credit on the Langlade County charge.5               Fermanich signed a

       A few years after State v. Floyd, 2000 WI 14, 232
       4

Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155, we held that read-in charges do not
necessarily require a defendant to admit guilt.        State v.
Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, ¶97, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 750 N.W.2d 835.
We acknowledged that some of our prior cases——such as Floyd——
stated that read-ins constitute admissions.      Id., ¶89.   But
after consulting the statutory definition of read-in crimes
(which made no mention of admissions), as well as a wide array
of cases on the subject, we concluded that circuit courts should
not "deem the defendant to admit as a matter of law to the read-
in crime for purposes of sentencing."        Id., ¶¶59-92.    We
withdrew language from prior cases, including Floyd, suggesting
otherwise. Id., ¶95.

     In his brief, Fermanich contends he admitted to the charges
when the cases were consolidated.    The State does not contest
this point.     Thus, neither party argues that Straszkowski
changes the calculus regarding Floyd's application to the facts
of this case, so we do not address it.

       Instead of applying Floyd, the dissent contends it should
       5

be overruled, which no party asked us to do.     See Serv. Emps.
Int'l Union, Loc. 1 v. Vos, 2020 WI 67, ¶24, 393 Wis. 2d 38, 946
N.W.2d 35 ("We do not step out of our neutral role to develop or
construct arguments for parties; it is up to them to make their
case.").

                                        8
                                                                         No.     2021AP462-CR

signature bond on the Langlade County charge, similar to the

personal recognizance bond signed by the defendant in Floyd.

Id., ¶2.       But Fermanich spent time in custody on the Oneida

County charges that were dismissed and read in at sentencing,

the same way the defendant in Floyd spent time in custody on the

armed      robbery    charge    that       was     dismissed        and        read    in    at

sentencing.          Id.,    ¶¶3,    6.          Thus,     per    Floyd,        Fermanich's

confinement on the Oneida County charges, which were read in at

sentencing,     related      under    Wis.       Stat.     § 973.155(1)(a)             to    the

Langlade     County    charge——the          charge       for     which    Fermanich          was

ultimately     sentenced.           Id.,     ¶32.          Fermanich       is     therefore

entitled to credit on that sentence just as the defendant in

Floyd was entitled to credit on his reckless endangerment charge

for his confinement on the armed robbery charge.                         Id.

      ¶16    The State does not ask us to overrule Floyd.                             Instead,

it argues that Floyd does not control because Fermanich already

received credit for the dismissed and read-in charges when the

circuit     court    awarded    him       credit     on    the     two    Oneida       County

charges for which he was sentenced.                      The State misreads Floyd.

The defendant in Floyd received credit because the confinement

on   the    armed    robbery   charge       became        related    to    the        reckless

endangerment        charge   when     the    circuit        court    considered             them

together at the sentencing hearing.                  Id.       The same applies here.

The dismissed and read-in Oneida County charges were considered

alongside the Langlade County charge for which the circuit court

ultimately sentenced Fermanich.                   Therefore, Floyd does control

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                                                                  No.   2021AP462-CR

the outcome here and Fermanich is entitled to credit for the 433

days he spent in the Oneida County Jail on the Langlade County

charge.

                                III.   CONCLUSION

    ¶17     Fermanich was in custody in the Oneida County Jail for

offenses in that county.         At sentencing, three of those offenses

were dismissed and read in alongside three counts he pled no

contest to, one of which originated in Langlade County.                      Under

Floyd, pre-trial confinement on a dismissed and read-in charge

relates   to    an    offense   for    which    the   offender     is   ultimately

sentenced.      Id.    Applied here, that means that the confinement

on the dismissed and read-in Oneida County charges related to

the Langlade County charge.            Fermanich is therefore entitled to

credit on that charge for time spent in custody in the Oneida

County Jail.

    By    the    Court.—The     decision       of   the   court   of    appeals   is

reversed.

                                        10
                                                                            No.    2021AP462-CR.rfd

       ¶18    REBECCA            FRANK        DALLET,       J.        (concurring).                One

September         night,         Michael      Fermanich          stole      three        trucks    in

Langlade County, one after the other, before crashing the third

into a creek in neighboring Oneida County.                                 For this less than

two hour episode, Fermanich racked up numerous charges which

were filed in separate cases in the two counties.                                        Unable to

post bail on the Oneida County charges, Fermanich spent 433 days

in pre-trial custody in the Oneida County Jail.                                  Eventually, all

of the pending charges were consolidated into a single case in

Langlade      County,        and     Fermanich        pleaded         no    contest       to     three

offenses1:         (1) operating a motor vehicle without the owner's

consent      in    Langlade         County,      (2)       operating         a    motor     vehicle

without the owner's consent in Oneida County, and (3) fleeing

and    eluding         in   Oneida       County.        The      circuit         court    sentenced

Fermanich to 18 months of initial confinement and 24 months of

extended      supervision            for      each    of      these        counts,2       with     the

sentences to be served concurrently.

       ¶19    The central question in this case is how much sentence
credit Fermanich is due on count one——operating a motor vehicle

without the owner's consent in Langlade County.                                    The answer to

that       question         is    important          because      everyone          agrees        that

Fermanich         is    entitled         to    433    days       of    credit       against        his

       The remaining five counts were dismissed and read in at
       1

sentencing.

       As explained in the majority opinion, the circuit court
       2

initially withheld sentence and placed Fermanich on probation.
See majority op., ¶7.   After several probation violations, the
circuit court revoked probation and imposed this sentence. Id.,
¶8.

                                                  1
                                                                No.    2021AP462-CR.rfd

sentences on both of his Oneida County convictions for the time

he spent in pre-trial custody in Oneida County.                       Given that the

circuit court imposed concurrent sentences, that credit would be

meaningless if Fermanich is not entitled to the same credit

against the sentence on his Langlade County conviction.                             He

would have to serve 433 additional days in prison.

