Court Opinion

ID: 9911746
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-20 19:02:24.809635+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T12:54:20.082629
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/20/23 P. v. Brooks CA3
                                           NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

                IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
                                      THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
                                                     (Sacramento)
                                                            ----

 THE PEOPLE,                                                                                   C098599

                    Plaintiff and Respondent,                                      (Super. Ct. No. 11F08623)

           v.

 ROY BROOKS,

                    Defendant and Appellant.

         In 2021, defendant Roy Brooks was serving a 29-year four-month sentence when
the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR) sent a letter to
the trial court recommending defendant’s sentence be recalled and he be resentenced
under former Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1).1 The trial court denied the

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code. Former section 1170,
subdivision (d) was later recodified as section 1170.03, subdivision (a)(1). (Stats 2021,
ch. 719, §§ 1-7.) Section 1170.03 was then recodified without substantive change
as section 1172.1, as of June 30, 2022. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 9.)

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request, but this court remanded the matter for rehearing based on intervening legislative
changes. On remand, the trial court again declined to resentence defendant. Defendant
now argues the trial court erred because there was insufficient evidence to show he was
an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety under section 1170.18, and he is entitled
to reconsideration of several sentencing enhancements based on Senate Bill No. 81
(2021-2022 Reg. Sess.). We do not find the trial court abused its discretion and will
affirm the trial court’s order.
                                   I. BACKGROUND
       In 2012, a jury found defendant guilty of assault with a firearm (§ 245, subd.
(a)(2)), shooting a firearm in a grossly negligent manner (§ 246.3), possession of a
firearm as a convicted felon (former § 12021, subd. (a)), misdemeanor criminal threat
(§ 422), and misdemeanor vandalism (§ 594, subd. (a)). (People v. Brooks (August 5,
2022, C093996) [nonpub. opn.].) “As to the assault count, the jury also found true an
allegation defendant personally used a firearm. (§ 12022.5, subd. (a).) The trial court
found defendant had three prior serious felony convictions. (§§ 667, 1170.12.) The court
proceeded to sentence defendant to an aggregate term of 29 years four months, comprised
of: eight years for the assault count (the upper term, doubled), plus 10 years for the
firearm enhancement; 16 months for the possession of a firearm count (one-third the
midterm, doubled), five years for each of the prior serious felony convictions, with one of
the sentences stayed under section 654; and time served for the two misdemeanor counts.
The court stayed the sentence on the discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner
count.” (Ibid.)
       In the direct appeal from defendant’s convictions, this court summarized the facts
of the case. (People v. Brooks (Feb. 26, 2015, C072134) [nonpub. opn.].)2 In short,

2 The People request we take judicial notice of our opinion from the direct appeal of
defendant’s case. Defendant does not object to the request. We will grant the request
and take judicial notice of the opinion. (Evid. Code, §§ 459, subd. (a) [“The reviewing

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defendant left his car with the victim, a mechanic, so the victim could work on the car.
The victim left with a friend to get dinner and returned to find that defendant had
smashed the windshield of the friend’s truck. Defendant arrived and admitted he had
smashed the windshield. The victim picked up a pipe, planning to smash defendant’s
windshield, but then threw the pipe over a fence. The victim heard a gunshot and turned
to see defendant pointing a gun at him from 20 to 30 feet away. The victim started
walking towards defendant and defendant ran away. Defendant called the victim shortly
thereafter and said he was going to “ ‘come back and finish the job.’ ” (Ibid.) This court
modified the judgment to correct a sentencing error regarding section 654, and affirmed
the judgment as modified. (People v. Brooks, supra, C072134.)
       In 2021, the Secretary of CDCR sent the trial court a letter recommending
defendant’s sentence be recalled and he be resentenced under former section 1170,
subdivision (d). The trial court declined to recall the sentence. Defendant appealed the
order, citing statutory changes to the resentencing statute made by Assembly Bill No.
1540 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 719). (People v. Brooks, supra, C093996.)
This court reversed the order and remanded the matter for reconsideration. (Ibid.)
       On remand, the court held a hearing, explaining that the first step of its analysis
would be whether defendant was entitled to a recall of his sentence. If recall was
warranted, defendant would be able to take advantage of any new sentencing legislation
that applied to his sentence. The parties agreed. The parties had defendant’s probation
report and a packet from CDCR outlining defendant’s criminal history and rule violations
he had incurred in custody.
       The prosecution argued defendant posed a significant risk to public safety given
his criminal history, which included prior convictions for assault with a firearm and
discharging a firearm in a grossly negligent manner. Although defendant was older, his

court may take judicial notice of any matter specified in Section 452”], 452, subd. (d)
[permitting a court to take judicial notice of records of “any court of this state”].)

