Court Opinion

ID: 9629940
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 09:53:50.400068+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:07:27.563115
License: Public Domain

McALLISTER, J.,
dissenting.
The majority holds, and I agree, that defendant was entitled to a jury trial on his counterclaim. I do not agree that defendant was not prejudiced by the denial of a jury trial. In my opiMon, the evidence raised a question of fact which should have been determined by a jury.
The majority relies on the recitals in the quitclaim deed as conclusive evidence that the parties agreed that plaintiffs should retain the payments which had been made on the contract. Undisputed testimony of the plaintiff Irwin ScMegel, however, indicates that there was no such agreement. Mr. Schlegel testified:
“Q There was no discussion on October 14th, or prior that [sic], as to the return of payments to Mr. Doran, was there?
“A No, sir.
*279“Q At no time was that ever discussed?
“A No, sir.”
Defendant testified:
“Q Was anything said to Mr. Schlegel at all about the repayment of any money?
“A No.
“Q At any time?
“A No.”
During oral argument before this court, plaintiffs’ attorney conceded that the record showed no explicit agreement between the parties about the return or retention of the payments.
Although plaintiffs rely on the deed as some evidence of their version of the agreement, they contend that the agreement itself was an oral one, thus recognizing that the terms of that agreement are a question of fact.
In his counterclaim, defendant alleged that the parties mutually agreed to rescind the original contract. On appeal, he has argued that the evidence shows a rescission by conduct of the parties, but he has not abandoned his original theory of a termination by mutual agreement. He argued to the court that the two theories were alternatives. In my opinion, the evidence would permit a finding in accord with the allegations of the counterclaim — that the parties simply agreed to terminate their contract.
On September 24, 1968, when payments on the contract had for some time been one month in arrears, plaintiffs’ attorney wrote to defendant demanding prompt payment of the delinquent instalment and timely payment of future instalments. The letter threatened defendant with foreclosure proceedings if this was not done.
*280Some time in September, Mr. Sehlegel telephoned defendant to discuss taking the business back. He testified:
“Q Whose idea was it that the business be taken back?
“A Mine.
“Q Did you approach Mr. Doran about this then?
“A Yes.
“Q If he couldn’t make the payments that you would have to take the business back?
“A On the telephone conversation, yes.”
Defendant testified as to this same conversation:
“Mr. Sehlegel wanted the payment for February and also the October payment and I told him that I wasn’t in a position to make the payment, so he said he wanted the car wash back. So, we agreed to meet there for the purpose of turning back the keys to him.
*****
“Q Mr. Doran, in September you talked to Mr. Sehlegel on the phone, and at that time it was decided that you would turn the business back over to him?
“A Yes.
“Q What was your reason for wanting to do this?
“A Well, I didn’t call him. He called me. I didn’t want to. He wanted the money and I didn’t have it.
“Q You couldn’t make the payments ?
“A Yes.
“Q So you agreed to turn it back over to him?
“A I agreed to go out there and give him the keys and let him take possession, yes.”
*281On October 12, defendant’s attorney wrote to plaintiffs’ attorney:
“Richard Doran has talked to Mr. Schlegel and has offered to return the Car Wash to Schlegel provided that Mr. Doran has no further liability.
“Would you prepare the appropriate papers?”
On October 14, the parties met at the car wash; at that time the keys were returned to plaintiffs and various matters were discussed. Mr. Schlegel testified:
“We agreed that if everything was paid up which he contended that it was and promised that it was and would be, that we would take the business back without any foreclosure proceedings.”
Plaintiffs’ attorney, who was present during that conversation, testified:
“We went over with him the fact that we were cutting everything off as of that date. All bills were to be paid by him to that date and Mr. Schlegel would take everything back as of that date. There would be no further responsibility under the contract or liability to Mr. Doran. Mr. Schlegel was giving up his right to foreclose and take a judgment or take back the security. This was agreeable.”
As I have previously pointed out, everyone agrees that at no time was there any discussion about defendant’s payments being returned to him or about the retention of those payments by the plaintiffs.
In Share v. Williams, 204 Or 664, 675, 277 P2d 775, 285 P2d 523 (1955), we said:
“Since the time of the case of Frink v. Thomas, 20 Or 265, 25 P 717, it has been the rule of this jurisdiction ‘that when the parties voluntarily agree to rescind a contract, there being no express stipulation with reference to payment or payments *282already made thereunder, the law will imply a promise on the part of the vendor to refund such payment or payments to the purchaser, and the latter may maintain an action to recover back the same’. Mascall v. Erikson, 131 Or 509, 516, 283 p 2 # # #»
In Share, the parties had entered into a written agreement canceling their contract, which agreement provided that the contract
“£* * * is hereby terminated, cancelled and rendered for naught, and that the same is null and void and of no effect after the execution hereof, * * ” 204 Or at 668.
Of this agreement the court said:
“It seems clear to us from the actions of the parties and the recitals in the agreement that the parties were mutually abandoning all rights under the contract. Having both consented to this recission [sic], neither can base any claim thereon except such rights as each may have to the restoration of status quo. * * *” 204 Or at 675.
In Mascall v. Erikson, 131 Or 509, 283 P 2 (1930), quoted in Share v. Williams, supra, the purchaser became unable to make payments on a land sale contract. By agreement between the parties, the possession was restored to the vendor. The details of that agreement do not appear, the opinion stating:
“It conclusively appears from the evidence that, upon the failure of the purchaser to continue his payments under the contract, the vendors and purchaser mutually agreed that the property should be received by the vendors and that the purchaser should relinquish all interest therein. We find from the evidence that the contract was to this extent rescinded and abandoned, without any oral agreement made in regard to the payments which had *283been made upon the purchase price by plaintiff. * * *” 131 Or at 513.
The court held that the purchaser was entitled to recover the payments he had made, less a reasonable rental and damages to the land while he was in possession. 131 Or at 516-517.
In the present case I think the evidence set out above could reasonably be interpreted as establishing an agreement to abandon the contract — that plaintiffs were to take back the business and defendant was to have no further obligations. Under the doctrine of Share v. Williams and Mascall v. Erikson, supra, in the absence of any agreement about the payments already made, defendant would then be entitled to the return of the amounts he had paid, less a reasonable rental for the period he was in possession of the business.
The recitals in the quitclaim deed are, of course, some evidence of an understanding that plaintiffs were to retain the payments made under the contract. They are not, however, conclusive evidence of such an understanding. The majority relies heavily on the recital that the deed was given “in lieu of foreclosure.” I have found no cases construing this language in a deed, and we have no reason to believe that the term is one of art which carries with it the idea that the parties are to be put in the same position as though plaintiffs had foreclosed upon the contract. “In lieu of” means “instead of,” “in place of,” or “in substitution for.” See, e.g., City of Mesa v. Killingsworth, 96 Ariz 290, 394 P2d 410, 414 (1964); Burpee v. Logan, 216 Ga 434, 117 SE2d 339, 342 (1960); Reed v. Albanese, 78 Ill App 2d 53, 223 NE2d 419, 423 (1966); Glassman Construction Co. v. Baltimore Brick Co., 246 *284Md 478, 228 A2d 472, 474 (1967). There is no suggestion in the cases construing these words, in their dictionary definitions, or in common usage, that they necessarily mean an equivalent or something accomplishing the same result. The trier of fact was entitled to consider the effect of the deed recital in light of the other evidence in determining what the parties’ agreement was.
Because I think there was clearly an issue of fact involved in defendant’s counterclaim, I would reverse and remand so that defendant can have the jury trial to which he is entitled.
Tongue, J., joins in this dissent.