Court Opinion

ID: 9638574
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 15:47:38.635519+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:22:20.238186
License: Public Domain

JOHNSON, Judge,
dissenting.
When Damon Jones failed to appear at the call of the trial list on December 8, 1988, the Honorable Abraham J. Gafni entered a judgment of non pros. This was nothing more nor less than is contemplated by Pa.R.C.P. 218. Without filing any petition to remove the non pros, Jones appeals directly to this court.
This case is both factually and procedurally identical with Williams v. Gallagher, 396 Pa.Super. 584, 579 A.2d 403 (1990). Both cases involve a criminal defendant/plaintiff suing his attorney for legal malpractice. As occurred in Williams, the majority in this case would utilize a three-prong test to determine whether grounds exist to support the opening of the judgment of non pros. As in Williams, the majority refuses to distinguish between (1) a direct appeal from the order entering a non pros and (2) an appeal from an order granting or denying a petition to remove the judgment of non pros.
By refusing to recognize the difference, the majority attempts to analyze and evaluate a non-existent petition to open or remove the judgment and then proceeds to analyze and evaluate the underlying complaint, as if a demurrer to the complaint was before us for review. I find troubling the references by the majority to Jones’ “omitted petition”, at page 522, and “his petition to open”, at page 522. There *407is no petition to open included in the certified record in this case.
Moreover, the docket entries certified to this court by the Prothonotary in and for Philadelphia County on June 28, 1989 and December 31,1990 contain absolutely no reference to either a petition to open or any attempt to file such a document. My colleagues apparently are willing to ignore Damon Jones’ malpractice in this malpractice action and review Jones’ claims as if a petition to open had been filed!
In Williams v. Gallagher, supra, I agreed completely with the most distinguished trial judge, Judge Gafni. I reviewed the certified record in that case and concluded that:
Judge Gafni appropriately limited himself to those matters which had been properly placed before him, both in administering the call of the list and in complying with Pa.R.A.P.1925. Were we to do the same, we would find no abuse of discretion on the part of the most distinguished trial judge.
... We need only determine what facts were available to Judge Gafni at the moment he entered the judgment of non pros. Until either [in this case—Jones] or the majority cites to something specific in the record certified on this appeal, which cited information was available to, and should have been known by, Judge Gafni at the time the list was called, I will continue to afford Judge Gafni the respect and credibility which is his due.
Williams v. Gallagher, 396 Pa.Super. at 590, 579 A.2d at 406, (Dissenting Opinion, Johnson, J.).
I reach the identical conclusion, on identical facts and identical reasoning, in the case before us. The reasoning and analysis contained in the majority opinion on this appeal parallels that contained in the majority decisions in Valley Peat & Humus v. Sunnylands, Inc., 398 Pa.Super. 400, 581 A.2d 193 (1990), petition for alloc. filed 979 E.D.Alloc.Dkt. 1990, November 5,1990, and Williams v. Gallagher, supra. *408I have attempted to set forth my position concerning these cases involving Pa.R.C.P. 218 in my dissents to those cases. 398 Pa.Super. at 411-419, 581 A.2d at 198-202; and 396 Pa.Super. at 588-591, 579 A.2d at 405-407.
My colleagues on the lead opinion suggest that the procedural history of this case is obscure and confused. I cannot agree.
The certified record is quite clear. Judge Gafni executed an order, dated December 8, 1988, which entered judgment of non pros. Copies of the order were sent to the parties on December 9, 1988. The order was filed in the Prothonotary’s Office in the First Judicial District on December 13, 1988. There are no pleadings contained within the certified record to support Jones’ contentions in his brief regarding any petition to open.
Only facts that appear in the record may be considered by this court on review. An appellate court cannot, and should not, consider anything which is not a part of the record in the case. Reilly by Reilly v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 507 Pa. 204, 214-215, 489 A.2d 1291, 1296 (1985); Commonwealth v. Young, 456 Pa. 102, 114-116, 317 A.2d 258, 264 (1974); McCormick v. Allegheny General Hospital, 364 Pa.Super. 210, 218-20, 527 A.2d 1028, 1032-33 (1987).
Until our court filed its decisions in Williams, supra, Valley Peat & Humus, supra, and Elcomp, Inc. v. Drolet, 398 Pa.Super. 203, 581 A.2d 203 (1990), the procedure to follow in cases involving Rule 218 was, in my view, quite clear. See Nivens v. Chestnut Hill Hospital, 373 Pa.Super. 377, 541 A.2d 365 (1988); Toczylowski v. General Bindery Co., 359 Pa.Super. 572, 519 A.2d 500 (1986).
The only order from which an appeal has been taken, and which is presented to this panel for review, is Judge Gafni’s order of December 8, 1988 entering judgment of non pros upon failure of a party to appear at the call of the list. I fail to see what a non-existent petition to open, or the allegations contained in the complaint, might have to do *409with the review of that order. As in Williams v. Gallagher, the only issue before us on this appeal is this:
When a case is called for trial, if without satisfactory excuse a plaintiff is not ready, may a court enter a non pros on its own motion without abusing its discretion?
I strongly believe that the answer to that question must be a simple yes, without embellishment. Since the lead opinion employs a manner of decision that seems to rely upon the majority opinions in Valley Peat & Humus, and in Williams, I must dissent. I agree that the order entering judgment of non pros must be affirmed, but for the reasons cogently and concisely set forth by Judge Gafni in his Opinion dated 6/15/89, and for no other reasons.
Where an appeal has been taken directly to an appellate court without the previous filing of a motion to vacate the judgment of non pros and without the evidentiary hearing which would follow, how can we expect our trial judges to divine whether the default that occasioned the entry of judgment can be reasonably explained? I feel we are placing an impossible burden upon our trial judges. I dissent.