Court Opinion

ID: 9907016
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-05 18:02:50.896111+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:55:40.928727
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/5/23 P. v. Bell CA2/7
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                         SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                      DIVISION SEVEN

 THE PEOPLE,                                                   B322496

           Plaintiff and Respondent,                           (Los Angeles County
                                                               Super. Ct. No. TA145962)
           v.

 CHIVON SUGAR BELL,

           Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Hector E. Gutierrez, Judge. Affirmed.
      Marta I. Stanton, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Blake Armstrong, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
                       INTRODUCTION

      A jury convicted Chivon Sugar Bell of gross vehicular
manslaughter under Penal Code section 191.5, subdivision (a).1
Bell argues substantial evidence did not support the verdict
because the evidence showed she acted with ordinary negligence,
but not gross negligence. Because a rational trier of fact could
have found Bell acted with conscious indifference to the
consequences of driving while under the influence of alcohol, we
affirm.

      FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

       A.    Bell’s Boyfriend Dies in a Car Accident
       One night in November 2017, Bell met her boyfriend, Alton
Ray Griffin, Jr., at a karaoke bar inside a bowling alley between
10:00 p.m. and 11:00 p.m. Bell later said that earlier in the
evening she had two glasses of wine at her cousin’s house and
that when she arrived at the karaoke bar she had a vodka and
cranberry drink.
       Approximately 90 minutes after she arrived at the bar,
Griffin drove Bell to a cash machine and then to a taco truck.
After they finished eating, Griffin began driving Bell back to her
cousin’s house, but he pulled over to the shoulder and told Bell he
was too intoxicated to drive. Bell had not driven Griffin’s car
before that night, but she got into the driver’s seat and proceeded
to drive toward her cousin’s house.
       At 3:15 a.m. a driver in the middle lane of the freeway
observed a sedan pass on his right traveling 80 miles per hour.

1     Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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Several moments later the driver saw the passenger side of the
sedan “clip” the rear driver’s side of a semi-truck traveling much
slower in the far right or slow lane.2 The driver did not see the
truck “make any swerving movements” before the sedan clipped
it while attempting to change lanes.
      The driver of the semi-truck was traveling approximately
50 miles per hour in the slow lane when his truck was hit from
behind. The truck driver was not braking, changing lanes, or
swerving. He saw the car that hit his truck spin in circles while
moving forward and eventually stop in the carpool lane.
      A third driver travelling 50 to 55 miles per hour while
merging onto the freeway saw the sedan pass him at 80 to
85 miles per hour. Five minutes later the driver saw the sedan
“really damaged” near the carpool lane.
      A paramedic arrived at the scene shortly after the accident.
The paramedic smelled alcohol while treating Bell in an
ambulance, and Bell told him “they had been drinking, went to
get some food, and were headed home.” Bell also told the
paramedic she was not driving the car, but the paramedic
observed Griffin’s body “half in, half out of the passenger’s seat.”
A California Highway Patrol officer also responded to the scene
and saw the lower half of Griffin’s body still seat-belted into the
car on the passenger’s side and the upper half of his body on the
pavement.
      Bell was transported to a hospital where California
Highway Patrol Officer Luis Murillo administered a horizontal
gaze nystagmus test and observed Bell’s eye jerk involuntarily,

2     A semi-truck is a combination of a tractor and trailer.
(Truck Trailer Manufacturers Association, Inc v. Environmental
Protection Agency (D.C. Cir. 2021) 17 F.4th 1198, 1200.)

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indicating intoxication. Officer Murillo also observed Bell had
red and watery eyes, and he detected a “strong odor” of alcohol on
her breath. Bell told Officer Murillo that she had two margaritas
at approximately 10:30 p.m., she was not under the care of a
doctor, she had not taken any medicine or drugs prior to driving,
and she had not had any recent surgeries. Officer Murillo noticed
Bell slurred her words as she spoke. Bell also told Officer Murillo
that she was not driving the car at the time of the accident and
that instead she was sitting in the back seat without her seat belt
on. Officer Murillo, however, observed a “distinctive mark of a
seat belt” on Bell’s left clavicle and bruising on her hip, which
were consistent with Bell wearing a seat belt at the time of the
accident. Based on Officer Murillo’s observations, he believed
Bell was under the influence of alcohol.
       Bell refused Officer Murillo’s request to take a chemical
test to determine the amount of alcohol in her blood. Officer
Murillo obtained a warrant to draw blood, and a nurse drew
Bell’s blood at approximately 8:00 a.m. the next morning.
A Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department laboratory technician
determined that, approximately five hours after the accident,
Bell’s blood alcohol concentration was 0.04 percent.

