Court Opinion

ID: 9838965
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-09 00:01:01.058237+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:04:55.409052
License: Public Domain

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
                        FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

    v.
                                      Crim. Action
                                      No. 13-231-01 (EGS)
    HERMAN CURTIS MALONE,

                    Defendant.

                        MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

I.       Introduction

         In 2014, Herman Curtis Malone (“Mr. Malone” or “Defendant”)

was sentenced to serve 100 months in prison, followed by 60

months of supervised release. See Judgment, ECF No. 154 at 2-3. 1

He now proceeds pro se and seeks early termination of his term

of supervised release. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 235.

         Pending before the Court is Mr. Malone’s Motion for

Reconsideration of its Decision Denying His Motion for Early

Termination of Supervised Release, ECF No. 235. Upon careful

consideration of the motion, opposition, and reply thereto; the

applicable law; and the entire record herein, the Court DENIES

Mr. Malone’s motion.

1  When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
filed document.
II.   Background

      A.   Factual

      On March 12, 2014, Mr. Malone pleaded guilty to one count

of Conspiracy to Distribute and Possess with Intent to

Distribute 500 grams or more of Cocaine and 100 grams or more of

Heroin, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), and

841(b)(1)(B). See Plea Agreement, ECF No. 97 at 1. Thereafter,

on May 28, 2014, Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle sentenced Mr. Malone

to 100 months in prison and 60 months of supervision. See

Judgment, ECF No. 154 at 2-3. Mr. Malone completed his term of

imprisonment in December 2020, and his term of supervised

release is projected to conclude in December 2025. See Gov’t’s

Resp. Opp’n Def.’s Mot. Early Termination Supervised Release

(“Gov’t’s Opp’n”), ECF No. 237 at 2.

      B.   Procedural

      On December 21, 2022, Mr. Malone filed this Motion for

Reconsideration of its Decision Denying His Motion for Early

Termination of Supervised Release. See Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 235.

The Government filed its brief in opposition on March 10, 2023,

see Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 237; and Mr. Malone submitted his

reply brief on April 5, 2023, see Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 238. The

motion is ripe and ready for the Court’s adjudication.

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III.   Legal Standard

       “Unlike the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, neither the

 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure nor the Local Criminal Rules

 for this district provide for motions for reconsideration.”

 United States v. Bagcho, 227 F. Supp. 3d 28, 31 (D.D.C. 2017)

 (citing United States v. Hong Vo, 978 F. Supp. 2d 41, 47 (D.D.C.

 2013); United States v. Cabrera, 699 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40 (D.D.C.

 2010)). Nevertheless, “the Supreme Court has recognized, in

 dicta, the utility of such motions.” United States v. Ferguson,

 574 F. Supp. 2d 111, 113 (D.D.C. 2008) (citing United States v.

 Dieter, 429 U.S. 6 (1976); United States v. Healy, 376 U.S. 75,

 80 (1964)). Accordingly, “judges in this district have assumed,

 without deciding, that they may consider motions for

 reconsideration in criminal cases.” Bagcho, 227 F. Supp. 3d 28,

 31 (citing United States v. Hong Vo, 978 F. Supp. 2d 41, 47

 (D.D.C. 2013); United States v. Cabrera, 699 F. Supp. 2d 35, 40

 (D.D.C. 2010); United States v. Cooper, 947 F. Supp. 2d 108, 109

 (D.D.C. 2013)).

       “Judges in this district have applied the standard

 contained in Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

 to motions for reconsideration of final orders in criminal

 cases.” Hong Vo, 978 F. Supp. 2d at 47 (citing Cabrera, 699 F.

 Supp. 2d at 40; United States v. Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d 46, 47

 (D.D.C. 2006)). Nevertheless, motions for reconsideration “are

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disfavored” and “granted only when the moving party establishes

extraordinary circumstances.” Niedermeier v. Off. of Baucus, 153

F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001) (citing Anyanwutaku v. Moore,

151 F.3d 1053, 1057 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). To prevail, the movant

“must demonstrate that (1) there has been an intervening change

in controlling law; (2) there is new evidence; or (3) there is a

need to correct clear error or prevent manifest injustice.”

United States v. Ferguson, 574 F. Supp. 2d 111, 113 (citing

Libby, 429 F. Supp. 2d at 47); see also Firestone v. Firestone,

76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996). The movant “may not use

Rule 59(e) either to repeat unsuccessful arguments or to assert

new but previously available arguments.” Smith v. Lynch, 115 F.

Supp. 3d 5, 11 (D.D.C. 2015) (citing Exxon Shipping Co. v.

Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008)).

IV.   Analysis

      Mr. Malone moves the Court to reconsider its denial of his

Motion for Early Termination of Supervised Release. See Def.’s

Mot., ECF No. 235 at 1-2. For the reasons that follow, the Court

DENIES this motion.

      Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B), a court must impose a

minimum of four years of supervised release for a conviction

involving 100 grams or more of heroin and 500 grams or more of

cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B). A defendant may seek

relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), which authorizes a court to

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terminate a mandatory term of supervised release “at any time

after the expiration of one year of supervised release” after

considering: whether the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. §

3553(a) are met and whether release “is warranted by the conduct

of the defendant released and the interest of justice.” United

States v. Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d 137, 142 (D.D.C. 2017)

(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 18 U.S.C. §

3583(e)(1)). Those 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors include: “(1) the

nature and circumstances of the offense and defendant’s history

and characteristics; (2) deterrence of criminal conduct; (3)

protection of the public from further crimes of the defendant;

(4) the need to provide the defendant with educational or

vocational training, medical care, or other correctional

treatment; (5) the applicable sentencing guideline range for the

offense and pertinent policy statements issued by the U.S.

Sentencing Commission; (6) the need to avoid unwarranted

sentencing disparities; and (7) the need to provide restitution

to any victims of the offense.” United States v. Kaplan, No. CR

14-226 (BAH), 2021 WL 4521041, at *2 (D.D.C. Oct. 4, 2021)

(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)).

     Mr. Malone asserts that the Court “reach[ed] an incorrect

conclusion as a matter of law” regarding his eligibility for

early termination of supervised release. Def.’s Mot., ECF No.

235 at 1. He argues that recent caselaw confirms that the Court

                                5
has discretion to modify a statutorily mandated term of

supervised release. Id. (citing Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 142-

43; United States v. King, No. 03-cr-249, 2019 WL 415818, at *4

(D.D.C. Feb. 1, 2019); United States v. Wesley, 311 F. Supp. 3d

77, 79 n.1 (D.D.C. 2018)). He further argues that he did not

need to show any “extraordinary or unusual conduct” during

supervised release and that he satisfies all the criteria for

early termination. Id. at 2 (citing Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d at

148-50).

     The Government opposes Mr. Malone’s motion. See Gov’t’s

Opp’n, No. 237. Citing Harris, the Government contends that Mr.

Malone’s “burden in moving for early termination of supervised

release is high” to avoid the filing of repeated motions asking

the Court to reassess the Section 3553(a) factors. Id. at 2

(citing Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 149). The Government argues

that Mr. Malone has not met his burden because “the only 3553(a)

factor presented is an assertion, absent any documentation or

supporting explanation, that supervision unduly delays his

requests for ‘approved domestic travel’ in connection with his

profession.” Id. at 3.

     In his reply briefing, Mr. Malone asserts that he “has far

exceeded simply meeting” the Section 3553(a) factors. Def.’s

Reply, ECF No. 238 at 3. Without citing any of those factors, he

states that: his community welcomed him back during supervised

                                6
release; he has performed a substantial portion of his required

community service hours; he has mentored youth in the

Washington, D.C. area; he has spoken to basketball teams at

various colleges about his experience; and he co-founded a

company, CampusVR. See id. He emphasizes that he seeks early

termination “main[ly]” to travel to make presentations to

prospective clients for CampusVR. Id.

     The Court first clarifies for Mr. Malone its earlier order

denying his motion for early termination of supervised release.

There, the Court held that Mr. Malone “is ineligible for a . . .

reduction of his term of supervised release” because “he ha[d]

not begun his term of supervised release.” Minute Order (Nov.

13, 2020) (citing Probation Mem., ECF No. 232 at 2); see also 18

U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). Because Mr. Malone did not meet the

necessary condition for early termination pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e)(1), the Court concludes that it correctly denied Mr.

Malone’s motion.

     The Court further concludes that Mr. Malone is still

ineligible for early termination of supervised release. Contrary

to the Government’s assertion, see Gov’t’s Opp’n, ECF No. 237 at

2; Section 3583(e)(1) does not present an insurmountable burden

to early termination. See Harris, 258 F. Supp. 3d at 150

(“Indeed, § 3583(e)(1) invites flexible reexamination of the

continued need for supervised release ‘at any time’ after one

                                7
year of supervision has lapsed.”). However, Section 3583(e)(1)

still requires consideration of the Section 3553(a) factors. See

18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1). Mr. Malone does not explain how he

satisfies any of those factors in his briefing. See generally

Def.’s Mot., ECF No. 235; Def.’s Reply, ECF No. 238.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that early termination of

supervised release is not warranted and DENIES Mr. Malone’s

motion. To the extent Mr. Malone seeks to travel, he can file an

appropriate motion with the Court.

V.   Conclusion and Order

     For the reasons set forth above, it is hereby

     ORDERED that Mr. Malone’s Motion for Reconsideration of its

Decision Denying His Motion for Early Termination of Supervised

Release, ECF No. 235, is DENIED.

     SO ORDERED.

Signed:   Emmet G. Sullivan
          United States District Judge
          September 8, 2023

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