Court Opinion

ID: 9377604
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-03-08 15:04:07.935661+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:17:15.157044
License: Public Domain

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SJC-13331

      CITY OF CHELSEA vs. NEW ENGLAND POLICE BENEVOLENT
                 ASSOCIATION, INC., LOCAL 192.

            Suffolk.    January 6, 2023. - March 8, 2023.

 Present:    Budd, C.J., Gaziano, Lowy, Cypher, Kafker, Wendlandt,
                            & Georges, JJ.

Arbitration, Arbitrable question, Confirmation of award. Public
     Employment, Collective bargaining, Termination. Labor,
     Collective bargaining, Grievance procedure, Public
     employment, Arbitration.

     Civil action commenced in the Superior Court Department on
July 26, 2021.

     The case was heard by Patrick M. Haggan, J., on motions for
judgment on the pleadings.

     The Supreme Judicial Court on its own initiative
transferred the case from the Appeals Court.

    Strephon Treadway for the plaintiff.
    Thomas E. Horgan for the defendant.

    KAFKER, J.     After the New England Police Benevolent

Association, Inc., Local 192 (NEPBA), replaced the International

Brotherhood of Teamsters, Local 25 (Local 25), as the exclusive
                                                                   2

bargaining representative for the emergency dispatchers in the

city of Chelsea (city), the NEPBA sought to arbitrate a

grievance regarding the termination of a dispatcher that

occurred following the change in union representation.     The

NEPBA and the city had not yet bargained to a new contract, but

employees had been working pursuant to the terms and conditions

of the city's prior collective bargaining agreement with Local

25, which contained an arbitration provision.     The parties

submitted to an arbitrator the question whether the dispute was

arbitrable.   The arbitrator ruled that it was.    The city now

appeals from a Superior Court order confirming the arbitrator's

decision.

    We determine that the dispute was arbitrable because (1)

the dispute clearly would have been covered by the broad

arbitration provision negotiated by the city and the prior

union, if the contract with the city had remained in effect; (2)

the arbitrator, acting within her authority, found that the

contract was extended by the city according to the terms of the

contract, and we defer to such contractual interpretation by the

arbitrator; and (3) we conclude that the labor relations act

entitles a successor union to "step[] into the shoes of its

predecessor" and enforce an arbitration provision in a

collective bargaining agreement negotiated by its predecessor.
                                                                    3

See Watertown v. Watertown Mun. Employees Ass'n, 63 Mass. App.

Ct. 285, 291 (2005) (Watertown).

    Background.    The city's emergency dispatchers had been

represented by Local 25 since 2009.   On January 3, 2020, the

NEPBA filed a petition to represent the bargaining unit.     On

January 8, 2020, Local 25 sent a letter disclaiming interest in

representing the dispatchers.   The NEPBA won the subsequent

election unanimously; due to Local 25's disclaimer, it was the

only union on the ballot.   On April 16, 2020, the Department of

Labor Relations certified the NEPBA as the dispatchers'

exclusive representative.

    The most recent collective bargaining agreement in effect

for the dispatchers was negotiated by Local 25.   It contained

multiple arbitration provisions.   One stated that "[o]nly

matters involving questions whether the [c]ity is complying with

its obligations under this [a]greement, including matters

involving the meaning, application or interpretation of the

[a]greement" are subject to the grievance and arbitration

procedure, except that "[n]o matter shall be subject to the

arbitration procedure of this [a]greement which is subject to

the authority or jurisdiction of Civil Service or any Retirement

Board."   More specifically, the agreement also provided:    "Any

protest against discipline, suspension or discharge shall be
                                                                     4

handled under the grievance and arbitration procedure provided

for in the agreement."

       By its terms, the agreement also had the following

duration:

       "This [a]greement shall remain in full force and effect
       from July 1, 2016 until midnight June 30, 2019 and shall
       terminate unless extended by mutual consent of the parties,
       or unless either party hereto gives written notice to the
       other not less than sixty (60) days prior to the date of
       expiration, of a desire to change or amend the terms or
       conditions hereof."

       The city solicitor wrote to representatives of Local 25 on

January 31, 2019 (thus "not less" than sixty days before June

30):   "Our agreements expire on June 30, 2019 and I was hoping

to schedule our initial meetings for bargaining."     Although

Local 25 and the city exchanged proposals for a new contract and

met several times, they did not reach an agreement.    A

representative from the NEPBA reached out to start contract

negotiations after the union was certified, but by the time of

the dispute in question, the parties had not reached an

agreement.   The city continued to abide by all provisions in the

contract during this period of time and apparently has done so

to this day, with the exception of the arbitration provision.

