Court Opinion

ID: 9622053
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:11:33.228551+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:05:12.789177
License: Public Domain

BRYANT, Judge,
concurring in the result.
Because In re Civil Penalty requires the result reached in the majority opinion, I concur in the result. 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (“Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher court.”). However, I write separately to express my concern that requiring chemical analyses of substances which are readily identifiable by visual inspection goes beyond what our General Statutes require.
The majority opinion relies on language from State v. Ward that “controlled substances defined in terms of their chemical composition can only be identified through the use of a chemical analysis rather than through the use of lay testimony based on visual inspection.” - N.C. App. -, -, 681 S.E.2d 354, 371, disc. review granted, 363 N.C. 662, 686 S.E.2d 153 (2009). Our decision in Ward was characterized as an extension of the “logic utilized by Judge Steelman in dissent with the subsequent approval of the Supreme Court” in State v. Llamas-Hernandez, 189 N.C. App. 640, 659 S.E.2d 79 (2008), rev’d, 363 N.C. 8, 673 S.E.2d 658 (2009). Id. However, T believe Ward actually went beyond the result suggested by Judge Steelman’s dissent in that case. Llamas-Hernandez concerned visual identification of a non-descript white powder as cocaine. 189 N.C. *362App. at 646, 659 S.E.2d at 83. Judge Steelman’s dissent specifically distinguished visual identification of such common, non-descript substances from more distinctive controlled substances, noting: “Crack cocaine has a distinctive color, texture, and appearance. While it might be permissible, based upon these characteristics, for an officer to render a lay opinion as to crack cocaine, it cannot be permissible to render such an opinion as to a non-descript white powder.” Id. at 654, 659 S.E.2d at 87 (distinguishing State v. Freeman, 185 N.C. App. 408, 648 S.E.2d 876 (2007)). Despite this distinction in Llamas-Hernandez, in Ward, as in the instant case, we found error where the trial court allowed testimony from an expert chemist that pharmaceutical pills stamped with identifying markings were controlled substances. Ward, -N.C. App. at-, 681 S.E.2d at 371-73. Thus, I believe Ward extended beyond the logic of the dissent in Llamas-Hernandez. In this light, I note that the North Carolina Supreme Court granted discretionary review in Ward, and, therefore, we may have additional guidance on this issue in the near future.