Court Opinion

ID: 9656628
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 19:52:47.7571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:33.802063
License: Public Domain

RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge,
dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. The right of an accused to have a trial by jury is a fundamental procedural safeguard protected by Missouri’s Constitution. When the legislature amended section 558.014 after State v. Mitchell, 659 S.W.2d 4 (Mo.App.1983), it did not choose to amend the statute to allow court-martial convictions to qualify as prior convictions. Moreover, under the rule of lenity, any ambiguity should be resolved in the defendant’s favor.
The purpose of the Military Justice System is to maintain discipline and duty and promote efficiency and effectiveness in the military establishment. Manual for Court-Martial, R.C.M. Part I, Para. 3 (2000); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137, 140, 73 S.Ct. 1045, 97 L.Ed. 1508 (1953). As such, the rights of individuals in the military can be conditioned and prefaced on maintaining such order. Id. No other jurisdiction of law in the United States holds comparable purposes.
Missouri’s criminal statutes are to protect the public and its citizens from crime and to punish offenders; however, they also protect the accused by providing due *742process of law, including a right to a trial by jury. The right to trial by jury ensures an individual receives due process of law by preventing government oppression. Id. As such, Missouri holds the right to a trial by jury inviolate. Mo. Const. art. I, section 22(a). Moreover, Missouri has decided that the right to a trial by jury requires twelve impartial jurors and a unanimous finding of guilt. State v. Hadley, 815 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. banc 1991); Mo. Const. art. I, section 22(a).
The Uniform Code of Military Justice is premised on maintaining the effectiveness and efficiency of the military by protecting the order and discipline of the organization. The military accomplishes this is by allowing a general court-martial panel to be comprised of five members. 10 U.S.C. sec. 816(a) (2000). In cases that do not involve the death penalty, the panel can convict based on a two-thirds vote and sentence based on either a two-thirds vote or a three-fourths vote.1 10 U.S.C. see. 852 (2000). Moreover, the court-martial panel members are commissioned officers or warrant officers selected by the military judge; enlisted men are only selected if requested by the accused and if readily available. 10 U.S.C. sec. 825 (2000).
The Court of Appeals, Eastern District, found the military system of discipline “sufficiently foreign from our own system of criminal justice and from that of our sister states and federal government” with its lack of trial by jury. State v. Mitchell, 659 S.W.2d at 6.2 The court held that a court-martial conviction did not qualify as a prior offense for the purpose of enhanced statutory punishment under section 558.016. Id. That court was correct.
The Mitchell decision was issued in 1983. Since then the legislature has amended section 558.016, but has not altered the language to allow court-martial offenses to constitute a prior offense. In Missouri, there is a presumption that the enacting body acted with full awareness and complete knowledge of the state law at the time. State v. Rumble, 680 S.W.2d 939, 942 (Mo. banc 1984). By not amending section 558.016 to include court-martial convictions as prior offenses, the legislature can be presumed to have acted with full awareness of the holding in Mitchell that court-martial convictions do not constitute prior offenses. The legislature has evinced the intent not to include court-martial convictions as prior offenses.
“The rule of lenity gives a criminal defendant the benefit of a lesser penalty where there is an ambiguity in the statute allowing for more than one interpretation.” State v. Rowe, 63 S.W.3d 647, 650 (Mo. banc 2002). In this ease, the statute does not unambiguously demonstrate the state’s position that a court-martial conviction qualifies as a prior offense. Therefore, because this case involves construction of a criminal statute, it must be strictly construed and any ambiguity resolved in the defendant’s favor.
For these reasons, I would reverse.

. A death sentence requires unanimity. 10 U.S.C. sec. 852 (2000). A sentence of life imprisonment or confinement for more than ten years requires a three-fourths vote. Id.

. As noted by the principal opinion, several jurisdictions agree with this reasoning (including the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit), while several jurisdictions disagree.