Court Opinion

ID: 9403711
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-06-21 16:01:11.535571+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T17:20:09.225496
License: Public Domain

NOT FOR PUBLICATION                        FILED
                    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        JUN 21 2023
                                                                      MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
                                                                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
                              FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

LAWRIDAN NGASONG ASONGTIA,                      No.    20-72307

                Petitioner,                     Agency No. A213-186-589

 v.
                                                MEMORANDUM*
MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney
General,

                Respondent.

                     On Petition for Review of an Order of the
                         Board of Immigration Appeals

                               Submitted June 15, 2023**
                               San Francisco, California

Before: WARDLAW, TALLMAN, and HURWITZ, Circuit Judges.

      Lawridan Asongtia, a native and citizen of Cameroon, petitions for review of

a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an appeal

from an order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of

removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).

      *
             This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
      **
             The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
Exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a), we deny the petition.

      1. Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Asongtia did

not establish eligibility for asylum or withholding of removal. See 8 C.F.R.

§§ 1208.13(a), 1208.16(b)(2); Farah v. Ashcroft, 348 F.3d 1153, 1156 (9th Cir.

2003).

      a. Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse credibility determination.

In making an adverse credibility determination, an IJ must consider “the totality of

the circumstances” and “all relevant factors,” including, but not limited to,

demeanor, candor, responsiveness of the applicant, and the inherent plausibility of

the applicant’s account. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). We give an IJ’s adverse

credibility determination special deference if supported by “specific and cogent

reasons.” Shrestha v. Holder, 590 F.3d 1034, 1044 (9th Cir. 2010).

      The IJ found that several relevant factors undermined Asongtia’s credibility,

including unresponsiveness and evasiveness, lack of detail in her account, and

demeanor. In affirming the credibility finding, the BIA properly credited the IJ’s

assessment of specific examples—such as “rapid fire renditions,” repetitive

answers unresponsive to the questions asked, absence of detail, and visible

nervousness on cross-examination—that rendered Asongtia’s testimony rehearsed,

memorized, and mechanical. See Manes v. Sessions, 875 F.3d 1261, 1263–64 (9th

Cir. 2017) (per curiam); Ling Huang v. Holder, 744 F.3d 1149, 1155 (9th Cir.

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2014).

        Although some of Asongtia’s unresponsiveness might be explained by a

language barrier, she was still unable on cross examination to elaborate why she

believed Cameroonian authorities were targeting her. See Bingxu Jin v. Holder,

748 F.3d 959, 965 (9th Cir. 2014) (holding that evasiveness to questions on cross

examination supports an adverse credibility finding). And even if alternative

explanations exist, “it would be extraordinary for a reviewing court to substitute its

second-hand impression of the petitioner’s demeanor . . . for that of the IJ.” Jibril

v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d 1129, 1137 (9th Cir. 2005). Any technical issues during the

hearing were relatively minor, and do not cast sufficient doubt on the IJ’s analysis

of her testimony. Ultimately, Asongtia’s “testimony here is not so thorough and

comprehensive as to compel a contrary conclusion.” Ling Huang, 744 F.3d at

1155.

        b. The IJ’s finding that Astongtia did not provide sufficient corroborating

evidence is also supported by substantial evidence. Asongtia provided some

documentary evidence—declarations, medical records, and police

“convocations”—in support of her testimony. However, to reverse a determination

about the sufficiency of corroborating evidence, we “must find that the evidence

not only supports [a contrary] conclusion, but compels it.” Aden v. Holder, 589

F.3d 1040, 1046 (9th Cir. 2009). The IJ appropriately gave these unauthenticated

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photocopies of what Asongtia claimed were official records little weight. See

Vatyan v. Mukasey, 508 F.3d 1179, 1185 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Immigration judges

retain broad discretion to accept a document as authentic or not based on the

particular factual showing presented.”).1

      2. Because Asongtia failed to contest the agency’s denial of CAT relief in

her opening appellate brief, she has forfeited that claim before this Court. See

Martinez-Serrano v. INS, 94 F.3d 1256, 1259 (9th Cir. 1996).2

      PETITION DENIED.

1
 Asongtia also argues that she was entitled to notice and the opportunity to obtain
sufficient corroborative evidence. However, this claim was not raised before the
BIA and thus is unexhausted. See Rojas-Garcia v. Ashcroft, 339 F.3d 814, 819
(9th Cir. 2003) (“Before a petitioner can raise an argument on appeal, the petitioner
must first raise the issue before the BIA or IJ.” (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d))).
2
 Asongtia’s motion for stay of removal pending our review of her case is denied as
moot.

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