Court Opinion

ID: 9846860
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 03:49:38.231394+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:16:56.167094
License: Public Domain

O’CONNELL, J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion treats this case as if it were controlled by the Federal constitution, relying upon United States Supreme Court cases which support the conclusion that defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated. As a sovereign state, applying its own constitution, Oregon is bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court only to the extent that they guarantee a federal constitutional right to the defendant; this court is not bound to follow decisions of the United States Supreme Court which deny to our citizens a right which we find guaranteed to them in our own constitution.①
The majority opinion never discusses the question of whether, under the Oregon Constitution, defendant’s interest in privacy should be protected in this case, nor does the majority make any effort to evaluate the decisions which it relies upon. The decisions relied upon *173are not entitled to be accepted without question. In the long parade of cases involving the Fourth Amendment decided by the Supreme Court of the United States, there are numerous instances in which the court has employed reasoning and reached results subject to widespread criticism and in more than a few cases later repudiated by the court itself.②
*172“Our holding, of course, does not affect the State’s power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so.”
*173I would like to believe that in some of those instances this court would not have made the same error. The folly of an unquestioning obeisance to the rea*174soiling and pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States is demonstrated in our own ease of State v. Cartwright, 83 Or Adv Sh 141, 418 P2d 822 (1966), cert. denied, 386 US 937 (1967), where the majority of the court rested its decision upon the trespass formula pronounced in Olmstead v. United States, 277 US 438, 48 S Ct 564, 72 L ed 944, 66 ALR 376 (1928) and Silverman v. United States, 365 US 505, 81 S Ct 679, 5 L ed2d 734 (1961), which has recently been repudiated in Katz v. United States, 36 USLW 4080 (Dec. 19, 1967).
I believe that it is reasonable to predict that some of the cases relied upon in the majority opinion, particularly Cooper v. California, 386 US 58, 87 S Ct 788, 17 L ed2d 730 (1967) are doomed to the same fate as Olmstead and Silverman.
I would, then, examine the instant case a priori to determine whether under our constitution (Art. VII, §9) defendant has a legitimate claim to the preservation of his privacy.
If it were my choice alone, I would begin by implanting as a cornerstone in the interpretation of our constitution the principle recognized in United States v. Trupiano, 334 US 699, 68 S Ct 1229, 92 L ed 1663 (1948) (and later repudiated in United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 US 56,70 S Ct 430, 94 L ed 653 (1950)) that any search is unlawful if it is practicable for the police to obtain a search warrant. I expressed this view in State v. Chinn, 231 Or 259, 288, 373 P2d 392, 401 (1962), but my brethren chose to reject it.
But under any view, a search warrant is required unless “[t]here are exceptional circumstances in which, on balancing the need for effective law enforcement against the right of privacy, * * * a magistrate’s *175warrant for search, may be dispensed with.”③ Although this statement was made in 1948, it is still viable today.④ The exceptions which have been recognized are (1) searches incident to arrest, (2) consensual searches, and (3) searches after seizure authorized by statute (Cooper v. California, supra).
The majority opinion concludes that “[t]he search here was valid as incident to a lawful arrest.” The only explanation the majority gives for characterizing the search as incident to the arrest is that the car was searched within an hour after the arrest and the arrest was made within ten feet of the car and, therefore, “[t]he search was not too remote in time or place.” What difference should it make whether the car was ten feet or ten miles from the place of arrest; what difference whether the search was made one hour or one week after the arrest? Searches incident to arrest are not be tested simply by the tape measure and the clock; the test must relate in some way to the purposes of the Fourth Amendment or our own constitutional counterpart in Art. VII, § 9.
Searches incident to an arrest are permitted only if the circumstances attending the arrest require prompt police action that cannot await the obtaining of a warrant. The reason for the rule is explained *176in Preston v. United States, 376 US 364, 367, 84 S Ct 881, 11 L ed2d 777 (1964):
“* * * The rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction of evidence of the crime — things which might easily happen where the weapon or evidence is on the accused’s person or under his immediate control.”
The majority opinion notes these “traditional grounds for justifying a warrantless search,” but concludes that they are “not exclusive.” Relying upon People v. Webb, 56 Cal Rptr 902, 424 P2d 342 (1967), the majority treats these “traditional grounds” simply as “examples” of circumstances which may lead to the conclusion that the search is reasonable. No reason is given by the majority for this extension of warrantless searches other than the fact that the extension was recognized in People v. Webb, supra, and some other cases.
This reduces the judicial process to a game of citations — a game at which two can play, as the cases cited in the margin will demonstrate.⑤ If we propose to extend the permissible limits of warrantless search beyond the exceptions traditionally recognized, we should explain why it is desirable to do so when the *177search of vehicles is involved bnt not when the search of a house or other private place is involved.
It is clear that if the police, acting without a warrant, had searched defendant’s home rather than his car the search would have been illegal. "Where, as here, a car is so situated that there is no danger of losing the evidence it contains, it is difficult to understand why the limitations on search applicable to houses should not be applicable to cars.
Apparently the rule we now adopt does not permit the police to make a warrantless search of immobile cars as an incident of arrest in all cases — the search must be reasonable. But what is the test for reasonableness in these cases? If it is reasonable to search a car ten feet from the place of arrest, why would it not be just as reasonable to search a car ten miles from the place of arrest? And if it is reasonable to search a car one hour after arrest, why would it not be just as reasonable to search it one week after the arrest?
