Court Opinion

ID: 9945872
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-28 18:01:10.278991+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:22:17.101800
License: Public Domain

Appellate Case: 23-9502       Document: 010111006640   Date Filed: 02/28/2024   Page: 1
                                                                               FILED
                                                                   United States Court of Appeals
                                                                           Tenth Circuit
                                             PUBLISH
                                                                        February 28, 2024
                     UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                                                       Christopher M. Wolpert
                             FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                         Clerk of Court
                           _________________________________

  CORESLAB STRUCTURES
  (TULSA), INC.,

         Petitioner/Cross Respondent,

  v.                                                   Nos. 23-9502, 23-9505

  NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
  BOARD,

         Respondent/Cross Petitioner.

  ----------------------------------------
  INTERNATIONAL UNION OF
  OPERATING ENGINEERS,
  LOCAL 627, AFL-CIO,

         Intervenor.
                           _________________________________

                  Petition for Review and Cross-Application
                      for Enforcement of an Order of the
                        National Labor Relations Board
                   (NLRB Nos. 14-CA-248354, 14-CA-248812)
                        _________________________________

 Christopher C. Murray of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. of
 Indianapolis, Indiana (Daniel A. Adlong and Henry Bryce Farrington of
 Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C. of Costa Mesa, California,
 with him on the briefs), for Petitioner/Cross Respondent.

 Joel Heller (Elizabeth A. Heany, Ruth E. Burdick, Jennifer A. Abruzzo, Peter
 Sung Ohr, and David Habenstreit with him on the briefs) of the National
 Labor Relations Board, Washington, D.C., for Respondent/Cross Petitioner.
Appellate Case: 23-9502   Document: 010111006640    Date Filed: 02/28/2024   Page: 2

 Steven R. Hickman of Fraiser, Fraiser & Hickman, LLP of Tulsa, Oklahoma,
 for Intervenor.
                    _________________________________

 Before HARTZ, TYMKOVICH, and ROSSMAN, Circuit Judges.
                  _________________________________

 ROSSMAN, Circuit Judge.
                  _________________________________

       Coreslab Structures petitions for review of a National Labor Relations

 Board decision finding it violated several provisions of the National Labor

 Relations Act. Exercising jurisdiction under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) and (f), we grant

 in part and deny in part Coreslab’s petition for review, deny the Board’s

 cross-petition for enforcement, and remand to the Board for further

 proceedings.

                                        I

                                        A

       Coreslab produces bridge components and other structural materials

 at its facility in Tulsa, Oklahoma.1 From 2004 until 2019, Coreslab

 recognized the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 627,

 AFL-CIO (the Union) as the bargaining representative of the company’s

 production and maintenance employees.

       1 We draw these facts from the Board’s order. We address Coreslab’s

 challenges to these findings in Section II.
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       Coreslab and the Union executed their first collective-bargaining

 agreement in 2005. That agreement and the agreements that followed

 required Coreslab to make pension contributions to a Central Pension Fund.

 Under Article XVI of the collective-bargaining agreement at issue here,

 Coreslab had to pay a certain amount into the Central Pension Fund for “all

 hours worked” by unit employees.

       But beginning in 2011, Coreslab made pension contributions only for

 hours worked by unit employees who were members of the Union—about

 twenty-five percent of the total of unit employees. In lieu of pension

 contribution payments, Coreslab provided annual profit-sharing payments

 to non-Union bargaining unit employees. These profit-sharing payments

 were not included in the collective-bargaining agreements. Nor were they

 provided to Union employees. Some Union-member employees, including

 Union    steward    Floyd    Prince,   became     aware   of   this   dual-track

 pension/profit-sharing system as early as 2011. But Coreslab did not inform

 Union President Jason Evans, Union Business Manager Michael Stark, or

 the two business agents who helped Mr. Evans negotiate the 2015-2019

 agreement, until 2019.

       In March 2019, Coreslab received notice from the Central Pension

 Fund that the Fund would conduct a random compliance audit for

 Coreslab’s pension contributions over the past three years. Eventually, that

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 audit revealed Coreslab underpaid the Fund by roughly $120,000 during

 the 2016 to 2018 period. This underpayment, the audit determined, was due

 to the exclusion since 2011 of hours worked by non-Union bargaining unit

 employees from Coreslab’s calculations of its obligations to the Fund. The

 audit results became available to Coreslab in mid-July 2019. Shortly after,

 the company informed the Union of the audit’s basic conclusion—Coreslab

 owed the Central Pension Fund money—but it did not tell the Union how

 much money was owed or the cause of underpayment.

       In a separate July incident, Mr. Evans was speaking with a new hire

 in the Coreslab facility’s breakroom. While not yet a permanent employee,

 the new hire was signing an authorization for Union representation. A plant

 manager, Danny Johnson, interrupted their conversation, and directed the

 new hire not to speak with the Union. Mr. Johnson apparently believed

 temporary employees had no right to speak to the Union; Mr. Evans

 explained “that wasn’t the law, and . . . wasn’t the way it worked.” AR.136.

 After this brief exchange, both the new hire and Mr. Johnson left the

 breakroom.

       Since April 2019, meanwhile, Mr. Evans had been attempting to

 schedule bargaining sessions with Coreslab general manager Neil Drews to

 negotiate a successor collective-bargaining agreement. Mr. Drews cancelled

 further meetings after a brief session in the spring, and delayed bargaining

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 in response to at least six requests from Mr. Evans during the early summer

 of 2019. The parties finally met in late July 2019, when Coreslab proposed

 the cessation of the pension benefit program. The company did not inform

 Mr. Evans that Coreslab had already terminated its pension payments for

 non-Union employees.

       To provide employees with Coreslab’s view of the flagging bargaining

 efforts, Mr. Drews met with company employees in late August. He

 mentioned the audit results and shared his view that one impediment to

 progress was the audit’s conclusion the company owed money. “Any money

 that the company may owe,” Mr. Drews warned, would “be paid to the

 pension fund and not the employees.” AR.1626. If the employees were not

 Union members, he continued, they would receive no benefit from the

 “extra” contribution the company was being forced to make, AR.1626, and

 they would “be forfeiting the profit sharing” payments, AR.1640.

       At the third bargaining session on September 6, 2019, Mr. Drews told

 Mr. Evans for the first time that Coreslab had not been making pension

 contributions to the Central Pension Fund for non-Union bargaining unit

 members. Instead, non-Union employees were permitted to participate in a

 profit-sharing plan. Shortly after the meeting, the Union requested

 information about Coreslab’s profit-sharing plan; Coreslab declined to

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 provide some of the requested information, including the 401(k) plan

 prospectus and the calculation bases for profit-sharing eligibility.

