Court Opinion

ID: 9793171
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 02:43:55.642604+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:03:32.350681
License: Public Domain

ROONEY, Justice,
dissenting, with whom RAPER, Chief Justice, joins.
I cannot agree that the requirement of § 2 — 4^101, W.S.1977 was not here met. Furthermore, I believe that the majority opinion places an onerous and unnecessary impediment on the probate of an estate.
The majority opinion requires, as a practical matter, that the court bring the spouse personally before it for the purpose, of advising him or her of the right to make an election and of the consequences thereof. How else can it be positive that the advice was received as required by the majority opinion? In fact, such opinion will authorize a spouse to prevent timely progress of probate proceedings by making herself or himself unavailable for the advice — through a trip to Washington or otherwise. The spouse does not exist in a vacuum, but has some obligation to react in a reasonable fashion to information in his or her actual or constructive possession.
The statute does not mandate that the advice be given personally. It does not prohibit “constructive receipt” thereof as is read into the statute by the majority opinion.1 In this case, the failure to receive the letter of advice by Mrs. Reno was her own fault. It was her agent that did not forward the document which was properly sent by the court to her address. There is no controversy over the fact that the court mailed a letter containing the necessary advice to Mrs. Reno’s address; that it was sent certified mail — return receipt requested; that it was received at that address by her stepfather; and that she authorized him to receive her mail. With reference to this authorization, she testified:
“Q. And, did he receive any other mail for you?
“A. He received all my mail.
* * * * * *
“Q. He was authorized to pick up the mail?
*555“A. Yes, he was.”
She received other mail relative to the probate of the estate at that address, including the Notice of Final Settlement, the return receipt for which was signed by her stepfather.
She should not be permitted to avoid the purpose of the statute by virtue of her own failure to arrange for transmittal to her of legal and business communications sent to the address designated by her.
“It is a fundamental rule underlying the structure of agency law that the principal is bound by, and liable for, the acts which his agent does with or within the actual or apparent authority from the principal, and within the scope of the agent’s employment * * *.” 3 Am.Jur.2d Agency § 261 (1962), citing Jones v. Wettlin, 39 Wyo. 331, 271 P. 217 (1928) among many other cases.
I would hold that advice in a written form, mailed to the spouse’s address would satisfy the requirement of the statute, absent a showing that the communication was not delivered to that address.
This holding gives effect to the legislative intent, rather than the contrary. It is generally thought that the 1957 amendment to § 2-4-101, W.S.1977 (relative to advising the spouse concerning the right to make an election and the consequences thereof) was a result of the decision of this court in the case of In Re Hartt’s Estate, 75 Wyo. 305, 295 P.2d 985 (1956). The Hartt case held in effect that the spouse was presumed to have knowledge of the election right and of its consequences. Against the widow’s contention that “she did not know that she had the right to dissent from the will,” the court held that there was no duty on the part of the executors to so advise her (she contended that they had this duty), and it quoted with approval the following at page 999 of 295 P.2d from Stephens v. Gibbes, 14 Fla. 331, 356:
“ ‘Neither the executors, the other devi-sees or legatees, nor the creditors, are in any legal sense under an obligation to give the widow notice of the provisions of the will. The law presumes her knowledge of the will and its contents as well as her knowledge of her right of dower and its nature, and she is bound to know that if she omits for the space of one year to signify her dissent, she cannot claim dower.’ ”
The Hartt case did not involve the issue of whether or not advice or notice was properly given. It involved the issue as to whether or not such was necessary at all. The legislature subsequently amended the statute to require the giving of advice or notice. It did not require such to be given personally; and, as already stated, I believe Mrs. Reno was adequately advised pursuant to the statute.
I believe the statute clearly and unequivocally sets forth the interpretation I here give to it. Normally, I would, thus, agree with the majority of the court in its statement that the statute is clear and unambiguous. However, since the fact is that we are in disagreement concerning the meaning of the language of the statute, I must conclude that the statute is not clear and unambiguous and that the aforesaid determination of legislative intent is necessary. Certainly, recent legislative attention to probate procedure emphasizes the dissatisfaction with formality therein such as required by the majority opinion.
The use of the words “advice” and “explanation” in the statute have no significance in this determination. “Advice” and “explanation” are routinely and customarily given in writing and with constructive receipt in connection with ordinary happenings in everyday life. Labels and directions explaining the contents and uses thereof are on many of the articles purchased daily in the marketplace.. Acceptances of many contracts made daily in the business world are effective when mailed to the offerer’s address. Decisions and opinions of courts, including this one, explaining the nature of controversies and their solutions, and advising relative to future actions are effective when issued whether or not they are actually read by anyone. Many other instances can be referenced in which a communication is effective when uttered or issued and directed to a particular person or group of persons without regard to the actual (as *556distinguished from constructive) receipt thereof.
The pertinent timetable in the case is:2 9/13/76 - Will admitted to probate.
11/16/76 - Court mailed letter of advice to Mrs. Reno’s address, certified mail — return receipt requested.
11/18/76 - Return receipt signed by Mrs. Reno’s stepfather.
11/30/76 - Mrs. Reno signed Notice of Election to take under the Will.
12/6/76 — Notice of Election filed with the court.
Therefore, the requirements of § 2-4-101, W.S.1977, relative to the election by the spouse, were accomplished within the times specified therein, and the court’s order to the contrary should be reversed with the case being remanded for proceedings accordingly.

. The statute does not convert the trial judge into counsel for the spouse, and the requirements of attorney-client relationship should not be read into the statute. Any full explanation by the court “of the rights and consequences” of the election could be little more than as accomplished by the words of the statute. Even should the judge be cast in the role of counselor, he could seldom “advise” or “explain” further at the time in the proceedings at which such is required, inasmuch as the inventory and appraisement of the estate would not normally be available at that time.

.The fact that Mrs. Reno had actual knowledge of the right to make an election and of the consequences thereof is not pertinent to the determination of this case, except to emphasize the absurdity of the necessity to give the advice personally. That she had such knowledge is evidenced in several places in the record, including her statement in a letter postmarked November 3, 1976 that “I would be in a better bargaining position if I don’t sign & file the one taking the wills” and including the following contents of her letter to Mr. Swanton dated November 9, 1976:
“I would greatly appreciate it if you, as Floyd’s lawyer for his estate would contact the other inheritors for me. I have the option of going with Floyd’s Will or taking under the statutes of the state of Wyoming whereby I would be entitled to one-fourth of the entire estate.
“Rather than ask for one-fourth of the estate I would like to go with the Will but feel very strongly that I am entitled to an equal share of Floyd’s mineral rights in lieu of one-fourth of the entire estate.
“Please contact the other inheritors at your earliest convenience since my decision must be made and the papers filed before December 13.”