Court Opinion

ID: 9898795
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-15 07:09:55.845738+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:17:55.392897
License: Public Domain

AFFIRM in part and REVERSE and REMAND in part; and Opinion Filed
November 9, 2023

                                         S In The
                                     Court of Appeals
                              Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                     No. 05-22-00820-CV

                         17714 BANNISTER, Appellant
                                    V.
                  TAS ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES LP, Appellee

                    On Appeal from the 429th Judicial District Court
                                 Collin County, Texas
                        Trial Court Cause No. 429-04496-2020

                              MEMORANDUM OPINION
                         Before Justices Carlyle, Smith, and Kennedy
                                  Opinion by Justice Smith
         In this appeal, 17714 Bannister challenges the trial court’s dismissal of its

breach of contract, negligence, nuisance, and trespass claims against appellee TAS

Environmental Services, L.P. (TAS). 17714 Bannister raises two issues, contending

the trial court erred in dismissing the claims based on either special exceptions or a

Rule 91a1 motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, we affirm in part, reverse

in part, and remand for further proceedings.

   1
       TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.
                                    Background

      In its original petition, 17714 Bannister alleged that it leased office,

warehouse, and yard space at 17714 Bannister Street in Dallas, Texas (the premises)

to TAS beginning in August 2005. The lease was extended several times; TAS

ultimately vacated the premises in March 2018. According to the petition, 17714

Bannister discovered that TAS stored hazardous materials on the premises, those

materials leaked onto soil, carpet, and sheetrock, and the premises required extensive

remediation. 17714 Bannister asserted claims against TAS for breach of contract

and negligence. 17714 Bannister thereafter filed a first amended petition, which

alleged the same operative facts and claims.

      TAS filed special exceptions. In the only special exception relevant to this

appeal, TAS asserted that 17714 Bannister was an assumed name for Dallascape,

Inc., a company owned by Anthony Martellotto. Dallascape’s assumed name

certificate had expired while the case was pending; therefore, TAS argued,

Dallascape lacked capacity or legal authority to file suit as 17714 Bannister. TAS

also contended that property records showed the premises was owned by Meredith

Branstetter, trustee of the Bannister Trust. Following a hearing, the trial court

granted the special exception and ordered that, within fourteen days, the petition be

amended to include the plaintiff’s correct legal name and facts establishing its

                                         –2–
capacity to sue. The order cautioned that the court would dismiss the lawsuit if the

plaintiff failed or refused to timely amend and cure the defect.

      17714 Bannister timely filed a second amended petition in response to the trial

court’s order. The petition identified Branstetter, trustee of the Bannister Trust d/b/a

17714 Bannister, as plaintiff and landlord and alleged that TAS leased the premises

from the Bannister Trust, which conducted business under its informal common

name of 17714 Bannister.

      Approximately two months later, Branstetter, as trustee of the Bannister Trust

d/b/a 17714 Bannister, filed a third amended petition. The petition added allegations

that the premises was conveyed to the trust on March 29, 2006, and, as of that date,

the trust was landlord of the premises, was identified in the lease as 17714 Bannister,

and did business as 17714 Bannister.

      A fourth amended petition was filed almost three months later. It named as

plaintiffs: Branstetter, as trustee of (1) the Bannister Trust d/b/a 17714 Bannister,

(2) the Sender Living Trust d/b/a 17714 Bannister, (3) the O’Malley Living Trust

d/b/a 17714 Bannister, and (4) the Blair Living Trust d/b/a 17714 Bannister; and

Dallascape d/b/a 17714 Bannister.         The petition alleged that the trusts and

Dallascape conducted business under the informal common name 17714 Bannister.

A copy of the lease agreement attached to the fourth amended petition shows that

TAS entered into the lease with 17714 Bannister. The petition further alleged that,

beginning January 2001, Martellotto leased the premises to Dallascape d/b/a 17714

                                          –3–
Bannister. Beginning August 2005, TAS leased the premises. On March 29, 2006,

two of the three tracts that comprised the premises were conveyed to the Bannister

Trust, and Martellotto assigned his role as landlord to the Bannister Trust. Also on

March 29, 2006, two parcels of property, which together constituted a third tract of

the premises, were conveyed to the Sender Living Trust and the O’Malley Living

Trust and another tract adjacent to the premises was conveyed to the Blair Living

Trust.     The fourth amended petition also added new claims against TAS for

negligence per se, trespass, and nuisance.