       On September 11, Mr. Drews received a disaffection petition signed

 by 18 of the 26 bargaining-unit employees. The petition indicated the

 undersigned employees no longer wished to be represented by the Union.

       The next day, Mr. Drews withdrew tentative agreements reached

 during the three bargaining sessions. Mr. Drews rejected an additional

 information request from the Union received on September 16 about the

 company’s 401(k) and profit-sharing plans. He explained that information

 was not relevant because it only concerned plans “taken off the table . . . on

 . . . September 12, 2019.” AR.1626.

       Disaffection petition in hand, Mr. Drews informed the Union on

 September 24 that Coreslab would be withdrawing its recognition when the

 current collective-bargaining agreement expired on September 30, 2019.

 Mr. Drews refused requests for further bargaining sessions, and Coreslab

 ceased recognizing the Union on October 1.

                                       B

       The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., protects the

 right of employees “to bargain collectively through representatives of their

 own choosing.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. Section 8 of the Act makes unlawful a

 number of unfair labor practices. Among them, employers may not

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 “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees” in the exercise of protected

 rights, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), discriminate “in regard to . . . any term or

 condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any

 labor organization,” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), or “refuse to bargain collectively

 with the” employee representatives, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). To effect these

 rights, the National Labor Relations Board “is empowered . . . to prevent

 any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice . . . affecting

 commerce,” 29 U.S.C. § 160(a), after the filing of a charge and investigation

 by the Board and its agents, 29 U.S.C. § 160(b).

                                       C

       Based on charges filed by the Union, the General Counsel of the NLRB

 issued a complaint against Coreslab. He alleged the company’s conduct

 constituted unfair labor practices under three provisions of the Act.

 Coreslab, the General Counsel urged, violated 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) by:

 unilaterally modifying its agreements with the Union, failing to make

 pension contributions required by the collective-bargaining agreement,

 initiating a profit-sharing payment program for non-Union employees,

 ceasing all pension fund contributions after the 2015–2019 agreement

 expired, failing to bargain with the Union in good faith, and withdrawing

 recognition of the Union. He alleged Coreslab discriminated between Union

 and non-Union employees by providing profit-sharing payments to the

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 latter and not the former, in violation of § 158(a)(3). And he identified as

 violative of § 158(a)(1) Mr. Johnson’s direction to an employee not to speak

 with the Union.

       In February 2021, the administrative law judge (ALJ) assigned to the

 case largely agreed with the General Counsel and found Coreslab violated

 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), and (5).

        That decision was upheld, in relevant part,2 by the Board.

       First, the Board rejected Coreslab’s contention the Union had actual

 or constructive knowledge of the disparate compensation plans. AR.1621.

 While the Board refused the ALJ’s characterization of the pension and

 profit-sharing plans as “secret” or “covert,” AR.1621 n.7, it declined to

       2 While the Board and the ALJ agreed the Union lacked knowledge of

 the pension and profit-sharing plans, the Board pointedly did “not rely on
 the [ALJ’s] characterization of [Coreslab’s] unlawful pension and profit-
 sharing conduct as ‘secret’ and ‘covert.’” AR.1621 n.7.

       Coreslab makes much of this disagreement in its petition for review,
 insisting it “demonstrat[es] a lack of substantial evidence.” Opening Br.
 at 15. If Coreslab means this disagreement is part of the complete record on
 review, it is, of course, correct. But if Coreslab intends to suggest
 contradictory findings between the Board and an ALJ indicate a lack of
 substantial evidence per se, we reject that contention. Our “standard of
 review is not altered when the ALJ and the Board reach contrary
 conclusions.” Medite of N.M., Inc. v. NLRB, 72 F.3d 780, 785 (10th Cir. 1995)
 (quoting Harberson v. NLRB, 810 F.2d 977, 983 (10th Cir. 1987)). The
 record, however, will include the ALJ’s findings, “whether they contradict
 or support the Board’s determination.” Id.

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 impute Mr. Prince’s knowledge of the plans to the Union itself (as required

 by Coreslab’s actual-knowledge argument) or to find Mr. Evans had failed

 to exercise basic diligence that would have revealed Coreslab’s actions (as

 required by Coreslab’s constructive-knowledge argument), AR.1621–23.3

       On the merits, the Board found Coreslab violated § 158(a)(1) when

 Mr.   Johnson     prohibited   an   employee   from   speaking    with     Union

 representatives during non-working hours in a non-working area. It

 concluded Coreslab violated § 158(a)(3) by “discriminatorily failing to make

 pension contributions on behalf of unit employees because they were not

 members of the Union,” and, conversely, “discriminatorily excluding unit

 employees who were members of the Union from [the company’s] profit-

 sharing plan because of their membership in the Union.” AR.1629–30.

 Failing to make pension contributions and adding the profit-sharing

       3 Board Member Ring dissented from this portion of the Board’s
 decision. Member Ring would have held Mr. Prince’s knowledge of the
 alternative compensation scheme—and Coreslab’s apparently open practice
 of the profit-sharing program—gave the Union actual knowledge of
 Coreslab’s benefits practices. Member Ring also concluded the Union had
 constructive knowledge, based on the practice’s longevity, and its
 implication of a “a key economic term of the collective-bargaining
 agreement.” AR.1635. Based on this reasoning, Member Ring dissented
 from the majority’s conclusion Coreslab “violated [§ 158(a)(5)] by modifying
 the 2015-2019 collective-bargaining agreement and by unilaterally
 implementing profit-sharing payments.” AR.1636.
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  program, the Board determined, were also unlawful, unilateral contract

  modifications barred under § 158(a)(5).

        The Board further concluded Coreslab had violated § 158(a)(5) “by

  failing and refusing to furnish the Union with requested relevant

  information,” “failing and refusing to bargain in good faith with the Union,”

  “withdrawing recognition from the Union” based on a tainted disaffection

  petition, and ceasing pension contributions for all unit employees after

  September 30, 2019. AR.1630.

        To remedy these violations, the Board required Coreslab to make

  pension contributions for all unit employees, regardless of Union status,

  and to include Union members within the profit-sharing program. The

  company was ordered to “[m]ake all delinquent payments to the Central

  Pension Fund,” and to “[m]ake all current and former unit employees who

  were excluded from [Coreslab’s] profit-sharing plan . . . whole for any loss

  of earnings and other benefits.” AR.1632. The Board directed Coreslab to

  provide these make-whole remedies “without an offset for the benefits [the

  employees] were already receiving.” AR.1630 n.32, 1632. Coreslab also was

  ordered to re-recognize the Union, provide it with the information needed

  as “collective-bargaining representative of [Coreslab’s] unit employees,”

  and bargain for a successor agreement in good faith. AR.1632. And

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  unilateral changes, like the profit-sharing program, were to be rescinded

  “[o]n request by the Union.” AR.1632.