How, then, do we apply this new test of warrant-less search predicated solely upon its “reasonableness”? The answer is that it cannot be applied because “reasonableness” in the context of search and seizure is a meaningless term unless we know what standard we are applying. If we begin with the assumption that a search warrant is normally required but that it can be dispensed with under reasonable circumstances, we can apply this test and treat as reasonable those searches of vehicles made at the time of the arrest which are necessary to protect the officer or to avoid the loss of the evidence. But if these circumstances are not present, what other circumstances can account for dispensing with a search warrant? I think it will be apparent upon close examination that the rule of search *178and seizure of vehicles which the court now adopts is logically alien to the proposition that a search warrant is the basic protection afforded the citizen under our constitution or the federal constitution. The rule now adopted by the court appears to be that once a man is arrested in this state, the police may thereafter search his car (unless, perhaps, it is within the curtilage of his home).
The majority opinion attaches significance to the fact that the automobile was “an instrumentality of the crime.” This fact would certainly entitle the police to examine its exterior for fingerprints or perform any other tests which did not violate defendant’s constitutional right of privacy. But it is difficult for me to understand how the fact that the car was an instrumentality of the crime of rape has any relevance to the question of the legality of a warrantless search of its interior. Using the court’s reasoning, the pólice could also make a warrantless search of a man’s bedroom on the ground that it was an instrumentality of the crime of rape.
Implicit in the court’s position is the idea that the interior of a ear, unlike the interior of a building, is not an enclave of privacy, or if it is, at least, it is not protected against warrantless entry and search to the extent that a building is so protected. It may be conceded that one cannot and does not expect to have the same degree of privacy in a car as he has in his home.⑥ This does not prove that there are no areas of privacy within an automobile. A glove compartment in an automobile may be just as important to the owner as a dresser drawer at home in keeping personal effects *179free from public scrutiny. If an item is secreted in a glove compartment or elsewhere in the car, it is entitled to the same protection from warrantless search as items secreted in a home, subject, of course, to the rules of search incident to an arrest applicable to both. The fact that a car, or a home, is the instrumentality of a crime does not vitiate this constitutional protection.
The majority, although electing to rest the present case upon the ground that the search was incident to an arrest, suggests that the search could be sustained on the alternative ground that the automobile, having been lawfully seized and held as evidence, could be lawfully searched under the rationale of Cooper v. California, 386 US 58, 87 S Ct 788, 17 L ed2d 730 (1967).
There are a number of reasons why the court should not adopt or endorse Cooper v. California, supra. In the first place, it is so ambiguous that it is impossible to state its rationale. As one commentator has said, “it is at best conjecture to predict what will ultimately be the correct interpretation and the proper scope of the Cooper decision, as its ambiguity and its departure from the reasoning of Preston will doubtless result in a variety of interpretations by the lower courts.” The author adds, “[sjhould chaos result it can only be hoped that the Supreme Court will undertake to clarify the problem which it has created.”⑦
It is not necessary for us to adopt Cooper v. California, supra. By eschewing it we can avoid being drawn into the chaos which the case is almost certain to create. Secondly, even if we are to adopt Cooper, *180it is distinguishable from the ease at bar. In Cooper the car was seized because the officers were required to do so by state law. The statute provided that a vehicle used in the violation of the narcotics law was “ ‘to be held as evidence until a forfeiture has been declared or a release ordered.’” (Emphasis supplied by the Court.) The court said that “the reason for and nature of the custody may constitutionally justify the search.” 386 US at 60-61. The court then concluded that “[u]nder the circumstances of this ease, we cannot hold unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment the examination or search of a car validly held by officers for use as evidence in a forfeiture proceeding.” (Emphasis supplied.) 386 US at 62. Thus the case can be read to pronounce a rule relating only to searches authorized by forfeiture legislation.⑧
But regardless of whether Cooper v. California, supra, is given a narrow or broad interpretation, I believe it is indefensible. It permits a warrantless search under circumstances which provide no reasonable argument for making an exception to the search warrant requirement.
As I have already indicated, the confused reasoning in the Cooper case is characteristic of the reasoning in many of the opinions of the Supreme Court on the law of search and seizure. I diagnose this confusion as resulting from the failure to maintain a constant and consistent view of the essentiality of the search warrant in protecting the constitutional right of privacy. In some opinions the court sees the search warrant as a sine qua non of a legal search unless there are circumstances which justify a search without *181it. In other opinions the court tests the validity of a search solely upon the basis of its “reasonableness,” a test which is not related to the search warrant requirement and apparently to be applied as if the search warrant requirement did not exist.
This inconsistency was spawned by United States v. Rabinowits, 339 US 56, 70 S Ct 430, 94 L ed 653 (1950), where the court held that a search could be reasonable even though it was practicable for the police to obtain a warrant. This left the test for the legality of searches and seizures at large without any standard for determining what was reasonable and wholly without regard to the need for the judicial scrutiny provided by a search warrant. Although the test for reasonableness of a search was thus separated from the warrant requirement, the court on occasion continues to use language suggesting that a search warrant is necessary unless there is some compelling necessity for dispensing Avith it.
To avoid this kind of confusion, I would suggest that this court adopt the principle that a warrantless search is unreasonable unless it is impracticable for the police officer to obtain a search warrant. To be sure, this does not solve all of the difficult problems arising out of search and seizure, but it does establish a bench mark from Avhich Ave can operate Avith some measure of rationality. Thus, under this principle it would be reasonable to hold that the police may, without obtaining a warrant, search a vehicle if the search is necessary for the safety of the arresting officer, or to avoid the loss of evidence as a result of the mobility of the vehicle, or to prevent the escape of the accused, or for any other reason which outweighs the need for the judicial surveillance over police activity which the search warrant provides.
*182In the present case there appears to be no reason why the officers conld not have obtained a warrant to search defendant’s car. I would hold, therefore, that the search was illegal.