    ¶20       To decide Fermanich's entitlement to sentence credit

we should begin with the text of the relevant statute, Wis.

Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).           That statute says that "[a] convicted

offender shall be given credit toward the service of his or her

sentence for all days spent in custody in connection with the

course    of    conduct    for    which       sentence    was    imposed."         Id.

(emphasis added).         Section 973.155(1)(a) doesn't define "course

of conduct," but it is a common phrase with a familiar meaning.

It simply refers to two or more acts, connected to each other by

a common purpose or intention.3               Many statutes define the phrase

similarly.      See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 940.32(1)(a) ("'Course of

conduct' means 2 or more acts carried out over time, however
short    or     long,     that    show        a   continuity      of     purpose.");

§ 947.013(1)(a) ("'Course of conduct' means a pattern of conduct

composed of a series of acts over a period of time, however

short,    evidencing       a     continuity       of     purpose.");       see    also

    3  See,    e.g.,    Course,    Merriam-Webster    Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/course       (defining
"course" as "accustomed procedure or normal action," "an ordered
process or succession," and "the act or action of moving in path
from point to point"); Conduct, Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/conduct    (describing
conduct as an "act, manner, or process of carrying on")

                                          2
                                                                  No.    2021AP462-CR.rfd

§ 943.204(1)(b) (incorporating the definition in § 947.013(1)(a)

by reference).

       ¶21     Although § 973.155(1)(a) doesn't expressly incorporate

these definitions, they all mirror the way an ordinary person

might    use    the    phrase    "course    of    conduct"       when    applied    to   a

series of criminal acts.              For example, if someone robs a bank

and flees the scene, leading the police on a high speed chase,

one might refer to those acts together as a "course of conduct."

While the theft and the fleeing are different acts that might

support different criminal charges, they are nevertheless part

of a single course of conduct because they are united by a

common purpose——stealing from the bank.

        ¶22 So     too    for    Fermanich's          actions.      He    stole    three

different      trucks     from     three   different       locations      in   Langlade

County.      The police finally caught up with him in Oneida County.

While    fleeing      from   the    police,      he    crashed    the    third     stolen

truck.       Fermanich's purpose was stealing trucks, and his one-

after-the-other-after-the-other crime spree is a classic example
of a course of conduct.             As the circuit court correctly put it,

"[t]his was all the same course of conduct.                      It happened on the

same day within a short period of time.                     The only reason we're

dealing with this issue is because it happened to spill over a

county line."

       ¶23     Given that Fermanich's actions were all part of the

same    course    of     conduct,    he    is    entitled    to    the    same     credit

against his sentences on all three counts under § 973.155(1)(a).
As explained previously, defendants are entitled to credit for

                                            3
                                                                            No.   2021AP462-CR.rfd

pre-trial custody "in connection with the course of conduct for

which    sentence      [is]    imposed."                 Id.      In    other     words,    if   a

defendant is held in pre-trial custody for an offense that is

part of a broader course of conduct, he is entitled to credit

for   that    time     so   long     as    he       is    ultimately         convicted     of    an

offense that is also part of that same course of conduct.                                    That

is    what    happened      here.         The       433        days    Fermanich      "spent     in

custody" were for driving a stolen vehicle from Langlade County

into Oneida County and using it to flee and obstruct officers.

Id.     This conduct was part of the same "course of conduct for

which sentence was imposed"——stealing trucks in Langlade County,

driving one into Oneida County, and, when caught, fleeing from

the police.      Id.     Therefore, Fermanich is entitled to credit.

       ¶24    This            interpretation                      of           § 973.155(1)(a)

straightforwardly applies its text and furthers the statute's

purpose——"to afford fairness by ensuring 'that a person [does]

not serve more time than that for which he is sentenced.'"                                      See

State    v.    Johnson,       2007    WI    107,          ¶70,        304   Wis. 2d 318,        735
N.W.2d 505 (quoting State v. Beets, 124 Wis. 2d 372, 379, 369

N.W.2d 382       (1985)).                 Nevertheless,                cases       interpreting

§ 973.155(1)(a) have strayed a long way from its text.                                  Since at

least the court of appeals' decision in State v. Tuescher, 226

Wis. 2d 465, 595 N.W.2d 443 (Ct. App. 1999) and our decision in

State ex rel. Thorson v. Schwarz, 2004 WI 96, 274 Wis. 2d 1, 681

N.W.2d 914, courts have rejected a reading of § 973.155(1)(a)'s

"course of conduct" language that would cover all parts of "the
same criminal episode."              Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d at 471.                      Instead,

                                                4
                                                                       No.    2021AP462-CR.rfd

they read § 973.155(1)(a) to apply only to time a defendant

spends in custody in connection with "the specific 'offense or

acts' embodied in the charge for which the defendant is being

sentenced."        Tuescher,      226    Wis. 2d at             471     (quoting       another

source); see also Schwarz, 274 Wis. 2d 1, at ¶31 (discussing

Tuescher's      interpretation          of       the         phrase).          Under      this

interpretation, if my hypothetical bank robber were held in pre-

trial custody only on a charge of fleeing the police, he would

not   receive    any    sentence    credit             for    that     time    if   he    were

ultimately convicted and sentenced only for the bank robbery.

