Court Opinion

ID: 9657115
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-23 20:14:27.521415+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:13:40.934359
License: Public Domain

REES, Justice
(dissenting).
*770I find myself unable to agree with the majority, and respectfully dissent.
Concededly, the petition filed in the Juvenile Court of Clayton County, pursuant to order authorizing its filing, charged the defendant with being a delinquent child within the meanings of the statutes defining delinquency, and in order to support the claim of delinquency asserted that on the 24th day of August, 1969 the defendant committed the crime of arson by setting fire to two school buildings in the town of Elkader, contrary to section 707.2, The Code, 1966.
The record reflects that:
“Before the beginning of testimony the court discussed with the Clayton County Attorney the question of whether or not an indictment or information had been filed. Since neither had been filed the court inquired to (sic) the county attorney if he anticipated instituting the matter in the district court should the juvenile court not retain jurisdiction. The county attorney replied affirmatively.”
The record goes on to reflect that the court thereupon made the following preliminary statement in the record:
“THE COURT: Before we hear the first witness, it is the Court’s view that this is a regular hearing on a petition charging delinquency and at this time the State and the juvenile may present any or all relative evidence concerning the question of delinquency and as to whether the court should or will make a finding of delinquency. . . . ”
We agree with the majority that a full-blown juvenile hearing on the merits followed, the court hearing 17 witnesses regarding the fires and the claimed connection of the defendant with them, examining 29 exhibits, hearing a psychiatric evaluation of the defendant and receiving a written report of the social investigation by a social welfare agency. Following such hearing the court entered its judgment, finding defendant would not benefit from juvenile court facilities, but that the evidence was sufficient to warrant a criminal charge, and ordered the matter referred to the Clayton County Attorney for proper action under criminal law. All of the foregoing proceedings took place before the Clayton County Juvenile Court, Judge Oberhausen presiding.
Subsequently, the Grand Jury of Clayton County indicted the defendant for arson. A written plea was filed by the defendant, asserting that he had been formerly acquitted of the offense charged in the indictment by judgment of the Juvenile Court of Clayton County, or alternatively, that he was not guilty of the offense charged in the indictment. The Clayton County Court, Judge T. H. Nelson presiding, who dismissed the indictment, held:
“The finding that delinquency was not proven necessarily means that the crime of arson was not proven to have been committed by the defendant, and that it therefore was an established fact as between the State and the defendant that the defendant did not commit arson.”
I. With the finding of the trial court (Nelson, J.) that the Juvenile Court had previously determined defendant had not committed arson, and therefore criminal prosecution was barred under the doctrines of prior jeopardy and res judicata, I cannot agree. If such had been the finding of the Juvenile Court, I do agree that fundamental fairness would bar criminal prosecution. In my opinion the Juvenile Court merely found there was sufficient evidence to support the accusation of arson, but that the social and psychiatric reports and other evidence before it were not “sufficiently clear and convincing to warrant a finding of delinquency or that this juvenile at this time can benefit from the facilities available to this court for his future care and supervision.”
II. The historical development of our present juvenile court law has been adequately detailed by the majority. I have *771no difficulty in agreeing with the majority that the enactment of section 232.72, The Code 1971, in 1967, was motivated by the pronouncements of the Supreme Court of the United States in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). [Kent involved an ex parte order by a juvenile court authorizing criminal charges to be filed against a child.] However, I do not agree section 232.72 provides for a separate hearing other than the hearing provided for by sections 232.4-232.11, The Code. Section 232.72 merely sets up the mechanics of transfer to criminal prosecution, and requires a “hearing”. The reference to “hearing” is obviously referable to a hearing under sections 232.4— 232.11, and does not necessitate the holding of a separate hearing. Kent requires a hearing on transfer only and does not involve the merits of the matter under scrutiny herein. It arose under entirely different circumstances than those present in the case before us. In Kent, the defendant was arrested for rape, robbery and housebreaking. Because he was 16 years of age, he was subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Juvenile authorities. However, the District of Columbia Code allowed the Juvenile Court to waive jurisdiction for trial in the District Court. The Juvenile Court, without a hearing, without talking to the defendant, or to his parents, entered an order waiving jurisdiction to the District Court, and stated it had made a full investigation. On subsequent trial in District Court, Kent was found not guilty by reason of insanity on the charge of rape, but on six counts of housebreaking and robbery he was found guilty, and was later sentenced to five to 15 years on each count. The judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals.
The distinction between Kent and the matter before us, simply stated, is that in Kent the defendant had been denied any hearing on the waiver, and in the matter before us, it is asserted the hearing went too far and that therefore jeopardy attached. Kent did not hold or even logically infer that the hearing must be closely circumscribed and limited to the transfer issue. The following selected quotations from Kent, I deem to be particularly applicable to the matter under consideration by us here. At 86 S.Ct. 1053-1054, we find:
“We do not consider whether, on the merits, Kent should have been transferred; but there is no place in our system of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony — without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of reasons. It is inconceivable that a court of justice dealing with adults, with respect to a similar issue, would proceed in this manner. It would be extraordinary if society’s special concern for children, as reflected in the District of Columbia’s Juvenile Court Act, permitted this procedure. We hold that it does not.”
Further, at page 1055, the Court said:
“It is clear beyond dispute that the waiver of jurisdiction is a ‘critically important’ action determining vitally important statutory rights of the juvenile.

