Court Opinion

ID: 9351991
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-01-04 16:03:13.302727+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T16:57:41.150427
License: Public Domain

Third District Court of Appeal
                               State of Florida

                        Opinion filed January 4, 2023.
       Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

                            ________________

                             No. 3D22-2056
                       Lower Tribunal No. 20-17285
                          ________________

                      Alfredo Rodriguez, et al.,
                                 Petitioners,

                                     vs.

                             Rohan Halsall,
                                Respondent.

     A Case of Original Jurisdiction – Prohibition.

     Davis, Giardino, Hrivnak & Okon, PLLC, and Wayne T. Hrivnak (West
Palm Beach), for petitioners.

      The McFarlane Firm, P.A., and Gregory McFarlane (Ft. Lauderdale),
for respondent.

Before LINDSEY, HENDON, and LOBREE, JJ.

     PER CURIAM.
      Petitioners (Defendants below), Alfredo Rodriguez & Miami Fine

Foods, LLC, petition this Court for a writ of prohibition following the trial

court’s denial of their motion for disqualification. A sworn motion filed below

in support of the motion alleged the trial court made improper comments at

a calendar call. As this Court explained in Nguyen v. Nguyen, 229 So. 3d

407, 407 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017):

      The standard of review of a trial court’s determination on a
      motion to disqualify is de novo.

            The Florida Rules of Judicial Administration provide for the
      disqualification of a judge when “the party fears that he or she
      will not receive a fair trial or hearing because of specifically
      described prejudice or bias of the judge.” Fla. R. Jud. Admin.
      2.330(d)(1).[1] The legal sufficiency of a motion to disqualify
      depends on “whether the facts alleged would place a reasonably
      prudent person in fear of not receiving a fair and impartial trial.”
      Livingston v. State, 441 So. 2d 1083, 1087 (Fla. 1983); State v.
      Borrego, 105 So. 3d 616, 619 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013). The
      allegations of fact that are contained in the motion must be taken
      as true, Masten v. State, 159 So. 3d 996, 997 (Fla. 3d DCA
      2015), and “the question of disqualification focuses not on what
      the judge intended, but rather how the message is received and
      the basis of the feeling.” Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. 2000
      Island Blvd. Condo. Ass’n, 153 So. 3d 384, 390 (Fla. 3d DCA
      2014) (citing Livingston, 441 So. 2d at 1086).

(Citations omitted).

1
  The current rule is Florida Rule of General Practice and Judicial
Administration 2.330(e)(1).

                                       2
      Treating the allegations of fact contained in the motion to disqualify as

true, as we must, we conclude that disqualification is warranted.

Accordingly, we grant the petition. We withhold formal issuance of the writ,

confident that the trial judge will promptly issue an order of disqualification.

We remand this cause for reassignment to a successor judge, if one has not

already been reassigned by virtue of the annual judicial rotation of divisions,

and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      Petition granted. Cause remanded. Writ issuance withheld.

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