      ¶25     There are many reasons to reject this overly narrow

interpretation.        For starters, it reads the words "course of"

out of § 973.155(1)(a).           If the legislature intended for credit

to be available only for "the specific 'offense or acts'" for

which   the     defendant    is    being         sentenced,           see    Tuescher,     226

Wis. 2d at 471 (quoting another source), then it could easily

have written a statute entitling defendants to credit only "for

all days spent in custody in connection with the conduct for
which sentence was imposed."                     See    § 973.155(1)(a).               But the

legislature     did    not   do   so.        Moreover,          by     using     the    phrase

"course of conduct," the legislature focused the sentence-credit

inquiry directly on the factual relationship between the conduct

for which a defendant was in custody and the conduct for which

sentence was imposed.          See id.; see also State v. Carter, 2010

WI 77, ¶56, 327 Wis. 2d 1, 785 N.W.2d 516 (explaining that "it

is the factual connection between custody and the conduct for
which sentence is imposed that is controlling").                               The analysis

                                             5
                                                              No.   2021AP462-CR.rfd

required by § 973.155(1)(a)'s text is thus at odds with Tuescher

and Schwarz's narrow focus on just "the specific 'offense or

acts' embodied in the charge for which the defendant is being

sentenced."       Tuescher,    226     Wis. 2d at      471    (quoting          another

source); see also Schwarz, 274 Wis. 2d 1, at ¶31.

     ¶26    We    should      therefore       consider         realigning            our

interpretation     of      § 973.155(1)(a)        with      its     text        in    an

appropriate case.       But we need not do so here because, as the

majority    opinion     correctly     explains,      our    decision       in     Floyd

governs.4     Floyd makes clear that Fermanich is entitled to the

sentence    credit      he    seeks     under      a       different       part      of

§ 973.155(1)(a).        See   State   v.    Floyd,     2000   WI    14,    ¶32,      232

Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155, abrogated on other grounds by State

v. Straszkowski, 2008 WI 65, ¶¶89, 95, 310 Wis. 2d 259, 750

N.W.2d 835.      I therefore join the majority opinion in full and

respectfully concur.

     4 Moreover, the parties did not ask us directly to revisit
our precedent.

                                        6
                                                                        No.    2021AP462-CR.akz

      ¶27    ANNETTE        KINGSLAND    ZIEGLER,          C.J.     (dissenting).             We

accepted this case for review in order to determine the meaning

of the phrase "all days spent in custody in connection with the

course of conduct for which sentence was imposed" under Wis.

Stat. § 973.155(1)(a), Wisconsin's sentence credit statute.                                  But

the majority neglects to answer this question.                                 The majority

instead     rests     its    decision        on    a    precedent       that    is    entirely

disconnected        from    the    statutory           text.      The     result      is    that

Fermanich receives credit for time spent in custody toward a

sentence that has no connection to his previous custody, based

on offenses for which he was neither convicted nor sentenced.

      ¶28    This case involves Fermanich's series of motor vehicle

thefts, which occurred in both Langlade and Oneida counties on a

single    night.       He    was    subsequently          held     in    custody      for    the

Oneida County charges but posted bond on the Langlade County

charges, meaning his custody was unrelated to those charges.

Fermanich later pled no contest to one of the Langlade County

counts    and   two    of    the    Oneida        County       counts.        The    remaining
charges were read in at sentencing.

      ¶29    Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1)(a) entitles a convicted

defendant to sentence credit "for all days spent in custody in

connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was

imposed."       Although Fermanich is entitled to credit for the

Oneida    County     counts,       he   is    not      entitled     to    credit      for    the

Langlade County counts because his custody in Oneida County was

not   connected       to    the    conduct        underlying      the     Langlade      County
counts.      Fermanich's separate offenses also do not constitute

                                              1
                                                                      No.    2021AP462-CR.akz

the    same    "course    of     conduct."          The    conduct      underlying         each

offense occurred at a different time, in a different place,

using    different       acts    than      were     required     to    prove       the   other

offenses.       His Langlade County conduct was not connected to his

custody, so he is not entitled to sentence credit toward any

Langlade County count.

       ¶30    The       majority,          however,        reaches          the      opposite

conclusion.         It    does      so    based     not   on    the    language       of   the

statute, but instead on the erroneous conclusion in State v.

Floyd that a defendant is entitled to sentence credit based on

read-in       charges.          This      directive       is    absurd      and     must    be

overruled.       It is impossible to grant sentence credit for read-

in    charges    because      defendants       are    not      sentenced      for     read-in

charges.       Floyd deals with this hurdle by granting credit toward

a    sentence    even    if     the      sentence    is   not    imposed      for     conduct

connected to the defendant's custody.                      Floyd's result is flatly

at odds with the language of Wis. Stat. § 973.155, and we should

bring clarity to this area of law by overruling it.                               Because the
majority fails to do so, I respectfully dissent.

                               I.     FACTUAL BACKGROUND

       ¶31    On September 30, 2017, Michael Fermanich committed a

series of crimes.          He stole three trucks, one after the other,

in Langlade County.              He stole the first truck in the Town of

Antigo.       After driving that truck to the Town of Peck, Fermanich

abandoned it and proceeded to steal a second truck.                                 He drove

that second truck to the Town of Parish, where he abandoned that

                                              2
                                                         No.   2021AP462-CR.akz

truck and stole a third.      The trucks were each owned by separate

individuals.

      ¶32   After stealing the third truck, Fermanich drove into

Oneida County.       He led officers on a pursuit throughout Oneida

County before losing control of the stolen truck and running it

off the road into a ditch.            He was arrested and charged in

Oneida County with five offenses, each involving conduct that

took place in Oneida County:         operating a motor vehicle without

the   owner's   consent   contrary   to   Wis.   Stat.   § 943.32(2),      two

counts of attempting to flee or elude an officer contrary to

Wis. Stat. § 346.04(3), obstructing an officer contrary to Wis.

Stat. § 946.41(1), and failure to obey a traffic officer or

signal contrary to Wis. Stat. § 346.04(2t).          He was held in the

Oneida County jail on cash bail.

      ¶33   Two months later, on January 29, 2018, Fermanich was

charged in Langlade County with one count of taking and driving

a motor vehicle without the owner's consent contrary to Wis.

