Court Opinion

ID: 9914329
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-12-30 00:01:56.928428+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:11:19.873936
License: Public Domain

Filed 12/29/23 P. v. Propps CA2/5
   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on
opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule
8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

                      SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

                                    DIVISION FIVE

 THE PEOPLE,                                                     B320370

          Plaintiff and Respondent,                              (Los Angeles County
                                                                 Super. Ct. No.
          v.                                                     NA104701)

 CHRISTOPHER ARMOND PROPPS,

          Defendant and Appellant.

      APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Chestopher L. Taylor, Judge. Affirmed in part,
reversed in part, and remanded.
      Stanley Dale Radtke, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
      Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Rene Judkiewicz, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
       A jury convicted defendant and appellant Christopher
Propps (defendant) of second degree robbery in 2016. Defendant
was sentenced to 35 years to life under the Three Strikes law. In
a prior opinion on defendant’s appeal from the criminal
judgment, we affirmed defendant’s conviction but held the matter
must be remanded to give the trial court an opportunity to decide
if defendant was eligible for mental health diversion and to
exercise newly conferred discretion to strike one or both of the
prior serious felony conviction enhancements imposed under
Penal Code section 667, subdivision (a).1 (People v. Propps (May
8, 2019, No. B281522) [nonpub. opn.] (Propps).) On remand,
defendant made an oral People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118
motion to replace his trial counsel, which the trial court denied.
The court exercised its discretion to strike defendant’s section
667, subdivision (a) enhancements, but stated our remittitur
precluded it from considering any other modifications to
defendant’s sentence. We consider whether the trial court erred
in denying defendant’s Marsden motion and whether, as the
Attorney General concedes, the court should have conducted a
full resentencing.

                       I. BACKGROUND
      A.    Defendant’s Trial and Initial Appeal
      Defendant stole a watch, a cellphone, and recyclable cans
from victim Jayson Eugenio in July 2016. The Los Angeles
County District Attorney subsequently charged him with second
degree robbery in a single-count information. The information

1
     Undesignated statutory references that follow are to the
Penal Code.

                                2
additionally alleged defendant personally used a deadly and
dangerous weapon (a knife) in the commission of the offense and
had previously sustained two or more serious and/or violent
felony convictions.
      During trial, defendant admitted to having been convicted
of three prior felonies. The jury convicted defendant of second
degree robbery, but it found the allegation that defendant used a
deadly weapon in the commission of the crime not true.
      Before sentencing, defendant’s attorney filed a Romero2
motion asking the trial court to dismiss at least one of
defendant’s prior “strike” convictions. The trial court denied the
motion and imposed the aforementioned 35 years to life prison
sentence, ten years of which was attributable to the impact of
section 667, subdivision (a) enhancements for defendant’s prior
serious felony convictions.
      Defendant appealed and argued, among other things, that
he was entitled to a remand so the trial court could consider (1)
whether to exercise newly-conferred discretion under Senate Bill
No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) to strike prior serious felony
conviction enhancements under section 667, subdivision (a),3 and

2
      People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497.
3
      When the trial court initially sentenced defendant,
imposing a section 667, subdivision (a)(1) five-year enhancement
for sustaining a prior serious felony conviction was mandatory.
Subsequent legislation, which took effect before defendant’s
conviction was final, deleted the provision of section 1385 that
made the imposition of the enhancement mandatory (along with
related language in section 667 itself), thereby permitting trial
courts to strike such enhancements when found to be in the

                                3
(2) whether defendant was eligible for mental health diversion
pursuant to section 1001.36.
       We affirmed defendant’s conviction but remanded the case
to the trial court with directions to conduct a diversion eligibility
hearing under section 1001.36 and to consider whether it wished
to exercise its discretion to strike defendant’s section 667,
subdivision (a) enhancements under Senate Bill 1393. We
further directed that if the trial court determined defendant was
not eligible for diversion, then the court was to reinstate the
judgment, with any modifications required as a result of any
decision to exercise Senate Bill 1393 discretion.

