Court Opinion

ID: 9885452
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-10-06 13:01:43.563999+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:48:53.744991
License: Public Domain

KAROHL, Judge,
dissenting.
I must dissent.
Mercantile Bank dishonored its cashier’s check made payable to David Godat, an innocent payee. The remitter of the cashier’s check was Godat’s dishonest investment broker. Without Godat’s knowledge, Kevin Hasty purchased the cashier’s check utilizing a fraudulent cheek scheme and the bank negligently failed to confirm the sufficiency of the remitter’s funds. Godat received, endorsed and delivered the check to another before he learned of Hasty’s wrongdoing.
The parties tried the ease on the assumption Godat must be a holder in due course to recover. The elements necessary to establish Godat’s status as a holder in due course were the basis of the verdict directing instruction. The evidence in the present case supported the verdict and would support a finding Godat was a holder in due course of the cashier’s check. Therefore, it is unnecessary to decide, as the majority does, whether Godat was entitled to recover only if he was a holder in due course of the cashier’s check.
In general, upon proof of an available defense against payment of a negotiable instrument, a person entitled to enforce the instrument bears the burden of proving his or her status as a holder in due course. Section 400.3-307(b)(3) RSMol978 (Now § 400.3-308(b) RSMo Cum.Supp.1992). It is not clear that this requirement applies to the holder of a cashier’s check. See, e.g., § 400.3^412 RSMo Cum.Supp.1992 and Da Silva v. Sanders, 600 F.Supp. 1008 (D.C. 1984). Section 400.3-412 was added and adopted in Missouri in 1992 to the Uniform Commercial Code in order to define the obligation of the issuer of a note or a cashier’s check. The majority concludes “it does not appear that the result would be altered by application of the present Code,” but it fails to examine this section. Significantly, § 400.3^412 defines the obligation of the issuer “at the time it was issued,” or “if not issued, at the time it first came into possession of a holder.” The new section does not distinguish a holder from a holder in due course for purposes of defining the bank’s obligation. The commentary for the new section concludes it did not change existing law. However, the parties in the present case did not contest the issue of the integrity of a cashier’s check in the hands of a holder. Therefore, it is only necessary to examine whether the jury verdict was supported by the evidence.
The jury found under the non-MAI verdict directing instruction that: (1) Godat was a holder of the cashier’s check; (2) he took it for value; (3) he took it in good faith; (4) he took it without notice it was obtained without consideration; (5) it was not paid; and, (6) the bank’s refusal to honor the cashier’s check caused damage.
The trial court granted Mercantile’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because it found:
The evidence at trial was uncontroverted that Plaintiff did not pay value for the cashier’s check as defined in § 400.3-303 RSMo. Plaintiff admitted that, at the time he received the check from Kevin Hasty, Plaintiff had no money invested with Hasty and Hasty owed Plaintiff no money.... Given that Plaintiff did not pay value for the cashier’s check, he was not, as a matter of law, a holder in due course as defined in § 400.3-302 RSMo.
The uncontroverted evidence also established that the cashier’s check was procured from Defendant by fraud, that Kevin Hasty provided no consideration for the check, that Plaintiff did not take the instrument in good faith, and that he had notice from the bank, before he presented the check, that the check had been fraudulently procured. Finally, there was no evidence that Plaintiff was in any way damaged.
These findings are wholly unsupported by the evidence, and immaterial insofar as they relate to information known at the time Mercantile dishonored its cashier’s check or at the time of trial, rather than at the time Godat came into possession of it. After dis*8honor the holder of the cheek at the time of dishonor returned the check to Godat as its endorser. These facts illustrate the legal problem created by casting doubt on the commercial use of a cashier’s check.
