Court Opinion

ID: 9458125
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-04 20:43:40.782785+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:35:38.862441
License: Public Domain

DUNIWAY, Circuit Judge
(dissenting) :
I dissent because I am convinced that Johnson did present a prima facie case for classification as a conscientious objector. I assume, although I do not necessarily agree, that his answers to the questions in the SSS Form 150 were insufficient. But there is more. At the September 16 “courtesy interview”, Johnson enlarged upon his beliefs. The draft board’s summary of the interview states:
“Registrant appeared as requested. Oath administered by Mr. Bruce, Chairman. CO questions were answered.
“Registrant stated that he feels the idea of killing or helping to kill anyone is against his beliefs. He doesn’t feel that he has the right to kill and that he has the right to do what he wants as long as he doesn’t hurt anyone. He was baptized Lutheran but does not attend the church now. He does believe in and would call the police in case of trouble, but although he had thought of being a member when younger, he would not join now. He believes in the Fire Department. He is against war. He used to believe *597in a Supreme Being, but now he is not sure. There might be a Supreme Force. He doesn’t believe that churchgoing is a requisite, since many people don’t enact their beliefs 'whereas he believes he does enact his beliefs. He would accept alternate service if it helped people and helped to stop violence. The registrant is not employed and has attended 3 years of college.
“Members asked registrant to submit letters from the references given in SSS Form 150. They advised he would not be placed in class 1-0 on the basis that his claim is not [sic] on religious training and belief as required by the statue [sic]. They will review the file again after the letters are received.
“Was advised that classification was not to be reopened.”
In my opinion, Johnson’s statements, considered together with his answers to the questions in the SSS Form 150 do state a prima facie case, and the board should have reopened his classification.
1. The test for determining whether a registrant’s classification should be re-opened.
In Mulloy v. United States, 1970, 398 U.S. 410, 416-417, 90 S.Ct. 1766, 1771, 26 L.Ed.2d 362, the Supreme Court established the following test for determining whether a registrant’s classification should be re-opened.
“Where a registrant makes non-frivolous allegations of facts that have not been previously considered by his board, and that, if true, would be sufficient under regulation or statute to warrant granting the requested reclassification, the board must reopen the registrant’s classification unless the truth of these new allegations is conclusively refuted by other reliable information in the registrant’s file.
“Because of the narrowly limited scope of judicial review available to a registrant, the opportunity for full administrative review is indispensable to the fair operation of the Selective Service System. Where a prima facie case for reclassification has been made, a board cannot deprive the registrant of such review by simply refusing to reopen his file.
“The Government suggests . that the board might have concluded that the prima facie claim had been undercut by the petitioner himself— by his statements at the courtesy interview or because his demeanor convinced the board that he was not telling the truth. There is, however, but scant evidence in the record that the board’s action was based on any such grounds. And, in any event, it is on precisely such grounds as these that board action cannot be predicated without a reopening of the registrant’s classification, and a consequent opportunity for administrative appeal.
“This is not to say that on all the facts presented to it the board might not have been justified in refusing to grant the petitioner a 1-0 classification; it is to say that such refusal could properly occur only after his classification had first been reopened.”
It obscures analysis to dispose of the present case, as the majority does, by comparing its facts to those in Mulloy. The Supreme Court indicated in Mulloy that the case before it was well within the test applied by the Court, but it did not state that facts less overwhelming than those in Mulloy would automatically fall outside the test. Thus, I think the focal point of analysis should be the test used in Mulloy, and not the facts in Mulloy.
To determine whether appellant satisfies the test in Mulloy we should first decide whether appellant has stated a prima facie case for reopening his classification, and second, whether the facts which form the basis of his prima facie ease are conclusively refuted by other reliable information in his file.
*5982. Whether appellant has stated a prima facie case.
To answer the first inquiry, whether appellant has stated a prima facie case, I turn to United States v. Seeger, 1965, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733, and Welsh v. United States, 1970, 398 U.S. 333, 90 S.Ct. 1792, 26 L.Ed.2d 308. The facts of those two cases and the present one are strikingly similar in several important respects. As the Court noted in Welsh:
“Both Seeger and Welsh were brought up in religious homes and attended church in their childhood, but in neither case was this church one which taught its members not to engage in war at any time for any reason. Neither Seeger nor Welsh continued his childhood religious ties into his young manhood, and neither belonged to any religious group or adhered to the teachings of any organized religion during the period of his involvement with the Selective Service System. At the time of registration for the draft, neither had yet come to accept pacifist principles. Their views on war developed only in subsequent years, . . ..” 398 U.S. at 335-336, 90 S.Ct. at 1794. “[N] either could definitely affirm or deny that he believed in a ‘Supreme Being,’ both stating that they preferred to leave the question open. But both Seeger and Welsh affirmed on those applications that they held deep conscientious scruples against taking part in wars where people were killed. Both strongly believed that killing in war was wrong, unethical, and immoral, and their consciences forbade them to take part in such an evil practice.” Id. at 337, 90 S.Ct. at 1795.
Of most importance in the present case is the Welsh Court’s treatment of the question what constitutes “religious belief” within the meaning of the Selective Service Laws. The government had argued that Welsh was distinguishable from Seeger because Seeger had merely placed quotation marks around the word “religious” whereas Welsh had struck the word “religious” entirely. From this the government argued that Welsh’s views, unlike Seeger’s, were “essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.” A belief based on such views disqualifies one for conscientious' objector status. 50 U.S.C. App. § 456(j). The Court, however, concluded that “[wjhat is necessary under Seeger for a registrant’s conscientious objection to all war to be ‘religious’ within the meaning of § 6(j) is that this opposition to war stem from the registrant’s moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions.” Id. at 339-340, 90 S.Ct. at 1796.
