Court Opinion

ID: 9764207
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-29 03:14:45.210597+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T07:29:54.740628
License: Public Domain

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
I dissent to the majority’s resolution of points of error complaining of the admission of extraneous offenses in this cause. The majority concludes that evidence that appellant was driving a stolen car was admissible as “contextual evidence.” Op. at 571. The majority relies primarily on Mayes v. State, 816 S.W.2d 79 (Tex.Cr.App. 1991). Op. at 570 & 571-572, n. 8. Mayes expressly holds that “evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts,” Tex.R.Cr.Evid., Rule 404(b), is not admissible if the only theory the State can articulate for its admissibility is that it provides “background” of the charged offense. Whether “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” may be proven simply because they occurred during the “same transaction,” and thus constitute “context” of the offense, is a question left open by Mayes —not resolved by it, as the majority opinion in this cause implies. Op. at 571. Under the new Rules of Criminal Evidence, more is required.1
To be admissible for some “purpose” other than one of those delineated in Rule 404(b) itself, evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” must have some relevance to an issue in the case. Tex.R.Cr.Evid., Rule 402. That is to say, it must have some “tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Tex.R.Cr.Evid., Rule 401. Simply to observe that an extraneous offense is “contextual” is not sufficient to establish it has relevance apart from its character conformity value. And where evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” has only character conformity value, “the balancing otherwise required by [Tex.R.Cr.Evid.,] Rule 403 is obviated, the rulemakers having deemed that the probativeness of such evidence is so slight as to be ‘substantially outweighed’ by the danger of unfair prejudice as a matter of law.” Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, at 387 (Tex.Cr.App. 1991) (Opinion on rehearing on Court’s own motion).
Apart from proclaiming “context,” the majority does not identify any fact of consequence that evidence that the car was stolen makes more or less probable. Nor does the majority explain how evidence is “relevant” under Rule 401 just because it is (if it is, which is doubtful) “indivisibly connected to” the charged offense.2 Op. at *576571. It certainly is not self evident to me that the jury could not readily have understood what transpired in the hotel room between appellant and Officer Hulsey without knowing the car was stolen. In fact, I cannot imagine how that knowledge could have impacted the jury’s deliberation of the material issues in this case one way or the other. Neither could the prosecutor, judging from his complete inability to identify a single fact of consequence the offense was relevant to prove. Op. at 570, n. 4. It appears the extraneous offense had no more purpose than to prejudice appellant unfairly by showing his general propensity to crime. It no more contributed to proving a consequential fact than did those we held were erroneously admitted in Christopher v. State, 833 S.W.2d 526 (Tex.Cr.App. 1992).
I cannot say beyond a reasonable doubt that, especially taken together with the evidence of the robbery in Baton Rouge and the burglary during which the gun was stolen, which the majority acknowledges was admitted in error, evidence of the stolen car made no contribution to the verdict. Tex.R.App.Pro., Rule 81(b)(2). Therefore I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand the cause for new trial. Because the majority does not, I respectfully dissent.

. All decisions cited as authority by the majority other than Mayes were prosecuted prior to the effective date of the new rules.

. It is unclear to me why the majority believes the car was stolen as part of the “same transaction” as the shooting of Officer Hulsey in the hotel room. I would not think so. Thus, even assuming, as the majority mistakenly believes, that Mayes did hold that "same transaction” misconduct will always be admissible under Rule 404(b), supra, I do not see how that would render the offense here admissible.