The only relevant facts are: (1) Godat received the cashier’s check, endorsed it and delivered it to a third party to purchase an interest in a new investment; (2) at that time he knew nothing about the circumstances under which the check was issued; (3) at that time he knew only that Kevin Hasty, the remitter of the check, owed him far more than the amount of the check; and, (4) his investment account balance with Hasty was proven by his testimony and statements of that account which were exhibits in evidence. After Hasty defrauded the bank he changed his story and denied there was an investment balance. If it is relevant that Godat gave value for the check, he did by crediting Hasty with the amount of the check against his account balance. The jury verdict was therefore fully supported by the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Neither the trial court nor this court has authority to question the verdict for Godat by directing a verdict for Mercantile Bank. Stark v. American Bakeries Co., 647 S.W.2d 119, 121 (Mo. banc 1983).
Godat was indisputably the holder of the cashier’s check in question. He was in possession of the instrument, issued to him, with an apparent right to enforce it. He received it in good faith and without notice of Hasty’s check kiting scheme. The instrument was regular on its face. Both Godat and Hasty, a witness on behalf of Mercantile, testified Go-dat was told and believed Hasty was turning over $200,000 of Godat’s own money. Hasty testified Godat was unaware of any of Hasty’s illegal activity or that the name “Colonial Investors” and the investment statements he gave Godat were fictitious, at the time Godat received the cashier’s check. Hasty’s account with Mercantile was in the name Colonial Investors. Godat learned of Hasty’s fraud after he received and endorsed ■the cashier’s check and after he used the check to purchase an investment in 24-Hour Postal Center, Inc.
The evidence of “value” which supported the verdict consisted of (1) investment statements dated after July 1983 evidencing in excess of $500,000 in transactions, and, (2) Hasty’s testimony that he continued to represent to Godat, up to and including the moment the cashier’s check was delivered to Godat, that Godat’s account balance exceeded $500,000. Godat believed his investment accounts were worth well in excess of $200,000 up to and including the moment of delivery and endorsement of the cashier’s check, and the check consisted of Godat’s own funds. The value Godat gave for the check was a credit; Hasty owed Godat $200,000 less immediately after delivering the instrument to him. Section 400.3-303(b) RSMol978. The jury could properly believe this evidence and disregard or disbelieve Hasty’s testimony that there was no account balance. DeWitt v. American Family Mutual Ins. Co., 667 S.W.2d 700, 709 (Mo. banc 1984). A jury can believe one part of a [witness’] testimony and reject another. Id.
The trial court apparently found that because Hasty subsequently claimed and Godat concluded Hasty had no more of Godat’s money, the transfer of the cashier’s check from Hasty to Godat did not in fact discharge any obligation Hasty owed to Godat. On these facts, it found there was no exchange of value and a failure to honor the check caused no damage. However, the fact that Godat came to believe Hasty was no longer in possession of money in an account earmarked for Godat does not change the fact that Go-dat’s testimony and the investment statements entered in evidence showed transactions involving a balance of over $500,000 owed to Godat. The legal rights of Godat, as a holder in due course, and duties of Mercantile, as issuer of a cashier’s check, were settled as of the time the check was delivered. The jury could have surmised from the investment statements that Hasty in fact did owe Godat at least $200,000 at the time the cashier’s check was issued and delivered rather than believing Hasty’s story that he kept gratuitously giving Godat his own money or money obtained from other sources. Hasty had no apparent motive to lie to Godat before the fact. He had a strong motive to lie after the fact. Hasty’s motive when he *9told Godat there was no account balance was to get the check back for return to the bank. Godat’s concession at trial that Hasty did not have $200,000 of his money depended on the validity of Hasty’s remarks made after the bank discovered the fraud. It was not a matter Godat could determine independent of Hasty. Godat’s belief at the time of trial was not proof he did not have an account balance to credit. He did not vouch for Hasty’s credibility.
Hasty’s fraud upon Mercantile does not affect Godat’s status as holder in due course, as long as he was unaware of it. Both Hasty and Godat testified Godat had no knowledge of any wrongdoing in the acquisition of the cashier’s check, and he took it in good faith. Hasty’s statement that he no longer owed Godat anything, yet was willing to give him a $200,000 cashier’s check, was for the jury to believe or disbelieve.
