Court Opinion

ID: 9953771
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2024-03-22 20:07:45.762541+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T08:09:57.527745
License: Public Domain

FOR IMMEDIATE NEWS RELEASE                                                   NEWS RELEASE #006

FROM: CLERK OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

The Opinions handed down on the 26th day of January, 2024 are as follows:

BY Weimer, C.J.:

 2021-KP-00812              STATE EX REL. DARRELL J. ROBINSON VS. DARREL VANNOY,
                            WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY, ANGOLA, LOUISIANA
                            (Parish of Rapides)

                            CONVICTION AND SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR NEW TRIAL.
                            SEE OPINION.

                            Crichton, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, and assigns reasons.
                            Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
                            McCallum, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Crain and assigns
                            additional reasons.
                    SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA

                                   No. 2021-KP-00812

                   STATE EX REL. DARRELL J. ROBINSON

                                            vs.
 DARRELL VANNOY, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY,
                  ANGOLA, LOUISIANA

           On Supervisory Writ to the 9th Judicial District Court, Parish ofRapides

WEIMER, Chief Justice

      Certiorari was granted in this "'" to con,ide, the claim of defffidant, Dorrell

J. Robinson, that the district court erred in denying his petition for post-conviction

relief. Finding merit to the claim that the State suppressed material impeachment and

exculpatory evidence and presented false and misleading testimony and argument to

the jury, we conclude that the suppression violated defendant's due process rights and

requires reversal of his conviction under the rule of Brady v. Maryland, 3 73 U.S. 83

(1963), and Napue v. People of the State of Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).

Accordingly, defendant's conviction is reversed, his sentence is vacated, and this

matter is remanded for a new trial.

                     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

      In order to place defendant's post-conviction claims in the proper context, it

is necessary to begin the discussion with a recitation of the evidence adduced and

presented at defendant's 2001 capital trial for the first degree murders of Billy

Lambert, Carol Hooper, Maureen Kelly, and Nicholas Kelly.
          At      that    trial,     it was     revealed          that    defendant            and victim          Billy       Lambert        were

introduced          to each other            at the Veteran's            Administration                (VA)      Medical        Centerwhere

they were both receiving                     inpatient      treatment            for alcoholism.              While      the two were             still

in treatment,            Lambert          invited     defendant          to live     with      him     in exchange            for performing

chores      on his fartn.            Defendant          moved        into       Lambert's         spare bedroom               approximately

eight     days prior         to the murders,             but began          drinking           again    within        days.     According            to

Lambert's          cousin,         David       Peart,     the night         before       the homicides,               Lambert         told    Peart

that he intended              to kick        defendant       out of the house                  the next       day, and send him                   back

to the VA,         because          of his drinking.

          At      approximately                8:30      on the      morning             of    May      28,      1996,        the    day     of    the

mrirders,         defendant          purchased           a bottle        of vodka             at the nearby           Town          and Country

store.     Laterthatmorning,aroundll:30a.m.,defendantwasseenparkingLambert's

truck     at another          grocery        store.

           Doris      Foster,        Lambert's          cousin,     arrived        at Lambert's           home        on Guy Peart Road

in Poland,         Louisiana,             at approximately               12:10 p.m. on the 28Ih, having made plans to

have lunch          with      Lambert,         his sister        Carol Hooper,                Carol's     daughter Maureen Kelly,

and Maureen's               infant        son, Nicholas           Kelly.         Lambert's           brown Ford truck and Carol

Hooper's          car were         parked       in front     of the house,              but the front          door      was unexpectedly

locked.        Foster       used her key to enter                  the house,           where        she discovered             the bodies of

her four       relatives           on the living          room      floor, all shot in the head. Lambert                               had been

shot     twice,       and the        other      victims      had each been shot once.                             Foster heard a noise

coming         from       the rear         of the house, so she quickly                         exited and drove to the nearby

Town        & Country              store, where the clerk called 911 for her.

           When          Foster       returned          to the     house         with     first responders,                she noticed             that

Lambert's          brown           Ford     truck     was missing.               Gary     Normand             was trtrnmxng            trees near

                                                                            2
the Lambert           house       when        he observed           a light      brown         Ford        truck      spinning      its wheels           as

it turned off Guy Peart Road at approximately                                          12:15 p.m. that afternoon.                        Similarly,

Farrell      Scallan,        who      was     eating        lunch       at a restaurant              in the area,          saw a light          brown

Ford      truck     being     driven      erratically           on Guy Peart Road                    by a young          man with            dark hair

around       the same tune.

            Shortly        thereafter,        and about           11 miles          away,       Michael            Poole       encountered            the

brown       truck      when        it swerved           into      his    lane,     knocking             the    driver's          side    mirror       off

Poole's      vehicle.         Poole      reported           that when          the driver           of the truck,          who      he identified

as defendant,           did not stop, he pursued                     him,       soliciting          the assistance           of his friend            and

neighbor,          Steve     Halbert,         when      the two          vehicles         passed        Halbert         on the road.

           Eventuallythe              truck     stalled        at a traffic      light.      Poole      approached             the vehicle,           and

he and defendant               engaged         in a heated          argument.             Defendant           tried     repeatedly           to restart

the truck,         and when         he finally         succeeded,              he fled       the scene.

           At approximately                 12:44      p.m.,      Poole        called        911 to report            the hit and run, while

Halbert       continued           to pursue          defendant,           who          was    driving         erratically,         forcing        other

vehicles      off the road.            The chase continued                      into    Evangeline             Parish,       where       defendant

turned      down       a gravel        driveway,            drove       through         a fence,        and parked             behind        a house.

Defendant           then     exited      the truck          and ran into          the nearby            woods,          where      police       found

him       at approximately               2:30       p.m.,       crouched          behind            a mound           of dirt.          As    officers

approached            with     guns      drawn,        defendant            reportedly          blurted            out: "I'm       not       armed.         I

don'thaveagun.                    Whilebeinghandcuffed,defendantadditionallyvolunteered:"I'm

on medication              for violent         tendencies.

           According           to the arresting              officers,         defendant            was,     in fact,      unarmed.           He was

wearing           a pair     of    shorts       under       blue        )eans,      and       his    clothes          were       stained with             a

                                                                           3
combination             of dirt, paint, and blood.l                     Small spots of blood                     were          discovered         on the

bottom of defendant's                     left     shoe       and     the       end      of the       left     shoe      lace.         Later     testing

determined            the blood       spots on defendant's                     shoe were consistentwith                          victimNicholas

Kelly's       DNA.

            Among         the contents            of defendant's                pockets,         officers         found          a yellow        pocket

knife      belonging            to Lambert        and a pack of Marlboro                       Lights         cigarettes         (which        Lambert

was     known          to smoke).             Defendant             also       had      $71     cash         in his     wallet.          Despite       an

extensive           search       of Lambert's          house,        his truck,            the route          defendant              drove,     and the

woods        where       he was arrested,             no murder                weapon          was ever         located.

            Atthe      crime       scene, investigators               found          adamp,       bloodstainedtowel                      onthe     floor

of Lambert's            bedroom.          Testing         revealed          that blood,          too, was consistent                    with     victim

NicholasKelly'sDNA.                      Amongtheitemsontopofadresserindefendant'sbedroom,

investigators           found       a wallet       with      Lambert's               identification            and credit            cards      in it; no

cash was         found          in the wallet.          A bloodstained                   red jacket            was      found         hanging       on a

doorknob          near the victims.               DNA        testing        of the jacket             showed          the bloodstains              were

human,        but the victims           and defendant               were        all excluded            as the source.                Although       the

victims       had a total           of five      gunshot        wounds           between           them,        only          four    of the bullets

were       ever located.

            Alfred       J. Schwoeble,              an expert           in gunshot              residue,          examined              defendant's

clothesinl998.                  Schwoeblelatertestifiedthathedidnotfindsignificantparticleson

defendant's           t-shiit     or shoes.        He did find          two particles             unique         to gunshot            residue,      one

particle      characteristic           of gunshot            residue,          and three        lead-rich         particles           on the inside

waistbandofdefendant'sjeans.                              Becausetheparticleswereinsidethewaistband,they

could      not have        come       from       the discharge             of a gun, but rather                  had to have transferred

  DNA       testing    revealed      the blood      stains    on his       clothes      were    exclusively          tliose     of defendant.

                                                                           4
from       another        source,       such as a gun tucked                 into the waistband                or contaminated                 hands.

Schwoeble            found        six    particles          characteristic           of gunshot            residue        and     40 lead-rich

particles on the right leg of defendant's                                        leans.       On the left leg, he found two

characteristic              particles       and      five      lead-rich        particles.           In    response            to prosecutor's

questions          at trial,     Schwoeble              agreed      the residue           patterns        on defendant's               jeans     were

consistent         with        the right-handed                defendant        firing     a gun downward.

            Following           the initial       investigation,            defendant         was charged               with    four     counts      of

capital      murder.           While       awaiting         trial   in Rapides           Parish,     defendant           shared        a cell with

Leroy       Goodspeed.              Goodspeed               reported       to Steve        Wilmore,          the lead investigator                 for

the Rapides            Parish       Sheriff"s        Office,        that on November               11, 1997,            defendant         told    him

that he "did         those people,            a man,         two women           and a small          child,       and threw           the gun off

of a bridge."

            Defendant's           jury      was selected            in St. Landry           Parish        and transported              to Rapides

Parisli     for    trial.       See, La.        C.Cr.P.         art. 623.1.          In addition           to the evidence                outlined

above,      the Staterelied              on circumstantial             evidence           to theorize        that defendantkilledthe

victims        using        Lambert's           missing         .38    caliber         revolver.           According            to the      State's

theory,      the victims             had     a total        of five        gunshot        wounds,          which         meant      the murder

weapon         had been loaded                with      five    bullets.        No guns were              found     in Lambert's               house,

but    Doris       Foster       testified        that    Lambert           routinely        kept     a gun        next     to his bed.            She

explained          that     she had Lambert's                   guns    at her house           for safekeeping                 while     Lambert

was       in the     VA        Hospital.          Because           she was        afraid      of guns,           and     the revolver            was

loaded,        she brought              the revolver            to Lambert             at the VA           and     had     him     remove         the

bullets.       Roughly           a week         before       the murders,          Foster      returned           the unloaded            gun and

the bullets        to Lambert,             but she forgot            one of the bullets            at home,         so she only          returned

five    bullets.

                                                                            5
            Defendant         attempted         to counter         the State5s case by arguing                     that he was not the

pet-petrator.         Rather,      counsel        argued      that defendant             discovered            the murders           when       he

returned home            from      the store,      and fled        in shock         and fear, much             like     Doris     Foster.       In

his panic,        he sideswiped          Poole's      car.     When        Poole       and Halbert            chased       him,     his panic

escalated, ultimately                 leading      him      flee    into     the woods            to escape           them.        As     to the

"bloodstain"            evidence,        defendant's          experts         established            that    the blood            on the red

jacket      found       at the scene       was      not     consistent         with      either      defendant           or the victims,

indicating          the possibility        that    another          person     was      involved.            No blood           spatter     was

detected       on defendant,            as would          be expected          after     shooting           several      people      at close

range.       In fact,    the only       blood      on defendant            was a minute              transfer         bloodstain         on the

bottom       of his shoe          and the end of that               shoe's      lace,       which      the defense            attributed        to

stepping          on a drop       of Nicholas         Kelly's         blood      when         defendant            stumbled        upon      the

scene.       With      respect       to the "gunshot           residue"        evidence,            the defense          argued         that the

gunshot       residue        on defendant's          jeans         was either         cross-contamination                   from     the pat-

down        search      of    defendant         or transfer          residue        from      the     improper             storage       of his

clothing.         The defense         pointed      out that defendant's                 hands       were     not tested         for gunshot

residue      at the time         of his arrest,      although         the Assistant           District        Attorney          involved        in

the     investigation          had     asked      officers         to do      so.      Moreover,             the      arresting      officers

reportedly         admitted       to the defense           investigator         that they unzipped                    defendant's         pants

themselves          during       the pat-down.

            The     defense       proposed         that     Mark       Moras          was     the     actual       perpetrator           of the

murders.          EvidenceestablishedthatMorashadbrieflylivedwithLamberttwomonths

prior    to the murders.             Lambert       discovered         that Moras            was forging            checks       in his name

and confronted            him.       The two       fought,         and Lambert          shot at Moras              while        chasing him

out of the house.                Lambert        contacted          the police         about       the checks,           and Moras           was

                                                                      6
arrestedandchargedinbothRapidesandAvoyellesParishes.                                                                      Lambertwasmurdered

before       the charges               were       resolved.

            Finally,           the defense challenged                            the credibility                  of jailhouse            snitch            Leroy

Goodspeed,              cross-examining                     him    about         his drug             addiction,          his extensive               criminal

history, his mental                     health        diagnoses           and medications,                       and his        instances           of lying.

However, tn response                        to direct questioning                      by defense             counsel         as to whether               he had

received         any         beneficial           treatment            from      the        State,     Goodspeed               denied        that         he was

offered a deal in exchange                             for his testimony.                      The      State then           called      attori"iey         w.'r.

Aimitage,            who       had recently             represented              Goodspeed               in a very          favorable           guilty       plea

in Rapides          Parish,       to counterthe              defendant's               insinuations              that Goodspeed's                 testimony

factored        into     the lenient              sentence        Goodspeed                  received.2            Arrnitage          testified           that no

mention         was made of Goodspeed's                            involvement                 as awitness            in defendant's              trial     when

entering        his guilty          plea       on the Rapides                 Parish         charges.

           Following             deliberations,              the jury         found          defendant           guilty     of four      counts           of first

degree       murder.3             In     accordance            with       the jury's                 unanimous             recornrnendation,                   the

district     court       imposed            a sentence            of death           on all four          counts.           On direct        appeal,          this

court      affirmed,           finding,         in pertinent            part,        that    the evidence              was      sufficient          to prove

defendant's            identity         as the perpetrator                beyond             a reasonable             doubt     under      the standard

enunciated           in Jackson               v. Virginia,             443 U.S.             307 (1979),           and that the circumstantial

evidence            presented             was        sufficient          to      exclude             every        reasonable            hypothesis               of

2 Although          facing     a possible         33 year     sentence        for the charges            filed    against      him    in Rapides          Parish,
Goodspeed        entered        a guilty      plea    and was sentenced                to three       years   imprisonment            at hard      labor,     with
one year suspended.                He was released             after    serving        11 months.

3 As an aggravating               circumstance             on each of the four               counts,     the jury      found    defendant          laiowingly
created    a risk     of death         or great    bodily     harm      to more        than     one person.           La. C.Cr.P.       art. 905.4(A)(4).
As   to count        four      (involving         victim      Nicholas          Kelly),       the jury        found       an additional         aggravating
circumstance:          the victim         was under         12 years      old.       La. C.Cr.P.         art. 905.4(A)(10).

                                                                                 7
innocence.              State       v. Robinson,                02-1869           (La.     4/14/04),        874     So.2d      66.      The       U.S.

Supreme         Court            denied        certiorari.       Robinson             v. Louisiana,           543 U.S.        1023       (2004).

           In 2005,              defendant          initiated      post-conviction               proceedings           by filing         a Pro      Se

Application            for Post-Conviction                      Relief     and Request            for Counsel         in district        couit.      A

series     of supplemental                     and amended           petitions           followed,        accompanied           by a series         of

procedural            objections           filed      on behalf          of the State.           The procedural              objections         were

denied       by the district              court      following           a hearing.         Subsequently,           on April         2, 2014,      the

district      court       granted          an evidentiary                hearing         on all of defendant's                claims.          Those

claims,      in anutshell,            consist         of allegations          thatthe        State failedto         disclose      exculpatory

evidence        inviolation               ofBradyv.             Maryland,             373 U.S. 83 (1963);             thatthe        State failed

to correct       false or misleading                    testimony          at trial      in violation       ofNapue          v. People         of the

State      of Illinois,            360     U.S.       264    (1959)         and Giglio           v. United         States,      405      U.S.     150

(1972);      thatthe        defendant             is actuallyinnocent;                andthat        defendantreceived                ineffective

assistance        of counsel              in     both    the guilt         and penalty           phases     of his capital           trial."

           Priorto        the evidentiaryhearing,                        the parties        begannegotiating             ajoint       stipulation

regarding        the undisclosed                    evidence        forming           the basis         of defendant's          Brady          claim.

At     a hearing         on May            9, 2016,          the parties          signed       and      submitted       a nine        page      Joint

Stipulation            of Fact       listing        the evidence            the defense           had not         received.          The district

court      accepted         the stipulation              and associated               exhibits       into evidence.           The defendant

also submitted              a Motion             to Vacate        Conviction             and Sentence on the basis of the Joint

Stipulation.

4 Defendant           additionally   raised claims regarding the alleged discriminatory      selection of the grand
juiy    foreperson,       alleged juror misconduct, and the cumulative effect of the errors identified, among
others.     Because       of our ultimate   resolution of this matter, it is not necessary to address these claims
in any further         detail.

                                                                              8
             Three days               later,      the        defendant             submitted             a withdrawal                of     stipulated              fact,

seeking           to withdraw            a portion             of the stipulation                   that addressed            undisclosed                serology

notes.5          The State responded                     by filing          its own notice                of withdrawal               in which,           without

explanation,               it withdrew             its consent              to the use of the vast                         majority             of previously

stipulated           facts.6

             On      May        14,     2018,          the     matter          finally        proceeded            to an evidentiary                     hearing,

conducted            over       a period         of 10 days, with                    additional           days of depositions.                     Numerous

witnesses,           both      lay and expert,                 testified,          and volumes             of documentary                    evidence           were

introduced.               Givenourultimateresolutionofthismatter,itisnotnecessarytorecount

all of the evidence                    in detail.             For purposes                 of the present                inquiry,         we focus           on the

evidence           adduced            with     regard          to defendant's                 Brady        claims         and the development                          of

Mark        Moras          as an alternative                  suspect.

             With        respect       to defendant's                  claim       that the State withheld                     exculpatory               material

in the form              of an undisclosed                     deal with           jailhouse           informant            Goodspeed,              defendant

presented           the following                evidence,             which         was discovered                 post-conviction.

