Court Opinion

ID: 9912975
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-26 16:37:57.748459+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:06:35.912654
License: Public Domain

134 Nev., Advance Opinion 11
                         IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

                   WILLIAM EDWARD BRANHAM,                              No, 74,743-COA
                   Appellant,
                   vs.
                                                                              Fi D
                   ISIDRO BACA, WARDEN,                                       DEC 1 3 2018
                   Respondent.
                                                                                       p•

                                                                                       ;LEFIX

                               Appeal from a district court order dismissing a post -Conviction
                   petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Second Judicial District Court, Washoe
                   County; Elliott A. Sattler, Judge.
                               Affirmed.

                   Rene L. Valladares, Federal Public Defender, and Jonathan M. Kirshbaum,
                   Assistant Federal Public Defender, Las Vegas,
                   for Appellant.

                   Adam Paul Laxalt, Attorney General, Carson City; Christopher J. Hicks,
                   District Attorney, and Terrence P. McCarthy, Chief Appellate Deputy
                   District Attorney, Washoe County,
                   for Respondent.

                   BEFORE SILVER, C.J., TAO and GIBBONS, JJ.

                                                    OPINION

                   PER CURIAM:
                               In this opinion, we consider whether the United States
                   Supreme Court decisions in Welch v. United States, 578 U.S.       , 136 S. Ct.
                   1257 (2016), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S.          , 136 S. Ct. 718
                   (2016), constitute good cause to overcome the procedural bars to a
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                   postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in which the petitioner
                   contends he is entitled to the retroactive application of a nonconstitutional
                   substantive rule.    Welch and Montgomery do not alter the threshold
                   requirement that, for a new substantive rule to apply retroactively, it must
                   be a constitutional rule. We hold the decisions in those cases do not
                   constitute good cause to raise a procedurally barred claim arguing a
                   nonconstitutional rule should be applied retroactively. Therefore, we
                   conclude the district court did not err by finding Branham failed to
                   demonstrate good cause or a fundamental miscarriage ofjustice to overcome
                   the procedural bars to his petition. Accordingly, we affirm.
                                           PROCEDURAL HISTORY
                               William Edward Branham was convicted in 1993 of first-degree
                   murder. The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Branham's conviction on
                   direct appeal. See Branham v. State, Docket Nos. 24478 & 24648 (Order
                   Dismissing Appeals, December 18, 1996). Thereafter, Branham filed a
                   timely postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, which was
                   resolved on its merits, and a subsequent, procedurally barred petition. The
                   district court orders resolving those petitions were affirmed on appeal. See
                   Branham v. State, Docket No. 45532 (Order of Affirmance, November 10,
                   2005); Branham v. Warden, Docket Nos. 33830 & 33831 (Order Dismissing
                   Appeals, February 15, 2000).
                               Branham filed the instant postconviction petition for a writ of
                   habeas corpus on April 7, 2017, more than 20 years after the remittitur was
                   issued from his direct appeal. He claimed he is entitled to the retroactive
                   benefit of the narrowed definition of "willful, deliberate and premeditated"
                   murder announced in Byford v. State, 116 Nev. 215, 236-37, 994 P.2d 700,
                   714-15 (2000), and, accordingly, his convictions should be set aside and he

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                   should receive a new trial wherein the jury is properly instructed. Although
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                   acknowledging his petition was subject to procedural bars, Branham
                   asserted the recent United States Supreme Court decisions in Welch and
                   Montgomery provided good cause to raise this claim. The district court
                   dismissed Branham's petition as procedurally time-barred, finding he failed
                   to demonstrate good cause or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to
                   overcome the procedural bars. This appeal follows.
                                                   ANALYSIS
                               Branham claims the district court erred by dismissing his
                   petition as procedurally barred. Branham acknowledges his petition was
                   subject to procedural bars, see NRS 34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b), (2), but he
                   argues the district court erred by finding he failed to demonstrate good
                   cause or a fundamental miscarriage of justice to overcome the procedural
                   bars. 1
                               The application of procedural bars is mandatory, see State v.
                   Eighth Judicial Dist. Court (Riker), 121 Nev. 225, 231, 112 P.3d 1070, 1074
                   (2005), but a petitioner may overcome the bars in one of two ways: (1) by
                   demonstrating good cause and actual prejudice, see NRS 34.726(1); NRS
                   34.810(3), or (2) by demonstrating actual innocence, such that a
                   fundamental miscarriage of justice would result were the underlying claims
                   not heard on the merits, see NRS 34.800(1)(b); Pellegrini v. State, 117 Nev.
                   860, 887, 34 P.3d 519, 537 (2001). As discussed below, we conclude the
                   district court did not err by finding Branham failed to overcome the
                   procedural bars.