       Nearly one year after the NEPBA was certified, a dispatcher

allegedly failed to properly dispatch a fire response, and then

misreported the facts in a subsequent investigation.       As a

result, the city dismissed her.    The union protested the
                                                                     5

discipline and invoked the grievance procedure in the collective

bargaining agreement, which involves a multistep process that

culminates in arbitration.   The relevant contract term states:

    "Grievances not settled in the [s]teps of the grievance
    procedure may be referred to an arbitrator agreed upon by
    the parties . . . [or one] designated by the American
    Arbitration Association . . . . The decision of the
    arbitrator within the scope of his authority shall be final
    and binding upon the parties."

    Although the city disputed that it was required to

arbitrate the grievance, the parties proceeded to arbitration

and submitted to the arbitrator the question whether the dispute

was arbitrable.    The arbitrator ruled that it was, because the

agreement negotiated by Local 25 was still in effect on February

1, 2021, by its terms.    The arbitrator explained:   "While [the]

letter [regarding scheduling bargaining] does not use the exact

language of Article 25 [(the duration provision)], I find that

it adequately satisfies Article 25, and thus extended that

contract."   She also relied on the reasoning of the Appeals

Court decision in Watertown discussing the presumption of

arbitrability, including when "the arbitration provision being

interpreted involves expiring contracts and changes in union

representation."    Watertown, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 290.

    The city filed a complaint in the Superior Court to vacate

the arbitration award, arguing that the arbitrator exceeded her

authority because there was no agreement to arbitrate in effect
                                                                      6

once Local 25 disclaimed interest.     See G. L. c. 150C, § 11 (a)

("the superior court shall vacate an award if . . . the

arbitrators exceeded their powers").     The union moved to confirm

the arbitration award.   Both parties moved for judgment on the

pleadings.   The judge confirmed the arbitration award, allowed

the union's motion, and denied the city's motion.    The judge

determined that the collective bargaining agreement, including

the arbitration provision, "remained in effect when the

arbitration occurred" because a new bargaining representative

"'steps into the shoes of its predecessor' for purposes of the

[agreement]" (quoting Watertown, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 291).

    The city appealed from the judgment.     This court

transferred the appeal on its own motion.

    Discussion.    The well-settled background principles for

resolving this case are summarized in the Appeals Court decision

in Watertown, and we repeat them here:

    "'The first principle is that "arbitration is a matter of
    contract"' and cannot therefore be imposed if it is not a
    part of the bargained-for exchange. [Local No. 1710, Int'l
    Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO v. Chicopee, 430 Mass. 417,
    420-421 (1999), quoting AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Communications
    Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986).] Courts
    recognize, however, that 'a collective bargaining agreement
    is not an ordinary contract.' [John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v.
    Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 550 (1964).] A collective
    bargaining agreement governs an entire, evolving labor-
    management relationship. It is negotiated in a highly
    regulated environment that determines the certification and
    decertification of unions and establishes bargaining
    obligations of unions and employers. A collective
    bargaining agreement also promotes the equitable,
                                                                  7

    efficient, and peaceful resolution of workplace disputes.
    Arbitration provisions play an important part in the entire
    process, as they provide for the expeditious resolution of
    workplace disputes by decisionmakers with expert knowledge
    of the common law of the shop. [United Steelworkers of Am.
    v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-582
    (1960).]

    "For these reasons, where the collective bargaining
    agreement 'contains an arbitration clause, there is a
    presumption of arbitrability in the sense that "an order to
    arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
    unless it may be said with positive assurance that the
    arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation
    that covers the asserted dispute. Doubts should be
    resolved in favor of coverage . . . particularly . . .
    where the clause is . . . broad" (emphasis added).' [Local
    No. 1710, Int'l Ass'n of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, 430 Mass.
    at 421, quoting AT&T Techs., Inc., 475 U.S. at 649.] In
    addition, when the arbitration provision being interpreted
    involves expiring contracts and changes in union
    representation, courts carefully consider the statutory
    context in which the agreements are negotiated. See, e.g.,
    [Nolde Bros. v. Local No. 358, Bakery & Confectionery
    Workers Union, 430 U.S. 243, 254 (1977)] (discussing how
    parties drafted their arbitration clause 'against a
    backdrop of well-established federal labor policy favoring
    arbitration')."

Watertown, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 289-290.