             On      January           28,      1998,           Goodspeed's                   wife,      Becky            Goodspeed               provided                 a

statement            to    police.             That      statement              contained              marginal           notes       which            had     been

scribbled           over     in an attempt               to obscure             them.         The notes           appear        to state, in part, "try

5 The relevant            portion      of the stipulation              indicated         that defense      counsel         would      testify     that    54 pages
of bench         notes    and diagrams           related       to the North          Louisiana         Crime      Lab's     1996      serology      repoit          were
not provided         to defense        counsel         and were        absent      from      both     the defense        file and the district           attomey's
file.      The    withdrawal          pleading         explained         that      after    additional         review,      it was        discovered         that     the
district     attorney's        file   did,   in fact,        contain     the undisclosed              notes.

6 The State's notice of withdrawal followed the replacement of the ASSiStant District Attorney who
negotiated the Joint Stipulation of Facts with a Special Assistant District Attorney retained for the
puipose  of handling the post-conviction  proceedings.

   When      the State later          submitted         an Amended              Notice       of Withdrawal          in which         it "re-admitted"           three
of the stipulated           facts     it had withdrawn,                 it alleged         that   any disclosure           of the     State's      rationale          for
witlidrawing         the stipulated            facts    was protected            under        La. C.E.     arts. 506 and 509.

                                                                                    9
and reconcile...said                this     may      help       you    to get out Det[ention].                     When         the statement

was turned         over       to trial      counsel,         a black          marker       completely         obscured           the notes.

           OnDecember                  18, 2000,       Goodspeed'sprobationofficer,                              ScottyMelancon,                      sent

a letter to Judge            Ross         Foote      in Rapides           Parish       advising       the Judge         that on December

14, 2000, Goodspeed,                      who      was on probation                 in connection            with    a 1997            guilty        plea,

had been arrested                 on charges          of principal            to first     degree      robbery      in Lafayette                Parish.

Melancon          recornrnended                  that no action         be taken         against     Goodspeed             at that time.              The

Rapides       Parish        District       Attorney's            Office       was copied           on the letter,        and the copy                 was

found      in the District             Attorney's          files.       It was not provided               to defense            counsel.

           ASSiStant         District        Attorney            Greg      Wampler,           who      was      originally            assigned           to

handle      defendant's            post-convictionpetition                      forthe      Rapides       ParishDistrictAttortaiey's

Office      and       who        negotiated          the     stipulations           with     defense         counsel           that     were         later

presented       to the district             court,     testified        that he spoke           with      Melancon             about         the letter

and Melancon             told       him     he would          not have           written      the letter        to Judge          Forte         unless

someone        had asked            him      to do SO."

           OnFebruary              26, 2001,         Goodspeedwas                 charged      in Lafayette          Parish           with     issuing

worthless       checks,          and on Februaryl5,                    he was formally              charged      by bill of infonnation

as a principal         to first          degree      robbery.          As a fourth         felony      offender,        Goodspeed                faced

a mandatory           sentence           of imprisonment                for life without            parole     for these offenses.                    The

Louisiana         Department               of     Corrections             CAJUN            database       shows         that     Goodspeed's

Rapides       Parish        convictions             were     pardoned           on January           29, 1999       and on Februai'                      2,

7 For liis part, Melancon              explained      via deposition           that he does not recall         the details       surrounding           the
issuance    of the     letter.     but    that    it was   not      unusual     to not     recommend          revocation         when        there     is a
pending     charge,    and "apparently             I chose    not to recommend              revocation,       between      my supervisor               and

                                                                          10
2001,      although      as a habitual          offender        he was not eligible                 for pardons       without      first

going      before     the Pardon           Board.

           Goodspeed           testified      against      defendant            on March          7, 2001.         In response        to

questioning,        he stated that he did not receive                       anything        in return    for his testimony,         nor

was there any promise                of future       benefit.       His Rapides             Parish      defense     attorney,     w.'r.

Armitage,       was called         by the State and verified                    that Goodspeed's             testimony         was not

a factor     in his lenient        sentence         on the Rapides             Parish       charges.

           The records         of the Lafayette          Parish           District       Attorney's      Office     reflect     that on

May 17, 22, and 31, 2001,                   Prosecutor       Mike          Sharu'ion       left messages          for the Lafayette

Parish       ADA      prosecuting            Goodspeed            on the         first     degree       robbery      charge,      Luke

Edwards.       Edwards          sent a five page fax to Sharu'ion on June 7, with                             the message: "Per

yourrequestLeroyGoodspeed."                          WhilethetransmittalsheetwasfoundintheDistrict

Attorney's         file, the 4 pages forming               the substance                 of the fax were not located.

           On June       19, 2001,           Edwards       requested,            and was granted,             a continuance           in

Goodspeed's           first degree robbery            case. The same day, Goodspeed wrote a note to the

supervising         officer      at the Lafayette           Parish          Correctional         Center      stattng:    "Dear       Sir

Would        you please        check       and see if I have any hold's [sic] or warrents [sic] on me.

I went to court          and the DA           is going     to give me time served on 8-13-01.                           I should go

home that day. "Just making                     sure nothing              stop's [sic] me at that time."'                In keeping

with     that note,      the State dismissed               Goodspeed's principal                       to first degree robbery

charge in Lafayette             Parish on August 13, 2001. Then, on October 25, 2001, "BL"                                          left

a note for Lafayette            Parish       ADA Thomas Frederick.                        The note stated:"Tommy, Luke

Edwards       is requesting         that you dismiss the check charge. Luke states Mr. Goodspeed

was     an   essential        witness       in a murder         trial."       In keeping with that note, the issuing

worthless       checks        charge       was dismissed by ADA                      Frederick on November 6, 2001.

                                                                    11
           Neither the post-trial                   communications                     between Edwards and Shannon,                                   nor the

note requesting                disinisSal           of Goodspeed's                     issuing         worthless         checks          charge          were

provided         to defendant's             trial        counsel,         although             defendant's         conviction            was pending

on direct        appeal        at that time.

           Susan Herrero,              defendant's               post-conviction                  mitigation        specialist,          testified        that

she      spoke     with        Leroy        Goodspeed                   on     March           20   and      22,    2012.          In       their      initial

conversation,             Goodspeed               relayed              that    he had           been      given        a deal       by       Prosecutor

Shannon          in     exchange            for          his     testimony              against        defendant.             In        their         second

conversation,           Goodspeed             suggestedthat                    Ms. Herrero           look      for a letterthatthe                  Rapides

Parish       prosecutor            wrote            to     the         Lafayette          Parish         prosecutor           asking             to      have

Goodspeed's             charges        dropped.                He reiterated             that he got a deal               in exchange                  for his

testimony,         but he also stated                    he did not want                to come         back       to Louisiana             because         he

did not want           to get into       trouble.8

           Finally,      KevinNicholstestifiedthathe                                   sharedacellwithLeroyGoodspeedand

was      present       when       Goodspeed                    returned         from       testifying          at defendant's                 trial.       He

reported      that      Goodspeed            was          very     angry        when           he returned         because,         as Goodspeed

explained,         he felt      he had been                    badly     "incriminated"                 by defense          counsel             on cross-

examination            and that,       as a result,              his deal might                not go through.

           For his part,         Mike       Shannon,              the lead prosecutor                   at defendant's             trial,     explained

that,    as regards        the     statement              from         Becky          Goodspeed,             when      he reviewed                  witness

statements,           it was    his practice               to write           notes     in the margins.                If those       notes         did not

contain     exculpatory           information,                  he would            instruct      his secretaryto          blackoutthe                  notes

before     turning        the statement              over        to defense            counsel.         Shannon          further        testified         that

he does notknowwho                     Scotty        Melancon                 is, and never         spoke       with    Melancon              regarding

8 Mr. Goodspeed died on June 11, 2016, prior to the hearing date.

                                                                               12
Leroy       Goodspeed.                He stated        that      from       their      first     meeting,        he informed                Goodspeed

that he only         wanted         the truth,         and that he was not going                          to offer       Goodspeed                   anything

in exchange           for his testimony.

           When        asked          whether          he had         ever       spoken           with     anyone          in     Lafayette              about

Goodspeed,             Shannon              replied:       "Never            with        Melancon                    I   did       after        trial     have

communication                  with       the        ADA       in     Lafayette."9                  According              to         Shannon,            after

defendant's           trial,      his nephew            asked        him "to           put      in a good        word           for      [Goodspeed]"

because         they had been in a halfway                       house        together.            He further            explained:             "I    want      to

say it was in May                 of 2000,       two months              after       trial,     and LeRoy           Goodspeed                also called

me about          that same period               of time       and said, can you just                      put in a good                 word        for me.

Before      he would           agree     to do so, Shannon                   testified,          he contacted             the Lafayette                 Parish

District        Attorney's         office       to obtain      the police            reports,       and he could "just                    about         bet my

last dollar"         that the missing                pages       from       the fax were             the police            report.         Because           he

felt the circumstances                  of the robbery              "were           not a real serious               thing"           and because            he

felt    sorry     for Goodspeed               because         of the grueling                   cross-examination                     he had endured

at defendant's           trial,    he called         Edwards          and asked himto                    "find    a wayto               assiSt him...He

was a material            witness        in a murder             case.        According             to Shannon:             "[T]hat's                all I told

LeRoy        I would         do after       trial.     I said,      look,     it's      out of my jurisdiction,                         LeRoy.          I have

110    authority.       All       I can do is call            and ask."

           In     addition         to   evidence            regarding            the          undisclosed         deal          witli      Goodspeed,

defendantpresented                    evidence         ofothermaterials                   discoveredpost-convictionthatwere

allegedly         not disclosed,            despite        specific       and detailed              discovery            requests.          According

to defendant,          first      among       the materials             are approximately                   51 pages            of serology             bench

9 Shannon did acknowledge                    that he Renew          about the pending Lafayette Parish charges prior to trial
and that he had visited Goodspeed in the Lafayette jail a couple of times.

                                                                            13
notes        as well        as diagrams                 of    physical         evidence             prepared       in   connection            with      a

November              7, 1996,        Serology               Report      issued      by the North               Louisiana          Criminalistics

Laboratory.                These         bench          notes          and     diagrams             demonstrate            the     presence          and

classification             of blood         evidence,              contain      information              about     serological            and DNA

testing,andprovideanoutlineoftheforensicinvestigationandtesting.                                                                     Ofparticular

relevance,           and a focus           of the evidentiary                  hearing,        was testing          performed             on the red

jacket       found       hanging         on a doorknob                 in the hallway          of the Lambert              residence         with    the

left     sleeve       turned      inside         out.        The      bench        notes      indicate       the presence             of high        and

medium          velocity        impact      blood            spatter     on the front,         back and sleeves              ofthe        red jacket,

as well       as transfer         blood      stains           on the back           of the jacket.           The transfer           stains     do not

match        the DNA           profile     of either           defendant           or any of the victims.               Photographs             taken

at tlie      crime       scene      and     found            in the possession                of the crime           lab    include         close-up

imagesoftheredjacketandofablooddripontheneighboringwall.                                                                         Alettersentvia

facsimile         transmission            fromDistrict                 Attorney's          Office     Investigator          Ray De!comyn               to

David        Exline       of RJ Lee Group                    (the group        that performed               the gunshot           residue     testing

for    the     State)      explains         the "significance                  of this jacket."              As    set forth         in the letter,

which        was      found       in the         District        Attorney's           files     but      which      was      not     disclosed         to

defense        counsel:        "The       crime         lab has reported             finding         high    velocity       blood      spatters       on

thesleeveareasofthisjacket.                              Thebloodcontainedinthesehighvelocityspatterwas

insufficient          for an identification.                     However,           two      other     spots      of blood         were     noted     on

the jacket,          and this blood              does not match                the defendant              or any of the victims.

             At trial,     David         Peart     was called            by the State to offer               a possible          explanation         for

the presence             of the foreign           blood         stains       on the jacket.           He testified that Lambert wore

the jacket        when      they were working                      together         on the farm and that he, Lambert,                         and his

workers         cut themselves              on barbed              wire      used     for their        cattle     business and then rcde

                                                                              14
 together in Peart's truck. Lead defense attorney                                                       Michael          Small           testified            that      had     he

 been providedwiththe                            serologyevidence-the                           blood        drip onthe             wall          andthe         presence

 of high and medium velocity impact blood spatter on the jacket-he                                                                                would         have used

 that evidence to impeach                          Peart's         testimony             about          how the foreign                    DNA          got on the red

jacket.'o

             Defendant also produced                                 testimony                 and      evidence            with          regard           to ballistics

bench notes and photographs in the possession                                                     of the crime                 lab that showed                       ricochet

marks and diagrams ofthe crime scene, whichnotes andphotographs                                                                                   defense            counsel

did not find in any of his files.                                  Attorney             Small          testified         that      had he been                   provided

with       these      materials,               he would             have        used           them       to develop               evidence                as    to bullet

tra)ectories           and to possibly                   impeach              the State's         theory           of how          the crimes               unfolded."

             In response               to defendant's                   allegations              regarding               the     failure           to disclose                the

specified          materials              from    the crime             lab, the State presented                           the testimony                      of Thomas

Willson,           the      ASSiStant             District           Attorney              who          assisted          Shannon                  in      prosecuting

defendant            and who              handled        most         of the forensic                   evidence.              Willson             testified          that he

learned         from        Shannon              that     the defense               had         specifically              requested                notes         from         the

crime       lab, so he instructed                      Investigator             Delcomyn                 to obtain          them          and deliver                them       to

the defense.           '2

'o Stuart     James,        an expert       in bloodstain            pattern      analysis,          testified     at the post-conviction                      hearing        that
the blood       stains      on the red jacket             and the passive               drip    stain     on the wall          were       most       likely      pait    of the
same bloodshed              event.

" JohnNixon,anexpertinfireaiins,ammunition,andgunshotresidue,testifiedthatgunsliotresidue
analysis      has "fallen           out    of favor       because         of the lack           of probative             value,"         and that          under        current
testing      protocols,          defendant's           clothing       would        not     have        tested      positive        for     gunshot            residue.         He
further     opined       that,     based    on photos         of the crime              scene and ricochet               and divot           marks,        at least six or
more      shots were        fired     and the probability                of more         than     one shooter            is more          than     fifty      percent.

'2 For his pait, Delcomyn                    testified      via deposition              that in early            March    1999,          he took        it upon       himself
to autlior      a letter         to T.J.    Shuflin,        the director          of the        Crime       Lab      in Alexandria,                 under       Shannon's
signature,      requesting           any and all laboratory                   notes,     and then          sent a separate               letter    to tlie      Shreveport
]ab requesting            the same.         Delcomyn              testified      that    he delivered             a large       packet        of materials              tl'iat he
received      to Atton'iey           Small's      office,     but did not examine                     the contents            of the package.

                                                                                   15
            Prosecutor            Shannon        testified           that     initially       he     did     not      agree       to     open       file

discovery,           but    during       a recess         in    a hearing             in     February          of     2000,       he made            an

agreement with               the    defense       "to     open         the    doors        of the      crime        lab.         According            to

Shannon,          after     the     recess,      the    defense             stated    for     the    record         that    the     parties        had

"reached         an agreement            to tour        the     lab,         which        meant       the    defense          could       "look          at

everything"            related     to defendant's          case.'3 Later,             he testified:         "As      you know,           I've     been

accused        of hiding         those   lab notes       and as I recall             andunderstand                  Mr.    Delcomyn             asked

for them        at my request            sometime             into     the case.            When       the lab notes              came         in Ray

brought       them       to me.      I did not open the envelope.                           I did not look           at them.          I told     Ray,

Mr.WillsonishandlingDNA,bringthemtoMr.Willson."                                                             Shannonfurthertestified

that     the Jab notes           were    brought         to trial,          and that       Willson          questioned           expert         Curtis

Knox        on the lab notes,            and Attomey                 Small       cross-examined                   Knox      referencing             the

notes.       On cross-examination,                     he testified,          "Listen,        I never         saw the serology                  notes

until    it was attached            to y'all's     post-conviction."

            Finally,       defendant      presented            evidence          regarding           his allegations             that the State

failed      to disclose          exculpatory        information               from        eyewitnesses              developed           during       its

investigation           of the crimes.           Specifically,              defense        counsel         Small     testified         tliat    he did

not receive          a four page transcription                 of the statement               of GaryNormand,                     who testified

at trial.     That     statement,        taken     on June 5, 1996,                  contains        a handwritten            note at the top

'3 A transcript of the February 2, 2000 hearing shows that the defense had filed a motion for open
file discovery, which tlie State opposed. After argument from both parties, the couit denied open
file discovery on the grounds that "I don't think there is anything else tliat can possibly pop up that
hasn't already popped up in this trial." The court added that as of that date, no new evidence would
be admitted at trial.

   The court then addressed a defense subpoena for records related to crime lab protocols, policies,
and procedures. The court briefly recessed to allow the defense to confer with the state crime lab's
director, TJ. Shuflin. When court resumed, defense counsel Danalynn Recer annouriced that "I
talked with Mr. Shuflin and he's agreed to allow us and our expeits to tour the Jabs both here in
Alexandria and at their Shreveport facility. We've reached that agreement." Defense counsel Small
added: "And that satisfies the subpoena, Judge."

                                                                        16
ofthe      first page that states: "Says                    he may have seen another                       auto-leaving            going     south

(rt.beforelunch)-couldhavebeenlO:00-checkwithWayneNormand."                                                                        Inaddition,

while      Small      did     receive         a transcription            of the June             4, 1996,         interview         of Andrew

Dunn,      thattranscript            didnot        containhandwrittennotes                        that appearon            the secondpage

of the      interview         that     read:       "Kirby       Brown-saw                    someone-drop             Robinson            off-that

mo[rn]ing."          Post-convictioninvestigatorslocatedandinterviewedMr.Brown,whose

signed      statement,         introduced            at the hearing,             declares         that on the day of the murders

he observed           defendant         being       dropped        off across           the road         from     Billy    Lambert's         place

around       noon      or later,       which        places       defendant             outside      the time         frame        in which       the

State postulated             the murders            were      committed."'