                                        II

        Coreslab assails the Board’s unfair-labor-practice findings on

  multiple fronts. It argues the profit-sharing plan was implemented openly

  and without anti-union animus. It maintains it did not violate the Act “by

  failing to make pension contributions for unit employees who were not

  Union members and excluding those who were Union members from its

  profit-sharing plan.” Opening Br. at 32. The company claims there was

  nothing unlawful about Mr. Johnson’s interruption of a representative-

  employee meeting and his instruction to the worker not to speak with the

  Union. And Coreslab insists it neither failed to bargain with the Union in

  good faith nor unlawfully withdrew recognition from the Union.

        We conclude the Board’s findings regarding Coreslab’s violations of

  the Act are “the product of reasoned decisionmaking.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs.

  Ass’n of U.S. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 52 (1983).

  Under these circumstances, the Board’s conclusions will be upheld unless

  they have “no rational basis or [are] unsupported by substantial evidence.”

  United Steelworkers of Am., Loc. 14534 v. NLRB, 983 F.2d 240, 244 (D.C.

  Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). As we explain, we discern no reason to

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  overturn the Board’s judgment, and reject Coreslab’s petition in this

  respect.

                                        A

        Our review of the Board’s decisions on the merits is deferential, and

  the scope of our inquiry limited. NLRB v. Interstate Builders, Inc., 351 F.3d

  1020, 1028 (10th Cir. 2003) (describing scope of review as “quite narrow”).

  We will not re-weigh the evidence or second guess the Board’s factual

  inferences. NLRB v. Velocity Exp., Inc., 434 F.3d 1198, 1201 (10th Cir.

  2006). Instead, “we review only to ensure the NLRB acted within reasonable

  bounds and substantial evidence supports the order.” Id.; see 29 U.S.C.

  § 160(e) (“The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if

  supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall

  be conclusive.”). Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a

  reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

  Interstate Builders, 351 F.3d at 1027–28.

        “Although we ordinarily review questions of law de novo, the Board’s

  construction of the National Labor Relations Act is entitled to considerable

  deference.” NLRB v. Okla. Fixture Co., 79 F.3d 1030, 1033 (10th Cir. 1996).

  “For the Board to prevail, it need not show that its construction is the best

  way to read the statute; rather, courts must respect the Board’s judgment

  so long as its reading is a reasonable one.” Holly Farms Corp. v. NLRB, 517

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  U.S. 392, 409 (1996). It is not for this court to “displace the Board’s choice

  between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably

  have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.”

  Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488 (1951).

                                        B

        First, we review the Board’s conclusions that Coreslab’s selective

  profit-sharing payments and its failure to make pension fund contributions

  violated the Act. Recall, the Board found (1) the Union lacked knowledge of

  the company’s unilateral addition of profit-sharing and failure to make

  pension   fund    contributions   until    2019,   and   (2)   these   dual-track

  compensation systems discriminated based on Union membership status.

        The Act generally bars “discrimination in regard to . . . any term or

  condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any

  labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3). Employer conduct which

  “discriminates solely on the basis of union status” will fall within the Act’s

  ambit. Metro. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 460 U.S. 693, 702 (1983). The Act

  proscribes the refusal to bargain collectively with union representatives.

  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). “[A]n employer’s unilateral change in conditions of

  employment . . . is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which frustrates

  the objectives of [§ 158(a)(5)] much as does a flat refusal.” NLRB v. Katz,

  369 U.S. 736, 743 (1962).

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                                        1

        Coreslab contends there can be no violation of either § 158(a)(3) or

  (a)(5) here because the Union had known about the dual-track

  compensation scheme since 2005. The Union, Coreslab argues, had actual

  knowledge of the disparate pension and profit-sharing plans based on Mr.

  Prince’s status as a Union steward. And even if not, the Union had

  constructive knowledge of the practices because it could have discovered the

  violations through the exercise of “reasonable diligence.” Opening Br. at 26.

        Coreslab’s actual-knowledge argument rests on the existence of an

  alleged principal-agent relationship between the Union and Mr. Prince. The

  Board’s agency determination looks to common-law agency principles.

  Mar-Jam Supply Co., 337 NLRB 337, 337 (2001). At common law, an agency

  relationship may be found where an individual has actual authority or

  apparent authority to act on behalf of another. Id. In either scenario, the

  agency relationship must encompass the “specific conduct” at issue. In re

  Cornell Forge Co., 339 NLRB 733, 733 (2003).

        As the party asserting the existence of an agency relationship,

  Coreslab has the burden of establishing its existence by clear and

  convincing evidence. In re Branding Iron Motel, Inc., 798 F.2d 396, 401

  (10th Cir. 1986) (“We begin by noting that a party asserting a principal-

  agent relationship bears the burden of establishing its existence by ‘clear

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  and satisfactory evidence.’” (citation omitted)). Coreslab could make this

  showing by demonstrating Mr. Prince’s actual or apparent authority to act

  in lieu of the Union. See Alfaro-Huitron v. Cervantes Agribusiness, 982 F.3d

  1242, 1251 (10th Cir. 2020).

        Actual authority requires the agent’s “reasonabl[e] belie[f], in

  accordance with the principal’s manifestations to the agent, that the

  principal wishes the agent to so act.” Id. (quoting Restatement (Third) of

  Agency § 2.01). Apparent authority turns on a third party’s reasonable

  belief that the agent “has authority to act on behalf of the principal and that

  belief is traceable to the principal’s manifestations.” Id. (quoting

  Restatement (Third) of Agency § 2.03); see also In re Pan-Oston Co.,

  336 NLRB 305, 305–06 (2001) (“Apparent authority results from a

  manifestation by the principal to a third party that creates a reasonable

  belief that the principal has authorized the alleged agent to perform the

  acts in question. Either the principal must intend to cause the third person

  to believe the agent is authorized to act for him, or the principal should

  realize that its conduct is likely to create such a belief.” (citation omitted)).

        Whatever the agency relationship asserted, Coreslab must show

  Mr. Prince’s agency encompassed the specific conduct—notice and consent

  to agreement modifications—at issue here. Pan-Oston Co., 336 NLRB at 306

  (“We emphasize that an employee may be an agent of the employer for one

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  purpose but not another.”). Here, then, Mr. Prince’s actual authority would

  come from the Union’s express representation to Mr. Prince that he had the

  authority to consent to changes in the collective bargaining agreement. His

  apparent authority would follow from any representations made by the

  Union to Coreslab that Mr. Prince could consent to changes to the

  agreement.

