Court Opinion

ID: 9944919
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-02-26 18:52:29.868149+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T14:24:45.694395
License: Public Domain

The litigation at hand arises from a dispute over title to residential property in the City of Jackson, Michigan.
Examination of the history of the title, insofar as relevant to this case, discloses the following facts:
On February 3, 1948, Ida Tray conveyed the property in question by quitclaim deed through a straw man to herself, Sarah Tray, her daughter-in-law, Sally Ann Tray, and Edward S. Tray, both minors, her grandchildren, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. Although the conveyance was absolute in form, letters introduced in evidence at the trial indicate that the gift by Ida Tray to the other parties was subject to a condition that the property would be reconveyed to her at her request. Thereafter, on December 29, 1953, the aforementioned Sarah Tray, individually, and as guardian of Edward S. Tray, at that time 19 years of age and a minor, and Sally Ann Tray, who had by that time attained the age of majority, attempted to convey their interest in the property back to Ida Tray. At no time did the minor Edward S. Tray join in the conveyance, nor was the deed executed in his name by a duly-appointed guardian.
Subsequently, on January 9, 1954, Ida Tray, through a straw man, attempted to convey the property to herself, Jessie M. Whitney, Ida Tray's sister, and Cathryn M. Whitney, the defendant in this cause, as joint tenants with right of survivorship. *Page 538 
Ida Tray died on May 17, 1956. On January 12, 1958, Jessie M. Whitney died. As a result, the defendant appeared to hold record title to the property in fee simple absolute.
Plaintiff, Edward S. Tray, thereafter began an action in April, 1963, to determine interest in the land, praying that the court determine that he was the owner of the property in question and, further, that defendant be required to account for the reasonable value of the use of the premises, along with the rents and profits which had accrued while defendant was in possession.
From the judgment in favor of defendant, and the denial of plaintiff's motion for a new trial, plaintiff appeals of right.
Numerous assignments of error have been made by the parties but, in essence, the central issue relates to whether the doctrine of laches was properly invoked by the trial court.
In view of the merger of law and equity in this state, and the supplanting of the hitherto separate actions of ejectment and to quiet title by a single action to determine interests in land, expressly declared to be equitable in nature,1 there appears to be little reason to determine the question of whether the equitable defense of laches may be interposed to an action formerly cognizable only at law. Since plaintiff has successfully petitioned the chancellor to assume jurisdiction over his cause, he should not be heard to complain at this late date.
Contrary to the assertion of plaintiff that the record does not evidence any grounds upon which laches may be founded, other than the passage of time, the trial court detailed specific findings as to why plaintiff's lack of diligence precluded granting the relief sought. *Page 539 
I quote from the well-reasoned opinion of the learned trial judge in relevant part:
"The plaintiff herein knew in 1953 when he was 19 years of age that his mother, Sarah Tray, deeded the property in question back to Ida Tray and in said conveyance signed as his guardian. This was discussed by him with his mother in connection with giving the quitclaim deed to Ida Tray and Ida requesting it because she needed money for medical expenses.
"When Ida Tray died on May 17, 1956, plaintiff was 21 years of age, having reached his majority on November 8, 1955.
"He was contacted by a firm of attorneys in Tennessee in November, 1956, advising that he had a possible interest in the property and requesting if he wished to pursue his claim thereto. He retained counsel in Tennessee to represent him in this matter in December, 1956. The matter was then referred to his present counsel and, other than the fact that he spent two years in military service, no reason is advanced for his not commencing suit to assert his claim until April 23, 1963, other than that the matter was being investigated.
"As stated aforesaid, Ida Tray died May 17, 1956, and Jessie Whitney died January 12, 1958. Since the death of both, the defendant and crossplaintiff has paid the taxes and maintained the property in question which has been rented out by her, which facts were known or should have been known by the plaintiff if he was really interested in claiming this property as his own.
"All of the testimony hereinbefore referred to is relevant and admissible for consideration by this court on the question of laches.
"Actually, what we have here is an effort by this plaintiff to upset a conditional family agreement as to this property (which was later reputed by deeds of conveyance, creating a joint tenancy with right of survivorship, as evidenced by exhibits 7 and 8), *Page 540 
which conditional family agreement was obviously entered into to avoid probate as to the property in question. Although the plaintiff was not an actual participant in the conditional family arrangement, the plaintiff did have actual knowledge of the same, which fact may be considered by this court.
"There was a delay in pressing this claim of plaintiff for seven years and five months after he reached majority and for six years and four months after retaining counsel. The fact that he was in military service for two years is not being overlooked, but it has a rather hollow ring under all the circumstances.
"If this plaintiff was not in agreement with the termination of the conditional family agreement aforesaid, he was under a duty and obligation to assert and press his claim within a reasonable time after the disability of infancy ceased.
"Laches is an affirmative defense which depends not merely on lapse of time but principally on the requisite of intervening circumstances which would render inequitable any grant of relief to a dilatory plaintiff. See Lewis v. Poel [1965], 376 Mich. 167.
"For this plaintiff not to assert his claim to this property for the period which he did while someone else used this property, paid the taxes on it, and maintained it, makes him guilty of unconscionable and inexcusable delay and, hence, guilty of laches which bars his now asserting his claim. In making this statement, the court is aware of the fact that he was not a resident of the State of Michigan.
"This plaintiff is an intelligent individual who at the time of trial of this matter on August 6, 1968, had been employed as a sales engineer by an engineering company in Chicago, Illinois, for a period of five years. If his desires with reference to pressing this claim were not carried out by his attorneys, then he was under a duty and obligation to see that his desires were carried out." *Page 541 
For the reasons here set forth, I conclude that the trial court properly applied the ancient doctrine of laches to deny plaintiff relief under circumstances which otherwise would bring about an unjustifiable hardship upon the defendant, who had reasonably relied upon the apparent state of title and the acquiesence therein by plaintiff. The judgment below finding title in the defendant should accordingly be affirmed.
Costs to the defendant.
1 MCLA § 600.2932(5) (Stat Ann 1962 Rev § 27A.2932[5]).