Court Opinion

ID: 9958398
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-04-09 14:00:46.347239+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:18:22.749190
License: Public Domain

United States Court of Appeals
                            FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 21-5181                                                    September Term, 2023
                                                               FILED ON: APRIL 9, 2024

WILLIAM B. JOLLEY,
                       APPELLANT

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
                   APPELLEE

                           Appeal from the United States District Court
                                    for the District Columbia
                                      (No. 1:20-cv-00668)

       Before: WILKINS and CHILDS, Circuit Judges, and EDWARDS, Senior Circuit Judge.

                                        JUDGMENT

    This appeal was considered on the record from the United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, the briefs of the parties, and oral argument held on January 10, 2024. The court has
accorded the issues full consideration and has determined that they do not warrant a published
opinion. See D.C. Cir. R. 36(d). It is:

                 ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the appeal be DISMISSED.

                                              * * *
     In 2018, Petitioner William Jolley filed two pro se administrative appeals under the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”) with the Merit Systems
Protection Board (“MSPB”). See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4335. While his appeals before the MSPB
were pending, Jolley brought a separate suit in the District Court, challenging the constitutionality
of the appointments of the MSPB’s Administrative Judges (“AJs”) and the statutory review scheme
to which his claims were subject. The District Court dismissed Jolley’s claims for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction, pursuant to Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich, 510 U.S. 200 (1994). Jolley then
appealed to this court to overturn the District Court’s dismissal of his case. However, before this
court could decide Jolley’s appeal, his proceedings before the MSPB concluded. This renders his
constitutional claims moot. Because we have no authority to decide moot claims, see Iron Arrow
Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983), we dismiss Jolley’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

                                                   I.

      “A special statutory review scheme . . . may preclude district courts from exercising
jurisdiction over challenges to federal agency action.” Axon Enter., Inc. v. FTC, 598 U.S. 175, 185
(2023). The Supreme Court has said that “in cases involving delayed judicial review of final
agency actions, we shall find that Congress has allocated initial review to an administrative body
where such intent is fairly discernible in the statutory scheme.” Thunder Basin Coal Co. v. Reich,
510 U.S. 200, 207 (1994) (footnote and quotation omitted). “Whether a statute is intended to
preclude initial judicial review is determined from the statute’s language, structure, and purpose,
its legislative history, and whether the claims can be afforded meaningful review.” Id. (citation
omitted). To determine whether a statutory review scheme affords a claim “meaningful review,”
the Court has set forth three factors. See id. First, could “a finding of preclusion . . . foreclose all
meaningful judicial review”? Id. at 212-13. Second, is the claim “wholly collateral to [the] statute’s
review provisions”? Id. at 212 (quotations omitted). And, finally, is the claim “outside the agency’s
expertise”? Id.

     The Supreme Court recently amplified the Thunder Basin test in Axon. The plaintiffs in Axon
were respondents in administrative enforcement actions before the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”). The respondents sued in
district court seeking to enjoin the FTC and SEC proceedings prior to any Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”) decisions in the agency enforcement actions. “Each suit charged that some
fundamental aspect of the Commission’s structure violate[d] the Constitution; that the violation
made the entire proceeding unlawful; and that being subjected to such an illegitimate proceeding
cause[d] legal injury (independent of any rulings the ALJ might make).” Axon, 598 U.S. at 182. In
particular, respondents claimed that the agencies’ ALJs were insufficiently accountable to the
President, in violation of separation-of-powers principles. And one respondent attacked as well the
combination of prosecutorial and adjudicatory functions in a single agency. The Supreme Court
said that “[t]he challenges [we]re fundamental, even existential. They maintain[ed] in essence that
the agencies, as currently structured, [we]re unconstitutional in much of their work.” Id. at 180.

     The Court in Axon concluded that, in applying the Thunder Basin factors, it was clear that the
district court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the respondents’ “sweeping constitutional claims.” Id.
at 189. First, the Court found that eventual review by a federal appellate court “would come too
late to be meaningful” because the claims considered were “about subjection to an illegitimate
proceeding, led by an illegitimate decisionmaker. . . . A proceeding that has already happened
cannot be undone.” Id. at 191. That these claims were structural also meant they were collateral to
the relevant statutes’ review provisions, because they “challeng[ed] the Commissions’ power to
proceed at all, rather than actions taken in the agency proceedings.” Id. at 192. Finally, because
these claims involved “standard questions of administrative and constitutional law, detached from
considerations of agency policy,” they did not implicate either agency’s special expertise. Id. at
194 (quotations omitted).
                                                   II.

