Court Opinion

ID: 9565641
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 19:24:57.752654+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:19:48.565757
License: Public Domain

CLARK, J.,
Dissenting. — Participation of an undercover officer in attorney-client conferences was not under the circumstances of this case *764violative of the right to counsel protected by either the California or the federal Constitutions. But even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioners’ right to counsel was violated, dismissal of the charges is wholly inappropriate — an example of judicial overkill.
The majority’s attempt to distinguish Weatherford v. Bursey (1977) 429 U.S. 545 [51 L.Ed.2d 30, 97 S.Ct. 837] fails.
In that case, Weatherford, an undercover officer, joined Bursey in vandalizing a selective service office. To maintain his undercover status and his capability of working on other current matters in that capacity, Weatherford was arrested and charged along with Bursey. The two men retained separate counsel; however, on two occasions Bursey and his attorney invited Weatherford to confer with them so that they might obtain from him information, ideas or suggestions regarding Bursey’s upcoming trial. Weatherford accepted these invitations but did not divulge to the prosecution any information regarding Bursey’s trial plans or strategy. His identity as an undercover officer having become known shortly before trial, Weatherford was called by the prosecution and gave an eyewitness account of the crime. He did not, however, testify to anything said or done at the meetings he attended with Bursey and his attorney.
Following his conviction, Bursey sued Weatherford under 42 United States Code section 1983, alleging that Weatherford’s participation in the two meetings had deprived him of the effective assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as his right to a fair trial guaranteed by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court found for Weatherford in all respects and entered judgment accordingly. The court of appeals, without disturbing the district court’s factual findings, reversed, holding that “ ‘whenever the prosecution knowingly arranges or permits intrusion into the attorney-client relationship the right to counsel is sufficiently endangered to require reversal and a new trial.’” (429 U.S. at p. 549 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 36].) The judgment of the court of appeals was reversed by the high court.
Because the United States Supreme Court expressly rejected the court of appeals’ per se rule, it is important to recognize that the majority of this court today adopt the veiy rule repudiated by the high court. To reiterate, the court of appeals held that “ ‘whenever the prosecution knowingly arranges or permits intrusion into the attorney-client relation*765ship the right to counsel is sufficiently endangered to require reversal and a new trial.’” (429 U.S. at p. 549 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 36].) This court’s majority here hold; “The right under California law to communicate privately with counsel was violated when a government agent in an undercover capacity was present at confidential-attorney client meetings.” (Ante, p. 755; see also p. 752.) For both the court of appeals and the majority of this court it is immaterial that the intrusion occurred in order to maintain the officer’s undercover status and his ability to work on other pending matters in that capacity, and that the prosecution was not informed of anything the officer learned at the attorney-client conferences. The position taken by the majority of this court is actually far more extreme than that taken by the court of appeals, for the federal court reversed and remanded for a new trial whereas the unprecedented remedy fashioned by this court’s majority is outright dismissal of the charges.
The United States Supreme Court refused to adopt a per se rule because “it would require the informant to refuse to participate in attorney-client meetings, even though invited, and thus for all practical purposes to unmask himself. Our cases, however, have recognized the unfortunate necessity of undercover work and the value it often is to effective law enforcement. [Citations.] We have also recognized the desirability and legality of continued secrecy even after arrest. [Citation.] We have no general oversight authority with respect to state police investigations. We may disapprove an investigatory practice only if it violates the Constitution; and judged in this light, the Court of Appeals’ per se rule cuts much too broadly. If, for example, Weatherford at Bursey’s invitation had attended a meeting between Bursey and Wise [Bursey’s attorney] but Wise had become suspicious and the conversation was confined to the weather or other harmless subjects, the Court of Appeals’ rule, literally read, would cloud Bursey’s subsequent conviction, although there had been no constitutional violation. The same would have been true if Wise had merely asked whether Weatherford was an informant, Weatherford had denied it, and the meeting had then ended; likewise if the entire conversation had consisted of Wise’s questions and Weatherford’s answers about Weatherford’s own defense plans. Also, and more cogently for present purposes, unless Weatherford communicated the substance of the Bursey-Wise conversations and thereby created at least a realistic possibility of injury to Bursey or benefit to the State, there can be no Sixth Amendment violation. Yet under the Court of Appeals’ rule Bursey’s conviction would have been set aside on appeal.” (429 U.S. at pp. 557-558 [51 L.Ed.2d atp. 41].)
*766In these hypothetical situations the rule adopted by this court today would, of course, lead to an even more absurd result — not mere reversal but dismissal of the charges.
The appropriate standard for reviewing claims of this sort can be ascertained from the high court’s following statement: “Had Weatherford testified at Bursey’s trial as to the conversation between Bursey and Wise; had any of the State’s evidence originated in these conversations; had those overheard conversations been used in any other way to the substantial detriment of Bursey; or even had the prosecution learned from Weatherford . . . the details of the Bursey-Wise conversations about trial preparations, Bursey would have a much stronger case.” (429 U.S. at p. 554 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 39].) The absence of any of these elements led the high court to conclude Bursey’s right to counsel had not been violated, and for the same reason there has been no .violation here. Defense counsel conceded and the trial court expressly found that the prosecution has not heretofore learned anything from Officer Lee, either directly or indirectly, concerning defense tactics or strategy. Moreover, the parties stipulated that “the People may not use any evidence obtained by Mr. Lee or that was derived from his presence at any meetings between counsel, either previous counsel, present counsel or future counsel, if such be the case, nor the fruits thereof may not be used in evidence, and that they may not in rebuttal to any evidence put forth by the defendants, use any evidence whatsoever unless the prosecution can first prove beyond a reasonable doubt that such evidence was obtained independently of the activities of Mr. Lee.”
