Court Opinion

ID: 9677942
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 06:06:18.100218+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:00.437999
License: Public Domain

ANDERSON, J.
¶ 37. (dissenting). While I agree with the majority that Wis. Stat. § 802.05, repealed and recreated by S. Ct. Order 03-06, 2005 WI 38, 278 Wis. 2d xiii (eff. Mar. 31, 2005), is a procedural rule, Majority, ¶ 23, I do not agree that it is to be applied retroactively under the particular facts of this case. I conclude that its retroactive application would impose an unreasonable burden upon the administration of the judicial system and Scott Oil.
¶ 38. A universal rule of statutory interpretation is that procedural statutes are to he applied retroactively.
The general rule of statutory construction is that statutes are to be construed as relating to future and *688not to past acts. There is an exception to this rule: if a statute is procedural or remedial, rather than substantive, the statute is generally given retroactive application. The exception to the rule also has a qualification, namely that the retroactive application must not disturb contracts or vested rights.
Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 17, 308 N.W.2d 403 (1981).
¶ 39. In Mosing v. Hagen, 33 Wis. 2d 636, 641,148 N.W.2d 93 (1967), the supreme court explained this rule and its exceptions.
In Steffen v. Little (1957), 2 Wis. (2d) 350, 357, 358, 86 N.W (2d) 622, we stated:
"While statutes in general are construed prospectively the rule is otherwise with statutes whose operation is procedural or remedial. In State ex rel. Davis & Starr Lumber Co. v. Pors (1900), 107 Wis. 420, 427, 83 N.W 706, we quoted Chancellor Kent as follows:
" 'This doctrine [prospective construction of statutes only] is not understood to apply to remedial statutes, which may be of a retrospective nature, provided that they do not impair contracts or disturb absolute vested rights, and only go to confirm rights already existing and in furtherance of the remedy, by curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing existing obligations.'"
"In Pawlowski v. Eskofski (1932), 209 Wis. 189, 192, 244 N.W 611, we said: 'It is true as a general rule that statutes that are remedial only are retroactive,....' In State ex rel. Schmidt v. District No. 2 (1941), 237 Wis. 186, 190, 295 N.W 36, we said: '... it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that a retroactive operation is not to be given so as to impair an existing right or obligation otherwise than in matters ofproce-*689dure, unless that effect cannot be avoided without doing violence to the language of the enactment.' (Emphasis supplied.)"1
¶ 40. Mosing considered whether a provision of the statutes, governing commencement of an action, stating that if a summons was not filed with the clerk of courts and the requisite fees were not paid within one year of service on a defendant service was void, should be applied retroactively.2 Id. at 639-41. In Mosing, the summons was served on the defendants on November 12, 1964, but it was not filed until January 3, 1966. Id. at 638-39. The defendants sought to have the proceedings declared null and void. Id. Mosing argued that a retroactive application of the statute would affect a vested right because during the time between service and the filing of the summons the statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 641. In rejecting Mosing's arguments, the supreme court held:
We do not perceive that its [retroactive] application affects any substantive rights nor that it imposes an unreasonable burden upon the plaintiff as to its procedural requirements.
Id. at 642 (emphasis added). I take away from Mosing another qualification to the retroactive application of a procedural statute: a statute will not be applied retroactively if to do so imposes an unreasonable burden upon a party.
*690¶ 41. The retroactive application of the sanctions statute in this case will place an unreasonable burden on the effort to improve judicial efficiency, Majority, ¶ 21, because it allows Trinity to escape unscathed after prosecuting an action the circuit court declared frivolous from the day of filing. As the circuit court noted in denying Scott Oil's motion for sanctions, "[Tjhere was probably more than ample material available to Trinity that they should have realized that the continuation of this case would have been fruitless and it should have been terminated at an earlier time and fashion, but it didn't. It continued on."
¶ 42. The retroactive application will also place an unreasonable burden on Scott Oil, the inability to recoup some of the attorney fees incurred in this frivolous lawsuit. Scott Oil has had to defend this action for more than a year, a large portion of that time was devoted to a protracted discovery dispute brought about by Trinity's disregard of Scott Oil's discovery demands. When Scott Oil sought to enforce its right to discovery, Trinity defended by raising technical arguments that Scott Oil had failed to comply with local rules of procedure rather than raising any objections to discovery recognized by Wis. Stat. ch. 804. It is obvious that Scott Oil had to devote considerable resources to defending against Trinity's assertion that it breached the contract and to obtain discovery guaranteed to it by ch. 804.
¶ 43. It is also an unreasonable burden to hold the parties and their attorneys to new standards for the imposition of sanctions, which became effective only five days before the hearing on Scott Oil's successful motion for summary judgment. Between April 4, 2004, and June 30, 2005, everyone operated under the standards for determining and sanctioning frivolous con*691duct set forth in Wis. Stat. §§ 802.05 and 814.025. There are extensive changes in the new sanctions statutes. In addition to the creation of a safe harbor, the new statute provides for broad judicial discretion in determining that an act is frivolous and grants limited permission to make factual contentions that lack evi-dentiary support. Janine E Geske and William C. Gleisner, III, Frivolous Sanction Law in Wisconsin, 79 Wisconsin Lawyer 16, 19 (2006). Furthermore, the purpose of the new statute is to deter rather than to compensate, S. Ct. Order 03-06,278 Wis. 2d at xxi; to fulfill this purpose the statute requires that if a monetary sanction is imposed, it should ordinarily be paid into the court, § 802.05(3)(b), and bars the imposition of monetary sanctions for frivolous arguments — no longer "bad faith" arguments — for the extension, modification or reversal of existing law. Sec. 802.05(2) (b). I am sure that neither Scott Oil nor Trinity nor their counsel conducted this litigation under these new standards.
¶ 44. In 1994, the Seventh Circuit was faced with a cross-appeal from the denial of Rule 11 sanctions and began its discussion with the observation, "[o]ur resolution of the sanctions question initially is complicated by the December 1,1993 amendments to Rule 11, which took effect while this appeal was pending." Land v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Health and Welfare Fund, 25 F.3d 509, 515 (7th Cir. 1994).3 The United States Supreme *692Court adopted the amended version of Rule 11 in early 1993 to take effect on December 1, 1993, and it governed "all proceedings in civil cases thereafter commenced and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings in civil cases then pending."4 Id. at 516 (citation omitted). In deciding that it would not be "just and practicable," to apply the newly amended Rule 11 to the case the Seventh Circuit reasoned:
Both at the time Land filed his complaint and when the Fund moved for sanctions, the old Rule 11 was in effect, and both parties presumably were operating under the standards and procedures propounded in that rule. Counsel's conduct should therefore be judged under those standards. [Knipe v. Skinner, 19 F.3d 72, 78 (2d Cir. 1994)] (court should not charge party with knowledge of a rule that was not in effect at the time of filing); In re Crysen/Montenay Energy Co., 166 B.R. 546, 552 n.5 (S.D.N.Y.1994) (same); Kraemer Export Corp. v. Peg Perego U.S.A., Inc., 1994 WL 86357, *7-9, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3071, *21-22 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 1994) (would not be just to apply amended rule to conduct that occurred and motions that were filed prior to amendment); Agretti v. ANR Freight System, Inc., 1994 WL 46670, *1, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1433, *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 7, 1994) (would not be just to apply amended rule *693when parties must have expected that their conduct would be judged under the rule in effect at the time).
Land, 25 F.3d at 516.
¶ 45. I see no difference between deciding whether retroactive application is "just and practicable," id., and deciding whether retroactive application "imposes an unreasonable burden" on a party. Mosing, 33 Wis. 2d at 642. For this reason, I adopt the Seventh Circuit's reasoning and conclude, under the facts of this case, it would impose unreasonable burden on the administration of the judicial system and Scott Oil to judge the conduct of the parties by standards that were not in effect when the conduct occurred.