        Both arguments falter on the factual record before us. Mr. Evans, not

  Mr. Prince, was the designated point of contact for issues involving the

  terms of the collective-bargaining agreement. Mr. Evans and Mr. Prince

  confirmed Mr. Prince did not discuss the inclusion, modification, or

  omission of agreement terms. The Union never held out Mr. Prince as

  having authority to approve or decline changes to the collective-bargaining

  agreement. And the record indicates Mr. Drews addressed substantive

  matters about the collective-bargaining agreement with Mr. Evans—and

  Mr. Evans only. While the record suggests Mr. Prince attended at least one

  negotiating session, he apparently never spoke at the bargaining table. The

  company has provided no reason to think Mr. Prince’s “mute presence” at

  these sessions generated actual or apparent authority, particularly given

  the “long-established channels of communication for bargaining matters”

  between Coreslab’s management and Mr. Evans. AR.1622 & n.10.

  Substantial evidence supports the Board’s reasoning, and we will not

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  displace the Board’s finding Mr. Prince was not an “agent” of the Union “in

  this particular respect.” AR.1622.

        Still, Coreslab maintains the Union had constructive knowledge, even

  if it lacked actual knowledge. As a general matter, “the law will sometimes

  impute knowledge . . . to a person who fails to learn something that a

  reasonably diligent person would have learned.” Intel Corp. Inv. Policy

  Comm. v. Sulyma, 140 S. Ct. 768, 776 (2020). The Board and parties relied

  on Moeller Bros. Body Shop, 306 NLRB 191 (1992), to help identify the

  bounds of what “reasonable diligence” means in the labor-relations context.

        Moeller Bros. involved an employer’s failure to abide by union-

  security provisions and pay certain benefits and contractually required

  wages. There, the Board rejected claims of violations which occurred before

  the sixth-month limitations period in 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) based on union

  officials’ failure to exercise reasonable diligence.

        Had the Union made even a minimal effort to monitor the
        Respondent’s facility since 1983, it should have become aware
        of the Respondent’s policy of hiring prejourneymen at
        individually negotiated pay rates, without making fringe benefit
        payments on their behalf. Mere observation would have put the
        Union on notice that the number of unit employees was at least
        double the number reported on the Respondent’s fringe benefit
        forms. The Union rarely visited the Respondent’s operation
        however, never appointed a shop steward, . . . and never took
        any measures to enforce the union-security provisions of the
        contract.

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  306 NLRB at 192. “[A] union is not required to aggressively police its

  contracts,” the Board explained, but “it cannot with impu[]nity ignore an

  employer or a unit . . . and then rely on its ignorance of events . . . to argue

  that it was not on notice of an employer’s” unfair labor practices. Id. at 193.

        We agree with this general proposition from Moeller Bros. But we also

  agree with the Board majority’s holding “the facts of that case are clearly

  distinguishable” from those before us. AR.1623. To be sure, we share some

  of Member Ring’s alarm that Coreslab’s basic compensation practices

  apparently escaped Mr. Evans’s attention for well over a decade. But “[o]ur

  job isn’t to make the call ourselves, . . . only to ask whether a reasonable

  mind could have made the call the NLRB made.” Laborers’ Int’l Union of

  N. Am., Loc. 578 v. NLRB, 594 F.3d 732, 734 (10th Cir. 2010).

        Like the Board majority, we cannot ascribe Mr. Evans’s dilatory

  awareness of these changes to the lack of “reasonable diligence” described

  in Moeller Bros. 306 NLRB at 192. Unlike the officials in Moeller Bros.,

  Mr. Evans frequented the Coreslab facility and interacted with employees

  there. Unlike the unfair labor practices at issues in Moeller Bros., the profit-

  sharing and pension fund violations were not literally visible. And where

  the employer in Moeller Bros. provided regular reports that did not match

  the facts—e.g., by misstating the number of employees working at any given

  time—Coreslab has identified nothing the company or the Fund provided to

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  the Union that could have placed Mr. Evans on notice of the violative

  compensation practices.

        The Board’s conclusion that the Union lacked knowledge of the

  pension contribution/profit-sharing scheme until Coreslab informed Mr.

  Evans on September 6, 2019 is supported by substantial evidence.4

        4 On appeal, Coreslab argues the Board erred in finding the company’s

  § 10(b) limitations argument waived. We need not reach this argument.
  Even if Coreslab properly raised this defense before the agency and the
  Board was wrong to conclude otherwise, the defense would be unavailing
  based on the panel’s resolution of the notice/knowledge issues.

        As discussed, Mr. Prince had no agency to bind the Union to a
  modification of the collective bargaining agreement. Whether notice to
  Mr. Prince could have constituted notice to the Union may be a closer
  question, however. Ordinarily, the Union steward is the agent through
  which a Union learns of breaches. But on the record before us—which
  involves breach of contractual provisions governing compensation practices,
  not the sort of day-to-day work of employees—we conclude the Board could
  reasonably find Mr. Prince was not an agent for notice of this breach.

        We thus agree with the Board the Union lacked knowledge of the
  violations until September 2019, so the six-month clock in § 10(b) would not
  begin to run until that time. See, e.g., Esmark, Inc. v. NLRB, 887 F.2d 739,
  746 (7th Cir. 1989) (“The 10(b) period begins when the victim of an unfair
  labor practice receives unequivocal notice of a final adverse decision.
  Rumors or suspicions will not do; nor is it relevant when an unlawful
  decision was actually made, if the decision was not communicated to the
  affected party until later. . . . The 10(b) period does not commence until an
  aggrieved party has knowledge of the facts necessary to support a present,
  ripe, unfair labor practice charge.”).
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                                        2

        Coreslab next contends the Board erred in concluding its withholding

  of pension contributions and its provision of profit-sharing payments to

  non-Union employees violated the Act. We disagree.

        Recall, an employer violates 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) if it “discriminat[es]

  in regard to . . . any term or condition of employment to encourage or

  discourage membership in any labor organization.” Here, Coreslab provided

  profit-sharing payments to non-Union members. It did not provide

  profit-sharing payments to Union members. Regardless of why it initiated

  this dual-track compensation scheme, Coreslab has not otherwise argued

  the provision and denial of this benefit turned on any other basis beyond

  Union membership. Accordingly, substantial evidence supports the Board’s

  conclusions Coreslab withheld benefits “solely on the basis of union status,”

  Metro. Edison Co., 460 U.S. at 702, and that this facially discriminatory

  distinction “bears its own indicia of intent to discourage or encourage

  membership in the Union,” AR.1625 (internal quotation marks omitted).

  See also NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26, 32 (1967)

  (explaining an employer discriminates under § 158(a)(3) by “paying accrued

  benefits to one group of employees while announcing the extinction of the

  same benefits for another group of employees who are distinguishable only

  by their participation in protected concerted activity”).

