Court Opinion

ID: 9860213
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 23:14:35.223584+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T11:19:17.407876
License: Public Domain

JUSTICE GILLERAN JOHNSON, dissenting: The trial court’s March 22, 2005, order, from which the respondent filed a timely notice of appeal, was a final order. An order is final for purposes of review where matters left for future determination are merely incidental to the ultimate rights that have been adjudicated by the judgment or decree. In re D.D., 212 Ill. 2d 410, 418 (2004); Deckard v. Joiner, 44 Ill. 2d 412, 416 (1970). In its March 22, 2005, judgment for dissolution of marriage, the trial court awarded joint legal custody to the parties, designated the respondent as the primary residential custodian, and reserved jurisdiction “for the purposes of entering a Joint Parenting Order incorporating a Joint Parenting Agreement to be prepared and submitted to this Court by the parties.” Additionally, the trial court incorporated the findings it had made in a March 7, 2005, opinion letter into the March 22 dissolution judgment. In the second paragraph of those findings, the trial court stated that “[t]he parenting time of the [petitioner] shall be liberal and in accord with the usual and customary schedule. *** The parties shall provide a framework in the judgment for such parenting time keeping in mind the spirit of this decision.” By incorporating this finding, the judgment for dissolution of marriage not only awarded joint legal custody to the parties, with the respondent designated as the primary residential custodian, but also awarded the petitioner the “usual and customary” visitation. Accordingly, the dissolution judgment was a final adjudication of all the parties’ rights and was thus a final order. The joint parenting agreement merely set forth the “usual and customary” visitation schedule. Specifically, the joint parenting agreement incorporated into the July 1, 2005, joint parenting order indicates that the parties shall share responsibility for and jointly make decisions affecting the best interests of the children on issues involving health, education, religion, and welfare. Additionally, the agreement grants the petitioner visitation on alternating weekends, Wednesday evenings, alternating holidays, and four weeks during the children’s summer vacation from school. Accordingly, the joint parenting agreement merely recited the standard visitation schedule. See In re Marriage of Collingbourne, 204 Ill. 2d 498, 501 (2003) (joint parenting agreement provided visitation to noncustodial parent every other weekend and alternate holidays); In re Parentage of Tavares, 363 Ill. App. 3d 964, 966 (2006) (joint custody agreement provided noncustodial parent with visitation on every other weekend, on every other holiday, and for four weeks during the summer); DeBilio v. Rodgers, 337 Ill. App. 3d 614, 615 (2002) (joint custody order granted noncustodial parent visitation every other weekend, every Tuesday evening, and various holidays); In re Marriage of Ludwinski, 312 Ill. App. 3d 495, 497 (2000) (joint custody order granted noncustodial parent visitation on alternate weekends, one day midweek, eight weeks during the summer, and various holidays); In re Marriage of Kartholl, 143 Ill. App. 3d 228, 230 (1986) (joint custody order granted noncustodial parent visitation on alternating weekends, holidays, and four weeks during the summer); Kraft v. Kraft, 108 Ill. App. 3d 590, 591 (1982) (joint custody agreement specified that noncustodial parent would receive visitation every other weekend, every Tuesday afternoon, four weekends during the child’s summer vacation, and alternate holidays). Under these facts, the judgment for dissolution of marriage was a final order. Such a determination is not contrary to our supreme court’s policy, set forth in Leopando, that discourages piecemeal appeals in marital dissolution proceedings. In the present case, the trial court’s reservation of the right to enter the joint parenting agreement was merely incidental to the ultimate rights adjudicated by the dissolution judgment. See In re D.D., 212 Ill. 2d at 418. In the judgment for dissolution, the trial court ordered that the parties be awarded joint custody of their children and that the parenting time of the petitioner be liberal and in accord with the usual and customary schedule. Additionally, the trial court made determinations as to the distribution of marital assets, child support, and maintenance. Based on the trial court’s order, it is clear that custody, visitation, and all other remaining issues had been resolved. Moreover, the fact that the entry of the joint parenting order was merely incidental to the rights adjudicated by the dissolution judgment is supported by the fact that the petitioner admitted at trial that custody was not at issue in this case. The majority reasons that the March 22, 2005, dissolution order cannot be considered final and appealable because it is allegedly unclear and insufficient to support a contempt finding. The majority’s conclusion is flawed. There is no case law to support the majority’s proposition that an order is not final unless it is sufficient to support a contempt finding. Furthermore, contempt is not an issue in this case. In addition, the March 22 dissolution order was enforceable. The case law set forth above is quite clear as to what a usual and customary visitation schedule entails. Moreover, in ordering that the parenting time of the petitioner be “liberal and in accord with the usual and customary schedule,” the trial court specifically instructed the parties that their joint parenting agreement was to “provide a framework *** for such parenting time keeping in mind the spirit of this decision.” As such, the trial court was quite clear as to the scope of the visitation schedule that was to be set forth in the joint parenting agreement. Accordingly, the trial court’s determination as to the rights of the parties concerning custody and visitation was clear for purposes of review and enforcement. As such, the March 22, 2005, order was final because jurisdiction was not retained for the determination of a matter of substantial controversy. Unlike in Leopando, matters were not reserved for future consideration or adjudication by the trial court. The trial court adjudicated all issues in the dissolution judgment. The trial court specifically granted usual and customary visitation to the petitioner. The joint parenting agreement merely put into legalistic form what the trial court had already awarded in general terms. Additionally, it is important to note that the respondent raises meritorious arguments on appeal. The record reveals that the trial court erred in its distribution of the marital assets and in its determination of child support. In determining that we are without jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the majority denies the respondent substantial justice. Accordingly, I dissent from the majority’s erroneous and inequitable decision that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the merits of the respondent’s appeal.