Court Opinion

ID: 9550350
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-07 18:34:22.349759+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:21:25.688441
License: Public Domain

URBIGKIT, Justice,
specially concurring.
I concur in both the opinion and decision, but write separately to express concern that what I call adjudication from ignorance will not occur upon remand. See Cutbirth v. State, Wyo., 751 P.2d 1257 (1988), Urbigkit, J., dissenting; Kesser v. State, Wyo., 737 P.2d 756, 760 (1987), Urbigkit, J., dissenting. Cf. Frias v. State, Wyo., 722 P.2d 135 (1986).
Not only do I find that a hearing is required, but a hearing with live testimony, where the facts will be established before the decision on a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is made. As *233to the validity of the verdict count of assault and battery with intent to rape now presented in this proceeding, the principal prosecution witness either did or did not commit significant perjury at trial. The difficulty in determination by use of subpoenaed witnesses should not be unduly burdensome, and particularly so considering the significant liberty issue that is at stake. Due process and equal protection demand this at least. Furthermore, the invidious and insidious nature of perjury as a principal evil within the justice-delivery system commands an exemplary character of judicial attention.
The issue to be determined by the trial court in first analysis, where the testimony of W.H. effectuated the guilty verdict, will be whether there was perjury of the principal complaining witness. The second concern will be what test or principle should be applied if that substantive peijury is found. Nothing that has occurred since my writing in Keser v. State, supra, has diminished a deep-felt anguish about any possibilities of perjury-effectuated criminal conviction. A thoughtful and validated review is most recently provided in State v. Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 730 P.2d 1069 (1986), in recognition of the difference between trial perjury and post-trial newly discovered evidence. See Larrison v. United States, 24 F.2d 82 (7th Cir.1928).
As here presented, the materiality of the rebuttal testimony of W.H. as applied to the specific charge which she made cannot be in question: she was the prosecution’s case. If it had been proven that she lied about the IUD, her effect to the listening jury as protagonist in conviction testimony could have been de minimis. Additionally, I submit that:
“If any examination or cross-examination of the witness is to take place, it should be done in the court room.” Larrison v. United States, supra, 24 F.2d at 89.
Frias v. State, supra; United States v. Rodriguez, 738 F.2d 13 (1st Cir.1984); State v. Lawrence, supra. Cf. Cutbirth v. State, supra and Keser v. State, supra. I specially concur to assert the moralistic criterion and legal standard that the “whether or not” should first reasonably be determined before disposition by the trial court of the motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence can properly be accomplished.