    In the instant case, there are three interrelated

questions.   First, is the issue in dispute (the employee

discharge) covered by the arbitration provision from the

collective bargaining agreement?   Second, did the agreement

expire or was it extended by the parties?   Third, what is the

effect of the change in union representation?   Although the

parties, or at least the city, skip over the first two

questions, we address them, as they inform the answer to the
                                                                      8

third.   Indeed, it is the breadth of the arbitration provision

and the extension of the contract that are the key issues for

arbitrability of the dispute, not the change in union

representation.

    1.   Employee discharge.    The first question is clearly not

disputed in the instant case.     The arbitration provision states:

"Any protest against discipline, suspension or discharge shall

be handled under the grievance and arbitration procedure

provided for in the agreement."    The termination of the

dispatcher would fit squarely within the language of the

arbitration provision if the collective bargaining agreement

were still in effect.

    2.   Extension of agreement.    The second question regarding

the extension or termination of the agreement is also not

contested in part, as the city concedes that the contract was

extended, but contends that the extension ended upon the change

in union representation, which took place one year before the

employee was disciplined and sought arbitration.     As the issue

the city concedes again informs resolution of the issue the city

contests, particularly regarding deference owed to the

arbitrator's contractual interpretation, we briefly address it.

    Although the question "whether a party has agreed to

binding arbitration of a particular dispute is always a question

for the court," Massachusetts Community College Council v.
                                                                   9

Massachusetts Bd. of Higher Educ./Roxbury Community College, 465

Mass. 791, 795 (2013), threshold or subsidiary questions, such

as whether the agreement providing for arbitration has been

terminated or extended, are often questions for the arbitrator,

particularly under so-called "broad[ly]" drafted arbitration

provisions, see Brotherhood of Teamsters & Auto Truck Drivers

Local #70 v. Interstate Distrib. Co., 832 F.2d 507, 511 (9th

Cir. 1987) (Teamsters).   That is because "[t]he disagreement

between the parties . . . is not primarily over what the

arbitration clause provides, or what its scope is, but rather

concerns the effect to be given a letter -- or an exchange of

letters -- under the terms of the termination or expiration

clause of the parties' collective bargaining agreement.     In

short, the real dispute is over the proper meaning or

interpretation of the termination clause."   Id. at 510.

    In broadly worded arbitration provisions -- that is, those

"covering all disputes concerning the meaning of the terms and

provisions of the agreement," Teamsters, 832 F.2d at 510 -- this

interpretation is ordinarily left to arbitrators.   That is

because "[t]he issue involves the interpretation of the

expiration or termination provision of the agreement, and

standard arbitration clauses ordinarily provide that such

interpretations, like all others necessary to the resolution of

disputes over the meaning of the contract, shall be made by an
                                                                    10

arbitrator."   Id.   See District No. 1, Pac. Coast Dist., Marine

Eng'rs' Beneficial Ass'n, AFL-CIO v. Liberty Maritime Corp., 815

F.3d 834, 845 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ("If the arbitration provision is

broad, the court presumes that the parties intended to arbitrate

the duration dispute . . ."); Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n

Local No. 18 -- Wisc., AFL-CIO & Everbrite, LLC, 359 N.L.R.B.

1095, 1096 (2013) (arbitration "agreement provides for the

resolution of contract interpretation disputes" and whether

"agreement was automatically extended . . . by its terms" is

such dispute).

     Here, we are likewise dealing with a broadly worded

arbitration agreement:   the agreement provides that "matters

involving questions whether the [c]ity is complying with its

obligations under this [a]greement, including matters involving

the meaning, application or interpretation of the [a]greement,"

are subject to the grievance and arbitration procedure.1   See

Massachusetts Correction Officers Federated Union v. Sheriff of

Bristol County, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 285, 288 (2002), quoting

United Steelworkers of Am., 363 U.S. at 585 ("Supreme Court

treated as 'broad' a clause that called for the arbitration of

any differences 'as to the meaning and application of the . . .

     1 Matters covered by the civil service or pension laws were
excluded.
                                                                  11

Agreement'").   The termination and extension provision is a part

of the collective bargaining agreement and was not distinguished

from other provisions of the contract.   As interpretation of the

contract, including the extension and termination provisions,

has been assigned to the arbitrator by the contracting parties,

we defer to the arbitrator's interpretation, even if it

implicates arbitrability.   We distinguish this from when an

arbitrator relies on public law rather than the contract itself,

in which case we do not defer.   School Comm. of Lexington v.

