Court Opinion

ID: 9895848
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-11-08 20:10:30.633752+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T09:12:22.187637
License: Public Domain

J-A18015-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

  IN THE INTEREST OF: S.W., A                  :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
  MINOR                                        :        PENNSYLVANIA
                                               :
                                               :
  APPEAL OF: W.W., MOTHER                      :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :
                                               :   No. 308 WDA 2023

             Appeal from the Order Entered February 15, 2023
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
                      No(s): CP-02-AP-0000034-2022

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                      FILED: November 8, 2023

       W.W. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered on February 15, 2023,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, involuntarily terminating

her parental rights to her daughter, S.W. (“Child”), born in September 2020.1

Upon careful review, we affirm.

       On March 31, 2022, Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth &

Families (“CYF”) filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Mother’s

parental rights to Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).

The court held an evidentiary hearing on January 27, 2023, when Child was

____________________________________________

1 By the same order, the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated the parental

rights of any unknown father with respect to Child. No purported father filed
an appeal or participated in the instant appeal.
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two years old.2 Child’s court-appointed counsel represented both her legal

and best interests.3

       CYF presented the testimony of its caseworker, Ronnie Tustin; court-

appointed psychologist, Gregory            A.   Lobb, Ph.D., who   performed an

interactional evaluation of Child and Mother as well as an individual evaluation

of Mother, among other things; and another court-appointed psychologist,

Beth A. Bliss, Psy.D., who performed an Intelligence Quotient (“IQ”) test on

Mother as well as interactional evaluations between (1) Mother and Child and

(2) current foster parents and Child. In addition, CYF introduced, and the

court admitted, Dr. Lobb’s reports dated August 8, 2021, and May 9, 2022, as

CYF Exhibit 1; and Dr. Bliss’s reports dated October 18, 2021, and January

20, 2023, as CYF Exhibit 4, inter alia. Mother testified on her own behalf and

adduced the testimony of Nicole Dardia, the in-home specialist at Family

Resources who helped Mother obtain various services.

       The relevant factual and procedural history is as follows. CYF became

aware of Mother approximately one month after Child’s birth. On October 13,

2020, CYF received a general protective service report that raised concerns
____________________________________________

2 The Honorable Eleanor L. Bush presided over the termination of parental
rights proceeding as well as the underlying dependency matter.

3 Insomuch as Child’s legal interests were incapable of ascertainment due to

her young age, the court did not appoint separate legal counsel for Child. See
In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1092-93 (Pa. 2018) (holding, “if the preferred
outcome of a child is incapable of ascertainment because the child is very
young and pre-verbal, there can be no conflict between the child’s legal
interests and his or her best interests; as such, the mandate of Section
2313(a) of the Adoption Act” is satisfied).

                                           -2-
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about Mother’s mental health and indicated that she required assistance

caring for Child.    See N.T., 1/27/23, at 46; see also CYF Exhibit 2

(Dependency Orders).

      Two days later, CYF performed a home visit. See N.T. at 46. According

to Ms. Tustin, it appeared Mother was experiencing visual and auditory

hallucinations: (1) Mother deconstructed Child’s crib because she saw red eyes

in it; (2) Mother reported that the lights were making a clicking sound despite

the caseworker not hearing anything; and (3) Mother reported “bad vibes”

from inanimate objects. See id. at 50. CYF also learned that Mother has a

history of untreated mental health issues. See id. at 64. Additionally, Mother

revealed that she was feeding Child, who was merely one month old,

inappropriate food for Child’s age, and during the visit, left Child with the

caseworker to do her laundry. See id. at 51.

      The same day, Mother was taken to a psychiatric hospital for evaluation.

See id. Thereafter, CYF obtained emergency protective custody of Child. At

this time, CYF performed an examination of Child.       See id. at 53.     The

evaluation revealed skin breakdown in Child’s groin area and that Child had

not been gaining weight since she was born. See id.

      Following a shelter care hearing on October 21, 2020, Child remained in

the care and custody of CYF.      See CYF Exhibit 2 (Dependency Orders).

