Court Opinion

ID: 9907468
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-06 16:06:40.40965+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:56:48.575154
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                 No. 23-0807
                           Filed December 6, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

STEPHEN PRENTICE POTTER,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Henry County, Joshua P. Schier,

Judge.

      Stephen Prentice Potter appeals the sentences imposed by the district court

after his guilty pleas. AFFIRMED.

      Pamela Wingert of Wingert Law Office, Spirit Lake, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Joshua A. Duden, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Tabor, P.J., and Badding and Chicchelly, JJ.
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CHICCHELLY, Judge.

        Stephen Prentice Potter appeals the sentences imposed by the district court

following his guilty pleas entered for eluding, possession of marijuana, and

operating while intoxicated. He contends the district court abused its discretion by

failing to properly weigh opportunities for rehabilitation and the State breached the

plea agreement. Because we find the district court did not abuse its discretion and

the State did not breach the plea agreement, we affirm the sentences.

   I.      Background Facts and Proceedings.

        This appeal results from a high-speed chase occurring in Henry County,

Iowa. Potter eluded officers on his motorcycle, leading to one of the officers

crashing and totaling his patrol vehicle. Following the crash, officers arrested

Potter and discovered marijuana in his possession. They also determined he was

under the influence while operating his motorcycle.

        Potter was ultimately charged with Count I, eluding; Count II, possession of

a controlled substance, third offense; and Count III, operating while intoxicated,

second offense. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Potter pled guilty to the lesser

offenses of eluding; possession of marijuana, second offense; and operating while

intoxicated, first offense.   The parties stipulated to concurrent, suspended

sentences on Counts I and II; a three-year suspended sentence on Count III to run

consecutive to Counts I and II; and probation. But the court’s approval of the

sentence was not a condition of the plea agreement, and the sentencing court

rejected the sentencing recommendations, instead sentencing Potter to

consecutive indeterminate prison terms on all three Counts: two years each for
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Counts I and II and one year on Count III, for a total of five years. The court also

ordered Potter to pay $22,253.50 in restitution for the damaged patrol vehicle.

          Potter timely appealed. On appeal, he argues the district court abused its

discretion in sentencing and that the State breached the plea agreement.

   II.       Scope of Review.

   We review sentencing orders for correction of errors at law.            State v.

Damme, 944 N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020). “We will not reverse a sentence unless

there is ‘an abuse of discretion or some defect in the sentencing procedure.’” Id.

(citation omitted).

   III.      Abuse of Discretion in Sentencing.

          We begin by addressing Potter’s claim that the sentencing court abused its

discretion. An abuse of discretion occurs when “the district court exercises its

discretion on grounds or for reasons that were clearly untenable or unreasonable.”

State v. Gordon, 921 N.W.2d 19, 24 (Iowa 2018) (citation omitted). In sentencing,

the court must consider “the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances,

the age, character and propensity of the offender, and the chances of reform.”

State v. Formaro, 638 N.W.2d 720, 725 (Iowa 2002).             It must also weigh

rehabilitation of the offender against the protection of the community. Id. at 725.

“The sentencing court has broad discretion to impose the sentence it determines

is best suited to [these goals].” State v. West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d 344, 355

(Iowa 2022) (citing Iowa Code § 901.5 (2021)).        Exercising this discretion by

selecting one particular sentence over another is not an abuse of discretion.

Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725.
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       First, Potter claims the district court abused its discretion when sentencing

him by failing to follow the plea agreement. Because the sentencing court is clearly

not bound by the plea agreement, we quickly reject this argument. See Iowa R.

Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b)(8).

       Next, Potter contends the district court abused its discretion by improperly

weighing the circumstances of the case and the rehabilitative goals of sentencing.

He specifically claims the district court ignored key opportunities for rehabilitation,

including the available community resources and supports, his ability to pay the

restitution amount by working during probation, and substitute sentencing options

other than prison. Potter also argues serving the sentence prevents him from

providing necessary care for his ailing parents.

