Court Opinion

ID: 9748349
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:00:25.097637+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:34.596120
License: Public Domain

DANIEL E. SCOTT, Chief Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent for several reasons, but I will focus on two for brevity.

Facts Underlying the Court’s Analysis

The principal opinion builds its analysis largely upon these observations and statements from its “Factual and Procedural Background” section:
• Claimant “was usually on her feet approximately fifty percent of the time she spent outside of work.”
*470• “Prior to the accident, Claimant had never had any problems with her right foot.”
• “After the injury, Claimant was diagnosed with chronic tendonitis of the peroneal tendon, which was caused in part by calcifications in the tendons of her foot.”
• “[Cjhronic tendonitis is consistent with prolonged walking over a period of time.”
• “[A] person who develops tendonitis usually has an abnormal foot motion or walking pattern over a prolonged period of time.”
• “[Bjecause Claimant had calcium on her tendon, the act of walking could cause the bone to break and result in inflammation of the tendon or tendonitis.”
It is important to note that the Commission did not find any of the above. Whether Claimant had a tendon condition, its cause or effect, or the relationship of any of these to Claimant’s injury are not discussed or even mentioned in the award. Further, even if Claimant had tendonitis, no medical evidence of record purported to link it to her working conditions or walking at work.
Since the Commission did not find that Claimant had tendonitis, or its cause, or link those to her work,1 or even discuss such issues or evidence, I do not think this court can make its own findings, even if some evidence might support them,2 then use those as a basis to reverse the Commission. See § 287.495.

Miller

“The question we must consider,” according to the principal opinion, “is whether Claimant’s injury came ‘from a hazard or risk unrelated to the employment to which workers would have been equally exposed outside of and unrelated to the employment in normal nonemployment life.’ ” I think our supreme court answered this in Miller v. Missouri Highway and Trans. Com’n, 287 S.W.3d 671, 672-74 (Mo. banc 2009), a case that specifically considered the intent and effect of current § 287.020 with respect to walking at work:
The meaning of these provisions is unambiguous. An injury will not be deemed to arise out of employment if it merely happened to occqr while working but work was not a prevailing factor and the risk involved — here, walking — is one to which the worker would have been exposed equally in normal non-employment life.
Id. at 674. The principal opinion claims to distinguish Miller because “the risk to Claimant was not mere walking, but was instead the risk of tendonitis due to prolonged walking.... The extent of time Claimant was on her feet in the present case is important because her injury was caused by prolonged walking over a period of time.”
Again, the problem is that the Commission made no such findings; these are findings made by this court on appeal. For that matter, the following excerpts from the principal opinion’s “two-step analysis” show that it suffers from the same flaw:
A worker’s activity can provide the nexus needed to show an injury came *471from a hazard or risk related to employment. The risk or hazard to which Claimant was exposed due to her employment was the development of brittle bones in her foot due to tendonitis, which in turn was caused by the prolonged walking required by her job duties.
... [T]he twisting of the ankle shattered the calcified bone which had developed by excess walking at her workplace. Had Claimant not been exposed to the excess walking, as her job required, Claimant would not have sustained the injury.
What the Commission did find, by contrast and after declaring Claimant’s testimony not credible in part, was that Claimant suffered “a pedestrian stumble that could have happened anywhere, anytime, to any person.” This finding is supported by the record, and thus binding on this court, bringing Miller right back into focus:
The injury here did not occur because Mr. Miller fell due to some condition of his employment. He does not allege that his injuries were worsened due to some condition of his employment or due to being in an unsafe location due to his employment. He was walking on an even road surface when his knee happened to pop. Nothing about work caused it to do so. The injury arose during the course of employment, but did not arise out of employment. Under sections 287.020.2, .3 and .10 as currently in force, that is insufficient.
Miller, 287 S.W.3d at 674.
My basic complaint is that the principal opinion relies on facts found by this court, not by the Commission.

. Possible causes, per medical testimony in the record, included a predisposition because Claimant has an extra bone in her foot.

. It is the Commission, not this court, who is to weigh the evidence, find the facts, and in doing so is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented. See Hartle v. Ozark Cable Contracting, 291 S.W.3d 814, 815 (Mo.App.2009).