Court Opinion

ID: 9590934
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 23:59:52.721492+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:01:06.629991
License: Public Domain

Whittle, J.,
dissenting.
The majority opinion holds, “The failure of the city of Richmond to properly charge the taxes in the names of the life tenants has precluded the remaindermen from paying such taxes and then proceeding in a personal action against the life *435tenants. Because of this, the rights of the contingent remainder-men have been prejudiced and the errors complained of have not been cured by the provisions of Code, § 58-815, therefore, the assessments are invalid.”
I cannot agree with this holding. I do agree with the majority when they say, “It is not apparent how the legislature could have made Code, § 58-815 more comprehensive than it is now”. I agree, too, that the “comprehensive” statute was passed to meet our holding in the Massey and Stark cases, and that the language in the statute was taken from the opinion in the Old Case for the express purpose of remedying the situation.
It is admitted that it was error for the commissioner of the revenue to assess the land in the name of the Doherty estate. It should have been charged on the land book in the name of the life tenants. But the statute provides that, “No assessment of any real estate, f * * shall be held to be invalid because of error, omission or irregularity by the commissioner of the revenue ⅜ ⅞ * in charging such real estate on the land book unless it be shown by the person or persons contesting any such assessment that such error, ⅝ ⅜ * has operated to the prejudice of his or their rights.” (Italics supplied)
The statute places the burden upon the contestants to show prejudice. They must allege and prove actual prejudice, not some theoretical prejudice that might be supposed to exist.
It is vaguely suggested in the pleadings that the contingent remaindermen have been prejudiced but the record is void of any evidence which shows prejudice to either the life tenants or the contingent remaindermen.
The statement in the majority opinion that the contingent remaindermen have been precluded “from paying such taxes and then proceeding in a personal action against the life tenants ’ ’ is beyond the evidence. There is no such proof. It was suggested in argument that had the error not been made this course might have been open to the contingent remaindermen, but there is no evidence to support the argument. In no event did the error preclude the contingent remaindermen from pursuing this course if they felt that their “ephemeral interest” justified the risk.
There is no evidence to show that either the life tenants or the contingent remaindermen have been misled in any way by the error. On the contrary, it is shown that the parties knew the *436provisions of the will, their interest in the land, and that the taxes had not been paid. The way was wide open for them to protect their interests if they desired to do so.
It is not sufficient to suppose that the contingent remainder-men would have acted differently if the assessment had been properly made. They had all the information that a proper assessment would have given them.
The majority opinion will tend to nullify this highly beneficial legislation. The decision not only denies appellant in the instant case the right to collect taxes which are justly due, but it will, in the future, permit whimsical excuses to act as barriers to the collection of taxes.
The opinion charges commissioners of the revenue with too high a degree of legal knowledge in the interpretation of wills. Volumes have been written by courts and text writers on the subject of who takes what in will cases. No branch of the law is more complex and troublesome, and we should not be too strict in dealing with laymen unless it is affirmatively shown that the interpretative error of the layman has “operated to the prejudice” of the contestants.
I would reverse the decree.
Buchanan, J., joins in this dissent.