         TAS, asserting that plaintiffs remained unable to identify which entity had

entered into the lease agreement, filed a motion to dismiss, motion to strike, and

second special exceptions. In response, 17714 Bannister filed a fifth amended

petition. That petition alleges that the previously-named trusts, two new trusts (the

Collin Living Trust d/b/a 17714 Bannister and the Kelly II Living Trust d/b/a 17714

Bannister), and Dallascape d/b/a 17714 Bannister operated a joint venture called

17714 Bannister at all times relevant to the lawsuit. 17714 Bannister, the joint

venture, is the only named plaintiff in the fifth amended petition.

         TAS amended its motion to dismiss, motion to strike, and second special

exceptions. TAS moved to dismiss the lawsuit in its entirety (or, alternatively, that

17714 Bannister’s claims be stricken) based on 17714 Bannister’s failure to comply

with the court’s special exceptions order. TAS also sought dismissal under Rule 91a

and a second special exceptions, arguing that the claims against it were barred by

                                         –4–
limitations, lack of privity, and lack of standing. On July 29, 2022, the trial court

signed an order granting the motion and dismissing with prejudice all claims asserted

against TAS.

      This appeal followed. It is unclear from the trial court’s order whether its

dismissal of 17714 Bannister’s claims was based on its special exceptions order,

Rule 91a, and/or TAS’s second special exceptions. In two issues, 17714 Bannister

asserts the trial court erred in dismissing its claims on each ground.

                             Special Exceptions Order

      In its first issue, 17714 Bannister contends that the trial court abused its

discretion to the extent it dismissed 17714 Bannister’s claims for failure to comply

with the special exceptions order. 17714 Bannister asserts that it timely and

adequately complied with the order and subsequently clarified its status as a joint

venture.

      A pleading must provide fair notice of the claim and relief sought such that

the opposing party can prepare a defense. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 45, 47; Thomas v. 462

Thomas Fam. Props., LP, 559 S.W.3d 634, 639 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet.

denied). The opposing party must be able to “ascertain from the pleading the nature

of the controversy, its basic issues, and the type of evidence that might be relevant.”

J.G. v. Jones, 660 S.W.3d 786, 789 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, pet. denied); Thomas,

559 S.W.3d at 639–40.

                                         –5–
      An opposing party may challenge the sufficiency of a pleading by special

exceptions. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91; Gatten v. McCarley, 391 S.W.3d 669, 673 (Tex.

App.—Dallas 2013, no pet.). The purpose of special exceptions is to compel

clarification of pleadings that are not sufficiently specific or fail to plead a cause of

action. J.G., 660 S.W.3d at 789. “If a trial court grants special exceptions, the

pleader may either amend [its] petition to cure the defect or stand on the pleadings

and test the decision on appeal.” Id. (citing Doe v. Univ. of the Incarnate Word, No.

04-19-00453-CV, 2020 WL 3260080, at *1 (Tex. App.—San Antonio June 17,

2020, no pet.) (mem. op.)).

      Before a trial court may dismiss a plaintiff’s case for pleading defects it must

afford the plaintiff an opportunity to amend and cure the defects. Id. (citing

Humphreys v. Meadows, 938 S.W.2d 750, 753 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1996, writ

denied)); cf. Baylor Univ. v. Sonnichsen, 221 S.W.3d 632, 635 (Tex. 2007) (“when

the trial court sustains special exceptions, it must give the pleader an opportunity to

amend the pleading, unless the pleading defect is of a type that amendment cannot

cure”). If the plaintiff makes a good faith attempt to amend its petition in response

to an order granting special exceptions, the trial court may not dismiss the amended

petition unless the defendant files special exceptions to the amended petition, the

court sustains the new special exceptions, and the court gives the plaintiff the

opportunity to amend the amended petition.            J.G., 660 S.W.3d at 789–90;

Humphreys, 938 S.W.2d at 753. We review the trial court’s decision to dismiss for

                                          –6–
insufficient pleadings under an abuse of discretion standard. J.G., 660 S.W.3d at

789; Gatten, 391 S.W.3d at 673.