The fact that Godat previously received a sizable return on his investment does not exclude the possibility that over a period of years he earned and was entitled to that amount or more and also have an account balance. A conclusion that Godat was not damaged constitutes a judicial determination that Godat received an appropriate or adequate return on his original investment before receipt of the cashier’s check and that Hasty’s revised version of the facts was true. The jury found the reverse.
A cashier’s check, unlike an ordinary check, is a check drawn by the bank on itself. A cashier’s check is accepted by the mere act of its issuance, and it becomes the primary obligation of the bank to pay from its own assets upon demand. State ex rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14, 16 (Mo. banc 1976). The nature and usage of cashier’s checks in the commercial world is such that public policy does not favor a rule that would permit stopping payment of them, as they circulate in the commercial world as the equivalent of cash. Id. People accept a cashier’s check as a substitute for cash because the bank stands behind it, rather than an individual. Id.
The majority relies on dicta from Environmental Quality Research, Inc. v. Boatmen’s Nat’l Bank of St. Louis, 775 S.W.2d 199, 204-205 (Mo.App.1989), (citing Rezapolvi v. First Nat’l Bank of Maryland, 296 Md. 1, 459 A.2d 183, 188-189 (Md.1983)), in holding that a bank may effectively dishonor its cashier’s check, if it was obtained through fraud, and if it is not in the hands of a holder in due course. We did not reach that broad conclusion in Environmental Quality Research, a case in which the bank issuing the subject cashier’s check was no longer involved when the case was tried. In Environmental Quality Research, we held the deposit of a cashier’s check into a payee’s account was provisional rather than final because the deposit was for collection. Id. at 205. For that reason the payee’s bank did not act improperly in debiting his account when the cashier’s check was dishonored. The obligation of the issuing bank to the payee was not an issue after plaintiff dismissed its claim against the issuing bank without prejudice.
The majority also misplaces reliance on Blue Cross Health Services, Inc. v. Sauer, 800 S.W.2d 72 (Mo.App.1990), wherein we held checks mistakenly mailed to the wrong payee with the same first and last name, which were used to pay antecedent debt of some person but not the intended person, were not given for value for purposes of holder in due course status. The “value” which renders the possessor of the instrument a holder thereof must have some meaning to the maker or transferor of the instrument. Id. at 77. The check in the present case had meaning for Godat in that it was partial payment of a debt owed to him. He was the true payee of the check.
An alternative grant of a new trial based on the trial court’s assessment the jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence is not reviewable on appeal, Witt v. Austin, 806 S.W.2d 63, 65-66 (Mo.App.1991), Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Fleischer, 772 S.W.2d 809, 819 (Mo.App.1989), unless this characteristically discretionary order is based on a misapplication of law. State ex rel. State Highway Comm’n v. Nickerson and Nickerson, 494 S.W.2d 344, 346 (Mo.1973). This case is controlled by the exception.
*10Rule 78.08 requires a trial court ordering a new trial to specify the grounds on which it is granted. Here, the trial court followed its JNOV findings with the alternative finding that the “jury’s verdict is against the weight of the evidence.” There were no additional findings, other than those already quoted concerning the JNOY findings. This grant of a new trial was based on a finding that Hasty’s fraud upon the bank affected Godat’s right to enforce the cashier’s check, and a finding that good faith, value, and damages were to be measured at the time of trial rather than upon the issuance and delivery of the cashier’s check. These findings are all misapplications of the law and the alternative grant of a new trial is erroneous as a matter of law. On the facts, there was no evidence to be weighed except the opposing testimony of a single witness, Hasty.
I would reverse the judgment notwithstanding the verdict and remand for the trial court to enter judgment on the jury verdict in accordance with this opinion.