Court Opinion

ID: 9810686
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-31 21:56:33.727259+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:40:09.606802
License: Public Domain

Babnhill, J.,
dissenting: While, as now drafted, the majority opinion correctly states the question presented for decision, I am still unable to concur in the conclusion reached.
The case comes here on demurrer. The only question raised by the demurrer is that of jurisdiction. If it appears from the pleadings that the negligence alleged in the complaint had no relation to the employment or to the business with which it was concerned the Superior Court had jurisdiction and the judgment should be .reversed. Hence, the one and only question debated in the briefs and presented to us for decision is this: Does the Industrial Commission have jurisdiction of the cause of action set out in the complaint; that is, in effect, does it appear from the pleadings that the master-servant relation existed at the time of and in respect to the alleged injury and death?
In Reaves v. Mill Co., 216 N. C., 462, 5 S. E. (2d), 305, it is said that insofar as it depends upon the statute alone the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission attaches (a) if the contract of employment was made in this State; (b) if the employer’s place of business is in this State; and (c) if the residence of the employee is in this State. A practical application of the statute requires the addition of one other requisite : the employer-employee relation must exist at the time of and in respect to the injury or death or to the transaction out of which such injury or death arose. On this we now seem to be in agreement.
The relevant provision of the statute is as follows: “The rights and remedies herein granted to an employee where he and his employer have accepted the provisions of this Act, respectively, to pay and accept compensation on account of personal injury or death by accident, shall exclude all other rights and remedies of such employee, his personal representative, ... as against his employer at common law or otherwise, on account of such injury, loss of service, or death.” Sec. 11, Oh. 120, P. L., 1929. There is no limitation or qualification here. The sole requisite is that of the employer-employee relation in respect to the transaction out of which the injury arose. That this is the criterion of jurisdiction is the clear import of the statute. If this relation exists all other remedies are excluded. There is no middle ground and no concurrent jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the Commission, whatever it may be, is exclusive.
When the employer-employee relation exists the employer is liable only to the extent and in the manner specified in the Act. Sec. 10. *222Suck rights and remedies are exclusive, sec. 11, and the Industrial Commission alone has jurisdiction. Hedgepeth v. Casualty Co., 209 N. C., 45, 182 S. E., 704; Pilley v. Cotton Mills, 201 N. C., 426, 160 S. E., 479; Tscheiller v. Weaving Co., 214 N. C., 449, 199 S. E., 623; Cooke v. Gillis, 218 N. C., 726, 12 S. E. (2d), 250.
It is admitted in the pleadings that the relation of employer and ■employee, as those terms are defined in the Act, existed between the deceased employee and the defendant employer. Did it exist at the time of and in.relation to the injury and death or to the transaction out ■of which such injury and death arose? If the pleadings so disclose the judgment should be affirmed.
. It is alleged in the complaint that it had become the policy or custom of the defendants to provide an annual outing or picnic for their employees “said outing or picnic being for the purpose of promoting employer-employee relations”; that pursuant to said policy an arrangement was made for an outing or picnic at Southport, N. O., for a group of its employees; that the plaintiff’s intestate was included in said group at the solicitation of the defendants’ manager; that he went as a member of said group; that said group of employees, including plaintiff’s intestate, was under the direction and supervision of said manager and all ■expenses of said employees were being paid by the defendants; that the manager chartered the “Nightingale” with its crew for the purpose of taking said employees, including plaintiff’s intestate, out to the fishing grounds in the Atlantic Ocean; and that the plaintiff’s intestate and the other employees in the group boarded the boat at the direction of said manager..
The employer, as such, extended the invitation. The plaintiff’s intestate, as employee, accepted. The trip was for the benefit of the business of the employer. The “Nightingale” was, for the time being, the premises of the employer. The employee was on the premises at the direction of the manager of the employer and to participate in promoting the best interest of his master. The annual picnic had become a custom — an incident of the business — for the purpose of promoting employer-employee relations, a phase of business vitally affecting its successful operation too often neglected or completely ignored by business management. Here, at least, we have employers who recognize that their employees are more than mere chattels and that upon their good will and friendship the success of the business in which they are all engaged, some as employers and some as employees, very largely depends. I, for one, am unwilling to take the position that this enterprise, prompted by this worthy motive, had no relation to the employment or to the business with which it was concerned. Instead, I insist that it related directly and substantially to the business and to the best *223interest of both the employer and the employee. It tended to promote the business of the employer and to give assurance of continuing and profitable employment to the employees. In this both were interested. Surely, then, the employer-employee relation existed in respect to this transaction.