As a matter of substance I think that Johnson’s claim is no weaker than those in Seeger and Welsh, and in at least one respect is stronger than the claim in Welsh. Like Seeger and Welsh, Johnson indicated that he was unsure whether there was a Supreme Being. At his courtesy interview he indicated that there might be a Supreme Force. Like Seeger and Welsh, Johnson had attended church as a child, but was not a member of any organized religion at the time that he applied for conscientious objector status. And like Seeger and Welsh, Johnson stated categorically that under no circumstances could he take the life of another human being. Finally, in contrast to Welsh, Johnson stated that he had acquired the belief which formed the basis of his claim in “church as a child.” Welsh indicated that his beliefs had been formed by “reading in the fields of history and sociology.” 398 U.S. at 341, 90 S.Ct. at 1797. On the basis of the similarities between the present case and Welsh I find it impossible to conclude that Johnson has not stated a prima facie case.
*599This case differs from Seeger and Welsh in two respects. First, Johnson’s answers to the SSS Form 150 questions were both meager and flippant. This might be a basis for a board finding that he was insincere. The board’s first disposition of his CO claim hints at such a finding. But I see neither flippancy, nor any other evidence of insincerity in what Johnson said to the board at the September 16 interview. What I do see is a better statement of his views, without the flippancy. I note, too, that the board did not, at that interview, find him insincere. It rested refusal to reopen solely on its conclusion that his views were not founded on religious training or belief.
Second, Seeger and Welsh were far more articulate than Johnson and went into greater detail about their beliefs than did Johnson. However, a registrant’s inability to express himself well or apparent general lack of intelligence do not prevent his stating a prima facie case. See generally United States v. Mount, 9 Cir., 1970, 438 F.2d 1072; United States v. Stephens, 3 Cir., 1971, 445 F.2d 192; United States v. Garvin, 7 Cir., 1971, 438 F.2d 1054; United States v. Joyce, 7 Cir., 1971, 437 F.2d 740; United States v. Callison, 9 Cir., 1970, 433 F.2d 1024; United States v. Davila, 5 Cir., 1970, 429 F.2d 481; United States v. Lamberd, W.D.Mo., 1970, 315 F.Supp. 1362.
The majority relies heavily on our decision in United States v. Moore, 9 Cir., 1970, 423 F.2d 556. As the author of the opinion in that case, I can hardly object to its whole-hearted acceptance by my brethren. Moore, however, was decided after Seeger but before Welsh. I am convinced that Moore cannot survive Welsh — that if Welsh stated a prima facie case, as the Supreme Court has held, then Moore did too.1
For this reason I think that we should now follow United States v. Callison, supra, which was decided after Welsh. In Callison the appellant’s conscientious objector claim was rejected by his local board with the following statement:
“From a review of the statements in this form, you stated that your beliefs were part of your conscience, and that you did not know whether or not you believed in a Supreme Being. In no place did you state your objections to war were based on any religious training or belief. From this, the Board could only assume that yours was purely a philosophical view or moral code and not one based on religious grounds.’’ Quoted in 433 F.2d at 1026.
In claiming conscientious objector status Callison had stated in SSS Form 150, “ ‘My beliefs and my conscience makes it impossible for me to engage in the systematic killing of other human beings.’ ” He further indicated that “ T believe that I’m part of a human consciousness to which I would do immoral violence by killing people, or helping others to kill people.’ ” Quoted at Id.
On those facts we held that Callison had stated a prima facie ease under Welsh, notwithstanding the fact that his views had apparently been set forth in rather abbreviated form. On its face, Johnson’s case is no weaker than Calli-son’s, and actually is somewhat stronger in that Johnson explicitly stated that the beliefs which form the basis of his objection were formed in church as a child.
Thus, I conclude that Johnson, on the strength of Seeger and especially of Welsh, has satisfied the first half of the Mulloy test — i. e., if the facts he stated in his form 150, plus what he told the *600board at the interview, are true, he has made out a prima, facie case for having his classification reopened. I also conclude that we should look to Cailison rather than Moore for guidance. I think that' Welsh did have an effect in this area of law beyond that which resulted from the Court’s decision in Seeger, and that Cailison accurately reflects that additional impact in a way that Moore does not.
The second half of the Court’s test in Mulloy remains to be considered: Whether there is other information in the registrant’s file that “conclusively refutes” the allegations that form the basis of his prima facie case. 398 U.S. at 416, 90 S.Ct. 1766.
As I have already noted, the board did not purport to base its decision on any ground other than its opinion that Johnson’s claim was not based on religious training and belief. It made no finding that Johnson’s belief was not sincere or not deeply held. Cf. United States v. Coffey, 9 Cir., 1970, 429 K2d 401. Under Mulloy, such a finding would have no effect unless the evidence supporting it conclusively refuted Johnson’s claim. I cannot find evidence of that character in Johnson’s file. By that I do not mean that there is no evidence pointing to insincerity. There is some: the flippancy of some of the answers on the SSS Form 150, and the failure of any of his references to respond. But the timing of the application is not such evidence. The courts have universally held that a registrant’s application for conscientious objector status after he realizes that he no longer qualifies for a student deferment cannot serve as the basis for a finding of lack of sincerity. See, e. g., United States v. Bornemann, 2 Cir., 1970, 424 F.2d 1343.
The existence of such non-conclusive evidence cannot support a failure to reopen. Mulloy, quoted above, is explicit in so holding.
I would reverse.

. I commend to judges who may find themselves in my position the delightful concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson in McGrath v. Kristensen, 1950, 340 U.S. 162, 176-178, 71 S.Ct. 224, 233, 95 L.Ed. 173. Like Baron Bramwell, whom he quotes, I find that “[t]he matter does not appear to me now as it appears to have appeared to me then.”