        Citing Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 28, TAS’s special exceptions

complained that 17714 Bannister lacked capacity to sue. Rule 28 provides that an

entity doing business under an assumed name may sue in its assumed or common

name, but the entity’s correct legal name may be substituted on motion by any party

or on the trial court’s own motion. TEX. R. CIV. P. 28. An entity’s correct legal

name must be substituted before judgment. Sixth RMA Partners, L.P. v. Sibley, 111

S.W.3d 46, 53 (Tex. 2003). TAS argued that 17714 Bannister was an assumed name

for Dallascape, but Dallascape’s assumed name certificate had expired while this

lawsuit was pending.2 Further, property tax records reflected that Branstetter, as

trustee of the Bannister Trust, owned the premises.

        In response to TAS’s special exceptions and the trial court’s order, 17714

Bannister timely amended its pleading to identify itself as Branstetter, trustee of the

Bannister Trust d/b/a 17714 Bannister and alleged that the trust was the landlord of

the premises. The amendment did not correctly identify 17714 Bannister.3 We

    2
      An entity’s failure to file an assumed name certificate does not prevent it from initiating an action in
court arising out of a contract or act in which an assumed name was used, but the entity may not maintain
the action until an original, new, or renewed certificate has been filed. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
71.201(a).
    3
        TAS argues that there was no excuse for 17714 Bannister’s failure to correctly identify itself when,
as it subsequently alleged, it had operated as a joint venture and landlord since March 2006. We understand
TAS’s frustration with the fact that 17714 Bannister provided the correct identification only after multiple
amendments. Our rules, though, allow a plaintiff to freely amend its petition, see TEX. R. CIV. P. 63, and
17714 Bannister did so to provide its correct legal name and information regarding its capacity to sue.
                                                    –7–
nevertheless conclude that 17714 Bannister, although incorrectly identifying itself

as only one of the joint venturers that owned a portion of the premises, made a good

faith attempt at the time to amend its pleadings to comply with the trial court’s order.

TAS did not file special exceptions challenging the second amended petition, and

17714 Bannister then amended its petition further to identify its correct legal name

and show its capacity to sue. Accordingly, to the extent the trial court dismissed

17714 Bannister’s claims for failure to comply with its special exception order, we

conclude that the trial court abused its discretion. See, e.g., J.G., 660 S.W.3d at 791–

92. We sustain 17714 Bannister’s first issue.

                          Rule 91a and Second Special Exceptions

        TAS sought a Rule 91a dismissal of 17714 Bannister’s claims on the grounds

that (1) all of the claims were barred by the statute of limitations, (2) the breach of

contract claims fail for lack of privity, and (3) Dallascape lacked standing to sue for

injury to the premises.4 TAS’s second special exceptions also sought dismissal of

the breach of contract and negligence claims because the fifth amended petition

    4
       TAS’s amended motion primarily addressed claims asserted by “new plaintiffs,” referring to the trusts
added as plaintiffs in the fourth amended complaint and Dallascape, which it asserts was omitted from the
second amended petition, but appeared again in the fourth amended petition. The argument appears to rest
on TAS’s assumption that Dallascape, which held an assumed name certificate for 17714 Bannister
beginning in 2001, had to be the named plaintiff in the original petition. However, the fact that Dallascape
held an assumed name certificate and conducted business (including actively managing the joint venture)
as 17714 Bannister did not preclude the joint venture also from conducting business in its own name during
the same period. 17714 Bannister, the joint venture, is the only named plaintiff in the fifth amended petition
and, although initially named incorrectly, has remained a plaintiff since it filed the original petition. The
fifth amended petition superseded and supplanted the earlier pleadings, TEX. R. CIV. P. 65, so the trusts and
Dallascape, by their omission, were effectively dismissed as plaintiffs. See Woodruff v. Wright, 51 S.W.3d
727, 731–32 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2001, pet. denied). Accordingly, we only address TAS’s arguments
regarding dismissal as they apply to 17714 Bannister, the joint venture.
                                                    –8–
failed to state a claim for relief.5 In its second issue, 17714 Bannister asserts the trial

court erred to the extent it dismissed its claims on each ground.

