Court Opinion

ID: 9680621
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 07:35:18.792687+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:29.712138
License: Public Domain

*482LAMBERT, Chief Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority opinion except as to Part IV relating to apportionment of fault to Louisville Water Company.
The Court of Appeals properly stated the facts and applied the law as follows:
LWC [Louisville Water Company] was not ever named a party to the action herein, but prior to trial, Parrish settled a workers’ compensation claim with LWC based on the resultant disability from the asbestos exposure. First, as this was a product’s liability action, we see no justification for apportioning fault to LWC since it had nothing to do with the “manufacture, construction, design, formulation, development of standards, preparation, processing, assembly, testing, listing, certifying, warning, instructing, marketing, advertising, packaging or labeling of any product.” See KRS 411.300(1). Nor was the employee a wholesaler, distributor or retailer. See KRS 411.340.
The view expressed above is consistent with the view I expressed in Griffin Industries, Inc. v. Jones.1 There, as here, this Court’s majority allowed apportionment of liability against a Workers’ Compensation carrier. My view is that apportionment is improper because the injured employee has no right to recover against the employer because of the exclusive remedy provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act.
STUMBO and WINTERSHEIMER, JJ., join this opinion.

. Ky., 975 S.W.2d 100 (1998) (Lambert, J„ concurring in part and dissenting in part).