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Thereafter, CYF filed a petition for dependency which was granted by the court

on November 25, 2020. See id.4

       In furtherance of Child’s permanency goal of reunification, Mother was

required to complete the following goals: (1) comply with mental health and

psychiatric evaluations and follow through on the recommendations; (2)

attend supervised visitation with Child; (3) follow recommendations from

forensic evaluations; (4) participate in IQ testing; (5) identify safety concerns

within her home; and (6) learn about Child’s needs and development. See

N.T. at 56-57.

       Over the course of Child’s dependency, Mother progressed from minimal

compliance to substantial compliance with her objectives. However, at each

permanency review hearing, the court indicated that Mother had made

____________________________________________

4 Child was initially placed, through Pressley Ridge, in the home of A.E. and

A.E. (“former foster parents”). N.T. at 54. On July 6, 2022, the court held a
permanency review hearing where multiple service providers raised concerns
about former foster parents based on Dr. Lobb’s forensic report dated May 9,
2022. See CYF Exhibit 1 (Dr. Lobb’s Reports).

      Thereafter, CYF filed a motion requesting to move Child to a new foster
home. On August 26, 2022, the court conducted a hearing, and, by order of
the same date, the court granted CYF’s motion.          See CYF Exhibit 2
(Dependency Orders). As such, Child was placed with a new pre-adoptive
foster family (“current foster parents”) on September 6, 2022. See N.T. at
54.

      Following Child’s removal, former foster parents filed a motion to
intervene which, following oral argument, the court denied by order dated
November 8, 2022. See id. Former foster parents appealed this order. Their
appeal is docketed at 22 WDA 2023, and we dispose of it by separate
memorandum.

                                           -4-
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minimal progress toward alleviating the circumstances which necessitated

Child’s original placement. The court repeatedly found that Mother “exhibits

little understanding of the reasons why Child is in foster care.” CYF Exhibit 2

(Dependency Orders).     Indeed, Ms. Tustin, CYF caseworker, testified that

Mother “consistently reports to me that she does not understand the need for

mental health [treatment] and that she is, quote, not crazy.” N.T. at 71. Dr.

Lobb confirmed that he does not believe Mother is aware of her limitations.

See id. at 21.

      By order dated January 27, 2023, and entered on February 15, 2023,

the orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant

to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b). On March 14, 2023, Mother timely

filed a notice of appeal and a concise statement of errors complained of on

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b). The court filed its Rule

1925(a) opinion on April 17, 2023.

      On appeal, Mother presents the following issues for review:
      1. Did Mother waive her right to challenge the trial court’s decision
      to terminate her parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2)?

      2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
      law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s
      parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (8)?

      3. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
      law in concluding that CYF met its burden of proving by clear and
      convincing evidence that termination of Mother’s parental rights
      would best serve the needs and welfare of the child pursuant to
      23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)?

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Mother’s Brief at 6 (issues reordered for ease of disposition).5

       We consider Mother’s claims in the context of determining whether the

involuntary termination order is supported by competent evidence.          In re

Adoption of C.M., 255 A.3d 343, 358 (Pa. 2021).            When applying this

standard, appellate courts must accept the orphans’ court’s findings of fact

and credibility determinations if they are supported by the record. Interest

of S.K.L.R., 256 A.3d 1108, 1123 (Pa. 2021). “Where the trial court’s factual

findings are supported by the evidence, an appellate court may not disturb

the trial court’s ruling unless it has discerned an error of law or abuse of

discretion.” In re Adoption of L.A.K., 265 A.3d 580, 591 (Pa. 2021).