      B.     A Jury Convicts Bell of Gross Vehicular
             Manslaughter While Intoxicated
      The People charged Bell with gross vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated (§ 191.5, subd. (a)); driving under the influence
of an alcoholic beverage and causing bodily injury to another
person (§ 23153, subd. (a)); and driving with a blood alcohol
content of 0.08 percent or more and causing bodily injury to
another person (§ 23153, subd. (b)). Regarding the latter two

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counts, the People alleged Bell personally inflicted great bodily
injury, within the meaning of section 12022.7, subdivision (a).
      A jury found Bell guilty of gross vehicular manslaughter
while intoxicated,3 and the trial court sentenced Bell to the lower
term of four years in prison, imposed various fees and
assessments, and ordered Bell to pay restitution pursuant to a
hearing. Bell timely appealed.

                          DISCUSSION

      Bell argues substantial evidence did not support the jury’s
verdict because the evidence did not show Bell acted with a
conscious indifference to the consequences of driving under the
influence of alcohol. Bell contends she acted with mere ordinary
negligence, not gross negligence.

      A.    Applicable Law and Standard of Review
      “Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being
without malice. [Citation.] A conviction of gross vehicular
manslaughter requires: ‘(1) driving a vehicle while intoxicated;
(2) when so driving, committing some unlawful act, such as a
Vehicle Code offense with gross negligence, or committing with
gross negligence an ordinarily lawful act which might produce
death; and (3) as a proximate result of the unlawful act or the
negligent act, another person was killed.’” (People v. Batchelor
(2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1102, 1109, disapproved on another
ground in People v. Hicks (2017) 4 Cal.5th 203, 214, fn. 3; see
People v. Givan (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 335, 348-349; People v.
Diaz (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 743, 758.)

3     During trial the People dismissed the other two counts.

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       “‘[G]ross negligence is the exercise of so slight a degree of
care as to raise a presumption of conscious indifference to the
consequences. [Citation.] “The state of mind of a person who
acts with conscious indifferences to the consequences is simply,
‘I don’t care what happens.’” [Citation.] The test is objective:
whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would
have been aware of the risk involved.’” (People v. Ochoa (1993)
6 Cal.4th 1199, 1204 (Ochoa); see People v. Bennett (1991)
54 Cal.3d 1032, 1036; People v. Nicolas (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th
1165, 1171.) “In determining whether a reasonable person in
defendant’s position would have been aware of the risks, the jury
should be given relevant facts as to what defendant knew,
including his [or her] actual awareness of those risks. . . . [T]he
defendant’s lack of such awareness would not preclude a finding
of gross negligence if a reasonable person would have been so
aware. But the converse proposition does not logically follow, for
if the evidence showed that defendant actually appreciated the
risks involved in a given enterprise, and nonetheless proceeded
with it, a finding of gross negligence (as opposed to simple
negligence) would be appropriate whether or not a reasonable
person in defendant’s position would have recognized the risk.”
(Ochoa, at p. 1205; see Bennett, at p. 1038 [although the test for
gross negligence is objective, “[t]he jury should . . . consider all
relevant circumstances . . . to determine if the defendant acted
with a conscious disregard of the consequences rather than with
mere inadvertence”]; People v. Givan, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at
p. 346 [“a defendant’s lack of awareness does not prevent a
finding of gross negligence if a reasonable person would have
been aware of the dangers presented”].)

