Court Opinion

ID: 9772379
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 17:16:10.664543+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:31:43.864704
License: Public Domain

On Motion for Rehearing
The plaintiffs have filed a motion for rehearing which points out certain errors we have made in recitation of the facts, particularly in our elimination of Mr. Joe Clark as a person who could have been a witness in the case.
The motion is unusually thorough and persuasive, but after further search into the authorities we have reached the conclusion that our disposition on the original hearing was correct.
Essentially, our problem involves the consideration of presumptions and inferences as applied to the question of agency, and in this connection we are of the opinion that the following discussion is warranted.
Where agency is a matter for inference, the question of whether the inference is overcome would ordinarily be a question for the trier of the facts. It would only be when the evidence is of such character that only one reasonable deduction could be drawn therefrom that the court could resolve the question as a matter of law. See cases under the Ten-Year Supplement to 17 Tex.Jur., p. 2S2, “Evidence — Civil Cases,” sec. 60, “(Presumption) Force and Effect — Rebuttal”; Ross v. Green, 1940, 135 Tex. 103, 139 S.W.2d 565.
Where agency is a matter for presumption, such presumption vanishes and ceases to have probative force or effect when positively contradicted. In such an *873instance, the adverse party has the burden of proceeding with more or other evidence upon penalty for failure to do so of having an instructed verdict against him upon the issue. Page v. Lockley, Tex.Civ.App., Eastland, 1943, 176 S.W.2d 991. Beginning at page 998, Judge Funderburk goes into the distinction between inference and presumption, analyzing the leading cases. Though the judgment of the Eastland court was reversed at 142 Tex. 594, 180 S.W.2d 616, the basis of the reversal was the application of the principles discussed to the circumstances of the case there under consideration rather than upon any erroneous conception of the law on the part of the Court of Civil Appeals.
In the instant case, we have a presumption of agency upon the proof by the plaintiffs that the defendant’s servant was driving its truck and that the servant had been employed to drive said truck. We have an inference of agency in view of the “Driver’s Daily Log” prepared by the servant and delivered to and made a part of the business records of the defendant. We have also a circumstance justifying an argument to the jury by the plaintiffs that certain absent witnesses who reasonably should have knowledge bearing upon the question of such agency could not have aided the defendant’s contention that no agency existed if they had appeared and testified. Under the circumstances of this case, we do not believe that the failure on the part'of the defendant to produce said witnesses would amount to either an inference of the fact of agency or raise a presumption of agency.
However, when the inference of agency provided by the “Driver’s Daily Log” became a part of the evidence in the case, the circumstances, (1) that the servant was employed to drive the truck arid was driving the truck, and (2) that witnesses under ' the defendant’s control who were in posi- ' tion to testify upon the matter of agency' were not produced by the defendant, were before the jury and entitled to be considered by it in connection with the ultimate, question if, in the light of all the evidence in the record, reasonable minds could differ as to whether the acts of the servant at the time and place of the collision were within the scope and course of his employment.
The initial presumption in the case before us, upon the matter of agency of the defendant’s truck driver, arose by reason of the proof that the truck belonged to the defendant and the driver was the defendant’s servant employed to drive the same. In view of the testimony of the servant as to what he did and as to his movements, etc. (disregarding the servant’s own opinions and conclusions upon whether or not such constituted him an agent), it is our opinion that his testimony amounted’ to positive evidence that he was not acting within the scope and course of his employment at the time of the collision. In Texas,, though certain exceptions are recognized, the general rule is that a presumption vanishes and ceases to have any effect upon the introduction of any proof which amounts to evidence sufficient to justify a finding against the fact presumed, — and that immediately thereupon the burden of proceeding and the burden of persuasion devolve upon him who theretofore had relied upon the presumption. Texas Law of Evidence, 2nd Ed., McCormick & Ray, sec. 53, “True Presumptions — Rebuttable Presumptions of Law.” No exception is here involved and we are satisfied, therefore, that when defendant’s servant testified about the facts the presumption of his agency for the defendant disappeared. Hudiburgh v. Palvic, Tex.Civ.App., Beaumont, 1954, 274 S.W.2d 94, writ refused, n. r. e. This case also holds that the mere right of the jury to> disbelieve a servant’s testimony that he was not an agent at a material time does not authorize it to believe the opposite of what his testimony imports. (Citing cases.)