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     The statutory review scheme at issue in the instant case is contained in USERRA, which
creates a tiered system of review for claims by veterans alleging employment discrimination under
the statute. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4322-4324. Veterans asserting claims against private employers can bring
their actions in federal district court. Id. § 4323(b)(3). Veterans bringing claims against state
employers generally must bring their actions in state court, id. § 4323(b)(2), and veterans whose
USERRA claims lie against a federal employer must initiate administrative appeals before the
MSPB, with the prospect of eventual review in the Federal Circuit, id. § 4324.

     As noted above, Jolley filed two pro se administrative appeals with the MSPB in 2018. He
asserted employment discrimination claims under USERRA and raised a constitutional challenge
to the appointments of the MSPB’s AJs. The appeals were consolidated, and the Appointments
Clause question was certified to the MSPB, with the proceedings stayed pending its resolution. At
the time, the MSPB lacked the requisite number of members to form a quorum and could not
decide the question.

     While his USERRA actions were pending before the MSPB, Jolley filed suit (pro se again) in
the District Court. In this suit, he challenged the constitutionality of having to proceed with his
USERRA claims in the MSPB’s administrative review process instead of in a federal district court.
He pressed three claims: First, he alleged that USERRA’s separate channels of review for veterans
in private employment and in federal employment violated the Equal Protection Clause by creating
two unequal classes of veterans. Second, he alleged that the MSPB and its AJs unconstitutionally
exercise Article III power when reviewing USERRA claims. Third, he alleged that the MSPB’s
AJs were not appointed in accordance with the Appointments Clause.

     The Government moved to dismiss, and Jolley moved for partial summary judgment on his
Appointments Clause claim. The District Court granted the Government’s motion and dismissed
Jolley’s claims for want of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that USERRA’s comprehensive
review scheme precluded federal district court jurisdiction over Jolley’s suit.

     Jolley filed a timely appeal to this court. During the pendency of his appeal, this court ordered
that the appeal be held in abeyance while the Supreme Court resolved Axon, 598 U.S. 175. Around
the same time this court ordered that the appeal be held in abeyance, the MSPB attained a quorum.
See U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., Frequently Asked Questions about the Lack of Quorum Period and
Restoration of the Full Board (updated Jul. 12, 2023), https://perma.cc/8Q8Z-S9NJ. The MSPB
then acted to ratify its prior appointments of its AJs “as [its] own under Article II of the
Constitution.” U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., Ratification Order (Mar. 4, 2022), https://perma.cc/258E-
5EG6. The MSPB then addressed Jolley’s stayed appeals and found that its ratification order had
mooted his Appointments Clause challenge. Jolley v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 2022 WL
985832, at *2 (M.S.P.B. Mar. 31, 2022). In December 2022, a new AJ considered and denied
Jolley’s claims on the merits. Jolley v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 2022 WL 17902460
(M.S.P.B. Dec. 21, 2022). Jolley’s subsequent petition for review of the AJ’s decision was
dismissed as untimely. Jolley v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 2024 WL 245034, at *1 (M.S.P.B.
Jan. 22, 2024).

                                                  3
     On April 14, 2023, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Axon. This court then removed
Jolley’s case from abeyance, appointed Amicus counsel to present arguments on his behalf, and
ordered the parties to rebrief the case. Order (Jul. 11, 2023). In this order, we directed the parties
to address (1) Axon’s application to the case, and (2) the effect of any developments in Jolley’s
claims before the MSPB and Federal Circuit during the pendency of the appeal. Id.

                                                 III.

     At the court’s request, the parties have confirmed that all of Jolley’s MSPB claims underlying
his District Court action have been resolved and none remains pending. An MSPB AJ resolved
Jolley’s claims on the merits in December 2022. See Jolley v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 2022
WL 17902460 (M.S.P.B. Dec. 21, 2022). Jolley later petitioned the MSPB for review of the AJ’s
decision, but that petition was dismissed as untimely filed without good cause. Jolley v. Dep’t of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 2024 WL 245034, at *1 (M.S.P.B. Jan. 22, 2024). And our review has
confirmed that the contested USERRA actions before the MSPB and Federal Circuit that underlay
Jolley’s Axon action in the District Court are no longer live.