       At the sentencing hearing, the district court explained its decision as follows:

              The Court’s considered all the sentencing provisions provided
       for in Iowa Code Chapters 901, 902, and 907. The following
       sentence is based upon my judgment of what will provide maximum
       opportunity for your rehabilitation and at the same time protect the
       community from further offenses by you and others.
              The Court has specifically considered the following factors:
       Your age, your criminal history. . . . Your prior employment, your
       family circumstances. I do note that you do have the support of your
       parents. The nature of the offenses committed, the harm to the
       victims, your need for rehabilitation and your potential for
       rehabilitation, the plea agreement, and all the factors set out in the
       [pre-sentence investigation report].
              The Court is concerned with the history of your criminal
       offenses. You’ve had several driving charges. You’ve had multiple
       driving under the influence. You’ve had several drug charges. You
       have similar offenses over and over and over. You’ve had the benefit
       of parole; you’ve had the benefit of probation; you’ve had probation
       revoked; you’ve had parole revoked twice for the same charge. You
       had opportunities, sir, and it doesn’t seem that you’re learning from
       them. . . .
              ....
              The reason the Court is ordering these sentences to run
       consecutively is due to the nature of your offenses, the potential
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         harm to the community, the need to protect the community. It’s due
         to your criminal history and your history of failing to succeed on
         probation and parole.

         Potter fails to show the sentencing court abused its discretion. The court

properly considered the goals of sentencing and the circumstances of Potter’s

situation. After assessing the applicable factors, it declined to follow the plea

agreement. While there are circumstances that weigh in favor of probation, such

as Potter’s positive social support and his caregiving responsibilities, these are not

dispositive. Conversely, Potter had similar criminal offenses with a history of failed

attempts at supervision.      The offenses themselves were also the result of

dangerous circumstances involving a high-speed chase that put others at risk. The

court was authorized to consider all these factors and exercise its discretion in

determining a sentence. See West Vangen, 975 N.W.2d at 355. While the court

could have imposed the sentence recommended in the plea agreement, it is not

error for it to have imposed a different sentence. See Formaro, 638 N.W.2d at 725.

   IV.      Breach of Plea Agreement.

         Potter also challenges his sentence by alleging the State breached the plea

agreement by failing to properly recommend the agreed upon sentence to the

district court. A breach of the plea agreement is a defect in the sentencing

procedure that warrants reversal.        State v. Patten, 981 N.W.2d 126, 130

(Iowa 2022). Our inquiry is “whether the prosecutor acted contrary to the common

purpose of the plea agreement and the justified expectations of the defendant and

thereby effectively deprived the defendant of the benefit of the bargain.” Id. at 131

(citation omitted).    By agreeing to a plea, the prosecutor is obligated to

“recommend” the plea agreement, which “requires the prosecutor to present the
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recommended sentences with his or her approval, to commend these sentences

to the court, and to otherwise indicate to the court that the recommended

sentences are supported by the State and worthy of the court’s acceptance.” State

v. Horness, 600 N.W.2d 294, 299 (Iowa 1999). But we do not require “florid

advocacy” by the State. State v. Davis, 971 N.W.2d 546, 557 (Iowa 2022). The

mere proposal of a plea agreement “carries with it the State’s implicit

representation it is ‘worthy of the court’s acceptance.’” State v. Schlachter, 884

N.W.2d 782, 786 (Iowa Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Horness, 600 N.W.2d at 299–300).

      Regarding the plea agreement, the State stated:

          Since this case did involve possession of drugs, I did staff this
          case with the county drug investigator and the attorney in my
          office that handles driving offenses, and based upon the facts
          presented to us, we agreed that a proper recommendation in this
          case would be for [Potter] to plead to the lesser-included offenses
          and recommendation of two years on each aggravated, those run
          concurrent with one another; one year on the serious offenses,
          consecutive, for a total of three years, suspended with supervised
          probation.

Potter argues this is not an adequate recommendation of the sentence, thereby

breaching the plea agreement. We disagree. There are no facts here to suggest

that the State interfered with the agreement in any way. See id. at 787 (“[W]here

the prosecutor has been held to have breached the plea agreement, there was

something the prosecutor said that implicitly or explicitly undermined the plea

agreement.”).   While certainly not a glowing reference, we only require the

minimum recommendation. See Davis, 971 N.W.2d at 557. Upon review of the

record, we find the State adequately commended the plea agreement to the

sentencing court. Based on the nature of the offenses and the experience of the

actors consulted during negotiations, the State explained its reasoning for the
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agreement. It also highlights the agreement itself, providing its implicit support of

the proposed sentence. See Schlachter, 884 N.W.2d at 786. There is no evidence

here suggesting the State sabotaged the process or somehow convinced the

sentencing court to decline the agreement. Absent additional circumstances, we

find no breach.

       Because we find the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing

Potter, and the State did not breach the plea agreement, we affirm Potter’s

sentences.

       AFFIRMED.