Court Opinion

ID: 9702275
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 23:04:38.55842+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:21:36.118366
License: Public Domain

REILLY, Senior Judge,
dissenting:
Notwithstanding the lucid analysis of the evidence in the majority opinion, I am unable to agree with its conclusion for it seems to rest on a misapplication of the rules relating to the propriety of summary judgment. I do not question that the essence of Super.Ct.Civ.R. 56 is correctly summarized by my colleagues in their statement that:
Summary judgment is properly granted only when the pleadings and other materials on file demonstrate that no genuine issue of material fact remains for trial and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
But what appellants cite here and in the motions court as raising a genuine issue of material fact is evidence already received at the trial, not something that “remains for trial.” Granted the “facts” recited in the testimony of one of the appellants, Mrs. Cassidy, were certainly disputed by other witnesses, the question before the motions *257court was a simple one, viz.: assuming the Cassidy testimony was true, were the facts established thereby material in view of a record showing that at no time did Cassidy or any of the other appellants make a tender of the undisputed sum due the holder of the mortgage note — the unpaid balance mentioned in the foreclosure notice. This was precisely the point that the principal appellee argued in moving for summary judgment. The motions court in granting the motion “for the reasons argued by Mr. Luchs [counsel for the defendant bank]” clearly considered this question and decided that it was not.
Hence, the only issue before us on appeal is not whether the bank “did in fact, send Cassidy a statement, misrepresenting the pay-off costs” — a matter on which there was a sharp conflict of testimony — but whether the court after accepting the foregoing as a fact, erred in holding it immaterial. The majority apparently would have arrived at a contrary holding in view of its willingness to entertain the belated argument that the bank was estopped by the conduct of its agents from raising the tender issue, but then goes on to recognize that even if there had been a misrepresentation, it was necessary also for appellants to prove reasonable reliance upon it by the party invoking the doctrine of estoppel. As the majority noted:
One who claims the benefits of an es-toppel on the ground that he has been misled by the representations of another must not have been misled through his own want of reasonable care and circumspection. A lack of diligence by a party claiming an estoppel is generally fatal. If the party conducts himself with careless indifference to means of information reasonably at hand, or ignores highly suspicious circumstances, he may not invoke the doctrine of estoppel.
28 AMJuR.2d Estoppel and Waiver § 80, at 721 (1966) (footnotes omitted).
After making this point, the majority observes that because the reasonableness of an asserted reliance is a question of fact, disposition by summary judgment is “generally inappropriate ...” and that “courts in assessing claims of equitable estoppel may take into account subjective factors such as the relative lack of knowledge and experience of a party, and the good faith of the reliance.”
While these foregoing observations have some validity, the majority in applying them to this case makes an assertion lacking in record support: “No evidence pertaining to these factors was presented at the hearing on the preliminary injunction.”
But one of the findings of Judge Bacon, who presided at that hearing, reveals that both parties in their testimonial presentation drew such factors to her attention. She found, inter alia, that:
Plaintiffs have some knowledge of real estate matters, and, accordingly, their contention that they had been given incorrect figures with respect to the balance due to stop the foreclosure proceedings with respect to 2260 Mount View Place, S.E. which took place in October 1982 is not persuasive as justification for their failure to make payments on the promissory note when due.
Before preparing the written findings and order, the court, from the bench in explaining her reasons for denying injunc-tive relief said:
The court specifically finds in this case that plaintiffs do not establish sufficient likelihood of success on the merits to entitle them to preliminary relief. Obviously, the persons who are before the court have some knowledge and understanding of real estate matters; during the course of these events they had a person by the name of Mr. Sama or Sarma dealing on behalf of them. They are seeking out Mr. Berlin’s services. In the course of this litigation they elected to proceed on a buy-in having sought some type of advice with regard to doing that.
Thus, by the time the motions court (Judge Murphy) conducted the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, the question of good faith reliance cited by appellants in their opposition to summary judgment as presenting a genuine issue of material fact had already been decided ad*258versely to them by the judge, who had heard all the testimony bearing on this question. As appellants offered nothing at the hearing before Judge Murphy except the transcript of evidence in the preliminary injunction proceedings to show that a genuine issue of material fact remained undetermined, it was certainly no error for Judge Murphy to defer to Judge Bacon’s finding on this point, irrespective of whether he was bound by such finding under the law of the case doctrine.1
Accordingly, I submit that the order granting summary judgment should be affirmed.

. Cf. United States v. Dockery, 294 A.2d 158 (D.C.1972); Jenkins v. United States, 284 A.2d 460 (D.C. 1971).