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last convictions had occurred when he was already 60 years old, and he engaged in
violent conduct throughout his life. The probation report also showed defendant had
engaged in a “non-stop, continuous pattern of criminal activity” and had never been
crime free for any period out of custody.
       Defendant argued the “unreasonable risk of danger” language from the statute
required that defendant be likely to commit a “super strike” crime, such as murder,
manslaughter, or sex offenses, and defendant had never committed any of those crimes.
Defendant was 71 years old, had multiple medical issues, and used a wheelchair. Finally,
his only rule violations in prison were nonviolent.
       The trial court issued a written order declining to recall defendant’s sentence. The
trial court noted the statutory framework, observing there was a presumption in favor of
recall that could only be overcome if the trial court made a finding defendant was an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, meaning an unreasonable risk that defendant
would commit a new violent felony enumerated in section 667, subdivision (e). Citing
People v. Strother (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 563, the trial court determined the combination
of defendant’s criminal history, institutional behavior, and the absence of any trauma as a
contributing factor to the crime meant that defendant posed an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety.
       Defendant had “more than two dozen adult convictions” with “multiple felony
convictions involving firearms and three convictions, which the trial court found
constituted strike offenses within the meaning of the three strikes law. [Citations.] T[he
trial] court found it particularly noteworthy that all of defendant’s prior strike offenses
involved the use of firearms, and that defendant had already been convicted for an assault
with a firearm and grossly negligent discharge of a firearm.” Moreover, as the
prosecution noted, defendant had not been crime free for any “significant period of time”
when not incarcerated.

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       There was no evidence of any psychological, physical, or childhood trauma that
contributed to the offenses. While in custody, defendant had received “counseling
chronos” for violating count procedures and failing to meet work expectations.
Defendant received rule violation reports for being out of bounds and refusing assigned
housing-delaying a peace officer. These violations were spread out over time, indicating
defendant was unable to “comply with rules and regulations for a sustained period of
time.” He was not currently participating in any self-help programming, although he had
in the past. The trial court concluded defendant would likely commit “another violent
strike offense once back in society.”
       The trial court noted defendant had a total of five possible strike convictions on his
record and was clearly willing to commit the same strike offense multiple times. And, he
had a history of firearm offenses, a lack of self-help programming, and historic evidence
of his criminal behavior that demonstrated an inability to obey the law for “a meaningful
amount of time.” Thus, the trial court concluded he posed “an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety within the meaning of section 1170.18.”
       Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal.
                                    II. DISCUSSION
       Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion because there was
insufficient evidence to show defendant was likely to commit a “super strike” crime
listed in section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) if he were released from custody. We
disagree.
       Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) authorizes a court to “recall the sentence and
commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if
they had not previously been sentenced” at any time upon a recommendation from the
Secretary of CDCR or other specified persons.
       The goal of such resentencing is to “eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(2).) Section 1172.1, subdivision

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(a)(4) provides that, “In recalling and resentencing pursuant to this provision, the court
may consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record
and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that reflects
whether age, time served, and diminished physical condition, if any, have reduced the
defendant’s risk for future violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have
changed since the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice. The court shall consider if the defendant has experienced
psychological, physical, or childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse,
neglect, exploitation, or sexual violence, . . . and whether those circumstances were a
contributing factor in the commission of the offense.”
       Because the Secretary of CDCR recommended resentencing, there is a
“presumption favoring recall and resentencing of the defendant, which may only be
overcome if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,
as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 1170.18.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).) Section
1170.18, subdivision (c) states that “ ‘unreasonable risk of danger to public safety’ means
an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the
meaning of clause (iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section
667.” That clause includes several enumerated offenses, including several sex offenses,
“[a]ny homicide offense, including any attempted homicide offense,” and “[a]ny serious
or violent felony offense punishable in California by life imprisonment or death.” (§ 667,
subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).) We review the trial court’s determination for an abuse of discretion.
(People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 863.)
       Here, the trial court acknowledged the presumption in favor of resentencing and
explained it was determining whether there was an unreasonable risk defendant would
commit one of the felonies enumerated in section 667, subdivision (e). To evaluate this
risk, the trial court looked at defendant’s criminal history, behavior while in custody, and
the absence of mitigating trauma, all of which were factors permitted under section