       Our Supreme Court has explained, “[a]n abuse of discretion does not

result merely because the reviewing court might have reached a different

conclusion,” or “the facts could support an opposite result.” In re Adoption

of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826–27 (Pa. 2012). Instead, an appellate court may

reverse for an abuse of discretion “only upon demonstration of manifest

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. at 826.    This

standard of review reflects the deference we pay to trial courts, who often

observe the parties first-hand across multiple hearings. Interest of S.K.L.R.,

256 A.3d at 1123–24.

       The involuntary termination of parental rights is governed by Section

2511 of the Adoption Act (“Act”), which requires a bifurcated analysis.
____________________________________________

5 Child’s attorney filed a brief in this appeal advocating for affirming the
termination order. See N.T. at 176-78.

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23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.    Initially, the trial court must determine whether the

conduct of the parent warrants termination under Section 2511(a). Only if

the court determines that the petitioner established grounds for termination

under Section 2511(a) does it then engage in assessing the petition under

Section 2511(b), which involves a child’s needs and welfare. In re T.S.M.,

71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

      To involuntarily terminate parental rights, the petitioner must prove

grounds under both Section 2511(a) and (b) by clear and convincing evidence,

which is evidence that is so “clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable

a trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of

the precise facts in issue.”    C.M., 255 A.3d at 359 (quoting Matter of

Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

      In this case, the relevant provisions of the Act are Section 2511(a)(2)

and (b), which provide as follows:
      (a) General Rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
      may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
      grounds:

                                      ...

         (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
         or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
         essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
         his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
         causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
         will not be remedied by the parent.

                                      ...

      (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
      of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
      physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights

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       of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
       environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
       income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
       control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
       to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
       efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
       which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
       filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).6

       The grounds for termination of parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2)

due to parental incapacity are not limited to affirmative misconduct. We have

explained, “[a] parent who is incapable of performing parental duties is just

as parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties.”        Matter of

Adoption of C.A.W., 683 A.2d 911, 914–15 (Pa. Super. 1996) (citation

omitted).

       With respect to Section 2511(b), the court is required to “give primary

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare

of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). Regarding the “emotional needs and

welfare” of the child, our precedent has interpreted it to include “intangibles

such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267 (citation

and quotation marks omitted).

       Our Supreme Court in In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481 (Pa. 1993), first

recognized that the “emotional needs and welfare” analysis under Section

____________________________________________

6 The court also terminated Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section
2511(a)(8). However, this Court “need only agree with any one subsection of
§ 2511(a), in addition to § 2511(b), in order to affirm the termination of
parental rights.” In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc).

                                           -8-
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2511(b) should include, in part, the child’s bond with his or her parent. In

doing so, trial courts must examine the effect on the child of severing such a

bond, and this includes “a determination of whether the bond is necessary and

beneficial to the child, i.e., whether maintaining the bond serves the child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare.” In the Interest

of K.T., 296 A.3d 1085, 1113 (Pa. 2023).

      The High Court recently explained:
      Severance of a “necessary and beneficial” bond would predictably
      cause more than the “adverse” impact that, unfortunately, may
      occur whenever a bond is present. By contrast, severance of
      a necessary and beneficial relationship is the kind of loss that
      would predictably cause “extreme emotional consequences” or
      significant, irreparable harm. See E.M., 620 A.2d at 484 (“a
      beneficial bonding could exist between a parent and child, such
      that, if the bond were broken, the child could suffer extreme
      emotional consequences”).

K.T., 296 A.3d at 1109-10 (some citations omitted).

      As   such,   the   K.T.   Court   distinguished   “extreme    emotional

consequences” from an “adverse impact” to the child when parental rights are

terminated. Id. at 1111. Specifically, the Court cautioned that a trial court

“must not truncate its analysis and preclude severance based solely on

evidence of an ‘adverse’ or ‘detrimental’ impact to the child.”   Id. at 1114.

The Court concluded, “to grant termination when a parental bond exists, there

must be clear and convincing evidence that the bond is not necessary and

beneficial.” Id.

      Moreover, in reiterating that the parental bond is only one part of the

analysis, the K.T. Court held that the “Section 2511(b) inquiry must also

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include consideration … [of] certain evidence if it is present in the

record.” Id. at 1113 n.28 (emphasis in original). The specific evidence at

issue in K.T. related to the child’s need for permanency and the length of time

she had spent in foster care; the pre-adoptive nature of her foster home and

the child’s bond with foster parents; and whether the foster home met the

child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs. Id. at 1112. The Court

emphasized, however, that these foregoing factors were not an exhaustive list

for consideration under all Section 2511(b) analyses.       Id. at 1113 n.28.