    1. Rule 91a

        Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a authorizes a defendant to move for

dismissal of a cause of action that has no basis in law or fact. See TEX. R. CIV. P.

91a.1; City of Dallas v. Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d 722, 724–25 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam).

A cause of action has no basis in fact “if no reasonable person could believe the facts

pleaded.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.1. A cause of action has no basis in law “if the

allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from them, do

not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.”                   Id.    Typically, there are two

circumstances in which a court may determine that a cause of action has no basis in

law under rule 91a: (1) where the plaintiff fails to plead a legally cognizable cause

of action; or (2) where the allegations in the plaintiff’s own pleading establish a

complete legal bar to its claims by affirmatively negating entitlement to the relief

requested. See In re Shire PLC, 633 S.W.3d 1, 18 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2021,

orig. proceeding). For reversal of a Rule 91a dismissal, an appellant must negate the

validity of each ground on which the trial court could have relied in granting the

    5
       TAS excluded the breach of contract and negligence claims asserted by Bannister Trust from its Rule
91a motion, but argued that those claims were barred by the statute of limitations and a lack of privity in
its second special exceptions. Again, Bannister Trust was not named a plaintiff in the fifth amended
petition.
                                                   –9–
dismissal. Buholtz v. Gibbs, No. 05-18-00957-CV, 2019 WL 3940973, at *3 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Aug. 21, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.).

        Rule 91a provides a harsh remedy and should be strictly construed. Renate

Nixdorf GmbH & Co. KG v. TRA Midland Props., LLC, No. 05-17-00577-CV, 2019

WL 92038, at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 3, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re

RNDC Tex., LLC, No. 05-18-00555-CV, 2018 WL 2773262, at *1 (Tex. App.—

Dallas June 11, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.). It is not a substitute for special

exception or summary judgment practice. Royale v. Knightvest Mgmt., LLC, No.

05-18-00908-CV, 2019 WL 4126600, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 30, 2019, no

pet.) (mem. op.).

        The trial court must decide a rule 91a motion based solely on the pleading of

the cause of action, together with any pleading exhibits permitted by rule 59.6 TEX.

R. CIV. P. 91a.6; see Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C.,

595 S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. 2020). We review a trial court’s decision on a rule 91a

motion de novo; “the availability of a remedy under the facts alleged is a question

of law and the rule’s factual-plausibility standard is akin to a legal-sufficiency

review.” Sanchez, 494 S.W.3d at 724. We apply a fair-notice pleading standard to

determine whether the petition sufficiently alleges a cause of action, Thomas, 559

    6
       Rule 59 permits “[n]otes, accounts, bonds, mortgages, records, and all other written instruments,
constituting, in whole or in part, the claim sued on, or the matter set up in defense” as pleading exhibits.
TEX. R. CIV. P. 59.

                                                  –10–
S.W.3d at 639, and “construe the pleadings liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to

the pleader’s intent, and accept as true the factual allegations in the pleadings to

determine if the cause of action has a basis in law or fact.” In re RNDC, 2018 WL

2773262, at *1. “If a petition provides sufficient facts to give fair notice of the claim,

then a motion seeking dismissal based on lack of a basis in fact should be denied. . .

. Similarly, if nothing in the pleading itself triggers a clear legal bar to the claim,

then there is a basis in law and the motion should be denied.” Id. (citation omitted).

   2. Statute of Limitations

      TAS moved to dismiss 17714 Bannister’s claims, asserting the statute of

limitations barred the claims, which TAS contended had to have accrued prior to

March 31, 2018, when the lease agreement terminated and TAS ceased operations

at the premises. As support, TAS cited photographs attached to the fifth amended

petition purporting to show storage of hazardous materials on the premises and

argued that, because Dallascape collected and managed lease payments, Dallascape

and Martellotto knew or should have known of the activity and conditions reflected

in the photographs.

