Court Opinion

ID: 9479080
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-05 07:07:54.250256+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:46:49.126721
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Circuit Judge,
dissenting.
The majority today concludes that the imposition by FERC of a condition limiting the terms of certain certificates of public convenience and necessity granted to FGT constitutes arbitrary and capricious action on the part of FERC. Persuaded that, by so concluding, the majority is effectively substituting its judgment in this area for that of FERC, I respectfully dissent.
Initially, it should be noted that this Court has previously said that “[a]ny attack on a condition in a certificate issued by the Commission must confront the well-established principle that generally the Commission has extremely broad authority to condition certificates of public convenience and necessity.” Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corporation v. FERC, 589 F.2d 186, 190 (5th Cir.1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915, 100 S.Ct. 1275, 63 L.Ed.2d 599 (1980) (emphasis added). Accordingly, in deference to the extremely broad authority of FERC in this area, this Court, in reviewing a decision of FERC to impose a condition on a certificate of public convenience, will affirm that decision unless the action of FERC is arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with the law.
Even further, and as recognized by the majority, in imposing such conditions, FERC may invoke rules of general application in individual cases. Shell Oil Company v. FERC, 707 F.2d 230, 234-35 (5th Cir.1983). The majority, however, states that “due process requires that affected parties be allowed to challenge the basis of the [general] rule,” and that “FERC must be able to substantiate the general rule.” The majority then concludes that FERC has failed to so justify the general rule applied to FGT in the instant case. It is this writer’s view, however, that the majority errs in reaching the above conclusion as FERC has indeed substantiated the general rule applied to FGT; in fact, it is this writer’s view that the majority merely disagrees with the justification advanced by *46FERC for its implementation and application of the general rule.
Specifically, FERC justifies its blanket policy of imposing one year durational terms on certificates of public convenience and necessity on the basis of its concern to assure nondiscriminatory access to transportation. As articulated by FERC in its order affirming the orders of the Director in the instant case,
This policy is based on our concern about the potential for undue discrimination in proposals to certificate individual transportation arrangements under section 7(c) of the [NGA]. It is also based on the fact that the industry is currently in a transition period pending ultimate implementation of the blanket transportation policies adopted in Order Nos. 436 and 500.
41 F.E.R.C. ¶ 61,267, 61,681 (1988) (footnote omitted).
Despite the attempts by the majority to distinguish it, the case recently decided by the D.C. Circuit, New Jersey Zinc Company v. FERC, 843 F.2d 1497 (D.C.Cir.1988), is persuasive in this area. In New Jersey Zinc, the D.C. Circuit addressed and upheld this samé identical justification by FERC for the imposition of a one-year durational term on a certificate of public convenience and necessity pursuant to a rule of general, not individual, application. The D.C. Circuit stated that, “[t]he decision to review individual certificates periodically is reasonably related to FERC’s concern to assure nondiscriminatory access to transportation.” The Circuit then went on to say that, “fa]s to the precise interval selected, we have no cause to second guess the Commission’s expert judgment, and we recognize that on questions of this order, ‘a certain amount of arbitrariness goes with the territory.’ ” New Jersey Zinc, 843 F.2d at 1501 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). We likewise should not second guess FERC’s experienced and reasoned judgment in this area.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from the majority’s opinion which does no more than effectively substitute its preferred view for the “expert judgment” of FERC.