In our original opinion, we commented upon the case of Houston News Co. v. Shavers, 1933, 64 S.W.2d 384, 386, error' *874refused, authored by Judge Alexander when he was on the Waco Court of Civil Appeals. We recited language “lifted” therefrom by the plaintiffs under their contention that in this case agency was a question of fact to be resolved by the jury because the defendant had not made a “clean and clear disclosure” of all the evidence apparently within its possession by producing all the witnesses who presumably would know the facts. We then discussed the failure of the defendant to bring its servant’s father and tender his testimony. In the course of the discussion, we stated that a Mr. Joe Clark, who had direct control over the firm’s employees, including the servant, was not present at a material time on the day of the trip.
On the motion for rehearing, the plaintiffs point out an error on our part with reference to the statement made about Joe Clark. They demonstrate from the record that it was another man by the name of Clark who was out of town when defendant’s servant left Wichita Falls, and that Mr. Joe Clark and the servant’s father both talked with the servant immediately before he left on the trip in question. Indeed, it was shown that it was by Clark’s leave that the trip to Springtown was made via Henrietta in Clay County rather than by going through Archer County, increasing the distance to Springtown by a mile or two.
 It is primarily because plaintiffs point out this circumstance that this discussion was deemed necessary. The plaintiffs present a very strong argument to the effect that under the language and holdings of the Houston News Co. v. Shavers, supra, case there was an inference upon which the jury was authorized to make the fact finding it did make as to the agency of the defendant’s servant at the time of the collision. They contend for such authorization because of the defendant’s failure to produce Mr. Joe Clark as a witness on the trial. Of course, they also repeat the same argument as to the absence of the father of the servant.
The only evidence in the record concerning instructions given by Clark immediately before the servant started his trip came from the lips of the servant himself. He testified that Clark was acquainted with the deviation whereby on the trip to Spring-town he went by way of Henrietta. Naturally, this was pursuant to the conversation held and authorization received just before leaving Wichita Falls. The “helper” on the truck was not present at the time, according to his own testimony, and therefore it would clearly appear that we can disregard any possibility of his having heard the conversation. The defendant’s servant further testified in response to questions, as follows: “Q. Did you have anybody at Azle that you had been instructed to contact or see for your employer, * * ? A. No, sir. Q. When you came on to Fort Worth did you have anybody that you were supposed to contact or see here in Fort Worth * * *? A. No, sir.”
The defendant tendered the testimony of Mr. Richard Haas and Mrs. E. E. Albright, superiors of defendant’s servant in that firm’s operations, both of whom testified that there was nothing which the servant was supposed to perform in the way of duty in Fort Worth and vicinity. The effect of their testimony was to establish that the servant was outside the scope and course of his employment at the time and place of the collision. It was clear that neither of these witnesses knew what conversation might have taken place between the servant and anyone in Wichita Falls immediately before the servant left that point.
For the purposes of this discussion, we concede that if the defendant had offered no evidence concerning the servant’s authority to be where he was with the truck at time of the collision, even that of the servant himself, the situation might have created an inference of his agency upon which the jury might be authorized to pass. Nevertheless, we believe that such inference may not be said to exist where the defendant did produce some evidence- on the question, though *875failing to produce additional testimony from other witnesses within its control, where it does not further appear that such other testimony would have been more direct and explicit. It may seem that this statement contradicts the holding in the case of Houston News Co. v. Shavers, supra, hut we believe that a careful analysis will lead to a contrary conclusion. Under the annotations in 135 A.L.R. 1375, “Presumption or inference from party’s failure to produce witnesses within his control, as affected by his introduction of some evidence on the matter in question,” we find the case of Marek v. Southern Enterprises, Inc., of Texas, 1936, 128 Tex. 377, 99 S.W.2d 594. It would appear from the case and from others to be found in the annotations that while in Texas it is proper for counsel for a litigant to comment upon the absence of some witness who might have been called by his adversary in corroboration of other witnesses who were offered by the adversary, and to argue that if the absent witness’ testimony would have done the adversary’s case any good it would have been produced,—it nevertheless is the law that a legal inference does not exist under such circumstances constituting in and of itself competent and sufficient evidence upon which a judgment might be founded.
