Court Opinion

ID: 9696776
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 18:58:22.670403+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:20:26.700545
License: Public Domain

FLAHERTY, Judge.
P.R., the mother of D.N., petitions for review from an order of the Department of Public Welfare (DPW) which denied P.R.’s request that a report of child abuse against P.R. be expunged. We reverse.
The hearing officer of DPW made the following findings of fact which were adopted by DPW:
1. D.N. was born on August 25, 1983, and resided with her biological mother, P.R., at the time of the alleged incident on April 16, 1990.
2. On April 24, 1990, the Department of Public Welfare, 0[ffice of) C[hildren,] Y[outh and] F[amily], received a report alleging that P.R., the biological mother of D.N. had accidentally struck D.N., the subject child, in the right eye while she was attempting to discipline D.N. by using a belt.
3. As a result of this report, Argeleen Wilson, Department of] H[uman] S[er-vices] Social Worker, instituted an inves*436tigation of suspected child abuse on April 25,1990.
4. On or about April 25,1990, Argeleen Wilson interviewed the Appellant, P.R., and the subject child, D.N., in the Wills Eye Hospital.
5. The subject child, D.N., was hit in the eye with a belt buckle when the Appellant, P.R. attempted to strike her in the buttocks with the strap of the belt in order to discipline her.
6. The subject child, D.N. was admitted to the Wills Eye Hospital for a surgical procedure with respect to her right eye.
7. The subject child, D.N. remained at the Wills Eye Hospital for several days during which a physician performed a surgical procedure.
8. The Appellant did not deny striking the subject child, D.N. in the eye while she was spanking her.
9. The caseworker concluded her investigation by filing an indicated report of child abuse on May 26,1990.
Hearing officer’s Adjudication (Adjudication) at pp. 2-8. The hearing officer framed the salient issue as whether DPW had “presented substantial evidence that the Appellant inflicted non-accidental serious physical injury on the subject child....” Id. at 3. The hearing officer noted that the “Appellant’s counsel presented the uncontroverted testimony of the child who admitted that she was struck in the eye with an unidentified object while she evaded being struck by the leather strap of the belt (N[otes of] Testimony] 52-53) during a spanking.” Id. at 3. The hearing officer then concluded that she afforded “much credibility to her [the child’s] statements since she could have easily recanted her initial story....” Id. The hearing officer then concluded that P.R.’s request for expungement of her record should be denied because the injury was not accidental. DPW adopted the hearing officer’s recommendation in toto. P.R. petitions for review from the DPW’s order.
Appellate review in this matter is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, whether errors of law were committed or whether necessary findings of fact are supported by substantial evidence. E.D. v. Department of Public Welfare, 719 A.2d 384 (Pa.Cmwlth.1998).
On appeal, P.R. contends that DPW’s decision must be reversed because 1) DPW’s conclusion that D.N.’s injury was not accidental is unsupported by substantial evidence, 2) DPW applied an incorrect legal standard when it determined that D.N.’s injury was not an accident because P.R. should have foreseen the injury as a natural consequence of her actions, and 3) even if the foreseeability analysis was properly applied, the incident does not constitute child abuse.
P.R. argued before DPW and now argues before this court that although she may have struck D.N. with the belt buckle, she did not intend to do so and it was an accident that happened when she attempted to strike D.N. on the buttocks with the leather portion of the belt. When she went to spank D.N. with the leather portion of the belt on her buttocks, D.N., in an effort to avoid being struck, ducked and turned which resulted in D.N. accidentally being struck in the eye with the buckle of the belt. DPW rejected this argument and reasoned that
[a]n accidental injury is a fortuitous one which one cannot foresee. However, one must not confuse accidental with unintentional.
.... Moreover she [P.R.] should have foreseen the “natural consequences” of her actions — that the child would have made efforts to avoid being struck by the belt.
Adjudication at p. 4. DPW concluded that because in its estimation, the injury to the child’s eye was foreseeable by P.R., even if it was unintentional, the injury to D.N.’s eye was not accidental. In support of its conclusion, DPW cited to J.H. v. Depart-*437merit of Public Welfare, 73 Pa.Cmwlth. 369, 457 A.2d 1346 (1983). Adjudication at p. 4. Because we agree with P.R. that DPW utilized the wrong legal standard for determining the meaning of “accidental” injury, we reverse.
The Pennsylvania legislature defined “child abuse” at the time of the incident in question, i.e., April 16, 1990, as “serious physical or mental injury which is not explained by the available medical history as being accidental, or sexual abuse or sexual exploitation, or serious physical neglect of a child under 18 years of age, if the injury, abuse or neglect has been caused by the acts or omissions of the child’s parents. ...” Section 3 of the Act of November 26, 1975, P.L. 438, No. 124, as amended, formerly 11 P.S. § 2203, repealed by Section 6 of the Act of December 19, 1990, P.L. 1240.
The legislature did not define “accidental” in this context. Where a term is not defined, we are instructed that “words and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according to their common and approved usage.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1903(a). Moreover, in ascertaining the common and approved usage or meaning, we may have resort to the dictionary definitions of the terms left undefined by the legislature. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Kline, 300 Pa. 485, 494, 150 A. 889, 891-92 (1930); Contas v. City of Bradford, 206 Pa. 291, 55 A. 989 (1903) and Department of Labor and Industry v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 203 Pa.Super. 183, 199 A.2d 474, 478 (1964).
As the term accidental is undefined by the legislature, we may turn to the dictionary to assist us in understanding the meaning of this term. Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (1986) defines accidental in relevant part as follows:
2: occurring sometimes with unfortunate results by chance alone: a: UNPREDICTABLE: proceeding from an unrecognized principle, from an uncommon operation of a known principle, or from a deviation from normal; b: happening or ensuing without design, [or] intent ....
(emphasis added). In the instant case, the injury to D.N.’s eye indisputably happened without design or intent and thus, the eye injury falls within the common and approved definition of “accidental” and hence outside the relevant statutory definition of “child abuse”.
DPW’s conclusion to the contrary relies upon J.H. This reliance on precedent although understandable is misplaced. J.H. involved a situation remarkably similar to the case at hand. Therein, J.H., a stepfather, attempted to administer corporal punishment to his stepson by striking him across the buttocks with an oak stick. The son however, spun around and ducked and the blow struck him on the head resulting in a laceration requiring six sutures. Following an investigation by the local Child Protective Services, J.H was placed upon the registry of child abusers. J.H sought to have his name expunged on the grounds that the injury was accidental in nature. J.H.’s request for expungement was denied. J.H petitioned for review in this Court. Without performing any analysis of the term “accidental” and without resorting to the dictionary definition of accidental, a panel of this Court concluded that
[a]ll parties agree that accidental injuries are beyond the scope of the CPS Law. J.H. contends that the injury to his stepson was accidental because it was unintentional. The record supports the Hearing Officer’s conclusion that J.H. intended to inflict pain. J.H. was aware of the natural consequences of his action, i.e., that it would generate the child's reaction even though not intentional. Accordingly, we conclude that the Hearing Officer did not err as a matter of law in not characterizing the injury as accidental.
J.H., 451 A.2d at 1348. Thus, the panel concluded that because such an injury was *438reasonably foreseeable it was therefore not accidental. The panel’s conclusion in J.H. fails to take account of the relevant statutory construction principles, and in doing so, comes to a conclusion that simply is irreconcilable with the common and approved usage and meaning of the term “accidental.” That an event is reasonably foreseeable does not thereby always render the event other than accidental. See, e.g., Ferraro v. Crowell, 198 Pa.Super. 222, 182 A.2d 98 (1962).
In Ferraro, the court had to define the term “accident.” The plaintiff in Ferraro sued individuals who repossessed his truck. When the defendants came to the plaintiffs house to repossess the truck, they were informed that the truck had been drained of its oil. Heedless of this warning, the defendants nevertheless drove the truck thereby causing the engine to burn out. The plaintiff paid the amount in arrears owing on the truck and took back possession but discovered that the engine was ruined. The plaintiff sought to sue the defendants who were Ohio residents. The plaintiff also sought to serve them with process pursuant to a statute which permitted service upon nonresidents of Pennsylvania who operate vehicles within the Commonwealth in suits “arising out of any accident or collision occurring within the Commonwealth in which such motor vehicle is involved.” Id. at 99. The issue was whether the damage to the engine was an “accident” permitting service upon the Ohio residents who accomplished the repossession. The Court reasoned that
[i]n Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (unabridged), the word “accident” is defined to be “an event which, under the circumstances is unusual and unexpeeted[.]” .... If a wheel had dropped off the truck when it was being operated by the defendants, we are clearly of the opinion that such an event or happening would be called an accident, considering the common or popular use of the word. In spite of the warning given to the defendants concerning the operation of the truck without oil in the crankcase, it could hardly be concluded that the destruction of the engine was intentional. That some damage might be done to the truck in the operation might be reasonably foreseeable does not eliminate the conclusion that it was unexpected or unusual. We can see no distinction between the dropping off of a wheel during the operation of a motor vehicle and the burning up or destruction of an engine in such vehicle during the operation. In each case, the common understanding of people, generally, would be that it would be called an accident.
Id. at 100 (emphasis added). In like manner, even though it may be reasonably foreseeable that a child might attempt to escape from a spanking and thereby cause an injury that was unintended by the parent seeking to administer corporal punishment, this does not eliminate the conclusion that such unintended injury was “accidental.” Mere foreseeability does not necessarily render an accidental occurrence other than accidental. To decide otherwise, as did the panel in J.H. contorts the common understanding of “accidental” contrary to the intent of the legislature and the rules of statutory construction and brands every parent who experiences a mishap in the administering of corporal punishment a “child abuser” in fact. Because such a result is both unfounded in the law and unreasonable, as amply illustrated by the facts of this case, we must reverse the DPW. Moreover, to the extent that J.H. is inconsistent with this case, J.H. is overruled.
We do not hold today that in order to engage in child abuse, one must engage in behavior where one intends harm to the child. Negligent conduct is sufficient to permit a finding of child abuse. We merely hold that foreseeability is a necessary but not sufficient element for determining that one has negligently engaged in “serious physical or mental *439injury which is not explained by the available medical history as being accidental... ” within the meaning of Section 8 of the Act of November 26, 1975, P.L. 438.

ORDER

NOW, September 18, 2000, the order of the order of the Department of Public Welfare, dated December 26, 1997 and docketed at No. 21-96-291 is hereby reversed.
Dissenting opinion by President Judge DOYLE joined by Judge McGINLEY.