Zagaeski, 469 Mass. 104, 112 (2014), quoting School Dist. of

Beverly v. Geller, 435 Mass. 223, 229-230 (Cordy, J.,

concurring) (although "an arbitrator may be uniquely qualified

to interpret the 'law of the shop,'" courts are "better

positioned to interpret the 'law of the land'"); Watertown, 63

Mass. App. Ct. at 292 ("The arbitrator's interpretation of the

agreement was not based on any specific contractual language,

nor has any contractual language supporting his interpretation

been brought to our attention by the town").

    Here, the arbitrator determined that the collective

bargaining agreement had been extended and was still in effect,

more than one year after the change in representation, on the

date of the February 1, 2021 incident.   She explained that the

agreement contained a specific duration term with "key

language":   it would terminate on June 30, 2019, unless extended
                                                                  12

by mutual consent or if "either party hereto gives written

notice to the other not less than sixty (60) days prior to the

date of expiration, of a desire to change or amend the terms or

conditions."2   The arbitrator found that this condition was

satisfied via the city solicitor's e-mail message to the union

on January 31, 2019, not less than sixty days before the

deadline, where she stated that she "was hoping to schedule our

initial meetings for bargaining."   The city apparently did not

contest the determination of extension either at arbitration or

before the Superior Court judge, except to argue that the

extension terminated once there was a change in representation:

the arbitrator stated that "[t]he [c]ity provide[d] no answer

. . . in its brief" to her analysis that the notice extended the

contract; and the judge observed that "[t]he [c]ity concede[d]

that by its own terms the [agreement] was extended beyond its

nominal termination date by the [c]ity's conduct and therefore

     2 This is a type of "evergreen" clause: language in a
collective bargaining agreement providing that the terms will
remain in effect while the parties negotiate a new contract.
Because the statute limited the express term of a collective
bargaining agreement to three years, G. L. c. 150E, § 7 (a),
this court ruled that an agreement could not be extended beyond
three years via an evergreen clause, see Boston Hous. Auth. v.
National Conference of Firemen & Oilers, Local 3, 458 Mass. 155,
164 (2010). However, the Legislature subsequently amended the
statute to expressly allow such provisions. See G. L. c. 150E,
§ 7 (a), as amended through St. 2011, c. 198, § 1; State Police
Ass'n of Mass. v. Alben, 97 Mass. App. Ct. 366, 372 (2020).
                                                                    13

[did] not argue that the arbitration was invalid because the

[agreement] had expired."

     The arbitrator appeared to consider the change in

representation to be of no import regarding her interpretation

of the continuation of the contract.     For support, she drew on

the Appeals Court decision in Watertown.    Although we do not

second-guess her interpretation of the agreement or the law of

the shop, we do not defer to her additional reliance on public

law, including the correct application of the Appeals Court

decision in Watertown, on an issue concerning arbitrability.

See Zagaeski, 469 Mass. at 111-112; Watertown, 63 Mass. App. Ct.

at 289.   We agree with her analysis on this issue as well, for

the reasons discussed infra, but we nonetheless owe her no

deference in this regard as this raises a public law issue

regarding arbitrability, which must be decided by the court.

See Zagaeski, supra at 112.   See also John Wiley & Sons, Inc.,

376 U.S. at 546-547 (requiring court and not arbitrator to

decide whether arbitration clause in collective bargaining

agreement survives corporate merger).3

     3 Finally, we note that the arbitrator's decision is further
supported by the city's recognition that all the other
provisions in the contract continued in force to this day, as
confirmed by counsel at oral argument.
                                                                 14

     3.   Change in union representation.   Because the agreement

negotiated by Local 25 had been extended, it was still in effect

when the NEPBA sought to arbitrate a dispatcher's termination.

The question then becomes whether a union can enforce an

arbitration agreement against an employer, when the employer

agreed to arbitrate with the predecessor union but not the

successor union.4

     4 This issue has not been consistently resolved under
analogous Federal law. The National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) has ruled that after a change in union representation,
"the new union may not compel the employer to arbitrate,"
because the employer did not consent to arbitrate with that
union -- although the employer must still arbitrate with the
predecessor union grievances that arose before the change in
union representation. Children's Hosp. & Research Ctr. of
Oakland & Serv. Employees Int'l Union, United Healthcare Workers
-- W., 364 N.L.R.B. 1677, 1680 (2016), citing Arizona Portland
Cement Co. & Local 296, Indep. Workers of N. Am., 302 N.L.R.B.
36 (1991). However, Federal courts have found that a successor
union can compel the employer to arbitrate pursuant to the
previous agreement. See Cincinnati Newspaper Guild, Local 9 v.
Cincinnati Enquirer, Inc., 863 F.2d 439, 445-446 (6th Cir. 1988)
(Cincinnati Newspaper) (employees' right to arbitrate "may not
be abrogated by the employer merely because the employees
subsequently see fit to change their agent"); Local No. 503 of
the Graphic Communications Conference of the Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters vs. Cascades Containerboard Packaging, U.S. Dist. Ct.,
No. 17-cv-6605 (W.D.N.Y. Dec. 19, 2017) (following Cincinnati
Newspaper but denying relief on other grounds); General
Teamsters Union Local No. 439 vs. Sunrise Sanitation Servs.,
Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct., No. S-05-1208 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2006).
The NLRB rule would create the awkward situation where the
employees vote out a union but must still rely on it for
arbitrations. Worse, if applied to cases like this one, where a
grievance arises after a change in representation, employees
would appear to lack any right to arbitrate grievances.
                                                                     15