           In     addition      to     his     Brady          claims,         and       in     support       of     his    claim      of     actual

innocence,          defendant         presented         evidence         that he alleges             points        to Mark        Moras      as the

perpetratorofthemurders.                        Specifically,defendantofferedevidenceestablishingthat

the     transfer      bloodstain         on the        outside          of the red jacket                 found       at the      crime      scene

matches          a DNA       sample      obtained           from       Moras.          A previously             untested       bloodstain            on

the     lining     of the jacket             was     also     matched           to Moras's               DNA.      In addition,            counsel

obtained         a statement         fromWayne              Guillot,     Moras's             neighbor,      that contradicts           Moras's

statement          to Investigator            Delcomyn           that    he spoke             to Guillot          on the mornxng             of the

mrirders         and learned         of the murders             from        Guillot.          Guillot,      a volunteer           fireman      who

was called          to the crime        scene to help              direct      traffic,       denied       speaking        with     Moras       that

day or telling          him    anything            about     the murders.

'4 In furtherance        of his claim        of numerous         Brady                defendant also presented
                                                                              violations       by the State,
evidence   that the State failed to disclose     records from the Rapides Parish Coroner's       office showing
victim   Carol Hooper     had a life insurance     policy, and that Detective  Steve Wilmore     of the Rapides
Parish Sheriff's   Office   consulted   a psychic    during the course of his investigation  into the murders.

                                                                         17
            Post-conviction               investigator         Gary Eldredge                   interviewed               Louella      Rollins,

Moras's girlfriend                at the time of the murders. He testified that Louella                                       told     him     she

worked as a housekeeper for Billy Lambert and was supposed                                                      to clean      his house          on

the day of the murders, but Lambert called and cancelled                                                the appointmerit.                 When

Moras appeared at her home that morntng,                                   he was "loaded"                    and hostile.           Rollins's

father had to pull Moras off of her.                             After her father intervened,                             Moras      was     still

worked up and said he needed more drugs, that Lambert owed him money,                                                                 and that

he was going             to Lambert's         to get his money.              Moras             took     the keys          to her truck       and

left.     She     did not see him again until                  late that afternoon                when          he returned          her truck

and reported           that he had gotten             money      from      Lambert.

            Finally,      Linda     Lachney,         whose      father     was friends            with        Lambert,        testified      that

on the morning             of the murders,           Lambert      called     her father           at around         7:00 or 7:30 in the

moriiing         and asked         him    to stop by.        She and her father                  brought         her mother          to work,

then      went     to Lambert's            house.      As they        approached               the house,         she saw defendant

running       from       the property        going     toward      the railroad           track,        looking          scared.      She saw

a truck      and a car parked             at the house.        They      parked     and walked                up to the door,          but got

no answer          when     they    knocked.         Lachney       testified       that she looked                 in the window             and

saw the bodies             of the victims            on the floor.          They        left     and returned              to her father's

liouse,     where       she placed         an anonymous           call to 911.           She and her father                  then drove          to

tlieTown&Countrystoreandwatchedaspoliceandambulancesarrived.                                                                       According

to Lachney,            Moras       was     a drunk     and a "drug         head"        who           would      run liis mouth.             She

testified     that she overheard              himtalking         to his brother           Abe         (who      she had dated)            about

stealing         money      from         Lambert      and     where       the     two      had         buried      it.      Although         she

disputed         large parts of an affidavit            she hadpreviouslysigned,                          she verifiedthat             aspects

of the affidavit           were     true.     Specifically,           she testified            that     she heard          Moras       talking

                                                                   18
about having stolen a lot of money from Lambert by forging                                                                                  Lambert's                   checks,        that

he was being               prosecuted                  for          the forgeries,                    and that          he wanted                    to get Lambert,                    but

Lambert          was killed               before         he could                    get to him.

             Finally,        post-conviction                           investigation                    uncovered                  a check                that     Lambert             had

written to defendant                       011 May             24, 1996, four days before the murders.                                                           The check             was

in the         amount           of    $75.00,             and           the          word          "labor"         was           written             on      the        memo          line,

providing            an alternate              explanation                       for the $71.00                   in cash found                      on defendant                    at the

time      of his arrest.

             Following               the      conclusion                        of      the        hearing,          after          supplemental                        filings        and

extensive            briefing,         the district                  court             issued        a judgment                  denying             all claims             for post-

conviction             relief        on the          finding               that         defendant             "has          failed          to carg               his burden                of

proof."        In written             reasons,            the court                    rejected          defendant's                   arguments                  that     the State

suppressed             material            exculpatory                    evidence                 in violation             of     Brady,             and        that     defendant

received          ineffective                assistance                   of         counsel,            writing:            "Certainly,                    post-conviction

counsels         have       raised           concerns                 as to certain                    items       or veracity                  of certain               witnesses,

however          that      information                   alone             does           not        convince              this      Court           that         evidence            was

withheld         which          violated            Brady              or that trial                 counsel         was ineffective.                            The defendant

was       provided          a fair         trial.             The         district             court       did      not      address               defendant's                    factual

innocenceclaim.'5                      0ndefendant'sapplication,thiscourtgrantedasupervisorywrit

'5 hi brief,     defendant           contends          that tlie district                 court      erred      in failing        to address           his factual          innocence
claim.      He noted       that since          the district            couit's           ruling       in this case, the legislature                        enacted        La. C.Cr.P.
art. 926.2,     whicli     provides          forpost-conviction                          factual       innocence           claims          based      on "new,           reliable,      and
noncumulative             evidence           that      would            be legally                 admissible          at trial           and   that       was      not     known           or
discoverable           at or      prior      to     trial,"         and         that     is "scientific,            forensic,             physical,          or nontestimonial
documentary           evidence,"           or "testimonial                 evidence            that is corroborated"                   by such evidence.                  La. C.Cr.P.
ait.   926.2(B)(1)(a).               A defendant               is entitled              to relief       under       this     article        upon          presenting         clear      and
convincing        evidence,           considered              "in     ligl'it     of all the relevant               evidence"              tliat "liad           the new      evidence
been presented           at trial,     no rational             juror       would          have       found       the petitioner             guilty        beyond         a reasonable
doubt     of either      the offense          of conviction                 or of any felony                 offense       that was aresponsive                         verdict      to the
offense      of conviction."              La. C.Cr.P.               art. 926.2(B)(1)(b).                     The legislation                expressly            makes      the article
applicable      to defendant,             whose        claim         forpost-convictionreliefwas                                  filed    before         December3               1, 2022.

                                                                                              19
to assess the correctness                           of the district              court's        ruling.          State         ex rel.          Robinson              v.

Vannoy,             21-00812           (La.        6/26/23),         363 So.3d           1230.

                                                            LAW         AND       ANALYSIS

             In Brady           v. Maryland,                   373 U.S.          83, 87 (1963),                 the United                States        Supreme

Court        held that suppression                     by the prosecution                   of evidence                favorable               to the accused

after     receiving           a request            for the evidence                  violates       a defendant's                  due process                 rights

where        the evidence               is material            either        to guilt      or punishment,                  without              regard         to the

good       or bad faith          of the prosecution.                      For purposes              of the State's                due process               duty to

disclose,           no    difference               exists         between         exculpatory                evidence              and         impeachment

evidence.            State      v. Kemp,               00-2228,           p.7 (La.         10/15/02),            828       So.2d          540,         545.        The

Brady        rule encompasses                      evidence          which       impeaches            the testimony                    of a witness            when

the reliability             or credibility             of that          witness         may     determine              guilt       or innocence,                   and

applies       whether          a general,            specific        or even no request                   at all is made                for the evidence.

United         States         v. Bagley,             473      U.S.      667,      676,      682      (1985);           State           v. Knapper,                 579

So.2d        956,     959     (La.      1991).

             It is important              to note          that    Brady         and its progeny                 do not           establish            a general

nile      of discoverability,                     and not         every       case in which               it is discovered                     post-trial          that

favorable            evidence            was        withheld            by     the      State      will       result        in         a reversal             of   the

conviction.               A    prosecutor                  does     not       breach        any      constitutional                     duty      to     disclose

favorable           evidence           unless       the "omission                is of sufficient              significance                to result           in the

denial       of the defendant's                    right     to a fair trial.              United          States       v. Agurs,               427 U.S.            97,

La. C.Cr.P.         art. 926.2(A).           Because         the district       court    did not make           a finding         regarding         defendant's
factual      innocence         claim      under       the    criteria        enacted     in this     recent      article         (or    under      the previous
jurisprudential          standard       eitlier    for that matter),          this court    would         ordinarily       be inclined           to remand         this
matter     to the district       couit      for consideration             of defendant's           factual      innocence              claim     under      the new
provisions         of La. C.Cr.P.          art. 926.2.         However,         because       of this      couit's     decision          to grant        defendant
a new     trial,    it is unnecessaiy             to do so.

                                                                                20
108(1976).           ForpurposesofBrady'sdueprocessrule,areviewingcourtdetermining

materiality must ascertain "not whether the defendant would more likely than not

have received           a different                 verdict      with       the evidence,            but whether               in its absence,          he

received        a fair trial,        understood               as a trial    resulting         in a verdict         worthy          of confidence.

Kylesv.Whitley,514U.S.419,434(1995).                                                  Thus,thereviewingcourtdoesnotput

the     withheld       evidence               to     an outcome-determinative                           test     in    which         it weighs          the

probabilities         that the petitioner                     would        have obtained             an acquittal             at trial    or might      do

so at a second              trial.           Instead,          a Brady            violation          occurs       when           the "evidentiary

suppression          aunden'nines confidence                            in the outcome               of the trial.               Kyles,       514 U.S.

at 434 (quoting          Bagley,              473 U.S.          at 678).       And,     most         importantly,             this is assessed          by

evaluatingthecumulativeeffectoftheundisclosedevidence.                                                             Kyles,514U.S.at436.

As we have          explained:              "It     is not enough            for reviewing             courts         to consider           the impact

of each      item     of exculpatory                      evidence         standing         alone;      the cumulative                   effect    of the

suppressed          evidence           must         be considered."                 State      v. Marshall,              94-0461,           p. 15 (La.

9/5/95),     660      So.2d          819,          826.       In other       words,         a Brady            violation          is shown          when

undisclosed         favorable           evidence,              considered          cumulatively             and not item by item,                   could

reasonably         be taken           to put the whole                  case in such           a different            light      as to undermine

confidence          in the verdict.                 Kyles,       514 U.S.          at 435-36.

           While     the foregoing                   rules      apply       broadly      in the assessment                     of Brady           claims,

there    is a singular          category             of undisclosed            evidence         that is subject               to a slightly        lower

standard        of materiality                under        Brady,          and that         consists        of previously                 undisclosed

evidence        revealing            that         the prosecution             introduced            trial   testimony              that    it knew       or

shouldhaveknownwasfalse.                                   Agurs,427U.S.atl03-104.                               Rudimentaryprinciples

of justice       are offended,                and due process                 is violated,           when        a prosecutor              deceives         a

court    and jurors       with         the presentation                 of known            false    evidence.             Giglio,        405 U.S.       at

                                                                             21
153.       The        same      holds       true      when        the   prosecution,              although         not    soliciting          false

evidence,            allows     it to go uncorrected                 when     it appears.            Napue,        360 U.S.       at 269.         In

such      instances,          a new         trial     is required          if "the          false     testimony          could    ... in        any

reasonable            likelihood        have        affected       the judgment            of the jury."'           Giglio,      405 U.S.         at

154 (quoting             Napue,       360 U.S.            at 271).

           With the foregoing                  principles          in mind,       we turn         to defendant's          contention            that

the district          court   erred     in rejecting             his claim    that the State failed                 to disclose        material

exculpatory            evidence         in violation             of Brady,        and that the State knowingly                         failed     to

correct        misleading          evidence          at trial,     in violation           of Giglio      and Napue.

           To prevail           on his Brady            claim,      defendant         was required            to demonstrate            that (1)

the State suppressed                 evidence,          (2) the evidence             was favorable             to the defense,          and (3)

the evidence            was material.               LaCaze         v. Warden              Louisiana          Correctional          Institute

for    Women,            645 F.3d        728,       735     (5'h Cir.      2011).         Because       they       are inter-related,            we

will    discuss        the first      two     prongs         of defendant's               required      Brady        showing       together,

before     proceeding              to analyze         the materiality           requirement.

                              Suppression of Evidence Favorable to the Defense

           In its written           reasons,         the district       court        identified        the evidence           forming           the

crux      of    defendant's           Brady           claim        as allegations             that     (1)    Goodspeed,           jailhouse

informant,           received       an undisclosed               deal; (2) serologyreport                andnotes         were     withheld;

(3)    other     forensic          evidence          [was]       withheld;        i.e.,    investigator's            letter   to R.      J. Lee

Group          and     photographs,            ballistics          bench      notes,        sketches         and     diagrams;          and      (4)

                                                                        22
eyewitness information inconsistent with trial testimony [wasl not provided.'6                                                                         We

will    address     each of these                items      of evidence          separately.

Jailhouse        Informant             Goodspeed

          As to jailhouse              informant,          Goodspeed,            the district            court     foundthatthe             evidence

establishes        that      the       State      failed      to    disclose         that         Goodspeed              in    fact      testified         in

exchange         for beneficial              treatment.         Specifically,             the district           court        found:

          During       the post-conviction                   hearing,         more        detailed         evidence           came forth
          that    appears             to indicate          Goodspeed            may        have          been      allowed            special
          treatment.             The      records          submitted        show          that      the     State      twice      entered
         pardons          into     the state's        offender        tracking        system,             when       that is typically
          not an option               for offenders.           Robinson's            team          provided          affidavits          from
          other     witnesses             who       reported         that     Goodspeed                  after     testifying            made
          coininents             to     an     inmate,        Kevin         Nichols               about      receiving            a deal.
          Documentation                  existed       wherein         cornrnunications                   between           the Rapides
          Assistant          District         Attorney         and Lafayette                Assistant            District       Attorney
          exchanged              phone        messages          and     shortly           after     the     Robinson            trial,     the
          Lafayette          charges           were        dismissed.           The        record          is full       of    instances,
          circumstantial,               that further         supports       the flawed              character          of Goodspeed
          and his desire               to have      a deal.

          Review          of the        record        convinces          this     court           that     the     district      court's         factual

conclusion        that Goodspeed                 both      desired      to have a deal and received                           special      treatment

in exchange         forhis        testimony           is amply       supported            bythe          evidence        adduced          atthepost-

conviction        hearing          and is not an abuse                 of discretion.                See, State             v. Thompson,               11-

0915,    pp.l3-14          (La.       5/8/12),      93 So.3d         553, 563 (quoting                     State      v. Wells,          08-2262,        p.

4 (La. 7/6/10),        45 So.3d              577, 580)       ("[W]hen           a trial     court        makes       findings          of fact    based

on the weight          of the testimony                  and the credibility               of the witnesses,                  a reviewing            court

owes those findings                   great deference,             andmaynot              overturn          those findings unless there

'6 There are two additional items of evidence that defendant alleged were not disclosed, the life
insurance  policy of victim Carol Hooper, and the fact that one of the lead investigators, Det.
Wiln'iore, consulted with a psycliic. The district court found that the State did not have knowledge
of the existence of the life insurance policy and that the consultation                                          with the psychic was a false
lead, that the State had no general duty to disclose, citing State v. Broadway, 17-0825, p. 8 (La.
9/21/18), 252 So.3d 878, 885. We find no error in these findings, and no reason to disturb the
district court's ruling as to these items of evidence.

                                                                         23
is no      evidence          to    support            those        findings.")           The       fact     that     this        evidence             was         not

disclosed         is not disputed.

           Nonetheless,             the State challenges                      the district        court's         fact findings,              arguing            that

defendant          failed    to produce                  direct        evidence        of the existence              of an undisclosed                          deal

prtor     to defendant's                 trial,      and        that    the     evidence,          at most,          proves            that        prosecutor

ShannondecidedtorewardGoodspeedaftertrial.                                                       ContrarytotheState'ssuggestion,

however,           a Brady            violation              has        never        been       limited      to      cases          where           the         facts

demonstrate           that the state and the witness                            have reached              a bona fide,            enforceable                   deal.

LaCaze,           645 F.3d        at 735.            The key question,                  insofar          as Brady          is concerned,                  "is     not

whether       the prosecutor                   and        the     witness         entered         into     an effective                 agreement,                but

whether        the      witness          "might           have         believed         that      [the     state]        was       in       a position             to

implement...            any promise                 of consideration."'                  Id.    (quoting          Napue,          360 U.S.             at 270).

As this court           has explained:

           [T]o      the    extent         exposure               of    a witness's             motivation           is a proper                   and
           important          function              of     the     constitutionally                protected             right         of     cross-
           examination,              a witness's                  "hope         or    knowledge             that     he      will           receive
           leniency         from         the        state       is highly            relevant       to     establish             his        bias     or
           interest."         State        v. Brady,               381     So.2d        819,      822     (La.      1980)         (collecting
           cases);      see also           State         v. Nash,         475        So.2d      752,      755-56         (La.       1985).            A
           witness's         bias        or interest              may     arise      from       arrests      or pending                 criminal
           charges,         or the        prospect              of prosecution,                even       when       he has made                    no
           agreements             with      the state regarding                      his conduct.           Id.

State    v. Vale,          95-1230,          p. 4 (La.            1/26/96),          666 So.2d            1070,     1072.

           Here,     the testimony                  demonstrates              that Goodspeed                had charges                pending            in both

Rapides       and Lafayette                Parishes.              While       the State went              to great        lengths            to dispel           any

notion      that     Goodspeed                had        received          beneficial           treatment           in    connection                 with         his

Rapides       Parish        charges,           going        so far as to call Goodspeed's                           Rapides             Parish         defense

attorney      at defendant's                trial     to verify          that Goodspeed's                 testimony              was not a factor                  in

his lenient        sentence         in Rapides              Parish,        Goodspeed              told     post-conviction                    investigator

                                                                                24
Herrero         that       he had been                     given       a deal         by prosecutor               Shannon          in exchange              for his

testimony,             and         that      evidence               of the       deal        could       be found           in the       Lafayette          Parish

prosecutor's                files.           The           undisclosed                cornrnunications                between            the      Rapides       and

Lafayette          Parish           DA's            offices         that followed             on the heels             of Goodspeed's                 testimony

at defendant's               trial,       andthe            subsequent            dismissal           of Goodspeed's               first    degree       robbery

cliarge        and his             issuing            worthless            check          charge         because        "Mr.       Goodspeed              was     an

essential          witness             in     a murder               trial,"          corroborate           Goodspeed's                 statement         to Ms.