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1172.1. As the trial court noted, defendant had over two dozen convictions as an adult,
beginning in 1971 and concluding with his most recent conviction. Defendant had
multiple felony convictions involving the use of firearms. In 1979, defendant received a
robbery conviction with a firearm use enhancement for robbing a convenience store at
gunpoint. In 1990, defendant received a conviction for possessing a firearm as a
convicted felon. In 1996, defendant was convicted of assault with a firearm, shooting a
firearm in a grossly negligent manner, and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon
for an incident in which he “entered the victim’s residence, fired a gun at the ceiling, and
threatened to kill the residents.”3 Although defendant had no violent rules violations
while incarcerated, he had disciplinary issues in 2013, 2015, 2019, and 2020, which the
trial court interpreted as another indication defendant could not follow rules and
regulations.
       Defendant argues a general pattern of criminal behavior is not enough to show
defendant was likely to commit a “super strike” offense, citing People v. Hoffman (2015)
241 Cal.App.4th 1304, People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 1138, and People v.
Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440. All of these cases are distinguishable, however; as the
People note, the defendant in People v. Hoffman had “no prior criminal history.” (People
v. Hoffman, supra, at p. 1310.) In both People v. Whitmill and People v. Moine, the
respective defendants had criminal histories that did not include violent or sexually
violent convictions, unlike defendant here. (People v. Whitmill, supra, at p. 1151; People
v. Moine, supra, at pp. 450-451.) And although the defendant in People v. Moine had
pending violent felony charges, two psychiatrists opined that he posed a “low risk for
future assault.” (People v. Moine, supra, at pp. 450-451.)

3 The 1979 conviction, along with the 1996 convictions for assault with a firearm and
shooting a firearm in a grossly negligent manner, were prior strike offenses in
defendant’s most recent sentencing hearing.

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          We find more comparable circumstances in People v. Strother, supra, 72
Cal.App.5th 563, which was cited by the trial court, and People v. Hall (2016) 247
Cal.App.4th 1255. In both cases, the defendants had criminal histories that included
violent crimes, leading the respective courts to conclude the defendants presented an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. (People v. Strother, supra, at p. 573; People
v. Hall, supra, at pp. 1265-1266.) In People v. Hall, for example, the defendant had no
record of misconduct in prison, but had regular criminal behavior over a two-decade
period that included two prior strike robbery convictions. Because the defendant had
received “numerous opportunities to reform,” but continued committing violent offenses,
“[t]he trial court could reasonably infer. . . that [the defendant] present[ed] an elevated—
and escalating—risk of not only threatening violence, but also using deadly force.”
(People v. Hall, supra, at p. 1266.) Here, as in Hall, defendant has an extensive criminal
history that includes violent strike offenses, including offenses that are the exact same
offenses for which he was most recently convicted. And, as in Hall, the trial court found
it relevant that defendant had no crime free periods, had demonstrated an inability to
reform or follow rules, and was thus at high risk of committing other violent offenses.
(Ibid.)
          We disagree with defendant’s argument that because defendant has not yet
committed a “super strike” offense, it was “irrational” to find defendant posed an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. A defendant need not commit at least one
such offense before a court can find he is at risk of committing another. (People v. Hall,
supra, 247 Cal.App.4th at p. 1266.) We likewise reject defendant’s argument that the
trial court failed to consider defendant’s age; this factor was raised both in the initial
recommendation letter from CDCR and in argument by defense counsel, and we see
nothing in the record to indicate the trial court refused to consider this fact. We thus
conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it declined to recall defendant’s
sentence.

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       As a separate issue, defendant argues portions of defendant’s sentence should be
reconsidered based on statutory amendments made by Senate Bill No. 81 (2021-2022
Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2021, ch. 721, § 1). But as the trial court noted—and the parties
agreed—the recall of defendant’s sentence was a prerequisite to resentencing. (See Dix
v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 456.) Thus, defendant would receive the
benefits of the new sentencing laws only if the trial court first decided to recall his
sentence. Because the trial court did not recall defendant’s sentence, he was not entitled
to a resentencing hearing and any new resentencing laws would not apply. We thus need
not reach defendant’s argument.
                                    III. DISPOSITION
       The trial court’s order declining recall of defendant’s sentence is affirmed.

                                                            /S/

                                                   RENNER, J.

We concur:

/S/

DUARTE, Acting P. J.

/S/

KRAUSE, J.

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