Stat. § 943.23(2), and two counts of operating a vehicle without
the owner's consent contrary to Wis. Stat. § 943.23(3).                   Each

offense involved conduct that took place in Langlade County.

Fermanich made his initial appearance in Langlade County and

signed a $10,000 signature bond on February 6, 2018.                    As the

majority correctly observes, "[b]y signing the signature bond,

Fermanich was free to go for purposes of the Langlade County

charges."   Majority op., ¶5.

      ¶34   The cases were consolidated, and the State amended the
Langlade    County    information    to   include   the        Oneida   County

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                                                                          No.    2021AP462-CR.akz

charges.        At a plea and sentencing hearing in Langlade County

circuit court on December 6, 2018, Fermanich pled no contest to

one of the Langlade County charges (count 1) and two of the

Oneida County charges (counts 4 and 5).                            All other counts were

dismissed and read in at sentencing.                        The circuit court withheld

sentencing,         imposed          five        years'     probation,          and        concluded

Fermanich was entitled to 433 days of sentence credit on counts

4 and 5 for the time he spent in the Oneida County jail if

probation was later revoked.

     ¶35      In 2020, Fermanich's probation was revoked, and the

circuit       court      imposed       a    sentence        consisting        of      18     months'

initial confinement and 24 months' extended supervision.                                        The

circuit court imposed this same sentence for each of the three

counts     to      be     served      concurrently.               The    issue        is     whether

Fermanich's 433 days of sentence credit for the time spent in

the Oneida County jail applies against his sentences for all

three    counts         or    just    the    counts       arising       out     of    Fermanich's

conduct in Oneida County, counts 4 and 5.1
                                II.        STANDARD OF REVIEW

     ¶36      The question in this case "presents a straightforward

issue    of     statutory        interpretation           that     we    review        de    novo."

Backus v. Waukesha Cnty., 2022 WI 55, ¶8, 402 Wis. 2d 764, 976

N.W.2d     492.              "[W]e    have        repeatedly       held       that         statutory

interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute.                                     If the

meaning       of    the       statute       is     plain,    we     ordinarily         stop     the

     1 The parties agree that Fermanich is entitled to 433 days
of credit on counts 4 and 5.

                                                   4
                                                                 No.    2021AP462-CR.akz

inquiry.'"        State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004

WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (quoting Seider v.

O'Connell, 2000 WI 76, ¶43, 236 Wis. 2d 211, 612 N.W.2d 659).

"Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted

meaning,    except     that    technical        or   specially-defined        words   or

phrases     are     given   their      technical       or    special     definitional

meaning."     Id.     "Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in

the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of

a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-

related     statutes;         and     reasonably,       to      avoid     absurd      or

unreasonable results."              Id., ¶46.        Legislative history may be

"consulted to confirm or verify a plain-meaning interpretation."

Id., ¶51.

                                    III.    ANALYSIS

    ¶37     Unlike the majority, I begin with the essential task

of attempting to find meaning in the statutory text.                          See id.,

¶44 ("It is, of course, a solemn obligation of the judiciary to

faithfully give effect to the laws enacted by the legislature,
and to do so requires a determination of statutory meaning.").

I then explain that Wis. Stat. § 973.155's plain meaning does

not entitle Fermanich to credit on count 1.                     Finally, I discuss

Floyd and conclude it should be overruled because its ruling is

directly contrary to the language of the statute Floyd purported

to interpret.

   A.   Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1)(a)'s Proper Interpretation

    ¶38     Fermanich       argues     he       is   entitled    to     433   days    of
sentence credit on count 1 because his confinement in Oneida

                                            5
                                                                   No.   2021AP462-CR.akz

County was "in connection with the course of conduct for which

sentence     was     imposed"          under       Wis.    Stat.     § 973.155(1)(a),

Wisconsin's sentence credit statute.                       According to Fermanich,

this is so because "all three counts arose from a single course

of conduct."       The State argues the counts did not arise from the

same   "course     of    conduct."         Instead,        the    phrase   "course     of

conduct"     means      "the     'specific         acts'   or    offense      for   which

sentence was imposed."             Because Fermanich was never in custody

for the same specific acts for which sentence was imposed on

count 1, the State argues Fermanich is not entitled to 433 days

of credit on count 1.

       ¶39   Wisconsin         Stat.    § 973.155(1),           Wisconsin's     sentence

credit statute, provides in relevant part:

            (a) A convicted offender shall be given credit
       toward the service of his or her sentence for all days
       spent in custody in connection with the course of
       conduct for which sentence was imposed. As used in
       this subsection, "actual days spent in custody"
       includes,    without   limitation    by   enumeration,
       confinement related to an offense for which the
       offender is ultimately sentenced, or for any other
       sentence arising out of the same course of conduct,
       which occurs:

             1.    While the offender is awaiting trial;

             2.    While the offender is being tried; and

            3. While the offender is awaiting imposition of
       sentence after trial.

            (b) The categories in par. (a) and sub. (1m)
       include custody of the convicted offender which is in
       whole or in part the result of a probation, extended
       supervision or parole hold under s. 302.113(8m),
       302.114(8m), 304.06(3), or 973.10(2) placed upon the
       person for the same course of conduct as that
       resulting in the new conviction.
                                               6
                                                         No.       2021AP462-CR.akz

The statute is remarkably uncomplicated.           A convicted defendant

receives sentence credit for "all days spent in custody."                   Those

days spent in custody must be "in connection with the course of

conduct for which sentence was imposed."           If a defendant was in

custody for a course of conduct, and later sentenced for that

same course of conduct, the defendant receives credit.