Rather, the K.T. Court found, as noted above, that the particular facts of each

case determine the factors to be considered.

      The Court recognized that “case law indicates that bond, plus

permanency, stability and all ‘intangible’ factors may contribute equally to the

determination of a child’s specific developmental, physical, and emotional

needs and welfare, and thus are all of ‘primary’ importance in the Section

2511(b) analysis.” Id. at 1109. For instance, if relevant in a case, a trial

court “can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child” in its analysis

under Section 2511(b).    See In re M.M., 106 A.3d 114, 118 (Pa. Super.

2014).

      In Mother’s first issue, she contends that she did not waive her argument

under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).     In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’

court concluded that Mother waived any challenge regarding Section

2511(a)(2) because she did not assert an error regarding her repeated and

continued incapacity. See Orphans’ Court Opinion (“OCO”), 4/17/23, at 10-

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11. Rather, Mother asserted an error only with respect to the court’s finding

that her conduct demonstrated repeated and continued abuse, neglect, or

refusal. See id.

     Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statement declares the following:
     The trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a matter of
     law in granting the petition to involuntarily terminate Mother’s
     parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (8).
     There was not clear and convincing evidence of abuse, refusal,
     or neglect by Mother. The conditions which led to the removal
     of the child no longer exist and termination of the parental rights
     of Mother would not serve the needs and welfare of Child.

Rule 1925(b) statement, 3/14/23 (emphasis added).

     Our Supreme Court has held:
     The purpose of a Rule 1925(b) statement is to facilitate appellate
     review and to provide the parties and the public with the legal
     basis for a judicial decision.             To this end, Rule
     1925(b)(4)(ii) provides that the Rule 1925(b) statement “shall
     concisely identify each error that the appellant intends to assert
     with sufficient detail to identify the issue to be raised for the
     judge.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(ii) (emphasis added). Highlighting
     this need for conciseness, Rule 1925(b)(4)(iv) indicates that
     the Rule 1925(b) statement “should not be redundant or provide
     lengthy explanations as to any error.” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(iv).
     On the other hand, the Rule 1925(b) statement cannot be too
     concise, as it must properly specify the errors to be addressed on
     appeal. … Pursuant to Rule 1925(b)(5)(vii), “[i]ssues not included
     in the Statement and/or not raised in accordance with the
     provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”

     To ensure that a Rule 1925(b) statement is both concise but also
     sufficiently detailed to identify all of the issues desired to be raised
     on appeal, Rule 1925(b)(4)(v) provides that “[e]ach error
     identified in the Statement will be deemed to include
     every subsidiary issue        that     was     raised   in   the    trial
     court[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(v) (emphasis added).

                                       ...

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      The text of these rules emphasizes that to be “subsidiary issues,”
      the unstated issue must be “included” within the stated issue. …
      Conversely, an unstated issue is not subsidiary when it is separate
      and distinct from the stated issue.

Commonwealth v. Price, 284 A.3d 165, 170-71 (Pa. 2022) (citations,

quotation marks, and footnote omitted); see also In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163

A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2017) (reiterating that issues not included in the

concise statement are waived).

      Mother contends in her brief that “incapacity” is included within the

stated issue in her Rule 1925(b) statement as she posits that the court erred

in terminating her parental rights “pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2).”

Mother’s Brief at 28-29. We agree insofar as Mother’s stated issue challenged

the orphans’ court’s conclusions under Section 2511(a)(2).

      Further, although Mother failed to specify “repeated and continued

incapacity” in her Rule 1925(b) statement, the orphans’ court nonetheless

addressed the issue on the merits in its Rule 1925(a) opinion. See OCO at

11-19; see also Commonwealth v. Arnold, 284 A.3d 1262, 1269 n.9 (Pa.