     Because Jolley’s contested USERRA actions have concluded, the constitutional claims he
raised before the District Court are moot. Jolley’s Appointments Clause challenge was rendered
moot by the MSPB’s ratification of its prior appointments of its Administrative Judges “as [its]
own under Article II of the Constitution.” U.S. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., Ratification Order (Mar. 4,
2022), https://perma.cc/258E-5EG6; see Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms &
Explosives, 920 F.3d 1, 16 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (Appointments Clause claim mooted
where actions were “ratified by someone whose authority to undertake such a ratification . . . [the
plaintiff] cannot challenge.”). Following the MSPB’s ratification, a new AJ heard Jolley’s
administrative appeals on the merits. This second hearing gave Jolley all the relief he requested:
adjudication by a properly appointed AJ. There is no more effectual relief available. Church of
Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (“[I]f an event occurs while a case is
pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant any effectual relief whatever to a
prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed.”) (quotation omitted).

     Jolley’s Equal Protection and Article III claims must also be dismissed. Like the plaintiffs in
Axon, Jolley styles his injury as a “‘here-and-now’ injury of subjection to an unconstitutionally
structured decisionmaking process.” Axon, 598 U.S. at 192 (quoting Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140
S. Ct. 2183, 2196 (2020)). But, as the Supreme Court stated clearly in Axon, “[a] proceeding that
has already happened cannot be undone.” Id. at 191. We cannot turn back the clocks on Jolley’s
USERRA claims to give Jolley relief from any injury he alleges to have suffered. Given that
Jolley’s administrative proceedings have concluded, “[j]udicial review of [his] structural
constitutional claims [comes] too late to be meaningful.” Id.; see also McBryde v. Comm. to
Review, 264 F.3d 52, 55 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (“If events outrun the controversy such that the court
can grant no meaningful relief, the case must be dismissed as moot.”).

    Because the MSPB proceedings referenced by Jolley’s District Court complaint have

                                                  4
concluded, Jolley’s federal court suit no longer touches upon any live MSPB action. Even
assuming, arguendo, that there might be some merit to his arguments relying on Axon, there is no
viable claim for us to remand to the District Court. Absent a pending and contested administrative
proceeding, Jolley lacks standing to challenge the constitutionality of USERRA’s administrative
review scheme. All he has is a “generalized grievance,” which is insufficient to present a
constitutional case or controversy. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572
U.S. 118, 127 n.3 (2014). And Jolley can make no claim of a “credible threat of enforcement,”
because his conduct is not subject to liability under USERRA. See Susan B. Anthony List v.
Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 159 (2014). Unlike a plaintiff asserting threatened government action as
a basis for standing, Jolley voluntarily chose to bring the contested administrative appeals through
the USERRA review scheme. See id. He is therefore bound by the MSPB’s disposition of the
claims raised in this case. Any judicial review of those claims was properly subject to the
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit.

     We leave for another day the questions that Axon poses. We do not decide whether Jolley’s
claims are of the “fundamental, even existential” kind that go “to the structure or very existence
of an agency” that the Supreme Court considered in Axon. See Axon, 598 U.S. at 180, 189. We
also do not address whether Axon’s holding is limited to enforcement actions or whether petitioners
bringing affirmative claims may bypass an administrative review scheme. See id. at 191. Nor do
we determine how, even if we were to assume the District Court had subject matter jurisdiction
over Jolley’s claims pursuant to Axon, the lack of a cause of action or waiver of sovereign
immunity should affect our disposition of Jolley’s claims.

                                            *    *   *

     Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 36, this disposition will not be published. The Clerk is directed
to issue the mandate forthwith. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(b); D.C. Cir. R. 41(a)(1).

                                           Per Curiam

                                                            FOR THE COURT:
                                                            Mark J. Langer, Clerk

                                                     BY: /s/
                                                         Daniel J. Reidy
                                                         Deputy Clerk

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