That the deceased received nothing other than entertainment in return for his time; that he performed no duty of his employment; that the injury did not arise out of or in the course of the employment; and that the risk was not incident to the employment are all facts bearing only upon compensability. They do not control jurisdiction.
To hold otherwise is but to hold that the Commission has jurisdiction only when the claim is compensable and every non-compensable case must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Likewise, it would require us to overrule a long line of decisions.
Nor do I agree that, in order to sustain the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission in this case, it is necessary for us to take the view that where a contract of employment exists between parties for any purpose whatever, then by operation of the Act, all negligent injury to the employee of whatever nature, however disconnected with the employment and wherever or under whatever circumstances consummated, is a matter exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission. This, it is true, is apparently the view advanced by defendants. ¥e are not required, however, to adopt all their argument in order to sustain the contention that upon this record it affirmatively appears that the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction of plaintiff’s claim.
That the injury did not arise out of or in the course of employment and that it resulted from a risk which was not incident to the employment are by no means determinative of jurisdiction. The existence or non-existence of these facts is to be ascertained after jurisdiction is assumed and their non-existence does not defeat the jurisdiction of the Commission. The existence of the relation is all that is required. Hildebrand v. Furniture Co., 212 N. C., 100, 193 S. E., 294; Lockey v. Cohen, Goldman & Co., 213 N. C., 356, 196 S. E., 342; Davis v. Meck-lenburg County, 214 N. C., 469, 199 S. E., 604; Dependents of Phifer v. Dairy, 200 N. C., 65, 156 S. E., 147; Bray v. Weatherly & Co., 203 N. C., 160, 165 S. E., 332 and cases cited; Lassiter v. Tel. Co., 215 N. C., 227, 1 S. E. (2d), 542; Wilson v. Mooresville, 222 N. C., 283; Bryan v. T. A. Loving Co., 222 N. C., 724; Davis v. Veneer Gorp., 200 N. C., 263, 156 S. E., 859; Francis v. Wood Turning Co., 204 N. C., 701, 169 S. E., 654; Beavers v. Power Co., 205 N. C., 34, 169 S. E., 825; Smith v. Machine Co., 206 N. C., 97, 172 S. E., 880; Porter v. Noland Co., 215 N. C., 724, 2 S. E. (2d), 853.
*224In the Hildebrand case, supra, the evidence tended to show that the defendant furniture manufacturer entered an exhibit in an exposition of finished furniture; that the exposition was solely to sell furniture to retailers and could in no way help defendant’s employees as to methods of manufacture or improve their usefulness to the defendant; that the foreman of the glue room, along with other foremen of the plant, was asked to go; that employees who elected to go were not paid for time and were given no orders while on the trip, but that part of their expenses was paid by defendant, and plaintiff’s intestate was requested to go after the end of the work week as a matter of courtesy as an “outing” or pleasure trip. Claimant’s intestate was killed in an automobile accident while he was driving the car of his fellow employee hack to the town in which the defendant’s plant was located.
In the Smith case, supra, the employee left his place of employment, went to a store for his own convenience and was killed when two armed men undertook to rob the merchant.
In the Porter case, supra, the employee used his employer’s ear for a week-end pleasure trip and was injured on the return trip.
In the Beaver case, supra, a private photographer was taking a group picture of the night shift of the mill employees on the premises of the employer. T,he employer had no interest in having the picture taken; it was not for use in the business; it included only those who voluntarily wished to appear in the group; the photographer alone intended to profit; the employees had not begun their work. The bench on which claimant and others were sitting collapsed, injuring claimant.
"Without undertaking to analyze the other cited cases it is sufficient to say that the facts were similar in that in each case it affirmatively appeared that at the time of the injury the employee was not about his master’s business and the injury resulted from a risk which was not incident to his work. In each case cited above the Court sustained the jurisdiction of the Industrial Commission.
But it may be said that in none of these cases did the Court make any reference to jurisdiction. On this point, silence is the strength of the decisions.
Our jurisdiction is derivative. If the inferior court is without jurisdiction we have none, and it has been the consistent policy of this Court to dismiss on motion or ex mero motu'so soon as a defect in jurisdiction is made to appear. “The. instant that the court perceives that it is exercising, or is about to exercise, a forbidden or ungranted power, it ought to stay its action; and, if it does not, such action is, in law, a nullity. Burroughs v. McNeill, 22 N. C., 291; Washington County v. Land Co., 222 N. C., 637; McCune v. Mfg. Co., 217 N. C., 351, 8 S. E. *225(2d), 219; Shepard v. Leonard, ante, p. 110. Hence, when we considered these and the many other cases of like import which have been before'this Court on the merits we, of necessity, sustained the jurisdiction of-the Industrial Commission.