 This is recognized in Cooper v. California, 386 US 58 at 62, 87 S Ct 788 at 791, 17 L ed2d 730 at 734 (1967), where the court said:

 Some of the criticism of the court is severe. Professor Henry M. Hart, Jr. of the Harvard Law School, in appraising the court’s work during the 1958 term, said:
“* * « [F]ew of the Court’s opinions, far too few, genuinely illumine the area of law with which they deal. Other opinions fail even by much more elementary standards. Issues are ducked which in good lawyership and good conscience ought not to be ducked. Technical mistakes are made which ought not to be made in decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. The measured judgment of two thoughtful commentators expressed two years ago has lost none of its force in the two terms which have elapsed since: ‘The Court’s product has shown an increasing incidence of the sweeping dogmatic statement, of the formulation of results accompanied by little or no effort to support them in reason, in sum, of opinions that do not opine and of per curiam orders that quite frankly fail to build the bridge between the authorities they cite and the results they decree.’ It needs to be said with all possible gravity, because it is a grave thing to say, that these failures are threatening to undermine the professional respect of firstrate lawyers for the incumbent Justices of the Court * * The Supreme Court — 1958 Term, 73 Harv L Rev 84, 100-101 (1959).
Another critic, Professor Philip B. Kurland of the University of Chicago Law School, comments as follows:
“If it is inappropriate to expect elegance from a Court dedicated to egalitarianism, it is not unreasonable to hope for workmanlike quality. It is, nevertheless, an unfulfilled wish. Since example must again suffice, not only the Court’s more egregious ‘stylistic’ faults will be considered here; the failure of the Court to provide guidance for later litigation. In part this is due to the substitution of ‘hallowed catchword and formula’ in place of reasons.” The Supreme Court — 1963 Term, 78 Harv L Rev 143, 169 (1964).

 Johnson v. United States, 333 US 10, 14-15, 68 S Ct 367, 369, 92 L ed 436, 440-441 (1948). See also Stoner v. California, 376 US 483, 486, 84 S Ct 889, 11 L ed2d 856 (1964); Chapman v. United States, 365 US 610, 615, 81 S Ct 776, 5 L ed2d 828 (1961); Jones v. United States, 357 US 493, 499, 78 S Ct 1253, 2 L ed2d 1514 (1958).

 For example, in Preston v. United States, 376 US 364, 367, 84 S Ct 881, 11 L ed2d 777, 780 (1964), the court said:
“* * * [W]e must inquire whether the facts of this case are such as to fall within any of the exceptions to the constitutional rule that a search warrant must be had before a search may be made.”

 The following cases have regarded as illegal a search made of a vehicle where it could not be justified on the so-called “traditional grounds” referred to in the majority opinion: Smith v. United States, 335 F2d 270 (D.C. Cir 1964); United States v. Cain, 332 F2d 999 (6th Cir 1964); Sisk v. Lane, 331 F2d 235 (7th Cir 1964) (dictum); Staples v. United States, 320 F2d 817 (5th Cir 1963); United States v. Stoffey, 279 F2d 924 (7th Cir 1960); Shurman v. United States, 219 F2d 282 (5th Cir 1955); Rent v. United States, 209 F2d 893 (5th Cir 1954); Hart v. United States, 162 F2d 74 (10th Cir 1947).

 For example, the interior of a vehicle is normally more exposed to public view than the interior of a dwelling or other building.

 Comment, Constitutional Law: Delayed Search of Accused’s Vehicle without Warrant Reasonable under Fourth Amendment, 52 Minn L Rev 533, '540 (1967).

 It is therefore unnecessary for us to decide whether such legislative authorization would render the search valid under our constitution.