      Generally, a cause of action accrues and the limitations period begins to run

“when facts come into existence that authorize a party to seek a judicial remedy.”

Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 221 (Tex. 2003). Stated

differently, a cause of action accrues “when a wrongful act causes a legal injury,

regardless of when the plaintiff learns of that injury or if all resulting damages have

                                          –11–
yet to occur.” Id.; Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc., 800 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex.

1990). A breach of contract claim accrues at the time the contract is breached. See,

e.g., Archer v. Tregellas, 566 S.W.3d 281, 288 (Tex. 2018); Via Net v. TIG Ins. Co.,

211 S.W.3d 310, 314 (Tex. 2006). 17714 Bannister’s tort claims are subject to a

two-year statute of limitations; its breach of contract claim is subject to a four-year

statute of limitations. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.003(a), 16.051;

Etan Indus., Inc. v. Lehmann, 359 S.W.3d 620, 623 (Tex. 2011) (trespass); Schneider

Nat’l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 270 (Tex. 2004) (nuisance); KPMG

Peat Marwick v. Harrison Cnty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex. 1999)

(negligence); Eagle Oil & Gas Co. v. TRO-X, L.P., 619 S.W.3d 699, 707 (Tex. 2021)

(contract).

      The relation-back doctrine allows a party to assert additional grounds of

liability or defense after limitations have run if they relate to the same transaction or

occurrence the party had placed at issue in a pleading filed within limitations. See

CIV. PRAC. & REM. ANN. § 16.068. Under section 16.068, a two-part test determines

whether an amended pleading relates back to an original pleading. Ware v. Everest

Grp., L.L.C., 238 S.W.3d 855, 866 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied). First, the

statute of limitations must not have barred the cause of action asserted in the original

pleading when the original pleading was filed. Id. Second, the amended pleading

that changes the facts or grounds of liability or defense must not be wholly based on

a new, distinct, or different transaction or occurrence. Id.

                                         –12–
        A Rule 91a dismissal may be based on an affirmative defense, but dismissal

is not appropriate when the defense is not “conclusively established by the facts in a

plaintiff’s petition.” Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656. 17714 Bannister’s fifth amended

petition does not allege facts pertaining to the statute of limitations. Specifically,

the petition does not allege when there was injury to the premises, i.e. when

hazardous materials were stored or leaked, when the lease agreement was breached,

or facts to show if or when either Martellotto or Dallascape had notice of hazardous

materials on the premises or hazardous materials leaking.                         Instead, it alleges

generally that TAS vacated the Premises on or about March 31, 2018, and 17714

Bannister discovered and learned that TAS had stored hazardous materials on the

premises in violation of the lease agreement and the materials were released into the

environment.7

        17714 Bannister first asserted its breach of contract and negligence claims

against TAS in its original petition, which it filed on September 14, 2020. TAS

acknowledges that, assuming some of the alleged property damage occurred within

the last weeks of TAS’s lease, 17714 Bannister had until September 15, 2020 to

initiate its tort claims.8 17714 Bannister would have had additional time to file its

breach of contract claim. Accordingly, we conclude that nothing in the fifth

    7
       The photographs attached to the petition are not dated and, in any event, are not pleading exhibits
that can be considered in deciding a Rule 91motion. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6.
    8
      Any limitations deadline falling between March 13, 2020 and September 1, 2020 for filing civil cases
was extended to September 15, 2020. See Twenty-First Emergency Order Regarding the Covid-19 State
of Disaster, 609 S.W.3d 128, 129 (Tex. July 31, 2020).
                                                 –13–
amended petition triggers a clear legal bar to 17714 Bannister’s breach of contract

and negligence claims under the statute of limitations.

       17714 Bannister first asserted its claims for negligence per se, trespass, and

nuisance in its fourth amended petition, which was not filed until March 2022.

