Court Opinion

ID: 9630353
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 10:09:10.173042+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:38:53.497550
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur in affirming the conviction of appellant and generally concur with the decision of this court, but write further to express concern about developments in the Wyoming law on the validity of eye-witness identification. Next to bad acts evidence, expert witness testimony and jury instructions on that subject have become some of the most prolific sources of appellate argument in this nation’s criminal prosecution.
*241This is not a good case for exhaustive pursuit since appellant was previously known by the pharmacist, was previously seen by the doctor where the prescription blanks were used, and the identifications were founded on time and place components which connoted certainty. Additionally, the eye-witness expert was permitted to testify about the questionable characteristics of eye-witness identifications for support of the defense to establish reasonable doubt.
On appeal, appellant, although permitted use of the expert witness, now challenges denial of the theory of the eye-witness instruction questioning use of what has generally come to be described as the Telfaire instruction.1 Consideration of all Wyoming cases on eye-witness identification provides little direction or stability. Unresolved is whether the defendant in defense of identification is entitled to an expert witness, an instruction of the Telfaire nature, both or neither. Is it purely a question of trial court discretion without regard for the strength or weakness of the issue within the trial court presentation? I can hardly believe the last choice of neither provides the stability and counseling that due process demands unless the exercise of discretion is clearly founded on a rationally differentiated factual basis in the individual case.
In national perspective, some courts use a Telfaire instruction2 and some courts allow the expert witness.3 On occasion, both are permitted, and at least generally some courts tend to allow neither. Superimposed on exercised discretion and its constituent is the seriousness and the validity of the defense presented. If it is a neighbor that has lived next door to the identifying witness for ten years, functionality of the defense itself is clearly less than de minimis.
I find no error here within the current state of Wyoming law since use of the expert witness was permitted and rational doubt further justifying a special instruction on identification was not persuasively presented. In a case like this with appropriately active final argument, use or non-use of the instruction could hardly have mattered to the jury. In concurrence with the result in this case as properly exercised discretion, I remain dissatisfied with the absence of clear principles for cases of severe contest where either issues of expert witness or special instruction become serious ingredients in the determination of guilt or innocence. Concern also exists about any approach which would deny an instruction to the defendant on any legitimate theory of defense. B-T Ltd. v. Blakeman, 705 P.2d 307 (Wyo.1985); Goodman v. State, 573 P.2d 400 (Wyo.1977).
I do not accept attribution from this decision that Wyoming should not adopt a general standard of utilization of the special instruction on eye-witness identification as has been done by many other states and particularly so if the trial court denies use of the alternative, the expert witness. Superimposed on all discussion of contested eye-witness identification is a failure to differentiate that function of credibility which is deliberate and intended from capability and capacity which encompass physical limitations of the testifying witnesses as an actual, even though perhaps unintended, constituent of invalidity. This court should not ignore the well-documented frequency of mistake which occurs in eye-witness identification with regard for what should be appropriate in the tough cases.4 I do *242not find undone justice on this occasion and consequently concur even if the instruction addressing the thesis of defense could have also been properly given. People v. Wright, 45 Cal.3d 1126, 248 Cal.Rptr. 600, 755 P.2d 1049 (1988). See California Supreme Court Survey—May 1988-July 1988, 16 Pepperdine L.Rev. 431 (1989).

. United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552 (D.C.Cir.1972).

. Kansas, Rhode Island, Utah, and West Virginia are examples. See State v. Wheaton, 240 Kan. 345, 729 P.2d 1183 (1986); State v. Warren, 230 Kan. 385, 635 P.2d 1236 (1981); State v. Mastracchio, 546 A.2d 165 (R.I.1988); State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986); and State v. Watson, 318 S.E.2d 603 (W.Va.1984). See also Note, Eyewitness Identification Testimony and The Need For Cautionary Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 1387 (1983).

. State v. Chapple, 135 Ariz. 281, 660 P.2d 1208 (1983); People v. McDonald, 37 Cal.3d 351, 208 Cal.Rptr. 236, 690 P.2d 709 (1984).

. The prevalence of cases and law review analy-ses are almost beyond count. See Annotation, Admissibility, at Criminal Prosecution, of Expert Testimony on Reliability of Eyewitness Testimo*242ny, 46 A.L.R.4th 1047 (1986) and Annotation, Necessity of, and Prejudicial Effect of Omitting, Cautionary Instruction to Jury as to Reliability of, or Factors to be Considered in Evaluating, Eyewitness Identification Testimony — State Cases, 23 A.L.R.4A 1089 (1983).