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        An employer violates 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) when it shirks its statutory

  obligation to bargain before changing the terms and conditions of

  employment settled upon in a collective-bargaining agreement. Katz,

  369 U.S. at 743 (explaining a “unilateral change in conditions of

  employment . . . is a circumvention of the duty to negotiate which

  frustrates” the Act). Here, the record confirms Coreslab did not bargain

  with the Union before it ceased making pension contributions for all hours

  worked by bargaining unit employees. This was a “unilateral change”

  encompassed by 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5).

        Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supports the Board’s

  findings of Act violations based on the refusal to make full pension

  contributions and the commencement of a profit-sharing plan that did not

  include Union members.

                                         C

        Coreslab also argues it did not violate the Act by telling a worker he

  could not speak with Union officials. We discern no error in the Board’s

  finding to the contrary.

        The Act prohibits an employer’s interference with, restraint, or

  coercion of employees in the exercise of guaranteed rights. 29 U.S.C.

  § 158(a)(1). To be liable under § 158(a)(1), an employer need not actually

  succeed in infringing an employee’s rights. Rather, “[t]he test is . . . whether

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  the employer engaged in conduct which reasonably tends to interfere with,

  restrain or coerce employees in the free exercise of their rights.” Lear

  Siegler Inc. v. NLRB, 890 F.2d 1573, 1580 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting

  Medallion Kitchens, Inc. v. NLRB, 806 F.2d 185, 191 (8th Cir. 1986))

  (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        According to Coreslab, Mr. Johnson’s statement in the breakroom

  could not reasonably tend to interfere, restrain, or coerce protected rights

  because (1) “[t]here is no evidence that [Mr.] Johnson’s statements had any

  effect on” the individuals involved and (2) Mr. Evans was speaking to a

  temporary worker employed by a staffing service. Opening Br. at 44–45. We

  are not persuaded.

        As the Board correctly explains, whether the statement affected the

  employee is irrelevant—an employee’s “subjective response does not bear

  on the issue” because liability may lie “regardless of whether the ‘coercion

  has succeeded or failed.’” NLRB Br. at 16 (quoting Lear Siegler, 890 F.2d at

  1580). As for the employee’s temporary status as an employee of a staffing

  company, the Supreme Court has endorsed Board precedent holding an

  “‘employer’ may violate [§ 158(a)(1)] with respect to employees other than

  his own.” Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 510 n.3 (1976). On this record,

  we have no great difficulty concluding Mr. Johnson’s directive that the

  employee could not speak with Union President Evans would “reasonably

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  tend” to interfere with the employee’s right to speak to union

  representatives.

                                        D

        Next, Coreslab insists “[t]he Board erroneously found the Company

  failed to bargain with the Union in good faith for a successor agreement.”

  Opening Br. at 45.

        Recall, an employer will violate 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) by failing to

  “bargain collectively with the representatives of [its] employees” “with

  respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment.”

  29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5), (d). “Parties must bargain in good faith to comply with

  the statutory duty, but bad faith is not a necessary element for a breach of

  the duty.” Norris v. NLRB, 417 F.3d 1161, 1168 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing

  Katz, 369 U.S. at 742–43). “The employer’s duty to bargain collectively

  ‘includes a duty to provide relevant information needed by a labor union for

  the proper performance of its duties as the employees’ bargaining

  representative.’” Id. (quoting Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 303

  (1979)).

        Here, the record supports the Board’s conclusion Coreslab failed to

  bargain in good faith. Coreslab refused to meet with the Union more than

  three times over a five-month period, despite repeated requests from the

  Union. After a first meeting on April 10, 2019, Coreslab cancelled the

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  scheduled negotiation on April 19—and refused to reschedule for three

  months. On appeal, Coreslab points to the pending audit of the Central

  Pension Fund to explain its delay. But, like the Board, we are left to wonder

  “why that should halt all bargaining.” AR.1627. At the same time the

  company proposed modifying pension contributions and adding profit-

  sharing, it declined to inform the Union it had already made those changes

  unilaterally until the third, final bargaining session. And, even after

  informing Mr. Evans of the profit-sharing plan and receiving his request for

  further information about it, Coreslab refused to provide the relevant

  information requested by the Union about this plan.

        We conclude the Board’s finding of the § 158(a)(5) bargaining violation

  is amply supported by substantial evidence.

                                        E

        Finally, Coreslab argues there was nothing unlawful about its

  withdrawal of recognition from the Union. Rather, the disaffection petition

  signed by 18 of the 26 bargaining unit employees provided “objective

  evidence the Union no longer had the support of a substantial majority of

  the unit.” Opening Br. at 50. Under these circumstances, Coreslab

  maintains, the Act permits an employer to withdraw recognition.

        Coreslab is correct that a “petition expressing disaffection that is

  signed by a majority of the represented unit . . . provides reliable evidence

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  of actual loss of support.” Id. at 50; see Leggett & Platt, Inc. v. NLRB,

  988 F.3d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir. 2021). But, as the Board convincingly argues,

  that general principle is of limited force here because Coreslab cannot

  defend its withdrawal based on a disaffection petition tainted by “its own

  unfair labor practices.” NLRB Br. at 42.

        “[U]nfair labor practices which are of a character as to cause employee

  disaffection with the union, or at least have a meaningful impact in bringing

  about that disaffection, will taint a subsequent employee antiunion

  petition” and may not serve as the basis for withdrawing recognition from

  the Union. Manna Pro Partners, L.P. v. NLRB, 986 F.2d 1346, 1353 (10th

  Cir. 1993). To decide whether the unfair labor practices “are of a character

  as to . . . cause employee disaffection,” the Board weighs the four factors

  identified in Master Slack Corp., 271 NLRB 78, 84 (1984). Those facts are

  (1) the temporal proximity between the unfair labor practices and the

  withdrawal of recognition, (2) the nature of the unfair labor practices, (3)

  the tendency of the unfair labor practices to cause employee disaffection

  from the union, and (4) the effect of the unfair labor practices on unit

  employee morale, organizing, and union membership. Id.

        The Board carefully considered each factor, and we conclude

  substantial   evidence    supports   its   findings.   At   (1),   the   disparate

  compensation system was ongoing at the time of the disaffection petition.

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  At (2), the Board rightly found unilateral additions and alterations to

  compensation programs, made in disregard of the terms of the collective-

  bargaining agreement itself, will undermine employees’ perception of the

  Union’s effectiveness. Under prong (3), we agree with the Board that the

  tendency of the unfair labor practice to cause disaffection was amply

  demonstrated by Mr. Drews’s discussion with bargaining unit employees,

  who were upset to hear they might lose their profit-sharing payments and

  never benefit from the pension contributions required by the collective-

  bargaining agreement. And as to (4), that Master Slack factor is borne out

  by the facts on the ground—employees told Mr. Drews they did not join the

  Union because of the unlawful profit-sharing plan.

