Court Opinion

ID: 9839573
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-13 15:07:05.77907+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:40:56.130423
License: Public Domain

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

                                   No. 21-1783
                            Filed September 13, 2023

STATE OF IOWA,
     Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.

STEPHEN DEVON PHILLIPS,
     Defendant-Appellant.
________________________________________________________________

      Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Black Hawk County, Linda M.

Fangman, Judge.

      A defendant appeals his conviction and sentence for robbery in the first

degree. AFFIRMED.

      Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Bradley M. Bender,

Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.

      Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Zachary Miller, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee.

      Considered by Bower, C.J., and Tabor and Greer, JJ.
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TABOR, Judge.

       A jury convicted Stephen Phillips of robbery in the first degree. A judge then

sentenced him to serve no more than twenty-five but at least seventeen and one-

half years in prison. Phillips appeals, arguing (1) the State did not present sufficient

evidence of his guilt and (2) the court abused its discretion by imposing the

harshest mandatory minimum sentence allowed. Finding substantial evidence of

his guilt and no abuse of discretion in sentencing, we affirm.

       I.     Facts and Prior Proceedings

       Phillips accidentally recorded himself committing the crime. He was calling

his acquaintance, L.Y.-F., as he approached L.Y.-F. to rob him. L.Y.-F. didn’t

answer. But Phillips didn’t hang up—leaving L.Y.-F. a voicemail full of threats. On

the recording, Phillips can be heard saying, “give me your money” and “I’m gonna

tie your ass up,” as well as “I’m gonna lay you down” and “I’m gonna kill you.”

Phillips also said: “[g]ive me that bread” and “[y]ou guys have ten seconds to give

me whatever you guys have” before he began counting down. L.Y.-F., who was

outside his girlfriend’s house barbecuing, asked Phillips if he was serious. Pointing

a handgun at L.Y.-F., Phillips answered: “I will pop your ass.”

       Meanwhile, L.Y.-F.’s girlfriend, B.W., and her sister, J.W., rounded up their

children from the yard and took them inside to be safe. L.Y.-F. recalled that Phillips

rushed onto the porch, “trying to basically bogart his way in the door with the gun,

trying to point it in the door and shoot them.” J.W. described a “tug of war with the

door.” When they finally got it closed, she recalled Phillips “started beating on the

door.” To deflect attention from his family, L.Y.-F. reached into his pockets and

gave Phillips everything he had, including his cell phone, keys, and his EBT
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(electronic benefits transfer) card. Phillips took those items and left in a Honda

Accord belonging to J.W.1

       A few hours later, police caught up with Phillips in a Motel 6 parking lot. He

was still driving the Accord. As Phillips ran from police into the motel, he tripped

and tossed away a handgun.         That gun, which was unloaded, matched the

description of the weapon used in the robbery. Inside the Accord, police found

L.Y.-F.’s EBT card and phone. When police returned the phone to L.Y.-F., he used

his passcode to discover the incriminating voicemail.

       The State charged Phillips with robbery in the first degree, a class “B”

felony, in violation of Iowa Code sections 711.1 and 711.2 (2020). A jury found

him guilty as charged. At sentencing, the district court imposed the indeterminate

twenty-five-year sentence required by statute and found that “the mandatory

minimum of [seventy] percent” was appropriate. Phillips appeals his conviction

and sentence.

       II.    Analysis

       A. Substantial Evidence of First-Degree Robbery

       Phillips first contends the record did not support the jury’s verdict. To prove

first-degree robbery, the State had to satisfy these elements:

              1. On or about the 15th day of May, 2020, the defendant had
       the specific intent to commit a theft. . . .
              2. To carry out his intention or to assist him in escaping from
       the scene, with or without the stolen property, the defendant:
              a. Committed an assault on [L.Y.-F.] . . . OR
              b. Threatened [L.Y.-F.] with, or purposely put [L.Y.-F.] in fear
       of immediate physical injury, OR
              c. Threatened to commit Willful Injury . . . .

1 J.W. testified that she was there to pick up her daughter, parked in the driveway,

and left the keys in her car.
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              3. The defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon.

       In his most precise challenge, Phillips disputes element number one, the

State’s proof of his specific intent. He also highlights other perceived weaknesses

in the prosecution’s case—without specifying which element he is contesting. We

review his challenge for the correction of legal error. See State v. Burns, 988

N.W.2d 352, 370 (Iowa 2023). We defer to the jury’s verdict if it is supported by

substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence must be enough to convince a

rational jury that Phillips is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Jones,

967 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Iowa 2021). In deciding whether substantial evidence

supports the verdict, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,

including all legitimate inferences that we can fairly deduce from the record. Id.