We believe that it would be hazardoAitcS adopt a rule such as advanced by the .plain J tiffs, and'insisted upon under theirietfes|iaifcsi tion of the Houston News Coinv.,e!§hsl&ifo case. If the law should be ⅜⅜1)⅛⅜⅞⅛¾⅜7 a failure to call a witness,iWhskí8£§Si:ifif¡rdn|o may corroborate that 0⅛6⅛#⅛⅞11⅜1⅛⅜£⅜⅞⅛⅜1 duced, would raise th^htíeteíce,8ttafnth®I testimony of the been in corrobo'rafls®? bfl§4W the9l&ftte'd$5^ would compeRSpaH;pt'i££¥ll9í#<ÍF^ 1⅜9&⅜⅜1 however wSi!iS&RS®v¿Ífe at the péi#6f tke failure ⅛⅞3⅛⅞⅞ ¾⅛⅛¾⅛! ing ⅜⅞⅛⅞⅛⅜½⅞ i^®i8wÍHfcH4?n^á?d^:SíS>¿íjtfii|í-^ apjíaMríP t&í f ⅜⅞⅝£3$⅜%(?⅜¾¾?⅞¾⅛5⅜ liíiátítM^^íidíflfíTOl^áHiafe^to^o#^-0 direct and explicit upon the question as that not tendered/there should not be any inference that the evidence not introduced would be against his interest. Rather should it be assumed, in the absence of anything to the contrary, that the evidence, if tendered, would be in corroboration.
Applying such principle to the matter at hand, we believe it is not apparent that the testimony of Mr. Joe Clark or the servant’s! father would be any more direct and expl&SiP on the question of whether the servant acting within the scope and courseojpf his employment (i. e., was defendant^ agentjc at the time of the collision than .was the. , ,. ... . , { nottsnnoim testimony which was introduced. Of course. ■ ,, ,, . , .y, ?r,v/ JnsmuTO on the matter of what was said in the course . , . ... om fte to yiofom of the conversation which took place, Mr. „, , , . m am nqSti jr&onoi Clark s testimony would have been, more ,. , .. . nq a sa yls'iDm bsisDis direct and explicit. However, it must be . , , ,qo Dili to ája w .team remembered that the, conversation in itself .macots ?.r Tmonisnoo ocrioii is not the issue^big evidence bearjn^n jnl lohl" ,88S ,oo3 ,.bíl bnS ,ooaob
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8¾( is to be noted that there was no testimony ⅞0 the effect that the entry was correct in Íaiíy5 respect. Indeed, we note that the iníorlaSion reflected on the face of the in-áírum°nl wa's inconsistent with and contradictory aft %be other evidence of the de-féMa'n?Bií§on°SieLmatter of agency. Con-3¾⅞!¾¾%⅜3^£⅛ a prior inconsistent state-rnÍnífüwe 'aife^of’Ylie opinion that it could ¿¿¾⅝ ⅜⅞⅛⅝⅞ as0su1?stantive evidence of ⅛⅝⅝⅞⅜⅛&⅛⅛ stated. See McCormick'9®8feiy, riPSxalnLaw of Evidence, 2nd Ed., sec. 688, “Prior Inconsistent Stffisllntive Evi-d§>0fe8{”2-BBtit"$á)íE btísfiíls3'i5SSS'f@ofríhe de-the ⅛§⅛½1$(⅜$¾1⅜⅛&⅞⅜⅞⅜⅜⅜⅜)⅞ 4ew£>\bfe%«Ma 3¾⅞7⅛° \(⅞¾⅛¾⅛⅜ Afin.ClVP SHp ‘ ®&r®5¥á®?Ríffi. ¾⅛ org^0fí®io¿,93tSi Sswfc.^onggg ⅛⅜0¾⅞¾⅜* dtáib?oPrfrfSS3@í¡ R# teÍfea^efeid®3>^É^§hi iMá^vRé-áoiíds^AKPrífpbsávmtie &$ A®at$tq &⅞⅜⅞⅞⅛<¾ ⅛⅛⅜⅝⅞⅛⅛⅛ 1⅛⅛ 9&5¾¾⅜3 3dpi ybiBibammi noiijsnim.sxo-aaoio aril rrO bobtB^sisib baratos aTliJntBlq art! ,gniwoI -⅞¾1⅜⅛⅞\⅜?⅞⅜ ⅛ ⅜⅛⅛ ⅛⅝⅝0!⅞⅜⅛ ⅛⅜ 1?¾½⅛⅜⅛ ⅛⅞⅞ ⅞⅝¾⅛⅛3 alfefc ⅜\⅝ ¾⅜ 0⅞°%¶⅛⅛& ⅛⅛⅛⅜ Afe ¥%⅞⅜⅛¾⅛⅛1⅛‡6 ⅜⅞⅞⅜⅜⅛ ⅞⅜⅛⅛⅞⅞¾ ⅜⅞⅜¾⅛^⅜' sWb%t ⅞.SB* ,¾⅝⅜⅛⅛¾⅛1? ⅞⅞⅜⅛⅛ ^§&⅞⅞¾ ⅜ ¾⅛⅛⅞⅛⅜⅛⅜⅞¾⅞⅜¾ a,f?⅝$? ⅜⅛ % ⅜⅞⅜¾⅛ ⅜^⅞⅞⅜§⅛⅜⅛ ⅛⅛ ⅛⅛§⅛⅞; <¾§?,1$⅞ ⅜ ⅛⅛⅛⅞⅛⅛⅛* acting within the scope and course of his employment at the time of the collision. McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, 2nd Ed., Ch. 17, “Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule — (8) Admissions of a Party”, sec. 1164, “Agents and Employees, Including Corporate Agents and Officers.”