Herrero."'             Moreover,                     Kevin          Nichols,            a cell       mate      of     Goodspeed                at the    time     of

defendant's               trial,      testified            at the post-conviction                     hearing          that     Goodspeed             was upset

when      he returned                fromtestifying                   because           he felt he had been "incriminated"                              on cross-

examination,                 and,         as a result,               his       deal      might       not       go through,              providing         further

evidence           of Goodspeed's                          belief      that     he would             be receiving              favorable           treatment       in

exchange           for his testimony.                         While        the State insists               that the testimony                  of Ms. Herrero

and Mr. Nichols                    is not credible,                 the district          court      found        otherwise,           and that credibility

determination                 is particularly                 within           the province           of the trier            of fact,     here the district

corirt.    SeeStatev.Higgins,03-1980,p.                                                17(La.4/1/05),898So.2dl219,                                  1232("The

trier     of    fact        makes              credibility             determinations                    and      may,        within       the      bounds        of

rationality,           accept          or reject            the testimony                 of any witness.").

           Finally,            despite              the      State's       insistence             that      the     defendant            failed      to present

evidence         ofhaving                 receivedundisclosed                          specialtreatmentpriorto                         his trial     testimony,

as the district court noted, "[tlhe records submitted show that the State twice entered

pardons        into the state's                     offender         tracking           system,       when          that is typically             not an option

for offenders.                     This      occurred           on January               29 and February                 2, 1999, after Goodspeed

'7 This    court     has noted              that     a prosecutor's            duty    to disclose       material      exculpatory         evidence      does not
end with       a jury's       verdict.             State    v. Pierre,         13-0873,       p. 11 (La.       10/15/13),        125 So.3d         403, 410.

                                                                                        25
    had come forward                   and before he testified                          at defendant's            trial.     Further,        found         in the

    District        Attorney's             files      was         a letter       from     Goodspeed's               probation             officer,        Scotty

    Melancon,          dated December 18, 2000, advising that Goodspeed had been anested                                                                       on

    charges         of principal             to first        degree         robbery       in Lafayette            Parish        and recommending

    that   no action            be taken             with         regard        to revoking          his probation               at that      tune.         This

    evidence, while              circumstantial,                    demonstrates            special        treatment           that could        have been

    used as impeachment                      evidence              at trial     to counter         Goodspeed's              claim        that he received

    no special         favors        from       the State.             The prosecution                  had a duty         to disclose           it.'8

    Serology         Report      and hTotes

               As     to bench             notes          as well           as diagrams            of    physical          evidence          prepared              in

    connection          with         a Serology               Report           issued     by the North              Louisiana             Criminalistics

    Laboratory,          the district              court      found         that the post-conviction                   evidence            demonstrated

    that the prosecution                had obtained                  51 pages of serology                  documents            from      the crime         Jab,

    but    failed      to disclose              at least           some        portion       of the       notes      to the         defense.             ("What

    remains         uncertain         to this court               is whether         the entire         51-page        section        was provided.")

    The court        noted      that the State offered                         contradictory            testimony          about     its efforts         to turn

    over all records            to     defense            counsel,            but ultimately            concluded          that the defense               likely

had the notes because                          defense            counsel       Michael          Small     did not object             at trial       when     the

    State's    DNA        expert,          Curtis         Knox,        referred         to lab analyst          Dawn        Tingle's        notes        on two

    occasions         during         his       testimony.              The       court     found         that   although            it appeared            some

portion         of the 51 pages                    of serology             notes    was not disclosed,                 other       portions          were    not

    only    exchanged            and shared                 but used during               trial.    The court          speculated            that "[w]hat

'     The same analysis              holds      true with         respect      to the statement         of Goodspeed's           wife,     Becky,     in wl'iich
marginal        notes     stating     "try      and reconcile...              said this may lielp         you to get out Det,"            were    completely
obscured        by a black       marker            before     being     tut-ned    over to defense          coonsel.       These     notes cast doubt on
Goodspeed's             claim       at trial       that     his    decision      to come       fonvard      was     entirely       an act of conscience
uninfluenced           by any selfish              motive,        and as such,      constitute      impeachment            evidence       that should       liave
been disclosed.

                                                                                   26
perhaps has been discovered                        these many          years        later    are the records            not used during

trial.

           The benchnotes                and diagrams         referenced,           and which          defendantmaintains                were

not disclosed,           demonstrate,              among      other     things,        the presence           of high       and medium

velocity       impact      blood         spatter    on the front,           back,     and sleeves          of the red jacket            found

hanging        on a doorknob               in the hallway         of the Lambert                residence,        as well     as transfer

blood       stains     on the back           of the jacket,        which        do not match              the DNA         profile      of the

defendant          or any of the victims.'9                 In addition,        photographs              taken     at the crime         scene

and found          in the possession             of the crime      lab include              close-up      images        of the red jacket

and of a blood             drip    all    the adjacent         wall.        Defendant           maintains        this     evidence          was

exculpatory            to the extent          it connects        the jacket           to the homicides              and supports            the

narrative       that someone             other     than defendant            was in Lambert's               home,       bleeding,       at the

time ofthe          homicides.           The State counters            the blood            stain evidence         is not exculpatory

because        there     is no evidence            the perpetrator            was injured            during      the murders,           nor is

there      evidence       as to when             the blood       stains       on the back            of the jacket         identified        as

matching           the DNA        profile        of Mark      Moras          were      deposited         on the jacket.             Because

Moras        had lived     in the Lambert             home     and workedwith                  Lambert        on his farm,          the State

argues       there     is an alternative           explanation         for the presence                of his blood       on tne jacket.

The      State's       argument          misconstrues          its duty        under        Brady.         Evidence         need      not    be

definitive         to be exculpatory.              Kyles,     514 U.S.        at 450-451          ("Such       argument,        however,

confuses        the     weight      of the         evidence      with        its favorable             tendency[.]").           Here,       the

eviaence        is exculpatory            in that it supports           defendant's            theory      of the case, i.e., that an

'9 The transfer blood stains on the back of the jacket were ultimately                                  linked to alternative         suspect,
Mark Moras, through post-conviction    DNA testing.

                                                                       27
unidentifiedperson                  who was neitherdefendantnor                             one ofthe           victims        was present            and

involved         in the murders.

            Despite the State's failure                    to disclose          at least some portion                       of this exculpatory

evidence,        the district         court     foundno          Brady         violation,         noting       that the defense               retained

its own serology               experts,        and hadphysical                possession           of the red jacket                fortesting        and

xnspectton.              Further,      the court          pointed        out that         the     State       had     offered          to allow        the

defense "to explore                   the lab and secure                 any and all records                    the trial           counsel       could

want.          Thus,        the     district     court      reasoned,            citing         State     v. Harper,                10-0356           (La.

11/30/10),            53 So.3d        1263,       there     was     no Brady               violation          because          the      State    is not

obligated        to provide           a defendant          with     information             he already            has or can obtain                with

reasonable            diligence.

            Before       this court,         defendant       contests          the district         court's       factual          findings      in two

respects.       First,     defendant           argues      the district         couit       ened        in finding           that some portion

of the crime           lab's      serology      notes were "exchanged                       and shared              [and]     also used during

thetrial.        Second,defendantdisputesthedistrictcourt'sconclusionthatthedefense

had access            to the lab notes            because         the defense             and its experts               were        permitted         "to

explore       the lab and secure                 any      and all records               trial     counsel         could        want."          Both     of

these findings             are, in fact,        contradicted            by the trial            record.

            In concluding             that     notes     from     the crime          lab were             brought           to the attention            of

trial    counsel         and "appear[]           to have         been    used       during          the trial       by all attorneys,                 the

district      court       cited     to two       excerpts         from        the trial         transcript.           Ill    the     first,    defense

corinsel       Michael         Small       asked        the State's       expert          witness,         Curtis       Knox,          about     blood

stains      circled       on Exhibit            S-31,     the bloodstained                  towel         found       in Lambert's               room.

KIIOX       replied      that he saw four               stains    that were         marked           as positive             for blood          but not

                                                                         28
tested     for DNA,              and added: "Looking                     at Ms. Tingle's            notes,          there    is another          area that

she has designators                    in the area that she tested,                         but it is not circled              on that item."

           Inthesecondexcerptcitedbythedistrictcourt,                                               SmallaskedKnox:                     "Letmeask

you      this.       Would          your       notes       easily        or    readily         reflect        the     date      of    Ms.        Tingle's

screening?"               Knox       replied:     "Well,       it would            be her notes.          But,        I have a copy            of them."

           Contrary              to the district         court's     finding,         these excerpts                merely      demonstrate            that

Knox      had the lab notes.                     They       do not indicate                 defense       counsel           had access           to them,

that    he ever           saw them,            or that     he was aware                of them          before        Knox      mentioned            them

during       his testimony.                In fact,        the trial      transcript           shows         that     defense        counsel        Small

expressly           told     the witness           that "all        the       [reports]        in this       case to which              I have       been

made privy               are certified         reports."       The serology                 bench       notes       are not certified            repoits.

           A review               of the trial      transcript           demonstrates             that the parties              only     questioned

I(nox      about           the     certified       reports         and     the      trial     exhibits.             While      some         of    Knox's

responses            indicated          that     he was        referring            to or consulting                  notes,         nothing        in the

transcript          indicates        the defense           had access to those notes,                        orthat     the notes        were "used

during       the trial           by all attorneys.

           Ill    the same vein,               a review       of the contemporaneous                          trial    transcript        reveals       that

the district             court     incorrectly          reported         the agreement                that      was     reached         between         the

prosecution               and defense           with      respect        to the offer          to tour        the crime         Jab.     The record

reveals          that,     in satisfaction             of a defense            subpoena           for     documentation                 of the crime

lab's    procedures,               policies,      and protocols,               the parties          agreed          to allow     the defense           and

its experts          to tour       the lab facilities          in Alexandria                 and Shreveport.                 The agreement              did

                                                                              29
 not address           the serology              notes     or the lab's         records,        and contrary           to the district            couit's

 statement, did not encompass                             "any       and all records              the trial       counsel        could       want."2o

             Defense            attorney         Small affirmed                in his         post-conviction                testimony           that   the

 serology        notes were neverproduced                            to him,        and that he did not refer                   to any such notes

 during       his cross-examination                       of Knox.           And,     while       the State withdrew                   its riegotiated

 stipulation           that the serology                 notes     were      not provided              to defense         counsel         and argued

 instead that the serology                       notes     were      turned         over to the defense,               as the district            court's

 reasons        acknowledge,                  the testimony             from        the     State's      witnesses            on this       point       was

 conflicting.            ("At        the     post-conviction                 hearing,         there      was      a dispute            between          the

 witnesses         about         the efforts            to turn      over      all records            to trial     counsel.").              Moreover,

 while       insisting         that the offer            to tour     the crime          lab gave defense               counsel          free reign          to

 access any and all materials,                       prosecutor           Sharu'ion         acknowledged              on cross-examination

tliat    he did not in fact                  agree       to open      file    discovery.              The district           court's      conclusion

that the serology                notes        were      available       to and used by all counsel                        at trial,      and that the

 State's       offer        to tour        the   crime       lab     facilities        afforded          counsel          any    and      all records

counsel         could          want        are    not     supported            by     the     trial    record,       and        are     an abuse           of

discretion.

             In addition            to challenging           the district           court's      factual        conclusions            regarding        the

disclosure             of     the     serology           notes,       the      defendant              questions        the       district        court's

deterinination               that the State had no duty to disclose                             the crime         lab's      conclusions            about

the blood-spattered                   red jacket          because       the defense             had access to the evidence                       and the

opportunity            to conduct             its own       testing       and consult            its own         experts.

2o In fact,     when         the paities      announced          an agreement         had been        reached      for defense         counsel      and its
experts      to tour        the State's      crime      lab, Attorney        Small     was quite        clear    in adding      that the agreement
"satisfies      the subpoena"              for records     related    to the crime          lab protocols,        policies      and procedures;          no
more      expansive          agreement        than   this was memorialized.

                                                                              30
           For the general               proposition              that the prosecution                    has no obligation                to provide

a defendant          with     information             he already            has or can obtain                 with      reasonable          diligence,

the district         court     cites      Harper,           supra.          However,              under       the particular             facts    of this

case, reliance          on the broad               proposition            of law announced                    therein      is misplaced.2'              The

applicable          procedure            article      is La. C.Cr.P.               art. 719,          under     which          the prosecution             is

obligated       to disclose,             upon       written        request         of the defendant,               "any        results     or reports,

or copies       thereof,         ...of     scientific         tests       or experiments,                 made        in connection              with     or

material       to    the      particular            case,        that     are     in     the    possession,              custody,         control,        or

knowledge            of the      district          attorney         and intended                for    use at trial.              La.    C.Cr.P.        art.

719(A).        Here,         defense        counsel         not     only        filed     a detailed          Motion           for Discovery            and

Inspectionrequestingdocuments,photographs,                                                andtangibleobjects                     inthepossession

of the State,         which       are favorable               to defendant               and material             and relevant           te ISSUES of

guilt    or punishment,             as well         as any results              or reports        of scientific           tests or experiments

intended       foruse        at trial,     but also a Motion                 for Expanded                Discovery             in a Death        Penalty

Trial,     specifically         requesting            scientific           and forensic               evidence,         expert        notes,     records

andexpertreportsandallrawdatarelatedthereto.                                                    ThattheStaterecognizedtheneed

to disclose         the requested            information                is not seriously              disputed.         In its original          Answer

to Motion        for Discovery,              the State assured                   defendant            that while         scientific       testing       had

not yet been reduced                 to writing,            "upon         receipt        of crime        Jab documentation                  same will

be immediately               provided           to the defendant."                      While         in a Second              Supplemental             and

Amending            Answer         to Motion               for     Discovery              and     Inspection             the     State    attached          a

number        of forensic           reports          and      notes,        the        serology         notes     were         not    among         them,

2' The frequently cited notion that the prosecution has no obligation to provide a defendant with
infoimationhe  alreadyhas orcan obtainwithreasona-ble  diligence contemplates informationrelating
tothedefendant'sownhealth,actions,orhistory,i.e.,Statev.Hobley,98-2460(La.                                                              12/15/99),752
So.2d771,785-86,orinfoi-mationcontainedinpubliccaserecords,i.e.,                                                     UnitedStatesv.Newman,
849 F.2d 156, 161 (5"' Cir. 1988).

                                                                            31
despite assurance in the answer that copies of all scientific tests and/or experiments

and physical examinations had been provided.

        Thus, there was a specific written request for the reports and notes from the

Crime Lab in accordance with La. C.Cr.P. art. 719(A) that the State was obligated to

satisfy. The provisions of La. C.Cr.P. art. 719(B), which state that, upon motion, the

defendant shall be allowed to conduct his own DNA testing of samples the court

ordered him to provide, do not relieve the State of its obligation to disclose

exculpatory information in its possession. The testing authorized under La. C.Cr.P.

art. 719(B) is "[i]n addition" and not alternative to the disclosure obligation under

C.Cr.P. art. 719(A). 22 That independent testing does not extend so far as to permit

suppression of documentation and test results that could exculpate a defendant or

undermine the State's theory of the case at trial on grounds that the defense experts

had the ability to form the same conclusions.23

       Based on the foregoing, therefore, it appears the district court abused its

discretion in determining that the defense had access to and used the serology notes

at trial and that the State's obligation of disclosure ceased when the defense was

given access to the red jacket and the opportunity to conduct its own testing and

consult its own experts. The serology notes were exculpatory evidence the State was

obligated to, but did not, disclose.

22
    The case o f State v. Franklin, 03-3072 (La. 4/23/04), 872 So.2d 1051, cited by the State, is
inapposite. The case does not address the State's obligation to disclose substantive or exculpatory
testing evidence, which is the Brady issue presented here. Rather, Franklin clarified the scope of
discovery obligations in light of the 1997 amendments to La. C.Cr.P. art. 719. Specifically,
Franklin found the district court did not err by denying a defense request for "not only computer
software programs and proprietary macros used in the [DNA] testing but also information with
regard to laboratory personnel, outside audits, and proficiency testing programs," because
amendments to C.Cr.P. art. 719 provided the defense with the opportunity to conduct independent
testing. The Franklin per curiam expressly notes that the State had provided the defense with the
lab's report and test results.

23 In fact, defendant's DNA expert retained at trial did not detect high velocity impact blood spatter

on the jacket.

                                                 32
Other        Forensic           Evidence

             The next           category          of evidence               forming          the basis         of defendant's                 Brady          claim

consists          of crime           scene     photographs,                  ballistics          bench     notes,        sketches            and diagrams

of the crime               scene       in addition              to a letter           from        DA     Investigator                 Ray    Delcomyn              to

David        Exline        of RJ Lee Group                     (the group          that performed               the gunshot                 residue         testing

for the State)             explaining             the "significance"                     of the red jacket          in the State's                 case. With

respect        to the photographs,                     ballistics        bench           notes,     sketches       and diagrams,                   the district

couit       found       that the State did provide                           a significant           number        of photographs                    and other

materials           that       the     State         believed         supported              its "five         bullet      theory"            of     the      case.

However,            the court          noted,        "[w]hether              the State, the detectives                     and law           enforcement,

who         contributed               to    the       investigative               record           following            the      event,            lacked         the

wherewithal                to recogruze               the need         to share           all materials           with        trial     counsel            is what

appears           could       be the issue.