        The Board correctly applied Master Slack to explain why the

  disaffection petition could not render lawful the company’s withdrawal of

  recognition. Coreslab has provided no alternative to support the

  withdrawal, and we see no basis to disturb the Board’s conclusion Coreslab

  violated the Act by this action.

                                       III

        Having affirmed the Board’s findings on Coreslab’s violations of the

  Act, we turn to the company’s petition for review of the remedies selected

  by the Board for those violations. We can discern no abuse of discretion on

  most of these remedies. But we find the Board exceeded its statutory

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  authority under the Act by ordering back-payments without offset and

  requiring   Coreslab    to   retain   the   unlawfully-created   profit-sharing

  program.5

                                         A

        As a threshold matter, the Board argues we lack jurisdiction to

  consider Coreslab’s objections to the make-whole remedies because the

  company did not challenge them before the Board. Coreslab points to places

  in the record where it did contest the award of back-payment without offset,

        5 Coreslab contends the Board also abused its discretion by ordering

  the company “to recognize and bargain with the Union,” Opening Br. at 55,
  though this argument seems to disappear by the Reply Brief. In any case,
  it lacks merit. In considering the propriety of an affirmative bargaining
  order, the Board already took the extra steps required by the D.C. Circuit—
  but not our own. See NLRB v. Cmty. Health Servs., Inc., 483 F.3d 683, 688
  (10th Cir. 2007) (“We are aware that the District of Columbia Circuit
  requires the Board to adopt additional findings to support a remedial
  bargaining order. Even were we to endorse that circuit’s rule, we would find
  it satisfied here.” (citation omitted)). And it correctly addressed the impact
  of the tainted disaffection petition. See Johnson Controls, Inc., 368 NLRB
  No. 20, 2019 WL 2893706, at *9 (July 3, 2019) (explaining a “union that
  receives . . . notice of anticipatory withdrawal . . . . may file an unfair labor
  practice charge alleging . . . that the petition is tainted by serious
  unremedied labor practices”).

        In a single paragraph, Coreslab challenges “[t]he remainder of the
  Board’s remedies” as unenforceable because “the Board’s findings of various
  violations are unsupported by substantial evidence and/or arbitrary.”
  Opening Br. at 65. As we have explained, we find no error in the Board’s
  conclusion Coreslab violated the Act, and decline to disturb the Board’s
  remedies on that basis.
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  but the Board rejoins the company’s failure to move for reconsideration

  means the issue has not been preserved.

        We therefore understand the Board to identify two impediments to

  our jurisdiction. To address them and assure “ourselves that our

  jurisdiction is proper,” Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior,

  870 F.2d 1515, 1521 (10th Cir. 1989), we must first consider whether

  Coreslab    challenged—and      challenged   adequately—the       make-whole

  remedies before the Board. If so, we must still determine whether Coreslab’s

  failure to move for reconsideration of the Board’s order divests this court of

  jurisdiction to entertain those challenges on a petition for review. After

  explaining the jurisdictional color of 29 U.S.C. § 160(e)’s preservation

  requirement, we address both the Board’s contentions and conclude we have

  jurisdiction.

                                        1

        Preservation concerns6 typically bear on whether it is appropriate for

  a party to raise an argument on appeal, not on whether we have the power

        6 Confusingly, courts describe § 160(e) in terms of “exhaustion,”
  “preservation,” and “jurisdiction.” Compare Noel Canning v. NLRB,
  705 F.3d 490, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (comparing § 160(e) to other
  “jurisdictional exhaustion” provisions), with Allied Aviation Serv. Co. of
  N.J. v. NLRB, 854 F.3d 55, 62 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (referring to § 160(e)’s
  “preservation requirement”).

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  to consider it. See First W. Cap. Mgmt. Co. v. Malamed, 874 F.3d 1136, 1144

  (10th Cir. 2017) (explaining that “‘[n]ormally when a party presents a new

  argument on appeal and fails to request plain error review, we do not

  address it[,]’ [b]ut even when a party fails to preserve an issue, we retain

  ‘discretion to raise and decide issues sua sponte’ . . . because ‘[w]aiver . . .

  binds only the party, not the court’” (citations omitted)). But the terms of

  the Act itself transform preservation issues into jurisdictional questions.

  That is because, under 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), “[n]o objection that has not been

  urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be considered

  by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be

  excused because of extraordinary circumstances.” In turn, § 160(e)’s

  “objection” requirement is satisfied when “the matter the petitioner seeks

  to raise here [was] pressed before the Board with ‘sufficient specificity and

  clarity’ so the tribunal was aware it needed to be addressed and could

  become the subject of litigation in this court.” Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M. v.

  NLRB, 692 F.3d 1068, 1073 (10th Cir. 2012) (quoting Interstate Builders,

  351 F.3d at 1034 n.8). “[W]hatever else § 160(e) may be designed to do, it’s

        In Public Service Company of New Mexico v. NLRB, we explained
  § 160(e) embodies an “‘objection’ requirement,” but confirmed § 160(e)
  operates as a “true jurisdictional limit.” 692 F.3d 1068, 1073, 1076 (10th
  Cir. 2012). “[T]he language of § 160(e) speaks to the power of the reviewing
  court, a fact that distinguishes it from many non-jurisdictional
  requirements addressed only to the parties.” Id. at 1076.
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  plain from its face that it seeks to allow the agency at least the chance to

  apply its expertise to a problem before it comes to us.” Id. Indeed, the

  “salutary policy” behind § 160(e) “afford[s] the Board opportunity to

  consider on the merits questions to be urged upon review of its orders[s].”

  Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 318 U.S. 253, 256 (1943). Adherence

  “assure[s] that the Board is fully alerted to the contentions of the parties

  and aware that they should be addressed and ruled upon.” NLRB v. L & B

  Cooling, Inc., 757 F.2d 236, 240 (10th Cir. 1985). “In each case,” the D.C.

  Circuit has explained, “the critical inquiry is whether the objections made

  before the Board were adequate to put the Board on notice that the issue

  might be pursued on appeal.” Consol. Freightways v. NLRB, 669 F.2d 790,

  794 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

        From this we summarize the general principle: If a party does not

  “urge[]” an objection before the Board—meaning raise it in a manner

  sufficient to place the Board on notice it should be addressed and may

  become an issue in this court—we may not consider the objection for the

  first time on appeal absent extraordinary circumstances. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e).

                                        2

        With this foundation in mind, we turn to the Board’s first

  jurisdictional argument that Coreslab inadequately objected to the make-

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  whole remedies before the agency. In considering this contention, we assess

  both the exceptions filed by Coreslab and how the Board understood them.

