Court Opinion

ID: 9683212
Source: CourtListenerOpinion
Date Created: 2023-08-24 13:24:36.20178+00
Date Added: 2024-06-11T18:17:46.249901
License: Public Domain

McCALEB, Justice
(dissenting).
In reinstating its previous judgment in this case, the majority has placed its decision on the ground that Section 122 of the Criminal. Code, which defines the crime of public intimidation, was not intended to embrace the- acts for which appellant has been charged and convicted.
This conclusion is unsound in my opinion. The provisions of R.S. 14:122 are clear and, therefore, need not be construed or interpreted. As applied to this case, the pertinent language of the statute reads:
“Public intimidation is the use of violence, force, or threats upon any of the following persons, with the intent to influence his conduct in relation to his position, employment, or duty:-
“(1) Public officer or public employee ; * * * ”
Appellant was charged with violating the statute in that he used force and violence upon Otis Edwards, an employee of the Louisiana State Penitentiary, with intent to influence his conduct in relation to his said employment and duty. Manifestly, this charge, which tracks the statute, satisfies legál requirements and contains all of the essential elements of the crime, (1) use of force upon a public employee and (2) with intent to influence his conduct in relation to his position.
And the facts of the case reveal that there was some evidence elicited by the .prosecution to sustain each element of the offense. Edwards was shown to be an employee of the State Penitentiary in Charge of prisoners; that it was his duty to require the prisoners to line up in single file at mealtime; that appellant was out of line and refused to get back in line and that, when he attempted to force appellant to do so, appellant struck him with his fist. Since appellant’s act in striking the officer was doubtless an act of violence, the only other question in the case for the jury to determine was whether the violence was administered with intent to influence the *1032prison guard’s conduct in relation to his duty.. Determination of this criminal intent was, as pointed out in my dissent to the original opinion, purely a question of fact, review of which is not within the jurisdiction of this court.
Nevertheless, the majority now deduce that the Legislature never intended that the type of conduct charged against appellant would be violative of the public intimidation statute.
This holding fails to 'take in account that it is not for us to say what act or acts were intended to be covered by the statute — for, its provisions being explicit, the enactment is not subject to judicial construction or interpretation.
The majority ruling is far reaching because it opens the door for this Court to construe legislative intent of statutes which are clear and unambiguous. The fact that a penal law must be strictly construed does not in anywise extend the right of the court to redefine the conduct proscribed by the statute. The determination and definition of acts which are punishable as crimes is purely a legislative function which cannot be delegated to, or exercised by the courts. State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So.2d 758.
I respectfully dissent.