Court Opinion

ID: 9740720
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 20:40:51.334979+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:24:19.975992
License: Public Domain

VANDE WALLE, Justice,
concurring specially.
Dr. Wentz expressed his tentative position in writing prior to the hearing. He did not notify MSC of that position. Had he notified MSC of his tentative position prior to the hearing, MSC’s due process rights would have been protected. With this understanding, I concur in the majority opinion.
The fact investigative, accusative and adjudicative functions are combined in one board or person is not in itself a denial of due process. First American Bank & Trust Company v. Ellwein, 221 N.W.2d 509 (N.D.1974). Although due process of law presupposes a fair and impartial hearing before a fair and impartial tribunal, the minimal due process that must be afforded participants before a administrative board or agency is not synonymous with minimal due process requirements in a court of law. Id. Thus, previous decisions of this court such as Berdahl v. N.D. State Personnel Bd., 447 N.W.2d 300 (N.D.1989); Domek v. N.D. State Personnel Bd., 430 N.W.2d 339 (N.D.1988); Hammond v. North Dakota State Personnel Bd., 345 N.W.2d 359 (N.D.1984); and First American Bank Trust Company v. Ellwein, supra, are not affected by our decision today.
Nevertheless, because administrative agencies are given duties to license and regulate they will ordinarily not approach their adjudicative functions without having performed investigative functions and, in the process, formed certain impressions and opinions. Indeed, the agency would be derelict in its duties if it did not do so, and must necessarily do so when it exercises accusative functions. In this instance, those impressions and opinions were expressed in writing, although not to MSC.
The majority does not decide what would be the result if we could divine the preconceived ideas of those decision makers who in pectorum [in their heart] have formed the same opinion but have left no trail thereof. Perhaps all agencies should be required by statute to express a preliminary determination so the parties to the hearing may be aware of the predilection of the agency and, as a result, of the burden they face in order to prevail. As the majority opinion observes, that was not done in this case, although the Department contends it normally issues a notice of intent to grant or deny an environmental permit prior to the hearing.
New statutes enacted by the 1991 Legislature appear to be designed to insulate the adjudicative function from the investigative or accusative functions. See § 28-32-08.1; 28-32-12.2; 28-32-13, NDCC. We have not yet been faced with an issue of whether or not the findings and decisions of a professional hearing officer are due the same deference as we give to a decision of the agency itself where the issue is one involving application of expertise entrusted to an agency composed of experts in that subject matter. See, e.g., Bank of Hamilton v. State Banking Bd., 236 N.W.2d 921 (N.D.1975).
MSC’s application for a permit involves a matter of application of expertise; but we do not reverse on the merits of the decision of the Department of Health and Consolidated Laboratories. We reverse only because MSC had not been made aware of the Department’s pre-hearing position. On that basis, I concur with the majority opinion.
ERICKSTAD, C.J., concurs.