                          'To the extent Branham also claims the district court erred by finding
                   he failed to demonstrate prejudice, because Branham had to demonstrate
                   both good cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural bars, see NRS
                   34.726(1); NRS 34.810(1)(b), (3), and because, as explained below, we
                   conclude he did not demonstrate good cause, we need not address this claim.
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                   Branham did not demonstrate good cause
                               To demonstrate good cause to overcome the procedural bars, a
                   petitioner must offer a legal excuse by showing "that an impediment
                   external to the defense prevented him . . from complying with the state
                   procedural default rules." Hathaway v. State, 119 Nev. 248, 252, 71 P.3d
                   503, 506 (2003). That is, a petitioner must show "that the factual or legal
                   basis for a claim was not reasonably available . . . or that some interference
                   by officials, made compliance impracticable." Id. (internal quotation marks
                   omitted).
                               Branham claims he demonstrated good cause to overcome the
                   procedural bars because the recent United States Supreme Court decisions
                   in Welch and Montgomery expand the reach of federal retroactivity
                   jurisprudence to state collateral proceedings.
                               In both Welch and Montgomery, the issue before the Court was
                   whether an earlier decision announced a new, substantive rule of
                   constitutional law that must be applied retroactively to cases that were final
                   when the earlier decision was rendered. See Welch, 578 U.S. at         , 136 S.
                   Ct. at 1261; Montgomery, 577 U.S. at       , 136 S. Ct. at 732-34. The question
                   in Welch was whether the prior decision constituted a new substantive
                   constitutional rule. 578 U.S. at , 136 S. Ct. at 1261. In deciding this
                   question, the Court held that whether a rule is characterized as procedural
                   or substantive depends on the function of the new rule, "not the
                   constitutional guarantee from which the rule derives." Id. at , 136 S. Ct.
                   at 1266. The question in Montgomery was whether "the Constitution
                   requires state collateral review courts to give retroactive effect" to "a new
                   substantive rule of constitutional law [that] controls the outcome of a case."
                   577 U.S. at , 136 S. Ct. at 729. The court held the answer was yes. Id.

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                               Branham asserts these decisions establish that the substantive
                   rule exception to the federal retroactivity framework requires states to
                   apply any new substantive rule, including a decision narrowing the
                   interpretation of a criminal statute, retroactively. In particular, Branham
                   claims that Welch implies "the clarification/change in law dichotomy [in
                   retroactivity analysis] has become essentially obsolete" and, after Welch,
                   the only relevant question is whether the new interpretation represents a
                   new substantive rule. Branham argues that the decision in Byford set forth
                   a new substantive rule and, as a result, the decisions in Welch and
                   Montgomery provide a legal basis that was not previously available to
                   support his underlying claim that he is entitled to the retroactive
                   application of Byford. Branham is mistaken as to the implications of the
                   holdings of Welch and Montgomery.
                               The United States Supreme Court first set out its modern
                   retroactivity framework in the plurality opinion Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
                   288 (1989). Teague established that new constitutional rules, i.e., rules of
                   criminal procedure that have an underlying constitutional source, generally
                   do not apply retroactively to convictions that were final when the new
                   constitutional rule was announced.        Id. at 306-07. However, Teague
                   recognized two categories of constitutional rules that are not subject to its
                   retroactivity bar. Montgomery, 577 U.S. at , 136 S. Ct. at 728. "First,
                   courts must give retroactive effect to new substantive rules of constitutional
                   law." Id. "Second, new watershed rules of criminal procedure, which are
                   procedural rules implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the
                   criminal proceeding, will also have retroactive effect."   Welch, 578 U.S. at
                      , 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (internal quotation marks omitted). The threshold
                   requirement for the applicability of Teague's retroactivity framework is that