Super. 2022) (rejecting trial court’s claim that a litigant failed to preserve a

claim with sufficient specificity pursuant to Rule 1925(b), where “the court’s

alternative analysis on the merits demonstrates that it was well-aware of the

nature and scope” of the petitioner’s argument).      Thus, we decline to find

waiver in this regard.

      With her second issue, Mother argues that CYF presented insufficient

evidence to support termination of her parental rights regarding any continued

incapacity of Mother to provide Child essential care and that the conditions

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that led to removal cannot or will not be remedied. See Mother’s Brief at 22.

Mother contends that the court erred in finding that she did not complete her

goals. See id. at 22-23. She further posits that her participation in mental

health treatment programs and coached parenting classes remedied the

conditions that led to Child’s removal. See id. at 23.

      The court focused its reasoning under Section 2511(a)(2) on Mother’s

failure to alleviate the conditions that brought Child into care, despite

completing various services. The court explained as follows:
      The [c]ourt acknowledges, and CYF concedes, that Mother has
      complied with required services. Despite this compliance, Mother
      continues to deny the need for services and displays no
      understanding of her diagnoses or the reason Child is in care. In
      sum, the evidence established that despite Mother’s active
      participation in the services provided to her, she was unable to
      demonstrate mental health stability and age-appropriate
      parenting skills. The [c]ourt viewed this evidence in conjunction
      with evidence of Mother’s intellectual disability, a static condition
      for which there is no treatment, and the impact it has on Mother’s
      ability to manage the ever-changing needs of a developing child.

OCO at 18-19.

      Ms. Tustin, CYF caseworker, testified that Child was removed from

Mother’s care due to concerns regarding her mental health and her inability

to properly care for Child.      Ms. Tustin testified as follows, on direct

examination, regarding Mother’s mental health at the time of removal:

      Q: So going back to the earlier question, Ms. Tustin, can you
      advise us, what did CYF learn in the course of its home visit on --
      I think you said October 15, 2020?

      A: Yes. At the time it appeared that [M]other was exhibiting
      auditory and visual hallucinations.

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       Q: And was the -- were there details provided by the visiting
       caseworker regarding what had been observed or heard during
       that home visit?

       A: Yes. Inside the home it was observed that the crib was not set
       up. Mother had reported that it was taken down [due] to seeing
       red eyes in the crib. Mother reported hearing and seeing things,
       including that the lights in the home were making a clicking noise.
       Mother was asked to plug those lights in, and the caseworker did
       not observe those same sounds. Mother had reported bad vibes
       coming from inanimate objects, and the couch was also observed
       to be [upside] down against the wall.

N.T. at 50. CYF learned that Mother was not participating in any treatment

for her mental health issues. Id. at 64.

       Accordingly, the court ordered Mother to undergo a mental health

assessment, psychiatric evaluation, and follow all recommendations for

treatment and medication. Following his initial individual evaluation of Mother

in March 2021, Dr. Lobb diagnosed her with Unspecified Schizophrenia

Spectrum7 and Other Psychotic Disorder.            See id. at 9-13; see also CYF

Exhibit 1 (Dr. Lobb’s Reports). Dr. Lobb recommended that Mother obtain a

psychiatric evaluation to determine if medicine would be appropriate

treatment. See N.T. at 13. He testified that “[g]enerally, those symptoms

are [] thought to be responsive to medication, and first line treatment for that

diagnosis is medication.” Id. at 13-14.

       Ultimately, Mother participated in a psychiatric evaluation in August

2022. Mother reported to Ms. Tustin that the evaluation did not recommend

____________________________________________

7 Dr. Lobb described the diagnosis as “a general category of somebody that

may have a thought disorder and has some symptoms of psychosis or
schizophrenia, auditory hallucinations, those types of things.” N.T. at 13.

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that she be prescribed medication. See id. at 68-69. However, Mother did

not provide CYF with any documentation to confirm. See id. at 131. Ms.

Tustin attempted to contact the provider of the evaluation to obtain a report

but was unsuccessful. See id.