Although 17714 Bannister pleaded additional details related to its claims in its

amended petitions, the new claims also concern TAS’s storage of hazardous

materials on the premises during the lease. Because the claims are not based on a

new, distinct, or different transaction, we conclude they relate back to 17714

Bannister’s original petition and nothing in the fifth amended petition triggers a clear

legal bar to the claims under the statute of limitations. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

ANN. § 16.068; e.g., Lexington Ins. Co. v. Daybreak Express, Inc., 393 S.W.3d 242,

245 (Tex. 2013) (per curiam) (relation-back doctrine applied because statutory

cargo-damage claim and breach-of-settlement claim based on settlement to resolve

cargo-damage dispute arose out of same occurrence—shipment of cargo).

      Construing the fifth amended petition liberally in 17714 Bannister’s favor and

accepting as true its factual allegations, we cannot conclude that its claims are barred

by the statute of limitations. See, e.g., Davis v. Homeowners of Am. Ins. Co., No.

05-21-00092-CV, 2023 WL 3735115, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 31, 2023, no

pet.) (“viewing the [plaintiffs’] pleading against [the defendant’s] . . . affirmative

defense of limitations, we conclude that because nothing within the [plaintiffs’]

pleading itself triggers a clear legal bar to their claims, the claims cannot be said to

                                         –14–
lack a basis in law, and the trial court erred in granting the rule 91a motion on this

basis”); Life v. Gino Morena Enterprises, LLC, No. 08-23-00055-CV, 2023 WL

4557747, at *5 (Tex. App.—El Paso July 17, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (when

plaintiff’s petition did not allege dates upon which alleged wage theft occurred,

limitations was not a basis on which Rule 91a motion to dismiss plaintiff’s theft of

services claim should have been granted). Accordingly, we conclude the trial court

erred to the extent it granted TAS’s rule 91a motion to dismiss on statute of

limitations grounds.9

    3. Lack of Privity

        TAS next moved to dismiss 17714 Bannister’s breach of contract claim for

lack of privity.        Specifically, TAS argued that it entered into the lease with

Dallascape, which was using the assumed name 17714 Bannister during the lease

term, and the fifth amended petition does not allege that there was an express

assignment of contractual rights and interests under the lease agreement to any of

the trusts.

        Generally, “the benefits and burdens of a contract belong only to the

contracting parties, and ‘no person can sue upon a contract except he be a party to

    9
       To the extent the trial court dismissed the claims on these grounds in response to TAS’s second
special exceptions, we likewise conclude that the dismissal was an error. A trial court may dismiss a claim
after sustaining special exceptions without providing an opportunity to amend if the pleading defect is of a
type that an amendment cannot cure. See Sonnichsen, 221 S.W.3d at 635. Here, however, the fifth amended
petition did not affirmatively allege facts demonstrating that 17714 Bannister’s claims were time barred, so
dismissal of the claims based on the statute of limitations would have been an abuse of the trial court’s
discretion.
                                                  –15–
or in privity with it.’”10 First Bank v. Brumitt, 519 S.W.3d 95, 102 (Tex. 2017)

(citation omitted). Privity is established by proof that the defendant was a party to

an enforceable contract with either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of

action to the plaintiff. OAIC Commercial Assets, L.L.C. v. Stonegate Vill. L.P., 234

S.W.3d 726, 738 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied).

         The lease agreement attached to the fifth amended petition identified TAS as

the lessee and 17714 Bannister as the landlord. The petition alleges that, at that time,

Dallascape held an assumed name certificate for 17714 Bannister. The petition,

however, further alleges that, upon the 2006 conveyance of the premises and

adjacent tract to the trusts and from that time forward, TAS leased the premises from

17714 Bannister, the joint venture comprised of the trusts and Dallascape.11 In

furtherance of the joint venture, the trusts owned property that was leased by 17714

Bannister and Dallascape actively managed the joint venture. Operating as part of

the joint venture, Dallascape and the trusts each conducted business under the

assumed name 177154 Bannister.