“ * * * In these circumstances, considering particularly that decision as to waiver of jurisdiction and transfer of the matter to the District Court was potentially as important to petitioner as the difference between five years’ confinement and a death sentence, we conclude that, as a condition to a valid waiver order, petitioner was entitled to a hearing, including access by his counsel to the social records and probation or similar reports which presumably are considered by the court, and to a statement of reasons for the Juvenile Court’s decision. We believe that this result is required by the statute read in the context of constitutional principles relating to due process and the assistance of counsel.”
*772And, again, at page 1057, the Court said:
“Meaningful review requires that the reviewing court should review. It should not be remitted to assumptions. It must have before it a statement of the reasons motivating the waiver including, of course, a statement of the relevant facts. It may not ‘assume’ that there are adequate reasons, nor may it merely assume that ‘full investigation’ has been made. Accordingly, we hold that it is incumbent upon the Juvenile Court to accompany its waiver order with a statement of the reasons or considerations therefor. We do not read the statute as requiring that this statement must be formal or that it should necessarily include conventional findings of fact. But the statement should be sufficient to demonstrate that the statutory requirement of ‘full investigation’ has been met; and that the question has received the careful consideration of the Juvenile Court; and it must set forth the basis for the order with sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.
“Correspondingly, we conclude that an opportunity for a hearing which may be informal, must be given the child prior to entry of a waiver order. Under Black [v. United States, 122 U.S.App.D.C. 393, 355 F.2d 104 (1965)], the child is entitled to counsel in connection with a waiver proceeding, and under Watkins [v. United States, 119 U.S.App.D.C. 409, 343 F. 278 (1964)], counsel is entitled to see the child’s social records. These rights are meaningless — an illusion, a mockery — unless counsel is given an opportunity to function.
⅜ ⅜ ⅜ * * #
“We do not mean by this to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment. Pee v. United States, 107 U.S. App.D.C. 47, 50, 274 F.2d 556, 559 (1959).”
From the foregoing it appears there must be a full hearing on waiver. I am unable to conclude the hearing in the case before us violated the fundamental fairness test. Nor am I able to interpret section 232.72, The Code, to require a separate hearing on transfer. The enactment of section 232.72, The Code, made treatment of a child as a juvenile mandatory unless waived to the District Court after a hearing necessitated by Kent as reasoned by the majority. However, the hearing provided for by section 232.72 is not required to be separate from the hearings provided for in sections 232.4 to 232.11, inclusive.
It occurs to me it would be illogical to permit the Juvenile Court to marshal as much information as possible before making its determination of waiver, and to then conclude because the hearing involved too much, that jeopardy attached in a juvenile hearing. We do not understand the Juvenile Court’s findings and judgment before us to be a finding and adjudication the defendant had not committed arson. It found there was sufficient evidence to support the accusation of arson, but that the social and psychiatric reports and other evidence were not sufficiently clear to warrant a finding of delinquency. Judge Nelson, relying on section 232.2(13)a, which defines a delinquent child, held the cited section “does not say that the juvenile court may, in its discretion, find such a child delinquent, nor does it require the finding of any other circumstances with regard to the child.” We concede this is true, but we do not believe the Legislature in so defining a delinquent intended to deprive the Juvenile Court of the discretion and flexibility carefully preserved in other sections of the chapter. I believe the Legislature meant to make one violation enough to make the child a delinquent, but did not mean to require a finding of delinquency based upon one violation of law. Such a holding would deprive the Juvenile Court of the alternative of withholding a finding *773of delinquency and transferring jurisdiction when the petition alleged delinquency based on a single criminal act. Such an interpretation would make duplicate hearings a necessity in every juvenile case. The Legislature obviously did not intend such a result and provided for one combined hearing.
In my view the Juvenile Court’s failure to find delinquency under the circumstances was not tantamount to a finding defendant was not guilty of the crime of arson.
I would therefore reverse the judgment of the trial court, and remand the case for further proceedings.
MOORE, C. J. and LeGRAND, J., join in this dissent.