Court Opinion

ID: 9564581
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:03:34.466106+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:18:32.417307
License: Public Domain

Eldridge, Judge,
dissenting.
This Court continues to tread a wrong path only recently forged in Vogleson v. State.17 The wrong created by Vogleson can be corrected. However, to do so would require quieting the roar of “Sixth Amendment Rights!” that accompanied the Vogleson decision, a din that — when improperly applied as in Vogleson — is superficial.18 Instead, I urge the employment of reason — and the law.
1. In Perez’s case, as in Vogleson, informing the jury of the statutory sentence an accomplice avoided by pleading to less than the indicted offense also informs the jury of the statutory sentence the defendant is facing under the indicted offense — if the jury convicts him. Every jury, composed of ordinary human beings, feels the pressure that accompanies its duty to convict when the evidence so demands. Such pressure can only increase with the knowledge of the statutory sentence to be imposed on a defendant — if the jury convicts him. It is for this reason, a defense attorney may want sentencing information to go before the jury, hoping to play upon emotions regardless of the facts. And it is for this same reason the statutory sentence authorized by conviction has never been permitted to go before the jury during guilt/innocence deliberation: “injection of sentence in a jury’s deliberation as to guilt or innocence is improper.”19 This is because the sentence carried by a particular crime is completely irrelevant with regard to whether a defendant actually committed the crime. Such principle of law has deep roots which the majority appears completely willing to abandon.20
Because Vogleson represents a stark abandonment of stare deci-sis, it should be overruled. In doing so, this Court should adhere to *879the Supreme Court’s decision in Hodo v. State.21 When a defendant is otherwise permitted to thoroughly explore an accomplice’s deal with the State as a motivation for testifying, the refusal to permit conjecture about specific penalties imposed or to be imposed does not amount to an abuse of the trial court’s discretion.22
2. Also, in Vogleson and now here, this Court endorses a strategy which misleads a jury into believing that the statutory sentence authorized by an indicted offense is identical to the amount of “prison time” an accomplice avoided by pleading to a lesser offense and testifying for the State. As was stated in Vogleson,
the trial court completely precluded any testimony regarding the sentence [the accomplice-witness] would have received if he had not reached a deal with the State and had been convicted of the crimes for which he was indicted. By doing so, the trial court prevented the jury from considering the most important aspect of [his] deal — how much prison time he was avoiding by agreeing to cooperate with the State.23
Vogleson held that it is proper to inform a jury on cross-examination that “the accomplice-witness ‘saved himself’ a minimum of 15 years by virtue of reaching a deal with the State.”24 And, again here, the majority reiterates this principle by holding that a defense attorney may put before the jury “the amount of prison time the co-defendant or accomplice would avoid by agreeing to cooperate with the State and testify against the defendant.”
But, this Court is well aware that the amount of prison time “saved/avoided” by Cruz’s plea cannot be known and is not the equivalent of the statutory sentence carried by the indicted offense. The State Board of Pardons & Paroles determines the amount of prison time on a sentence imposed for most offenses, including nonviolent crimes and drug offenses with “mandatory” sentences, as here and in Vogleson.25 In fact, in the vast majority of cases, the amount of actual prison time is considerably less than the sentence authorized *880by the indicted offense.26 In this case, for example, Cruz will be eligible for parole after serving five years and Perez will be eligible for parole after seven years (the same scenario as Vogleson).27 So, Cruz “saved himself” two years of prison time before the possibility of release, not the “minimum of 15 years” the specific statutory sentence — and Vogleson — would allow the jury to believe as a motivation for Cruz’s testimony.28 Obviously, the amount of prison time avoided by a plea is speculative and conjectural only.
To allow a jury to believe that the sentence authorized by the indicted offense corresponds to the amount of “prison time” an accomplice avoided by pleading to a lesser offense is completely misleading. And why this Court continues to endorse such deception is a mystery. But clearly, in these circumstances, the State should be allowed to rehabilitate such misrepresentation on redirect. Under parole guidelines in most cases, an accomplice is not facing the amount of prison time authorized by the indicted offense; he knows he is not facing such prison time; and so avoiding such prison time cannot be the “motivation” for his testimony.29 If exploring an accomplice’s “motivation” for testifying is the reason for the majority’s decision, then the accomplice’s understanding of the prison time he actually faces under the indicted offense should be put before the jury as his “motivation” — not merely the statutory sentence carried by the indicted offense. Of course, such questioning will also inform the jury that the defendant does not face the amount of prison time authorized by the indicted offense. But misrepresentation of an accomplice’s motive to *881testify clearly merits correction. Invoking the Sixth Amendment cannot legitimate misrepresentation. Indeed, to me, the correction of such misrepresentation presents a compelling and logical reason to overrule Vogleson.
Decided March 27, 2002
Reconsideration denied April 12, 2002
Martin M. del Mazo, for appellant.
Patrick H. Head, District Attorney, Andrew J. Saliba, Amelia G. Pray, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.
Again, in overruling Vogleson, we should adhere to the Supreme Court’s decision in Hodo v. State, supra. When a defendant is otherwise permitted to thoroughly explore an accomplice’s deal with the State as a motivation for testifying, the refusal to permit conjecture about specific penalties imposed or to be imposed does not amount to an abuse of the trial court’s discretion. In so finding, we establish the continuity in the law that concerns us all.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Andrews joins in this dissent.