         Limiting our review to 17714 Bannister’s live pleading, as we must, and

accepting as true the factual allegations in the pleading, we cannot conclude that

    10
      An exception to this general rule applies to qualifying third-party beneficiaries. Brumitt, 519 S.W.3d
95, 102.
    11
        The petition also alleges facts to show that 17714 was a joint venture. See First United Pentecostal
Church of Beaumont v. Parker, 514 S.W.3d 214, 225 (Tex. 2017) (“The elements of a joint venture are (1)
an express or implied agreement to engage in a joint venture, (2) a community of interest in the venture, (3)
an agreement to share profits and losses from the enterprise, and (4) a mutual right of control or management
of the enterprise.”).
                                                   –16–
17714 Bannister lacked privity. Whether 17714 Bannister satisfies the criteria for a

joint venture and whether TAS leased the premises from the joint venture during the

lease term are questions to be resolved on the parties’ evidence and are not suitable

for a Rule 91a motion to dismiss. See Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 656. Accordingly, we

conclude that 17714 Bannister’s breach of contract claim, as pleaded, is not without

a basis in fact or law and the trial court erred in dismissing the claim under Rule

91a.12

    4. Lack of Standing

         TAS also moved to dismiss Dallascape d/b/a 17714 Bannister’s claims for

lack of standing because it did not own the premises or adjacent tract of land and,

therefore, cannot demonstrate that any act or omission by TAS caused it damage.

Because 17714 Bannister, the joint venture, remains the only plaintiff in the fifth

amended petition, we construe TAS’s argument to apply to the joint venture and we

agree in part.

         “Standing is a constitutional prerequisite to suit,” and “[a] court has no

jurisdiction over a claim made by a plaintiff who lacks standing to assert it.”

Heckman v. Williamson Cnty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 150 (Tex. 2012). “The issue of

standing focuses on whether a party has a sufficient relationship with the lawsuit so

as to have a ‘justiciable interest’ in its outcome.” Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato,

    12
       For the same reasons, dismissal for lack of privity in response to TAS’s second special exceptions
also would be an abuse of discretion.
                                                 –17–
171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005) (citation omitted). A plaintiff has standing when

it is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether it is acting with legal authority.

Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cnty. Appraisal Dist., 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996).

To establish standing, a plaintiff must allege “a concrete injury . . . and a real

controversy between the parties that will be resolved by the court.” Heckman, 369

S.W.3d at 154. “[I]f a plaintiff lacks standing to assert one of his claims, the court

lacks jurisdiction over that claim and must dismiss it.” Id. at 150.

      When, as here, a Rule 91a motion challenges the trial court’s subject-matter

jurisdiction, the motion effectively constitutes a plea to the jurisdiction, and we apply

the standard of review for a plea to the jurisdiction challenging only the pleadings.

See Lexington v. Treece, No. 01-17-00228-CV, 2021 WL 2931354, at *15 (Tex.

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] July 13, 2021, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing Dall. Cnty.

Republican Party v. Dall. Cnty. Democratic Party, No. 05-18-00916-CV, 2019 WL

4010776, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 26, 2019, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). We

review the trial court’s grant of a plea to the jurisdiction de novo and determine

whether the pleader has alleged facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court’s

jurisdiction to hear the case. Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d

217, 226 (Tex. 2004). In doing so, we look to the pleader’s intent and construe the

pleadings in its favor. Id. If the pleadings lack sufficient facts to affirmatively

demonstrate the trial court’s jurisdiction but do not affirmatively demonstrate

incurable defects in jurisdiction, the plaintiff should generally be given an

                                         –18–
opportunity to amend. Lexington, 2021 WL 2931354, at *15 (citing Cnty. of

Cameron v. Brown, 80 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Tex. 2002)). If the pleadings affirmatively

negate the existence of jurisdiction, then the plea may be granted without allowing

the plaintiff an opportunity to amend. Id.

       In Texas, a cause of action for injury to real property accrues when the injury

is committed. Exxon Corp. v. Emerald Oil & Gas Co., L.C., 331 S.W.3d 419, 424

(Tex. 2010). And, “[t]he right to sue is a personal right that belongs to the person

who owns the property at the time of the injury.” Id.; Denman v. Citgo Pipeline Co.,

123 S.W.3d 728, 732 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.); e.g., Senn v. Texaco,

Inc., 55 S.W.3d 222, 225–26 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2001, pet. denied) (when “[a]ny

injury to the land that the defendants might have caused, whether temporary or

permanent, occurred prior to the [plaintiffs’] purchase of the land,” the plaintiffs had

no causes of action for either type of injury that may have been caused by the

defendants).