    In a similar context in Watertown, the Appeals Court ruled

that when the grievance arises before a change in union

representation, the employer must arbitrate it with the

successor union, because the successor union "steps into the

shoes of its predecessor."   Watertown, 63 Mass. App. Ct. at 291.

In that case, as in this one, the previously negotiated contract

had been extended by an evergreen clause.     Id. at 288.   As the

agreement was in effect when the grievance occurred, the

situation is similar:    the successor union simply seeks to

enforce an arbitration agreement negotiated with its

predecessor.

    We determine that the employer must arbitrate the

grievance, as it has agreed to do so via the collective

bargaining agreement, and the successor union steps into the

shoes of its predecessor.    This conclusion is supported by three

aspects of the labor relations act.      First, the statute favors

arbitration as a means of resolving employment disputes once

parties have agreed that the disputed matters are subject to

arbitration.   See G. L. c. 150E, § 8.    At that point, the

presumption in favor of arbitration applies and "[d]oubts should

be resolved in favor of coverage."    Local No. 1710, Int'l Ass'n

of Fire Fighters, AFL-CIO, 430 Mass. at 421, quoting AT&T Techs.

Inc., 475 U.S. at 649.
                                                                     16

    Second, the statute provides for employees' free choice in

union representation.    "[M]ajority rule is a fundamental aspect

of American democratic government" and Massachusetts labor

policy.     Branch v. Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 481

Mass. 810, 827 (2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 858 (2020).      To

preclude a successor union from arbitrating grievances would

"penalize[] and indirectly intrude[] on the employees' right to

select new union representation," by forcing them to choose

between giving up their bargained-for grievance process or

sticking with a disfavored union.     Watertown, 63 Mass. App. Ct.

at 292.     The same principles apply here, even though Local 25

sent a letter disclaiming interest rather than losing an

election.    The dispatchers unanimously selected the NEPBA as

their bargaining agent, evidencing their desire to continue

being represented by a union.    Their right to arbitrate

grievances cannot be revoked just because they have switched

representatives.

    Third, an employer cannot unilaterally change terms and

conditions of employment.     "[T]he public employer and the

employee organization" must "negotiate in good faith" over

"terms and conditions of employment."     Somerville v.

Commonwealth Employment Relations Bd., 470 Mass. 563, 569

(2015), quoting G. L. c. 150E, § 6.     It is a "prohibited

practice" under G. L. c. 150E, § 10 (a) (5), for a public
                                                                    17

employer to make a unilateral change to a mandatory subject of

bargaining without first bargaining to impasse.    See Somerville,

supra at 570.    The terms of a grievance procedure for employment

disputes that culminates in arbitration is such a mandatory

subject.     See School Comm. of Newton v. Labor Relations Comm.,

388 Mass. 557, 563 (1983) (implementation of employee

terminations "involved the very essence of the relationship, the

employment itself, and not a peripheral matter").     See also 14

Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 256 (2009) (arbitration

is mandatory subject under Federal labor law).     Thus, until the

successor union and the city agree to a new contract or bargain

to impasse, all the key terms and conditions of the prior

contract must remain in effect, including the arbitration

provision.

    Conclusion.      The dispute at issue was covered by the

arbitration provision contained in the contract negotiated by

the city and the union that previously represented the

bargaining unit.     As found by the arbitrator within her

authority to interpret the contract and the law of the shop, the

contract, including the grievance and arbitration provision, was

extended and not terminated by the city.     Finally, we conclude

that the labor relations act empowers the successor union to

step into the shoes of its predecessor and enforce the

provisions of the extended contract, including its arbitration
                                                                18

provisions.   For all of these reasons, we affirm the judge's

order granting the NEPBA's motion for judgment on the pleadings,

denying the city's motion for judgment on the pleadings, and

confirming the arbitration award.

                                    So ordered.