     Mother also repeatedly reported to Ms. Tustin that she does not

understand why she needs to attend therapy. See id. at 65. She consistently

stated to Ms. Tustin that she is “not crazy” and refused to acknowledge her

mental health needs. Id. at 71.

     Dr. Lobb emphasized the need for treatment and stated the following

on direct examination:
     My concern is [Child] is very young and … without having support
     around her, I guess, around [Mother], my concern would be that
     if those symptoms were to come back and she was not under
     proper care with a psychiatrist and a therapist, having a mental
     health team, … [Child] could be at risk of being in danger because
     of this.

Id. at 26.    Dr. Lobb was also concerned with Mother’s commitment to

treatment:
     Q: And you indicated that [Mother] was defensive toward her
     symptoms or disclosing her symptoms and she was minimizing
     her symptoms. How can this minimization impact kind of her
     long-term commitment to treatment?

     A: I would be concerned that if the court was no longer involved,
     whether she would continue with treatment. If her symptoms …
     have remitted or have reduced for her and she is not having those
     symptoms, I would still, particularly with the age of [Child], and
     [Mother] having a history of these symptoms, I would still want
     her to be in treatment long-term. I think that … not having natural
     supports around her, a therapist could be very supportive for her,
     … having a psychiatrist, … she’s able to follow up with who’s
     familiar with her. If she has some sort of an increase in symptoms

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       at some point, somebody is there to intervene sooner rather than
       later.

Id. at 36-37 (cleaned up).

       Dr. Bliss, who was court-appointed to perform an IQ evaluation on

Mother, diagnosed her with a mild intellectual disability and noted Dr. Lobb’s

diagnosis of Unspecified Schizophrenia Spectrum and Other Psychotic

Disorder. See CYF Exhibit 4 (Dr. Bliss’ Reports).8 She testified that Mother

would require significant support in order to meet Child’s needs. See N.T. at

99-103.     She further emphasized that therapy is not sufficient to treat

Mother’s mental health, as follows:
       One, that the primary mental health concern that I identified and
       diagnosed as well as prior individuals, from my understanding, it’s
       related to psychosis, and so therapy is not typically the main form
       of treatment for any kind of psychotic disorder. It would be
       medication. I [am not] aware of any other mental health concerns
       really for her, so therapy really wouldn’t be effective, especially
       not by itself.

       Additionally, there’s the concern about her IQ, and again, therapy
       is not very effective with low IQ people. It needs to be very
       concrete at her level, and I’m not sure what she’s receiving, if it
       is, but again, the research has shown that therapy is usually not
       very effective with low IQ individuals.

Id. at 107-08.

       Mother failed to identify any additional supports. When Ms. Tustin asked

Mother about additional support, she merely indicated that Child “needed to

____________________________________________

8 While Dr. Bliss was appointed to conduct an IQ evaluation of Mother, Dr.
Bliss testified that — during that evaluation — she also noticed aspects of
Mother’s behavior that made Dr. Bliss concerned that Mother may have a
psychotic disorder. N.T. at 104-05, 107.

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be with her.” Id. at 89. Ultimately, Mother revealed maternal grandmother

as a support, but CYF assessed her and deemed her inappropriate. See id.

      Despite Mother’s participation in the various services, Ms. Tustin

testified, on direct examination, that Mother’s capacity to provide essential

parental care for Child’s physical or mental well-being has not improved:

      Q: And can you take us through what has been [Mother’s]
      response to your -- the concerns you’ve raised?

      A: [Mother] generally [disagrees] with [CYF]. When I identify
      safety concerns and give her suggestions on how to rectify them,
      her general response is that [Child] knows better. For example,
      when [Child] became more mobile, it was suggested that a safety
      gate be placed on [Mother’s] stairs, and [Mother] had reported
      that [Child] knew better than to try to go up the stairs.

      Q: Are there any other examples you can provide us?

      A: There was a point in time when [Mother] had moved [and] I
      assessed her new home. There was a pair of scissors on the floor
      that I suggested be picked up before the visits start, at which
      [Mother] also reported [Child] knew better….

