Court Opinion

ID: 9842821
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-09-24 02:19:08.860433+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:13:54.693629
License: Public Domain

MEDINA, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I dissent and would reverse the conviction adjudging appellant .guilty of contempt for asserting his constitutional privilege and refusing to answer the questions put to him before the Grand Jury.
The basic error, as I see it, is disclosed by the attempt on the part of the District Court to induce appellant to explain in a satisfactory manner how answering the. questions would incriminate -him. *845When appellant said “I honestly feel that making a statement there might incriminate me,” the Court replied, “That won’t do.”
But the giving of a satisfactory explanation might well have been more incriminating than answers to the questions; and we have held that to require the witness “to prove the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court,” would compel the surrender of “the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee.” United States v. Doto, 2 Cir., 205 F.2d 416, 417; see also United States v. Coffey, 8 Cir., 198 F.2d 438. The protection of the Fifth Amendment would be a mere mockery if the witness could avail himself of the privilege only by demonstrating his guilt.
Thus it is to the surrounding circumstances and not to explanations by the witness that the Court must look to see whether the refusal to answer has some reasonable and credible basis. If such a scrutiny makes it highly probable that the refusal is due to mere whimsy, or scrupulosity, or reluctance to participate in the disclosure of criminality on the part of others, then the witness must answer the questions or take the consequences, even if his friends or relatives are the ones against whom prosecution seems imminent or possible.
What is the background here? Two indictments had already been handed down in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York charging Isadore Hillman and Thomas Tanner with theft of goods in interstate commerce. The indictments are not before us, but it does appear that Hillman pleaded guilty and is now serving the term of imprisonment imposed upon him by the judgment of conviction. We also know that the Gulf Trading Corp., at 220 Broadway in New York City, is involved and that there are “three other person's,” whose names have not been disclosed, against whom indictments may subsequently be found. The full record of the questions put to appellant has not been furnished but some of his answers to a few of the questions appear in the record and will be referred to shortly. The claim of the prosecution is that appellant “may have some knowledge of operations or have some knowledge of the whereabouts of Mr. Thomas Tanner.” All we know about appellant is that he comes from somewhere in Massachusetts and that he vigorously insists that answers to the questions may involve him in some charge of conspiring with Hill-man, Tanner and others in connection with the alleged theft of goods in interstate commerce or other federal crimes.
What should give us pause at the outset and is perhaps sufficient to dispose of the entire matter before us is that two of the questions put to appellant were, whether he ever used the name of Thomas Tanner, the missing, fugitive from justice, and whether, he ever used the name of James Fausto, a man connected with the purchasing department of Gulf Trading Corp. When appellant was brought before the judge for rulings on the ■ questions these two were excluded, but they had been asked and the prosecutor thought them of sufficient importance to request the judge to direct the witness to answer them. This could scarcely have failed to impress appellant with the fact that he was at least suspected of using as aliases the very names of the fugitive and a person who might well prove to be the leader of the whole group. Moreover, in accord with what we considered in United States v. Scully, 2 Cir., 225 F.2d 113, 116, to be the practice in this circuit, appellant was “advised that he had the right to refuse to answer questions on the ground of incrimination.” Furthermore, he had, been asked these same questions by an FBI agent in Boston.
Other circumstances, viewed in their relation to one another, constituted'such a pattern of suspicion, as to more than amply justify appellant’s expressed belief that answers to any of the questions might ‘ provide leads to further disclosures, the inevitable or at least the probable effect of which would have been ap*846pellant’s indictment for conspiracy or as a principal in the alleged scheme of stealing goods in the course of interstate shipment.
Thus, immediately after the question about using the name of Fausto, came another question, “Can you type?” The District Court saw no deprivation of constitutional rights in compelling appellant to answer this question. But the following letter, the authenticity of which is not disputed, makes it reasonably clear that someone whose real or assumed name was Fausto was participating in alleged illegal transactions through the instrumentality of Gulf Trading Corp. at 220 Broadway in New York City, and doing so by the use of typewritten documents. The letter follows:
“Gulf Trading Corp.,
“220 Broadway,
“New York 38, N. Y.
“December 12, 1952
“Gentlemen:
“We are in the process of planning our future requirements. Possibly, your line may fit into our general picture.
“Do you have a local representative or sales office in this area, whom we may contact for samples and further information?
“Kindly send us descriptive literature, illustrations; quantity and trade discounts; delivery time and F. O. B. point; plus any other material your (sic) may deem helpful.
“Your prompt reply would be appreciated.
“Very truly yours,
“J. D. Fausto “Purchasing Dept.
“JDF/AM”
Perhaps the government may some day claim that appellant is none other than the Fausto who signed the letter, that he typed it himself in order that no subordinate could be in a position to testify against him, and that he is in fact one of the “three other persons” the prosecutor is looking for.
But this is not all. The first question he refused to answer was whether he knew one Harry Baus. Appellant admitted that he had seen Harry Baus in 1950, but refused to go further. His objection to answering the question whether he knew Hillman who had pleaded guilty and was in jail, was also overruled. A similar question about William Cooper was held to be proper.' Immediately after the questions about Baus, Hillman and Cooper, came another question “Did you ever operate any business in New York”; and other questions related to his having registered in any trade names in New York, whether he ever had any offices at 220 Broadway, New York City, the address of Gulf Trading Corp., or at 246 Fifth Avenue, New York City, whether he ever heard of the Empire State Buying Company, which also appears to have been involved in the illegal operations, and whether he ever stayed at the Hotel Victoria in New York City.
The inference from all this is inescapable, it seems to me, that appellant may turn out to be one of the unnamed and unidentified missing men, or to have participated in some direct or remote way in the illegal scheme, and that any information provided by answers to any of the questions may complete or lead to the completion of the chain of proof against him. In that event it would of course be of no avail to appellant that the prosecutor now tells us that the investigation is not consciously aimed at appellant. Perhaps each question, standing alone and by itself, may seem innocuous. But, taken together, they fully support appellant’s claim that to answer them may incriminate him.
Despite all the hue and cry against the Fifth Amendment it still stands as one of our fundamental constitutional rights and we must be zealous to preserve it, rather than to weaken and dilute it by interpretations of doubtful validity.