Court Opinion

ID: 9372178
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-02-18 21:00:18.067302+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:16:33.493561
License: Public Domain

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                                            UNPUBLISHED

                               UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
                                   FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

                                               No. 21-4128

        UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

                             Plaintiff - Appellee

                      v.

        BRADLEY CHARLES ROBERSON, a/k/a Fly Guy,

                             Defendant - Appellant.

        Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
        Greenville. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (4:19-cr-00024-BO-1)

        Submitted: January 5, 2023                                    Decided: February 17, 2023

        Before THACKER, Circuit Judge, and MOTZ and KEENAN, Senior Circuit Judges.

        Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

        ON BRIEF: Geoffrey W. Hosford, HOSFORD & HOSFORD, PC, Wilmington, North
        Carolina; Matthew N. Leerberg, Raleigh, North Carolina, Brian Bernhardt, FOX
        ROTHSCHILD LLP, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr.,
        United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, Lucy Partain
        Brown, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
        ATTORNEYS, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.

        Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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        PER CURIAM:

               Bradley Charles Roberson appeals from his 66-month sentence, imposed on remand

        for resentencing. On appeal, he challenges the adequacy of the district court’s explanation

        of his sentence and the district court’s failure to orally impose the discretionary conditions

        of supervised release. We affirm.

                                                      I.

               On August 8, 2019, Roberson pleaded guilty without a written plea agreement to

        possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and

        924. The United States Probation Office prepared a presentence investigation report

        (PSR), calculating an offense level of 25 and a criminal history category of III, with a

        resulting United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines) imprisonment range of 70 to

        87 months. Roberson did not object to the calculation.

               At Roberson’s sentencing hearing, defense counsel stated that Roberson served two

        years in the Army after graduating from high school. Defense counsel explained that, after

        Roberson returned home from the Army, he “got into this drug business [and] made some

        bad choices.” Defense counsel noted that Roberson’s stepfather owned an auto body shop

        and would have a job waiting for Roberson when he was released from prison. Counsel

        asked the court to vary downward from the Guidelines range because of Roberson’s service

        to his country and the fact that he would have a job waiting for him when he returned home

        from prison.

               The court then asked Roberson about a traffic stop from earlier that year in which

        five pounds of marijuana was found in Roberson’s car. Roberson explained that he did not

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        know about the marijuana and that it was his cousin’s. The Government noted that the

        charges were dismissed in light of the instant charges, for which Roberson would face

        “serious time.”

               After this exchange, the court, without further explanation, imposed an 84-month

        term of imprisonment, a three-year term of supervised release, and credit for time served

        while awaiting his sentence. The court did not orally explain or discuss the conditions of

        supervision, but the written judgment included mandatory, standard, and additional

        standard conditions of supervised release. Roberson timely appealed.

               On appeal, we determined that the district court procedurally erred by failing to

        adequately consider Roberson’s arguments for a variant sentence.        United States v.

        Roberson, 827 Fed. App’x 302, 303 (4th Cir. 2020) (No. 19-4939). We noted that the

        district court did not “in any way” address Roberson’s request for a variance based on his

        military service and the fact that he had a job secured upon his release. Id. at 304.

        Moreover, although the court engaged in a colloquy about potential additional criminal

        conduct by Roberson, the court did not “provide any reasoning whatsoever for choosing

        the sentence it did.” Id. Accordingly, we vacated Roberson’s sentence and remanded for

        resentencing. Id. at 305.

               At resentencing, neither the court nor the parties revisited the calculation of the

        Guidelines range. Roberson’s counsel again highlighted Roberson’s military service and

        that Roberson had employment waiting for him upon his release. Further, he noted that,

        due to COVID-19, Roberson was in isolation for nearly a year and programming at his

        prison was suspended. Defense counsel requested a variant sentence of 60 months.

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               The Government noted that Roberson received a “general” rather than “honorable”

        discharge from the Army. The Government argued that such a discharge “suggest[ed]

        some sort of disciplinary action,” although the Government “couldn’t attest to that.”

        Finally, the Government stated that federal prisons were “rolling out vaccine[s] pretty

        quickly.” The Government did not advocate for a particular sentence.

               The district court noted that the Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months was “legitimate

        and appropriate.” The court found the request for 60 months “to be too modest given

        [Roberson’s] criminal history.” Nonetheless, the court imposed a downward variance of

        66 months’ imprisonment with “three years of supervised release,” and stated that “the

        other conditions remain as previously imposed.” The written judgment noted that the

        below-Guidelines sentence was imposed based upon Roberson’s military service,

        “[p]ending employment upon release,” and COVID-related issues. The written judgment

        included mandatory, standard, and additional standard conditions of supervised release.

        Roberson timely appealed.

                                                     II.

               When rendering a sentence, the district court must make and place on the record an

        individualized assessment based on the particular facts of the case. United States v. Carter,

        564 F.3d 325, 330 (4th Cir. 2009). While the sentencing court must state the specific

        reasons that support the sentence, the explanation “need not be exhaustive.” United

        States v. Avila, 770 F.3d 1100, 1107 (4th Cir. 2014). The court’s explanation must be

        sufficient “to satisfy the appellate court that [the court] has considered the parties’

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        arguments and has a reasoned basis for exercising [its] own legal decisionmaking

        authority.” Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 356 (2007).