             In    addressing              some         of     defendant's                specific       complaints               about        the         lack    of

information             concerning             ricochetmarks                  andphotographs                   thatmight              have documented

those marks,              the district         court         ultimately          concluded             that the trial           record        does support

that    photographs                  were       taken          and     that      ricochet            marks      were          noted,         especially            in

connection              with     testimony             regarding            the shooting             event     between            Billy       Lambert and

Mark         Moras.24           However,              the district            court       does not make             a finding               that     all     of the

materials,           especially            those        inconsistent             with        the State's        "five         bullet        theory,"          were

turned        over;        the court         simply           notes      that     photographs                documenting                 ricochet           marks

were        discussed          at trial.     Trial       counsel            for defendant,             Attorney          Small, testified that the

24 The trial excerpts            cited     by the district          court    in this regard          are not supportive          of the propositioxi that
the crime         scene photos,         ballistics      reports,      sketches        and diagrams           in question       were actually produced
pre-trial      and/or      available       to defense          counsel       at trial.      The    excerpts     merely         establish that there was
discussion         at trial    of shots      having       previously          been       fired    in the Lambert         home          and that at least one
photo       of potential       impact       marks       from     a bullet      was taken.

                                                                                 33
materials, and inparticularthe                       BulletWorksheet,25                     werenot        in his files        andnotturned

overtohimindiscovery.                       TheStateinbriefdoesnotdisputethiscontention;itargues

simply     that the materials               are not exculpatory.

          To the extent             that the district          court      attributed         omissions            in production           to mere

negligence          or     lack     of    training      of      law       enforcement               officials,       such        unintentional

negligence         does       not    relieve        the State         of its Brady             obligations.              Brady         holds      that

suppression         of material            exculpatory          evidence            violates         due process            "irrespective           of

thegoodfaithorbadfaithoftheprosecution.                                              Brady,373.U.S.at87.                         Totheextent

that the district          court     relieved        the State of its Brady                   obligations           because          the defense

had retained         its own         ballistics       expert,         the district          court      erred       for the same reasons

discussed       above        in connection            with      the undisclosed                serology           notes:      the availability

of an expert        witness          does not permit               suppression              of documentation                  and test results

that could        exculpate          a defendant         or undermine                the State's           theory      of the case.

          Here,     the ballistics          evidence         was exculpatory,                  as explained            by John Nixon,               an

expert     in     firearms,         arnrnunition,            and      gunshot          residue         who        testified          at the     post-

conviction        hearing,          to the extent        the undisclosed                    crime      scene       photos,       ricochet         and

divot     marks          support         a conclusion              that        at   least     six     or    more         shots        were      fired

(undermining             the State's        "five     bullet       theory"          of tl"ie crime)          and that         more       than     one

shooter      was involved.               Again,      contrary         to the State's          position           that the evidence              is not

exculpatory         because          it does not take              into        account       Mark       Moras's            earlier     encounter

with     Lambert          wherein          shots      were      fired,         evidence         need        not     be      definitive         to be

exculpatory.             Kyles,      514 U.S.        at 450-51.

25 The Bullet Worksheet              indicates that three different kinds of projectiles                          or bullets were recovered
at the scene, supporting post-conviction                  expert John Nixon's                hypothesis that more than one firearm
was  used.

                                                                          34
           A similar               analysis            holds        true       with        respect          to the        letter       from      investigator

Delcomyn            to the RJ Lee Group.                            The district court determined                               that the letter,             wliich

explains          the "significance"                      of the high               velocity          blood          spatter         detected      an the red

jacket,26was not disclosed                              to the defense.                   The court            also    determined               that the State

had       no     obligation              to     disclose           the     letter        or the          prosecutor's              concerns           about       the

"significance"               of the evidence                   to its case because                    the defense              had the opportunity                   to

have       the     jacket          examined              by        its     own        expert         who          could        have      drawn         his     own

conclusions.              As discussed                 above,       however,              the State's          obligation            of disclosure           under

Brady          did not cease wlien                       the defense                was      given          access      to tlie       red jacket           and the

opportunity             to conduct              its own testing               and consult                its own      experts.          The district          court

abused         its discretion             in determining                   to the contrary.

Eliewitness             Information               Inconsistent              with         Trial      Testimony

           The final          category             ofmaterials              the defendant                 maintains         were suppressed                  bythe

State      in violation              of       its Brady             obligations              consists           of    statements             obtained         from

eyewitnessesonthedayofthemurders.                                                Specifically,thepartiesstipulatedthatafour

page transcription                  of the statement                      of Gary         Normand,              who       testified       at trial,     was not

provided           to     the      defense.                  The         statement,              taken       on      June       5,    1996,       contains            a

handwritten              notation             at the top of the first                    page that states: "Says                       he may }iave           seen

ariother       auto-leaving                   going      south           (rt. before         lunch)-could                 have        been     10:00-check

with      Wayne            Normand."                    In     addition,            while          the      defense          was       provided            with       a

transcription             of the June 4, 1996,                       interview            of Andrew               Dunn,        that transcript             did not

contain        handwritten               notes         that appear            on the top of the second                         page that read: "2

Brown-sawsomeone-dropRobinsonoff-thatmo[rn]ing.                                                                           Thedefendantmaintains

26 The letter           explains      that      tlie   crime       Jab had reported               finding      high    velocity        blood     spatter     on tlie
sleeves    of the jacket           in an insufficient              quantity      to be tested            for identification,          but other     blood     spots
on tlie jacket      were        tested        and did not match               the DNA            of the defendant           or any of the victims.

                                                                                    35
that these handwritten                    notations           are exculpatory,                    and should          have       been     disclosed,

because they (l)               identify         another         car fleeing           the crime             scene     around        noon,       and (2)

place       defendant           outside          the     Lambert            residence               at     the     time       the      crimes          were

cotnrnitted.27           We agree.28             The      statements             and notes           should        have      been      disclosed.

                                                                  Materialitv

            Having        concluded              that     the     State          failed      to     disclose          at least         some       of    the

exculpatory           evidence          presented         by the defense,                  the district           court     nonetheless         denied

defendant's            Brady        claim       on its analysis              of the third                 prong     of the required             Brady

showing:         materiality.             And,        in doing       so, the court             engaged            in two       legal    errors,        both

affecting       its     analysis.            First,     the      district         court      applied             an incorrect           standard          in

assessingmateriality.                   Initswrittenreasonsforjudgment,thecourtrecitedthecorrect

test for materiality              as reflected           in this      court's         decision             in State        v. Bright,         02-2793

(La.    5/25/04),        875 So.2d            37:

          For       purposes            of      Brady's           due        process              rule,      a     reviewing            court
          determining             materiality           must      ascertain:

                       not whether           the defendant            would          more         likely     than not have
                       received         a different        verdict        with       the evidence,                but whether
                       in its absence he received a fair trial, understood as a trial
                       resulting in a verdict worthy of confidence. [Emphasis
                       supplied.]

Bright,      02-2793           at 6, 875 So.2d                at 42 (quoting               Kyles,          514 U.S.         at 434).      However,

in the very      next      sentence,          the district         court         found:      "This         Court      does not view             that the

evidence        that     may      not     have        been      provided,           (for     reasons          cited       above),       would          have

27AdeclarationobtainedfromMr.Browninconnectionwiththepost-convictionproceedingsattests
that on the day of the murders               Brown      observed        defendant          being     dropped        off across      the road from the
Lambert      residence     around        noon     or later,     undermining           the State's          timeline       of the morning's        events.

2" The State argues that this evidence is not exculpatory because defendant has failed to produce
evidence linking the other vehicle to alternative suspect Mark Moras, and because the declaration
of Mr. Brown is "worthless"     since he did not testify at the post conviction hearing. Again, the
evidence is exculpatoiy in tl'iat it intetnipts the State's timeline of events and is consistent with
defendant's position           that he simply stumbled upon the crime scene and fled.

                                                                            36
resulted        in a reversal          of [defendant's]                 conviction."            This      standard         is the very          standard

counseled against                  in Bright:             "[T]he          reviewing             court      does      not     put        the    withheld

evidence to an outcome-determinative                                       test in which              it weighs          the probabilities               that

the petttioner             would        have      obtained             an acquittal         at trial       or might          do so at a second

trial.      Id.     Rather,        materiality            for Brady             purposes        "is     not a sufficiency                of evidence

test.      A      defendant           need        not         demonstrate          that     after        discounting              the    inculpatory

evidence          in light     of the undisclosed                     evidence,         there    would         not have been eriough                     left

to convict."             Kyles,       514 U.S.           at 434-35.             To prevail         on a Brady              claim        (and     it bears

reiteration),            a defendant         must         demonstrate             only     that "the            favorable          evidence         could

reasonably              be taken       to put the whole                  case in such a different                    light        as to undeimine

confidence              in the verdict."                Id.     at 435.         Here,     the district           court      applied           the wrong

standard          in conducting            its materiality               analysis.

           The second             error    committed                 by the district        court       in its materiality              analysis         was

its decision             to analyze        the potential                prejudice         from        each       category          of undisclosed

evidence          separately.          Pursuant           to controlling            Supreme             Court     precedent,            for purposes

of materiality,            reviewing           courts          are directed         to evaluate           the cumulative                effect     of the

undisclosed             evidence.         Id. at 436 ("suppressed                       evidence          [is] considered               collectively,

not item        by item");            see also,         Wearry          v Cain,         577 U.S.         385,      394 (2016)(finding                    the

"state     postconviction                 court     improperly              evaluated            the materiality              of each           piece      of

evidence           in     isolation        rather             than     cumulatively"              as required               by     Kyles).           This

evaluation          is accomplished                 at the end of the inquiry.                          Kyles,      514 U.S.            at 437,      n.lO

("We     evaluate          the tendency            and force            ofthe     undisclosed             evidence          item by item;           there

is no      other        way.       We      evaluate             its    cumulative           effect       for     purposes           of materiality

separately         and at the end of the discussion.").                                   The rule        applies          with     equal        force     in

Louisiana          courts,      as this court            has previously              explained.           See, State             v. Louviere,            00-

                                                                            37
2085, pp.l6-17                (La. 9/4/02), 833 So.2d 885, 898 (evaluating                                                         the        entirety      of     a

defendant's Brady claims so "the evidence [couldl be considered collectively,"

according         to Kyles);            Marshall,              94-0461          at 16, 660 So.2d                    at 826 ("It              is not enough

for reviewing            courts         to consider              the impact                of each         item      of exculpatory                 evidence

standing          alone;         the     cumulative                   effect         of     the      suppressed                  evidence           must         be

considered.").             Thus,        as the            district      court         did        here,     it was          error        to     evaluate       the

materiality         of the       suppressed                 evidence           item         by    item      and      in isolation,              rather      that"i

collectively.

            Whether         evidence               is material          for    purposes              of a Brady              violation           is a mixed

question        of law      and fact.              See, Mahler                v. Kaylo,           537 F.3d           494,        500 (5'h Cir.            2008).

Under        Louisiana           law,     mixed             questions           of        law     and      fact     are generally                entitled        to

deference        on review.             O'Hern             v. Department                    of Police,        13-1416,             p. 7 (La. 11/8/13),

131     So.3d      29,     33.      However,                where,       as here,            legal       error      (in    the fornn           of applying

incorrect        legal      standards               in making            the     materiality               determination)                    interdicts       the

findings       of the district           court,           de novo       review            is appropriate.             See, Jones               v. State,     22-

1455,       p. 5 (La.      5/5/23),       362 So.3d              341, 345.                Accordingly,              this court          will     proceed         to

a de novo           assessment                of     whether           defendant                demonstrated                that    the        undisclosed

evidence,         considered             in        the    aggregate,           was         material          such         that     disclosure             of the

suppressed         evidence            could         reasonably           be taken              to liave     put the whole                   case in such a

different       light    as to undermine                    confidence           in the verdict.                  Kyles,         514 U.S.        at 435-36.

Thus,      an evaluation            of each category                   of evidence               the defense          was deprived                of in light

of the       evidence        that       each         side     presented              at trial,       concludes              with        the     cumulative

assessment          of     the    impact             of    the       suppression.                 LaCaze,            645         F.3d        at 736       ("The

materiality        of Brady             material           depends         almost           entirely        on the value                of the evidence

                                                                               38
relative        to the other             evidence         mustered        by the state."),           quoting       Rocha            v. Tbaler,         619

F.3d     387,       396 (5'h Cir.              2010).

Jailhouse           informant             Goodspeed's               Undisclosed            Deal

           In concluding                  that     the defendant            was not prejudiced                   by the State's             failure       to

disclose         that       it provided            Goodspeed             with     "special         treatment"           in exchange              for    his

testimony            at trial           and,     thus,     the      suppression          was       not      material,         the     district     court

reasoned           that (1) the value                of Goodspeed's                testimony         was very           low    compared           to the

other      evidence               at trial;      and (2) given            that    the jury        heard       evidence         of Goodspeed's

three      year      sentence            on his charges              in Rapides          Parish,         when     he faced            a possible         33

year sentence,              "it     is unlikely          that [the      undisclosed]            information         would           have seriously

underx'nined            Goodspeed's                testimony          any more           than the evidence               heard        by the jury         at

trial.

           In brief,         the State adopts                and expands           upon      this reasoning,              arguing         that "[i]t      is

    difficult        to consider               a witness      subjected          to more        scourging         cross examination                    than

Leroy      Goodspeed                    was    in this      case.       It quotes        this     court's       opinion        on direct         appeal

wherein         the court            noted:

           At      trial,     defense           counsel       reminded            the jury       that     Goodspeed             had been
           arrested          24 times,           amassed           six felony       convictions,            is mentally             ill, takes
           Haldol           for auditory           hallucinations,               and has admitted               that he will           say or
           do anything                  to get out of prison,               where        he has spent            most      of his adult
           life.      Thus,         the defense            ensured      that the jury           heard     every    possible           reason
           to reject          Goodspeed's                 testimony....

Robinson,             02-1869            at 17-18,          874 So.2d           at 79.

           The        flaw         in    the     State's      argument            in this       regard       is that      it is not          factually

accurate.           As the evidence                     adduced       post-conviction               demonstrates,               the jtQ          did not

hear "every             possible              reason"       to reject       Goodspeed's             testimony:            it did not         hear,      for

example,           of the          two        pardons       that     were        entered        in the      CAJ[TN            system       before        he

                                                                             39
testified            at defendant's                      trial; it did not see the letter from                                  probation             officer            Scotty

Melancon                   recoinmending                           to      Judge          Foote       that        no    action        be       taken          to     revoke

Goodspeed's                   probation                  despite           his arrest           in Lafayette           Parish      on charges              of principal

to first degree                robbery;              it was not alerted                    to the marginal              notes on Becky                 Goodspeed's

transcribed                 statement             "...said             this may help you get out of Det;"                              and it did not hear of

Goodspeed's                    expectation                      that      he would           receive         beneficial          treatment            in connection

with       his pending                 charges              in Lafayette                 Parish     in exchange              for his testimony.                     Despite

defense            counsel's               efforts,             Goodspeed                repeatedly          denied       any promises                were         made        or

special        treatment               received                 during           both     direct     and cross-examination.29

              While            it     is     certainly                  true,       as the         State      maintains,            that       defense              counsel

challenged                 Goodspeed's                      credibility              on several           fronts,      his testimony                that he had not

received            favorable               treatment               and did not expect                     to receive         favorable            treatrrient           in the

future        in exchange                   for his testimony                        against       defendant           went      unchallenged.                     Not      only

did this testimony                         go unchallenged,                         it was bolstered               by the State's             solicitation               of the

testimony              of the attorney                          representing               Goodspeed               on the Rapides                   Parish         charges,

w.'r.       Annitage,                 who         testified             that Goodspeed's                   status      as a potential               witness         against

defendant              was not              discussed                  in the pretrial             conference            in which           his Rapides              Parish

29 Goodspeed                 variously            testified         on direct         examination          that    he came       forward           because      he and his
wife,     Becky,       "talked          about        it and we both                 agreed...You       know,        the right      thing     to do and I felt             it was
the right          thing     to do, too;"                that    when         he gave      his statement           to detectives,          "they     did     not    offer     me
anytliing,"          and lie did not               ask for anything;                  and that he was happy               to be a witness            because        "I    mean
it's    tlie right     thing."          Finally,           on direct,            the following       exchange          occurred:

                             Have       you received                   or have      you been       offered        anything      for your       testimony?
                             No,      sir. I haven't.
                             And       I assume             that        you[r]      attorney,      W.T.      Armitage,        would         know      whether
                             that's        true    or not,         too?
              A:             I, yes, sir.

       On cross-examination,                       in response to defense counsel's question "[wlith                                        all of these things that
are cuirently              pending         against         you,        what      plans    do you have         to try and help         yourself        get out of this,"
Goodspeed             replied:        'Tm         just     going         to take my lick."

                                                                                            40
    plea deal was worked                               out,        nor      was          the judge                made          aware         of     it.3o It          was      also

    capitalized        upon          by the prosecutor                       in both             opening-"              and closing            arguments,                wherein

    the prosecutor               told     the jury:

            Goodspeed                   toldyou,           "I      didn't         ask for anything,                       and nothing              was       offered
            to me."              Goodspeed's                     own         attorney              took      this        stand.       He looked                 at you
            andsaid,"Itwasn'tdiscussed.                                                Inthepleabargainnegotiation,itwasn't
            discussed.                  I didn't          know           about          it, I - and the judge                       didn't         know          about
            it."

                    Goodspeed                  was not given                       anything.                He was not                offered           anything.
            He did not ask for anything.

            The       materiality                of evidence                     "is      best       understood                  by taking             the word              of the

prosecutor."                 Kyles,          514 U.S.                 at 444.           Here,        the prosecutor                   went         to great         lengths        to

bolster       Goodspeed's                      credibility,               eliciting              testimony               that    he did not testify                    pursuant

to a plea           deal         on the          Rapides               Parish             charges,           but         failing      to disclose                 subsequent

documents             requesting                dismissal                of Goodspeed's                      pending             charges           in Lafayette              Parish

because            he has served                       as an "essential                      witness"              at a murder                trial.         This        conduct

implicates           Giglio             and Napue.

