Court Opinion

ID: 9744786
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 22:16:08.032267+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:51.733677
License: Public Domain

SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION UPON DENIAL OF REHEARING Mr. JUSTICE SEIDENFELD delivered the opinion of the court: In its petition for rehearing, the petitioner contends (1) that the trial court erred in finding a reasonable probability of rezoning to a commercial or office use; (2) that this court erred in ruling that the jury should have been instructed as to the reasonable probability of rezoning because such an instruction would only serve to single out one portion of the evidence; (3) that the jury was required to find a reasonable certainty that the property was adaptable for the proposed use and that the test of reasonable probability is only the standard for the admission of evidence of rezoning; and (4) that the defendant’s preferred instruction was erroneous in that it did not point out what zoning was to be considered or advise the jury that it should consider reasonable probability of rezoning only to the extent that it affected the market value on April 28, 1970. We adhere to the holding in the original opinion that the trial court properly determined that there was sufficient evidence of the reasonable probability of rezoning to a nonresidential use to permit the defendant’s experts to testify to the market value based on such a probability. See Department of Transportation v. Western National Bank, 63 Ill. 2d 179, 184-85 (1976). We also agree that the argument of the petitioner to the effect that the jury should bring in a verdict “unaffected by what you have heard as to reasonableness and future use and all that” under the particular circumstances was prejudicial.  However, we are of the opinion that the giving of IPI Civil No. 300.84, including the bracketed material, was proper. The error below was the court’s refusal to give any instruction on the reasonable probability of rezoning. That error was compounded by the petitioner’s argument. As noted in the opinion, the court’s refusal was based upon the recommendation, at IPI Civil No. 300.85, that no instruction be given on the effect of a possible change in zoning. The just compensation to which the property owner is entitled is the fair market value of the property at its highest and best use on the date of the petition. See IPI Civil No. 300.80, and Comment. IPI Civil No. 300.84 not only defines “highest and best use,” but also accurately instructs the jury that it may give consideration to evidence indicating that the highest and best use of the property is a use other than the actual use on the date of the petition. The jury may give consideration to another use if the property was “then adaptable” to that use and the use in question “could be anticipated with such reasonable certainty that it would enhance the market value” on the date of the petition. The instruction is designed to discourage compensation based upon uses which are speculative, imaginary, or merely possible. Compare City of Chicago v. Lord 276 Ill. 571 (1917), with City of Chicago v. Sexton, 408 Ill. 351 (1951). We also have no quarrel with the IPI policy, noted in the comment to IPI Civil No. 300.85, of avoiding singling out one portion of the evidence for particular comment in jury instructions. We disagree, however, with the petitioner’s contentions that the test of reasonable probability of rezoning is only a standard for the admission of evidence and that an instruction on the subject would only serve to single out one portion of the evidence. Since 1968, the question of the reasonable probability of rezoning has occupied a position in the trial of an eminent domain proceeding different from evidence of the possibility of obtaining other legislative or administrative action which will enhance the market value of the property. See, e.g., South Park Commissioners v. Ayer, 237 Ill. 211 (1908); Chicago & Western Indiana R.R. Co. v. Heidenreich, 254 Ill. 231 (1912); and City of Chicago v. Sexton, 408 Ill. 351 (1951). In the wake of the adoption of modern comprehensive zoning ordinances, the Illinois Supreme Court impliedly recognized the effect of zoning restrictions on the determination of fair market value at the highest and best use. See Forest Preserve District v. Kercher, 394 Ill. 11, 14, 21-23 (1946), and Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Drobnick, 14 Ill. 2d 28, 32-33 (1958). In Park District v. Becker, 60 Ill. App. 2d 463, 468 (1965), this court considered the question of “whether in considering the highest and best use of the land for determining the just compensation due the owner, a use can be contemplated which would not be permitted under existing zoning restrictions” and held that the jury might take into consideration the reasonable probability of rezoning in the near future. However, the rule in Becker was subsequently refined. In Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Rogers, 78 Ill. App. 2d 141, 144-45 (1966), this court held that the property owners were entitled to present evidence of a recent modification of the municipality’s zoning ordinance in support of their theory of the reasonable probability of rezoning. The supreme court affirmed (Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Rogers, 39 Ill. 2d 109, 113-15 (1968)), noting that the failure of the trial court to admit evidence tending to show flexibility of the ordinance effectively precluded the defendants “from arguing objective evidence to the jury in support of their theory of the reasonable probability of rezoning” while permitting petitioner to make a strong argument against the probable rezoning theory (Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Rogers, 39 Ill. 109, 115 (1968)). Subsequently, in Lombard Park District v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 103 Ill. App. 2d 1, 6 (1968), this court noted, “Possible rezoning is relevant only if it reflects some value in the land because of a present capacity for future use which may be anticipated with reasonable certainty and which may be made the basis of an intelligent estimate of value.” Accordingly, it has been held that the burden of proof of the reasonable probability of rezoning is on the landowner. (Department of Transportation v. Western National Bank, 63 Ill. 2d 179, 185 (1976).) Before evidence based on the theory of probable rezoning may be presented to the jury, the trial court must determine whether there is sufficient evidence of factors which would permit a jury to conclude that there is a reasonable probability of rezoning (Lombard Park District v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 103 Ill. App. 2d 1, 8-9 (1968); Board of Junior College