 In Gutter v. Seamandel, 103 Wis. 2d 1, 17-18, 308 N.W.2d 403 (1981), the supreme court repeated this formulation immediately after setting forth the general rule of statutory construction that is quoted in the above text.

 Wisconsin Stat. § 262.13(3) adopted by supreme court rule on January 20, 1964, with an effective date of May 1, 1965.

 Supreme Ct. Order 03-06,2005 WI38, 278 Wis. 2d xiii, xvii (eff. Mar. 31, 2005), recognizes that Wisconsin courts "will now be able to look to applicable decisions of federal courts since 1993 for guidance in the interpretation and application of the mandates in FRCP 11 in Wisconsin." Id. This has been our practice whenever a state rule mirrors the federal rule. State v. *692Cardenas-Hernandez, 219 Wis. 2d 516, 527-28, 579 N.W.2d 678 (1998). Of course, these federal decisions are not binding on us but we can adopt those that we find persuasive. Streff v. Town Of Delafield, 190 Wis. 2d 348, 356-57, 526 N.W.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1994).

 Unfortunately, the Wisconsin Supreme Court failed to specify that the new sanctions statute would govern all proceedings in civil cases commenced after the effective date "and, insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings in civil cases then pending." See Land v. Chicago Truck Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Indep.) Health and Welfare Fund, 25 F.3d 509, 516 (7th Cir. 1994).