      Q: And in the course of your observations of visits, were you able
      to observe whether [Mother] [was] independently … able to, I
      guess, determine or see or address a safety concern[]?

      A: Not that I have observed.

Id. at 79-80.    Ms. Tustin further testified that Mother continued to lack

knowledge of appropriate foods for Child. Id. at 93 (“[Child] is two years old,

but there were still moments where [Mother] wanted to feed [her] formula or

a bottle instead of transitioning to toddler foods….”). Mother also repeatedly

failed to read Child’s cues during visits. Id. (“Child [] became more mobile

[and] would indicate that she would want down … and [Mother] was not []

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interpreting those needs as [Child] was displaying them, did not want to put

her down, did not want to … allow [Child] to do those things.”).

      The record reveals that Mother has not developed insight into her

incapacities nor progressed in alleviating the circumstances that brought Child

into care. Throughout the case, Mother repeatedly questioned the need for

services. Mother merely relied on her own self-serving testimony to indicate

that she does not require medication. However, both Dr. Lobb and Dr. Bliss

insisted that medication is the first line of treatment when addressing

psychotic disorders.

      Based on the foregoing, we discern no abuse of discretion by the

orphans’ court in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section

2511(a)(2). The record demonstrates that Mother’s repeated and continued

incapacity to acknowledge her limitations with her mental health has caused

Child to be without essential parental care, control, or subsistence necessary

for her physical and mental well-being.      Further, the cause of Mother’s

incapacity cannot or will not be remedied.

      With her third issue, Mother argues that the orphans’ court erred in

analyzing Section 2511(b) because the court abused its discretion with respect

to Section 2511(a).    See Mother’s Brief at 26.   In the alternative, Mother

argues that terminating her parental rights would be detrimental to Child

because her relationship with Mother adds value to her life. See id. at 26-27.

      The trial court opined the following regarding its Section 2511(b)

analysis:

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     In this matter, CYF conceded the existence of a bond between
     Mother and Child. The court assumed the existence of this bond
     in considering the evidence and credits Mother for her ability to
     develop a bond with Child while she has remained out of Mother’s
     care. However, despite the existence of a bond between Mother
     and Child, the evidence supported the court’s conclusion that
     termination of Mother’s parental rights served Child’s needs and
     welfare.

     Child was removed from Mother’s care at approximately one
     month old and has remained in care since that time. Following
     multiple individual evaluations of Mother and interactional
     evaluations of Mother and of Child’s current foster parents with
     Child, Dr. Bliss observed Child to be “bonded and attached” to
     Mother but opined that Child “views foster parents as her
     psychological parents, looking to them when she needs extra
     comfort, support, or reassurance.” With regard to Mother’s
     intellectual disability, Dr. Bliss expressed concerns with Mother’s
     ongoing ability to independently parent Child or meet her needs
     as she continues to develop, testifying that she would need
     continued support throughout Child’s life to be able to effectively
     parent. Though she noted that Mother is not currently a risk to
     Child if she were to have some limited unsupervised visits, Dr.
     Bliss concluded that “[d]ue to her low intellectual functioning, her
     mental illness, and her medical issues, Mother is not currently in
     a position to be a primary caregiver to her daughter.”

     Considering whether termination of parental rights would meet
     Child’s needs and welfare, Dr. Bliss concluded that it would, “as it
     is unlikely that Mother will ever be in a position to be a primary
     caregiver to Child[,] and she has already been placed outside of
     Mother’s care for a significant length of time given her young age.”
     While acknowledging that termination may have a detrimental
     effect on Child should she never see Mother again, Dr. Bliss opined
     that foster parents, given their relationship with Child, would be
     able to alleviate any of the negative effects Child may experience.
     In this same regard, Dr. Lobb testified that given the significant
     length of time Child has been in care, having permanency
     outweighs any impact termination of Mother’s rights would have
     on Child.