District No. 515 v. Wagner, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1010 (1971); Lake County Forest Preserve District v. Reliance Standard Life Insurance Co., 29 Ill. App. 3d 145, 150 (1975); and Department of Conservation v. First National Bank, 36 Ill. App. 3d 495, 506 (1976)), and that such probability would enhance the market value (Department of Conservation v. First National Bank, 36 Ill. App. 3d 495, 500 (1976)). In the absence of a proper foundation the trial court may exclude all evidence and opinions of value based on a use permitted only by rezoning. Lombard Park District v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 103 Ill. App. 2d 1, 9 (1968); Foss Park District v. First National Bank, 125 Ill. App. 2d 276, 280 (1970); Board of Junior College District v. Wagner, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1010 (1971); and Department of Conservation v. First National Bank, 36 Ill. App. 3d 495, 506 (1976). However, once the trial court has determined that there is sufficient evidence of the reasonable probability of rezoning to warrant submitting the issue to the jury, it is for the jury, in considering the weight to be given to valuation testimony based upon the reasonable probability of rezoning, to determine whether there was a reasonable probability of rezoning, and if so, its effect on the fair market value of the property (Lombard Park District v. Chicago Title & Trust Co., 103 Ill. App. 2d 1, 9-10 (1968); cf. Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Exchange National Bank, 31 Ill. App. 3d 88, 105 (1975)); and both parties may present evidence designed to convince the jury of the likelihood or unlikelihood of rezoning (Board of Junior College District No. 515 v. Wagner, 3 Ill. App. 3d 1006, 1010 (1971); cf. Department of Public Works & Buildings v. Rogers, 39 Ill. 2d 109, 113-15 (1968)). Therefore, it appears that before a jury may consider valuation testimony based upon a highest and best use to which the property was then adaptable and which could have been anticipated with such reasonable certainty that it would have enhanced the market value on the date of the petition, were it not for the fact that the use in question was unpermitted by the applicable zoning ordinance, the jury must be convinced that a reasonable probability of rezoning existed on the date of the petition. Stated otherwise, before a jury may even reach the question of whether a use which was unpermitted by the zoning ordinance otherwise meets the criteria of a highest and best use, the jury must find that there was a reasonable probability of rezoning. Since the question of the reasonable probability of rezoning is, in an appropriate case, an issue on which the jury must make a finding of fact, we believe that the jury should be accurately instructed on the law as to the necessity and effect of making that finding. The importance and necessity of such an instruction is clear in the context of the case at bar. Here, there was conflicting testimony as to both the highest and best use of the property and the likelihood of rezoning. Witnesses for both sides were asked questions concerning the “reasonable probability” of rezoning. Yet the jury was given no instruction incorporating that phrase which permitted counsel for the petitioner to make a skillful argument emphasizing the phrase “reasonable certainty” from IPI Civil No. 300.84 and to argue, “Now, how can you have a probability and a certainty at the same time? You can’t.” Whenever the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions do not contain an instruction on a subject on which the jury should be instructed, a simple, brief, impartial instruction may be given. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1969, ch. 110A, par. 239.) It fairly appears from the record that the jury, without any guidance from the instructions on the law regarding reasonable probability of rezoning, may have believed that it could not consider unpermitted uses unless the rezoning was reasonably certain. This clearly is not the law and a supplemental instruction on rezoning should have been given. In a case in which there is an issue as to the reasonable probability of rezoning with valuation testimony based in part upon the reasonable probability of rezoning, such an instruction, given in addition to and with proper reference to IPI Civil No. 300.84, would inform the jury of the necessity of making a finding that there was in fact a reasonable probability of rezoning on the date of the petition before making a determination of just compensation based upon a highest and best use which was unpermitted by the applicable zoning classification on the date of the petition. Cf. Dolezal v. City of Cedar Rapids, 209 N.W.2d 84, 89 (Iowa 1973); Community Redevelopment Agency v. Henderson, 251 Cal. App. 2d 336, 345, 59 Cal. Rptr. 311, 316 (1967), overruled on other grounds in Merced Irrigation District v. Woolstenhulme, 4 Cal. 3d 478, 495, 483 P.2d 1, 12, 93 Cal. Rptr. 833, 844 (1971).1  Petitioner’s final contention on rehearing that defendant has waived its right to a separate instruction on the probability of rezoning because of a failure to submit a proper instruction is not persuasive on the record before us. In the context of the discussions before the trial judge, it became apparent that no instruction on the probability of rezoning would be given in deference to the IPI recommendation. In view of the unduly advantageous use made by petitioner’s counsel in arguing a requirement of “reasonable certainty” to the jury based on the instruction given, the defendant in effect was deprived of any reasonable opportunity to persuade the jury that the probability of rezoning was material. The application of the rule of waiver in this context would sanction an unfair proceeding. The petition for rehearing is denied. However, the petitioner’s alternative motion for certificate of importance is allowed. GUILD, P. J., concurs. Mr. JUSTICE HALLETT took no part in the consideration or decision respecting the petition for rehearing and the supplemental opinion.   We note that in one jurisdiction a separate instruction on rezoning was held unnecessary in the context of a set of instructions which utilized the phrase “reasonably probable” in defining the permissible consideration of uses to which the property was adaptable. (See Reller v. City of Lincoln, 174 Neb. 638, 119 N.W.2d 59, 63-64 (1963).) We have given some thought to the idea that a similar result might be obtained if IPI Civil No. 300.84 were modified to read “reasonable probability” instead of “reasonable certainty.” However, this approach does not appear to be consistent with the language used in the Illinois cases on which IPI Civil No. 300.84 is based. See Comments, IPI Civil No. 300.84 (2d ed. 1971).