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       “[G]ross negligence may be shown from all the relevant
circumstances, including the manner in which the defendant
operated his [or her] vehicle, the level of his [or her] intoxication,
and any other relevant aspects of his [or her] conduct.” (Ochoa,
supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1207; see People v. Givan, supra,
233 Cal.App.4th at p. 349.) Gross negligence, however, “‘cannot
be shown by the mere fact of driving under the influence and
violating the traffic laws.’” (People v. Batchelor, supra,
229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1109; see People v. Hansen (1992)
10 Cal.App.4th 1065, 1075 (Hansen) [“that a defendant drives a
motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol and violates a
traffic law is insufficient to constitute gross negligence”]; People
v. Von Staden (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 1423, 1427 [same].)
       “‘The proper test for determining a claim of insufficiency of
evidence in a criminal case is whether, on the entire record, a
rational trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. [Citations.] On appeal, we must view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the People and must
presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact
the trier could reasonably deduce from the evidence. [Citation.]
[¶] Although we must ensure the evidence is reasonable,
credible, and of solid value, nonetheless it is the exclusive
province of the trial judge or jury to determine the credibility of a
witness and the truth or falsity of the facts on which that
determination depends. [Citation.] Thus, if the verdict is
supported by substantial evidence, we must accord due deference
to the trier of fact and not substitute our evaluation of a witness’s
credibility for that of the fact finder.’” (Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at
p. 1206; accord, People v. Morales (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 978,
988.) “‘The conviction shall stand “unless it appears ‘that upon

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no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support [the conviction].’”’” (People v. Suazo (2023)
95 Cal.App.5th 681, 691; see People v. Cravens (2012) 53 Cal.4th
500, 508.)

      B.      Substantial Evidence Supported the Jury’s Finding
              Bell Acted with Gross Negligence
       Bell’s only argument is that substantial evidence did not
support the jury’s finding on the second element of gross
vehicular manslaughter, namely, that she acted with gross
negligence. The People introduced evidence showing Bell drove
at least 15 miles per hour over the speed limit, passed cars on the
right while speeding, had a blood alcohol content in the range of
0.12 to 0.18 percent at the time of the accident, and had received
instruction on the dangers of driving under the influence of
alcohol as part of her training as a train operator for the
Metropolitan Transit Authority. This evidence, none of which
Bell disputes, was sufficient to support the verdict. (See People v.
Givan, supra, 233 Cal.App.4th at pp. 340-341 [substantial
evidence supported a conviction for gross vehicular manslaughter
where the defendant drove between 68 and 79 miles per hour in a
50-mile-per-hour zone, ran through a red light, and had a blood
alcohol content of 0.17 percent one hour after the accident];
People v. Batchelor, supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 1110
[substantial evidence supported a conviction for gross vehicular
manslaughter where the defendant crashed into a tree after
exceeding the speed limit by 10 to 17 miles per hour with a blood
alcohol content of 0.13 percent to 0.24 percent and had attended a
“first-time offender program that addressed the dangers of
driving under the influence of alcohol”]; see also People v.

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Bennett, supra, 54 Cal.3d at pp. 1034-1035 [jury could find gross
negligence from evidence the defendant wove in and out of traffic,
passed several cars on a blind curve, exceeded the speed limit by
10 miles per hour, lost control of his car at the bottom of a hill,
and had a blood alcohol content of 0.20 percent two hours after
the accident].)
       Bell’s blood alcohol content may have been lower than the
blood alcohol content of the defendants in these cases, but she
drove at least 15 miles per hour over the speed limit in the slow
lane, had a blood alcohol content of 0.12 to 0.18 percent (50 to
125 percent over the legal limit), and was aware of the dangers of
driving while under the influence of alcohol. This evidence was
sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Bell acted with a
conscious indifference to the consequences of her actions.
       Bell argues the evidence did not support a finding of gross
negligence because she “did not believe that she was too impaired
to drive,” she “lost control of [Griffin’s] muscle car” because she
was unfamiliar with it, she had not suffered a prior conviction for
driving under the influence or attend a course on alcohol
awareness, and no one warned her not to drive that night
because she was too intoxicated. Citing only evidence in her
favor, however, does not meet Bell’s burden to show substantial
evidence did not support the jury’s the verdict. (See People v.
Cardenas (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 220, 228 [defendant’s argument
the verdict was not supported by substantial evidence
“misfocuse[d] on the evidence favorable to his position” and did
not affirmatively demonstrate that the evidence supporting the
verdict was insufficient]; People v. Sanghera (2006)
139 Cal.App.4th 1567, 1573 [defendant cannot show a verdict
lacked substantial evidence “by citing only his own evidence”].)

