Court Opinion

ID: 9594201
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 00:28:01.712144+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:38:38.378999
License: Public Domain

Kelly, J.
(concurring in part and dissenting in part). I agree with the majority that the plaintiff has failed to make out a prima facie case under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act. However, I disagree that the evidence advanced to convince the factfinder that plaintiff was about to report suffices to establish a jury question.
i
Plaintiff Shallal alleges that she was engaged in protected activity under the act because she was “about to” report defendant Quinn’s abuse of alcohol and agency funds to the Department of Social Services. She asserts that Quinn’s activities violated DSS agency rules. She supports her claim with deposition testimony that describes her confronting Quinn with his violations. She also provides entries from her personal calendar that identify by date the people she spoke with about her desire to report Quinn.
I would hold that Shallal failed to present evidence that she had formed a definite intent to report to a public body in the near future. Without that intent, she could hardly be found to have been “about to” report, unless she was “about to” do it without knowing it.
Shallal established that she learned of Quinn’s abuses and recognized the need to correct the problem. However, recognizing that something must be done, and deciding without contingencies to do it, are distinct steps. What constitutes “about to” report is a function of the facts and circumstances of each case. Normally, the determination will involve a plaintiff’s *624state of mind and will be a question for the jury. However, as the Court of Appeals noted, there are cases in which the plaintiffs proofs are so lacking on this element that no reasonable juror could conclude that plaintiff was about to report. Unpublished opinion per curiam, issued February 28, 1995 (Docket No. 155006), slip op at 1. I see this as one of those cases. Like well-intentioned New Year’s resolutions never acted upon, Shallal’s showing that she recognized the offenses, and desired to report them if they did not end, are not evidence that she was “about to” report.
I am unpersuaded by plaintiff’s reliance on Lynd v Adapt, Inc, 200 Mich App 305; 503 NW2d 766 (1993). Rather, I believe that Shallal’s actions are distinguishable from those of the employee in Lynd. Betty Lynd presented evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that she had definitely decided to report employer misdeeds in the near future. The Court of Appeals reasoned that she
made several attempts to remedy what she believed to be improper practices by reporting the alleged abuse to her supervisors and the organization’s board of directors. She also contacted her state representative to leam whom she should contact to report the suspected abuse. [Id. at 306.]
The Court considered the fact that she reported the employer misdeeds after her termination. However, it correctly noted that an employee need not actually report after termination to be covered under the act’s “about to” report language. Id.
Whereas Betty Lynd reported to her supervisor and her employer’s board of directors, Janette Shallal merely discussed what could be done about Quinn with her supervisor and an honorary board member. *625She did not take the latter’s advice to report Quinn because she feared for her job. Perhaps she was not “about to” report, for the same reason. Unlike Lynd, Shallal did not call her state representative to learn where to report the abuse. Although it is not dispositive, Shallal did not report after her termination, either, as did Lynd. Finally, she never stated that she had decided to report Quinn in the near future.1
The majority disagrees with my finding insufficient evidence because plaintiff failed to report before or after termination, to get information on how to report or even decide to report soon. Ante at 619-620. The majority points out that the statute does not require any of these actions. Id.
Certainly, the statute requires no specific action. However, the actions I refer to, significant by their absence, represent the state of the plaintiff’s mind. If she had taken any of them, it would serve to convince a jury that she was about to report. Any of them would have been evidence that Shallal had formed the intention to report to a public body with immediacy.
*626As the majority notes, the common meaning of “about to” suggests a sense of immediacy. Ante at 612. (‘'Webster’s defines ‘about’ as ‘on the verge of’ when followed by an infinitive . . . .”) None of the actions Shallal did take indicates an intention to report soon to a public body. Thus, I respectfully disagree with the majority’s inference that my position reads into the statute something that is not there.
I find the majority’s analogy to the False Claims Act unpersuasive. As the majority notes, what constitutes protected activity under that act differs from what constitutes protected activity under the Whistle-blowers’ Protection Act. Ante at 618. Under the fca, evidence that an employee observed and confronted a defendant with her observations suffices to get the case to a jury. Id. Under the whistleblowers’ act, however, there must be evidence that the employee reported or was about to report.
Since the actions required of employees under the fca are clearly less stringent than those required under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act, the majority’s analogy loses force. If the Michigan Legislature intended to protect an employee who confronts an employee, as the FCA does, it could have done so. The New York Legislature wrote a stronger whistle-blowers’ law than ours.2 But the Michigan Legislature has seen fit to require either actual reporting or proof *627by clear and convincing evidence that an employee was “about to report.” It has refused to bring within the protection of the act an employee who discusses reporting and who approaches the employer and threatens to report, but takes no further action. Perhaps this is regrettable and should be remedied. However, the lawmaking that is appropriate is legislative, not judicial.
In conclusion, no reasonable jury could conclude from the fact that plaintiff discussed reporting Quinn and threatened him, that she had decided actually to do it and do it in the near future. Without some evidence of that decision, plaintiff could not have been “about to” report. Therefore, I conclude that the trial judge properly granted defendant’s motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10).
n
I would not reach the issue whether a causal relationship existed between the discharge and the protected activity. Rather, I would dismiss plaintiff’s claim because she failed to present evidence sufficient for a jury to find that she was about to report.
Mallett, C.J., and Brickley, J., concurred with Kelly, J.

 In her deposition, Shallal was asked if her testimony was that she had been “about to” report to a public body for a period of time, two or three years. She responded:
I think when this — these things came up, you know, those wrongdoings, and when they came up, and the feeling of reporting was thought about, it was — again, it was like trying to confirm the information, trying to find who would be the best to report it to, who would intervene in the most, you know, best way. And I think it took a while to be able to decide exactly when to do it. I wanted to do it but when it [was], you know — again, it was all part of a process that I felt . . .
The deposer then repeated the question and Shallal responded “yes.” This falls short of evidence that Shallal definitely had formed the intent to report the violations to a public body with some immediacy.

 New York’s equivalent to Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act provides that an employer cannot take retaliatory action against an employee if the employee
discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an activity, policy or practice of the employer that is in violation of law .... [New York Labor Law 740(2)(a).]