         In its exceptions to the ALJ’s order, Coreslab objected to the

  “retroactive grant of [a] profit[-]sharing benefit remedy,” to the “grant of [a]

  profit[-]sharing benefit remedy,” and to mandated “contributions to the

  Central Pension Fund” as “contrary to the law and substantial weight of the

  record.” AR.1494–95. As we evaluate the sufficiency of these objections, our

  opinion in Public Service Company is instructive. There, petitioners made

  a two-sentence objection to the ALJ’s analysis. 692 F.3d at 1073–74. We

  found this objection sufficient—though barely—to preserve the issue for

  review in this court. Id. at 1074. We also found citations to the ALJ’s order

  included in the exceptions “put a little more meat on the bone, directing the

  Board to the specific reasoning the ALJ offered on these particular issues.”

  Id.7

         Here, Coreslab’s exceptions to the make-whole remedies were

  similarly terse. But Public Service Company directs us to find them

  sufficient to satisfy § 160(e)’s preservation requirement. As in that case, we

  cannot say the brevity of Coreslab’s objections rendered them inadequate to

         7 We are unpersuaded, then, by the Board’s contention that Coreslab’s

  objections were as bare-bones as the objections found insufficient in NLRB
  v. Seven-Up Bottling Co. of Miami, 344 U.S. 344, 350 (1953).
                                        31
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  place the issue before the Board on intra-agency review. And we observe,

  like the petitioners in Public Service Company, Coreslab included citations

  to the record where the ALJ reasoned through the challenged action.

  Coreslab’s objections to the ALJ’s remedies “w[ere] (just) enough to

  preserve” the issue for our review. Pub. Serv. Co., 692 F.3d at 1074.

        Our law also directs us to look beyond the exceptions themselves. To

  determine whether an issue has been urged before the Board, we must

  consider whether the Board itself understood an obligation to address an

  argument and was provided the opportunity to do so. See L & B Cooling,

  757 F.2d at 240.

        Here, we cannot say the exceptions were insufficient to put the Board

  on notice the make-whole remedies might come up on appeal. To the

  contrary, as in Public Service Company, though “the Board might have been

  within its rights to consider [the exceptions] insufficient for any purpose,”

  the Board “[i]nstead . . . chose to address the . . . objections it felt it could

  discern lurking here.” 692 F.3d at 1074. Clearly, then, Coreslab’s

  submission “provid[ed] sufficient specificity and clarity”—albeit with

  “painful brevity”—“to allow the Board to bring its expertise to bear.” Id.; see

  also Interstate Builders, 351 F.3d at 1034 n.8 (considering whether the

  Board was “aware” of the need to decide an issue).

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        Recall,   the     “salutary   policy”   behind     §   160(e)’s   preservation

  requirement guarantees the Board a first chance “to consider on the merits

  questions to be urged upon review of its order[s].” Marshall Field & Co., 318

  U.S. at 256. Here, the Board expressly concluded any challenge to the

  make-whole remedies without offset would be unmeritorious based on

  Board precedent “finding a wrongdoing employer ‘cannot complain of the

  extra cost of improperly created, substitute fringe benefits.’” AR.1630 n.32.

  For that proposition, it cited its holding in In re Harding Glass Company,

  337 NLRB 1116, 1118 (2002), in which the Board rejected a similar

  argument that “contribution payments due . . . must be offset by the value

  of any alternative payments [already] made.”

        On this record, we cannot conclude our exercise of jurisdiction would

  deprive the Board of an opportunity to consider the issue in the first

  instance. Coreslab challenged the remedies—if generally and briefly—and

  the Board opted to defend the make-whole orders with a specificity that

  encompassed the issue currently before us. “Whether or not each of these

  things alone might be sufficient, in light of them collectively,” we find

  Coreslab “present[ed] qualifying ‘objections’ on these two issues under

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  § 160(e)” and allowed “the Board to bring its expertise to bear.” Pub. Serv.

  Co., 692 F.3d at 1074.8

        8 Coreslab argues an alternative basis for our jurisdiction. Because

  the make-whole order without offset veered from remedial to punitive, the
  company contends, the Board exceeded the policy parameters of the Act.
  And this court, Coreslab urges, “may review actions that exceed the Board’s
  statutory authority irrespective of [§ 160(e)].” Reply Br. at 19.

        As Coreslab correctly points out, § 160(e) bears its exceptions. We may
  exercise our jurisdiction over a challenge despite a party’s failure to object
  before the agency in the case of “extraordinary circumstances,” 29 U.S.C.
  § 160(e), or where the decision at issue clearly demonstrates the Board
  exceeded its statutory authority, NLRB v. Cheney Cal. Lumber Co., 327 U.S.
  385, 388 (1946) (“[I]f the Board has patently traveled outside the orbit of its
  authority,” then “there is legally speaking no order to enforce.”).

        “Congress has imposed on [us] responsibility for assuring that the
  Board keeps within reasonable grounds.” Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB,
  340 U.S. 474, 490 (1951). To police those bounds of agency action, federal
  courts must retain the ability to consider “[c]ertain jurisdictional
  challenges” which “need not be raised before the Board to be considered on
  review.” Carroll Coll., Inc. v. NLRB, 558 F.3d 568, 574 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
  (finding Board lacked jurisdiction over petitioner despite petitioner’s failure
  to raise jurisdictional argument before the Board). At bottom, “[a] court can
  always invalidate Board action” when that action “is patently beyond the
  Board’s jurisdiction, even if the jurisdictional challenge was never
  presented to the Board.” Loc. 900, Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach.
  Workers, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 727 F.2d 1184, 1191 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1984).

       Because we find Coreslab adequately urged its exceptions before the
  Board, we need not determine whether we would also have jurisdiction
  because the Board’s make-whole remedies without offset exceeded the
  bounds of its statutory authority.
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                                        3

        Even accepting Coreslab’s objection was urged before the agency, the

  Board insists we still lack jurisdiction because “Coreslab needed to file a

  motion for reconsideration with the Board to preserve that challenge for

  appeal.” NLRB Br. at 51–52 (citing Woelke & Romero Framing, Inc. v.

  NLRB, 456 U.S. 645, 665–66 (1982)). We are unpersuaded.

        We observe, as a preliminary matter, the statutory provisions

  governing our jurisdiction do not require reconsideration motions to

  preserve challenges. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (obliging parties only to “urge[]”

  objections before the Board). And as Coreslab persuasively argues, the

  agency’s own regulations provide no such requirement: A party “may . . .

  move for reconsideration,” but “[a] motion for reconsideration . . . need not

  be filed to exhaust administrative remedies.” 29 C.F.R. § 102.48(c), (c)(3)

  (emphasis added).