               “Where the defendant or prosecutor presents nonfrivolous reasons for imposing a

        different sentence than that set forth in the advisory Guidelines, a district judge should

        address the party’s arguments and explain why he has rejected those arguments.” United

        States v. Bollinger, 798 F.3d 201, 220 (4th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

        Although “[i]t is sometimes possible to discern a sentencing court’s rationale when an

        explanation is lacking,” United States v. Lewis, 958 F.3d 240, 243 (4th Cir. 2020)

        (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted), “an appellate court may not guess at the

        district court’s rationale, searching the record for statements by the Government or defense

        counsel or for any other clues that might explain a sentence[,]” Carter, 564 F.3d at 329-30.

        An insufficient explanation of the sentence imposed constitutes significant procedural error

        by the district court. United States v. Lynn, 592 F.3d 572, 581 (4th Cir. 2010).

               When, as here, the defendant has properly preserved the issue whether the

        explanation was adequate by arguing for a sentence different from that which was imposed,

        we review the issue for abuse of discretion. Id. at 578. If we find such abuse, we must

        reverse unless we conclude that the error was harmless. Id. at 576. The Government bears

        the burden of showing “that the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect or

        influence on the result and we can say with fair assurance that the district court’s explicit

        consideration of the defendant’s arguments would not have affected the sentence imposed.”

        United States v. Boulware, 604 F.3d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 2010) (alterations and internal

        quotation marks omitted).

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               Here, despite this court’s ruling that the district court failed to provide an

        explanation for its chosen sentence, the district court again failed to provide an explanation

        on remand. The court noted that Roberson’s “criminal history” prevented the requested

        60-month sentence, but the court did not provide any analysis as to why a downward

        variance was appropriate. Neither the parties nor the court discussed Roberson’s criminal

        history at the resentencing hearing in any way, and as discussed above, at the first

        sentencing, the court focused on conduct which Roberson denied and for which he was not

        convicted.   Moreover, aside from the COVID-19 argument, Roberson’s mitigating

        arguments at his second sentencing were the same as his arguments at his first sentencing.

        Yet, without discussing COVID-19 or Roberson’s other arguments, the court imposed a

        sentence 18 months shorter than the one imposed at Roberson’s first sentencing and below

        the Guidelines range.

               The Government argues that, because Roberson’s variance request was granted in

        part, the court adequately considered Roberson’s arguments. However, when a variance is

        granted, the court must still explain the extent of its variance and why the lower sentence

        sought did not satisfy the § 3553 factors.

               Next, the Government avers that any error was harmless because Roberson’s

        sentence was unlikely to change on remand. Upon our review, we find this argument

        persuasive and conclude that Roberson was not prejudiced by the district court’s error. In

        fact, the district court’s brief consideration of the § 3553 factors resulted in a favorable

        downward variance, despite the fact that Roberson’s arguments for a variance were not

        particularly convincing, and those he presented at his first sentencing hearing had not

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        resulted in a downward variance. Accordingly, given the reduction in sentence Roberson

        received at his second sentencing, the relative weakness of his arguments for a variant

        sentence, and the district court’s brief statement regarding Roberson’s criminal history, we

        find that the district court’s inadequate explanation for the chosen sentence was harmless

        error.

                                                         III.

                 Finally, the district court did not announce the discretionary conditions of

        supervised release at either sentencing hearing. We have held that “all non-mandatory

        conditions of supervised release must be announced at a defendant’s sentencing hearing,”

        including both special conditions and discretionary “standard” conditions. United States

        v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020); see also United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341,

        347 (4th Cir. 2021) (discussing supervised release nomenclature). We have explained that

        “a district court may satisfy its obligation to orally pronounce discretionary conditions

        through incorporation—by incorporating, for instance, all Guidelines ‘standard’ conditions

        when it pronounces a supervised-release sentence, and then detailing those conditions in

        the written judgment.” Rogers, 961 F.3d at 299; see also U.S. Sentencing Guidelines

        Manual § 5D1.3(c), p.s. (listing standard conditions).

                 Here, both the written judgment from Roberson’s first sentencing and the amended

        written judgment from his second sentencing imposed the “mandatory” conditions listed

        in 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d), the “standard” conditions listed in USSG § 5D1.3(c), p.s., and

        “additional standard conditions,” which are contained in USSG § 5D1.3(d), p.s. (“special”

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        conditions). The district court did not orally impose any of these conditions at either

        sentencing.

               In his first appeal, Roberson did not challenge his conditions of supervised release.

        And at Roberson’s second sentencing hearing, the district court informed Roberson that

        “the other conditions remain[ed] as previously imposed.” We conclude that this statement,

        though brief, incorporated by reference the conditions imposed at Roberson’s first

        sentencing hearing. See United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 346 (4th Cir. 2021)

        (“[A] district court may incorporate by reference a condition or set of conditions during a

        [sentencing] hearing.”); Rogers, 961 F.3d at 299 (finding that such incorporation satisfies

        the district court’s obligation).

               Thus, we affirm Roberson’s sentence and deny his motion to remand. We dispense

        with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the

        materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

                                                                                       AFFIRMED

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