The instrument in question, the “Driver’s Daily Log”, is a form prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Thereon appears a space to be filled in as the “Starting point or place” and a space to be filled in as the “Destination or turn around point or place”, plus spaces for hourly tracings through a twenty-four hour period so as to show either “Off Duty”, “Sleeper Berth”, “Driving”, or “On Duty (Not Driving)”. There is no space on the form to show any period during which the driver could, if he cared to, indicate that he had departed from his employment in a deviation while driving and operating the truck. The defendant’s servant had filled in the form so as to show Wichita Falls as his starting point and Fort Worth as his turn around point, and had marked the form as “Driving” between the time he left Springtown and the time of the collision, with the time from that of the collision on until midnight as “Off Duty”.
On the matter of judicial notice we quote from McCormick & Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, 2nd Ed., sec. 172, “Federal Laws”, as follows: “The Texas courts must tafei$udicial notice of the laws of the Unit-edtoSfates, including all the public acts and rs&Pjiltipfts of Congress and proclamations o¿n&Sbfeü§sident thereunder. * * * Ad-rules adopted by boards, de-BSífínjfitíís,so9®d commissions pursuant to ⅜⅜⅛^⅛⅜⅜⅞¾§¾⅝^ also matters of judicial LffWfefeesrfl "WfheiJo such regulations are Register a federal 51¾⅛⅜⅞111)0⅞1⅛⅞⅝⅛⅛#⅜⅛'⅛ contents shall be ⅛⅜⅜⅛ ⅞⅜&⅜ s-mlill Sift W^take ju-§⅞⅞¾⅛⅛1113 °f %⅞ ⅛⅞¾⅜¾#011!⅞⅝[⅞£8 ⅛⅞⅛⅛§⅜⅛ %¿n?fe¥ft>c%^§PSPif 6⅜⅝| ⅞⅛⅜ %⅜⅝. %%I ⅞8&⅛8⅛⅞ ¾⅜⅜»» ⅛⅜⅝^⅜⅛ ⅞⅜0⅛0⅜¾¾⅛⅛⅞'5⅛⅛03¾⅛¾?⅛>’⅜⅜⅞⅜1 ⅞>⅜6⅜⅜8⅛⅜⅜¾¾0⅛9£1⅛ ⅛⅛⅛⅞⅛¾» *877sec. 195.1 and succeeding sections that a driver is “on duty” from the time he begins to work until the time he is relieved from work and all responsibility for performing work, — that “driving time” includes all time spent on a moving vehicle and also other time not material here, — and that a driver’s daily log shall be made on form BMC-59 the form used in the instant situation).
We are of the opinion, in view of what is to be noticed from the foregoing paragraph, that the notation of the defendant’s servant that he was “driving”, presumably on duty, between Springtown and the point of the collision, does not import that he was acting within the scope and course of his employment. Thus, the only statement on the form which gives us concern is that reflecting that Fort Worth, Texas, was his “Destination or turn around point or place”. When we remember that it was the morning following the collision before the form was prepared and the space was filled in, considering also the events and occurrences of the period after the departure from Wichita Falls, we are convinced that the servant’s entry, “Ft. Worth”, rather than “Spring-town” should be accorded no weight.
When we consider the whole record in light of the inference which could be drawn as to the agency on the part of the defendant’s servant, — giving due regard to the absence of certain witnesses within the defendant’s control who were in possession of evidence which defendant might have introduced (albeit in corroboration of other testimony which was introduced), and also considering the presumption from the fact of the servant’s having been employed to drive the defendant’s truck, — we reach the conclusion that the evidence is of such character that only one reasonable deduction could be drawn therefrom. That deduction, in our opinion, is positive. The defendant’s servant had departed from the scope and course of his employment and at the time of the collision such condition still obtained.
The motion for rehearing is overruled.