        Instead, the Board’s argument for the necessity of a reconsideration

  motion rests solely on Woelke & Romero. In that case, the Supreme Court

  held the petitioners “could have objected to the Board’s decision in a petition

  for reconsideration or hearing,” and the “failure to do so prevent[ed]

  consideration of the question by the courts.” 456 U.S. at 666. For support,

  the Court cited International Ladies’ Garment Workers’ Union, Upper South

  Department, AFL-CIO v. Quality Manufacturing Co., 420 U.S. 276, 281 n.3

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  (1975), in which it had previously held an objection “may not be considered”

  when the objecting party fails to avail itself of the post-judgment motions

  provided for by Board regulations.

        We rejected a similar argument from the Board in Facet Enterprises,

  Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 963, 971–72 (10th Cir. 1990). There, the ALJ found

  Facet Enterprises violated its statutory duty to bargain in good faith by

  unit-splitting—or separating employees in one facility from an “established

  appropriate bargaining unit.” Id. at 970. The Board agreed the employer

  violated its statutory duty. But its amended conclusions of law based that

  determination on a different ground, “finding instead that Facet was

  culpable for direct dealing.” Id. Facet Enterprises contended—before this

  court—that the “switching of legal theories by the Board on appeal violated

  due process.” Id. The problem, though, was that Facet Enterprises failed to

  object   to   the   Board’s   recasting    of   the   violation   by   moving     for

  reconsideration. The agency pointed out as much, and contended Woelke &

  Romero and Garment Workers’ Union “preclude[d] our review of [the

  company’s] due process claim.” Id. at 971.

        We disagreed, distinguishing Woelke & Romero and Garment Workers’

  Union by explaining those cases were concerned with circumstances when

  the Board lacked entirely “an opportunity to consider” claims the

  petitioning employers advanced on appeal. We find that distinction

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  persuasive on these analogous facts. As in Facet Enterprises, the Board did

  address the company’s challenge to the action contested by the employer—

  and defended by the Board—on review before this court. When switching

  legal bases for liability, the Board in Facet Enterprises had already

  “considered specifically the due process implications.” Id. at 971. So too

  here, where the Board addressed and defended a potential objection to the

  make-whole remedies without offset.

        In Facet Enterprises, we reasoned “[t]he policies underlying [§ 160(e)],

  i.e., notice, efficiency and providing the Board with the first opportunity to

  consider a claim, would have been undermined had the Supreme Court

  allowed judicial review” in Woelke & Romero and Garment Workers’ Union.

  907 F.2d at 971. In contrast, those policy considerations were not implicated

  when the Board already had that first opportunity, and Coreslab’s “filing a

  motion seeking reconsideration of the Board’s decision would have been”

  the “empty formality” we have refused to require of parties invoking our

  jurisdiction. Id. at 972. On these facts, we decline to convert a motion for

  reconsideration into a jurisdictional requirement.

                                        B

        Having assured ourselves of jurisdiction, we next address our

  standard of review and then the propriety of the Board’s remedies.

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        The Board enjoys broad discretion to craft remedies appropriate for

  violations of the Act. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203,

  216 (1964); accord NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32

  (1969) (“In fashioning its remedies under the broad provisions of [29 U.S.C.

  § 160(c)] . . . the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise all its

  own, and its choice of remedy must therefore be given special respect by

  reviewing courts.”).

        But that deference cannot extend to remedial orders “other than those

  which can fairly be said to effectuate the policies of the Act,” Va. Elec. &

  Power Co. v. NLRB, 319 U.S. 533, 540 (1943), or those exceeding a “rational

  and consistent” interpretation of the Board’s statutory authority, NLRB v.

  United Food & Com. Workers Union, Loc. 23, AFL-CIO, 484 U.S. 112, 123

  (1987). The power Congress granted to the Board to rectify unfair labor

  practices is—and must be in its exercise—“remedial, not punitive.” Republic

  Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 12 (1940).

                                          C

        We conclude two of the Board’s ordered remedies are inconsistent with

  the purposes and policies of the Act.

        First, the orders to provide back payments under the profit-sharing

  plan and back payments to the Central Pension Fund without offset

  exceeded the Board’s authority. As Coreslab persuasively explains, the

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  Board’s otherwise broad discretion to craft a response to an employer’s

  unfair labor practices stops when that response veers from remedial to

  punitive. See Republic Steel, 311 U.S. at 9 (providing for deductions from

  award amounts “because, having already been received, these amounts

  were not needed to make the employees whole”). To comply with the Act,

  the Board should have ensured its remedies were “sufficiently tailored to

  expunge only the actual, and not merely speculative, consequences of the

  unfair labor practice.” Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 900 (1984).

  Here the Board orders to provide full back-pension contributions and

  provide full back-profit-sharing payments to all employees without offset for

  the compensation already provided to them were not “sufficiently tailored”

  to the actual harms suffered by those employees, and must be made so on

  remand.

        Second, the order to retain the profit-sharing program unless the

  Union requested its recission similarly exceeded the Board’s authority. As

  we have previously explained, “the Board’s remedial powers are ‘limited to

  carrying out the policies of the [Act] . . .,’ and ‘[o]ne of these fundamental

  policies is freedom of contract.’” Teamsters Loc. Union No. 435 v. NLRB,

  92 F.3d 1063, 1072 (10th Cir. 1996) (quoting H.K. Porter Co., Inc. v. NLRB,

  397 U.S. 99, 108 (1970)). “[T]he Board cannot dictate the terms of a labor

  contract, which should be decided upon by the give and take of collective

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  bargaining.” Id. at 1072–73. It may be that Coreslab and the Union decide

  to continue the profit-sharing program alongside, or in lieu of, the pension

  program. But that is a decision for the parties to make during the

  bargaining process the Act protects.

                                         IV

        For these reasons, we GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART

  Coreslab’s petition for review. We DENY the part of Coreslab’s petition

  challenging the Board’s conclusions Coreslab violated several provisions of

  the National Labor Relations Act and its remedial orders to provide the

  Union with relevant information and to recognize the Union and bargain

  with it in good faith. But we GRANT Coreslab’s petition to the extent it

  contends the Board exceeded its statutory authority by ordering remedial

  back payments without offset for prior compensation and by ordering the

  company to maintain the profit-sharing plan. We GRANT Coreslab’s

  unopposed motion to lodge non-record materials.

        Accordingly,      we   also   DENY    the   Board’s   cross-petition    for

  enforcement.

        We REMAND to the Board for further proceedings consistent with

  this opinion.

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  23-9502/9505, Coreslab Structures v. NLRB
  HARTZ, J., partially dissenting.

         I agree with the analysis of the panel opinion except on one point. On the issue of

  constructive knowledge, I do not think a reasonable person could say that it was

  reasonable for union leadership to fail for eight years to check on whether the employer

  was complying with a contract provision as important as the provision of a pension. I

  would hope, and expect, that any union that tried to defend such gross neglect would find

  itself in a battle with a competing union offering better representation.