The majority seek to distinguish Weatherford on several grounds, the first being that Weatherford retained separate counsel and attended the conferences with Bursey and his attorney at their request. (Ante, p. 755.) However, the significant point is that Weatherford attended the attorney-client conferences, not to spy, but to maintain his undercover status so that he might continue to work on pending matters in that capacity. (429 U.S. at p. 557 [51 L.Ed.2d at p. 41].) This case is indistinguishable in that respect. Officer Lee and his superiors all testified that he had initially undertaken this undercover investigation to determine whether petitioners planned to commit acts of violence during their demonstration against the Pacific Gas and Electric Diablo Canyon nuclear power plant or had been infiltrated by groups, e.g., the New World Liberation Front, planning violence. They further testified the officer maintained his “cover” when arrested, not to obtain information regarding petitioners’ trial preparations, but to continue his investigation concerning future *767demonstrations against the nuclear facility planned by petitioners. Had Officer Lee retained separate counsel he would have risked his “cover” for the other 40 demonstrators had agreed upon joint representation. He would have estranged himself from the group whose planned future demonstrations he was supposed to investigate.
Another purported distinction: “Weatherford communicated no information about the defense to his superiors. However, in the present case Officer Lee told his superiors that there was to be a ‘political’ defense and that the defendants would attempt to postpone the trial.” (Ante, p. 755.)
This business of the “political defense” is a red herring. The important point is that the prosecution did not learn anything from Officer Lee, either directly or indirectly, concerning defense tactics or strategy. Petitioners’ counsel so conceded, and the trial court so found. Indeed, we know nothing about the so-called “political defense” other than that Officer Lee used this perjorative term to refer to what he perceived as petitioners’ delaying tactics, and that Officer Lee may have mentioned this matter to his immediate superior, Detective Doug Mansfield, in explaining why he (Lee) at one time felt he should disassociate himself from petitioners by entering a separate plea of nolo contendere. Detective Mansfield did not recall any such conversation. Mansfield testified, however, that he did not divulge to the prosecution anything he learned of Lee’s conversations with defense counsel, and Lee testified he did not mention the matter of the “political defense” to anyone but Mansfield. Moreover, the majority’s decision does not turn on this point. Had Lee said nothing to Mansfield concerning the “political defense,” indeed, had Lee himself never heard of the defense, the majority would still dismiss the charges against petitioners, for Lee’s mere presence at the attorney-client conferences would trigger the per se rule announced today.
Finally, the majority seek to distinguish Weatherford on the ground Bursey’s defense was not prejudiced, while there is evidence here that since the disclosure of Officer Lee’s undercover role, petitioners have become reluctant to speak out at defense meetings, fearing that there may be other undisclosed undercover agents still among them. (Ante, pp. 749-750, 755.) This point need not long detain us, for even petitioners’ counsel labeled this alleged fear as “paranoia.” Moreover, as the People point out: “It is important to note that the instant case is still in the pretrial stage, and many options are therefore available. For example; the court could order that all undercover officers must be disclosed or removed. The heads of the local police agencies could be placed under oath and *768could testify that no undercover agents are being or will be used to infiltrate petitioners’ meetings with counsel. If petitioners are dissatisfied with the handling of the defense they can retain or receive separate counsel to represent them individually or in smaller groups. All these and other remedies are available to cure any alleged ‘fears’ on the part of petitioners.”
In conclusion, this case is simply not distinguishable from Weatherford. Applying the criteria articulated in that case reveals that petitioners’ right to counsel has not been infringed. But, perhaps even more significantly, had there been a violation of the right to counsel in Weatherford, the high court, unlike the majority of this court, would not have invoked the remedy of outright dismissal of the charges. As the Court of Appeal recently observed in Wilson v. Superior Court (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 751, 758 [139 Cal.Rptr. 61]: “Federal courts which have considered the issue have not required automatic dismissal of criminal charges when the confidentiality of a defendant’s relationship with his attorney has been breached. Rather where the issue was raised on a post-conviction appeal it has been held that the conviction must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial at which the prosecution would not be permitted to make use of the illegally obtained evidence or its fruits. (O’Brien v. United States, 386 U.S. 345 [18 L.Ed.2d 94, 87 S.Ct. 1158]; Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 307-308 [17 L.Ed.2d 374, 384-385, 87 S.Ct. 408]; Black v. United States, 385 U.S. 26, 28-29 [17 L.Ed.2d 26, 28-29, 87 S.Ct. 190]; Caldwell v. United States, 205 F.2d 879, 881; Coplon v. United States, 191 F.2d 749, 760 [89 App.D.C. 103].)”
Their failure to distinguish Weatherford appears to have been recognized by the majority for they ultimately shift ground from the federal to the California Constitution, as has been their practice recently. (See, e.g., People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 [148 Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748]; People v. Hannon (1977) 19 Cal.3d 588 [138 Cal.Rptr. 885, 564 P.2d 1203]; Allen v. Superior Court (1976) 18 Cal.3d 520 [134 Cal.Rptr. 774, 557 P.2d 65]; People v. Maher (1976) 17 Cal.3d 196 [130 Cal.Rptr. 508, 550 P.2d 1044]; People v. Disbrow (1976) 16 Cal.3d 101 [127 Cal.Rptr. 360, 545 P.2d 272]; People v. Longwill (1975) 14 Cal.3d 943 [123 Cal.Rptr. 297, 538 P.2d 753]; People v. Norman (1975) 14 Cal.3d 929 [123 Cal.Rptr. 109, 538 P.2d 237]; Gee v. Brown (1975) 14 Cal.3d 571 [122 Cal.Rptr. 231, 536 P.2d 1017]; People v. Brisendine (1975) 13 Cal.3d 528 [119 Cal.Rptr. 315, 531 P.2d 1099].)
The writ should be denied.