      ¶40    The question this case presents is what constitutes a

"course     of   conduct."     One   need   look   no    further        than   the

statutory text to find the answer:          "course of conduct" refers

to the conduct underlying the offense for which the defendant is

convicted and sentenced.         We know this based on the statute's

definition of "actual days spent in custody."                After stating the

"actual days spent in custody" must be "in connection with the

course of conduct for which sentence was imposed," the statute

restates and clarifies this requirement.              "[A]ctual days spent

in   custody"    includes    "confinement   related     to    an    offense     for

which the defendant is ultimately sentenced, or for any other

sentence arising out of the same course of conduct."                  Wis. Stat.
§ 973.155(1)(a).

      ¶41    "[A]ctual days spent in custody" therefore includes

confinement related to either the "offense" or the "course of

conduct" for which the defendant was ultimately sentenced.                     This

language draws a distinction between a "course of conduct" and

an "offense," which makes sense because the same conduct can

give rise to multiple statutory offenses.             This reality is well

recognized in the law generally.          As we have stated in the area
of double jeopardy:

                                      7
                                                                   No.    2021AP462-CR.akz

      [T]his court was one of many state courts signifying
      the distinction between acts and offenses by stating:
      "'The test is not whether the defendant has already
      been tried for the same act, but whether he has been
      put in jeopardy for the same offense.'"       State v.
      Brooks, 215 Wis. 134, 140, 254 N.W. 374 (1934)
      (quoting Morey v. Commonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434
      (1871)).    The same distinction between acts and
      offenses has long been noted by scholars and treatise
      writers addressing the double jeopardy questions posed
      by multiple prosecutions.   E.g., I Wharton's Criminal
      Law 509 (11th ed. 1912) ("Same act may constitute two
      or more offenses which are distinct from each
      other.").
State     v.     Hansen,    2001       WI   53,    ¶29,     243    Wis. 2d 328,           627
N.W.2d 195 (footnote omitted).                    Recognizing this distinction,

the statute provides credit for confinement that is related to

either the "offense" for which the defendant is sentenced or the

"course     of    conduct"       for    which     the    defendant       is     sentenced.

Because a single "course of conduct" can give rise to multiple

"offense[s]," the statute ensures the defendant receives credit

regardless       of   the   specific        statutory     offense        for    which     the

defendant is ultimately sentenced.                      It does so by providing

credit based on the "course of conduct" underlying the offense,

as opposed to providing credit based on the offense alone.                               This

makes clear that when the statute says "course of conduct," it
is referring to the conduct underlying the offense for which the

defendant is sentenced.

      ¶42      Wisconsin    Stat.      § 973.155's        legislative          history    and

our     precedent     support      this      plain      meaning.         We     previously

examined       the    statute's        legislative        history        in      State     v.

Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d 86, 423 N.W.2d 533 (1988).                              We began by
discussing       Klimas     v.    State,     75    Wis. 2d 244,          249    N.W.2d 285

                                             8
                                                              No.    2021AP462-CR.akz

(1977), which we decided before the legislature first enacted

the     sentence   credit       statute.          In    Klimas,     "[t]his     court

specifically invited the legislature's attention to the existing

federal law, 18 U.S.C.A. sec. 3568.                We stated that the federal

law being 'simple and . . . just' had much to recommend . . . ."

Boettcher, 144 Wis. 2d at 91 (alterations in original) (quoting

Klimas,     75   Wis. 2d   at    251).       A    month    after    we   made      this

recommendation, the legislature followed suit.                     Id.   It enacted

§ 973.155 using the very same wording that exists today.                           § 9,

ch. 353, Laws of 1977.

      ¶43    Our review of legislative history revealed that Wis.

Stat.     § 973.155   is    rooted    "in        the    federal    sentence-credit

statute, 18 U.S.C. sec. 3568,[2] and in the Model Penal Code sec.

      2 The sentence of imprisonment of any person convicted
      of an offense shall commence to run from the date on
      which such person is received at the penitentiary,
      reformatory, or jail for service of such sentence.
      The Attorney General shall give any such person credit
      toward service of his sentence for any days spent in
      custody in connection with the offense or acts for
      which sentence was imposed. As used in this section,
      the term 'offense' means any criminal offense, other
      than an offense triable by court-martial, military
      commission, provost court, or other military tribunal,
      which is in violation of an Act of Congress and is
      triable in any court established by Act of Congress.

      If any such person shall be committed to a jail or
      other place of detention to await transportation to
      the place at which his sentence is to be served, his
      sentence shall commence to run from the date on which
      he is received at such jail or other place of
      detention.

      No sentence shall           prescribe       any     other    method     of
      computing the term.

18 U.S.C. § 3568 (1977).
                                         9
                                                           No.     2021AP462-CR.akz

7.09" and that "our legislature intended a statute with the same

meaning."     Id. at 92–93.         A report in the legislative drafting

file explained:

       If enacted, the Bill would clarify a currently unclear
       and chaotic area of the law . . . and would bring
       Wisconsin law into conformity with the recommended
       minimum criminal justice sentencing standards of the
       American Bar Association, Section 7.09 of the American
       Law Institute's Model Penal Code, federal criminal
       sentencing procedures as set forth in 18 U.S.C.
       s. 3568 and the laws of many other states.
Id. at 92 (quoting Wisconsin Legislative Council Report No. 6 to
the 1977 Legislature:            Legislation Relating to Credit for Time

in Jail, 2).         We also observed that the federal statute uses

similar language to § 973.155.             "[E]ach uses the language, 'in

connection with,'——in the state statute, 'in connection with the

course of conduct for which sentence was imposed,' and in the

federal statute, 'in connection with the offense or acts for

which sentence was imposed.'"             Id. at 93.      "We perceive[d] no

meaningful difference between" the two statutes.                      Id.      The

Model Penal Code similarly used the phrase, "the crime for which

such    sentence     is    imposed,"     and   "[t]he    comments     note    that