       On the first element, Phillips argues that “one can speculate what [he] was

intending when he showed up to [B.W.’s house] with an unloaded handgun but

inferences that do no more than create speculation, suspicion, or conjecture do

not create a fair inference of guilt.” Phillips is right on the law, but wrong on the

facts. To learn his specific intent, we can just listen to the voicemail that Philips

left L.Y.-F. He told the victim point blank that he intended to take whatever

valuables he had. No conjecture necessary.

       Beyond disputing the proof of his intent, Phillips points to three alleged

shortcomings in the State’s case. One, the State offered no voice-recognition

expert to verify who was speaking on the voicemail. Two, the evidence was

inconsistent “on what type of weapon” he displayed that day.          Three, not all

witnesses reported that he banged on the door of B.W.’s house.
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       But those points don’t undermine the strength of the State’s case.      First,

the prosecution did not need a voice-recognition expert because L.Y.-F. verified

that the recording documented his tense conversation with Phillips. Second, the

record showed that Phillips brandished a pistol when he confronted L.Y.-F. The

kind of pistol is unimportant. A pistol fits the definition of dangerous weapon under

Iowa Code section 702.7. And “the State is not required to establish that a pistol

was loaded at the time of the offense to prove its character as a dangerous weapon

in a prosecution for robbery in the first degree.” State v. Nichols, 276 N.W.2d 416,

417 (Iowa 1979). Third, the jury could believe J.W.’s testimony that Phillips beat

on the door. See State v. Hunt, 801 N.W.2d 366, 377 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). And

even without that testimony, the State proved the elements of first-degree robbery.

We affirm the verdict.

       B. Exercise of Sentencing Discretion in Setting Mandatory Minimum

       Phillips next argues the district court abused its discretion by imposing a

seventy-percent mandatory minimum for his first-degree robbery sentence. We

review his sentence for the correction of legal error. See State v. Damme, 944

N.W.2d 98, 103 (Iowa 2020). We will find error if the sentencing court abused its

discretion or Phillips can show a defect in the sentencing procedure. See id.

       Two sentencing statutes are at play. Under Iowa Code section 902.12(3),

a person serving a sentence for first-degree robbery “shall be denied parole or

work release until the person has served between one-half and seven-tenths of

the maximum term of the person’s sentence as determined under section 901.11,

subsection 3.” As cross-referenced, under section 901.11(3), the district court

must decide when the robbery offender shall first become eligible for parole or
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work release under the parameters of section 902.12(3). In making that decision,

the court must consider “all pertinent information including the person’s criminal

record, a validated risk assessment, and the negative impact the offense has had

on the victim or other persons.” Iowa Code § 901.11(3).

       At Phillips’s sentencing, the State urged the court to impose the highest

mandatory minimum, seventy percent, pointing to (1) his recent domestic abuse

assault convictions, (2) the effect of this robbery on L.Y.-F. and his family, and

(3) the Iowa Risk Revised (IRR) assessment that Phillips ranked in “a high

category for future violence.” The prosecutor also noted that Phillips was twenty-

eight years old. Defense counsel asked the court to impose the lowest mandatory

minimum, fifty percent, pointing to Phillips’s “relatively limited adult criminal history”

and the fact that the gun was unloaded during the robbery. Counsel also argued

the court should give the IRR assessment “less weight, because there is very little

data on what those conclusions are based upon.”

       The sentencing court adopted the State’s recommendation and revealed its

thought process: “I am considering, Mr. Phillips, your criminal history, the nature

of the offense that you committed, your age, your education, your needs, and the

needs of society.     I’m also considering the information contained in both the

presentence report and the addendum.” The court conceded, “it’s true that your

criminal history consists of three misdemeanors.”             But it noted that those

misdemeanors involved domestic violence and his conduct was increasing “in

severity”—including a conviction for strangulation. The court also acknowledged

the defense concern with the risk assessment, but noted its statutory duty to

consider that factor. The court stated: “If the risk assessment suggests that he is
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in a moderate/high category for future victimization, that concerns the Court

greatly.” Finally, the court mentioned the victim impact:

       I think it’s significant to note and remember that the victim and his
       family actually fled the state of Iowa because they were afraid of Mr.
       Phillips; and they were afraid to testify, and they were afraid to be
       back in the state in case something were to happen to them. So
       certainly there has been a great negative impact on the victim and
       his family.

       On appeal, Phillips maintains the sentencing court did not consider “all

pertinent information.” For example, he notes that he has earned his GED, has

two children, and denies using controlled substances. But that information was

included in the presentence investigation report, which the district court expressly

considered. All in all, the sentencing court did a careful analysis of the pertinent

factors and reached a reasoned decision about the mandatory minimum. See

State v. Dixon, No. 19-2007, 2021 WL 5106052, at *7 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 3, 2021)

(“The record does not support Dixon’s contention the court failed to consider the

relevant factors when sentencing Dixon.”). We find no abuse of discretion.

       AFFIRMED.