Court Opinion

ID: 9585352
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-21 22:59:35.76534+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:39:04.928062
License: Public Domain

Felton, Chief Judge,
dissenting. I dissent from the judgment and Division 1 of the majority opinion. In my opinion we are squarely faced with the question whether Subsection (c) of the Act of 1965 and 1966 as codified in Code Ann. § 70-207 has any meaning. In my opinion the failure of the court to explain to the jury the meaning of Code § 68-1650 (a) and (b) was error as a matter of law. Without an explanation the jury could not possibly have decided the case on any sound or reasonable basis. The question as to when two vehicles approach an intersection at approximately the same time is a vital one and one that will be the determining factor in the many intersection cases which are bound to arise in the future. It is of vital importance that this question be decided now for the protection of the parties to this as well as future cases involving the question which has not been decided in this state.
Enumerated error 1 is as follows:
“1. The court erred in charging the jury on two conflicting propositions of law, without explanation as to how they should be resolved, as follows:
“(a) The court charged the language of Georgia Code § 68-1650 (a) which provides that the driver of a vehicle approaching an intersection shall yield the right of way to a vehicle which has entered the intersection from a different highway.
“(b) The court also instructed the jury that under Georgia Code § 68-1650 (b), when two vehicles enter an intersection at approximately the same time, the vehicle on the right shall have the right of way.
“ (c) However, the court gave the jury no rules for resolving the conflicting statutes.”
The enumeration of errors need not conform to the overly stringent technicalities of the assignments of errors abolished by the rules of the Appellate Practice Act of 1965. Code Ann. § 6-810' (Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 29; 1965, pp. 240', 243). It can be expounded and elaborated upon by the briefs and by oral *273argument as long as it meets the minimum requirement of putting the opposite party on notice of the errors complained of.
The basis of the contended conflict is the view that the pleadings and evidence show that the VW necessarily “entered” the intersection first, yet, because of their relative speeds, both vehicles entered the intersection “at approximately the same time.” Under this view, the effect of charging both subsections without explanation in the present case was to charge that both vehicles had the right of way at the intersection, the plaintiff’s under Subsection (a) and defendant’s under (b).
“Apart from, or without reference to, such statutes, or at least in the absence of regulations establishing a different rule, it has been held that the vehicle first reaching and entering an intersection has the right of way over a vehicle subsequently reaching it; and the driver of the latter vehicle should delay his progress so as to allow the first arrival to pass in safety.” 60 CJS 871, Motor Vehicles, § 362 (b 3). Teague v. Keith, 214 Ga. 853 (108 SE2d 489); Phillips v. Reece, 106 Ga. App. 779 (128 SE2d 370); Meeks v. Johnson, 112 Ga. App. 760 (146 SE2d 121). Irrespective of the matter of right of way, both of the drivers had a duty under Code Ann. § 68-1626 (a), (c) (Ga. L. 1953, Nov. Sess., pp. 556, 577, as amended) to drive at an appropriate reduced speed in approaching the intersection, and failure to perform this duty could have been found to be such additional negligence as would have made it impossible to comply with the right of way statute. Since there was evidence authorizing a finding that the VW entered the intersection first, the charge on Subsection (a) was appropriate.
The provision of Subsection (b) is not intended to be in conflict with that of Subsection (a) (60 CJS 871, Motor Vehicles, § 362 (b 3)), but applies to a different factual situation, i. e., where the vehicles enter the intersection at “approximately the same time.” This phrase has been variously defined by the courts so as to apply, generally, when, at a given point in time, there is an imminent hazard of a collision if both continue the same course at the same speed; “and the right of way must be yielded to a vehicle approaching from the left and first entering the intersection only if the vehicle on the left has reached the *274intersection an appreciable length of time ahead of the automobile approaching from the right and is in actual possession of the intersection.” 60 CJS 871, Motor Vehicles, § 362 (b 3), nn. 92, 93, and cit. The cases therein cited agree on the propositions that the mathematical determination of who reaches an intersection first by a few feet should not be controlling, and that the driver on the left cannot pre-empt the intersection by a mere split-second prior entry, as by racing into it with undiminished speed. “Approximately the same time,” then, means, generally, within a split second of each other. Under this construction, even if the jury found, for example, that the defendant’s vehicle was only 40 feet away from the intersection as the VW was entering it, and the defendant’s speed was twice that of the VW, nevertheless, if the defendant entered the intersection one second or longer after the VW, then the defendant could be found to have violated the VW’s right of way.
The evidence as to the speeds, distances and times involved is necessarily based on opinion and circumstances, which cannot be so absolutely and mathematically weighed as to decide the issues as a matter of law. In view of the close situation presented by the evidence as to whether or not the vehicles entered the intersection at “approximately the same time,” the jury was properly charged the provisions of Subsection (b). Although the provisions of the two subsections are not in conflict, nevertheless the proven facts in a given case can come within the purview of but one of them and the jury should have been given sufficient interpretation of the two provisions and instructions as to how to determine which was applicable under the particular facts they might find. “[I]f there is or may be a difference of opinion regarding the interpretation of the statutory language, it has been said to be the better practice for the trial court, in giving instructions in such language, to interpret the statute.” 10B Blashfield, Cyclopedia of Automobile Law and Practice, p. 482, § 6666. See also Ivey v. Hall, 77 Ga. App. 350 (48 SE2d 788), in which a similar charge was held error for lack of an explanation of how to determine the question of right of way. “A charge containing two distinct propositions directly conflicting the one with the other is calculated to leave the jury *275in such a confused condition of mind that they cannot render an intelligent verdict.” Strong v. Palmour, 113 Ga. App. 750, 754 (149 SE2d 745), and cit.
Although no exception to the above charge was made during the trial, because the charge of the two subsections, without any interpretive instructions, left the jury in this case confused as to how to determine the right of way under such statute, and may well have the same result in future similar cases, it was “a substantial error in the charge which was harmful as a matter of law,” such as can be considered without an objection. Code Ann. § 70-207 (c) (Ga. L. 1965, pp. 18, 31; 1966, pp. 493, 498); McCurry v. McCurry, 223 Ga. 334 (1) (155 SE2d 378); Carnes v. State, 115 Ga. App. 387, 392 (5) (154 SE2d 781); State Hwy. Dept. v. Calhoun, 114 Ga. App. 501 (5c) (151 SE2d 806).