 250 Ga. App. 555 (552 SE2d 513) (2001), cert. granted, Case No. S01C1642, February 4, 2002.

 Even the most important of our constitutional protections cam be employed in empty rhetoric.

 Vogleson v. State, supra at 564 (3) (Eldridge, J., dissenting), citing Green v. State, 206 Ga. App. 539, 541 (2) (426 SE2d 65) (1992).

 Bellamy v. State, 272 Ga. 157, 159 (4) (527 SE2d 867) (2000); Harris v. State, 234 Ga. 871, 873 (218 SE2d 583) (1975); Ford v. State, 232 Ga. 511, 518 (14) (207 SE2d 494) (1974); Moore v. State, 228 Ga. 662, 665 (5) (187 SE2d 277) (1972); accord Fletcher v. State, 197 Ga. App. 112, 113 (3) (397 SE2d 605) (1990); Lewis v. State, 158 Ga. App. 575 (281 SE2d 318) (1981); Evans v. State, 146 Ga. App. 480, 483 (2) (246 SE2d 482) (1978); Hill v. State, 144 Ga. App. 259 (2) (241 SE2d 44) (1977); Mayo v. State, 139 Ga. App. 520 (1) (229 SE2d 16) (1976).

 272 Ga. 272, 274 (4) (528 SE2d 250) (2000).

 Whitlock v. State, 239 Ga. App. 763, 765-766 (2) (521 SE2d 901) (1999); Ross v. State, 231 Ga. App. 506, 509 (3) (499 SE2d 351) (1998).

 (Emphasis supplied.) Vogleson v. State, supra at 558 (1).

 (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 562 (Ruffin, J., concurring specially).

 See Swantner v. State, 244 Ga. App. 372, 375 (2) (b) (535 SE2d 343) (2000) (OCGA § 17-10-6.1 “provides for mandatory minimum sentences and forbids pardon, parole, or first offender status for certain ‘serious violent felonies,’ but not for drug trafficking.”); see also Mann v. State, 273 Ga. 366 (541 SE2d 645) (2001); Norwood v. State, 249 Ga. App. 507 (548 SE2d 478) (2001) (specific sentencing provisions in statutory offenses prevail over mandatory sentencing provisions in recidivist statute at OCGA § 17-10-7 so that the trial *880court retains discretion to impose any sentence within the mandatory minimum and the statutory maximum range and is not bound by the recidivist statute’s mandatory provisions).

 OCGA §§ 42-9-40; 42-9-42; 42-9-45; 42-9-46; see Vargas v. Morris, 266 Ga. 141, 142 (2) (465 SE2d 275) (1996); see also Charron v. State Bd. of Pardons & Paroles, 253 Ga. 274 (319 SE2d 453) (1984) (OCGA § 42-9-46 authorizes the Parole Board to consider an inmate for parole before the inmate has served the minimum time specified in § 42-9-45).

 OCGA § 42-9-45 (b), (f).

 See OCGA §§ 17-10-6.1; 17-10-7; see also Freeman v. State, 264 Ga. 27 (440 SE2d 181) (1994); compare Hernandez v. State, 244 Ga. App. 874, 876 (537 SE2d 149) (2000) (evidence of a mandatory sentence is not error so as to demonstrate a “manifest necessity” for mistrial).

 Indeed, the Parole Board’s guidelines are often an essential part of a defendant’s decision to plead guilty. See, e.g., Swantner v. State, supra at 375-376; Crabbe v. State, 248 Ga. App. 314 (546 SE2d 65) (2001) (defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel because of erroneous advice about parole eligibility); see also Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. 580, 581-582 (1) (513 SE2d 212) (1999) (failure to advise of parole guidelines does not render guilty plea invalid); State v. Colack, 273 Ga. 361 (541 SE2d 374) (2001) (failure to inform defendant of “collateral factor” such as deportation renders counsel ineffective); Mann v. State, supra at 367 (1) (defendant rejected the plea bargain due to his trial counsel’s failure to inform him that the only sentence he could receive if convicted was life without parole). Imparting incorrect information about parole can serve as a basis for ineffective assistance of counsel, because the subsequent guilty plea based on incorrect parole information was not freely and voluntarily made. Crabbe v. State, supra; State v. Colack, supra.