3o Ai-mitage         testified          as follows            in response              to the prosecutor's                 questions:

            Q:             ... At that pretrial                conference              did you make               the judge        aware      of was anything
                           discussed           tliat      Leroy          Goodspeed                was     a possible             witness       against          Danell
                           Robinson?
                           No.
                           Was       it even      discussed?
                           No.
                           As far as you               know,         was the judge                ever    even      aware        of it?
                           Not     as far as I know.

"     In his opening,            the prosecutor                told      the jury:

            We      will     offer       evidence             from       an inmate,               Rapides         Parish        Detention          Center,       Leroy
            Goodspeed.                  Leroy          Goodspeed                will      tell     you      in    November            of     1997,         he    had     a
            conversation             with       Darrell          Robinson              in which         Darrell         Robinson       said I did that            man,
            two     ladies       and a young              child.       And       I got rid of the gun.                   Threw      it off a bridge-among
            other     things.           No     doubt       the defense             will      use every            ploy     possible        to discredit          Leroy
            Goodspeed.                  Now,       Leroy           Goodspeed              has a felony              record.         He       has    some        felony
            convictions.             Tliey      are mostly               drug     related.          He had a drug               addiction.          But,     you will
            see from          the testimony                 he did         not     gain          anything         for    his    testimony.             And      he has
            absolutely           no reason             to lie.

                                                                                            41
            In Giglio,            the petitioner             discovered            after his conviction                        that the Government

had told a testifying                   witness        that the witness             "would           definitely           be prosecuted              if he did

not testify,          and that if he did testi'fy he would                                          be obliged               to rely      on the       'good

judgmentandconscienceoftheGovernment'                                                    astowhetherhewouldbeprosecuted.

Giglio,       405 U.S. at 153. However,                               the witness             did not disclose                  this    at trial,    and the

Government                argued           to tlie jury      that the witness                "received             no promises            that he would

not be indicted.                    Id. at 152            The Supreme Court found                                   a Fourteenth            Amendment

violation       and grantea the petitioner                            a new        trial.      Id.    at 155.

            In Napue,             the State's           principal          witness           in a murder              trial,    then      serving       a 199

year      sentence          for        the     same       murder,           testified          in    response             to    a question            by    the

prosecutor           that         he     had        received         no    promise            of     consideration                in     return      for       his

testimony.           In fact,          he had been promised                       consideration,                   but the prosecuter                took      no

action      to correct          the witness's             false      testimony,             although              the jury      was apprised            that a

public      defender         had promised                 to do what             he could           for the witness.               Napue,           360 U.S.

at 265.       The Supreme                  Court      found     a Fourteenth                Amendment                violation          and granted         the

petitioner         a new          trial,      holding         that    a conviction                 obtained          through           the use of false

evidence,       known             to be such by representatives                             ofthe     State, is a denial                of due process,

and that       there        is also          a denial        of due process                 when      the State,             though       not     soliciting

false evidence,             ailows           it to go uncorrected                when        it appears.             Id. at 269.         Moreover,          the

Court       added,         this        principle        applies           even     if the          false      testimony            goes      only      to the

credibility         ofthe       witness;            and it applies         even ifthe           jurywas             apprised           of other     grorinds

for    believing          that         the    witness         may     have         had       an interest             in testifying           against        the

petitioner.         Id.     at 269-'i          O.

           Giglio         and       Napue            stand     for    the proposition                      that     where        a key      witness         has

received       consideration                   or potential          favors        in exchange               for testimony               and lies about

                                                                              42
those      favors,     the trial        is not fair.        Tassin         v. Cain,         517 F.3d           770,     778 (5fh Cir.             2008).

Further,         as Tassin        explains:

            Although           Giglio         and     Napue         use the          term    "promise"                in referring           to
            covered-up              deals,      they        establish           that       the      crux       of      a      Fourteenth
            Amendment             violation          is deception.             A promise            is unnecessary.               Where,
            as here,     the witness's               credibility       "was...            an important           issue        in the case

            ... evidence             of any          understanding                   or     agreement            as to a future
            prosecution           would       be relevant           to his credibility              and the jurywas               entitled
            to know        of it."

Id.   (quoting        Giglio,        405      u.s.     at 154-55           (emphasis          added)).

            Here,     defendant          presented          evidence            of an understanding                    between          Goodspeed

and the State           with      regard       to his pending               charges         in Lafayette              Parish,      and the State

failed      to correct         Goodspeed's               testimony            that     no such          understanding             or agreement

existed,         or that       Goodspeed              had       received         favorable              treatment          even     prior         to his

testimony.           The     district        court     outlined        just     some        of the evidence                presented: (1) the

State twice          entered      pardons           into the State's            offendertracking                 systemwhen              that is not

typically         an option         for offenders;           (2) Goodspeed                  after       testifying         made comments to

an inmate,           Kevin       Nichols,        about      receiving           a deal;      and (3) phone                 messages          between

the Rapides            Parish        Assistant         District       Attorney             and the Lafayette                   Parish     Assistant

DistrictAttorneywere                     exchanged and shortlyafterthe                              defendant's            trial, the Lafayette

Parish       charges         were       dismissed.           Yet      at trial, Goodspeed                     testified         that he had not

received          or been         offered       anything           in exchange               for his testimony,                   and that, with

respect       to his pending             charges,        'Tm        just    going         to take my lick."                More     importantly,

the      State     bolstered         Goodspeed's                testimony            that no favorable                  treatment          had been

offered          or received         by calling           his      attorney          on the Rapides                  Parish     charges,          W. T.

Annitage,           to testify      that Goodspeed's                 testimony            was not a foactor in his favorable                         plea

in    Rapides         Parish.           The     State       not     only       allowed           this     deceptive            testimony           to go

uncorrected,           it capitalized            on the testimony                to argue           to the jury         that    Goodspeed             did

                                                                           43
not gatn          anything           for his testimony,                        and "he           has absolutely                 no reason           to lie.           This,

in   and of itself,                demonstrates                      the      materiality            of the undisclosed                          evidence.             See,

Lacaze,            645      F.3d       at 737,              n.l      ("The           State's      argument             that      an unrevealed                     deal       is

imr'naterial             after    going          to such            lengths           to emphasize                [the witness's]                 credibility             and

lack    of any motives                  for lying                 at trial     simply           lacks     force.").

             The district             court,        and the State in turn,                         attempt          to downplay                  the significance

of Goodspeed's                    testimony,                taking         the position             that the value                  of his testimony                 "was

very        low         compared            to     the        other          evidence             at trial,"         and        that      it     is unlikely              the

suppressed               information               would            have       undermined                Goodspeed's                   testimony            any more

than the evidence                    heard         by the jury.                However,            the case against                  defendant             was based

largely       on a chain              of inferences                   from          circumstantial                evidence.32             The only            physical

evidence           connecting               defendant               to the murders                was the minute                    transfer       bloodstain             on

the bottom              of his left         shoe and the end of that shoe's                                       lace,      and this          evidence            (which

is consistent             with       defendant                stepping              on a small          drop       of blood           when         he entered             the

house)       proves           only      that       defendant                 was present             at the Lambert                   residence,            which          he

admits.        OnlyGoodspeed'stestimonyprovidesanyindicationthatdefendantwasthe

perpetrator              of the murders.

            Here,        evidence           ofanyunderstandingoragreementbetweenGoodspeedandthe

State       was         central        to     determining                    Goodspeed's                 credibility.                 The        fact      that      other

32 In its written          reasons,         the district           court     outlined       the evidence           presented          at trial    as evidence           that:
(1 ) defendant           had been      living       at the Lambeit                  residence      following         his release         from      the VA         hospital;
(2) defendanthad              no employment                  outside         ofhis     work      at Lambert's         faiu'i;    (3) defendant            had resumed
drinking;         (3)    defendant          fled      the     scene;         (4)     Lambert's          empty       wallet      was      found       in    defendant's
bedroom;          (5) defendant,        wlien         apprehended,                 hadLambert's          knife,     apackofcigarettes                the same brand
as Lambert         smoked,        and $71.00            in cash; (6) gunshotresidue                       was detected on defendant's                       waistband;
(7) atowel        with     Nicholas         Kelly's         blood      was found          on the floor         of Lambeit's            bedroom;           (8) two drops
of Nicholas         Kelly's       blood       were       found        on the bottom              of defendant's              shoe    and a shoe           lace;     and (9)
testimony         from     jailhouse        infornnant.

                                                                                       44
impeaching            evidence        was presented          to the jury       does not undermine                   the materiality          of

the undisclosed            evidence.

           The       materiality        inquiry       does     not     turn      on      which       of    two      competing
            sources      of bias       a court,      in hindsight,           determines           the jury       would        have
           considered            more       important.              Rather,       the      inquiry          is   whether         an
           undisclosed           source      of bias-even           if it is not the only            source       or even       the
             main      source"-could              reasonably          be taken        to put      the whole           case in a
           different       light.

Id.   at 736 (citing          Kyles,        514 U.S.      at 434-35).

           The State's         suppression           prevented        the defense          from      impeaching             Goodspeed's

claim that he received no inducements for his testimony,                                                         so the 3ury           heard

uncontradicted             testimony          that    defendant            admitted        to the         murders.          Under       these

circumstances,            there      is at least a "reasonable               likelihood"          the disclosure            to the jury      of

Goodspeed's             motive       for testifying         against        defendant        might         have   affected       the jury's

judgment            and put the whole            case in a different            light.      As a result,         the nondisclosure,

in and of itself,          was material           under      Brady,        Napue,         and Giglio.

Undisclosed            Forensic        Evidence

           In addition        to the undisclosed               deal with        jailhouse          informant          Goodspeed,          the

State      failed     to disclose        exculpatory          forensic        evidence           in the fortn         of the    Serology

Report       andnotes,       the letterfromInvestigatorDelcomyn                              explaining           the "significance"

of the red jacket            in the State's          case, and crime             scene photographs,                   ballistics bench

notes,     sketches       and diagrams            of the crime        scene.      Defendant           maintains,         and we agree,

that the disclosure            of this evidence             would     have resulted           in a weaker            case    for the State

and a stronger            case for the defense,               as the defense             could     have      used the evidence               to

attack      the probative           value    of the physical          evidence           and the State's          theory      of the case.

           As discussed             at length,     supra,     the undisclosed              serology         notes     document high-

velocity       impact      blood       spatter    on the front,        back      and sleeves          of the red jacket,              as well

                                                                      45
as transfer          blood      stains     on the back           of the jacket.            Undisclosed               photographs           taken       at

the crime        scene include              close-up          images       of the red jacket               and of a blood           drip      on the

neighboring            wall.      According               to post-conviction              defense          expert,     Stuart     James,        these

undisclosed            materials          demonstrate            that     the unknown                blood     spatter      resulted         from          a

violent      incident,          and that the blood               stains        on the red jacket             and the passive           drip     stain

on the wall           were      most      likely     part     of the same bloodshed                       event.

           The Staterecognizedthe                          importance           ofthis     evidenceto           its case, memorializing

the "significance"                of the high             velocity      impact         blood      spatter      in conjunctioxi           with       the

unidentified           third      party         transfer       stains      on the         back       of    the jacket       in Delcomyn's

undisclosed            letter      to     the      State's      gunshot           residue         expert.          And,     it    elicited         trial

testimony            from       David        Peart,         Lambert's            cousin        and        neighbor,       to      preempt          any

argument         by trial         counsel          that     the red jacket              was    connected             to the crime           (and      an

unidentifiedpersonwasinvolvedinthehomicides).                                                     Peart'stestimonysuggestedthe

bloodstains            resulted         from       minor       work-related               injuries        on Lambert's             cattle      farm,

misleadingly            implying          the blood           stains      on the jacket            were      innocuous           and unrelated

to   the     homicides,             despite          the      fact      that     the      State      knew       this      explanation              was

inconsistent           with     the undisclosed                serology          notes.

           Post-conviction                testing         revealed       the transfer          stains       on the jacket          matched          the

DNA        profile      of alternative             suspect,      Mark          Moras.      Had defense               counsel known of the

State's      forensics         expert's         conclusionregardingthehigh-velocity                                  impact blood spatter,

he could         have,         as he testified,               used      that     information              to impeach             David       Peart's

testimony            and to advance              his alternative           theory        that another person               was present and

hadcomrnittedthecrimes.                            Indeed,ifdefensecounselhadbeenprovidedtheserology

notes,      the prosecutor               could       not     have       argued,         as he did in closing:              "Finally,          if not

[defendant],           who?"            Defense           counsel       could     have        used    the undisclosed              evidence           to

                                                                           46
undermine            the State's            theory       of the case and bolster                  his defense         that another            person,

i.e., Mark       Moras,            committed             the crimes.

           A similar             analysis        holds    true with          respect        to the undisclosed           ballistic        notes    and

crime scene photographs.                           At trial, the State theorized                   that one assailant             had fired        five

bullets       from     the gun Doris               Foster      claimed         to have returned             to Lambert           approximately

a week before the murders.33 The undisclosed                                           materials       contradict        this theory.           Upon

reviewing        the undisclosed                    evidence,          post-conviction              expert     John Nixon              opined      that

it is likely         more        than     one firearm               was used          at the scene,        at least      six gunsliots            were

fired,     and the shots                likely      came       from      more        than     one shooter.           This     eviderice         could

have been used by the defense                              to undermine               the State's        theory      as to what         happened

the day of the murders                      and to provide               a plausible          alternative         narrative        of the crime.

As   evidence             that     could         have    been         used     to attack         the investigation               and    lessen     the

credibility          of     the     State's          case,     it     was     material.           See,      Kyles,       514       U.S.       at 445

(undisclosed              evidence          is material        ifit    couldhave            beenusedto          attackthe         investigation

and lessen           the credibility               of the State's            case).

Undisclosed               Witness        Statements

           The final         category             of undisclosed             exculpatory           evidence        left for us to consider

consists       of the suppressed                   statement           of Gary        Normand         and the interview                of Andrew

DunnfromwhichanotationregardingKirbyBrownwasredacted.                                                                   Handwrittennotes

on the Normand                   statement          indicate          that Normand            and his brother           Wayne          "may       have

seen another           auto"        leaving         around       the time          of the murders.           Notes      handwritten            on the

transcribed          Dunn         interview          indicate         that Kirby         Brown       may have           seen someone              drop

defendant        off       at Lambert's              home      that morning.

33 In fact, a murder             weapon          was never     recovered;          the State's    theory     was just    that:    a theory.

                                                                              47
            TheundisclosedinformationfromGaryNormand's                                           statement-thatanothercar

was seen leaving              the area-could           have been used to support                 defendant's         argument       that

another person committed                     the murders and to impeach law enforcement                                 officers       for

failing      to adequately             investigate         altemative         suspects.         The    information           regarding

Kirby       Brown       could have          been       more     devastating           to the State's       case.      Had      defense

counsel been alerted to this information,                              counsel     could    have located        and interviewed

Mr.     Brown,      who        revealed       in his post-conviction                  declaration       that   he had        observed

defendant        being        dropped      offacross        theroad         fromthe      Lambertresidence            aroundnoon,

or later,    the day of the murders.                  Such testimony              would     have directly       contradicted         the

State'stimelineofthatday'sevents.                              Inhisclosing,theprosecutorarguedtothejury

thatdefendantarrivedattheLamberthousebetween                                             11:15-11:45      am,shotthevictims

betweenll:45-11:50am,andthenhaduntil                                        12:lOpm(whenDorisFostercameupon

the scene)       to gather         money,         cigarettes       and Billy's           pocketknife       and flee.         Brown's

statement,       in contrast,          has defendant           being     dropped       off at the Lambert          residence       after

noon,      making       it impossible            for him     to have        coinmitted       the murders       according         to the

State's     timeline.          However,          defense       counsel        was unable         to challenge         this    timeline

because      the notation          identifying         Kirby     Brown         as a potential       witness    was suppressed.

The undisclosed               informationregarding               Mr. Brownwas               clearlymaterial          underBrady.

See, Juniper             v.    Zook,       876     F.3d     551,       570     (4Ih Cir.     2017)     ("Corirts       have      found

withheld      evidence          material      when        the evidence           undermined         the government's            theory

as to when        a petitioner          coinrnitted        a crime.").

                                                                       48
Cumulative               Effect      of Undisclosed                 Evidence

             In    assessing            the       significance               of the       evidence              withheld,            it is important                    to

reiterate         thatthe      case against              defendantwas                 based largely               on circumstantial                    evidence.

The only           physical         evidence           presented             by the State consisted                       of two particles                  "unique

to"     and one particle               "characteristic                 of"    gunshot           residue         detected           in the waistband                     of

defendant's              jeans,34          and the minute               amount          (two       drops)          of victim           Nicholas              Kelly's

blood        found        on the bottom                 of defendant's                left     shoe and the end of that                          shoe's           lace.

The only           evidence           that        identified        defendant             as the perpetrator                    was the testimony                       of

jailhouse          informant,              Goodspeed.

             Throughthispost-convictionproceeding,                                              defendantdemonstratedthatthe                                      State

failed       to     disclose          (1)        evidence          showing             Goodspeed's                     beneficial             treatment,              (2)

serology           evidence            potentially              implicating               an     alternate            suspect,          (3)      crime          scene

documentation                 and notes              with       the potential                to contradict              the      State's       "five         bullet"

theory       of the case, and (4) witness                            statements               potentially             placing          defendant             outside

the     State's          timeline          of events.             Considered                 separately,           each         item      underi'nines                the

strength          of the State's              case,, considered                  cumulatively                  they     convince           us that we can

have      no confidence                    that     the jury's          verdict         would            not    have          been      affected            had       the

suppressed               evidence           come       to light.

             Nevertheless,                 in brief,     the State takes the pesition                             that none            of the suppressed

evidence           was material               and its suppression                 was inconsequential                           because          the presence

of Nicholas              Kelly's       blood         on the bottom               of defendant's                   shoe and the end of his shoe

lace conclusively                   establishes              defendant's           guilt.         The      State rests            its argument                 on the

34 Post-conviction                expeit     John      Nixon      explained        that       gunsliot     residue        evidence        has low           probative
value     due to the number                of possible       sources     (beyond        discharge          of a gun)          for the particles        commonly
identified        with    gunshot      residue        and the ease oftransfer                 of such particles           from     one surface         to another.
Because       the particles         identified        with     gunshotresidue             can come         from       other    sources,       Nixon     explained
that tlie definitions          have        evolved       over    the years       and particles           once     considered           "unique        to"     gunshot
residue      are now        described         as merely        "characteristic          of'     gunshot        residue.