'obviously,' if the detention were for the 'same series of acts

as the sentence,' presentence credit would not depend on their

being the same crime in a narrow sense."                Id. at 97-98.        Based

on   this   review    of   the    text   and   the   legislative    history,    we

arrived at an interpretation that confirms the plain meaning

explained    above     and   illustrates       the   distinction     between    an

"offense" and a "course of conduct":

       [I]t would appear that the drafters of the Wisconsin
       statute, who acknowledged their use of the MPC as a
                                10
                                                                         No.    2021AP462-CR.akz

    model, simply avoided the problem inherent in the
    MPC's use of the phrase, "for the crime for which such
    sentence is imposed."   Thus, in order to make clear
    that the defendant is entitled to credit for time
    served pretrial, even if he is ultimately convicted of
    a different crime than that charged, the drafters of
    the Wisconsin statute hit upon the idea of referring
    to the defendant's objectionable behavior as a "course
    of conduct." In this way, there could be no argument
    that a defendant who was charged with rape, but
    convicted of assault, should not get his full
    presentence credit.   Instead, because both the rape
    charge and the assault conviction arose out of the
    "same course of conduct," he clearly was entitled to
    credit.
Id. at 98.     This confirms that "course of conduct" refers to the

conduct underlying the offense for which sentence was imposed.

    ¶44      The court of appeals later relied on our decision in

Boettcher in a case that presented the same question as the

present     case.        State       v.     Tuescher,         226        Wis. 2d 465,          595

N.W.2d 443      (Ct.        App.     1999),          involved        a         defendant       who

"burglarized     a   restaurant           while      armed    with       a     shotgun"       and,

"[w]hen     police     confronted         [the       defendant]          as     he    left     the

restaurant,     he     exchanged      gunfire          with    them       and        wounded    an

officer."      Id.     at    467.         He    was    charged       and        sentenced      for
attempted second-degree intentional homicide, attempted burglary

while armed, and possession of a firearm by a felon.                                        Id. at

467-68.   He   "received       224    days          credit    on    each        of    the    three

concurrent     sentences      for    time       he    spent     in       custody       prior    to

sentencing."     Id. at 468.          The attempted homicide conviction was

eventually overturned, and the defendant later pled guilty to

the lesser charge of first-degree reckless injury.                                     Id.     The
issue was whether the defendant was entitled to credit for the

                                               11
                                                                      No.   2021AP462-CR.akz

time spent "serving the other two sentences" but not "serving a

sentence for the shooting of the police officer."                           Id.

       ¶45        Resolving      that    issue,    like        in    the    present   case,

"turn[ed]          on    our    interpretation          of     the   phrase    'course   of

conduct' in [Wis. Stat.] § 973.155."                         Id. at 470.      The defendant

argued       he    was    entitled      to   credit      because     "his     burglary   and

firearm possession sentences 'arise out of the same course of

conduct' for which the reckless injury sentence was imposed."

Id.    Relying in part on our decision in Boettcher, the court of

appeals disagreed.               It concluded, even though the defendant's

offenses          "were        committed      virtually          simultaneously,"        the

sentences did not arise from the same course of conduct because

the sentences were not "based on the same specific acts."3                               Id.

at    475.         The   acts    underlying       the    offenses——burglarizing          the

restaurant and shooting an officer——were different, so they did

not constitute the same "course of conduct."

       ¶46        We embraced      Tuescher's interpretation of "course of

conduct" five years later in State ex rel. Thorson v. Schwarz,
2004 WI 96, 274 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 914.                           Thorson involved a

defendant who was convicted of attempted second-degree sexual

assault and false imprisonment, and sentenced to 13 years in

       The court of appeals also relied on its earlier decision
       3

in State v. Gavigan, 122 Wis. 2d 389, 362 N.W.2d 162 (Ct. App.
1984), where it concluded a robbery and later act of fleeing the
police, though "closely related," were not the same "course of
conduct."    Id. at 393.       See also State v. Beets, 124
Wis. 2d 372, 381-83, 369 N.W.2d 382 (1985) (approving of Gavigan
and stating "it is clear that, unless the acts for which the
first and second sentences are imposed are truly related or
identical, the sentencing on one charge severs the connection
between the custody and the pending charges").

                                              12
                                                                  No.   2021AP462-CR.akz

prison.      Id., ¶2.          "Shortly before his scheduled release, the

State    commenced        an   action     to    commit    [the     defendant]     as    a

sexually violent person pursuant to Chapter 980.                        Thus, instead

of being released from custody, [the defendant] was transferred

to the Wisconsin Resource Center (WRC) for further evaluation."

Id., ¶3.      A jury declined to commit the defendant, and he was

released on parole.            Id., ¶4.        He later violated parole and was

incarcerated for ten months.                   Id., ¶6.       The defendant sought

sentence credit for the time at the WRC awaiting the Chapter 980

trial.    Id., ¶7.

     ¶47     We     concluded      the    defendant       was     not    entitled      to

sentence credit for the time spent at the WRC because it was not

"in connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was

imposed."4    Id., ¶30.         We began by recognizing that "[t]he phrase

'course of conduct' was explicitly construed by the court of

appeals in Tuescher" as meaning "the specific 'offense or acts'

embodied     in     the   charged    for       which    the     defendant    is   being

sentenced," not a mere "criminal episode."                        Id., ¶31 (quoting
Tuescher,     226    Wis. 2d at      471).         We    then    applied    Tuescher's

definition, concluding the defendant "was not detained for the

specific offense that caused his original conviction.                          Rather,

the filing of a Chapter 980 petition was the reason for his

detention."       Id., ¶34.

     4 We also concluded the defendant was not entitled to credit
because he was not "in custody" for purposes of the sentence
credit statute.   State ex rel. Thorson v. Schwarz, 2004 WI 96,
¶29, 274 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 914.

