Court Opinion

ID: 9749172
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-27 16:26:30.902823+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:25:44.679778
License: Public Domain

HornUy, J.,
filed the following opinion, concurring in the re-
sult.
The majority, in affirming the order of the lower court vacating its decree and setting aside the tax sale deed, based their conclusion on the fact that the failure of the tax sale purchaser to comply with the provisions of Maryland Rule 105 g 1—re-quiring the purchaser to make a reasonable effort in good faith to locate the property owner and warn her of the pendency of the foreclosure proceeding — amounted to constructive fraud. Aside from the fact that it seems to me that the majority, in attempting to distinguish the instant case from Sanchez v. James, 209 Md. 266, 120 A. 2d 836 (1956), have in effect adopted the dissenting opinion in Sanches and overruled the majority opinion, the affirmance, in my opinion, should have been based squarely on the ground, as did the lower court, that it had no jurisdiction to decree a foreclosure of the right of redemption to property on which the taxes had beqn paid prior to the tax sale.
Although § 101 of Article 81 of the Code declares that the court has equity jurisdiction to give full and complete relief under the tax sales statute in accordance with general equity jurisdiction and practice and the provisions of all laws and rules of court except as otherwise provided in the statute and § 113 *8provides that the final decree foreclosing the right of redemption is conclusive and may not be opened except on the ground of lack of jurisdiction or fraud in the conduct of the foreclosure proceeding, it is clear that, under § 72, the collector of taxes (the county treasurer in this instance) had authority to sell only1 property “upon which taxes are in arrears.” As stated in § 70, only unpaid taxes constitute a lien on real property. Furthermore, while the present tax sales statute was designed to improve the method of foreclosing redemption rights so as to expedite the procurement of marketable tax titles, as was pointed out in Hauver v. Dorsey, 228 Md. 499, 180 A. 2d 475 (1962) and earlier in Thomas v. Kolker, 195 Md. 470, 73 A. 2d 886 (1950), there is nothing in the statute indicating that the legislature had any intention of authorizing a sale of property for taxes that had been paid before the sale was made.
Our predecessors, having concluded in Mullen v. Brydon, 117 Md. 554, 83 Atl. 1025 (1912), that a tax collector had no power to sell land for taxes unless the taxes were due and in arrears at the time of sale, went on to hold that a sale of property for taxes which had been paid prior to the sale was null and void and conferred no title on the purchaser. The situation here is identical with the situation there. And since there is not the slightest doubt that the sale made by the county treasurer was null and void under the circumstances of this case, the lower court never acquired jurisdiction in the first place and, because it did not, it had no power to decree foreclosure of a right of redemption that did not in fact exist. Any other holding would be in conflict with § 23 of the Declaration of Rights (Due Process) declaring that no man ought to be dis-seized of his freehold or deprived of his property but by the law of the land. Also see Thomas v. Hardisty, 217 Md. 523, 143 A. 2d 618 (1958), holding that neither § 113 nor § 112 of Article 81 undertake to give validity to a void sale and that any attempt to do so would involve a denial of due process.

. The statute uses the word all instead of only but contextually all as used in § 73 of Article 81 of the Code means “only” or “nothing but” according to the second edition of Webster’s New International Dictionary.