Court Opinion

ID: 9600019
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 01:23:08.332588+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:48.634387
License: Public Domain

HASELTON, J.,
dissenting.
A bartender is not a clerk. Accordingly, I must dissent.
The majority acknowledges that the defining characteristic of a clerk for purposes of ORCP 7D(3)(b)(i) is the responsibility for handling and transmitting documents to the registered agent. 133 Or App at 321. That requirement accords both with the commonly understood meaning of “clerk” 1 and with the realities of office service: An employee *322with document-handling responsibilities is presumably more likely to actually convey a summons and complaint to the registered agent than an employee without such responsibilities. Nonetheless, the majority fails to explain how or why bartenders in general, or the Tillicum Club’s bartenders in particular, have document processing responsibilities akin to those of “secretar[ies], typist[s], [or] receptionist[s].” 133 Or App at 320.
The majority does not, I believe, purport to hold that all bartenders are clerks. Nor could it plausibly.2 Thus, the majority’s holding must turn on an implicit conclusion that this bartender was a clerk of defendant’s registered agent, Cynthia Meredith.
That conclusion, however, disregards Meredith’s affidavit, which states that she instructed the bartender “not to accept anything on my behalf or on behalf of the tavern that required a signature.” That averment afforded a sufficient evidentiary basis for the trial court’s presumptive finding that the bartender had no duty to insure that the registered agent received the summons. See Ball v. Gladden, 250 Or 485, 487, 443 P2d 621 (1968).3 Thus, this bartender was not a clerk, and plaintiff did not effect service on defendant’s registered agent under ORCP 7D(3)(b)(i).
Plaintiff argues, in the alternative, that there was effective office service on the registered agent. ORCP 7D(2)(c).41 disagree. The bartender was not a “person who is *323apparently in charge” under the definitional test articulated in Boyd and Boyd, 131 Or App 194, 884 P2d 556 (1994), rev den 320 Or 507 (1995): “[T]he person physically receiving the summons must have a business duty to insure that the defendant received the summons.” 131 Or App at 199.
I will not pretend that dismissal of plaintiffs action is sensible or just. There is no question that defendant actually received the complaint and summons in a timely fashion and was not prejudiced by the deficiencies in service. But Oregon’s arcane rules governing service of process make no allowance for actual notice and, thus, compel such technically correct, but practically absurd, results. Amendment, not judicial ingenuity, is the answer.5
I respectfully dissent.

 When construing statutes, we first examine the text and context of the statutory provision. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). In so doing, words of common usage are given their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning. 317 Or at 611. Webster’s ThirdNew International Dictionary 421 (unabridged 1971) provides the following definitions for “clerk”:
“3 a: an employee or official responsible (as to a corporation or government agency) for correspondence, the keeping of records and accounts * * *.
“[3] b (1): one employed (as in abusiness office) to keep records or accounts or to perform more or less routine office tasks * *

 Such a holding would evoke a sign from my youth: “Shakey’s has an agreement with the bank: Shakey’s doesn’t cash checks, and the bank doesn’t make pizza.” In general, bartenders don’t process documents, and secretaries don’t mix drinks. Sam Malone was not Della Street.

 The majority suggests that, notwithstanding Meredith’s affidavit, service could be deemed sufficient because clerk status should be judged “from the perspective of the person serving the summons” and because the bartender told the process server that she would “make sure” that the papers were given to Meredith. 133 Or App at 320-21 n 6. That reasoning is remarkable. By logical extension, any employee who has regular contact with the public and with the registered agent can be deemed a “clerk” so long as he or she volunteers to transmit the summons and complaint, regardless of his or her actual job duties. Thus, service on an accommodating or disgruntled elevator operator, waiter, or parking lot attendant would be sufficient, regardless of whether the registered agent actually received the summons and complaint. That construction effectively reads “clerk” out of ORCP 7D(3)(b)(i).

 ORCP 7D(2)(c) provides:
“If the person to be served maintains an office for the conduct of business, *323office service may be made by leaving a true copy of the summons and complaint at such office during normal working hours with the person who is apparently in charge. Where office service is used, the plaintiff, as soon as reasonably possible, shall cause to be mailed a true copy of the summons and complaint to the defendant at the defendant’s dwelling house or usual place of abode or defendant’s place of business or such other place under the circumstances that is most reasonably calculated to apprise the defendant of the existence and pendency of the action, together with a statement of the date, time, and place at which office service was made. For the purpose of computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by these rules, office service shall be complete upon such mailing.”

 On appeal, plaintiff did not argue that, even if the service did not comply with one of the enumerated methods described in ORCP 7, it was adequate because it was effected in a “manner reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the defendant of the existence and pendency of the action and to afford a reasonable opportunity to appear and defend.” ORCP 7D(1). See Baker v. Foy, 310 Or 221, 225-26, 797 P2d 349 (1990). Consequently, I express no opinion as to whether the service in this case satisfied that standard.