Court Opinion

ID: 9693845
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:03:24.737141+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:19:51.169985
License: Public Domain

Justice LONG,
concurring.
This case involves the actions of a fourteen-year-old boy who foolishly shot some BBs to “ding” passing vehicles. As a result, the driver of one of the vehicles sustained an injury. The boy’s • parents sought coverage under their homeowner’s policy. Although all parties agree that there is no direct evidence that the boy subjectively intended or expected to cause an injury, the insurer declined coverage on the basis of two exclusionary clauses in its policy. We are here called upon to determine the meaning of those clauses.
*345I.
The facts established during discovery are as follows. On January 20, 2001, fourteen-year-old Timothy Murphy, III, and his thirteen-year-old friend Erie Kovalehek, visited the home of fifteen-year-old Erie Elder. At around 11:00 p.m., the boys decided to shoot BBs at passing cars. They retrieved a BB gun from the Elders’ shed, and climbed onto a ten-foot high wooden platform in a tree at the edge of the Elders’ property, twenty-five yards from the road. The night was dark and moonless, and it was sleeting. Visibility was poor.
According to Murphy, he and Elder took turns firing. By listening to the sound of the BBs ricocheting off the vehicles, Murphy estimated that he hit four or five of them. Kovalehek did not remember Elder hitting any cars, though he did recall Murphy hitting two or three, including a Jeep. By all accounts, Kovalehek did not shoot the BB gun.
Murphy admitted to shooting intentionally at the cars, but he denied that he intended to hurt anyone and claimed that he did not understand at the time that someone could get hurt. When asked why he thought that shooting BBs at moving cars would not cause injury, Murphy responded, “Because I never thought that it would hit a person, I was just seeing like to get it to hit the car. I never thought it would go inside of them.” Murphy also conceded that, at the timej he knew that what he was doing was “wrong,” “illegal,” and might subject him to “juvenile court.” Despite understanding those risks, Murphy thought at the time that he was just “hav[ing] fun with [his] friends.” He acknowledged that the boys talked “a little bit” during their time on the platform, but he could not remember what they had discussed.
For the most part, Elder and Kovalehek confirmed Murphy’s version. Elder testified that he never thought that they could hurt anyone and that “it seemed harmless at the time.” Elder also stated that nothing was said on the platform that indicated that any of the boys expected or feared that someone would be hurt. Kovalehek said that he told the others, “I don’t feel like this is the *346right thing, I don’t think we should be doing this,” but, when asked whether Elder or Murphy said or did anything that gave him the idea that they wanted to harm someone, Kovalchek answered, “No, not at all.” Further, Kovalchek indicated that no one expressed concern that the BBs could penetrate one of the cars.
At some point that night, Gina Santiago drove her soft-top Jeep along the road in front of the Elders’ property. Her husband, Ferdinand, was a passenger in the vehicle. A BB, shot from the platform, struck the Jeep, pierced its plastic window, and entered Mrs. Santiago’s right eye. She was permanently blinded in that eye, an injury that leaves her susceptible to further complications.
Elder stated that the boys decided to end the shooting when Santiago’s vehicle stopped and the driver got out because they “thought it could have been teenagers like coming back to like find us or something like that____” Kovalchek confirmed that a Jeep stopped on the road after being hit by a BB, which Murphy had fired, and that a passenger got out of the Jeep, walked around it and got back in, and that the Jeep drove off. Murphy denied that the boys were aware that a vehicle had stopped, and he could not recall the precise reason why they had ceased shooting. The boys returned to the Elders’ house, where they spent the night.
After an investigation, the State filed a delinquency petition against Murphy alleging facts that, if committed by an adult, would have constituted possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and aggravated assault. Murphy admitted to aggravated assault with a civil reservation that prevented use of his admission in any future proceeding. The judge adjudicated Murphy delinquent and imposed two years of probation. Murphy was also required to pay fines, take a gun-safety course, and participate in community service.
In January 2002, based on diversity jurisdiction, the Santiagos sued Murphy and his parents (collectively the Murphy family) in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. Cumberland Mutual Insurance Co., the Murphy family’s home*347owner’s insurance carrier, then began this declaratory action in Superior Court, naming Murphy, the Murphy family, and the Santiagos as defendants. Cumberland sought a declaration that it was not obliged to provide coverage to the Murphy family for the injuries suffered by Mrs. Santiago.
Cumberland based its denial of coverage on exclusions contained in the homeowner’s policy. The policy provides coverage for “bodily injury” that is caused by an “occurrence” and, in turn, defines “occurrence” as “an accident ... which results ... in bodily injury.” The policy excludes coverage as follows:

SECTION IID ■ LIABILITY NOT INSURED

We do not provide insurance under Section II for any sort of damages, expenses, liability, or loss directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, aggravated by, consisting of, or resulting from the following
4. ENDANGERMENT OR HARM
We do not cover bodily injury or property damage, whether or not expected or intended by the insured, which is a consequence of an insured’s willful harm or knowing endangerment.