                                           13
                                                                    No.   2021AP462-CR.akz

      ¶48    The case now before the court presents one of those

rare circumstances where nearly every data point leads to the

same answer.         The statutory text, the legislative history, and

the case law all converge on one interpretation of "course of

conduct"     under      Wis.   Stat.       § 973.155.       It    means     the   conduct

underlying the offense for which the defendant was sentenced——or

as Tuescher put it, "the specific 'offense or acts' embodied in

the   charge      for    which       the    defendant      is    being      sentenced."5

Tuescher, 226 Wis. 2d at 471.

                         B.    Application to This Case

      ¶49    Applying this straightforward definition of "course of

conduct," it is clear that Fermanich is not entitled to credit

on count 1, which relates to an offense Fermanich committed in

Langlade County.          "[T]wo conditions must be met in order for a

defendant to receive sentence credit:                     (1) the defendant must

have been 'in custody' for the period in question; and (2) the

period    'in    custody'      must    have       been   'in    connection       with   the

course      of   conduct       for    which       the    sentence     was    imposed.'"
Thorson,         274      Wis. 2d 1,          ¶15        (quoting         Wis.      Stat.

§ 973.155(1)(a)).

      5One should not confuse "specific acts" with "specific
act."   Often there are multiple acts, as opposed to just one
act, which are required to establish a statutory offense, such
as conspiracy. See Wis. Stat. § 939.31. This is why Wis. Stat.
§ 973.155(1) uses "course of conduct" rather than "conduct."

     This rule is sensible and easy to apply.        It merely
requires comparing the conduct underlying the offense for which
the defendant was sentenced and the conduct connected to the
defendant's custody.   There is no need to engage in a vague,
subjective inquiry into the defendant's purpose.

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                                                                              No.      2021AP462-CR.akz

      ¶50     It is undisputed that Fermanich was "in custody" for

433   days.         The    only    issue      is       whether      that       custody          was    "in

connection with the course of conduct for which the sentence was

imposed."       It was not.             Fermanich's custody was in connection

with only the Oneida County charges, not count 1——the Langlade

County charge.            He failed to post cash bail on the Oneida County

charges,      meaning       he    was   "in    custody"            for    purposes             of    those

charges.      But his custody was unrelated to any of the Langlade

County    charges.           Fermanich        "was       incarcerated               in   the        Oneida

County Jail based on his charges there," not based on count 1.

Majority op., ¶5.            He signed a signature bond and was therefore

"free to go for purposes of the Langlade County charges."                                           Id.

      ¶51     Fermanich's argument that the conduct underlying all

of the charges is the same "course of conduct" clearly fails

under    Wis.      Stat.     § 973.155's           clear      meaning.              A    "course          of

conduct"      is     the     conduct      underlying           the       offense          for       which

sentence      was     imposed.            Fermanich          was     sentenced            for       three

offenses:       count      1,     operating        a    vehicle      without             the    owner's
consent in Langlade County; count 4, operating a vehicle without

the owner's consent in Oneida County; and count 5, fleeing and

eluding an officer in Oneida County.                               The conduct underlying

count 1 is not the same as the conduct underlying the Oneida

County    counts.           Fermanich       took        a    truck       in       Langlade          County

without     the     owner's       permission           and    operated            it     in    Langlade

County.         The       other    counts      involve         different               acts,        namely

operating the truck at a different point in time and eluding law
enforcement.          The       conduct    underlying          count          1     occurred         at   a

                                               15
                                                                         No.    2021AP462-CR.akz

different time, in a different place, using different acts than

were required to prove the other offenses.                               It is a different

"course of conduct."

       ¶52    As a result, because the conduct underlying count 1 is

not the same "course of conduct" as the conduct underlying the

other     counts,        and       because     Fermanich's         custody       was    not    in

connection with count 1 due to the signature bond, he is not

entitled to sentence credit on count 1.

                                     C.   State v. Floyd

       ¶53    This case presents the opportunity to bring clarity to

the    law.        The    majority        declines         this    opportunity,         instead

applying      State      v.    Floyd,         2000    WI     14,   232    Wis. 2d 767,         606

N.W.2d 155, which erroneously held "that Wis. Stat. § 973.155(1)

requires sentence credit for confinement on charges that are

dismissed and read in at sentencing."                          Id., ¶1.         This approach

endorses an "unclear and chaotic" sentencing regime much like

what the legislature sought to avoid when it enacted Wis. Stat.

§ 973.155.
       ¶54    Floyd      involved         a    defendant       who    "was      charged       with

recklessly         endangering        safety         while    armed      with    a     dangerous

weapon,       carrying         a    concealed         weapon,      fourth-degree           sexual

assault, disorderly conduct, and criminal trespass."                                   Id., ¶2.

"He was released on a $3,500 personal recognizance bond," but

was subsequently re-arrested for a later armed robbery.                                       Id.,

¶¶2-3.       Unable to post bond, he remained in custody.                              Id., ¶3.

As    part    of    a   plea       agreement,        the   State     dismissed       the   armed
robbery charge and instead filed a felony bail jumping charge.

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Id.,    ¶4.     The     defendant      "pled       guilty     to   both        the    original

reckless endangerment charge and the felony bail jumping charge

with the understanding that all remaining charges, including the

armed     robbery      charge,      would     be    dismissed       and        read     in     at

sentencing."        Id.    At sentencing, defense counsel asked that the

court grant 217 days of credit against all sentences for the

time the defendant spent in custody after his second arrest.

Id., ¶7.

       ¶55    From there, the resolution should have been simple.

The     defendant's       custody     was     never     in     connection            with    the

reckless      endangerment        charge     because     he    posted      bond       on     that

charge.       His     later      custody    was    in   connection        with       only    the

felony bail jumping charge.                  Therefore, the defendant in Floyd

should have received credit toward his sentence for bail jumping

but not reckless endangerment.

