Court Opinion

ID: 9693898
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-25 17:09:25.680657+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T15:10:53.188381
License: Public Domain

RENDERED: AUGUST 18, 2023; 10:00 A.M.
                        NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

                   Commonwealth of Kentucky
                            Court of Appeals

                              NO. 2022-CA-0949-MR

THOMAS E. LONG                                                       APPELLANT

                   APPEAL FROM UNION CIRCUIT COURT
v.                HONORABLE C. RENE’ WILLIAMS, JUDGE
                         ACTION NO. 21-CI-00010

NUTRIEN AG SOLUTIONS, INC.                                              APPELLEE

                                       OPINION
                                      AFFIRMING

                                      ** ** ** ** **

BEFORE: EASTON, LAMBERT, AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

MCNEILL, JUDGE: This case involves an unpaid commercial debt for

agricultural goods. The debtor is Appellant, Thomas Long (Thomas). The creditor

is Appellee, Nutrien Ag Solution, Inc. (Creditor). Creditor filed one suit in Union

Circuit Court to collect a debt owed by Thomas. The parties reached an agreement

in that case, and it was dismissed.

             Creditor filed a second suit to collect another debt owed under a

separate account by Thomas and his son, Michael, jointly and severally. After
subsequent attempts to recover that debt proved unsuccessful, the circuit court

entered a default judgment. Thomas filed a motion to set aside the default

judgment, which was denied. Thomas appeals to this Court as a matter of right.

For the following reasons, we affirm.

                                STANDARD OF REVIEW

                “Although default judgments are not favored, trial courts possess

broad discretion in considering motions to set them aside and we will not disturb

the exercise of that discretion absent abuse.” Howard v. Fountain, 749 S.W.2d

690, 692 (Ky. App. 1988) (citation omitted). A trial court does not abuse its

discretion unless its decision is “arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by

sound legal principles.” Miller v. Eldridge, 146 S.W.3d 909, 914 (Ky. 2004)

(citation omitted). CR1 55.02 provides: “For good cause shown the court may set

aside a judgment by default in accordance with Rule 60.02.” (Emphasis added.)

See VerraLab Ja LLC v. Cemerlic, 584 S.W.3d 284, 287 (Ky. 2019) (“Good cause

is not mere inattention on the part of the defendant . . . .”) (citation omitted).

                CR 60.02 provides in relevant part: “On motion a court may, upon

such terms as are just, relieve a party or his legal representative from its final

judgment, order, or proceeding upon the following grounds: (a) mistake,

inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect . . . or (f) any other reason of an

1
    Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure.

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extraordinary nature justifying relief.” “We review the denial of a CR

60.02 motion under an abuse of discretion standard.” Foley v. Commonwealth,

425 S.W.3d 880, 886 (Ky. 2014) (citation omitted). With these standards in mind,

we now return to the present case.

                                      ANALYSIS

                Thomas’ primary argument on appeal is that the circuit court did not

properly consider the relevant factors for setting aside a default judgment.

“Factors to consider in deciding whether to set aside a judgment are: (1) valid

excuse for default, (2) meritorious defense, and (3) absence of prejudice to the

other party.” Perry v. Central Bank and Trust Company, 812 S.W.2d 166, 170

(Ky. App. 1991) (citation omitted). Thomas specifically claims that, due to the

settlement in the first case, he reasonably believed that he was relieved of

responsibility in the present case. As to a meritorious defense, Thomas claims that

Creditor has never produced a document evidencing his obligation to pay the debts

of another pursuant to the Kentucky Statute of Frauds. KRS2 371.010(4). Lastly,

and without specificity or preservation, Thomas asserts an absence of prejudice to

the Creditor.

2
    Kentucky Revised Statutes.

                                           -3-
             In its order denying Thomas’ motion to set aside the default judgment,

the circuit court unequivocally found that Thomas’ “excuse is not a valid excuse

and certainly is not excusable neglect.” The court reasoned as follows:

             [Thomas] fully understood that he was being held liable
             by Plaintiff for both accounts; that after being served
             with the summons and complaint for both accounts on
             January 15, 2021, Defendant Thomas Long agreed to
             compromise his unpaid balance on the Nutrien account
             #1097304 which was dismissed and the settlement as
             stated in the written communications clearly reflects the
             settlement is for this account and this account only

             ....

             Further, the Court is of the opinion that setting aside the
             Default Judgment against Defendant Thomas Long
             would be prejudicial to Plaintiff given the fact that the
             accounts were already approximately two years past due
             when the parties had a hearing in this matter.

In consideration of the record and arguments presented, we cannot conclude that

circuit court abused its discretion in denying Thomas’ motion to set aside the

default judgment. Therefore, we affirm.

             Lastly, Thomas asserts that that the circuit court should have

conducted a hearing on damages pursuant to CR 55.01. Thomas did not appeal

from the default judgment itself, only the order denying the motion to set aside.

Moreover, CR 55.01 does not require a damages hearing. Pursuant to the relevant

portion of that rule, a hearing is required only if “it is necessary to take an account

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or to determine the amount of damages . . . .” Id. There is no indication such

concerns are at issue here.

                                 CONCLUSION

             For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the Union Circuit Court’s

order entered on July 7, 2022.

             ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:                     BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

J. Christopher Hopgood                    David T. Reynolds
Henderson, Kentucky                       Owensboro, Kentucky

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