                                                                                 49
lack of any bloody                    footprints          at the scene            and the testimony               of defendayit's               post-

conviction          expert in bloodstain                  patteiw analysis, Stuart James. However,                                  a review          of

Mr. James's testimonyreveals                            thatthe       State's      theorythat        the lack of bloodyfootprints

at the scene proves                  defendant            acquired        the blood          on his shoe while                 the victim        was

actively       bleeding,            and not       later    (as defendant              maintains)           upon    stumbling             upon     the

scene,      was just        that:     a theory          or hypothesis             proposed        to tlie expeit,         who      in response

to State's question,                  responded:           "That         could      be possible....             Yeah.          Based       on that

hypothesis,          yes.         On re-direct,           Mr.     James testified            that it also possible               that someone

 could      have     stepped          into     a roam""'        and come           in contact       with      a pool     of blood          withoiat

leaving       a bloody         footprint.           Far from          being        conciusive,        the evidence              regarding         the

small      amount          of blood          on defendant's            shoe is equivocal,              and the State's             reliance         on

this     single      item      of     evidence-far              from      proving           the    strength       of    its     case,     and     the

immaterialityofthe                  suppressed            evidence-underscores                     ourconclusionthatthe                     largely

circumstantial             case upon           wliich     defendant's             conviction        rests would          have      been rntxch

weaker        than the one heard                 by the jury          had the undisclosed                  evidence       been presemed.

           The      State     went       to great          lengths        in this          case   to refute       any         contention         that

jailhouse         informant          Goodspeed            testified      pursuant           to any inducements                 (even     going      so

far as to call his attorney                    to bolster       this claim).          The undisclosed              evidence             regarding

the favorable             treatment          Goodspeed            did receive         would       have     a11owed        defense         counsel

to impeach          this     claim,      and undertnine                the credibility            of the only          witness      to identify

defendant          as the perpetrator               of the homicides.                  When         considered          together         with     the

undisclosed          serology          notes      and other        crime       scene evidence              that couldhave              'oeen used

by defendant              to support         his claim        that another          person        may have been involved                     and to

rebut     the testimony             ofDavid         Peart elicited          bythe          State to conceal        tlie relevance            of the

35 Nicholas       Kelly     was     the victim      closest     to the    front    door.

                                                                          50
undisclosed       serologyevidence,wefindourselvesleftwithasingularconclusion:                                       the

defendant      did not receive      a fair trial,    or a verdict     worthy     of confidence.        He is entitled

to a new trial     under   Brady,       Giglio,      and Napue.

                                                  CONCLUSION

           For the foregoing     reasons,         defendant's       conviction     is reversed,       his sentence      is

vacated,      and this   case is remanded           to the district     ccurt    for a new   trial.

CONVICTION               AND        SENTENCE              VACATED;               REMANDED               FOR     NEW

TRIAL.

                                                           51
                      SUPREME COURT OF LOIDSIANA

                                No. 2021-KP-00812

                  STATE EX REL. DARRELL J. ROBINSON

                                         vs.
  DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN, LOIDSIANA STATE PENITENTIARY,
                  ANGOLA, LOIDSIANA

     On Supervisory Writ to the 9th Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides

Crichton, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, and assigns reasons.

      I agree with the majority that the state did not disclose favorable evidence to

the defendant, but I dissent in part because, in my view, the cumulative effect of the

withheld evidence did not deprive defendant the right to a fair trial as to his gu ilt.

See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 49 L.Ed.2d 342

(1976). As to the penalty, though, I believe that in the absence of the suppressed

evidence, the death sentences imposed in this case are not "worthy of confidence,"

and must be overturned. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,434, 115 S.Ct. 1555, 1566,

131 L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). For that reason, I would affirm the ruling of the trial court

denying defendant's post-conviction Brady claims as to his convictions but reverse

the ruling of the trial court as to the penalties, vacate defendant's four death

sentences, and remand to the trial court to convene a new penalty phase trial.

      On May 28, 1996, at approximately 12:10 p.m., Doris Foster arrived at the

home of her cousin, Billy Lambert. Foster discovered the bodies of Lambert, his

sister Carol Hooper, Carol's daughter Maureen Kelly, and Maureen's infant son,

Nicholas Kelly, all shot in the head. She left immediately and drove to a nearby store

where the clerk called 911. When she returned to the scene with the police she

noticed that Lambert's truck, which had been there when she arrived earlier, was

now gone.
        It was soon discovered that defendant, who had been staying in Lambert's

home at the time, had fled the scene in Lambert's truck. At trial, the state presented

evidence of defendant's highly suspicious behavior. Witnesses testified seeing him

speed away from the home at about 12:15 p.m. Defendant drove erratically,

swerving into other lanes of traffic, forcing motorists off the road, and side-swiping

another vehicle. A chase ensued and defendant was followed until he turned down a

driveway, drove through a fence, abandoned the truck behind a house, and ran into

the woods where the police later found him hiding. As they approached, defendant

told the officers he was unanned and "on medication for violent tendencies."

        Besides his incriminating conduct, the state presented additional physical

evidence connecting defendant to the crime. When he was arrested, defendant had

Nicholas's blood on the sole and lace of his shoe, Lambert's knife in his pocket, and

some cash and cigarettes in his possession. At the crime scene, a spot ofNicholas's

blood was found on a towel in Lambert's bedroom and Lambert's wallet, emptied

of cash, was found in defendant's room. All four victims were shot with a .38 caliber

gun, the same caliber gun Lambert was known to keep in the house, but the weapon

was never recovered. A gunshot residue expert testified that he found one particle

on defendant's shirt, a few particles on his waistband, and many particles on his pant

legs.

        Finally, the state called Leroy Goodspeed to testify against defendant.

Goodspeed testified that in November 1997, while the two men were jailed together,

defendant confessed to him that he "did those people, a man, two women and a small

child, and threw the gun off of a bridge." Critically, the confession Goodspeed

testified about is not self-corroborating. In other words, it does not contain

information that only the perpetrator of the crime could have known. 1 Since the

1
 The identity of the victims of the crime was well-known public information and the murder
weapon was never discovered, under a bridge or elsewhere.

                                            2
 reliability of the confessioncannotbe deteimined by its substance alone, to believe

 that defendant confessedto the crime, a )uror must have taken Goodspeed                                                                                      on his

 word that it occurred.Thus, Goodspeed'scredibility                                                              became and remains a relevant

 factor     in this case.

            At trial, Goodspeed'scredibility                                    was put to a rigorous                            test. He underwent                      a

blistering             cross-exatnunation                        by defendant's                   highly            experienced             attorney           using

 abundantimpeachment                              evidence that had been turned                                      over       by the      state.        The jury

heard           that     that     Goodspeed                      had been arrested                          24 times,             amassed            six      felony

convxctxons,              was mentally                    ill,     took      medication                    for     auditory         hallucinations,               and

admitted          that      he will        "say      or do anything                      to get out of prison."                         State     v. Robinson,

2002-1869,              pp. 17-18            (La. 4/14/04),                 874 So.2d 66. The jury also learned                                        that when

Goodspeed reported defendant's                                       confession,               he had been facing up to 33 years                                       in

prxson on charges pending                                 in Rapides Parish; however,                                    before          defendant's            trial,

Goodspeed                accepted            a plea              deal in        which                he     was       sentenced            to      three       years

imprisonment                at hard        labor         with      one year             suspended,               and was released                 after     serving

11 months              of that        sentence.           The       state dispelled                  any suspicion               this     outcome            related

to his asststance                in defendant's                   case by calling                 Goodspeed's                   attorney         who       testified

that      the     lenient        sentence            he          received       was            not        related      to     his       testimony           against

defendant.2

           Nevertheless,                  despite        the defense's                  successful               incrimination            of his character,

Goodspeed               maintained                that      he      had      not         received,               requested,         or     been        promised

anything           from         the       state     in      exchange            for        his        testimony              against        defendant.            He

explained          that he was only                  doing          so because             it was "the               right      thing     to do."         The jury

heard      that    Goodspeed                had charges               pending             against           him      in Lafayette,              where       he was

facing      up to life          in prison,          but his testimony                      suggested               that he was unaware                     that his

2 There     are, of course,           a myriad       of reasons,            aside       from     seeking          cooperation       from        Goodspeed,        that
the state may          have     offered     him     a plea         deal on these          charges.

                                                                                    3
asststance         in defendant's                   case in Rapides                   Parish       could         possibly           result       in beneficial

treatment          in      Lafayette           Parish.           In     its     opening            statement,               the     state       asserted         that

Goodspeed           had no reason                    to lie about               the confession                  and nothing              to gain         from      his

testtmony.          In closing,              the      state      stressed           that     Goodspeed                 was        not     given         anything,

offered anything,                 and did not ask for anything                               in exchange                for his testimony.

           After          the      trial,      defendant                discovered                additional                evidence             that       further

impeached           Goodspeed's                     already           marred          credibility.              As     noted        above,        Goodspeed

denied       receiving             any        favorable               treatment            from          the      state       for       his     testimony             at

defendant's             trial    in March            2001.       However,                on two          occasions            (on January              29, 1999,

and on February                  2, 2001)           pardons           were       entered          into     the Department                      of Corrections

offender      tracking             system            on Goodspeed's                       behalf.3         In    addition,           on December                  18,

2000,      a probation             officer          wrote       a letter        to a judge           recommending                       that    Goodspeed's

probation      in Rapides              Parish          not be revoked                    despite         his arrest         on first          degree      robbery

charges      in Lafayette              Parish.         Neither           the pardon               entries        nor the probation                     letter    was

disclosed      to defendant                  before         Goodspeed                 testified      against           him.       As a result,            the jury

did not learn             that    Goodspeed                 had received                 these      additional              benefits           from     the state

after   he came           forward           about      the confession                    but before         he testified            against           defendant.

           A discussed              above,           at trial         Goodspeed              denied         asking          for     or being           promised

anything      from          the state in exchange                        for his testimony                      against        defendant.              However,

there    is evidence,             presented           in post-conviction,                     from        which         one can reasonably                      infer

Goodspeed               was      incentivized               by    the         state      to testify             against        defendant.              First,     the

Lafayette       Parish            charges            that     were            pending          against           Goodspeed                 at the         time      of

defendant's             trial     were        all     later      dismissed                expressly             because           he testified             against

defendant.         Rapides            Parish          Assistant               District       Attorney                Mike      Shannon             testified        in

post-conviction                 that after trial            Goodspeed              asked him to put in a "good                                 word"      for him

3 During the post-conviction                   hearing, the state could not provide an explanation                                            as to how or why
these entries were made.

                                                                                  4
with      the Lafayette            Parish       District        Attorney,             he called           and asked                them       to "find         a way

to assist him              [because]            he was a material                           witness           in a murder                    case."       Internal

memoranda              in the Lafayette                Parish District                Attorney            file shows                they      made       good       on

this request             and dismissed                 Goodspeed's                    charges because he was "an                                         essential

witness          in a murder              trial."      Second, while                   Goodspeed                   testified          that     he was            only

testifying         against         defendant           because          "it     was         the right         thing         to do,"          Kevin       Nichols

testified        in post-conviction                 that       when           Goodspeed            returned              to his cell            immediately

after     testifying         against           defendant,         he indicated                  he was              worried           "that         he was        not

getting       his deal and he was headed                           back          to Lafayette."                Nichols's               account          points      to

Goodspeed's              belief      that he had a deal with                        the state before                he testified              in defendant's

trial.    Third,      a post-conviction                investigator                 spoke      with       Goodspeed                  in March          2012.      He

told     her that he received                   a deal on his Lafayette                         Parish         charges              in exchange            for his

testimony           against         defendant."              Fourth,           the     Rapides             Parish           District          Attorney            file

contained          a handwritten               note in the margin                    of a transcript                of a police              interview          with

Goodspeed's              wife      about       the confession.                  The note was scribbled                              over      but appears           to

say, in part, "try              & reconcile...said               this may              help     you to get out Det[ention]."

             Weighing             this     evidence            together,              against           the        self-serving               testimony             of

Goodspeed            at trial      and Shannon                in post-conviction-who                                both           denied      the existence

of a pre-trial           deal-one              could         nevertheless              reasonably              conclude               that     there      was,      in

fact,     some promise              of additional,             future         aid by the state in exchange                              for Goodspeed's

testimony          against        defendant.           Yet     this agreement                  was not disclosed                       to defendant              and

not revealed           at trial.     Without           this information,                    defendant           was not able to show                           to the

3iiry    that, contrary to the claims of the prosecutor, Goodspeeddid have a reason to

lie      about       defendant's               confession             and           that,      despite             his       assertions             otherwise,

4 Since       Goodspeed           died     before      the    post-conviction                hearing,         we      are    relegated         to     considering
hearsay       evidence       about       his   involvement          in        defendant's        trial.       While         this     is permitted         in    post-
conviction        proceedings,           it is accorded        less weight           than     if he had testified                  at the hearing        and been
subjected        to the test of cross-examination.                 State        ex rel.      Tassin       v. Whitley,          602     So.2d     721,     724 (La.
1992).

                                                                                5
Goodspeed           was not only             testifying       because         it was "the            right    thing    to do."    Thus,     while

Goodspeed             was thoroughly               impeached            at trial,       the jury        did not hear all the reasons

to reject       his testimony             as incredible.

           There        is additional            favorable        evidence          that the state did                not turn    over     to the

defense         besides       the undisclosed              benefits      made          and promised             to Goodspeed.            At trial,

the jury        heard      about     a red jacket           collected         from      the Lambert             house      that was stained

with     the blood          of an unknown                 third    party.5        At     trial,      the state presented            testimony

suggesting          that      the blood          on the jacket            came         from         an injury         sustained    by a farm

worker      and was not related                   to the murders.             Contrary            to the theory         posited    to the jury,

the state's         own       experts        had examined             the jacket         before         the trial      and concluded          that

some       of    the     blood       on      the jacket           was    "high          or     medium          velocity      spatter."       This

classification            connects         the blood         on the jacket              to a gunshot            event     and, thus,       to the

murder.          This fact was not disclosed                         to defendant                 before trial. If it had been, the

defense         could     have counteredthe                 state's      theory        ofthe        origins     ofthe blood and argued

that    it pointed         to the presence                of someone            other        than     defendant at the house when

the murders             occurred.

           Finally,        the     state      withheld        handwritten               notes        providing         investigative        leads

relating        to the timeline              of the crime          and when             defendant             was     seen at the Lambert

house       on the         morning           of the murders.              The )ury heard from two witnesses                                   who

recalled        seeing      Lambert's            truck speeding away from the house at around 12:15 p.m.

In     closing        argument,           the     prosecutor            told the )ury               that defendant           arrived       at the

Lambert          house      between           11:15 and 11:45 a.m., shot the victims                                   between 11:45 and

11:50       a.m.,       and      then      had    until      12:10       p.m.       (when           Doris      Foster arrived)           to steal

Lambert's           money,          knife,       and cigarettes before fleeing                           in his truck. However,                the

5 At trial the jury heard that the blood on the jacket was not from defendant or any of the victims.
Later, post-conviction   DNA testing of revealed that it came from Mark Moras, a former resident
of the Lambert house who had an ongoing conflict with Lambert and who was the altemate
perpetrator urged by defendant at trial.

                                                                          6
state did not reveal to the defense that one of the witnesses                                                                                   told the police                 that     he

and his brother                     may have seen another                                         vehicle             leave the house that morning.                                    The

state also suppressed a note about anotherwitness,                                                                         Kirby     Brown,            who saw defendant

being dropped                  off at the Lambert                                  house that moming.                             If the state had told defendant

about Brown,                  they would                         have interviewed                            him and learned that he recalled                                   seeing

defendant           being dropped                            off at the Lambert                             house at 12 p.m. or later that                              day.        If this

evidence           had been turned                                   over,          the )ury would                          have heard               testimony                that was

inconsistent              with           the state's                 timeline               and        consistent            with       defendant's               claim        that      he

happened           upon the victims                               after they were murdered                                    and fled in panic.

             The         cumulative                         effect            of      all       the         undisclosed               evidence-the                        beneficial

treatment          provided                     to    Goodspeed                     by      the        state,     the       serological              evidence           relating         to

the       bloodstained                   jacket,            and         the        investigative                 leads        relating          to    the      timeline          of    the

crime-is                noteworthy.                         However,                   in       my           view,          even       taking           into       account             the

suppressed               evidence,                   the         case     for        defendant's                  guilt       remains           strong         and       worthy          of

confidence.6                Thus,               unlike            the         majority,                I    decline          to     conclude            that      the      withheld

evidence           is     material                   to      the        guilty            verdicts               and        would         not        disturb         defendant's

convictions.7

             Importantly,                     and         distinct        from           the      dissent,           I believe        that      the withheld               evidence

undermines                confidence                        in    defendant's                     death          sentences,              and     I would             reverse           the

ruling        of   the      trial         court            as to        the        penalty             phase.         In    Brady        v. Maryland,                   the    United

6 La. R.S. 15:438               permits               convictions                  based       on circumstantial                   evidence          alone     when, "assuming
every      fact to be proved                    that the evidence                    tends to prove,                 [] exclude[s]        every reasonable                hypothesis
of innocence."            Furthermore,                      as this Court                 explained             in State v. Davies,             350 So.2d            586, 588 (La.
1977),       "[e]vidence                 of     flight,          concealment,                  and         attempt      to avoid         apprehension              . . . indicates
consciousness             of guilt              and, therefore,                is one of the circumstances                            from      which        the jury         may     infer
guilt."