     Child is now two years old and has remained outside Mother’s care
     for almost all of her life. Given Mother’s ongoing inability to
     independently care for Child, Child’s length of time in placement,
     and her bond with her [current foster parents], the court

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      justifiably concluded that Child’s need for safety, permanency,
      and stability outweighs the possible benefit to Child of
      maintaining her relationship with Mother. Based on these
      observations and conclusions, the [c]ourt appropriately
      determined that termination of Mother’s rights serves Child’s
      needs and welfare.

OCO at 22-24 (cleaned up; emphasis added; footnotes omitted).

      The certified record supports the orphans’ court’s findings. There is no

dispute that Mother regularly attended supervised visitation three times per

week. Further, CYF acknowledged that, during the course of her dependency,

Child appeared more comfortable with Mother. See N.T. at 84. Dr. Bliss,

after conducting interactional evaluations in January 2023, also indicated that

Child appears to be attached to Mother, “at least to some degree.” Id. at 111.

However, she emphasized that Child relies on current foster parents when she

needs comfort, security, and stability, as follows:
      Q: So you also did an interactional with [current] foster parents
      and you noted in your conclusions that they were her
      psychological parents. So can you describe for us, what was --
      you observed and noted from the interactional with these foster
      parents that led you to that conclusion?

      A: Sure. So, again, how I define psychological parent, it’s who []
      the child looks to when they need extra comfort, support,
      reassurance. It’s who they feel is going to meet their primary
      day-to-day needs.

                                      ...

      And so [here], the bond and attachment that I viewed and the
      positive interactions during the [interactional evaluations] with
      the foster parents was one piece. So really that, the fact that she
      looked to her foster mom when she was tired, when she was done,
      when she needed some comforting, that was kind of a main factor
      in concluding that [she] was her psychological parent.

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Id. at 114-16.   Dr. Bliss recognized that termination of Mother’s parental

rights may have a detrimental effect on Child, but she opined that her

relationship with current foster parents could help alleviate any negative

effects she might experience. See id. at 119, 124; see also K.T., 296 A.3d

at 1114 (stating that a trial court “must not truncate its analysis and preclude

severance based solely on evidence of an ‘adverse’ or ‘detrimental’ impact to

the child”).   Further, when asked by the orphans’ court if Child would

experience extreme emotional consequences if Mother’s parental rights were

terminated and Child did not see her again, Dr. Bliss opined that she did not

believe Child “would experience extreme negative consequences or trauma.”

N.T. at 125. Relatedly, Dr. Lobb emphasized Child’s need for permanency.

Id. at 39 (“I think she does have a bond with [Mother], but … I think that not

having permanency would outweigh that at this point, in my opinion.”).

      Despite finding some level of attachment between Mother and Child, the

record supports that the bond they share is not necessary and beneficial. See

K.T., 296 A.3d at 1114 (concluding that “to grant termination when a parental

bond exists, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the bond is not

necessary and beneficial”).   Moreover, the evidence reveals that Child has

been removed from Mother’s care since she was one month old, is living in a

pre-adoptive home, and shares a psychological bond with her current foster

parents, which is necessary for her emotional needs and welfare. We discern

no abuse of discretion in the court’s weighing of these factors. See id. at

1113 (emphasizing that “the parental bond is but one part of the overall

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[Section 2511](b) analysis”); id. (adding that the court must also consider

“other important factors such as the child’s need for permanency and length

of time in foster care…; whether the child is in a pre-adoptive home and

bonded with foster parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s

developmental, physical, and emotional needs…”).

      Based on the foregoing, the record evidence amply demonstrates that

the termination of Mother’s parental rights will serve the developmental,

emotional, and physical needs and welfare of Child. See In re A.S., supra

at 483 (“[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can equally

emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should also consider the

intangibles, such as the love, comfort, security, and stability the child might

have with the foster parent.”). Therefore, we discern no abuse of discretion

by the court in terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section

2511(b).

      Accordingly, we affirm the order terminating Mother’s parental rights

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b).

      Order affirmed.

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DATE: 11/08/2023

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