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                   the new rule at issue must be a constitutional rule. 2 See Teague, 489 U.S.
                   at 306.
                               In both Welch and Montgomery, the Court applied the existing
                   Teague retroactivity framework to decide the issue before it. See Welch, 578
                   U.S. at , 136 S. Ct. at 1264-68; Montgomery, 577 U.S. at , 136 S. Ct.
                   at 728-36. Nothing in either case alters Teague's threshold requirement
                   that the new rule at issue must be a constitutional rule. See Welch, 578
                   U.S. at , 136 S. Ct. at 1264 (reiterating that the Teague retroactivity
                   framework applies to new constitutional rules); Montgomery, 577 U.S. at
                   , 136 S. Ct. at 728 (same). Because the decisions in Welch and
                   Montgomery do not alter this threshold requirement, we hold those
                   decisions do not constitute good cause for raising a procedurally barred
                   claim arguing a nonconstitutional rule should be applied retroactively.
                               Here, Branham claimed the decisions in Welch and Montgomery
                   provided good cause to raise his Byford claim. However, the decision in
                   Byford "was a matter of interpreting a state statute, not a matter of
                   constitutional law," and "[n]othing in the language of Byford suggests that
                   decision was grounded in constitutional concerns." Nika, 124 Nev. at 1288,
                   198 P.3d at 850. Because the decision in Byford did not establish a new
                   constitutional rule, the decisions in Welch and Montgomery do not

                         2Nevada has adopted• a more liberal version of the federal
                   retroactivity framework, but still recognizes this threshold requirement.
                   See Nika v. State, 124 Nev. 1272, 1288, 198 P.3d 839, 850 (2008) ("[I]f a rule
                   is new but not a constitutional rule, it has no retroactive application to
                   convictions that are final at the time of the change in the law."); Colwell v.
                   State, 118 Nev. 807, 816-17, 59 P.3d 463, 469-70 (2002).

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                   constitute good cause for Branham to raise his procedurally barred claim
                   that Byford must be applied retroactively. 3
                   Branham did not demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice
                               Branham also claims he demonstrated a fundamental
                   miscarriage ofjustice to overcome the procedural bars. A district court may
                   reach the merits of any claims of constitutional error where a petitioner can
                   demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice has resulted in the
                   conviction of one who is actually innocent. Pellegrini, 117 Nev. at 887, 34
                   P.3d at 537. Branham's argument fails for two reasons.
                               First, a successful claim of a fundamental miscarriage of justice
                   only allows for consideration on the merits of claims of constitutional error.
                   But because the Byford decision was not grounded in constitutional
                   concerns, Branham's underlying Byford          claim was not a claim of
                   constitutional error. Accordingly, Branham would not have been entitled
                   to have his underlying Byford claim decided on the merits. Second,
                   Branham could not demonstrate he was actually innocent. See Mitchell v.
                   State, 122 Nev. 1269, 1273-74, 149 P.3d 33, 36 (2006) ("[A]ctual innocence'
                   means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency." (alteration in
                   original) (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998))). He

                         3 We note that even if the holding in Byfordcould be construed to fall
                   within the Teague substantive rule exception, the portions of Welch and
                   Montgomery on which Branham relies are based on federal law that has
                   long been available for Branham to raise in postconviction proceedings.
                   Further, because Nevada adopted the federal retroactivity framework in
                   2002, Branham could have raised his retroactivity argument long before the
                   decision in Montgomery was issued. Therefore, Welch and Montgomery still
                   would not provide good cause to excuse the procedural bars. See Hathaway,
                   119 Nev. at 252-53, 71 P.3d at 506 (holding a good cause claim cannot itself
                   be procedurally barred).
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                   thus failed to demonstrate dismissal of his claim would result in a
                   fundamental miscarriage of justice.
                                                  CONCLUSION
                               We hold that the United States Supreme Court decisions in
                   Welch and Montgomery do not constitute good cause to raise a procedurally
                   barred claim arguing that a nonconstitutional rule should be applied
                   retroactively. Because the decision in Byford did not establish a new
                   constitutional rule, we conclude the district court did not err by finding the
                   decisions in Welch and Montgomery did not constitute good cause for
                   Branham to raise his procedurally barred claim that Byford must be applied
                   retroactively. 4 Branham also failed to demonstrate that dismissal of his
                   claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Accordingly, we
                   affirm the district court's order dismissing Branham's postconviction
                   petition for a writ of habeas corpus as procedurally barred.

                                                                                        C.J.
                                                         Silver

                                                         Tao
                                                                  1.---
                                                                    Atre52°             J.

                                                                                        J.
                                                         Gibbons

                         4We note the district court erred by finding that           Welch and
                   Montgomery did not provide good cause to overcome the procedural bars on
                   the ground that Byford did not announce a new substantive rule.
                   Nevertheless, for the reasons stated, we conclude the district court reached
                   the correct result, albeit for the wrong reason. See Wyatt v. State, 86 Nev.
                   294, 298, 468 P.2d 338, 341 (1970) (holding a correct result will not be
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                   reversed simply because it is based on the wrong reason).
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