7 In so doing,            I am cognizant                          of the impact                 overturning                murder      convictions             has on surviving
victims.       See State            v.    Reddick,               2021-1893,               pp. 15-16              (La.      10/21/22),          351     So.3d      273,        283. As I
acla'iowledged            in Reddick,                     "[e]ven         when           the evidence                can be reassembled,                     conducting         retrials
years      later inflicts       substantial                 pain on crime                 victims           who must testify             again and endure                new trials."
Id., quoting        Edwards                v.    %nnoy,            593 U.S.              ---, 141          s.ct. 1547, 1554-55, 209 L.Ed.2d 651 (2021)
and citing         United           States           v.    Mechanik,                475     U.S.           66, 72, 106 s.ct. 938, 89 L.Ed.2d 50 (1986)
("[V]ictims        may be asked to relive                               their       disturbing              experiences.").

                                                                                                   7
 States Supreme Court held that a due process                                                  violation               occurs        when       the       state

 withholds favorable evidence                            that is "material                either      to guilt         or to punishment."                  373

 U.S. 83, 87, 83 s.ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963)                                                                    (emphasis            added).

During a penalty phase of a capital trial, the jury                                                is required            to consider           "[a]ny           []

relevant mitigating                  circumstance"                when       determining                 the approprtate              sentence           to be

imposed. La. C.Cr.P. art. 905.5(h). The United States Fifth Circuit                                                              Court       of Appeals

has "frequently               recognized the strategic value of relying on 'residual                                                        doubt"'         by

defendants          during         the sentencing              phase        of a capital           trial.     Kirkpatrick            v.         itley,     992

F.2d 491, 497 n. 33 (5th                      Cir.    1993). Residual                doubt         has been defined                  as "a      lingering

uncertainty about facts-a                            state of mind that exists somewhere between                                             'beyond             a

reasonable         doubt'          and 'absolute            certaimy.""Franklin                       v. Lynaugh,              487 U.S. 164, 166,

108 s.ct.         2320,      2323,         101 L.Ed.2d            155 (1988).

           At     the     trial     on     the       sentence,       "[o]ne          or     more            )urors       [may]       retain[]         minor

trepidations         about         the nature"         ofthe      state's        evidence          "or       [feel]     a general         ambivalence

about      imposing          the death           penalty,"         and that "uncertainty,                            though        not rxsing         to the

level     of reasonable             doubt        regarding         guilt,     might         [lead]          such a juror           to hold      out for a

life    sentence."         State       v. Lee,        524      So.2d        1176,     1192           (La.       1987).         The    United          States

Supreme         Court       has acknowledged                   that "[e]vidence                that is material                  to guilt    will        often

be material         for     sentencing            purposes         as well."          Cone          v. Bell,          556 U.S.        449,      473,      129

s.ct.     1769,      1784,         173     L.Ed.2d          701     (2009).         While           not       giving      rise     to a reasonable

doubt,     there     is a reasonable              probability          that the evidence                      withheld         by the state in this

case, considered cumulatively,                              may have reasonably caused at least one 3uror to

nevertheless            entertain          some       residual       doubt          about      defendant's                guilt,     and that juror

"can     be expected              to resist      those      who    would          impose       the irremedial                  penalty       of death."

Smith     v. Balkcom,              660 F.2d          573,    580-81          (5th    Cir.     1981).

          "The      Brady           rule    is based         on the requirement                       of due process.                 Its purpose            is

        to ensure       that a miscarriage                  of justice           does not occur."                     United     States      v. Bagley,

                                                                             8
 473 [J.s. 00'7, 675, 105 s.ct.                               3375, 3379-80, 87 L.Ed.2d 481 (1985).                                                   We     are

required to apply                    heightened              care to protecting                       the due process                       rights     of the

 defendant in capital prosecutions.                                 See Woodson                 v.    North         Carolina,              428 U.S. 280,

305, 96 s.ct.                 2978, 49 L.Ed.2d                       944 (1976)                 (explaining                 that      because          of    the

"qualitative            difference"             between        the death penalty                     and life imprisonment,                        "there        is

a corresponding               difference              in the need for reliability                       in the determination                      that death

is the appropriate              punishment              in a specific              case."). Applying                    the heightened               standard

of care applicable                    to capital            cases, it is my               opinion                that      there      is    a   reasonable

probability            that the Brady                 materials         in this case would                        have caused trepidations

about the nature of the state's case sufficient                                      to cause one or more jurors                                to withhold

capital          punishment.8          For this reason, I believe                         the state's withholding                            of favorable

evidence           resulted         in a miscarriage                of justice        rendering             the death sentence imposed

in this case not worthy                       of confidence.              Therefore,             I would            vacate the sentence and

remand the case for a new trial on the penalty                                         phase.9

8 See      La.     C.Cr.P.   art.    905.8,      "The       court    shall     sentence         the     defendant           in     accordance        with    the
determination          of the jury.      If the jury        is unable     to unanimously                agree      on a determination,               the court
shall     impose      a sentence      of life    imprisonment           without       benefit         of probation,          parole        or suspension       of
sentence."

9 Pursuant         to La. C.Cr.P.      art. 61, the District            Attomey        has the discretion                to retry     the penalty       phase
of the trial       or not seek a capital         verdict.      In that circumstance,                 the trial     court     shall    impose      a sentence
of life    imprisonment         at hard       labor     without      benefit       of parole,        probation          or suspension           of sentence.
See La. R.S. 14:30(C)(2).

                                                                               9
                      SUPREM:E COURT OF LOUISIANA

                                No. 2021-KP-00812

                  STATE EX REL. DARRELL J. ROBINSON

                                         vs.
  DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN, LOUISIANA STATE PENITENTIARY,
                  ANGOLA, LOUISIANA

     On Supervisory Writ to the 9th Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides

CRAIN, J., dissenting.

      Billy Lambert, Carol Hooper, Maureen Kelly, and Maureen's infant son,

Nicholas Kelly, were all murdered in Lambert's home on May 28, 1996. Defendant

was spotted frantically fleeing the scene in Lambert's pickup truck at a high rate of

speed, spinning-out, side-swiping a vehicle, and running other motorists off the road.

An ensuing car chase ended with defendant driving through a fence, abandoning the

truck, and fleeing on foot into nearby woods. Apprehended shortly thereafter,

defendant had Nicholas's blood on his shoe and Lambert's knife in his pocket.

Lambert's wallet, emptied of cash, and a towel stained with Nicholas's blood were

found in defendant's room at Lambert's home. All four victims were shot at close

range with a .38 caliber gun, the same caliber pistol Lambert had in his house before,

but was never found after, the murders. Gunshot residue was found on defendant's

shirt, waistband, and pants.

      A unanimous jury found defendant guilty on all four counts of first degree

murder and recommended the death sentence, which the trial court imposed. On

direct appeal, this court unanimously affirmed the verdict and sentence, finding "the

circumstantial evidence presented at 'defendant's trial excluded any reasonable

hypothesis of his innocence." State v. Robinson, 02-1869 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So. 2d
66,      75.       The       majority        now      finds       the    verdict           not "worthy                of    confidence.               I

respectfully          disagree.

           The      majority's          decision      rests largely             on the premise                  that the state failed              to

disclose         a purported         "deal"      between          the state and Leroy                       Goodspeed,             the jailhouse

informant            who        testified       defendant          admitted               to     the       murders.         This      finding       is

contradicted           by direct         evidence        from     four       witnesses             who      testified      that nothing         was

promised           or offered        to Goodspeed             in exchange             for his testimony.                    These      witnesses

are Mike          Shannon,        the lead prosecutor              in the murder                 trial;    Ray Delcomyn,             the district

attorney's         investigator          for the murder            trial;     W.T.         Annitage,            a defense          attomey      who

represented           Goodspeed             in a criminal         proceeding              in Rapides            Parish;      and Goodspeed

himself.           Implicitly         finding      these        witnesses           all        cornrnitted       perjury,          the majority

defers         to a "factual         conclusion"          by the trial          court "that               the State failed           to disclose

that Goodspeed                in fact testified          in excliange          for beneficial               treatment." I cannot find

any such conclusion                  by the trial        court.

           In written          reasons       rejecting        defendant's           claim,          the trial     court     pointed        out that

during         the trial, "much             effort was put forth to attack and reveal any possible adeal'

made       with      Leroy       Goodspeed."             The trial          court    noted          that Goodspeed,                under     cross-

examination,             admitted           that he "would           do anything                  in his power             to avoid being in

jail";     and the )ury was informed                       about        the three-year                    sentence      he received          in the

recently          concluded           Rapides         Parish criminal                     proceeding             The trial           court then

reviewed          the "new"          evidence      presented by defendant, describing it as"more detailed

evidence               . that     appears        to indicate            Goodspeed                may have         been allowed special

treatment."            (Emphasis            added.)      The trial court identifies the pardons, the statements

allegedly           made        by      Goodspeed          to a cellmate and a defense investigator, and

documents             showing         some      communications between Sherman(the Rapides Parish

assistant         district    attoniey)        and a Lafayette assistantdistrict attorneyover two months

after defendant's               trial. But, the trial court made no factual conclusionsabout any of

                                                                         2
this "new"            evidence.                 Instead,          the court             pretermitted             any finding             as to the existence

of the      alleged          deal          and        found            no Brady            violation          based           on a lack        of materiality,

reasoning            that     Goodspeed's                       trial     testimony                was      limited           and    subject     to    extensive

cross-examination                         about       a possible               deal.     This       is apparent          from       the closing        sentences

of the trial         court's          reasons            on this          issue:

            The       value      of Goodspeed's                            testimony               was      very        low     compared         to the
            other        evidence               brought          against          [defendant]              at trial.      Unlike         witnesses       in
            most         cases        where             such           Brady           violations          are     found,           he   was    not      an
            eyewitness                    nor     was           liis     testimony                 central         to    [defendant's]             case.
            Goodspeed's                    testimony              contained              only       an alleged          jailhouse          confession
            ....    The jury              was presented                    with         evidence           of special          treatment        at trial,
            which           defense             counsel           was          able     to use to impeach                      Goodspeed           in its
            cross-examination.                           The           only      additional           evidence            now        being     brought
            by      [defendant]                  is     similar           circumstantial                   evidence           possibly         showing
            further          special             treatment              received                at later     dates    following the trial.
            Therefore,               it     is unlikely                 that     this      information              would have seriously
            undermined                    Goodspeed's                   testimony               any more         than     the evidence            heard
            by the jury              at trial.         [Emphasis                 added.]

"[P]ossibly              showing"               something                is not a factual                conclusion.            Particularly          where that

conclusion               means             four        witnesses,                including             both        parties          to the alleged            deal,

committed             perjury.

            Absent           a factual                finding           by the          trial     court,      de novo           review         of the relevant

evidence            is     appropriate                  on       appeal           to      determine if defendant proved the state

promised            or offered              Goodspeed                   anything           in exchange for his testimony. Cl State v.

Thompson,                11-0915             (La.       5/8/12),              93 So. 3d 553, 563 ("When                                  a trial court makes

findings           of fact       .         a reviewing                  court      owes          those findings great deference.") Based

upon       my       review       of the evidence,                         defendant did not prove a deal between the state

 and Goodspeed.                  Assistant               District          Attorney               Sherman and Goodspeed both expressly

testified          there     was no agreement,                           understanding,                    or any other arrangement to induce

 Goodspeed               to testify.              Their testimony                        was corroborated by the district attorney's

 investigator,              who testified                 he was present for all meetings with Goodspeed and no

 deal    was        ever      discussed;                and Goodspeed's                           defense attorney in the Rapides Parish

 proceeding,               who confirmed                     there was no deal in that matter.

                                                                                           3
           The      contrary         evidence        is mostly          inferences        drawn      from       letters     and    otlier

communications                that    were      adequately            explained      at the evidentiary             hearing.         The

probation          officer      who      sent    the       letter     to the judge         presiding        over     Goodspeed's

probation          did not say the letter             was part of a deal or had been requested                            by anyone.

Instead,       as recognized            by the majority              in footnote      7, the officer        testified       it was not

uncornrnon          for him to not recommend                        revocation      when    there was a pending                  charge,

and "apparently              I chose not to recommend                       revocation,     between         my supervisor            and

I."     The probation           proceeding           was pending            in Rapides     Parish,      so it is not surprising

that     the     Rapides        Parish       District        Attorney's          office    was    copied         with      the    letter.

Sherman           likewise         explained         the    circumstances            surrounding          him      contacting         the

Lafayette          Parish     assistant      district       attorney        a'fter defendant's         trial.    That was at the

urging      of a relative        who had been in a halfway                     house with        Goodspeed. The majority

also      points      to     the "pardons"              entered         into     a database       by the Department                     of

Conections,            but      there     is no       evidence          the    Rapides      Parish District               Attorney      is

authorized          to direct      such entries         or was otherwise            involved      in that record keeping by

the Department               of Corrections.               The only testimony referring to a deal is second-

liand     information           reported        by      Goodspeed's cellmate and a defense investigator,

wliich     I find      are not more           persuasive            than the      direct testimony from the witnesses

involved         in the alleged deal, all of whom refute it.

           Finding          no agreement             between         the state     and Goodspeed, the state did not

violate        its obligation         to disclose          any      such agreement and did not present, or fail to

correct,       false testimony.           See Giglio             v. United     States, 405 U.S. 150, 150-51; 92 s.ct.

763,      764; 31 L.Ed.2d 104 (1972); Napue v. People ofState ofIll., 360 U.S. 264, 265;

79     s.ct. 1173, 1175; 3 L.Ed.2d 1217 (1959).

           Defendant           alternatively         argues         the state should have disclosed the letter from

the probation           officer,      the existence of the two pardons, and the prosecutor'snotes in

the      margin       of a statement            from        Goodspeed's wife.                This information is neither

                                                                        4
exculpatorynor sufficiently material to constitute                                      a Brady      violation.            "Favorable

evidenceis material                        if there is a reasonable probability                      tliat,     had the evidence

been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would                                                           have       been

different." Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 433; 115 s.ct. 1555,                                              1565;      131 L.Ed.2d

490 (1995). Whether considered in isolation or cumulatively                                             with      the other          Brady

evidence, disclosure of the probation officer's letter, the prosecutor's                                                notes,      and the

pardons would not "have made a different result reasonably probable."                                                       See Kyles,

514 U.S. at 441; 115 s.ct. at 1569. In affirming the juty's                                     verdict        against      defendant,

this court reviewed all of the evidence and specifically                                       recognized             the strength         of

the state's circumstantial evidence,                          which       "excluded        any reasonable               hypothesis         of

his innocence.                  Robinson,            874     So.     2d     at 75.      Commenting               on      Goodspeed's

testxmony, this court                 observed,       "Clearly...             the quantum          of the State's            proof      was

significantly           more    than the testimony                 of Leroy     Goodspeed."             Robinson,           874 So. 2d

at 78.      I agree.          Given      the convincing            nature     of the state's       circumstantial             evidence,

the failure        to produce            information         that,    at best, might         marginally           further          impeach

Goodspeed's              testimony        is not a Brady           violation.

         Defendant             also maintains              the state failed       to disclose        serology           and otlier        lab

notes from         the North          Louisiana        Criminalistics           Laboratory,        as well       as diagran"is,          and

pl'iotographs.            The    trial     court      rejected       this    contention,       fuiding,        "The        trial     record

sripports       tlie    State did disclose             tliese      pieces     of evidence."         Delcomyn,               tlie    district

attorney's        investigator,          testified     that he requested              any and all laboratory                notes from

the   Crime            Labs    in Alexandria            and      Shreveport.          He received         a large          package         of

materials        that he personally              delivered         to the defense          attorney's         office.      Defendants

were additionally              given      full   access to the Crime             Lab.      This information               was also not

material,       particularly          given      that defendant's            expert    had prolonged             possession           of the

jacket      that is the subject            of the note related              to blood    splatter    on the jacket             sleeve.

                                                                      5
           Lastly,    I find no merit      to defendant's              factually-innocent         claim      under Louisiana

Code       of Criminal       Procedure         article    926.2.        To prevail,         a defendant      must prove "by

clear and convincing               evidence      that, had the new evidence                   been presented           at trial,    no

rational      juror      would     have   found      the petitioner          guilty     beyond         a reasonable        doubt.

La. Code Crim.             Pro. art. 926.2B(1)(b).            Defendant            relies    on evidence       indicating          that

blood      on the back           of a jacket     in Lambert's            house      was from          an alternative       suspect

identified      by the defense.           The presence            of this blood         does not exculpate             defendant

in these murders            to the point       that "no      rational      juror      would     have found         him     guilty."

Id.

           Defendant        had a fair trial        that resulted          in convictions         on four      counts       of first

degree murder.             These convictions             should    not be set aside based on inferences drawn

from      limited     circumstantial       evidence         where       every      witness     with     personal    knowledge

of the relevant          events confimied           the actual         facts. I dissent and would affirm the trial

cotut's      judgment.

                                                                   6
                      SUPREME COURT OF LOIDSIANA

                                No. 2021-KP-00812

                  STATE EX REL. DARRELL J. ROBINSON
                                         vs.
  DARREL VANNOY, WARDEN, LOIDSIANA STATE PENITENTIARY,
                  ANGOLA, LOIDSIANA

     On Supervisory Writ to the 9th Judicial District Court, Parish of Rapides

McCallum, J., dissents for the reasons assigned by Justice Crain and assigns
additional reasons.

      I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion for the reasons assigned by

Justice Crain in his dissenting opinion. I write separately to emphasize that the jury

weighed testimony and determined that the defendant was guilty of the murders of

three adults and a child. The jury then determined that the defendant's actions

warranted the death penalty. On direct appeal, this court affirmed the defendant's

convictions and sentence. State v. Robinson, 02-1869 (La. 4/14/04), 874 So. 2d 66.

The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari, leaving those convictions and

sentence undisturbed. Robinson v. Louisiana, 543 U.S. 1023 (2004).

      After a review of the record, I agree with the trial court's denial of the

defendant's petition for post-conviction relief. Unlike the majority, I find that the

cumulative effect of the withheld evidence did not deprive defendant of the right to

a fair trial, and the guilty verdicts and the convictions are worthy of confidence.

Since the disputed evidence related to guilt, not the penalty, in my opinion, it

logically follows that the death sentence imposed by the jury is also worthy of

confidence.