Court Opinion

ID: 9733445
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-26 17:07:52.310196+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:26:41.557099
License: Public Domain

TAPKEN, Circuit Judge
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority opinion.
The right to effective legal representation is guaranteed at every critical stage of a criminal proceeding, including appeal. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967). Appellant desired to appeal his conviction of forgery and his court-appointed appellate counsel was aware of that decision. Counsel failed to file the notice of appeal with the clerk of courts as required by SDCL 23A-32-16, but rather stated he sent it to the court reporter with instructions to file the notice for him.
In Grooms v. State, 320 N.W.2d 149,152 (S.D.1982), we stated:
Many federal and state courts have held that the failure of counsel to timely file a notice of appeal when instructed by one’s client to do so constitutes a deprivation of the client’s constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel. (Citations *445omitted.) Failure to appeal within the prescribed time cannot be viewed as a strategic move on the part of the attorney. (Citation omitted.)
In Jones v. State, 353 N.W.2d 781,785 (S.D.1984), we cited Grooms, supra, as authority for the proposition that failure of counsel to appeal is strong evidence of a failure to protect the interests of a defendant. In the case at bar, appellate counsel should have personally insured the notice of appeal was properly filed. I would hold his failure to do so constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel.
The majority opinion indicates appellant must not only show ineffective assistance of counsel, but, additionally, that he has suffered prejudice as a result. I agree this is the correct “two-fold” test appellant has the burden of proving. Strickland v. Washington, — U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984); Jones, supra. I disagree, however, with the application of the facts of the present case to the prejudice part of that “two-fold” test.
The analysis of the majority would require the appellant to show prejudice at the trial level through the writ of habeas corpus, citing Grooms, supra, as authority. In the present case, however, appellant suffered prejudice from the simple fact he was denied the statutory right to an appellate review. In Jones, supra, counsel’s trial tactics were strongly indicative of incompetency. Further, counsel talked his client out of appealing her case because of concern for his reputation. In Jones, 353 N.W.2d at 786, we stated as follows:
As a result, Jones suffered actual prejudice at trial; furthermore, Jones was prejudiced when no appeal was taken due to counsel’s concern for his own reputation. (Emphasis supplied.)
I interpret Jones as authority that prejudice exists for failure to appeal a client’s case when requested to do so, irrespective of any errors that may have existed at the trial level.
The holding of the majority court would require an appellant to prove a successful appeal before relief would be granted for failure of counsel to perfect an appeal when requested by his client to do so. This is contrary to Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 89 S.Ct. 1715, 23 L.Ed.2d 340 (1969), wherein the Supreme Court held that federal statute has made the appeal from a judgment of conviction in a criminal case a right and nothing more than a simple deprivation of that statutory right of appeal need be shown before relief should be granted. In Rodriquez, the Court explicitly rejected a requirement imposed by the United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, that an appellant must show some likelihood of success on appeal before relief would be granted on failure to properly file an appeal. The Rodriquez decision has been consistently interpreted to mean that prejudice or likelihood of success on the merits need not be shown to establish ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to perfect a timely appeal. Hollis v. United States, 687 F.2d 257 (8th Cir.1982); Barrientos v. United States, 668 F.2d 838 (5th Cir.1982); Perez v. Wainwright, 640 F.2d 596 (5th Cir.1981); Cleaver v. Bordenkircher, 634 F.2d 1010 (6th Cir.1980); Brown v. United States, 623 F.2d 54 (9th Cir.1980); Miller v. McCarthy, 607 F.2d 854 (9th Cir.1979); Cantrell v. State of Ala., 546 F.2d 652 (5th Cir.1977); Riser v. Craven, 501 F.2d 381 (9th Cir.1974); United States ex rel. Williams v. LaVallee, 487 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir.1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 916, 94 S.Ct. 1622, 40 L.Ed.2d 118 (1974); United States ex rel. Randazzo v. Follette, 444 F.2d 625 (2d Cir.1971); Nance v. United States, 422 F.2d 590 (7th Cir. 1970); Wilbur v. State of Maine, 421 F.2d 1327 (1st Cir.1970). Contrary to the analysis of Rodriquez in the majority opinion, the above decisions have not limited the ruling as only applicable to indigents or applicants under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 or § 2255.
As above stated, present South Dakota law provides a defendant the statutory right to appeal from a final judgment of conviction. SDCL 23A-32-2. A number of courts have applied the Rodriquez rule in cases where a state has statutorily established a defendant’s right of appeal. Robinson v. Wyrick, 635 F.2d 757 (8th Cir.1981); Miller, supra; Cantrell, supra; *446Riser, supra; LaVallee, supra; Follette, supra; Wilbur, supra; Galloway v. Stephenson, 510 F.Supp. 840 (M.D.N.C.1981); Blanchard v. Brewer, 318 F.Supp. 28 (S.D. Iowa 1969). I find no sound reason why Rodriquez should not be applied to this case.
In my opinion, the majority’s reliance upon Strickland, supra, and United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 101 S.Ct. 665, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981), is misplaced. Those cases dealt with trial tactics and prejudice resulting therefrom, not the failure to properly and timely perfect an appeal. Neither Strickland nor Morrison expressly overruled or limited, let alone mention, Rodriquez, which dealt with the clearly distinguishable issue of a person’s statutory right to appeal from a judgment of conviction.
Appellant has been denied effective assistance of counsel. As a result, he has been denied his statutory right to appeal and has suffered prejudice as a result. I would remand the case to the trial court for resentencing and allow appellant the statutory opportunity to perfect his appeal. Whether any issues appellant has raised or might raise should be for another day.
I am authorized to state that Justice HENDERSON joins in this dissent.