       ¶56    But Floyd searched for ambiguity rather than meaning

in Wis. Stat. § 973.155.               Floyd concluded the phrase "offense

for which the offender is ultimately sentenced" was ambiguous.
Id., ¶18.        According to Floyd, it was possible to read the

statute either as "allow[ing] credit only on the charge for

which the offender is convicted" or as "includ[ing] credit for a

read-in      offense      upon    which    the     sentence    ultimately            might     be

based."        Id.,    ¶19       (emphasis    added).         Based       on    § 973.155's

perceived purpose, and with a brief nod to the rule of lenity,

the court concluded it does permit credit for dismissed and

read-in offenses.          Id., ¶¶31-32.

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    ¶57     Floyd made several important errors, and the majority

compounds those errors by applying it today.                        Most importantly,

Floyd skipped the essential work of attempting to find meaning

in the statute and summarily declaring it                          ambiguous.        "[A]n

offense for which the offender is ultimately sentenced" is clear

as day:    a sentence which is imposed for that offense.                              Wis.

Stat. § 973.155(1)(a).            It is elementary that a court has no

ability to impose a sentence unattached to any offense for which

the court found the defendant guilty.                     Absent any independent

conviction,    a    defendant      cannot       be    sentenced       for    a    read-in

charge.    As Floyd recognized, but apparently disregarded, "[a]n

offender does not run the risk of consecutive or concurrent

sentences based on read-in charges and, in that respect, is not

formally sentenced on these charges."                  Id., ¶26.          It is simply

not the case that considering the defendant's conduct at the

sentencing     stage      means    the     sentence     was        imposed     for    that

conduct.     That has never been the law.                    Austin v. State, 49

Wis. 2d 727,    732,      183     N.W.2d 56      (1971)      ("Under        our   read-in
procedure,    the   defendant       does      not    plead    to    any     charges    and

therefore is not sentenced on any of the read-in charges but

such admitted uncharged offenses are considered in sentencing

him on the charged offense.") (also referencing "[t]he English

practice of 'taking into account' [which] allowed consideration

of uncharged offenses at the request of the accused and, like

the Wisconsin practice, there was no conviction in respect to

such offenses"); cf. Witte v. United States, 515 U.S. 389, 399
(1995)    ("[U]se    of    evidence      of     related      criminal        conduct    to

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enhance a defendant's sentence for a separate crime within the

authorized statutory limits does not constitute punishment for

that       conduct      within     the   meaning            of    the     Double      Jeopardy

Clause.").

       58        Second,   Floyd    applied       credit         to    offenses      that   were

neither connected to any custody nor part of the same course of

conduct          as     offenses     that       were         connected         to     custody.

Understandably, the defendant in Floyd did not ask for credit

toward his sentence for the read-in charge; he was not sentenced

for a read-in charge, so no such sentence existed.                                  He instead

asked for credit toward his sentence for reckless endangerment.

Because      Floyd      concluded    the     defendant           should       receive   credit

based       on    the    read-in    charges,          but    there       was    no    sentence

accompanying those read-in charges, the court applied the credit

anywhere         it   could.       The   only     option         was    the    sentence     for

reckless         endangerment      because      the    defendant         already      received

credit toward his sentence for bail jumping.                             But the defendant

was never in custody in connection with the conduct underlying
the reckless endangerment charge.                       He posted bail after his

initial arrest, meaning he was not in custody.                                  Nor was the

conduct underlying the reckless endangerment charge part of the

course of conduct forming the basis for his later custody——

felony bail jumping.6

       Floyd correctly concluded the same, characterizing the
       6

connection between the reckless endangerment and bail jumping
offenses as procedural rather than factual.      State v. Floyd,
2000 WI 14, ¶¶14-17, 232 Wis. 2d 767, 606 N.W.2d 155.

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                                                                       No.   2021AP462-CR.akz

       ¶59    In     short,      Wis.      Stat.        § 973.155(1)(a)        entitles        a

convicted offender to credit "for all days spent in custody in

connection with the course of conduct for which sentence was

imposed."           "[T]wo     conditions         must    be     met   in     order    for    a

defendant to receive sentence credit:                          (1) the defendant must

have been 'in custody' for the period in question; and (2) the

period   'in        custody'    must       have    been    'in    connection         with    the

course       of    conduct     for      which      the     sentence      was       imposed.'"

Thorson,           274      Wis. 2d 1,            ¶15      (quoting           Wis.         Stat.

§ 973.155(1)(a)).            Contrary to the statute, Floyd required that

sentence credit be granted toward the defendant's sentence for

reckless endangerment even though the defendant's custody was

not "in connection with the course of conduct for which the

sentence was imposed."            In this case, blindly and unquestionably

applying      Floyd,     as    the     majority         does,    results      in   Fermanich

receiving credit toward his sentence based on a period spent in

custody that has no connection to that sentence.                             Floyd mandates

that sentence credit be awarded in a manner directly at odds
with the statutory text, and it must be overruled to restore

clarity,          consistency,       and     sensibility          to    sentence       credit

determinations.

                                     IV.    CONCLUSION

       ¶60    Wisconsin Stat. § 973.155(1) sets forth a simple and

understandable method for granting defendants sentence credit

for time served.             If an offender was in custody in connection

with   the        conduct     underlying      the       offense    for       which    he    was
ultimately sentenced, then the offender receives credit for that

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time spent in custody.          Floyd upended this system by granting

credit   based    on   offenses   for    which   a   defendant     was   neither

convicted   nor    sentenced,     and   applying     that   credit     toward   a

sentence disconnected from any time spent in custody.                    Because

the majority's decision to adhere to this erroneous precedent

completely strays from clear statutory language, I respectfully

dissent.

    ¶61     I am authorized to state that Justice REBECCA GRASSL

BRADLEY joins this dissent.

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