If we were correct in so doing, particularly in Hildebrand v. Furniture Co., supra; Porter v. Noland Co., supra, and Beaver v. Power Co.., supra, when nothing more than the relationship and an injury appeared, I cannot perceive how we can escape the same conclusion here.
Sec. 2, Ch. 449, P. L., 1933, to my mind, evidences an intent on the part of the Legislature that an employee shall test his rights first before the Industrial Commission. Otherwise, a converse provision would have been made so that if he proceeds in the Superior Court and loses he will then have time to present his claim to the Commission. He is protected if he fails to establish the employer-employee relation before the commission but he has no other recourse if he, in the beginning, seeks to evade the provisions of the Act. Ch. 120, P. L., 1929.
In any event, this statute rebuts any suggestion that the conclusion that the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction creates a “No Man’s Land” in respect to jurisdiction of claims of employees for injuries shown to have no relation to the employment. In the event the commission finds that the employer-employee relation did not exist at the time of and in respect to the injury or to the transaction out of which such injury arose the doors of the Superior Court are still open to the employee. He can then present his cause in that forum.
The case comes to this: plaintiff is seeking now to assert a right her intestate surrendered in exchange for the benefits accruing to him under the Act. She should be required to present her cause in the tribunal created by the Act.
Since this dissent was tendered then re-drafted to meet changed made in the majority opinion there have been additional changes, both in substance and in form, in the majority opinion. “Nor is this all. Since writing the above in answer to the theory formerly advanced by the majority, a concurring opinion has been filed herein. The same procedure was followed in the ease of Fvans v. Bochingham, Homes, Inc., 220 N. C., 253. Here, as there, the concurrence gives added significance to the dissent.” Stacy, C. J., in ’ dissenting opinion in Williams v. McLean, 221 N. C., 228, at p. 231, 19 S. E. (2d), 867.
Due to these circumstances further change in the form of this dissent may be in-order. Be that as it may, my one and only object is to express my views on the law of the case — now in part adopted by the majority. This I have done. I am content to let it stand as written. However, it is necessary for me to add something in reply.
*226In Hildebrand v. Furniture Co., sufra, an award was made. Tbis Court reversed for tbe reason that the evidence failed to disclose that the injury and death arose out of and in the course of employment. It is so stated in the first paragraph of the opinion. This is all I am capable of reading into the decision.
On the first appeal in the Francis case, 204 N. C., 701, 169 S. E., 654, this Court specifically held that the employer-employee relation existed and the cause was remanded. The Commission then denied compensation. Francis sued in the Superior Court and a demurrer was sustained. It is said that we affirmed on the grounds that the judgment of the Industrial Commission was res judicata. Suffice it to say that if the Commission had no jurisdiction, no order it made could be res judicata.. Such order would be a nullity and a nullity decides nothing.
Rut we may write the Hildebrand and the Francis cases out of the books and there still remain numerous cases to the same effect. I have read with care the cases cited in the majority and the concurring opinion, as well as those cited here. So far as I can find we have only two decisions in which the cause” was decided adversely to the claimant for the reason that the employer-employee relation was not shown to exist at the time and in respect to the injury. The two exceptions are Ridout v. Rose's Stores, Inc., 205 N. C., 423, 171 S. E., 642, and Hollo-well v. Dept. of Conservation and Development, 206 N. C., 206, 173 S. E., 603. Each is factually distinguishable from the instant case.
We have decided, in cases originating in the Superior Court, that the employer-employee relation gives exclusive jurisdiction to the Industrial Commission even though the injury did not arise out of or in the course of the employment. McCune v. Mfg. Co., sufra; Pilley v. Cotton Mills, supra; McNeely v. Asbestos Co., 206 N. C., 568, 174 S. E., 509; Francis v. Wood Turning Co., supra; Lee v. American Hnka Corp., 212 N. C., 455, 193 S. E., 809; Murphy v. American JUnha Corp., 213 N. C., 218, 195 S. E., 536.
The substance of these decisions is epitomized in the syllabus in the Lee case as follows: “Even though the injury is not compensable under the Compensation Act the Superior Court properly dismissed the action, since plaintiff, by accepting the provisions of the Compensation Act, surrendered his right to maintain an action at common law to recover for an injury caused by the negligence of his employer, and in exchange therefor received the benefit of the employer’s assumption of liability for injuries compensable under the Act regardless of negligence.”
But now, after much writing on both sides, we must again come to the only real question posed for decision: Does it affirmatively appear from the admissions and the allegations made in the complaint that the employer-employee relation existed at the time of and in respect to the *227injury and death of plaintiff’s intestate? If so, the judgment should be affirmed. If not, it should be reversed. I vote to affirm.
WiNBORNE, -J., concurs in dissent.