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Where, as here, the evidence reasonably justified the jury’s
findings, “‘a reviewing court’s conclusion [that] the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does
not warrant the judgment’s reversal.’” (People v. Tran (2022)
13 Cal.5th 1169, 1204; see People v. Ramirez (2022) 13 Cal.5th
997, 1118.)
       Bell’s reliance on Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th 1199 and Hansen,
supra, 10 Cal.App.4th 1065 is misplaced. In Ochoa the Supreme
Court held the evidence showed “no ‘mere’ traffic violation while
intoxicated” and supported a conviction for gross vehicular
manslaughter. The evidence in that case was that the
“defendant, (a) having suffered a prior conviction for driving
under the influence of alcohol, (b) having been placed on
probation, (c) having attended traffic school, including an alcohol-
awareness class, and (d) being fully aware of the risks of such
activity, nonetheless (e) drove while highly intoxicated, (f) at
high, unsafe and illegal speeds, (g) weaving in and out of
adjoining lanes, (h) making abrupt and dangerous lane changes
(i) without signaling, and (j) without braking to avoid colliding
with his victims’ vehicle.” (Ochoa, at pp. 1207-1208.) The
Supreme Court held “the trier of fact could conclude from
defendant’s course of conduct and preexisting knowledge of the
risks that he exercised so slight a degree of care as to exhibit a
conscious indifference or ‘I don’t care attitude’ concerning the
ultimate consequences of his actions.” (Id. at p. 1208.)
       In Hansen, which did not involve whether substantial
evidence supported the conviction, the issue was whether the
defendant’s failure to ensure his passengers were restrained by
seat belts could constitute the “‘commission of an unlawful act’ or
the ‘commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an

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unlawful manner,’ within the meaning of [section] 191.5,
subdivision (a).” (Hansen, supra, 10 Cal.App.4th at p. 1078.) In
that case, however, the jury convicted the defendant, who drove
off a cliff killing one of two passengers in his car, of gross
vehicular manslaughter where the defendant drove more than
40 miles per hour on curves “that should have been driven at
20 or 25 miles per hour,” denied multiple requests from one
passenger to pull over and let her out, and had a blood alcohol
content of 0.20 percent several hours after the accident. (Id. at
pp. 1069-1070.)
       Contrary to Bell’s suggestion, Ochoa and Hansen do not
stand for the proposition the defendant, to be convicted of gross
vehicular manslaughter, must have taken “an alcohol-awareness
class,” been previously convicted of driving under the influence,
or been told not to drive. Such facts were relevant in those cases
because they tended to show a person in the defendant’s position
would be aware of the risk of driving while impaired. (See, e.g.,
Ochoa, supra, 6 Cal.4th at p. 1208 [alcohol awareness class was
relevant to the defendant’s “preexisting knowledge” of the risks of
driving under the influence of alcohol].) Here, the People
presented evidence Bell had a similar awareness from her
training as a train operator “on how dangerous it is to drive
under the influence of alcohol,” and Bell admitted she could not
operate a train with a blood alcohol content of more than
0.04 percent. The jury could infer from this evidence Bell knew
driving under the influence after only one or two drinks was
dangerous. (See People v. Tran, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 1204
[reviewing court accepts the logical inferences a jury could draw
from circumstantial evidence]; People v. Miranda (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 162, 180 [same].) Indeed, the evidence arguably

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showed Bell “actually appreciated the risks” involved in driving
under the influence of alcohol “and nonetheless proceeded.”
(Ochoa, at p. 1205, italics omitted.) Substantial evidence
supported the jury’s finding of gross negligence.

                         DISPOSITION

      The judgment is affirmed.

                                           SEGAL, Acting P. J.

We concur:

             MARTINEZ, J.

             EVENSON, J.*

*     Judge of the Alameda Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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