       The fifth amended petition makes clear that the trusts, and not the joint

venture, owned the premises and adjacent real property.           Accordingly, 17714

Bannister’s tort claims belonged to the trusts, see Denman, 123 S.W.3d at 734; Senn,

55 S.W.3d at 226, and the trial court lacked jurisdiction over 17714 Bannister’s tort

claims and did not err in dismissing them. See Lexington, 2021 WL 2931354, at

*15.

                                         –19–
      However, to the extent the trial court dismissed 17714 Bannister’s breach of

contract claim for lack of standing, we conclude the trial court erred. As discussed

above, the fifth amended petition alleges facts to show that, at least from March

2006, TAS leased the premises from 17714 Bannister, the joint venture comprised

of the trusts and Dallascape. 17714 Bannister thus alleges that it has an enforceable

interest as a party to the lease agreement. See Am. Pride Xpress Logistics, Inc. v.

Joe Jordan Trucks, Inc., No. 05-20-00281-CV, 2021 WL 5754807, at *5 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Dec. 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“For purposes of standing, privity

is established by proving the defendant was a party to an enforceable contract with

either the plaintiff or a party who assigned its cause of action to the plaintiff.”);

Republic Petroleum, LLC v. Dynamic Offshore Res. NS, LLC, 474 S.W.3d 424, 430

(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. denied).

      Further, the petition alleges that TAS breached specific provisions of the lease

agreement by storing hazardous materials on the premises, failing to comply with

applicable laws, ordinances, and regulations, leaving hazardous waste contamination

on the premises, leaving the fence and concrete pad in a state of disrepair, failing to

obtain a certificate of occupancy, and failing to reimburse 17714 Bannister for

utilities. The petition alleges that, as a result of the breaches, 17714 Bannister

suffered damages and TAS is contractually obligated to reimburse 17714 Bannister

for the extent of the damages. Construing the pleadings liberally in favor of 17714

Bannister and looking to its intent, we conclude that the fifth amended petition

                                        –20–
alleges a concrete injury to 17714 Bannister and a real controversy between the

parties. See, e.g., John C. Flood of DC, Inc. v. Supermedia, L.L.C., 408 S.W.3d 645,

652 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (plaintiff had standing to bring breach of

contract claim against defendant when petition alleged, and summary judgment

evidence supported, that plaintiff was party to contract under its former business

name, defendant agreed to pay plaintiff for services but did not, and defendant was

indebted to plaintiff). Accordingly, we sustain 17714 Bannister’s second issue with

respect to its breach of contract claim, but overrule the second issue to the extent

that it argues dismissal of its tort claims was improper.

                                     Conclusion

      We affirm the trial court’s order granting TAS’s amended motion to dismiss,

motion to strike, and second special exceptions in part and reverse in part. We affirm

the order to the extent that it dismissed 11747 Bannister’s negligence, negligence

per se, trespass, and nuisance claims against TAS. We reverse the order to the extent

it dismissed 11747 Bannister’s breach of contract claim against TAS. We remand

the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.

                                            /Craig Smith/
                                            CRAIG SMITH
                                            JUSTICE
220820F.P05

                                        –21–
                                   S
                            Court of Appeals
                     Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
                                  JUDGMENT

17714 BANNISTER, Appellant                    On Appeal from the 429th Judicial
                                              District Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-22-00820-CV           V.               Trial Court Cause No. 429-04496-
                                              2020.
TAS ENVIRONMENTAL                             Opinion delivered by Justice Smith.
SERVICES LP, Appellee                         Justices Carlyle and Kennedy
                                              participating.

        In accordance with this Court’s opinion of this date, the July 29, 2022 order
of the trial court is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part. We REVERSE
that portion of the trial court’s order dismissing appellant 11714 Bannister’s breach
of contract claim against appellee TAS Environmental Services, LP. In all other
respects, the trial court’s order is AFFIRMED. We REMAND this cause to the
trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

      It is ORDERED that each party bear its own costs of this appeal.

Judgment entered this 9th day of November 2023.

                                       –22–