Court Opinion

ID: 9621938
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-22 06:09:47.382401+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T13:32:18.489281
License: Public Domain

*393Ms. Justice Groves
dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the conclusion expressed in the majority opinion that the testimony of the appraiser, Bresnahan, was violative of the decision in Department of Highways v. Schulhoff, 167 Colo. 72, 445 P.2d 402. The Schulhoff case involved a tract of land slightly more than three quarters of an acre in size. As stated in the majority opinion, Schulhoff’s appraisers were permitted to arrive at their opinions by hypothetically carving the tract into residential building sites, estimating the value of each site, and then adding the values of all sites.
In Schulhoff, this court stated:
“It is the duty of the jury to find and allow no more than the present market value, no matter what the future prospects may be, and this character of evidence may be considered only for the purpose of ascertaining the market value at the time of the trial. After considering any and all reasonable uses to which the property may be put in the future, the question is, taking all things into consideration, what is the present market value, not what will or may be its value later on account of some use to which it may be put in the future.”
“Valuation must be based on what a willing purchaser will pay for the whole at the time of the taking and not what a number of purchasers might be induced to pay in the future for the land in smaller parcels.”
“Evidence of the price paid for similar property in a voluntary sale is admissible on the question of value of the property condemned, provided the properties sold are similar in locality and character to the property in question and not so far removed in point of time to make a comparison unjust or impossible.”
The instant matter involved a long, narrow strip of land containing 128.727 acres. This land was raw and undeveloped, but substantial portions of it were located across *394the road from a number of established land use areas. Land in.different areas had different values. On direct examination Mr. Bresnahan testified that in his opinion the entire strip of land, in its raw and undeveloped state, had a value of $1,508,012.75. Bresnahan also testified concerning 13 comparable sales of undeveloped, raw land and 23 sales of subdivided commercial tracts. He explained .that in evaluating a tract such as the one involved, one should separate it into land use areas comparable to those across the road from the various segments of the strip, and that by reason of location and nearby use, the different segments should be assigned different values.
After these matters had been elicited, Mr. Bresnahan testified that, in reaching his valuation of the various segments, he considered all of the above sales of land as though they.were without improvements and that, “these sales are all based on vacant ground.” Primarily, his valuations were based upon value per acre.
This mode of valuation seems both logical and reasonable. The land taken is adjacent to' a large development, which is continuing to develop. Appraisers could reach the conclusion that the development would continue into adjacent lands and the jury should be allowed to consider testimony pro and con in this respect. As I read the testimony of Mr. Bresnahan, he was expressing an opinion as to what a willing buyer would pay a willing seller for this long, narrow strip containing nearly 129 acres. If I am correct, then it follows that the jury was entitled to consider his testimony and assign it such weight as they deemed proper. This is a far cry from the Schulhoff prohibition against a hypothetical subdivision of the property into lots and then projecting a value at which eachof the lots might sell.
I am authorized to state that Mr. Chief Justice McWilliams joins in this dissent.