      B.     Proceedings on Remand
      After our remand order, the trial court held an initial
hearing in January 2022. During the hearing, and at defendant’s
request, the court convened Marsden proceedings outside the
presence of the People. After hearing from both defendant and
his appointed attorney, the court denied defendant’s Marsden
motion.
      Proceeding to the issues before the court on remand,
defendant asked the court to dismiss his prior serious felony
conviction enhancements and to dismiss at least one of his prior
qualifying convictions under the Three Strikes law. Defendant
maintained he was entitled to a full resentencing and the court
had jurisdiction to modify any aspect of his sentence. The
prosecutor opposed defendant’s requested relief, arguing the
scope of the remand was limited and the court was not permitted

interest of justice. (Sen. Bill No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)
§§ 1, 2.)

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to undertake a full resentencing. The court continued the
hearing to a later date.
       When the parties were back before the court, the court
noted defendant had not filed a request for mental health
diversion and asked defendant to confirm he was not seeking any
relief with respect to that issue. Defendant confirmed he was
not. The court stated it had in any event considered the six
requirements with respect to mental health diversion and found
defendant was not suitable for it.
       Regarding the defense request to hold a full resentencing,
the trial court reviewed the remittitur from defendant’s initial
appeal and understood it to require only an exercise of discretion
on whether to strike the five-year prior serious felony conviction
enhancements, not a full resentencing. The trial court struck the
two five year priors, stating it thought 25 years to life was “more
than enough” under the circumstances. The court imposed a
prison sentence of 25 years to life, reinstated the judgment, and
remarked there was “nothing else [it] can do.”

                          II. DISCUSSION
      The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying
defendant’s Marsden motion. The arguments defendant makes
now regarding his trial attorney’s purported failure to submit a
mental health report to the trial court were not presented as
grounds for replacing counsel during the Marsden hearing and
therefore cannot serve as a proper basis for reversal.
Additionally, though defendant and counsel appear to have had
some difficulties in their relationship, defendant did not establish
they had an irreconcilable conflict likely to result in ineffective
representation.

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       Additionally, and though the trial court conscientiously
attempted to hew to the remand directions in our prior opinion,
we accept the Attorney General’s concession that defendant is
entitled to remand for a full resentencing. We shall remand the
cause to permit the court to consider the appropriate sentence
anew, with an understanding of the full extent of its discretion to
fashion an appropriate sentence.

      A.     Denial of the Marsden Motion Was Not an Abuse of
             Discretion
       “‘When a defendant seeks to obtain a new court-appointed
counsel on the basis of inadequate representation, the [trial]
court must permit him . . . to explain the basis of [the] contention
and to relate specific instances of inadequate performance. The
court must appoint a new attorney if the record clearly shows the
current attorney is not providing adequate representation or that
the defendant and counsel have such an irreconcilable conflict
that ineffective representation is likely to result. [Citations.] If[,
as here,] the court holds an adequate hearing, its ruling is
reviewed for abuse of discretion.’” (People v. Rices (2017) 4
Cal.5th 49, 69.) Our review is necessarily based on the record
before the court when it ruled, disregarding “subsequent
matters.” (People v. Berryman (1993) 6 Cal.4th 1048, 1070,
disapproved on another ground in People v. Hill (1998) 17 Cal.4th
800.)
      Defendant argues denial of his Marsden motion was an
abuse of discretion because trial counsel did not have him
assessed by a mental health professional and did not seek an
additional continuance to obtain a report from such a
professional. This argument lacks merit for two reasons. First,

