Court Opinion

ID: 9781139
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-30 16:14:05.09939+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:34:18.266475
License: Public Domain

HUNSTEIN, Chief Justice,
dissenting.
Because the defendant was denied his constitutional right to be present during the in-chambers conference at which the State presented the similar transaction evidence that it intended to introduce at trial, I would reverse and remand for a new trial.
While the Court of Appeals has adopted the majority opinion’s remedy of remanding for a pre-trial hearing on similar transaction evidence after a jury has convicted the defendant, this resolution makes meaningless the requirement that the trial court rule on the admissibility of the evidence prior to the jury hearing it. See Williams v. State, 261 Ga. 640 (2) (409 SE2d 649) (1991). Holding a post-conviction pre-trial hearing is an oxymoron and fails to afford the necessary due process. “The purpose of the notice requirement contained in USCR 31.3 is to provide a criminal defendant adequate notice of the State’s intent to use similar transactions to enable the defendant to resolve questions regarding admissibility of such evidence before trial.” Brown v. State, 307 Ga. App. 99, 102 (2) (704 SE2d 227) (2010) (Citation and punctuation omitted). If the rationale for a pre-trial hearing on similar transaction evidence is to enable defendants to adequately prepare for trial, there is little use in giving them notice and the opportunity to be heard on the evidence after *811the jury has returned its verdict.
Unlike the majority, I believe the trial court held a Williams hearing during the off-the-record, in-chambers discussion. At this conference, the State presented the similar transaction evidence that it intended to introduce at trial, and Moore’s attorney objected to the trial court’s ruling on its admissibility. It is undisputed that Moore was not present at this hearing. The Court of Appeals has concluded that a prosecutor’s statement in his or her place about the relevant facts the State expects to show at trial is sufficient to satisfy the requirements of a pre-trial hearing on similar transaction evidence. See, e.g., McCann v. State, 203 Ga. App. 880 (1) (418 SE2d 144) (1992) (relying on prosecutor’s statement of what he expected to show at trial to uphold trial court’s finding of sufficient similarity).
Under our Appellate Practice Act, which must be liberally construed, we have a responsibility to “carefully examine the appellate record to understand better the trial court errors an appealing party is holding up to appellate scrutiny,” Felix v. State, 271 Ga. 534, 538 (523 SE2d 1) (1999). Proceeding pro se in this appeal, Moore contends that the trial court erred in failing to hold the required hearing on the admissibility of evidence, allowing the jury to hear arguments by the prosecutor about the similar transaction, and admitting the similar transaction into evidence without meeting the requirements of Williams. In support, he argues that the trial court’s failure to hold a hearing was a violation of due process. The State construes this enumeration as alleging that the trial court erred in admitting the similar transaction evidence and having a discussion in chambers when Moore was not present. Like the State, I construe Moore’s stated objections to encompass the argument that he had a right to be present during the discussion on the similar transaction evidence.
The Georgia Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant the right to be personally present at every stage of the proceedings against him. 1983 Ga. Const., Art. I, Sec. I, Par. XII; Tiller v. State, 96 Ga. 430 (1) (23 SE 825) (1895). This right is based on due process of law and attaches at every critical stage of a criminal trial where the defendant’s presence is necessary to contribute to the fairness of the proceedings. See Huff v. State, 274 Ga. 110 (2) (549 SE2d 370) (2001). Unless the defendant waives his right to be present or acquiesces to his absence, Brooks v. State, 271 Ga. 456, 457 (2) (519 SE2d 907) (1999), we have consistently found that the claim is not subject to a harmless error analysis on direct appeal. Holsey v. State, 271 Ga. 856, 860-861 (5) & n. 11 (524 SE2d 473) (1999) (listing cases).
We have determined that a “critical stage” in a criminal proceeding is one in which the “‘defendant’s rights may be lost, *812defenses waived, privileges claimed or waived,’ ” or the outcome of the case may be substantially affected. Huff v. State, 274 Ga. at 111 (quoting Ballard v. Smith, 225 Ga. 416, 418 (2) (169 SE2d 329) (1969)). Thus, we have concluded that the defendant’s right to be present attaches to the following critical stages of a trial: jury selection, presentation of evidence, hearing on a motion to disqualify defense counsel, closing arguments, substantive communications with jurors, and resentencing. See, e.g., Fair v. State, 288 Ga. 244 (3) (702 SE2d 420) (2010) (evidentiary hearing on motion to disqualify co-defendant’s attorneys); Dawson v. State, 283 Ga. 315 (5) (658 SE2d 755) (2008) (presentation of testimony to the jury); Shaheed v. State, 274 Ga. 716 (559 SE2d 466) (2002) (amendment of sentence imposing harsher punishment); Brooks, 271 Ga. at 456-457 (striking of jurors); Hanifa v. State, 269 Ga. 797 (6) (505 SE2d 731) (1998) (colloquy between the trial judge and jury); Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 73, 75-78 (90 SE2d 557) (1955) (solicitor-general’s argument to the jury). Similarly, I would hold that the hearing to determine the admissibility of similar transaction evidence under Williams is a critical stage of a trial proceeding. Cf. McClarity v. State, 234 Ga. App. 348 (4) (506 SE2d 392) (1998) (defendant’s presence is required at the similar transactions hearing because it is either an evidentiary matter or involves an evidentiary question).
In this case, Moore’s right to be present was violated because there was a reasonably substantial relationship between Moore’s presence during the in-chambers discussion and his ability to defend against the charges. The similar transaction evidence involved a death that Moore contended was an accident as a result of his overzealous attempt to resuscitate a man who had stopped breathing while under his care. A comparison of the independent act with the crimes charged involved facts that were within his personal knowledge and to which he could make a meaningful contribution. Moore was an active partner in his defense. He identified five persons, including three connected to Littrell’s death, that he wanted called as witnesses; engaged in discussions conducted outside the jury’s presence; requested that his trial and appellate counsel ask specific questions of witnesses; and elected to represent himself on appeal “to get the truth on the record.”
Given Moore’s right to participate in his own defense and the prejudicial effect of the independent act evidence to his defense against the charges for which he was standing trial, I would conclude that his presence during the in-chambers conference was necessary to contribute to the fairness of the proceeding. Because his exclusion from the discussion on the admissibility of the similar transaction evidence violated his constitutional right to be present at a critical *813stage of his trial and he did not waive his right to be present, I would reverse.
Decided March 23, 2012
Reconsideration denied April 11, 2012.
Calvin Moore, pro se.
C. Paul Bowden, District Attorney, Samuel S. Olens, Attorney General, Paula K. Smith, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Sara K. Sahni, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
I am authorized to state that Justice Benham concurs in this dissent.