Court Opinion

ID: 9587330
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:21:07.493577+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:37:21.210638
License: Public Domain

Thompson, Justice,
dissenting.
I believe the application of the doctrine of res judicata in this case violates our State’s public policy.3 Accordingly, I dissent.
The doctrine of res judicata is aimed at fostering the finality of litigation, but it must always be balanced against the right of litigants to be heard in court. See Anderson Oil Co. v. Benton Oil Co., 246 Ga. 304, 306 (271 SE2d 207) (1980). In balancing these interests, and determining whether the doctrine is to be applied, our courts consider (a) the identity of the parties and their privies; (b) the sameness of the matters in issue; (c) the binding effect of the prior judgment; and (d) public policy concerns. Fierer v. Ashe, 147 Ga. App. 446, 448 (249 SE2d 270) (1978). I agree with the majority that the first three elements of the doctrine have been met in this case. However, I do not believe that the doctrine should be applied so as to preclude plaintiffs from seeking punitive damages.
The doctrine of res judicata is not a rigid rule of law. See generally Brookins v. Brookins, 257 Ga. 205, 206 (2) (357 SE2d 77) (1987) (“a mechanical application of the res judicata rule in this situation would frustrate the purposes of the URESA”). In fact, it has “ ‘been occasionally rejected or qualified in cases in which an inflexible application would have violated an overriding public policy or resulted in manifest injustice to a party.’ IB Moore’s Federal Practice 783, para. 0.405 [11].” Fierer, supra at 449-450. In my view, our public policy with regard to punitive damages claims militates against the application of the res judicata doctrine in this case.
*426OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (e) (1) permits the recovery of only one punitive damages award against a defendant in a product liability case regardless of the number of individuals who may have been harmed by the defendant’s act or omission. Standing alone, this subsection would give rise to the argument that settlement of a punitive damages claim in a product liability case bars a subsequent claim for such damages. However, this subsection must be read in conjunction with OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (d) of our punitive damages statute, which provides, in pertinent part:
(1) An award of punitive damages must be specifically prayed for in a complaint. In any case in which punitive damages are claimed, the trier of fact shall first resolve from the evidence produced at trial whether an award of punitive damages shall be made. This finding shall be made specially through an appropriate form of verdict, along with the other required findings.
(2) If it is found that punitive damages are to be awarded, the trial shall immediately be recommenced in order to receive such evidence as is relevant to a decision regarding what amount of damages will be sufficient to deter, penalize, or punish the defendant in light of the circumstances of the case.
(Emphasis supplied.)
This provision makes it clear that our legislature did not intend to bar a punitive damages claim simply because punitive damages were sought and settled in a prior proceeding. On the contrary, this provision demonstrates that a punitive damages award cannot act as a bar to a subsequent claim for such damages unless, in the course of an adversary proceeding, a factfinder determines whether such an award is appropriate and, if so, the amount necessary to deter or punish the defendant.
I believe our legislature grounded this provision on wise policy considerations. See Logan v. State, 86 Ga. 266, 266-268 (12 SE 406) (1890) (statute is expression of public policy by the legislature). A judgment awarding punitive damages should not preclude a subsequent punitive damages claim if it has not been tried by a factfinder. No other procedure can ensure that a punitive damages claim is fully and fairly assessed; no other procedure can ensure that a punitive damages award should even be a bar to subsequent punitive damages claims. In short, no other procedure can guarantee that a punitive damages judgment has not been procured by fraud or collusion. See Fierer v. Ashe, supra at 448.
*427Decided March 13, 2006
Reconsideration denied April 13, 2006.
Batch & Bingham, Dorian N. Daggs, King & Spalding, William R. Bassett, Jr., William E. Hoffmann, Jr., EricM. Wachter, Richard A. Schneider, Gordon A. Smith, for appellant.
Doffermyre, Shields, Canfield, Knowles & Devine, Robert E. Shields, Ralph I. Knowles, Jr., Leslie J. Bryan, Clifford E. Douglas, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Isaac Byrd, Deputy Attorney General, Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellees.
This is not to say that the consent judgment entered in the prior litigation was procured by fraud. The facts show only that the State sought compensatory and punitive damages, that the State’s claims were settled, and that no portion of the settlement monies were used to pay “enhanced damages.” But whether the settlement was or was not procured by fraud or collusion is beside the point. The potential for fraud was there, and that is why it is imperative that we follow the legislative directive set forth in OCGA § 51-12-5.1 (d).
Given this State’s policy approach, as expressed in the punitive damages statute, I would hold that, although a punitive damages claim can be compromised and settled, a settled punitive damages claim cannot preclude a subsequent claim for punitive damages. I fear that, by holding otherwise, the majority’s approach will encourage product liability defendants to settle bogus punitive damages claims in order to preclude subsequent punitive damages litigation.

 In footnote 2, the majority posits that the public policy question was not raised by the parties and, therefore, cannot be considered by the Court. I disagree. The district court did not ask us to enter a ruling strictly upon the issues presented by the parties. Rather, we have been asked to expound upon Georgia law with regard to the interplay between res judicata and punitive damages. Thus, our response does not need to be limited by the issues and problems posed by either the district court or the parties. See Doss v. Food Lion, 83 F3d 378, 380 (11th Cir. 1996).
I should add that Fierer v. Ashe, 147 Ga. App. 446 (249 SE2d 270) (1978), does not hold that a Georgia court cannot consider a public policy issue on its own motion. (It simply ruled that appellees did not carry their burden of showing that the doctrine of res judicata should not have been applied in that case.) Indeed, such a holding would have been contrary to our jurisprudence, and the law of other jurisdictions, which permit sua sponte consideration of issues of public concern. See, e.g., Crew v. Hutcheson, 115 Ga. 511 (42 SE 16) (1902) (proper for trial court to exclude evidence on ground of public policy ex mero motu); Goodrum v. State, 60 Ga. 509 (1878) (trial judge may take corrective action on his own motion when matter of public policy is violated). See also Annot., What Issues Will the Supreme Court Consider, Though Not, or Not Properly, Raised by the Parties, 42 LE2d 946, § 12; Vestal, Sua Sponte Consideration in Appellate Review, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 477 (1959).