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the issue of whether defendant would seek mental health
diversion was still open at the time of his Marsden hearing in
January 2022. The trial court did not deny mental health
diversion until the May 2022 hearing. In the interim, defendant
did not interpose another Marsden objection or ask for another
Marsden hearing at that time. Accordingly, the trial court could
not have granted the Marsden motion on the ground defendant
argues now. Second, the record does not in fact establish trial
counsel did not obtain a mental health assessment of defendant.
It merely reflects defendant ultimately did not submit any
additional evidence in support of eligibility. The record
accordingly does not permit drawing a conclusion that counsel
did not obtain a psychological evaluation of defendant—
particularly when counsel represented she was working to obtain
such an evaluation and would file a motion for diversion if an
expert evaluation provided a basis to do so.
       Defendant also argues denial of the motion was an abuse of
discretion because he and his attorney were embroiled in such an
irreconcilable conflict that ineffective representation was likely to
result. A defendant’s assertion of lack of trust in the attorney
does not constitute an irreconcilable conflict. (People v. Myles
(2012) 53 Cal.4th 1181, 1207 [“‘If a defendant’s claimed lack of
trust in, or inability to get along with, an appointed attorney
were sufficient to compel appointment of substitute counsel,
defendants effectively would have a veto power over any
appointment, and by a process of elimination could obtain
appointment of their preferred attorneys, which is certainly not
the law’”].) Nor is an irreconcilable conflict shown by “heated
words . . . spoken between client and attorney,” without more, or

                                  7
conduct by a defendant that manufactures a conflict with his
attorney. (People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 696.)
      Defendant contends an irreconcilable conflict resulted from
counsel’s failure to obtain a psychological evaluation of
defendant, counsel’s refusal to investigate and file a motion for
mental health diversion, counsel’s asserted untruthfulness with
defendant, and the animus between counsel and defendant—
which interfered with their ability to meaningfully communicate
with each other. The first two contentions are unpersuasive for
reasons we have already discussed. As to defendant’s remaining
arguments, we have reviewed the sealed Marsden transcript and
we agree with the trial court that defendant did not establish the
existence of an irreconcilable conflict. (Smith, supra, 6 Cal.4th at
696 [“To the extent there was a credibility question between
defendant and counsel at the hearing, the court was ‘entitled to
accept counsel’s explanation’”].) We are also of the view, based on
what we see in the Marsden hearing transcript, that the tension
or animosity that defendant claimed existed was largely a
product of defendant’s own conduct.4

      B.     Defendant Is Entitled to Remand for a Full
             Resentencing
      Defendant argues the trial court erred by finding he was
not entitled to a full resentencing under our prior remand order.
The People concede—partly relying on recent amendments to

4
      Our rejection of defendant’s claim of Marsden error resolves
his Sixth Amendment contention. (People v. Roldan (2005) 35
Cal.4th 646, 683, 683 [no Sixth Amendment violation where trial
court did not abuse its discretion in denying a Marsden motion].)

                                 8
Penal Code section 1172.1—that a full resentencing was
required. We accept the concession.
       Our prior opinion remanded the cause to allow the trial
court to determine whether defendant was eligible for mental
health diversion and to determine whether it wished to exercise
its discretion to strike defendant’s prior serious felony conviction
enhancements. Resentencing was not required unless the court
acted “favorably” by striking one or more of the priors. (People v.
Buckhalter (2001) 26 Cal.4th 20, 34.) The trial court was thus
correct, in a certain sense, that our remand instructions did not
automatically require it to resentence defendant. However, the
trial court ultimately decided to exercise its discretion and struck
both of defendant’s five-year enhancements. When it did so, it
triggered the “full resentencing rule” and had jurisdiction to
modify every aspect of defendant’s sentence. (People v. Walker
(2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 198, 205 [where trial court corrects part of
a sentence on remand, it is resentencing defendant and must look
at the facts and law in effect at time of resentencing]; People v.
Murphy (2001) 88 Cal.App.4th 392, 396-397 [limited remand did
not require trial court to resentence defendant unless it first
decided to vacate a strike finding]; see also People v. Buycks
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 857, 893 [explaining the “‘full resentencing
rule’”].)
       The trial court stated it believed it lacked the authority to
consider any other part of defendant’s sentence and its comments
do not clearly indicate that it would not have exercised its
discretion to modify any other aspect of defendant’s sentence. We
shall therefore remand for the trial court to conduct a full
resentencing, including consideration of any renewed Romero

                                 9
motion made by the defense. We express no view in this opinion
on the sentence the trial court should impose on remand.

                          DISPOSITION
      The cause is remanded for resentencing. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.

   NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

                      BAKER, Acting P. J.

We concur:

     MOOR, J.

     KIM, J.

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