SECTIONS I & II- OTHER LOSS AND LIABILITY NOT INSURED

We provide no insurance for any sort of damages, expenses, liability, or loss directly or indirectly, wholly or partially, aggravated by, consisting of, or resulting from the following.
GOVERNMENTAL AND LEGAL ACTION
D. Knowing violation of penal law or ordinance committed by, or with the consent of, an insured, statutory fines, or exemplary or punitive damages, illegal transportation or trade.
[(Formatting altered).]
Cumberland and the Santiagos filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The fundamental issue on both motions was whether the policy provisions clearly excluded Murphy’s acts from coverage. After a hearing, the trial judge denied Cumberland’s motion and granted that of the Santiagos. The judge determined that the material facts — that multiple shots were fired and that Murphy fired the BB that hit Santiago — were not disputed. He concluded, *348however, that, contrary to Cumberland’s contention, the circumstances surrounding the shooting would not support a presumption that Murphy harbored a subjective intent to injure anyone. Specifically, the judge held, among other things, that Mrs. Santiago’s injury was not “an inherently probable and foreseeable consequence” of Murphy’s actions, given the weather, the boys’ stated intention, their distance from the roadway, the few shots that hit their mark, and the unlikely happenstance of the Santiago’s vehicle having a permeable top. He also found that although Murphy and Elder did “something utterly stupid[,]” “this stupid prank was not one in which they envisioned the horrible injury that they caused.”
Cumberland appealed. In an unpublished, per curiam opinion, the Appellate Division affirmed. We granted Cumberland’s petition for certification, Cumberland v. Murphy, 182 N.J. 139, 861 A.2d 844 (2004) and now affirm.
II.
Cumberland argues that the “willful harm” and “knowing endangerment” exclusion preludes coverage for injuries caused by an insured’s intentional acts; that in ruling in favor of coverage, the courts below misapplied our prior case law regarding intentional acts; that Murphy’s intent can be presumed based on the “objective circumstances” surrounding his “particularly reprehensible” conduct; and that, in any event, the penal law exclusion in the policy precludes coverage. The Murphys counter that Mrs. Santiago’s injury was plainly contemplated by their homeowner’s insurance policy, that the boys’ actions were not intentional acts subjecting them to the policy’s exclusion, and that the fatally ambiguous “willful harm” or “knowing endangerment” exclusions must be construed in favor of coverage.
III.
We have carefully reviewed this record in light of the claims advanced by Cumberland and have concluded that our interven*349tion is unwarranted. As Cumberland concedes, the outcome in this ease depends on the application of our prior decisions in Voorhees v. Preferred Mutual Insurance Co., 128 N.J. 165, 607 A.2d 1255 (1992), SL Industries Inc. v. American Motorists Insurance Co., 128 N.J. 188, 607 A.2d 1266 (1992), and Harleysville Insurance Companies v. Garitta, 170 N.J. 223, 785 A.2d 913 (2001).
In Voorhees, we recognized that the accidental nature of an occurrence is determined by analyzing whether the alleged wrongdoer intended or expected to cause an injury. 128 N.J. at 183, 607 A.2d 1255. Thus, a “covered accident” includes the unintended consequences of an intentional act, but not an injury that is, itself, intended. Id. at 182, 607 A.2d 1255. Foolhardy or reckless acts are not automatically excluded from coverage. Id. at 184, 607 A.2d 1255. However, if the acts are particularly reprehensible (for example, sexual abuse of children in a day care center), subjective intent can be presumed from the likelihood that injury will result from that reprehensible conduct. Ibid.
In SL Industries, we considered the additional questions “whether any intent to injure will render the resulting injury intentional, whether the wrongdoer must intend the specific injury that results, or whether there is some middle ground between the two approaches.” 128 N.J. at 209, 607 A.2d 1266. We held that coverage is generally excluded if the insured “subjectively intends or expects to cause some sort of injury.” Id. at 212, 607 A.2d 1266 (emphasis added). However, if the insured’s conduct causes a degree of injury that is “improbable,” then the court must determine “whether the insured subjectively intended or expected to cause that injury.” Ibid, (emphasis added). Without the intent to cause “that injury,” the injury will be deemed “accidental,” and the insurance company will be obligated to provide coverage.
We reaffirmed the holdings in Voorhees and SL Industries in Garitta:
As a general rule, then, policy exclusions of the type at issue here represent enforceable limitations to an insurance contract when free of ambiguity. Courts *350ordinarily should refrain from summary judgment in respect of whether an insured intended or expected to cause the actual injury to a third party unless the record undisputedly demonstrates that such injury was an inherently probable consequence of the insured’s conduct. In that latter circumstance, a trial may not be necessary to determine the applicability of the exclusion, provided that there has been a sufficient demonstration of the insured’s subjective intent to cause some degree of injury. When the insured’s conduct is particularly reprehensible, courts may presume an intent to injure without inquiring into the actor’s actual intent.
[Garitta, supra, 170 N.J. at 234-35, 785 A.2d 913.]
Applying those principles, we are satisfied, as were the trial judge and the Appellate Division, that what occurred in this case was an “accident” within the meaning of the Cumberland policy. The uncontroverted evidence given by Murphy, Elder and Kovalchek provides no basis for the conclusion that they subjectively intended or expected to injure anyone. Neither, in light of the weather, the distance of the boys from the road and the few shots that hit their target, can we say that Mrs. Santiago’s injury was an inherently probable consequence of Murphy’s conduct. Nor do we agree with Cumberland that the heedless conduct of that fourteen-year-old boy was in any way equivalent to the acts we have previously characterized as “particularly reprehensible,” so as to give rise to a presumption of an intent to injure Mrs. Santiago.
We likewise question our dissenting colleagues’ postulate that the “willful harm” and “knowing endangerment” exclusion was meant to eliminate from consideration the notions of “expected or intended” injury and the jurisprudence surrounding them. Indeed we think it would be fair to say that “expected” is an analogue of “knowing endangerment,” and “intended” of “willful harm.”
But even if our colleagues are correct in their determination that the willful harm and knowing endangerment exclusion was fashioned to eliminate our prior “expected or intended” jurisprudence, the result would be the same. The insurer, as the drafter of an insurance policy, is responsible for its language. Where that language is ambiguous, its object is determined not by what the insurer intended it to mean, but by what a reasonable person in the position of the insured would have understood it to mean at *351the time the contract was entered into. 2 Couch on Insurance 3d § 21.14. An insured’s reasonable expectation of coverage depends, in turn, on the plain meaning of the policy language. Ibid. “[W]hen the terms of an insurance contract are clear, it is the function of a court to enforce it as written and not to make a better contract for either of the parties.” Kampf v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 33 N.J. 36, 43, 161 A.2d 717 (1960).
However, when a policy is unclear ambiguities ordinarily are resolved in favor of the insured. We have observed that where the policy language of an insurance policy supports two meanings, one favorable to the insurer and the other to the insured, the interpretation favoring coverage should be applied.
[Progressive Cos. Ins. Co. v. Hurley, 166 N.J. 260, 273-74, 765 A.2d 195 (2001) (internal citations and quotations omitted).]
With that teaching in mind, we have reviewed the language of the exclusion in Section 11(D)(4) and have concluded that it is impossible to divine its boundaries insofar as it simultaneously does not require an injury to be “expected or intended,” but does require it to flow out of “willful harm” or “knowing endangerment.” Those terms, which are undefined in the policy, elsewhere have been recognized as imprecise. Cumberland Mutual Fire Insurance v. Beeby, 327 N.J.Super. 394, 402-03, 743 A.2d 853 (App.Div.2000). Indeed, our dissenting colleagues concede that the words are subject to numerous interpretations. To us, that leaves open the issue of whether the improbable consequences of Murphy’s childish conduct fall within the exclusion. At the very least, a reasonable insured, who read the policy, might have expected that they would not. Thus, under our well-established principles of insurance policy interpretation, the policy must be interpreted in favor of coverage. Lundy v. Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co., 92 N.J. 550, 559, 458 A.2d 106 (1983).
IV.
We are likewise unpersuaded by Cumberland’s reliance on the penal law exclusion in the policy. Our Legislature, aided by our case law, has created vastly different systems to address adult and juvenile crime, in recognition of the fundamental differences in *352culpability as between a child and an adult. Because of that recognition and because the exclusion at issue here does not define a violation of the penal law, it can arguably be read as referencing only an adult’s violation of a criminal statute, and not conduct by a juvenile that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime. Even if debatable, the penal law exclusion is ambiguous and must be interpreted in favor of coverage. Progressive, supra, 166 N.J. at 273-74, 765 A.2d 195.
V.
We would affirm the judgment of the Appellate Division.
Chief Justice PORITZ and Justice ZAZZALI join in the opinion.